

Socialism: Confusing Morals and Politics

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Abstract

Private property, properly defined, means that an object or a state of affairs is valued as a good and owned by someone who decides upon its use in a sovereign way and with respect to all dimensions of it (usus, usus fructus, abusus). The uncritically transposition of moral conceptions, such as distributive justice and voluntariness, into the political sphere helps modern socialist reasoning in combining capitalist principles with collectivist ones and thus undermining private property.

Introduction

This paper is about private property and its undermining by socialist thinking. Based on Hayek, I shall argue that modern socialist thinking is not only about transposing the values of the tribal society into the great anonymous society, but also about transposing moral conceptions into the political sphere.

When it comes to economic theory and economic policy, we live in a world of myths. Allegedly, socialism is intellectually and otherwise dead, and capitalism, namely neo-liberalism, is spreading all over, constantly steering economic reforms in the Old West and implementing capitalism everywhere else and thus leading there to destruction of cultures and wealth under the banner of globalisation. Nothing of all this is true, nothing supported by any sound empirical evidence. Socialism is as lively as ever, intellectually even more sophisticated than before, hardly any of the alleged capitalist reforms deserve its name, and economic globalisation is always to the effect that it enriches the development countries. If in the course of (non-political, i.e. non-governmental) globalisation, cultures change and adapt to capitalist practices, they do so voluntarily and not by capitalist force. There is no such thing as a capitalist enforcer, for by definition capitalism excludes any involuntary act.

If this is so, why do such myths thrive? In the following sections, I shall provide some arguments for the thesis that a confusion of

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moral and political categories, especially a confusion of moral and political conceptions support this development and the intellectual reasoning current socialism reveals. Doing so, I shall use a few examples from the country with which I am most familiar: Germany. However and despite differences in culture, history and mentality, following the development of reforms in other European countries, one hardly gains the impression that other European nations are either much better off or much worse off. Differences occur only in degree and with respect to the area of economic reform, but not in category.

Socialism and Property Rights

If we were to believe socialists, today's politics is dominated by neo-liberalism, the rule of property rights and the neglect of social justice. However, when we have a closer look to policy decisions, the reverse is true. Though not necessarily of communist spirit and though of some sort of liberal heritage, socialist mentality is lively as ever and recently in a sophisticated and powerful restated for instance by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel. Murphy and Nagel claim in their new book¹ that a fantasy existed according to which „we earn our income and the government takes some of it away from us.“ Not so, they say. According to these two scholars from New York University, individual citizens do not own anything except through laws that are enacted and enforced by the state, because without government there would be anarchy. As a consequence, we would not have the pretax incomes we enjoy without government's protection. Hence it is after-tax incomes that we are entitled to own.

This view can be criticized for many reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the authors obviously ignore the literature on the protection of property without the state.² It is neither logically nor chronologically evident that private property presupposes a state and a tax system. People lived in small hordes for hundreds of thousands of years without these relatively recent developments in human cultural evolution.

Be this as it may, Murphy and Nagel represent a type of thinking which borrows elements from capitalism and mixes them with ideas of collectivism in order to come up with the proposal that since the appropriation of private property, be it material or intellectual, rests on the usage of goods, which owe their existence to the spontaneous cooperation of everybody, past and present generations, it is only fair to pay taxes as if they were a toll which in some proportional way were to pay for using these goods.

As James Griffin has put it, „... products are no longer just my doing, or even yours, mine, his and hers in identifiable proportions. Society now makes its own contribution; so does tradition. Not even the products of thought retain much purity. A medical researcher might make a discovery of great commercial value. He might have worked terribly hard to bring it off. But even so, who trained him? Who moved the subject to the point where the discovery became possible? Who built the lab in which he worked? Who runs it? Who pays for it? Who is responsible for the enduring social institutions that present the commercial opportunities? One who cleverly exploits the

¹ Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, *The Myth of Ownership*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

² Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *The Myth of National Defense. Essays in the Theory and History of Security Production*, Auburn, AL.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2003, 454 pgs.

social framework has both his cleverness and the framework to thank.” (J. Griffin, *Well-Being*, Oxford 1986, p. 288.)

In a similar way, Joel Feinberg has argued that the individual producer owes as much or more to this “pool” than to his own efforts. Anthony de Jasay³ rightly has pointed out that these authors simply ignore that the “pool” of societal goods consists of nothing but positive externalities. By definition as well as historically, they emerged spontaneously and yet are the outcome of voluntary transactions (contracts) among individuals who were fully compensated. There is no bone to pick with anybody. Members of human society may profit from the pool, some more, some less, but merely being a member does not establish a right to toll others who use the pool more often than they do. One might add, *per impossibile*, that a consequence of the pool concept would be that enterprisers, artists, scientist, inventors were entitled to claim remuneration from others for the usage of the positive externalities they create in bigger proportions than their fellow members.

It is hard to imagine that these modes of thinking were original. On the contrary, it seems that they were residuals of our phylogeny, of the tribal society, as Hayek⁴ called it, in which man lived for such a long part of his cultural evolution. In prehistoric times, these groups were wonderfully adapted to nature. Individuals hardly ever managed to survive without the protection and support of their fellow group members. No wonder

the concepts of Feinberg, Griffin, Murphy and Nagel are so readily received by many.

However, as Hayek rightly pointed out, the huge anonymous society of our times requires different values in order to survive. These are the values of capitalism that ask for the recognition of private property, individual liberty and the compliance with (voluntary agreed) contracts. Moreover, it appears to me that the new type of socialist thinking as described above rests not exclusively on moral sensations of the tribal society. It also rests on moral conceptions, namely those of Aristotle, that were developed for the small society rather than for the great society. In order to explain this in more detail it is useful to start with some basic remarks on the conception of private property in general.

Private Property, Properly Defined

The two facts, firstly, that the above quoted authors, namely Feinberg, Griffin, Murphy and Nagel, fail to recognise that societal goods (pool goods) are nothing else but positive externalities, owned by nobody, and secondly, that they revive socialism by mixing it with capitalist principles (partial recognition of property rights) reveals the need for more enlightenment on the proper definition of private property.

This section summarizes some concluding statements that go along with the word private property. Though some of them look trivial, that they are in fact, we shall later see why they are significant enough to be mentioned here. (It should be stressed here that the following remarks operate on a descriptive level if not indicated otherwise.)

It is not necessarily an expression of feminist thought, if one objects to the custom to define a wife by the relation to her husband.

³Anthony de Jasay, “On Redistribution”, in: *Advances in Austrian Economics*, Vol. 2, pp. 179ff.

⁴ See Friedrich A. von Hayek, „Epilogue: The three sources of human values“, in *his Law, Legislation and Liberty*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982 (complete edition in new one-volume paperback).

The demur might well rest on other grounds. On a common sense level, one might argue that such a definition is simply misleading, for the fact that one person is married to another is accidental rather than constitutional to both.

For the same reason, it equally would be a fallacy to define private goods by their relation to public goods. Thus it would be fallacious to conclude that different to public goods, for which most authors claim non-exclusivity⁵, private goods are exclusive. Whether or not a good is exclusive is a coincidental character rather than a constitutional character of the good in question. It all depends on the way the good is treated by its owner and others. If an owner shares his good with others, it loses its exclusivity

⁵ At the same time, we cannot deal here with the related question of how to define public goods appropriately. It seems, however, obvious that non-exclusion is an inappropriate constitutional character of public goods. So a likely concomitant of public goods, it is only coincidental. For instance: For the time a public library is used by just one person, it is, strictly speaking, not non-exclusive.

Probably without complete reflection of the problems discussed here, and rather more by intuition and/or lead by other reasons, many authors prefer to define public goods, normatively, by non-excludability. Thus, shifting the topic from the descriptive level to the prescriptive level, they circumvent all the problems on the descriptive level with which we are concerned here. On various meanings of non-excludable public goods, see also (whether in a technical, normative or any other sense. On this see Gerard Radnitzky, Review article of Anthony de Jasay, 'Social contract, free ride' (London: Oxford University Press 1989), in *The Cato Journal* 9 (Spring/Summer 1989), pp. 268-270.

In logical terms, the fallacy of defining a private good in relation to public goods ultimately rests on the confusion of contrary and contradictory terms: With respect to the reference system in question, the category of goods, public goods and private goods are contrary terms, but not contradictory terms. A good may also be a common good and thus, by definition, neither private nor public. Contradictory terms presuppose the absence of such a third modus in which the term can appear, a tertium quid. An example for contradictory terms would be "alive" and "dead".

though not necessarily its character of being private.⁶

Analogously, it would be misleading to say that a private good is a good for which the owner has solved the exclusion problem, or paid the exclusion costs. Although this may hold for many private goods, it is accidental, but not constitutional. Some private goods do not have any exclusion costs, simply because there is nobody interested in being included.⁷

Consequently, an appropriate definition of private property presupposes to look for the subject who privatised the good. This is because the reason to name a good private is not in the good itself, rather than in the relationship between the good in question and a "relator", i.e. someone who owns it privately, namely the owner. If the owner is sovereign over it, then the good in question is a private good, his private good. In other words: It is sovereignty rather than exclusivity that defines private property.⁸

⁶ Bringing in the owner's *right* to exclude others shifts the story onto another level for which different conditions hold. Foremost, talking of rights requires the inclusion of normative sentences in the debate, while the aforesaid operates with descriptive sentences exclusively.

⁷ Think of bulky waste that nobody wishes to have. If placed on no-mans-land it becomes a common good (or evil); if placed on a public good (street) it becomes a public good (or evil); if thrown in the neighbours garden, it continues being private – and most likely becomes subject of a fierce dispute among neighbours.

⁸ "Sovereignty may be delegated revocably, or transferred for good, but it cannot be shared, and that is why there is no true property that, after cancelling out agents, delegates and intermediaries, is not mine, yours, his or hers." (Anthony de Jasay, *Choice, Contract, Consent. A Restatement of Liberalism*, London: IEA 1991, p. 75)

One might add that exclusion is the most common expression of sovereignty. However and still on a descriptive level, exclusion only expresses the mode of usage over a given time, where it is sovereignty that indicates who decides on this mode. Exactly this, the fact that there is one identifiable person who decides on the use of a

Though it holds for all kinds of goods, it should be added here that a private good is not a good *per se*, but only through the valuation of man. It is man who rates an object or a state of affairs, for instance a service, to be either a good or a bad. In some cases there exists intersubjective agreement on whether or not an object or state of affairs is either a good or a bad, in some not. And it is the price paid for a good that expresses that purchaser and seller had close so not identical valuations of the good for the time of exchange.⁹

To sum up, we can say that by definition a private good needs to be valued as a good and owned by someone who is sovereign in using it. Having said that, it seems worth to envision what is meant by sovereignty. If the term is to make sense, it cannot but mean that the person in question is free to use his private good to his or her liking. In other words, sovereignty over goods presupposes individual freedom.

Unfortunately, even in classical liberal and libertarian literature the concept of individual freedom is far from being clearly de-

good in all its variations (usus, usus fructus, abusus) permits us to they that the very good is private.

Notwithstanding the previous note, it seems appropriate at least to indicate that an explication of the term "public good" would show that one of its main characteristics is non-sovereignty.

⁹ Though it may sound paradoxically, it goes without saying that at the time of exchange the purchaser values the good more than the seller. If both value it to identical degree, they do not exchange at all, given two rational actors. The fact that they agree on the price might leave a different impression at first sight. It should be noted that the agreed price is not the price of the good rather the price of exchange. If the purchaser would rate good and price identical, he had no rational incentive to trade, because nothing would compensate him for his costs associated with the transfer action. Hence, the purchaser rates the good higher than the price he will pay. Analogously, the seller rates the price (money) higher than the good.

finied. In fact they suffer under circularity.¹⁰ In order to have a more precise definition and thus a better intellectual tool in political economy, I proposed an explication at a different place.¹¹ The upshot of my "explication," which avoids circularity, is to look at freedom and coercion as both including offers of two kinds, i.e. that both ask for two different decisions, one on the object-level and one on the meta-level. It can be shown that choice under coercion produces cost on the meta-level that choice in liberty does not evoke.¹²

¹⁰ See my „Breaking the circle: The definition of individual liberty“, in: *Etica and Politica*, forthcoming. For a more detailed explication of the subject see my *Freiheit, Liberalismus und Wohlfahrtsstaat*, Baden Baden: Nomos: 1997, Chapter 3.

¹¹ On the characteristics of an explication see Gerard Radnitzky, „Explikation“, in *Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie*, ed. by Helmut Seiffert and Gerard Radnitzky, Munic: Ehrenwirth 1989, pp. 75-80.

¹² My starting point is that the perception of a new information creates a new decision. As soon as we perceive a new information we cannot but decide whether or not to change our plans because of the new data. This happens every day hundreds of times. These situations constitute what we might call "either-or-choices". Of course, these "either-or-choices" of our daily life are often routinised. Nonetheless, they call for decisions caused by new information.

For instance, when we start to cross a street and perceive an approaching car, then we have to decide either to pursue the existing plan or to change it. When we read a sales offer, then we cannot but decide either to react to it or to stay to the status. When we on our way to our home cross the market and being asked by the merchant to buy either apples, oranges, or bananas, then again we cannot but decide whether to stay to our original plan or to change it, i.e., to "react" to that offer.

Of course, this decision we will make will be somehow influenced by the offer itself, e.g. by the price and quality of the fruits. Nonetheless, the decision either to react to the offer or not is not to be confused with the choice between apples, oranges, or bananas. It was even there if there was no choice between apples, oranges, and bananas, for instance, if the merchant spoke to us in a foreign language or too faint to be clearly understood. If it was the case that the merchant conveyed no choice between apples, oranges, or bananas, then we still had to decide whether we deviated from our original plan (i.e.,

react to the foreign speaking merchant) or stayed to our original intention (i.e., going home unflustered). The first decision precedes the second analytically, although it might coincide with it chronologically.

To distinguish these two types of decision a terminological distinction is useful. It is also useful to start with the description of the second decision of the example mentioned above. The second decision (choice between three different fruits) is characterised by the fact that it constitutes a decision among different objects. I propose to call that second decision an object-decision. The number of objects does not influence the character of an object-decision. In order to distinguish the two types of decisions clearly, I propose to call the first decision meta-decision. The first decision (meta-decision) is a decision between staying to the original plan or deviating from it, hence an "either-or-choice". Having these two and only these two alternatives is a constitutional character of a meta-decision. The decision is necessarily no other than a decision between "either" "or", independent of the content of the plan to which one either stays or from which one deviates.

However, what is the distinction between object-decision and meta-decision good for, beside from the fact that it might serve as an analytical insight of decision processes? The decision helps us out of our circular definition. To use that help, let us look, firstly, at a typical case of coercion and, secondly, at that very case transformed into a typical case of free choice.

(A) Suppose, you liked to keep your money and your life. Suppose also, an armed robber asked for your "Money or life!" That would be understood as a clear case of what we use to call coercion.

(B) Suppose now, that, *ceteris paribus*, the same person would be unarmed and obviously unable to threaten or extort you in any possible way, and suppose, that very person would kindly ask you to give him either money or your life. Then we would not say that he coerces you. We would classify his saying as a case in which he offers you a free choice. (Although it does not matter analytically, we also would classify his saying as silly.)

Now, let us separate the meta-decision from the object-decision. With regard to the object-decision, the two cases (A and B) do not differ. In both cases you have the choice either to give your money or your life. Hence, in both cases the costs of your decision will be the same.

With respect to the possible meta-decisions, we notice a difference. The costs of a positive meta-decision (i.e., to consider the offer of the person), however huge, are the same in both cases. Nonetheless, the costs of a negative meta-decision (i.e., to ignore the offer of the person) differ decisively. In the first case you have to expect additional costs by the person (e.g., being shot or hurt). In the second case you do not have to expect such costs. Hence, under the preconditions mentioned above

Taken this into consideration, one can simplify the outcome by saying individual liberty means the option to refute offers without any costs that would come along as penalty for refusal.

Transposing a moral conception into a political one

It appears to me that some of the socialist reasoning can be interpreted as the outcome of an uncritical shift of moral conceptions into the area of politics. Think of the various models of a "Third Way" in politics, who explicitly or implicitly free ride on Aristotle's moral conception of the "Golden Rule", "that one should use the mean – not the excess, nor the deficiency – and that the mean is as the right principle dictates."¹³ "Third Way"-models ignore that the Aristotelian principal of right moral conduct is a conception made for morals, not for politics. One cannot simply transpose the Aristotelian moral system into the political sphere and infer that the right way in politics is the mean, the "Third Way".

Of course, the thesis that the uncritical transposition of a moral conception into a political one contributed to socialist thinking needs more extensive and elaborate support than can be provided here. I shall restrain myself here to a prominent example of Aristotelian philosophy, namely the conception of distributive justice and the conception of voluntariness. I shall argue that these conceptions raise no difficulties if understood as moral conceptions, but become irritating when used as political conceptions.

the difference between a case of coercion and a case of free choice is in the artificial costs that are to be expected in case of a negative meta-decision.

¹³ Aristotle, *Ethics* (Penguin Books), revised edition 1976, p. 203.

It is well known that the conception of social or distributive justice goes back to Aristotle's treatment of justice as a virtue in his *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁴ In the third and fourth book of his *Ethics*, Aristotle introduces such well-known virtues as courage, temperance, and liberality. These virtues, and a few minor ones, if practised, mark the just man. The just man is a virtuous man, for short. Justice in this sense is universal.

In this universal sense, justice tells us something about human *actions*, but not of human *transactions*; nothing about the transactions of goods and evils among individuals or within groups. To judge human transactions, Aristotle uses justice in a particular sense. And since these transactions have a distributive and a rectificatory aspect, he ends up with two types of particular justice.

“One kind of particular justice, and of that which is just in the corresponding sense, is that which is shown in the distribution of honour or money or such other assets as are divisible among the members of the community (for in these cases it is possible for one person to have either an equal or an unequal share with another); and another kind which rectifies the conditions of a transaction. This latter kind has two parts, because some transactions are voluntary and others involuntary.”¹⁵

With this distinction, the difference between (*re*)*distributive justice* or *social justice* and *commutative justice* or simply *justice* was settled. Aristotle always thought that, besides honour, only common goods, rather than private goods, should be subject to dis-

tribution among members of a community.¹⁶ The following quotation states this clearly. Moreover, if distribution of common goods among citizens were to happen, then they were to happen in corresponding proportions to the contributions of the citizens, according to Aristotle. “If the distribution is made from common funds, it will be in the same ratio as the corresponding contributions bear to one another.”¹⁷

Each according to his contribution. This is the message of Aristotle's distributive (or social) justice. It has nothing in common with what socialists intend when they talk of social justice. They use the term „social justice“ either to call for redistribution of private property (socialism) or for a redistribution of income (social democracy), allegedly for the needy.¹⁸ In either case it is obviously in opposition to Aristotle's principle of distributive justice.

The socialist interpretation of social justice opposes commutative justice too. Aris-

¹⁶ See also Aristotle, *The Politics*, edited by Stephen Everson, Cambridge: University Press 1992, „Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make progress, because everyone will be attending to his own business.“ The phrase „should be in a certain sense common“ alludes to things one shares or uses with friends commonly. Of what should be common and used commonly, Aristotle wrote, „although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. ... And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property.“

¹⁷ 1131b27ff.

¹⁸ This allegation is either hypercritical or false or both. Redistribution transfers from the poor and rich to the medium income classes; see Erich Weede, Vom europäischen Wunder zum schleichenden Sozialismus, in: Gerard Radnitzky and Hardy Bouillon, *Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik*, Berlin: Springer 1991, pp. 15-46.

¹⁴ All quoted passages after the Penguin Edition, *The Ethics of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by J.A.K. Thomson, revised edition 1976.

¹⁵ 1130b30ff.

totle declared that commutative justice has to equalise injustice in the course of transaction. Transaction can be either voluntary (selling, buying, lending at interest, etc.) or involuntary (theft, murder, robbery, etc.). Both types can lead to injustice for obvious reasons. Voluntary transactions can be subject to fraud. That means that one party breaches the contract and thus causes injustice. Involuntary transactions lack the consent of at least one party involved and thereby cause injustice. In the name of commutative justice judges should, according to Aristotle, equalise these unjust inequalities. Since "all that the law considers is the difference caused by the injury; and it treats the parties as equals, only asking whether one has committed and the other suffered an injustice, or whether one has inflicted and the other suffered a hurt. Accordingly the judge tries to equalise the inequality of this injustice."¹⁹

It is obvious that commutative and distributive justice, as developed by Aristotle, were supplementary to each other. They were not mutually exclusive as are justice and social justice today. We can convert Aristotle's understanding of justice into a very simply message: *Transactions are just if they include the consent of all parties involved.*

Some of human transactions are taken by two or some people, others by bigger societies, for instance by nations. In this particular sense it is reasonable to distinguish between individual and societal transactions. Market transactions among people, as for instance buying and selling goods, might be rated as individual transactions, whereas the exchange of taxes and public goods represent societal transactions, because it includes all (or nearly all) members of a society. Ar-

istotle and his contemporaries knew of such societal transactions. He had these in mind when he talked about the distribution of honour or common funds among citizens.

Therefore, the word „social“ in social justice has to be interpreted descriptively rather than normatively. Social justice means justice of social (societal) transactions. These transactions are just only if they include the consent of all parties involved. Of course, universal consent to social transactions, like the distribution of common funds, is likely only if each receives from the fund in the same ratio as he contributed to it. The smaller the society, the lesser the probability that the consent cannot be achieved.

Today, social justice has a different meaning, mostly normative. As Anthony Flew has written, *social justice takes „justly acquired property of some in order to transfer it to others who have not been unjustly deprived of it.“*²⁰ Neither does social justice have or ask for the universal consent, nor does it distribute in the same ratio as it collects. The collection and use of taxes illustrate this fact and thus that social justice became a political conception.

Paying taxes is mandatory. If tax-paying would rest on universal consent, then it would not need to be mandatory. With respect to German income tax, roughly speaking, today 4% of the tax-payers (highest taxed) pay 40 % of the total income tax, whereas 40% of the tax-payers (lowest taxed) pay 4% of the total income. Since both groups have equal access to the public goods provided by income tax, the ratio of

¹⁹ 1132a3

²⁰Anthony Flew, Social democracy and the myth of social justice, in *Libertarians and Liberalism. Essays in Honour of Gerad Radnitzky*, ed. by Hardy Bouillon, Aldershot: Avebury 1996, p. 349.

distribution is not the same as the ratio of the contribution.²¹

It is obvious that social justice in this socialist interpretation opposes justice. Justice takes unjustly acquired property of some in order to transfer it to others who have been unjustly deprived of it. Contrary to this, social justice takes justly acquired property of some in order to transfer it to others who have not been unjustly deprived of it.

Finally, let us turn to the conception of voluntariness, which in a similar way as does the conception of distributive justice becomes an irritating one once it is uncritically transposed into politics.

As is fairly known, Aristotle wrote his *Nicomachean Ethics* mainly for his students, the would be leading figures of the small urban society in which they grew up. In his book, he was pretty clear on voluntariness as a moral conception. "If an involuntary act is one performed under compulsion or as a result of ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be one of which the originating cause lies in the agent himself, who knows the particular circumstances of his action."²² It is important to note that for Aristotle voluntariness presupposed the absence of coercion *and* the presence of knowledge of the particular circumstances of his action.

If one were to adopt Aristotle's moral conception of voluntariness analogously in an unreflected way as a political conception, one would end up with a conception of individual freedom that would invite to all sorts of intrusion. The reason for this is quite simple. Morals is about rules for the conduct of life subject to individual choice, politics is about rules for a political body subject to political choice. Saying that an individual chose without compulsion but also without sufficient knowledge is just a statement, either true or false. But there is nothing in the fact of incomplete knowledge that would give cause to interference. All we can do (by using our liberties and our information) is to offer this person information about the particular circumstances of his or her action in order to help him or her to achieve a higher degree of voluntariness (in the terms Aristotle defined it).

In political sphere, the story changes decisively. Given the rules for a political body were such that some institution (for instance the state) were asked to increase people's lack of information about the particular circumstances of their actions in order to increase their degree of voluntariness, the state had ample reason to do so whenever he thinks people decide on the basis of incomplete knowledge. In other words: It would make complete sense to argue that the state is to coerce its citizens to take some information, which is necessary in the state's perspective, into account for the benefit of their individual liberty. In more plain terms: It would make sense to say that the state coerces people to make them free.²³

²¹ In Germany the exact ratio of tax group to tax share in 1995 was 4.1% to 37.6% (tax payers with an income of 120,000.00 DM p.a.) and 43.5% to 4.7% (tax payers with an income of less than 30,000.00 DM p.a.); see Roland Baader, *Fauler Zauber. Schein und Wirklichkeit des Sozialstaats*, Gräffelfing: Resch 1997, p. 108-109.

²² Aristotle, *Ethics* (Penguin Books), revised edition 1976, p. 115. I should stress that my remarks are not meant to give an interpretation of Aristotle. Rather I solely intend to use the categories he provided and to draw some consequences when these are transposed into the political sphere.

²³ Some might feel reminded of *Catch 22*, others to the German Enlightenment Philosophy and the welfare state in particular. However, I leave it to the reader what he thinks of such a consequence.

This consequence is another way of saying that the impact of conceptions may vary from framework to framework. However, it goes without saying that this conception of individual freedom uncritically adapted from

Aristotle's moral conception of voluntariness does not harmonise with the definition of individual freedom given above. It gives ample support to any collectivist thinking and to any destructions of individual liberty.

Amerikan Kıskacında Dış Politika

Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası

Ramazan Gözen

Körfez Savaşı, sadece Orta Doğu bölgesinin değil, hatta 20. yüzyıl dünya politikasının en önemli dönüm noktasından biridir. Savaş, bölgesel dengeleri temelden etkilediği gibi, Soğuk Savaş döneminin sona ermesinde de katalizör görevi yapmıştır. Körfez Savaşı'nda kaçınılmaz olarak çok kritik bir pozisyonda olan Türkiye'nin, böylesi önemli olaya dönük dış politikası da, en az Körfez Savaşı kadar ilginç, çarpıcı ve tartışmalı olmuştur.

Bu kitapta, Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı politikasının analizi yapılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Türkiye'nin nasıl bir kıskaç altında kaldığı, Körfez Savaşı girdabına nasıl düştüğü, Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı politikasının oluşumunda hangi faktörlerin rol oynadığı, bu süreçte oldukça aktif bir rol oynayan ve ön plana çıkan dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın, böyle bir dış politikayı niçin, nasıl ve hangi şartlar altında oluşturduğu ve nihayet, Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı politikasının ortaya çıkardığı sonuçların Türkiye'yi ve Türk dış politikasının nasıl etkilediği sorularına cevaplar bulacaksınız.

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