# Silk Road Economic Belt as China's Eurasian Dream: Common Identity or Common Fear?*

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## Abstract

The Silk Road Economic Belt is the key component of China's Eurasian Pivot strategy. In this study, China's Eurasian Pivot is approached as a creativity strategy from the perspective of social identity theory. In order to succeed in its creativity strategy, China is trying to create a common in-group identity with the Silk Road Economic Belt countries through the Chinese Dream. However, the Chinese Dream is not perceived as a common identity by Central Asians and Uyghurs. While Central Asians respond China's economic presence in the region positively, they are afraid of demographic changes and cultural influences that Chinese migration will cause. Therefore, the Chinese Dream has been a common fear for Turkic societies along the Silk Road Economic Belt rather than common identity. This fear could be one of the most important factors that will prevent the success of China's Eurasian Pivot in the long run.

## Keywords

China's Eurasian Pivot strategy, Silk Road Economic Belt, China Dream, Central Asian Countries, Uyghurs.

## Introduction

In an article published in Foreign Policy in 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the 21st Century will be America's Pacific Century (Clinton 2011). While defining its Asia-Pacific strategy in its political statements, the United States first used the concept of Pivot; then, continued with rebalancing since the Asia Pivot was perceived as a strategy that directly targets China on the strengthening of military alliance (Dews 2014). Therefore, the negative meaning of the pivot concept has tried to be removed with rebalancing. Yet, no matter how this strategy is defined, it is perceived as a threat by China. Yan Xuetong (2014: 46-48) states that America's pivot to Asia-Pacific has confirmed most Chinese people's suspicions of containment by a superpower. He also states that this strategy encourages China's enemies to increase tensions in the region. The United States' efforts to strengthen its diplomatic, economic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region have pushed China into a climate of insecurity in the region. The perception that this strategy was put forward to prevent China's rise did not leave a space for cooperation between the US and China within the East Asia region (Ratner 2013: 21). China's response to the Asia Pivot strategy has been a new strategic orientation with the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). In this study, SREB, which China has introduced against the Asia Pivot, is examined as a creativity strategy from the perspective of social identity theory. In order to succeed in its creativity strategy, China has to create a common group identity with the countries along SREB. Therefore, China is trying to make the Chinese Dream a common identity shared with the countries of the region. However, the Chinese dream is thought to be a new version of Han nationalism by Central Asian nations and Uyghurs. Thus, in order for the Chinese dream to be adopted as a common identity, China needs to respect religious and cultural differences.

### Silk Road Economic Belt as a Social Creativity Strategy

In 2013, Xi Jinping in his speech at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan offered to build "SREB" between China and Central Asian countries and to increase cooperation within the region (Xi 2013a). In the same year, addressing the Indonesian Parliament he expressed his vision of "21st Century Silk Road" to be built between Southeast Asian countries and China (Xinhuanet 2015). Land-Sea Silk Road initiatives together were

called "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)". SREB, a land-based component of the BRI, is an alternative West strategy to the east orientation policy of the United States. Wang Jisi (2014: 132) stated that the United States' pivot to Asia poses the threat of zero-sum game for China and the United States in East Asia. Thus, "Marching Westward" is a strategic requirement for China's rise. Zhang and Belgibayev (2014) consider SREB as the key component of China's Eurasian Pivot strategy. China's proposal of SREB is also considered by Western thinkers as an answer to the Asia Pivot strategy of the United States (Clarke 2015). In this study, the SREB component of BRI will be examined from the perspective of Tajfel and Turner's social identity theory because the idea behind China's New Silk Road route is not only to establish regional hegemony or to develop an international economic system based on mutual dependence. Indeed, with this initiative, China will penetrate the center of Eurasia and gain more geopolitical power. Blended with infrastructure projects, new institutions, new ideas and values, SREB is an instrument that will allow China to reorganize the Western-led international system in line with its own perspective (Habova 2015: 68). According to the theory of social identity, China may attempt three different strategies against US Asia Pivot: mobility, creativity, and competition. Instead of conflict with the United States in East Asia, China is putting forward its Western strategy, namely SREB, as a social creativity strategy. Behind this creativity strategy is the idea that the current international system should be replaced not by conflicts but by alternative ways.

**Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior**

Three fundamental principles of the social identity theory of intergroup behavior are as follows: 1. Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity. 2. Positive social identity is largely based on favorable comparisons between in-group and some relevant out-groups. 3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals either leave the existing group and join a different group with a more positive identity or strive to create positive distinctiveness in their existing group (Tajfel &Turner 2004: 284). The in-group, whose identity is threatened, may attempt three strategies to gain a positive identity: social mobility, social creativity, and social competition. As an individual-centered strategy, social mobility enables individuals who are dissatisfied with their low-status group, to pass

to a high-status group (Tajfel &Turner 2004: 286). Social creativity, on the other hand, is the ability of the group members to redefine or change the parameters of comparison with the out-group in order to create a positive distinctiveness for the in-group. As a collective strategy, social creativity may manifest in three different ways. The first one is the comparison of in-group and out-group according to some new dimensions. The second is the change of the characteristics attributed to in-group. Finally, the third is the change of the out-group. In the social competition strategy, on the other hand, the members of the in-group compete directly with the out-group to gain positive social identity (Tajfel &Turner 2004: 286-288).  According to the social identity theory assumptions, behind China's "SREB" or "Marching West" strategy, there is a perception of threat towards its positive social identity in East Asia. According to Yan (2014: 47), Asia Pivot is a strategy backed by the United States that encourages regional states to question China's authority. For this reason, China believes that its positive image in the region is damaged and constrained by the Asia Pivot strategy. To obtain a positive identity in Eurasia, China attempts three forms of social creativity strategy. The first one is to change the characteristics of the in-group. Xi Jinping has introduced the concept of the Chinese Dream, which combines the rise of China with the national rejuvenation (Sorensen 2015: 55).  This concept refers to China's return to the glorious days of the past as against the century of humiliation (Wang 2013). The Chinese Dream also aims to provide wealth, prosperity and security for the Central Asian countries on SREB. Therefore, the Chinese Dream is a common dream that both encompasses the Asian Dream and is shared with the states of the region (Gosset 2015).  The second one is the comparison of the in-group and out-group over some new dimensions. China has preferred to choose another sphere of influence against the Asia Pivot strategy of the United States that targets East Asia. With Marching West strategy, China is trying to establish influence in a geography where the United States is not involved. The last one is the changing of the out-group that is the subject of the comparison for in-group. China's Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (2015) expressed that BRI is not a tool of geopolitics. According to many Chinese academics who support the official discourse, BRI is not an answer to the US's rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacific. On the contrary, it is a part of China's reassurance and non-confrontation strategy (Bondaz et al.

2015: 6). China, especially in official discourse, does not prefer launching BRI as a counterbalance strategy. That's because the reduction of SREB to China's Eurasian Pivot strategy would hurt the initiative itself more than anything else. On the basis of China's social creativity strategy, there is a desire to become the rule maker (Callahan 2016: 14). That is why China has introduced a number of new concepts which also form the foundation of SREB. These concepts are new diplomacy, new projects, new institutions, and new ideas. *New Diplomacy:* Xi Jinping announced the new trends in Chinese foreign policy to the world through two important conferences. These are the 2013 Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference and the 2014 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. In Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference, Xi Jinping (2013b) describes the basic concepts that will guide the diplomacy of the periphery in four characters: Qin (亲) (closeness), cheng (成) (earnestness), hui (惠) (benefit) and rong (容) (inclusiveness). At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, Xi (2014) went one step further and declared that China's aim is to establish a community of common destiny with neighboring countries. Xi stresses that peripheral diplomacy must be successful in order to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China's neighbor-centric foreign policy highlights the dependence between countries. Xi considers dependence between China and its neighbors as an opportunity because this dependence will make it easier to inject Chinese values into these countries (Callahan 2016: 8). BRI has been established as the implementation project of this peripheral diplomacy. *New Project:* BRI aims to establish cooperation in 5 key areas between the countries involved within the initiative and China. These five areas are policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds (National Development and Reform Commission 2015). According to Wang Yiwei (2015: 99), the difference of SREB from the ancient Silk Road is that it does not only promote trade but also links the hearts and minds of people. For this reason, the community of common destiny is an important component of SREB. *New Institutions:* Two important institutions were established to finance BRI. The first one is the Silk Road Fund, which was established in 2014. The Silk Road Fund was established by China with a budget of $ 40 billion (http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/). The second one is Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established

in 2015. AIIB is a multilateral development bank as well as an international financial institution. The aim of AIIB is to finance infrastructure investments in the countries of BRI. The bank was established with a capital of 100 billion dollars. China is the largest shareholder of the bank with a capital contribution of 30% (Kawai 2015: 5). The establishment of AIIB means that there will be a rival for the mainstream international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in Asia. Whereas broadening liberal democracy lies behind the IMF and the World Bank's policy of helping developing countries, China, the largest founding member of the AIIB, is not interested in the internal affairs of other countries in its aid policies and strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference. Accordingly, the AIIB was designed as an alternative financial institution against Western development banks adorned with the political values of the Bretton Woods system (Liao 2015). *New Ideas:* Xi Jinping describes the Chinese Dream as a national rejuvenation dream shared by all ethnic groups within the country. However, because the realization of the Chinese dream depends on ensuring a peaceful and stable environment in the international arena as well as in the neighboring countries, adoption of this dream only within the country will not be sufficient. As the Chinese Dream is closely linked to the dreams of other people around the world, China should help developing and neighboring countries in their own development (Yang 2013). In other words, the Chinese Dream is actually a world dream since it aims to develop other countries. SREB as a part of the Chinese dream aims to develop the countries involved within the initiative.

Peripheral diplomacy, BRI, AIIB, and the Chinese Dream are the main forms of creativity of the alternative world order that China wants to establish. These creativity forms also are indicators of how the Chinese world order will work in the future. Yet, what will determine the success of this creativity strategy is how other countries and even the ethnic minorities within China will perceive it. Therefore, there are two fundamental factors that can prevent China's creativity strategy from being successful against the Asia Pivot. The first one is that SREB may create a new bipolarity within the international system. China's Eurasian Pivot strategy could pave the way for a bipolar world order with China, Russia and Central Asian states in one pole; the United States, the EU and their Asian allies on the other pole. The second factor to undermine China's creativity strategy is the inability

to establish a common identity; namely intra-group cohesion, between the SREB countries and China. The second part of the study will focus on whether the Chinese dream will be adopted by Central Asian countries and Uyghurs as an in-group identity.

**Chinese Dream: Shared Value or Chinese Exceptionalism**

Friend and Thayer (2017: 99) claim that the Chinese Dream is a concept that feeds the Chinese exceptionalism. They argue that the rise of Han-centrism is related to the obsession with China's weakness. Although, various groups in China have their own interpretations of the Chinese Dream, the common point of these interpretations is that the purpose of the Chinese dream is "fulfilling the great renaissance of the Chinese race" (Meyer 2016). According to the Han Nationalists, foreign influence is the reason for the decline of China in the past. Yet, these foreigners are not only Westerners but also ethnic groups within the country. What prevents China from modernization is the non-Han ethnic groups within the country as well as an external influence (Friend& Thayer 2017: 99). However, the merge of the Chinese Dream with the Han-centrist nationalism carries a serious risk. The Chinese Dream is explained on the international platforms, like the community of common destiny, through cultural interaction and common links between people (Xi 2013c). However, the rise of Han nationalism in the country points to the contrary. The equalization of the interests of the Han race to the interests of China within the country could create the same effect for the Chinese Dream as well (Leibold 2010: 549). The criticism of the Zhas Alash newspaper published in Kazakhstan against the Nur-Otan Party can be considered within this context.

Chinese leader's strategy called 'Chinese Dream' is similar to our country's strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050'. However, we do not want to see Bauyrzhan Baibek [one of the leaders of the Nur-Otan Party] to declare something like this tomorrow: 'from now on we rename our Nur-Otan Party into the Chinese Communist Party Nur-Otan. Our strategies and goals are declared in the Xi Jinping's strategy 'Chinese Dream'' (Burkhanov& Yu-Wen 2016: 11).

Chinese leaders are careful to emphasize that all countries in BRI are equal (Wang 2014). However, the discourse before the initiative was introduced proved to be contrary. Liu Yazou, General of the Chinese People's Liberation

Army of China, used the following statement for Central Asia: "Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heavens" (Pantucci 2017). China's State Council Member Yang Jiechi, in his speech at the ASEAN meeting in 2010, has made a hierarchical distinction between China and other small countries: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact" (Storey 2010: 4). In order to be adopted as an in-group identity by both ethnic minorities and Central Asians, the Chinese Dream has to pull away from Han chauvinism since Han nationalism creates rigid boundaries between groups rather than providing common identities.

### Rigid Boundaries Between the Chinese and the Turks

In order for China to provide a common group identity through the Chinese Dream, the rigid boundaries drawn between the Turks and the Chinese must be eliminated. According to Fredrik Barth (1969), social encounter is essential in constructing the boundaries between the two ethnic groups. Boundaries between groups become apparent only when two groups encounter and are involved in each other's social lives. The rigid boundaries between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs were constructed in two ways. The first one is a large scale Han migration to East Turkestan. The second one is the political pressure imposed on the Uyghurs by the Chinese government (Han 2010: 250). The encounter of the Turks in the Central Asian states with the Chinese has also been through immigration. In the post-Cold War period, many of the Chinese, who came to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to trade, later settled in these countries (Dillon 2004: 76). The immigration of the Chinese to Central Asia is increasing day by day but the waves of migration divide the two ethnic groups rather than bringing them closer. In other words, the Chinese Dream and SREB could raise common fear and doubt for the Uyghurs and Central Asians rather than providing a common identity. Another issue that nurtures this fear is the Chinese government's repression of Uyghurs ' identity and culture.

### Great Leap Forward: Han Settlement in East Turkestan

Ethnic Han emigration to Eastern Turkestan began with China's 5-year economic policy, called Great Leap Forward, between 1958-1963. These migrations are called Xia Fang (send down) or the rustication movement to

reduce the cultural and class differences between city and rural areas. The two other objectives of the Xia Fang migration movement are to facilitate the integration of China's ethnic minorities and strengthen the security of China's territorial borders (Dreyer 1975: 353). In East Turkestan, the 5.5% Han population in 1949 increased to 40% in 1970 with the Xia Fang movement (Dillon 2004: 75). Another important reason for increasing the Han population in East Turkestan was the creation of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, known as *Bingtuan* in Chinese (O'Brien 2016: 36). Bingtuan is a military-agricultural settlement designed to promote economic development within the region and to provide permanent settlement of Han Chinese in East Turkestan (Millward & Tursun 2004: 90). During this period, Han immigrants began to penetrate the small cities and towns, namely the castles of the Uyghurs, as workers and peasants. This social encounter between the two ethnic groups[1] allowed the Uyghurs to realize how different they were from Han Chinese. These differences have caused them to separate from each other and to set a distance between them (Han 2010: 252). The Han migration to the Eastern Turkestan region has three observable effects on the life of the region. Firstly, the Uyghurs put their ethnic identities into the foreground with the rise of Han migration and it became more difficult to reduce the religious-cultural differences between the two ethnic groups. Secondly, the increase in the Han migration caused socio-economic disparities between the two ethnic groups in the East Turkestan region. For example, one of the reasons for the increase in unemployment rates among the Uyghurs was the Han migrants who joined the labor market. The last effect is that the Han immigrant population tries to adapt Uyghurs to Chinese culture rather than to adapt themselves to Uyghurs culture. This cultural conflict has led Uyghurs to complain about ethnic discrimination and Han chauvinism (Smith 2002: 157). The relations between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese brought spatial and cultural divisions in areas such as language, time, food and marriage (Han 2010: 250). Speaking Chinese and Uyghurs between Uyghurs is associated with two places: house and outside. Since the urban labor market requires speaking Chinese, it is imperative for most Uyghur youth to learn Chinese. In Eastern Turkestan, the Uyghurs are divided into two groups according to which language they receive an education. The Uyghurs who received education in Chinese are called Minkaohan and the Uyghurs who received

education in Uyghur are called Minkaomin (Han 2010: 251). Minkaomins are the majority in Uyghur society. However, the number of Minkaomin students has begun to fall due to the educations' poor quality and quantity after the "bilingual education policy" put into practice by China in 2003 (Wang 2015: 43). Since speaking Chinese is an important criterion to find a job among the Uyghurs, learning Chinese is actually a survival strategy. However upward mobility into this new Uyghur class, the Minkaohan, was not equally available to all. The great majority of rural youth had little familiarity with Chinese or Putonghua and remained efficaciously excluded and subject to severe handicaps in all segments of the labour market (Hann 2014: 193).

The issue of time is also important in constructing the social boundaries between Uyghur and Han ethnic groups. The local time of Eastern Turkestan is 2 hours behind the local time of Beijing. Yet, the Chinese government is implementing the only one-time zone policy for all China. Beijing time is used in public areas and government institutions in the East Turkestan region. However, Uyghurs continue to use local time in their private lives (Beller-Hann 2002: 60). Moreover, religious differences between the two ethnic groups, as Uyghurs only go to restaurants where Halal food is served, also play a major role in drawing boundaries in the social sphere (Cesaro 2000). In China, inter-ethnic marriage is seen as an important step towards eliminating social barriers and ensuring national unity (Jian 2017). However, marriages between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in the Eastern Turkestan region are not accepted due to religious-cultural differences. Inter-ethnic marriages are not accepted in Uyghur society because of the risk of losing religious and national identity (Smith 2002: 161-163). It is not easy to overcome the rigid social boundaries constructed between the two ethnic groups after the Han migration to East Turkestan. For example, one of the reasons for the Uyghur uprising in 2009 is the perception of Han migration to the region as a threat to the way of life, culture and identity by the Uyghurs (Howell &Fan 2011). Although the Eastern Turkestan region is an important cornerstone of SREB, the Uyghurs ' adoption of the Chinese dream as a group identity does not seem possible due to the social boundaries drawn between the Han Chinese and them. The lessons learned from the historical experience of the Uyghurs negatively affect the Central

Asian societies' outlook towards the Chinese dream.

**Great Leap Outward: Chinese Migration into Central Asia**

Migration from China to Central Asian countries occurs in two ways: labor force migration and trade-related migration (Sadovskaya 2011: 88-90). The Chinese government is following a strategy that promotes both domestic migration and labor force export to reduce the rate of unemployment within the country. In this strategy, internal migration is encouraged to the north and northwest regions of the country. Although there is no limitation for external migration, due to the geographical proximity both internal and external migration brings Chinese immigrants closer to Central Asian States (Kozhirova & Ospanova 2014: 483). Furthermore, after the Cold War, bilateral agreements were signed among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China for joint ventures. Within the context of these agreements, many Chinese who came to Central Asia for economic assistance did not return to their countries even though their visas had expired (Dillon 2004: 152). Chinese migration to Central Asian countries is likely to gain even more intensity with the infrastructure projects of SREB. China's presence in Central Asia and SREB is welcomed by the governments of the regional states. However, the view of the Turkic community within the region towards China is not in line with the policies of the governments. While China's presence in the region is generally perceived as positive regarding issues such as geopolitics, security, and economy, when it comes to identity and culture this perception becomes negative (Peyrouse 2016: 19). Business and trade migration from China to Central Asian countries have an important role in the formation of this negative perception. Especially in Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies, migration is the most important cause of negative perceptions. Kozhirova & Ospanova (2014: 482) state that Chinese migration to Kazakhstan is perceived as a threat to national identity and security in Kazakh society. It is thought that migration will deteriorate the demographic structure of Kazakhstan since the surplus workforce accumulating on the Kazakhstan border, especially in the Eastern Turkestan region, will eventually return to Kazakhstan as legal and illegal labor migration (Syroezhkin 2011: 103). In an article published in the Kazakh Atamekan newspaper, Chinese migration is considered as a serious threat.

The Chinese who came to Kazakhstan for economic aid settled in the country through marriage, land and estate purchase. Since the Russians settled in the country in the same way in the past, the population structure of Kazakhstan should be prevented from deteriorating by the Chinese (Dillon 2004: 153).

In countries with weak economic power, such as Kyrgyzstan, China is also seen as a threat in the field of economy. According to a public opinion survey conducted in Kyrgyzstan, China is regarded as the country's largest economic partner by 21%, while 27% considers China as a threat to the country's economy (*Public Opinion Survey Residents of Kyrgyzstan* 2016: 50). As Kyrgyzstan is China's largest export market among Central Asian countries, China has many investment companies in Kyrgyzstan. The interaction between Chinese workers, coming to work in these investment companies, and Kyrgyz people is much more than in the other Central Asian countries. For this reason, violent incidents occur occasionally between Chinese and Kyrgyz (*China Daily* 2013).  Apart from migration, Central Asian Turkic societies have historical reasons for their negative view of China. According to Peyrouse's (2016: 21) research on Chinese perception in Central Asian newspapers, China's presence in the region is considered to be expansionism. Beijing has historically been accused of developing prejudiced policies against nomads and Turkic people. Moreover, it is argued that China aims to break the Turkic population continuum between Central Asia and Uyghurs by encouraging Han migration to the Eastern Turkestan region. Consequently, because China's policies to suppress the identity and culture of Uyghurs are of concern in Central Asian societies, they consider that the civilizational barrier between Central Asia and China should be maintained (Peyrouse 2016: 22).

## Conclusion

China has launched the SREB initiative in Eurasia to balance the Asia Pivot strategy of the United States. China has chosen to establish a new sphere of influence in Western Asia rather than having conflicts with the United States in East Asia. The keystones of China's social creativity strategy are peripheral diplomacy, development banks, SREB, and the Chinese Dream. The purpose of China's peripheral diplomacy is to create a stable environment for national rejuvenation. Moreover, the development of neighboring countries is one of the most important factors that will ensure

stability within the region. Therefore, the Chinese dream is also defined as an Asian dream aiming for the development of Central Asian countries. In China's creativity strategy, the Chinese Dream is put forward as a common identity to ensure the intra-group cohesion between the SREB countries and China. However, because China is thought to be trying to create a cultural influence in the region with the concept of the Chinese dream, it is not perceived as a unifying identity by both the Central Asian Turkic Communities and the Uyghurs. The Central Asian Turkic communities' negative view of the Chinese Dream is based on the pre-delineated rigid boundaries. China's domestic and foreign migration policies are of the fundamental causes in the construction of rigid social boundaries between Chinese and Turks since these boundaries between two ethnic groups have become evident by their inclusion in each other's social lives. While the Central Asian States welcome economic and geo-strategic affirmation of China's presence in the region, they are afraid of the demographic changes and cultural influences that Chinese migration will bring. While China seeks to establish a relationship with the Turkic and Muslim countries in SREB on the basis of respect for cultural and religious differences, it wants to weaken the religious and cultural identity of the Uyghurs. Therefore, the Chinese Dream is a common fear rather than the common identity of SREB. This fear could be one of the most important factors that will prevent the success of the initiative in the long run.

### Endnote

1    The Chinese term for the ethnic groups is "Minzu"（民族）, which means minority nationalities. Although the term "nationality" is still being used in practice, the official stance prefers "ethnicity" or "ethnic group" as the translation of "Minzu" (Wang 2015: 4).

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# Çin'in Avrasya Rüyası Olarak İpek Yolu Ekonomik Kuşağı: Ortak Kimlik mi Ortak Korku mu?*

**Nilgün Eliküçük Yıldırım**<sup>**</sup>

### Öz

İpek Yolu Ekonomik Kuşağı Çin'in Avrasya Ekseni stratejisinin anahtar bileşenidir. Bu çalışmada Çin'in Avrasya Ekseni stratejisi, sosyal kimlik teorisi perspektifinden bir yaratıcılık stratejisi olarak ele alınmıştır. Çin, yaratıcılık stratejisinde başarılı olabilmek için, İpek Yolu Ekonomik Kuşağı ülkeleriyle Çin Rüyası üzerinden ortak bir grup kimliği oluşturmaya çalışmaktadır. Fakat Çin Rüyası, Orta Asya Türk Toplumları ve Uygurlar tarafından ortak bir kimlik olarak algılanmamaktadır. Orta Asya Devletleri, Çin'in bölgedeki varlığını, ekonomik ve jeo-stratejik olarak olumlu karşılarken, Çinli göçünün yol açacağı demografik değişimlerden ve kültürel etkiden korkmaktadırlar. Bu yüzden, Çin Rüyası, İpek Yolu Ekonomik Kuşağında yer alan Türk toplumlarının ortak kimliğinden ziyade ortak korkusudur. Bu korku uzun vadede girişimin başarısını engelleyecek en önemli faktörlerden biridir.

### Anahtar Kelimeler

Çin'in Avrasya Ekseni stratejisi, İpek Yolu Ekonomik Kuşağı, Çin Rüyası, Orta Asya Ülkeleri, Uygurlar.

# Экономический пояс Шелкового пути как евразийская мечта Китая: общая идентичность или общий страх?*

## Нильгюн Эликючюк Йылдырым**

### Аннотация

Экономический пояс Шелкового пути является ключевым компонентом евразийской стратегии Китая. В данном исследовании евразийское господство Китая рассматривается как стратегия творчества с точки зрения теории социальной идентичности. Чтобы преуспеть в своей стратегии творчества, Китай пытается создать единую групповую идентичность со странами Экономического пояса Шелкового пути через китайскую мечту. Однако китайская мечта не воспринимается как общая идентичность центральноазиатами и уйгурами. Хотя жители Центральной Азии позитивно реагируют на экономическое присутствие Китая в регионе, они боятся демографических изменений и культурных влияний, которые вызовет китайская миграция. Поэтому Китайская мечта была скорее общим страхом для тюркских обществ вдоль Экономического пояса Шелкового пути, чем общей идентичностью. Этот страх может стать одним из наиболее важных факторов, которые будут препятствовать успеху Евразийского стержня Китая в долгосрочной перспективе.

### Ключевые слова

Евразийская опорная стратегия Китая, Экономический пояс Шелкового пути, Китайская мечта, страны Центральной Азии, уйгуры

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