

TURKEY'S INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE: INITIAL PHASES RECONSIDERED

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INTRODUCTION

It is an established fact that the turning point in Turkey's integration with the West is the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. However, we should note that despite this well-known fact, many people overlook the operational meaning of the Truman Doctrine and the events following it in terms of Turkey's integration process with the West in general and with Europe in particular. In this respect, it is first necessary to make a clear distinction between the Doctrine and the Marshall Aid Plan. Then we need to identify the meaning of 'operational'. By 'operational' we mean how a 'factor' – fictional or material – is used and what function this factor has in the real world. From a general perspective in this sense, two important points should be made at the outset of the study. First, whereas the Truman Doctrine in fact provided a theoretical understanding for the West in general, the Marshall Aid Plan showed, however in part, how to put this theory into practice. If the Truman Doctrine was a cluster of ideas defining democratic ideals from the vantage point of the USA, Marshall Aid was a guideline not only sponsoring but also urging European nations to come together to solve their problems by their own means as much as possible. Second, from the perspective of Turkey's integration process with the West, the Truman Doctrine pulled Turkey towards the USA (which would be crowned with Turkey's participation in NATO) while the Marshall Aid Plan pushed Turkey to Europe (a process that was started in 1947 but is not yet finished). Thanks to the USA and the Truman Doctrine, Turkey was able to enter the defence structure of the West, but it is still struggling to complete the process of integration with Europe as a fully-fledged member, a process started by the Marshall Aid Plan.

The subject of this article is the initial phases of this integration process, including Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe, which is a result of and simultaneously a part of this historical process. Through analysing what meanings the Turkish decision makers attributed to the declaration of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of European organisations, and the factors which were used by European countries against Turkey's membership in these organisations, we have tried to establish if there was any pattern of policy in relations between Turkey and Europe applied in the past. To find an answer to the question of whether or not these patterns are still in operation is left to the readers. In this respect, this analysis is an attempt to remind the students of Turkish politics of some important aspects of these initial phases as a way of understanding our relations with Europe today.

MARSHALL AID AND TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION

IN EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS

There is little dispute over the fact that the Truman Doctrine had far-reaching effects on post-war Turkish foreign policy. This is simply because it provided Turkey with the moral and psychological support it needed.¹ With this support, Turkey would become a staunch ally of the West and a militant advocate of bloc politics during the Cold War.

Of course, Turks felt comfortable with Truman's Declaration following, as it did, a period of isolation. But the economic burden of the consequent defence policy and the presence of a giant enemy over its frontiers always bothered decision-makers in Ankara. Since 1939, internal and external pressures had substantially weakened the Turkish economy. In this respect, because it was seen as complementary to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan created much hope in Ankara.² On 5 June 1947, the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, declared that Washington was ready to offer aid to Europe if they would come together to implement a programme of economic recovery. In his speech at Harvard University, he concluded: "The initiative, I think, must come from Europe... The programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations."³

It was the clear intention of the Marshall Plan to establish common ground and a joint organisation for European countries. European countries were shaken by political uncertainty and on the edge of economic and social collapse. Since the end of the Second World War, interim American financial aid to individual European countries had proved insufficient to solve their problems.⁴ That is why Europe promptly and positively responded to the Marshall declaration. Soon after Marshall's speech, Britain and France assumed a leading role in organising Europe. They invited all European countries, including the Soviet Union, but excluding Spain, to take part. Nonetheless, eight of twenty-two European states, including the Soviet Union, declined to join such a conference, mainly for well-known political reasons. Despite such a development, the conference started on 12 July 1947 in Paris with the participation of the other states.⁵

THE FORERUNNERS OF EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS:

CEEC AND THE ERP

As a result of the conference, the Committee for European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) was, in addition to other committees, established and one of its founding countries was Turkey.⁶ In fact, the Turks had followed with curiosity from its very inception all developments taking place in the US and Europe that led to the establishment of the CEEC.⁷ Therefore, the Turkish government welcomed the invitation to take part in the Paris Conference and the Turkish delegation even played an active role at the conference in drafting the framework of the European Recovery Programme.⁸ Turkey attached as great importance to the establishment of the CEEC as it did to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Turkish authorities had the impression that the organisation would be of great significance in the future. According to Necmettin Sadak, for example, the CEEC was only the beginning of bigger and stronger organisations in Europe.⁹ In terms of economic aid, Turkey also needed the initial support of the US to finance its development plans. In return, Turkey believed that it could later contribute to the economic recovery of Europe.¹⁰

Up to this stage, all developments seemed to be in favour of Turkey, as much as other European countries at the Paris Conference. But the publication of Blue Book Studies in late 1947 in the USA, which were compilations of American experts' assessments of the economic situation of each European country, disappointed Turkey.¹¹ The Studies concluded that a substantial part of Turkey's development plans fell outside the European Recovery Programme (ERP).¹² In addition, Turkey, which had substantial gold and foreign exchange reserves, was classified as a 'cash country' that was able to pay cash for equipment for its agriculture and mining production. In short, Turkey's conditions were found unsuitable for membership of the ERP. It was recommended that Turkey finance its national development

plans by applying for credit directly from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.¹³

It was this conclusion that profoundly disappointed the Turks.¹⁴ They thought that Turkey deserved more and felt it necessary to express their sincere feelings to the US Ambassador in Ankara.¹⁵ But they never considered turning their backs on the West. However, after 1946 in particular, they could change their policies and take sides with the Soviet Union, which seemed ready to offer financial assistance to Turkey. Instead, Ankara preferred the hard way and tried to influence US policy-making in Turkey's favour. Yet, when it was understood that convincing the US administration through inter-governmental talks was nearly impossible, the Turkish government orchestrated the national media on the subject. The Turkish press, which had extensively reported the content of the Blue Book Studies, devoted their columns to conveying the regrets of the public.¹⁶ Emotional in essence, they focused on getting acceptance from the USA for the ERP. According to editorials, the behaviour of the West showed that they did not want to understand Turkey. If Turkey now had some economic difficulties, then the reason was that it was one of the first countries to resist the spread of communism and the expansion of Russia. To the press, what Turkey expected from the US was encouragement by offering economic and financial aid in addition to moral and military support. Public opinion held that Turkey should be accepted into the ERP since the Plan would otherwise be incomplete.¹⁷

Interestingly enough, opposition, mostly from the newly established Democrat Party (DP), held the government responsible for the result and accused Prime Minister Hasan Saka and his cabinet of giving the American experts deficient information.¹⁸ According to them, the West was simply misled. For example, Emin Erişirgil, a deputy from Zonguldak questioned the attitudes of the government and the foreign minister alike and requested the government to apply pressure, "as much as they can on Washington", to ensure the inclusion of Turkey in the ERP. Otherwise, according to the deputy, Turkey's modernisation and Westernisation efforts would be seriously wounded since it would be difficult to present to the public the West in general and America in particular as a reliable ally. He pointed out that the public had already begun to wonder "if this America would leave Turkey alone in political and military fields as it did now in this economic plan." In order to satisfy public opinion, he said, "Turkey, which was an indispensable part of Europe, should take an active role in the ERP."¹⁹

Such concerns and the question of Turkish membership of the ERP encouraged and compelled the government to increase contact with the US to revise the negative conclusions of the Blue Book. To this end, as the Saka government presented information on Turkish economy to the CEEC,²⁰ it also urged Washington to pay special attention to Turkey's geopolitical situation and the burden of military expenditure on the national budget.²¹ Although the first reaction of the US government to the request was to restate the Blue Book conclusions, Washington later changed its opinion for strategic reasons and reconsidered Turkey's situation "with a friendly understanding".²² Then, the US agreed to offer a place to Turkey in the ERP. Nonetheless, despite this show of goodwill, the sum of projected aid was far from Ankara's expectations.²³

PARTICIPATION IN THE OEEC AND PUBLIC OPINION

In the absence of proper analysis and documents, it is difficult to answer the question of how far Marshall aid affected Turkey's economic development, but it is certain that membership of the ERP opened a new chapter in Turkey's external relations. As the declaration of the

Truman Doctrine made Turkey's incorporation in the West possible, ERP membership gave it several opportunities to participate in future European organisations, as we stated at the outset of the study. Thanks to ERP membership, Turkey first became one of the sixteen member states of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).²⁴ The OEEC was established to ensure the success of the ERP and to create a permanent organisation that would facilitate the flow of information between members in to co-ordinate the application of the plan. Turkey took an active role in the establishment and subsequent activities of the OEEC because, for Turkey, the organisation, like previous ones, meant more than an economic body co-ordinating the work of its member states. Most of the Turkish élite also regarded membership as another step in Turkey's Westernisation. Therefore, Turkey's reaction to the establishment of the OEEC was emotional and ideological in essence.²⁵ For example, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, stated that it was always Turkey's desire to make a substantial contribution to the ERP countries' efforts to build European solidarity and unity in all fields.²⁶ Thus, according to press reports, Ankara was very happy to have found another opportunity to express that indispensable feeling. In the same vein, newspaper editorials commented in favour of the OEEC and Turkey's active participation in it. Ahmet ? Esmer wrote in *Ulus*, "[This participation] is just a step...it is going to be in this country's interest to enter such a group consisting of democratic and progressive states."²⁷ In his article in *Cumhuriyet*, Ömer R. Dođrul described the OEEC Convention as "an unequalled document in the history of mankind" and congratulated the government on putting its signature to such a convention.²⁸

Not surprisingly, the most emotional comments took place in the Assembly when the Convention was up for approval.²⁹ As Necmettin Sadak thanked the US for granting the opportunity of participation in the organisation, he declared that the OEEC membership confirmed Turkey's place among Western countries and its geo-political importance in the world, which was divided between the East and the West.³⁰ According to Fazıl Ahmet Aykaç, a poet and politician, there was "a civilised and sacred holy war" that had been waged under the leadership of the US against totalitarian regimes, first fascism and then bolshevism. In this war, Americans had helped all the nations of the free world, but they found only one "ideal and reliable friend" in the personality of Turkey. They then understood two main points properly: (1) the Turks were men who could die for their country, independence and honour, and (2), from now on, the peace of the world could not be sustained without co-operation with the Turks. To Aykaç, that document was a result of the two beliefs that "our friends" held.³¹

For Turkish decision-makers and intellectuals alike the OEEC was much more than an economic organisation; they regarded it as a political entity with great symbolical value.³² Indeed, the OEEC was regarded as a framework for Turkey's integration into Europe and the civilised world. After membership, the Turks put further emphasis on the European vocation of Turkey in international organisations. With this emphasis, Turkish decision-makers continued to play a more active role in the integration of Europe.³³ In this context, Turkey sent a delegation to the Congress of European Parliaments, which was held in September 1948 at Interlaken. Making a speech there, the head of the Turkish delegation declared, "Turkey as a European state shall be always in favour of a united Europe" and would always defend the realisation of "the sacred ideal".³⁴ Whereas *Gece Postası*, a daily newspaper, reported the events of the Congress in detail,³⁵ Cihad Baban in *Tasvir* wrote that Turkey could not be separated from the idea of a united Europe since the Kemalist movement created a modern, Westernised and Europeanised state in Turkey.³⁶

Against this background, Turkey was in fact one of the countries in the World happiest to see European countries united. But Turkey's integration with the Western world in general and with Europe in particular could not materialise without a lot of effort. Unfortunately, at every step, Turkey's place in that world would be questioned more than any other country's, as it had been in the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid and the ERP. But, unlike those cases, the identity of Turkey would be questioned not only in economic and military fields but also in terms of history and culture when Turkey expressed its desire to enter future Western organisations, including the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU. This country's process of integration with all these organisations is of course worth analysing here, but space allows us to analyse only one of these, Turkey's participation in the Council of Europe, in the present article.³⁷ However, this case also provides us with important clues that can be employed to other processes to understand the exact nature of Turkey's relations with the West in general and Europe in particular.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE:

ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND THE ISSUE OF MEMBERSHIP

The motivations for and the starting point of integration and the establishment of organisations in Europe are a controversial subject. According to one student of the subject, there are four different perspectives on explaining it. The first perspective looks at it from the perspective of common culture and religion in European identity. A second perspective, on the other hand, argues that integration emerged as a response to the challenge of a new international system after the Second World War, based on bipolarity. A third one emphasises the importance of economic considerations and the need for [inter] national trade and industry for a greater market. The fourth perspective sees the construction of Europe as a historical phenomenon rather than an inevitable process.³⁸

To provide a detailed analysis of these perspectives or to discuss all possible motivations and reasons behind the integration of Europe is not the aim of this article. But, as far as Turkey is concerned, the arguments of the first perspective are of special importance because, as it will be demonstrated below, Turkey's involvement in the integration of Europe has always brought to the mind the question of identity concerning the religious and cultural foundations of European integration in particular. Having said this, it is not to deny the importance of the other perspectives. Yet, in order to understand the case of Turkey the first model provides here a starting point, at least for analysis of the subject matter.

As a result of pan-Europeanist movements, the Council of Europe was created by a general agreement which was called the Statute of the Council and signed in London on 5 May 1949, with the participation of ten European countries: namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.³⁹ Initially, Turkey was not invited to the formative meetings of the Council. Nor was Turkey's name among the ten European countries that signed the Statute in London in May. After the establishment of NATO, the European countries again disappointed the Turks. Many people in Turkey expressed their deepest regrets in public meetings and in the press and asked the question why Turkey was not invited to participate in such an organisation.⁴⁰ They wondered if these countries, which fostered the idea of the Council of Europe, had not yet accepted Turkey as a European country, despite the Kemalist revolutions and the Turks efforts in external and internal affairs since the Second World War. Hüseyin C. Yalçın, in a leading article in *Ulus*, questioned the behaviour of the European countries and wrote as follows:

"...The point that we have not seen as natural and reacted to with surprise and regret is that Turkey was not invited [to the CE]...Therefore, we cannot restrain ourselves from openly expressing the indignation we feel that emerged from that forgetfulness that demonstrated [the existence of] negligence and indifference to our country [in Europe]."41 Referring to Turkey's exclusion from NATO,42 Yalçın asked ironically whether or not the Constitution of the US also dissuaded European countries from inviting Turkey into the establishment of the Council.43

THE UNKNOWN SIDE OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

AND UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTIONS

Of course, everyone knew that the reason Turkey was not invited to the establishment of the Council was not the US Constitution but the Constitution (Statute) of the Council of Europe and the mentality of the people who designed it.44 This is because, there was one important point in the preamble that was concerned with the past, history and culture of those founding countries, which separated (or was thought to separate) Turkey from the others: "The spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of [European] peoples." It was also stressed in the first article of the Statute that "the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage..."45 No one denies that the ingredients of this common heritage were obviously Greek philosophy, Roman Law, the Western Christian Church, the humanism of the Renaissance, the emergence of positivism, and the French Revolution, nationalism and industrialisation among others.46 Europe and European civilisation was certainly based on these, and one of the most sacred common elements was religion. However, it was hardly possible to find an open reference to Christianity in the official texts establishing the Council, except for the phrase of "common heritage". Among European countries, religion was exactly what James Joll called an "unspoken assumption":47 a matter that everybody accepted as an essential and indisputable truth but not well documented. Christianity seemed to be such a matter for the Council, as the first President of its Consultative Assembly pointed out in September 1949:

"This European civilisation is the civilisation of Christianity and the civilisation of humanity. It now remains for us not to repeat this formula mechanically, but to make the necessary effort to bring together in harmonious synthesis, particularly when there are difficulties, all of which is great, magnificent and at the same time moving in this civilisation of Christianity and this civilisation of humanity."48

As far as Turkey is concerned, no one can claim that it shared a common heritage of Christianity, despite the fact that most of the principles, not unspoken but written ones in the document that gave shape to the Statute and the structure of the Council, had been wholeheartedly accepted by Turkish decision makers, too. For most of them, Atatürk had already solved this problem in fact by creating a modern country that was based on secular Western values like any country in Europe.49 It was indeed true that Turkey was once the enemy of Europe, but what secular Turkey would like to share with Europe was not the past, but the present and future.50 As it was in any European country, individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law were also recognised by Turkey. The pursuit of peace based on justice and international co-operation had already become the fundamental tenets of modern Turkey, especially since 1923. As formulated in the dictum of Atatürk, 'Peace at home and peace in the world', and applied before and during the Second World War, Turkey's loyalty to

international organisations, peace and peaceful means in international relations had clearly illustrated the main character of Turkish foreign policy. A closer unity and a closer association with Europe could not be separated from the very existence of modern Turkey. Therefore, the Turks should not have been denied the right to join such a European organisation.⁵¹

Fortunately, Turkey's misfortune did not last very long because at its first meeting the Committee of Ministers of the Council extended an invitation to Turkey, as well as Greece and Iceland, to join it. In a statement on 8 August 1949, the Committee declared that if Greece and Turkey sent in their instruments of accession to the statute, their representatives could take part in the work of the organs of the Council.⁵² Immediately, Turkey replied to this invitation favourably, as Greece did, and the following day, the Turkish delegates took their places on the Committee of Ministers.⁵³ As was also reported in *The Times*, this admission was warmly welcomed in Turkey and did much to soothe the disappointment caused by its exclusion from NATO.⁵⁴ For the Turks, this membership meant that Turkey could not be separated from Europe geographically; the moral implication was that enormous changes made by the Kemalist revolution were regarded with sympathy and encouragement by the Western world. According to the editors of *The Times*, with this participation, it was not only Turks who considered Turkey to be a European country, but also some Western diplomats saw it as an essential change for the country. For example, Sir Knutchball-Hughes said "In the past, Turkey was an Asiatic state in Europe, but it is now a European state in Asia."⁵⁵

Legally, any country in Europe with a democratic political system could be a member of the Council following the procedure written down in its Statute. According to the article 3 of the Statute, "Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Under this article, it was open to any European country, but the Council envisaged a *sui generis* membership procedure in fact. Instead of direct application, a membership invitation was required: only then, "Any State so invited shall become a member on the deposit on its behalf with the Secretary General of an instrument of accession to the present Statute."

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TURKEY AND THE TURKISH REACTION

But the question of Turkey's acceptance as a member caused a heated debate in Europe. Some thought that this participation violated the main principles of the Council, because of this country's identity and its social and cultural traditions. The press in particular reported that many members of the Council had asked whether Turkey, as an overwhelmingly Muslim country, could be described as a country sharing the same European heritage as other members.⁵⁶ For example, *The Times* expressed doubts about the appropriateness of the country's admission to the Council.⁵⁷ According to the newspaper, if the aim of the organisation was to rally all those nations in or near Europe who were threatened by communism and to plan a strategy and organise the defence of Western Europe, then none had better reason than Turkey and Greece did to join this organisation. But, if the purpose of the Council was, "as many suppose", to clear the way for a closer union, "then the question is more difficult". In this case, the West European countries had no way other than starting the job with those nations who shared "a common tradition, common religion, and common system of government." In addition, the paper argued, it could be to their benefit if they used a common script, though they could not speak the same languages. According to the article, only Greece, which would always be honoured as the fountain of European civilisation, came

near to fulfilling these conditions among the three countries. "But it would be absurd and insulting to the Turks, a nation with a proud and glorious history of their own, to pretend that they share a common [identity] with the French and English. Muslim in religion and with an Asiatic language and Arabic script, it is not easy to see how Turkey could take her place easily in a United States of Western Europe."⁵⁸

However, all this was meaningless for the Turkish authorities. One Turk, Kasım Gülek, protested to *The Times* in a letter, accusing the editor of the newspaper of using wrong information and falsifying facts. According to Gülek, the religion of a state should not be considered an important principle in the relations of modern nations because such a thing belonged to the past, to "the medieval ages". Turkey was a modern country in all respects. "Furthermore, ... [it] has been a secular state for the last quarter of a century and adhered to this principle very strictly, having incorporated" it into her Constitution. Politically, Turkey was also a democratic state, with a multi-party regime and free press. The question of whether the Turkish language, "which had the same origin as Hungarian, Finnish and Estonian", he wrote, was Asiatic or not should be left to philologists. "But surely the origin of the language of a country should not determine her adherence to the European union."⁵⁹ In short, Gülek meant that Turkey was surely a European country that deserved the membership of the Council.

Gülek was not alone as deliberations on the question of the Turks' place in Europe went on in Turkey. For example, many members of the National Assembly felt that the West deliberately humiliated Turkey initially, as explicitly stated in one of the Assembly's sittings for debating the affair of the Council on 12 December 1949.⁶⁰ Most of them believed that Turkey was a European country in the full sense and that this was not a matter of argument. According to the Turkish Foreign Minister,⁶¹ the Statute of the Council presented an important turning point in European history, but Turkey's participation was as important as the establishment of the Council. For Turks, this was "a momentous event in itself". Then, he dwelt on the problem of whether Turkey was a European or an Asian state. According to Sadak, the Council itself had solved this problem by extending an invitation to Turkey. In his opinion, it should not be doubted that Turkey had economic and political interests everywhere including Asia and the Near East. "But for Turkey, the membership of the Council of Europe was of special meaning, because Turkey's destiny had already been tied to that of Europe." He evaluated Turkey's membership of the Council as a fruit of the Kemalist Westernisation process, in the last resort, as follows:

"The centre of gravity of our foreign policy is the Western world...Our participation in the Council of Europe as a European country is a necessary outcome of our long and continuous policy...It is doubtless that in the matter of Turkey's entry into the community of Europe in terms of culture and civilisation, the reforms of Atatürk play a much greater role than geography...Our membership is not only a matter of geography, but it is a result of...the revolution of Atatürk."⁶²

The opposition in the Assembly totally agreed with the opinions of the government. Speaking on behalf of the DP, a deputy congratulated the membership and expressed his party's special gratitude to the government. According to another one, Turkey's acceptance into the community of Europe, "not only in theory, but both de facto and de jure", fortified the concept of Europe, as much as it honoured Turkey. To him, the question of Turkey's place was in the past was used against Turkey, as "a matter of polemic". Now, this resolution certainly confirmed Turkey's place as a Western country, "not in regard of geography, but thinking and

mentality...This situation [Turkey's admission to the CE], accommodating the confirmation of a civilisation, a civilisation to which this country had turned its face and adopted for 150-200 years, has materialised our ideal. Therefore, it deserves many thanks."⁶³

After some discussions, the Assembly passed the draft law approving the Statute of the Council of Europe, with an overwhelming majority.⁶⁴ Turkey then became a de jure member of the Council.⁶⁵

CONCLUSION

Turkey's integration with Europe was opened wide by the declaration of the Marshall Plan. Thanks largely to the Plan, Turkey took part in the CEEC, ERP, OEEC and the Council of Europe. But, the Turks had different ideas when joining these organisations, ideas that cannot be confined to the aims of the Aid Plan only. In addition to the financial aspect of the Plan, the Turks also saw it as an opportunity for integration with Europe and thus a vital part of Turkey's Westernisation-modernisation process. This is an ideological outlook and therefore not a rational policy, but most Europeans had a similar approach as far as Turkey was concerned. This is simply because, whenever the issue of Turkey came to the table they could not refrain themselves from raising the question of identity and cultural differences, more than anything else. Interestingly enough, not only Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe, but of other organisations established before and after it, caused such debates, despite their economical and financial character.

However, Turkish decision-makers and the élite in particular sincerely wanted to be a part of Europe in the past as much as they do now; in essence, they saw themselves as a Western nation. After a long period of Westernisation, the Turks thought that they deserved much and had a natural right to be identified as such. For the Turks, Turkey's membership of Western organisations was a matter of contemporisation, a matter that many in Europe still seem not to understand.

1 For the Truman Doctrine and its impact on Turkey see: Şaban Çal, 'Turkey in the International System of Western States', *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 1997, pp. 75-100. Also Şaban Çalıř, *The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Nottingham, 1996, pp. 103-106. M. Gölübol (et al.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara, 1989, pp. 219-230. [Editorial], 'Truman Doktrini Marshall Yardımı ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri' and 'Truman Doktrini Marshall Yardımı ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri', *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 1., Istanbul, 1983, pp. 549-550. O. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964*, Ankara, 1979, pp.11-40.

2 Interview with Semih Günver conducted by the author in August 1993 in Ankara.

3 For his speech visit <http://www.oecd.org/about/marshall/speech.htm> (1 December 1999).

4 For the Marshall Plan particularly see: J. M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (February 21-June 5, 1947), New York, 1955, pp. 239-256; H. S. Truman, *The memories of H. S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 1945-1953*, Vol. II, London, 1956, pp.116-126; Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1947, III, *The British Commonwealth, Europe*, Washington DC, 1972, pp. 197-237. See also: P. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948*, London, 1952, pp. 19-20 and 63-65; M. Gönlübol and H. Ulman, 'Genel Durum', in Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 228-229; N. Y. Tschirgi, *Laying Foundations of Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1979, pp. 289-293; Oran, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, pp. 40-55.

5 For the conference, see <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins/conf-oeec.htm>.

6 R. Karluk, *Uluslararası Ekonomik, Mali ve Siyasal Kuruluşlar*, Ankara, 1998, pp. 25-27. For CEEC see also: N. Güran and Y. Aktürk, *Uluslararası İktisadi Kuruluşlar*, Isparta, 1999, pp. 205-206; DPT, *Dünyada Küreselleşme ve Bölgesel Bütünleşmeler*, Ankara, 1995, pp. 62-63; A. I. MacBean and P. N. Sowden, *International Institutions in Trade and Finance*, London, 1983, pp. 132-136. Also see: <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins/conf-oeec.htm>.

7 See: TBMM, *Zabıt Ceridesi (Tutanak Dergisi, hereafter cited as TD)*, Period VIII, Vol. 10, Ankara, 1948, pp. 4-14. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 11, 1948, pp. 43-46. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 12, pp. 1-3, 998-1004.

8 Interview with Günver. See: TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 10, 1948, pp. 4-14. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 11, 1948, pp. 43-46. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, 1948, Vol. 12, pp. 998-1004.

9 TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 11, 1948, p. 45.

10 TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 10, 1948, p. 11.

11 Interview with Günver. See also: TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 10, pp. 11-14.

12 Tschirgi, *Laying Foundations*, pp. 306-309. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 10, p. 7.

13 *Ibid.*, pp.8-10.

14 According to Günver, this conclusion was based on inadequate information given by the government. Interview, Günver.

15 Tschirgi, *Laying Foundations*, p. 309-311.

16 For comments see *Aydın Tarihi*, January and February 1948.

17 See *Ulus*, and *Cumhuriyet*, 25 January 1948.

18 Gönlübol and Ulman, 'Genel Durum', p. 230.

19 TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 10, pp. 11-13.

20 Interview with Günver. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 12, pp. 999-1000. Turkey also took some initiatives in London and Paris. TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 11, pp. 43-44.

21 TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Vol. 12, 1948, pp. 1000-1002.

22 Ibid., p. 999.

23 According to the government's figures (1952), Turkey received \$354.2 million during the Marshall Plan period. The total breakdown of this aid in years is as follows: 1948-49: \$49m, 1949-50: \$132.7m, 1950-51: \$100m, 1951-1952: \$70m. TBMM, TD, Per. 9, Vol. XV, Ankara, 1952, p. 311. Some sources mention different figures. For example, according to Karluk, this figure is \$225 million: R. Karluk, Türkiye Ekonomisi, Eskişehir, 1995, p. 342. Oran noted \$434 million: Oran, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, pp. 53-54.

24 The Convention setting up the OEEC was signed in Paris on 16 April 1948. For the establishment, structure and aims of the organisation see: Karluk, Uluslararası Kuruluşlar, pp. 25-27; Güran and Aktürk, Uluslararası İktisadi Kuruluşlar, pp. 205-206; DPT, Dünya'da Küreselleşme, pp. 63-64; MacBean and Sowden, International Institutions, pp. 134-144. Also: <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins/oeec.htm>. The OEEC is the father of the OECD, which was set up on 14 December 1960. For the establishment and changes in the structure and functions of the OECD, see all the above-cited publications. Also surf at <http://www.oecd.org/about/origins/index.htm>.

25 For Turkey's official policy towards the OEEC, see TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, Per. VIII, Vol. 12, pp. 98-103 and 192ff. Also: Tschirgi, Laying Foundations, p. 334-335; T. Ataöv, NATO and Turkey, Ankara, 1970, pp. 106-107.

26 For the speech of the Foreign Minister and comments, see issues of Ayın Tarihi in March and April 1948.

27 19 April 1948.

28 Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1948.

29 TBMM, TD, Per. VIII, Birleşim 85, İctima 2, Vol. 12, pp. 998-1004.

30 Ibid., pp. 998-1000.

31 Ibid., pp. 1000-1001.

32 Oran, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, pp. 48-52.

33 Interview with Günver.

34 Ayın Tarihi, Vol. 178, September 1948, p. 83.

35 Gece Postası, 5 September 1948.

36 Tasvir, 10 September 1948.

37 For a more information see: Çalıcı, The Role of Identity, pp. 108-114.

38 A. Deighton, 'Introduction' to her edited book, *Building Post-War Europe*, Oxford, 1995, pp. xiii-xxviii. See also: Çalıř, *The Role of Identity*, pp. 108-109.

39 For the establishment of the Council visit: <http://www.coe.org.fr/present/history.htm>. (1 December 1999) and <http://www.coe.org.fr/present/about.htm>. See also: A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe: Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*, London, 1961, particularly chapter 1.

40 Gönlübol and Ulman, 'Genel Durum', p. 234.

41 H. C. Yalçın, 'Avrupa Birliđi Müessisleri ve Türkiye', *Ulus*, 8 May 1949.

42 The Western countries denied Turkey membership of NATO when it was established on 4 April 1949. The main reason was that Turkey was not an Atlantic country. On the question of the NATO membership, see: Çalıř, "Turkey in the International System of Western States", pp. 84-100 and Çalıř, *The Role of Identity*, pp. 114-129.

43 *Ulus*, 8 May 1949.

44 For the Turkish text of the Statute see *Düstur, Tertip III*, Vol. 31, pp. 198ff. I. Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağıtları*, Vol. II (1945-1990), Ankara, 1990, pp. 329-342.

45 Robertson, *The Council of Europe*, p. 257.

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

47 J. Joll, '1914: the Unspoken Assumptions', in H. W. Koch (ed.), *The Origins of the First World War*, Basingstoke, 1972, p. 309.

48 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, First Sessions 10th August [1949], Reports, Part IV, 8 September 1949, Strasbourg, 1949, p. 1328.

49 Interview with Günver.

50 Interviews with Günver and Hayrettin Erkmen. The interview with Erkmen was conducted by the author in September 1993 in Istanbul at Arifi Pa'a Korusu.

51 Gönlübol and Ulman, 'Genel Durum', p. 234.

52 *The Times*, 9 August 1949.

53 *The Times*, 10 August 1949. For the Turkish reaction, see *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1949.

54 *The Times*, 9 September 1949.

55 TBMM, TD, Per. 8, Vol. 15, 1949, p. 181.

56 *Manchester Guardian*, 10 August 1949.

57 *The Times*, 10 August 1949, 'Union and Geography', p. 5.

58 Ibid. Italics added. This article was based on a number of serious mistakes.

59 The Times, 18 August 1949. See also Ataöv, NATO and Turkey, pp. 105-107.

60 For debates see: TBMM, TD, Per. 8, Vol. 15, 1949, pp. 178-192ff.

61 Ibid., pp. 178-180, 190-192.

62 Ibid., p. 180, 191.

63 Ibid., pp. 181-182.

64 Düstür, Tertip III, C. 31, pp. 198ff.

65 For a brief history of these relations visit <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/mfa471.htm>.