

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-1895 AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

1894-1895 ÇİN-JAPON SAVAŞI VE OSMANLI DEVLETİ

Togay Seçkin BİRBUDAK*

Makale Bilgisi Article Info

Başvuru: 14 Eylül 2017 Recieved: September 14, 2017

Kabul: 12 Aralık 2017 Accepted: December 12, 2017

Abstract

Before the World War I, military struggles that were precursors of war took place in various tense regions of the world besides the territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire. In the quarter century before the World War I, the Ottoman Empire engaged in the Turco-Italian War with Italians and in the Balkan Wars with the Balkan countries. The leading actor of the wars taking place in the Far East, on the other hand, was Japan. The Japanese fought a war with the Chinese in 1894-1895 and with Russia in 1904-1905. They won a victory in those wars, contrary to what the Ottoman Empire did. This research aims to reveal the relationships between Japan, which gained momentum in the Far East at the beginning of the 20th century, and the Ottoman Empire, which experienced problems in the Middle East and Balkans in the same period, and the outlook of the Ottoman Government on the Sino-Japanese War, which took place very far away from its territories, based on archive documents.

Keywords: Ottoman State, Japan, China, Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Jiawu War), international relations

Özet

I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde sadece Osmanlı Devleti'nin hâkim olduğu topraklarda değil, dünyanın çeşitli gergin noktalarında savaşın habercisi askeri mücadeleler yaşanmıştır. I. Dünya Savaşı öncesindeki çeyrek yüzyıllık dönemde Osmanlı Devleti, İtalyanlarla Trablusgarp, Balkan devletleri ile de Balkan Savaşları'nı gerçekleştirmiştir. Uzakdoğu'daki savaşların baş aktörünün ise Japonya

* Yrd. Doç. Dr., Gazi Üniversitesi Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi, Türkçe ve Sosyal Bilimler Eğitimi Bölümü, Tarih Eğitimi Anabilim Dalı Öğretim Üyesi, tsbirbudak@gazi.edu.tr

olduğu görülmektedir. Japonlar 1894-1895 yıllarında Çin, 1904-1905 yıllarında ise Rusya ile savaşmış ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin aksine bu savaşlardan zaferle ayrılmışlardır. Bu araştırma, XX. Yüzyıla girerken Uzakdoğu'da ivme kazanan Japonya ile Ortadoğu ve Balkanlarda sorunlar yaşayan Osmanlı Devleti arasındaki ilişkileri ve Osmanlı idaresinin kendisinden çok uzakta yaşanan bu savaşa bakış açısını arşiv belgeleri ekseninde ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

***Anahtar Kelimeler:** Osmanlı Devleti, Japonya, Çin, 1894-1895 Çin-Japon Savaşı, uluslararası ilişkiler*

Introduction: Beginning of the Japanese Expansionism in the Far East Asia

Opening itself to the West and moving into a rapid development phase since the second half of the 19th Century, Japan has gradually acquired the opportunity to raise its status among the great powers and entered into a struggle for sovereignty over the territories close to the mainland. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were the most obvious two examples of the Japanese expansionism before the World War I. Regardless of the consequences, Japan did not hesitate to be engaged in a war with these two countries within a period of ten years in an effort to occupy the Korean and Manchurian territories in the strict sense and to become the predominant power in the Far East in the broad sense.

Ruled by a feudal oligarchy composed of territorial lords and an aristocratic warrior caste throughout the centuries, Japan went through the Meiji Restoration period in 1868, from which the country moved into a development phase and achieved an all-out progress in almost all areas, especially in the fields of administration, law, education and military. Despite these positive developments, Japan experienced some handicaps as the only non-Western country that went through an industrial revolution. Among these handicaps are the lack of underground sources, the necessity for the import of iron and steel and the country's failure to end external dependence in the shipbuilding industry despite being an island country as well as the lack of domestic capital and the consequent financial incapability to meet industrial, infrastructure and military investments¹.

Renewing itself with the development process, Japan also changed its foreign policy over time and the idea of expansionism began to have a place in the country's foreign policy. Both the lack of raw materials supplied by the

¹ Paul Kennedy, *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri*, Çev. Birtane Karanakçı, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, p. 240-242.

equity capital² and the country's total area falling short of supporting the increasing population³ gave rise to the objective of occupying the Asian coasts facing the Japanese islands. Therefore, Japan began to follow an expansionist foreign policy as of the 1870s⁴. In this sense, Korea, Taiwan and the Chinese territories near the North Korean border were Japan's primary targets for expansion.

Since 1873, Japan has begun to take a close interest in the Korean Peninsula and planned to reach the region to occupy it before the Russians. Within this framework, the idea of launching a military operation was brought to the country's agenda as early as 1873; however, no decision for war was taken⁵. The reasons that make Korea attractive for Japan can be roughly stated as follows: First of all, Korea becomes the target of Japan due to its underground and surface sources as well as its potential to be an attractive market for goods. Besides, Korea serves as a starting point for Japan's expansion in Asia and the first line of defense against a potential threat from Asia⁶. Another factor that might be effective in Japan's decision to choose Korea as a target is China's poor sovereignty over Korea, since Korea was a kingdom that was close to the external world and unstable due to the fights for the throne. Besides, it had a population of about 10 million people and was subject to pay tax to China⁷. However, the geographical affinity of Korea with the Chinese capital Beijing makes Korea more important for China compared to the country's other vassal states⁸.

² Eberhard takes iron as an example in terms of Japan's lack of raw materials. Japan has to import all of its iron ore, one of the most important raw materials of the industrial era, from the USA. W. Eberhard, *En Eski Devirlerden Zamanımıza Kadar Uzak Doğu Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2010, p. 212.

³ There was a massive increase in Japan's population together with rapid development. Regarding the transfer of increasing population to the newly gained territories, Eberhard states that about 900,000 Japanese people migrated to Korea and Taiwan between 1895 and 1936. Eberhard, *ibid*, p. 212.

⁴ Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1985, p. 230.

⁵ Shizuo Seki, "Japonya'da Modernleşme Süreci ve Dış Politika (1853-1905)", *Japon Uzmanların Gözüyle Modern Japonya*, Türk-Japon Üniversiteler Derneği, Ankara, 1992, p. 37.

⁶ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1992, p. 92. Pointing out a different aspect of Japanese expansionism, Beşikçi states that there lies also security concerns as well as the economic ones behind the expansionist policy of Japan. Indicating that Japanese people describe Korea as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan", Beşikçi denotes that Japanese expansionism also aims to take defensive measures. Mehmet Beşikçi, "1894-1895 Çin-Japon Savaşı: Japon Emperyalizminin Yükselişi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *Toplumsal Tarih*, No: 161, Mayıs 2007, 61-62.

⁷ Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1997, p. 763.

⁸ William H. McNeill, *Dünya Tarihi*, Çev.: Alaeddin Şenel, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002, p. 700.

Not only Korea, but also Taiwan (Formosa) has an important place in Japan's aim to expand its area of sovereignty from the islands it has to the Asian territories. In the early 1870s, a special department called the "Bureau of Taiwan Affairs" was established in the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a US General named Le Gender provided consulting services to this bureau. Le Gender reported that Taiwan could provide significant advantages to Japan due to its natural resources and strategic importance⁹.

In this sense, Japan made its first actual move in Korea in 1876. Korea was forced to open some of its ports to Japan. From this date on, a competition erupted between Japan and Chinese¹⁰. The clause in the treaty stating that Korea was an independent state adversely affected the Sino-Japanese relations as a matter of course. The imperial struggle of great powers over Korean territories speeded up as a natural consequence of the treaties signed by Korea with the USA, the UK, Germany and Russia in 1882. In this struggle, Japan made the first move in 1884. Japan took part in the fight for throne occurring at that time in Korea and got involved in an armed conflict with the Chinese soldiers in Korea; however, the Japanese had to take steps backwards due to the attitudes of local people in favor of Chinese soldiers¹¹. The reason for Japan's sending troops to Korea was the burning down of the embassy building in Seoul. With the Tientsin Convention signed between China and Japan in April 1885, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops and experts from Korea and decided that, in case of a potential dispatch of troops, a written notice of such an action was to be sent in advance to the other side¹². However, the developments indicated that this convention could achieve to postpone Japan's plans to establish sovereignty over Korea only for ten years. In fact, the Japanese took part in another civil strife in Korea in 1894 and then brought the region under their control.

a. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895

The revolt of 1894 that occurred in Seoul, the capital of Korea, led to the eruption of the Sino-Japanese War and the emergence of Japanese sovereignty in Korea. The Donghak Peasant Revolution that broke out in Seoul gradually made the ruling Joseon Dynasty a target, compelling the Korean government to demand military assistance from China. Taking advantage of this situation,

⁹ Mete Tunçoku, *Japonya-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri*, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, p. 33.

¹⁰ Uçarol, *ibid*, p. 230.

¹¹ Armaoğlu 1997, *ibid*, p. 764.

¹² Janet E. Hunter, *Modern Japonya'nın Doğuşu*, Çev.: Müfit Günay, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002, p. 72-73; Ali Merthan Dündar, *Panislâmizm'den Büyük Asyacılığa Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Japonya ve Orta Asya*, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2006, p. 138.

Japan dispatched troops to Korea using the Tientsin Convention of 1885 as a basis. Acting more quickly than the Chinese, the Japanese army reached Seoul, toppled the existing government and established a regime under its control.¹³ Following the Korea's request for assistance, China sent 3,000 soldiers to the peninsula, while Japan deployed 18,000 soldiers¹⁴. The Sino-Japanese War broke out on July 25, 1894 when the Japanese warships attacked two Chinese vessels off the Korean Port of Asan. The formal declaration of war was issued on August 1, 1894. During this war, the Japanese army won a great victory against China. Having a far superior military power than China, Japan defeated the Chinese army in September 1894 in the current North Korean capital of Pyongyang and achieved to occupy the city of Lushun (Port Arthur) on November 21st. In early February 1895, Weihaiwei (Weihai) city located in the Province of Shandong was also captured by the Japanese troops. During the naval campaigns, the Japanese navy achieved superiority against the Chinese¹⁵. On March 26, 1895, the Japanese took the control of the Pescadores (Penghu) islands located off the western coast of Taiwan¹⁶. Japan achieved superiority against China on all fronts and the Japanese troops posed a threat to Beijing over Southern Manchuria. These developments were an indicator of the fact that the war was over for China. Witnessing that its capital was in danger, China requested US mediation. First, an armistice was signed on March 30, 1895, and then the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895, formally ending the war¹⁷. The treaty was signed between the Chinese statesman Li Hung-Chang and the Japanese Prince Ito¹⁸. According to the terms of the treaty, China recognized the independence of Korea and ceded Taiwan, the Pescador islands and the Liaodong Peninsula in Southern Manchuria to Japan. The terms also required China to pay Japan a heavy indemnity¹⁹. With the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and

¹³ Beşikçi, *ibid*, p. 61.

¹⁴ Armaoğlu 1997, *ibid*, p. 765.

¹⁵ Yin Pumin, "The Defeat That Changed China's History", *Beijing Review*, 21 August 2014, p. 16. There are various studies reporting the allegations that Chinese civilians were subject to a massacre during the Japanese siege of Port Arthur. Douglas Howland, "Japan Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)", *Journal of the History of International Law*, Vol:9, No: 2, 2007, p. 181, 194-198; Benjamin Elman, "The Rise of Japan and the Fall of China After 1895", *The Chinese Chameleon Revisited: From the Jesuits to Zhang Yimou*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 144, 149.

¹⁶ Edward I-te Chen, "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-1895", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol: 37, No: 1, November 1977, p. 67.

¹⁷ Armaoğlu 1997, 766. A copy of the treaty signed between China and Japan on April 17, 1895 is available in the Ottoman archives. BOA. Y.A.HUS. 338/68.

¹⁸ Eberhard 2010, 213.

¹⁹ Chinese government committed to pay an indemnity of 200 million Tales. Dündar 2006, *ibid*, p. 139. Pumin indicates that this indemnity today corresponds to a value of about \$5.3 billion USD. Pumin 2014, *ibid*, p. 19.

Navigation, the Japanese were granted the same privileges as the European countries obtained in their relations with China²⁰.

The fight with Japan cost China quite a lot. During this period, the Japanese called China “*The Sick Man of the Far East*”, referring to the name given to the Ottoman Empire²¹. China was unable to make a stand against the Japanese troops in the battlefield and lost a significant amount of territory with the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed following the war. The treaty also speeded up the downfall of the ruling Qing dynasty²². Following the war, the weak status of China was recognized by the great powers, increasing imperialist pressures on the country, together with especially the impact of Russia.

When considered from the viewpoint of Japan, the situation is a lot more complicated. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 which lasted about 8 months, and the consequent Treaty of Shimonoseki helped Japan to be engaged in the Far East politics for the first time as a regional power along with the western actors. However, with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan, as the rightful owner of Manchuria, was inevitably engaged in a conflict with Russia and the other imperialist European countries which aimed to have sovereignty over the same region.

Disturbed by Japan’s territorial gains following the war, Russia tried to put in place the international powers through diplomatic channels and proposed Britain, France and German to act jointly in order to force the Japanese out of the Liaodong Peninsula. The proposal was well received by France which signed a new alliance agreement with Russia, and by Germany which desired to remove Russia from the politics of Europe. Pleased with Japan’s rise in the Far East as a power against Russia, Britain was not clearly for or against Russia’s side and only recommended the Japanese to withdraw from the region²³. As a result of the negotiations between Russia and France, it was agreed that China must pay a reasonable amount of indemnity to Japan in return for Japan's withdrawal from Liaodong, and the Japanese must leave the peninsula immediately after the payment of the first instalment. Eventually, Russia, France and Germany issued an ultimatum to the Japanese

²⁰ Hunter, *ibid*, p. 74. Armaoğlu lists the factors that made Japan superior than its neighbor as population, military system and the investments in navy forces. Economic development which run parallel to population growth, together with the military system which has been systematized since 1873 and the huge investments in naval forces all contributed to Japan's easy victory over China. Armaoğlu 1997, *ibid*, p. 763.

²¹ Urs Matthias Zachman, *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity 1852-1904*, Routledge, 2009, p. 39.

²² Hunter, *ibid*, p. 74-75.

²³ Armaoğlu 1997, *ibid*, p. 767-768.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs calling on Japan to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula on April 23, 1895²⁴. Such an intervention by three great powers less than a week later after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed was described as a “friendly advice” for the sake of peace and stability in East Asia²⁵. The Japanese government refrained from engaging in a conflict with all these three countries and retroceded the region to China in return for a certain amount of indemnity in November 1895. However, the Russo-Japan conflict over the region escalated following these developments²⁶. As said by Kennedy, Japan’s withdrawal from Liaodong at the end of 1895 triggered the country’s determination to try once more to occupy the same region in the future²⁷. Russia became Japan’s main rival as of 1895, not only due to being among the nations that diplomatically expressed objection to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, but also due to its expansionist policies in East Asia and the Trans-Siberian Railway project²⁸.

As a matter of fact, it is hard to say that China’s sovereignty over the region was re-restored powerfully after the withdrawal of Japan's forces from Manchuria. During the period following the Sino-Japanese War, Russia wanted to construct a railway between Siberia and the Port Lushun and achieved to obtain China's permit necessary for the construction, gaining an important advantage of becoming influential in the region²⁹. Another important aspect of the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1896 was that the Russians obtained the mining rights around the rail line³⁰. The statement made by the British diplomat Ernest Satow about the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to the Lord Salisbury during the period after the war clearly indicates the imperialist conflict over the Far East Asia. Satow explains the Russo-Japanese imperialist conflict lying behind the Sino-Japanese War as follows: “*Undoubtedly there is another reason other than the regular looking one. The main purpose of the Japanese is to prevent the Russian fleet from sailing to*

²⁴ Ge Fuping, “France and the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895”, *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, p. 151, 155-156.

²⁵ Zachman, *ibid*, p. 32.

²⁶ Armaoğlu 1997, *ibid*, p. 769. The amount of indemnity proposed to be paid to the Japanese in return for retrocession of the Liaodong region to China was 30 million Taels. Jiang Liwen, “The First Sino-Japanese War Indemnity Revisited”, *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, p. 129.

²⁷ Kennedy, *ibid*, p. 243.

²⁸ Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, The Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 2005, p. 5.

²⁹ Eberhard, *ibid*, p. 214.

³⁰ Selim Sırrı Altıer, “Türk-Japon Dostluğu Hakkında Tarihi Bilgiler”, *Türk Dünyası Tarih Kültür Dergisi*, S. 186, Haziran 2002, p. 31.

the Pacific"³¹. The war itself and the post-war developments show that Russia achieved to remove the Japanese from the region through diplomatic channels in 1895 and gained significant ground again through diplomatic means. However, the Russian influence in the region was then replaced with the Japanese sovereignty in the medium term. Japan came through the war with China unscathed in 1894 and put Korea under great influence by granting the country's status as an independent state, but had to renounce the claims of sovereignty over the territories occupied in mainland China due to international pressures. In 1904, Japan was not to fail to declare war against Russia and won a victory against its enemy, finally annexing the Korean peninsula by toppling the Korean emperor in 1910³².

b. Ottoman Empire During the Sino-Japanese War

The Sino-Japanese War, which appears to have broken out due to imperialist goals over Korea, does not seem to be among the agenda items of top priority for the Sublime Porte, since the conflicts took place in a geography far from the Ottoman Empire and the Empire's commercial and political goals for the Far East Asia was not as effective as its political power. However, the great powers behind the war, especially the fight for sovereignty between Russia and Japan, revealed the position of Russia which did not hesitate to follow an aggressive policy towards the Ottoman Empire since the 19th century as well as the necessity to closely follow the course of this war in Istanbul to understand the Russian policies towards the Ottoman Empire.

The materials in the Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives clearly show that the Ottoman government closely followed the course of this war and reached up-to-date information through the diplomatic units abroad. The Ottoman Archives reveal that the Sublime Porte followed the course of the Sino-Japanese War in line with the Far East policies of great powers and was frequently provided with information by various diplomatic missions, especially those in London, Petersburg and Washington. Following the outbreak of the war, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a struggle for learning the policies followed by the leading governments from the Ottoman embassies³³.

³¹ F. Şayan Ulusan Şahin, *Türk-Japon İlişkileri (1876-1908)*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 104. After the Sino-Japanese War, England decided to political rapprochement with Japan for advantages in Asia. Selçuk Esenbel, "Türk-Japon İlişkilerinin Tarihi, *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, C. 13, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, p. 153.

³² McNeill, *ibid*, p. 700.

³³ During this period, the ambassadors from the Ottoman Empire working in the presence of great powers are as follows: Sinan Kunalalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricalî (1839-1922)*, İsis Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 45-48.

During the final days of July and the first week of August 1894, frequent flow of information about the Korean matter was available to the Sublime Porte from the Ottoman embassies. The correspondences exchanged from the foreign missions of the Ottoman Empire in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the war show that the officers tried to analyze the viewpoints of great powers about both the Sino-Japanese War and the Far East matter. In the telegram sent from the Ottoman Embassy in London on July 26th, 1894, it was stated that Britain was following the developments in the Far East Asia with concern for the purpose of protecting its trade interests and the Russian government was of the opinion that Japan's accusations against China about the poor management in Korea were insufficient. It was also stated that Korea was regarded as an autonomous province of China by the Russian government. Besides, the telegram also stated that Britain was not expected to take a stand for any side³⁴. In the telegram sent from Petersburg immediately before the war, it was indicated that Russia was in favor of the maintenance of the status quo in Korea and of the opinion that the great powers which had trade interests in the region must take a step in the presence of the Chinese and the Japanese government³⁵. On the other hand, in the telegram sent by the Ottoman Embassy in Berlin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the negotiations with the German political authorities on August 1, 1894, it was concluded that the Sino-Japanese War which broke out due to the Korean matter would not give rise to any disorder in the Europe since both Britain and Russia were on the same page³⁶.

After China and Japan declared war on each other on August 1st, 1894, Britain announced that it would remain impartial. The official statement of Britain was published in the London Gazette dated August 7, 1894³⁷. This issue was also discussed frequently in the collection of biographies sent by the Ottoman Embassy in England to the Empire's Foreign Ministry in August

London: Rüstem Pasha (October 1885 – January 1896)
 Kostaki Antopulo Pasha (January 1896 – December 1902)
 Paris: Mahmud Esad Pasha (September 1880 – September 1894)
 Yusuf Ziya Pasha (September 1894 – January 1896)
 Salih Münir Pasha (January 1896 – August 1908)
 Petersburg: Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha (August 1889 – August 1908)
 Washington: Mavroyani Bey (December 1886 – May 1896)
 Berlin: Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (December 1885 – January 1896)
 Rome: Mahmud Nedim Bey (March 1891 – February 1896)
 Mustafa Reşid Pasha (February 1896 – December 1908)

³⁴ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 306/48.

³⁵ BOA. HR.SYS. 382/13.

³⁶ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 305/3; HR.SYS. 382/13.

³⁷ Fuping, *ibid*, p. 141.

1894. According to the abovementioned documents, the Queen of England declared that Britain would remain impartial in the war between China and Japan and a regulation was prepared to be valid in all ports and gulfs under the British control as well as the British territorial waters during the course of the war³⁸. Translation of the official document that includes the valid rules regarding the British territorial waters and ports was sent by the Embassy in London to the Foreign Ministry and necessary steps were taken for the preparation of such a regulation in case of a war between the states which were in good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Although it was first decided to submit the documents to the Council of State, then it was thought that it would be more appropriate to let the legal advisors work on the issue first, and then to bring the matter to the Council³⁹.

The correspondence delivered by the Ottoman ambassador to Washington to the Foreign Ministry in August presents the Sino-China conflict over Korea in detail. According to this document, the Japanese forced the Korean government several times to fulfill their requests in line with their interests, although Korea was subject to pay tax to China. The paper also gives Japan's dispatch of troops to Korea in 1884 and the consequent Treaty of Tientsin as an example. However, the current statements focus on that the Japanese sent their troops to Korea under the cover of their interests which finally led to the outbreak of the war. They also point out that the recent Western-style reforms in Japan were not well received by the public, thus Japan entered into a war with the Chinese in order to eliminate the dissatisfaction among its people. Although Britain and Russia encouraged the US government to intervene in this war, the country aimed to remain impartial and even did not want to seem as if it was acting together with any European country. However, it is also stated that in addition to adopting such an impartiality policy, the US government was more close to Japan than China and could derive great financial benefits in Korea by means of the reforms that the Japanese wanted to make in Korea. Besides, Korea was a quite suitable place for the US industry and trade⁴⁰.

In late October 1894, the translator of the Italian Embassy in Istanbul came to the Foreign Ministry and reported on behalf of the Italian ambassador that the Italian government would follow a total impartiality policy during the war⁴¹. During the same times, the Ottoman Embassy in Rome notified that the

³⁸ BOA. HR.SYS. 382/13; BEO. 472/35342; 477/35756; Y.A.HUS. 306/48; 308/113.

³⁹ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 308/113; İ. HUS. 29/47.

⁴⁰ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 308/4.

⁴¹ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 311/44.

Italian government issued an official declaration of impartiality⁴². Thus, just like Britain, Russia and the US, Italy also submitted a declaration of impartiality during the Sino-Japanese War.

As can be understood from the archive documents, the Ottoman Empire was informed about the political stance of the great powers at the beginning of the war by the foreign missions. Although none of the great powers was intended to be engaged in the Sino-Japanese War, it is not possible to speak of a large-scale diplomatic attempt to prevent the war. The only archive document that we managed to discover was based on the information obtained from the Russian press. It is not possible to describe the idea stated in this document as a realistic peace. The archive document which includes the news summaries from the Russian press states that Russia was on China's side during the Sino-Japanese War and these two countries would need money to continue the war, thus gradually having to lay down arms in case the European countries did not grant loans to these countries⁴³. It is also worth mentioning that an important part of the Ottoman archives include materials sent from the capital Petersburg about the developments in the Russian press. Mass telegrams were sent from the Ottoman Embassy in Russia to the Foreign Minister Said Pasha from July 1894 to May 1895 and the information about the war published in the newspapers "Rus Novosti", "Novoye Vremya" and "Moskovskie Vedimosti" was conveyed to Istanbul⁴⁴.

As mentioned above, the Sino-Japanese War which broke out in August did not follow a pleasant course in terms of China. The Japanese army achieved an almost total victory against China and was successful in achieving

⁴² BOA. HR.SYS. 382/13.

⁴³ BOA. Y.PRK.TKM. 32/30. There is no indication of date in the archive document that include the related information. However, the date of the file including the archive document is August 14, 1894 according to the Gregorian Calendar.

⁴⁴ The telegrams were written in French and they only include some summary information. In this sense, it can be said that the information was conveyed about the course of the Sino-Japanese War, the predictions about the potential consequences of the war, the policy followed by Britain during the war and the effect of German-French-Russian political association against the Japanese in the post-war period on the relations with Britain. However, there is no detailed document other than the summaries included in the archive documents in the Foreign Ministry Political catalogue. BOA. HR.SYS. 1317/45; 1317/60; 1317/75; 1317/81; 1317/103; 1318/1; 1318/19; 1318/26; 1318/32; 1318/33; 1318/50; 1319/3; 1319/29; 1319/36; 1319/95; 1319/104; 1320/1; 1320/3. Moreover, examining the Russian press during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Kosmach, describes all three newspapers followed by the Ottoman diplomats as monarchist and discusses in detail the news published in these newspapers during the war. Alena Eskridge-Kosmach, "The Russian Press on Russia's Chinese Policy in the Period of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, No: 25, 2012, p. 621, 625.

their goals without much difficulty at all. When it was clear that the war would come to an end with a Japanese victory, the Ottoman government began to closely follow the predictions of the post-war period.

During the meeting between the Ottoman ambassador to London and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley in November 1894, the issue of China's request for mediation by great powers to end the war was discussed. The Foreign Secretary confirmed the receipt of such a request; however, he expressed his opinion that such an attempt would not be sufficient to end the war, since the views and opinions of great powers about this issue were not clear⁴⁵. On the other hand, there is another document dated December 1894 which indicates that Russia and Britain were of the same opinion about the course of action to follow with regard to the consequences of the Sino-Japanese War⁴⁶. In the correspondence exchanged by the Ottoman Embassy in Washington at the beginning of 1895, it was reported that the conflicts between two countries came to an end and the former US Secretary of State John Foster was included in the commission to negotiation to lend assistance to the peace negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese governments⁴⁷.

The war between the two parties was brought to an end with the Treaty of Shimonoseki which was signed following the negotiations on April 17, 1895. Although the treaty ended the Sino-Japanese conflict over the region, it also gave rise to the subsequent diplomatic Russo-Japanese conflict. Disturbed by the advantages the Japanese gained with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia started a diplomatic initiative which was closely followed by the Sublime Porte.

According to solid intelligence referred to in a telegram sent by the Ottoman Embassy in Berlin on April 24, 1895, the German government allied with Russia and France for the amendment of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and started a diplomatic initiative by means of the embassy in Tokyo. The purpose of the initiative was shown as the amendment of the clause about the retrocession of the Liaodong region to Japan. In the telegram, it was also stated that the trade interests of these three countries would be harmed in case of such a retrocession⁴⁸. In a telegram sent to Istanbul on April 26, 1895, the

⁴⁵ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 313/48. At this meeting, the course of the Africa case between France and Britain was brought up. Although the British Minister reported that negotiations took place in Paris, the Ottoman ambassador stated that no progress seemed to have been achieved.

⁴⁶ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 315/12.

⁴⁷ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 318/76. Zhihai indicates that John Foster was assigned by the Chinese government for a period of 3 months with a monthly salary of \$10,000 USD. Cui Zhihai, "The United States and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895", *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, p. 179.

⁴⁸ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 326/5.

Ottoman ambassador to Petersburg reported a conversation with the Russian Foreign Ministry, stating that the diplomatic representatives of Russia, Germany and France in Tokyo sent a joint and friendly notice with regard to reviewing the clause which provided the retrocession of the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur to Japan. He also reported that Britain's hesitation to make an attempt was greeted with astonishment⁴⁹. Moreover, it was stated in the correspondence exchanged by the Ottoman Embassy in Washington to the Sublime Porte that, just like Britain, the US government intended to be impartial in the new case between Russia, France and Germany and Japan⁵⁰.

The war between China and Japan which broke out in August 1895 was ended with the treaty signed in 1895. However, a diplomatic conflict in which Germany and France were involved took place between Russia and Japan in the following period and it was Japan, the winner of this conflict, who managed to force Russia to retrocede some part of the territories that Japan obtained with the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

The telegram sent by the Ottoman Embassy in Washington to the Sublime Porte in October 1895 constitutes one of the interesting archive documents about the post-war period. The telegram reports the Chinese and Japanese public opinion about the post-war period. According to the telegram, one of the semi-official newspapers of Japan published news that it would not be of the interest of Japan to ally with a European country, especially with Britain, since the British government saw Japan as a trade rival and a potential war would shake Britain out of its foundations. According to some other news from Morning Post, the British influence on China decreased gradually, while the Russian influence increased. On the other hand, it was also emphasized that the Sino-Japanese War was followed by a conflict between the great powers, giving rise to a potential outbreak of a war in the Far East in line with the goals of great powers about China and Japan, so the Ottoman Empire must be careful about this particular situation⁵¹.

The developments related to the Ottoman Empire during the days of the Sino-Japanese War were another important issue. We were able to detect three

⁴⁹ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 326/29.

⁵⁰ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 329/1. In the first sentence of the study by Zhihai on the US politics during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, he states that the US government claimed to be impartial, but actually followed a policy in favor of the Japanese. Zhihai, *ibid*, p. 164.

⁵¹ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 338/47. Likewise, the report sent from Petersburg to the Sublime Porte on October 7, 1895 states that the success achieved by Russia and France following the Sino-Japanese War as well as the presence of Russian and French naval forces in Chinese waters harmed the political and commercial influence of Britain in the region. BOA. Y.PRK.EŞA. 22/78.

examples in this sense. In the archive document dated August 14, 1894 (early days of the war), it was indicated that the Bulgarian Prince took a political step in the presence of Britain in order to make the principality recognized by the great powers, but the British government refused his request due to the ongoing Sino-Japanese War in the Far East⁵². In another document, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt, states that the British government was thinking about occupying Sudan in October 1894, but no treaty was signed between the British ambassador and the Khedive of Egypt due to the ongoing Sino-Japanese War⁵³. The correspondence exchanged by the Ottoman Embassy in London in December 1894 gives some information about the meeting with Lord Kimberley which was held to discuss the claims of a tension between Britain and Russia. It was also stated that negotiations took place between Britain and Russia about the Afghan border and the Pamir plateau and both parties were close to an agreement and expressed a joint opinion concerning the potential consequences of the Sino-Japanese War. The British Foreign Secretary also delivered an opinion about whether such cooperation would be maintained for the Straits Question, indicating that the political cooperation with Russia in the Afghan and the Far East issues did not cover the straits question⁵⁴. Based on the abovementioned archive documents, it is possible to say that the Sino-Japanese War which took place thousands of kilometers away from the Ottoman territories had an indirect and limited effect on the internal affairs of the Empire, which seemed to be in favor of the Ottoman state.

As mentioned above, the Sino-Japanese War was closely followed by the Ottoman government. Moreover, this war also attracted Ottoman public attention. Ziya Sakir, a journalist who lived during these years, stated that the war attracted great attention in Istanbul and the local newspapers frequently published news about the war. He also indicated that translations of the news in the European media were published in the Ottoman newspapers⁵⁵, adding

⁵² BOA. Y.PRK.MK. 6/54.

⁵³ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 310/109.

⁵⁴ BOA. Y.A.HUS. 315/12. Lord Kimberley's statement in the archive document is as follows: "...Çin ve Japonya muhârebe-i hâzırâsının intâc edebileceği netâyice karşı ittihâzı lazım gelen meslek-i hareket hakkında dahî İngiltere ve Rusya müttefikü'l-efkâr olduklarından Aksâ-yı Şark cihetinde devleteyn beynindeki hüsn-i vifâkı ihlâl edecek bir şey yoktur." "...Şurasını temin edebilirim ki Asya-yı Vustâ ile Aksâ-yı Şark meseleleri hakkında hâsıl olan itilâf Kal'â-yı Sultâniye ve Karadeniz boğazları hakkında bir gûna itilâfî tazammun etmez. Eğer bu mesele mevki-i bahs ve müzâkereye vaz' edilecek olur ise keyfiyeti vakt u zamâniyle size bildiririm."

⁵⁵ For the two studies on the Ottoman media during the Sino-Japanese War, see Yusuf Avcı, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Japon İmgesi (1839-1908)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2013, p. 111-113; Şayan Ulusan Şahin, "Bazı Arşiv

that Abdul Hamid II closely followed the course of the war by sitting in front of the Far East map and observed what kind of a war strategy the Japanese emperor followed. Ziya Sakir also reported that Sultan Abdul Hamid II sent his sincere congratulations to the Japanese Emperor for their victory following the end of the war as well as presenting a precious horse to him as a gift⁵⁶.

c. The Ottoman-Japanese Relations in the Post-War Period

The Ottoman-Japanese relations were maintained as a friendly relationship based on the visits by the Japanese princes to the Ottoman Empire and the tragic event that occurred after the goodwill visit of the Frigate Ertugrul to Japan. The relations were also shaped by the pan-Islamist overturns of Abdul Hamid's foreign policy⁵⁷ and the rise of Japan to an imperialist world power following the reform and transformation period at the beginning of the 20th century. Although the Ottoman Empire was the first foreign and oriental member of the European community of states with the signing of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Japan got ahead of the Ottoman Empire by making progress in the second half of the 19th century and by demonstrating a broad commitment to international treaties⁵⁸. Moving into a rapid restoration period during the Meiji Restoration period, Japan began to follow an expansionist foreign policy in the last quarter of the 19th century. Such a policy, together with the subsequent conflicts with China and Russia, were of high importance for the Ottoman Empire which was having problematic relations with the European great powers

In the quarter century before the World War I, the Tragedy of Frigate Ertugrul was the main focus of the Ottoman-Japanese relations. Before this tragic event, the relations between two countries were based on some friendly diplomatic contacts focused on trade. In May 1893, Count Aoki, the Japanese ambassador to German, paid a visit to Istanbul and had a meeting with Abdul

Belgelerinde ve Ahenk Gazetesi'nde Çin-Japon Savaşı (1894-1895), *Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, C. 1, S. 2, 2003, p. 82-88.

⁵⁶ Ziya Şakir, *Sultan Abdülhamid ve Mikado*, Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, p. 107-108.

⁵⁷ After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Abdul Hamid II decided to develop closer ties with Germany to eliminate the country's problems, thus he followed certain policies for the purpose of reaching an effective position in the Islamic world. His Pan-Islamist foreign policy took effect not only in the Middle East and Africa, but also in India and the Far East. The Chinese Muslims constituted a political basis for the Ottoman Empire. The government took care of these Chinese Muslims who recognized the Sultan Abdul Hamid II as the caliph and prayed for the Ottoman sultan during the Friday Khutbahs. The government also got into contact with these people through public and private officers. Hee Soo Lee, "II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya'daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti", *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, C. 2, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, p. 363-365.

⁵⁸ Howland, *ibid*, p. 200.

Hamid II to sign a treaty of commerce between the two countries. In the report he sent to Tokyo following the meeting in Istanbul, Aoki stated that the Ottoman emperor was willing to sign a treaty, but he was not authorized to sign such a treaty which created disappointment on the part of the Ottoman Empire⁵⁹.

A year after the meetings with Aoki—during the years of the Sino-Japanese War—Prince Yorihito Komatsu paid a visit to Istanbul to present the gifts sent by the Japanese Emperor to Abdul Hamid II. A hotel room in Beyoğlu was booked and a tour director was assigned for him. He and his subordinates were decorated with badges according to different ranks. The Ottoman government's attention to the Prince was not limited to this. When Prince Komatsu left the Ottoman capital and reached Belgrade, he was met by Tevfik Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador to Belgrade. As there was no Japanese diplomatic mission in Belgrade back then, he was taken with great care in Belgrade, too⁶⁰.

The Ottoman Empire did not make any fundamental change in the foreign policy after the Sino-Japanese War. However, we can say that the war and the consequent developments further enhanced the positive relations between the Ottoman Empire and Japan. It is also worthy of note that the Tsarist Russia was both a common neighbor and a political rival for both countries, which was an important factor that played a role in the closer ties between the two countries. The Ottoman Empire had been busy with the Russian trouble for more than a century. Following the war with China, Japan took Korea and Manchuria under control. As a result of the subsequent Russo-Japanese conflict, Russia became a common rival for both the Ottoman Empire and Japan. On the other hand, the political affinity emerging between Japan and Britain helped Britain to have a new ally in Asian politics, while also bringing up the potential loosening of the British policy which favored the protection of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Moreover, Japan began to follow an imperialist policy as of this date, thus also following an aggressive policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

After the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government reawakened the issue of signing a treaty of commerce, which was brought up a few years ago, with some changes. The Japanese government also made

⁵⁹ Avcı, *ibid*, p. 108-109.

⁶⁰ Şahin 2001, *ibid*, p. 103. Sultan Abdul Hamid II – Since the meeting with Prince Komatsu corresponded to the ongoing Sino-Japanese War, the identity of the Japanese Prince was kept confidential and the Prince used the name "Count Mishima" during the visit. Avcı, *ibid*, p. 109.

some attempts in 1895 to sign a capitulation with the Ottoman Empire by the help of the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, Count Aoki. Japan's proposal was conveyed to the Ottoman ambassador to Berlin by Aoki; however, no treaty was signed as the Ottoman government reported that such capitulation was not just made up of commercial privileges, but also included legal ones⁶¹. This development can be given as an example to Japan's aggressive foreign policy. The Japanese failed to sign a treaty before the war, but then attempted to conclude a capitulation with the Ottoman Empire after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, just like the other great powers. However, Japan's proposal for a capitulation was not welcomed and the Ottoman government refused to sign even a treaty of commerce.

It is important to note that the contacts between the Ottoman Empire and Japan were still maintained even after unsuccessful negotiations for capitulation. In 1896, Yazumaza Fukuşima who was assigned to analyze the military systems of the Asian and European countries came to Istanbul and went to the Foreign Ministry to inform that he would like to visit the Ottoman military schools during his two-week visit in Istanbul. The Ottoman government allowed Fukuşima to visit the Taşkışla Barracks. The Japanese Minister of Mail and Telegram M. Den visited Istanbul again in 1896 and stayed there with his subordinates for a while. They were decorated with badges. In 1897, a treaty concerning the mutual establishment of embassies and consulates was signed between two countries⁶².

Conclusion

Toward the World War I which totally upset the political balance of the world, the number of political and military conflicts increased not only in the Ottoman territories in Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Middle East, but also in the distant geographies such as Africa and the Far East Asia. The Ottoman Empire had to be involved in a war with the Italians in North Africa and with Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkans. On the other hand, Japan who had been ruled by a closed government throughout the centuries, but entered into a rapid development period called the Meiji Restoration in the second half of the 19th century, fought a battle with China and Russia during the same period as the Ottoman Empire, but for an exact opposite political purpose, i.e. to expand its sovereignty and to participate in the great imperial powers.

⁶¹ Avcı, *ibid*, p. 115. Esenbel indicates that especially Said Pasha opposed to treaty with Japan. Esenbel, *ibid*, p. 154.

⁶² Şahin 2001, *ibid*, p. 108-110.

The Sino-Japanese War which broke out as a result of a political conflict over the Korean matter between 1894 and 1895 ended in the decisive victory of the Japanese who were in a period of total development. Japan defeated the Chinese army in a rapid and traumatic way and reinforced its military victory with a crowning achievement, i.e. signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. However, as we have seen many examples in the world politics of the 19th and 20th century, the victory in the battlefield has always been reshaped through diplomatic means. Following the diplomatic attempts of the world's leading great powers, many changes were made in the Treaty of Shimonoseki to ensure the political balance in the Far East Asia, and Japan's gains from the war were reduced albeit partially.

The lack of the sufficient power to be engaged in the Far East Asia politics due to the distant geography the war was based on, together with the economic and political depression environment that the Ottoman Empire went through, prevented the Ottoman government to keep the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 in the main agenda. However, the other great powers, especially Russia which adopted an aggressive strategy towards the Ottoman Empire for more than a century, closely followed the course of the war. Therefore, the Sublime Porte could not ignore the developments about the Sino-Japanese War. To that end, the Ottoman government tried to be informed of the course of the war through its ambassadors in important European capitals and Washington and to observe the potential effect of the developments in the Far East Asia on the European politics. The Empire also refrained from taking sides during the war.

The Ottoman-Japanese relations, which were shaped in the early 1890s independent of the Sino-Japanese War, were maintained in the post-war period because Russia clearly stood as the political rival of Japan in the Far East Asia as of 1896, meaning that Japan rose a natural ally for the Ottoman Empire which had been dealing with the Russian trouble for more than a century. Hence, even closer relations were forged between the Ottoman Empire and the Japanese in the post-war period. However, it is important to note that the close relations between two countries did not turn into an alliance. The Japanese government exhibited a capitulation-oriented approach to the relations with the Ottoman Empire, which was not approved by the Sublime Porte. Therefore, the relations between the two countries did not make significant progress, but were maintained in a friendly manner in the 20th century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY**A. Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives (BOA.)**

- *Bâb-ı Âlî Evrâk Odası (Arşivi) Belgeleri (BEO.):* 472/35342; 477/35756
- *Hâriciye Nezâreti Siyasî Kısım Belgeleri (HR.SYS.):* 382/13; 1317/45; 1317/60; 1317/75; 1317/81; 1317/103; 1318/1; 1318/19; 1318/26; 1318/32; 1318/33; 1318/50; 1319/3; 1319/29; 1319/36; 1319/95; 1319/104; 1320/1; 1320/3.
- *Îrâdeler Husûsî (İ. HUS.):* 29/47.
- *Yıldız Sadâret Husûsî Mârûzât Evrâkı (Y.A.HUS.):* 305/3; 306/48; 308/4; 308/113; 310/109; 313/48; 315/12; 318/76; 326/5; 326/29; 329/1; 338/68.
- *Yıldız Perâkende Evrâkı Elçilik ve Şehbenderlik Maruzâtı (Y.PRK.EŞA.):* 22/78.
- *Yıldız Perâkende Evrâkı Müfettişlik ve Komiserlik Tahrîrâtı (Y.PRK.MK.):* 6/54.
- *Yıldız Perâkende Evrâkı Tahrîrât-ı Ecnebiye ve Mâbeyn Mütercimliği (Y.PRK.TKM.):* 32/30.

B. Copyrighted-Anonymous Works

- Altier, S. S., "Türk-Japon Dostluğu Hakkında Tarihi Bilgiler", *Türk Dünyası Tarih Kültür Dergisi*, S. 186, Haziran 2002, pp. 29-33.
- Armaoğlu, F., *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1992.
- Armaoğlu, F., *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1997.
- Avıç, Y., *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Japon İmgesi (1839-1908)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2013.
- Beşikçi, M., "1894-1895 Çin-Japon Savaşı: Japon Emperyalizminin Yükselişi ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *Toplumsal Tarih*, No: 161, Mayıs 2007, pp. 60-63.
- Chen, Edward I-te, "Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-1895", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol: 37, No: 1, November 1977, pp. 61-72.
- Eberhard, W., *En Eski Devirlerden Zamanımıza Kadar Uzak Doğu Tarihi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2010.
- Dündar, A. M., *Panislâmizm'den Büyük Asyacılığa Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Japonya ve Orta Asya*, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2006.
- Elman, B., "The Rise of Japan and the Fall of China After 1895", *The Chinese Chameleon Revisited: From the Jesuits to Zhang Yimou*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, pp. 143-171.
- Esenbel, S., "Türk-Japon İlişkilerinin Tarihi", *Türkler Ansiklopedisi*, C. 13, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 2002, pp. 149-161.
- Fuping, G., "France and the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895", *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, pp. 138-163.

- Howland, D., "Japan Civilized War: International Law as Diplomacy in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)", *Journal of the History of International Law*, Vol:9, No: 2, 2007, pp. 179-201.
- Hunter, J. E., *Modern Japonya'nın Doğuşu*, Çev.: Müfit Günay, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002.
- Kennedy, P., *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri*, Çev. Birtane Karanakçı, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 1991.
- Kosmach- Eskridge, A., "The Russian Press on Russia's Chinese Policy in the Period of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, No: 25, 2012, pp. 618-661.
- Kowner, R., *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, The Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 2005.
- Kuneralp, S., *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922)*, İsis Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999.
- Lee, H. S., "II. Abdülhamid ve Doğu Asya'daki Pan-İslamist Siyaseti", *Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi*, C. 2, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara, 1999, pp. 363-372.
- Liwen, J., "The First Sino-Japanese War Indemnity Revisited", *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, pp. 113-137.
- McNeill, W. H., *Dünya Tarihi*, Çev.: Alaeddin Şenel, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 2002.
- Pumin, Y., "The Defeat That Changed China's History", *Beijing Review*, 21 August 2014, pp. 14-19.
- Seki, S., "Japonya'da Modernleşme Süreci ve Dış Politika (1853-1905)", *Japon Uzmanların Gözüyle Modern Japonya*, Türk-Japon Üniversiteler Derneği, Ankara, 1992.
- Türk-Japon İlişkileri (1876-1908)*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001.
- Şahin Ulusan, F. Ş., "Bazı Arşiv Belgelerinde ve Ahenk Gazetesi'nde Çin-Japon Savaşı (1894-1895)", *Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, C. 1, S. 2, 2003, pp. 79-91.
- Tunçoku, M., *Japonya-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri*, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2002.
- Uçarol, R., *Siyasi Tarih*, Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1985.
- Zachman, U. M., *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity 1852-1904*, Routledge, 2009.
- Zhihai, C., "The United States and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895", *Social Sciences in China*, Vol:36, No:4, 2015, pp. 164-192.
- Ziya Şakir, *Sultan Abdülhamid ve Mikado*, Boğaziçi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994.