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PERCEPTIONS

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SEECP-Key to Regional Cooperation Challenges Lying Ahead of the Current Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office 2015-2016

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Abstract

At this critical moment for Europe and the SEE region, Bulgaria took over, for the third time, the chairmanship of the South-East European Cooperation Process for the period of 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. Under the slogan "SEECP – a key to regional cooperation over the past 20 years", the Chairmanship aims at promoting constructive dialogue and cooperation among the SEECP participants in order to raise the effectiveness and visibility of the regional initiative among the international partners. In terms of the collision between European integration and growing nationalism, it is our responsibility to defend the European idea by guaranteeing the stability and territorial integrity of the countries in the region. The South-East European Cooperation Process is the proper format for reaching such ambitious perspectives for the benefit of all our friends in the region.

Key Words

Southeast Europe, Balkans, South-East European Cooperation Process, Bulgaria, regional cooperation.

The Balkans are once again in the focus of public attention. Many of the major issues that concern Europe are concentrated in the South-East Europe (SEE) region. In times of potential vulnerability and risks of destabilization, it is our responsibility to defend civil rights, the rule of law, and the democratic perspective for the countries of the region. We should collectively support the processes of severe reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus, our region will show that the integration processes on the continent are neither an exclusive "patent" of other states, nor can they be completed without the participation of the SEE countries. Along with that, close cooperation is needed in order to ensure political stability and conditions for the economic prosperity of our countries. The 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, which we commemorated on the 11th of July 2015, should remind us how fragile stability is in the Balkans and how important it is to work together towards sustaining it.

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At this critical moment for Europe and the SEE region, Bulgaria takes over, for the third time, the chairmanship of the South-East European Cooperation Process for the period of 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. Under the slogan "SEECP – a key to regional cooperation over the past 20 years", the Chairmanship will aim at promoting constructive dialogue and cooperation among the SEECP participants in order to raise the effectiveness and visibility of the regional initiative among the international partners. In terms of the collision between European integration and growing nationalism, it is our responsibility to defend the European idea by guaranteeing the stability and territorial integrity of the countries in the region. Bulgaria will always be on the side of dialogue and against the powers of collision; on the side of beneficial competition and against rivalry and resignation. The South-East European Cooperation Process is the proper format for reaching such ambitious perspectives for the benefit of all our friends in the region.

The celebration of the 20th anniversary of the SEECP in 2016, which coincides with the Bulgarian Chairmanship,

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once again symbolically underscores Bulgaria's role in the successful development of regional cooperation over the past two decades. The Member States of the Euro-Atlantic community have the obligation to be a democratic example and to stimulate the proper approach towards European integration. As an EU and NATO Member State, Bulgaria considers its commitment to being the exclusive partner of the countries from the region in applying the Euro-Atlantic norms and principles. We share, with the SEE countries, not only similarities in our culture and historical past, but we are also ready to share the perspectives for our economic and political future.

Affirming SEECP as an effective initiative and seeking concrete results, that is the key to successful regional cooperation. Led by this principle, Bulgaria will focus on project-oriented and concrete results-based *interaction among the SEECP, the EU,* and other international organizations and formats. That will make our voice stronger and more important within the framework of international dialogue and interaction. It is of great importance for the cooperation in the region to go on deepening the fruitful

synergy between the SEECP and the RCC Secretariat, also known as its "operational unit".

Special emphasis will be put on the *policy of continuity* in SEECP activities, considering it as an important step towards the promotion of that format as a reliable, consistent, and predictable initiative. The Republic of Bulgaria is prepared to carry on the efforts that have been made by the previous Romanian and Albanian chairmanships in particular areas of cooperation, such as stabilization and economic development, security and rule of law, preservation of the environment and fighting climate change, regional youth and sports policy, human potential development, culture, and education. *We highly appreciate the work done so far.*

As the main promoter of parliamentary cooperation in the region, our country will focus its efforts on developing the *SEECP Parliamentary Dimension* as a key factor for sustaining stability and enhancing cooperation in the region. The eventual selection of Sofia as the place for deployment of the future Permanent Secretariat of the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly will deepen the idea of parliamentary cooperation in Southeastern Europe. Having in mind our country's contribution to the development of this initiative, we consider this to be the logical and correct choice. Regarding the future Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly,

without any doubt, the most effective and economically efficient solution is to use the already accumulated experience and resources of the current ad-hoc acting Secretariat, which has been functioning in Sofia for more than five years. In addition, concerning the need for deepening the relations among the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly, European Parliament and the European Commission, placing the SEECP PA headquarters in an EU Member State is an obvious advantage and it can be referred to as the most logical development of the campaign.

The Bulgarian Chairmanship will maintain constant interest in the topic of implementing major diversification projects in the region and will subject this topic to discussion at the highest levels.

The Bulgarian Chairmanship will concentrate its efforts particularly on **three priority spheres**: connectivity – transport, energy, and infrastructure; media freedom and freedom of expression; migration and coping with the refugees flow.

The first line of priority will coordinate and intensify the efforts of the countries of the region towards *establishing a transport infrastructure*

with a focus on those projects with the highest added value for Southeastern Europe. Our country will make efforts towards achieving visible progress in the process of establishing a modern transport network that will allow the activation of trade and economic cooperation among the countries, thus positively affecting their standards of living.

Although key transport corridors of the Old Continent pass through the region, the overall status of the infrastructure linking the Balkan countries is still far from the levels reached in other parts of Europe. Having in mind the fact that this is largely due to the shortage of financial resources, Bulgaria will focus its efforts on implementing alternative methods of financing the transport sector on the principles of public-private partnership. Different options will be discussed for increasing the efficiency and quality of the transport services through such means as modernization of the existing infrastructure, implementing modern transport systems, raising the competitiveness of the transport enterprises, and limiting the harmful effects on the environment.

In the context of the current security challenges for the region, the importance of energy security becomes more essential. Regarding this, during the chairmanship of the SEECP, Bulgaria will encourage seeking a coherent

energy policy among the countries in the region, based on ensuring energy supply and diversification of the energy suppliers and transport, raising energy efficiency, developing a competitive energy market, securing energy needs, and protecting consumers' rights. The provision of an infrastructure suitable for this purpose is seen by our country as a prerequisite for ensuring the energy security in one of the, in this sense, most vulnerable regions of Europe. To this end, the Bulgarian Chairmanship will maintain constant interest in the topic of implementing major diversification projects in the region and will subject this topic to discussion at the highest levels.

Providing public access to the full range of sources of information and emphasising access to the internet and new technologies is also an integral part of the priorities of the Bulgarian Chairmanship.

The main line of business will be directed towards connecting the national electrical grids as an integral part of the process for creating an integrated, liberalized, and competitive, regional energy market, which will successfully function even in cases of sudden interruption of the energy supplies. Considering that the development of

energy security based on a developed gas infrastructure is of priority concern for the European Union, these actions could be considered as an additional opportunity to prepare the Western Balkan countries in reaching their ultimate goal – full integration into the European family.

The recent events in the Republic of Macedonia have shown the necessity to reaffirm our support for the independence and territorial integrity of these countries.

In pursuing the above-mentioned priorities, the relevant Bulgarian authorities and institutions will actively participate in the management of the various activities set out in the calendar of events of the Chairmanship. For example, a regional meeting on energy efficiency and sustainable development will be organized, jointly with the Ministry of Energy, whereas regarding transport connectivity, a conference on transport infrastructure as a factor for promoting and improving economic ties in the region will be arranged. Organizers of the event will be the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The serious influence enjoyed by the media in the modern world also implies the existence of various types of abuse of media freedom and freedom of expression. That's why Bulgaria assumes this issue as one of its three main sectoral priorities and will direct the SEECP activity towards creating a diverse, independent, and stable media environment in the region as well as respecting the regional and the international instruments for freedom of speech and mass-media. The main target will be to ensure balanced, accurate, and objective information reflecting the entire range of different views and opinions, respecting the ethnic, linguistic, religious, political, and social diversity in Southeastern Europe. It is necessary to take adequate counteraction measures against the non-democratic tendencies arising in the mass-media, especially when it comes to the concentration of media ownership in the hands of oligarchic circles – a phenomenon which is still widespread in the countries of the region.

Providing public access to the full range of sources of information and emphasising access to the internet and new technologies is also an integral part of the priorities of the Bulgarian Chairmanship. In that respect, as far as existing media regulations are concerned, an equal footing of the electronic and print media should be

ensured, and, in addition, the use of electronic services should be promoted not only in the public, but in the private sector. One of the ideas of the Bulgarian Chairmanship concerning the development of that sector, is to create an online regional media platform. A meeting of the major mass-media from Southeastern Europe to discuss the challenges of the region in this aspect is scheduled for April 2016.

The Bulgarian Chairmanship will be led by the principles of democracy, rule of law, and ensuring freedom in political and economic terms, along with ensuring the necessary arrangements for their implementation. The integration of the Western Balkan countries in the European Union, as well as protecting their territorial integrity, have no alternative and are the main guarantees for peace and stability in the Balkans. The activities of the European Union in the region should be enhanced in order to provide an effective solution to overcome future crises and to create conditions for the establishment of modern institutions. The recent events in the Republic of Macedonia have shown the necessity to reaffirm our support for the independence and territorial integrity of these countries. The Republic of Bulgaria, in its capacity as the Chairman-in-office of the SEECP, will initiate and work for the adoption of a joint Declaration, confirming the principle of inviolability of territorial boundaries in Southeastern Europe.

Within the framework of a comprehensive global approach, the efforts will be concentrated towards the creation of an effective regional policy based on solidarity with the most affected countries as well as on close cooperation with the countries of origin and the transit countries.

The Bulgarian Chairmanship will also focus on cooperation in the field of *migration and the successful management of the migratory pressure* – another major issue not only for the region but also in a broader sense, in the context of the various challenging events that are occurring in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and North Africa. The direct link between the political instability in these regions and the migration flows that cross Southeastern Europe challenges the SEECP participants to cooperate actively in supporting the international efforts to find a lasting solution to the problem. Profound analyses of the situation in the affected countries; the origin and the final destination of the migration flow as well as the attitude of the respective societies towards that

process and the domestic and foreign policy actions of each country should be made in order to meet successfully the challenges that stem from the migration influxes.

Special efforts should be made for achieving successful integration of the refugees and other vulnerable groups, susceptible to the dangers of speaking the language of hatred. At such difficult moments, the SEE countries should defend their European and Euro-Atlantic values. The SEECP will be the major coordinating format, while preparing a regional strategy for the integration of people that have received international protection status in the SEECP countries, based on the experience and good practice from other countries facing similar challenges. This policy will achieve the desired results if proper measures are taken to limit the language of hatred and reduce the xenophobia and intolerance that are observed in some countries of the region. Following the priorities of the Albanian SEECP Chairmanship (July 2014 – June 2015), particularly – the realisation of concrete goals in real time, we have started, along with the RCC Secretariat, consultations for the establishment of a regional platform for fighting terrorist threats. Forecasts for the duration of the conflicts close to the region are unspecified, but predictions point to an increasing number of returnee foreign terrorist

fighters. In this sense, the establishment of a network of counterterrorism mechanisms for identifying vulnerable groups at the national and regional levels is of major importance for Southeastern Europe.

Looking at the situation in a broader plan, the Republic of Bulgaria as an EU Member State will initiate the process of seeking cooperation not only within the framework of the EU, but also with other international organisations in order to better defend particular regional interests and needs derived from the intensified migratory flows. An active dialogue with the relevant EU organisations, such as the European Commission, EASO (the European Asylum Support Office), FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration, etc., is going to be conducted.

The international commitments and obligations of the SEECP participating countries have already predefined the necessity of coordinated and targeted actions in dealing with the refugee flows. Within the framework of a comprehensive global approach, the efforts will be concentrated towards

the creation of an effective regional policy based on solidarity with the most affected countries as well as on close cooperation with the countries of origin and the transit countries. All of this requires enhanced diplomatic contacts and close cooperation with key countries along the route of the migratory wave. Last but not least, the Bulgarian SEECP Chairmanship-in-office aims at assisting the allocation of the financial support rendered by the EU and the international community for the purpose of dealing with the migratory pressure. Guided by the European solidarity and its practical dimensions, all EU Member States should be involved in the process towards ending the crisis and overcoming the migratory pressure.

Conclusion

The countries in the Balkans have made remarkable progress in solving a number of serious problems over the past two decades, but more efforts are required in achieving lasting peace and prosperity in the region. Taking over the SEECP chairmanship for the third time, Bulgaria will work towards increasing the voice of the SEECP countries within the framework of the continental debates and the integration processes. A collective and persistent "we" – mutually spoken by all of us – will add more strength and legitimacy

to the countries from the region, and help prevail over alternative interests.

Looking towards the future, we should firmly and definitely wipe out the alternatives replacing democracy such as aggressive nationalism and populism. The European future is the unifying factor for the region, while the integration process is its driving force in that direction. Cooperation among the countries is a powerful tool for moving ahead in the future. Each country in the region can and should contribute to the peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Balkans. We should strive towards common standards in the interpretation of history, politics, diplomacy, rule of law, and media freedom. Finally, we should stop being hostages of the subjective interpretations of our historical past and start being people sharing a common interest in the future – decent incomes for our citizens, guaranteeing their regional security and democratic perspective.

That is the reason why the main priorities set out by Bulgaria are so clearly formulated and concrete in their search for an answer to the most relevant and serious challenges that the Southeastern European countries face. The South-East European Cooperation Process, which has proven itself as an effective and relevant mechanism for fruitful political dialogue among the countries of the region, will be the

key instrument for ensuring stability and security in the region. During the one-year period of its Chairmanship, Bulgaria will aim at achieving concrete results in major issues on the regional agenda. Only through joint efforts and shared values, can stability and economic growth be achieved and can the Southeastern Europe peoples enjoy the prosperity and fair-dealing which we deserve along with everyone else.

We thank our Romanian and Albanian colleagues for the fruitful cooperation within the "Troika" format. We welcome the willingness of Croatia to take over the next SEECP Chairmanship. Our country will strongly support each successive Chairmanship of the Process that is committed to the Euro-Atlantic perspective of the region. We are convinced that our joint work within the SEECP will show to the rest of the world the effective and beneficial example of the Balkans. We all together will transform the current challenges in the region into new opportunities for the decent future of our peoples.

Revisiting the Debates on a Model of Integration for Post-Crisis Europe: Towards A Political Union or Just More Differentiation?

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Abstract

The Euro crisis, which has had deep economic, social and political implications for the European Union (EU), has revived the debates on the future model of European integration. In this respect, the establishment of a European political union has been advocated as a way of restoring shattered confidence in the EU. Whereas these debates recall neofunctionalist/supranationalist approaches to European political integration, the enduring crucial role of national preferences in the integration process keep intergovernmentalist arguments on the agenda as well. Furthermore, the increasing divergences within the EU endanger the unity and cohesion required by a political union, bringing forward arguments in favour of differentiated integration as an alternative model for post-crisis Europe. This paper aims to analyse the implications of the crisis for the EU on theoretical grounds, elaborating on the debates over a future model of integration for post-crisis Europe. It is mainly argued that these debates reveal the persisting complexity of reconciliation on the possibilities and means of building a European political union and stimulate conventional controversies rather than clarifying the finality politique of the EU.

Key Words

European Union, Euro crisis, political union, differentiated integration, neofunctionalism, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism.

Introduction

The controversy between supranational and intergovernmental tendencies has long influenced not only the political processes in Europe but also theoretical discussions, causing a long-lasting ambiguity regarding the *finalite politique* of European integration. This controversy has been explicitly reflected by the theoretical debate between the original and revised versions of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.[1] Neofunctionalism views European integration as a self-sustaining process that will incrementally lead to further integration resulting in the formation of a new political entity, preferably a political union. This vision primarily focuses on a process through which supranational European institutions gain political autonomy and authority. On the other hand, intergovernmentalists emphasize

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the state-driven nature of European integration, prioritising national preferences and intergovernmental bargaining.[2] Hence, the suprana-tionalist-intergovernmentalist debate has conventionally comprised a crucial aspect of European political integration theories although other theoretical perspectives have also periodically gained prominence over this theoretical dichotomy. In fact, each theory can only describe particular periods or pieces of European integration. Thus, as Wiener and Diez state, "each approach can be seen as a stone that adds to the picture that we gain of the EU. This picture is likely to remain unfinished, as new approaches will add new stones to change the picture".[3]

At the policy level, European integration has followed a dynamic trajectory with ups and downs rather than a linear process. This dynamic process has been shaped by changing agendas and political priorities in an effort to achieve different goals in different periods. The goals of completing the internal market, introduction of the single currency Euro and the eastern enlargement have been on the top of the European agenda throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, the need to face common European challenges has constantly influenced the integrationist strategies in the EU.[4] In the post-Lisbon era, the recent crisis stands as the greatest challenge to an enlarged EU within an ever accelerating process of globalisation. The global economic and financial crisis that started in 2007-2008 and soon became a sovereign debt crisis, a Euro crisis and eventually a social and democratic crisis in Europe, has doubtlessly marked the EU agenda, leading to a growing pessimism regarding the future of European integration in various circles.

> The establishment of a European political union has been advocated as a way of restoring shattered confidence in the EU.

It is therefore the objective of this study to explore the implications of the crisis for the future of European integration, elaborating on the debates on model of integration for the post-crisis Europe. Following a brief description of the EU's response to the crisis, the paper discusses the implications of this response, revisiting the theoretical dichotomy between neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist arguments. Afterwards, it analyses the debates on the future of European integration, particularly concentrating on the questions of European political union and differentiated integration.

The EU's Response to the Crisis: Further Integrationist Steps Instead of Stagnation

German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her views on the possible grave repercussions of the crisis for both the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the overall integration process by stating: "If the Euro collapses, then Europe and the idea of European Union will fail".[5] The then European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, emphasized the multidimensional implications of the crisis by stating that the crisis had become much more than a financial and economic one, gaining the characteristics of a social but also a political crisis of confidence as well.[6] The crisis caused an unprecedented politicisation of European integration due to its direct negative impact on the welfare of the citizens of highly indebted member states, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, which were subject to harsh austerity measures as part of the EU/International Monetary Fund rescue packages. This, in return, resulted in several mass protests targeting the EU and national governments, and causing government instability and early elections. Ten of the 15 parliamentary elections in the Eurozone countries between 2010 and mid-2013 were early elections (Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia,

Greece, Netherlands, Italy, Malta) that were mostly triggered by the crisis. In addition, in November 2011, two governments changed in Greece and Italy without elections as crisis-driven emergency measures.[7]

> European integration has followed a dynamic trajectory with ups and downs rather than a linear process.

Aside from its profound economic, social and political implications, the crisis revealed the persistent divergences among the EU member states and particularly of the Eurozone. The crisis aggravated the already existing economic and social disparities between old and new member states, as well as between the northern and southern states. It also demonstrated the economic fragility of some of the older member states that were previously seen as economic models, such as Ireland. Combined with these factors, the asymmetry problem has been exacerbated in the EU, transforming it "from a club of more or less equals into a polity with significant discrepancies among its member states".[8]

Due to the increasing pessimism regarding the consequences of the crisis, one would expect that it would lead to stagnation or even a reversal in the integration process. Yet the

EU's response to the crisis resulted in further integrationist steps rather than a stagnation. The fiscal consolidation agenda and strict austerity programmes designed to cut high public debts, particularly in some southern EU member states, were supported by the institutionalisation of financial support between the Eurozone countries. The establishment of the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (2010) was followed later in 2012 by the formation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a permanent rescue mechanism for Eurozone countries.

> Aside from its profound economic, social and political implications, the crisis revealed the persistent divergences among the EU member states and particularly of the Eurozone.

The "Euro-Plus Pact" was signed in March 2011 by 23 member states,[9] committing themselves to strengthened coordination for competitiveness as well as coordination in areas of national competence such as employment, wages, tax policy issues, and banking legislation. The Pact involved commitments to foster competitiveness and employment, enhance the sustainability of public finances, and reinforce financial stability and structured discussion on tax policy issues.[10] Furthermore, some new steps were taken for the surveillance and the coordination of economic policies. The "European Semester" was developed in 2010 for an integrated multilateral economic and budgetary surveillance. For strengthened fiscal regulation and supervision, a series of legislative acts were adopted, most notably the "Six Pack" of December 2011 and Two Pack of March 2013. The "Treaty for Stability, Coordination and Governance" (also known as the Fiscal Compact) was signed by 25 member states (all but the United Kingdom [UK], Czech Republic and Croatia) in March 2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013. The signatories committed themselves to fiscal discipline by incorporating a "balanced budget rule" into their national legal systems. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was reinforced through stronger preventive and corrective action against excessive budget deficits and public debts.

Financial sector supervision was also strengthened through the establishment of European supervisory bodies, namely the European Banking Authority for bank supervision, European Securities and Markets Authority for capital market supervision and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority for insurance supervision. Further integrationist steps towards a

"banking union" were also taken as a response to the crisis. On the basis of the European Commission roadmap, the member states agreed to establish a "Single Supervisory Mechanism," founding the first pillar of the banking union. This Mechanism, comprising the European Central Bank (ECB) and the supervisory authorities of the member states, will be responsible for the supervision of major national banks in the Eurozone. Moreover, the "Single Resolution Mechanism" (SRM) aims at effective management of bank resolution through a Single Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund in cases of bank failures. The SRM and the Board have become operational as of 1 January 2016. The banks in the Mechanism will start to contribute to the Single Resolution Fund in 2016 while they contributed to national resolution funds in 2015.[11] Whereas the SRM involves all Eurozone countries, it is also optionally open to the non-Euro countries. The proposal of the Commission in November 2015 to form the Eurozone-wide European Deposit Insurance Scheme also stands as an outstanding attempt for the establishment of a full banking union.

> The progressive development of the EMU into a banking union and the debates on the possible establishment of a fiscal union that can pave the way for a political union, seem to correspond to the arguments of the neofunctionalists' theory.

This Scheme is aimed at securing a more solid and a rather standard insurance cover for retail depositors within the banking union.[12]

The reforms undertaken during the crisis resulted in the introduction of exceptional collective liabilities, reduced state autonomy in budgetary policy, and centralised financial market supervision. These steps strengthened the role of supranational institutions, specifically the ECB as the supervisor of the European financial system and also of the Commission in fiscal supervision.[13] Moreover, the proposal of the Commission for the establishment of a full banking, fiscal and economic union as well as a political union in the long term is noteworthy.[14] In this respect, the crisis produced an opportunity structure rather than an impediment to European integration, at least in the short-run.[15] Such an argument also seems in conformity with the EU's founding father Jean Monnet's prediction that "Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for these crises".[16] Yet, the question whether the crisis will ultimately result in a substantial transformation in the

European political order is still far from being clear.

Theoretical Discussion of the EU's Response to the Crisis: Revenge of Neofunctionalism or Triumph of Intergovernmental Preferences?

The EU's response to the crisis triggered debates on the fate of European political integration. It appears that these debates reproduced the conventional theoretical dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Thus, this section aims to discuss the EU's answer to the crisis in terms of neofunctionalist and intergovernmental perspectives. These two theories, which have different visions of European integration, have long competed with each other to describe the route and predict the future of integration. Indeed, they could only describe particular aspects and periods of integration. Nevertheless, their theoretical debate continued to be cultivated not only by the EU's peculiar hybrid structure constituting both supranational and intergovernmentalist elements but also by the persisting uncertainty of the EU's political finality. In this vein, these theories seem to regain explanatory power at least over some particular aspects of the EU's response to the crisis that reflect both supranationalist and intergovernmentalist tendencies. Accordingly, studies analysing the crisis through theoretical lenses increasingly consider neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist points of view. This paper aims to contribute to this scholarly debate by combining this theoretical discussion with the wider debate on the future of European integration and the questions of European political union and differentiated integration. Thus, it will initially elaborate on the aspects of the EU's response coinciding with the neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist arguments.

Alternative choices such as the dissolution or break-up of the Eurozone seemed unthinkable as these would be extremely risky due to the deep interdependencies originating from the high level of capital market integration.

On the one hand, the progressive development of the EMU into a banking union and the debates on the possible establishment of a fiscal union that can pave the way for a political union, seem to correspond to the arguments of the neofunctionalists'

theory. The incremental developments throughout the crisis bring the expectation that centralisation in economic and financial areas will require further political integration. Such an incremental logic of integration recalls the concept of "spillover" envisaged by neofunctionalism,[17] which evaluates European integration as a self-sustaining process driven by *functional spillover* and supplemented by *political* and *cultivated spillovers*.[18]

Functional spillover presupposes that sectoral integration in an area will unintentionally promote further integration in others because of the functional interconnectedness of policy areas. Political spillover mostly focuses on the role of sub-national actors, such as interest groups, in political integration. These actors push for further integration when they acknowledge the benefits of integration.[19] The pressure exerted by these groups on the member states is further reinforced by the supporting role of supranational actors such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB, as predicted by the cultivated spillover. These actors provide a political stimulus to the process by promoting further integration.[20] In this respect, it is assumed by some scholars that the functioning of the EMU and the crisis created functional pressures for the spillover of integration from the centralised monetary policy to

the formerly decentralised fiscal and financial market policy.[21] Some even evaluated the crisis as "the revenge of neofunctionalism" and regarded the demands for a fiscal union as "vindication for the first grand theory of European integration".[22]

The response of the EU to the crisis may be assessed as a consequence of the quest of the member states for joint solutions that seem strategically more suitable for the pursuit of their economic interests.

From this point of view, the integrative measures taken during the crisis essentially were aimed at alleviating the functional pressures emanating from the dissonance between supranational monetary policy and intergovernmental budgetary, and fiscal and structural policies in the Eurozone. Moreover, the increasing incompatibility of EU-level financial market integration with national financial supervision generated an additional pressure. Therefore, the crisis compelled the Eurozone members to take the required integrative steps which were avoided under favourable economic circumstances. Alternative choices such as the dissolution or break-up of the Eurozone seemed unthinkable as

these would be extremely risky due to the deep interdependencies originating from the high level of capital market integration.[23]As renationalizing monetary policy was far too costly for the member states, they rather preferred to consolidate the EMU through an institutionalised financial support system, and a more centralised fiscal and financial market policy. Therefore, preservation and the deepening of the Eurozone can be considered as the product of a functional spillover. Overall, the EU's response to the crisis resulted in a higher level of integration in fiscal and financial policy, which was opposed previously.[24]

Moreover, the pressing role during the crisis of supranational actors such as the European Commission and the ECB, as well as the actors in the international financial markets, resembles neofunctionalist arguments. It is argued that although the pressure exerted by the financial markets is indirect and different in this sense from the pressure of the other interest groups, its actual effect is similar, as markets press for centralised solutions in line with their interests. Besides, supranational institutions and their leaders, particularly the Commission, have been active in pushing for centralised solutions, which transfer further competences to the EU level and establish stricter rules of monitoring and control for the EMU.[25] The role

of the ECB has been considerably strengthened in this process. On the other hand, the implementation competences of the Commission have also increased or, for some, transformed in terms of economic, budgetary surveillance and fiscal supervision.[26] Regarding the role of interest groups at the supranational level, the preference of European business leaders for supranational solutions should be mentioned. For instance, the initiation of a newspaper campaign in 2011 emphasizing the necessity of the Euro by a coalition of 51 German and French top representatives from major corporations, including Air France, Deutsche Bank, Michelin and Siemens is noteworthy.[27]

On the other hand, it is not possible to neglect the continuing vigorous role of the member states, or the impact of national preference convergences and divergences on the evolution of European integration. Within this context, intergovernmentalist arguments, the longstanding rival of neofunctionalism, also provide another point of view in evaluating the current dynamics in the EU. Integration is analysed by intergovernmentalist theory as the outcome of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the grounds of their preferences and power.[28] Thus, classical intergovernmentalism views the EU as an institutionalised form

of interstate cooperation under the control of the interest-driven member states. Considering the distinction between low politics and high politics, it refuses the possibility of a European political union while economic integration is not discarded. Liberal intergovernmentalism, which has a broader perspective, deals with the interface between domestic and international politics. It emphasizes that while national governments pursue state interests that reflect domestic policy preferences formed in a rather liberal domestic context, decisions at the EU level are taken strategically as a consequence of bargaining among the member states whereby governments' relative bargaining power is crucial. Hence, the member states that have stronger bargaining power inherently play a key role in the determination of policy outcomes.[29] The gradual process of preference convergence among the member states in the international area may result in a transfer of some degree of authority to the supranational level, but this transfer is aimed at enhancing the member states' capacity rather than limiting it and does not render superiority to supranational institutions. As this paper mainly focuses on the role of the member states and their strategic decision-making at the EU level, domestic preference formation and domestic politics within member states are beyond its scope.

Accordingly, the response of the EU to the crisis may be assessed as a consequence of the quest of the member states for joint solutions that seem strategically more suitable for the pursuit of their economic interests. In this respect, the reforms are viewed by some scholars as a sequence of strategic decisions coordinated essentially by Germany due to its apparent strong bargaining position with the support of the ECB as well. The main aim has been to prevent full scale market panic and to put pressure on the Eurozone countries to control their finances and undertake structural reforms.[30] Additionally, the initiation of Euro Summits among the Eurozone countries to provide a forum for discussion and concerted action strengthened the supervisory role of the member states in the field of economic governance.[31]

> The preference of the member states for intergovernmental initiatives once again exposed the limits of the supranational delegation of powers in the EU.

Thus, the reforms were decided substantially within the intergovernmental framework, and the resulting complex economic governance system was essentially based on an intergovernmental logic. This logic

was used as a means of balancing the divergent national preferences as well as accelerating the decision-making process. On the other hand, it also strengthened the leadership role of member states that had stronger bargaining power in prompting the EU to the reforms. Yet, the reaction of the supranational institutions, namely the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission, could moderate the intergovernmental tendencies to a certain extent. The EP's pressure contributed to the inclusion of a provision into the Fiscal Compact Treaty requiring the incorporation of the Treaty into the EU legal corpus within five years at most. On the other hand, the Commission is tasked with the monitoring of the excessive budget deficits of the member states.[32]

Nonetheless, the preference of the member states for intergovernmental initiatives once again exposed the limits of the supranational delegation of powers in the EU. The ESM was established by an intergovernmental treaty rather than a supranational upgrade of the EMU and was later anchored to the EU's treaty framework through a "simplified treaty revision procedure," which enables amendments by the European Council without an intergovernmental conference only if a treaty change doesn't increase the EU's competence. Both the Fiscal Compact and Euro Plus are intergovernmental agreements. Fiscal Compact, whose implementation is supervised by the Commission, involves 25 member states (all but the UK, the Czech Republic and Croatia) whereas Euro Plus Pact involves 23 member states.[33]

> The Lisbon Treaty reproduced the EU's hybrid polity and legal constitution cultivating the conventional theoretical dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

The preference for these new intergovernmental initiatives is principally related to the goal of avoiding any referenda required by Treaty revisions and hence of reducing the impact of the politicisation of a crisis that could disrupt the reform process.[34] Thus, it may be seen as the outcome of the constraining role of domestic politics and also of decreasing public support for supranational solutions.[35] In the post-Maastricht Treaty era and particularly over the last decade, decreasing support for the EU and closer European integration has led to a shift in European public attitudes from "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus".[36] In this vein, it is argued by some scholars that integration theories, particularly neofunctionalism, tend to underestimate the EU's vulnerability to domestic politics and public support.[37]

European citizens' considerably low trust for the EU is highlighted in various polls. The proportion of EU citizens expressing trust in the Union was only 32% according to the Eurobarometer survey in autumn 2015. Furthermore, Europeans with a positive image of the EU made up just 37%.[38] Thus, despite the increasing federalisation of European economic policy, a democratic legitimacy problem continues to threaten European level decisions transferring further competences to the EU.[39] The crucial question that comes to the forefront is whether it is possible "to make Europe without Europeans".[40] It is a fact that neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism thoroughly analyses this vital point, which stands as a vital challenge for European integration.

Debates on the Future of the EU and the Revival of an Old Dream: Finally Towards a Political Union?

The theoretical debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism has long interacted with the wider debate on the future of the EU and the possibilities of establishing a European political union. In fact, the debates at the theoretical and policy making levels have mutually promoted each other since the

beginning of European integration. Hence, one should consider the reflections of this theoretical dichotomy on the policy processes and views of the policy leaders regarding political union. Indeed, the idea of establishing a political union is not a new goal for Europe. This goal was acknowledged by both Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monnet in the 1950s in federalist, albeit different methodological, viewpoints. Spinelli's federalist strategy was grounded on "the constitutionalist method," suggesting a popularly-endorsed treaty, which would be drafted by an elected European parliamentary assembly. On the other hand, Monnet believed in a rather functionalist approach in the merits of "federalism by instalments," which would be built upon small, concrete, economic steps culminating in a federal Europe.[41] The idea of establishing a political union was later elaborated on within a relatively intergovernmentalist design in the early 1960s through the Fouchet Plans, which were named after Christian Fouchet, a French diplomat. The then French President, Charles de Gaulle, proposed the Fouchet Plans as an intergovernmental design for a West European political union, which was supposed to be a union of states. Such a design would weaken the supranational executive European Commission while strengthening the role of the member states and guaranteeing their national sovereignties.[42]

Following the failure of the Fouchet Plans, which were opposed by supranationalists, it took almost three decades until the concept of political union reappeared in the conclusions of the European Council in Rome in 1990 and Luxembourg in 1991, and the Final Act of the Maastricht negotiations. Nevertheless, this concept did not take place in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which officially established the EU.[43] The call of Jacques Delors, the European Commission president, for a "federation of nation-states" in 1994 was another expression of the goal of a political union. Joschka Fischer, the then German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, re-triggered the debates on the future of the EU in the beginning of the 2000s, by proposing the formation of a European federation in his well-known speech at Humboldt University.[44]

The debates on the future of the EU marked the first decade of the 2000s and ultimately led to the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009 following the unsuccessful trial of a European Constitution. The Treaty involved some crucial legal amendments implying the strengthening of supranationalism. These included the dissolution of the pillar system,[45] the establishment of the EU's legal personality, identification of the co-decision procedure as ordinary legislative procedure, the extension of

qualified majority voting to some new areas, and the creation of the positions of President of the European Council and High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, the appearance of the categories of EU competences as exclusive, shared and supporting competences[46] in the Treaty was a vital step to clarifying the division of competences between the member states and EU. Nevertheless, the preservation of some core competences such as defence and taxation under the control of the member states and the continuing intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is subject to unanimous voting, revealed the persistence of intergovernmental trends and resistance to spillover effects. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty reproduced the EU's hybrid polity and legal constitution cultivating the conventional theoretical dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

While the Lisbon Treaty could not bring a concrete answer to the question of the EU's political finality, the Euro crisis has been a catalyst for the revival of the debates on the future of Europe. The previous President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, followed the path of Delors by calling for "a federation of nation states" in his 2012 address to the EP. He expressed in his speech the need for "a political

union as a horizon" with the following words:[47]

> A deep and genuine economic and monetary union, a political union, with a coherent foreign and defence policy, means ultimately that the present European Union must evolve. Let's not be afraid of the words: we will need to move towards a federation of nation states... This is our political horizon…

The quest for more Europe was also voiced by the "Future of Europe Group," which was set up by Germany's then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle as an informal dialogue forum among 11 foreign ministers[48] to discuss the future of European political integration. In a report in 2012 calling for a political debate on the European project across Europe, the Group proposed making more use of differentiated integration, strengthening the role of the Commission, transferring further responsibility to the High Representative, and majority decision taking in the areas of CFSP.[49]Despite his objection to the transformation of the Union into United States of Europe, Herman Van Rompuy, the then President of the European Council, was also among those expressing the need for more Europe.[50] In fact, besides the priority of finding a way out of the crisis, founding a stable political framework stands as another crucial goal for post-crisis Europe. Therefore, it would be fair to say that establishing a political union is viewed as a goal

closely associated with the priorities of the EMU, at least by some leading figures in Europe.

Nevertheless, the meaning of political union is still far from being clear due to an apparent lack of consensus on the concept. Indeed, the connotation of the expression of "political Europe" may vary visibly in different contexts. On the one hand, it may connote the federal ideal transcending national sovereignties in favour of a common European interest. On the other hand, it may also imply the consolidation of Europe's world position privileging the role of the leading member states.[51] The degrees of sovereignty that different EU member states are ready to transfer to the Union differ considerably. These divergences show various patterns not only across small/big, old/new, debtor/funder countries but also according to the differentiation in member states' involvement in common policies.[52] It is a fact that the measures taken during the crisis have considerably transformed the European economic and fiscal governance system promoting supranationalist tendencies. Nevertheless, the dominance of the member state preferences in the bargaining and policy making processes confirm the persistence of intergovernmentalist tendencies. Hence, although the EU has taken crucial integrative steps transferring further competences to the EU to

overcome the crisis in the pursuit of their economic interests, these do not seem to provide enough evidence for forming a "political union". Indeed, huge political obstacles persist. Furthermore, the continuing debates on the appropriate model of integration leave the future of the EU unclear. Besides the unitary model of integration principally favouring the uniform implementation of the EU system in all member states, the proposals of differentiated integration are also being revisited for post-crisis Europe. Thus, although it has been more than six decades since the beginning of integration, there is still not a consensus on *finalite politique* of the EU.

Revisiting the Debates on Differentiated Integration

Differentiated integration refers to "the state in which the uniformity and simultaneity of integration of all member states is more or less restricted by temporary or permanent exceptions".[53] In general terms, it raises the possibility for member states to have different rights and obligations with respect to certain common policy areas.[54] While the founding Paris and Rome Treaties were based upon the principle of equal rights and obligations for all member states, this mode of integration implies a deviation from this principle as an institutional response

to the increasing heterogeneity within the EU.[55] It allows different forms of cooperation and/or integration in which not all EU member states are involved. Naturally, the legal and political effects of such initiatives are not uniform for all members. Unlike the uniform implementation of the EU system and rules in all cases and for all countries, flexibility works as an operating principle in this integration model.[56]

In fact, differentiated integration is not a new idea in EU policy making. Nevertheless, it has been long viewed as a secondary option due to the prevailing focus on achieving an ever closer union characterized by uniformity. The debate on differentiated integration was initially launched in 1974 by Willy Brandt, the German Chancellor, who introduced the idea of "multispeed Europe" following British opposition to the harmonisation of banking legislation and company law.[57] The debate was further elaborated in 1975 by the Tindemans report, which is named after the then Belgium prime minister. The report proposed that different states would achieve deeper integration at different speeds, depending on their ability.[58] Yet, neither of these two proposals had an immediate practical effect on European integration.

A paper published in 1994 by Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers,

two German Christian Democrat politicians, revitalised the debate on differentiated integration. Schäuble and Lamers argued for the creation of a hard core Europe around France and Germany that would move towards a federal political union that the others could subsequently join. France and Germany were proposed to be the joint leaders of the hard core, which would also include the Benelux countries.[59] The report became subject to several criticisms with the argument that such a structure would lead to "a sort of privileged circle" in the EU. The British Prime Minister John Major objected to the proposals of hard-core, inner and outer circles and a two-tier Europe in which "some would be more equal than others".[60]

These political discussions were accompanied by academic debates throughout the 1990s and thereafter. Various conceptual schemes and classifications were presented over the years causing a conceptual ambiguity and an excess of terminology. Two-speed or multi-speed Europe, hard core, variable geometry, multi-tier, pick-and-choose, and concentric circles of Europe are just a few of these classifications that imply overlapping or diverse forms of integration. As a nonexclusive but widely accepted categorisation, Stubb[61] suggested distinguishing between three basic forms of differentiated integration according to time, space

and matter, under which he listed about 30 models. These basic forms include the multi-speed, variable geometry and à la carte models. Whereas the multi-speed model is based upon temporal differences regarding the participation of member states in integrative schemes, variable geometry envisages more permanent differentiations between core states and less integrated ones, creating spaces between them. On the other hand, the à la carte model, which is quite distant from the current EU structure as the most extreme case of differentiated integration, allows member states to pick and choose the policy areas in which they wish to take part in an entirely intergovernmental decision-making.

The timing of these debates was not coincidental given that some core EU policies underwent differentiation by the 1990s. Actually, differentiation was originally developed as a last resort mechanism where integrative steps could not be taken concurrently with all member states. Thus, it was rather used as a functional-pragmatic strategy aimed at coping with blockades of certain member states in specific policy areas and tackling crisis conditions.[62] The development of the Schengen regime first outside and then inside the treaty framework, but not including all member states, and also the British and Danish opt-outs from the EMU have steadily

brought a differentiated approach to European integration from the late 1980s onwards. The development of an "enhanced cooperation" mechanism in the Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009) Treaties further developed the legal basis of this integration model in the EU. This cooperation enables multispeed integration without undermining the single market and the EU's cohesion. It provides the possibility for at least nine member states to make deeper cooperation than that initially provided for by the Treaties in different sectors, provided that they do not belong to areas of the EU's exclusive competence. The remaining states also have the option of joining the cooperation later. The Lisbon Treaty extended enhanced cooperation to include matters of defence, offering possibilities of establishing permanent structured cooperation thereby enabling member states to participate in European military equipment programmes and provide combat units for EU missions; join certain missions relating to the CFSP; and cooperate to increase military capability under the framework of the European Defence Agency.[63]

Enhanced cooperation can be utilized when the EU as a whole cannot agree on the desired objectives within a reasonable period of time. The EU institutions continue to perform their usual functions in the respective policy areas. The mechanism was initially used following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on divorce law and patents in 2010. In 2013 the establishment of enhanced cooperation on a common Financial Transaction Tax was authorised by the Council. The Commission also proposed enhanced cooperation for establishing a European public prosecutor office.[64]

As another case of differentiation, the UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of being covered by any legislation adopted under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the Lisbon Treaty. However, it is also possible for these states to leave this system at any time and choose an opt-in system on a case-by-case basis, or completely leave any opt-ins/opt-outs, preferring the same approach as the other member states. This possibility, which allows over-flexible participation in criminal justice issues, has been evaluated as a severe challenge to a common justice area in the EU.[65] Additionally, the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic benefit from special arrangements regarding the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty into European primary law. Due to their opt-out status, the rights of EU citizens in these member states are not protected under the Charter.

The multiple layers of policy coordination that emerged throughout

the crisis further expanded the use of differentiated integration particularly outside the EU Treaties. Such intergovernmental policy cooperation allowing the partial integration of member states in specific areas was already experienced through the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 2005 Prüm Treaty. These were later incorporated into the EU's legal framework in 1999 and 2008 respectively.[66] However, the economic governance reforms carried out since 2010 differ from the traditional type of intergovernmental cooperation as they construct a hybrid structure outside the EU Treaties but still using the EU institutions. For instance, the European Commission is assigned to supervise the implementation of the Fiscal Compact. When Compact rules are violated, member states can pursue legal action in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This can be viewed as a trend towards "a governance model with multitier and multispeed characteristics involving different member states in different sectoral cooperations".[67]It is argued by some scholars that this kind of differentiation can permanently change the governance, balance of power and cohesion in the EU.[68]

Thus, the divisions between debtor and creditor states, between "ins", "outs", "preins" of different cooperative frames concerning the EMU and new economic governance add up

to the divergences within the EU-28.[69] It appears that the crisis has created a periphery group within the Eurozone comprised predominantly of Southern European countries that became dependent on external financial support from the creditor Eurozone members. On the other hand, the Eurozone is argued to have been taking gradual steps towards a quasi-federation. Hence, the Union is split into multiple layers involving the Eurozone core and its differentiated peripheries, depending on their level of integration with the Eurozone in different spheres.[70] For instance Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Denmark signed the Euro Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact whereas Sweden and Hungary preferred to sign the Fiscal Compact but not the European Plus Pact. The UK and Czech Republic remained outside of both agreements.

Considering the increasing heterogeneity, it is asserted that flexibility is now not only a reality in the EU but also likely to increase further in the future.[71] The expanded use of differentiated integration triggered the discussions on whether this integration model is turning out to be a *modus operandi* rather than a mechanism of last resort. This model is seen by some prominent political figures as a means to bridge different levels of capacities as well as diverse preferences of member

states regarding further political integration. Given the fact that not all member states are willing to transfer more competences to the EU level, differentiated integration is believed to be the most appropriate mechanism that will enable the building of a political union. Thus, it is proposed as a way of reconciling supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

Nevertheless, the views on the possible implications of adopting differentiation as an integration model diverge to a great extent. From the pro-differentiation perspective, this model is viewed as a "soft alternative to unanimity" and "compromise solution" in the functioning of the EU. Hence, differentiation saves integration from stagnation and ineffectiveness. In this respect, differentiated integration not only allows a group of willing and capable members states to proceed to integrate, but also reduces the political pressure on the non-participating member states. Furthermore, provided that the initiative unleashes centripetal forces from the more integrated core by attracting the outsiders, it may also function as a catalyst for integration such as in the cases of the Schengen and Prüm agreements. Similarly, the Fiscal Compact envisages the incorporation of this intergovernmental agreement into the EU treaties within five years. Nevertheless, the requirement of a Treaty revision for

such incorporation increases the salience of hurdles caused by domestic politics and national ratification processes in the member states. Besides, the possible incorporation of intergovernmental agreements into the *acquis communautaire* does not always necessarily mean the "reunification" of all member states in the initiative. Such reunification occurred only once so far for the Agreement on the Social Policy of the Maastricht Treaty, which was initially rejected by the conservative British government and then supported by the new labour government in 1997. It was then incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty. But still, the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement and the Prüm Convention into EU law, albeit at the cost of opt-outs, can be evaluated as an indicator of the tendency towards more inclusive integration.[72]

From an anti-differentiation perspective, this integration model will undermine the EU's constitutional principles including unity, equality and solidarity. Hence, it bears the risk of fragmentation for the EU, and challenging of the unity vision. The main concern here is that such integration may cause further heterogeneity and even disintegration, by weakening the already fragile sense of European identity. The core dilemma appears therefore, to be between flexibility and unity.[73] It is further

claimed by the critics that this mode of integration masks the hegemonic aspirations of the larger states to gain power over the others and thus is likely to cause discrimination among the members as first and second class states.[74] If it is used as a mechanism beyond a compromise solution--that means as an instrument for deliberate exclusion of some member states from certain areas of cooperation--this can lead to severe confrontations within the Union. Especially, the conduct of cooperation on a permanent basis outside the EU framework would elevate these challenges. Therefore, critics are concerned with its potentially harmful impact on cohesion and solidarity in the EU. From this point of view, differentiated integration may result in a "two-class EU" composed of an integrated core group actively excluding the others to protect itself from the negative effects of increasing diversity within the Union.[75] The institutionalisation of an exclusive mode of differentiated integration can harm not only the very essence of European integration but also the sense of community within the EU.

Conclusion

The Euro crisis has had multidimensional economic, social and political implications for the European Union, not only causing the politicisation of European integration but also shattering confidence in the EU. Nevertheless, the crisis resulted in further integrationist steps rather than stagnation in integration. The institutionalisation of financial support among the Eurozone member states, the commitment of these states and some non-Euro states to strengthened fiscal regulation and supervision and to incorporation of a balanced budget rule into national legislation and the steps taken towards a banking union are just some of the remarkable reforms in this account. The calls for a full banking and fiscal union that will be complemented by further political integration have once again brought forward the debates on the possibility of transforming the EU into a political union reproducing the conventional theoretical controversy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. On the one hand, the progressive development of a monetary union promoting further integration in fiscal and financial market policies and the pressing role of the supranational actors in this development are reminders of the concept of spillover introduced by the neofunctionalists. On the other hand, the continuing key role of the member states, particularly those possessing stronger bargaining power such as Germany, and the determining impact of national preferences on the policy choices, support the intergovernmentalist point of view.

The long-established goal of founding a European political union has retaken its place on the agenda as further political integration is viewed in various circles as a means of setting up a stable political framework for post-crisis Europe. Furthermore, it is expected that the steps taken towards a banking union are likely to pave the way incrementally for fiscal and political unions. Yet, the lack of a shared vision of the appropriate model of integration complicates the task of clarifying the meaning and scope of this goal. Whereas some support unitary model of integration, others are in favour of differentiated integration considering the increasing divergences and heterogeneity within the Union. The proponents of differentiation view this model as a way of reconciling supranationalists and intergovernmentalists, enabling the building of a political union, at least among some member states. In fact, the multiple layers of policy coordination that have emerged throughout the crisis have further expanded the sphere of differentiation in the EU. Although it is evident that realizing the uniform model is steadily becoming harder, the permanent adoption of differentiated integration bears the risk of harming the sense of community, potentially leading to a fragmentation in the Union. All in all, the debates on the future model of integration and differentiated integration once again reveal the difficulty of reconciliation on the possibilities and means of forming a European political union. In fact, the debates are stimulating the traditional controversies rather than clarifying the *finality politique* of the EU.

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Information and Communication Technologies and Organizational Culture in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs[1]

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to provide an insider's perspective on the mutually constitutive interplay between Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the organizational culture of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the last two decades. It is argued that the introduction of ICTs to work processes in the Ministry has been a set of reform attempts of senior bureaucrats to adapt the organization to the rapidly changing socio-political environment and to ensure the dominance of the Ministry in the information field of Turkish foreign policy. Reforms have targeted organizational behaviours manifesting the basic assumptions of the organizational culture, namely "hierarchy", "secrecy", "one-way communication with the public" and "the notion of the survival of the state". This case study indicates that the influence of ICTs is most profound in the communication style of foreign service officials, which has gradually been changing from one-way to two-way communication with the public. ICTs have also enabled foreign service officials to develop collaborative cross-agency relations with other public and private organizations. The article

concludes that these changes have transformed the Ministry into a more efficient and credible public organization in foreign policy.

Key Words

Turkey, Foreign Ministry, organizational culture, technology, communication, public diplomacy.

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) play a significant role in changing traditional diplomacy and the organizational culture of foreign ministries. The literature on public diplomacy offers a rich account on the role of ICTs in foreign policy processes.[2] However, except for a few valuable pieces of research,[3] it does not say much about the interplay between ICTs and organizational culture in individual foreign ministries. One of the reasons for this is that researchers look at the implementation phase of foreign policies with a narrow focus rather than adopting a broader perspective, including more challenging and less

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visible earlier phases such as decision-making and policy formulation within bureaucracy. The culture of secrecy dominating foreign ministries further exacerbates this trend by making it difficult for outsiders to have access to information about the inner functioning of foreign ministries.

This article focuses on the intensive application of ICTs in work processes in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as "the Ministry") by a group of computer-enthusiast senior bureaucrats to recalibrate the capacity of foreign service officials to handle more efficiently contemporary foreign policy processes over the last two decades. It provides a framework of analysis to answer the research question of how ICT applications have worked, and in time, served senior bureaucrats' endeavour to achieve an organizational transformation. The Turkish experience indicates that ICTs have consciously been employed to mediate changes in organizational culture within the Ministry by conditioning the actions of foreign service officials. Technological reforms have penetrated through social contexts that reproduce, maintain and change the basic assumptions of the Ministry's organizational culture, namely *hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public,* and *the notion of the survival of the state*. Changes have gradually become visible in the most profound manner in the attitudes of foreign service officials in engaging with the domestic and foreign publics as well as their approaches towards cross-agency collaborative work at the national level.[4] Consequently, those changes have transformed the Ministry into a more efficient public organization in foreign policy.

Technological reforms have penetrated through social contexts that reproduce, maintain and change the basic assumptions of the Ministry's organizational culture, namely *hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public, and the notion of the survival of the state.*

In conducting this research, the author holds the assumption that the underlying objective of ICT reforms was to ensure the dominance of the Ministry as a hub agency in the information field governing Turkey's foreign policy processes, which has long been challenged by new actors and power shifts in Turkish politics. This assumption was drawn upon various statements of senior bureaucrats in their advocating within and across the Ministry the benefits of technology in work places. In addition, the premises

of post positivist approaches have been adopted to accommodate the observer's being part of the observed phenomenon as well as the mutually constitutive nature of technology and social contexts, through which those technologies have come into being in the first place.

The article applies a research method that combines the professional experience of the author with the theoretical perspectives offered by the *technology enactment process* and *organizational culture*. While offering a unique advantage by combining theory with practice, it also carries constraints such as the preference to remain anonymous of foreign service officials, whose candid personal accounts made valuable contributions to the substance of discussions, and the preference of the author not to refer to the outcomes of occasional questionnaires conducted by the Ministry's Information Technologies Department as well as the contents of formal in-service instructions on ICT applications. Those constraints originate from the mainstream characteristics of institutional censorship and secrecy dominating foreign ministries operating in traditional diplomacy. Therefore, it suffices to state that the overall conclusions of this research are a thorough study of formal instructions circulating within the Ministry, the statements and presentations of those

senior bureaucrats who designed and implemented ICT reforms in the Ministry, formal staff meetings as well as small cafeteria talks among foreign officials about the merits and perils of ICT-induced changes in work processes.

In the following section, the article will develop a theoretical model framing discussions on the interplay between technology and the Ministry's organizational culture. Then the influence of ICTs on the basic assumptions of the organizational culture, which are identified as *hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public,* and *the notion of the survival of the state*, will be discussed. Finally, conclusions will be drawn on areas involving behavioural changes that are most profound among foreign service officials.

Concepts and Definitions

In this article, ICT is defined as computers (hardware and software), any form of connections facilitating Internet-based work processes, and social media technologies employed in foreign policy processes. In discussing ICT at the Ministry, it differentiates between *computer-supported work systems* such as DOC-ARCHIVE, BUDGET PROGRAMME, CONSULAR-NET and DIPLOMATIC PORTAL and *social media portal and technologies*

such as MEMLEKETIM PORTAL, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The first category includes software designed for collaborative use in a work environment, whereas the latter are popular media applications designed for individual use for business and social purposes. One should also recognize the hybrid characters of CONSULAR-NET and MEMLEKETIM PORTAL designed for interaction with and among individuals. These two programs include features supporting both collaborative use in a work environment and person-to-person interaction for social purposes through web-based communication networks.

Furthermore, following the line of Orlikowski and Robey, it is assumed that ICTs contain both social and material properties and that ICTs, by nature, comprise social products created by human action within a specific structural and cultural context.[5] Technology and institutional structures involve a process of mediating (enabling, constraining) human action, and through human action, contributing to producing, maintaining and changing social contexts. In other words, ICTs are social products constituted through institutional structures and, in turn, they contribute to the constitution of institutional properties of an organization by enabling and constraining human action.[6]

An explanatory cognitive model of two phases – *the technology enactment process* and *the transformation of organizational culture* – is offered to simplify various elements of intertwined arguments throughout discussions in this article. In the first phase, Fountain's *technology enactment framework* is employed to explore earlier processes involving the development, design, use and implementation of ICTs in the Ministry.[7] In the following transformative phase, priority is given to interaction between enacted technology and organizational culture in the Ministry.

Fountain differentiates between *objective* and *enacted* technologies in the technology enactment framework. She holds that objective technologies are hardware, software, telecommunication and other material systems as they exist apart from the ways in which people use them. Enacted technologies are the ways that a technological system is actually used by actors in organizations. Similar technologies may acquire different social meanings and functions, resulting in different organizational outcomes.[8] Two intermediating variables are identified in her framework: *organizational forms* and *institutional arrangements*. Organizational forms include both *bureaucracy* and *networks* in which civil servants operate interchangeably depending on the nature of their

engagement in work environments. They operate in bureaucracy to carry out policy-making and service delivery activities, and in networks to engage in cross agency cooperation and coordination in the public sector. Institutional arrangements are comprised of *cognitive institutions* (referring to mental habits and other cognitive models influencing behaviour and decision-making), *cultural institutions* (referring to shared symbols, narratives and meanings), and *government institutions* (denoting laws and rules framing problem-solving and decision-making). Fountain holds that these variables influence technology choices, individual responses to those choices, and the outcomes of enacted technologies. Similar technologies may produce different organizational outcomes depending on the formal structure of an organization or institutional arrangements.[9]

> Tension between the centre and the periphery of the society keeps the bureaucratic elite from directly communicating with the public.

In this article, two modifications are made to the original technology enactment framework: first, actors are limited to *bureaucratic leaders* and *foreign service officials,* while the varying roles in the enactment framework of all groups of actors are recognized.[10] Bureaucratic leaders include a group of technology-enthusiast foreign service officials with unique political connections and the professional capacity to initiate and implement ICT reforms. *Turkish foreign service officials* include those who are primarily responsible for conducting foreign policy processes in the Ministry. Second, the concept of *organizational culture* replaces *institutional arrangements* to highlight fundamental changes in social contexts in which foreign service officials operate. While there are numerous definitions of culture,[11] the definitional and analytical framework of *organizational culture* provided by Schein allows us to differentiate between the levels of assumptions, values, beliefs and artefacts influencing the mind-set and attitudes of foreign service officials.[12] According to Schein organizational culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions, differentiating the members of an organization from those of the others, helping members in their adaptation to the environment and consolidating in-group integration. He argues that organizational culture can be analysed at three different levels: (i) *basic assumptions* that are unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (ii) *espoused beliefs and values* that are the ways an organization justifies

what it does and (iii) *artefacts* that are visible organizational structures and processes.[13] Schein's approach allows one to highlight the definitional boundaries and functions of organizational culture. However, it does not say much about institutional sources informing basic assumptions, values, beliefs and artefacts of organizational culture.

Turkish bureaucrats in general, and foreign service officials in particular, differentiate between the concepts of the *state* and the *government* in running state affairs.

Batora's new institutionalist perspective provides the remedy in the case of foreign ministries. He argues that diplomacy is an institution comprised of a set of rules, norms and procedures defining appropriate behaviours for actors in terms of relations between roles and situations, and that it operates on the basis of three organizing principles: *hierarchy, secrecy,* and *one-way communication with the public*. Foreign ministries embody the organizing principles of this particular institution.[14] Batora shrewdly puts in place the link between diplomacy and foreign ministries, and highlights similarities in organizational structure and professional behaviours among foreign ministries around the world. However, he falls short of explaining divergences in the mind-set and approaches of foreign service officials operating in the same professional field of diplomacy.

Batora's approach may further be developed by referring to the national–level sources of organizational culture. Apart from diplomacy, state traditions that are formed and sustained throughout centuries or millennia have an imprint in the organizational culture of individual foreign ministries. For instance, the Ministry, in the Turkish case, is not only the carrier of *hierarchy, secrecy,* and *one-way communication with the public* but also *the notion of the survival of the state* (*devletin bekası*) originating from the particular historical and political evolution of the Turkish state and society. Turkey has inherited the political and bureaucratic culture of the Ottoman Empire.[15] When the Ottoman government was abolished in 1922, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara recruited former foreign service officials who carried along their mental mappings of how to conduct foreign policy, and set the foundation for the organizational culture of the Ministry.[16] The most salient of those mappings is *the notion of the survival of the state,* which refers to the excessive occupation of Turkish bureaucrats, including foreign service officials, with the long term well-being of the state.

In this article, the notion of *the survival of the state* is understood as a concept with two dimensions: first, that *foreign policy is presumed to be supra-political,* and, second, that *the long-term well-being of the state is considered critical for the survival of the Turkish nation.* These two dimensions are interrelated and reinforce one another in organizational practices. In Turkish society, state affairs are traditionally considered above society.[17] They are treated as a cluster of security dominated issues about which only a handful of qualified elected representatives in the parliament, as well as military and civilian officials have a say. By not offering an effective channel of communication, society has been practically banned from discussing state affairs or influencing the official decision-making process involving foreign policy issues. The state dominates all aspects of social life. Tension between the centre and the periphery of the society keeps the bureaucratic elite from directly communicating with the public. Foreign policy is presumed to be a technical topic which requires special expertise and is therefore of no interest to the public and political party figures representing the narrow interests of certain cliques within society. This notion has long kept the Ministry autonomous in its actions and unresponsive to the public. First,

it legitimizes the exclusive nature of the hard-to-gain expertise of foreign service officials, second, it grants these officials immunity from liability of any kind in their actions in foreign policy.

Turkish bureaucrats in general, and foreign service officials in particular, differentiate between the concepts of the *state* and the *government* in running state affairs. From the 14th century onwards, the state began to separate itself from the sultan during the Imperial Era.[18] The core functions of the state had been institutionalized as hierarchically organized, strong bureaucratic organizations which operate on an exclusionary logic of the *adab* (manner) tradition.[19] According to this logic, the well-being of the state has been prioritized over the welfare of the society. The expectations of the society have been subjugated to an ambiguous concept of national interests. In other words, the organizational culture of the Ministry has been informed by not only the institution of diplomacy, but also state traditions exclusive to Turkish political life.

Drawing upon the deliberations in the preceding paragraphs, the rest of the article discusses the Turkish experience in a mental model of two consecutive phases of *the technology enactment process* and *the transformation of organizational culture.*

Technology Enactment Process

The Ministry is a traditional public organization that is broadly organized and functions in line with the principles of Weberian bureaucracy.[20] The main function of the Ministry is to conduct the foreign policy of the Turkish government. The Ministry has its headquarters in Ankara, five representational offices across Turkey, and more than 220 diplomatic missions worldwide. The number of missions has increased by approximately 40% from 2000 to 2015, following the policies of reaching out to Africa and Latin America, as well as other proactive initiatives, which required active involvement in foreign policy dialogues with the governments and the peoples of other states. The total number of foreign service staff is 6,414, 20% of whom are career officials, 13% consular and administrative officials, and the rest advisors, clerical and technical staff employed both at the headquarters and diplomatic missions. For the purpose of this study, career as well as consular and administrative officials are categorized as *foreign service officials*.

The Ministry had a certain degree of familiarity with technology over the course of many decades. The need to process diverse and large volumes of information over different time zones and vast geographical spaces and simultaneously ensuring secrecy in work processes encouraged the Ministry to establish a cipher bureau in the early years of the Republic and both the telephone and telegraph were widely used in the following decades. The first facsimile machine and few personal computers were introduced in the 1980s. In spite of a general awareness about the role of ICT in diplomacy, however, technology was only a part of the office routine of typing and transmitting information. Foreign service officials have been poorly skilled in handling technologies because clerical staff and technicians would carry out those tasks on their behalf. A review of memoirs of Turkish diplomats having served since the 1920s provides no reference to personal experiences involving communication technologies in either their public or private accounts.[21]

Foreign service officials curiously observed the ways other institutions deal with ICT in workplaces, and adapted those ICT practices which may be of some use in diplomatic communication within and across the Ministry.

Challenges and opportunities[22] that recent advances in ICT introduced to

the profession of diplomacy, as well as the diffusion of ICT through Turkish society and public administration, encouraged the Ministry to treat technology appropriation as an organizational policy priority from the mid-2000s. This approach gained further momentum with the e-Government Initiative.[23] The early introduction of ICT into the Ministry has been a typical practice of imitating similar practices of other foreign ministries to reduce uncertainty dominating the organizational field of diplomacy.[24] Foreign service officials curiously observed the ways other institutions deal with ICT in workplaces, and adapted those ICT practices which may be of some use in diplomatic communication within and across the Ministry. The first successful initiative was a consular project designed and implemented at the Turkish Consulate General in Chicago in the early 2000s. The project involved designing and implementing a consular website providing information for citizens and international visa applicants, an online mail box to be attended regularly by consular clerks, and a modest office network to enable consular clerks

> Bureaucratic leaders who are personally involved in promoting the advantages of employing technologies in work processes, took part in the technology development and design processes.

to process consular applications in a system of networked computers.

The Ministry today provides ICT-supported public services to approximately six million Turkish nationals and many more internationals worldwide. Various forms of ICT-supported work systems and social media technologies have been added to the Ministry's technology basket. The hardware includes approximately six thousand computers (30% at the headquarters and 70% in the diplomatic missions), and approximately 700 physical and digital service providers worldwide. The Ministry currently operates an integrated network of multi-modular software applications, namely INTRANET (Dışnet), CONSULAR-NET (Konsolosluk.net), MEMLEMETIM PORTAL, DOC-ARCHIVE (Belge-Arşiv), BUDGET PROGRAMME (Bütçe Programı), DIPLOMATIC PORTAL (Diplomatik Portal), E-VISA (e-Vize), integrated WEBSITEs, and E-ARCHIVE.[25] An explanatory note on these software applications is included in the Annex.

Furthermore, social media technologies such as Twitter, Facebook,

Instagram, podcasts, Internet TV and blogging are increasingly becoming indispensable components of the Ministry's ICT technology basket. The Ministry issued an organizational circular in 2012 which required high ranking bureaucrats and heads of mission to use Facebook and Twitter actively for official purposes, to regularly inform their peers and the public about the foreign policy priorities of the Turkish government. Social media technologies diffused quickly among foreign service officials at all levels. Those tools carry all communication advantages of advanced ICT, such as being cost-effective, widely used, user friendly, and were already embedded in various social networks with high social capital for diplomats.

In the Turkish case, the technology enactment process exhibits dynamic characteristics from the beginning to the present. First of all, it was a top-down process. Ideas were formed in the minds of a group of technology-enthusiast bureaucratic leaders, technological choices were made exclusively by those bureaucratic leaders, and then put into use in accordance with instructions issued by the Information Technologies Department. In the early phases of the process, there were no prior consultations with foreign service officials, who were the main users of those technologies. The Department was not only closed to

prior consultations but also feedback from users. Communication was limited to those installing ICT in work places. Otherwise, all users' complaints remained within the confines of offices. The Department's attitude can partly be explained by the one-way communication dominating the Ministry's organizational culture, and partly by a pragmatic policy choice of bureaucratic leaders to guard nascent reforms from discouraging critics. The Ministry has recently changed this attitude, with growing success stories in the technology enactment process over the last decade. The Information Technologies Department seems more eager today to interact with foreign service officials in designing and developing new ICTs than before. It does consultations and receives feedback through questionnaires, online platforms for informal exchange of ideas among users, face-to-face consultations and brainstorming sessions.

Second, technologies available in the market initially constituted the main source of ICT reforms in the Ministry. The technology market has continuously been monitored for opportunities to improve the technological software used in the Ministry. Bureaucratic leaders observed the current of technological developments and determined the way forward.[26] Priorities in the technology

enactment process are continuously re-moulded in accordance with opportunities that innovative ICT may offer. The consular projects were top priority in the early stages of the process. Later, attention was paid to office document management, archives, digital engagement with the public, and various other fields which had been unimaginable to realize two decades earlier. Since 2010, the Ministry has accelerated the ICT appropriation with a multi-modular approach and organization-wide blanket applications. In addition, one could observe a process of ICT hardware updates, network expansion worldwide, and the renovation of physical premises to reflect the new technology-enhanced make-up of the Ministry, both at the headquarters and in diplomatic missions abroad.

Technologies available on the market have been tailored for the work processes of the Ministry and the public service it delivers. Technologies obtained on the market were in Fountain's terms, "objective" technologies existing independent of the ways the staff at the Ministry use them. The objective technologies were re-designed, developed, and adapted to the organizational goals, structure, and institutional particularities of the Ministry. Efforts toward technology design and development included various consultations between bureaucratic leaders from within and ICT vendors and consultants outside the Ministry. At the early stages of the reform process, the bureaucratic leaders used to approach local and international consultants to develop ICTs suitable for the Ministry's work processes. Today, the Ministry receives numerous project proposals from local ICT consultants to be incorporated into its work processes.

Third, the Ministry has applied various policies in order to ensure the faithful and widespread appropriation of ICTs by foreign service officials over the last five years. Those policies include actively monitoring and recording ICT-related trends and statistics in work processes, intervening if those trends indicate directions other than those desired, stimulating staff members through reward systems (punishment of deviant practices, rewarding appropriate practices), providing in-service training and regular updates on ICT developments with special attention to success stories, and effective leadership in encouraging foreign service officials to contribute to the design and development of ICT. Among those methods, the most effective one is constant monitoring of ICT uses and delivering warnings for deviant behaviours since no staff member would like to be singled out for not complying with rules and procedures that are already in place and widely observed at the Ministry.

Last, effective leadership is another important characteristic of the technology enactment process at the Ministry. For the purpose of this study, effective leadership is interpreted as personal efforts and remarkable level of devotion of a group of senior bureaucratic leaders in advancing ICT reforms at the Ministry. A group of computer-enthusiast bureaucratic leaders constitutes the driving force behind technological reforms put in place at the Ministry. Bureaucratic leaders who are personally involved in promoting the advantages of employing technologies in work processes, took part in the technology development and design processes.[27] Those bureaucratic leaders were initially accessible only to those who wanted to take part in the technology development efforts. The author recalls email exchanges she had with the ICT team when installing the consular software at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne in 2003. The ICT team was accessible for all enquiries and exchange of ideas on how to install and activate the consular application. She also recalls the personal involvement of then Consul General Koru in Chicago in overcoming challenges originating from the poor Internet infrastructure at the local level when creating the website of the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa in 2004. From this case, one may notice the selective nature of interaction between bureaucratic leaders and foreign service officials. The former group cooperate with those who exert efforts in advancing the technology enactment process of the Ministry.

One may draw the conclusion from the Turkish technology enactment experience that unlike the common misconception that bureaucrats constitute an impediment in the incorporation of information technologies into organizations, they have in fact played a critical role in technological reforms at the Ministry. This confirms the proposition that senior civil servants are not an impediment to organizational changes, rather they may become key players in government reforms. High-level bureaucrats are in a better position to work out details of critical importance to the success of technological reforms, and play a significant role in the enactment framework by combining deep tacit knowledge of policy and administrative processes with deep understanding of public service and the constraints it imposes on potential design choices for new ICTs.

Following the technology enactment phase, foreign service officials gradually experienced changes in intra-organizational relations both at the horizontal and vertical levels, relations with other organizations as well as in their interactions with the domestic and

foreign publics. With Schein's levels of organizational culture and Batora's propositions about the organizing principles of foreign ministries in mind, the following section will discuss those changes under four sub-headings: *hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public,* and *the notion of the survival of the state.*

Transformation of Organizational Culture
Hierarchy

Foreign service officials act in *bureaucracies* and *networks* simultaneously. The Ministry carries out policy-making in bureaucracy, and cooperating and coordinating diplomatic tasks in cross-agency networks at the national and international levels. These two forms of organizing require different logics of operation, a model of top-down decision-making and implementation through a unitary chain of command in the former, and a model of horizontal decentralization and coordination in the latter. However, foreign service officials tend to apply the logic of hierarchy to all forms of engagement within and outside the organization. This is even more so when it comes to the Ministry's relations with the business community in Turkey.[28] Therefore, the interplay between

ICT and the organizational form will be discussed with special attention paid to the Ministry's experience in collaborative networks.

The formal organizing form of the Ministry is hierarchy with a clear line of authority and non-permeable walls separating departmental jurisdictions from one another.[29] This form of organization has long been a source of prestige among foreign service officials who refer to the so-called "clockwork functioning" of the organization, the precision of which is comparable to that of the Turkish army. Hierarchical organizing provides predictability and stability to large-scale organizations with a considerable volume of routine tasks, in the Ministry's case, routine diplomatic correspondence and consular services. However, it falls short in handling emerging collaborative engagement across networks and democratic demands from within and outside the Ministry for effective public relations, transparency, and accountability.

The initial design and development of ICT programs, particularly DOC-ARCHIVE, BUDGET PROGRAM, and INTRANET, included features reflecting the existing line of bureaucratic hierarchy. A director is supposed to receive documents related to the jurisdiction of his/her departments via DOC-ARCHIVE, and distribute them to individual desk

officers in their units who administer a particular file. Desk officers produce appropriate outputs and submit them electronically to their closest supervisor, who sends them further up in the hierarchy to finalize the document. Following the formal line of authority, the document ultimately reaches the appropriate level and is endorsed to send to its final destination outside the Ministry. All official documents except for those classified above the level of *"restricted"* are processed through DOC-ARCHIVE.

The introduction to diplomatic missions of ICT increased the frequency, speed and volume of correspondence between the headquarters and diplomatic missions.

In practice, however, the majority of directors request clerical staff to print all incoming documents that need to be processed. These directors review those documents and task a desk officer to process them, and place appropriate instructions on printed ones. Clerical staff members then take marked documents to desk officers who process them electronically and transfer printed documents to the closest supervisor for revision, endorsement or referral to an official of higher rank on the same jurisdictional line

of authority. At the final stage, a desk officer electronically signs documents on behalf of the authorizing official and sends them to their final destination outside the Ministry, with printed and initialled copies kept in files. In addition, BUDGET PROGRAM has been in use for a limited number of staff in charge of financial affairs. The experience of those staff members is similar to that of those using DOC-ARCHIVE. Due to the regulations which require a printed copy of documents with original signatures, the users of BUDGET PROGRAM complain about a cumbersome process of multiple printings, signings, and then sending documents to their final destinations by regular post.

On the other hand, communications regarding administrative issues strictly related to the functioning of the Ministry including relations between staff members and the human resources department have been carried out electronically with no printed papers involved. In addition, any communication calling for technical assistance for ICT use and maintenance of office machines is done electronically with no paperwork required.

The maintenance of beliefs, values, and practices producing hierarchical relations require routine face-to-face communication.[30] Foreign service officials use DOC-ARCHIVE to re-produce organizational hierarchy.

A director needs to see subordinates visiting his/her office on a regular basis to receive instructions, consult on how to process documents, and reassure one's loyalty to the superior. It is necessary for subordinates to secure the trust of the superior, to learn from the master the subtleties of diplomacy and to become acculturated into the community of foreign service officials. Routine conversations during the processing of foreign policy documents between superiors and subordinates carry the tenets of hierarchy as one of the basic assumptions of the organizational culture. Therefore, although DOC-ARCHIVE offers faster and more efficient ways of conducting business, foreign service officials resist using DOC-ARCHIVE in accordance with its original guidelines. However, they are more apt to use ICT in administrative and technical communications through INTRA-NET since those applications are related to secondary matters (though not necessarily less important), which fall under the jurisdiction of departments such as the Information Technologies Department, the Human Resources Department or the Financial and Administrative Department. This experience illustrates differences between objective and enacted technologies, and unexpected outcomes of the technology enactment process.

From this analysis, one may argue that political departments play a critical role in producing, maintaining and modifying the notion of hierarchy at the Ministry. Foreign policy issues are handled in these departments. The notion of hierarchy is strongly experienced through face-to-face communication between superiors and subordinates working for those departments. These observations illustrate differences in the appropriation of ICT in processing foreign policy-related documents and carrying out administrative and technical applications. Foreign service officials resist using DOC-ARCHIVE in the fastest and most efficient way while almost fully complying with guidelines in using INTRA-NET. The organizational culture of prioritizing political issues over technical ones prevents staff members from fully utilizing DOC-ARCHIVE while endorsing the use of other programs.

Another dimension of hierarchy at the Ministry is the hierarchical relationship between the headquarters and missions abroad. Diplomatic missions are subordinated to the headquarters in their conduct of foreign policy processes. The introduction to diplomatic missions of ICT increased the frequency, speed and volume of correspondence between the headquarters and diplomatic missions. Particularly DOC-ARCHIVE,

CONSULAR-NET and E-VISA enable diplomatic missions to directly communicate and exchange documents, not only with the headquarters but also with other public organizations, such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the autonomous branches of those organizations. In addition, diplomatic missions have secured access to the national data banks of records of birth, death and marriages as well as penal records of Turkish citizens. An increase in the frequency and speed of communication between diplomatic missions has reduced down time lapses and distance between various agencies. While the headquarters' control and monitoring over diplomatic missions has increased, the latter has secured more freedom of action in proceeding with their routine tasks. The headquarters receives daily activity reports from missions, carrying out all communications, and providing instructions in response to emerging new conditions more quickly. Diplomatic missions don't need to wait for days for a response or confirmation from the headquarters, which reduced significantly the reaction time of missions in responding rapidly to emerging foreign policy issues in host countries.

The third dimension of hierarchy at the Ministry is related to the perceived hierarchical relations between the Ministry and other public organizations. This dimension falls in the category of networks as a form of organization. Foreign service officials have maintained a hierarchical professional culture which prioritizes the realm of foreign policy over other areas that fall in the jurisdiction of other public organizations. This cultural attitude stems partly from the profession of diplomacy, and partly from the Ottoman and Republican state traditions which equate foreign policy to security policy.[31] Foreign service officials identify themselves as the guardians of an upper realm in state affairs and display corresponding organizational behaviours in the public sphere. This practice perpetuated a hierarchical relationship between the Ministry and other public organizations. Despite the law, which does not decree a relational hierarchy between the Ministry and other Ministries that carry out the core functions of the state, the former has sustained a culture of hierarchical relations by exclusively mediating relations between the national and the international, producing strictly formal correspondences with other public organizations, paying special attention to meticulous customs in face-to-face engagement with those outside the Ministry and, most importantly, displaying an image of a class of foreign service officials with distinct high culture.

However, the rapid diffusion of ICT and social media technologies throughout Turkish society has brought about new opportunities for various public organizations to obtain information, familiarize themselves with new professional networks, and engage in trans-boundary relations independent of the Ministry. This is most evident in the cases of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Economy, and Treasury, which have made efforts to provide linguistic, professional and cultural training for staff members to pursue ministerial tasks at the international level. With the emergence of new opportunities that have been seized by other public organizations, the facilitator role of the Ministry has decreased dramatically since the 1990s. Formal correspondences are transmitted without any involvement in the substance of the jurisdictions of other public organizations. The Ministry has faced challenges in conducting business as usual, and has to revise its hierarchical engagement with other public organizations. As a remedy to this, the

introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry provided an interesting opportunity for foreign service officials to transform relations with other public organizations from self-perceived hierarchy to collaborative network relations that provide the Ministry with the upper hand in reaping social capital from those networks. The Ministry has actively promoted the extension of its software service networks to other public organizations.[32] It signed protocols to implement DOC-ARCHIVE in the Office of President, the Ministry for EU Affairs, and the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries. The Ministry produces organizational replicas by transferring those technologies to other public organizations, and creating collaborative networks. Cooperation with other public organizations not only makes ICT reforms sustainable within the Ministry, but also encourages further ICT reforms and legitimizes demands for more funds for new software programs. The Ministry uses ICTs as strategic products to be tradable for securing the partnership of other

> Although the new form of relations between the Ministry and other public organizations is far from being hierarchical today, it still displays a characteristic where the Ministry re-defines its role as a hub agency playing a unique, innovative and indispensable role in the public sector.

organizations, creating networks where the Ministry holds an upper hand in reaping social capital originating from network transactions, and most importantly reclaiming dominance in the knowledge field of foreign policy and technological innovation in the public sector. Although the new form of relations between the Ministry and other public organizations is far from being hierarchical today, it still displays a characteristic where the Ministry re-defines its role as a hub agency playing a unique, innovative and indispensable role in the public sector. This, in turn, reinforces the self-perception among foreign service officials of being a distinctive community with exclusive qualities in the public sector.

Secrecy

Following the line of Batora,[33] *secrecy* is taken as a basic assumption of the Ministry's organizational culture. The interplay between ICT and secrecy will be discussed in terms of *access to information* and *information security*. Both dimensions are governed by the traditional *need-to-know principle*, which implies that an officer has access only to those files that directly concern his/her daily work. Access to information within the Ministry is regulated through strict rules and procedures. Information is compartmentalized within departments. Each department adamantly guards the boundaries of its jurisdiction and pays particular attention to avoiding infringements from within and outside the Ministry. Information is managed and archived by authorized foreign service officials working at those departments with corresponding jurisdictions. Information exchange between departments is made through a written request that is drafted by the department requesting information and authorized by high-ranking officials in the line of authority. Holding information and expertise on a foreign policy topic is a source of power for individual foreign service officials, therefore the need-to-know principle is strictly adhered to at all levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Individual foreign service officials traditionally prefer a minimum level of disclosure of foreign policy information to the lowest number of authorized officials from within and outside the Ministry.

Information security constitutes the external dimension of secrecy. Official correspondence between the Ministry and diplomatic missions abroad is conducted through secured communication lines. Information is secured because of the sensitivity of the content that is related to the national interests of the state, a moral responsibility to keep any confidential information belonging to other states, or a precaution to avoid leaking information which may call into

question the legitimacy of the Ministry. Risk avoidance is a policy choice resulting from the need-to-know principle at the Ministry. If there is high risk in using certain communication method, then it is avoided for the sake of information security.

The introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry has not changed the appearance of traditional rules and procedures on the management of and access to information within the Ministry. Information is still compartmentalized among various departments and access to information depends on a written authorization. However, the boundaries of information to be disclosed within the Ministry have been re-drawn to allow the construction of semi-permeable walls within and outside the Ministry. The volume of unrestricted information increases as their contents are disclosed by other sources than foreign ministries in mainstream or social media. Most of the time an outbreak of armed conflicts elsewhere in the world is disclosed in the mainstream or social media hours before a secured correspondence is completed between a particular diplomatic mission abroad and the headquarters in Ankara. Therefore, foreign service officials have relaxed internal access to information, and become willing to share more information with other stakeholders.

A gradual policy change could be observed in information security at the Ministry over the last two decades. It was a change from risk avoidance to *risk management*. In the past, the Ministry would communicate confidential information via the cipher bureau, in which diplomatic cables were coded, transmitted through the communication lines to the final destination, and decoded for foreign service officials to read the content of the cable. Today, the cipher bureau is still in use for confidential information.[34] However, as the volume of unrestricted information sent electronically has increased dramatically, so is the risk of leaking information to unauthorized third parties. Instead of banning the use of ICTs and social media technologies, the Ministry applies a policy of free usage of electronic communications on the condition that users strictly follow information security guidelines. Drawing on lessons learned from the WikiLeaks scandal involving the disclosure of sensitive foreign policy information of the U.S. State Department, Deputy Foreign Minister Koru has stated that such leaks could happen any time in any country, including Turkey, and no one can claim that their country will not ever face such challenges. The purpose of the information security policy of the Ministry is not to eradicate the possibility of leakages, but to minimize

such incidents. He referred to a series of meetings held at the Ministry to review the current infrastructure of ICT following the WikiLeaks scandal.[35]

> The concept of risk management enabled bureaucratic leaders to put into action the long awaited E-ARCHIVE project, in which documents in the diplomatic archive covering the period of 1919-2008 are de-classified and re-catalogued for the public eye.

The Ministry's risk management policies have three dimensions: first, the Board of Response to Cyber Incidents was established in 2013 to assess risks arising in cyberspace and formulate measures to be taken in handling cyber incidents. The Board comprises high-ranking foreign service officials and representatives of the Information Technologies Department. It plays a critical role in reviewing the Ministry's current communication infrastructure and developing guidelines and procedures to be followed to minimize the impacts of cyber incidents. One may observe an institutionalization process involving rules and procedures on how to reduce unauthorized disclosure of foreign policy information, and deal with cyber incidents related to the diffusion of ICT within the Ministry

and missions abroad. Second, the Ministry's Information Technologies Department often issues circular notes in which foreign service officials are requested to be extra careful in communicating foreign policy information, and to be vigilant in bringing to the Department's attention any infringement of the Ministry's communication infrastructure. The Information Technologies Department deals with thousands of cyber-attacks each day. Third, the Ministry takes an active role in drafting national laws and regulations on cyber security, proactively sharing its experience on cyber security with other public organizations, and promoting international cooperation between Turkish authorities and international organizations such as the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Task Force-Computer Security Incident Response Teams/Trusted Introducer (TF-CSIRT/TI). The Ministry hosted the D-8 Information Technologies Workshop in Ankara in April 2014, and facilitated the conduct of the International Cyber Shield Exercise in Istanbul in May 2014.

Furthermore, the concept of risk management enabled bureaucratic leaders to put into action the long awaited E-ARCHIVE project, in which documents in the diplomatic archive covering the period of 1919-2008 are de-classified and re-catalogued for the

public eye. The introduction of ICT into the diplomatic archive enabled foreign service officials to get key documents in a shorter period of time and assess current foreign policy issues with sound background knowledge. In addition, E-ARCHIVE is used to facilitate the re-branding of the existing paper-based diplomatic archive and institutionalized the public access to digitalized documents. This allows the Ministry to reinforce its position as a hub agency in the knowledge field on the foreign policy of Turkey.

One-way Communication with the Public

The historical evolution of diplomacy resulted in a centralized public communication function in foreign ministries. All messages were drafted and disseminated by the Department of Information at the headquarters. In addition, the communication style between the state and the public has usually been one-way and ex-post in nature. In other words, the public was informed only if it was deemed necessary by the state, and only after events occurred.[36] There have been no channels for state consultation with the public in the process of foreign policy-making or implementation.

The introduction of ICTs to work processes at the Ministry has influenced communication patterns in interactions among foreign service officials as well as their communication style with the public. It is the assumption of the author that foreign service officials' communication style with the public is strictly related to and influenced by intra-organizational communication patterns prevailing work processes at the Ministry. Therefore, both dimensions are discussed within this section.

As to intra-organizational communication, one may observe two lines of communication simultaneously operating among foreign service officials at the organizational level. The first one is the formal communication line that follows the line of authority and regulating processes involving foreign policy decision-making. The second is the informal communication line in which the formal line of authority has been mostly ignored. Informal conversations dominate the discourse and play a complementary role to the formal communication line involving foreign policy decision-making and a much greater role in administrative decision-making. In the latter form of communication, a network of people with converging interests is in operation. These informal networks are constituted of people with similar educational backgrounds, familial ties, political and religious affiliations or a constructive work experience generating personal trust.

Participants interact with one another as long as social capital in the networks serves their individual interests.

In both the formal and informal communication lines, an authoritative-benevolent tone prevails in the language of superiors while a submissive and reverent tone is the norm on the side of subordinates. The converging attitudes of benevolent authoritarianism and submissiveness originate from socioeconomic environments, such as family structure, education, and state traditions, where the mode of *master-apprenticeship* is the primary source of socialization and organizational learning. Organizations replicate authority structures of families where fathers acquire the highest level of authority and others occupy lower levels. The education system perpetuates those tendencies in families and in society.[37]

In addition, the mode of master-apprenticeship plays a critical role in socialization and organizational learning at the Ministry. Since diplomacy is treated as a delicate art of negotiations, senior foreign service officials are considered masters from whom subordinates should learn necessary qualifications. It is the duty of subordinates to create a trustworthy environment by exerting the highest quality of service, and showing absolute loyalty to superiors to obtain valuable insights about the art of diplomacy. This mode accentuates the hierarchy in communication between superiors and subordinates at the Ministry.

> In order to adapt to the new media landscape, bureaucratic leaders encouraged foreign service officials to use social media technologies in crafting messages for the public, with a particular interest being vested in input from the public.

The introduction of ICTs to work processes at the Ministry had an impact on the mode of master-apprenticeship as the primary source of socialization and organizational learning. First, information has been partly freed from the grip of foreign service officials holding key positions in the organization. This was because a wide array of alternative information resources has become readily available online both within and outside the Ministry. Second, the diversification of information resources removed conditionality between access to valuable information as well as professional expertise by junior staff members and their absolute loyalty to superiors. This paved the way for previously unimaginable constructive exchanges of ideas along the horizontal and vertical lines of authority. Both superiors and subordinates constructively exchange views without evoking a sense of threat or challenge to superiors. Furthermore, better informed subordinates are able to

develop viable arguments which enrich political discussions in foreign policy making.

Organizational patterns of communication among foreign service officials are similar to their communication style with the public both at the national and international levels. In the mind of Turkish foreign service officials, the traditional media landscape positions the Ministry at the centre of the communication network. The public receives messages crafted and disseminated unilaterally by the Ministry in a one-way and ex-post fashion. This model of communication between the Ministry and the public has been profoundly challenged by the new media landscape painted by Shirky.[38] In order to adapt to the new media landscape, bureaucratic leaders encouraged foreign service officials to use social media technologies in crafting messages for the public, with a particular interest being vested in input from the public. The use of social media has diffused rapidly throughout various departments and diplomatic missions. Social media technologies provide foreign service officials with the opportunity to present the contributions they have made in foreign policy processes, enabling them to interact with colleagues around the world, exchanging experience on how to put into practice foreign policy

instructions received from the Ministry, and most importantly, attracting attention to their personal attributes, preferences and knowledge.

The introduction of ICTs, particularly software such as E-VISA and CONSULAR-NET as well as social media portal and technologies such as MEMLEKETIM PORTAL, Facebook and Twitter formed online communication lines with the public both domestically and internationally. The Public Diplomacy Department was formed in 2010 in order to deal with input from the public, and to coordinate the public diplomacy initiatives of diplomatic missions abroad, as well as the headquarters' public relations.[39] Diplomatic missions are requested to take into account the public diplomacy dimension of their activities, and regularly report on diplomatic activities involving public diplomacy and advocacy initiatives since 2012. The Human Resources Department and the Diplomacy Academy offer a diverse set of in-service training for foreign service officials. Those courses involve seminars and workshops to improve the communication and public engagement skills of foreign service officials. The burgeoning literature refers to the potential of generating soft power through an active engagement with the public. This has raised awareness among foreign

service officials about the benefits of constructively engaging with the public. The creation of new channels has enabled the public to contribute to foreign policy processes by conveying their requests and expectations in advance and constituting viable public pressure on foreign service officials regarding policy choices.

The two-way communication emerging out of the technology enactment process indicates the change of mind-set among foreign service officials. Although the Ministry occupies a central position in the media landscape in the thinking of foreign service officials, it no longer displays characteristics of outdated hierarchical relationships between a dominating organization and a passive audience. The public is now considered an active and legitimate contributor to foreign policy processes. The Ministry today cares more than ever before about how many followers each Facebook or Twitter account of diplomatic missions has, and includes public diplomacy as a substantial agenda item in the Annual Conference of Turkish Ambassadors. Furthermore, the dismantling of the model of master-apprenticeship as a form of socialization and organizational learning accelerates social media-enhanced communication trends suitable to the new media landscape.

The Notion of the Survival of the State

The idea that foreign policy is supra-political has been rendered untenable following socio-political changes experienced in Turkish society. Those changes include the pro-active involvement of the AKP government in foreign policy processes,[40] the decoupling of foreign and security policies with the emergence of economic factors as a key determinant in policy choices[41], and the rise of interest in foreign policy issues in the society in general, and among think tanks and universities in particular, since the 1990s.[42] Those changes have influenced the Ministry in two ways: first, actors influencing foreign policy processes increased in number. The Ministry needs to coordinate foreign policy processes with various actors ranging from business associations to influential lobby groups. Second, those actors have become more influential in determining a particular policy choice serving their interests. For instance, foreign policy papers published by business associations such as the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MÜSİAD), inform the public about the business priorities of those associations and offer policy suggestions for the Government.

Third, the diffusion of democratic ideals through Turkish society forces public organizations to be accountable to and receptive towards demands from the public.

In the new socio-political environment, foreign service officials are encouraged to become constructive interlocutors negotiating with the public in working out particular policy choices in foreign affairs. Therefore, in this social context it is rather difficult to identify how ICTs have influenced the tenet of foreign policy as being supra-political, in a socio-political environment that has already been in a radical transformation in recent decades. However, one may observe that ICTs provided the Ministry with ample opportunities to constructively engage with other public organizations through technology and data transfer and the joint use of software such as INTRA-NET, E-VISA and CONSULAR-NET. The newly forged collaborative networks reinforce the Ministry's role as the leading public organization mediating relations between public organizations and their peers internationally, as well as its primary role in foreign policy processes at the domestic level. In addition, there are new avenues available for engagement with influential actors in Turkish society. The Ministry effectively uses its valuable expertise and information by allowing the public to access the information it holds. Furthermore, as in the case of E-ARCHIVE, the Ministry re-calibrates foreign service officials by encouraging them to use social media technologies in public engagements, providing inservice training to improve communication and negotiation skills for them. The Ministry actively weaves networks, which may contribute to its adaptation to the changing socio-political environment, in other words, the emerging information society.

> ICTs provided the Ministry with ample opportunities to constructively engage with other public organizations through technology and data transfer and the joint use of software such as INTRA-NET, E-VISA and CONSULAR-NET.

However, the introduction of ICTs to the Ministry has not made a visible difference in the mind-set of foreign service officials regarding the differentiation between the concept of the state and the government. It is strongly believed that the state is the permanent and sacred one while governments are temporary and may change in parliamentary elections. This traditional line of thinking has

increasingly been questioned from within and outside the Ministry over the last two decades. In fact, the well-being of the state includes a complex assessment involving the past, present and future of Turkish society with a particular emphasis on the well-being of society at present. It would not be misleading for one to conclude that the Ministry is becoming more responsive to public opinion and the views of other stakeholders involving foreign policy processes following the recent social and political changes in Turkish society and rapid changes in the communication capacity of individuals, thanks to the diffusion of ICTs through societies at the national and international levels.

Conclusion

Recent developments in and rapid diffusion through society of ICTs have unleashed diverse discussions on the very nature of ICT, as well as its impacts on individuals, social institutions and organizations. Similar discussions have increasingly taken place in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article has tried to elaborate on how ICT has been understood and internalized in work processes within and across the Ministry. The objective was two-folded: first, to reveal how ICT applications have functioned in transforming the organizational culture

of the Ministry; second, to identify if there are any changes in the mind-set and communication patterns of foreign service officials in carrying out their routines in foreign policy. A thorough analysis on this matter is, in fact, a prerequisite to make sense of Turkey's public diplomacy practices, especially those carried out by diplomatic missions abroad.

The introduction of ICTs to work processes at the Ministry has been based upon a conscious decision of a group of computer-enthusiast senior foreign service officials to transform the organization. The underlying motivation for this initiative was to adapt the Ministry to the rapidly changing socio-political environment, and restore the Ministry's traditional dominance in the information field of foreign policy of Turkey.

This article concludes that the continuous introduction of ICTs to work processes has resulted in a gradual transformation in the basic assumptions of the organizational culture, namely, *hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public,* and *the notion of the survival of the state,* over the last two decades. Although it is difficult to determine precisely to what extent those changes were caused by ICTs, while various other factors have also been involved in work processes, an analysis of ICT-intensive social processes provides a

set of credible evidence to establish a link between ICTs and changes that occurred in the basic assumptions of the Ministry's organizational culture. Behavioural changes are more visible in the communication style of foreign service officials with the public and their approach towards cross-agency collaborative work. An approximation between national and societal interests have also been observed with the growing recognition among foreign service officials that the well-being of the state cannot be defined without a reference to the current interests and concerns of the public. However, it is too early to identify the extent to which those changes emanated from ICTs and the extent to which they were related to the transformation of the socio-political environment in Turkish society, which has itself been undergoing a major transformation on a much wider scale.

This case study contributes to the literature in three areas: first, it enriches the literature, which lacks case studies involving interactions between technology and public organizations. Second, while providing insights on some aspects of the technology enactment process of the Ministry, it calls for new questions on the roles of ICT in foreign policy processes as well as the public diplomacy of Turkey. It invites students of public diplomacy and foreign policy to carry out comparative analyses on the adaptation processes of foreign ministries to the emerging information society. Last but not least, this article puts to test the explanatory power of the technology enactment framework applied to analyses involving interactions between technology and public organizations. Students of public diplomacy and ICT studies are encouraged to engage further in the basic premises of the main argument in this article through alternative studies in public organizations and diplomacy.

Annex

INTRANET is a software application designed to provide standardized and up-to-date information to foreign service officials employed at the headquarters and diplomatic missions abroad. It also allows staff members to process routine human resource-related applications online. There are online platforms where staff members may exchange ideas, and coordinate group actions.

CONSULAR-NET is the earliest and the most advanced technology application. It includes a website and a secured software application that allows integrated information processing by all the Turkish Consulates worldwide. CONSULAR-NET has multiple functions: first, it provides citizens abroad with pragmatic and procedural information on consular matters. It provides those services through websites, call centres, mail boxes and consular TV. Second, Turkish citizens are able to fill out certain consular applications online and complete those processes without being present in person at the Consulate. Third, it links Turkish Consulates to the headquarters and key public organizations such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and in doing so, enables fast and secure data transfer between those public organizations. While it used to take up to three months to issue a penal certificate for an applicant through a paper-based correspondence between diplomatic missions abroad and the law enforcement authorities in Turkey, it takes only 2-3 minutes today to provide this service thanks to the online access of Consulates through CONSULAR-NET to the database of those authorities.

MEMLEKETIM PORTAL is a web-based social networking site for Turkish nationals abroad and those of Turkish and Turkic background around the world. The portal aims to build stronger communication ties within the Turkish diaspora and enhance their connection with and interest in Turkey. It includes a web-based communication network, online shopping, e-education, youth programs, and a Turkish FM online radio channel disseminating the most up-to-date information about cultural, economic and political life in Turkey. Since being launched in early 2015, the number of members has reached 4,733 in total. There are occasional convergences of information to be provided through CONSULAR-NET and MEMLEKETIM PORTAL since the target audience is Turkish nationals and Turkish speaking communities around the world. However, the function of the former is more one of official communication between citizens and the state, while the latter is less formal in tone and prioritizes networking building within the target audience.

DOC-ARCHIVE is a web-based document management and archive application. It was designed in 2001 to process documentation and unclassified data transmission between the headquarters and diplomatic missions. The functioning of this application follows the logic of hierarchical authority and a formal communication line. This application oversees the process of drafting documents, sending them for endorsement, endorsing those documents via an e-signature application by an authorized superior, sending the endorsed documents to the designated department or organization, and finally saving the document in the electronic archive. DOC-ARCHIVE constitutes the backbone of the communication and information processing system of the Ministry. Approximately 12 million official documents have been processed and archived electronically since 2001. The application was revised and further developed in 2008 and 2013 to take advantage of technological advances to improve organizational efficiency in information processing and transmission. This application has been replicated for the use of public organizations such as the Secretariat General of the Presidency, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, and the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Directorate General for Civil Aviation, and the Secretariat General of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Parliament). These organizations use similar document management systems to process information and exchange documents online with the Ministry.

DIPLOMATIC PORTAL is a web-based document management and transmission application launched in July 2013. This application is designed to electronically process formal communication between the Ministry and foreign diplomatic missions in Turkey.[43] It has two properties: a web page, which provides up-to-date information about the Turkish foreign policy, diplomatic procedures and ceremonial practices, and an innovative communication channel, which allows the drafting and transmission of official papers online between foreign diplomatic missions and the Ministry. This application also incorporates an electronic archive, which offers data storage and allows electronic searches. In April 2015, the new face of DIPLOMATIC PORTAL was introduced. It features an interactive platform where information on cultural activities is exchanged regularly between the Ministry and foreign diplomatic missions. The Ministry takes a proactive role by broadcasting news or announcements about its activities, which may be of interest to the diplomatic community in Turkey.

E-VISA is a web-based visa application system launched in April 2013. It provides a simple and straightforward visa application process and service for citizens of approximately 100 countries. This application has so far received encouraging feedback from visa applicants and the business community in Turkey. The Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and the Turkey Information

Technology Foundation's technology award for "e-services from public organizations to citizens" went to the Ministry for its E-VISA application in 2013.

In addition, the Ministry was one of the earliest public organizations to launch an official Internet website in the 1990s. In the following years, diplomatic missions abroad launched individual websites in English and other languages. The websites have been standardized and interconnected to provide a unified frame for disseminating information on Turkish foreign policy since 2010. As part of the standardization process, departments at the headquarters and diplomatic missions abroad have been required to only use official email addresses provided by the Ministry.

E-ARCHIVE is another technological initiative that the Ministry has embarked upon. The diplomatic archive of the Turkish state from 1919-2008 is kept on the Ministry's premises. It includes more than 65 million documents in paper format. Those documents are poorly catalogued and kept in dusty files that are out of reach of the public. To bring those documents to light the Ministry launched the E-ARCHIVE project in January 2015.[44] More than 200 specialists are taking part in the project. A total of 25 million documents were scanned and electronically catalogued in 2015, and according to the Department of Archives, the number will increase to 65 million by the end of 2016. This project has been warmly welcomed in Turkey.[45]

Endnotes

1   The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author thanks Dr. Manabrata Guha, Mr. Denis Cunningham, and Mr. Haldun Koç for their thorough review of the earlier drafts of this article.

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Reform and the Dynamics of In/stability in Jordan during the Arab Uprisings

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Abstract

The argument that Jordan is a remarkably stable country in a volatile region has become axiomatic. Some contend that the Hashemite monarchy is indispensable for the country's stability. Nonetheless, an in-depth analysis of Jordan's political status quo reveals the deep-seated cleavages that- if left unattended- could jeopardize the stability of the country in years to come. The advent of a political awakening among Jordan's youth- who display unprecedented self-entitlement- and the eruption of the Arab uprisings have left the monarch with two options: either effect genuine reform to restore the public's trust in the regime or risk facing future instability. This paper identifies the shortcomings and imperfections of the current autocratic status quo and assesses the prospects of instability. My intent in this paper is to explain and contextualize the intricate dynamics of the regime's insistence on reproducing the non-democratic status quo during the Arab Spring and question whether this might lead to instability in the long term in a changing society.

Key Words

Political reform, instability, hirak, autocracy, Muslim Brotherhood, East Bankers, Jordan, Hashemite Monarchy.

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Introduction

In present-day Jordan, the conditions required to support a thriving and genuine democracy are not yet existent. Over the last decade, however, Jordanians have become increasingly restive due to official policies embraced by the autocratic ruling elite, which have exacerbated the worsening living conditions of the population. Thus, the emergence of protest movements in early 2011 was hardly surprising. With the people's perception of themselves and their unelected leaders profoundly shifted since the start of the Arab Spring, a new pervasive sense of entitlement and empowerment poses an unprecedented challenge to the rule of King Abdullah II.

Of equal importance, the fast spread of protest groups in Jordan- henceforth known as *Hirak-* shattered many of the country's long-held, dominant taboos. Once docile and complicit, Jordanians now commonly criticize the monarch, accusing him and his closest advisors of corruption. By and large, the wall of fear- in the past, more than 75%

expressed their fear to publicly criticize the government let alone the monarch- was brought down.[1] For the majority, taking the uncharted water of defiance and placing the blame squarely on official policies-something many would not have thought of a decade ago- proved to have no cost.

> The advent of a political awakening among Jordan's youth- who display unprecedented self-entitlement- and the eruption of the Arab uprisings have left the monarch with two options: either effect genuine reform to restore the public's trust in the regime or risk facing future instability.

With the trust gap between the ruler and the ruled widened to an alarming degree following the events of the past several years, the entrenched ruling elite's lip service to the issue of reform has run aground. Indeed, the decade-long attempts at half-hearted reform and unfulfilled promises of public empowerment have not only been exposed, but are now ridiculed, especially considering the teetering economy and pervasive corruption. This new popular activism and entitlement has thus compelled the monarch to be more attentive to his subjects and address his country's challenges with a top-down package of reform.

Thus far, King Abdullah II has managed to weather the political storm that has swept across much of the region since 2011. And yet, long-time observers of Jordanian politics argue that barring genuine political reform, the autocratic status quo is untenable. Meanwhile, the country's economic problems are worsening. With such a fragile economy, it is hard to see how the regime will contend with the increasing numbers of disgruntled youth without genuine political participation and inclusion.

Lacking the essential financial windfall, the regime will not likely be able to afford its age-old rentier relationship with its East Banker constituency. Evidence suggests that the monarch's reliance on financial and economic support from some Gulf countries and the United States to underwrite the rentier relationship with his people cannot be counted on in the long term. To make matters worse, genuine economic development in Jordan's countryside, where citizens have become most accustomed to trading blind loyalty for personal gains, was neglected due to economic mismanagement by successive governments. In fact, East Bankers' growing dissatisfaction took a twist when demonstrations erupted in Ma'an- a city in the southern part of the

country - as early as 1989. Ever since, a growing number of East Bankers has suspected that the successive governments are turning their backs on these remote areas.[2]

> With such a fragile economy, it is hard to see how the regime will contend with the increasing numbers of disgruntled youth without genuine political participation and inclusion.

A thorough scrutiny of recent developments reveals that the traditionally revolution-adverse Jordanian political culture, which has long been nourished with the infusion of the patron-client relationship, can no longer be taken for granted. Hence, such severe transformations may pose serious challenges that have the potential to reach a tipping point, thus jeopardizing the stability of the country. In the global political awareness,[3] it seems that the only way to avert instability and address deep-seated political frustrations is through embarking on the trajectory of reform with a clear blueprint for transition from an autocratic state to one of democracy. Such a transition could offer Jordan's monarch a new social contract whereby he could continue his reign in a country with a society of changing needs.

Nonetheless, the regime's most recent package of reform- claimed by the ruling elite to be the most achievable option- has fallen short of reform-oriented groups' expectations. Key political forces have casted doubt on the trajectory of the reform process altogether and argue that a paradigm shift is necessary. Observers maintain that the package of reform was designed to stifle internal opposition and reproduce the much-loathed undemocratic political status quo. Meanwhile, most citizens do not trust the state institutions. Indeed, it is the growing trust gap between the state and most of its citizens that may be the country's Achilles heel for instability. If anything, the Jordanian protest movements of the past several years reveal and reinforce one idea: the ruling elite is broadly seen as being unresponsive, unaccountable, non-transparent, and dangerously untrustworthy.

This paper is composed of three sections: Section one presents a conceptual framework; section two examines the resilience of Jordan's autocracy, particularly since King Abdullah's ascendance to the throne; and section three identifies and scrutinizes the dynamics that have thus far secured the country's relative stability. In particular, the last section delves into the workings of the fractured protest groups and how they

worked at cross-purpose during the Jordan Spring. In the conclusion, the paper will foreshadow the potential dynamics of future instability.

The Conceptual Approach

The argument that the Arab region is resistant to democracy has become a cliché. The democratic deficit has been an underlining feature of the Arab region since the Middle East state system emerged in the wake of World War I. Even the belated third wave of democracy has not seriously impacted Arab politics in any meaningful way.[4] According to Daniel Brumberg, the region has been caught in a trap of liberalized autocracies. Although some Arab regimes have responded positively to the push for democratization, they have done so in bad faith. Brumberg writes, "Over the past two decades, the Middle East has witnessed a 'transition' away from- and then back toward-authoritarianism. This dynamic began with tactical political openings whose goal was to sustain rather than transform autocracies."[5]

Reasons for the perennial endurance of authoritarianism and the democratic deficit in Arab countries abound. Some ascribe this phenomenon to culture and Islam, others to socio-economic reasons and rentierism, while some place responsibility on colonial legacies. The modernization theory of the 1950s identifies the prerequisite requirements and conditions of democratization in the developing world as certain thresholds of economic development. According to the theory, heightened levels of economic opportunity allow societies to have social mobility, which in essence defies autocracy. Therefore, the propensity to political activism and participation is the logical outcome of economic development, urbanization, and increased levels of literacy. In such a society, authoritarianism can hardly survive.[6]

It is the growing trust gap between the state and most of its citizens that may be the country's Achilles heel for instability.

Other scholars attach monumental importance to the role of the socioeconomic variables in democratic transition. According to her theory of "developmental paradox," Eva Bellin examines the role of socioeconomic factors on democratization. For democratization to take root, two factors should be available: a sizable middle class and a private sector, both of which are financially and politically independent from the state. The existence of rentierism in some parts of the Arab world has not helped

develop a society that is free of the state. For decades, oil has become the source of rent in a handful of Arab countries. Even in non-oil producing countries, such as Jordan, a semi-rentier economy has developed thanks to the considerable infusions of worker remittances and foreign aid. Others have observed that in the Middle East, civil society is either weak or, in some countries, absent altogether.[7]

> While the Jordanian people's frustration with the lack of political reform is evident, many wonder whether the country would descend into violence in the process, as has been the case in other transitioning Arab countries.

Yet, as democratization failed to take root in some Arab states even after they passed the so-called economic threshold that has generated democracy elsewhere, some scholars have fallen back to the notion of cultural exceptionalism that impedes the transition to a more democratic society. Explicit in this school of thought is the idea that the Arab region- with its culture of Islam, patrimonialism, patriarchalism, and Oriental despotism- is exceptionally adverse to democracy. Raphael Patai's book "The Arab Mind" is a key effort

to support this argument. According to Patai, the psychological profile of Arab personalities and Arab cultures are primitive, irrational, violent, and undemocratic.[8] In the same vein, Ellie Kedourie argues that Oriental despotism and the Middle East are inseparable. Meanwhile, in his study on the "third wave" of democratization of the 1980s, Samuel Huntington makes the case that "conceivably Islamic and Confusion cultures pose insuperable obstacles to democratic development."[9] That said, there is no empirical evidence to support the above cultural arguments. Emerging bodies of literature based on opinion polls and surveys suggest that the belief in Islam as a religion and the acceptance of democracy as a political system are not incompatible. Notable scholars such as Ronald Inglehart and Mark Tessler subscribe to this paradigm.[10]

Key to understanding the topic of this paper is to explain the comparative resilience of undemocratic monarchies. In her gripping analysis of absolutism and the resilience of monarchy rather than republicans in the Middle East, Lisa Anderson does not see eye to eye with the cultural explanations of the adaptability of monarchy in the Arab region. She argues that the cultural explanations are "empirically unsatisfactory on two grounds. First, monarchy as currently understood in the Middle East is not more indigenous

than liberal democracy. Second, even if it were a traditional regime type, its alleged historical authenticity fails to explain the apparent ability of Middle Eastern monarchs to accommodate and even foster non-traditional- not to say modern- social and political change."[11] She refers to vagaries of historical accidents to account for the prevalence of monarchies in the Middle East. In brief, she argues that a combination of the British imperial policy and the "imperatives of historical process – notably the formation of new states and the building of new nations in the realms until recently ruled by the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours" explain the resilience of monarchy in this part of the world.[12] To her, the affinity with the project of nation building and state formation is a key to understanding the survival of monarchies.

In Jordan, the lack of democratization is largely due to the fact that the entrenched ruling elite have little incentive to give up their power and privileged status for the sake of democracy. Samuel Huntington's thesis of "the King's dilemma" comes to mind: While the monarch in Jordan realizes that the autocratic status quo is unsustainable, he fears that any genuine concession would only expand the opposition's appetite to ask for more. The King also fears losing altogether the privilege to rule with unchecked

power. To be sure, some in Jordan call for a constitutional monarchy in which the King would reign, but not rule.[13]

While the Jordanian people's frustration with the lack of political reform is evident, many wonder whether the country would descend into violence in the process, as has been the case in other transitioning Arab countries. In fact, the Arab uprisings have made an impact on theoretical discourse on the nature of revolutions. The events of the Arab Uprisings have demonstrated that there is no general theory of revolution or social changes that applies to all societies.

This paper argues that Jordan's stability is contingent upon seven factors. First, although the regime has been hard hit by the Arab uprisings, the opposition groups have not created enough of a critical mass of protesters required to exert pressure on the regime to reform. Second, given the tribal nature of Jordanian society and the Palestinian-Jordanian cleavage, it is difficult to foster enough trust between groups in order to unify political activism to such a critical level. It was hardly possible for various groups to trust each other. They never had a record of working together to bring about change in the country. Moreover, the internal Palestinian-Jordanian divide has been exploited by the regime to prevent a unified opposition.[14] Many Trans-Jordanians were made to

believe that any change in the country would only favor the Jordanians of Palestinian decent. Third, the Jordanian regime enjoys the support of the West and the financial support of key Gulf countries. The internal opposition has not succeeded in cultivating such alliances with important external players. Fourth, despite grappling with economic woes, Jordan's economy is still functioning. Certainly, though, an economic collapse would lay the groundwork for instability. Fifth, though the trust gap between state institutions and the people is growing at an alarming rate, Jordanians on the whole do not envisage an alternative to the Hashemite monarchy. Nevertheless, the regime's legitimacy could be undermined if the discrepancy between reform rhetoric and actual policies continues unchecked. The tactic of merely talking about reform while politically and practically undermining its realization is unsustainable. Sixth, the regime's policy of "soft co-optation" and tolerance in dealing with protesters helped contribute to its stability. To the King's credit, he never sanctioned the use of force, which indeed helps keep the people's demands within a certain affordable limit. Finally, due to the official policies of the 1950s onward, the public space in Jordan remains both Islamic and tribal. The late King Hussein's decision to ban political parties in 1957 nearly eliminated all

secular political forces, while politically empowering two main constituents: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the tribes. Neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor the tribes were democratic. Their alliance with the regime helped them work publicly at the expense of other political forces. Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), are the best-organized political force, but they are by no means the only one. The regime has been instrumental in using this fact as a bogeyman to elicit Western support of its autocratic policies. In the same vein, such fear-mongering tactics have proven successful even inside Jordan, where tribes are poised to stand against the Islamists in support of the regime.

> For decades, the main point of contention between the regime and the active opposition was over the Palestinian cause, which is rooted in foreign policy rather than democratic reform.

To be sure, the absence of violent turmoil in Jordan, while striking, should not come as a surprise to long-time observers. Such is the difference between "revolutionary situation" and "revolutionary outcome."[15] In 2011, it

seemed as though the rift and mistrust between the state and society reached a low point. But while Jordan was on the verge of entering a revolutionary situation, the revolutionary outcome seemed far from certain. Although the protest movements kept the momentum for more than two years, they never enjoyed the backing of a significant portion of the public. It may have helped that neither the government nor the security apparatus were in the mood or had the option to violently crack down on demonstrators.

Thus far, this model has secured Jordan's stability even with minimum reform. There is no guarantee, however, that the aforementioned conditions supporting this stability will continue. There is a good chance that any of the seven or so factors could collapse, allowing for Jordan to descend into disorder. Considering this logical possibility to a conclusion, Jordan may experience serious instability in the future.

The Resilience of Limited Reform

In a recent article published in the online *World Policy Journal*, King Abdullah II wrote, "When I had the honor to ascend to the Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, nearly 15 years ago, I took an oath

upon myself to contribute all I could to making Jordan more prosperous. And it has always been crystal clear to me that this means more democratic, too."[16]Explicit in this statement is the King's deep understanding that the only way to prop up his regime for decades to come is to push forward a genuine plan for political reform and democratization. That said, the King has yet to make good on this undertaking. This recurring statement begs the question: why, after almost a decade and a half, is Jordan still so far from being a democracy?

A glance at the not so distant past reveals why, even today, genuine democratic reform is still a far-fetched objective. Some key external actors believe that stability is better anchored by upholding the autocratic political status quo. For many important regional and international powers, the stability of Jordan serves the region a whole. In the words of the renowned historian Asher Susser, "owing to the Kingdom's geopolitical centrality, the regime and the state have been constantly supported by an array of external allies, for whom the Kingdom's destabilization would be a nightmare. Those regional and international powers have always been willing to assist in bailing out the regime in time of need."[17]

The continuous external financial and economic support has historically

provided the regime with resources, thus transforming Jordan into a semi-rentier state.[18] As a corollary, the Jordanian monarch has long maintained his position at the apex of power without having to defer to any domestic impetus for genuine reform. The lopsided pattern of this patron-client relationship between the regime and a considerable and politically important faction of the population has helped undercut any momentum for change. On the whole, Jordanians have little access to finances independent of the state. The 1970s oil flow boosted the regime as resources continued to flow unremitted. For decades, the main point of contention between the regime and the active opposition was over the Palestinian cause, which is rooted in foreign policy rather than democratic reform.

The 1980s brought change to the regional and domestic environments. During this time, it became obvious that there were limits beyond which the tight control and manipulations exercised by the regime ceased to be effective. With Iraq bogged down in eight years of war, the sharp drop in the region's oil revenues, and the sudden eruption of the first Palestinian Intifada, the 1980s proved to be so detrimental that the regime nearly reached a point of collapse in 1988. In response to this dire situation, the government resorted to the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) for help. The IMF-prescribed austerity program and the restructuring of the Jordanian economy were antithetical to the previously dominant rentier philosophy.

By the end of the 1980s, Jordan's economic woes began to have grave political consequences. Slowly but surely, the regime retreated from the unwritten social contract whereby the state offered jobs in exchange for loyalty and apolitical activism. The state was no longer in a position to underwrite the increasing burden of this rentier relationship. Prices skyrocketed and, as a consequence, riots broke out in East Banker strongholds in the South. In an attempt to pre-empt the situation, the King swiftly responded by firing his government in April 1989 and announcing parliamentary elections to be held in the Fall.

Interestingly, the elections catapulted the political opposition groups -- mainly Islamists -- into prominence. The Muslim Brotherhood won just over 25 percent of parliamentary seats, thus proving that it was a force to be reckoned with. To observers, Jordan was on the path of political liberalization and democratization. In April 1990, the King commissioned a representative committee to draft a National Charter as a blueprint for future pluralism in the country. Amid fanfare and enthusiasm, the charter was signed. Soon after, all remaining effects

of martial law were declared null and void.

This era has often been touted as one of tremendous progress in terms of Jordan's path to full-fledged democracy. For all of its deficiencies and imperfections, Jordan was momentarily on the right track. Additionally, the King stood tall particularly after his people were united behind his position vis-à-vis the war in Iraq. Having projected a pro-Iraq stance in the war, the King's traditional leftist and pan-Arabist opponents in Jordan could no longer outbid him. Nonetheless, his popular pro-Iraq position- though in line with the people- was not without cost. Jordan became isolated regionally and, to some extent, internationally.

The sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and then in Egypt inspired Jordanian youth in January 2011 to take to the street demanding genuine political reform and the elimination of pervasive corruption.

Hence, the enthusiasm over democratization proved to be short-lived. Determined to break the regional and international isolation, the King had to maneuver to get back into the good graces of his external adversaries.

The peace process that was launched in Madrid at the end of 1991 provided the King with an opportunity to make his country relevant again. However, Jordan's position in the peace talks once again rekindled differences between the regime and the Islamists and leftists alike. Anticipating a deal with the Israelis, the King realized that he was walking a tight rope. For all intents and purposes, it was as if the democratization process had to give way to another paramount objective. Therefore, the King took a second look at the democratic process altogether and resorted to a political gambit. He took advantage of his constitutional powers, dissolved the parliament, and called for new elections to be conducted along with a new provisional electoral law.

At this juncture, a number of factors were at work. First, the monarch was apprehensive of the unmanageable momentum of reform. He realized that there was a need to put a cap on the process. Second and most important, the King sought to restructure a parliament that would not defy him on the issue of peace with Israel. There also came the realization that there was no need for political liberalization as the King did not need the process to reinforce his legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the government adopted a provisional electoral law that included the *single non-transferable vote* (SNTV). This new electoral law was designed to

limit the influence of Islamists and to keep the liberalization process under control.

The peace process was thus utilized by the regime to change the internal political equation in a way that would allow for a concentration of power in the hands of the very few.[19] Ever since, the internal political process has been designed to prevent the emergence of a credible political force that could challenge the peace treaty, and to secure the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few.

Whether by design or default, the official policy of political exclusion coupled with on-going economic hardship led to growing discontent among the Jordanian people, and the parliament lost its relevance in the process. Since 1993, there has been a steady and persistent erosion of the parliament's legitimacy in the eyes of the Jordanian public. A series of polls conducted by Jordanian research centers reveals the institution's declining status.[20] Therefore, political power was kept concentrated in the hands of the unelected as the parliament continued to work on the margins of the political process. When the grossly rigged 2007 parliament was dissolved in 2009, some 67% of participants responded that they were not affected, while 20% stated that they were positively affected.[21] A clear majority of respondents said that members of the parliament voted for

their personal parochial interest rather than the wider national one. For this reason, citizens feel that they have long been politically disempowered. There has been a pervasive sense that the ruling political elite - whether elected to parliament or appointed - do not represent them or defend their interests.

Twelve years into the rule of King Abdullah II, hundreds, if not thousands, of people took to the street calling for change. The massive popular uprisings that broke out in Tunisia and immediately after in Egypt in January 2011 generated a wave of change that few politicians or pundits could have foreseen even a few days earlier. The state was so centralized, so strong, and so confident to the extent that Mubarak was grooming his son to succeed him. The well-known Egyptian sociologist and activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said that the Arabs had come up with a new, heretofore unknown form of government. He says that this new form adds the republic (*jumhuriay*) with the monarchy (*malakiya*) thus creating *jumlukiya*, which can be translated into "monarpublicanism."[22] Saad Eddin Ibrahim jokingly used this phrase to refer to the strength of presidents in the Arab world such that they were becoming like monarchies. A British renowned historian Roger Owen referred to them as "President for life."[23]

The sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and then in Egypt inspired Jordanian youth in January 2011 to take to the street demanding genuine political reform and the elimination of pervasive corruption. The regime in Jordan was caught off guard, and only weeks into the back-to-back demonstrations, the King caved in to the people and dissolved the government only 40 days after being sworn in. The more pessimistic analysts were quick to argue that the regime might not hold.

Despite some pockets of instability, Jordan's monarch has on the whole skillfully weathered the regional storm of the Arab Spring. For some, the country's stability is nothing short of a puzzle or even a paradox. The prestigious British journal *the Economist* wrote:

> "At the outbreak of the Arab spring few thrones looked as precarious as that of Jordan's King Abdullah II. Squeezed between bigger, beefier and more turbulent neighbours, his resource-poor kingdom faced mounting friction at home. Trouble brewed between the numerical minority of native "East Bankers" and the relatively disenfranchised majority of Jordanians who are of Palestinian descent. Government critics, both Islamist and secular, jockeyed to exploit street-level discontent. The king's traditional immunity from criticism had worn dangerously thin, his talk of reform belied by such enduring woes as a yawning wealth gap, corruption, an intrusive security apparatus and heavily stage-managed politics."[24]

In the next section, the paper delves into the dynamics of in/stability in Jordan amid the sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring.

The Battle Over Reform: The Road not Taken

Like other Arab states, Jordan has never been ruled by a democratically elected government. Interestingly, during the Arab uprisings, Jordan was neither embroiled in revolutionary turmoil, nor were domestic actors locked in an ideological struggle. Yet, the domestic discontent took on a new twist when a majority of Jordanians reached the conclusion that the ruling elite had been mismanaging the country for a long time. In an opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute, more Jordanians (45%) said that the country was heading in the wrong direction as opposed to those who said otherwise (43%).[25] Such a statistic supports the contention that Jordan may be on the brink of instability.

Over the years, political reform in Jordan has been slow in coming and the reform package presented thus far has been a mere drop in the bucket. To be sure, the package of reforms presented in 2012 was intended to please Western countries while stifling any internal momentum for more

substantial reform. And yet Jordan did not experience chaos or instability. This begs the question of how Jordan has managed to keep its head above water when many expected mayhem. At the heart of Jordan's resilient stability is the failure of the protest groups to convince a critical mass of people to take to the street. This section identifies and examines the elements that have contributed to the country's stability over the course of the Arab Spring and to the weakness of the protest movement.

> While the street was brewing in Jordan and the regime felt compelled to act, the Muslim Brotherhood opted for a procrastination tactic, thus further weakening the *Hirak*.

For starters, the Palestinian-Jordanian divide and the society's tribal nature have stymied the *Hirak* and stripped it of the ability to articulate an agreed upon blueprint for change. Due to these serious societal divisions, it was simply not possible to generate enough trust necessary to mobilize people of differing affiliations behind a unified *Hirak*.[26] Nonetheless, the fear of catastrophic consequences of clashes between those of Palestinian and Jordanian descent has long helped

to keep internal differences at bay.[27] Despite the common complaint articulated by some in Jordan that the gerrymandered electoral law benefits the East Bankers at the expense of Jordanians of Palestinian descent, the latter did not join the protest movement. Perhaps this is due to the identity-based slogans raised at some of the East Banker protests. Palestinians were discouraged from taking to the street as some felt that they were targeted by these slogans.[28] Not surprisingly, this divide was fully exploited by the regime to exacerbate tensions and undermine the push for change.

By and large, East Bankers have no agreed upon concept of reform. A prominent Jordanian sociologist and a former cabinet member, Sabri Rbeihat, argues that reform means different things to different groups in Jordan.[29] As Rbeihat accurately articulates, "differences persist, as do mutual suspicions. Pro-status quo forces in particular suspect that any genuine change would privilege the Palestinian-Islamist elements in the society."[30] After all, what set the region ablaze during the Arab Spring were issues such as sheer hopelessness, youth unemployment, and the alarming rates of poverty. Hence, the urge for democracy was not the primary concern that triggered the Arab Spring.

Jordan's East Bankers have grappled with the issue of democratic reform.

While a majority seeks to change the distribution of power and wealth, few have a serious interest in proper reform that would equally empower both the Palestinians and the Islamists. This reality served as a mitigating factor and helped weaken the *Hirak's* momentum. Despite the weekly demonstrations and sit-ins across the country, the vast majority of people were not mobilized to take to the street, and the opposition ultimately failed to present a serious challenge to the regime.

Key to the failure of the *Hirak* is the fact that it was fraught with dissonance and fragmentation. The Muslim Brotherhood was the only organized and influential group in Jordan that pressed for radical changes and could potentially contend with the regime politically. While the street was brewing in Jordan and the regime felt compelled to act, the Muslim Brotherhood opted for a procrastination tactic, thus further weakening the *Hirak*. The dominant argument among observers and politicians is that the Brotherhood was never interested in actual reform; rather, it was waiting for what it saw as a looming victory for the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian opposition. Therefore, key figures within the Brotherhood bet on time to cut an optimal deal with the Jordanian regime.[31]

Senior figures within the Brotherhood have dismissed this argument. Zaki Bany Rsheid, the second in command of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, argues that a change in Syria would have facilitated their task, but it would not have changed their demand of fixing rather than toppling the regime.[32] The problem, Bany Rsheid insists, is that the regime lacked the political will to effect changes. Another important figure in the Brotherhood's dovish camp, Nabil al-Khofahi, argues the situation in Syria would not have changed their basic demands and that they "felt that the state was trying to use the MB to undermine the protest movement."[33]

In March 2011, Jordan's Prime Minister established a 52 person National Dialogue Committee (NDC), which was assigned with drafting an electoral law and apolitical parties law. The MB dismissed this initiative as "an ineffective stalling tactic."[34] But, according to the head of the NDC, former Prime Minister and current speaker of parliament Taher al-Masri, Jordan's Islamists sought two things: a royal committee appointed by the King rather than the Prime Minister, and an amended constitution.[35] Masri took the issue to the King, who replied, "don't touch the constitution."[36]

In response, the reform-averse ruling regime advanced two arguments via state-run media outlets in order to discredit the MB: First, they argued that the MB is not a national Jordanian

movement to promote a national agenda, but rather an organization with external links to the MB's Guidance Office in Egypt (*Maktab al-Irshad*) and Hamas in order to advance transnational agendas. Second, state media characterized the MB as a power-seeking organization with no plans for reform.[37] These accusations were further deepened after the MB's fiasco in Egypt. In fact, the military coup and "the unfolding crisis in Egypt…further revealed the depth of the Jordanian monarch's antipathy toward the Muslim Brotherhood."[38]

> The dissonance of the groups within the larger Hirak and the disparity between their shifting demands made it almost impossible for them to unify or at least reach an agreement over the minimum demands that could unify them.

Contrary to the King's statements describing his reign as "inclusive" and all of the country's political actors as "trustworthy," the monarch is known to dislike the MB, and harbors deep suspicion of the group's underlying motives. The King's true feelings surfaced when he dubbed them as "wolves in sheep clothing."[39]

Meanwhile, the anti-reform elites have attempted to provoke dormant internal ethnic divisions within the MB between the East Bankers and the Jordanians of Palestinian descent by portraying the movement as one with Palestinian leanings. Such rhetoric has resonated well with some of the East Bankers who are wary of the increasing political role of Jordanians of Palestinian descent.

Interestingly enough, there is a perennial internal rivalry between the MB and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). This division came to the fore when the groups' dovish wing, led by Irhaiel Gharaibeh and Nabil al-Kofahi, joined a broader national initiative called Zamzam.[40] The active roles of moderate MB-affiliated figures in the new initiative generated significant backlash within the organization, which was not officially part of *Hirak*. Leader Zaki Bany Rsheid reacted by accusing Zamzam of being backed by the security apparatus, arguing that the initiative was "suspicious and designed to cause a rift within the Brotherhood's ranks in collaboration with official parties."[41] In August 2013, the group's differences reached the press in the wake of the Egyptian military coup, when Irhaiel Gharaibeh implicitly accused his hawkish rival of creating unnecessary tension with the regime. Such infighting was not lost on the part

of observers and the regime exploited these differences in full.[42]

Another significant faction within the *Hirak* is the disgruntled youth protest groups that are scattered across the country. While this amorphous group generated significant momentum and broke down many of the country's taboos,[43] they nonetheless remained localized, fragmented, and without genuine democratic discourse.[44] Furthermore, these groups were primarily composed of East Bankers, the historic bedrock of regime loyalists; therefore, the regime was able to manage them by using a strategy of co-optation and detention until they eventually ran out of steam. The third category is the emergence of groups with tribal demands. These groups only sought to realize parochial interests and some political gains rather than genuine democracy. Some specifically called for the reversal of privatization, which for many Jordanians is a euphemism for looting the country.

The dissonance of the groups within the larger *Hirak* and the disparity between their shifting demands made it almost impossible for them to unify or at least reach an agreement over the minimum demands that could unify them. While they agreed on the need to quell corruption, they remained highly divided on political issues.[45] To their dismay, all attempts to join forces were either short-lived or met with mutual suspicion. The regime succeeded in cultivating the perception that the MB was using the other groups in order to reach a deal with the state. These groups ultimately failed to join forces to create enough political pressure, which in part explains why the *Hirak* failed to sustain momentum and instead grew progressively weaker.

> The geostrategic centrality of Jordan generated policies of support for the monarchy out of fear that chaos could lead to broader regional instability in the United States, European countries, and Saudi Arabia.

The internal opposition to the regime was then further debilitated by the essential role of external forces in Jordanian politics. The geostrategic centrality of Jordan generated policies of support for the monarchy out of fear that chaos could lead to broader regional instability in the United States, European countries, and Saudi Arabia. Particularly in Saudi Arabia, the threat perception was heightened as MB movements swept elections in both Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the Arab uprisings and therefore waged a counter-revolution to prop up like-minded monarchies. Its financial

support to Jordan was thus intended to enhance the power of the King so that he would not have to give in to the MB.

> A possible economic collapse would certainly deprive the regime of its East Banker support and would lay the groundwork for instability.

With the onset of the Arab Spring, Riyadh framed a new strategic outlook portraying the protests movements as negative trends that undermine stability, weaken the region's economy, and empower radicals.[46] Equally important, many Jordanian politicians believe that the dynamic of change in Jordan is by and large shaped by external influences.[47] Indeed, absent external support or pressure, radical changes in Jordan would hardly be possible. The United States and Saudi Arabia are considered the two external players to most heavily impact the scope of reform in Jordan. For the United States, the tumultuous regional developments following the ascendance of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia and the disheartening conflict in Syria have further discouraged a policy of pressuring the monarch on reforms. Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, the same factors have compelled the royal family to embolden the monarch to forgo reform altogether.

At the start of the Arab Spring, U.S. calculations were drastically different from Saudi objectives. President Obama and his administration adopted the logic that undemocratic regimes are unsustainable in the long term; therefore, a country such as Jordan should embark on the path to reform before it is too late. In the case that these regimes could effectively make the transition to democracy, Washington would benefit; however, the U.S. would find itself in a bad position if the implementation of reform were to destabilize its allies. Jordanian anti-reform forces were quick to play on the Americans' fear of possible instability in Jordan. In the King's interview with Jeffery Goldberg, the King dubbed the U.S. naïve in believing that the region's Islamists could serve as an engine for change.[48] The King used the MB as a bogeyman to scare the West. He presented the situation in Jordan as a zero-sum struggle between the regime and Islamists. The Saudis and the Americans clearly differed in strategy on how the Jordanian monarch could survive, and to some extent, the kingdom became a battleground for these two diverse perspectives. Washington pushed for gradual, top-down political reform, while Riyadh favored limited reform in exchange for economic development and stability. Riyadh provided Amman with the necessary financial aid to help the

government stabilize the country and address the public's economic needs. Accordingly, such external factors have been detrimental to Jordan's internal opposition forces calling for reform.

The task of fear-mongering and sowing suspicions between groups was made possible when various political forces in the opposition seemed to be working for different goals during much of Jordan's political uprisings.

Lastly, grievances aside, the overwhelming majority of East Bankers still want to see the continued rule of the monarchy under the Hashemites. Few, if any, ever thought of an alternative to the Hashemite monarchy. Nonetheless, their support for the monarchy is not a foregone conclusion. Though Jordan's economy is still functioning, successive governments have been grappling with destabilizing, though perhaps necessary, structural reforms. A possible economic collapse would certainly deprive the regime of its East Banker support and would lay the groundwork for instability. As Robert Satloff and David Schenker from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argue, this could lead to a defection of the East Bankers, a

scenario that could pose a fatal threat to the regime. In their view, the most threatening factor to the country's stability is by far financial.[49] All of my interviewees for the sake of this paper see eye to eye with the statement that a likely deterioration of the national economy would motivate the Jordanian people to take to the street. The result of such a scenario is unpredictable, but certainly the combination of discontent and hopelessness is a recipe for future mayhem in the country.[50]

Conclusion: Will Stability Endure?

A quick glance at the internal situation in Jordan during the Arab Spring shows that the society was at one point on the verge of a civil war.[51] If carried out to the extreme, unfolding events could have triggered a bloody confrontation between the security apparatus and the *Hirak*. But all in all, stability persists.

Indeed, Jordan survived the otherwise strategic nightmare caused by the eruption of the Arab Spring. As of writing this paper, the protest groups have lost momentum and the regime has effectively steered the country away from instability. Indeed, the King's statecraft and his restrained, balanced foreign policy have helped insulate Jordan from the fallout from

its conflict-ridden neighbors. Despite regional turmoil, Jordan has remained immune to revolution.

Arguments have been made that the Hashemite regime could survive with only limited reforms for the foreseeable future, as Jordanians have no alternative whatsoever to this regime. This line of thinking revolves around several factors: the lack of alternative; the fissure of the pro-reform groups and their lack of both a unified endgame and a vision; the demographic makeup of Jordan and societal divisions, ensuring the Hashemite as a safety valve; and the historical legitimacy of the regime.

Furthermore, significant external forces (namely the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) were complicit in the country's sustained autocratic nature. Washington propped up the regime by offering aid and political support to the King, who used the Islamists as a scarecrow to secure continued Western support for his regime. The Jordanian regime also exploited regional instability-- from Saudi paranoia of spreading opposition movements, to the American fear of short-term instability -- in order to get away with a reform package that only reinforced its autocratic grip. With the *Hirak* remaining fragmented and

lacking in a unified strategy or vision, it will be unable to amass enough force to pressure the regime to change course.

More often than not, the issues of political reform and stability in as divided a society as Jordan is fraught with paradoxes, risks, and opportunities. Jordan's ruling elite has thus played on fears and employed deception in order to maintain the never-ending presumption of being reformers when they are not. The task of fear-mongering and sowing suspicions between groups was made possible when various political forces in the opposition seemed to be working for different goals during much of Jordan's political uprisings.

And yet, barring a genuine effort to restore the centrality of the regime, the monarch runs the risk of having difficulty surviving future instability and turmoil. Many Jordanians ceased to believe that the state respects the rule of law. In fact, the trust gap in state institutions is still widening, making it difficult for the regime to circumvent its negative consequences. In an article entitled "A Dying Society," Fahd Khitan, a prominent Jordanian columnist, argues that people no longer have respect for the law.[52] He also argues that the disparity between the

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positions of the ruling elite and the broader public remain wide.

With a teetering economy, pervasive corruption, a lack of accountability, and a lack of checks and balances, conditions for instability in Jordan will be ripe. Certainly, if the economy ceases to function and the state continues with its unbearable levels of taxation, more people will be forced to change their views of the current status quo. The regime's inability to create jobs to ease the effects of demographic changes and pervasive youth unemployment could lead to a devastating combination of frustration and hopelessness. This in turn could set in motion an unpredictable level of instability.

The regime has not yet seized the opportunity to bring about proper democratic reform, let alone restore the trust of people. As Robert Satloff and David Schenker argue, there is an inherent instability in Jordan that could conceivably become serious though it may seem far-fetched at present.[53] This prognosis does not rule out possible internal developments that could affect stability in dramatic ways in years to come.

Endnotes

1   The Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan conducted a series of polls over the last decade and a half in which a clear majority of Jordanians expressed their fear to publicly criticize the government. For instance, in January 2012, the Center for Strategic Studies published a study on the "The State of Democracy in Jordan." In this report, 59% of Jordanians fear criticizing government policies in the public spheres. For more details see, http://www.jcss.org/ShowNews.aspx?NewsId=317 (last visited 24 September 2015).

2   Russell E. Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Challenges 1988 – 2001,* New York, State University of New York Press, 2005, pp. 90-113.

3   Expression coined in David Ignatius, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Basic Books, 2009.

4   The surge of the third wave of democracy is a term coined by Samuel Huntington. In his book, Huntington argues that the third wave of democracy started in Portugal in 1974 until the end of the Cold War and the democratization of Eastern Europe. For more details see, Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

5   Daniel Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy*", Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), p. 56.

6   Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966, pp. 225-332.

7   Timothy Piro, *The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan*, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 63.

8   Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

9   Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

10   For more details, see, Mark Tessler, *Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens*, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2011.

11   Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.106, No.1 (Spring 1991), p. 3.

12   Ibid.

13   Interview with Nabil Kofahi, Amman, 30 July 2013.

14   Interview with Orieb Rantawi, Amman 12 July 2013.

15   Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution,* New York: McGraw-Hill*,* 1978, p. 191.

16 http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/King-Abdullah (last visited April 2015)

17 Asher Susser, "Is Jordanian monarchy in danger?" *Middle East Brief*, No. 72, (10 April 2013), p. 2.

18 For the best analysis of the rentier economy, see Warwick Knowles, *Jordan Since 1989: A Study in Political Economy*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2005.

19 A series of polls conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, www.css-jordan.org (last visited 12 June 2014)

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Juan Cole, "Saad's Revolution", at http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/saads_revolution_20110131 (last visited 10 May 2015).

23 Roger Owen, *The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life*, The United States of America, Harvard University Press, 2012.

24 "Jordan: Surprisingly Stale for the Moment", *The Economist,* 9 November 2013.

25 The International Republican Institute, "Jordanians Split over the Direction of the Country, Economy and Corruption Cited as Top Concerns", http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-poll-jordanians-split-over-direction-country-economy-and-corruptio (last visited 24 September 2014).

26 Interview with Musa Maiteh, Amman, 11 June 2013.

27 Interview with Orieb Rantawi, Amman, 12 July 2013.

28 Interview with Lamis Andoni, Amman, 23 June 2013.

29 Interview with Sabri Rbeihat, Amman, 25 June 2013.

30 Ibid.

31 Interview with Mamdouh al-Abbadi, former member to the parliament and former cabinet member, Amman, Jordan, 10 June 2013. This argument was advanced by many of my interviewees, including Taher al-Masri and Musa Ma'aitah, the former minister for political development, whom I interviewed in Amman on 11 June 2013.

32 Interview with Zaki Bany Rsheid, Amman, 21 June 2013.

33 Interview with Nabil al-Kofahi, Amman, 30 July 2013.

34 Ibid.

35 Interview with Taher Masri, Speaker of the Senate, Amman, 9 June 2013.

36 Ibid.

37 There are a plethora of articles and reports in governmental al-Raid Daily.

38 Hassan Barari, "Jordan's Monarch and MB Emboldened by Egyptian Coup, Furthering Divide", http://fikraforum.org/?p=3640 (last visited 24 July 2015).

39   Jeffery Goldberg, "The Modern King in the Arab Spring", *The Atlantic*, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/   (last visited 30 July 2015).

40   Zamzam Initiative, or the National Initiative for Building, was launched in 2012 by moderate Islamists from the MB and other political figures to address the challenges facing the Kingdom. The Initiative highlighted the necessity to preserve state sovereignty, adopt gradual reform, and select honest people for decision-making posts. The MB rejected the move, which was seen as a sign of an unwelcome crack within its ranks.

41   Tamer al-Samadi, "'Zamzam' Reveals Divisions In Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood", Al-Monitor,   http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/12/divisions-hit-jordanian-muslim-brotherhood.html (last visited 24 September 2015).

42   Al-Hayat, 6 August 2013, at http://alhayat.com/Details/539781 (last visited 20 July 2015).

43   Interview with Basel Okoor, Amman 25 May 2013.

44   Interview with Sabri Rbeihat, Amman, 25 June 2013.

45   Interview with Rana Sabbag, Amman, 5 June 2013.

46   Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, "Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council", *Orbis*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (January 2012), p. 84.

47   Interview with Rana Sabbagh, a journalist, Amman, 5 June 2013, Lamis K Andoni, journalist at Al-Arab Al-Yaum, Amman, 23 June 2013, and Mubarak Abu Yamin al-Abbadi, a lawyer and former member to the parliament, Amman, 5 June, 2013. They all made the same observation.

48   Jeffery Goldberg, "The Modern King in the Arab Spring", *The Atlantic*, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/   (last visited 30 July 2015).

49   Robert Satloff and David Schenker, "Political Instability in Jordan", Council on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2013, http://www.vista.sahafi.jo/art.php?id=bb7d5c1aff3af7008336a332bf7cfce004d2631d (last visited 1 June 2013).

50   Interview with Mubarak Abu Yamin, Amman, 23 June 2013.

51   Interview with Awn Khasawneh, a former Prime Minister of Jordan, Amman, 24 June 2013.

52   Fahd Khitan, "A Dying Society", *Alghad Daily,* at http://www.alghad.com/index.php/afkar_wamawaqef2/article/33266/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%B1.html?sd=10 (last visited 20 April 2015).

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Cold War Triumphalism and the Reagan Factor

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Abstract

Three decades after Gorbachev's 1986 Glasnost campaign, the sudden death of the Soviet Union still continues to keep diplomatic historians busy with its momentous implications. The mutually excluding political realms of the Cold War forged a conservative American historical discourse, which perceived the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Existing biases against Moscow continued after the Soviet collapse and were conjured up in a new scholarly genre that might properly be termed as "the Reagan Victory School". The adherents of this school suggest that President Reagan's resolve and unsophisticated yet faithfully pragmatic foreign policy designs – the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in particular – became the major factor behind the Soviet Union's demise and America's "triumph" after the Cold War. Looking at several influential monographs on the subject, this paper seeks to demonstrate the well nuanced yet often mono-causal notions vocalized by American scholars of Cold War triumphalism.

Key Words

In 1986 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics finally became the toast of American diplomats, who believed that global harmony was a step closer. After four decades of superpower conflict, the new Russia was seen as a long lost friend that reemerged from its ashes, promising to adopt democracy and a liberal market economy. Mikhail Gorbachev's *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* signaled the end of a modern period in history that had been economically and politically exhausting for virtually the whole world. Faced with a serious ideological and military threat after the Second World War, the United States spearheaded the transatlantic community and systematically pursued the common interests of the democratic world against what President Ronald Reagan would later call an "evil empire". During the first 40 years of Cold War bipolarity, American leaders

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had become so familiar with the names and faces of Soviet leaders that these shadowy figures somehow symbolized everything loathsome and hateful in their minds. Thus came into being a popular surge of anti-Sovietism in America that uncannily resembled what Edward Said called, "Captain Ahab in pursuit of Moby Dick."[1]

> The mutually excluding political realms of the Cold War forged a conservative American historical discourse, which perceived the Soviet Union as an evil empire.

When Gorbachev took office in 1986 and propagated his new thinking (*novoe myshlenie)* campaign, the Transatlantic alliance embraced "the great Other – understood yet not understood."[2] The initial euphoria, however, soon faded with the dissemination of armed conflicts in such regions as Yugoslavia and the Southern Caucasus. Russia proved to be ever more lethargic in adopting liberalism and the oligarchs/ *nomenklatura* of the young federation found it more lucrative to adopt Yegor Gaidar's – Boris Yeltsin's Deputy Prime Minister – shock therapy, which essentially contradicted the principles of market liberalization.[3] Suddenly, the adherents of Western optimism and the Third Wave realized that the new

road ahead could actually be even more dubious and unpromising than the past 50 years.

Like all events that have such momentous ramifications, the collapse of the Soviet Union became the center of scholarly controversy. Several new monographs, in their different agendas, provide readers of Cold War history with the essential route map to understand the causal factors behind the collapse not only as a march of abstract social forces and ideologies but as a human event with complicated ramifications. By reexamining the causes and outcomes of 1986-1991, a plethora of recent monographs expose the blueprints of new political factions in American scholarship that emerged after the Soviet Union's demise. As historian Peter Holquist puts it, "while the Soviet Union may be no more, its past marches on in popular memory and the professional historical literature."[4]

The number of new publications on the Soviet Union's death grew exponentially over the following decades, and the most apparent reason for this scholarly enthusiasm seemed to be the opening of the previously closed Soviet archives. The demise of the Soviet Union, thus, furnished historians with new archival references and enabled them to present their arguments with more evidence. Nevertheless, the growing interest vis-à-vis the causes behind the collapse cannot merely be

attributed to the opening of archives. Another, perhaps more relevant reason, was the contemporary incredulity towards the ideological divides intrinsic in the works of Cold War historians.

During the first 40 years of Cold War bipolarity, American leaders had become so familiar with the names and faces of Soviet leaders that these shadowy figures somehow symbolized everything loathsome and hateful in their minds.

The mutually excluding political realms of the Cold War evidently influenced the conservative American historical discourse that perceived the Soviet Union as an evil empire. These biases continued after the collapse and were conjured up in a new scholarly genre what might properly be termed as "the Reagan Victory School". The adherents of this school suggest that President Reagan's resolve and unsophisticated yet faithfully pragmatic foreign policy designs – the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in particular – became the major factor behind the Soviet Union's collapse and America's "triumph" after the Cold War. Essentially, the divide between the Reagan Victory School and what John Gaddis calls "the many

geopolitical sophisticates on the left" is one of ideology – a struggle between neo-conservatism and liberalism.[5]

Therefore to say that the USSR's unforeseen implosion between 1986-1991 had been "extensively studied" would do violence to "both the verb and the adverb."[6] Existing literature on the subject yields to more questions than answers. First and foremost, what role, if any, did Ronald Reagan play in the collapse of the Soviet Union? As Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry suggest in their *Who Won the Cold War*, "the emerging debate over why the Cold War ended is of more than historical interest: At stake is the vindication and legitimation of an entire world view and foreign policy orientation."[7]

Jay Winik's *On the Brink*; Beth A. Fisher's *The Reagan Reversal;* John Gaddis's *The Cold War: A New History; and* Jack Matlock's *How the Cold War Ended* are the four examples used in this paper that demonstrate the well nuanced yet mono-causal notions supported by the Reagan Victory School. These neoconservative scholars hold the view that when Reagan became president in 1981, the USSR was a flourishing superpower that had surpassed the US in the arms race, and that Reagan's new military buildup duel with the USSR exacerbated the Soviets' financial vulnerability, consequently leading to its demise. The

latter part of this paper explores four more monographs written by scholars from the liberal opposition: Frances Fitzgerald's *Way Out There in the Blue;* Raymond Garthoff's *The Great Transition;* William Pemberton's *Exit with Honor;* and David Abshire's *Trust is the Coin of the Realm.* In contrast with the Reaganauts, Fitzgerald, Garthoff, Pemberton and Abshire make it clear that Mikhail Gorbachev was the key player during both the Reagan and Bush administrations, and emphasize the reactive role Reagan played while Gorbachev was transforming the Soviets into a more open society.

The Reagan Reversal in US Foreign Policy

Based on several hundred interviews, recently declassified documents and letters of correspondence, Jay Winik's voluminous account on the Reagan years – *On the Brink* – carries the Reagan debate to a new level.[8] The author sheds light on four defectors from the Democratic Party, who joined Reagan's brain team and laid out the blueprints of Reagan's neo-conservatism: Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams; Assistant Secretary of Defense and arms control negotiator Richard Perle; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick; and human rights advocate Max Kampelman. Winik gives credit to these four cold

warriors, arguing that they managed to undermine both Nixon's legacy of soft line détente policy at home and the Soviet threat abroad. The author clearly identifies President Reagan as the mastermind of this team. In response to the liberal left's harsh criticism of President Reagan, Winik poses the question: Why did the Soviet Union collapse when it did? Simply put, one major factor comes to the forefront in Winik's account: Reagan's firm stance in the arms control talks with the USSR, and the containment of nuclear missiles in Europe by launching the SDI – more popularly known as the Star Wars.

Winik particularly emphasizes Richard Perle's role in the arms negotiations, and suggests that he deserves much credit with his determination on the implementation of a zero-option strategy against the Soviets. Opposing the accommodationist policies of the Nixon-Ford-Carter administrations toward the Soviet Union, which seemingly took the US to the brink of an uncontrollable arms race, Winik seeks to demonstrate how Perle and his comrades had defended the line until the Soviets yielded and ultimately decided to remove all SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles (INF) from Europe. For Winik, Reagan and Perle had decisively "won" the Cold War when they prompted the

SDI against the Soviet Union. "For the prophets of détente and for die-hard doves, the [collapse] had a jarring, even uncomfortable, ring to it. The euphoria of the young people madly chipping away at the Berlin Wall…stood in sharp contrast to those in the West who had for years preached coexistence with the Communist world."[9] Winik further suggest that those who were alarmed by Reagan's tough rhetoric – since they thought it signaled another "menacing round in the escalating arms race" – were almost disappointed to see that "the reverberations of the collapse were without precedent" and that "not even a single shot had been sounded."[10]

Taking a leader-oriented historical approach, Fischer argues that much as Reagan was responsible for the initial anti-Soviet campaign during the early 1980s, he deserved all the credit for masterminding the National Security Planning Group and reversing the evil-empire rhetoric to a non-belligerent, conciliatory tune after 1984.

Suffice it to say, soon after the collapse people from all around the globe heard innumerable shots and witnessed several tragedies. Overall, Winik's argumentation is flawed for two reasons. First, it lacks scholarly evidence and highlights those that attribute the end of the Cold War solely to the United States' actions. Readers will not be able to find the slightest clue about what happened in the Soviet Union during this period. Secondly, although written in a rather convincing prose, the author employs a populist discourse and manifests his political inclinations. While his prose makes the book less valuable for academic circles, Winik probably secures a larger audience of conservatives outside the American academe.

In a similar vein, Beth A. Fischer's *The Reagan Reversal* seeks to explain the ways in which President Reagan managed to become a major catalyst in ending the Cold War.[11] Fisher is particularly interested in the reasons behind President Reagan's reversal of his assertive stance in early 1984 – 15 months prior to Gorbachev's administration. The author suggests that "in January of that year President Reagan abandoned his hardline approach to Moscow and began pursuing a more congenial relationship" with the Soviet Union.[12] In her preface, Fisher suggests that she actually started off her project with frequently-cited liberal suppositions in mind – Reagan being merely the spokesperson of his administration. The author tells the

reader that she initially assumed "the president played an inconsequential role" in his foreign policy apparatus, and that it was only when she began to reconsider her assumptions "the answer to [her] puzzle began to unfold; it became increasingly clear that Reagan's fingerprints were all over them."[13]

Essentially, Fischer seeks to debunk "the liberal myth" that portrays Ronald Reagan as a reactive actor in coping with the USSR, and challenges the conventional wisdom, which "holds that the Reagan administration did not begin seeking better relations with Moscow until November 1985, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev first met during the Geneva summit meeting."[14] Instead, Fischer suggests, it was in October 1983 when Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam delivered a mesmerizing speech "that epitomized the Reagan administration's confrontational posture [which] marked the end of Reagan's hardline period."[15] Hence, taking a leader-oriented historical approach, Fischer argues that much as Reagan was responsible for the initial anti-Soviet campaign during the early 1980s, he deserved all the credit for masterminding the National Security Planning Group and reversing the evil-empire rhetoric to a non-belligerent, conciliatory tune after 1984. In other words, for Fischer, President Reagan was not a "no hands president, allowing others to develop and execute his policies."[16] Instead, the author argues, "Reagan did take control of U.S. foreign policy – but only in those issue areas that especially interested him."[17]

> Up until Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland, and Reagan's implementation of zero-tolerance policies, détente apologists like the Nixon-Kissinger bloc had turned a blind eye to the ideological, military, and economic conflicts, in which eventually the whole globe was embroiled.

In explaining the Reagan reversal Fischer takes into account three major hypotheses, two of which had been raised earlier: (i) The Grand Old Party (GOP) leaders put some pressure on him before the 1984 elections, asking him to tone down his provocative rhetoric against the Soviet Union; (ii) a relatively moderate faction of the GOP took control of foreign policy; (iii) President Reagan himself decided to take action and readjusted his Soviet policies. Fischer dismisses the first two options and emphasizes the third option as the major cause of reversal. She uses examples from cognitive psychology and public records to support her case.

Consequently, Fischer provides the readers with a more analytical account compared to Jay Winik's monograph, and she does so by remaining aloof to both a populist discourse and a strictly academic jargon. Similar to Winik, however, scholars would find Fischer's argument problematic for two reasons. Firstly, her reliance on public records or cognitive psychology does not disclose a convincing image of the President. Although her hypothesis might seem stronger than Winik's, she too lacks sufficient evidence to give a personal account of the President; how and why Reagan changed his mind about US-Soviet relations in 1983, just before the elections, remains unclear. Secondly, even if one assumes that Reagan indeed reversed his policy on his own, Fischer's account still focuses merely on the actions of the U.S., dismissing the role of domestic problems in Moscow behind the collapse.

Saboteurs of the Cold War Status-quo

Probably the most prominent Moscow insider within the Reagan administration was Jack Matlock, who successfully discredits Beth Fischer's arguments in his *Reagan and Gorbachev*.[18] Based on his personal encounters with such major players as George Shultz, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Anatoly Chernayev, the four-term American ambassador to Moscow tries to make a case as to how Gorbachev and not Ronald Reagan transformed the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Contrary to Fischer's claims, Matlock suggests that the Soviet-American rapprochement began at Reykjavik in 1986 – not in 1983 as Fischer argues.

In his succinct account, Matlock spares a substantial space to emphasizing the domestic developments through which Gorbachev managed to take "full command of the Soviet leadership and…come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union required more than arms negotiations to solve its problems."[19] Despite his seemingly fair treatment of Gorbachev, however, Matlock's exceeding admiration of Reagan and his "firm attitude and bargaining skills" seems to limit his perception of the Soviet collapse to America-centric Cold War lenses. The author asserts that "psychologically and ideologically, the Cold War was over before Reagan moved out of office."[20] It might be fair to suggest that the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War are historically two different events. But Matlock's argumentation still proves to be quite problematic since he does not support it with evidence from the Soviet archives. Bearing in mind the fact that when Matlock's book came out in 2005 the Soviet archives were by and large open (disorganized to be sure, but open), one wonders why the

author did not make use of his Russian and provide first-hand sources.

Similar to such Reagan Victory School adherents as Winik and Fischer, Matlock tries to give full credit to Ronald Reagan and dismisses the fact that Gorbachev had been signaling his reform agenda two years before he took office. In other words, the winds of change had already been blowing in Russia as early as 1983, before Deputy Secretary Dam's speech, which Fischer tries to show as the reason behind the Reagan Reversal, or before the Reykjavik summit, as Matlock suggests. Whether or not President Reagan played the leading role in crumbling the Soviet Union into dust, and if he did, how he embarked on this odyssey are questions that deserve a more detailed historical scrutiny; one that can be found in John Lewis Gaddis's *The Cold War: A New History.*[21]

> Although most Americans probably see détente as a failed attempt to check the Soviets, it was actually Nixon's pursuit of negotiation rather than confrontation policies that paved the way for a leader like Gorbachev.

Since the publication of *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* in 1972, Gaddis has been considered to be the most controversial yet successful post-revisionist Cold War historian. He has written half a dozen books on this topic since 1972, all of which became academic best-sellers. In 1972, Gaddis challenged both conventional scholars in the discipline, who pinned the blame on Stalin for escalating the tension after the Second World War, as well as the revisionist historians that perceived the United States as the main agitator in the Cold War conflict. Instead, Gaddis argued, it was a series of misunderstandings and foreignness that these two novice world powers suffered after 1945. When the Iron Curtain fell, however, Gaddis reconsidered his earlier remarks in *We Now Know* (1997) and argued that it was indeed Joseph Stalin's personality and leadership that prompted the Cold War in the first place. His latest publication, *The Cold War: A New History* (2007), essentially conjures up – if not reiterates – the arguments he put forward since his last work.

Unlike *We Now Know,* which covered the period from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gaddis' new account covers the whole Cold War period in less than 300 pages. While this seems to be another major accomplishment for Gaddis, the book actually has less to offer compared to his earlier works. Leaving aside Gaddis's post-

revisionist and rigidly conservative political stance, *We Now Know* was a more focused account of the origins of the Soviet-American animosity and offered new perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, Gaddis manages to convey a gripping narrative on "the saboteurs of the Cold War status-quo", that is Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II, Margret Thatcher, and Lech Walesa. For Gaddis, up until Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland, and Reagan's implementation of zero-tolerance policies, détente apologists like the Nixon-Kissinger bloc had turned a blind eye to the ideological, military, and economic conflicts, in which eventually the whole globe was embroiled.

Like Jack Matlock, Gaddis suggests that Reagan's contribution to the Soviet collapse was to embrace Gorbachev and let him further his reforms in Russia. Having read Gaddis's account, one still wonders though how helpful Reagan had been with his "evil empire" rhetoric. Moreover, Gaddis' controversial remark about the post-1991 period becomes rather absurd since it is difficult to believe that "the world is a better place for the Cold War having been won by the side that won it."[22] Obviously, neoconservatives – such as Richard Pipes – might think otherwise, and argue that the Cold War, was a "hegemonic struggle that ended without bloodshed when the

party that began it quietly folded its tent and vanished from the historical stage."[23]

Although some of these scholars recognize the fact that the Soviet downfall was partly a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking (*novoe myshlenie)* and his pursuit of a romantic dream of socialist reform, they attribute the major role to Ronald Reagan's attacks on Soviet policy after 1980, when the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States widened. This flamboyantly subjective and ultimately chauvinist perspective on the Reagan phenomenon necessitates an extensive and deeper approach to the study of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Frances Fitzgerald's *Way out There in the Blue* and Raymond Garthoff's *The Great Transition* are two successful examples of the popular liberal opposition to the Reaganites. In an attempt to eschew the self-congratulatory idea that unrelenting economic and military pressure of President Ronald Reagan caused the USSR's demise, these scholars seek to demonstrate how the Soviet Union collapsed from within.

The Collapse from Within

Frances Fitzgerald, who won the Pulitzer Prize in 2002 with her *Fire in the Lake,* makes a persuasive case against the Reagan Victory School. With her

Out There in the Blue, Fitzgerald offers an in-depth analysis on the history of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, which apparently was designed to provide a security umbrella against a possible nuclear attack against the US.[24] Popularly known as the Star Wars project, SDI remained a highly controversial matter even after Reagan stepped down. As Fitzgerald suggests: "Between 1983 and the fall of 1999 the U.S. had spent 60 billion USD on anti-missile research, and though technological progress had been made in a number of areas, there was still no capable interceptor on the horizon."[25]

When Reagan launched his initiative in 1983, the project was immediately called "Star Wars" in the press. As Fitzgerald explains, "the title was a reflection not merely on the improbability of making nuclear missiles impotent and obsolete," but also on Reagan's speech from just two weeks before when he had spoken of the Soviet Union as "the evil empire."[26] Historians have long debated over the possible sources of inspiration behind Reagan's imagination. Fitzgerald seems to agree with Michael Rogin - professor of political science at Berkeley – who claimed in the mid-eighties that Reagan was profoundly influenced by the movies he starred in. She suggests that behind Reagan's SDI obsession was the 1940 production *Murder in the Air,* where the president played an

American secret agent trying to save the country from a newly invented super-weapon. As Fitzgerald further asserts, the Americans became so enthralled with the Star Wars that the country kept pouring in billions of dollars despite the abundance of scientific evidence against the feasibility of such a defense system. *Out There in the Blue* makes a convincing case as to *why.*

For Fitzgerald, those who listened to Reagan's "patriotic pieties" believed in the 19th century Protestant beliefs about American exceptionalism and desired to make America invulnerable. Although American exceptionalism had Puritan roots – the perception of the country as a covenanted New Israel – "it was in its complete form a secularized, or, rather, a deicized version of 19th century beliefs about spiritual rebirth, reform and evangelism."[27] Since these pieties had been a part of American patriotism, as the author concludes, *Murder in the Air* delivered the message to the public. In reality, however, from Reagan's own team members to senators, people knew what was going on. In one instance "Senator Bennett Johnston went to the floor of the Senate without any preparation – just cold – and asked if anyone believed in an astrodome defense. A dead silence followed."[28] Fitzgerald's account is partly a successful survey history of the SDI phenomenon in American history and partly a good psychobiography of Ronald Reagan.

Similar criticisms against the unduly alarmist and antagonist Reagan administration can be found in Raymond Garthoff's *The Great Transition*.[29] Garthoff, like Matlock, is a career diplomat who negotiated the SALT I treaty—the episode that initiated a historical period covered in his earlier publication *Détente and Confrontation*. *The Great Transition* covers the Reagan and Bush administrations, and offers a stimulating account of Soviet-American, Transatlantic, and Asian-American relations during the 1980s. He journeys from Reagan's repudiation of détente and avowal of direct confrontation in his first term to the reemergence of a soft-line policy under George Bush the senior.

Garthoff makes it clear that Mikhail Gorbachev was the key player during both the Reagan and Bush administrations. Unlike Matlock, Gaddis, or Fischer, the author emphasizes the reactive role Reagan played while Gorbachev was transforming the Soviets into a more open society. He further asserts that, although most Americans probably see détente as a failed attempt to check the Soviets, it was actually Nixon's pursuit of negotiation rather than confrontation policies that paved the way for a leader like Gorbachev. Hence, Reagan's crusader attitude and belief in dialogue through strength are deeply criticized in Garthoff's account. In many regards,

the author seeks to answer some of the questions he had raised earlier in *Détente and Confrontation*: "Was détente a potential solution to the risks and costs of confrontation, a solution undercut by actions of the Soviet Union, or of the United States, or both? Or did détente exacerbate the problem by providing only a disarming illusion of an alternative?"[30] Essentially Garthoff seeks to provide the readers with the roots of American unilateralism that was to come two decades later.

The New Right Movement

The debate between the "Reaganauts" and liberals ultimately boils down to the puzzling nature of the Reagan administration, and to the myths surrounding the character of the president himself. Since Reagan's inauguration in 1981, scholars, journalists, lay observers, as well as those who were personally involved in his administration have been trying to deconstruct this myth surrounding Reagan's persona. They do so by posing a set of similar questions. Was he remote from the particulars of his own administration or did he actually manage to amalgamate the once dichotomized conservative and liberal public factions? Could the revival of Grand Old Party conservative ideas be attributed to the success of his ambitious team of political activists?

Was Reaganomics a myth rather than reality? How did Reagan dodge the Iran-contra affair, when at some point during his second term this scandal seemed to shatter his public image? William Pemberoton's *Exit with Honor*, and David Abshire's *Trust is the Coin of the Realm* seek to answer these questions in their different agendas.

The rise of the New Right movement since the late 1970s still seems to be puzzling historians. With the exponential growth in literature on political conservatism in the United States, readers are more likely to be overwhelmed by a multitude of divergent arguments. Conservative ideology had often been portrayed as a shallow combination of rigid dicta following John Stuart Mill's label – the stupid party ideology. There is nonetheless a substantial body of new publications that explains the ways in which conservatism had managed to reformulate its *raison d'étre*.[31] A similar debate revolves around the question vis-à-vis the tradition of conservatism in the United States. While some scholars argue that the Right has no roots in American society, others suggest that "the Right has always been a part of [it]."[32] Perhaps the most intriguing episode of this conundrum is the Reagan presidency; a period when image and reality somehow intermingled in Reagan's optimist discourse and conservatism, making

his legacy an appealing myth for many. In James T. Patterson's words, "it was Ronald Reagan's good fortune to ride on a large wave [of political conservatism] that swelled in the late 1970s and that was to leave its considerable traces on American politics for the rest of the century and beyond."[33]

> Historians often portray the affair as a tragic interlude caused by meddling intermediaries, holding it as evidence of Reagan's remoteness from the consequences of his own policy actions.

William Pemberton's biography of Ronald Reagan, *Exit with Honor*, is a part of The Right Wing in American History Series published by M.E. Sharpe. In Glen Jeansonne's words (the series editor), Pemberton's work is yet another attempt "to resurrect the Right from the substratum of serious scholarship…and reveal its deep roots."[34] To what extent Pemberton manages to trace these roots or expose the veil that separates Reagan's public and private personas is debatable. Nevertheless, in his succinct account of around 200 pages, Pemberton journeys through Ronald Reagan's life, starting from his childhood in Dixon, Illinois to his early career as a B Grade actor in Hollywood, and moves chronologically

towards his governorship in California and finally to his notable two-term presidency between 1981-1989.

Pemberton spares four chapters on Reagan's early career until the end of his governorship and six chapters on his presidency. While this might seem to be a fair treatment for an introductory level biography, Pemberton relies heavily on secondary sources and fails to give the reader a fresh insight about the blank pages of the "Great Communicator". Pemberton's analysis in the first part does not go beyond a number of repetitive remarks on Reagan's ability "to use his fertile imagination and glib tongue to create word portraits that made partly fictionalized contests come alive for his audience."[35] Through revealing the dichotomy between reality (growing up in Great Depression Dixon with an alcoholic father and a religious mother) and Reagan's fictionalized recollections, which resembled rare Huck Finn-Tom Sawyer idylls, Pemberton seeks to explain Reagan's relentless optimism.

Pemberton reiterates the already existing assumption that Reagan's Hollywood experience and ability to fictionalize enabled him to "touch the hearts of listeners who responded to his sunny vision of a way of life that no longer survived and, indeed, probably never existed."[36] Pemberton's suggestions bear a strong resemblance to those raised earlier by Lou Cannon, who was the White House correspondent for *The Washington Post* during the Reagan administration and who covered Reagan extensively in his *The Role of a Lifetime*. Even the title of Pemberton's book – *Exit with Honor* – seems to be inspired by Canon's provocative introduction. In his very first sentence, Canon suggests that "[Reagan] had always prided himself on knowing how to make an exit, and when the end came, on a day of sun and shadows he called bittersweet, Ronald Reagan understood exactly how to leave the stage."[37] Likewise, the locus of Pemberton's arguments in the first part could be found in Canon's conclusion, wherein he suggests that "the presidency had turned out to be Reagan's best role... [it] seemed a romantic extension of the world he had known in Dixon and Des Moines." [38]

Discussing the circumstances under which Reagan's psyche flourished might give the readers a sense of why Reagan often opted to act the part of a "citizen-crusader" or a "cowboy-Cincinnatus" in the latter part of his political career. This correlation alone, however, does not illuminate the ways in which Reagan channeled conservative ideas or perceived the foreign policy decisions during his administration. Pemberton is most likely aware of this flaw; hence in the second part of his book, he seeks to expose a different image of Reagan, one that was

available to the Washington insiders. The author suggests that "Reagan did not contribute to the formulation of postwar conservative thought, but he was a powerful spokesman for those ideas," and that his populism was simply based on his belief in American exceptionalism; "the idea that he would develop movingly in his verbal portraits of America as God's shining City on a Hill."[39]

Pemberton secures a balanced portrait of Reagan by exposing his public disguise as a self-assured leader. The author emphasizes the fact that although Reagan managed to cushion himself with a strong image, "his grasp of most issues was shaky to nonexistent" and that "he was often almost entirely absent from the nuts-and-bolts work of his administration's policy formulation."[40] Likewise, Pemberton challenges Reagan's reputation as a "budget slasher" and argues that "The Reagan Revolution… was more a matter of perception than reality."[41] Through presenting statistics on the macro-economic situation and on the budget deficit stalemate throughout the 1980s, the author convincingly demonstrates that spending actually rose under Reagan, "even for many social welfare programs."[42]

In his chapter on the Soviet collapse, Pemberton seeks to challenge the orthodox conviction that Reagan's SDI initiative triggered the consequent disintegration of the USSR. Pemberton convincingly argues that most Cold-War Sovietologists – including the prominent hard-liner Richard Pipes – reached problematic conclusions in their works, which colonized the field immediately after the Soviet collapse.[43] Pemberton suggests that despite Reagan's containment policy he was a closet supporter of détente. In other words, for Pemberton, despite Reagan's evil empire rhetoric and gargantuan defense build-up, "he joined Mikhail Gorbachev to bring the cold war to an end."[44] The Reagan Victory School's confinement to Cold War lenses, as Pemberton further suggests, downplays the importance of domestic factors leading to the demise of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Pemberton poses a significant question: How did Reagan, who "did not have a coherent foreign policy [except for] a few fundamental beliefs, manage to bring Moscow to the bargaining table?"[45] A significant proof of Reagan's lack of experience in foreign policy decisions was the Iran-contra affair which almost ruined Reagan's political career in his second term.

Pemberton deserves much credit for his skillful treatment of the Iran-Contra Scandal. Readers will find a concise account of this scandal, almost every aspect, scrutinized in 25 pages. Those who expect a more

comprehensive narrative would be interested in David Abshire's *Saving the Reagan Presidency: Trust is the Coin of the Realm.* Abshire, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO (1983-1987) and vice-chairman of The Center for Strategic and International Studies, was brought back to Washington D.C. by Reagan as a cabinet-level special counsel to investigate the Iran-contra affair, which haunted Reagan's credibility during his second-term. As the title implies, the book is based on Abhire's personal memoirs and a detailed account of his 86 days long investigation. In Abshire's words, his purpose is to clarify the period when he carried out the formidable task of restoring the "coin of the realm of trust for it to become the basis of Reagan's leadership."[46]

Although the contra part of the affair (American funding of contra-guerilla forces in Nicaragua) began to unfold as early as 1981, it was not until 1986 that Reagan's trading of arms for hostages (held by Hezbollah mujahedeen) became publicized. It soon became clear that the diversion of funds received from the Iranian arms sales to support the Nicaraguan anti-communist rebels had been authorized by the President; this was an act in violation of the Constitution and constituted "theft of government property - stealing and using funds for unauthorized purposes."[47] Reagan's disastrous press

statements in response to *Al-Shiraa's* (Lebanese periodical) initial coverage of the story deeply undermined his situation. In Abshire's words, "If Reagan did know (the particulars of the Affair) he could have been guilty of a cover-up and obstruction of justice, and if he were guilty of these, the acts would be grounds for impeachment."[48]

> Three decades after Glasnost, a set of questions still remain to be answered: Why did Gorbachev fail to implement the economic reforms in time to prevent a conservative counterrevolution against the reforms?

Hence, the author focuses on a central question; one that was posed earlier by Sen. Howard Baker about President Nixon in the Watergate hearings: "What did the president know and when did he know it?"[49] The answer to this question is central not only for understanding the mystery behind the scandal but also for getting a better sense of Reagan's touch with reality and the particulars of his government. Abshire provides a convincing answer by exposing both causes and ramifications of the crisis, while keeping his role in saving the presidency as a reappearing theme. Following a brief episode on negotiations, Abshire

defines his conditions to the White House, on which he would accept of the post. After all, as Abshire puts it, he first had to "ensure that [he] had the conditions to be successful and not become some kind of victim like Bud McFarlane."[50] Abshire further suggests that although the Reagan administration "did not jump with joy about any outside advisors," they knew very well that Abshire was their "best ticket to survival."[51]

Historians often portray the affair as a tragic interlude caused by meddling intermediaries, holding it as evidence of Reagan's remoteness from the consequences of his own policy actions. Although Abshire too seems to refrain from giving a direct answer to the question as to how much Reagan knew, he gives a clear-cut account on how the Reagan administration managed to overcome this scandal. Abshire's thorough analysis and personal reflections bring important pieces of the Iran-contra puzzle to the surface, and shed light on the entire dramatis personae; including chiefs of staff Don Regan, Lt. Col. Oliver North, John Poindexter, Howard Baker, the "covert master strategist" and CIA head Bill Casey, the Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar as well as Nancy Reagan and the President himself.

Conclusion

The interesting thing about the USSR is that, even months before its demise, it was lethargically stable. The central planning was indeed a total mess, and the party apparatus was much confused by the further exasperation of clashes between the various factions of Soviet public spheres in East Europe. But it was, nevertheless, a stable mess. In Alexei Yurchak's phraseology, by 1991, a great majority of the people living in the Soviet Empire still thought that "everything was forever until it was no more."[52] Why, then, under Gorbachev's leadership, did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the vanguard of world socialist revolution, abolish itself with barely a whimper? This has been a quintessential debate since the end of the Cold War.

In response to this debate, Robert Wegs suggests that Gorbachev strongly believed in the free flow of information as "the basis for economic and ultimately the political and military strength of a country."[53] But the differences between the various models of economic modernization eventually led to the Soviet collapse. The readers will find a more detailed account of Sovietonomics in Ota Sik's *The Economic Impact of Stalinism.* Sik suggests that, "Soviet communism, which claims to be the sole exemplar and champion of a universal socialist

evolution, [had], in fact become the most formidable obstacle to any advance toward a progressive and humane socialism."[54] Perhaps more notably, "technological backwardness, the distorted production structure… the wasteful utilization of material inputs and the decelerating growth of labor productivity," had all remained unsolved, producing a decline in the national growth until the 1980s.[55]

A brief survey of publications presented in this paper suggest that adherents of the Reagan Victory School fall back on such mono-causal notions as American triumphalism. Juxtaposed against these books, both David Abshire's *Saving the Reagan Presidency* and William Pemberton's *Exit with Honor* seek to demythologize Reagan's cult as a Great Communicator. Despite differences in their agendas, both publications give the readers (in and outside the academe) a better picture of Ronald Reagan and his role in the New Right movement. Pemberton and Abshire's accounts on the ideological framework of neo-conservatism and President Reagan's legacy are major contributions to the American historical profession. They also stress the need for more substantial research on Russia's domestic problems, which ultimately paved the way for the Soviet Union's implosion.

Nevertheless, three decades after *Glasnost*, a set of questions still remain to be answered: Why did Gorbachev fail to implement the economic reforms in time to prevent a conservative counterrevolution against the reforms? Or, why did he fail to resurrect any remaining belief in true socialism that was left in the Soviet Union at all? The Soviet leadership could have used its immense military and internal-security apparatus to hold power, regardless of the cost. Ultimately, even while it was faltering, why did the USSR not even attempt to stage a cynical foreign war to rally support for the regime?

These questions stress the need for a more substantial body of literature on the Soviet Union's internal dynamics throughout the 1980s. In the end, this paper supports the greater validity of the argument that stresses the Soviet Union's internal problems as being behind the collapse of Cold War bipolarity. After all, the privileged party elite (*Nomenklatura*) in Russia and elsewhere in the Union were acutely aware that they could not follow the attempts to reform a system that was intrinsically against reform. To truly understand these questions and the legacy of the Cold War, historians should approach the subject with less fixed ideas about the nature of American triumphalism and the fate of the Soviet Union.

Endnotes

1   See Edward Said, "Islam and the West", *The Observer,* 16 September 2001.

2   Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: A History,* Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. xi.

3   Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000,* New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.

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6   Marshall Poe, *The Russian Movement in World History,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003, p.76.

7   Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Who Won the Cold War?", *Foreign Policy,* No. 87 (Summer 1992), p. 123.

8   Jay Winik, *On The Brink: The Dramatic Behind the Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996.

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10   Ibid, p. 596.

11   Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War,* Missouri, University of Missouri Press, 1997.

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13   Ibid., p. x.

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15   Ibid.

16   Ibid., p. 102.

17   Ibid., p. 103.

18   Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended,* New York, Random House, 2004.

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21   John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History,* New York, Penguin, 2006.

22   Ibid., p. xi.

23   Richard Pipes, "Back in the USSR", *Commentary*, Vol. 121, No. 2 (February 2006), pp. 66-67.

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26   Ibid., p. 22.

27   Ibid., p. 25.

28   Ibid., p. 370.

29   Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1994.

30   Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institute,1985, p. 2.

31   Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana*, Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953, p. 3.

32   William Pemberton, *Exit with Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. xi.

33   James T. Patterson, *Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush versus Gore*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 130.

34   Ibid., p. xi.

35   Pemberton, *Exit with Honor*, p. 15.

36   Ibid., p. 5.

37   Lou Canon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991, p.15.

38   Ibid., p.837.

39   Pemberton, *Exit with Honor*, p.49.

40   Ibid., pp. 106-109.

41   Ibid., p. 105.

42   Ibid.

43   Ibid., pp. 150-155.

44   Ibid., p. 149.

45   Ibid., p. 211.

46 David M. Abshire, *Saving the Reagan Presidency: Trust is the Coin of the Realm,* College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2005, p. 14.

47 Ibid., p. 5.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 15.

50 Robert McFarlane was the National Security Advisor to President Reagan during the scandal, who later became one of the major scapegoats along with John Poindexter. Ibid, p. 20.

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52 Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005.

53 J. Robert Wegs, "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, 1980s, and Beyond", *Europe Since 1945: A Concise History,* Bedford, St. Martin's, 1996, p. 208.

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
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