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**THE TURKISH MODEL AND THE TURKIC REPUBLICS**

İDRİS BAL

*Dr. İdris Bal is a Lecturer at the Police Academy, Ankara.*

**INTRODUCTION**

Following the collapse of the USSR, Turkey and Iran were considered to be rival powers which would fill the Central Asian and Caucasian power vacuum left by the former superpower and which would be imitated by the newly independent states in their search for a political model, nationhood and identity. During the early days of this competition, the West supported Turkey. The ‘Turkish Model’ was put forward as an ideal Muslim democracy and a model of development especially for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, which are Muslim in religion and have ethnic and linguistic ties to Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, was usually regarded as the representative of fundamentalist Islam and oppression, and it was feared that Iran sought to export its regime to this unstable region using its historical, geographical and religious ties.

The aim of this paper is, first, to give brief information about the design of the Turkish Model after the establishment of Turkish republic. Second, to underline some weaknesses of the model and to find the factors that made the Turkish Model popular in 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the USSR. In conclusion, a brief explanation about decline of the model will be given.

**THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC AND DESIGN OF THE TURKISH MODEL**

The westernisation of Turkey mainly started with the Tanzimat (Reorganisation) and Turkey has been following this path since then.<sup>1</sup> After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turkish Republic was established. The important thing that should be underlined here is that after the First World War and the foundation of the Turkish Republic (1923), Mustafa Kemal<sup>2</sup> took into his close circle those intellectuals who were pro-Western, and their presence helped him to accelerate, and in some cases to finalise the reforms which had already been started in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

After the international status of Turkey was settled, Mustafa Kemal began his internal reforms. His aim was to turn Turkey into a European state and the Turkish people into a European nation.<sup>3</sup> To this end, in November 1922, the sultanate was abolished. Two years later, in 1924, the caliphate was abolished as well. All members of the Ottoman dynasty were banished. Turkey then became a republic and Mustafa Kemal became its first president.<sup>4</sup> The state was established on a strictly secular basis. The Grand National Assembly accepted the new constitution on 20 April 1924. This constitution declared that the “Turkish Republic is a republic” and “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.” Although the 1924 version of the constitution still stated that “the religion of the Turkish state is Islam,” this provision was revoked in 1928. An amendment made

during 1937 inserted the principle of secularism was inserted in the Turkish constitution.<sup>5</sup> The religious courts were abolished, Muslim law abandoned, religious schools were closed down and the entire education system was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Western legislation was introduced in all fields, drawing on the Swiss civil code, the German criminal law of procedure, and the Italian penal and commercial codes. The wearing of the fez was forbidden and European clothing in general was recommended, and brimmed hats for men were mandatory.<sup>6</sup> The Religious-Dervish orders were outlawed. The Gregorian calendar replaced the lunar calendar of Islam. The weekend holiday was moved from the Islamic holy day of Friday to Sunday.<sup>7</sup> In 1928, a new Latin alphabet was introduced instead of its counterpart Arabic alphabet.<sup>8</sup> Atatürk personally visited different parts of the country to demonstrate the intricacies of the new alphabet. The aim of language reform was to get rid of Arabic and Persian structures in the language and to replace Arabic and Persian words with Turkish ones.<sup>9</sup> In 1932 all prayers, including the call to prayer from the Mosques, were ordered to be made in Turkish and not in Arabic, the language of the Koran.<sup>10</sup> In 1934, a law was passed which required everyone to adopt a surname. “Mustafa Kemal declared that no longer would names follow the traditional pattern of son-of-father, but that each person would adopt a family name, to continue through the generations. Mustafa Kemal himself became Kemal Atatürk (father of the Turks)<sup>11</sup>.”

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the First World War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the population was far more homogenous than the population of the Ottoman Empire. However, there were still some religious minorities, such as various groups of Christians and Jews. Within the Muslim population of Anatolia, there were ethnic differences (for example Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians, etc.) and differences of sect. Whereas religion united the Sunni Muslim population during the Ottoman Empire, and the absence of a cultural and a religious policy eased the differences between people most of the time, in the new republic, religion and state were separated, and religion, the importance of which was reduced in the state and society, could no longer be a unifying power, Atatürk’s solution to the problem was to define an entity called ‘Turkishness’ and urge the citizens to unite around it.<sup>12</sup> Although Mustafa Kemal was a nationalist, his nationalism was not based on race, but limited by the boundaries of Turkey and open to all citizens.<sup>13</sup> It was a quick and practical solution to the problems created by the objective to create a new identity and a culture which would cut its ties with the undesirable sections of its past. Now the peoples of the new Republic had to unify around ‘Turkishness’ which, as defined by Atatürk, emphasised the centrality of a being a Turkish citizen, and took no account of the origins of its constituent people. Anyone who carried a Turkish I.D. card and called Turkey his or her homeland, was a Turk. Hence, being a Turk was a question of citizenship rather than race,<sup>14</sup> and in theory, Atatürk’s nationalism disregarded differences in race and religion. “Proclaiming oneself a Turk thus became a badge of pride and the key to full membership of the state, rather than the social stigma it had been under the Ottomans,”<sup>15</sup> and the founder of the Republic called himself ‘Father of the Turks’, and cemented nationhood with the phrase ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene’ (‘Happy is the One Who Calls Himself a Turk’), a phrase still to be found on the walls of important official buildings.<sup>16</sup>

Although the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), which was established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923, remained as the only political party until 1945, during Atatürk’s rule other short-lived political parties were established such as the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Progressive Republican Party) and Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (the Free Republican Party). When Atatürk began his reforms after the establishment of the new republic, these were not realised without the opposition of his former colleagues. During the Lausanne peace negotiations (20 November 1922 to 24 July 1923), the first uprising against Atatürk took place in Parliament. In order

to have a more 'friendly' Parliament during these turbulent times, Atatürk asked the Parliament to dissolve itself on 1 April 1923.<sup>17</sup> In the new Parliament, supporters of Mustafa Kemal outnumbered the opposition, and this ensured a suitable basis for the ratification of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (23 August 1923), the declaration of the Republic (29 October 1923) and the abolition of the Caliphate (3 March 1924) without much discussion. Under these conditions, Atatürk's colleagues Kazım Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha, Refet Pasha, Rauf (Orbay) and Adnan (Adıvar) left CHP and on 17 November 1924 established the Progressive Republican Party. This party had a liberal-democratic programme and criticised the administration of the Kemalist cadre. On 1 February 1925, the Sheikh Said revolt took place. Following accusations that the Progressive Republican Party had supported this Kurdish uprising which wanted Islamic rule, the party was closed on 5 June 1925 and its members were taken to court.<sup>18</sup> A second attempt at a multi-party system took place in 1930, and in contrast to the previous one, this time Atatürk played a vital role in the establishment of an opposition party.

Mustafa Kemal had his reasons for creating an official opposition. Firstly, in Western democratic countries, as Kinross points out, "Turkey's one-party system was seen as a sign of her inferiority to the West. He [Atatürk] had been stung by the criticism of European writers that the Turkish system, though Western in form, was Eastern in practice."<sup>19</sup> It was naturally disturbing for a man who advocated democracy to be criticised for being anti-democratic. Atatürk is reported to have told his friend Fethi (Okyar), "I do not want to die without bringing the regime of personal rule in Turkey to a close. I want to create a liberal Republic."<sup>20</sup> Atatürk claimed that the administrative tradition of the Turks was familiar with democracy. \_nan cites him as saying "In the early history of the Turkish nation, through their famous councils and electing heads of the states in these councils, Turks proved that they were strongly attached to democratic ideas. However, in the later period of our history, Padishahs headed Turkish states and they left these (democratic) principles and became despotic."<sup>21</sup> He also criticised anti-democratic ideologies and underlined the superiority of democracy in several of his speeches, for example, "According to us, in our understanding, popular governmental administration is possible through democracy."<sup>22</sup> Secondly, in the 1930s, opposition to Atatürk's reforms was increasing and discontent was not helped by economic stagnation. The opposition had to be kept under control and under these circumstances, Atatürk asked his friend and Prime Minister, Fethi (Okyar), to establish an opposition party,<sup>23</sup> and the Free Republican Party was established on 12 August 1930 under the spiritual protection of Mustafa Kemal.

However, the life of this party was to be short. It was wrongly perceived as a true opposition party and the citizens of Turkey rushed to support it. Although support came from all sections of the society, the presence of a large conservative mass among its members was significant. To complicate matters, CHP members tried to create the impression that their colleague Fethi Okyar was in actual opposition to Mustafa Kemal. Okyar unwillingly closed his party on 7 November 1930.<sup>24</sup> This was the last attempt at a multi-party system during the life of Atatürk. After Atatürk, his lieutenant İnönü became president and one-party rule continued until 1946. In 1946, the Democrat Party was created by some CHP members and by this means the one-party system ended and, after the 1950 elections, the Democrat Party came to power bringing an end to one-party rule. However, since then Turkish democracy has been interrupted three times, in 1960, 1971 and 1980. However the generals always gave way to democracy and a multi-party system.<sup>25</sup>

It is apparent that Atatürk was well aware of the importance of the economy in safeguarding the sovereignty of a state. This stance is clearly indicated by some of his statements. For example; "A nation's absolute independence can only be achieved through a combination of sovereignty of the

nation with that of the economy. .... However grand political and military victories may be, they do not make an impact if they are not merged with economic ones,” or, “We have to give absolute priority to the economic matters of our newly born Turkish republic, if we desire to reach the level of contemporary civilisation. This age, no doubt, is an age of economy.”<sup>26</sup> During Atatürk’s rule, the economic policy of the state changed twice. Between 1923 to 1930, Atatürk followed a more liberal economic policy and the main economic decisions were aimed at spreading private ownership of land, appropriating land for landless farmers and migrants, extending state credit for capital accumulation in agriculture, promoting private enterprises, protecting domestic production by customs policies and refraining from external borrowing. The transition to a market economy took a long time, and the change did not follow a straight line of development. After following a liberal economic policy between 1923 and 1930, a mixed economic policy placing considerable emphasis on the role of the state was adopted and it continued until the 1980s, with the exception of the Democrat Party’s attempts at liberalisation. In 1981, the strategy of import substitution as the means of industrialisation was abolished. The Turkish economy transformed from being a closed, agricultural and non-competitive economy to being market-oriented and liberal, and the Turkish experience in economic transformation and a market economy constituted another important characteristic of the Turkish Model.

Although the Ottoman Empire was weakened at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was still one of the big powers, and the new Republic had to learn to adjust itself to being a secondary power after an imperial past.<sup>27</sup> Also, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, it had defined itself as a part of Western civilisation. Hence, the desire to be a part of the Western scheme of things, while accepting a less glorious role in international affairs began to shape the foreign policy of Turkey after 1923.<sup>28</sup> During the 1930s, there were other one-party regimes and leaders like Atatürk, but there were significant differences between Atatürk’s foreign policy and theirs. Unlike Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin’s policies, Kemalist foreign policy was essentially pacifist, nourishing neither territorial nor political ambitions at any other country’s expense. As Kinross points out, peaceful coexistence, “Peace at home and peace in the world,” were Mustafa Kemal’s watchwords. Atatürk had no plans to reconquer former Ottoman lands and his foreign minister defined his country’s policy, by stating: “Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what she holds.”<sup>29</sup> The main desire of Turkey was only its territorial integrity and freedom.<sup>30</sup>

After the Second World War, Soviet demands pushed Turkey to make a real choice in its foreign policy, and Turkey joined NATO, and Turkish membership of Western institutions such as the Council of Europe, the OECD and her associate membership of the EEC (then the EC and, later, the EU), reinforced Turkey’s closeness to the West. Thus, in the early 1990s, the Turkish Model came to mean a secular state where the majority of the population is Muslim, with a multi-party system, which is close to and co-operates with the West, and has a market economy.

During Atatürk’s time, a basis for democracy and the multi-party system were established.<sup>31</sup> The role of religion was undermined in society and the state.<sup>32</sup> As these developments showed, the new republic turned her face toward the West completely and westernisation became the main aim of Turkey.<sup>33</sup>

## THE FACTORS THAT MADE THE TURKISH MODEL POPULAR

In the 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Model became popular with the West which regarded it as an ideal model for the Muslim republics of the ex-Soviet Union.

Was it because the Turkish Model is perfect? It is difficult to give a positive answer to this question as, though it has some strength, it has significant problems as well. Its democracy was interrupted three times, its economy is still weaker than those of the European powers are, but more importantly, the ethnic problem (Kurdish) and religious minority problem (Alawite) are the main problems of the model.<sup>34</sup> It can be said that though the model has some weaknesses, three main factors made it attractive for Western support immediately after the end of USSR. These factors are: secularism and democracy, common culture, and the Turkish experiment in economic transformation.

### Secularism and Democracy

With the end of the USSR, the classic twin superpower, bipolar international system and the struggle between communism and capitalism ended, two major factors—the arms race, and political and ideological competition—that had dominated East-West relations since the end of Second World War<sup>35</sup> diminished, the international system changed and only the US remained a superpower.<sup>36</sup> After the collapse of the USSR, all fifteen former Soviet Socialist Republics gained their independence. Five of them are called Turkic Republics<sup>37</sup> because of their Turkic culture and heritage.<sup>38</sup> They started to reform the old system, but what would they use instead? In this respect, after the collapse of the USSR, one of the most argued issues was the rise of Iran and Turkey as new players in the Caucasus and Central Asia because of their historical, geographical and cultural closeness to the region. After the collapse of the USSR, the question was who would fill the power vacuum left by the USSR. In this sense, Turkey and Iran have been underlined as rival powers. Also an ideological competition between Iran and Turkey has been emphasised by several authors.<sup>39</sup> The newspaper *Le Nouvel Observateur* mentioned the competition between Turkey and Iran and added that the common language and common sect of Islam (Sunni) are the main powers of Turkey.<sup>40</sup> Robins points out that “when the Soviet Union formally broke up, exaggerated claims were immediately made as to the role that Turkey could play in Central Asia. Such claims owed more to ideology than to practicality. The major proponent of such a view was the United States, which feared that a political vacuum had been created in Central Asia and that it would be filled by Iran and its revolutionary brand of Islam.”<sup>41</sup> In this competition, the West was seen as supporting Turkey<sup>42</sup> as Turkey represents secularism, closeness to the West, and Democracy.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, it is believed that Iran represents the Islamic regime, hostility to the West. The Turkish Model was emphasised as an ideal Muslim democracy versus the Iranian regime. For example, after a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, in Washington on 13 February 1992, the US President, George Bush, pointed to Turkey “as the model of a democratic, secular state which could be emulated by Central Asia.”<sup>44</sup> Similarly, in June 1992, Mme. Catherine Lalumiere, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, visited the Central Asian republics. During her visit, she declared that “Turkey provided a valid model of development for many a newly-independent country in Asia.”<sup>45</sup> Therefore, it is possible to argue that the West promoted and supported the Turkish Model as an ideal path for the Central Asian republics.<sup>46</sup>

In brief, the West and the US assumed that the Russians had vacated the area and that therefore a power vacuum was created in Central Asia, and if nothing was done, this vacuum could be filled by an anti-Western and revolutionary kind of Iranian Islam and that in that case Western interests would be harmed in the region. To stop this, the West chose the Turkish Model as an instrument for its policy and put it forward as an ideal model. The presence of Iran in the region, the Western fear that the Turkic Republics could adopt the Iranian model and, on the other hand, Turkey’s success with democracy, a multi-party system, secularism and its Western-oriented image, were the main factors that made it popular. Because of these features of the Turkish Model, the West supported and

promoted it and it became popular.

### Common Culture

If the aim was to stop Iran and prevent the export of her ideology and to assist the establishment of democratic and secular systems, why were Western democracies not shown as ideal models? Because Western democracies are more prosperous and their economies are more developed, these democracies are stronger and do not have the problems that Turkey has. In fact Turkey is itself trying to catch up with the West and the West is the origin of the Turkish Model. But surprisingly the Turkish Model was shown as the ideal model. The reason behind this decision was the common culture between Turkey and the Turkic Republics and positive public opinion in the Turkic Republics towards Turkey.<sup>47</sup>

In other words, the Turkic Republics tended to follow the path or country they felt affinity with and with which they have cultural ties. Therefore, the alternatives would be Iran or Turkey. The natural inclination of most of the Muslim republics of Central Asia and of Azerbaijan was to foster their ethnic and cultural links with Turkey.<sup>48</sup> The effects of common culture and ethnicity can be seen easily in the statements of the presidents of the Turkic Republics. These can give an idea of their inclination towards Turkey. For example, in an interview with the former president of Azerbaijan, Ebulfesz Elchibey, he said, “In the past, there was only one independent Turkish state, it was the Anatolian Turks who were our symbol for independence... . We have fifty million Turkish brothers in Anatolia... .”<sup>49</sup> He also explained that they have chosen Turkey as a model for their state. The statements made by Azeri politicians, such as, “the enemies of Turkey are our enemies too”, give some idea about their attitudes towards Turkey.<sup>50</sup> Secondly, Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, visited Turkey and he said, “our example is Turkey, we will establish our state according to this example.” He also said, “I support the idea of a unified Turkish people, this unification must take place. Instead of political unification, economic unification can be established, you can call this a Turkish Common Market. If unification is possible for Slavs, it must be possible for Central Asian people, and this unification must include Azerbaijan and Turkey.”<sup>51</sup> Thirdly, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, in a speech said, “Turkey is a morning star that shows the true path to other Turks.”<sup>52</sup> Nursultan Nazarbayev and Separmurad Turkmenbasi (formerly Niyazov), the president of Turkmenistan, made similar statements as well. But the examples given above are enough to show their inclination towards Turkey.

The peoples of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet union—Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs and Turkmen—are from the same origins as the Turkic people.<sup>53</sup> As Devlet has pointed out, the Turkic people usually accept the name of their tribes as their nationalities.<sup>54</sup> The term ‘Turk’ is usually used to refer to citizens of Turkey.<sup>55</sup> However, they are aware of the fact that the Central Asian people and the Turkish people are coming from the same origin. As Frank has pointed out, ethnicity cannot be separated from political and economic relations, either at the level of the nation state or internationally.<sup>56</sup> Therefore ethnicity is affecting the tendencies of the Central Asian republics towards Turkey in a positive way.

Religion is another important cultural tie between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. Although religion was forbidden and attacked during the Soviet term,<sup>57</sup> as Bennigsen explains the accusations of the Soviet authorities to undermine religion (especially Islam), were not so successful as regards the Turkic people.<sup>58</sup> Malashenko argues that the Islamic line was never broken in Soviet society. Despite the ambiguity of its position, Islam remained the preserver of spirituality, the framework for

a worldview, and to a significant extent, the regulator of relations between people. Perestroika activated political life in the Muslim republics of the former USSR. Islam appeared alongside nationalism.<sup>59</sup> In a survey in the 1980s, thousands of respondents in Central Asia were asked two questions, “How do you live, following what norms?” and “What defines your way of life?”. With very few exceptions the answer to the first question was always the same: “We live as our fathers devised,” “We live as Muslims.” The second question received only one answer: “Tradition.”<sup>60</sup> However, the religiosity of the Central Asian Muslims should not be exaggerated and confused with the Iranian kind as their religiosity is very moderate. It is still possible to say that Islam is a common religion of the Turkic people, moral values are still important and Islam is regaining its strength in those areas. This reality is another positive factor for relations between Turkey and Turkic Republics.

Turkic people speak Turkic languages.<sup>61</sup> This reality makes language another factor that encourages the establishment of close relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics.<sup>62</sup> The Turkish minister of culture, Fikri Sağlar, a member of Republican Peoples Party, pointed out that “the Turkish Language has been the most important unifying factor for the Turkic people who had been separated several centuries ago.”<sup>63</sup>

Mainly because of the common culture between Turkey and the Turkic Republics<sup>64</sup> there is positive public opinion in the Turkic Republics towards Turkey.<sup>65</sup> People of the Turkic Republics also feel kinship with Anatolian Turks, which is a positive factor for the relationship between Turkey and Turkic states.<sup>66</sup> As some observers have pointed out, the people of the Turkic Republics see the people of Turkey as their brothers and see Turkey as a strong state to which they are related and that will help them in all aspects.<sup>67</sup> These cultural ties therefore formed another factor that determined the rise of the Turkish Model.

### The Turkish Experience in Economic Transformation

The centre strictly controlled the economies of the Turkic Republics. The scope for lower levels of government to choose priorities was very limited. As White pointed out, all of the all-union ministries situated in Moscow, produced 57 per cent of industrial output, union-republican ministries based partly in Moscow produced a further 37 per cent. Only six per cent of industry was wholly regulated at the republican level.<sup>68</sup>

An Uzbek writer, Islamov, pointed out that the system kept Central Asia backward in the following ways: firstly, the region was forced into the mould of agricultural and raw material producer with cotton monoculture and little manufacturing. Secondly, the lowest investment was allocated to Central Asia. Thirdly, economic units were organised on a grandiose scale, while public services and trade were run through equally inefficient units. Also repression of private ownership affected the Central Asian economy in a negative way because of the existence of a strong commitment to private ownership in Central Asia.<sup>69</sup>

The communist economic system proved to be unsuccessful mainly because public ownership of the means of production eradicated motivation and reduced efficiency in the economy.<sup>70</sup> Soviet industry depended on quantity rather than quality.<sup>71</sup> By means of massive deportations, Stalin forced people to be slave-labourers and in this way he was able to find a very cheap work force for industry.<sup>72</sup> However, it was impossible to do it all the time, and natural resources as well as a work force are limited and they should have been used efficiently. Absence of competition in the economy led firms

into technological backwardness. The state determined market prices, this led to the creation of a black market and increased waste and corruption in the economy.<sup>73</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Turkic Republics tried to transform their economies from the centrally controlled, inefficient communist system to the market economy. However, it is difficult to transform a centrally controlled economy into a market economy. One of the candidates of the presidency of the Russian Republic in 1991, Vadim Bakatin, explained this difficulty: “It is easy to make the transformation from capitalism to socialism. It looks like making omelette by breaking eggs. But it is not easy to produce a capitalist regime from socialism. It means trying to make a fresh egg from the omelette.”<sup>74</sup> It is necessary to underline the fact that the market economy has some requirements: private ownership, suitable legal bases (commercial laws, debt law, and other legal controls), low inflation rates, a tax policy that suits the price system, no subsidies for state-owned firms, free interest rates, prices set by the market not by the state, the presence of a banking system and capital market, privatisation, etc.<sup>75</sup> These things did not exist in Turkic Republics. Also people who grew up in the communist system expected everything from the state and had no ambition to do anything that was suitable for a market economy. There must be a suitable society that understands and appreciates the market economy.<sup>76</sup>

Therefore, they needed to make use of the experience of another country that had transformed recently. If this model country had a similar social and cultural structure to these Turkic Republics, it would be more suitable and useful. After this brief, it can be said that the Turkish experiment in transforming a centrally controlled economy into a market economy was regarded as a good example and this experiment therefore was another factor that helped the rise of the Turkish Model in 1990s.

Although Turkey was not a socialist state before 1980, the public sector was very important; sixty per cent of the economy belonged to the public sector as so-called ‘State Economic Enterprises’ (K\_Ts), which did not function according to the price mechanism. K\_Ts had no right to decide their production, investment or employment policies, or the price of their products.<sup>77</sup> The previous President, Turgut Özal, explained the situation of the Turkish economy in 1970s: “Our closed economy had to be opened and integrated with the world economy. The Turkish economy of the 1970s resembled to some extent the socialist economies of the East European countries. In fact, we were even lagging behind those countries. We had long queues, a black market, several exchange rates, enormous subsidies, etc. We had to establish a free market economy, .... Our exports at the beginning of the last decade were a mere \$2.2billion. Our oil imports alone added up to \$3.4billion. Our economy was suffering from a chronic account deficit.”<sup>78</sup> To solve these problems, the 24 January 1980 decisions were taken and this was the end of import substitution as an industrialisation policy and the free market mechanism was adopted as a principle in the economy.<sup>79</sup> After the 24 January decisions, Liberal economic policies were applied to the economy. “Trade and exchange regulations have been liberalised, quotas and import deposits have been abolished, quantitative restrictions on imports and agricultural subsidies have been removed. Liberal foreign investment legislation has been introduced, price controls have been discontinued, and positive interest rates and realistic exchange rates have been adopted.”<sup>80</sup> With these policies the economy has been transferred from a closed, agricultural and non-competitive one to a market-oriented, liberal and rapidly industrialising one. The growth has been export-led. Exports were \$2.9bn dollars in 1980. This number increased to \$13bn dollars in 1990.<sup>81</sup> Also the share of industrial goods within exports increased to about 80 per cent from about 35 per cent at the end of the 1970s.<sup>82</sup>



Briefly it can be said that after 1980, state intervention in the economy has been reduced and the economy opened to the outside. The ratio of exports within national income was five per cent in 1980. This number increased to 16.5 per cent in 1988. Necessary legal arrangements have been done. However inflation is still high and the state is still supporting most of the products in the public and agricultural sectors. Therefore it is possible to say that the transformation is still continuing in Turkey.<sup>83</sup> This fresh example immediately after the end of the Soviet Union is another important factor that helped the rise of the Turkish Model in Central Asia.

## CONCLUSION AND DECLINE OF THE MODEL

Mustafa Kemal designed the Turkish Model in the 1920s and various reforms took place. Mustafa Kemal's aim was to turn the Turkish state into a European state and the Turkish nation into a European nation. Although there was no multi-party system in the beginning, in the 1990s the term 'Turkish Model' refers to a multi-party system, free market economy, democracy, secularism and closeness to the West. Although its democracy was interrupted three times (in 1960, 1971 and lastly in 1980) and its economy is still weaker than those of the industrialised nations are, and despite ethnic and religious minority problems, the Turkish Model became popular with the end of USSR. It can be said that three factors determined this:

First, with the end of the USSR, it was believed that a power vacuum was created in Central Asia. Who would fill this gap? In this respect Turkey and Iran have been usually mentioned as rival powers. Iran was an anti-Western, Islamic regime. On the other hand, Turkey was a democratic, secular country with a free market economy and, more importantly, a closeness to the West. Therefore the Western fear of Islam and the presence of Iran (geographically, culturally and historically close to the region), and the fear that the Muslim republics would adopt an Iranian model were the main reasons that determined the rise of the Turkish Model as an ideal path for the Central Asian republics. Mainly because of these reasons the West (especially the US) supported the Turkish Model as an ideal model for the Central Asian Republics.

Second, although western democracies are the origin of the Turkish Model and they are still stronger than the Turkish one, the Turkish Model became popular because of the common culture between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. As Turgut Özal,<sup>84</sup> Demirel, Nurmamedov,<sup>85</sup> Yolcuoğlu<sup>86</sup> and several other people have pointed out, there is a suitable cultural base for a close relationship and for the Turkish Model. It has ethnic links (more or less all Muslim republics are of Turkic origin), linguistic links (Turkic languages are spoken in the Turkic Republics), and religious links (the majority of people in the newly independent republics believe in Islam, especially the Sunni sect of which Turkey is a part).

Third, with the collapse of the USSR, the Turkic Republics began to try to reform their centrally controlled economies but they had no experience and the requirements for the market economy did not exist in the republics. Therefore a fresh example was needed for their transformation. In this sense, the Turkish experience in economic transformation after 1980 (with the 24 January decisions) is another factor that made the Turkish Model desirable and popular for the Turkic Republics.

After the collapse of the USSR, mainly because of the reasons that were discussed in this article, the Turkish Model became popular. However after a few years passed the popularity of the Turkish Model or at least the support of the West for this model declined. The West (including the US) had supported and promoted the Turkish Model and this support was the main factor determining the

popularity of this model. However, a few years later, Western knowledge of the region and its economic, cultural and strategic issues increased, and new developments took place. In turn, the West and the US reconsidered their initial assumptions and policies and reduced their support for the Turkish Model. Again there were some important reasons behind the decline in Western support for the Turkish Model. The following factors can be listed:

First, after understanding the real conditions of the region, the West realised that although Iran had some geographic and strategic advantages in the region, it has significant handicaps as well. Although Iran is an Islamic state, in contrast to initial Western assumptions, the effect of Iran in the Turkic Republics has been very limited. This is mainly because there is a divide between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and a hostile attitude between these two sects.<sup>87</sup> Iran is a Shiite state while, on the other hand, the majority of the population of the Turkic states is Sunni, except the Azeris. These hostile attitudes are the main barrier for Iran. Nurmemedov, the Undersecretary at the Türkmen Embassy in Ankara has pointed out this issue by saying that: “Iranian Fundamentalism cannot come to us, their people are Shiite, our population is Sunni. Our population does not trust their Mollas.”<sup>88</sup> Iran’s influence even over the Azeri population is very limited. The Azeris are Turkic and Iran also has an ethnic Azeri population of some 20 million living in the north of the country. It is worried about the possible unification of these peoples. It must also be pointed out that, perhaps because she realised her limits in the region, in contrast to Western expectations, Iran did not become involved in a struggle to export her regime to the Turkic Republics. In fact she has been looking for possible co-operation in economic fields, after being isolated by the West. Therefore Iran’s policy was pragmatic and realistic rather than adventurist. This was a surprise for the West: the perceived danger of the Iranian model in the Central Asian republics was the main reason that had led the West to promote the Turkish Model to the region as a counter-ideology. Therefore, because of Iran’s pragmatic policy, the main reasons behind Western support for the Turkish Model diminished. This had a negative effect on Western support for the Turkish Model.

Second, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia initially gave priority to domestic affairs, and it was assumed that Russia did not want to regain control over former Soviet territory. Most people therefore talked about a power vacuum created in the region by the end of the USSR. However, especially after 1993, Russia clearly announced its intention of regaining control over former Soviet territory, known as the ‘near abroad’. Russia justified her policy in three ways: there were economic reasons, as the Russian economy depends on the other republics (and vice versa); and security reasons, as Russia wants to control nuclear weapons and does not want to see a rival power settled in former Soviet territory; finally, the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside Russian territory encouraged Russia to control former Soviet territory in order to guarantee their civil rights. In 1994 Russia signed several agreements with the Turkic Republics and Russian bases reopened in the region. This was not a terrible development for the West, which preferred to deal with one nuclear power in the region rather than four, and was seeking the stability in the region that Russia could provide. Therefore, in contrast to Turkish expectations, the West allowed Russia to implement its policy in its ‘near abroad’ as if it was Russia’s legitimate right to control former Soviet territory. Western support for Russian policy in the Turkic Republics was a negative development for Western support for the Turkish Model, as the two are irreconcilable.

Third, in contrast to initial Western assumptions, there was no danger of the Iranian model gaining ground in the Turkic Republics, which were trying to transform their economies, to become a part of the international community, and to establish close relations with the West (directly, not via Turkey). On the other hand, some Turkish policies and declarations by Turkish officials were interpreted by

the West as indications of a re-emergence of pan-Turkism. Further support for the Turkish Model might have encouraged this trend, and therefore support for the Turkish Model declined in order to prevent the creation of a pan-Turkic union.

Fourth, although the Turkish Model became popular after the end of the USSR, Turkey was involved in an undeclared war in southeastern Anatolia costing several lives every day. Since 1991, this problem has not been solved: it has negative effects on the Turkish economy and Turkish foreign policy. In addition to this Turkey faced another fatal crisis in the form of Alawite dissatisfaction, which also threatens the unity of Turkey and demands reform of the Turkish Model. These two problems are crucial for Turkey and constitute an important part of the current Turkish political agenda. The effects of these problems played a negative role in terms of the popularity of the Turkish Model and Western support for this model.

Finally, although the presidents of the Turkic Republics clearly stated that they would follow the Turkish Model, after the realisation of the problems of Turkey; economic, political, ethnic and religious, etc., they started to say that they wanted only good parts of the model. Furthermore they started to look at other models such as the Malaysian and Chinese, etc. Therefore the popularity of the Turkish Model in 1998 is looking weaker than ever. In another words, mainly because of initial Western assumptions and fears related with the conditions of Central Asia, the Turkish Model became popular immediately after the end of USSR (between 1991 and 1993). However after realising the real conditions of the region, the West reconsidered its initial assumptions and policies and declined in its support for the Turkish Model.

*\* This article is a revised version of the paper, 'The Turkish Model' for the Turkic Republics of the ex-Soviet Union, delivered by İdris Bal at the second University of Manchester Workshop on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Manchester, 18-19 May 1995.*

*1 Foreign Policy of Turkey, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, third printing, (Ankara: Directorate General of Press & Information, 1992), p. 4.*

*2 For more information about Atatürk see Kinross, Patrick (1993), Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson; H.C. Armstrong (1939), Grey Wolf, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.*

*3 Vali, Ferenc A. (1971), Bridge Across Bosphorus, London: The John Hopkins Press, p. 21.*

*4 Kinross, op. cit., chapters, 42, 46, and 52.*

*5 Turkey, (Ankara: Office of the Prime Minister Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1993), p. 35.*

*6 Weekes, Ava S. and Richard V. Weekes (1978), 'Turks, Anatolian' in Weekes, Richard V. (ed.), Muslim Peoples, London: Greenwood Press, p. 439.*

*7 Robins, Philip (1991), Turkey and the Middle East, London: Pinter Publishers, p. 7.*

*8 Kinross, op. cit., Chapter 54.*

9 *Ibid.*, Chapter 57.

10 Vali, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

11 Weekes and Weekes, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

12 For the intellectuals who affected Atatürk's thoughts, see Heyd, Uriel (1950), *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, London: Luzac & Company Ltd. and The Harvill Press Ltd; Koran, Ercüment (1992), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğun'da Yenileşme Hareketleri*, *Türk Dünyası El kitabı Vol. I*, Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü; Rasonyi, Laszio (1998), *Tarihte Türklük*, Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü; Tuncay, Hasan (1978), *Ziya Gökalp*, İstanbul: TokerYayınları; Gökalp, Ziya (1968), *The principle of Turkism* (translated by Robert Devereux); Kinross, *op. cit.*

13 Robins, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

14 Atatürk has been accused of hidden racism and the official argument used by the state against those who accuse him of racism is that, 'Turkishness' in Atatürk's sense was never related to race because two important figures in the foundation of Turkish nationalism and who inspired Atatürk were racially non-Turks, namely Ziya Gökalp (ethnically Kurdish) and Tekin Alp (Moiz Kohen; ethnically Jewish). For a sample of this official argument, see Yetkin, Çetin (1993), 'Atatürk Milliyetçiliği ve Terrör', *Yeni Forum*, Vol. XIV, No. 286, pp. 55-56.

15 Robins, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

16 Hindle, Tim (1993), 'Young Turks', in *The World in 1994*, London: The Economist Publications, p. 59.

17 For opposition to Atatürk during the First Parliament, see for example; Koçak, Cemil, 'Siyasal Tarih', in 'Türkiye Tarihi', *Çağdaş Türkiye Cilt 4*; Tuncay, M., Koçak, C., et al. (eds.); Erdoğan, Mustafa (1993), 'Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş Deneyimi (1945-1950)', in *Türkiye-Azerbaycan ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinde Demokrasi ve Piyasa Ekonomisine Geçiş Süreci*, *Yeni Forum Uluslararası 2. Sempozyumu*, 16-23 November 1992, Baku, Azerbaijan, Ankara: Yeni Forum A\_.

18 Erdoğan, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

19 Kinross, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 450-455.

21 İnan, Afet (1971), *M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım*, İstanbul, p. 69.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 74-77.

23 Erdoğan, *op. cit.*, p. 112 and Kinross, *op. cit.*, pp. 450-451.

24 Erdoğan, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

25 Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L., 'Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Uluslararası Koşulları' in *Türk Modeli ve Türk Kökenli Cumhuriyetlerle Eski Sovyet Halkları*, Ankara: Yeni Forum, p. 32.

26 Kartay, Hami (1989), 'The Past, Present and Future of Turkish Industry', *Turkish Review*, Spring, Vol. III, No. 15, p. 62.

27 For the details of Turkish Foreign Policy between the years 1919 and 1939, see, for example: Armaoğlu, Fahir (1988), 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, pp. 307-360.

28 Deringil, Selim, 'Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk', Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) (1992), *Turkish Foreign Policy*, London: The Eothen Press, p. 1.

29 Kinross, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

30 *Ibid.*

31 Vali, Ferenc A., *op. cit.*, p. 24.

32 See for details Edip, Halide (1963), *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, Lahore: Jamia Millia.

33 *Foreign Policy of Turkey*, pp. 9-10; for a brief summary of the reforms that took place in the period between 1923 and 1930, see Yalçın, Aydın (1992), 'Türk Demokrasinin Ekonomik ve Sosyal Temelleri' in *Türkiye Modeli ve Türk Kökenli Cumhuriyetlerle Eski Sovyet Halkları*, Ankara: Yeni Forum.

34 Mango supports the idea that the Kurdish problem is one of the main handicaps of the model. At the outset of his article, Mango underlined the usual implications of the Turkish Model as a 'model of a secular, democratic, Muslim country, aiming to achieve Western standards, in partnership with the West, by applying liberal free-market policies (Mango, Andrew (1993), 'The Turkish Model' in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, October, p. 726). Then he went on to question this model by looking at two sets of problems. (A) economic conditions or life standards and human rights in Turkey. He rightly asserts that before eliminating these problems it would be difficult to show the Turkish Model as an ideal model for elsewhere. He points to the growing population of Turkey as the cause of economic problems. (B) As a second set of problems of the Turkish Model he sees the minority issues: the Kurdish problem, Greeks, Jews and women rights. He pointed out that it was the West who proposed the Turkish Model for the Turkic Republics. See Mango, *ibid.*, pp. 726-757.

35 Been, David Wedgwood (1989), 'Glasnost, Dialogue and East-West Relations', *International Affairs*, Vol. LXV, No. 2, Spring, p. 289.

36 Valenta, Jiri (1995), 'Coping with the Red-Brown Spirit in the Post-Communist Countries', *Issues & Studies - A journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, January, p. 77; See Nitze, Paul H. (1990), 'America: An Honest Broker', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXIX, No. 4, Fall.

37 The term 'Turkic Republics' usually refers to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

38 Devlet, Nadir (1993), *Çağdaş Türkiler*, İstanbul: Akçağ Yayınları. Some Turkish authors titled Tadjikistan a Turkic Republic; for example, see Ömür, Bilal (1992), 'Turkey's Relations with Central Asian Turkic Republics', *Turkish Review*, Summer, Vol. VI, No. 28, p. 11.

39 For example, see Apostolou, Andrew (1992), 'New Players in an Old Game', *The Middle East*, July, No. 213, pp. 5-6; Saivetz, Carol R. (1994), 'Central Asia: Emerging Relations with the Arab States and Israel' in Malik, Hafeez (1994) (ed.), *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 312-313; Smolansky, Oles M. (1994), 'Turkish and Iranian Policies in Central Asia' in Malik, Hafeez, *ibid.*, pp. 292-293; Parsons, Sir Anthony (1993), *Central Asia the Last Decolonisation*, London: The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, p. 8; Karasik, Theodore (1993), *Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Future Persian Gulf Security*, p. viii.

40 *Dünya*, 6 November 1992.

41 Robins, Philip (1994), 'The Middle East and Central Asia' in Ferdinand, Peter (1994) (ed.), *The New Central Asia and its Neighbours*, London: Pinter Publishers, p. 63.

42 *The Economist*, 25 February, 1992, p. 70.

43 Israeli, Raphael (1994), 'Return to the source: the Republics of Central Asia and the Middle East', *Central Asian Studies*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 19.

44 Rashid, Ahmed (1994), *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?*, London: Zed Books, p. 210.

45 Mango, *op. cit.*, p. 726.

46 Andrew Mango and Aydın Yalçın also believe that first of all the West proposed Turkish Model to the Central Asian Republics.

47 In a private interview conducted by me with the ambassador of Azerbaijan, Mehmet Novruzovlu Aliyev, in Ankara and with a Councilor of Kyrgyz Embassy in Ankara, Anvarbek Mokeev, also in Ankara (28 December 1994), they both underlined the common culture that makes the Turkish Model desirable for them.

48 Apostolou, *op. cit.*, p. 5-6.

49 Toker, Yalçın (1992), *Büyük Uyanış*, İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, p. 61.

50 Pipes, Daniel and Patrick Clawson (1993), 'Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbours' in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXII, No. 1, Winter, p. 135.

51 'Uzbekistan, Türk Cumhuriyetleri' series *Sabah*, 1992.

52 'Kyrgyzstan, Türk Cumhuriyetleri' series *Sabah*, 1992.

53 In the case of Tadjikistan there are some arguments about their origin. When I asked Nurmamedov about Tadjiks, he pointed out that "Tadjiks are the people who speak Iranian languages and are of Turkic origin. They join the group of Turkic people naturally and historically. Their tradition and culture is the same as Turkish tradition but there is Iranian civilisation in their language. In the past there were Arabic and Iranian effects on our culture as well. But in the case of the Tadjiks, this effect was greater and the Iranian language remained as the people's language.

*Some other people say that although the Persian dialect is spoken in Tadjikistan, more than one-third of the population is of Turkic origin and the Tadjiks are Sunni Muslims not Shiite like the Iranians and are thus closer to Turkey.”*

54 Devlet, Nadir, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

55 *Ibid.*

56 Frank, André Gunder (1992), *The Centrality of Central Asia*, Amsterdam: VU University Press, p. 22-23.

57 Bennigsen, A. and M. Broxup (1983), *Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 60-65.

58 *For details see ibid.*

59 Malashenko, Alexei V. (1993), 'Islam Versus Communism' in Eickelman, Dale F. (ed.), *Russia's Muslim Frontiers*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 66-67.

60 Poliakov, Sergie (1992), *Everyday Islam*, (edited and introduced by Martha B. Olcott, translated by A. Olcott) London: M.E. Sharpe, p. 3.

61 Arat, Rasit Rahmetli (1992), 'Türk Lehçe ve Şiveleri' in *Türk Dünyası El Kitabı*, Vol. II, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, pp. 59-69 and Zenkovsky, Serge (1960), *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-8.

57 Bennigsen, A. and M. Broxup (1983), *Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 60-65.

58 *For details see ibid.*

59 Malashenko, Alexei V. (1993), 'Islam Versus Communism' in Eickelman, Dale F. (ed.), *Russia's Muslim Frontiers*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 66-67.

60 Poliakov, Sergie (1992), *Everyday Islam*, (edited and introduced by Martha B. Olcott, translated by A. Olcott) London: M.E. Sharpe, p. 3.

61 Arat, Rasit Rahmetli (1992), 'Türk Lehçe ve Şiveleri' in *Türk Dünyası El Kitabı*, Vol. II, Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, pp. 59-69 and Zenkovsky, Serge (1960), *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-8.

68 White, Stephen (1991), *Gorbachev and After*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 139-140.

69 Islamov, Bakhtiar A. (1991), *Soviet Central Asia: Problems of Development in the Context of Republic-Centre Relations*, Harvard: Harvard University, Harvard Institute of International Development, p. 52; also see Aslan, Yasin (1992), *Azerbaycan'ın Bağımsızlık Mücadelesi*, Ankara: Yağmur Basın Yayın, pp. 1-3.

70 Ergün, İsmet, 'Kollektif Bir Sistemden Piyasa Eackonomisine Geçiş Sorunları', in *Türkiye Modeli*

ve Türk Kökenli Cumhuriyetlerle Eski Sovyet Halkları, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

71 Smith, Timothy J. and Green, Eric F. (1989), 'The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union' in Green Miller, William (ed.) (1989), *Toward A More Civil Society*, London: Harper & Row Publishers, pp. 125-127; White, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-103.

72 Uludağ, İlhan and Salih Mehmedov (1992), *Sovyetler Birliği Sonrası Bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Türk Guruplarının Sosyo-Ekonomik Analizi Türkiye ile İlişkileri*, Ankara: TOBB, p. 9.

73 Ergün, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

74 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

75 Togan, Subidey, 'Piyasa Ekonomisine Geçiş Süreci ve Türkiye'nin Tecrübeleri', in *Türkiye Modeli ve Türk Kökenli Cumhuriyetlerle Eski Sovyet Halkları*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-95.

76 Ergün, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

77 Togan, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

78 President Turgut Özal's address at the European Studies Centre Global Panel, 9 April 1991, see for the document; *Turkish Review*, Spring 1991, Vol. V, No. 23.

79 Togan, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

80 President Turgut Özal's address at the European Studies Centre Global Panel, *op. cit.*

81 Togan, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

82 President Turgut Özal's address at the European Studies Centre Global Panel, *op. cit.*

83 Togan, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

84 The former president of Turkey, Turgut Özal, pointed out that to establish multiple relations there are suitable historical and cultural basis among Turks. After explaining brotherhood among the Turkic world and pointing out the strength of solidarity and co-operation among Turkic people, he added, "If it is so, I can see no valid reason not to establish regional co-operation among our countries." Özal also added, "Our peoples are expecting this kind of co-operation because we are from the same origin. We are branches of same great tree and we are a big family. Naturally we are keen on each other, and we will be keen on each other. Our co-operation is the benefit of our peoples and regions." See *Dünya*, 6 November 1992.

85 A private interview with Annaguli Nurmamedov, Chancellor of the Turkmenistan Embassy in Ankara, (conducted by me), Ankara, 11 June 1993.

86 A private interview with İsmail Yolcuoğlu, Chancellor of Azerbaijan's Embassy in Ankara, (conducted by me), Ankara, June 1993.



*87 Several wars between Iran and the Ottoman Empire can be explained by this reality.*

*88 A private interview with Annaguli Nurmemedov, the Chancellor of the Turkmenistan Embassy, Ankara (conducted by me), Ankara, 11 June 1993.*

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