

ZIONIST PLANS AND CYPRUS

(1896-1948)

Şükrü S. GÜREL

Although other schemes were also formulated and pressed for, Zionist plans for settlement had from the start mainly concentrated on Palestine. Zionist colonization plans involving territories in America and Africa are widely known,¹ but these were regarded as temporary solutions “until Turkey is dissolved” and Palestine is made available for Jewish colonization.² Cyprus, owing to its geographical location, has been either directly or indirectly involved within Zionist schemes concerning Palestine. With this article, it is aimed at raising this point, mainly depending on British documents.³

First Zionist Contemplations Concerning Cyprus (1896-1903)

Theodor Herzl, who was elected President of the Zionist organization in 1897, was “by June 1896 thinking of ‘acquiring’ Cyprus in order to offer it to Turkey, with additional payment, as a trade for Palestine.”⁴ Soon other Zionists were also interested in Cyprus. First thoughts of “acquiring Cyprus” from Britain and offering it to Turkey in exchange of Palestine⁵ later

¹ Robert John and Sami Hadawi, *The Palestine Diary*, Vol. I (1914-1945), The Palestine Research Center, Beirut, 1970, p. 11.

² Raphael Patai (Ed.), *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Vol. II (tr. Harry Zohn), Herzl Press and Thomass Yosseloff, New York, London, 1960, p. 644, cited in H.D. Purcell, *Cyprus*, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1969, p. 210.

³ Colonial Office correspondence regarding Cyprus (CO 67), Public Record Office, London.

⁴ Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁵ Jews were subjected to an Ottoman ordinance that they might visit Palestine on pilgrimage, but were prohibited from acquiring the ownership of land or taking up permanent residence. In 1885, Abdul

were replaced by settlement schemes directly involving Cyprus itself.

To Zionist minds, if Cyprus could be colonized by Jewish people, it could constitute a firm base, a vantage-point which could in future enable them to achieve their ultimate goal, i.e. colonization of Palestine. A proposal put forward in January 1901 that England should exchange Cyprus for German East Africa led Zionist leader Herzl to speculate: "Germany would then have to welcome a Jewish settlement in Cyprus with delight. We should rally on Cyprus and one day go over to Eretz Israel and take it by force..."⁶

Zionist plans for settlement had, from the summer of 1902 began to evolve around territories close to Palestine, including Cyprus. In July 1902, Herzl, for several times, discussed with Lord Rothschild, a devoted supporter of Zionist schemes, for Jewish settlement plans involving the Sinai Peninsula, Egyptian Palestine (El Arish), and Cyprus.⁷ On 23 October 1903 Herzl had a chance to meet Britain's Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and put the same plan to him. Colonial Secretary's reply was of no encouragement to the Zionist plan, since "the proposed mainland settlements were a matter for the Foreign Office, and, as regards Cyprus, Greeks and Moslems already lived there and the British government had a duty to stand by them." Besides, according to Chamberlain, "there would be real difficulties if the Cypriote Greeks resisted with the support of Greece and Russia." However, the Colonial Secretary was ad-

Hamid II had issued an edict against aliens holding or acquiring real estate in Palestine, and against the creation there of any further Jewish colonies. See: John and Hadawi, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Island of Cyprus, which had been Turkish territory since 1571, was transferred to British rule under the conditions stated in the Convention of 1878. The adamant attitude of Ottoman administration in preventing Jewish colonization in Palestine left only one option to the Zionists: Trading some other territory in exchange. This territory could be Cyprus, they began to contemplate, since Ottomans were not happy in handing it to the British in the first place. See also: Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 211. Besides, 1878 Convention had been harshly criticized in British political circles and uselessness of Cyprus as a military base had been widely propagated.

⁶ Patai (Ed.), *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1023, from Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

⁷ Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

ding, if Herzl "could show him a spot in the English possession where there were no white people as yet", they could talk about it. Also, Chamberlain was not hiding his fear of public opinion and said that "in our country everything is out in open, and if Cyprus were discussed in this way a storm will break out immediately".⁸ Although Herzl proposed to start a campaign and "have a current created in our favour in Cyprus", Chamberlain could only give his blessing to the Sinai settlement part of the plan, which was soon to be dropped, owing to lack of water in the area.⁹ So, although Herzl thought that "the Moslems will move away, the Greeks will gladly sell their lands at a good price and emigrate to Athens or Crete",¹⁰ these initial settlement plans for Cyprus had failed.

Zionist Plans Concerning Cyprus Following World War I

When Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on Germany's side, England put aside the 1878 Convention and annexed Cyprus. During the war, desperate in the Balkans, England and her allies tried to induce Balkan states, including Greece to take side with them. British government first promised Greece "important concessions on the coasts of Asia Minor" after the war. Then came the Cyprus offer. On October 16, 1915, British government offered Cyprus to Greece if she entered the war on Britain's side. Greece refused. But this refusal had come from the King of Greece and his cabinet. Venizelos, who was restored to power by the Allies, was ready to receive any territorial bribe. Thus, after the war, Venizelos, while engaging in an adventure in Turkey with Britain's firm support, at the same time, silently awaited the day the "generous British Empire" would hand Cyprus over to Greece just as it did the Ionian Islands (and Anatolia)! This was supported by loud Greek Cypriot propoganda for "enosis".

⁸ Up to that date, in addition to, and in a way in collaboration with, the propoganda (stated above in fn. 5) against the value of Cyprus to Great Britain, "union with Greece" propogandists were active and could acquire substantial support among British politicians. So, Chamberlain can be understood in his fear that if the subject of Cyprus is raised, it would bring in the storm awaiting.

⁹ Patai (Ed.), *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 1361, from Purcell, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

¹⁰ *Idem.*

At the end of the War, the Ottoman Empire had completed its life span, and it was the time to "solve" the Eastern question for once and all... Almost all of Turkey was put under Allied occupation and Western Anatolia was opened for Greek atrocities. All parties interested in the partition of the Ottoman Empire were active during the months following the end of the war. Zionists had already received promises especially from their British friends. In this atmosphere, Zionist and Greek claims inevitably clashed over Cyprus. But the British, while "generously" distributing "rights" over other war spoils, were not willing to give up Cyprus to either of these claimants.

On July 11, 1919, British representative in Prague, Mr. Cecil Gosling sent to Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary, a new Zionist settlement plan concerning Cyprus.¹¹ This document reads:

"I have the honour to enclose herewith a paper which has been addressed to me by Mr. David Treitsch, a prominent Jewish Zionist, who makes proposals regarding the Jewish colonization of Cyprus, and the frontiers of Palestine... should include Saida... Since my arrival in Prague, I have been in touch with the Jews resident here..."

Attached to the message of Gosling is the paper submitted by David Treitsch, the "prominent Jewish Zionist":

"... I should regard it as an unnecessary sacrifice on the part of Great Britain and as a great misfortune for Jewish colonization in Cyprus (as part of a Greater Palestine) if the country should go to Greece."

Mr. Treitsch, then goes on to support his view that "there is room for Jewish people in Cyprus" by stating that the present population of the island is only 300,000, while, before the Turkish conquest it used to be one or two million. Then, he goes on to reveal the details of his plan:

"If...by means of Jewish immigration and colonization the country could soon be made to flourish again it would become a most valuable possession, and by the same course the Jewish and the Moslem populations combined could in a short time

¹¹ CO 67/194, FO to CO, 21 July 1919, No. 102514/M.E. 44, Cecil Gosling to Curzon, Prague, July 11, 1919, No. 100.

outnumber the so-called Greeks and bring the anti-British propaganda to a stand-still. The accelerated development...would...benefit materially the whole of the population...so that all other considerations may soon disappear.

"Since the British declaration of November 2nd, 1917¹² the greater part of a Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe is destined to go to Palestine. But Palestine, after all, is a small country and will only with great difficulties be made to shelter and nourish the millions who must (or at least who ought to) leave their previous abodes...Palestine proper is by far too small to receive that large part of the Jewish race... so we must try to establish... for those fugitives some sort of a 'Greater Palestine'.

"In 1895 I came across the Cyprus problem... and since then I began to study these questions and to advocate Jewish immigration and colonization in Cyprus (as well as in El Arish in the North of the Sinai Peninsula).

"...Jewish immigration into the countries adjacent Palestine (Cyprus, El Arish, Rhodes) ought to be furthered by all means."

This "prominent Jewish Zionist" was raising several points to support his plan:

1 — Palestine was too small for the "Jewish race", therefore Jewish immigration to areas adjacent Palestine must also be provided, thus a "Greater Palestine" (including, Cyprus, Rhodes and El Arish) plan must be put into action.

2 — If Jewish colonization in Cyprus was permitted, the island would soon "flourish" again and material wealth would help "all other considerations" including "enosis" disappear. Besides, Jewish immigrants, when combined with Moslems (of course the consent of the Moslem population was out of question here) would outnumber the Greeks who were creating the "Cyprus problem".

The reaction of the British administration (or at least of the Colonial Office) to this plan is reflected by one sentence put on the file by one of the undersecretaries:¹³

"There is no room for Jews in Cyprus and if they came they would get a 'warm' reception. Putley (signed) 23/7".

¹² The "Balfour Declaration".

¹³ CO 67/194, *idem*. The file is numbered CO 42553.

Here, Undersecretary Putley's prophetic and ironic remark that "if the Jews came they would get a 'warm' reception in Cyprus" is interesting to note. It is not easy to guess whether his belief in this direction was generated from recent experience¹⁴ or not, but one can find substantial material in the history of Cyprus to support Putley's view.¹⁵

Jewish Migration to Cyprus Before the Second World War

The rise of fascism and nazizm in Italy and Germany, and overriding tendencies similar to these in other autocratic regimes in central and eastern Europe during 1930's, had led Jews living in these areas to seek sanctuaries elsewhere. A document dated October 1938, shows that Cyprus had been subject to Jewish —legal and illegal— migration during this period. This document also reveals that Jewish migration had culminated in the rise of anti-semitic feelings and certain uneasiness among the population of Cyprus. The Governor of Cyprus, on 17 October 1938, wrote:¹⁶

"... So long as we pursue our present policy I do not think that there will be serious trouble for it is well understood that Government is not going to permit anything in the nature of settlement by Jews or a competition of Jewish labour with Cypriote labour, but if we depart from our present policy materially, the only result will be so far as I can see, to extend the Palestine problem to Cyprus as well. All this is

¹⁴ During the War a number of refugees from Palestine, British subject residents in the area and Jews, had found shelter in Cyprus. See: CO 67/182, FO to CO, June 16, 1916, No. 84194; and CO to FO, May 3, 1916, No. 19373.

¹⁵ See, for example, Philip Newman, *A Short History of Cyprus*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, Toronto, (Sec. Ed.), 1953, pp. 62-63: "... in A.D. 115 the Jews of Cyprus rose in insurrection... For two years the Jews committed such excesses in Cyprus that Salamis was partly destroyed and nearly a quarter of a million Cypriots were killed... in A.D. 117 the rebellion was crushed. By a decree of the Senate all Jews were expelled from the island. So rigidly was this law enforced that for several centuries, any Jew found in Cyprus, even though shipwrecked on the island, was instantly put to death."

¹⁶ CO 67/282/2, Palmer to Acheson, Government House, Cyprus, Monday, 17th October 1938.

quite apart from the economic arguments against the admission of any refugees as a class to Cyprus...

"Such things as a demand for 'Hebrew' schools; the project of forming in Cyprus a 'Jewish Association'; malicious damage to fruit trees at Limassol because Jewish labour was employed on a plantation - show how easily and quickly a Jewish 'problem' would arise here if we depart from our present policy.

"I have no doubt that if we encourage Jewish migration to Cyprus - a situation analogous to that of Palestine will very soon develop."

If we look at the developments before the above mentioned letter was written by the Governor of Cyprus, we can easily grasp why he insisted that "the present Government policy should not be changed" and Jewish migration to Cyprus must not be let to become a systematic and wide practice. Starting from the summer of 1938, pressures from several Jewish leaders from different places were being put on British Government to allow big numbers of Jewish people into Cyprus. British Government, or in this case the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in turn begun to put pressure on the Governor of Cyprus, in the same direction.

In June, July and August 1938, "The Council for German Jewry", Dr. Max Ermers (representing Austrian Jews) and Fran Luzzato (representing Jewish people in Italy), have all petitioned British Government to permit them to go on with their plans for settlement in Cyprus.¹⁷ British Government, especially the Colonial Office seriously considered these proposals.¹⁸ At the end of September, Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, wrote to Governor Palmer, who was not in favor of the proposed schemes up to that date, to reconsider his view.¹⁹ But Governor Palmer would not change his attitude in this case, and he replied on the 4th and 14th of October

¹⁷ CO 67/230/14, Bentwitch to Ronald, London, 23 July 1938; Dr. Max Ermers' scheme for "cooperative settlement in Cyprus - for 1,000 Austrian emigrants," Vienna, 14 June 1938; Fran Luzzato to Mundy Schwalb, Milan, August 1938 and Schwalb to Wedgwood, London, 31st Aug. 1938.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, Gerald Creasy (Private Secretary of the Secretary of State for the Colonies) to colonel Wedgwood, London, 7 September 1938.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Malcolm MacDonald to Palmer, Downing St., 29 September 1938.

that, "we cannot in justice to the people of this island, encourage the emigration of aliens whoever they may be, to supplant them in their own country..." and "in Cyprus there is no room for such settlers."²⁰

Another plan of settlement involving Cyprus, dates back to the end of 1937. Reverend N. Levison, representing the "**International Hebrew Christian Alliance**", visiting Undersecretary A.R. Thomas in the Colonial Office on 3 December, proposed a scheme to open Cyprus to "selected Christian refugees of non-Aryan Origin". Undersecretary's reply was that this could only be allowed if every such family could invest £1000 and buy land.²¹ Levison, later in July 1938, repeated his proposal to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and when he received a reply to the effect that the British Government would rather receive a delegation than continuing written communication, he informed the Colonial Office that a representative from Berlin, Dr. Ruheman is on his way to Cyprus.²² At this point Governor of Cyprus intervened and demanded that this delegation should be stopped.²³ But, Dr. Ruheman soon arrived at Cyprus, and failing to find available land to buy, he left for Syria.²⁴

As we learn from the Governor of Cyprus, at this time, antisemitic feelings were running high in Cyprus, where there were about 2,500 Jewish immigrants by the end of 1938.²⁵ This number is soon to increase during the war, due to new developments.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Palmer to Wedgwood, Govnt. House, Cyprus, 4th October 1938 and Palmer to MacDonald, 14th October 1938.

²¹ CO 67/292/2, A.R. Thomas (minute), 3/12/'37.

²² *Ibid.*, Levison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, "Shalom", Ramsgate, 28 July 1938; Acheson to Levison, Downing St., 7 September 1938; Levison to Acheson, London, 30th November 1938.

²³ CO 67/292/2, Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State (Telg.), 4 Dec. 1938 (Immediate).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Gov. of Cyprus to Sect. of State, 19 Dec. 1938, No. 134 (Confidential) .

²⁵ In his telegram dated 4 December 1938 (See fn. 23), Palmer stated that there are 2,500 Jews in Cyprus already and local feeling is against them.

A Detailed Zionist Scheme for Cyprus - 1939

The most radical, ambitious and detailed scheme for Jewish settlement in Cyprus is the one submitted to the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and, Malcolm Macdonald, Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill on 11 March 1939 by three Jewish leaders.²⁶ This plan, titled "**A Solution to the Jewish Problem**", proposed "entire evacuation of the present population of Cyprus, which could be settled in the district of Selonika," and Jews living in Selonika were to be transferred to Cyprus. Thus, room would be opened for Jewish settlement in Cyprus. It was added that all transfer costs would be paid by "Jewish sources". The details of the plan were:

"The Jews of Selonika would form the nucleus of a new, entirely Jewish population in Cyprus. This island would support over a million Jews, and the population would grow through natural migration of Jews from all countries, especially those where persecution is prevalent."

To support the plan, the following points were raised:

- (1) By transferring the Greek population in Cyprus to Greece, these people who wished to be united with Greece would be made happy. "The experience of the Greeks in the accomodation of their distressed people from Asia Minor would facilitate the handling of the problem."
- (2) Britain would gain the friendship of a loyal population at a strategic location.
- (3) "Palestinian problem would be rapidly solved, as the Arabs would no longer be subject to pressure of Jews desiring to enter and reside in Palestine".
- (4) "The Jews would have a country of their own, bounded by the sea, protected by the British Navy, and at the same time would be living in very close proximity to their cultural centre (Jerusalem) and their young people would have access

²⁶ CO 67/302/9, Edward E. Bikington, A.M. Blackman, Alfred Rosskamm, to Prime Minister, Malcolm MacDonald, Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill, "Wyke End", Hoscote Park, West Kirby, Wirrel, Cheshire, 11th March 1939, A Solution to the Jewish Problem.

to the general education facilities of Palestine, and its university."

(5) "The Jewish problem will never be solved by increasing the density of the Jewish element in any other population. A problem similar to that created in Germany is already evident even in this country. A country solely Jewish (except for Naval and Military establishments) is essential to a satisfactory solution."

It is then stated that, Dr. Rosskamm, one of the signatories, would be happy and available to give additional explanation regarding the scheme should it be necessary: "Dr. Rosskamm is a Jewish refugee from Germany - resident in England for the past six years. He has travelled widely, and is familiar with the Jewish outlook in many parts of the world..."

This new scheme differed in an important aspect from the previous ones: While other, earlier plans looked at Cyprus as an additional settlement area, and regarded Palestine essential, this new scheme proposed **Cyprus instead of Palestine**. Material is not available to indicate how widely this scheme was accepted in Jewish circles. But one of the main motives behind it must have been the evident difficulty Jews were facing in this period in countering the resistance of the Arab majority in Palestine. Thus, in order to persuade Britain to give way in Cyprus, these Jews were offering "solutions" to her on two fronts: This scheme would **solve the Palestine problem** and would **end hostilities in Cyprus** against the British. Formulators of this plan were not forgetting to add that they would be **willing to give Britain certain naval and military facilities on the island**. In turn, they would **seek security under British protective umbrella** in Eastern Mediterranean.

The reaction of the British Government to this proposal was negative. A message from the Prime Minister's Office to the Colonial Office was worded thus: "I have sent an acknowledgement and explained that it would not be possible for the Prime Minister to receive Dr. Rosskamm."²⁷

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Prime Minister's Office to Colonial Office, 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, 13th March 1939.

Jewish "camps" in Cyprus During the Second World War

Beginning from the last months of 1939, Jewish immigration to Cyprus was legalized and systematized. The British, at war with Nazi Germany whose practices at this period against "non-aryan populations", especially the Jews, are well known and infamous even today, must have felt obliged to provide shelter to these oppressed and persecuted people. Two places were thought of as proper British sanctuaries for the Jews: Palestine and Cyprus. Of course, regarding Palestine, the British had already given their word to the Zionist since the well known "**Balfour Declaration**" and this promise was not for a temporary shelter but for a "**Jewish homeland**" in Palestine. But in Cyprus only temporary settlement would be provided, and this scheme eventually turned out to work as a "**springing board**" for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

On the 25th of October 1939, in the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State and the undersecretaries discussed a "suggestion which had been made that Palestine and Cyprus could afford some assistance towards alleviating the problem of the Polish civilian refugees in Rumania."²⁸ The course of the discussion and the decisions reached in the end are as follows:

"... With regard to Cyprus, the Secretary of State said that while there were serious objections to the proposal to admit these refugees to Cyprus even temporarily, he would nevertheless be willing to send a telegram to the Governor, emphasizing the seriousness of the problem, asking whether Cyprus could contribute towards its alleviation by affording temporary shelter to some of the refugees in a camp... The telegram should mention the percentage of the Jews and enquire whether the Governor saw grave economic or political objections to the project. Governor should also be told that no expense, beyond that of the normal services of Government would fall upon the revenues of the Colony..."

During the discussion the following points were raised and agreed upon: 1) At most, 1,000 refugees should be sent to Cyprus; 2) "in order to satisfy local opinion, the Cyprus Government should be furnished with absolute guarantees that

²⁸ CO 67/302/9, "Note of Discussion", Colonial Office, 25th October 1939. Present were the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Francis Humphrys, Sir John Shuchburg, Mr. Downie, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Hibbert, Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Warr (from Foreign Office).

the refugees would in fact be removed elsewhere immediately the war was over, or sooner."

The outcome of this discussion was conveyed to the Governor of Cyprus in a telegram by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "emphasizing the seriousness of the problem", on 2 October 1939. The Governor's reply was affirmative, but he emphasized that this should only be a **limited** and **temporary** scheme.²⁹

But, although the Jewish "camp" scheme contained conditions as to the limitation of number (i.e. not more than 1,000) and duration (till the end of the war or before), facts show us that in practice camps sheltered thousands of refugees and continued even after the war. After the war, the presence of Jewish camps added one more factor of disturbance to the life of the already socially unrest island. But, nonetheless, these "camps" were later to become a part of another "permanent" scheme elsewhere, i.e. Palestine.

After the War: Cyprus - the Zionist "springing board"

Social and economic situation in Cyprus after the war, and the role of the Jewish "camps" is explained by Crawshaw as follows:³⁰

"After the war unrest increased. Military expenditure was curtailed, the island's economic and strategic development had not yet begun. Markets which had readily absorbed Cypriot produce during the war were now entered by competitors. The detention of illegal Jewish immigrants in camps near Famagusta aroused Cypriot fears that the arrangement might be permanent and intended to reduce the Greek proportion of the population. Their presence, the Mayor of Limassol alleged, was responsible for shortages and rising prices..."

After the war, British authorities actually began to transfer the Jewish immigrants "elsewhere", as the temporary settle-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Secretary of State's, 2nd November 1939, No. 248 (Secret), and the Governor's, 16th November 1939, No. 226 (Secret).

³⁰ Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt. An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978, p. 33. See also: George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946. The Middle East 1945-1950*, Oxford University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954, p. 169.

ment scheme of October-November 1939 had proposed. But this "elsewhere" happened to be Palestine, and not only those who were present already in the camps were transferred, but also those camps were used as terminals on the way to Palestine. Jewish people arrived in Cyprus from other places, and were transferred to Palestine in thousands. This practice continued even after the British Government's decision to give "independence" to Palestine was announced as the "Bevin Scheme" on 7 February 1947.³¹

Governor's Reports for the year 1947³² clearly show that Cyprus was systematically used as a Jewish "springing board" to colonize Palestine. Governor's Reports for March to September 1947 indicate that, during that period constant number of Jews present in camps of Cyprus were 15 to 16 thousand, and thousands were sent to Palestine continuously.³³ October Report stated that, number of Jewish people in the said camps on October 30 was 17,540; "4,000 new arrivals came in during the month and 1,200 were transhipped as legal immigrants".³⁴ Governor's Report for December indicated that with 16,755 new arrivals during the month, the number of refugees in the camps rose to 31,081, and that the "transshipment" to Palestine was accelerated.³⁵

Under the light of the above stated data, it is appropriate to state that, although the efforts of the Zionists since 1896 to colonize Cyprus in addition to or instead of Palestine failed, they, nevertheless, after the Second World War, succeeded in using Cyprus as a "springing board" in the process of increasing the Jewish population in Palestine against the wishes of the Arab and Moslem majority. This fact, among others, is evidence to prove Britain's role in the emergence of the Middle East conflict in the post-War period.

³¹ See: John and Hadawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 117ff.

³² CO 67/341/7, Governor's Reports.

³³ *Ibid.*, March, April, May, June, July, August, September Reports

³⁴ *Ibid.*, October Report.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, December Report.