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CYPRUS - BRIDGE OR BUNKER? / The Cyprus Problem and prospects for its resolution

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INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus Problem is one of the few disputes world-wide to have remained unaffected by the end of the Cold War. The island is the site of the longest-lasting United Nations peacekeeping operation. UN troops were first sent to the island in March 1964, on a six-monthly mandate, which has been renewed on the same basis ever since. Writing in 1994, Anthony Parsons concluded his thoughts on Cyprus with the suggestion that it would be better to allow the status quo of de facto division of the island to continue:

At present it looks as though the status quo will persist without violence and loss of life on the island but with periodic incantations from the United Nations designed to encourage the parties and their champions to appease international concern by making concessions which neither wholeheartedly supports. Maybe it would be better to leave well enough alone, however diplomatically untidy it is.¹

Unfortunately, new elements in the situation since Sir Anthony wrote (the violence on the Green Line, leading to four deaths in the summer of 1996, and the Greek Cypriot order for Russian surface-to-air missiles), have made the problem appear more dangerous, and have caused the redoubling of efforts to find a solution.

Everyone agrees that a solution to the Cyprus Problem would increase regional stability. Politicians on both sides of the Green Line (the dividing line between the Greek and Turkish sectors) have mentioned the potential of Cyprus to act as a bridge: as a place through which ideas and goods can be carried, from East to West, West to East, North to South and South to North.² During the early history of the island, there was considerable interaction between the neighbouring continental areas, using Cyprus as a conduit through which many peoples, cultures, goods and ideas passed. St. Paul and St. Barnabas brought the Christian Gospel from Syria to Cyprus, crossed the island from Salamis to Paphos, and then went on to Asia Minor. Richard the Lionhearted, on his way to the Third Crusade, stopped on the island long enough to marry his fiancée, and to defeat the rebellious Isaac Comnenus, thereby establishing the Crusader Kingdom which was destined to outlast the Kingdom of Jerusalem in Palestine. Silks and spices from the East were transhipped in Cyprus, before continuing their journey westwards. The two major communities on the island—Greek and Turkish—are the descendants respectively of seafaring Mycenaean Greeks and the Ottoman Turks who conquered the island in 1570-71. To this has been added smaller numbers of Maronite Catholic Christians from Lebanon, Armenians, Latins and retired British military officers.

More often than not, the island of Cyprus has been a military bunker: a 'place of arms'. The Byzantines built castles, subsequently strengthened by the Lusignans, to ward off attack. The Venetians turned Cyprus into a fortress, in an ultimately vain attempt to staunch the Ottoman tide. Even in the 1950s, Britain was unwilling to relinquish control of the island: the need for a base in the Eastern Mediterranean, to protect trade routes to the Suez canal, and the need for a listening-post to spy on the USSR were cited as reasons. Today it is divided into two bunkers with almost no means of direct communication between the two sides. Each side sees the other as 'the enemy'.

Cyprus has never been fully independent. Either it has been ruled by a large empire controlling much of the surrounding mainland (Byzantines, Ottomans), or by a foreign power with interests other than the welfare of the Cypriots (Venetians, British). The one extended exception to this is the Lusignan period, but for the indigenous Cypriot population this was hardly a happy time. In all but name, the island was a colony of feudal France, run for the benefits of the (non-Cypriot) nobles on the island. Even the independence settlement of 1960, generally regarded by both sides as a second-best solution, a compromise between *énosis* (union) with Greece, and *taksim* (division) of the island between Greece and Turkey, left certain rights in the hands of other states: Britain, Greece and Turkey were all given the right to take a hand in the island's affairs. One consequence is that the members of the two largest communities tend to see themselves as part of the race of their motherlands, who happen to live on an island rather than as parts of a Cypriot identity with only a past origin to divide them. As Archbishop Makarios, the President when Cyprus achieved near-independence in 1960, said, "We have created a state, but not a nation". Unlike countries such as the USA or Australia, where allegiance is first to the country of residence, and only secondarily to ethnic origin, in Cyprus ethnic identification has become paramount. Thus, an Italian American is an American whose family came originally from Italy; whereas a Greek Cypriot is a Greek who happens to live in Cyprus. Maronite Cypriots still see Lebanon as home. The 1960 Constitution, in stressing the ethnic basis of representation at all levels of government, heightened the forces for division.

Possibly the root cause of the present conflict is religious, in the sense that the ethnic identity of the two major communities was traditionally expressed in terms of religion. Orthodox Christians were Greek, Moslems were Turkish. This distinction overrode considerations of culture and even language: until the 1950s some exclusively-Moslem villages in the more isolated areas of Paphos and the Karpas peninsula were Greek speaking. The religion one embraced determined to which community one belonged. Still, in Greece, non-Orthodox Christians face discrimination, and to leave the Orthodox church is seen by many families in Greece and Cyprus as a form of treason: rather like the way a Jewish family would react if a son converted to Christianity. Indeed, the 1960 Constitution (Article 2) used religion as a defining characteristic of the two communities. It is not that Cypriots are especially fanatical about their religion (each community was only too happy to share the other's holidays), but rather that religion was the medium through which identity could be preserved. The Ottoman sultans recognised the Orthodox Archbishop as the spokesman for the non-Turkish community on the island; Makarios was at the forefront of the campaign for *énosis* in the 1950s. Today, Archbishop Christostomos talks in terms of the Church's role in preserving Hellenic civilisation from the 'barbarian' Turks: the 1974 coup which led to the Turkish operation is remembered each July by church services with prayers for the 'liberation' of the 'occupied' lands.

Religion, then gives a potent source of conflict between the communities on the island. Since the 1950s, when Greece and Turkey both became more interested in the fate of Cyprus,³ conflicts between the motherlands are exemplified, possibly amplified, and expressed by the communities on the island. Tension between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus mirror the conflicts between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, and over the status of their respective minorities in Istanbul and Western Thrace.⁴

CULTURE - EXPRESSION OF IDENTITY

Cultural icons which express ethnic identity take on especial significance. In the Greek Cypriot south, the flag of Greece is far more in evidence at demonstrations and parades than the flag of the 1960 Republic. In the north, the Turkish flag is held in similar reverence. Each side uses the national anthem of its motherland. Orthodox Christianity is also seen as part and parcel of a Greek Cypriot's identity; Turkish Cypriots, although more secular in their outlook, remain loyal to the outward forms of Islam. Turkish and Greek national holidays are celebrated by their respective communities.

As one might expect, there is evidence of cultural syncretism. Inter-marriage between the communities is rare, but not unknown. One group, the Linobambaki (linen/cotton) practised outwardly the rites of Islam, but were secretly baptised as Christians.⁵ During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this group was recorded at Liopetri, south of Famagusta, in Louroujina

(Ak_nc_lar) between Larnaca and Nicosia, and in Tylliria (Dillirga). With the exception of the Louroujinans, who are now part of the Turkish Cypriot community, these people gravitated towards the Greek community after the end of Ottoman rule.

Shrines, such as the Monastery of St. Andrew in the far north-east of the island, were held to be holy by both religions. Both communities would go to the Maronite chapel of St. Marvi in Kormakiti (Koruçam).⁶ The practice of lighting candles was common in Cypriot folk religion.

Folk dancing and music are often very similar to both communities,⁷ as are certain foods, such as halloumi (hellim) cheese, moluhiya, and kolakas which are unknown on the mainland.⁸ Other food, such as _eftalia (peach kebab), are common to both, except the Greeks Cypriots make the dish from pork while the Turkish Cypriots use lamb. Idioms and swear words were often common to both communities, although separation since 1974 has meant that usage has decreased.⁹ Both Greek and Turkish ladies make Lefkara lace.

Unfortunately, while the above examples show considerable elements of cultural convergence, stronger forces tending to division exist. Most members of both communities see their identification with their respective motherlands as a vital factor, stronger than their loyalty to the island. This has produced a form of cultural clash which has led to the present situation on the island.

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

If one is to speak of “the Cyprus Problem” it is as well to be clear what that problem actually is. Salahi Sonyel, for example, gives several different definitions from the literature.¹⁰ Most of these stress the causes of the Problem, which is the title of Dr. Sonyel’s paper, and so emphasise the history of the island. This section examines the Problem in the context of recent history. One could go back further: as the Problem is of an inter communal nature, if there were only one community on the island, there would be no problem. Without the population transfers to the island following the Ottoman conquest in 1570-71 there would be no Turkish community on the island, and Cyprus could indeed have been a Greek island. Alternatively, if the Greek Cypriot community had been less keen to see the island become part of the Greek homeland, it is possible that peace could have prevailed. The revival of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus in the 1950s inevitably produced a clash with the existing Greek nationalism, although initial clashes were between the Greek Cypriot EOKA movement and the British authorities.

Cyprus, the ‘reluctant republic’, gained independence from Britain in 1960, following a bitter campaign by the Greek Cypriot community for énosis, and Turkish Cypriot claims for partition, [taksim]. A carefully-crafted constitution, aiming to balance the interests of the larger Greek Cypriot community against provisions for the safeguard for the Turkish Cypriots, was guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. Although an elaborate attempt was made to try to ensure that the system was free of ethnic bias (the composition of the two appellate courts included neutral–foreign–justices with casting votes), insufficient attention was paid to deadlock resolution machinery.

In December 1963 Greek Cypriot EOKA veterans attacked Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, and violence soon spread throughout the island. At the end of the fighting, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves de facto excluded from government, and huddled together in small enclaves for mutual protection. United Nations troops were sent to the island in 1964 to keep the two sides apart. Talks between the two communities began in 1968 (the interlocutors being Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denкта_, now the leaders of the two governments), but these failed to reach any conclusions by 1974. In July of that year a Greek junta-inspired coup against Makarios brought events to a dramatic head. Turkey sent troops to the island, citing its 1960 treaty obligations. When peace talk broke down, with the Turkish Cypriot community besieged in many places, the Turkish army swept across the Central Plain, and gained control of the northern third of the island. Greek Cypriots fled south and Turkish Cypriots fled north, as each community feared reprisals.

STEPS TOWARDS A SOLUTION

The first post-1974 meeting of the two leaders, Denktas and Makarios, was held in February 1977 in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. The two leaders worked out an agreement on four guidelines, with the aim of establishing an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal republic. Two years later, intensive negotiations between Denktas and the new Greek Cypriot leader, Spyros Kyprianou, produced a longer document, filling in some of the detail of the state-to-be. Further talks were held from August 1980 until February 1983, but when no agreement was reached, the Turkish Cypriot assembly declared its independence and established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The de facto division of the island was complete, although the Turkish Cypriots indicated a desire to continue working towards a new arrangement on the island.

The UN Secretary-General held separate consultations with the two sides beginning in August 1984. After four months, he presented to them a set of "Working Points" which comprised political confidence-building measures, the establishment of a federal government structure, and territorial adjustments. The Turkish Cypriot side gave full support but the Greek Cypriot side raised fundamental objections and finally in January 1985 rejected the document. A modified version also accepted by the Turkish side was ultimately rejected by the Greek side in June 1986.

There followed another break, this time of two years. After the election of a new Greek Cypriot leader, George Vassiliou, in 1988, the UN Secretary-General started a new initiative to bring the two leaders together. There were three rounds of talks, but again no agreement was reached.

In 1990, the Greek Cypriot government applied to the European Community for full membership. By claiming to speak on behalf of both communities in Cyprus, this action brought all efforts for a negotiated settlement to the brink of total collapse.

In 1992, the UN Secretary-General invited the two leaders to New York, first for indirect and then for direct talks. Three meetings took place, where consideration was given to a comprehensive package of measures. Although both sides accepted elements of the package, no overall agreement was reached. To overcome the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides, the Secretary-General concluded that the prospects for progress would be enhanced if a number of confidence-building measures were adopted by each side.

In 1993, the Secretary-General and his representatives put forward fourteen confidence building measures, foremost amongst which were the re-opening of Nicosia International Airport and Varosha (a ghost town in the southern part of Famagusta formally under the Turkish side's control since the 1974 cease-fire) for the benefit of both communities. Experts were commissioned to work out the costs of this, and documents were prepared to suggest how the proposals might be implemented. Both sides ended up accepting one document each, but not the same one. There the matter rested until this year, when meetings were arranged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders in the USA and Switzerland.

Given the failure of previous rounds of negotiation, it is difficult to believe that the present set of meetings will lead anywhere. Time was short, as the Greek Cypriot Presidential elections were due February 1998, so discussions on substantive issues should have been concluded before November. If they resume in 1998, it is unlikely that the imminent arrival of the Russian missiles (ordered by the Greek Cypriot government in 1996), and the Turkish threat to destroy them before they are deployed, will improve the temper of either side.

CYPRUS AS A BRIDGE?

Everyone agrees that a stable Cyprus, one without the current problem, could be a factor for stability in the Mediterranean. The bridging role of the island could then come to the fore, if it could somehow cease to be a place of conflict.

It is also generally agreed that the present status quo on the island is unacceptable. The high

number of troops, the level of armaments and various actions taken by the leaders of the two communities have all served to focus attention on the potential danger of the situation on the island. The tragic deaths as a result of a demonstration led by Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' in August served to concentrate minds, and efforts in the search for peace have been redoubled. While the island remains a place of arms the risk of a wider Graeco-Turkish confrontation grows. The Turkish side has threatened to bomb the Russian-made missiles that the Greek side says it will deploy in 1998; the negotiations for Cyprus' EU entry, starting in April 1998, are also seen by some as a time bomb.

It is further generally agreed that the economic benefits of a reunited Cyprus would devolve disproportionately to the Turkish Cypriots, as the poorer community, and that for that reason it should be possible to 'buy' a settlement which allows a certain measure of integration. The EU has gone to considerable lengths to explain to the Turkish Cypriots the benefits of EU membership to their community, while rejecting the argument that the current application by Cyprus is invalid, though it was made by the Greek Cypriot community alone.

The problem with such an argument is that it ignores the fears of the Turkish Cypriots; the chief of which is the problem of security. While economic benefits may be very great, if they cannot be enjoyed in peace then they are not worth having. Because of the way they were treated between 1963 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots do not trust Greeks bearing gifts. Only an effective Turkish military guarantee, of the type enshrined in the 1960 agreements, is sufficient to achieve the measure of security necessary to allow the enjoyment of economic advantages. Given the inability of the multinational United Nations force to protect Turkish Cypriot lives between 1964 and 1974, proposals of multinational Bosnia-style forces or NATO forces policing any settlement are unacceptable. But the idea that there would still be a large Turkish force on the island is hardly acceptable to Greek Cypriot opinion.

The issue of sovereignty is also important. After their experiences of the 1960s, the Turkish Cypriots are loath to allow a similar situation to develop again. While the idea of a single federal state is more or less agreed, there is considerable dispute as to what powers the central government of the new state should have. Again, it is probably true that the economic benefits to both sides are greater the more unified the state is,¹¹ but the two sides differ sharply as to the desirability of such a state. If federation is to be the solution, the Greek Cypriot side insists that the central government have considerable powers over the federated states, whereas the Turkish Cypriots insist on a much more confederate solution, with the bulk of the powers of government residing in the federated states themselves.

Similar problems concern the redistribution of land, and the right of settlement. After 24 years, the landscape of both parts of the island have been transformed: the south by coastal development especially, the north more by neglect. Refugees from both sides have lived in properties once occupied by people of the other community for almost a generation. To return such people to the place where they (or, often, their family) used to live, is unlikely to be viable. Again, Turkish Cypriot security concerns stress the need for a bi-zonal arrangement, whereby some portion of the island remains under de facto Turkish control; whereas many in the Greek Cypriot community claim the right of all refugees to return to their homes. This would mean that no part of the island would have a Turkish majority. As the principle of reducing the size of the Turkish Cypriot area as part of an overall solution has been accepted, some form of compensation package acceptable to those forced to move must be worked out. Problems over the valuation of land, and the unacceptability of the 1992 proposals to the Turkish Cypriots are hampering agreement on this point.¹²

The bottom line for any stable solution, as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, is that the physical security of their community is assured. Given the failure of the UN to protect them in 1964, 1967 and the period between the two stages of the Turkish operation in 1974, they feel that only Turkey can be relied upon to provide the sort of security needed. One way to achieve this would be to concede that the status quo is not so unacceptable after all. Serious bi-communal conflict has been avoided since 1974; if the two communities are kept separate, then there is little scope for

physical violence. Such a solution would recognise the existence of two states in Cyprus, and would encourage those states to learn to co-operate with each other. Even simply allowing trade between the two sides would give some economic benefits, and it is possible that this could lead to closer liaisons. As Mr. Boutros-Ghali noted, there is an acute crisis of confidence between the two sides.¹³ There were attempts to overcome this by means of confidence building measures, chief among which was the plan whereby the deserted Famagusta suburb of Varosha would be opened up to restoration and settlement by its former (Greek Cypriot) inhabitants and Nicosia International Airport re-opened. This plan floundered finally when the two sides who both claim to have accepted the idea, could not agree on which version of the plan they accepted.¹⁴

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

At present, the two communities in Cyprus have very different ideas about the form that any solution to the problem should take. The positions of the leadership on both sides have become more entrenched over time; the differences between what each side sees as an acceptable solution are as great as ever. Neither side is prepared to compromise on what it sees as its rights, even if there are considerable economic or financial inducements to do so.

The fact that the present situation has continued in Cyprus for so long without a resolution of the conflict suggests that a different sort of approach is needed to the various sets of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. A re-think of the problem was advocated by Hugo Gobbi in 1983.¹⁵ The argument for a change in approach was enthusiastically taken up by Rauf Denkta,¹⁶ and it is clear from the failure of the current set of negotiations to make significant progress that the possibilities of alternative solutions to the problem need to be examined. Otherwise, the present 'unacceptable' status quo could drag on indefinitely: Cyprus will remain two opposing bunkers. Or, worse, as the situation has features which could make it become more volatile, war could break out.

As far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, there are a number of possible options. One alternative is to merge the northern part of the island with Turkey, becoming a province of Turkey. Possibly a superior plan, in that it would better preserve the cultural differences between the islanders and the Turkish mainland, would be to enter into arrangement similar to that of Puerto Rico with the USA, or the Isle of Man with the United Kingdom. This is the type of solution advocated by Bülent Ecevit, the man who, as Prime Minister, authorised the Turkish military operation of 1974.

Any form of integration with Turkey has its drawbacks, however. At present, monetary union between North Cyprus and Turkey means that the high inflation and economic instability which this entails is imported to north Cyprus. Also, as costs on the island tend to be higher, there are very few goods and services in which the island has a comparative advantage over her powerful neighbour. This makes Turkish Cypriot products, from textiles to tourism, uncompetitive on world markets. For this reason, some form of accommodation with the Greek Cypriots is preferable. There are several types of economic activity where the Turkish Cypriots would have a comparative advantage over the Greek Cypriots, and the use of an appropriate exchange rate policy can ensure the competitiveness of the island's goods and services on world markets.

Any solution to the Cyprus problem must provide at least the level of stability that the status quo provides. If it can also turn Cyprus from being a bunker into a bridge, so much the better. The table summarises possible solutions.¹⁷

The meaning of the various options is as follows:

Separation: the two communities form separate states and go their own ways. History would suggest that this is not a viable option, given the small size of the two states that would then exist on the island, and the geopolitical significance of the region. If Cyprus as a whole has been unable to maintain its independence for any extended period, it is all the more likely that the two successor

states on the island would fall under the sway of outside powers. However, if the final divorce was without the present acrimony, it is highly likely that there would be some form of normalisation in relations between the two states. This might allow for the bridge motif to come to the fore, as the states found it in their mutual interests to co-operate.

Double énosis: whereby the Greek Cypriot sector joins the European Union, while the Turkish Cypriot sector joins Turkey, either by means of full integration or in the sort of arrangement that the Isle of Man has with the UK, or Puerto Rico with the USA. There is an additional danger here in that the border between Greece and Turkey would then be extended to include Cyprus, so that trouble between the two in other areas (Thrace and the Aegean) would be more likely to spill over into violence on the island.

Confederation: the two communities form some loose federal arrangement, where the powers of the central government is weak, with most of the powers emanating from the two provinces.

Federation: the two communities join together in a state where the central government is relatively strong, but where considerable powers are devolved to the two federated states.

Unitary State: a situation, as in 1960, where there is only one government, with no constitutionally-devolved powers to the zones. An attempt to re-establish something like the 1960 Republic is likely to end, once again, in tears.

Two solutions stand out as offering the prospect of stability, along with a reduction of the bunker mentality prevalent at present: complete separation, or a form of confederation.¹⁸ Given the small size of the two communities on the island, and the cultural features which they share, the latter is probably the more appropriate solution. Confederation has the potential to give the same gains in stability as an agreed divorce, while at the same time opening the way for bridges to be built between the two communities, and so allowing the island to function as a cultural meeting point again. Closer relations between the two communities at this time run the risk of instability, of the sort that led first to deadlock and then violence after the 1960 Constitution. Confederation itself is not without its dangers: without some minimum level of goodwill, suspicions that one side or the other might seek to subvert the state may tend towards instability. A carefully-crafted constitution would be necessary to allay such fears.

Even complete separation would be an improvement on the status quo, though; it would increase stability on the island by decreasing the risk of open conflict.

There is the temptation to impose a solution which would produce a kind of peace in the region, even if this means trampling on the rights of the Cypriots. Allowing the two communities to go their separate ways would reduce tension, at the cost of depriving many (mainly Greek Cypriots) of their rights to property. Appropriate compensation could be paid, as Mr. Denkta_ has proposed, and the area occupied by the TRNC reduced. The UN would call upon its members to recognise the TRNC, thereby removing the embargoes on it. In return, the Greek Cypriot state, the Republic of Cyprus, would be admitted to the European Union on schedule. The area close to the dividing line between the two states would be demilitarised, and the two states encouraged to allow for free trade. But such a solution would be totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot side.

On this basis also, a loose confederation is an improvement on the status quo; other alternatives have the risk of either greater instability or of the continuance of two opposing bunkers. It is, perhaps, the goal to which the two sides should be encouraged to work. Of course, such a solution would be highly unpopular on the Greek Cypriot side, and would require a far-sighted leader to accept that this was a realistic and achievable goal. But, in the long-run, such a solution, which would allow for the growth of co-operation between the two communities, while removing many of the tensions inherent in stronger forms of association, should produce lasting benefits, and a real chance of Cyprus' becoming a bridge.

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1 Parsons, Anthony (1995), *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN interventions 1947-94*. London; Michael Joseph, 1995, chapter 13 ("Cyprus"). The quotation is from pp. 178-79. Anthony Parsons worked at the British Embassy in Turkey in the 1950s, and was later Britain's Ambassador to the United Nations and Special Advisor on Foreign Policy to Margaret Thatcher.

2 To give just two recent examples: "We want ... a Cyprus of inter-communal partnership, a bridge of friendship between Turkey and Greece", Rauf R. Denktaş, opening address at the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies, Famagusta, 20-23 November 1996, *Proceedings* p. 22; "Our conviction is that Cyprus ... should be developed into a bridge for cooperation between European and Middle Eastern countries", Kyriacos Christofi, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, at a conference, 28 March 1997 (Cyprus News Agency report).

3 Possibly Turkey's interest was more of a reaction to Greece's widening of the question of the future of the island by referring the matter to the United Nations. Xydis, Stephen (1967); *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press; Bağcı, Hüseyin, 'The situation during the Cold War', *First International Congress on Cypriot Studies, Proceedings*, p. 88.

4 Interestingly, the effect of conflict between Greece and Turkey in other areas tends not to have a significant effect on the island. The Imia-Kardak incident in early 1996 brought the two motherlands to the brink of war over a group of uninhabited rocks, but there was no noticeable increase in tension in Cyprus.

5 These people were probably mainly descendants of the Venetians, with some Greeks and a few Armenians and Maronites. See Erdengiz, Ahmet (1993), 'Kıbrıs Türklerinin Kökeni ve Tarihi Süreç İçerisinde Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun Oluşumu' ('An Historical Perspective on the Origin of the Turkish Cypriot Community'), *Halkbilimi*, No. 29, p. 19.

6 Bağışkan, Tuncer (1990), 'Kıbrıs'ta Yağmurla İlgili İnanç ve Uygulamalar' ('Praying for Rain: Beliefs and Practices'), *Halkbilimi*, No. 19-20, pp. 20-41. Further examples are given in Mr. Bağışkan's article 'Karşılaştırma Yöntemiyle Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlarda Ortak İnanç ve Uygulamalar' ('An Analysis of Common and Differing Beliefs and Practices of the Cypriot Turks and Greeks'), *Halkbilimi*, Nos. 11, 12, 13 (1988).

7 See Yıkıcı, Özkan (1996), 'Bazı Müzik Ezgilerinin Varyantları Üzerine' ('On Themes and

Variations'), *Halkbilimi*, No. 41-42, p. 28.

8 These foods originated in the Arab world. Kolakas arrived in Cyprus from Egypt in the tenth century. 'Kolokas Üzerine Kısa Bir Not' ('A Short Note on Kolokas'), *Halkbilimi*, No. 41-42 (1996), p. 11.

9 Gökçeoğlu, Mustafa (1990), 'Kıbrıs Türk Atasözü ve Deyimlerinin Bazı Nitelikleri ve Yapıları' ('Turkish Cypriot Proverbs and Idioms: Nature and Structure'), *Halkbilimi*, No. 19-20, p. 43.

10 Sonyel, Salahi 'Historical Causes of the Cyprus Problem', in Doğramacı, Emel (et. al.) (1997), p. 33.

11 This point is argued for in Theophanous, Andreas (1996). He contrasts what he calls "strong" and "weak" federation, showing that there is a trade-off between the power of the federated states and the expected economic gains of federation.

12 The ideas of the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 1992 envisaged the transfer of the citrus-growing area around Morphou (Güzelyurt) from the Turkish side. Although production is declining and, according to a World Bank report, citrus is an inappropriate industry for a country with the water problems of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots claim that this area is of importance to the economy, still supplying around 25-30 per cent of exports. Perhaps more importantly, the cession of Morphou would leave the traditional Turkish town of Lefke cut off from the rest of the Turkish zone. Also, the current inhabitants of Morphou, refugees from Limassol and Paphos, are not keen on the thought of having to move again. Even though the proposal was to transfer control from the Turkish Cypriot authorities to the United Nations, and to allow all Turkish Cypriots who wanted to stay the right to do so, such is the fear of the Turkish Cypriots of Greek Cypriot domination that this was considered unacceptable. When the proposals about Morphou were published, the current residents of the town organised a mass demonstration in protest.

13 UN Security Council document S/26026, para. 2.

14 The difference between the two relevant documents concerned traffic rights for Turkish Cypriot airlines at Nicosia Airport; how many might use it, and how many might be able to fly directly to places other than Turkey.

15 Gobbi, Hugo (1993). Gobbi served in Cyprus in a diplomatic capacity from 1980 to 1983.

16 Denктаş, Rauf (1996), pp. 5-16.

17 The solution advocated by some extreme Greek Cypriot nationalists, the union of the whole island with Greece, is no longer a viable option. The annexation of the whole island by Turkey is also excluded for the same reason.

18 By 'Confederation' we mean a form of government with strong provincial powers: central government may exercise only those powers specifically delegated to it by the provinces, who retain sovereignty in all other areas. This differs from 'federation', where residual powers generally remain with the central government.