Mixed Dynamism of Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Historical Actualities of Fundraising Campaigns*

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I. Mixed Dynamism of Relief

The Mixed Economy of Welfare and the Mixed Dynamism of Relief

At first it is useful to look at the idea of the mixed economy of welfare, promoted by historians of the British Empire, as a starting point for investigating the forms of relief under Ottoman modernization. Generally, the three elements

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that composed the mixed economy of welfare are broadly referred as: 1) Official aid where the main actors in relief are rulers, the government, and local authorities. 2) Mutual aid where the actors are various groups and communities both large and small formed by region, social status, religious beliefs, and occupation. 3) Private aid or self-help which aims for personal relief with the individual as the smallest unit. What should be noted here is that these three elements are not mutually exclusive. They do not form a sort of fixed hierarchy, and they do not produce a linear development in time from self-help to mutual and from there to official aid. If anything, public debate and relief efforts expand their fields in a composite and mixed manner in a particular silhouette of welfare determined by the era and region of its formation.1

In presenting a rough sketch of the debate on “the mixed economy of welfare,” the three factors shaping the composite circumstances of relief which are focused on in this paper may be particularly helpful. However, rather than recycling them uncritically, some fine-tuning of the concepts involved in the debate on the mixed economy of welfare, elaborated in the context of Western and European historical research, will be required in order to describe the Ottoman case while following the contours of the modern historical debate. In fact, it is indisputable that the term “the mixed economy of welfare” implies a kind of difficulty. In particular, the term “welfare” unavoidably carries a sense of modernity, of the contemporary, which is almost impossible to avoid. For this reason, rather than “welfare,” this paper makes frequent use of the term “relief,” a word more neutral in its overtones relating to modernity and historicity. Within this framework the phrase “mixed dynamism” seems also more commensurable rather than “mixed economy” in describing the nature and circumstances of the composite nature of relief. So, let us reaffirm that the adoption of this terminology in the present paper on the “mixed dynamism” of relief is an attempt to examine these topics in their specific Ottoman context.

**The Various Aspects of Relief**

Can we assume that if we sort out research trends on mixed dynamism of relief in modern Ottoman history all relevant issues will become visible? First, let us examine the research trends on official aid in the Ottoman context. One of the

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At any rate, the work also offers outstand
ings made by posit
ngs – that is to say, the political designs of Abdülhamid II as he attempted to maintain the legitimacy of a despotic regime by posing in the image of the monarch as a benevolent patriarch. The concept of the mixed dynamism of relief becomes difficult to discern in the book's arguments on this aspect of official aid within the context of the welfare state theory.

Next, let us turn our attention to the trends in research on self-help. Yuval Ben-Bassat's recent work Petitioning the Sultan comprehensively analyses petitions (arzuhâl) made to the authorities by local residents in the Ottoman Palestine from the late nineteenth century into the twentieth. In general, these petitions have a character of what one should term self-help in order to gain access to official aid, or self-help in order to create linkages with official aid. No form of documentation other than these petitions and requests record the statements made in order to achieve their aims. In this sense, this research on petitions throws light on the mixed relationships between self-help and official aid, reaffirming the importance of focusing on the interrelationships between the various factors of mixed dynamism of relief. Another point one should note about this

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2 Nadir Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet (1876-1914) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).
work is its emphasis on the interrelations between the development of transport and communication means to the qualitative and quantitative changes in the petition system during the late Ottoman period. During the modernization of the military system during the Crimean War (1853-56) dense telegraph lines and postal system were established from the mid-nineteenth century onwards networking the whole country. At a single swoop, post and telegraph dramatically broadened access to the petition system, in contrast to the system which hitherto required bringing documents in person to government offices.

Thus, technological progress in the means of transport and communication diversified the available means for transmitting, sharing and storing information. However, what is more important in this regard is the upsurge in the publication of newspapers and magazines in the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s, especially those in Ottoman Turkish. Not only did they offer coverage of the various aspects of relief occurring in the late Ottoman era; they also became a forum for debate on the rationality and legitimacy of relief. These debates in turn fuelled further discussion on the topic, which on the ground spurred people onto further action—in turn fanning further debate; this cycle is demonstrated in the newspapers. In thinking about the nature of relief in the late Ottoman Empire thus it is necessary to take a serious, sustained look at the technological innovations and specifically the appearance of the new public arena of newspapers and magazines, which facilitated the circulation of debate and action.

**Mutual Aid in the Late Ottoman Era**

What, then, can be said of mutual aid—the third component, along with self-help and official aid, of the mixed dynamism of relief? The fact is that mutual aid is the area of research in this field in which late Ottoman historical studies have lagged behind the most. The only possible cause of this is a one-track vision of history, in which official aid forms the main axis of the process of formation of the welfare state whereby subsuming or eliminating discussions on other various forms of relief. In order to discuss the full aspect of relief in a mixed dynamism, it is necessary to carefully unravel the composite circumstances of relief, while relativizing this kind of “history of the development of official aid.”

There are two current researchers who have developed suggestive theses on this point. One is Amy Singer. Her recent work *Charity in Islamic Societies*
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focuses on the multifarious nature of charity and good deeds in Islamic society.\(^4\) By drawing on the theory of the mixed economy of welfare and working from a standpoint of the “mixed economy of charity,” her work questions the one-track historical view in which the protagonist of relief transits from the individual and family to the modern welfare state. It also focuses on the way in which multiple actors—individuals, families, the state and also non-state entities—perform their roles in relief driven by a wide range of motives. Focusing on the arena which the mixed dynamism of relief brings about; Singer’s work shares a common approach with this paper. However, while her work seeks examples mainly in \textit{sadaqa} (voluntary donations), \textit{zakat} (obligatory donations) and \textit{waqf} (Islamic charitable institutions), in which the individual Muslim is the protagonist, the current paper focuses on the fundraising activities in newspapers.

The second example is Yaron Ayalon’s work \textit{Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire} that surveys natural disasters diachronically from the rise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the thirteenth century right through its demise in the early twentieth century.\(^5\) Using the techniques employed by (global) history of environmental and natural-disasters Ayalon’s work attempts a novel description of the course of Ottoman history. At the same time the work devotes a chapter each to the official aid provided by the Ottoman state, mutual aid as developed by local communities based on the various \textit{millets} (religious communities), and the self-help achieved by individuals under the extreme conditions of natural disaster. Although relief and welfare do not take centre stage in this work, the scope of it suggests significant possibilities for a re-examination of the overall panorama for the three factors of the mixed dynamism of relief.

Among Japanese scholars doing research on Ottoman history, Jun Akiba, looking at the late Ottoman welfare state from a comparative social and educational history perspective takes the charity fundraising activities into account which flourished in the mid-nineteenth century without forgetting the mutual aid aspect.\(^6\) However, this work too is written from the perspective of the “history


of the development of official aid.” It should be mentioned that while some of my own works centre around the fundraising developed by the privately-owned Ottoman Turkish newspapers in the second half of the nineteenth century that share some aspects of Akiba’s paper – these could not develop an inclusive position in regard to the novel nature of mutual aid for fundraising in the mixed dynamism of relief.7

Looking at the above trends and concerns in the research, this paper focuses in particular on the aspect of mutual aid. This will help, though only partially, to gain a closer understanding of the mixed dynamism of relief in the late Ottoman Empire. In concrete terms, it treats the fundraising activities developed on the pages of the burgeoning Ottoman press in the second half of the nineteenth century, searching for the position of fundraising as mutual aid in the mixed dynamism of relief. Also, in the composite circumstances of such relief, the novel nature of mutual aid is explored, where we trace the process of action on relief.

In doing so, we wish to remain aware that the newspapers and magazines did not content themselves with simply covering relief activities; they also sometimes took the initiative and became actors in fundraising themselves. Put in terms of theory on source documentation, the newspapers should not be read merely as an archival source of information on fundraising; the newspapers themselves were an actor in the circular process of debate and action on relief, and in that sense the newspaper pages constitute a “historical arena.” It is with this awareness that we approach these newspapers as historical sources.

II. The Arena of Relief

From the Scene of the Hocapaşa Great Fire

Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman Empire from the mid-fifteenth century, was a city of densely packed wooden buildings interspersed with narrow lanes. The design of the urban space left it exceptionally vulnerable to fires. Overcrowding

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became worse especially from the eighteenth century onwards, aided by an influx of immigrants from the provinces. This made the damage even greater once a fire broke out. Although the authorities encouraged road-widening and building in stone. However, given the relative ease of reconstructing wooden buildings, they turned a blind eye to it after each fire, thus creating a vicious cycle in which fire-prevention measures could make no progress. The event that decisively changed the situation was the great fire of 1865, discussed below. As it started in the major Istanbul market, Hocapaşa, it is known in history as “The Hocapaşa Fire” (Hocapaşa Yangını), or because of the waste area it affected as “The Great Fire” (Harîk-i Kebîr). This was the first major fire to receive extensive coverage in the Ottoman press. Perhaps this extensive press coverage and public opinion was the reason why the fire occasioned the progress of urban development and fire-prevention policy in Istanbul, followed by the appearance of new forms of relief in the late Ottoman period. Before thinking further on this point in more detail, let us first look at the coverage of the events in contemporary newspapers.

The following publications were the main Ottoman Turkish newspapers of Istanbul during this period: the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekâyi’; the semi-official Rûznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis (Rûznâme); and the privately-owned newspapers Tercümân-i Ahvâl and Tasvîr-i Efkar. The Rûznâme came out five days a week, with Fridays and Sundays off; Tercümân-i Ahvâl and Tasvîr-i Efkar came out three times a week. Publication of the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekâyi’, on the other hand, was limited to once a week, limiting its newsworthiness vis-a-vis the other papers. However, weekly publication had the benefit of allowing the official newspaper to run a week’s worth of events in a compiled form, and gave it the time to cover stories in detail and edit them properly. Let us thus first draw on articles from this official newspaper to trace the particulars of the Hocapaşa Great Fire.

According to issue No. 815 (19 September 1865) of the newspaper, late at night on Wednesday the 16th of Rebi’ü’l-âhir 1282AH (7 September 1865), fire broke out in the Hocapaşa district and spread south, fanned by a strong wind that was blowing that night, burning areas such as Çağaloğlu and Sedefçiler. The fire

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did not abate until the following evening spreading straight south and then west, hitting areas like Kadırga, Kumkapı and Nişanca; burning down the Sultanahmet district bordering Topkapı Palace and its surroundings. The fire is estimated to have destroyed 7,000 to 8,000 houses, along with fourteen mosques, three caravanserais, seven public baths, two detached palaces and twenty mansions.

Meanwhile, the same issue of the official newspaper announced the formation of a “committee” for the relief of the fire victims, to be set up within the government and headed by the Foreign Minister Âli Paşa (1815-71), who was a leading politician of the Tanzimat period. The report on the setting up of the Relief Committee also proclaimed that fundraising would commence under the Committee’s leadership, stating that “financial contributions” (mu’avenet-i nakdiyye) towards “our fellow countrymen suffering the trials and tribulations of the fire” (ateş-i faqr û üzrâbda süzân olan vatandaşlarımız) were a “religious and humanitarian duty” (feriza-i diyânet ve insânîyyet) for “patriotic and generous gentlemen” (ashâb-i hamiyyet ve müürüvvet) who had had the good fortune to escape damage from the fire. The newspaper announced that government officials could donate to the offices they were affiliated with, whereas private subjects could do so to the nearest government office. There, their names, titles or occupations, and the sums they had raised would be recorded in a register (defter) and they would be given a receipt. The contents of the registers would then be publicized in “announcements and newspapers” (cerîdeler ve gazeteler). We can see here how the Committee was paying attention to the issue of preserving transparency in the flow of money that the fundraising process necessitates. Also, the same issue of the official newspaper carries a list of contributions by the incumbent grand vizier Fuad Paşa (1815-69) and other members of the Relief Committee, who had taken the initiative in offering funds. In addition to the grand vizier Fuad Paşa’s donation of 80,000 kuruş, the newspaper notes the funds raised by a total of thirteen high-ranking government officials, including the head of the Relief Committee, Ali Paşa (75,000 kuruş); and the president of the Supreme Council

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9 Tâkvim-i Vekâyi’ (TV), no. 815 (27 Rebi‘ül-âhir 1282 / 19 September 1865), p. 2.
11 TV, no. 815, p. 2.
12 TV, no. 815, p. 2.
of Judicial Ordinances (Medîs-i Vâlâ-yı Abêkâm-i 'Adliyye), Kâmil Paşa (75,000 kuruş). The total fund raised was mentioned in this list as 612,000 kuruş; the newspapers of the time were sold for 1 kuruş a copy.

After this, the other newspapers followed the official newspaper’s lead in running lists of donors. The Porte had, after all, taken the initiative in initiating the fundraising campaign, in which politicians and high-ranking officials were prominent, along with central and regional government officials. Listings included members of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances—the Porte’s supreme decision-making body at the time—chamberlains of the private apartment of the Palace (Mâbeyn-i Hümüûn), şeyhülislâm and kazaskers, along with prominent ulama, judges, military commanders and members of foreign delegations in Istanbul. Among the high-ranking officials and foreign diplomats, donations made by husbands and wives as couples crop up here and there in the lists. It also bears mention that, reflecting the multinational and multi-confessional makeup of the Ottoman Empire, there are not infrequent instances of fundraising efforts by non-Muslims as well as Muslims in these lists. Istanbul’s Kumkapı district, home to the seat of the Armenian Patriarch, hosted a large Armenian population, and Armenians were noticeable in the fundraising carried out by non-Muslim communities.\(^\text{14}\) Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-76), immediately after the outbreak of the fire also announced the prompt disbursement of monetary aid. Nor was that all; a further 1,000,000 kuruş was donated to the Relief Committee, along with a contribution of 150,000 kuruş contributed by the empress dowager Pertevniyâl under the same rubric of “imperial grants” (‘atiyye-i ‘aliyye).\(^\text{15}\) The way in which Abdülmâhid II undertook charity work as a monarch deploying imperial grants is well known through the research undertaken by Nadir Özbek,\(^\text{16}\) but what we should note here is that this approach had already been adopted since the Tanzimat period, and in addition we should also note that this form of benevolence on the part of the monarch and the court had hitherto been widely publicized by newspapers to the public. Issue 817 (12 October 1865) of the official newspaper, published about a month after the outbreak of the fire, announced that

\(^{14}\) “Harîk i‘ânesi defterlerinden on yedinci defterdir”, TV, no. 821 (26 Cemâziye’l-âhur 1282 / 16 November 1865), p. 2.

\(^{15}\) TV, no. 815, p. 2; TV, no. 817 (21 Cemâziye’l-âhur 1282 / 12 October 1865), pp. 1-2; cf. “Mathû‘ât müdîrî cânibinden neşr olunmak üzere vürûd eden varakanın sûretidir”, Tasvîr-i Efkar (TE), no. 335 (12 Cemâziye’l-evvel 1282 / 3 October 1865), p. 1.

\(^{16}\) Özbek, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu’nda Sosyal Devlet.
fundraising would cease on November 5. However, in issue 820 (8 November 1865), it was announced that the deadline for donations would be extended for one month to accommodate donors from the provinces who still wished to make contributions.¹⁷ Fundraising for the Hocapaşa Great Fire accordingly lasted exactly three months, from early September to early December of 1865. Listings of donors were still run in the newspapers even after donations had closed, and the total sum of funds raised ran to 5,865,529 kuruş.¹⁸

**Reportage and Relief**

The coverage of the Hocapaşa Great Fire reflected the character and stance of the various newspapers which covered it. For example, *Tasvir-i Efkâr* – a pioneer among the privately owned Ottoman Turkish newspapers, in publication since 1862 – stated in its initial report, printed the day after the outbreak of the fire, that:

This fire is not outdone by the Cibali fire of ‘42 [1242AH; 1826/27] or the Hocapaşa fire of ‘46 [1246AH; 1830/31]. It has not been one of our sad duties to report a fire of this magnitude since privately owned newspapers appeared in our country.¹⁹

Foreign-language newspapers and newspapers by non-Muslim subjects were already being published in the Ottoman Empire by the first half of the nineteenth century. The official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekâyi* commenced publication in 1831. However, the true dawn of privately owned Ottoman Turkish newspapers had to wait until the 1860s, following the Crimean War.²⁰ Taking this

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¹⁷ TV, no. 817, pp. 1-2; “Neşr olunmak üzere Matbû‘ât Kâlemî‘nden mevru’d varakadur”, TV, no. 820 (18 Cemâziye‘l-âhr 1282 / 8 November 1865), p. 2.

¹⁸ The official newspaper published more detailed lists of donors and donations than other newspapers, and such listings can be confirmed right through to issue No. 859 (3 September 1866), a year after the fire. “Harîk i’ânesine dâ’ir defâtir-i bakiyyeden elli birinci defter ber-vech-i zir beyân olundu”, TV, no. 859 (22 Rebi‘ü’l-âhr 1283 / 3 September 1866), pp. 1-2.

¹⁹ Transcription: “Bu harîk kirk iki ve kirk altıda zuhûr etmiş olan Cibali ve Hocapaşa yangınlarına mu‘âdil ‘add olunuyor. Mülkâmüzde gayr-i resmi gazeteler zuhûrundan-berü bu kadar cesîm bir harîkin i’lânı hidmet-i elimesinde bulunmamışdır”, *TE*, no. 328 (16 Rebi‘ü’l-âhr 1282 / 8 September 1865), p. 1. Throughout the Ottoman era, the old Istanbul market areas of Cibali and Hocapaşa were known for the fires which broke out there.

²⁰ Sasaki, “The Emergence of Journalism and the Formation of a Readership,” pp. 113-123.
historical background into account, the importance of how the approach to covering these terrible scenes of fire in the period before the flourishing of Ottoman journalism differed from what was to come after is underscored by the *Tasvir-i Efkâr* article quoted above. The importance of this difference in approach shall be further explored in the latter part of this paper.

Meanwhile, *Rûznâme* – a revived version from the first half of the 1860s of the semi-official newspaper *Ceride-i Havâdis* that first came out in 1840 – was in an entirely different set of circumstances from the other newspapers that reported about the Hocapaşa Great Fire. Its publishing office was in Çağaloğlu, one of the areas hit by the fire, and was burned down by it. Issue 236 (9 September 1865) of the paper explained that it had been impossible to publish the day before due to the loss of its press, and that its current issue had had to be reduced from its customary four pages to one. It also informed its readers of the temporary location of the newspaper in a new publishing and sales office. Issue 242 (18 September 1865) warned regular subscribers that some of their records had been lost, and informed them about the difficulty distribution and subscriptions in the wake of the fire. In covering the Hocapaşa Great Fire, *Rûznâme* literally ended up on the scene of the story. Even so, as a veteran among Ottoman Turkish privately owned newspapers, *Rûznâme* had for some years cultivated its own distinctive character in terms of investigative journalism and editorial prowess. It looked more independent as it delivered a multifaceted coverage of developments non-existent in other newspapers. For example, its article on the fire in its 236th issue, quoted above, was the first on-the-scene coverage of the outbreak of the fire, and it ran a strongly worded opinion on how, if anything, “on this point we have to be grateful” (*bu bâbda müteşekkir olmalıdır*) that the fire had wiped out a number of hotbeds of the cholera that had run rampant through the city before the disaster. *Rûznâme* ran stories on how the corpses of dogs and cats produced by the disaster were, along with their ordure, adversely affecting the environment of the urban and harbour districts, yet at the same time informed its readers of how feline victims who had escaped from the ordeal of the fire were assembling around *medreses*, leaving people troubled about how to handle them, and how to take care of them.

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22 RCH, no. 242 (26 Rebi‘ü’l-âhir 1282 / 18 September 1865), p. 4.
23 RCH, no. 247 (2 Cemâziye’l-evvel 1282 / 23 September 1865), p. 1; “Mahmûdpaşa medresesi ahâlisi tarafından gelen varakadır”, *RCH*, no. 252 (10 Cemâziye’l-evvel 1282 / 1 October 1865), p. 2
A fuller picture of the total damage emerged about a month after the outbreak of the fire. All of the newspapers gave coverage to the government’s reconstruction plan; at the same time, they also started to offer suggestions about the reconstruction, published in the form of editorials, readers’ letters and the like. Using its own sources and distinctive layout, the semi-official Rüznâme started to debate the policy on reconstruction in a proactive and concrete manner. For example, issue 256 (5 October 1865) carries a letter from an official in the finance ministry suggesting the establishment of a permanent fund for post-disaster reconstruction purposes.24 Issue 269 (25 October 1865) recommended that this fire should be taken as a rare opportunity to rebuild in stone and organize the urban development of Istanbul in the shape of a dialog between a “Gentleman” (merd-i zarif) and a “Wise Man” (merd-i ‘âkil).25

Given the heated debate on the reconstruction, the Relief Committee was now pressed to provide plans on what it intended to do with the donations and it published an outline of the program in issue 822 (24 November 1865) of the official newspaper.26 The outline ran thus: first, it was seen as vital to survey the situation of the victims on the ground and assess the sums of donated money that needed to be distributed. The policy suggested was to disburse funds in nine different levels, depending on the victims’ circumstances and assets. At the same time, it also affirmed that the most vulnerable among the victims, such as widows, orphans and the elderly, would receive priority in this process. After this two methods for managing the donations were suggested. One approach was to disburse the entire sum of donations immediately. The other approach was to disburse only the funds thought necessary, reserving the rest for a “permanent welfare fund” (refâb-ı da’aime). The suggestion made was that the former approach merely constituted a temporary and palliative financial solution. However, a better course to take would be to set up the funds using part of the donations, establish poorhouses and to support building in stone. As we shall see in the latter part of this paper, the channelling some of the donations into a fund under the latter

24 “Mektûbi-i Mâliyye hulefâsi mütehayyizânundan Emin Bey’in mazarrat-ı harikiyyenin de’f’ini ve nazar-ı dikkatini càlib tahrîr ve Rûznâmemezi dere olunmak üzere tarafimiza tesyîr eylediği varakanın sûretidir”, RCH, no. 256 (14 Cemâziye’l-evvel 1282 / 5 October 1865), pp. 2-4.
26 “Muhtâcin-i harîkzedegâna i’âne olunmak üzere Bâb-ı ‘Âlî de teşkil buyurulan komisyon cânib-i ‘âlsinden neşr olunmak üzere vürûd eden varakanın sûretidir”, TV, no. 822 (5 Receb 1282 / 24 November 1865), pp. 2-3.
Public Debates on Relief Effort

The draft reconstruction plan, created on the twin pillars of furthering urban development and setting up a permanent fund, began to appear on the policy agenda in its concrete form from March 1866— that is half a year after the outbreak of the fire. Here, let us take a look at various aspects of the public debate on the reconstruction efforts, basing our analysis on its coverage in the official newspaper and the privately owned *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*. Issue 374 (20 March 1866) of *Tasvîr-i Efkâr* carried an unsigned editorial on fire-prevention policy for Istanbul, penned by the paper’s executive editor Nâmîk Kemal (1840-88), who had taken up the post the previous year. Kemal, an opponent of the state-led reform policy, was a leading figure in the group of intelligentsia known as the Young Ottomans (*Yeni Osmanhîlar*), and was later to lead the first campaign in Ottoman history for a constitution. As a fire-prevention policy for Istanbul, he emphasized the importance of, and called for an enhanced firefighting service, roadbuilding measures, and housebuilding in stone. He had high praise for the government’s promotion of stone for buildings, which he termed a great enterprise that would find a place in the history of the homeland (*vatan*). At the same time, he appealed to the government to intervene in the pricing of stone so as to bring it to an affordable level. Among others, this editorial apparently won the appreciation of the head of the Relief Committee, Âli Paşa. However, as we have already seen in this paper, the same points were being made aplenty at the same time in the other papers, *Rûznâme* first and foremost, and this fact makes it very difficult to credit Nâmîk Kemal as the first to come up with these arguments. If anything, for the purposes of this paper’s approach to the issues, what draws attention here are his allusions to the way in which the limits of mutual aid were reached in the composite circumstances of the relief efforts for the Hocapaşa fire.

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The point we should carefully scrutinize here is whether the policy discussed above is to be all helping each other, or of borrowing from a company. To be sure, it is difficult to imagine that engaging in mutual aid (te’âvün) could be harmful to the state. But it is also difficult to see any advantages which would allow this approach to realize its objectives. Major fires like this occur every few years at most, so surely state funding would be preferable to be used for clearing up the ruins. Fundraising for the Hocapaşa fire is, after all, a one-off effort, and the donations will even not fully cover the rebuilding of a single block.29

Nâmık Kemal’s phrase “all helping each other” (te’âvün-i ʻumûmî) refers to a fund for reconstruction set up on the basis of donations from the public. His point was that putting such a fund in place was basically the responsibility of the government, and that relying on the generosity of the public to do the heavy lifting was merely to burden them still further; even for the victims of the Hocapaşa fire, this could be nothing other than “the flame of tyranny” (zûlm ateşî). In pointing out the limits of mutual aid and calling for official aid, Kemal conversely places responsibility at the feet of the government in cases where such official aid is unforthcoming. Here, while we can see at work the tension between the logic of mutual aid and the logic of official aid, we can also glimpse how the two could be mixed. Issue 840 (10 April 1866) of the official newspaper, released the following month, carried a report by the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances on the reconstruction plan.30 The report claimed that the reasons the fire damage to Istanbul had been so extensive were the large number of wooden buildings and the narrowness of the streets, and that there was a need to address both issues through road-widening and building in stone. Again, we must point out the staleness of these ideas at this point in time. However, the report also stressed


that the requisitioning of sites for road-widening would be done prudently and “following legal precedent” (nizâm ve emsâline göre):

In undertaking the enlargement of roads in an appropriate manner, along with the demarcation of sites, the steps to be taken shall be within the scope of law and justice, because the situation requires the public welfare to be served...\(^{31}\)

Thus, adherence to the law and the maintenance of fairness became important aspects of the reconstruction discussions. A separate report recording the scope of operations, issued by the “Roads Construction Commission” (Islâhât-i Terük Komisyonu) based on the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances report, explained that it was essential that the resettlement of sites be undertaken with prudence and illuminated by “truth and justice” (hakk u ‘adl).\(^{32}\) We can see that, with the main outlines of the reconstruction plan in place half a year after the outbreak of the fire, public attention was turning to the fairness of the way in which the reconstruction effort was to be handled.

Up to this point, we have been looking at newspaper coverage of the public debate on the reconstruction effort. Now, let us change our viewpoint to get a clear angle of vantage on newspaper coverage as a “historical arena” which this debate and effort brought forth. What we should remember here is that—as pointed out above in Tasvir-i Efkâr—this was the first major fire in Ottoman history to be covered by privately owned newspapers. The situation on the ground, the government’s response and the progress of the relief effort centred around the fundraising campaign, and furthermore complaints and demands about the government’s disaster-response policy—the entire debate and effort was widely publicized through the newspapers, informing and fuelling the controversy in a quite unprecedented way, as foreseen, albeit accidentally, in the point made above by Tasvir-i Efkâr. Accordingly, it would appear that one of the reasons why such great strides were suddenly taken on the issue of housebuilding in stone, for example—which had remained unresolved for years—was that large numbers of people were being made aware, through the newspapers, of their importance and urgency. We might restate this in other terms by saying that the “historical


\(^{32}\) “Bu def’a teşkil olunan Islâhât-i Terük Komisyonu’nun vazîfiﬁni şâmil ve on beş maddîyi hâvi läyihadur”, TV, no. 851 (17 Safer 1283 / 1 July 1866), pp. 2-3.
arena” became visible on the newspapers pages as the debate and effort on relief, this in turn heightening public awareness of and involvement in the relief effort. On the other hand, it goes without saying that this process of relief being made visible led to demands for a high degree of transparency in its implementation. Although the government stressed its efforts to maintain fairness in the requisitioning of sites for road-widening, and was pushed to maintain a qualitatively unprecedented degree of transparency, this can only have been the case because it now had to act in a “historical arena” – an arena formed and rendered glass-walled by the newspapers. This circumstance of what we should call the “visualization of relief,” which happened with the newspapers acting as the “historical arena,” demonstrates that the interconnections between technological innovation and changes in relief that Ben-Bassat pointed out for acting in the self-help phase can also be confirmed for the mutual aid phase. In fact, of all the various aspects of the subsequent public debate and relief effort, the need for transparency in the transfer of funds which accompanies the trouble-free progress of fundraising made it necessary for the newspapers to appeal for public support. The public were also to be informed about how this transparency, fairness and credibility values were failing, the news would have to be broken in a wave of criticism and questioning of the relief effort – thus the sword which the newspapers wielded turned into a double-edged one. With regard to this point, while taking a look at one last example, let us observe the arena in which relief took on a novel character in the late Ottoman era.

Public Trust Concerning Relief Effort

The reconstruction effort after the Hocapaşa Great Fire got underway in earnest from the spring of 1866, and newspaper coverage of the issue gradually dwindled. In its place, the story that grabbed the headlines from the summer onwards was the anti-Ottoman uprising by members of the Greek Orthodox community in the eastern Mediterranean island of Crete, which had a mixed Christian and Muslim population. In these disturbances, which contemporary coverage generally referred to as “the Cretan Question” (Girid Meş'eleşi), the island was devastated, leaving its inhabitants in abject destitution. The Istanbul newspapers thus launched a fundraising campaign to relieve the islanders’ distress, starting in February 1867. Among the newspapers Rûznâme, which had the backing of the Porte, and Mühbir, whose recent founder and executive editor
was Ali Suavî (1839-78) – later to become one of the Young Ottomans’ leading figures—became most actively involved in the fundraising. Working in tandem with Nâmis Kemal’s Tâsvîr-i Efsâr, Ali Suavî’s Muhbîr, which had aroused public opinion on the Cretan relief issue, kicked off the campaign by putting out a special edition. The proceeds were to go into the Crete fundraising. The donation of profits was a first for fundraising in Ottoman history.

Elsewhere, I have previously examined the fundraising undertaken while the Cretan Question was in its full throes. My findings have established that fundraising for this was at first framed as a relief effort by Muslims for Muslims, but that—occasioned by a reader’s letter to the newspapers—there was an apparent move towards broadening out the relief effort into a movement transcending religious boundaries. Thus, this turned into a campaign undertaken by “Ottomans” and “Ottoman nation” who share the same homeland.33 Also, charity lectures for the Cretan relief campaign that Muhbîr’s fundraising had triggered were organized, with a kûrâ’îthâne (reading room) as the venue. The kûrâ’îthâne was a combination of coffeehouse and reading room for newspapers and magazines; becoming popular in the second half of the nineteenth century in Istanbul and then all across the Ottoman territories. Proceeds from these lectures were also to be donated, Muhbîr reported. From this example, we can see that a shift in the situation was taking place; fundraising campaigns with newspapers as the medium were giving way to charity drives triggered in the kûrâ’îthâne—which provided their clientele with spaces to read newspapers or listen to them being read—such drives being further publicized to bigger readership by the newspapers. The transition was toward what we should perhaps call a “relief chain,” with newspapers acting as the medium.34

So, then, if we were to look at the issues from the standpoint of the mixed dynamism of relief, what kind of connections would we be able to see between the fundraising for the Hocapaşa Great Fire and the fundraising for the Cretan Question? The newspaper coverage linked the memory of the fundraising efforts


for the Hocapaşa Great Fire to fundraising for the Cretan Question in two separate but reciprocal evaluations. One was affirmative since it emphasized the successful example of fundraising efforts undertaken through the newspapers. The other was negative where the way in which government handling of donations were put into question by showing how the fund had been lacking in fairness and transparency, thus making government fundraising untrustworthy. In fact, this had garnered public attention to the extent that Rûznâme had been fielding reader’s questions right from the planning stages of the reconstruction effort for the Hocapaşa Great Fire. These were questioning how the donations, all of which had been placed into a fund, were to be used. However, rumours had remained widespread because the head of the Relief Committee, Âli Paşa, failed to the end to make a public report on the management of the reconstruction fund, damaging public trust in the project.

In a pamphlet attacking the Porte written in his later years in exile in Paris, Ali Suavî records that in the end the donations had never found their way to the victims, and that, when questioned about how they had been used, Âli Paşa unconvincingly replied that they had been used instead for “the great national matter” (devletin pek mühimmi işi) – that is to say, the Cretan Question. This had heightened public “dis-trust” (ennıyıyetizlik) exceptionally. Coverage of Cretan fundraising also looked back to how during the fundraising effort for the Hocapaşa Great Fire civil servants had seen automatic deductions from their salaries, raising questions on whether or to what extent fundraising should be voluntary.

In this atmosphere of public distrust to government fundraising, the strategy for the success of the Cretan fundraising taken by Ali Suavî at Muhbir and Nâmk Kemal at Tâsîrı-i Efkâr was to assure the public that the government would have no hand or part in this purely private campaign. For example, issue 460 (20 February 1867) of Tâsîrı-i Efkâr carried an unsigned editorial, thought to be by Nâmk Kemal, replied to the rumours on the fundraising campaign being carried out by the government-supported Rûznâme by affirming the non-governmental aspect:

Some charitable persons have asked the newspapers where the donations are to be kept. So the state has replied, saying that those wishing to make donations should deposit the appropriate sum of money in a bank. Naturally, since this fundraising campaign is not being carried out by the state, the donations are not put under any particular state supervision.\(^3\)

A few days later, issue 24 (27 February 1867) of Muhbir carried an announcement explaining their fundraising plan; it was said that the fundraising was to be carried out by “personages whom all should be able to trust” (herkesin emniyyet edeceği mu’teber zevât). It was announced that, “in order to give everyone peace of mind” (herkesi te’min için), a register would record the disbursement of all donations. The paper stressed its policy of making every effort to ensure the trustworthiness and transparency of its fundraising, even going so far as to ask its readers for their ideas on how best to “maintain [the public] trust” (emniyyet için).\(^4\) The Turkish word emniyyet, meaning “trust” and “credibility,” was now obviously becoming a key term in these discussions.

Here, comparing the two fundraising campaigns for the Cretan Question run by the newspapers Rûznâme and Muhbir, we see that—due to the composite circumstances of relief in the late Ottoman era—a situation of what we perhaps should call a “bifurcation in the form of relief” was developing. Rûznâme’s fundraising progressed with the strong involvement of the Porte and the experience of fundraising for the Hocapaşa Great Fire behind it. One might call its campaign a synergy of official aid and mutual aid. Muhbir’s campaign, on the other hand, took a firm stance of rejecting government involvement; this was to be a purely private initiative, a new form of relief. This new form took the experience of the Hocapaşa Great Fire as a negative lesson, establishing by experience what to avoid in fundraising. One could equally call this an attempt of mutual aid without being absorbed by official aid. In this “bifurcation in the form of relief” we can see, without contracting the progress of the “history of the development of official aid,” the supple transition of the organic and mixed dynamic of relief in the late Ottoman period.


Conclusion

In this paper, by investigating various aspects of the public debates and efforts on fundraising in Ottoman Turkish newspapers of the 1860s, we have clarified a part of the mixed dynamism of relief in the late Ottoman era. That is to say, we have clarified the tensions wrought by mixed dynamism between fundraising as official aid and as mutual aid, along with the novel form of mutual aid brought about by its separation from official aid. Here we see a double process whereby mixed dynamism is accompanied by further mixed dynamism. It goes without saying that this paper has left many issues unexamined. In particular, there remains the vital task of analysing the relationship between self-help and mutual aid among the three factors constituting the mixed dynamism of relief, and on the basis of this, making a general investigation of the relationships between all three factors of self-help, mutual aid and official aid, in order to press on toward a general overview of the true state of affairs of the mixed dynamism of relief in the late Ottoman period. Now is the time to re-examine each and all of the various aspects of relief—which cannot be corralled into any “history of the development of official aid.” Such a re-examination opens up the possibility of rethinking the historical development of relief in the late Ottoman era as a dynamic reorganization process of the mixed dynamism of relief.

Mixed Dynamism of Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Historical Actualities of Fundraising Campaigns

Abstract This paper is an attempt to understand part of the mixed forms of discourse and practice surrounding relief generated by Ottoman modernization, particularly as a partial case study of the various phases from the end of the 19th century onward, from within the various aspects of relief in the Ottoman Empire. Section I states the analytical perspective of this paper, specifically, it offers a variation of the “mixed economy of welfare” theory, namely, the “mixed dynamism of relief”. Section II focuses on fundraising campaigns through newspapers and magazines that were organized in the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th century, and discusses the new forms of relief that developed from within the mixed conditions of relief within the context of Ottoman modernization.

Keywords: Relief, Mutual Aid, Fundraising, Hocapaşa Great Fire, Cretan Question
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