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**SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 186 AND UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS
(UNFICYP)**

AHMET C. GAZIÖĞLU

Ahmet C. Gazioğlu is the Editing Director and Manager of the Cyprus Research & Publishing Centre in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). He is the author of various books on Cyprus in Turkish and English. His recent English books include: *The Turks in Cyprus* (1990), *Cyprus, EU and Turkey* (1998), *Two Equal & Sovereign Peoples* (2nd Edition, 1999) and *Past Masters of Illegality* (2000).

Resolution 186, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 4 March 1964, has been ever since a cornerstone of the Cyprus problem and a turning point, the dimensions of which created an obstacle to a final and just settlement. Let us first recall what this Resolution was about and how it affected developments, and then its consequences in the light of historical documents.

Noting that the situation was likely to threaten international peace and security and considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 by the five parties, namely Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, it called upon all members to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation or endanger international peace. It recommended the creation, with the consent of the 'Government of Cyprus', of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, the composition and size of which would be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK.

It also recommended:

"The function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." (UN Security Council Resolution 186, para. 5)

Not unreasonably, the Turkish community has always maintained that 'the restoration of law and order' referred to should mean law and order as decreed by the constitutional government to which the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was originally accredited. Unfortunately, such a joint authority has not existed since 1964.

DEFINITION OF 'THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT'

This Resolution recommended further that the Secretary-General would designate a mediator to promote a peaceful solution and agreed settlement.

It is interesting to note here that according to this Resolution, both the establishment of the

UNFICYP and the designation of the mediator should be effected with the consent of the 'Government of Cyprus' and in consultation with the three Guarantor Powers. Since the start of discussions within the Security Council on the draft resolution, and from the first day of its acceptance, the main argument centred on the definition of 'the Cyprus Government'. What is the legal government that can represent the whole island? Was it the one that assumes a de facto authority or the one set up in accordance with the constitution and international law?

For instance, British archive documents, now released under the 30-Year Rule, which restricted previous publication, are a reliable source for this purpose. In order to pass the correct judgement and determine the definition of 'the Cyprus Government,' the related documents and correspondence have to be thoroughly examined.

The British Foreign Office sent a ciphered telegram to the Head of the UK Mission at the United Nations on 2 March 1964, two days before Resolution 186 was accepted, giving him clear instructions that the British position over the validity of the Cyprus Treaties and the constitution should be made plain during the Cyprus debates in the Security Council.

These instructions were as follows:

1) "Regarding the constitutional procedures, you should draw attention to the fact that our own Peacekeeping force was properly established with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President of Cyprus. In our view this would inevitably be the condition of an international force being acceptable and welcome to both communities and this would in turn be essential to the success of the international force."

2) "Her Majesty's Government is of the opinion that any course of action upon which the UN embarks should be generally acceptable to all the parties including the two communities."¹

Sir Patrick Dean, the British Representative at the UN, underlined these views during discussions on the draft resolution, making it plain that a UN peacekeeping force could only be properly established with the concurrence of both the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, and that the international force should be generally acceptable and welcome to both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

In addition to this warning to the Security Council, on 4 March, the day the Resolution was adopted, the British government felt obliged to deliver an aide-mémoire to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, thus underlining the British viewpoint on this matter, both orally and in writing.

This document is of paramount importance as it re-affirmed the right and legal approach to the issue. After reiterating the views expressed in the 2 March 1964 instructions to the UK Mission in New York given above, inter alia, it stated:

"Her Majesty's Government's view is that until such time as the Constitution of Cyprus and the Agreements are amended through negotiation and with the consent of all parties, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Guarantor Powers and the United Nations as a whole have no alternative but to conduct their activities in accordance with the Constitution and with the Agreements."

However, it was very disturbing for the Turkish side to see that despite the above explanations concerning the application of Resolution 186, the Secretary-General appointed the first commander of the UNFICYP, General Gyani, without having consulted or even informed the Turkish

Government.

Only a few days afterwards, on 9 March, well before the UN peacekeeping force arrived in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, Dr Fazıl Küçük reminded both the British Foreign Secretary and the UN Secretary-General that, under the Cyprus Constitution, the Turkish Cypriot community had equal rights with the Greek Cypriot community, particularly on matters relating to foreign affairs, defence and security. Dr Küçük pointed out that, owing to the nature of the present situation in Cyprus, it was physically impossible for the Turkish elements to come together and transact government business with the Greek elements.

Dr Küçük concluded:

"In view of this, it is imperative that in implementing Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Resolution, both the President and Vice-President are consulted and/or their consent obtained."

Thus any consultation with or consent obtained from solely the Greek Cypriot element, in substance and under the Cyprus Constitution, could not be considered as consultation with 'the Cyprus Government' as envisaged under Resolution 186.

Following Dr Küçük's telegram, the Turkish Foreign Ministry delivered a Note to the British Ambassador in Ankara, bringing the following to the attention of the British Government:

1) "The Turkish Government is of the opinion that the spirit if not the letter of the resolution of the Security Council regarding the appointment of the Commander of the Force could be construed as implying that the Secretary-General should consult with the parties concerned before selecting any personality for this vital, delicate and strenuous task."

2) "The term of 'Cyprus Government' could only mean a government which, according to the Cyprus Constitution, acts and takes decisions with the concurrence of the Turkish Vice-President and its Turkish members. This sine qua non condition should be clearly brought at the outset to the knowledge of both General Gyani and to whoever would have to deal with the Cyprus problem in any capacity, including that of mediator."

The British response to the Turkish Note was of particular importance as it clearly and definitely proved the fact that at the beginning the British held identical views to those of the Turkish side on this vital issue.

However, the Foreign Office replied the next day saying that the Turks may have misjudged General Gyani's 'robustness and impartiality' and added that the British officials in Cyprus and General Carver, his deputy, were in close contact with him.

On the second point, which was about the definition to be given to the expression 'the Cyprus Government' in the Security Council Resolution 186, the British reply said:

"We agree with the Turkish Government. Her Majesty's Government have indeed already drawn U Thant's attention to this point in a confidential aide-mémoire which was left with him by Sir Patrick Dean on March 4."²

INEFFECTIVE PROTESTS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ILLEGALITY

But, despite their assurances, the British government hesitated to take a firm stand against the

illegitimate regime of Makarios and although they protested about its illegal activities, which openly violated the Cyprus Treaties, all those protest Notes were allowed to remain ineffective. For instance, when the Makarios regime decided to form an army called the 'Greek Cypriot National Guard', which was enacted in early June 1964, the British High Commissioner, on instructions from London, warned the 'Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister' in advance, on 27 May 1964:

"Article 129 of the Constitution requires that compulsory military service shall not be instituted except by common agreement of the President and Vice-President of the Republic and that article is a basic article in the terms of Article 182 and by Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee. The British Government, as a Guarantor Power, recognise and guarantee the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution."

The British also reminded the Greek Cypriot side that if the proposed bill were passed it would not conform with Paragraph I of Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964.

It seems that Britain's stance at that time was to a certain extent more respectful of international law and the Treaties than the attitude they adopted a few years later. The reasons for the change in stance were underlined in 1968, in a ciphered telegram from Sir Norman Costar, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, who stated that it was contrary to British interests to continue protesting about Greek Cypriot legislation that infringed even the basic articles of the Constitution. He said:

"Our protests will inevitably annoy the Cyprus [Greek] Government and may adversely affect British interests, particularly our Bases."³

A well-known British scholar, Michael Moran, who has researched the Cyprus problem thoroughly and published books and articles about it, stated:

"Equality of status between the two communities was certainly not something that was being assured after resolution 186 of 4 March 1964. Once Makarios, with the aid of that resolution, had got his purely Greek administration at first simply called - and then, as time went on, actually recognised as - 'the Government of Cyprus', the Turkish Cypriots knew that their real ordeal had only just begun."⁴

Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot fighters and the whole community were in a desperate position due to merciless Greek Cypriot attacks, oppression, economic blockades and the danger of extermination, which obliged Dr Küçük to ask for Turkish intervention. Consequently, the Turkish Government decided to exercise its right to intervene in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. But, before doing so, the Turkish Government thought it better to first address certain demands to Makarios to see if there was a peaceful way out. Thus, a Note was prepared and sent to Makarios that same day, underlining the following:

1. During the days immediately following the adoption of the Security Council resolution, the Greek Cypriots resumed their acts of extermination that aimed to obtain a definite result before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces on the island and it was observed that these acts were continuing.
2. The Greek Cypriot leaders and the press proclaimed that these savage onslaughts would be carried on against the Turks in disregard of the various cease-fire agreements and that an overt war aimed at the unconditional surrender of the Turkish Cypriot community had already been started.
3. The fact that in recent days the onslaughts against the Turks on the island had taken such an ignominious character as to revolt the conscience of humanity and that they had become generalised

and were ever increasing in violence necessitated the reconsideration of Turkey's peaceful and moderate attitude, praised by world opinion.

4. Despite the Security Council resolution, which requested all necessary measures be taken by the 'Cyprus Government' to stop bloodshed, the Greek Cypriot leaders were acting without the least sense of responsibility and as such were guilty of crimes against humanity, such as attempts to annihilate the Turkish community before the arrival of the UN force.

5. In view of this situation, the government of the Turkish Republic requested that all individual or collective assaults and acts committed against the Turkish community in Cyprus - such as murder, pillage, robbery, arson, rape, torture and the like - be stopped forthwith. Turkey also called for an immediate cease-fire on the island and all existing cease-fire agreements and Green Line Agreement in Nicosia to be observed completely and without exception. Ankara also demanded that all sieges around Turkish enclaves be lifted, that liberties of movement, communication and correspondence be immediately restored and that Turkish hostages and the bodies of those murdered be returned to the Turkish community without delay.

6. Otherwise, the Government of the Turkish Republic declared, it would use the right to take unilateral action conferred upon it by the Treaty of Guarantee of 16 August 1960.

The British Foreign Office informed Athens that this ultimatum, if it could be so called, was flexible: it did not demand a reply, it did not set a time limit and it indicated that the Turkish Government would not move if the UN force got into position before further atrocities.

Meanwhile, the British Ambassador in Ankara was instructed to do all he could to persuade Prime Minister İnönü not to intervene.

A second telegram from London asked the Ambassador to seek an immediate meeting with İnönü and to tell him sympathetically that, while Britain fully understood how severely Turkey had been provoked over Cyprus and shared the government's anxieties, they appealed to Turkey to hold off, in the hope that the imminent arrival of the UN force would reduce tension in the island.⁵

A third telegram from London carried a message from the British Prime Minister to his Turkish counterpart, İnönü, that aimed to restrain the Turkish government from taking any unilateral action. If, despite the message, İnönü intended to go ahead, the Ambassador was instructed to urge him strongly to avoid any action by the Turkish forces which might bring them into conflict with the forces of the other two Guarantor Powers.

"With this object you should suggest that the Turkish Government should if possible announce geographical limits to the area which Turkish forces intend to occupy."⁶

Makarios replied to the Turkish Note the same day, describing it as "unacceptable" and stating that Turkey had no right to take unilateral action under the Treaty of Guarantee.

On the other hand, when İnönü received the British Ambassador on the evening of 13 March, he told him that the Turkish Government would be guided by events in Cyprus, rather than by any assurances received from Makarios and that they were interested in facts, not words.

Makarios wanted to test the Turkish Note and risked total war a few days later by attacking the Turkish village of Gaziveran, which resulted in the death of six Turks and the Greeks taking many

hostages. However, the British Truce Force arranged a cease-fire and Turkey did not intervene.

TURKISH MEMORANDUM ON UNFICYP'S TERMS OF REFERENCE

On 25 March, Turkey replied to the UN Secretary-General's memorandum on the terms of reference for the Cyprus Peacekeeping Force.

The Turkish memorandum underlined that the 'Cyprus Government', as referred to in Resolution 186, was meant to be a legitimate government which could only be created and function according to the Constitution and 1960 Agreements, i.e. one which ensured in practice the joint participation of the Turkish and Greek communities in the administration.

It further emphasised the following points:

1. It is absolutely necessary that the commander of the UN forces should always make sure that the Constitution is duly respected.
2. Because of the Greeks' armed threats and attacks, Turkish civil servants, including the three Turkish Ministers and the Vice-President, were unable to go to their offices in the Greek sector. Therefore, they continued to exercise their functions as foreseen by the Constitution only in the Turkish sectors where they lived and were safe. It was necessary, therefore, to recognise that the provisions of the Constitution regarding the functioning of the Cyprus Government could in no way be affected by the fact that the Turkish and Greek elements of the government could not be under the same roof until security, law and order was established.
3. In view of the ad hoc constitutional provisions, the Greek Cypriot police could not be considered the sole legitimate security forces on the island. The Turkish police were also part of the legitimate security forces, whose duties and participation ratio were specified in Article 130 of the Constitution. To restore confidence among the Cypriots, it would be necessary to put the Greek police temporarily under the charge of a board of neutral countries.
4. The UN Force should be authorised to use arms where necessary to fulfil their duties as defined in Resolution 186.
5. Taking into consideration the events which had taken place so far it was deemed that the duties of the UN forces should include the following:
 - a) To secure and maintain freedom of movement on the island and into and out of Cyprus;
 - b) To stop the inflow of arms;
 - c) To stop hostage-taking, unlawful arrest and search, arson and looting and to ensure the return of hostages;
 - d) To control and ensure that all Cypriots could benefit from the utilities and services, such as running water, electricity and communications etc., which were normally the responsibility of the government;
 - e) To ensure that supplies such as goods, medicines etc., which were sent to help Turkish Cypriot refugees, reach their destinations.

A week later, Turkish Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp delivered another Note to the Foreign Office, drawing attention to Articles 130, 132 and 50, which dealt with the creation of the Republic's security forces "by common agreement of the President and Vice-President". Kuneralp emphasised that:

"The Greek elements in the Government of Cyprus who, in contravention of all ad hoc constitutional provisions, have already established without the consent of the Vice-President an all-Greek police force of seven thousand, have now proposed to General Gyani, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces for Cyprus, security measures for the island which, if adopted, would amount to a gross violation of the Constitution by:

- a. Preventing the Vice-President from exercising his right of veto.
- b. Eliminating the Turks from the security forces.
- c. Putting the whole of the island under the exclusive control of the Greeks.

In virtue of the above-mentioned articles on the strict application of which depend the peace and order in Cyprus, the Turkish police are a legitimate force of security on the island.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations should be approached in order that instructions be given to General Gyani to view the proposals of the Greek Cypriots in the light of the preceding considerations."⁷

THE DENIAL TO UNFICYP THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS MANDATE

Professor Thomas Ehrlich, Dean of Stanford Law School and former Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State, stated that the Security Council's steps in creating a UN peacekeeping force had not provided a legal basis to put into abeyance an act of unilateral intervention, as envisaged in Article 53 of the UN Charter.

"Article 53 appears to preclude military action by a regional arrangement once the Council has authorised creation of a peacekeeping force to deal with a [particular] crisis."

Whereas Resolution 186 of 4 March did not authorise the UN force to deal with the crisis by, if necessary, using force to re-establish the status quo ante, and "in this situation the [Greek] Cypriot Government had denied the [UN] Force the right to exercise its mandate. In fact the [Greek Cypriot] Government's attack against Turkish Cypriots in the Kokkina-Mansoura area violated an express agreement with the force commander".⁸

The UNFICYP mandate, which Makarios' Greek Cypriot regime denied, was explicitly stated in paragraph 5 of Resolution 186, which said:

"... the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

The Greek Cypriot Government's open defiance of the Resolution and international law prevented the UNFICYP fulfilling any of this provision.

It is interesting to recall in this context that during the attack on the Turkish village of Kophinou, a joint force comprising the Greek National Guard and troops from Greece under the command of General Grivas forcibly disarmed the UN peacekeeping force in the area and disabled the force's wireless. One British soldier was wounded when he refused to hand over his rifle.

"What had definitely been demonstrated was the limited effectiveness of UNFICYP (and indeed of the UN), within the terms of reference. The British Government protested, but took no action. U Thant also protested without taking any action, though he rightly pointed to the speed of the operation as evidence that it had been pre-planned. Clearly the Turks could hardly feel their own people were safe in care of UNFICYP."⁹

The so-called (Greek Cypriot) National Guard persistently threatened elements of the UNFICYP. They manhandled UN soldiers whenever the demolition of some sandbags was ordered. The Greek soldiers fired on a UN helicopter more than once. They even abducted and murdered in cold blood Major Edward Macey and his driver, Leonard Platt, both of whom were UNFICYP members.

The Turkish insistence that UNFICYP should not only be operational but also effective in implementing its mandate had always fallen on deaf ears. According to Professor Thomas Ehrlich,

"The UN debates before August 1964 reflect, on the part of nations not directly involved, a growing weariness with the crisis and an increasing sense that the people of Cyprus should be left alone to work things out."¹⁰

UNFICYP functioned during the years between 1964-1974 as a force that had almost become non-operational and was ineffective in fulfilling its mandate. It acted as if it was a force to help Makarios establish Greek Cypriot domination over the whole island.

As early 1965, Makarios openly declared that he considered the members of UNFICYP not a force as envisaged in Resolution 186, but "permanent tourists". This statement proved how satisfied he was with their ineffective operations, and how he depended on their ineffective presence to promote his regime's survival.

1974 AND AFTER

The Greek military Government's 1974 coup to oust Makarios and unite the island with Greece forced Turkey to intervene to save the Turkish Cypriot people and stop the civil war among the Greeks. The main consequence of the Turkish peace operation was the separation of the two peoples of Cyprus into two distinct regions of the island with a frontier between them, in order to avoid further killings and ethnic cleansing, and to facilitate a bizonal settlement based on the political equality of the two sides. Until then, Turkish Cypriots had for 11 years been confined into enclaves comprised of three percent of Cyprus and been defending themselves against the gunmen of Makarios, who had assumed the name 'National Guard'.

A buffer zone, which came under the direct control of UNFICYP, was created all along the border between the two regions. As a matter of fact, this dividing line was a line where the Greek atrocities and ethnic cleansing of the years 1963-1974, which UNFICYP could not control, was effectively stopped.

The position of the UNFICYP following the 1974 Turkish intervention and the establishment of two

separate regions is worth considering.

First, the UNFICYP was vitally helpful during the application of the Exchange of Population Agreement, reached in Vienna between Greek Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides (then the President of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives) and President Rauf Denktaş, on 2 August 1975. According to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Agreement, the Turkish Cypriots in the South and the Greek Cypriots in the North would be allowed, if they so wished, to go, under an organised programme and with the assistance of and supervision of UNFICYP, to the region where the rest of their community was living.

As a direct result of this Agreement, the UNFICYP successfully organised and supervised the voluntary transfer of the remaining Turks from the South to the North and of all but a few Greeks from the North to the South.¹¹ The UNFICYP has continued since then to discharge humanitarian functions for a few hundred Greek Cypriots remaining in the Turkish North.

The Turkish Cypriot President and the TRNC Government have always been helpful over the UNFICYP functions in Northern Cyprus and have tried to convince the UN that a 'Status Agreement', similar to that which was concluded with what was regarded the government of Cyprus in 1964, should be signed by the Turkish Cypriot side. Unless this was done, they warned, the functions of the UNFICYP in the TRNC would be too difficult to arrange and co-ordinate. Without such an agreement, the UNFICYP functions in the Turkish part of the island would cause problems that might result in legal and administrative irregularities.

Almost every time a resolution passed for the renewal of the deployment of the UNFICYP, the Turkish side repeatedly stated that any reference to the 'Cyprus Government' was unacceptable because UNFICYP had been deployed in Cyprus in the first place with the consent of both sides and the successful functioning of the force depended on its being acceptable and welcome to both sides, as has been underlined many times. However, despite the fact that they rejected the resolutions referring to the so-called 'Government of Cyprus', the Turkish Cypriot side reiterated its willingness to co-operate with the UNFICYP, on the understanding that this co-operation would be extended within the framework to be decided by the TRNC Government, which would hold the stationing and activities of the UNFICYP, as well as its contribution to peace and stability in the island, under constant review in the light of developments.

TURKISH CYPRIOT GESTURE OF GOODWILL

On 19 July 1998, having conveyed the above to the UN Secretariat as an aide-mémoire dated 1 July, the Turkish Cypriot side also delivered a Memorandum of Understanding and an annex stating 'Privileges and Facilities for UNFICYP'. The Memorandum of Understanding laid down specific provisions for the UNFICYP regarding freedom of movement, access and liability while in TRNC territory and stated that UNFICYP personnel should be accorded the same treatment as diplomatic personnel.

The UN declined to sign this Memorandum and, instead, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, attached an addendum to his report to the Security Council on 15 December 1999 stating:

"The Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the UK have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension [of UNFICYP for another six months] but the Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot party,

namely that UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work with them to develop modalities of UNFICYP's operations in Northern Cyprus.¹²

After 1974, the Resolutions extending the stationing of the UNFICYP in Cyprus stated:

"...the parties concerned had signified their concurrence and the Cyprus Government has agreed..."

But, following the TRNC's declaration, in Security Council resolutions the term 'the parties concerned' was dropped and only 'the Government of Cyprus' remained. However, each time the Secretary-General took the views of the Turkish Cypriot side they stated their objection to use of 'the Government of Cyprus' and that they rejected the resolution. However, the Turkish Cypriots declared that they would facilitate the UNFICYP in the North as accepted guests. An addendum is usually attached to the Secretary-General's report, stating the position of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.¹³

A REALISTIC APPROACH

The UNFICYP Chief of Mission, Dame Ann Hercus, at a Press Conference on 14 April 1999, shed some light on the status and functions of the UNFICYP, which I consider worth mentioning. It contains new elements and a new approach, based on the existing realities of island.

She considered it an opportune time to look at what the UNFICYP does, how it does it and what recent changes there have been in the UNFICYP.

Dame Ann Hercus underlined four facts:

"FACT I: UNFICYP, which was created 35 years ago, had 3 main tasks:

- a) to prevent a recurrence of fighting,
- b) to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order,
- c) to contribute to the return to normal conditions.

Since 1974, and the establishment of the Buffer Zone our mandated tasks have not changed. But instead of being spread island-wide, our tasks are naturally more focused.

FACT II: We are here by consent. The day consent is withdrawn or collapses is the day UN peacekeepers pack up their bags and go home. Consent and co-operation of the parties to a conflict are essential for peacekeepers to perform their role. They can assist the conflicting parties in implementing a cease-fire or a subsequent settlement. But peacekeeping operations cannot do this without that general consent which is the basis of its being here.

FACT III: Since 1974 the peace has been kept. There have been no active hostilities for 25 years despite a range of violations of the cease-fire. What has not yet been successful on Cyprus is the peace-making.

The international community can offer help to the parties to solve the dispute, but it cannot do it for them. In the end, a peace settlement has to be signed by the parties themselves. This cannot be imposed by other sides.

FACT IV: Model peacekeeping depends on using a range of skills in a co-ordinated and integrated way."

It is unfortunate that in spite of this clear declaration by the special representative of the UNSG in Cyprus and the prevailing practice of consulting all parties over the years, all of a sudden, the UNSG was faced with abandoning this practice and thus putting the Turkish Cypriot side into a dilemma: to stop all contacts with the UNFICYP and ask them to leave the North or to have certain restrictive actions against it, with the hope that the wrong done would be corrected. The TRNC authorities chose the latter action.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this rather long paper I would like to bring your attention the very latest developments concerning the UNFICYP.

Unfortunately the Greek Cypriot leaders, who are skilful propagandists, protested furiously about the UN Secretary-General's addendum that was attached to the 15 December 1999 Security Council Resolution, and managed to have it dropped from the next one passed six months later, in June 2000.

When the UN Security Council bowed to the protests of the Greek protagonists - who do not want to see a separate Turkish Cypriot political existence on the island and still dream of a wholly Greek (Hellenic) island, and have refused to come to terms with the Turks in regard to UNFICYP functions in the North - the Turkish Cypriot authorities were left with no alternative than to apply measures concerning UNFICYP operations in the TRNC. These have been effective since 30 June 2000.

These measures are as follows:

1. UNFICYP's entry to and exit from the TRNC will take place only through the Ledra Palace border gate. This arrangement also applies to visits for social purposes.
2. UNFICYP will be required to have all UN vehicles used on TRNC territory insured by an insurance agency operating in the TRNC.
3. UNFICYP will be required to pay, to the relevant departments of the State, for the water and electricity used at its camps located in the TRNC, as well as for the other services rendered (cleaning, etc). The fees will go into effect as of 30 June 2000 at 06:00 hours; UNFICYP will be required to comply with the payment due dates and, in the event of non-compliance, the services will be discontinued.

I honestly believe the Turkish Cypriot side considers that all who want to contribute to the smooth running of UNFICYP and to help reach a final and just settlement in Cyprus will take the existing realities seriously. The UN Special Representative, Dame Ann Hercus, underlined these realities in April 1999. In this way, Cyprus might become a golden bridge between Turkey and Greece as well as the two Cypriot peoples.

If this is what the world community is genuinely seeking, let them first accept the existing realities of Cyprus and help to conclude a 'Status Agreement', that the Turkish Cypriot side and the UN can sign without delay.

1 Prem 11/4706-28672, from Foreign Office to UK Mission to the UN, New York, 2 March 1964,

Telegram No. 1114.

2 Prem 11/4707-28964, from Foreign Office to Ankara, 12 March 1964.

3 FCO 27/70, 24 June 1968.

4 A.C. Gazioğlu & M. Moran, Past Masters of Illegality, CYREP, 2000, pp. 59-60.

5 Prem 11/4707-28964, from Foreign Office to Ankara, 13 March 1964, Confidential Emergency Telegram No. 133.

6 Prem 11/4707-28964, from Foreign Office to Ankara, 13 March 1964, Confidential Telegram No. 1349.

7 FCO 371/174750-XC21602, 3 April 1964.

8 T. Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 82-84.

9 H.D. Purcell, Cyprus, London, 1969, p. 381.

10 T. Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 86.

11 Secretary-General's Second Interim Report, S/11789/add. 2, 13 September 1975.

12 S/1999/1203/add. 1, 15 December 1999.

13 S/1994/680/add. 1, 14 June 1994; S/1995/1020/add. 1, 19 December 1995; S/1997/437/add. 1, 26 June 1997.
