

**THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATE OF THE 2000s IN
PERSPECTIVE: SECURITIZED CITIZENSHIP
AND THE MODERN DILEMMA***

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to highlight the relevance of the citizenship debate of the 1990s to post-September 11 context in which citizenship has been subjected to securitization parallel to the extensive securitization of public life in all over the world, especially in the Western world. The argument is that citizenship debate of the 2000s draws insights from the debate of the 90s in terms of the persistence of the problems of modern citizenship having roots directly in its modernity. The new dynamic of securitization of citizenship will be discussed as a factor that triggers the existing modern dilemma.

KEYWORDS

Citizenship, securitization, September 11, security.

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The post-September 11 period has witnessed an inalienable revitalization of the citizenship debate which marked the mainstream academic discussion in political science, sociology and international relations throughout the 1990s. It was among the key concepts of the post-Cold War democratization efforts which focused on to eliminate the defects of existing democracies of the West and to establish liberal democracy properly in the rest of the world.¹ A problem solving capacity was ascribed to the concept since it presents serious opportunities to think about the historical problem of proper political agency and the rules of co-existence. The citizenship debate of the 90s resulted in the projection that modern citizenship should be reformulated to create a new common allegiance in the modern societies which should genuinely guarantee the rights and freedoms of the "others" and to accommodate social and cultural plurality, i.e., minority problems, religious differentiation and linguistic demands.

On the other hand, the 1990s witnessed the rise of the studies on the historical formation and nature of Western European citizenship traditions.² These studies aimed to reveal the dynamic interaction between sub-structural and super-structural levels, i.e. between the socio-economic formations and the rise of hegemonic nationalist ideologies, legal developments in citizenship, and of the political culture, i.e., deeper sensitivities and social prejudices towards various elements of difference. They attempted to picture the roots of deficits in the "democratic" citizenship traditions of the Western societies and provided a ground to think about the possibilities of transformation in these societies. What was in

¹See for examples, Bryan S. Turner, *Citizenship and Social Theory*, London, Sage, 1993; Bart von Steenberg (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship*, London, Sage, 1994; Nick Ellison, "Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity" *Sociology*, Vol. 31 (November), 1997, pp. 697-717.

²For such context-based studies, see, William Rogers Brubaker (ed.), *Immigration and Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, Lanham, University Press of America, 1989; David M. Smith and Maurice Blanc, "Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnic minorities in Three European Nations", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 20, 1996, pp. 66-82; Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (eds.), *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring the States*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , 1992.

common in such studies was their focus on the rise of the modern state and on the foundational discourses behind the so-called stable and homogenous state identity known as citizenship.

A decade after these discussions, the problem in essence seems remaining the same. When one looks at the recent studies on citizenship, the answer of the question "what is left of citizenship" is still addressing the same problem:³ The realities of the existing political environment even in the most developed democracies are alarming in the sense that there is a growing number of refugees, legal and illegal immigrants, indigenous peoples, peoples under emergency rule and peoples living under foreign occupation are deprived of their most basic citizenship rights. Nyers defines this situation as a "citizenship gap" referring to the radical inequalities in the application of the citizenship rights and benefits across the globe.⁴ Furthermore, the inequalities in the application of citizenship rights even within national contexts are becoming dramatically visible especially since September 11, 2001, a date after which citizenship has been subjected to securitization parallel to the extensive securitization of public life in all over the world, especially in the Western world. This new dynamic and the continuing hope in the potential of the concept to solve the problems of modern life have become the two aspects of the citizenship debate of the 2000s.

In this respect, the objective of this paper is to highlight the relevance of the citizenship debate of the 1990s to post-September 11 context in terms of the persistence of the problems of modern citizenship having roots directly in its modernity. After establishing this connection, the new dynamic of securitization of citizenship will be discussed as a factor that triggers the existing modern dilemma.

The Citizenship Debate of the 1990s

One of the basic characteristics of the citizenship debate of the 1990s was its exclusive focus on the idea of citizenship as an

³Peter Nyers, "Introduction: What's Left of Citizenship?", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 8(3), 2004, pp. 203-215.

⁴Ibid., p. 203.

“identity” rather than as a cluster of rights and obligations.⁵ In order to comment on the importance of this difference and to show its relevance to the problematique of this paper some clarification is needed.

As a concept, citizenship is marked by a differentiation: First of all, as an identity given by the state, it is dependent to the existence of a state as well as a political community. As Walzer properly stated, a citizen is first and the foremost a member of a political community entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities.⁶ Historically, it represents the establishment of a transcending public identity against other particularistic identity claims based on religion, estate, region, family, language etc. within a delimited territory. In the context of the modern nation-state, citizenship gains additional importance as the institution on which the state rests its legitimacy through the concepts of participation and popular sovereignty.

Citizenship as a form of membership, however, cannot be reduced to membership to a nation-state. As an identity relying on a membership to a particular community, it is mainly definable in the framework of a political community, a civil society and a public sphere whether or not it is coterminous with a nation state. In this respect, as several authors have underlined, the identification and/or the fusion between national identity and citizenship is a historically contingent one. It is not an absolute or irreversible identification.⁷ Therefore, citizenship should be thought mainly as an identity given by the public-political authority and there is no conceptual linkage between national identity and citizenship. This is the identity aspect of the concept.

⁵Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and Political Community”, in C. Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, London, Verso, 1992, p. 235; Michael Walzer, “Citizenship” in T. Ball and J. Farr (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 221.

⁶Walzer, *Citizenship*, p. 211.

⁷Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe” in Ronald Beiner (ed.), *Theorizing Citizenship*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 259.

Secondly, citizenship implies the entitlement of the individual with a cluster of rights and obligations which make him/her a proper member of a particular political community. This refers to the democratic content of the modern citizenship. In this respect, it is a status enabling an individual to participate into the affairs of the community. Here, the point is that citizenship entitlements do not by themselves explain the political bond between the citizen and the state. The materialization of citizenship rights is possible only within a political culture which entails a rational, non-arbitrary political authority, i.e., making the state more intelligible.⁸ Furthermore, a citizen is a citizen of a state even without being entitled with some rights and obligations. It is the state that creates, promotes and safeguards the citizenship rights. In this respect, one should by no means accept the fact that, citizenship rights and obligations are not the determinative but the complementary aspect of modern citizenship conception.

The citizenship debate of the 1990s put forward this differentiation as a meaningful one from the analytical point of view. The theory of citizenship developed exclusively as a theory of the evolution of the citizenship rights, namely the civil, political and social rights along with the liberal/ republican or authoritarian modernization trajectories of the Western democracies.⁹ In the early 1990s, however, the citizenship theory acquired a different character. The revitalization of the interest in citizenship theory owed much to the cultural politics of the 1970s and to the subsequent post-modern critique of identity. The cultural politics of the 1970s basically argued that the modern egalitarian citizenship, which is based on the equal membership of abstract individuals, only served for the subordination

⁸Jean Leca, "Questions on Citizenship" in C. Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, p. 17.

⁹T. H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Pluto Press, 1992). Marshallian theory was known as the only original theory of citizenship for a long time, but during the 80's, it was criticized to a large extent. Still, the citizenship theory continued to rest on the basic realist assumptions of the Marshallian theory. See for the critiques, M. Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship." *Sociology*, Vol, 21,1987, pp. 339-354; Anthony Giddens, "Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights" in *Profiles Critiques and Social Theory*, London, Macmillan, 1982.

and marginalization of some sections of the society.¹⁰ The new right claims of the New Social Movements such as various women's organizations, the black, the youth, gays and lesbians, ethnic and religious minorities, regional secessionists, environmentalists and their demands for recognition in public sphere and integration through effective use of citizenship rights resulted in two significant developments in terms of citizenship: First, they indicated that the content of citizenship rights had to enlarge and differentiate.¹¹ Secondly, the unitary citizenship identity had to be transformed in order to accommodate these differences in the public sphere.¹²

The basic effect of the post-modern critique of identity on the citizenship theory, therefore, has been to transform it from "a theory of the development of the citizenship rights to a theory of the social and political formation of citizenship identity" through a critique of citizenship as modernization. It has been argued that, modern citizenship has provided not only a legal-political but also a cultural identity which refers to those practices enabling the citizen to participate and to adopt fully in the national culture.¹³ In other words, modern citizenship should be understood as an identity including not only legal entitlements but also territorial, cultural and political elements expressing an individual's participation and allegiance to a particular political community.

This brought the questioning of the deeply rooted fusion between national identity and citizenship as the condition of membership in modern, territorial nation-state. Furthermore, it was not only the nationality dimension that has become questionable.

¹⁰Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman "The Return of the Citizen: A Survey on the Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics*. Vol.104, January, 1994, pp. 370-377; Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, B. Turner (ed.), London, Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 13-16.

¹¹Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, B.S. Turner and P. Hamilton, (eds.), London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 392-406.

¹²Turner, "Contemporary," 11.

¹³Bryan S. Turner, "Post-Modern Culture/ Modern Citizens" in *The Condition of Citizenship*, B. von Steenberg (ed.), London, Sage, 1994, pp. 158-160.

More important than that, all the statist connotations which made modern citizenship a non-egalitarian-exclusionary status have been criticized.¹⁴ Citizenship theory faced with a significant task after this breaking point: For the construction of a new citizenship identity, the deconstruction of the existing understanding is necessary. Especially, the identification between citizenship and national identity or in other words, the surpassing of citizenship by national identity should be examined in different national contexts. The integration between citizenship and nationality has been dissolving for some time under the forces of globalization. It is now necessary to formulate it at the level of theory because the classical citizenship theory rests exclusively on the assumption that citizenship and national identity should be coterminous. Modern citizenship which was supposed to be a political membership, has been constructed as a unitary, centrally defined, homogenous, and in fact as a cultural (national) identity throughout the modernization process. The debate of the 1990s put clearly that under the pretence of universality, the modern category of citizen postulated a homogenous political community and relegated all kinds of particularities and differences to the private sphere.¹⁵ Any new attempt of theorizing citizenship should take this aspect into consideration.

Therefore, the critique of citizenship as modernization examined the formation of a particular citizenship identity within specific nation-building models and related it to the process of modern state formation. It considered citizenship as an identity that is formed as a result of multi-dimensional processes of "social closure" which facilitate the identification of the individual with a particular cultural community and with a political organization. In this respect, the critique of citizenship as modernization provided a framework for the deconstruction of modern citizenship within the process of modern state-formation. It is particularly through this contribution that the citizenship debate of the 1990s becomes relevant to the political realities of the post-September 11 context in especially the developed democracies of the Western world. Before clarifying this

¹⁴Turner, "Contemporary," p. 15.

¹⁵Ibid., pp.14; Chantal Mouffe, "Preface" in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, C. Mouffe, (ed), p. 9.

relevance, it is necessary to dwell more on the relationship between state formation and the construction of modern (national) citizenship.

The State and the Discursive Construction of Citizenship Identity

The state's position in the construction of the "political community of citizens" should be viewed at a general level, i.e., throughout the multi-level and multi-dimensional processes of state formation which is marked by the political and also discursive activities of the state in creating, managing, and shaping its constituent parts including the citizenship identity.¹⁶ According to Jessop, any general definition of the state would need to refer to "state discourse" as well as state institutions.¹⁷ One of the peculiar characteristics of the modern state is that an ensemble of institutions and organizations which constitute the core of the state continuously define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of the society in the name of their common interest. In other words, the state cannot be equated with simply government, law, bureaucracy and a coercive political apparatus but there is a political discourse which facilitates constant articulation of a "common interest" and a "collective will" as the key features distinguishing the state authority from direct domination. The society, whose common interest and the general will are administered by the state, therefore, could not be viewed as an empirical given as the state itself. The boundaries and the identity of the society –also the boundaries of the membership to society that is citizenship identity– are all constituted through the same processes by which the states are built, reproduced and transformed.¹⁸ The reproduction of a particular citizenship identity is then an integral part of these multi-level practices and discourses in and through which the common interest and the identity of the society are articulated.

Therefore, at an abstract level, citizenship identity is a construction which involves a continuous process of internal

¹⁶Pierson, *The Modern State*, p. 57.

¹⁷Bob Jessop, *State Theory*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, p. 341.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p.342.

integration to maintain a stable core of support and compromise. This integration is carried out through “political projects” that are directed towards the generation of “society effect”.¹⁹ In this respect, an analysis on the construction and politicization of the boundaries between people of inclusion (the community of citizens) and exclusion (the foreigners) necessitates a “strategic” and “relational” approach to the state.²⁰

The “strategic” as used by Pierson here, implies an element of intentional action through which structure bounded actors –the elite–pursuing particular state projects, create and maintain a particular identity for the state and for its bounded community of citizens. It is also a “relational” not a linear path of development in the sense that, the state is the generator and the product of strategies through which boundaries are defined, spaces are demarcated and the values and criterion of legitimacy are put forward.²¹ The point is that citizenship politics is the integral part of these processes of boundary- drawing. It is at the same time the constituting subject and object of the state activity. Therefore the analysis of the state’s activities on the discursive level is central in understanding the formation of any citizenship identity as one of the central political projects of the state in creating and maintaining its basis of legitimacy. A particular citizenship identity has no foundation prior to or outside of the operation of the state institutions at the discursive level.

The formation of the modern citizenship as an identity proposes the following undertakings by the state, each have both political and the discursive consequences: First, in defining its citizenry, the state begins with a territorial closure which draws the physical boundaries of the “community inside”. Secondly, through the politics of external and internal cultural closure, it defines the terms of a homogenous, unitary membership which erases or negates divisive differences within a delimited territory. Finally, modern citizenship rests on a particular mode of integration which constitutes from a body of shared values, institutions, a particular political

¹⁹Ibid., p.346.

²⁰Pierson, *The Modern State*, p. 79.

²¹Ibid.

disposition concerning the relationship between the state and the citizen.

Therefore, modern citizenship is the result of a series act of "social closure" conducted against the other nations outside and against the minorities inside.²² While, the main concern in drawing the territorial boundaries is to maximize the differences among the peoples of different countries; in the domestic field it is to minimize these differences under the pretence of equal membership. This latter point corresponds to the second aspect of modern citizenship that is the cultural (national) character of citizenship.

Citizenship as National Closure

National closure means drawing of the cultural boundaries of citizenship, i.e., the framing of a particular cultural identity around which maximum (national) homogeneity is claimed and built by the centralized modern state. In other words, national closure sketches out invisible but effectively differentiating cultural boundaries for the "community inside".²³

The first stage of the national closure is carried out towards the external world. Here, the cultural boundaries exclude the people who do not fit the specified cultural characteristics. The aim is to maximize the differences between the "community inside" and outside. The second stage, internal closure is applied in order to

²²In this study, the definition of citizenship as a territorial, cultural, and political identity mainly rests on William R. Brubaker's analysis of citizenship as a social closure which is inspired from Weber's analysis of open and closed social relationships. According to Weber, as Brubaker informs, social interaction may be open to all comers, or it may be closed in the sense that it excludes or restricts the participation of certain outsiders. Citizenship can be viewed as the materialization of a social closure of a specific kind, carried on by the specific administrative agencies of the modern state to separate insiders and outsiders, the citizens and foreigners. See William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 23-30.

²³Brubaker, *Citizenship*, p.28.

minimize ethnic, religious, cultural, sectional or any other kind of differences and loyalties which disrupt the sense of homogeneity within the "community inside". It is an ethno-cultural closure, exercised against people of different ethnic, religious or cultural origin even they are formal citizens who remain within the previously defined territorial borders. Here, there are tacit, uncodified classificatory criteria emerge to differentiate the proper citizens and citizens on paper.²⁴

National closure aims to establish national homogeneity that is formulated on the basis of a core ethnic, a religious affiliation, a particular language or various mixes of such elements of identity. Whatever the origin, a single identity is defined and imposed on the community through various strategies of homogenization, i.e., marginalization, eradication and assimilation and the like. As a result, the conditions of a national citizenry with which the modern nation-state identifies itself are constructed.²⁵ This is the moment of the fusion between citizenship and national identity. At this point it will be useful to examine the formation of this fusion more in detail.

Historically, national identity has been an indivisible part of modern citizenship. The element of nationality presupposes that citizenship, as a membership in a political community should also involve membership in a cultural community that is in a community of culture, language, mores and character.²⁶ This assumption is also reflected in the semantic and ideological confusion surrounding the two concepts. In the legal literature, nationality and citizenship are used as synonyms. However, there is a categorical difference between the two concepts. Modern citizenship primarily means membership in a territorially delimited political community. On the other hand, national identity implies belonging to a cultural community which may cross the physical-territorial borders between states. One can be

²⁴Ibid. p. 29.

²⁵Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton (eds.), London, Routledge, 1994, p. 207; Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 49-50.

²⁶Tomas Hammar, "Citizenship: Membership of a Nation or of a State." *International Migration*, Vol. 24 1986, p.743.

a member of a particular state without belonging to the national community of that state and vice versa.²⁷

According to Stolcke, the fusion between cultural (national identity) identity and political membership (citizenship) is in fact an ideological conflation and dates back to the early phase of nation building in Europe.²⁸ The modern idea of citizenship emerged originally as a civic-territorial concept but throughout 19th century thought and politics, the emancipatory idea of citizenship was circumscribed by exclusive nationality laws which codified the formal requirements that must be met by an individual to be recognized as nationals of a particular state.²⁹ These requirements gradually gained an ethnic-genealogical character even in France where citizenship depended primarily on territory and commitment to political integrity. Throughout Europe, in varying degrees in different national contexts, the extension of citizenship rights had gone hand in hand with the cultural homogenization of provinces, either through cultural assimilation of ethnically heterogeneous peoples or direct exclusion of the elements of difference.³⁰

As a result, citizenship and national identity became subsumed into one distinct status inherent to rather than acquired and became almost self-evident. Throughout the 19th century, the equation between the political community and the cultural community, indeed the culture of the dominant ethnic group undermined the public, open and shared character of citizenship.³¹ This is the general pattern; however, the politics of citizenship in Europe has been complicated by the duality of the concept of nation, the ethnic and the territorial models.³² In both models, national identity –whether as a civic or

²⁷Alfonso Alfonsi, "Citizenship and National Identity: The Emerging Strings in Western Europe" in *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*, T.K. Oomen (ed.), New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1997, p. 53.

²⁸Verena Stolcke, "The Nature of Nationality" in *Citizenship and Exclusion*, Veit Bader (ed), London, Mac Millan Press, 1997, p.63.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, London, Longman, 1990, p.185.

³¹Ibid., pp. 58-62.

³²Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 99.

ethnic identity- has a central place in the politics of citizenship. Why is it so?

According to Schnapper, the point is that it is by means of national citizenship that the modern state could create an egalitarian membership transcending particular identifications and loyalties as the basis of legitimacy for its internal and external actions.³³ It has been the main instrument of the state elite to create a sense of unique consciousness and the conditions of popular participation from which the central political authority has taken its power. The ruling elite rest on such a genuine and unified social base in its search for centralization against the threats of external intervention and of internal disintegration. In other words, the institution of citizenship emerges as the perfect combination of political and cultural elements on which the legitimacy of the modern nation-state is rested.³⁴ In this respect, the national idea can be thought as unique in the history of humanity since it integrates populations into a community of citizens whose existence legitimates the actions of the state both in the domestic and international fields.³⁵ Nations not just by their existence but as the community of citizens become the source of legitimacy.

Accordingly, the modern nation-state has to reproduce and sustain a homogenous, national citizenship through various "political projects" by which the abstract community of citizens becomes a concrete reality capable of mobilizing populations. In other words, since national identity and citizenship constitute a symbiosis in legitimating the peculiar values, mores, laws and actions of the state, the creation of a homogenous (national) political community with which it would identify itself has been a vital project. The success of the state elite in reproducing its national citizenry as the basis of legitimacy depends on its success especially in internal national closure. How the process of internal closure operates to maintain the cultural boundaries of a particular citizenship identity within a delimited territory?

³³Dominique Schnapper, *Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1998, p. 35.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid. p. 24.

The process on internal closure operates through two interrelated phases within the context of the modern nation-state: First, the state has to eradicate different ethnic, religious and other sectional loyalties –mostly in violent ways- in the existing political community. Secondly, it should maintain standardization through education, industrialization and military formation. The eradication of sectional loyalties is mostly achieved through the political projects of socialization to the national identity. As Tilly points out, the historically peculiar character of the modern state is that, it has an enhanced capacity of administration to discipline the “community inside” in various ways i.e., imposing common languages, religions, currencies and legal systems as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transformation and communication.³⁶ The use of national symbols, socialization through the education system, and the establishment of the political institutions seem to represent all sections of the society like competitive elections, compulsory military duty, national economy and concerning the subject of this paper a particular national security conception are the main instruments of the disciplining state authority.

“National” Security drawing the Boundaries of “National” Identity

The above analysis clarified that historically, the fusion between national belonging and political membership under “national citizenship” brought the subordination of particularity to universality within the modern nation state. Modern citizenship is rested on an idea of egalitarian-universal membership transcending particular loyalties which was historically created through various strategies of colonialism, nationalism and even racism.³⁷

At this point, the importance of this analysis for the objective of this study can be delineated as follows: Both at the discursive and political levels, in securing the boundaries of the domestic identity, the modern nation state rests –among other instruments- on a

³⁶Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* , Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 100.

³⁷Schnapper, *Community*, p. 27.

particular “conception of national security” and a certain “representation of threat” coming from inside as well as outside. In return, national security understanding frames the domestic society - in whose name they operate- through its claim to know the source of threats to domestic society and to the citizen.³⁸ In this way the construction and constitution of the non-citizen, the foreigner, the other, the anarchic and the dangerous are made possible by practices that also constitute the member, the domestic, and make the state the sole security provider. What is the relationship between the national security conception and the discourse of threat in the reproduction of the citizenship as a state identity?

As Walker states properly, the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community.³⁹ In modern times, since the primary form of political community is the modern state, the concept of security refers particularly the security of the modern state. The question “Who should be secured in what respect?” is answered from a state-centred point of view. The state as the only authority having the legitimate monopoly of violence in a particular territory draws the boundaries of the community to be secured via its definition of what –or who- the threat is. The statist conception of security reflects and reproduces deeply entrenched assumptions about political action and identity.⁴⁰

Therefore, the state’s position as the ultimate standard of security historically makes the state-bounded political community that is the national citizenry, the only legitimate political community to be secured. The point is that, given the identification between national identity and citizenship, the security of a particular citizenry is defined in terms the sustainability of traditional-hegemonic patterns of national culture, language, religion, some other national characteristics, and a system of values, and political traditions. National security conception is defined tightly knit to the security of

³⁸R. B.J. Walker, “Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics”, *Alternatives*, Vol. XV 1990, p.5.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid. pp. 5-6.

each of these components.⁴¹ Therefore, a matter of language or culture may easily be interpreted as a threat against national security.

In this way, a particular national security conception has identity-producing and sustaining effects. It prioritizes a particular cultural (national) and political identity to be secured from the external threats.⁴² In a more general sense, the feeling of threat and the need for security are the main factors in the construction and development of any communal identity. The production and articulation of danger or feeling of insecurity become a precondition for a state to exist. Threats are not the factors that weaken the state; on the contrary, they constitute its reason of existence.⁴³

Therefore, security policy and the articulation of danger turn to a performative political discourse through which the inscription of the boundaries of "normal" politics and the disciplining of a national identity becomes possible.⁴⁴ National security conception and the policies become the tools to integrate the resistant elements to a coherent, definite identity on the inside. As Walker states, in effect, all differences, discontinuities and conflicts are converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society understood as an identity and a domain of anarchy.⁴⁵ (It is through national security practices and policies) "Boundaries are constructed, spaces are demarcated, standards of legitimacy are incorporated, interpretations of history are privileged and alternatives are marginalized".⁴⁶

Concerning the maintenance of the fusion between national identity and citizenship through national security policy, the point is that national closure is not momentary but necessitates "continuous

⁴¹Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, pp. 89-90.

⁴²David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 69.

⁴³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁴R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 151-152.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Campbell, *Writing Security*. pp.72-75.

actions of common institutions” and their established forms of practices by which the state generate a particular citizenship identity.⁴⁷ On the other hand, “national security” as the site of practices is a collection of “stylized repetitive acts of the state” par excellence which frame and sustain a particular identity inside in a continuous manner. As a political practice, it has been granted a privileged position and is counted as representing the whole community. Therefore, it is an instrument which sustains and strengthens an internal process of communication and integration. It contributes to the socialization of the citizens as nationals in the framework of national solidarity. National security policies are carried out by the state elite with an overwhelmingly nationalist language and symbolism all are performed repetitively in the name of a national identity.⁴⁸ National security documents and measures always invoke three main elements whose indivisibility is sine qua non for the national existence: territory, history and community. In this way, they obscure ethnic, class, gender, religious differences within the national population and justify the eradication of intermediate bodies, loyalties and local differences for the interests of the “national” community as a whole. Campaigns against enemies or against external threats of all kinds are as functional as road building, history writing, and public education in generating integrated national societies in modern times.⁴⁹

As a consequence, it should be stated clearly that, national security measures and the national security discourse as a whole strengthen the “nationality” element within a particular citizenship identity. As stated before, modern national citizenship was born with an uneasy tension between the voluntary notion of universal membership and an inherited notion of genealogical belonging of a shared history. This tension can only be solved if a cosmopolitan understanding of human rights can be given priority over an ethnocentric notion of membership and community. National security policies and the discourse, on the contrary, rest on and reinforce an understanding which is exclusively about the protection of the

⁴⁷Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*, p. 39.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p.76.

⁴⁹Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997, p.79.

hegemonic notion of national belonging. The security of a national identity means security of the hegemonic culture, language, heritage, and all other characteristics of the dominant, supposedly homogenous entity. In this sense, national security prioritizes the security of the dominant ethnic-national community and contributes to the development legitimization of an exclusionary understanding of political community and membership.

Securitization of Citizenship in the Post-September 11 Context

The above analysis is drawn from the mainstream citizenship literature of the 1990s which brought a critique of citizenship as modernization and delineated the problems of modern citizenship having roots directly in the modernity of the concept. Based on these analyses, citizenship debates of the 1990s resulted in a specific policy prescription that modern citizenship should be reformulated as to create a new common allegiance in the society. This new bond should genuinely guarantee the rights and freedom of "others" and to accommodate social and cultural plurality, minority problems, religious differentiation and linguistic demands.

A decade after these discussions, the term which marks the citizenship debate of the 2000s is "citizenship gap" which refers in the same way the incapacity of modern citizenship in terms of accounting social and cultural plurality, the non-existence and/ or inequalities in the application of citizenship rights.⁵⁰ The events of September 11 have been followed by the introduction of "securitization of citizenship" to the existing debate. The period after this date has been defined as a period of extensive securitization of citizenship parallel to the extensive securitization of public life in all over the world but especially in the developed democracies of the Western world.⁵¹

⁵⁰Nyers, "What is Left", p. 203.

⁵¹Ibid., Benjamin Muller, "(Dis)Qualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and Identity Management", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 8(3), September 2004, pp. 279-294; Juliet Lodge, "EU Homeland Security: Citizens or Suspects?", *European Integration*, Vol. 26(3), September 2004, pp. 253-279.

What is the meaning of securitization of citizenship? Basically it means the rising perception and consciousness especially in the Western liberal democracies that citizenship or the question of who is and who is not capable of being a proper member and the political agent in a given political community is in fact a matter of security for that political community. In other words, membership through citizenship is internal to the security of that political community. This consciousness has gone hand in hand with what is called as the "securitization of the inside" which means the perception of immigrants, refugees and foreigners as social threats directed against the existing socio-political order and citizenship identity.⁵²

The xenophobic attitudes towards the outsiders have been evident in Western societies well before the September 11. However, as most of the studies underlie, it is the events of September 11 that has revealed a dramatic increase in the use of a discourse of threat and insecurity in the politics of citizenship. Worldwide media discourse and national policies have been increasingly relied on a conception of migrant as a social threat at best, as the criminal at worst. On the whole the acts of security have been decided and applied with a restrictive understanding of membership and political subject in most of the Western democracies.⁵³

The point is that, the events of September 11 have provided the basis to a well known modern dilemma to become surfaced once again: One of the bases of legitimacy of the modern state has been/is its promise to provide security of its citizens against internal and external threats. In the domestic field, security means freedom from arbitrary treatment and the maintenance of a secure environment enabling the citizens to use all kinds of rights and freedoms. The state is also responsible from the security of its citizens against external threats like military offenses, terrorist attacks, and foreign occupation. Here, the origin of the dilemma is that, the state can only maintain the monopoly of being the legitimate security provider by keeping the feeling of being threatened alive on the part of its citizens. It is in a position to rely on fear, discontent, unease and anxiety. This is exactly what has happened in the Western world after

⁵²Muller, "(Dis) Qualified", p. 282.

⁵³Lodge, "EU Homeland", p. 260.

the events. As a well-known fact, the measures that are taken in the name of security in these countries, have reinforced and fostered apprehension and fed nervousness in public life which in turn facilitated the strengthening of the state against the civil society and the individual. The post-September 11 context has been marked, as Peter Nyers has noted, by the emergence of "neurotic citizen" who is in chronic discontent and in search of absolute security.⁵⁴ Under these conditions the anti-terror legislations which had overt discriminatory elements in most of the European states did not face with widespread public opposition. On the contrary, they have found a receptive audience in European societies.

On the whole, it can be argued that September 11 brought extensive securitization in every field of contemporary political life, but its effects on the politics of citizenship and the politics of inclusion and exclusion have been decisive. It has by itself created the conditions for an intensive securitization of the inside which directly refers to the intensification of the conventional, restricted citizenship practices. The back to conventional, restrictive citizenship practices should be thought as a back to the national security state which prioritizes not only the security of citizens but also in the context of intensified internal securitization, the security of the proper citizens who are of the hegemonic cultural origin. To put more precisely, as some authors are perfectly stated, after September 11, governments are increasingly obsessed with the restriction of specific rights and entitlements only to the proper citizens who need and deserve to be secured. Especially the introduction of biometric technologies like digitalized fingerprints, retinal scans, facial recognition, voice scans etc has visualized securitization and brought surveillance society to the surface.⁵⁵ What is remarkable in the usage of biometrics is that these new techniques work to authenticate, to verify identity and at the final analysis ties rights and entitlements to that identity. What is not new in this practice is that as an advanced form of monitoring, it is under the service of the politics of inclusion and exclusion which is still operating within an ethnic and racial framework. All these new practices of security reaffirms state's role in monopolizing protection of security and identity.

⁵⁴Nyers, "What is Left", p. 206.

⁵⁵Muller, (Dis)Qualified", p. 285.

Consequently, the national security conception and practices of the modern state seems to persist as the most important impediment on the way to reconstruct an egalitarian political membership in contemporary societies. Especially in the post-September 11 world, the question of "Whose security?" is still being answered in a culturalist manner with a claim to know the threat as the non-citizen, the citizen of a different orientation, the outsider and the marginal. The identification between cultural belonging and proper (if not legal) political membership seems to be maintained through the securitization of citizenship in all over the world but especially in democracies of the Western world.