His Bailo’s Kapudan: Conversion, Tangled Loyalties and Hasan Veneziano Between Istanbul and Venice (1588-1591)

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Balyosunun Kapudanı: İhtida, Çetrefilli Sadakatlar ve İstanbul ile Venedik Arasında Uluc Hasan Paşa (1588-1591)


Anahtar Kelimeler: İhtida, mühtedi, kimlik, uyruk, aidiyet, dinler-ötesi diplomasi, gizli diplomasi, Kapudan-ı Derya, bailo, Osmanlı – Venedik ilişkileri, Habsburglar.

Introduction

Even though the Ottoman attitude towards them fluctuated over time, renegades remained the dominant group in the Ottoman administration and military

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throughout the sixteenth century. These renegades without local roots were expected to be utterly loyal to the Sultan to whose household they belonged. Mehmed II’s policy of centralization entrusted these *kuls*\(^1\) of the Sultan with the most important state offices. While most of these kuls were collected from the Sultan’s domain through a system called *devşirme* (child levy), there were other means for renegades to join the Ottoman ranks. In addition to sporadic instances of voluntary conversions, a good number of them were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire through the Ottoman navy. Thanks to the rise of the privateering on the one hand and the intensification of the imperial rivalry between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs on the other, several entrepreneurial corsairs found employment in the Ottoman Empire. While some of these corsairs were Muslim-born, most were renegades, usually coming from the Western Mediterranean.

Earlier experimentation in fifteenth-century Italy proved the usefulness of resident ambassadors, a practice which, hand in hand with the emergence of centralized bureaucratic apparatuses, spread throughout Europe in the early 16\(^{th}\) century.\(^2\) Meanwhile, Istanbul gradually became a center of diplomacy as one after another Christian states started to send resident diplomats. Cross-confessional diplomatic negotiations\(^3\) usually took place between the mostly renegade Ottoman grandees and the European diplomats, two groups that shared a common Christian background. As the *devşirme* officers were Orthodox and of Balkan origin, the effects of this common religious background with Catholic diplomats may have remained rather limited. However, the Ottomans also employed renegades with Catholic and Western Mediterranean backgrounds, especially among

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1 This word has a triple meaning. It could mean a slave, a servant or more broadly, the people of the Sultan. İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Administration, 1550-1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 41.


the palace dragomans (*Divan-ı Hümayun tercümanı*) and the members of the Ottoman navy.

This article concentrates on the relationship between a high-level Ottoman official with such a background and the European diplomats of Western Mediterranean origin. It seeks to analyze how their shared background shaped diplomatic negotiations as well as their personal relationship. The relationship between the Ottoman Grand Admiral Uluc Hasan Pasha (a.k.a. *Hasan Veneziano*) and his compatriots, the Venetian baili, will enhance our understanding of the basic dynamics of cross-confessional diplomacy in late sixteenth-century Istanbul. Furthermore, due to the dearth of documentation such an exceptional relationship between a renegade Ottoman official and European diplomats has rarely been subject to careful scrutiny, especially for such an early period. Thanks to the detailed correspondence that the baili left behind for us\(^4\) and the supplementary documentation from other European archives, we are now in a position to shed light on an Ottoman renegade’s tangled loyalties and inner conflicts, an unusual luxury for those studying the diplomatic and cultural history of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

In the first part of what follows, we will discuss the political nature of the relationship between the baili and Hasan.\(^5\) To what extent did the two sides co- 

\(^4\) Venetian diplomatic mission was the longest-serving one in the Ottoman capital and the baili were expert diplomatic negotiators and keen observers of political and military developments in Istanbul. Eric R. Dursteler, “The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16/2 (2001): 1-30. For two reasons the baili had to be in contact with the Ottoman grand admirals continuously. First of all, early modern diplomats had intelligence duties as well. The chief information gathering objective of the diplomatic representative of a naval power such as Venice was to learn the military preparations in the Arsenal who fell under the purview of the Grand Admiral. Moreover, one of the baili’s major diplomatic responsibilities was to ensure the Ottoman cooperation in punishing or at least restraining the unruly corsairs who, based in Ottoman port cities along the Aegean, Morean and Adriatic coasts, was attacking Venetian ships in contravention to the capitulations, the *abdnāmes*. Because of these two reasons, Ottoman grand admirals are the most frequently mentioned Ottoman officials after grand viziers in the bailate correspondence with Venice, the *disacci*.

\(^5\) The relationship between the Venetian baili and Hasan started earlier when the latter was Grand Admiral Uluc Ali’s majordomo. A grandee’s majordomo was an important diplomatic figure because he functioned as an intermediary between his master and the European diplomats. However, in this essay we will rather focus on the years between 1588, the year when Hasan became the Grand Admiral, and 1591, the year when his career ended with an abrupt death. Hasan’s early dealings with the baili as part of Uluc Ali’s household cannot be taken to represent Hasan’s own political agency as he was representing his master.
operate? What type of favors did they expect from and do for each other? What were the practical and material considerations at play behind their cooperation? How did their contemporaries see this close cooperation between two Venetians? What kind of methods did the latter employ in order to ward off accusations of betrayal and double game?

After delineating the particularities of this relationship, in Part II, we will analyze the mental framework of an Ottoman renegade while negotiating with his compatriots and facing a past that he had to forego years ago. First, we will demonstrate how he vacillated between the Serenissima and the Ottoman Empire, his past and present, his patria and his new home. By concentrating on Hasan’s expressions and words of affection that betray his attachment to his natal land, we will try to scrutinize his tangled loyalties and conflicted trans-imperial identity. We will also discuss whether we can take these expressions, mentioned in a non-ego document, as genuine and thus whether they could reveal Hasan’s inner conflicts arising from an identity tension. Then, we will compare and contrast the negotiations between Hasan and the baili with three similar cases of cross-confessional diplomacy: 1) a round of negotiations throughout the 1560s and 1570s between Uluc Ali (né Giovanni Dionigi Galeni) and a number of Habsburg go-betweens, 2) negotiations between Grand Admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha (né Scipione Cicala) and his brother Carlo Cicala who was a Habsburg spy, 3) negotiations for surrender between Charles V and the Governor-General of Algeria, the Sardinian renegade Hasan Agha, during the Habsburg siege of Algiers in 1541. The difference in the rhetoric employed by the Habsburgs and the Venetians in these negotiations will highlight their divergent views on the issue of subjecthood as well as their relationship vis-à-vis their renegade subjects in Ottoman service.

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6 The term, coined by Natalie Rothman, is an extremely useful one because it qualifies a simplistic understanding of cultural intermediaries. Trans-imperial subjects did not only forge ties across linguistic, religious and political boundaries and straddle them. They also consolidated the same boundaries they purported to mediate by articulating differences in specific institutional sites where these boundaries were constantly negotiated. With a careful combination of alterity and familiarity, trans-imperial subjects strategically positioned themselves between identities (local and foreign) and thus highlighted their indispensability as intermediaries; in Rothman’s words, they “regularly mobilized their roots ‘elsewhere’ to foreground specific knowledge, privileges, or commitments to further their current interests.” E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 11, also see Part Three.
PART I:
A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP

Although not as famous as his master Uluc Ali, Uluc Hasan Pasha, or Hasan Veneziano as he was known by the Europeans, was a key figure in the Ottoman maritime establishment throughout the 1580s. Thanks to a detailed study by Antonio Fabris,7 we have some information regarding his early life: He was born in 1544 as Andrea Celeste and the members of the Celeste family belonged to the *citadini*, the citizens of the Most Serene Republic.8 At the age of 16, he was enrolled as a scrivener (scrivanello) in a Ragusan ship named *Fabiana* and then captured in 1563 by Turgud Reis, the most famous corsair of his time and then the Governor-General of Ottoman Tripolitania.9 Hasan soon converted to Islam, following the footsteps of several other Christian captives who were lured by a combination of disillusionment with captivity and desire for enrichment. When his captor Turgud died during the siege of Malta (1565), another corsair on the rise, the Calabrian renegade Uluc Ali, became his new master. Hasan quickly gained Ali’s favor and became his majordomo (*kahya*), managing his vast household full of renegades like himself. When his master quickly furthered his career (Governor-General of Tripolitania (o. 1565-1568), Governor-General of Algeria (1568-1572) and Grand Admiral (1572-1587)), Hasan reaped the fruits of being close to power. Following the tradition of the time,10 he left his master’s household in 1577 as the Governor of Salonica. Then he established himself as a major figure in Ottoman North Africa when he was appointed, a few months


8 The class of *citadini* constituted a hereditary elite with special economic, social, and bureaucratic privileges that opened for them careers in lower rank government offices. Unlike the aristocratic *patrici*, they did not have political rights; however, they played an important role in bureaucracy, charitable institutions, and commerce. They could be considered as mediators between the patrici and the rest of the population, the *popolo*.


10 Following the example of the sultanic household, members of the Ottoman grandee households, too, left their masters for independent careers. For sure these members established a patron-client relationship (*intisab*) and acted in alliance with their former masters; but this does not rule out the possibility that in time they could become rivals.
later, as the Governor-General of Algeria (o. 1577-1580, 1582-1585), and then of Tripolitania (1585-1587), and Tunisia (1587-8). He gained so much political power and military prestige that at one point he openly defied his old master and became a serious contender for the leadership of the Mediterranean faction, as I discussed elsewhere.

Recent studies prove that converts did not sever ties with their past. They retained their familial relations, as well as their regional identities, continued using their mother tongues, kept traces of their former

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11 For his appointment as the Governor-General of Algeria, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Mühibbem Defterleri XXX, no. 432 (H. 5 Rebiüllevec 985, A.D. 23 May 1577). No. 489 stipulates that he was formerly the governor of Salonica.


15 Bennassar argues that conversion does not efface regional solidarity which was more important than religious solidarity. Les chrétiens d'Allah, 387, 394. Also see p. 395 for the Ferrarese clan in Tunis in the 1630s and 1640s. Maartje van Gelder has shown that the Dutch corsairs in Algiers preferred to sail with their compatriots. “The Republic’s Renegades: Dutch Converts to Islam in Seventeenth-Century Diplomatic Relations with North Africa,” Journal of Early Modern History 19/2-3 (2015): 175-198; here 187.

faith, and even hung on to their clothing habits. Moreover, they built alliances and established political networks based on common geographical, ethnic and linguistic origins. Mehmet Kunt’s paradigmatic argument holds, for instance, that there existed an ethnic/regional (cins) solidarity among the devşirme recruits in the seventeenth-century and that this solidarity shaped the factional rivalries in the Ottoman administration. Relations of clientelism along the cins solidarity created two factions vying for power: one consisted of westerners (Albanians and Bosnians) and the other of easterners (Abkhaz, Circassians, Georgians).

A similar factional network can be observed among the Venetian renegades in key political, military and diplomatic positions in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the 1580s and 1590s. Here I would like to propose a new approach to the study of Ottoman political networks by including European diplomats within the larger framework of factional rivalries. These European diplomats had to curry favors, establish political alliances and influence the Ottoman decision-making process through bribes, information manipulation, and persuasion. They thus became active players of high politics in the early modern Ottoman Empire.

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17 Several renegades contacted the Christian monarchs and indicated their desire to return to Christianity. AGS is full with documents testifying to their genuine regret. Moreover, we know of a convert who was planning to introduce the religion he had abandoned to the Ottoman Sultan. Friedrich Seidel, Sultanun Zindanında: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na Gönderilen Bir Elçilik Heyetinin İhret Verici Öyküsü (1591-1596), trans. Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2010), 70. Finally, Bennassar relates the story of the two corsairs who sealed a Muslim marriage by swearing on the Bible, Bennassar, Les chrétiens d’Allah, 417.

18 Kunt, “Ethnic-Regional,” 236. The clothing was of utmost importance for the construction of identity and religious conversion was closely intertwined with a ritualized changing of clothes. A person who became Muslim, for instance, “took the turban,” i.e. donned the Muslim headgear.

19 Kunt, “Ethnic-Regional.”

20 Members of this network were Chief White Eunuch Gazanfer Agha, Hasan Veneziano, Ömer Agha (a eunuch in the palace, born in Zara), Beatrice Michiel (Gazanfer’s sister), Gazanfer’s protégée and Beatrice’s husband Ali Agha (janissary agha for a few months) and finally, the Venetian baili.

21 I have elsewhere argued that foreign diplomats participated in factional politics and influenced the Ottoman policy, domestic and foreign, thanks to their political connections with the Ottoman grandees. Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Mediating Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-Betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 1560-1600,” Journal of Early Modern History 19 (2015): 107-128.
How did two Venetians, one a patrician on official duty, the other an apostate of lower origin, negotiate across political and religious boundaries? What kind of a role did their common patriotic, cultural, religious, and linguistic background play? How did Hasan situate himself between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and make use of his trans-imperial identity? How did he deal with his tangled loyalties? How did he remember his former life?

First, we should state that Hasan’s Venetian background did not automatically entail the bailo’s sympathy. After all, he was a corsair and an aggressive one at that; through the 1580s, his razzie brought him so much money and fame that he was able to challenge his former patron Uluc Ali as the leader of the Mediterranean faction. Moreover, his Venetianness did not seem to have stopped him from capturing Venetian goods and ships and enslaving the Serenissima’s subjects. This was the reason why bailo Lorenzo Bernardo did his best to prevent his appointment to the Grand Admiralty. Uluc Ali’s successor Ibrahim Pasha was an Enderun-educated devşirme who owed his position to his connections rather than his naval skills; therefore, he was definitely less dangerous than Hasan who spent several years in engaging in privateering in the Western Mediterranean. The appointment of a corsair to the Grand Admiralty could be taken as a portent of a bellicose policy in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in order to fight off the Christian corsairs, the Ottomans were entertaining the idea of establishing a separate admiralty of Morea under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Rumelia. Venice who considered the Adriatic as her own sea, a mare clausum, saw in this project an encroachment of her rights and the bailo did everything to prevent the establishment of this office, and in case it was established, to impede the appointment of Hasan to this post. They succeeded partially; even though Hasan was appointed to the Grand Admiralty, he was not given the post in Morea.

Hasan knew that Bernardo lobbied against his appointment. However, in spite of this bad start, he quickly established close relations with the latter’s suc-

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22 In 1587, when he captured Venetian ships, the bailo complained to Hasan’s superior at the time, the Grand Admiral Uluc Ali. Archivo di Stato di Venezia [hereafter ASV], Senato Deliberazioni Costantinopoli [hereafter SDelC], reg. 7, cc. 62v (18 April 1587), 79r-80v (19 September 1587).
23 Maria Pia Pedani, Dalla frontiera al confine (Venezia: Herder Editrice, 2002), 73-5. In the early 1400s, Captain-General Carlo Zeno labeled it as chaxa nostra.
24 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, cc. 77v-78rv (12 September 1587), 102r-102v (11 May 1588), 113r (5 July 1588).
25 ASV, Senato Dispacci Costantinopoli [hereafter SDC], fil. 28, c. 432v (27 January 1588, m.v.).
cessors. Cooperation fitted the interests of both sides. The baili ingratiated Hasan with presents and money, acquiesced to his demands for small favors and acted on his behalf in front of the Venetian authorities. Hasan, on the other hand, returned the favor by keeping his corsairs under control, leaking state secrets and protecting Venetian interests in the Ottoman capital. Now let us get into more details.

Most of the Ottoman grandees had extensive financial and trade connections throughout the Mediterranean and their agents conducted business on their behalf. Thus, they often asked the intervention of the Venetian baili in solving their trade-related problems or granting them privileges. Hasan had an agent named Cristoforo Bertolotti in Venice. He asked the Venetian authorities to allow Cristoforo to export silk clothes without paying the necessary custom dues. Bailo Giovanni Moro was at first hesitant as he did not want to set up a precedent that could be turned into a regular concession in the future (“per non introdurre questo mal esempio di lassar estrazer robba con pregiudizio deli dattii.”) 26 However, such requests were granted to other grand admirals before, and in the end, the Venetians accepted Hasan’s request. Bertolotti arrived in Venice with a letter of exchange for 1131 zecchini, issued by the bailo himself. 27 He bought 100 silk clothes 28 for Hasan without paying the customs dues worth 94 ducats. 29 A small favor, perhaps, but clearly a gesture of good will.

Recent studies show us that converts kept their ties with their families. Within the Ottoman context, we know that some of the renegade Ottoman grandees called their relatives to their side and tried to strengthen their household by incorporating them into Ottoman politics. To this end, they offered them government positions, arranged marriages for them and granted other favors. 30 For those whom they left behind, however, all they could do was to use their political power in Istanbul to secure the goodwill of their former rulers.

26 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, cc. 463v-464r (11 February 1588).
27 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c. 454r (5 August 1589); fil. 31, cc. 227v-228r; SDelC, reg. 7, c. 140r (14 January 1588, m.v.), 145v (26 January 1588, m.v.), 153r (24 March 1589).
28 See the list of these clothes in ASV, SDC, fil. 31, 232r (9 June 1590). Apparently there was an error with the shipment and three items were left behind. The Venetian authorities took great interest in assuring Hasan that these would be sent as soon as possible. ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, cc. 163r-164v (24 June 1589).
29 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, c. 162v (9 June 1589).
30 The most famous examples are Makbul Ibrahim Pasha, Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha and Gazanfer Agha who all brought their relatives to Istanbul. Hasan also called his cousin Livio Celeste to his side and used him as a spy. Fabris, “Hasan ‘il Veneziano,” 60-1.
Hasan had a sister named Camilla in Venice. The two were not on good terms as she got married without his brother’s consent. The fact that Hasan was offended by his sister’s disobedience is a clear proof that in spite of his “civil death” as a result of his apostasy, he still considered himself a *pater familias*. It was this perceived role that must have made him ask the bailo to intervene so that the Serenissima would provide her with a house. The Senate accepted his request and decided to give Camilla 100 zecchini per annum to help her pay the rent of her current house until a new house could be arranged for her. The Venetians made this payment until the relations between Hasan and Venice soured in the autumn of 1590. When the rationale behind the assignment of this pension which was already increased to 200 ducats was not relevant anymore (“*essendo cessata la causa per la quale gli fu assignata il detto danaro*”), the Venetian Senate stopped the payment. Still, Hasan continued asking for favors for his relatives. In 1591, his brother-in-law came to Istanbul and sought Hasan’s assistance in securing several concessions from the Venetian Senate. Hasan turned down most of his requests which were as much impractical as insolent (he wanted to be inducted into the nobility, for instance). He merely asked for a bakery license in S. Aponal for his sister and recommended his brother-in-law for a secretary post in the Senate. If the latter was not granted, the Senate could perhaps give him a pension.

31 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, c. 432r (27 January 1588, m.v.).


33 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 31, cc. 25r-25v, 33r (3 March 1590); fil. 31, cc. 49r (17 March 1590); *SDelC*, reg. 7, cc.183r-183v (20 January 1589, m.v.). This amount is in the same range with the amount asked from the Signoria by another relative of an important Venetian Ottoman renegade. Francesca Michiel, the mother of Chief White Eunuch Gazanfer Agha and the Head of the Privy Chamber (*Hasoda Bashi*) Cafer Agha, asked for an office with a monthly income of ten ducats. ASV, *SDelC*, reg. 6, cc. 164v-165r (29 December 1584). The register mistakenly names Cafer, who died in 1582, instead of Gazanfer.

34 ASV, *SDelC*, reg. 8, c. 85r (19 September 1592).

It was not only his relatives on whose behalf Hasan contacted the Venetian authorities. He also asked the bailo to intervene for the lifting of a childhood friend’s banishment. His friend, a priest, had fired an arquebus in the city and even though he did not injure anybody, the punishment for carrying and using weapons in Venice was banishment. Apparently, years ago Hasan had made a similar demand to Venetian ambassador Jacobo Soranzo for his banished cousin, Livio Celeste. Soranzo had then agreed to intercede for a *salvocondotto*; yet, this time, Giovanni Moro refused the offer. The punishment for crimes such as these was very strict, he stated. Also, it was not easy to influence the verdict as it was impossible to influence the judges who voted according to their conscience. He also reminded Hasan that several well-born men (*diverse persone di qualità*), including a patrician from the Pesaro family, were sent to gallows, the *forca*, for a similar transgression, even though they did not hurt anybody.36

Ironically, Hasan’s galleys, too, fell prey to the corsairs. On at least one occasion, when the Knights of St. John captured one of his galleys laden with goods, he asked the bailo to intervene.37 The Venetians genuinely tried; but as they had no leverage on the Maltese knights, they failed to secure the restitution of the ship and the goods. Still, it is worth noting that they decided to pay Hasan 1000 zecchini in order to placate him.38 This decision should be considered within the framework of Venetian claims on the Adriatic Sea which obliged the Venetian authorities to recompense an influential Ottoman official who lost a ship in the waters that they considered in their own jurisdiction.

Hasan returned these favors by helping the baili in many respects. Even though grand admirals with corsair backgrounds proved themselves recalcitrant when it came to enforcing anti-piracy clauses of the *‘abdnames*, Hasan made some effort to protect Venetian shipping. For instance, when a Venetian galleon named *Mocenigo* was seized by corsairs in 1589, the bailo chose to keep the matter secret and contacted the Grand Admiral first. Only when Hasan told him to secure a commandment from Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha, he made a formal complaint, and then he did this only in order to give Hasan an official reason to punish the corsair (“*accio potesse haver occasione di castigare il corsaro*”).39 The problem was

37 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, cc. 266v-267r (17 December 1588).
38 ASV, *SDeC*, reg. 7, c. 124v (13 October 1588).
39 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 29, cc. 358r-358v (6 July 1589). For translations of the commandments that Sinan gave to the bailo, see cc. 362r-363r and 364r-365r. For an order prohibiting Hasan from attacking Venetian possessions, see cc. 366r-366v.
left unsolved in 1590 when bailo Girolamo Lippomano decided to capitalize on the favor granted to Hasan's sister and demanded the return of the enslaved passengers without ransom.\textsuperscript{40} Although Hasan was complacent at the beginning, he tried to squeeze more money by claiming that he paid a certain Hasan Reis for the aforementioned slaves and that the Venetians owed him.\textsuperscript{41} The infuriated bailo considered going directly to the Grand Vizier, but he then gave up in order not to alienate Hasan any further. The slaves were still not restituted when Hasan died.

Next year, Giovanni Moro complained about a certain Ampra (Emrah?) Reis who attacked Venetian ships. This time, Hasan punished the corsair by confiscating his ships and slaves and conveyed a strong message, according to the bailo, to similar transgressors. A thankful Serenissima authorized Moro to give a present up to the value of 1000 zecchini to the Grand Admiral.\textsuperscript{42} Moro also noted that he gave Hasan an imperial commandment from the Sultan against the corsairs located in St. Maura. His hopes that Hasan would punish these corsairs seem to be justified; according to another dispatch dated 1590, Hasan wrote two letters, one to the governor of Karliili, the other to the castle-keepers of St. Maura and Prevesa. Both letters were forbidding privateering and the illegal sale of Venetian slaves.\textsuperscript{43}

A similar incident occurred when the bailo asked Hasan's help in securing the restitution of Leon da Trapani, a Capuchin friar. Hasan first seemed receptive and asked for further information that might be helpful in locating the friar.\textsuperscript{44} Later, however, he backed down, claiming that he could not help the bailo without giving his enemies an alibi to attack him. Moreover, the \textit{negotio di schiavi} should have been mutually beneficial, he stated and asked the bailo to act as mediator in the liberation of a corsair named Hasan Reis. This nephew of an important palace official, the \textit{Bostancıbaşı}, was then a slave at the hands of the Grand Duke of Florence. Realizing the inconvenience such an initiative might cause with the Florentines, however, the bailo backed off and the issue remained unsolved.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{40} ASV, SDC, fil. 31, cc. 25r-25v, 33r (3 March 1590).
\textsuperscript{41} ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 405r (February 1589); 453v-454r (17 February 1589, m.v.); fil. 31, cc. 49v-50v (17 March 1590), 64r-64v (31 March 1590), 106v (14 April 1590), 114v (28 April 1590).
\textsuperscript{42} ASV, SDC, fil. 31, cc. 116r-117r (28 April 1590).
\textsuperscript{43} ASV, SDC, fil. 32, cc. 117r-117v, 118r (undated letters sent in a dispatch dated 29 September 1590).
\textsuperscript{44} ASV, SDC, fil. 28, c. 434r (27 January 1588, m.v.).
\textsuperscript{45} ASV, SDC, fil. 28, cc. 463v-464r (11 February 1588, m.v.), 499r-501v (25 February 1588, m. v.); fil. 29, cc. 315v-316r (22 June 1589).
It was common that the European ambassadors used their connections in the Ottoman palace in order to influence appointments. As active participants of factional politics in sixteenth-century Istanbul, the baili actively sought to control who was appointed to key positions such as the Grand Admiralty, governor-generalships of North African provinces and governorships of strategically located ports. We have already stated how Lorenzo Bernardo opposed Hasan’s appointment to the soon-to-be-created Admiralty of Morea. When it became evident that Hasan was not getting the post, the Venetians switched strategy and tried to convince Hasan to resist the creation of such an admiralty which, bailo Moro argued, was a blow to his honor (“attion tanto pregiuditital al honor suo”). Hasan had to “impose his authority” (interponere l’auttorita sua) for otherwise this would be “a great scandal” (una pietra di scandolo). The creation of a new admiralty would not prevent corsair attacks; moreover, most of those who took part in the new fleet would turn to privateering themselves rather than fighting the Christian corsairs.46 Not convinced that this would do him any harm (Morea fell under the purview of the Governor-General of Rumelia), Hasan still agreed to talk to the Grand Vizier about the issue. Two weeks later, Hasan claimed that the bailo should not take the issue directly to the Grand Vizier and leave the matter to him.47 When he failed to provide concrete results, he told the bailo to refer the issue to another Venetian, the influential Chief White Eunuch (Babússaade Ağası) Gazanfer Agha.48 In the end, the admiralty was not established; yet Hasan’s role in this decision seems to have been very limited.

Hasan’s position as the highest-ranking officer of the Ottoman maritime establishment helped to smooth the effects of unfavorable appointments to strategic positions. In 1589, for instance, Giovanni Moro summoned Hasan’s help against the newly elected Governor-General of Algeria, Ramazan Pasha, an enemy of the Venetians.49 As Ramazan would soon take control of the corsair fleet in Algiers, it was of vital importance for the Venetians that his actions could be controlled. Only somebody like Hasan, the Grand Admiral and a frontier creature with extensive ties in the Western Mediterranean, could make sure Ramazan would not attack Venetian ships.

46 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, cc. 248v-249v (9 December 1589).
47 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, cc. 261r-261v (23 December 1589).
48 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, cc. 320v-321r (6 January 1589, m.v.).
49 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, cc. 317v-318r (22 June 1589).
The relationship between Hasan and the baili also had a financial side that transcended the humble realm of gift exchange. The baili regularly paid Hasan; he gave him 1000 zecchini on three occasions, in November 1588,50 March 158951 and April 1590.52 They were also authorized to make lavish presents such as clothes, worth as much as 1000 zecchini,53 and Hasan regularly made requests for a number of luxury goods such as Piacenza cheese54 or the corone and 4 cuori d’oro to be used in the decoration of the rooms in his new palace.55 Apparently, there was also the custom of giving silk clothes to grand admirals and their men before the Ottoman navy left the capital, a powerful argument against potential anti-Venetian sentiments, conveyed surely at the most strategic moment.56

Financial benefits seemed to have whetted the appetite of Hasan who tried to cheat the Venetian baili into giving him more money by seeking a combined strategy of threat, self-promotion, and manipulation. According to the bailo, he did this without “without a trace of shame” (alcun risegno di vergogna) because he was in dire need of money in order to keep his position. Complaining that he was not duly “recognized” by the Venetians, Hasan pretended to have accomplished things in which he had not played a direct part, such as the failure of Ottoman-Spanish truce negotiations and the prevention of the creation of the Morean admiralty.57 Moreover, he was constantly talking about large fleets in preparation in order to make veiled threats. Finally, he did not forget to point out the importance of money in diplomatic negotiations.58

Another important part of their mutually beneficial cooperation was the exchange of information. It was of utmost importance for the Venetian baili to gather information on the Ottoman naval preparations and the decisions taken in the Imperial Council. Thus, Uluc Hasan Pasha was their prime target. Hasan did not hesitate to share classified information with the baili, especially regarding the preparations in the Arsenal and the possible targets should there be any naval

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50 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, c. 132r (17 November 1588).
51 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, c. 150r (9 March 1589).
52 ASV, SDC, fil. 31, c. 117r (28 April 1590).
53 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, c. 148v (4 February 1588, m.v.); 150r (9 March 1589).
54 ASV, SDelC, reg. 7, cc. 153r-153v (24 March 1589); SDC, fil. 29, cc. 356r-356v (6 July 1589).
55 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, cc. 357v (6 July 1589), 440r (4 August 1589); fil. 31, c. 117r (28 April 1590).
56 ASV, SDC, fil. 29 315v (22 June 1589).
57 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, cc. 306r (6 January 1589, m.v.), 379r-380v (20 January 1589, m.v.).
58 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 406r (3 February 1589, m.v.).
expedition. Even when the Ottoman fleet was out in the Mediterranean, the baili had access to the most up-to-date information; Hasan’s men communicated to bailo Moro the latest news that their masters wrote to the capital regarding the actions and whereabouts of the Ottoman navy. Hasan also shared information about a wide range of issues such as the Ottoman army fighting with the Safavids in the East, discussions in the Imperial Council, the Sultan’s opinion on war and peace, rivalries between pashas, other states’ diplomatic initiatives in Istanbul and the Mahdi Rebellion in Tripolitania. Apart from sharing the fruits of his galleys’ reconnaissance missions, he even informed the baili about the strength and composition of the Habsburg fleet in the Western Mediterranean, an information exchange that one would expect to have occurred in the opposite direction.

Hasan must have seemed very cooperative when he assured bailo Giovanni Moro that he would tell him if anything detrimental to Venetian interests occurred (“se seguisse alcuna cosa a pregiudizio a quella Serenissima Repubblica”). Even though Hasan was sharing information with his own agenda and it is hard to tell to what extent he was manipulating the information that he shared, the baili appreciated his efforts. In addition to sharing the incoming information, Hasan also lent his expert opinion on certain matters, providing the baili with a unique glimpse of how the Ottoman government functioned and how certain problems were solved. A very good example to this is his plan to reform the administrative structure in Tripoli where the unruly and seditious behavior of local janissaries started a large-scale revolt.

It was not only Hasan who provided information. Even though documented to a lesser extent, Hasan seemed to have benefitted from the information exchange as well. The asymmetry in our sources does not necessarily mean that the Grand Admiral received less than he gave. It is likely that the baili hid the fact that they

59 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, cc. 265r (17 December 1588), 434r (27 January 1588, m.v.); fil. 30, c. 236v (23 December 1589).
60 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c. 402v (21 July 1589).
61 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, cc. 58r-60v (24 September 1588), 434r (27 January 1588, m.v.), 497r-498r (25 February 1588, m.v.); fil. 29, cc. 87r-87v (4 April 1589); 133v-135r (27 April 1589), 207r-207v (13 May 1589); fil. 30, cc. 249v (9 December 1589), 317v (22 June 1589), 335v (20 January 1589, m.v.).
62 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, cc. 135r-135v (27 April 1589).
63 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c. 316v (22 June 1589).
64 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, cc. 134r-135r (27 April 1589).
had to “exchange” information, i.e. to give in order to get. Given the Ottoman propensity to rely on Venetian diplomatic and commercial networks in order to obtain information, it is fair to assume that Hasan, too, frequently demanded information from the Venetians. To give an example: in March 1589 rumors arrived from Ragusa that the Duke of Guise, the leader of the Catholic League in France, had been assassinated. Hasan could not verify this important piece of intelligence that could (and did) change the balance-of-power in the French Wars of Religion and by extension in European diplomacy. When his intelligence network could not provide him with reliable information (lettere di certi, i.e. his spies’ letters, were yet to come), he would directly go to Giovanni Moro and ask what he knew about the issue.\textsuperscript{65}

Such close collaboration between Hasan and the baili did not escape the attention of their contemporaries. Renegades’ close ties with their former compatriots and coreligionists resulted in rumors which forced renegade Ottoman officers to be careful in their cross-confessional dealings. For instance, the most influential Venetian of the era, Gazanfer Agha was extremely cautious not to appear pro-Venetian; it was only through his sister that the baili could influence him.\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, when Hasan’s successor Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, a Genoese renegade trained in the palace, called his brother Carlo to his side, he was openly criticized by his sailors who were themselves renegades. They accused Cigalazade’s brother of

\textsuperscript{65} ASV, SDC, fil. 29, cc. 26v-26r (10 March 1589). We should bear in mind here, as I discussed elsewhere, that unlike the Venetians and the Habsburgs, the Ottomans never established a centralized bureau in charge of collecting information, but rather left this task to high-level officers who recruited spies and informants as part of their household. Collecting information regarding the Western Mediterranean and Europe fell upon the Grand Admiral’s shoulders. Emrah Safa Gürkan, “Espionage in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry” (Ph.D. Diss., Georgetown University, 2012), 362-368.

being a Habsburg spy and they were right in their accusation. Moreover, hearing that the same Cigalazade anchored off Messina with the entire Ottoman fleet and arranged a meeting with her mother, brothers and nephews aboard his capitana, the Valide Sultan Safiye attacked him fiercely.

As a self-made frontier creature, Hasan was an outsider to the Enderun-educated ruling elite of the empire. With a limited power base in the Ottoman capital, he would be even more susceptible to the criticism of duplicitousness. In other words, he had to be extra careful. For instance, in September 1588, Hasan and Giovanni Moro agreed that if others learned about their one-on-one negotiations, the bailo should deny it. According to their arrangement, Moro would directly come to Hasan only for urgent matters (di momento). For regular business, he should contact Hasan through the influential courtier David Passi, a Marrano power broker. The idea was to manipulate Passi, who had connections with other pasha households (“pratica per li porti di questi grandi”), so that he would tell other pashas that Moro and Hasan did not negotiate directly. A year later, Hasan came with an even more ingenious strategy to exonerate himself from accusations of playing a double game. Following the appointment of Sinan Pasha to the grand vizierate and amidst rumors of his replacement with another renegade, the Neapolitan Yusuf, Hasan’s political position was at best fragile. In order to fend off possible accusations of being a friend of the Venetians (“quando essi non habbiano alcun sospetto che egli sia amico della Serenità Vostrà”), he asked Moro to make a complaint to Sinan Pasha right before he left Istanbul at the helm of the imperial fleet and to accuse him of attacking Venetian ships and capturing Venetian subjects. Hasan even wanted Moro to act behind Sinan by writing an official complaint (arz) directly to the Sultan, because it was possible that Sinan

67 Horatio Brown (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice* [hereafter COSP], vol. 9 1592-1603 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1894), no. 273 (3 May 1594).

68 AGS, *E* 1158, fol. 186 (1 October 1598) and 187 (15 letters dated September 1598).


71 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, cc. 61r, 62r (24 September 1588).
would bury the issue. When Moro refused to bypass the Grand Vizier, Hasan made a counter-offer and urged the bailo to use one of these blank letters (*carte bianche*) that the ambassadors had in their possession and to forge a letter in the name of the Serenissima. If handed an official letter, Sinan would have to pass it to the Sultan. Moro denied that he possessed such blank letters. In the Venetian practice, he argued, official letters were written on a parchment (*pergamino*) with a lead seal, unlike other states who used paper (*carta bombacina*), stamped with wax (*bolino con cera*). In short, it was impossible to forge one. Hasan did one more move and requested Moro to ask his government to send an official letter against him. Such a letter needed to be sent with an express courier for otherwise it would not arrive on time, that is, before Hasan left with the Ottoman fleet.72 Realizing the benefits of keeping a pro-Venetian Hasan in office, Moro agreed to write the Signoria which quickly dispatched an official letter on May 16, only three weeks after the bailo wrote his letter.73 Next month, Moro submitted an ‘arz to Sinan who, just as Hasan presumed, did not give it to the Sultan. He provided Moro, however, with an imperial commandment forbidding the Grand Admiral from attacking Venetian ships.74 This commandment dispelled rumors around Hasan’s pro-Venetian proclivities and gave him a free hand in letting Venetian ships go.

To conclude: the common Venetian background played a facilitative role for cross-confessional diplomacy between the Ottomans and the Venetians; it provided a stable channel of communication between the two sides. An important detail here is that a similar channel between the baili and Hasan’s predecessor, Uluc Ali, was also secured via another Venetian: A renegade named Ridvan who was Hasan’s successor as Ali’s majordomo. The explicit discontent that Lorenzo Bernardo expressed when he heard that Uluc Ali dismissed his Venetian kahya clearly demonstrates how important solidarity was among the compatriots, especially in the realm of cross-confessional diplomacy.75

Our source base that draws heavily on Venetian archives allows us to see how the Venetian side benefitted from the common background. However, this does not mean that the benefit was not mutual; it would be naïve to expect from seasoned diplomats such as the baili to reveal to their superiors the other side of the coin. More important political figures than Hasan sought to capitalize on

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72 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 29, cc. 131r-133v (27 April 1589).
73 ASV, *SDelC*, reg. 7, c. 159v (16 May 1589).
74 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 29, cc. 275r, 286r (8 June 1589), 316v (22 June 1589).
75 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 22, c. 225v (13 November 1585).
trans-imperial ties that would help their dealings with the Venetian government that could do a number of favors for the Ottoman elites as was elucidated in the first part of this article. One good example is the Queen Mother Nur Banu who claimed to be descended from a Venetian patrician family, a statement which was not true.\(^76\) The fact that the Queen Mother, most probably belonging to a well-off Corfiote family, bothers to forge a trans-imperial link in order to ingratiate herself with the Venetians suggests that the Ottomans, too, considered the common background as a diplomatic asset.\(^77\)

\(\text{PART II:}\)

**FORSAKING THE PAST: MEMORY, IDENTITY, AND THE RENEGADE’S DILEMMA**

While there has been a recent interest on Ottoman self-narratives, autobiographies, and diaries,\(^78\) we have to concede that such first person accounts are


relatively few compared to the rich corpus at the service of European historians. This scarcity makes it hard for the historians to thoroughly analyze the mental framework of the Ottomans, especially when it comes to a sensitive issue such as a renegade’s memories of his life as a Christian and his attachment to his natal land. In her groundbreaking work on Ottoman self-narratives of conversion, Tijana Krstić has recently scrutinized five polemical religious treatises. These are extremely valuable sources; nevertheless, as they were penned by converts with little political relevance, we are still at a loss as to how the most powerful converts in the empire, the Ottoman pashas, experienced their conversion and what kind of a relationship they developed with their past. For those who were constantly engaged in fierce factional rivalries, it would be foolishly unsafe to reveal in writing their inner conflicts and tangled loyalties between two civilizations.

Gâzisi Hindi Mahmûd ve Esâret Hatnâralar (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2013). I should finally mention three diaries (two of them entitled ceride and the third yevmiye) whose authors hardly reveal anything about themselves so much so that even identifying them proved a taxing challenge. These diaries contain detailed entries on natural disasters, astronomical and meteorological information, building activities, major political and military events, career-related news, appointments, dismissals, exiles and executions of Ottoman administrative, military and judicial officers, public festivals and birth, death and marriages in the neighbourhood. The “I” is conspicuously absent in the texts that include nothing about the authors’ feelings or opinions. They may be diaries, but they most definitely are not self-narratives or ego-documents. Madeline C. Zilfi, “The Diary of a Müderris: A New Source for Ottoman Biography,” Journal of Turkish Studies 1 (1977): 157-174; Kemal Beydilli, Osmanlı’dâ İmamlar ve Bir İmamın Günliğü (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2013); Selim Karahasanoğlu, Kadi ve Günliğü: Sadreddinzâde Telhisâ Mustafa Efendi Efendi Günliğü (1711-1735) Üstüne Bir İnceleme (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012).


80 The authors of the five treatises are a Hungarian dragoman in the imperial service, a provincial Orthodox student of theology-turned-Muslim jurist, a learned Jew and a Christian priest both of whom became sufis and another Hungarian priest, the famous Ibrahim Muteferrika, who established the first Ottoman Arabic script printing press in 1727.
European sources seem to be the only way out of this impasse as ambassadors, spies and travelers left detailed accounts of their encounters and negotiations with the Ottoman officials, especially those with a renegade background. Even though it is true that these sources must be read with a critical eye, they possess an extraordinary potential in highlighting renegades’ identity tensions. Letters that the baili regularly sent to the Signoria, the dispacci, give us some clues regarding how Hasan Veneziano expressed his feelings and opinions regarding his natal land which he had to abandon for good against his own will.

We have to concede that we are still far from having an ego-document as it is still the bailo and not Hasan himself speaking in the dispacci. Still, it should be noted that even though they had a liberal arts education, the baili did not write their regular dispatches in a formulaic form. They made almost no embellishments except for a few words while opening and concluding the letter. Most of the time they gave direct quotations with only small alterations such as changing the first person singular to third person singular and replacing certain words with more appropriate forms, i.e. Venice to Serenissima or Serenità Vostra, Sultan to Gran Signore. In short, the hints which we find in their letters are the closest we can get to catch a glimpse of how an Ottoman renegade pasha behaved in front of a compatriot and how his tangled loyalties played out in the sphere of cross-confessional diplomacy.

Words of affection

Now, let us concentrate on Hasan’s wording. Certain words that betray his affection for his natal land appear very frequently in the baili’s dispatches. Patria is one of them. For instance, when Giovanni Moro complained of corsair attacks on Venetian shipping, Hasan openly underlined his attachment to the Serenissima by saying that “in the end, he was born a Venetian and he could not forget the patria” (che egli infine era nato Venetiano ne li poteva scordar della patria). He uses the same word when he talks about his sister who “sometimes reminded him of his patria” (quella gli haveva fatto raccordarsi alle volte della patria). Similarly, when the Venetians acquiesced to his request for exemption from customs dues, he expressed his gratitude towards “the Most Serene Republic which he saw after all as his patria” by stating that “he could not so easily forget the love of patria”

81 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, c. 262r (17 December 1588).
82 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, c. 432r (27 January 1588, m.v.).
(Serenissima Repubblica la quali in fine conosceva per patria sua et che l’amore della patria non poteva così facilmente scordare). 83

With the last sentence, we passed to other keywords that often appear in documentation, (to) love, amare, amor, amorevolezza and friend(ship), amico and amicitia. There was a close relationship between these two sets of words; true friendship was born out of love, not utility. Thus, their interchangeable use suggests a friendship that transcended the cold and calculated realm of a mutually beneficial political reciprocity. More importantly, the concept of “friendship” was part-and-parcel of the discursive realm of gift-exchange. The word emerged several times in Renaissance discourse on gifts so much so that one contemporary author dubbed them as the fifth law of friendship. 84 Given that the gift economy and political reciprocity dominated the relationship between Hasan and the Venetian baili, it is not surprising that they employed the word “friend” and its derivatives so often.

Less frequently used but more powerful than Hasan’s generic affectione, the word “love” was directed as much at Serenissima as other Venetian officers, first and foremost the baili themselves. For instance, when Proveditore Marc’antonio Barbaro wrote him a letter asking for the release of Leone da Trapani, Hasan told Moro that he “loved” Barbaro very much (he knew the Proveditore from his days as bailo between 1568 and 1573). 85 He wanted to “placate” (compiacere) him; but there was not much he could do. Given that he was turning down Barbaro, it could be claimed that Hasan was pretending to be friendlier than he actually was and that he was kindly refusing an old acquaintance’s request with nice words. Still, it does not mean that the sentiment was not genuine. It is worthy of note that Barbaro wanted to capitalize on their personal relationship; he believed it to be an asset that would help him secure Hasan’s cooperation in Leone da Trapani affair. Moreover, in a totally different context, Hasan once again used a word of affection, “friendship,” amicitia, for not only Marc’antonio Barbaro but also his son Francesco. 86

83 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c 315v (22 June 1589).
85 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c. 316r (22 June 1589).
86 ASV, SDC, fil. 28, c. 432v (27 January 1588, m.v.).
Hasan knew Barbaro since the time when he was an important but minor creature in the Ottoman politics as Uluc Ali’s majordomo; his positive feelings towards the baili did not change after his appointment to higher offices. In the same conversation where he expressed his amicable feelings towards Marc’antonio and Francesco, he also added Moro to his list of friends. Moreover, in another conversation, he expressed the sentiment of amor he “carried” for Moro and told the bailo how much he esteemed his “friendship” (*in quanto grado tiene la mia amicitia*). Moro thanked Hasan and added, with “a happy face” (*con faccia allegra*), that he deserved to be “loved” by him for being his “friend” (*ch’io meritavo di essere amato da lui essendo tanto suo amico*).87

These feelings of love had a mutual character, it was not only that Hasan loved Venice or her officers; he also expected to be loved by his patria. In December 1589, Hasan assured the bailo that he would do his best for Venice (“fària cosa gratissima alla Serenità Vostrà”) because the love and respect (*stima*) Venice “carried” for him obliged Hasan to favor her all the time.88 In another conversation, the bailo pointed out to the Serenissima’s “good opinion” (*buona mente*) about him as well as their friendship (*la nostra amicitia*) and reminded him that from Venice “he always received gestures of courtesy and love” (*receve sempre segno di cortesia et di amorevolezza*).89

If Hasan loved Moro and Barbaro, he most definitely disliked Lorenzo Bernardo in spite of the fact that the duo knew each other from childhood. Hasan could not reconcile with the fact that Bernardo tried to impede his appointment and in the same conversation in which he expressed his sentiments of friendship towards Marc’antonio Barbaro and his son Francesco, he complained to the bailo that Bernardo treated him poorly (“il Bailo passato si porta male meco”).90

**The issue of sincerity**

Should we take these expressions and words of affection seriously? To what extent do they reveal Hasan’s true feelings towards his natal land and his former compatriots? Were they mere strategic tools for diplomacy or could they provide

87 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, cc. 497r–498r (25 February 1588, m.v.).
88 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 30, c. 249v (9 December 1589).
89 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, c. 433v (27 January 1588, m.v.).
90 ASV, *SDC*, fil. 28, c. 432v (27 January 1588, m.v.).
us with some clues as to how Hasan felt about Venice? Can we infer from them to what extent Hasan’s conversion and his trans-imperial life trajectory between Venice, North Africa, and Istanbul affected his identity? To put it more simply: did Hasan still have a genuine sense of belonging to Venice?

It is hard to give a definite answer, but a number of arguments could be made, highlighting Hasan’s conflicted trans-imperial identity. First of all, in defense of the reliability of our source base, we have to add that the two Venetians conversed in their native language; thus, we have dodged a danger that would put us even further from Uluc Hasan’s mind: there is no cultural/linguistic discrepancy between what Hasan said and what the baili wrote down. Most of the conversation took place either between the bailo and Hasan or, when the two could not meet, between the latter and the bailate secretary. There were no interpreters (dragomans) involved in the negotiations. These Venetians may have purposefully manipulated the words of their compatriot Hasan; this is a risk that we always face while working on non ego-documents. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that they misunderstood it or substituted a word for another that made sense in the culture of the translator, but not in that of the speaker.91 In short, when the bailo included in his report a loaded word such as patria, it was most probably the exact word that Hasan himself used.92

91 One of the translation methods in early modern Europe was what Venturi called the “fluent strategy,” i.e. domesticating the foreign text by a sensum de sensu approach in a process similar to “acculturation.” Peter Burke, “Cultures of Translation in Early Modern Europe,” in Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe, eds. Peter Burke and R. Po-chia Hsia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7-38; here 26-27.

92 Jocelyne Dakhlia has asserted cautiously (“it seems it cannot be excluded”) that while negotiating with the baili, Hasan Veneziano may have spoken franco, i.e. the pidgin Lingua franca, a vehicular dialect widely spoken in the early modern Mediterranean among those who did not have a common language. This he did, according to Dakhlia, in order to “donner des gages de sa rupture avec son milieu original,” i.e. to keep a distance from his Venetian past, “a fortiori within the context of tense or hostile relations with Europe.” Jocelyne Dakhlia, Lingua Franca: histoire d’une langue métisse en Méditerranée (Arles: Actes Sud, 2008), 82-3. For converts’ strategic use of code-switching and an interesting example of how they evaded the responsibilities imposed by their former life and underscored a complete identity transformation by refusing to converse in their native language, see Ella Natalie Rothman, “Between Venice and Istanbul: Trans-imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early Modern Mediterranean” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, 2006), 380-382. I do not agree with Dakhlia for a number of reasons. First of all, throughout the dispacci, I have never encountered any reference to franco. Even though her argument that the contemporary observers, especially those with proper education, refrained from mentioning this spoken
Secondly, the baili themselves used similar words that tied Hasan to his Venetian past and reminded him of his responsibility towards his patria. In 1589, for instance, Moro admonished that a man as wise as him should not act against to his patria which one could never forget. Moreover, the examples given in this article clearly demonstrate the cordial relationship between Hasan and the baili; therefore, it was unlikely that the same Hasan who often accentuated his Venetian past would attempt to create a distance between his past and present by employing a pidgin language as asserted by Dakhlia. When he was captured, Hasan was too old to forget his mother tongue; in his conversations with the baili that took place without an interpreter, he must have used the Venetian dialect, perhaps a little bit tainted by Spanish words, reminiscent of the long years spent in the Western Mediterranean. However, even if Hasan Veneziano spoke franco with the baili, as this was a Romance-based pidgin language spoken without conjugations, the baili would not have to translate words such as patria, amare, amicitia into Italian. In short, we still do not face the risks posed by cultural incommensurability and the linguistic discrepancies that frequently occurred in translations.

93 “…non era conveniente che un uomo savio come lui dovesse cercare di fare una offesa alla Serenissima et alla sua patria, della quale in fine non può l’uomo scordarsi già mai.” ASV, SDC, fil. 28, c. 433r (27 January 1588, m.v.)

94 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, cc. 379r-380v (20 January 1589, m.v.), 405r-408r (3 February 1589, m.v.), cc. 453v-454r (17 February 1589, m.v.); fil. 31, cc. 64r-64v (31 March 1590), 106v (14 April 1590), 114r, 116v (28 April 1590), 455v-456v (18 August 1590).

95 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 313r (6 January 1589, m.v.); fil. 31, c. 452r (16 August 1590); fil. 32, cc. 64v (15 September 1590), 173r-175r and 179v-180r (both 18 October 1590).
Thirdly, there is other evidence that Hasan retained a part of his Venetian identity. Conversion for most renegades did not mean severing their ties with their past; it brought a “civil death” not a “social” one. We have already mentioned how Hasan kept ties with the relatives and friends whom he had to leave behind and on behalf of whom he negotiated with the Venetian authorities. Moreover, as the relationship between identity and memory is self-evident, Hasan’s ongoing ties with his past becomes more palpable in a few instances where he evoked his memories. For instance, he told Giovanni Moro that he used to go to Lorenzo Bernardo’s (the bailo whom he disliked) house in SS Giovanni e Paolo to “play ball” (giocar alla balla) with him.96 In another instance when he asked the lifting of a childhood friend’s banishment from Venice and when the bailo said he could not intervene given the harshness of the crime (firing an arquebus in the city), Hasan only gave in because he remembered a scene from his childhood: guilty of a similar crime, an important figure (persona di qualità) was hung with an arquebus tied to his foot in the Piazza Pubblica.97

In his passage from one society to another, it is evident that Hasan had some tangled loyalties. If he kept remnants of a forsaken past, he also had trouble in blending into a new society, if not in Algiers, at least in the Ottoman capital. Algiers was home to renegades and captives from the Mediterranean, northern Europe and beyond;98 it was in fact those renegades from the four corners of

96 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 379v (20 January 1589, m.v.); Fabris, “Hasan ‘il Veneziano,”’ 52.
97 ASV, SDC, fil. 31, c. 161r (12 May 1590).
98 According to Portuguese cleric Doctor Antonio Sosa, captive in Algiers with Miguel Cervantes between 1577 and 1581, renegades and their children outnumbered Moors, Turks and Jews in Algiers, “because there is no Christian nation on earth that has not produced renegades in this city” (porque no ay nacion de christianos en el mundo, de la cual no aya renegado y renegados en Argel). A good number of those renegades were from the Western Mediterranean shores, even though the Venetians, protected by capitulations, were few among them. In addition to those of the Mediterranean, Europe and the Balkans, Sosa’s long list of nations includes far-away nations as well: Russians, Abysсинians and even Indians from India, Brazil and New Mexico. Diego de Haedo, Topographia e Historia General de Argel, repartida en cinco tratados, do se veran casos extraños, muertes espantosas, y tormentos exquisitos, que conuene se entiendan en la Christianidad: con much doctrina, y elegancia curiosa (Valladolid: Diego Fernandez de Cordoua y Ouido, 1612), Chapter XIII, 10. For English translation, see Maria Antonia Garcés (ed.), An Early Modern Dialogue with Islam: Antonio de Sosa’s Topography of Algiers (1612), trans. Diana de Armas Wilson (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2011), 125. On the captivity of Sosa and Cervantes in Algiers, see María Antonia Garcés, Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive’s Tale (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).
the world that made the North African port cities the rich corsair nests that they were. Istanbul, however, was not on the frontier; it was an imperial capital with an established palace protocol, rules of etiquette and an entrenched political elite with exclusivist tendencies. No matter how big a role the renegade devşirme recruits (mostly of Balkan origin unlike Hasan) played in the governing of this Muslim empire, corsairs remained on the margins of Istanbul politics, their fortunes remaining strictly tied to naval offices. The Ottoman elite generally looked at the self-made corsairs with suspicion and disdain.\footnote{Emrah Safa Gürkan, “The Centre and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century,” \textit{Turkish Historical Review} 1/2 (2010): 125-163, here 147-9.} In spite of the fact that the sixteenth-century Ottoman society still retained the traces of a renegade identity,\footnote{The Ottomans still remembered their renegade background in the late sixteenth century. See Mustafa Ali’s famous passage in \textit{Kunhûl-Abbar}, vol. I, 16, cited by both Fleischer and Kafadar. For sixteenth-century Ottomans, the Rumi identity denoted a society of mixed origins that emerged as a result of the intermingling of Christians (autochthonous as well as slaves) and Turkish Muslims in Anatolia and the Balkans over the centuries. Fleischer, \textit{Mustafa Ali}, 253-257; Salih Özbaran, \textit{14-17. Yüzyıllarda Rûm/Rûm Âidiet ve İngeleri} (İstanbul: Kitap Yaynevi, 2004); Cemal Kafadar, “A Rome of One’s Own: Reflections on Cultural Geography and Identity in the Lands of Rum,” \textit{Muqarnas: An Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, History and Ideology: Architectural Heritage of the “Lands of Rum”} 24 (2007): 7-25.} those with Western Mediterranean provenance had trouble in adjusting to the rules of Ottoman politics and the lifestyle in the capital.

I have elsewhere discussed how Hasan’s predecessor Uluc Ali had a hard time in adjusting to the politics of the Ottoman capital.\footnote{Gürkan, “Fooling the Sultan.”} Financially pressurized by the twin forces of the expensive tradition of gift-giving in the Ottoman capital and the lack of a large naval expedition which would financially relieve him, the Calabrian Grand Admiral demanded more than once to be transferred to the frontier and appointed as the Governor-General of Algeria (with authority over Tunisia and Tripolitania as well), even though this meant volunteering for a demotion.\footnote{ASV, \textit{SDC}, fil. 21, cc. 241v-242r (14 May 1585).} Uluc Hasan did not stay in Istanbul long enough to request a similar demotion; however, when he felt challenged by other contenders for the grand admiralty, he told the bailo that he would prefer to go back to the North African frontier where he could reap the fruits of the turmoil caused by the French Wars of Religion.\footnote{He could be rich and make half a million ducats worth of \textit{preda} at a time when France was in a chaotic civil war without a King. ASV, \textit{SDC}, filza 30, c. 405v (3 February 1589).} There is
some proof, moreover, that he had trouble, at least in the beginning, to adjust to the imperial capital’s customs. For instance, bailo Nicolò Barbarigo related that Hasan could only speak 25 words of Turkish in 1577, the year when he was appointed first Governor of Salonica and later Governor-General of Algeria. The fact that a renegade governor-general could hardly express himself in Turkish 14 years after his enslavement and 5 years after his settlement in Istanbul is quite telling. Finally, Hasan’s taste for artistic goods from Italy as well as cheese from Piacenza (Ulug, on the other hand, favored those of Mallorca) betrays his North Italian, if not necessarily Venetian, origins.

Finally, even though a common background could serve in a facilitative fashion, the extent to which mere rhetoric could profoundly affect diplomatic negotiations was limited. Nor was there an exceptionally good relationship between the baili and Hasan. He did not seem to have received from the Venetian government more than what was generally due to cooperative Ottoman grand admirals. We had already shown how he had tried to trick the Venetians into giving him more money by pretending to have worked for Venetian interests even though he in fact did not move a finger. As an opportunist who demonstrated his self-seeking character while negotiating with the baili, he was not an unconditional Venetian supporter either. While on the one hand he harvested good relations with the Venetian diplomats, on the other he sought ulterior motives, sometimes at the expense of his former patria. In 1590, for instance, the Queen Mother Safiye Sultan’s mute told Giovanni Moro that Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha and Hasan Veneziano were acting against Venetian interests; with the intermediation of Gazanfer Agha, the Grand Admiral was provoking the Sultan against the Serenissima (“gli fa sapere molte cose contra la Sublimita Vostrà”). The mute’s hostile attitude towards Hasan and his highlighting the Queen Mother’s favorable mood towards Venice suggest that factional concerns were at play; nonetheless, his claim is supported by other evidence. Eight months later, Hasan asked Sinan Pasha’s hoca (tutor) to help him convince the Sultan to launch an expedition against Candia, the most prized target in the eastern Mediterranean. The pro-Venetian hoca, who was already acting as a middleman between Sinan and the bailo, refused Hasan’s offer of cooperation. Hasan had already gone to Sinan, but the hoca had dissuaded the

104 “...appena sa dir vinticinque parole in Turchesco.” ASV, SDC, fil. 11, fol. 103v (20 May 1577).
105 ASV, SDC, fil. 29, c. 315r (22 June 1589).
106 ASV, SDC, fil. 30, c. 313r (6 January 1589, m.v.).

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Grand Vizier from undertaking a Candian expedition.\textsuperscript{107} With or without the hoca’s help, it turned out that Hasan had already set to work for an expedition; the next month news reached Istanbul that his agents were discovered in Candia. Amidst rumors of his replacement with Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, a Genoese renegade with Enderun background (see below), Hasan was hastily pushing for a naval expedition that could save his office, bailo Lippomano suggested.\textsuperscript{108} In order to convince the recalcitrant Sinan, he even dismissed his Venetian origins in a meeting in Grand Vizier’s palace. He was aware that he was born a Venetian; but if he knew there remained one drop of Venetian blood in his veins, he would bleed himself to death in order to get rid of it.\textsuperscript{109} In light of his words of affection towards Venice, this last sentence, regardless of its melodramatic tone and strategic employment, clearly points to an identity tension: being born as a Venetian could be an asset as well as a liability; something that Hasan could choose to accentuate or understate, but could under no circumstances ignore, even after 25 years spent in Muslim lands.

In short, despite their shortcomings as non-ego documents, the baili’s dispatches are the most useful source that can help us understand the vacillation of an Ottoman renegade between his former and new homeland. They take us closer than any other source to getting a glimpse of what an Ottoman renegade felt about his natal land and how he remembered his forsaken past. Even though uttered in the less-than-friendly environment of diplomacy, certain words that Hasan employed betray his Venetian identity. Stuck between two identities and three worlds (Venetian, North African, and Ottoman), Hasan’s expressions speak volumes about inherent contradictions in the trans-imperial life trajectory of a Mediterranean go-between.

**Uluc Hasan’s patria vs. Uluc Ali’s Ecclesia:**

Hasan’s case is one of several examples of cross-confessional negotiations between the Europeans and the Ottoman officers with trans-imperial careers.\textsuperscript{110} For

\textsuperscript{107} ASV, SDC, fil. 31, c. 452r (16 August 1590).
\textsuperscript{108} ASV, SDC, fil. 32, c. 64v (15 September 1590).
\textsuperscript{109} COSP, vol. 8, no. 1008 (2 February 1590, m.v.).
instance, I have elsewhere focused on negotiations between Hasan’s predecessor, Uluc Ali, and the Habsburg agents who sought to arrange the latter’s defection from the Ottoman to the Habsburg camp. Engaging in a round of negotiations that spanned two decades, Habsburg agents tried to lure Uluc Ali to return to Christianity by accentuating his obligation to the Catholic Church and to his natural monarch. By employing such an argument, they used religion, rather than civic identity as was the case with Uluc Hasan, as a reference point. What was the reason for this fundamental difference? To answer this question, we have to concentrate on the divergent views of the Habsburg and the Venetian authorities on the issue of subjecthood and on their different attitude towards their renegade subjects in Ottoman service.

Even though what was at the heart of the defection negotiations were financial benefits and political concessions, Habsburg agents also presented moral arguments as to why Uluc Ali should switch sides. Born in Calabria, the troublesome corsair was, in fact, a Habsburg subject. He was thus bound by a religious duty, the Habsburg argument went, and as a good Christian he had to obey his Christian monarch, Philip II. The Habsburgs instructed Andrea Gasparo Corso, the agent who would undertake the negotiations, to remind the Calabrian corsair of his Christian past and add that he should leave this life he conducted “against reason, natural law, and the God’s truth” and “return to him” (“deve tener aborrescido camino tan contra la razon y ley natural y contra la verdad de dios como por el que ha bivido hasta agora y que deve de desear en su animo y corazon grandemente bolverse a el”). Neither Gasparo Corso nor several other agents who negotiated with Uluc Ali employed the word patria, an abstract notion that would attach Uluc to a particular place. Moreover, his natal land Calabria did not come up even once in the conversation. It was not that the Habsburgs were indifferent to Uluc Ali’s local links; they went to great lengths to locate a relative who would negotiate with Uluc Ali. It was just that Philip II was a foreign ruler whose sovereignty gained meaning only when expressed in universal terms. The same agents also touched upon Uluc Ali’s apostasy by arguing that he should return to the bosom of the Catholic Church, again stressing a religious rather than a civic duty.

112 AGS, E 487, document dated 2 July 1569.
113 AGS, E 487, documents dated 15 December 1568 and 18 March 1569.
A similar religious tone is apparent in the negotiations for defection between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Grand Admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, né Scipione Cicala. When Scipione called his brother Carlo to his side, the latter, who was in Habsburg employ at the time, had to ask permission from the authorities. In order to cloak his self-interested voyage, he offered to lure his brother to switch sides and convert back to Christianity. Emphasizing the benefit that his voyage would do for his brother’s soul as well as for his majesty’s interests, he proposed to remind Scipione “the fealty and devotion that all of us had for his Majesty and his duty and obligation to serve his natural principe et signore with some memorable and distinguished deed.” After receiving permission and sailing to the Levant, Carlo highlighted this moral obligation to his brother who came to Chios with the Ottoman fleet and stayed in Carlo’s house. He told Scipione that he should once again enter to the service of his Re Naturale with an outstanding deed that is worthy of a man of his quality and thus he would return to antica sua Religione.

A third example is the negotiations that took place between Emperor Charles V and Governor-General of Algeria Hasan Agha during the siege of Algiers by the Habsburgs in 1541. In search of a quick victory, the Emperor tried to convince this Sardinian renegade to surrender. If he did so, the imperial envoy argued in front of Hasan, his corsairs could go wherever they wanted while the Muslim population (i Mori del paese) could observe their religion unmolested. More importantly for our argument, the envoy assured Hasan that he would receive from the Emperor “great presents in times of war and peace” (premii grandii in guerra et in pace) and reminded that it was his duty to help the Christian cause. He had been born in Sardinia and had received the water of Holy Baptism (l’acqua del santo battesimo); this was the perfect opportunity (una bellissima occasione) to go back to the true religion (vera religione), save one’s faith and enjoy imperial favor. Doubting the chances of a siege at such a late time in the campaigning season, Hasan flatly refused the offer, a decision that he would not regret when a few days later the tempest transformed the siege into an ignominious defeat.

114 “…ricordando a ditto mio f.de la fidelta et devotion di tutti i nostri verso sua M. et il debito et obbligo suo all’incontro di perpetuarsieli con qualche memorabil et segnalato servitio come a suo natural principe et sig.” AGS, E K 1675, fol. 44 (30 April 1591).

115 “…acostandosi di nuovo con qualche opra segnalata e degno del suo valore alli servitii del suo Re naturale poi che in questo modo ritornerebbe all’antica sua Religion…” AGS, E 1158, fol. 26 (3 November 1594).

This emphasis on apostates’ double religious duty towards the true Church and the natural monarch demonstrates the Spanish perspective of a renegade who crossed the boundary and changed sides. An Ottoman renegade was still a Habsburg subject as long as he was born in one of the Habsburg provinces. Religion was what legitimized the King’s sovereignty over a renegade who by the very act of abjuring his faith denied this sovereignty. Thus, he had to recant his erroneous ways and “return” to his original state, that of being a Catholic and a Habsburg subject which in this case appears as the one and the same thing.

The relationship between the Habsburg rulers and their subjects was not conditioned by a local sense of belonging or citizenship; it was rather a moral duty towards a monarch, expressed in religious terms that connected the subject to the dynasty. Running an empire that stretched from Americas to the Philippines, from Flanders to Sicily, from Portugal to Milan, it was natural that the Habsburg understanding of subjecthood was religious; the Catholic identity was the only thing that could link people born in a number of different places to a common monarch.\(^{117}\) The Venetians themselves had their own empire in the Eastern Mediterranean and it could be argued that they would employ a more religious language if they were negotiating with their Greek subjects that settled in Constantinople. Still, I doubt that this was the case; because, being a Venetian entailed certain political and financial benefits even for these members of the ‘unofficial nation’.\(^{118}\) Moreover, Hasan was not a simple Greek subject; he was a citizen, if not

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\(^{117}\) Contemporaries such as Fray Juan de Salazar and Tommaso Campanella saw religion as the glue which held the Habsburg Empire together. See Juan de Salazar, *Política Española* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1945), proposition 3, cited by Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 99; Tommaso Campanella, *De Monarchia Hispanica Discursus* (Amsterdam, 1640), 18-19 cited by Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political History, 1513-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 51. According to their opinion, the Spanish Monarchy was founded upon the providence of God which not only legitimated Spanish imperialism (especially in the New World) but also gave the monarchy a historical role: uniting Christendom under a universal sovereignty, extirpate heresy and defeat the Turks.

\(^{118}\) It would be helpful to know whether the baili seriously argued that as good Christians these Orthodox should not serve an infidel ruler; unfortunately, however, we do not have detailed information on what kind of arguments they set forth while trying to persuade their Greek subjects to leave Istanbul where they settled in great numbers. Even when the Senate sent bailo Ottaviano Bon the instructions on how to encourage the Greek Venetians working in the Ottoman Arsenal to return, it did not make moral arguments but provide practical suggestions such
a patrician, and thus had social, economic and bureaucratic privileges that allowed
the likes of him to have a career in the permanent civil service, the lower echelons
of the diplomatic corps, the law, notarial offices, trade, and medicine. Hasan’s
privileged background meant that he shared a political vocabulary with the bailo
and the two Venetians could muster the sense of a civic belonging in their cross-
confessional negotiations. Habsburg agents, coming from different Habsburg pos-
sessions and negotiating on behalf of a distant king, on the other hand, could not
rely on such vocabulary while negotiating neither with Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan
who belonged to a Genoese aristocratic family that lived in Sicily nor with Uluc
Ali who was the son of a Calabrian fisherman. Negotiations between a Calabrian
(Uluc) and a Corsican (Andrea Gasparo) on behalf of a Castilian king in Madrid
(Philip II) had to rely on a more universal vocabulary.

Here one can also observe a clash between the Habsburg universalism sup-
ported by religious doctrine and the Venetian republicanism that located civic
identity, rather than religious duty, at the center. While the sovereignty of Philip
II was expressed in religious terms and historically the making of the Castilian

as offering to provide stable labor in the Cretan Arsenal, making small donations and granting
safe-conducts to the *banditi* among their numbers. ASV, *SDelC*, fil. 11, 6 February 1606, m.v.
Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 84. Still, it is
worth noting that while religion did not seem to establish a link between Venice and his Greek
subjects, the subjection did: the latter carefully avoided being subsumed into the much larger
community of Ottoman Greeks and insisted on identifying themselves as members of the Vene-
tian community. They regularly asked from the baili *fedi* and *bollottini*, documents that attested
to their status of Venetian subjects so that they would not have to pay the *kharaj* tax. Ibid., 88.

119 According to Brian Pullan, citizenship and patriciate comprised “two élites which, though legally
distinct, discharged analogous economic, social and administrative functions.” Patricians were
not a military caste; in spite of the differences in their status, the two classes derived their wealth
from similar sources and even intermarried to a limited extent. Brian Pullan, *Rich and Poor in
Renaissance Venice: The Social Institutions of a Catholic State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1971), 105-107.

120 Spanish Habsburg monarchs considered themselves as the defender of the faith. Charles V,
for instance, pursued a messianic imperialism in his struggle against the Ottomans and the
Protestants. Juan Sánchez Montes, *Franceses, Protestantes, Turcos: Los españoles ante la política
internacional de Carlos V* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1995), 42-51. As for Philip II’s
reign, the religious principle always prevailed over political calculation. This was the result of a
distinctive political philosophy expressed in messianic imperialism. Philip II, who saw himself
as *rex et sacerdos*, felt that he possessed a direct mandate to uphold the Catholic faith and to
this end his number one priority was to defend the Catholic Church: *Suma Ratio pro Religione,*

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kings had a deep religious element, the legitimacy of the Venetian government did not derive from religion. A republic with a well-ordered system of magistracies, it imbued its inhabitants with a sense of civic identity so much so that one contemporary saying went *non est vivere extra Venetiis*. Not only a political ideology shared by an exclusive political elite but also a myth communicated to masses by means of art, architecture, literature, history, and most importantly civic rituals, the myth of Venice made the Venetians believe that they lived in an exceptional place: a divinely ordained centre of religious, civic and commercial life, governed by a balanced constitution in the Aristotelian sense, one that harmonized the monarchy, aristocracy, and republican liberty. Someone born in Venice belonged to a privileged community; he was a member of the Most Serene Republic, a polity that was protected by St. Mark and autonomous from other powers in the world. In short, he was a proud Venetian.

The emphasis on *patria* during the negotiations between Hasan and the baili demonstrates Hasan’s awareness of his status as a citizen of a republic with civic institutions; one can sense a veiled sentiment of pride. Other Venetian renegades also expressed similar civic concerns. Beatrice Michiel/Fatma, the sister of the influential Chief White Eunuch Gazanfer Agha, is a case in point. Having converted to Islam and married an Ottoman officer, Beatrice left her estate in Venice to three charitable institutions: the Hospital of the Pietà as well as the nunneries

as one contemporary historian writing on Philip II’s life asserted. It is important to note that this was a popular image accepted by his subjects as well. While contemporary historians and artists portrayed him as the defender of the faith, a powerful propaganda machine supported the king’s religious image with triumphal arches, sermons, medals and commissioned books. Parker, *Grand Strategy of Philip II*, 92-109.


122 On these rituals, see Edward Muir, *Civic Ritual*. Muir argues that while ideology is the exclusive possession of politically or educationally advantaged groups, myth is the communal property of the entire society. Ibid., 57. Ritual is the most effective way to communicate a myth to the masses.

123 With its roots in the medieval ages, the “myth of Venice” was transformed into a coherent political ideology in the sixteenth century. It was a mythic vision of Venice as a sovereign and free city with a perfected social hierarchy and contented classes.

of Santa Croce and the Convertite. Even though these three were religious institutions, Tobias Graf convincingly argued that her motivations were “civic” and “charitable” rather than religious.125

Conclusion

Virginia Aksan has drawn attention to the difficulties of writing pre-modern lives in the field of Ottoman history.126 She has asserted that the lack of personal records due to the “communal silence” as well as the “amnesia of the archives,” a direct result of the oral nature of Ottoman correspondence, reduced the Ottomanists to ‘listening to silence’ in order to reconstruct the lives of the Ottomans. What Aksan has suggested for eighteenth-century sources is even truer in our period where the archival documentation is thinner, more formulaic and less diversified; in the sixteenth century, through the records of a yet-to-develop chancellery, the voices of the Ottomans are simply harder to reconstruct.

As this article tries to show, the solution to this problem lies in diversifying the source base by including European archival and other primary sources which recorded daily conversations between the European diplomats and the Ottoman grandees. By reading between the lines in these cross-confessional dialogues, the historian can overcome the Ottoman sources’ taciturnity especially while dealing with personal issues such as conversion, memory, and identity.

Regular meetings between the two Venetians, one the resident ambassador of his fatherland in a rival capital and the other a self-made renegade entrepreneur who reached the top in an infidel empire, are curious episodes of cross-confessional diplomacy in the early modern Mediterranean. They possess the unique potential to demonstrate us how an Ottoman renegade pasha perceived his passage from one religious community to another, how he felt about his conversion, how he resolved his inner conflicts and what kind of a role his tangled loyalties played in diplomatic negotiations. As such hesitations were extremely dangerous to be expressed publicly, it could not be expected that the Ottoman sources, already

125 According to him, had she been motivated by religious concerns she would have chosen Pia Casa dei Catacumeni, a religious institution that prepared neophytes for membership in the Catholic community. Graf, “‘I am Still Yours,’” 181-3.
silent about even the most innocent personal detail, would reveal the Ottoman grandees’ link with their past and their sympathies for their former fatherlands.

It is this potential that prompted us to delve into the mindset of a relatively overlooked figure of sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Hasan’s Western Mediterranean origin, a liability for a career in the imperial capital, has become an asset for the historian. The common background and the shared political vocabulary between Hasan and the baili, recorded on paper by the latter, allow the historian to catch a glimpse of Hasan’s persona and reconstruct identity tensions in an Ottoman renegade. Given that the Venetian ambassadorial dispatches are one of the two regularly classified corpora of diplomatic correspondence that had the potential to shed light on Ottoman individuals (the other is Austrian diplomatic correspondence), we know more about a Venetian renegade such as Hasan than many other more important figures of the time.

In Ottoman historiography focusing on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, even the most prominent sultans and grand viziers were left without an extensive biography.  

Neither do some of those few monographs that include in their title the name of an Ottoman individual reveal much about their subjects’ feelings or personal opinions. Thus, in the face of the double forces of “communal silence” and the “amnesia of archives,” the Ottomanists had to face the dangers inherent in “the imaginary and ambiguous reconstruction of historical lives and the messy intertwining of the factual with the speculative.” This article ventured into this hazardous task in order to give voice to at least one of the numerous political figures that steered the empire’s policy and strategy.

127 One notable exception is Feridun Emecen, Zamamın İskenderi, Şarkın Fatihi: Yavuz Sultan Selim (İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2010).


Abstract This article concentrates on the relationship between the Ottoman Grand Admiral Uluc Hasan Pasha (Hasan Veneziano), a Venetian renegade, and the Venetian ambassadors (baili) in Istanbul. Based on documentation from Venetian and Spanish archives, it analyzes how two compatriot’s shared background shaped diplomatic negotiations and their personal relationship. First, it scrutinizes several aspects of this mutually beneficent cooperation in the higher echelons of cross-confessional diplomacy. Secondly, it studies Hasan’s vacillation between the Serenissima and the Ottoman Empire, his past and present, his patria and his new homeland. It examines how this Ottoman convert resolved his inner conflicts and what kind of a role his tangled loyalties played in diplomatic negotiations. Finally, by comparing and contrasting a number of similar cross-confessional diplomatic negotiations between Christian rulers and renegade pashas, it aims to analyze the Europeans’ different attitude towards Ottoman renegades and illustrate how divergences in imperial projects and the renegades’ social background led the Habsburgs and the Venetians employ different arguments and use a different vocabulary while negotiating with their former subjects. Keywords: Conversion, renegade, identity, subjecthood, belonging, cross-confessional diplomacy, secret diplomacy, Ottoman Grand Admiral, bailo, Ottoman – Venetian relations, Spanish Habsburgs.

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