TURKISH-AFRICAN RELATIONS: AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Neba Ridley NGWA*

ABSTRACT

This article examines the distinctive role played by Turkish formal and semi-formal or structured and semi-structured institutions in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy in Africa for the past sixteen years. The paper answers two main questions, how has Turkey been establishing itself as a legitimate actor in Africa? What reasons and mechanisms provide the guideline for Turkish-African Relations? An institutionalist theoretical approach was employed as a framework for analysis. The outcome of analysis reveals the extent to which issues of classical diplomacy and international politics is no longer the sole prerogative of the ministry of foreign affairs and other staterun institutions. Turkey is now appreciating the changing roles and functions of non-state actors and business organizations in the conduct of foreign affairs. Its image in the region is greatly enhanced by structured and semi-structured institutions. The article concludes by highlighting the challenges and limitations that resurface from Turkey's institutional flows and those that result due to the political dynamics in Africa.

Key words: Foreign Policy, Institutionalism, Structured and Semi-structured Institutions

ÖZ

Bu makale Türkiye'nin son 16 yılda Afrika dış politika stratejisi ve uygulamalarında; resmi ve yarı-resmi, yapısal ve yarı-yapısal kurumların belirleyici rolünü analiz etmektedir. Makale iki önemli soruyu cevaplamaktadır, Türkiye Afrika'da kendisini nasıl meşru bir aktör olarak konumlandırmaktadır? Türk-Afrika İlişkileri için rehber ilkeler nelerdir? Makale, yapısalcı teorik yaklaşım çerçevesinde analiz edilmiştir. Analiz sonucu, klasik diplomasi ve uluslararası politika kapsamına giren konuların artık yalnızca dışişleri bakanlığı ve diğer kamu kurumlarının yönetiminde olduğu algısının değiştiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye dış ilişkilerin yürütülmesinde, devlet dışı aktörler ve ticari kuruluşların değişen rol ve fonksiyonlarından oldukça memnundur. Bölgede yapısal ve yarı-yapısal kurumların nüfuzu oldukça arttırılmıştır. Makale Türk kurumların gidişatının ve politik dinamikler üzerindeki etkilerinin yeniden su yüzüne çıkardığı engel ve sınırlamaların altını çizerek neticelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika, Kurumsalcılık, Yapısal ve Yarı Yapısal Kurumlar

^{*} PhD Candidate Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Turkey, e-mail: nebaridley@yahoo.com

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkey has a long-standing historical and cultural relation with the northern part of Africa dating back centuries past. But despite the long-standing relations it is only in the 2000s that Africa as a continent did really feature in Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Before then, Turkey showed more interest in the West, Central Asia and Middle East. However in the late 90s and early 2000s in a bit to establish itself as global actor in world politics Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy approach that permitted her to diversify its relations with new partners (RTMFA, 2019). The new multidimensional foreign policy led to the introduction of the "Action plan for Africa" in 1998, and a subsequent declaration of the 2005 as "The Year of Africa". Thus, since 2005 Turkey has showed interests and determination to become a leading actor in Africa and to play a strategic role in addressing the numerous problems facing the continent (RTMFA, 2019). Nonetheless, a great deal of foreign policy experts have been inclined to focus on the traditional role of state-run institutions in their efforts to analyze the nature of relations between Turkey and its African counterparts. They are disposed to overlook the distinctive role played by Turkish semi-formal or semi-structured institutions in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in the continent.

With this in mind, this article seeks to answer two pertinent questions, *how has Turkey been establishing itself as a legitimate actor in Africa? What reasons and mechanisms provide the guidelines for Turkish-African Relations?* In the past a great deal of academic literature on Turkish-African relations has persistently failed to explain and situate the relations between both parties beyond the classical context of foreign policy discourse. It is as a consequence of such deficiency that this article aims to unveil the unique approach that serves as the basis for Turkish-African relations. An institutionalist theoretical approach was employed as a framework for analysis. An institutional foreign policy refers to that which enables countries to interact together through formal, semi-formal and informal institutions such as NGOs and multinational corporations (Rhodes et al, 2008). The Institutional foreign policy framework informed by functional and rational choice theories provide an open ruled-based system, reduced cost in coordinating political transactions and create wide avenues for states to cooperate and achieve mutual gain.

Engagement with formal and semi-formal or structured and semi-structured institutions provides the legal and legitimate impetus to strengthen bilateral cooperation between Turkey and African countries. Turkey's engagement in Africa has been extensively noted, it has strengthen its relations with African countries through its activities with structured and unstructured institutions in both Turkey and Africa. Such institutions include The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency-TIKA, Turkey's Independent Industrialist and Businessmen Association-MUSIAD, Maarif Foundation, Turkish-African Business Association-TABA, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities-YTB, The Turkish Red Crescent, Doctors Worldwide (DWW), Economic Relations Board, Turkish Airlines etc. In Africa the African Union-AU, Economic Community of West African State-ECOWAS, East African Community-EAC, and Economic Community of Central African States-ECCAS.

This paper notes that even though Turkey's foreign policy agenda in Africa dates as far back as the pronouncement of the action plan in 1998, the effective implementation of such approach started with measures initiated by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in 2005. Thus it's only after declaring 2005 as "The Year of Africa" that some real changes could be discerned in Turkey's approach towards Africa. The article adopts qualitative research methods whilst making use of secondary data gathered from the World Bank. The paper is structured into three main sections, an introductory section, the institutionalist theoretical framework and lastly the foreign policy analysis.

2. INSTITUTIONALIST THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW INSTITUTIONS SHAPE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Since the beginning of the 21st century hitherto today Ankara's new multidimensional foreign policy approach and action plan in Africa has accorded them a special place within the continent. Most foreign policy analysts tend to focus more on the traditional state centric approach in explaining Turkey's relations with African states. Over the years the Turkish government has moved beyond state to state interaction in foreign affairs as it's increasingly recognizes the role and importance played by non-state actors in the conduct of foreign affairs in Africa. This paper embraces an alternative approach comprised of interaction between States and non-state actors as the basis for socio economic, political and humanitarian relations. It sheds more light on how an institutionalist theoretical framework provides the main lenses through which Turkish-African relations can be viewed.

As from the periods of 1970s onwards it can be argued that increasing interactions between states and non-state actors, or structured and semi-structured institutions reduced the primacy of a state centric foreign policy approach. Institutionalism set the foundation for an open based-rule system in which multiple actors interact to overcome constraints, address security dilemmas and pursue collective actions. The usage of structured institutions such as formal state, regional, sub-regional and global institutions in tandem with semi-structured or semi-formal institutions such as non-governmental organizations, multinational and bilateral economic corporations, trade agencies, interest groups and trade unions has been phenomenal in the implementation of foreign policies. In this article emphasis will be on the interaction between formal state institutions and semi-formal institutions in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Institutionalist claim is explained by the fact that world politics is characterized by complex interdependence of diverse forces and groups. Therefore foreign policy through an institutionalist approach considers a range of actors, both at formal and informal actors that shape diverse societal preferences and influence socio-economic, political cultural context of bilateral relations (Putnam et al, 1993). This piece notes that liberal institutionalism or institutionalism per say built on the rational

choice and functionalist theoretical approach best explains how institutions provides guidelines for an open ruled based system in which states and other actors cooperate and achieve mutual benefit. Hence rational choice institutionalism are the major liberal institutionalist mid-level theories that provide explicit account for international cooperative behaviour between multiple set of actors in Africa and Turkey (Putnam et al, 1993).

2.1. RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM

Rational choice institutionalist argues that institutions provide guidelines for agents to form alliances pursue common interest in a rational way and solve existential problems. In simple terms institutions provides equilibrium ways to do things. (Shepsle, 2006, p.23-28) Accordingly, rational choice institutionalism maintains the fact that institutions offers avenues for collective actions as it enables different groups of individuals to coordinate activities for mutual advantage. Sometimes coordination for mutual gain may take the form of a more formal arrangement and at other times it may take an unusual, strange or informal coordination. Base on this distinction rational choice institutionalist identified two types of institutions involved in the coordination of activities for mutual gains, that is structured institution considered in this article as formal institutions and unstructured considered as informal institutions (Rhodes et al, 2008).

Structured institutions are those characterized by politicians who are selected through a welldefined electoral process. It is argued by Rhodes and Sarah that while in office the policies of the elected politicians must reflect the demands and objectives of their electorates. This is the case with institutions administered by politicians and state bureaucrats whose responsibilities to design domestic and foreign policies that suits the demands of their electorates. While semi-structured institutions are those who's legitimacy and guidelines for operation are determine by structured institutions (Rhodes et al, 2008). They operate in an open rule-based system govern by guidelines instituted by structured institutions. The relationship between structured and unstructured institutions can be understood as that of principalagency interaction. Rational choice institutionalist contends that the delegation of certain powers by the principal to the agent enables the principal to lower cost of political transactions. Thus the delegation of powers by principal (structured institution) to agency (unstructured institutions) has several advantages; firstly, it enables the principal to take advantage of technical expertise within the agency. Secondly, delegation by principal increases the efficiency in foreign policy-making and management of scarce resources. Thirdly, delegation by principal to agency secures credible commitment and releases the pressure and responsibility on the part of elected politician to uphold particular policies (Shepsle, 2006). Hence it is on the basis of such rational choice institutionalist beliefs that Turkish foreign policy makers delegate management powers and operated in synergy with some non-stats actors in conducting relations with African countries. Turkey Independent Industrial and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD) have been fundamental in that respect.

Rational choice institutionalism is applicable to institutions at global, regional, national and local levels. At national and local levels it is important to understand the evolution, functions and activities of Turkish structured and semi-structured institutions in Africa. This article submits that these institutions whose origins lie in rationalist orientation have achieved a myriad of success by creating zones for peace through norms that guides its members. Rational choice underpinnings help guides foreign policy makers to understand the new forms of governance networks and informal steering groups that provide self-regulated arrangements of governance in pluralistic societies. The following section explains how rational choice institutionalism lays the foundation for Turkey's foreign policy in Africa. The new forms of governance networks applicable to Turkish-African relations is reflected in the role semi-structured institution that regulate and consolidate Turkey's foreign policy agenda with its African counterparts.

3. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: A NEW MOMENTUM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RELATIONS

3.1. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONALISM AND TRADE DIPLOMACY

This article contends that the desire of Turkey and African states to improve their economic and trade relations account for intense cooperation between both parties in recent years. Even though Turkey has a long established relations with North African countries owing to its historical and cultural ties dating back to the Ottoman era, however an extensive and in-depth economic strategic cooperation only started to improve with the declaration of 2005 as the year of Africa. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Trade's introduction of the strategic plan for the improvement of economic relations with African states was the beginning of the new phase of cooperation between both partners (Langan, 2017). Building on these discussions this article underpins that Turkey took the bold step to strengthen economic relations with African state and non-state actors. That is the adoption high level economic cooperation with both formal and semi-formal institutions quickly increased its legitimacy and consolidated its position as a legitimate partner in the region. In this respect I will explain the role played by key semi-structured institutions in Turkish and African relations in recent years. The analysis here focuses on prominent economic institutions like TABA, MUSAID, and DEIK.

3.2. INDEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIST AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATION (MUSIAD)

The Independent Industrialist and Business Association (MUSIAD) is a Turkish NGO established in 1990. It has as mission the desire to develop economic, commercial, social and cultural relations between Turkey and its foreign counterparts. MUSIAD declared 2018 as the year of Africa and to that effect has as one of principal objectives to advance cooperation and development in Africa through investment partnership, technology transfer, import and export trade. In recent years the organization has advanced Turkey's foreign relations with African states by encouraging Turkish businessmen to setup investment programs and engage in import and export trade. The association promotes not just economic partnership between Turkey and African states; it also consolidates cultural relations with its fellow Muslim communities (MUSIAD, 2019). It's in this context that the association has established offices with representatives in Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, Niger, Senegal, Benin, Chad, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Ghana, DR Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia.

Within its framework activities of foreign affairs are carried out by three main commissions; first the Foreign Organizational Development Commission (FODC), second, International Relations Commission (IRC) and third Fair-Forum & Organization Commission (FFOC). The Foreign Organizational Development Commission has been maintaining bilateral relations with formal and state recognized institutions in oversea member states. It also searched for new markets and expanded business networks in the continent. Fair-Forum & Organization Commission has been Implementing of MUSIAD's standards and quality guidelines of import and export trade. It also organizes major African Business Forums, seminars and conferences. The International Relations Commission hosting foreign trade delegations at MUSIAD's headquarters and branches in Turkey (MUSIAD, 2019). Generally the business organization works in works in synergy with the Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Development and Industry. It has been engaging diplomatic missions, building and preserving bilateral relations with diplomatic representatives in Turkey. For instance 2018 MUSIAD continued its economic and trade diplomacy approach with visit to South Africa and Zambia, during the visit the organization met representatives leading business companies in South Africa and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with MINERA one of the most important business organizations in South Africa. Such moves shows a decentralization of duties from top down to bottom up and has the advantage of building trust and to improving people to people relations.

3.3. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS BOARD (DEİK)

Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) is a semi-structured intuition involved the conduct of foreign relations. DEİK was established in 1986 and assigned to organize and manage Turkey's foreign economic relations in the private sector in respect to foreign trade, international investments, and agreements. DEIK explores investment opportunities home and abroad and help boost the country's exports. In 2014 DEİK's activities were restructured by law No: 6552 of 11 September 2014 assigning it the task of "conducting the foreign economic relations of the Turkish private sector", to become "business diplomacy" organization comprising Business Councils (DEIK, 2019). By legally recognizing and legalizing DEIK to an economic diplomacy institution, the Turkish government appreciates the changing roles and functions that these organizations has on foreign affairs and international politics. In a bit to boost trade relations with African countries, DEIK has established 43 business councils in African countries. Its activities have been prominent in Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Sudan (DEIK, 2019). Trade relations established by DEIK


became beneficial to most African countries in the area of construction, Agriculture and water drilling (Önis, 2011). Its activities have significantly contributed to the development of bilateral relations between Turkey and African states.

The Turkish-African Business Association, (TABA) is the semi-formal institution that concentrates on establishing strong socio-economic and commercial ties between Turkey and African states. Since 2012 hitherto today it has been organizing trade and development programs in African countries (TABA, 2017). It has increased both the level of communicative interactions and investments between both partners. Turkish-African Business Association is one of the main institutions that work in close collaboration with the Turkish government. The association undertakes the government's financial, industrial and investments opportunities coupled with other trade and development programs. To this end, the Turkish government appreciates the changing roles and functions of business organizations in shaping foreign affairs and international politics. They are using their informal institutions (NGOs) to help facilitate economic interactions with African states. Hence, Turkish image and presence in in the region has been enhanced by her engagement with multinational private companies and NGOs.

In the backdrop of these discussions it is important to notes that since 2005 trade volume with between Turkey and African countries have significantly increased. In the period between 2005-2017 Turkey's bilateral trade volumes with African countries has increased three-fold with imports of \$7.1 billion, exports of \$11.6 billion and a total trade volume of \$18.9 billion (RTMFA, 2017). It is estimated that the trade volume will reach U.S \$50 billion by 2025 Turkey's main trading partners now cuts across North and Sub-Saharan Africa, they include; Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana. The most important exports from Turkey include electrical machineries, agricultural appliances, chemicals, vehicles, and construction equipment. African countries in return exports mineral fuel, metals, inorganic chemicals, timber, cocoa, iron and steel to Turkey.

Turkey's Top 10 Import and Export Trading Partners in Africa-2017

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(Source: World Bank. Accessed: 7/16/2019).

Turkey's 16 years Africa initiative partly implemented through semi-structured institutions has increased economic cooperation, while also bringing political and cultural relations to another level. The experience of Turkish semi-structure institution, companies and NGOs has been transferred to the region and it has contributed to the development of the continent. The number of African countries with which Turkey has signed trade and economic cooperation agreements has increased from 32 in 2003 to 45 in 2017. Turkey has also signed free trade agreement with four African states including Tunisia in 2005, Egypt 2006, Morocco 2006 and Mauritius 2011 (Genç & Tekin, 2014). As concerns reciprocal protection agreement, before 2003 Turkey had signed only six reciprocal protection agreement, so far the number has increased to 26. Equally prevention of double taxation Agreement has been signed with 11 countries compared to the 4 in 2003. According to a 2015 report on the impact of Foreign Direct investment published by the "Financial Times", Turkish investment agencies and companies in Africa creates the highest amount of jobs compared to other foreign investment companies. The Turkish government has signed numerous agreements and permits its agencies to ensure the implementation process. Worthy of mention is activity of Turkish Airlines in the region. Turkish Airlines is another example of semi-structured institution that help shape the volume of trade flow and the pattern of economic interaction between Turkey and its African counterparts. The air transport company provides cargo services that facilitates commercial interactions in the continent (Genç & Tekin, 2014). As of July 2019, Turkish Airlines fly to 52 destinations in 34 African countries, before 2005 it was merely flying to North Africa but it has now extended its reach to Sub-Saharan Africa. Latest additions to its flight include Freetown, Sierra Leone and the Comoros Island.

Turkey now appreciates the changing role and function of business organizations in shaping foreign affairs. The government is using its informal institutions (NGOs) to help facilitate economic cooperation

with African states. Turkish image and presence in the region has been greatly enhanced by her engagement with private companies and NGOs. Thus at this point it's important to accentuate the fact that Turkey represents one of Africa's top emerging strategic economic partners as classified by the African Union, and the African Development Bank.

3.4. INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICAL RELATIONS

In the quest to build strong political ties with African states, Turkey embraced cooperation through regional and sub-regional institutions in Africa. In this regard key formal institutions based in Africa shape the pattern of political interaction between Turkey and its African counterparts. At regional level the African Union, at sub-regional level ECOWAS, ECCAS, EAC etc. Through exchange of high level official visits, participation in Turkish-African summits and conferences organized by state and non-state actors the government of Turkey has established itself as a well-recognized and legitimate actor with the continent.

3.6. ORGANIZATION OF SUMMITS AND CONFERENCES

Political relations between Turkey and African states over the past years have greatly been observe through conferences and international summits organized by formal and semi-formal institutions. The first international Turkish summit was organized by Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Studies, (TACSS) in Nov. 2005. It was at the summit that Turkey officially declared 2005 as the year of Africa. At the summit both partners established a roadmap for the new form of partnership. (Langan, 2017, p.25). The second international Summit took place in Istanbul in 2008. This first ever Turkey African Partnership summit organized by a formal institutions, ministry of foreign affairs in partnership with the African Union. The summit emphasized that Turkey's relations with African states should be built on the basis of the mutual and brotherly partnership. That is relations should be guided by win-win cooperation (RTMFA, 2019) In the aftermath of the summit Turkey's membership into the African Development Bank was approved and she was equally accorded an observer status and strategic partner by the African Union (Ozkan, 2013). Thus, the conference provided the impetus for mutual economic cooperation, investment opportunities and mutual trade agreements which till date continues to be at the epicenter of the high level strategic partnership.

The 2008 summit ended with the formulation of a framework for cooperation and follow up mechanism to ensure the intensification of continues collaboration. As a follow up approach, the second Turkey-African Partnership summit was held in Nov. 2014 in Malabo capital of Equatorial Guinea. The Malabo summit housed representatives from 30 African countries, seven African head of states including the host Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Benin, Zimbabwe and DR Congo. Equally present was the chairperson of the African Union. The theme of the summit titled "*A new model*".

of partnership for the strengthening of sustainable development and integration" marked the beginning of a new chapter of cooperation with the adoption of a joint implementation plan for the period 2015-2019. Turkish-African summits organized by the formal institutions particularly the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs and African union created avenues to strengthen political ties (Siradag, 2013). Formal international institutions coordinate and structure agendas that significantly influence the capabilities, understanding and mutual interests of states. The summits organized by formal institutions at national and regional levels influence interstate relations with multiple set of partners. The paper notes that the importance of political relations between both partners was highly visible with the activities of the United Nations. For instance in 2008 Turkey was voted as a non-permanent member with the UN Security Council. This achievement was partly due to the massive support received from African States who all voted in support of Turkey with the exception for South Africa and Mozambique. More so since Turkey's intends to play a leadership role in world politics, most African states backed its permanent membership position in order to ensure the protection of their interest within the UN forum.

Within the framework of this analysis, accreditation by sub-regional institutions in Africa is pivotal in determining the legitimate status of Turkey in Africa. In the year 2005 the Turkish embassy in Abuja was accredited to the most formal regional institutions in West Africa known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In Parallel lines in 2010 the Turkish embassy in Dares Salam in Tanzania gained accreditation from the East African Community. (EAC) In 2012 Turkish embassy in Lusaka was accredited to common markets for Eastern and Southern Africa and in 2013 that of Libreville-Gabon was accredited to Economic Community of Central African States- ECCAS (Njuafac, & Katman, 2016). With regards to Turkey relations with the African Union, Turkey remain committed to the support institutional capacities in both Turkey and Africa. Turkey has strengthened its relations with African Union and other sub-regional organization in the continent. Through interaction with the African Union, Turkey has quickly increased its legitimacy and is consolidating its position as a strategic partner. In 2008 the African Union accorded Turkey an observer and a strategic partner status. Since then the country has been has establish plan for regular meeting with AU. Apart of the African Union, the Turkish government has also made significant efforts to consolidate relations with other subregional institutions.

3.7. INTITUTIONALIZED SECURITY RELATIONS

The coordination of security partnership and security assistance by in Turkey in Africa is exclusively reserved for formal institutions. Security coordination through formal peacekeeping institutions is at the of Turkey's foreign in Africa. This work maintains that Turkey has greatly contributed to international peace and security in Africa. Since 2005 hitherto the country has taken up the responsibility to provide security assistance within the framework of formal institutions to crisis stricken African states. Turkey acted within these institutions as the voice of Africa to defend

the rights and interest of African states facing security challenges. As illustrated in the table below, it has immensely contributed to UN and AU peace keeping missions in Africa operating since 2003 hitherto today.

Name of Operation	Duration		
UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	March 1993–March 1995		
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	October 1999–December 2005		
UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC)	November 1999–June 2010		
UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	June 2004–December 2006		
UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	March 2005–July 2011		
UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	September 2007–December 2010		
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	September 2003–March 2018		
UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	April 2004–June 2017		
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	April 2013–present		
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	July 2010–Present 11.		
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	July 2007–Present		
UN in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	July 2011–Present		

Turkey's Participated UN Peace	Keeping Missions
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(Data source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The table above demonstrates that since 1993 Turkey had been participating in UN peacekeeping mission in order to maintain peace and security in Africa. Nonetheless, after the declaration of the special initiative for Africa in 2005, Turkey attached special importance to ensuring peace and stability in the continent through formal sub-regional, regional and global security institutions. Out of the existing nine peacekeeping missions in Africa, Turkey is currently providing personnel and contributing financially to seven of them, they include MONUSCO-DRC, MINUSMA-Mali, MINUSCA-CAR, UNAMID-Darfur, UNMISS-South Sudan, UNOCI-Cote d'Ivoire and UNMIL-Liberia.

As illustrated above, Turkey has embarked on providing military and financial assistance to major UN and AU peace keeping missions within the continent. Additionally Turkey partnered with United States in a Combine Task Force (CTF), a multinational task force situated at the coast of Somalia that carries out anti-piracy operation under the auspices of the UN Security Council. It is important to note here that in 2012 Turkey assumed full command of the Task force (Ozerdem, 2019). The Turkish National Police provides training in various fields to military personnel from African countries. The training program is scheduled to run from 2014-2022, in recent years the number of trainees has increased dramatically (Genç & Tekin, 2014). Since the introduction of the training program hitherto Turkey has signed more than 25 agreements with African states in the fields of defense and security and training. In 2015 alone Ankara hosted 570 trainees from different African countries and up to the moment it has trained more than 1000 foreign police officers and soldiers (Genç & Tekin, 2014). In Libya most of the assistance is in the health sector. The coordination of security partnership and security assistance is exclusively reserved for formal institutions.

3.8. HUMANITARIAN INSTITUTIONALISM


Humanitarianism is an essential aspect of Turkish foreign policy in Africa, it is at the center of AKP's approach in the continent. Turkey's narrative in Sub-Saharan Africa presents her as emerging state with no colonial ambition, its interest is not predicated solely on economic partnership but also on humanitarian concerns. The Turkish model has influenced some foreign affairs experts to describe Turkey as a country that is not obsessed with its own interests, but is to a large extent concerned with the wellbeing of Africans (Ozkan, & Orakci, 2015). As an emerging country, it is keen to share not just provide humanitarian relief assistance in areas of humanitarian concerns but most importantly to shared its development experience with African states. A detailed assessment of Turkey's institutionalist model in the continent is guided by two elements, first the desire to share her development experience with Africa and exalt the continent and secondly to help address humanitarian concerns. The distinctive feature of the model rest on the fact that it does not rely on the ministry of foreign affairs and other statrun institutions; rather humanitarian assistance is channeled through coordination between state and non-state actors. In this respect the proceeding section explores the synergy between formal humanitarian institutions such as Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) that function with semi-formal ones like Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and Humanitarian Relief Foundation (HRF), Maarif Foundation, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities YTB and Turkish Airlines.

3.9. TURKISH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AGENCY

The Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA) is a state-run development and humanitarian institution that prioritize a human centered approach of cooperation with African states. In January 1992 TIKA was established through Statutory Decree No. 480 as a technical assistance agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By virtue of Law No 4668 it was tasked with the responsibility of granted by other institutions and NGOs in Turkey. Therefore TIKA is a state agencies that coordinate and function in synergy non-state actors, particularly cultural groupings, business organizations and multinational corporations. TIKA's has as one of its principal objectives in Africa to share development experience with African states and provide humanitarian relief assistance to countries hit by humanitarian serious crisis. TİKA's President Serdar Çam noted "Our main aim is to contribute to developing countries by conveying Turkey's experience and to consolidate fair and sustainable cooperation which is based on mutual trust with African countries" (TIKA, 2019).

According to statistics from TIKA's Humanitarian Report in 2014, Turkey's humanitarian assistance stood at 3.3 billion USD. In 2014 she became the third largest humanitarian donor in the world (TIKA, 2017). In 2015 Turkey's emergency and humanitarian budget was \$3.2 billion, in 2016 it was estimated at 6.4 billion and in 2017 it surpassed \$ 8billion. In terms of development assistance, in 2018 Turkey was 6th according to global ranking. It has surpassed many developed countries like the France, Germany, United States and United Kingdom. Such progress is largely owed to the country's humanitarian agencies operating in synergy with non-state actors. TIKA operates in more than 150 countries and is ranked as the highest institution in Turkey that promotes humanitarian and development assistance in the world (TIKA, 2017). Through TIKA, Turkey provides humanitarian and development assistance to over 37 African countries in the field of Education Agriculture, health, water and vocational training (TIKA, 2017). Its numerous projects has greatly contributed in creating employment opportunities and in reducing the hyper unemployment and poverty rates within the region. TIKA has been one of the major agencies used by the Turkish government to help meet up its objective of providing humanitarian assistance in Africa.

Turkey's Official Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance



Source: Turkey Assistance Development Report 2016

Turkey's development and humanitarian assistance has been greatly felt in the domain of education, it has provided substantial scholarship to African students from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. In recent years the number of scholarship to African students has increased significantly. For instance in 2015-2016 Turkey provided 1239 scholarships to students from Africa. According to information from the semi-formal institution responsible for coordinating Turkish government scholarship, (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities YTB) they're more than 5000 African students studying under Turkish government scholarship RTMFA (2019). Furthermore the *Turkish* Maarif Foundation established by law in 2016 is an institutions with semi-autonomous status. It is responsible for coordinating Turkish Schools abroad. Maarif Foundation functions as a non-profit organization under the Turkish Ministry of Education and now operates in 33 countries across six continents in the world. Its activities are highly prominent in Africa and in the Balkans where it provides education from primary to university level. As of 2019 Maarif has over 84 operational schools across 14 African countries (Daily Sabah, 2019). The Foundation does only offer education, it provides assistance to many high school students in the continent. Vocational training programs offered by Maarif is another feature of shared development experience.

Since 2011 hitherto, Turkey has been providing development assistance to Somalis as part of its foreign policy objective (Daily Sabah, 2019). In 2015 TIKA donated ambulances to five regional hospitals across the country. In the domain of education Turkey offered special scholarship programs to Somalis to study in Turkey. In 2014 about 600 computers were donated to institutes of higher learning with University of Mogadishu being the greatest beneficiary (TIKA, 2017). In the aftermath of one of the nation's deadliest terrorist attacks in Mogadishu that killed over 300 people, the Turkish government

in synergy with its formal and semi-formal institutions, that is the Turkish ministry of health and Turkish airlines provided emergency medical assistance with a team of health experts, seriously injured patients were also evacuated to Turkey. In a bit to recognize and endorse Turkey's hard efforts in humanitarian assistance in the region, in 2016 the United Nations held its first ever Humanitarian World Summit in Istanbul (TIKA, 2017).

TIKA gives more importance to the improvement of water and environmental conditions in its activities in Ethiopia. 40 percent of aid to the country is directed to this area and close to 35 percent is spent on social infrastructure. Also the development of administrative and civil infrastructure is amongst the activities TIKA prioritizes in Kenya. The Agency also assists Kenya in the domain of Agriculture, communication, education social infrastructure and services. In an effort to support agricultural production and mechanization in Kenya, in 2018 TIKA donated modern mechanization equipment in the districts of Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Tana River and Lamu located in the Eastern and the North Eastern Provinces of Kenya (TIKA, 2019). The agency also carried out activities in communication, administrative and civil infrastructure, education and social infrastructure in Libya. Most of the assistance is in Libya is devoted to the health sector.

In Niger, TIKA is operating mostly in the fields of social infrastructure and improvement of water and environmental conditions. As well as health, education, administrative and civil infrastructure, the forestry and communication sectors are also supported by TIKA. For Instance in 2018, TIKA constructed a Maternal and Rehabilitation Center with 51 beds and other equipments in Niger. The facilities were handed over to Niger's Ministry of Public Health. In Senegal TIKA has been very active in recent years, in 2018 the agency made sure that 35% of the aid assigned to Senegal was spent on education, 25% on health, 19% on agriculture, and 8% on the improvement on water and sanitation.

[2016; Million US Dollars]

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3.10. THE TURKISH RED CRESCENT

The Turkish Red Crescent is another non-profit and semi-formal institutions that builds Turkey's image in Africa. The organization has been operating for more than 150 years and is well known for its humanitarian and relief assistance in many parts of the world. It is highly recognized by the International Committee for Red Cross and its role in international relations in not new (Ozkan, 2013). In the past two decades the Turkish Red Crescent has been active in a number of African countries in need of humanitarian assistance. The Vice president of organization Fuat Oktay reported in 2018 that the organization has provided relief assistance to 51 countries across the globe (Kizilay, 2019). In 2006 it built and equipped a hospital worth \$5 million in Darfur. In 2008, it established a modern pharmaceutical center in Ndjamena, Chad. One of its biggest assistance in the region was in 2011 when it launched a nationwide campaign to assist famine victims in Somalia. The Red Crescent coordinates a team of

Turkish medical experts called Doctors Worldwide (DWW). In recent years the team has been providing medical assistance to African countries including Kenya, Sierra Leone, Ghana Sudan and DR Congo. In 2007 and 2014 DWW in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent provided medical services and food relief to Central African Republic (Kizilay, 2019). DWW runs a hospital and medical training center in Mogadishu and has been responsible for the training of Somali medical experts. In a related development in 2017 the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) constructed one of largest orphanages in the Horn of Africa.

3.11. OBSERVATION

The analysis dawn in this paper answers the question; why do Turkey frequently use semi-formal intuitions as vehicles for cooperation in Africa. Turkey's institutionalist model predicated on rational choice theory provides an open ruled-based system and avenues for Turkey and African states to cooperate and achieve mutual gain. From this vantage point I identified three main reasons, firstly semiformal institutions provide alternative form of bilateral state interaction, such as decentralized cooperation. It's a mechanism for international decentralized cooperation. Secondly Semi-formal institutions allows for the centralization of Turkish foreign policy through a concrete and stable organizational structure and supportive administrative apparatus. This enhances the ability of semiformal institution to shape and affect the understandings and interests of Turkey in Africa. Semi-formal formation institutions also performs an independence function, by independence I mean it provides the Turkish government with the ability to act with some degree of autonomy within defined sphere. This is the case of the Turkish Maarif Foundation that operate in synergy with the Turkish government and in effect to enable the state to have some control and autonomy over Turkish schools in Africa. This paper further notes that since it's costly for states to negotiate with one another on an ad hoc basis the Turkish institutional model reduces the cost of coordinating political transactions. The model also provides rules and norms that enable a wide range of actors to overcome constraints and settle on specific course of actions. Therefore, it is due Turkish institutionalism that Ankara has quickly increased its legitimacy and consolidated its position as an observer in the African Union and as key strategic actor in the continent according to classification from the African Development Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

3.12. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

Turkey's institutions face several challenges while conducting activities in different parts of Africa that inter alia affect their efficiency. This paper notes that some of the challenges resurface from their own institutional errors, while others are the outcome of the political dynamics in Africa. The challenges encountered by Turkey institutions include problems such as lack of sufficient expertise, funding and professionalism. Turkish semi-structured agencies face problems of procuring sufficient resources to operate programs across the continent (Bulent, 2017).

A major limitation is lack of coordination, mismanagement and duplication of services. This often comes as a result of poor feasibility studies or inadequate preliminary inquiries and pre-deployment assessment before a particular project is executed. In an interview detailed by Bulent Aras, a representative of the Humanitarian Relief Foundation NGO operating in the continent stated as follows;

"There is a problem of coordination and mismanagement of available funds in humanitarian operations. For example, one NGO built a hospital but failed to manage it. Hospital management is a totally a different area. There are different resources at our disposal, but we fail to cooperate amongst each other to be able to make good use of them" (AID representative interviewed by Bulent Aras, March 2016).

This draws attention to the absence of a culture of cooperation among the semi-structured institutions particularly Turkey NGOs and civil society organizations operating in Africa. In parallel terms, El-Gazzar chief physician of the Kibuli Muslim Hospital in Uganda noted a similar problem:

"Someone has to coordinate the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs. We do not want them to duplicate activities. It is a waste of time, energy, and funds. Maybe we need one local coordinator to coordinate activities with principles, plans, and a common timetable" (M. El-Gazzar, 2015).

In some cases, lack of sufficient management and cooperation with local partners affect the efficiency of Turkey's presence in Africa. Although the cooperation through NGOs, multinational corporations and civil society organizations marks a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, to some extent relations are is restricted to East and some South and West African countries. For example, while TIKA extensively works with local actors in some Eastern and Southern African countries, there is little cooperation across Central Africa States. Thus, there's insufficient cohesive and cooperative activities in these part of the continent, many of them remain divided along lines of political ideology, religious ideology and geography. In some cases cooperation have been constrained by historical and cultural affinity. Turkey's presence and huge influence in North and Eastern African is partly explain by shared common culture and history. However, in order to further enhance its presence and image in the continent as a legitimate global actor, Turkey needs to move far beyond relations grounded on cultural and historical dictate.

In terms of institutional limitations from the African side, a substantial majority of the research have found that reliance on oversee development assistance has a negative effect on institution building in developing countries facing political and economic instabilities (Chikozho, & Nhemachena, 2017). According to these scholars, dependence on oversea aid, whether flowing from official or private channels both weaken incentives to build institutions. As predicted by

institutionalists scholars, African countries that suffer from political and economic instabilities like Somali have been are caught up in a vicious cycle of dependence of oversee development assistance from external partners like Turkey. Turkey is very familiar with challenges of building institutions, democratizations and politics of inclusion. Through its formal and semi-formal institutions Ankara can offer more in that regard.

4. CONCLUSION

The analysis in this article so far revealed the extent to which issues of classical diplomacy and international politics is no longer the sole prerogative of the ministry of foreign affairs and other staterun institutions. This paper answered key questions on; how has Turkey been establishing itself as a legitimate actor in Africa? What reasons provide the guidelines for Turkish-African Relations? Drawing from the aforementioned foreign policy analysis, the article contends that Turkey's engagement in Africa has been extensively noted, It has strengthen its relations with African countries through its activities with formal and semi-formal institutions in both Turkey and Africa. Such has been the case with the Turkish-African Business Association-TABA, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency-TIKA, Turkey's Independent Industrial and Businessmen Association-MUSIAD, Maarif Foundation, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities YTB, The Turkish Red Crescent, Doctors Worldwide (DWW), Economic Relations Board, Turkish Airlines etc. In Africa the African Union-AU Economic Community of West African State-ECOWAS, East African Community-EAC, and the Economic Community of Central African States-ECCAS.

The analysis dawn in this paper answers the question; why do Turkey frequently use semi-formal intuitions as vehicles for cooperation in Africa. Turkey's institutionalist model predicated on rational choice theory provides an open ruled-based system and avenues for Turkey and African states to cooperate and achieve mutual gain. From this vantage point I identified three main reasons, firstly semiformal institutions provide alternative form of bilateral state interaction, such as decentralized cooperation. It's a mechanism for international decentralized cooperation. Secondly Semi-formal institutions allows for the centralization of Turkish foreign policy through a concrete and stable organizational structure and supportive administrative apparatus. This enhances the ability of semiformal institution to shape and affect the understandings and interests of Turkey in Africa. Semi-formal formation institutions also performs an independence function, by independence I mean it provides the Turkish government with the ability to act with some degree of autonomy within defined sphere. This is the case of the Turkish Maarif Foundation that operate in synergy with the Turkish government and in effect to enable the state to have some control and autonomy over Turkish schools in Africa. This paper further notes that since it's costly for states to negotiate with one another on an ad hoc basis the Turkish institutional model reduces the cost of coordinating political transactions. The model also provides rules and norms that enable a wide range of actors to overcome constraints and settle on specific course of actions. Therefore, it is due Turkish institutionalism that Ankara has quickly increased its legitimacy and consolidated its position as an observer in the African Union and as key strategic actor in the continent according to classification from the African Development Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

It is apparent that the government of Turkey is now appreciating the changing roles and functions of non-state actors and business organizations in the conduct of foreign affairs in Africa. In recent years the government has been using its formal and semi-formal institutions to help strengthen economic, political, security and humanitarian relations with African states. Hence, Turkey's image and presence in the region has been greatly enhanced by the accreditation of non-state actors, private, regional and sub-regional organizations. Thus, Turkey remain committed to the support of institutional capacities in both Turkey and Africa, It has strengthened its relations with African Union and other sub-regional and global institutions in the continent. However, in order to further enhance its presence and image in the continent as a legitimate global actor, Turkey needs to move far beyond relations grounded on cultural and historical dictate. The article underpinned the limitations that resurface from Turkey's institutional flows and those that result due to the political dynamics in Africa.

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