

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS DECISION-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM CHANGED SINCE THE ENDING OF THE COLD WAR?*

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1. Introduction:

The aim of this study is to examine whether or not the end of the Cold War has made any significant difference to UN decision-making. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the question of the UN's place in the international order was raised by many academicians. One prevailing view was that the division of the world into East and West during the Cold War had prevented the UN from fulfilling its mission. However with the end of the Cold War, it was argued, the UN could fulfil the aims that its founders had intended. According to this view, the UN finally had the opportunity to perform its task better. This prevailing view in international relations will be challenged by this study, and it will be argued that the UN's role has not changed as dramatically since the end of the Cold War as the proponents of this view suggest.

The proponents of the view which claimed a new role for the UN after the Cold War based their argument on the notion of a 'New World Order'. Therefore in order to consider the effect of the end of the Cold War on the UN system, notion of a New World Order needs to be explored. Major events such as the Gorbachev reforms, transformation in the USSR and in the Central and Eastern European states and the Desert Storm War were seen as heralding the New World Order. The proponents of a New World Order

*This is a revised version of an M.A. Thesis under the same title, presented to the International Relations Department of the University of Sussex, UK, September 1996.

described it as the promotion of democratic practices and free market economics, collective resistance to aggression, cooperation by the major powers in the containment and the resolution of conflict under the UN umbrella by using its institutional processes and the upholding of universal values.¹ The New World Order is maintained through the cooperation of major world powers and is not a new concept. It was in fact embedded in the UN Charter and still remains as the prevailing view. The New World Order concept retains the old description of security as a 'great power directorate' but claims that there has been change as it has included disarmament, arms control, terrorism, migration, drug traffic and other issues to the conception of security.

This paper will approach the traditional view to the UN, the Realist one, critically. Realist and Neorealist theories dominate UN decision-making. This domination is seen both in the actual substantive UN decision-making and in the literature that analyses UN decision-making. During the Cold War, the UN was based on the Realist assumption that sovereign states, mainly the superpowers, were the principal actors in international politics. This Realist view considered the UN as a reflection of inter-state relations. The UN was controlled by what the member states, mainly the superpowers, asserted. This prevalent theory considered the superpowers' interests as the major determinant of their policies towards the UN: when the UN served that interest, the UN was allowed to go forward, when it did not, its evolution was hindered.

Looking at the UN Charter it can be concluded that the founders of the UN visualised an essentially static world system in which international peace and security implied the maintenance of a particular status quo and in terms of which the Security Council would decide who was an aggressor. The major concept developed to cover this arrangement was that of collective security, embodied in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Charter also incorporated what should happen if the major powers did not agree. The proponents of the view who claim that the UN can now play a prominent role in world politics, unlike the relatively ineffectual role it played during the Cold War, need to reassess their notion of the UN's primary tasks and consider that UN decision-making is still dominated by the Realist view which was present when the UN was constituted. The ending of the Cold War has not shifted the Realist perspective either in the actual substantive decision-making of the UN or in the literature that analyses UN decision-making. The international society is regarded as anarchical by the orthodox

¹G. Evans, 'The New World Order and the United Nations' in M. R. Bustello and P. Alston eds., *Whose New World Order?* Sydney, The Federation Press, 1991, pp. 2-3.

theories. Power in terms of military and economic capabilities is still seen as the most important force in the decision-making of the UN.

Consequently, in Realist tradition, the UN and other international organisations are not considered as autonomous actors in international politics. They are not equipped with powers capable of putting into effect collective purposes or using resources for these purposes. In Realist paradigm, as Cox critically states, international organisations:

...remain mechanisms for putting into effect, or merely for publicly endorsing, purposes that have been arrived at and are given effect by those states that dispose of the resources necessary for attaining them. International institutions are a public ritual designed to legitimate privately determined measures...²

Besides this Realist perspective, the relationship between the UN and individual countries has been described as more complex than simply state power relativities. Neorealist theory envisions the relation between the UN and member states as a system in which neither the UN nor the member states can neglect what the other offers. However, Neorealist theory still sees member states' interests as the main influence in the decision-making of the UN system. New theories have been introduced into the discourse on international organisations. One such theory is Liberal Institutionalism or Neoliberalism. This theory introduces the concept of international regimes. However, as will be argued later on, this theory is in fact an extension of Neorealism. All of these prevailing views are reductionist and they do not take into consideration the emergence of a transnational civil society which has been evolving both during and after the end of the Cold War. The development of this society will be explored in this paper. Interestingly, it seems that the end of the Cold War has not affected the policies or the decision-making of the United Nations specialised agencies such as the IBRD, IMF, WTO (formerly GATT), ILO, UNESCO, WHO or FAO. These organisations have played an important role in securing and maintaining the world capitalist economy. The present state of these UN specialised agencies does not show any evidence of change after the end of the Cold War. Liberal global political economic views are predominant in the constitutions, decision-making practices, conditions for membership of the United Nations Organisation and also in the specialised agencies.

When the UN System is being analysed, it is important to take into consideration that the UN agencies are a vital part of the UN and cannot be excluded from the discussion. This is particularly important when one takes into account that politics and economics are not separable. The decision-

²R. W. Cox, 'Multilateralism and World Order', *Review of International Studies*, 18 (1992), p. 167.

consequence of power relations and the way that power is structured is the determinant of the decision-making process. 'The pre-influence stage of decision-making is a mental picture of power relations'.⁵ Therefore one must analyse the structure of existing power relations in order to understand how decision-making processes are constructed, sustained, or changed, if at all. Defining the nature of power is, accordingly, relevant to this inquiry.

Realism

In the Realist paradigm, traditional power relations have been defined within a state-centric sphere. States are of prime importance as they engage in a struggle for power, with the ability to threaten or mobilise militarily. This is the primary assumption of the Realist view. Secondly, Realists hold that these concepts and claims can be explained only through the situation-bound interpretations of the analysts or statesmen and therefore reduce them to the concrete circumstances of time and space.⁶ Thirdly, Realists do not distinguish between subjective and objective aspects of international political life and consider the subjective perceptions of statesmen to be an important factor in decision-making. It is for this reason that their theory fails as it does not consider the international system as an objective social fact to be explained by theory.

Another flaw in the Realist paradigm is the separation of domestic and foreign politics. Realists limit their interest to the domain of political and military relations, that of high politics, and underestimate the importance of social, economic and class relations, that of low politics. This autonomy of political spheres renders the Realist paradigm incapable of explaining political and economic dilemmas. The other conceptual separation in Realism is the separation of politics from economics. This assumption of Realism is 'borrowed from and supported [by] the concept of a "liberal" economic order, that is an order in which economic activity is separated from political activity for the purpose of maximising the common wealth'.⁷ This separation in the orthodox theorising of International Relations can be found in the Realist approach to the UN system, where the UN Organisation (the six main organs: the Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the

⁵R. W. Cox and H. J. Jacobson, 'Decision-Making', *International Social Science Journal*, 29 (1977), p. 115.

⁶R. K. Ashley 'The Poverty of Neorealism' in R. O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 261.

⁷C. N. Murphy and R. Tooze, 'Getting Beyond the "Common-Sense" of the IPE Orthodoxy' in C. N. Murphy and R. Tooze, eds., *The New International Political Economy*, Boulder, Lynsee Rienner Publishers, 1991, p. 3.

Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice) is seen as belonging to the political domain and the UN agencies to the economic, scientific and technical domain.

For the Realist an international organisation cannot, without its own military capabilities at its disposal, act as a constraint upon the existing inter-state system or significantly affect the status quo. It can merely be a beneficial mechanism, by which peaceful minor adjustment in the balance of power are made.⁸

In this context, the Realist approach to the UN asserts that the state has not been displaced by international institutions as the main centre of international system. Decision-making in the UN, accordingly, does not rest upon any intrinsic power within that organisation but it is shaped by those states which make up its voting majorities. The Realist approach describes the UN as an instrument of sovereign states that carry out their policies through the balance of power which is determined by factors external to the UN. It enables them to communicate, collaborate with allies and denounce enemies. Consequently this approach does not give room for international organisations to take autonomous action.

Neorealism

As the Realist theory of International Relations began to be called into question, North American international theorists introduced their approach to International Relations. Theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin, Robert Tucker, George Modelski and Charles Kindleberger are the main proponents of this theory. In the 1980s, Neorealism was regarded as a progressive scientific redemption of Realism. Even though this theory attempts to break from the Realists' offerings, it does not escape its predecessor's subjectivist and empiricist understanding. Neorealism, can only be regarded as a problem solving theory that gave guidelines for foreign policy makers during the Cold War. As Ashley explains Neorealism:

What emerges is a positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance of variety across time and place, subordinates all practice to an interest in control, bows to the ideal of a social power beyond responsibility, and thereby deprives political interaction of those practical capacities

⁸Peter Willetts, 'The United Nations and the Transformation of the Inter-State System' in B. Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones, eds., **Change and the Study of International Relations**, London, Frances Pinter Ltd., 1981, p. 101.

which make social learning and creative change possible. What emerges is an ideology that anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics.⁹

Examining Neorealist theory in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. But Neorealism's commitment to state-centricism is well worth scrutinising. Neorealism offers a state-as-actor model of the world, meaning that one must view the state as an entity capable of having certain objectives or interests and of choosing the means to attain these objectives or defend these interests. The first implication of this state centricism is that, for Neorealists, it is impossible to describe the international structure without invoking the concept of states. For them, 'the state is ontologically prior to the international system'.¹⁰ Secondly, since their framework for international politics does not accord or recognise global collectivist concepts, ideas such as transnational class relations or the interests of humankind are '...granted an objective status only to the extent that they can be interpreted as aggregations of relations and interests having logically and historically prior roots within state-bounded societies'.¹¹

Thus, in Neorealism, like Realism, the individuality of states is taken for granted and is embedded in the definition of sovereignty.¹² The proposition that the state might be essentially problematic or contested is excluded from the Neorealist discourse. Thus, in the Neorealist approach, the UN system is state-bounded as it leads to the emphasising of state interests and bargaining power in the UN system. These interests do not disappear or become submerged when states interact in the UN, they only take different forms, according to Neorealist tradition.

Neoliberal Institutionalism

Another approach which has received much attention is Neoliberal Institutionalism. This approach is a further elaboration of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism which lost ground in the early 1970s. Functionalist and Neofunctionalist theories were introduced and developed by authors such as D. Mitrany, E. B. Haas, and found much ground in the integration process of the European Community. Of course, the entire arguments cannot be developed in a discussion of such a short length. Therefore, the reader is

⁹Ashley, *The Poverty*, p. 258.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 271, (emphasis original).

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹²Individual Neorealists differ in their theoretical commitment to the state centric model of the world. However, the general theoretical discourse of Neorealism is undoubtedly state-centric.

referred to related theories and authors. This approach can be regarded as an extension of Neorealism. Advocates of Neoliberal Institutionalism accept Neorealism's emphasis on state interest, power and anarchy but they include institutions as an integral component of their systemic-level analysis. Without questioning the fundamental principles of Neorealist theory, this approach seeks to explain how the spread of information, rules and norms may change or influence states' opinions and the international order, without affecting the underlying ordering principles. This theory introduces the concept of international regimes. Krasner defines regimes as:

...sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.¹³

Keohane on the other hand defines a regime in stricter terms as 'one form of international institution, one where there is significant convergence among states regarding norms, beliefs, rules, and procedures, but not necessarily a formal organisation'.¹⁴ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in this case can be regarded as an open trade regime that guides international trade.

Neoliberal Institutionalists claim that the emergence and development of institutions will transform the world order as states are brought under the authority of international regimes. The main difference between Neorealist and Neoliberal Institutionalist thinking lies in their conception of international institutions. While Neorealism sees international organisations as 'barely once-removed' from the wishes and capacities of dominant powers,¹⁵ Neoliberal Institutionalism emphasises that the interests of dominant powers shape the creation of rules and institutions but 'once

¹³S. D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables' in S. D. Krasner, ed., **International Regimes**, New York, Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 2.

¹⁴L. Cornett and J. A. Caporaso 'And Still It Moves! State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community', in J.S. Rosenau and E. Czempiel, eds., **Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 232.

¹⁵K. N. Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 88.

formed, the "rules of the game" rarely mirror the pattern of interests and capabilities from which they originated'.¹⁶

Therefore in Neoliberal Institutionalism, institutions are not merely added on to Neorealist theory but are integrated into it, and scholars in this tradition seek to explain how international institutions may change and influence the existing world order. States, accordingly, pursue their interests in an anarchical environment but with one modification: the presence of institutions. They not only constrain and empower states but also shape their interests as they transform the means through which states pursue their goals. Also articulated in the works of Keohane and Nye, this view introduced an approach where actors other than states participate directly in world politics. International institutions are constrained by global production and finance, non-governmental organisations, liberation movements, the media and so on. A central issue in this approach is 'hegemonic stability'. States, as rational actors continue the existing form of cooperation since they are aware of the opportunity costs. 'Complex interdependence' has become such that states continue the existing form of cooperation.

Neoliberal Institutionalism does not fully explain world order, and within it the United Nations system, because it contains exactly the same flaw as the two previously examined theories. Neoliberal Institutionalism, like Realist and Neorealist theories, sees international politics as a result of states that pursue interests as their capabilities allow, in an anarchical environment. By adopting these fundamental concepts of the two previous approaches, Neoliberal Institutionalism does not challenge its predecessors but can only be seen as an extension of them.¹⁷

The Neorealist and Neoliberal Institutionalist approaches to International Relations have extended the already prevailing Realist paradigm. Orthodox theories have marginalised the role of the UN and its agencies 'by constructing them either as passive instruments of inter-state bargaining (particularly of dominant states), or as unproductive domains of idealistic discussion about how the world ought to be' (the case of UNESCO will be discussed later on in this paper).¹⁸ Their approaches are based on 'methodological individualism', that is, assuming that reality exists and can

¹⁶R. O. Keohane in Cornett and Caporaso, *And Still*, p. 233.

¹⁷This is why Keohane or Krasner's work is categorised as Neorealist even though they themselves do not write under the Neorealist label.

¹⁸S. El Kahal and J. MacLean 'The Privatization of UNESCO: A New Form of Politicization Within the Global Political Economy', paper presented at the **Interdisciplinary Conference: The United Nations at the Threshold of a New World Order**, Hofstra Cultural Center, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York, 1995, p. 34.

be fully understood by the behaviour of actors. They fail to realise that social factors impact upon, but do not necessarily derive from, individual actors.¹⁹ They do not explain the role of the UN as a whole in the structures of the global political economy but reduce it to relevant units, the states. By accepting, on a priori grounds, the state as the fundamental unit of analysis, all other social factors are marginalised. The UN system, thus, is reduced to simply the balance of power relations of states. In addition to this, these theories consider the UN in simply observable institutional context. This positivist understanding exists in all the above approaches. Positivism assumes that objective reality exists independent of knowledge and can be derived from value-free facts. It 'denies the possibility that beliefs and values are just as real' as observable facts.²⁰ How we have come to think of the world and the way in which we take things for granted and produce knowledge is actually more crucial. In separating subjective and objective reality and claiming legitimacy from a positivist notion, one does not analyse the non-observable factors, for instance the global structures or unintended consequences.²¹ Such a reductionist conception of the UN in international relations cannot be sustained. This paper seeks to explain that the UN system cannot be constructed as subject to state actions and interests. The UN, in fact, legitimises the hegemony and reproduces it on a larger scale. The way in which this hegemony is established and reproduced by the UN organisation and its agencies will be discussed in the following pages.

3. Un Decision-Making And Change:

The literature on UN decision-making has been mainly devoted to its functioning and voting system and possible ways to improve them. These empirical approaches concentrate on the formal decision-making of the UN, mostly paying attention to the voting system, delegates and missions, caucusing groups, negotiations, resolutions in the Security Council and the General Assembly and also to the Secretariat's role. These studies also consider the informal decision-making of the UN such as side-bets, implicit decisions, controlling the agenda, drafting of compromise resolutions, reforming of coalitions, gathering of votes and so on. This literature mainly searches for answers to questions such as: What were the initial tasks of the UN? What was the structure of decision-making in the UN during the Cold War? How was the structure of the UN affected by bipolarity and the rise of the non-aligned group? How were decisions influenced by governments, different groups and interests in the UN system? How has the end of the Cold War affected the composition of the UN? Will the present policies and decision-making procedure of the UN Security Council be able to encompass

¹⁹Murphy and Tooze, *Getting Beyond*, p. 19.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p.18.

²¹Kahal and MacLean, *The Privatization*, p. 16.

the new security issues? To what extent has the developing countries' influence increased during and after the Cold War? How has the end of the Cold War affected the policies and the decisions of the UN specialised agencies?

Before moving on to discuss this literature, it is crucial to point out that empirical studies are not independent of theory. As J. MacLean points out, empirical conditions are relatively easier to construct because of the immediate availability of suitable data. This instant access to empirical conditions makes them 'seem immediately real, and indeed to constitute reality itself'.²² However, empirical conditions are in fact theory-laden. The theory behind these empirical conditions is embedded implicitly, thus they seem to constitute objective, impartial reality.²³ Hence, the studies that will be discussed below are not independent of theory as they are, in fact, based on Realist assumptions. Realism is embedded in the founding Charters, constitutions, decision-making procedures and membership conditions of the UN Organisation and its agencies. Thus, this empirical literature is not value-free and objective as it claims to be. Since this study refutes Realist approaches to the UN and constructs a different theoretical analysis for understanding decision-making, the literature below will only be discussed and not explained in detail.

For the purpose of this section, it is essential first of all to examine the literature written on UN decision-making and also the literature which claims that there has been a change in the UN decision-making since the ending of the Cold War. It is after this scrutiny that the concept of change can be introduced to the study and discussed.

Literature on The Formal and Informal Decision-Making

Works by S. D. Bailey²⁴ have been mainly devoted to the formal functioning of the UN organs but as he gives historical background to the functioning of these organs, he includes informal functioning in his studies.

²²J. MacLean, 'The Ideology of the End of the Marxism/End of Socialism Thesis: A Critical, Global Perspective' in B. Einhorn et al., *Citizenship and Democratic Control in Contemporary Europe*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Ltd., 1996, p. 192.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁴S. D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations*, revised ed., London, Pall Mall Press, 1964; S. D. Bailey, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975; S. D. Bailey, *The Secretariat of the United Nations*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1964.

Another prominent work of this sort is by Johan Kaufmann.²⁵ As he stresses in the introduction, his book, like its predecessor,²⁶ is highly practical, without any attempt to develop a theoretical framework. He describes and analyses the main procedures and decision-making processes of the three main organs of the UN; the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. He analyses permanent missions, delegations, the resolution-making and voting processes, the use of various tactical moves, the significance of speeches. He also looks at the rise of operational programmes, the increased use of ad hoc global conferences under UN auspices and the role of groups. He lays heavy emphasis on the private and informal nature of UN decision-making. Besides these, David Kay's chapter²⁷ on the instruments of influence in the UN examines the role of missions and delegations, gives an account of causing groups, devoting primary attention to the Afro-Asian group and shows the significance of commissions, committees and subcommittees. He also asserts the role of negotiations as an instrument of influence in the UN.

Peter R. Bachr's study²⁸ on the other hand, focuses on the role of a national delegation, the Dutch one in this case, in the decision-making process of the General Assembly. He analyses the composition of the delegation, relations between delegation and government, informal and formal meetings within the delegation and finally the making of a decision. From this experience, he carries on to examine the interaction between delegates among the Western group.

There are studies that give more historical background to show how the dynamics of the 1940s and the succeeding decades have affected the UN. J. G. Stoessinger's book²⁹ evaluates US, Soviet and Chinese relations and attempts to show how these relationships have been crucial for defining both the limits and the potentials of the UN. R. Ogley's study³⁰ is about the same issue, East-West relations, but is of a different nature. Unlike most

²⁵J. Kaufmann, *United Nations Decision Making*, Alphen, Sijthoff&Noordhoff International Publishers, 1980.

²⁶J. G. Hadwen and J. Kaufmann, *How United Nations Decisions Are Made*, 2nd ed., Leyden, Sythoff, 1962.

²⁷D. A. Kay 'Instruments of Influence in the United Nations Political Process' in D. A. Kay ed., *The United Nations Political System*, New York, John Wiley&Sons Inc., 1967.

²⁸P. R. Bachr, *The Role of a National Delegation in the General Assembly*, New York, Carnegie Endowment, 1970.

²⁹J. G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers*, 4th ed., New York, Random House Inc, 1977.

³⁰R. Ogley, *The United Nations and East West Relations*, University of Sussex, ISIO Monograph, number six, 1972.

other authors, as he studies and evaluates the record of the UN, he bluntly expresses how the UN has not been able to mediate and facilitate cooperation between the two sides because of the Western majority, led by the US, has assumed powers and used them to criticise and mobilise action against communist states. He shows how this discrimination took place and evaluates the East West relations in an unusual way.

H. G. Nicholas' book³¹ has been described as an admirable project in the study of the UN functioning. He examines the origins of the UN, the Covenant of the League of Nations and also the Charter of the UN. The book reflects the author's strong view about the systems and the institutions of the UN (a Realist one), tackles the issue of the decision-making in a historical perspective, looking at the conferences which established the UN, with emphasis on the Dumbarton Oaks, and also on the San Francisco Conferences and examines the Charter's attempts to improve on and avoid the mistakes of the League of Nations system. This book is one of the most prominent books written on the functioning of the UN system and was published many times, each new edition giving insights into how the UN is evolving while its structure remains essentially the same, and placing much emphasis on the prehistory of the UN and the Charter.

R. W. Cox's and H. K. Jacobson's study³² on the decision-making in the UN system, is one of the most prominent studies in this area, written again within the Realist approach. Their study attempts to explain how influence was acquired and exercised in eight of the specialised agencies of the UN: the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Their main objective is to explain the structure and the process of influence in these organs. In order to understand this, they have developed a comparative study of how decisions are made in these eight institutions. They first analysed the types of decisions to determine whether the patterns of influence differed depending on the issues involved. The types of decision they considered were: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational. They observed that decisions in different agencies were of different types. For example, symbolic decisions

³¹H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution*, 5th ed., Oxford University Press, 1975.

³²R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organisation*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1974.

were more common in UNCTAD than in IMF while rule-creating decisions were more frequent in IMF than UNCTAD. They classified individuals who were involved in decision-making in these organisations and they identified that the ones who were most influential were: representatives of national governments; representatives of national and international private associations; the executive heads of the organisations; high officials and other members of the bureaucracy of each organisation. They discovered that representatives of national governments were more influential in symbolic, representational and rule-making decisions whilst the executive heads of these organisations were influential in boundary and programmatic decisions. They sought to determine how personal attributes such as charisma, experience, expertise and negotiating skills played an important role in decision-making. They also sought to explain how groupings, whether formal as in the case of caucusing groups, or informal as in recurrent voting patterns, exerted influence on particular policy orientations. In addition to these, Cox and Jacobson sought to examine the outside of the internal interaction processes in these institutions by widening the scope of their study to include the environment that affected the framework of these institutions. Thus, they considered the general environment of world politics and also the environment that was specific to each agency. In summary, they sought to explain how influence was gained and used within the UN system by looking at the types of decisions, the influence of individual actors who participated directly in the making of decisions and the environmental factors.

The principal findings of their study was that in GATT, IMF, ITU and IAEA, policies were determined and controlled by their most powerful member states. Representatives of these countries played key roles in decision-making. Even though representatives from these countries enjoyed little autonomy and obeyed the instructions from their governments, their policies were very influential. Representatives of these countries also played a key role in UNCTAD, WHO, ILO and UNESCO even though these organisations gave higher priority to the views of their executive heads and of less powerful member states. Cox and Jacobson's work is very prominent in the study of international organisations, but it should be noted that it is an empirico-analytic approach. A different approach, which places the UN agencies in a structural picture of power relations, is required and I shall attempt to show this is so in the next section.

Even though understanding these formal and informal processes is necessary in understanding the UN system, such processes cannot alone explain the structure of UN decision-making. There is more that can be said about decision-making processes in the UN than can be gathered from the Charter, the official records and the formal and informal decision-making procedures. Both the formal and informal decision-making of the UN are based on a Realist approach to the UN. This study aims to show that there is a higher theoretical level of approach to UN decision-making which shows

how and why these formal and informal decision-making procedures are taken for granted and are assumed to be the very nature of decision-making in the UN.

Claims of Change In Decision-Making After the Ending of the Cold War

In the second part of this section, the literature that claims that there has been a change in the UN after the ending of the Cold War will be discussed and it will then be argued that their concept of change is inadequate since their theory is based on taking the prevailing social and economic institutions as the given framework. Proponents of this view who state that the UN's role and decision-making structure have changed, are usually analytical and descriptive in their approach rather than theoretical. In general, they consider the states and groupings in the General Assembly and in the Security Council and how they started working more closely together on conflicts. In terms of scope, the most extensive works of literature of this kind are written by Sally Morphet, Beatrice Heuser and Paul Taylor.

The end of the Cold War has been welcomed as a shift that could change the UN's role dramatically. The UN could move away from the traditional security issues towards new ones. The UN's agenda according to these scholars³³ has been shifted to issues such as terrorism, narcotic drugs, immigration, nuclear weapons, refugees, the arms trade, international debt and the environment. These problems, referred to as 'global riot control', could be handled by the UN. As these scholars stress the importance of these issues and try to explain the ways in which the UN will and should handle them, they give special emphasis to the Security Council's functioning. The recent revival of the Security Council was, according to these scholars, a consequence of the great shift in Soviet politics and also other developments that took place as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. These changes had brought cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council and had made it possible to deal with the issues of global riot control. The non-permanent members' participation in the solution of these issues is only considered to the extent that their votes are necessary to pass resolutions in the Security Council. Even though the other organs in the UN are examined in the works of these scholars, attention is mainly limited to the Security Council. Another flaw in their work is the lack of attention they give to the other organs in the UN. This is, of course, a result of their Realist approach which is inherently state-centric. They take the

³³G. Kostakos, A. J. R. Groom, S. Morphet and P. Taylor, 'Britain and the New UN Agenda: Towards Global Riot Control', *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991).

balance of power in the inter-state system as given, and consider the power relations in the UN Security Council within this already existing framework.

In fact, these issues should be considered as economic, social, cultural and technical consequences of the prevailing global political economy. The underlying causes of these problems are to be found in the existing hegemonic relations and therefore they cannot be fully understood or resolved by simply studying Security Council resolutions.

Sally Morphet's recent study³⁴ is about the changes that have taken place in the Security Council and the General Assembly between 1980 and 1994. In her study, she divides this time period into three sections and analyses how states and political groups have influenced decision-making in the General Assembly and the Security Council. She examines how permanent members voted, used vetoes and how the non-aligned states voted together or separately on resolutions (Morphet does not discuss the behaviour of non-aligned group as she points out that they do not work together on the Security Council). She found that between 1980 and 1985 the permanent members voted together on 75 out of 119 Security Council resolutions, as opposed to 68 out of the 79 resolutions passed between 1986 and July 1990. Vetoes were used by four of the permanent members: France cast four, the Soviet Union four, the United Kingdom seven and the United States twenty-five. China refrained from using any vetoes during this period. The non-aligned states, on the other hand, voted together on 113 out of 119 resolutions in this period. The non-aligned groups' votes seemed to split when the conflict was between a regional and a non-aligned view and/or when pressure was applied by a superpower. Between 1986 and 1990, both the permanent members and the non-aligned were able to cooperate more than in the previous period. There were 72 unanimous resolutions out of 119 between 1980 and 1985 as opposed to 68 out of 79 between 1986 and 1990. The number of resolutions on which both the permanent and the non-aligned members of the Security Council voted in the same way had increased in this second period. Morphet sees this as a transition period where the Cold War still had its impact but on a smaller scale. The analysis of the third period shows that both of the groups were able to reach unanimity on 263 of the 310 Security Council resolutions (54 were related to Chapter VII). The permanent members voted on 284 and the non-aligned on 278.³⁵ Analysing the Security Council resolutions, Morphet suggests that

...the familiar West, East and non-aligned pattern of political groups on the Security Council in the 1980s was replaced by a

³⁴S. Morphet, 'The Influence of States and Groups of States on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980-94', *Review of International Studies*, 21 (1995).

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 443-448.

permanent member/non-aligned group pattern from the mid-1980s onwards. Although these two groups sometimes differed, they were (judging from their voting records between 1986 and mid-1990) able to work more closely on certain regional conflicts (often through a process which included setting up peace-keeping bodies) which had become easier to resolve as the Cold War came to an end.³⁶

Beatrice Heuser's study, on the other hand, emphasises on the UN's new role in maintaining global collective security. She writes about the possibility of a new 'world authority', a 'world policeman' that would be charged with the tasks of dealing with breaches of non-proliferation treaties and also with destroying unlawfully acquired nuclear potential. She considers different arrangements such as one where the UN assumes control of NATO's military force including its nuclear capabilities. This, she suggests, could be done via CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to which both the US and British nuclear forces in NATO are assigned. Since the CSCE is a regional arrangement under the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Article 53,³⁷ this enables the UN Security Council to use the CSCE for enforcing action. Heuser states that the UN's new role, in the long term, will be to carry out such responsibilities. This true 'world authority' will be legitimate, internationally recognised, impartial, and based on international law.³⁸

Heuser's study is based on using the UN to deter aggressive regimes and to maintain international security. The role that she sees for the UN is limited to military security, one where the UN is used for the authorisation and legitimisation of hegemonic power's interests. This will enable the hegemonic powers to decide which power acts or regimes are aggressive and what are considered as breaches to the system.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 456.

³⁷Article 53 of the UN: The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional agreements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organisation may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

³⁸B. Heuser, 'Containing Uncertainty: Options for British Nuclear Strategy', *Review of International Studies*, 19 (1993), pp. 265-267.

Exploring the Concept of Change

The concept of change lies at the heart of this study. In this section, the concept of change will be explored. Mainstream theories in International Relations are essentially concerned with the conceptualisation of change. The different assumptions of different theories seek to explain change in terms of their own particular analysis. The orthodox theories of International Relations overlap in their understanding of what they see as science and the relations between theory and practice, as well as the question of change. These approaches are inherently empirical and they are not capable of offering more than superficial explanations of change. This is true for the case of Realist, Neorealist or other systems theories as they share common empirico-analytical position.³⁹ As J. MacLean states:

The unavoidable conclusion, in relation to understanding change, is that epistemologically empiricist based accounts are, in respect of their own criteria for validation, static, deterministic, and inadequate for other than describing the apparent ubiquitous nature of change. This is because first, what counts as truth or falsity hinges on the acceptability of a prior claim, namely that there is a single reality that can be both discovered and tested by reality. Secondly, this reality must be accepted as not only impartial with respect to the demands made upon it, but as uniform and regular, that is invariable with regard to time and place. Further, by positing the assumptions that social reality conforms to that description, and divests the history of social and political relations of explanatory force.⁴⁰

The concepts about the emergent order that appeared after the Cold War depends on how order and change are perceived. The transformative dynamics can be viewed as a new systemic foundation or as a reconstitution of the existing system, as Rosenau calls them.⁴¹ The former view sees the post-Cold War period as wholly original and accepts that there has been a systemic change toward a new order. On the other hand, the latter view conceptualises the end of the Cold War as a reconstituted version of its predecessor, and therefore perceives this development as a within-system change of the old order.⁴²

³⁹J. MacLean, 'Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of "Change" and the Study of IR' in B. Buzan and B. Jones, eds., *Change and the Study of International Relations*, London, Frances Pinter Ltd., 1991, pp. 50-51.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴¹J. N. Rosenau, 'Governance, and Change in World Politics' in J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 22.

⁴²*Ibid.*

If emphasis is placed on the dominance of sovereign states and the anarchical system they are accorded with, then 'the end of the Cold War, the replacement of superpower rivalry with a more dispersed, less militaristic competition among many states, can be seen as merely a new form of the existing order'.⁴³ In this view, hierarchies are altered, new patterns of relationships are arranged but the fundamental arrangements of the world order still remain the same. If, on the other hand, our analysis of the end of the Cold War stress the '...diminished competence of states, the globalisation of national economies, the fragmentation of societies into ethnic, religious, national, linguistic, and political subgroups, the advent of transnational issues that foster the creation of transnational authorities...'⁴⁴ then the end of the Cold War can be seen as the beginning of a new emergent world order.

The actual substantive UN decision-making does not include the notions of these forces in the world order. The ending of the Cold War has not shifted the Realist perspective, the dominance of sovereign states and their anarchical system, either in the actual substantive decision-making of the UN or in the literature that analyses the UN. The proponents of the idea who assign new responsibilities and new tasks to the UN, usually emphasise the ending of superpower rivalry in the UN, the increasing cooperation and the decreasing use of veto in the UN Security Council. They stress that these changes are substantial and that they have created a new international order. However, they fail to realise that these changes cannot be considered as systemic. They are reductionist since they see states as primary actors, driven by the pursuit of self-interest in an international system inherently anarchical and conflictual. The UN is thus regarded as the institutional mean 'by which militarily and economically powerful states seek to achieve their ends'.⁴⁵ They do not take into consideration the impact of global production and finance and merely perceive UN decision-making as a reflection of state politics.

What is important for my overall argument is that the approaches which were discussed in the previous section and the recent literature written about the so-called changes in UN decision-making both suffer from the flaws discussed above and therefore cannot be considered as a basis for understanding UN decision-making. The prevailing ways of looking at UN

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵K. Lee, 'A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Organisations: An Expanded Analysis of Current Reforms to UN Development Activities' in J. Macmillan and A. Linklater eds., *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1996, p. 146.

decision-making, as discussed earlier, examine organisational and functional decision-making and take for granted the established social and economic power relations. These established order trends, which Bourdieu refers to as doxa, are so firmly established that they appear as self-evident, objective truths. The doxa appears in the form of implicit assumptions within theories of reality; assumptions which seem beyond question. Schemes of thought and perception embodying the doxa remain undisputed and the prevailing system does not encounter rivalries or antagonisms.⁴⁶ Bourdieu explains this as:

The instruments of knowledge of the social world are in this case (objectively) political instruments which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing immediate adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of which they are the product and of which they reproduce the structures in a transformed form.⁴⁷

The self-evidence of the common-sense world is validated: the powers of the permanent members in the Security Council are taken for granted; the policies of the IMF, IBRD, GATT or ILO continue to be explicit and the very nature of UN decision-making remains unquestioned.

Orthodoxy aims to restore the doxa in the face of challenging questions, a goal which it can at best only partially achieve, by defining acceptable ways of thinking. Hence orthodoxy attempts to reproduce the unquestioned natural order of the doxa, in the face of competing theories, by imposing its own particular view. Heterodoxy, on the other hand, allows competing views to coexist. Neither heterodoxy nor orthodoxy, however, allows for questioning of remaining doxa.⁴⁸ Instead they serve to limit the sphere in which questioning is permitted: they decide which questions it is permissible to ask.

The theories examined in the previous section conflict with each other, but do not diverge significantly from mainstream Realism. They do not explicitly critique the doxa of Realism and therefore compete within the limits imposed by the established order. These theories take the world as they find it with the prevailing social and political relations and the institutions (the UN in this case) as the given framework. That is why these theories cannot be considered as alternative theories that explain the decision-making of the UN. They remain grounded in the acceptable ways of thinking and of

⁴⁶p. Bourdieu, *The Outline of a Theory and Practice*, trans by R. Nice, Cambridge, University Press, 1989, p. 164.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 168-170.

explaining the decision-making. The next section attempts to construct a theoretical framework which breaks away from this orthodoxy or heterodoxy and questions the universe of the doxa.

4. The Global Political Economy Approach:

This section discusses the global political economy approach to the UN system, through the elaboration of Antonio Gramsci's writing.⁴⁹ The extension of Gramsci's ideas and writings to the study of the global political economy has redefined the origins, the developments and dynamics of the global political economy and this approach will enable the reader to understand UN decision-making in a more in-depth way. Most of Gramsci's work focuses on the analysis of social formations in Italy. He examines the initial phase of state and civil society and there he finds the foundations of social hegemonies. He examines how the bourgeoisie attained a hegemonic position over the other classes and how they sustained capitalism while they made it acceptable to subordinate classes. Their hegemony was embedded in civil society: in religion, the education system and all other social institutions to the extent that it led people to behave, think and even adopt values and expectations which were consistent with the hegemonic social order. It is in this consensual aspect of hegemony that Gramsci's originality lies.⁵⁰

The recent studies of global political economy extend his work to the internationalisation of state and civil society, the international aspects of social hegemony, the transnational class and bloc formations and economic and social forces. They examine the role of international organisations and the nature of global politics in the twentieth century.⁵¹

While empirical analysis of the UN understands decision-making from the perspective of methodological individualism, the Gramscian approach to the UN perceives social structures as the fundamental unit of analysis. Thus as K. Waltz or R. Gilpin consider the inter-state system in individualistic terms, with states as atomised actors interacting in anarchy, the Gramscian approach explains the world order as a whole. What is referred to as the global political approach then, moves away from the inter-state system and

⁴⁹A. Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, trans. and eds. by O. Hoare and G. N. Smith, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.

⁵⁰R. W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay In Method' in S. Gill, eds., *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 51.

⁵¹A prominent study that extends Gramsci's ideas to International Relations is S. Gill, ed., *Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

the balance of power approach to one where social forces and social structures and institutions of production are examined to explain world order. This approach claims that since 1945, the era of Pax Americana, a new world order has emerged which cannot simply be explained in the Westphalian state-centric mode. Hence, there has been a move towards a post-Westphalian system, as R.W. Cox refers to it in his works. This new order needs to be explained through the examination of the ways in which social forces and structures enter into a period of transition and the formal system of state sovereignty is called into question.⁵²

Not only does this new order coincide with a decisive change in the productive powers and balance of social forces within and between the major states, but also state structures in the major capitalist countries have been transformed into different variant of a neo-liberal form, i.e. more oriented to the integration of their economies into the emerging global system of production and exchange, in which knowledge, finance, and information play a more decisive role, when contrasted with the inter-war period. This largely is what Cox means by the process of the internationalising of the state, involving coalitions, class alliances and historic blocs of social forces across, as well as within, countries.⁵³

The situation in peripheral countries, on the other hand, has reached a stage where the economic activity of the core, liberal neo-classical economic doctrines and associated institutions and social forces has become dominant. Their domestic social structuring has begun to disintegrate and they appear tightly geared to the trade, investment, production and finance of the core countries.⁵⁴ This has occurred as a consequence of market power and the Bretton Woods system which will be discussed later on in this section.

Hegemony

For the purpose of explaining UN decision-making at a higher theoretical level, it is essential to discuss the Gramscian concept of hegemony in International Relations. Hegemony in Realist terms is based on the distribution and mobilisation of material power resources which is associated with hegemonic stability where the hegemon asserts power, especially military power, and the subordinate states avoid actions which would antagonise the hegemon. Hegemonic stability assumes that states weigh up the costs and benefits of their actions and choose rational policies. The hegemon does not always explicitly exert power but subordinate states

⁵²S. Gill, 'Epistemology, Ontology and the Italian School', in *ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

refrain from antagonising the hegemon since they are aware of the hegemon's power. This concept of hegemony is rather limited since it reduces hegemony to states and balance of power.⁵⁵

Another conception of hegemony is associated with complex interdependence. This approach was introduced when the post-war US hegemony started declining. Hence, 'after hegemony',⁵⁶ as Keohane refers to it, the order was maintained since the patterns of interdependence had become so complex that the costs for a state not to cooperate with the existing order had become too high. States, as in the previous approach, are assumed to make rational choices and to be aware of the opportunity costs, and decide to support the existing international arrangements.⁵⁷ Like Keohane, R. Gilpin⁵⁸ is concerned with explaining what happens 'after hegemony'. He attempts to explain the stability of the international economy in a period of American hegemonic decline. He is concerned mainly with states and markets. According to Gilpin, international political economy (as he chooses to refer to it), takes place within the inter-state system. He defines the international political economy as the system in which the states (as major agents) and market actors such as multinational companies interact. He places much emphasis on international exchange relations and less to domestic social forces. This second definition of hegemony, does not view hegemony in terms of military capability. However it associates social forces with a territorial entity. It is a rather narrow approach, as it focuses on the interplay between states and markets and fails to see that power is not intrinsic only to states or markets. The concept of hegemony referred to in this paper perceives the global system as a whole. Therefore, R. W. Cox's definition in this case explains hegemony more fully.

Hegemony is a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities. In a hegemonic order, these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They appear to most actors as the natural order. Such a structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state's dominance is not sufficient to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the dominant social strata of the

⁵⁵S. Gill and D. Law, *The Global Political Economy*, Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, p. 76, 77.

⁵⁶R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁵⁷Gill and Law, *The Global*, p. 76.

⁵⁸R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1987.

dominant states in so far as these ways of doing and thinking have acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states.⁵⁹

In like manner, this study examines the UN, through which world hegemony is realised. Gramsci sees basic changes in international power relations and world order as resulting from fundamental changes in social relations. His conception of hegemony and consensus are useful to understand the world order in which one can place the UN system. Hegemony is achieved by securing the interests of the core states through using both coercive and consensual means. The latter is achieved through a system where the periphery states find the existing world order compatible with their interests. The more powerful make concessions to the interests of the weaker to retain their consent. This is secured by structurally embedded social constructs.⁶⁰ Therefore hegemony cannot be reduced only to raw, coercive forces. Economic, social, cultural and technical institutions established by the dominant social class help to maintain the world hegemony. Thus hegemony cannot be reduced merely to an order among states. 'It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production'.⁶¹ The UN, like other international organisations, can be described as one of the means of the institutionalisation of hegemony. The UN is a vehicle that universalises 'the norms proper to a structure of world power, and that structure of power maintains itself through support of these institutions'.⁶² The UN and other international organisations are mechanisms to secure this world order. In the light of this framework, it can be stated that the UN has not only institutionalised the hegemonic order but it has also reproduced this hegemony in the sense that the UN organisation and its agencies have led to the permeation of this prevailing hegemony through the social and economic structures of all societies. This reproduction of hegemony through the UN will be discussed later on in this section.

The UN is only the visible part of a more complex system that links the core and the periphery. This perception of core and periphery, which is referred to as world system structuralism, that has been elaborated by I. Wallerstein, also extends the Gramscian approach to international organisation. It sees world order as including a structural relationship between the core and the periphery where the core economies are dominant over peripheral ones. The core intervenes in the periphery through financial, cultural, military and other means with the support of the class allies in the periphery. The dominant classes or elites in the periphery who benefit from

⁵⁹Cox in Gill, *Epistemology, Ontology*, p. 42.

⁶⁰Cox, *Gramsci and Hegemony*, p. 61.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶²Cox, *The Crisis*, p. 377.

this help to maintain the relationship.⁶³ This core and periphery structure is institutionalised through the UN and the specialised agencies. They enforce or practice policies which are core-oriented and therefore perpetuate the existence of these norms. This world system approach is helpful in understanding the core-periphery relations. It is however, reductionist in that sense that it bases its main argument on the core and periphery states.

Reproduction of Hegemony

R. W. Cox defines the way in which international organisations function as the process through which institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. In like manner, the UN ideologically legitimises the norms of the world hegemonic order. Both the UN Organisation's and the agencies' orientations are favourable to the dominant social and economic forces. The IMF, the IBRD, the ILO and the other UN agencies all advocate the policy guidelines for states and strengthen the norms that are in favour of the dominant forces. The rules that they embody enable the hegemonic world order to expand and become established. As the UN and its agencies form and implement rules, they not only expand the hegemonic world order, but they also permit the subordinate economic and social forces to make adjustments so that it will be acceptable for them to sustain the hegemony. The formal decision-making of the UN, is weighed in favour of the dominant forces, but they make sure that they obtain some of the weaker forces' consent.

Orthodox theories base their argument on the separation of politics from economics. This assumption consequently propounds the view that 'economics is a natural phenomenon and subject therefore to objective laws, while politics is not natural, but wholly social, and necessarily evaluative'.⁶⁴ According to this picture, since economics is a natural, objective phenomenon, then the dominant Liberal/Capitalist economy, as it also offers a condition where politics is seen as separate from economics, is by definition impartial. This establishment of capitalism as an objective domain 'has come to count in the world as the dominant, objective, impartial academic economics' and this actually results in this particular capitalist economics becoming universal.⁶⁵ Turning now to the UN system, this separation of politics and economics -the UN Organisation seen in the political domain and the agencies in the economic and technical domain- allows the reproduction of this specific form of political economy. IMF conditionality, IBRD development projects, and GATT regulations are

⁶³I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, Academic Press, 1974.

⁶⁴MacLean, *The Ideology*, p. 190

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

regarded as inherently objective policies and are thus to be implemented without question since they derive from the objective and impartial academic economics. International law, international trade and even the international human rights legislation's of the UN embody this Liberal/Capitalist conception of the world. They are, however, articulated as scientific, impartial aspects of reality. The International Human Rights Declaration of the UN emphasises liberal, individual rights and does not equally stress collective rights. Thus it encourages a Liberal/Capitalist conception of human rights.

The UN Charter, the IMF Articles of Agreement, the 'free-flow of information' principle in UNESCO, the limiting of the ITU's regulatory competence to standard-setting, the elimination of concepts of socialised medicine from the constitution of the WHO, and most recently the establishment of a new specialised agency in 1984, The World International Property Organisation, all articulate and reproduce Liberal/Capitalist concepts and assumptions.⁶⁶

The UN's development activities are of a similar nature. These activities have been coordinated through ECOSOC which was created in 1964 for this purpose. ECOSOC has dealt with development issues such as: population, human rights, urban development, science and technology. Other UN development activities have been carried out through the UN agencies especially through the IBRD. In addition, the UN Special Fund and UNDP were created which focused only on development issues. These development activities have initiated and maintained consensus among the developed and developing countries, towards a particular form of development, which involved policies such as privatisation, encouraging foreign investment, lowering trade barriers, cutting down government spending etc. These development activities are presently implemented in the Central and Eastern Europe on a large scale. They have been convinced that the policies of the UN agencies, notably the IMF, IBRD and GATT are technical and objective and that adopting these development policies and projects will benefit them.⁶⁷

On the basis of this argument, it can be concluded that the UN agencies have played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of the hegemonic world order. The IMF, IBRD, GATT, UNESCO, WHO, and all the other agencies cause this dominant mode of political economy to permeate into all countries and reproduce hegemony. The establishment and development of post-war order, has supported the view of those who argue for the separation of politics from economics. The division of the UN system

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁶⁷Lee, A *Neo-Gramscian*, pp. 151-153

into political and economic domains rested on the idea that the international economic order was governed by scientific, technical norms. Together with the support of dominant academic economists, whose ideas were seen as scientific and therefore beyond question, the policies of these organisations were seen as expert knowledge which was objective. They were contrasted with the politicisation and polarisation of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. The Bretton Woods institutions, in setting up the international regime for trade and money, 'embedded liberalism'⁶⁸ in the post-war era. The basic principle of hegemony after the war, was the belief in an open trading system, with fixed and stable exchange rates and the relatively free movement of goods, capital and technology. Economic growth and rising productivity was used to supplement this conviction. Marshall Aid, the Truman Doctrine, NATO's defence programmes and OECD policies all incorporated condition articles that perpetuated the open trading system. The post-war hegemony was more fully institutionalised by the UN system. Both the UN organisation and UN agencies were institutions that satisfied the requirements of the liberal trade system and ensured the continuation of hegemonic powers.

GATT brought the most-favoured nation principle with an exception that allowed for already existing preferential arrangements and permitted customs union and free trade areas. Trade barriers, especially quantitative restrictions were prohibited and a substantial reduction of tariffs was enforced. The principle of reciprocity was adopted as a code of conduct so that the system's norms could be maintained.

The IMF was established to ensure a set of rules which would regulate monetary relations with an agreed stable currency. This currency would make monetary transactions flow easily. Countries which were having difficulties with their balance of payments would be assisted so that international trade would not get disrupted by countries resorting to protectionism. Consequently, the IMF would facilitate international trade for market economies. The IMF provided loans to countries with balance of payment problems so that they could make adjustments and join the liberal trading system and the IBRD supplied long term financial assistance and project lending. These institutions applied the system's norms by using conditionality so that the basic principles of the international economic system were perpetuated. Conditionality was used to the extent that it moved beyond the basic commitments of adopting the most-favoured-nation principle or maintaining an agreed exchange rate, to a general acceptance of

⁶⁸J. G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organisation*, 36 (1982).

the decrees of these institutions before national policies. Adjustments in these countries thus responded to the needs of the system as a whole.⁶⁹

The case of UNESCO is a rather unique one in that the attempt to introduce fundamental reforms to the policies and the functioning of this organisation in the years prior to 1987 has been followed by the withdrawal of the USA in 1984 and the U.K. and Singapore in 1985. These countries have complained about the 'politicisation' of UNESCO starting from the 1960s onwards, leading to a call for New International Information Order, and the inefficient functioning of the management and budgetary regulations. In addition to this, these countries objected to the increased government control over the international mass-media.⁷⁰ This claimed 'politicisation' of UNESCO was regarded by the dominant orthodox views as an ideological intervention which distorted the apolitical, technical aims of UNESCO. However as J. MacLean and S. El Kahal both argue, this so-called 'politicisation' and the subsequent 'privatisation' of UNESCO cannot be understood without referring to the dominant political-economy. This organisation, like the other UN agencies discussed above, can be best understood in terms of maintaining hegemony in the global political economy.⁷¹ As has already been strongly implied earlier in this paper, the UN agencies reproduced the existing hegemonic power from their inception. They state that:

...international organisations are not simply reactive entities, to be understood only as aggregate expressions of the explicit interests and needs of their members, but are themselves proactive causal mechanism that mediate and reproduce the conditions of global consensus or compliance necessary to the maintenance of hegemony in the late modern world.⁷²

The claims about the 'politicisation' of UNESCO in 1960s and 1970s are without justification. The very founding principles, constitutions and the decision-making processes of UNESCO embody a Liberal/Capitalist ideology, and thus this organisation was political from its creation. UNESCO, like the other UN agencies, is not and has never been apolitical or technical and its policies have not been value-free, as they have always allowed the reproduction of the dominant political economy.⁷³

⁶⁹R. W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory' in R. O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Colombia University, Press, 1986, pp. 230-231.

⁷⁰Kahal and Maclean, *The Privatization*, p. 1.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷²*Ibid.*

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 29.

Since 1987, when the Director-General of UNESCO changed, the organisation has gone through reform. The organisation has transformed into private sector management and its budget has become increasingly managed according to similar principles. UNESCO has adopted policies that advocated private ownership, trade sales, competition and etc. The content of these reforms will not be evaluated in this study, but it is important to locate that these reforms, as they still continue to be implemented, have transformed UNESCO into an institution that fulfils the needs of global firms.⁷⁴ This 'privatisation' of UNESCO in the last decade has been claimed as returning to its apolitical, technical form. However this is a new form of politicisation in UNESCO where Liberal/Capitalist policies are posited as scientific, expert knowledge.

What is important for the entire argument is that the UN agencies' policies have embedded liberalist ideas and have reproduced hegemony starting from their inception. Above, some of the UN agencies have been studied and it has been argued that these agencies are not value-free and objective as they are presented and they have played an important role in the reproduction of hegemony. The social production and reproduction of the orthodox view are very important to understand the 'common-sense' of the prevailing global political economy. This prevailing global political economy has been criticised in this paper together with the prevailing notions of Realism. It is by these means that International Relations theorising can go beyond the 'common sense' of these orthodox ones and can question the doxa.

5. Conclusion:

This study has attempted to show that most of the theories about the UN build their arguments or make their analyses without examining the doxa. They take for granted the formal and informal decision-making procedures and analyse them as they find them, with the prevailing theories. Orthodox theories have centred on Liberal and Realist views. They focus on member state policies in the UN and also on the formal and informal decision-making processes. They fail to recognise the other factors which have an impact on but which do not derive from state policies. Orthodox theories also focus on military and economic power, emphasising that states are driven by the pursuit of self-interest. According to this view, the decision-making of the UN is seen as merely the extension of state interests and policies, and influence in the UN is achieved as a result of power relations between states. This limited understanding of power does not take into consideration that power is intrinsic to social context, existing beyond military and economic terms and deriving from socially structured

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 21.

relationships. The resulting picture of the UN is, consequently, also incomplete.

This narrow perception of the UN system has been challenged in this paper. The global political economy approach goes beyond the dominant orthodox theories and explains the UN system using the Grascian concept of hegemony. The UN, in this case, is regarded not only as an institutionalisation of this prevailing order but also as reproducing hegemony. Decision-making procedures are visible and easy to understand. On the other hand, hegemony is invisible and therefore needs to be explained in a theoretical way. The existence or absence of changes in the decision-making procedures of the UN is of secondary importance to the question of change in the implicitly embedded hegemony. This paper has argued that the orthodox understanding of UN decision-making is flawed and the claims that the ending of the Cold War has brought about changes in this decision-making are products of this incomplete understanding. The proponents of the view which claims that there has been change in the UN system have sought changes which are parallel to the prevailing notions of state-centrism and Capitalism. However, a change in the UN system can only come about through the emergence of a counter-hegemonic force which questions the doxa. The prevailing notions of the global political economy do not take into consideration the emergence of such forces. As R. W. Cox has stated in his article, 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose'.⁷⁵ The theories and the empirical studies which are critically approached in this paper all have their own perceptions. Despite the fact that these approaches stem from Realist/Capitalist assumptions, they are presented as objective laws of politics and economics and as such are reproduced throughout the UN system. With the support of the academic hegemony of economics, the Liberal/Capitalist concepts and issues have been presented as successful models to be adopted. These efforts to present the UN agencies' policies as apolitical are themselves political and theory-laden. This paper has attempted to demonstrate that this is the case.

It is in this context, one can understand the underlying power relations in the UN system and broaden UN decision-making significantly. One must fully examine and explain the UN system in order to propose counter-hegemonic arguments.

⁷⁵Cox, *Social Forces*, p. 207.