



**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PALESTINIAN AND
JEWISH PUBLIC OPINIONS:
THE CASE OF 2008 GAZA WAR
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Abstract

Industrial revolution has influenced not only the structure of economic life but also that of socio-political life. The consequences regarding socio-political structure were the creation of mass society and then mass communication. These two breakthroughs are followed by the emergence of the concept of public opinion since the masses has become a political force by themselves; hence the people were important components for the politicians to win the elections or to reproduce a new political reality with the support of public opinion. In line with this background, this article examines as the case study the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. The study aims to demonstrate that two camps of the conflict attempt to represent the actions of other in a negative manner in the media and thus help to create a public opinion unfavorable vis-à-vis each other. To verify this hypothesis, the process after the Gaza War which took place on 27 December 2008 would be analyzed through the comparison of the news appeared on the chosen Palestinian and the Jewish media networks in that period.

Keywords: *Public opinion, Gaza War, Arutz Sheva, Palestinian Information Center, Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*



ARAP VE YAHUDİ KAMUOYUNUN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ: 2008 GAZZE SAVAŞI

Öz

Endüstri Devrimi sadece ekonomik yaşamın yapısını değil aynı zamanda sosyo-politik yaşamın yapısını da etkiledi. Sosyo-politik yapıdaki dönüşümün sonucu kitle toplumunun ve takiben kitle iletişim araçlarının ortaya çıkışı oldu. Bu iki yeniliği kamuoyu kavramının ortaya çıkışı takip etti. Zira kitleler kendi başlarına siyasi bir güç haline geldiler. Artık halk siyasetçilerin bir seçimi kazanmasında ya da kitle iletişim araçları vasıtasıyla oluşturulan kamuoyu desteğiyle yeni bir siyasi gerçeğin yaratılmasında önemli bir unsurdu. Bu arka plan ışığında, bu makalede vaka olarak Filistin-İsrail sorunu ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı her iki tarafın da diğerini medyada olumsuz şekilde ve dezavantajlı bir pozisyonda resmettiğini ve böylelikle birbirleri hakkında olumsuz bir kamuoyu yarattığını göstermektir. Bu hipotezi doğrulamak için ise 27 Aralık 2008 tarihinde başlayan Gazze Savaşı'nı takip eden süreç seçilmiştir. Olay hakkında o dönemdeki seçilmiş Filistin ve İsrail medyasında çıkan haberlerin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi yapılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamuoyu, Gazze Savaşı, Filistin-İsrail Çatışması, Arutz Sheva, Palestinian Information Center

1. INTRODUCTION

Industrial revolution has influenced not only the structure of economic life but also that of socio-political life. The consequences regarding socio-political structure were the creation of mass society and then mass communication by which the people would be informed as well as governed. These two breakthroughs paved the way for the emergence of the concept of public opinion since the masses has become a political force by themselves; hence the people were important components for the politicians to win the elections or to reproduce a new political reality with the support of public opinion by appealing

to mass communication. Since then, the media has become an important tool in winning hearts and minds of the people. However, despite it is admitted as one of the instruments of a democratic society, pluralism and freedom of expression; mass media has been so far today the subject of critical debates designating it as a tool for propaganda, for bending the truth and creating a new one. It has also been qualified as the producer of opinions.

Thus, the media creates pictures in our heads and these pictures become the catalysts in setting up certain judgments about an issue or an actor which would become later the *clichés*. In line with this background, this article examines the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. The aim of the study is to demonstrate that two camps of the conflict attempt to represent the actions of other in a negative manner, in a disadvantaged position in the media and therefore help to create a public opinion unfavorable vis-à-vis each other. To verify this hypothesis, the process after the Gaza War which took place on 27 December 2008 would be analyzed through the comparison of the news appeared on the chosen Palestinian and the Jewish media networks in that period.

The analysis embraces the process which began with the end of the Gaza war on 18 January 2009. The process after the Gaza War which lasted 22 days will be pursued until 17 April 2009. Israeli channel “Arutz Sheva” and the Palestinian network “Palestinian Information Center” are chosen for the comparative analysis. The media networks are determined according to their places on the political spectrum. Thus, both Arutz Sheva and Palestinian Information Center are designated as politically “relatively” radicalized media centers which reflect the Palestinian – Israeli conflict in a biased manner. It is crucial to choose relatively radical sides of the political spectrum in order to demonstrate clearly the scale of media’s contribution to the formation of public opinion and how far it might go.

The study consists of three main sections. First, an analytical framework is designated. The concept of public opinion and the theoretical approaches to the relation between media and the public opinion is discussed. Then, the case study is explained briefly to be able to put the analysis in its context. And finally, the data obtained via process tracing from the two networks is analyzed and evaluated critically.

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OPINION

No concept is easier to grasp, and hence perhaps more difficult to analyze than that of public opinion (Champagne, 1990, p.41). In the contemporary society, the scientific study concerning public opinion has developed following the achievement of a set of conditions that made it possible.

17th and 18th centuries have been the periods of technological progress, accelerated development and the advent of bourgeoisie which claims equality with the aristocracy and convergence between the folk and the political power. The division of power, the advent of liberalism and finally the attribution of more importance to the human rights have rendered the opinions of individuals more important than previous periods (Bektaş, 1996, p.18).

In the middle of 17th century, a new culture arose in Europe: *coffee houses*. They were accepted as the new social institutions of the period. Within time, those places became the localities in which political discussions took place and opinions exchanged. Those acts – exchange of opinions, political discussions – were the catalysts in the formation of political communication (Bektaş, 1996, p.21). The coffee houses of Britain were the *saloons* in France and the *tisthgesellschaften (societies of table)* in Germany. During the 18th century,

public opinion was a kind of ideological war machine ‘tinkered’ by intellectual elites and by the bourgeoisie to legitimate their own claims in the political domain and to weaken the royal absolutism (Champagne, 1990, p.46).

Class conflicts between feudal and aristocrats, the struggle between monarchy and parliament and the social and political disputes have formed the basis on which democracy and humanism would be able to develop. Contrary to the claim that public opinion is a new phenomenon, it could be asserted that it was already known implicitly or explicitly by the thinkers and politicians (Girard & Stoetzel, 1979, p.19).

The philosopher of the Enlightenment, Machiavelli affirms in *Prince* that the people deserve the affection of the prince since it is the most powerful and strong component of the state (Machiavelli, 2004). A bit later, Pascal defined public opinion as ‘the queen of the world’ while Locke claimed that it was the opinion of the bourgeoisie. As for Hume, public opinion was the only support of ruling class because the political force rest always with the ruled and hence the public opinion governs the State. American and French revolutions pushed these notions into actions and inscribed them into the law (Girard & Stoetzel, 1979, p.20). Public opinion in the sense of peoples’ participation to the policy making processes were used for the first time by Jean Jacques Rousseau after the French Revolution. For Rousseau, only the common will could lead the state forces. Since the fundamentals of power reside in the popular opinion then it is the public opinion which is important to seek, to know and to learn (Girard & Stoetzel, 1979, p.20). Rousseau is favored as the first contemporary thinker who defined and analyzed the concept of public opinion. He revealed the links between public opinion, pluralist democracy and representation (Speier, 1950, p.378).

In the 19th century yet, with the emergence of the concepts as “democracy” and “sovereignty of people”, the public opinion became a component of power in politics. The removal of monarchies and replacement of these regimes with the national/popular sovereignties has brought a opinion; however, this widening of content threatened to be self-destructive and burst the notion itself. In other words, public opinion has become an autonomous body claiming the exercise of power (Champagne, 1990, p.49). This kind of autonomy has been put into question with the assertion that it could put certain norms and notions in jeopardy. Alexis de Tocqueville referred to probable threats against freedom of expression that the sovereignty of public opinion could pose. In his pioneer work *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville enounced that powerful public opinion could produce a kind of repression:

The speech of a powerful man who penetrates lonely into a silent assembly has more power than the intermingling cries of thousand speakers; as long as one can speak freely in one public space, it is as if one is talking publicly in each village. You must therefore destroy the freedom of speech like that of writing. This time here you are in the share: everyone become silent. But where did you arrive? You were once on the side of abusing freedoms and now I find you under the feet of a despot (Tocqueville, 1990, p.141).

That kind of situation would jeopardize the freedom of others. In those societies where equality prevails, public opinion might influence and guide the individual, but it might exercise repression over the individual as well. Facing this situation, the individual might begin to think that he/she is wrong (Tocqueville, 1990, pp.196-198).

John Stuart Mill shared similar concerns with those of Tocqueville. According to Mill public opinion is another kind of domination. There is no common idea/ideal that could have the right to silence another counter-idea/ideal (Baum, 2001, p.516).

In the 20th century, the concept of public opinion became the reference object of the systematic research. American researchers such as Walter Lippmann, Geniş özet, 10 punto büyüklüğünde, Calibri karakteri kullanılarak yazılmalıdır. Geniş özet, ayrıca kelime sayısı sınırlılıklarına uyulup uyulmadığına göre de değerlendirilecektir.

John Dewey and Lawrence Lowell have attributed new meaning to the concept. During the first half of the 20th century, manifestations and protests in the streets and the media have begun to cover considerable place in the social definition of public opinion (Champagne, 1990, p.73). Protests and manifestations were the instruments through which opinions were expressed. As Alfred Sauvy contends public opinion is an anonymous power that has the potential to become a political force. Sauvy distinguishes between the public opinion and the plurality of individual opinions on a given subject. According to Sauvy, public opinion is composed of the voices of mouthpieces of pressure groups which take part in the visual and written media (cited in Champagne, 1990, p.79). As for the opinions expressed by the minority voices, it could be claimed that they would not carve out public opinion since the minority has not the power and options for their voice to be heard publicly in the media (Noelle-Neumann, 1998). Then, the concept becomes ambiguous because there would be two public opinions; one explicit and declared, the other deep but more differentiated; which is almost clandestine or just whispered (Champagne, 1990, p.80).

While Sauvy argues the ambiguity of the notion, Walter Lippmann precise that public opinion does not exist and that one could only talk about “Phantom Public”. According to Lippmann (1997) public opinion lies upon illusions instead of fair consents because it is linked to the stereotypes. For instance, the pseudonym “head slicer” used before the name of a politician who supports death penalty is a stereotype. After some time, one would not need to mention the name of the politician, “head cutter” would be enough to remember him/her (Lippmann, 1997, p.98). Ultimately Lippmann claims that we define our environment according to stereotypes imposed by our culture. Social norms determine our way of examination and our analysis of basic incidents (Bektaş, 1996, p.92). Therefore, when we begin to define what we see according to these norms, our perception would no longer be the reality but the culmination of our judgments. In other words, the reality would be the subject of interpretation (Lippman, 1997, Preface). Consequently, the environment in which public opinion develops is artificial; it is a *pseudo-environment* which loses touch with reality: *Real time, real figures, real connections, real weights are lost. The perspective, the background and the dimensions of activity are smashed and frozen in the stereotype* (Lippmann, 1997, p.100).

In this pseudo-environment, Lippmann places the blame upon the media since the media renders and reinforces the stereotyped perceptions (Lazar, 1995, p.105). That’s to say the audience receive the information without being aware of it. The individuals are used to adopt indirect experiences in order to adjust their conceptions and to conceive that there is no difference between their own experiences and those acquired via media. In any case, the world around us is too big and complex for individuals to be able to construct a real image. Man is not an Aristotelian God who contemplates the whole existence by just glancing;

he/she is a creature of the process of evolution which covers the enough portion of reality for survival (Lippmann, 1997, p.18). By doing so, individual learns to see the things that he/she cannot see, thus he/she generates “pictures in his/her head”. The pictures in the peoples’ heads, their own images, images of others, of needs, of aims, of relations become their public opinion (Lippmann, 1997).

On the other hand, the pictures in our heads are not sufficient to escape the reality. In a complex environment in which we live, one must reconstruct an image to recognize it in one’s own way. This is where media comes into play and helps to reconstruct an image since the individual does not own enough information to interpret the world rationally and thus ready to accept the information revealed by certain groups. Lippmann (1997, p.125-150) explains that this process of reconstruction of images are performed by “experts” i.e. journalists who would also help to create public opinion. The journalists decide which information would reach the audience and by doing so they act as the filters of news (Noelle-Neumann, 1998, p.170). Lippmann (1997, p.36) argues that journals carrying the news filtered by journalist’s “help” to complete the reconstruction process mentioned above, in fact they help to create of a pseudo-environment.

Therefore, it is obvious that the media plays an important role on the formation of the public opinion. It is the contention of this study that the public opinion does not emerge spontaneously but formed via the media. The Following section would refer to certain approaches that explain the relation between media and the formation of public opinion.

2.1. The Relation between Media and the Formation of Public Opinion

The mass media not only informs but also it is a significant source in the formation of public opinion. Lippmann considers that our opinions and attitudes are the responses not only to the world but also to our perception of the world (Lippmann, 1997).

The individuals live in a small part of the world. So, they are incapable of analyzing all the information that flows unremittingly. For this reason, they need the information to be able to complete their knowledge and to affirm their opinions. The information is usually received via mass media. Therefore, one could argue that the public opinion is formed during the communication process and the basic elements of our opinions are determined due to this process of transformation of information (Bektaş, 1996, p.117).

There have been several researches on the impact of mass media over the formation of the opinions. The first research was made by Lasswell in 1927. Laswell's research was about the propaganda techniques used in the First World War. Lasswell argued that by using mass media the state was successful in achieving the social solidarity needed for the legitimation of the entry to the war. In other words, governments won the consent of the public by appealing to propaganda techniques. While Lasswell contends that the effect of the mass media on the formation of the public opinion is powerful; Katz and Lazarsfeld consider that the direct effects of the mass media are limited, and they argue that the interpersonal relations too have impact on the change of attitudes as well.

There are three important theoretical approaches that put forth with clarity the role of the mass media on the formation of public opinion: Agenda setting and framing, two step flow of communication and gatekeeping theory.

Agenda Setting and Framing

The principal idea of agenda setting is that the eminent pictures which appear in the mass media become also eminent for the audience, in other words the agenda of the media becomes the agenda of the public. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs qualified the function of agenda setting as “the capacity of influencing the perceptive structure of the individuals in order to reform their opinions” (McCombs & I. Ghanem, 2011, p.67). For Dearing and Rogers the media inform the audience about the issues that have relative importance in a precise process and thus influence the public opinion (Yüksel, 2001, p.24). As for Windahl agenda setting explains why certain information on certain issues becomes known while the others stay unknown. He qualifies that the approach of agenda setting is better understood by taking the social change and social stability studies into consideration (Yüksel, 2001, p.25).

According to this theory the media does not reflect the reality; instead, certain aspects of reality are chosen. By this way, news in the mass media covers some chosen part of background of the issue, the media attribute more importance to certain problems than others and decide how to interpret and frame the issues (Perloff, 1998, p.210).

Agenda setting approach involves framing as well. Entman defines framing as follows: “Framing is to select certain aspects of perceived reality and to lay emphasis on them in the news texts to promote a definition for the issue, an interpretation, an ethical evaluation or the recommendations for it (Entman, 1993, p.52). Hence, one might argue that framing has implications on the attitudes, individual reasoning and on the public opinion as well.

It has already been mentioned in this study that there were two different arguments regarding the effects of mass media on the formation of the

opinions. Lazarsfeld (1968) asserts that the media had limited effects on the opinions and that mass media is far to be as powerful as one might think. According to this approach the individuals make themselves a sort of infiltration while they receive information from the mass media. During this process certain people emerge as 'opinion leaders' who seem to influence political opinions of their followers (Perloff, 1998, p.190). This approach has been theorized as two-step flow of communication.

Two-step flow of Communication

Lazarsfeld contributed to the approaches of the formation of the public opinion processes by emphasizing the power of informal groups, the inter-individual relations, and the gemeinschaft-like bonds. By doing so, he has challenged to the mainstream approaches to the relation between mass media and the formation of the public opinion and presented a powerful alternative to the theories of mass society which embraces the masses as atomized individuals and easily manipulated politically via the media (Robinson, 1976, p.304).

The results of the research conducted by Katz, Berelson and Lazarsfeld in 1950s has shown that interpersonal relationships have more impact on the reception and perception of the information than the direct effect of mass communication. This hypothesis has been theorized with the concepts 'opinion leader', 'gatekeeper' and 'two-step flow of communication'.

According to this theory, the opinions flow most of time from the media to the opinion leaders and through them to the masses (McQuail & Windahl, 2005, p.83). Opinion leaders shape the communication process according to the perspective of the group; by this way he/she reduces direct effect of mass

media on the formation of the public opinion. However, it is difficult to assert that mass media has not any impact on the opinions. While it has limited effects, the mass media plays a powerful role as well on shaping social values, the attitudes and social structure. Yet, Noelle-Neumann and other researchers argue today that the approach of limited effects has declined towards the end of 1960s and that most of researchers have admitted that the media plays a huge role on the perception of reality (Erdoğan & Alemdar, 2002, p.92).

Gatekeeping Theory

It has been argued so far that the media of mass communication decide which information would be transferred and how this process would function. This process is handled by employees in the media, editors, and journalists. Journalists and editors are the gatekeepers who observe and select the information coming from the news agencies (McQuail & Windahl, 2005, p.209). Hence, the 'gatekeeper' controls the chain. By deciding to publish this information instead of that, the editor decides at the same time which information would be known by the public. As Lippmann has affirmed yet in 1922, one is not able to know what happens in the world. Therefore, we need individuals who would transfer the information, but the *information that they have chosen*. Both the information and its source are determined by gatekeepers, and it is made ready to transfer to the public after this act of filtration.

Consequently, it has been sought to argue that the formation of public opinion has either direct or indirect link to the communication process. This also means that most of our judgements or prejudgments on an issue are formed according to the information received via mass media. The following sections would

analyze the case of Arab and Jewish public opinions via the examination of the reactions after Gaza War of 2008 in the light of this theoretical background.

3. CASE STUDY: THE GAZA WAR OF 2008

The Israeli attack on Gaza started when Israel launched a military campaign in the Gaza Strip on December 27, 2008. The Israeli offensive was called "Operation Cast Lead". The operation's stated aim was to stop Hamas attacks on Israel, and it included the targeting of Hamas' members, police force, and infrastructure as well (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Contrary to the formal name of the operation, the offensive was described as the "Gaza Massacre" by the Arab World and by most of the journalists, columnists, and academicians.

A six-month truce between Palestine and Israel ended on December 19, 2008. The two camps could not agree with the terms in extending the truce. While Israel blamed Hamas for violating the truce by sending rockets and by making mortar attacks against Israel; Hamas blamed Israel for not lifting the Gaza Strip blockade and for an Israeli raid on a purported tunnel. On December 27, 2008, Israel launched an uneven air strike targeting Hamas bases, police training camps, police headquarters and offices by an intense bombardment. Civilian infrastructure, including mosques, houses, hospital, schools, and UN buildings was attacked. Israel claimed many of these buildings were used by combatants, and as storage spaces for weapons and rockets as well (The Guardian, 2009). As retaliation, Hamas intensified rocket attacks throughout the Israeli operation, targeting Beersheba and Ashdod. Israeli ground invasion began on January 4, 2009. On 17 January, Israel declared a unilateral cease-fire, and the next day, Hamas did the same.

According to B'Tselem's *Guideline for Israel's Investigation into Operation Cast Lead: 27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009* the scope of damage came into light after Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) left the Gaza Strip. B'Tselem indicates after three weeks following the end of the operation that 1,300 Palestinians were killed and over 5,320 were wounded, some 350 of them seriously. And according to initial estimates based on satellite photographs, at least 1,200 buildings and over 80 hothouses were destroyed during the assault (B'Tselem, 2009, p.3). Tens of thousands of Palestinians became homeless.

3.1. The Background of the Conflict

Israel's "Operation Cast Lead" marks the fourth assault on Gaza in the ongoing Palestinian Israeli conflict. Israel had almost captured Gaza in the war of 1948, designated by the Israelis as "War of Independence". The Strip was captured second time in 1956 during the Suez War, as a part of a secret plan hatched with Britain and France to topple Nasser as Egypt's president and restore British control over the Suez Canal (Shlaim, 2000, p.169). Israel invaded Gaza Strip for the third time during the Six Day War of 1967 and stayed there for 38 years until the unilateral withdrawal in 2005. And finally, the last slaughter in Gaza, in which on one day alone some 40 civilians, among them many children, were killed by the Israeli shells, will pour fresh poison into the well of hate (The Economist, 2009).

The Jews and the Palestinians have been fighting for over 100 years. The Russian socialist idealists of the Zionist movement had set up an armed group, Hashomer, in 1909 in order to protect their new farms and villages from the Arabs who felt threatened by the new inhabitants lest they lose their lands. Since that day, Middle East has witnessed a series of war between Israel and Arab States: 1948, 1956, 1967, 19-73, 1982, 2006 and today 2009. The intervals

between these wars have been filled by bombings, suicide attacks, atrocities, raids, and uprisings. The diplomacy of peace made between two camps until today was just an illusion in fact. The great hope of peace had occurred during the Oslo Accords by Declaration of Principles in 1993; but unfortunately, this process did not culminate with the promised outcome, it collapsed with the Second uprising. What remain today on Palestine Israeli conflict are the wars without end, the peace without hope.

The memories of the two sides are still fresh: The settlers of Hebron still remember the killing of Hebron's Jews in 1929 during the first violent encounter between Jews and Arabs (Cohen, 2015, p.122-165). The Palestinians still cite the Deir Yasin massacres of 9 April 1948 which was the part of a systematic plan put into action by the Jewish paramilitary group Haganah, known as Plan Dalet (Pappe, 2006, p.90-1). These memories and the ongoing killings, assaults and attacking has brought the peace attempts into deadlock. The two sides always blamed each other. To Israel, the Arabs have missed the chance of having a state at least three times: They could have said "yes" to UN partition plan in 1948. They could have made peace after the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948 (Ovendale, 2004, p.135-9). They had yet another chance in 2000 when Ehud Barak offered a Palestinian state at Bill Clinton's summit in Camp David. The speech of one of the Israeli foreign ministers Abba Eban, has become a motto to remark that situation: "the Palestinians never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity".

This story of Israeli acceptance and Arab rejection is not perceived in the same manner by the Arab side. At the time of the UN partition, the Jews counted nearly 600.000 while Arabs numbered more than twice. The partition plan would be the wiser solution perhaps, but it was not remotely fair to the Arabs.

In the war, most of these Palestinians were fled, either by Israeli force or by the psychological warfare advanced by Jewish forces to make feel the Arabs fear being killed by Jewish forces (Morris, 1987). Till today, these people could not find any chance to return their homes; ultimately the refugee problem, with nearly 4.5 million registered in UN, has become the biggest problems as an obstacle to peace.

Another obstacle to peace occurred because of the Six Day War in 1967. Although political and territorial objectives were not defined by the government before giving the IDF the order to strike; the territorial aims were defined in response to developments on the battlefield. Victory in the Six Day War marked the beginning of a new era in Israeli history: an era of uncertainty. The victory reopened the old question of territorial aims of Zionism (Shlaim, 2000, pp.242-250) Israeli Prime ministers, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir advocated that this war was a miracle which affirmed a God given right to Israelis for the territories including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hence, the settlement activity that would divide future Palestinian state into tiny pieces of land has begun. These settlements have multiplied as the number of the Palestinian refugees did and became another handicap to peace as they prevent two state solution. The more settlements are implemented in the occupied territories, the more impossible has become the two-state solution as there would be no land for a Palestinian state.

At Camp David in 2000 Israel and the Palestinians could not agree. The questions of sharing Jerusalem, the return of the refugees; the distrust (may be paranoia) of Israel on vacating land to Palestinians, whether it will be used for another struggle extinguished the hopes of peace. Finally, the Second Intifada began.

3.2. Road to War and Its Aftermaths

Following the 2006 elections, Hamas assured an electoral victory in the Gaza Strip, not because most Palestinians shared its arguments but largely because after a decade of peace-processing and five years of bloody intifada, they were tired of Fatah's corruption and failure. After the takeover of the Strip from Fatah in 2007, Hamas challenged to rule under Israeli occupation and thus were exposed to diplomatic isolation. Subsequently, Egypt closed the Rafah border crossing while Israel closed all remaining access to Gaza. Israel began to control the flow of goods, power and water going to Gaza. Israel halted all exports, only allowed the shipments.

In 2008, a pause in hostilities between Israel and Hamas come into being with an agreement brokered by Egypt; according to Ethan Bronner (2008), journalist of The New York Times, neither side practiced the agreement effectively. Israeli forces continued to attack Hamas and Hamas went on firing rockets to Israel and smuggling arms using the tunnels. The UN recorded seven IDF violations of the ceasefire between June 20 and June 26, and three violations by Palestinian groups not affiliated with Hamas between June 23 and 26.

On December 4, 2008, Israeli forces raided a dug tunnel near the Israel Gaza border claiming that Hamas militants intended to capture Israeli soldiers while Hamas asserted that the tunnel was used for defensive purposes. After six of its members were killed by Israeli forces, Hamas declared this act as a massive breach to truce. As a result, the rocket attacks increased. On December 20, 2008 Hamas declared that it would not extend the truce which ended in December 19 citing the Israeli border blockade as a primary reason. On December 23, Israeli forces killed three Hamas militants; following this, Hamas launched more than 60 Katyusha and Qassam rockets that hit Negev. On

December 26 Israel opened the border to supply power and food to Gaza and after one day it launched Operation Cast Lead which lasted three weeks.

The Israeli attack on Gaza was condemned both by some governments and by the worldwide civilian demonstrations against Israel. UN Security Council issued a statement on December 28 calling for “an immediate halt to all violence” but the resolution was ignored by Israel and Hamas.

Avi Shalim (2009), in his article published in Guardian claimed that Israel has become a rogue state with *an utterly unscrupulous set of leaders* and that the aim of Israel is not peaceful coexistence with its Palestinian neighbors but military domination. The columnist John Pilger (2014) wrote about that the asymmetry of conquest and implied that terror was clear in this operation and condemned Operation Cast Lead as today’s Plan D which is the unfinished *Operation Justified Vengeance*.

On January 17, Israeli officials declared unilateral cease fire. The next day Hamas declared that it would stop launching rockets into Israel for one week. On January 21, Israel withdrew from Gaza. Egypt held the discussions with Israel and Hamas to extend the cease fire for one more year. Israel pressured Egypt to do more to stop smuggling of arms from the tunnels, declared that this was the central demand of Israel to make a truce. Hamas agreed that it would not insist on collecting reconstruction money itself and would allow donated money to flow through different ways based on the various alliances (The June 2008 Gaza Ceasefire, 2009). Israel stated that it would not agree a long-term truce unless Hamas freed Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier who was captured by militants in 2006. But Hamas insisted that the freeing of Shalit would be possible only if 1,400 Palestinian prisoners would be released. Finally, in February 2009, senior member of Hamas Abu Marzuk declared that Hamas had agreed on a truce with

Israel which would last two and a half years. Today, there are no ongoing attacks, but the hostilities continue. Israeli forces continue to enter Gaza and to kill or detain Palestinians.

4. DATA ANALYSIS: THE FORMATION OF PALESTINIAN AND JEWISH PUBLIC OPINIONS AFTER GAZA WAR

The method applied for data analysis is the critical discourse analysis whose fundamental goal is to interpret and to give sense to the texts of information. For the critical discourse analysis, the discourse is a social practice which represents the world. This becomes significant in the social and ideological context. Thus, critical discourse analysis deals with the production of the power and the ideologies, and its reproduction via the discourse (Van Dijk, 2006).

In this section of the study, the discourse of the two media networks - one Israeli and one Palestinian- are reviewed. The news which appeared in January and April 2009 on Gaza War is analyzed comparatively via critical discourse analysis.

By consulting critical discourse analysis, the study seeks to reveal the implicit structures of the texts from their explicit lingual structures in an objective and systematic manner (Van Dijk, 1988) to understand the formation of public opinion. The texts would be treated on word-based terms. The words will be classified according to their implicit and explicit senses, and finally the ideological senses behind the texts would be revealed.

4.1. The Chosen Medias

In this study, two different media networks have been chosen to compare their manner of representing the case in question. The goal is to show how the media texts related to the same subject could be different from each other when represented by different media networks in composing knowledge in the minds of audiences about the event that took place. To realize this aim, Arutz Sheva and Palestinian Information Center have been chosen as media networks.

Arutz Sheva (Channel Seven) is an Israeli media network which identifies itself with Religious Zionism. The Israeli government did not grant license to Arutz Sheva which is based in the West Bank. The network has seen itself as a counterbalance to the liberal left media in Israel until 1999. Arutz Sheva was granted license after the Knesset passed a law legalizing several pirate radio stations run by Jewish settlers and religious activists. This decision was taken by Binyamin Netanyahu under the pressure of the right wing and religious members of the parliament. According to an article published in BBC in 1999, Netanyahu's action was deemed to gain support from right wing and religious voters in the general elections of May 17, 1999 (BBC News, 1999).

Arutz Sheva began broadcasting in 1988 from a ship under the name Voice of the Gazalle. According to Arutz Sheva, they had to go to sea 12 miles beyond Israel's territorial waters to broadcast because the Labor Party controlled Israel's communications industry and could not tolerate any competition particularly from the religious right. The network claims to be the voice of the settler movement in Israel. Additionally, Arutz Sheva has Israel National TV and B'Sheva newspaper which is distributed free to over 150,000 homes weekly. The media network claims that it has been fighting a battle with the left wing in Israel since it was founded in 1988. The media network criticizes the editorial

policies of the liberal left media and it does not refrain from publishing open letters challenging the editorial policies of these newspapers or media networks (Arutz Sheva Challenges Haaretz's Editorial Policy, 2008).

Palestinian Information Center (PIC) is the first Arabic Palestinian media network established in 1997. Today the website offers news online in French, Turkish, and Persian and in other languages. The aim of the network is to encourage awareness about the Palestinians, the Palestine issue and to demonstrate the other side of the story which is invisible in the mainstream media. It claims to be the voice of Palestinians and their struggle for justice. Apart from daily news published on the website, the center gives information about the history of the Palestine question and human rights.

4.2. The Analysis

The coverage will include the period between the dates January 17, 2009 and 17 April 2009. The reactions of the two networks to the process after Gaza War, including the ceasefire conditions, the control of aid to Gaza Strip, and the elections which were held in Israel will be examined to demonstrate different representations of two camps.

The Overall Quantity of Data

After scanning the news which were appeared on Palestinian Information Center and Arutz Sheva within the period from January 17, 2009 to April 17, 2009; 98 news about the process after the Gaza attack have been chosen for the analysis. 58 of them appeared on Palestinian Information Center while 40 news were from Arutz Sheva. The most referred topics after the Gaza attack were as follows: whether Israel committed war crime and violated the

International law, ongoing arms smuggling of Hamas as an obstacle to ceasefire talks, the return of Gilad Shalit as a condition to start ceasefire talks, the number of Palestinians killed during the attack (Palestinian and Israeli sources give different numbers), the collapse of ceasefire talks (two side blaming each other).

Headlines

The headlines are the primary indicators showing the importance given to the subject. They help making estimation about the attitude of the network. After examining the headlines of Arutz Sheva and Palestinian Information Center, the differences between two networks have come out. For instance, the headlines of Arutz Sheva *“IAF kills 3 Gaza terrorists”, “Most of Dead in Gaza were Terrorists”, “Gaza Terror Boat Explodes near Coast”* focus on terror and terrorism. The headlines of Palestinian Information Center are as follows: *“Zionists have murdered 1200 Palestinians until now”, “The Occupier uses ceasefire as a camouflage”, “Not ceasefire, Effort to Cover the Incapability against the Resistance”, “The Most Peremptory Way of Wining the Elections is to Shed Palestinian Blood”, “There Can’t Be Stable Ceasefire with the Occupier”, “No Difference between the Leaders of the Zionist State”, “Hamas to Blame Israel for the Collapse of Ceasefire Talks”, “Attack to Lebanon Brotherhood Ship from Zionists”*. Hence the two sides are commenting the situation according to their view of the conflict in general. Israel is the enemy to the Palestinians; Palestinians are the terrorists to the Israelis. From the Palestinian perspective, the ship coming from Lebanon is a “brotherhood ship”; from the Israeli perspective it is a “Gaza terror boat”.

The Choice of Words and the Rhetoric of Information

The most used words in the news texts are shown according to their negative or positive senses. The assumption that the information changes our way of perception is generally exercised in the choice of the words. For instance, in the information of the Palestinian Information Center, the Israeli Forces are represented as “Zionist usurper Jews” or “the occupiers”. As we are not habited to read the texts *mot à mot* in order to find the *hidden* meaning behind the text, that sort of reference will take place in our heads and another time when we encounter the actor of this information, in another journal for instance, we will remember it as it was represented in the other network which we have already read: that the Israeli Defense Forces are the Zionist usurper Jews. In the table below, the most expressive words are presented proving that the choice of the word is an important step in building a “new reality”.

The employment of the words changes according to network they appear. As seen above on Table 1; the salient words in Arutz Sheva are “attack”, “terrorism”, “terror”, “terrorists”. While referring to the Operation Cast Lead, Israeli media network choose to use “attack” or “operation”. Palestinians are generally represented as “terrorists” or “Gaza terrorists”. The response of Hamas to the attacks of the Israeli military forces appears on Arutz Sheva as a “terror attack”. Therefore, the agenda of the audiences of this network is set according to this picture framed by Arutz Sheva. With these words the pictures in our heads create a new reality which is different from what is happening. Thus, the Jews’ understanding of this attack will be a counterattack as retaliation to Hamas militants’ launching missiles to Israel. On the contrary, Palestinian Information Center refers to Gaza attack by using the words “slaughter” and “massacre”. The acts of Palestinians against the Israeli forces

are represented as “resistance”. The Palestinians which were killed during the attacks are “martyrs” according to Palestinian media network while they are referred as “terrorists” on Israeli media network. Israel is described as “barbarian”, “occupier”, “Zionists” and “occupation forces”.

Table 1: The Most Used Words

Media Network	Arutz Sheva	PIC
Terror	159	21
Violence	3	4
Arms	36	16
Resistance	4	55
Armed Struggle	7	0
Massacre	1	29
Slaughter	1	16
Zionists	0	142
Occupation forces	1	25
Terrorists	113	7
Gaza Terrorists	12	0
Attack	69	52
Suicide bombing	2	0
Terror attack	6	0
War crime	3	6
Occupier	0	9
Palestine resistance	0	22
Martyr	0	23
Barbarian	0	13
Victory	0	25

While Israeli media tries to normalize the situation; that Israel is doing its best, that it is the side who is trying the most, that it is the Palestinian side who is to blame for the situation; the Palestinian media makes efforts in order to show

“Israel’s cruelty” to its people by using provocative words giving them very negative senses. For the two media networks, it is possible to say that none of them were objective and none of them structured their information with an affirmative language. The phrases in the negative sense are dominant in entire texts of each network.

The Stylistic Description: The References Attributed to the Actor

The description of the actors of the news is very important because the way the actors are described demonstrates the implicit attitudes and stances towards these actors. Table 2 lists the designations made for the actors of the study, i.e. the Palestinians and Israelis (Israeli state). Some are used to describe the role of the actor as “Israeli forces”, “militants of Hamas”, “Resistance of Palestine (referring to Hamas)”, the others are more evaluative: “Terrorists”, “The victims of occupation” etc.

Table 2: The Stylistic Description of the Actors

1. Arutz Sheva (17 January-17 April – referring to Hamas and Palestinians)

Hamas terrorists, Terrorist group, Hamas organization, Hamas government, Senior Hamas terrorist Musa Abu Marzuk, Hamas regime, Hamas terrorist officials, Hamas terrorist organization, Armed Hamas officials, Jihadist regime in Gaza, Hamas movement, Terrorists, Arab terrorists, Gaza terrorists

2. Palestinian Information Center (17 January-17 April – referring to the State of Israel)

Zionists, Zionist Occupation Army, Occupation forces, Occupier, Zionist Occupation State, Aggressor State, Enemy, Zionist Gang State, Butcher State, Butcher Zionist Leaders of the Zionist State, Zionist Terrorist State, the Terrorist Leaders of Zionist State, Israeli forces

Schematic Categorization

In this section, the organization of the media texts (history, summary, the consequences, the comments etc.) is examined according to the model of Van Dijk. The observations demonstrated that most of the audiences learn only the principal event and just the general framework; the news of the two networks do not mention about the history, the context or even the background of the current event. To demonstrate this case, the 17 January 2009; the declaration of unilateral ceasefire by Israel is chosen. Table 3 shows the figuration of the information according to the categorization.

Table 3: The Schematic Categorization in the Coverage of Arutz Sheva and PIC, 17 January 2009

Media Network	Arutz Sheva	PIC
Headline	x	x
Lead	x	x
Principle event	x	x
Background	x	x
History	no	x
Context	no	x
Consequences	x	x
Reactions	no	x

5. THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

The critical discourse analysis applied in this study provided the evidence that both media coverage of the two media network is the coverage of de-legitimization. Language of the media texts has demonstrated that each of them has utilized threatening and negative senses when they build the structures of the media texts. In most of the texts, words which mention terrorism, occupation, massacre, and violence are dominant. The presentation of the collapse of the ceasefire talks are given by each side as if that is the fault of the

other. According to these media networks, each side blames the other for not bringing peace. There is a feeling which could be derived from the news of these media networks that each side is pursuing a kind of denial of the other. That is to say, Israeli side is denying Hamas and it is also denying the Palestinians regarding all of them as terrorists while Palestinian side refuses Israel and represents its existence as the source of all the pains they have been suffering.

This study has sought to establish a relation between theory and actual reality in which we live. The theoretical approaches mentioned throughout the study – agenda setting, gatekeeping and framing – have helped to reveal that the information flowing through media acts as a catalyst in the formation of public opinion as well as in the determination of what kind of public opinion would emerge. This is validated via the case study.

The results have demonstrated that the perceptions of the audiences are manipulated using what Gans (1979) call the information of order and disorder. While the information of order refers to the positive perspectives in a way favorable to the actor of the information, the information of disorder insists on the negative perspectives and represents the actor of the information in the opposite manner.

After examining the media networks, the data analysis has showed that the representations made by two sides are negative and that they manipulate their audiences through the information of disorder. Both Hamas and Israel are represented as a security threat. These sorts of representations find their places in the heads of the public which lead us to the hypothesis that the media plays an important role in the process of the formation of public opinion. It might be

concluded that the media coverage of the process after Gaza attack consists of the information of disorder and they are anti-Hamas and anti-Israeli in general. The two media networks have applied the coverage of de-legitimization.

Finally, this study has shown that the ideological perspectives of the media network and the manner of its interpreting the world play an important role during the periods of selecting of the information, constructing the media texts, and presenting them (the theory of gatekeeping). The way that their re-creating the reality has changed according to their interpretations; that case is visible on the representation of the Palestinians who died during as martyrs by Palestinian Information Center and as terrorists by Arutz Sheva. The results have also shown that the descriptions of the actors are stereotypic in Arutz Sheva and Palestinian Information Center. Besides, there is the problem of neutrality in both networks. This might be due to the faults of journalism. Still, whether the journalists are the partisan supporters or the objective observers is the topic of another study.

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GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Giriş

Endüstri Devrimi sadece ekonomik yaşamın yapısını değil aynı zamanda sosyo-politik yaşamın yapısını da etkiledi. Sosyo-politik yapıdaki dönüşümün sonucu kitle toplumunun ve takiben kitle iletişim araçlarının ortaya çıkışı oldu. Bu iki yeniliği kamuoyu kavramının ortaya çıkışı takip etti. Zira kitleler kendi başlarına siyasi bir güç haline geldiler. Artık halk siyasetçilerin bir seçimi kazanmasında ya da kitle iletişim araçları vasıtasıyla oluşturulan kamuoyu desteğiyle yeni bir siyasi gerçekliğin yaratılmasında önemli bir unsurdu.

Bu arka plan ışığında, bu makalede vaka olarak Filistin-İsrail sorunu ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı her iki tarafın da diğerini medyada olumsuz şekilde ve dezavantajlı bir pozisyonda resmettiğini ve böylelikle birbirleri hakkında olumsuz bir kamuoyu yarattığını göstermektir. Bu hipotezi doğrulamak için ise 27 Aralık 2008 tarihinde başlayan Gazze Savaşı'nı takip eden süreç seçilmiştir. Olay hakkında o dönemdeki seçilmiş Filistin ve İsrail mediasında çıkan haberlerin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi yapılacaktır.

Gazze Savaşı'nı takip eden süreç 17 Nisan 2009 tarihine kadar izlenecektir. İsrail medyası Arutz Sheva ve Filistin medyası Filistin Bilgi Merkezi karşılaştırmalı analiz için seçilmiştir. Söz konusu kaynaklar siyasi yelpazedeki pozisyonlarına göre belirlenmiştir. Buna göre, her iki medya kanalı siyasi açıdan 'görelî' radikal kaynaklar olarak tanımlanmaktadır ve Filistin-İsrail sorununu objektiflikten uzak ve taraflı bir şekilde yansıtmaktadır. Siyaseten göreceli radikal tarafların seçilmesinin sebebi medyanın kamuoyunu oluşturma noktasındaki etkisini ve ne kadar ileri gideceğini açık bir şekilde ortaya koyması açısından elzem olmasındandır.

Analiz Çerçevesi: Kamuoyu Kavramı

17. yüzyılda Avrupa'da kafelerin ortaya çıkışı, kamuoyu kavramının nüvesini oluşturması açısından önemlidir. Zira zamanla bu mekânlar insanların toplanarak siyasi tartışmalar yaptıkları yerler haline gelmiştir. Siyasi tartışmalar, fikir teatileri ise siyasal iletişimin ortaya çıkmasında katalizör görevi görmüştür. Her ne kadar kamuoyu kavramı daha yeni bir fenomen olarak görülse de, açık ya da örtük bir şekilde bu dönemden itibaren hep var olagelmiş, siyasaı etkileme gücünü ise 19. yüzyılda demokrasinin ve medyanın gelişmesiyle beraber edinmiştir. Medya sayesinde siyasiler nezdinde sesleri duyulan kitleler bundan böyle siyasilerin karar alma süreçlerini etkiler hale gelmiştir. Ne var ki, medya zamanla dördüncü kuvvet olmaktan öteye giderek kamuoyunun oluşturulmasında ve şekillenmesinde önemli bir kaynak haline gelmiştir. Walter Lipmann daha da ileri giderek kamuoyunun aslında var olmadığını, kamuoyu denenin aslında bize medya aracılığıyla aktaran, kafamızdaki resimlerden ibaret olduğunu öne sürmüştür. Dolayısıyla, Lippmann'a göre düşüncelerimizi ve tutumlarımızı sadece dünyaya verdiğimiz cevaplar değil aynı zamanda dünyayı algılama biçimimizdir. Diğer bir deyişle hangi medya kaynağına maruz kalıyorsak, söz konusu olaylar ve durumlarla ilgili o medyadan aldığımız bilgilere göre bir anlayış ve davranış geliştiriyoruz. Medyanın kalıplaşmış algılarına bu imgeler ve söylemler aracılığıyla maruz kaldıkça medya tarafından aktarılan enformasyon son tahlilde bizim düşüncemiz ve kanaatimiz haline geliyor.

Kamuoyu ve medya arasındaki ilişkinin teorik altyapısı gündem belirleme, eşik bekçiliği ve iki aşamalı iletişim akışı yaklaşımlarıyla kurulmaya çalışılmış ve medyanın kamuoyunu belirlemedeki gücü Laswell (1927), Katz ve Lazarsfeld (1968) gibi araştırmacılar tarafından ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak kamuoyunun doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak iletişim süreçleri ile bağının olduğu

açıktır. Bu aynı zamanda bir konu hakkındaki yargılarımızın ve önyargılarımızın çoğunun medya tarafından aktarılan bilgilere göre oluştuğu anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu teorik arka plan ışığında, ilerleyen bölümde 2008 Gazze Savaşı hakkında Arap ve Yahudi kamuoylarının oluşmasında medyanın etkisi ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır.

Data Analizi: Gazze Savaşı'ndan Sonra Arap ve Yahudi Kamuoyunun Oluşumu

Data analizi için kullanılan yöntem eleştirel söylem analizidir. Eleştirel söylem analizinin başat amacı medya metinlerine anlam vermektir. Buna göre, söylem içinde yaşadığımız dünyayı temsil eden bir toplumsal pratiktir ve bu toplumsal ve ideolojik bağlamda önemli hale gelir. Dolayısıyla, eleştirel söylem analizi iktidarın ve ideolojinin üretimini ve yeniden üretimini söylem aracılığıyla analiz eder.

Bu bağlamda bu çalışmada 17 Ocak 2009 ve 17 Nisan 2009 tarih aralığında Arutz Sheva ve Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi adlı medya kanallarında Gazze Savaşı ile çıkan haberler incelenmiştir. Aynı konular hakkında farklı anlatımlar karşılaştırmalı olarak ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda 98 haber saptanmış; bunların 58 tanesinin Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi'nde ve 40 tanesinin Arutz Sheva'da yayınlandığı saptanmıştır. İsrail'in Gazze saldırısından sonra en fazla değinilen konular şunlardır: İsrail'in savaş suçu işlemesi ve uluslararası hukuku çiğnemesi, Hamas'ın silah kaçakçılığı ve bunun barışı örselemesi, saldırı sırasında öldürülen Filistinlilerin sayısı (her iki kaynak da farklı rakamlar vermektedir) ve sonuçlanmayan ateşkes görüşmeleri (her iki taraf da diğerini suçlamaktadır).

Analizde önce haber başlıklarına bakılmıştır zira başlıklar medyanın ilgili konu hakkındakini tavrı ile ilgili ilk ipucunu verir. Gazze Savaşı hakkında her iki medyada çıkan haberlere bakıldığında Arutz Sheva'nın İsrail'in Filistinlilere

yönelik saldırısını terör ve terörizme yönelik şekilde haberleştirdiği; Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi'nin ise İsrail'in saldırganlığından, öldürdüğü Filistinli sayısından ve ateşkese yanaşmamasından bahsettiği ortaya konmuştur.

Haberlerdeki kelime seçimlerine bakıldığında iki medyanın birbirinden farklı bir dil kullandığı görülmüştür. Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi İsrail'den 'işgalci', 'katil' ve 'siyonist' olarak bahsederken; Arutz Sheva Filistinlileri terörist addetmiş ve İsrail'in saldırısını 'operasyon' olarak nitelemiştir. Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi'ne göre ise öldürülenler 'şehittir', halk da 'direnmektedir.'

Haberlerdeki aktörlere atfedilen sıfatlar da önem arz etmektedir. Buna göre Arutz Sheva Gazze Savaşı hakkındaki haberlerinde Hamas'a atfen 'Hamas terör örgütü', 'Gazze'deki cihatçı rejim', 'Gazze teröristleri' gibi ifadeleri kullanırken, Filistin Enformasyon Merkezi İsrail' atfen 'işgalci', 'kasap devleti', 'siyonist devletin terörist liderleri', 'saldırgan devlet' gibi betimlemeleri kullanmıştır.

Sonuçlar ve Tartışma

Bu çalışmada başvurulan eleştirel söylem analizi her iki medya tarafından yapılan haberlerin gayri meşrulaştırma amacı taşıdığını göstermiştir. Medya metinlerinin dili incelendiğinde her iki medyanın da tehditkâr ve negatif göndermeler taşıyacak şekilde metinlerini inşa ettiği ortaya konmuştur. Çoğu metinde terörizm, şiddet, işgal ve katliam gibi olumsuz ve tehditkâr anlamlar taşıyan sözcükler tercih edilmiştir. Ateşkes görüşmelerinin sonuçlanamaması noktasında her iki medya diğer tarafı suçlamıştır.

Bu çalışma teori ve güncel pratikler arasında bir bağlantı kurmaya çalışmıştır. Makalede bahsedilen teorik yaklaşımlar medyadan gelen bilgilerin kamuoyu oluşumunda bir katalizör görevi gördüğü ve hatta nasıl bir kamuoyu oluşacağını

belirlemede çok etkili olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaya yardım etmiştir. Bu, vaka incelemesi aracılığıyla da tasdik edilmiştir. Medya kaynaklarından elde edilen haberler incelendikten sonra, her iki tarafın Gazze Savaşı hakkındaki temsillerinin negatif ve manipülatif olduğu bulgulanmıştır.