

**ACROPOLITES AND GREGORAS ON THE  
BYZANTINE- SELJUK CONFRONTATION AT  
ANTIOCH-ON-THE MAEANDER (A.D. 1211).  
ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY**

**ALEXIS G.C.SAVVIDES**

Modern research has conclusively established that the battle of Antiochad-Maenderum in Phrygia, considered to be the third most hotly contested confrontation between the Byzantines and the Seljuks since Manzikert (Malasgirt) in 1071 and Myriocephalum (Çardak) in 1176, took place in the spring or early summer of A.D. 1211 and not in A.D.1210, as it was previously believed <sup>(1)</sup> : Apart from the accounts of the basic Moslem chroniclers on 13<sup>th</sup>-century Anatolia, that is, Ibn al Athir (ed. C.Tornberg, vol.xII, Leiden-Uppsala 1873, pp.154-55 and Ibn Bibi (German trans. H.Duda, Köpenhavn 1959, pp. 50-57), who consider Alaşehir (Philadelphia) as the battle's location<sup>(2)</sup>, that eventful confrontation was recorded in detail

- (1) There is an old German trans. of the Greek extracts on the battle by B.Lehman, *Die Nachrichten des Niketas Choniates Georgios Akropolites und Pachymeres über die Selcugen in der zeit von 1180 bis 1280*, Leipzig 1939 and a Turkish adaptation of the relevant parts by M.Eren, Theodor I. Laskaris 1204-22. ve I. Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev, *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1971), pp. 593-598. Recent detailed analyses of this major confrontation are those by O. Turan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye. Siyasi Tarih Alp Arslan'dan Osman Gazi'ye 1071-1318*, İstanbul 1971 (repr. 1984), pp. 287-293, P.Zavoronkov, *Nicaean-Latin and Nicaean Seljuk Relations in the Years 1211-1216* (in Russian), *Vizantiiski Vremennik* 37 (1976), pp. 48-52 and A.Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East : its Relations with the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, A.D. c. 1192-1237*, *Thessalonica* 1981; pp. 94-105. Cf. also C.Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c. 1071-1330*, London 1968, p. 120= idem, *La Turquie pre-ottomane*, İstanbul-Paris 1988, p. 68; İ.Kafesoğlu (translated G. Leiser), *A History of the Seljuks, Southern Illionis V.P.* 1988, p.73.
- (2) Ibn Bibi gives 28 May as the date of the battle, while Ibn al-Athir 7 June; cf. A.Savvides, *The Arab Historiographer Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233) and his world Chronicle as a Sources for the History of the Crusades and Byzantina-Seljuk Relations* (in Greek), Athens 1981, pp. 7,13 note 20; cf. idem, *Byzantium in the Near East*, op. cit., p. 100. Zavoronkov, op. cit; pp. 48-50 supports the date 17 July based on the archaeological evidence.

by two major 13<sup>th</sup>- and 14<sup>th</sup>-century historiographers, i.e. George Acropolites (1217-1282), the official court-chronicler of the Nicaean Empire of the Lascarids, and the polymath Nicephorus Gregoras (c.1290-c.1359). Apart from the relevant texts of the two aforementioned Byzantine scholars, which follow here in an English adaptation, the event was also recorded by the bishop-chronicler of Cyzicus, Theodore Scutariotes (died c.1284), who follows closely Acropolites (ed. C. Sathas. *Mesaionike Bibliothek*, vol. VII, Paris-Venice 1894, pp. 454.24-456.30), by the monk-chronicler Ephaem (died post 1313) (ed. O. Lampsider, vol. II, Athens 1985), pp. 247-248, vv. 7607-7645), by the 14<sup>th</sup>-century "Vita Ioannis Batatzae" composed by the Greek bishop of Pelegonia (in Macedonia), George (ed. A. Heisenberg in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 14, 1905, pp. 214.11-217.8) as well as by an anonymous Byzantine "Short Chronicle" for the year A.M. 6719 (A.D. 1211) <sup>(3)</sup>. To these we may also add the indirect references to the battle by the scholarly Choniatae brothers, Michael and Nicetas, who, following the Byzantine victory over the sultan of Konium (Konya), Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw I, who fell in the battlefield, rejoiced at the Christian victory in rather long and bombastic panegyrics eulogizing the victorious Nicaean ruler, Theodore I Lascaris <sup>(4)</sup>.

The accounts of both Acropolites and Gregoras are in agreement in saying that the cause which sparked the hostilities between the Lascarids of Nicaea and the Seljuks of Rum was the arrival of the exiled Byzantine emperor, Alexius III Angelus (1195-1203, died post 1211) <sup>(5)</sup>, in the lands of the Sultanate and his attempt to regain his throne (now in Nicaean exile since 1204/1204) with Seljuk assistance.

(3) Ed. P. Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, vol. I, Vienna 175, p. 53, no. 4/5 and comm. vol. II, Vienna 1977, p. 190. Engl. trans. by A. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p. 106; idem, *The Kleinchroniken on Byzantium's Relations with the Seljuks and on the Oriental Frankish Kingdom's Relations with Saladin and the Mameluks (A.D. 1067-1291)*, *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 1 (1989), p. 36.

(4) Michael Choniates, ed. S. Lambros, vol. II, Athens 1880 (repr. Groningen 1968), pp. 354-55; Engl. trans. by A. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, pp. 110-11; Nicetas Choniates, *Orationes et Epistulae*, ed. J.-L. van Dieten, Berlin 1973, pp. 132, 136-137 and 170-172; Engl. trans. by Savvides, *op. cit.*; pp. 107-110.

(5) On the turbulent reign of Alexius III see C. Barzos, *The Genealogy of the Comneni* (in Greek), vol. II, *Thesalonica* 1984, no. 180 on pp. 726-801 on the hapless emperor's connection with the battle of Antioch-on-the-Maeander.

The text of Georgius Acropolites (ed. A.Heisenberg-corr. add. P.Wirth, vol.I, Stuttgart 1978, pp. 14.24-17.18) runs as follows : "The emperor Alexius (III) finally went to him (the sultan Kaykhusraw in Konya), as he was not willing to take refuge with his son-in-law, // the emperor Theodora (Iscariot in Nicaea). Taking with him the necessary provisions (for the journey) he landed in Atalia (Antalya) <sup>(6)</sup>. where was cordially received by the sultan. Then the emperor Theodore, who was ruling in Nicaea, received a legation sent by the sultan, who informed him of the arrival of his father-in-law (in Konya), the emperor Alexius (III), and accused him of having usurped the legitimate right (of Aleksius) on the (Byzantine) throne. Theodore was alarmed at these words, and fear enveloped him, because (he knew that) the sultan was going to exploit Alexius claims as a pretext for his real plans, that is to conquer and subjugate the entire Roman (Byzantine) state (the Nicaean Empire); so, it was said, things were balancing on a razor's edge for Theodore. He quickly summoned his confidants around him and asked them whether they would be on his side, or they would support his father-in-law, the emperor Alexius (III). Upon this they all unanimously assured him that they were ready to fight and die for him. Thus, greatly encouraged by their noble words, Theodore left Nicaea, taking the sultan's ambassador with him. After a rapid march he arrived at Philadelphia (Alaşehir), while the sultan had reached the city on Antioch, which is situated on the river Maeander (Büyük Menderes); he (Kaykhusraw) had brought the emperor Alexius with him, his bait towards his plans (of conquest), and was about to launch an attack on the city (Antioch), aiming at its capture; for that reason he had catapults erected, with which (his forces) began to bombard (the walls); the city was on the verge of surrender, when the emperor Theodore arrived hastily (there), fearing that if the sultan had succeeded in capturing it, nothing would have been able to stand in his way for the conquest of the entire Roman (Byzantine) territory (Nicaean Empire). He (Theodore) had decided to fight (against the sultan) // with the help and blessing of our Lord Jesus Christ, whose Holy Name has (always) been our shield and banner (in war). So, Theodore had ordered his soldiers to leave

(6) On Alexius III's arrival in Antalya see now A. Savvides, *Attaleia: 11<sup>th</sup>-early 14<sup>th</sup> Century. The transition from Christian to Moslem suzerainty (in Greek)*, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 92 (1989), p. 153. Attaleia, as it is known, was captured by Kaykhusraw I's forces in A. H. 603 (A.D. 1207); details in Savvides, *op. cit.*; pp. 135-142; see also Turan, *Selçuklular*, *op. cit.*; pp. 283-287.

back their tents and heavy possessions, which could tarry (the march of his army); had told them to carry with them only the (absolute) necessaries, that is some food and their clothing as well as everything that is useful for fighting (i.e. their armour shields and weapons). His (theodore's) army consisted of 2000 men 800 of which were Italian (mercenaries), who were valiant and very capable warriors, as time would (soon) prove; the rest (1200) were Romans (Byzantines)<sup>(7)</sup>. As soon as Theodore arrived at Antioch, he sent the Persian (Seljuk)<sup>(8)</sup> ambassador back to his master<sup>(9)</sup>, to him (the ambassador) said that the emperor had arrived and was preparing to attack him. The sultan refused to believe that, but (then) the ambassador took an oath that it was true, so the sultan summoned his troops and placed them in battle formations. They were attacked by the Italians at the beginning, but the massire bulk of the Moslem army annihilated them to the very last; they (the Italians) had manifested a unique caurage and glorius valour, having slain by their swords enemies many times their own number. The extermination of the Italians facilitated the Moslem advance against the Romans (Byzantines), whose majority began to withdraw and retreat at headlong speed, although a small number (of them) continued the fighting waiting for the final outcome. And so it seemed that the sultan had won the contest; he was (restlessly) trying the locate the emperor (Theodore), when somebody (of his soldiers) pointed at him; the emperor (still fighting) had found himself in a desperate position, and he (Kay-khusrew) swiftly rushed upon him, encouraged by his own physical superiority; they immediately recognized /

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- (7) There are significant differences in the Greek sources regarding the numbers of both the Christian and Moslem forces, Acropolites (p. 16.6-9); Scutariotes (p. 455. 24-26) and Gregoras (p. 18.17-19) recorded that the Nicaean army numbered 2.000 men, while George of Pelagonia in the "Vita Ioannis Batatae" (p. 215.25) wrote 3.000. The latter source estimated Kay-khusraw's army to consist of 60.000 men (an exaggerated figure 20.000 provided by Gregoras (p.19.19-20) is the most likely; cf. R. Grousset, *L'Empire du Levant*, Paris 1949<sup>2</sup>, p. 595; Zavoronkov, op. cit; p. 48 note 4.
- (8) On the term "Persai", which usually denotes "Seljuks" in 13<sup>th</sup>-century Greek texts, as well as on other popular appellations of the various Turcophone races at that time by Byzantine authors (e.g. "Agarenoi", "Mousoulmanoi", "Sarakenoi" and "Tourkoi"), see the relevant entries in G.Moravcsik, *Byzantino-turcica*, vol.II, Berlin 1952 (and 1983); cf. commentary by Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p.56 note 1. It is interesting to note here that the "Vita Ionnis Batatae" (p. 200.21) refers to the Seljuks as "this Scythian nation, who are nowadays called Tourkoi".
- (9) Text, p. 16.10-11; cf. Scutariotes, p. 455.27-28. According to Gregoras (p.17.24), however, Theodore I dismissed the Seljuk legates without giving them any definite answer to the sultan's request (bellow note 13).

/ each other; the sultan hit with his mace and the emperor, dozed by the blow he had received on his head (helmet fell from his horse; it is said that his horse fell with him, although I am not positive as to whether the sultan hit it for a second time. But it was then that the unhorsed emperor was suddenly revived by some divine power, and, standing on his feet, he unsheathed his sword; and as the sultan had turned (for a moment) to his soldiers crying boastfully 'ar-resthim', the emperor struck blow on the hind legs of the sultan's mare<sup>(10)</sup>, indeed clossal in size; the sultan fell as if from a tower, and, all of a sudden, his head was choped off, although neither the emperor nor his attendants knew who had decapitated him<sup>(11)</sup>. Thus the emperor, a loser until that time finally carried the day, although he could not advance (and chase the enemy), since he had been left with very few (soldiers). That is why the Romans (Byzantines) proposed a truce; the Moslems accepted and concluded a long term pe-ace with them.

This was Acropolites's account of the bloody confrontation at Antioch-on-the Maeander; we now turn to Nicephorus Gregoras (ed. I.Schopen, vol.I, Bonn 1829, pp. 17.8-21.15), whose long and important text, although written several decades later than that of Aeropolites, provides some interesting complementary details:

"And then (Alexius III) crossed the Aegen (Sea) and arrived in Attalia, in Asia (Minor), where he met Iathatines (Kay-khusraw), the ruler of the Tourkoi (Seljuks), who happened to be there at that time. He (Alexius) asked for protection and aid for his restoration on the throne (of the Byzantine Empire); he reminded him (the sultan) of the Byzantine Empire; he reminded him (the sultan) of the-

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(10) Text, p. 17.9-10; cf. Scutariotes, p. 456.18-19. According to Gregoras (p.21.1-2) the "front legs" of the sultan's horse were struck. Cf. below note 17 and W.Miller, *The Empire of Nicaea and the Recovery of Costantinople*, Cambridge Medieval History IV (1923) p. 484.

(11) Text, p. 17.10-13; cf. Scutariotes, p. 456.19-22. Scutariotes actually complements Acropolites by adding that the sultan's head was attached on the sharp point of a spear causing dread among the retreating Seljuks (p.456.24-25). Although both Acropolites and Scutariotes record that nobody among those present could be certain of the identity of the Christian soldier who decapitated Kay-khusraw that the sultan's head was cut off by "one of Theodore's Lancers", while Gregoras (p.20.26-21.4) attests to the fact that the emperor himself slew Kay-khusraw in single combat, attaching the victims head on his own spear: see below note 18. On the different account of Ibn Bibi (Germ. trans. H.Duda; Köpenhavn 1959, p.55) concerning the sultans death see references in Turan, Selçuklular, pp. 290-291 and Savvides, op. cit; p. 99 notes 2-3. cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 103-4, notes.

ir former friendship<sup>(12)</sup> , and exposed and lamended in a tragical tone with many tears his recent misfortunes; and upon this he promised (to Kay-khusraw) piles of riches (had he restored him). The barbarians accepted and gone in to the promises (of money), although he had also conceived other plans, as he could have used the spoils taken (from the Greeks) in wars (of conxquest) against foreign nations. So he gathered his forces and despatched legates to the emperor Theodore, threatening him (with war), unless he had his father-in-law, Alekxius, restored on the (Byzantine) throne (now in Nicaea). The emperor (Theodore) was at the begining disturbed by the message, but he soon regained his confidence, put his faith in the will of the Omnipotent God, and (deciding to accept the Seljuk challange), dismissed the legates (of the sultan) without giving them any answer<sup>(13)</sup>. Then he began to gather his own troops, which were much inferior in number // when compared to the (bulk of the) Persian (Seljuk) army, and had few chances of being successful (against them). The interventions of Divine Providence, however, could make them seem superior (and thus win). The barbarian (Kay-khusraw) arrived in Antioch on the river Maeander, at the head of a big army consisting of both infantry and cavalry; he surrounded (the town) thus beginning its siege: if he had succeeded in capturing it, he thought, the rest of the territories of the Roman (Byzantine) Empire (of Nicaea) would have easily fallen in his arms.

He had brought with him the (ex) emperor Alexius (III), who was serving as his tool for his devices. The emperor (Theodore) thought that it would have been unwise to expect the barbarian attach first, while he himself would be wavering in his lands out of fear (of a direct engagement). (He was aware that) if they had managed to conquer Antioch, thus getting hold of its spoils and using

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(12) Following his overthrow by his brother Rukn al-Din Süleyman Şah in 1197, Kay-khusraw I (first reign: 1192-97; second reign: 1204/5-1211 fled to Alexius III, who received him well in Constantinople, but when the latter was himself toppled on 17 July 1203, Kay-khusraw was also forced, it seems, to leave the Byzantine capital and arrive in Phrighia, where he was well received by the local Byzantine "archon", Manuel Mautozomes, whose daughter he took the wife. On Kay-khusraw's sojourn in Byzantine lans as well as on Aleqxius III's escapades after 1203 see references in A.Savvides, *Byzantine Minor, A.D.1189-c.1240* (in - Greek), Athens 1987 (diss.) pp. 231-233 and notes 7-12a on pp. 2338-239. See also Barzos, op. cit. (above note 5); R.Radic. *Local Rulers in Byzantium at the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> Century and the first Decades of the 13<sup>th</sup>* (in *Serbo-Croatian*), Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instutue 24-25 (1986), p. 273 ff.

(13) Cf. above note 9.

it as their base for their (further) campaigns, they would have been emboldened (by their success). So he left (Nicaea) and marched at the highest possible speed at the head of no more than 2.000 cavalr-ymen, of whom, as they say, 800 were Latins, chosen men and renowned for their skills in warfare<sup>(14)</sup>. After a three days progress they crossed the defiles of mount Olympus (Ulu Dağ), which extends in a great length, serving as the borderline between Bithynia on the north and the two Phrygia on the south. He arrived (in Phrygia) after an 11-days march and reached the place called Caystrum. He aimed at surprising with a sudden assault the barbarians, who would then be at a loss // not knowing whether an attack was really taking place or not. And so his (sultan's) resistance would seem like that of a toothless and clawless lion boldly attaching a pack (and unity) had not long before been disrupted in many parts : some of them (Greeks) had been scattered in foreign lands, while others had been exterminated by the Latins. Thus the remaining few were so (desperately) lacking in numbers, that they could hardly form a brigade (cohort). But despite that he (the sultan) had doubts whether he should attack directly (the Christian army); (it seems that) his (former) audacity and impetuously had been reduced because of an (ominous) dream he had had. And truly, there is a factor that should be taken into consideration: (in cases like this) when a small army are in a desperate condition, they can often overcome forces which may be superior in number, but are neglectful of their duties and in a state of carelessness. So he (Kay-khusraw) assembled his army totalling around 20.000 men<sup>(15)</sup>: it consisted of archers, slingers, lancers and sword men for hand-to-hand contest. But he was expecting the emperor's forces to charge first, as he was particularly distressed by the fact that his cavalrymen would not be able to advance freely, due to the narrowness of the plain (of the battle this is why he was waiting instead of launching a (direct) attack (on the Christians)<sup>(15a)</sup>. It was the emperor's 800 Latins who began

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(14) Cf. above note 7.

(15) Also above note 7.

(15a) According to George of Pelagonia ("Vita", pp. 200.12-201.25) the early stages of the siege of Antioch were undertaken by "barbarous" Turcomans in Seljuk service, who laid waste the Maenandrid regions, but were eventually repulsed by the "valiant" and "heroic" general Constantine of Lydia. Despite my initial precarious association of this Constantine with Theodore I's brother, Constantine Lascaris (Byzantium in the Near East, p. 102 note 2), I have recently concluded that, by "Constantine", George of Pelagonia actually refers to the uncle (not "grandfather"

(the battle) by forming a dense formation and falling // upon the central phalanx of the enemy: showing a great deal of bravery and prowess, they slew many of them (thus breaking the Seljuk formations) and finally they reached as far as the rear of the enemy's (troops). And then, turning back again, they caused considerable damage to them, as their (the enemy's) slinger and archers could not be of much use for hand to hand battle. (Moreover) (the rest of) the soldiers of the emperor (Theodore), without wasting any precious time, had marched on the enemy as well with tremendous determination. But as soon as the enemy came round (from the surprise of the sudden attack of the Christians), they hit back the Latins by a mere shout and onslaught: they (the Latins) were quickly surrounded and exterminated; they (Seljuks) had (decisively) outnumbered them, thus suffering little loss (in this final engagement with the Latins). So, after that, They (Seljuks) turned against our troops (the Greeks): part of their army were killed and the rest began to retreat. And the leader of the Tourkoi, the sultan Iathaniates (Kay-khusraw) had abandoned everything and was trying to discover the emperor Theodore; when he located him he immediately rushed upon him <sup>(16)</sup>, having confidence in his physical prowess and superiority; and coming near him (Theodore), he struck a blow on his head (helmet) with his mace; the emperor almost lost his senses and fell from his horse. God, however, did not want the emperor of the Romans (Byzantines) to perish in such a manner and his Empire to come to an end. His Grace Helped him (the fallen Lascaris) to crawl away out of the ditch of slime where he had fallen, and made him stand firmly on his feet again. In this miraculous manner he was fit (to carry on with the fight), although he seemed to have been defeated. So he moved rapidly towards the barbarian (the sultan) // unshathing his sword; without difficulty he struck a blow on the front legs<sup>(17)</sup> of the barbarian's horse and the mounted sultan fell: Theodore (then) beheaded him (before he could stand up); he then attached the head on a lance's edge and began to wave it showing it to

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p. 200.12-3) of John III Duvas Batatzes, i.e. John Comnenus Batatzes of Philadelphia ("Vita", p. 203.8-21); cf. A. Savvides, Constantine XI Lascaris, uncrowned and ephemeral "Basileus of the Rhomaioi" after the fall of Constantinople to the 4<sup>th</sup> Crusade, *Byzantiaka* 7 (1987), p. 166 note 120 with relevant bibliography.

(16) Doubtlessly the two men must have met in Constantinople, during the long period of Kay-khusraw's exile in the Byzantine capital (c.1197-c.1203); cf. above note 12.

(17) Cf. above note 10



the barbaric troops<sup>(18)</sup>. This was the (main) reason for the beginnings of the Roman (Byzantine) victory, which had been effected through the mediation of Divine Providence, standing above any human power. The barbarians were filled with horror and exasperation and started a massive retreat at headlong speed: the emperor had miraculously averted this imminent danger, and, what is more, he had eventually crushed (the enemy). After (the triumph) he staged a triumphant entrance in Antioch, where he offered his gratitude to the Almighty from the bottom of his heart. Following this (their defeat), the barbarians promptly sent a legation to the emperor entreating for peace, which they were granted; the emperor himself started its terms according to his own interest, so, they were not favourable to them (the Seljuks)" <sup>(19)</sup>.

Athens, January 1991

Centre For Byzantine Research,

Hellenic National Research Foundation.

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- (18) Cf. above note 11. George of Pelagonia has his own version of the "arranged" duel between the two leaders, which went well for Lascaris; When Kay-Khusraw fell from his horse, one of the Nicaean "daryphoroi" (Lancers) rushed on the fallen sultan and decapitated him; before Lascaris could recover from that, the unknown soldier attached the sultan's head on his spear and showed it to the jubilant Nicaean forces, whose possible retreat turned into an over-whelming victory and the eventually despoiled the Seljuk camp: "Vita Ionnis Batatae", pp. 216.115-217.8.
- (19) Text, p. 21.12-15; cf. Acropolites, 17.17-18 and Scutariotes, p. 456.30-31. On the 'treaty' see F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserrurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, vol. III (1204-1282), Munich-Berlin 1932, p.3 no.1682 (revised ed. by P. Wirth, Munich-Berlin 1977<sup>2</sup>, pp. 5-6 no. 1682); in fact it was a truce between the Byzantines and the Seljuks, since the official treaty was signed on the 14 June 1211 between Theodore Lascaris I and Kay-khusraw I's son and successor, Kay-kawus I: cf. G. Vismara, *Bisanzio e l'Islam. Per la storia dei trattati tra la Cristianità orientale e le potenze musulmane*, Milan 1950, p. 54: "... un armistizio o..."; see also Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 120-121- *Turquie pre-ottomane*, p. 68; Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East*, p. 104 note 5; cf also Kafesoğlu (tras. Leiser), op. cit; p. 73, who refers to the treaty as 'favourable' to Seljuks. Zavoronkov, op. cit; pp. 50 ff; 60-61, expresses his reservations concerning Ibn Bibi's testimony (trans. Duda, pp. 57-58) that, following his victory, the Nicaean Emperor sent an envoy to Kay-kawus I proposing peace, because he feared retaliations. Actually, Zavoronkov's thesis is that the struggle between Nicaea and the Konya Sultanate did not come to an end after the 1211 treaty, but continued until 1215/1216. The boundary between Konya and Nicaea, however, seems to have "remained fairly constant between 1211 and the removal of the capital from Nicaea to Constantinople", according to S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the 11<sup>th</sup> through the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, California V.P. 1971 (repr. 1986), p. 132.