INSTRUMENTALISATION OF GERRYMANDERING IN RECENTRALIZATION IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF ANKARA

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Öz

Bu araştırma, 2012 yılında yapılan 6360 sayılı kanunla yapılan değişiklikle gerçekleşen yerel seçim sınırlarına ilişkin düzenlemenin yeniden merkezileşmeye yol açtığını iddia etmekte ve bunu ampirik olarak kanıtlamaktadır. Bu argümanları kanıtlamak için seçim davranışı ile seçmen profili arasındaki ilişkiyi ele alan sivil gönüllülük modeli kullanılmıştır. Araştırmada kullanılan veriler Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (YSK) ve Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK) ile bir gayrimenkul internet sitesi kullanılarak oluşturulan verilerden oluşmaktadır. Bulgular, muhalefet partisinin hâkim olduğu alanların daralmakta olduğunu, bunun da ötesinde, söz konusu düzenlemeyi yapan siyasi iktidarın çeperde yer alan kendi egemenliğindeki alanları dahi yereldeki temsilcilerine bırakmayacak kadar merkezden idare etme eğilimine girdiğini göstermektedir. Bu durum seçim sınırlarına ilişkin yapılan düzenlemenin siyasal iktidarın hakimiyet alanını genişletmesinin ötesinde hegemonik bir biçimde Türkiye'de merkezileşme dinamiklerini yeniden harekete geçirdiğini ve bunun gerçekleşmesi için mekanın araçsallaştırıldığını göstermesi açısından önemlidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Seçim Sınırlarının Değiştirilmesi, Sosyo-Mekansal Dinamikler, Merkezileşme, Hegemonya, Regresyon Analizi, Türkiye

Abstract

The aim of this research is to demonstrate empirically that gerrymandering takes place specifically in the municipal elections which first started by the law 6360 in 2012 and not only leads to expansion of the political power's hegemony while limiting the opposition party's electoral boundary but also centralization. In order to prove this argument, civil voluntarism model, which deals with the relationship between electoral behaviors and voter's profile, was used. We use data on voter qualifications and election results from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) and the Supreme Electoral Board (SEB), two state institutions. And we also used an economic data we created from a real estate website. The findings show that the areas dominated by the opposition party are shrinking. Furthermore, the findings show that the ruling party that made this regulation tended to be centralized to the extent that it did not leave its domination areas to their local representatives. In this case, the regulation cannot be seen as a simple arrangement about only expanding of electoral boundaries. It also shows that mobilizes the dynamics of recentralization in Turkey and the place is instrumentalized for this purpose.

Keywords: Gerrymandering, Socio-Spatial Dynamics, Centralization, Hegemony, Regression Analysis, Turkey

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INTRODUCTION

In Turkey, a democratic country, two types of elections are held: general and local or mayoral elections. In general elections, parlamentarians of different parties are elected while in local or mayoral elections are held to elect a mayor of political party origin. In Turkey, which adopted its own administrative law from France, mayors are supposed to be affiliated with a political party unlike in France. The municipalities organize their own party's lobbying activities. So mayoral elections are at least as important as parliamentary elections. Parliamentary elections are seen as an important kind of political participation that should not be lost, especially for political parties. For example, one study on the general elections in 2002 based on an electoral geography consisting of the 8 metropolitian districts of Ankara (8 districts) revealed that the AKP did not receive most of the votes in the city's geometric center (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2006). Municipalities are audited by the ministry of environment and urbanization as well as ministry of finance. Therefore, in case these two ministeries are in the hands of the incumbent, the municipalities are privileged or underpriviledged in terms of economy. Mayors are elected by the majority of the local people. The duties and authorities are determined by the law 5216 on the metropolitan municipality. By this law, the boundaries of the municipalities are exposed to change. In addition, the same law allows the transformation of municipalities in the provinces where the population size is over 750.000 into metropolitan municipality. In 2012, the law 6360 on metropolitan municipality ascertained the borders of the province as the borders of the metropolitan municipality. Such a change by law is interpreted as a passage from metropolitan municipality to ''unicity model'' municipality since it affects not only the election results of the government but also of the opposition party (Çolak, Sağlam, and Topal, 2017). We argue that such a change is a sign of centralization and rescaling of the state.

Rescaling discussions pioneered by the implementation of neoliberal policies have led to some changes and transformations in politics in the world. While these changes were aiming at more decentralisation and federalization with decentralizing approaches at the beginning, recently they shifted towards centralization with the effects of conjunctural changes in the world (Theodore, Peck, and Brenner, 2011). As stated by Şahin (2018), Turkey was also touched by the glut of these changes. In this context, on one side, localization and centralization and, on the other side, two constrastive phenomena were observed in Turkish politics. To illustrate, two important events took place in this framework at the beginning of the year 2000 and in 2012. The first aimed at constructing a decentralized structure in line with the neoliberal policy of the current political power (with the draft version of the Fundamental Law on Public Administration); but the second was a decentralized structure that would contradict the former. The second intervention, which resulted in a centralized structure, will be examined from the electoral geography perspective. As in most countries, electoral boundaries are subject to change in Turkey, too. In this context, two significant changes have been made in the last twenty years of Turkish political history. The first took place in 2004 and the second in 2012. In these years, the necessary amendments to the legislation on mayoral elections created a suitable ground for gerrymandering.

The present study differs from previous research in that in the present study it takes into account socio-cultural dynamics and space in manipulating local elections in Turkey as a way of protecting political hegemony (Ataç and Işık, 2013; Aygul, 2016; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2006; Özözen-Kahraman, 2007). Our argument is that the political elites benefit from socio-cultural and socio-spatial dynamics, gerrymandering, in local elections in order to more centralize. We use data on voter qualifications and election results from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) and the Supreme Electoral Board (SEB), two state institutions. The civic voluntarism model among voter behavior models is adopted to analyze and interpret the data used in the study to understand the socio-cultural and economic bases of the parties and to contribute to the literature. In this framework, we use regression analysis (GR) to understand the electoral profile of the parties to examine the relationship of voter behavior to space.

Descriptive information on mayoral elections and political parties in Turkey and in Ankara are given in the first section of the study. In the second section, the data and methodology are explained. The third section is literature review. In the fourth section, the findings of the research are discussed followed by the results and conclusion.

BACKGROUND

Political Parties and Transformation of Mayoral Elections in Turkey

In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which defines itself as conservative democratic has been in power since 2002 (Akdoğan, 2004). It is the party that has won elections three times successively, which makes it the predominant party (Sartori, 1976: 175). In the parliament, opposition parties are the Republican People's Party (CHP), which is a social democratic party; the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a far-right party; and the socialist People's

Democratic Party supported by a majority of the Kurds. For a party to assume power in the Turkish electoral system, not only parliamentarian elections but also local or mayoral elections play an important role, as mayors are elected for a political party in the parliament and represent that party on the local scene. Municipalities seek to collect votes in parliamentarian elections by means of their services and infrastructure constructions for the local people. For instance, in one study on the AKP, municipalities are defined as organs that pump blood to the center, creating a basis for the center to have direct contact with the locals (Doğan, 2017).

In 2003, the AKP government sought to pass Law 5019 on municipal borders in order to provide more autonomy to local administations by rescaling the municipal borders, but the law was vetoed by the secular and Republican president at that time. However, the vetoed law was replaced by the law 5216 changed by the government. The aim of the law was to lessen the effect of more centralized stated to minimum stating in the 58th Government Emergency Action Plan that public administration should be more decentralized. Central government, thus, had policies aiming to give more authonomy to the local administrations and even had some authority over (Ayman-Güler, 2009: 113; Şengül, 2003: 206). In this respect, local administrations were supported and empowered economically and in terms of human resources while city councils were created to increase the participation of the local people. In addition, development agencies were established in order to set policies together with the local and share information with the partners (Şengül, 2003). A bottom-up approach which implies decentralization is identified with democracy from a liberal perspective. (Bayramoğlu, 2014; Şengül, 2003). Prioritizing decentralized policies right at the beginning of its power (2002) is closely related with negotiations of the political power with the European Union (EU). Indeed, IMF and EU recommend the political powers bottom-up approaches. Therefore, an article specifying the munical borders was added to Law 5216.[3] In accordance with the law enacted in 2004, municipal borders became administrative borders just in Istanbul and Kocaeli. In other cities, the governor's office had to be within the administrative borders as a requirement for being accepted as the center, the border being the circumference of a circle whose radius is 20 km of a metropolitan municipality whose population is up to one million; 30 km of a metropolitan municipality whose population is between one million and two million, and 50 km for a population over 2 million.

Unlike the changes made related to the transition to governance in 2004, in 2012 the government adopted government approach aiming centralization. It seems that Turkey has also been affected by the emerging neo-rightist and centralization tendencies after 2008 economic crisis. Interestingly, this is the period when debates on democratization in Turkey were ignited. With Law 6360,[4] which came into force in 2012, the borders of the municipalities were determined differently from the above law, and all districts and villages were connected to the metropolitan municipality. The municipal boundary was redefined as a provincial boundary. Therefore, according to the previous legislation, the villages and towns not in the area governed by the metropolitan municipality were converted into the neighborhoods and came under the control of the metropolitan municipality. As rescaled by the ruling party, the new boundaries are today controlled by that party and mayoral elections are thus gerrymandered.

The Case of Ankara

The reason why Ankara was chosen as a case in this study is because it is the province where the votes of the opposition have most pressure on those of the ruling party. Taking into consideration the voting rates of the parties, it can be seen that, in general, the votes of the ruling party and the opposition party are very close to each other, 44.9% and 43.8% respectively (www.ysk.gov.tr). Because the voting rates are so close, gerrymandering becomes ineluctable for political elites to win the capital and centralize its power. For instance, before the amendment made in 2012, the sovereignty of political parties in Ankara was as in Table 1. With the changes in 2012, 20 town administrations that had been connected to the districts within the periphery were joined to the metropolitan municipality (center). Eight out of the 20 abolished towns were governed by mayors of a party other than the AKP.

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[3] Provisional Clause 2: *https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5216.html* (Accessed on 07.04.2018)

[4] On üç ilde Büyükşehir Belediyesi ve Yirmi Altı İlçe Kurulması ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, *https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6360.html* (Accessed on 11.07.2018). For a detailed discussion of the law, see. (Savaş-Yavuzçehre, 2016)

Table 1: Distribution of the Parties that Won the Municipal Elections in 2009 According to Law 5216, Later Abolished by Law 6360 Put Into Force in 2012

Districts	AKP	CHP	DP
		Towns in the districts	
Ayaş	Oltan		
Bala		Afşar	
Beypazarı	Uruş	Karaşar	Kırbaşı
Güdül	Çağa, Sorgun	Yeşilöz	
Haymana	Çalış, Yurtbeyli	Balçıkhisar, Bumsuz, Yenice	
Kızılcahamam	Çeltikçi		
Nallıhan	Çayırhan	Sarıyar	
Şereflikoçhisar	Çalören, Devekova, Gülhüyük, Kacarlı		
TOTAL	**12**	**7**	**1**

With the amendment in 2012, the 8 opposition municipalities were subsumed under the control of the metropolitan municipality. In addition, the jurisdiction of the district municipalities was limited and the jurisdictional scope of the metropolitan municipality was extended. According to the 2009 mayoral election results, 14 out of a total of 25 municipalities in Ankara (56%) were governed by AKP affiliated mayors: 4 out of the 8 municipalities (50%) were governed by the AKP; and 10 out of the 17 lower-level municipalities (59%) in the periphery[5] were controlled by AKP mayors (Table 2). It is obvious that the AKP is more a peripheral party (Aygul, 2016). However, *a question arises here based on the empirical evidence we have in hand: why did a peripheral party that was already dominant in the area need an amendment that would allow the party to have more control over the periphery?*

Table 2: Parties that Won the Elections in the Districts Before and After Law 6360

	Electoral Region	2009 Mayoral Elections	2014 Mayoral Elections		Electoral Region	2009 Mayoral Elections	2014 Mayoral Elections
1	Akyurt	AKP	AKP	14	Haymana	AKP	DP
2	Altındağ	AKP	AKP	15	Kahramankazan	CHP	AKP
3	Ayaş	CHP	AKP	16	Kalecik	AKP	AKP
4	Bala	MHP	AKP	17	Keçiören	AKP	AKP
5	Beypazarı	MHP	AKP	18	Kızılcahamam	MHP	AKP
6	Çamlıdere	AKP	AKP	19	Mamak	AKP	AKP
7	Çankaya	CHP	CHP	20	Nallıhan	MHP	AKP
8	Çubuk	AKP	AKP	21	Polatlı	AKP	MHP
9	Elmadağ	AKP	AKP	22	Pursaklar	AKP	AKP
10	Etimesgut	MHP	MHP	23	Sincan	AKP	AKP
11	Evren	MHP	AKP	24	Şereflikoçhisar	AKP	AKP
12	Gölbaşı	MHP	AKP	25	Yenimahalle	CHP	CHP
13	Güdül	AKP	AKP				

According to Law 5216 of 2009, the municipalities (in bold) and lower-level municipalities that the AKP government won and lost are presented in the Table 1 above. In 2009, based on the law 5216, which covered the settlements within the radius of 50 km, Haymana and Şereflikoçhisar not being within the 50 km radius and some settlements of Gudul and Kahramankazan where AKP was dominant, were left outside the boundaries of metropolitan municipality[6]. With Law 6360, which came into force in 2012, the lower-level municipalities in Table 1 were abolished, and the governance of these municipalities was affiliated to the metropolitan municipality. For instance, with the law 6360, Kahramankazan municipality governed by CHP mayor until 2014, was won by AKP. The electoral rates of AKP and CHP are given in Table 2. With the law 6360 put into force in 2012, AKP rescaled the metropolitan municipality borders and extended its hegemony into the center where it was weaker while the opposition party, CHP was stronger (Table 3). The electoral rate of AKP in central districts in 2009 was 39,55% while it increased to 41,54%. On the contrary, the voting rate of CHP in 2009 29,14% while it was 27,96% in 2012 when the law was promulgated (Table 3). This is to argue that AKP had deliberate intent to narrow the borders of the region where CHP, opposition party, was dominant while AKP expanded its own hegemony.

Table 3: The Electoral Rates of Major Parties Before and After Law 6360

	Metropolitan municipalities		Peripheral Municipalities	
	2009	**2014**	**2009**	**2014**
AKP's voting rates	**39,55**	**41,54**	**50,84**	**47,14**
CHP''s voting rates	**29,14**	**27,96**	**12,50**	**11,65**

[5] Districts excluding Altındağ, Çankaya, Etimesgut, Gölbaşı, Keçiören, Mamak, Sincan and Yenimahalle are defined as peripheral districts.

[6] For a map showing these boundaries, see (Özçağlar, 2014: 185).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering can still be observed in the 21st century (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2009: 666). Gerrymandering literally means "a manipulation of electoral districts in order to give one political party an advantage by concentrating the opposition's voting strength in as few districts as possible." Elections, one of the criteria for democratic regimes besides the rule of law and media freedom, can be manipulated in many ways in favor of the incumbent, according to Schedler: limiting fundamental and political rights, access to media and financial sources, using election tricks, legal or active violation of general suffrage rules (Schedler, 2002b: 38-39, 42-46). In order to distinguish gerrymandering from electoral manipulation, Aygul (2016: 185) states that "while gerrymandering can be seen everywhere, if electoral manipulation is accompanied by 'constraints in media freedom and civil-political liberties,' the system verges towards 'electoral authoritarianism' rather than liberal democracy."

Gerrymandering is closely involved with administrative regions or election districts. According to Halas and Klapka (2017: 1572), "administrative regions are created the same as election districts." The politicians, thus, are tempted to manipulate the administrative regions and take into account the electoral population and their voting behavior. Gerrymandering is therefore a tool to manipulate elections in favor of the incumbent. Schedler (2002b: 45) regards gerrymandering and the manipulation of electoral districts as "the methods enabling the incumbent to continue to enjoy majority representation despite potential falls in their votes." By means of demographic and cartographic strategies, the incumbent may have an impact on the translation of votes into seats. Only the political party that is in power can practice gerrymandering, which covers a partisan mapping scheme that prevents the opposing party's chances of winning seats, since the relevant state institutions are controlled to its opponent's disadvantage (Giugal, Johnston, Chiru, Ciobanu, and Gavris, 2017: 685). Some scholars Bervoets and Merlin (2012: 474) suggest that gerrymandering aims to "gain more seats in the parliament for the majority, which they call packing or to diffuse minority strength across many districts," which is dilution. In this context, minority strength can be regarded as the effect of the opposition group in the majority's district. Incumbent gerrymandering, which aims to contribute to the reelection of the incumbent, is not seen as a culprit (Friedman and Holden, 2009: 593).

Therefore, there are two types of gerrymandering in terms of its implementation: intentional and unintentional gerrymandering. Intentional gerrymandering is a deliberate practice, and voting maps are drawn to favor partisan groups, whereas in unintentional gerrymandering "one party's voters are more geographically clustered than those of the opposing party due to residential patterns and human geography" (Chen and Rodden, 2013: 240). Giugal et al. (2017: 685) state that gerrymandering is a partisan mapping scheme that may hinder the opposing party's chances of winning seats.

Gerrymandering contains a partisan mapping scheme, which prevents the opposing party's chances of winning seats in the parliament, which can be done through the establishment of fewer constituencies in areas where the opposing party has strong electoral support. This is called a packed gerrymander or by creating as many colleges as possible in those areas in which the party that controls the mapping process has an electoral majority—a cracked gerrymander.

Gerrymandering is made possible through electoral boundaries and electoral systems in Turkey. The aim of gerrymandering is to increase the number of seats in parliament to the highest possible number with the available votes (Özözen Kahraman, 2004). In doing so, it intensifies the opposition party's votes in several different regions, or by spreading it to many regions, reducing its intensity and preventing it from reaching a sufficient percentage, and finally connecting the boundaries of the rival party's vote zone with other borders (Unintentional gerrymandering). Election systems on the other hand is a tool for gerrymandering, too. In Turkey, proportional representation system, the national remnant system and modified and nationwide d'Hondt method were observed. Today, the valid system is the nationwide d'hondt system. In addition, gerrymandering is also conducted by means of legal changes in administrative body.

According to the theory developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 12), it can be asserted that the Turkish political system is divided into four common cleavages: (1) the center and the periphery; (2) secular and conservative; (3) urban and rural; and (4) capital and labor. For instance, in Turkey most conservative democrats or nationalist conservative people are more clustered in moderately rural areas and suburbs, while the republicans live in more exurbs and densely populated city centers. Mardin (1973) emphasizes the conflict between center and periphery as well when it comes to party systems and voter alignments in Turkey. However, according to Mardin, the cleavage is more social and cultural than geographical. Secor (2001: 540) in her research on socio-political cleavages and the three-dimensional cleavage model in Turkey argues for a "traditional structure of center-periphery oppositions." Özbudun (2011b: 11) recapitulates that the conflict between the center and periphery is more between the political elite and the rest, a situation in which

gerrymandering can easily occur. In other studies Kalaycioglu (1994), the center-periphery conflict is based on religiosity or industrial or agricultural factors. Since those living in the center and periphery converge socially, culturally and economically, we adopt Lipset and Rokkan's approach to center and periphery (1967).

For Kennedy (2017: 267), gerrymandering is not the only factor that contributes to uncompetitive elections. In order for an election to be free and fair, partisan polarization and incumbency play a crucial role. The incumbent may also rely on partisan geography, such as malapportionment. Malapportionment has been defined in various ways:

The first type of malapportionment is deliberate intent: the mapping process is controlled by the incumbent and this creates larger constituencies in the areas where the opponent is strong. The second type is creeping malapportionment in which changes in constituency size over time create smaller seats where one's party is strong. The third one is reactive malapportionment where one party is strongest in the areas where abstention rates are greatest (Giugal et al., 2017).

Malapportionment is generally seen in electoral authoritarian regimes. Specifically, electoral malapportionment, "the disjuncture between the share of population in an electoral district and its share of seats," is a topic of interest in hybrid regimes (Ong, Kasuya, and Mori, 2017: 118) since it is at high levels in such regimes. However, in countries with strong democracy and authoritarian regimes, it is at a relatively low level. It has been pointed out that malapportionment is a tool to manipulate elections in hybrid regimes (Schedler, 2013: 98) but in consolidated democracies, malapportionment and gerrymandering must be avoided (Norris, 2014), as these two crimes "involve delineation of electoral boundaries so as to increase the likelihood of a particular outcome and potentially significant direct manipulation of the electoral process" (Birch, 2011: 25,30,84).

In electoral authoritarianism, according to Özbudun (2011a: 16), the rules related to elections are arranged in favor of the party in power, and the leaders of such electoral authoritarian regimes must have a balance between manipulation and conviction methods. "All electoral authoritarian regimes conduct regular elections" (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016: 1598), But these elections are not controlled by a neutral institution. Diamond (2002: 25) divides electoral authoritarian regimes into "the competitive and uncompetitive or hegemonic regimes." Parties turn into hegemonic regimes in "democratic" ways by resorting to hegemony. It is therefore important that elections be manipulated. Schedler (2006: 2) suggests that elections in electoral authoritarian regimes are unfree inasmuch as they are under tight authoritarian control. Indeed, these regimes do not practice democracy at all; but as Schedler (2002a: 36) points out, they are able to satisfy external and internal agents that they have "at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy." Finally, in electoral authoritarianism, the "autocrat chooses a binding policy deal conditioned on the citizen's choice of a payoff or policy concession" (Miller, 2012: 159). That is, citizens are verbally warned or intimidated through lack of service. For instance, in one campaign, former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu implicitly threatened the people if they did not vote for the AKP by stating that the "White Toros will be back if the AKP does not win the elections."[7] To illustrate further, the Istanbul metropolitan mayor stated that "priority would be given in underground lines to the districts loyal to AKP."[8]

Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM)

Political participation is one of the components of democracy. No one can be forced to vote for one party or another. However, certain prerequisites become determinants of political behavior. In order to better understand why some citizens actively participate in politics and elections while others do not, certain theories have been developed.AY These theories include the civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995), the theory of rational actors (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 2000), the theory of polyarchal democracy (Dahl, 1956) and standard political participation (Verba and Nie, 1987). The present study focuses on the civic voluntarism model because it is closely related to the resources and political behavior.

The civic voluntarism model (Verba et al., 1995) seeks responses as to why people do not participate in elections or politics. Oni et al. (2017: 318) state that the CVM "provides a more comprehensive approach and insight to understanding why people engage in political participation by incorporating the resource variables." In this model, *socio-economic and socio-demographic status and resources* are of great importance for voters' behaviors. Verba et al. (1995) point out that resources consist of time, money and civic skills supported by education and language, adult civic

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[7] White Toros polemics between the opposition and the power: "White Toros is remembered with unidentified murders. Unidentified murders were ended by AKP" http://bianet.org/english/politics/168524-white-toros-polemics (Accessed on the 16.04.2018)

[8] Mayor of Istanbul plans new metro lines for areas loyal to Erdogan's party. *https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/03/18/mayor-of-istanbul-plans-new-metro-lines-for-areas-loyal-to-erdogans-party/* (Accessed on 11.07.2018)

skills that focus on the workplace, voluntary associations and social and religious life. Interpreters (Lijphart, 1984) suggest that the principal reasons for conflict between parties consist of seven dimensions: socio-economic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, support for regime, foreign policy and post-materialism (Özbudun, 2011b: 3). In the CVM, scholars take into consideration the socio-economic and cultural dimensions. However, political scientists extend these dimensions to other aspects, such as free time, education, citizens' sense of efficacy, mobilisation to participate in political activity, party identification and political engagement. For instance, Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2003: 446) indicate that the abovementioned dimensions have an effect on political behavior of the citizens, and they formulate the civic voluntarism model as the total of resources, mobilization, party identification and political engagement "by $A=p+R+M+I+E$ where A is activism, p is efficacy, R is resources (time, money and civic skills), M is mobilisation ('Have you been asked to get involved?'), I is party identification and E is political engagement." If these dimensions are hindered or excluded, citizens are deeply affected. Therefore, in order to prevent electoral authoritarianism, not only free and fair elections are required, but also the dimensions listed above should also be provided. The civic voluntarism model is frequently used in most democratic practices. Associations, temples and gymnasiums are some of the places where people get together and seek to have influence on politics while socializing.

Clarke et al. (2004: 238,239,240) indicate three types of rivaling model for voting turnout: the *perceived equity-fairness or relative deprivation model*, where "individuals that think a gap exists between the expectation and what they get out of life suffer a sense of deprivation. If it is seen as the source of the deprivation, this turns into a vote against the incumbent"; the *social capital model*, where "the role of interpersonal trust in cooperation among individuals trying to solve collective action problems is emphasized and trust derives from face-to-face interactions among individuals participating in voluntary activities"; And the *civic voluntarism model*, where "social contexts aid individuals to obtain resources and skills, both economic and cognitive, which enable people to engage with politics."

In the civic voluntarism model, it is noted that voters in most democratic and hybrid regimes are generally rich and compose the elite class of the community. They are also generally elderly (Lipset, 1960: 239), since the education level of the voters is high and younger generations are more indifferent to political activism than the older ones. Pattie and Johnston (1998: 270) emphasize "party identification, social class, employment status, age, education, housing tenure, and region of residence" for political participation and civic voluntarism.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

This study is based on the data obtained from the official web site of TSI and SEB. The variables, such as educational background, age and place of birth (to understand immigration status) were taken from TSI, while the voting rate of the parties and the voters related to the election periods were obtained from SEB. Economic variables, such as household size, occupation, unemployment status, housing qualifications and ownership status of a house, were not included as variables because of the lack of district-wise data. The lack of these data could be considered a limitation of the research. However, in order to substitute the economic variables that are missing, an economic index related to the provinces was created. This index is based on the arithmetic average of the cost per square meter of the first most expensive five fields in each district according to February 2018 prices (for the data see Table 4). All data obtained were analyzed on the basis of 25 districts of Ankara. In the research, we used correlation and regression analyses.

Table 4: The Variables Used in the Analysis		
Variables	**Description of the data**	**Source**
	Dependent variables	
1-AKP's rate	The ratio of AKP's votes in the district to the total valid votes (2014)	SEB
2-CHP's rate	The ratio of CHP's votes in the district to the total valid votes (2014)	
	Independent variables	
	A- Demographic variables	
1-Young population rate (YPR)	The ratio of electorates aged 20-29 to the population in the district	
2- Middle age population rate (MAPR)	The ratio of electorates aged 30-44 to the population in the district	
3-Upper middle age population rate (UMAPR)	The ratio of electorates aged 45-64 to the population in the district	
4-Elderly population rate (EPR)	The ratio of electorates aged over 65 to the population in the district	TSI
	B- Cultural variables	
1-Population with no diploma rate (PND)	The ratio of the population with no diploma to the electorates in the	
2-Primary school graduate rate (PSR)	The ratio of the primary school graduate population to the	
3-Secondary school graduate rate (SSGR)	The ratio of the secondary school graduate population to the	
4-The rate of undergraduate (RU)	The ratio of under-graduate population to the electorates in the	TSI
	C- Social Variables	
1-Population rate according to place of birth (2014)	The ratio of the population according to place of birth to the total	TSI
	D- Economic Variables	
1-Economic index (EI)	Economic index created on the basis of field cost in the districts	www.sahibinden.com

Results of Regression Analysis

Multiple regression analysis is used to predict the effect of independent variables on a dependent variable. In other words, it aims to reveal the level of influence on the dependent variable of changes in independent variables. By means of the multiple regression analysis conducted in this study, we sought to understand which independent variables affected the voting rate (dependent variable) of the AKP and the CHP. In order for the regression analysis to be valid, the data have to meet certain assumptions. In this context, the data should have a normal distribution, and the Durbin-Watson (D-W) values are to be within the acceptable bounds, that is, between 1 and 3. Another test to measure the validity of the analysis is VIF (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2014: 200).The suggested cutoff for the tolerance value is .10 (or a corresponding VIF of 10) which corresponds to a multiple correlation with the other independent variables. Therefore, a VIF value below 10 shows that the analysis is valid. In this frame, the data with no normal distribution were normalized by measuring the square root. The results of both regression analyses, in which both AKP and CHP are considered as dependent variables, show that the D-W (see Table 5 and Table 7) and VIF values (see Table 6 and Table 8) are within the acceptable limits for the validity of the analyses. In regression analysis, the number of units is expected to be not less than 30. However, as Ankara has 25 districts, this expectation could not be satisfied due to the administrative structure.

Stepwise method was used for both AKP and CHP dependent variables in regression analysis. Regression analysis based on stepwise method minimize the number of variables in cases where there are many independent variables while maximizing R^2 and therefore is the unique method that yields to the best regression model/equation (Clark and Hosking, 1986: 419). After the assumptions of the regression analysis are created, considering the stepwise method, In the two regression analysis made, the voting rates of both parties were evaluated based on ten variables as shown in Table 4 (Four demographic, four cultural, one social and one economic). Analysis were conducted for each party.

In the first analysis where AKP's voting rate was used as a dependent variable, ten independent variables were considered. The results of the analysis showed that it was PSR that increased the voting rate of AKP. The value in the model *Adjusted R^2*=.442 accounts for 44% of the case. This independent variable that predicts the dependent variable has a positive significance (p=.000) (Table 5).

Table 5: Model Summary Table of Global Regression, Dependent Variable: AKP's Votes										
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	
1	,682ª	,466	,442	,56923	,466	20,039	1	23	,000	2,245
Predictors: (Constant), PSR										
Dependent Variable: AKP's rate										

t value that indicates the effect of the independent value on the voting rate of AKP is (*t*=4,477). This value shows also the effect of *PSR* on the model. The regression coefficient is *β*=,682. Beta values suggest that 1% of increase in the number of PSR raises the voting rate of AKP by extra 0,682 % (see. Table 6)

Table 6: Coefficients Table of Global Regression, Dependent Variable: AKP's Votes										
Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1 (Constant)	1,993	1,110		1,796						
PSR	-,707	,158	,682	4,477	,000	,682	,682	,682	1,000	1,000
Dependent Variable: AKP's rate										

As a result of the analysis where the voting rate of CHP was used as a dependent variable, the program has yielded to two models in accordance with stepwise method. In the model is included the variable *PSR* . The value in the model *Adjusted R^2*=.238 accounts for 24% of the case. This independent variable that predicts the dependent variable has a positive significance (p=.008) (Table 7).

Table 7: Model Summary Table of Global Regression, Dependent Variable: CHP's Votes										
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					Durbin-Watson
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F	
1	,519ª	,269	,238	,26159	,269	8,480	1	23	,008	1,728
Predictors: (Constant), PSR										
Dependent Variable: CHP's rate										

t value that show the effect of the independent variable on the voting rate of CHP are *t*= -2,912 for PSR. The value reveal that the variable PSR has a negative impact on the dependent variable. The voting rate of CHP decreases as the PSR. In the model, the regression coefficient is β=,-,519 for PSR. Beta values reveal that 1% of increase in PSR would decrease the voting rate of CHP by -,519% (see Table 8).

Table 8: Coefficients Table of Global Regression, Dependent Variable: CHP's Votes

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	3,116	,705		4,420	,000					
	PSR	-,292	,100	-,519	-2, 912	,008	-,519	-,519	-,519	1,000	1,000
Dependent Variable: CHP's votes											

Two separate regression analyzes of the two dependent variables reveal that the AKP overlaps the characteristics of the electorate in the periphery while those of the CHP more in the center in the case of Ankara.

CONCLUSION

After the 1950s, more and more of the world's countries have embraced democracy. After World War II, top-down approaches that are not very compatible with democracy have also come to the forefront. After the 1990s, the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1991) was witnessed; and while democratization has been adopted in many countries, in some countries the tendency towards authoritarianism and centralization has increased. After the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 world economic crisis, the world entered a new phase; partial dismantling of democratic values, walls built between peoples, centralizing tendencies becoming more and more visible than in the past. The political power, AKP, adopted neoliberal authoritarian state practices after 2008 and turned back to political recentralization which is operative in connection with its neoliberal macroeconomic program. This recentralization, which was adopted from the previous government in 2002 and left until 2008, favored the authoritarian drive today.

Entrustment to the municipality and empowerment of the local administration (Theodore et al., 2011), which were effective in the early stages of neoliberal policies (the 1980s), made the political power deauthorize municipalities on the periphery and authorize metropolitan municipalities. This aspect of the neoliberal policies can be seen as as one cause of the crisis of 2008. As part of the global world, Turkey was also affected by this transformation and joined in this centralization process. Its administrative structure has been shaped by it, and its spaces are being instrumentalized.

Centralization is also closely related with the transformation and the use of space. Centralization is therefore realized by the following arguments: Until the 1970s, the mainstream understanding tended to see space as a Euclidian and empty canvas. In the period after the 1970s, it was accepted that space took its source from the social dynamics in descriptions of space and spaces in the social science literature (Hubbard and Kitchin, 2011). According to Lefebvre, "space is a social product, or a complex social construction based on values, and the social production of meanings which affects spatial practices and perceptions" (Lefebvre, 1991: 26). For example, the housing realized by urban transformation policies taking into account the socio-cultural dynamics in the periphery exemplifies the reproduction of space (Çavuşoğlu and Strutz, 2014). The success of the AKP in three mayoral elections between 2004 and 2014 is due to the urban transformation and TOKI mass housing projects (Marschall, Aydogan, and Bulut, 2016).

Recently, the opening of new universities near peripheries or in the peripheries and the selection of schools based on residence can also account for the reproduction of space. These practices are indeed for political power to create its own social class. In Moore (1967) terms, the class difference between "the elites" and "the citizens" is in fact becoming extinct. Socio-cultural dynamics receive attention in the creation of the middle class in terms of the economy in democracies (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006: 38). Definitions of space have opened a serious paradigmatic transformation in geography, so that, according to Harvey, social practices and processes create centralized space. Harvey's emphasis on space and community interaction is defined by Soja (1980) as socio-spatial dialectic (Castree, 2011).

Given the definition of centralized space above, elections are also a dynamic that is spatially shaped. Political powers can change the boundaries of electorates in order to win elections. This phenomenon is observed within the framework of gerrymandering both in developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom and in the developing countries. Undoubtedly, gerrymandering is being carried out, and the peculiar dynamics of space become obvious as the relevant manipulations are made in favor of the politically hegemonic power. The association of

gerrymandering with electoral authoritarianism intends that political power should strengthen its own authority. For instance, the legal regulations concerning space made in Turkey in 2004 and 2012 serve this purpose. We argue that political powers do not ignore the socio-spatial dynamics, such as education, age, and economic situation, which are the components that constitute the civic voluntarism model when manipulating elections.

The present study examines the case of Ankara and demonstrates that the political power has taken into account the socio-spatial dynamics and has changed the electoral boundaries in such a way that activates the dynamics of recentralization. In this respect, the study differs from previous research on gerrymandering in that it examines why the political power empowers its own authority in the periphery where it has already its own hegemony. The results of the study are consistent with deliberate intent, which indicates that the political power apportions the boundaries of the regions where the opposition party is strong.

Voting behavior through socio-spatial dynamics is discussed under the theoretical framework of the civic voluntarism model. In this theory, voting behavior is shaped by the socio-spatial characteristics of the voters (Clarke, 2004; Leighley and Nagler, 1992). For example, voting behavior differs in individuals with a high profile in terms of income and education, as well as by age groups and those with low incomes and educational levels. In addition, the participation rate of older people in elections is different from that of the youth (Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Lipset, 1960; Mansley and Demsar, 2015; Pattie and Johnston, 1998). However in our study age factor has been reported to have no impact on the elections. Our research also reveals that voting behavior differs according to socio-economic characteristics. Indeed, the regression analyses give a clear picture of the voter profiles of each political party involved.

It appears that the AKP electorates differ significantly from those of the CHP in terms of education. Although the AKP government alleges that it has increased its educational level by opening many universities, there is a low correlation between university graduates and the number of AKP votes compared to the opposition parties. In fact, in the model based on the regression analysis, it is seen that the variable 'PSR' is a positive regression coefficient in the increase in the AKP's votes due to the votes of the PSR densely populated in the periphery while it has a negative regression coefficient with the vote rate that CHP receives.

It has been reported that the AKP is a middle-class party, investing in the Mass Housing Administration (TOKI), which promotes living areas for the middle class. These investments are made mostly in peripheral areas rather than in the center (Marschall et al., 2016: 201-204); this is also an indicator that the AKP is a party of the periphery.

It is seen that the AKP is a peripheral party while the CHP is a party appealing to the center, considering the differences between the votes of the two opposing political parties. As Mardin (1973) states, religious, ethnic and socially conservative groups are located in the periphery, while nationalist, statist and secular voters are at the center. Our results are consistent with the studies conducted by (Kalaycioglu, 1994; Kalaycioğlu, 2007) on the voters associated with the center and the periphery.

The answer to the question *"Why does a party with a stronger hegemony in the periphery need an arrangement to penetrate more into the periphery?"* would be because it has a centralization tendency. In other words, it is evident that although it is stronger in the periphery, the government does not count on the local people in the periphery to maintain its hegemony in the periphery. Baudrillard (2017) states that this is a transition from dominance to hegemony. The findings in our research in terms of the government's reinforcement of its central hegemony by gerrymandering are original insofar as they contribute to centralization discussions. Indeed, despite its political hegemony in the periphery, the political power assumes that its power should be centralized and the local should be administered from the center, which is a sign that the political power has abandoned the decentralized administration understanding it adopted in the early 2000s. In the academic research conducted on centralization and authoritarianism (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016; Özbudun, 2011a; Özbudun, 2015; Somer, 2016) and based on the reports published,[9] it is extensively discussed that Turkey has been backsliding towards centralization and authoritarianism, whether electoral authoritarianism (Miller, 2012) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

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