MILITARY INFLUENCE AND COALITION GOVENMENTS AS INPUTS INTO MINISTERIAL ATTRIBUTES, ATTITUDES AND JOB RISKS: TURKEY 1961-1972*

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The Council of Ministers, or the Cabinet as it is commonly called, occupies a strategic place in a parliamentary politial system. It often initiates the major public policies ,it is responsible for implementing them and it is the center from which governmental parties draw guidance.

The formation of cabinets takes place under many constraints, some deriving from factors originating in the political parties that are charged with forming the government, others from the environment in which the government will operate. This paper will examine two such constraints - the necessity to form a coalition an the level of military influence in politics. We seek to examine how these variables may influence some attributes and attitudes of ministers serving in given cabinets as well as the influence of these two variables on post-ministerial experiences.

The Political Role of the Military :

The high incidence of military intervention in the politics of developing countries has given impetus to many research efforts

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about the role of the military in the political processes of these countries. Many types of intervention and different political roles that the military can assume have been identified[1]. Although finer distinctions are possible and have been made, the political role of the military may be viewed as being either basically active or passive. A passive role would imply that governments would be formed by conventional political processes and would not be coerced into pursuing policies and activites by threats of intervention by the military. This definition does not exlude the possibility that civilian governments might be constrained by the choices or desires of the military. Rather, it merely suggests that when the political role of the military is passive, the constraints imposed by military organizations on civilian officials do not approximate a veto. An active role, on the other hand, would imply either that a group if military men take over the government and exercise political power with the consent and the support of the armed forces or that the military leadership designates what policies are to receive priority and who constitutes an acceptable team to carry them out.

Coalition Governments :

While coalitions may take many forms, they have one characteristic in common. The power to govern a polity is shared by more than one organization. Such organizations may or may not have their primary purpose defined as working to achieve public office.

Our major contention, to be spelled out in detail later, is that both the degree of military influence and the structural origins of a government (coalition vs. one-party governance) will affect the attributes of those recruited to ministerial office. These variables will

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1) Studies of the political role of the military are too numerous to cite here. An earlier but comprehensive treatment of the topic can be found in S.E. Finer, **The Man on Horseback : The Role of the Military in Politics** (New York : Praeger, 1962). Others include John Jay Johnson, **The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries** (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1962). For a case study, see Ergun Özbudun, **The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics** (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Center for International Affairs, no. 14, 1966).

also affect attitudes of ministers, particularly those regarding a) the nature of the job of a minister, b) the effectiveness of coalition governments, as well as their attitudes on other similar topics. Finally, these two variables will have an influence on the losses incurred by cabinet ministers upon departure from theis posts.

THE SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

The cabinets that have served Turkey between 1961-1972 provide an excellent case to examine our contentions. Nine cabinets have held office during the period in question[2]. Those cabinets serving between the elections of 1961 and 1965 were all coalition governments. The Justice Party won majorities in the 1965 and 1969 elections and formed one-party governments led by Süleyman Demirel. The Chiefs of the Turkish Armed Forces, dissatisfied with the inability of the Demirel Government to deal successfully with street violence and public disorders, issued a memorandum on March 12, 1971, forcing the government to resign. The next two goverments were also coalitions, but/of a different nature than those of 1961-1965. The latter reflected understandings reached by parties within the National Assembly. The military, having decided to turn power over to civilians after a new constitution was accepted following the 1960 Revolution, seemed interested mostly in making the framework, which it had been instrumental in creating, work. In contrast, the post-March 1971 coalitions required acceptance by military leadership as well as the confidence of the National Assembly, the latter being secured by raising the possibility of even more direct intervention. Part of the cabinet's responsobility was to translate into policy those objectives deemed desirable by the commanders, then to mobilize support for their acceptance by the legislature.

In light of the preceding discussion, we can classify Turkish cabinets of 1961-1972 into three types:

TYPE I = Political coalitions (1961-1965)
TYPE II = One-party governments (1965-1971)

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2)   These are I., II., III. İnönü; S.H. Ürgüplü; I., II., II. Demirel, and
     I., II. Erim cabinets,

TYPE III = Extraordinary coalitons (1971-1972)

These cabinet types differ from each other along the two dimensions we have proposed earlier. One type is a product of an active political role by the mitilary whereas two are products of convential political processes. Two are comprised of coalitions, one is not. We can express the differences schematically in the following diagram.

Political Role of the Military

		Active	Passive
Government Type of	Coalition		Type II
	One party	Type III	Type I

Before proceeding with our analysis of Turkish cabinet types, a brief explanation of our data collection might be useful. We administered a mail questionnaire to the members of Turkish cabinets. A list of ministers who had held office during 1961-1972 was complied by consulting *Resmî Gazete* (Official Gazette). The names of those currently serving as ministers and those known to be deceased were then eliminated. Questionnaires were mailed to 120 former ministers (80% of the total). By using reminder cards and telephone calls, 81 responses (68%) were obtained. The survey was conducted in the Fall of 1972[3].

ATTRIBUTES OF MINISTERS

Our first hypothesis is that attributes of ministers will vary between cabinet types. Two related questions need to be asked here: Which attributes and why the difference? Our interest being in the political role of the military and in coalition dimensions calls

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3) N for Type I = 47, Type II = 17, Type III = 17, Total 81. The lower N's for Types II and III do not reflect lower rates of response. It is just that fewer people served in those cabinets because many serves more than once,

for an attempt to identify those attributes which would be affected by these variables.

Let us consider the political role of the military first. If the role is *passive*, we would not expect ministerial attributes to be affected by this variable. If the role is *active*, however, some differences are to be expected. The assuming of this latter role by soldiers is reflective of dissatisfaction with civilian cabinets. Therefore, cabinets formed after the Armed Forces opt for an active role are likely to include only those persons not held responsible for previous unsatisfactory political performance. The new ministers may come from among parliamentarians whose names are "untarnished," i.e., less experienced, less visible persons. The may also be recruited from outside the parliement, which would be highly atypical under conventional political processes.

The military's understanding of politics is also likely to be different from that of the politicians. While the politicians usually perceive politics to be a process of representation, of reconciling conflicting interests and of reaching compromises, the leaders of the military tend to view it as a means through which certain goals that they value may be achieved. The differences of perception would suggest that the military supported cabinets would reflect greater emphasis on expertise since the problem for them would be to implement prescribed goals rather than to define them. This inclination would be reinforced by the military's own professional commitment to specialization as a "proper" basis of organization and of operation.

Now, what of Turkish cabinets?

In light of our introductory discussion, we might expect more of the members of Type III cabinets to be specialists.

Our data show the field of training and the profession held before assuming public office are both correlated with the type of cabinet (Contingency $C = 0.50$ and 0.40 respectively). Recognizing that there would be a relationship between the field of training and the profession held, we may conclude that *individuals of different professional-educational backgrounds are recruited to different types of cabinets.*

Table I-A shows that Type III contains the highest percentage of engineers and the lowest percentage of lawyers, which would appear to support our contention that an extraordinary coalition would contain a higher percentage of specialists. Yet, the evidence is not conclusive. There is a decline in the percentage of lawyers and an increase in the percentage of engineers from Type I to Type II and from Type II to Type III, the differences between the latter being somewhat larger. In other words, it is equally likely that the changes in the field of training reflects a trend which is at best partially related to the cabinet type[4].

More supportive of our expectation is the pre-ministerial and preparliamentarian professions of ministers where those of bureaucratic and academic background are more prominently represented in Type III. Bureaucrats and academicians would both represent high levels of specialization.

To further investigate whether expertise is deemed a more important attribute in Type III cabinets, we asked the former ministers why they thought they were recruited to ministerial posts[5]. Our data indicate that there are meaningful differences (Contingency $C = .51$) between types of cabinets. Members of Type III cabinets

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4) For example, Frederick Frey demonstrates how the social back-ground characteristics of the Turkish M.P.'s changed between 1920 - 1957, reflecting social and economic changes in Turkish society. See his **Turkish Political Elite** (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965). See also his "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey" in George Lenczowski, ed., **Political Elites in the Middle East** (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), pp. 41 - 82. See also Frank Tachau and Mary Jo D. Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change", Comparative Politics July 1973, esp. p. 557. For a more theoretical teartment of stuctural change and its political consequences, cf. Kemal H. Karpat, ed., Social Change and Politics in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), especially Karpat's own chapter "Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics", pp. 11 - 92. Although Karpat is concerned with more fundamental changes over a long period of time, a similar logic may be employed in explaining shorter term changes.

5) There is a limitation to this technique which the reader sehould

most frequently mentioned their being "recognized as experts in the field in which they were asked to serve" (41%). Both Type I and Type II cabinets gave priority to having successfully discharged duties and responsibilities given to them by their parties (30 and 29% respectively). The finding is clearly in the direction of our expectations.

TABLE I - A

Field of Training of Ministers
(Percentages)

Field of Study Type of Cabinet	Medicine	Engineering	Law	Pol. Science	Other	Total
Type I	9	11	53	19	8	100
Type II	18	18	41	6	17	100
Type III	12	29	18	18	23	100

TABLE I - B

Pre - Ministerial and Pre - Parliamentarian
Professions of Ministers
(Percentages)

Type of Cabinet	Official	Industry	Commerce	Lawyer	Univ. Prof.	Other	Total
Type I	40	11	15	19	6	9	100
Type II	41	6	12	24	0	17	100
Type III	65	12	0	6	18	0	100

Note :Official describes anyone who held a full time job with the central government, but does not include those working for State Economic Enterprises (included in "Other"). Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.

be aware of. In telling the reasons why they were asked to become ministers, the respondents may, in part, be projecting a role perception which they either think is the reason for recruitment or think it should be. The "should be" of course, relates to roles. The particular question we used was "What do you think are the three most important reasons why you were asked to become a minister?"

The need to form a coalition (for whatever reason) may also affect the attributes of recruits. To begin with, each party to a coalition will be able to place fewer of its representatives in the cabinet, than if it were forming the cabinet alone. This implies greater selectivity in naming ministers which may eliminate the probable candidacy of, for example, less experienced middle level leaders in favor of high level leadership. Conversely, if membership in a coalition is seen to be risky, but necessary (e.g. to keep the army from even futher intervention), top leaders of parties may deliberately choose not to take cabinet posts so that they will not be identified with an unpopular or unsuccessful governmnet.

More generally, cabinet formation seems to be a balancing act which is responsive to intra-party, intra-parliamentary and overall systemic distribution of power in a political system. As this distribution changes through elections or other means such as the military assuming a greater political role, so will the style of forming cabinets and what is expected from them. This, in turn, leads us to suspect that different types of cabinets would recruit persons with different attributes, depending on their style of formation, their sources of support and what they are expected to do.

It may be argued that ministers represent a sophisticated elite group, and may have similar attributes irrespective of the type of cabinet in which they serve. Here again(a question we asked previously comes up, which attributes and why? The answer, we believe, has to be contextual. If, for example, the basic cleavage in a political system is between an uneducated traditional and a more educated military elite, we might expect to observe differences in the levels of education of ministers in cabinets representing different power configurations. If, on the other hand, higher education is either widespread and/or a prerequisite for gaining admission to high level political elite status, the level of education would not be a good tool for distinguishing between types of governments. Again, ethnic background may be a more important attribute to study in a society where the basis of political organization is ethnic than in one where ethnic multiplicity is of more historical than current interest.

We also inquired about the degree of acquaintance of ministers with the prime minister prior to the assumption of ministerial duty.

We predicted that members of Type II would have the highest level of familiarity with their prime minister and Type III the lowest. This may be justified by two reasons, First, since prime ministers are usually party leaders in conventional times, members of the legislature would have occasions to meet them (the changes being higher if he is from one's own party). Secondly, if expertise is emphasized as a major qualification for becoming a minister under military prodding, reputation as an expert might be sufficient for being asked to join the cabinet without prior acquaintance with the prime minister.

Our data show that while almost all ministers in Type I and Type II had some acquaintance with their prime minister, more than half of the members of Type III had either casual or no acquaintance with their heads of government.

Although there is no legal requirement that ministers have legislator status prior to being appointed, almost all ministers have parliamentary backgrounds when cabinet formation takes place without extra-parliamentary constraints. We may ask, then, what type of legislators might be recruited to ministerial posts. Here, two attributes come to mind readily: the length of legislative tenure and whether ministers represent a leadership cadre in their own parties prior to appointment.

TABLE II

Degree of Acquaintance with Prime Minister
Before Becoming a Minister
(Percentages)

Acquaintance

Type of Cabinet	Know each Other Well	Know each Other Some	Casually Met	We had Never Met	Total
Type I	46	42	8	4	100
Type II	50	44	—	6	100
Type III	24	24	18	35	100

Note : Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding errors.

We are inclined to think that tenure may not be a reliable indicator for establishing generalizations of long range value, for the period in question. We should remember that members of the Democratic Party were banned from participating in politics and running for office after the Pevolution of 1960. Two parties claiming its heritage, the Justice and New Turkey Parties, did not, therefore, have access to many candidates with previous parliamentary experience for either parliamentary or ministerial posts. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that when asked how long the respondents had been active in political life, 65% of Type III said that they had never engaged in politics before. The corresponding figures for Types I and II were 6% and none respectively. 79% of all respondents were members of parliament when they became ministers.

Whether ministers represent a leadership elite prior to their cabinet membership, on the other hand, may give us a better understanding of the recruitment process. The data show that 74% of the members of Type I and 47% of Type II did hold leadership positions positions in their parties. Although, we do not have comparable information for the legislators as a whole or by parties,

TABLE III ABOUT HERE

TABLE III

Party Positions of Ministers

Position	1	2	3			
			National			
Cabinet	No	Parliamentary	Party	Total of		
Type	position	Caucus	Organization	2+3	N.A.	
Type I	21	23	51	74	4	100
Type II	53	18	29	47	0	10ᵒ

Note : Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors. Type III had only 3 legislator respondents.

it is safe to suggest that the percentages of leadership positions would be much lower in them in comparison to cabinet members[6].

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6)   Two things should be noted here. First, the smaller the number of M.P.'s of one party, the greater the percentage of M.P.'s who

The difference between Type I and Type II may be explained by our previous point that coalitions, by narrowing down the number of positions each party is entitled to, may favor the representation of high level party leaders in greater numbers in the government.

We may conclude this section by noting that there are differences between the attributes of ministers serving in different types of cabinets. Type III is more heavily staffed with persons of bureaucratic-specialist backgrounds than types I and II, which recruit from among party leadership know to the prime minister.

Our data (not all shown here) also demonstrate that ministers, regardless of cabinet types, are highly educated. Age of becoming a minister and birthplace of ministers do not vary sufficiently between cabinet types to warrant attention.

ATTITUDES OF MINISTERS

Our second hypothesis is that attitudes of ministers on various topics relating to their political activity will vary with the type of cabinet in which they served. We shall test our hypothesis by examining the attitudes of our respondents on expertise needed for ministerial jobs, on coalition governments, on qualities of prime ministers and on the relative importance of ministries.

Importance of Expertise :

Our earlier analysis would lead us to expect that expertise would be more highly valued by members of Type III cabinets, with no reason to expect major differences between types I and II.

Without exception, former ministers were agreed that a minister has to be a good administrator. But, on the importance of expertise for a ministerial post, significant differences emerged. While 65% of the members of Type III agreed with the statement "A minister must be an expert in the area in which he is to serve," only

would hold some leadership position. Secondly, all leadership need not be recruited from among legislators, My hunch is that the leadership positions in national organization and parliamentary group of a major party would not exceed 25 % of the number of representatives of that party in the legislature.

25% of Type I and 11% of Type II were of the same opinion. This, of course, is not surprising, if we recall why respondents thought they were asked to join a cabinet. Many members of Type III would probably have never served as ministers under conditions where competitive politics were fully operative.

What seems equally interesting is the difference between Type I and Type II. While no ready explanation exists, one may speculate that emphasis on expertise serves to make it possible for each minister to claim an area of operations not subject to scrutiny by his colleagues, although interdependency will, in fact, continue.

Attitudes on Coalitions:

A coalition implies that its members will represent different constituencies or clientele groups. Often, there will also be some ideological differences between members with different party affiliations. Our respondents include ministers that have served both in coalition and one-party governments. How do their attitudes on coalitions differ? We might anticipate that members of Type II Cabinets will generally have a low estimation of coalitions in comparison to Types I and III for two reasons. First, the experience of membership in a coalition may show the ministers that it is an acceptable arrangement. Second, some parties to a coalition may appreciate that the only way they can share governmental power is through membership in a coalition. We might further suggest that members of Type III will have the highest regard for them both because they tend to view cabinets as a technical team and because their ministerial service was rendered possible through a coalition.

An examination of our data show that while members of Type II Cabinets agreed by an overwhelming 94% that "Coalition governments always function more slowly and are less effective in comparison to one-party governments, "the corresponding figures for Type I and III Cabinets were 36% and 41% respectively. Although differences were smaller, responses to "In coalition governments, the party to which the Prime Minister belongs gains undue weight" follows the same pattern. While our finding is in the general direction of our expectations, the fact that members of Type III have a lower estimation than those of Type I deserves an explanation.

We think that this relates to the particular experiences of the cabi-
nets in Type III. The First Erim cabinet was ridden with internal
conflict which culminated in the resignation of eleven members
en masse. The two governments Erim formed, although retaining
de jure support of the National Assembly, were in fact resisted both
by the legislature and the bureaucracy in making and implementing
policy, a frustrating experience for its members, to be sure.

Qualities of Prime Ministers :

What qualities should a prime minister have? Can we assume
that the nature of the job results in a common set of requirements
that are similarly perceived by members of all cabinets or expect
that there   would be differences between members of different
types of cabinets?

Though with differing intensity, members of all cabinets think
that the most important quality a prime minister should have is "a
strong personality which gives direction to the cabinet in every
way." (72%, 82%, 65% for Types I, II, III respectively). Differences
become significant, however, when we examine the second-most
important quality. A majority of the members of Type II Cabinets
(65%), emphasize that a prime minister "should have the support of
his party." This opinion is mildly shared by members of Type I
Cabinets (26%), although they tend also to attach importance to
"having a lengthy political experience" (21%), a choice partly ac-
countable by the fact that the prime minister of three of the four
cabinets of this type was Ismet Inönü, an experienced politician
without whose efforts coalitions might have proved unworkable.
Members of Type III Cabinets, on the other hand, were concerned
with the prime minister's non-political qualities like his being a
"well educated and cultured man" (24%) and a "hard working,
honest man" (41%).

The prime-ministerial qualities that former ministers emphasize
gives, if indirectly, some ideas on the nature of different types of
cabinets. A majority of the ministers seem to appreciate the fact
that the prime minister has to lead the cabinet[7]. Members of one-

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7) Another question we asked was whether the respondents thought
    that the prime minister was **primus inter pares** or had a special

party governments seem to have, however, a clearer acceptance of a hierarchical relationship in which the prime minister is on top and an appreciation of the need for parliamentary support of a prime minister. Coalition members, on the other hand, seem to be more attentive to the qualities of the prime minister *per se*, rather than the qualities his role might require, probably because such factors assume greater influence in achieving cabinet harmony when there is no or partial cross-cutting loyalty of party.

Importance of Ministries :

In principle, all ministries are equal. Yet, since the consequences of their activity on the political system and its environment are in fact different, the importance of each is not the same. Some ministries such as the Ministry of Finance are viewed as being important regardless of time and circumstance. The importance of other ministries may rise or decline, depending on the problems of the time and/or particular policies a government chooses to emphasize. Some respondents declined to rank ministries with the line of reasoning indicated here - either they argued ministers were equal or they suggested a ranking would be impossible in the abstract. Of those responding to the question, a majority mentioned the Ministry of Public Finance, to be followed by the Ministry of Education, as being the most important. Almost all respondents included these two among the first four most important ministries. Others more frequently mentioned included Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs (Security) and Agriculture in that order. Furthermore, there did not appear to be discernible differences between Cabinet types.

That the Ministry of Public Finance is listed at the top is understandable, since it has more control over the most important resource - money. It may appear surprising that Nationd Educa-

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position in relation to other members of the cabinet. The percentages for those favoring the latter are 64 %, 88 %, and 82 % respectively for Types I, II and III. We might have expected the percentage for Type I to be higher and Type III to be lower. It appears that when cabinets are formed among parties, members from each party tend more to view their group as a sovereign equal.

tion is next since its activities are routinized and its professiona-
lization eliminates a high patronage potential. The emphasis on
education, we suspect, is somewhat peculiar to Turkey. Starting
with the mid 19th Century, Turkish political and cultural
elites have viewea education as the single most important
instrument of modernization and conversely backwardness as the
best testimony to its absence or insufficiency. Also, in recent years,
the uncompromising attempts of the Republic to westernize and
secularize the society have come under attack. Thus, education has
gained attention as an effective instrument of socialization both for
those supportive of the status quo and those arguing for restoration
of less secular value system.

Interestingly, there is substantial agreement on the least im-
portant ministries between members of various governments. The
two most frequently mentioned ministries are Ministry of Customs
and Monopolies and that of Sports and Youth. Others frequently
mentioned, without noticeable differences between cabinets, include
the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Tourism. The common
features of these ministries are that they were created relatively
recently and/or their functions can easily be performed within the
framework of an already existing ministry.

Our second hypothesis that attitudes of ministers relating to
various aspects of their political activity is borne out generally by
the data. Attitudes of members of different types of cabinets vary
on the importance of expertise for ministerial posts, on the effecti-
veness of coalitions, and on what qualities a prime minister should
have. There is common agreement, on the other hand, on the most
and least important ministries.

POST - MINISTERIAL STATUS

Serving as a cabinet minister is not lifetime employment. Mi-
nisters, particularly in a politically competitive system, are aware
that their tenure will be limited. While ministerial post may contain
many rewards for the holder, it also carries risks. For example, if
a minister is recruited from outside the parliament, he will probably
have to leave a job. After ministerial service, he may not be able
to return to his old job. He may fail to find any employment or he

may find employment which he deems less prestigious or lucrative than his pre-ministerial job. Having been -a minister, on the other hand, may sometimes serve to enhance the employment possibilities of an individual. Ministerial posts permit one to gain greater visibility, a broader circle of acquaintances ,as well as access to some instruments of rewards and favors which may be returned after the ministerial job ends.

Similar observations may be made regarding those who become ministers from the legislature. A minister may not find enough time to tend to the business of his constituents and his local party organization and thus weaken his chances of reelection. If becoming a minister means abandoning an important party post, which may not be recovered, it is easy to see that there is a long range loss involved. Performance of a minister, the services he renders to or withholds from his peers, may eiher enhance or weaken the influence wielded by him when he leaves office.

The risks of ministerial service interests us for two reasons. First, if the cost involved in becoming a minister is too high, the job would be rendered less attractive to many potential candidates; the base of recruitment would be considerably narrowed. Second those willing to assume ministerial posts would then try to lessen the probability of losing their office while maximizing short-range benefits in order to insure their material security, if in fact a loss occurs. These factors tend respectively to encourage usurpation of power and corruption.

Our last hypothesis was that loss of a ministerial post would carry different degrees of risk for members of different types of cabinets[8]. We would expect that membership in extraordinary governments (Type III) might carry greater risks since both rise to and loss of office in them could be through less well established patterns.

We inquired first about the financial consequences of losing ministerial posts. Here 75% of the respondents reported no change,

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8) For a theoretical discussion of political risk and its systemic consequences, see Lester Seligman, "Political Risk and Legislative Behavior in Non - Western Countries" in G.R. Boynton and C.L. Kim, eds., **Legislative Systems in Developing Countries** (Durham, North Carolina : Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 89 - 106.

while 12% each reported improvement or decline. We would expect
this, since there is no significant difference between the salaries of
legislators and ministers - and legislators comprised 79% of our
respondents[9]. An examination of our data show, however, that the
worsening of financial situations is not evenly distributed. While
only 11% of Type I and 6% of Type II Cabinet members reported
negative financial effects, 24% of Type III did the same[10].

We also wanted to know the non-financial consequences of
leaving office. Here we have to distinguish between the legislator
and the outsider. The legislator, serving as a minister, does not
lose his parliamentary job. So, the question becomes one of learning
whether ministerial office enhances the legislator's position in his
party and among his colleagues. For the outsider, on the other hand,
it is more difficult to identify as definite an area of change as for
the legislator. We asked-non-parliamentarians what effects leaving
office had concerning their jobs[11].

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9)   One minister added this commentary to the question on the fi-
     nancial affects of leaving office : "There is. as you know, a
     difference of 800 T.L. between the salary of a minister and a
     deputy. But, one's position as a minister calls for greater per-
     sonal spending. In a way, my financial situation improved be-
     cause I was freed from many costly obligations."
10) The difference becomes more pronounced if we compare minis-
     ters coming from the legislature with those coming from wit-
     hout. The following table shows that no improvement took place
     in the financial situation of former ministers of non - legislator
     background and a significant 41 % reported they became finan-
     cially worse off.

Financial Situation of Ministers
After Leaving Office

Financial Situation / MP or Not	Worsened	Improved	No Change	Total
Senator	4	13	83	100
Deputy	6	25	69	100
Non - Parlimentarian	41	0	59	100

11) The non - parliamentarian seems to lose more than a parliamen-

Studying Type I and II Cabinets, both comprising mainly legislators, we learn that the status within party of a majority have not changed (55% and 50% respectively). While 9% of Type I report a weakening of their political status, no members of Type II appear to have had a negative experience. 17% of Type I and 29% of Type II, on the other hand, reported enhancement of their political standing in their party. Serving as a minister, in Type I and II Cabinets involves little cost.

Our third hypothesis thus, is also borne out by our evidence. The level or risk involved in losing ministerial posts are different for different types of cabinets. The levels of risk are higher for ministers that are not legislators and only certain cabinets are, in fact, open to them.

CONCLUSION

In what way does the role of the military in politics and the necessity of government by coalition affcet the attributes, attitudes and costs of holding public office among ministers?

An active political role by the military seems to result in a cabinet of experts, valuing expertise as a prerequisite for the job who experience greater costs after loss of office. If the role of the military is passive ,on the other hand, the cabinet comprises leadership groups from member political parties, who are more inclined to emphasize ability to get things done within a party framework. Ministers do not encounter noticeable costs by leaving office; in fact, their standings in their parties may be enhanced.

The cabinets formed under active military role give the impression of being a team of experts who perceive their job to be carrying out the delineated functions of their ministry. If each

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tarian when he moves to a job from ministerial office. While 59 % reported that they either went hack to their former (38 %) or a comparable (21 %) job and found it gratifying, 33 % felt some sense of loss, 25 % saying that their new jobs were not as gratifying as the job they had left before becoming a minister, while 8 % finding that their former status had been undermined although they had returned to their former job.

performs his duties rationally, then a successful government is expected to emerge[12]. Governments formed when the military has assumed a passive political role, on the other hand, trend to value being a harmonious working team supported by the legislature and led by the prime minister.

Government by coalition, in the absence of an active military role, tends to increase the number of ministers coming from party leadership positions. Members of coalitions tend to have more esteem for coalitions than members of one-party governments.

In this study, treating the type of cabinet as an independent variable, we have tried to demonstrate that attributes, attitudes and orientations of ministers and the degree of risks involved in losing a ministerial job vary between cabinet types. It should be recalled that "type of cabinet" is not an autonomous variable, but a composite one, reflecting the relative might of social and political groups in a system, the important political problems of the times, the level of organization and effectiveness of voluntary associations including parties in a society, the existence of multiple bases of power and a set of other considerations. These affect what type of cabinet a country will have as well as the characteristics of the cadres that will run the government.

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12) I am using "rationally" in the Weberian sense. The data, by itself, does not suffice to make this observation but provides a clue. Other - wise, I relied on my familiarity with Turkish political life. An interesting example in this regard was the resignation of one of the ministers in Type III who had been recruited from the bureaucracy. In resigning, the minister is understood to have complained that the job was too "political." He asked that he be reinstated to his former position as an undersecretary in one of the ministries, a request he was granted.