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# THE ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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## INTRODUCTION

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has a relatively short history. The first decisions aimed at turning it into a 'regular' international organisation from a series of conferences were taken at the end of the Cold War in 1990 in Paris, where, among other things, the Charter of Paris was adopted. Subsequent decisions establishing the Secretariat, the institutions and changing its name from Conference to Organisation were steps on the road to maturity.

Even more important than summit documents were the decisions to engage the Organisation in the prevention and management of major crises in its area, as well as participating in post-conflict rehabilitation. The establishment of the mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the presence in Albania, the Kosovo Verification Mission and, most recently, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OSCE MiK), shaped the OSCE more dramatically than any other decisions. Through these missions, the OSCE has gained growing political support from its participating states, developed new instruments of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and laid the groundwork for close and practical co-operation with other international organisations and institutions in the field.

This 'organic' development through crisis after crisis and mission after mission has resulted in an organisation that has many strengths and some weaknesses. The future of the OSCE depends very much on its ability to build on these strengths and to overcome its weaknesses. But this can not be done in isolation. Full utilisation of its comparative advantages and unique resources can best be done in a broader framework-through co-ordination and co-operation with its partner organisations and institutions.

The OSCE's particular strength lies in the preponderance of field operations among its activities. About 20 field operations, employing 1200 internationals and almost twice that number of local staff, are supported by a Secretariat of about 200. (In fact, the Secretariat has a wider range of duties, going well beyond providing support for field operations, and including conference services, external relations, seminars, managing the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) communications network and assisting the Forum for Security Co-operation.) The OSCE institutions are also field-oriented: Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) regular observation of elections and its projects in the field of democracy building are good examples of this.

In the coming years the OSCE may face new challenges that are likely to put new burdens on already

over-stretched OSCE structures. These may include: the possible opening of large new field operations (for example, in the context of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict); a broadening of present activities (which might result from progress in any of the so called 'frozen conflicts' like the South-Ossetian or Trans-Dnestrian conflicts); and development of regional approaches and participation in the implementation of the Stability Pact. LESSONS LEARNED FROM LARGE FIELD OPERATIONS

OSCE's (CSCE pre-1995) involvement in Kosovo provides a useful illustration of the evolution in magnitude and complexity of the Organisation's activities in this decade. Among the first international bodies to deal with the Kosovo question, the then CSCE established the Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in 1992, withdrawing them in 1993 when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) failed to renew their mandate. Typical of the CSCE's early field activities, these missions, the first the Organisation had ever established, numbered initially no more than 40 personnel at maximum strength. The Kosovo Verification Mission, established in October 1998, numbered 1239 international staff on 20 March 1999, when withdrawn from the province. The present mission, the OSCE MiK, was established on 1 July 1999 and now numbers 460 international staff and has an estimated strength at full establishment of around 750 international personnel.

It is inevitable that the scale and tempo of these field operations places a substantial burden on what remains a small secretariat (or headquarters). It is important, however, that the Organisation's response to the lessons learned from the increased pace of its missions is not simply one of bureaucratic expansion; rather, it should lie in procedural changes, efficiency enhancements and internal re-structuring, buttressed with judicious recruitment where a clear gap in capabilities exists.

Experience has shown that there will always be a requirement to set up new missions quickly. For as long as this requirement exists there will be a commensurate advantage in establishing operational procedures before their establishment. The OSCE has reviewed its recruitment procedures in order to ensure that its adherence to the policy of selecting individual mission members does not impose unnecessary delay. The Rapid Experts, Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) concept, which seeks to establish and supervise rosters of pre-qualified personnel who may be called upon in emergency, may prove a further refinement.

Likewise, the creation of an embedded planning capability, charged with establishing operational templates for deployment based on recent lessons, is also under consideration. An ad hoc group, consisting of experts from other OSCE missions and of independent advisors, assembled the planning blueprints for the OSCE MiK in early 1999. This work, coupled with the revisions in personnel selection described above, bestowed a significant operational advantage on the OSCE MiK at establishment, enabling it to begin work in a coherent fashion from the outset.

CO-OPERATION WITH PARTNER ORGANISATIONS

In light of these requirements, co-operation with other international organisations becomes an increasingly important ingredient of the OSCE's work. As the international community shoulders ever more challenging early-warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation tasks, in addition to those inherent in assisting transition countries more effectively in building democracy, it becomes increasingly unlikely that no single organisation can 'go it alone'. Only co-ordinated action and regular dialogue with OSCE's partners can produce the

synergy required for success.

The planning, deployment and operation of the OSCE MiK is an excellent demonstration of how close co-operation with other international organisations and institutions can lead to efficient use of resources, savings in manpower, time and money as well as greater synergy. The OSCE MiK functions as one of the pillars of a larger UN operation. In this framework, it co-operates very closely not only with the UN and its agencies like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), but also with Kosova Force (KFOR) and the European Union's pillar. Co-operation with the Council of Europe (CoE) is even closer. Experts seconded by the CoE work in important positions throughout the OSCE Mission. This co-operation began with joint planning and continued with joint deployment and joint training. The OSCE and CoE are co-located in the OSCE Mission headquarters in Pristina. The OSCE also relies very much on the expert assistance of professional organisations, foundations and NGOs, like the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and the Association of Central- and East-European Election Organisations (ACEEEO).

This close co-operation in the field did not come about automatically. The various international organisations, institutions and NGOs had to undergo a long learning process. They got to know and respect each others' institutional cultures, methods of operation and accumulated expertise during a series of field operations from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Albania. Despite the impressive successes in Kosovo, the potential of this kind of co-operation has yet to be fully harnessed. The establishment of a modest planning capability within the OSCE Secretariat will, we hope, enable the Organisation to assess, in a much more comprehensive and in-depth manner, the potential contribution of international partners to future OSCE field operations, in addition to the personnel offered by its participating states. By identifying the sources of readily available expertise (be it for short-term assessment missions, studies or provision or the training of seconded experts) the OSCE will be in a situation to deploy highly specialised and professional field operations speedily and without over-stretching the resources of the participating states (although in many cases, the participating states rely on these NGOs, foundations and professional associations for expert personnel).

## DEVELOPING A REGIONAL APPROACH

Crises within the OSCE region have very different natures and thus call for different responses and tools to prevent or manage them. However, most crises have a regional dimension or element that should be incorporated in the strategy of international organisations. This approach naturally flows from the OSCE concept of comprehensive and co-operative security and has been progressively developed by OSCE field missions, whether in South Eastern Europe, Central Asia or the Caucasus. This is particularly true for the five OSCE missions in South Eastern Europe and, in assessing the OSCE's contribution to peace and stability in Europe, it is particularly significant that its largest missions are in this region.

The rationale behind the regional approach is, as the OSCE Chairman-in-Office said in the Permanent Council, that working across borders is necessary for success. The prospect for democracy in one country will be greatly reinforced if democracy-building succeeds across the region; the prospects for prosperity in one country will be strengthened if economic growth can be achieved in all; and the prospect for reconciliation and stability in one country will be greatly improved if this can be achieved for the entire region.

The OSCE shares the principles, norms and objectives on which the Stability Pact for South Eastern

Europe was established. It was agreed that this Organisation has a key role to play in fostering stability and security across the OSCE area; it is therefore determined to make a significant contribution to the efforts undertaken through the Stability Pact, specifically in the fields of human rights, democratisation, and politico-military security.

To play our role fully, and to complement the Stability Pact initiative, the OSCE, as the main regional multilateral organisation in Europe, has further developed the regional dimension of its work and activities. As the Chairman-in-Office for Regional Strategy said, the Stability Pact and the OSCE regional strategy are complementary in the sense that both conceptualise South Eastern Europe as a political and economic area. Both initiatives are based on the idea that the region as a whole faces a number of common problems and that many of these can only be overcome through a comprehensive and coherent approach to the entire region.

The OSCE regional strategy, with its framework for action and its specific regional initiatives with an important human dimension component, pose two inter-related strategic challenges to our Organisation.

The strategy is primarily the product of the OSCE missions and field operations in the region and these will be the main actors in its further development and implementation. This implies long-term strategic thinking in the regional involvement of the OSCE in South Eastern Europe, which could also be applied in other regions "since", as Minister Knut Vollebaek, said to the Permanent Council, 1 July 1999, "the concept of comprehensive and indivisible security applies throughout the OSCE area".

Another challenge is the need to make a more creative use of existing channels of co-operation and communication between the missions themselves, between missions and the central institutions and, particularly, between the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretariat, in order to provide the necessary institutional continuity for this common endeavour.

## CONCLUSIONS

The OSCE can face the challenges of the early next century with confidence. It is equipped with an impressive array of tools, an almost decade-long experience of field missions and a proven ability to mobilise political support and resources when needed. The decisions of the Istanbul Summit have further strengthened its ability to deploy large field operations rapidly, without bureaucratic expansion or disproportionate increases in its budget.

At the same time, there is no reason for complacency. As stabilisation efforts in South Eastern Europe progress from prevention or management of violent conflicts, to the more long-term and resource-intensive phase of strengthening stability, democracy and fostering transition, the OSCE will need to find ways to gradually hand over its operations to nationals and governments of the host states. The mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina provides an example of this local ownership process in action. This must be done without undermining their effectiveness or lessening the attention and support of the international community. This process might take many years and requires careful planning and execution.

As the OSCE's focus on field activities moves further east, mindful of a possible thaw in the conflicts in Moldova, the Caucasus, or more intensive involvement in Central Asia, the Organisation will have to develop new approaches and methods, taking into account the different historical backgrounds,

political situations and social traditions of these countries. It will have to cope with the problem of weaker incentives among the countries of these regions to co-operate with the Organisation on thorny issues that demand great political determination. In South Eastern Europe, the strong wish of most of the governments of the region to join Euro-Atlantic structures of integration provided a strong and continuous incentive for these countries to comply with OSCE principles and commitments and to accept the assistance of the OSCE community. The OSCE will have to find-in close co-operation with its partner organisations-ways to engage in a stable and robust way the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the complicated, and sometimes controversial, exercise of creating long-term stability through democracy and prosperity in these regions.

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA NICOLAS K. LAOS

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The turmoil associated with the emergence of the New World Order is, to a large extent, the result of the interaction of at least three types of states which call themselves nations but share few of the historic attributes of the nation state. First, there are ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires (e.g. the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union). Historic grievances obsess them, they often adopt a policy of nation-state building ignoring the goal of international order and their foreign policies are highly volatile since they have no experience or diplomatic tradition to rely on. These states need to be socialised1 into the international system. Walt2 argues that states of this type are almost revolutionary, tending to wage wars against one another because the turmoil surrounding them alters the balance of power, this increases the danger of misperception and affects their calculations about how easy it is to win. Second, there are post-colonial states (e.g. in the Middle East and Africa). These states are characterised by the traditions of tribalism and authoritarianism. However, the imperial powers imposed a new tradition upon them: the modern nation-state. In post-colonial states, political identities were traditionally drawn from one's religious affiliation or one's local kin group. However, the imperial powers took out their imperial pens and carved out an assortment of nation-states. In other words, most of the post-colonial states were not willed into existence by their own people; rather, the imperial powers imposed their shapes and structures and they have little or no historical precedent. When these new nation-states were created, in each one, a particular tribe-like group either seized power or the imperial powers ensconced them in power (e.g. the Alawites in Syria, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, etc.). These modernising rulers tried to solidify and develop their relatively new nation-states, and, therefore, the state too often came to mean the army, which was usually the only national institution safeguarding domestic order.

Third, there are continental-type states: India unites a multiplicity of tongues, religions and ethnic communities; China unites a multiplicity of languages under common writing, common culture and common history; the United States has succeeded in holding together a multiplicity of ethnic groups; and the Russian Federation is, at the end of the twentieth century, characterised by trends of disintegration on the one hand and reimperialisation on the other (after the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia has been trying to strengthen the CIS3 and establish it as an internationally recognised regional organisation).

Apart from the interaction of different types of states in the post-Cold War world, the fact that the number of states multiplies and their capacity to interact increases leads to a more complex

international system. On the one hand, fragmentation characterises the international system of the post-Cold War era and on the other hand globalisation.4

In the long run, the new international system will discourage the concentration of power in the hands of a single state.5 The reasons for this are mainly the following: (i) the erosion of the nation-state by the emergence of global issues (e.g. the global ramifications of a nuclear war, the management of the global economy, etc.) and non-state actors in the international system (e.g. the OECD, the IMF, the WTO, multinational corporations, etc.); (ii) the diffusion of knowledge and power as a result of the information revolution and the globalisation of the world economy; (iii) democratisation and multiculturalism produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defence to other priorities (especially in the absence of a clear-cut adversary) and hence make the conduct of an imperial foreign policy more difficult.6

In the New World Order, there are six main geopolitical actors, i.e. states that can challenge the geopolitical image of the world, namely, the United States, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India. As far as Europe is concerned, NATO provides the trustworthiest guarantee for the deterrence of aggression. If Germany and Russia become tempted to aggression and pursue a condominium over Central Europe or quarrel with each other, then the United Kingdom and France would be unable to sustain the political balance in Western Europe without the US. NATO is a necessary institution for the integration of Germany into the West and for the prevention of any Russian attempt to pursue the imperial goals of the Tsars and the communists. Additionally, the European Union plays a crucial role in the maintenance of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Post-communist Russia needs to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. On Russian television on 2 August 1992, Andrei Kozyrev argued that if Russian policy turned against America and other Western states, it would lead the state into isolation. This, he argued in an article for the American journal Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1992, would have a disastrous impact on Russian reform. Moreover, both the US and (especially) Russia have an interest in avoiding another arms race, in preventing nuclear proliferation (Russia has three neighbours possessing nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), in insuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (even though they differ about whether the eastwards expansion of NATO will help achieve such stability), and in stabilising international relations and domestic politics in Central Asia, which is a strategic black hole between the old Russian, Chinese, Indian, Persian and Ottoman empires.

However, in 1993-1995, the so-called Eurasian group became influential in Russian foreign policy (cf. Aleksandr Zhilin, 'Ia ne militarist i ne konservator', Moskovskie novosti, 4-11 February 1996). They argue that Russia should not trust the West. First, because, in case of a North-South confrontation, or in case of a confrontation between the West and Islam, a Russia that was part of the northern club would due to its geopolitical position pay the cost of being the club's shield. Moreover, the economies of the Asian dragons complement Russia's own, since they need its natural resources and it needs their technology. Boris Yeltsin claimed in January 1993 that his "recent series of visits to South Korea, China and now India is indicative of the fact that we are moving away from a Western emphasis" (ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1993).

Second, for Eurasians, what matters most is Russia's relations with Germany and Eastern Europe, rather than the EU and NATO.

Third, the Eurasians argue against a strategic partnership with the West and this has to do with the

emergence of Ukraine as an independent state, making Russia feel geopolitically isolated from the centre of Europe.

Given that Russia will always be essential to the world order, the West must pursue a strategic partnership with Russia in a way that will not allow Russia to threaten US interests, will prevent the development of an anti-hegemonic coalition of Russia-China-Iran against the US and will contribute to the peaceful integration of Russia into the world order. Moreover, Russia can play an important role in countering a possible decision of Chinese strategists to challenge the trilateral coalition of America-Europe-Japan and it can operate as the West's natural shield against Islamic fundamentalism.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, agreed in Paris on 27 May 1997, is a major step toward the co-ordination of the foreign policies of NATO and Russia, "To contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states." According to this Act, "NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and co-operation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro- Atlantic area and diminish the security of none." At the same time, the United States must maintain smooth triangular relations with China and Japan. Close Japanese-American relations offer a significant military reassurance to Japan and other states in Asia. Thus, Japan will depend on US military projection. A weaker US military presence in Asia might tempt Japan and China to pursue nationalistic foreign policies, which could lead to an international crisis involving Japan and China as well as the buffer states in between. Close Sino-American relations contribute to Japanese moderation and good Sino-Japanese relations. Given the mutual fears and tensions between China and Russia, the US must operate as the guarantor of the equilibrium between China and Russia: when any of these two geopolitical actors threatens to become dominant in Eurasia, the US must support the other side in order to maintain the equilibrium.

However, apart from the above-mentioned geopolitical actors, there are other states that cannot themselves change the geopolitical image of the post-Cold War world, but their geographical position and its impact on the behaviour of geopolitical actors give them special significance in the New World Order. These states are Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, Iran and South Korea.

The independence of Ukraine from Russia deprives the latter of the possibility of becoming a Eurasian empire since Ukraine is a state of 52 million people, it has significant natural resources and controls Russia's access to the Black Sea and Central Europe.7 The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine, agreed in Madrid on 9 July 1997, contains a variety of areas of consultation or co-operation between NATO and Ukraine, including political- and security-related subjects, conflict prevention, crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and arms control issues, combating drug-trafficking and terrorism, defence planning, science and technology issues and environmental security issues. In addition, at the 1999 Munich Conference on Security Policy, the US Secretary of Defence, William S. Cohen, stated, "There can be no stability throughout the continent without a stable Russia and a stable and prosperous Ukraine as well."

An independent Azerbaijan, connected to the West by oil pipelines, would deprive Russia of oil

resources and could give the West access to the rich energy resources of Central Asia.8

Even though Turkey has some domestic problems, it plays a stabilising role in the Black Sea, controls the exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, balances Russia's influence in the Caucasus9 and offers important services within NATO.

Israel is very important for the pursuit of US foreign-policy goals in the Middle East and, together with Turkey, it tries to counter Islamic fundamentalism and political extremism and to maintain order in the Eastern Mediterranean by creating a system of bilateral co-operation in the fields of defence and intelligence.

Moreover, although Iran is inimical to the West and especially to the US, it deters the expansion of Russian influence in the Persian Gulf, which would challenge American interests in the area.

Finally, the strong ties between South Korea and the US allow the US to offer military protection to Japan from abroad. The growing economic power of South Korea increases its significance as a US ally.10

The preceding geopolitical analysis of the post-Cold War world points toward the creation of a global security system. In Europe, the strengthening of West European and Atlantic institutions' ties with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine deters a German or Russian pursuit of imperialistic goals and encourages the maintenance of order in Eurasia. This is the main purpose of the eastward enlargement of NATO. Additionally, in Asia, there are two major balances of power: one between Russia, Japan and China in north-east Asia and the one between Russia, China and India in south-east Asia. The role of the US with respect to those balances of power is to protect potential victims against potential predators. Therefore, the global security system of the post-Cold War era is based primarily on an expanded NATO, Russia (co-operating with NATO within a viable and mutually agreed institutional framework), China, Japan and possibly India. Henry Kissinger maintains that, after the end of the Cold War, what "America must master is the transition from an age when all choices seemed open to a period when it can still accomplish more than any other society if it can only learn its limits."11

## DETERRENCE OF REGIONAL AGGRESSORS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In the post-Cold War era, the best way of deterring major wars between the principal geopolitical actors is the creation of the global security system that we mentioned above. Moreover, an intercontinental deal between an expanded NATO, Russia, China, Japan and possibly India, which would gradually give rise to a more formal structure, could play a decisive role in the deterrence of regional aggressors globally.

US foreign policy must strike a balance between its idealism and realpolitik. In Kissinger's words, this means, "There is a margin between necessity and accident, in which a statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication."12 International problems must be tackled on a case by case basis as components in a geo-strategic equation. Moralistic or legalistic approaches fail to identify the particular characteristics of each international problem and thus lure one into failure, since they tend to lead to the exchange of a lesser evil for a greater one. For instance, Jeanne Kirkpatrick argues, "[The] Carter administration ... wanted to bring about moderate and democratic regimes in Iran and Nicaragua. And they had followed certain

policies in the effort to bring about more moderate and democratic regimes. But what they produced were the more repressive, hostile regimes of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ortega brothers."13

Balance-of-power arrangements best serve the pursuit of international security. Kissinger argues that, when working properly, the balance-of-power system is "meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts ... a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order."14 Thus, US foreign policy should be based on the ideals of freedom and order, but it should pursue them by examining the geopolitical environment characterising each segment of space-time. In particular, the post-Cold War international system obliges the United States, for the first time in its history, to found its foreign policy on the maintenance of balance-of-power arrangements, since the global security system of the post-Cold War era should be based on NATO, Russia, China, Japan and India.

In addition to working towards the creation of the global security system that we have already discussed, the United States should take more short-term measures too. First, regional aggressors are difficult to deter if they expect their hold on power to erode if they do not take risks. Thus, the US deterrent strategy must be credible; namely, the adversary must believe that the US has both the intention and the capability of doing what it threatens to do.

The US's ability to deter risk-taking aggressors cannot easily extend much beyond those situations in which important US interests are at stake (e.g. Korea and the Persian Gulf) and a few others in which US deterrent capabilities themselves are enough to dissuade an adversary from aggression. It goes without saying that the US should pay special attention to the maintenance of order in states that have crucial geopolitical advantages, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, Iran and South Korea, and it should treat them as the major units of regional security systems.

A major deterrence enhancement for the US is intelligence. Technical intelligence (e.g. satellites, devices for electronic warfare, etc.) makes smart weapons smart, makes the monitoring of sanctions imposed on aggressors possible and allows the US to know as much about an adversary's arsenal and location as possible. Human intelligence provides necessary information about details regarding an adversary's intents and the scale and pace of an adversary's nuclear, chemical or biological programme. The Gulf War of 1990-91 is a characteristic case in point.15

In addition, NATO must be adjusted and transformed to meet new challenges and it must prepare its forces to protect its common interests. It must be prepared to endure the stresses and the strains of operations such as those found in Bosnia during the Yugoslav War. As Bosnia proved, there were no pre-existing communications, no pre-existing logistics, no headquarters or other necessary elements of infrastructure. Thus, the defence capabilities of NATO must be transformed to meet the challenges of regional security in the post-Cold War era.

Moreover, the regulation of the arms trade could make a substantial contribution to the deterrence of regional aggressors. The first major step towards that end was taken when seven Western industrialised powers agreed in the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) not to spread to the developing world ballistic missile technology with a range above 300 kilometres and a payload of over 500 kilograms. The MTCR, which in 1991 had 15 formal adherents, has gradually started monitoring the proliferation of cruise missiles too. Moreover, an agreement concluded by twenty-seven states in April 1992 is designed to limit the sale of dual-use machinery and materials

suitable for the production of nuclear weapons, but its enforcement is voluntary (i.e. evasion is almost certain). Thus, in addition to formal agreements for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community plays a crucial role in the struggle against the proliferation of these weapons. Given that the information revolution gives black-market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction several advantages (e.g. it facilitates communication), formal agreements are not enough since they cannot tackle the problem effectively. It is the intelligence community that has the capabilities and the flexibility necessary to tackle the problem of proliferation in a decisive way. Since the information revolution has transformed the problem of proliferation into a problem of information, the role of the intelligence community is a key one.

As far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned, it must be stressed that, even though nuclear weapons may remain relatively limited in years to come, states may be tempted to develop chemical and biological weapons, which are less costly and easier to conceal. In a recent collection of studies on twenty first century warfare issues,16 a US Air Force medical officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Kadlec, wrote that, under favourable meteorological conditions, 100kg of anthrax bacillus dropped by night on a city the size of Washington would cover an area of 300 square kilometres and could kill between one and three million people.

The danger of chemical and biological weapons increases because of the difficulty of prohibiting them. These weapons are easy to produce-in many cases, all that is needed is a rudimentary laboratory in a bathroom. Hence, it is very difficult for international inspection to be as effective as that imposed on signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For this reason, regular inspections should be carried out covering each state's military facilities, its chemical, pharmaceutical and food factories as well as every governmental building that could be used for those purposes. However, because biological agents can be produced in nondescript premises and biological weapons can be used for terrorist purposes,17 the role of human intelligence is of vital significance.

Thus, the various international non-proliferation treaties must provide adequate control measures for chemical and biological weapons and must be substantially amended and extended to non-governmental organisations as well as states. Additionally, preventive strikes, such as the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, may occasionally be useful if there is no risk of causing a major nuclear disaster.

In our analysis of regional security, we must not be oblivious of the fact that the potential users of weapons of mass destruction are mainly individual desperados and Third World states or movements opposed to the West. Therefore, in addition to trying to minimise the potential aggressors' capabilities of realising their threats, the West must try to modify the potential aggressors' intents by using diplomacy as a means of spreading prosperity. The British former Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, made a speech to the London diplomatic corps at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 11 June 1996, where he argued, "[A] peaceful world is one where nations can trade and do business freely to advance their own prosperity."18 Therefore, the industrial democracies must offer the necessary aid to the developing world in a way that encourages self-help and the successful integration of the developing states into the world economy, thus preventing corruption and the creation of a dependency culture. As Rifkind put it, "First, we must focus aid on those ready to make best use of it. Second, we must give developing countries a chance to secure their own future. Above all they need markets for their goods, and a real opportunity to build their prosperity."19

1 The term is used in the spirit of K.N. Waltz, op. cit. (fn. 1), pp. 74-77 and 127-128.

2 See S.M. Walt, 'Revolution and War', World Politics 3, 1992, pp. 321-368.
3 See M. Webber, CIS Integration Trends, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
4 See: J. Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988; S. Dalby, 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse', Alternatives, 17, 1992, pp. 95-134.
5 The post-Cold War international system is one of multilevel interdependence. At the military level, the international system is unipolar since there is no other military power comparable to the United States. At the economic level, the international system is tripolar consisting of an Asian bloc formed around the yen, a Western Hemisphere bloc around the US dollar and a European bloc clustering around the ECU or the German mark. At the level of transnational interdependence, the international system shows a diffusion of power.
6 Z. Brzezinski, in Out of Control-Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 2lst Century (New York, Macmillan, 1993), argues that the "transformation of America from a society dominated-and shaped-by a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture into a global mosaic inevitably will involve a profound shift in values and perhaps some further loss of social cohesion. While such a change may generate new creativity and dynamism ... it is also likely to be disruptive, even potentially divisive ... the new mosaic could generate within America even escalating urban guerrilla warfare." (pp. 114-115.)
7 See T. Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
8 See: R.J. Martin, The Economy and Foreign Relations of Azerbaijan, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996; G. Bondarevsky and G. Englefield, Boundary Issues in Central Asia, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
9 See P. Baev, Russian Policy in the Caucasus, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
10 See G. Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
11 See H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 834.
12 See H. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1979. p. 55.
13 See J. Kirkpatrick, interview, U.S. News & World Report, 10 March 1986, p. 36. It is a mistake on behalf of the West (especially the EU) to adopt the view that modern societies are supposed to diffuse the values of the Western democracy in the developing countries without bearing in mind historical necessities. For instance, in the 1990s, the army is the most modernised authoritative agency in Turkey's transitional society. In Turkey, the army can provide a sense of citizenship, an appreciation of political action and can lead to a more responsible nationalism since it counters Islamic fundamentalism and aims at the modernisation of Turkey by introducing and consolidating Western economic, social and political institutions. In general, following Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', Commentary 68, 1979, pp. 34-45, we can argue that authoritarian regimes (on the right) that are allies of the West should be differentiated from and considered to be 'better' than totalitarian regimes (i.e. regimes based on left-wing ideologies or religious fundamentalism) mainly because authoritarian systems are putatively susceptible to incremental democratisation/modernisation-a disposition for which their enmity to communism/fundamentalism served as a predominant piece of evidence.
14 See H. Kissinger, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 21.
15 See R. Gates, interviewed by B. van Voorst, Time, 20 April 1992, pp. 39-40. 16 See B. Schneider and L. Grinter (eds.), Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3, 1995.

17 A characteristic example of bio-terrorism is the Aum Shinri Kyo sect attack on the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995.
18 See M. Rifkind, 'Diplomacy and the Spreading of Prosperity', Survey of Current Affairs 26, 1996, p. 232.
19 See M. Rifkind, ibid., pp. 232-233.