

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations

no:
28
2013

Facts and Comments

Ömer E. LÜTEM

Armenians and Syria 1915 and 2013

Jeremy SALT

Different Opinions on Ottoman and German
Political Military and Economic Relations

Ata ATUN & Şükrü Server AYA

The Armenian Report of British War Office, General Staff:
"Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians"
(5th April 1918)

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Armenian Terrorism Between 1973 and 1984

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ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

Ahmet TETİK & Mehmet Şükrü GÜZEL

BOOK REVIEW



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Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal, or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the Journal's archives for five years.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 2 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24
Fax: 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Özyurt Matbaacılık
Büyük San. 1. Cad. Süzgül Sok. No: 7 İskitler / ANKARA
Tel: +90 312 384 15 36 **Fax:** +90 312 384 15 37

Printing Date: 15 February 2014

Annual Subscription: 20 US \$
15 TL

Please send your payment to the following bank account:
For TL - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221

For US \$ - Garanti Bankası- Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

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Özge Nur ÖĞÜTÇÜ

As is usual, the first article of the Review of Armenian Studies journal, “**Facts and Comments**” contains main events up until the end of 2013 and related comments about Turkey-Armenia relations, genocide claims, developments in the Armenian diaspora and Armenia’s internal situation. During this period, Turkey’s efforts at revitalizing its relations with Armenia were not accepted by Armenia. On the one hand, as a part of the activities for the centenary of 1915, Armenia has decided to conduct a juridical inquiry on claims (including land) that maybe made upon Turkey, which could lead to a crisis between the two countries if Armenia officially makes these claims. On the other hand, Armenia’s sudden decision to give up on being an associate member to the European Union and to agree to join the Customs Union that Russia is trying to establish means that Armenia’s vision of Europe is ending, and as such can result in important outcomes in the future. Lastly, this article gives detailed information about efforts at gaining recognition for the genocide claims from certain countries and international organizations with the help of Armenia’s diaspora.

In his authoritative article titled “**Armenians and Syria, 1915-2013**”, Jeremy Salt discusses - alongside the Syria topic - the Armenian genocide claims; and within this context makes very pertinent remarks about controversial issues such as numbers, military necessity, conflation, the missing Muslims, trials, Greeks and Assyrians.

Ata Atun and Şükrü Server Aya’s article titled “**Different Opinions on Ottoman and German Political Military and Economic Relations**” provides a better understanding of Turkey-Germany relations. The authors evaluate the political, social, juridical and military relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany during period up until the end of World War I; and reach certain conclusions through this evaluation.

The article titled “**The Armenian Report of British War Office General Staff: Historical and Ethological Notes on the Armenians**” (5th April 1918) by Tolga Başak contains the original English version of the report of the same name, and supplies extensive information amongst which the ones about Armenian population are especially noteworthy.

Hazel Çağan, in her article titled “**Approach of the Turkish Press to the Armenian Terrorism Between 1973-1984**”, maintains that the Turkish press

during this period did not inform the public about Armenian terror in a necessary and sufficient manner.

In our journal's "**Archival Documents**" section, Dr. Ahmet Tetik and Mehmet Şükrü Güzel have published some documents about the 11.5 million Ottoman liras deposited to German banks by some Ottoman state officials during World War I, which were confiscated by the Allies after the war.

There are two book reviews in our journal. The first one, penned by Şükrü Server Aya, is titled "**Twisted Law and Documented History - Geoffrey Roberson's Opinion on Genocide Against Proven Facts**". In his book, Aya responds to Geoffrey Robertson's observations in a detailed manner.

The second book that has been reviewed is titled "**Neither to Laugh nor To Weep – A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide**", which was published by an Armenian Protestant priest Abraham H. Hartunian. Although he defends the well-known Armenian stance, Hartunian complains about European countries' policies towards the Armenian question, and in the end concludes, "Moslem Turks dealt us better than these European Christians".

Sincerely,

The Editor

FACTS AND COMMENTS

(OLAYLAR VE YORUMLAR)

Ömer Engin LÜTEM

Ambassador (Ret.)
Center for Eurasian Studies, Advisor
oelutem@avim.org.tr

Abstract: *This article deals with two subjects, the first, under the title “Turkey-Armenia relations” relates the indirect territorial demand on 5th of July, 2013 of Armenia from Turkey. The second subject concerns developments on genocide allegations during the last two years in twenty one countries and three international organizations.*

Keywords: *S. Sarkisian, E. Nalbantian, R.T. Erdoğan, A. Davutoğlu, H. Demoyan, A. Hovsepyan, Pan-Armenian Lawyers Forum, Germany, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Armenia, Georgia, Great Britain, Spain, Israel, Sweden, Italy, Canada, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Ukraine, Uruguay, European Union, OSCE, Council of Europe*

Öz: *Bu yazıda iki konu ele alınmaktadır. Birincisi, Türkiye-Ermenistan ilişkileri başlığı altında, Ermenistan’ın dolaylı bir şekilde 5 Temmuz 2013 tarihinde Türkiye’den toprak talep etmesidir. İkinci konu ise yaklaşık son iki yıl içinde soykırım iddiaları konusunda yirmi bir ülkede ve üç uluslararası kuruluşta meydana gelen gelişmelerdir.*

Anahtar Sözcükler: *S. Sarkisyan, E. Nalbantyan, R.T. Erdoğan, A. Davutoğlu, H. Demoyan, A. Hovsepyan, Tüm Ermeni Hukukçuları Forumu, Almanya, Avustralya, Avusturya, Beyaz Rusya, Bulgaristan, Çek Cumhuriyeti, Danimarka, Ermenistan, Gürcistan, İngiltere, İspanya, İsrail, İsveç, İtalya, Kanada, Macaristan, Portekiz, Slovakya, Ukrayna, Uruguay, Vatikan, Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı, Avrupa Konseyi*

I. TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

Turkish-Armenian relations have experienced a stable period for almost the past four years since signing of the protocols on 10 October 2009. This is mainly because the protocols have not been put into implementation.

The protocols, which have been decided on upon lengthy negotiations, foresee the establishment of normal relations between the two countries and within this framework, the opening of the borders and establishment of a framework for cooperation. However, since issues such as the genocide allegations,

acknowledgment of territorial integrity by each side and the issue of Karabakh have remained unsettled; disputes and tensions would continue even if the protocols were implemented. Therefore, with the intention of using the protocols as an instrument for the settlement of the disputes, Turkey wanted one of the existing problems -the Karabakh issue- to be settled or at least for a step to be taken towards its resolution in order for the protocols to start being implemented. But, Armenia has not accepted this.

On the other hand, the Armenian Constitutional Court adopted a resolution that prevented the genocide allegations from being discussed and that at least put forth reservations on the recognition of Turkey's territorial integrity. Moreover, with the support of the US and the EU, Armenia requested for the protocols to be ratified and implemented without being linked to any preconditions and in order to achieve this, with the purpose of putting pressure on Turkey, wanted the genocide allegations, which until then had never turned into an official claim, to be recognized and for its consequences to be eliminated. However, rather than the discussion of these issues which have no legal basis, Turkey insisted on progress being made on the Karabakh issue which is the most current issue among others and which can greatly contribute to the settlement of other issues, if it is resolved. Upon Armenia's rejection, a stable and at the same time a tense situation in relations between the two countries emerged. Armenia's demand for land from Turkey on July 5, 2013, even indirectly, has increased tensions further.

1.1. PAN-ARMENIAN FORUM of LAWYERS

Commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 1915 events with various ceremonies and activities is an issue that almost every Armenian is strongly interested in. Some of them, nearly superstitiously, consider 2015 as the year

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that Turkey would recognize the genocide, apologize for it, pay compensation, give the Armenian properties back; and moreover, would meet Armenia's demand of land; or that, at least a process satisfying this demand would begin this year.

Despite the Diaspora's and in lesser extent the Armenian public opinion's expectations about the activities foreseen for 2015; no significant preparation has been observed about the path to be followed, although it was discussed to a great extent.

Armenia took the role of the coordinator on these issues¹ and President Serj Sarkisyan issued a decree on April 23, 2011 on "the establishment of a State Commission for coordinating events dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide".

The State Commission has gathered three times so far in 2011, 2012, and 2013 and reviewed the preparations. The crucial point is that practically no information has been given about what kind of ceremonies and activities would be done and there is no plan announced, although there is not much time till the anniversary. The reason of this is still vague. It could have been done with the intention of not alerting Turkey, or the delay for certain decisions about what would be done or lack of required financial support may have cause this.. The Secretary of State Commission Hayk Demoyan said that the commission should have been established earlier and complained about its slow performance². Moreover, President Sarkisyan said that 2015 was not the ultimate goal; that the main aim was to make Turkey recognize the genocide; that, therefore, these activities would continue after 2015³. It is understood that 2015 is seen as a final date for Turkey to recognize the genocide allegations but as the beginning of a process to that end. However, the important point in this issue is how and by which means a small country like Armenia and a dispersed Diaspora would make such a Turkey, a big and powerful country, recognize the genocide allegations. The answer to this question has become clear in "Pan-Armenian Forum of Lawyers" which was held in Yerevan on 5th July, 2013.

The Pan-Armenian Forum of Lawyers – in short, the Forum - is a kind of an NGO constituted by Armenian and Diaspora lawyers. It is not a member of the State Commission mentioned above. However, it is understood that the second meeting of the Forum would be useful for "the 100th Anniversary"

1 "RA President's decree on the establishment of a state commission for coordinating events dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide" May 27, 2011 <http://www.mindiaspora.am/en/News?id=1394>

2 "Plan For 100th Anniversary Appeal: Leader of Commission Says Unity Needed in Quest for Genocide Recognition" *Armenianow*. April 24, 2013.

3 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No: 44, pp. 16-17.

and therefore, it is titled as “Through the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide”.

In his opening speech in the Forum, President Sarkisyan stated that legal issues related to Armenian Genocide was the focus of the Forum, that lawyers would provide theoretical and practical contributions for the recognition of Armenian Genocide in the international level, and that their efforts to attract the attention of other countries’ to the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide were commendable, and helpful to prevent the crime of genocide in rest of the world.

He also said, “International recognition, of the Armenian Genocide, its condemnation and elimination of the consequences will always be an imperative. As long as there exists Armenian state, all efforts to deny and send an oblivion this historical reality will be doomed to failure. The greatest crime against humanity must be recognized and condemned once and for all and first of all by Turkey itself.”

Recognition of Armenian Genocide allegations by other countries and the main international organizations is an issue on which all Armenian presidents and other authorities specifically put emphasis. However, until now, Armenia has not made a clear demand for that Turkey to recognize and condemn the 1915 events as genocide.. President Sarkisyan has increased the dose of his criticism towards Turkey after the protocols failed, and started to ask Turkey to recognize and condemn the genocide allegations. Besides, beyond recognition and condemnation of it, he insisted in “removal of the consequences of the genocide”. As it is understood, this expression shortly means giving Armenian properties back, paying compensations, and ceasing some land from Turkey to Armenia. However, as the land issue was not officially mentioned, this leads to a conviction that Armenian demands are only the recognition of the genocide, giving Armenian properties back, and paying compensation.

Armenian Attorney General Agvan Hovsepyan eliminated this conviction with a report⁴ that he introduced to the Forum of Lawyers. He, furthermore, indicated that it was required to pay tangible compensation to “the heirs of genocide victims” ” (to descendants of those who were forced to emigrate), to return the church buildings and lands to the Armenian Church, and added that “the Republic of Armenia shall get back its lost territories.”

4 This report is entitled as “A. Hovsepyan: Recognition of Armenian Genocide Shall Have A Perfect International Legal Provision” and the subtitle “RA Prosecutor General Aghvan Hovsepyan’s Report at the Second Pan-Armenian Conference of Lawyers ‘Ahead of the 100th Anniversary of Armenian Genocide”.

Before presenting a detailed analysis of the issue of land demand, we will summarize the main arguments of the Attorney General's report, which, it seems, will be the main document with regard to the Armenian demands from Turkey.

The report, besides expressing satisfaction that many countries have recognized and condemned the Armenian genocide allegations, states that the international community has not given a final solution to this issue. This stems from the geographical-political interests of mainly the big powers, and at times, the collision of these interests. Such is the situation today and it was a century ago. The issue of the recognition of the genocide allegations should be moved to the legal dimension. It is impossible to solve the issues of international recognition of the genocide allegations and Turkish-Armenian relations in general, without any legal proofs based on a scientific ground. In this context, the Armenian General Attorney has put forward some ideas that are nonsense and that cannot be proved, as if the Armenian genocide occurred between 1876 and 1923; thus, responsibility of that event is bore not only by the Ottoman Empire but also by contemporary Turkey, and its founder Kemal Atatürk's arms are painted with Armenian blood as well. According to the General Attorney, it is indisputable that Armenian genocide committed in Turkey is fundamentally proved.. Among the evidence, the according to the report, were the court martial trials that took place in 1919-1920. The report claims that the main responsible part for the Armenian Genocide is Turkey; however, it also has some accomplices, and the duty of Armenian Lawyers is to reveal them.

The report states that, it is necessary to conduct serious studies about the legal problems on eliminating the consequences of Armenian Genocide.

Elimination of the consequences of Armenian genocide allegations depend on the issue of compensation. In this context, heirs of the victims of the genocide should be materially compensated, churches and church lands should be returned, and Republic of Armenia should get back the lost territories. However, all of those requirements should have a perfect legal basis.

The international recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations is only a component of the solution of the Armenian issue and the normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations; it has a legal component; and it should be resolved on the basis of fundamental principles of international law. Beginning from Berlin Congress to the last protocols that were not ratified, all the international treaties on Armenian nation and its territories should be subjected to appropriate international legal expertise.

The Armenian General Attorney has stated that the Treaty of Sèvres is an

important one among the treaties that concern the Armenian society. Although non-ratified by signatories, it was not rejected and, therefore not denounced by the Treaty of Lausanne.

The General Attorney stated that President Wilson's arbitral award on 22 November, 1923 was also crucial from the aspect of the normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations; according to article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey and Armenia agreed to submit the issue of borders to the arbitration of U.S. President; if both sides accept to have recourse for the resolution of the dispute between them to the arbiter; that means that they will follow the decision of the arbiter; furthermore, this decision is conclusive and cannot be subjected to statutory period of limitations. The decision of the arbiter President Wilson has the same characteristic- being conclusive and not subjected to statutory period of limitations- for Turkey, Armenia and all other countries that signed Treaty of Sèvres; and 103.599 km² of land would be given to Armenia with this decision.

The General Attorney claimed that if Treaty of Sèvres did not come into effect, article 89 did not come into effect either and, accordingly, the decision of President Wilson is not binding either. But article 89 is the formulation of the expression of will of Armenia, Turkey and other countries that signed the Treaty of Sèvres to consult to the arbitral award of President Wilson; the issue of ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres or leaving it ungratified has no relation with this expression of will of the parties. In other words, for the General Attorney, although Treaty of Sèvres was not ratified; the expression of intent is still valid. Moreover, the General Attorney asserted that there was no word in Treaty of Lausanne laying down the Turkish-Armenian border, thus the current Turkish-Armenian border did not comply with the Treaty of Lausanne.

The General Attorney stated that one could object that the Turkish-Armenian border had already been laid down by the Treaty of Moscow dated 21 March, 1921, however, that, the signatories (Turkey and the Soviet Union) were not internationally recognized at the time and could not be considered as subjects of international law. Therefore, the Moscow Treaty could not be considered as a full international treaty, the General Attorney wrote. Furthermore, Armenia was not allowed to participate in the negotiations, and did not sign the treaty; thus according to the principles of international law, as third party that was not a signatory, Armenia did not bear any responsibility.

While claiming that one could object that Armenia had signed the Treaty of Kars of October 21, 1921, the General Attorney claimed that the treaty had not been initially valid as Armenia had been a part of Russia at the time and not a subject of international law.

The General Attorney said “Today, Armenian-Turkish border is not laid down yet. I think, for legal solution of the dispute it is necessary to prepare a big claim package with appropriate juridical arguments and submit it to Armenian authorities, later to the UN body making legal decisions to solve the issue of handing it to International Court of Justice.”

Having provided the important points of the Armenian General Attorney A. Hovsepyan’s report, which also available in English in full in the “Contemporary Documents” section of our journal, it would be useful to present a clause by clause summary of those points..

- For the Armenian Genocide to be internationally recognized, this issue should be transferred to the legal arena.
- Elimination of the consequences of the Armenian Genocide depends on the issue of “compensation”, which includes giving compensation and returning properties to the descendants of those who were exposed to forced emigration, giving churches and the lands belonging to the churches back to the Armenian Church, and giving land to Armenia. However, these demands should be formed on a perfect legal basis.
- President Wilson’s arbitral decision dated November 22, 1921 which defined the Turkish-Armenian border is still valid.
- The Moscow Treaty, dated March 21, 1921, which defined the Turkish-Armenian border is not valid.
- The Kars Treaty, dated October 13, 1921, which was on the same issue, is not valid.
- For a legal solution of all the disputes between Turkey and Armenia, a big claim package should be submitted in an application to the International Court of Justice. According to the statement⁵ accepted by the Forum at the end of the consultations; it was agreed to compile a list of complete and substantiated documents based on the views expressed during the forum, the existing studies and documents, as well as the norms and principles of international law in order to eliminate the consequences; to collaborate with the State Commission and the committees established in the Armenian diaspora; to establish a special committee that would make the package of legal documents on key issues related to the Armenian Genocide allegations.

5 English version of this notification is in the part of “Archival Documents” in the previous issue of our journal.

As can be seen, some demands based on the genocide allegations were put forward in the Forum. The most important of all, without a doubt, was demand of land from Turkey through questioning the legality of the Turkish-Armenian border. This particular issue is what the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly reacted to. The statement by the Ministry in the “Question-Answer” session is provided below.

QA-18, 12 July 2013, Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in Response to a Question Regarding the Declaration of the Prosecutor General of Armenia about the Border between Turkey and Armenia.

What stands out in this brief statement, from a legal perspective, is that Armenia, in its claim of land from Turkey, contradicted with its obligations (respect for the principle of territorial integrity) as a member of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

We deplore the declaration made by the Prosecutor General of Armenia, Aghvan Hovsepyan, during his presentation at the Pan-Armenian Forum of Lawyers held in Yerevan on 5-6 July 2013 - opened with the remarks of the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan - that the border between Turkey and Armenia has never been legally established and that lost Armenian land should be returned to Armenia.

Such a declaration made by an official occupying a position as important as that of Prosecutor General reflects the prevailing problematic mentality in Armenia as to the territorial integrity of its neighbor Turkey and to Turkish-Armenian relations and also contradicts the obligations it has undertaken towards the international organizations of which it is a member, particularly the UN and the OSCE. One should be well aware that no one can presume to claim land from Turkey.

What stands out in this brief statement, from a legal perspective, is that Armenia, in its claim of land from Turkey, contradicted with its obligations (respect for the principle of territorial integrity) as a member of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Politically, the following expression is the most significant in the statement: “One should be well aware that no one can presume to claim land from Turkey.” Indeed, no one can presume to claim land from Turkey, especially Armenia.

In a statement⁶ regarding the issue, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated that, they called on those who attempt to take even a piece of pebble from Turkey not to cross the line and added: “Let alone having someone propose it, it cannot even be a matter of discussion.” While stating that the remarks on this issue were just “nonsense”, the Foreign Minister, emphasized that, for the peace in Caucasus, everyone should know their limits that it would be a win-win situation only when this was done,; whereas, those who made such arguments would lose. IN addition, he called on everyone to come to reason, and stated that territorial integrity of Turkey and Azerbaijan were both fundamental to Turkey.

Neither the US nor the EU countries have made an official comment with regard to the claim of land from Turkey by the Armenian General Attorney. Presently, there have not been commentaries regarding this issue in the media.

On the basis of the principles of international law, it would not be difficult to prove the invalidity of the General Attorney’s views presented in the report. However, it would be so detailed and long that it would not fit into this text. It would be more appropriate to leave such an analysis aside until there is further progress. In conjunction with this, we would like to touch upon some issues to give our readers an idea about the legal significance of General Attorney’s views.

The main subject of the General Attorney’s report is the international recognition of Armenian Genocide allegations. The basic document of the international law on the issue of genocide is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dated 1948. There is no reference to this Convention in the report.

It is claimed in the report that while the Treaty of Sèvres is still partially valid, Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1920 are invalid. Presently, there are some international agreements on the validity of these treaties. In the event that this issue is taken to the International Court of Justice or to another international authority, these agreements would be consulted. However, there is no reference to these agreements either, in the General Attorney’s report. Shortly, the views of the General Attorney on the validity of the treaties have no place in the context of principals of international law and are just a result of the logic of the General Attorney. In this context, it would not be difficult to disprove the General Attorney’s arguments.

6 “Davutoğlu’dan Ermenistan Başsavcısı’na Sert Yanıt” (Davutoğlu’s Harsh Response to the Armenian Attorney General), *Hürriyet*, 17 Temmuz 2013.

1.2. EXPLANATIONS and COMMENTS

Before diagnosing this situation, the Armenian General Attorney's "adequacy of representation" in other words, to what extent he represents the Armenian state, should be determined. As in the other countries, Armenian General Attorney is an authority in the legal issues of his own field, and neither bears responsibility nor he is an authority regarding the international affairs of the country. However, when this incident is closely examined, it can be seen that the General Attorney did not directly demand land from Turkey, and that Armenia called for an investigation in establishing a legal basis for the demands to be made to Turkey, including the land demand. It should be also stated that none of the segments of the Armenian society showed a negative reaction against this attitude by the General Attorney, and no one interrogated General Attorney for his report. Besides, in the Armenian political system, the Presidency's authorities are so broad that it would not be possible for the General Attorney Hovsepyan to make such an attempt without knowledge and consent of President Sarkisyan. Today, as claim for land may be a cause of armed conflict, this attitude is not welcomed and is even generally condemned by the international society. President Sarkisyan, most probably, taking this into consideration, did not claim land himself but had the General Attorney do it.

If one examines this issue from a political perspective, it has been the case since Armenia gained its independence in 1991 that Armenian Presidents and members of the cabinet have been carefully avoiding such attitudes that could seem like land claims from Turkey. On the other hand, they also have not made claims that could mean they recognized the existing border, as it is in force according to Kars Treaty. President Sarkisyan followed his predecessors' policy for two years after his election. Then parting with those policies, he approved the recognition of the existing border between Turkey and Armenia with the "Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" on October 10, 2009.

However, Turkey's intention of linking the ratification of the Protocols to the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought about a great discomfort in Armenia and left President Sarkisyan in a difficult situation, who had secured that the protocols were signed despite the opposition by the Diaspora. With that, Sarkisyan started to follow a policy that would help him avoid the Protocols, and in that sense, he benefited from the Constitutional Court which investigated if the protocols commensurate with the Armenian Constitution. In a decision made in three months after the signing of the protocols, the Court interpreted some articles of the Protocols, and it stated, with the condition of complying with these,, the Protocols would not be conflicting with the Constitution

The following matters are significant in the interpretations by the Court: The first matter is that the article in the Protocol on establishment of diplomatic relations on the recognition of the border by the two countries, would be only about border-crossing and that would not impose any obligation to Armenia. Therefore, it is intended to emphasize that the recognition of the existing border by Armenia would not come to mean recognition of Turkey's territorial integrity. The second matter is that according to Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration, Armenian Genocide is real and cannot be discussed; in other words, subcommission on the historical dimension proposed by the Second Protocol would not bear any responsibility for debating the genocide. The third matter is the expression that there would be no relation between the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the Protocols.

The decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court eliminates the advantages of the Protocols for Turkey. Turkey, along with making an objection to the decision of Constitutional Court⁷, did not object to the Protocols and these documents remain on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Armenia, on the other hand, tried to retract the Protocols from the Parliament as part of its policy of getting rid of them; however, upon the expression of objection by the US, EU, and probably Russia, as an intermediate formula, Armenia temporarily omitted the Protocols from the agenda of the Armenian Parliament on April 22, 2010⁸.

Turkey's insistence on linking the implementation of the Protocols with developments on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and escalation of the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation after signing of the Protocols; and besides, in a year after the protocols, the signing of the Treaty for the Establishment of High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between these two countries in September 15, 2010 made the Armenians finally understood that they could not construct a normal relationship with Turkey in their own terms, and Armenia thereon started to follow such a policy which could be described as hostile and aggressive from time to time. Briefly, there have been radical changes in Armenia's policy towards Turkey during President Sarkisyan's term. While, previously, Armenia kept silent about Turkey's recognition of the genocide allegations; now it is clearly being demanded. Previously, Armenia avoided such statements that related to claim of land from Turkey; whereas, now legal attempts that would be the basis of the land claim have officially been initiated.

7 Ömer Engin Lütem, Olaylar ve Yorumlar, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 35, s. 19

8 Ömer Engin Lütem, Olaylar ve Yorumlar, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 35, ss. 46–50

Consequently, Armenia has now been following a different policy towards Turkey. This is the case because of the failure of the Protocols which were mostly beneficial for Armenia in the final analysis, and because of further development of the close relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the cooperation between them following the signing of the Protocols. On the other hand, it is seen that this new policy is in line with the activities planned for 2015 towards Turkey. Indeed, such demands related to Turkey's recognition of the genocide and to claims of land would raise the importance of the activities and make them draw more attention.

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However, since it is not possible that Turkey would keep silent to this new policy of Armenia, it may be expected that the dispute between Turkey and Armenia would carry on a new level, that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is in fact in a dead lock, and other problems Armenia has with Azerbaijan would be affected by this development; that a period of depression would finally start in the South Caucasus; and that plans to achieve peace, security, and cooperation in the South Caucasus, which is desired much by the US

and EU and not objected by Russia, would be postponed.

1.3. Turkey's Position and Davutoğlu's visit to Armenia

In the period examined, Turkey's efforts to reach normal relations with Armenia continued. Upon Aliyev's re-election and his meeting with President Sarkisian in Vienna on 19 November- which was portrayed as a positive one by the media-, conditions suitable for a Turkish-Armenian meeting were established. Turkey, previously, had sought to contact Armenia and in that vein, asked for Swiss mediation. He said, upon journalists' reminder of the 4th anniversary of the signing of the Protocols, that Turkey attached importance to the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, but in order for this normalization to be permanent, the issues in the Southern Caucasus, especially the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, must be settled and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories must come to an end, that they had shown great effort for the protocols to be implemented and that these had not entirely fallen off the agenda, but that there was no opportunity for the protocols be implemented due to the resolution adopted by the Armenian Constitutional Court and the tensions emerging in the region

later on. Davutoğlu, expressing that now they were looking towards advancing with new creative ideas, said that they would increase their efforts in this direction in the coming period and that, in the case that Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized, then most of the issues would settle into a resolution framework in parallel to the Azerbaijani-Armenian relations⁹. According to the news in the press, Davutoğlu, wishing Switzerland to step in once again, told Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter that if Armenia would start to leave the occupied territories in accordance with a clear timeline predetermined by Armenia and accepted by Baku, Turkey would start the implementation of the Protocols¹⁰.

It did not take long for Yerevan to respond to Davutoğlu's statements. The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry said: "Four years have passed since the initialing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols and since then the Armenian side has constantly heard the same old song from Ankara about some creative approaches," and added, "All these statements are nothing other than a permanent attempt by Ankara to veil the Turkish side's torpedoing of the ratification and implementation of the Armenian-Turkish protocols without preconditions, which is expected by the international community,"¹¹ Edward Sharmazanov, spokesman of the ruling Republican Party and the Vice-President of the Armenian Parliament, stated, concerning Turkey's intention of linking the opening of the borders to withdrawal of troops by Armenia from the "liberated territories", that talking with Armenia in the language of ultimatums is a thankless job and that they had always said that relations between Turkey and Armenia should develop without preconditions. Furthermore, he said, "it is better for Turkey to use its influence in urging Azerbaijan to withdraw from the occupied territories of Karabakh¹² and herself to end the occupation of Northern Cyprus and that the Armenian people lived, lives and will live in Karabakh, because Karabakh is a part of Armenia's sacred homeland."

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu also provided in the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Planning and Budget Commission on 21 November 2013 information that complemented his initiatives. He said that presidential elections had took place in Armenia and Azerbaijan, that public support for both leaders was confirmed and therefore, that time had come for peace in the Caucasus. Providing information on a process initiated for this purpose, Davutoğlu, indicated that this issue had also been addressed during Aliyev's

9 "Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkilerini Geliştirmeye Çalışıyoruz" (We Are Trying to Develop Turkish-Armenian Relations), *Haber 7.com*, 11 October 2013.

10 "La position de la Turquie sur le conflit du Haut-Karabagh", *Armenews*, 13 November 2013. "Turkey Asks Swiss Mediation in Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict" *Today's Zaman*, 12 November 2013.

11 "Yerevan Reacts to Ankara's Remarks on Reviving Relations" *Hürriyet Daily News*, 15 Ekim 2013.

12 Except for some small parts like Martakert, the entire region of Karabakh is under Armenian occupation.

visit- which will be explained below, stated that he had discussed this issue with US Secretary of State John Kerry during his visit to the US and that Prime Minister Erdoğan would also discuss this issue with President Putin during his visit to Moscow.

In response to a question posed by parliamentarian Sinan Oğan of MHP from İğdır on whether or not any preparation had been made towards the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border gate, Davutoğlu said that there were progress in this direction, that there might be a surprise development if Azerbaijan could be persuaded, but that this depended on the condition of Armenia withdrawing from Karabakh and stated “If this is accomplished, both the border gate and the railroad will open. Of course we want to achieve this together with Azerbaijan”¹³. Foreign Ministry spokesman Levent Gümrükçü, stated to the Turkish journalists, who asked for additional information on the matter, that they were working together with Azerbaijan in full cooperation and coordination, that all kinds of developments were addressed comprehensively together, and that parallel to the ending of the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories, he evaluated Turkey’s steps towards developing cooperation with Armenia positively, adding that no contact had yet been made with Armenia on this matter¹⁴.

After being re-elected, President Aliyev conducted his first official visit to Turkey. In the press conference held together with Prime Minister Erdoğan, he said that Karabakh was not just Azerbaijan’s problem, but also Turkey’s problem. For his part, President Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had full trust in Turkey when it came to the case of Nagorno-Karabakh¹⁵. Thus, it became clear that the Azerbaijani side supported Turkey’s initiatives.

According to the press, Ankara was also discussing this proposal with members of the Minsk Group¹⁶.

Through the efforts of the Minsk Group, President Aliyev and Sarkisian met for the first time in Vienna on 19 November 2013 after two years. Concerning this meeting, President Sarkisian said that he also saw President Aliyev’s will to resolve the problem and that he himself also desired a resolution in the shortest time possible. Then he said “but with which conditions does Azerbaijan want the settlement of the problem, with which conditions do we

13 “Davutoğlu’ndan Sürpriz Ermenistan Hazırlığı” (Surprising Armenia Preparation by Davutoğlu) *Aksam.com.tr*, 6 November 2013.

14 “Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı: Ermenistan ile İrtibat Yok” (Turkish Foreign Ministry: There is No Contact with Armenia). *Baku-1News.com.tr*, 8 November 2013.

15 “Nagorno-Karabagkh is Turkey’s Problem Too, Says Erdoğan” *Today’s Zaman*. 13 November 2013.

16 Sami Kohen. “Azerbaycan ile Bütünleşme... Ermenistan ile Normalleşme?” (Integration with Armenia.. Normalization with Armenia?) *Milliyet*, 15 November 2013.

want it, this is the whole issue. When assessing the meeting in general, I consider it constructive. Talks are a new phase and start within the resolution process” and indicated that they had instructed the Foreign Ministers of both countries to start negotiations in December^{17,18}.

According to the news¹⁹, Prime Minister Erdoğan, during his visit to Moscow on 22 November 22, mentioned this matter to President Putin and indicated that the Minsk Group, since 1992 when it was first founded, had not achieved any progress and said that the peace process must be rekindled and for this, Turkey and Russia must work together.

Thus, with the efforts of Turkey, an appropriate conjuncture emerged for the settlement of the issues in the Southern Caucasus. According to the press, Ankara had prepared a road map for a peaceful resolution in the Caucasus. Withdrawal of Armenia from the Azerbaijani rayons (districts) surrounding Karabakh, and, in connection to this, opening of the border gates by Turkey (and Azerbaijan) with Armenia formed the essence of this roadmap. Armenia had verbally accepted withdrawing from two of the rayons. In the case of Armenia declaring that it would withdraw from these areas, Davutoğlu would hold talks in Yerevan- to which he visited to attend the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation’s Ministerial Meeting- and then the border would open²⁰.

While no reaction was received from the Armenian Foreign Ministry, National Assembly Deputy Speaker Edward Sharmazanov showed reaction to this news by providing mocking statements that five rayons had been mentioned in the past, now two rayons were spoken of and if this continued there would not be any issue of withdrawal from any rayon²¹.

Turkey’s proposal to open the border on the condition of Armenia withdrawing from Karabakh and the other Azerbaijani territories is not new and has been repeated several times in the last four years, but it has not been accepted by Armenia. Armenia links the returning of the seven rayons surrounding Karabakh to determining the status Karabakh region will possess in the future. Deep differences exist in the views of the sides on this issue. While Azerbaijan

17 “ Serj Sarkisian: Azerbaycan Cumhurbaşkanı Sorunu Çözme Arzusunu Gördüm. Ancak bu Yeterli Değil” (Serge Sarkisian: I saw in the Azerbaijani President the Will in Resolving the Conflict, but this is Not Enough) *NEWS.am*, 23 November 2013.

18 “Yukarı Karabağ’da Yeni Bir Aşama Başladı” (A New Phase Starts in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict) *www.ntvmsnbc.com*, 24 November 2013.

19 “Erdoğan’dan Putin’e: Kafkaslara Barışı Beraber Getirelim” (From Erdoğan to Putin: Let Us Bring Peace to the Caucasus Together) *Türkiye*, 28 November 2013.

20 “Ermenistan ile ilişkilerde Sürpriz: Çekilme Başlıyor.” (A Surprise in Relations with Armenia: Withdrawal Starts) *Sabah*, 28 November 2013.

21 “Armenian Parliament Vice-Chair on ‘Withdrawal From Two Karabakh Rayons” *News.am*, 28 November 2013.

defends that Karabakh should continue being a part of Azerbaijan with extensive rights given to the Armenians of Karabakh, Armenia insists that this region should be an independent state. Currently, Turkey reiterates its proposal to open the border with the condition of having Armenian forces withdraw from the Azerbaijani rayons surrounding Karabakh. It is understood that, in order to prove the seriousness of this proposal, the restoration of the Kars-Gyumri railway, highway and border facilities have been started.

As will be mentioned below, at the Summit of the Heads of State of Eastern Partnership Countries held on 29 November in Vilnius, President Sarkisian delivered a speech on the occasion of Armenia and the European Union adopting a Joint Declaration²². In his speech, mainly addressing Armenian-European Union relations, the President, also said, although it was not the occasion, “I believe that consistent adoption of the European values can help Turkey to reconcile with its own past. Today thousands of Turkish people condemn the Armenian Genocide and stand by us to commemorate the victims of the Genocide. I believe that on the eve of the Armenian Genocide Centennial the Turkish authorities should be able to demonstrate will and decline the policy of denial. In order to continue its integration with the European Union in a capacity of a European nation Turkey still faces the challenge of opening the last closed border in Europe and establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia. We expect that the EU member States, as our partners, will fully engage themselves and display consistency in order to remove the illegal blockade of Armenia by Turkey”.

It is unnecessary to bring forth the issues between Armenia and Turkey in a meeting on the relations between Armenia and the European Union. However, it could be seen that, Sarkisian, by doing so, sought to provide two messages for the upcoming period when Armenia’s contacts with the European Union will weaken.

The first of these messages concern the 100th anniversary of the genocide allegations and is directed towards gaining the most possible support from the European countries for the activities to be held on this occasion. For this, Sarkisian uses the slogan that countries should reconcile with their past, which is recently very popular especially within some circles in Europe. Moreover, he tries and emphasizes the validity of his views by indicating that some Turks support Armenia’s genocide allegations.

His second message is directed towards Turkey in convincing it to open its border with Armenia. For this purpose, he again refers to some slogans like

22 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/11/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-at-the-third-Eastern-Partnership-summit/>

“the last closed border in Europe” and “illegal blockade”. However, the Turkish-Armenian border is not the last closed border in Europe (in principle, the Georgia-Russia border is also closed). Moreover, even though the land border is closed, airspace is open. Turkey conducts trade with Armenia through Georgia, which is constantly developing. Since there is no obstacle to the movement of persons, many Armenians work in Turkey or visit Turkey for tourism. Therefore, there is actually no blockade and there is nothing contradictory to international law.

If Armenia had signed the Association Agreement, then President Sarkisian’s claims that “Turkey should recognize the genocide” and “open the border” could have found support in European countries. However, it is not expected right now, when Armenia has drifted away from the European Union, that this kind of claims would create reactions except among certain segments.

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During President Sarkisian’s speech, optimism is perceived regarding relations with Azerbaijan and the Karabakh issue. Sarkisian said that after a pause of almost two years a meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan itself was a positive phenomenon, but also added that it was too soon to talk of the results. Furthermore, he put forth that the successful outcome of the negotiations in reality depended on their ability to reject the negative rhetoric and ease

the tension on the Line of Contact. However, neither the “negative rhetoric” nor the small-scale conflicts seen occasionally throughout the Line of Contact, although disturbs Armenia, are not important factors in resolving the Karabakh issue. The settlement of this issue depends, before everything else, on Armenia abandoning its expansionist policy and believing that peace will be to the advantage of Armenia the most.

Last of all, although Sarkisian, in his speech, has displayed prudent optimism for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, he has displayed the usual harsh attitude regarding issues with Turkey and particularly the genocide allegations. If in the future the Karabakh issue enters a phase of resolution and therefore Turkey opens its border, it is possible that even this positive development will not affect the genocide allegations and Armenia will continue to accuse Turkey of genocide in and after 2015 and will claim compensation.

Davutoğlu, while in Yerevan to attend the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation's Ministerial Meeting on 12 December 2013, hold talks with Edward Nalbandian and discussed the issues between the two countries.

Meanwhile, Turkey's gesture of goodwill was not evaluated well in Armenia. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Shavarsh Kocharyan asked Davutoğlu to visit the genocide monument, stated that the border should be opened to have the relations between the two countries recover²³, organized demonstrations against the Turkish delegation in front of the hotel that the meeting would take place²⁴. Even though it is not a rule but an observed practice that the heads of visiting delegations- in person or all together- visit the President, this visit did not actually take place, and this created the impression that this had resulted from Sarkisian's unwillingness to meet Davutoğlu.

In return, Davutoğlu, like the other heads of delegations, had the opportunity of having a tête-à-tête meeting with Nalbandian. However, the two ministers did not have a press conference together.

In a written statement made by the Armenian Foreign Ministry on this meeting²⁵, it was declared that Nalbandian reaffirmed the principled position of Armenia on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations without any preconditions.

Davutoğlu, on the other hand, told the Turkish journalists that the meeting took place in a warm and sincere setting; that differences of views existing between the two countries had already been known; that it was crucial to hold meetings more often and follow the developments and that Turkey wished to elevate its relations with Armenia to the highest point, like it does for its relations with the rest of its neighbors. Additionally, Davutoğlu, said that the peace and stability project in Caucasasia was in Turkey's agenda. He expressed that there had been a bit of interruption in its communications with Armenia, that it would not be right to have the impression that, in this kind of negotiations, the problems would have been solved altogether, but that it was nonetheless not possible to resolve disputes without having consultations and forming dialogue; that it was important to go beyond the psychological threshold and to synchronize the meetings, and that the meeting with Nalbandian was significant in that sense.²⁶

23 *Today's Zaman*, 9 Aralık

24 "Ermenistan'da Soykırım Protestosu" *Haberler.com*, 12 Aralık 2013 (Genocide Protests in Armenia)

25 <http://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/item/2013/12/12/bsec29th bil/>

26 "Psikolojik Eşiğin Aşılması Önemliydi" *RS FM* 13 Aralık 2013 (It was Crucial to Go Beyond the Psychological Treshold)

Davutoğlu told the journalists, upon his arrival in Yerevan, that he considered the Armenian relocation as a practice that was completely wrong; that what the Ittihadists had done was inhumane and that the current government had never adopted relocation.²⁷ These remarks has had coverage in the Armenian and the Diaspora press, but there have also been claims that these expressions were made to hamper the activities to be made for the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide.²⁸

This visit, which the Armenians were reluctant for, was significant because, for the first time in a long time, there were direct talks with the Armenians as a result of Turkey's attempts. Most probably, Armenians, as they revealed to the press in fact, has not gone beyond conventional views that the relations between the two sides should be normalized without preconditions. However, it has been revealed that they themselves, by doing so, prevented talks and negotiations, aiming to resolve disputes, from happening. Turkey, on the other hand, has shown that it had the opposite stance with its proposals and attempts seeking to resolve disputes.

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1.4. European Court of Human Rights' Decision Regarding Doğu Perinçek

Doğu Perinçek announced that the Armenian genocide was “an international lie” in various conferences he attended in Switzerland in 2005. Reacting to this, Armenian associations in Switzerland reacted to Perinçek's statements, and applied for legal proceedings against him. In 2007, the Lausanne court, in which the legal case took place, convicted Perinçek of racial discrimination. His appeals were rejected by the Vaud Cantonal Court and further by the Federal Court. Upon exhaustion of domestic remedies, Perinçek brought the case before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled on 17 December 2013 that Doğu Perinçek's freedom of expression was violated in an unfair and groundless manner.

The mentioned decision included some statements that constituted a damage to the Armenian claims.

27 “Tehciri Benimsemiyoruz” *Hürriyet*, 13 Aralık 2013 (We don't Acknowledge Relocation)

28 Harut Sasunyan “Davutoğlu Charm Offensive During Visit to Armenia” *Asbarez*, 17 Aralık 2013.

The first is that there is not a general consensus as to genocide took place, especially in the academic community.

Moreover, the Court stated that only 20 out of about 190 states that make up the international community took decisions in their parliaments recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations and that such decisions did not come from the governments of those states.

Lastly, the court made a clear distinction between the Armenian claims and the holocaust crimes committed by the Nazis against Jews, putting on record that they are not similar.

The European Court of Human Rights has not taken a decision on whether or not the 1915 events were genocide as this would be out of ECHR's jurisdiction. However, the points mentioned above would at least overshadow the Armenian claims.

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For the validity of the verdict, there must be no appeal filed within three months, or in the case of an appeal, a court to be established with a larger membership must ratify this decision.

In the case that the decision is finalized, it would not be possible to claim the Armenian genocide allegations with impunity, as it has been done up until today. Besides, the plausibility of the activities planned for 2015 would be open to discussion as most of them are based on the genocide claims.

II. Customs Union Membership? EU Association?

2.1. Introduction

In our last article where we examined Armenia's relations with the European Union on the one hand and with the Customs Union on the other, which Russia wants to create and will later on transform into a Eurasian Union²⁹, we had indicated that it was difficult for Armenia, which for economic reasons wants integration with the European Union and for security reasons was obliged to maintain close relations with Russia, to continue its "Complementary Policy" which does not accord with each other and that therefore in the near future,

29 Olaylar ve Yorumlar, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 42, (2012) ss.27-38

Armenia will have to make a decision between the Eurasian and European Unions. We had also indicated that, when taking into consideration Russia's influence and perhaps even dominance over Armenia, this country did not truly have a right to decide. Our view had occurred more rapidly than expected and in 2013, especially as a result of the developments taking place in the second half of this year, Armenia had officially declared on 3 September 2013 that it would take part in the Customs Union created by Russia.

As mentioned above, Armenia has not actually chosen between the Eurasian and European Unions by its own freewill, but has been forced to declare that it wants to enter the Customs Union as a result of some pressures of Russia it has utilized cautiously.

Here, we must indicate that Russia has not exerted direct, but indirect pressures over Armenia and this way, it has prevented the Armenian public opinion from being affected negatively. On the other hand, Armenian officials have been attentive to indicating that they have not been pressured by Russia to enter the Customs Union. Within this framework, President Sarkisian has said: "don't believe those who say the Russians have forced us to become a member of the Customs Union".

Concerning this issue, to make it convenient for our readers, it is noteworthy to mention again the pressures we had indicated in the "Russia's Instruments of Pressure over Armenia" section of our previous article³⁰. One of the important pressures is the price of natural gas Russia applies to Armenia. Russia sells natural gas to Armenia way below world prices, but in order to bring these prices closer to market prices³¹, it sometimes raises the prices. However, for Armenia, buying natural gas from market prices means that it is entering a serious economic crisis and for this price to be maintained at an appropriate level is obliged to accept some claims of Russia.

In order for this situation to be understood better, it is crucial to mention Russia's primary position within the Armenian economy. In short, all natural gas and electricity distribution companies are still in Russia's hands. Moreover, apart from some hydroelectric power stations, Russia also manages the Metsamor nuclear power station which neighbors Iğdır. Armenian railways are also managed by a Russian company. Since it seems too expensive, Armenia does not want to use much credit from the free market and appeals

30 Olaylar ve Yorumlar, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Sayı 42, (2012) ss.32-33

31 Although Russia reiterates that it wants to sell natural gas from free market prices, in practice natural gas prices show great variation according to countries. Within this framework, it has been understood from a research that the price of natural gas sold to countries other than those of the former Soviet Union where in general prices are low, is between 313 and 564 dollars for 1000 m³ and that Turkey has paid in average 406 dollars. (*Hürriyet*, 4 February 2013). "Gazprom Gazı Kime Kaç Dolara Sattığını Açıkladı" (Gazprom Declared Who It Sold Gas to for How Much)

to Russia whose conditions are more suitable. However, Russia is insistent on the credit it provides to be paid back on time. It has been seen that in situations where the payment has been postponed, the debt has been cleared by sometimes transferring some industrial facilities to Russia.

Approximately 1 billion dollars sent by the Armenians working in Russia each year to their countries is very valuable for the Armenian economy.

Armenia is also dependent on Russia in the area of defense. First, Armenia's borders (its borders with Turkey and Iran) of the former Soviet Union period are still protected by Russian forces. Then, most of the weapons the Armenian army needs are provided by Russia. Finally, it could be seen that there exists an opinion and even a belief in Armenia that if another war breaks out with Azerbaijan, Russia will take their side. These factors, at times when needed, turn into instruments that allow Russia to put pressure on Armenia.

New ones have in the recent months been added to these instruments of pressure. In short, these include Russia selling arms worth billions of dollars to Azerbaijan, President Putin constantly delaying his visit to Armenia and some persons, who have no official title but without doubt reflects the views of the Russian Government, warning Armenia in taking part in the Customs Union.

In this situation, there is almost no possibility for Armenia to deviate from or do the opposite of a line of policy that Russia sees appropriate. If Russia has seemed as if it has not pressured Armenia too much in joining the Customs Union, it could be understood that this has been to prevent the reactions that could be received from the Armenian public opinion, which seems extremely sensitive. In the end, after experiencing a period of hesitation, Armenia has willingly accepted to join the Customs Union as if it has never been under pressure and has further strengthened Russia's positive image in Armenian public opinion.

At the beginning of this year, everyone was in agreement that Armenia would sign an Association Agreement with the European Union and that this agreement would at the same time comprise a "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area" (DCFTA). Although in Armenia the tendency of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union and a Customs Union Agreement with Russia and other countries was observed for a while, after the European Union clearly declared that it is impossible for the DCFTA and Customs Union to be in accord with each other, Armenia abandoned its tendency and signing an Association Agreement with the European Union gained priority. However, based on also establishing some kind of tie with the

Customs Union due to having close relations with the Russian Federation, there was an attempt to form a cooperation agreement with this Union or to gain an observer status³². But, events have shown that Russia has not taken kindly to this idea.

It could be understood that it does not seem possible for Russia, who approaches the issue entirely from a political aspect and seeks the Republics forming the Soviet Union to form close cooperation with each other, to accept this behavior which means that Armenia chooses the European Union. Even though some Armenian officials have said that it is out of the question for Armenia to join the European Union as a full member beyond association, this has not satisfied Russia.

It is true that Russia has not openly criticized Armenia for this matter, but some events have shown that Armenia choosing European Union association instead of the Customs Union has become a matter of dispute between the two sides and has created displeasure. For instance, after being re-elected, President Sarkisian has visited Moscow in March and has met with President Putin. But, there has been no information that Customs Union membership has been discussed. Since it is not possible for such an important subject not to be discussed, it could be presumed that the two sides have not been able to reach an agreement. Russia had organized an unofficial summit conference in Bishkek with the presidents of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries to which Armenia is also a member. Sarkisian did not attend this conference by giving the excuse that it coincides with the Armenian national day. However, he could have attended it even at a later hour. This event has also been interpreted within Armenian press as a reaction to the increase in natural gas prices³³.

On the other hand, Armenia's desire to somehow establish relations with the Customs Union has caused concerns for the European Union. During President Sarkisian's official visit to Poland at the end of June, President Komorowski told his counterpart in front of journalists that he understood the desire of Armenia to develop the best possible relations with Russia, but it is impossible to act at the same time on two different economic areas³⁴.

During his visit to Armenia on July 9, European Commissioner Responsible for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle has informed the press that negotiations over Armenia to sign the Association Agreement with the

32 "L'EU met en garde l'Arménie" *Armennews*, 11 June 2013.

33 "Le président Sarkisian ne se rendra pas à Bichkek pour un sommet informel des alliées de la Russie" *Armennews*, 28 May 2013.

34 "Unclear Geopolitical Directions of Armenia" *Vestnikkavkaza.net*, 8 July 2013.

European Union were coming to a final stage³⁵. Füle, who also indicated that it was possible to provide some funds to Armenia, has said that these funds would be granted in parallel to the reforms made by Armenia and has listed these reforms as making significant progress towards democracy, working towards fundamental freedoms, fighting against corruption and harmonizing legislation with the European Union³⁶. Füle has not provided any information concerning the amount of funds but has said that in the European Union's next financial cycle of 2014-2020, more financial assistance has been envisaged for the countries which will boost reforms³⁷. On the contrary, information has been provided within the Armenian press that this assistance could be between

Füle has called upon Armenia to reach an agreement on the resolution of the Karabakh issue based on the Madrid principles and concerning the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.

1.5 and 2 billion dollars³⁸. On the other hand, Füle has said that apart from providing funds, the European Union would also support other international investors to take interest in Armenia³⁹. Let us note that Russia providing aid to Armenia in the form of donation has never occurred, at least until now.

By providing statements on other issues besides financial ones, Füle has called upon Armenia to reach an agreement on the resolution of the Karabakh issue based on the Madrid principles and concerning the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, has said that they continue to call upon Turkey to continues its process of joining the European Union and that European Union membership requires maintaining good relations with neighbors⁴⁰. (These statements mean that Turkey must resolve its issues with its neighbors in order to become a member of the European Union) Füle, who has also referred to Armenia-Russia relations and in the meantime, to the increase in Russian natural gas prices and Russia selling arms to Azerbaijan, has said that he could not comment on whether these pressures were put on Armenia with regard to the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union and that the Armenians must decide on whether or not they were pressured.⁴¹

Right after Füle's visit to Armenia, European Peoples Party Summit has been

35 "European Union is loyal to its commitment supporting Armenia: Stefan Füle" *Armenpress*, 9 July 2013.

36 "Füle Explains EU Integration" *Lragir.am*, 10 July 2013.

37 Ibid.

38 "Armenia Between Brussels and Moscow" *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 7 July 2012.

39 "Füle Explains EU Integration" *Lragir.am*, 10 July 2013.

40 "Stefan Füle: We Need Partners to Be Always Trusted" *Aysor.am*, 10 July 2013.

41 Ibid

held in Moldova's capital city Kishinev. President Sarkisian, in his speech, indicated that the DCFTA, which is still being negotiated with the European Union, would not be able to function as required if the Armenian-Turkish border does not open, has tried to push the European Union in putting pressure on Turkey concerning this matter⁴².

With a press release dated 24 July 2013⁴³, the European Commission has declared that within the framework of an association agreement, the Republic of Armenia and the European Union have reached an agreement that day on the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). In this declaration which summarizes what kind of benefits the Free Trade Area will carry for Armenia, it is indicated that this agreement would cause Armenia to gain 146 million Euros in the long run, that this corresponded to an increase of 2.3% in Armenia's gross national product and that due to the Free Trade area, it was foreseen for Armenia's exports to European Union countries to increase by 15.2% and its imports by 8.2%.

Therefore it had become official that Armenia would sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, including the DCFTA. However, since this agreement must also be presented to other member countries of the Union, it was envisaged for it to be initialed before being signed and for this to occur at the Summit of Eastern Partnership Program to be held on 28-29 November 2013.

Meanwhile, it has drawn attention that no declaration has been issued in Armenia in parallel to the European Commission's press release or that it has not been confirmed in any other way that Armenia has reached an agreement with the European Union.

2.2. Pressures on Armenia

Although the Armenian public opinion generally supports Russia, recently it has been seen that complaints by this country have increased.

As can be presumed, at the top of these complaints is the increase in natural gas prices. This increase, which is approximately 50%, has started being applied upon Armenia's request after Sarkisian being elected as president in April. By reflecting this increase to consumers as 18%, the Armenian Government had greatly prevented any criticisms that could have been

42 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/07/11/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-participated-in-EPP-summit-Moldova/>

43 http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_fr.htm

received, but has been forced to pay the difference of 150 million dollars per year. There have been news in the press that the Armenian Government wanted the Russian company Gazprom to pay the 150 million dollars, that 80% of the Armenian natural gas distribution companies is in the hands of Gazprom and that an agreement has been reached for Gazprom to pay the 150 million dollars in exchange for the remaining 20% to also be handed over to this company⁴⁴.

Secondly, it is possible to mention that Russia has sold arms to Azerbaijan which is worth almost one billion dollars. This has especially caused a very negative effect in Karabakh. For instance, Arkady Karapetyan, who was an Armenian commander in this region in 1991, had accused Russia of preparing genocide for the Armenians of Karabakh. On the other hand, Deputy Prime Minister of Karabakh Arthur Agabekyan had described this arms sale as “treacherous”. On the opposite, it has been seen that the Armenian public authorities have displayed a stance that considers this arms sale as normal. By making a bizarre comparison, Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarch Kocharian has said that if Russia’s arms sales deal with Azerbaijan is just business, then Armenia signing the Association Agreement with the European Union is also business⁴⁵. This way, on the one hand he has tried not to exaggerate these two events while on the other, has tried to convey a message that if Russia is free in selling arms to Azerbaijan, then Armenia is free in signing an agreement with the European Union.

In the meanwhile, a simple incident has caused Armenian public opinion to seriously criticize Russia. A truck, driven by a driver named Hrachya Harutyunyan who works in Russia, has caused the death of 18 people by colliding with a bus. Harsh criticisms on this driver published in the local press and in particular, brining this person in front of the court by making him wear a woman’s robe has been perceived in Armenia as if Russia is humiliating the Armenians. In effect, unprecedentedly, demonstrations have been held in front of the Russian Embassy in Yerevan. The Armenian press has also criticized Russia and there have been those creating conspiracy theories that Russia created this situation in order to display its displeasure in the agreements Armenia wants to conclude with the European Union⁴⁶. Although a continuously strengthening xenophobia exists in Russia, the conviction has been reached that the Armenian press has exaggerated the Harutyunyan incident.

44 “Russian-Armenian Deal on Gaz Price Subsidy Agreed” *RFE/RL*, 29 August 2013.

45 *Arminfo.am*, 22 August 2013.

46 “Chairman of Armenian Helsinki Committee: Russia has used Hrachya Harutyunyan Case as part of its anti-Armenian campaign” *Arminfo.am*, 17 July 2013.

It must be, on the one hand, due to Armenian public opinion's extreme sensitivity and, on the other hand, the idea that openly criticizing the Armenian government would bring more harm than benefit that while Russia supports Armenia becoming a member of the Customs Union, it has refrained from publicly criticizing it from becoming an associate member of the European Union. On the other side, as mentioned above, President Sarkisian and other Armenian officials have put forth that Russia has not applied pressure on Armenia to join the Customs Union. However, when Armenia's intention to establish an association with the European Union had become evident, Russia had to convey its dissatisfaction to the Armenian government and the public opinion through indirect means.

In an interview delivered on July 8, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, who was the Russian Ambassador in Yerevan from 2009 to March of this year, said that Armenia was reluctant to seek membership in the Customs Union, on the other hand, it was close to signing the association agreement with the European Union, but one would ask what real assistance, except for advice and promises for the future has the European Union provided to Armenia. Furthermore, by stating that the Association Agreement with the European Union would mean that allied relations between Russia and Armenia have their boundaries, has recalled the words of an Armenian author a century ago that Russia is the sole guarantor of Armenia's survival and has quoted the words of another author that "Armenia can only live with Russia or not live at all"⁴⁷. Moreover, Director of the Institute of Commonwealth of Independent States Konstantine Zatulin has criticized the disdainful attitude to the Eurasian integration project in Armenia⁴⁸.

Officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry have chosen not to speak on this issue, but have still expressed their dissatisfaction by allowing a low-rank official to talk. Aleksander Vasiliev, who is the First Secretary at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Yerevan, by greatly exaggerating, has compared the Association Agreement foreseen to be signed with the European Union with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed between the former Soviet Union and Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War and which enabled them to occupy several Eastern European states⁴⁹.

On the other hand, it is quite likely that Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha's visit made to Armenia in June, whose purpose was not informed⁵⁰, concerned Armenia becoming a member of the Customs Union.

47 "Ex-Russian Envoy Warns Armenia Over European Integration Drive" *RFE/RL*, 8 July 2013.

48 "Sarkisian Calls For EU Pressure on Turkey" *Asbarez*, 12 July 2013.

49 "Putin Sarkisian to Hold More Talks on Integration Process" *RFE/RL*, 30 August 2013.

50 "Unclear Geopolitical Directions of Armenia" *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 9 July 2013.

However, the effect of these warnings has not been observed in Armenia. Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian seemed confident that the Association Agreement and the DCFTA would be signed in Vilnius, that there is no inconvenience in Armenia joining both the Customs Union and the DCFTA and has tried to explain his view by bringing forth that Armenia does not want to become a full member of the European Union and NATO.

Due to historical reasons, Russia's prestige in Armenia is great. But, increasing natural gas prices, selling arms to Azerbaijan which would essentially be used against Armenia and the incident of Hrachya Harutyunyan should have shaken Russia's position within public opinion. However, a public opinion poll has revealed that by 77.2% Russia is Armenia's greatest friend. In comparison, it could be seen that for reasons that could be understood, Azerbaijan is considered as the greatest enemy by 62.7% and that Turkey is the second greatest enemy by 32.5%⁵¹.

On the other hand, the those who give full support to European Union membership (associate membership) is 26.4%⁵², whereas those supporting Russia's Customs Union is 61%⁵³. When considering that the ruling Republican Party and the main opposition parties support association with the European Union and that with the exception of the small Communist Party, no party openly opposes this association, it is difficult to understand how the Customs Union, whose benefits to Armenia is unclear, has gained so many supporters. The following view of a Russian publication could bring some explanation: "80% of the Armenian political elite are pro-Western, while 80% of the population is pro-Russian"⁵⁴.

It is noteworthy to indicate that the indirect instruments of pressure Russia applies to Armenia have also started being applied directly to the other former Soviet Union members which will sign an Association Agreement. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Rogozin has said that Moldova's signing of the Association Agreement would bring grave consequences and it has been understood in this context that Moldova could create difficulties in its exportation of wine to Russia. In fact, news has started being published that the importation of Moldavian wines could be banned for not according with the Russian rules of health and security⁵⁵. Right after, this importation has been suspended. Romania, a European Union member, has declared that it

51 Caucasus Analytical Digest, No.53,54, 17 July 2013

52 Ibid. It indicates that there is a category who "more or less support" EU membership and that their percentage is 28.1%. These could be those who will support EU membership in the future.

53 *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 9 July 2013.

54 *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 30 April 2013.

55 "AB, Ermenistan'ı Rusya'nın Gümrük Birliğine Kaptırdı" (EU Lost Armenia to Russia's Customs Union) *Euractiv.com.tr*, 4 September 2013.

will increase its imports of wine from Moldova, whereas the European Commission has started inspecting the increase in the wine quota for Moldovan wine⁵⁶. Due to these measures, Moldova has signed the Association Agreement in Vilnius on 29 November.

On the other hand, Ukraine, which is determined in signing the Association Agreement with the European Union and resists Russia's pressures, has tried another method. One of Putin's advisors Sergey Glyazev has said that if Ukraine joins the Customs Union, it will make a profit of 8 billion dollars due to the price cuts to be applied to Russian natural gas and moreover, that financial assistance will be provided to Ukraine⁵⁷. As will be examined below, eventually this country has also not been able to sign the Association Agreement, but this has caused large demonstrations of protest in the country.

Russia's pressures have drawn the reaction of the European Union and this issue has started to be discussed in the European Parliament. Stefan Füle, while indicating in his speech that any threats from Russia are unacceptable and that this is not how international relations should function in Europe in the 21st century, has stated that association agreements concluded with the European Union are not against Russia, but that on the opposite, Russia will greatly benefit from European integration⁵⁸.

Stefan Füle, has stated that association agreements concluded with the European Union are not against Russia, but that on the opposite, Russia will greatly benefit from European integration.

In a lengthy resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 2013 which in general concerns the association agreements and in particular concerns Russia's pressures⁵⁹, in summary, after recalling non-intervention in internal affairs, sovereignty of countries, good cooperation among states and some other fundamentals govern international relations, states that the pressures exerted by Russia are unacceptable and calls on Russia from refraining from taking such action. Furthermore, it calls on the European Commission to take action in defense of the European Union's partners.

Since this resolution is not only a warning against Russia, but is also a declaration of an idea or recommendation, it is not possible to say that it has created a serious effect.

56 "EU Warns Russia Over Trade Threats to Ex-Soviet Bloc" www.bbc.co.uk, 12 September 2013.

57 "AB, Ermenistan'ı Rusya'nın Gümrük Birliğine Kaptırdı" (EU Lost Armenia to Russia's Customs Union) Euractiv.com.tr, 4 September 2013.

58 "EU Deplores Russian Pressure on Eastern Neighbors" *RFE/RL*, 12 Eylül 2013.

59 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013_0383+0+DOC+XML+V0//FR&language=FR

2.3. Armenia Cannot Resist Russia

At a time when Europe, under the influence of news received from Armenia, believed that Armenia will not join the Customs Union and will be contented with signing a protocol with this union or with forming a loose tie such as being an observer and on the contrary, will sign an Association Agreement in Vilnius in November 2013 with the European Union, including the DCFTA, President Sarkisian has visited Russia and met with President Putin, signing a statement which indicated that Armenia will first join the Customs Union and then will participate in the formation of a Eurasian Economic Union.

The statement is as follows:

Joint Statement of the Presidents of Armenia and Russia⁶⁰

Moscow, September 3, 2013

As a result of the negotiations held in Moscow on September 3, 2013 the President of the Republic of Armenia S. Sargsyan and President of the Russian Federation V. Putin confirmed the objective of further developing economic integration processes in the Eurasian area.

In that context, the President of the Republic of Armenia S. Sargsyan announced the decision of the Republic of Armenia to join the Customs Union and to take necessary steps toward that end, and later to participate in the formation of the Eurasian economic union.

The President of the Russian Federation V. Putin expressed his support for the aforementioned decision of the Republic of Armenia and stated readiness of the Russian side to comprehensively assist the Republic of Armenia in that process.

President of the Republic of Armenia S. Sargsyan

President of the Russian Federation V. Putin

According to this statement, Armenia's obligations are the following:

- a. Armenia will join the Customs Union, for this it will take necessary steps.

⁶⁰ <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/09/03/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-and-President-Vladimir-Putin-joint-statement/>

- b. Later on, it will also participate in the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union.

On the other hand, the Presidents of the two countries have also issued a Joint Statement on the same day⁶¹. In this document, after it was indicated that through a separate statement, the Presidents reiterated the resolve of the countries to develop economic integration processes in the Eurasian area, the agreements they reached on other matters have also been stated. The important points could be summarized as follows:

- a. The commitment of the Presidents to the exclusively peaceful means for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, in the format of a joint work with the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group, based on the principles of non-use or threat to use force, territorial integrity of the states, equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
- b. Cooperation in the political-military and military-technical areas will be further strengthened and improved. It would be appropriate to understand this statement as Russia, by taking into consideration political conditions, will provide/sell advanced arms to Armenia in the technical area.
- c. The two countries are ready to modernize and diversify the Armenian economy. With this, they want to express that Russia will provide assistance to Armenia in the economic field.
- d. The two Presidents noted the importance of the currently functioning Armenian NPS and of the project for the construction of a new nuclear power station. Here, it draws attention that Russia has not made any promise to build a new nuclear power station.
- e. The two leaders stressed the importance of continued efforts aimed at the implementation of joint programs related to infrastructure, building of railroads, as well as new logistics and communication routes. Russia has also not made any promise on this issue.

After the two statements mentioned above were signed, President Sarkisian has delivered a speech⁶² and has provided some short information concerning the content of these documents. In terms of its general lines, Sarkisian has talked in accordance with the content of these documents signed, but has also referred to a matter concerning the European Union which was not mentioned

61 Ibid

62 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/09/03/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-working-visit-to-Russian-Federation/>

in the documents. He has said that this decision does not preclude Armenia's dialogue with European Union structures, that through the assistance of European partners Armenia has implemented serious institutional reforms, and in that sense today's Armenia is a more efficient and competitive state than it was years ago. Furthermore, he has indicated that Armenia is determined to continue the reforms.

By declaring in the presence of Putin that Armenia will continue some relations with the European Union, Sarkisian has tried to prevent any complication from developing in the future with Russia due to these relations. On the other hand, by indicating that reforms will be at the center of relations to be maintained with the European Union, Sarkisian has pleased the Union.

In his speech⁶³, President Putin has emphasized the economic aspect of Russia-Armenia relations and has said that the volume of trade reached 1.2 billion dollars, that Russia's accumulated investments in Armenia amount to 3 billion dollars, that this is almost half of all foreign investment, that about 1,300 Russian companies are active in Armenia, and that an investment of 500 million dollars has been made in Armenian railways operated by Russia. These statements of President Putin display that Russia is active in Armenia in all areas and in fact that this presence is turning into some kind of domination.

Therefore, following quite a long process, Armenia has preferred Eurasia over Europe; or rather it has been obligated to make such a preference. Not a desirable proposal, but the indirect pressure exerted by Russia has been determinative in Armenia making such a choice. Armenia's inclusion into the Customs Union has or should bring some interests. What has been gained in the economic field is uncertain. Actually, it has been seen that an unclear formula that this inclusion "will bring new economic perspectives for Armenia" has been used⁶⁴. From this, the conclusion that Russia has not promised financial assistance to Armenia is reached. Since decrease in natural gas prices is foreseen in exchange for the distribution company to be handed over to Russia, it cannot be considered as assistance. On the opposite, if Armenia had signed the Association Agreement, including the DCFTA, with the European Union, it would have received financial assistance of around 1 billion dollars or even more for various projects. Moreover, upon the recommendation or guarantee of the Union, it would have more easily reached international credits. The Customs Union does not provide such opportunities.

63 "Putin, Armenian President Adress Media After Talks – Kremlin Transcript" President of Russian Federation Website, 4 September 2013.

64 This formula has been used the Spokesman of the ruling Republican Party and Vice-President of the Armenian Assembly Eduard Sharmazanov. "Un officiel arménien affirme que la sécurité de l'Arménie va être boostée" *Armenews*, 27 September 2013.

In this situation, the question of why Armenia has preferred the Customs Union when it has not gained any particular benefit in the economic area come to mind. According to some press news, Armenia has stood by Russia due to security considerations. Regarding this issue, information regarded as concrete exists within the press. According to one news article⁶⁵, during Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev's visit to Armenia, which we mentioned above, a military and technical cooperation agreement between the two countries had been signed. This agreement gives Armenia the right to directly buy arms from Russian factories. This way, arms will be able to cost cheaper. Moreover, arms used within the Russian army will also be able to be bought. On the other hand, Russia and Armenia will form a joint defense enterprise. It could be understood that here, production of ammunition and the repair of arms and armaments will take place. Therefore, it could be seen that with the Customs Union, Armenia has been tied to Russia in the area of defense as much as it has in the economic area, or rather that its existing ties have increased. In the area of defense, which is considered to be vital, being dependent on one country generally does not create good consequences.

In short, when looking from the outside, the conviction that by joining the Customs Union, Armenia has not made a good deal in the economic and defense areas is created. However, when considering that a part of Armenia's borders is protected by Russia, that it obtains its arms from Russia, its railways and natural gas and petroleum distribution is in Russia's hands, and that the only nuclear power station that provides a significant amount of the country's electricity is operated and repaired by Russia, it could be seen that Armenia has no other choice but to do what Russia says due to Russia's domination in the country. In this situation, Armenia's sovereignty has turned into a relative state. But, Russia has not only achieved this superior position through its own efforts, but also with the consent of the Armenian governments. In this context, if in the future complaints about some behaviors of Russia emerge, it will be recalled that Armenia has a large share in the two countries drawing very close to each other and the complaints will be assessed accordingly.

On the other hand, even after Armenia accepted to join the Customs Union, Russia has continued to play its card of defending Armenia in order to influence public opinion. For this, in an unusual manner, commander of the Russian base in Gyumri Captain Andre Ruzinsky has issued a statement. He has said that the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute could cause a conflict and that if Azerbaijan was to adopt a decision to restore jurisdiction over Karabakh by forceful means, the military base could enter into an armed conflict in accordance with the treaty obligations within the framework of Collective Security Treaty (CST)⁶⁶.

65 "Armenia and Russia to Ratify Direct Weaponry Purchase Deal" *Vessnik Kavkaza*, 24 September 2013.

66 "Lack of Response to Russian Commander's Remarks" *Turan News Agency*, 31 October 2013.

The base commander's statements have created quite a lot of reactions. As explained in the section entitled "Armenia's Security Question" in this article, according to the CST's 4'th article, In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the States Parties, all the other States Parties will render it necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal. Armenia is a member of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) which fulfills the CST, while Azerbaijan is not. However, in case of an aggression, the intervention of CST member countries is not automatic and requires reaching a unanimous decision. Under ordinary conditions, there is almost no possibility for the Muslim (and of Turkish origin) members of the organization to allow force being used against Azerbaijan.

We believe that Commander Ruzinsky's statement is directed towards satisfying Armenian public opinion which always has security concerns. In fact, in a public opinion poll conducted at that time, the ratio of those approving Armenia's Customs Union accession has increased from 67% to 86%.

However, the issue that is problematic in Ruzinsky's statements is that the military base in Gyumri could enter into an armed conflict if "Azerbaijan was to adopt a decision to restore jurisdiction over Karabakh by forceful means". Since Karabakh is legally not part of Armenian territory and since no one asserts this, on what grounds will the Russian military base make such an intervention? Meanwhile, it is also known that Secretary General of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha has provided statements indicating that Karabakh

is not part of this organization's area of responsibility⁶⁷.

We believe that Commander Ruzinsky's statement is directed towards satisfying Armenian public opinion which always has security concerns. In fact, in a public opinion poll conducted at that time, the ratio of those approving Armenia's Customs Union accession has increased from 67% to 86%⁶⁸.

Therefore, after a positive atmosphere was created within Armenian public opinion, General Anatoli Vaysak, Head of Russian Defense Ministry's Security Department, has fixed the blunder made intentionally by saying that the Russian military base cannot intervene in the Karabakh conflict because this region is neither part of Russian territory nor part of Armenian territory, therefore it has no connection to the CSTO⁶⁹.

67 "Lack of Response to Russian Commander Remarks" *Turan News Agency*, 31 October 2013.

68 "86% of Armenian Respondants Has Favorable Attitude Towards Custom Union Accession" *NEWS.am*, 8 November 2013.

69 "La protection de la Russie ou comment lire entre les lignes..." *ArmeniaNow*, 8 November 2013.

2.4. Reactions, Criticisms

Armenia all of a sudden making a U-turn and choosing the Customs Union, which is under Russia's management, instead of the European Union Accession Agreement and the DCFTA with which its negotiations had been concluded has been seen as a surprise in the international sphere and has caused some reactions.

a. The European Commission

In a statement issued by the European Commission⁷⁰, it has been declared that the Commission has noted Armenia's wish to join the Customs Union, that it looks forward to understanding better from Armenia what their intentions are and how they wish to ensure compatibility between these and the commitments undertaken through the Association Agreement and DCFTA and that once this consultation has been completed, the Commission will draw its conclusions on the way forward.

As can be seen, the reaction of the European Commission is restrained. It does not go beyond stating that it will determine its stance base on the information received from Armenia.

As can be seen, the reaction of the European Commission is restrained. It does not go beyond stating that it will determine its stance base on the information received from Armenia. On the contrary, the reactions of some of the Union's officials are more diverse. Stefan Füle, Commissioner responsible for enlargement, has said that it difficult to imagine the signing at Vilnius of the Association Agreement and that based on the information they have, the compatibility of obligations to the Customs Union with those under an Association Agreement and the DCFTA look problematic⁷¹.

The reactions received from the political wing of the European Union are harsher. After Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee of Foreign Affairs Elmar Brok indicated that Russia exerts pressure over Armenia concerning the Karabakh issue and that Russia blackmailed a small country like Armenia in making this decision, has said that he supports the European Union's relations with Armenia in the future, but that the European perspective has come to an end for Yerevan⁷².

In a resolution adopted by the European People's Party, a non-organ of the European Union but formed in order to support this Union which has a center

70 "Deep Free Trade Agreement Compatible With CIS Economic Cooperation: EU" *ARKA*, 5 September 2013.

71 "EU Signals No Association Agreement With Armenia" *RFE/RL*, 6 September 2013.

72 "Putin Ermenistan'ı AB'den kopardı" (Putin Ripped Armenia from the EU) *abhaber*, 5 September 2013.

left tendency and generally supports Armenia, has said that they regret the decision of Armenia to join the Customs Union which undermines the achievements of Armenia towards the European Union and that membership in the Russian-led union is incompatible with concluding the Association Agreement⁷³.

b. The European Parliament

Although it is an organ of the European Union, it can sometimes adopt difference stances than those of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. We observed above that the European Commission displayed a restrained reaction towards Armenia's sudden decision of joining the Customs Union and in particular, that it tried to maintain its relations with Armenia within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, although the European Parliament has not very openly criticized Armenia, it has experienced events which display that the majority of the parliament is displeased with the country's decision of joining the Customs Union.

The first of these events is some members of the Parliament postponing their visit to Yerevan that was to be conducted on 28-29 October for the Armenia-EU Commission inter-parliamentary cooperation. While the reason for such postponement was not explained, there were news in the Armenian press that its purpose was to protest Armenia's decision of joining the Customs Union⁷⁴ and the likelihood of this being true is quite high.

The second event is much more important. On 23 October 2013, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution entitled "European Neighborhood Policy: Towards a Strengthening of Partnership"⁷⁵. Evaluations regarding the countries to which the neighborhood policy is applied exist in the resolution. Although it is stated that Armenia's progress made in democratic standards and in the fulfillment of Association Agreement requirements are recognized, the resolution also indicates that deficiencies exist in the area of democracy and that progress should also be made in the areas of governance reforms, including law enforcements, judicial sectors and the fight against corruption. It is also expressed in the text that the latest move by the President of Armenia concerning the Customs Union is regretted, that such a policy is not compatible with the Association Agreement, that it deplors, in this regard,

73 "EU Signals No Association Agreement With Armenia" *RFE/RL*, 6 September 2013.

74 "EU Members of Parliaments Cancel Visit to Yerevan" *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 23 October 2013.

75 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2013 on the European Neighbourhood Policy: towards a strengthening of the partnership. Position of the European Parliament on the 2012 reports. (2013/2621(RSP)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0446+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> -

the fact that this choice was made without fully fledged parliamentary scrutiny or an open debate in Armenia society and by hoping, in this regard, that Armenia will continue European Union related reforms, calls for a pursuit of cooperation with the European Union.

In the resolution, the following points have been expressed concerning the Karabakh issue. First of all, it is stated that the occupation by one country of the Eastern Partnership of the territory of another violates the fundamental principles and objectives of the Eastern Partnership. Then, it recalls the resolution and principles that must be complied with for the settlement of the Karabakh issue and indicates that the resolution of the Karabakh conflict should comply with UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of 1993 and the Minsk Group Basic Principles, enshrined in the L'Aquila joint statement of 10 July 2009.

The most important articles of the four above-mentioned resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in 1993 are the ones concerning the withdrawal of occupying forces from occupied areas of Azerbaijan. Among the principles conveyed in the L'Aquila Joint Statement are items that rather support Azerbaijan's views such as the returning of the territories surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, an interim status for Karabakh providing guaranties for security and self-governance and the rights for refugees to return to their former places. Apart from these, some other points exist which reflect Armenian views such as the self-determination of peoples, future determination of the final legal status of Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will (like a referendum or plebiscite), and a corridor linking Armenia to Karabakh being established. When considering these provisions together, recognizing the existence of an independent Karabakh state, which Armenia still defends, becomes impossible.

The European Parliament's resolution has drawn the reactions of Armenia. First, Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian⁷⁶ and shortly after Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian have declared that this resolution is at odds with the official positions of the European Union as well as the US, Russia and France. If such contradiction exists, this should not have been conveyed by Armenia, but by the European Union, US, Russia or France.

The second point which the Minister and Deputy Minister brought forth was that the authors of that wording (in other words, the European Parliament) should understand that they bear responsibility for its possibly negative impact

76 "Yerevan Paps EU Parliament Over Karabakh Claim" *RFE/RL*, 24 October 2013. "Edward Nalbandyan: Formulation About Nagorno-Karabakh in European Parliament's Resolution.... Run Counter to EU's Official Stance" *Arminfo*, 30 October 2013.

on the negotiation process and undermining of the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group aimed at the peaceful settlement of the conflict. If this was really the case, then this should have also been conveyed by the Minsk Group. On the other hand, since the meeting of President Aliyev and Sarkisian almost a month later in Vienna constitutes proof that the negotiation process is continuing, the case of undermining, which the Minister and Deputy Minister expressed, has not occurred.

c. The Reactions of Some Countries

Although not wanting to openly express it, the accession of Armenia to the Customs Union in an unexpected manner after negotiating the Association Agreement with the European Union for approximately 3.5 years has created negative reactions within the European Union and in some member countries. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, who put in great efforts in the implementation of the neighborhood policy, together with Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak of Slovakia, have stated that they have come to the conclusion that the Association Agreement has been eliminated from the Armenian agenda⁷⁷.

Through partnership, Poland is a country that has very much supported the joining of Armenia to Europe. However, Armenia's proposal to sign the Association Agreement after the DCFTA is eliminated has even not been supported by this country and Nalbandian, who had visited Poland for this purpose, had returned with empty hands⁷⁸.

Among the European Union officials, Elmar Brok, Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee of Foreign Affairs, has always shown interest in the subject of Armenia's association and has openly expressed his ideas. When Armenia's decision to join the Customs Union became apparent, Brok has said that it is not that Europe lost Armenia, but rather Armenia lost its European prospect⁷⁹, that Moscow uses the Karabakh conflict as an instrument of pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan and is not interested in its settlement⁸⁰. Although these views are not much openly expressed, it could be understood that they are shared among European Union circles. On the other hand, it could be seen that when Russia, which regards the European Union's neighborhood policy as interfering in its sphere of influence and therefore wants to prevent this policy, is unable to deject Ukraine, Moldova and

77 *Trendinfo*, 11 September 2013. "Sweden: Association Agreement With Armenia Eliminated From Agenda"

78 "Poland Also Rejects Alternative EU-Armenia Accord" *RFE/RL*, 17 September 2013.

79 "Armenia Lost its European Prospect.." *News.am*, 25 September 2013.

80 "Brok: Armenia and Azerbaijan Are Hostages of Moscow's Policy" *Turan Information Agency*, 24 September 2013.

Georgia's European Union ambitions, has attached particular significance to Armenia joining the Customs Union.

On the other hand, as a result of the pressures from Russia, Ukraine has also postponed the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union a week left until the Vilnius summit. Prime Minister M. Azarov has declared that they made this decision "to ensure the national security of Ukraine"⁸¹. Large demonstrations have been carried out against the Government's decision. A Turkish news agency speaking with one of the demonstrators has conveyed that this person said: "We are here, because we want to protect our rights. We are European society. We don't want to give Ukraine to the domination of the Russian Empire. If this continues, we will become Russia's colony. We are members of an independent and civil European family"⁸².

While no official reaction was received from the US right after Armenia accepting to join the Customs Union, a US Department of State official not wanting his name to be disclosed has told Radio Liberty that all countries have the right to choose their own path of economic integration according to national interest and that the US hopes that Armenia will carry on with European integration even after pledging to join the Customs Union⁸³. Then, US Ambassador in Yerevan John Heffern has indicated that Armenia joining the Customs Union will not affect relations with the US and that these relations are based on Armenia's welfare, the settlement of the Karabakh issues through peaceful means and the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia by reaching reconciliation⁸⁴.

On this point, let us indicate that although there is the conviction that the US's influence in Armenia is restricted, its financial aids are not much, does not sell arms in principle, does not openly support Armenia regarding the Karabakh issue and relations with Turkey, and the two countries have close relations due to the Armenian Diaspora in the US, this is not quite true. For instance, while President Sarkisian, after being elected in 2008, had visited Moscow more than 30 times, he did not (or was unable to) conduct any official visit to Washington.

As expected, no official reaction to Armenia's decision of joining the Customs Union came from Turkey. Without dwelling upon this event too much, the media presented it as news and except for one article⁸⁵, no other writing has been come across that only focuses on this event.

81 "Ukraine Drops EU Association Plans" *Asbarez*, 21 November 2013.

82 "AB Yanlıları Tüm Gece Eylem Yaptı" (EU Advocates Held Protests the Whole Night) *Haber Türk*, 22 November 2013.

83 "U.S. Urges Armenia to Keep Up European Integration" *RFE/RL*, 5 September 2013.

84 "Les Etas-Unis restent confiants après le retournement arménien" *Armenews*, 18 September 2013.

85 <http://www.avim.org.tr/degerlendirmetekli.php?makaleid=6137> – Alev Kılıç, "Armenia Has Opted to Join the Eurasian Economic Union" *AVİM Bulletin*, 6 September 2013.

d. Reactions in Armenia

The reactions of Armenian political parties to the decision of joining the Customs Union have varied according to whether they are in power or are within the opposition.

The Republican Party, the great partner of the coalition in power, has naturally supported this decision. While Spokesman of the party Eduard Sharmazanov has said that the decision meets the national interests of Armenia⁸⁶, Hovhannes Sahakyan, Secretary of the party's parliamentary faction has said that Armenia is already included in a Russian security network, and thus cannot remain aloof from any economic ties, but that Armenia would continue to cooperate with the European Union and Armenian joining the Customs Union could not upset such ties⁸⁷.

The reactions of Armenian political parties to the decision of joining the Customs Union have varied according to whether they are in power or are within the opposition.

Head of the Rule of Law Party and Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan has repeated the official view that Armenia's entry into the Customs

Union does not hinder the Association Agreement with the European Union and has said that Russia will intensify its involvement in the development and diversification of Armenian economy and as a proof of this soon new programs and projects will be seen⁸⁸.

Concerning this matter, Vardan Bostanjyan, member of the Prosperous Armenia Party which did not join the Government Coalition following the parliamentary elections, after saying that the main objective must be the security of Armenia and Karabakh, has indicated that the Armenian products cannot cause breakthrough in the European markets at least in the first five years, that the main market of Armenian export sales is Russia and that when considering these factors, the Armenian President made a decision that is the most appropriate⁸⁹.

On the other hand, the Dashnak Party has issued a statement on this issue, criticizing the government for not providing the necessary information to the public regarding this decision and stating that they assume that the primary

86 "Le parti au pouvoir affirme que la décision de rejoindre l'Union Douanière répond aux intérêts nationaux de l'Arménie" *Armenews*, 9 September 2013.

87 "Republican Party Spokesman: There can be no Talk of Russian Pressure" *Hetq.am*, 4 September 2013.

88 "Baghdasaryan: Entry into Custom Union Does Not Hinder Signing Association Agreement With EU" *Panorama.am*, 9 September 2013.

89 "President Decision to Join Custom Union Was Rational; Prosperous Armenia Party Member" *News.am*, 4 September 2013.

reason for the Armenian President's decision was the security issues of Armenia and Karabakh, that any economic integration must give clear guarantees for maintaining and consolidating the security and developing the economy of Armenia, whereas this decision shall not become an obstacle before the continuation of Armenia activities in the European direction⁹⁰. As can be seen, despite its criticizing tone, the Dashnaks' statement actually supports Armenia's decision.

In a statement made on this issue, Armenian National Assembly Chairman and Armenia's first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, after saying that he has reservations about Armenia's decision to join the Customs Union, has lambasted President Sarkisian's last-minute decision as humiliating and shameful and said that the European Union committed a serious mistake by supporting Sarkisian for the last five years⁹¹. On the other hand, another member of the party Aram Manukyan said that it is Sarkisian's habit not to inform his people of his actions, for instance that the Turkey-Armenia protocols were also initialed quite unexpectedly and that Armenia is losing its image of a reliable country⁹².

Raffi Hovannissian, Head of the Heritage Party, seen to be under the influence of the US Armenians, has opposed Armenia's decision to join the Customs Union. Stepan Safaryan from the same party has said that joining the Customs Union puts Armenia's independence into danger, because apart from being economic, this Union also carries a geopolitical feature and moreover, that Armenia has been devoid of entering the European market and the opportunity to create a democratic and continuous state⁹³.

Boris Navasardian, speaking on behalf of some civil society organizations which defend integration with the European Union, has criticized the Government's stance of foreseeing the signing of the Association Agreement without the DCFTA and has said that meaningful political association with the European Union is impossible without DCFTA because the free-trade agreement would not only open the market to Armenia but also requires a radical reform of the Armenian business environment⁹⁴.

Last of all, we must note that a day after Armenia declared its decision on 4 September 2013, a protest rally was organized in front of the Presidential

90 "Decision to Join Customs Union Was Laden With Huge Responsibility for Armenia's Future- ARF" *News.am*, 4 September 2013.

91 "Ter Petrossian: "Sarkissian a trompé l'Europe et humilié l'Arménie" *Armnews.am*, 10 September 2013.

92 "Oppositionist: Serzh Sargsyan is Completely Illegitimate and Acts at Foreign Forces' Bidding" *Arminfo.am*, 10 September 2013.

93 "Rulling Party Says Customs Unions Decision Meets Armenia's National Interests" *ArmeniaNow*, 6 September 2013.

94 "Government Bid to Dilute Accord With EU Criticized" *RFE/RL*, 5 September 2013.

Residence in Yerevan opposing the Customs Union. The rally participants had declared that by joining the Customs Union, Armenia would make a step towards restoration of the former Soviet Union and had asked President Sarkisian's resignation. Moreover, a clash had broken out between the demonstrators and police and nine demonstrators had been arrested⁹⁵.

As can be seen, parties holding a great majority of the seats in the Armenian National Assembly had adopted a stance that favors the Customs Union and within the bounds of possibility had supported relations with the European Union. The number of those with the opposite view is less and their influence in the political area is limited.

2.5. The Armenian Government's Stance

Following the announcement that Armenia will join the Customs Union, Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian made a statement on how relations with the European Union could be from now on. He has accepted that the DCFTA is incompatible with the membership of the Customs Union and said that Armenia would continue to cooperate with the European Union as much before, with the exception of the DCFTA. Furthermore, he has expressed that they are willing to sign the Association Agreement and are ready to maintain all other programs with the European Union and to continue the implementation of reforms⁹⁶. It could be understood that Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, who visited Brussels right after Armenia declared its decision and met with European Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle, also shares the same views. At the same time, Nalbandian's visit has fulfilled the European Union's wish mentioned above to obtain information from Armenia.

According to a press release by the Armenian Foreign Ministry concerning this visit⁹⁷, Nalbandian has reiterated Armenia's readiness to continue the broad cooperation with the European Union on mobility, enhancement of the reform process, good governance, democracy, human rights, and multisectoral economic cooperation, underlining the will of Armenia to develop close partnership as much as it is appropriate for the European Union and so that it would not contradict Armenia's membership to the Customs Union.

In short, except for the DCFTA, Armenia wants to sign the Association Agreement and to maintain all its other relations with the European Union.

95 "Protests Against Joining Customs Union Outside Presidential Residence" *AMT*, 4 September 2013.

96 "Armenia Willing to Continue EU Cooperation" *Asbarez*, 5 September 2013.

97 "Foreign Minister Met With EU Commissioner" Press Release, 5 September 2013. http://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/item/2013/09/05/meeting_Füle/

This way, it has tried and continued its policy of benefitting economically from the European Union and from Russia in the area of defense.

On 12-13 September 2013, the European Union's Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministerial meeting has been held in Yerevan. Stefan Füle, who attended the meeting on behalf of the European Commission, has expressed the Union's stance opposite to Armenia's stance mentioned above regarding the European Union⁹⁸. Contrary to Armenia's proposal to sign the Association Agreement by excluding the DCFTA, Füle has said that the Association Agreement is actually one agreement, one treaty, that it is not two treaties and they are two parts of one treaty, that there are clear links between those two parts and that you cannot separate just one at the expense of the other. This way, the fact that the European Union does not accept Armenia's proposal of signing the Association Agreement by separating the DCFTA has gained clarity.

Füle has also indicated that the European Union stands ready to continue developing ties with Armenia through a "new legal framework", but that he is skeptical about the Armenian side's desire to work it out in time for the EU Summit in Vilnius slated for November. It could be understood from Füle's statements that since the Association Agreement cannot be signed, Armenia seeks for a new document to be prepared that would regulate relations with the EU and for it to be signed during the Vilnius Summit. Although not rejecting this, by stating that this document will not work out in time until November, Füle has indicated beforehand that no document will be signed with Armenia at the Summit. The points to be included in the new document, or in Füle's words, in the "new legal framework", has not been explained. It has been understood that it is expected from Armenia to present some proposals concerning this issue⁹⁹.

Although it is understood from Stefan Füle's statements that Armenia will not sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, President Sarkisian has personally made some contacts to achieve this when opportunities arise. As Armenia chairs the Committee of Ministers of the European Council, he has delivered a speech in the Parliamentary Assembly on 2 October 2013¹⁰⁰ and has responded to the questions. In short, the Armenian President has stated that they want to sign an association agreement with the European Union envisaging mainly political reforms and that he will participate at the Summit in Vilnius with the thought that some changes could be made to the document

98 "EU Sees No Association Accord With Armenia" *RFE/RL*, 13 September 2013.

99 "British Ambassador Says Armenian Authorities Should Present Clear Proposals on Those Fields Where They See Further Cooperation With EU" *ARKA*, 30 September 2013.

100 <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2013/10/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-participated-at-the-session-of-the-PACE-speech/>

negotiated until now with the European Union¹⁰¹. By taking advantage of being already in France, Sarkisian has also met with President François Hollande. It is natural that Sarkisian has requested Hollande's help in a document which would preserve Armenia's ties to the European Union being signed in Vilnius. However, in the Elysée Palace's statement concerning this visit, this issue has not been mentioned.

In a similar manner, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian has also tried to convince officials in signing a document regarding relations with the European Union. Apart from the political reforms to be made by Armenia, no information exists on the content of this document. One source has even indicated that the document to be signed could be symbolic¹⁰².

The reason for Armenia to insist so intensely on signing a document with the European Union during the Vilnius Summit is that it has completely entered Russia's orbit after declaring that it would join the Customs Union. On the other hand, Armenia's policy pursued for years and shortly described as "complementary" of cooperating with Eastern countries and the European Union for economic development and with Russia for security has also come to an end. However, Armenia needs a balance which it can also bring forth against Russia when necessary. This is actually why, even if symbolic, Armenia is willing to sign an association document with the European Union. Yet, even though the European Union is uncomfortable with Armenia making a U-turn, it has not adopted a "punishing" approach towards Armenia in order not to push the country further into Russia's lap. It desires to establish some kind of cooperation with Armenia. Therefore, similarities exist between the stances of Armenia and the Union. The problem stems from what the cooperation will be and on what legal basis it will be founded upon not being determined. As mentioned above, European Commissioner responsible for the Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle had said that the European Union is ready to develop relations with Armenia through a "new legal framework", but that he is skeptical about the Armenian side's desire to work it out in time for the Summit to be held in Vilnius in November. But, Armenian officials have continued their insistences on a document being signed in Vilnius. In the meanwhile, according to a news item, signing a document in Vilnius with Armenia entailing issues like the protection of human rights, implementing democratic reforms and combating corruption, rather more in the form of a proclamation, was envisaged¹⁰³.

101 "L'Arménie espère toujours trouver un accord d'association" *Armenews*, 3 October 2013.

102 "Armenian Authorities Adopt "New Line" in European Integration" *NEWS.am*, 5 October 2013.

103 "Vilnius'ta AB'yle 1,5 Sayfalık Ortak Bildiri İmzalanacak" (A Joint Statement of 1,5 pages will be Signed with the EU in Vilnius) *NEWS.am*, 16 October 2013.

On the other hand, the European Union has announced that it will sign two agreements with Armenia during the summit in Vilnius. The first of these is the Visa Facilitation Agreement which provides ease to those of Armenian nationality to enter European Union countries. The other is the Readmission Agreement regarding Armenian nationalities entering European Union countries through illegal means to be readmitted by Armenia¹⁰⁴. Both agreements do not carry a political, but a technical aspect.

As for Armenia, it is seen that Armenia has acted towards joining the Russian controlled Customs Union as soon as possible after it gained clarity that the Association Agreement with the European Union would not be signed without the DCFTA. For this purpose, President T. Sarkisian has created seven working groups within the Government. Despite this impatient stance by Armenia, negotiations to be held with the Customs Union countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus) could last for months and furthermore, many changes must be made to Armenia's regulations¹⁰⁵. In short, Armenia's accession to the Customs Union will take quite a long time.

It is seen that Armenia has acted towards joining the Russian controlled Customs Union as soon as possible after it gained clarity that the Association Agreement with the European Union would not be signed without the DCFTA.

Thus, Armenia's accession to the Customs Union has reached the phase of implementation and this has satisfied President Putin which he has expressed in a letter to President Sarkisian¹⁰⁶. Despite all the claims by Armenia, President Putin refrained from providing a date for visiting this country and as mentioned above, used this visit as an instrument of pressure over Armenia. After it became clear that Armenia would join the Customs Union, some developments took place, and the date of the visit was determined as December 2nd when it was certain that this visit would take place, although it was not announced first due to security reasons,

It could be seen that NATO also pursued the European Union's policy of maintaining its ties with Armenia to a certain extent, while on the other hand, Armenia is also willing to develop these ties. James Appathurai, NATO Secretary General's Representative for Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, has praised Armenia's cooperation with NATO; has reiterated NATO's readiness to support defense reforms in Armenia and has emphasized that

104 "EU Hopes For Conclusion of Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement With Armenia in Vilnius: Stefan Füle" *NEWS.am*, 4 October 2013.

105 "Le Gouvernement arménien annonce le lancement du processus d'adhésion dans L'Union Douanière" *Armenews*, 20 September 2013.

106 "Putin Again Hails Armenian Entry into Russian-Led Bloc" *RFE/RL*, 23 September 2013.

Armenian officials, including President Sarkisian, had told him that nothing would hinder deepening relations with NATO along with being a CSTO and Customs Union member¹⁰⁷.

In Armenia, particularly in the press, some views against the Customs Union have been brought forth that have not quite affected public opinion.

The first of these views is that Armenia would not gain any or it would gain little economic benefit from the Customs Union. On the contrary, there are those who assert that natural gas prices would fall if it becomes a Customs Union member which is possible. Moreover, there are also those who put forth that Armenian goods would be sold to Customs Union countries more easily. This is also possible. But, Armenian goods directed to the Customs Union mean that not much would change in their quality, whereas the production of goods of high quality would be necessary in order to sell goods to the European Union. Over time, this could have caused serious improvements especially in the industrial sector.

The second view is that if Armenia joins the Customs Union, it will at least partially lose its sovereignty or independence. These views are seen in the political area as much as in the press. For instance, Mikael Hayrapetyan, Head of the Conservative Party, has said that Armenia's accession to the Customs Union will further restrict its sovereignty which is already limited¹⁰⁸. On the contrary, Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian has indicated that each country of the Customs Union maintains its sovereignty, notwithstanding each member of the union confers a certain part of its authority to the Union¹⁰⁹. This view is true and applies to all countries that are members of international organizations. On this point, it should be noted that reduction in Armenia's sovereignty rights does not arise from being a member of the Customs Union, but from gradually becoming closer to a great country like Russia, because then the final word will come from Russia.

The third and, in our view, a serious issue is what the status of the Karabakh region would be with the Customs Union; in other words, whether this region would join the Customs Union together with Armenia. Concerning this issue, Russia's view has not yet been come across. According to the international law, as Karabakh is not part of Armenia, the Customs Union should not apply to this region. If Karabakh is left outside the Customs Union, customs duty will be collected from the commercial activities between this area and

107 "NATO Representative Told the 'Secret' *Lragir*, 18 October 2013.

108 "Armenia Accession to Custom Union Means Further Restriction on its Sovereignty" *Tert.am*, 24 October 2013.

109 "All countries of Custom Union Maintain Their Sovereignty: Deputy Foreign Minister" *Armenpress*, 19 September 2013.

Armenia, whereas Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian has strictly opposed this possibility by indicating that there can be no border between Armenia and Karabakh¹¹⁰. However, if Karabakh is an independent state, as alleged by Armenia, it would be appropriate for it to remain outside the Customs Union. On the other hand, as Azerbaijan justly defends, since Karabakh is an autonomous area in Azerbaijan, it should not be a part of the Customs Union. Therefore, it is quite difficult to support the Armenian view which considers Karabakh as if it is included in the Customs Union.

On the other hand, if Karabakh was included in the Customs Union, it would be appropriate for Azerbaijan to object to this by putting forth that Karabakh exists within its own boundaries. It could be conceived that such a development would also negatively effect or even halt talks on the Karabakh issue. Since the draft agreement related to Armenia's accession to the Customs Union has not been published, it is unclear whether or not it includes the Karabakh region. However, since Armenia is no longer an associate to the European Union, this matter no longer carries importance for the time being.

Meanwhile, let us indicate that a scholar from the Diaspora has approached the issue from another perspective, putting forth that the Customs Union, even if indirectly, would include Karabakh and that every international regulation comprising Karabakh would make it easier for this region to be annexed to Armenia¹¹¹.

As can be seen, although there are some groups in Armenia that oppose the Customs Union, public opinion polls have shown that a majority of the public supports the Union and furthermore, has great confidence in Russia. According to a research conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank, 67% of the people interviewed (62% in 2012) has said that they want Armenia to join the Customs Union. Those regarding Russia as “a friendly country” exceed 90%¹¹². On the opposite, 45% of the youth indicating that they want to study in European Union countries, while only 17% expressing that they want to study in Russia or in a country of the former Soviet Union is an interesting finding.

2.6. The Vilnius Summit

The fact that Armenia had presented a draft to the European Union concerning the document to be signed in Vilnius-only to be rejected-, was learned through

110 “La polémique se poursuit” *Armenews*, 13 September 2013.

111 Raymond Azadian, *mirrorspectator.com*, 17 September 2013.

112 “Majority of Young Armenians Would Like To Study in An EU Country Rather than Russia” *ARKA*, 24 October 2013.

the press¹¹³. While Armenia's proposals have not been explained,, it is not difficult to make presumptions. As Armenia expressed before on various occasions, it sought to sign a document that preserves, within the bounds of possibility, the other sections of the Association Agreement excluding the DCFTA, but this was not accepted by the European Commission.

During the Summit of the Heads of State of Eastern Partnership Countries organized in Vilnius on 29 November 2013, Armenia and the European Union issued a joint statement. The original text of this short statement is given in the footnote¹¹⁴.

In the statement, the following points are mainly indicated:

- a. Although the Association Agreement has not been signed, the two sides specify that they want to continue cooperation in all areas of “mutual interest”. This way, they have wanted to show that ties between Armenia and the European Union have not been abolished.
- b. The European Union wants its member states or associated member countries to fulfill some conditions. Although Armenia is not an associated member, a paragraph exists in the statement that it is committed to fulfill the conditions. These are the improvement of democratic institutions and judiciary, the promotion of human rights, rule of law and good governance, the strengthening of civil society, and the fight against corruption. Moreover, it has also been asked from Armenia to fulfill some principles in the economic area.

Armenia was also supposed to comply with these rules during negotiations on association continuing for almost four years. But, as the fraudulent elections have shown, it is not possible to say that significant developments in these areas have taken place in Armenia. Since the importance of these issues within the Customs Union and later on in the Eurasian Union is also

113 “Armenia and EU Cannot Reach Agreement on Vilnius Document – Newspaper” *NEWS.am*, 26 November 2013.

114 http://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/item/2013/11/29/eu_js/

JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Vilnius, 29 November 2013)

The EU and Armenia enjoy close links and reconfirm their commitment to further develop and strengthen comprehensive cooperation in all areas of mutual interest within the Eastern Partnership framework.

Based on common values, both sides are committed to further cooperation aimed at the continuous improvement of democratic institutions and judiciary, the promotion of human rights and rule of law, good governance, the fight against corruption, the strengthening of the civil society, the further improvement of the framework for enhanced trade and investments, the continued implementation of the mobility partnership and increased sectoral cooperation.

Based on their common endeavour to build upon the existing framework of cooperation, the EU and Armenia stress the importance of revisiting the basis for their relations.

The EU and Armenia acknowledge that they have completed negotiations on an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, but will not proceed with its initialling due to Armenia's new international commitments. They agree on the need to update the EU-Armenia ENP Action Plan.

relative from now on, it could be expected for the developments in these areas to be much more severe.

As known, countries to become members of the European Union must conform to the Copenhagen criteria and in particular, to the principle of good neighborly relations. It cannot be said that Armenia pursues a policy of good neighborly relations while it is at war with one of its four neighbors and has no diplomatic relations with another. Yet, the statement does not entail this principle and this can create the notion for Armenia that continuing the irreconcilable policy it has pursued until now towards Azerbaijan and Turkey has no inconvenience from the European Union's aspect.

- c. The importance of revisiting the basis for relations between the European Union and Armenia is emphasized in the statement. It is also indicated that the sides agree on the need to update the EU-Armenia European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan. This means that works will be conducted towards determining on what foundations and in which areas relations between the two sides will be carried out.
- d. The statement also puts forth that the European Union and Armenia acknowledge that they have completed negotiations on an Association Agreement, including a DCFTA, but will not proceed with its initialing due to Armenia's new international commitments. This way, Armenia has accepted responsibility for the Association Agreement not being able to be signed.

If Armenia had signed the Association Agreement, there is no doubt that the European Union's aid would have been much higher.

Without doubt, this statement is way below the expectations of Armenia, because apart from the European Union adopting a general approach that it will form cooperation in the future, it has not made any promises to Armenia. In particular, there is no statement that would mean that funds to Armenia will continue. However, it is possible that aid provided for some projects will continue until the projects are finished. According to one source, this aid was 110 million Euros for the year 2014¹¹⁵. If Armenia had signed the Association Agreement, there is no doubt that the European Union's aid would have been much higher. Although no specific number has been indicated for this, the source mentioned above has brought forward that 6 billion Euros was envisaged to be given to Armenia during the 3-4 year period. Due to the

115 "EU Was Ready to Provide Armenia With 6 Billions Euro Aid in 3-4 Years- Concord Center Head" *ARKA*, 26 November 2013.

economic situation the European Union is still in, the allocation of this money to Armenia could have been difficult. But, it is normal for Armenia to require this amount or even more in order to develop economically.

President Sarkisian has delivered a speech during the Summit of Eastern Partnership¹¹⁶, stating that Armenia is determined to continue with the implementation of the deep and large-scale reforms which exist in the Joint Statement mentioned above. He has also said that building and strengthening Armenian nationhood upon the European model has been the conscious choice of Armenia and that process is hence irreversible. But, he has not mentioned why Armenia has chosen the Russian model if the European model is so important.

Another point drawing attention in his speech is that the Eastern Partnership should become a natural bridge that promotes integration from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans and this is as if Armenia also somehow suggests to Russia to become an associate to the European Union.

The Armenian President's speech was focused on the Armenian-European Union relations. In an environment where many statements are issued, referring to other subjects would have been baseless. But, without having such concerns, Sarkisian had also touched upon Armenia's relations with Turkey, the genocide allegations, the 100th anniversary of 1915 and also the Karabakh issue. By doing so, although relations with the European Union have weakened, he has tried to convince the Union and member states to continue to support Armenia in these issues.

Sarkisian's words regarding Turkey and Karabakh have been mentioned in our article's section of "Turkish-Armenian Relations".

III. ARMENIA'S SECURITY ISSUES

Just like every other country, Armenia also has security needs. Due to the clashes with Karabakh not coming to an end with a peace treaty, but with a ceasefire, and also due to Armenia's legal occupation of Azerbaijani territories, Azerbaijan reserves the right to take back its territories according to the article 51 of the United Nations Charter. For this reason, it is likely for clashes between the two countries to re-emerge. It is possible for Armenia to withdraw from the occupied territories and in return, to make peace with Azerbaijan and eliminate the possibility of war by obtaining, under international

116 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/11/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-at-the-third-Eastern-Partnership-summit/>

guarantee when necessary, a special status for the Karabakh Armenians. However, Armenian public opinion, which is still under the impact of the military success achieved in early 1990's, the stance of some political parties—with the Dashnaks at the forefront—, which abuse the military success and the Republican Party generally acting in a similar manner, have blocked reconciliation with Azerbaijan and therefore, has increased the chance of war. Besides, with the opportunities gained by selling petroleum and natural gas, Azerbaijan has strengthened its armament and its defense. For some time, Azerbaijan's defense budget has been higher than Armenia's total budget. At a date not far away, Azerbaijan will gain absolute advantage over Armenia in the military field and will be able to use its opportunities in this field to rescue its territories under Armenian occupation.

At this stage, beyond keeping hold of the occupied Azerbaijani territories, Armenia also needs foreign aid for the defense of its own territories and it could be seen that under current conditions, this function can best be fulfilled by Russia. Russia seeks to hold influence in the Southern Caucasus, which it had fully dominated in the past and for this, it takes advantage of Armenia in which it established a military base. Therefore, Armenia's need for security and Russia's desire to maintain its presence in this region find a middle ground and forms a strategic partnership.

However, Russia not only requires influence in Armenia, but also in the other two countries of the Southern Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan, which according to Armenia are at a stronger position. For reasons known, it is difficult or will at least take a long time for Russia to re-establish its former relations with Georgia. On the contrary, at least due to its policy of armament, it has common points with Azerbaijan in some areas. This situation is the weak spot of the Russia-Armenia strategic partnership and creates the result of Russia's support to Armenia, especially in the area of defense, not being certain, but relative; in other words, it varies according to conditions.

On what legal foundation is Russia's contribution to Armenia's defense based?

From the aspect of bilateral relations, the situation is as follows:

- a. With an agreement concluded with Russia in 1995, Armenia had given Russia a military base near the town of Gyumri. Additionally, it had been agreed for Russia to safeguard Armenia's borders from the former Soviet Union period. This way, Armenia believes that Turkey would not want to interfere through Armenian territories in the armed conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, by taking this into consideration, determines and conducts its policy towards Azerbaijan. This situation, “the Russian

umbrella” forms a basis for Armenia’s uncompromising and sometimes violent policies towards Turkey. In short, Armenia does not steer clear of Turkey in the military field due to “the Russian umbrella”.

- b. Armenia’s borders with its other two neighbors (Georgia and Azerbaijan) are not protected by Russia.

Although this is the actual situation, Armenian politicians, from time to time, make statements meaning as if a treaty or at least an agreement has been reached for Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan to be protected by Russian forces. This situation was especially observed in 2010 during the extension of the Russian military presence in Armenia.

The duration of the agreement Armenia signed with Russia in 1995 concerning the establishment of a military base in Gyumri, which we mentioned above, is 25 years and will end in 2020. While there is almost ten years until it expires, the agreement was extended on 20 August 2010 for 24 years until 2044¹¹⁷. Therefore, it became clear that the only Russian military presence in the Southern Caucasus would continue at least until the middle of the century; in other words, that Russia never had the intention to abandon the Southern Caucasus.

As for what this agreement brought in for Armenia, news were published in the press that the Gyumri base, together with the Armenian armed forces, would also provide security to Armenia and moreover, that Russia accepted to provide modern and suitable arms and special military equipment to Armenia¹¹⁸. Furthermore, President Sarkisian, in the press conference held with President Medvedev on the day of the signing of the agreement, said “The Protocol not only stipulates prolonged presence of the Russian military base in Armenia but also expands the scope of its geographical and strategic responsibilities. Until now, the actions of the base were limited by the state borders of the former USSR; at present that limitation has been removed from the text of the Agreement. The Russian side has assumed responsibility to jointly provide for the safety of the Republic of Armenia and assist our Armed Forces in augmenting their arsenal with modern weaponry”¹¹⁹. This has confirmed the news in the press. However, Medvedev has not referred to this issue.

A short while after this visit, President Medvedev had conducted an official visit to Baku in early September 2010 in order to maintain a balance between

117 Detailed information on this issue could be found in *Ermeni Araştırmaları* No:36. (2010). pp.74-82

118 “Russia-Armenian Defense Pact Will Avert New War in Karabakh” *Armenianliberty.org*, ve *RFE/RL* 17 August 2010.

119 <http://www.president.am/events/press/eng/?id=54>

Armenia and Azerbaijan. Right before this visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an interview delivered to an Azerbaijani newspaper¹²⁰, has referred to the Russian base in Armenia and said that the protocol signed with Armenia on 20 August extended the presence of Russian military base in Armenia and nothing more, that it did not change either the function of the base or the number of the servicemen at that base or the number of the arms, that the main purpose of the base was to ensure the interests of the Russian Federation, that these interests included maintaining stability in the South Caucasus and Caspian region, and that this goal did not change with the extension of the agreement¹²¹. During his visit, President Medvedev also talked in the same manner and put forth that the protocol signed did not constitute a threat to Azerbaijan's security¹²².

In conclusion, no written promise of Russia that it will protect Armenia against Azerbaijan or any other country exists. Armenia asserts that, with the agreement of 20 August 2010 that extends the term of the Gyumri base, Russia has assumed the responsibility of providing security to Armenia and moreover, that it has accepted to provide modern weapons to the Armenian army, while Russian officials prefer to remain silent on this issue.

Another possibility concerning this issue is that an agreement not revealed to the public has been concluded between Russia and Armenia. This is possible, but article 102 of the United Nations Charter is the directive that every international agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat. Since agreements not registered cannot be brought forward before any organ of the United Nations, it is assumed that Russia will not appeal to this method that is considered as null in international law and is not acknowledged among the public due to the problems created by the "secret" treaties of the First and Second World Wars. On the other hand, the emergence of a secret defense agreement made with Armenia, which certainly will emerge, would damage Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Therefore, while Russia wins Armenia, it will lose the wealthy Azerbaijan and this not a usual manner in the Russian diplomacy. However, the situation is different in multilateral relations.

Armenia is a party to the Treaty on Collective Security founded by the Russian Federation in particular and some Republics disintegrating from the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the Russian Federation). It is also a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) created by these countries.

120 "Russian FM Sergey Lavrov on Essence of St. Petersburg Proposals on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Major Goal of Russian Military Base in Armenia" *Today Azerbaijan*, 29 August 2010.

121 Ibid.

122 "Dimitri Medvedev rassure l'Azerbaïdjan sur l'Accord arméno-russe" *Armenews*, 3 September 2010.

Article 4 of the Treaty on Collective Security relates to the attacks that could be carried out against the member states. According to this article, in case an act of aggression is committed against any of the Member States, rest of the Members States will provide it with necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter¹²³. According to this, if Armenia faces an attack, it can receive military assistance from the Member States to the Collective Security Treaty. While this is the case, this assistance is not self-driven. In other words, in the case of an attack against Armenia (or another Member State), military assistance will not be provided immediately, and the Member States must make an unanimous decision unanimously. Under current conditions, it is difficult to suppose that the CSTO will allow Muslim countries to use military force against Azerbaijan. In fact, President Sarkisian has indirectly referred to this situation. In his speech delivered at the CSTO Council meeting on 23 September 2013 in the city of Sochi in Russia¹²⁴, the Armenian President has said that in their documents-including the Moscow Declaration adopted last December- the importance of the exclusively peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict through the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group based on the UN Charter, the principles and norms of international law-particularly those pertinent to the non-use of force or threat to use force-, equality and right of people for self-determination and territorial integrity of the states were stressed, but that contrary to the spirit of the decisions were adopted, some of the member states in other settings and in other organizations on the same issue adopted declarations which disagree with the decisions adopted in the framework of the CSTO. He has also indicated that many countries have their own interests related to Azerbaijan, however that the adoption of the documents which are based on the interest-inspired relations is unacceptable for Armenia when they run against the interests of the CSTO.

123 The text of this article is as follows: “In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the Member States all the others Members States will provide it with necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter” .

Without changing its essence, the following amendment has been made to the article in 2010: If one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States as aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to all the Member States of this Treaty.

In case of aggression commission (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to any of the Member States, all the other Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defence pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Member States shall immediately inform the United Nations Security Council on the measures taken on the basis of this article. When implementing these measures, the Member States shall adhere to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.

124 <http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/09/23/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-participated-at-the-session-of-the-CSTO-Collective-Security-Council/>

Although President Sarkisian has not explained in his speech which countries “some of the member states” are, it is without doubt that these are the CSTO’s Muslim countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These countries have accepted the unanimously reached decisions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation which embrace Azerbaijan’s views on Karabakh. Furthermore, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have adopted a declaration at the Turkic Speaking States Summit held in Azerbaijan’s city of Qabala on 16 August 2013 which envisaged the settlement of Karabakh within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders¹²⁵.

Most of the military forces under the command of the CSTO are Russian forces. However, it is not possible for Russia to provide military assistance to another Member State on its own based on article 4 of the CST, because this article states that military and other kinds of assistance could only be made collectively.

Another point on this issue that should not be ignored is the following: if the Karabakh issue turns into an armed conflict, legally, this might not entail an attack against Armenia. No one doubts that the seven “rayons” surrounding Karabakh which are currently still under Armenian occupation belong to Azerbaijan. Therefore, a military operation conducted by Azerbaijan with the purpose of rescuing these areas from Armenian occupation would not entail an attack against Armenia, thus not requiring the CSTO’s intervention.

A similar situation exists in Karabakh. According to the international law, this area is part of Azerbaijan. Therefore, a military operation to get these territories back will not mean that an attack has been carried out against Armenia. We examined above that although legally this is the situation, commander of the Russian military base in Gyumri Captain Ruzinsky had issued an opposite statement and that later on, a Russian general had said that the CSTO has no connection to Karabakh.

On the other hand, Armenia does not argue that this region is in their territory and that it is an independent region, or at least a state. But, as this region - which is unable to fight against Azerbaijan although it has armed in its own way- is not internationally recognized, it is unable to conclude a defense agreement with another state except with Armenia or cannot ensure its defense within an organization like the CSTO.

Another factor regarding this issue is how much Russia can be trusted. Despite close relations and even the military alliance it has with Armenia, Russia has been selling arms to Azerbaijan all along. The final sale took place in June

125 “Armenia Slams Turkic Allies Over Pro-Azeri Statement” *RFE/RL*, 23 September 2013.

2013 and was worth 1 billion dollars¹²⁶. Russia has been selling arms to Azerbaijan for years. These sales are worth 5% of total arms sales and among the former Soviet Union countries, the biggest arms sale is made to Armenia in order to maintain the military balance in the Southern Caucasus¹²⁷. Since there is no doubt that these arms will first be used against Armenia when necessary, arms sales is to the detriment of Armenia. However, with the appeal of winning dollars, Russia does not abstain from making these sales. Excuses that this final sale was directed towards keeping military parity in the Southern Caucasus¹²⁸ or that this sale did not breach military parity¹²⁹ have been brought forth. What is interesting is that statements were received from Armenia that defended Russia and tried to underestimate the importance of this sale. For instance, Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council Arthur Baghdasaryan has said that Armenia is equipped with superior arms than Azerbaijan¹³⁰, whereas Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan, in a rush to defend Russia, has said that military-technical cooperation with Russia is on a high level and that Armenia retains the balance in the region in qualitative terms¹³¹. The final sale worth one billion dollars constitute modern weapons of 90 tanks, 100 armored personal carriers, motorized guns and rocket launchers. Azerbaijan has increased its defense budget, which was worth 163 million dollars in 2003, currently to 3.7 billion dollars. This amount exceeds Armenia's entire state budget¹³². In this situation, it is difficult to believe that Armenia maintains parity. The military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan can only be achieved if the Russian forces in Armenia are also included to the Armenian forces. If this is the situation, it means that it has already been decided for Russian and Armenian forces to act together against Azerbaijan and this situation is unacceptable for Azerbaijan. Events have shown that Russia prioritizes its financial interests regarding arms sales. But, since it is difficult for Armenia to obtain weapons other than from Russia, the country necessarily is dependent in this area on Russia.

It is possible to draw the following conclusions from what we have explained so far:

- a. Russian forces deployed in Armenia will protect Armenia against any attacks by Turkey and/or Iran.

126 "Armenia Unfazed by Reported Russian Arms Supplies to Azerbaijan" *RFE/RL*, 19 June 2013.

127 "Vladimir Yevseyev: "Only Two States in the CIS Can Afford Russian Arms" *Vestnik Kavkaza*, 23 July 2013.

128 "N. Bordyuzha: Russia Sold Arms to Azerbaijan to Keep military parity in South Caucasus" *Arminfo*, 26 June 2013.

129 "Armenian-Azeri Parity not Breached" by Russian Arms Supplies" *RFE/RL*, 26 June 2013.

130 "Armenia Equipped with Superior Arms than Azerbaijan" *Armenpress*, 27 June 2013.

131 "Seyran Ohanyan About Arms Race: The situation is Under Control" *Medimax*, 26 June 2013.

132 "Defense Chief Dismisses Azeri Buildup" *RFE/RL*, 28 June 2013.

- b. It is not clear whether Russia has made any promise that it will bilaterally safeguard Armenia. Normally, as Russia assuming such liability will very much negatively affect relations with Azerbaijan, this does not seem reasonable.
- c. It is difficult and almost impossible for the CSTO to take a decision to safeguard Armenia with the rule of unanimity.
- d. If a military intervention is made to the seven Azerbaijani rayons and/or to Karabakh, it will not be considered as an attack made towards Armenia and will not require the CSTO's intervention.

As can be seen, if clashes start again, assistance will or will not be provided to Armenia according to the place or places the clashes occur and the conjuncture dominant at that point. Therefore, it is not possible to say that agreements with Russia or being a CSTO member will certainly provide security to Armenia.

There is another way for security to be provided: Resolving a disagreement that threatens security. It is without doubt that Armenia has occupied the territories belonging to Azerbaijan. No state recognizes Karabakh. Therefore, the likelihood of settling this conflict by accepting Armenia's views does not exist. In this situation, withdrawing from the seven occupied Azerbaijani rayons, bringing an end to this conflict by determining a status for Karabakh within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and this way, not only ensuring its own security, but also starting a period of peace and cooperation in the Southern Caucasus seems as the most reasonable approach.

As can be seen, if clashes start again, assistance will or will not be provided to Armenia according to the place or places the clashes occur and the conjuncture dominant at that point. Therefore, it is not possible to say that agreements with Russia or being a CSTO member will certainly provide security to Armenia.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT GENOCIDE ALLEGATIONS IN SOME COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

In the last volumes of our journal, very important developments about genocide allegations that were occurred in the countries such as USA and France were covered in detail, and due to the lack of space, other developments in other countries could not been addressed. Yet there have been also important developments on the issue of genocide allegations in other countries. In this issue of our journal, the developments about genocide

allegations in question in the countries and some of establishments being discussed will be covered.

Our article is divided into two parts. First part which is titled as “Some of Countries” includes 21 countries. They are alphabetically like the following: 1. Germany, 2. Australia, 3. Austria, 4. Belarus, 5. Bulgaria, 6. the Czech Republic, 7. Denmark, 8. Armenia, 9. Georgia, 10. England, 11. Spain, 12. Israel, 13. Sweden, 14. Italy, 15. Canada, 16. Hungary, 17. Portugal, 18. Slovakia, 19. Ukraine, 20. Uruguay, 21. Vatican

Three organizations are examined in the second part titled as “International Establishments”.

European Union, 2. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 3. The Council of Europe

A. Some Countries

1. Germany

Following the US, Germany is the second important country that the Armenian Diaspora attaches importance on the issue of genocide allegations. There exists a view that this powerful country of Europe, in case it recognizes the genocide allegations by Armenia, would force Turkey to recognize the allegations and this will provide Armenia a convenient ground to fulfill its demands. However, this is just an assumption. Events show that although there is a tendency to recognize the genocide allegations in Germany, German Government does not have an intention to force Turkey in this respect; if she forced Turkey, Turkey would absolutely not accept that position and, in the end, relations between these two countries would be harmed. The German Government surely is aware of this and thus, keeps its distance from the Armenian demands.

As mentioned above, the German public recognizes the alleged Armenian genocide. However, this issue is on the very bottom of the list. There are some reasons behind it. Firstly, except some of the leftist groups, the issue of genocide is not issue that is generally desired to be talked about in the German public for obvious reasons. The Armenian Diaspora in Germany is composed mostly of 1960s’ migrants from Turkey and their number is about 30.000. It would not be very true to claim that they all are interested in the genocide allegations. Although there are some Armenian foundations trying to spread these allegations throughout Germany, they are not very influential due to the

existence of a Turkish population of 2.5 million and to reluctance by the majority of German politician. However, as we will see below, they also do not lag behind doing demonstrations or making demands.

After it was accepted that Turkey would be an EU member in the case of fulfilling certain conditions, some EU countries started issuing decisions on the recognition of Armenian Genocide allegations. At the time, this issue was discussed frequently in the German Parliament and in the end; a text accepted by the Christian Democrats and Socialists was adopted without a discussion on June 15, 2005. The significance of this text was the fact that it did not include a definition of genocide for the 1915 events, although the text was very long and included comments and views on 1915 emigration of Armenians. This issue was avoided with a formula of stating “Many independent historians, some countries’ parliaments, and international organizations name 1915 events as genocide.” This formula made neither Armenians nor Turks happy. While Turkey severely criticized this decision¹³³, it continued to maintain its normal relationship with Germany. On the other hand, Armenian Government avoided this matter. Armenian militants in Germany criticized this decision and they could not make any results although they made some attempts for the recognition of 1915 events as genocide.

There is not much room to analyze all of the mentioned attempts. Therefore, we will be mentioning just some of them.

Aiming to communicate with electorates directly, German Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated a process through which the electorates could submit laws they wished Germany to pass through the internet. Among proposals sent by the electorates, there was a law suggesting that those who deny Armenian and Syrian Genocide allegations should be charged, and this proposal was ranked first with 157.000 signatures among the proposals made on the internet¹³⁴. In a meeting with some of the proposers, Merkel refused this suggestion indicating that this could damage relations with Turkey, a great partner in commerce,

Previously, Prof. Tessa Hofmann, who has been a great defender of Armenian Genocide allegations in the last thirty years in Germany, failed in a request she proposed to Bundestag about having consultations on charging those who deny Armenian Genocide¹³⁵.

133 For the mentioned decision of Germany see Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue 16-17, pp. 66-73.

134 “German propose Passing of Bill that considers Armenian Genocide’s Denial Unlawful” *News.am*, July 7, 2012.

135 “Bundestag to Consider Petition on Criminalization of Genocide Denial” *ParArmenian.Net*, February 27, 2012.

Considering these developments, it is understood that the German Government and majority of Bundestag were not willing to support the attempts that legally go beyond the decision of on the Armenian issue. Although Chancellor Merkel linked this with its trade relations with Turkey, it is doubtless that she considered the strategical importance of Turkey and the position of 2.5 million Turks living in Germany.

Moreover, in Germany any kind of demonstration can be done about Armenian Genocide allegations within the context of freedom of speech. As a matter of fact, official authorities can support these. For instance, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed a project titled “Adult Education and Oral History Contributing to Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation”¹³⁶. A book published in Turkish, Armenian, and English on this project, that included several interviews, were published¹³⁷. The significance of this is that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened in the issue of “pacification and reconciliation” which is Turkey’s and Armenia’s business, and that Germany financed a project which featured the Armenian Genocide allegations. What is interesting is that so few people were informed in Turkey about the project and the book that, the project and the book did no contribution to the reconciliation of the two countries and/or the two societies. Furthermore, nowadays Turkish-Armenian relations are much worse than it was in 2010.

A development that was much more significant was surely the opening of the House of Lepsius in Berlin. Johannes Lepsius (1858-1926) was a Protestant priest and an evangelist. He spent a part of his life in Ottoman Empire and was interested in especially Armenians there, and wrote a book on this matter. Lepsius tried to turn the German public opinion to Armenians’ advantage and gave importance to the propaganda as Ambassador Henry Morgenthau did for the American public opinion.

Among the works of Lepsius, his book titled “Deutschland und Armenian 1914-1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke (Germany and Armenia 1914-1918: An Anthology of Diplomatic Documents)” was specifically criticized.

Lepsius, with permission to work on German diplomatic documents of World War I, published this book after “cleaning up” the documents to the advantage of Armenians, and editing them to acquit Germany with regard to the 1915 events. The distortions by Lepsius were discovered later on and, in the last

136 Muriel Mirak-Weissbach, “Can Germany Mediate Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation” *Center for Research on Globalization*, October 31, 2011.

137 These discussions were published under the title of “Speaking to One Another: Personal Memory Explanations in Turkey and Armenia”. http://speakingtooneanother.org/assets/uploaded/Birbirimizle_Konusmak.pdf-2010.12.13.pdf

years, he was written about by scholars that have a different political orientation in the matter¹³⁸. Moreover, Lepsius was known by his extreme rightist views. However, he could not have the chance to serve for Nazi Germany since he died in 1926.

Lepsius has always been safeguarded by German Protestant Church of which he was a member. The church and some German politicians who can be considered as rightists have tried to add to his reputation since 1980s by highlighting his cloth and his works in this area without mentioning his distortions and his orientation as an extreme rightist. In this context, the idea of collecting Lepsius' documents in his home in Potsdam near Berlin, which he had lived in until his death, and turning the house into a library and research center was brought forward. However, counterviews by Turkey, a part of Turkish community in Germany, and the German Leftist Party's prevented this project to come true¹³⁹. After Bundestag adopted the decision mentioned above in 2005, German Government gave the green light for this project.

The house was opened on May 3, 2011 with a ceremony with the attendances of Representative of the Federal Government for Culture Bernd Neumann from CDU Party, Armenian Ambassador Armen Martirosyan, officials from the Protestant church, and members of the "the House of Lepsius Organization". The president of the organization, Peter Leinemann, said that Lepsius House included an exhibition of the Armenian culture, history, and 1915 genocide, and, besides a conference hall and a library. He also stated that life of Lepsius and his family were also represented in this house. In that sense, it is understood that the Lepsius House is a ground rather to introduce Armenian views in the context of 1915 events. Moreover, Leinemann clearly said that the house represented the Armenian Genocide¹⁴⁰.

On the other hand, Representative of Culture, Neumann, stated that Lepsius House would be a place of union for the Turkish and Armenian cultures¹⁴¹ - although he did so with the intention of ease possible reactions by Turkey and the Turks in Germany-, while Leinemann stated that the house would serve for improvement of the relations between Turkey, Armenia, and Germany¹⁴².

138 Cem Özgönül's book "*Der Mythos eines Völkermordes. Eine kritische Betrachtung der Lepsiusdokumente sowie der deutschen Rolle in Geschichte und Gegenwart*" (2006) (Genocide Legend. A critical view of Lepsius documents and the role of German in history and today) which stresses the alterations Lepsius did on behalf of both Armenians and Germans and one of German writers who defend the genocide allegations Wolfgang Gust's book "*Der Völkermord an den Armenien 1915/16. Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes*" (2005) (Armenian Genocide 1915/16. Documents from German Foreign Ministry Political Archive) which stresses the alterations of Lepsius rather to justify Germany can be concerned in this issue.

139 "Turks destroyed Armenian Memorial, we have built it." *Ntvmsnbc* <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25209213/>, May 3, 2011.

140 "La Maison Lepsius Inauguré en Allemagne" *Armenews.com.*, May 8, 2011.

141 "Turks destroyed Armenian Memorial, we have built it." *Ntvmsnbc* <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25209213/>, May 3, 2011.

142 "La Maison Lepsius Inauguré en Allemagne" *Armenews.com.*, May 8, 2011.

However, the main reason behind the fact that Turkey and Armenia can not establish good relations is the genocide allegations.

Although there is a tendency in Germany not to be included in Armenian Genocide allegations, it can also be seen that when it is compelled, it acts in accordance with those allegations. One example was observed during a meeting conducted by the private organization Hamburg Turkish Society Youth, titled “Armenian Tragedy in Ottoman Period” early April 2012. A hall was requested from Hamburg University for a speech by the well-known historian Prof. Norman Stone to be held in, and the hall was permitted to be used. However, the permission was cancelled after the Armenian Community in Germany had written a letter to the University President Prof. Dieter Lenzen and accused Prof. Stone of denying the allegations¹⁴³.

Although there is a tendency in Germany not to be included in Armenian Genocide allegations, it can also be seen that when it is compelled, it acts in accordance with those allegations.

Lastly, it should be stated that the German politicians visit the Genocide Monument and stand for a moment of silence during their visits to Armenia. Among those who visited the monument, there are German Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, Minister of State Cornelia Pieper, Vice-President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, and President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert.

2. Australia

Australia is a community which was formed as a result of migration of various nations to the continent. Among these nations-although they are few in number- there are Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Assyrians that migrated in the last years of Ottoman Empire and there are also Turks who settled after 1960s. According to the statistics of Australia¹⁴⁴, population of Turks was 59.404 in 2006. With the addition of Turkish Cypriots, this number is to be over 61.000. The number of Syrians and Assyrians are 24.505, while Armenians amount to 15.791. The number of Greeks is indicated as 365.145. It would be correct to add most of the Cypriots, which is stated as much as 10.719, to this number.

143 “Armenian Tension in Germany” *Haberx.com*, April 16, 2012.

144 “20680-Ancestry (full classification list) by Sex – Australia” Australian Bureau of Statistics, Data of 2006 Census [http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/ABSNavigation/prenav/ViewData?breadcrumb=POLTLD&method=Place%20of%20Usual%20Residence&subaction=-1&issue=2006&producttype=Census%20Tables&documentproductno=0&textversion=false&documenttype=Details&collection=Census&javascript=true&topic=Ancestry&action=404&productlabel=Ancestry%20\(full%20classification%20list\)%20by%20Sex&order=1&period=2006&tabname=Details&arcacode=0&navmapdisplayed=true&](http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/ABSNavigation/prenav/ViewData?breadcrumb=POLTLD&method=Place%20of%20Usual%20Residence&subaction=-1&issue=2006&producttype=Census%20Tables&documentproductno=0&textversion=false&documenttype=Details&collection=Census&javascript=true&topic=Ancestry&action=404&productlabel=Ancestry%20(full%20classification%20list)%20by%20Sex&order=1&period=2006&tabname=Details&arcacode=0&navmapdisplayed=true&)

There is a clear tendency among Greeks, Armenians and Syrians to keep alive the memories of the experiences they had during or after the Ottoman era which actually which caused them to migrate. Although it can be considered normal in one hand; on the other hand, supposing that it is exaggerated, this indicates a pursuit of national identity which, in turn, leads us to observe that they take their identity, which they acquired in their new homeland, for insufficient. Besides, it is also seen that majority of these groups have become Australian at large and they do not attach importance to “the old stories”. However, the number of those who do not leave behind the recent history and are still looking for a kind of “revenge” is not few.

Like it is in the rest of the world, the most radical one among these groups is Armenians. Although politically motivated violence has been rare in Australia, Turkey’s Consul General Şark Arıyak and his bodyguard Engin Sever were assassinated in Sydney on December 17, 1980. Justice Commandos took responsibility for the assassination and the perpetrators could not be found. It is possible that the perpetrators were from the Armenian Community in Australia or that, even if they were from another country, they were assisted by the Armenians in Sydney and left the country afterwards.

It has been an encouragement to put genocide allegations forward that Armenians were not condemned clearly in the Australian public for the assassination.

In addition to the erection of some monuments to the 1915 events, the motion passed by the Parliament of New South Wales in 1997 was first of its kind as a decision on the alleged. . The motion condemned attempts to deny or distort the Armenian Genocide and all other acts of genocide. It was stated in the motion that in New South Wales, 24 April was designated throughout New South Wales as a day of remembrance of the 1.5 million Armenians who fell victim to the first genocide of this century and requested the Commonwealth Government to recognize this day.¹⁴⁵.

145 For the full version of this text see “Armenian Genocide Commemoration” Parliament of New South Wales Full Day Hansard Transcript <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LA19970417004>



The second motion was adopted in about ten in another state by the Parliament of South Australian in April 30, 2009. With this motion, it was claimed that not only Armenians but also Greeks (Pontic), Syrians and other communities of “Minor Asia” had been subjected to genocide and these “genocide” acts were condemned. Moreover, the Parliament of Australia was requested to recognize these genocides. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this decision and considered it as an irresponsible act, stated that they sadly witnessed the obedience of Australian local politicians to the pressures by the Armenian and Greek lobbies, that Turkey had suggested an Impartial Historical Commission to be to be established for a decision to be made about the events in the past, and the mentioned motion by the Parliament was contradicting with the existence of strong feelings friendship between Turkish and Australian societies. On the other hand, by calling on the Australian Ambassador in Ankara, it was highlighted that this kind of events might damage the relationship between Turkey and Australia. The Ambassador stated that the Commonwealth Government did not have an intention to adopt this motion and be involved in these matters¹⁴⁶. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the Commonwealth Government does not have an authority to interfere in the decisions taken by the State Parliaments.

146 For detailed information about this issue see Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments” *Ermeni Araştırmaları* No: 32, pp. 48-50.

While the Australian Commonwealth Government, taking into consideration the good relations with Turkey, avoids to adopt the claims by Armenians or other communities that are against Turkey or support it in any way, it is seen that it does not use the term “genocide”, an additionally that it supports the proposal with regard to the “Historical Commission”, that this stance caused the objection of the militant Armenians and that a campaign war launched to submit petitions in this matter.¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, it is also observed that State politicians change their stance when they take office on Federal level. For instance, Armenians were very pleased when Bob Carr, the then Premier of a state, who was considered to be helpful in the adoption of the decision in 1997 by which the New South Wales Assembly recognized the genocide allegations and additionally inputting up a statue of Armenian Genocide in the garden of the State Parliament, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Commonwealth Government. This assignment was seen as a step that brought Australia a step closer to recognizing the Armenian genocide¹⁴⁸. However, in less than a year, Bob Carr’s attitude toward the Armenian issue in his new position started to be a subject of complaint. His depiction of the Armenian issue as a historical dispute in a statement and his expressions that the Australian Government would not take a stance on this issue were condemned with a huge disappointment by Dashnak prone Armenian National Committee (ANC) which is the primary Armenian political organization in Australia¹⁴⁹.

Although there are some groups in the Australian Parliament who recognize the alleged Armenian genocide in, they are not sufficient to have a decision adopted.

An increase in the demonstrations in support of the allegations that Armenians and other Ottoman Christian minorities were subjected to genocide and of the Armenian views on the issue of Karabakh has been observed since 2002. While the reason of this is not very clear, it might be because of the fact that the 100th anniversary of 1915 is coming up.

On May 20, 2012, the opening of a statue for Syrian, Pontic Greek and Armenian victims of genocides in the city Salisbury in the state of South Australia took place. In that ceremony, there were prominent people from these three communities, clerics from three churches, and some state representatives. In the speeches made in the ceremony, Australian Federal

147 “L’Australie Change de Position”*Armenpress*, April 6, 2010.

148 “Newly Appointed Australian Foreign Minister Recognizes Armenian Genocide”*Armenpress*, March 4, 2012.

149 “ANC Australia Condemns Foreign Minister Bob Carr For Calling the Armenian Genocide a “Historical Dispute”*Armenpress*, February 25, 2013.

Government was called on to condemn the heinous acts committed against the Christians of Anatolia and to pressure Turkey to acknowledge and apologize for the atrocities committed¹⁵⁰.

In a decision adopted on October 25, 2012, the Parliament of New South Wales stated that it “recognized the right to self-determination of all peoples including those of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and called on the Commonwealth Government to officially recognize the independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh¹⁵¹.”

This decision is quite surprising. First of all, it was taken by unanimity. It is very rare that a decision is taken unanimously on a case that barely concerns Australia, that is not in the scope of authority of a state parliament, and that is not supported by any country except Armenia. This shows us the influence of Armenian minority in the Parliament of New South Wales.

The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian said that this decision would open the way to the international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh¹⁵². The interesting point here is that while Armenia argues for the independence of Upper Karabakh, it does not officially recognize it itself. The main reason behind this is that the recognition would lead Azerbaijan to withdraw from the Minsk Group, would cause the tension increase, and maybe would trigger armed conflicts again.

It was also covered in the press that Azerbaijan had sent a diplomatic note to Australia, and that, in return, the Australian Government stated that, in accordance with the international community’s stance, it did not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country and did support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan¹⁵³.

Another motion adopted by the Parliament of New South Wales on unanimity on May 1, 2013 increased the tension between the parliament and the Turkish society in Australia and additionally caused Turkey to react (This decision was also adopted in the secondary parliament of the New South Wales).

In the mentioned decision, to sum up, it is stated that whereas the parliament had passed a motion in 1997 recognizing and condemning the Armenian Genocide, it recognized that Assyrians and Greeks (Pontic Rums) were

150 “Assyrian, Greek, Armenian Genocide Monument Unveiled in South Austria” *Aina.org/news*, May 25, 2012.

151 “Australia New South Wales Recognize Karabakh Independence” *Asbarez*, October 25, 2012.

152 “Foreign Minister of Armenia: The Resolution Passed by Australia’s New South Wales State to Pave the Way to the International Recognition of Nagorny Karabakh” *Arminfo*, October 26, 2012.

153 “Reactions to recognition of Karabağ have been increasing in Australia” *Haberimport.com*, November 20, 2012.

subjected to qualitatively similar genocides by the Ottoman Government between 1914-1923. The parliament condemned the genocides of the Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks, and, lastly, called on the Federal Government to condemn these genocides.

Despite the efforts by the Turkish Embassy in Australia and the Turkish Consul General in Sidney to give information about the historical events and their emphasis on the inaccuracy of the characterization of these events as genocides; South Wales Parliament's insistence almost intentionally in its views caused Ankara to react. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a press release numbered 133 on May 7, 2013, briefly stated that it severely condemned and rejected this decision which was in not way compatible with historic facts and that while the existing friendly relations existing between the peoples of Turkey and Australia would not deteriorate because of this unilateral decision, its negative repercussions were nonetheless inevitable. Additionally, following the statement that proponents of such initiatives would deprived of the hospitality and friendship that are never withhold from the people of Australia, the statement continued:

Shortly, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that those who had prepared this motion and accepted it in the local parliament would not be invited to the great memorial ceremony of the 100th anniversary of Çanakkale Wars.

“These persons who try to damage the spirit of Çanakkale/Gallipoli will also not have their place in the Çanakkale ceremonies where we commemorate together our sons lying side by side in our soil.”

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Considering its importance, the full text of this declaration is given below:

No: 133, 7 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Motion Passed by the Legislative Council of the Parliament of the State of New South Wales in Australia

The Legislative Council of the Parliament of the State of New South Wales in Australia passed on 1 May 2013 a motion entitled “Assyrian, Armenian and Greek genocides”.

We strongly condemn and reject this motion which is in no way compatible with historic facts. The fact that this motion has been passed

through a fait accompli by a local politician, whose antagonism to Turkey in his attitude and behavior is well-known, during a session at the State Parliament attended by a small number of parliamentarians, shows how lightly and unsoundly such a sensitive issue is dealt with. It is evident that history will not be rewritten by such motions passed with petty political calculations under the influence of ethnic lobbies known for their excesses and prejudices.

Although the solid friendly relations existing between the peoples of Turkey and Australia will not deteriorate because of this unilateral decision which is the fait accompli of a small group, its negative repercussions are nonetheless inevitable. In this context, the proponents of such initiatives aimed at dealing a blow to the very special relations that exist between our peoples will doubtlessly be deprived of the hospitality and friendship that we will never withhold from the people of Australia. These persons who try to damage the spirit of Çanakkale/Gallipoli will also not have their place in the Çanakkale ceremonies where we commemorate together our sons lying side by side in our soil.

Necessary representations with Australian authorities have been made, stressing that our primary expectation from the Australian authorities for the sake of our relations that have developed so far on the basis of friendship, is that they be more attentive to unacceptable claims directed towards Turkey and the Turkish identity and that they take timely action against initiatives carrying anti-Turkish content and hate-speech.

The Battle of Çanakkale has a different meaning for Australia (New Zealand) in that it emphasizes the revival of their national identities. This is why these wars are very important both for historic reasons and the present domestic policies. Every year, many Australians and New Zealanders visit Turkey to commemorate the Battle of Çanakkale. It would offend some that they won't be able to make that visit in the 100th anniversary of these wars. However, New South Wales Parliament's support for the Armenian views on the Armenian issue and the issue of Karabakh without reservation has obligated Turkey to take this precaution, although Turkey has been obviously very sensitive about Armenian Genocide allegations since Consul General Şarik Arıyak in Sidney was assassinated in 1980.

The impacts of Turkey's this decision have already started to be felt. Fred Nile who introduced the decision dated May 2013 to the Parliament of New South Wales tried to soften the situation by stating that their aim was not to denigrate Turkey, and the mentioned genocides (Armenian, Assyrian, and Pontic Greek)

were committed not by the Republic of Turkey which has great relations with Australia but by the Ottoman Empire¹⁵⁴.

Vache Kahramanian, the President of Armenian National Committee of Australia (Australian Dashnak Committee) aggravated the situation when he stated that the press release by the Turkish Foreign Ministry meant that the members of the parliament of the New South Wales wouldn't be able to enter Turkey, and even if they did, they would not be treated hospitably¹⁵⁵ However, as it is mentioned in the press release by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, there were very few parliamentarians who attended the meetings in the Assembly. Therefore, the number of those who are not welcomed in Turkey would relatively be small.

The last point we would like to emphasize is that the mentioned decision taken by the parliament of New South Wales created solidarity among various communities with Turkish origins in Australia. A group of almost 2.000 people coming from Turkey, Azerbaijan, North Cyprus, and Central Asia Turkic Republic held a protest and made slogans such as "Leave history to historians", and "the parliament is not a court to judge." in front of the parliament building on June 18, 2013.¹⁵⁶

3. Austria

During his visit to Yerevan in July, 2012, Heinz Fischer, the President of Austria-a country that can be considered as one of the small countries in Europe- visited the Genocide Memorial, and stood for a moment of silence¹⁵⁷. It is hard to find an appropriate explanation for Fischer's attitude¹⁵⁸ who had said that the Austrian Parliament had not recognized the alleged Armenian Genocide; that there had not been a particular movement in Austria in this regard, and who had said that he had sincere and perfect relations with President Gül, when he visited Turkey a week prior to his visit to Yerevan.

Relations between Turkey and Austria can be considered as good. However, extreme rightist movements, which are very strong in this country and sometimes influential on politics, cause some problems for Turks who mostly became Austrian citizens when they discriminate or try to have others discriminate the Turks. Ambassador Ecvet Tezcan's clear expressions of these

154 "Turkey's Criticism of Genocide Motion Rebuffed" *Aina.org/news*, June 3, 2013.

155 "Turkey Bans Australian Lawmakers From Gallipoli" *Panorama.am*, May 11, 2013.

156 "Turkish Communities in Australia Protest Genocide Recognition" *Aina.org/news*, June 18, 2013

157 "Le Président Autrichien Heinz Fischer a Visité le Musée du génocide arménien" *Armenews*, July 9, 2012.

158 "Austria President Heinz Fischer: Muslims have certain contributions to our country." *Zaman*, June 29, 2012.

problems and description of the facts in 2011¹⁵⁹ did not create a good impression and caused Fischer to postpone his visit to Turkey.

4. Belarus

The Parliament of Belarus has also not taken a decision as to recognize of the Armenian Genocide allegations.. However, the relations between Armenia and Belarus are at a good level as both countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which is a military organization. This explains why, President Alexander Lukashenko, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Martynov visited the Genocide Memorial and placed a wreath before the memorial on May 15, 2013 and in April, 2012, respectively.

On the other hand, there is also press coverage on the attempts by the Vice-President of the Armenian National Assembly Eduard Sharmazanov to erect an Armenian *khachkar* (cross-stone) in the Hero-Fortress memorial in the Brest province in Belarus¹⁶⁰.

5. Bulgaria

Bulgaria is a very active country with regard to the issue of recognition of genocide allegations. This is firstly because of the hostility against Turks and Turkey, which is common in Bulgaria. Secondly, it is because of the Armenians who migrated to this country after the 1915 events, who currently amount to about 30,000 and of which almost all nourish hatred for Turks and Turkey.

Bulgarians' hostility towards Turkey stems from its history. The most important issue in domestic politics for the Bulgarian Principality (Kingdom after 1909)- which was founded in 1878 after the Ottoman Empire won the "93 War" against Russia, and, which was dependent on the Ottoman Empire in appearance but acted independently of the Empire, and, firstly was under Russia's control, then Austria-Hungary's, and lastly the German Empire's- was to establish a Bulgarian Nation. Indeed, prior to 1878, nationalist views were not common- excluding a few intellectuals - in the country. Bulgarians' contribution to the "93 War" on the side of Russia was very limited. For the establishment of a Bulgarian nation, the following were promoted: the Bulgarian history, the necessity of the establishment of the "Great Bulgaria" which would have the same boundaries as in Byzantine times, the panslav

159 "Recall your delegate, otherwise I am not going to come" *Hürriyet*, April 4, 2011.

160 "Armenian cross-stone to be placed at Brest Fortress of Belarus" *News.am*. 13 Temmuz 2013.

notions, and the hostility against Ottomans/Turks. Thus, in a very short period of time as twenty years, nationalism became the main political ideology in Bulgaria.. This ideology attributed Bulgaria's lagging behind other European countries to the Ottoman hegemony, besides, supported the desire to fight the Ottoman Empire as the "Great Bulgaria" included Carigrad (Istanbul), and established the political and psychological ground for the Turks -who were the very last in Bulgaria and constituted over 10% of total population- to be emigrated or assimilated.

Bulgarian Kingdom participated in the Balkan Wars, World War I and World War II with the intention of partially establishing the Great Bulgaria and was defeated in all of them. In the communist period (1946-1989) as the Soviet Union did not support it, the "Great Bulgaria" dream had to be given up; however, extreme nationalist notions continued to exist and, this time, it showed itself practically in the efforts to create one nation, in other words, in forcing all the non-Bulgarian ethnic societies to become Bulgarians by assimilation. But, as Turkey resisted, these efforts did not come to fruition towards the Turks, the biggest minority in Bulgaria.

After President Jivkov's being overthrown in 1989, extreme nationalism regressed in Bulgaria but it did not become marginal nor it came to power. The main scope of the extreme nationalists, which are organized through some political parties, has been to form opposition against Turks and Turkey. As Armenians in Bulgaria are also hostile against Turkey, an unwritten alliance between extreme nationalists and the Armenians in Bulgaria has been formed.

Armenians, with the support of the extreme nationalists, worked towards having the Bulgarian Parliament adopt a motion recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations. The information about the significant attempts on this matter was given in our previous issues¹⁶¹. These attempts, however were prevented by those Bulgarian Governments that attached importance to having good relations with Turkey. Therefore, having changed their tactics, while they have continued in their efforts to have the parliament take such a decision, they have started to work on passing decisions with the same character through city councils and were very successful at it.

It has been observed that some of these city councils that recognized the Armenian Genocide allegations have made efforts to establish relations with some cities in Turkey using the "twin town" procedure. Then this procedure in Turkey was suspended. According to the news reports, upon request by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, in an official

161 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue: 20-21, pp. 20-46-47; Issue: 25, pp. 24-25; Issue: 27-28, pp.35-36; Issue: 29, pp.15-17; Issue: 32, pp. 53-54.

letter in February, 2010, asked¹⁶² the municipalities of the 81 cities and 923 provinces to limit cooperations and visits, and to suspend the procedure of establishing “twin towns” with the municipality of Stara, Zagora, Rusçuk, Silistre, Gabrovo, Dobriç, Vrasta, Pazarçık, Varna, Şumnu and afterwards Burgaz, the municipalities that recognized 1915 events as genocide. In accordance with this official letter, the municipality of Tekirdağ suspended¹⁶³ its twin town relationship with Şumnu, and then put an end to some of its projects with Edirne Yanbol financed by the EU.. The municipality of Yanbol called off its decision recognizing the Armenian Genocide allegations¹⁶⁴. Consequently, it can be said that the decision of suspending the “twin towns”

As the Bulgarian Parliament did not recognize the Armenian Genocide allegations, the President of Bulgaria should have acted accordingly.

procedure and other relations has been successful in warning the municipalities in Bulgaria that did or was preparing to recognize the Armenian Genocide allegations.

On the other hand, attempts proposing Bulgarian National Assembly’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide allegations continued.

A suggestion, put forth by extreme rightist party ATAKA in the beginning of 2010, which proposed that Turkey should pay compensation to Bulgarians who had left Turkey during the Balkan Wars and that the 1915 events should be accepted as genocide was rejected with the reason that it could have a negative impact on the Bulgarian-Turkish relations.¹⁶⁵

After a while, the conservative Order, Law and Justice (OLJ) Party, proposing a draft notification in March, 2010, requested that it should be named genocide that the Armenians were forced to relocate in the Ottoman era, that the Bulgarian and Armenian architectural and religious heritage in Turkey should be maintained as a part of European civilization, and that Bulgarian government should determine¹⁶⁶ its stance towards Turkey’s EU membership in accordance with Turkey’s recognition of Armenian Genocide. However, this attempt also proved abortive.

As the Bulgarian Parliament did not recognize the Armenian Genocide allegations, the President of Bulgaria should have acted accordingly. However, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, during his visit to Armenia in April 2012, went

162 “When Bulgarians also attempt to announce Turks as Armenian Genocider...” *Nethaber*, March 28, 2010,

163 “Edirne Freezes Twinning Agreement with Yambol over “Armenian Genocide” *EMG.RS*, January 11, 2011.

164 “Yambol Municipal Council Cancels Declaration Recognizing Armenian Genocide” *Focus News*, October 26, 2012.

165 “Bulgarian Parliament Rejects Armenian Genocide Motion Not to Spoil Relations With Turkey” *PanArmenian.Net*, February 7, 2010.

166 “Bulgarian Party Submits Declaration For Parliament to Condemn Genocide” *Asharez*, March 18, 2010.

to the genocide memorial, stood for a moment of silence, and wrote in the guestbook: “A deep bow to the victims of this horrible tragedy. Such tragic events should never be forgotten.”¹⁶⁷

6. Czech Republic

According to the Armenian press, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, has passed a decision in February 7, 2013 that saw Khojaly events as racial cleaning and describes it as a “genocide”¹⁶⁸, the Czech parliament adopted this decision on 20 February¹⁶⁹. This incident has caused an exaggerated indignation in Armenia and there have been commentaries on the press that demanded the diplomatic relations with the Czech Republic to be cut off¹⁷⁰.

Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that they were not informed about the preparation of such a decision, that there has not been any alterations in the official position of the Czech Republic had not changed with regard to finding a peaceful solution to the Karabakh issue through workings of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-presidents, and that they pursued the policy of friendly and mutually advantageous relations both with Azerbaijan and Armenia¹⁷¹. Moreover, Czech Republic First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg, said in speech in the award ceremony of Azerbaijani human rights defender Intikam Aliev on 4 March 2013, that the West should not behave like an ostrich and hide its head in the sand against the human rights violations in Azerbaijan and that he would not apologize for the truth¹⁷².

Karel Schwarzenberg visited Armenia in April 10-12, 2013. In a press conference during his visit, he stated that it was not accurate that the resolution by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security, had been adopted by the whole parliament, that the Khojaly events cannot be compared to what happened to Armenians hundred years ago and that they are in different categories¹⁷³.

167 “Bulgarian PM Pays Tribute to Armenian Genocide Museum” *Novinite*, April 3, 2012.

168 “Jaromir Stetina Suggest Denouncing Resolution on Khojaly Presented by Czech MP” *Panorama.am*, February 19, 2013.

169 “Will Armenia Cut Diplomatic Ties With Czech?” *Lragir.am*, February 20, 2013.

170 *ibid.*

171 “Azerbaijani MFA Published Document Before Czech Parliament Made it Public: Czech Side is Unpleased” *Times.am*, February 21, 2013.

172 “Czech Foreign Minister Not Intended to Apologize to President İlham Aliev For Calling Him Dictator” *Panorama.am*, April 25, 2013.

173 “We Cannot Compare Khojaly Events With What Happened to Armenians Hundred Years Ago – Czech FM” *News.Am*, April 11, 2013.

Furthermore, after Schwarzenberg visited the Genocide Memorial and stood for a moment of silence, he wrote on the special guest book: “The centenary of all those horrors will be marked soon. This is not only your history, but the history of the whole humanity. These photos [in the museum] tell us the terrible truth about what a human being can do.”¹⁷⁴

These events mentioned above prove that there is still an instable political life in Czech Republic. An important committee of the Assembly sees Khojaly events as a racial cleaning and genocide; whereas, Deputy Prime Minister underrates this decision. Moreover, he does not hesitate to speak against Azerbaijan. On the other hand, in early June, a group from the Czech Parliament visited Karabakh and met Bako Sahakyan, the president of this region. As it is known, Azerbaijan is against such visits that could lead to the conclusion that this region is independent and autonomous, which is in fact legally dependent on Azerbaijan.

Karel Schwarzenberg’s visit to Armenia, while aiming to overcome the negative impact of the mentioned decision on the Khojaly events passed by the related committee of the Parliament, was also about the policy of recovering Armenia from the Russian impact, and of connecting her to the West with associate membership of the EU. Supporting this policy, Czech Minister stated during his visit to Armenia that his country was ready to assist the integration process with the EU¹⁷⁵, that the views of Armenia and Czech Republic coincided with 95 per cent¹⁷⁶, and that Czech Republic could serve as a mediator in the issue of Karabakh conflict¹⁷⁷.

The visit of Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Genocide Memorial in Yerevan should be evaluated in the framework of the rapprochement policy with Armenia. However, the fact that the Czech Parliament has not adopted any resolution on the Armenian Genocide allegations, despite some attempts, makes the Minister’s visit to the Genocide Memorial and his remarks incompatible with the Parliament’s policy on this matter. Furthermore, it is also possible that behind the Czech Minister’s visit -that would not be welcomed by Turkey-, there lies the belief that Turkey’s EU membership would not materialize in the short or even in the middle term.

One of the results of these attempts by the Czech Republic in its policy of rapprochement with Armenia was observed in the Czech Senate. Senator Jaromir Stetina stated that he would try to have a notification describing these

174 “Czech Foreign Minister Pays Tribute to the Armenian Genocide Victims” *Armradio.am*, April 11, 2013.

175 “Karel Schwarzenberg. Czech Republic Ready to Assist Armenia’s EU Integration” *Armenpress*, April 12, 2013.

176 “Armenia and Czech Republic’s views coincide by 95 per cent - Karel Schwarzenberg” *News.am*, April 11, 2013.

177 “Czech Republic Ready to Act as Mediator in Karabakh Conflict” *News. Am*, April 17, 2013.

events as genocide passed, on the occasion of 100th anniversary of genocide allegations, firstly by the Senate's related Committee and then by the General Assembly¹⁷⁸.

7. Denmark

Denmark is one of the European Union countries that has not recognized the Armenian genocide allegations and that, in its Parliament, has not passed a resolution on this matter. However, it must have been found appropriate to fulfill the insistent demands by Armenia and the Armenian diaspora to some extent that an exhibition titled as "Armenian Genocide and the Scandinavian Response" was launched in November 2012 in the Royal Library in Copenhagen with the request of the Armenian Ambassador Hraçya Agacanhhan. Upon the objection of the Turkish Ambassador Berki Dibek, the director of the Library stated that Turkey, if it desired, could also launch an exhibition to explain its stance on the matter. Having found out about the situation, a newspaper (*Berlingske Tidende*) started a campaign claiming that the Royal Library had given into the pressures of Turkey and this campaign was supported by the "genocide supporters" in the country, extreme rightist Denmark People's Party, and a member of the Copenhagen City Council Aslan Rasmussen whose father was a Turk¹⁷⁹.

In fact, all over the world, there were and have been attempts to have the Armenian genocide allegations recognized. Turkish Embassies or the Consulate Generals have been opposing them by claiming that they have been, indeed, aiming to slander Turkey. What makes this event interesting is the fact that the "Armenian Lobby in Turkey" had sent a letter to the director of the Royal Library, that severely criticized Turkey for this event. (With the term "Armenian Lobby in Turkey", a group of intellectuals and artists that are Turkish and, that recognize and support the Armenian genocide allegations as much as extreme Armenians are meant to be addressed. However, contrary to the assumptions, among these, there are only a few Turkish Armenians.)

In the letter, it has been claimed that Turkish governments have been denying the genocide for 90 years, and repressing those who accept it: that, it is not accurate that there are two different views for the 1915 events; that over one and a half million Armenians were forcefully exiled from the country and murdered by the state. In the letter, which claims that denial, systematic pressure, and the strategy of deterrence have been continued and that the last

178 "Jamomir Stetina to Introduce Declaration on Armenian Genocide Recognition to Czech Senate" *Armenpress*, April 24, 2013.

179 "Democracy Lesson from Our Intellectuals to Denmark" *Zaman*, January 4, 2013.

victim of this was Hrant Dink who was assassinated in 2007, it is also put forward that Turkey's pressures and strategies of deterrence will continue with the mentioned exhibition, and it is said, addressing the director of the Royal Library, that "The support you will give to this regime which is based on denying history and facts is same with supporting an apartheid regime. We would like to warn you that with the support you provide to Turkey, you are preventing the struggles of democratization in this country." The letter proposes a highly exaggerating claim like "Peace, democracy, and stability in the Middle East can occur by regimes facing history honestly. Turkey is preventing this with her policies of denial." It ends by demanding the director

The Armenian Parliament rejected a draft bill on March 21, 2012, that proposed to condemn the genocide of Pontic Greeks, Syrians, and other ethnic groups during the Ottoman era.

to consider the proposal for the "alternative exhibition"¹⁸⁰. The list of the signers of the letter is provided in the footnote¹⁸¹. This group is composed more or less of those who have been organizing or participating in the activities for the commemoration of April 24 in the recent years.

As it has been considered, an exhibition could be launched in response to the other, allowing the opposite view being expressed, the interesting point about the letter is that it is, in fact, reflecting a non-democratic and an unfair mentality as it is requested in the letter that the opposing view should not be allowed.

8. Armenia

Armenia, while it has been seriously struggling to have the Armenian genocide allegations being recognized by other countries, it is observed that it does not agree to recognize some other genocide allegations.

The Armenian Parliament rejected a draft bill on March 21, 2012, that proposed to condemn the genocide of Pontic Greeks, Syrians, and other ethnic groups during the Ottoman era, brought up by the Heritage Party led by Raffi Hovannisian. Only the Heritage Party and Dashnaks voted for this bill.

Galust Sahakyan, who spoke on behalf of the Republican Party that is in

180 Same source.

181 Fikret Adanır, Taner Akçam, Ayhan Aktar, Cengiz Aktar, Cengiz Ađlan, Ahmet Altan, Maya Arakon, Oya Baydar, Yavuz Baydar, Osman Baydemir, Murat Belge, Halil Bertay, İsmail Beşikçi, Hamit Bozaslan, İpek Çalışlar, Nilüfer Göle, İřtar Gözaydın, Gençay Gürsoy, Ayşe Hür, Ahmet İnel, Ayşe Kadiođlu, Gülten Kaya, Ümit Kıvanç, Ömer Laçiner, Roni Margulies, Baskın Oran, Cem Özdemir, Esra Mungan, Sırrı Sakık, Betül Tanbay, Zeynep Tanbay, Turgut Tarhanlı, Ufuk Uras, Şanar Yurdatan.

power, said that there was no political necessity to adopt the bill, that views of the minorities in Armenia should be taken into account before debating this bill, that they respected the communities that were subjected to genocide in the Ottoman era, and that they condemned these “massacres”¹⁸².

As it is seen, Sahakyan makes a distinction between “genocide” and “massacre”, and so he indirectly implies that only Armenians were subjected to genocide. Moreover, Sahakyan’s view of having “no political necessity” is not clear enough. On the other hand, the “need to take into account the views of the minorities in Armenia” seems very meaningless since there is not a remarkable amount of Greek and Syrian minorities in Armenia, and minorities with that size would not be able to reject this draft bill. Besides, it is hard to understand the rationale behind the rejection of the mentioned draft bill considering that Diaspora Armenians establish close relations with Pontic Greeks and Syrians in many countries especially in USA, Sweden, and Australia to make genocide allegations recognized. The most reasonable explanation of this is that the Armenian Government, which gives priority to having the widest recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations in the international arena in the course of 2015, would not want to create obstacles in the way of its case by trying to defend other genocide allegations that, it seems, are insignificant to itself.

9. Georgia

According to Georgian statistics, in the Samtshe-Javakheti region, and mostly in Ahalkalek, there are about 124,000 Armenians¹⁸³. Although this minority - under the influence of Armenia- has a large scale of minority rights, they generally are not satisfied with their lives and have an attitude of constantly complaining about it. The Georgian Government tries to act considerably towards this minority as it attaches importance to having good relations with Armenia. It is seen that the views against Turkey, especially the genocide allegations, were intended to put forward by this minority with the support of a few Georgian politicians; however, it seems that this attempt was not quite successful. On the other hand, there are approximately 280,000 of Azerbaijanis in Georgia¹⁸⁴.

Lastly, it is understood from the news on the press that Jondo Bagaturia, a parliamentarian from the opposition party, has put the issue of Georgia’s recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations forward in the Georgian

182 “Armenian Deputies rejected the bill ‘Genocides in Ottoman Period’ .” *Hye-Tert*, March 21, 2012.

183 [En.wikipedia.org/wiki/AArmenians_in_Samtskhe-Javakheti](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AArmenians_in_Samtskhe-Javakheti)

184 “Azerbaijani” *Wikipedia* <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azeri>

Parliament in May 2011; that Azerbaijani parliamentarian A. Süleymanov certainly rejected it and that, as a result of this dispute, the session was paused for a while¹⁸⁵.

It is seen that the Georgian Government officials prefer not to talk about the genocide allegations and in case they have to, they try to avoid the subject with a solution of saying “Armenians’ pain is close to the Georgian people”¹⁸⁶ as the Defense Minister Bacho Akhala did in April 2001.

Although their own country has such cautious attitudes towards the issue of Armenian allegations, it was observed that Georgian officials did not hesitate

Although their own country has such cautious attitudes towards the issue of Armenian allegations, it was observed that Georgian officials did not hesitate to visit the Genocide Memorial during their visits to Armenia, either.

to visit the Genocide Memorial during their visits to Armenia, either. Defense Minister Bacho Akhalya, mentioned above, is one of them¹⁸⁷. Previously, Foreign Minister Grigol Washadze visited the memorial in 2009¹⁸⁸. According to Armenian sources, President Saakashvili visited the memorial in 2004 and 2009¹⁸⁹. However, while not keeping them as secret, the Georgian side intentionally does not want to announce these visits much. On the other hand, it is seen that the previous Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has attached importance to make

public his visit to the Genocide Memorial during his visit to Armenia in January¹⁹⁰.

In conclusion, it is possible to assert that the Georgian politicians do not take sides considering their country’s close cooperation with Turkey, however, as they attach importance to having good relations with Armenia, they try to strike a balance by visiting the Genocide Memorial during their official visits to this country.

10. England

We have provided detailed information, in previous issues of our journal, on the efforts to have the Parliaments of Great Britain recognize the Armenian

185 Armenews.com, May 25, 2011.

186 “Georgian Defense Minister Avoids Question About Genocide” *News.am*, April 18, 2011.

187 Same source

188 “The Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze visited Tsisernakaberd Memorial Complex” The Armenian Genocide Museum Institute, Yerevan <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/news-2009.php>

189 The Armenian Genocide Museum Institute, Yerevan <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/news.php>

190 “Ivanishvili Paid Tribute to Memory of Genocide Victims” *Armenpress*, January 17, 2013.

genocide¹⁹¹. To summarize briefly, almost no one in the House of Commons supports the views of the Armenians. In the House of Lords, however, the number of those who support those is more, although, it is still very far from being the majority. This situation diverted the Armenian militants to the local parliaments, and, the Scottish Parliament and the Assembly for Wales took decisions recognizing the genocide allegations. Lastly, although a proposal submitted to the Scotland Parliament and was signed by the majority of parliament members, according to an Armenian press agency¹⁹², included some expressions recognizing the genocide allegations, this proposal did turn into an official decision.

Wales played a primary role in Armenian genocide allegations. Parliament of this region took decisions on this matter in 2001 and 2006. Rowan Williams, who was the Archbishop of Wales and the Archbishop of Canterbury between 2002-2012, was an active defender of the Armenian genocide allegations. Although during his last post he did not express his views about the genocide allegations very much -as this could be against the policies of the government-, he, even if it was indirectly, spoke of them whenever possible. For instance, he made a mention of the Armenian genocide allegations among with other genocides during the “Holocaust Memorial Day”, which is organized every year to commemorate mainly the genocide of the Jews¹⁹³.

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Although no motion has been passed by the Parliaments of Great Britain on this matter, it is seen, especially in the House of Lords, that general meetings take place on the matter. Finally in a meeting held on June 17, 2011, Baroness Cox, Baroness Shreela Flather, Lord Evabury, Lord Bishop of Chester, and Lord Tomlinson, who are known be supporters of the Armenians, mentioned the genocide allegations.. Minister of State Lord Howell, who responded to them on behalf of the government, stated that hundred thousands of Armenians faced with terrible acts in 1915 had died because of armed attacks, starvation, and illnesses; and added that they thought it would be more appropriate to evaluate the common history of Turkey and Armenia together; that they supported the attempts in accordance with this; that countries such as the USA and France also supported this; and that Great Britain should act meticulously and carefully about the actions intended to deteriorate and recognize these fragile and significant attempts¹⁹⁴.

191 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments” *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue 36, pp. 60-62; Issue 27-28, p. 31.

192 Petition on Armenian Genocide Recognition Received the Support of Majority of Scottish Parliament” *Armenpress.am*. May 25, 2013.

193 Archbishop Highlights Armenian Experience in Genocide Remembrance” *Ekklesia*, January 27, 2011.

194 “Attempt to ‘1915’ Memorial Day in England” *Hürriyet*, June 18, 2011.

11. Spain

As one of the big countries in Europe, Spain is one of the countries that are desired by the Armenian militants to recognize the genocide allegations. Upon rejection of the proposals on the matter by the Spanish Parliament, the matter was headed towards states with extensive autonomous rights, and, while some of them like Valencia rejected the recognition, Catalonia (2010), the Balearic Islands (2010), and the Basque Country (2007) accepted it¹⁹⁵.

A proposal, submitted by the Republican Left of Catalonia on the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Spanish Parliament in March 2011 and supported by the Basque Nationalist Party, was rejected by 31 votes against 2 votes¹⁹⁶. In 2012, the same scenario was repeated, and this time, the proposal was rejected by 36 votes against 3 votes¹⁹⁷.

In the meetings on this matter, the spokesperson for the ruling party stated that they were against making a historical revision, and, that, instead they wanted to urge the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. The spokesperson for the opposition party, on the other hand, asserted that these kinds of decisions, as it was in the example of France, have negative impacts on the Turkish-Armenian relations. Moreover, addressing the parliamentarians of the Basque region, the spokesperson for the Democracy and Progressive Unionist Party said: “Before shedding crocodile tears for Armenians, cry for those who lost their lives in the terror attacks in the Basque region and condemn these terrorist attacks... The worst thing for Armenians is to be defended by you.”¹⁹⁸

It can be seen that support for Armenian ideas by Catalonia and Basque region, where separatist movements are strong, creates reactions in the Spanish Parliament. That is to say, Armenian militants backed the wrong horse in this country.

12. Israel

Israel has started to attach more importance to Armenian genocide allegations especially after the “Mavi Marmara” event, and the Israeli Parliament has started to discuss this matter in order to have a decision taken when

195 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Facts and Comments” *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue 36, pp. 59-60; Issue 27-28, p. 37; Issue 23-24, p. 66; Issue 25, pp. 18-19.

196 “Rejection from Spain to Armenian Allegations” *Ntvmsnbc*, March 10, 2011.

197 “Rejection from Spain to ‘Armenian Genocide’ Allegations” *Ntvmsnbc*, May 24, 2012.

198 Ibid

needed. Information about these discussions was provided in our previous issues¹⁹⁹.

A second response to Turkey by the Israeli Government has been in accordance with its policy to try and improve its relations with Armenia. For this reason, the Israeli Minister of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs Yuli Edelstein and the Minister of Agriculture Orit Noked visited Armenia²⁰⁰. They also did not fail to visit the Genocide Memorial. Despite these gestures, it does not seem possible for Israel and Armenia to have an advanced level of cooperation because of their foreign policies.

Israel is a country against Iran for known reasons. Armenia, however, has close political relations and cooperation with Iran because of the natural disharmony between Azerbaijan and Iran, and on the other hand, because of open border gate with Iran despite the fact that it is closed with Turkey and Azerbaijan.. The attendance of President Sarkisyan in the oath taking ceremony of the recently elected Iranian President Hasan Ruhani has been a concrete proof of this intimacy. On the other hand, there are intense relations between Azerbaijan and Israel stemming from the fact that they can confront Iran together when needed, and, of which, the actuality can be protected by Israel's arms sales to Azerbaijan..

The issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide allegations by Israeli Parliament was finally transferred to the Commission.

While the tension caused by the event "Mavi Marmara" has continued, Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech in the Forum of "Alliance of Civilizations" organized in Vienna in the end of February that included his words, "We must consider- just like Zionism, or anti-Semitism or fascism- Islamophobia as a crime against humanity", caused negative reactions in countries in which many Jews live, such as Israel and primarily the USA; and a campaign was launched against Turkey and the Prime Minister. Under these conditions, it was thought that Knesset might have taken a decision about the recognition of Armenian Genocide allegations.

In these circumstances, it was very surprising when the Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu called Prime Minister Erdoğan about 20 days after the Vienna Forum on March 22, 2013 to apologize for the "Mavi Marmara" event and informed him that compensation would be paid. This has changed the status quo. It is known that what caused Netanyahu to make this move was the friendly pressure of President Obama. This case shows that both the USA

199 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 39, pp. 57-60; Issue: 42, pp. 39-43.

200 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 42, pp. 39-43.

and Israel acted with the consideration of Turkey's special position in the Middle East and the need for cooperating with Turkey.

Despite Netanyahu's apology, the relations between Turkey and Israel have not been normalized as some issues related to Palestine, especially the issue of giving compensation to those who were killed, have not been resolved yet.

As it has been expected, the issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide allegations by Israel started to be discussed in Knesset in April 23rd, coinciding with the memorial ceremony of April 24th. There is no need to explain this meeting in detail since it is clear that it includes the same elements with last year's meeting²⁰¹ and it has been clear since the beginning that no decision will be taken. Briefly, in this meeting²⁰², in which all speakers seem to recognize the Armenian Genocide and support Knesset in passing a resolution accordingly, only Ofir Akunis, the Deputy Minister in the prime ministry, stated that as Israelis, they had the responsibility of remembering the tragedies of humanity, that one of these tragedies was the massacre of the Armenian community, and that the Israeli State did not deny these horrible events, and he added that investigating the related events must be done through open debate, not by political declarations²⁰³. Turkey agrees with the view that no political decision about the issue of genocide allegations should be taken, and that, however, these should be the subject of scientific discussions.

Consequently, Deputy Minister suggested discussing the matter; however, added that Knesset should not pass a resolution on it and Knesset, in accordance with this, directed the matter to the Committee, to be discussed in more detail, as it was done before. It is observed that Israelis, taking into account their relations with Turkey, do not wish to pass any resolution on the genocide allegations in Knesset; however, that they have continued to keep this matter on the agenda in order to create a pressure on Turkey.

13. Sweden

As is generally known, the Swedish Parliament passed a resolution to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations on March 11, 2010²⁰⁴. Briefly, it was stated in this resolution that, in addition to the Armenians; Assyrians, Syrians, Chaldeans, and Pontic Greeks were also subjected to genocide under the Ottoman Empire. The resolution, furthermore, requested the Swedish

201 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 42, pp. 39-43.

202 "In Israel, Both Coalition and Opposition Urge Remembrance of Armenian Genocide" *Ha'aretz*, April 23, 2013.

203 Ibid.

204 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments", *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue 35, pp. 36-37.

Government to make an initiative towards the Turkish Government, and also towards the European Union and the United Nations in order to have the Ottoman Empire recognize the claimed genocide of the mentioned minorities. Objecting to this decision, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt stated that historical events should not be evaluated on political level but should be discussed by the concerned parties. Moreover, he asserted that this decision would not create any positive impact on the normalization process Turkish-Armenian relations.

Turkey reacted to this decision; recalled its ambassador to Sweden for a while; and Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Sweden was canceled²⁰⁵.

However, the resolution -passed by one vote- has caused a lot of discussion, as the Swedish Government has not fulfilled the demands since then. As the Swedish Constitution grants the authority of determining the foreign policy to the government, the resolutions to be passed by the Parliament on this matter are not binding for the government. However, Turkish Assyrians; some political institutions such as the Social Democratic Labor Party and the Leftist Party; some left oriented media establishments; and, of course, the Armenians living in this country stated the necessity for the government to apply this mentioned resolution on all occasions²⁰⁶. But the government did not change its attitude towards this matter. On the other hand, although Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, who was the addressee of the mentioned pressures, went to the Genocide Memorial and stood for a moment of silence during his visit to Armenia on June 14, 2010; the pressures were not alleviated.

In about two years, during President Abdullah Gül's visit to Sweden, this matter inflamed again and some activities with the attendance of Assyrians were organized. The President, who did not mention this matter in his speech in the Swedish National Assembly, later on said to the journalists that this matter should be dealt not by politicians but by experts²⁰⁷.

The Socialist Party in opposition declared that they would implement the mentioned resolution in case they came into power²⁰⁸.

There is a particular point about recognition of the genocide allegations by some countries' parliaments that must be kept in mind. Parliaments can easily pass such resolutions, as they do not bear responsibility for foreign policy; but, on the contrary, the governments, executing foreign policy, would not

205 Ibid, p. 37.

206 "Reaction to Sweden Government not Applying Genocide Decision" *Hye-Tert*, November 24, 2012.

207 "SPD Will Recognize Turkish Genocide of Armenians" *Dagens Nyheter*, March 14, 2013.

208 Ibid.

prefer to have a dispute with Turkey for an incident that occurred a century ago. In that sense, there is no guarantee that, in case of Socialists coming into power in Sweden, they would execute this act of the Parliament. What can utmostly be expected is that they could make a claim about this matter from Turkey, the EU, and the UN; however, they could try to avoid disputes by being non-insistent.

14. Italy

The Italian Parliament recognized the Armenian genocide allegations in 2000 by referring to the decision, dated 1987, of the European Parliament. There is a small but influential Armenian community in Italy and this community has tried to bring the genocide allegations to the agenda at every turn.

It is observed that, on this matter, the Italians benefit from literature, and the works of Antonia Arslan, an Italian writer and academic of Armenian origin born in 1938, are pioneers in the issue of genocide and the Ottoman Armenians. Her work “La Messeria delle Allodole” (Skylark Farm, 2004) received many awards and became the subject of a film with little success by well-known director Taivani Brothers in 2007²⁰⁹. Her works “La Strada di Smirne” (Street of İzmir, 2009) and “Il Libro di Mush (Book of Muş, 2012) are about Ottomans and Armenians.

Paolo Cossi, a well-known producer of cartoon albums, played an important role in spreading genocide allegations through Italy with his published album “Medz Teghern Il Grande Male (Genocide, A Big Enormity) in 2007 of which the cover illustrated an Ottoman soldier holding an Armenian’s head cut-off.. Moreover, Paolo Cossi’s last album “Ararat, la Montagna del Mistero” (Ağrı, Mountain of the Mystery, 1912) discusses Ottomans’ massacre of Armenians.

The final political development has been the erection of an Armenian “Kachkar” (a big stone cross) in the city of Bari on January 11, 2013. Meanwhile, it should be stated that many assemblies of Italian cities and towns have taken decisions in recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. According to an Armenian source, these decisions amount to 37²¹⁰. While most of these are small cities and towns; there are also big ones such as Milan, Rome, Florence, Venetia, and Genova.

209 *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue 23-24, pp. 56-58.

210 According to *armenian-genocide.org*, an Armenian cite, these are cities and towns recognizing genocide allegations in Italy: Caponogara 1997, Sanguinetto 1997, Bagnacavallo 1997, Fusignano 1997, Montorso Vicentino 1997, Padova 1997, Monterforte d’Alpone 1997, S. Agata Sul Santerno 1997, Cotignola 1997, Asiago 1997, Lugo 1997, S. Stino Livenza 1997, Ponte di Piave 1997, Conselice 1997, Villafranca Padovana 1997, Milano 1997, Parma 1997, Solarolo 1997, Imola 1998, Faenza 1998, Feltre 1998, Venezia 1998, Firenze 1998, Ravenna 1998, Thiene 1998, Castelsilano 1998, Montana Feltrina 1999, Genova 1998, Massa Lombarda 1999, Roma 2000, Salgareda 2000, Belluno 2000, Sesto San Giovanni 2000, Udine 2001, Di Bertiole 2001, Reggio 2005, Viterbo 2005, Isola del Liri 2011.

Considering the positive and close relations with Turkey, the Italian Government officials generally keep silent when it comes to the issue of genocide. In that sense, it was found strange when Italian Ambassador Bruno Scapini said in Yerevan that a country that respects universal values and that is on its way to democracy should recognize this crime.

It is very rare for Italy to make high-level visits to Armenia. Therefore, it should be stated that although the visit by Italian Minister of Defense Giampaolo Di Paola to Armenia on October 16, 2012 drew attention, the number of visits by the European Union countries to Armenia have increased after it became certain that Armenia would sign a partnership agreement with the European Union. Minister Di Paola visited also the Genocide Memorial.

15. Canada

Canada was a scene of Armenian terror in 1980s and, as for the Armenian claims, it is one of the countries that recognized the Armenian Genocide allegations in 1990s and 2000s.

States of Quèbec and Ontario, when they recognized the genocide allegations in 1980 -when these allegations were not prevalent-, were almost the precursors of the Armenian terror that would start shortly after. Afterwards, the state of British Columbia, took a similar decision in 2000; and, Quèbec, where the Armenian militants were very active, repeated its decision in 2003 and 2004.

On federal level, the Canadian House of Commons passed decisions in 1996 and 2004, the Canadian Senate in 2002, recognizing the genocide allegations. Prime Minister Harper recognized the allegations firstly verbally and then in writing in 2006.

Recognition of genocide allegations by parliaments, although it would not lead to a conclusion beyond evaluating a historical event or in other words commenting on it, would be significant in the sense that it becomes a government policy when the head of the government makes a similar evaluation in writing. However, as the members of the Canadian Cabinet are as not insistent as the Prime Minister on this matter and besides, the continuous objection by Turkey to these decisions and declarations prevent the Canadian Government to perform an active role with regard to the Armenian Genocide allegations and especially when it comes to the demands of Armenians from Turkey. Turkey's response to the decisions taken in the Canadian Assemblies and to the pro-Armenian attitude on the part of the

Canadian Prime Minister were so strong that Turkish ambassadors has been called twice to Ankara for consultations²¹¹. Moreover, there have been some rumors saying that there would be some trade restrictions and that Turkey would not award some bidding to Canada. These issues were discussed in detail in our previous articles²¹².

The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being aware of the fact that Canada's stance on the Armenian issue has caused a serious dispute with Turkey and that it could even strain relations, urges the Prime Minister to act more moderately. On the other hand, it should not make sense, for a country

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like Canada that allows immigrants, that it embraces past experiences of each immigrant group and get in conflicts with other countries in this cause. However, Prime Minister Harper has easily done this. Although the populations of those with Turkish and Armenian origins are almost the same, he has opted for Armenians because they are more active and more interested in the politics; and, besides, he has been on the side of Jews against Palestinians. However, he has become to have more of a moderate stance -although he did not change his mind-through strong reactions of Turkey and his own Ministry's prompting. For instance, in the identical statements released in reference

to April 24th in 2012 and 2013, upon touching upon the recognition of the 1915 events by Canadian parliaments as genocide, he stated that this was a day that they acknowledged solemnly, not to cast blame back into the distant past, but to guide them to a better future; that the Turkish and Armenian Canadians could live together sharing values of tolerance and openness; and, that Canada supported efforts by Armenia and Turkey to seek reconciliation including an open border, the establishment of diplomatic relations and the implementation of a dialogue of the events of 1915. Other issues in this statement, except for the genocide allegations, are acceptable for Turkey. However, while the Armenian militants have stated that there is no need to discuss the events of 1915 as it is generally recognized as genocide; they would not have approved Stephen Harper's remarks on the two countries' entering into a conversation.

211 Ambassador Aydemir Erhan in 2006, Ambassador Refet Akgünay in 2009 were invited to Ankara.

212 For the decisions taken about Armenian genocide allegations in Canada and Turkey's reaction to them see Ömer Engin Lütem. "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue: 2, p. 25; Issue: 6, pp. 15-16; Issue: 12-13, pp. 14-17; Issue: 20-21, pp. 21-26; Issue: 30, pp. 30-31; Issue: 32, pp. 50-51; Issue: 36, p. 56.

Briefly, after a period of serious tension, the relationship between Turkey and Canada has started to enter a stage of improvement. The monument erected in 1982 in the name of Military Attaché Colonel Atilla Altıkat, who was assassinated by Armenian terrorists, has strengthened this improvement.

While the Canadian public is certainly against terrorist acts, Canada witnessed the Armenian terror acts and had difficulties in coping with these acts. In 1980s, the most intense period of the Armenian terror, the Turkish Embassy in Canada and its personnel received many anonymous threats from Armenians. Although Canadian authorities were notified about these, this did not give any result.

The first terrorist act against Turks in Canada, dated on April 8, 1982, resulted in the serious injury of Commercial Counsellor Kâni Güngör. Güngör became paralyzed for his whole life. The perpetrators could not be found through the investigations held by Canadian authorities.

The Armenian terrorists in general were trained in some camps in Lebanon and were sent to foreign countries to perform their acts. However, as they were not knowledgeable about the conditions of the country they were sent to, Armenian citizens of that country helped them to specify the target, follow daily actions, and determine the place of assassination. It was hard to find the perpetrators since they were unknown to the local security offices, and, for this, the authorities had to find the abettors in the Armenian community. This could not be easily done because of political sensitivities. Furthermore, that the perpetrators left the country as soon as possible made it difficult to catch them.

Within about four months of the attack committed to Kâni Güngör; Colonel Atilla Altıkat, the Military Attaché in the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa was assassinated on August 28, 1982. Colonel Altıkat was shot in his car, when he stopped at the traffic lights on his way to the embassy, by a person who got out of the car behind.

This incident is important in several aspects. For the first (and last) time, a Turkish army officer was killed by Armenian terrorists. Since there was military rule in Turkey, this act was thought to be directly targeting the Turkish Army. Besides, since terrorists claimed that they were in an armed struggle against Turkey, they considered it more crucial to assassinate a Turkish army officer than to assassinate a diplomat, and this encouraged them.

This assassination was considered as important by also the Canadian Government since Officer Altıkat was the first foreign diplomat assassinated

in Canada. Although the perpetrators could not be found, with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's instructions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense flew their flags at half-mast; the Canadian Minister of National Defense, the Army Chief, and the General Attorney attended the ceremony in the airport to send his mortal remains to home; and additionally, the Canadian brigade of nine soldiers escorted the funeral²¹³.

The final attack carried out to a Turkish diplomat in Canada was the one against the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa on March 12, 1985. During this attack, a Canadian bodyguard was killed; 13 people including Ambassador Coşkun Kırça, his wife and children were taken hostage; the Ambassador later on escaped but he got seriously injured. In the end, three Armenians who carried out this attack were captured and they were sentenced to life, being eligible for parole after serving a minimum of 25 years imprisonment. They were released after having served 25 years. As mentioned above, it was significant in terms of developing the relations between Turkey and Canada that the Canadian authorities granted permission for the erection of a monument in the name of Officer Atilla Altıkat. Taking into consideration possible rejections and blockings by Armenians and Armenian supporters in the Canadian Parliament, the news of the building of the monument were not shared with the public, although it was not a secret. The monument was built by sculptor Azimet Karaman, Architect Levent Timurhan, and Reha Benderoğlu. In the shape of a half-sphere with a 6-meter diameter; the monument weighs 26 tones and is composed of wooden and metal elements. It was produced in Turkey and transported to Ottawa and mounted. The monument was approved by NCC (National Capital Commission) which is an office responsible for any work of art and grand building to be built in Canada²¹⁴. The monument was built on the lawn right next to the road where Altıkat was martyred²¹⁵.

The monument was opened on September 20, 2012 with a ceremony with the attendances of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird, Officer Altıkat's wife and children, and Turkey's Former Ambassador to Ottawa Refet Akgünay who highly contributed towards the production of this monument Davutoğlu and Baird made speeches during the ceremony. The writings on the monument are like this²¹⁶:

213 There is detailed information about the assassination committed to Colonel Altıkat in Bilal N. Şimşir's book "*Our Martyr Diplomats*" (Bilgi Publishing House, Ankara 2000). pp. 551-580.

214 "Martyr Diplomats Memorial / Ottawa, Canada" *Arkiv* <http://www.arkiv.com.tr/proje/sehit-diplomatlar-aniti/1263>

215 This area is on the corner of these roads: Island Park Drive and John A. Macdonald Parkway

216 "The Text on the Introductory Signboard of Colonel Atilla Memorial" Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/albay-atilla-altikat-aniti.pdf

This monument is dedicated to the memory of the Republic of Turkey Ottawa Embassy Military Attaché Colonel Atilla Altıkat who lost his life in this cross road by an assassination committed by terrorists in August 27, 1982.

In the name of all other diplomats and public officers who were martyred during their assignments abroad, this monument witnesses the principles of permanent peace, freedom, and coexistence between Turkey and Canada.

With its perfect sphere shape, the monument symbolizes martyrs' places of eternal rest. Sphere's wide side looking to the sky opens to "Door of Eternity"; its narrow side looking to the ground opens to "Gate of Time". Each of prisms inside the monument represents martyrs that sacrifice their lives. The only prism in the "Gate of Time" perpetuates the memory of Martyr Officer Atilla Altıkat.

God rests souls of our beloved martyrs makes their places heaven.

As one can see, the perpetrators of the assassination of Officer Altıkat have not been mentioned on the monument. This was presumably demanded by the Canadian authorities to be able to prevent the pressures that would come from Armenians. Additionally, that the monument was dedicated to "*all other diplomats and public officers who were martyred during their assignments abroad*" makes its approval easier.

Davutoğlu briefly mentioned the Armenian terror his speech in the opening ceremony of the monument. In an interview with a Canadian newspaper²¹⁷, he went on and stated that it must be questioned why the Turkish Foreign Minister had not visited Canada for 14 years; why the relations between these two countries were not as good as other relations such as the Turkish-Brazilian relations; and stated that Harper Government's formal recognition of Armenian genocide allegations in 2006 had created a psychological obstacle in the relations; that Turkey would not accept to such political pressures; that Turkey would not question what happened to Red Indians in North American continent; that it was not the place of a third country's Parliament to determine what happened in other lands a century ago; and that they hoped that Canada would contribute to reconciliation efforts between for Armenians and Turks, rather than taking sides on this issue.

That a monument was built in Canada in the name of Colonel Altıkat where he was martyred has been a very important step in Turkey's struggle with

217 "Straddling Europe, Middle East, Turkey's view is from eye of storm" *The Globe and Mail*, September 21, 2012.

the Armenian terror and, in general, with Armenia's propaganda against Turkey and Turks. Because this monument is the proof that Armenians' politically motivated violence is not acceptable. This monument and other monuments that we hope would be built in other countries, where Turkish diplomats were martyred by the Armenian terror, would cause not only condemnation of the terror but also questioning of the views of Armenians on the events of 1915.

16. Hungary and the "Ramil Safarov" Event

Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijani army officer who attended a language course in NATO in 2004, killed an Armenian army officer from the same language course, Gurken Margarian, who had insulted the flag of Azerbaijan. Safarov was tried in Hungary, and was sentenced to life imprisonment, although it was matter of mitigation. The Azerbaijani Government made several initiatives firstly to reduce Safarov's punishment; and then to get him released in a short time after the sentence, or to extradite him to Azerbaijan. In response, Armenia made efforts in the opposite way.

Hungary released Safarov in August 31, 2012. This was done in accordance with the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners, dated March 21, 1983. The convention foresaw an opportunity for foreign prisoners to serve their sentence in their own countries. For this, the sentencing country and the home country had to agree. Article 12 of the convention stated that states could grant pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentence in accordance with their own constitution and other laws. After Safarov returned to Azerbaijan, President Aliiev pardoned him Safarov exercising his executive authority. Moreover, it was covered in the news that his accumulated wages was paid to him during his imprisonment of almost nine years; that an apartment was provided for him; and that he was promoted to the rank of major.

This provoked a massive reaction from Armenia which was also a result of the presidential elections that would take place soon. While Azerbaijan was gravely criticized of releasing Safarov, diplomatic relations and all official contacts with Hungary were suspended as of August 31, 2012. Furthermore, an intense campaign was launched against both Azerbaijan and Hungary with active contributions of the Armenian Diaspora and the Armenian churches. As a result of this campaign, Safarov's release was condemned by some international organizations, primarily by the European Parliament and the Parliamentarian Assembly of Council of Europe. The Western media acted in the same way.. However, this campaign did not effect Azerbaijan that had released Safarov in accordance with the 1983 Convention.

Although the opposition in Hungary tried to weaken the government led by Prime Minister Victor, it did not succeed in doing so. Criticism by the EU countries and reactions by the public opinion in these countries led the Hungarian government to immediately normalize its relations with Armenia; however, it was not possible because of reluctance on the side of Armenia.

While Armenia had organized a successful campaign against Azerbaijan and Hungary, it found itself in a tough situation as the campaign did not cause an effect on the policies of neither Azerbaijan nor Hungary, and tried to move the issue onto the international arena. Hence, some news on the press pointed out that the Safarov issue would be taken to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination²¹⁸ but this did not take place. Correspondingly, Armenia has provided the means with which the inheritors of the Armenian army officer Gurken Margariyan, who was killed, could apply to the European Court of Human Rights²¹⁹.

Lastly, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian stated on April, 2013 that Armenia was ready to normalize relations with Hungary; however, for this, Hungary should take certain steps in that direction²²⁰. Although he did not mention what these steps were, after a while, the inauguration of a khachkar (a big cross made of stone) “dedicated to the victims of the Armenian Genocide” in April 22, 2013 in the city of Szeged in Hungary was seen as one of these steps. In the ceremony, President Sarkisyan’s sibling who attended the ceremony as an ambassador of good will said: “although the recent period had witnessed some difficult moments, they have been swept away like ash in the wind”²²¹. However, the relations between these two countries were not normalized. It was covered in the press that Armenia demanded an apology from Hungary for this²²².

The part of this event that concerns Turkey was that as one of the steps to normalize relations with Armenia, Hungarian authorities allowed the inauguration of a khachkar related to the genocide allegations; in other words, that Hungarians appeased to Armenia over Turkey.

17. Portugal

While Portugal had been known as a country far from Armenian activities, as

218 “Armenia to Appeal to UN Committee on Elimination of Discrimination On Safarov Case” *News.am*, March 1, 2013.

219 “Complaint on Safarov Case Filled to European Court of Human Rights” *News.am*, March 1, 2013.

220 “Armenia Ready To Mend Ties With Hungary, But...” *Armradio*, April 14, 2013.

221 “Armenian Genocide Memorial Erected In Hungary” *Armenpress*, April 22, 2013.

222 “La Hongrie N’est Pas Prête À Faire Des Excuses à l’Arménie Dans l’affaire Safarov Selon Le Site Hongrois “Hu-Lala” *Armenews.com*, April 28, 2013.

a result of the attacks against Turkish diplomats in 1982 and 1983, it became the first in the agenda.

Administrative Attaché Erkut Akbay in the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon and his wife Nadide Akbay, who was a secretary in the embassy, were attacked by Armenian terrorists in their car in front of their house. Erkut Akbay died on the premises, while his wife Nadide Akbay was seriously wounded, stayed in a hospital in Lisbon for a period of time, was brought to Turkey and died in Hacettepe Hospital in Ankara on January 10, 1983. Dashnak originated Justice Commandos took responsibility for the attack, and the perpetrators could not be found.

Within about a year, five Armenian terrorists attacked the building of the embassy in Lisbon and killed a Portuguese police officer on July 27, 1983²²³. The embassy personnel responded to shooting and a Turkish bodyguard killed one of the terrorists. While the terrorists could not enter the embassy building-which was their main goal-,they occupied the Ambassador's Residence and took Chargé d'affaires Yurtsey Mihçioğlu's wife Cahide Mihçioğlu and his son Atasay Mihçioğlu hostage. The Portuguese government held a meeting led by Prime Minister Mario Suarez Presidency and decided for an armed intervention. The terrorists responded to the shooting of the Portuguese special forces. At a moment when shooting stopped, there was an explosion in the Ambassador's Residence. Four Armenian terrorists died, Cahide Mihçioğlu got seriously injured, was taken to a hospital and died there, and her son Atasay Mihçioğlu survived with relatively minor injuries.

This event caused the condemnation of the Armenian terrorism on large scale as it occurred within two weeks of the bombing at the Orly Airport which left 8 dead and 60 injured. Even US President Reagan felt the necessity of making a declaration on this, and described these events as barbarous and inhumane, and said "no complaint, whether it is real or imaginary, can legitimize horrific events of modern times." Briefly, the events in Lisbon, along with the Orly events, played an effective role in ending the Armenian terrorism.

Up until today, there have been some questions left without answers about the Lisbon attack. Why were the two big Armenian terror acts performed in Portugal where only a small number of Armenians live and where there are no popular political view excusing terrorism for any reason? It is known that terrorists are provided support by Armenians living in the countries which the terror acts are performed in. Who provided support in Portugal? Could it be the Gulbenkian Foundation in Portugal or the Armenians working for this

223 Information about the attack to Lisbon Embassy was taken from Bilal N. Şimşir's book "Our Martyr Diplomats" (Bilgi Publishing House, Ankara 2000). pp. 715-743.

foundation that provided this support for them? As it is known, Calouste Gulbenkian, who was an Ottoman Armenian, became very wealthy as result of his shares of Iraqi petrols and then used his wealth to collect pieces of art and exhibit them. Although it would seem quite appropriate, the idea that the Gulbenkian Foundation had a connection with Armenian terror could not go beyond being a doubt, and no proof was found on this matter. However, on the other hand, it was not released who helped those Armenian terrorists, of which none is Portuguese.

The second question is about the rationale behind the explosion in the Embassy. As it will be seen below, Dashnaks claim that terrorists (freedom fighters as they call themselves) chose to attempt suicide instead of surrendering. At those times, it was clear that suicide was not necessary since it was evident from the events that Armenians were not punished much in Europe. The normal thing to do would be to maintain the occupation as long as possible and make it heard in the public, and then to surrender. Thus, in a phone conversation with Chargé d'affaires Mişcioğlu, they stated that their aim was to have their case heard, that there was a text in the pocket of their friend who was shot, and that they wanted it to be published. This was not done. Then, at a moment when the Portuguese special team stopped shooting and when there was relatively a quiet moment, an explosion occurred. There are two different views on how this happened. The Armenian terrorists were not very capable of using explosive substances and guns since they were comparatively not trained well. Previously, there were such situations when they fired but could not shoot, and at least one of them had a bomb explode in their hand. Therefore, it is possible that the explosion in the ambassador's residence took place because of the lack of experience on the part of the terrorists.. The second possibility suggested by Yurtsev Mişcioğlu was that Cahide Mişcioğlu might have thought her son was dead -when, in fact, he fainted after he was hit on the head- and that she might have exploded the substances that can be easily arranged to explode when they are plugged in. Cahide Mişcioğlu, who was known as very patriotic and brave, had such a character that she was capable of doing this.

The attack by the Armenian terrorists on the Embassy was, in fact, a big failure since the Embassy Building-the main target as it is understood- could not be occupied; the text prepared by the terrorists could not be read out loud; and, moreover, five terrorists were killed. It is understood that this event caused a demoralizing effect on Dashnaks. However, after a while, this failure turned into a kind of heroism, a "precedent". According to this, people in question are freedom fighters who chose to attempt suicide instead of surrendering. By sacrificing themselves, they ensured that the Armenian case was heard on a large scale. Every year, Dashnaks hold ceremonies to commemorate the act and death of the five terrorists, called "The Lisbon Five". It is observed that,

this year on the 30th anniversary of the event, the ceremonies have been emphasized, and commentaries written on this issue have increased in number.²²⁴

On June 7, 2013, on the 31st anniversary of the attack on Erkut and Nadide Akbay, a monument dedicated to their memory, as well as to all diplomats and government officials fallen while on duty abroad, was launched.. In a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter, it was asserted that Cahide Mihçioğlu was also martyred as a result of Armenian

Slovakia's close interest in the Armenian genocide allegations can only be explained by the fact that Slovakia itself had annihilated its own Jews during World War II and by its desire to appear as the most sensitive country towards the genocide in order to justify itself or at least to be accused less.

attacks 13 months after the above-mentioned attack²²⁵. The opening ceremony of the monument was attended by the Turkish Ambassador in Lisbon, Ebru Barutçu Gökdenizler, and the Mayor of that region (Oeira), and relatives of martyres²²⁶.

This monument is the second monument dedicated to the memory of the victims of Armenian terror after the monument built in 2002 in the memory of Colonel Atilla Altıkat who was martyred in Ottawa in 1982 (please see the 'Canada' part).

18. Slovakia

In 2004, Slovakia, passed a decision to recognize the Armenian genocide allegations²²⁷. Later on, in 2008, with the efforts of the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Stefan Harabin, and, in spite of Foreign Minister Jan Kurbis's objection, it was proposed in the Slovak Parliament to add an article to the Slovak Penal Code about criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide allegations²²⁸. This article became a law in September 1, 2009. According to this, while only the denial of the Jewish genocide were to be punished up until today; this law has provided an opportunity for the imprisonment of those who deny other genocides for up to 5 years²²⁹.

224 As an example, Ara Khachatourian "Editorial: Remembering The Heroes of Lisbon 5" *Asbarez*, July 26, 2013; Antranik Kasbarian (Member of Dashnak Party Central Committee) "The lessons of Lisbon" *The Armenian Weekly*, August 1, 2013.

225 No: 162, 6 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Monument to Fallen Diplomats to be Unveiled in Lisbon. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-162_-6-june-2013_-press-release-regarding-the-monument-to-fallen-diplomats-to-be-unveiled-in-lisbon.en.mfa

226 "Memorial for the victims of ASALA" *Hürriyet*, June 9, 2013.

227 Ömer Engin Lütem, Olaylar ve Yorumlar. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Sayı 16-17*, ss 37-39

228 Ömer Engin Lütem, Olaylar e Yorumlar. *Ermeni Araştırmaları Sayı 30*, ss. 32,33

229 *Nouvelles d'Arménie Magazine* No. 184, April 2012, p. 29

Slovakia's close interest in the Armenian genocide allegations can only be explained by the fact that Slovakia itself had annihilated its own Jews during World War II and by its desire to appear as the most sensitive country towards the genocide in order to justify itself or at least to be accused less. Stefan Harabin helped Armenian militants about Armenian genocide allegations and he is still continuing helping. Stefan Harabin is still the president of Slovakia Supreme Court.

There is a Khachkar (a big stone cross) built in the center of Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, to commemorate "the victims of the Armenian genocide". President of the Armenian Constitutional Court Garig Harutyunyan and President of the Court of Cassation

Arman Mkrtumyan who visited Slovakia on April 4, 2012 placed a wreath on the khachkar. Stefan Harabin stated in his speech on this occasion that any Turkish official, regardless of his rank, or any other person who dared to deny the fact of the Armenian genocide in Slovakia would immediately be sentenced to 5 years in prison. The interesting point here is that Harabin would in fact be pleased by imprisonment of Turkish officials in the case that they denied the Armenian genocide allegations. We have already presented that Stefan Harabin, during his terms as the Justice Minister first, and then, the Deputy Prime Minister, had used extreme expressions on the Armenian issue; and that beyond embracing the Armenian genocide allegations, he acted and talked like an Armenian militant.²³⁰ His manners have not changed in five years. On this matter, it should be noted that any Turkish official who deny the Armenian genocide cannot be investigated, let alone be sentenced, because of diplomatic immunity. It is very surprising that a former Justice Minister and a current President of the Court of Cassation does not know this basic principle of law or that he does not want to take it into consideration even if he knows it.

As the Slovak Parliament recognizes Armenian genocide allegations, the Slovak Cabinet members visit the Memorial of the Genocide during their visits to Yerevan. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister Mirtoslav Lajcak visited the Memorial on October 10, 2012.

Finally, it is observed that Turkey, in spite of Slovakia's stance towards the Armenian genocide allegations, has made efforts to establish good relations with Slovakia. In this context, Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic's visit to Turkey on August 20, 2013 was successful, according to the news coverages²³¹.

230 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue 30, p. 33.

231 "Gül hosted for diner in honour of the President of Slovakia" *IHA*, August 20, 2013.

19. *Ukraine and Crimea*

There is a quite crowded and influential Armenian minority in Ukraine. This group has been making efforts for a decision recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations to be passed by the Ukrainian Parliament for year; however, this has not been possible because of the intense relations between Turkey and Ukraine, especially on economic arena. Nevertheless, attempts by the Armenians have been continuing²³². Lastly, a new draft decision on this matter was presented to the Parliament of Ukraine on June 6, 2013²³³.

It is observed that the strategy of passing decisions in the Ukrainian republics and in some cities with big Armenian communities was embraced since it was not possible to have it passed in the parliament. The best example of this is the decision passed by the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 2005, which could not be lifted despite the efforts. Moreover, some city councils such as in Kiev and Uzhgorod passed similar decisions²³⁴. Kiev City Council additionally permitted building of a monument for the Armenian genocide²³⁵. The same council requested the Ukrainian Parliament to recognize the Armenian Genocide²³⁶. On the other hand, some well-known Ukrainians have been making efforts for this decision to be passed by the Parliament.

While the Ukrainian Parliament did not pass this decision, Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko visited the Genocide Memorial in Yerevan during his visit to Armenia and left a wreath at the memorial. The Foreign Minister wrote in the memorial guestbook in the that the suffering of the Armenian nation in 1915 was not alien for the Ukrainian people who had experienced the most tragic page of their history in 1932-1933²³⁷. The Minister was referring to the famine, called “holodomor”, which had been caused by Stalin in Ukraine because of political reasons and had left more than 3 million people dead. The idea that this famine is genocide is quite prevalent in Ukraine. Therefore, the Ukrainian public and politicians are sensitive about the genocide allegations.

In the meantime, it would be useful to mention that the President of Ukrainian

232 There is a brief information about Ukraine’s stance towards Armenian genocide allegations presented in *Ermeni Arařtırmaları* Issue: 37-38, p. 150; Issue: 39, pp. 64-65.

233 “DRAFT Resolution of Armenian Genocide Recognition Introduced in Ukrainian Parliament” *Armenpress*, June 8, 2013.

234 “Uzhgorod City Council Recognizes Armenian Genocide” *PanArmenian*, May 20, 2010.

235 “Monument to Victims of Armenian Genocide to be Established in Kiev” *PanArmenian*, February 25, 2010.

236 “Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Urged to Proclaim April 24 as the Commemoration Day of the Armenian Genocide Victims” *Panorama.am*. April 29, 2011.

237 “Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pays Tribute to Memory of Armenian Genocide Victims” *Armenpress*, February 11, 2011.

Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn also visited the mentioned memorial in July 2011²³⁸.

The latest development on Ukraine is that two parliamentarians originated from Armenia has presented a draft law to the parliament on the recognition of mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1922 as genocide; and on commemorating April 24th as the day of genocide victims. The draft was discussed by Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations and was evaluated as unacceptable. Mustafa Jamil, a committee member and the Vice-President of the Parliament from Crimea, presented information on the matter and stated that such a proposal should be firstly investigated by historians and a joint decision should be reached; that, on the other hand, it was rejected considering the fact that such a decision may undermine the international friendship²³⁹.

Crimea is an autonomous republic of Ukraine. Tartars who are the main community in this region compose only 12% of the population since they were exiled in the times of Stalin. The majority is Russians with 58%. Ukrainians constitute 24% of the population. Armenians are 0.5%. Briefly, Crimean Tartars are a minority in their own country.

The Crimean Parliament passed a decision recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations in 2005. The cooperation of Armenians, a small community with bigger influence, with especially the Russians and that the majority of the members of the Crimean Parliament were not well informed about the events of 1915 played a role in this. This decision created discomfort in Turkey due to the fact that closeness between the Crimean Tartars and Turks to the extent of being same. However, as it is mentioned above, the Crimean Tartars were not in a position to prevent the passing of this decision as they have become a minority in their own country.

During a visit in early April 2013, the President of Turkish Grand National Assembly Cemil Çiçek stated, in a meeting with the Head of the Parliament of Crimean Autonomous Republic Vladimir Kostantinov, that the parliaments should not take decisions about historical events and it should be left to historians; that, although this decision was said to be lifted following the elections in 2012, this was not fulfilled; and, that, it would be appropriate to lift this decision as soon as possible²⁴⁰. While it was not known how the Head of the Crimean Parliament responded to this; Sergey Shuvaynikov, the

238 "Volodymyr Lytvyn Pays Tribute to Memory of Armenian Genocide Victims" *Armenpress*, July 11, 2011.

239 "Exemplary Genocide Decision from Ukraine Parliament" *TurkishNY.com*, July 30, 2013.

240 "The President of Turkish Grand National Assembly Çiçek is in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" *Zaman*, April 6, 2013.

presenter of the decision of 2005 objected to Çiçek's request and stated that the lifting of this decision would be an act of disrespect towards the large Armenian Diaspora in Crimea²⁴¹.

20. Uruguay

As it can be remembered, the Armenian Diaspora has been continuing to systematically bring forward genocide allegations against Turkey and has been trying to have parliaments of some countries take decisions on this matter since 1965, the 50th anniversary of 1915 events. In this context, the Parliament of Uruguay was the first parliament that recognized the Armenian genocide allegations in 1965. It has played an important role in this that there is a small but politically active Armenian community and almost no Turks in return, and that there is not a representative office of Turkey in Uruguay.

On March 26, 2004, Uruguay accepted a decision which recognized April 24th as "The Day of Recognition of the Armenian Martyrs" and obliged radio and television services to allocate part of their program to this event on this day²⁴².

Despite Uruguay's leading position in recognizing the Armenian allegations, the contacts between these two countries are not intense because of the geographical distance. However, upon Armenia's request, two high level visits to Armenia were performed by Uruguay in 2012.

The first visit took place in May 2012 by Uruguayan Foreign Minister Luis Almagros. During his visit to the Genocide Memorial, he stated that Armenian Genocide was a crime not only against Armenian nation but against the whole humanity²⁴³. In a press conference with Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, he made some statements reflecting Armenia's views; stated that the Karabakh issue should be resolved on the basis of self-determination; that Uruguay adopted the proposals of the Minsk Group; and, that this issue could not be resolved by military terms²⁴⁴.

The second visit was made by President of the Uruguayan House of Representatives Jorge Orrico in November 2012. Upon his visit to the Genocide Memorial, Orrico indicated that there was an Armenian Genocide Museum in Uruguay, and besides made a statement not quite meaningful like

241 Turkish Parliament Speaker Urges Crimea to Cancel Resolution Recognizing Armenian Genocide" *Arminfo*, April 9, 2013.

242 "Day of Recognition for the Armenian Martyrs" Uruguay, Bill Number 17.752, *Armenian-Genocide.org* http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.282/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html

243 "Uruguayan MFA Visited Tsitsernakabert" *Times.am*, May 4, 2012.

244 "Uruguay Thinks Karabakh Issue Should be Resolved on the Basis of Self-Determination" *Armenpress*, May 4, 2012.

“Armenia is an important strategic partner for Uruguay”²⁴⁵. (There is not even diplomatic representation of Armenia in Uruguay nor diplomatic representation of Uruguay in Armenia). Orrico and the commission in his accompany went to Karabakh and met Bako Sahakyan, the President of the Armenian Administration in this region, and mentioned about the possibility of Uruguay’s recognition of the “Republic” of Karabakh. Upon this incident, it was understood that Azerbaijan sent a diplomatic note to Uruguay²⁴⁶.

Lastly, preparation for opening an Armenian Genocide Museum in Uruguay were started on July 17. The museum was built by the Uruguayan Ministry of Education and Culture and the Armenian community. The museum will not only refer to the Armenian Genocide but also to the defense of human rights in general and the recognition of other genocides such as the Holocaust or the African genocides during slavery. It is planned to be launched on April 24, 2015²⁴⁷.

21. Vatican

The Papacy is a Christian Catholic organization with government status. Because of this feature, it can not establish close relationships with Muslim countries, besides it can be said that it has a prejudice against Muslim countries, however normal relations are tried to be performed as much as possible.

For Vatican, Turkey is important both in terms of foreign policy and religion. The Vatican wishes to have good relations with Turkey since it is the most powerful country in Middle East. On the other hand, Turkey has the lands that Christianity had firstly developed on, and only Christians were settled on these lands until the 11th century. Vatican tries to protect the religious works of art from the first period of Christianity in Turkey; to put convenient ones to use; and to protect cultural and religious rights of Christians and especially of the Catholic minority in Turkey. Moreover, the Vatican, in accordance with the relations with other Christian churches, has the policy of having close relations with Ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul which it recognizes its the ecumenical (universality) feature. In that sense, Popes have visited the Patriarchate in the previous years.

The Vatican has not faced any difficulty in cooperating with Turkish Governments on the issue of protection of Christian works of art in Turkey

245 “Armenia is an Important Strategic Partner for Uruguay: Jorge Orrico” *Armenpress*, November 13, 2012.

246 “Muchas Gracias, Uruguay” *The Armenian Observer*, December 14, 2012.

247 “Armenian Genocide Museum Launched in Uruguay” *Press Office of Diario Armenia*, July 20, 2013.

and of the rights of Catholics. In spite of this, Popes' visits to the Patriarchate have sometimes caused some problems. The main difficulty is that Turkey does not recognize the ecumenical feature of Patriarchate. In other words, it views the Patriarch as the religious leader of the Greeks in Turkey and not as the supreme spiritual leader of all Orthodox people.. However, the Vatican attaches importance to the Patriarchate because of its ecumenical characteristic. So much so that Pope Paul VI wanted to come to Istanbul just to visit the Patriarchate in 1967, but he was obliged to visit Ankara when Ankara insisted on the necessity of a visit to Turkey by the Pope as the head of the state. After this official visit, he particularly visited the Patriarchate in Istanbul. This method was also used for other Popes' visits. The

The majority of Armenians do not adhere to the Vatican as they are in the Gregorian sect. On the other hand, there is a small number of Catholic Armenians. Agacanyan, one of them, rose to the cardinalship position, and, even became one of the most important candidates for the office of pope in 1958.

The majority of Armenians do not adhere to the Vatican as they are in the Gregorian sect. On the other hand, there is a small number of Catholic Armenians. Agacanyan, one of them, rose to the cardinalship position, and, even became one of the most important candidates for the office of pope in 1958.

The Vatican still has the policy of having good relations with other Christian sects and in the meantime, of providing the recognition of spiritual primacy of the Pope. This issue becomes prominent in its relationship with the Gregorian Armenian Church. In return for better relations on a higher level, the Gregorian Armenian Church wishes the Vatican to recognize the Armenian Genocide allegations. It is doubtless that the Vatican, which had showed interest in the relocation of 1915 and even requested it to be halted, has received this request positively. However, because of the reasons stated above, it is understood that Vatican firstly rejected this to maintain the good relations with Turkey. Upon Turkey was recognized as a candidate for full membership to the EU, Vatican, in 2000, recognized the Armenian Genocide allegations²⁴⁸. However, wishing to make a nuance in this policy, Pope Jean-Paul II used the expression "Metz Yegern" (great disaster) which may have the same meaning in the Armenian language instead of the word "genocide" during his visit to Yerevan in 2001 and did not touch upon this subject again.

His predecessor Pope Benedict XVI, on the other hand, was mindful of not using the term "genocide" considering Turkey's stance.

248 Enough detailed information about Vatican's recognition of Armenian genocide allegations was once given in our journal. See *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue: 3, pp. 13-15.

Upon Pope Benedict XVI's resignation, it has appeared in a short span of time that the newly elected, Italian originated Argentinian Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, who took name Franciscus (Francis in English, Francesco in Italian, François in French) on March 13, 2013, recognized the Armenian Genocide allegations.. Cardinal Bergoglio made some remarks in this context. For instance, in a statement made in the opening ceremony of a Khachkar in Argentina in 2005, he stated that he wished to be buried underneath the stone after his death²⁴⁹; and in 2006, he urged Turkey to recognize the genocide as the gravest crime of Ottoman Turkey against the Armenian people and the entire humanity²⁵⁰; and in 2011, he condemned “the abominable crime of genocide that the Turkish state committed against the Armenian people between 1915 and 1923”,²⁵¹ and in a book composed of his interviews, which was published just after his election as Pope²⁵², he said, while mentioning the massacres made in the name of God, “The Turks did it with the Armenians, the Stalinist Communists did it with the Ukrainians and the Nazis with the Jews”

It is without doubt that his contacts with the Armenian community in Argentina and the decisions passed in the parliament²⁵³-which makes Argentina the country that recognized the genocide to the greatest extent- have been influential in Cardinal Bergoglio's persistent belief that Armenians were subjected to genocide. Undoubtedly, antagonizing Turks and/or Turkey in the context of Islamophobia would build a reputation in a Catholic country with a small Turkish community and a very small community of other Muslims.

Statements and acts of a cardinal would only concern the Catholic church in the country he is based in. However, statements of popes are very crucial as they are the spiritual leader of all Catholics and as they would not be in the wrong, based on their impeccability. On the other hand, their statements create political consequences, as they are heads of state of the Vatican in addition to their spiritual role. In this context, it might be expected that the new Pope would follow the steps of his predecessor Pope Benedict XVI on the issue of Armenian Genocide allegations. Besides, as the Vatican had recognized the Armenian Genocide allegations in 2000, there is no need for every pope to make this recognition.

249 *Armenpress*, April 3, 2012.

250 “New Pope Urged Turkey to Recognize genocide in 2006”*Asbarez*, March 15, 2013.

251 Harut Sassounian, “Will Pope Francis Repeat Cardinal Bergoglio's Words on the Genocide” *The Armenian Weekly*, March 19, 2013. Harut Sassounian,

252 Jorge Mario Bergoglio & Abraham Skorka *On Heaven and Earth: Pope Francis on Faith, Family and the Church in the Twenty Century* Image Publishing, April 2013, ISBN 978- 0770435066, p. 21.

253 Argentine National Assembly accepted two decisions recognizing Armenian genocide allegations and accepting the day April 24 as an off day in 1993, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.

It was surprising that during a meeting with a delegation of Catholic Armenians on in July 3, 2013, the newly elected Pope responded to a lady in the delegation who had said that she was a descendant of genocide victims; and stated that “the first genocide of the 20th century was that of the Armenians”. Moreover, it was covered in the press that he had stated, during an opening ceremony of the Armenian Embassy in the Vatican more or less on the same dates, that he wished to hold a religious ceremony in Yerevan on the 100th anniversary of the “genocide”²⁵⁴.

In a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry²⁵⁵ in the following days, it was stated that the Pope expressed views reflecting opinions of Armenians regarding the 1915 events; that this period needed to be understood in its entirety and such an exercise required a reliable factual basis, and that, for this purpose, Turkey had proposed the establishment of a joint commission composed of Turkish and Armenian historians. The statement went on by stating that “while, from the legal point of view, no competent international court had taken up the events of 1915 and while differing opinions among scholars clearly existed, third parties in authority should not exploit history for political reasons by passing one-sided judgments; what was expected of the office of the Pope, under the responsibility of the spiritual authority it has been endowed with, as to contribute to world peace instead of bringing out enmity from historical events. It also stated that the Holy See should refrain from taking steps that might cause harm to the bilateral relations between Turkey and the Vatican that may be difficult to repair.”

Therefore, briefly and clearly, it was stated that the Pope did not have the authority to decide on the 1915 events; that he should not bring out enmity by these events, and that bilateral relations would be harmed if he continued to support the genocide allegations.

Lastly, there has been news on the press that Pope will visit Istanbul Patriarche on November 30, 2014, an important day (Aya Andrea) for the Orthodox world²⁵⁶. It is doubtless that realization of such a visit would be due to the change in the Pope’s stance regarding the genocide allegations.

254 “Pope Plans to Attend 2015 ceremony in Armenia Amid Ankara’s Genocide Protest” *Armradio.am*. June 10, 2013.

255 “About Pope’s expressions about 1915 events” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website, Contemporary Explanations No: 163, June 8, 2013 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-163_-8-haziran-2013_-papa_nin-1915-olaylarina-iliskin-ifadeleri-hk.tr.mfa (English version “Press Release Regarding the Pope’s Statements on the Events of 1915” www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-163_-8-june-2013_-press-release-regarding-the-pope_s-statements-on-the-events-of-1915.en.mfa - No: 163, 8 June 2013.)

256 “Pope will come Turkey in November 2014” *Zaman*, July 15, 2013.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. European Union

European Union's decision to sign a Free Trade Agreement and partnership agreement with Armenia in the context of the Eastern Neighborhood Program caused an increase in the number of visits by European Union officials to Armenia. In this context, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the President of European Commission Manuel Barroso visited Armenia on July 4, 2012 and on December 1, 2012, respectively and left wreaths on the Genocide Memorial.

European Parliament's resolution "on a political solution to the Armenian question" passed in 1987 had recognized the Armenian genocide allegation; requested Turkey to recognize it; and stated that the refusal by the Turkish Government to recognize it would create an obstacle in Turkey's full-membership to the Union. In most of the resolutions passed by the Parliament, in accordance with the progress reports on Turkey that were issued following recognition of Turkey as a candidate for full-membership to the European Union in 1999, there were references to the resolution dated 1987. However, the important point here is that the resolutions passed by European Parliament in such issues have the characteristics of an advice. No prerequisite condition such as recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations were put forward during the membership negotiations. The decision dated 1987 and the references to this decision in the following years indicate the general idea about the Armenian genocide allegations in the Union. It is possible to claim that this general idea constitutes the basis for the visits of Rompuy and Barroso to the memorial.

The important point here is that the resolutions passed by European Parliament in such issues have the characteristics of an advice. No prerequisite condition such as recognizing the Armenian genocide allegations were put forward during the membership negotiations.

There is no information with regard to the mentioning of the genocide allegations in these visits, although it is understood that issues of normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations, and confirmation and implementation of the protocols were discussed. At the present time, while there have been many problems between Turkey and the Union, and the issue of membership of Turkey to the Union is in a deadlock; the executive organs of the European Union would not wish to create more tension in the relations because of the genocide allegations. On the other hand, it is seen that Diaspora has been trying to execute the idea that Turkey cannot be a member of the Union unless she recognizes the Armenian genocide allegations. For instance,

a Dashnak Newspaper titled *Asbarez*, which is published in the US, wrote a while ago that President of the European Parliament Martin Schultz said that the precondition of Turkey's membership to the Union was her recognition of Armenian genocide²⁵⁷. Although Schultz denied this²⁵⁸, those claims were repeated for a while.

2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

OSCE, which was founded in 1975 to help to end the Cold War with respect to some norms about security, human rights, and democracy among the European countries, has currently 56 members. This organization made a great effort to stop the war, which started on the issue of Karabakh, with a truce. The Minsk Group, which is responsible of resolving the Karabakh conflict, was established within this organization.

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Riccardo Migliori visited Armenia last year in February; visited the Genocide Memorial and stood for minute of silence. In his speech, he asserted that many countries did not know of the Armenian genocide allegations, time was needed for all to recognize this genocide, and this was the tragedy of not only Armenians but all of Christians of the world²⁵⁹.

There is not a single decision taken by OSCE about the Armenian genocide allegations. In this context, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of this organization should have avoided such remarks that could mean the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. Far from doing this, the President tried to bring forward a religious dimension to those events by claiming that it was a tragedy for the Christianity world.

3. Council of Europe

In a visit to Armenia, Jean-Claude Mignon, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, went to Genocide Memorial on June 1, 2013, stood for a moment of silence and wrote on the guestbook: "This touching visit to the Memorial perpetuates the sad memory of the innocent victims of the Armenian Genocide, Every day the European Council struggles not to allow the repetition of such a tragedy"²⁶⁰

257 "Genocide Recognition Precondition to Turkey's EU Bid, Says Euro Parliament President" *Asbarez*, September 18, 2012

258 "Martin Schultz dément avoir évoqué la question du génocide arménien" *Armenews.com* September 20, 2012.

259 "Time is needed in order everybody recognize Armenian genocide, Riccardo Migliori" *Armenpress*, February 19, 2013.

260 "PACE President: Turkey Should Accept Armenian Genocide And Face Reality" *Armenpress*, June 1, 2013.

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has not taken a single decision concerning the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. Jean-Claude Mignon should not have visited the mentioned memorial since he visited Armenia not in his personal capacity but on behalf of the Assembly, and he especially should have used such remarks that clearly reflected his recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations. From this point of view, it can be seen that Mignon went beyond his authority during his visit to Armenia.

In conjunction with this, we should indicate that Armenians have occasionally claimed that Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly have recognized the Armenian genocide allegations. With Mignon's visit to Armenia, the Armenian press has covered this issue again and it was stated in the press that the Assembly had adopted two separate declarations on the Armenian genocide in 1998 and 2001²⁶¹. However, there are no such declarations among the decisions of Assembly. On the contrary, among the documents published by the Assembly, there are two "written declarations": written declaration number 275 dated 1998 and number 320 dated 2001, signed by those who expressed their recognition of Armenian genocide allegations. The declaration, dated 1998, was signed by 51 people, whereas the declaration, dated 2001, was signed by 63. The number of the members in the Assembly, however, is 318. For a document to be adopted in the Assembly, it should be brought in to the agenda, put up for discussion, and voted on; and in the case of having the majority, it should be declared by the President. Two documents mentioned above were not decisions adopted by the Assembly since they did not go through this process. Moreover, on these documents, it is written: "This written declaration commits only the members who signed it." Therefore, it would be a deception to introduce these "written declarations" as the decisions of the Assembly.

In the past years, this method of introducing "written declarations" was also applied in other occasions. However, it is understood that Armenian militants did not refer to these since only small numbers of signatures could be collected. The last development regarding this issue occurred in 2010. A text prepared by Armenian members of the Assembly, proposing the recognition of genocide allegations, were to the Assembly by Jean-Claude Mignon who was administrating the Assembly as vice-president at the time. 20 people signed it²⁶².

Another deceptive event occurred in the United Nations. In a report on genocides presented to the Human Rights Subcommittee in 1985, the Armenian genocide allegations was presented among other examples. Since

261 "PACE President Paid Tribute to Memory of Armenian Genocide Innocent Victims" *Armenpress*, July 1, 2013.

262 Ömer Engin Lütem, "Facts and Comments" *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue: 36, p.64.

then, the Armenians have presented this as if the United Nations had recognized the genocide allegations. However, this mentioned report was just “noted” without any proceedings. In other words, it did not pass through the required processes and was not put to vote. Upon the insistence by the Armenians, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a declaration on April 30, 2007 and stated that the UN has taken no position with regard to the events of 1915 up until then²⁶³.

Another issue worth to be mentioned with regard to Council of Europe is about Jean-Claude Mignon’s remarks on Turkey during his visit to Armenia. According to the Armenian press²⁶⁴, he asserted that Turkey should recognize the Armenian genocide allegations; that this would be one of the most important steps towards its membership in the European Union; and, that Turkey should accept the “committed genocide” and face the history and reality. He also stated that there were quite many victims and human tragedies committed by Turkey. It is obvious that the President of the Assembly’s attitude has been very far from impartiality, which he has to adopt in the fulfillment of his duty, and it is rather in the manner of Armenian militants.

263 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement dated June 8, 2007 and numbered 89” *Ermeni Araştırmaları* Issue: 25, p. 18.

264 “PACE President: Turkey Should Accept Armenian Genocide And Face Reality” *Armenpress*, June 1, 2013.

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ARMENIANS AND SYRIA 1915 AND 2013

(ERMENİLER VE SURİYE: 1915 VE 1923)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Jeremy SALT

Bilkent University
jeremy@bilkent.edu.tr

Abstract: *This brief article takes as its starting point a parallel drawn by the British journalist Robert Fisk between the suffering of Armenians during the First World War and the suffering of Armenians during the current conflict in Syria. The author draws other parallels: between the manipulation of the Armenians and other ethno-religious groups to serve the interests of the entente powers between 1914-18 and the human consequences of intervention in present day Syria by western governments and their regional allies. Indeed, the entire Middle East and North Africa has been an arena for western intervention since early in the 19th century. The author looks at key events from the unfolding of the 'Armenian question' through to the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919, carried out under the aegis of the victorious wartime powers and ending in disaster for both Anatolian Turks and Greeks. The article challenges the historical division drawn between the perpetrators of violence and the victims of violence, showing that both were to be found in virtually all ethno-religious groups in what was at the time the most destructive war in world history. The author sees the acknowledgement of this reality as the true foundation of reconciliation between groups still clinging to deeply polarized historical narratives.*

Keywords: *Fisk, Armenians, Ottoman government, relocation, Justin McCarthy, Australia, Russia, Ottoman provinces, insurgency, Van, Third Army, Andonian papers, lobbyists, France, Kurdistan, wartime atrocities and trials, Assyrians, Balkan Muslims, Greek invasion 1919, Syrian Christians and Muslims, parallels 1915 and 2013.*

Öz: *Bu kısa makale İngiliz gazeteci Robert Fisk tarafından Ermenilerin Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında ve günümüzde Suriye'de çektikleri acı arasında kurduğu paralelliği konu almaktadır. Yazar başka paralellikler de kurmaktadır: örneğin 1914-1918 arasında Ermeniler ve diğer etnik-*

dini grupların itilaf devletlerinin çıkarları doğrultusunda manipüle edilmesi ile günümüzde Suriye'ye batılı hükümetler ve bölgedeki müttefikleri tarafından yapılan müdahalelerin insani sonuçları arasında. Gerçekten de Orta Doğu'nun ve Kuzey Afrika'nın tamamı 19ncü yüzyılın başından bu yana batılı güçler için bir müdahale alanı olmuştur. Yazar "Ermeni sorununun" gözler önüne serilmesinden zafer kazanmış savaş dönemi büyük devletlerinin himayesinde yürütülmüş ve hem Anadolu Türkleri hem de Yunanlılar için felaketle sonuçlanmış olan Anadolu'nun 1919'da Yunan işgaline uğramasına kadar birçok anahtar tarihsel olaya göz atıyor. Makale dünya tarihinin en yıkıcı savaşının gerçekleştiği dönemin şartlarında tüm dinsel-etnik grupları arasında şiddeti uygulayanlar ile bu şiddetin mağdurları arasında çizilen ayrımı sorgulamaktadır. Yazar bu gerçeğin kabul edilmesinin bugün hala derin bir şekilde kutuplaşmış bulunan tarihsel anlatılara tutunan gruplar arasında hakiki bir uzlaşının sağlanabilmesi açısından en temel dayanak olduğunu ifade etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Fisk, Ermeniler, Osmanlı hükümeti, tehcir, Justin McCarthy, Avustralya, Rusya, Osmanlı vilayetleri, ayaklanma, Van, Üçüncü Ordu, Andonian belgeleri, lobiciler, Fransa, Kürdistan, savaş dönemi mezalimleri ve yargılamaları, Asuriler, Balkan Müslümanları, 1919 Yunan İşgali, Suriye Hristiyanları ve Müslümanları, 1915 ve 2013 arasında paralellikler.*

In a recent article¹, Robert Fisk has drawn a parallel between massacres of the Armenians in 1915 and their suffering in Syria in 2013. This response is based on what happened to the Armenians during the First World War, what is happening in Syria now and where other parallels lie between these two periods of history.

For a long time Fisk's accusations against the Ottoman government were based on forged 'documents', the notorious Andonian papers, which purported to show that the Ottoman government sent orders to provincial officials to exterminate the Armenians. Most of his other claims are based on First World War propaganda or his own imaginative suppositions. The stories told to him by ancient Armenian survivors from the massacres of 1915 could have been matched by the tales of ancient Muslim survivors of massacres by Armenians, had he even been aware of their existence, had he bothered to travel to eastern Anatolia to talk to them before they, too, died.

For a long time Fisk's accusations against the Ottoman government were based on forged 'documents', the notorious Andonian papers, which purported to show that the Ottoman government sent orders to provincial officials to exterminate the Armenians.

With 1915 rapidly approaching, the cultural mainstream is going to be saturated with a wave of propaganda aimed at compelling the Turkish government to 'admit' that what happened in 1915 was genocide, i.e. the destruction of Armenians for no other reason than that they were Armenians. There is no debate on this issue, not because there is not a counter-narrative but because it is barred from being given a hearing.

The truth is apparently known to people who would have no idea of what happened in late Ottoman history outside what has been handed to them on a plate by Armenian propagandists or what they have read in deeply prejudiced, frequently dishonest or ignorant sources. The resolution passed by the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on this issue in 2010 is stamped with all these characteristics. Its claim that nearly two million Armenians were 'deported' is ludicrous, beginning with the fact that the Armenians were not deported but 'relocated' within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and ending with the fact that the number said to have been deported was close to half million more than the empire's entire Armenian population. In between there are many other facts that expose the falsehoods in this resolution.

¹ Robert Fisk, 'Nearly a century after the Armenian genocide, these people are still being slaughtered in Syria', *The Independent*, December 1, 2013.

History has turned into theology on this issue. To say that there is no God is to 'deny' his existence. That was the bottom line of the Star Chamber and the same tactic is used by Armenian lobbyists and propagandists around the world. 'Genocide scholars' use the same unscrupulous tool of 'denialist' to denigrate and marginalize those who disagree with their version of history. If they have a reason for going for the man instead of the ball, it is because their narrative cannot stand once the Armenian question is properly contextualised. It is for this reason that debate on the Armenian question has to be shut down before it starts. In this respect, the abuse of the U.S. scholar Justin McCarthy while visiting Australia was another salutary lesson to those who dare to stand up – and stand out – and say what they think is the truth. Professor McCarthy is a well-established scholar, a leading expert on the demographics of the late Ottoman Empire, with a long list of books and articles to his name yet none of this countered in Australia. The media took up the cry of the Armenian, Greek and Jewish lobbies that he was a 'holocaust denialist.' One of the worst offenders was the national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, one of whose reporters, Michael Brissenden, called Professor McCarthy 'one of the world's most strident genocide deniers.' The clamor the lobbies raised had the desired effect. Professor McCarthy was due to give a public lecture at the University of Melbourne and at the New South Wales Art Gallery but both venues refused to give him a platform after learning of his 'denialist' views. Having flown from the US to Australia, the only talk Professor McCarthy could give was at a small private function in a committee room in Parliament House in Canberra, arranged by the Australian Labor Party's Senator Laurie Ferguson. The abusive treatment of Professor McCarthy was an exemplary demonstration of media cowardice and ignorance in the face of determined lobbies, working in combination to close down open discussion and prevent Australians from hearing what they might be interested in knowing.

Against this background, here is a heretic's view of some of the key issues:

1. Numbers. The number of Armenian dead given by Armenian or pro-Armenian sources has fluctuated and continues to fluctuate depending on who you read. Estimates made at the end of the First World War on the allied side suggest between 600,000-800,000. The figures most commonly given in Armenian sources now alternate between about one million and 1.5 million. On the Turkish 'side' estimates range between about 300,000 and 600,000. There were about 1.6 million Ottoman Armenians and as hundreds of thousands survived the war the higher figure given by Fisk and others is not and cannot be correct. The Armenians suffered terribly, but in the interest of historical truth the claims that 1.5 million Armenians were 'massacred' in 1915 or even

during the whole course of the war have to be unequivocally refuted. The causes of death among the Ottoman Armenian population included combat, exposure, malnutrition and disease. Far more Armenians died from these other causes than actual massacre. What is never mentioned in the standard narrative is that probably between two and 2.5 million Ottoman Muslim civilians died in this war from the same range of causes. They are the ghosts never talked about because the news correspondents, consuls and missionaries were only interested in the suffering of Christians. The Muslims have disappeared from history as if they never existed.

2. Military necessity. Dismissed out of hand by Armenian propagandists and ‘scholars’ inside the genocide network, it is the crux of the argument from history on the Turkish ‘side’. The two relevant questions here are a) does a government have the right in international law to remove a rebellious population in time of war and b) did sabotage from behind the lines by Armenian armed insurgent groups represent such a threat to the war effort that the ‘relocation’ of the Armenians could be justified?

Apart from Armenians fighting in the Russian army, the Tsar formed special Armenian units tasked with ‘liberating’ east Anatolian Ottoman provinces in which the population was more than 80 per cent Muslim (largely Kurdish or Turkish).

Here the central issues include the role of Russia in using the Armenians as a weapon of war. Apart from Armenians fighting in the Russian army, the Tsar formed special

Armenian units tasked with ‘liberating’ east Anatolian Ottoman provinces in which the population was more than 80 per cent Muslim (largely Kurdish or Turkish). The Armenians were coaxed along with promises of autonomy in a region that would include conquered Ottoman lands. The striking power of these Russian Armenians was augmented inside the Ottoman Empire by tens of thousands of Ottoman Armenians. They cut lines of supply and communication, attacked military convoys and massacred Muslim civilians. Their violence reached a peak during the Russian-Armenian occupation of northeastern Anatolia from 1916-18. Towns, villages and cities were turned into a charnel house, with Russians officers shocked at the savagery of the atrocities being perpetrated by their Armenian protégés.

The Armenian insurgency - uprisings, attacks on military convoys and Muslim villages, the cutting of telegraph lines and the sabotage of

government buildings - in the first half of 1915 culminated in the uprising in the eastern city of Van. Thousands of Armenians were involved. They were well armed and well prepared, down to the trenches and tunnels they had dug and the uniforms they had fashioned for themselves. With no soldiers available, the defence of government positions rested in the hands of gendarmes (jandarma) and volunteers. After weeks of heavy fighting the Armenians triumphed. As the governor fled and the city fell, many thousands of Muslim civilians were massacred by Armenians within the city limits or in the villages around the nearby lake.

The revolt was launched in the middle of April and may well have been coordinated with Britain and Russia, and thus timed to take place as the British were preparing to land in Gallipoli and the Russians were about to launch a large-scale offensive around Dilman in northwestern Persia. The fighting in Mesopotamia, with the British pushing north from their foothold in Basra, may also have been part of these calculations. Having captured Van, the Armenians handed it over to the Russians.

On April 24, about a week after the launching of the Van uprising, the Ottoman government closed down the Armenian committees in Istanbul, moving the hundreds of people they arrested into the interior, mainly to Çankiri and Ayyaş, on the outskirts of Ankara. It is from April 24 that the Armenians date the 'genocide', when the critical date was when Armenians launched their revolt in Van about a week earlier. Given Armenian desertions from the army, actions of Armenian bands from behind the lines and the collaboration of Armenian revolutionary committees with the enemy, all that should be surprising about the action taken on April 24 is that it was not taken earlier.

Towards the end of May the Ottoman military command recommended that the Armenian population in the war zone be 'relocated' southwards into Syria. It is clear that the Van rebellion had brought a deteriorating security situation to a head. Since its shattering defeat at Sarikamiş early in 1915, the Ottoman Third Army had been in no position to defend northeastern Anatolia from Russian invasion and attacks from behind the lines. Launched in late 1914 the Sarikamiş campaign started well but ended disastrously when a blizzard swept across the mountains and tens of thousands of Ottoman soldiers, ill prepared for a winter campaign, froze to death overnight. The Third Army was decimated and unable to launch strategic offensives for three years. The civilian population of the entire region was virtually on its own. The military command had already moved some Armenians but after

Van, unable to stem uprisings and sabotage of the war effort from behind the lines, it finally recommended that the bulk of the Armenian population be ‘relocated.’

These facts are the core of the argument from military necessity. The attempts by Vakahn Dadrian and his Turkish protégé, Taner Akçam, to show that the Ottoman government met before the Van uprising and decided to annihilate the Armenians have no basis in fact. Both fortify their case with forged ‘documents’, namely the ‘Andonian papers’ and the so-called ‘ten commandments’. Handed to British officials by an Ottoman functionary after the war, this second piece of paper purports to show that ruling CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) figures sat around a table in Istanbul and took a decision to annihilate all Armenian men and convert their women and children to Islam. The British were then searching high and low for evidence they could use against the leading figures in the Ottoman government. They scoured the Ottoman archives, they raked through their own archives and they asked the Americans if they had anything but they could not find one incriminating document. Had there been any possibility of convincing the world that the piece of paper on which the ‘ten commandments’ were written was a genuine document the British would have jumped on it straight away but it was so obviously a fake they quickly discarded it. Yet in his book *Blood and Soil: A History of Genocide from Sparta to Darfur*, Ben Kiernan, the Director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, uses this bogus ‘document’ as the very foundation for his accusation of genocide against the wartime Ottoman government. These forgeries are not isolated examples because the Armenian case against ‘the Turks’ is buttressed with numerous fabrications, both textual and photographic.

The attempts by Vakahn Dadrian and his Turkish protégé, Taner Akçam, to show that the Ottoman government met before the Van uprising and decided to annihilate the Armenians have no basis in fact.

3. Conflation. Towards the end of maximizing the numbers of dead, Armenian lobbyists and propagandists have lengthened the time frame of the ‘genocide’ to 1922 or 1923, a period that includes the First World War, the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919, and the fighting in the Caucasus and southeastern Turkey that continued at the same time. In fact, each of these periods of history has to be examined separately. The fighting in the Caucasus over territory and resources (the oil of the Caspian Sea) involved the British and their western

allies, white Russians, Bolsheviks, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians and other ethno-religious groups in the Caucasian mosaic. They all killed each other and they all died from the same other causes, including disease, malnutrition and exposure.

At the same time France had invaded what is now southeastern Turkey, bringing with it an Armenian legion and intending to set up an autonomous or semi-independent Armenian 'state' under French protection. By agreement with Britain its territorial remit - 'sphere of influence' - ran as far north as Lake Van. For France southeastern

Turkey was part of *la Syrie integrale* – greater Syria – whose central attractions were the cotton fields of Çukurova and the deep water port of Eskanderun, tucked away in the corner of the eastern Mediterranean, which could be developed to create a trans-Mediterranean naval axis with Algeria. The French invasion triggered off a new wave of killing of Muslims and destruction of Muslim property which did not stop until both the French and their Armenian legion had been driven back by the Turkish nationalists.

Many if not most of the dead were Kurds and their killers were mostly Armenian, underlining the degree to which the conflict in eastern Anatolia was a continuation of an Armenian-Kurdish struggle over territory incited by the British in the late 19th century when they took on the 'Armenian question' and began to apply the word 'Armenia' to Ottoman provinces in which Armenians constituted a small minority.

4. The missing Muslims. No one knows with any semblance of accuracy how many Ottoman Muslim civilians died during the First World War, not to speak of those who died during the fighting which continued afterwards. More than 80 per cent of the Muslim population was illiterate and therefore incapable of writing down the story

of what they endured. The round figure already given of between two and 2.5 million Muslim civilian dead is no more than a starting point for discussion of numbers. Many Muslim civilians - half a million according to the figures compiled from Ottoman documents - were massacred throughout the course of the war. Many if not most of the dead were Kurds and their killers were mostly Armenian, underlining the degree to which the conflict in eastern Anatolia was a continuation of an Armenian-Kurdish struggle over territory incited by the British in the late 19th century when they took on the 'Armenian question' and began to apply the word 'Armenia' to Ottoman provinces in which Armenians constituted a small minority. The word used by the Kurds and even by the sultan and the Ottoman government was 'Kurdistan'.

Threatened by what appeared to be an attempt by the British to grant the Armenians autonomy in their traditional lands, the Kurds prepared to defend themselves.

Many of the crimes committed by Armenians during the First World War were recorded in documents written by Ottoman army commanders and provincial authorities when they were able to return to eastern Anatolia – the central killing grounds - in 1918. These accounts were not written for propaganda purposes as were the lurid allegations made against ‘the Turks’ by James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee in 1915-16. They were recorded solely for the information of the central government. This other truth blurs the divide between perpetrator and victim and threatens the Manichean narrative which lies at the heart of modern Armenian nationalism. If young Armenians ever conclude that their forefathers were perpetrators as well as victims, the national narrative will be exploded. This is why the countervailing narrative has to be closed down.

At the moment it seems psychologically, culturally, historically and politically impossible for Armenians to own up to the scale of atrocities (even if some admit there were a few) carried out by their forebears. Needless to say, as they insist decade after decade that ‘the Turks’ were responsible for genocide, they should be obliged to consider whether what Armenians did to the Muslims should be given the same label.

A more balanced appraisal of history might lead to a real reconciliation with Turks and Kurds on the basis of the mutual acknowledgement of the crimes committed by all their ancestors and the suffering of all the innocent whether Muslim or Christian. This point might be reached one day but at the moment it seems psychologically, culturally, historically and politically impossible for Armenians to own up to the scale of atrocities (even if some admit there were a few) carried out by their forebears. Needless to say, as they insist decade after decade that ‘the Turks’ were responsible for genocide, they should be obliged to consider whether what Armenians did to the Muslims should be given the same label.

The reports of Armenian atrocities came from across eastern Anatolia. These were killings on a large-scale and grossly inhumane in their nature. Babies thrown into bread ovens; people flayed alive or trampled to death by horses; people locked in barns or houses and burnt alive; people taken away en masse and killed out of sight of the

Russians. Ottoman forces entered cities strewn with bodies and even body parts. In their reports some Russian officers expressed revulsion at the behavior of their Armenian protégés and even accused them of seeking to exterminate the Muslims. While these killings brought Armenian violence to a peak, earlier killings of Kurds and other Muslims establish revenge as a motive for the mass attacks on Armenians as they were led south to Syria in 1915.

5. The trials. In his writings Taner Akçam pays considerable attention to the show trials held in occupied Istanbul under the aegis of the British authorities. These resulted in few convictions for crimes committed against the Armenians. In any case, the more authentic trials were those established by the Ottoman government following attacks on Armenian convoys in 1915. Commissions of inquiry were set up in late 1915 and about 1600 people court-martialled as a result. Some of those found guilty were executed and others were imprisoned, including Ottoman officials guilty of negligence or complicity. As news came through of attacks on the convoys the government in Istanbul sent coded messages to provincial officials demanding that they provide the Armenians with greater protection. There are many such documents in the archives and they clearly establish that in ‘relocating’ the Armenians the government did not have the intention of killing them.

That many of the provincial officials handed the responsibility of arranging the ‘relocation’ were incompetent, that numbers of them were actively complicit in the mistreatment of Armenians and that others were wilfully negligent is very clear. At the same time it would have been extremely difficult to organize such a mass movement of people when the military had its back against the wall on all fronts and all the necessities of life were being directed towards its needs. There was not sufficient food, medical care, transport and even armed men to guard the convoys. Civilians were in a desperate state and even many soldiers were dying of disease or malnutrition before they reached the front. The Ottoman government has to be held responsible for the calamitous consequences of the ‘relocation’ decision even if it did not know what those consequences would be. However, in acting on the recommendation of the military command, did the government have any idea of how badly things would turn out? Did anyone at any stage stand up and say ‘this can’t be done’ even if the military command had reached the conclusion that it had to be done? Almost a century later, there will probably never be clear answers to these questions.

6. Greeks and Assyrians. As both claim to have suffered ‘genocide’ at the hands of the Turks, here is some of the context generally missing from the standard mainstream narrative. In 1897 a Greek army attacked the Ottoman Empire and was beaten off. In 1912 the Greeks tried again in the company of Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro. The Ottomans were outnumbered and quickly overwhelmed on all fronts. The empire lost most of its territory on the European land mass and probably would have lost all of it had not the Balkan allies fallen out in 1913 and started attacking each other just as viciously as they had laid into the Muslim enemy. In the territories overrun by the Balkan armies the Muslim population was ethnically cleansed – as the process would now be called – for the second time since the 1870s. The intention of the Balkan governments was to obliterate the Ottoman presence in southeastern Europe and to kill or drive out as many Muslims as possible. Between 1904-1907 the Germans murdered or otherwise caused the death through their brutality of up to 100,000 Hereros in what is now Namibia. If this was the 20th century’s first genocide, the massacre and dispossession of Balkan Muslims in 1912-13 has to be regarded as the second, even if completely ignored by Kiernan and other ‘scholars’ in the professional genocide network. Justin McCarthy, has estimated that the Balkans war ended in the death of 632,000 Muslims, or 27 per cent of the Muslim population of the conquered Ottoman domains in Europe. Those who survived massacres and the pillaging of their villages by soldiers and the bloodthirsty *çeteler* (bandit gangs) following in their wake fled across the Aegean or on land towards Istanbul. Along with retreating soldiers they died en masse from disease, malnutrition and exposure. If they managed to reach Istanbul they were given shelter and medical treatment in mosques and converted government buildings. The fields along the approaches to the city were littered with the bodies of the dead and dying. Even now the extirpation of Muslims in 1877-78 and again in 1912-13 has virtually no place in ‘western’ histories of the Balkans.

In 1919 the Greeks invaded Ottoman lands again. The empire had by this time been at war since the Italian invasion of Libya (1911). Libya was followed by the Balkan wars (1912-13), then the First World War (1914-1918) and then the fighting which convulsed the Caucasus and what is now southeastern Turkey. To launch yet another war on this devastated land was an act of almost sadistic cruelty, but this is exactly what the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, as intense in his love of the Greeks as he was in his racist hatred of ‘the Turks’, and his dear friend, Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, did.

Ferried across the Aegean under the protection of an allied fleet, the Greek army landed at Izmir in May, 1919. The killing started immediately. The dead included Christians identified as Muslims because they were wearing a fez.

Theoretically, the Greek army was supposed to remain within a restricted zone centering on Izmir but it soon burst these bounds and began heading north in the direction of Istanbul and east in the direction of Ankara. Its trail was marked by massacres, arson, pillage and destruction in towns and villages. Arnold Toynbee was in the region at the time and described the Greek campaign as a war of extermination of the Turks. An Interallied Commission of Inquiry and the representative of the International Red Cross agreed. Finally held and defeated by the Turks in 1922, the Greek retreat to the Aegean coast was marked by the same atrocities and destruction the whole way. Armenian and Greek civilians supporting the invading army joined in the pillage and destruction of Muslim property. This criminal adventure ended in the population exchange of 1922, with 1.5 million Greeks uprooted from their homes in Anatolia and half a million Turks uprooted from their homes in Greece. Lloyd George and Venizelos have to be held directly responsible for this tragedy. With British troops facing the resurgent Turkish nationalists at Canakkale, Lloyd George was ready for yet another war as long as someone else would fight it but his appeals to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa to send troops fell on deaf ears.

The third ethno-religious group making allegations of genocide are the Assyrians, a tiny community based in southeastern Turkey and northwest Persia which was lured into the war by the promises of the British and the Russians but had no hope of standing up against the Ottoman army, the Turkish army or the Kurdish forces. Fleeing from their Ottoman homeland, the Assyrians joined their coreligionists in northwestern Persia before fleeing in the direction of Iraq, thousands dying on the way. Most of the survivors ended up in the Baquba refugee camp, north of Baghdad. They were acknowledged as being brave soldiers but prone to indiscipline and brutal behavior. In 1924 a group of Assyrian levies attached to the British army opened fire with machine guns in the central market of Kirkuk, killing hundreds of people; in 1933 a band of armed Assyrians provoked a major crisis by attacking Iraqi troops near the Tigris river, killing 34, wounding about 100 and mutilating the bodies of the dead (striking back, the army massacred hundreds of innocent people near the Mosul district village of Simel); when Kurds attacked the Assyrian camp at Baquba some of

those captured and killed had their heads cut off, according to the British proconsul in Iraq, Arnold Wilson.

7. So, who comes out of this with clean hands? No one, it seems. There were not perpetrators on one side and victims on the other. There were perpetrators and victims on all sides. Even during the ‘relocation’ many Muslims tried to help the Armenians and alongside the negligent Ottoman officials were those who, in extremely difficult circumstances, did their best to see that the Armenians in their charge were looked after. There is still no comprehension in mainstream ‘western’ histories of how devastating the war was for the Ottoman civilian population. When it ended people were digging barley out of horse manure and eating grass in the attempt to survive. Even during the war, in 1915-16, people were dropping dead from hunger or disease in the streets of Beirut and other Syrian towns and cities. In the mountains of Lebanon men who could not feed their families were wandering off to die alone in their shame. Whole villages were depopulated. The dire consequences of war, the draining of food, medicine and transport for the men at the front and the enormous death toll from diseases such as cholera and typhus among soldiers and civilians alike were worsened by the allied naval blockade of the Mediterranean coast, killing off cash economies and depriving farmers of spare parts needed for the irrigation of their crops. The locust plague of 1915 stripped crops and trees bare, adding to the general misery and destitution. The Arab historian George Antonius estimated that the civilian death toll in Syria alone during the war was about 400,000. Across eastern Anatolia, conditions were just as bad if not worse. The population of some provinces was reduced by 40 to 60 per cent. Hundreds of thousands of people fled the war zones and the survivors were left uprooted and starving not just in the Ottoman lands, but in the Caucasus and northwestern Persia. This was a war of annihilation, of an empire being

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put to the sword and fighting for its life and of minorities sucked into the maelstrom by the intrigues and false promises of the allied powers.

8. Finally we come to other parallels between 1915 and Syria in 2013. It is not just Armenian Christians being killed or driven out of Syria right now but all Christians. Two orthodox bishops are still missing, believed to be held in Aleppo by Chechens, if they are still alive; priests have been murdered and the ancient Christian city of Ma'lula attacked and its churches desecrated; in another recent attack on Ma'lula 12 nuns were taken hostage by armed men; only recently more than 40 Christians, men, women and children, were massacred in the village of Sadad. The black flag of Al Qaida has been hoisted over churches by the equally black forces of darkness unleashed on Syria by western governments and their regional allies. They have destroyed more than 60 churches and monasteries and driven tens of thousands of Christians out of their homes.

Only the Vatican is speaking out against these atrocities and the extirpation of Christianity in the lands of its birth. Western politicians who wear their Christianity on their sleeve when it suits them have had nothing to say about the Christians or the tens of thousands of Muslims who have died in Syria as the direct result of the intervention by the cohort of governments calling themselves, grotesquely, the 'Friends of the Syrian People', not to speak of the millions who have been displaced. If they are pulling back now it is only because they realize they have created a Frankenstein who threatens to turn on them, within their own borders and against their interests around the world.

For two centuries the 'west' and its local allies have been playing havoc with peoples' lives in the Middle East. They have played the minority card, the sectarian card, the civil war card, the invasion and occupation card, the assassination card, the sabotage card, the bribery card, the sanctions card, the economic boycott card and the overthrow card. They shuffle the pack according to need and so far they have shown they will stop at nothing to get what they want. This is the true parallel with the First World War. The world created in great power interests in 1918 is now being ripped apart in great power interests. Iraq has gone and Syria is being destroyed. The central lands of the Middle East are spilling over with refugees. The outflow from Iraq after 2003 was the greatest since 1948 and the outflow from Syria is as bad if not worse.

The Armenians and Assyrians got nothing back in return for their

support of the allied war effort. Promises made either were not kept or could not be kept. Thanks to the Bolsheviks the Armenians got their autonomous republic but the Assyrians ended up as refugees in Iraq or other countries prepared to take them in. The Arabs were deceived and betrayed. The only promise followed through was that made to the Zionists, and as was the case post-1918, so it is the case now: the greatest single beneficiary from the destruction of Iraq and the ongoing destruction of Syria is the colonial settler state implanted in the Middle East in furtherance of western strategies.

The suffering of Armenians in Syria today is only a fragment of the overall picture. The central lands of the Middle East are being ravaged in the most shocking fashion. Stirred up by the true enemies of God - the clerical sowers of fitna and the governments that support them - and unable to stand back and see the bigger historical picture, as relevant now as it was more than a century ago, of countries being destroyed in accordance with grand strategies developed in distant 'western' capitals, the people of the region again tumble into the traps set for them. Their governments and institutions disgrace themselves with their treachery, collaboration and abject surrender to money and power. Surely such a low point has rarely been reached in the history of the Arab and Islamic Middle East.

DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON OTTOMAN AND GERMAN POLITICAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(OSMANLI VE ALMAN SİYASİ, ASKERİ VE
EKONOMİK İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNE FARKLI GÖRÜŞLER)

Şükrü Server AYA & Prof. Dr. Ata ATUN
ssaya@superonline.com, ata.atun@atun.com

Abstract: *The purpose of this paper is to surf through history and emphasize some of the important events which took place between the Ottoman Empire and German Kingdoms like Prussia, Kingdom of Bavaria up to the ending of WWI.*

The importance of this paper is to put forward the immense political, social, judicial and military relations between Ottoman Empire and German Kingdoms for the past millennium.

At the request of Sultan Mahmut II, the appointment of Captain Moltke's (Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke), a young (Captain-officer) in the German Army, as an advisor to Anatolia in the year 1838, started the military interrelations between Ottoman Empire and Prussia. When he returned to Germany, he had written a book on Russian-Turkish conflicts and this raised the attention of Germans about Turks. Moeltke in 1857 was Chief of General Staff of Prussian Army for 30 years, and in 1871 he was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal.¹

This first initiative formed a strong base for a firm military relation between the two empires and the German-Ottoman relations reached to peak during the reign of Abdulhamid II. Prior to the foundation of Germany's National Unity, the relations at the time of reign of Bismarck came closer but Bismarck was a pacifist and did not want to get involved in the Eastern Question.

Abdulhamid II's sympathy (or need) of Germany started to establish cultural relations, some officers were being sent to Germany for education. Germany sent a Military Advisors group under command of Wettendorf. Few years later this was substituted by a larger group (1883-1895) under

¹ E. Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri, 1876-1907, Cilt VIII (Volume VIII)* (Istanbul, Turkey, 1962, Türk Tarih Kurumu Printing Office, ISBN 975-16-0020-0), p. 165.

Von der Goltz. German Deutsche Bank opened a branch in Istanbul and import of German military equipment and goods started.²

In 1888 Germans were given the right to operate the Istanbul-Izmit railway and extend it to Ankara. The portion from Eskişehir to Konya was completed in 1896. The plan was to complete the railway line all the way to Bagdad and Basra. Britain was competing with Germany to get the concession of this railway but the project was given to Germans.

These interactive military, social, cultural and economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and German Kingdoms got stronger each decade more than the previous and fortified the ties between the two countries.

Relations between German and Turkish States and people have been rather calm, cooperative and beneficial to all parties at all times.

Keywords: *Ottoman-German Relations, Abdulhamid II, Baghdad Railway, Britan*

Öz: *Bu yazının amacı I. Dünya Savaşı'nın sonlarına kadar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Prusya, Bavyera Krallığı gibi Alman Krallıkları arasında olan bazı önemli olayları vurgulamak ve tarihin içinde gezinmektir.*

Bu yazının önemi geçtiğimiz bin yıl içinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Alman Krallıkları arasındaki engin siyasi, toplumsal, hukuki ve askeri ilişkileri öne çıkarmasıdır.

Sultan II. Mahmut'un talebi üzerine Anadolu'ya 1838 yılında danışman olarak, Alman ordusunda genç bir yüzbaşı-subay olan, Yüzbaşı Moltke'nin (Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke) tayini Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Prusya arasındaki karşılıklı askeri ilişkileri başlatmıştır. Almanya'ya döndüğü zaman Rus-Türk çatışmaları üzerine bir kitap yazmıştı ve bu Almanların Türklere olan ilgisini arttırmıştır. Moeltke 1857 yılında 30 yıldır Prusya Ordusu Genel Kurmay Başkanıydı ve 1871 yılında Feldmareşal rütbesine terfi etti.

Bu ilk girişim, iki imparatorluğun sıkı askeri ilişkiler kurması için sağlam bir temel oluşturmuş ve II. Abdülhamit döneminde Alman-Osmanlı ilişkileri doruk noktasına ulaşmıştır. Almanya Ulusal Birliği kurulmadan önce Bismarck döneminde daha yakın ilişkiler kurulmuştur, ancak Bismarck bir pasifistti ve Doğu Sorununa dâhil olmak istemiyordu.

II. Abdülhamit'in Almanya'ya olan sempatisi (ihtiyacı) sebebiyle kültürel ilişkiler kurulmaya başlandı, bazı subaylar eğitim için Almanya'ya gönderiliyordu. Almanya ise Wettendorf komutasındaki bir Askeri Danışmanlar

grubunu gönderdi. Birkaç sene sonra (1883-1895) bu grup Von der Goltz komutasındaki daha büyük bir grupla değiştirildi. Alman Deutsche Bank İstanbul'da bir şube açtı ve Alman askeri teçhizatının ve mallarının ithalatı başladı (Karal, 1961, s. 174).

1888'de Almanlara İstanbul-İzmit demiryolunu işletme ve demiryolunu Ankara'ya kadar uzatma izni verildi. Eskişehir'den Konya'ya olan kısım 1896 yılında tamamlandı. Demiryolu hattının Bağdat ve Basra'ya kadar tamamlanması planlanmıştı. İngiltere demiryolunun imtiyazını kazanmak için Almanya ile rekabet ediyordu ama proje Almanlara verildi.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Alman Krallıkları arasındaki bu etkileşimli askeri, toplumsal, kültürel ve iktisadi ilişkiler her on senede daha da pekişti ve iki ülke arasındaki bağları kuvvetlendirdi.

Alman ve Türk devletleri ve insanları arasındaki ilişkiler her zaman için tüm taraflar adına oldukça sakin, işbirliğine dayalı ve faydalı olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri, II. Abdülhamid, Bağdat Demiryolu, İngiltere*

INTRODUCTION

Since its foundation in A.D. 1299, the spread of the Ottoman Empire firstly in Europe followed a pattern of power and use of all available technical means.

Sultan Mehmet's conquest of Istanbul in 1453 was made possible with the large guns cast by master Urban or Orban said to be of Hungarian origin. One of the gigantic guns can be seen in the British Museum, with a diameter of about 92 cm. shell weight of about 700 kgs and range of about 1,200 meters.

The Empire became famous, only after Constantinople (today's Istanbul) was conquered with an army of about 70.000 Turkish soldiers against what had remained in the city, about 10.000 Christian fighters, mostly Byzantine Orthodox and a few thousands of Venetian and Genovese professional soldiers. The Byzantines had to depend on the strength of their walls. The Pope had refused to assist Orthodox Christians because they had not become Catholics despite several calls. The city was emptied; the healthy ones that could afford had gone to other countries.

Sultan Mehmet's step mother is said to be Serbian – Christian Mara who raised Mehmet and later died in Serbia as Christian.

Sultan Mehmet was fluent in Greek. The Edict he gave to the Genovese of Galata, four days after Constantinople was conquered, can be seen in the British museum and also with contents.³

Mehmet's goal was Rome, and he identified himself strongly with Alexander the Great.⁴ Although born and raised Moslem, he was very liberal towards others religions, like his ancestors.

The first thing he did was to restore the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and assure the Orthodox of their faith and freedom. Next, in 1461, Armenians were let to settle in the city; a new Gregorian Patriarchate was founded independent from the one at Etchmiadzin. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Italians etc. were all embraced to restore trading, craftsmanship and bring the city into life.

2 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 174.

3 Ş. Server Aya, *The Genocide of Truth Continues But Facts Tell The Real Story* (Derin Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2010, ISBN 978-605-5500-07-8), p. 296.

4 Philip Mansel, *Constantinople, New York, 1996. St Martin's Press* (ISBN 0-312-14574-8), p. 6.

Birth of Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire kept on spreading and in the year 1517, Sultan Selim I. (B. 10.10.1470 - D. 22.09.1520) conquered Egypt and acquired the title of Khalif,⁵ God's representative and leader of all Moslems on Earth, a pious practice of the Islam religion. The lands ruled by the Mamluks (*Syria, Palestine, Arabia*) too entered under Sultan's domination.⁶

During the very same epoch Catholic Priest, later professor of theology Martin Luther, was reforming the religion introducing Protestantism faith in Germany. The Holy Roman emperor Charles V (1500-1558) had collected a Religious Congress in 1829 and prohibited the printing and spreading of the new Protestant Bible.⁷

The Lutherans had asked help from Suleiman to put up against Pope. We understand that Suleiman sent a messenger and letter and were on the side of the Lutherans (but later Protestants were to become arch enemy of Moslems). When the printing press was invented, a new development or renaissance in art and science was in fast progress, Suleiman who became Khalif and hence adopted the "Sharia law" in all establishments soon fell back on all modern developments and science.

Piri Reis, an Admiral who had an inexplicable map showing Africa, South America and some parts of the North with the precision of today's instruments was and had submitted a book he wrote on navigation in 1525, was hanged by order of the Sultan in 1554. Likewise, an observatory which was put into use in Istanbul was closed, because it was a sin to watch God and how he created the World. Shortly, when the western world was coming out of the dark ages, the Ottomans had pulled themselves the curtain of the holy book Koran over their heads and entered the "Moslem dark age" which continues even up to day.

An observatory was built in Istanbul with the grant of 10,000 Ottoman gold of Sultan Murat III, by "the soothsayer" (astronomer and mathematician) named Takiyuddin, who was originally an Arab master of astronomy and trigonometry, to be able to follow the movements of stars. It was started in 1578, and opened in 1579, equipped with best instruments of astronomy of the day.

Apparently he could tell what was to happen by looking at stars. A year later

5 Osmanlı Tarihi Ansiklopedisi (2013), "Osmanlı Tarihi Hakkında Ansiklopedik Bilgi, Hilafet" (Retrieved September 19, 2013, from <http://osmanliansiklopedisi.blogspot.com/2012/07/hilafet.html>).

6 İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, C.II (Volume II)* (Ankara, Turkey, 2011, Türk Tarih Kurumu Printing Office. ISBN 975-16-0012-7), p. 292.

7 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, C.II (Volume II)*, pp. 485-486.

(1580) the observatory was destructed in one day with cannon fire from the sea.

There are two rumors for the destruction.

One is that the Sheikul Islam issued a *fatva* for demolishing based on the rumor that the “soothsayer was watching the legs of the angels in the heaven”.

The second rumor is that an earthquake happened which was attributed to God’s punishment because of the observatory and the *fatva* was issued. Another live episode about the German version of the art of soothsaying will follow.⁸

A century later another courageous man, Hezarafen Ahmet Celebi (1609-1640) devised wings and in the year 1632 he flew from Galata tower to the other side of the Bosphorus. Sultan Murad IV, who saw the flying, was told that “this man could be dangerous since he could fly”. He was given a purse of gold as reward, but he was also exiled to Algiers where he died at a young age.

The army of the Ottoman Empire

In the early ages of the Empire, the Ottoman Army’s backbone was the “Janissary Corps”, who were recruited every five years from healthy mostly Balkan Christian orphan boys aged 10-12 and had the chance to become a high social class. The Janissary Corps were established in 1383, performed excellently in the conquest in Istanbul and other battles, owing to their strict discipline and brotherhood. They were the first regular army on salary with uniforms.⁹ They were permitted to marry only after retirement.

The great advantage of becoming a Janissary and join the conquests of other lands, was the right to share the plunder. One fifth of the plunder was Sultan’s share, the second one fifth is the State or Prophet’s share and the remaining three fifths was the “halal income” of the warrior. The enemy cities, who would surrender without fighting, were exempt from destruction and plunder.

Those which would resist were let free for three days for plunder by victors. This Ottoman battle rule was one of the reasons why the city Vienna was kept under blockade and no serious attack was made to conquer it in 1683, is said to be the Grand Vizier’s concern of the plunder of the city for three days after it was taken. The city was expected to surrender, since all logistic means were cut and they were out of food.

⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, C.II (Volume II)*, p. 118.

⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, C.II (Volume II)*, p. 517.

The Janissary corps in 1525 had made a major revolution against the palace; in 1648 it repeated and showed that this army had turned into a large group threatening the palace asking “bakshih” (since there were no victories and rewards) and even deciding for the fates of the viziers.¹⁰

By the time the Janissaries were disorganized and could not keep with the newly developed arms and engineering techniques in Europe.

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire could be stopped in 1699 with Karlowitz Treaty. The old war techniques and arms were no longer enough. Europe had undergone an important reform in culture, industry, arts, sciences, whilst the Ottoman Sultans no longer marched with their armies and preferred to enjoy their harem.

In 1730 in another revolt, Istanbul was raided; hoodlums got the control of the city. It was only in 1826 that Sultan Mahmut II, could wipe off the degenerated Janissary Corps and look for reorganization under existing great changes that had taken place.

In 1827 the Ottoman Navy was ambushed and totally destroyed at Navarro by the united Christian navy.

Capitulatory rights

Sultan Suleiman’s second great blunder was to bestow on French capitulatory rights to trade freely under Ottoman protection in empire’s lands in the year 1536. This capitulatory agreement was updated and became definite in 1740, when Europe was changing in industry, arts, culture and economy.¹¹

Actually this was an extension of the Edict¹² given to the Catholic Genovese colony in Galata, against their assisting Turks during the siege of Constantinople and in particular the dragging of Turkish navy into the Golden Horn, on a track of about two miles built by logs crossing over hills.

Accordingly, the unilateral benefits granted to industrially strong countries, plus the heavy restrictions of the Koran laws prohibiting simplest modern improvements, started to bring the end of the empire.

10 Mansel, *Constantinople*, p. 221.

11 Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, C.II (Volume II)*, p. 118.

12 Aya, *Facts Tell The Real Story*, p. 296.

Baltalimani Capitulatory Agreement with Britain and Ireland

The Turkish industry and trade was already at great disadvantage against western powers' concessions. Turks needed the assistance of Britain to put up against the revolting Mehmet Ali Paşa of Egypt. In those days most countries were levying taxes on both import and export of goods and raw materials. Britain, to favor the Turkish requests asked a new Trade Agreement which was signed on August 1938 at Baltalimani in Istanbul. This enabled Britain to import all raw materials without paying any tax, and sell their own production to Turks free of any customs tax. As a consequence, even street or house brooms were imported.¹³ "Made in Britain" cheap goods occupied markets wiping the remaining of the local industry. The same trade benefits were later extended to several other European Countries like France, Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Portugal and others.

The Prussian – Ottoman relations

The Prussian – Ottoman relations started in 1761 but it is said that an Army of Germans fought for the first time against Turks, during the second siege of Vienna in 1683, when religious wars and inquisitions dominated Europe. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations consisted of some 500 tiny city states and was only dissolved as late as 1806. We also know that once unified, Germany imposed heavy custom duties against imports from Britain and France. This gave the support for fast progress of German industry. Now they needed to sell to other countries their products, mostly competing with Britain.

Sultan Mustafa III tried to reform the army. Because of his interest in astronomy he had brought some books from France. He also brought human body organs made of wax for study of medicine.

He was astonished that Prussia rather a small state of the era, could win over the great Russia in the seven years wars (1756-1763). He believed that this could only be" achieved by having capable soothsayers". So he sent his ambassador to the Prussian King and asked for "three soothsayers" to be sent to him. King Fredrick told the ambassador "tell your Sultan that having a good army, training it during peace time ready to go to war and keeping the treasury full are my three soothsayers. Tell our friend your Sultan that there are no other soothsayers."¹⁴

13 Ş. Server Aya, *A Brief Hopscoch Stroll in the Ottoman History and Economy* (Booklet, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012), pp. 16-17.

14 E. Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789 - 1856), Cilt V (Volume V)* (Istanbul, Turkey, 2011, Türk Tarih Kurumu Printing Office, ISBN 975-16-0017-2), p. 165.

Sultan Mahmut II, had asked “military advisors from the Kaiser”; he sent Captain Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke to Anatolia in 1838. The Ottoman Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Paşa had revolted and was marching towards Anatolia with a modern army of about 40.000 men.

The Ottoman army was about the same size, but had no tents and had suffered seriously with epidemics in the past eight months. When both armies took positions, the Prussian officers who were the advisors told the commander in chief Hafiz Paşa that they could win if they would attack immediately. It was Friday, and the religious consultants inside the army said that “according to the Koran, fighting on Fridays is sinful”.

Next day the Prussian officers told that they should make a sudden surprise night attack, but again it was rejected since it would not fit the reputation and chivalry of Sultan’s armies. Meanwhile the Egyptian army started to encircle the Ottoman army; Moltke said that the army should immediately retreat. But again the Commander said that retreating would be cowardice. The Egyptian army attacked and within four hours the Ottoman army was lost with thousands of casualties and complete destruction.¹⁵

Moltke was later to return to Germany; he wrote a book about Turks, which created some interest in Germany to learn Turks. Moltke in 1857 became Chief General Staff of the Prussian Army for 30 years and he was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal.¹⁶ This very incident explains the great difference between mentalities of Eastern and Western countries.

Until the rise to power of Otto von Bismarck during the last quarter of the 19th century, Prussia’s attitude was basically sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time it refrained from acting in a manner that would distort what it considered to be more important interests, namely its relations with the other members of the Concert of Europe. Prussia did, however, act as a friendly mediator when possible, favoring the Ottomans in the negotiations regarding the Near Eastern crisis, which led to the Treaty of Edirne, signed in 1829, and also in the peace negotiations that followed the Crimean War between years 1853-1856.¹⁷

Ottoman Empire’s Relations with Great Powers of Europe

German-Ottoman relations reached to peak during the reign Abdulhamid II prior to the foundation of Germany’s National Unity, the relations during the

15 Karal, *Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri*, p. 141.

16 Karal, *Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri*, p. 165.

17 Edip Öncü, *The Beginnings of Ottoman-German Partnership* (Master Thesis, Ankara, Turkey, 2003, Bilkent University), p. 6.

reign of Bismarck came closer; but Bismarck was a pacifist and did not want to get involved in the Eastern Question.¹⁸

In the 1877-78 Russia's War against Ottomans the Turks were totally beaten and Russians came up to the location of today's Istanbul airport namely Yeşilköy or Agios Stephanos. The British intervened and sent their navy to the Bosphorus. Turks accepted heaviest peace terms and agreed to pay an indemnity of 30 million gold liras, when they were bankrupt.¹⁹

Britain arranged a new Conference in Berlin on 13.7.1878, to ease terms; Russians were given other concessions, such as the right to protect Christians in Ottoman Empire; Cyprus was leased to Britain against debts, to later become British as Crown Colony by the Order of the King.²⁰

Bismarck was not in favor of colonies in far away countries. Although there were some German settlements in New Guinea and Africa these were not satisfactory. On the other hand new colonies required a strong Navy, and Germany's geographical location presented some problems.²¹ For this reason Germany got interested in the fertile lands of Anatolia and thought that the alliance of Turks will be of great value for future wars against France, Russia and Britain.²²

Cultural Relations between Ottoman Empire and Germany

Abdulhamid II did not trust or liked Britain nor France. They had established large economic power in the Ottoman Empire through Christian businessmen exporting all commodities and even guns, which had become a free commodity for all citizens after the 1876 Edict of Restoration and declaration of Constitution guaranteeing rights of the citizens. Armenians were to use this freedom and many houses surely had more than one weapon, even for women.²³

Abdulhamid II's sympathy (or need) of Germany started to establish cultural relations, some officers were sent to Germany for education. Germany sent a Military Advisors group under command of Wettendorf. Few years later this was substituted by a larger group (1883-1895) under Von der Goltz. German

18 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 161.

19 Ş. Server Aya, *A Brief Hopscotch Stroll in the Ottoman History and Economy* (Booklet, Istanbul, Turkey, 2012), p. 34.

20 Aya, *Hopscotch*, p. 36.

21 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 170.

22 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 171.

23 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 173.

Deutsche Bank opened a branch in Istanbul and import of German military equipment and goods started.²⁴

In 1889, Emperor Giyom II or namely Kaiser Wilhelm II, visited Istanbul and became friends with Abdulhamid II. To honor his visit he gifted the “German Fountain” to the city of Istanbul, monument now in the Sultanahmet Square. Kaiser Wilhelm II continued his trip to Damascus, Jerusalem and Haifa where he was warmly received by Arabs and Jews; he showed that he was a friend of 300 million Moslems.²⁵

Industrial Relation between Ottoman Empire and Germany

In 1888 Germans were given the right to operate the Istanbul Izmit railway and extend it to Ankara. The portion Eskisehir to Konya was completed in 1896. The plan was to complete the railway line all the way to Bagdad and Basra. Britain was competing with Germany to get the concession of this railway, but the project was given to the Germans.

The Company formed to build the new railway line was financed 40% by Deutsche (German) Bank and 40% by the French Ottoman Bank. The remaining 20% was financed by various shareholders. The railroads that were built and opened, immediately contributed to the progress of farming and trading in the adjacent towns and villages. The investment was reimbursing the share holders. One very important incentive or capitulation given under this railway contract was that the geographical and topographic preferences were left to the Company. An area of 20 km on either side of the railway, totaling a band of 40 km wide was also left to the complete benefit of the Company, including all quarries, mines and other resources that were available on this wide strip of land, with the possibility of drilling new oil wells. There were rumors that Germany would resettle new immigrants from Germany and form a “de facto independent German land”. Britain was of course much disturbed with this expansion towards Basra which was their road to India.

Uprisings in Balkans

In 1912 with the support of Russia the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans (Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria) revolt and the Ottoman Army loses all fights and retreats towards Istanbul. More than five million Moslem settlers in those countries desert their villages and properties

24 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 174.

25 Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri*, p. 177.

and immigrate to Anatolia, many subjected to atrocities and murders to make them leave.

The western powers were happy with this large defeat of the Turks and loss of all their land in Europe. Their reaction was to send a joint force of 2700 soldiers (British-French-German-Austrian) in November 1912 to occupy key points in Istanbul “to protect Christians, in case the Moslems of Istanbul were to retaliate for the happenings in the Balkans. In this turmoil the Young Turks (Enver-Talat-Cemal and Friends) raided the office of the Grand Vizier with a “coupe de etat”. Enver became the Minister of War.

Turks needed not only new army discipline and training but also, arms, ammunition and money to pay the salaries of the army officers delayed for several months. .

The new government tried to please western powers. Reform of the gendarmerie was given to France; reform of Navy including purchase of two dreadnought class battleships from Britain with the donations of the people was given to Britain.²⁶ And the reform of the Army was entrusted to Germany again. General Von der Goltz was busy in reforming the Turkish Army since 1882 and him translated-published

more than 4000 pages of military lessons.

Alliance of Ottoman Empire and Germany in World War I

Ottomans had asked Kaiser Wilhelm II to send an “Army Reformation Envoy” in May 1913. The emperors sent General Liman von Sanders, who was reputed with his discipline plus a delegation of 42 officers in October 1913. Liman von Sanders was put on duty for 5 years with very wide authorities even equaling or surpassing the Minister of War.²⁷

The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28th, 1914 gave the Austro-Hungarian Empire the excuse to start the WW.I much earlier than what was anticipated by all parties. Germans needed Ottoman Empire’s man power and strategic location, the Ottomans needed an ally for the WW.I in sight, because their approach to Britain was rejected earlier and those to France and Russia, was likewise refused in the spring of 1914.

Turks needed not only new army discipline and training but also, arms,

26 Ş. Server Aya, *The Genocide of Truth* (Istanbul, Turkey, 2009, Istanbul Commerce University, ISBN 978-975-6516-24-9), p. 220.

27 Yavuz Özgüldür, *Yüzbaşı Helmut Von Moltke'den Müşir Liman Von Sanders'e Osmanlı Ordusunda Alman Askeri Heyetleri* (Ankara, Turkey, 1993, OTAM, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı: 4), p. 305.

ammunition and money to pay the salaries of the army officers delayed for several months. Alliance with Germany was inevitable and the young Minister of War, educated in Germany and liked by the Kaiser, grabbed the situation to drag the Ottoman Empire into the War, which had started in Europe on July 28, 1914.

Some documents revealing the alliance of Turkey and Germany in WWI history.

From Letter of Ambassador Wangenheim to German F.O. Constantinople July 24, 1914:²⁸

“The Turkish condition is that his Majesty the Kaiser leave the German military mission her in the case of war. In return, Turkey would obligate itself to find some form under which Supreme Command of Turkish army and actual command of one-fourth of the army would be transferred, at the outbreak of war, to the military mission. The negotiations should be carried out in strict secrecy, even as regards Turkish ministers...”

From Reich Chancellor to Ambassador in Constantinople, Berlin July 28, 1914:

<Par.3: Germany turns over her military mission in case of war. Turkey guarantees actual direction of (Turkish) High Command by the (German) military mission. >

From Text of Treaty of Alliance – Translation Therapia, Constantinople August 2, 1914:²⁹

P.42: < Massacres: Europeans and Americans have shown quite different reaction to the tales of Mohammedan being massacred and the tales of Christians being massacred. When the Christians have been the unfortunate victims, the incident has been headlined and dramatized and used as just one more example of the practices of the “bloody Turk”. On the other hand, when innocent Mohammedans have been the victim, likely as not the case has been disregarded or misrepresented. This has been particularly true since the Treaty of Berlin, which made the Armenians official wards of Britain>

P.46 < A Christian historian of the eighteenth century wrote: “European Christians should be ashamed of reaching into the gutter and fishing

28 Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent* (New York, USA, 1944, Farrar & Rinehart Inc), p. 16.

29 Tim Epkenhans, *Denkschrift betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde* [Memorandum concerning the fomenting of revolutions in the Islamic territories of our enemies] (Germany, 2001, Archivum Ottomanicum, vol. 19, pp. 120–163).

out these outdated stories of superstitious Oriental Christians". It is from such sources that common prejudices and misjudgments about the "the Turk" have originated. It is for this reason –to use Atatürk's words- that "the manner of depicting Turkey in the eyes of the civilized world is bristling with faults".

According to the agreement between the two countries, when the commander in chief was German, his general staff was Turkish. (Liman von Sanders and İzzet Pasha). When the Army Commander was Turkish, his general staff was German (Enver Pasha and General Bronssart von Schelledorf, 4th Army Commander Djemal Pasha and his general staff Colonel Kress von Kressenstein , 6th Army Commander General von der Goltz, his general staff General Ali İhsan Sabis, etc.).

The WWI German-Turkish military collaboration, discipline, chivalry is full of many unbelievable interesting episodes, such as the foresight of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli as Lieutenant Colonel and his fast appraisal by Liman von Sanders.

Another episode is the disastrous attack on the Russian Army at time of Christmas 1914 planned by Enver Pasha and his aide General von Schellendorf. Sanders was against this plan to be executed by the 3rd Army, because of high mountains, severe winter weather conditions, lack of logistics, food and even winter clothing. In spite of the sinking of three supply ships by the Russian navy which should have stopped the campaign before it started, Enver fired the 3rd Army Commander who was his teacher and was against this crazy attack with so many privations, and as deputy Commander ordered the attack which ended with the greatest military catastrophe, such as death of about 60.000 soldiers frozen like statues because of cold, starvation, epidemics etc. plus a serious resistance at mountain passes put up by the Armenian revolutionaries. This was the greatest and fastest defeat of the Ottoman Army because of self praise. But both von Bronssart and Enver Pasha were up in the front lines in deep snow during this disaster and escaped from falling prisoner to the Russian army, since they had their horses and left just in the nick of time.

On the Suez Canal Front in February 1915, we read that an army of 12.000 crossed the desert on foot in several days, carrying even their pontoons to cross the canal. This impossible mission was accomplished because Von Kressenstein had gone to the area earlier and dug some water wells which made this crossing possible. The British were expecting Turks since they were informed earlier, Turks lost 2.000 soldiers and returned back to Palestine defeated, but the crossing of the dessert on foot both ways became history.

In Bagdad Area, the 6th Army intercepted General Townsend's Army which came from India and was to take Bagdad. The British Army was surrounded and left without food and any other outside aid. The soldiers started to eat draft animals but the soldiers of India would not eat. After a blockade of about 5 months the army of 13,400 men surrendered to Turks. This victory at "Kutulamara" in 1916 by the 6th Turkish Army is marked in history and Townshend was kept as prisoner in Istanbul, Büyükkada. After he was freed under the Mudros Cease Fire in October 1918, he preferred to live on the island until he died in 1924.

The Commander of the 6th Army, Colmar von der Goltz, was sick of typhus in Bagdad and died of high fever not seeing his army's victory. He asked to be buried in the garden of the German Embassy in Therapia with both German and Turkish flags on his coffin. The irony is that Goltz died because of typhus. Typhus is a microbe carried with lice from one body-clothing to another and is common "when the person or clothes are not washed and kept clean". Typhus was one of the best servants of angel Gabriel in all armies, killing in wards even without fighting. (The very last US Ambassador in Istanbul Abraham Elkus, could not leave in 1917 when the diplomatic relations were cut. He too was sick of typhus, but made it through).

The memories of Turks and Germans fighting and dying together as strong comrades are beyond any praise.

The memories of Turks and Germans fighting and dying together as strong comrades are beyond any praise. However, after the WWI ended and both Germany and Turkey surrendered, the procedures with the Kangaroo Courts set up both countries are soaked with injustice, travesty and shame. In Istanbul a Court Martial decided for the execution of several defendants (including Ataturk and all his aides) in absentia. And those put on trial could not have a lawyer to defend, no written minutes were kept and they were more like lynching courts.

The leaders of the CUP government had taken refuge in Germany with a submarine. Djemal Pasha went to Tbilisi where he was murdered by an Armenian assassin. Talat Pasha had kept his identity in secrecy in Berlin, but Armenians found and killed him in the front of his house in mid March 1921. This part is no news, because Armenian Nemesis were killing any Turk they could find, including Grand Vizier Said Halim in Rome.

The year 1921, like every year between World War I and Adolf Hitler's rise to power, was for Germany one of gloom, political life had not yet recovered from the shock caused by the overthrow of a form of government deeply rooted

in the history of the people. The newly empowered Reichstag was prey to wild party strife, which made the formation of a stable government difficult.

The trial of the murder of Talat Pasha proved to be a most shameful comedy, because the killer Tehlarian was found innocent whilst the victim Talat Pasha was found guilty of killing Armenians previously in Turkey. The German Judges gave in to the Armenian and Victor's pressures.

Liman Von Sanders and the German Protestant pastor Dr. Johannes Lepsius deposed in the court as experts. Liman Von Sanders did mention anything about the German Ambassador of the era and also him being the Commander in Chief of the Ottoman Army. He did not testify against Talaat but he also did not tell the truth in full extend but a quarter of it only. Accordingly his testimony was against rather than pro.

The trial of the murder of Talat Pasha proved to be a most shameful comedy, because the killer Tehlarian was found innocent whilst the victim Talat Pasha was found guilty of killing Armenians previously in Turkey.

Although an appeal notice was sent to Bronsart Von Shellendorf, he wasn't called as a witness to the court. After the final verdict of the court, he published an article in a newspaper as a reaction to the court's verdict.

Conclusion

Existing historical exposes that:

- 1- Relations between German and Turkish States and people have been rather calm, cooperative and beneficial to all parties at all times.
- 2- The Protestant-Catholic Missionaries in the Ottoman Empire were too few to disturb peace. Excluded is the slander of fanatic Dr. Lepsius, who spent about a month in Istanbul being briefed by Armenians and Morgenthau and was not welcome by the German Embassy.

The book written by Franz Werfel "40 Days at Musa Dagh" was not based on realities but it did tremendous addition to the prejudices and antagonism against Turks in general.

- 3- The German Press and Government's "black hole of historical knowledge" continues most strongly up to date in magazines, TV programs, news, and speeches of ignorant politicians over shading the historical facts and the perfect comradeship between the two brave and

decent people by lies proven to be fake or doctored by irrefutable documents. Unfortunately the German academia, press and other institutions have not taken the trouble to go deep enough into this subject to discover that:

- a. Any one that would read the full notes of the Solomon Tehlirian's case on "<http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2009/06/2893-full-transcript-of-soghomon.html>" will surely notice that all witnesses were those provided by the defendant and who told tales to the court and Jury, but the two most important witnesses of everything from A to Z, Generals Liman von Sanders (commander in chief of all armies) who was directly responsible for the actions of Ottoman Armies under his command, deposed in the court as an expert only but not the Commander in Chief of the Ottoman Army. General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who had the authority to sign official documents on behalf of the Minister of War were not invited by the court to tell what he knew. After the final verdict of the court, he published an article in a newspaper as a reaction to the court's verdict.

None of the around 10,000 German officers serving in the Ottoman Army during this period invited or called to the court as a witness.

Interested parties can also see page 363, note # 37 of "The Genocide of Truth". Truth seekers can also refer to "<http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2005/07/78-german-officers-genocide-eyewitness.html>" and read the written declaration of General Von Schellendorf as printed in "*Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 342; July 24, 1921.*"

The "German court and jury in the turmoil of 1921 when Hitler was about to become a solution", undoubtedly committed a judicial crime by "condemning the victim for being guilty and acquit the criminal with compliments for a murder committed in Berlin on the street. Is it not the time for Germany to "study their own records, books and authentic documents of their own Generals and other officers who were in service throughout the Empire and responsible for the initial orders to the ruling government? This paper is a formal invitation by the researcher, to meet and prove that the "genocide allegation and related propaganda documents" are nothing but unfounded lies, not even one supported by authentic document or established laws and rules for international crime declarations.

- b. Isn't the German Press and media aware of the 22.000 Armenian Legion soldiers who served Hitler (4.800 of them SS) who rounded

up Jews and sent them to death Camps when Turkish Diplomats (Ambassador to Vichy, Ex Colonel Behic Erkin, Iron Cross Medal of first degree for the services in WWI) saved over ten thousand Jews and had them transferred to Turkey saving their lives?

These are all in several books, in internet in documents. How anyone can be that naive not to see all this or that the Armenian Legion leftovers ruled the Berlin Blackmarket up to 1950's when they started to be transferred to USA with affidavits?

Why not even one Nazi-Armenian “displaced person” did not utter a single word about any massacres in the past by Turks when they were in Germany?

This “money swindling industry through victimization started after 1960's” and those who are not eager to “defend truth and decency” as a minimum need for global harmony and peace, should think more than twice when blaming other persons or nations based on hearsays and the shameful of all by not even “asking an opposite view” or defense.

This “money swindling industry through victimization started after 1960's” and those who are not eager to “defend truth and decency” as a minimum need for global harmony and peace, should think more than twice when blaming other persons or nations based on hearsays and the shameful of all by not even “asking an opposite view” or defense. All decisions are made in absentia for different types of benefit. This is a shame, and the writer of this paper cordially invites the “sensitive or responsive parties” to take this paper as an introduction in discovering truths.

The WWI casualties are estimated about 37 millions, 16 millions dead. All states who suffered these great losses have forgotten the past and restored peace. The name of Armenia does not even count among the countries with large losses but they have been largely fabricated and spread around and today the world forgets all the facts and busies herself to propagate the Dashnakist Armenians lies who make a living on this fanfare. Written evidences from Armenian and neutral sources are too many, for those who tale the trouble to learn truth themselves and not what liars (politicians, media, press, academia, etc. etc.) propagates taking their readers as absolute dupes.

EPILOGUE

These “**black pages**” in the relations of the two nations has not been studied deep enough and the German media and press sympathize with present Armenian genocide propaganda, to a degree that Armenians are about to

introduce books in the German school system, and give birth to a new “German-Turkish animosity” by huge distortions, thanks to the absolute indifference of Turkish institutions or authorities. Nowadays we find very few persons interested “to learn the truth”, and of course much lesser persons who spend their lifetime to “defend truth” and avoid frictions created by lies or easygo propagandas. Regrettably some political parties [some with a few Turkish politicians in Germany] easily join the lynch mobs based on hearsay only.

Germany is the number one trade and moral partner of Turkey practically on most things, technical, education, health and too many fields to count. There are over 4000 German Companies who invested in ventures in Turkey. There are about 3.500.000 Turks living and most of them working for Germany. **In short, Germany has been the Number One supplier of everything Turkey needs, in the path of civilization.** The above question is posed because of the apparent shortage of justice in the Middle East. This study may be interpreted as a sincere question to ask if “you now have replenished your century old shortage or later dictatorial defects of justice”, wouldn’t you think of exporting or donating some of this most precious commodity to friendly countries and save all time friends from political and judicial suffocations?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We kindly extend our gratitude to Dr. Latif Çelik for his studies and contributions on the Turkish-German relations and his outstanding book detailing the trails of Ottomans in Europe.

We also convey our thanks to the chairs Prof. Dr. Ramazan Çalık, Prof. Dr. Eckhard Pache and the members of the Organizing Committee of Uşak University and the Würzburg Maximillians University, for organizing the II. Turkish-German Relations with Historical and Cultural Aspects Symposium.

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THE ARMENIAN REPORT OF BRITISH WAR OFFICE, GENERAL STAFF: "HISTORICAL AND ETHNOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE ARMENIANS" (5TH APRIL 1918)

((THE ARMENIAN REPORT OF BRITISH WAR OFFICE, GENERAL STAFF:
"HISTORICAL AND ETHNOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE ARMENIANS"
(5TH APRIL 1918))

Assist. Prof. Dr. Tolga BAŞAK

Atatürk University
Institute of Atatürk's Principles and History
tbasak@atauni.edu.tr

Abstract: *This study presents the report of the British War Office, General Staff on "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians." In the light of cyclical international developments of the era in which this report was written up, some evaluations are made. The report written in the last year of I. World War includes some information on Armenian history. Aside from assessments related to Turkish-Armenian, Armenian-Kurdish, Armenian-Georgian, Armenian-Russian and Armenian-Iranian relationships some statistical information on Armenian population are submitted in this report. This study also mentions the policy of British War Office on Armenians and lastly some statistical information revealed in this report are surveyed and compared with some other information given in different sources.*

Keywords: *First World War, Armenian Question, Armenians, Armenia, British War Office.*

Öz: *Bu çalışmada İngiliz Savaş Bakanlığı Genelkurmay Başkanlığının "Tarihsel ve Etnolojik Açından Ermeniler" başlıklı raporuna yer verilerek raporun kaleme alındığı dönemin uluslararası konjonktürel gelişmeleri ışığında bazı değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır. Ermeni tarihiyle ilgili bilgiler içeren rapor I. Dünya Savaşı'nın son yılı içinde hazırlanmıştır. Raporda Türk-Ermeni, Ermeni-Kürt, Ermeni-Gürcüü, Ermeni-Rus, Ermeni-İran ve Ermeni-Azeri ilişkilerine ait değerlendirmeler yanında Rus ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Ermeni nüfusuna ilişkin istatistiksel veriler sunulmaktadır. Adı geçen veriler kaynaklarıyla beraber incelenmiş ve diğer kaynaklardaki bazı verilerle karşılaştırılarak genel bir değerlendirme yapılmıştır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *I. Dünya Savaşı, Ermeni Sorunu, Ermeniler, Ermenistan, İngiliz Savaş Bakanlığı.*

Introduction

Political initiative and concerns as a result of military evaluations constituted an important aspect of the Armenian question that began to appear in international politics towards the end of the 19th century. Ottoman Armenians began to take part in international discussions after Russia's military victories against the Ottoman State. The military and political potential that the Armenians could utilize within a crumbling empire began to be noticeable by the imperialist powers at that time. Russia's attempt to unilaterally use this potential triggered Britain's worries about the eastern dominions,¹ which caused a rivalry problem² to gain an international character.

The 1877-78 Turkish-Russian War and gains Russia made with the Treaty of San Stefano were milestones in this process. The British ambassador in Istanbul Layard considered the conquest of a part of Eastern Anatolia by Russia to be a great blow to British interests. While in his letter sent to London, Layard stressed the dire nature of the situation;³ the British Foreign Minister of the time Lord Salisbury stated that His Majesty's Government too could not stand idly by the unfolding events Asia Minor.⁴ In the end Russian gains were curtailed in the Berlin Congress and the arrangements of San Stefano that would have caused the Armenians to be subject to Russian influence were revised.⁵ From this point onward, Britain attempted to remove the potential of the unilateral use of the Ottoman Armenians from Russian hegemony. With such British attempts, the Armenian question began to be discussed in the international platform in different guises and justifications, the foremost being the issue of reform. This British political stance borne out of rivalry and military justifications carried the Armenian question to Europe's congresses and conferences, and eventually carried it all the way onto the Treaty of Sevres in the 20th century.

The change in Britain's policy regarding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State also affected the Armenian question. Just before the outbreak of World

1 James Long, *The Position of Turkey in Relation to British Interests in India*, East India Association, London, 1876, pp. 9-13.

2 Münir Süreyya Bey, *Ermeni Meselesinin Siyasî Tarihçesi, (1877-1914)*, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, Yayın No: 53, Ankara, 2001, p. VII.

3 Arman J. Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, from the 1830's to 1914*, London, 2003, pp. 64-65.

4 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Volume: LXXXII, Turkey No: 36 (1878), *Correspondence Respecting the Convention Between Great Britain and Turkey* of June 4, 1878, No. 1, The Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Layard, Foreign Office, May 30, 1878.

5 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Volume: LXXXIII, Turkey, No: 22, (1878), *Annex to Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano*, pp. 14-15; House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Volume: LXXXIII, Turkey, No:37, (1878), *Map Showing the Territory Restored to Turkey by the Congress of Berlin*, London, 1878, p.1; House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Volume: LXXXIII, Turkey, No: 44, (1878), *Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East*, Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878, Article; LVIII, pp. 27-28.

War I, Russia had gotten Britain’s permission to use Armenians for political and military purposes. At the same time, the 1878 arrangements that prevented Russia from unilaterally exploiting the Armenian question were cancelled. Upon Russia’s initiative in 1914, an international conference was convened in Istanbul and the Armenian question was updated in the light of other political agendas.⁶

World War I carried the use of the Armenian reforms problem for the projects of establishing influence on the Ottoman Empire and disintegrating the state onto a different platform. In conjunction with the changes brought forth by the international conjecture, the Armenian question’s potential began to be used by Britain and Russia.

The great powers’ stances on the Armenian question during the World War were shaped by the same interest-based impulses. The war had to be finished in favor of the Allies as soon as possible. The first step toward this goal was taken in the form of a Russian-Armenian cooperation⁷ in conjunction with Armenian insurrection. The second concrete step was the “*massacre of the Armenians in Turkey*” propaganda propagated by Britain. A propaganda campaign was begun that contained stories of Armenians in Turkey being deported, of Armenians being subjected to massacres, and even of attempts at exterminating them as a group of people. The result of this campaign was a work produced by the British War Propaganda Bureau (Wellington House) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office called “The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916, Miscellaneous, No: 31.”⁸

The last step in this process was taken after Russia was knocked out of the war in 1917 by the Bolshevik Revolution. During this period the Russian area of conquest in Eastern Anatolia and Caucasus was attempted to be protected by Armenian gangs and soldiers. During 1917-1918, a British-Armenian military alliance occurred in the east. Britain resorted to the policy Russia employed at the outbreak of the war in order to fill in the void in the Eastern front left by the retreating Russian army, to protect the petroleum region in the Caucasus and to prevent the Turkish union project that posed a threat to Britain’s colonial

6 *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Report and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, Part: I, Series: B, The Near and Middle East, 1856-1914, Volume: 20, Editor: David Gillard, Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1985. p.433; *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, Volume: X, Part: I, *The Near and Middle East on the Eve of the War*, London, 1936, pp. 531-532; 545-546; 548; Stefanos Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar, Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta Doğu*, İstanbul, 2000, p.132.

7 The National Archives of United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/2147/74733, P. Stevens to Foreign Office, 29.10.1914; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/2147/74733, *Consul Stevens (Batoum)*, to *Foreign Office*, October 29, 1914; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/2146/68443, *Francis Kinby (Ruster on Don)* to *Foreign Office*, November 7, 1914.

8 *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916, Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon with a Preface by Viscount Bryce*, Misc No: 31, Cmd 8325, H. M. Stationery Office, London, New York and Toronto, 1916. For information relating to the effects of British propaganda during the World War I on the Armenian question, please see: (Tolga Başak, *İngiltere’nin Ermeni Politikası*, İstanbul, 2008, pp. 196-228).

empire. Armenian troops and gangs were given military assistance, and they were used in line with British war policies.⁹

The British-Armenian alliance project put into place in Eastern Anatolia and Caucasus with military plans and justifications, in short time, resulted also in political initiatives. In an effort to bolster the Armenians' will to fight, the British government attempted to motivate the Armenians by using the "Independent Armenia" discourse and promises expressed by Russia in the beginning of the war. In this way, Britain added political content to military cooperation. Lacking any alternatives, the Armenians, meanwhile, wanted to use the British for their political future.¹⁰ The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with the sympathetic plans and projects it devised, made serious references to an independent Armenia that would be established after the war.¹¹

The British-Armenian alliance project put into place in Eastern Anatolia and Caucasus with military plans and justifications, in short time, resulted also in political initiatives. In an effort to bolster the Armenians' will to fight, the British government attempted to motivate the Armenians by using the "Independent Armenia" discourse and promises expressed by Russia in the beginning of the war.

The British War Office, under conditions of war, handled the Armenian question as a propaganda tool, and the propaganda bureau, Wellington House,¹² carried out what it was tasked. At the same time, however, according to the War Office, Britain was not to commit

to any obligations regarding the political future of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia and Caucasus.¹³ In relation to this, the British War Cabinet that convened in London in 1917 proposed protection by the USA for Armenia.¹⁴ This stance of the British Government was to be the backbone of its post-war Armenian policy. The War Office's realistic perspective on the Armenian question and especially on "Independent Armenia" resulted from time to time in disputes in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

9 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3284/75611, "Memorandum Regarding the Support Afforded to the Armenians", *Department of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office*, April 29th 1918.

10 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3062/234125, Mr. Stevens (Tiflis) to Foreign Office, December 10, 1917; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3062/219773, War Office to Mr. Balfour, Secret, No: 0149/4786 (M.0.2), 29th October, 1917; *Lord Bryce to Lord Robert Cecil*, November 5, 1917; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3016/208687, *General Barter to C. I. G. S.*, No: 1332, 24 October 1917; *Foreign Office to Sir C. Spring Rice (Washington)*, No: 4687, 2 November 1917.

11 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3018/237859, *Foreign Office to Mr. Stevens (Tiflis)*, No: 5, December 13th, 1917; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3062/234125, *Foreign Office to Mr. Stevens (Tiflis)*, December 13th, 1917; TNA. PRO. FO. 371/6561/E 14000, *The Case for Armenia, The British Armenia Committee*, London, 1921, s.6-8; Artin H. Arslanian, "British Wartime Pledges, 1917-1918", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume: 13, Number: 3, (July, 1978), pp. 517-529.

12 TNA. PRO. CAB. 24/3, G.102, s.2.

13 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3018/237859, *C.I.G.S to General Shore*, December 17th, 1917; *Foreign Office to Sir C. Marling (Teheran)*, No: 353, December 16th, 1917.

14 PRO. CAB. 23/13, *War Cabinet 308a Secret, Draft Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.*, on Monday, December 31, 1917 at 4 P.M., pp. 2-4.

After World War I, the War Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office began to view the Armenian question from different angles. Military evaluations developed a context that was suitable for the conditions of the region. Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in line with its previous promises and its role as the Champion of the Christian world, exploited to the limit the Armenian question and its potential for use. During the arrangements that were to be made in Paris, the warnings made by the War Office¹⁵ with regards to Turkey in general, and Eastern Anatolia and the Armenian question in specific were not heeded. As a result of this, it was decided that an important part of Anatolia would be established as Armenia under the Treaty of Sèvres.¹⁶ Politicians, who had disregarded the warnings of British War Office, were forced to completely change their stance on the Armenian question at the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Since, generally speaking, the Armenian question kept being updated in periods throughout and after the war, British war circles would prepare reports about the Armenians and the Armenian question, and send such reports to political platforms for evaluation. One such report was made up of notes sent by the British General Staff to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office six months prior to the end of World War I. These notes primarily contained some information and evaluations regarding Armenians and Turkish-Armenian relations, and contained a historical narrative of the Armenian question. Alongside these, the report also provided population statistics for pre-war Eastern Anatolia and Caucasus. Dated April 5, 1918, the report was titled "*Historical And Ethnological Notes On The Armenians*".¹⁷

15 TNA. PRO. CAB. 24/89, G.T. 8292, *War Cabinet*, "Military Policy in Asia Minor" Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 9th October 1919; HLRO. LG/F/206/4/14, "Erzurum and the Western Boundary of Armenia" *General Staff War Office*, 11.2.1920, B. B Cubitt, (WO) to Secretary of the Cabinet, 12 February 1920; TNA. PRO. WO. 106/64, "The Situation in Turkey, 15th March, 1920", s.8-9; TNA. PRO. CAB. 24/103, C. P. 1035, "Treaty of Peace with Turkey", *Copy of letter from Marshal Foch to Mr. Lloyd George*, March 30, 1920; TNA. PRO. CAB. 24/103, C. P. 1014, "General Staff Memorandum on the Turkish Peace Treaty", *The War Office*, 1st April, 1920.

16 *Traité Entre Les Puissances Alliés et Associées et la Turquie Signé Le 10 Aout 1920, A Sevres*, Texte Français, Anglais et Italien, pp.190-191.

17 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/34105/204335, "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, pp. 1-10.

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HISTORICAL AND ETHNOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE ARMENIANS.

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APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.—Statistics as to Armenians.

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Without attempting any chronological survey or detailed statistical consideration, it may be useful to summarise briefly the historical and ethnological background of some of the more salient Armenian problems. A note as to numerical distribution is given in an appendix.

1. *Independent Armenia.*—The most important fact in this connection is that the Ottoman Turks have been in possession of Armenia since Selim I.'s conquests of 1514. An independent Armenia, with varying boundaries, existed at various times before that date, but it would be fair to say that its final extinction took place in the first quarter of the 11th Century (1021); the subsequent Kingdom of Lesser Armenia, mainly in Cilicia, was admittedly a transplantation. It does not, therefore, seem profitable here to do more than pick out a few special points in pre-Ottoman Armenian history.

- (a.) Throughout the first 1,000 years of our era, the Armenians were a buffer between the Roman and Byzantine Empires and the various Eastern Empires, which included Persia, Mesopotamia and, under the Caliphs, Syria. During this period their fullest independence was attained when the power controlling Asia Minor was in active rivalry with that controlling Mesopotamia and Persia, and, as against the Parthians, when the Armenians held the lower Araxes Valley (roughly, first three centuries A.D.).
- (b.) Owing to geographical difficulties and owing to the fact that Armenia never became more than a nominally vassal state of Rome, the Armenians never experienced Roman influence to any very great extent; the same causes, *plus* the religious difference, affected relations with Byzantium.
- (c.) The Armenians were converted to Christianity by St. Gregory, the Illuminator, about a hundred years before the partition of Armenia between Rome and the Persian (Sassanian) Empire in 387 A.D. This, together with the standardisation of the Armenian alphabet and the translation of the Bible, helped to fuse the people together, but the final break off from the Roman Church at the end of the 5th Century rendered them additionally isolated from European influences. The most striking feature of Armenian nationality has been the centring of its aspirations and traditions round the Gregorian Church, but it was this narrow intensity that ruined Armenian relations with Byzantium (later represented by Moscow) and with Rome, and left the Armenians to struggle unaided against the early successes of Mahomet. Only when they moved out of their true home, the Armenian Plateau, to the plains of Sivas or to Cilicia, do they seem to have shown themselves capable of collaboration with other Christians.

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(d.) In spite of the bond of religion, the Armenians seldom displayed much cohesiveness; the high plains, running roughly east and west, were, as a rule, separated by difficult parallel ranges, and neither of the Empires, to the west or the east, could spare the energy fully to absorb them. Consequently the prevailing *régime* seems to have been one of numerous native nobles and foreign adventurers, at times coalescing under a particularly strong leader or succession of leaders. "Some were vassals of the Greek Emperor, some of the Caliph; some were Moslems, some were Christians, some were Armenians, and some were Kurds; some were descendants of Arabian Emirs and their servants." This more or less feudal *régime* was modified to an important degree by the pressure of the Seljuks and the resulting tendency of many Armenians to move further westwards towards Sivas and south-westwards towards Aleppo. The seal was set on this process by the Emperor Basil II transplanting the "dynasty" of Van to Sivas (1021), and by Michael IV. transplanting the Bagratid dynasty (centred in the middle Araxes and Arpa Chai valleys) to Cilicia. The result was a great diminution in the Armenian nobility left in the old "Armenia." Three centuries of struggle amongst themselves, the Kurds and the Seljuks sufficed almost entirely to eradicate them, leaving the Armenians constituted as a peasant population with a marked proportion of persons engaged in commerce and rudimentary industries, and with the clergy as the leaders in their country.

(e.) The Bagratid Kings (886–1041), mentioned above, are important as marking a period of national power and heroism and of a considerable consolidation of rule over the chief districts of present-day Armenian population in Russian Trans-Caucasia. The historical tradition of this kingdom, though exaggerated, is still of influence, especially in conjunction with the position of Échmiadzin, now the religious capital, which is also in Russian Trans-Caucasia, near the town of Erivan.

2. *Geographical Distribution.*—(For number and percentages, see Appendix I.) The true home of the Armenians may be considered to be the high plateau,* intersected by mountain ranges running roughly east and west, and bounded on the north by the Pontic Mountains; on the south by the Eastern Taurus and the Alps of Kurdistan, on the west by the Euphrates from its passage through the Taurus to Erzingan, and thence north across very difficult country to the Pontic Mountains; on the east by the Hakkari, the heights east of Lake Van along the Turco-Persian frontier, the Agri Dagh (the Ararat Range), and the tumbled mass of inward curving offshoots of the Pontic Alps. The word Armenia will be used throughout these notes as signifying the above-mentioned stretch of country. Both the northern and the southern frontiers are far more definite than the western or eastern; the Pontic and Taurus Mountains each present a wall pierced by only two important lines of egress or ingress, in the former case the Erzerum—Baiburt—Gumishkahé—Trebizond route and the passage of the Chorokh to the sea, in the latter case the Bitlis Gorge and the Haini and Arghana Passes. Consequently the Arabs never got a hold on Armenia, and it was from the east, and later the west, that Moslem invasions took place; so too, except for the Trebizond—Tabriz caravan route, the Black Sea has never played any part in the development of the Armenians, who have always been, and still are, despite their dispersion, an inland people with no maritime abilities or traditions. West of the Euphrates the country gradually develops into the plains of Sivas and the steppes of Anatolia, the centre of the Osmanli Turks, where the Armenians and the Kurds have never been more than scattered immigrants. To the east of Lake Van and Erzerum the closing in of the offshoots of the Eastern Taurus and the Pontic Mountains has resulted in the knot of mountains of which Ararat is the culminating point; their general course is south-easterly from the Chorokh to Ararat, then almost due south. But they do not present an insuperable barrier, in spite of the great altitude of the whole country. In particular, the Araxes, rising in the Bingeul Dagh, south of Erzerum, flowing east, forces a way through the gap between the Aghri Dagh and the Soghanlu Mountains, and thence forward in Russian Trans-Caucasia forms a rich and attractive valley. Having comparatively easy communication both with the Eastern and Western Euphrates, the three valleys have been at all times main lines of movement. So too the mountains south of Ararat, before they become entangled in the Hakkari, have always proved

* Its average height is about 5,000 feet, but many of the plains are much higher, e.g. 7,000 feet.

passable for Oriental peoples or armies, moving from the rich lands round Lake Urmia or the valleys of the Kizil Uzen Su and its tributaries to the plains of Van, Melashkert and Mush, which lead on to the Eastern Euphrates. Armenia, as described above, was not entirely the true home of the Armenians, for from very early times they appear as inhabiting the middle Araxes and Arpa Chai basins, centreing round Erivan and Alexandropol, but on the whole their increase and diffusion in Russian Trans-Caucasia took place later than in Armenia. Van preceded Ani as a national centre.

Though the chief feature of the distribution of the Armenians is that they usually form minorities, an important compensating factor is to be found in their occupation of the richest lands of Armenia, and of Erivan, Kars and the Upper Kura; the plains, e.g. of Van, Mush, Bulanik, Palu, Alashkert, were in 1914 still thickly studded with Armenian villages, and were original centres of Armenian life. Their agricultural ability was combined with commercial aptitude and skill in handicrafts, which favoured their collection in small towns, and eventually led to their colonies being found in most of the towns of Turkey and Trans-Caucasia. The development of these "town" Armenians has been so great that as a people they can be sharply differentiated between "progressive" money-makers engaged in commercial, financial or industrial pursuits* and hardy peasants of considerable education, but not naturally inclined to the doctrinaire westernism of the "town" leaders. Inter-marriage between the two is stated to be very rare. Parallel with this distinction, according to some authorities amounting to a physical distinction, there is also the natural difference due to their dispersion. The Armenians around Tiflis are naturally marked by wide divergencies from those of Mush, or the Turkish-speaking Armenians south-west of the Euphrates, or the great Constantinople colony. Finally a third line of cleavage may be noticed in the strong hostility shown between Gregorians, Roman Catholics and Protestants,† though the last two are in very small numbers.

3. *Armenians and Turks*.—Following on the passage of the Seljuks through Armenia to Anatolia (11th Century onwards) and the chaotic and desolating succession of Seljuk, Kurdish and Armenian chieftains, the Ottomans finally conquered Armenia in the beginning of the 16th Century. Their policy towards the Armenians was largely bound up with their attitude towards the Kurds, and will be summarized in paragraph 4. As Christians, the Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire were organized in *millet*s under ecclesiastical chiefs, with absolute authority in civil and religious affairs, and as regards certain criminal offences. The result of this system, which gave them religious freedom, and the right to manage their educational and municipal affairs, was to foster strong communal feeling and enterprise, which eventually developed into a definite national consciousness. The influence of the Armenian Church was thus increased by the Turkish policy, but the prominence of the ecclesiastics as civil leaders affected adversely their spiritual leadership, and also stimulated their conservatism. From 1839 onwards the tendency to break away from this rigid ecclesiastical organization received assistance from the Sultan, and a lay Armenian *intelligenza* grew up, originally as the rival of clericalism. Later transformed by the example of the Balkan States and European revolutionary ideas, they stood out more and more as the upholders of violent action to attain autonomy or even independence. Their increasing power and the desperation caused by the failure of their hopes in 1878 was in part responsible for Abd-ul-Hamid's reversal of the previous Turkish policy towards the Armenians. The subsequent relations between the Turkish Government and the Armenians, except for an interval after 1908, were as bad as could be; it does not seem necessary to trace them here (see also paragraph 6), but it may be pointed out that the Armenian Church consistently opposed the schemes of the extremists and their committees, that the oscillations and jealousy of the European Powers enormously weakened the position of the Armenians, and that, though Armenian revolutionary propaganda was undoubtedly very active, it seems doubtful whether it made much progress except among the Armenians in the towns.

Apart from the Kurds, the Armenians are also, in the north and east of Armenia much intermixed with Turks (and Turkomans). In many districts (e.g. in the Erzerum and Erzingan districts) there are villages composed of Armenians and Turks, while west of the Euphrates, in full Turkish land, the Armenians are scattered broadcast among the Turks, mainly in the towns. Prior to the last fifty years they seem to have lived

* The clergy also were recruited mainly from the town class.

† But recently this hostility has much decreased, the Protestants even having been admitted to the Gregorian National Assembly.

side by side without much hostility, but the renaissance of Armenian nationalism and the cruelty and extortions of the centralised administration and police created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, before the massacres made their mutual relations almost intolerable.

4. *Armenians and Kurds*.—Whether the bulk of the remaining Armenians in Turkey remain under Turkish rule or not, this is the centre of the Turkish Armenian problem. The two races, before the war, were much intermixed in their distribution and throughout history they have been closely connected; this was accentuated by the gradual extension north-westwards and northwards of the Kurds, following on the Seljuk desolation of Armenia and Ottoman encouragement. Although some Kurdish tribes have become sedentary and shown aptitude for agriculture, particularly in Northern Mesopotamia, the two races may fairly be contrasted, the one as agricultural cultivators of the plains, the other as pastoral nomads or semi-nomads of the mountains. The necessity of coming down to less bitter and inhospitable lands in winter, the movements in search of pasture, and the mutual economic requirements of the two peoples have always perpetuated difficulties, but prior to the 19th Century their relations do not seem to have been particularly bad. The Ottoman policy favoured the Kurds as a semi-independent bulwark against Persia and as capable of maintaining a feudal authority over the Armenians in addition to their own tribal authority. The Armenian peasantry thus became *rayahs* and enjoyed the protection of their overlords as against the attacks of any other Kurdish chieftain against them. Religious toleration was extended to the Armenians, as to the other Christians in Turkey; ever since the strong hostility between Armenians and Kurds religious differences have played a minor, or artificial, rôle. The Kurds are sub-divided between Sunnis and Shiihs, with a considerable element of Animism and eclectic Paganism. They are of Iranian, not Turanian, race, and speak a variety of Kurdish dialects some of them akin to Persian. Their connection with the Turks is mainly Governmental, and their attitude to them chiefly influenced by the policy of Constantinople towards them. This policy as outlined above was changed in the beginning of the 19th Century when Sultan Mahmud initiated an era of centralization and of official Ottoman administration among the Kurds and the Armenians. Somewhat later the interest of the European Powers in the Armenians, beginning about 1830 and increasing during the course of the century, had a bad effect on the Kurds. This was fatally aggravated by Abd-ul-Hamid's policy after the Russo-Turkish war of setting the Kurds against the Armenians. Arms were distributed to the former, the *Hamidieh* were raised and the massacres organized. At the same time the Kurds were further encouraged, and as far as possible compelled, to take to agriculture and cultivate barren hills or the richer lands of the Armenians. After 1908, the C.U.P. attempted to mend matters and had some success, particularly in the reduction of Ibrahim Pasha's Milli Confederacy, but they could not undo the fatal mistake of assisting to arm the Kurds. Since the war they have reverted to Abd-ul-Hamid's ideas and have far surpassed him in the success of their efforts to exterminate the Armenians. But it should be noted that not all the Kurds have joined in the massacres of the Armenians; little more than tribal consciousness exists among them, and they are scarcely as yet capable of applying any methodical, "nationalistic," policy. During the 1915 massacres, in particular, some of the Kurds of the Aleppo *vilayet* and those of the Dersim (the wild tract of country roughly between Kharput and Erzincan), have shown themselves friendly to the Armenians. There is strong reason to believe that the recent terrible accentuation of the Armeno-Kurdish problem is in part artificial and that, given a strong Government to repress and overawe the more wild and bellicose tribes, and a wise Government to keep tolerably adjusted the friction between a pastoral and an agricultural people, Armenians and Kurds might live together, as they have in the past, without exceptional strife, especially if the Kurdish settlement of Northern Mesopotamia were to prove practicable.

5. *Armenians and Georgians*.—These two peoples represent the only two important Christian groups of Trans-Caucasia and North-East Asia Minor. The Georgians are, however, Orthodox, and are of the Caucasian group of races; the temperaments and characteristics of the two races do not appear to have much in common. Nor is their literary or cultural development closely connected. During certain periods of mediaeval history, there were, however, numerous historical links between the leaders, if not between the peoples. The position of Georgia and Armenia naturally inclined the Byzantine Emperors to utilize them as barriers against the succession of Turco-Tartar peoples that

swept in from the east and north-east, and against the Arab encroachments of the Caliphs. The persistent attempt to combine this with a pan-Greek policy combined with other factors to render the attempt usually a failure. But during the time of the Bagratid dynasty in modern Russian Armenia (846-1045), and of an offshoot of the same dynasty in Georgia, a near approach to a Christian bloc was at moments achieved. The principal reasons for its failure seem to have been the quarrels and intrigues of the Orthodox and Armenian ecclesiastics, the intestine feuds of the Armenian feudal chiefs, especially in the case of the Kings of Van, and the selfish exclusiveness encouraged among the Georgians by their remoteness. It should be noted that at this period the Armenians possessed a powerful and able feudal nobility, which has now entirely disappeared. During the subsequent centuries of Moslem (Seljuk, Ottoman, Mongol, Persian) invasion and conquest, no attempt was made at an Armeno-Georgian combination. The Armenian nobles either migrated to lesser Armenia, or were killed off, or remained in the service of their conquerors. The Georgians retained their independence with varying boundaries until their annexation by Russia in 1801. Latterly the great growth of Armenians, largely composed of emigrants from Turkey, especially at and around Tiflis, has created a race problem at a particularly delicate spot for the Georgians. The common link of Russian denationalizing policy was probably in the main only negative.

6. *Armenians and Russia.*—As a result of the Russo-Persian wars of the first quarter of the 19th Century, most of the Armenians in Trans-Caucasia were under Russian rule by 1830; the Armenian population in the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum were gained from Turkey in 1878. Previous to the 19th Century Russia had no important connections with the Armenians. For the greater part of the century they were treated well, *i.e.*, left very much to themselves with the advantage of being able to rely on the support of the Russian frontier forces. They were valuable to the Government as a barrier against the Turks, and their relatively prosperous and stable condition induced considerable emigration from the Turkish provinces. But in the early eighties there was a change in Russian policy, due to the removal, or abatement, of fears from the side of Turkey consequent on the war of 1877-1878, and to the "reaction" that followed the murder of Alexander II. in 1881. The schemes of Loris Melikov (himself of Armenian origin) for an Armenian State to include the Armenians of Trans-Caucasia and Armenia under the supremacy of Russia fell to the ground, and the Armenians felt the full weight of governmental and bureaucratic pressure. The attempts to Russianise them, particularly by inducing them to enter the Orthodox Church, have quite failed; the number of Russians living amongst the Armenians is almost entirely confined to officials and soldiers and the two peoples have never really come into contact. The result of Russian policy towards the Armenians, both in the Russian and Turkish Empires, was to cause a gravitation of hopes and political energies to Constantinople; immediately before the war, despite the Turkish massacres and the ruin of the hopes aroused by the Young Turk revolution, many of the Armenian leaders (the Dashnakist Party) still considered that more could be done from the side of Turkey than from contact with the Russian Government. The fatal bar of different Churches and the fact that the Armenians have never had an opportunity of learning or appreciating the qualities of the Russian peasantry have resulted in little influence being exercised by either side. Russia stood for a "strong government," but the advantages of this, curtailed by the corollary of moral and spiritual bondage, appear to have inclined the Armenians, with perpetual oscillations, to prefer the laxness of the Turkish State even at the price of bodily danger. The revolution, in so far as it has replaced a bureaucratic autocracy by a system of Socialist Soviets, does not seem likely to find a real echo among the Armenian peasantry, the driving force of whose political consciousness is controlled by the ecclesiastical hierarchy and to a less extent by the leaders of the Dispersion; the activities of the Heutchakist (Social Democratic) Party, before the war confined to Turkish Armenia, seem to have been influential chiefly in Armenian colonies rather than in the nucleus of the race.

During the war the Russian treatment of Turkish Armenians was not of a character to inspire friendly feelings; the main features were excessively strict military control, importation of Russian labour battalions, support of the Kurds, schemes for settling Cossacks on Armenian lands, and the demand that Armenians must produce written evidence as to the ownership of their land.

7. *Armenians and Persia.*—Throughout history Armenia has figured as the passage-way for peoples moving or raiding from the East, and as the combat-ground between the various Empires of Persia and the Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk and Ottoman

(6583-16)

Empires. In consequence, Armenia has frequently been under the rule of Persia. The two races are considered by some ethnologists to belong to the same Iranian group, and the language, and to a lesser extent some of the customs, of the Armenians show Persian influence. But there is no evidence that the Armenians in any numbers were ever settled in Persia or *vice versa*, and connection between them seems never to have been really close. The conversion of the Persians to Mohammedanism served to weaken such slender links as existed between the two nations; the settlement of Azerbaijan by Tartars, mainly due to Selim I. in the 16th century, created a wedge between them; finally the more and more persistent Turkish control under the later Ottomans over the Van—Ararat region and the Russian conquest of Trans-Caucasia, removed even Persian rule over any considerable number of Armenians.

8. *Armenians and Tartars.*—The position of the Tartars in Azerbaijan, South-East Trans-Caucasia and the Baku district is important as cutting off the Armenians from the Caspian Sea. Prior to the Tartar settlements, various other Turkish-speaking races seem to have occupied these districts, and the Armenians have at no time attempted to control the Caspian as an outlet to Russia and Central Asia. The rise of the oil industry around Baku in the last century has caused the immigration of a considerable number of Armenians to the town and district, but they are only the usual Armenian urban colonies of commercial, financial and industrial interests; they in no sense represent any real north-westward extension of the Armenians of Erivan. At Baku economic and social difficulties, inflamed by the nascent Tartar *intelligenzia*,* gave rise to serious massacres in 1905; these may have been fortuitous and exceptional, but relations are certainly bad. This is all the more important as any movement of Tartar nationalism or of strong hostility to the Armenians is more likely to be started in Baku than in those districts where the two races are intermingled in greater numbers, e.g., around Elizabetopol and Shusha. In Persian Azerbaijan, the Armenians are so few that no real Armeno-Tartar problem arises.

APPENDIX I.

STATISTICS AS TO ARMENIANS.

(i.) IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

The Russian Official Census for 1897 is admitted by authorities to be as impartial and correct as can be possible in so large an Empire with such great difficulties of topography, migration and ignorance. There seems to have been no intentional misrepresentation in the figures for the different nationalities, either in the Caucasus or elsewhere. The 1897 Census is therefore taken by all subsequent experts as the basis for their investigations. But for the Armenians there are also available the statistics collected by the highly perfected organization of the Gregorian Church and those of various missions; these figures probably represent an over-estimate.

The numbers of the three chief races in Trans-Caucasia immediately prior to the war were approximately as follows:—

Armenians	about 1,500,000
Georgians	„ 2,000,000
Tartars and Turkish-speaking peoples	„	2,000,000

A very considerable migration of Armenians from Turkey into Russian Caucasasia took place in the last 75 years, notably in 1830, in 1839, at the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878, and after the massacres of the nineties. A certain proportion of the emigrants, especially since 1880, were, however, only temporary. The Armenians are now chiefly concentrated in the provinces of Tiflis, Elizabetopol, Erivan and Kars. Tiflis city itself has an enormous colony (over 150,000 out of a total population of about 300,000), though it is historically and sentimentally the Georgian capital. The region of Baku and Shemakha also has a considerable number, the town of Baku itself having about 60,000 out of a total population of about 250,000. The following is their distribution according to the census of 1897:—

Province of Tiflis	196,286	19 per cent.	..	Georgians, 43 per cent. ; Tartars, 10 per cent.
„ Elizabetopol	292,188	38	„	Tartars, 61
„ Erivan	441,000	53	„	„ 38
„ Kars	73,466	25	„	„ Kurds, 14
„ Baku	52,233	6	„	„ Tartars, 59
„ Kutais	5,385	5	„	„ Georgians, 69

* It should be noted, however, that this *intelligenzia* is very small and that the Tartars are extremely illiterate, (probably over 80 per cent.).

**The Armenian Report of British War Office, General Staff:
"Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians" (5th April 1918)**

Armenians are to be found in trade and business in all the towns of Trans-Caucasia, and they have increased to over 250,000 in the province of Tiflis, chiefly in the city of that name and in the upper Kur valley, but their real centre is in the country watered by the Arpa Chai ("the grain river") and the left bank tributaries of the Araxes as far south-east as Ordubad. From the headquarters of the Arpa Chai they have spread over into the upper valley of the Kur and are numerous round Akhalkalaki: all down the Arpa Chai they form a compact mass, with the ruins of their ancient cities dotted along its course; as also in the Araxes Valley from Kagyzman to Erivan, and in the town and district of Novo-Bayazet on the west shores of Lake Sevan. They also outnumber the Tartars in the districts of Shusha and Zangezur (*i.e.*, between the Araxes and Lake Sevan). The vast majority of the Armenians in Trans-Caucasia are Gregorians; the Roman Catholics are estimated at about 30,000 and the Protestants at 1,500.*

The number of Armenians in the rest of Russia is small and scattered (about 200,000); their chief colonies are in Astrakhan, Moscow, Petrograd, Bessarabia, near Rostov-on-Don and in the Black Sea Province. Though most of them are newly established in commerce, &c., some, *e.g.*, at Astrakhan, emigrated before the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. They are almost entirely engaged in commerce or industry and are wealthy.

(ii.) IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

Turkish official figures are based on taxation registers and recruiting rolls; consequently they usually tend to underestimate the population, as females are not directly included and the desire to escape taxation and military service is universal. There is the additional difficulty of attempting to estimate nomad or migratory tribes. In the case of the Armenians there has also been flagrant misrepresentation. Armenian ecclesiastical figures, though usually exaggerated, supply a useful maximum figure. The most reliable statistics, those of Guinet and Lynch, date from the middle nineties; figures drawn up by the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople in 1912 differ by as much as 500,000, an increase impossible even for the prolific Armenians. The 1915 massacres are said officially to account for about 600,000 persons. In the light of previous massacres it is difficult to believe that this figure is correct. Further, about 600,000 are said to have been deported, of whom a considerable number have died; this figure again will probably prove erroneous, unless are included the refugees into Trans-Caucasia. At the close of 1915 there were estimated to be about 200,000 of these.† Whatever the truth may be, there can be no doubt that enormous alterations and reductions among the Armenians in Turkey have taken place.

The following is a rough estimate, which may be regarded as a minimum, of the number of Armenians in the Turkish Empire in 1914, together with the percentages in the six Armenian *vilayets* of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Mamuret-ul-Aziz (Kharput), Diarbekr and Sivas:—‡

In the city of Constantinople	200,000
In the six "Armenian vilayets"	900,000
In Zeitun	200,000
In rest of Turkish Empire	300,000
Total	1,600,000

Vilayet of Erzerum.—Here the Armenian percentage was about 25 per cent., the remainder being mainly Turkish, with about 20 per cent. Kurds. In the town of Erzerum the Turks were preponderant, with a strong Armenian element of perhaps 30 per cent.

Vilayet of Van.—The town had an Armenian majority over Turks and Kurds taken separately, but perhaps not over the two combined; the *sanjak* of rather over 50 per cent. The Kurds came next with 20 per cent. The rest of the *vilayet*, comprising the wild and inaccessible Hakkiari, was almost exclusively peopled by Kurds and Nestorians: the great majority of these latter have either been massacred during the war or have fled across the Persian border and into Trans-Caucasia, where a large number are reported to have died from disease.

Vilayet of Bitlis.—Here the Armenians formed about 40 per cent. of the population, with the remainder Moslems, mainly Kurds; the Turks formed a feeble minority. In the town and *kaza* of Mush the Armenians were preponderant, over 60 per cent.; in no other district of any size were they more numerous than the Moslems combined.

Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz (Kharput).—In the whole *vilayet* the Armenians (about 15 per cent.) were heavily outnumbered by the Moslems (about 80 per cent.); but they formed a strong minority (40 per cent.) in the *sanjak* of Kharput, and they were in a majority over the Kurds, who took second place, and over the Turks, chiefly in the town itself, taken separately. In the *sanjak* of Dersim, a westerly counterpart to the Hakkiari, Kurds of various kinds largely predominated, as also in that of Malatya, the south of which, even by Armenian ecclesiastical figures, was excluded from the true Armenian area.

Vilayet of Diarbekr.—Here there is great division of opinion, but the south of the *vilayet* was admittedly Kurd, though there was an important Armenian colony at Mardin. For the whole *vilayet* they probably represented about 25 per cent., and the Kurds about 35 per cent. The Turks were again in a great minority. The Armenians were most numerous in the extreme northward *Paşa*, and round Farkin.

Vilayet of Sivas.—The great majority of the population was Turkish and Turkoman; the Kurds were numerous chiefly in the eastern and south-eastern districts, the Circassians in the south in the Uzun Jailu. There were a number of Greeks in the north and north-west towns. The Armenians were scattered everywhere, chiefly in the towns round Sivas and in the eastern districts; they probably constituted about 16 per cent. of the total population: they were most numerous in the north-east in the *kaza* of Kurahissar (about 25 per cent.).

In rest of Turkish Empire.—The Armenians were to be found in commerce and finance in most of the towns. Their principal colonies were, apart from Constantinople, at Brusa, Ismid, Trebizond, Samsun, Smyrna, Baghdad, Mosul, Jerusalem, Adana, Killis, Urfa, Aintab and Marash. Including Constantinople, these urban

* 1913 figures from German Orient Mission.

† The total population of Armenians allowed for by the editor of the Blue Book on the 1915 massacres in Turkey is about 1,800,000.

‡ In the following percentages by *vilayets* considerable use has been made of a memorandum of January, 1918, on the population of Turkish Armenia, prepared by the Naval Staff, Intelligence Division.

colonies probably totalled about 450,000. There was also a large and sturdy peasant community on the southern slopes of the Taurus, in the *sanjak* of Kosan (Sis) and in the neighbouring corner of the *vilayet* of Aleppo, around Zeitun and Andarin, comprising probably about 200,000 persons. These were the remnants of the ancient Kingdom of Lesser Armenia, and originally emigrated from the Armenian plateau in the 11th Century, owing to the pressure of the Seljuks and the offers of the Byzantine Emperors: their survival was chiefly due to their natural bravery and to the inaccessibility of the district.

(iii.) IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

Besides their many colonies throughout the Turkish Empire, there are important communities of Armenians at Cairo, Alexandria, Singapore, Calcutta, Bucharest, in Switzerland, at London, Manchester, Paris and in the United States. Their wealth, education and ability renders them particularly important, as in the event of the reconstitution of some form of an independent Armenia, their ranks might be utilized for recruiting administrators and leaders. Their number may be put at 250,000.

In addition, there were in Persia between 50,000 and 100,000 Armenians, mostly in Azerbaijan, though there was a small colony at Ispahan (as at Julfa) established by Shah Abbas the Great in 1604.

(iv.) GRAND TOTAL.

The following approximate figures may be given for the total number of Armenians in 1914:—

In the Russian Empire	1,700,000
In the Turkish Empire	1,600,000
In the rest of the world	350,000
Grand total	<u>3,650,000</u>

Note.—Official figures of the *Katholikos of Echmiadzin* just prior to the war—

Armenians in the Caucasus	1,636,486
Armenians in rest of Russia	about 400,000

Official figures of *Patriarch at Constantinople*, 1912—

Armenians in Turkey	about 2,100,000
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Turkish official figures just prior to the war—

Armenians in Turkey	about 1,100,000
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STATISTICS OF ARMENIANS IN THE SIX *Vilayets*.

(From Russian Orange Book, 1915.)

<i>Vilayets.</i>	<i>Sanjaks.</i>	Armenian Patriarch, 1881.		Lynch.		Turkish Ministry of Justice, 1890.		Cuinet, 1892.	
		Armenians.	Mohamme- dans.	Armenians.	Mohamme- dans.	Armenians.	Mohamme- dans.	Armenians.	Mohamme- dans.
Erzerum	136,147	195,067	*106,768	*428,495	109,819	441,671	134,967	500,782
Sivas	243,515	605,610	118,085	735,489	170,433	839,514
Diarbekr	55,614	240,374	79,129	328,644
Mamuret-ul-Aziz.	107,059	169,364	(1890)	(1890)	80,511	300,194	69,718	504,946
	Kharput	85,000	120,000
	Dersim	8,000	62,000
Bitlis	130,460	21,121	†97,184	†145,454	107,804	167,054	131,390	254,000
Van	133,559	113,586	71,582	282,582	79,998	241,000
	Van	75,644	52,229
Total	751,041	1,104,748	372,596	808,178	543,515	2,167,564	665,625	2,668,886
		(Excluding <i>vilayet</i> of Diarbekr).		(Only <i>vilayets</i> of Erzerum and Bitlis and <i>sanjaks</i> of Kharput, Dersim and Van).					

* From Turkish official figures, 1887.

† From Turkish official figures, 1893.

The Armenian Report of British War Office, General Staff:
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Vilayets.	Sanjaks.	Ormanian, 1910.		Russian Consul-General at Erzerum, 1912.		Armenian Patri-arch, 1913.		Maevsky, 1899. (By houses: counts 8 for a house.)		Russian Vice-Consul Olpherev, 1912.	
		Armenians.	Mohammedans.	Armenians.	Mohammedans.	Armenians.	Mohammedans.	Armenians.	Mohammedans.	Armenians.	Mohammedans.
Erzerum	..	203,400	..	200,000	550,000	215,000	370,000
	Erzerum	152,500
	Erzingan	35,700
	Bayazid	15,200
Sivas	163,200	1165,000	1287,000
	Sivas ..	86,000
	Tokat ..	23,500
	Amasia ..	28,500
	Karahis-sar.	25,200
Diarbekr	..	81,700	§ 105,000	§ 127,000
	Diarbekr and Mardin.	*47,000
	Arga	*6,700
	Severek	*50,700
Mamuret-ul-Aziz.	..	131,200	168,000	277,000
	Kharput	80,700
	Dersim ..	27,500
	Malatia ..	23,000
Bitlis	196,000	..	† 150,000	† 497,000	180,000	162,000	186,608	277,320	180,000	280,000
	Bitlis ..	76,500
	Mush and Gendj.	94,000
	Sairt ..	25,500
Van	192,200	109,880	234,864	120,000	240,000
	Van ..	182,200	185,000	147,000
	Hakkiari	10,000
Total	967,700	..	350,000	1,047,000	1,018,000	1,178,000	296,488	522,134	300,000	520,000
				(Vilayets of Erzerum and Van only).		(Excluding south of Malatia, north-west of Sivas vilayet, Bisherek and Hakkiari).		(Vilayets of Bitlis and Van only).		(Vilayets of Bitlis and Van only).	

* Adds up to 104,000.

† Figures supplied by Russian Consul at Bitlis.

‡ Excluding north-west part of vilayet.

§ Excluding Bisherek.

|| Excluding southern part of Malatia.

APPENDIX II.

ARMENIANS AS AFFECTED BY THE BREST-LITOVSK TREATY.

By the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of the 3rd March, 1918, ratified subsequently by the Moscow Congress and by Petrov at Berlin, Turkey was given back the territory acquired by Russia after the war of 1877-78. Article IV. runs:—"The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum shall . . . without delay be evacuated by Russian troops. Russia shall not interfere with the reorganization of the constitutional and international conditions of these districts, but shall leave it to the population of these districts to carry out the reorganization in agreement with the neighbouring States, particularly Turkey." (German version, as published in the *Times* of the 6th March.) The district of Batum belongs to the old Russian Government of Kutais, the districts of Kars and Ardahan to that of Kars. The Armenians are probably slightly outnumbered by Turkish-speaking peoples in the whole of this ceded area, but in the east and south-east of the Government of Kars they form a compact and strong majority, principally in the rich lands near the Araxes and the Arpa Chal; they also extend to the upper valleys of the Kura, but there is only a sprinkling of them in the district of Batum.

DISTRICT OF BATUM.

Total population. 1914, approximate, from Russian Year-book . . . 172,000
 (Town of Batum.. 30,000)
 Turks. 1897. Based on Russian Official Census approximately . . . 40,000

Majority of population in 1914 was Georgian (mainly Mohammedan). A considerable number of Greeks are found in the towns; the Armenians probably did not number not more than 5,000 or 6,000 in 1914.

GOVERNMENT OF KARS.

1897. Russian Official Census:—

Total population	292,498	
Armenians	78,406.	25 per cent.
*Turks	68,547.	21 "
Kurds	42,968.	15 "
Greeks	32,593.	11 "
Russians	27,856.	9 "

1914. Approximate, from Russian Year-book—

Total population 389,000

The increase of Armenians would be proportionately greater than that of other nationalities, except perhaps than that of the Greeks.

DISTRICT OF BATUM AND GOVERNMENT OF KARS.

1914. Approximate estimate—

Armenians	120,000
Georgians	110,000
Turkish-speaking peoples	140,000
Kurds	50,000

Note.—The term "Turks" probably implies only ethnological, linguistic and religious kinship with the Osmanli Turks of Anatolia.

* The census in addition gave 8,442 Turkomans and 2,347 Tartars.

GENERAL STAFF,
 WAR OFFICE,
 5th April, 1918.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

As far as it can be understood from the note written down on the file cover, the report was described by British historian Arnold J. Toynbee¹⁸ as being "a useful historical summary and valuable statistics about Armenians penned in a non-partisan manner", and that it had been prepared in the last year of World War I. In comparison to other British politically motivated reports gathered about Armenians and Turkish-Armenian relations, especially the letterheads and propaganda related works of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the report prepared by the General Staff was noticeably more neutral in its character. This was especially apparent in the comparative statistic data on population and the historical narrative given about the Armenians. Despite this, the report contained the "Christian victimhood" theme in Turkish-Armenian relations and the statements of "massacres" carried out in Turkey. In this respect, the report contained no data that would change perception of the Christian world in general, and that of Britain in specific.¹⁹

Containing population statistics about pre-war Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia, the report was written in period of British-Armenian military alliance and intensified rhetoric about independent Armenia. It was organized under eight main headings and concluded with an appendix at the last section.

The purpose of the report was to put forth a set of data that could be evaluated by providing a summary of the historical and ethnological foundation of the Armenian question.²⁰ The first two sections were elaborated under "Independent Armenia" and "Geographic Distribution" headings, and highlighted certain passages about pre-Ottoman Armenian history. The fact that Ottoman Turks had possessed Eastern Anatolia since 1514 and that the last independent Armenian formation had ceased to exist by the last quarter of the 11th century were the parts underlined in these sections. Having been a

18 Not only was Arnold Toynbee a famous historian, but he was also an important member of the propaganda bureau Wellington House of the British War Office and Political Intelligence Service during World War I. In his work "Armenian Atrocities, The Murder of a Nation" - based on American Committee Reports, Armenian émigrés and publishers - he described the precautions taken by the Ottoman State against the Armenian insurrections in 1915 as the "annihilation of all of the Christian population. (Arnold J., Toynbee, *Armenian Atrocities, The Murder of a Nation*, London, New York, Toronto, 1915, p. 27). In addition to this he, along with Lord Bryce, prepared the propaganda book known as the Blue Book, and with his work during World War I he used Turkish-Armenian relations as a tool for war propaganda. (*Treatment of Armenians of Ottoman Empire*, pp. XVI-XVII). Later on he would make evaluations that resembled a confession of his propaganda work (Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, A Study in the Contact of Civilisations*, London, Bombay, Sydney, 1922, p. 50).

19 In memorandum submitted by Toynbee to British Foreign and Commonwealth Office on October 3, 1918 after the Armistice of Montrose, some information regarding the history of the Six Provinces was given in conjunction with a mentioning of four great Armenian massacres carried out in Turkey. According to Toynbee the first massacre was carried out in the 1893-96 years, the second in 1909, the third in 1912 and the last one in 1915. Such statements in general actually demonstrated the perspective of the Christian world that was equipped with one-sided sources of information. (TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3448/166382, "War Office Draft Conditions of Armistice With Turkey", memorandum by A. Toynbee, 3.10.1918).

20 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p. 1.

buffer between Eastern and Western empires, the Armenians were not subject to much Roman influence due to the region's geographic structure and due to their superficial ties to the Roman Empire. Furthermore, due geographic difficulties no empire was able to fully bring the Armenians under its control.

The report indicated that the Armenians converted to Christianity in 300 A.D., and that their final separation from the Roman Church in the 5th century isolated them from European influence. According to the report, the most noticeable attribute of Armenian nationalism was that its aspirations and traditions were rooted in the Gregorian Church.²¹ This situation had a negative impact on Armenians' relations with Byzantium and Rome, and thus left the Armenians by themselves in their struggle against Islamic forces.²² Another point mentioned in the report was the treatment of the Armenians by the Byzantine emperors. According to the report, Emperor Basil II had in 1021 transferred the Van "dynasty" to Sivas, and Michael IV had transferred Bagratid Dynasty²³ in the middle of the Aras and Arpa Creeks valley to Cilicia. The importance of the Bagratid Kingdom was that it represented for the Armenians a period of national power and heroism. With the entrance of the Seljuks into the region, the region's system with a feudal like regime experienced important changes, which caused an Armenian movement to begin towards the West and the Southwest.²⁴

The "Geographic Distribution" heading of the report in general defined the borders of the high plateau (Eastern Anatolia) that was considered to be the true homeland of the Armenians. The report, just like all the other British

21 Since they lacked a political organization (the state) through which they could express, preserve and develop their national identity, the Armenians protected their national existence by devoting themselves to Christianity. It was for this reason that religion and its representative the Armenian Church became the vanguard of Armenian political identity. The "Catholicos" title of the Armenian religious leaders meant "the representative of the people" (Erol Kürkçüoğlu, *Roma'dan Selçuklu İdaresine Ermeniler*, Erzurum, 2005, p. 34. For information about the Armenian's conversion to Christianity and Christianity's effect on the Armenians, please see pages 28 and 37 of the same work).

22 During this period the Armenians had become targets of Eastern Romans just as much as that of the Persians. Until the period of Turkish incursions into Anatolia, the Armenians were stuck between Persian, Eastern Roman-Byzantine and Islamic-Arabic forces. By the time Turks were beginning to dominate Anatolia in 11th century, the Armenians were on the brink of being destroyed as a result of the orthodoxation and greekification policies of Byzantine (Davut Kılıç, *Osmanlı Ermenileri Arasında Dini ve Siyasi Mücadeleler*, Ankara, 2006, pp. IX,X).

23 There is both error and inconsistency in the dates given for the establishment and the collapse of the Bagratid Dynasty. The Bagratid Dynasty which ruled between 885-1045 (Esat Uras, age, pp. 74, 76.) was cited as having ruled between (886-1041) in one instance, and (846-1045) in another instance.

24 Prior to the entry of the Seljuks to Anatolia, there were two Armenian principalities in Eastern Anatolia that were tied to the Byzantine Empire. One of them was the Bagrat Dynasty (Ani Principality), the other was the Vaspuragan Principality east of the Lake Van. Having previously been a part of the Abbasids, these two principalities came under Byzantine domination in the 10th century. After the incursions by the Turks began, the Vaspuragan Prince came to an agreement with the Byzantine Emperor, abandoned Van to Byzantine and took a large part of his people from Van to the Sivas region in 1021. In this way the Armenian principality in Van came to an end. Having invaded Van, the Byzantine Empire settled some of the Armenians in the region to Inner Anatolia, and some to Urfa. The Ani Kingdom, having still been subject to the Byzantine Empire during this time, was put an end to by Byzantine again in 1045. Meanwhile the cities of Kars and Ani would come under Turkish dominance in 1064 (Ali Güler, Suat Akgül, *Sorum Olan Ermeniler*, Ankara, 2003, pp. 7-8). For reference to Seljuk-Armenian relations, please see; Mehmet Ersan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Anadolu'da Ermeniler*, Ankara, 2007; Ali Sevim, *Genel Çizgileriyle Selçuklu-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, 1983; M. Altay Köymen, *Selçuklu Devri Türk Tarihi*, Ankara, 1989; Erol Kürkçüoğlu, *Roma'dan Selçuklu İdaresine Ermeniler*, Erzurum, 2005.

documents, used Armenia as a geographic term that defined Eastern Anatolia, and, this understanding was underlined in the report. On a related note, another point emphasized was that the region mentioned as Armenia was not in its entirety the true homeland of the Armenians.²⁵ At the same time, the report indicated that Van was more prominent as the national center than Ani, and that the main feature of the distribution of Armenians in the region was their position as a minority. The geographic distribution of Armenians resulted in significant social, physical but also denominational differentiation. In other words, Armenians of Tbilisi, Muş and Istanbul were different from one another; and there were certain divergences between Protestant, Catholic and Gregorian Armenians due to disagreements and infighting.²⁶

The report's "*Armenians and Turks*" heading in general presents a summary of primarily the Ottoman period, with the main theme being the "Millet System"²⁷ and repercussions of this system for the Armenians. Accordingly,

25 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, p. 2. In British documents and also in western literature "Armenia" is used to describe a geographic region. A region in the south of Caucasus is mentioned as "Armenia of Russia," while Eastern Anatolia is mentioned as "Armenia of Turkey" or "Western Armenia.". "United" or "Great Armenia" meanwhile is term that encompasses the regions of Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia (Başak, *ibid.*, p. 266). Prof. Jean Laurent's words regarding Armenia emphasize that it is primarily a geographic term: "In reality, since the beginning of written history this country that is being defined has not been a state but a geographic term. There is no doubt that Armenians have lived in this region... But just because this region carries the name Armenia in no way means that it can be associated to Armenian destiny or to a state that carries the name Armenia." (Erdal İlt'er, "Ermenistan Adı, Ermenilerin Menşei ve Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Konusunda Tespitler", *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, ed. İdris Bal, Mustafa Çufalı, Ankara, 2003, pp. 3-4). For some studies on the prehistoric period of the region referred to as Armenia, please see; Yıldız Devenci Bozkuş, *Sultan Deniz Küçükler, Armenia, Ermeniler ve Armenia Bölgesinin Eskiçağ Tarihi*, Ankara, 2011; Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, İstanbul, 1987; Sadı Kocaş, *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, 1967; Şemseddin Günlaltay, *Yakın Şark IV. Romalılar Zamanında Kapadokya, Pont ve Artakıad Krallıkları*, Ankara, 1951; René Grousset, *Başlangıcından 1071'e Ermenilerin Tarihi*, İstanbul, 2005; George A. Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, USA, 2002; A. E. Redgate, *The Peoples of Europe The Armenians*, USA, 1998; Kevork Aslan, *Armenia and the Armenians*, New York, 2005; Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*, New York, 2006; Robert W. Thomson, Mouses, *Khorenatzi's History of Armenia*, England, 1980; İnyetullah Cemal Özkaya, *Le Peuple Arménien et les Tentatives de Reduire le Peuple Turc en Servitude*, İstanbul, 1971; V. De Saint Martin, *Mémoires Historique et Géographiques sur l'Arménie*, Paris, 1818; Frédéric Macler, *La Nation, Arménienne, Son Passé, ses Malheurs*, Paris, 1923; David Marshall Lang, *Armenia, Cradle of Civilisation*, London, 1980; N. Adontz, *Histoire des Arménie: Les Origines (du X au VI s. av. J.C.)*, Paris, 1946; C. A. Burney, David Marshall Lang, *The Peoples of the Hills: Ancient Ararat and Caucasus*, London, 1971.

26 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, p.3. For this subject, please see; Davut Kılıç, *Osmanlı Ermenileri Arasında Dini ve Siyasi Mücadeleler*, Ankara, 2006.

27 The Ottoman State was being governed by Islamic law called "şariat" (sharia), rulers' biddings called "kanun" (law), and customs called "örf". In accordance with these rules non-Muslims were protected and were able continue their community lives on the condition that they accepted Islamic laws. The manner in which communities administered themselves under the Millet System gave the Ottoman State a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character. Until recently this opportunity was not given to Muslims living in lands captured by Christians (Andrew Mango, *Atatürk, Modern Türkiye'nin Kurucusu*, Turkish translation: Füsün Doruker, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 22-23). The following studies can be referred to for Ottoman-Armenian relations and the Millet System: Salahi Sonyel, "Hıristiyan Azınlıklar ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Son Dönemi", *Yeni Türkiye, Ermeni Sorunu Özel Sayısı*, II (Mart-Nisan 2001), Ankara, pp. 687-692; Cevdet Küçük, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Millet Sistemi", *Ermeni Sorunu Özel Sayısı*, II (Mart-Nisan 2001), Ankara, pp. 692-702; Benjamin Braude, "Millet Sistemi'nin İlginc Tarihi", *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara, 2000, pp. 131-145; Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "Çok Milletli Bir Ulus Olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu", *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara, 2000, pp. 163-171; Salahi Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians, Victims of Great Power Diplomacy*, London, 1987; Yavuz Ercan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Müslüman Olmayan Topuluklar (Millet Sistemi)", *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara, 2000, pp. 45-163; İdris Bal, Mustafa Çufalı, *Dünden Bugüne Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, 2003, pp. 76-110; Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Alman İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığında Altında Gayrimüslüm Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914)*, Ankara, 1989; H. Gibb, H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West, V.I., Part II*, Oxford, 1969.

the Armenians, being the Christian element throughout the Ottoman Empire, were for legal issues (mostly concerning religious and national affairs) organized as “millets” under religious leaders. Armenians, like other Christians in Turkey, were provided with an environment of religious tolerance. This system bolstered the influence of the Armenian Church, provided the Armenians autonomy in religious and educational affairs, and encouraged a strong sense of community and initiative in Armenians that would later on turn into national consciousness. Identifying the revolutionary ideas in Europe and the example of Balkan states as a model, the Armenians came to be noticed more and more as being “supporters of violent acts” in effort to gain autonomy and even independence.²⁸ The disappointment experienced in 1878 would encourage Armenians to become more aggressive, and the rivalry and indecisiveness of the European states adversely affected their condition. The last remarks of the report about Ottoman-Armenian relations had a character that summarized the viewpoint of the British General Staff. The outbreak of Armenian nationalism, alongside the “tyranny and cruelty” of the police and central government,

Religious differences played a minor role in the hostilities between the two, and the Ottoman policy had favored the Kurds in the form of maintaining a feudal authority over the Armenians.

created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between the two communities. As of 1918, the focus of Turkish-Armenian issue was whether or not the Armenians in Turkey would remain under Turkish rule.

The next section of the report that is entitled as “Armenians and Kurds” started with the emphasis that the relations between the two societies had not been particularly bad. Nonetheless, the Kurds, who possessed nomadic and semi-nomadic rural elements, and the Armenians, the agricultural cultivators of the plains, conflicted against each other. Religious differences played a minor role in the hostilities between the two, and the Ottoman policy had favored the Kurds in the form of maintaining a feudal authority over the Armenians. Towards the end of 19th century, the interest of the European states in the Armenians had a negative effect on the Kurds. Kurdish-Armenian relations were fatally aggravated by Abdulhamid II’s policy of setting the Kurds against the Armenians. The British General’s expressions, thereafter, shows traces of

28 These expressions used in the report had a character that exposed the true nature of the Armenian question, which would be carried onto international platforms under different guises and justifications starting from the end of the 19th century. In fact, the Armenian question was different from the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian nationalist movements aimed at seceding from the Ottoman State; to which the Armenian question was being likened to by certain circles. The main particulars of the Armenian question were that the Armenians were not settled enough in any specific region of the Ottoman Empire to constitute a majority, that they were therefore far from fulfilling the condition necessary to transform into a nation-state; that as such their uprising changed from a people’s rebellion against imperial rule into inter-communal fighting, and which intensified during a time when the Ottoman Empire was about to wage a war against foreign powers (Stefanos Yerasimos, *I. Dünya Savaşı ve Ermeni Sorunu*, Ankara, 2002, p. 3).

the propaganda efforts accompanied by chronicled prejudices. After 1908, even though the CUP attempted to mend matters, they could not undo the fatal mistake of supplying arms to the Kurds. Since the First World War, they returned to the policies of Abdulhamid and outdid him in their successful efforts to exterminate the Armenians. Nonetheless, during the "1915 massacres", the Kurds, especially those from Dersim and Aleppo *vilayets*, showed themselves friendly to the Armenians.²⁹

The following section, examining the two important Christian groups in Trans-Caucasia and North-East Asia Minor, "Armenians and Georgians", denoted that these two groups did not have much in common related to their temperaments and characteristics, nor to their literary or cultural development.³⁰ It was mentioned that the Byzantine Emperors had utilized Georgia and Armenia as barriers against the succession of Turkish-Azeri peoples that swept in from the east and northeast and against the Arab encroachments of the Caliphs. It was also noted that the only common link between the Armenians and the Georgians was the Russian policy.

The report next summarized the Russia's policy towards Armenia in historical context in the section entitled as "Armenians and Russia". The section noted that the Armenians had been valuable to Russia as they were seen as a barrier against the Turks. Relatively wealthy and stable condition of the Russian Armenians encouraged significant emigration from Turkey. Nonetheless, in the late 19th century, the Russian policy towards the Armenians changed; Loris Melikov's plans for an Armenian state with the inclusion of Armenians of Trans-Caucasia and Armenia under the supremacy of Russia collapsed. With these developments, Armenians felt significant pressure and the two peoples (Russians and Armenians) never really interacted. The report went on to note that the Russian policy towards Armenians had been "to cause a gravitation of hopes and political energies" to Istanbul right before the First World War. Even though the hopes were ruined by the "Turkish massacres" and the Young Turk revolution, many Armenian leaders still considered more could be achieved from the side Turkish side than by the contact with Russia. Here, the author

29 The British Historian Andrew Mango makes the following remarks on the Kurds of the Dersim area: "Dersim (now Tunceli) massif, 10,000 feet at its highest point, was home to unruly Kurdish tribes, professing their own form of Shiite Islam and speaking a Kurdish language (*Zaza*) unintelligible to the majority of Ottoman Kurds. The Dersim tribes augmented their meager livelihood from their herds of sheeps and goats by extracting subsidies for good behavior indifferently from the Ottoman authorities and from their domestic and foreign enemies. The alternative to subsidies was brigandage. In the Great War, the tribes had provided services to the Ottomans, the Russians and the feeling Armenians." (Mango, *Atatürk*, *ibid*, p.280)

30 For more information on Armenian-Georgian relations, see: Stephen F. Jones, "Georgian-Armenian Relations in 1918 to 1920 and 1991 to 1994: A Comparison", *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change*, Ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, The University of Michigan Press, 1996, p.441-460; Şota Tetvadze, Otar Tetvadze, *Somhebi Sakartveloşi*, Tiflis, 1999; Paul G. Forand, "Accounts of Western Travellers Concerning the Role of Armenians and Georgians in Sixteenth Century Iran", *The Muslim World*, LXV, 4 (1975), p. 246-278; Gérard Garitte, "La Source Grecque des 'Trente Articles' Géorgiens Contre les Arméniens", HA, XC, 1-12 (1976), p.111-116; P. B. Henze, "Fire and Sword in the Caucasus: The Nineteenth Century Residence of North Caucasian Mountaineers", *Central Asian Survey*, II, 1 (1983), pp.5-44.

most likely intended to emphasize the collaboration between the Armenians and the Young Turks against the autocratic rule of Abdulhamid. The expansionist Russian policy in the Eastern Anatolia before the First World War was omitted from the report. So as the historical data that laid out that the Armenians fully reverted to Russia.³¹ In addition, the report touched upon the Russian treatment of the Armenians of Turkey during the First World War and deliberated that it had not been shaped by friendly feelings. The report defined the main characteristics of the Russian treatment as excessively strict military control, importation of Russian labor battalions, support of the Kurds, schemes for settling Cossaks on Armenian lands, and most importantly, Russians' demand that Armenians must provide written evidence as to prove ownership of their land.³² In fact, the Russian attitude³³ mentioned in the report along with the peace formula "without annexations or indemnities" had shocked the Armenians³⁴ as they recognized that they were being used by the Russians.

The last two sections of the report, prior to the the "Statistics as to Armenians" section, were on Armenians' relations with Iran and Azerbaijan.³⁵ In history, Armenia has served as a passageway for people moving or raiding from the east as well as a struggle ground between the Empires of Persia and the Roman, Byzantine, Seljuk and Ottoman Empires and consequently, the region frequently came under rule of Persia. What caused the Persian rule abate were the persistent control by the Turkish under the later Ottomans over the Van-Ararat region and the Russian occupation of Trans-Caucasia. The expressions that stood out in the report with regard to the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are about the position of Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan, South-East Trans-Caucasia and the Baku district. It was a cutting off the Armenians and the Caspian Sea. Besides, Armenians never attempted to get hold of the Caspian as a passage to Russia and Central Asia. The rise of the oil industry around Baku in the 20th century caused the immigration of Armenians to Baku and the district in significant numbers. The report pointed out that alleged massacres of the Armenians during the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict in 1905 were an

31 For Russia's policy towards the Armenians in early 20th century, please see: Tolga Başak, *ibid.*, pp.126-144.

32 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p.5.

33 Russia, when it occupied the most crucial parts of Eastern Anatolia, didn't allow the Armenians, who were moved from the region in line with the 1915 decision, to come back to the region and settle in. Russia's political attitude was designed in line with the slogan of "having as few Armenians as possible in Russian lands", and even of "Armenia without Armenians". (S. Torossian, "Soviet Policy in the Armenian Question", *Caucasian Review*, IV, (Munich, 1957), p.10-11; Richard G. Hovannissian, "Caucasian Armenia Between Imperial and Soviet Rule the Interlude of National Independence", *Transcaucasia, Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, Ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, The University of Michigan, 1983, p.260; Somakian Manough Joseph, *Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920*, New York, 1995, pp.102-103.)

34 TNA. PRO. FO. 371/3016/208687, Foreign Office to Lord Bertie (Paris), No: 2686, November 10th, 1917; Lord Bertie (Paris) to Foreign Office, No: 1265, November 15th, 1917; Torossian, *agm*, s.12; "New Chapter of Armenian Massacres; Betrayal by the Bolshevists", *The Times*, Monday, February 18, 1918, p. 5.

35 As in all British documents, the Turks of Azerbaijan was denoted as "Tartars".

exception, although, it described the Azerbaijani-Armenian relations as certainly bad.³⁶

The report included population statistics as to Armenians in the 'Appendices' section. The Russian Official Census for 1897 was given as the main resource in the report for the Armenian population in the Russian Empire. At the same time, it was mentioned in the report that the statistics collected by the Gregorian Church and various missions represented an over-estimate. According to these statistics, the Armenian population in Trans-Caucasia prior to the First World War was about 1.500.000.³⁷ In the last 75 years, especially in 1830 and in 1839, during the Russo-Turkish war in 1777-78, and in 1890s, there was considerable migration of Armenians from Turkey into the Russian Caucasia. Notably, Tiflis had a big colony of 150.000 Armenians. The report went on to mention some proportional data as for the Armenian population in Tiflis, Gence (Elizabetpol), Erivan, Kars, Baku and Kutais, and according to this, the Armenians made up %53 of the population in Erivan, %19 of Tiflis, %25 of Kars, and %9 of Baku. Erivan had a Turkish population that made up the %38.³⁸ The number of Armenians in the rest of Russia was about 200.000.³⁹

The report later on discussed the situation in the Ottoman Empire and made a general examination of the statistics and the 1915 events. According to this, there had been a distortion in the data regarding the Armenians⁴⁰ as the Turkish official figures had underestimated the population.⁴¹ Records by the Armenian

36 Please see the following for Azerbaijani-Armenian relations: Mahir Garibov, *I. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Azerbaycan-Ermenistan İlişkileri*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2006; Nesrin Sarahmetoğlu, *Azeri-Ermeni İlişkileri*, (1905-1920), Ankara, 2006.

37 The data also shows that there were 2.000.000 Georgians and 2.000.000 'Tartars and Turkish-speaking peoples' in Trans-Caucasia prior to the war.

38 In a study based on Russian resources and Russian census statistics, demographics of the Erivan province was studied and statistical data that covers between 1827- 1922. According to this study, the Muslim population in the Erivan district between 1886-1915 was 40.4 per cent of the total population on average. Statistics for the same district in 1908 showed that the Muslim population was 42.4 per cent. (Yavuz Aslan, "Rus İstilasından Sovyet Ermenistanı'na Erivan (Revan) Vilâyetinin Demografik Yapısı, (1827-1922)," *Yeni Türkiye, Ermeni Sorunu Özel Sayısı*, II, (Mart-Nisan, 2001), Yıl: 7, Sayı: 38, p.1022.)

39 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, p.7.

40 The belief that the Ottoman population statistics had underestimated the number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire on purpose was especially expressed by the Armenians and their circles after the First World War. At the same time, studies show that the most reliable among existing data were the Ottoman. In fact, European consuls and military attachés who served for many years in the Ottoman Empire accepted that the Ottoman statistics were basically reliable, and consequently, these statistics were used by Ubicini, Boué, Urquhart, Kutscherai Paul bautet, A.Ritter zur Helle von Somo, Ernst Behm, H. Wanger, Vital Cuinet and others. Because there was an important step after years 1881-1882 with regard to the reliability and consistency of the official Ottoman data that was published, British, also, started feeling confident about it. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p. 34-35, 149-150.) That said, Ottoman Empire's statistics on the Christian population was criticized. Those who advocated for an independent Armenia at the end of the first world war said many times that the censuses conducted by the Ottoman Empire had not scientific character and they shouldn't be relied on. (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, pp.59-60.)

41 These expressions in the report are valid. It is known that the Ottoman resources underestimated the population by around %17-22, and this was because of the rationale behind conducting census in the Ottoman Empire. The officials based the census on men with regard to taxation registers and recruiting rolls, and therefore, omitted the others, especially women from the census. (Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu, 1830-1914*, İstanbul, 2010, pp.8-9.)

Church, on the other hand, were overestimated to a great extent. The report viewed Cuinet's⁴² and Lynch's⁴³ statistics as the most reliable of 1890s, and points out that figures drawn up by the Armenian Patriarch at 1912 differed by as much as 500.000, which was impossible.⁴⁴

At this point, the most crucial point that the report omitted is the fact that the population in Anatolia was counted and recorded only by the Ottoman Empire. Consuls, representatives of minorities such as the Patriarch and explorers only made guesses about the population.⁴⁵

The assessment by the report of the 1915 events, on the other hand, does not constitute an alternative point of view on how the Christian world viewed the events. The assessment of the Turkish-Armenian relations as a propaganda tool during the war and that the War Office made a great effort for this cause⁴⁶ formed the basis of the expressions in the report. According to this, while mentioning that "the 1915 massacres" officially accounted for 600.000 people, the report pointed out that this number could actually be bigger. Likewise, it mentioned that a 600.000 were "deported"⁴⁷ -of whom a significant number died-, but the actual number could be bigger if the refugees in Trans-Caucasia are included. The report noted that the number of refugees in Trans-Caucasia prior to the war was 200.000, and no matter what the truth was, it noted that, in this process, there was an enormous change for the Armenians in Turkey as well as a significant reduction in the Armenian population.

The report referenced Blue Book, which was the most important product of the propaganda movement during the war, emphasizing that A. Tonybee, the editor, noted that total Armenian population in Turkey was about 1.800.000. In the next paragraph, the report itself gave numbers as to the population of the Armenians in the Turkish Empire. According to this, it was estimated that, in 1914, there were 1.600.000 Armenians living in Turkey, of which 900.00

42 The mentioned resource here is Vital Cuinet's book entitled as "La Turquie d'Asie, IV. Cilt, Paris, 1890-1994". In fact, this was compiled from Ottoman resources that was revised. (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p. 68.) In a German resource that was based on this book by Vital Cuinet, the number of Armenians living in the six districts in 1896 was 651.134. (A. Petermann, *Mitteilungen aus Justus Peterke's Geographischer Anstalt 24* (1878), directly on page. 8 Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, pp.150-151 and footnote. 40.)

43 H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia, Travels and Studies*, II, London, 1901.

44 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p.7.

45 Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, pp.2-3.

46 For more information on the effects of the British war propaganda on the Armenian question, please see: Tolga Başak, *ibid.*, pp.196-228.

47 As in many British documents, as well as in other foreign documents on the subject, the General Staff's report used the term "deport" to denote the dispatching of the Armenians. But, this is wrong, as the Armenians were not actually deported, but re-located. In this case, it would be better to use "re-location" to define the Armenian dispatching in 1915.

lived in the six "Armenian vilayets"⁴⁸, 200.000 in Istanbul, 200.000 in Zeydan, and 300.000 in the rest of the empire.

The report furthermore went on to summarize the region's population structure by going into particulars of the six provinces, denoted as "Armenian vilayets", and by providing proportional characteristics of these provinces. According to this, the Armenians broadly made up the %25 of the population in Erzurum, %40 in Bitlis, %15 in Mamüretülaziz (Harput), %25 in Diyarbakır, and %16 in Sivas. In the province of Van, although the number of Muslims exceeded the number of Armenians in the city, in the case of dividing the population into segments such as Turkish, Kurdish and Armenians, the Armenians, the report noted, make up the dominant group. While the Armenians constituted more than 50 per cent of the population in the *sanjak* (Van), the Kurdish ranked the second with a 20 per cent slice. The total number of Armenians in rest of the empire was about 650.000.⁴⁹

Following the section on the Russian and Turkish empires, the report mentioned that the Armenian population living in other parts of the world was around 300.000-350.000. The report expressed that, as in the event of the reconstitution of some form of an independent Armenia, the ranks of communities of Armenians in Cairo, Egypt, Singapore, Calcutta, Bucharest, Switzerland, London, Manchester, Paris and the United States might be utilized for recruiting administrators and leaders.

While demonstrating that the Armenian population in 1914 in the world as a whole was 3.650.000, the report, by clarifying prior data, expressed that

48 After the Treaty of Berlin, the issue regarding the population of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire also attracted the attention of British officials and studies were conducted accordingly towards the end of the 19th century. The Ottoman statistics and the numbers declared by the British officials to London showed a very little difference. At this point, Commander Henry Troter, who examined his own data as well as the Turkish and the Armenian, assisted the British government in a great extent in its initiative to calculate estimations of the population. Troter, who denied the Armenian statistics presented to the Congress of Berlin, did a comparative analysis of all the existing information (Armenian and Turkish) on the population, together with Lieutenant C. W. Wilson. Consequently, detailed and comprehensive data on Eastern Anatolia was prepared. According to this study, non-Muslims, of which the most is Armenians, in Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır and Harput districts amounted to 567.000, and the Muslims, excluding tribes, refugees and immigrants, amounted to 1.488.000. In the case of including the groups that were excluded, the number would have been amounted to 3.000.000. Recent data compiled by the British in 1896, however, indicated that there were 697.598 non-Muslims and more than 2.750.000 Muslims in the region. A confidential study conducted by the Ottoman in 1897, on the other hand, pointed out that the total population in the region had rose to 3.179.000, of which 2.5 million was Muslim and 566.267 was Armenian and the rest was composed of peoples with other nationalities. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.9. footnote. 4, pp.142-143, 145, 148-149, 402-403, 412-413.)

49 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, pp. 7-8. While the statistics presented by the report reflected more or less on the population profile in the region, (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.45-90.), Justin McCarthy examined these statistics: "The area claimed as "Turkish Armenia" was commonly known as the Six Vilayets-Van, Bitlis, Mamuretulaziz, Diyarbahr, Sivas, and Erzurum. In 1912, there were only 870,000 Armenians in the Six Vilayets as a whole. Accordingly, the Armenian population in the six provinces was not even one fifth of the total population. In some provinces of the Six Vilayets, Moslems outnumbered Armenians six to one. Moreover, Armenians were settled an over the Ottoman Empire, not simply in the East. As many Armenians lived in the rest of the Ottoman Empire as in the Six Vilayets. However, even if all the Armenians of the Empire had come together to live in Eastern Anatolia, the Moslems would still have outnumbered them by more than two to one."

1.700.000 lived in the Russian empire, 1.600.000 lived in the Ottoman Empire, and 350.000 lived in the rest of the world. In addition, the report included figures of the Katholikos of Echmiadzin⁵⁰ and of Patriarch of Istanbul, as well as official Turkish figures just prior to the war. The population of Armenians in Turkey was shown as 2.100.000 in the figures of the Patriarch of Istanbul, and as 1.100.000 in the official Turkish figures. There was a difference of about 1.000.000 between the two.⁵¹ As Kemal Karpat expressed in his analysis of the Ottoman population, “the population statistics became the first weapon to be used in a battle to be carried out with weapons in the future.”⁵²

The first part of the appendices section included two statistical tables as to the six provinces, and in the first table, with the resource given as “Orange Book, 1915”, population statistics of the six provinces in the 19th century by the Armenian Patriarch, Lynch, Turkish Ministry of Justice, and Cuinet were compared.

In general terms, the difference between the number of Muslims and the Armenians living in the six provinces were 353.700 in the Armenian Patriarch’s data, 435.582 in Lynch’s, 1.624.049 in Turkish Ministry of Justice’s, and around 2.000.000 in Cuinet’s. It was emphasized here that the data presented by Lynch for the Erzurum and Bitlis provinces had been taken from Turkish resources respectively in 1887 and 1893, and the mentioned data were only related to the provinces of Erzurum and Bitlis and the *sanjaks* of Harput, Dersim and Van. Likewise, the Armenian data did not include the statistics of the province of Diyarbakır.⁵³ In the same table, the Armenian Patriarch’s data (1881) on the Muslim population of Bitlis was shown as 21.121, as it was reflected on the total population, and this number was absolutely wrong. So much so that the population of the mentioned province was actually around

50 For more information on Katholikos of Echmiadzin, please see Ali Arslan, *Kutsal Ermeni Papalığı*, İstanbul, 2005.

51 “Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians”, *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, p.8.

52 Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p. 124. The Armenian Patriarch, for the first time, give out information on the population of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the Congress of Berlin, and demanded recognition of Armenia’s independence as in the case of Bulgaria. While in the Ottoman documents and reports by the British Consulate, the Armenian population between 1878-1914 was indicated as 1.250.000-1.400.000, the Patriarch reflected it as 2.5 million. This number turned into a reference point for some politicians and scholars and was started to be used for propaganda purposes. Marcel Léart, supposedly a Frenchman but actually an Armenian from Istanbul whose actual name was Kirkor Zohrap, based on this data, presented that the population of Ottoman Armenians was 2.5 million in his book called “*La Question Arménienne à la Lumière des Documents, Paris: A Challemeil, 1913*” (p. 50-59) and this number was a source of inspiration for similar studies after this. In addition, by this period, the statistics presented by the Patriarch was objected by the British officials who had been serving in the region and it was determined that data was false. Patrik Nerses, who used fraudulent number to multiply the population of Christians and understate the number of Muslims, was seriously criticized. The data presented by the Patriarch was so inconsistent that it was demanded an explanation of its method of calculation. Despite all this, publishing of “subjective” and “totally false” information resumed. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.9 ve dip.5, p.141,144-146,150. For more information on the Armenian Patriarch’s data on the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, see: Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.50, Tablo: 3. 2, p.51, Table: 3. 3, p.52, Table: 3. 5, p.55, Table: 3. 6.)

53 “Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians”, *General Staff, War Office*, 5th April, 1918, p. 8.

200.000.⁵⁴ In fact, the statistics by the Armenian Patriarch (1881) presented in the report did not overlap with Patriarch's data presented in some resources (1882).⁵⁵ For example, while the Armenian population in the six provinces (excluding the Diyarbakır province) was presented as 1.420.000⁵⁶ in the Patriarch's data, which appeared in the works of Esat Uras and Justin McCarthy, the data in the mentioned report used the number 751.000. Likewise, while the Muslim population in the six provinces excluding Diyarbakır was shown as 1.104.748 in the Armenian Patriarch's data of 1881 presented in the report, it was 1.738.760 according to the general census by the Ottoman in 1881/82.⁵⁷ In short, Patriarch's data based on the Russian Orange Book was not reliable. The Muslim and the Armenian population, although exaggerated and inconsistent, were shown under "the actual data of the Patriarch".

The rest of the data in the report indicated that Lynch's figure for the Muslim population of the Bitlis province was 145.454, while Cuinet's was 254.000. There was little difference between Cuinet's data as presented in Esat Uras' work and in the mentioned report.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the data presented by the Turkish Ministry of Justice regarding the Armenian and the Muslim population in 1890 and data in other sources overlapped with each other.⁵⁹

In the second table that appeared in the General Staff report, on the other hand, there was data regarding the Armenian and the Muslim population in the six provinces for the 20th century based on some sources. According to this, while Ormanian's⁶⁰ records of 1910, which only examined the Armenian population, registered the Armenian population in the six provinces as 967.700, didn't provide any information on the Muslims. Russian Consul-General's data solely

54 Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.35. 1881/82 According to the general census by the Ottoman, the number of Muslims in the province of Bitlis was 167.054. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.274.) The Patriarch's data of the year 1913 pointed to a Muslim population of 162.000 in the region. ("Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p.9.) 19. For Turkish data and statistics on the Muslim population in the six provinces towards the end of century and the beginning of the 20th century, please see: Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.24, Tablo: 2.11; p.34, Tablo: 2.18; p.35, Tablo: 2.19; p.36, Tablo: 2.20; p.39, Tablo: 2.22; p.41, Tablo: 2.23; p.43-44, Tablo: 2.24. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, pp. 310-311, 317-318, 320-327, 330-333, 352-355, 358, 359, 366, 368, 372, 374-75, 382, -83, 396, 409-410.

55 Although 1881 was given in the report as the appropriate year for the Patriarch's data, it actually should have been 1882. (Justin McCharty, *Muslumanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.49; Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.149.)

56 Esat Uras, *ibid.*, p.138, Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.55.

57 Esat Uras, *ibid.*, pp.310-313.

58 For example, while the Armenian population in Erzurum was indicated as 120.466 in Cuinet's data presented in Esat Uras' work, it was indicated as 134.967 in the General Staff report. (Esat Uras, *ibid.*, p.139.)

59 Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.412, Table: II. 6. According to the Turkish sources referenced in Kemal Karpat's work, the Muslim population of the six provinces was 2.028.351 in 1881-82 (p.310-312, Table: I. 8. B), 2.028.182 in 1894 (p.316-18, Table: I. 9), 2.700.940 in 1896'da (p.326-28, Table: I. 12), 2.332.760 in 1897'de (pp.330-32, Table: I. 13), 2.483.135 in 1906-7 (pp.352-54, Table: I. 16. B) and 2.861.511 in 1914. (Kemal Karpat, *ibid.*, p.396, Table: I. 17. B)

60 The Armenian Patriarch Malachia Ormanian, provides the mentioned data in the appendix section of his study entitled as "L'Eglise Arménienne, Paris, 1910." According to the mentioned data, the total number of Armenians living in Turkey is 1.579.000. (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.57; Esat Uras, *ibid.*, p.138.)

on the provinces of Erzurum and Bitlis⁶¹ for 1912, on the other hand, indicated to 1.047.000 Muslims and 350.000 Armenians. According to same data, compared to the Muslim population of 550.000 in the province of Erzurum, there was 200.000 Armenians living in the province. Data on the province of Bitlis, while obtained from the Russian Consul-General in Bitlis, was only concerning the Gregorian Armenians.

The Armenian Patriarch's data on the six provinces as a whole in 1913 was another resource utilized in the table.⁶² Here, the Armenian population was recorded as 1.018.000, and the Muslim population was 1.178.000.⁶³ These numbers overlapped with the Patriarch's data (1912) provided in other resources.⁶⁴ In addition, the number of Muslims residing in the provinces excluding the province of Sivas was –probably mistakenly- understated; but this situation was not reflected in general total. The Patriarch's data of 1913 on the province of Erzurum, compared to 1912 data by the Russian Consul-General in Erzurum, it could be observed that the number of Muslims went down by 180.000, in addition to an increase in the number of Armenians by 15.000. The same comparison provided an increase by 30.000 in the Armenian population and a decrease by 335.000 in the Muslim population in Bitlis.⁶⁵

The last two resources, which provided data solely on the provinces of Bitlis and Van, were of Mayevsky's (1889)⁶⁶ and of the Russian Vice-Consul's (1912). In the foremost of these closely related resources, it was mentioned that eight different censuses were done for one household, and the Armenian population in the mentioned provinces were 296.488, while the Muslim population was 522.184. Russian Consul-General Olpherev, on the other hand, pointed to 300.000 Armenians and 520.000 Muslims living in these provinces.

61 Although it is indicated in the bottom section of the table, which provides total population, that the mentioned data provides information regarding "vilayets of Erzurum and Van only", the content of the table included data regarding Erzurum and Bitlis.

62 In fact, the mentioned data was of the year 1913. (Justin McCharty, *Musulmanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.47, Table: 3.1; p.49.)

63 It was indicated in the table that south of Malatya, northwest of Sivas province, Hakkari and Beşiri were not included in these numbers. ("Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p.9.)

64 Esat Uras, *ibid.*, p.39; Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, p.51, Tablo: 3. 3.

65 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p. 9. Allegedly, the statistics by the Armenian Patriarch was generally based on the registrations of baptism and death. Data on Muslims in these statistics, when compared to the Ottoman records, it could be easily noticed that Patriarch's numbers were very low. The officials of the Patriarch, although not able to do a census for the Muslim population, did not accept the Ottoman data and produced its own estimates. The understatement of the Muslim population would serve some political interests. (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, pp. 48-49, 51-53.)

66 Mayevsky, a Major General serving in the Russian General Staff, was commissioned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the region for more than five years, visited almost all parts of Van and Bitlis and prepared population records related to these provinces. Mayevsky's published statistics, which were prepared by examining documents remaining from the Ottomans, were analyzed by the Ottoman Ministry of War, and the book was later translated into Turkish and was published. The book entitled "Van ve Bitlis Vilayetleri Askeri İstatistiği" (Translator: Suvari Binbaşısı Mehmet Sadık, İstanbul, Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1330.), provided duplicates of registries that included each village, family and ethnic-religious community. (Justin McCarthy, *Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar*, pp.75-76.)

Following the statistics on the six provinces, the last part of the appendices section of the General Staff report was about the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Armenians, and went on with the population statistics of Batum and Kars regions.⁶⁷ According to this, while the Russian Yearbook of 1914 pointed to a total population of 172.000 in the Batum region, the Russian official census of 1897 pointed to the existence of 40.000 Turkish people. By 1914, there was a considerable amount of Greeks in Batum, where the Muslim Georgians made up the most of the population, and the number of Armenians did not exceed 5-6 thousand.

Data, presented under the title "Government of Kars" and based on the 1897 Russian Official Census, provided that the total population in the region was 292.498 and the Armenians, with 73.406 people, made up the %25 of the total population. The total population of the region, according to the Russian Yearbook, would rise to 389.000 in 1914.

Finally, by 1914, Armenians made up the 120.000 of the total population of the "Batum and Kars" district with 420.000 people.

The British General Staff, with summaries of the mentioned historical processes and statistical information on the population, targeted and was successful to provide well-organized data on the Armenians about whom many discussions took place regarding their political future and outgoing attitude was shown related to their independence by 1918. Especially, the statistics related to the Armenian population in the Eastern Anatolian provinces prior to the war were significantly important. In addition to this, mentioning of the manifestation of the Armenian nationalism in the 19th century with revolts and massacres only superficially, and the lack of mention of the Armenian revolts and the British and the Russian state policies towards the Armenians, as well as the chronicled, one sided, prejudiced and exploitive points of view related to the 1915 events and deprivations presented in the report were among the most important shortcomings of the report.

After the First World War, the British War Office Office's point of view on the Armenian question and its plans related to Eastern Anatolia, denoted as Armenia, would be highly realistic. The British General Staff would emphasize

The British General Staff, with summaries of the mentioned historical processes and statistical information on the population, targeted and was successful to provide well-organized data on the Armenians about whom many discussions took place regarding their political future and outgoing attitude was shown related to their independence by 1918.

67 "Historical and Ethnological Notes on the Armenians", General Staff, War Office, 5th April, 1918, p.10

that Erzurum should not be included in the Armenia to be founded⁶⁸ and would remind that Muslims had made up most of the population in Erzurum prior to the war.⁶⁹

The British army officials, while leaving on one side the hostility towards the Turkish which blinded the British politicians in Paris, would start examining the events with a realistic point of view, bringing the matters related to peace conditions to be offered to Turkey and to the policy towards Armenia to the table in line with realist principles. The British War Ministry, which had the view that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had reputed policies towards Armenia, would voice that the promises and intentions towards the Armenian independence had expressed nothing at all.

The issue of the future of Armenia would become an issue that the British General Staff was concerned about, and the founding of the planned Armenian state would not be a applicable policy that the General Staff supported.⁷⁰

68 TNA. PRO. FO. 608/271/4, "General Staff Comments on M. Berthelot's Note of 12.12.19. and the Comments of the Political-Section Thereon", Lieut. Colonel, G.S. M. Gribbon, 10 January 1920.

69 HLRO. LG/F/206/4/14, "Erzerum and the Western Boundary of Armenia" General Staff War Office, 11.2.1920, B.B Cubitt, (WO) to Secretary of the Cabinet, 12 February 1920.

70 TNA. PRO. CAB. 24/103, C. P. 1014, "General Staff Memorandum on the Turkish Peace Treaty", The War Office, 1st April, 1920.

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APPROACH OF THE TURKISH PRESS TO THE ARMENIAN TERRORISM BETWEEN 1973 AND 1984

(1973 VE 1984 YILLARI ARASINDA
TÜRK BASINININ ERMENİ TERÖRÜNE YAKLAŞIMI)

Hazel ÇAĞAN

Specialist,

The Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)

hcagan@avim.org.tr

Abstract: *This study aims to examine how Turkish newspapers approached the Armenian terrorism which emerged in the years between 1973 and 1984 as the third wave of Armenian terrorism since the late 19th century. The Armenian terrorist organizations officially emerged in the third wave again, in 1975 in order to show the world their claims in terms of the so-called Armenian genocide, assassinating Turkish diplomats, including ambassadors and their families, in a planned and systematic fashion within these 11 years. Along with the accelerated Armenian terror, domestic terrorism and political disorder were the other developments in Turkey. Within the context of such difficulties, the extent of Armenian terrorist activities and the changes in the politically varied Turkish newspapers' regarding Armenian terrorism between 1973 and 1984 are examined thoroughly.*

Keywords: *Armenian question, Armenian terrorism, Turkish press, Turkish diplomats, ideological cleavages.*

Öz: *Bu çalışmada, 1973 ve 1984 yılları arasında, 19. Yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren zaman zaman patlak veren Ermeni terörünün 3. dalgasının yeniden ortaya çıkışı ve bu terör faaliyetlerinin Türk gazeteleri tarafından gündeme getiriliş biçimi ele alınmıştır. Resmi olarak 1975 yılında ortaya çıkan Ermeni terör örgütleri, Ermeni soykırım iddiaları konusunda haklı olduklarını bütün dünyaya duyurmak için, aralarında büyükelçilerin de bulunduğu, Türk diplomatlarını ve aile fertlerini 11 yıl boyunca sistemli ve planlı bir şekilde katletmişlerdir. Ermeni terörünün yoğun bir şekilde yaşandığı bu dönemde, ülke içindeki siyasi karışıklıklar ve terör faaliyetleri de yoğun bir şekilde devam etmiştir. Tüm bu gelişmeler yaşanırken, Ermeni terör saldırılarının bu 11 yıllık dönemde siyasileşmiş Türk gazeteleri tarafından mevcut ideolojik ayrılıkların yaşandığı bir dönemde, Türk halkına ne kadar sağlıklı bir biçimde aktarıldığı ve Türk basınının Ermeni sorununa yaklaşımındaki değişim mercek altına alınmıştır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ermeni sorunu, Ermeni terörü, Türk basını, Türk diplomatlar, Türk gazeteleri, ideolojik ayrılıklar*

Introduction:

In the period between 1973 and 1984, Turkish diplomats were assassinated by Armenian terrorists in 18 different cities¹ all over the world. The world press closely followed developments about the Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats as well as Turkish press coverage of these events.

It was three times that the Armenian terrorism was experienced in history. Turkey faced the first period of Armenian terrorism in the late 19th century. Armenians and Turks lived in peace for nearly four hundred years until Tsarist Russia invaded the Caucasus and the relationship between the Armenians and the Turks began to deteriorate after the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War² as Russians made use of Armenian secret organizations and political parties. Shortly after the Russo-Ottoman War, an Armenian union was formed under the name of “Black Cross” and attacked Muslims and Armenians in Van and the surrounding area.³ The rebellions started with Sassoun rebellions in 1894 by Hamparsum Boyacıyan with the promise of English support for the rebellious Armenians.⁴

In the beginning of the First World War, the second period of Armenian terrorism started with the second Zeitun rebellion in 1914.⁵ British, French and Russian troops again cooperated with the Armenians and they tortured Muslims as well as Armenians in Anatolia.⁶ The well-known “Armenian atrocities” were actually a part of Armenian terrorism.⁷ Armenian terrorism continued even after the end of World War I, until Turkish armed forces secured these places towards the end of 1920.⁸

This research aims to investigate the position of the Turkish press regarding Armenian terrorism and the multi-vocal Turkish press which existed in the 1970s will be examined in relation to Armenian terrorism. The answers to questions such as to what extent Turkish press was able to understand, analyze and reflect the seriousness of the Armenian challenge to Turkish public opinion; whether the Turkish press was able to develop a common stance in relation to such a national question and if the political divisions in the domestic political arena in this period affected the capabilities of Turkish press in truly comprehending Armenian terrorism targeting Turkey abroad will be discussed.

1 Ömer Engin Lütem, *Armenian Terror*. Ankara: Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 8.

2 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 8.

3 Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 129.

4 Ömer Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları 2007, p.172.

5 Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. p. 187.

6 Karayumak, *Ermeniler, Ermeni İsyanları, Ermeni Katliamları*. p. 232.

7 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 12.

8 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 12.

In the years between 1973 and 1985, Turkish diplomats began to be victimized as a result of Armenian terrorist attacks and Turkish newspapers were divided according to their political affiliations. Even if a terrorist attack was a national problem and hence required a united front to cope with it, the political division among central left and central right parties was so severe that a newspaper was even capable of using the news on Armenian terrorist attacks to accuse others with opposite political views of being part of these attacks. Such a division stemmed from the nature of the Turkish political scene of the period. From 1973 to 1980, the government mainly oscillated between the Republican People's Party (RPP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), whose leader was Bülent Ecevit, and the Justice Party (JP – Adalet Partisi), whose leader was Süleyman Demirel⁹, in addition to major political actors such as Alparslan Türkeş of the National Movement Party (NMP – Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). Moreover, Turkey had experienced short-lived coalition governments and technocratic rule in this period. The newspapers were so blinded by their political tendencies that they were not in a position to grasp and sufficiently analyze the developments about Armenian terrorism. They focused intently on their political battles against each other.¹⁰

In the years between 1973 and 1985, Turkish diplomats began to be victimized as a result of Armenian terrorist attacks and Turkish newspapers were divided according to their political affiliations.

After 12 September 1980, publications were banned and a state of emergency was declared.¹¹ According to the amendments in the Press Law, the articles became harsher. The penalties were increased from 5.000 to 150.000 Liras.¹² Especially in between 12 September 1980 and 12 March 1984,¹³ the implementations of the law became severe. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* was closed four times, for 41 days; *Milli Gazete* was closed four times for 72 days; *Tercüman* was closed for 29 days; *Milliyet* was closed for 10 days and *Hürriyet* was closed two times for 7 days.¹⁴

Turkish press was in a very politically divided period as it faced Armenian terrorism. As the newspapers were very much linked to Turkish political parties and ideologies, journalism was shaped by these political parties and ideologies. Kabacalı expressed the link between the political parties and the newspapers, “At first, it can be seen that diversity of thoughts and the defense of all kinds

9 Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 39.

10 Salih Bayram, “Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, A Historical Interpretation”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.4, 579-611, December 2010, p. 587.

11 Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003. p. 263.

12 Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 262.

13 Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 259.

14 Topuz, *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. p. 259.

of aspects may indicate the existence of a democratic context; it is possible to mention only a “dialogue of the deaf” for the rest of the publications except for the high-circulation newspapers share their opinion with the similar quarters. It is apparent that the reason is political polarization.”¹⁵ According to Kabacalı’s analysis, the clash of contradicting thoughts demolishes the democratic system, rather than strengthening it. Kabacalı summarized the transition from the politicized political period before 1980 to the depoliticized period after 1980 in his work. The confusion and lack of experience among Turkish newspapers transformed national news like Armenian terrorism into tools of domestic political competition. Until the newspapers began to comprehend these issues as a national question, this competition carried on.

The best-known Armenian terrorist organization in Turkey was ASALA. ASALA is the abbreviation of *L’Armée secrète arménienne de libération de l’Arménie*, or Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.¹⁶ After the terrorist attacks, the Turkish press perceived these various terrorist groups as branches of the ASALA. Although the attacks against Turkish diplomats started in 1973, the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA became well-known with the assassinations of Daniş Tunalıgil and İsmail Erez¹⁷ in 1975. Only after these assassinations did Turkish public opinion and the Turkish government realize that these assassinations were supported and financed by other groups and countries.¹⁸ It is not sufficient only to give information about ASALA while talking about the Armenian terrorism. There were some other Armenian terrorist groups which prepared attacks in Turkey and in many states. The reason behind Armenian terrorism was to express the claims of Armenians about the events of 1915, and bring forward their political and economic demands from Turkey, which was taken as the direct heir of the Ottoman State. Even though the Armenian terrorist groups were considered the same, these terrorist groups were classified into two main groups. These groups are Hinchaks and Tashnaks, and they have the same ultimate goal for Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora. However, Hinchaks and Tashnaks are in struggle in terms of ideologies. Hinchaks follow the Marxist-Leninist ideology and Tashnaks adopted right-wing principles.¹⁹ The first attack on Mehmet Baydar and Bahadır Demir in Los Angeles was committed by Mıgırđıç Yanıkıyan, who apparently was incited by Tashnaks to commit the crime.²⁰ On the other hand,

15 Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Millî Kütüphane Basımevi, 1994. p. 324.

16 Bilal Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız-2*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000, p. 17.

17 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız-2*, p. 18.

18 Michael Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism.” *Conflict Quarterly*, 5, Fall 1985. p.31. [Online]. <https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fjournals.hil.unb.ca%2Findex.php%2FJCS%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F14692%2F15761&ei=6AVUrPWPkF8ygPQuYLQBA&usq=AFQjCNFbTwPQyL9bwhPUjQfKcMq0iBZ2hQ&sig2=I2TWJjtFBIFINWYwK4nIA&bv=57155469.d.bGQ> [11.06.2011].

19 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 9.

20 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p. 19.

the infamous ASALA was founded by leftist-Hinchak supporters and followed leftist principles. The less well-known Armenian terrorist organization Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) was right-wing and was supported by Tashnaks. While most of the attacks were committed by leftist Armenian terrorist group ASALA and there were attacks by JCAG too. One of the attacks by JCAG was on Administrative Attaché Bora Suelkan in Bulgaria, an Eastern Bloc²¹ country, in September 9, 1982. The ideological struggle between leftist ASALA and JCAG ended whenever they united against Turkish diplomats and Turkish foreign diplomacy. Their ultimate goal eliminated their ideological clash.

Terrorism and Division in the Turkish Press (1973-1980)

Armenian terrorism was exacerbated when Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir were murdered by an Armenian in Santa Barbara, California, 1973.²² These first two assassinations could not have been identified as a part of an organized attack by Armenian organizations, but it evolved in the years to follow and by the mid-70s, Turkey had started to grasp the seriousness of a well-organized and efficient world-wide international terrorist network.

A 77-year-old American citizen professing to be of Iranian origin made an application to Turkey's Consulate General in Los Angeles to donate a painting which had been stolen from the Ottoman palace and a souvenir banknote to the Turkish Republic.²³ The Consul General Mehmet Baydar in Los Angeles arranged an appointment to meet the old man. Two Turkish diplomats, Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir went to the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara in order to be closer to Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan as they had decided. Nevertheless, they did not foresee the exact purpose of the old American man. The old "Iranian-American" prepared two guns for his victims in order to shoot them. The two Turkish diplomats were shot by Yanıkyan in January 27, 1973 in Santa Barbara and both died.

The real identity of the murderer was revealed after the incident. He was an Armenian-American, Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan. This attack was definitely a shock both for the US and Turkey. As a result of this unprecedented event, Turkish newspapers could not conceal their denunciation of the negligence of the United States and Diaspora Armenians. The assassinations were covered

21 "Suelkan Doğu Bloku'nda Öldürülen İlk Diplomatımız Oldu." *Son Havadis*, 10 September 1982.

22 Bilal Şimşir, *Ermeni Terörü ve Tehdit: Türk Diplomatları Üzerine Bazı Tespitler*, Ermeni Araştırmaları 1. Türkiye Kongresi Bildirileri, Cilt II, Ankara:2007, p. 399.

23 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız – I*, p. 83.

widely by the Turkish press, and the press published all details about the incident.

Two days after the attack, newspaper *Akşam* published a front page item with a huge title “Our Two Consuls Were Killed in the USA”²⁴ and the subheading of the news continued, “Armenian Grudge Arose Again”.²⁵ Although this title and content of the article accused the “Armenians” of murdering the Turkish diplomats, no Armenian group accepted this accusation. However, in the following days a group appeared under the name of “soldiers of Gourgen Yanıkyan”²⁶ and gave an impression that the assassinations were not simple isolated events.

The titles of the related news encapsulated the reaction towards the attack. On the one hand Yanıkyan was described as “Despicable Assassin”²⁷, on the other hand the newspaper questioned the power behind him: “Who enraged the insidious Armenian?”.²⁸ However, *Akşam* also published the statements of the Armenian Patriarch in Turkey in its front page under the title of “The Attack Created Hatred”.²⁹

A few days after the incident, the American police found the letters written by the murderer Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan. Yanıkyan in these letters explained how he nurtured hatred against Turkey and by the assassination he had taken the revenge of his ancestors who had been killed in 1915. Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan claimed in court that he was not guilty and repeated that he had taken revenge for his slain ancestors who had been murdered by the Ottomans/Turks. *Akşam*, which covered these letters and Yanıkyan’s defense in the court, suggested that in fact Yanıkyan planned these murders, in all these years he spent in the USA, and strove to commit atrocities.³⁰

Son Havadis was the most nationalistic newspaper among the newspapers analyzed in this study. *Son Havadis* gave the news about the first incident in the US with the title of “An Armenian Murdered Our Two Diplomats in Los Angeles”³¹ on 29 January. The next day, *Son Havadis*’s caption read as: “Attempts of the US government for the security of our representatives”³²

24 “Amerika’daki İki Konsolosumuz Öldürüldü -Ermeni Kini Yine Hortladı” *Akşam*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

25 *Akşam*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

26 Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, San Francisco: Oxford, Westview Press, 1991. p. 19.

27 “Alçak Kaatil! [sic]” *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

28 “Hain Ermeni’yi Kimler Kudurttu?” *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

29 “Ermeni Patriği: Olay Nefret Yarattı” *Akşam*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

30 “Yanıkyan Masum Rolüne Büründü” [“Yanıkyan pretends as if he was innocent.”] *Akşam*, 1 February 1973, p. 1.

31 “Bir Ermeni, Los Angeles’ta İki Diplomatımızı Öldürdü” *Son Havadis*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

32 “Temsilcilerimizin Emniyeti İçin Teşebbüse Geçildi” *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

Nevertheless, this attempt for the security of our diplomats would rewind several times in the following years. On the 30th of January, *Son Havadis* published further details about the murderer Yanıkyan. Among these details, Yanıkyan's marriage to a Russian woman was highlighted as a caption on the front page.³³ *Son Havadis*'s special emphasis on such a minor detail was a deliberate attempt of this politically right-wing newspaper to imply a possible Soviet or communist conspiracy in relation to these assassinations. Nevertheless, the rest of the newspapers did not mention the Russian connections of Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan. In the following days, *Son Havadis* also provided the information about Turkish society's cancellation of the dinner organized by the Turkish-Armenian society in Los Angeles.³⁴ As a result of the lack of the flow of information in Turkey, Turkish people merely reacted against the USA. However, the US was not the only country which formed a base for the Armenian attacks. The connection among Armenian Diaspora, the US and the Soviet Union was underestimated by the Turkish press. Thus, the inadequate transformation of the intelligence on the first Armenian attack in 1973 started to damage Turkey's image.

The political struggle among the newspapers prevented them from researching and transmitting information clearly to Turkish society. For example, *Son Havadis* was affiliated with Süleyman Demirel's JP³⁵, which was in opposition in that period.³⁶ Hence it gave Demirel's condemnation of the terrorist attack its front page.³⁷ What is more interesting is that *Son Havadis* only provided Demirel's statements about the murders. So, this one-sidedness did not let newspapers like *Son Havadis* transmit the news as it was. *Son Havadis* continued to follow the case of Yanıkyan in the following days and reported that in his defense, Yanıkyan had urged the Armenians to act everywhere as he did in Los Angeles.³⁸ *Son Havadis* also reported that Yanıkyan claimed he was not guilty but the judge refused the demand of release.³⁹

The emotional editorial front page of *Son Havadis* published on 31st January, 1973 provides important clues about the standpoint of the newspaper vis-à-vis the Armenian terrorism:

33 "Katil Ermeni Bir Rus Kadınla Evli" ["Assassin Armenian had been married to a Russian lady."] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

34 "Türk Cemaati, Los Angeles'taki Türk-Ermeni Demeği Yemeğini İptal Etti" ["Turkish side in Los Angeles cancelled the supper in Turko-Armenian Council"] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

35 Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 324.

36 <http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pCabinetRoot.aspx> [01.12.2012].

37 "Demirel: Cinayeti Nefretle Karşılдық" ["Demirel: We Condemn The Assassination with Hatred"] *Son Havadis*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

38 "Katil, 'Ermeniler Her Yerde Bu Taktiği Uygulamalı', diyor." ["Yanıkyan has told that Armenian should apply this method everywhere."] *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

39 "Yargıç, Kaatilin [sic] Serbest Bırakılması Talebini Reddetti" *Son Havadis*, 1 February 1973, p. 1.

Our newspapers are interpreting the hideous assassinations as “a new view of enmity against Turks”. As usually, this is a quick judgment taken feverishly. In our opinion, it is wrong to evaluate this incident as a fanatical revenge attempt of a furious Armenian. It is inconceivable for a psychopathic Armenian who interpreted the historical Turkish-Armenian relationship in a wrong way, waited until his seventy to take revenge by killing two Turks by chance.⁴⁰

Son Havadis, in its news on the burial of the two diplomats, referred to Yanıkyan as “a Maniac Armenian”, a description in the Editorial quoted.⁴¹

Son Havadis did not simply provide intelligence or views on the current murders, but also focused on the historical roots of the Armenian enmity towards Turks. Kemal Bingöl in his column “Fikir Meydanı” questioned how people could be so cruel and build their relations on atrocity. According to Bingöl, the brotherhood between Turks and Armenians had been damaged. Bingöl, who was from Erzurum, directed the attention of his readers to the fact that Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan was also born in Erzurum, and condemned the seeds of hatred planted between these two ethnic groups.⁴²

Son Havadis, nine days after the assassinations, published an article written by Armenian origin Turkish citizen Torkom İstepanyan. *Son Havadis*'s giving a space for this author was related to the fact that İstepanyan openly expressed his feelings of belonging to Turkish nation and pointed out the strong link between the Armenian statesmen and the Ottoman Empire through his publications in the following years.⁴³ İstepanyan began his article with a quotation from *Ansiklopedia Americana*, claiming that “In 1915, the ‘Turkish’ government, because of the fear of Russian invasion of ‘Turkey’, decided to solve the Armenian question and massacred the Armenians and forced women and children to convert to Islam.”⁴⁴ İstepanyan says in his article that the

40 “Başyazı” [“Editorial”] “Gazetelerimiz, Los Angeles’taki işlenen iğrenç cinayeti, ‘Türk düşmanlığının yeni bir görüntüsü’ olarak yorumluyorlar. Bu çoğu zaman olduğu gibi, olayın heyecanı sırasında verilmiş acele bir hükümdür. Bu olayı fanatik bir intikam teşebbüsü, gözü dönmüş bir Ermeni’nin kişisel bir tecavüzü olarak değerlendirmek kanatımızca yanlıştır. Tarihsel Türk-Ermeni ilişkilerinin tatsız bir dönemini, yanlış yorumlayan bir Ermeni’nin hasta bir ruhla, intikam alması için bunca yıl beklemiş olması rastgele iki Türk’ü tuzağa düşürerek arkadan vurması için yetmiş yaşını beklemiş olması, aklın alacağı bir durum değildir.” *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

41 “Bir Manyak Ermeni Tarafından Öldürülen 2 Şehit Hariciyecimiz Toprağa Verildi” [“The two Turkish Diplomats who were murdered by a maniac Armenian had been buried”] *Son Havadis*, 4 February 1973, p. 1.

42 “Fikir Meydanı – Hınçaklar ve Taşnaklar” [“Hinchak or Tashnaksutiun”] *Son Havadis*, 31 January 1973, p. 7.

43 Torkom İstepanyan, *Atatürk’ün Doğumunun 100. yılında Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, “ Mareşal Garabet Artin Davut Paşa (P.T.T Bakanlığı ve Bayındırlık Bakanlığı) (Ministry of Organization of Post and Telegraph and Ministry office, responsible for Urbanism), Andon Tıngır Yaver Paşa (P.T.T Bakanı), Oskan Mardikyan (P.T.T Bakanı) (Ministry of Organization of Post and Telegraph), Bedros Hallacyan (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Avukat Krikor Sinapyan (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Krikor Agaton (Bayındırlık Bakanı) (Minister of Urbanism), Gabriel Noradunkyan (Bayındırlık Bakanlığı ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı) (Ministry of Urbanism and Ministry of Foreign Affairs)” İstanbul: Bolis-Constantinople, 1984.

44 *Son Havadis*, “1915’te Türk hükümeti Ruslar Türkiye’yi işgal ederse Ermenilerin onlarla birleşmesinden korkarak Ermeni meselesini halle karar verdi, katliam yaptı kadınlar ve çocuklar zorla müslüman yapıldı.” 06 February 1973.

Armenians had never been Islamized. This truth is known by Armenians themselves including American, Lebanese, Syrian and French Armenians.⁴⁵ İstepanyan further argued that Armenians were not forced to convert in mass numbers and this is a truth known by Armenians living in the USA, Lebanon, Syria and France. For hundreds of years, according to İstepanyan, Turks and Armenians lived peacefully together and Islam allowed such a peaceful co-existence. He boldly argued that claims of genocide did not make sense in such a cosmopolitan empire as the Ottoman Empire.

Torkom İstepanyan continued that Turkish-Armenian hostility stemmed from the fact Armenians were armed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and France and were promised independence by these powers. These armed Armenian mobsters attacked Turkish villages. İstepanyan in his article also addressed the Armenians in the USA:

For hundreds of years, according to İstepanyan, Turks and Armenians lived peacefully together and Islam allowed such a peaceful co-existence.

...It is reality that there are still people who are insulted, tortured just because of being Muslim, Buddhist and black people are still being tortured. Besides these tragedies, Turkish people have succeeded to heal their wounds.⁴⁶

The day *Son Havadis* published İstepanyan's article, the newspaper also reported the Armenian Patriarch Kalustyan's view on the assassinations. Especially his remark on cursing "The fingers of a maniac which intends to reopen the healed wound" was highlighted. Like İstepanyan, Kalustyan gave a message of "let bygones be bygones."⁴⁷

Son Havadis however, did not stop covering the incident even one month later. This time the issue was covered by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the famous author, journalist and politician who was also a close associate of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Unlike the previous articles, Karaosmanoğlu focused on the international connections of the Armenian terror. He highlighted the significance of the French attitude against Turkey especially in terms of the Armenian question. Karaosmanoğlu, accused Nihat Erim's government (1971-1972) of not pursuing effective foreign policy despite Erim's visits to foreign countries and Turkey was perceived "powerless" and "inadequate" abroad

45 *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973.

46 "Yemek Listesindeki 1914 Ermenistan'ı ve Bir Türk Ermenisi'nin Dünya Ermenilerine Açık Mektubu," ["Armenia of 1914 in Menu and the Open Letter to Armenians in the World."] *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973, p. 4.

47 "Bir manyağın kapanan bir yarayı deşmeye yeltenen parmaklarını lanetliyoruz." ["We deeply curse the fingers of a maniac which intends to reopen the healed wound"] *Son Havadis*, 06 February 1973, p. 7.

owing to the image created by him.⁴⁸ Unlike Armenian authors, Karaosmanoğlu's article in *Son Havadis* moves away from the emphasis of brotherhood between Armenians and Turks. Rather, he accused Erim's government of not representing Turkey abroad properly. Especially, Erim's statements during his visit to France did not please Karaosmanoğlu as according to him, Erim spoke about his loyalty to "democracy, human rights and principles of justice" to every statesmen he met as if he wanted to account for Turkish internal affairs to the foreigners.⁴⁹ In his article, Karaosmanoğlu not only accused the Armenian Diaspora, France, the French press, European Council and even M. Yanıkyan, but also Nihat Erim's government of being guilty. Karaosmanoğlu highlighted that Yanıkyan had been supported by both the East and the West.⁵⁰

Son Havadis continued to pursue the news on the incident such as Yanıkyan's defense until the beginning of March.⁵¹ However, the approaching presidential elections changed the agenda.⁵²

As *Son Havadis* did, *Tercüman* released the first news about the assassinations under a headline written in large fonts. "Two Turkish Diplomats Murdered in the United States".⁵³ *Tercüman* did not simply provide the information about the assassinations, but also provided photograph of the location of the murder as well as Mehmet Baydar's family. The following day, Mıgırdıç Yanıkyan's words "I took revenge"⁵⁴ became the main headline on the first page once again. At every opportunity, Yanıkyan expressed that he was the pioneer of the battle against Turks.⁵⁵ The editorial published in the first page of *Tercüman* argued that the attack was not personal but was against Turkishness and this attack was a result of Hinchak and Tashnak manipulations, which created the grudge of Yanıkyan and revealed itself in his murders. Like *Son Havadis*, this article also emphasized the good historical relations between Turks and

48 "Fransız Basını, Erim Hükümeti, Avrupa Konseyi ve M. Yanıkyan" ["French Press, Erim Government, European Council and M. Yanıkyan"] "Nihat Erim Bey biraz sonra Fransa'ya gittiğinde, sanki, dış kamuoyuna açıklayacak başka birşeyimiz yokmuş gibi her görüştüğü devlet adamına demokrasiye, insan haklarına ve adalet prensiplerine sadakatinden bahsedişini onu hiç yoktan yabancılara kendi devlet ve hükümet işlerimizin hesabını vermek ister gibi göstermiştir." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

49 "Fransız Basını..." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

50 "Mesela, son seksen veya yüz yıl boyunca Ermeni teröristlerinin Türkiye'de yaptıkları suikastları, kurdukları komploları gözlerimiz önünden geçebilir ve Washington Büyükelçimizin yukarıki sözüne ekleyerek bütün bu cinayetlerin kâh doğudan kâh batıdan büyük devletlerin himayesi altında yapılmış olduğunu, fakat, eski yaraları desmek ne bunları açanları ne açtıranların hayrınadır." *Son Havadis*, 26 February 1973, p. 5.

51 "Yanıkyan, mahkemede "masumum" diye konuştu." ["Yanıkyan expressed that he was innocent in the court"] *Son Havadis*, 28 February 1973, p. 1.

52 "Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimine 10 gün kaldı" ["10 Days for the Presidential Elections"] *Son Havadis*, 3 March 1973, p. 1.

53 "Amerika'da iki Türk Diplomatı öldürüldü." *Tercüman*, 29 January 1973, p. 1.

54 "İntikam Aldım!" ["I have taken revenge!"] *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

55 "Yanıkyan: Türklere Karşı Savaşın Öncüsüyüm!" ["Yanıkyan: I am the Pioneer of the War Against Turks!"] *Tercüman*, 31 January 1973, p. 1.

Armenians.⁵⁶ Ahmet Kabaklı, the famous literary figure and *Tercüman* columnist since 1961, condemned the groups of Hinchak and Tashnaks and did not view these assassinations as an isolated event in his column “Gün Işığında”.⁵⁷

Kabaklı continued to write on the Armenian issue parallel to excerpts from Mayewski’s book which will be discussed shortly. According to Kabaklı, Russia had never been influential over the Armenian culture. However, Russia had never intended to make any other minorities work for them. There had been an opportunity for Armenians to continue their lives without being assimilated. Kabaklı asks The Soviet Union did not assimilate Armenians.⁵⁸

Murders in Vienna and Paris

Two and a half years after the assassinations in Los Angeles, Daniş Tunalıgil, the Turkish ambassador in Vienna, was killed on October 22, 1975. He was the first ambassador who was murdered by the Armenian terrorist organizations. Three gunmen with two Hungarian-made Wallam automatic guns, one British-made MP Sten and one Israeli-made MP Uzzi entered the Turkish Embassy in Vienna located in Prinz Eugen Strasse 40 in the daylight and killed Tunalıgil in his office, which was on the first floor of this historical building. Tunalıgil was 60 years old when he was murdered.

The confusion in the Turkish press was denoted by Bilal Şimşir. According to Şimşir’s book, *Tercüman* reported that “The Greek Cypriots want to blame Armenian organizations with murdering our Ambassadors”.⁵⁹ The Turkish press was not able to comprehend who were the murderers of Tunalıgil. Initially, the assassination of the ambassador was blamed on anarchist Greek Cypriots by the press. The reason why the press focused on the Greek Cypriots as culprits of the crime was the Cyprus Peace Operation led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1974. Turkish newspapers thus drew a correlation between the resentment of Greek Cypriots and the assassination. For instance, *Tercüman* argued that the murderers might have been Greek Cypriots or Armenian anarchists.⁶⁰ The day after the murder of Tunalıgil, *Tercüman* carried on publishing repetitive news on the assassination.

56 “Başyazı” [“Editorial”] *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 1.

57 Ahmet Kabaklı, “Gün Işığında” *Tercüman*, 30 January 1973, p. 2.

58 Kabaklı, “Gün Işığında - Erivan” [“Yerevan”] *Tercüman*, 04 February 1973, p. 5.

59 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız – I* “Rumlar, Elçilerimizin öldürülüşünü Ermeni örgütlerinin üzerine yıkmak istiyorlar.” p. 122.

60 “Daniş Tunalıgil” *Tercüman*, 23 October 1975, p. 1.

While there was confusion over the culprits of Tunalıgil's murder, *Tercüman* was the first Turkish newspaper to name the terrorist organization ASALA and claimed that ASALA members had been trained in Lebanon, Beirut.⁶¹ According to the news that *Tercüman* reported, Austrian police officials reported that, the Armenian terrorists had been trained in Lebanon along with the Greek Cypriot terrorist group Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (EOKA-B). Thus, EOKA-B had been among the possible responsible terrorist groups.⁶² In the following days, *Tercüman* was certain that the attackers were Greek Cypriots and the headline ran: "The Greek Terrorists murdered our diplomats".⁶³

Only two days after the assassination of Daniş Tunalıgil, Turkey's ambassador to Paris İsmail Erez and his driver Talip Yener were shot by Armenian terrorists, while they were on their way to the Turkish embassy.

This headline demonstrates the confusion of the Turkish press about Armenian terrorism. Ahmet Kabaklı in his column asked who the murderers were⁶⁴ and listed the possible candidates: Hinchak, Tashnak, EOKA-B and Turkish Communist Groups⁶⁵; the last possibility in particular was clear proof of how internal political differences blurred the perceptions related to the attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad.

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Later it was learned that the assassination was executed by three or four terrorists who ran away after the attack. Ambassador Erez received bullets to his heart and neck and died on the spot, as did the driver. After the attack a phone call from the ASALA threatened the Turkish embassy with a possible explosion. *Son Havadis* grew suspicious about Greek Cypriots, running a headline reading "Greek Cypriots raised doubts"⁶⁶ and reporting the news as follows:

The assassination of İsmail Erez led to various speculations about the identity of the murderers. According to *Akşam*, Turks, Greeks and Armenian citizens in Paris were interrogated after the incident.⁶⁷ There was a phone call to Turkish

61 *Tercüman*, 23 October 1975.

62 *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975.

63 "Elçilerimizi Yunanlı Tedhişçiler Öldürmüştü" *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

64 Kabaklı, "Katil Kim?" *Tercüman*, 29 October 1975.

65 Kabaklı, *Tercüman*, 29 October 1975.

66 "Bütün Şüpheler Kıbrıslı Rumlar Üzerinde Toplandı" *Son Havadis*, 26 October 1975.

67 "Paris'teki Rumlar Sorguya Çekiliyor" *Akşam*, 26 October 1975.

embassy in Paris and the person on the phone said that the murder had been committed by the Armenians. However, in another phone call another person on the phone claimed this time that EOKA-B was responsible for the murder of Ambassador İsmail Erez. But, *Akşam* apparently did not give credit to the allegations about EOKA-B and so mentioned the possibility of EOKA-B terrorism only once. *Akşam* also published condemnations of and protests against the terrorist activities.⁶⁸

Unlike *Akşam*, *Tercüman* published news and comments supporting the allegations of EOKA-B's responsibility for killing the Turkish ambassadors.⁶⁹

In October 26, 1975, the information that Turkish newspaper provided enlightened the assassination of Turkish ambassadors. For instance, *Tercüman* reported the release of three Greek suspects.⁷⁰ This discredited the previous observations and assumptions of *Tercüman*. In any case, as the real murderers were not found, the confusion and speculations about the identities of the terrorists continued.⁷¹

Among the political party leaders, Vice Prime Minister Alparslan Türkeş had been given place in *Son Havadis*. According to the news in *Son Havadis*, Türkeş stated that these attacks were against the existence of Turkey.⁷² There was not any political party leader who was given place in *Son Havadis*. This constituted an example of diversity not only among Turkish political parties, but also showed the diversity in the rightist Turkish political parties.

Tercüman columnist Ahmet Kabaklı, in line with the front page of the newspaper, threatened that the ones who dared to attack Turkish ambassadors would give an account of this attack. He also put the blame on EOKA-B, which Kabaklı described as a “blood thirsty terrorist group,”⁷³ for committing this attack. Moreover, in his article, Ahmet Kabaklı asked Turkish public opinion to unite against the Cypriot terrorists.⁷⁴

The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and enmity of Greek Cypriots towards Turkey led *Tercüman* to believe that the murderers of the Turkish diplomats

68 *Akşam*, 26 October 1975.

69 “Elçilerimizi Yunanlı Tedhişçiler Öldürmüştü” *Tercüman*, 25 October 1975.

70 “Atina Şüpheli 3 Rum’u Serbest Bıraktı.” [“Athens has released 3 Suspicious Greeks”] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 1.

71 “Caniler Hakkında İpuçları Aranıyor” [“The Clues About the Murderers is Being Searching”] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 1.

72 “Devletimize karşı siyasi bir tavırdır.” *Son Havadis*, 27 October 1975.

73 Kabaklı, “Kimsenin Yanına Kalmaz” [“Nobody Got Away With What They Had Done”] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 7

74 Kabaklı, “Kimsenin Yanına Kalmaz” [“Nobody got away with what they had done”] *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975, p. 7

were Greeks. Although Yanıkyan's murders for the Armenian cause had happened only two years before, the link between these two incidents was not established, but instead *Tercüman* searched for the reasons behind the assassinations not in the past but in the present. This attitude can also be interpreted as a sign of lack of understanding of the Armenian terrorism in 1975. Hence, *Tercüman* put great emphasis on the ungrounded intelligence leaked from the French Police Department such as "a vast number of Greek and Armenian officers in Turkish embassies helped the murderers."⁷⁵

The murders triggered a strong nationalist response among the Turkish nationalist groups and parties which emphasized national solidarity, and *Tercüman* gave substantial space to such calls. For instance, the leader of the Youth Section of the NMP, Sami Bal, declared that "It should be known well that such perfidious and insidious attacks may have an effect on another nation but it only shows its effect on great Turkish nation by uniting it."⁷⁶

For the nationalist newspapers it was important to highlight the nationalist factors to bind people to each other in order to show a strong stance. Therefore, it was not important which country or which terrorist group was behind the terrorist attacks. The idea of nationalism was the ultimate concern for the newspapers. That is why *Tercüman* put the blame on the Greek Cypriots, who were the usual suspects.⁷⁷

When the Austrian Police Department released the three Greeks arrested after the assassination of Ambassador Tunalıgil, *Tercüman* stopped accusing the Greeks of murders. But the failure of the French and Austrian authorities finding the real culprits created an atmosphere of defeat and frustration among Turks both at home and abroad. For instance, Turks in Paris protested the French press and the murders.⁷⁸ The atmosphere of frustration stemming from the fact that the murderers would go unpunished led to Ahmet Kabaklı's strong reaction in his column "Gün Işığında". After listing terrorist organizations such as Hinchaks, Tashnaks, EOKA-B and Greek Cypriots which targeted Turkey and Turks, he declared that Turkish nationalists were getting stronger and would not give in to such terrorist attacks. He also expressed that he had been yearning for the period of Süleyman the Magnificent's rule.⁷⁹

75 "Caniler Paris'te" ["The Murderers are in Paris"] *Tercüman*, 27 October 1975, p. 1.

76 "Çok iyi bilinmelidir ki bu gibi kahpece ve alçakça saldırılar, bir başka millet üzerinde belki etkili olabilir, ama büyük Türk milleti üzerinde ancak ve ancak birleştirici bir tesir icra eder." *Tercüman*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

77 *Tercüman*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

78 "Yürüyüş Yapan Gençler İntikam Diye Haykırdı" *Tercüman*, 26 October 1975.

79 "Batiya karşı korunmanın iki yolu kalmış görünüyor: Biri sersem batıcıların istediği tarzda Hristiyan olarak, manevi teslim bayrağını çekmek... İkincisi: İslam aleminin önündeki yerimizi tavizsiz ve dürüst bir tarzda alarak güçlenmek ve batıya Kanuni gibi, ısıramadığı elimizi öptürmek..." *Tercüman*, 30 October 1975.

The exact name of the terrorist group had never been heard until 1975. As the news on the assassinations reached the newspapers, *Akşam*, reported the news as: “It is denounced that the ASALA and its members are acting in order to take revenge of the Armenian massacre and to found an independent Armenia.”⁸⁰ Armenia was not free from the Soviet Union and was under the Soviet regime. Correspondingly, ASALA was a left-wing Armenian terrorist organization. Armenian terrorism was adduced as a communist threat by the nationalist based Turkish political parties. Moreover, *Akşam*, as a left-wing daily, reported the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s fear about communism: “The ones who support the leftists do not consider communism as a danger.”⁸¹ *Akşam* found it necessary to highlight Demirel’s words. While the rightist political parties ended with their comments on the assassinations in Paris and Vienna, Ecevit criticized the Demirel administration: “The government has faced accelerating difficulties which could not take positive decisions within six months,”⁸² addressing the rising Armenian violence.

Like *Tercüman*, *Son Havadis*, too reached a conclusion about the murderers of Turkish Ambassador to Vienna Daniş Tunalıgil, on the basis of the Austrian Police Department’s arrests of three Greeks who were suspected to be members of the EOKA-B.⁸³ *Son Havadis*, like *Tercüman*, did not establish any immediate link between the murder in Vienna and ASALA, but focused on EOKA-B and further supported its thesis by claiming that three Greek terrorists had arrived in Vienna two days before the attack against Daniş Tunalıgil.⁸⁴ However, there was a contradiction in *Son Havadis*’s news on the assassination. On the front page there was a big caption read as “All Suspicion Focused on the Greek Cypriots”.⁸⁵ One of the main reasons for such great confusion in the Turkish press over the real identities of the murderers in Vienna and Paris was the different intelligence provided by the French and Austrian police. For instance, *Son Havadis* reported in one news item that the

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80 “Beyrut’ta ‘Ermenistan Gizli Kurtuluş Ordusu’nun kurulduğu, üyelerin de Ermeni katliamının intikamını almak ve bağımsız bir Ermenistan kurmak için faaliyette buldukları açıklandı.” *Akşam*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

81 “Demirel: Sol Düşünceleri Benimsyenler Komünizmi Tehlike Saymıyor.” *Akşam*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

82 “Ecevit: Altı Ayda Olumlu Kararlar Alamayan Hükümetin Zorlukları Daha da Arttı” *Akşam*, 28 October 1975, p. 1.

83 “Tunalıgil’i Öldüren 3 Yunanlı’nın Olaydan 2 Gün Önce Viyana’ya Geldiği Açıklandı.” [“Reported that, 3 Greeks had just arrived in Vienna 2 days before they shot Tunalıgil.”] *Son Havadis*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

84 *Son Havadis*, 25 October 1975, p. 1.

85 *Son Havadis*, “Bütün Şüpheler Kıbrıslı Rumlar Üzerinde Toplandı” [“Suspicion is on the Greek Cypriots”] 26 October 1975, p. 1.

French police pointed out Greek terrorists while the Austrian police released Greek suspects.⁸⁶

Son Havadis, as it did after the assassinations in Los Angeles, opened its pages to Turkish-Armenian authors. One of these was Torkom İstepanyan who also published a series of articles in the same newspaper in 1973. İstepanyan basically underlined the brotherhood between Turks and Armenians living in peace together and claimed that the recent events were the outcomes of international terrorism, not the results of grievances of Armenians in Turkey.⁸⁷

On the left of the spectrum of the Turkish press, *Cumhuriyet* provided news about the assassinations and its columnists focused on the dynamics behind these incidents. One day before the assassination of Erez, *Cumhuriyet* published a piece on the inadequacy of the Viennese police to find the murderers of Tunalıgil on its front page.⁸⁸ Even after the Viennese police release of information about the possible identity of the attackers, *Cumhuriyet* was cautious and did not name EOKA-B as the organization responsible for the murder of Tunalıgil like the other newspapers, but instead gave the news as, “this time, it is claimed that the murderers whose identities have not been determined were the members of EOKA-B”.⁸⁹

While *Cumhuriyet*, as a newspaper, was cautious not to put definite blame on EOKA-B, its columnists were not. Uğur Mumcu, who would be the pioneering journalist in analyzing the Armenian terrorism correctly, did not link the attacks in Vienna and Paris to Armenian terrorism but relied on the speculative news about the role of Greeks/Greek Cypriots in the assassinations. He commented that, “According to the initial clues, both assassinations were committed by Greeks or Greek Cypriots. If these clues reflect the truth, we are exposed to an organization which intends to solve the Cyprus issue by individual terrorism.”⁹⁰ Uğur Mumcu was one of the confused journalists in 1975. Mumcu expressed that there could be some groups which intended to retaliate, but that this was not a solution and there was not any international problem which could be solved by terrorism.⁹¹ Mumcu considered the retaliation to Cyprus Peace

86 “İki cinayetin de profesyonel katiller tarafından işlendiğine muhakkak nazarı ile bakan Avrupa polisi meçhul örgütü meydana çıkarmak için alarm durumunda çalışmaktadır.” *Son Havadis*, 26 October 1975. p. 1.

87 İstepanyan, “Fikir Meydanı ‘Ermeniler ve Son Olaylar’” *Son Havadis*, 27 October 1975. p. 7.

88 “Viyana Polisi Yeteri Kadar Çaba Sarfetmemiştir” *Cumhuriyet*, 23 October 1975. p. 7.

89 “Kimlikleri Saptanamayan Katillerin Bu Kez de EOKA-B Mensubu Oldukları İddia Edildi” [“It is claimed that the murderers whose id’s have never been determined were the members of EOKA-B”] *Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 1975, p. 1.

90 Uğur Mumcu, “Cinayetlerin Ardından” [“After the Assassinations”] “Ele geçen ilk ipuçları, her iki cinayetin de Yunanlılar ya da Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından işlendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu ipuçları gerçeği yansıtıyorsa, Kıbrıs sorununu bireysel terörle çözmeye çalışan bir çeteye karşı karşıyayız demektir.” *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 7.

91 Mumcu, “Cinayetlerin Ardından”, *Cumhuriyet* “Bazı çevreler misilleme yapmayı düşünebilirler, bu çözüm değil, uluslararası hiçbir sorun terörle çözülemez.” 26 October 1975.

Operation by the possible responsible actors, Greeks and Greek Cypriots, in his column in *Cumhuriyet*. Ali Sirmen, who was a columnist in *Cumhuriyet*, also asked what the aim of Greek Cypriots was in killing two Turkish ambassadors.⁹² There was not even a word on Armenian terrorist organizations by these columnists.

As Uğur Mumcu highlighted, national unity and solidarity is the name of the domestic union.⁹³ Uğur Mumcu was not alone in pointing to the Greeks as the main suspects for the murders. Ali Sirmen in his column accused the Greek terrorist groups of murder. Moreover he claimed that Greece's hesitation in condemning the assassinations strengthened this accusation.⁹⁴ Uğur Mumcu was one of those journalists who followed the developments and shared them with the Turkish public. In 1979, Mumcu argued that even if EOKA-B was not the only terrorist group which committed the terrorist attacks, EOKA-B was one of the supporters of ASALA. Nevertheless, Uğur Mumcu would express that Armenians were not alone in the organization of these terrorist organizations, and the terror inside Turkey was related to international terrorism. Moreover, he would argue that drug smuggling was closely related to the hidden leaders of these terrorist groups.⁹⁵ The journalists in Turkey were blinded by the international questions that Turkey was subjected to. The thought which had been wanted to be created was chauvinism or real patriotism. The Turkish press played a role in social engineering. Even if the newspapers' intention was not to create a public mind, those newspapers are in competition to deliver news to the public. Whatever the released latest news, newspapers conveyed the news to people without any filters. The journalists realized that Turkey faced international isolation and expressed their annoyance under the title, "The loneliness that we have been left day by day" Turkey's problems about the Cyprus issue has been a focus of analysis. According to the governments in Turkey, the key question for domestic politics is the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, the international terrorism was another important problem that Turkey had to cope with. As the newspapers highlighted the domestic problem became an international issue.

Assassinations in Ottawa and Burgas

The assassination of Kemal Arıkan was the beginning of an acceleration of

92 Ali Sirmen, "Acaba Rum militanlar iki Türk diplomatını öldürürken ne gibi hesaplar peşinde koşmuşlardır?", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1975.

93 Mumcu, "Cinayetlerin Ardından" ["After the Assassinations"] *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 7.

94 Sirmen, "Dünyada Bugün 'Cinayetler ve Sağduyu'" ["In the World Today 'Assassinations and The Common Sense'"] "Gelen haberler ve Atina'nın tutumu, cinayetlerin Kıbrıslı Rum ya da Yunanlılar tarafından işlendiği kuşkularını yoğunlaştırmaktadır." *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1975, p. 5.

95 Mumcu, "Gözlem - İç terörle diplomatlarımıza karşı gerçekleştirilen saldırılar, üstelik uyuşturucu ve silah kaçakçılığı birbiriyle doğrudan alakalıdır." *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1979, p. 5.

Armenian terrorist attacks. From April until August, each month an attack against the Turkish diplomatic corps was executed in different parts of the world. Kani Güngör, who was Counselor for Commercial Affairs, was shot in Ottawa on April 8, 1982.⁹⁶ Less than a month later, Orhan Gündüz, Honorary Consul was murdered in Boston on May 4.⁹⁷ Erkut Akbay, Administrative Attaché and his wife Nadide Akbay were assassinated in Lisbon on June 7.⁹⁸ Following the murders of these diplomats, for the first time, a military member, Military Attaché Air Pilot Staff Officer Colonel Atilla Altıkat was murdered in Ottawa, Canada in his car.⁹⁹ The terrorist attack was undertaken by JCAG and Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA).¹⁰⁰

The frequency of these attacks was closely related to the martial law that Turkey was subjected to.¹⁰¹ The militarist image of the state made the Armenian terrorist organization more active than before. According to Laçiner, Turkey's image was not positive in Europe due to the coup and Turkey failed to communicate its case to the European countries properly.¹⁰² Kamuran Gürün, too, criticized the Turkish failure to even follow the publications on Armenian allegations and have an archive about the matter.¹⁰³ Moreover, Turkish administrations did not even look into their own archives, let alone research foreign archives and have serious debates on them.¹⁰⁴

Besides this lack of knowledge and intelligence about the Armenian allegations on the part of the Turkish state, the Turkish press failed to present a better understanding of Armenian terrorism. These all emboldened Armenian terrorist organizations; hence they aimed to harm Turkey, especially its new military regime, as much as they could. The assassination of Atilla Altıkat was planned to serve this purpose.

Armenian terrorist attacks were not limited to the murder of Turkish diplomats.

96 "Yeni bir Ermeni saldırısı olduğu öne sürülüyor - Ottawa Ticaret Müşaviri Güngör vuruldu." *Milliyet*, 09 April 1982, p. 1.

97 "Boston Fahri Konsolosumuz Orhan Gündüz şehit edildi - Reagan: Ermenilere ödün verilmeyecek" *Milliyet*, 05 May 1982, p. 1.

98 "Evren: Suçluların yakalanmasını sabırla bekliyoruz - FBI Uyardı: Hedef Washington Büyükelçiliği - Şehit ataşe Akbay'ın eşi Nadide Akbay'ın sağlık durumu çok ciddi." *Milliyet*, 09 June 1982, p. 1.

99 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız - 2*, p. 551.

100 Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, p. 199.

101 Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 203.

102 Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, "Özellikle Avrupa ile ikili ilişkileri büyük sekteye uğrayan askeri yönetim, Ermeni saldırıları karşısında Batılı ülkeler ile ciddi bir iletişim eksikliği yaşamış ve argümanlarını dünyaya ikna edici bir şekilde anlatamamıştır.", p. 203.

103 Kamuran Gürün, *Fırtınalı Yıllar, Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları*, "Türkiye henüz o tarihe kadar Ermeni iddialarını içeren kitapları, belgeleri, dergileri vb. dahi takip etmemiş, bu konuda bir arşiv dahi oluşturamamıştır." İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995, p. 205.

104 Laçiner, *Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası*, "1980 tarihi itibarıyla Türk arşivleri kapalıdır ve diğer ülke arşivlerindeki bilgiler ise Türkiye'ye getirilmemiş, ciddi bir değerlendirilmeden geçirilmemiştir.", p. 203.

By 1982, in a period of strict martial law in the country, ASALA was able to commit crimes in Turkey.¹⁰⁵ Three Armenian terrorists killed 3 security guards and 5 civilians, also injuring 72 people at Ankara Esenboğa Airport on August 8, 1982.¹⁰⁶ One of the terrorists was killed and two others were captured wounded. The terrorists were members of ASALA. Levon Ekmekjian, who was captured, was taken to court and sentenced to death¹⁰⁷ by the military court.¹⁰⁸ After the declaration of his sentence, Ekmekjian expressed his regret and cried.¹⁰⁹ While the Bulgarian police searched for the Armenian terrorists who were members of ASALA, the Ekmekjian case became a tool of propaganda for the benefit of Turkey. For instance, ASALA terrorist Levon Ekmekjian's regretful expressions were intended to be integrated into a documentary on the Armenian genocide claims.¹¹⁰ On January 29, 1983, Armenian terrorist Levon Ekmekjian was executed in Ankara.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, the news on Armenian terrorism provided a contribution to ASALA's goal with the mass destruction in Ankara Esenboğa Airport.

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According to *Son Havadis*, Ekmekjian's statements of regret over killing innocent Turks and his apologies from Turks were circulated in the press both abroad and in Turkey by Turkish authorities. Ekmekjian's blame of historians writing about the Armenian representation of history took its place in newspapers, too.¹¹² But in any case, Ekmekjian was executed in Ankara at the beginning of 1983.¹¹³

An Assassination in the Eastern Bloc and more

While the case of Ekmekjian was on the agenda, five days after the funeral of Military Attaché Air Pilot Staff Officer Colonel Atila Altıkat in Ankara, on

105 "ASALA Cinayetlerini Türkiye'ye Taşdı" *Milliyet*, 08 August 1982, p. 1.

106 "3 Terörist Esenboğa'da, 3'ü güvenlik görevlisi 8 kişiyi öldürdü, 72 kişiyi yaraladı." *Milliyet*, 08 August 1982, p. 1.

107 "Ekmekçiyen İçin Karar Tek Celsede Verildi." *Milliyet*, 08 September 1982, p. 1.

108 "Ankara Özel Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı 3 no.'lu Askeri Mahkemesi'nce ölüm cezasına çarptırılan Esenboğa katliamı sanığı Ermeni terörist Levon Ekmekçiyen'in dosyasına Askeri Yargıtay 1. Dairesi bakacaktır." *Milliyet*, 29 September 1982, p. 12.

109 "Ermeni Terörist Konuşurken Ağladı - Ekmekçiyen: Bin Kere Pişmanım" *Milliyet*, 06 October 1982. p. 6.

110 "Ermeni ASALA Örgütü teröristi Levon Ekmekçiyen'in Ankara'da yargılanırken yaptığı açıklamaların dünyaya dağıtıldığı, bu konuda bir de film hazırlandığı bildirildi. *Son Havadis*, 11 September 1982. p. 1.

111 "Ekmekçiyen İdam Edildi." *Milliyet*, 29 January 1983. p. 1.

112 "Ekmekçiyen'in yargılanması, ölüm cezası ve mahkemede söyledikleri, pişmanlığı ve Türklerden özür dilemesi anlatılmış. Ekmekçiyen'in Ermeni tarihini yazan tarihçileri suçlaması ve terörün hatalarını belirtmesi de gazetelerde yer aldı." *Son Havadis*, 11 September 1982. p. 6.

113 "Ekmekçiyen İdam Edildi." *Milliyet*, 29 January 1983. p. 1.

September 9, 1982, Administrative Attaché to Burgas Bora Süelkan was murdered¹¹⁴. Bulgaria was the first Eastern Bloc country in which Armenian terror showed its face. A phone call to the Associated Press expressed that the murder was undertaken by ASALA.¹¹⁵ Around the location where Süelkan was murdered, a surgical glove, 7.65 mm “Walter” pistol and a piece of cloth, on which “We shot the Turkish diplomat” was written were found.¹¹⁶

Three days after Süelkan’s murder, some newspapers were celebrating the anniversary of the September 12 coup. *Son Havadis* declared: “A peaceful September 12”¹¹⁷ and “Terrorism Had Been Drained”.¹¹⁸ However, Armenian

This terrorist attack was undertaken by rightist Armenian terrorist groups JCAG and ARA. The JCAG and the ARA increased the density of their attacks. In the following four months, two more Turkish diplomats were murdered in two different cities.

terrorist activities continued as the Ambassador Galip Balkar in Belgrade was killed on March 9, 1983. This terrorist attack was undertaken by rightist Armenian terrorist groups JCAG and ARA.¹¹⁹ The JCAG and the ARA increased the density of their attacks. In the following four months, two more Turkish diplomats were murdered in two different cities. Dursun Aksoy, Administrative Attaché to Brussels was murdered on July 14, 1983 and Cahide Mihçioğlu, wife to the Counselor in Lisbon, was murdered on July 27, 1983.¹²⁰ However, it was observed that after the execution of Levon Ekmekjian in January

1983, ASALA stopped its activities until April 28, 1984, and with the assassination of Embassy secretary Sadiye Yönder’s husband Işık Yönder in Tehran¹²¹, ASALA activities started again.

Cessation of Armenian Terrorism

ASALA’s bloody bombing in Orly Airport, in front of the Turkish Airlines Bureau on 15 July 1983, is considered the beginning of the end of ASALA’s terrorism. According to Lütem, “Especially the death of four Frenchmen in

114 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız* – 2, p. 584.

115 “Associated Press ajansına telefon eden biri olayı ASALA’nın üstlendiğini söylemiştir.” *Milliyet*, 10 September 1982, p. 8.

116 “İdari ataşemizin şehit edildiği yerde, bir cerrahi eldiveni, 7.65mm’lik bir ‘Walter’ tabanca ve üzerinde ‘Türk diplomatını biz vurduk’ yazılı beyaz bir kumaş parçası bulundu.” *Son Havadis*, 10 September 1982, p. 1.

117 “Huzur ve Barış İçinde Bir 12 Eylül” *Son Havadis*, 12 September 1982, p. 1.

118 “Terör Kurutuldu” *Son Havadis*, 12 September 1982.

119 Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects*, p. 206.

120 Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects*, p. 211.

121 Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism, The Past The Present The Prospects* p. 216.

this incident changed the attitude of French government.¹²² France exerted its influence upon other European countries and terrorists began to be taken under surveillance.¹²³ Interestingly, Varoujian Garbidjian, who had been educated as a commando in Palestine terror camps since 1975 and organized the bombing at the Orly Airport, was given a valid passport and resident permit in France.¹²⁴ Eight people were killed and more than 60 wounded as a result of the attack. One French, one American with his Turkish fiancé, and one Greek-American were killed besides the Turks.¹²⁵ Among the casualties were French citizens and hence this weakened the French support to the ASALA. In any case ASALA and other Armenian organizations achieved their goal of making the Armenian case known world-wide and created a unity in the Armenian Diaspora around the aim of making genocide claims accepted by international public opinion.¹²⁶

The Armenian terrorist activities took place in 19 different countries including Turkey and caused the death of 70 people while 524 were injured during these attacks. Not only Turkish people but also citizens of the host countries were killed, injured or taken hostage. The Orly Massacre, which was considered a mistake even by ASALA itself¹²⁷ led to the cessation of support for Armenian terror from France and similar countries and forced ASALA to abandon its murder policy.

Eight people were killed and more than 60 wounded as a result of the attack. One French, one American with his Turkish fiancé, and one Greek-American were killed besides the Turks.

CONCLUSION

In the period when Armenian terrorist activities started to target Turkish diplomats in 1973 (officially in 1975), the Turkish political scene was polarized. Each newspaper in general represented an ideological stance and was affiliated with a political party and its leader. Within this polarized atmosphere, the Turkish press could not initially comprehend the seriousness of the terrorism targeting Turkey abroad. Even in 1975, with the killings of Turkish ambassadors in Paris and Vienna, the Turkish press focused on the

122 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p.44.

123 Lütem, *Armenian Terror*, p.44.

124 Laçiner, "Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası", p. 172.

125 Laçiner, "Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası", p. 270.

126 Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2010. p. 409. The Armenian terrorism was stopped with the efforts of National Intelligence Organization (MİT - Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı). The operations on cessation of Armenian terrorism run with the help of Abdullah Çatlı. For more detailed information see: Tuncay Özkan, *MİT'in Gizli Tarihi*, İstanbul: ALFA Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2003. p. 298-300.

127 Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, p. 59.

possibility of Greek terrorism towards Turkey due to the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, rather than understanding that although the Armenian terrorist organization had links with Greek and Greek Cypriot paramilitary groups, they had a separate agenda to pursue and challenge Turkey accordingly.

Instead of finding out the roots and connections of Armenian terrorism and putting pressure on Turkish governments to solve this problem, the Turkish press indulged in using this national issue as a part of its domestic quarrel. Nationalist newspapers published heroic speeches and articles representing the benevolence of Turks towards Armenians, while accusing the Turkish left of being in cooperation with Armenian terrorist organizations. On the other hand, Turkish leftist newspapers accused of the other newspapers of ignoring the connections of Armenian terrorism and hence implying a general conspiracy against Turkey, in which these newspapers somehow took a part.

After the September 12, 1980 coup, Turkey entered a new political phase in its history, the political parties were closed, their leaders were jailed, thousands of people were arrested, but the Armenian terrorist activities accelerated rather than stopping. Within this atmosphere of pressure, the Turkish press's attitude did not change dramatically, but it changed dimensionally.

On the whole, the years between 1973 and 1984, the political cleavages were the ultimate question for Turkish newspapers. Between 1973 and 1980, the political challenge was explicit. When martial law was declared on September 12, 1980, the clash at least appeared to have ceased. Even a national question could not prevent the newspapers and political groups in Turkey from challenging each other. The insufficient intelligence of the newspapers prevented Turkey from expressing herself even domestically. Furthermore, even today, Turkey cannot defend herself abroad. Turkey will become much better equipped and effective about the Armenian question only if information is transferred to the Turkish public. Hence, Turkey should take the Armenian question seriously and use the fertility of historical materials. Thus, Turkey will be able to persuade the countries which are blinded by Armenian allegations.

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ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

(ARŞİV BELGELERİ)

Dr. Ahmet TETİK
Mehmet Şükrü GÜZEL
atetik008@gmail.com

Cavit Bey, according to the notes he took on 16 October 1918, states that the assembly had gathered, that he gave information on staff officer Nuri Bey's general situation, and he explains in his statements that "we have only 6,5 Liras currently and even if there are banknotes equal to 2 million on the way, it will not be possible to receipt an invoice and withdraw it since the equivalents had not been restored".¹ Therefore stands a terrible scene. As for the people who govern the country, with however carelessness, they would deposit millions of Ottoman Liras to the German banks. Those numbers are truly remarkable. Exactly 11.5 million Ottoman liras in total. Thus is it possible to talk about the scientificity of conclusions based on predictions, without answering the question with documents "why this big amount of money had not been invested into war power and had been transferred to alleged personal accounts?" since the war economy destroyed every other sector and while the income of the Devlet-i Alieyye do not increase under the war conditions?

It is said that in 1915 and 1916, the amounts of money mentioned above had been transferred to the "personal accounts" in Berlin of Talat Pasa, Enver Pasa and Cemal Pasa. Paradoxically it is argued that the money that was transferred in 1915 was the credit that Germany and Austria gave to Duyun-iUmumiye of Ottoman Empire, the one that had been transferred in 1916 is said to be deposited to the personal accounts of Talat, Enver and Cemal Pasa in Berlin. On the one hand, it has been stated that there is no information about the source of the money transferred to personal accounts of Ittihadists, while it has been "presumed" that "this money might belong to Armenians". On the other hand, it is said that, with quotations from various resources, these gold are related with the jewelries and similar precious jewels of the Armenians that has been seized and put in Ottoman Banks. Finally, thereby with expressing that the money and jewelries seized in various places had been sent to Istanbul, it is assumed

1 Maliye Nazırı Cavit Bey, *Felaket Günleri-Mütareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi 1*, Temel Yay., İst.2000, s.12-13

that “it is not possible to have a direct relation with the money that had been transferred to Berlin and the Money deposited there, but that might be the situation.” Taking into consideration the fact that Britain paid GBP 5000 to a group of British citizen from Canada and of Armenian origin, it is necessary to question the scientific basis of the arguments by the British that this money belong to the Armenians. Instead of uttering groundless assumptions based on mere “possibilities”, a consideration of the documents given below will prove the validity of scientific approach.

Arşiv Belgeleri

Cavit Bey, 16 Ekim 1918 gününe dair tuttuğu notlarında, Meclis’in toplandığını, Erkân-ı Harp Nuri Bey’in genel durum hakkında bilgi verdiğini, kendisinin de “mali ahval”e dair açıklamalarında “Elimizde ancak 6,5 milyon lira para mevcut olduğunu, yolda bir iki milyonluk evrak-ı nakdiye varsa da mukabilleri depo edilmemiş olduğundan imza ettirip almak mümkün olamayacağını...”² söylüyor. Dehşet verici bir manzara ortada duruyor. Devleti yönetenler ise, nasıl bir aymazlıksa, Alman Bankalarına milyonlarca Osmanlı lirasını yatırıyorlar. İfade edilen rakamlar olağanüstü. Tam 11,5 milyon Osmanlı lirası. Tabii savaş şartlarında Devlet-i Aliyye’nin gelirleri artmadığından, harp ekonomisi de bütün sektörleri yerle bir ettiğinden dolayı bu kadar büyük miktarlar “Neden harp gücü için harcanmıyor da sözde şahsi hesaplara aktarılıyor?” sorusunun cevabını belgeleriyile ortaya koymadan, tahmine dayalı hükümlere varmanın bilimselliğinden söz edilebilir mi?

1915 ve 1916’da, yukarıda belirtilen miktarın Talat Paşa, Enver Paşa ve Cemal Paşa’nın Berlin’deki “kişisel hesaplarına” transfer edildiği yazılıp, söyleniyor. 1915 yılında gönderilen paranın Almanya ve Avusturya’nın Düyûn-ı Umûmiye verdiği kredidir, denirken, 1916’da aktarılanın ise Talat, Enver ve Cemal Paşaların Berlin Bankalarındaki şahsi hesaplarına “havale edildiği” öne sürülüyor. 1916’da İttihatçıların özel hesabına giden paranın kaynağı hakkında bilgi sahibi olunmadığı belirtiliyor ancak “bu paralar Ermenilerin **olabilir**” diye tahmin yürütülüyor. Diğer yandan, “çeşitli kaynaklardan alıntılar yapılarak” bu altınların Ermenilerden el konulan ve Osmanlı Bankalarına yatırılmış mücevher ve benzeri kıymetli taşlara ilişkin olduğu söyleniyor. Nihayet, çeşitli yerlerde el konulan “paraların ve mücevherlerin” İstanbul’a gönderildiği ifade edilerek “Bu paralar ile Berlin’e gönderilen paralar arasında direkt ilişki kurmamız mümkün değil fakat **öyle de olabilir.**” hükmüne varılıyor. İngiltere’nin Kanadalı “Britanya vatandaşı” bir grup genç Ermeni’ye

² Maliye Nazırı Cavit Bey, *Felaket Günleri-Mütareke Devrinin Feci Tarihi 1*, Temel Yay., İst.2000, s.12-13

5000 sterlin ödemesinden hareketle, İngilizlerin bu paranın Ermenilere ait olduğunu kabul ettiklerini söylemenin bilimsel dayanağını da sorgulamak gerekiyor. Mesele üzerinde “olabilirliklere” dayalı varsayımlar yerine, aşağıdaki belgelerin söylediklerini dikkate almak yersiz tahminlerle değil, bilimsel gerçeklerden hareket etmenin geçerliliğini ispatlamaktadır.

1924		SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.		LEAGUE OF NATIONS.	
Classement. REFUGEES FROM ASIA MINOR		REGISTRY.			
		Classement No. 48	Document No. 39396	Dossier No. 25699	
Expéditeur. See Schedule within	Sujet. <i>Settlement of Armenian Refugees.</i>				
Date.	<i>Proposed utilization of funds paid over by the Turkish Government to the Allied and Associated Powers.</i>				
L'USAGE DE CET EMBLEMMENT EST RÉSERVÉ AU REGISTRY. Responses, &c. (Out Letter Book): See Schedule within	REMETTRE CE DOCUMENT A— (En Premier lieu.)	DATE.	REMETTRE CE DOCUMENT A— (En second lieu).	Date.	
	<i>I. Refugees S³</i>	<i>06.24</i>			
	<i>Refugees S³</i>	<i>9 OCT</i>			
	<i>W. Felkin</i>	<i>15.11.24</i>			
	<i>Capt Harold</i>	<i>22.11.24</i>			

REFUGEE SERVICE
1925

BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DU TRAVAIL. (1)
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE.

<p>OBJET. SUBJECT.</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">Armenian Refugees</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">Proposed utilization of funds paid over by the Turkish Government to the Allied & Assoc. Powers</p>	<p style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">C 1024</p> <p>Dossier no. File No.</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em; font-family: cursive; text-align: center;">Pa 404/1/66/1</p> <p>Date</p> <p>Lettre Enregistrement Letter Registration 20/2/25</p> <p>Dossiers annexes. Other relevant papers.</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-family: cursive;">5-</p>
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Transmis à Referred to	Date	Transmis à Referred to	Date	
Serv Refug	20/2/25			
W. Johnson	21 FEV. 1925			
W. Arnold	17 MARS 1925			
P. A. M.	21 Mars 1925			

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II

48/39996/25899.

Geneva, November 24th 1924.

Dear Mr. Berry,

You will remember that you asked me to make enquiries concerning the Turkish Gold deposited in the Berlin banks during the War.

I had enquiries made at the Reparation Commission and I am informed that a special convention of November 23rd 1923, between the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, provided that it should be applied to covering allied claims for damages done in Turkey, and that it has been transferred for this purpose to the Commission for the Valuation and Reparation of Losses in Turkey, set up in execution of the Convention.

You will thus see that there is no hope of this gold being used for refugee work.

Yours sincerely,

(I.C. Arnould)
For Assistant High Commissioner
for Refugees.

G.L. Berry, Esq.,
Near East Relief,
15, Boulevard des Italiens,
PARIS.

18/39896 + 195899

BRITISH DELEGATION,
REPARATION COMMISSION.

131, Avenue des Champs Elysees,
Paris, 21st November, 1924.

Cap Armenians

Dear Felkin,

Leith Ross's hands are very full with the work of the Conference of Financial Experts at present sitting in Paris, and he has asked me to reply to your note of the 19th inst. about the Turkish gold deposited in the Berlin banks during the war.

It is no use your trying to get hold of this gold for your Armenian or Greek friends. A special Convention of November 23rd 1923, between the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, provided that it should be applied to covering allied claims for damages done in Turkey, and it has been transferred for this purpose to the Commission for the Valuation and Reparation of Losses in Turkey, set up in execution of the Convention. So the matter is out of our hands.

Mr. Vickry is, of course, wrong in his assumption that this money ever belonged to or was subscribed by the Armenians. It was German gold, advanced by the German Government to Turkey during the war and transferred by the Turkish Government to the Ottoman Debt Administration. In fact, it never left Germany till it came to Paris.

Yours sincerely,

H. Somerville Smith

H. Felkin Esq.,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

*P.S. The gold is portion accounted when transferred to the Assessment Commission to about £3 million instead of the £5 million mentioned by Mr. Vickry.
I am sorry this answer is so disappointing.
H.S.
21/11/24*

48 | 89396 + | 25899

GENEVA.

19th November, 1924.

Dear Leith-Ross,

I have been asked by the Section of the Secretariat connected with Refugee work to obtain if possible some information as to the probable fate of the £5,000,000 of Turkish gold deposited in the Berlin banks during the war, and to ask whether there is any possibility of this money being used for refugee work. Enclosed is a letter from Vickry, General Secretary of the Near East Relief, who has perhaps already approached you.

The letter seems pretty complete, so that I do not think I can usefully add anything to it. If, on the other hand, there are any questions which you would like answered from here, I shall of course be only too glad to obtain replies.

Yours sincerely,

E. Fackler

F.W. Leith-Ross Esq.,
Finance Service,
Reparation Commission,
131, Avenue des Champs Elysées,
Paris.

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Mr. Felckin.

With reference to our conversation may I avail myself of your kind promise to make enquiries on the subject of the Five million ~~Turkish~~ Pounds or more of Turkish gold deposited in the Berlin banks during the war and later taken over by the Allied and Associated Powers as a part of the war indemnity.

I understand that a Committee of the Allied and Associated Powers was to examine the disposal of this sum one month after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne, but there my knowledge ends.




15.II.24.

JAMES L. BARTON
CHAIRMAN
JOHN H. FINLEY
VICE-CHAIRMAN
CHARLES V. VICKREY
GENERAL SECRETARY
CLEVELAND H. DODGE
TREASURER
FRANK L. POLK
GENERAL COUNSEL

NEAR EAST RELIEF

INCORPORATED BY ACT OF CONGRESS
(FORMERLY AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR ARMENIAN AND SYRIAN RELIEF)

125 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK



CABLE ADDRESS:
NEAREAST

TELEPHONE:
ASHLAND 7480

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TALCOTT WILLIAMS
STEPHEN S. WIRE
LEONARD WOOD

Paris, France.
September 6, 1924.

Dr. W. W. Peet, Hotel Rubens, London.
Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, League of Nations, Geneva.
Rev. Harold Buxton, 96 Victoria Street, London.
Copy to John Harris, Esq., M.P., Hotel des Familles,
Geneva.
Copy to Mr. Gordon L. Berry, 9, Place de la Pusterie,
Geneva.

I have had some most interesting and I think profitable conferences yesterday at the offices of the Reparations Commission and at the American Embassy concerning the \$5,000,000 or more of Turkish gold deposited in the Berlin banks during the war and later taken over by the Allied and Associated Powers as a part of the war indemnity.

I of course recognize that the chance of securing this vast sum of money or any part of it with which to aid in securing some of the rights and settlement of the Armenians is remote, but the sum is so large, the solution so satisfactory if secured, and the moral rights of the wronged people so clear that I feel we ought to make one last united effort through our respective governments to secure recognition of the rights of the Armenians in connection with these funds. I am returning to America, determined to take the matter up once more with our own State Department, though we find it a little harder to get action through our own government than through some other governments due to the unfortunate fact that our government has not ratified either the Treaty of Versailles or the Treaty of Lausanne. Our government, however, has not thereby waived its claims and rights as one of the Allied and Associated Powers, and I am hoping to get it to assert these rights. Initiative, however, from the French, British, and Italian governments will doubtless be far more influential in securing results. My suggestion is that we approach it from as many angles as possible at once.

The following seem to be the outstanding facts which we should consider and press:

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REGISTRY
OCT 10 1924


- (1) The money is now in the Allied banks on deposit.
- (2) The money has not been distributed, and I can get no evidence that it has been irrevocably ear-marked.
- (3) A recent action refers the question to the Council of Ambassadors for instructions as to what shall be done with the money.
- (4) The Council of Ambassadors has not yet had the matter presented to them and probably will not for two or three weeks as it must first go through the Finance Board and the Reparations Commission.
- (5) The Finance Board may meet within a very few days, drafting recommendations, which recommendations, once drafted, will, while not binding upon the Ambassadors, have great weight in pre-judging the ultimate decision.
- (6) After the Finance Board has passed upon the question, it will go through the Reparations Commission, but quite probably the Reparations Commission will simply ratify the action of the Finance Board as a recommendation to the Ambassadors.
- (7) America is not officially represented on the Finance Board, though our observers indicated that they would sit in if requested on this question. A more influential approach would be through some government that has an official representative on the Finance Board.
- (8) The following points, in my judgment, are worthy of emphasis and elaboration which I have not time or opportunity to give as I leave for my steamer:
 - (a) The Armenians, who were once citizens of Anatolia, property owners, and tax-payers to the Turkish Government, were the original owners of a considerable portion of this £.Stg.5,000,000 of Turkish gold.
 - (b) They not only lost and in some cases had gold and other property forcibly taken from them, but they lost their entire property and rights to citizenship because of their sympathy for the Allied cause.
 - (c) If this £.Stg.5,000,000 Turkish gold is to be allocated to meet the claims of those who suffered and lost property at the hands of the Turks during the war, there is certainly no steamship company, tobacco company, or commercial organisation that lost anything like as heavy as did these Armenians who lost everything.
 - (d) The claims of the Armenians are not now being presented because there is no government interested in their behalf. They are without country.

Is determining

(e) We may not be able to establish full, technical, legal claim because these people have lost not only property but country, and if the case is kept by shrewd constitutional lawyers on purely legal grounds, the Armenians will have to pay the pound of flesh and more as they have done in the past; but if we still have faith to believe that in our so-called christian, civilized governments there is such a thing as moral justice, we may hope that our governments may forego certain legal claims in order that higher moral claims may be recognized and the greatest step possible taken toward solving what is otherwise a serious refugee, social, political problem, not only shaming but menacing international politics.

I am hastily dispatching this note to the above men, hoping that one or more of the group will see fit to confer with other leaders here in Europe to see what can be done on the matter; and while I do not feel that I will be especially influential, I am going to associate with me other more influential friends to do anything that may be possible through the American government. In the meanwhile, however, some step should be taken if practicable to see that no action of the Finance Board is taken within the next few days which may seriously interfere with, if not preclude, successful negotiations later.

Sincerely yours,


Charles V. Vickrey,
General Secretary.

Postscript:

I have no thought of trying to handle or meddle with the claims of individual Armenians but rather that the matter may be handled through a properly constituted international commission on behalf of the exiled refugees seeking repatriation and rehabilitation.

Sattelmant
C.V.V.

BOOK REVIEW

(KİTAP TAHLİLİ)

Hazel ÇAĞAN

Specialist,

The Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)

hcagan@avim.org.tr

TWISTED LAW AND DOCUMENTED HISTORY - GEOFFREY ROBERSON'S OPINION ON GENOCIDE AGAINST PROVEN FACTS

Author: Şükrü Server Aya, Athol Books, Belfast, 2013

Geoffrey Robertson, who prepared a report named “Was There an Armenian Genocide?” and this report was submitted to the British Parliament by British Armenian All-Party Parliamentary group on 14th December 2009. The report includes documents from Foreign and Commonwealth of Nations. The purpose of the report is to declare British Parliament as a denier of the so-called Armenian genocide.

This informative book was written in order to respond Prof. Geoffrey Robertson QC (Queens Counsel) article by article considering Armenian allegations which are contrary to the existing documents. Each article is interpreted and uncovered by the author, Şükrü Server Aya in a simple and frank way. Mr. Aya presents a documented historical response to Mr. Robertson. In order to adhere to the original report by Mr. Robertson, Mr. Aya quoted the related articles from the report. Therefore, the readers have a chance to read both sides at the same time.

The set of response begins with a photo which was used as a front cover of the report. The distortions in the photo are indicated by Mr. Aya. Furthermore, Mr. Aya continues that the location where the photo was taken is not mentioned. Another important point which should be highlighted that the same photo was used in a web page “The Pontian Genocide: Distortions Misconceptions and Falsehoods”. On the web page, it was claimed that the marching people in the photo were Pontic Greeks. Therefore, the front page photo does not give the report readers the impression of being trustworthy.

BOOK REVIEW

This book analysis surely not sufficient to show how hatemongering is always carried out by pro-Armenian enunciators who are supporting Armenian allegations and try to make governments to receive Pro-genocide law amendments. Mr. Aya's book is intense and to the point on replying Mr. Robertson's report. In order to have a deep understanding on the theme of the book, this interactive book is recommended to be read with the support of electronic sources.

Armenian allegations and distortions of the truth are being raised by Mr. Robertson at the very beginning of the report. The promotion of hatred or hatemongering collapses with the refuse of the recent British governments. Due to the documents and historical facts, it is proved that the promises given to the Armenians were forgotten. This was also proved with the Official Gazette of the League of Nations, 1929. Furthermore, the following paragraphs on the issue part were supported by the electronic resources strongly.

Mr. Robertson expressed that Raphael Lemkin was a legal architect of the Genocide Convention and formulated the word genocide. Nevertheless, Mr. Aya replies that Lemkin had no relationship to law or had not known about the League of Nations' resolutions. Armenian genocide was only mentioned in Nuremberg a trial which was based on invalid document concerning a speech by Hitler. Furthermore, this document was warped by the Armenian soldiers in the Nazi Army. The Jews were sent to the death camps by these soldiers under the auspices of SS soldiers. This information is also strengthened by Mr. Aya with the submission of another internet link. Mr. Aya emphasizes that these documents like photos, evidences and all details were historical truth. There is another epicenter point about the historical facts of the salvation of the Jewish people. Mr. Aya again set forth evidences that Turkish diplomats saved many Jews from slaughter or sent them to the places in the Middle East.

Mr. Aya highlights that there are lots of repeated fantasies exaggerated by Mr. Robertson. In his report, Mr. Robertson, intents to replace "relocation" with "deportation". To Mr. Aya, "deportation" is used to promote "relocation" as one of the crimes against humanity.

Mr. Aya repeatedly reminds readers of British imperialism and its aftermath. Here again, Mr. Aya replies Mr. Robertson with the racist ideas of British imperialism while defending Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, he adds, the Ottoman Empire was lack of racialist ideology and this remarkable feature of Ottoman Empire was applauded by one of the British poets, Rudyard Kipling, Mr. Aya highlights.

Mr. Robertson repeatedly denotes in his report that he got benefits from

eyewitnesses, journalists, German bankers, missionaries etc. But, somehow he never refer to “neutral witnesses” says Mr. Aya. Mr. Aya adds, is it proved that supply of news information is from Reuters London to the rest of the world. Furthermore, Mr. Aya narrates how Turkish troops were helpful to the Armenians and orphans in Van with respect to the book, which was written in 1937, by Kathe Erhold, *Returning Home* (Dresden, Leipzig) the distortions in Morgenthau’s book were exposed by Mr. Aya in his book, “Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau”. Swedish army officer Pravitz report was used as one of the sources. Mr. Aya emphasizes that there are 226 pages of irrefutable historical documents and these documents are available on the website which is indicated in the book.

In the Article 41 of Mr. Robertson’s report, the Blue Book was a production of war propaganda. As a tool of propaganda, the Blue Book does not constitute a set of facts and this is also denoted. What Mr. Robertson wants is to re-discuss the said allegations. Nevertheless, Mr. Aya strongly replies, as a war propaganda the Blue Book was written with the purpose of putting into the shades the atrocities done by the Russians against the Jews when WWI commenced. The ultimate purpose was to produce allegations against Turks.

One of the parts in Mr. Robertson’s report, the most respectable historians Prof. Justin McCarthy, Prof. Bernard Lewis and Prof. Heath Lowry are known for their neutral historical studies. However, Mr. Robertson claims that these “Pro-Turkish” historians were recruited by Turkish government and they were paid money. Mr. Aya makes the point of bringing Mr. McCarthy’s thoughts about “paid Pro-Turkish historians” that the idea is simply a lie and there is no document that these respectable historians were paid by Turkish government.

Mr. Robertson benefitted limited number of selected resources and generally the report was written on assumptions. Nevertheless, as a reply, this book is explanatory enough on the Armenian allegations by using reliable historical documents and neutral respectable historians.

NEITHER TO LAUGH NOR TO WEEP – A MEMOIR OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Author: Abraham H. Hartunian, Beacon Press: Boston June, 1976

The book entitled “Neither to Laugh nor To Weep – A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide”, memoirs originally written in Armenian by Abraham H. Hartunian, compiled and translated into English by Vartan Hartunian, his son, is a biography of a priest based on his personal experiences and ideas, who served in Turkey between the dates 1895-1922. In the publisher’s note part publisher introduces him as “an Armenian Protestant pastor and community leader who miraculously survived the massacres and deportations of the Armenians in Turkey from 1895 to 1922”. So when I refer to the author, I refer to both Abraham H. Hartunian, who is the author of the original text, and Vartan Hartunian, who prepared the final version of the book in English.

The author divided the book into 3 parts within the framework of time-periods and 14 chapters according to some specific experiences he had been through. For instance first part covers the dates 1872-1914, second part 1914-1918 and the third part 1919-1922. The events take place around South East Turkey and ends up in Izmir, from where his journey to United States starts. While reading the book, one wonders how all these events started and what the breaking point was that ended the peaceful co-existence and co-habitation in these regions.

There are two main points to emphasize; the signs of the author’s strong religious belonging and the reflection of the intervention of the third parties to the internal problems of Turkey (or Ottoman Empire before 1923) and how the events ended up in the eyes of the Armenians. While trying to understand the changing times in the Armenians’ eyes, it is important to underline the fact that the time periods mentioned in the book were war times when the whole country and population faces drastic, traumatic upheaval.

Starting from the first chapters; for instance at page 34, first part of the book, the author says “The English ambassador then instructed his consul

at Diyarbekir to look after our case, and one day the dragoman of the English consulate, Mr. Tovmas Mugerditchian, appeared in court.” When the author took initiative and asked for help from American and English embassies, his request was not rejected and English authorities took action. Obviously, English authorities and individuals were involved in the Armenian issue directly or indirectly according to the personal experiences told in the book. On page 40 it is also stated that “a wealthy British women, on their way toward the Armenian provinces, stopped in Severeke” and she was very much interested in hearing the situation of the churches and Armenians living in the region, she asked questions and gave a letter to A. Hartunian written by a student living in Tarsus to be delivered to his mother. Considering the fact that first part covers the years 1872-1914, before World War 1 and the unfortunate events, it is interesting to see the direct British interest in the Armenian issue.

In part 2, chapter 6, while explaining how Zaytoon was taken back by Turkish army, after Armenian rebellions, author tells his personal experiences such as preparations for the deportations in 1915. They (Zaytoonists) have been ordered to leave and go to Fundejak and Derekoy and some of the religious heads also have been summoned by Turkish officials, including Hartunian himself, to deliver the messages to Armenian community. Unfortunately there had been a battle between Armenians and Turkish army. In the end, as a consequence, Constantinople strictly ordered Armenians to leave their guns and surrender. It is interesting to see in this chapter, during all this chaos suddenly the government decides to exempt Protestants from deportation as assign of positive discrimination differentiating them from the more militant and militarily organized Gregorians, of local administration officials towards Armenians. This decision shows us that Turkish officials (at least some of them) tried to find another way or different possible solutions to solve the problem. Some even take initiatives and try to do something at the personal level. For instance: A “mutasarıf” has sent to his personal police to keep eye on the officials who have been told to search the church where Hartunian is working at and made sure that nobody attempted to do anything tricky that might put the church under a difficult situation.¹ So we can understand that during the times of first WW1, the aim of the Turkish officials was actually trying to provide security in the region, manage unfortunate events, protect the citizens in the most possible way and suppress rebellions (in a subtle or violent manner, it is a different discussion). After the order to keep Protestants it is obvious that the reason behind the deportations was not to “get rid of” from a certain group, but trying to find a solution to solve the conflicts in the region as soon as possible.

1 P.72

After going through some events, in chapter 7, the author decides to approach to German missionaries and live under their protection. Germans are busy with the construction of Berlin-Baghdad railway road and they are hiring workers and covering their living expenses. According to the book, there were thousands of people working there including approximately 12 thousand Armenians.² But later on, with another order coming from the government, it has been decided to send them to Baghtche.

Under the 10th, seeing an open support to 300 French soldiers is interesting. Especially when one recalls the part about lack of food and other living facilities, he or she wonders how they managed to take care of the soldiers on the “church campus”. At the same time, during the time of preparations for the war and rebellions, Turkish aghas and religious leaders invited Armenian aghas and religious leaders in order to discuss the options other than fighting each other. The idea is to unite against French army that has been getting ready to invade Gaziantep (Aintab). Armenians did not accept this plan but most revealingly, Hartunian admits that “it would have been much more wiser cause than the one we took. At least we would have lived” but since they thought it would have been the opposite of their cause, they did not accept this offer. There is another striking fact, mentioned by the author that seven safe “military” centers in Marash included churches, hospital, an American collage and a German orphanage. It is again admitted by Hartunian that these civilian centers were to be used as “military” centers and safe places.³ Actually it is surprising to see that these civilian facilities, or supposed to be civilian, has been called as “military” centers. It explains the reason why Turkish officials were cautious towards any kind of foreign institutions, even if they were presented as religious or humanitarian institutions.

Moreover, involvement of third parties to the Armenian efforts in South East Anatolia region has been revealed in the second part as well. The author himself tells in the first part that he lived in one of the American colleges like many other Armenians who are running away did, the second part follows up with the occupation of Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep, and vicinity, (Aintab as written in the book) by British Army. It is interesting to read that Armenians living in these regions see the occupation as their liberation. There was a very high expectation on the British Army in the way that they would fight Turkish people and “save” Armenian community. For example, the author stated that one day Armenians gathered with British officials in order to “(There was an) ... exchange of opinion about the present situation, the possibilities for the future, and about the cause and freedom of the Armenian nation”⁴. But it was

2 P.77

3 P. 134

4 P. 125

the war times and later on, when the situation started to evolve circumstances changed, policies also changed. In Hartunian's words officials in the British army started to get closer with the Turkish officials because of "oil, mines etc."⁵ and therefore, they abandoned Armenian community. He openly writes "Oh that we had realized from the start that all the European powers were thinking only of their own gain and were ready to sacrifice the Armenians!" Actually it is more than a sentence, maybe it is kind of a declaration about the expectations and the disappointment on the European powers who were "supposed to "save Armenians". "(...) The European, Judas-like, kissing us, betrayed us. The Britisher, the Frenchman, the German, the Italian, the Russian - all the Christian powers of the world are our murderers. The Armenian nations must not forget this fact" he continues. Maybe the strongest expression of all "The Christian powers of the world are the murderers of the Christian Armenian nation!"⁶

Later on, after giving up on British Army and withdrawal of the British troops, Armenians decide to look for help from French troops that are in Antep already. In a couple of days they enter Marash with "brave Armenian volunteers" (...) "Different sentry groups, composed of Agerian, Tunusian and Armenian soldiers, were organized under the leadership of French officers, undertook to protect the city."⁷ But conclusion with the British goes for the French troops too. Starting from an unfortunate event, an Armenian volunteer was shot while patrolling around the city by a Muslim man and battle between Turkish people and joint French troops – including Armenians -⁸, French officials did not respond and react in a way Armenians expected, and in the end they felt betrayed and left alone again. The author even says that if French troops really wanted they would have taken the city but "Turk was dearly loved by Frenchman".⁹ It is possible to sense the level of "hate" in the entire book but in chapter 10, 3rd part, it is written that "at nightfall, as if to avenge the deeds of the Turks, the Armenians set mosques and Turkish houses on fire and killed few Turks they found here and there. Again the Armenians were joyous and were congratulating each other." Besides many of similar expressions, this sentence gives an idea about the general environment and how Armenian population were acting against Turks. One wonders if this feeling of hate existed since the beginning or only after all these unfortunate events among Turks, Armenians and third parties who were involved directly.

Throughout the chapters 11th, 12th and 13th the author tells the experiences he had while he is moving to Izmir (Smyrna as it is written in the book) from

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8 pp.131, (144)

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Antep and Maras (Aintab and Marash as it is written in the book). During this long journey and unfortunate events one more time we see that the author blames Europeans and Americans for what happened to them “(...) although the European showed himself most false, although the American broke faith in selfishness and fear (...)”.¹⁰ On the other hand, when he was getting prepared to move to America he gets an offer from a Greek church in Izmir as well as promises to provide safety and protection by the government of Greece. Thinking that moving to America would be much easier from Izmir and his son already lives there, he decides to accept the offer and start serving at a church again. Even though at first the Armenian community sees Greece as their liberator this time, it is possible to sense the feeling of regret of the Armenian community. Armenians first tried to communicate and act together with the Greeks when they first arrive to Izmir. It is also very important to see that the annual conference of the Bithinian Armenian Evangelical Union happened without any interruption by Turks or the government officials.¹¹ When the Turkish army passed the Afyon-Karahiser frontier Greeks decide to leave and adding the attitude of the Greek officials towards religious heads, Armenians felt like Greek diplomats and officials betrayed and left alone to death the Greek minority: “Woe unto you unjust diplomacy! Shameless, ignoble, deceitful diplomacy! The Greek nation deceived her people and betrayed them to the Turk, to be strangled by his hands! I spit on you, hellish diplomacy!”. It is quite obvious to see mistrust of Armenians on Greece as well.¹²

But as a final and conclusive statement, after all these events and long ways passed, author says “That base, murderous, Moslem Turk dealt with us better than these European Christians! If only we had known this before and dealt instead with the Turk!”¹³

Secondly, as I said before, there is a strong sense of religion and belonging in the book. Since the Armenian community gathers around the church and religious missionaries, the strong effect of religion over the ideas, mentality and social practices is quite obvious. In fact, there is a term he used that got my attention, after the occupation by the British Army his church was crowded and İbrahim Hoja, approached him and expressed his feelings about Christianity stating that he believes that the Christianity is the real religion and Islam has been corrupted. The author said that “he was sincerely happy that the door was finally open for the Christianization of Islam”¹⁴. He proceeds

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explaining his experiences by giving examples of the Muslim people who converted to Christianity. Although it is not clear whether this was the main aim of the church, this process, or the author was just expressing his strong feelings.

In general, besides the strong sense of religion and religious belonging, between the lines it is possible to see that the Armenians regret relying on Europeans and America since they did not act the way Armenians expected. During the war times circumstances change and therefore the policies of the countries change accordingly. This idea is missing in the book because author mostly focuses on the fact that Europeans and America are trying to have good relations with Turkey since they have a strong interest in the resources like mines, oil and so on in the last chapters¹⁵. Also, although Turkey (or Ottoman Empire before 1922-1923) had been through two very tough wars, First World War and Independence War, the general country-wide situation of the country is omitted in the book while analyzing what is going on and the core of the problems related with food, capabilities and general environment in the country. Particularly when he is telling some events, related with the lack of food or health facilities and secure environment, it is crucial to keep in the mind the fact that during these time periods people living around this region, without any discrimination, suffered because of many different reasons. Furthermore, not all of the deaths are related with conflicts, one should keep in the mind the fact that more Muslims also died because of the same problems Armenians faced. Nevertheless, the book gives us insights from the mouth of an Armenian priest who while defending his misgivings, inadvertently reveals concealed facts and feelings.

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