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# Integration Trends Among Syrian Refugees: The Case of Gaziantep City

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## Abstract

Today, the overwhelming wave of refugees is a problem experienced by Turkey as well as the wider world. By now a busy route of immigration, Turkey became the scene of the largest and most rapid mobility of refugees in the Republic era, as the Syrian Civil War began and intensified. According to official figures, there are around 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. That figure is not distributed homogenously throughout the country, and is mostly clustered in the cities closer to the Syrian border, and in metropolises. Indeed, one can even speak of a concentration in specific neighborhoods of such cities. Such a state of affairs was not conducive -to say the least- to the adaptation of the refugees, and their integration with the local population, for the refugees bring their own culture, behavior patterns, life styles, ideologies, religions, languages, and life-long habits wherever they go. The areas receiving the refugees, in turn, have their own and distinct socio-cultural patterns. Therefore, immigration also refers to the meeting of distinct economic, socio-cultural, and ideological patterns of two distinct areas, in just one. This, in turn, plays a positive or negative part on the cultural, economic, and social integration of the two cultures, with reference to the level of similarity or difference thereof. The present study is based on a survey carried out with 240 refugees in the city of Gaziantep, which hosts approximately 10% of the refugees in Turkey. The survey was directed towards individuals in the 15-34 age group, which may arguably be the group with the highest potential for resistance towards adaptation in Turkey. The survey results were analyzed both with respect to specific groups based on gender, age, race, level of education, and profession, as well as in general. The ultimate aim was to shed light on the perceived obstacles before the social integration of Syrian refugees. The findings shed light on a detailed discussion on the problems of cultural integration Syrian refugees suffered in the city of Gaziantep.

**Keywords:** Syrian refugees, Integration, City of Gaziantep, Turkey, Adaptation

## Introduction

Immigration is a collective act brought about by social change, and affects both societies involved -the source as well as the destination- (Castles and Miller, 2008: 29). Immigration is not only about spatial redistribution; it is essentially a dynamic change leading to further changes on the social, economic and cultural fronts. Immigration can supply qualified human resources in the form of a cheap and dynamic work force (Sönmez ve Mete, 2015), all the while leading to negative consequences by emphasizing the differences between

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and segregation of social groups, not to mention cultural and socio-economic problems (Sirkeci and Yüceşahin, 2014:2-3). A long-term analysis of immigrants is no simple task. According to Timothy Hatton (2016) immigration can lead to negative consequences on the economic front, and may lead to failures on part of the individuals to get over the psychological pressures preventing adaptation. On the other hand, the enrichment of the culture as a consequence of immigration is often deemed a gain. Yet, for culture to be enriched, cultural adaptation must take place (Hatton, 2016). As the individuals' adaptation to the labor force in the economic sense is limited to the work the individual carries out, it is easier; cultural socialization and fusion, however, is another story. This is because there is no easy way to make different cultures mingle quickly. In particular, the transition period requires substantial change. In the beginning of that process, the individual severs her relationship with her existing social role and status, and thus begins a disassociation with her past. Thereafter, the process for adaptation with new roles starts, leading to change itself. In the final stage, the individual naturalizes in her new role and status, whereupon cultural adaptation takes place (Montreuil and Bourhis, 2001). Of course the cultural adaptation of individual immigrants is not enough in and of itself. Those hosting immigrants should also develop an understanding for the immigrants, prioritize social and cultural respect, and above all, accept living together. Otherwise, the adaptation of the immigrants can occur only as a form of assimilation, and does not culminate in genuine cultural integration.

The cultural adaptation depends on the actual acculturation strategy embraced. The development of the relationships between the groups occurs through a number of strategies the literature refers to as: *multiculturalism*, *melting pot*, *segregation and exclusion*. In this context, when the *separation* strategy is applied, the result would be *segregation*. In the same vein, the dominant group's efforts towards the *marginalization* of immigrant groups leads to *exclusion*, while efforts to facilitate *cultural diversity* brings about *multiculturalism*. (Berry, 1997, s. 10) The studies carried out so far with immigrant groups reveal that the integration strategy is the most popular option, and it is also the acculturation strategy that facilitates adaptation most. The second leading strategy is separation. Marginalization, on the other hand, is the least popular strategy. A perspective focusing on the experiences of the immigrants alone is not sufficient to understand the acculturation process. Indeed, the process is actually one of a mutual transformation through interaction between the two groups. (Şeker, 2015, s. 16) Furthermore, the inclination of the immigrant individuals to compare their existing cultures with the new culture, coupled with the usually negative attitudes towards the

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new one they face can often lead to resistance to embracing the new culture (Meşe, 1999; Aliyev and Öğülmüş, 2016). Perhaps Turkey's most important shortcoming on this front is the lack of a clearly delineated strategy towards culture. Even detailed analyses, reports, and academic studies about immigrants are lacking. In this context, the problems experienced by and the expectations of the refugees are virtually unknown, leading to a lack of information to help choose the applicable strategy.

The Syrian Civil War which began in 2011 led to the flight of more than 4 million of which ended up in Turkey. The crisis which erupted in Syria brought about one of the largest population movements and refugee crises the world had ever seen, and made approximately more than six million people refugees (UNHCR, 2019). As the conflict went on and on, the refugees began to cause certain effects on the political, economic, social and security fronts in the recipient countries (Tunç, 2015: 30). Today, in many provinces of Turkey, Syrian refugees live side by side with Turkish citizens, and engage in various forms of interaction at schools, marketplaces, and work. This development has numerous positive and negative consequences, and various layers and individuals of society are trying to digest these consequences (Kara et al., 2016: 950)

The Syrian refugees have not been distributed homogeneously throughout Turkey, and have clustered rather at a number of provinces on the border between Turkey and Syria, and other metropolises. In particular, the economic structure in metropolitan areas significantly affected the spatial density and segregation of asylum seekers (Arapoglou, 2006, s. 16). Indeed, the economic profile of Syrian asylum seekers in Gaziantep is also low, so it has to be forced to choose the shanty neighborhoods as a necessity (Sönmez, 2016). A number of economic concerns such as the reduced chances of employment and increased rent figures, as well as certain socio-cultural differences came to gain prominence in these areas of dense refugee settlement. In particular, in the city of Gaziantep uneasiness based mostly on economic concerns run along with socio-cultural issues. These contrasts is closely related with the compatibility of the minority culture introduced through immigration, and the dominant culture, and the level of acculturation levels of the individuals belonging to different cultures. The study focused on the city of Gaziantep, which hosts approximately more than 400 thousand Syrian refugees (Göç İdaresi, 2019). The fact that, in Gaziantep, refugees are concentrated mostly in low-income shantytown neighborhoods makes interactions between the refugees and the local population, and therefore the social integration of the former group a harder task (Sönmez and Adıgüzel, 2017, s. 798). As adaptation is a two-sided process, the

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problems and expectations of the refugees, and their perspectives towards Turkey should be understood clearly. Indeed, the Syrian refugees in Gaziantep have certain economic, cultural and social concerns. And the prominence of such concerns vary by gender, age, race, profession, and level of education. Against this background, the present study aims to reveal the relationship between gender, age, race, profession, and level of education of Syrian refugees, and their inclinations towards adaptation. In this context, the factors affecting the adaptation of the refugees were discussed, along with the presentation of various solutions.

### **Materials and Methods**

Within the framework of the study, a survey was carried out with a random set of 240 respondents from the 15-35 age group, in order to understand how inclined the refugees are towards adaptation. The primary reason for choosing this age group lies in the fact that the members of this age group are the ones with the highest level of resistance towards adaptation, and would, in the event that they do not return to their home country, constitute the primary element of the Syrian refugee population in Turkey. The demographics of Syria were also taken into consideration to ensure that the survey results provide insights into the views of the Syrian refugees in general, and respondents were selected to meet these requirements. Therefore, the members of the survey group were selected with reference to their gender, age, race, profession, and level of education.

59.43% of the respondents are men, and 40.57% are women. 1.44% of the respondents are illiterate, while 28.98% have received primary education, 31.88% received secondary education, 33.33% bachelor's degrees, and 4.34% post-graduate degrees. 14.49% of the respondents were in the age group 15-19, while the age groups 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34 respectively accounted for 26.08%, 31.88%, and 27.53% of the respondents. 10.14% of the respondents were housewives; a further 10.14% were unemployed, 26.08% were civil servants, 28.98% were workers, 4.34% were shopkeepers, and 20.28% were students. Arabs amounted to 43.10% the respondents, while Turkmens comprised 34.48%, and Kurds a further 22.41%.

The results of the survey were evaluated on the basis of the abovementioned criteria, leading to a number of distinct conclusions.

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## Results

### *Specific Results*

Within the framework of the study, the respondents were asked about their perceptions of Turkey before and after their arrival in Turkey, with a view to understanding how their perceptions changed. The prudent course of analysis regarding these views, on the other hand, should be based on the ethnic backgrounds of the respondents. For, understanding the variations in perceptions in overall and for specific groups in Syria -a country called home by various ethnic groups- is key to understanding why the perceptions of Syrian refugees in Turkey change. 95% of the Turkmens reported that they had very good or good perceptions of Turkey before actually coming here, while the corresponding rates among Arabs and Kurds are more than 55% and around 50% respectively. The remainder of the Kurds and Turkmens and 40% of Arabs reported not to have any specific perceptions before coming to Turkey. No respondent reported to have a very bad perception of Turkey before coming here, while 4% of Arab respondents reported a bad perception. Such perceptions, however, were altered substantially after their arrival in Turkey. In particular, 60% of the Turkmens, whose perceptions of Turkey had been almost unanimously positive before their arrival, noted their disappointment with Turkey, and a turn for the negative in their outlook. In contrast, Arabs are the ethnic group among which the largest rate (32%) of positive views remained. Among the Kurds, the comparable rate is 23%. Yet, among Turkmens, who had very good opinions of Turkey before their arrival, that rate was just 15%. In general, 23% of the respondents reported a positive change in their views after arriving in Turkey, while approximately 38% reported no change, and around 39% reported a change for the worse (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Refugees' views about Turkey.

		What was your perception of Turks before your arrival in Turkey?					How did your views change after your arrival?		
		Very good	Good	Bad	Very bad	I did not have an opinion	Positive	Negative	None
Ethnicity	Turkmen	65	30	0	0	5	15	60	25
	Arab	32	24	4	0	40	32	28	40
	Kurd	32	15	0	0	53	23	30	46

The willingness of the refugees to become permanent residents of Turkey, provided that they are granted citizenship, also vary by their ethnicity. Kurds are the group which voice the highest interest in such a probability, with a rate of 61%, followed by Turkmen (50%), and Arabs (36%). The highest rate of the respondents who would not stay permanently even if citizenship is granted belong to Arabs ethnic group (36%). Kurds, on the other hand, constitute the group which is most inclined (61%) to return to Syria if a favorable environment comes into existence there, even if Turkish citizenship is granted in the meantime. These are followed by Arabs (56%), which are nonetheless are not very willing to stay. Turkmen, on the other hand, are the group which express the lowest amount of interest in returning even if favorable conditions arise in Syria, against a background of Turkish citizenship. Turkmen rank at the top of the ethnic groups which consider Turkey as their homeland (45%). In contrast, the same figure is less than 30% among Arabs and Kurds. Kurds are the ethnic group which do not consider Turkey as their homeland to the largest extent (46%). On the other hand, they are also the group (46%) which are willing to build a shared future with Turkish citizens, while Turkmen (55%) are the group which are least interested in building a shared future in Turkey. This figures reflect a significant contradiction. Approximately half of Arab respondents were unwilling to build a shared future with Turks (Table 2).

**Table 2.** The refugees’ willingness to stay in Turkey or return, broken down by ethnicity.

Are you willing to stay in Turkey assuming you are granted citizenship?				Will you be willing to return if favorable conditions arise in Syria, even though you were granted citizenship here in the meantime?				
		Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe	
<b>Ethnicity</b>	Turkmen	50	20	30	20	45	35	
	Arab	36	36	28	56	12	32	
	Kurd	61	30	7	61	15	23	
	<b>Do you consider Turkey as your homeland?</b>				<b>Are you willing to build a shared future with Turkish citizens?</b>			
		Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe	
	Turkmen	45	15	40	40	5	55	
	Arab	28	32	40	32	20	48	
	Kurd	23	46	30	46	15	38	

In an analysis based on age groups, 25 years old or older respondents express the greatest interest towards Turkish citizenship. Around 60% of this age group have a favorable view of Turkish citizenship. In contrast, in the age group 15-24, just around 30% have such an outlook. Indeed, among the age group 15-19, 50% of the respondents do not intend to stay in Turkey on a permanent basis, even if Turkish citizenship is granted to them. In the same vein, 70% of the respondents in the 15-19 age group noted their willingness to return to Syria in case favorable conditions arise there, even if they were granted Turkish citizenship in the meantime. The respondents' willingness to return vary with reference to the age group involved, yet is least prominent with the age group 25-29. The willingness to consider Turkey as a homeland also varies by age. Just 10% of those in the age group 15-19 consider Turkey home, while the comparable figure for those older than 19 is 40%. This picture for the question about the respondents' willingness to build a shared future with Turks is also similar (Table 3).

**Table 3.** The refugees' willingness to stay in Turkey or return, broken down by age groups.

Are you willing to stay in Turkey on a permanent basis, assuming you are granted citizenship?				Will you be willing to return if favorable conditions arise in Syria, even though you were granted citizenship here in the meantime?			
				Yes	No	Maybe	
Age	15-19	30	50	20	70	20	10
	20-24	33	33	33	44	16	38
	25-29	59	18	22	27	27	45
	30-34	57	26	15	42	36	21
	Do you consider Turkey as your homeland?				Would you be willing to build a shared future with people in Turkey?		
					Yes	No	Maybe
	15-19	10	60	30	10	60	30
	20-24	22	33	44	38	22	38
	25-29	40	22	36	36	9	54
	30-34	36	26	36	42	5	52

The refugees willingness to stay/return and build a shared future also vary with reference to their literacy rates. All the illiterate respondents had a favorable view of Turkish citizenship, but were found to be undecided in terms of their willingness to return in the face of favorable conditions in Syria even if Turkish citizenship is granted in the meantime, the

perception of Turkey as their home, and their willingness to build a shared future with Turks. In contrast, the respondents with the highest level of education (post-graduate) were more willing to consider Turkey as their homeland, had a favorable view of Turkish citizenship, and are not willing to return to Syria even if favorable conditions arise there. The group most willing to return to Syria in case of favorable conditions there, even if Turkish citizenship is granted in the meantime, is the ones with primary or secondary education. Indeed, less than 25% of the respondents from these groups consider Turkey as their homeland. Those with a bachelor’s degree, in turn, rank just behind these groups (Table 4).

**Table 4.** The refugees’ willingness to stay/return with reference to their level of education.

Are you willing to stay in Turkey assuming you are granted citizenship?				Will you be willing to return if favorable conditions arise in Syria, even though you were granted citizenship here in the meantime?			
	Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe	
<b>Level of Education</b>	Illiterate	100	0	0	0	100	
	Primary education	60	30	10	51	30	
	Secondary education	31	38	31	56	31	
	Bachelor’s degree	47	23	30	30	30	
	Post-graduate	66	33	0	0	33	
	<b>Do you consider Turkey as your homeland?</b>				<b>Would you be willing to build a shared future with the people of Turkey?</b>		
		Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe
	Illiterate	0	0	100	0	0	100
	Primary education	24	36	40	30	25	45
	Secondary education	22	47	31	31	38	31
	Bachelor’s degree	39	17	43	42	0	58
	Post-graduate	67	33	0	35	0	65



A substantial difference can be observed in a break-down by gender. Approximately half of all women (46%) and men (50%) would be willing to stay in Turkey, assuming Turkish citizenship is granted, the two genders have different outlooks voiced in response to other questions. For instance, just 14% of women consider Turkey as their homeland, that figure rises to 43% among men. In the same vein, only 21% of women are willing to build a shared future with Turks, compared to 44% of men. Furthermore, the female respondents' willingness to return to Syria in the face of favorable conditions there, even if they are granted Turkish citizenship in the meantime, is higher than the comparable figure among male respondents (Table 5).

**Table 5.** The refugees' willingness to stay in Turkey or return, broken down by gender.

Do you consider Turkey as your homeland?				Would you be willing to build a shared future with the people of Turkey?				
		Yes	No	Partly	Yes	No	Maybe	
Gender	Female	14	33	53	21	22	57	
	Male	43	31	26	44	17	39	
	<b>Are you willing to stay in Turkey assuming you are granted citizenship?</b>				<b>Will you be willing to return if favorable conditions arise in Syria, even though you were granted citizenship here in the meantime?</b>			
			Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe
	Female	46	33	21	48	10	42	
	Male	50	26	24	39	37	24	

The analysis based on professions reveals that housewives and the unemployed clearly do not consider Turkey as their homeland, and are unwilling to build a shared future with Turks. In contrast, government employees (civil servants) express a favorable outlook in response to both questions. Indeed, the unemployed are interested in getting Turkish citizenship, but also are the group most willing to return to Syria provided that favorable conditions arise there. The civil servants and shopkeepers, on the other hand, have the completely opposite outlook. For instance, 60% of the civil servants express a willingness to build a shared future with Turks, while the majority of the remainder are undecided on that issue. The shopkeepers, students, and workers, however, do not present a significant clustering in terms of their outlook about the matters discussed (Table 6).

**Table 6.** The refugees’ willingness to stay in Turkey or return, broken down by occupation.

<b>Do you consider Turkey as your homeland?</b>				<b>Would you be willing to build a shared future with the people of Turkey?</b>			
	Yes	No	Partly	Yes	No	Maybe	
<b>Occupation</b>	Housewife	14	15	71	0	0	100
	Unemployed	14	58	28	28	44	28
	Civil servant	45	22	33	57	5	38
	Worker	25	35	40	30	25	45
	Shopkeeper	34	66	0	34	33	33
	Student	35	30	35	35	23	42
	<b>Are you willing to stay in Turkey assuming you are granted citizenship?</b>				<b>Will you be willing to return if favorable conditions arise in Syria, even though you were granted citizenship here in the meantime?</b>		
		Yes	No	Maybe	Yes	No	Maybe
	Housewife	58	28	14	28	15	57
	Unemployed	28	58	14	72	28	0
	Civil servant	56	33	11	38	46	16
	Worker	55	20	25	45	15	40
	Shopkeeper	34	33	33	33	67	0
	Student	35	23	42	36	14	50

The respondents were also asked about their complaints, in order to ascertain the grounds of their outlook concerning the abovementioned issues. In this context, the most commonly voiced complaint is about exclusion and scorn.

**Table 7.** The refugees' general complaints by ethnicity.

		Ethnicity			Age				Level of education				
		Turkish	Arab	Kurd	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	Illiterate	Primary education	Secondary education	Bachelor's	Post-Grad
What is your complaint?	Exclusion-scorn	35	28	30	30	33	22	25	100	30	40	17	0
	Racist attitudes	15	12	2	30	16	15	5	0	20	18	8	0
	Exploitation of labor	15	20	7	20	18	18	28	0	20	13	21	34
	I have no complaint	35	40	61	20	33	45	42	0	30	27	52	66

### **General Results**

The views the respondents had about Turks, before their actual arrival in Turkey, had also changed substantially since. Prior to their arrival in Turkey, 43.37% of the respondents had very favorable opinions of Turks, followed by 26.08% with favorable opinions, and 28.98% with no opinion, with just 1.44% having unfavorable opinions. 31.88% did not have any change in their views after their arrival, while 23.18% mentioned change for the better, and 44.92% for the worse. A study carried out in year 2000 surveyed and interviewed a number of Arab citizens (including those from Syria). According to the results of that study, 62% of professors, merchants, artists and intellectuals had favorable opinions of Turks before their arrival in Turkey. The comparable rate among the students is 39%. Once they got acquainted with Turks, 76% of them experienced a change for the better in terms of their views of Turks, bringing the favorable view to around 90%. The study noted that the unfavorable perception of Turks stemmed from the labels “arrogant, despotic, and occupant” associated with the Turks, while the basic grounds of sympathy with the Turks is based on the view that they are “brothers and fellow Muslims” (El-Dakuki, 2001). The present study reached comparable findings as well, albeit with certain changes.

37.68% voiced no complaints, while those noting complaints about being subjected to exclusion and scorn rank at the top of the list, with a rate of 27.53%. They are followed by

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those noting exploitation of labor (18.84%), and racist attitudes (14.49%). Among those reporting exploitation of labor or exclusion and scorn, the unemployed and the workers rank at the top of the list, while housewives and shopkeepers complain mostly about racist attitudes. More than 55% of civil servants and students note no complaints.

The refugees' attitudes towards agencies in Turkey are mostly favorable. 40.57% of the respondents said that the agencies are very responsive and sincere, with a further 28.98% reporting generally favorable views. 30.43% of the respondents, on the other hand, raise complaints about the agencies. The perceptions about the attitudes of Turkish citizens, on the other hand, are somewhat less favorable. 36.28% of the respondents voiced a favorable view of the citizens' attitudes, with 27.08% noting acceptable attitudes, with the remaining 36.62% noting concerns about the attitudes of the citizens.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

The study found that ethnicity is the most important factor in terms of affecting the respondents' views of Turks. In particular, before their arrival, the Turkmens considered Turkey as their homeland, and had strong bonds with the country, and duly had favorable views about it. Yet, after their immigration, they saw their views about Turkey change for the worse, as they were disappointed with the level of interest and welcome they received. Indeed, 95% of the Turkmens had a very favorable opinion of Turkey before their arrival, but 60% had their views change for the worse afterwards. One can safely say that the Turkmens were disappointed in terms of their expectations from Turkey. Yet, 45% of Turkmens still see Turkey as their homeland, while 40% note that they could live with the Turks in the future, without any problems. This outlook on part of the Turkmens, despite the noted change in their views, is perhaps related with the historical and ethnic ties they have. 20% of Turkmens report their willingness to return to Syria in case favorable conditions arise there. Arabs and Kurds, on the other hand, did not see substantial change in their views, and exhibit very high levels of willingness to return, approaching around 60%. Arabs are the group with the strongest will to return. This is perhaps related with the development of a "Arab" impression in Turkey in general. In particular, the use of the word "Arab" as a derogatory adjective leads to a major concerns. Therefore, those from the Arab ethnic group note the lowest amount of interest in case they are granted Turkish citizenship. Furthermore, assuming that Arabs had ranked higher in the social hierarchy of Syria, enjoying better conditions, this outlook may be easier to understand. A large portion of Kurds, in turn, do not consider Turkey as their homeland,

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but state that they would be willing to stay in Turkey in case they are granted citizenship, and that they would reach shared grounds with Turks. Yet, interestingly, they are also the group which note the highest level of interest in returning to Syria, provided that favorable conditions arise there. This is perhaps mostly related with the Kurds' expectations concerning Syria. It would be feasible to hypothesize that Kurds, who are both willing to stay in Turkey and to return to Syria, are more inclined to adaptation, compared to other ethnic groups.

- ✓ Taking the picture summarized above into account, the refugees' bonds with Turkey are based mostly on ethnic conceptions, rather than Islamic or cultural ones.
- ✓ The Kurds constitute the ethnic group which can be deemed undecided the most. Against this background, their willingness to return is mostly based on the development of favorable conditions. In contrast, the Turkmens are not really willing to return. This is clearly associated with their view that conditions favorable to them would not arise in Syria. Better expectations the Arabs and the Kurds harbor with respect to Syria, in turn, reinforce their motivation levels, and lead to action in line with their expectations.

Yet another important finding of the study is about age. In particular, just 10% of the youth (15-19 age group) which would grow into the dominant age group among the refugees in Turkey in the future, consider Turkey as their home. In the same vein, just 10% of this age group note a willingness to build a shared future with the Turks, while 70% intend to return in case favorable conditions arise. This is arguably about the high levels of impact cultural clashes have on the youth, making them feel excluded, and therefore experience acculturation stress (Romero & Roberts, 2003). On the other hand, as the respondents aged closer to 30 voice changes in those rates, and exhibit a group more inclined to adaptation. Even though racism ranks low among the complaints voiced by all respondents, substantial racism is observed to arise among the youth. One can forcefully argue that the youth, who may be forced to coexist with the Turks in the future, feel the strain of exclusion.

This would trigger

- ✓ Increased racism among the youth,
  - ✓ An environment conducive to social and cultural conflicts,
  - ✓ Marginalization of the youth, leading them to terrorist organizations,
  - ✓ Ghettoization, and
  - ✓ Segregation
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An important finding demanding further discussion is about the level of education. As the refugees' level of education increases, they express a more favorable outlook towards adaptation. In particular, those who had received secondary education or less express a higher willingness to return, and lower inclination to consider Turkey as their home. In contrast, among those with a bachelor's degree or post-graduate degree, the willingness to stay and attachment levels are markedly higher.

- ✓ As the level of education rises, the relations with government agencies improve, along with the skills of self-expression and communication. These factors contribute to enhanced social adaptation on part of the individual.
- ✓ Furthermore, individuals with a higher level of education are more inclined towards empathy, and thus have a more understanding outlook towards the concerns Turkey has on this matter.
- ✓ In this light, significant projects for the education of the refugees, boosting their education levels, is a definite must. Failure to do so will only grow a thoroughly dissatisfied group willing to engage in conflict. The low level of education among the refugees in Turkey increase this risk substantially.

Another important finding of the study is about the occupations and the economy in general. In particular, the unemployed and housewives express really low levels of sympathy towards Turkey. The workers also express similar views. In contrast, the shopkeepers, civil servants (paid employees of various government agencies) and students note a higher level of commitment to Turkey. Economic interests and incomes can go a long way in explaining this picture. Indeed, as the unemployed and workers complain mostly about the exploitation of labor, while the shopkeepers and civil servants are rather concerned about racist attitudes. These concerns seemingly arise out of continued discussions about contracted personnel employed by various government agencies in Turkey, and about Syrian shopkeepers. It is true that economics is the most important means towards establishing deep-rooted relationships between the citizens (Iceland, 2014). Therefore, the steps Turkey is to take on this front are most crucial.

- ✓ The economic status of the refugees will determine their future position in Turkey.
  - ✓ Their attitudes towards social, cultural, and ethnic issues will change in parallel to their economic earnings.
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The refugees' gender-based perspectives towards Turkey are also crucial. Given the fact that women are the group that raises the children, and that women are also have virtually no interest in integration into Turkish society, the future may bring substantial problems. The refugee women's willingness to embrace Turkey as their home, and their willingness to stay are very low. In contrast, the men seem to be much more interested in integration in Turkey, and in living together. Yet, the perspective of the women will be a more predominant determinant of the outlook of the next generation of refugees. Therefore, one of the fundamental contributions to reducing social conflict, in the event that the refugees do not return to Syria, could be made by altering the women's outlook for the better. Indeed, the views of women differ substantially from those of the men. This discrepancy is probably associated with sociological and psychological factors. In particular, the relative freedom of movement the men have in Turkey, their ability to work in various occupations, compared to the alternative of returning to Syria to take part in the war, may go a long way in understanding their more favorable outlook. On the other hand, refugee women live in the same society as Turkish women, but do not have a life comfortable enough to be comparable to those of Turkish women on the social and economic front, which can lead to negative psychological motivations.

- ✓ One should never forget that today's social conflicts and acts of terror, and particularly the ones the West experiences, are triggered by second and third generation immigrants, rather than first generation.
- ✓ Indeed, the analysis of the results with reference to age groups reveal that the 15-19 age group suffer from the lowest rates of adaptation to Turkey.

The attitudes of the citizens and agencies of the Republic of Turkey play a major part in determining the adaptation levels of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The respondents generally noted a higher level of satisfaction with the attitudes of the agencies, compared to less favorable opinions about the attitudes of individual citizens. 6% more of the respondents voiced complaints about the attitudes of individuals, compared to those complaining about the attitudes of agencies. Such attitudes reveal the need for individuals to be more careful about their relationships with refugees. The citizens of the Republic of Turkey need to get accustomed to the idea that the refugees are part of this society, even if for a temporary time frame only, and to meet them on common ground. The same applies for the refugees as well. The refugees need to make more effort to adapt to society, and to be more respectful of the culture, customs, and traditions of Turks. In other words, even if the refugees do not embrace

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Turkey as their homeland, or do not envisage a shared future with the Turks, they need to accept it as the only place extending open arms to them, providing them the means to sustain their life, if only for a limited time. Otherwise, integration will be a much harder task, and will lead to insurmountable problems in the future.

Furthermore, in a case comparable to the one which happened in Europe, Turkey will also see individuals lacking the skills required for adaptation to and integration with the social order, as well as qualifications and education will cluster in certain neighborhoods, bringing about ghettos inhabited by these minorities only. (Fuller, 2010; Sönmez, 2016) This will pose substantial social problems in Turkey, including but not limited to its metropolises. Therefore, it is necessary to settle the immigrants homogeneously in cities throughout Turkey, and to keep them under the control of the state.

In conclusion, Turkey, in performing its humanitarian duty by accepting approximately 4 million Syrian refugees, also took substantial risks. The failure to ensure the adaptation of these immigrants, who are not deemed very likely to return in the short-term may lead to significant social problems and episodes associated with the refugees, in a period of 5 to 10 years. The present study focused mostly on the youth, and found that the young, women, unemployed, and illiterate are not very enthusiastic about adaptation. Taking into account the fact that the women, children, unemployed, and the young constitute a majority of the refugees, coupled with their low level of education, it would not be far-fetched to argue that future may bring serious problems to Turkey. On the other hand, individuals around the age of 30, with a higher level of education and economic income are observed to be more inclined towards adaptation. Indeed, the older the refugee, the more emphatic the loyalty for the sacrifice of Turkey becomes. In contrast, the individuals who arrived in Turkey as children lack such awareness. In this context, the majority of the respondents in the 15-19 age group, who noted the least inclination towards adaptation, were in 8-12 age group at the time of their arrival. These can be considered the seeds of major risks to affect Turkey in the future. Considering the fact that the vast majority of the acts of terror inflicted in the West were committed by second and third generation immigrants, this will make the risks posed by this state of affairs more evident. Another finding of this study is the prominence of ethnic identity among the refugees, compared to religious and cultural affinity. Therefore, subsequent generations of refugees could focus more on ethnicity, bringing about a society open to conflict. That is why Turkey urgently needs to develop and implement serious social,

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cultural and economic programs, in addition to just opening up the border for refugees, and providing them with material assistance.

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