beni (1871), Castelu [Borlak] (1870), Ciocârlia [Büyük Bülbül] (1879), Ciocârlia de Sus [Küçük Bülbül] (1872), Ciucurova [Çukurova] (1922), Cotu Vaii [Kırağı] (1880), Dulceşti [Küçük Tatlıca] (1891), Gradina (1860), Hagieni [Hacılar] (1856), Movilita [Musurat] 1870, Nisipari [Karatay] 1860, Poarta Alba [Akça Kapı] (1877), Valu lui Traian [Hasança] (1905).

Yukarıda bahsi geçen camilerin dışında var olan camiler ve bölgede günümüz sayımlarına göre yaşayan 70 – 80 bin Türk – Tatar Müslüman varlığı ile Romanya'daki Türk-İslâm varlığının son izleridir. Bu bağlamda bu yazıda tanıtmaya çalıştığımız ve Rumenler tarafından hazırlanmış olan Camiler kitabı, bu izlerin kaybolmasını önleme noktasında önemli bir çabadır. Rumen yayınevi tarafından başlatılmış olan bu çabanın, ülkemizden tarihçi, kültür adamları ve yayıncılarla desteklenerek teknik nedenlerden ötürü albümde kendine yer bulamamış diğer eserleri de fotoğraflamak, tarihi geçmişini araştırıp bilim dünyasının dikkatine sunmak ve bunları yayımlayarak bilgi dolaşımına sokmak kanımızca çok önemlidir. Ayrıca albümde yer almış Dobruca camilerinin çoğunun ve kendine yer bulamamış cami, mezarlık ve çeşme gibi kültürel mirasa dair yapıların neredeyse tamamının ciddi restorasyona ihtiyaçları olduğunu bildirmemiz gereklidir. Ülkemizde yurt dışındaki kültürel mirasımıza sahip çıkma noktasında ciddi çabalar gösteren TİKA, Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü ve Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı gibi kurumlarımızın Romanya'daki ecdat yadigarı eserlerimizle ivedi ve acil olarak ilgilenmelerinin ehemmiyetine dikkat çekmek isteriz.

Haşim Koç

Bruce P. Lenman (ed.),

Military Engineers and the Development of the Early-Modern European State,

Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2013, 362 pp., ISBN: 978-184-586-120-9

Recently, there has been an abundance of thematic compilations on a range of historical topics. International publishing houses encourage such projects for various reasons: (1) they make studies by many scholars accessible worldwidein

bir restorasyon ile kurtarılması mümkündür. Burada dostumuz kıymetli yazar Güner Akmola'yı Köstence'deki görevimiz sırasında bize göstermiş olduğu konukseverlikten ötürü şükranla anmadan geçemeyeceğim.

English and (2) they encapsulate a wealth of information on a specific history topic. On one side of the pendulum are well-edited books with articulated chapters offering new insights on a theme in world history; at the opposite side are books that haphazardly put together a number of chapters that vaguely agree with each other in terms of intent and content. The book at hand is a case in point of the latter. While several chapters are based on original research, others –particularly those on non-European history including mine– provide general information on the topic as required by the editor. Obviously, the target audience for this book is those readers familiar with European history. The introduction and conclusion written by the editor fail to knit these free-floating chapters together; rather, they read as two additional contributions to the book. This is one example of how one should not edit a book, although in itself it does not violate academic conventions. However, this book does violate academic conventions in a very particular way; it infringes upon the copyright of my chapter titled "Military Engineering in the Ottoman Empire" (pp. 179-201). This chapter includes many revisions and additions that suffer from inaccurate information and mistaken assumptions about Ottoman history -- all done without my knowledge or consent. I would like to offer a brief review of the book before dealing with my own chapter in detail.

This book compiles eleven chapters in three parts that tackle the question of military engineering and its contribution to the development of early-modern European state. The first part ("Military Engineers and the State in Early Modern Western and Central Europe") focuses on military engineering in the Low Countries, France, and several minor states such as Savoy, the German principalities, and Scotland in five chapters. The second part ("Military Engineers in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Eastern Frontiers of Europe") includes three chapters on Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia; these chapters summarize general approaches and views in the related literature rather than providing original findings. The last three chapters form the third part ("Beyond Europe: Military Engineers in the Early-Modern European Oceanic Empires"). They discuss the colonies in the Americas and India. Lenman, the editor, deals with military engineering in his introduction and conclusion. He nevertheless falls short of demonstrating the ways in which these chapters make sense together. Neither does he attempt to synthesize the views and statements of the contributors so as to underline the ultimate goal of the volume in his rather lengthy chapters.

All the contributors seem to agree on a number of points though: (1) military engineering was craft rather than science until the 18th century in terms of

education (by apprenticeship), practice (by tradition based on trial-and-error), and social standing. However, there was no linear progress in this development even afterward, as the field relied on the personal skills and efforts of certain individuals rather than institutional support lent by the state. (2) There was no clear separation between civil and military engineering until the establishment of relevant schools and departments. (3) Job definitions and career paths of military engineers were rather vague and hazardous. Their activities as artisans covered a wide range of fields, including cartography, land surveying, fortification, ship-building, and the construction of military plants.

In the first chapter by Erik Swart ("'Qualifications, knowledge and courage': Dutch Military Engineers, c.1550-1660"), we learn that Dutch engineers were employed at *trace italienne* fortification, surveying as well as hydraulic engineering. Whereas there was always a social prejudice against them as artisans, a new social category based on the knowledge of mathematics took shape with increasing professionalism. While Dutch engineers ran largely military projects, the French were also employed at several public works as well as royal gardens as laid forth by David Buisseret ("Military Engineers in France before Vauban (1500-1650)"). Focusing on the pre-Vauban era, he also observes that mathematics was crucial in the rising spirit of professionalism among engineers. Mastery in cartography and mathematics accounted for their employment in military and civil engineering projects alike including town planning, developing harbors, drainage, and canal digging. Christopher Storrs, ("Military Engineers, Maps and the Survival of the Savoyard State (1559-1798)") differs from the previous authors in the question of social status of military engineers and the importance of foreign experts. In the case of the Duchy of Savoy, foreigners were indispensable to the military engineering projectsmostly, fortification of the Alpine passages --until the establishment of engineering schools. Also, engineers were made part of the service nobility and thereby enjoyed popular respect. Thomas Wollschlager ("Military Engineers and the Development of the Princely State in Germany") agrees with Storrs on the role of foreign expertise. Prussia and several other German principalities had to rely on French and Dutch engineers until well into the eighteenth century. He also shifts the focus from French-Dutch borders to the Ottoman-Habsburg frontiers where Daniel Speckling (1536-89), the father of military engineering in the German lands, spent many years. The debate about the relative advantages of French and German styles of fortification shows us that military engineering was not all about warfare and technology but also part of intellectual history. A clear sign of the lack of linear progress is the deterioration of the corps of military engineers in

Prussia after the imprisonment of Gerhard Cornelius Walrave (1692-1773) who actually created the corps. In the last chapter of the first part, Carolyn J. Anderson ("Cartography and Conflict: the Board of Ordnance and the Construction of the Military Landscape of Scotland, 1689-1815") focuses on the importance of (road) maps and (fortification) plans in political territorialism pursued by Britain in Scotland. Obviously, military engineering gave political leverage to the Crown in the definition of national space in this case.

The second part opens with Ruth Gertwagen's contribution ("Fiscal and Technical Limitations on Venetian Military Engineering in the *Stato da Mar* in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries") that juxtaposes the Venetian strategy of defense in the *Stato da Mar* (maritime and overseas possessions) with that in the mainland dominions. The Venetians neglected the fortifications in the Mediterranean and invested heavily in those on the mainland (i.e., Padua and Verona). For Gertwagen, this was imposed by geopolitical factors. It was impossible to maintain simultaneously the fleet and fortifications against the Ottomans in an overextended maritime empire. In the intense rivalry with the Ottomans (and the Genoese in its early history), Venice suffered from backward artillery until the fifteenth century. Port construction and fortification came in response to the Ottoman aggression because artificial ports increased the defensive capacity of a town against the Ottomans who were expert besiegers. Nevertheless, there were many limitations in this endeavor: lack of a hydraulic cement (pozzolana) in the construction of a mole necessitated constant repairing. The fact that the Venetians did not know about pozzolana until mid-eighteenth century makes one raise eyebrows especially when we know that the main source of pozzolana was Livorno/Tuscany. Another limitation was due to the decline in marine engineering skills since the early Byzantine period. The Venetians, for instance, did not realize that circulation gaps created by the builders of the Muslim mole let the sea currents in the closed anchorage zone and prevented silting. When they closed them in Candia (Crete), silting became an unceasing problem. Thus, they grew skillful in the construction of digging/dredging machines. The second article of this part, my chapter on military engineering in the Ottoman Empire, is a general treatment of different fields of activity ranging from ship-building to fortifications and military industrial plants until the 1800s. I put the emphasis on geopolitical factors (the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin) in analyzing the successes and failures of Ottoman military engineers. Brian Davies ("Military Engineers and the Rise of Imperial Russia") traces the transition from craft to science back in pre-Petrine period of late seventeenth century. Large-scale military construction

in the southern and western frontiers was based on standardized fortress plans. Some prefabricated construction materials were used in fortress construction as well as in *guliai-gorod* (wagenburg/*tabur cengi* in Ottoman context). Nevertheless, at this time Russia suffered from limited knowledge of Western mathematics and geometry. Russian engineers were inferior in ballistics and cartography to their Western counterparts. They did not know Indo-Arab numeral notation until the 1680s either; this handicapped them in precise mathematical calculations. Also, there was no Russian equivalent of Ottoman *lağımcı*s (miners and sappers) until the 1650s. Peter the Great invested heavily in engineering by recruiting foreign engineering officers, sponsoring translation projects, and opening military academies. James Daniel Bruce –son of a Scottish expert in Moscow- was the true father of Russian scientific military engineering. Encouraged by Peter, he studied under Newton and Halley in London for a time. Among his achievements are the standardization of artillery, advancement of siegecraft, and translations of the most popular engineering works into Russian.

The third part is reserved for European overseas colonies. Bruce P. Lenman, ("Amphibious Engineers and the Margins of Seaborne Empires") observes that navigational and military engineering were inevitably intertwined in the British case. British military engineers were preoccupied with fortifying ports and harbors despite the prohibitive cost. One is appalled by the fact the Crown did not provide royal navy captains with official charts. They had to be sought for and bought from a commercial market even in the early nineteenth century. That demonstrates the lack of a well-defined policy towards professionalism in military engineering. Emilie d'Orgeix ("French Military Engineers in the American Colonies, 1635-1776") and David Buisseret ("The Civilian Contribution of the Spanish Royal Engineers, 1500-1800") shift the focus to Americas. The tendency to use engineers in both military and civilian projects was stronger in the Americas due to the shortage in experts in the colonies. They were competent enough to be employed at town planning, construction of churches and hospitals, road construction, and land surveying.

It is truly a disappointment to realize that my chapter is not the text I submitted three years ago. Chapter 7 in the book includes much new information, fresh footnotes, and misguided ideas. Moreover, it omits some of my arguments and partly distorts my views. Most of the interventions go beyond the usual copy editing work and they were done without my permission. The editor Bruce Lenman never consulted with me about the suggested revisions despite the early promises he had made. I have never received the reviewer's report although I

regularly urged the editor via e-mail to receive them. I had made it very clear that I would like to revise my chapter before the proof reading, as I had to submit it hastily to meet the submission deadline. I was the last to join the project and the submission date was already quite close. The editor has agreed to that and I permitted him to undertake some stylistic modifications. I was never asked to do the proof reading. Assumingly, Lenman simply inserted all the comments coming from the reviewer –or his own ideas- into my text without my approval. Some paragraphs are completely overhauled and rewritten without my consent. Lenman obviously wanted to enrich the text by expanding and extrapolating on what I said, but the final output misrepresents my views on several occasions. Had the editor forwarded to me the reviewer's report and his own comments, I would have certainly checked the suggested studies to see in which ways they could provide me with new insights and I would have done the revisions accordingly. As soon as I saw the printed version of my article, I sent via e-mail a letter of complaint to Lenman and invited him to publicly accept his responsibility for this unethical behavior on November 15, 2013. I have forwarded this letter to the representative of Dundee University Press (which went out of business) on December 11, 2013. I have not heard from them up to now.

As it stands, this chapter is simply co-authored. All the responsibility for the material/factual errors involved in the revised parts of my chapter solely lies with this mysterious co-author. Those who like to read the original text should visit https://sehir.academia.edu/KahramanSakul. What follows is a list of the unapproved interventions and additions that one comes across in the chapter:

p. 181:

> "Such engagements *strained to destruction the system for* the transportation of weapons and ammunitions to war zones (in time) from the production plants scattered all over the empire."

This sentence is an unwelcome addition and grammatically wrong. Compare the italicized phrase with the original phrase (such engagements *hindered* the transportation…).

> "This was a sophisticated Islamic state in Anatolia which the Ottomans only finally absorbed partly due to their superior use of firearms, in 1487"

This sentence was added to the text to define the Karamanid emirate without my prior knowledge. I do not consider the Karamanids neither as a state –'Islamic' or not- nor as a sophisticated polity.

p. 182:

> "This was particularly true in warfare on the Mediterranean littoral or on islands, where Ottoman shipping could bring in metal and other materials for a foundry at a period when mobile foundries were not commonly in use in most of Europe. Warfare in difficult terrain far from the sea was a different story. The cannons cast by the Ottomans were much the same as those cast by other European powers, but it was a truism that very heavy artillery could be more of a drawback than an asset, adding little or nothing to battle firepower.

The Ottoman armies were always accompanied by large contingents of allied light cavalry used for skirmishing and intelligence work. For the Janissaries, the sultan's regular infantry, and his timariot cavalry, funded from land grants, the first priority was always flexibility to exploit the opportunities identified or created by this surrounding cloud of horse. For a specific siege deep inland it might be possible to use a large navigable river the way the Ottomans used the Aegean Sea or the Danube.

> "During the 1638 siege of Baghdad, for example, 50-pound cannon and 70-pound pieces were cast at Birecik on the Upper Euphrates and then rafted down the river to the theatre of operations around Baghdad. Usually and sensibly, Ottoman armies operated with much lighter gunpowder weapons produced in a central state arsenal."

This is an extreme case of unapproved intervention. The whole text is an addition and footnoted as "Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (London, 1999), 109". I made no discussion about the relative advantages of besieging a coastal town at all. I definitely disagree with the suggested motivations of the Janissaries and the timariots in the text above.

p. 183:

> "The logical conclusion of this argument was that the Ottoman Empire remained technologically a backward military power throughout the early-modern era, surviving through the use of 'overwhelming' numbers (Which was more often an excuse used by the defeated opponents than a reality) and an increasingly inadequate, sclerotic, technology transfer system."

These statements do not belong to me. Due to the omissions of particular sentences in the original text, this excerpt misrepresents my argument. I am not arguing for an Ottoman technological backwardness throughout centuries, but suggesting that the Ottomans experienced several setbacks and temporarily lagged behind from time to time. I have directed the reader in fn. 17 to fn. 22 for more information on this debate. The latter footnote number should have been corrected as fn. 24 because of the new footnotes added to the text without my consent.

p.184:

> "Other Europeans learned from them in this area. An example is Pedro Navarro, a Spanish engineer in Venetian service, who studied Turkish siege mining methods to turn them against the Ottoman garrison that had seized the fortress of San Giorgio in the Venetian island of Cephalonia in the Ionian Islands in 1500. He did it by sapping and blowing up bastion defences rather than breaching them with a massive bombardment. Navarro subsequently joined the Spanish forces fighting the French in the south of Italy, where his success with a huge mine he drove under walls of the Castello Nuovo outside Naples in 1503 forced other military engineers greatly to elaborate ditch defences around artillery forts."

This is added to the text presumably because the editor wanted to enrich the content. It is supported by a new footnote (fn. 19) that cites a study that I am unaware of.

p. 185:

In fn. 23, I excuse myself on not consulting Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) by stating that it was only recently released. The sheer existence of this footnote proves that the editor denied me the chance to revise my text in the three years that passed after the submission.

p. 187:

> "As Imperial Architect to three Ottoman sultans, Sinan's achievement has been justly compared with that of his contemporary Michelangelo. The latter, like Leonardo da Vinci, was well known to the Sublime Porte, which invited both men to submit designs for a bridge over the Golden Horn. Sinan touched the very heights of classical Ottoman architecture in the second half of his long life. He ranks as one of the very greatest of European architects. Disciples disseminated his approach and styles throughout the empire during his term of office."

The co-author dwells on to a comparison of Sinan with great artists of the Italian Renaissance. Nevertheless, no new source to support this view was put in the footnotes! Besides, the planned canal between Jiddah to Mecca is mistaken to be an "aqueduct" in the revision.

p. 189:

A good example to the misassumptions of the co-author is his description of Hungary as a "vast plain" –statement that does not exist in the original text. Historians of Hungary are opposed to such misrepresentations of the country as an undifferentiated mass of land.

p. 191:

> "As was the case in some other European polities, the Ottomans did not draw a sharp line between naval and military engineering. The educated elite of the Janissaries was expected to be versatile."

This sentence does not exist in the original text. Nowhere in the text have I implied that all the military engineers were the members of the Janissary corps. New information is inserted in the part where I discuss the transition from galleys to galleons in the Ottoman navy with reference to "Colin Thubron, *The Venetians* (Amsterdam, 1980), 94" in fn. 48. Furthermore, the co-author expresses his/her own views at the expense of mine. Compare the co-author's intervention:

> "In fact the Ottomans, despite the expense of oar-powered galleys, probably made the right decision until the end of the seventeenth century because their campaigns often involved amphibious operations, for which galleys were ideal"

with my omitted sentence:

> "The transition to galleon in the Mediterranean, however, did not imply technological innovation, but was the outcome of the sharp increase in the volume of merchandise."

p. 192:

Compare the omitted part shown in italics in my contribution:

> "Thus, not only the Ottomans but also Spain and France kept their galley fleets in service even "after the armed merchant vessels of the Atlantic powers operating in the Mediterranean *rendered the galleys worthless as warships*"

with his/her addition

> "…operating in the Mediterranean *made galleys poor corsair ships because corsairs, being independent businessmen, could not afford to wait for calms that would enable them to manoeuvre to avoid broadside fire*."

My "huge collisions were less decisive on the sea as proved in Prevesa (1538) and Lepanto" is replaced with "Major fleet actions such as Prevesa (1538) and Lepanto were rare."

p. 193:

Compare the addition below with the original statement that follows:

> "The Ottoman state had first entered history in a relatively small area of north-east Anatolia and had then moved over the Sea of Marmora to become the heir of Byzantium and a European power with probably more Christians than Muslim subjects. Explosive expansion in the Balkans, Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa then left a heritage of endless two-front conflicts and long wars which stretched te state's weapon procurement capacity to breaking."

> "In the lack of a battle-winning weapon, the party with more guns (or warships for that matter) had the advantage over its rivals. This, however, inevitably affected the quality of the Ottoman weapons. Double-front engagements and long wars seem to have forced the Ottomans to compromise the quality."

First of all the Ottoman expansion was not 'explosive' but 'gradual', extending well over 200 years. Second of all, I do not argue for 'a heritage of endless two-front conflicts' but rather link low-quality weapons to some double-front 'engagements.' My statement about battle-winning weapons is completely omitted.

p. 194:

My sentence "Rochefort offered to *establish a corps* of military technicians for the Ottoman army *along the European fashion and undertake the instruction of the army officers in modern military methods"* turned into "Rochefort offered to *supply a group* of military technicians for the Ottoman army, *charged with instructing it in the latest Western European military methods*" with considerable distortion in the meaning (italics are mine).

The co-author assumes that the Ottomans declared war on the Habsburgs to recapture Belgrade, whereas war broke out by the Habsburg declaration of war.

Compare the added phrase shown in italics with the original one shown in the brackets:

> "The Sublime Porte fought reasonably well against the Habsburgs and the Russians at the same time *to recapture Belgrade in 1739*" […and succeeded to recapture Belgrade in 1739].

p. 197:

I define the ulama as "*men of learning in science and religion*" on page 194, but the co-author redefined it as "a body of Islamic jurists common to all Islamic countries but exceptionally influential in the Ottoman Empire," continuing to freely expose his ideas about them:

> "As they were the equivalent of university graduates and believed that a Muslim should ideally have a broad general education, it was unsurprising that the sultan expected some of these often very bright men to learn and teach technical subjects"

p. 198:

The concluding paragraphs are completely overhauled and reworked so as to distort my views, containing many inaccuracies and passing value-judgments. My contention that the eighteenth-century reforms were evolutionary and that they transformed the configuration of the empire in the long run is replaced with an unfootnoted paragraph. I show errors in bold in the brackets:

> "The 1730 rebellion that ended the so-called "Tulip Period" of extraordinary cultural innovations under Ahmed III though led by a janissary, Patrona Halil, **[he was not a Janissary]** had likewise shown no active hostility to the modernisation **[value-judgment]** of military education. The problem lay in securing sustained support from the increasingly distracted central government of an over-extended monarchy. Ottoman reforms were often intermittent, as in the case of the military engineering school established by Count Bonneval in 1734, which had to be reopened as part of a new wave of reform by Sultan Abdulhamid I after a war with Russia ended in a disastrous peace in 1774."

Although, I assert that these evolutionary reforms "*eventually resulted in the emergence of a national Muslim army in the reign of Mahmud II*", the co-author crosses out my conclusion and instead accentuates his/her own concluding remarks that contain many factual errors shown in italics:

> "The shift from voluntary recruitment to *obligatory conscription in the New Order army established in 1829* created a critical mass of Muslim, Turkish soldiers in the reign of Mahmud II, yet the Ottoman state, like that of the Austrian Habsburg or the Russian Romanovs, was still a multinational conglomerate monarchy, and *its core identity to the very end was loyalty to the centre in the name of Islam*. In the early-modern period it drew in foreign military engineers, developed and *educated its own, mostly* [p. 199] *from the janissary ranks*, and used them in highly flexible innovative ways by no means exclusively for military purposes, much as other European powers did."

The *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order) army was founded in 1792/3. No obligatory conscription was enforced on Ottoman subjects in this army. The co-author seems to mean the *Asakir-i Mansure* army of Mahmud II, which was established in 1826. Besides, it is out of question that the Ottoman Empire sought 'loyalty to the centre in the name of Islam' from all subjects at all times. Finally, I have never suggested that most of the Ottoman military engineers came from the ranks of the Janissaries. It is pretty obvious that the views of the co-author in these misguided insertions run parallel to those of the editor, Bruce Lenman, revealed in the introduction and conclusion chapters. These views include the lack of clarity in military and non-military tasks of the engineers and cosmopolitan nature of early-modern empires. Seemingly, the editor wanted to underline these points in my chapter so that it would fit neatly in the compilation. Nevertheless, he took the wrong path of revising and modifying the text without consulting with the author. The final output is a co-authored text that contains factual errors, distorts my views, and omits my arguments. I, as the author of chapter 7 of this book, hereby state that the sole responsibility for the afore-mentioned unauthorized changes and additions inserted into my article, lies with Bruce Lenman, the editor of the book.

Kahraman Şakul

Nalan Turna,

Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri: Mürûr Tezkereleri,

İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınevi, 2013, 256 s., ISBN 978-975-256-396-4

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun on dokuzuncu yüzyılda yaşadığı dönüşüm, günümüz tarih yazımının en çok ilgi gösterdiği konular arasında yer almaktadır. Söz konusu ilgi, revizyonist ya da yenilikçi olarak adlandırılabilecek ve devletin