

ÇİHAÇÇILIK NEREYE? ORTADOĞU'DA ÇİHAÇÇI SÖYLEMİN YENİDEN İNŞASI

ÖZ

Ortadoğu siyaseti, askeri faaliyetlerdeki motive edici rolünden dolayı, cihat söylemi ile iştilgal edilmiştir. Cihat Kur'ani bir kavramdır, bu da kutsal kitapta tanımı yapılan terimin İslami kurallara göre yeniden yorumlanmaya mevzu bahis olmaması anlamına gelmektedir. Kur'an'daki açık anlamına rağmen siyasi aktörler terimi farklı politik koşullara göre uyarlamaktadırlar. Klasik cihat anlayışından farklı olarak, günümüz radikal İslami hareketler cihatçı söylemi var olan uluslararası sistemi yıkmak, Müslüman toplumlar arasındaki sınırları yok etmek ve şeriat kurallarını yeniden kurmak amacıyla kullanılmaktadırlar. Cihat'tan cihatçılığa doğru gelişen söylemsel dönüşüm ise Ortadoğu'da İslam'ın siyasi bir araç olarak nasıl manipüle edildiğini göstermektedir. Çalışma, zaman ve mekanın tarihsel bağlamı içerisinde cihadın farklı anlamlarını incelemektedir. Çalışmada cihat kavramının tarih boyunca bir devlet politikası, bir doktrin aracı ve onlarca savaş, işgal, fetih ve direnişe sebep olan bir enstrüman olmak üzere çok çeşitli biçimlerde kullanıldığını ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cihat, Cihatçılık, İnşacılık, Söylem İnşası, Siyasi İslam

فكرة الجهاد الى أين؟ ظهور مقولة الجهاد من جديد في الشرق الأوسط بقلم : هاجر جوشكون عائشة اومور اتماجا خلاصة :

تنهيك سياسة الشرق الأوسط بمقولة "الجهاد" بسبب دوره الذي يجري تنشيطه في معرض الفعاليات العسكرية. والجهاد مفهوم قرآني، ويعني ذلك عدم امكن تفسير المصطلح الذي يتم تعريفه في الكتاب المقدس وفق القواعد الإسلامية مجددا. ورغم المعنى الواضح لهذا المصطلح في القرآن، فإن الفاعلين السياسيين يعملون على تحويره وفقا للظروف السياسية المتباينة. إن الحركات الإسلامية الراديكالية في يومنا هذا تفسر مفهوم الجهاد، خلافا للمفهوم التقليدي له، على انه يعني هدم النظام الدولي القائم، وازالة الحدود القائمة بين المجتمعات الإسلامية، واعادة العمل بقواعد الشريعة الإسلامية. اما التحول اللفظي من مفهوم الجهاد الى مفهوم الوظيفة الجهادية، فإنه يظهر كيفية تطويع مفهوم الاسلام في الشرق الاوسط ليكون اداة سياسية. وتتولى هذه الدراسة تحليل المفاهيم المختلفة للجهاد ضمن الروابط التاريخية للزمان والمكان، كما توضح كيفية استعمال مفهوم الجهاد عبر احقاب التاريخ كسياسة دولة، وكأداة تعليمية، وكسبب لعشرات من الحروب واحتلال البلدان والفتوحات وحركات التمرد، وذلك باساليب واشكال متعددة جدا.

الكلمات الدالة: الجهاد، الجهاد كمهنة، تكوين المفاهيم، الاسلام السياسي.

QUO VADIS JIHADISM? RECONSTRUCTION OF THE JIHADIST DISCOURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ABSTRACT

Middle Eastern politics is occupied by *jihadist* discourse because of its motivating role in military campaigns. *Jihad* is a Qur'anic term which means that its definition is fixed within the sacred book and, according to Islamic rules, is not subject to re-interpretation. Despite its clear meaning within the Qur'an, political actors have appropriated it according to various political conditions. In contrast to the classical understanding of *jihad*, contemporary radical Islamic movements have used *jihadist* discourse in an effort to destroy the current international system, erase state borders among Muslim societies and reconstruct sharia rules. The discursive transformation from *jihad* to *ihadism* reflects how Islam has been manipulated as a political device in the Middle East. This article examines the varying meanings of *jihad* across time and space within their historical contexts. It is argued that *jihad* has performed numerous functions through history: as a state policy, a doctrinal tool, and an instrument with which dozens of wars, invasions, conquests, and resistances have been waged.

Keywords: Jihad, Jihadism, Constructivism, Discourse Construction, Political Islam.

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Introduction

Islam has always been at the center of Middle Eastern politics, and *jihad* is one of its most influential terms, not only in the past when Islam was a dominant ideology, but also in the contemporary world where religion-based states are considered outdated. The Islamic rules on war and peace are considered to be based in an understanding of *jihad*. Islamist political groups thus feel the need to apply the concept of *jihad* to justify their actions. Therefore, studies about the discourse of *jihad* can be used to represent Islamic perspectives on war and peace.

Indeed *jihad* is a Qur'anic term. This means that the definition of the term is fixed within the sacred book and, according to Islamic rules, is not subject to re-interpretation. Within this framework *jihad* is divided into two categories: inner *jihad*, which relates to an individual's duties, and collective *jihad*, which involve state military participation. However, in the contemporary world, collective *jihad* no longer carries its traditional meaning. Despite its clear meaning within the Qur'an, political actors have appropriated it according to political conditions. This study will analyze the usages of *jihad* within their particular temporal and geographical contexts.

The concept of *jihad* was applied by early Islamic states and empires to motivate people and generate legitimacy for their state affairs. In contrast, contemporary radical Islamic movements have used *jihadist* discourse in an effort to destroy the current international system, erase state borders among Muslim societies and reconstruct *sharia* rules. Current Islamic radicalism contributes to violence and division within the Islamic world itself. Therefore, Islamism is perceived as a threat to the liberal-democratic ideals of the world system. Since the discursive transformation from *jihad* to *jihadism* reflects how Islam has been manipulated as a political device in the Middle East, this study will contribute significantly to an understanding of how Islam is affected by Middle East politics.

In addition, a study of *jihadism* is necessary in order to understand how the straightforward definition of *jihad* has lost its meaning in recent history. The international community has been confronted with the devastation caused in the name of *jihad*, the worst of these being the 9/11 attacks in 2001. As a result, the concept of *jihad* has become synonymous with terrorism or warfare. However, as is well known, *jihad* begins with verses in the Qur'an, and the early and imperial expansion of Islam cannot be explained with terrorism. The layered meanings of *jihad* are much more complex than a simple association with aggressive campaigns. This study also reveals reasons behind this misunderstanding.

A constructivist approach can be utilized to analyze discourses on *jihad* because of its focus on identity and discourse formation. Generally, con-

structivism argues that all human activity, including politics, is understood through the meanings people give to their world, and that such meanings are intersubjectively constructed with the events and institutions of their worlds.¹ This approach helps us form reasonable questions with regard to the actions of *jihadist* groups. By incorporating identity politics, the role of non-state actors and discourse construction processes, constructivism provides an attractive framework within which to explore how the notion of *jihad* is manipulated to attract people's attention and support.

The Early Islamic Period and the Emergence of *Jihad*

Islamic thinking on war and peace started with interpretations of Qur'anic verses on *jihad*, *harb* and *qital*. In the Qur'an, the word *jihad* appears to refer not to warfare, but rather to disputation and works undertaken in the name of God. Therefore, to understand the legal military framework of Islam, additional verses about fighting, treatment of non-Muslims, and relations with other countries should be considered.

Narratives on military *jihad*² begin with the Prophet Muhammad's *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina in 622.³ The Prophet became leader of a state and an Islamic community was formed. In this capacity he had to consider the material needs of all Medinian people⁴ (whether Muslim or not), which necessitated military campaigns following the establishment of the Islamic state (*al Dawla al Islamiya*).

The warfare policies and military campaigns of the new state were shaped around the concept of *jihad* in order to mobilize Muslims, and conversely, *jihad* as a state of mobilization shaped the development of the state's military and strategic dimensions.⁵ During those years, Islam was considered as a religion and a state system. Therefore, from the beginning, Islamic movements carried both religious and political meanings.⁶ By the time of the Prophet's death, most of Arabia had been united under the banner of Islam.⁷ Needless to say, no religion can spread widely without conquests.⁸ The Qur'an provides

1 Brenda Shaffer, *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 2006), p.50.

2 Since this research is about *jihadist* discourse in International Relations, the spiritual developments of *jihad* will be excluded from the discussion.

3 Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.15.

4 Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, *Jihad and the Islamic Law of War*, (Jordan: Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute Publication, 2002), p.5.

5 Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.22.

6 *ibid.*, p.21.

7 *ibid.*, p.24.

8 David Cook, *Undersanding Jihad*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p.13.

the doctrine of *jihad*, and the practical criteria of *jihad* were set during these conquests.

The conditions of *jihad* as an obligation are underlined clearly. The first condition occurs when the Muslims are in danger of being physically attacked. *Jihad* becomes the legitimate call for mobilization and action under the supreme religious leader of Islam.⁹ Secondly, *jihad* should be pursued to promote, propagate, and conquer for Islam.¹⁰ The aim should be Islam and no other gains can be considered. The early conquests of Islam were propelled by Islamic values rather than state objectives.¹¹ Early Muslims never waged *jihad* just for *jihad*; its ultimate aim was to introduce Islam to every parts of the globe.¹² The Prophet Muhammad succeeded in establishing a divine and moral message for all Muslims. Islam prevailed over wide geographies, long histories and varied cultures. It exhibited the ability to meet the social and moral needs of diverse societies over a long period of time, and under different historical and regional conditions.¹³

***Jihad* in the Imperial Period**

During the early years of Islam, classical *jihad* was invoked to inspire the military campaigns of Muslims. Thirty years after the Prophet's death, Islamic empires were formed and Islamic laws and principles were drawn up by religious scholars. Different schools emerged for evaluating Islamic principles according to divergent ways of life, and these differences affected expressions of *jihad*.¹⁴ Islamic imperial conquests led to the discursive division of the world into two: the Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), where the jurisdiction of Islam was enjoyed, and the Abode of War (*dar al-Harb*), or those who should be converted to Islam. This conception can be explained in political and territorial, but not religious terms because neither the Qur'an nor the *hadiths* make this kind of division.¹⁵

As stated before, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, great conquests were continued by caliphs for thirty years. After a civil conflict, the Umayyad Dynasty came to power in 661¹⁶ claiming the authority of the caliphate; this marks the beginning of the imperial period in the history of Islam. The most important elementary point to remember is that the Qur'an

9 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, p.23.

10 *ibid*, p.24.

11 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.60.

12 Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam World Politics and Europe*, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.52.

13 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, p.25.

14 Richard Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.71.

15 Paul L. Heck, "Jihad Revisited", *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol.32, i.1, (2004), pp.127-128.

16 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.119.

did not stipulate a specific form for the state or government, nor did the Prophet Muhammad appoint a successor for himself.¹⁷ Therefore, this change in the structure of the state system can be considered legitimate within the Islamic legal scheme as well. On the other hand, *jihad* became a state activity under the command of the caliphate. Although sufis and religious scholars applied *jihad* to spiritual development issues, ordinary *jihad* was thought of as a state affair. The army had a duty to go on *jihad*, but it was not the obligation of every individual.

The imperial period is one in which *jihad* can be regarded as a combination of the political and military aspects of Islam.¹⁸ Following the great conquests of the caliph period, various dynasties emerged, and a different understanding of *jihad* evolved to advance the position of each. The mainstream approach was continued by the Abbasid Empire and its consequent empires. The religious aspects of *jihad* gradually disappeared, and the concept came into the service of state ideology.¹⁹ Although the imperial powers engaged in wars in the name of *jihad*, these are not properly defined as *jihad* because soldiers were paid, while *jihad* should be voluntary. Simply, the conquests became Arabian rather than Islamic.²⁰

With imperial expansion, Islam reached far and wide, from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Indian subcontinent.²¹ Since religion became an imperial tool for Islamic states, emperors employed religious scholars (ulama) to preach *jihad* in their military campaigns.²² The policies of the Umayyad Empire in particular led to divergent evaluations of Islamic principles, including *jihad*. For instance, the Maliki School proposed one of the first interpretations of *jihad* that opposed that of classical scholars. Imam Malik bin Anas, the founder of the school, argued that *jihad* could not be a principle that determines relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.²³ Since unbelievers should not be subjected to war, *jihad* could not be used to legitimize all military action against non-Muslims.²⁴

Crusaders of the Christian world brought the concept of ‘defensive *jihad*’ to Muslims. Against Cilician Armenia, considered to be the last Crusader state, the Mamluk emperor of Egypt employed Ibn Taymiyah to

17 Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p.6.

18 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, pp.128-130.

19 Heck, “Jihad Revisited”, p.128.

20 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.60.

21 Tibi, *Political Islam World Politics and Europe*, p.51.

22 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, pp.128-130.

23 *ibid.*, p.71.

24 Stephen Collins Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment: Ignoring What Extremes Say about Jihad”, *Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence*, (July 2007), p.155.

preach *jihad*²⁵ for purposes of defense. In this context, *jihad* was perceived as the savior of Islam from both the Christian crusaders and the pagan Mongols.²⁶

There was also the Sufi movement's doctrine of *jihad*. In Sufism (a mystical sect of Islam) *jihad* was understood as an inner struggle against the base instincts of the body but also against corruption of the soul, and it was believed that the greater *jihad* was a necessary part of the process of gaining spiritual insight.²⁷ Today, most Muslims see *jihad* as a personal rather than a political struggle, while physical action taken in defense of the realm is considered the lesser *jihad*.

By the time the Ottoman Empire was established in the late 13th century, Islam already had a long history. However, one of the founding principles of Ottoman State was a *ghaza* (*jihad*) understanding, as religion was important legal principle (*sharia* rule).²⁸ Under the banner of Islam, Ottoman armies crossed the Bosphorus into the Balkans, and acquired the capital of Eastern Christianity, Istanbul.²⁹ Turkish conquests also expanded towards Anatolia, Asia and other Islamic lands. The conquest of Mecca and acquisition of the caliphate in the 16th century turned the Ottoman rulers into a global authority.³⁰ Until the First World War, the *nida'ul jihad* (call for *jihad*) was a matter of official state business in the Ottoman Empire. While *jihad* could be seen as a religious duty, it could only be legitimately called for by the caliph or his representatives.³¹

To sum up, during imperial times, *jihad* was interpreted as a collective duty under state authority rather than an individual obligation. Therefore, it should be waged under the caliph's authority and with the state's army. Thus, collective *jihad* activities also should be maintained by the state on behalf of the people.

The Reconstruction of *Jihad* in the Modern World

At the point at which European colonial expansion began, the Middle Eastern territory was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. When the First World War started in 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the on the side of the Axis

25 Devin R. Springer et al, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009), p.28.

26 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, p.42.

27 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, p.9.

28 *ibid.*, p.128.

29 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, p.42.

30 Yılmaz Yurtseven, "Osmanlı Klasik Döneminde İdeoloji, Din ve Siyasi Meşruiyet", *Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol.11, no.1-2, (2007), p.1262.

31 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, p.44.

Powers in an effort to protect its territories.³² To that end, the first act of the Sultan, in his dual role as caliph and thus spiritual leader of all Muslims, was to declare a *fatwa* calling for *jihad* against the Allied Powers. However the *fatwa* did not result in significant Muslim defections from the Allied cause, nor did it prevent Arab revolt against Muslim rule.³³ This dramatic event showed that the Ottoman caliphate had already lost its moral influence over Muslims. All Muslim local leaders in the Middle East realized that the postwar political situation would change according to the new realities. The dynamics of the new world order led to the establishment of nation-states and democratic regimes not founded in pure Islamic principles.

With abolishment of the caliphate, the understanding of *jihad* from the imperial period also came to an end, since it had been linked to the authority of the caliph. The rebellion against the caliph's call for *jihad* during the First World War showed that state-centered *jihad* would no longer hold sway among Muslim societies. Yet this rebellion did not mark the end of Islam in state affairs. The Arab rebellion against the Ottoman sultan was a reaction against the Ottoman state, not against Islam, despite the fact that the sultan was also the leader of the Muslim world. Therefore, it is not surprising that understandings of *jihad* in the nation-state era were intertwined with the notion of independence from colonial powers; the people were united in independence movements through calls for *jihad*.³⁴

European leaders seized direct or indirect control of lands in the Middle East by collaborating with local Arab leaders, acquiring guidance regarding the development of local societies. However, not every local leader accepted European domination, or when the new states achieved enough power to govern themselves they wished to acquire full independence. *Jihad* played a role in these initial independence movements against European colonialism. A revival of *jihadist* movements was seen in struggles against colonial powers throughout the Muslim world. This had first appeared during the 19th century in Algeria against French domination, spreading towards Libya, Egypt, etc. Within this framework, *jihad* became understood as defensive warfare.³⁵

Middle Eastern Muslim societies used *jihad* discourse to rescue their societies from colonial powers. However, after gaining independence, the new leaders did not consolidate their new states on the basis of Islamic principles. With the adoption of nationalist ideas, change came with the abolition of the caliphate by the new Turkish Republic in 1924.

32 Mehran Kamrava, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since World War I*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), p.39.

33 Douglas E. Streusand, "What Does Jihad Mean?", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.4, no.3, (September 1997), pp. 9-17.

34 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.159.

35 *ibid.*, p.160.

The next understanding of *jihad* was shaped within this context. Scholars redefined *jihad* to emphasize defense, also establishing state and non-state organizations to increase their influence and disseminate their ideological framework to the masses—especially to youth.³⁶ These new organizations did not need the universal caliph to call for *jihad*. This understanding of the concept was not initially popular because of the popularity of nationalist leaders. However, as the nationalist leaders began to lose their popularity, Islamic groups were well positioned to step into the role of governance, bringing their ideologies with them.

***Jihad* in the Period of the Political Formation and Consolidation of Nation-States**

The leaders of the new Middle Eastern states focused on building nationalist-secular state structures during their wars of independence. Islamic identity had also been a primary vehicle for popular mobilization, but political consolidation was achieved through nationalism rather than Islamic identity. This caused a separation between Islamic intellectuals and state powers. The former felt uncomfortable with and distant from Western-style separation of state operations and religious faith.³⁷

The post-First World War period in the Middle East was not only one of new state consolidation but also one during which Islamic movements were being reshaped. It was clear that the end of the Ottoman Empire was also the end of faith-based rule, as well as the end of the caliphate, in the Muslim world. New Islamic movements therefore had to determine their policies in order to gain the support of society and the restoration of the caliphate. Madkhali (Jami) in Yemen, Albani Salfists in Albania, Suris in Saudi Arabia, The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad are some examples of modern Islamic movements of the period. However, since the nationalist leaders were so effective in garnering public trust, the Islamic movements of those years could not make an impressive impact. During these years, none of the Middle Eastern states officially declared *jihad*; however, discussions about *jihad* from this period would form the basis for many Islamic activities in subsequent decades.

At the end of the First World War, the only Islamic state in the Middle East was Saudi Arabia. The ideological foundations of the state were rooted in the teachings of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), a religious leader, and Muhammed Muhammed ibn Saud (1735-1765), the leader of an Arab tribe and adopter of the ideologies of al-Wahhab in state affairs. In 1935, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud (1880-1953) defeated his rivals and united tribes

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.164.

³⁷ Graham E. Fuller, *Future of Political Islam*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.120.

under the banner of the modern state of Saudi Arabia.³⁸ Wahhabi teachings separate religious imams from state leaders, so Saudi leaders did not claim to also represent Muslims all over the globe.

The existing state leaders of Saudi Arabia pursued an Islamic cause and the *jihad* calls of its founding fathers of state. Wahhabism declared a perpetual *jihad* against any kind of Islamic corruption, and against modern and un-Islamic ways of life, advocating a return to the practices of the early years of Islam. The Saudi leaders after the First World War pursued *jihad* policies domestically and also began to support other Sunni organizations towards the expansion of Salafi doctrines around the Muslim world. They would become very effective agents of the emergence and development of Political Islam in the Middle East, and of the strengthening of Islamist groups around the world. Especially after the Arab-Israel War in 1973, which resulted in a worldwide oil crisis, Saudi Arabia would take advantage of huge economic opportunities to support Sunni Islamic movements.

The second cause for a call to *jihad* during these years was seen after the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*). When the Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate, Muslims lost the symbol of their integrity. The most famous Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, was formed in 1928 in order to restore the position of the caliphate.³⁹ Founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), the Muslim Brotherhood was a Salafi movement and adopted orthodox Sunni methods.⁴⁰ The founders established social services, and produced ideological writings to guide all Muslims and solve their problems not only in Egypt but also all over the Middle East.⁴¹ By the 1950s, the organization had established an international infrastructure for communicating, mobilizing, recruiting and fundraising.⁴²

The political workings of the Muslim Brotherhood started with combating British colonial control in Egypt in 1936. The organization also supported the 1952 Free Officers' Coup; however, the new regime banned the Muslim Brotherhood and six of its members, including Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, were assassinated in 1966 for their anti-government opinions.⁴³ After this, the Muslim Brotherhood went underground. To increase their influence, Islamic organizations focused on providing social assistance, building hospi-

38 Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.20 and Larbi Sadiki, "Saudi Arabia" in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.31.

39 Jarret M. Brachman, *Global Jihadism Theory and Practice*, (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), p.23.

40 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, pp.211-212.

41 Aini Linjakumpu, *Political Islam in The Global World*, (Great Britain: Ithaca Press, 2008), p.60.

42 Brachman, *Global Jihadism Theory and Practice*, p.23.

43 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.86, i.2 (March-April, 2007), pp.107-121.

tals and schools, and distributing media and publications.⁴⁴ Even if the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to attract widespread public support in its early years, the networks it formed and the literature it disseminated would form the basis of later Islamic movements, which would become dominant after the 1960s.⁴⁵ Their harsh discourse and understanding of *jihad*⁴⁶ would be adopted by nearly all later Islamist movements.

Thirdly, the longest-running *jihad* in the Middle East is accepted as the struggle against Israel for the Muslim holy lands. In 1948, a month before the Arab states declared war on the new state of Israel, the ranking cleric of Egypt, Hasanayn Muhammad Makhluf, issued a *fatwa* declaring that all Muslims should participate in the *jihad* to “rescue” Palestine because the true intention of the “Jewish Zionists” was to “dominate all Islamic states and to eliminate their Arabic character and their Islamic culture.”⁴⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood’s scholars also declared *jihad* against the presence of a “Zionist entity” in Palestine. All these calls for *jihad* by religious scholars emphasized the existence of an imminent threat to Muslims in and around Palestine.⁴⁸ Although these scholars had no armies at their command, their calls nevertheless became the foundation of subsequent military campaigns against the State of Israel.

Lastly, Sufi movements of this period pursued *jihad* in the spiritual development of society. It can be argued that non-state Islamic organizations were permitted in society as long as they did not pose a threat to the secular state structure.⁴⁹ The most important among these non-state actors were the sufi communities and their *Da’wa* (call to Islam). *Da’wa* is a classical strategy to transform a society into a truly Islamic one. It suggested that Islamic change in society will, over time, lead to change in the political order itself.⁵⁰ The most prominent *Da’wa* movement in the world is the *Tablighi Jama’at* in Pakistan.⁵¹ The Nur (Light) movement in Turkey is considered the second most influential Islamic movement in the world.

44 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.163.

45 Barry Rubin, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 39-57.

46 The early leaders of Muslim Brotherhood branches defined defensive *jihad* as an individual rather than a collective duty. Thus, if Muslim identity is perceived as being under attack, there is no need to wait for the reactions of leaders. Every Muslim should instead take on the responsibility of joining a *jihad* movement regardless; in other words, defending Islam against foreign attacks became the responsibility not of governments but of people, and *jihad* became a form of warfare.

47 Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), p.105.

48 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur’an to bin Laden*, p.270.

49 Fuller, *Future of Political Islam*, p.121.

50 Oxford Islamic Studies Online, “Dawah” <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e511>, Retrieved on December 16, 2013.

51 Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions”, *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.11, i.1, (Winter

In the preceding years, some displeased religious leaders had begun to exhibit their dissatisfaction by forming organizations against the state system. This period witnessed the transformation of the sufis into guerilla fighters or army commanders.⁵² Many of the new sufi leaders would call for *jihad*, describing it not only as a source of personal enhancement but also as a struggle against *fitnah*, or foreign occupation,⁵³ defined as both external imperialism and internal leadership that was allied with Western powers. This revolutionary and revisionist framework represented a supreme rejection of the existing political order.⁵⁴

***Jihadist* Discourse between the 1970s and 1990s**

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Political Islam became the driving ideology in the Middle East. The process of secularization and modernization, promoted by states and through social change alike, had produced a political counter-reaction which satisfied society but disappointed some Islamist groups. The new governing force changed not only the politics of the Middle Eastern states but also led to the formation of radical Islamist groups.

From the 1970s, religion became widely viewed as acceptable grounds for political order. However, with the exception of the Shi'ite Iranian state, Political Islam at this time did not carry revisionist ideas. Sunni Islam, dominant in the Middle Eastern states, ordered obedience to rulers and support of the *status quo*; in other words, the states around the region had already been established and their Islamic governments were not interested in upsetting the existing state configuration. When they came to power, the main figures of Political Islam accepted the existing nation-states and abandoned the fundamentalist views which denied the legitimacy of the nation, advocating instead a supra-national community of believers (*umma*).⁵⁵

Political Islam was not equally successful in all Middle Eastern societies because of their different characteristics and particular histories. Most importantly, it did not gain the support of radical Islamist groups. The new parties adapted to the existing state systems. No one except Khomeini altered the structure of the state itself upon coming to power. Although they used the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood or comparable ideas as a background for their propaganda, all also gave up radical discourses and dropped the war against Western values.

2005), p.3.

52 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, p.172.

53 *ibid.*, p.173.

54 Fuller, *Future of Political Islam*, p.125.

55 International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism", *The Middle East and North Africa Report*, no.37, (March, 2005), p.6.

Divorcing *jihadist* discourses from the political sphere in the Middle East, the new political parties acted within the existing framework. This development among new governing parties drove a wedge between them and radical Islamist groups. The most important stumbling block was seen in the debate on secularism. By the start of the 1980s, only one predominantly Muslim state was purportedly ruling according to *sharia* laws, Saudi Arabia.

As has been argued, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the resurgence of Political Islam in Middle East politics; however, the discourse of *jihad* did not figure prominently in these political developments. The term appeared in relation to three major events in this period: the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, the takeover of Grand Mosque (*Kabaa*) and during the Iran-Iraq War.

The assassination of Egyptian President Sadat (6 October, 1981)⁵⁶ was considered to be a turning point in this period. In contrast to Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat had viewed Islamist groups favorably, and tried to modify the state system according to *sharia* principles. He even oversaw a 1980 constitutional amendment which made Islam the ‘religion of the state’ and *sharia* the ‘main source of legislation’.⁵⁷ In addition, he allowed religious groups to act freely within the country. Under these political circumstances, an influential name in Egypt, Abdullah Faraj, founded the *Jihad Organization (al-Jihad or al-Jama’at-Jihad)* in 1979. For Faraj, *jihad* had been neglected by the Islamic ulama despite its strategic importance for the future well-being of Islam and Muslims; *jihad* should be duty of every Muslim against all kinds of threats to Islam, even if the threat is coming from state leader.⁵⁸ Faraj criticized other groups for their gradualist strategies and involvement in the existing political system. He insisted that active, immediate, and above all, violent *jihad* was the only strategy to achieve an Islamic state. In tactical terms, Faraj argued that the assassination of Egypt’s president (called the ‘evil prince’ and ‘the Pharaoh’⁵⁹) would be an effective first step in a revolution that would seize power and establish an Islamic state.⁶⁰ His *fatwa* was heeded by a member of al-Jihad who, in October 1981, assassinated Sadat. The police in Egypt undertook a huge investigation and the new leader Hosni Mubarak banned all opposing movements again.

The second seminal event in the *jihad* movement occurred in November 1979, when 2000 Islamic fundamentalists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the annual hajj and held hundreds of pilgrims in hostage.⁶¹ This

56 Devin R. Springer et al., *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, p.33.

57 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), p.7.

58 Cook, *Undersanding Jihad*, p.107.

59 Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History Doctrines and Practice*, p.163.

60 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur’an to bin Laden*, p.291.

61 Jalil Roshandel and Sharon Chadha, *Jihad and International Security*, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), p.12.

showed that even the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia was not immune to Islamic resurgence. When the Saudi royal family established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, other tribes accepted its legitimacy. However, some groups felt defeated themselves and formed *Ikhwan* (Brotherhood—not to be confused with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), an organization that criticized the Saudi monarchy for not being religious enough.⁶² A group of students had previously assassinated King Faisal in Medina in 1975, so the criticism became a cause for concern for the monarchy and many members of *Ikhwan* were arrested. Its leader, Juhaiman b. Muhammad al-Utaibi (1940–1979), who had planned to announce himself as *mahdi* at the end of the pilgrimage month on 20 November 1979, declared a *jihad* against the Saudi royal family. On the morning of 20 November, the heavily armed group occupied the Kaaba,⁶³ but the rebellion was violently suppressed. With the help of French security forces, the Saudis were able to bring the situation under control, though 250 people died and many more were wounded.⁶⁴

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was the most important *jihad* cause of new state of Iran. Although the Muslim countries of the Middle East were inspired by the Iranian Revolution, they felt threatened by the export revolution ideology of Iran. Finally, supported by Gulf countries and other Sunni states of the Middle East, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 in an effort to contain the Shi'ite revolution in Iran. Saddam Hussein also defined the battle as a “heroic *jihad* and martyrdom for the cause of right”. Thus Saddam Hussein argued that the Iranians were not “true” Muslims, and that Muslims were now obliged to fight not just for Iraq but also to defend “the ideals for which the prophet Mohammed and his great supporters waged holy war.”⁶⁵ The eight-year war resulted in a million casualties and ruined the economies of both countries.⁶⁶ Thinking that he was fighting on behalf of Sunni states, Hussein claimed that all these countries were then responsible for Iraq’s war debt, a position which would cause further crisis.

At the same time, nonviolent *jihad* activities were also strengthened by religious people during 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly the theological connections between *Da'wa* (preach and call) and *jihad* were being made by street and neighborhood preachers. This populist version of Islam empowered thousands who took the demand of the Islamic call to heart. They saw it as their duty to bring fellow Muslims back to the “straight path” propagated by Islam. Their message was based in principles of reform and nonviolence.

62 Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, p.99.

63 Reinhard Schulze, *A Modern History of the Islamic World*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000) p.228.

64 Roshandel and Chadha, *Jihad and International Security*, p.12.

65 *ibid.*, p.18.

66 Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p.250.

In places like Jerusalem and the West Bank *Da'wa* members worked in the refugee camps as well.⁶⁷

On the other hand, the most crucial debate over Islam in politics occurred outside of the Middle East, in Afghanistan, when the Soviet regime occupied the country in 1979. With the call for *jihad* by Abdullah Azzam,⁶⁸ the Afghan cause became the concern of all Muslims. Not only the Muslim states but the US also became involved in the Afghan *jihad*, and supported strengthening of Afghan mujahids. The arrows of *jihadist* mujahids who had been trained and armed by the US forces turned against Western powers and resulted in the most destructive attacks including 9/11 in 2001. The beginning of the Taliban regime in 1996 introduced a new dynamic to modern Islamist policies. As much as Khomeini made the Islamic term *fatwa* popular, so did bin Laden with *jihad*.

Jihadism after the 1990s

By the mid-1990s, the idea of a global *jihad* school had contributed to the philosophy of *jihadism*. Although there are many different types of *jihadist* organizations in the world, all share a common argument: There is a global conspiracy functioning to destroy Islam. It is argued that the Christian West and their ally Zionist Israel are working to destroy Islam, and Muslims are suffering from the aggression of Zionists and Crusaders⁶⁹ in the form of unending economic, military and cultural pressures on the Islamic world.

Hesitant religious groups shifted towards more aggressive tools in response to local and international developments. Since the 1990s, Islamist fighters have been found globally. Every day *jihadist* militants implement new combat tactics, techniques and procedures against the Western world, especially against the US and existing local leaders. Radical religious organizations have been using violence and terrorism, arguing that they were fighting under the banner of *jihad*. From then on, *jihad* as military tool has been used by non-state actors to gain legitimacy for their aggressive actions. This form of war is a threat to international security since it aims to be a destabilizing force. Over the course of Islam's politicization, followers have been mobilized through the call to *jihadist*.⁷⁰

67 Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945*, p.69.

68 Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam became the major Arab advocate of the *jihad* against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1989. See: Springer et al., *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*, pp.42-43.

69 Abubaker A.Bagader, "Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World" in *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*, ed. Akbar S.Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.124.

70 Bassam Tibi, "Radical Islam and International Security", in *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses*, ed. Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar, (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.21.

The transformation of Political Islam into radical Islam has meant militarization, which were to be accomplished through irregular warfare. *Jihadism*, particularly in the form of terrorism, is based in Political Islam, which is not the case with all religious extremism. The irregular war of *jihadism*, unlike classical *jihad*, is warfare without rules and without a limit to the number and type of targets. This is indicative of a radical change in international affairs. Politically, it is related to a politicization of Islamic universalism that is striving to establish a new Islamic world order.⁷¹

Jihadism has little religious significance to Muslims. Unlike early *jihad* movements, the *jihadism*, which is a military and political version of *jihad*, started in Central Asia. In Afghanistan, in response to the Soviet occupation, a *jihad* had been called during the 1980s by Azzam. Saudi Arabia became the most important supporter of that *jihad*, providing key military and economic support to Afghan mujahids. However, the later call to *jihad* by Osama bin Laden in August 1996 received a different response,⁷² and the notion of *jihadism* would become synonymous with Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The mid-1990s witnessed the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The second wave of Afghan *jihad* differed from that called against the Soviet invasion.⁷³ This time, *jihadism* formed within an exploitive environment.

In Sudan, Muslims in the north had been waging *jihad* against the largely Christian-Animist south. But in 1992, just after bin Laden moved there, the Sudanese regime extended the call to *jihad* to include the country's Nuba Muslims as well because they opposed the fundamentalist vision of the ruling party. The government declared that anyone who resisted the regime was an apostate and would be sentenced to death.⁷⁴

Radical Islam posed a threat not only to non-Muslim societies but also their states because the fundamentalists rejected every element of the modernity project. In some countries radical Islamist groups declared *jihad* against the ruling authority. For example, in Algeria, a group of Islamists immediately declared *jihad* against the regime. Since Algeria gained independence from France in 1962, one political party effectively dominated the system: the National Liberation Front. However, in 1991, an Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), received a surge in popularity. The existing Algerian regime decided to close down the party for fear of losing power. Soon after, a more radical Islamist group—the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—emerged, justifying its social and military activities as a form of defensive *jihad*.⁷⁵ In

71 *ibid.*, p.22.

72 Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, p.323.

73 Brachman, *Global Jihadism Theory and Practice*, p.8.

74 *ibid.*, p.19.

75 Roshandel and Chadha, *Jihad and International Security*, p.21.

neighboring Tunisia, and also in Yemen, radical Islamists declared *jihad* against Western powers.⁷⁶ Over time, *jihad* would expand around the world, including non-Muslim states. In short, *jihad* had gone global.

This new version of *jihad* is totally different than the traditional view. Global radical Islamist groups have based their philosophical development on *jihadism*. Global *jihad* emerged on the international scene after al-Qaida's 9/11 attack, and has since become synonymous with terrorism. The most important thing about *jihadism* is that it has been developed by non-state Islamic organizations (radical and global) rather than by Muslim states.

The governance of Political Islam has not been confronted by public opposition, but by radical Islamist organizations, which have been slowed by the policies of governments. Islamic governments have not changed their state systems, and have curtailed their foreign relations with non-Muslim states, especially the US. The radical Islamic groups are not happy with the activities of their governments and have shaped their own policies not only against the dominant Western powers but also against Islamic states that ally with them. The radical discourse is characterized in two basic slogans: "*Islam huva al-hall*" (Islam is the solution) and "*al-Qur'an dusturna*" (The Qur'an is our constitution).⁷⁷

The new *jihadist* praxis is enabled through technology. Any interested parties can find digital articles, writings, personal stories, etc. in huge numbers on the internet. Any interested parties can follow links to discussion forums, learn about recent attacks, or discuss the future goals of *jihadist* movements. The al-Qaida web page contains a library of 3000 books by respected *jihadist* thinkers outlining core doctrines and religious legitimizations for their violent approach.⁷⁸ A *jihadist* thinkers group has disseminated a set of basic parameters of its ideologies in an effort to reach all Muslims. Their messages have now become available in variety of media formats, including cassette tapes, large books, CDs, web pages, etc., and have been translated into multiple languages by internal translation bureaus.⁷⁹ The teachings work to convince Muslims to commit to or support their violent acts by framing them as a response to a global conspiracy to destroy Islam.

There are several basic arguments in the justification for *jihadism*. The main argument is that there is a global conspiracy towards Islam. *Jihadist* leaders think that Muslims living in Christian countries face many challenges in their daily lives that make it difficult to practice their religion: Western civilization is in a state of perpetual war with Islam and the proof can be seen

76 *ibid.*, p.22, pp.28-29.

77 International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism", pp.1-6.

78 Brachman, *Global Jihadism Theory and Practice*, p.14.

79 *ibid.*, p.11.

in everywhere. Western civilization works through mind control and social engineering. At Western schools, which Muslim children also have to attend, students are given a corrupted education. Western economics promote lending money for interest. Along the way, un-Islamic economic activities become integrated into the global economic system. International trade is used to exploit Muslim wealth and a Muslim labor force. Under these circumstances, a compromise with the West is impossible for Muslim communities. Muslims must be made aware of these enemy alliances and define their positions accordingly. The only solution is preparation for war.⁸⁰

Jihadists argue that Islam has deviated from the true path and Muslims face humiliation, aggression or persecution.⁸¹ The new activists criticize traditional *jihadist* scholars, claiming that the historical ideology of *jihad* had been exclusively preoccupied with individual behavior, which distracted the attention of Muslims from more urgent issues.

The Latest *Jihadist* Discourse

The most recent development seen in Iraq and Syria is the declaration of *jihad* by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (*al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa-al-Sham*), with which it announced the establishment of an independent Islamic state in occupied territory, along with the restoration of the caliphate for Muslim unification.⁸² In March 2011, demonstrations against the Bashar al-Asad regime led to civil war in Syria. Within a short time, radical groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaida in Iraq joined the struggle, and the conflict spread rapidly all over the country. At the same time, the continuing sectarian conflict in Iraq led to the disobedience of some groups. Within this framework, the Iraqi branch of al-Qaida declared its independence from the main organization and announced it's the establishment of a new state under the name ISIS.

The organization was composed of some radical Islamic organizations during the Syrian Civil War. The group was formed in 2004 under the name of "the Organization of Monotheism and *Jihad*" (*Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad*) with the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was the leader of al-Qaida at that time. In 2010 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, also known as Abu Dua, became the leader of the organization. In 2013, following a conflict with Afghan leaders, al-Baghdadi declared his separation and changed the name of his organization to the Islamic State of Iraq and

80 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, pp.61-62.

81 Brachman, *Global Jihadism Theory and Practice*, p.5.

82 Adam Withnall, "Iraq Crisis: ISIS Changes Name and Declares its Territories a New Islamic State with 'Restoration of Caliphate' in Middle East" *The Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-declares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-as-emir-removing-iraq-and-syria-from-its-name-9571374.html>, Retrieved on June 29, 2014.

al-Sham.⁸³ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also declared himself as the caliph and “leader for Muslims everywhere.”⁸⁴ His declaration of *jihad* calls for every Muslim to join the organization to fight for the new caliph.

ISIS controls many recruitment and logistics networks. Those who have previously fought with the organization remain connected with one another, and are likely to keep in touch even after returning to their places of origin. The solidarity and brotherhood established on the front lines cements enduring relationships, which will be important for the future of the *jihadist* movement. ISIS continues to build its prestige and legitimacy within the Islamist movement at large. The organization deploys social media effectively and Muslims around the world are joining them.⁸⁵ Indeed, the extent of ISIS’s political and media outreach aimed at garnering local support is unprecedented in the history of global *jihadist* movements.⁸⁶ It shows that Muslims are ready for establishment of a caliphate.

ISIS’s *jihad* approach differs from those of other current *jihadist* movements. Many Muslim groups, governmental or non-governmental, do not accept the validity of the call for *jihad* in the Syrian dispute because it is political, not religious.⁸⁷ Instead, the parties involved in the conflict were Shi’ite groups and Sunni groups or ideological opponents of Bashar al-Asad. Some religious leaders have issued *fatwas* blaming ISIS for creating disputes among Muslims.⁸⁸ In other words, the conflict is not between Muslims and non-Muslims so there is no threat to Islam.

In contrast to other *jihad* movements, ISIS has targeted Muslims, and specifically the Syrian and Iraqi people, rather than foreign powers. Many Muslim cultural groups are tolerant of other groups; ISIS shows no such tolerance to any non-Sunni group. This call to *jihad* has seen non-Muslim communities in Syria and Iraq attacked, and the majority of those killed have been Muslims. Although the organization announces its objections to foreign powers, especially Great Britain and the US, the targets of ISIS’s campaigns have been Muslim civilians and other local groups living within Muslim states.

83 BBC News, “Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084>, Retrieved on June 30, 2014.

84 BBC News, “ISIS Rebels Declare ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28082962>, Retrieved on June 30, 2014.

85 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement”, *Research Notes of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, (June 2014), no. 20, p.7.

86 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham”, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Middle East Forum*, v.6, (January, 2014), p.6.

87 Muhammed bin Ali, “Jihad in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS”, RSIS Commentaries, no.194, Nynang Technologies University, <http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/24352>, Retrieved on December 19, 2014.

88 Recep Tayyip Gürlür and Ömer Behram Özdemir “From Al-Qaeda to Post-Qaeda: The Evolution of ISIS”, *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.1, i.1, (May 2014), p.138.

As a last point, the two new *jihadist* organizations, al-Qaida and ISIS, declared *jihad* on each other in April 2015. This call to *jihad* is further evidence that these groups use *jihad* as a tool to realize their political and militaristic aims.

Conclusion

Jihad is a multi-faceted phenomenon both in theory and in practice. It is not a single, all-encompassing concept applied uniformly over the long history of Islam. This study shows that *jihad* has performed numerous functions throughout the history: as a state policy, a doctrinal tool, and an instrument with which dozens of wars, invasions, conquests, and resistances have been waged. The meaning of *jihad* has been determined by time and space according to situation.

From the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century until the time of the last Ottoman Sultan in the twentieth century *jihad* was regarded as a state business. No call for *jihad* could be made or superseded outside the authority of the caliph. *Jihad* could not be proclaimed for personal reasons (it should aim to rescue all Muslims or protect Islam) either.

The First World War changed international norms and values. The division of the world into rival Islamic and non-Islamic territories is no longer a reality of current world system. However, the new system, which benefits the dominant Western powers, is slow to respond to the needs of other societies. Some Muslim scholars have perceived the new international values scheme as threat to the future of Muslim identity. The current iteration of the doctrine of *jihad* gained its meaning within this context.

During the independence period *jihad* calls were realized by national leaders even if they were not religious leaders. Since the caliphate had been abolished by the new Turkish Republic, there was no need to seek the support of the caliph. However, the leaders were aware of the power of religion to unite and motivate people for the sake of the independence struggle. Therefore, the independence movements were presented as a struggle to rescue Islam from Christian domination. Within this scope, some independence movements incorporated the concept of *jihad* or emphasized the religious importance of their causes, but ultimately these new states developed Western-style nationalist state systems rather than religious ones.

After the First World War, the most important factor in the declaration of *jihad* was Western involvement in the Middle East, and especially Jewish settlement in the Palestinian territories. Although full-scale war had been terminated around the globe, developments in Palestine led to the continuation of military conflict in the Middle East. In order to support military conflicts, the religious ulama announced *jihad* emphasizing the wellbeing of Muslims

in the Middle East. These *jihad* calls were more defensive in nature since Muslim political actors and scholars realized that the Christian world had already gained supremacy over the world. Therefore, Muslim scholars and politicians used *jihad* to protect their sovereignty in the Middle East and gain political power in international relations.

Although nationalist leaders had the support of their people in early times, the 1970s witnessed the rise of Islamic discourses. When nationalist movements failed to solve structural problems, the Islamic resurgence found its way to power.⁸⁹ Under the nationalist leaders, the involvement in the political sphere of the oppositional religious groups had been suppressed by harsh state interventions. Yet these religious groups continued their activities illegally or apolitically. Many youths were educated in Muslim Brotherhood schools in various countries, including Palestine, Egypt, Syria, etc., and the writings of mentors were distributed all over the Muslim world. The groundwork for Islamic resurgence was thus laid.

Within this emergent framework, *jihad* became understood as a form of opposition against not only foreign powers, which tried to control the politics of Muslim societies, but also against local leaders who were ready to cooperate with Western powers. This marks the beginning of the transition from understandings of classical *jihad* towards the contemporary idea and practice of *jihadism*. The overall context is the contemporary politicization of religion in predominantly Muslim countries as they endured periods of severe structural and moral crisis. The enemies of Islam were redefined and *jihad* was re-shaped accordingly.

In a globalized world, the aim of *jihad* has turned towards aggressive ends, to eliminate all perceived threats against Islam. When the Islamic Republic of Iran abandoned the policy of exporting revolution, its state-sponsored *jihad* came to an end. Instead, non-state or sub-state organizations have pursued *jihadist* aims, acting as representatives of all Muslims around the globe. A particular interpretation of *jihad* has inspired the establishment of an Islamic state and a reconstruction of the caliphate with the aim of uniting all Muslims against threats. At first the current *jihadist* organizations aimed to topple local regimes which were called as un-Islamic. However, over time the call has changed. From the first assault on the World Trade Center in New York back in 1993, followed by 9/11 and combined with the assaults in Europe between 2004 and 2006,⁹⁰ *jihadism* took on a global form. The phenomenon is explanation as a “revolt against the West”, or simply as anti-globalism.

89 İhsan D. Dağı, *Ortadoğu'da İslam ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: Boyut Yayın, 2000), p.205.

90 Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West*, pp.126-127.

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