

VASAD

Vankulu Sosyal Arařtırmalar Dergisi
Sayı/Issue: 3
Sayfa / Page: 71-87
Yaz / Summer, 2019

Geliř/Received: 19.04.2019 | Kabul/
Accepted: 08.05.2019
Makale Bilgisi / Article Info :
Arařtırma Makalesi / Research Article



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**ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE * | SOĞUK SAVAŐ SONRASI DÖNEMDE
SİLAHLARIN KONTROLÜ VE SİLAHSIZLANMA: AVRUPA GÜVENLİK VE
İŐBİRLİĐİ TEŐKİLATI'NIN ROLÜNÜN BİR ANALİZİ**

Abstract

This article is mainly interested in analyzing the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the efforts to create and maintain regional arms control and disarmament regimes in the post-Cold War era. The Proliferation of mass destruction weapons (WMD) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, their delivery means and the proliferation of conventional weapons is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. After the Cold War period, the OSCE, as a regional security organization, started to attach special importance to arms control and disarmament issues in its region under the umbrella of its politico-military dimension. Although the politico-military dimension of the OSCE has diminished in importance since the end of the Cold War, it remains relevant for security. Disarmament, arms control, and CSBMs are important parts of the overall efforts to enhance security in the military field. In order to increase military transparency and predictability, the OSCE supports the implementation of arms control treaty regimes. The OSCE has contributed to the maintenance of regional and international security through its activities on arms control and disarmament.

Keywords: Armament, Disarmament, Arms Control, The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

* This article is from unpublished PhD thesis of Hakan Karaaslan, 'The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the Post-Cold War Era: An Analysis of Its Comprehensive Approach to Security', submitted to the Middle East Technical University, 2015.

Öz

Bu alıřma temel olarak Soğuk Savař sonrası dönemde bölgesel temel- li silah kontrol ve silahsızlanma rejimlerinin kurulması ve sürdürülmesi abala- rında Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliđi Teřkilatı'nın (AGİT) rolünün analiz edilmesi ile ilgilidir. Nükleer, biyolojik ve kimyasal silahları içeren kitle imha silahlarının yayılması, bu silahları gönderme araçları ve konvansiyonel silahların yayılma- sı 21. yüzyılda büyüyen bir somut tehdittir. Bölgesel bir güvenlik örgütü olarak AGİT, Soğuk Savař sonrası dönemde siyasi-askeri boyutu şemsiyesi altında kendi bölgesinde silahların kontrolü ve silahsızlanma konularına özel bir önem vermeye başlamıştır. AGİT'in siyasi-askeri boyutunun Soğuk Savař'ın bitiminden bu yana önemi azalmış olmasına rağmen, güvenlik açısından halen gündemde olma özelli- ğini korumaktadır. Silahsızlanma, silahların kontrolü ve Güven ve Güvenlik Arttı- rıcı Önlemler askeri alanda güvenliđi artırma amaçlı abaların önemli bir parçası- dır. AGİT, askeri şeffaflıđı ve öngörülebilirliđi artırmak için, silahların kontrolüne yönelik rejimlerin uygulanmasını desteklemektedir. AGİT silahların kontrolü ve silahsızlanma üzerine yürüttüğü faaliyetler ile bölgesel ve uluslararası güvenliđin sürdürülmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Silahlanma, Silahsızlanma, Silahların Kontrolü, Avrupa Konvansiyonel Kuvvetler Antlaşması (AKKA), Avrupa Güvenlik ve İş- birliđi Teřkilatı (AGİT)

Introduction

The idea of security defined as a 'state' or 'national security' in largely militarized terms' dominated the field of security for much of the Cold War era (Baylis, 2011: 300). Because the structure of the international system is anarchic in the absence of any central authority, states had the main responsibility for their own security (Gärtner and Adrian Hyde-Price, 2001: 1-2). Statesmen and academics mainly focused on the military capabilities of the states to address existential threats, posing serious risks and challenges to their security and stability (Baylis, 2011: 300). In this respect, military power which was defined in terms of military capabilities was seen as the best instrument to achieve security in the international system. As a result, "security was defined as the absence of threat or the capability to deter threat" (Gärtner and Adrian Hyde-Price, 2001: 1-2).

"The highly militarized and highly polarized ideological con- frontation between the superpowers" dominated the international security agenda during the Cold War era. In this period, due to the intensive rivalry and confrontation between the two blocs and the danger of nuclear war, political-military issues were dominant in the international security agenda (Buzan, 1991: 433).

For much of the Cold War period, military dimension of securi- ty was dominant in security studies. Traditional military and state-centric

approaches dominated the security agenda for much of the Cold War period (Buzan, 1991: 158-159). National security was considered primarily in military terms (Buzan, 1991: 222) The main focus of security studies within the framework of state-centric and military conception of security were “the study of threat and war and the control of military force” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 162). During the Cold War period, state was accepted as the main referent object of security and military domain was adopted as the privileged security dimension (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 166).

With the end of the Cold War period, a new security understanding has come to the fore in security studies beyond the traditional military and state-centric security conceptions of the Cold War. This new security thinking is mainly based on broadening and deepening of security studies. This new way of thinking on security as a concept has portrayed new referent objects rather than the state and new security dynamics and issues for security analysis (Gärtner and Adrian Hyde-Price, 2001: 3). Within this context, the origins of threats and challenges have been diversified, arising from different dimensions such as economic, environmental and societal in addition to the political and military domains. These new security threats and challenges started to gain importance and at the same time, they have been integrated into the security analysis. The new threat areas include the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic and environmental concerns, democracy, political stability, socio-political cohesion of societies, social and cultural issues, illegal migration, religion and identity issues (Gärtner and Adrian Hyde-Price, 2001: 4-5), , poverty, pandemics, organized crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons and international terrorism” (Mérand, Irondelle and Foucault, 2011: 14-15). Economic and environmental issues started to come into the security agenda and non-military issues or non-military aspects of security started to achieve security status (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998: 2-3).

In the post-Cold war period, military-based threats and challenges to international security have remained relevant. Within this framework, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons their delivery means and the proliferation of conventional weapons is a growing tangible threat in the 21st century. According to the introduction part of the SIPRI Yearbook 2017, “virtually all the major global indicators for peace and security have moved in a negative direction: more military spending, increased arms trading, more violent conflicts and the continuing forward march of military technology. Existing multilateral and bilateral arms control agreements and processes are also under challenge—not least due to the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the United States—raising questions of global concern

and potentially epochal scope” (International security, armament and disarmament, <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2017/01>, Accessed on 15 April, 2019).

This article is mainly interested in analyzing the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the efforts to create and maintain regional arms control and disarmament regimes in the post-Cold War era. Within this framework, the study firstly tries to explain armament issue as a serious threat to international security. Secondly, this paper mainly aims to explain and analyze the role and activities of the OSCE in creating and maintaining regional arms control regimes with a specific emphasis on Europe. Finally, the study tries to summarize the main findings of the research in the concluding part.

1. Armament Race as a Threat to International Security

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological and chemical ones and their delivery means constitute a serious threat and challenge to the security and stability of all states and seriously threaten the international security and stability. These military threats might arise from primarily states or groups of states. Military threats mainly target the population at large and state structures / infrastructure. Diplomatic, secret service and military tools are appropriate instruments in dealing with military threats. In addition to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means as a military threat, Conventional Weapons Proliferation also constitutes a serious concern for all international community. The excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) pose a significant threat to peace and security as well as to the social and economic development of many countries’. Because there is a close relationship between illicit trade in SALW and terrorism, all states have to support and encourage international cooperative approaches and instruments in order to tackle and eliminate illicit trade in SALW within the framework of various international organizations such as the United Nations (Arms Control and Disarmament, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on December 20, 201).

Hoyer (2010: 116) argues that “disarmament and arms control must be central to any discussion of European security”. It is strongly agreed that the existing arms control regimes and agreements should be strengthened and adapted to the newly emerging security environment and conditions in the post-Cold War era. Within the framework of military threats, it is commonly agreed that while multilateral regional approaches are best suited to deal with conventional attacks, multilateral global initiatives are best suit-

ed to combat with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as biological, chemical and nuclear ones and their delivery means. All international and collective efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means should be supported by the all international community. In this regard, maintaining and strengthening the legal framework, the basic parameters and finally effective implementation of the international legally-binding non-proliferation regimes and instruments are highly significant for maintaining international security and stability (Arms Control and Disarmament, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on December 20, 2013).

2. Disarmament-Arms Control and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

After the end of the Cold War period, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as a regional security organization, started to attach a special importance to arms control and disarmament issues in its region under the umbrella of its politico-military dimension. The OSCE, working in close co-operation with other international and regional organizations and interested actors, carries out its arms control and disarmament-related activities with a view to contributing to the realization of more stable and peaceful security environment particularly in its region or, in a wider sense, across the whole world. ('Arms Control and Disarmament', Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013). The Forum for Security Co-operation, as the basic regular decision-making body of the OSCE is tasked to act in the military aspects of security, works to provide support, assistance and expertise to the participating States through initiatives aimed at "developing documents regulating transfers of conventional arms and establishing principles governing non-proliferation" ('OSCE, Arms Control', available at <http://www.osce.org/what/arms-control>, Accessed on 1 December 2013).

In dealing with the WMD, the OSCE basically aims at encouraging and supporting all participating States in their efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMD. In tackling with the proliferation of WMD, "maintaining the legal framework and the basic parameters of the international legally binding non-proliferation regimes is of vital significance. Strengthening the full and effective implementation of the international non-proliferation instruments and regimes is equally important". Within this context, the OSCE also support its participating States to accept and implement international agreements and documents aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMD ('Arms Control and Disarmament', Republic

of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

A huge amount of surplus weapons have started to pose a serious threat to European security and stability following the end of the Cold War era. In this regard, the OSCE, through all relevant institutions, structures and field missions, has focused on providing assistance to its participating States in order to prevent and stop the spread of these kinds of weapons as well as to destroy them in a safely manner within the politico-military dimensions of security ('Arms Control and Disarmament', Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

This paper mainly focuses on the three activity fields of the OSCE with regard to arms control and disarmament. These are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Conventional Ammunition respectively.

2.1. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

'The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe' (The Treaty on CFE or the CFE Treaty) established the most important and comprehensive legally binding conventional arms control regime in the world. The CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990 and entered into force on 9 November 1992 ('The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security An Overview of Major Milestones', OSCE Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, Vienna, 2009: 12). The CFE Treaty is generally referred as "the cornerstone of the European conventional security architecture" ('Arms Control and Disarmament', Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013). The CFE Treaty is not an official part of the OSCE. However, the negotiations and discussions with regard to the CFE Treaty have always been carried out within the framework of the CSCE/OSCE up to the present (Zellner, 2010: 238-239). The CFE Treaty includes legally binding provisions which "provide a system of limitations for equipment holdings and ensures military transparency through mandatory notification of certain military activities and equipment holdings". Information exchange and regular verification in the military field have been maintained within the framework of the legally-binding conventional arms control regime established by the CFE Treaty ('The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security An Overview of Major Milestones', OSCE Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, Vienna, 2009: 12). "The CFE Treaty, through setting up ceilings, has ensured significant reductions in five categories of

conventional arms and equipment, namely battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters and imposed certain numerical limitations on states parties both at strategic and regional levels” (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013). During the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CFE Treaty proved to be a highly effective instrument for distributing military equipment among the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the successor states to the Soviet Union” (Evers, Kahl and Zellner, 2005: 20).

“The CFE regime is designed for several purposes in consolidating the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region”. The CFE Treaty regime provides “comprehensive security guarantees to all states in the CFE Zone of application in equal and satisfactory terms in accordance with the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ in the OSCE region”. In other words, the CFE Treaty does not provide different level of security guarantees for different regions in the CFE Zone. “Security concerns of all States Parties to the Treaty are taken into consideration in accordance with the principle of indivisibility of security” (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

“Thanks to the CFE Treaty, Europe embarked on an unprecedented disarmament process after the Cold War” (‘The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security An Overview of Major Milestones’, OSCE Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, Vienna, 2009: 12). The CFE Treaty, as ‘the cornerstone of European security’ has been effectively implemented by the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to “increasing military transparency, predictability and transparency” across the entire OSCE region. “The CFE Treaty has played a vital role in maintaining regional stability and security of the Caucasus, Black Sea and northern Europe particularly during the period of historical transformations of the Euro-Atlantic area” (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013). In this regard, the CFE Treaty, as legally-binding conventional arms control instrument, has contributed substantially to the creation and maintenance of a ‘co-operative security regime’ in Europe after the end of the Cold War era (Richter and Zellner, 2008: p.6).

Following the end of the Cold War period, negotiations and discussions have been maintained on the issue of adapting the CFE Treaty to

the changing realities, conditions and dynamics which have been shaped by the newly emerging security environment in the post-Cold War Europe. Consequently, ‘the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe’ was signed by all States Parties to the original CFE Treaty during the OSCE Istanbul Summit Meeting of 1999. While the original CFE Treaty sets up collective limits for two military blocs in the bipolar structure of the Cold War era, Adapted CFE Treaty creates outlines national and territorial ceilings. Other participating States of the OSCE in the “geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains” could access to the Adapted Treaty when the Adapted CFE Treaty would come into force. “Until all 30 States Parties have ratified the Agreement, the original CFE Treaty remains in effect” (‘The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security An Overview of Major Milestones’, OSCE Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, Vienna, 2009: 12). The Adapted CFE Treaty has been only ratified by the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan so far. As a result, the Adapted CFE Treaty has not come into force.

The Adapted CFE Treaty has not been ratified by the members of NATO Alliance due to the unfulfillment of the politically-binding commitments made by the Russian Federation at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its armed forces and military equipment stationed in Georgia and Moldova, namely two former Soviet Union republics (Kühn, 2009: 1). These so-called ‘Istanbul commitments’ have been generally considered as a precondition for the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by Western countries, particularly members of NATO alliance (Richter and Zellner, 2008: 6). As a result, the Adapted CFE Treaty has not entered into force due to disagreement between NATO and Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of Russian military presence from Georgia and Moldova.

The Russian Federation suspended unilaterally the implementation of the original CFE Treaty in December 2007 and based its unilateral decision to the national security concerns originating from the NATO enlargement. 29 State Parties continue to implement the obligations of the Treaty. The NATO allies have undertaken two initiatives (‘parallel action plan’ and ‘consultations at 36’) in order to overcome the existing deadlock. These initiatives have failed. This situation created an uncertainty with regard to the future of the CFE regime and all European conventional security system in a wider sense” (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013). Zellner (2010: 238-239) states that “a failure of the CFE regime, this cornerstone of cooperative security, would necessarily damage the OSCE

which is equally built on the basis of a cooperative security approach”

Despite the overall contributions of the multilateral treaty regimes to security and stability, the original CFE Treaty was suspended by the Russian Federation in 2007 (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on December 20, 2013). As a result, the Organization’s co-operative security approach is being seriously undermined. Zellner (2009: 8) states that

the very existence of the OSCE’s politico-military dimension is threatened by the impending collapse of the CFE Treaty, which establishes a core of military stability and predictability, which is fundamental for the security of all participating States. The erosion of the conventional arms control regime in Europe, and specifically the CFE Treaty, poses a serious challenge to the OSCE region Zellner, Boyer, Evers, Facon, Grand, Kühn, Kulesa and Zagorski, 2012: 17). The Treaty’s military dimension, in the narrower sense of limiting capacities, is the landslide loss of confidence, the loss of a unique regime of cooperative transparency, and the open breakdown of the most visible symbol of common security in Europe. What is at stake now is nothing less than the further pursuit of co-operative security policy in Europe (Zellner, 2009: 14-15).

In other words, “the crisis of the CFE is a crisis of co-operative security policy, one of the OSCE’s key missions. Therefore, the future of the CFE has a direct impact on the further development of the OSCE” (Zellner, 2009: 20-21).

2.2. Small Arms and Light Weapons

Another important issue in the field of arms control and disarmament within the OSCE region revolves around the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). After the Cold War era, the proliferation and illegal trade of SALW started to pose a serious threat to security and stability of the OSCE participating States. “The excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of SALW pose a significant threat to peace and security as well as to the social and economic development of many countries. There is also a close relationship between illicit trade in SALW and terrorism” (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

The illicit spreading of small arms and light weapons particularly in the conflict zones and post-conflict areas of the OSCE region constitutes a growing and tangible risk and challenge to the security and stability of all the participating States of the Organization. The illicit proliferation of these weapons also prevents the full and effective implementation of the

conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation activities initiated by the OSCE (Brichambaut, 2007: 187). In addition, accession to small arms and light weapons is very easy in comparison with other arms and weapons and they can be easily transferred. “The illicit trade of these weapons is connected with the spread of terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime” (Lynch, 2008: 219).

Particularly, spreading and uncontrolled usage of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANDPAS) is a significant and alarming threat to the security and stability of the OSCE participating States. Civil aviation, peace-keeping operations, anti-terrorist operations and crisis management activities are negatively influenced by the use of MANDPAS. Civilians have been considerably damaged with the use of MANDPAS by several terrorist groups and organizations. In this respect, it is of great importance that stricter export and import controls on these weapons should be established and stockpile security should be promoted by both all countries and relevant international institutions. Additionally, exchanging information and experiences among the participating States of the OSCE should be encouraged in order to deal with the illicit trade and uncontrolled proliferation of MANDPAS (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

On the one hand, the proliferation and illicit trade of SALW constitute a serious security concern to all participating States of the OSCE particularly in the regions including ongoing conflicts and post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building processes. On the other hand, the major producers and exporters of SALW across the entire OSCE region are the participating States of OSCE (Brichambaut, 2007: 187 and Lynch, 2008: 219). “The OSCE comprises many of the world’s largest small arms suppliers, but also includes a number region which has been seriously affected by the spread of small arms” (‘OSCE, History and Background of CSBMs in the OSCE’, Document FSC, 1 January 2004, available at www.osce.org/fsc/40035, Accessed on 1 September 2013). Within this context, the participating States are strongly convinced that the OSCE has to be responsible for tackling with the threats and challenges emanating from the proliferation and illegal trade of SALW (Brichambaut, 2007: 187 and Lynch, 2008: 219).

Within the environment outlined above, ‘the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons’ was adopted in November 2000 within the framework of politico-military dimension of the OSCE. The Document on SALW produced by the OSCE is the most comprehensive multilateral

agreement adopted by an international organization to date. The Document mainly aims to contribute to the combating efforts against the proliferation and illicit trade of SALW. In order to control the spread of SALW, the Document established standards for manufacture, marking, export control and stockpile security of these weapons (Brichambaut, 2007: 187).

“The OSCE Document on SALW is a politically binding agreement which contains norms, principles and measures covering each stage in the life of a weapon: production, transfer, storage, collection or seizure and destruction. On the basis of the Document, participating States have agreed to share information, on a one-off basis, on issues concerning: national marking systems; national procedures for the control of manufacturing; national legislation and current practice in export policy, procedures and documentation, and control over brokering; small arms destruction techniques; and small arms stockpile security and management programmes. Additionally, participating States have committed themselves to exchange annually data on exports to and imports from other OSCE participating States, as well as on small arms deemed as surplus and/or seized and destroyed on their territory in the previous calendar year” (Lynch, 2008: 219-220).

With the purpose of building trust among the participating States and encouraging common action in addressing the threats and challenges originating from the illicit spreading and trade of SALW, the OSCE created a regime, allowing the participating States of the Organization to exchange information with regard to their national policies, export and import controls and the ways for destroying these weapons. Furthermore, upon their request and according to their specific requirements, the participating States can benefit from the assistance provided by the other participating States of the OSCE in the management and destruction of SALW (Brichambaut, 2007: 187).

In order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of the standards and commitments outlined in the Document on SALW, the OSCE has been developing and implementing various normative-based measures, including “politically binding agreements on export controls in the OSCE area”. In addition to this, the OSCE provides assistance to the participating States through several projects “aimed at improving stockpile controls of SALW and destroying surplus weapons” (Lynch, 2008: 220).

The FSC also produced ‘the Handbook of Best Practices on SALW’ with the purpose of supporting the OSCE participating States in their efforts for implementing the commitments and standards adopted within the OSCE framework. The Handbook provides a comprehensive framework

for “the all stages of a gun’s life, starting with manufacture and finishing with destruction and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”. The Handbook consists of several recommendations aimed at enabling the participating States to improve their national policies (Brichambaut, 2007: 187). The Handbook serves as the useful instrument to support the governments of the participating States, international institutions and non-governmental organizations in combating the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW (Dunay, 2005: 252-253).

‘The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’, adopted in 2001, is the major international document pertaining to the SALW. In order to effectively combat with the threats and risks originating from the spreading and illegal trafficking of SALW, “the full and comprehensive implementation of the UN Programme of Action” is highly important. Adapting the UN Programme of Action to the newly emerging security conditions in the OSCE region is also equally important in fighting against the security risks and challenges based on the proliferation and uncontrolled usage of SALW (‘Arms Control and Disarmament’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on 20 December 2013).

2.3. Conventional Ammunition

In the field of arms control and disarmament, the OSCE FSC adopted another significant document titled as ‘OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition’ in 2003. The main target of the Document is to support and help the OSCE participating States in their efforts for storing safely and destroying the large amount of stockpiles of conventional ammunition (Lynch, 2008: p.220). Since 2003 several former Soviet Union countries such as Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation have requested assistance from the OSCE in destroying the surplus conventional ammunition in their territories (Evers, Kahl and Zellner, 2005: 21).

According to Lynch, “it has been estimated that there are up to 300 million tons of surplus conventional ammunition in the ex-Soviet territories by 2008”. These stockpiles of conventional ammunition constitute considerable security risks and challenges to the security of the OSCE participating States as well as across the whole environment in the OSCE region. Therefore, the OSCE aims to support its participating States in their efforts towards meeting the security concerns with regard to the surplus stockpiles of conventional ammunition. To achieve this, the OSCE carries out concrete assistance projects with a view to contributing to the

improvement of national capacities of the participating States “for a better stockpile management and security”. In accordance with its comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE has made efforts in dealing with the conventional ammunition within the framework of politic-military dimension of security (Lynch, 2008: 221).

Conclusion

This article has dealt with the issues of arms control and disarmament in the post-Cold War era and the role of the OSCE in creating and maintaining arms control and disarmament regimes. Military threats including biological, chemical, nuclear and conventional attacks seen as one of the most important threats to security of all states, societies and individuals all over the world. The OSCE has engaged in military security issues as a reflection of its comprehensive security approach. The Organization has carried out its military security activities through supporting arms control treaty regimes, developing Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), and assisting the participating States in the field of military reform and co-operation. Even in the military field, the OSCE uses soft tools such as co-operation, dialogue, negotiation and confidence-building measures.

In the military field, the OSCE works to enhance security and stability by promoting openness, transparency and predictability. The OSCE provides a platform for maintaining negotiations, consultations, dialogue and co-operation on military security. Disarmament, arms control and CSBMs are important parts of the overall efforts to enhance security in the military field. In order to increase military transparency and predictability, the OSCE supports the implementation of arms control treaty regimes. The negotiations and discussions on CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and the CSBMs have been conducted under the OSCE framework. These treaty regimes are generally considered the cornerstones of European Security architecture. The CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, including legally binding commitments, have been designed to contribute to the creation and maintenance of security, stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. These multilateral instruments constitute the backbone of the European conventional security architecture and operate under the umbrella of the OSCE. Although these treaty regimes are not the official part of the OSCE acquis, the OSCE has provided assistance and support for the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on CFE and the Open Skies Treaty since their inception. These two treaty regimes have contributed greatly to increasing openness, transparency and predictability and building confidence and trust among the State parties to the treaties in the field of mili-

tary security. CSBMs also represent a key element of the politico-military co-operation in the OSCE area. The CSBMs provide an important complementary framework for the arms control and disarmament regimes and agreements within the framework of the politico-military dimension. The CSBMs have been designed to build trust and confidence among the OSCE participating States and reducing the possibility of armed conflicts or military confrontation by improving transparency, openness and predictability. As a result, the OSCE has contributed to the maintenance of international security through its activities on arms control and disarmament and developing CSBMs.

‘The CFE regime is designed for several purposes in consolidating the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region’. This regime provides comprehensive and equal guarantees for all State Parties (Arms Control and Disarmament, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on December 20, 2013). “The CFE Treaty establishes an outstanding level of military transparency, to which no other part of the world even comes close” (Evers, Kahl and Zellner, 2005: 21). “With its legally binding limitation, information and verification regime, the CFE Treaty in particular is a vital component of European security architecture and constitutes a milestone in the development of the concept of co-operative security or co-operative security approach” (Hoyer, 2010: 116).

The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was adopted in the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. However, the adapted Treaty has not entered into force due to disagreement between NATO and Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of Russian military presence from Georgia and Moldova (Arms Control and Disarmament, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>, Accessed on December 20, 2013). On the other hand, with the unilateral suspension of the original CFE Treaty by Russia in December 2007, it is not possible any longer to sustain “transparency and verification through data exchange and on-site inspections” within the framework of the CFE Treaty. The lack of any restrictions implemented for conventional arms control started to pose a serious threat to security in terms of accelerating the armaments level in the OSCE region particularly at sub-regional levels. Consequently, the CFE Treaty, ‘as a vital instrument for promoting military transparency, openness and predictability and for establishing trust among all the States Parties’, has not been implemented since December 2007.

Military or hard security issues were heavily emphasized within the OSCE framework during the Cold War period. Although the politi-

co-military dimension of the OSCE has diminished in importance since the end of the Cold War, it remains relevant for security. However, although the OSCE has registered some success and contribution in maintaining arms control and disarmament efforts, the OSCE's contribution via politico-military dimension has remained limited. The OSCE is neither a military organization nor a military alliance against any threat of source. It is obvious that the Organization cannot provide hard security guarantees for its participating States like a politico-military organization. Most importantly, the OSCE could not play a role in the efforts aimed at revitalizing the original CFE Treaty which was suspended by the Russian Federation unilaterally in 2007. The OSCE has also failed to play a constructive role for eliminating the disagreements between the NATO members and Russia over the ratification of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty. The main reason for this is that arms control and disarmament issues have been increasingly politicized by some OSCE participating States.

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