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(KAAM)-VIII
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2003

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OLBA'nın Basılması İçin Vermiş Olduđu Desteklerden Dolayı
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PIRACY ON THE SOUTHERN COAST OF ASIA MINOR AND MITHRIDATES EUPATOR

(LEV. 38)

Murat ARSLAN*

ÖZET

Bu makalenin amacı, İÖ II. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren özellikle Küçük Asya'nın güney sahillerinde ortaya çıkıp giderek artan korsanlık faaliyetlerinin nedenlerini tartışmak ve İÖ I. yüzyılın ilk yarısındaki Mithridates-Roma Savaşları sırasında korsanların Pontos Kralı Mithridates VI. Eupator'la olan ilişkilerini antik kaynaklar, epigrafik belgeler ve modern literatür ışığında sistematik bir şekilde incelemektir. Bütün bunlar yazılırken, Hellenistik Dönem boyunca Anadolu kıyı kentlerinin ve adaların korsanlara karşı tutumları ve Romalıların Lykia, Pamphylia ve Kilikia sahillerindeki korsanlara karşı yaptıkları uzun savaşlar detaylı bir şekilde gözler önüne serilmeye çalışılmıştır.

During the second half of the second century BC the south coast of Anatolia (Fig. 1) appears to have been the base of a large number of pirates that made an income mainly via the slave trade with Rome, and who assisted Mithridates Eupator, king of Pontus, with military operations against the Romans during the Mithridatic Wars between 90 and 63 BC.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider and discuss the following questions: Why did piracy come to flourish especially during this period of time? How did the cities on the coast of Asia Minor deal with the menace of the pirates and what kind of textual and epigraphic information do we have on piracy? Furthermore the relationship between Mithridates Eupator and the pirates during the Mithridatic Wars will be described and finally the measurements that were eventually taken by the Romans against the pirates towards the first half of the first century BC will be presented.

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Cilicia Tracheia in particular appears to have been infamous for its bandits and pirates – the geographical characteristics along its coast were well suited for banditry both on land and by sea. On land due to the size of the mountains and the size of the ethnic groups in the highlands, and because the plains and extensive farmlands in the region are open and easily exposed to raids. By sea because of the supply of wood for building ships, naturally sheltered harbours, fortified outlooks and hidden inlets¹. Moreover, due to the busy trade route along this coast from Syria to the Aegean and western Mediterranean there was sufficient opportunity for taking up piracy. In fact, according to Appian (Mithr. 21), the word “Cilician” eventually became synonymous with pirate². The same writer (Mithr. 92), as well as Cassius Dio (xxxvi. 20-23), Strabo (xiv. 3. 2 c. 664) and Plutarch (Pomp. xxiv. 1 ff.) all present a picture of Cilicians and Pamphylians as either being pirates themselves, or otherwise furnishing the pirates with docking facilities and markets for their plunder. The Lycians, on the other hand, according to Strabo (xiv. 3. 3 c. 665), were known as civilised, Hellenised people living in well-organised cities, who did not lust after shameful booty but stayed in their fatherland organised as the Lycian League, with such a decent behaviour that Rome allowed them considerable autonomy.

Probably the main reason for the growth of piracy from the middle of the 2nd century BC onwards was the combined result of political instability in the Mediterranean and the increased economic opportunities that arose due to the demand on slaves in Rome.

¹ Strab. xiv. 5. 6 c. 671; see also Shaw 1990, 263.

² App. Mithr. 21; see also Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 669; Magie 1950, 281.

Initially, something has to be said about the identity of the pirates: As mentioned above, the word “Cilician” became synonymous with pirate, as the region of Cilicia was especially suited as a hideout for bands of pirates. It appears, however, that pirates came from all over the Mediterranean, especially the southern Anatolian coast, but some were also from the Black Sea coast.

It is important to keep in mind when speaking of pirates, that it does not necessarily mean all the pirates in the region, but only one, or perhaps some, of the many groups of pirates that terrorised the Mediterranean. Some pirates, like Tryphon (Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 668) and Zeniketes (Peek 1978, 247-248), were leaders of bands that grew in power and they eventually called themselves kings of larger, organised groups, but there does not seem to have been any formal cooperation between the groups.

After the battle of Pydna in 168 BC the Senate in Rome decided to separate parts of Lycia and Caria from Rhodes, which thereby lost the resources of the mainland, constituting a major part of the island's economy. At the same time the Senate decided to make Delos a free port as well as liberating several cities of the Peraia, making Rhodes lose its hitherto privileged position in the maritime trade in the Aegean. Consequently Rhodes lost a considerable part of its navy strength and was no longer able to suppress piracy, as it had made successful attempts to do until then³.

Shortly afterwards, in 142 BC, Antiochus VI. Epiphanes died, leaving the Seleucid dynasty shaken in a succession struggle that gradually diminished its power and, among other things, its hold on Cilicia. The region was quickly taken over by local rulers, one of whom was Diodotus, called Tryphon, who had led a revolt against the Seleucids already in the late 140s BC. Attacking the Syrian coastline and the cities of the Levant⁴, he seized control over much of Syria from his base in Coracesium⁵ and during his time the Cilicians took up organised piracy. This was looked upon as a means of further weakening the power of the Seleucids by their enemies, the Rhodians and the Ptolemaic kings of Egypt and Cyprus. Consequently they would only reluctantly interfere with the activities of the pirates⁶. According to Strabo (xiv. 5. 2 c. 669) during this period of time Rome was preoccupied with matters that were nearer and more urgent, and therefore they were unable to keep an eye on the undesirable elements within the Hellenistic kingdoms in Asia Minor. For the Romans the priority concerning Anatolia was to protect the *status quo* of Asia Minor. Fighting the Hellenistic kingdoms was considered more important than suppressing piracy. In fact, until the end of the second century BC, the Romans did not consider themselves responsible for security matters in this region, but put the blame of the flourishing piracy on the incompetence of the Seleucids.

³ Polyb. xxv. 4-6; xxvii. 3-4; 7; xxx. 1-5; 5. 12; Liv. xli. 6-8; xlii. 45-46; 48. 8; xlv. 20-25; App. *Mithr.* 62; see further Sherwin-White 1976, 3 n. 8.

⁴ Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 668; xvi. 2. 14 c. 754; 19 c. 756.

⁵ Coracesium was a safe base for Diodotus because it lay well beyond the geographical limits of Seleucid power as defined by the treaty of Apameia. Souza 1999, 98 n. 4.

⁶ Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 669.

In brief, the political instability in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean opened up the possibility for an illegal trade such as piracy, as the powers so far concerned with piracy no longer had the sufficient strength to carry on their fight against the freebooters. The nature of the pirates, operating in small and unorganised bands⁷, meant that tracking them down and confronting them in battle was difficult⁸.

Another aspect, apart from politics, mentioned above as a cause for the growth of piracy, was economy.

Strabo (xiv. 5. 2 c. 668/669) linked the growth of Cilician piracy with the slave trade that appears to have grown by the mid second century BC due to increased demands by Rome, the city having become rich after the victories over Carthage and Corinth (146 BC). The pirates raided the coasts of the Mediterranean and captured both free people and slaves from the cities. Trading in slaves appears to have been a very profitable business indeed; the slave markets at Crete, Rhodes and especially at Delos were capable of taking in and selling tens of thousands of slaves every day. Especially Delos became the main market in ancient world, where people from all over gathered together, bringing their wares and cargoes to trade, crammed full with riches⁹. Whence arose the proverb¹⁰, “*Merchant, sail in, unload your ship, everything has been sold*”.

Despite a certain degree of moral objections to the trade in free people, even fellow Greeks, the pirates’ trade appears to have been carried out without interference¹¹. As a matter of fact, piracy seems to have been the major source of the much-needed slave supply in the Mediterranean region, at the same time as the slave trade, according to the ancient historians, was the major source of income for the Cilicians¹².

⁷ They were never formally united in any kind of organisation, and the various groups appear to have been operating fully independently. The fact that Delos was sacked by pirates in 69 BC (Phlegon 12-13 = FGrHist II 257, 1163-1164) in spite of its important slave market is compelling evidence that the pirates were not operating in any organised manner. For a city being on friendly terms with one group did not necessarily mean being let off from attacks from other groups.

⁸ App. Mithr. 93; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 3.

⁹ Cic. Leg. Man. xviii. 55.

¹⁰ Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 668.

¹¹ Garland 1978, 13-18; Souza 1999, 63.

¹² Souza 1999, 64-65.

An even bigger economic advantage of piracy was to hold prisoners for ransom, which, from both textual and epigraphic evidence, appears to have been a very common practice. Depending on the individual prisoners, the ransom which relatives or fellow citizens might be willing to pay for one person, would often be higher than the price paid for the same captive by auction on the slave market. By asking for a ransom, a deal could be made without having to ship the prisoners to the slave market. All in all, a highly advantageous business and from the ancient sources it appears to have become one of the principal aims of piracy¹³.

Not only the pirates themselves gained from their business - it appears that some of the slave markets, for instance, deliberately chose to provide facilities for groups of pirates¹⁴, and that some coastal cities such as Phaselis (Cic. Verr. 4. 21) and Side (Strab. xiv. 3. 2 c. 664), without being directly involved in piracy, cooperated with pirate bands in exchange for a substantial share of their profit.

Certainly a large amount of men, women and children were moved around the Mediterranean as a result of the slave trade. How did the coastal communities of the Mediterranean respond to this threat? An inscription dated from the second half of the 3rd century BC from Teus in Ionia describes how the citizens of this city agreed on paying a tenth of their fortune in order to buy back a group of fellow citizens, among them women and children, who had been taken prisoner by pirates¹⁵. The money was collected by the city's magistrates and handed over to representatives of the pirates who had stayed in the city for the same purpose, and the inscription gives the impression that this arrangement was far from unusual. From Miletus we have evidence of a treaty from mid 3rd century BC¹⁶, which the Milesians made with several Cretan cities, obliging all parts to refrain from buying slaves from either Miletus or Crete, in an attempt to protect the citizens of these cities. Other inscriptions commemorate the courageous deeds of citizens of a coastal city in battles against pirates,

¹³ For example, Naxos: SIG 520; Crete: SIG 535 lines 1-20; Teus: Şahin 1994, 6 ff.

¹⁴ Souza 1999, 58.

¹⁵ Şahin 1994, 1-40.

¹⁶ The inscription was found in Miletus and dates some time between 260-230 BC. SdA III 482 = ICret I Knossos, no. 61. See further Souza 1999, 62 n. 71.

or the lucky escape from pirate attacks through the warning cries of observant guards. A 1st century inscription from Xanthus celebrates the deeds of a Xanthian general called Aichmon, son of Apollodoros. He was the commander of the fleet of the Lycians, and according to the inscription he fought a sea battle around Cape Chelidonia, invaded pirate territory, laid it waste and was victorious in three battles¹⁷. As the Romans are not mentioned in the inscription, we can infer that these military actions against pirates were made without the help of Rome, that is, the battles were the initiative of Xanthus and not part of a larger-scale campaign. The city of Syedra appears to have openly refused pirates entry into their harbour and engaged in independent military actions against them just before 67 BC¹⁸, as did Seleucia on the river Calycadnus¹⁹. There is no evidence, however, of any coastal cities ever uniting in an attempt to confront and fight off the pirates. The force of the pirates was simply too strong. Possibly the cities thought that suppressing piracy was the responsibility of the Hellenistic kingdoms or the Roman Empire.

At the end of the 2nd century BC piracy had become so widespread that the Romans finally took action against this trade. Under the command of Marcus Antonius²⁰ Rome initiated a military campaign against the Cilician pirates in ca. 102 BC that included both naval and land operations²¹. As a

¹⁷ OGIS 552-554; ILLRP 3. 607 A-B; 620; Souza 1997, 480; 1999, 137-138.

¹⁸ Bean and Mitford 1965, 21-23; Parke 1985, 157-159; Souza 1997, 477-481; 1999, 139-140.

¹⁹ Strab. xiv. 5. 4 c. 670. But neighbouring city Coracesium was well known as a centre of piracy which resisted the Romans in 67 BC. They were defeated by Pompeius near the promontory of Coracesium and then besieged (Plut. Pomp. xxviii. 1; Vell. ii. 32. 4).

²⁰ The sources refer to Marcus Antonius as both *praetor* and *proconsul*. According to Livy (perioch. 68) and Cicero (Orat. i. 82) he was *praetor*. But an inscription (IGR IV 1116) from Rhodes which honours a naval officer who served under Antonius calls him *proconsul* (= στρατογός ἀνθύπατος). He is also referred to as *proconsul* in a Latin inscription from Corinth (ILLRP 1. 342) *pro consule*. According to Taylor & West 1928, 10 ff, *pro consule* was the usual terminology for provincial governors at that time. See further Souza 1999, 103 n. 31-34; 104. For Antonius' career pattern the date 103 BC fits his praetorship. He seems to have gone out to his *provincia* Cilicia immediately after his praetorship in 102 BC, where he held the *proconsular imperium*. Two years after the end of his praetorship he was elected consul in Rome. This was common among the Roman aristocrats at that time (Souza 1999, 103-104). For the high success rate of praetorian *triumphatores* in the consular election see (Harris 1979, 262-3).

²¹ Liv. perioch. 68; Cic. de Or. i. 82; Tac. ann. xii. 62; Obseq. Prodig. 44; IGR IV 1116; ILLRP 1. 342; see further Crawford 1996, 261-162; Ferrary 1977, 657 ff; Souza 1999, 102-104; 107.

result of this campaign Cilicia was made a praetorian province²², which Marcus Antonius celebrated with a triumph on his return to Rome²³. To defeat the pirates completely, however, more than one campaign was needed. As soon as Marcus Antonius left the province, piracy was taken up again by the Cilicians. Ironically, a few years later Marcus Antonius' own daughter was captured by pirates²⁴.

The next step for Rome was to issue a *Senatus consultum* against piracy, hereby declaring pirates the enemies of the people, friends and allies of Rome. This law was declared around 101-99 BC. In the so-called *lex de provinciis praetoris*²⁵ Rome promised to guard the Mediterranean and provide sailing safety for all her citizens, friends and allies²⁶. Rome's view of pirates, as expressed through the words of Cicero (Off. iii 107; Verr. II.

²² The Romans called the province Cilicia though it contained no Cilician territory. In that time Cilicia Tracheia was under the control of pirates and local chiefdoms and Cilicia Pedias was under the control of the Seleucids. But around 83 BC the Armenian king Tigranes II. Megas attacked the Seleucids and their king Antiochus X. Eusebes was not able to withstand him. Thus Tigranes conquered Cilicia Pedias. See further detail in Plut. Luc. xiv. 5; xxi. 4-5; Pomp. xxviii. 4; App. Syr. 48; 69-70; Mithr. 105; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 37. 6; Iust. xl. 1. 2-4; 2. 3; Iosep. Ant. Iud. xiii. 16. 14; Strab. xiv. 5. 2 c. 669; Diod. xl. 1a dn. 4.

²³ Plut. Pomp. xxiv. 6; see also Souza 1999, 109; 114.

²⁴ While he was away from Rome (Cic. Rab. Post. 26). Cic. Leg. Man. xii. 33; Plut. Pomp. xxiv. 6.

²⁵ The Greek translation of this law fragment was found on the inscribed monument of L. Aemilius Paulus at Delphi and a slightly different translation of the same law has been found at Cnidus, which has made a far greater proportion of the text available to study. See further Hassal 1974, 195 ff; Shaw 1990, 220 n.63-65; Crawford 1996, 231-270; Souza 1999, 108.

²⁶ A Roman consul wrote to “ ... the king ruling in the island of Cyprus, and to the king [ruling at] Alexandria and Egypt [and to the king] ruling in Cyrene and to the kings of Syria [who have] friendship and alliance [with the Roman people, he is to send letters] to the effect that it is also right for them to see that [no] pirate (πειρατῆς) [use as a base of operations] their kingdom [or] land or territories [and that no officials or garrison commanders whom] they shall appoint harbour the pirates (πειρατῶς) and to see that, insofar as [it shall be possible.] the Roman people [have (them as) contributors to the safety of all...]”. The consul is instructed to give the letters to the Rhodian ambassadors -which indicates that the Rhodians were the most concerned of all the allies and friends of Rome about the problem of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sherwin-White 1976, 5 n. 21; Crawford 1996, 253-257; Souza 1999, 109-111.

As a consequence of the *lex de provinciis praetoris*, in 95 BC Sulla appears to have been assigned as praetor and Cilicia as his provincia, with the intention of fighting the pirates. But when he was on his way to Cilicia, his instruction were changed; the invasion of Cappadocia by Tigranes II. Megas made the restoration of Ariobarzanes I. Philoromaiois a more pressing and prestigious task -at that moment- than fighting the pirates (Badian, 1959, 284 ff; McGing 1986, 78 n. 45). See further Rubinsohn 1993, 18-19 n. 59.

5.76) was that “*..they were the bitterest and most dangerous enemies of the Roman people, in fact, the common enemies of all mankind, to whom only a severe punishment would be adequate, as they did not deserve the normal respect that was due to enemies according to the conventions of war*”.

Rome did not eliminate the existence of piracy in Southern Anatolia through these first attempts, and during the three Mithridatic Wars between 90 and 63 BC they were continually faced with forces of pirates that, according to Appian (Mithr. 63), gradually increased in strength until they were more like a regular navy than individual pirate bands.

Mithridates VI. Eupator, king of Pontus, who reigned from 120/119 BC and fought against Rome until his death in 63 BC, was blamed by several ancient authors for encouraging, and even initiating, piracy in the Mediterranean. The importance of Mithridates in this respect seems highly overrated and rather more a product of Roman propaganda against the king than the actual truth²⁷. Nevertheless, it is certain that Mithridates and the pirates of the 1st century BC cooperated – the pirates took advantage of the general chaos of war to go on with their criminal business unopposed. It is certain that Mithridates used bands of pirates for his own purposes on more than one occasion. He gave them free hands on the sea in return for military services, particularly attacks on Roman naval forces and supply ships²⁸. As Mithridates needed their assistance in conquering and controlling the Eastern Mediterranean, the pirate forces were free to plunder any enemy of the Pontus kingdom on the sea and on the coasts. There are also examples of pirates being formally hired as mercenaries by Mithridates. According to several ancient writers²⁹ Mithridates also recruited mercenaries from Crete, which was notorious for its pirates and bowmen.

²⁷ Most probably Appian (Mithr. 63) and Plutarch (Pomp. xxiv. 1) may, in fact be repeating the hostile propaganda of earlier Roman writers, aimed at discrediting the Pontus king and trying to find a better interpretation of Rome's war against an eastern despot like Mithridates who had done the worst crimes (App. Mithr. 62). Souza 1999, 116-117 n. 107 is conscious of the dangers of believing everything that Appian and Plutarch say.

²⁸ Maróti 1970, 485; 488 ff.

²⁹ App. Sic. vi. 1; Flor. epit. i. 42. 1; Memnon 43. 1; see also 48. 1.

During the First Mithridatic War in 89-85 BC, Mithridates and the pirates appear to have been in close cooperation when Sulla's *quaestor*, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, attempted to gather a fleet in order to challenge the Pontic naval supremacy, and suffered numerous attacks from pirates on his journey³⁰. At the end of the same war, when Mithridates found himself losing control over Asia Minor, he let hordes of pirates pillage the coastlines and the islands that had betrayed him³¹. Even after Sulla defeated Mithridates in the First Mithridatic War, the pirates continued, and intensified, their activities regardless of their ally's defeat. Clazomenae, Iasus, Samos and Samothrace were attacked and even the temple of Samothrace was sacked and 1000 talents stolen from it, while Sulla was nearby. It is interesting to note that Sulla did not interfere with the looting but left Asia Minor to participate in the Civil War of Rome³².

Possibly the best evidence of the alliance between Mithridates and the pirate bands is the fact that the king in the Third Mithridatic War, during a storm where a substantial part of his fleet sank, boarded a ship belonging to a pirate named Seleucus. The pirate brought the king safely to Sinope³³. Seleucus was a leading figure among the Cilician pirates and played an important role in his alliance with Mithridates during the Third War. From

³⁰ Plut. Luc. ii-iv; App. Mithr. 33; see further Ormerod 1997², 212; Pohl 1993, 140-44. But according to Souza 1999, 119; neither of the authors (Plut. Luc. ii. 5; App. Mithr. 56) suggest that any pirates attacked him on Mithridates' instructions or on their own initiative with the intention of helping the Pontic king's cause. Because of this reason we cannot be sure that those were the pirates who co-operated with Mithridates against the Romans. See also Plut. Luc. iii. 2-3.

³¹ App. Mithr. 62; 92. During the First Mithridatic War the island of Tenos was continually attacked by the pirates (IG XII 5. 860; SEG 29 no. 757). See also Ormerod 1997², 233 n. 1; Souza 1999, 162-163.

³² Sulla did nothing to protect the coast cities from the pirates. He might have wanted that those who had offended him should feel the effect of the pirates, or possibly he was simply in haste to put down the hostile fraction in Rome; in any circumstance he left Asia Minor and sailed for Greece (App. Mithr. 63).

According to Rostovtseff (1941, 1514 n. 48) and McGing (1986, 130 n. 183) the raid on Ephesus referred to in (IGR IV 1029; IG XII 3. 171= IGSK Ephesos 1a no. 5; IG XII 3. 173; Sherk 1969, no. 16) may be dated to the First Mithridatic War. The Astypalaeans came to the rescue of Ephesus and defeated the pirates. But other scholars prefer to date this rescue operation to the late second century BC (Magie 1950, 1160 n. 9; Souza 1999, 100-101).

³³ App. Mithr. 78; Plut. Luc. 13. 3; Oros. hist. vi. 2. 24; 3. 2; see also Münzer 1921, 1247; Ormerod 1997², 211; Maróti 1970, 487 n. 24; McGing 1986, 139; Souza 1999, 125.

Memnon (53. 1-5) we know that Seleucus³⁴ was also known as Mithridates' general and the commander of the Cilician garrison that held Sinope occupied on behalf of Mithridates³⁵.

Sulla's successor in the province of Asia, Lucius Licinius Murena, continued to campaign against the pirates in 83 BC and appears to have been successful – he was honoured as a benefactor, patron and saviour of the people of Caunus for his anti-piratical achievements³⁶. Also the *proconsul* of Asia Minor, Gaius Claudius Nero, campaigned against pirates – from around 80 BC we have an inscription from Ilium commemorating his campaign³⁷.

At the same time, however, there is plenty of evidence from the ancient sources that pirate attacks were regularly taking place along the coast of Asia Minor. Despite the efforts of the Romans, no effective steps to control piracy had yet been taken.

In 78 BC Publius Servilius Vatia arrived in the province of Cilicia as *proconsul*. The fact that Rome appoints an *ex consul as proconsul* of Cilicia shows the concerns of the Romans for piracy and banditry in this area as well as the strategic importance of Cilicia in the war against Mithridates. Servilius carried out several campaigns against the pirates in the years 78-74 BC, at first forcing the pirates to enter naval battles with his fleet³⁸ and afterwards attacking and besieging their strongholds on the mainland³⁹. The cities and strongholds most commonly mentioned in the

³⁴ Ormerod (1997², 211 n. 1) cites Orosius' brief account (hist. vi. 2. 24), in which the pirate vessel's commander is identified as Seleucus. This Seleucus is supposed to be the same Seleucus who rescued the king's life on the way back from the siege of Cyzicus. Orosius (hist. vi. 3. 2) also identified Seleucus as an arch pirate in the Sinope blockade and adds that Cleocharis was a eunuch of Mithridates. See further Münzer 1921, 1247; Souza 1999, 126 ff.

³⁵ Plut. Luc. 23. 2-3. Memnon (53. 3) also mentions that the Roman admiral Censorinus had 15 escort triremes, but these were defeated by Sinopian triremes under Seleucus who captured the supply ships for their booty.

³⁶ Bernhardt 1972, 123; 126 ff; see also Reddé 1986, 463; Pohl 1993, 259; Ögün 2001, 23; 123 ff.

³⁷ I. v. Ilium no: 73, lines 1-6; IGR IV 196; OGIS I 443; see also Ormerod 1997², 206 n. 4; Souza 1999, 123-124.

³⁸ Liv. perioch. 90; Flor. epit. i. 41. 5-6; Amm. Marc. xiv. 8. 4.

³⁹ Strab. xii. 6. 2 c. 569; xiv. 5. 7 c. 671; Flor. epit. i. 41. 5; see further Sall. Hist. frg. 1. 127-133; Cic. Verr. ii. (4) 10. 21; Leg. agr. ii 50, Liv. perioch. 90; 93; Vell. ii. 39. 2; Amm. Marc. xiv. 8. 4; Eutr. vi. 3; Oros. hist. v. 23. 21; Festus Brev. xii. 3; Ormerod 1922, 37; 1997², 114 ff; Magie 1950, 288 ff. n. 22; Sherwin-White 1994, 232 n.1.

sources are Phaselis⁴⁰, Corycus⁴¹ and Olympus⁴². After that he extended his operations into Pamphylia and captured territory from Attaleia⁴³. At the end of his campaigns he attacked Isaura Vetus and Nova⁴⁴. Then he turned to the *ager Oroandricus et Gedusanus* (Cic. leg. agr. ii. 50) in 76-75 BC, apparently with some temporary success⁴⁵. Through his campaigns Servilius ended up controlling such strategically important regions as Lycia, Pamphylia and certain parts of Cilicia Tracheia and was able to threaten the Pontus kingdom from the southern side⁴⁶.

In his speech on the Manilian Law in 67 BC⁴⁷ Cicero claims that the Romans were left to the mercy of the pirates until Pompey drove them

⁴⁰ “Phaselis, which Publius Servilius captured, had not always been a city of Cilician pirates. It was the Lycians, a Greek people, who inhabited it. But, because of its situation, and because it was protected so far out to sea the pirates often had cause to call in on their expeditions from Cilicia, both on the outward and the return journey, and they made the city their own, first through commercial ties, then also by an alliance”. (Cic. Verr. ii. (4) 10. 21). See further Cic. leg. agr. ii. 50; Sall. Hist. i. 127-137; Strab. xiv. 5. 7 c. 671; Flor. epit. i. 41. 5. Eutr. vi. 3; Oros. hist. v. 23.

⁴¹ Sall. Hist. i. 127-137; Strab. xiv. 5. 7; Oros. hist. v. 23. 21; Eutr. vi. 3. For further detail see Keyser 1997, 64 ff.; for localization of Hellenistic Olympus and Corycus, see forthcoming Adak 2003.

⁴² Cic. Verr. ii. (1) 21. 56; Sall. Hist. i. 127-137; Strab. xiv. 5. 7 c. 671; Flor. epit. i. 41. 5; Oros. hist. v. 23; see also Strab. xiv. 3. 3 c. 665.

⁴³ Strab. xiv. 5. 7 c. 671; see also Cic.; Verr. ii. (4) 10. 21; leg. agr. i. 5; ii. 50; Ormerod 1922, 36.

⁴⁴ Liv. perioch. 93; Strab. xii. 6. 2 c. 569; Flor. epit. i. 41. 5; Frontin. strat. iii. 7; Eutr. vi. 3; Festus. Brev. xii. 3; Vell. ii. 39. 2; Oros. hist. v. 23. 22. See further, Ormerod 1922, 44 ff; Hall 1973, 568 ff; Keyser 1997, 168 ff.

⁴⁵ Shaw 1990, 221; Keyser 1997, 65 ff; Arslan 2000, 100 dn. 389.

⁴⁶ Sall. Hist. ii. 47. 7; see also Ormerod 1997², 214-220, Sherwin-White 1976, 11;

⁴⁷ Cicero (Leg. Man. xii. 33) points out that, even in Italy the coastal cities like Caieta, Misenum and Ostia were attacked by pirates. Vellius Paterculus (xxxi. 2) says that pirates plundered certain cities of Italy. Florus (epit. i. 41. 6) mentions that the pirates extended their operations to a far wider area than before and they created panic on the coasts of Sicily -App. Mithr. 93- and Campania. According to Appian (Mithr. 92), pirates attacked Brundisium -see also Cic. Leg. Man. xii. 32- and Etruria. Cassius Dio (xxxvi. 22. 1-2) speaks of pirates pillaging and burning Ostia and other cities of Italy. Plutarch (Pomp. xxiv. 1-8) also indicates that the pirates started to attack the coast of Italy, and the Romans became their main targets for attack. They raided the cities, harbours, roads and villas and disgraced the Roman supremacy. He also describes the humiliations and insults which the pirates enjoyed inflicting upon their Roman victims. See in detail Souza 1999, 165-66.

Pirates even conquered some of the Roman generals in naval engagement. They dominated the entire Mediterranean to the Pillars of Hercules and no sea could be navigated safely (Cic. Leg. Man. xi. 32-xii. 33; xviii. 55; App. Mithr. 93).

away. Up until then the menace of the pirates had become increasingly worse; high-ranking Romans had already become the victims of pirates⁴⁸; many islands and cities had been either abandoned out of fear of the pirates, or had been taken by them. Numerous cities and islands, such as Cnidus, Colophon, Samos and Delos, had been sacked⁴⁹. Plutarch (Pomp. 24. 5) lists 13 plundered sanctuaries and claims that no less than 400 cities were captured by pirates at the height of their power. Both Cassius Dio (xxxvi. 20-21) and Appian (Mithr. 63; 92-93) note how the pirates had gone from the occasional attacks on ships to the bolder raiding of harbours and even fortified cities until they dominated the whole Mediterranean⁵⁰.

Consequently, around 67 BC the power of the pirates was felt all over the Mediterranean. It was impossible to sail anywhere and all trade was stopped⁵¹. The pirates began to interrupt the grain supplies of Rome from Egypt and the markets in Rome started to go short of food, threatening the enormous population of the city with famine. This was finally the point that made Rome stir and respond to the pirate menace⁵². The tribune Aulus Gabinius proposed a law to clear the sea from piracy in 67 BC⁵³, and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus was appointed commander for three years with supreme command over all of the Mediterranean as well as all its coastlines to a distance of 80 km from the sea, in order to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean once and for all⁵⁴.

Pompey's main military activity confirms that securing Rome's grain supply was of the utmost importance⁵⁵. The sea around Italy was secured

⁴⁸ Cic. *Leg. Man.* xii. 32-33; Plut. *Pomp.* xxiv. 4-6.

⁴⁹ Cic. *Leg. Man.* xi. 31-xii. 35; 54-57. Cicero (*Verr.* ii. (3) 37. 85) points out that the Lipari islands and some towns followed the course of purchasing exemption from pirate raids by a fixed annual tribute (Ormerod 1997², 208).

⁵⁰ Plut. *Pomp.* xxiv. 1-4.

⁵¹ Plut. *Pomp.* xxv. 1; see also Cic. *Leg. Man.* xii. 32.

⁵² Plut. *Pomp.* xxv. 1; Liv. *perioch.* 99; App. *Mithr.* 93-94; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 23. 2.

⁵³ Cic. *Leg. Man.* xvii. 52; xviii. 54; xix. 57-58; Plut. *Pomp.* xxv. 2; xxvi. 1-4; App. *Mithr.* 94; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 23. 4; Vell. ii. 31. 2.

⁵⁴ The Romans were well aware at this time that this was the most effective way to deal with the pirates. Cic. *Leg. Man.* xxiii. 67; Plut. *Pomp.* xxv. 1-3; App. *Mithr.* 94; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 37. 1; Vell. ii. 31. 2. See further Shaw 1990, 222; Sherwin-White 1994, 249; Souza 1999, 161-167.

⁵⁵ Souza 1999, 167.

first⁵⁶. Pompey then divided up the sea and its coastlines into 13 regions, assigning each of them to his generals and providing them with a sufficient number of ships. Having thus spread out his forces, he was able to surround the pirates from all sides and they could not escape⁵⁷ – the first part of his campaign in the western Mediterranean was completed in 40 days⁵⁸. The attack on Cilicia itself, the region of the final strongholds of the pirates, was facilitated by the reputation that Pompey now had – most strongholds surrendered without battle⁵⁹.

The overall success of Pompey's campaign, and the permanence of the arrangements that resulted from it, was due to the way the general treated his prisoners: Contrary to common Roman opinion, Pompey did not believe that the pirates deserved death; on the other hand he treated the pirates more like political enemies and agreed on generous terms for them to surrender. The land he had conquered in Asia Minor and Achaia he offered to the pirates in exchange for their ships – in this way he not only made them give up piracy for the time being, but also gave them an opportunity to resettle in a new life as farmers⁶⁰. Thus he successfully completed a three-year mission in less than three months⁶¹.

To summarise, the growth of piracy from the middle of the 2nd century BC was the combined result of changes in the centres of power around the

⁵⁶ Cic. Leg. Man. xii. 34; Plut. Pomp. xxvi. 4; see further Souza 1999, 167-69.

⁵⁷ Plut. Pomp. xxvi. 3; App. Mithr. 95.

⁵⁸ Liv. perioch. 99; App. Mithr. 95. According to Livius (perioch. 99) and Florus (epit. i. 41. 15), it took only 40 days to complete the entire mission, including the conquest of Cilicia. But Cicero (Leg. Man. xii. 35) indicates that sailing from Brundisium to bringing Cilicia into the Roman empire took Pompey 49 days.

⁵⁹ Cic. Leg. Man. xii. 35; App. Mithr. 96; Flor. epit. i. 41. 13-14.

⁶⁰ After his achievement against the pirates he did not return to Rome, but remained in Asia. He made various regulations for the towns which he had conquered. He selected the thinly populated or deserted cities, some as a result of the Mithridatic Wars, and resettled them with pirates (Seager 1979, 37-8; Greenhalgh 1980, 91-100; Shaw 1990, 222 n. 72; Pohl 1993, 278-80; Souza 1999, 176). Those were the cities of Cilicia like Adana, Mallus, Epiphaneia, and Soli, which was renamed Pompeiopolis (Strab. viii. 7. 5 c. 388 ; xiv. 3. 3 c. 665; 5. 8 c. 671; Plut. Pomp. xxviii. 3-4; App. Mithr. 96; 115; Cass. Dio xxxvi. 37. 6; see also Cic. Off. 3. 49; Flor. epit. i. 41. 14; Vell. ii. 32. 6-7). A certain amount of Cilician settlers was also transferred to Dyme, a city of Achaia (Strab. viii. 7. 5 c. 388; xiv. 3. 3 c. 665; Plut. Pomp. xxviii. 4; App. Mithr. 96).

⁶¹ Plut. Pomp. xxviii. 1; see further Cic. Leg. Man. xi. 31-xii. 35; Liv. perioch. 99; Plin. nat. vii. 26. 97; App. Mithr. 114; Flor. epit. i. 41. 12-15.

Mediterranean, opening a space for pirate bands to operate in, and the increased economic opportunities that arose due to the demand on slaves particularly in Rome.

The relationship between Mithridates and the pirates seems to stem from a mutual need of assistance; Mithridates was in need of extra naval forces, and the pirates were dependent on free movement on the Mediterranean to carry out their unlawful trade. Some pirate bands, notably those under the command of Seleucus mentioned above, appear to have held strategically important positions within the forces of Mithridates, whereas other bands were probably more loosely connected.

The victims of piracy, the coastal and island communities, seem to have arranged themselves in whatever way they could. Some cities cooperated with the pirates, others fought them off or, apparently more commonly, entered “embargo” treaties with other cities, or simply paid the ransom demanded by the pirates for their citizens. There does not seem to have been any attempts of a united war against the pirates from the side of the cities.

Rome made only half-hearted attempts at suppressing piracy until the city found its own food supplies cut by the lack of safety on the Mediterranean. At this point finally Pompey was given sufficient time and means to clear the seas from pirates once and for all⁶².

⁶² We should keep in mind that after Pompeius' campaign piracy in the Mediterranean did not completely disappear, but their numbers were reduced very much. According to Cassius Dio (xxxvi. 20. 1) “*Pirates always used to harass those who sailed the sea, even as brigands did those who dwelt on land. There was never a time when these practices were unknown, nor will they ever cease probably so long as human nature remains the same*”.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

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CQ	The Classical Quarterly. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
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- ICret Inscriptiones Creticae opera et consilio Friderici Halbherr collectae. 1 Tituli Cretae mediae praeter Gortynios. Curavit Margartia GUARDUCCI. Rome 1935.
- IG Inscriptiones Graecae, consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Borussicae ed. maior: I-IV., VII., IX., XI., XII., XIV. Berlin 1873-1939.
- IGR Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas Pertinentes. Ed. by R. Cagnat- J. Toutain. I-IV. Paris 1906-1928.
- ILLRP Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae 2Bde. 1925-31. Ed. by A. Degrassi 1961.
- I.v. Ilion Inscripfen von Ilion. P. Frisch. Bonn 1975 (I.K. 3).
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- RE Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearb. unter Mit-wirkung zahlreicher

- Fachgenossen hrsg. von G. Wissowa (später fortgef. von W. Kroll u. K. Mittelhaus et al., hrsg. von K. Ziegler) Reihe 1, Halbbd. I-XLVII. Reihe, Halbbd. I- XIX. Suppl.- Bd. I-XVI. Stuttgart (München) 1893-1980 (Reihe 1: A-Q, Bde. I-XXIV 1, 1893-963; Reihe 2: R-Z, Bde. IA1-XA, 1914-1972; Suppl.-Bde. I-XV, 1903-1978.
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Fig. 1
Map of Anatolia
with cities mentioned
in the text.