

# FORGERIES VS. HISTORICAL RESEARCH

## ARAM ANDONIAN'S "MEMOIRS OF NAIM BEY" AND THE CONTEMPORARY ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THEIR "AUTHENTICITY"

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**Abstract:** *This article analyses the attempts made, since 1986, to maintain that the "documents" published in 1920 by Aram Andonian are probably, if not almost certainly, "authentic". A systematic checking of the assertions defending Andonian's work proves that these attempts are not less misleading than the book which they support. Andonian's forgeries served for dec*

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### Introduction

For years, one of the most used "evidence" of the "Armenian genocide" allegation were the "Andonian documents". Aram Andonian (1875-1951) compiled his material, i.e. the so-called "Memoirs of Naim Bey", the so-called "official documents" supposedly sent by leaders of the Committee Union and Progress (CUP, the party which ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1918) and his proper comments, apparently in the Spring or the Summer of 1919. The French and English translations were published later in 1920. The compilation and the publication in Western languages happened in the context of attempts to obtain the largest territorial ("integral") Armenia, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea,<sup>1</sup> a design which would mean a vast operation of ethnic cleansing, as acknowledged by the Armenian leaders themselves.<sup>2</sup> The English version of some "telegrams" was republished in July 1921 by the monthly *Current History*.

1 Houri Berberian "The Delegation of Integral Armenia — From Greater Armenia to Lesser Armenia," *Armenian Review*, XLIV-3, Autumn 1991, pp. 39-64; Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 102-139; Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, p. 213.

2 Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, *The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference*, 1919, pp. 2 and 7-13 (more especially p. 12)  
<http://www.archive.org/download/armenianquestion00pari/armenianquestion00pari.pdf>

Andonian's work was used during the trials of Armenian terrorists: S. Tehlirian (of "Nemesis", the terrorist branch of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1920-1922), murderer of Talat Pasha, in 1921; Mardiros Jamgotchian (of Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia, ASALA), murderer of Mehmet Savaş Yergüz, secretary of the Turkish Consulate in Geneva, in 1981; Max Hraïr Kilndjian (of Justice Commando of Armenian Genocide, JCAG, the terrorist wing of the ARF in 1970's and 1980's) in Aix-en-Provence, 1982; four ASALA terrorists who attacked the Turkish Consulate of Paris, 1984; and the three main perpetrators of the bombing by ASALA in Orly airport, judged in Créteil (Parisian suburb), 1985.<sup>3</sup> The increasing use of these documents to support the "genocide" charge and to excuse the numerous acts of Armenian terrorism provoked a detailed refutation by the Turkish side, in 1983-1986.<sup>4</sup>

In 1986, Vahakn N. Dadrian, at that time professor of sociology at State University of New York (SUNY) in Geneseo (he was forced to resign in 1991 for sexual harassment against female students)<sup>5</sup> published a long article concluding that the "documents" of Andonian are in fact "with a high degree of certainty [...] true documents".<sup>6</sup> In 1989, the Dashnak-owned publishing house Parenthèses (Marseille) published a book of Yves Ternon, a surgeon in Paris — and defense witness for Armenian terrorists during the Geneva, Aix-en-Provence and Paris trials (1981-1984) —, who supported the main conclusions of Mr. Dadrian.

Outside the circle of the most nationalist Armenian writers and their friends, Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon's analysis convinced very few persons. Michael M. Gunter, professor of political science at Tennessee Technical University and International University-Vienna, answered to Mr. Dadrian and maintains until today that Andonian material is nothing but forgeries.<sup>7</sup> Gilles Veinstein, professor of Ottoman and Turkish history at the Collège de France, considers that "the Andonian

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3 *Armenian Terrorism and the Paris Trial/Terrorisme arménien et procès de Paris*, Ankara University, 1984, pp. 24 and 48 [http://turquie-news.fr/IMG/pdf/TERORISME\\_ARMENIAN\\_ET\\_PROCES\\_DE\\_PARIS.pdf](http://turquie-news.fr/IMG/pdf/TERORISME_ARMENIAN_ET_PROCES_DE_PARIS.pdf); Comité de soutien à Max Kilndjian, *Les Arméniens en cour d'assises. Terroristes ou résistants?*, Marseille : Parenthèses, 1983, pp. 114 and 201-202 ; Jean-Pierre Richardot, *Arméniens, quoi qu'il en coûte*, Paris : Fayard, 1982, p. 102; *Terrorist Attack at Orly: Statements and Evidence Presented at the Trial, February 19 - March 2, 1985*, Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, 1985.

4 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, *Ermeniler Talat Paşaya Atfedilen Telegrafların Gerçek Yüzü*, Ankara: TTK, 1983. French translation (used hereafter) : *Les « Télégrammes » de Talât Pacha. Fait historique ou fiction?*, Paris: Triangle, 1986, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=Yayinlcerik&SayiNo=27> English translation: *The Talât Pasha Telegrams. Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?*, Nicosia-Oxford: K. Rüstem & Brothers/Oxford University Press, 1986. The demonstration is summarized in Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Andonian "Documents" Attributed to Talat Pasha Are Forgeries!*, Ankara, 1984, <http://www.ataa.org/reference/andonian-ataov.html>

5 "Geneseo Fires Professor for Sexual Harrasment," *Times Union*, April 25, 1991, p. B10.

6 Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XVIII-3, August 1986, pp. 311-360 (quotation p. 340).

7 Michael M. Gunter, "Gunter Response to Dadrian Article," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XIX-4, November 1987, pp. 523-524 ; "A Reply to Judith Tucker's Excerpt of Vahakn Dadrian's Article," id., XL-4, Autumn 2008, pp. 728-729.

'documents' were just fakes, as established by the historical critique."<sup>8</sup> Paul Dumont, director of the Turkish studies department in Strasbourg-II University, who was also director of the French Institute of Anatolian Studies, writes that the authenticity of Andonian's "documents" "is today seriously contested."<sup>9</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, professor of Turkish studies and hardly an advocate of the CUP, considers that it "have been shown to be forgeries."<sup>10</sup> For Guenter Lewy, professor emeritus of political science at Massachusetts-Amherst University, Andonian material is of "highly questionable authenticity"; "Orel and Yuca's painstaking analysis of these documents have raised enough questions about their genuineness as to make any use of them in a serious scholarly work unacceptable."<sup>11</sup> The noted historians Andrew Mango and Norman Stone stated repeatedly that the book of Andonian is just the work of a clumsy falsifier.<sup>12</sup>

Even some Armenian and pro-Armenian authors showed, explicitly or implicitly, their skepticism about Andonian "documents." Christopher Walker, one of the main supporters of the "Armenian genocide" allegation in UK from 1970's to 1990's, considers that despite Vahakn N. Dadrian's article, "the doubt must remain until and unless the documents or similar ones themselves resurface and are published in a critical edition"<sup>13</sup> — a suggestion which was never carried out. The German sociologist Taner Akçam, who was supervised by Vahakn N. Dadrian himself for his thesis, wrote in 1992 that "there are important grounds for considering these documents fake."<sup>14</sup> Recently, the Armenian American scholar Ronald Grigor Suny called the book "the controversial and disputed 'Andonian documents.'"<sup>15</sup> During the 1990's, the use of the Andonian's book declined strongly, Mr. Ternon was more an exception than an example of the rule in maintaining positive developments on this work.<sup>16</sup> Mr. Ternon himself wrote in 1998 that "it is preferable" to "refrain to present [Andonian's material] as evidence of the criminal intention of the Ittihad [ve Terraki,

8 Gilles Veinstein, « Trois questions sur un massacre », *L'Histoire*, avril 1995.

9 Paul Dumont, « La mort d'un empire (1908-1923) », in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris: Fayard, 1989, p. 624.

10 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey : A Modern History*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 115-116.

11 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005, pp. 73 and 250.

12 Andrew Mango, "Turks and Kurds," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XXX-4, October 1994, p. 985; "The Definition," *Times Literary Supplement*, September 17, 2004; Norman Stone, "A Bungled Case for the Prosecution," *The Spectator*, April 24, 2004, [http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/20864/part\\_3/a-bungled-case-for-the-prosecution.html](http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/20864/part_3/a-bungled-case-for-the-prosecution.html); "Armenia and Turkey," *Times Literary Supplement*, October 15, 2004; "Armenia in History," id., November 26, 2004; and "What Has this 'Genocide' to Do With the Congress?," *The Spectator*, October 17, 2007, <http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/269381/what-has-this-genocide-to-do-with-congress.html>

13 Christopher Walker, "World War I and the Armenian Genocide," in Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), *The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Time*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1997, p. 247.

14 Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*, İstanbul, 1992, p. 119, n. 8; reed., 2001, p. 156, n. 246.

15 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Writing Genocide", in *A Question of Genocide*, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 320, n. 41.

16 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens, histoire d'un génocide*, Paris : Le Seuil, 1996, pp. 333-336 and even more p. 390, n. 53.

i.e. the Committee Union and Progress, in power in 1913-1918]”.<sup>17</sup> During the civil court case against Bernard Lewis in Paris, in 1995, the Andonian “documents” were not used by the plaintiffs’ lawyers.

However, only the French philologist Jean-Louis Mattei provided a detailed response to the attempts to save the authenticity of Andonian’s material.<sup>18</sup> And there was a revival of the use of this book since 2003: the writer Peter Balakian and the journalist Robert Fisk used some Andonian “documents” in their books.<sup>19</sup> Vahakn N. Dadrian reiterated in 2005 his assertions about Andonian material, on the Web site Jihad Watch, which is not known to publish scholarly articles; excerpts of his article of 1986 were republished in 2008.<sup>20</sup> In her short biography of Aram Andonian, Rita Soulahian Kuyumjian, relying on Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon’s, alleges that Andonian “clearly established the background and lay the corner stone for Armenian genocide studies”.<sup>21</sup> In a communiqué of 2011, the French deputy Richard Mallié (UMP) used an Andonian “document” to claim the vote of a bill penalizing the “contestation of the existence of the Armenian genocide”.<sup>22</sup> Called “liberticidal, inquisitorial and obscurantist” by the chairman of Senate’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Jocelyn de Rohan (also UMP), the bill was rejected by a large majority of senators, members of all the groups.

The purpose of this paper is to make a detailed rebuttal of the argumentation which attempted to “prove” that the Andonian material is “probably” accurate. Since Mr. Dadrian is the main author of such arguments, his article of 1986 is the most commented work below, and the references to the pages of his article are hereafter included in the text itself, instead of the footnotes. But other publications, and especially Mr. Ternon’s books, will be, of course, studied also. Beyond the case of Andonian material, this study shows how mainstream Armenian historiography attempts to “prove” the charge of “genocide”, since both Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon assert that the best argument for “probable authenticity” is to compare this material with other sources.

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17 Yves Ternon, « La qualité de la preuve. À propos des documents Andonian et de la petite phrase d’Hitler » in Comité de défense de la cause arménienne (ed.), *L’Actualité du génocide des Arméniens*, Paris : Edipol, 1999, p. 138.

18 Jean-Louis Mattei, *Belgelerle Büyük Ermenistan Peşinde Ermeni Komiteleri*, Ankara-Istanbul : Bilgi Yayınevi, 2008, pp. 261-284.

19 Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, New York: Harper & Collins, 2004 (first edition, 2003), pp. 345-347 and p. 435, n. 66. On this tendentious book, see Andrew Mango, “The Definition”, art. cit.

20 Judith Tucker, “Excerpt from ‘The Naim-Andonian Documents’,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XL-2, May 2008, pp. 171-179; <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2005/10/vahakn-dadrian-responds-to-guenther-lewy.html>

21 Rita Soulahian Kuyumjian, *The Survivor. Biography of Aram Andonian*, London: Gomidas Institute/Tekeyan Cultural Association/Taderon Press, 2010, pp. 24-36 (quotation p. 36).

22 [http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id\\_article=69493](http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=69493) See also: <http://www.collectifvan.org/article.php?r=0&id=52322>

## Lack of Logic and Neglected Facts

### Logical Fallacies

The most obvious shortcoming of Mr. Dadrian's article is located pp. 339 and 355, n. 102 of his article: he uses for "evidence" one of Andonian's "document" to corroborate the authenticity of Andonian's "documents". It does not need any comment. Mr. Dadrian refers, pp. 322-323, to a "cipher [...] which is not included in the Naim-Andonian material" (Vahakn N. Dadrian's emphasis). This "cipher" is one of the "telegrams" which Andonian possessed but did not publish and whose "originals" are also lost. This is another example of circular argumentation.

Equally circular is this remark, p. 324: Andonian's "penchant for faithfulness in translation is certified by none other than the two Turkish authors Orel and Yuca", because in several case, they notice that the translations from Ottoman to French are not bad. Mr. Dadrians says even: "such fidelity bespeaks of discipline and self-restraint, if not integrity". Such a way of reasoning supposes that Andonian did not forge his documents, but it is precisely what Mr. Dadrian is supposed to attempt to demonstrate. And actually, Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca noticed several serious discrepancies in the translation of certain "telegrams".

Similarly absurd is this allegation: "The presence and easy detection of such defects in the material under review militate against that charge [of forgery]". The ultimate logical consequence of this way of reasoning is to reject the basic methods of the internal critique of historical documents: in following strictly Mr. Dadrian, more the obvious aberrations would be numerous in a document, more the authenticity of this document would be likely. And Mr. Dadrian contradicts himself by this sentence, since he pretends, in the rest of his article, that the defects are not very important — especially p. 339.

Mr. Dadrian alleges that the Andonian "documents", "If authentic, assume extraordinary import" (p. 312 and p. 358, n. 109). But Aram Andonian was not very careful with these "documents". He showed an "incomprehensible laxity" (p. 319) according to the proper words of Mr. Dadrian. Probably to diminish this "laxity", Mr. Dadrian attempts to limit greatest part of these shortcomings to the English version: "the English version is mere a 'summary' and as such is deficient in textual precision" (p. 319); "it received a shabby treatment in its English translation" and "not knowing English at all, Andonian could neither control typographical errors nor oversee the body of the translation" (p. 344, n. 6). The problem is that Andonian himself criticized both the Paris and the London Committees to have treated "cavalierly" his manuscript.<sup>23</sup> Andonian knew French and Mr. Dadrian fails to

23 Ara Krikorian (éd.), *Justicier du génocide arménien : le procès de Tehlirian*, Paris : Diasporas, 1981, p. 232-235. Hereafter Procès.

explain why this treatment was “cavalier” in the French version and why Andonian was so powerless for the publication of his proper material of “extraordinary import.”

Even more disturbing is that Andonian acknowledged in a letter of 1937 that, as early as Spring 1921, before the Tehlirian trial he “did not think to these documents anymore,”<sup>24</sup> a very strange statement about so important “documents.” How Andonian could have almost forgotten such “documents” in the context of London conference (February-March 1921), the first attempt to revise the dead-born Sèvres

treaty after the collapse of the independent Armenian Republic?<sup>25</sup> The material of Andonian was compiled in 1919 and translated primarily into Armenian, but the Armenian version was published (in Boston) only in 1921, probably after the Tehlirian trial. Mr. Ternon observes, this time correctly, that the “telegrams” which remained in the possession of Andonian were never catalogued in the Boghos Nubar Library.<sup>26</sup> Not unlike Andonian, Mr. Dadrian does not refer to these “documents” of “extraordinary import” in his *History of the Armenian Genocide* published

firstly in 1995, and his article of 1986 is not reprinted in his collection of papers *Warrant for Genocide*.<sup>27</sup>

Mr. Dadrian refers to the Memoirs of General Sabis, stressing that “Şakir’s pervasive authority, extending to the Ottoman War Office and High Command, was confirmed by General Ali İhsan Sabis and by Colonel Ari Baytın” (p. 330) and that “General Sabis in his memoirs complained about Şakir’s key role in Turkey’s entry into the war, and his pan-Turanist, or pan-Turkist, ideology, denouncing his lack of grasp and incompetence in military affairs” (p. 350, n. 48). Such remarks are irrelevant for the authenticity or not of Andonian’s “documents”, even more since the CUP did never assume a “pan-Turanist, or pan-Turkist” ideology, even in 1917-1918.<sup>28</sup> Even more

*The material of Andonian was compiled in 1919 and translated primarily into Armenian, but the Armenian version was published (in Boston) only in 1921, probably after the Tehlirian trial.*

24 Procès, op. cit. p. 231.

25 Serge Afanasyan, *L'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, de l'indépendance à l'instauration du pouvoir soviétique. 1917-1923*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1981, pp. 176-181 ; Paul Dumont, *Mustafa Kemal invente la Turquie moderne*, Bruxelles : Complexe, 1997, pp. 100-105 ; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic : The Turkish War of National Independence. 1918-1923*, Ankara: TTK, 2000, tome III, pp. 1200-1243; Anahide Ter Minassian, *1918-1920, la République d'Arménie*, Bruxelles : Complexe, 2006, pp. 250-252.

26 Yves Ternon, art. cit., p. 137.

27 Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turco-Armenian Conflict*, New Brunswick-London, Transaction Publishers, 1999. For a concise critique of this collection of tendentious essays, see Mary Schaeffer Conroy, “Review of Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turco-Armenian Conflict*,” *The Social Science Journal*, XXXVII-3, July 2000, pp. 481-483.

28 Michael Reynolds, “Buffers, not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy and the Myth of Panturanism,” *Past and Present*, n° 203, May 2009, pp. 137-179. See also Niyazi Berkes (ed.), *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization. Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959.

problematically for his argumentation, Mr. Dadrian neglects that the Memoirs of General Sabis contradict the "letter" attributed by Andonian to Dr. Şakir, and dated of March 3, 1915. Indeed, the "letter" is supposed to have been sent from Istanbul; General Sabis indicates that Şakir was actually in Erzurum, where he remained until March 13, 1915.<sup>29</sup>

Mr. Dadrian, Mr. Ternon and Ms. Kuyumjian reproduce without any critique the assertion of Krikor Guerguerian, aka "Krieger" (1911-1988), who pretended to have seen the original version of "Naim Bey's Memoir" in the middle of the 1960's. Nobody can corroborate this testimony, and there are two additional serious problems. At first, it is hard to believe that the "original" was conserved intact and unknown during almost an half-century, when the Armenian nationalist organizations were in a very bad mood — discredited at first by the Lausanne treaty, and then by their compromising with Fascism, Nazism and/or Stalinism as well as by the inter-Armenian bloody clashes<sup>30</sup> —, but "disappeared" in the second half 1960's, i.e. precisely during the revival of the Armenian nationalism, when the "Armenian genocide" allegation appeared in the public opinion. Even more disturbing is that Andonian explained, in his letter to Mary Terzian, that he sent the manuscript of Naim to the patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1920. In the same letter, Andonian indicated that he "did never know what happened" to the documents sent to Jerusalem and London.<sup>31</sup> Andonian did not pretend to have retaken this manuscript and to have deposited it in Nubar Library, where he served as curator until his death, or to have sent only a part of Naim's manuscript. "Krieger" pretended even to have seen twenty-five "originals" of "telegrams",<sup>32</sup> despite that such documents were never cataloged in the Nubar Library, as explained already.

Mr. Dadrian praises "the pioneering work of Krieger, who for decades singlehandedly and patiently canvassed the available archives here and abroad, especially the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive, compiling a mass of documentary data. The author takes his opportunity to express his appreciation to Krieger, who helped him become initiated into this most neglected genre of scholarship combining Turkish and Armenian studies" (p. 344, n. 5). Unfortunately, the archives of Armenian patriarchate are closed to any researcher who would

29 Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Cihan Harbi*, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1990, tome II, p. 378.

30 Jean-Pierre Alem, *L'Arménie*, Paris : PUF, 1959, pp. 95-97 ; John Roy Carlson (Arthur Derounian), "The Armenian Displaced Persons," *Armenian Affairs Magazine*, I-1, Winter 1949-1950; Georges Mamoulia, *Les Combats indépendantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occidentales : le cas de la Géorgie (1921-1945)*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2009, p. 159 ; Gäidz Minassian, « *L'Internationale socialiste et les partis socialistes exilés du bloc communiste : le cas de la Fédération révolutionnaire arménienne* », *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, XXXII-3, 2001, p. 111 ; Cyril Le Tallec, *La Communauté arménienne de France. 1920-1950*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2001, pp. 186-199 ; Kapriel Serope Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted*, Boston: Baikar Press, 1934, pp. 52-73; Christopher Walker, *Armenia. The Survival of a Nation*, London-New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 357, 360-363 and 366-370.

31 Procès, op. cit. p. 231.

32 Yves Ternon, *Enquête...*, op. cit. p. 77, [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/2\\_chapitre1](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/2_chapitre1)

disagree with the “Armenian genocide” label, or even to any Armenian scholar who is seen as insufficiently nationalist, for instance Ara Sarafian.<sup>33</sup> Mr. Dadrian knows perfectly this kind of problem. After his forced resignation from SUNY (see n. 5), he became, and is still, the director of the Zoryan Institute, a think-tank which received many private papers of Armenian exiles in 1980’s. Despite the close links of the Institute with the ARF, these documents were never catalogued and remain closed to the independent researchers, even if they are of Armenian heritage.<sup>34</sup> In addition, Mr. Dadrian neglected always to make any research in the Ottoman and Turkish archives, in İstanbul and Ankara, despite their obvious importance for the “scholarship combining Turkish and Armenian studies.”<sup>35</sup> The results of his disciple Taner Akçam, who worked extensively in these archives, are less than impressive: full of factual errors, mistranslations, misquotations and allegations given without proof.<sup>36</sup>

None of the supporters of the Andonian’s material “authenticity” pay attention to the “telegrams” whose reproduction is not provided. Especially, no one attempts to explain how Enver Pasha could have sent, in February 1918, a telegram asking to exterminate the Armenian officers of the Ottoman army. Andonian alleged, in the previous parts of his books, that the Armenians living in Anatolia under the control of Ottoman forces were “exterminated” in 1915, but curiously, he asserted also that Armenians remained among the officers of the Ottoman army in 1918. The fact is that at least several hundred — probably more — of loyal Armenians remained in the Ottoman army without suffering any discrimination, nor massacre in any form whatsoever,<sup>37</sup> until the end of war. This is generally not commented by the supporters of the “Armenian genocide” label, especially those who attempt to defend the “probable authenticity” of Andonian material.

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33 “Study the Armenian Genocide with Confidence, Ara Sarafian Suggests,” *The Armenian Reporter*, December 18, 2008. <http://www.reporter.am/go/article/2008-12-18-study-the-armenian-genocide-with-confidence-ara-sarafian-suggests>

34 Ibid.

35 For developments on this topic, see Türkaya Ataöv, *The Ottoman Archives and the Armenian Question*, Ankara, 1986; Yücel Güllü, “Will Untaped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate? Turkey, Present and Past,” *The Middle East Quarterly*, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 35-42, <http://www.meforum.org/2114/ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate>; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation of Armenians. 1914-1918*, Ankara, TTK, 2002, pp. 119-122; Yusuf Sarıncay, “Türk Arşivleri ve Ermeni Meselesi,” *Belleten*, LXX/257, April 2006, pp. 291-310; Jeremy Salt, “The Narrative Gap in Ottoman Armenian History,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXIX-1, January 2003, pp. 19-36.

36 Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: A Scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII-2, Summer 2008, pp. 303-319; id. “Armenian Question: Scholarly Ethics and Methodology,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, n° 19-20, 2009, pp. 141-152; id. “Review Essay: the Armenian Question,” *Middle East Policy*, XVII-1, Spring 2010, pp. 144-157.

37 Edward J. Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study*, London-New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 129-130; Maurice Larcher, *La Guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale*, Paris, 1926, p. 396; Turkish General Staff, *Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents*, Ankara: ATASE, tome II, 2005, pp. 72-80, [http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni\\_sorunu\\_salonu/arsiv\\_belgeleriyle\\_ermen\\_i\\_faaliyetleri/pdf/Arsiv\\_Belgeleriyle\\_Ermeni\\_Faaliyetleri\\_Cilt\\_2.pdf](http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni_sorunu_salonu/arsiv_belgeleriyle_ermen_i_faaliyetleri/pdf/Arsiv_Belgeleriyle_Ermeni_Faaliyetleri_Cilt_2.pdf); for individual cases, see also “İki Pastermacıyan ve diğer bilmediklerimiz”, *Milliyet*, June 4, 2006; *Facts from the Turkish Armenians*, İstanbul: Jamanak, 1980, p. 25; Willy Sperco, *Moustapha Kemal Atatürk, créateur de la Turquie moderne*, Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1958, p. 137; and hereafter, the case of the Stange detachment.



### Neglected Problems about Naim and Andonian

In complete contradiction with his assertions of 1920 about the character of Naim,<sup>38</sup> Andonian acknowledged in 1937 that "Naim Bey was an alcoholic and addicted to gambling, and in reality it was his vices which dragged him into treachery. The truth is that we bought all what he provided us in the way of documents", "Naim was a totally amoral creature" and that "Naim was a totally insignificant civil servant."<sup>39</sup> Guenter Lewy notices rightfully that "no one could be expected to believe the 'memoirs' of an alcoholic, gambler or dissolute character [...] who would be suspected of having manufactured the documents to obtain money for his destructive and expensive habits."<sup>40</sup> But Mr. Dadrian does not refrain to use Naim's "testimony" as evidence to corroborate the "documents" (p. 345, n. 13). Moreover, in the "Memoirs" which Naim is supposed to have written that he became in 1915 "Chief Secretary",<sup>41</sup> a much higher position than "a totally insignificant civil servant."

Another problem with Naim's position is to understand how a "totally insignificant civil servant" could have taken documents of "extraordinary import". Mr. Dadrian quotes the pro-Armenian German Consul Rössler, who "stated that Naim's possession of the documents can be entirely granted for as far as I knew the Turks [in Aleppo] never catalogued and attached their documents." Mr. Dadrian fails to demonstrate that a foreign Consul, by no means friend of Turks, is a reliable source for the internal and material issues of the Ottoman administration. And Rössler believed wrongly that Naim was a chief secretary, not a "totally insignificant civil servant". Mr. Dadrian avoids also responding to other objections of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, on the same topic. Especially, Andonian gave completely contradictory explanations about the way of the recuperation of the "documents".<sup>42</sup> Contradictory also is the part of the French version where it is alleged twice that Naim was "revoked" (révoqué) in 1916.<sup>43</sup> Mr. Dadrian dares to reply that "the French word révoquer in addition to 'dismiss' has the meaning of 'recall'" (p. 346, n. 22). This meaning is indeed the etymological sense, but it disappeared completely of the common use many years before the publication of Andonian's book. The Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle of Pierre Larousse (15 volumes, from 1866 to 1876) does not even include this meaning, out of the etymology; the Dictionnaire général de la langue française (two volumes, 1890-1893) mentions it only as "ancient." The meaning is completely absent of the 8<sup>th</sup> edition of the dictionary

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38 *Memoirs...*, p. X; *Documents...*, p. 12.

39 *Procès*, op. cit. p. 234.

40 Guenter Lewy, op. cit. p. 69.

41 *Memoirs*, p. 8; *Documents...*, op. cit. p. 22.

42 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 20-22.

43 *Documents...*, op. cit., pp.12-13 and 79.

published by the French Academy (two volumes, 1932-1935).<sup>44</sup> Anyway, there is no reason which could explain why Naim would have kept these “documents” during more than two years, since he pretended to have nothing to fear, and since he could not know the result of the war.

The revelation about Naim’s character and position tends not only to discredit Naim’s “testimony” (already seriously problematic because the disappearance of the original) but also Aram Andonian’s assertions. Andonian lied purely and simply about his key source. There are other examples of acknowledged falsifications. The pro-Armenian Walter Rössler made a strong critique of Andonian’s allegations against Germany. These critiques were eventually accepted as valid by Andonian himself (my emphasis):

*“Certainly, he [Rössler] is right for most of the cases which he stresses. He forgotten only that my book was not an historical work, but of propaganda, and, naturally, could not be exempt of the imperfections inherent to this kind of publications. It is also necessary to think that at that time, to be listened by the Entente countries, you had inevitably to say something bad against Germany”.*

Rössler denied even that Andonian could be “able of objectivity”.<sup>45</sup>

Not less problematic for Andonian’s credibility is the strident anti-Turkish racism expressed in his book:

*“Every Turk expressed a sadistic happiness when a whole people were slaughtered with a barbarity unknown in history.”*

*“Can one show one Turk who did not take profit of these pillages? Can one show one Turkish house which does not keep a ravished Armenian woman, girl or boy?”<sup>46</sup>*

It is unneeded to say that, even if all the Turks would had wanted to “ravish” one Armenian for their house, there would had been not sufficiently potential victims. Such racist and self-refuting allegations are by no means isolated in the literature of the Armenian nationalism.<sup>47</sup> More importantly, the absurdity of the charge shows

44 <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k205365n/f1132.image.r=.langFR>  
<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k206410m/f828.image> <http://atilf.atilf.fr/academie.htm>

45 *Procès*, op. cit., p. 232.

46 *Documents...*, pp. 11 and 165.

47 *The “Clean-Fighting Turk”*. *Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & C<sup>o</sup>/Armenian Bureau Publications, 1918 (especially p. 3); Avetoon Pesak Hacobian, *Armenia and the War*, New York: George Doran C<sup>o</sup>, 1918, pp. 37-39, 44-47 and 56-61; Mikael Varandian, *L’Arménie et la question arménienne*, Laval: G. Kavanagh & Cie, 1917, pp. 23-30. For later racist speeches, see, for example, *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator*, April 21, 1945, p. 1; *The Armenian Weekly*, June 1, 1983, p. 42 and June 30, p. 2.

clearly that Adonian was not always concerned by the credibility of his allegations. Mr. Dadrian mentions briefly the "vituperative comments" who "somewhat tainted Andonian's credibility" (p. 324) but does not make any development.

On the large-scale massacres of Turks by Armenians during the Russian retreat of 1917-1918, Andonian attempts to deny crudely the existence of these crimes, and, in self-contradiction, to justify them by military necessities.<sup>48</sup> Probably because the considerable body of — not only Ottoman, but also Russian and Western — evidence,<sup>49</sup> Mr. Dadrian does not attempt to deny the existence of these massacres. Mr. Ternon calls even the butchery in the city of Erzincan and neighboring villages "unspeakable" and "unjustifiable" crimes.<sup>50</sup>

Despite all these problematic facts, Mr. Dadrian uses Andonian as a valuable reference, for example pp. 323-324 and p. 348, n. 34, always to corroborate the "authenticity" of the Andonian's "documents". However, it is true that, as pointed correctly the Armenian British historian Ara Sarafian, Mr. Dadrian asserts that "all the Turks and Kurds were involved in the genocidal process".<sup>51</sup> It is equally true that in a later publication, Mr. Dadrian attempts himself to excuse, minimize, not to say to justify, the butchery of Turks in 1917-1918.<sup>52</sup> Mr. Dadrian's indulgence for Aram Andonian should so not be a surprise.

*Mr. Dadrian avoids to explain why the British and the French, who were looking for evidence against the CUP leaders, did not find the "documents" and were never involved in the process of "checking" by the Armenian National Union*

To explain why Andonian was able to find "documents", and why they were not destroyed before the capture of Aleppo, Mr. Dadrian argues that "not only was Aleppo not considered in danger, but as late as autumn 1917, it became the site of the Headquarters of Army Group F (*Yıldırım*)."<sup>53</sup> Such a remark has few relevance, since it neglects the change happened in 1918, especially during the last months of the

48 Documents..., op. cit., pp. 154-155.

49 *Documents relatifs aux atrocités commises par les Arméniens sur la population musulmane*, İstanbul: Société anonyme de papeterie et d'imprimerie, 1919, [http://louisville.edu/as/history/turks/atrocites\\_commises\\_par\\_les\\_armeniens.pdf](http://louisville.edu/as/history/turks/atrocites_commises_par_les_armeniens.pdf); *Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, Ankara, tome II, 1985, pp. 119-154, <http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Documents2.pdf> and tome III, 1986, pp. 135-171, <http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Documents3.pdf>; Justin McCarthy, "The Report of Niles and Sutherland," *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Ankara: TTK, 1994, tome V, pp. 1828-1830, 1842, 1850, [http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Niles\\_and\\_Sutherland.pdf](http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Niles_and_Sutherland.pdf); Vladimir Nikolaevitch Twerdokhleboff, *War Journal of the Second Fortress Artillery Regiment, and Notes of a Superior Russian Officer on the Atrocities of Erzerum* İstanbul, 1919, <http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/Khlebof%20War%20Journal.pdf>

50 Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause*, (Delmar : Caravan Books), 1985, pp. 123-124; *Les Arméniens*, op. cit., p. 341.

51 "Study the Armenian Genocide With Confidence, Ara Sarafian Suggests," art. cit.

52 Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, Providence: Berghahn Books, 2003, pp. 425-426 (first edition, 1995).

war.<sup>53</sup> More problematically, Mr. Dadrian avoids to explain why the British and the French, who were looking for evidence against the CUP leaders, did not find the “documents” and were never involved in the process of “checking” by the Armenian National Union — and this is the most important argument of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca on this precise topic.

Mr. Ternon adds another inaccuracy in asserting, without any source, that Andonian was “one of the few survivors of the April 24 raid.”<sup>54</sup> In fact, the majority of the Armenians arrested on April 24 were not killed.<sup>55</sup>

### Inventing “Errors” in the Orel-Yuca Book

To dismiss the importance of the “errors” in Andonian “documents”, Mr. Dadrian alleges that the book of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca contains itself “many errors of counting, dating, and inaccurate referencing.” Among his examples, he mentions (p. 346, n. 25):

- a) “The March 25 letter (n° 2) is not misprinted as February 8, as they assert, but rather is printed in the ET [English translation] correctly.” In fact, Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca do not allege that it is “misprinted as February 8”, but as November 18, and this allegation is true. Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca say that the letter cited in the March 25 letter is dated on February 8 in the English text, and it is also true.
- b) “Again on p. 33 they inaccurately report that the FT [French translation] has omitted the year of the February 18 letter (n° 1); it did not.” Indeed, it did not, and Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca do not pretend that.

### Sources Contradicting the “Documents” (1): Forgotten and Denied Facts

The “documents” dated of March 9, September 21 and September 16, 1915, are supposed to have been specially sent to the prefecture of Aleppo, concerning the “whole extermination of all the Armenians.”<sup>56</sup> But almost all the Armenian community of Aleppo city (around 22,000 persons) was explicitly exempted of forced displacement by the CUP government and remained at home during the war,<sup>57</sup> a fact that even Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon do not deny. Some thousands of

53 Edward J. Erickson, op. cit., pp. 127-154.

54 Yves Ternon, art. cit., p. 136.

55 Yusuf Sarıncay, “Decree of April 24, 1915 and the Armenian Committee Members Arrested in Istanbul,” *Review of Armenian Studies*, n° 15-16, 2007, pp. 69-81.

56 Documents..., pp. 146; Memoirs..., op. cit., p. 15, 60 and 64.

57 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 191.

Armenians from eastern Anatolia and northern Syria were relocated to Aleppo instead of the camps; they were in the most safe of the persons subjected to forced reinstallation.

More generally, the numerous geographical (İstanbul, Edirne, İzmir, Aydın, Kütahya, Kastamonu, Antalya, Konya, Maraş, Aleppo, Mosul, Jerusalem) and categorical exemptions (Catholics, Protestants, artisans, officers of the Ottoman Bank, Ottoman Debt Administration and Ottoman Post, employees of the Railroad Administration, sick persons in hospitals, orphans, families of soldiers and MPs, some notabilities of cities like Bursa) of forced displacement to camps in Arab lands<sup>58</sup> are denied, forgotten or explained by totally unconvincing arguments. Guenter Lewy points correctly:

*"the argument that the Turks refrained from deporting the Armenians of these cities [Istanbul, İzmir, Aleppo] in order to avoid unfavorable publicity is invalid, for the world heard of the deportations and accompanying massacres in the provinces almost as soon as they took place. Adverse publicity was not avoided by sparing the Armenians of these three important cities."*<sup>59</sup>

Neither Mr. Dadrian nor Mr. Ternon or Ms. Kuyumjian provide any direct response to the numerous Ottoman documents on the Armenian insurrections and other acts of treachery; no direct reply, also, to the explicit claims made by the Armenian nationalist leader Boghos Nubar, conserved in French archives and reproduced in the book of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca.<sup>60</sup> The Turkish authors are however far to have exhausted the list of acknowledgments of treachery by Armenian leaders. The most famous is the Manifesto of Hovannes Katchaznoui, leader of the ARF until 1923, Prime Minister of the independent Armenia in 1918-1919. In this very lucid speech pronounced in front of the Dashnak congress, Katchaznoui acknowledged that the ARF did not keep their promise of loyalty to the Ottoman government, organized recruitment of volunteers for the Russian army, as early as 1914, which "was wrong". The Dashnaks "embraced Russia whole-heartedly without any compunction" and "had lost [thei]r sense of reality and were carried away with [their] dreams."<sup>61</sup>

58 Kemal Çiçek, "Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915: A Reassessment," *Review of Armenian Studies*, n° 22, 2010, pp. 120-121; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?*, Ankara: TTK, 2008, pp. 52 and 91; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 158, 165, 180, 186-187, 191, 203-205; Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 119-123; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıncay, *Turkish Armenian Conflict Documents*, Ankara: TTK/TBMM, 2007, pp. 119, 127, 175, 201, 203, 207, 213- 221, 237, 265, 283, 321, 339, 341.

59 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 251. See also Michael M. Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause of their People". *A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, Westport-New York-London: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 23; and Eberhard Jäckel, "Genozid oder nicht?", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 22, 2006, <http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30525/genozid-oder-nicht-30146581.html>

60 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 38-41 and 104-113; See also, among others, Kâmuran Gürün, *The Armenian File*, İstanbul: Türkiye Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007 (first edition in Turkish 1983, first edition in English 1985), pp. 237-256; and Turkish General Staff, *Armenian activities...*, op. cit., eight tomes, 2005-2008, [http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni\\_sorunu\\_salonu/arsiv\\_belgeleriyile\\_ermeni\\_faaliyetleri/arsiv\\_belgeleriyile\\_ermeni\\_faaliyetleri.htm](http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni_sorunu_salonu/arsiv_belgeleriyile_ermeni_faaliyetleri/arsiv_belgeleriyile_ermeni_faaliyetleri.htm)

61 Hovannes Katchaznoui, *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore*, New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955 (1st edition, 1923), pp. 5-8, <http://ia600602.us.archive.org/14/items/armenianrevolution00katc/armenianrevolution00katc.pdf>

In a letter published by *Russfoje Slovo*, n° 19, January 24, 1915 (so several months before the decree of forced displacement), an Armenian lawyer named Calkus argued (my emphasis):

*“In Turkey’s eyes, the Armenians deserved the horrors inflicted upon them by the Turks because we were guilty of treason. Armenians confess to this treason without any further ado. No Armenian shoots a Russian, because he sees a big brother or a defender in him. The Armenian is a traitor to Turkey because Turkey is not his mother but his stepmother. A growing number of Armenians are volunteering in the ranks of the Russian army. They are streaming toward Russia from the far corners of the world, from America, Asia, and Europe. They believe in Russia and Russia’s mission.”*<sup>62</sup>

The Armenian Deputy Papadzanov stated in the Russian Duma, January 28, 1915 (my emphasis):

*“The Armenian population of Turkish Armenia [Eastern Anatolia] joyously greeted our victorious [Russian] army. Armenians helped wherever and however they could, and prepared a hearty welcome for the Russians....”*<sup>63</sup>

Garegin Pasdermadjian, a former Dashnak terrorist who became, thanks to the pardon of the CUP, deputy of Erzurum from 1908 to 1912, came to Russia as early as Summer 1914, to organize the recruitment of Armenian volunteers. He wrote in 1918 that if the Armenians “had bought their fate in 1914 to the German cause”, “first of all, these frightful Armenian massacres would have not taken place.”<sup>64</sup> In his Memoirs, Pasdermadjian added that he came to Russia despite the warnings of some of his proper Dashnak comrades, who said that this decision “could have negative effects for the Armenians of Turkey.”<sup>65</sup> Aram Turabian, Pasdermadjian’s counterpart for the France’s Foreign Legion, was even more explicit. He claimed that he and his associates (including the ARF-Dashnak) “knew perfectly” the bloody consequences of the revolutionary activities against the Ottoman Empire. Aram Turabian advocated shameless for the “necessity” to “sacrifice a part of the current [Armenian] generation.”<sup>66</sup>

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62 Ernest Jackh (Ernst Jäckh), *The Rising Crescent. Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, New York-Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944, p. 43, n. 6.  
<http://www.archive.org/download/risingcrescent002408mbp/risingcrescent002408mbp.pdf>

63 Ibid.

64 Garegin Pasdermadjian, *Why Armenia Should Be Free*, Boston: Hairenik, 1918, p. 43. See also Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

65 Garegin Pasdermadjian, *Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo*, Detroit: Armen Topouzian, 1990, p. 19. See also Richard G. Hovannian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 44-45 and 272, n. 18.

66 Aram Turabian, *Les Volontaires arméniens sous les drapeaux français*, Marseille: Imprimerie nouvelle, 1917, pp. 41-42. See also Kapriel Serope Papazian, op. cit., p. 38.

In a note of July 24, 1915, Boghos Nubar's committee claimed that "in Turkey, only the Armenian populations of Armenia [eastern Anatolia] and Cilicia have very marked insurrectional tendencies against the Turkish regime", giving as evidence that there were "25,000 insurgents" in Cilicia and "15,000" in "neighboring provinces".<sup>67</sup> Such an insurrectional situation had few links with the decree of forced displacement: as early as November 1914, Boghos Nubar proposed a landing to the British and the French: "Armenians in Cilicia are ready to enlist as volunteers to support a landing in İskenderun, Mersin or Adana. Armenians in mountainous areas can also provide valuable support; they will rebel against Turks if they are supplied with arms and ammunitions."<sup>68</sup>

All these sources contradict the part of Andonian material which alleges that the Turkish actions against Armenians were unprovoked and motivated only by vicious designs. The indirect ways used by Mr. Dadrian to dismiss the obvious fact of numerous Armenian uprisings, and their danger for the Ottoman army,<sup>69</sup> is discussed in the third part of this article.

On the issue of the Ottoman leaders interned in Malta in 1919-1921, Mr. Ternon avoids purely and simply to make a development in his main book and makes a brief paraphrase of Mr. Dadrian's article in the one devoted specifically to the "probable authenticity" of the Andonian material. So, not surprisingly, the essential of the response comes from Mr. Dadrian. Principally:

- 1) "The disposition of Abdülhalik had very little to do with his guilt or innocence" and everything with "a 'package deal' [of the British] with the Kemalists" (p. 336). If the immediate reason of the release was indeed an agreement between London and Ankara, the British authorities concluded before the agreement that, despite two years of intensive researches in Ottoman, British, Armenian and US documents, by a British prosecutor

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67 Commission des archives diplomatiques, *Documents diplomatiques français : 1915*, tome III, Brussels : Peter Lang, 2004, p. 98; Vatche Gazarian, *Boghos Nubar's Papers and the Armenian Question, 1915-1918. Documents*, Waltham: Mayreni, 1996, p. 203.

68 Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question*, Ankara: TTK, 2001, p. 111. See also Edward J. Erickson, "Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations — 1915," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, XXVIII-3, 2005, pp. 529-548; Yücel Güçlü, op. cit., pp. 51-101; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 103-109. For the background, see Yücel Güçlü, op. cit., pp. 19-50; Salâhi R. Sonyel, "The Turco-Armenian 'Adana Incidents' in the Light of Secret British Documents," *Bellesten*, LI-201, December 1987, pp. 1291-1338; Yusuf Sarıncay (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları*, Ankara, 2010, two volumes.

69 For an overview: Edward J. Erickson, "Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy," *War in History*, XV-2, April 2008, pp. 141-167, [http://www.tc-america.org/media/Ericson\\_militarypolicy1915.pdf](http://www.tc-america.org/media/Ericson_militarypolicy1915.pdf); Justin McCarthy, "The Armenian Uprising and the Ottomans," *Review of Armenian Studies*, II-7/8, 2005, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=Dergiler&IcerikNo=134>; id., "Losing the War in the East: the Armenian Contribution to Ottoman Defeat 1915," in Şafak Ural and alii (ed.) *The New Approaches to Turkish-Armenian Relations*, İstanbul: İstanbul University Press, 2008, pp. 383-390; Justin McCarthy and alii, *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006. For the background, see also Türkkiye Ataöv, "Procurement of Arms for Armenian Terrorists: Realities Based on Ottoman Documents," in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*, Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984, pp. 169-177; and William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, pp. 150-164, 321-325 and 349-350.

assisted by Armenians and Greeks, it was not possible to organize a trial against any of the 144 Ottoman interned in Malta, including Abdülhalik.<sup>70</sup> Mr. Dadrian discusses no one of the British documents expressing this failure to find any evidence.

- 2) “Britain’s U.S. Ambassador never stated that he could find no evidence of massacres in U.S. State Department files” (ibid.) Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca did not pretend that, focusing on the case of Abdülhalik and the other Ottoman leaders interned in Malta.
- 3) Few British officials accused a minority of the 144 interned persons to be criminals (p. 337). But if the British authorities themselves had found any credibility in these reports, they would have used them for a trial. They did not.

However, the most important point of the Malta procedure, for the issue of Andonian material, is that the “telegrams” attributed to Talat and other CUP leaders were included in the file of several indicted persons, who were nevertheless found not guilty and released.<sup>71</sup> Mr. Dadrian avoids carefully discussing this fact. About the attempt of a trial of Abdülhalik in Turkey, Mr. Ternon and Mr. Dadrian reproduce without particular explanations the allegations of Andonian, failing to challenge the response of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca on this point.

### Sources Contradicting the “Documents” (2) : The Alleged “Double Track”

Mr. Dadrian replies in few paragraphs only to the third part of Şinasi Orel’s and Sürreya Yuca’s argumentation: the dozens of authentic documents, taken from Ottoman archives, which rebut completely the charge of extermination intent.<sup>72</sup> His first argument is also the most obviously misleading. Mr. Dadrian quotes, p. 328, the comment of Nevile Henderson, actually High Commissioner in İstanbul, in 1923:

*“These are well worth reading and keeping as a vivid illustration of Turkish methods and mentality. It is left for academic speculation whether they were countermanded by secret orders or whether they were merely drafted in the certainty that natural savagery and callousness would make them worthless.”*

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70 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 122-128; Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 96-98; Bilâl N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926)*, İstanbul: Tasvir Press, 1984, pp. 26-41.

71 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 123 and 125.

72 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 101-134.



Henderson gives not a single argument to support his allegations, based only on openly racist prejudices ("Turkish methods and mentality"; "natural savagery and callousness"). In the continuity of his misrepresentation of the Malta investigation, Mr. Dadrian provides no real discussion on the documents seized by British army, and the comments of British diplomats like W. S. Edmonds ("There is not enough evidence here to bring home the charge of massacre any closer") or D. G. Osborne ("On the contrary, the last paragraph of the order of the Minister of the Interior specifically warns against measures liable to lead to massacres").<sup>73</sup>

Mr. Dadrian relies also to the book Falih Rifık Atay, pp. 339-340. Atay wrote (italics added):

*"One day, he [Talat] again called out for me from the office. There was an applicant [man] next to him. He said: 'Write a letter to the Mutasarrıf [sub-governor] of Izmit and recommend them to definitely do the work of this Gentleman'.*

*I wrote and brought [the letter]. He signed it. The poor man took the letter and left by giving his thanks. A little later, they had told me that the Minister [Talat] wanted to see me. I went [to see him]. He said: 'write a ciphered telegram to the Mutasarrıf of Izmit and inform him that the letter I sent has no importance'."*<sup>74</sup>

At first, Atay was speaking about a letter of recommendation, demented by a cipher telegram giving this time an order, and not about an order by cipher telegram denying another, which is already sufficient to diminish the pertinence of this book for this controversy. Secondly, nowhere in this quotation, or in the rest of his book, Falih Rifık Atay gives any indication that this event was an example of a "routine practice" or a "system" (as asserted by Mr. Dadrian pp. 328 and 339), still less a practice involving the Armenian relocation.

Mr. Dadrian argues that "in his memoirs, the American Ambassador in Istanbul reveals another feature of Talat's cover and informal methods of transacting party and/or government business that is not mentioned anywhere else": a "telegraphic equipment in the privacy of his home". Heath W. Lowry established, in comparing the diary of Morgenthau with his allegations in the Story that the former Ambassador rewrote entirely the scene, and, in particular, that the "telegraphic equipment" was

73 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations: A Re-Appraisal in the Light of New Documents," *Belleleten*, January 1972, pp. 58-60; id. (ed.), *Displacement of the Armenians: Documents*, Ankara: TTK/Baylan Matbaası, 1978; id., *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia. Turks and Armenians in the Maelstrom of Major Powers*, Ankara: TTK, 2000, pp. 114-120.

74 Quoted and translated in Erman Şahin, art. cit., p. 134.

nothing but an invention.<sup>75</sup> In his diary, Morgenthau mentioned a telephone, and did not assert that Talat was using this to send secret orders. Morgenthau's diary was entirely published online by the Gomidas Institute, so anybody can check that Mr. Lowry's finding is right.<sup>76</sup>

Not only the allegations of "double track" are baseless, but the information of the documents given by Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca are largely corroborated by later findings.

***Dr. Hilmar Kaiser, a supporter of the "Armenian genocide" allegations, acknowledged that trials occurred actually in 1916, and that he does not know how to reply to this contra-genocide argument.***

Especially important are the documents demonstrating that the Ottoman government asked the punishment of the Muslims who attacked Armenian exiles.<sup>77</sup> This issue is much better known today. It is established that, following the initiative of Talat, the Ottoman government created three commissions<sup>78</sup> to investigate the complaints of Armenians and the denunciations of civil servants, including Şükrü Bey (his role is discussed below). It is also established that, as a result, in March-April, 1 673 Muslim were sent to martial-courts, including 67 who were sentenced to

death and hanged, 524 were sentenced to jail, 68 received other punishment, including forced labor.<sup>79</sup> It was the most active time of repression, but not the single. For instance, Cerkez Ahmed and Galati Halil were arrested in September 1915 for murders (especially the assassination of Krikor Zohrab and Seringulian Vartkes, two Armenian deputies of the Ottoman Assembly) and robberies, sentenced to death and hanged in November, under the authority of Cemal Paşa, who followed the instruction of Talat Paşa.<sup>80</sup> These facts constitute one of the most destructive rebuttals of Andonian's material, especially the "documents" asking to kill all the Armenians and to prevent the investigation against the perpetrators.<sup>81</sup> Even more especially, the trial and the death-sentence of Ahmed and Halil destroy the credibility of the unpublished "file" conserved by Andonian (which disappeared opportunely, like the other "telegrams") about Zorhab's assassination, used by "Krieger" and praised by

75 Heath Lowry, *The Story Behind "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story"*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990, pp. 47-50. For other analysis of Morgenthau's book see Şükrü Server Aya, *The Genocide of Truth Continues... But Facts Tell the Real Story*, Istanbul: Derin, 2010, pp. 274-331; Ralph Elliot Cook, *The United States and the Armenian Question, 1894-1924*, Ph.D. dissertation, Flechter School of Law and Diplomacy, 1957, p. 129; Clinton Hartley Grattan, *Why We Fought*, New York: The Vanguard Press, 1929, pp. 250-251; George Abel Schreiner, *The Craft Sinister*, New York: G. Albert Geyer, 1920, pp. XXI and 125-126, <http://ia340943.us.archive.org/2/items/craftsinisterdip00schruoft/craftsinisterdip00schruoft.pdf>

76 [http://gomidas.org/gida/index\\_and\\_%20documents/MorgRecords\\_index\\_and\\_documents/with%20frames/index\\_archives\\_MorgRecords.htm](http://gomidas.org/gida/index_and_%20documents/MorgRecords_index_and_documents/with%20frames/index_archives_MorgRecords.htm)

77 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 125-127.

78 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts...*, op. cit., pp. 84-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıay, op. cit., p. 294.

79 Kemal Çiçek, art. cit., pp. 125 and 133; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story...*, op. cit., pp. 82-87.

80 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 112-113; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıay, op. cit., p. 261. For other cases, see Stanford J. Shaw, op. cit., tome I, pp. 57-58.

81 *Memoirs...*, p. 17.

Mr. Ternon.<sup>82</sup> Dr. Hilmar Kaiser, a supporter of the "Armenian genocide" allegations, acknowledged that trials occurred actually in 1916, and that he does not know how to reply to this contra-genocide argument.<sup>83</sup>

Similarly, it is solidly established that the Ottoman administration allocated an important budget to give food and other needed aid to the Armenian exiles, and allowed — contrary to the allegations of Andonian and other supporters of the "general extermination" charge —, the Western relief groups to give food to displaced Armenians,<sup>84</sup> despite that the great majority of the relief from Western countries was devoted to the Christians, the Muslims, i.e. the majority of the Ottoman population, receiving only a small minority. William W. Peet, the American head of the International Armenian Relief Effort in İstanbul, explained that Talat "gave prompt attention to my requests, frequently greeting me as I called upon him in his office with the introductory remark: 'We are partners, what can I do for your today?'"<sup>85</sup>

These facts, never seriously challenged by the Armenian side, would be sufficient to demonstrate that the Andonian material is nothing but forgeries; however, the rest of the argumentation in favor of the "probable authenticity" will be studied now.

## The Internal Critique

### Signatures (1)

There is at least one point where both Andonian and his contemporary advocates on one side, Şinasi Orel, Sürreya Yuca and those who share their main conclusions on the other side, agree: the signature of governor Abdülhalik is a fundamental issue for the "authenticity" or not of the Andonian "documents." Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca argued that the signature of Abdülhalik in authentic document is completely different of the "signature" in Andonian "documents." In his reply, Mr. Dadrian uses two main arguments:

- 1) "The matter can hardly be settled on the basis of inspecting printed pages that consist of reproductions, and in some cases, of consecutive reproductions." The differences are actually sufficiently obvious and the reproductions of the alleged signatory are not so bad. Moreover, the ultimate logical consequence

82 Yves Ternon, *Enquête...*, op. cit., pp. 199-204, [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/3\\_chapitre7](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/3_chapitre7)

83 *The Armenian Weekly*, March 8, 2008.

84 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story...*, op. cit., pp. 71-82; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 65, 194-198 and 218-220.

85 Louise Jenison Peet, *No Less Honor: The Biography of William Wheelock Peet*, Chattanooga: E. A. Andrews, 1939, p. 170 (based on W. W. Peet's personal papers).

of such a reply is to dismiss any possibility of checking on any of the Andonian “documents”.

- 2) “The determination of whether there are substantial differences in the two versions of the signature in question is a much more complicated task than that performed by these critics; one may even dispute the existence of any important differences.” One more time, the differences are very clear, and Mr. Dadrian fails to give any explanations. Mr. Ternon himself acknowledges the differences, and suggests that “Abdulhalik modified deliberately his signatory on secret documents, with the goal to annul, one more time, the document”.<sup>86</sup> This is not only in contradiction with Mr. Dadrian’s denial, but also a completely absurd and baseless supposition, a desperate attempt to challenge what is obvious.

Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon avoid also replying on the resemblance between the forged signatories attributed to Mustafa Abdulhalik and those attributed to the governor of Aleppo Abdulahad Nuri.<sup>87</sup>

Another problem, not sufficiently expressed by Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, is that, in the authentic documents, Abdülhalik signs “The governor of Aleppo (Halep valisi)” and in the Andonian “telegrams”, the signatory is simply “The governor (vali)”.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, in the numerous documents from the Ottoman archives used by scholars, including many documents published,<sup>89</sup> Talat Pasha signed “The Minister” or “The Minister, Talat”; but never “The Minister of Interior Talat”, a signatory systematically used in the “telegrams” of Andonian. This question was raised in the 2000’s by Yusuf Halaçoğlu and Jean-Louis Mattei.<sup>90</sup> No reply from the nationalist Armenian side followed.

Anyway, both Mr. Dadrian (p. 324) and Mr. Ternon argue also of the checking carried out by the Armenian National Union/Union nationale arménienne at Aleppo, for the Andonian “documents” in general and for the signature in particular. Mr. Dadrian refers to “two specific tests”, one involving the work of Naim — and it was seen before that this is a circular reasoning — one being a comparison with “several specimens of Aleppo Governor Abdülhalik signature and handwritten notes”. For this second “test”, all the credibility depends of the reliability of this Armenian group.

One more time, appears the question raised by Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, and

86 Yves Ternon, *Enquête...*, op. cit., p. 63, [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1\\_chapitre5](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1_chapitre5)

87 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

88 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 53 and 57-59. I express my thanks to Jean-Louis Mattei to have called my attention to this point.

89 Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıncay, op. cit., passim; Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., passim.

90 Jean-Louis Mattei, *ibid.*

unresolved by the supporters of "probable authenticity": why the British and the French authorities, who were looking for evidence against Ottoman officials, were never involved in the operation, and did not give credit to it? But there are other reasons to consider as unreliable the findings of the Armenian Nationale Union/Union nationale arménienne. As explains Mr. Ternon himself, the Union nationale arménienne was a branch of the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), and so, of the Ramkavar party.<sup>91</sup>

In a letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boghos Nubar, as a leader of the Union nationale arménienne, complained about the treatment of the Armenian volunteers of the Légion d'Orient (separated few weeks after in a Légion syrienne and a Légion arménienne).<sup>92</sup> General Jules Hamelin, chief of the French armies in the Near East, replied that the allegations were baseless. Hamelin added that he sent the Légion d'Orient from Syria to Cilicia because the Armenian "exactions against the Muslim population" at the end of 1918 prevented him to maintain this military unit in Syria, and that the attacks by Armenians continued "every day" in Cilicia ("robberies, hold-ups, pillages, murders"), forcing the French officers to punish the perpetrators. In March, Hamelin went further, warning that France was not, and would be never awarded by any gratitude from the Armenians.<sup>93</sup> Hamelin blamed explicitly the Armenian committees for their "pernicious influence" on the legionnaires, especially the Union nationale arménienne, for its "excitations to indiscipline, and against France", in a "systematic" way. Hamelin supported his conclusions by letters sent from Egypt and USA to Armenian legionnaires, by Boghos Nubar's organizations. These letters contain indeed a strident anti-French propaganda.<sup>94</sup> Assuming Hamelin's findings, the official French military history blames both the Union nationale arménienne and the Ramkavar ("Comité d'Égypte") for a defamatory campaign against France, campaign due to the punishments given by the French military judiciary to Armenian soldiers who perpetrated crimes against Turkish civilians.<sup>95</sup>

Captain Roger de Gontaut-Biron, a staff officer of the High Commissioner François Georges-Picot in the Near East, corroborated fully the Hamelin's account. He

91 Yves Ternon, *Enquête...*, op. cit., p. 31, [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1\\_chapitre2](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1_chapitre2)

92 Lettre de Boghos Nubar au ministre, 13 janvier, archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), microfilm P 1426.

93 Télégrammes du général Hamelin, 2, 25, 26 février, 4, 5 mars 1919 ; lettre du général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 15 février 1919 ; lettre du président du Conseil au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 25 février 1919 ; télégramme de Georges Picot, 19 février 1919, télégrammes de l'amiral Cassard au ministère de la Marine, 13 février, 1er mars 1919, *ibid*.

94 Lettre du général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 27 juin 1919 ; rapport au président du Conseil, 10 septembre, AMAE, P 16672 and 16673. See also Général Hamelin à M. le général commandant le XX<sup>e</sup> corps britannique, 20 mars 1919 ; Général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 27 juin 1919 ; Général Hamelin à M. le commandant des troupes françaises en Cilicie, 20 août 1919, Service historique de la défense nationale, 4 H 47, dossier 6.

95 *Les Armées françaises au Levant*, Vincennes, Service historique de l'armée de terre, tome I, 1979, p. 123, quoted and translated in Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, op. cit. tome II, pp. 878-879.

mentioned the bad and disturbing influence of the Union nationale arménienne on the Armenian legionnaires and led them to commit numerous crimes against the Muslim civilians and acts of rebellion against their French officer. Gontaut-Biron complained of its “obvious bad faith” and the “hugely exaggerated” grievances against the French army.<sup>96</sup>

The Armenian Legion itself was disbanded in 1920, because the numerous troubles which most of its members provoked,<sup>97</sup> but Boghos Nubar continued his bitter and unsubstantiated critics, for instance in alleging that France promised Cilicia as the land for an “autonomous Armenia”, an assertion which was completely false.<sup>98</sup> Even Aram Turabian, in charge of the recruitment of Armenian volunteers for the French Foreign Legion, criticized strongly the lack of loyalty and sincerity of Boghos Nubar vis-à-vis France, from another perspective: the double negotiations and double speech about a Western mandate on Cilicia, with both France and USA, at the same time, a strategy which had no result but only discredited the Armenian parties in Paris.<sup>99</sup>

Since the Union nationale arménienne and its holding group Ramkavar showed, as early as the beginning of 1919, such a disloyal and dishonest attitude against an actual ally — against the single power which occupied a territory claimed by the Armenian nationalists — who could trust their grievances against the Turks, who they considered as their arch-enemy?

Anyway, these Armenian groups diffused so clumsy propaganda in 1919-1920, i.e. when the translations into French and into English of the Andonian material were made and published, that the British diplomats W. S. Edmonds and D. G. Osborne warned the Foreign Office against these “alarmist rumors” and this “fallacy of the massacres and deportations”.<sup>100</sup> Admiral Mark Bristol, US High Commissioner, made a similar analysis, and even Zenope Bezdjian, head of the Protestant Armenian community, acknowledged that considerable exaggerations were diffused by the

96 Roger de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (1918-1919)*, Paris : Plon, 1922, pp. 54-55, <http://www.archive.org/download/commentlafrances00gontuoft/commentlafrances00gontuoft.pdf>

97 Année 1920 — Dossier relatif à divers incidents qui ont lieu à la Légion arménienne, SHDN, 4 H 47, dossier 6 ; Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 20 mai 1920 ; réponse du ministre des Affaires étrangères, 18 juin ; ministre de la Guerre au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 12 juillet, AMAE, P 1426. See also, Paul Bernard, *Six mois en Cilicie*, Aix-en-Provence : Éditions du Feu, 1929, pp. 36-37, 45-49, 59-60, 63, 70-73, 82, 85-94 ; Édouard Brémond, *La Cilicie en 1919-1920*, Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1921, p. 66.

98 Lettres de M. de Selves, président de la commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat, au président du Conseil, 28 décembre 1920 et 13 février 1921, AMAE, P 16670 ; Réponse à des questions posées par la commission des Affaires extérieures du Sénat, 29 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 16676.

99 Aram Turabian, *L'Éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne : l'Arménie*, Marseille : Imprimerie nouvelle, 1929, pp. 66-72. (It is needless to say that whatever could Turabian's incontrovertible and interesting lucidity on some subjects, his strident anti-Turkish racism takes off any credibility to him on several other points.) See also, vice-consul Guernonprez au ministère, 28 janvier, 14 juillet 1919 ; télégramme de Georges Picot au ministère, 16 juillet, AMAE, P 16670 and P 16672.

100 Salâhi R. Soneyel, “How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World in Connection With the Deportations and ‘Massacres’”, *Bellesten*, January 1977, pp. 167-168; “Armenian Deportations”, art. cit., p. 65.

Armenian propaganda.<sup>101</sup> The intelligence service of the French Navy warned several times Paris against the "Armeno-Greek provocations", especially the "so-called massacres in Cilicia" of March 1920.<sup>102</sup>

## Signatures (2)

Ms. Kuyumjian invents another argument (my emphasis):

*"As regards the debate over the signature of the Vali (the governor of Aleppo) Mustafa Abdul Halik, the German Consul compared it with signatures on documents in his possession from the same period signed by Mustafa Abdul Halik when Rössler was stationed in Aleppo, and concluded that it looked alike."*<sup>103</sup>

She refers not directly to Walter Rössler, but to Yves Ternon. Actually, nor Walter Rössler neither even Yves Ternon pretend that the German Consul had "documents in his possession". Rössler said actually (my emphasis):

*"The authenticity of the telegrams sent from Constantinople and containing the instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is of course very difficult to establish, because they contain only the handwriting of the civil servant of Telegraph or of the person in charge of deciphering. However, I believe to recognize the signatory of the vali Mustafa Abulhalik Bey. Anyway, it should be possible to check this signatory in Aleppo, and in doing like that, one would give an indirect proof of the authenticity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' telegrams."*<sup>104</sup>

Mr. Ternon summarized it by the following paraphrase:

*"Rössler had stated that he supposed to recognize on the originals of these telegrams the signatory of Mustafa Abdulhalik. (Rössler avait déclaré qu'il lui semblait reconnaître sur les originaux de ces télégrammes la signature de Mustafa Abdulhalik.)"*<sup>105</sup>

Mr. Ternon himself commits another misrepresentation: Rössler did not claim to

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101 Yücel Güçlü, op. cit., pp. 124-127; Heath W. Lowry, "American Observers in Anatolia ca. 1920: The Bristol Papers," *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire...*, op. cit., pp. 42-58. On the Kars affair, see also Défaite de l'armée arménienne, 6 janvier 1921, AMAE, P 16675.

102 Lieutenant de Vaisseau Rollin, chef du S.R. Marine, 19 octobre 1920, AMAE, P 16674.

103 Rita Kuyumjian, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

104 *Procès...*, p. 228.

105 Yves Ternon, *Enquête...*, op. cit., p. 63, [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1\\_chapitre5](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/1_chapitre5)

have read “the originals” but only, as Mr. Dadrian points — for one time correctly — “the French version” (p. 324) with facsimiles.<sup>106</sup>

Rössler’s recollections of 1921 seem especially questionable. For instance, he alleges “a general impression of authenticity”, without making any reference to the “telegrams” where Talat is supposed to ask the “extermination” of the Armenians to the prefecture of Aleppo. As a former Consul in this city during the war, Rössler was in a good position to understand that these telegrams were obvious forgeries.

*Lepsius, who never set foot in Anatolia during WWI, was a major piece of a propaganda machine working in practice for the Entente and against Germany’s interest;*

Mr. Dadrian indicates rightfully (pp. 324-325) that Rössler was “induced to prepare his above-mentioned evaluation in a confidential report to Johannes Lepsius, the author of the massive compilation of German Foreign Office documents on the Armenian deportations and massacres.” But such a relation is not a positive indication for Rössler’s objectivity, since Lepsius falsified largely his material, as established by a systematic comparison between the originals and the version published in

1919.<sup>107</sup> Frank G. Weber, an historian rather sympathetic to the Armenian claims, gives this interesting information on Lepsius:

*“What he [Lepsius] wrote was not always up to date or unbiased. [...]*

*Meanwhile, the incorrigible professor Lepsius ground out brochures and pamphlets claiming that the German banking and finance, the navy, the Chancellor, and even Hindenburg, all disgusted at the Armenian atrocities, favored peace and satisfaction of Britain’s claims at Turkey’s expense. The Foreign Ministry had to deny all this through Kühlman, but it was impossible to shut up the professor because had taken refuge in a Dutch coastal resort and there merrily spun out his fulminations and intrigue.”<sup>108</sup>*

Actually, Lepsius, who never set foot in Anatolia during WWI, was a major piece of a propaganda machine working in practice for the Entente and against Germany’s interest;<sup>109</sup> it is not a good indication for Rössler’s lucidity that a German patriot like him was compromised with somebody who could be appropriately called a traitor to Germany.

106 See also *Procès...*, p. 226: Rössler explains that he “received the book of A. Andonian”.

107 Cem Özgönül, *Der Mythos Eines Völkermordes*, Köln: Öner Verlag, 2005.

108 Frank G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent. Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance. 1914-1918*, Ithaca (NY)-London: Cornell University Press, 1970, pp. 151 and 216.

109 Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, Ankara: TTK, tome II, 2008, pp. 1113-1128.



### The Code Keys and the Legend on Special Organization

Extremely laconic and unconvincing is the reply of Mr. Dadrian about the aberrations of the codes used in Andonian "documents" (p. 322):

*"The matter of changing code keys is related to a regular, structured communication system, not necessarily applicable to the ad hoc improvisations surrounding the deportations and massacres. These improvisations were not enacted by the General Staff, the author's reference point, but by the Interior Ministry, its subsidiary agencies, and the Special Organization. Moreover, 'the chronic confusion in the archives of the Ottoman General Staff during the war' has been pointed out [by Philip H. Stoddard]."*

Mr. Dadrian asserts without any proof about the "ad hoc improvisations", of which he fails to demonstrate the simple existence. He misrepresents the argumentation about the code key. Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca give, as evidence, telegrams sent by Talat Pasha, as Minister of Internal Affairs: it shows clearly that the Ottoman Ministry of Interior used in 1915 code keys of five numbers instead of three numbers.<sup>110</sup> Mr. Dadrian forgets other arguments. Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca explain that it is almost impossible to decipher a telegram ciphered by both groups of two and groups of three, as used in some telegrams.<sup>111</sup> The disappearance of the code key in several telegrams, which Mr. Ternon himself considers as a very serious problem, at least in relying on legal criteria,<sup>112</sup> is not explained by any supporter of the "probable authenticity" of the Andonian "documents".

Anyway, it is very difficult to understand why Mr. Dadrian rejects the pertinence of the Ottoman General Staff's archives for this precise point, and in the next sentence makes a comment about these very same archives. He relies to the Ph.D. thesis of Philip H. Stoddard, but nothing in the context of the mentioned page suggests that Dr. Stoddard was referring to the code keys. In addition, Dr. Stoddard did never support Mr. Dadrian's allegations against the Special Organization, quite the contrary, and co-signed in May 1985 the petition of 69 scholars asking to the US Congress to avoid using the "genocide" label for the Armenian case, petition published in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and *The Washington Times*.<sup>113</sup> It is now completely established that the allegations of SO's participation to the forced displacement and massacres of Armenians are based on nothing but

110 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 87-92.

111 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., p. 71. See also p. 86.

112 Yves Ternon, art. cit., p. 138.

113 <http://www.historyoftruth.com/declaration-made-by-american-academicians-may-19-1985>

falsifications of sources and a complete negligence of the relevant Ottoman archival documents.<sup>114</sup> For instance, Mr. Dadrian, followed without precaution by Mr. Ternon and Mr. Akçam, alleges (p. 357, n. 108) that, according to the Memoirs of Arif Cemil Denker, “Şakir conveyed in Erzurum a meeting of his top aides” in February 1915, that “he was subsequently able to persuade his cohorts in İstanbul that the Special Organization had to shift its operations from the external to the internal front, involving the Armenians.”

What Arif Cemil Denker said actually is very different (*italics added*):

*“In İstanbul, Dr. Bahaettin Şakir Bey has now decided to concentrate on the country’s internal enemies by abandoning the Special Organization’s affairs related to foreign enemies.*

*This was because Dr. Bahaettin Şakir Bey has witnessed many facts during the period of four-five months he has spent in Erzurum and at different points of the Caucasian front. The attitude the Armenians have taken against Turkey and the assistance they provided to the Russian army have convinced him [Bahaettin Şakir] that it was necessary to fear the internal enemies as much as the external ones. By forming bands, the Armenians inside were threatening the rear of our army and were trying to cut our lines of retreat.”<sup>115</sup>*

Arif Cemil Denker affirmed even that “the deportation of the Armenians is totally beyond the action of the Special Organization (Ermenilerin Tehciri meselesi Teşkilatı Mahsusa mevzuunun büsbütün harincinde kalmaktadır).”<sup>116</sup>

Mr. Dadrian (p. 358) and Mr. Ternon distort also the meaning of Philip H. Stoddard: “the fear of a future Armenian independence on a territory separated from the Ottoman Empire, was, adds [Stoddard] an important factor in the strategy of the S.O.”<sup>117</sup> The context of Dr. Stoddard’s short remark about this fear shows clearly that he was meaning only to operations in Central Asia, instead to any participation to the Armenian relocations:

*“Steps to cause an uprising of Muslim Turks in Russian Central Asia — this*

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114 Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” *The Middle East Quarterly*, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, <http://www.meforum.org/991/armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame>; Guenter Lewy, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-88; Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: the Armenian Question,” *art. cit.*, pp. 151 and 153; Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman...*, *op. cit.*, tome I, 2006, pp. 373-409; Arslan Terzioğlu, “The Armenian Deportation in Line With National and Foreign Sources of Information,” in Selçuk Erez and Mehmet Saray (ed.), *Uluslararası Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: İstanbul University, 2001, pp. 321-358.

115 Quoted and translated in Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: the Armenian Question,” *art. cit.*, p. 151.

116 Quoted and translated in Arslan Terzioğlu, *art. cit.* p. 328 (quotation in Turkish p. 306).

117 [http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/3\\_chapitre4](http://www.imprescriptible.fr/ternon/3_chapitre4)

*would thwart any Russian-Armenian plans for an independent Armenia carved out the Ottoman territory.”<sup>118</sup>*

Both Mr. Ternon and Mr. Dadrian (p. 346, n. 21) write wrongly that Mr. Stoddard's thesis was presented in University of Michigan, instead of Princeton University; such a error is not a good indication of a careful reading of Dr. Stoddard's work.

According to Mr. Dadrian (p. 331), a report of German Major Stange has “extraordinary importance” because Stange

*“was the highest German officer commanding Turkish guerilla units, which were operating in the border areas before being shifted to brigandage against the Armenian deportees convoys.”*

But, as demonstrated by Dr. Edward J. Erickson, Stange, “a conventional military officer with no special knowledge of guerilla operations” commanded indeed 1,430 members of the Special Organization, but, as early as December 1914 (i.e. before the forced displacement of Armenians) he “kept the Special Organization engaged in conventional military operations” and “Special Organization units associated with Stange were not redeployed from the Caucasian front to deport and massacre Armenians.”<sup>119</sup> The German officer Paul Leverkuen wrote in his Memoirs that the Stange Detachment included Armenians,<sup>120</sup> a fact more than difficult to conciliate with the thesis of a participation of the Stange detachment to any “extermination campaign against the Armenians”, and also with any allegations of a campaign of this kind by the Ottoman army. Last but not least, Stange justified explicitly the forced displacement of the Armenians from Erzurum by the insurrectional activities of the Armenian revolutionaries, and their attacks against the Muslim population.<sup>121</sup>

Mr. Dadrian misrepresents equally (p. 351, n. 52) the role of Ahmed Refik (Altınay), who was not “a captain at the War Office's Intelligence Section”. A virulent opponent to the CUP even before 1914, he was appointed in the beginning of the war as a major (not a captain) in Eskişehir (Western Anatolia), where he was in charge of the Recruitment Department; as early as 1915, he was transferred to the civil service. The quotation used is especially unconvincing, since Altınay mentions the case of Ahmed and Halil, the murderers of two Armenian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, and immediately after accuses the CUP government of

118 Philip H. Stoddard, *The Ottoman Government and the Arabs. A Preliminary Study of the Teskilat-I Mahsusa*, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1963, p. 56.

119 Edward J. Erickson, “Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame,” art. cit.

120 Paul Leverkuen, *Posten auf ewiger Wache: Aus dem abenteuerlichen Leben des Max von Scheubner-Richter*, Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1938, p. 33.

121 Cem Özgönül, op. cit., p. 200.

extermination designs. Actually, Ahmed and Halil were arrested following an order of Talat, sentenced to death and hanged under the authority of Cemal Pasha, Minister of Navy and number 3 of the government, as seen previously.

### The Signs of Besmele

The two “letters” published by Andonian include an obviously wrong sign of Besmele, a religious insignia placed on the top of the Ottoman documents. Especially, the size of the “bismallah” sign is much bigger and of a clearly different form than in the authentic Ottoman documents: for instance, in the authentic documents, the “bismillah” is closed, a bit like a Greek alpha, but open in the Andonian “documents.”<sup>122</sup> This is not, as Mr. Dadrian alleges (p. 321), “minuscule variation in the positioning of signs”; and if “handwriting, as compared with standardized printing, is intrinsically irregular in any language”, there are “in any language” graphical aberrations which cannot be committed any literate person, especially if religion is implied. It is significant that, like in several other occasions, Mr. Dadrian asserts without any detailed analysis.

In addition, the majority of the Andonian “documents” do not include the Besmele sign, which should necessarily be present<sup>123</sup> — so, this absence in itself sufficient to consider these “documents” as very suspect.

### The Paper of the “Documents”

Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca observed that all but two Andonian “documents” are written on ordinary paper, instead of the official paper of the Ottoman Empire; three are even written on a paper for notebook in primary schools. Mr. Dadrian replies (p. 321) in referring to a book of Ahmed Reşit Rey, a civil servant during WWI. The passage used is the following:

*“After the State Council reviewed my application, it found me rightful and decided on doing what is necessary about the application. This way, I was rescued from unjustly losing each month one thousand three hundred kouroush. As an additional benefit of my application, during this process, I saw in the file a letter written to the Prime Ministry. Minister of Internal Affairs Talat Bey, who had written the letter, never mentioned me as if I had vaporized in Aleppo and as if the Aleppo Governorship was empty,*

122 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 46-50 and 188-264; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıay, op. cit., passim. This analysis was confirmed to me by Jean-Louis Mattei.

123 I express my thanks to Yusuf Halaçoğlu and Jean-Louis Mattei, who attired my attention on this important point.

*submitted to the Prime Ministry the name of a general from the army for this post, whose name I forgot, with a letter, who knows where and when was written, because it was inscribed on an ordinary paper and probably they were not able to find one with letterheads.*"<sup>124</sup>

The author was, as this text explains, a bitter critique of Talat, and not an impartial observer. He does not refer to the paper of any school. Last but not least, he is only speculating, having no way to know that "they were not able to find one with letterheads". He could make confusion between the draft and the letter itself. To reinforce this very weak argument, Mr. Dadrian uses the "testimony" of "Naim himself" (pp. 321 and 345, n. 13). We saw how unconvincing is such a reference.

The single pertinent argument which could dismiss the use of ordinary paper would be the discovery in the Ottoman archives of a telegram written on such paper. Mr. Dadrian never wanted to work in these archives, and such a telegram was never found by nobody else, not even Taner Akçam, Vahakn Dadrian's disciple, who worked many times within the archives of İstanbul. The alleged letter itself was not discovered.

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### **Grammatical and Stylistical Problems**

About the grammatical issues raised by Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, Mr. Dadrian replies by generalities on the — undisputed — difficulties of the Ottoman language especially about the "chaotic sway of Persian and Arabic" and on second-hand comments about two texts written in Ottoman, including an (authentic) letter of Talat (pp. 321-322). Such a reply is largely irrelevant, since it is the specifically Turkish part of the Ottoman language which is mistreated in some Andonian "documents" and so targeted by Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca. Barely more pertinent is the comment of İsmail Hami Danişmend on a letter supposedly in written in "bad" Turkish by Talat in 1918: no kind of general analysis of Talat's mastering of the Ottoman language, and no kind of grammatical comparison between the alleged "bad" Turkish of this letter with the errors contained by several telegrams is provided.

124 Ahmed Reşit Rey, *Gördüklerim-Yaptıklarım (1890-1922)*, İstanbul, 1945, p. 117.

Concerning the very strange style of several “documents” (like the two “letters”), looking like a clumsy fabrication of self-confession more than to an authentic document,<sup>125</sup> Mr. Dadrians replies just nothing.

### Chronological Aberrations

The “cipher telegram” attributed to Talat Pasha and dated of September 3, 1331 (September 16, 1915) contains a note attributed to Abdülhalik, as governor of Aleppo, and dated of September 5, 1331. But at that time, Abdülhalik was not yet governor of Aleppo. Mr. Dadrian himself acknowledges that “should this presumption hold, the cipher becomes highly suspect” (p. 320). All what Mr. Dadrian finds as response is that “instead of the year and the month, the customary symbol *minh* is written, literally meaning ‘from it,’ and roughly translating ‘same’”. Mr. Dadrians takes it as argument to allege that “the indication ‘5’ may have been referring on October 5”. There is absolutely no basis for such a speculation. Quite the contrary, on the “telegram”, the single month named is September, so the *minh* can only refer on September. A similar case can be found in the book of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca: an authentic telegram dated of March 5, 1331 (March 18, 1915) has two apostilles, one time “fi 5 minhu”, one time of the complete date.<sup>126</sup>

Concerning the two “letters” absurdly dated of February 18, 1331 (April 7, 1915) and March 25, 1331 (March 2, 1916), Mr. Dadrian assert to have found the “key to resolving this confusion” in the “facsimile of the March 25, 1915, letter produced in all three versions, i.e. Armenian, French and English”, which “restores the sequential interconnection between the two” (p. 319). One more time, Mr. Dadrian uses a circular reasoning, with the présupposé that the “documents” are in fact “authentic”. Anyway, this “letter” raises itself a serious problem of date. Andonian alleges indeed that, because this letter, Cemal Bey left Adana to participate to the “massacres of the Armenians.”<sup>127</sup> But in March 1915, the forced displacement did not begin (except for the Armenians of Zeitun, who were displaced to Konya). More important, the “letter” of March 25, 1331 (April 7, 1915), has an obviously forged sign of *Besmele*, as we saw already; both the “letters”, as explained previsously, include stylistical aberrations; and anyway, Mr. Dadrian fails to explain why such “important letters” would had been sent by the ordinary mail. Not very more convincing is the reference to “a similar instance of Şakir’s misplacing dates”. The misplacing concerns, according to what Mr. Dadrian himself explains

<sup>125</sup> Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

<sup>126</sup> Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., p. 205 (translation p. 108). Jean-Louis Mattei must be thanked to have attired my attention on this point.

<sup>127</sup> *Documents*, p. 100.

after, *one* date and not several. More important, the source of Mr. Dadrian, Ernest Ramsaur, speaks of a "misprint" and does not allege clearly that Şakir was responsible of this one.<sup>128</sup>

In the matter of chronology, the problem of the numerotation is at least as serious as those who were discussed in the precedent paragraphs. For instance, the telegram actually sent by the Ministry of Interior to Aleppo on September 3, 1331 (September 16, 1915) has not the number 502 but 78 is devoted to the digging of wells for water in various parts of the Sinai Peninsula. The telegram sent to the same city on September 29, 1331 (1915) has not the number 537 but 95 and has a very different content than the fake document published by Andonian.<sup>129</sup> The "telegram" of March 7, 1332 (March 20, 1916) has the number 819. But at that time, the first day of the year was March 1st. It would mean that the Ottoman government would have sent 819 ciphered telegrams to Aleppo in one week, as noticed Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca. The "telegram" of November 5, 1331 (November 18, 1915) has the number 603. The telegram sent to Aleppo at that date is in the register of the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs; its number is 150, and the content is completely different of Andonian's "telegram". On March 7, 1332 (March 20, 1916), no telegram with the number 819 was sent to Minister of Internal Affairs to Aleppo; the telegram registered has the number 9 and was sent to Antep.<sup>130</sup>

In addition to the discrepancies with the Ottoman archives, there are internal contradictions. The "telegram" of December 12, 1915 received the number 830, but the one of December 29, 1915 received the number 809 and the one of January 1916 received the number 820. Similarly absurd, Andonian gave the same number (76) to two "telegrams" dated of the same year, and sent to same authority.<sup>131</sup> Nor Mr. Dadrian neither any other supporter of the "probable authenticity" of Andonian material attempted to explain these aberrations.

### Other German Comments

Mr. Dadrian writes that Rössler "described these flaws as 'simple errors'" (p. 344, n. 5). In fact, Rössler called "simple errors" only some aberrations of date, and did not give a single argument for this dismissal. More importantly, Rössler said also:

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128 Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, *The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 123, n. 73.

129 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 66-71.

130 Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., pp. 72 and 79.

131 *Documents*, pp. 106 and 112 ; *Memoirs...*, pp. 54-55 and 72.

*“On the authenticity, or inauthenticity, of the especially important letter, which preceded all the deportations, [and] which the Young Turk Committee addressed to his representative in Adana, Djemal Bey, in date of February 1915 (p. 96 of this book), like on the other letters of the Committee, I can say nothing and I do not see how their authenticity could be proven.”*<sup>132</sup>

As we saw already, Rössler was very critical against other aspects of Andonian’s book, and denied even any objectivity to the author.

Treating at least one of his contradictors like several of his sources, Mr. Dadrian alleges (p. 347, n. 29) that “Ataöv credits Gollnick, the Prosecutor-General at the trial, with a definitive statement declaring the documents as ‘false’; this attribution is false because Gollnick never made such a statement. [...] Gollnick merely raised the possibility of falseness out of a general skepticism.” The real misquotation is made by Mr. Dadrian. Prof. Ataöv wrote actually:

*“Further, many foreign circles take it for granted that the German court which tried Tehlirian, Talat Pasha’s assassin, had accepted or had even endorsed at least some Andonian Naim Bey ‘documents’ as authentic. But the minutes of the court proceedings show that the Court has neither accepted them as evidence, nor judged them as authentic. Tehlirian’s lawyer Von Gordon withdraw them, and the Prosecutor said that the use of false documents cannot mislead him and that he know how so-called documents carrying the signatures of high dignitaries were later proven to be fabrications.”*<sup>133</sup>

This is an accurate summary of the prosecutor’s statement, and indeed, some Armenian authors, and not among the less known, asserted falsely that the documents were accepted during the Tehlirian’s trial.<sup>134</sup> This manipulation does not incite Mr. Dadrian to express any reprobation. Recently, Ms. Kuyumjian asserted falsely that “copies of the telegrams in *Medz Vodjiru* were translated into German and used in Soghomon Tehlirian’s trial in Berlin in 1921. They were given to jurors as evidence of the crimes committed by Talaat, and as proof of the innocence of Soghomon Tehlirian, who had taken vengeance on Talaat in the streets of Berlin.”<sup>135</sup>

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132 *Procès*, pp. 228-229.

133 <http://www.ataa.org/reference/andonian-ataov.html>

134 For instance : Jean-Marie Carzou (Zouloumian), *Arménie 1915 : un génocide exemplaire*, Paris: Flammarion, 1975, p. 248. Seventeen years later, Mary Mangigian Terzian repeated the same lie: *The Armenian Minority Problem. 1914-1934*, Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1992, p. 65.

135 Rita Soulahian, op. cit., pp. 28-29.



The validity of Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca's criticism is even more enlighten by the findings of the inter-Allies investigative commission of İzmir/Smyrna events, 1919:

*"Fears of Christian massacres were unjustified. Investigations have shown that attempts to rally Muslims to a Greek massacre, which came to the attention of the Greek authorities a few weeks before the landing and which were forwarded to Athens, were not written by officers in the Turkish constabulary, whose signatures appeared on these documents. These documents are undoubtedly forgeries."*<sup>136</sup>

The Greco-Armenian cooperation had increased in 1918, and in February 1919, a joint committee was established in London.<sup>137</sup> The coincidence of both time and clumsy technique between the Greek and Armenian forgeries raises necessarily questions.

But whatever could be questionable the arguments of Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon about the "conformity" of the Andonian material to the actual historical facts, this "conformity" will be examined now.

## **The External Critique (1): Inventing a Genocidal Intention**

### **The Trials in Court-Martials of 1919-1920**

This argument deserves a special attention, since it is largely used to defend the "Armenian genocide" label, far beyond the attempts to defend the "probable authenticity" of Andonian "documents", and even far beyond the writings of Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon.

The trial of the Ministers, which happened in İstanbul in 1919 was the most important. Such a trial was legally wrong, since the Constitution of 1876, suspended in 1878 and restored in 1908 by the Young Turk Revolution, ordered

<sup>136</sup> <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/GREEKOCUPATIONOFIZMIR.pdf> For other examples of nationalist Greek propaganda, war crimes and treachery, see, among others, Laurence Evans, op. cit., pp. 179-182 and 272; Dimitri Kitsikis, *Propagande et Pressions en politique internationale : la Grèce et ses revendications à la conférence de la paix (1919-1920)*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963; Pierre Loti, *Les Alliés qu'il nous faudrait*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1919, pp. 28-38, 62-64, 71-74, 77-78, 90-91, 97-103, 106-117, 123, <http://www.archive.org/download/alliesquilnous00loti/alliesquilnous00loti.pdf> ; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of Empire*, New York-London: New York University Press, 1983, pp. 89-99; id., *Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995, pp. 255-332; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire....*, op. cit., tome II, pp. 469-480, 507-539 and III-1, pp. 1260-1290.

<sup>137</sup> Attaché militaire à Berne au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 29 janvier 1919, AMAE, P 16670 ; Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Ankara: TTK, 1993, pp. 345-347 ; Aram Turabian, *L'Éternelle victime....*, op. cit., pp. 244-260.

that the members of the government could be judged for the acts committed only by a special tribunal, the High Court. The Entente Libérale (also called in English “Liberal Union”), which was recreated by the instigations of the British Embassy, thanks to Greek and British money, in 1910-1911,<sup>138</sup> came back to power in 1919 during the occupation of İstanbul thanks to the British pressure, and was even infiltrated by the British Intelligence Service, according to the French officers in Turkey.<sup>139</sup> The party was an arch-enemy of the CUP and wanted to reject all the

*An unconstitutional procedure was chosen by the Entente Libérale to sue former CUP Ministers and their ex-collaborators, because in front of military justice, the indicted persons were not allowed to be assisted by a lawyer during the investigation and did not have the right of cross-examination during the trial.*

possible blames on the CUP’s leaders, both by personal hatred and because an illusory hope to obtain a better peace treaty.<sup>140</sup> For the trial of the Ministers, even Oskan Mardikian, former Minister (CUP) of Post and Telegraph, was indicted.<sup>141</sup>

An unconstitutional procedure was chosen by the Entente Libérale to sue former CUP Ministers and their ex-collaborators, because in front of military justice, the indicted persons were not allowed to be assisted by a lawyer during the investigation and did not have the right of cross-examination during the trial.<sup>142</sup> On May 6, 1919, the defense counsel for the trial of the Ministers “challenged the court’s repeated

references to the indictment as proven fact, but the court rejected the objection.”<sup>143</sup> The American High Commissioner in İstanbul Lewis Heck noted with disapproval that the defendants of the Yozgat trial would be tried by “anonymous court material”.<sup>144</sup> The government of Damat Ferit Pasha himself was disturbed by the numerous abuses of Investigation teams, and sent repeated orders — such a repetition being hardly a proof that the orders were applied.<sup>145</sup> But Damat Ferit

138 Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *Angora, Constantinople, Londres*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1922, p. 65, <http://www.archive.org/download/angoraconstantin00geor/angoraconstantin00geor.pdf> ; Edward F. Knight, *The Awakening of Turkey. The Turkish Revolution of 1908*, Boston-Tokyo: J. B. Millet C°, 1910, p. 290, <http://www.archive.org/download/turkeyawakeningo00knigrich/turkeyawakeningo00knigrich.pdf>

139 Lettre du général Pellé au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 22 novembre 1921 ; Notice au sujet de Zeinel Abeddin Bey, novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17785.

140 Hüsamettin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitapevi, 1957, pp. 370–373; Laurence Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey (1914-1924)*, Baltimore-Lewy, op. cit. p. 75; Malcolm E. Yapp, “Review of *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, by V. N. Dadrian,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXII-4, October 1996, p. 397.

141 Ferudun Ata, op. cit., pp. 219-220; Raymond H. Kévorkian, *Le Génocide des Arméniens*, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2006, p. 966, n. 523. Mr. Kévorkian fails to comment this fact, like most of the problems raised by the trials of 1919-1920.

142 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 79.

143 Guenter Lewy, *ibid.*

144 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 80.

145 Ferudun Ata, *İşgal İstanbul’unda Tehcir Yargulamaları*, Ankara: TTK, 2005, p. 148.

Pasha, going even beyond the restriction of the court-martials' ordinary rule, in April 1920, banned the defendants from hiring a lawyer, finishing to suppress any right of defense.<sup>146</sup>

After the forced resignation of Damat Ferit (October 1920), the right to appeal the decisions was eventually accorded, for the sentences pronounced after April 23, 1920. All the persons who had this right appealed, and all were acquitted of every charges by the appeal court.<sup>147</sup> The others trials were not "jettisoned during the subsequent months of Kemalism", as asserts Mr. Dadrian without giving any reference, but ended in practice on March 28, 1922 by the last Ottoman government, which acknowledged, after an administrative investigation, many shortcomings in the conducts of these trials.<sup>148</sup> Nemrut Mustafa Paşa, president of one of the main courts, was himself sentenced for corruption in December 1920.<sup>149</sup> The former CUP leaders were not alone to receive unfair sentences in abstentia by magistrates of questionable ethics. Damat Ferit, who saw no salvation for the Ottoman Empire but a kind of British protectorate, was unable to accept the contradiction, and even obtained a court-martial death sentence of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) for rebellion on May 11, 1920<sup>150</sup> — a self-explanatory decision for both the Liberal Union and its misuse of justice.

In his reply to Guenter Lewy published in 2005, Mr. Dadrian attempted to defend the reliability of the martial-courts of 1919-1920 in asserting that they applied a procedure similar to the French one. In fact, the right to be assisted by a lawyer during the investigation exists in the French law since the Constans Act (*loi Constans*) of December 8, 1897 and of course, the right to hire a lawyer appeared in the origins of the French legal system. Even in the Moscow trials organized by Lenin's regime in 1922, the right of cross-examination was allowed to the defendants.<sup>151</sup>

The serious violations of the rights of defense are even more discrediting the findings of the martial-courts of 1919-1920 since all the material is lost. Mr. Ternon points rightfully that no one is able to show a single original of the "documents" used during in front of these courts.<sup>152</sup> But if Mr. Ternon acknowledges that the lost of the originals of the Andonian "documents" is an insoluble problem for the use of

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146 Erman Şahin, "A Scrutiny", art. Cit., p. 307.

147 Ferudun Ata, op. cit., pp. 281-283.

148 Ferudun Ata, op. cit., p. 287; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 78.

149 Türkkiye Ataöv, *What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?*, New York: Okey, 2006, pp. 75-81.

150 Paul Dumont, op. cit., pp. 26-27, 31-33, 36, 49, 52-54, 67-69 and 75 ; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third Edition*, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 240-241, 246 and 250-252.

151 Leonard Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Political Opposition in the Soviet State*, Cambridge (MA)-London: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 153 (1st edition, 1955).

152 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens...*, op. cit. p. 333.

this text as “evidence of genocide”, at least with the exigencies of a tribunal,<sup>153</sup> he does not explain why the lost of all the material of the martial-court (not even facsimiles remain) is, this time, unimportant. All what subsists, it is the reproductions of some documents and partial accounts of audience in newspapers, but these accounts contain several important contradictions between them,<sup>154</sup> and there is no way to know what is the right, or even *if* there is one which is accurate.

The validity of Mr. Dadrian’s allegations is not improved by his selection among the second-hand material which remains of the trial’s proceedings. Actually he chooses, as argument, some of the less convincing “evidence”.

He alleges, p. 326, that “the Court martial key indictment cites Talat’s ‘criminal posture’ [...] and declares him ‘a principal co-perpetrator of the massacres’ [...] In further corroboration of evidence against Talat, the Indictment adduces the testimony of Trabzon deputy Hafız Mehmed on the Black Sea mass-drowning operations (*gark*), which Talat knowingly allowed to continue”. At first, an indictment is not a proof — especially in such unfair tribunals. This acceptance of an indictment as face value is the best example of what Mr. Sarafian called Vahakn N. Dadrian’s “prosecutorial approach”.<sup>155</sup> Secondly, and more importantly, the “*mass* drowning” in the Black Sea was proven to be a hearsay by a supporter of the “Armenian genocide” label, Mr. Sarafian, relying on the work of Lord Byrce,<sup>156</sup> one of the most vituperative enemies of the Turks. Thirdly, there were indeed some *isolated* cases of drowning, but far to have “knowingly allowed to continue” such crimes, Talat, when he was informed of their existence, ordered that the prefect of Ordu be dismissed and tried for his participation to these murders.<sup>157</sup>

Mr. Dadrian asserts, p. 330, that “the most devastating confirmation of Şakir’s decisive role was provided by Third Army Commander Mehmed Vehib Paşa, whose military command zone nearly coincided with the operational zone of Şakir’s Special Organization”. The same General asserted, at the same time, that the war of independence launched by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) would ruin Turkey<sup>158</sup> — an absurdity which does not deserve any comment. These anti-CUP and anti-Kemalist statements become more understandable in knowing that they were made at a time when Vehib was himself charged for a serious case of

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153 Yves Ternon, art. cit., p. 138.

154 Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny”, art. cit., p. 305.

155 “Study the Armenian Genocide with Confidence, Ara Sarafian Suggests,” art. cit.

156 Ara Sarafian, “Icons and Scholarship,” *Armenian Forum*, II-3, pp. 91-94, <http://www.gomidas.org/forum/icons.pdf>; “Ara Sarafian Responds,” *Armenian Forum*, II-4, February 2003, pp. 143-145, <http://www.gomidas.org/forum/af8-adal.pdf>

157 Erman Şahin, “Review Essay: The Armenian Question,” art. cit., p. 148.

158 Michael M. Gunter, “A Reply to Joseph Kéchichian and Keith Watenpaugh,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XXXIX-3, August 2007, <http://www.hnn.us/roundup/entries/41948.html>

embezzlement, and feared to be sentenced to jail — eventually, he received indeed a sentence of four month of prison in September 1921.<sup>159</sup>

Mr. Dadrian adds that Vehib “launched an investigation [in 1916], which led to a Court Martial and to some executions” perpetrators of a massacre of Armenians; nor Mehmed Vehib Paşa neither Vahakn N. Dadrian explain how a General serving a State which was allegedly carrying out a “campaign of extermination” could have been, without being himself arrested, “launched an investigation”, the result of which was several “executions” of perpetrators of this “campaign of extermination”. In short, Vehib was by no means a credible “witness”. Anyway, Şakir was never the director of the SO,<sup>160</sup> and, as explained already, the SO was not redeployed in the interior of Anatolia to participate to any forced displacement of Armenians.

Mr. Dadrian’s praising of the 1919-1920 trials raises also serious questions of internal logic. Falih Rifkî Atay is used, pp. 339-340 and pp. 352-353 (n. 76), as a reliable source. But in his book, Atay criticizes the conduct of the trials, explains that he was himself judged by one of these martial-courts, that the decision to sentence him to death was made even before the beginning of the trial, and that he escaped by paying to the judges less than 500 Lira.<sup>161</sup> This account is largely corroborated by Refik Halid Karay, an anti-CUP and anti-Kemalist author.<sup>162</sup>

The German Ambassador Paul von Wolff-Metternich, also used as an important reference by Mr. Dadrian (his reliability is discussed below) demanded in January 1916 “the supervision of Turkish courts by German officials, ‘since one cannot have confidence in Turkish jurisprudence’”.<sup>163</sup> Mr. Dadrian himself alleged that the Ottoman martial-courts “hanged countless Armenians on the filmiest charges” in 1915<sup>164</sup> — avoiding to explain how an even less equitable procedure, in front of the same kind of tribunals, could have been produced in 1919-1920 honest judgments.

The famous writer and feminist Halidé Edib, another source used by Vahakn N. Dadrian, and also by Yves Ternon, gave in her books a picture of Istanbul in 1919-1920 which does not lead the reader to be optimistic on the serenity of the court-martials.

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159 Gotthard Jaeschke, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar*, Ankara: TTK, 1989, p. 161 (1st edition, 1970); Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahu Vahidettin Mütareke Gayyasında*, İstanbul: Sebil, 1994, pp. 88-91 (1st edition, 1969). Peter Balakian, op. cit., p. 343, refers also to Vehib as a very good witness, ignoring purely and simply all his shortcomings.

160 Yücel Güçlü, “Mislabeling Genocide?”, *The Middle East Quarterly*, XIII-2, Spring 2006, p. 68. <http://www.meforum.org/969/the-great-game-of-genocide>

161 Falih Rifkî Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar*, İstanbul: Bateş, 1998, pp. 218-230 (pp. 219 and 223-224 for Atay's case).

162 Refik Halid Karay, *Minelbab İlelmihrab*, İstanbul: İnkılâp-Aka Kitabevleri, 1964, pp. 195–196.

163 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 78.

164 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Secret Young Turks Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, XXII, 1994, p. 188.

*“With the entry of the Allied armies the insolence of the Greeks and the Armenians and the treatment of the peaceful Turkish citizens in the streets became scandalous. [...] The Greek and Armenian interpreters and assistants of the Allied police – the English particularly – greatly influenced and colored the behavior of these men toward the Turks.*

*Apart from the unjust as well as unwise policy of the Allies toward Turkey, their armies of occupation in the first months saw the Turks with the eyes of the Greeks and Armenians, and perhaps this was what hurt the man in the street most at the time. One often saw Turkish women roughly pushed out of tramcars, and heard Turkish children called ‘bloody cusses.’ [...] As the Turkish press was tightly muzzled by the Allied censor, and as very few of these things could be published, the rumors became more serious and probably more exaggerated.*

*Colonel Heathcote Smythe, who seemed to be the most powerful person in the English headquarters, had gone to inspect the Turkish prisons in Istantboul. [...] Colonel Heathcote Smythe had ordered all the Christian criminals to be set free. Most of them were ordinary murderers. [...]*

*As the Turkish population was entirely unarmed and anyone found with arms was very severely punished, and as all the Christians had deliberately armed themselves, a series of murders verging on massacre started in the Turkish quarters, especially in the Ak-Serai and Fatih regions, where the streets are dark and covered over with lonely ruins of past fires.”<sup>165</sup>*

More especially, Edib described the actual Armenian newspapers of Istanbul as far from objectivity:

*“The first sigh of foresight and the greatest evidence of wisdom was publicly shown by Dr. Gates at this period. He is a fervent Christian and naturally a friend of the Armenians. He took a small trip to southern Turkey all through Adana to study the situation. On his return he dared to say that owing to the fact that the Armenians were so infinitely in the minority, an Armenia in southern Turkey was an impossibility. The Armenian press was furious, never realizing that his declaration, if listened to in Paris, would prevent a tragedy in the unfolding of which the Armenians as well as the Turks would suffer.”<sup>166</sup>*

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165 Halidé Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal*, New York-London: The Century C°, 1928, pp. 4-6.

166 Halidé Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal*, op. cit., p. 11.

It does not prevent Mr. Dadrian to refer several times to the trials' accounts published by the İstanbul's Armenian newspapers. It is also noticeable that Halidé Edib herself was sentenced to death in absentia by an İstanbul's martial-court on May 11, 1920.<sup>167</sup> The distortions of Edib's book by Vahakn N. Dadrian are discussed in the next section.

Perhaps even more problematically, Mr. Dadrian writes in a later publication that Cemal Paşa and some other CUP's leader "refused to embrace the secret genocidal agenda of the party's top leadership and whenever they could tried to resist and discourage the attendant massacres".<sup>168</sup> But Cemal was sentenced to death in absentia at the end of the Ministers' trial (1919) and eventually assassinated by a Dashnak terrorist on July 25, 1922. Equally embarrassing for Mr. Dadrian's thesis is that Cemal, considered correctly as without any criminal intentions against the Armenians, defended Talat and the other CUP top-rank leaders in his Memoirs. Cemal argued that if the choice of the Arab provinces as place for relocation was an error, the relocation itself was very likely justified by the Armenian revolts; and that the CUP government had no intention to exterminate the Armenians.<sup>169</sup> Mr. Dadrian knows that, since he refers to Cemal's Memoirs (p. 336), but mentions only the comments of Cemal about the place of relocation, not his defense of the CUP.

### Sources Distorted: Turkish Authors

Mr. Dadrian misquotes the *Memoirs of Halidé Edib* (p. 352, n. 76): "Edib grants that 'besides the political argument there was a strong economic one... to end the economic supremacy of the Armenians, thereby claiming the markets for the Turks and the Germans.'" Mr. Dadrian changes "this" into "the", fails to quote what Edib was meaning by "political argument", and avoids to say that Edib was not far to understand this one (my emphasis):

*"It was an extremely difficult time for the Turkish population; in spite of the public disapproval of the government's acts, every Turk was deeply conscious of Turkey's danger, and that it would mean complete spoliation and extermination of the Turks if the Turkish army should be defeated. One naturally felt that Armenian revolutionary centers were used as the strategic points to carry out allied policy against the Turks. [...]"*

167 Paul Dumont, op. cit. p. 75.

168 Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification*, Cambridge (Massachusetts)-Toronto, Zoryan Institute, 1999, p. 54, n. 64.

169 Cemal Paşa, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman. 1913-1919*, London: Hutchinson & C°, 1922, pp. 241, 277-280 and 299-302. See also pp. 42, 72-73 and 128-129, <http://www.archive.org/download/memoriesofturkis00ahmeuft/memoriesofturkis00ahmeuft.pdf>

*In 1916 I spoke to a very large audience, mostly Unionists, in the Turk Ojak on the Armenian question and national economics. I saw the Armenian question quite differently from the way I see it to-day. I did not know about the Armenian crimes, and I had not realized that in similar cases others could be a hundred times worse than the Turks. [...] I received the next day a great volume about the massacre of the Turks by the Armenians.”<sup>170</sup>*

To finish this distortion, Mr. Dadrian edits also his quotation of Halidé Edib according to his whim, suppressing the following words: this political argument “which the Armenians did their best to justify by *their own bloody deeds*” (my emphasis). Mr. Dadrian does not even mark this ellipsis.

Edib’s Memories contain important remarks which denies the Andonian’s presentation of Talat as a bloody monster (my emphasis):

*“His frugal ways, his modest life, and his charm of the true democrat kept my respect and admiration for him as a man throughout. However one may criticize him, one is obliged to admit that he was the truest of patriots, and that no act of his was either for personal gain or love of power. He lived and died a poor man, proud to be poor, and ready to endure all for what he believed to be best for his country.*

*He succeeded during those years in creating a much better department of the interior, and he fought mercilessly against corruption and abuse.”<sup>171</sup>*

Edib praises even Talat for some aspects of his attitude vis-à-vis the Armenian, even if she criticizes a lot this policy in general (my emphasis):

*“In 1915 the Ojak generously used its influence to have him [Komitas] spared from deportation, but in 1916 he had a serious disturbance in his mind, which gave way under the strain of those horrible times. Dr. Adnan begged Talaat Pasha to allow him to go to Paris for a cure, and this was accorded to him. He is still in an asylum.”*

*“What is more I heard that some of the Unionists were furious with me and that they proposed to have me punished, which Talaat Pasha refused. ‘She serves her country in the way she believes,’ he had said. ‘Let her speak her mind; she is sincere.’ But the number of young intellectuals who came to my house decreased to a considerable degree. Talaat Pasha himself, however, did not change his friendly attitude.”<sup>172</sup>*

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170 *Memoirs of Halidé Ebid*, New York-London: The Century C°, 1926, pp. 386-388.

<http://www.archive.org/download/memoirsofhalide00haliuoft/memoirsofhalide00haliuoft.pdf>

171 *Memoirs of Halidé Ebid*, op. cit., p. 349.

172 *Memoirs of Halidé Ebid*, pp. 374 and 387-388.



Another statement of Talat confirms that there is no "utterance of guilt" (as alleged by Vahakn N. Dadrian p. 359, n. 113) but regrets about a moral responsibility (my emphasis):

*"What other choice was there but to remove this race away from the war zones? There was absolutely no other solution. This was not at all an easy task. For that reason, therefore, while this policy was being carried out, some instances of bad management and evil deeds took place. But one cannot blame members of the government like myself for such instances which took place in far away provinces and of which had no knowledge. It grieves me that we were unable to save some Armenians who had no connection with the revolt, among whom were two of my very closest colleagues. One can accuse us of lack of experience, incapacity and ignorance. But no one can say that we were thieves. I still to the present day feel great pain and distress that I was unable to prevent the atrocities that were carried out against people who were outside the area of revolt and had absolutely nothing to do with it."*<sup>173</sup>

Behind this misuse of Edib's writings, there is apparently a book of Armenian propaganda, published in Armenian in 1926, and later translated into English by Mr. Dadrian, then into French by the Athens chapter of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.<sup>174</sup>

Anyway, Mr. Dadrian continues to distort Edib's intention in asserting (p. 353, n. 78) that a "statement about the forced mass conversion of Armenian orphans is verified by the writer Halidé Edib, who denounced it as 'wrong'". More precisely, Edib wrote (my emphasis):

*"There were a large number of Turkish orphanages in Anatolia filled with Turkish children whose parents had been the victims of the Armenians. These orphanages had taken Armenian children as well and made them Moslems (which was wrong). The rest of the Armenian orphans were taken by the Americans. Apart from this, some Turkish families had taken Armenian children out of kindness and pity without any desire to make them Moslems: for the Moslem Turks do not have the missionary instincts of the Christians of the West. [...]"*

*An international committee for the separation of the Armenian children was formed under the patronage of Colonel Heathcote Smythe. It rented a house in Shishli, and the central committee which had to separate the children were*

173 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, op. cit., tome I, pp. 61-62.

174 Zarevand (Zeven et Vartouhie Nalbandian), *United and Independent Turania. Aims and Designs of the Turks*, Leyde: E. J. Brill, 1971, p. XII (French version: *Touranie unifiée et indépendante*, Athènes: éditions arméniennes, 1988).

*mostly Armenians. Nezihe Hanum, the general secretary of the women's section of the Red Crescent, was asked to represent the Turks. She went three times a week for nearly two months, but resigned afterward. She used to say that her presence did not in any way help the Turkish children, who were being Armenianized daily. The children who were brought to the association were left in the care of the Armenian women, and these Armenian women, either by persuasion or threats or hypnotism, forced the Turkish children to learn by heart the name of an Armenian woman for their mother and the name of an Armenian man for their father.*"<sup>175</sup>

On the other hand, several Western sources, including the missionaries Mary L. Graffam and Mary Caroline Holmes noticed that most of the children and women converted to Islam resisted strongly to the attempts to take them out of the Muslim houses in 1919, i.e. when no kind of threat or hypnotism, if it existed, was no more possible for Muslim families.<sup>176</sup>

The distortion of some letters published in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur's and Ahmed Bedevi Kuran's books is even more obvious (pp. 356-357, n. 107). Mr. Dadrian sees in these letters signs of "premeditation" of "genocide". Nowhere such an intent appears. For instance, "In one of these letters dated June 11, 1907, Şakir is accusing the Armenian revolutionaries of wanting to establish an Armenian State to be carved out of the territory of the Ottoman Empire." But this is exactly what the Armenian revolutionaries wanted, since decades.<sup>177</sup> Mr. Dadrian alleges also that "touching on the ingredient of premeditation, Bayur concedes that, exasperated with the tribulations of discord with the Armenians, Ittihad would eventually solve the problem by force of arms, i.e. using the army [işî ordu ile görmek] (Bayur, *Türk İnkilâbı Tarihi*, vol. 2, part 4, p. 13)." Even in this version, what Mr. Dadrian argues is not a "premeditation" of "genocide". But at the indicated page, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur quotes two texts of Ahmet Rıza, who rejects the use of violence against Abdülhamit, mentions the weapons of the Bulgarian and Armenian revolutionaries, then the strategy of provocation used by both — in noticing that fortunately, the provocation was not followed by bloody reprisals during the last years. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur comments these texts in saying that later, the idea to use army became stronger among the Young Turks. Nothing in the text or in the comment allows speculating about a specific use of the army against the Armenians, especially for an enterprise of extermination.<sup>178</sup>

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175 Halidé Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal*, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

176 Stanford J. Shaw, "The Resettlement of Refugees in Turkey During World War I and the Turkish War of Independence, 1917-1923," reprinted in *Studies in Ottoman and Turkish History. Life With the Ottomans*, İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000, pp. 471-479; Salâhi R. Sonyel, "How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World in Connection With the Deportations and 'Massacres'," art. cit., pp. 174-175.

177 William L. Langer, *ibid.*; Louise Nalbandian, op. cit.

178 Thank you to Jean-Louis Mattei for the translation of this text, which contains several words of Ottoman Turkish.

The allegation of "premeditation" is especially absurd, since the CUP opened its membership to the non-Muslims, including Armenians. Bedros Halacyan Effendi, elected three times as an Unionist deputy of İstanbul, was "influential in the CUP"<sup>179</sup>, served as Minister of Commerce and Public Works in 1910-1912 and was appointed as representative of the Ottoman Empire to the International Court of Justice of The Hague in March 1915. Oskan Mardikian Effendi was Minister of Post and Telegraph in 1913-1914.<sup>180</sup> A sympathizer of the CUP, Bedros Kapamacyan Effendi, was elected as mayor of Van in 1909, thanks to the support of the Unionists, and eventually assassinated in December 1912 by the Dashnak committee because of his loyalty to the Ottoman State.<sup>181</sup>

Seeming to have forgotten his rational and critical remark of 1992 about the Andonian's material, Taner Akçam wrote in 2008 that a letter of Bahaettin Şakir, quoted in a book of Ahmed Emin Yalman, has important "similarities" with the two letters attributed to Şakir. But Yalman, who was a bitter critique of the government who ruled the Ottoman Empire in 1913-1918 (despite his CUP's membership), did not quote any "letter" in the page indicated by Mr. Akçam, but conveyed a rumor.<sup>182</sup>

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### Sources Distorted: "Confessions" to German Officials

In attempting to find Talat's admission of his criminal designs, Mr. Dadrian alleges "On at least two occasions Talat slipped into the mistake of admitting Ittihad's plan of eradicating the Armenian question by eradicating the Armenians themselves" (p. 327). As evidence, he gives two conversations.

"Talat told Interim Ambassador Hohenhole that the Armenian Question is finished,

179 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 171.

180 Feroz Ahmad, "Young Turk-Armenian Relations During the Second Constitutional Period," in Metin Hülagü (ed.), *Armenians in the Ottoman Society*, Erciyes University, 2006, tome I, p. 330, <http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2007/01/1349-young-turk-armenian-relations.html>

181 Hasan Oktay, "On the Assassination of Van Mayor Kapamacyan by the Tashnak Committee", *Review of Armenian Studies*, I-1, 2002, pp. 79-89, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=Dergiler&IcerikNo=94>; Kapriel Serope Papazian, op. cit., p. 69. For critiques a the "premeditation" allegation by two supporters of the "genocide" label, see Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy," *Past and Present*, n° 181, November 2003, pp. 141-191; and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Reply to My Critics," *Armenian Forum*, I-2, Summer 1998, pp. 131-136.

182 Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in the World War*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1930, p. 220.

is no more (La question arménienne n'existe plus)" (pp. 348-349, n. 36), but Mr. Dadrian reverts purely and simply the sense of Talat's statement in presenting it as a confession of criminal intention:

*"On the 2nd of this month [September 1915], Talaat Bey gave me the German translation of various telegraphic orders on the persecution of the Armenians which he sent to the provincial authorities concerned, copies of which are enclosed. With these, he wished to deliver proof that the central government is seriously attempting to end the riots, which have taken place against the Armenians in the heart of the country and to see to it that those who have been deported receive provisions during transport. A few days earlier, in reference to this, Talaat Bey said to me, 'La question arménienne n'existe plus.' ('The Armenian question no longer exists.')*"<sup>183</sup>

Writing to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 14 and September 25, 1915 Hohenhole denied that Talat Pasha was deceiving his Western interlocutors in affirming that he exempted families of soldiers, artisans, Catholic and Protestant Armenians. The German Ambassador considered that these exemptions were not respected by some local officials, especially in Adana.<sup>184</sup> Hohenhole's conclusion is supported the following events: the US Consul Nathan reported on October 30, 1915, that "three rabid members of the Union and Progress Committee of Adana were expelled from that city because of the manner in which they were hounding the Armenians out of the city" and on November 6 that the order to stop any further deportations had been arrived.<sup>185</sup>

In addition, Mr. Dadrian makes a highly questionable interpretation of the statement made by Talat to Mordtmann, and reported on June 17, 1915: "he intended to get rid Turkey's 'internal foes' by 'taking advantage of the war'" (p. 348, n. 36). What Talat meant can be interpreted only in its full context. Mordtmann's reports themselves contain indications on this context, especially his report of May 7, 1915, based on the findings of the German Consul in Adana — a Consul who seems a very good source according to Mr. Dadrian (p. 349, n. 38). Mordtmann explained that in this town, bombs were discovered in the houses of Armenians, after the accidental explosion of one of them.<sup>186</sup> So, it appears that Talat wanted to eliminate the Armenian terrorists and to relocate the other Armenians of eastern Anatolia in places where they would be no more under the influence of Russian agents — as explained clearly by the

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183 Document published by Wolfgang Gust:  
<http://www.armenocide.de/armenocide/armgende.nsf/24599fab3538b532c1257794007b610b/300f11530a3eacfd1256d3d006c1e43!OpenDocument> Ironically, the translation was "sponsored by the Zoryan Institute".

184 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 185 and 231.

185 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 186.

186 Cem Özgönül, op. cit., p. 150-151.

German General F. Bronsart von Schellendorf.<sup>187</sup> Other sources on the Armenian insurrections and terrorism are discussed below.

Mr. Dadrian finishes his article (p. 343) in referring to three quotations of the *Memoirs of Bernstorff*, which are supposed to corroborate the "genocide" allegation in general and the guilty of Talat in particular. Mr. Dadrian distorts seriously two (precisely those who are presented as almost confessions) and the third is an unreliable opinion on the situation in Eastern Anatolia. I devoted a previous article to the misuse of Bernstorff's book.<sup>188</sup>

Mr. Dadrian considers apparently Paul von Wolff-Metternich as a reliable source, free of anti-Turkish prejudice, and raises no doubt about the accuracy of von Wolff-Metternich's testimony against Talat (pp. 327, 343, p. 349, n. 37, p. 356, n. 104). Hans Human, Marine's attaché of the German embassy in İstanbul gave a very different picture (my emphasis):

*"The Minister of Internal Affairs, Talat Pasha, said that in no occasion he exchanged more than one word with the count Metternich. When they meet them in the room of a third person, he [Talat] leaves the room to avoid to see [Metternich]. Metternich is a man who hates the Turks and who wants to harm them. Enver, Talat, Halil, like the Grand Vizier, know that the Ambassador has no concern for the Turks, but only for the enemies of the Turks, those who have ties with the powers which the Ottoman government is fighting, i.e. the Greeks and the Armenians, the Levantines, the Liman's clique."*<sup>189</sup>

Frank G. Weber, a rather pro-Armenian historian as said already, notices that von Wolff-Metternich was openly the reverse of a Turkophile, had many problems with the Ottoman government, "was dogged by ill omens and never gained the position his predecessors achieved".<sup>190</sup> Mr. Dadrian does not explain how a mediocre and highly prejudiced Ambassador, who "in no occasion exchanged more than one word" with Talat Pasha during the weeks preceding his allegation can be a reliable source for Talat's actual intention vis-à-vis the Armenians.

Before that the relations with Talat became so bad, Metternich sent a report, on December 15, 1915, indicating that, following the orders of Talat, more than twenty Muslims were sentenced to death and hanged for crimes against the Armenians; and

187 F. Bronsart von Schellendorf, "Ein Zeugnis Für Talaat Pascha", *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 24, 1921. See also Heath Lowry, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

188 Maxime Gaun, "The Misuse of 'Memoirs of Count Bernstorff' in Armenian Nationalist Publications," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, March 18, 2011, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/402/the-misuse-of-memoirs-of-count-bernstorff-in-armenian-nationalist-publications.html>

189 Cem Özgönül, op. cit., p. 252.

190 Frank G. Weber, op. cit., pp. 159-224 (quotation p. 163).

wrote a telegram of February 10, 1916, favorable to both Enver and Talat, including about the Armenian issue.<sup>191</sup> Nor Mr. Dadrian neither Mr. Ternon makes any comment on these self-contradictions of von Wolff-Metternich.

### Tendentious Interpretations and Hearsays on Şükrü Kaya

To accuse Şükrü Bey (Kaya), director of Migrations, Mr. Dadrian uses second-hand and unconvincing quotations. He quotes the conversation between Şükrü and Rössler, as reported by the late six years after. The director is supposed to have said: “Nous voulons une Arménie sans Arméniens (We want an Armenia without Armenians)” (p. 332). Even in taking Rössler’s assertion as face value — which is not an obligation, as seen before —, this is by no means an evidence of a genocidal intention. Rössler himself explained that in the context of the time, he did not consider it as a declaration of extermination plan. It is only after reading Andonian’s book that Rössler made such a reinterpretation. As we saw already, F. Bronsart von Schellendorff, in an incomparably better position to know the designs of the Ottoman authorities, discerned an idea to relocate the Armenians from eastern Anatolia to Arab lands permanently, for safety reasons, and absolutely not for extermination.

Mr. Dadrian argues also that the *Kölnische Zeitung* “quoted Şükrü as saying ‘As Germany wants only Germans in Germany, we Turks want only Turks’”. Because the correspondent of this newspaper in the Ottoman Empire was Harry Stürmer, who never set foot in Arab provinces or Eastern Anatolia, and was the author of a highly questionable book on Germany, the Ottoman Empire and the Armenians,<sup>192</sup> the accuracy of this quotation is not ascertained. Anyway, since the Wilhelmina Germany, whatever could be its shortcomings, was far to carrying out any genocidal policy on its metropolitan soil, this quotation, even if authentic, is not an evidence of extermination design.

The single explicit allegation looks like a hearsay. It is a conversation reported to Rössler by “a German engineer named Bastendorf”. Şükrü had no reason to confess a secret policy to a simple engineer. Rössler himself contradicted his source in a report of February 14, 1917, where he explained that the Ottoman authorities

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191 Cem Özgönül, op. cit., pp. 245-246; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 111.

192 English version: Harry Stuermer, *Two Years in Constantinople*, New York, George H. Doran, 1917. For instance, Stuermer alleges, pp. 42-43: “I must hold the German Government as equally responsible with the Turks” for the fate of the Armenians, which is false (Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 159-161), and condones *Armenian Atrocities*, i.e. a tendentious propaganda booklet of Arnold J. Toynbee, with a pronounced anti-German bias (William McNeil, *Arnold Toynbee. A Life*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 74). Stuermer charges Enver of pan-Turanist policies (p. 77, 181-187 and passim), which is also false (see n. 28). Stuermer called “emigrants” the Muslim refugees fleeing the massacres in the Balkans and defamed them (“their instability, their idleness and love of wandering, their frivolity, and their extraordinary fanaticism”, p. 168). Despite his insurances, Stuermer does not avoid crudely racist remarks (“The Arabs, intellectually far superior to the Turks, have at last made up their minds to defy their oppressors”, p. 179).

approved a program of aid for the Armenian exiles, distributed by the Consul Jackson<sup>193</sup> — despite that Jackson had a strong pro-Armenian bias and was a bitter, not to say inaccurate in several occasions, critique of CUP government.<sup>194</sup> Nevertheless, the main relevant sources on Şükri's policy are the Ottoman archives, these archives where Mr. Dadrian did never want to work. Many Ottoman documents demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that Şükri had a central role in the distribution of food needed by Armenian exiles and in the punishment of Muslims who attacked Armenians, both as an executioner of Talat's orders and as informant on necessities and misdeeds.<sup>195</sup> In the province of Aleppo alone, where Şükri's office was installed, 56 Muslims were sent to martial-courts for crimes against Armenian exiles during the Spring 1916.<sup>196</sup>

## The External Critique (2): Inventing a "General Extermination" Against an "Impotent Minority"

### Use of Fakes and Unreliable Sources

Among his "evidences" of "extermination", Mr. Dadrian mentions the book of "an Arab", Faiz el-Gusein (pp. 327 and 348, n. 34). Vahakn N. Dadrian wrote his article before than Justin McCarthy demonstrated that el-Gusein was purely and simply a fictional character, invented by the British propaganda: no person of this name, or of similar name, is recorded in the Ottoman archives; since the Wellington House burned its archives at the end of the war, there is no British document on him (such document would had probably explained what British propagandist invented this character), and obviously not the "original Arabic" of the book.<sup>197</sup> But before the analysis of Mr. McCarthy, it was possible to have serious doubts about the reliability of el-Gusein. There are geographical errors, which could not have been committed by an Ottoman official, and absurdities, like conversations of Talat and Enver which el-Gusein, if he really existed, would never had been in a position to listen, especially not from his supposed prison of Diyarbakır.

Mr. Dadrian refers also, as a very valuable source, to *Les Mémoires de M<sup>gr</sup> Jean Naslian* (p. 354, n. 96). The voluminous book of this Catholic bishop, who remained in Istanbul during the whole war, was demonstrated to be less than reliable by the

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193 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 195.

194 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 142.

195 *Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents*, op. cit., tome VIII, pp. 162 and 165; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story...*, op. cit., pp. 73-74 and 85; Şinasi Orel and Sürreya Yuca, op. cit., p. 120; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınoy, p. 259, 311-315, 329, 335, 351, 361, 365.

196 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, op. cit., p. 86.

197 Justin McCarthy, "Wellington House and the Turks," in *The Turks*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002, tome IV, pp. 464-465, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/wellington-house-and-the-turks.en.mfa>

Dashnak author James H. Tashjian, several years before the publication of Vahakn N. Dadrian's article.<sup>198</sup> Even Yves Ternon, generally sympathetic to the ARF, and who praises Mr. Dadrian's article on Andonian, acknowledges that Naslian's Memoirs "contain too many egregious errors to be accepted, apart the personal recollections of the bishop".<sup>199</sup> One of the most obvious "errors" looks like a lie: Naslian attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk a quotation made by another person; G. Guergerian, the first Armenian author who noticed that Atatürk did not make actually this statement, asked to Naslian to correct his Memoirs, but Naslian did not, neither in the original version in French (1951) and nor in the Armenian translation (1960).<sup>200</sup>

Mr. Dadrian does not refrain to take as face value the famous quotation of Adolf Hitler (p. 355, n. 103), which is proven to be apocryphal.<sup>201</sup> In one of his few concessions to the Turkish side, Mr. Ternon himself acknowledged that Prof. Türkkaya Ataöv's criticism against this sentence is "totally justified (tout à fait justifié)".<sup>202</sup> To support his abrupt affirmation, Vahakn N. Dadrian relies on two references. One of them is the article of the German historian Winfried Baumgart, published in 1968. But Winfried Baumgart said actually that the authenticity of this sentence is not sure, and that it could be an interpolation.<sup>203</sup> The second is a short book of Kevork B. Bardakjian, a professor of literature, without degrees or experience in history, and published by the Zoryan Institute, a think-tank whose reader can already have a certain idea with the example given by the methods of Mr. Dadrian.

Mr. Dadrian and Mr. Ternon use also as a very good source the book of Armin T. Wegner on Armenians. The German scholar Martin Tamcke, not exactly a pro-Turkish author, demonstrated conclusively that this book has no historical value, and that Wegner's photographs represent, in the best hypothesis, only a part of the truth — using for his demonstration the proper archives of Wegner and other German documents (including the papers of Lepsius).<sup>204</sup> Tessa Hoffman, who praised for

198 James H. Tashjian, "On a 'Statement' Condemning the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1918, Attributed in Error to Mustafa Kemal, Later 'The Ataturk'," *Armenian Review*, XXXV-3/139, Autumn 1982, pp. 228, 230 and 232-233.

199 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens*, op. cit., p. 397, n. 42.

200 James H. Tashjian, art. cit., p. 230; Türkkaya Ataöv, *Armenian Falsifications*, New York: Okey, 2008, p. 45.

201 "Historian of Armenian Descent Says Frequently Used Hitler Quote is Nothing but a Forgery," *The Armenian Reporter*, August 2, 1984; Türkkaya Ataöv, *Hitler and the Armenian Question*, Ankara, 1984, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/hitler-and-the-armenian-question.en.mfa> ; Michael M. Gunter, *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide*, New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 27-28; Robert John, "Did Hitler Say It?," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1985; Heath Lowry, "The US Congress and the Armenians," *Political Communication and Persuasion*, III-2, 1985, <http://www.ataa.org/reference/hitler-lowry.html> ; Arnold Reisman, "Could the US Holocaust Memorial Museum Have Erred in a Major Exhibit?," Social Science Research Network, December 31, 2010, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1520503](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520503)

202 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens*, op. cit., p. 347.

203 Winfried Baumgart, „Zur Ansprache Hitlers von den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939: Eine Quellenkritische Untersuchung“, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, XVI, 1968, p. 139.

204 Martin Tamcke, *Armin T. Wegner und die Armenier. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit eines Augenzeugen*, Münster: LIT, 1996 (first edition, Göttingen: Cuvillier, 1993). See also Cem Özgönül, op. cit., pp. 284-293.



years the book of Wegner, nuanced her judgment in 1996, recognizing that it suffers of "pathos and passionate exaggeration"<sup>205</sup>, and finally admitted during a meeting with Guenter Lewy (September 2001) that this work is less than reliable.<sup>206</sup>

In his counter-response of 1987 to Michael M. Gunter, Vahakn Dadrian argued that he was not defending, in his article of 1986, the book published by Mevlanzade Rifat in Aleppo in 1929.<sup>207</sup> That is true, but in 1999, he did not refrain to use this obvious falsification as a rather good reference.<sup>208</sup> Even Yves Ternon acknowledges that "one finds in this text so egregious errors that one cannot give to it any credit".<sup>209</sup>

### Sources Distorted

Referring to the book of the journalist Ahmed Emin Yalman on the WWI, Mr. Dadrians asserts (p. 358, n. 109):

*"Referring to the 'policy of general extermination', he described the Ittihadist rationale as follows: 'A dense Armenian population in the Eastern Provinces has proved to be a danger to the very existence of Turkey... [T]he instruments to remove this danger... shall be universally despised and condemned. Only in a very distant future' would this sacrifice for the national cause appreciated."*

Actually, Yalman was just reproducing a hearsay: "Those who put forward the policy of general extermination were said to take this stand."<sup>210</sup> Yalman does not give any reference for this rumor, and not a single evidence of any "policy of general extermination". Even more problematically for the use of Yalman by Mr. Dadrian, this author mentions, in the same book, the Armenian rebellion at Van, the "thousands of organized revolutionaries and daring fights well armed with modern rifles", who "constituted a great military danger. He speaks of the "massacre" of the "Mohammedan population" — who "was entirely defenseless" — by the men of Garegin Pasdermadjian, former deputy of Erzurum who left to Russia in 1914 and organized the recruitment of Armenian volunteers in Russian army. Yalman concludes that "some measures of precaution were certainly justified",<sup>211</sup> in complete

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205 Tessa Hoffman, *Armin T. Wegner: Writer, Eyewitness and Photographer of the Armenian Genocide*, Yerevan: Arpaqa, 1996, p. 7.

206 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 304, n. 22.

207 "Dadrian Response to Gunter," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XIX-4, November 1987, p. 524.

208 Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Convergent Roles of the State and the Party in the Armenian Genocide," in Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian (ed.), *Studies in Comparative Genocide*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, p. 100.

209 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens...*, op. cit., p. 389, n. 45. For a detailed analysis, see Gwynne Dyer, art. cit. pp. 379-382.

210 Ahmed Emin Yalman, op. cit., p. 220.

211 Ahmed Emin (Yalman), op. cit., pp. 218-219.

contradiction the Andonian material. Unlike the hearsays who he reproduces on unnamed Ottoman leaders, Yalman's remarks about the Armenian revolutionary activities are corroborated by many valuable sources.<sup>212</sup>

Similarly, Mr. Dadrian relies on two ciphers of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, dated of November 1916 (pp. 341 and 358, n. 110). It has not been possible, for the moment, to check if Mr. Dadrian reserved the same fate to these documents than to the account of the discussion between Hohenhole and Talat, but it is at least achievable to notice that the same Lansing wrote to President Woodrow Wilson, also in November 1916 (my emphasis):

*“The well-known disloyalty of the Armenians to the Ottoman government and the fact that the territory which they inhabited was within the zone of military operations constituted grounds more or less for compelling them to depart their homes. It was not to my mind the deportation which was objectionable, but the horrible brutality which attended its execution.”*<sup>213</sup>

It is so logically impossible to use Lansing as a corroborating source for the Andonian material, since Lansing refers unequivocally to the Armenian insurrections, and justify the displacements themselves.

Even more surprising is the distortion of Bernard Lewis' meaning (p. 355, n. 96): “the noted scholar Bernard Lewis, presumably in recognition of the practice of burning alive, saw fit to describe the Armenian experience as ‘the terrible holocaust of 1916, when a million and a half Armenians perished (*The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Toronto, New York, 1961, p. 350)”. There is absolutely no basis to “presume” that Prof. Lewis supported the “practice of burning alive” allegation (supported, in Mr. Dadrian's article, by Naslian's book and similar hearsays); and, one more time, Mr. Dadrian eliminates the most relevant part of his source. In the preceding lines, Bernard Lewis wrote (my emphasis):

*“For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, however reluctantly, withdraw, abandoning distant provinces and bringing the Imperial frontier nearer home. But the Armenians, stretching across*

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212 For the case of Van, see, among others: *Aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens, avant et après la proclamation de la Constitution ottomane*, İstanbul, 1917, pp. 261-301 ; Hüseyin Çelik, “The 1915 Armenian Revolt in Van: Eyewitness Testimony,” in Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Armenians...*, op. cit., pp. 87-108, <http://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobi/e-library/TheArmenians/RevoltInVan.pdf>; *Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, Ankara, tome II, 1983, pp. 13 and 44-54 ; Edward J. Erickson, “The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy”, art. cit., pp. 153-155 ; Kâmuran Gürün, op. cit., pp. 239-242 ; *Armenian Activities...*, op. cit., tome I, pp. 32-33, 65-70, 75-76, 89-95 109-121, 124-125, 128-129 and passim ; Maurice Larcher, op. cit., p. 395; Justin McCarthy and alii, op. cit., pp. 180-266 et 277-281 ; Hikmet Özdemir et Yusuf Sarıay, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

213 Yücel Güçlü, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

*Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland-and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state. Turkish and Armenian villages, inextricably mixed, had for centuries lived in neighbourly association. Now a desperate struggle between them began-a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland..."*

Such remarks are obviously in contradiction with the Andonian material. In the second edition, published in 1968, i.e. 18 years before the article of Mr. Dadrian, Prof. Lewis changed "holocaust" into "slaughter", added "according to estimates" before "a million and a half Armenians perished", in addition to "as well as an unknown number of Turks" after. In the third edition, he changed "one million and half" to "one million" (always "according to estimates").<sup>214</sup>

*The highly selective use of sources by Vahakn N. Dadrian is a well-known fact, explained by both Turkish and some pro-Armenian historians.*

Before the publication of Mr. Dadrian's article, Mr. Lewis had already criticized the "Armenian genocide" label, signing the petition of 1985, and devoting some lines to the Armenian issue (against the "genocide" charge) in a book published the next year.<sup>215</sup> It is barely needed to say that Bernard Lewis reiterated several times his contra-genocide views.<sup>216</sup>

### Selections of Western Sources

The highly selective use of sources by Vahakn N. Dadrian is a well-known fact, explained by both Turkish and some pro-Armenian historians,<sup>217</sup> and up to this point of the article, the reader has already seen some examples. But the list is not finished.

Mr. Dadrian asserts that "in a 22-pages report [Ernst] Jäckh, a key promoter of friendship ties with Turkey, describes Talat's 'unabashed sense of political relief over the destruction of the Armenian people'" (p. 349, n. 36). The report is not entirely

<sup>214</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence...*, op cit., p. 356.

<sup>215</sup> Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice*, New York-London: W.W. Norton and C<sup>o</sup>, 1986, p. 21.

<sup>216</sup> «Les explications de Bernard Lewis», *Le Monde*, January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1994 ; Haaretz, January 23, 1998 ; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qG70UWESfu4>; Bruce Fein, "Armenia Crime Amnesia?" *The Washington Times*, October 16, 2007, [http://www.turkishcoalition.org/media/fein\\_wt.pdf](http://www.turkishcoalition.org/media/fein_wt.pdf)

<sup>217</sup> See, among others: Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Armenian Question. Conflict, Trauma and Objectivity*, Ankara: SAM Papers, 1997, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/SamPaperNo199.pdf> ; Hilmar Kaiser, "Germany and the Armenian Genocide: A Review Essay," *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, VIII, 1995, pp. 127-142; id., "Germany and the Armenian Genocide: Reply to Vahakn N. Dadrian's Response", *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, IX, 1996, pp. 135-140.

devoted to the Armenians, far from that, and it contains several parts in clear contradiction with Andonian's book, above all the allegations against Germany and the assertion of "unprovoked massacres":

*"On the Armenian question, Enver maintains the concern for Ottoman Empire's needed security against an Armenian revolution, which erupted behind the Turkish troops (eine armenische Revolution, die im Rücken der türkischen Truppen ausgebrochen war). [...]"*

*Against the Turkish government and against Germany, the French corrupted the Levantines, the Armenian layer (who held the Germany responsible of the Armenian persecution) and the Arab population, particularly the Christian (in French and English training services)."*

Supporting his conclusions only by Western and Armenian sources, Jäck wrote later that "from the Turks' point of view, the Armenian revolutionaries, citizens of the Ottoman Empire, played the role of a 'fifth column' more than twenty years before that term was coined during the Spanish Civil War."<sup>218</sup>

In his report of 1915, Jäckh does not give any source for Talat's "unabashed sense of political relief" and is laconic on the "destruction of the Armenian people". Both allegations are seriously contested by the proper archives and later statements of Jäckh. Jäckh received a letter from the Armenian plenipotentiary in Berlin, Dr. Greenfield, on November 29, 1916 (my emphasis):

*"I learned from Dr. Lepsius that you have succeeded in saving all the Armenian families in Konya as well as in Cilicia and Syria the relatives of Missirian, Boghossian, Adamian and Atayan by your intervention with Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha and General Djemal Pasha respectively. I feel I must thank you for all you are doing for the Armenian cause. It is indeed unique to be able to depend on the humanity of someone who has the confidence of both your Turkish friends and our Armenian representatives."*<sup>219</sup>

Mr. Dadrian refers (p. 352) to a report of Alexandrette (İskenderun) Consul Hermann Hoffmann as an excellent source to prove the "extermination process" and the "defensive nature" of the insurrections in "Zeytun (Süleymanlı), Funducak, Urfa and Musa Dağ". This report is totally inaccurate, informing us on the prejudices of its author instead to inform us about the historical facts. To challenge the charge of "extermination process", it is not necessary to look outside of the files of Hoffmann

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<sup>218</sup> Ernest Jackh (Ernst Jäckh), op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>219</sup> Ernest Jackh (Ernst Jäckh), op. cit., p. 44, n. 7. See also Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarinay, op. cit., p. 345, 355 and 385.

himself: as far as Spring 1916, he reported that he used German money to help Armenian deportees, without being prevented in his relief work by the Ottoman authorities.<sup>220</sup>

Consul Rössler, despite his strong pro-Armenian bias, wrote that in organizing uprisings in Cilicia during the year 1915, "the Armenians themselves were to blame for causing the outbreak of fighting."<sup>221</sup> In a previous report, Rössler mentioned "insurrectional" activities around Zeytun.<sup>222</sup> The Austrian counterpart of Rössler in Aleppo blamed the Great Power to have incited the Christians to uprisings, and said also that the rumors of bloody massacre have few credibility (*wenig Glauben*).<sup>223</sup> The rebellion in Zeytun — a city with a strong tradition of Armenian revolutionary activities and revolts<sup>224</sup> — started in August 1914, increased in January-February 1915, and the displacement of the Armenian population of this town was an ad hoc measure in reaction to the revolt and which was not immediately followed by a mass displacement from other regions.<sup>225</sup> The uprising of Urfa broke up despite that the city was initially exempted from forced displacement; and the strong measures of the Ottoman State, whatever could be their brutality, were only reactions to the insurrection.<sup>226</sup> The insurgency of Musa Dağ appears in both Western and Ottoman sources as a revolt prepared as early as 1914 rather than a desperate self-defense action.<sup>227</sup> Mr. Dadrian avoids to deal with the biggest Armenian revolt of 1915, the insurrection of Van. So, he can present the assassination of the Dashnak deputy Arshak Vramian as an episode of "genocide" (p. 337). Vramian was actually one of the leaders of the insurrection.<sup>228</sup>

Mr. Dadrian relies also (p. 349, n. 37) to a report sent by Johann Pallavicini, Austrian-

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220 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 195.

221 Quoted in Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire...*, op. cit., tome II, p. 881.

222 Document published and translated by Wolfgang Gust:  
[http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1915-04-12-DE-001](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-04-12-DE-001)

223 İnanç Atılğan and Garabet Moundjian (ed.), *Archival Documents of the Viennese Armenian-Turkish Platform*, Klagenfurt-Vienna-Ljubljana-Sarajevo: Wieser Verlag, 2009, pp. 370-373.

224 See, among others: Aghassi (Garabet Tursargisian), *Zeïtoun, depuis les origines jusqu'à l'insurrection de 1895*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1895 <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5855106p> ; Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1963, pp. 66-78, 126-128 and 165, <http://www.ucpress.edu/op.php?isbn=9780520009141>

225 *Aspirations...*, op. cit., pp. 222-226; Arthur Beylerian, (éd.), *Les Grandes Puissances, l'Empire ottoman et les Arméniens dans les archives françaises (1914-1918)*, Paris : université de Paris-I, 1983, p. 7; *Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, op. cit., tome I, p. 5; Gwynne Dyer, "Correspondence," *Middle Eastern Studies*, IX-3, 1973, p. 383; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts...*, op. cit., pp. 47-48 and 58-60 ; Yusuf Sarıнай (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyancıları*, Ankara, 2009, tome IV, pp. 88-90, 105-108, 113-15; George Abel Schreiner, *From Berlin to Bagdad: Behind the Scenes in the Near East*, New York-London: Harper & Brothers, 1918, pp. 197-198 ; Azmi Süslü, *Armenians and the 1915 Event of Displacement*, Ankara: Yüzyüncü Yıl University Rectorship Publications, 1994, p. 68.

226 İnanç Atılğan and Garabet Moundjian, op. cit., pp. 270-273; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts...*, op. cit., p. 69; Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 198-203; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıнай, op. cit., p. 229 ; Yusuf Sarıнай, op. cit., pp. 127-128 and 138-151; Azmi Süslü, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

227 Edward J. Erickson, "Bayonets on Musa Dagh", art. cit.

228 Justin McCarthy and alii, op. cit., pp. 165-166, 182 and 200-201.

Hungarian Ambassador, on September 8, 1915. This text<sup>229</sup> is one of Pallavicini's most inaccurate ones. For example, he asserted that the Armenian population in relocation towns could not constitute more than 5 % of the population. Actually, the limit was 10 %.<sup>230</sup> Other reports of Pallavicini are much closer to the truth, mentioning Armenian rebellions and "large-scale massacres of Turks" by Armenians.<sup>231</sup> Even more importantly, in a report dated of September 29, 1917, Karl von und zu Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian-Hungarian chargé d'affaires commented favorably a speech of Talat Pasha. Trauttmansdorff concluded that the Ottoman Empire was right at least for the principle of the forced displacement, which was decided because, the insurrectional activities of the Armenian committees.<sup>232</sup> To insinuate, as does Mr. Dadrian, that the Austria-Hungary's diplomatic archives support mostly the allegation an unprovoked "genocide" is just false.

Mr. Dadrian relies (pp. 311 and 343, n. 1), to Arnold J. Toynbee. To decide if Toynbee reversed entirely or not his minds about the Turkish-Armenian conflict is beyond the limits of this article. It will be sufficient to notice that he changed on at least some important points, which prevent to use him as a corroboration of the Andonian material. Toynbee asserted in 1915 that "All this horror, both the concerted crime and its local embellishments, was inflicted upon the Armenians without a shadow of provocation."<sup>233</sup> As early as 1922, Toynbee wrote that "it is quite possible that (as the Turks allege) there was similar provocation for the atrocities against the Armenians in 1915" and that the Turkish crimes "are undoubtedly exaggerated in the popular Western denunciations, and the similar crimes by Near Eastern Christians in parallel situations are almost always passed over silence."<sup>234</sup> In a letter of 1966, he said that the displacement in itself — not the conditions — was a "legitimate" measure,<sup>235</sup> and reiterated in his Memoirs, one year later, that:

*"These [...] Armenian political aspirations had not been legitimate [...] Their aspirations did not merely threaten to break up the Turkish Empire; they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself."*<sup>236</sup>

229 İnanç Atılğan and Garabet Moundjian, pp. 480-484.

230 Kâmuran Gürün, op. cit., p. 243; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarıay, op. cit., p. 69.

231 İnanç Atılğan and Garabet Moundjian, op. cit., pp. 166-170, 240-242 and 280-281 (see also pp. 186-188 the report of the Consul in Trabzon); Artem Ohanjanian (ed.), Österreich-Armenien, 1872-1936: Faksimilesammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke, Vienna, 1995, tome VI, p. 4675.

232 İnanç Atılğan and Garabet Moundjian, op. cit., pp. 796-805.

233 Arnold J. Toynbee, *Armenian Atrocities. The Murder of a Nation*, London-New York-Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915, p. 69  
<http://ia600400.us.archive.org/20/items/armenianatrociti00toyn/armenianatrociti00toyn.pdf>

234 *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, London-Bombay-Sydney: Constable & C<sup>o</sup>, 1922, pp. 276 and 354. See also pp. VII-VIII.  
<http://www.archive.org/download/westernquestioni00toynrich/westernquestioni00toynrich.pdf>

235 <http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/pics/professors/toynbee-files/1-toynbee-etmekjian-1966.JPG>

236 Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 241.

Such post-WWI statements contradict at least a substantial part of the Andonian material; but even in the Blue Book, despite the numerous shortcomings of this work<sup>237</sup> — shortcomings which Toynbee acknowledged later, in 1957 and 1959, according to Stanford J. Shaw and Robert F. Zeidner<sup>238</sup> — there is at least one report, written by the missionary Mary L. Graffam, which denies explicitly that the government or top-rank officials were involved in any criminal acts against the Armenian population.<sup>239</sup>

Mr. Dadrian fails to discuss any of these points and so misrepresents, one more time, his Western sources.

More generally, Mr. Dadrian avoids discussing any Western source which challenges the charge of a "general extermination" ordered by the central Ottoman authorities, especially the journalists Gustav H. Pravitz, George Abel Schreiner and Stefan Steiner, who travelled in Anatolia and, in the case of the first, in the Arab provinces<sup>240</sup> and the German Consul in Trabzon Heinrich Bergfeld.<sup>241</sup>

### The number of victims: confusion and distortion

Wanting to persuade his reader that the majority of the Armenian population was assassinated, Mr. Dadrian gives the figure of 800,000, given by the Ottoman Ministry of Interior in 1919 (p. 342). It has been explained already of the very little credibility of this government, which wanted to demonize by all ways —including the most unfair — its predecessor and any critiques. Mr. Dadrian gives no documentary evidence establishing that the figure of 800,000 was the conclusion of any serious investigation. He gives also second-hand and third-hand rumors about the figure of one million (p. 359, n. 111).

In fact, the most careful studies indicate that the total losses of the Armenian population from 1914 to the beginning of the 1920's are about 600-650,000 individuals.<sup>242</sup> Some Armenian authors, like Levon Marashlian and Raymond

237 Justin McCarthy, "Wellington House and the Turks", art. cit., pp. 460-463; Hikmet Özdemiş, *Arnold Toynbee'nin Ermeni Sorununa Bakışı*, Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Forumu, 2005; James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda. 1914-1919*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press/Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 221-222; Ahmed Rüstem Bey, *La Guerre mondiale et la question turco-arménienne*, Berne: Stämpfli & Cie, 1918, pp. 95-132 <http://www.archive.org/download/laguerremondiale00ahmeuoft/laguerremondiale00ahmeuoft.pdf>

238 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire...*, op. cit., tome I, p. 62, n. 21.

239 *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, London-New York-Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916, pp. 306-308. See also İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian, op. cit., pp. 500-511.

240 Gustav H. Pravitz, "Armeniernas läge", *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, April 23, 1917; George Abel Schreiner, op. cit., pp. 124-125; Stefan Steiner, "Armenien", *Algemeen Handelsblad*, 25 mai 1920.

241 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 145-146 and 231; İnanç Atılgan and Garabet Moumdjian, op. cit., pp. 332-335.

242 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 236-239; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, op. cit., pp. 121-130; id., "The Population of the Ottoman Armenians," in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians*, op. cit., pp. 65-78, <http://web.itu.edu.tr/~altilar/tobile-library/TheArmenians/Population.pdf>

Kévorkian, took argument of the figure of around 1,900,000 Armenians, estimated by the patriarchate on the eve of WWI, to defend higher losses.<sup>243</sup> But if this estimation is accepted as face value (which is questionable), the simple logic implies to accept also the number of survivors estimated by the same patriarchate at the end of 1918, and assumed by the Armenian delegation in Paris: 1,260,000.<sup>244</sup> In 1919, the Armenian National Council gave a similar estimation: 1,250,000.<sup>245</sup>

In considering that about 150,000 Ottoman Armenians perished during the displacement by the Russian army in 1915-1916, dozens of thousands (refugees) by epidemics in Armenia in 1918-1919, probably dozens of thousands others during the military battles (within or against the Ottoman army) and between 2 and 3,000 were dead during the displacement by the French army in Cilicia (1920),<sup>246</sup> it is safe to conclude that the global estimation of Boghos Nubar Pasha in December 1918 (around 300,000 Armenian who died because the displacement by the Ottoman forces, on a total of perhaps 700,000 exiled)<sup>247</sup> is very close to truth.

*The most careful studies indicate that the total losses of the Armenian population from 1914 to the beginning of the 1920's are about 600-650,000 individuals.*

As a result, the mortality rate represents around 37-41% of the total pre-war Armenian population and more than 40 % for the displaced Armenians. Such figures are obviously high, but in themselves by no means exceptional for this place and time. From 1914 to 1919, more than 43% (701,166 on 1,604,031) of the Muslim refugees fleeing (from eastern Anatolia and Caucasus) the war crimes of Russians and Armenians perished of hunger, disease or massacre.<sup>248</sup> The demographic losses of the Muslim Anatolians represent at least 18 % of the pre-war population — 62 % in the province of Van, 42 % in Bitlis,<sup>249</sup> which had both a strong Armenian minority until 1915, including a large number of insurgents. The mortality rate of the Armenians displaced by the Russian army was, according to the Richard G. Hovannisian's figures, around 50% — which would mean that the Ottoman displacement was

243 Raymond H. Kévorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian, *Les Arméniens dans l'Empire ottoman à la veille du génocide*, Paris, 1992. The figure in 1913 was 1,915,000; in 1912, 1,845,000. The second estimation was assumed by Johannes Lepsius (*Procès*, op. cit., p. 118) and Christopher Walker (*Armenia. The Survival of a Nation*, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 230 [http://armenia-survival.50megs.com/Survival\\_Ch\\_7.htm](http://armenia-survival.50megs.com/Survival_Ch_7.htm)).

244 Alexander Anastasius Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After (1915-1922)*, London: Methuen & Co., 1934.

245 Georges Mesrop, *L'Arménie au point de vue géographique, historique, ethnographique, statistique et culturel*, Istanbul : Conseil Consultatif national arménien, 1919, p. 81.

246 Georges Boudière, « Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cilicie. L'affaire de Maras (janvier-février 1920) », *Turcica IX/2-X*, 1978, p. 160; Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road...*, p. 67; id. *The Republic of Armenia. The First Year, 1918-1919*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1971, p. 130 (gives the figure of around 200,000 victims of epidemics in 1918-1919, Russian Armenians, Ottoman Armenian refugees and non-Christian minorities confused).

247 <http://www.ttk.org.tr/templates/resimler/Image/ErmeniArsivBelgeler/belge5.jpg>

248 Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, op. cit., tome II, p. 993.

249 Justin McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 133-137.



proportionally a bit less costly in human life, despite the certified cases of massacres. The epidemics and famine killed huge numbers of people among every Ottoman population, and the massacre was not at all the exclusivity of only one side.<sup>250</sup>

Actually, the specificity of the Ottoman Armenians' tragedy is that they disappeared as an ethnic community from large parts of Anatolia, unlike the Muslims; but the main reason of this specificity is the foolish policy of the Armenian nationalists, followed until 1922,<sup>251</sup> not any "plan of general extermination" designed by the CUP.

### The Burning of İzmir: An Irrelevant Allegation without Source

Searching to put the blame on the Turks on every occasion, Mr. Dadrian writes that Abdülhalik "was promptly appointed Governor of İzmir in the wake of the capture, sacking and burning of that port city in 1922", without giving any reference to support his allegations. The "sack" is a myth, at least if it is attributed to the regular Turkish army, and the charge that it was Turks who burned the city is a more than questionable assertion. Numerous American, British, Jewish and Turkish sources demonstrate that the responsibility is not Turkish but Greek and/or Armenian.<sup>252</sup> The painstaking investigations of the French officials — Consul Graillet, Admiral Dumesnil and their associates — came to the same conclusion, and added that the conduct of the Turkish army was fair: the soldiers did not pillage, did their best to extinguish the fire, and severely punished the Muslim irregulars who committed crimes (mostly pillages) against Christians.<sup>253</sup> The engineer C. Toureille corroborated

250 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., pp. 53-62, 97-98, 116-122 and 250; Justin McCarthy and alii, op. cit., pp. 233-257 and 279-281; Hikmet Özdemir, *The Ottoman Army, 1914-1918. Disease and Death on the Battlefield*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2008.

251 Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettre du ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17785; Hüseyin Çelik, art. cit., pp. 95-96; Yücel Güçlü, op. cit., pp. 143-200, relying on Western and Armenian sources. For other examples of Armenian regrets and self-criticism, see also Abraham H. Hartunian, *Neither to Laugh nor to Weep: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide*, Cambridge (MA): Armenian Heritage Press, 1986, p. 190 (first English edition, 1968); Hovannes Katchaznouni, op. cit.; Donald E. Miller et Lorna Touryan Miller, "Armenian Survivors: A Typological Analysis of Victim Response," *Oral History Review*, X-1, 1982, pp. 63-64.

252 "A Missionary Eyewitness Lays the Blame on the Armenians," *The Times*, September 25, 1922; "Armenians, not Turks Set Smyrna Ablaze Relief Worker Declares," *The San Antonio Express*, January 22, 1923; Türkkaya Ataöv, *Armenian Falsifications*, op. cit., pp. 109-123; Florence Gilliam and Arthur Moss, "The Turkish Myth," *The Nation*, June 13, 1923; Lord Kinross, *Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Turkey*, New York: William Morrow & C°, 1965, pp. 365-375; Heath Lowry, "Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will it Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, IX, 1988; Jean Méliá, *Mustapha Kémal ou la rénovation de la Turquie*, Paris: Fasquelle, 1929, p. 31; Henri Nahum (ed.), *La Grande Guerre et la guerre gréco-turque vue par les instituteurs de l'Alliance israélite universelle d'Izmir*, Istanbul : Les éditions Isis, 2003, pp. 68 and 71; E. Alexander Powell, *The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia*, New York: The Century C°, 1923, pp. 32-33; Jeremy Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 2008, pp. 77-78; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire...*, op. cit., tome IV, pp. 1722-1739; Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Turkey's Struggle for Liberation and the Armenians*, Ankara: SAM Papers, 2001, pp. 206-207. See also Willy Sperco, op. cit., pp. 81-84.

253 Amiral Dumesnil à Marine, 16 septembre 1922 ; Amiral Dumesnil, rapport, 28 septembre ; Graillet au ministère, 22, 26 septembre 1922 ; Général Pellé au ministère, 15, 17, 23 septembre 1922 ; télégramme chiffré du ministère au chargé d'affaires à Washington, 26 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

fully the allegations against Greeks and Armenians.<sup>254</sup> These conclusions are especially credible, since the Greek army and its Armenian volunteers burned systematically the cities and villages of Western Anatolia, except when a Western intervention prevented it.<sup>255</sup> The intrigues of some Armenians to excite — this time in vain — the Greek authorities occupying İzmir against the Turks, at the end of 1920,<sup>256</sup> suggests also an Armenian origin of the fire — not incompatible with Greek firings, some hours after.

Nevertheless, the Kemalist movement was by no means hostile to the non-Muslims in general, and was supported, not only by most of the Turkish Jews, but also by a part of Istanbul's Armenians, the most famous being Berç Keresteciyan (1870-1949), future deputy to the Turkish National Assembly from 1935 to 1947.<sup>257</sup>

*The Kemalist movement was by no means hostile to the non-Muslims in general, and was supported, not only by most of the Turkish Jews, but also by a part of Istanbul's Armenians,*

### Conclusion: Warrant for Terrorism

This analysis illustrates the previous judgment of several scholars. Malcolm E. Yapp noticed that Vahakn N. Dadrian is “obsessed by his theory”.<sup>258</sup> Mary Schaeffer Conroy observed that he “relies too much on theory and educated guesses and too little on facts or Turkish archival sources.”<sup>259</sup> Guenter Lewy demonstrated conclusively that “Many Armenian scholars use selective evidence or otherwise distort the historical record, but V. N.

Dadrian is in a class by himself. His violations of scholarly ethics, which I document in my book, are so numerous as to destroy his scholarly credentials.”<sup>260</sup> Mr. Dadrian's attempt to save Aram Andonian's forgeries — and the publications which copy without critique these logical fallacies — typify such a non-scholar, unethical treatment of history, by the usage of other falsifications, or the fabrication of misleading arguments. The judgment of Prof. Xavier de Planhol, one of the best

254 Incendie de Smyrne par les Grecs et les Arméniens, 3 novembre 1922, *ibid.*

255 Elzéar Guiffray, administrateur délégué de la Société des quais de Smyrne, au ministère, 27 juillet 1922 ; Télégramme de l'ambassadeur de France à Londres au ministère, 12 septembre 1922 ; Pellé au ministère, 13 septembre 1922 ; télégramme chiffré du ministère aux ambassadeurs français à Rome, Londres, Washington et Athènes, 5 octobre 1922 ; rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, septembre 1922 ; ambassadeur à Athènes au ministère, 3 mai 1923 ; AMAE, P 1380.

256 S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, 16674.

257 Mim Kemal Öke, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-202 and 210-216; *id.* “The Response of the Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’ (1919-1926),” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-88; Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire...*, *op. cit.*, tome III-1, p. 1050.

258 Malcolm E. Yapp, *art. cit.*

259 Mary Schaeffer Conroy, *art. cit.*

260 “No Evidence of Ottoman Intent to Destroy Armenian Community,” *Today's Zaman*, April 24, 2006, [http://www.todayzaman.com/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=32399](http://www.todayzaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=32399) ; Guenter Lewy, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-89, 94 and 160-161.

specialists of Turkish studies, seems to have been written to describe Mr. Dadrian's publications: "The 'Armenian question' is the topic of a huge literature [...] which contains frequently considerable historical distortions, which takes away any value to it".<sup>261</sup>

"The noted scholar Bernard Lewis", to use Vahagn N. Dadrian's proper words, places the Andonian "telegrams" in the same category of forgeries than the *Protocols of the Elder of Zion*.<sup>262</sup> The Protocols were called "warrant for genocide". The Andonian material could be called appropriately "warrant for terrorism" because of its use to justify terrorist acts, from the assassination of Talat by S. Tehlirian to the more recent crimes of JCAG/ARA and ASALA. Aram Andonian glorified Tehlirian in an article published in 1946.<sup>263</sup>

Significantly, Mr. Dadrian avoids to call "terrorist" both Tehlirian and the assassin of Yılmaz Çolpan, counselor of the Turkish embassy in Paris, murdered on the Champs-Élysées in 1979 by JCAG/ARA (p. 359, n. 112), like for the victims of Nemesis terrorists (p. 350, n. 51, p. 359, n. 113). Mr. Dadrian participated several times in political meetings of the ARF,<sup>264</sup> i.e. the party which created and controlled the JCAG/ARA and, before, Nemesis.<sup>265</sup> Forgetting that Mr. Dadrian was deprived since several years of his professorship title, Roxanne Makasdjian, spokesperson of the Armenian National Committee (ANC) said in San Francisco: "Prof. Dadrian and those few like him are our precious intellectual soldiers of truth."<sup>266</sup> A branch of the ARF, the ANC gave an unconditional — moral and material — support to the JCAG/ARA.<sup>267</sup> Mr. Dadrian cannot ignore that.

Mr. Balakian, who transposed in popular essays Mr. Dadrian's main arguments, praises a lot the terrorists of Nemesis, is not far to excuse the assassinations of Turkish diplomats by ASALA and JCAG/ARA and does not say a single word about the Orly attack and other bombings of this kind.<sup>268</sup> Mr. Teron was a witness of

261 Xavier de Planhol, *Minorités en Islam. Géographie politique et sociale*, Paris: Flammarion, 1997, p. 450, n. 144.

262 Bernard Lewis, *From Babel to Dragomans. Interpreting the Middle East*, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 389; reed. London: Phoenix Paperbacks, 2005, p. 480.

263 Aram Andonian, *Exile, Trauma and Death. On the Road to Chankiri with Komitas Vartabed*, London: Gomidas Institute/Tekeyan Cultural Association/Taderon Press, 2010, p. 2 (translated from Armenian by Rita Soulahian Kuyumjian).

264 For example: [http://www.anca.org/press\\_releases/press\\_releases\\_print.php?prid=318](http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases_print.php?prid=318)

265 Michael M. Gunter, "Pursuing...", op. cit., pp. 29-30 and 55-65; Gaïdz Minassian, *Guerre et terrorisme arméniens. 1972-1998*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002, pp. 28-29 32-34, 42, 70, 73, 77, 81, 90-93, 105-109 and passim; Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 61-62.

266 <http://www.ancof.org/pressreleases/1999/01311999.htm>

267 Michael M. Gunter, "Pursuing...", op. cit., p. 99; *The Armenian Weekly*, January 14, 1984; Asbarez, September 16, 2000.

268 Peter Balakian, op. cit., pp. 345 and 380. For similar praising of the Nemesis terrorist acts, see Edward Alexander, *A Crime of Vengeance. An Armenian Struggle for Justice*, New York-Toronto: The Free Press/MacMillan, 1991; Michael Bobelian, *Children of Armenia*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. 52-64; Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge*, New Brunswick-London: Transaction Books, 1990; "2000 Remember Tehlirian Renew Commitment for Justice," *Asbarez*, March 18, 2002, <http://asbarez.com/46564/2000-remember-tehlirian-renew-commitment-to-justice/>

defense for Armenian terrorists, as explained in the introduction. He used not only the Andonian material, but also, in 1984, a fake quotation of Atatürk,<sup>269</sup> despite that it was proven to be a forgery as early as 1982 by James H. Tashjian, as explained above.

In a painstaking study of the support enjoyed by Armenian terrorists of 1970's and 1980's, Heath W. Lowry concluded pertinently, in 1984:

*"History does in fact contain lessons for today. It explains how the failure of the Armenian community to openly condemn the Armenian terrorism of the 1920's [assassinations of Turkish and Azerbaijani ex-leaders] has contributed to the 'current round' of terrorist activities, and, it suggests that the Armenian failure to condemn today's terrorism, will guarantee yet another 'round' in the coming generation."*<sup>270</sup>

It is exactly what happened with the wave of terrorism against Azerbaijan (1988-1994), in the context of the aggression of Azerbaijan by Armenia.<sup>271</sup>

The needed scholar approach of the Armenian question, as well as the not less needed reconciliation of Turkish and Armenian people, imply a strong condemnation, from both sides, not only of the numerous war crimes committed during WWI, but also of terrorism and falsifications, remarkably exemplified by the Andonian material and its use by polemicists supporting the Armenian nationalists' point of view.

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269 Türkkaya Ataöv, *Armenian Falsifications*, op. cit., p. 48. For another use of forgery, see Jeremy Salt, "Forging the Past: OUP and the Armenian Question," *EurasiaCritic*, January 2010, <http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/forging-past-oup-and-armenian-question>

270 Heath W. Lowry, "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Armenian Terrorism: 'Threads of Continuity,'" in *International Terrorism...*, op. cit., p. 82.

271 [http://mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly\\_en/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=39](http://mfa.gov.az/eng/khojaly_en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=39)

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