

ON THE ANALYSIS OF POWER AND SUBJECTIVITY IN NEGRI AND HARDT

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I will examine some of the crucial themes concerning subjectivity and power in the context of Negri and Hardt's three works, namely Empire, Multitude and Declaration by considering the limits of Chantal Mouffe's critiques on the withdrawal strategy which is attributed to them by Mouffe. The basic questions of my discussion will evolve around Negri and Hardt's analysis of subjectivity as well as an axis examining the power relations and conceptions of Empire and Multitude. I will discuss the structures of Empire, the biopolitical problematics, and those subjectivities that were identified by Negri and Hardt as the four modes of subjectivity in the neoliberal order, namely indebted, securitized, mediatized, and represented. I will put forward the possibilities of transformation within each of these subjectivities in the modes identified in Declaration and try to show that such a transformation can be possible by revealing the irreconcilable conflicts in the context of power relations.

Keywords: Empire, Multitude, Subjectivity, Power, Labour, Capital.

NEGRI VE HARDT'TA İKTİDARIN VE ÖZNEMLİĞİN ANALİZİ ÜZERİNE

ÖZ

Bu yazıda, Chantal Mouffe'un Negri ve Hardt'a atfettiği geri çekilme stratejisi üzerine eleştirisinin sınırlarını göz önünde bulundurarak, Negri ve Hardt'ın İmparatorluk, Çokluk ve Duyuru başlıklı üç eseri bağlamında, öznellik ve iktidara ilişkin kritik temalardan bazılarını inceleyeceğim. Tartışmamın temel soruları, iktidar ilişkileriyle imparatorluk ve çokluk kavramsallaştırmalarını irdeleyen bir eksenin yanı sıra, Negri ve Hardt'ın öznellik analizi üzerinden gelişecek. Bu yazıda İmparatorluğun yapısını, biyopolitika sorunsalını ve Negri ile Hardt'ın neoliberal düzendeki dört öznellik kipi olarak belirledikleri borçlandırılanlar, güvenleştirilenler, medyalaştırılanlar ve temsil edilenleri ele alacağım. Bu öznelliklerin her birinin içinden gelişebilecek dönüşüm imkânlarını Duyuru'da belirlenen kipler içinde ortaya koyacağım ve böyle bir dönüşümün, iktidar ilişkileri bağlamında uzlaşmaz çatışmaların açığa çıkarılmasıyla mümkün olabileceğini göstermeye çalışacağım.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İmparatorluk, Çokluk, Öznellik, İktidar, Emek, Sermaye.

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Introduction

In “Radical Politics Today,” Chantal Mouffe attempts to criticise that approach which was developed by Antonio Negri and Michel Hardt in their collaborative works, *Empire*, *Multitude* and *Common Wealth* by analyzing their underlying “ontology of immanence” and the horizon of their political thought based on that ontology. For Mouffe, that approach in question is depended upon the strategy of “withdrawal from institutions.”¹ This withdrawal strategy is based on the autonomous and collective movements of multitudes instead of a struggle that is able to traverse the state itself and its institutions. It tries to reveal the conceptual powers of uprisings and provides the practical conditions for autonomisation and globalisation of the resistance as well as the possibilities of disobedience rather than binding itself to the reformist arrangements and representative democracy. However, according to Mouffe, on the plane of contemporary hegemony, what should be done is to provide the real conditions in order to create a counter-hegemony by thinking and acting on the basis of the strategy of “engagement with institutions.”² In this context, Mouffe's critique raises two major problematics of classical Marxism: the first of which depends upon an intellectual tradition on the axis of the advantages and disadvantages offered by the modern state apparatus, believing that the state will fade away like a balloon and the other deals with the communist ideal itself. In other words, this conception which is based on the belief that the state is a parasitic entity considers communism from an orthodox perspective and provides the communist ideal with a purely fictitious understanding of a harmonious sociality in which all antagonisms are resolved. In Mouffe's view, seeing the state as a parasitic entity not only hampers its materialist analysis but also results in a distorted belief that it will fade away like a balloon. And this means disregarding the transformation opportunities with which an engagement strategy might face, while it is able to traverse the state and its institutions.

In this paper, I will examine some of the crucial themes concerning subjectivity and power in the context of Negri and Hardt's three works, namely *Empire*, *Multitude* and *Declaration* by considering the limits of Chantal Mouffe's critiques on the withdrawal strategy, and try to show that such a

¹ Chantal Mouffe, “Radical Politics Today”, *Contemporary Marxist Theory: A Reader*, ed(s): Andrew Pendakis, Jeff Diamanti, Nicholas Brown, Josh Robinson, Imre Szeman, Bloomsbury Academic, 2012, pp. 32-35.

² Chantal Mouffe, “Radical Politics Today”, pp. 36-38.

transformation can be possible by revealing the irreconcilable conflicts in the context of power relations.

1. Structures of Empire

The first axis that Mouffe identified in Negri and Hardt's project is based on the transformation of sovereignty.³ Accordingly, sovereignty is united in a single world-wide logic of management. Both in the nation-states and international entities, the relations of sovereignty have gained a new and global form and this new form of global sovereignty is a substitute for the imperialist mode of sovereignty. But what is happening is based not on a mere displacement but on the aggregation of the national and regional power centers of the imperialist sovereignty apparatus under a global form of sovereignty. Therefore, the sovereignty of Empire is not limited to certain regions. Unlike the domination of imperialist sovereignty over limited time-spaces, Empire is a form of sovereignty over the whole of the earth. Empire does not have certain borders and no particular center because the vertical hierarchical models have been abandoned and organized in the form of horizontal networks. Within these interconnected networks, it has developed discursive and non-discursive practices that organize an economical, political and moral sphere of power. Empire is both a deterritorialized system of governance and a deterritorializing entity that captures the regional autonomies into its own network of sovereignty and therefore Negri and Hardt think there is no "outside" in Empire. They claim that since Empire does not have certain boundaries and a well-defined form, we must abandon traditional dichotomies such as inside/outside or internal/external to understand its functionings. Even if we ask where the imperial power is, we can say that it is everywhere and nowhere as Negri and Hardt emphasize that remarking character in *Empire*: "In this smooth space of Empire, there is no *place* of power – it is both everywhere and nowhere. Empire is an *ou-topia*, or really a *non-place*."⁴

1.1. Logic of Subordination

In fact, one of the most specific aspects of Empire is the form of sovereignty that it establishes on space and time, on living being and life itself

³ Chantal Mouffe, "Radical Politics Today", p. 33.

⁴ Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 190.

as a whole. This form of sovereignty is tied to technological, communicative, financial and administrative networks that have never been seen before in history. Does this decentralized, deterritorialized/deterritorializing management apparatus constitute a horizontal time-space design that is isolated from all hierarchies? In a sense, Empire has invented a new network that transforms the forms of sovereignty of the imperialist era and the centralist models based on vertical hierarchies. According to this logic, there is a series of processes that involves both the administrative hierarchical structure of the bipolar world of the cold war years and the functions of single nation-state by translating them into its own functionings. But the point here is that these processes of inclusion and translation are completely different from a Hegelian *Aufhebung* which is a logic of stages or rather moments. If the logic of the global power apparatus were *Aufhebung*, it would have already abolished the nation-state by means of inclusion. This means the nation-state would have been eliminated by Empire, just as, in Hegel, it would be transcended by the organic, mediated and actualized entity. Yet the Empire does not transcend the nation-state, because its logic is not *Aufhebung* but subordination. In other words, Empire subverts the forms of territorial and national sovereignty and subordinates them by deterritorializing their immanent energies. But instead of eliminating them at this point it allows them to function better in accordance with the logic of subordination, because capitalist modernity needs some capacity to maximize its domination over living labor and its control over space and time. These capacities can be extended from the forces of the body to social investments of desire, and from massive political objects to discursive formations. In the eyes of Empire, the objects of the political sphere are not pure objects in themselves; on the contrary, they are “one each” capacity to be developed. They are “one each” capacity because in Empire the homogeneous space of the objects has been replaced by the specificity of the capacities. Therefore, it can be said that the vertical hierarchy of the imperialist era, which is characterized as territorializing/territorialized structure in certain regions and is defined by a closed-space system, is replaced by a system of networks that is organized globally but capable of penetrating into the individual level and that is specialized in communicative-economical-political capacities.

1.2. The Same and the Other

Then, how could such an Empire be possible? What is the network of relations on which Empire arose? Can Empire be destroyed by what makes it possible? These questions cannot be answered by ignoring the Empire's

actions to include and incorporate everything possible as “outside”. The absence of an outside of Empire arises from the realization of a basic logical break; a break that is characterized by the “*non-place*” of the form of power it implements. The modes of power in Empire work by synthesizing of different levels of energies including basic dichotomies, even though the nation-states of the imperialist era can be understood on the basis of bipolar oppositions such as people and rulers, those who exercise power and those who are subject to it. This synthesis can take place in the form of connective, disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses, as emphasized by Deleuze and Guattari in their collaborative work *Anti-Oedipus*, the first volume of their seminal project *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.⁵ For example, consider the notion of racism. Although racism is basically defined as the superiority of one race in terms of existence, value and origin compared to others, the new forms of racism in Empire leave this dual structure behind and infect daily lives, bodies, perceptions and cover the discursive field by means of its contagious characteristics. Even Negri and Hardt say with reference to Deleuze and Guattari: “No identity is designated as Other, no one is excluded from the domain, there is no outside.”⁶ But it would be wrong to think that a system of spatial-temporal domination without outside creates a closed organisation. *Because, from the perspectives of the networks, if and only if there is actually a closed space, there is also an “outside.”* At this point, Negri and Hardt make use of the systematic analysis of what Deleuze and Guattari call capitalist axiomatic in their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.⁷

For Deleuze and Guattari, one of the characteristic features of capitalism is that it can internalize its own boundaries and make itself open by absorbing nomadic entities’ energy to fleeing. So in capitalist axiomatic, everything is decoded, but at the expense of using their energies and capacities for the development of this axiomatics, but not for their own liberation.⁸ In this analysis why is the classical definition of racism inadequate? Because, in classical theory of racism, the superiority of one race over others is analyzed through political and ideological discourses and practices, that is, through the dominant political field. Therefore, one can observe superior and subordinate races, the treatment of superior race to subordinate one, othering, persecution and exploitation as far as one remains

⁵ Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia I*, trans. Mark Seem, Helene R. Lane, London: The Athlone Press, 1994, pp. 76-83.

⁶ Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, *Empire*, p. 194.

⁷ Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia II*, trans. Brian Massumi, London: The Athlone Press, 1988, pp. 455-456.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 371.

in the field of molar perspective; in other words one cannot see the the potentialities that overturn the dominant system immanent in such phenomena. However, from the molecular level, there is no *Other* in Empire or every otherness that tries to emerge is contained by the Empires' *Same*. Identities, populations and bodies that seem to be excluded are the elements of this inclusion and therefore the potentialities to overturn this system are included in this process. So, in the classical theory of racism, the others, the objects on which power will be applied, have become a *capacity* to be exploited and used for Empire. But it is clear that this capacity is never predetermined. Some orthodox approaches that are based on classical plane of spatial coordinates cannot analyse the new phenomena of racism, just like in the case of phenomenon of power. Everyone can be the Other, but it is also a space where the mask of difference is imposed by sameness, that is, the Same of Empire. At this point, the most characteristic aspect that our investigation should determine is that the structures of Empire are not based on transcendence. This means that the practice of power based on transcendence is re-positioned in *Empire* within a Deleuze-Guattarian term "plane of immanence".⁹ Negri and Hardt think of Empire in the context of a plane of immanence. There is no "outside" of the plane of immanence because nothing can transcend it; the plane of immanence is an assemblage of forces whose future lines cannot be predicted because of their contingent character in the nexus of life.

Empire is a global management device that rises on political, historical, cultural, communicative and productive forces. Here, we should point out that, besides this point of view coming from Deleuze and Guattari, Negri and Hardt inherited the concept of power in Foucaults' analyses. This inheritance is apparent in Negri and Hardt's formulation concerning the structure of Empire as a micropolitical device in addition to its macropolitical functionings. Empire is a network of dispositives and the power it implements in the production of subjectivities operates beyond the repressive models and notions. In other words, there is a series of logic and operations in the structures of Empire that rehabilitates rather than punishes, while at the same time it makes the internalization of social fear instead of an intimidation. At this point, it may be useful to look closely at the differences that Negri and Hardt used in Empire which takes Deleuze and Guattari's *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and Marx's *Capital* into its center. The first is the distinction between the proletariat and the industrial working class, and the other between the use value and the exchange value.

⁹ Gilles Deleuze&Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 2281.

1.3. Two Distinctions

The transformations that make up Empire or occur with Empire are fundamental changes in the capitalist system of production. Negri and Hardt's theses in *Empire* put the transformations in the form of capitalist production at the center of their analysis. But at this point, capitalist forms of production are conceptualized in an axiomatic that considers the transformations of the sovereign paradigm and economical transformations together rather than to be stuck in a purely economical category. Then, Empire brought about both the transformation of economical forms and a radical transformation in the form of sovereignty. In the economical sphere, fordist forms of production have been replaced by post-fordist forms, and the form of sovereignty has evolved from a centralized state apparatus at the national level to a global network without external borders. This complex networking is called Empire. At this point, labor forces are experiencing a global transformation and are subject to a new working regime. A flexible, precarious and unorganized working regime is organized on the axis of neoliberal policies, which creates qualitative transformations in the whole functions of labor. In this process, labor is subject of a spatial-temporal division and continual fragmentation. The structure of the industrial factory, which allows for a central working class and its political organization, is now abolished within flexible working regimes and precarious working process. The industrial factory, where workers work together, is replaced by new models such as subcontracting, workbenches, domestic production, daily labor, temporary workmanship in some workshops that offer much worse conditions. Therefore, from Negri and Hardt's point of view, we are now facing the movements of multitudes, not a working class working in central manufacturing sectors, as they pointed out in *Empire*: "This is the new proletariat and not a new industrial working class. The distinction is fundamental."¹⁰ It is a mistake to disregard the distinction between the proletariat and the working class and to take the term proletariat as a one and the direct reference to the working class. According to Negri and Hardt's interpretation, this is both a historical error and an ideological obstacle that overshadows many distinctions that are to be made in order to analyze the present. The term *proletariat* refers to both the industrial working class, the peasants engaged in production, and the workers in the field of service. In fact, the proletariat generally corresponds to the dispossessed, i.e. to those who do not have any means of production and property that can produce surplus value and employ wage workers. However, the term working class is a formulation made exclusively through

¹⁰ Antonio Negri&Michael Hardt, *Empire*, p. 402.

an industrial factory. Is it possible to say that the working class has disappeared with post-fordist modes of production replaced by fordist production?

In fact this is not the case, there are masses of workers who are still *working for others* and the conditions of exploitation are becoming increasingly severe for whole members of the same class. But Negri's emphasis on this point is directed to the proletariat as a "multitude," not on the industrial workers as a "class."¹¹ The axis on which exploitation is intensified now proceeds by enclosing all forms of labor: physical, intellectual, emotional, material, or non-material. It is not possible to say that the proletariat of Empire is much more advantageous than the working class of the imperialist period. The proletariat of Empire is literally a *precariat*. In other words, they are condemned to hold onto a precarious, destabilized smooth ground. In this process, the division and fragmentation experienced by labor produces destructive results such as the new fragmentations of space and time organisation in addition to the contrast between living labor and materialized. But the living labor continues to be a very important category for Negri. For he puts an annotation by emphasizing that the use value cannot be completely absorbed into the exchange value as a whole, just as he finds that living labor is not ontologically open to be transformed into objectified labor. In order to explicate this point, we need to carefully analyze the following quote from Marx.

The communal substance of all commodities, i.e. their substance not as material stuff, as physical character, but their communal substance as commodities and hence exchange values, is this, that they are objectified labour. The only thing distinct from objectified labour is non-objectified labour, labour which is still objectifying itself, labour as subjectivity. Or, objectified labour, i.e. labour which is present in space, can also be opposed, as past labour, to labour which is present in time. If it is to be present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility; hence as worker. The only use value, therefore, which can form the opposite pole to capital is labour (to be exact, value-creating, productive labour).¹²

¹¹ Antonio Negri, *İmparatorlukta Hareketler*, trans. Kemal Atakay, İstanbul: Otonom, 2006, p. 148.

¹² Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, trans. Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin Books and *New Left Review*, 1993, pp. 271-272.

In his first sentence, Marx reveals the basic line of the theory of labor-value: It is the socially average labor-time embodied in it that determines the value of a commodity. Otherwise, the commodity itself would be deprived of a quantity of value. However, there must also be a labor potential that has not yet been objectified or embodied, that has not yet turned into a measurable labor-time in order to provide the objectified with the living. This point also reveals the paradoxical structures of capitalist reproduction processes. In the commodity before us, besides the embodied and objectified labor, there is a whole body of labor that is not embodied and objectified. One of the main objective of Empire, in the contemporary form of the capitalist machine, is to reformulate this living labor which has not yet been objectified. In other words, Empire aims to include, exploit and absorb the forces of labor as subjectivity. For labor can exist only as a *living subject* in the form of living labor. Objectified labor is no longer living labor, but dead labor which has lost its vitality in the form of commodities. The capitalist mode of production absorbs this living content of labor by objectification. Empire also knows that besides this absorbing, it has to keep labor alive, so it organizes a power practice in biopolitical processes.

As for the distinction between use value and exchange value, it is often defined as the distinction between the practical material usefulness of something and the value that it takes as a commodity in the market.¹³ But how can this distinction still be maintained in the current capitalist process as market-centered system? In fact, for much of the Marxist writers it is more usual to analyze the market processes in which use value is subordinated to exchange value. But Negri's attitude at this point develops in a completely different way. Marx's emphasis on living labor is that the only form in which labor itself can exist as a living subject is no longer objectified labor, but labor that has not yet been objectified, one of the reasons why the use value cannot be fully absorbed. The potentials of labor are not available to be actualized ontologically as a whole. There is a great teleological prejudice in the ontic character of capitalism that every potential will necessarily be actualized. But there is another reason: money. What is the position of money that is designated as a universal exchange tool in this discussion? Does the money have a use value?

I will give a brief answer to these questions that go beyond the limits of this study and I will move on to the biopolitical problem. During the imperial period, money is no longer merely a universal instrument of exchange, but itself became a determinant within financial networks. Debt

¹³ Karl Marx, *Capital I*, trans. Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin, pp. 41-42.

and financial networks spread the material and virtual processes of money to the textures of the social surface and make the industrial production network dependent on monetary financial networks. The development of various types of loans such as home loans, consumer loans, general loans, car loans can be explained as such. Money is the God of Empire. But this god can only be defined by a logic of control over not only past and present but also on the future. This is the giant steps of Empire that are taken to the future. This analyses will lead us to the biopolitical problem at the heart of the system.

2. Biopolitics and Subjectivity

In Negri's one of the important essays, "Constituent Power: A Concept of Crisis," his emphasis on living labor is very clear:

Living labor, instead, embodies constituent power and offers it general social conditions through which it can be expressed: constituent power is established politically on that social cooperation that is congenital in living labor, thus interpreting its productivity or, better, its creativity.¹⁴

The constituent power is the movement of specific multiplicities with the potential to create another formation instead of established power. While objectified and embodied labor confronts the proletariat with an alien force, living labor is tied ontologically to the existence. This is where the whole issue is concentrated. The logic of capitalist production of the imperialist era is displaced by Empire, which discovered the creative spontaneity of living labor or its capacity to renew itself in its immediateness. The energy flows that created Empire comes from the multitude, that is, from the biopolitical production of the multitude. In contrast, Empire seizes, exploits, and restrains this productivity in the biopower processes and rises on the power it exploits. In other words, Empire depends on the productivity of living labor tied to the movements of multitudes and their existence in order to be able to exist. In particular, it is in need of the cooperation produced by living labor and the wealth it produces. So, what is biopower? Where does the distinction between biopower and biopolitics lie?

¹⁴ Antonio Negri, "Constituent Power: A Concept of Crisis", *Contemporary Marxist Theory: A Reader*, ed(s): Andrew Pendakis, Jeff Diamanti, Nicholas Brown, Josh Robinson, Imre Szeman, Bloomsbury Academic, 2012, p. 27.

2.1. From Disciplinary Power to Biopower

The power in Empire spread from the asylums, prisons, schools and factories, which Foucault regarded as the closure areas, to the whole social sphere. For this reason, instead of the disciplinary social space of closed spaces, Empire takes the open spaces of control society as its own model. Indeed, one of the most central theses for Negri and Hardt is based on the notion of control society, a notion first put forward by Michel Foucault and then by Gilles Deleuze. According to this thesis, we have gradually moved away from a disciplinary social system of social power and have become involved in the networks of a supervisory power practice. It is no coincidence that Negri and Hardt quoted Foucault's words, "Life has now become [...] an object of power."¹⁵ For Negri and Hardt's analysis of the conceptual and material distinction between biopower and biopolitics, as well as their analysis of the structure of power over life, develop around this argument. So how does power over life work? What is the difference, for example, from other forms of power? The comparison here is based on the disciplinary power which is defined by Foucault as "take life and let it live" rather than the pastoral power. Disciplinary power offers a mechanics of power divided into closed spaces. The central element of disciplinary power is the panopticon prison, designed by Jeremy Bentham as an architectural model.¹⁶ In this prison model, the wards where the prisoners remain are completely seen by the watchers in the huge tower in the middle. Thus, it is aimed that prisoners would internalize the feeling of constantly monitored and their behaviors are controlled. The aim is to sustain discipline and to provide that it is to be internalized by the prisoner.¹⁷ Bentham regards this model as a model for the discipline of the social sphere as well. The power technology Foucault sees in panopticon architecture refers to something entirely new. There is no longer a power in the hands of the sovereign, but a network of power relations that is fully distributed to the space and shared with the observers.

However, this technology of power is not limited to the prison model and it should be taken as a model of operation of all closure institutions. In other words, hospitals, asylums, schools, church workshops and factories will be organized according to this logic of discipline and thus each population in each institute will be subject to disciplinary process on their own actions. This is what actually happened during the nineteenth century. The disciplining of

¹⁵ Antonio Negri&Michael Hardt, *Empire*, 2000, p. 24.

¹⁶ Jeremy Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, London: Verso, 1995, p. 43.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Entelektüelin Siyasi İşlevi*, trans. Işık Ergüden, Osman Akınhay, Ferda Keskin, İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 2005, p.181.

labor within the industrial factory is now intertwined with what society distinguishes between what is normal and what is abnormal, and what makes the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent, and in general, what crime and non-crime are regulated.

Thus, a new population emerged through disciplinary processes. The processes in the disciplinary society are therefore the processes of disciplining the populations in closed spaces. However, as Negri and Hardt pointed out (in fact, Gilles Deleuze emphasized this point in his "Postscript on Control Societies"¹⁸) the analysis of the transition from a disciplinary society to control society was first articulated by Foucault. Although Foucault's terms such as oppression and repression are often used at certain levels for the analysis of discursive and non-discursive practices of power, it is Foucault who insists that power is a productive arrangement. For this reason, the power relations that have now come out of the closure institutions are completely scattered in the social sphere. This means that not only the populations within the closure institutions, but rather the social sphere and the socialization itself are inherent in power relations. But why does Empire need to exploit life as a whole and to have an immanent structure to it? Is the contrast here a kind of contrast between capital and labor? Is life itself the only element that Empire cannot fully incorporate, just as the only reality that is not capital is labor-power or rather labor? This point is highly controversial. Because there seems to be a premise that in Negri and Hardt's projects, even if the immediate is mediated, it cannot be completely captured or tamed, and that the immediateness itself can still have a wild productivity.

Empire is dependent on the labor and desire that produces life, and what makes it is nothing but this labor and desire. But it is labor and desire as an inseparable force from the existence of the proletariat, even if it is objectified and priced. So Negri and Hardt's premise, or rather, their pre-assumption, is based on the idea of an ontological inseparability. If we need to give it a name, we will call it an "ontological node" or an "inherent ontological knot." Empire wants to unravel the immanent ontological knot but it is also the condition of its existence. Therefore, it must also allow this node to self-wrap to a certain extent. In the context of capital production, life and levels of exploitation have become much more confronting. Every element within Empire is tied to production and reproduction networks:

In the biopolitical context of Empire, however, the production of capital converges ever more with the production and reproduction

¹⁸ Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript On Control Societies", *Negotiations*, trans. M. Joughin, New York: Columbia University, 1995, pp.77-78.

of social life itself; it thus becomes ever more difficult to maintain distinctions among productive, reproductive and unproductive labor. Labor –material and immaterial, intellectual and corporeal– produces and reproduces social life, and in the process is exploited by capital.¹⁹

In order to exist, labor is forced to be dependant on the processes of exploitation, that is to say both a fragmentation and division and to lose its qualitative distinctions. It is obvious that the exploitation of labor is intense and destructive in the disciplinary processes of power. But in disciplinary processes, labor is disciplined as a whole and the distinctions between working time and leisure, productive labor and unproductive labor can be maintained. Because discipline is an overcoding process; in other words, discipline takes place in the present and as a whole, in pursuit of continuity and efficiency; however, control processes are discontinuous and instantaneous, which are organized according to a variable logic of modulation and programmed to operate not only in the present but also in the future.²⁰ This means that life, which is the real object of the biopower processes in *Empire*, is also life as a potentiality that carries the dimension of the future within it. But at this point in our discussion we must reconsider a change in the concepts of biopower and biopolitics in the analysis of Negri and Hardt to clarify these concepts.

2.2. Transcendence and Immanence

Negri and Hardt's analysis of the biopower processes that take life as their object in *Empire* reaches a new perspective in the second volume of the project, in *Multitude*.

Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society and creates social relationships and forms through collaborative forms of labor.²¹

Negri and Hardt often use some concepts such as general intelligence and immaterial labor, which are in line with their thesis that immaterial labor is one of the dominant form of labor in post-industrial societies. All of these concepts can be understood around the conceptualization of the plane of

¹⁹ Antonio Negri&Michael Hardt, *Empire*, 2000, p. 402.

²⁰ Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript On Control Societies," p. 181.

²¹ Antonio Negri&Michael, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of War*, New York: Penguin Press, 2004, p. 94.

immanence which we mentioned above regarding Deleuze's philosophy. This concept points to a spatial-temporal arrangement into which any transcendental and external force, usually the intrusive and detached subject of modernity, cannot penetrate, but every element within it is organized in interaction. External intervention to the plane of immanence is impossible, because just it has not an inside and centre, so it has no outside and circumference. In this respect, it is completely unfamiliar to dichotomic thinking models. Concepts such as general intelligence and immaterial labor are alien to the idea of transcendence because a transcendental perspective regards only the masses and the forms of material labor of the masses as the social entities. However, in this non-material aspect, forms of material labor also point to a dynamics that are not completely absorbable, that is, cannot be spatialized. In other words, immaterial labor is an inseparable part of the plane of immanence. Just like the concept of general intelligence, immaterial labor has no single subject which corresponds to the first or second pole of the separation between mental labor and physical labor. Immaterial labor is one of the ontological nodes of the plane of immanence. And general intelligence does not belong to anyone. It carries the impulses, fears and reflexes of thousands of years of collective production, which is historical but also geographic. In other words, it is a temporal and spatial intensification of the creativity. But general intelligence is neither a summary of our thoughts nor an authority that determines our thoughts from above. On the contrary, general intelligence is part of the resistance of the existence of the multitudes as a form of defense and speech developed against such authority.

What needs to be done now is to expose the biopolitical production of the plane of immanence in a way that it reveals the strategies of resistance. This will lead us to the patterns of subjectivity in the neoliberal order and to the analysis of the rebellion potentials of these patterns within themselves.

2.3. Four Modes of Subjectivity in Neoliberal Era

Declaration begins by declaring that it is not a manifesto but indeed a declaration. According to Negri and Hardt, manifestos converge to the discourse of prophets who believe that they are capable of creating a people in the future. But the declaration is an expression of the multitudes that has been already moving everywhere. This distinction is the result of both a polemic on the role of the political intellectual and of a debate within Marxism, which is very familiar with the tradition of manifestos. We cannot enter into this discussion here, but let's just say that Gramsci's concept of organic intellectual has a special contact and conflict with this point, and that

the concept of the pioneering party in orthodox Marxist theory does not pay much attention to the declaration of the multitude that has already moved on the streets. Negri and Hardt state in *Declaration* that four forms of subjectivity prevail within the contemporary neoliberal order: indebted, mediatized, securized, and represented.²²

Indebted is the new victim of the global financial network. In fact, this discussion goes as far as the moral guilt and debt themes that Friedrich Nietzsche analyzes as the debtor-creditor relationship.²³ Negri and Hardt merely address this point and engage in the analysis of the contemporary figure of indebted subjectivity. Indebtedness is a necessary consequence of contemporary financial capital, never and never the result of excessive consumption or extravagance of certain subjects. In fact, even if only the general health system is analyzed in terms of how it works, it can be understood that the social security system is based on the logic of indebtedness. Producers are subject to austerity policies imposed by IMF and the World Bank, which control the financial network of Empire, and have to undertake the debt burdens that are not the result of their own expenditure. The global financial network imposes indebtedness anywhere from credit cards to house loans, from social security systems to national monetary policies. Negri and Hardt's critical point about this subjectivity figure is that people can no longer engage in social relations without being indebted. This shows the organic connection of the biopolitical context to social relationship and social life. However, a network of discursive practices stating that socialization is possible only by being included in debt networks is at work. Indebted subjectivity is a weak form of existence that feels guilty. This figure is called by Maurizio Lazzarato as *Homo Debitor*: Indebted Human.²⁴

The level of articulation to the financial levels in which the debt is organized and the formation of another mode of subjectivity is the media. The subjectivity that takes shape in the media axioms is actually the subjectivity that sees itself in the global power scene. There is no direct contact between the resulting representation and the represented. The media presents a form to the subject and captures the desires of the subjects. This device of capture produces a fully mediatized personality. In other words, it leads to a subjectivity that has delivered the production of reality to the media

²² Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, *Duyuru*, trans. Abdullah Yılmaz, İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 2012, pp. 18-36.

²³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Ian Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2007, p. 47.

²⁴ Maurizio Lazzarato, *The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition*, trans. J. D. Jordan, Amsterdam: Semiotext(e), 2012, pp. 8-32.

networks and has lost its connection with the truth from the very beginning. Within the field of meditated subjectivity, the individual produces a cynicism against the destructive and undeniable aspects of the reality in which he lives. The subject buys the truth that is produced in his name because he has completely lost his belief that he can produce the truth. S/he enters into the form and now embraces it as his own reality.

There is an Empire that constantly produces social fear for the subjectivity of indebted and mediatized. In the face of both the fear of the destabilized future from debt and the global terror alarm from the media, subjectivity begins to be shaped within security devices. It is the third mode of subjectivity securitized and is particularly related to new security policies initiated after the attack on twin towers. Developing a global discourse of terrorism in global system in the age of security is not accidental. Empire produces and reproduces war and terror on a global level. For this reason, securitized subjectivity will want to guarantee her/his life more than ever in the past. But one aspect of this is related to virtual threat areas such as cyber-security, and even biopolitics developed against the risks of physical sterilization and infectious diseases. Security is now put into the same equation with freedom.

The complement of the indebted, the mediatized and the securitized subjectivity in political practice will develop through representation. The fourth form of subjectivity is called as the represented. The represented is the one who transferred his power from the very beginning to others who speak in the name for him. This means that he has surrendered his will for the production and maintenance of the common. The story of democracy told to the represented is completely wrong. The represented is a form of subjectivity that ignores its constitutive power and potential to create a world without representation. It is the subjectivity that transfers the right to speak in the formation of the political field.

Conclusion

We can think that in Empire these modes of subjectivity work as a combination; in other words, each of us, our social groups and societies are involved in the axioms of both debt and media, as well as security and representation. However, the critical axis lies in presenting these forms of subjectivity as the condition and possibility of socialization and social relations. At this point, it is necessary to question the forms of resistance inherent to all these forms of subjectivity and whether it is possible to

globalize these resistances. Is it possible to say that “I refuse to pay your debt” for the indebted subjectivity? To reverse the debt relations imposed on the indebted subjectivity itself, to desire and create the truth against the mediatized subjectivity, to participate in the production of truth, to defend the freedom of life by breaking the security-freedom equation of securitized subjectivity, and to resist the world of representation, one can begin by thinking current irreducible conflicts within Empire in relation to the outburst of these subjectivities. In fact, what is happening nowadays is precisely the revolts of these modes of subjectivity. In Negri and Hardt's opinion, multitudes have entered into an irreconcilable conflicts with Empire and have already begun to organize the forms of overthrowing it by reproducing themselves in new modes. From the perspective of the irreconcilable conflicts, there is no withdrawal strategy on which the transformation of subjectivity and power relations will be based, just as there is not any engagement strategy that is able to achieve this transformation; but, we can think a new strategy that can be called “a strategy of metamorphosis” in which all the codes of exploitation and persecution are decoded by the forces of liberation and all hierarchies, vertical or horizontal, are abolished by the forces of equality.

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