

MEASURING EU ACTORNESS THROUGH CFSP AND ESDP: CIVILIAN POWER EU

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Abstract

The European Union Foreign Security and Defense policies have always been a strategic issue for the Union. The Union has been debating on these policies since the beginning of the 70's which is the period of time coincides with the introduction of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)

Today the discussion mostly centers on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is the successor of EPC, and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) which was in fact derived from the CFSP itself. There are two main points of debate behind these discussions. The first is whether the Union has the capability and strength to act in a civilian, normative or military capacity. The second question is will both the CFSP and ESDP be successful enough to assert the strength of the EU on the international stage. The main discussion within this paper assumes that the EU is in fact an active force, although it manifests some shortcomings which are that the EU lacks a clear and stable political and institutional identity. To address the second point of debate, this article focuses on how the EU might be evaluated (as a civilian, normative or military power) with its increasing powers in today's globalizing world. The only way of quantifying the Union's increase in power is through the detailed analysis of its civilian and military capabilities.

Key Words: *EU Identity and Actorness, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, Civilian and Military Crises Management*

Özet

Avrupa Birliği (AB) bütünleşme sürecinde dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikaları önceliğini daima koruyacaktır. 1970'lerden bu yana Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği (ASİ) adı

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altında başlayan bu alanlardaki işbirliği günümüze kadar bir dönüşüm sürecinden geçmektedir. Günümüzde hararetli tartışmaların ortasında bulunan en önemli gelişme ise ASİ' içinden doğan Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ile ODGP' içinden yaratılan Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP) alanlarıdır. Bu gelişmelerin yarattığı bir başka tartışma konusu ise Avrupa'nın ne tür bir güç olduğunun irdelenmesidir. Bu makalede ele alınan konulardan ilki AB'nin aktif bir uluslararası güç olduğu fakat siyasi ve kurumsal bir kimlik oluşturamadığı sorunudur. Bugünün küresel dünyasında AB'nin bir sivil güç mü yoksa normatif ya da askeri bir güç olma yolunda ilerleyip ilerlemediği tartışılmaktadır. Bu nedenle makalenin ikinci tartışma noktası AB'nin ne tür bir güç olduğu sorusunun irdelenmesi ve AB'nin giderek güçlenen bu nüfuzunun sivil ve askeri yeteneklerinin irdelenmesiyle ölçülebileceğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Kimliği, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, Sivil ve Askeri Kriz Yönetimi.

Introduction

Indeed, the goal of the EU becoming an international actor is not a subject of current debate. In fact, the logic behind the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) was not only the laying down of a protectionist peace, but more importantly the establishment of a working peace. The latter was the ultimate aim which is one of the assumptions of the functionalist theory.¹ And within today's context, the EU is working towards fulfilling its objectives within the foreign and security policy realms where it is still dealing with some of its shortcomings. Certainly these sensitive areas, labeled as high politics, do not make it easy for states to cooperate. Due to their importance, every state refrains from any act which might result in a limitation against its sovereignty. This is the main difficulty among the Member States of the EU in establishing reconciliation.

This process, especially in the realm of decision-making, forces countries to shape their policies to calculate every detail for reaching their national objectives and to end up with the least harm possible. Actually, this calculation of relative gains is the main obstacle the Union faces within the realms of CFSP and ESDP. But the changing international environment, especially after the Second World War shows that security and defense alliances are a necessity for countries to seek cooperation and coordination in their defense and security policies, as no country has the ability to deal with newly evolving threats on its own. It is well known that this need for cooperation has been underlined with great importance in the European Security Strategy in 2003. But the question appears to be, will the Union be successful enough to improve its capacity in acting as a force, not only for the sake of its own interests but more importantly doing its work for bringing peace and security to our world, through creating the right perception both inside and outside the Union. From inside, what is actually meant is the lack of an institutional and political identity, and from an outside view, how this would be perceived by others. As there is an ongoing integration process giving birth to new policy innovations. The situation here is actually multifaceted; the first problem appears

¹ A. David Mitrany, **Working Peace System**, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966.

to be the lack of the Union's identity, and the second is, the introduction of new mechanisms such as the ESDP, which actually leads to misunderstandings by sending wrong signals towards 3rd parties.

This is the main theme within this paper, which is to focus on whether the Union should become a military power, is it really militarizing or should remain just as a civilian power. Besides the analysis of the concepts mentioned above, this paper focuses on the impacts of the military means (used or to be used in the future) on the Union's civilian notion. Certainly before questioning these concepts, there is a need to have a few words on the Union's CFSP and the absence of its political identity in order to understand the evolution of the ESDP and today's debated civilian or military power EU.

The foreign policy realm of the EU integration process dates back to the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Certainly the aim of the treaty was to develop a single market between the six Member States by removing the barriers for free trade between them, which was then named as the European Economic Community (EEC). Certainly this desire of the Union also covered external dimensions which were laid down within the Rome treaty.² For instance, how the legal basis of association agreements or negotiations with third parties were to be established etc. These steps taken within the EEC directly opened the way for the Community to be represented in the international arena. This could be implemented through acting as a single unit and establishing the ability to speak with one voice. Starting with such a view, the foreign policy of the EEC, which is now labeled as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the second pillar of the EU, has been derived from the Community's economic concerns and objectives, which gave birth to a foreign policy dimension in the mid- 1970's called the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Certainly being nothing more than a consultation mechanism, the importance of the EPC comes from being the first step within this realm (*although there were previous attempts which came out with failure*³). Actually it was an important step towards forming a political dimension, namely foreign policy, to address the need of the Community's economic relations, which still take first priority due to their success. But when it comes to the other side of the coin the frequently asked question is, where the political (CFSP) side of the community's foreign policy is actually headed. That is why the issue within this framework appears to be so complicated. The lack of conciliation among the Member States of the Union prevents it from developing a strong and stable presence in the international environment. That is why, this paper questions the Union's actorness separately from its identity with the questions of does an actor need an institutional identity within today's

² Articles 181a, 182- 188 of the Treaty of Rome, Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, **Official Journal of the European Communities** C 325/33, 2002.

³ Before the EPC, there were two attempts for establishing political cooperation among the Member States. These were the Pleven Plan (1950), and the Fouchet Plans (1961, 1962). The former had the aim of creating a European Defence Community, while the latter was about establishing an intergovernmental European Political Union, with the idea of what De Gaulle named 'Europe des Patries'. Due to the divergence of interests the Plans were abandoned. See, Simon Duke, **The Elusive Quest for European Security**, London, 2000, Macmillan.

global world, or can such post-national forces be successful in settling themselves within today's international arena. Where is this ramification leading towards which started with foreign and lead to security, and finally to defense components within the Union.

The EU, as always expressed, has been successful within the economic realm which is the main reason why the Union itself was established. Creating a single market with removing the barriers between the Member States and establishing the economic and Monetary Union (EMU) can be defined as a victory for the Member States. This successful economic unification has certainly laid the foundation for acting as a single unit, which will eventually have the ability to speak with one voice on economic and monetary issues in the international environment. Of course the EU gains this strength from having adopted a common commercial policy and a single currency which makes it more powerful in the international arena. Due to one of the highest levels of GDP – nearly 9.6 trillion euros per year ranking right after the US – and with its increasing population – nearly 455 million – the Union has become the most important trade bloc in the world.⁴ Besides all these successes in the foreign economic policy realm, when it comes to the CFSP, the Union is still facing the same difficulties that it has had since the very beginning of the CFSP. Taking new steps within these policies certainly requires an integrated approach both with the institutions, policy making, policy makers, interests etc.

Practicing Actorness Without a Political Identity

When starting to analyze the European Union's actorness or its process of becoming an actor on the world scene, the first aspect one might start exploring is the Union's identity. The first question which comes to mind is: does the EU have a political or an institutional identity? How might we define this formation? Is it enough to name this entity as a regional trade association of nation states, or as a liberal institution which has promised to safeguard democratic values and human rights? What is that notion which defines this entity, which is labeled as sui generic due to its nature? Is it the multi level governance interacting at the sub-national, national and at supranational level? Or is it, its elective shape shifting from a society-centered vision to a state-centered one, or just the opposite?

Although some scholars strictly criticize the Union remaining as a limited treaty-based organization, the EU integration process, which dates back to the 1950's, has shown that it has never been and will never be a framework entity. On the other hand, it is also evident that the EU is still far away from creating its political identity. The Union lacks political traditions, doctrines which might guide it through the stages of building its institutional identity, not only for the sake of its relations with the outside world but also for the good of its citizens. The main argument is that this lack of identity stems from multi-speed Europe and the differentiated integration giving birth to the abstention of certain Member States, these abstentions prevent the Union from achieving closer

⁴ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, **The European Union as a Global Actor**, New York, Routledge, 2006, p.62

cooperation, especially in the areas of foreign and security policy, on which this article will focus. The EU operates as a 'multi – level governance' system especially within the Community pillar but when it comes to the intergovernmental CFSP, although there are certain interactions among certain institutions, such as the Member States Foreign Ministries, Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), Permanent Representatives Committee (COROPER) etc. the final say is up to the European Council, in which decisions are shaped through processes like the Member States convincing each other, bargaining, coalition buildings, logrolling etc. And decisions taken through these processes, although may result with positive outcomes, do not help the Union strengthening its presence. Bretherton & Vogler have defined presence as "not denoting purposive external action, rather it is a consequence of being".⁵

Presence, in a point of my view is more about finding the right spot, the reason, in which to flourish on a stable and sole identity. 'Presence' according to Hill "emphasizes outside perceptions of the EU and the significant effects it has on both the psychological and operational environments of third parties".⁶ Or Hettne & Söderbaum put it as "an actor must be subjectively conscious about its presence and prepared to make use of it in accordance with its objectives".⁷ It is obvious that the Union proves its presence more or less in different locations around the world. However the point is, although reflecting this presence in different locations, the EU shortfalls of what kind of presence it is actually practicing towards third parties? This question will be detailed below alongside with the concept of actorness.

Building identity actually depends on building institutions, which must act with consistency to fulfill the missions and objectives for implementing preferences and interests. This is not about the way in which certain tools are implemented or employed; it is actually about the first phase of reflecting presence with a single voice. Additionally, Mitzen underlines the importance of identity as "actors need stable identities to be actors or agents at all".⁸ That is why there is a need to make a separation between the Union's identity and actorness. It is evident that the EU is on its way becoming an important international actor, but the crux of the matter is whether the EU will be able to fulfill its actorness without a stable institutional or political identity. Identity here rests on certain traditions, myths or discourses; on the other hand, actorness is the practice of these traditions and norms, etc. The question which comes to mind is, is the identity of the EU, an outcome of a political will, shared understandings, reflection of identities, or is it a process of utility, purely about fulfilling national or

⁵ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *op cit.*, p.27

⁶ Cited in, Roy H. Ginsberg, "Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability – Expectations Gap", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1999, Vol. 37, No.3, p. 448.

⁷ Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2005, Vol.10, No: 4, p.537.

⁸ Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2006, Vol. 13, No: 2, p. 271.

common interests, which Manners labels as “goal-driven instrumentalism”.⁹ Bretherton and Vogler put it forward as “The relationship between identities, interests and behavior, however, is neither simple nor linear”.¹⁰

In support of debating at this point, there is a need to look at the terms ‘actor’ and ‘actorness’. Briefly, according to International law, only the states with sovereignty are able to sign treaties, become a party of international organizations and be recognized by others within the international framework. These states are the only ones named as actors on the world scene¹¹. A similar approach can be also seen within the neo-realist theory with its state-centric assumption. But on the other hand, there are certainly different International Relations (IR) theories and their approaches to the concept of actorness. For instance if we are to move on through a constructivist or transnationalist approach they are considered as more inclusive in labeling international organizations, cartels, NGO’s etc. as actors within the international system. But actually none of them gives a full explanation or a clue about where the EU stands within this IR system of actorness. Not being a state but actually offering more than an ordinary organization, for example Messner’s (2007) poetic description of the EU structure as “no longer merely the sum of nation states, more than an association of states, but still clearly not a federal state...”,¹² explains the complexity of the EU. So the question is where might we locate the EU with its *sui generis* structure? This complexity of this structure is why one should refrain from seeking a theoretical base within this framework.

The only way to determine the EU’s actorness is, by analyzing both the EU’s institutional structure and the way the Union interacts with the rest of the world. In fact, the Union being unique in its structure is another point which has to be explained, as there is no such other entity around the world like the EU. That is why there is no possibility of making any comparison to other entities on whether the integration of the EU will be successful or not. That is why other scholars like Richard Rosecrance (1997) define the EU as a “new type of international actor”¹³ where the Union is only to be compared with itself.

If we are to detail the concept of institutional identity alongside the concept of actorness in relation to the EU, it will be useful to examine the other criteria in addition to presence. According to Caporaso and Jupille (1998), these are; autonomy, recognition, authority and, cohesion.¹⁴ Alongside with the requirements of legitimacy,

⁹ Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2006, Vol. 35, No.1, p.177

¹⁰ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *op cit.*, p.37

¹¹ Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *op cit.*, p.14.

¹² Dirk Messner, “The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the Asia-Pacific Century?”, *IPG I/2007*, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2007-1/03_a_messner_gb.pdf> (04.05.2009)

¹³ Richard Rosecrance, “Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy The European Union: A New Type of International Actor”, *EUI Working Papers*, RSC 97/64

¹⁴ Cited in, Roy H. Ginsberg, *op.cit.*, p. 447

which are representation, accountability, identity and recognition¹⁵, all these criteria are singled out within this paper under; representation, acceptance/recognition and “capabilities”¹⁶.

Although supporting the argument of the EU being an important major power, I will not refrain from making certain criticisms. If we are to forget the Union’s behavior of act or action with its failures and successes for a moment and just concentrate on the concept of *representation*, which is an important aspect covering coherence and consistency, it can be seen that the EU is facing problems within this area. Consistency in law is defined as “the absence of contradictions; coherence on the other hand refers to positive connections.”¹⁷ So we may ask how the Union might fit this definition within its representation, as it does not seem it will be able to maintain its representation through a six months’ rotating presidency where each state holding the presidency is trying to meet its own national priorities. Another hindrance to maintaining its representation is the EU’s High Representative, who has been restricted within a narrow framework. Finally, the turf wars, where different actors or institutions seek more active roles within the institutional framework cause contradictions in the representation of the EU. So even if we put ‘acting as a single unit’ aside, the EU is not even able to ‘speak with one voice’ in a full motion. The famous example still given to this problem is Kissinger’s statement within the 1970’s as “who can I call when I want to speak to Europe”¹⁸.

The EU is still suffering from not being able to make a distinction among its institutions, such as the post of High Representative addressed within the CFSP pillar or the post of commissioner responsible for external relations within the community pillar and besides the Rotation of the Presidency still leads to a certain contradiction.¹⁹ The problem occurs because the different pillars cover different policy areas and different institutions appointed in dealing with them, which can be defined as supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism within the EU context. This is the most important reason why some scholars are having difficulty identifying the EU as an *actor* and therefore refrain from using the term *actor*, finding it more suitable to label the EU as a *political union* or

¹⁵ Ronald Holzhaecker, “Democratic Legitimacy and the European Union”, **European Integration**, 2007, Vol. 29, No.3 p.259

¹⁶ Hill (1996) argues that true actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, but also practical capabilities to have effective policies. Cited in, Roy H. Ginsberg, **op.cit.**, p.447-448

¹⁷ Simon Duke, “Consistency as an issue in EU External Activities”, **European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper** 99/W/06, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/542/01/99w06.pdf>> (15.02.2009), p. 3.

¹⁸ Cornelia Beyer, “The European Union as a Security Policy Actor- the case of Counterterrorism”, 2006, <<http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/beyer2.pdf>> (10.01.2009), p.6

¹⁹ Daniel Thym, “Reforming Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, **European Law Journal**, Vol.10, No.1 2004, p. 9.

a *passive pole* or a *strategic actor*²⁰ or on the other hand simply and loosely as a *post modern force*.²¹ It is best to move to another criteria, *acceptance*, which is something the EU has to overcome urgently both from inside and outside, if it is willing, for deeper integration. The debate about acceptance and recognition needs a closer look at the views from both outside and inside. By inside, it is the view of the community or society, and by outside the view from third parties towards that entity searching legitimacy. The problems occurring inside the community can be summarized as such: the Union is still not capable of explaining the integration process to its citizens, and although stressing several times that the integration and the EU must come closer to the man on the street, it seems the EU is not capable of doing so.

The EU, with its complex structure and institutions, still stands far away from the EU citizens, who perceive the EU as lacking accountability and transparency. The most important symbol of the gap between the EU and its citizens can be seen when the Member States hold referendums for the ratification of the treaties. Any support coming directly from the community would directly affect the strength and presence of the Union in its external relations. For instance, although receiving remarkable support (public opinion favoring CFSP: 68 %, public opinion favoring ESDP: 75%, *Eurobarometer, 2006*)²² for strengthening and developing both CFSP and ESDP from the community, the EU lacks the ability to respond to these high expectations.

The views expressed from the outside are perhaps more useful than views expressed from the inside. When the subject of external relations, namely foreign policy, came on to the agenda of the Community in the mid 1970's with the introduction of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it certainly attracted attention as soon as it was established. The most well-known example was the Euro-Arab Dialogue, in which the EU desired a more active role due to the conflicts occurring in the region. But the transformation of the EPC to the CFSP actually did not bring true innovation or prestige to the Union's foreign relations.

Thirdly, the *capabilities* of the Union have to be analyzed when debating the actorness of the EU. The tools and the mechanisms the EU employs towards third parties can be classified under three groups. These are the economic, political and military instruments which the Union employs. The economic instruments, which the EU employs very successfully, can be categorized as framework, coercion and regulatory tools. These tools, which fall under the competence of the community pillar, appear to be the most functional and the Union does not hesitate or refrain from expanding its hegemony through the use of them. The framework mechanism consists

²⁰ Charlotte Wagnsson, "The EU as strategic actor, pragmatic 're-actor' or passive pole?" **Paper presented at third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics** 21-23 September 2006, Istanbul, <<http://www.jhube.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/029.pdf>> (22.12.2008), p.7

²¹ Hanns Maull, "Europe and the new balance of global order", **International Affairs** 81/4, 2005, pp. 778-779.

²² Public opinion in the EU, **Standard Eurobarometer Survey 66**, Autumn 2006, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf> (15.01.2009), pp. 22 – 25.

of trade, partnership, financial and technical assistance agreements signed between the EU and third parties. These two mechanisms, framework and coercion, can be defined through the EU's conditionality, which is about employing the carrots and the sticks towards third parties. On the other hand, the regulatory mechanism is more about the EU's role in international organizations, making it more effective in negotiating laws and regulations. For instance, this can be seen in the role of the Commission having the right to negotiate on behalf of the EU's Member States in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The use of these mechanisms by the EU gives it an advantage when interacting with third countries. This success in the trade and economic realms results in acting as 'a single unit' and having the ability to 'speaking with one voice' on economic and monetary issues in the international environment. According to Smith, this is because the first pillar which is responsible for economic issues has been given international status; however the other pillars of the EU have not been given this authority.²³

Besides the economic tools listed above, the EU also has political and military mechanisms, which can be employed in its relations with the outside world. The success of the use of these mechanisms certainly is open to discussion and this success, or lack thereof, in my opinion deserves certain critiques. First of all, the political or legal instruments used within this realm are the joint actions, common positions and common strategies, which fall under a shared competence within the realm of CFSP. Once agreed upon, all these instruments are binding on all Member States. But the point to be underlined here is that, the decision making within this area is intergovernmentalism, where it is up to the Member States to adopt any decision. This certainly weakens the Union's character resulting mostly in differentiated integration. Not being capable of reaching common decisions, even after a lengthy and rigorous bargaining process, leads to certain opting-outs by Member States, which instigates clashes between common and national interests, resulting mostly in an 'every state for itself approach'.

Another issue within the CFSP realm is the opportunistic behavior of the EU. Instead of developing certain tools or mechanisms under the CFSP, or making use of its common positions and common strategies, the EU takes the shortcut by including its political interests into the trade or partnership agreements with third countries. This certainly ends up with subordinating the CFSP and attributing importance to its foreign economic policy. As explained above any trade or partnership agreement to be signed between the Union and a third party includes special clauses to be implemented by that third party, for instance strengthening democracy, human rights or the rule of law. These political aspirations are likely to increase. For example, as agreed in 2003, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is included in all trade agreements by the EU, in which the third party must obey. Certainly all these democratic principles and the Union's aspiration of spreading them are welcomed by the international community, but the question is how they are employed and serve to strengthen the Union's identity. Although receiving positive outcomes and increasing its powers with this shift in policy areas, the 'cross-pillar regime' of the EU prevents the Union from

²³ Hazel Smith, **European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it does**, London, Pluto Pres, 2006, p.2

strengthening its institutional and political identity. In fact this is the point where actually the issue becomes complicated, as the problem of the institutional identity or failure of the EU, is an internal and institutional disability. As according to my opinion, the EU is already an actor certainly giving reference to mostly its economic successes which can not be underestimated. But when it comes to the political and diplomatic side of the situation the EU lacks consensus in responding to certain causes around the world due to the divergence of the Member States interests as well as the multiple actors (*institutions*) within the EU.

For a better understanding, there is a need to detail the 3 pillar structure of the EU. The Treaty on the EU (TEU) introduced the 3 pillar structure, which consists of the Community Pillar, the CFSP and, justice and home affairs (*renamed as the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters*). The crux of matter at this point, is that, each of the three pillars listed above have a foreign policy dimension. Each one of these includes different actors, institutions and decision-making methods. For instance the community pillar consists of the Union's foreign economic policy. This type of foreign policy refers to the Union's relations with third parties in the realm of common commercial policy, development policy (*where only involves trade*) and other areas for instance within today's context humanitarian aid, educational partnerships, environmental issues etc. which fall in the community pillar of the EU. The EU is very successful within this area where the EU institutions having exclusive competences and the Member States enjoying a reconciliation among themselves for fulfilling goals in common. The EU signing agreements with third parties for instance, the Lome Convention (1975) which was replaced by the Cotonou agreement (2003) with the African Caribbean and Pacific states, partnership and cooperation agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia which also cover an educational partnership dimension, association agreements with the European Economic Area countries²⁴ all have shown different levels of success.

The second pillar of the community foreign policy is the CFSP. There are some criticisms to be made as mentioned above the success of foreign economic policy can not be witnessed within the CFSP field. Located as the second pillar with the TEU and based on an intergovernmental bargaining process there are some shortcomings where the Union is still not capable of fulfilling. The CFSP and the ESDP here are the elements to be analyzed in order for detailing the success of the EU as an international actor. Certainly it must be marked here that the EU has an important rank within the international arena where its role can not be underestimated, but it is also obvious that the CFSP is not able to meet the demands from both inside and outside the community.²⁵ The coordination among the three pillars in certain cases is so closely related that they can not be distinguished. The main reason for this is the institutional framework, where

²⁴ Christopher Piening, **Global Europe, The European Union in World Affairs**, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007, Table 1.2.

²⁵ Martin Holland, "Bridging the Capability- Expectations Gap: A case study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.33, No. 4, 1995, p. 557.

some institutions namely the Commission being involved in the process where competence actually falls within the Member States. On the other hand the community foreign policy in specific areas covers either of the first and second pillars or in some cases in fact all the three of them. For instance the well known sample is the so called ‘petersberg tasks’ taken into the Amsterdam Treaty refers to the three pillars of the EU. Covering humanitarian, combat forces, crises management and peacekeeping dimensions; it falls into competence of the all three pillars of the EU²⁶, which in a point of my view is the main obstacle for the EU strengthening its political identity.

In addition to the aforementioned pillars, starting with the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, it is clear that the EU is on its way developing military means to be employed when dealing with crises around the world, which has been developed under the CFSP and later became known as the ESDP. The well known Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) has been established for use in conflict ridden regions. The criticism to be made about the RRF is about the way it is employed, which is all about the Union’s identity, giving birth to the question of, do the civilian or military missions reflect a common EU identity? Since 2003 the Union has launched 15 missions in different parts of the world, 10 of which are actually civilian crises management operations. The civilian / military dilemma will be discussed further within this paper. However, the point which has to be marked here is that these crises management operations, known as ‘joint actions’ by the EU, are not so joint after all, at least in the phase of implementation. When analyzing these missions, one might come across a single state’s hegemony in these operations, which is usually about a Member State having deep interests in that country or region in which the operation has been launched. So the question appears: how ‘European’ are these operations? Are they actually ‘European’, that is, do they involve multiple Member States, or are they purely French/British European? There are examples of this French/British initiative, such as, the EUFOR TCHAD mission which was maintained under a great majority of French forces and civilian personnel, or the EUPOL Afghanistan mission which was primarily under German leadership, or even operations including contributors from non-EU Member States. How could these arrangements provide positive contributions for an entity searching a common political identity?

In addition to its search for political identity, the EU is showing progress in developing its institutional identity. Certainly, the EU itself is aware of how complex its institutional framework is becoming, and that is why, when the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) was introduced, the Articles within the Treaty which first drew attention were related with strengthening the Union’s institutional identity, which would result in overcoming the Union’s lack of coherence and consistency. When analyzed in detail, these innovations within the ToL can be summarized as the introduction of a permanent President within the European Council, who would facilitate the EU’s ability to ‘speak with a single voice’ to a certain degree (*ToL, Article 9B, paragraph 5*). Another innovation introduced by the ToL, probably more considerable than the permanent

²⁶ Annegret Bendiek, “Cross- Pillar Security Regime Building in the European Union: Effects of the European Security Strategy of December 2003”, *European Integration Online Papers (EIoP)* Vol. 10, No.9 2006, p. 9.

President, is the modification of the ‘High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’, who would hold the responsibilities of both the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. The modified HR will have the responsibilities of “conduct security and foreign policy on behalf of the Council” (*ToL, Article 9E, paragraph 2*) and “conduct of political dialogue with third parties, and shall express the Union’s position in International Organizations and at intergovernmental conferences” (*ToL, Article 13A, paragraph 2*). Clearly, this appointment would be known as ‘double – hatted’ and would be of great help combining the Union’s ‘cross-pillar regime’ into a single body, which in a point of my view is the most important obstacle the Union, must overcome. If the ToL is ratified successfully, that is if it does not share the same fate as the Constitutional Treaty, it will gather momentum in the Union’s institutional identity. This identity building is also something about the EU’s vision which is suffering between concepts like civilian, normative, military, or militarizing etc.

Distinct from the concept of actorness, is the more important issue of whether the EU is a civilian, normative or a military power that directly reflects its identity. It is evident that the EU is expanding its policies both through widening and deepening. But the sticky point appears to be, will the EU manage the implementation of these policies as a single unit within a reliable and acute manner? Leaving aside the institutional structure of the EU, the paper will now focus on how these components of the EU reflect a vision to the outside world, as a civilian, normative or as a militarizing EU power

Circling Around the EU Power Concepts: Civilian, Normative or Military?

As discussed above the EU’s actorness certainly reflects a vision towards the outside world, which is debated highly among scholars, about whether the Union is a civilian, normative, military or even a militarizing power. If we were to talk about a state’s security or defense policy it would be actually based on military elements and means but when it comes to *soft power* EU or *civilian/normative*? We might see that the debate on matters covered under defense and security concepts does not always lead to purely military means. As within the ESDP there is a great expansion of instruments to be applied to crises both civilian and military. In order to be clear, my point of my view is that, the EU is a civilian power rather than normative or military.

In order not to cause any contradictions, the terms *civilian*, *military* and *normative* power have to be laid down for a deeper understanding. The *civilian* concept introduced by Duchêne (1973) defines the EU (then the EEC) relying itself on purely soft mechanisms, namely economic.²⁷ According to Karen Smith “*civilian*, means non-military and includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments, and

²⁷ See, Duchêne, F. ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’ in Kohnstamm, M. And Hager, W. (eds.), **A Nation Writ Large? Foreign - Policy Problems before the European Community**, 1973, London, Macmillan.

military, means involving the use of armed forces’’.²⁸ On the contrary to Smith, Hanns Maull argues that “an actor may use military instruments and still can be a civilian power’’.²⁹ He further stresses that “civilian powers concentrate on non- military, primarily economic means to secure goals, but retain military power to safeguard other means of international interaction’’.³⁰

There are definitions made by Twitchett (1976) and Maull (1990) on the civilian power concept, which Manners emphasizes is “being the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co- operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to achieve international progress’’.³¹ This definition makes reference to a civilian type of actorness, built on civilian means, which also underline, in my point of view, in which the EU remains successful, making use of its economic successes, and favoring diplomacy through the consciousness of playing with words (*a concept known as euphemism*), rather than playing with arms. The ‘civilian ends’, the EU tasks, is strengthening international cooperation, solidarity, the diffusion of equality, and justice³². If the EU is committed to the aforementioned ends, then what differs from being civilian to normative? It is actually the means, and the way in which the EU employs them towards 3rd parties. This is about using “material assets and physical power’’,³³ in the civilian concept, or the “non-material, contagion of norms through imitation and attraction’’,³⁴ in normative. Although Manners has put forward five distinctions between the concepts normative and civilian, the most important in a point of my view, is the aforementioned clarification on how the EU employs its ends. The discussion will be further below through the analysis of normative power EU.

Leaving the *Military* concept to be discussed below with the questions of how military and successful is the Union in carrying out its crises management tools, now the paper will concentrate on the EU being a normative power or not. Normative power according to Manners is “neither military nor purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions’’,³⁵ he further stresses, the importance of the EU trying to spread the norms, which it has built its integration on. Arguing, the Union is a civilian power, but on the other hand acknowledging that civilian powers rely on soft power, does cause a contradiction. According to Nye (2004) soft power is having “the ability

²⁸ Karen E. Smith, “Still civilian power EU?”, **European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper**, 2005/1, <<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU%20Working%20Paper%202005-1.pdf>> (08.02.2009), p.1

²⁹ **Ibid.**, Karen E. Smith, p.7.

³⁰ **Ibid.**, Karen E. Smith, p.7.

³¹ Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, 2002, Vol. 40, No: 2, p. 236- 237.

³² **Maull (1990) & Duchene (1973) cited in** Karen E. Smith, “Still Civilian Power EU”, **op.cit.**, p.3

³³ Ian Manners, 2006, **op.cit.**, p.176

³⁴ **Ibid.**, Ian Manners, p.176

³⁵ Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe”, **Journal of International Studies**, 2005, Vol. 33, No: 33, p.615.

to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments''³⁶, this is what most scholars put forward when defining the EU as a normative power. It mostly rests on the awards (*political, symbolic or material*) employed by the Union towards third countries or regions, in which it safeguards its foreign and security concerns.

From this point of view, it could be argued that being normative rests on both multilateralism and international law in which those universal norms and principles could be spread and guaranteed. But what exactly has to be underlined here is, within this normative ends, there is a dilemma of norms versus interests. The questions here appear to be, firstly, how compliant is the EU in practicing those norms or principles it has promised to safeguard? And, secondly, does the EU practice in spreading those values, norms etc. the same way with all the 3rd parties which it has relations with?

An answer to the above questions requires the debate of which logic of action shapes the EU's relations, is it the logic of consequentiality or the logic of appropriateness? In other words, is it either the sum of 'costs and benefits' or 'norms and rules'? Appropriateness includes rules of both normative and cognitive components. March & Olsen define these rules as 'being followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected and legitimate''³⁷. Acting appropriately 'is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good''³⁸. On the other hand, the logic of consequentiality puts forward, certain preconditions which determine the action to be taken. These are being aware of capabilities, analysis of several options, and calculation of the costs and benefits. The question is whether the EU follows this appropriate action? Is it really those norms, values or morals which stimulate the EU to take action, or purely the calculation of interests? In a point of my view, the EU, decides/shapes its relations with the logic of consequentiality rather than appropriateness. If an empirical underpinning is to be made, it is obvious that the EU has different agendas through its bilateral or multilateral agreements.

According to Hettne & Söderbaum, the EU's relations with East Asia through the Asia- Europe Meeting (ASEM) is 'symmetrical, in which the EU does not seek to impose such norms and practices on the Asian counterpart''³⁹, however, the EU's relations with the Mercosur states is rather asymmetrical, in which the EU, besides economic relations, imposes certain norms (democracy, human rights etc.) towards the

³⁶ Cited in Hiski Haukkala, 'The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy', **Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA)** 4th Convention, 2006, <<http://www.cceisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=164113/Haukkala.pdf>> (05.07.2009), p.6

³⁷ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Logic of Appropriateness', **Arena Working Paper**, 04/09, Centre for European Studies, <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf> (15.07.2009), p.3

³⁸ **Ibid.**, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, p.4.

³⁹ Björn Hettne and Frerdik Söderbaum, **op.cit.**, p. 548

Mercosur states. This is certainly about interests vs. norms. Hettne & Söderbaum put it forward as “the interests of the strongest”⁴⁰ namely ‘soft imperialism’.

Leaving aside whether the EU is a soft or hard power, it is more worthy to lay down how the Union softens or hardens its ends in an instrumentalist manner when it comes to fulfilling long term goals. There are several examples which could be laid down to weaken the normative power argument in the EU discourse. For instance, the EU’s response to the results of the democratic elections in Austria (2000), in which the *Alliance For the future of Austria* found a seat in the coalition government, was entirely undemocratic. Another example of such hypocrisy was the Union’s response or lets say lack of response (even in the realm of discourse) to Pakistan when Pervez Masharraf came to power with a coup d’etat in 1999. There are similar examples which could be listed reflecting the Union’s normative or non-normative vision. Some scholars acknowledge this behavior of the EU in the framework of norms vs. interests dilemma, as defined in Wolfers “*milieu vs. possession goals*”.⁴¹ Scholars like Tocci, defines this as the EU trying to fulfill *milieu goals* which are “essentially concerned with the wider environment within which international relations unfold”.⁴² According to these approaches the Union is exercising these norms for the benefit of itself and of the partners which share the same values. That is why they do not reflect certain self interests. Another point within this self and common interest dilemma is, when the Member States of the Union realize that using the EU label is inevitable, they certainly make a strong use of it through Europeanizing their long term goals from national to the EU level. When analyzing these objectives, it can be seen that, there is a transformation of self interests into common interests accepted by the rest of the Member States. However, what about *possession goals*? Besides protecting the universal values jointly with other organizations, what about the interests of the EU throughout its agreements or relations? For instance Smith argues “the EU’s enlargement policy contains both milieu and possession goals”.⁴³ Similarly, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also includes norms as well as interest. Besides establishing (*at least aiming to*) an area of security and stability, the EU is expanding its area of influence, namely room for maneuver.

To some degree, it might be admitted with the Union’s normative vision employed both inside and outside the Union. But singling out normative power as a separate way of acting does not make any sense in which the EU is incapable of fulfilling. At the utmost, normative could only be a part of being a civilian power, which remains as a mechanism to be used when serving the benefits of the ones exercising them, just as how Thomas Diez defines ‘civilian power’ within this context or labeled as “a norm

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Björn Hettneard and Frerdik Söderbaum, p. 547

⁴¹ See Arnold Wolfers, “The Goals of Foreign Policy”, (Chapter Five) **Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics**, 1962, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Pres.

⁴² Nathalia Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The EU and its Global Partners”, **CEPS Working Document**,_No. 279/ 2007, <http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1578> (25.01.2009), p.4

⁴³ Karen E. Smith, *op.cit.*, p.7

exporting ‘civilian’ power’.⁴⁴ That is why Smith has put forward the argument that, ‘being’ and ‘exercising’ normative power requires a clarification.⁴⁵ It is obvious that the EU exercises normative ends, but as a result this does not make it a normative power.

There are even marginal approaches among scholars in classifying EU institutions on one hand as normative and on the other as civilian. Certainly there is a complex relation between the institutions of the EU which can be acknowledged when it comes to external relations, but the situation is not actually the argument of having different characters, but is mostly the divergence of discourses. That is why the ‘normative’ concept of the EU should be treated as a ‘normative vision’ as an installment within the civilian power EU, rather than normative power. In a point of my view, the EU being ‘normative’ and ‘power’ is not a suitable wording, in which does not fulfill each other.

Non- Military, Militarizing or Military- (Power) EU?

Acknowledging normative within the civilian context, the paper will concentrate on the dilemma of civilian / military power EU with the questions of, does the military components of the Union harm its civilian notion, are they actually necessary, and if so, for what? If we are to analyze the EU within this context, it could be seen that the EU throughout its integration process is built on civilian notions and principles. Recent developments within the military concept have opened up this debate. The evolution of the ESDP to some degree has an important impact on EU’s civilian notion. Absorbing the mechanisms of the Western European Union (*Petersberg missions*) and developing new tools (*Rapid Reaction Force*) for carrying out missions abroad do harm the civilian notion of the EU. That is why, there is a need in analyzing the EU crises management tools for figuring out the military means of the Union in practice. The question is, does the EU employ these tools as a coercive mission, or are they used for rendering those principles it is safeguarding as a multilateral force. It is clear that, the developments within the military realm are for preserving peace and resolving conflicts. The missions employed by the Union are defensive rather than offensive. These missions have the goal of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, but the point here is that, becoming more and more relying on these tools and making a clear distinction between the civilian and military crises management will certainly cause a contradiction and will deserve a reconsideration of the Union’s civilian or military power dichotomy.

The developments of the military capabilities mentioned above are important signs of the militarization of the EU. That is why; there is a need to clarify the concepts ‘military’ and ‘militarizing’. Smith defines ‘military actor’, ‘‘which uses military means, relies on coercion to influence other actors for pursuing military or militarized ends, through an undemocratic foreign policy process ’’.⁴⁶ It is evident that the EU is not a military power (at least for now). The aforementioned definition of ‘military actor’

⁴⁴ Andrea Ciambra, ‘‘Normative Power Europe: theory and practice of EU norms. The case of Macedonia’’, **Jean Monnet Working Papers**, No.64, <<http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp64.pdf>> (18.12.2008), p.11

⁴⁵ Karen E. Smith, **op.cit.**, p.1

⁴⁶ Smith, **op.cit.**, p.5

makes it clear that the EU is not such kind of an actor. Nevertheless then how can one define the developments within the ESDP? The concept ‘militarizing’ has been put forward in demonstrating the military means developed under the ESDP. That is, there is a need to make an analysis of those means.

So what are these military capabilities, which in a point of my view do negate the EU’s civilian notion? Initiated with the Helsinki European Council (1999), the aim of the EU was at first to gather ‘‘60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year’’.⁴⁷ These ambitions (*later became known as European Union Force*) (EUFOR) were fulfilled more or less during the following years, which were even reinforced with the Headline Goal 2010. The EU also started practicing EUFOR in operations. Firstly replacing NATO led SFOR and IFOR as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Tchad in Chad, and EUFOR DR Congo in Democratic Republic of Congo. Certainly each of these operations has their own specific characteristic, due to the amount of troops, timing, the Member States contributions etc. Besides EUFOR, what was underlined in the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 was the obligation of establishing ‘smaller response elements’ (*later what became EU Battle groups*⁴⁸) (BG’s) at short notice. Both EUFOR and EU BG’s have been fully deployable from the 1st January 2007. The former is established with a big capacity of large amounts of troops, while the latter is more towards crises requiring immediate response with small groups of troops. However, what is to be noted is that, these operations mentioned above are purely military operations conducted by the EU. Apart from EUFOR and EU BG’s, the EU has launched the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) in 2006. EGF is established with the agreement of five⁴⁹ Member States of the EU. The EGF is a European intervention force, which will militarize police functions and specialize in crises management.⁵⁰

Another question at this point is does the Union need developing such military means. The EU which is often named as been built on the *Kantian pacifism* certainly needs preserving this notion. Certainly this is actually under questioning after Bull’s (1982) contribution of ‘‘a civilian power cannot be a pacifist power or a neutral power

⁴⁷ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.103.

⁴⁸ The battle groups are based on the principle of multinationality and may be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States for an autonomous EU operation. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A battle group is associated with a deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics. Member States may also contribute niche capabilities, providing specific elements with added value to the battle groups. The battle groups are sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. EU Council Secretariat, **Factsheet**, ‘‘EU Battlegroup’’, Feb.2007, p.2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf> (01.08.2009)

⁴⁹ France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain

⁵⁰ <<http://www.eurogendfor.org/referencetexts/EGF%20Treaty%20english%20version.pdf>> (03.08.2009)

in the 20th century and beyond’.⁵¹ But, what if the EU becomes a military force, or use purely military means, which according to some scholars ‘can be of a civilian type if it promotes human rights and democratic principles’. According to my opinion, civilian means or using civilian elements still lead to become powerful, and that, instead of developing such tools (military) the Union should concentrate on soft elements for instance indirect ways of reaching goals within the realms of security and defense. The (de) securitization concept by Waever (1996) explains as how important security concerns might be eliminated through different approaches which mostly rely on discourses or namely *language of security*. For Waever, security is ‘a ‘self referential’ practice not a question of measuring the seriousness of various threats...’.⁵² For instance, Jones (1999) puts it forward as ‘To desecuritize an issue is to remove it from the realm of the politics of survival and thus to render it amenable to more cooperative forms of behavior’.⁵³ The EU on one hand is trying to create a ‘ring of friends’ through its well known Neighborhood Policy and Euro- Mediterranean Dialogue, which covers positive discourses and a cooperative manner, but on the other hand, the EU is also working towards strengthening its military means through not being satisfied with the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, moving towards strengthening its ESDP unilaterally, which contradicts with itself.

Starting with the Amsterdam treaty, the Union is now under such a contradiction that, nearly all official documents under the CFSP pillar include wordings such as; *deployable forces, defense capability, aircraft carrier, battle groups etc.* which do harm its civilian notion even if we put aside the ongoing missions and operations conducted by the Union. That is why the Union should avoid from such developments both in the realm of discourse and practice. Otherwise it is creating confusion, in which gives birth to different perceptions as a civilian, military or as a militarizing kind of force. And once the EU is addressed as a military kind of force, it will be evaluated in the same basket as the US, which would even worsen the Union’s relations with 3rd parties. This is about the EU (for now) which is trying to reach certain goals through soft mechanisms (regulatory, coercive or framework) but in the future, if the Union continues developing its ESDP tools, weather it will be used or not, will cause negative impacts in its relations. For instance, Stavridis (2001) building on Bull’s work, puts it forward as ‘sanctions should not only be seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the extreme case of using force’.⁵⁴ This kind of a misperception in 3rd countries or regions towards the EU will certainly cause a reconsideration of the nature of the EU and its integration process. These kinds of developments will be

⁵¹ Stelios Stavridis, ‘‘Why the ‘Militarising’ of the European Union is strengthening the concept of a ‘Civilian Power Europe’’, 2001/17, **EUI Working Papers**, <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/01_17.pdf> (11.02.2009), p.18

⁵² Ole Waever, ‘‘European Security Identities’’, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, 1996, Vol. 34, No.1, pp. 106-107.

⁵³ Richard Wyn Jones, **Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory**, 1999, Lynce Rienner Publishers, p.109

⁵⁴ Stavridis, **op cit.**, p. 16.

questioned both in and outside the Union. When analyzing the concepts civilian and military, it is often referenced to the impact of outside relations and interactions. But within an entity like the EU, what is more important is how this impact will be evaluated internally in the Union. Differently from civilian, becoming a military force brings together serious doubts. Any misuse of military means gives birth to different problems. If we were to talk about a state, any such kind of problems would probably end up with the removal of that authority from office in that country. But when it comes to an entity like the Union, it comes to mind of how all this will end up within the EU. Matlary has made the critic of “using military force does not go down well with democratic publics when the issue is not one of existential survival...”.⁵⁵ If nowadays debating whether the Union is acting in a military or a militarizing capacity, the concern which has been mentioned above would likely come to debate as well. The citation made above about the ‘milieu goals’ of the Union which is defined as; “essentially concerned with the wider environment within which international relations unfold”⁵⁶, is something very important on how the EU’s militarizing process will be evaluated within that international environment.

I do not agree with the argument of the military power EU, but taking further steps in making progress towards militarizing itself, do negates its civilian notion. And actually when compared with other systemic actors such as US, Russia or even China in the realm of military means, it could be examined that each of them has a great use of power through their military mechanisms (implementation, tools, arms etc.). Debating their strength of military capabilities starts with analyzing their military doctrines or national security strategies, in which, it is clearly identified how they acknowledge or address threats against their security, and the procedures they follow in eliminating them. Comparing these aforementioned actors and their behaviors with the Union, it could be seen from the very beginning that, even in the realm of addressing threats differs from the ones listed above. No matter how or when the EU will increase its military capabilities, what is more important, appears to be the perception of a common political thought/will in security and defense, which would back up the capabilities of the Union, and transforming the EU more than what is nowadays debated as a ‘strategic actor’.⁵⁷ The EU insists on dealing with security concerns should be the work of multilateral institutions and what international law points out. But this is only a way to be preferred when dealing with crises management or threats; it is not the way in putting forward a common security and defense policy. On the other hand, the actors listed above are closer to the belief of international law and multilateralism being insufficient in dealing with certain threats. The use of military forces is always at hand in which

⁵⁵ Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible? 2006, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37 (1), p.106

⁵⁶ Tocci, *op cit.*, p.4.

⁵⁷ The concept ‘strategic actor’ here is used according to the definition made by Hyde-Price, as; *both the ability to threaten the use of force through coercive diplomacy and the ability to actually deploy such force*. Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security, Strategic Culture and, the Use of Force”, *European Security*, 2004, 13 (4) 323 – 343.

they do not hesitate using. Such examples can be laid down as the US invasion of Iraq, or more recently the Russian military intervention to Georgia etc.

For a more detailed analysis, the EU's increasing military role and its mechanisms will be discussed below within the framework of crises management. The questions put forward within this framework are, is the military crises management of the Union solely military, should it be, or would a congruent relation between civilian and military crises management be of good help for reflecting the Union's civilian actorness.

Civilian and Military Crises Management: A Distinct, Why Not Holistic?

The evolution of ESDP starting from 1999 resulted with the EU handling both civilian and military crises management. The distinction made between the civilian and military crises management tools are harming the Union's civilian notion. Civilian crises management when compared to military crises management remains successful. Certainly the reason behind this success of civilian means is the nature (*decision-making*) in operating civilian missions easier when compared to military crises management. This is where civilian crises management differs from military, as it falls under the competence of both the first and the second pillar, and military crises management is maintained under the intergovernmental second pillar only. Howorth puts forward that "Civilian crises management covers a much broader range of instruments than the military component of ESDP and involves a much greater degree of institutional flexibility, since it calls on agencies from all three 'pillars' of the EU".⁵⁸

It is not a surprise that the EU is receiving success in its civilian operations, as the vision of the EU which is argued in this paper, is built on a civilian notion, which is still to sum degree preserved. By using the wording of *preserve* what is meant is that, the EU should sustain its civilian vision rather than military. Ian Manners (2004) argues that otherwise the EU would cause a contradiction with itself. And if it is to carry out military operations these should be maintained under U.N mandate only.⁵⁹ Actually the confusion here is two footed, the first problem is what Christopher Hill points clearly as the "capabilities – expectations gap",⁶⁰ in which the EU falls short, due to its limited sources, instruments and the ability in using them, and on the other hand the civilian or military power dilemma still causing a diffusion. Certainly there are some elements of military means evolving within the ESDP which are acknowledged and can not be underestimated, but reaching those means (*such as the Rapid Reaction Force for military crises management*) does not refer being and handling military crises management within a full motion in practice; from pre to post crises era. The reason of criticizing the military operations of the EU within a harsh view is not just because of the EU's lack, in responding to them rather very unsuccessfully, but it is, because the

⁵⁸ Howorth, *op.cit.*, p.93

⁵⁹ Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: From Civilian to Military power: the EU at crossroads?", **CIDEL Workshop**, Oslo 22-23 October 2004, <<http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Manners.pdf>> (27.01.2009), p.20

⁶⁰ Christopher Hill, "The Capability – Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 31, No.3, 1993, p. 315.

EU should refrain from any unilateral act covering purely military means. Then why not avoiding embarrassment? It is not necessary becoming military to be a global actor. Carr emphasizes that “Political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power”.⁶¹ And that is why; the Union must never subordinate its *humanitarian* feature. The missions should be built on “one mandate, one mission head, and one mission structure”.⁶² That is why; the paper puts forth the argument of why not integrating civilian and military means in a single framework, with a single political-strategic aim.

In a point of my view the civilian and military concepts should not be distinguished as they are reinforced by each other. Biscop (2006) names this as a *holistic* approach. The *holistic* concept identifies, on one hand integrating civilian and military means in crises management, and on the other refers to the EU working close with other organizations (U.N, NATO, OECD) within its crises management⁶³ in which it seeks a cooperative manner, and multilateralism, which is defined as *negotiated order* but developing and strengthening military crises management tools and dissociating them separately from civilian mechanisms would sooner or later push the EU towards a unilateral act, and a kind of an *imposed order*.

That is why; in a point of my view military means must be integrated with civilian and moreover even subordinated by civilian means. According to scholars like Lindborg (2002)⁶⁴ and Nowak (2006)⁶⁵ the civilian crises concept has evolved through the experience the EU had faced during the crises in the western Balkans (*namely Kosovo*) as the issue was not only to be handled by military means but also supporting the construction of the region afterwards was one of the ultimate goal for the EU (*like keeping an eye on the region*).⁶⁶ However if the issue is to be considered within a general framework, the EU has developed as a civilian actor up to the late 1990’s on the international stage. But especially starting with the St. Malo Declaration the issue is now debated over the civilian or military power concepts. If we are to look inside the EU, there is a divergence among the Member States, as for instance, on one hand UK

⁶¹ Robert Nalbanov, “Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia”, **Caucasian Review of International Affairs**, Vol.3 (1) Winter 2009, <http://cria-online.org/6_3.html> (02.08.2009)

⁶² The ‘one mandate, one mission head, and one mission structure’ is retrieved from Blair’s approach in analyzing the SSR mission in Guinea Bissau, where military and civilian personnel work together. Stephanie Blair, “Towards Integration? Unifying Military and Civilian ESDP Operations”, **European Security Review, ISIS**, No.44, May 2009, <http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_272_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf> (01.08.2009), p.3

⁶³ Sven Biscop, “The international Security Engagement of the European Union- Courage and Capabilities for a more active EU”, **International Policy Analysis Unit**, Report from the first European Strategic Forum, Warsaw, 2006 pp. 4-6.

⁶⁴ Chris Lindborg, “European Approaches to Civilian Crises Management”, **British American Security Information Council, Basic Special Report**, 2002, <<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2002ccm.pdf>> (25.12.2008)

⁶⁵ Agnieszka Nowak, “Civilian Crises Management within ESDP” in Civilian crises management: the EU way **Chaillot Paper**, No.90, (ed.) by Agnieszka Nowak June 2006, Institute for Security Studies.

⁶⁶**Ibid.**, Agnieszka Nowak, p. 18.

and France pushing towards for a more active ESDP in which they do also differ on this military means, such as UK favoring to focus on crises management, and France willing for a collective defense and contrary to both of them, Germany standing closer for a civilian power EU. Because of this divergence among the Member States, the Union still lacks a civilian or military doctrine which can guide it through its responses to crises. Ian Manners defines this, as the lack of cultururation, capabilities and conciliation between the Member States.⁶⁷ This lack certainly is rooted in the Member States interests, each favoring a different kind of dimension in the integration process, for instance: integrationists, Atlanticists or neutrals. Certainly the aim of this paper is not discussing the divergence of approaches towards military power EU, instead, is the need for integrating civilian and military means all together. However, more important than compromising on a doctrine, the point is how these means are developing. Matlary, making reference to Clausewitz & Brodie, puts forward that; ...war as an instrument of policy, war as a political tool. The clue to an EU strategic culture is to understand that 'war' in this context will mean the military tool integrated with other tools. The ongoing work on civil-military integration, the stress on crises management and a 'European way of war' point in the direction of a carefully framed use of force.⁶⁸

The aforementioned definition made by Matlary is certainly a positive approach towards explaining the need of integrating civilian and military means, but how will this 'European way of war' result? In addition to the evolution of these crises management civilian or military, the EU has repeated several times that certain threats can not be handled only with military means, and this is why some scholars have the opinion that especially in the future operations, there will be increasingly joined up and joint operations including civilian and military means simultaneously.⁶⁹ According to Howorth "without the complementary deployment of civilian instruments of crises management, the application of naked military power can often lead to failure".⁷⁰ The developments within the Union are also proving these arguments, for instance the establishment of the Civilian Military Cell (*CivMil Cell*) under the EU Military Staff in 2003, showed the need of more united civilian and military units.⁷¹ For the sake of relations, especially with partner USA, this is actually what the EU needs to fulfill, which is another reason that some politicians and scholars put forward when criticizing the Union's military means which will result damaging the transatlantic relations.

It is well known that when analyzing crises management under civilian means there is a wide range of tools falling under different groupings. The classification made by the Union, is built on six headings, shortly these are named as political measures, sanctions, possible crises actions & related EC instruments, specialized sectoral

⁶⁷ Manners, *op cit.*, pp. 2-4.

⁶⁸ Matlary, *op.cit.*, p.112

⁶⁹ Gerard Quille, & Giovanni Gasparani & Roberto Menotti & Nicoletta Pirozzi "Developing EU Civil Military coordination: The role of the new Civilian Military Cell", **Joint report by ISIS Europe and CEMISS**, (ed.) Stephen Pullinger 2006, p.14.

⁷⁰ Howorth, *op.cit.*, p.93

⁷¹ Catriona Gourlay, "European Union Procedures and Resources for Crises Management", **International Peacekeeping**, Vol.11, No.3, 2004 p. 404.

assistance instruments, CFSP actions in third countries and long term geographical assistance instruments. In fact these tools are also classified under the period of crises which they are deployed to, for instance dealing with pre, active or post crises operations.⁷² Certainly for a more tidy and short explanation we may classify these instruments as Political, Economic and Specialized assistance instruments. In fact the most important dimension within the civilian crises management is, the EU's pursuit of establishing both capacity and capability to act before such crises or conflicts occur, known as preventive activities.⁷³ Since 2003 the EU has started using its instruments in launching 15 missions in different parts of the world in which 10 of these are civilian crises management operations.⁷⁴ These civilian missions were built with a divergence of different objectives, from civil protection, to police forces or from monitoring missions to supporting civil administration.

Finally it is important to underline that nearly all Member States of the Union have contributed in some way for the successes to be achieved in civilian crises management, which is something that can not be seen in military crises management, which are being mostly maintained under the monopoly of one or two Member States (*namely United Kingdom and France*). But in civilian operations it could be witnessed that there is more accepted consensus among the states each contributing with different tools and mechanisms for the success of the missions.

Actually integrating civilian and military crises management within a single framework would be of great help for the EU in defining its actorness, as a civilian power, which I acknowledge should be clearly identified. This would fade away the confrontation of civilian or military power EU, which is the ongoing dilemma weakening the Union's identity.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to evaluate the identity of the EU alongside with its increasing role in the international order. The paper labels the Union as an important actor through making a distinction between actorness and identity. The EU has a certain degree of influence in world affairs, but the lack of the Union's actorness, is the absence of a stable political identity. Being an entity consisting of a sum of multiple actors, which are the Member States plus the institutions of the Union, certainly makes it difficult to maintain or even establish stable political traditions or discourses. It is obvious that the EU is using its economic relations as a tool for fulfilling its political interests around the

⁷² European Commission, Conflict Prevention and Crises Management Unit, 'Civilian Instruments for EU Crises Management', 2003, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/doc/cm03.pdf> (19.01.2009)

⁷³ European Council, 'Civilian Headline Goal 2008', Brussels, 2004, **DG E IX**, <<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st15/st15863.en04.pdf>> (01.12.2008)

⁷⁴ 'European Security and Defense Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management', **EU Council Secretariat**, 2007, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Background_JPO_2007-Civilian_aspects_compressed.pdf> (01.12.2008)

world. But the problem is the way they are implemented in which the CFSP is to a certain degree overshadowed.

Certainly considering the EU as an important civilian power, it is also obvious that there is a need for increasing its act both within the institutional and procedural framework. It is evident that the EU integration is not on a halt and with its dynamic character will continue expanding its policies, borders, institutions etc. which could be acknowledged as slowing down its integration towards a political unity. Welcoming more and more Member States obviously is the most important obstacle in front of achieving this unity. Certainly this ongoing dynamic process, which is also defined as a process of social learning in policy – making, is another aspect weakening the identity of the Union. The interaction among the politicians and institutions both at national and supranational level are into a mutual effect shaping the policy making and implementing procedures, which do carry different political motives from each party. This structure certainly makes it difficult reflecting a strong presence. Even in the ad hoc working groups or informal meetings this policy shaping can be witnessed. These are all related with the EU's complex structure which affects its actorness in the international arena.

The paper considers the Union as an international actor, a civilian power, although reflecting a different kind of character when compared to others. Another point, the paper underlines is how the Union will maintain deepening its actorness with an unstable and changeable identity. The paper considers the EU as a civilian actor, which must act in consistency when developing policies in the foreign and security realms. This consistency must be furthered in a civilian vision through putting forward civilian means rather than military. As even if we put aside the Union's practice in military means, the ongoing discourse and debates on *military* or *militarizing* EU harms its civilian notion, which this paper has tried to make an overall analysis. To sum up, certain developments in military means should not be singled out from civilian means in crises management. There is certainly a must in integrating them in order to avoid any offensive perception which might be loaded to the Union's international presence.

As defined within the paper, facing the realities both in its internal and external relations the EU is continuously gains experience for taking further steps in developing its legal personality. The Union to sum degree, thanks to *Europeanization* and *Brusselization* has managed overcoming certain obstacles. But this personality will become truly evident when the policy– making (within the realms of CFSP & ESDP) of the Union will not become subordinated by the Member States of the EU. A convergence in this national versus common interests urgently needs attention in establishing a common identity, which will end up with strengthening the Union's actorness.

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