ORSAM

ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

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Book Reviews / *Kitap İnceleme*

Ortadoğu Etütleri in its January 2015 issue, brings together eight articles and a book review.

Like the previous issues, this issue starts with an article analysing the ongoing conflict in Syria. William Harris, in his article titled *Syria's Firestorm – Where From? Where To?* points out the limitations of conflict resolution approaches and calls for a political solution in the Syrian conflict and presents us with the idea that a military solution can be the only way out of this crisis. By looking at the sources, characteristics and the trajectory of the conflict, the author pays a special attention to Russian, US, Iranian and the Turkish roles in the development of the crisis and by integrating the domestic and the external dynamics assesses the future trajectory of the Syrian conflict.

Joseph Alagha in his article titled *Hizballah's Resilience During the Arab Uprisings* looks at length to the historical evolution of Hizballah and the transformation it went through in the past three decades. The author discusses Hizballah's role in the Syrian conflict – its active fighting in Syria. By integrating the speeches of Nasrallah and other Lebanese actors involved to his analysis, Alagha looks not only at Hizballah's role but also the spill-over effects of the Syrian conflict in Lebanon.

In the third article of this issue, *Implications of the Arab Spring for Iran's Policy Towards the Middle East*, Bayram Sinkaya analyses how the Arab Spring made an impact on Iran's Middle East policy. Arguing that the changes in the evolution of the Arab Uprisings makes it difficult to talk about one Iranian policy, the author looks at the change from an initial optimism to a growing anxiety. The article examines how the coming to power of Rouhani in 2013 has brought a moderate approach to Iranian foreign policy, made the nuclear issue and relations with the US a policy-priority, led to closer relations with the Gulf countries and yet how this moderation and the "constructive engagement" remains short when it comes to the Syrian conflict.

In the article titled, *Implications of the Arab Uprisings on the Islamist Movement: Lessons from Ikhwan in Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan*, Nur Köprülü argues that it is difficult to generalize the effects of the Uprisings on the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and calls for a case-by case analysis. The author questions Jillian Schwedler's argument regarding the linkage between inclusion into politics and moderation of movements and argues that Ikhwan is in general moderate and

can be effective in keeping the more radical and salafist groups from finding a support base in these three countries –Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.

Gudrun Harrer in *European Powers and the Naissance of weak States in the Arab Middle East After World War I,* analyzes in details the post-World War 1 era and the legacy of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. Challenging the argument that Sykes-Picot and the artificial borders it created are the reason of the problems of the Middle East both in terms of the content and implementation of this agreement, the author argues how this idea is dominant in the region. Putting the emphasis and the blame on the changing policies of the British and the French after the World War, the author relates her arguments to the offer of the Islamic State (Daesh) today in the Middle East.

Muhammet Fatih Özkan and Gürol Baba, in their article, *Unpredictable Power Broker: Russia's Role in Iran's Nuclear Capability Development,* put the mediation approaches to at the core of their analysis. The article argues that Russia had been a part of Iran's nuclear capability development, yet its position against the possibility of Iran acquiring military grade nuclear technology makes it a "very suitable mediator" in the process. The authors argue how Russia, as a Great Power utilizes mediation as a means of influence and dominates an international dispute rather than solving it.

In his article titled, *The Iran-Iraq War in Iranian Women's Memoirs: Reading Seyyedeh Zahra Hosseini's Da,* Metin Yüksel critically examines a woman's memoirs,on the Iran-Iraq War. The work called *Da*, has been comissioned and published with state support. Basing his arguments on field research, the author places the memoirs in its social, political and historical context and demonstrates how the work could be seen as part of the ideological project of the state to address the discontents of women, the youth and ethnic minorities in Iran in the politically more open post-war period, i.e. the 1990s and 2000s.

This issue contains a bookreview. Rümeysa Eldoğan reviewed Fawaz Gerges's *The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World* for this issue.

Hope you enjoy this very rich January 2015 issue!

Özlem Tür

SURİYE'NİN ATEŞ FIRTINASI: NEREDEN, NEREYE?

ÖZ

Mevcut Suriye krizi ve savaşına ilişkin analizlerin büyük bir kısmı, siyasi çözümler, istikrarsızlığın yapısal kaynakları, Irak'tan taşma etkisi ve dış aktörlerin sorumluluğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu yöndeki analizler Suriye iç politikasını ve yerel liderlik aktörlerini değersizleştirmektedir ki bu Suriye rejimi için kullanışlı bir değersizleştirmedir. Bu makale, nihai bir askeri sonucu siyasi kozmetiği içerecek şekilde dikkate almaktadır. Bu makale mezhepsel tutuşma da dahil olmak üzere Suriye'deki gelişmelerin yönetici hizip aktörleri ile yakından alakalı olduğunu ve Irak'ın aksine Suriye'nin 2011'den itibaren krizin ana arenası olduğunu savunmaktadır. Makale ayrıca Suriye çerçevesinde 'vekaleten savaş' ve nihai hedefi dikte edemeseler de dış güçlerin Suriye'deki gidişat üzerindeki etkilerini sorgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler : Suriye, yapı ve aktör, mezhepçilik, vekaleten savaş, cihatçılık, rejim değişikliği

العاصفة الملتهبة في سوريا: من أين؟ الى أين؟
وليام هاريس
خلاصة

ان القسم الأكبر من التحليلات المتعلقة بالأزمة السورية الراهنة والحرب الجارية فيها، يركّز على الحلول السياسية، والمصادر البنيوية لعدم الاستقرار، والتأثيرات القادمة من العراق، ومسؤولية اللاعبين الخارجيين. ان التحليلات التي تتجه الى هذا المنحى تعمل على التقليل من أهمية السياسة الداخلية لسوريا واللاعبين المحليين في معركة الزعامة، والذي يعتبر بدوره تقليلا من الأهمية يمكن ان يستفيد النظام السوري منه. ان هذا المقال يأخذ بنظر الاعتبار النهاية العسكرية القاطعة ممزوجة بها المداخلات السياسية. ويدافع هذا المقال عن فكرة وجود علاقة وطيدة بين التطورات في سوريا وبين اللاعبين الاداريين والحزبيين ، بما في ذلك الانحياز المذهبي، مثلما يؤكّد على ان سوريا، بعكس ما عليه الحال في العراق، هي الميدان الرئيسي للأزمة منذ عام 2011. كما يناقش المقال تأثير القوى الخارجية على سبر الأحداث في سوريا وان لم تتمكن هذه القوى من الأخذ بنظر الاعتبار عاملي '' الحرب بالوكالة '' والهدف النهائي من ذلك.

الكلمات الدالةً : سوريا، البنية واللاعبون، الطائفية، الحرب بالوكالة، الجهاد، تغيير النظام.

SYRIA'S FIRESTORM: WHERE FROM? WHERE TO?

ABSTRACT

Much analysis of the present Syrian crisis and war emphasizes political solutions, structural sources of instability, spill over from Iraq, and the responsibility of external actors. Such analysis devalues both Syrian domestic affairs and local leadership agency, devaluation convenient to the Syrian regime. This article considers an eventual military outcome, involving political cosmetics. It suggests that developments in Syria, including sectarian inflammation, have had a lot to do with ruling clique agency, and that Syria -not Iraq- has been the core crisis arena since 2011. The article also questions the idea of "proxy war" in the Syrian case; outside powers influence the trajectory in Syria, but they may not dictate the destination.

Keywords: Syria, structure and agency, Sectarianism, proxy war, Jihadism, regime change

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Prattle about there being only "a political solution" for the ongoing Syrian war notwithstanding, most conflicts resembling it have had winners and losers established by force, whether or not with diplomatic decoration. This applied to the civil war following the Russian revolution of 1917, the French revolutionary decade of 1789-1799, the crushing of Hungary by the Habsburg monarchy backed by Tsarist Russia in 1849, and the American revolutionary war of 1776-1781. The Lebanese assert "no victor and no vanquished" as the end product of their fifteen years of turmoil in 1990. Nonetheless, the outcome was imposition of a Syrian Ba'thist reading of the 1989 Ta'if agreement after Maronite Christian militaries tore each other apart and a Syrian assault winkled General Michel Aoun out of the Lebanese presidential palace. Similarly, the 1995 Dayton agreement among the sides in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war followed decisive NATO military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. Twenty-five years of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka ended in 2009 with the crushing of the Tamils, no political frills attached.

In cases of anti-regime uprisings morphing into military contests, which include Syria since 2011, the pattern has been for multi-phase fighting leading into overthrow of the established order, smashing of the rebels, or extended stalemate. The Hungarian repudiation of Habsburg despotism in 1848-1849 was a relatively brief episode of eighteen months, with the balance swinging back and forth and Budapest changing hands three times.[1] The parties were unbending in their basic requirements, precluding negotiation, and the old regime triumphed with foreign assistance and manipulation of ethnic groups -Slavs and Rumanians- against Hungarian supremacy. The parallels with external intrusion and sectarian breakdown in present-day Syria are obvious, though the Syrian autocracy is relatively weaker and has less mobilization capacity than its Habsburg counterpart. Almost twenty years later, after the 1866 defeat of Austria by Prussia, the Hungarian elite was able to turn the tables in the "compromise" of the "dual monarchy." Similarly, triumphant despotism in Syria at the expense of the bulk of the Sunni Arab majority would guarantee a new explosion, probably within months rather than years.

Conflict resolution logic that presupposes a conflict "ripening" toward a settlement by mutual exhaustion of the parties[2] is callous, dangerous, and probably inapplicable in a case like the Syrian conflict. It is callous because 200,000 deaths and nine million refugees and displaced people have evidently not been enough for the "ripening." Does it require half a million dead and complete destruction? The logic is dangerous because two major parties,

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1 For good summaries, see Mike Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (London: Abacus, 2008), and Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

2 The concept of the "ripe moment" in conflicts is elaborated in I. William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 2001), pp. 8-18.

the regime and the Islamic State (ISIS[3]) jihadists, have relentlessly made it plain that they only contemplate extermination or subjugation for people not in their camp. The regime, for example, would only negotiate with its hold on security machinery undisturbed, and would, on its track record, use that machinery to subvert and destroy its partners in any "transition government." The Obama administration's expressed preference for preserving Syrian regime institutions indicates that it is not sensitive to the risk; opposition personalities going into any joint government might well be entering a death trap. For practical illustration, Syrian opposition politicians need only contemplate the procession of political murders in Lebanon between 2005 and 2008, for which the Syrian regime and its Hezbollah ally are the leading suspects.

The three-sided face-off of a mafia style dictatorship, Sunni Muslim jihadists, and fractious non-jihadist fighters who only agree not to accept anything short of uprooting the ruling clique is hardly conducive to "mutual exhaustion" therapy. Certainly either the regime or the main jihadist force -ISIS- has to suffer a conclusive decline on the battlefield to make political resolution possible. Collapse of the non-jihadist opposition would leave only the absolutists, rendering conflict resolution logic redundant.

This article considers selected internal and external dimensions of Syria's breakdown, in the hope of contributing to debate about the sources, characteristics, and trajectory of the Syrian crisis. It examines the balance of structures and personal agency in the crisis. It discusses Russian, US, Iranian, and Turkish roles in the development of the crisis. It attempts to integrate internal and external dynamics in assessing the future trajectory.

Structure and agency in the Syrian crisis

Multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic states bequeathed by British and French intervention in the 1920s predisposed the eastern Arab world to ethnic-sectarian sensitivity and authoritarian rule, both preordained to disasters. Frankly, the larger united Arab entity desired by the Hashemite prince Faysal and the bourgeois Arab nationalists would also have incubated these tendencies, and would have been even more vulnerable to breakdown. More recently, the incompetent US management of Iraq after the 2003 invasion and occupation emphasized sectarian identities and preeminence of Shi'ite Arabs over Sunni Arabs, inflaming sectarian conflict and Sunni jihadist extremism, the latter likely to embroil Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It is false, however, to conceive the US impact in isolation; Saddam Husayn had already destabilized Iraq with his repression of Shi'ites through the 1990s and his persecution of the Kurds from the 1970s on, not to mention his ruinous adventurism against

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3 ISIS is short for "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria," Syria here referring to greater or geographical Syria, in Arabic termed *Bilad al-Sham* and in English the Levant.

Iran and Kuwait. After 2003, Iraqi Shi'ite politicians and militias, encouraged by the Shi'ite theocratic regime in Iran, pursued sectarian supremacy and vengeful hounding of Sunni Arabs. Also, the Syrian regime's fostering of Sunni jihadism in western Iraq against the new US supported order in Baghdad inflated "al-Qaeda in Iraq."

In short, blame for structural instability in the Arab Levant states and Iraq in the early 2000s can be spread around, encompassing European colonial powers, chauvinist Arab nationalists, the United States, Iranian theocrats, and the Ba'thist Arab masters of Iraq and Syria. Whatever the case, Middle Eastern volatility and vulnerability do not tell us much about the specific developments that occurred in Syria in 2011. It is difficult to understand the crony capitalist policies that marginalized provincial and suburban Sunni Arab Syria in the early 2000s, or the Syrian regime's manipulative interactions with Sunni jihadists at home and abroad, without considering the predilections of the ruling clique and the leader. The structural instability that characterized the new Arab states of the twentieth century made violent upheavals unsurprising and provided a fertile environment for despotism and paranoia, but it does not account for the actual Syrian crisis of 2011, or explain why the crisis became a catastrophe.

Particularities of the Syrian domestic arena are key to interpreting the evolution from discontent to the street challenge to the regime, and then from protests to warfare. Leo Tolstoy might not approve, but personal agency is part of the picture.[4] This applies to the backdrop of state policies and behavior in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the handling of the street protests against the regime in 2011, and the steady escalation of state recourse to all varieties of violence. Direction of the state under President Bashar al-Asad after June 2000 had serious implications. Neo-liberal economic policies tailored to bourgeois interests close to the regime involved running down state support for the mass of the population in the urban and rural peripheries, penalizing those whom Bashar's father Hafiz had taken care to placate. Repression of secular dissent after a brief relaxation dashed the hopes of much of urban society. Pandering to Sunni Islamism at home and double-dealings with jihadists in Iraq and Lebanon stirred dangerous forces. At the same time, the regime's partnership with revolutionary Shi'ite Iran increasingly aroused Syrian Sunni Arab suspicion. Drought on the desert fringes after 2008 exacerbated misery and alienation, but even without it there was plenty of combustible material for sparks from the successful early 2011 street revolts in Tunisia

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4 At several points in *War and Peace*, Tolstoy pauses to denigrate the significance of individuals in history as opposed to broad trends representing the momentum of the multitudes. For example, see Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, translated by Anthony Briggs (London, Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 667-671 and 912-914.

and Egypt. Bashar al-Asad's interview with *The Wall Street Journal* in January 2011 indicated that he was not simply insensitive, but oblivious.[5]

Despite the Syrian regime's endeavors to rewrite the reality of March 2011 as an armed "terrorist" onslaught and a foreign conspiracy against the citadel of "resistance" to Israel and the West, virtually all violence in the initial ten weeks of the street challenge came from the regime. The ruling family and clique were incensed at the impertinence of multitudes of demonstrators daring to assert popular rights, and they were determined not to concede anything real. Bashar al-Asad came into his own as their incendiary front man; his bellicose, patronizing speeches of March and June 2011 threatened war, mocked demands for reform, and dehumanized critics as "outlaws" and agents of "conspiracies" that "multiply like germs."[6] From June 2011 through 2012, with opposition elements goaded into armed resistance by the regime and then supported in their persistence by Turkey and Arab oil financiers, the regime could proclaim its fight against terrorism and escalate assaults on Syrian cities, towns, and villages, deploying heavy artillery, helicopter gun-ships, air force jets, and ballistic missiles. Provincial and suburban Sunni Arab Syria was increasingly driven to the wall, and into the arms of jihadist absolutists, starting with Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012.

Overall, there is a strong basis for arguing that this descent of Syria into a black hole was substantially the personal work of regime overlord Bashar al-Asad. Through the critical months of slippage toward a fully militarized contest, from armed clashes in Jisr al-Shughur in June 2011 to the regime siege of the Baba Amru suburb of Homs in February 2012, no other engine of destruction existed remotely comparable to the regime. The regime had fully autonomous momentum and its military activities demonstrated that it had no objective except total repression. Without the regime momentum, Arabian Peninsula and Turkish backers of emerging armed opposition factions would not have had the opportunity or the traction to make their own more modest contributions to the course of events. At this critical stage, regional and international actors reacted to developments far more than shaping them.

Through almost four years since March 2011, the Syrian president has both denied and asserted responsibility in a highly disturbing fashion that deserves closer scrutiny than it has received. The cold, clinical, aloof, self-righteous posturing amid mayhem and mass murder indicated a self-absorbed personality disconnected from the fates of ordinary people. In an extraordinary interview with *Paris Match* in November 2014, Bashar dismissed opposition as

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5 Jay Solomon and Bill Spindle, "Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad", *The Wall Street Journal*, 31 January 2011.) https://www.google.co.nz/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=wall%20street%20journal%20interview%20assad

6 *Al-Safir* (Beirut), 31 March 2011; *al-Hayat* (London), 21 June 2011; *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 21 June 2011.

"terrorism" and flatly claimed that there had been no regime bombardment of civilians – "it is impossible for a state to target civilians."[7] In other words, the indisputable artillery shelling, aerial bombing of hospitals and bakeries, ballistic missile strikes against urban neighborhoods, and indiscriminate dumping of barrels loaded with explosives and shrapnel out of helicopters wasn't happening and had never happened. In a December 2011 interview with the American ABC network, Bashar even rejected personal accountability for the army and its behavior – "they are not my forces."[8] Yet the same Bashar presented a ghoulish medical metaphor for his hands-on responsibility in a June 2012 speech: "When the surgeon enters the operating theatre and … extracts and amputates, what do we say to him? You fix on his [hands] being bloodstained or do we salute him for saving the patient."[9] Bashar would certainly be there for the salutations.

Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who met Bashar repeatedly as UN Syria envoy between 2012 and 2014, was well placed to assess the outlook of the Syrian leader and his entourage. In October 2014, Brahimi told a gathering at Chatham House that Bashar and his Iranian allies "don't cease to bet on the military solution," believing "they will win and recover rule over all of Syria."[10] According to Brahimi, Bashar and the regime still refused to accept that there was any internal problem in Syria. This unabashed absolutism, undented by any serious reflection on the catastrophic trajectory, easily matched that of the Nusra or ISIS jihadists; it had precipitated the wrecking of Syria and it guaranteed more misery to come.

Sunnis, Alawites, and Shi'ites: a sectarian confrontation?

There can be little doubt that in early 2015 domestic support for the Syrian regime derives primarily from Syria's sectarian minorities, particularly Alawites and Christians, amounting to about one quarter of the population, and that the greater part of the Sunni Arab two-thirds of Syria repudiates the regime. The chief ethnic minority, the Kurdish one-tenth, mostly wants to escape Arab Syria altogether. The picture has gray zones. Segments of the Sunni Arab population – bourgeois elements tied to the regime's crony capitalism, salaried personnel within the regime apparatus, secularized professionals fearful of ISIS, and some tribal groups – remain within the regime camp. Sunni members of the loyalist combine at the summit of the regime continue to staff important positions – for example, National Security office head Ali

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7 "Our Full Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad", *Paris Match*, 4 December 2014. http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Our-Interview-with-Syrian-President-Bashar-al-Assad-661984.

8 "Transcript: ABC's Barbara Walters' Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad", *ABC News*, 7 December 2011. http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs-barbara-walters-interview-syrian-president-bashar/story?id=15099152.

9 *Al-Safir*, 4 June 2012.

10 *Al-Hayat*, 15 October 2014.

Mamlouk, Defense Minister Fahd Jasim al-Freij, and political security chief Rustum Ghazale.[11] No one, however, should harbor delusions. This is a residual minority vulnerable to the pain and fury of the Sunni masses targeted and displaced by the regime. On the other side, many poorer Alawite Arabs in the coastal hills derived no benefit from being in the community of the ruling family, and severe losses and sacrifices have produced deep discontent among those not well connected with the regime. Nonetheless, fear of liquidation by Sunni jihadists has kept Alawites firmly behind the Asads, regardless of the fact that many view Bashar al-Asad as thoroughly unworthy.

Whatever the gray zones, the regime's determination to brand its opponents as Sunni jihadist terrorists ensured inflammation of sectarian prejudice. The narrative of a Sunni Islamist monster serving America, Zionism, Turkey's Muslim Brotherhood aligned prime minister, and reactionary Arab oil sheikhs helped stiffen Alawite commitment and fed the ferocity of regime militias. It also aimed to demonize Syrian Sunnis in the wider world. The narrative became a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the military firestorm it sought to legitimize provoked and radicalized young Sunni males, who flocked to Islamist and jihadist militias. Further, the regime's deployment from late 2012 onward of mainly Alawite and minority army and National Defense Force units on front lines intensified Sunni Arab anger.

Sunni sectarian assertion ranged from the Muslim Brotherhood's agenda to impose Sunni Islamic law on society to the maniacal bigotry of ISIS. The Brotherhood rejected the Asads in the late 1970s; it oversaw a rebellion in 1979-1982. Hafiz al-Asad crushed it in Hama in March 1982, also razing much of the city. The Brotherhood fine-tuned its rancor in exile and took an arrogant supremacist stance toward the protest movement after March 2011.[12] Turkey's AKP government and Qatar encouraged its pretensions to dominate the opposition, but it found itself sidelined as jihadists and radical Islamists seized the initiative among Sunnis inside Syria by early 2013. The Brotherhood dissimulated in its perspective on religious minorities; certainly it had no enthusiasm for long-term power sharing. The other Islamists, steeled in the regime firestorm, were unambiguous. Their websites referred to Alawite fighting units in such derogatory terms as *awkar al-nusayriyya* (nests of Nusayris), and in September 2013 Islamist militias committed the first major opposition atrocity by massacring Alawite villagers in a raid toward the coast.

For a while Jabhat al-Nusra was the jihadi spearhead, attracting the allegiance of Sunnis desperate about international apathy toward the flood of

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11 Fatima Nasrallah, "Man hum A'da' al-Daira al-Dayqa al-Muhita bil-Asad (Who are the Members of the Inner Circle around Asad?), *al-Hayat*, 16 October 2014 .

12 Ayman Sharrouf, "The destructive ascendancy of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood", *NOW*, 2 December 2014), provides a sharp, well argued commentary. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/564483-the-destructive-ascendancy-of-syrias-muslim-brotherhood

regime war crimes. However, in April 2013, a split produced ISIS, which abandoned the Nusra focus on destroying the regime in favor of seizing opposition-controlled territory for immediate creation of a fanatic Sunni religious state. For Bashar it was an ideal evolution: ISIS would degrade the whole opposition and turn the international tide to the advantage of the regime and its narrative. The regime took no military initiative against ISIS, and arranged to buy eastern Syrian oil from it.[13] Until August 2014, regime military camps near al-Raqqa coexisted with ISIS command of the town. The ISIS leadership and military command came from Sunni western and central Iraq and comprised a bizarre mixture of religious militants and Ba'thist army officers bitterly resentful of US occupation and Shi'ite ascendancy. Nonetheless, whatever its Iraqi dimension, the new organization owed its existence, its mobilization capacity, and its core territory in eastern Syria to the Syrian firestorm and the impresario of the firestorm – Bashar al-Asad.

Beyond Sunni/Alawite strain and the inflammation of Sunni jihadism, the Syrian crisis has fueled mutual hostility between Sunnis and Shi'ites within and beyond Syria. Twelver Shi'ites, the predominant branch of Shi'ite Islam, are barely two percent of Syria's population, but the regime's principal Middle Eastern confederates are Shi'ite – Iran, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi'ites. In July 2012, when lightly armed Sunni Arab rebels took parts of Damascus and Aleppo and the regime appeared to falter, Bashar's Shi'ite allies came to the rescue, under Iranian coordination. Iran dispatched a training and advisory contingent of veteran revolutionary guards whose significance went beyond their numbers of perhaps a couple of hundred. Their primary function was to establish a National Defense Force (NDF) of tens of thousands, drawing overwhelmingly on Alawites and other minorities, to answer the manpower deficit in the regular forces given distrust of Sunnis and substantial Sunni Arab defections.[14] The NDF would buttress offensive activity, for example around largely Sunni Aleppo, and provide defense of core regime territory. The Iranians succeeded in this assignment in less than a year.

Meantime, with firm Iranian backing, Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'ite militias, the latter collectively termed the Abu Fadl al-Abbas brigade, sent up to seven thousand fighters into Syria from late 2012, making a critical contribution through 2013-2014 to regime campaigns in Damascus, along the Lebanese border, and around Homs. They linked with local Shi'ites near the Shi'ite Sitt Zeinab shrine in Damascus and in a Shi'ite rural pocket northwest of Aleppo.

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13 See Tony Badran, "Minority Report: Is the Link between Assad and the Islamic State a Christian One", *NOW*, 5 September 2014. (") https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/562681-minority-report; and Valérie Marcel, "ISIS and the Dangers of Black Market Oil", Chatham House expert comment, 21 July 2014. http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/15203

14 Consult Sam Dagher's detailed analysis in *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 August 2013, "Syria's Alawite Force Turned Tide for Assad". http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578639903412487708

They emphasized religious solidarity and, increasingly, their mission against "terrorism," meaning the whole Syrian opposition. Their presence also highlighted the Twelver Shi'ite origins of Alawites. After the ISIS lunge into Iraq in June 2014 compelled most Iraqi Shi'ites to return home, Iran imported non-Arab Shi'ites from further afield, for example Hazara Afghanis. Sunni Arab Syrians were deeply outraged by the Iranian role and the infusion of foreign Shi'ites, regarding it as a form of colonization. The joint belligerence of Bashar, Iranian clerical politicians, and Lebanese Hezbollah chief Hasan Nasrallah made future Syrian Sunni Arab reconciliation with both Alawites and Twelver Shi'ites an ever more mountainous task. The regime side naturally denied any sectarian bias and did not fail to parade its own Sunnis, including the Grand Mufti, and its organic linkage with Sunni Islam, but its alignments and military targeting indicated another story.

Syria and Iraq: interpreting spillover

Because of US occupation of Iraq after 2003, exacerbation of Sunni/Shi'ite sectarianism in that country from the 1990s, and global focus on Iraqi oil resources, it has been tempting to view the Syrian crisis as subsidiary to preceding destabilization of Iraq. Superficially, Iraqi antecedents of al-Qaeda inspired Sunni jihadist movements such as al-Nusra and ISIS seem to fit this outlook. Certainly any emphasis on reverberations from US intervention in Iraq suits those uncomfortable with the notion that Arabs might have responsibility for Arab predicaments. It also suits the Syrian regime and its apologists, chiefly interested in any self-serving story that might help to obscure regime barbarism.

Blaming the early twenty-first century mess in Iraq for the post 2010 upheavals across the Arab world has two problems when we consider the Syrian crisis. First, the protest movement and uprising in Syria through 2011, and the vicious behavior of the regime, were Syrian domestic phenomena with no discernable link to Iraq. The only credible external triggering for events in Syria was from the overthrow of the Egyptian and Tunisian rulers, which inspired marginalized populations in Syria's down at heel provincial towns and the depressed countryside of Damascus and Aleppo. Manufacturing causal connections with either the American disaster in Iraq or Israeli-Palestinian affairs can only be nebulous, to say the least.

Second, the main direction of spillover since the behavior of the Syrian regime opened the gates of hell in Syria in 2011 has been from Syria into Iraq – not the reverse. Since 2011, the Syrian crisis has been the engine of upheaval in the eastern Arab world. Courtesy of Bashar al-Asad's driving of millions of Sunni Arabs to desperation, the crisis has converted Syria into the new global center of jihadism and nihilist fanaticism. In brief, Syria has become primary and Iraq secondary in the new integrated arena. In its current "caliphal" configuration, ISIS has been forged in the Syrian furnace, and it can only be

decisively defeated in its eastern Syrian heartland. There is of course no better illustration of the current direction of spillover than the critical extra energy and capacity given to the June 2014 ISIS offensive in Sunni western Iraq by the organization's entrenchment and build-up in eastern Syria. The ISIS plunder of cash and US weapons from Mosul has been substantially taken away to al-Raqqa in Syria, ISIS oil production and smuggling primarily pivot on Syria, and important new weapons acquisitions have come from takeovers of Syrian regime bases.

No rollback of ISIS in Iraq can be secure without reduction of ISIS in Syria, especially while Shi'ite and Iranian hegemony in Baghdad continues to guarantee Iraqi as well as Syrian Sunni rejection of the prevailing order. In January 2015, after five months of bombing by the US and its partners, ISIS expansion persisted in Syria. Meantime, campaigning alongside the Obama administration's air assault on ISIS with its own intensified indiscriminate unloading of barrel bombs on civilians, the Syrian regime sought to associate the US with its war crimes. The US wanted only to shore up a "federal" Iraq as the legacy of its vast expenditure in that country and did not even want to hear about Syria, but there was no exit from its new military embroilment in Iraq without somehow addressing the anger of Syrian Sunni Arabs.

Is the Syrian war a proxy war?

Syria's crisis is frequently described as a "proxy war," with the implication that the local combatants are little more than puppets of external sponsors, and that some grand bargain among the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia would dispose of the problem. Given that the main dynamic of the warfare has been a local fight to the finish over command of the state, the parties are not proxies in this sense. The Syrian regime probably conceives the Iranians and Russians as more dependent on it than vice versa. Virtually the entire armed opposition deeply distrusts the Obama administration. Turkey adopted a policy of removing Bashar that had no practical underpinning, and has faced a credibility gap on that account. The jihadists follow their own path in their own universe. And Syrian Kurds are determined that Syria will cease to be qualified by the word "Arab." In short, there are worldviews and bottom-line demands that will frustrate attempts at imposition, even assuming coordination among the aspirant patrons.

It is worth taking four external players that have become involved in the Syrian arena -Russia, the US, Iran, and Turkey- and comparing their roles and influences with the local parties. Russia and Iran have committed themselves to salvaging Bashar al-Asad and the regime, while the US and Turkey have toyed with selected elements in the fragmented opposition. Through almost four years, Russia and Iran have given Bashar freedom of maneuver to wreak extraordinary havoc, enabling regime survival but not decisive regime recovery. They present an appearance of irrevocable entanglement with the regime

that can only embolden Bashar, feeding a conviction that he can hold out on his own, steering allies who are supplemental rather than critical. As for the armed non-jihadist opposition, practical support from the US and Turkey has always been tightly constrained, contrasting with pompous American and Turkish rhetoric against the regime. Most of the non-jihadist opposition feels that it has endured more than three years on its own, and it is not minded to take much notice of miserly "friends" who will do their own deals at a moment's notice, particularly the US with Iran.

Russia had a long-standing relationship with the Asads, dating back to Soviet times, and a continuing presence of advisors and interest in arms deals. Above all, however, the Russians feel the West took advantage of their acquiescence in UN approval of "humanitarian" military intervention in Libya to implement regime change, and that this reflected Western contempt for Moscow. They determined that there would be no repetition in Syria, and exerted their veto power in the UN Security Council to paralyze international initiatives against the Syrian regime.

Russia and Iran played complementary roles in defense of Bashar. The Russians provided the international cover and maintenance of major weapons systems that was beyond the Iranians. Iran supplied the financial flows to pay Russia, counteract Western sanctions, and ensure viability for the regime's war economy. Iran also mobilized foreign Shi'ite fighters to compensate for the regime's manpower deficit, and upgraded exploitation of the Syrian Alawite demographic base. For Iran, the Syrian regime anchored the Iranian Shi'ite theocracy's strategic extension into the eastern Mediterranean, principally to Lebanon's Shi'ite community and Hezbollah. Only thus could Iran pursue its ideological mission against Israel, and preserve Hezbollah's Iranian and Syrian sourced missile arsenal as a deterrent against an Israeli assault on Iranian nuclear facilities. With reach to the Mediterranean, Iran could also bother the new Egyptian military regime and outflank Turkey, these two plus Saudi Arabia being its rivals for regional power. Without Damascus, Iran would be shrunk back to a defensive position in the Persian Gulf, and even Iraqi Shi'ite Arabs might look elsewhere.

In such a landscape, Bashar al-Asad could readily imagine Russia and Iran as his prisoners. Certainly they happily parroted his regime's narrative of its war against terrorism, and betrayed little appreciation of their provocation of Sunni Arabs in Syria and beyond. The Syrian regime's near-certain responsibility for the large-scale poison gas attack on opposition suburbs of Damascus in August 2013, killing more than one thousand civilians, probably represented Bashar taking his allies for granted. Both the Russians and Iranians were undoubtedly embarrassed, and the Russian backing for Syrian chemical disarmament may well have been as much to restrict Bashar as to forestall US military action. In late 2014, the ISIS surge demonstrated the magnitude of the "black hole" created by Bashar, regime manpower difficulties persisted de-

spite Iranian efforts, and US aerial bombing of ISIS in Syria with no recourse to the UN Security Council set a precedent that might at some point extend to bombing the regime.[15] Russia at least had incentives to cash its chips; its promotion in December 2014 of contacts in Moscow between the Syrian regime and opposition personalities possibly reflected this.

Proxy conflict requires patrons with credibility among their supposed clients. Russia and Iran had credibility with the Syrian regime, even if the serenely rigid and self-important Bashar al-Asad made it difficult to discern who exactly was in the driver's seat. In contrast, this basic condition failed to apply to relations between armed opposition factions and both the United States and Turkey, supposedly their patrons. The Syrian uprising coincided with the American recoil from massively expensive and poorly managed ground interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. There was no chance of anything beyond highly circumscribed air strikes and carefully limited arms supplies from any US administration, though these would probably have been enough for the requisite psychological impact on the Syrian regime.

The Obama administration proved belligerently non-interested in Syria, the more so as the Syrian crisis became the world's leading humanitarian and geopolitical nightmare. The US went through the motions of declaring that Bashar had "lost legitimacy" and endorsing exiled opposition coalitions and "moderate" rebels. Yet American refusal of any deterrence against a Syrian air force engaged in constant outrages against civilians, proclamation of fake red lines against use of poison gas, and hints of weapons supplies that only intermittently eventuated confused and infuriated Syrian rebels. Deserted by the West and pressed to the wall by the regime, the armed opposition fragmented, trended toward fierce jihadism, and repudiated the well-heeled politicians in exile that the US favored.

US relations with Sunni Arabs inside Syria became fraught when the US began bombing ISIS in Syria in September 2014, effectively partnering with the Iranians in Iraq while bombing alongside the Syrian regime's continuing air strikes against civilians in Aleppo and elsewhere. The US left the regime untouched while it targeted non-ISIS jihadists such as al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, popular with the Syrian opposition public. President Obama sent a reassuring message to Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei,[16] but ignored the Syrian people. Amid all this, the US drip-fed weapons to selected opposition factions and expected whatever was left of the "moderates" to be its ground force against

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15 Ibrahim Hamidi, "Rusiya tabda' Sira'an ma'a Iran – 'ala Suriya" (Russia opens a Rift with Iran – concerning Syria), *al-Hayat*, 4 December 2014), examines Russian and Iranian positions in light of the US campaign against ISIS.

16 Jay Solomon and Carol Lee, "Obama Wrote Secret Letter to Iran's Khamanei About Fighting Islamic State", *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 November 2014). http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-wrote-secret-letter-to-irans-khamenei-about-fighting-islamic-state-1415295291

ISIS in Syria. It was a breathtaking array of contradictions that only made sense in terms of President Obama's priority of a US bargain with Iran.

Turkey expressed formal dedication to a new Syria free of the Asads, a bridge too far for the Obama administration. Partly because of the absence of US leadership, the Turkish government otherwise drifted into policies and activity that were unviable and counter-productive. Having effusively patronized Bashar al-Asad before the Syrian uprising, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan turned against the Syrian dictator in August 2011, after Bashar spurned brotherly advice for reforms. There was clear personal animosity in Erdoğan's embracing of regime change in Syria that fitted poorly with a Turkish public unenthusiastic about military intervention and Erdoğan's own impetus to upgrade economic and political interactions with Iran and Russia. Through 2012 and 2013, Erdoğan expected Barrack Obama to exert the essential hard power against Bashar, always a fatuous expectation. Turkey was reduced to hosting an inundation of refugees and to taking occasional air actions to keep Syrian warplanes and helicopters a little away from the border fences.

In the search for any instrument to use against Bashar, Turkey's Islamist inclined government adopted a permissive posture toward Syria's expanding Islamist and jihadist organizations. This played into Bashar's narrative of a terrorist opposition inspired from outside. It also enhanced Turkey's vulnerability to spillover from Syria, Turkey being the only one of the four external players featured here to neighbor Syria directly. Foreign jihadists, many from Western Europe, transited through Turkey to Syria, while ISIS built networks in Turkey that by 2014 were a menace to their host.[17] Competing Arabian Peninsula sponsors of jihadists could interact with their competing clients in Syria via Turkey, threatening the "moderates" and less ferocious Islamists that Turkey preferred. Turkey failed to constrict a dangerous jihadist dynamic that handicapped any sort of Syrian opposition that the wider world could endorse. Turkey itself felt the consequences in June 2014 when ISIS seized Mosul and took forty-six Turkish staff of the Turkish consulate hostage.

Dereliction – not proxy management – would seem the better description of US and Turkish approaches to the Syrian crisis. The US abandoned Syrians to desperation and radicalization, while Turkey simply floundered. This, however, did not necessarily mean that Bashar al-Asad, Iran, and Russia would win.

Imagining futures

Looking ahead, three questions arise. First, what seems the most likely path into the future, and what are the implications? Second, given that the likely

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17 "Looking for ISIL [ISIS]: How jihadists operate among Turks", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 September 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/PrintNews.aspx?PageID=383&NID=7205

future is appalling, what alternative future might be imagined? Third, given conflicts of interest, entrenched intransigence, and the awesome scale of the mess, can the alternative be achieved?

Both the bottom-line stances of the parties inside Syria and their capabilities and characteristics relative to one another make a long haul on the battlefield with a military outcome the leading scenario. A long haul probably does not favor the regime, because of its restricted demographic reservoir. Nonetheless, the greater commitment of regime allies Iran and Russia compared with backers of the non-jihadist opposition means that the regime's advantage in weaponry and expertise can keep it afloat in its heartland, including the capital, for years yet. Certainly the regime no longer commands the resource base to re-impose itself across Syria unless it acquires a long breathing space in which the opposition loses its Arab and international sympathizers. Through 2014, despite Iran, Russia, and massively superior firepower, the regime fell back south of Damascus and was unable to achieve a siege of rebel-held eastern Aleppo. It also lost a major air-force base to ISIS immediately the latter decided to quit tolerating a regime presence near al-Raqqa. Saudi Arabia and Western powers have an interest in non-jihadist pressure on Damascus from the Syrian/Jordanian border, while Turkey may be infusing advisory and material support to keep Aleppo open to the Syrian/Turkish border. This is far short of real proxy warfare, but even such minimal involvements negate regime advantages.

The qualification to protracted stalemate is potential collapse of two sides in the triangular contest of the regime, the non-jihadist opposition, and the ISIS and al-Nusra jihadists. For the regime, collapse means a breaking-apart of the Alawite community under the stress of First World War level depletion of the adult male population, perhaps expressed in a coup against Bashar al-Asad. There would then be a scramble for Damascus and advantage in a new triangular contest of non-jihadists, ISIS, and al-Nusra. For the already splintered non-jihadists, the prospect of being endlessly squeezed by the regime, ISIS, and al-Nusra with little relief from the Arabs, Turkey, and the West may bring morale collapse, expressed in desertion to the jihadists or flight from Syria. Indeed, it is a wonder that they persevere into 2015. Despite the aerial campaign of the US and others against ISIS in Syria since September 2014, the jihadists are unlikely to fall down in the war environment. Ultimately their fanaticism and nihilism guarantee their unviability, but meantime they have taken hold of Syrian Sunni Arab fury at Bashar al-Asad's firestorm. Only regime change can begin to draw down this poison. Our main problem with assessing the predicaments of the sides is shortage of information. There is only a scattering of impressions from within the Alawite community or the jihadist apparatus. We know more about the non-jihadists, whether Islamists or not, but that merely suggests the incongruity of their persistence.

From early in the crisis there has been complete political incompatibility of the sides, and no shift in that incompatibility. As regards the "transition administration" proposed in the international community's 2012 Geneva guidelines, former UN special envoy Brahimi noted in late 2014 that the regime's "extreme limit" remained assimilation of some mild critics into a government subordinate to Bashar, "without any basic change."[18] For the Western backed coalition of opposition politicians in exile, this was intolerable: the opposition would take the lead in a transition government with full security powers; Bashar and his inner circle would depart; and no one from the regime side with "blood on their hands" would participate. For the armed opposition within Syria, transition was treason: the Asad regime would be dismantled; a tribunal would try its leaders; and there would be a new Syria directly. For the jihadists, Syria would either be a Sunni Islamist emirate, according to Jabhat al-Nusra, or the nucleus of an inflating terrorist caliphate, according to ISIS. Only the politicians in exile and segments of the non-jihadist armed opposition still contemplate political pluralism and power sharing. Otherwise outcomes mean either continuation of Ba'thist autocracy or location somewhere on a spectrum of Sunni Islamist dictatorship running from Wahhabi style *shar'ia* rule to the most outlandish fanaticism.

In 2015, the death toll from violence of well over 200,000 since March 2011 seems set to rise to 300,000 and beyond. Dangerous spillover both for the neighbors and the West looms: more than three million angry refugees are a ticking time bomb for radicalization, and Syria has become the new top sanctuary for global Sunni Muslim jihadism. Enough of the Sunni Arab majority blames Bashar al-Asad and is sufficiently embittered to make any regime resurgence ephemeral. On the one hand, the regime will look for any device to forestall collapse, even clandestine nuclear collaboration with Iran and North Korea. On the other hand, Syrian Sunni Arabs will fight on in whatever conditions, including US enticements to Iran at their expense.

What new Syria might have a chance of offering a modestly hopeful future? We cannot pretend that ethnic-sectarian sentiment does not exist. It is only one facet of the identity of Syrians, but it has been massively inflated since 2011 by the regime's firestorm. The country has become divided according to ethnic-sectarian communities: the regime's core territory and support are heavily Alawite; the Kurds have established autonomy across northern Syria; and the rest is under Sunni Arab warlords, the most dynamic of whom are also the most sectarian. A new Syria would have to reflect both the fact of the Sunni Arab majority and the imperative of ethnic-sectarian power sharing – the latter would be both geographical and built into representative institutions. In parallel, the Syrian state cannot house pluralism or a range of freedoms until it is purged of the existing regime. This is above all the case for the security

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18 *Al-Hayat*, 15 October 2014.

institutions, which have been instruments of mass murder. Another necessary condition for reducing the ghastly legacy of the present war is an accounting for the criminality of all parties; Syria will need international aid for the tribunal without which it cannot have social health. These parameters might seem impossible, but without them there is only war or tyranny.

Obviously this new Syria requires removal of Bashar al-Asad and deflation of the jihadists. In January 2015, neither is on the horizon. As a substitute for progress toward a political resolution, for which the prospects are currently zero, there have been proposals for local cessations of hostilities, whether defined as cease-fires or freezing conflict.[19] In the Syrian war these ideas are tainted by association with the regime's imposition of terms on several Damascus suburbs by starvation through 2013-2014. They rest on the pious hope that a period of calm will make it difficult to resume hostilities, but without progress toward a general settlement the natural tendency is for the sides to retool for the next round of hostilities. Here the regime has the advantage of reliable allies, and from the military perspective the non-jihadist opposition would be mad to gift it the breathing space. The suggestion that the international community fund reconstruction in such an environment, with no assurance that hostilities are over, is preposterous, apart from the distasteful implication that Western taxpayers reward Bashar al-Asad for wrecking Syria.

The highway not the byway is the route to resolution in Syria. This means the US and the EU affirming the necessity of regime change in Damascus. Unfortunately, in line with President Obama's fixation on an agreement with Iranian theocrats regulating the latter's nuclear project, rationalized as avoiding war and facilitating understanding, the US and the EU are also heading toward laxity with Iran's Syrian protégé, which will be taken by Bashar as endorsement. The Iranian theocratic regime logically has two imperatives: a nuclear agreement with deficient oversight that can be flouted, and an ending of Western sanctions that will reinvigorate its financial capability, among other things to pursue hegemony over Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, manipulating Alawites and Shi'ites. In early 2015, the Iranian leadership, stung by the Saudi assisted collapse of oil prices, looks to Obama to relieve it of the Saudis. US and EU laxity with Bashar and Iran will darken the outlook in Syria because it will vindicate the regime in its absolutist obduracy. Sunni Arabs will fight on regardless, even more envenomed, including against the West. Only regime change in Damascus can open a road to deflating Syrian Sunni Arab support for jihadists and closing down the new global Sunni jihadist base in Syria.

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19 For discussion of the concepts of Nir Rosen and UN envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, see David Kenner, "Rewriting Syria's War," *Foreign Policy*, 18 December 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/18/syria-assad-ceasefires-surrender-nir-rosen-hd-centre-report/

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ARAP İSYANLARI SIRASINDA HİZBULLAH'IN DİRENCİ

ÖZ

Daha çok Lübnan İslami Direniş olarak bilinen Hizbullah (Allah'ın Partisi) 'terörist' küresel erimi ve militan yüzü ile kötü bir üne sahiptir. 1980'lerde ve 1990'ların başında Hizbullah Lübnan'da Batılıları kaçırmış ve 2000'li yıllarda askeri güçleri geri çekilinceye İsrail ordusu ile savaşmıştır. Arap Baharı/İsyanlarında, Hizbullah Suriye rejimin yanında savaşmış ve Iraklı ve Yemeli Şii askeri milislere logistik destek sağlamıştır. Hizbullah pan-Arapçılık ve pan-İslamcılık parametreleri çerçevesinde bir kayma yaşarken, sahip olduğu Lübnan ulusal kimliğini merkezde tutmaya devam etmektedir. Buna rağmen, Hizbullah militanlık ve entegrasyon arasında hareket etmektedir; ilki Hizbullah'ın Arap İsyanları sırasındaki şahin politikasını temsil etmekteyken, ikincisi meşruiyet devşirdiği Lübnan'ın ayrılmaz bir parçası olmasına dayalı güvercin yüzünü göstermektedir. Bu kayma Sünni-Şii ayrışmasını yada nifakını (fitne) beslemekte, Lübnan topraklarında Hizbullah ve Lübnan ordusunun IŞİD ve Nusra Cephesi ile savaşmasının ardından ciddi bir şekilde Suriye iç savaşının Lübnan'a taşması tehdidini ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Baharı/İsyanları, IŞİD, hegemonya, infitah (açılım); Sünni-Şii nifakı (fitnesi), güç boşluğu, Suriye, Lübnan

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حركات التمرّد العربية ومقاومة حزب الله

جوزيف الاغا

خلاصة :

يملك حزب الله، الذي يعرف اكثر ما يعرف بالتمرّد الاسلامي اللبناني، شهرة سيّئة باهدافه العولمية ''الأرهابية'' وبما يتّصف به من فعليات ميليشياته. فقد مارس حزب الله في الثمانينات وبدايات التسعينات من القرن الماضي عمليات خطف الغربيين، مثلما حارب ضد الجيش الاسرائيلي في بدايات القرن الحادي والعشرين الى حين انسحاب قواته العسكرية. وقد حارب حزب الله الى جانب النظام السوري في احداث التمرد ابّان ايام الربيع العربي، كما قام بتأمين التعبئة اللوجيستية للميليشيات الشيعية العراقية واليمنية. وبينما نجد حزب الله يعيش انحرافا في اطار معايير العروبة والاسلام، فانه يستمر في نفس الوقت في الحفاظ على مركزية هويته اللبنانية الوطنية. وبالرغم من ذلك، فان حزب الله يتحرّك بين الميليشيائية وبين التكامل. وبينما يمثّل اولهما سياسة الصقر لحزب الله خلال حركات التمرّد العربية، فانه يظهر في الجانب الآخر وجه الحمامة المستند على كونه جزءا لا يتجزّأ من لبنان الذي يجنّد المشروعية في خضمّه. ان هذا الانحراف يعمل على تغذية التفرقة او النفاق (الفتنة) السنّية – الشيعية، كما يظهر للعلن تهديدا جديا لنقل الحرب الاهلية السورية الى لبنان في اعقاب مشاركة حزب الله في حرب الجيش اللبناني مع تنظيم داعش وجبهة النصرة.

الكلمات الدالّة : الربيع/ حركات التمرّد العربي، داعش، السيطرة، الانفتاح، النفاق (الفتنة) السنّية – الشيعية، فراغ السلطة، سوريا، لبنان.

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HIZBALLAH'S RESILIENCE DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

ABSTRACT

Hizballah (The Party of God), better known as the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, is infamous for its 'terrorist' global reach and militant face. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Hizballah abducted Westerners in Lebanon and fought the Israeli Army until Israel withdrew its forces in 2000. In this Arab Spring/ Uprisings, Hizballah is fighting alongside the Syrian regime and lending logistical support to the Iraqi and Yemeni Shi'ite armed militias. Hizballah seems to shift within the parameters of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, while maintaining its Lebanese national identity at the center. Notwithstanding, Hizballah moves between militancy and integration, the former exemplifies its hawkish policy during the Arab Uprisings, while the latter illustrates its dovish domestic face of being an integral part of the Lebanese state, from which it derives its legitimacy. This shift fueled Sunni-Shi'a divide or discord (fitna), threatening a serious spillover of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon after ISIL and Nusra battled Hizballah and the Lebanese Army on Lebanese soil.

Keywords: Arab Spring/Uprisings; ISIL; hegemony; infitah ('opening-up'); Sunni-Shi'a discord (fitna); power vacuum; Syria; Lebanon

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Introduction

The Lebanese political party Hizballah labels itself as an Islamic *jihadi* movement, whose primary concern is the preservation of its identity in light of the Arab Uprisings/Spring, which resulted in dramatic developments and turmoil that are rupturing the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While al-Qa'ida's offshoot *The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant* (ISIL) wrecks havoc in the MENA, especially in failing states such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, Hizballah did not remain idle. The 'Shi'ite' resistance movement Hizballah joined the Syrian regime, and to a lesser extent, the Iraqi regime[1] in their fight against 'Sunni' transnational anathema (*takfiri*) *jihad*. Hizballah dubs as *takfiri* the Sunni militants who are nibbling the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity, in a regional and international war where superpowers and regional powers are contesting spheres of influence. Russia, China, Iran, and Hizballah support the Syrian regime; while the US, France, Britain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia support the moderate rebels, who have been trying to topple the Syrian regime for the past four years. After ISIL declared its war against the US and Western Europe and beheaded US and British citizens, on October 15, 2014 'Operation Inherent Resolve' was born: a US-led coalition of 40 countries, including Saudi Arabia[2], Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan.

In conformity with its *realpolitik* (realist) policy to change as circumstances themselves change, one could argue that the Lebanese Hizballah is not monolithic. The party's internal structure allows it to operate on a number of levels. Hizballah is a sophisticated, complex, multifaceted, multilayered organization, composed of at least four main divisions: (1) the 'military wing': the *jihadi* and 'terrorist' branch; (2) the social services, NGOs, and civil institutions branch; (3) the 'political wing' branch; (4) the cultural politics branch or 'resistance art'.

Hizballah's Anathema

Hizballah witnessed remarkable transformations in the past three-plus decades. From its founding as an Islamic movement of social and political protest during 1978–1985, it evolved into a full-fledged social movement between 1985 and 1991, and then into a parliamentary political party from 1992 to the present.

Hizballah defines its identity as an Islamic *jihadi* (struggle) movement, "whose emergence is based on an ideological, social, political and economic

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1 By November 2014, Hizbullah has lost more than 1000 fighters, around 2000 wounded and many handicapped in its war of attrition against the Sunni militants in Syria and Iraq.

2 The Saudi King vehemently bashed ISIL and its medieval mindset, arguing that their particles have nothing to do with Islam, which preaches tolerance and acceptance of the other.

mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context."[3] Its roots can be traced back to 1978, which coincided with the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr[4] and the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon. By the efforts and under the auspices of leading Iranian hard-line clergy and military figures such as 'Ali Akbar Muhtashami and Mustapha Shamran, combined with the endeavors of the first and second Hizballah Secretary Generals, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli and Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, Hizballah's nucleus was established. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, many Lebanese Shi'ites saw in Imam Khumayni their new leader. During the same period, Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi officially founded 'The Hizballah of Lebanon', supported by his students and other leading *'ulama* (religious scholars).[5]

In the 1980s, Hizballah pursued the establishment of an Islamic state from the perspectives of both religious ideology and political ideology. This era was characterized by Hizballah's religious capital[6] (Iranian *marja'iyya*, or authority of emulation); political capital[7] and symbolic capital (Islamic Resistance's war and suicide/ 'martyrdom' operations against Israel in the south and the *Biqa'*, northeastern part of Lebanon); economic capital[8] and social capital[9] (social institutions targeting only Shi'ite grassroots); and Islamic Jihad's acts as symbolic capital (honour and dignity). Symbolic capital corresponds to someone's

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3 'Identity and Goals' is Hizbullah's 2004 self-description. See Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), p. 60.

4 Musa al-Sadr, one of Hizbullah's ideologues, was a charismatic and distinguished leader, who mobilized the Lebanese Shi'ites in the 1960s and 1970s and was able to channel their grievances into political participation. Al-Sadr never called for an Islamic state, rather for equality and social justice among the various denominations, which form the myriad of the Lebanese multi-confessional system.

5 Tawfiq Al-Madini, *Amal wa Hizbullah fi Halabat al-Mujabahat al-Mahaliyya wa al-Iqlimiyya [Amal and Hizbullah in the Arena of Domestic and Regional Struggles]*. Damascus: Al-Ahli, 1999, 172.

6 According to Pierre Bourdieu, religious capital refers to the way religious knowledge is appropriated and disseminated. Bourdieu used the term religious capital in 'Genèse et structure du champ religieux', *Revue française de sociologie*, Vol. 12, 1971, pp. 295-334. See also the English translation 'Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field', *Comparative Social Research*, Vol. 13, 1991, pp. 1-44.

7 'Political capital is everything that enables leaders to get anything done. It's their reputation, their ability to make the newspaper, their statutory role, their friends in the community, the amount of money they can raise, the number of people who support them, the length of time people are willing to pay attention to them and a lot more than that as well'. See http://www.theaesthetic.com/NewFiles/capital. html (Accessed 5 July 2005). Thus, political capital is present in both Hizbullah's political ideology and political program.

8 Economic capital corresponds to 'stocks and shares but also the surplus present in very high salaries". Brigit Fowler, 'Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theory of culture'. *Variant*, Vol. 2, Summer 1999, p. 2. According to Kane, 'economic capital refers to material wealth in the most common sense of the word'. Ousmane Kane, *Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition*, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), p. 22.

9 Social capital is 'the network or influential patrons that you can use to support your actions'. (Fowler, 'Pierre Bourdieu's…', 2). Simply stated, social capital is contacts, acquaintances, and the practice of durable social networks.

reputation, honour, distinction, and prestige. Bourdieu defined symbolic capital as the 'degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration or honor [dignity, possessed by someone and] founded on the dialectic of knowledge and recognition'.[10]

Fragmented public spheres existed in Lebanon as cantons – confessionally based mini-states within the Lebanese state. During the mid-1980s, the issue of establishing cantons along sectarian lines was high on the agenda of many political parties, including the Christian ones. For instance, Habib Matar[11] stated in 1986 that his call to the Vatican of establishing a Christian state in Lebanon should not be viewed as a call for the disintegration of Lebanon; rather, he clarified that the Christian state would be erected on all the Lebanese soil. Matar questioned, 'Why don't the Christians in the East have a shelter or a small state?' When he was asked what the Muslims should do, he replied: 'It's their own problem. There are a lot of vacant areas in the Arab world [where they can go], or let them be governed by the Christian state, and this is better for them'.[12] A similar view was earlier announced by the Phalangist Leader, the late ex-President Bashir Gemayyel who said in 1982 that the Maronites were aiming at converting Lebanon into a Christian state where all the Christian Arabs could reside.[13]

In Hizballah's case, founding a Shi'ite canton in the areas under its control, would have implied establishing a replica of an Islamic state in miniature. For instance, unlike the Lebanese Forces and Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)[14], Hizballah neither established a mini-state – with its own ports, airports, taxation, and civil administration – within the Lebanese state, nor did Hizballah call for federalism. In 1986, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizballah's current Secretary General, stressed that the Muslims have no right whatsoever to even entertain the idea of a Muslim canton, a Shi'ite canton, or a Sunni canton… Talking about cantons annihilates the Muslims, destroys their potential power, and leads them from one internal war to another. Only the Islamic state upholds their unity.[15]

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10 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 7.

11 Back then, the deputy president of the National Liberal Party (*Hizb al-Wataniyyin al-Ahrar*). See http://www.ahrar.org.lb/news.asp?id=120

12 *Al-Masira* last week of March 1986.

13 As to the borders of the alleged Maronite state, Z'aytir claims they are constantly expanding. See Muhammad Z'aytir, *Al-Mashru' Al-Maruni fi Lubnan: Juzuruhu wa Tatawwuratuhu [The Maronite Project in Lebanon: Roots and Development]* (Beirut: Al-Wikala Al-'Alamiyya lil-Tawzi', 1986), p. 14. Since this book contains 1136 pages of severe political-ideological bashing against the Maronites, it is officially banned in Lebanon. (The book's cover portrays a blue map of Lebanon with a black cross situated in its midst).

14 See respectively http://www.lebanese-forces.com/ and http://www.psp-lb.org/

15 *Al-'Ahd* 95 (9 *Sha'ban* 1406/ 18 April 1986), 11.

The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the spark that reignited Hizballah and led to its formation as an Islamic *jihadi* movement. The Islamic Resistance, Hizballah's military wing, made some breakthroughs in the face of the Israeli army that advanced towards Beirut and led a campaign of resistance against the Israeli Forces (IDF)[16] after they occupied the Lebanese capital. Leading Hizballah cadres such as Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the current Secretary General, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, the current head of Hizballah's political council (Politburo), and Husayn al-Musawi[17] were all AMAL[18] members. These, among others, were later totally against AMAL joining the Lebanese cabinet.[19] Therefore, these radicals abandoned AMAL and joined the ranks of existing Islamic Shi'ite groups – including members of the *Hizb Al-Da'wa Al-Islamiyya* ('The Islamic Call Party'), *Itihad al-Lubnani lil Talaba al-Muslimin* ('The Lebanese Union of Muslim Students')[20], as well as independent active Islamic figures and clerics – and established Hizballah to oppose the Israeli occupation, with the material support of Iran and backing from Syria.[21] These groups came together in fighting the Israeli occupation and built the backbone of the party, and most importantly its 'resistance identity'. Their later achievements in addressing the socio-economic grievances, resulting from the Israeli occupation, gained the party a solid ground among the grassroots of Lebanese society.

After operating for some years anonymously underground for security reasons, on 16 February 1985, Hizballah became a noticeable player in the Lebanese political system when it publicly revealed its Political Manifesto or Open Letter, which disclosed its religio-political ideology, thus signalling its open engagement in Lebanese political life.[22] In the Open Letter, Hizballah disclosed a radical-militant approach that regarded the Lebanese political system as infidel by nature, and considered the Lebanese government as being an

16 Ironically, Hizbullah notes that the name 'IDF' is itself a euphemism since the 'aggressor' is labelled as the 'defender'.

17 At the time, he was head of the Islamic AMAL, and later served as Nasrallah's aide for municipal affairs. Currently, he is a member of Hizbullah's parliamentary bloc.

18 AMAL, the Lebanese secular Shi'ite political party with a military wing, was founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr at the outset of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.

19 Nabih Berri, the current leader of AMAL and the Speaker of the Lebanese parliament, has repeatedly stated that AMAL gave birth to Hizbullah.

20 Established in 1966. See Waddah Sharara, *Dawlat Hizbullah: Lubnan Mujtama'an Islamiyyan [The State of Hizbullah: Lebanon as an Islamic Society],* (Beirut: Al-Nahar, 2006, Fourth edition, pp. 87). It is worth mentioning that Shaykh Na'im Qasim, Hizbullah's current deputy Secretary General, was one of its leading founding members.

21 Talal Salman, *Sira Dhatiyya li Haraka Muqawina 'Arabiyya Muntasira: Hizbullah [An Autobiography of a Victorious Arab Resistance Movement: Hizbullah],* (Beirut: *Al-Safir*, June 2000), p. 7.

22 'Ali Al-Kurani, a Hizbullah middle rank cadre, was the first to expose the social movement's mobilization strategies in his book entitled, *Tariqat Hizbullah fi Al-'Amal Al-Islami [Hizbullah's Method of Islamic Mobilization],* (Tehran: Maktab Al-I'lam Al-Islami: Al-Mu'assa Al-'Alamiyya, 1985), pp. 183-203.

apostate, that should be uprooted by a top-down revolutionary process and be replaced by the rule of Islam.

Hizballah's reputation as an Islamic resistance movement has been marred by the West's accusation of 'terrorist' operations of global reach; the majority of which were claimed by the Islamic Jihad.[23] Some of the hard power attacks which made Hizballah gain global attention were the US embassy suicide attacks on 18 April 1983[24] and 20 September 1984; the 23 October 1983 twin-suicide attacks that led to the death of 241 US marines[25] and 58 French paratroopers; the Buenos Aires bombing of the Israeli embassy on 17 March 1992[26]; and the holding of Western hostages. The Israeli government and the US Administration claim that Hizballah's Islamic Resistance constitutes a semi-clandestine organization and that Islamic Jihad is its clandestine wing.[27] In an endeavor to ward off the charges of terrorism, Hizballah's ideologues, leaders, cadres and intellectuals voice a consensus that has systematically and constantly denied any connection or link to Islamic Jihad or acts it has claimed as its own.

Since its inception, Hizballah has adopted Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship of the jurisprudent) as its ideology in the Lebanese social and political conditions. Khomeini's *wilayat al-faqih* was imported to Lebanon, serving as a blueprint for a progressive Islamic state to be emulated by Hizballah in its constituencies. Illustrating the vital importance given to becoming a member of '*Ummat Hizballah*', a Hizballah cadre told me, on condition of anonymity, that a person who tried to join the party but failed the process of screening (*ta'tir*) that Hizballah's prospective members undergo three times returned with an assault rifle and killed his recruiting

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23 The now defunct 'Islamic Jihad' was at the time the spearhead of radical Shi'ite military factions mobilized on the ideology of fighting Israel, the US, and the West. This Shi'ite 'Islamic Jihad' should not be conflated with the Sunni Islamic Jihad, a Palestinian organization founded by Fathi al-Shaqaqi and Abd al-Aziz 'Awda in Syria during the 1970s.

24 According to US political analysts, this incident served as a blueprint for the Marine's bombing six months later. On this basis, it ought to have served as an omen to the CIA to try to prevent the Marine's bombing. Brent Sadler, 11 GMT News, *CNN,* 23 October 2003. The death toll of the US Embassy in West Beirut was 63 people, out of whom 17 were Americans, including the entire Middle East contingent of the CIA. Ann Byers, *Lebanon's Hezbollah -Inside the World's Most Infamous Terrorist Organizations-,* (London: Rosen Publishing Group, 2003), pp. 26-35.

25 The same sources claim that the 12,000 ton explosion was the largest non-nuclear device that resulted, in one instance, in the largest number of US casualties since WWII. Until now, the US holds Iran and Hizbullah responsible for the incident. Ibid., 28-33.

26 In retaliation to Israel's assassination of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbullah's second Secretary General, on 16 February 1992.

27 Shaul Shay, *The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizbullah, and the Palestinian Terror*, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), pp. 89-100; Byers, op. cit, pp. 36-49; Ely Karmon, *Fight on all Fronts: Hizbullah, the War on Terror, and the War on Iraq*, Policy Focus, no. 46, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2003), pp. 1-29.

officer. Another member told me that as a practice of indoctrination and as an initiation ceremony, new Hizballah recruits had to repeatedly state: 'If the jurisprudent told you to kill yourself, then you have to do it'.[28] This illustrates not only indoctrination but also the total obedience to the *faqih*.

In the early 1980s, Khomeini instructed 'Ali Khamina'i, who was at the time Deputy Minister of Defence, to take full responsibility of the Lebanese Hizballah. Since then, Khamina'i has become Hizballah's 'godfather'. That is why, since its inception, Hizballah, based on a religious and ideological stance, fully abides by the ideas and opinions of Khomeini as communicated by Khamina'i. During that initial period, the religious/ideological bond between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon could be examined from the following declarations by Hizballah and Iranian officials—Shaykh Hasan Trad: 'Iran and Lebanon are one people in one country'; Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid: 'We do not say that we are part of Iran, we are Iran in Lebanon and Lebanon in Iran'; Ali Akbar Muhtashami: 'We are going to support Lebanon politically and militarily like we buttress one of our own Iranian districts'; Shaykh Hasan Srur: 'We declare to the whole world that the Islamic Republic of Iran is our mother, religion, *Ka'ba*, and our veins'.[29]

In the 1980s, Hizballah advocated the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and maintained the *ahl al-dhimma* category with respect to non-Muslims.[30] In spite of its exhortation of Christians to convert to Islam, Hizballah did not seek to impose this conversion by force. Rather, the party applied its theory of tolerance to those Christians living in its constituencies, as well as to other Christians, as long as they were not 'treacherous or aggressive'. In conformity with the Prophetic tradition and the Qu'ran, Hizballah stressed that there should be 'no compulsion in religion' (Qur'an 2:256) and an 'equitable world' (Qur'an 3:64) or common ground that should guide relationships between Muslims and Christians. As such, it emphasized that the common ground between *ahl al-dhimma* and Muslims involves the social values of mutual tolerance, respect, brotherhood, and solidarity. On this basis, Hizballah recognized the human freedom, that is, social and religious freedom, of Christians but *not* their political autonomy, as was the case in the 1926 French Mandate Constitution and 1943 Independence Constitution. Thus, in the 1980s, contrary to the Prophetic tradition that granted non-Muslims partnership in political structures, Hizballah's 'tolerance' or 'inclusiveness' excluded Christians from political life, which could be regarded as a discriminatory practice. Hizballah's then policy seemed to imply that toler-

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28 Mahdi N. and 'Abdallah S., interviews by the author conducted in Beirut, October 21 and 25, 2004, respectively.

29 *Al-'Ahd* 8 (21 Dhul-Qadah 1404/August 17, 1984): 6.

30 Minorities, such as Christians and Jews, were treated as residents holding limited rights and required to pay a poll tax in lieu of almsgiving (*zakat*).

ance is the responsibility of the 'majority' and integration is the responsibility of the 'minority'.

Therefore, in the 1980s Hizballah became a closed sectarian social movement. Through heavy reliance on a strict application of Imam Khumayni's *wilayat al-faqih* (guardianship by the jurisprudent), 'Hizballah – The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' emerged as an internally strong organization with limited following. Al-Tufayli repeatedly stressed Hizballah's aim of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon as part of an all-encompassing regional Islamic state, headed by Iran. This unprecedented commitment to the Islamic state in Lebanese political discourse backfired domestically alienating Hizballah from other political and social movements, and from an effective position within the Lebanese political sphere. Thus, Hizballah's policies were counterproductive, leading to the failure of its integration into Lebanese political life.

Since 1985, there developed a number of changes in Hizballah's ideological identification with Iran's ruling elite. Hizballah argued that during the early phase of its formation, it needed a unifying religious-political ideology, rather than an elaborate political program. Thus, it based itself on *wilayat al-faqih* and regarded Khomeini as the jurisconsult of *all* Muslims.[31] In the beginning, the organization was, ideologically, completely dependent on Khomeini. Later on this dependency witnessed some leeway, in the sense that Hizballah did not blindly follow the Iranian regime; rather, it had some specificity (*khususiyya*), since in his capacity as the Supreme Leader (*Rahbar*), Khomeini was endowed with the sole right to determine the legitimacy (legitimate authority) of Hizballah. Khomeini highlighted certain precepts within which Hizballah could move freely; however, he left their implementation to the party's discretion. Thus, although Hizballah was ideologically dependent on the Iranian regime, it had some room to maneuver in its decisions pertaining to some cases in Lebanese domestic affairs. Even though the fragmentation of religious authority, that is, the multiplicity of *marja'*s among the Shiites, continued after Khomeini's death, in Hizballah's case the issue of *marja'iyya* was determined on the doctrinal-ideological basis of following the official *marja' al-taqlid*, who is recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, Hizballah's religious authority was and still is the Iranian *faqih*. This made the transition after Khomeini's death smoother.

Up until 1991, Hizballah considered the Qur'an as the constitution of the Islamic Umma and Islam as both a religious and a governmental order (*din wa dawla*). The party enjoined Muslims to strive, using all legitimate means, in order to implement the Islamic order, wherever they might be.[32] In the

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31 Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *National Broadcasting Network*, July 21, 2002.
32 'Ali al-Kurani, op. cit, ; Muhammad Z'aytir, *Nazra 'ala Tarh Al-Jumhuriyya Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan* [A Look at the Proposal of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon] (Beirut: Al-Wikala Al Sharqiyya lil-Tawzi', 1988).

period 1985–1991, Hizballah regarded the Lebanese political system, which was dominated by the political Maronites (Catholic Christians), as a *jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic pagan) system. It applied this classification to every non-Islamic system: be it patriotic, democratic, or nationalistic, even if it were governed by Muslims.[33] In other words, Hizballah pursued the establishment of an Islamic state from the perspective of religious and political ideology. The religious ideology, as Hizballah's leading cadres argued, enjoined adherents to instate God's sovereignty and divine governance on earth through *hakimiyya* and to execute God's law by instituting an Islamic order as a *taklif shar'i* (religious and legal obligation). According to the political ideology, Hizballah did not want to impose an Islamic order by force unless an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese voted in its favour through a referendum. This should be taken with apprehension since Hizballah's rhetoric was different from what it was actually doing on the ground; it was actively engaged in preparing the way for establishing an Islamic order, through a bottom-up process, at least in its constituencies.

Hizballah's Integration in the Political System

In its third stage of evolution, from 1992 onwards, Hizballah has experienced a considerable ideological shift. Hizballah succeeded in adding electoral politics to its political capital (Sunnis and Christians on Hizballah's electoral slates). Hizballah's clandestine military organ, the Islamic Jihad disappeared from its symbolic capital; the prominent role was given to Hizballah's semi-clandestine military wing, the Islamic Resistance. Finally, Hizballah accumulated more social and economic capital by way of the benefiting of Sunni and Christian grassroots from its NGO's services, which could be regarded as one of the measures or social dynamics of the Party's *infitah* ('opening-up') policy. Thus, Hizballah reinterpreted its seemingly irredentist[34] ideology and evolved, more and more, into an 'ordinary' political party, with an extensive network of social services (open to both Muslims and Christians), and participated in parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work.

As a prelude to contesting the 1992 legislative elections, Hizballah gained more resources, moderated its discourse, initiated several policies to broaden its appeal to a larger constituency, and embarked on further institutionalization. Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, Hizballah's second secretary-general, initiated a policy of openness (*infitah*) and dialogue toward the Lebanese myriad[35]. Af-

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33 Muhammad Z'aytir, *Al-Mashru' Al-Maruni fi Lubnan: Juzuruhu wa Tatawwuratuhu.*

34 Because of Hizbullah's adherence to, and following of, *wilayat al-faqih* − which is a transnationalist ideology. Irredentism refers to the 'dissatisfaction with the incongruity between territorial borders and [Benedict Anderson's] "imagined communities" '. See Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of Middle East States*, (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 7.

35 The Lebanese myriad or mosaic refers to the ethnic composition of the Lebanese communities that comprise Lebanon, including the officially recognised 18 sects.

ter al-Musawi's death, his student and successor Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the third secretary-general, continued this process of mobilization and organization at the grassroots level to support advocacy in and outside of parliament.[36]

The year 1992 was a central year in shaping Hizballah's evolving identity. The party faced a challenge in deciding whether to participate in the parliamentary elections or not. Hizballah's twelve-member committee took a positive decision after much heated internal debate and discussions, followed by Iranian arbitration (*tahkim*). Since the *faqih* is the one who determines 'legitimacy' (even in practical political matters), Khamina'i had to intercede and grant legitimacy for participation. This caused a considerable schism within Hizballah, because Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizballah's first secretary-general, contested the decision and pursued a confrontational stance with the party and the Lebanese state. Al-Tufayli held a high post in the leadership of Hizballah in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, he later created minor dissent in the party for reasons that apparently were socioeconomic ('Revolution of the Hungry' in 1997) but, in fact, involved control of the Ba'albak region. Al-Tufayli today represents that category of Hizballah member who still upholds the Iranian revolutionary ideology of the 1980s. He repeatedly accused Hizballah of 'protecting the borders of Israel' since it prevents *jihadis* from targeting it or crossing the border, and he criticized Iran for 'serving the interests of the US'. Al-Tufayli emphatically stated, 'This is not the Hizballah I founded, and this is not the Iran of Khomeini'.[37]

Asef Bayat has noted that Islamic movements like Hizballah are constituted of many layers and orientations that make up a collectivity, but one that is fluid and fragmented. This collectivity remains coherent when its leaders are successful in creating a hegemonic reading of events that gains consensus among its followers. This means that there is always a danger of losing adherents due to integration or moderation. This can lead the more radical elements of the social movement, such as al-Tufayli, to leave the movement because they disagree with the course it is taking.[38]

By giving an extended interpretation to the doctrine of *wilayat al-faqih* – i.e. applying it to the Lebanese multi-confessional, multi-religious society, rather than to 'monolithic' Iran, with its predominantly Shi'ite majority – the committee strongly recommended participation in the elections. This was in harmony with Hizballah's holistic vision, which favored living up to the expectations of the people by serving their socioeconomic and political interests. The committee added that Hizballah's greater *jihad* and dedication to addressing

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36 Joseph Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 38–42.

37 See Subhi al-Tufayli, interview by Tha'ir 'Abbas, *al-Sharq al-Awsat* 9067 (September 25, 2003).

38 Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.

the plight of the people did not contradict its priority of a smaller military jihad for the sake of the liberation of occupied land. As such, participating in elections would lead to the achievement of good political results and could also be regarded as a leading step toward interaction with others. By this, Hizballah presents a novel experience in the *infitah* ('opening-up') of a young Islamic party. The committee stressed that this participation was in accordance with the Lebanese specificities (*khususiyyat*) as well as the nature of the proposed elections, which allowed for a considerable margin of freedom of choice. In short, the committee concluded that the sum total of the pros (*masalih*) outweighed the cons (*mafasid*) by far. That was why participation in the parliament would be worthwhile, since it was viewed as one of the ways of influencing change and making Hizballah's voice heard, not only domestically but also regionally and internationally through the podiums made available to the members of parliament.[39] Thus, it seems that political circumstances, the Ta'if Agreement -Lebanon's new 1990 constitution- and the end of the civil war forced Hizballah to adjust to a new phase in its history by propagating a matter-of-fact political program and by merging into the Lebanese political system.

A further shift occurred in the interpretation of the authority of the jurisprudent (*faqih*) when Hizballah argued that it did not consider the current regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran as the jurisconsult of all Muslims and, in consequence, not all Islamic movements had to abide by the orders and directives of the *faqih* or the regime.[40] Religious capital was consolidated when, in May 1995, Imam Khamina'i appointed Nasrallah and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, head of the religio-judicial council, as his religious deputies (*wakilayn shar'iyyan*) in Lebanon. This move granted Hizballah special prerogatives and delegated responsibilities (*taklif shar'i*) that reflect a great independence in practical performance. Thus, Hizballah consolidated its financial resources, since the one-fifth religious tax (*khums*)[41] imposed on those Lebanese Shiites who followed Khamina'i as their authority of emulation (*marja'*), as well as their alms (*zakat*) and religious (*shar'i*) monies, would pour directly into Hizballah coffers, instead of being channelled through Iran, as had been the case.

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39 Na'im Qasim, *Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustaqbal* [Hizbullah: The curriculum, the experience, the future], 7th rev. and updated ed. (Beirut: Dar Al-Mahajja Al-Bayda', 2010), pp. 337–343.

40 Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *National Broadcasting Network,* August 4, 2002.

41 One-fifth: a 'religious tax' comprising 20% on a person's surplus of income over necessary living expenses according to the Shi'ite interpretation of the Qur'anic verse (8:41): {'And know that whatever booty you take [in war], the fifth thereof is for Allah, the Apostle, the near of kin, the orphan, and the wayfarer, if you really believe in Allah and what We revealed to Our servant on the day of decision [battle of *Badr*, decision between the forces of faith and unbelief], the day when the two hosts meet. Allah has power over everything'}. Half is paid to the *marja'* (religious authority) as the representative of the Imam (*sahm al-Imam*), and half to the Sayyids. Noteworthy, the more followers a *marja'* has, the more powerful he is, both financially and religiously.

The interpretation of authority took another dramatic shift after the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005. In conformity with its policy to change when circumstances change, Hizballah switches from Iranian to local authority when it suits its purposes. Although the watershed decision to participate in the Lebanese cabinet ideologically required the *shar'i* judgment and legitimacy of the *faqih*, Hizballah set a precedent by securing religious approval and legitimacy from Shaykh 'Afif al-Nabulsi[42]—at the time, the head of the Association of Shi'ite Religious Scholars of Jabal 'Amil in south Lebanon—and not Khamina'i, a move that indicates even more independence in decision making.

Thus, Hizballah heeds Lebanese religious authority in addition to the Iranian one, and therefore, its participation in the Lebanese cabinet was relegated to an administrative matter, not a doctrinal one. Consequently, Hizballah's leadership was capable of taking independent decisions. Instantly, Hizballah joined the cabinet with two ministers and proliferated in Lebanese state institutions and the administrative structure just before the conservative Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his government were sworn to power in Iran. This led to increased Lebanonization that is more in line with the specificities (*khususiyyat*) of Lebanese society, rather than blind adherence to Iran.

Therefore, Hizballah moved from complete ideological dependency on Khomeini to much less dependency after his death. The party gained more independence in decision making, not only in practical political issues but also in military and doctrinal issues, to the extent that it seems as if Hizballah exercised almost independent decision making, at least in some cases. Even in military matters, Hizballah does not always heed Iranian orders if they do not serve its overall interest (*maslaha*[43]). Two cases in point that illustrate this trend are Sharon's 'April 2002 West Bank counterterrorism offensive' and Barak's December 2008–January 2009 'Operation Cast Lead' in Gaza. Iran strongly urged Hizballah to open the northern front across the Lebanese–Israeli border in order to release pressure on the Palestinians,[44] but Hizballah adamantly refused because such a move was considered detrimental to its national interest (*maslaha*). This trend continued after Ahmadinejad won a second term in the controversial June 2009 presidential elections, and president Ruhani's ascension to power in 2013.

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42 Al-Nabulsi argued that from a political standpoint there was a certain wisdom and interest (*maslaha*) that called upon Hizbullah to participate on the basis of the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence. He added that the political situation lifted any prohibition on Hizbullah's participation since it safeguards law and order in Lebanese society (*National News Agency*, 10 August 2005; and see Lebanese daily newspapers the next day).

43 *Maslaha* has an Islamic connotation. It refers to one of the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (*qawa'id al-fiqh*), which states that the avoidance of vice is always preferable to any benefit that might accrue from the act.

44 This information is based on interviews I have conducted with high-ranking cadres, including members of the Consultative (*Shura*) Council.

Although Hizballah was inspired by the Islamic Revolution, it operates like any ordinary political party functioning within a non-Islamic state and a multi-religious confessional and sectarian state. Hizballah cannot go beyond being a political party operating within the Lebanese public sphere. That is why, for instance, in the parliamentary elections, it reached out and allied itself with secular parties and former enemies on the Lebanese scene, like any political party that accommodates protest via negotiations and bargaining, making compromises on some doctrinal aspects. In the process, Hizballah moved from separation to integration into Lebanese society, eventually becoming part of the national state. Hizballah's voting behaviour in the legislature progressively shifted from (1) voting against granting confidence to the cabinet between 1992 and 1996 to (2) abstaining between 1998 and 2004 to (3) voting for confidence since 2005, the year the party joined the cabinet. Thus, Hizballah granted its approval only after it participated.

These changed framing processes and new mobilization tactics are evidence of Hizballah's attempts to transcend communal boundaries by creating imagined solidarities and having partially shared interests with other communities.[45] This is necessary since the existing Lebanese political system mandates intercommunity cooperation, which suggests that Hizballah has learned to operate within the established political framework. Furthermore, the party needs to be careful not to revert to its extremist image because this could lead to a loss of the resources it gained due to its moderation. Hizballah as a social movement gained political power in this stage of its evolution. This empowerment reinforces its identification with its national context, though not at the expense of its regional and transnational solidarities.

Hizballah shifted its political strategy from a gradual integration in the Lebanese public sphere in the 1990s, to attempting to manipulate the Lebanese public sphere after the assassination of PM Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, and to endeavoring to exercise hegemony over the Lebanese public sphere after the 'Second Lebanon War' in the summer of 2006 by means of changing the political system through obtaining veto power in the cabinet, the main executive branch of government.

The tug-of-war between the Hizballah-led opposition (March 8 Group), on the one hand, and the Lebanese cabinet and its supporters (March 14 Trend), on the other, led to bitter polarization, which plunged Lebanon into 537 days of stalemate and political deadlock, from December 1, 2006, to May 21, 2008. Tensions reached unprecedented highs and the snowball exploded in May 2008 into violent military confrontations in the streets of the Lebanese capital and Mount Lebanon.

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45 Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly* 26.6 (2005): 891–908.

The 'Doha Accord' of May 21, 2008, between March 14 and March 8, negotiated by the Arab League, granted Hizballah veto power in the next national unity thirty-member cabinet by a margin of eleven ministers, while March 14 acquired sixteen ministers, and the president, three. Hizballah ended its sit-in in downtown Beirut and dismantled its tent city. After six months of vacuum in the seat of the presidency, the consensus president, army commander general Michel Sulayman, was elected on May 25, 2008, by 118 votes out of 127 MPs.

Hizballah flexed its military muscle in order to gain veto power, which proved to be a short-term political gain. However, the experience was negative in the cabinet since it led to the paralysis of the state institutions, an eventuality that convinced the party to discard this newly gained political capital. The hegemony wave subsided after the Hizballah-led opposition lost the 2009 legislative elections. Hizballah took a reality pill and contended itself with minor political gains for the sake of upholding the fragile consensual democracy, the fulcrum of the political system.

Hizballah as a Major Player in the Lebanese Fabric

While pursuing policies that work within the electoral fabric of Lebanon, Hizballah did not abandon its rhetoric vis-à-vis the *wilayat al-faqih*. In fact, it legitimized its political program of working within a multicultural, multi-religious country with reference to *wilayat al-faqih* without encroaching upon its doctrinal-ideological, Islamic-religious convictions.[46] In May 2008, after March 8 gained veto power in the Lebanese cabinet, Nasrallah reiterated, I am honoured to be a member of the party of *wilayat al-faqih*. The just, knowledgeable, wise, courageous, righteous, honest, and faithful faqih… *Wilayat al-faqih* tells us [Hizballah] that Lebanon is a multi-confessional, multi-religious country that you have to preserve and uphold.[47]

With this unshakable commitment to *wilayat al-faqih*, Hizballah reformulated what it meant by an Islamic state by making a categorical distinction between *al-fikr al-siyasi* (political ideology), which it maintained, and *al-barnamaj al-siyasi* (political program), which it promoted. From an ideological perspective, Hizballah is committed to an Islamic state, and it will not be dropped as a legal abstraction. However, the party's political program has to take into account the political status quo and the overall functioning of the Lebanese political system. Hizballah characterizes the Lebanese political situation as a complicated mould of sectarian-confessional specificities that prohibit the establishment of an Islamic state, not only from a practical perspective but also from a doctrinal one. Hizballah's political ideology stip-

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46 Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, cited in Hasan 'Izzeddine, "How Is Hizbullah Looked Upon and How Does It Introduce Itself?" *Al-Safir*, November 12, 2001.

47 *Al-Intiqad* 1267 (May 30, 2008).

ulates that an Islamic state should be established on solid foundations having full legitimacy and sovereignty from the people. Since the general will of the Lebanese people is against the establishment of an Islamic state, then it is not plausible to establish one.

In an atmosphere of optimism, Hizballah revealed its new political platform on 30 November 2009 when it reconstructed its identity by forging a second Manifesto, which presents a complete overhaul to its 1985 founding document, the Open Letter.

Although the 2009 Manifesto neither mentions the Islamic state nor refers to *wilayat al-faqih*, Nasrallah affirmed that there is no contradiction/opposition between Hizballah's belief in *wilayat al-faqih*, on the one hand, and the erection of a strong institutionalized Lebanese state, on the other. On the contrary, *wilayat al-faqih* sanctions and allows Hizballah's integration into the political system. Not only that, in line with the Vatican's position and papal guidance, Nasrallah added that Hizballah believes that Lebanon is a blessing and has accomplished great historical achievements. He reiterated Imam Musa al-Sadr's stance that 'Lebanon is the definitive nation to all its citizens', which is in conformity with the Lebanese constitution.[48]

Thus, Hizballah shifted its position through its acceptance of and engagement in the democratic process under a sectarian-confessional political and administrative system. More dramatically, Hizballah's political program modified its demand for the abolition of political sectarianism and adopted the political Maronite discourse, which stresses the abolition of political sectarianism in mentality before eradicating it in the texts. In line with the Ta'if Agreement and its earlier election programs, Hizballah's 2009 Manifesto called for the establishment of a 'National Body for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism', since sectarianism is perceived as a threat to consensual democracy and national coexistence.[49] Although Nasrallah deemed the sectarian system a tribal system, he clarified:

> Let us be realistic. The abolition of political sectarianism is one of the most difficult issues and cannot be accomplished overnight. . . . [N]obody can dictate how to abolish it in a sentence or two. Rather, if after years of debate, ranging from five to thirty years, we find out that political sectarianism cannot be abolished, then let us be bold enough to say that what we agreed upon in the Ta'if Agreement cannot be realized. However, till then, the Lebanese need to found the 'National Body for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism' in order to initiate the debate in a constructive manner.[50]

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48 Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, press conference, broadcasted live on *Al-Manar* TV, 30 November 2009, at 13:30 GMT.

49 Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents*, 32.

50 Nasrallah, press conference, 30 November 2009.

The 2009 Manifesto delineates an almost complete Lebanonization of Hizballah, at least in discourse, since it no longer included transnational links such as wilayat al-faqih and the Islamic state in its primary frame of authority. Furthermore, it gives primacy to the national political arena for achieving national goals that would be beneficial to all Lebanese. Moreover, the manifesto represents Hizballah's ideological shifts in assimilating into the political system to accomplish its goals through political initiatives and continued cooperation with other parties. It seems this manifesto might signify Hizballah's trajectory toward a post-Islamist trend in practice, thus transcending Islamism, its exclusivist platform, and evolving in the pluralistic political reality of Lebanon, even though certain Islamist rhetoric might still be voiced and although Hizballah's political interests keep it an ally of the Islamist regime in Iran.

Hizballah laid the groundwork for this precept of practice earlier. On 26 May 2008, the party celebrated the eighth anniversary of the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon through a fiery speech delivered by Nasrallah, who stressed that Hizballah abides by the Ta'if Agreement, will honour the Doha Accord to the letter, and will continue to participate in the political system as it is. Nasrallah's stance remained the same after the fiasco of March 8 to acquire the majority of the seats in the June 2009 legislative elections. Hizballah gave up its veto power and helped to broker a national unity cabinet on 9 November 2009, based on the previously agreed-on power-sharing formula: fifteen seats for March 14, five seats for the centralist coalition of the president, and ten seats for March 8. Although Hizballah ruled Lebanon by democratic means in 2011 when it obtained majority in the parliament and the cabinet, it represented itself with only two ministers, while it gave its Christian allies 12 ministers, including the ministries of defense and interior. Since then, in the recurring cabinets, contrary to its military power and demographic strength, in an endeavor to uphold consensual democracy, Hizballah contented itself with two ministers and ceded other ministerial seats for the sake of national unity and coexistence. Further measures of political compromise, such as conceding ministerial quotas to Sunni and Christian representatives in the cabinet, suggest that Hizballah remains committed indeed to a mode of governance that is inherently communal, pluralist, and representative.

From Terrorism and Global Reach to the Arab Spring

Hizballah is infamous for its 'terrorist' global reach and militant face. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Hizballah abducted Westerners in Lebanon and fought the Israeli army, until Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2000, after 22 years of occupation. Hizballah reaped political capital and boosted its pan-Arab and pan-Islamic credentials as being the only guerrilla movement that forced Israel to withdraw and return land, while regular Arab armies succumbed to Israel's military might. In the wake of the 2011 Arab Revolutions,

the new policy shift resulted in Hizballah's loss of most of its accumulated pan-Arab and pan-Islamic capital since the party was viewed as a sectarian movement aiding Shi'ites, irrespective if they were oppressors or oppressed. In this Arab Spring/Uprisings, Hizballah is fighting alongside the Syrian regime and lending logistical support to the Iraqi and Yemeni Shi'ite armed militias. So, how could such a radical organization continue to exercise militancy and deplete its resources in regional wars, while at the same time it plays a prominent role in Lebanese domestic politics, thus ironically earning it legitimacy for its regional adventures from the Lebanese state and its institutions?

Hizballah's Stance on the Arab Spring

Hizballah was elated by the Tunisian and Egyptian street politics and youth power. In this Arab Spring, Hizballah issued political declarations blessing the Tunisian and Egyptian people, in particular, and the Arab masses, in general, for their drive for 'freedom and dignity.' Hizballah's Secretary General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah added, 'This is the true path when people believe in their resolve… this is the new Middle East created by its own people.' He concluded, 'Your Spring has begun; no one can lead you to another winter. Your belief, vigilance, and resilience will overcome all difficulties and make you triumphant.'[51]

Hizballah supported the Arab street with the exception of Syria, where it adamantly stood by the Syrian regime, its indispensable strategic ally. Hizballah lent its coreligionist Bahraini populace unwavering support in the face of the Sunni ruling elite. This stance led some political analysts to criticize such 'double standards'. Being on the defensive, Nasrallah tried to defend, justify, and legitimize Hizballah's policies. In terms of geopolitics, Hizballah has repeatedly stated that it would not interfere in any military attack targeting Syria and Iran, unless there is an existential danger facing the two regimes, whereby Hizballah's joining the fight would tilt the balance in favor of the aggressed upon parties. Therefore, Nasrallah repeatedly stated that Hizballah will only resort to fighting in Syria in case of extreme necessity.

Hizballah's Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the Lebanese Repercussions

On May 25, 2013, Nasrallah deemed it an existential necessity and blatantly announced that Hizballah has entered the Syrian fight on the side of the regime. Invoking the 'Divine Victory' legacy of 2006 July War with Israel, Nasrallah emphatically promised his constituency another victory, which materialized on June 12, 2013, when the party 'liberated' *Qusayr* from the Syrian opposition fighters.[52]

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51 Joseph Alagha, *Hizbullah's Identity Construction*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 188.
52 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=27814&cid=141#.UaXNXaFKSSo

Employing anti-takfiri discourse, Hizballah interfered in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria in order to protect its back and fend off the militant Sunni fundamentalist threat originating from there. Of course, Hizballah's military involvement was welcomed by its strategic ally, the Syrian regime, which considers it a boost in its fight against 'armed gangs' South Lebanon Army (SLA) and 'international terrorism' or 'jihadis affiliated with al-Qa'ida', as the Syrian regime labels the military opposition. Hizballah accused the Free Syrian Army (FSA) as being traitors, collaborators with the 'enemy', as the defunct SLA did during the IDF occupation of southern Lebanon. As such, Hizballah accused the FSA of furthering the Israeli-US agenda in the Middle East, or of creating the 'New Middle East of Condoleeza Rice', the ex-Secretary of State.

Domestically, Hizballah traded accusations with the Western-backed *March 14* coalition, which compared Hizballah's military intervention in Syria with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) occupation of Lebanon in order to protect Israel from the attacks of the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance. According to *March 14*, Hizballah behaved like the IDF by invading and occupying land and encroaching on the 'sovereignty and territorial integrity' of Syria, a UN member country, in order to protect its back.. Furthermore, *March 14* argued that Hizballah's involvement in the Syrian civil war is diminishing its availability across the Lebanese-Israeli border and is distracting its vigilance in dealing with any Israeli imminent threat.

Due to its strategic interest and its fear of losing its backyard, its 'vital space' (élan vital), as well as an easy weapon's supply route, Hizballah involved itself in the Syrian quagmire. It sent fighters, in spite of the heavy blood price it has to pay and the fear of depleting its human and material resources, especially after losing fighters everyday. Sayyid Nasrallah conceded Hizballah's limited capabilities and argued that his party cannot change the outcome of the Syrian war, but can offer logistical and material help to the Syrian Army and train it for guerrilla warfare: 'We went to Syria to defend Lebanon… we did it by a personal decision, rather than heeding an Iranian order.' Nasrallah accused Saudi Arabia of waging proxy wars in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and more importantly in Syria by its material and military support of radical Islamist groups fighting the regime.[53]

In addition to many radical Lebanese Sunni Islamists volunteering to fight against the Syrian regime, jihadi Salafis such as the Shaykh Ahmad al-Asir of Sidon and Shaykh Salem al-Rāfi'i of Tripoli sent fighters en masse. The Sunni-Shi'a strife (*fitna*) in Lebanon appeared to be unavoidable. On June 23, 2013, violent military clashes in Sidon erupted between Hizballah and

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53 See his interview with *OTV* on December 3, 2013, and his speech of December 20, 2013, commemorating the assassination of Hassan al-Laqis, a leading cadre of the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah's military wing.

Shaykh Ahmad al-Asir supporters. After many dead and wounded fell, the Lebanese Army intervened and ended the fight, but at a high price. Al-Asir's headquarters were destroyed and many of his supporters were arrested. Al-Asir fled and his whereabouts are unknown to date. My omen became a painful reality when, on November 19, 2013, two supporters of al-Asir conducted a twin-suicide operation against the Iranian Embassy, located at *Dahiya* – the heart of Hizballah's den and stronghold of the southern suburb of Beirut, killing 23 people. Previously, the *Dahiya* was targeted by rockets and two massive explosions: the first on July 7, 2013 led to a few deaths, while that of August 15, 2013, killed 31 people, after which Hizballah agreed to the deployment of the Lebanese Army and security forces. On January 16, 2014, a suicide bomber detonated a car in *Hirmel*, Hizballah's stronghold in the *Biqa'*, killing two and wounding more than 46. For the next two days, the Syrian Islamists continued to target *Hirmel* with sporadic rockets. On January 21, 2014, another suicide bomber detonated a car in *Dahiya* killing three and wounding 35 people.

On September 28, 2013, violent confrontations erupted between militant Sunnis and Hizballah fighters in the *Balbaak*, in the outskirts of the Eastern *Biqa'* valley. As was the case in *Dahiya*, this eventually led to the deployment of the Lebanese Army and security forces in the city, thus returning sovereignty to the state after the apparent failure of private security measures for a second time. On August 23, 2013, two car bombs targeted two Sunni mosques in Tripoli, north Lebanon – the second largest Sunni city after Beirut. Regular skirmishes and seven mini-wars in Tripoli erupted between the Sunnis, who support *March 14*, and the 'Alawis, who support the Syrian regime. In short, unfortunately, what *Hizballah's DNA* admonished against two years ago – namely that the Syrian uprising will spill over to Lebanon with drastic and detrimental consequences, the most salient of which is the feared *fitna* – became a painful reality.

In August 2014, the most serious spillover of the Syrian civil war occurred when takfiri jihadis from the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and "Victory Front" (*Jabhat al-Nusra*) raided and occupied the border town of *'Irsal*. The Lebanese Army intervened. After a few days, the takfiris were defeated and they headed back to Syria, but they were able to kidnap 30 Lebanese soldiers and security forces personnel. To the time of writing this article, the takfir's executed four Lebanese military, threatening more executions if the Lebanese government does not comply with their demands and release a number of hardcore Sunni militants responsible for earlier deadly confrontations with the Lebanese Army. On December 2, 2014, the takfiris ambushed seven Lebanese Army soldiers – near the arid boarder area of *Ras Ba'albak* – killing six and wounding one. Therefore, the tendency of targeting the Lebanese Army and Security Forces is on the rise.

Power Vacuum in Lebanon in Light of the Syrian Crisis and the Regional Dynamics

Domestically, the Syrian civil war led to a political deadlock/stalemate and an unprecedented political paralysis. Lebanon was witnessing a power vacuum, the paralysis of institutions, and the hovering omen of civil unrest. Hizballah benefited from the Arab Spring in order to spread its hegemony over Lebanon through democratic means. In January 2011, the party and its allies forged a majority in the parliament and formed a cabinet. The cabinet collapsed two months before Hizballah's overt acknowledgement of involvement in the Syrian quagmire on May 25, 2013. Although a national unity cabinet headed by PM Tammam Salam took the helm of government in February 2014, the Syrian quagmire made it difficult for it to operate efficiently. Nominal power vacuum has been reigning in Lebanon, where there are no properly running institutions and the rule of law is compromised. In March 2013 and November 2014, the parliament extended its mandate twice – something unprecedented since the end of the civil war in 1990 – thus, down trotting popular will and sovereignty. The office of the President has been vacant since May 2014. This situation increased sectarian tensions, especially the Sunni-Shi'a divide or discord (*fitna*). In spite of the relative stability of Lebanon, like the Arab Uprisings, the country lacks a clear ideological vision, unified leadership, and has serious problems with institutionalization and constitutionalism.

It seems that power vacuum in Lebanon serves Hizballah's interests, although the discourse of its leading cadres is otherwise. Hizballah is buying time until the tide changes in its favor: it engages in diplomacy, negotiations, bargaining, and is ready to make concessions in the power-sharing Lebanese 'consociational'/consensual democratic political system.

Conclusion

Hizballah witnessed remarkable transformations in the past three decades: from its founding as an Islamist movement of social and political protest anathematizing the political order and regarding the Lebanese state as an apostate in the 1980s, to a parliamentary political party since 1992. The party has indeed reformulated some of its central ideas and strategies. In response to the Lebanese national context, the country's multi-religious realities, and the new post-civil war possibilities of successfully operating within a democratic system, prompted Hizballah to integrate into the Lebanese political system. Its political ideology changed in so far as its leaders meanwhile concede that the establishment of an Islamic state would need the full legitimacy and sovereignty from the Lebanese people. Hizballah's former top-down strategy of forcibly imposing an Islamic state against the will of significant parts of the Lebanese society has changed toward an integrative, bottom-up strategy. Hizballah's metamorphosis could be attributed to changed historical and social

circumstances and, more importantly, to the results of interactions with other political actors. Thus, the objective, sociological, and political reality of Lebanon compelled this originally Islamist movement onto the post-Islamist path, even though such post-Islamism remains inconsistent, selective, and pragmatic. It seems Hizballah is still experimenting with the tenets of post-Islamism.[54]

Through heavy reliance on a strict application of Khomeini's *wilayat al-faqih* in the 1980s, 'Hizballah—The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' emerged as a strong internal organization with a limited following. Subhi al-Tufayli's firm, uncompromising political discourse, and his repeated references to the establishment of an Islamic state, which was unprecedented in Lebanese political discourse, backfired domestically, considerably alienating the party from other political and social movements and from the Lebanese public sphere. Thus, Hizballah's policies were counterproductive, leading to a failure to integrate into Lebanese political life, especially after the party's initial vehement criticisms of the Ta'if Agreement.

Since the early 1990s, Hizballah regarded founding an Islamic state as a 'legal abstraction' and dropped its demands for its implementation in Lebanon. This paved the way for the party to employ the concept of *muwatana* (citizenship) instead of *ahl al-dhimma*. Hizballah's intellectuals based this current practice on a novel interpretation of the Prophetic tradition, as sanctioned by Shiite jurisprudence. Thus, since the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, Hizballah has made great strides forward in acknowledging the human, civil, economic, social, cultural, and most importantly, political rights of the so-called ex-*dhimmis*, recognizing their right to full citizenship, as citizens of equal status and rights. This is not a rhetorical shift; rather, it is a major policy alteration, which is being implemented, and it is aimed at making the 'other' secure in a shared Lebanese polity that might one day be dominated by the Shi'ite majority. With this new policy of alliances, diplomacy, negotiations, and bargaining, Hizballah has been able to spread its wings and flanks to a tangible part of the Christian constituents of the country.

Hizballah's commitment to the Arab Spring seems to be selective, pragmatic, contextual, and circumstantial. Hizballah is consistent in its discourse of maintaining its ideological alliance with Iran and its strategic-political alliance with Syria, as its 2009 Manifesto states.[55] The party is a strong advocate and practitioner of *realpolitik*. As a thoroughgoing realist, Hizballah changes as circumstances themselves change: the party neither hesitates to go against the concept of popular sovereignty nor to interfere, or encroach upon, the sovereignty of other states, regionally (Syria) and internationally (Hizballah's alleged 'terrorist activities' and 'global reach'). It seems Hizballah is facing

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54 Joseph Alagha, "Hizbullah's Infitah: A Post-Islamist Trend?" in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, ed. Asef Bayat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 240-254.
55 Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents*, 129-131.

the dilemma of asserting *raison de la nation* (pan-Arabism/pan-Islamism) or *raison d'etat* (state sovereignty). Most likely, its 'strategic' intervention in Syria has compromised both, including its ideology of supporting the 'oppressed' over the 'oppressor.' Through fuelling Sunni-Shi'a discord (*fitna*), Hibullah has weakened its pan-Islamic credentials by buttressing the state sovereignty of the Syrian regime at the expense of people's sovereignty. This seems to be in accord with the international community, which prefers a weakened Syrian autocratic regime to stay in power to radical Islamists ruling the country. After more than four million refugees[56] fled to Syria's neighboring countries of Turkey, Jordon, Lebanon[57], Iraq, and Egypt, the international community has done little to help. If a political settlement is difficult to broker, then the efforts of the international community ought to converge on solving the humanitarian crisis. Still not enough aid is being delivered, and many Syrian refugees, especially children, are dying in the cold and suffering from malnutrition and diseases. In the beginning of December 2014, the U.N.'s World Food Program suspended its aid to the Syrian refugees due to lack of funds. In order to preclude a humanitarian and security crisis, Lebanon called for a 'crisis response plan' aimed at dealing with the 1.2 million registered Syrian refugees residing in the country. Ross Mountain, the U.N. resident coordinator in Lebanon, made the case of an urgent need to deliver aid to keep the county with the highest percentage of refugees to its population stable. Ninette Kelley, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Lebanon, reiterated Mountain's concern of lobbying the international community to donate the estimated $2.1 billion needed to keep the crisis at bay. Will the international community deliver? Alternatively, will its costly war on ISIL preclude such a humanitarian commitment?

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56 Only 1.7 million are registered at the UN.

57 By the acknowledgement of the international community, there are one million and 50 thousand officially registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon (*LBCI*, December 15, 2013). On January 15, 2014, the Lebanese Caretaker PM Najib Miqati announced in Kuwait – at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria – that the Syrian refugees are estimated to number one-fourth of the Lebanese people. See Lebanese daily newspapers the next day; *Al-Afkar* 1640 (January 20, 2014): 30.

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ARAP BAHARI'NIN İRAN'IN ORTADOĞU POLİTİKASINA ETKİLERİ

ÖZ

Bu makale, Arap Baharı'nın İran'ın Ortadoğu politikası üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Arap Baharı'nın etkilerinin sonradan ortaya çıkan gelişmelere bağlı olarak zamanla değişmesi nedeniyle İran'ın bu dönemde tutarlı bir bölge politikası geliştiremediği iddia edilmektedir. Arap isyanlarının İran'ın önünde açacağı düşünülen fırsatlar gerçekleşmemiş, üstelik İran'ın bölgesel siyaseti için yeni tehditler ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, Arap isyanlarının başlangıcında oldukça iyimser olan İranlı liderler zamanla daha ihtiyatlı bir yaklaşım geliştirmiş ve bölgesel gelişmeleri endişeyle izlemiştir. Yeni Cumhurbaşkanı Hasan Ruhani, dış politikada itidal ve uluslararası aktörler ile yapıcı etkileşimi öne çıkaran bir yaklaşımla Arap Baharı'nın İran'ın bölge siyaseti üzerindeki menfi tesirlerini etkisizleştirmeye çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Baharı, Orta Doğu, İran, Ruhani, Şii Ekseni

تأثير الربيع العربي على سياسة ايران نحو الشرق الأوسط
خـلاصـة

يهدف هذا المقال الى دراسة تأثير الربيع العربي على سياسة ايران نحو الشرق الأوسط. ان الربيع العربي الذي تغيرت تأثيراته بمرور الزمن بنتيجة التطورات التي ظهرت فيما بعد، قد حالت ايران دون تكوين سياسة متماسكة في المنطقة على حد ادعاء البعض. ولم تتحقق الفرص المفترض انها تنفتح امام ايران بسبب الثورات في بلدان الربيع العربي، بل ظهرت بعكس ذلك تهديدات جديدة امام السياسة الاقليمية لإيران. ولهذا السبب فان الزعماء الايرانيين الذين كانوا متفائلين جدا في بدايات ثورات البلدان العربية، قد طوّروا بمرور الزمن سياسة تنطوي على حذر اكثر وبدأوا بمتابعة التطورات الاقليمية بقلق. وقد حاول رئيس الجمهورية الجديد حسن روحاني ازالة التاثير السلبي لتاثير الربيع العربي على سياسة ايران الاقليمية عن طريق سلوك نهج الاعتدال في السياسة الخارجية وابراز التفاعل الايجابي مع اللاعبين الدوليين.

الكلمات الدالّة : الربيع العربي، الشرق الأوسط، ايران، روحاني، المحور الايراني.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SPRING FOR IRAN'S POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to review effects of the Arab Spring on Iran's policy toward the Middle East. It argues that Iran could not have developed a consistent policy towards the region, because implications of the Arab Spring have varied in time in accordance with subsequent, emerging developments. The initial optimism of the Iranian leadership with regard to the Arab upheavals, gave way to prudent caution and rising anxiety as the expected opportunities brought by upheavals were overwhelmed by new challenges to Iran's regional strategy. With a new approach to foreign policy that highlighted moderation and constructive interaction with international actors, new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has striven to neutralize the Arab Spring's adverse effects on the regional policy of Iran.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Middle East, Iran, Rouhani, Shiite Axis

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Introduction

A few years ago, crowds of people from diverse backgrounds took to the streets, challenging ruling authoritarian Arab regimes at the time. Instantaneously dubbed the "Arab Spring" by many pundits, the Arab upheavals, triggered by the self-immolation of a young Tunisian street vendor named Mohammed Boazizi on December 17, 2010, profoundly altered regional geopolitics. Although it remained on the sidelines, Iran was also heavily impacted by the events that engulfed the Arab streets.

From the outset, the question of how politics and foreign policy in Iran was impacted by the Arab Spring has been in dispute. Some of the existing literature has focused on Iranian perceptions of the Arab upheavals, and/or underlined Iran's inconsistent responses to developments in various Arab countries. Initially, Iran welcomed the upheavals as the "Islamic Awakening" that targeted pro-American regimes in the region, but denied the very democratic roots of the Arab upheavals, which was regarded as a threat to the arguably authoritarian regime in Iran and its only ally in the region: Syria.[1] Actually, as Hamid Ahmadi put it, "there was no agreement among the Iranians regarding the nature of the Arab Spring."[2] Besides major disagreements between the ruling elite and mainstream opposition parties, there were also considerable differences within the ruling elite itself.[3] Nevertheless, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, instituted and represented the official stance of Iran toward the Arab revolts by referring to them as the 'Islamic Awakening.'[4]

A bulk of the literature addressing Iran's approach to the Arab Spring has been informed from the regional standpoint. Studies in this category mainly reviewed the strategic implications of the Arab Spring on regional politics and speculated on whether it has reinforced or undermined the regional power of Iran.[5] While some analysts claimed that the Arab Spring as a whole improved

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1 Ali Parchami, "The 'Arab Spring': the View from Tehran," *Contemporary Politics*, Vol.8, No.1, March 2012, pp. 35-52; Ali Alfoneh, "Mixed Response in Iran: Middle Eastern Upheavals," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.3, Summer 2011, pp. 35-39; Mahjoub Zweiri, "Revolutionary Iran and Arab Revolts: Observations on Iranian Foreign Policy and its Approaches," Arab Center For Research & Policy Studies, Doha, September 2012.

2 Hamid Ahmadi, "Iran and the Arab Spring: Why Haven't Iranians Followed the Arabs in Waging Revolution," *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol.5, No.3, 2013, p. 407.

3 For an analytical study deals with differences among the Iranian political elite at their approaches to the Arab Spring see, Amir Mohammad Haji-Yousefi, "Iran and the 2011 Arab Revolutions: Perceptions and Actions," *Discourse – An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol.10, No 1-2, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 23-60.

4 Payam Mohseni, "The Islamic Awakening: Iran's Grand Narrative of Arab Uprisings," Middle East Brief (Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies), No.71, April 2013.

5 Dalia D. Kaya, Frederic Wehrey and M. Scott Doran, "Arab Spring, Persian Winter: Will Iran Emerge the Winner from the Arab Revolt", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2011; Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi, "Arab Spring Seen from Tehran: The Geopolitical Contest fort the Region's Hearts and Minds", *The Cairo*

Iran's regional standing,[6] others argued that the same events weakened Iran's regional power.[7] However, almost four years after the Arab Spring and the unintended consequences in the region, these earlier analyses have failed to best capture the dynamics unleashed—both at the regional level and internationally—by such upheavals. This is because although some of these developments served Iran's regional interests, others proved seemingly contradictory to their overall strategic interests.[8] To answer the question of whether the Arab Spring worked for or against the Iranian regional interest, a much more nuanced and contextual analysis is needed.

This article attempts to analyze the implications of the Arab Spring for Iran's policy toward the Middle East. It argues that Iran could not have developed a consistent policy towards the region, because implications of the Arab Spring have varied in time in accordance with subsequent, emerging developments. In terms of its effects on Iran, the post-Arab Spring developments could be analyzed in three stages. In the first stage, which covers the first few months after the initial revolt in Tunisia in late December 2010, Iran was relatively content with the initial direction of the Arab Spring. Having been stuck in a "Cold War" in the Middle East for the last decade, Iran welcomed the "revolutionary movements" that challenged the rival "conservative" regimes in the region. There was a sense of complacency in the way the Iranian leadership viewed the Arab upheavals as a kind of 'blessing'. This was due in large part to the fact that, when viewed from the regional point of view, the revolts enhanced Iran's power vis-à-vis its adversaries.

Soon after, however, the initial optimism of the Iranian leadership gave way to prudent caution and rising anxiety as the expected opportunities brought by the Arab Spring were overwhelmed by new challenges to Iran's regional strategy. Contrary to its expectation to enlarge its sphere of influence and weaken its regional adversaries, Iran remained isolated and further threatened when the uprising targeted the Assad administration in Syria, a long-term ally of Iran.

With the election of Hassan Rouhani as the new president of Iran in June 2013, the third stage of Iran's policy toward the Middle East after the Arab Spring has begun. Until the election of Rouhani, Iran's foreign policy was

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Review of Global Affairs, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 98-112; Naysan Rafati, "After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: Iran and the Arab Spring," IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR011. *LSE IDEAS*, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, May 2012.

6 For instance see, Suzanne Maloney, "Iran: The Bogeyman", in *The Arab Awakening*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp. 258-267.

7 For instance see, Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated", Gulf Research Center (GRC) Paper, September 2012.

8 Henner Furtig, "Iran and the Arab Spring: Between Expectations and Disillusion," German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Papers, No.241, November 2013; Peter Jones, "Hopes and Disappointment: Iran and the Arab Spring," *Survival*, Vol 55, No.4, August-September 2013.

particularly dominated by Iranian neo-radicals in association with the former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader Khamenei. This foreign policy was essentially based on confrontation with the United States and its regional allies. Weakened by the second stage of the Arab Spring, however, Iran was forced to reconsider its foreign policy. It was in this context that Rouhani emerged as a potential game-changer in Iranian foreign policy.[9] With a new approach to foreign policy that highlighted moderation and constructive interaction with international actors, Rouhani has striven to neutralize the Arab Spring's adverse effects on the regional policy of Iran.

In a systematic attempt to analyze the impact of the Arab Spring on Iran and its policies toward the Middle East, this essay reviews Iran's responses to regional developments in three parts. First, it reviews Iranian responses to the Arab Spring in the optimistic early months. In the second section, the challenges raised by the post-Arab Spring Middle East and Iran's concerns with and responses to regional developments are examined. Finally, it reviews the Rouhani administration's foreign policy with an eye toward exploring its implications for the region.

First Stage: Arab Spring as a 'Blessing' for Iran

The Arab Spring took place at the height of polarization amongst the Middle Eastern states along the lines of their strategic considerations. A new "Cold War" had emerged between the regional countries shortly after the American intervention in Iraq in 2003.[10] The demolition of the Baath regime in Iraq and the empowerment of the Shiite parties close to Tehran had raised concerns among the "conservative regimes" across the Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Additionally, the popularity of Iran on the Arab street for its support for Hamas and Hizballah fighting against Israel – and partly for its evident anti-Americanism – further underpinned concerns of the conservative Arab regimes, who had warm relations with the United States and calm relations with Israel. They were afraid of the increasing regional power of Iran and of relying on the empowerment of Shiites and pro-Palestinian and anti-American sentiments within the Arab street. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rise to power in Iran in June 2005, with an agenda aspiring to resuscitate a "revolutionary foreign policy" with an inflexible rhetoric, further aggravated the perceived threats on the side of conservative Arab leaders.

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9 Mahmood Monshipouri and Manochehr Dorraj, "Iran's Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No.4, Winter 2013.

10 Morten Valbjørn and André Bank, "Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-Shi'i Divide," *Middle East Report*, No. 242, Spring 2007, pp. 6-11; Morten Valbjørn & André Bank, "The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Middle East Regional Politics," *Review of International Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, 2012, pp. 3-24.

In order to balance the emerging "Shiite axis" – including Syria, Hizballah, and the Shiite dominated Iraqi government – in alliance with Hamas, and to curb the increasing regional power of Iran, the conservative Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan consolidated their security and political cooperation among themselves, which was labeled the Arab "moderation camp."[11] Then, most of the regional powers opted for one of the two rival camps; the axis of moderation against the Shiite axis or the "resistance front."[12] The fierce competition between the rival camps became clearly evident through the Israeli military attacks against Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008-2009, when prominent leaders of the conservative camp criticized Hizballah, Hamas and the Iranian leadership for provoking the clashes. The Tehran-Riyadh rivalry that lies at the center of regional polarization was dramatically exposed by the disclosure of Wikileaks documents, which hinted that King Abdullah asked his American interlocutors "to cut off head of snake"; implicating Iran.[13] Geopolitical implications of the Arab Spring fanned the flames of mistrust and tension between the rival blocs.[14]

The polarization of the regional countries played a decisive role in their approaches to the upheavals within the Arab street that broke out in late 2010. The political elites have seen opportunities and challenges associated with the Arab Spring through that prism and have responded accordingly. As the tides of upheaval targeted conservative regimes of the moderation front, the Iranian leadership welcomed them as a 'blessing' for Iran and expressed its support for the protest movements.[15] From the Iranian point of view, ostensibly "revolutionary" movements, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain, were wel-

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11 Kayhan Barzegar, "The Arab Revolutions and Iran's Regional Policy," *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol.10, No 3-4, Summer-Fall 2012, pp.i-iv; Raed Omari, "The 'Arab axis of moderation' needs help," *Al-Arabiya*, September 27 2013, available at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/09/27/The-Arab-axis-of-moderation-needs-help.html (accessed on May 15, 2014).

12 F. Gregory Gause III, "Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian Question," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 6, No.2, March 2007, pp. 1-8; Ayellet Yehiav, "The Anti-Iranian Front: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 11, No.1, March 2007, pp. 6-9.

13 "US Embassy Cables: Saudi King urges US Strike on Iran," *The Guardian*, November 28, 2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/150519 (accessed on May 5, 2014). Alleged Iranian attempt to assassinate Saudi ambassador to Washington was another instance of Riyadh-Tehran confrontation. See, "Iranian plot to kill Saudi ambassador thwarted, U.S. officials say," *CNN*, October 12, 2011, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/11/justice/iran-saudi-plot/ (accessed on May 5, 2014).

14 Mohammad Ayoob, "The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, No.3, Fall 2012, pp. 84-97; Mohammad Ayoob, "The New Cold War in the Middle East," *The National Interest*, 16 January 2013; Curtis Ryan, "The New Arab Cold War and Struggle for Syria," *Middle East* Report, No. 242, Spring 2012.

15 "Regional Uprisings, Fruit of 1979 Revolution," Official website of the Supreme Leader, April 3, 2011, http://www.leader.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=7938 (accessed on May 5, 2014).

comed events because they were expected to end pro-American conservative regimes in these countries.[16]

The Iranian elites anticipated that prospective regimes in those countries would be friendly to Iran because of either ideological or strategic reasons.[17] Above all else, they appreciated some similarities between the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the current revolutionary upheavals across the Arab world in terms of their roots, organization and targets.[18] Accordingly, the upheavals were inspired by the Iranian revolution to be anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist; and they were led by predominantly Islamic movements that aimed to build "religious democracies".[19] Ayatollah Khamenei asserted that economic and social factors, which are generally thought to be influential in the outburst of these mass protests, were only symptoms of a deep-seated rage felt across the Islamic world against the West.[20] Indeed, Islamist movements with a long history of opposition to the repressive regimes have given their support to the revolutionary social movements. Islamist parties like Al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt joined the opposition, asking for the fall of the regimes, gave enormous momentum to the revolutionary movements. Mosques were used effectively in the mobilization of the masses against ruling regimes. Slogans chanted by crowds at rallies and the demands of the people, according to the Iranian officials, were "more religious than political." [21]

Iranian leaders also believed that the Arab revolutionary movements began a new chapter in the "perennial confrontation" between "Islamic revolutionary" Iran and the "imperialist world" led by the United States and Israel. This belief was further boosted by some reports implying that the US administration eyes Iran while making decisions on regional affairs.[22] This perception was evident in Khamenei's Norouz message in March 2012:

16 Actually, the social movements have done what Iran wished for years after the Islamic revolution of 1979. Then Iranian leadership had promoted and encouraged the Muslim masses to revolt against and depose pro-Western conservative regimes ruling over them. Despite the changing regional dynamics and the foreign policy perspectives of Iran throughout three decades after the revolution, the recent rise of regional polarization reactivated the Iranian ideological/revolutionary approach towards the Middle East. See, Parchami, "The 'Arab Spring': the view from Tehran," p.36.

17 Kayhan Barzegar, "Arab Uprising and the Changing Geopolitics in the Middle East," *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol.10, No 1-2, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. i-xi.

18 For a comparative study of the Iranian revolution and the Egyptian "revolution" see, Farzad Poursaid, "A Comparative Study on Iran's Islamic Revolution and Egypt's Revolution," *Discourse – An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol.10, No 1-2, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 119-143. "What is happening now is the same experience the Iranian nation had 32 years ago..." Abbas Keshavarz, "Public demands in the Middle East are more religious than political," *Islamic Awakening*, No.3, June 2012, p. 7.

19 Mohammad Hossein Jamshidi, "Unity, key to success of Islamic Awakening movement," *Islamic Awakening*, No.3, June 2012, p. 8.

20 Parchami, "The 'Arab Spring': the View from Tehran," 38.

21 Keshavarz, "Public demands in the Middle East are more religious than political," 6-7.

22 David Sanger, "The Larger Game in the Middle East: Iran," *The New York Times*, April 2, 2011.

The year that came to an end - the year 1390 - was one of the eventful years in the world, in the region and in our country. In general, one can see that these events ended in favor of the Iranian nation and they furthered the goals of our nation. Those in western countries who are nurturing malevolent goals in their minds about the Iranian nation, Iran and Iranians are faced with different problems. In the region, the nations that have been supported by the Islamic Republic have achieved great goals. Certain dictators were removed from power. The constitutions that were ratified in certain countries were based on Islam. The archenemy of the Islamic Ummah and the Iranian nation - namely the Zionist regime - was besieged.[23]

As for strategic considerations, because the upheavals primarily targeted pro-American regimes that maintained amiable relations with Israel, Iran believed that the succeeding regimes in the revolutionary countries would most likely become anti-American. Iran considered the upheavals to be not only against the ruling regimes, but also against foreign powers that supported them, and also against the regional status quo that favored Israel.[24]

In accordance with the assessment of the upheavals as anti-American, anti-Western, and predominantly Islamic, the Iranian leadership expected that the future regimes in revolutionary countries would be ideologically closer to Tehran. Therefore, the tide of upheavals would not only lessen the clout of the anti-Iranian front across the region, but also would eventually lead to the alteration of regional geopolitics in favor of Iran.[25] Additionally, it would provide new breathing space for Iran, having been under the pressure of heavy sanctions led by the United States and regional adversaries of Tehran.

Against this background, Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei branded the Arab upheavals as part of the wider "awakening" in the Islamic world. The wider Islamic awakening was seen as an indication of "Islamic Iran's" moral superiority against its rivals.[26] By branding the upheavals as an Islamic awakening, Khamenei underlined similarities between the Iranian revolution and the Arab revolutions. Thereby, he aimed to constitute a kind of solidarity between Iran and the revolutionary movements.[27] That sense of solidarity was

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Robert Tait, "Is Iran still center of Middle East's 'Great Game,'" *RFE/RL*, April 13, 2011. See also Daniel Pletka and Frederick W. Kagan, "America vs. Iran: The Competition for the Future of Middle East," *AE*I, January 2014.

23 "Supreme Leader's Norouz message," Official website of the Supreme Leader, March 20 2012, available at http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1611&Itemid=16 (accessed on May 5, 2014).

24 Parsi and Marashi, "Arab Spring seen from Tehran."

25 "Islamic Awakening will Give Birth to a New World Order in the Future," *Islamic Awakening* (website), May 21 2012.

26 Sadegh Zibakalam, "Syria's Uprising Spoils the Iranian victory of Islamic Awakening," *The Daily Star*, November 1, 2011.

27 The depiction of the Arab upheavals as the Islamic Awakening had also a domestic mission to con-

underpinned not only through similarities between the Iranian and Arab revolutions, but also through common enemies. According to Iranian leadership, perceived Islamic and anti-Western characteristics of the revolts made them open to attacks by enemies of Islam.

Nevertheless, Iran scarcely went beyond declaring political support for the so-called Islamic awakening. Probably the most concrete step taken by Iran in response to the Arab Spring was the establishment of the "World Assembly of Islamic Awakening." Headed by Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister and current advisor to Khamenei, the Assembly organized several conferences in Tehran, titled the Islamic Awakening, addressing miscellaneous social groups including religious scholars, intellectuals, university professors, youth, and women from various Islamic countries. The Assembly also started to publish a multilingual website and a monthly magazine named Islamic Awakening that ceased to appear after the tenth issue.[28]

Second Stage: Currents Reversed Against Iran

Notwithstanding the initial optimism of the Iranian leadership towards the Arab Spring, the ensuing developments raised a number of challenges to Iran. First of all, it was not certain that an Islamic religious regime would replace the outgoing government. Unlike the narrative of the Iranian leadership, there was no common ideology, let alone Islamic identity, among the protestors to shape the future of the revolutionary countries.[29] On the other hand, even if Islamist movements come to power in the revolutionary countries, it might not necessarily serve Iranian interests.[30] This was partly because of the differences between parochial Islamic movements and the Iranian regime. Iran had few ties to the Islamic opposition movements in revolutionary countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Contrary to the Shiite characteristic of Iran, most of the local Islamic movements were predominantly Sunni. The rise of sectarian politics in the region further alienated local Sunni Islamic movements from Tehran. Moreover, some Salafi groups that appeared in due time were publicly against 'Shiite Iran'.

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solidate legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Accordingly, the strife of wider masses in the Arab world to replace pro-Western conservative regimes with Islamic ones proved the rightfulness of the Islamic Republican regime and debased claims of opposition against the regime in Iran.

28 The publication of the Islamic Awakening was ceased after the 10th issue. For the published issues see, http://islamicawakening-mag.net (accessed on July 5, 2014).

29 Mohammad Frazmand, "Nations, not governments will make the new Middle East," *Iranian Diplomacy*, March 27 2011, available at http://irdiplomacy.com/en/page/10798/Nations%2C+not+governments%2C+will+make+the+new+Middle+East+.html (accessed on May 5, 2014).

30 Ahmad Naghibzadeh, "Iran and the New Middle East," *Iranian Diplomacy*, April 4, 2011, available at http://irdiplomacy.com/en/page/10786/Iran+and+the+New+Middle+East.html (accessed on May 5, 2014).

The spillover effect of the Arab Spring also emerged as a challenge to authoritarian rule in Iran. The grassroots opposition movement in Iran, which emerged under the guise of the Green Movement immediately after the controversial presidential elections in 2009, might exploit the new regional mood to take discontented people into the streets again. Ironically, it was not only the ruling elites but also the figureheads of the opposition in Iran that welcomed the Arab revolts. According to the latter, however, the upheavals in the Arab street were far from being an Islamic awakening, as Khamenei put forward, but a predominantly democratic movement. The opposition underlined 'democratic' demands and multi-colored features of the protests against the dictatorial powers.[31] What was troubling was the fact that these same opposition sources had been accusing the Iranian leadership of being dictatorial, as well. Therefore, the Arab revolts could precipitate similar waves, such as a democratic movement challenging the autocratic leadership in Iran. Considering the potential challenges raised by the Iranian opposition that could exploit the region-wide protests, Iran prevented rallies called by the opposition leaders, ostensibly for consolidation with the Egyptian people. Moreover, Mir Hussain Mousavi and Mahdi Karrubi, respected leaders of the opposition that survived the suppression of the Green Movement, were put under house arrest. Thus, the consequences of the Arab Spring have led to the increased securitization of domestic politics in Iran.

On the other hand, the Iranian leadership was also concerned with probable counter-revolutionary activities by opponents of the so-called Islamic awakening. To the Iranians, the United States and its regional allies who were afraid of the Islamic awakening would attempt to control the course of events and to derail the "revolutions."[32] In this respect, Supreme Leader Khamenei warned in public sermons that 'arrogant powers are repositioning themselves as if they have been supporting popular movements' in order to overtake the revolutionary movements.[33]

From mid-March 2011 onward, the course of developments shattered the initial Iranian optimism toward the Arab Spring and turned it into a formidable challenge for Iran. The first blow to the Iranian optimism came in Bahrain.[34] The spread of the tide of revolts into Bahrain on February 14, 2011 had further excited the Iranian leadership. There were primarily two reasons

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31 For instance see Sadeq Zibalam, "ME Movements are not anti-Western in Nature," *Iranian Diplomacy*, March 27 2011, available at http://irdiplomacy.com/en/page/10802/ME+Movements+are+not+Anti-West+in+Nature.html (accessed on May 5, 2014).

32 Ghasem Torabi, "Arab Revolutions and Iran's Security," *Discourse – An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol.10, No 1-2 Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 97-117; Keshavarz, "Public demands in the Middle East are more religious than political," p. 6.

33 Parchami, "The 'Arab Spring': the view from Tehran," p. 37.

34 Mehdi Khallaji, "Iran's Policy Confusion about Bahrain," *WINEP Policy Watch*, No. 1823, June 27, 2011.

for the Iranian excitement. First, Bahrain has been home to the 5th Fleet of the US Navy. A successful and supposedly anti-American revolution in Bahrain would create troubles for American military interests in the Persian Gulf, and would prevent further American access to Bahrain. The second reason was the demographic structure of that island country. Almost 70 percent of the Bahraini population is Shiite. Therefore, a successful and democratic revolution in that country would most likely bring Shiites to power. A prospective Shiite government so close to Saudi Arabia, a nation that apparently leads the anti-Iran/Shiite front, would be a strategic gain for Iran. Furthermore, a successful revolution in Bahrain might precipitate similar revolts in the conservative Gulf countries that could profoundly change the geopolitical structure in the Middle East in favor of Iran.

Considering the challenges of a "Shiite revolt" in Bahrain and upon the invitation of King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa, a GCC force led by Saudi troops intervened in the island country on March 14, 2011. The intervention of Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, to quell 'peaceful' protests against al-Khalifa rule, evidently displayed the Saudi resolve to impede and contain any opposition movement threatening Saudi interests.[35] It sparked strong criticisms in Iranian media outlets and Iranian officials brought the issue to UN forums, albeit without much success in the way of meeting their goals and expectations. Eventually, the Iranians who were initially heartened by the prospects for the protests in Bahrain were disappointed and helpless against the Saudi intervention.[36]

Another blow to the optimism of Iran came with the military intervention of NATO in Libya on March 19, 2011 to save the opposition forces from reprisal by Muammar Qaddafi. The NATO intervention in Libya not only saved the opposition, but also secured close relations with the prospective government in Tripoli and the West. Thereby the West, in view of the Iranian leadership, "hijacked" the revolutionary movement of the Libyan people.[37]

The foremost challenge raised by the Arab Spring for Iran was the spread of a revolutionary wave into Syria on March 16, 2011. The ruling Baath regime in Syria was a long-time and only ally of Iran among the Arab states. In contrast to the low profile and reactive policy of Tehran towards the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the uprising in Bahrain, it was resolved to prevent any kind of revolutionary change in Syria. Iran did not lose time in depicting the growing opposition against the Assad administration and the anti-gov-

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35 Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "Interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran Collide, With the U.S. in the Middle", *The New York Times*, March 17, 2011.

36 Simon Henderson, "GCC Summit will Gauge Regional Confidence in U.S. Policy," *WINEP Policy Watch*, No. 2180, December 9, 2013.

37 "Iranian Diplomat Cautions about West's Plot to Derail Libyan Revolution," *Fars News Agency*, January 3, 2012.

ernment rallies that rapidly turned into violent clashes between the security forces and the protestors as plots of the enemies of the Islamic Awakening. To the Iranian leadership, which regards being against Israel and the American hegemony as the most important characteristic of the Islamic awakening, any rebellion against a regime that was part of the resistance front was illegitimate.[38] As the Assad administration was a part of the "resistance front" against the "Israeli occupation" and the American hegemony, it was unacceptable to the Iranian leadership that the Syrian people would rise against it.

Recalling the previous American attempts to dissociate Syria from its alliance with Iran,[39] Tehran viewed the Syrian revolt not only as a challenge for the Assad administration, but also as an attack against the interests of Iran. The likeliness of the deposition of the Assad administration in Syria, which was considered an indispensable part of the 'resistance front' bridging Iran to Lebanon, would deal a heavy blow to the strategic interests of Iran in the Levant. Then, Iran would not only lose its critical ally, but also become vulnerable against future incursions of its enemies. Western and Saudi support for the Syrian opposition have also "confirmed" the Iranian resolve to stand with the Assad administration. [40]

Iran's strong support for the Assad administration to fight a "peaceful opposition movement demanding political rights" has furbished the Iranian image as an expansionist and sectarian power. Since the rise of the polarization of the Middle East between the so-called Shiite axis and the moderate camp in mid-2000s, its adversaries portrayed Iran as a sectarian power aspiring to build a "Shiite axis" by exploiting the Shiite peoples across the region. Iran was also depicted as a destabilizing force that mobilizes insurgents or Shiites against their own governments.[41] Iran's support extended to mostly "Shiite" Bahraini opposition against the ruling "Sunni" al-Khalifa dynasty and to the predominantly "Alawite" – an offshoot of Shia – Assad administration against

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38 Sadegh Zibakalam, "Syria's Uprising Spoils the Iranian victory of Islamic Awakening," *The Daily Star*, November 1, 2011.

39 Mohammad Tabaar, "Analysis: Breaking the Syria-Iran Alliance," *BBC News*, August 26, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5263800.stm (accessed on July 5, 2014); Tony Badran, "The Syria-Iran Alliance," *In Focus Quarterly*, Vol.3, No.1 (Spring 2009), available at http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/825/the-syria-iran-alliance (accessed on July 5, 2014).

40 Torabi, "Arab Revolutions and Iran's Security," 97-117. See also Bayram Sinkaya, "İran-Suriye İlişkileri ve Suriye'de Halk İsyanı" (Iran-Syria Relations and Popular Unrest in Syria), *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol.3, No.33 (September 2011), available at http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/2011926_5.pdf; Bayram Sinkaya, "Arab Baharı Sürecinde İran'ın Suriye Politikası," *SETA Analiz*, No.53, April 2012, available at http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/arap-bahari-surecinde-iran'in-suriye-politikasi.pdf.

41 Mohammad Ali Mohtadi, "Spreading Iranophobia, Propagating Anti-Shiism," *Iranian Diplomacy*, November 5, 2012, available at http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1908734/Spreading+Iranophobia%2C+Propagating+Anti-Shi%E2%80%99ism.html (accessed on May 5, 2014). Zweiri, "Revolutionary Iran and Arab Revolts: Observations on Iranian Foreign Policy and its Approaches," pp. 5-7.

mainly Sunni opposition was used by its adversaries to paint the Iranian image as biased, sectarian, expansionist, with a destabilizing government. Indeed, the growing sectarian conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon, etc. has boosted that image, which has smeared the Iranian claim for leadership for causes of the whole Muslim world. Subsequently, the popularity of Iran in the Arab street had deeply reversed by late 2011.[42] Former President Ahmadinejad, once very popular in the Arab street for his support to the "resistance" against Israel, was faced with severe criticism from the Egyptians at his visit to al-Azhar in Cairo, in February 2013, for sectarian and pro-Assad policies of his government.

As the course of events reversed against its interests, Iran has failed to turn regional developments to its advantage and reap dividends of the Arab Spring. Tehran has pursued a low profile and reactive policy towards the region.[43] Actually, Tehran had few instruments and a limited capacity to influence the course of events throughout the Arab Spring. The factional bickering inside the country, worsening economic conditions, and rising international pressure to isolate Iran heavily curbed its capacity to deal with regional developments.

Although Iranian officials had assessed the Arab Spring as a new opportunity to confront American policies[44] and the "moderate camp" in the Middle East, Iran could not have secured the friendship of new governments in Tunis, Cairo, or Tripoli. The successors of the outgoing regimes, instead of joining the resistance front, preferred to be distant from Iran either because of intimidation from Western or regional powers, or because of their own rational calculations. Any kind of close relationship with Iran had few to render to the "revolutionary" governments with the exception of bringing a high risk of antagonizing major Western and regional powers. Instead, those governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have approached "the Turkish model" and embarked on improving their relations with the Western countries and the moderate camp.[45]

Tehran welcomed the establishment of new governments in countries in transition – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, however, its relations with

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42 "Poll: Sharp Drop in Iran's Popularity in Arab World", *Haaretz*, 27 July 2011; David A. Patten, "Zogby Poll: 'Shocking' Drop in Iran's Popularity in Arab World," *Newsmax*, July 26, 2011, available at http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/zogby-obama-iran-popularity/2011/07/26/id/404933/ (accessed on May 30, 2014). See also Shibley Telhami, "Arab Perspectives on Iran's Role in a Changing Middle East", Wilson Center, *The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East*, Issue 2, 2013.

43 Farhad Atai, "Itan within the Political Dynamics of the Middle East," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, Vol.2, No.4, Winter 2012, pp. 53-54; Maloney, "Iran: The Bogeyman", p. 262.

44 Plenary talk given by Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Fathollahi at the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, October 7, 2011.

45 Mohyeddin Sajedi, "Critical Review of Islamism in Arab States," *Press TV*, May 14, 2012, available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/05/14/241213/critical-approach-arab-islamists/ (accessed on May 30, 2014).

those countries hardly realized expectations of the Iranian government. Aside from the expression of goodwill, Iran's relations with those countries remained limited to the exchange of some ministerial and parliamentary delegations. Among the revolutionary countries, Iran paid special importance to developing its relations with Egypt.[46] Immediately after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Egyptian officials allowed two Iranian war-ships to pass through the Suez Channel to reach the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the two countries declared their intention to establish diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless there was no recorded high-level visit between the two countries until Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi's visit to Tehran in August 2012 for the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. In return, Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited Cairo in February 2013 to attend the summit of Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Mutual visits between Iran and Egypt led to the signing of a number of agreements, including the promotion of Iranian tourists to visit Egypt. The Morsi government, however, faced opposition from Salafi groups and remnants of the Mobarak regime inside the country and criticism from some Gulf countries in his attempt to improve Tehran-Cairo relations. When President Morsi was ousted by a coup d'état in July 2013, Egypt and Iran still had some steps to normalize diplomatic ties and to exchange ambassadors.

In the meantime, after a decade of unprecedented rapprochement, Iran's relations with Turkey started to deteriorate when they adopted opposite approaches to developments in Syria.[47] While the Turkish government has hosted and supported the opposition, Iran vigorously supported the Assad administration. Moreover, in addition to close cooperation between Turkey and the United States vis-à-vis regional developments, the Turkish permission for the deployment of American radars in Malatya in 2011 within the framework of the NATO missile defense shield program exposed the realignment between Ankara and Washington. The ensuing encounter between Turkey and Iran led to mutual criticisms of their regional policies. Hence, Turkish-Iranian relations apparently started to decline soon after the Arab Spring.

The commitment of Iran to keep Assad in power not only alienated Turkey, but also worsened its relations with Hamas. Iran cut its financial support to Hamas because it refused to support Assad. In response to increasing pressure both from pro-Assad forces and from his opponents, Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas's political bureau, left his headquarter in Damascus for Doha,

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46 "Challenges in Iran-Egypt Relations," *Iranian Diplomacy*, September 30, 2011, available at http://irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/16631/Challenges+in+IranEgypt+Relations.html (accessed on May 30, 2014).
47 Bayram Sinkaya, "The 'Fall' of Turkey-Iran relations," *ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis*, September 22, 2011, available at http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=816 (accessed on June 30, 2014).

in January 2012. This movement was regarded as Hamas's split with the 're-sistance front.' Thus Iran lost one of its few allies in the region.[48]

Consequently, by the time Hassan Rouhani came to power in mid-2013, Iran remained weakened and isolated in the region. Moreover, the Iranian image in the Arab street was further tarnished because of its staunch support for the Assad regime, which was presented/viewed as a sectarian Shiite con-solidation against a revolutionary, popular, democratic movement. Iran could not have established effective and sustainable relations with the "revolutionary governments" in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The late flirtation between Tehran and Cairo was reversed by the coup d'état in Egypt. Besides its failure to se-cure friendship of any of the "revolutionary" governments, its few allies in the region have broken away. While Hamas changed its allegiance from Tehran to Doha, Syria was dragged into a bloody civil war.

Third Stage: Rouhani and New Horizons in Foreign Policy

Hassan Rouhani was elected as the new president of Iran to replace Ahmadine-jad in June 2013. Rouhani's approach to foreign policy has been profoundly different from his predecessor, who strived to resuscitate revolutionary foreign policy and highlighted confrontation with, and resistance against, the West.[49] Instead, Rouhani has been committed to a moderate approach regarding for-eign policy based on rationality and prudence. He has promised "moderation" in foreign policy and "constructive interaction" with regional and internation-al actors.[50] In addition to his political career as a close confidant of the well-known pragmatist leader Hashemi Rafsanjani, and his selection of a foreign policy team consisted of internationally respected diplomats; Rouhani's em-phasis on moderation has marked the ascension of 'realism' and pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy.[51]

Indeed, Rouhani exposed what he does understand in his moderation in foreign policy. According to him, moderation means establishing a balance be-tween realism and the pursuit of the ideals of the Islamic Republic; to discard any extreme approach in relations with other states; effective and constructive understanding and interaction with the outside world; and to focus on mu-tual confidence building with neighbors and regional and international ac-

48 Fares Akram, "Hamas Leader Abandons Longtime Base in Damascus," *The New York Times*, January 27 2012; Ali Jannati, "Doha's Attempts to Distance Hamas from Tehran," *Iranian Diplomacy*, October 22, 2012; Girogio Cafiero, "Hamas in the New Middle East," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, November 15, 2012; Nicholas Blanford, "Iran's 'axis of resistance' losses its Palestinian arm to Syrian war," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 9, 2013.

49 Monshipouri and Manochehr Dorraj, "Iran's Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape."

50 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "Rouhani's post-populist foreign policy," *Asia Times*, August 2, 2013.

51 Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran-Saudi Relations Under Rouhani," *Al-Monitor*, July 19, 2013, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-saudi-relations-under-rouhani.html (accessed on June 30, 2014).

tors. One of the remarkable features of moderate foreign policy as emphasized by President Rouhani was to "try to orient foreign policy towards economic development."[52] By restoring and improving Tehran's relations with leading international and regional actors with a moderate foreign policy, Rouhani is projected to improve Iran's standing in international and regional affairs, and to increase its maneuvering capability in dealing with foreign policy issues.[53]

Rouhani has given priority to the diplomatic solution of controversy over the Iranian nuclear program. Although he has been denouncing so-called Western attempts to halt Iran's nuclear program and criticizing sanctions in most of his speeches, Rouhani advocated further transparency with regard to the nuclear issue in order to alleviate concerns of Western and regional powers. Thereby, he hoped to waive heavy sanctions that had begun to cripple the Iranian economy and to break the isolation of his country in the last couple of years.[54] Thus, Rouhani invested much in the political solution of the nuclear issue. The Joint Action Plan is extended twice in 2014 to provide a solid ground for future negotiations between the parties.

Having a "centrist" position in the Iranian political landscape and having served as representative of Ayatollah Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council for over twenty years, President Rouhani has enough credit to reach a compromise with P5+1 countries on the nuclear issue. His "moderate" discourse has also been welcomed by the international community, which served as an intervening factor in finding a diplomatic solution to the problem.[55] Eventually, the parties reached a 6-month preliminary agreement that would give further chances for a definite solution in November 2013.[56] In accordance with the Geneva Agreement, P5+1 countries have accepted the easing of limitations on Iranian oil revenues and the removal of sanctions on Iran's petro-chemical exports in return for Iran's promise to decrease its stockpile of enriched uranium, halt enrichment activities temporarily, and cease building a heavy-water reactor in Arak. The parties agreed to put the Joint Action Plan that was drawn in parallel to the Geneva Agreement into force on January 20, 2014.

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52 "Dr. Rouhani's Speech in a Gathering Convened by Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York," Presidency of the IRI News Service," Official Website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, September 27, 2013, http://pesident.ir/en/71857/printable (accessed on May 10, 2014).

53 Mohammad Reza Kiani, "Iran's Foreign Policy Under Rouhani," Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, September 7, 2013, available at http://en.cmess.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98&ArticleId=567 (accessed on May 10, 2014).

54 "President in his First Press Conference: Sanctions Aimed at Pressuring Iranian People," Official Website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 6, 2013, http://president.ir/en/70454/printable (accessed on May 10, 2014).

55 Reza Kiani, "Iran's Foreign Policy Under Rouhani," September 7, 2013.

56 "Iran seeks to reverse referral process of Iran's Nuclear issue to Security Council," *Iranian Diplomacy*, January 18, 2014.

Corresponding to the initial breakthrough with the West provided by the Geneva Agreement, Rouhani has aimed to restore Iran's relations with the European countries, which had worsened in the previous decade as marked by the EU's increasingly heavy sanctions against Tehran. Furthermore, Iran's diplomatic relations with Britain, a major player in European politics, had nearly ceased after mobs stormed the British embassy in November 2011 to protest British policies. Unlike his predecessor, that turned the direction of Iran's foreign policy towards the "East",[57] Rouhani has had particular interest in improving relations with European countries. Immediately after the election of Rouhani, former British Secretary of State Jack Straw expressed his interest in attending the new president's inauguration ceremony on August 3, 2013. Although the hardliners in Tehran discouraged the presence of Straw, British Prime Minister David Cameron wrote a letter to Rouhani and "called for improved ties with Iran." Soon after his inauguration, Iran and the United Kingdom took steps to normalize diplomatic relations. Eventually a British parliament delegation visited Tehran in January 2014, and soon after a visit was paid by an eight-member delegation from the European Parliament.[58] Meanwhile, after a decade of nonattendance by Iranian leaders, President Rouhani joined the World Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2014 and invited international companies to invest in Iran.[59]

Rouhani's Approach toward the Middle East

Although President Rouhani put a diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue as his first priority, his foreign policy agenda that call for "constructive interaction" has implicated a revision of Iran's approach to the Middle East as well. Until the time Rouhani came to power, as outlined in the preceding pages, Iran had not only failed to materialize either of the expected benefits from the Arab Spring, but also further antagonized the Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Iran's staunch support for Assad, who had been fighting opposition violently and dragging his country into civil war, has further alienated the Arab streets from Tehran. Additionally, the regional policies of Iran as practiced for years were partly responsible for the deterioration of its relations with the West. Therefore, with his credentials for being rationalist and moderate, Rouhani was expected to "pursue an accommodative foreign policy" in the Middle East.[60]

57 Sanam Vakil, "Iran: Balancing East against West," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.4, 2006, pp. 51-65; Nasser Saghefi-Ameri, "Iran and 'Look to the East' Policy," *Center for Strategic Research*, September 2006, available at http://www.csr.ir/PDF/Issues102/PeriodicalIssues_1.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2014).

58 "British Lawmakers Visit Iran Ahead of Talks," *The New York Times*, January 7, 2014.

59 Reza Kiani, "Iran's Foreign Policy Under Rouhani," September 7, 2013.

60 Barzegar, 'Iran-Saudi Relations Under Rouhani,' July 19, 2013; Afrasiabi, "Rouhani's post-populist foreign policy," August 2, 2013.

As to the Middle East, Iran's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia was critical, because the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh has further complicated a number of regional issues. Iran and Saudi Arabia confronted each other in regional hot spots such as Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. While Iran has been accusing Saudi Arabia of fomenting unrest in Iraq and Syria by supporting "terrorists" and blocking people's legitimate demands in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has charged Iran with deliberately destabilizing Bahrain, Yemen, and Lebanon.[61] Hence, since the beginning of his election campaign, Rouhani has given positive signals toward the Saudi Kingdom.[62]

Despite its "official" welcoming of the election of Rouhani and the Geneva deal,[63] the Saudi officials did not believe in a change in Iranian foreign policy regarding its geopolitical interests, arguably in search of regional hegemony relying on the Shiite demographic structure. The maintenance of Iranian approaches to crisis points as in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon has led to the continuation of the Saudi sense of a threat from Iran. The preliminary agreement between Iran and P5+1 and the ensuing perception of "conciliation" between Iran and the United States has further distressed the Saudi concerns with potential geostrategic implications of any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.[64]

Indeed, Rouhani's "moderate" foreign policy approach has not reached the Syrian issue. It is partly because of the very complex nature of the conflict in Syria, and partly because the existence or collapse of the Assad administration in Syria has been regarded by Iran as a matter of national security. Thereby, the command of relations with Syria has been mostly surrendered to the security elites and the Revolutionary Guards. Reiterating previous Iranian statements on Syria, Rouhani has denounced civil war, the presence of 'terrorists' in the country and foreign intervention.[65] He has argued that the only solution to ending the crisis in Syria lies in political means and talks among all Syrian groups and the government. Nonetheless, Iran's resolution to support the Assad administration has not changed.

Nevertheless, soon after achieving the preliminary agreement on the nuclear case, the Rouhani government has turned its attention to the Gulf. In

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61 Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran Takes Charm Offensive to the Persian Gulf," *The New York Times*, December 4, 2013.

62 "Iran-Saudi Détente, Requisite of Regional Peace," *Iran Review*, January 14, 2014, available at http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Saudi-Détente-Requisite-of-Regional-Peace.htm (accessed on May 10, 2014).

63 "Saudi Arabia welcomes Geneva Agreement on Iranian nuclear program as first step," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC, November 25, 2013, http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news11251302.aspx (accessed on March 1, 2014).

64 Barzegar, 'Iran-Saudi Relations Under Rouhani.'

65 "President in his First Press Conference: Sanctions Aimed at Pressuring Iranian People," Official Website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 6, 2013.

the first week of December, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif paid official visits to Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and UAE to mend ties with the Persian Gulf countries. However, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia[66] were missed in this tour of the region. Although Zarif confirmed Iran's interest in reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and revealed his intention to visit Riyadh, Saudi officials reportedly declined the offer by arguing, "the time was not ripe for such a rapprochement."[67] Six months later, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal extended a public invitation to his Iranian counterpart to visit Riyadh. This time, however, a prospective dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh was marred by a sectarian crisis flaming in Iraq in June 2014.

President Rouhani's overture towards Israel has also remained unreciprocated. Both Rouhani and Zarif renounced Ahmadinejad's public "anti-Semitism" and his denial of the Holocaust. Unlike his predecessor, President Rouhani called the Holocaust a "reprehensible" act.[68] Additionally, Iran under Rouhani turned down confrontationist rhetoric towards Israel.[69] However, Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, labeled Rouhani as "a wolf in sheep's clothing" and criticized any kind of compromise with Iran.[70] Israel has also emerged as the principal opponent of the Geneva Agreement, which was declared by Netanyahu as a "historic mistake."[71]

The change of government in Tehran, however, gave an impetus to Iran's relations with Oman and Turkey. Oman was among the few countries in the Gulf that strived to keep friendly relations with Iran. Partly for its close relations with Iran – and partly for its being afraid of the Saudi dominance – Oman has rejected further integration amongst the GCC countries. Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman was the first head of state to visit Tehran, on August 25, 2013, following the election of Rouhani. Then he was reportedly acting as a broker in paving the ground for nuclear negotiations between Iran

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66 Dahlia Kholaif, "Gulf States Hesitant About Iranian Overtures," *Aljazeera*, December 8, 2013, available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/gulf-states-hesitant-about-iranian-over-tures-2013127144157666140.html (accessed on June 10, 2014); "Iran deal recasts regional politics," *Al-Monitor*, December 1, 2013, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/iran-deal-recasts-middle-east-politics-nuclear-program.html (accessed on June 10, 2014).

67 Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran Takes Charm Offensive to the Persian Gulf," *The New York Times*, December 4, 2013; Kholif, "Gulf States hesitant about Iranian overtures."

68 David Blair and Robert Tait, "Iran's Hassan Rouhani calls the Holocaust 'reprehensible'," *The Telegraph*, September 25, 2103.

69 Meir Javedanfar, "Iran, Israel and the Politics of Gesture," *Al-Monitor*, February 5, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/iran-israel-politics-gesture.html# ; (accessed on June 10, 2014).

70 "Israel PM calls Iran leader 'wolf in sheep's clothing'," *BBC News – Middle East*, October 2, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24354160 (accessed on June 10, 2014).

71 "Israeli Leaders Denounce Geneva Accord," *The New York Times*, November 14, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/middleeast/israeli-leaders-decry-iran-accord.html?_r=0 (accessed on June 10, 2014).

and the United States. In return, Rouhani paid a visit to Muscat on March 12, 2014. Besides its economic aspects, including a gas deal in which Iran will supply 10-billion cubic meters of gas annually through a 350-km pipeline, the visit has exposed the growing friendship between Oman and Iran.[72]

Moderate foreign policy as proposed by President Rouhani was welcomed in Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, have met on several occasions and displayed a close friendship. The previous Turkish perception of Iran as a destabilizing force in the region was replaced by an understanding that the moderate foreign policy of Rouhani might contribute to peace and stability to the region. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Tehran on January 28-29, 2014, when the parties signed a preferential trade agreement and a cooperation agreement to form a Joint Trade Committee. Additionally, Erdoğan and Rouhani signed a joint political declaration to establish a High-Level Cooperation Council, which meant that the two leaders are resolved to deepen bilateral relations between Ankara and Tehran.[73] The first meeting of the High-level Cooperation Council was held on June 9, on the sidelines of Rouhani's visit to Ankara.

Iran under Rouhani has also reinstated its relations with Hamas leadership. It is announced in early December 2013 that the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip had renewed its ties with Iran following the elections of Rouhani.[74] In addition to restoring its ties with Hamas, Iran has also re-established its relations with Fatah. Jibril Rajoub, deputy secretary of Fatah's Central Committee, visited Tehran on January 28, 2014 in order "to convey President Mahmoud Abbas's regards to the Iranian leadership and congratulate the Iranian people on the agreement with P5+1." Actually, the visit of Rajoub was an attempt on the part of Fatah leadership "to start a new chapter" in Palestine-Iran relations.[75]

Notwithstanding the improvements recorded in Iran's ties with Oman, Turkey and the Palestinian organizations, the Rouhani administration could

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72 Simeon Kerr and Najmeh Bozrogmehr, "Iran's Hassan Rouhani seals gas deal during visit to Oman," *Financial Times*, March 13, 2014. See also, Basma Mubarak Saeed, "Oman, Iranian Rapprochement and a GCC Union," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, May 6, 2014, available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/01/20141218365065800.htm (accessed on June 10, 2014).

73 Bayram Sinkaya, "Turkish PM Erdoğan's Visit to Tehran: A New Milestone in Relations Between Turkey and Iran," *ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis*, January 31, 2014, available at http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2586 (accessed on June 10, 2014).

74 "Zahar: Hamas renewed ties with Iran following Rouhani election*," The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 2013.

75 Ali Hashem, "Jibril Rajoub calls for Iran to deal with 'all the Palestinian groups'," *Al-Monitor*, February 8, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/interview-jibril-rajoub-palestine-iran.html (accessed on June 10, 2014); Ali Hashem, "Iran Diversifies its Palestinian Strategy," *Al-Monitor*, February 14, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/originals/2014/02/iran-palestinian-strategy-diversifies.html# (accessed on June 10, 2014).

not have established sustainable relations with the countries in transition – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. This was partly because the countries in transition have been dragged into domestic turmoil and could not have formed sustainable political and economic structures, and this prevented the development of consistent foreign relations. As for the strategic capacity and capabilities of Iran, although the factional bickering inside the country has been considerably contained with the election of Rouhani, the dire economic conditions could not yet have been rehabilitated. Most importantly, President Rouhani has given priority in his foreign policy to a diplomatic solution to the nuclear controversy, the restoration of ties with the West and neighboring countries.[76]

Conclusion

The polarization and the Cold War in the Middle East preceding the outbreak of the Arab Spring have profoundly affected responses of the regional actors toward the social movements across the region. The regional politics have been predominantly occupied by an outgoing rivalry between two blocs, headed by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The differences between the two sides have been too extensive to resolve most of the regional disputes and crises ranging from Yemen and Bahrain to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria through cooperation. This rivalry was not only intensified by differences and strategic calculations of regional countries but also by the apparent US support for the Saudi-led bloc. Having failed to persuade most of the neighboring countries of its so-called "benign" regional vision, Iran under Ahmadinejad has engaged in confronting the Saudi and American powers in the Middle East.[77]

Against such a background, Iran has seen the Arab Spring as an opportunity to undermine the rival bloc and to confront US influence in the region. The first waves of upheavals that hit pro-American conservative regimes in Tunisia and Egypt have given credit to the official Iranian view of the Arab Spring. Iran's capacity to influence the course of events, however, has been marred by a number of factors, including dire economic conditions in the country and international pressure to isolate the regime in Tehran. Additionally, the emergence of growing factional divisions in Tehran around the same time the mass upheavals swept the Arab streets has prevented Iran from developing a consistent strategy toward the Arab Spring. Moreover, the subsequent waves of the Arab Spring—particularly in Syria—have turned against the interests of Iran. Thus, not only has Iran failed to expand its regional influence riding on the Arab Spring coattails, it has also faced new challenges, such as how to defeat strong opposition to its principal and only ally in Damascus. Increasingly,

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76 Pinar Arikan, "Change in Foreign Policy of Iran under Rouhani Government and its Reflections in Domestic Politics," *ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs*, no.1 (March 2014) available at http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014320_orsambrief.pdf (accessed on June 10, 2014).

77 Kayhan Barzegar, "Regionalism in Iran's Foreign Policy," *Iran Review*, February 8, 2010.

Iran's strategic goal of keeping Assad in power has led to the securitization and militarization of its approach to Syria.

Hassan Rouhani, who came to power in Iran in August 2013, has set new horizons for Iranian foreign policy: to replace confrontation with accommodation and constructive interaction. To that end, he has reached a preliminary compromise with the United States over the controversial nuclear program. Rouhani's initial success toward achieving improved relations with some countries in the region notwithstanding, much of his efforts to do so have been regarded more as an attempt to regain Iran's lost grounds in the preceding years rather than neutralizing current regional challenges.

The lack of a dramatic change in Iran's foreign policy toward the region could be accounted for in several ways. To begin with, and despite the relative thaw in Iran's relations with the United States, the regional geopolitics has yet to shift in Iran's favor. The ongoing conflicts between Iran and regional and international actors continue to constrain Iran's options and maneuverability in the Middle East. Secondly, President Rouhani has given precedence to the "normalization" of Iran's relations with the West over dealing with regional problems on the assumption that the former will positively affect the latter. Finally, most of the regional issues have been securitized by the Iranian regime. It should be noted, however, that President Rouhani, like all Iranian presidents before him, lacks the ability to fully control security policies, despite the fact that he comes from the security sector and has good relations with the security organizations. That may explain why it is very critical for him to cut a deal with the Western countries on the nuclear issue. If he could successfully solve the nuclear issue, he could then claim further authority on shaping the country's security and foreign policies, including even adopting a new approach to the Middle East.

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ARAP AYAKLANMALARININ İSLAMİ HAREKET ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: TUNUS, MISIR VE ÜRDÜN İHVAN'INDAN DERSLER

ÖZ

Arap ayaklanmalarından sonra İslami hareketlerin Ortadoğu'nun büyük ve karmaşık yapısının ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu hususunu ve artan İslami aktivizmin irdelenmesi gerekliliğini ortaya koydu. Bu makale, Ortadoğu'da İslami hareketin ve İhvan'ın yekpare olmadığını ve örnek ülke analizleri ile anlaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Ayaklanmaların ardından ortaya çıkan en önemli konulardan birisini otoriter yapıların yerini siyasal çoğulculuğa bıtakıp bırakmayacağı yönünde olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, İhvan'ın Mısır ve Tunus'ta yürüttüğü siyasal pratikler birbirinden farklılık göstermekte olup, Ürdün ise bahse konu iki ülkenin melez bir örneğini teşkil etmektedir. İhvan içerisindeki bu farklı tutumlar İslami hareketin, ılımlılık-dahil etme hipotezi üzerinden yeniden düşünülmesi ihtiyacını doğurmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Islami aktivizm, Müslüman Kardeşler, Arap ayaklanmaları, ılımlılık-dahil etme, demokratikleşme, Mısır, Tunus, Ürdün

تأثير حركات التمرّد العربية على الحركات الإسلامية : دروس من الإخوان المسلمين في تونس ومصر والأردن.

نور كوبرولو

خلاصة :

اظهرت الحركات الاسلامية التي اعقبت احداث التمرد العربية كونها جزءا لا يتجزّأ من هيكلية الشرق الأوسط الكبيرة والمعقّدة، بالاضافة الى اظهارها ضرورة البحث عن الفعاليات الاسلامية المتزايدة. ويتبنّى هذا المقال فكرة عدم كون الحركات الاسلامية في الشرق الأوسط متلازمة مع حركة الإخوان المسلمين. ويعطي المقال نماذج تحليلية عن الوضع في عدد من الدول لتوضيح وتأكيد هذه الفكرة. على ان احد اهم امواضيع التي طرحت نفسها بعد احداث التمرّد هذه، هو عدم اتاحة الانظمة المستبدّة الفرصة للانظمة المستندة على الأغلبية السياسية لتحلّ محلّها. وفي هذا الإطار، فان الفعاليات السياسية التي مارستها حركة الاخوان المسلمين في مصر وتونس، تختلف احداها عن الأخرى. اما الأردن، فإنه يمثّل نموذجا هو مزيج بين الدولتين المشار اليهما. ان هذا الموقف المختلف داخل حركة الاخوان اظهر ضرورة اعادة التفكير مجددا حول الحركات الاسلامية بما فيها المعتدلة منها.

الكلمات الدالّة : النشاطات الاسلامية، الاخوان المسلمون، حركات التمرد العربية، الاعتدال، التحوّل الى الديمقراطية، مصر، تونس، الأردن.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS ON THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: LESSONS FROM IKHWAN IN TUNISIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN

ABSTRACT

After the Arab uprisings, it has become apparent that Islamists are an integral component of the huge and complex structure in the Middle East, and the recent growth of Islamist activism in the region needs to be addressed. To that end, this article will argue that Islamists and the Ikhwan in the Arab Middle East do not form a monolithic entity and need to be on a case-by-case basis. Following the uprisings one of the key questions regarding Islamist parties has been centered on whether or not affected states will shift from authoritarianism towards political pluralism. The political practices of the Ikhwan movement in Egypt and Tunisia have exhibited clear cut differences from those of their predecessors, while the case of the Ikhwan in Jordan may be seen as a hybrid of the Egyptian and Tunisian cases that has brought the question of the 'moderation-inclusion hypothesis' back to the surface.

Keywords: Islamist activism, Muslim Brotherhood, Arab uprisings, moderation-inclusion, democratization, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan

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The social movements that first erupted in Tunisia then spread around the Arab world to Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain and Syria have initiated debate over the stability and legitimacy of the existing regimes. Although the uprisings broke out over economic crisis, as exhibited in the public's struggle with growing unemployment, what began as rallies escalated to calls for reformation and political transformation.

At the beginning of the so-called 'Arab Spring' it seemed that Islamists would come to power with a linear increase in political pluralism. Islamists – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood Society (*al-Ikhwan*) – with their history of quick and effective organization and mobilization, were actually late participants in the public rallies, but the domino effect of the upheavals ultimately positioned them as an integral part of the emergent regional social structure. The key figure of the Islamist movement in the Middle East -i.e. Ikhwan candidate Muhammed Morsi- also achieved a high-profile presidential victory in Egypt.

The decline of Arabist and Baathist ideologies and identities, which can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s, has led to a resurgence in Islamist activism in the Middle East. Egypt's peace-making with Israel in 1979 led to a debate on the decline of Pan-Arabism and resulted in the emergence of a new order in the Middle East, i.e. the Camp David Order. The Iranian Revolution and its Shi'a character were also instrumental to the increase in Islamist activism in the region. Meanwhile, the trend towards democratization by the late 1980s foreshadowed an Islamist rise to power in more democratized or pluralist societies. One of the main reasons for this was the weakness of the opposition around the region. In addition, Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood Society, had been established as charity organizations in most Arab countries, and were thus able to continue their activities even under martial law and during states of emergency.

Perhaps it is too early to think of the upheavals as revolutions, or to credit them with enacting lasting structural change; instead, the post uprising period may be characterized as an era of transition. Nevertheless, related studies have revealed two main characteristics about this moment in the history of the Arab world: first, the social movements in the region are clear indicators that a process of change is underway within the structures of Arab regimes; and second, in many cases, Islamist movements and parties have become important actors in the political arena.

Ikhwan after the Uprisings: A testimonial to the integration of moderates?

With the onset of the Arab social upheavals, moderate or centrist Islamists, specifically Ikhwan-affiliated Islamists, emerged as willing ac-

tors within the political systems -if not with the ruling regimes- exhibiting a variety of *political practices*. Fawas Gerges analyzes the patterns of behavior among two main groups of Islamists in the Middle East -moderates/modernists and *Salafi Jihadis*- during this moment:

> most [Islamists] are centrist and modernist and accept the rules and procedures of the democratic game, in shaping the future political trajectory of their societies. In contrast, the Salafis and Islamic ultraconservatives in general, who believe that Islam controls all social spheres and regulates the whole of human life, are a sizeable minority.[1]

The resurgence of the Islamist movement especially in Egypt and Tunisia uncovered the very old discussion of whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy. For instance, according to Esposito and Piscatori, "ideas of some theoreticians and leaders of political Islam can contribute to a reconceptualization of the democratic ideal and help correct some of the 'defects' of Western democracy". Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Francis Fukuyama, meanwhile, take the approach that the goals of the movements and parties "identified with political Islam [are] 'undemocratic' or even 'anti-democratic'".[2]

As Katerina Dalacoura puts forward, "None of the 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had a predominantly Islamist agenda".[3] Nevertheless, in most cases Islamists have been seen as the main beneficiaries of the revolts, and after four years their integral position among the emergent factions is evident. The 6 April and 'We are all Khaled Said' groups and the trade unions in Egypt; workers, members of the middle class, liberals and a wide range of protestors in Tunisia; Jordanians comprising different socio-economic segments of the society, as well as those of Palestinian descent (although with a minimum impact), they all gathered at public rallies in the zeitgeist of the Arab uprisings.

Tunisia: Transition to democracy and the role of Ennahda

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings Tunisia's democratic transition has shown itself to have the greatest chance of success.[4] The *Union Générale des*

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1 Fawas Gerges, "The Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 128, No. 3, 2013, p. 389.

2 Ibid.

3Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and geopolitical implications", *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, 2012, p. 74.

4 "Tunisia stands out as an exception in the region. Its political evolution stands in stark contrast to many of the region's tragic turmoils: Egypt's return to military authoritarianism, Syria's civil-war slaughter-house, and Libya's utter chaos." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/26/guardian-view-tunisia-transition-success-story

Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the country's main trade union, took a leading role at public rallies in the aftermath of the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi. With the downfall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his 24-year rule on 14 January 2011, the Tunisian endeavor toward democratization began. The multiparty elections held on 23 October 2011 culminated in the victory of Ennahda (Tunisian Ikhwan), which won a legislative majority, taking 90 out of 217 seats. The second winner of the elections was the Nida Tunis (Tunis Calls) Party, which can be characterized as a liberal coalition comprising the members of the old *al-Dustur* Party of Habib Bourguiba and former-President Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR), as well as secular leftists and progressive liberals with ties to the ousted regime.

The Tunisian experience has demonstrated that democratization will integrate Islamists into the emerging political system. Ennahda (the Renaissance Party), the country's main Islamist movement, "stands out among its Arab counterparts by virtue of its pragmatism, efforts to reach out to other political forces, and sophisticated intellectual outlook. Some secular parties have sought … to build bridges with the movement".[5] Ennahda was founded in 1981, and was barred from participation in the 1989 elections by President Bin Ali. Ennahda was recognized as a terrorist organization by the ruling regime, and many of its members and sympathizers were imprisoned.[6] Ennahda's leader Rashid El-Ghannushi, who had been in exile in London, came back to Tunisia right after the outbreak of the protests. Ghannushi has traditionally been considered as a moderate Islamist, and Tunisian Ikhwan under him has demonstrated an approach distinct from that of its Egyptian counterpart, the Freedom and Justice Party.

Ghannushi, whose party represents a *mehcer* (migrant) character among Islamist movements in the region, rejects extremism. "The type of state we want is one that doesn't interfere in people's private lives," he has explained, "The state should not have anything to do with imposing or telling people what to wear, what to eat and drink, what they believe in, what they should believe in."[7] This moderate character is central to understanding the compromises made during both the constituent assembly elections of 2011 and the recent presidential elections. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Ghannushi has also underscored his position on the highly debated issue of Islam and democracy:

> For more than a quarter of a century, I have continued to affirm that democracy and Islam are integral, not conflicting principles. Democracy thrives with Islam and Islam thrives with democracy. They are intimate and co-exis-

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5 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way", *Middle East/North Africa Report* No. 106, 28 April 2011, p. ii.

6 "Tunus Kurucu Meclis Seçim Sonuçları: Bir Devrimin Ardından Kazananlar ve Kaybedenler", *ORSAM*, 23 Ekim 2011; orsam.org.tr

7 "Rashid Ghannushi on Britain, Islam and Democracy", http://www.bbc.com/news/world-16932923

tent couples and friends. Therefore, we Islamists do not face any difficulty or religious taboo when we advocate an Islamic democracy.[8]

As reported by the BBC, Ghannushi "goes back to the values of the Koran rather than a literal reading of it. He then argues that these values – such as justice, public consultation and human rights – are encapsulated in modern democratic states."[9] In the aftermath of the uprisings, Ennahda was thus viewed as a viable alternative for Tunisians seeking more accountable government, freedom and justice.

Following a collapse in the national dialogue between the ruling party Ennahda and the opposition, Tunisians went back to the ballot box on 26 October 2014. This time, the Nida Tunis Party captured the most parliamentary seats – 85 out of 217 – leaving Ennahda second in the legislature, this time with 69 seats. Nida Tunis, which had run on an explicitly anti-Islamist platform, won the right to name the prime minister and lead a coalition government.[10] This shaped Ennahda's role in the subsequent presidential elections.

"In the context of the meagre harvest of the Arab Spring, Tunisia remains the last hope for a successful democratic transition. The country and its allies have every reason to ensure that Tunisia continues on its exceptional course".[11] The role of Ennahda during the recent presidential elections strengthens this argument. Following the success of Nida Tunis in the October parliamentary elections, Beji Caid Essebsi, former parliamentary speaker under President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, became the Nida Tunis presidential candidate. With the combined support of leftist and rightist seculars, Essebsi took 55.6% of the vote, defeating incumbent Moncef Marzouki.[12]

Ennahda had decided to remain neutral in the presidential elections process. One reason for this was the loss of one-quarter of its vote in the 26 October elections from its 2011 results, giving Nida Tunis the seats necessary to form the government. Upon election, Essebsi announced his party would not join Ennahda in any form of coalition. As a result, the only political role that Ennahda appeared to be left with at first glance was that of key opposition in the legislature. Neutrality continues to be Ghannushi's approach for the moment, which takes the form of tacit support for Marzouki.

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8 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/2012913653599865.html

9 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-16932923

10 "Tunisia election results: Nida Tunis wins most seats, sidelining Islamists", *The Guardian*, 30 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/tunisia-election-results-nida-tunis-wins-most-seats-sidelining-islamists and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/tunisia-protests-urge-government-resignation-2013102372524126573.html

11 "Tunisia's Elections: Old Wounds, New Fears", *International Crisis Group Middle East & North Africa Briefing,* No. 44, 19 December 2014.

12 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30639792

Ennahda has been classified by Olivier Roy and Asaf Bayat as "*post-Islamist* amongst its supporters, candidates and voters".[13] Recognizing it was at risk of losing ground, the party has opted to compromise with the other actors involved in Jasmine Revolution. As Tarek Chamkhi observes,

> The Ennahda-led government in Tunisia (from December 2011 until January 2014) showed utmost respect to [a] historic agreement and towards the toleration principle. Ennahda's contribution to the National Constituent Assembly was 42 women – a larger percentage than all of the secular parties combined.[14]

Here Chamkhi excludes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from the 'neo-Islamist' category that emerged with the Arab uprisings due to the party's "tendency towards autocracy and refusal to cooperate with the opposition".[15]

Egypt: The Fear of the Past

For Marc Lynch, the "unified narrative of change, and the rise of a new, popular pan-Arabism directed against regimes, is perhaps the greatest revelation of the uprisings".[16] Egypt's *Kefaya* (Enough) movement was in many ways the first sign of the Arab uprisings. Merging young Egyptians, liberals, Nasserists and Muslim Brothers, *Kefaya* helped to carve out a public space for political and social contestation. As he put it, "the uprisings were not only about jobs and bread, but about making sure the people deserved bread".[17] For Fuad Ajami, "the region's exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral embarrassment"; he argues that, "from Cairo, the awakening became a pan-Arab affair, catching fire in Yemen and Bahrain".[18] In this sense, it can be said that the future of uprisings in Egypt will, in one way or in another, determine the nature of transition in the region.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt formed the Justice and Freedom Party and joined the November 2011 elections, similar to the case of Tunisia. The Muslim Brotherhood Society (Ikhwan) had been established in Ismailiyya, Egypt in 1928 by schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna with the aim of building a "transnational" Islamic state.[19] At that time, although Ikhwan's ideology conflicted with secular ideology, al-Banna's rejection of the use of violence in

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13 Tarek Chamkhi, "Neo-Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 460. Emphasis added.

14 Ibid, p. 465.

15 Ibid.

16 Marc Lynch, "The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring", *Foreign Policy*, December 2011, Issue 190, pp. 46–47.

17 Ibid.

18 Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, Issue 2, March/April 2012, pp. 56–65.

19 Chamkhi, p. 455.

political *jihad* (struggle) marked the Brotherhood out as peculiarly moderate. Ikhwan's will to engage the political scene was set back primarily by the 1952 Free Officers coup d'état and the newly established structure of Nasser's civil and military bureaucracy.

Consequently, the resurgence of the Brotherhood has alarmed secular groups around the country, although the downfall of Mohamed Morsi, the first elected president of Egypt, cannot be reduced simply to a secular-Islamist cleavage or a tension between the old ruling regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.[20] In fact, the new constitution retained an article from the old constitution stipulating that 'the principles of Islamic law are a main source of legislation', a provision none of the opposition leaders have rejected. From this, a new article has been added to the constitution which "defines those principles as the established schools of Sunni Muslim scholarship".[21]

Thus, it was not secularism that led the opposition to move against Ikhwan, but rather the lack of compromise by the new leadership under Morsi in the making of the new charter. For instance, according to Hamdeen Sabahi, a leftist and former presidential candidate, "This is a constitution that lacks the most important prerequisite for a constitution: consensus … This means we can't build our future based on this text at all".[22] In this regard, Morsi's position during his one-year term demonstrated that the resurgence of Salafi Islamists under the al-Nour Party caused a fear of losing the ground gained by the Freedom and Justice Party; this led them to rapidly launch reforms without the adequate popular support and will of the people, unlike the case of Tunisia.

After the coup on July 4th, General Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi announced, "We will build an Egyptian society that is strong and stable; that will not exclude any of its sons".[23] The overthrow of Morsi affected more than his own political influence; the exclusion of Muslim Brotherhood members from the political scene cut the party off from the influence it had accumulated over its 85-year history. It is important to note here the trepidation many Egyptians felt over the possibility of moving directly from one long-term authoritarian regime to another. They did not want to topple Hosni Mubarek only to take a step backwards with Morsi, despite the still-vital presence of the army as a guardian of stability. Dalacoura observes a fundamental difference between Egypt and Tunisia here:

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20 Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Mübarek Sonrası Mısır", *ORSAM Yazıları*, 6 Şubat 2013.

21 "Egypt Opposition Gears Up After Constitution Passes", *The New York Times*, 23 December 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/middleeast/as-egypt-constitution-passes-new-fights-lie-ahead.html?_r=0

22 Ibid.

23 "Mohammed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years", *The Guardian*, 4 July 2013.

In Tunisia and Egypt, where the regimes were overthrown without outside intervention (as occurred in Libya), the security services stood aside and did not attempt to crush the protestors – for reasons which are still obscure – while the army was impelled by popular mobilization to move against the president. In Tunisia, the army refused to open fire on the demonstrators and was instrumental in pushing Ben Ali out. … In Egypt, the army's position during the protests was ambivalent, but it eventually opted to remove Mubarek.[24]

Jordan: Ikhwan and the Monarchy

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was neither bypassed nor suppressed by the Arab uprisings. Nevertheless the trend towards democratization has been underway in the Kingdom since 1989 after public unrest in the city of Maan, although the opposition has not been satisfied with the stagnant pace of reform. Political parties were legalized with a new Political Parties Law in 1992, at which point the Jordanian Ikhwan formed its political wing, i.e. the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Since then the Front has been regarded as the country's key political party, having the largest capacity for mobilization and organization.

With the onset of the upheavals in Jordan, King Abdullah II pursued a policy of reshuffling the government to contain the growing opposition. He first appointed Marouf al-Bakhit as prime minister in 2011, then replaced him with Awn Shawkat Khasawneh the same year. The Kingdom also attempted to rebuild its ties with the Brotherhood, meeting with IAF members to put forward liberalization reforms. Its new policy of rapprochement with the IAF marks a significant step forward in Jordanian politics given the Front's boycott of the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood (and the IAF) had boycotted the 2010 elections on the grounds that the prevailing system was not moving Jordan's democracy ahead. According to Zaki Bani Rsheid, deputy head of the Brotherhood, their decision not to participate in the elections was related to a countrywide lack of confidence that a change would occur.[25] For that reason, the Kingdom pursued a policy of integrating the IAF into the elections that were scheduled to be held on January 23, 2013. However the Ikhwan and the Front decided not to join the early elections after the public rallies.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was established by Abu Qura in 1947; he was succeeded by Abd al-Rahman Khaliaf. In 1953 Khaliaf mobilized the Brotherhood into a 'national movement' with branches and activities within Jordan and elsewhere.[26] The Ikhwan in Jordan did not attempt to change the

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24 Dalacoura, p. 70.

25 Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader, Zaki Ben Irsheid, Amman, Jordan, November 9, 2010.

26 As'ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, "Strategies of electoral participation by Islamic movements: the Muslim Brotherhood and parliamentary elections in Egypt and Jordan, November 2010", *Contempo-*

regime; their focus has traditionally been on practical changes, which have not been contradictory to the preferences of the Hashemite monarchy.

In 1994, the Ikhwan established a new "General Guide". Under the leadership of Abd al-Majid Dhunaybat, and at the onset of Jordan's peace making process with Israel, the non-confrontational relations between the party and the throne entered a new era. The party's opposition to normalization of relations with Israel produced friction with the monarchy, called the King's peace. Although it had boycotted the 1997 elections, the Ikhwan decided to participate in the 2003 elections, issuing a *fatwa* encouraging participation.[27]

The main turning point in Jordan's Spring occurred on 24 March 2011 when thousands of demonstrators reached the capital city of Amman calling for efforts against unemployment and corruption, as well as asking for more political reforms. A fundamental difference with the cases of Tunisia and Egypt can be seen in the slogans used during the Jordanian protests, which did not call for the regime/monarchy to be deposed. Instead, the demands were centered on 'bread and freedom'.

The overnight protest in Amman on March 24, which resulted in one death and over 100 injuries, had two significant outcomes. The first was the founding of a group called the National Front for Reform, comprising leaders of the IAF, leftist parties, and trade unions, along with independent Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.[28] Since the onset of the Arab Spring, this group has alleviated the major areas of contention between Palestinians and Jordanians. Second, during the same period, the Hashemite monarchy took significant steps to initiate a comprehensive reform program; the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) was thus established with the aim of revising the controversial electoral law. Unfortunately, the protests became prolonged as the reform process came to a standstill, and King Abdullah eventually replaced Marouf Bakhit's government in response to growing public discontent.

An 1993 amendment to the electoral law is a key issue on the IAF's agenda, as well as that of the opposition, over claims that it disproportionately represented the rural south of the country and its centers of Maan, Karak and Tafila.[29] There are two main elements in the debate over the electoral law: first, the urban areas, which are located mainly in the north, are heavily populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who have been regarded as the main threat to the longevity of the monarchy since the Black September/*Fedayeen*

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rary Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2011, p. 402.

27 Ibid, p. 404.

28 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan", *International Crisis Group Middle East & North Africa Briefing,* No. 18, 12 March 2012.

29 Russell E. Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 19.

episode of 1970–71. In the aftermath of the civil war, Palestinians were not only seen as a threat to the monarchy, but were also identified as the main obstacle to unifying the opposition. The second factor is a matter of rural-urban cleavage. Although Jordanians make up the political majority, the economy is dominated from the urban centers of the north, which are disproportionately populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The Hashemite monarchy has historically acquired its political legitimacy primarily from the rural areas of the south, which are heavily populated by Bedouins.

The combination of these elements has made bedfellows of the IAF and Jordan's Palestinian population; since the electoral law amendment and the Kingdom's normalization of relations with Israel, they have become the party's primary support base. And although the IAF has historically maintained cordial ties with the monarchy and has never been banned or suppressed,[30] the organic relationship between Jordan's Ikhwan and Hamas is a matter of concern for the present government. These socio-economic and political cleavages were manifested during the uprisings.

In May 2012, hundreds of Jordanians – mostly Islamists and youth activists – marched in Amman after the Friday prayer, calling for the cancellation of the Jordan-Israeli treaty, as well as for an elected government and comprehensive reform. The march against Israel was actually a reaction to new Prime Minister Tarawneh's statement that 'he would sign a Jordanian-Israeli treaty again'.[31] It was a clear indicator that tensions between the opposition (mainly Islamists) and the regime had resurfaced over the issue of relations with Israel. At the same time, the banners held by demonstrators that asked for an elected government highlight the effects of the Arab Spring within Jordan. During this very critical moment, most Ikhwan members took a moderate and cautious position. According to Larbi Sadiki,

> Jordan's formidable Ikhwan [is] diverse, and boasts at least four currents. Three of these share a platform of "moderation" – favoring gradual, peaceful and bargain-based political reform, in conjunction with the government, not without or against it.[32]

Nevertheless the IAF is currently not represented in the parliament due to their boycott of the early-2013 elections; they still represent the main opposition in the country demanding a real political reform process, however. In this respect, Jordan offers an exceptional case where the Ikhwan has historically established close ties with the regime, despite current tensions. For Ghanem

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30 Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation:*, *Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 199.

31 "Hundreds of Jordanians protest Israel peace deal", *The Jerusalem Post*, May 4, 2012.

32 Larbi Sadiki, "Jordan: Arab Spring Washout?", http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/201319134753750165.html

and Mustafa, "the character of both sides – the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood – was the key factor explaining the structure of their relationship".[33] Thus, the newly emerging structure of relations between them will also help the Ikhwan movement in the region to re/construct its role within the changing environment of the Middle East by taking into consideration the resurgence of *Salafi Jihadism*.

The Moderation-Inclusion Hypothesis Revisited

The nature of the Arab uprisings has demonstrated that the Islamist movement in the region is not monolithic, and that Islamist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in each Arab country should be analyzed separately, according to the dynamics between each regime and each Islamist faction, and according to the historical particularity of each country. The discourses and practices implemented by Islamists following the Arab uprisings have also differed. For instance, in the case of Syria a lack of unity among the opposition – in contrast to the case of Egypt – and the relative absence of public space for the Muslim Brotherhood to operate are a key reason the riots devolved into sectarian conflict. The repressive policies of Hafiz al-Assad under Baath rule had closed nearly all avenues for the mobilization of an opposition, especially the Ikhwan. In contrast, Islamist parties in Jordan and Morocco are able to act within the political system, and what the Arab uprisings brought them was a call for more political reform. According to Fawas Gerges,

> In Tunisia, Ennahda has undergone a more-rapid shift than the [Egyptian Muslim] Brotherhood toward modernity and pluralism through the work of its more-youthful members ... Similarly, the moderate youth in Morocco have built a critical mass within the Party of Justice and Development.[34]

The cases of Jordan and Egypt also show that differences in their historical trajectories, as well as in their relationships with the ruling elite, play a determining role in the political agendas of Islamist parties. According to Asad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, "Both [the] Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and in Jordan, support the idea of participating in national elections, while they differ in the level of expectation from such involvement in the political process in their societies", though in the Jordanian example, the Brotherhood "wants to transform its public influence to political power".[35] The regime in Jordan has launched reforms to ensure its survival, although these have been characterized as 'cosmetic democratization', 'defensive democratization' or a symbolic 'façade democracy'.[36] Jillian Schwedler argues

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33 Ibid, p. 403.

34 Fawas Gerges, p. 396.

35 Asad Ghanam & Mohanad Mustafa, "Strategies of electoral participation by Islamic movements", p. 396 and p. 397.

36 Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", *International Journal of Middle Eastern*

that Jordan after the Arab uprisings has become '*more liberal and more authoritarian*' at the same time.[37] Thus, the varying characters of both the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in each country have always been the key to restructuring their relationships.

The shifts that have occurred in Jordan and Egypt have once again brought questions to the surface about whether such parties become more moderate when they are included in the political arena. As Jillian Schwedler argues, "The most common formulation of this [inclusion-moderation] argument is that institutions shape political behavior by creating constraints and opportunities, which in turn structure the choices available to political actors".[38] She also added that "moderation may have little to do with whether political actors have actually *changed their positions on particular issues* … That is, inclusion may not turn radicals into moderates, but rather deny radicals the support base that provides political advantage".[39] This hypothesis is applicable to Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan despite their divergent political trajectories. In all three cases, the Ikhwan, as the main Islamist movement, prefers to act within the political arena, accepting the rules and values of the political systems, if not the regimes. The main difference between Egypt and Tunisia, as compared to Jordan, is that Jordanians do not call for the Hashemite monarchy to be deposed. The Jordanian Ikhwan thus occupies an exceptional case in the region, at least for the time being, and has instead established close ties with the ruling regime. In this respect, Ikhwan can be said to represent moderate Islamism in all three cases (if indeed such a label is required), as opposed to the system having turned them into moderates. In addition, the existence of Ikhwan is also central to the normalization of relations between Islamists in general and the political systems of each country in particular. In other words, the growing influence of radical and *Jihadi Salafis* can be minimized with the inclusion of the moderates within the political arena. Ikhwan's rejection of the use of force (with the exception of Hamas) is a crucial distinction that needs to be drawn between *Jihadi*s and the Brotherhood.

Conclusion

The issue of how to characterize the Arab Spring has incited a great deal of debate over the last four years. It has been labeled as a revolt or a crisis, often a 'spring' and mostly an uprising. In this article, the term uprising has been chosen to describe events in the Arab world dating back to 2011, since the political situation in the region is still in transition and no structural transformation has yet occurred. Still, the events have had particular ramifications

Studies Vol.30, 1998, pp. 387-410.

37 Jillian Schwedler, "The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan", *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 2012, pp. 259–270.

38 Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation,*, p. 11.

39 Ibid, p. 13.

and implications in each country, which speak to the question of 'whether the Arab world is a *unified* entity or not'.[40] Dalacoura's description, "a series of interconnected yet diverse events" reminds us that it is imperative to analyze each case individually, if comparatively; this has explanatory power regarding Muslim Brotherhood practices in various political arenas. The cases of Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt have additionally shown that the integration of Islamists into politics weakens the hypothesis that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Instead, it has become apparent that the definition and composition of Islamist activism in the region is not unified at all. But the path Rashed Ghannushi of Ennahda is walking may be seen as an attempt to outline discourses and practices for the integration of Islam, democracy and human rights.

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40 Dalacoura, p. 63.

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AVRUPA GÜÇLERİ VE I. DÜNYA SAVAŞI SONRASINDA ARAP ORTADOĞUSUNDA ZAYIF DEVLETLERİN DOĞUŞU

ÖZ

1914 yılında patlak veren I. Dünya Savaşı'ndan bir yüzyıl sonra, savaş sonrasında Avrupalı güçler tarafından oluşturulan Arap ulus devlet sistemi baskı altındadır. 'İslam Devleti', Irak ve Suriye'nin bugünkü sınırlarının sonunu getirebilir. Bu çalışma bu devletlerdeki direnç eksikliğinin nelerden kaynaklandığını sorusuna eğilmektedir. 'Yapay' devletler olarak oluşturuldukları ve hala da öyle oldukları yönündeki cevap tatmin edici değildir. Önce Büyük Britanya ve Fransa, ardından demokratik olmayan rejimler tarafından alınan ilk tercihler devlet toplumlarının kırılganlığına katkıda bulunmuştur.

القوى الأوروبية وولادة الدول الضعيفة في الشرق الأوسط العربي، في اعقاب الحرب العالمية الأولى
كودرون هارير
خلاصة

بعد مرور قرن على نشوب الحرب العالمية الأولى في عام ١٩١٤، فان نظام الدول القومية العربية التي اقيمت بعد تلك الحرب من قبل القوى الاوروبية غدت ترزح تحت ضغوط كثيرة. ويمكن لما يسمى بـ "دولة الإسلام" ان يزيل الحدود الحالية للعراق وسوريا. وتعمل هذه الدراسة على ايجاد ثمة اجابة على سؤال مفاده: من اين ينبع نقص قوة المقاومة والصمود لهذه الدول. ولا شك ان الإجابة التي تتلخص في ان اهذه الدول انشئت بصورة مصطنعة وانها لا تزال كذلك حتى اليوم ليست بإجابة مقنعة. ان المبادرات الأولى المتخذة من قبل بريطانيا العظمى وفرنسا اولا ومن بعدها الانظمة غير الديمقراطية، قد ساهمت في هشاشة مجتمعات الدول.

EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE NAISSANCE OF WEAK STATES IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AFTER WORLD WAR I

ABSTRACT

Hundred years after World War I broke out in 1914, the Arab national state system which was created by European powers after the war is under pressure. The so called "Islamic State" could lead to the end of Iraq and Syria in their present borders. The paper examines the question where the lack of resilience of those states stems from. The answer that they were created as and still are "artificial" states is not satisfactory. Early policy choices, first by Great Britain and France, then by undemocratic regimes, contributed to the fragility of the state societies.

Keywords: World War I, Sykes-Picot, League of Nation Mandates, Syria, Iraq, Islamic State

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The year 2014 marks the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the First World War. In the Middle East, the commemoration falls into a very sensitive period of time. The region is witnessing what could be the breakdown of the order which was established by the European powers after the end of the Great War, as it was called at that time, in 1918. Two of the states which have been created from the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Iraq, lie in shambles. The Iraqi-Syrian border partly does not exist anymore. The national states which for decades were held under the tight control of strong regimes have shown a striking lack of resilience, and poor sustainability, as their regimes were gone or grew weak. They have proven to be highly vulnerable, their futures as unified states in the borders given to them after World War I seem uncertain. This paper deals with the question where this lack of resilience derives from. Naturally, there is no simple answer, the causes certainly are multiple: a mix of unfavourable preconditions and bad turns taken throughout the history of the 20th century.

The creation of Iraq and Syria was the result of the first large-scale modern Western military intervention in the region: the war of the Entente Powers against the Ottoman Empire – and later also against local populations, in disregard of the spirit of US president Woodrow Wilson's 14 points speech of January 1918. In it Wilson had demanded respect for the "interests of the populations concerned".[1] The French had to crush a revolt in Syria, to impose their will, the British in Iraq.

The "Arab Spring" movements since 2011 by some were identified as a "second Arab revolt" – aiming at ending once and for all the postcolonial period by toppling the undemocratic regimes of the 20th century.[2] In 2011, only the regimes were challenged, but a few years later also the state-system itself which is the product of the First World War, comes under pressure. Today's disintegration again started with a massive military intervention: with the invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq by the United States of America together with some allies, including Europeans, in March 2003. The so called "Islamic State", *Daesh*,[3] which had its beginnings as "Al-Qaida in Iraq" in 2004, can be called a late paradox product of this intervention – and one should expect other paradox results of the present intervention against *Daesh*.

There are some striking parallels between the British role in Iraq after 1917 and the US endeavours after 2003. Both, UK and US, sported the claim of

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1 The text of Wilson's speech is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp All download quotes for this paper were last checked on January 3, 2015.

2 See e. g. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Contradictions of the Arab Spring", *Al Jazeera online*, November 11, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/20111111101711539134.html

3 Daesh is the acronym of ad-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa ash-Sham, Islamic State in Iraq and the al-Sham region (Greater Syria). In 2014 Daesh dropped "fi al-Iraq wa ash-Sham", but the acronym stayed in use.

ending an unrightful oppression, as British General Stanley Maude declared after he entered Baghdad in 1917: "Our armies do not come into your lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators."[4] A few years later in the capitals of both countries, UK and US, political discussions followed about the wisdom of imperial overreach, costly adventures and doubtful commitments: "We cannot act alone as the policeman for the whole world", said the opposition leader and later conservative British prime minister Bonar Law in 1922.[5] And in both cases the former liberators tried to disengage and get rid of the burden without giving up their influence.

"Artificial" statehood?

In the western media but also in the Middle East the Arab national states often are dubbed "artificial" and the whole Arab statehood concept "unnatural". This stands in an old tradition: Arab nationalists like Sati al-Husri (1880 –1967) were convinced that the European powers had carved up what was a cultural entity and supposed to become a political one.[6] Today the imposition of the state order after World War I sometimes is identified as the root cause of the weakness of the states overrun or threatened by the "Islamic State". However, it is hard to see what presumably more resilient "natural" and "non artificial" states and borders should be exactly: formed according to which criteria, geographical, tribal, ethnic, religious? Do not many other successful states in the international system stem from war and conquest? Why should Basra, Bagdad and Mosul, with old historical connections, not fare well together? Do not the Arab states by now have their own separate histories during which their populations showed deep loyalty and attachment to their countries? Did not, as Adeed Dawisha points out, even early Arab nationalist societies feel "the strain of regional loyalties", like Syrian or Iraqi?[7]

Undoubtedly, the denial of a big Arab nation state has been a festering wound for old Arab nationalists. However, it is questionable to claim that this denial condemned nation states like Syria and Iraq from the outset. I would rather prefer to call those states "impeded" or even "prevented" or "aborted" – or, as what happens today, "disowned". They were exogenously created, but this would not be enough for them to be doomed, there must be more: Also after their creation, foreign interests – and home-made bad policies – interfered seriously with the will and needs of their populations and prevented them growing together and develop national identities which are

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4 General Stanley Maude's declaration is reproduced e. g. in Anthony Shadid, *Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War*, (London: Picador, 2006), p. 464.

5 Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq - The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 24.

6 Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century - From Triumph to Despair*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 3.

7 Dawisha, op. cit., p. 30.

strong enough to sustainably transcend other identities and resist crises like the current ones.

Nevertheless, there was damage done and it can be blamed on the conflicting British promises during World War I, in the continuation of "The Oriental Question" of the 19th century, who would inherit the remains of the Ottoman Empire after its long expected demise. It is a story of lies, betrayals and misconceptions. Ironically enough, the British were not only playing double games, they were deceived too: they fell to the claim of a young Arab nationalist, Mohammed al-Faruqi, who succeeded in making them believe that a huge majority of Arab soldiers in the Ottoman army was ready to turn against their masters if an Arab revolt was proclaimed by Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. Faruqi introduced himself to the British as the Sharif's confidant and as the British' confidant to Hussein – "a great hoax" as David Fromkin called it.[8] His exaggerations resulted into the Clayton memorandum[9] which strongly recommended British policy makers to support Hussein, in the belief that a powerful organisation waiting to cooperate existed behind enemy lines. In the Hussein-McMahon correspondence between July 1915 and January 1916 the British pledged their support of an Arab revolt against the Ottomans – and outlined a future Sharifian Arab government (open to many different interpretations of what they really meant and what was included or excluded).

Dysfunctional bureaucracy

One might identify another parallel between the British of that time and the Americans ninety years later: the bureaucratic and political fissures in both administrations which led to conflicting statements and also domestically contested policy decisions. In the British case this was the competition between the Arab Bureau in Cairo on one and the India office on the other hand and the Foreign Office in London as a third party plus other London offices.[10] In the case of the US invasion of Iraq it was the deep enmity between State Department and Pentagon – which resulted in the ousting of professional diplomacy from the Iraq file and with it of a lot of Middle East knowhow.[11] In both cases the divisions within the bureaucracy undermined attempts to build functioning states.[12] After 2003, many Iraqis could not believe that the poor results of reconstruction efforts were the consequence of the dysfunc-

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8 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Holt, 1989 (paperback edition of 2009), p. 177.

9 Gilbert Clayton, British intelligence officer in Cairo, sent a secret memorandum to Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War.

10 See e. g. Fromkin, op. cit., p. 145.

11 See e. g. Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory - America's Second War against Iraq,* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2004), p. 130.

12 Dodge, op. cit., p. X.

tional system of the occupier: Thus, the conspiracy theory started to flourish claiming that the US wanted to prevent Iraq to recover.

In 1915, Britain's India Office was totally against and the Foreign Office at least sceptical about the Arab Office's plans to create an Arab caliph – one of "true race", as the Earl of Kitchener wrote[13] – in the person of the Hashemite Hussein bin Ali. The India Office's man for the rule on the Arab peninsula and for partnership with the British was Abdulaziz Ibn Saud – who had for years written letters to the British, without being listened to – and who finally became handy at the outset of the war, to harass the Ottomans and their allies, the house of Rashid in Hail.[14] He suffered set-backs at the beginning, but later would also expel the Hashemites from the Hijaz. Today many identify the Wahhabi ideology – the 18th century Salafism of Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab – as the origin of the destructive radical Jihadism embodied by the "Islamic State".[15]

Syria and Iraq have been mentioned as the states whose borders are crumbling, however *Daesh* has its sights also on the two states of the before mentioned dynasties: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – founded by one of the sons of Sharif Hussein, Abdullah bin Hussein – and Saudi-Arabia, the state assembled by Ibn Saud and proclaimed kingdom in 1932. Both belong to the list of countries which *Daesh* sees as colonial creatures. It is of a certain irony that the historically difficult relationship between the Sauds and the Hashemites has never been better than just now.

There were several reasons for the British Arab Bureau in Cairo to engage with the Arabs: The disaster of the ongoing battle of Gallipoli changed the British view of what the Ottoman Empire still could achieve militarily.[16] Also the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force was in dire difficulties in Iraq after the defeat in al-Kut.[17] The British feared an Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal and even more that such an attack could ignite an anti-British revolt in Egypt. The Ottoman Empire had proclaimed a Jihad and also the Germans were eager to "revolutionize" the Muslims of the Middle East against the British.[18] One other motive for a certain political sector in Britain – represented by the

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13 Timothy J. Paris*, Britain, the Hashemites, and Arab Rule 1920-1925: The Sherifian Solution,* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 314.

14 Fromkin, op. cit., p. 107.

15 Among many others, the Beirut based political analyst and Middle East expert Alastair Crooke. See "You can't understand ISIS if you don't know the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia", *Huffington Post*, August 27, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabi-a_b_5717157.html

16 Fromkin, op. cit., p. 166.

17 Ibid., p. 202.

18 See e. g. Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914 – 1918,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, third edition 2014), p. 100.

British liaison officer in the Arab camp, T.E. Lawrence – were anti-French sentiments: If the Arabs got Syria, the French would not.[19] The British-French competition in the Middle East lasted well until after the Second World War.

There are still different views on the question, if the British support for Sharif Hussein at the end was a miscalculation.[20] Without doubt, the British alliance with the Arabs was at least a very important piece of war propaganda. But for sure it was a political misunderstanding: What the British looked for at that time was a kind of Arab pope for the Muslims – and this was, in fact, also the wish of Panislamists like Rashid Rida (1865-1935).[21] Instead, with the Hashemite they got an Arab politician, and not a very successful one. Even if there was a big amount of Arab resentment against the Ottomans and from a certain point in the history the wish to get rid of their rule, this did not mean that the Arabs agreed to support all together one of their own.

The British in the meantime tried to square the circle and to reconcile their promises to the Arabs with their commitments towards their ally, France. The diplomat and presumed Middle East expert Mark Sykes was tasked to negotiate the future frontiers of Syria with his French counterpart, Francois Georges-Picot.[22] In the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 the United Kingdom and France defined their future areas of control and influence. Originally the deal included also the approval of the Russians – who themselves held old ambitions to get the filet pieces of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian plans – like attacking the Bosphorus – were never realized and therefore are not being recounted and evaluated any more: Sean McMeekin calls this an "outcome bias".[23] The outbreak of the revolution in Russia led also to the publication of the mutual Anglo-French commitments.

Sykes-Picot, the original sin

Today, Sykes-Picot in the media is often quoted as a synonym for the borders which were drawn by the European Powers between the new Arab states after the War. Of course this is not correct. The agreement between Sykes and Georges-Picot first of all covered only the area between Palestine to Iraq.[24] The

19 James Barr, *A Line in the Sand - Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 39.

20 See e. g. John Taylor's polemical article against Fromkin who is accused of belittling the Arab military contribution: "Deconstructing A Peace to End All Peace", July 2012, http://original.antiwar.com/john-taylor/2012/07/15/deconstructing-a-peace-to-end-all-peace/

21 Dawisha, op. cit., p. 21.

22 Fromkin, op. cit, p. 189.

23 Sean McMeekin, "The War of the Ottoman Succession - The Forgotten Attempts to seize Istanbul in the First World War", *Art and Thought, 100th Anniversary Issue: 1914 – The First World War and the Reshaping of the East,* 51st year, No. 100, 01/2014 – 07/2014, Goethe-Institut München, pp. 22-27.

24 Florence Gaub, Patryk Pawlak, "Sykes-Picot and Syria", *EUISS Alert,* No. 34, October 2013, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_34-Sykes-Picot_and_Syria.pdf

projected zones of interest and control do not coincide with the later states. Sykes-Picot never was implemented in the original of 1916, the most obvious example being Mosul which was supposed to be in the French zone but which France later gave up in exchange of British support regarding Alsace-Lorraine.[25] It is also not correct that the borders which were drawn following the 1920 San Remo conference were totally made up: more often than not they followed old Ottoman district boundaries.[26] Between Sykes-Picot and the implementation of the actual state order, several UK policy changes took place.[27] However, Sykes-Picot does remain a document which illustrates the complete disregard of the European powers for the wishes and aspirations of the populations living in the Middle East and as such it has become a code for imperial power. This may not be academically correct but it has a powerful historical influence – even *Daesh* propagandists refer to it and it will have not much effect to tell them that they got it all wrong.[28]

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 on the other hand appealed only to a – then small – part of the population in the region. In it the British foreign ministry held out the prospect of "the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, excluding anything "which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities."[29] Also here, the background was clear: to encourage Jewish cooperation in Palestine – this was not so difficult in the face of the policies of Turkish governor Cemal Pasha towards the Jews, many of them citizens of enemy countries who feared the same fate as Armenians –, and to win over the support of the international Zionist movement which was supposed to have influence on the American government.[30]

The contradictoriness of the British promises to the Arabs and the Jews is well documented in a letter which the head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, David Hogarth, had to deliver to Hussein in January 1918 (he had already proclaimed himself "King of Arab Lands", but was recognized by the British only as "King of Hijaz").[31] Hogarth's account shows that the British knew well that

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25 Barr, op. cit, p. 71.

26 Gaub/Pawlak, op. cit.

27 Toby Dodge, "Can Iraq Be Saved?", *Survival: Gobal Politics and Strategy*, Volume 56, October-November 2014, pp. 7-20, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2014-4667/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-october-november-2014-be95/56-5-02-dodge-d058

28 David L. Philips, "Extremists in Iraq Need a History Lesson", *CNBC online*, July 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101818814

29 For the text see e. g. http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E210CA73E38D9E1D052565FA00705C61

30 Fromkin, op. cit., p. 299.

31 For the significance of the later so called "Hogarth message" see Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth - The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914 – 1939*, (London: Routledge, 1976, edition of 2014), p. 284.

not all commitments could be honoured: He reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain".[32]

A rare public acknowledgement in this regard came from British Foreign Minister Jack Straw ninety years later:

> A lot of the problems we are having to deal with now, I have to deal with now, are a consequence of our colonial past... The Balfour declaration and the contradictory assurances which were being given to Palestinians in private at the same time as they were being given to the Israelis – again, an interesting history for us but not an entirely honourable one.[33]

Bassam Tibi draws a direct link between the history of the contradicting promises during World War I and the fact that the Middle East, perhaps like no other region in the world, is so full of conspiracy theories.[34] The common sentiment is that there is always a presumed hidden agenda – or several – behind the officially proclaimed one. If these theories contradict each other they do not become less credible – perhaps even the contrary. Also today, in the face of the advance of *Daesh*, the region abounds with conspiracy theories. The "Islamic State" proclaims a war against the "Crusader-Zionist-Safawid" coalition, and many Arab and Iranian Shiites are convinced that the same "Islamic State" is a joint venture of the Israeli Mossad with the Saudi king to fight the Shiites. Many Sunnis think it is a US-Israeli invention which gives them the pretext of a "war against the Sunnis" and again others think it is a project to create the Kurdish state which was denied to the Kurds after 1918 – to complete the World War I mission of dividing and weakening the Middle East.

Divide et impera

This paper looks only into the first years of Iraq and Syria. In November 1918 the Anglo-French Declaration still pledged that the UK and France would "assist in the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia", but despite all reassurances the French had already decided to rule Syria directly.[35] Both, France and Great Britain, proceeded to implement their ideas even before the Council of the new League of Nations approved their mandates. After an ultimatum to the Arab Syrian Govern-

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32 Sahar Huneidi, *A Broken Trust. Sir Herbert Samuel, Zionism, and the Palestinians*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 66.

33 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1413237/Straw-blames-crises-on-Britains-colonial-past.html

34 Bassam Tibi, Die Verschwörung - Das Trauma arabischer Politik, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1993).

35 See the text at http://de.scribd.com/doc/71915217/The-Anglo-French-Declaration-Nov-7-1918#scribd

ment, the French intervened militarily and defeated the Arabs at the Battle of Maysalun in July 1920. They deposed the Arab government and in August removed Faisal from Damascus.

The dream of a big unified Arab state or even of a "Greater Syria" – which the 1919 King Crane Commission had reported as the wish of the people[36] – was frustrated, but even Syria in its French mandate borders did not really get a chance. France's obligation, according to the duties of a Mandatory as stipulated by the League of Nations, was to render "administrative advice and assistance until such time as [the states are] able to stand alone".[37] France was supposed to guide Syria on its way to be accepted as an independent member of the League of Nations. Instead the Mandatory was caught in fighting Arab nationalism and as a counter measure fostered ethnical and sectarian divisions.[38] One old trick was geographical division, granting the minorities, especially the heterodox sect of the Alawites, special autonomous forms of administrations. The rise of the Alawis in the ranks of the Syrian military was a late consequence of French *divide et impera* policies in Syria. Today the "Islamic State" – and even less radical Sunnis – see the Assad family with its Alawi roots as instrument of the imperial West.[39]

In Iraq, the British – who at the outset of the war still thought of annexing Basra and establishing a protectorate over Baghdad – had understood that British rule had to be justified on different grounds than the "rights of conquest".[40] But it took some time after the war until everybody accepted what Sykes wrote in 1918, namely that "imperialism, annexation, military triumph, prestige, white man's burden… expunged from the popular political vocabulary…".[41] The British had decided "to go it slowly" with the Arab participation in governing the country – a revolt which had to be put down was the result.[42]

One element of British rule was the revision of the Ottoman tribal policy which had aimed at weakening tribal leaders and bringing tribes under gov-

36 Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs - A History*, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p. 159.

37 For the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp

38 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, "Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012. http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/roots-alawite-sunni-rivalry-syria?print

39 An Azhar graduated Sheikh, Alawi Amin, told the Lebanese newspaper *As-Safir* in July 2014 that Daesh was "a terrorist group which was born out of colonialism and U.S. and Western intelligence for the purpose of slitting the throats of Muslims and dividing the Islamic nation." "Grand Sheikh Of Al-Azhar: Islamic State Barbaric, Distorts Islam", http://www.rferl.org/content/under-black-flag-egypt-sheikh-tayeb/26723627.html

40 Dodge, op. cit., p. 9, p. 13.

41 Ibid., p. 13.

42 Ibid., p. 16. Dodge quotes Arnold Wilson, Civil Commissioner in Iraq, 1918-1920.

ernment control. The British did the contrary. They made tribal sheikhs – of their liking – stronger, with a separate penal code for tribes, the infamous Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation which granted judicial authority to tribal leaders (Saddam Hussein did a similar thing 70 years later).[43] "Using the sheikhs" helped to reduce British personnel costs but it did not help the social cohesion of the new state. After 2003 the US first worked mainly with Shiites and Kurds and "used" Arab Sunni sheikhs only later, against Al-Qaida after 2005.

Also the king of Iraq was a British invention, Faisal, who had to be compensated for the loss of Damascus – nevertheless he duly started soon to struggle for greater power and autonomy.[44] But there were losers. The Shiites did not get the dividends of their involvement in the revolt and, although already a majority in the country, never got on board of the new state. A disillusioned Faisal deplored in his memorandum of 1932 that "there is no Iraqi people in Iraq" and depicted a Sunni governed state with an alienated religious majority, the Shia, and a substantial alienated ethnic minority, the Kurds.[45] Iraqis did not grow together. After the end of the monarchy in 1958, they would break up mainly along political lines – nationalists against communists. After the demise of the big ideologies and the breakdown of the Iraqi state during the 1990s due to the UN sanctions, and the chaos after the US invasion of 2003, they resorted to their sectarian, ethnical and tribal affiliations.

A "quasi-state"

The abrogation of the mandate was a key demand of Faisal and Iraqi politicians. Already in 1922 the British government – also under domestic political pressure – entered a treaty relationship with Iraq. Iraq had to pay half of the costs of the British residency with obvious consequences for the economic development of the country.[46] When Iraq in 1932 entered the League of Nations it did so as a *de jure* independent and self-determined nation state. The reality, however, was quite different. Iraq was ruled by a small clique of mainly Sunni politicians who depended completely on British support. The state in fact did fulfil only one of the five criteria for independence, formulated by the League – which was having a settled government and an administration operating essential services. Iraq was a "quasi-state".[47]

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43 Ibid., p. 63 and p. 83.

44 Ibid., p. 20.

45 Ali A. Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 537.

46 For the early treaty relationship see e.g. Karol Sorby, "Iraq from Faysal's Ascendancy to the Throne to the Ratification of the First Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1921-1924", *SAV (Slovak Academy of Science) Journal*, 2012, p. 199-219. http://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0919090804_Sorby_199-219.pdf

47 Dodge, op. cit., p. 31.

Also Mosul was given to Iraq on false grounds: The League of Nation commission, which in 1925 was sent as fact finding mission, attested some progress but also the overall instability of Iraq. For adding Mosul to the young state, it recommended to the League to put conditions: a long mandatory relationship between Iraq and UK, necessary for the consolidation of the state. The British agreed to 25 years.[48] They wanted Mosul badly for Iraq, not only because of the oil – one of the driving forces of UK policies already during the war – but also as reinforcement of the Sunni sector in the Iraqi society.

Equally the commitments of the US towards Iraq after 2003 were downgraded step by step. At the beginning the aim was the establishment of a sound, secure and friendly democracy, at the end Washington would have been glad to leave a decently stable Iraq "which can defend itself and is not a danger to its neighbours".[49] This was not to be. The Iraqi state could not and cannot fulfil the functions of a state – coercion of power, defence of its borders, provision of infrastructure and last but not least of legitimacy in the eyes of its inhabitants.

Hanna Batatu's picturesque description of the political violence in Mosul in 1959 shows how in situations of conflict every possible fault line in such a split society breaks open. At the end everybody is fighting everybody, sects, ethnicities, tribes, families, social classes, urban and rural people, town quarters.[50] It was then – and it is now – difficult to recognize, less comprehend, all levels of conflict in Iraq.

The "offer" of *Daesh*

55 years after those events, a part of the Arab Sunnis in Mossul decided that they would fare better if they link their fate to the absurd organisation of the "Islamic State" rather than stay with the Iraqi state and its central government which they did not consider any more their own. *Daesh* is fought by a mixture of forces which in fact looks like anything but not like the army of a regular state: regrouped Iraqi troops, Kurdish peshmerga, autonomous Shiite militias, tribal forces, Iranian advisors, and air strikes by a US led coalition which includes Arab Sunni states (as is known since a Jordanian pilot was captured by *Daesh* after his aircraft went to ground).[51] Also if *Daesh* is defeated, the trust

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48 Ibid., p. 32.

49 Yoel Guzanzky, "The Day after the US Withdrawal from Iraq*", INSS Insight,* No. 288, October 2011, http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=2397

50 Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq - A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 866.

51 See e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/24/islamic-state-shot-down-coalition-war-plane-syria

of the Sunnis into the state will not be automatically restored. The former masters of the state have disowned it.

The US intervention of 2003 changed the strategic balance of the region completely. In the eyes of many Sunni Arabs, Iraq – which was held in the Sunni Arab "orbit" by the Tikriti Saddam Hussein – shifted to a different identity, from a Sunni Arab to an Iraqi Shiite. It is not any more the same state. *Daesh* is a materialisation of Sunni fears, and an attempt to reverse the new facts.

The danger of regional contagiousness is obvious. In Jordan, a recent poll shows that 38 percent of the population do not consider *Daesh* a terrorist organisation[52] (and not few of those who do consider it a terrorist organisation think that it has been created by the US). The attractiveness of *Daesh* cannot be explained on religious grounds, also if the fight against Shiites, Christians and not recognized religious communities might attract some radicals. The Muslims of Jordan do not have misgivings about their religious identity, it is the state which suffers from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of some. Certainly this was not caused by the founding history alone but also by later shortcomings of the state. But the narrative that this state has to be annihilated because it was an exogenous creation by "crusaders" is appealing to some Jordanians.

The belief that the home state, the *watan*, is only a step to something bigger was instilled to the populations of the region by Arab nationalism – the founding fathers being deeply convinced that the creation of the Arab states were an imperialist project.[53] However, the "super legitimacy" of one single Arab Nation state is not available any more. What is waiting behind "the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states" which are "deviant and transient entities: their frontiers illusory and permeable; their rulers interim caretakers, or obstacles to be removed", as Walid Khalidi wrote?[54] After the unfulfilled dream of political unity came Nasser's postulate of "Arab solidarity" which however did not defeat Israel in 1967. The Arab defeat instead boosted the rise of political Islam. The last illusions started to crumble in 1990, after Saddam Hussein's invasion of neighbouring Kuwait, followed by a US-led war against Iraq with Arab participation. The deathblow came with the revolts of 2011 which led to the suspension of Syria – the cradle of Arab nationalism – as a member of the Arab League. And all of a sudden an offer comes around which is called "Islamic" and "state", indigenously and not exogenously created, politically genuine and culturally authentic for those who believe in it. An organisation like *Daesh* can succeed only if the ground is prepared. And even if its rise certainly is multi-causal, the preparation started hundred years ago.

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52 It is a poll by the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. See David Schenker, "There is a Worrisome Support in Jordan for the Islamic State", *New Republic*, October 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119909/islamic-state-isis-support-jordan-worrying-poll

53 Dawisha, op. cit., p. 3.

54 Ibid., p. 10.

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ÖNGÖRÜLEMEYEN GÜÇ SİMSARI: İRAN'IN NÜKLEER KAPASİTE GELİŞTİRMESİNDE RUSYA'NIN ROLÜ

ÖZ

Yeni milenyum uluslararası ilişkilerinin en önemli gerilimlerinden biri şüphesiz ki İran ile Batılı devletler arasında uzun bir süredir süre gelen gerilimdir. Bu gerilimin en temel sebebi İran'ın, Rusya yardımıyla geliştirmeye başladığı nükleer kabiliyetidir. Batı da Rusya da, İran'ın bu kabiliyetini askeri nitelikli bir hale dönüştürmesini istememekte ve bundan ciddi bir endişe duymaktadırlar. İran'ın nükleer çabalarını bu düzeyde bir uluslararası soruna dönüştüren temel sebep de bu endişedir. Her ne kadar İran bunun aksini defalarca ifade etse de, özellikle Batı, bir gün gelip İran'ın askeri nitelikli nükleer bir güce kavuşup kavuşamayacağından emin olamamaktadır. İran'ın nükleer enerji teknolojisini, diğer pek çok edinimlerine ek olarak, Rusya'dan alıyor olması da Rusya'yı bu düzlemde en belirleyici arabulucu konumuna getirmektedir. Bu çalışma, Rus diplomasisini İran'ın nükleer kabiliyet elde etmesi çerçevesinde ve özellikle de arabuluculuk kavramı bağlamında değerlendirmektedir. Çalışma 2002-2014 yılları arasındaki gelişmeleri ele almaktadır. Bu değerlendirme aracılığı ile çalışma, uluslararası uyuşmazlıklarda bir çözüm yöntemi olarak kullanılan arabuluculuğun esasında tam anlamıyla iyi niyetli bir diplomatik yaklaşım olmadığını, Rusya gibi, büyük güçler tarafından söz konusu uyuşmazlığı çözmek yerine tarafları etkileyerek sorunu tahakküm etmek ve bu şekilde kendisine özel bir mevki edinmek için kullanılan bir araç olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, İran, arabuluculuk, nükleer güç

القوة السياسية غير المرغوب فيها : دور روسيا في تطوير ايران طاقتها النووية.

محمد فاتح اوزكان – كورول بابا

خلاصة :

لا شك ان احدى اهم الأزمات في العلاقات الدولية خلال فترة الألف عام الجديدة، هو الأزمة المستفحلة منذ مدة طويلة بين ايران وبين الدول الغربية. ان السبب الرئيسي لهذه الأزمة هو القدرة النووية التي بدأت ايران بتطويرها بمساعدة روسيا لها. على ان كلا من الغرب وروسيا لا يرغبان في تحويل ايران لقدرتها هذه الى قوة عسكرية، وان كلاهما يشعران بقلق شديد جرّاء هذا الاحتمال. ان السبب الرئيسي لتحويل فعاليات ايران النووية الى مشكلة دولية على هذا المستوى، هو هذا القلق. ومهما كانت ايران تعرب عن عكس ذلك مرات متتالية، فان الغرب بالأخص ليس واثقا من ان ايران ستتمكن يوما ما من التوصل الى قوة نووية ذات طابع عسكري. ان حصول ايران على تقنية الطاقة النووية من روسيا، بالاضافة الى مكتسباتها العديدة الأخرى، يتيح لروسيا ان يلعب دور الوسيط المهم في هذا المضمار. وتتولى هذه الدراسة تقييم دور الدبلوماسية الروسية في اطار حصول ايران على القدرة النووية، وبالاخص في مجال قيامه بدور الوسيط. وتتناول الدراسة التطورات الحاصلة بين عامي ٢٠٠٢ و ٢٠١٤. ان العمل عن طريق هذا التقييم يظهر ان الوساطة التي تستعمل كطريقة لحل الخلافات الدولية، انما هي في الواقع ليست طريقة دبلوماسية تنطوي على نية حسنة، بل هي وسيلة لقيام قوى كبيرة مثل روسيا بالتأثير على اطراف النزاع والتحكّم في الموضوع وفسح موقع لنفسها بهذه الوسيلة، بدلا عن قيامها بحل الخلاف الناشب بين الاطراف.

الكلمات الدالّة : روسيا، ايران، الوساطة، الطاقة النووية.

UNPREDICTABLE POWER BROKER: RUSSIA'S ROLE IN IRAN'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

ABSTRACT

One of the major strains of the new millennium international politics has been happening between Iran and the West. Iran's efforts to build up its nuclear capability with Russia's help have been keeping the West on its toes. Neither the West nor Russia would really want, and therefore always concerned about, Iran to have a nuclear competence on a military grade. Even though Iran declares the opposite, the West is never sure about the possibility that Iran will achieve this grade one day. Since Iran has been receiving nuclear technology, together with many other commodities, from Russia, Moscow becomes almost a perfect candidate to be a mediator in this dispute. This study investigates Russian diplomacy on Iranian nuclear build up and its problematic consequences within the framework mediation as a strategy to ease disputes. The time frame covers the developments from 2002 to 2014. Via this investigation this research argues that mediation is not as suave as it seems but more of a means for a Great Power, like Russia, to be utilized to influence or almost dominate an international dispute, via carving out a special position and acting as an "unpredictable power broker", rather than solving it.

Keywords: Russia, Iran, mediation, nuclear power

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Introduction

Russia, as a part of its post-Cold War reintegration with the "new world order" policy, has been deepening its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Having a common understanding on more than a few foreign policy issues sustained Moscow's success. One of these issues is Iran's nuclear capability development and its repercussions.

West's concerns about this issue were ignited from the very beginning with the construction of a light water commercial power reactor at Bushehr. On this very project Russia did not only provide technology transfer but also showed that it significantly controls Iran's nuclear build up. This aggravated West's concerns since mid-1990s. The West concerned that Iran desires to have nuclear weapon capability, which has constantly been refused by the latter.

What makes this issue even more controversial is Russia's unpredictable acting as a mediator between the West and Iran. It was unpredictable because Moscow has been tilting its support from West to Iran depending on the situation. Moscow has been doing this for two reasons: first, it does not want to lose its influence on Iran's nuclear capability development, arms and energy deals; second, it would like to keep the West believing that it is an indispensable communicator for easing the tensions.

This study elaborates on Russian diplomacy on Iran since 2002, when Iran's relations with the West were seriously strained due to the revealing of two secret nuclear plants in Natanz and Arak. This brought Russia into the diplomatic scene as the foremost mediator. This research questions and criticizes mediation by analysing Russia's mediation between Iran and the West as a case study. Accordingly, this study argues that the mediation as a dispute easing strategy is not completely battle-proven. As it is seen in Russia's diplomatic moves, the mediator does not always interfere with impartiality, or even in good faith. The mediator, especially if it is a Great Power, could try to dominate the issue rather than aiming to resolve it. This transforms the mediator into a power broker in a way that it attempts to achieve a significant leverage over parties to accept its own proposals rather than acting as a referee. In other words, Russian diplomacy on Iranian nuclear capability is a good illustration for depicting how mediation can be utilized by a Great Power as a means of influence to almost dominate an international dispute rather than solving it.

The first part of the study analyses mediation in terms of its meaning in international politics, the elements of being a mediator, its strategies, and fallacies. The second part consists of three sections. Firstly, the 2002-2005 period in which Russia began its mediation between the West and Iran. Secondly, the 2006-2010 period when Russia joined the other members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for carrying out sanctions against

Iran's nuclear program at the same time preventing Iran to be alienated and radicalized. Finally, the 2011-2014 era in which Russia understood the ineffectiveness of sanctions and tried to increase its influence for a more stable dialogue between the West and Iran.

Mediation in International Politics

International crises do not only threaten the interests of the concerned parties but also the stability of the international system. They affect international institutions, belief systems and the distribution of power within international and regional realms.[1] Yet not every international conflict can be categorized as crisis. There are low-key conflicts known as "international disputes". Various legal/diplomatic/political methods can be applied to prevent these disputes to turn into a crisis, i.e. negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. In terms of this study, mediation has a specific value. It is recognized as a means of solving international disputes in the principal documents of international law such as the 1856 Declaration of Paris and the Second Hague Conference of 1907.[2]

Mediation is an informal process in which the conflicting parties resolve their disputes with the aid of an impartial third party, the mediator. In this process, disagreements are determined, confusions are clarified, and solutions are investigated for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.[3] It generally has *ad hoc* and non-binding diplomatic means, which converts a bilateral dispute into a triadic interaction. Mediator makes sure that such interaction is non-violent,[4] there is no direct use of force or any goal of saving one of the parties. Mediation creates a communication environment to change disputed parties' perceptions towards each other. For this mediators not only propose ideas for a settlement but also negotiate directly with both sides.[5] In this way the mediator aims to re-interpret the dispute via confidence-building mechanisms.[6] Yet this method is not as innocent and hassle-free as it seems.

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1 Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 47, No. 3, June 2003, p. 279.

2 Mohammad Naqib Ishan Jan, "The Role of Mediation in the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", *Asia Pacific Mediation Forum*, http://www.asiapacificmediationforum.org/resources/2008/6-Muhammad_Naqib.pdf Accessed on 14 August 2014, pp. 2-3.

3 "Mediation: Another Method for Resolving Disputes", *Alabama State Bar*, January 2007, http://www.alabamaadr.org/web/publicinfo/documents/ADRC_Mediation_Brochure_English_1201.pdf   Accessed on14 August 2014.

4 Jacob Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches To Conflict Management*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), pp. 4-5.

5 William Zartman and Saadi Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, pp. 31-32.

6 Elizabeth Cousens, " It ain't over 'till it's over: what role for mediation in post-agreement contexts?" , *The OSLO Forum Network of Mediators*, OSLO Forum 2008, pp. 66-67.

Becoming a Mediator: Actors, Reasons and Impartiality

Although individuals, international institutions and organizations could play a mediating role, states are still the primary mediators.[7] Successful mediation increases their reputation, influence, and, even, power.[8]

Recognition of the mediator is also a significant requirement. Strong political and economic ties between the mediator and disputants could facilitate this.[9] For maintaining the recognition, the mediator acts with two major considerations: to protect its own interests and to boost its influence by deepening relations with disputed parties. During the recognition, the mediator aims to increase disputed parties' dependence rather than resolving the dispute.[10] Here, the mediator attempts to achieve a special position of an indispensable communicator that the parties cannot even communicate without its help.

The other aspect is neutrality of the mediator. Although it is a requirement, it is very difficult to achieve. Since the third party intervention turns a bilateral interaction into a triad, mediators cannot easily be neutral. What they can do is to act impartially,[11] which means that the mediator does not promote the arguments of only one side while ignoring the concerns of the other. It should put forward impartial proposals for reaching a mutually acceptable solution.[12]

These major aspects show that mediation is not completely battle-proven. States' changing, shifting, intermingling, and conflicting interests can damage this impartiality and make the mediator to tend towards one side's position. The other issue is that the mediator can utilize its position to dominate the issue rather than aiming to resolve it. These two issues could both be observed in Russia's position in the repercussions of Iran's nuclear capability development.

The Strategies of Mediators

There are various strategies of mediation. Kressel and Pruit put forward one of them by asking: What do mediators do to resolve disputes? Since there is not a single answer to this question, they underline reflexive, contextual, and substantive intervention strategies. Reflexive interventions refer to mediators' efforts to orient themselves to the dispute while contextual interventions refer

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7 Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict", *Beyond Intractability*, January 2004, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med-intractable-conflict Accessed on 14 August 2014.

8 Moly M. Mellin, "When States Mediate", *Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, April 2013, p. 80.

9 Moly M. Mellin, "When States Mediate", pp. 82-83.

10 William Zartman and Saadi Touval, "International Mediation", p. 32.

11 Jacob Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity ", p. 6.

12 William Zartman and Saadi Touval, "International Mediation", pp. 36-37.

to the mediators' attempts to change the conditions prevailing between the parties. Substantive interventions are related to some tactics, which facilitate to curb different point of views and accelerate the process of resolving the dispute. These tactics include finding common points, offering satisfactory accords, showing both the positive and negative sides of a possible solution and explaining the practice dimension of a technical agreement.[13]

Bercovitch and Houston, argue that mediation strategies, which are communication-facilitation, procedural and directive strategies can be identified according to their level of intervention from low to high. The minimum level of intervention is seen in the communication-facilitation strategies in which mediators both transfer information to the parties and ease cooperation. However, they have a passive role and limited control over the negotiations. Procedural strategies require mediators, which determine meetings' structural aspects, control constituency influences, and the flow of information among the disputed parties. Finally, in directive strategies, mediators influence the matter of negotiations by giving incentives to parties or by issuing ultimatums. The data about the results of mediation demonstrate that directive strategies are more successful than others although mediators more frequently use communication-facilitation-oriented ones.[14]

Zartman and Touval's classification examines mediators' principal roles for influencing the attitudes of disputants. The first is the mediator as a communicator who comes into play as a "telephone wire" when parties get stuck in a situation. The second is the mediator as a formulator, in which mediators work on carving out a mutually satisfactory solution depending on their understanding of the dispute. The third is the mediator as a manipulator. Mediators, with this role, get involved into the issue to protect their interests even in a way to keep the parties locked into a mutual stalemate. Here the mediator creates a perception that there is no way out of this impasse without its help.[15]

Marieke Kleiboer put forward four prototheories of international mediation. These are mediation as power brokerage, mediation as political problem solving, mediation as re-establishing social relationships and mediation as domination. Mediation as power brokerage[16] is the most convenient approach for this essay for analysing Russia as "unpredictable power broker" on the nu-

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13 Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt, "Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, pp. 188-192.

14 Jacob Becovitch and Allison Houston, "Why Do They Do It like This? An Analysis of Factors Influencing Mediation Behaviour in International Conflicts", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Apr. , 2000, p. 175.

15 William Zartman and Saadi Touval, "International Mediation", pp. 38-39.

16 For another kind of usage of the term, also see "Putin Plays powerbroker in Mideast" , *Deutsche Welle*, 22 November 2013, http://www.dw.de/putin-plays-powerbroker-in-mideast/a-17242484 Accessed on 17 October 2014.

clear issue of Iran. Kleiboer's makes a reference to the approach of neorealist international politics and lists the main characteristics of power brokerage.[17]

Firstly, the major powers or the actors close contact with major powers, are most of the time evaluated as the candidates for being a mediator. The success in this case is generally provided by the mediator's capability to possess a considerable leverage over the parties to accept its proposals. It is strengthened by the capability of the mediator that it has enough influence to persuade the unsatisfied party for a settlement.[18]

These tactics show that there is not a single method, procedure, aim or dimension of mediating. The strategies and tactics above propose ways and methods of mediators to handle and manage but more importantly to influence the dispute at stake. In this sense, one dimension of mediation is that the mediator aims to ease the dispute by using various strategies and tactics, as briefly listed above, but in another dimension it attempts to protect and develop its interests/power/capabilities via influencing it. In other words, the mediator acts as a power broker for the sake of its own interests. Russia's position vis-à-vis Iran and the West us a good depiction of this.

2002-2005: The Emergence of Iranian Nuclear Dispute and Russia's Mediation

The debates about Iran's nuclear program began with a statement of Alireza Jaferzadeh, one of the dissidents of the Iranian government. He revealed Iran's secret nuclear plants in the cities of Natanz and Arak in August 2002. This triggered the dispute. The US almost immediately accused Iran for attempting to have nuclear weapon capability and called the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to duty to prevent Iran's so-called attempts.[19] Moscow, firstly, ignored these secret nuclear plants due to the previous statements of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). Later in March 2003, Moscow's stance changed particularly after its representatives visited these plants. Moscow's representatives stated that Russia was only aware of the Bushehr but had no information about the others. This change in Russian stance did not stop the increasing diplomatic pressure of the US, which made the Russian Foreign Minister of the period Igor Ivanov to stress the importance of IAEA's supervision to all Iranian nuclear programs in May 2003.[20]

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17 Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Jun 1996, pp. 377-383.

18 Ibid. , p. 380.

19 Cemile Asker, "Tarihsel Süreç İçerisinde İran ve Nükleer Gücü", *Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, April 2010, http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=751 Accessed on 16 August 2014.

20 Robert O. Freedman, "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record" , *The Strategic Studies Institute*, November 2006, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub737.pdf Accessed on 17 August 2014, p. 15.

Such change in Russia's attitude was an important depiction that Moscow's support to Tehran was not an unconditional one. Russia did not want to bear international risks prospectively caused due to its support of Iran. Yet this does not mean Russia would support every step of the US and Europe against Iran either. Instead, it began its mediatory role between Tehran and the West.

This approach could be seen in President Vladimir Putin's statements about the American reactions and diplomatic pressures. In September 2003 in a CNN interview, President Putin stated that Russia had been not only a signatory but also one of the most active defendants of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, a new nuclear power very close to Russia will be against its national interests. If Iran has nuclear weapon technology, this might cause regional and global risks, which Russia has been aware of. Thus, it could (is ready to) cooperate with the international community. However, since it is a real threat perception, everyone should speak with numbers and exact information instead of speculation. Finally, if Iran doesn't aim to have nuclear weapon, it should not hide any information from the IAEA.[21]

Russia's constructive approach softened up Iran. Tehran informed the IAEA about its nuclear enrichment activities in October 2003. In November, Iran's nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani went to Moscow and proclaimed Tehran's decision to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities and to sign the 1997 Additional Protocol of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[22] In December, with Russia's encouragement, Iran signed the "Additional Protocol", which allows the IAEA to control the nuclear facilities without a prior notice. However, the Iranian parliament didn't officially ratify this agreement. In this period, Moscow also promised Tehran to proceed the construction of Bushehr's second complex as long Iran had a nuclear program compatible with the NPT's regulations and the IAEA's working principles.[23]

In this phase of Russian-Iranian relations, Russia's mediation changed Iran's attitude against the West and apply more West-compatible policies. Iran's approach suits into Kleiboer's determination about mediation as power brokerage that if the disputed parties or even one of them do not want to break their relations with the mediator by declining its initiative, could have a tendency to accept the mediator's suggestions. Russia's mediation kept both the West and Iran in the loop. Additionally, this policy of Russia had similar aspects with the Bercovitch and Houston's directive strategies in which mediators influence the matter of negotiations by giving incentives to parties.

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21 Fatih Özbay, "Realpolitik, Pragmatizm, Ulusal Çıkarlar ve Nükleer Program Ekseninde Dünden Bugüne Rusya-İran İlişkileri", in Kenan Dağcı and Atilla Sandıklı (eds.), *Satranç Tahtasında* İran*: Nükleer Program,* (İstanbul: Tasam Yayınları, 2007), p. 180.

22 John W. Parker, "Russia and Iranian Nuclear Program: Replay or Breakthrough", *INSS Strategic Perspectives 9,* March 2012, p. 21.

23 Fatih Özbay, "Realpolitik, Pragmatizm" , pp. 191-192.

In 2004, Tehran announced the suspension of its uranium enrichment activities and submitted a report about the details of its nuclear program upon the demand of the IAEA in May 2004. However, the IAEA wasn't satisfied and criticized Iran for the inadequacy of cooperation. This annoyed Iran and the Foreign Minister Kemal Harrazi said that Iran's nuclear activities were irreversible so it should be recognized by international society. Russia stepped in and introduced a proposal to relieve the tension.[24]

The details of this proposal took place in the Russo-Iranian protocol in February 2005, which removed the obstacles against the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Moreover, Russia would send nuclear fuel rods to Iran for this plant. The US and Israel were seriously concerned that giving nuclear fuel rods could open a path for Iran to improve nuclear weapons by aid of this power plant.[25]

In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election as a president fuelled up these concerns. Proving these concerns, the new administration stated that 'it had resumed work on converting uranium into a gas that can be purified for use in both nuclear reactors and weapons'[26]. The IAEA Board of Governors' stressed the application of sanctions against Iran.[27]

West's rising concerns did not harvest Russia's support for the sanctions. On the contrary, Russia, mostly with the support of China, tried to prevent the UNSC's sanction plans.[28] Russia's mediation here was not an ultimate support of Iran but to deescalate the situation. Moscow at that stage was still not sure that Iran's nuclear programme had a clear military objective.[29] In order to test Iran's new administration's aims Moscow, at the end of 2005, proposed a plan to Tehran, which offers to establish a consortium for the uranium enrichment in Moscow and the required fuel would be provided to Iran's reactors from here. Tehran declined this offer, which put Moscow in a difficult situation particularly in terms of UN's prospective sanctions.[30] The uncompromising attitudes of Tehran compelled Moscow to stiffen its approach in the next phase.

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24 Talha Köse, *İran Nükleer Programı ve Ortadoğu Siyaseti: Güç Dengesi ve Diplomasinin İmkanları*, (Ankara: SETA Yayınları III, 2008), p. 22.

25 Fatih Özbay, "Realpolitik, Pragmatizm" , 192-193.

26 Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, (New Haven&London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 335.

27 Robert O. Freedman, "Russia, Iran " , p. 43

28 Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Iran" , *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2012, p. 56.

29 Thomas Kunze and Lars Peter Schmidt, "Russia's Iran Policy Against the Background of Tehran's Nuclear Programme", *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,* July 2009, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_17144-544-2-30.pdf?090721133140 Accessed on 20 August 2014.

30 Abbas Milani, "Russia and Iran: An Anti-Western Alliance?", *Current History Journal of Contemporary World Affairs*, Vol. 106, Issue 702, October 2007, p. 331.

Kressel and Pruit's mediatory strategy fits into Russian attitudes, i.e. ensuring the Bushehr Plant's operation, sending nuclear fuel rods to Iran for this operation and presenting a plan for establishing a consortium in Moscow. In 2002-2005 period Russia did not only act to relieve the tensions but to keep both sides, particularly the West, on their toes. This is what makes Russia's image as an "unpredictable power broker" in between the West and Iran.

2006-2010: Russian Participation to the UNSC Resolutions about Iran's Nuclear Program

The crisis between the IAEA and Tehran at the beginning of 2006 was a breaking point in Moscow's support for Iran. In February 2006, the IAEA voted for the UNSC's punitive measures for Iran. As a reaction, Tehran declared that it would comply with the NPT rules but would end its cooperation with the IAEA and begin a full-scale production of enriched uranium. Russia and China did not support Iran this time and decided to solve the issue within the scope of the IAEA. Russia tried to soften up the crisis with a proposal that Moscow will make sure that the enrichment of uranium will be in lower rates, but the US rejected it. In March 2006, Washington and Moscow came to an understanding and supported the UNSC's retributory precautions against Iran.[31] In Kleiboer's analysis again, the mediator should build up a perception that it has enough influence to persuade the other party for a settlement. In this case, Russia's support for the UNSC measures aimed to persuade Iran.

With Russia's support in July, the UNSC Resolution 1696 was passed, which invited Iran to suspend all its nuclear enrichment and plutonium processing activities by August 2006. Non-compliance would bring sanctions.[32] This showed that Russian support for Iran was the most significant obstacle for the application of the UN sanctions.

Tehran did not take the UN proposal very seriously. In response, the UNSC passed the Resolution 1737, which issued the first round of international sanctions in December 2006. In addition to other sanctions, the resolution initially froze the financial assets and brought travel restrictions to persons, who are involved in the Iranian nuclear and missile program. Russia stood against the travel restrictions and claimed that its intention was to encourage Tehran to negotiate with international society instead of bringing solid punishments.[33] This was another "vague" message of Moscow: it supports the West but did not completely cut off its support for Iran.

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31 Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran*, pp. 335-339.

32 Mariya Y. Omelichova, "Russia's Foreign Policy Toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective", *Journal of Balkan and Near East Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2012, p. 331.

33 Cole J. Harvey and Richard Sabatini, "Russia's Lukewarm Support for International Sanctions against Iran: History and Motivations", Nuclear *Threat Initiative (NTI)*, April 2010, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-support-sanctions-against-iran/ Accessed on 19 August 2014.

Yet, neither Iran nor the West did receive this message in this tone. For Tehran, Russia's stance was not that different from the West's since it didn't show patience and continuity in its support. For the West, Russia was seen almost as an ally against Iran. For strengthening this, Washington proposed a few attractive offers to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his official visit to Washington. These were: acceleration of Russia's membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO), consolidation of Russia's position in G-8, and promising the President George W. Bush's attendance to the G-8 summit in 2006. Russia's above-mentioned "vague" attitude this time relieved the West but put Iran on its toes. One of the senior officials of Iranian Parliament, by referring to the negative aspects of two countries' historical relations, defined Russia as a "good cop" in the West's scenario of Iran.[34] In Zartman and Touval's analysis, one disputant blames the mediator as a supporter of the other disputant when it is displeased with the state of affairs.

Iran's unhappiness neither changed Russia's attitude, nor stopped the UN to take extra sanctions. In March 2007, the UNSC passed Resolution 1747, which primarily froze more persons' financial assets and brought extra travel restrictions. The resolution brought strict restrictions to Iran's imports and exports on arms or any related materials.[35]

In October, Russia was back again to its power broker role. Putin in his visit to Tehran clearly expressed his concerns about Iranian missile tests and nuclear activities and recommended Iran to make a deal with the international community. During these talks, Russia accepted to give the *Tor M-1* air defence system and sell the more effective *S-300* system to Iran against any possible Israeli and American threats.[36] Putin's statements unearthed Russia's two significant aims: one was to prevent Iran to be completely cut off from international community, which could radicalize it and indirectly restrict Russia to use Iran's nuclear development programme as a bargaining chip and two was to have a control over Iran's both nuclear programme and its foreign policy particularly in terms of its anxieties against the US and Israel.

Developments at the end of 2007 restrained Russia to carry out these two aims. The US National Intelligence Estimates' (NIE) intelligence report claimed that Iran didn't have any kind of nuclear weapon. President Ahmadinejad stated that the report demonstrated Iran's righteousness.[37] This report was interpreted as a new beginning for a solution between the IAEA and Iran.

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34 Fatih Özbay, "Realpolitik, Pragmatizm , p. 196.

35 Cole J. Harvey and Richard Sabatini, "Russia's Lukewarm"

36 Dimitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, "Iran: A View From Moscow" , *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2010, p. 21.

37 Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri Ekseninde İran'ın Nükleer Faaliyetleri", in Türel Yılmaz and Mehmet Şahin (eds.), *Ortadoğu Siyasetinde* İran, (Ankara: Barış Kitap, 2011), pp. 245-246.

In February 2008, the IAEA reported that there were not so many unsolvable problems about Iran's nuclear program except uranium enrichment process. The report unearthed the fact that IAEA's and Western concerns do not overlap. France and the UK did not agree with the report and dispatched Iran's insistence on uranium enrichment to the UNSC, which was followed with a more detailed package of sanctions under the Resolution 1803 in March.[38]

The last quarter of 2008 enabled Russia to act as a power broker again. The IAEA's report in September stated that 'Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities'.[39] Iran's successful launching of a space rocket re-raised the concerns about the Iran's possible goal to put a military grade to its nuclear program. In September, the UNSC adopted the Resolution 1835, which did not impose new sanctions but reaffirmed a legal proposal to halt uranium enrichment. Russia stepped in. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stood against Washington's increased pressure to put more punitive measures depending on this resolution.[40]

Russian mediation, once again, was neither totally pro-Iranian nor pro-Western. It did not attempt to dissatisfy one side for the sake of satisfying the other. This condition also indicates the issue of difficulty of mediator's impartiality. An impartial mediator was not promoting the arguments of only one side while ignoring the concerns of the other but it cannot sustain it. Moscow ratified the Resolution 1835 but at the same time tried to soften its rigid terms. [41]

Meanwhile, the election of Barack Obama as the US president commenced a new era for the nuclear talks. Obama's reconciliatory attitude fuelled optimism. In April 2009, the Obama administration offered a proposal to Iran, quoting certain elements of the US, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (P5+1) proposal. Tehran announced its readiness to discuss the package proposal with a precondition that the nuclear rights of Iran would not be negotiated in this process. The parties made the first meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009. It was decided at the meeting the details of this issue would be talked between the US, France, Russia and Iran in Vienna on 19-20 October.[42] The Geneva meeting managed to build up the roadmap.

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38 Murat Yeşiltaş, "İran 2008" , in Kemal İnat, Muhittin Ataman and Burhanettin Duran (eds.), *Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2008*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009), pp. 73-77.

39 "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran", *IAEA Board of the Governor*, 15 September 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf Accessed on 24 August 2014.

40 Mariya Y. Omelichova, "Russia's Foreign Policy", p. 332.

41 Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Iran", p. 57.

42 Bayram Sinkaya, "İran'ın Nükleer Programı: Müzakere Sürecinde Umutların Yükselişi ve Düşüşü", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Aralık 2009, Cilt 1, Sayı 12, pp. 74-75.

This settlement plan anticipated the handover of Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Russia where further enrichment would be made. In this stage, the 20% level of enriched uranium would be send to France to carry out their final fabrication and then to be returned to Iran as nuclear fuel. This aimed to curb Iran's capability to enrich its low-enriched uranium to weapons grade. Tehran was reluctant since it would like to keep a substantial quantity of low-enriched uranium inside the country. Moreover Iranian press stated that Russia delayed the construction of Bushehr and delivering the *S-300s*. From Iran's perspective, Moscow is also an "unpredictable power broker" and therefore should not be totally trusted due to the return of necessary fuel on time. In response President Medvedev suggested to stiffen up further sanctions against Iran in November.[43] In this scheme Russia not only achieved a more practical role in its mediatory activities in terms of controlling Iran's uranium enrichment but also showed its acerbity to the Iranians if its efforts were not appreciated.

With the Russian support, the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran to comply with the obligations of the UNSC resolutions, meet the Board of Governors' requirements, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and ratify the Additional Protocol and implement other technical details.[44] Iran refused. President Ahmadinejad declared that their production level of enriched uranium rose up 20 percent from 3.5 percent on February 2010, which was a remarkable increase.[45]

Iran's reaction disheartened Russia and tilted it to the Western side. With the US and France, Moscow sent a letter to the IAEA in February, criticizing Iran's increased enriched uranium production. In April, Moscow came to terms with the US on imposing limited sanctions on Iran.[46] This showed that Moscow's support to Tehran continued as long as Russia controls Iran's nuclear capability development and its compliance with the Russian national interests.

Moscow's "unpredictable power broker" role continued in 2010. In June, Moscow supported the UNSC Resolution 1929. [47] With this support Moscow aimed to "reset" relations with the US. Moscow evaluated Obama's aban-

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43 Mark N. Katz, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Obama Era", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 2010, p. 65.

44 "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran", *IAEA Board of the Governor*, 27 November 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf Accessed on 24 August 2014.

45 Chidozie Ezeozue, "The United States and Iran Nuclear Programme: A Critical Analysis", *Journal of Global Intelligence & Policy*, Vol. 6, Issue 10, 2013, p. 118.

46 Cole J. Harvey and Richard Sabatini, "Russia's Lukewarm Support".

47 "UN Security Council Resolution 1929, Iran", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 9 June 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/un-security-council-resolution-1929-iran/p22433 Accessed on 26 August 2014.

doning of European missile-defence plans as a gesture, which tilted it a bit more to the West.[48] Obama's conciliatory attitude also alleviated Russian concerns on NATO's enlargement into Ukraine and Georgia.[49]

This was another element of Russian mediation. For Moscow, supporting Iran could not counterweigh any opportunity, which can contribute to Russia's international status. Iran's capability development could be sacrificed to a notable degree for the sake of Russian interests. Even though Russia supported the Resolution 1929 together with Obama's conciliatory attitude, it found out the sanctions appeared to be counterproductive. Therefore, it began to reorient its relations with Iran by returning back to its previous style of mediatory tendencies balancing Iran and the West in the next phase.

2011-2014: New Rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran and the Nuclear Negotiations of Iran with the P5+1

The new Russo-Iranian rapprochement began due to the criticisms in Russia that imposing sanctions went beyond the Resolution 1929. In February 2011, this became more visible when Moscow had opposed to the new round of sanctions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that the existing measures were enough for compelling Tehran to negotiate with the international society. The additional sanctions would create a turnaround in the Iranian economy and harm the population.[50] To prevent this, Lavrov proposed a "step-by-step" plan in July 2011. According to the plan, Iran would cooperate with the IAEA to eliminate the concerns about a possible military upgrade of its nuclear program. In response, the UNSC would ease the sanctions. The plan would progress through reciprocal measures. The West did not reject this plan but was not completely satisfied either. [51]

The IAEA's November report refuelled the crisis. The report claimed that Iran had some activities of developing a nuclear explosive device,[52] which almost immediately heightened the US' and its allies' accusations on Iran.[53] The British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that the IAEA's report proved the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program so the UK would

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48 Andrew C. Kuchins, "Russia's Contrasting Relations with Turkey and Iran", *CSIS Report on the Turkey, Russia and Iran Nexus Driving Forces and Strategies*, March 2013, p. 19.

49 Dimitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, "Iran: A View ", p. 22.

50 John W. Parker, "Russia and Iranian", p. 22.

51 Richard Weitz, "Russia and Iran: A Balancing Act", *The Diplomat*, 21 November 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/russia-and-iran-a-balancing-act/ Accessed on 24 August 2014.

52 "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran " , *IAEA Board of Governors*, 8 November 2011, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf Accessed on 24 August 2014.

53 "Russia rules out new Iran sanctions over nuclear report", *BBC News Middle East*, 9 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15659311 Accessed on 24 August 2014.

prohibit all business with Iranian banks. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a call to other international partners to attend additional sanctions.[54]

Russia as an "unpredictable broker" reacted against these accusations by stating that additional punitive measures would be unacceptable, against the international law and would hamper the endeavours of dialogue and discourage Iran to negotiate.[55] The Russian Deputy Prime Minister Gennady Gatilov said that Moscow would be against new sanctions on Iran.[56]

The change in Russia's stance was a product of developing bilateral relations with Iran in security and economic aspects. Russia and Iran converged on the Syrian crisis.[57] Moreover, although the total figures were still low ($3.7 billion), the bilateral trade between Russia and Iran have approximately tripled over the past decade.[58]

Yet Russia's tilt was not unconditional. When Iran began to enrich uranium at a level of 20% in Fordo nuclear facility, which was confirmed by the IAEA, Russia stepped in. The P5+1 offered Tehran to resume talks.[59] After four rounds of talks (Geneva, Istanbul, Baghdad, Moscow) not much of a remarkable result was achieved.[60]

Russian diplomacy during the talks depicted its power brokerage. During the next round of 5+1 group talks in Istanbul in March 2012 President Medvedev managed to carve out a "win-win" resolution to the US antimissile defence in Eastern Europe issue.[61] Russia utilized Iran's nuclear capability development issue as a diplomatic leverage against both the West and Tehran. Depending on the situation, Moscow sometimes tilted to the West sometimes to Iran, in order to show its counterbalancing influence and to promote its national interests.

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54 Jamie Craftword et al. , "Russia slams new sanctions against Iran" , *CNN International Edition*, 22 November 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/22/world/meast/iran-sanctions/ Accessed on 24 August 2014.

55 Ibid.

56 "Russia rules out new sanctions against Iran", *Al Arabiya News*, 09 November 2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/09/176253.html Accessed on 24 August 2014.

57 Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Iran" , p. 61.

58 Andrew C. Kuchins, "Russia's Contrasting" , p. 13.

59 "Timeline of Iran's Nuclear Programme" , *Aljazeera News Middle East*, 24 November 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/201241410645752218.html Accessed on 22 August 2014.

60 Ersoy Önder, İran'ın *Nükleer Programının Analizi ve Türkiye (İlişkiler, Yaklaşımlar ve Gelişmeler)*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2013), pp. 348-352.

61 Nikolay Kozhanov, "Russia's Position on Iran's Nuclear Program" , *The Washington Institute Policy Analysis*, 19 April 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-position-on-irans-nuclear-program Accessed on 28 August 2014.

Changes in 2013 proved this tilt once again. When the annual trade between Russia and Iran "declined to \$2.33 bn in 2012 – 38 per cent lower than in 2011"[62] due to the sanctions on Iran, Russia stepped in to counterbalance. Russia did not want to lose its domestic market share in Iran because of the effect of sanctions.

On 23 February the Atomic Energy Organization reported new deposits of raw uranium and sites of 16 more nuclear power station sites in Iran.[63] The report resumed the P5+1 talks. Three round of talks (Almaty, Istanbul, Almaty) ended without an agreement or a specific timeline for a new round of talks.[64] The talks clarified one thing: Russia and China were against the new punitive measures on Iran.[65]

Russia and China's attitude did not alleviate international sanctions. Continuing sanctions worsened the economic situation in Iran. From the mid-April, the national currency of Iran decreased in value by half, which significantly increased inflation. Moreover Iran's oil export was almost halved and international banking capabilities were very badly affected. This increased domestic pressure on Iranian government.[66] The sanction-worsened economy was one of the most important campaigning issues in the presidential elections in May/June 2013.

Iran's ex-nuclear chief negotiator; Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections on 14 June 2013. Rouhani started with economy, i.e. mitigate the influence of sanctions and increasing trade with Asia. More importantly Rouhani government attempted to recalibrate relations with the West and the only way to do it was a negotiated solution to the nuclear impasse.[67] Rouhani

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62 Y.Y Belebrov et al. , "New Agenda in Russian-Iranian Relations" , in I. S. Ivanov (ed.), *Modern Russian and Iranian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities*, (Moscow: Spetskniga, 2014), p. 20, quoted from Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Integrated Foreign Economic Information http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/ir/ir_ru_relations/ir_ru_trade (in Russian).

63 "Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program", *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear timeline.html?_r=0#/#time243_10489 Accessed on 4 November 2014.

64 Steven Erlanger, "As Negotiators Ease Demands on Iran, More Nuclear Talks Are Set" , *New York Times*, 27 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-talks.html?ref=world Accessed on 3 September 2014.

65 David M. Herszenhorn and Rick Gladstone, "After Talks End, Iran Announces an Expansion of Nuclear Fuel Production", *The New York Times*, 9 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/middleeast/iran-expands-nuclear-fuel-production-after-talks.html?ref=world Accessed on 4 September 2014.

66 Thomas Erdbrink and Rick Gladstone, "Fearing Prices Increases, Iranians Hoard Goods" , *The New York Times*, 23 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/middleeast/iran-shoppers-fearing-price-increases-hoard-goods.html Accessed on 4 September 2014.

67 Suzanne Maloney, "Three Reasons Why Russia Won't Wreck the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations" , *Brookings*, 25 March 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2014/03/22-russia-us-tension-sabotage-iran-nuclear-deal Accessed on 5 September 2014.

stated Iran's intention to resume talks with the P5+1 group. The negotiations began on 15 October 2013 at Geneva, which ended with a Joint Plan of Action, a roadmap for the next six months. This was probably the most promising period of the ten-year long international dialogue.[68]

Joint Plan aimed to make sure that Iran would not have military grade nuclear capability. The Plan involved many reciprocal concessions. For example, Iran would not enrich uranium more than 5% and the existent stockpiles of enriched uranium would be destroyed from the level of 20% to 5%. Some sanctions would be alleviated in return.[69] Second round was in Paris on 12 January 2014, which started the new schedule, monitoring of the progress in every six months.[70] This roadmap put forward some converging points for Russia and the West but it did not eliminate divergences completely. Meanwhile, the six-month period of the Joint Plan came to an end in July but the Obama administration announced a four-month extension to talks in order to persuade Iran to conclude a comprehensive agreement.[71]

At the end of this extension the P5+1 countries and Iran came together in Vienna between 18-24 November for a final decision. However, the parties only manage to declare a new seven-month extension. The parties were seemingly satisfied. The IAEA declared that Iran kept its word; Rouhani stated his belief in reaching a final agreement.[72] During this process, as Nikolay Kozhanov stated, Moscow played an active role to sustain the efficiency of the dialogue. From Lavrov's 2012 step-by-step plan to the negotiations of November 2014, Russian diplomats constantly carried out bilateral consultations with almost all parties.[73] These efforts were also an indication of Russia's mediatory role, continuing in Iran's nuclear capability development and its repercussions.

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68 Y.Y Belebrov et al. , "New Agenda in Russian-Iranian Relations" , pp. 11-12.

69 Yücel Acer, "İran ile Nükleer Antlaşma: Hepimiz Şimdi Daha mı Güvendeyiz" *Ankara Strateji Enstitüsü*, 16 December 2013, http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/prof-dr-yucel-acer/iran-ile-nukleer-antlasma-hepimiz-simdi-daha-mi-guvendeyiz/ Accessed on 6 September 2014.

70 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Negotiators Put Final Touches on Iran Accord" , *The New York Times*, 12 January 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal.html Accessed on 6 September 2014.

71 Josh Rogin, "Putin Poised to Retaliate Against Obama by Trashing Iran Deal", *The Daily Beast*, 18 July 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/18/putin-set-to-retaliate-against-obama-by-trashing-iran-deal.html Accessed on 7 September 2014.

72 "İran'la Nükleer Müzakereler 7 ay Uzatıldı" , *Al Jazeera Türk*, 25 November 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/iranla-nukleer-muzakereler-7-ay-uzatildi Accessed on 27 November 2014.

73 Nikolay Kozhanov, "Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Negotiations in Vienna", *Carneige Moscow Center*, 27 November 2014, http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=57331 Accessed on 04 December 2014.

Conclusion

Mediation is not completely a battle-proven method for easing international disputes. Depending on the changing and conflicting interests of states the mediator cannot always fulfil impartiality. Moreover mediators sometimes mediate, not to resolve but to dominate the issue, or even the disputants. Particularly Great Power mediators, in our case Russia, try to dominate the disputes in order to protect and develop their own interests/power/capabilities. In other words, the mediator acts as a power broker. Its actions could be unpredictable because it tilts from one side to the other depending on situational fluctuations. Russia's position in the above mentioned case is a good depiction of this.

In the 2002-2005 period, Russia's mediation started after the revealing of Iran's secret nuclear power plants. Russia's mediation led Tehran to apply more West-compatible policies. Russia's power brokerage was to convince Tehran that is should not break its relations off with Moscow. If one of the disputed parties doesn't want to break their relations with the mediator, it should accept its suggestions. When the situation was strained between the West and Iran, Russia as a power broker used its veto power in the UNSC and prevented sanctions against Iran. In this term, Russia, as another mediation strategy, carried out substantive interventions, i.e. adopting a new solution-oriented approach like the establishment of a consortium for uranium enrichment.

Between 2006-2010 Russia's mediation was more of an "unpredictable power broker". Russia tilted from one side to the other. In 2006, Russia supported the West to pass the Resolution 1737, at the same time standing against some parts of the resolution and not completely leaving Iran alone. In 2007, Russia approved the Resolution 1747, but again recommended Iran to make a deal with the international community. In 2009, Russia worked with the rest of P5+1 to carve out a compromised settlement. Yet when Iran seemed reluctant and emphasized its distrust towards Moscow, Russia suggested to stiffen up the sanctions against Iran and supported the 2010 Resolution. These examples show that neither Iran nor the West were Moscow's major concern. Russia's unpredictable diplomacy was for protecting its national interests and dignity.

Between 2011-2014 Russia's unpredictable power brokerage continued. In the first phase Moscow tilted back to Iran with a new rapprochement and also with an understanding that continuing sanctions and additional punitive measures would be of no use. Therefore Lavrov proposed a cooperation plan between the IAEA and Iran. However, in 2012 the EU's decision for additional sanctions and Iran's unravelling attitude forced the P5+1 for a new negotiation process. Moscow utilized this process to smooth over its own issues with the West, such as the US antimissile defence in Eastern Europe. Once again Russia acted as a power broker by sometimes tilting towards the West

and sometimes to Iran, in order to show its counterbalancing influence and to promote its national interests. Russia continued its mediatory role with the new administration in Tehran, which came to power in 2013. Although this development opened a path for more substantial solution prospects between Iran and the West, Russia still continues its active mediatory role during the negotiations.

Russia, from the beginning of this dispute, was against the possibility of Iran achieving military grade nuclear technology. That was one of the reasons why Moscow had always been a part of Iran's nuclear capability development. This made it a very suitable mediator from the beginning. Yet, as a Great Power, Russia attempted to dominate this process. It has been playing an unpredictable power broker role to protect its national interest. This role is unpredictable for the disputants since Moscow constantly tilted due to fluctuations. Yet Russia, because of its continuing peculiar role in the development of Iran's national capabilities, will continue to be the most significant mediator (power broker) in currently easing nuclear dispute between the West and Iran.

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İSRAİL VE LEVANT HAVZASININ GAZ KAYNAKLARI

ÖZ

Bir jeostratejik boyut olarak enerjinin önemi, Doğu Akdeniz ülkeleri arasındaki ilişkilere daha fazla perspektif eklemektedir. Bağımsız bir devlet olarak ortaya çıkışından itibaren İsrail, kendi doğal kaynakların yetersizliği nedeniyle enerjiyi ithal etmektedir. İsrail'in enerji arzına yönelik ihtiyacı, başta Mısır, Lübnan ve Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi (GKRY) olmak üzere komşu ülkelere yönelik dış politikalarını etkilemektedir. Ancak, İsrail'in kıyılarında dev rezervlerin keşfi, İsrail'in talihini ve bölgedeki joepolitik güç dengesini değiştirmiştir. Dahası İsrail GKRY'nin açık denizlerinde doğalgaz sahalarının keşfedilmesi yeni ittifaklar için teşvik edici hale gelmektedir fakat bu durum bölgesel gerilimi de arttırmaktadır. Ortadoğu bölgesinde yeni doğal gaz sahalarının keşfedilmesinin stratejik önemi hem enerji şirketlerinin hem de bölge devletlerinin dikkatini çekmektedir. Bu çalışma yeni doğalgaz sahalarını keşfedilmesinin İsrail üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Çalışma, İsrail'in bu doğalgaz kaynaklarına sahip olacağını, ancak eğer komşu ülkeler ile sorunlarını çözmez ise bu kaynakları çıkarmasının ve ihraç etmesinin zor olacağını iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İsrail, Akdeniz, Levant Havzası, Gaz, Dış Politika

<div dir="rtl">

اسرائيل ومصادر الغاز الطبيعي في حوض لوانت

أ . مراد اكدمير

خلاصة :

تضيف اهمية الطاقة كبعد جيو ستراتيجي، منظورا اقوى على العلاقات بين دول حوض البحر الابيض المتوسط. ان اسرائيل اعتبارا من ظهورها كدولة مستقلة، تقوم باستيراد الطاقة بسبب عدم كفاية مصادر الطاقة الكائنة لديها. كما ان حاجة اسرائيل الى الطاقة كمادة معروضة تؤثّر على سياستها الخارجية نحو البلدان المجاورة لها وعلى رأسها مصر ولبنان ونظام قبرص الجنوبية اليونانية. غير ان اكتشاف مصادر طاقة هائلة على سواحل اسرائيل، قد غيّر حظوظ اسرائيل مثلما أدىّ الى تغيير توازن القوى الجيوسياسية في المنطقة. واكثر من ذلك فان اكتشاف حقول للغاز الطبيعي في مناطق السواحل المفتوحة لنظام قبرص الجنوبية اليونانية، جاء عاملا محفّزا للوصول الى اتفاقيات جديدة، غير ان هذا الوضع اضحى عاملا لزيادة التوتر الاقليمي في المنطقة. ان الأهمية الاستراتيجية لإكتشاف حقول جديدة للغاز الطبيعي في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، اضحى يجلب انتباه شركات انتاج الطاقة، مثلما يجلب انتباه دول المنطقة سواء بسواء. ويتولى هذا البحث دراسة تأثير اكتشاف حقول جديدة للغاز الطبيعي على اسرائيل. كما يتبنّى مقولة ان اسرائيل ستسيطرعلى مصادر الغاز الطبيعي هذه، غير انها ان لم تتوصل الى حلول حول مشاكلها مع البلدان المجاورة لها، فانها ستلاقي صعوبة في استخراج هذه الطاقة وفي تصديرها.

الكلمات الدالّة : اسرائيل، البحر الأبيض المتوسط، حقول لوانت، الغاز، السياسة الخارجية.

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ISRAEL AND THE GAS RESOURCES OF THE LEVANT BASIN

ABSTRACT

The importance of energy as a geostrategic dimension adds more perspectives to the relationships between Eastern Mediterranean countries. Israel, from its beginning as an independent state, has imported energy because of a lack of its own natural resources. The requirement for energy supply affects its foreign policy with neighboring countries, particularly with Eygpt, Lebanon, and the South Cyprus Greek Administration (SCGA). However, the discovery of huge reserves off Israel's coast is changing Israel's fortune and the geopolitical balance of power in the region. Moreover, gas discoveries off the shore of Israel and the SCGA have become an incentive for alliances, but have created regional tensions. The strategic significance for the Middle East region of the discovery of the gas resources draws the attention of the energy industry as well as regional countries. This paper attempts to analyze the potential impacts on Israel of these discoveries of natural gas. The argument is that for Israel, it will have its own gas resources; however, unless it solves its problems with neighbours, it will be very hard to exploit them and be an exporter.

Keywords: Israel, Mediterranean, Levant Basin, Gas, Foreign Policy.

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Introduction

Israel has one of the most developed economies in the region; however, it lacks secure and sustainable energy supplies and, has been dependent on energy imports since 1948. However, recent discoveries have changed Israel's energy perspective dramatically; the estimated gas reserves found in the eastern Mediterranean seem to be enough for Israel to be a net energy exporter. In April of 2010, the US Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the undiscovered natural gas resources in the Mediterranean's Levant Basin area, as shown in Figure-1, to be between at least 122 to 227 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of technically recoverable natural gas.[1] The survey refers to an offshore basin that covers the territorial waters off the Palestinian Coastal Plain, Lebanon, and Syria. Additionally, according to the Israeli government's Sheshinski Committee, two-thirds of these reserves lie within the territorial waters of Israel.[2]

Figure-1 Levant Basin[3]

Israel is located close to the oil-rich and gas-producing countries in the Persian Gulf and North Africa. However, it produces much less oil and natural gas than it consumes and moreover political animosity has prevented it from cooperating with its close neighbours for most of the last several decades. As a result, it has been dependent on remote suppliers like Russia, as well as Central Asian and Latin America countries to replenish these energy resources. Israelis joke that when Moses led Jews out of Eygpt, he took the wrong direction by turning left into Canan rather than right into the oil-rich areas and, as once Israeli Prime Minister Golda

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1 US Geological Survey, "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean", p.3, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf

2 Ministry of Finance of the State of Israel, "Conclusions of the Committee for the Examination of the Fiscal Policy with Respect to Oil and Gas Resources in Israel", January 2011, p.17, http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/publications/02_Full_Report_Nonincluding_Appendixes.pdf

3 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "The Geopolitical Impacts of the Discovery of Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin", December 2012, p.2, http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/b69fb5e1-b575-4ddf-a792-3aae0c3d189c

Meir said, the only thing the Jews have against Moses is that he led his people to the only place in the Middle East without oil.[4]

Israel's fortune started to change in the 2000s. First it made an agreement with Egypt, under which Israel supplied large proportions of its gas needs.[5] Moreover, Israel discovered natural gas in the Tamar and Leviathan basins in 2009 and 2010. The Tamar field is estimated to contain approximately 9 TCF of gas, while Leviathan field is estimated to contain approximately 17 TCF of gas. These gas discoveries on the one hand created opportunities for regional cooperation but on the other hand created regional tensions with Israel's Mediterranean neighbours as well.[6]

There is a link between geopolitics and energy security in the eastern Mediterranean. As being key players in the region, gas findings of the shores of Israel and the SCGA give them sufficient energy resources and provide the opportunity to be energy exporters. This article examines the developments regarding the discoveries of gas fields off of Israeli shores and their implications for regional stability in the eastern Mediterranean. First, I discuss the discoveries off the shore of Israel. Then, I analyze Israel-Lebanese claims and disputes in the Levant basin and Israel- SCGA relations. In conclusion, I try to investigate the implications for Israel of the newly found gas resources. The analysis suggests that Israel will have its own gas resources; however, unless it solves its problems with neighbours, it will be very hard to exploit them and be an exporter.

Israel and Discoveries of Gas Fields

Oil and gas exploration in Israel began in the early 20th Century; however no significant discoveries were made until the 21st Century, and the exploration outlook started to change with the discovery of several offshore gas fields in 1999. The largest of them was the Mari-B gas field, which has been supplying natural gas for Israel Electric Corporation since 2004[7]. In 2009, the Tamar field was discovered with enough gas to supply Israel's domestic needs for 15 years, and in 2010, an even larger discovery was made in the Leviathan field west of Tamar.[8] As soon as this gas field was discovered in October 2010, Israel

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4 Yacine Fares, "No Oil for Israel, Israel Mines for Natural Gas", *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2013, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/No+oil+for+Israel%3A+Israel+mines+for+natural+gas.-a0316203912

5 Gawdat Bahgat, "Israel's Energy Security: Regional Implications", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.18, No.3, Fall 2011, p.25.

6 Walid Khadduri, "East Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities ands Challenges", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.17, No.1, March 2012, p.111.

7 Ministry of Finance of the State of Israel, "Conclusions of the Committee for the Examination of the Fiscal Policy with Respect to Oil and Gas Resources in Israel", January 2011, p.16.

8 Simon Henderson, "Israel's Natural Gas Challenges", 7 September 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-natural-gas-challenges

declared it to be in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[9] Present estimates shows that Israel might go from a gas poor country to a gas exporter.

Figure-2 Israel's major gas fields[10]

Abundant reserves in the Tamar and Leviathan fields exceed Israel's domestic consumption. Three Israeli energy companies in cooperation with Noble Energy announced initial estimates that the newly discovered fields hold huge amounts of gas and that one gas field, Leviathan, holds enough reserves to supply Israel's gas needs for 100 years.[11] The Levant Basin Province is comparable to some of the other large provinces around the world. Israel can benefit from these gas fields (as shown in Figure-2) both domestically and internationally. Israel's electricity sector may switch from using mainly coal to natural gas and this move would improve Israel's trade balance. Moreover, these new reserves could transform Israel into a gas exporter, and given the geographical proximity and close political and economic ties, Europe is an attractive target. However, if Israel decides to pursue the option of exporting its gas to Europe, it has to compete with other gas exporters such as Russia, Norway and Algeria.[12]

Gas discoveries in the Levant Basin have the potential to change the geopolitics of the entire region, including the Aegean Basin off the shores of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and the Levant Basin off the shores of Lebanon, Israel and Syria. The entire region faces completely new geopolitical challenges and potentials for conflict. Securing foreign gas has been a national security priority for Israel as existing domestic gas supplies have dwindled dangerously low. Moreover, the so-called Arab Spring protests sweeping across Egypt into

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9 F. William Engdahl, "New Mediterranean Oil and Gas Bonanza", 26 February 2012, http://rt.com/news/reserves-offshore-middle-east-engdahl-855/

10 Brenda Shaffer, "Israel: A New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean", *Energy Policy*, Vol.39, No.9, September 2011, p. 5382, http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~bshaffer/Shaffer_Israel_naturalgas.pdf

11 Charles Levinson and Guy Chazan, "Big Gas Find Sparks a Frenzy in Israel", *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 December 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204204045760498427867665 86.html

12 Bahgat, "Israel's Energy Security: Regional Implications", p.29.

Libya in early 2011 added to the energy crisis and Israel has become more than nervous about its future energy security.[13]

However, with the Tamar and Leviathan discoveries, Israel has begun to discuss how to become a major natural gas exporter, and the export of gas depends on the commercial viability and investment requirements. While Lawson Freeman, vice president of Noble Energy, stated that "there is a really compelling case for natural gas exports"[14], Bini Zomer, director of corporate affairs at Noble Energy Mediterranean claimed that the Leviathan gas field "should largely be exported."[15] In spite of the declarations of Noble Energy officials, the volume of gas available for export will depend on political decisions at different levels and between different countries. Based on the information above, the emergence of Israel as an exporter of natural gas to world markets is a realistic possibility. However, there are two rising questions about the export of the gas: where to export and how. Israel looks to cooperate regionally with the SCGA and Greece to export gas to the European market, either through siting liquefaction plants (Liquefied Natural Gas, or "LNG" plants) or by connecting Greek Cypriot, Greek and Israeli-controlled gas fields to each other through gas pipelines.[16] These sentiments are clearly expressed in the Sheshinski Committee's Report:

The large-scale uncovering of deposits will also allow the export of Israeli gas to other countries, whether by its liquefaction and transport in tankers or through the laying of appropriate pipelines. The export of gas is likely to change the strategic status of the State of Israel.[17]

There are mainly three choices which Israel could prefer. One way is by building a pipeline infrastructure to supply the regional market (Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon) and connect it with the Arab Gas Pipeline as shown in Figure-3. As Israeli Energy and Water Resources Minister Uzi Landau claimed: "Naturally, the immediate export of natural gas will be to our neighbors the Palestinians and the Jordanians, and I believe that this connection will be an important step in building trust and peace in the region."[18] However, this

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13 Avi Bar-Eli and Itai Trilnick, "Forecast Blackout Israel is About to Run Out of Natural Gas: Shortage Expected to Last at Least Until Next Year, When the Tamar Gas Field Starts Production", *Haaretz*, 2 February 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/misc/iphone-article/forecast-blackout-israel-is-about-to-run-out-of-natural-gas-1.410513

14 Ari Rabinovitch, "Natural Gas Firms Call on Israel to Allow Exports", *Reuters*, 29 November 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/29/idUSL5E7MT21K20111129

15 Sharon Udasin, "New Natural Gas Wealth Means Historic Change for Israel", National Geographic News, 3 July 2012, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/07/120703-israel-new-natural-gas/

16 Shaffer, "Israel: A New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean", p. 5386.

17 Ministry of Finance of the State of Israel, "Conclusions of the Committee for the Examination of the Fiscal Policy with Respect to Oil and Gas Resources in Israel", January 2011, p.20.

18 Sharon Udasin, "Natural Gas Will 1st Go to Arap Neighbors", *Jerusalem Post*, 28 March 2012, http://

market may not be big enough to monetize the gas in a way that makes the investment worthwhile.

Figure-3 The Arab Gas Pipeline[19]

Another alternative is the construction of an underwater pipeline between Israel, the SCGA and Greece as shown in Figure-4. This pipeline would enable the export of natural gas to the European market; however, the execution of such a plan requires the cooperation of the European Union to secure both the investments needed and the demand for the gas. In addition, European governments may prefer to import natural gas without the involvement of transit countries due to the obligatory dependence which may result. In this respect, a number of potential obstacles to this project has been summarized by Shaffer:

Israel has not yet officially decided to export natural gas. Despite strong indicators of the existence of reserves that would allow the Israelis to export gas, they remain fixed in the stages of exploration and evaluation of proven reserves. The discovery of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region coincides with a worldwide saturation-particularly in Europe-of the market for natural gas, including LNG. Moreover, energy companies in the United States have achieved major technical developments in the extraction and production of Shale Gas, providing the US with self-sufficiency in gas. The US could develop into a natural gas exporter in the short term. The increase in the supply of natural gas over the past 20 years has outpaced the growth in demand, resulting in a global decline in the price of natural gas worldwide (although to varying degrees across different regions. The present and medium-term financial and economic situation in the European Union prevents European investment in a network of pipelines that would tie Israeli, Cypriot and Greek gas fields to European markets. European countries prefer to rely on direct

www.jpost.com/Enviro-Tech/Natural-gas-exports-will-1st-go-to-Arab-neighbors

19 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "The Geopolitical Impacts of the Discovery of Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin", December 2012, p.13.

import agreements that would free them from transit routes that would otherwise leave them at the mercy of transit countries. Both Greece and Turkey lack the necessary infrastructure to export additional quantities of natural gas (to Europe). Developing such an infrastructure would require additional investments and the burden of expenditures, which the European economy cannot tolerate at this time.[20]


Figure-4 The proposed route of underwater natural gas pipelines[21]

The third possibility to export great volumes of gas is the construction of liquefaction plants. Such an infrastructure would transport large quantities of gas to European and global markets.[22] Discussions between the Greek Cypriot, Greek and Israeli governments have focused on the economic and technical feasibility of such a project. Figure-5 below presents a schematic diagram of proposed locations for the siting of such liquefaction plants. The Israeli government has laid down the condition that, for national security reasons, "export facilities should be located in Israeli territory;" if not, they should be built "in the framework of bilateral agreements between countries."[23]

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20 Shaffer, "Israel: A New Natural Gas Producer in the Mediterranean", p. 5386.

21 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "The Geopolitical Impacts of the Discovery of Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin", December 2012, p.9.

22 Cyprus Gas News, "Decision Already Taken for LNG Terminal", 8 June 2012, http://www.cyprusgasnews.com/archives/589

23 Ministry of Energy and Water Resources of Israel, "The Natural Gas Inter-ministerial Committee Main Recommandations", August 2012, http://energy.gov.il/Subjects/NG/Documents/MainRecommendations.pdf

Figure-5 *Options for the construction of natural gas liquefaction plants*[24]

Israel-Lebanon Offshore Disputes and Israel-SCGA Relations

Israel's natural gas explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean have not been without controversy. After the Leviathan field was discovered by Israel, a geopolitical conflict between Lebanon and Israel came into being. Israeli excavations have been disputed by Lebanon, and it has filed complaints to the United Nations claiming that Israel is encroaching on its maritime border. Lebanese politicians made a series of harsh statements, and Israel responded by saying that its military would not hesitate to protect the gas fields, as Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman stated, "we won't give an inch."[25] Moreover, as Israel has cooperated with the SCGA to effectively exploit the resources in the region, it further deteriorated its already soured relationship with Turkey.

The disagreement over the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean is not only between Israel and Lebanon, but also between Israel and Turkey as well. Gas discoveries came at the same time that foreign relations between Israel and Turkey deteriorated. As Turkish-Israeli relations soured, Israel has become increasingly intertwined with Greece and the SCGA. The rapprochement was put into practice with the maritime agreement between Israel and the SCGA of December 2010.[26] The agreement delineated the sea border between Isra-

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24 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "The Geopolitical Impacts of the Discovery of Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin", December 2012, p.10.

25 F. William Engdahl, "New Mediterranean Oil and Gas Bonanza", 26 February 2012, http://rt.com/news/reserves-offshore-middle-east-engdahl-855/

26 Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of

el and the SCGA. However, Lebanon protested the Israel-SCGA Maritime Agreement at the United Nations in June 2011[27] and complained that the zone defined in the agreement infringes parts of Lebanon's EEZ.

Figure-6 Disputed Israel-Lebanon maritime border[28]

The dispute between Israel and Lebanon concerns the demarcation lines (as shown on Figure-6) of the maritime borders of two countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Both countries have been formally at war for years, and they have never agreed on a delimitation of their maritime boundaries. The Israeli gas wells in the Leviathan lie within Israeli territory as Lebanon affirms; however, Lebanon claims that the field extends over into the waters of its EEZ as well and it delivered maps to the UN to back up this claim. After Lebanon prepared a draft law in August 2011 to demarcate the maritime borders with Israel and SCGA, the Israeli government drew its own maritime boundaries with Lebanon. However, Lebanese authorities claimed that the maritime boundaries mapped out by Israel infringed on 850 square kilometers of Lebanon's EEZ.[29]

Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, December 17, 2010, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/cyp_isr_eez_2010.pdf.

27 Adnan Mansour, Minister for For. Aff. & Emigrants, "Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nation, U.N. Doc. 2082.11D", June 20, 2011, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/communications/lbn_re_cyp_isr_agreement2010.pdf.

28 Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and El Habib El Elandaloussi, "Outlook for Oil and Gas in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries", October 2012, p.11. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=154892

29 Nizar Abdel-Kader, "Potential Gas Conflict in the Mediterranean", 16 March 2012, http://www.

Tensions between Lebanon and Israel have been running high. Israeli Energy and Water Resources Minister Uzi Landau stressed that "We will not hesitate to use our force and strength to protect not only the rule of law but the international maritime law."[30] Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in January 2011 that "there is no doubt these resources are a strategic objective that Israel's enemies will try to undermine, and I have decided that Israel will defend its resources."[31] Moreover, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Lebanon's boundary declaration "contradicts the line Israel has agreed upon with Cyprus, and what is more significant to me is that it contradicts the line that Lebanon itself concluded with Cyprus in 2007."[32] As a result of this conflict over maritime boundaries, the Israeli Navy has begun to maintain a twenty-four hour presence over the site using drones to protect the offshore gas fields.[33] Statements by Lebanese officials have been equally strong. "We warn Israel not to touch this area or try to steal Lebanon's resources" declared Hassan Nasrallah, head of the resistance group Hezbollah in Lebanon.[34] "We are determined to defend them, especially since we are fully committed to the law of the sea. If Israel violates this law, it will pay the price," affirmed Lebanon's Energy and Water Resources Minister Jibran Bassil.[35] Lebanon's President Michel Suleiman said in his speech at the 66th meeting of the UN's General Assembly in New York that:

> We emphasize that we strongly uphold our full sovereignty and economic rights over our territorial waters and exclusive economic zone as well as freedom of the exploitation of our natural resources, be they on land or in the deep sea, independently from any designs or threats.[36]

Both Israel and Lebanon believed that they could benefit from the natural gas found in the Levant Basin. Until 2012, Israel had imported forty percent of its natural gas from Egypt, and with the effect of the domestic turbulence,

realclearworld.com/articles/2012/03/16/potential_gas_conflict_in_the_mediterranean_99965.html

30 Jonathan Ferziger and David Wainer, "Landau Says Israel Willing to Use Force to Protect Gas Finds Off Coast", Bloomberg, 24 June 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-24/landau-says-israel-willing-to-use-force-to-protect-gas-finds-off-coast.html

31 "Netanyahu Vows to Defend Med Gas Fields", *Cumhuriyet,* 19 January 2011, http://www.cumhuriyet.com/?hn=209634.

32 Herb Keinon, "Cabinet Approves Northern Maritime Border", *Jerusalem Post*, 10 July 2011, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=228666.

33 Yaakov Katz, "IDF Deploys Drones to Protect Gas Fields From Hezbollah", *Jerusalem Post,* 9 August 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/IDF-deploys-drones-to-protect-gas-fields-from-Hezbollah

34 Zeina Karam, "Israel-Hezbollah Dispute Emerging Over Mediterranean Resources", *Huffington Post*, 26 July 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/26/israel-hezbollahdispute_n_910224.html.

35 Wassim Mroueh, "Lebanon to Fight Israel at U.N.", Daily Star, 11 July 2011, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Jul-11/Lebanon-to-fight-Israel-at-UN.ashx#axzz1ZtdbDoni.

36 H.E. General Michel Sleiman, President of the Republic of Lebanon, Address at 66th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 21 September 2011, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/LB_en.pdf.

imports from Egypt had become increasingly difficult[37], because Egypt, fresh out of the Arab Spring, cancelled its natural gas supply agreement with Israel in May 2012.[38] However, instead of importing energy, Israel could become an energy supplier, as the newly discovered gas resources have a huge potential for export to the EU[39] or to Jordan.[40] For Lebanon, the oil and gas reserves could help its economy recover and reduce its national debt as well.[41] However, the problem remains that they mostly need UN assistance to facilitate indirect negotiations between them to help demarcate the boundary line. Because such a process usually occurs through bilateral negotiations or mutually-agreed arbitration, no such opportunity exists, because the two countries are in a state of war.

Building on the agreement between Israel and the SCGA, the SCGA has licensed Noble Energy, the same company with large stakes in Tamar and Leviathan, to explore a block bordering Israeli waters. Turkey criticized these moves on the grounds that they disregarded the rights and jurisdiction of Turkish Cypriots on the island.[42] Turkey claimed that the Greek Cypriot government in the southern part of the island did not have the authority to sign deals with Israel.[43] Moreover, the cooperation deal also opened the way for Greece to fill the vacuum Turkey left in Israel's regional relations. High-level talks between Israel and Greece have taken place about the construction of an underwater pipeline to Europe which would make Greece the transit country for Israeli gas to reach Europe, bypassing Turkey, its traditional partner.

Both Israel and the SCGA greeted the announcement of gas discoveries offshore with enthusiasm and the Greek Cypriot-Israel rapprochement initiated in March 2011 with the visit of SCGA president Dimitris Christofias in Israel.[44] Soon afterwards, both sides began to discuss how they could help each other take advantage of their new finds. Shimon Peres, the President of

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37 Abraham D. Sofaer, "Securing Israel's Offshore Gas Resources", 23 June 2011, http://www.abesofaer.com/2011-pdfs/Offshore-Gas-Security-6-23-2011.pdf

38 Michael J. Economides, "Eastern Mediterranean Energy: The Next Game", 5 June 2012, http://www.energytribune.com/11093/eastern-mediterranean-energy-the-next-game

39 Avi Bar-Eli, "Netanyahu Offers Natural Gas to Greece", *Haaretz,* 29 August 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/netanyahu-offers-natural-gas-to-greece-1.310761

40 Nadav Shemer, "Analyst: Jordan to Buy Israeli Gas as Alternative to Egypt", *Jerusalem Post*, 6 October 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Business/Business-News/Analyst-Jordan-to-buy-Israeli-gas-as-alternative-to-Egypt

41 Petroleumworld, "Lebanon Parliament to Vote on Gas Rights Bill", 17 August 2010, http://www.petroleumworld.com/story10081702.htm

42 Bahgat, "Israel's Energy Security: Regional Implications", p.31.

43 Anshel Pfeffer, "Turkey to Deploy Warships Over Gas Dispute with Cyprus", *Haaretz,* 25 September 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/turkey-to-deploy-warships-over-gas-dispute-with-cyprus-1.386659

44 Avirama Golan, "Friends on the East-West Seam", *Haaretz,* 11 March 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/friends-on-the-east-west-seam-1.348565

Israel, visited the SCGA in November 2011 and stated that joint natural gas projects could have positive effects in both economies.[45] In February 2012, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the SCGA to expand and formalize trade pacts between the two unlikely partners. Netanyahu's visit was the first by an Israeli prime minister to the eastern Mediterranean island.[46] Netanyahu traveled to the SCGA with a mission of twenty high-level government officials, including Energy and Water Resources Minister Uzi Landau and the directors of Israel's National Security and National Economic councils. He signed a cooperation agreement for the protection of natural gas platforms.[47] The deal is supposed to allow Israel to use the SCGA air space and territorial waters for aerial and naval search and rescue drills. Netanyahu's office said that the deal was inked as part of the two sides' efforts to "strengthen the improving ties between the two nations," as well as "to boost the cooperation in the fields of energy, agriculture, health and maritime research."[48] Netanyahu said at the signing that the gas could be liquefied in either the SCGA or Israel, and subsequently exported either to Europe through the SCGA or to Asia through Israel. In April 2012 Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made a three-day visit to the SCGA to discuss the gas-sharing agreement to exploit reserves that fall on the maritime boundary between Israel and the SCGA. Lieberman later discussed the prospects of further expansion of cooperation between the two countries in the fields of energy, tourism and investment with Commerce and Industry Minister Neoclis Sylikiotis.[49] "It's really a win-win situation and we will use all possibilities to improve and strengthen our bilateral relations" said Lieberman.[50]

Given the recent deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations and the prospect of economic benefits of cooperation, Israel and the SCGA have a mutual interest in the development of their bilateral relations. Israel might need the SCGA to export its gas resources and on the other hand, the SCGA, facing severe economic difficulties, might need both Israel's economic and political backing. Moreover, the long-standing conflict between Greece and Turkey

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45 Greer Fay Cashman, "Peres, Cypriot Counterpart Discuss Gas Cooperation", *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 November 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Peres-Cypriot-counterpart-discuss-gas-cooperation

46 Palash R. Ghosh, "As Israel And Cyprus Ally Over Energy, The Rest Of The Region Feels The Aftershock", 2 June 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/israel-and-cyprus-ally-over-energy-rest-region-feels-aftershock-701215

47 Michele Kambas and Ari Rabinovitch, "Netanyahu Discusses Energy Cooperation in Cyprus", *Reuters,* 16 February 2012, http://ru.reuters.com/article/idUKL5E8DG3PS20120216

48 Itamar Eichner, "Netanyahu embarks on historic visit to Cyprus", *Ynet News*, 16 February 2012, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4190731,00.html

49 Cyprus Gas News, "Cyprus-Israel Close to Gas-Sharing Deal", 18 April 2012, http://www.cyprusgasnews.com/archives/370

50 Stefanos Evripidou, "Liberman: Cyprus-Israel relations 'a win-win situation'", Cyprus E Directory, http://www.cyprusedirectory.com/articleview.aspx?ID=20694

may open the way for a tripartite partnership between Israel, the SCGA and Greece. This would constitute a major development in the strategic role and position of both the SCGA and Israel.

Implications for Israel of the Discovery of the Gas Resources of the Levant Basin

The majority of discoveries of natural gas in the Levant Basin are located in the Israeli EEZ. With these discoveries, Israel would not only secure its energy supply, but also emerge as an energy exporter. There are two ways to export natural gas: by pipeline or by special LNG tankers. If the Middle East were a normal place, Israel would build a gas pipeline to its neighbours Jordan, Syria, Lebanon or Egypt. This choice would make the most commercial sense. However, it is impractical from both a security and political perspective. Other options would be to pipe the gas, via a pipeline to Greece, to connect with Europe's distribution system or export LNG to markets where prices are high. However, a pipeline would be longer, costlier and riskier; exporting gas by LNG terminals requires huge investment and a large coastal site. An LNG plant in Israel would be impractical, since space is limited, environmentalists unyielding and security hard to guarantee.[51] The SCGA is keen to invest in LNG, but doesn't have the cash and in case of the liquefaction in the SCGA, Israel does not want to give up control.

The discovery of natural gas off the Israeli coastline in recent years should have significant repercussions regionally and will doubtlessly impact Israel on a number of levels. From a security perspective, as these discoveries reduce Israel's reliance on imported sources of energy, they might allow Israel to enhance its energy security. Israel can substitute imported gas with locally produced natural gas. However, with the rising tension between countries in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel will need heightened security measures to protect its gas fields and the related infrastructure. Gas facilities are difficult to protect and the Israeli Navy has already been alerted to protect the newly discovered gas fields.

From an economic point of view, the use of domestic natural gas should end the Israeli dependency on foreign energy supplies and should reduce the cost of energy production in the Israel. This would lead to an increase in the competitiveness of Israeli industrial output. Moreover, indigenous gas supplies may contribute to sustainable economic development and improve the country's trade balance. Improvement in the economic condition may also lead to the development of military-security capabilities without recourse to foreign financial aid. Another economic aspect of the gas discoveries is related

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51 The Economist, "Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Drill, or Quarrel?", 12 January 2013 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21569452-politics-could-choke-supplies-big-new-offshore-gasfields-drill-or-quarrel

to the dwindling water resources of the Middle East. If the natural gas is used to power water desalination plants, these discoveries may also have a positive impact on the conflict over water in the region.

The discovery of natural gas resources in the Levant Basin might result in a significant readjustment of the regional geopolitical map. Gas findings in the Levant Basin either destabilize the region or contribute to the improvement of the relations between related countries. Developing these resources shall require exceeding major challenges which might have geopolitical implications. Although Israel has reached agreement with the SCGA on its maritime boundary, disagreement with Lebanon is unlikely to be resolved soon. Additionally, Turkey has signaled its opposition to any Israeli-SCGA cooperation. It is likely that cooperation between Israel, the SCGA and Greece would be enhanced. The development of relations between Israel, the SCGA and Greece might help Israel overcome its regional isolation. However, Lebanon's disagreement with Israel over maritime boundaries has the potential to contribute to hostility and mistrust between two sides. For the time being, the discoveries of natural gas in the Levant Basin have exacerbated both the Lebanese-Israeli conflict and the conflict between Israel, Turkey and the SCGA. Any resolution of this dispute requires a cessation of hostilities and resolution of the disputes over maritime boundaries. As the uprisings in the Arab world continue and the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict change, it is difficult for Israel to reach a comprehensive solution regarding its maritime boundries. The Egyptian government's decision to end natural gas exports to Israel following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime shows this reality. Without solving the problems, it is true that the chances for a conflict increase with each new discovery of gas in disputed waters. Even though Israel will have its own gas resources, unless it solves its problems, it will be very hard for Israel to exploit them and become an exporter.

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THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN IRANIAN WOMEN'S MEMOIRS: READING SEYYEDEH ZAHRA HOSSEINI'S *DA*

ABSTRACT

Based on a textual and ethnographic exploratory research conducted in the summers of 2012 and 2013 in Iran, this paper critically examines a woman's memoir about the Iran-Iraq War. Published in 2008, promoted by the state and entitled *Da*, this memoir was written by a Kurdish Shiite woman by the name of Zahra Hosseini. This study attempts to interpret *Da* by contextualizing it on two levels. Like every oral history project and memoirs, *Da* has also been the product of its immediate social, political and historical context. Secondly, it seems that the state initiative to commission and promote such a work seems to be an ideological project to counter the discontents of women, the youth and ethnic minorities in Iran in the politically more open post-war period, i.e. the 1990s and 2000s.

Keywords: Seyyedeh Zahra Hosseini, Iran, Iran-Iraq War, State, Memoirs

الحرب الايرانية – العراقية في مذكرات النساء الايرانيات : تقييم كتاب (دا) للسيدة زهراء حسيني

متين يوكسل

خلاصة :

ان هذا المقال الذي يستند على ابحاثي التي قمت بها في ايران خلال فصلي الصيف من عامي ٢٠١٢ و ٢٠١٣ بهدف الكشوفات النصية والاتنوغرافية، عبارة عن محاولة لتقييم مذكّرات امرأة تم نشرها وتوزيعها ضمن مصادر عديدة بتعضيد من الدولة في عام ٢٠٠٨. ويتناول المقال مذكرات سيدة كردية – شيعية اسمها السيدة زهراء حسيني، كانت قد نشرت كتابا بإسم (دا) يتناول مذكراتها حول الحرب الايرانية – العراقية. وكما هو الحال بالنسبة لتدوين اي مشروع تاريخي او تدوين مذكرات ما، فان (دا) عبارة عن نتاج مباشر لسياق اجتماعي وتاريخي خاص. ومن جانب آخر، فان من الممكن اعتبار (دا) كمشروع ايديولوجي رسمي تم تطويره في التسعينات من القرن الماضي وفي الالفيات من هذا القرن كردّ على امتعاض النساء والشباب والأقليات في ايران.

الكلمات الدالّة : السيدة زهراء حسيني، ايران، الحرب الايرانية – العراقية، الدولة، مذكّرات.

İRANLI KADINLARIN HATIRATLARINDA İRAN-IRAK SAVAŞI: SEYYİDE ZEHRA HOSEYNİ'NİN *DA*'SINI YORUMLAMAK*

ÖZ

2012 ve 2013 yıllarının yaz aylarında İran'da yaptığım metinsel ve etnografik keşif amaçlı araştırmalara dayanan bu makale 2008'de devlet desteği ile yayımlanıp çeşitli kanallardan dağıtımı yapılan bir kadın hatıratını yorumlamaya girişmektedir. Bu makale, Kürt Şii bir kadın olan Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni'nin İran-Irak Savaşı hakkındaki hatıratını konu alan *Da* başlıklı kitabını iki düzlemde bağlamsallaştırmaktadır. Her sözlü tarih projesi ve hatırat yazımı gibi *Da* da özgül bir toplumsal, tarihsel ve siyasal bağlamın dolaysız ürünüdür. İkinci olarak, *Da*'yı 1990'lar ve 2000'lerde İran'da kadınlar, gençler ve azınlıkların hoşnutsuzluklarına cevaben geliştirilmiş bir resmi ideolojik proje olarak yorumlamak mümkün görünmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni, İran, İran-Irak Savaşı, Devlet, Hatırat

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Giriş

Bu çalışma, öncelikle Türkiye'de 'Orta Doğu'[1] Çalışmaları'na hakim olan güvenlik ve siyasal çatışma eksenli yaklaşımlardan farklı olarak toplumsal ve kültürel hayata dair bir inceleme yapmayı amaçlamaktadır.[2] Orta Doğu'da kadın tarihi ve tarihyazımı konusunda daha öncelere dayanan araştırmalarımın[3] devamı şeklinde de görülebilecek bu çalışmam ikinci olarak Türkiye'de bazı çevrelerde İranlı kadınlara dair sıkça rastlanan önyargıların[4] ötesine geçerek İranlı kadınların hayat hikayeleri, yürüttükleri hak mücadeleleri ve ürettikleri edebiyat eserleri aracılığı ile kendi seslerini dinleme gereğinin altını çizmektedir.[5]

Bu çalışmanın ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan esası önemdeki üçüncü nokta ise İran'daki kısa süreli ve keşif amaçlı araştırmalarımda öne çıkan bir gözleme dayanmaktadır. Tahran'a ilk defa giden bir ziyaretçi için gözden kaçırılamayacak büyüklükte bir görsel temsil binaların dış cephelerinde dini liderler Humeyni ve Ali Hamaneyi'nin büyük resimlerine eşlik eden sözleri ve "şüheda"nın resimleridir. Kamusal alandaki görsel ideolojik temsiller aracılığıyla İran-Irak Savaşı'nın hatırasının milliyetçi ve devrimci Şii söylemlerle canlı tutulmaya çalışıldığını görmek mümkündür. Bu temsiller 'bombardımanına' tutulan bir ziyaretçi için akla ilk gelen sorulardan biri şudur: İran'da devlet başka hangi yollarla İran-Irak Savaşı'nı resmi söylemi ile canlı tutmaktadır? 1980-1988

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1 Orta Doğu kavramının 19. yüzyıl Avrupa'sının emperyalist bir inşası olduğunu ve bu kavramı kullanırken bu sömürgeci kavramsal mirasa istemeyerek de olsa iştirak ettiğimizi kaydetmek gerekiyor. Bu kavramın tarihsel kökenine ve analitik olarak yol açtığı problemlere ilişkin faydalı bir tartışma için bkz. Nikki R. Keddie, "Is There a Middle East?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4: 3 (Jul., 1973), 255-271.

2 Türkiye'de İran'a dair yapılan akademik çalışmaları incelediğim eleştirel bir çalışma için bkz. Metin Yüksel, "Iranian Studies in Turkey," *Iranian Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/00210862.2014.890848

3 Metin Yüksel, "Reconstructing the History of Women in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 11: 1-2 (2005), 49-59; Metin Yüksel, "The Encounter of Kurdish Women with Nationalism in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42: 5 (September, 2006), 777-802.

4 Çarpıcı bir örnek için bkz. Asena Günal, "Mine G. Kırıkkanat ve Beyaz Türk Oryantalizmi," *Birikim*, No. 144 (2001), 67-73.

5 Bazı örnekler için bkz. Taj al-Saltanah, *Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Persian Princess from the Harem to Modernity* (Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 1993); Shireen Mahdavi, "Taj al-Saltaneh, an Emancipated Qajar Princess," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23: 2 (1987), 188-193; Camron M. Amin, *The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State Policy and Popular Culture, 1865-1946* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), Michael C. Hillmann, *A Lonely Woman: Forugh Farrokhzad and Her Poetry* (Washington DC: Mage Publishers, 1987); Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women's Autobiographies in Contemporary Iran* (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 1990); Farzaneh Milani, *Veils and Words: the Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992); Farah Pehlevi, *Anılar* (İstanbul: Dünya, 2004); Ashraf Zahedi, "State Ideology and the Status of Iranian War Widows," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 8: 2 (2006), 267-286; Shahla Haeri, "Women, Religion and Political Agency in Iran," *in* Ali Gheissari (ed.) *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009,) 125-149. Ayrıca bkz. "Women's Worlds in Qajar Iran Digital Archives:" http://www.qajarwomen.org/en/ (erişim tarihi 7 Mart 2014).

arası "bir milyon cana" ve büyük toplumsal yıkımlara yol açan ve "20. yüzyılın en uzun konvansiyonel savaşı" olan İran-Irak Savaşı'nı İran resmi ideolojik söyleminin nasıl temsil ettiğine dair bir merak da bu çalışmaya kaynaklık etmektedir.[6]

Da ile İran'ı Keşfetmek

Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni adlı İranlı bir kadın tarafından yazılan, 2008'de yayımlanan ve sonuna eklenen dizin, belgeler ve fotoğraflarla toplam 812 sayfa olan bu kitap savaş başladığında 17 yaşında olan Hoseyni'nin anılarından oluşuyor.[7] *Da*, 1000 saatten fazla süren görüşmeye dayanmaktadır. Görüşme için Direniş Edebiyatı ve Sanatı Ofisi ilk defa 2001 (1380) yılında Hoseyni ile görüşme talebinde bulunmuş ancak Hoseyni önce görüşmeyi reddetmiştir. Bir süre sonra bu birimin yayınlarını inceleyip güvenilir olduklarını ikna olduktan sonra görüşmeyi kabul etmiştir. Görüşmeler 2005 ve 2006 (1384 ve 1385) yıllarında tamamlanmıştır.[8] Zehra Hoseyni yoksul bir Kürt Şii ailede 1963'te dünyaya gelir. Ailesi Kürtlerin yaşadığı ve İlam eyaletinde bulunan *Zerrinabad-i Dehlaran* adlı köyden Basra'ya 1950'lerin sonunda göç etmiştir.[9] Evde Kürtçe konuşmaktadırlar zira babası iyi Arapça konuşamamaktadır.[10] Nitekim kitabın başlığı *Da* da Kürtçe'de anne anlamına gelmektedir. Annesi de babası da dindar Şiidirler. Babası Baas rejimine muhalif siyasi faaliyetlerde bulunduğundan aile Basra'da yaşarken babası bir süre hapsedilir. Bir süre sonra güneybatı İran'da bulunan Hürremşehr'e göç ederler.[11] Hürremşehr savaşın başlarından 1982'de İran tarafından geri alınıncaya kadar Irak'ın kontrolünde kalır. Hürremşehr'in "neredeyse tamamı Saddam tarafından tahrip edildiğinden" ismi ile kafiyeli olan *huninşehr* (kanlı şehir) de denilmektedir.[12] Hoseyni'nin anlatısının büyük kısmı Hürremşehr savunmasındaki mücadeleyi ve direnişi konu almaktadır. Zehra Hoseyni özellikle cephe arkasında aktif bir şekilde yer alır. Örneğin ölüleri yıkar ve defneder. Hatırat cephe gerisindeki acıyı, yası, ağıtları, cesetleri ve ölülerin gömülmesini kadınların penceresinden detaylı ve oldukça grafik bir şekilde anlatmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, kitap savaş anlatısı olduğundan acı, yas, ölüm, cesetler, ağıtlar ve oldukça kanlı manzaralarla yüklüdür. Zehra Hoseyni ölüleri yıkadığı ve defnettiği için detaylı

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6 Saskia M. Gieling, "Iran-Iraq War," *Encyclopedia Iranica* http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war (erişim tarihi 27 Aralık 2014). Ayrıca bkz. Ervand Abrahamian, *Modern İran Tarihi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009).

7 Seyyide Azam Hoseyni, *Da: Haterat-i Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1389). 2012'de edindiğim bu kopya kitabın 117. baskısıdır.

8 Ibid.,14.

9 Ibid., 18.

10 Ibid., 18-19.

11 Ibid., 33, 35.

12 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 946.

ceset tariflerine de kitapta sıkça rastlanmaktadır.[13] Ölüleri için yüzlerini tır-
malayan, saçlarını yolan, göğüslerini döven ve başlarına toprak atan erkeklerin
ve özellikle kadınların yürek parçalayıcı manzaraları görülmektedir.[14] Ayrıca
zaman zaman konuşma dili ile yazılmış olması, kadınların Kürtçe ve Arapça
ağıtlarına yer vermesi ile *Da* yoksulların ve kadınların savaş tecrübesini oku-
yuculara adeta kendi sesleri ile sunmaktadır.[15] İran hakkında çalışma yapan
yabancı araştırmacılar için bu özellikleri ile oldukça öğretici bir kitaptır.

Da, 1988'de kurulan ve 8 yıl süren savaşla ilgili edebi, sanatsal ve araştır-
maya dayalı eserleri toplama ve yayımlama amacıyla kurulan *Hovze-yi Ho-
neri*[16] adlı kurumun bünyesinde faal olan Direniş Edebiyatı ve Sanatı Ofisi
(*Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet*) tarafından gerçekleştirilen araştırma
sonucu ve yine *Hovze-yi Honeri*'nin yayıncısı olan Sure Mehr Yayınları[17] ta-
rafından 2008'de yayımlanmış. Savaş Kütüphanesi (*Ketabhane-yi Tehessosi-yi
Ceng*) müdürü Nosretollah Samedzade'nin işaret ettiği üzere, *Da* yazım süreci
ve tarzı itibariyle İran'da savaş hatıraları yazımı konusunda öncü bir örnek zira
Farsça *hatere-negar* diye adlandırılan görüşmecinin etkin katılımı ile yazılı-
yor.[18] Samedzade'nin kaydettiğine göre, *hatere-negar* örneğin görüşme yaptığı
kişinin anlatısına konu olan yerleri gezerek ve inceleyerek olgusal verilerin
doğruluğunu mümkün olduğunca teyid etmeye çalışıyor. Bu ortak çabanın
bir parçası olarak daha önce yayımlanan ve nispeten 'kuru' savaş anlatısı şek-
linde kaleme alınan hatıratlardan farklı olarak *Da* ile başlayarak bu kurum ini-
siyatifi ile yayımlanan savaş hatıratları roman tarzı anlatımları sayesinde daha
ilgi çekici olmaktadır. *Da*'nın yayımlanmasından sonra aynı ofis ve yayınevi
tarafından yayımlanan İran-Irak Savaşı hakkındaki çok sayıda kadın hatıratı
Tahran'daki kitapçıların Mukaddes Savunma (*Defa-i Mogeddes*) başlıklı rafla-
rında bulunuyor.[19]

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13 Örneğin, bkz. Seyyide A'zam Hoseyni, *Da: Haterat-i Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure
Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1389), 82.

14 Örneğin, bkz. Ibid., 92, 93, 95, 96, 120, 323, 350.

15 Ibid., 80, 198.

16 http://www.hozehonari.com/Default.aspx?page=8923 (erişim tarihi: 23 Aralık 2014)

17 http://www.sooremehr.ir/fa/pages/about (erişim tarihi: 23 Aralık 2014)

18 Bu çalışmada Savaş Kütüphanesi müdürü Nosretollah Samedzade'ye atfen verilen bilgiler kendisi ile
27 Ağustos 2013 yaptığım görüşmeye dayanmaktadır.

19 Bunlardan edinebildiğim ve bir kısmını da inceleme imkanı bulduğum hatıratlar şunlar: Behnaz De-
rebizade, *Dohter-i* Şina: *Haterat-i Gedemhayr Muhammedi-yi Kenan* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Def-
ter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1392); Golestan Caferiyan, *Ez Çandela ta Ceng: Haterat-i Şems-i
Sobhani* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1392); Leyla Mu-
hammedi, *Didar-i Zehma: Haterat-i Masume Mirzayi* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat
ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1389); Leyla Muhammedi, *Dohter-i U. P. D: Haterat-i Mina Kemali* (Tehran:
Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1390); Şiva Seccadi, *Haterat-i İran:
Haterat-i İran Turabi* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1391);
Nahid Selmani, *Gol-i Simin: Haterat-i Seham Takati* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve
Honer-i Mogavemet, 1392); Feriba Taleşpur, *Potinha-yi Meryem: Haterat-i Meryem Emcedi* (Tehran: En-
teşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1391); Seyyid Kasım Yahoseyni, *Zeytun-i*

Laetitia Nanquette adlı bir araştırmacının İran Çalışmaları alanında önde gelen akademik yayın organlarından olan *Iranian Studies* dergisinde *Da* hakkında yayımladığı makalesinde işaret ettiği gibi, *Da*'nın yayımlanması, dağıtımı ve yaygınlaştırılması —dini lider Ali Hamaneyi'nin internet sitesinde kitabı övmesi dahil olmak üzere— "müthiş bir propaganda makinesi" (*a formidable propaganda machine*) ile oldu.[20] İngilizce çevirisi yakınlarda yayımlanan kitabın,[21] yine Nanquette'in kaydettiği gibi, İran devlet televizyonunun 1. kanalında "prime time"da, akşam 9 haberlerinden önce, animasyon şeklindeki yapımda *Da* 15'er dakikalık toplam 120 bölümde 55 kadın oyuncu tarafından okunmaktadır ve bu bölümlerin çoğu halen youtube'da erişime açıktır.[22] *Da* hakkında İran'daki çeşitli üniversitelerin genellikle Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı bölümlerinde yüksek lisans tezleri yazıldı.[23] Savaş Kütüphanesi Müdürü Samedzade'nin Mukaddes Savunma hakkında İran'daki yazılı eserlere dair temin ettiği verilere göre, 1980'den 2012'ye kadar İran'da İran-Irak Savaşı hakkında yayımlanan yaklaşık 11.000 adet Farsça kitabın 4679'u "belgesel yazın", yani "hatırat, biyografi, mektuplar, tanıklıklar ve raporlardır." Kadınların savaşa katılımını konu alan çeşitli türlerde kitaplar yayımlanmıştır.[24] Savaş hakkında-

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Sorh: Haterat-i Nahid Yosifyan (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1387); Seyyid Kasım Yahoseyni, *Derya Hanom: Haterat-i Azar Allamezade, Hemser-i Şehid Reza Celilvend* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1390).

20 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 943.

21 Zahra Hoseyni, *One Woman's War: Da [Mother]. The Memoirs of Seyyedeh Zahra Hoseyni* (Mazda, 2014). *Da* Türkçe'ye de çevrilmektedir.

22 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 956; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsZDUBdtVQo (erişim tarihi: 7 Mart 2014).

23 Erişim ve inceleme imkanı bulamadığım şu tezlerin künyelerini Savaş Kütüphanesi müdürü Nosretollah Samedzade temin etti: Mena Borchani, *Mogayese-yi Ketab-i "Da" ve "Dohteri ez İran"* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, el-Zehra Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1389); Mocteba Haci Mirzamohammed, *Berresi-yi Avamil-i Moesser ber Gerayeş-i Hanendegan be Ketab-i "Da", Haterat-i Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Sure Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu, Kültürel Yönetim Bölümü, 1391); Leyla Hagiri, *Berresi-yi Seyr-i Haterenivisi-yi Defa-i Mogeddes be Tekid ber Ketab-i "Da"* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Allame Tabetabai Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1389); Feriba Rahimi, *Negd ve Berresi-yi Enasır-i Dastan der Ketab-i Da* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Arak Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1391); Zohre Geffari, *Negd ve Berresi-yi Camieşenahti-yi Çend Roman-i Dowre-yi Defa-i Mogeddes* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İslami Azad Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1391); Zehra Serai, *Berresi-yi Haterenegari-yi Defa-i Mogeddes ba Negd ve Tehlil-i Ketab-i "Da"* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Yezd Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1390); Aşhab Esmail, *Berrasi-yi Enasır-i Dastani-yi "Da"* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Peyamnur Üniversitesi, Fars Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü, 1390).

İran'da genel olarak Mukaddes Savunma konusunda özel olarak ise *Da* hakkında yapılan akademik çalışmaları incelemek özellikle İran içinde üretilen İran tarih, toplum ve siyaseti hakkındaki akademik üretimin niteliğini görmek açısından faydalı olabilir ancak böyle bir araştırma bu çalışmanın sınırlarını aşmaktadır. Nanquette adı geçen makalesinde Serman ve Kerman Üniversiteleri'nde Mukaddes Savunma Edebiyatı alanında yüksek lisans dereceleri verildiğini not etmekte ve bu alandaki çalışmaların çoğunlukla resmi söylemi tekrar ettiğini eklemektedir: Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 945.

24 İran-Irak Savaşı ve İranlı kadınlar hakkında kapsamlı bir açıklamalı kaynakça (*annotated bibliography*)

ki kurumsal ve kültürel bir girişim de müzelerdir. Mukaddes Savunma Müzesi (*Muze-yi Defa-i Mogeddes*) ve Şüheda Müzesi (*Muze-yi Şoheda*) gibi müzeler aracılığı ile Savaş hakkındaki resmi ideolojik perspektif popülerleştirilmektedir. Bir araştırmacının kaydettiği gibi: "Bu Savaş ve Gazi Müzeleri bugün güçlü kuruluşlardır çünkü hem geçmişi hem cereyan etmekte olan tarihi genç nesle öğretmek için pedagojik araçlar olarak kullanılmaktadır."[25]

Da Hakkında Bir Çalışma

Bu noktada Nanquette'in yukarıda adı geçen çalışmasına yakından bakmak gerekmektedir. Bu makale Mukaddes Savunma'ya dair İran'da var olan "edebiyat endüstrisi" alanındaki faaliyetlerin kapsamlı bir manzarasını sunmaktadır. Yazar çeşitli kurumların yanı sıra "ansiklopediler, şiir kitapları, hatıratlar, duvar resimleri, posterler ve televizyon ve radyo programları" ile devletin Mukaddes Savunma'ya dair resmi ideolojik söylemi nasıl dolaşıma soktuğuna ışık tutmaktadır.[26] Bu çalışma *Da*'nın üretiminden dağıtımına dek devlet tarafından nasıl desteklendiğini ve İran toplumu tarafından nasıl kabul gördüğünü incelemektedir. Yazar, *Da*'nın eğitimli kitlelerin savaş hakkında okullarda okuduklarından farklı bir hatırat okuma ihtiyaçlarına cevap verdiğini iddia etmektedir.[27]

Nanquette'in makalesi Mukaddes Savunma hakkında İran'daki kültürel üretim hakkında bilgilendirici olmakla birlikte bazı ciddi problemler barındırmaktadır. Birincisi, *Da*'nın hedef kitlesinin muhafazakâr çevreler ile çocuklar olduğu konusundaki iddiadır:

> "Mukaddes Savunma" metinleri ideal olarak tüm İran nüfusuna ulaşmayı amaçlamaktadır, ancak gerçekte iki ana hedefe yönlendirilmişlerdir: muhafazakâr çevreler ve okul çocukları. Etkin ve yaygın örgütlenmeler sayesinde, [bu] söyleme zaten ikna olmuş muhafazakâr çevrelere ulaşmak epey kolaydır; ve İslami propaganda, müfredatlarının bir parçası olarak liseye kadar bazı

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için bkz. Meryem Zaghiyan, *Ketabşenasi-yi Zen ve Defa-i Mogeddes* (Tehran: Sazman-i Çap ve Enteşarat-i Vezaret-i Ferheng ve Erşad-i Eslami, 1387). İran-Irak Savaşı'nın devlet tarafından geliştirilen "Müslüman kadın" fikri ve modelini inşa ve propaganda eden kültürel milliyetçi söylemlerin ve projelerin bir incelemesi için bkz. Shirin Haghgou, *Archiving War: Iran-Iraq War and the Construction of "Muslim" Women* (Toronto: Unpublished MA Thesis at the Department of Adult Education and Community Development, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2014).

25 Christiane Gruber, "The Martyrs' Museum in Tehran: Visualizing Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Visual Anthropology* 25 (2012), 69. Orijinali: "These war and veterans' museums are powerful entities today since they are used as pedagogical tools for teaching history, both past and unfolding, to a young generation."

26 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 944-946.

27 Ibid., 946.

"Mukaddes Savunma" metinlerini okuyan ve savaş alanlarına yapılan ve devletçe desteklenen gezilere katılan çocuklara yönelik olarak özellikle aktiftir.[28]

Eğer muhafazakâr çevreler zaten resmi ideolojik söyleme ikna iseler ve çocuklar da zaten okullarda resmi söylemle kuşatılan bir ortamda yetiştirilmekte iseler,[29] bu iki kitlenin *Da*'nın hedef kitlesi olduğu iddiası isabetli görünmemektedir. Özellikle çok uzun ve grafik ölüm ve ceset tasvirleri ile yüklü bir savaş anlatısının hedef kitlesine çocukları dahil etmek isabetli görünmemektedir.

Nanquette'in çalışmasındaki ikinci problem ise kitabın alımlanması konusunda yaptığı yorumla ilgilidir. Tahran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi'nin Tahran'da 4000 kişi ile telefonla yaptığı anketin niceliksel sonuçları ve 648 kişi ile internetten yapılan anketin niteliksel sonuçları yazarın *Da*'nın alımlanmasına dair kullandığı temel dayanaktır.[30] Buradan hareketle, yazar kitabın "alışılmışın dışında geniş ve farklılaşmış alımlanışı"[31] (*unusually wide and varied reception*) iddiasında bulunmakta fakat sonraki sayfalarda ise şunları kaydetmektedir:

Kültür ve İslami Rehberlik Bakanlığı'nın "topluma faydalı" addettiği kitapları, özellikle halk kütüphanelerine, kültürel merkezlere, okullara ve üniversitelere vermek için satın aldığını göz önünde bulundurmak da önemlidir. Örneğin, Da'nın nüshaları öğretmenlere dağıtıldı. Üniversitesince kendisine [kitabın] iki defa sunulduğu bir öğretmene rastladım. Tam olarak kaç tane olduğunu bilmek mümkün değilse de, Da'nın kopyalarının önemli bir sayısı bu amaçla alınmıştır. Satış istatistiklerini incelerken bu önyargıyı göz önünde tutmak önemlidir. Kitap satın alınmış olabilir ama gerçekten okunup okunmadığı belirlenememektedir. Kitabın satın alındığı yaygınlıkta okunmadığı makul olarak varsayılabilir (vurgu bana ait).32

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28 Ibid., 945-946. Orijinali: ""Sacred Defense" texts ideally aim to reach the whole of the Iranian population, but in effect they are directed at two main targets: conservative milieus and school children. Thanks to the active and wide network of organizations, it is fairly easy to reach the conservative milieus already convinced by the discourse, and Islamic propaganda is particularly active toward children, who read some "Sacred Defense" texts as part of their curriculum as late as high school, and participate in state-sponsored visits to the battlefields."

29 İran sineması çeşitli toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel ve tarihsel konularda olduğu gibi İran-Irak Savaşı hakkında da değerli bir sanatsal kaynaktır. Dünyaca ünlü İranlı yönetmen Abbas Kiarostami'nin yönettiği 1987 yapımlı olağanüstü filmi *Meşg-i Şeb* (Gece Ödevi) savaş esnasında ilkokul çocuklarına yönelik resmi ideolojik endoktrinasyonun yanı sıra savaşın çocuklar üzerindeki yansıması hakkında dolaylı yoldan bir fikir vermektedir: Abbas Kiarostami, *Meşg-i Şeb* (1989). İran-Irak Savaşı'nın çocuklar üzerindeki etkilerini konu alan başka önemli bir film için bkz. Behram Beyzai, *Başu, Geribe-yi Kuçek* (1989). İran savaş sineması hakkında bir çalışma için bkz. Michaël Abecassis, "Iranian War Cinema: Between Reality and Fiction," *Iranian Studies* 44: 3 (2011), 387-394.

30 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 947.

31 Ibid., 943.

32 Ibid., 953. Orijinali: "It is also important to take into consideration the fact that the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance buys books that it considers "beneficial to society," particularly to give to

Yazar sonraki sayfalarda ise kitabın başarı kaydettiğini iddia etmektedir:

O, böyle bir başarı oldu çünkü genç bir kitlenin olağanüstü bir kadının kişisel hatıraları hakkında okuma ihtiyacına, ve eğitimli bir kitlenin okulda savaşa dair okudukları tüm hatıratlardan farklı bir hatırat okuma ihtiyacına cevap verdi.[33]

Yazarın, "fevkalade propaganda makinesi" tarafından üretildiğini, satın alındığını, dağıtımının ve reklamının yapıldığını vurguladığı *Da* için Tahran'da yapılan anket sonuçlarına dayanarak "genç bir kitlenin" farklı bir hatırat okuma ihtiyacına cevap verdiğinden başarılı olduğunu iddia etmesi tutarsız görünmektedir.

Üçüncü bir problem de şudur: resmi ideolojik propaganda ağından ve Hoseyni'nin bu ideolojik söylemle yoğrulduğundan haberdar olmasına rağmen yazarın şu yargısı bir naiflik işareti gibi görünmektedir:

Zehra'nın hatıratı İslami bir organizasyon tarafından üstlenildi (*commissioned*) ve resmi kurumlar tarafından reklamı yapıldı. Ayrıca, hikayenin ne kadarının sadece Zehra'ya ve ne kadarının A'zam'ın dinlemesine ve soruları aracılığı ile hikayeye rehberlik etmesine borçlu olduğunu belirlemek zordur. Her ne kadar güçlü iradeli bir kadının öznel müdahalesi olarak görünmekte ise de bu üretimin bağlamından kaçılamaz.[34]

Ne kadar "güçlü iradeli bir kadın" olursa olsun Zehra'nın da, ona rehberlik eden A'zam'ın da Nanquette'in tam da "kaçılamayan bağlam" olarak işaret ettiği kuşatıcı resmi ideolojik ağdan bağımsız olabileceklerini ima ederek anlatının ne kadarının Zehra'ya ne kadarının *hatere-negar* A'zam'a ait olduğunu değerlendirmenin zor olduğunu söylemek muhal görünmektedir. Zira tam da "müthiş propaganda makinesi"nce vücut bulan, bu anlamda bireysel hatırlamayı temelden kuşatan total bir ideolojik operasyon söz konusudur. Bir başka deyişle, bu hatıratın resmi kurumsal (*Hovze-yi Honeri*) inisiyatifin ürünü olduğunu kaydetmesine rağmen makalenin devamında bu olayı sadece Hoseyni

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public libraries, cultural centers, schools and universities. Copies of Da have been distributed to teachers, for example. I encountered one teacher who had been offered it twice by his university. A significant number of copies of Da have been bought for this purpose, although it is impossible to know exactly how many. This bias is important to factor in when scrutinizing sales statistics. The book may be bought, but whether it is actually read or not cannot be determined. It can reasonably be assumed that it has not been as widely read as it has been bought."

33 Ibid., 956. Orijinali: "It became such a hit because it answered the needs of a young audience to read about the personal memories of an extraordinary woman, and of an educated audience to read a memoir different from all the memoirs on the war they read at school."

34 Ibid., 952. Orijinali: "Zahra's memoir was commissioned by an Islamic organization and promoted by official institutions. Moreover, it is difficult to assess how much of the story is due to Zahra only and how much is due to A'zam's listening and guiding the story through her questions. Although it appears as a subjective intervention of a strong-willed woman, the context of this production cannot be escaped."

ile A'zam arasında cereyan eden bir süreçmiş gibi ele alması yazarın tam da sözünü ettiği bağlamı yeterince hesaba katmaması anlamına gelmektedir.

Son olarak, Nanquette'in Hoseyni'nin Şii Kürt kimliğinin bu resmi ideolojik operasyon bağlamında icra ettiği fonksiyonu takdir edememesi bu çalışmadaki bir diğer sorundur. İran'da Kürtlerin güçlü bir bağımsızlık ve muhalefet hareketine sahip olduklarını belirtmesine rağmen,[35] yazar şunu ifade etmektedir:

> Tanıtımın amacı, İran ulusunu yeniden birleştiren —Farsça okurlarına açıklanmak zorunda bulunulan *başlığının paradoksuna* rağmen— ve tüm sınıflar ve kuşaklar tarafından takdir edilecek bir metin olarak metnin reklamını yapmaktır.[36] (vurgu bana ait)

Kitabın başlığının Farsça okurlarına açıklanmaya muhtaç Kürtçe bir kelime olması da yazarının Şii Kürt bir kadın olması da —yazarın İran'daki Kürtlerin politik geçmişine ve tercihlerine dair yaptığı gözlem dolayısıyla— paradoksal olmadığı gibi tesadüfi de görünmemektedir. Savaşın hatırasının Kürt Şii bir kadının cesareti ve fedakarlığı üzerinden dolaşıma sokulması bu ideolojik operasyon bağlamında isabetle istifade edilen bir durum gibi görünmektedir ki yazar da buna değinmekte ancak bunu yeterince bağlamsallaştırmamaktadır: "Bir kadın ve Kürt Şii azınlığın bir üyesi olarak konumunun orijinalliği kendisini konuşmaya tayin eden hükümetin resmi söylemine faydalı olmaktadır."[37]

Da'yı Yorumlamak

Da'yı isabetli bir şekilde yorumlamadaki esası nokta şudur: hatırlama, sözlü tarih ve hatıra yazımı cereyan ettikleri toplumsal, tarihsel ve siyasal bağlamın dolaysız ürünüdür. Diğer bir deyişle, Hoseyni'nin İran-Irak Savaşı'nı hatırlaması ve A'zam ile bunun üzerinde çalışması bizatihi siyasi bir olaydır. Kitabın Giriş kısmında Hoseyni hatıratını kaleme almasının, İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin mukaddes düzeni için kendilerini feda edenlerin savaş çığırtkanlığı/militarizm (*ceng-telebi*) ile suçlanmalarından ileri geldiğini kaydetmektedir.[38] Hoseyni, ayrıca Irak Baas rejiminin saldırganlığına karşı İranlıların haklılığını ve mazlumiyetini göstermeyi istediğini not etmektedir.[39]

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35 Ibid., 949.

36 Ibid., 955. Orijinali: "The purpose of the publicity is to promote the text as one which reunites the Iranian nation —despite *the paradox of its title* that has to be explained to Persian readers— and which can be appreciated by all classes and generations." (vurgu bana ait)

37 Ibid., 957. Orijinali: "The originality of her position as a woman and as a member of the Kurdish Shia minority benefits the government's official discourse, that has commissioned her to speak."

38 Seyyide Azam Hoseyni, *Da: Haterat-i Seyyide Zehra Hoseyni* (Tehran: Enteşarat-i Sure Mehr, Defter-i Edebiyat ve Honer-i Mogavemet, 1389), 11.

39 Ibid., 12.

Hoseyni tarafından dile getirilen bu kaygılar hatırlama ve hatıratlar üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda vurgulanan gözlemlere değinmeyi gerektirmektedir. Bu konuda yapılan birçok çalışmanın gösterdiği gibi, hatırlama içinde bulunulan toplumsal, tarihsel ve siyasal bağlam tarafından kuşatılmış ve şekillendirilmiştir. Maurice Halbwachs bu noktanın altını şöyle çizmektedir: "…en kişisel duygularımız ve düşüncelerimiz belirli toplumsal ortamlarda ve şartlarda temellenir."[40] Elizabeth Tonkin ise şunları ifade etmektedir:

> Görünürde otobiyografik olmayan anlatıcı bile bir anlatıya o anın perspektifinden başlar. 'Hatırlama ve anlatma bizatihi olaydır, salt olayların tasviri değil…' Yaşanan bir olay bitmiştir, tecrübe edilmişlikle sınırlanmıştır. Ancak hatırlanan bir olay sınırsızdır, zira öncesinde ve sonrasında vuku bulan her şeyin anahtarıdır.[41]

Peter Novick Amerika'daki Yahudilerin Holokost'u hatırlamasının 1940'lar ve 1950'lerden 1980'ler ve 1990'lara doğru gösterdiği değişimi incelerken şunu kaydetmektedir: "Her nesil Holokost'u kendi ruh haline uyan şekillerde çerçeveler, temsil eder."[42] Holokost'un Yahudi kimliğinin nasıl temel tanımlayıcısı haline geldiğini incelediği bu ilginç çalışmasında, Novick'in şu gözlemleri Hoseyni'nin hatıratı aracılığıyla İran devletinin kolektif hafıza yaratma ve yaygınlaştırmasını anlamada yardımcı olmaktadır:

> …kollektif kimlik ile kollektif hafıza arasında döngüsel (*circular*) bir ilişki bulunmaktadır. Belirli hatıraları merkeze almayı seçeriz çünkü [bunlar] bizim için kollektif kimliğimizin merkezinde olanı ifade ederler. Bu hatıralar, öne çıkarıldıkları anda, bu kimlik formunu güçlendirirler.[43]

Da ve benzeri savaş hatıratları da hamasi, milliyetçi ve militarist tonları ile "Mukaddes Savunma"yı İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucu bir unsuru olarak öne çıkarmaktadır.[44]

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40 Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 33. Orijinali: "...our most personal feelings and thoughts originate in definite social milieus and circumstances."

41 Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: the Social Construction of Oral History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. Orijinali: "Even the apparently un-autobiographical narrator sets out a narrative from the perspective of that moment. 'The remembering and the telling are themselves events, not only descriptions of events…' "An event lived is finished, bound within experience. But an event remembered is boundless, because it is the key to all that happened before and after it."

42 Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 120. Orijinali: "Every generation frames the Holocaust, represents the Holocaust, in ways that suit its mood."

43 Ibid., 7. Orijinali: "...there is a circular relationship between collective identity and collective memory. We choose to center certain memories because they seem to us to express what is central to our collective identity. Those memories, once brought to the fore, reinforce that form of identity."

44 İranlı ve Iraklı iki askerin savaştan yıllar sonra Kanada'da tekrar karşılaşmalarını işleyen ve farklı bir savaş anlatısı sunan dikkat çekici bir belgesel için bkz. Jiyar Gol (yön.) *A Tale of Two Soldiers* (2010). Jiyar Gol'un bu belgeselin arka planı hakkında verdiği bilgiler için bkz. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ worldagenda/2011/01/110131_worldagenda_tale_two_soldiers.shtml (erişim tarihi: 1 Ocak 2015).

Da'yı analiz etmede ikinci esası nokta ise *Da*'yı 2000'lerde İran'ın toplumsal, siyasal ve ekonomik bağlamına yerleştirerek okumak gereğidir. Nanquette'in sadece bir alt başlıkta ifade ettiği ve fakat analizinde üzerinde durmadığı soru devletin neden "savaş hakkında söylem üzerinde ulusu birleştirme girişimi"ne (*An Attempt to Unify the Nation on the Discourse on the War*)[45] ihtiyaç duyduğu sorusudur. Bir başka deyişle, *Da*'yı isabetli olarak analiz edebilmek için sorulması gereken asıl soru şudur: Neden 2000'lerde Kürt Şii bir kadının kahramanı olduğu bu savaş anlatısı devletçe desteklendi, yayımlandı ve çeşitli kanallarla dolaşıma sokuldu?

Bu soruyu cevaplamada üç sosyal grup öne çıkmaktadır: kadınlar, gençler ve azınlıklar. 1989'da Humeyni'nin ölümünden sonra Ali Ekber Haşimi Rafsancani (1989-1997) ve Muhammed Hatemi (1997-2004)'nin cumhurbaşkanı oldukları dönemde İran'da gelişen bir kadın hareketi söz konusudur. Shahla Haeri'nin işaret ettiği gibi, Rafsancani'nin cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde İran "dışarı açılmaya başladı ve ülke içinde bazı sivil haklar tanındı."[46] Özellikle gazeteci, akademik ve bakanlıklarda görevli üst düzey kadınların yanı sıra "reformcu Altıncı Meclis (2000-2004)"te bulunan milletvekili kadınlarla yaptığı derinlemesine görüşmeler aracılığıyla bu kadınların tecrübelerine ve siyasi söylemlerine dayanarak Haeri 1990'lardan 2000'lerin ortalarına kadar İranlı kadınların faaliyetlerine ve taleplerine ışık tutmaktadır.[47] Kadınlar Rafsancani ve Hatemi dönemlerinin "açık siyasal atmosferinden faydalanarak" çeşitli sivil toplum örgütleri kurarak, feminist dergiler ve gazeteler yayımlayarak eşitlik ve demokratik hak talepleri ekseninde mobilize oldular.[48] Zamanın İçişleri Bakan Yardımcısı ve Hatemi'nin danışmanı Eşref Burucerdi şunları kaydetmektedir:

> Kadınlar öyle bir sosyal tanınma derecesine ulaştılar ki artık gözardı edilemezler. Savaşın [İran-Irak] bitmesi, iletişimin yaygınlaşması ve devletin retoriği [Hatemi'nin demokrasi, hukuka ve bireysel haklara saygı çağrısı] kadınların bilincinin ve beklentilerinin artmasına yardım etti. Kadınların gazeteler, sivil toplum örgütleri, kadın dernekleri ve kurumları, devlet örgütleri, Parlamento üyeleri, özellikle Altıncı Meclis tarafından propaganda edilen (*publicize*) çok talebi vardı.[49]

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45 Laetitia Nanquette, "An Iranian Woman's Memoir on the Iran–Iraq War: The Production and Reception of *Da*," *Iranian Studies* 46: 6 (2013), 957.

46 Shahla Haeri, "Women, Religion and Political Agency in Iran," *in* Ali Gheissari (ed.) *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 130.

47 Ibid., 128.

48 Ibid., 135-136.

49 Ibid., 135. Orijinali: "Women have reached a degree of social recognition that they can no longer be ignored. The end of the [Iran-Iraq] war, the expansion of communications, and the rhetoric of the state [Khatami's call for democracy and respect for law and individual rights] helped raise women's consciousness and expectations. Women had many demands, which were publicized through newspapers, nongovernmental organizations, women's associations and institutions, state organizations, and members of parliament, particularly the Sixth Majles."

Başka bir araştırmacı da şunları kaydetmektedir:

> Hatemi'nin cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim platformu sivil toplumu, hukuk dev-
> letini, ve medya için daha büyük açıklığı da içeren daha fazla sosyal özgürlüğü
> savundu. Hatemi'nin platformu kadınlara, gençlere ve 1979'daki popüler
> devrime katılımlarından bu yana dışlanan daha büyük orta sınıfa cazip gelmiş-
> ti.[50]

Savaş sonrası dönemde politik olarak önemli diğer sosyal grup ise İran nüfusunun önemli bir kısmını oluşturan gençlerdir. 2010 itibariyle 15-29 yaş arası nüfus toplam nüfusun üçte birinden fazlasını oluşturmaktadır.[51] Djavad Salehi-Isfahani'nin kaydettiği gibi, 1997 ve 2001'de Hatemi'nin cumhurbaşkanı seçilmesinde olduğu gibi Mahmud Ahmedinejad'ın ikinci defa seçildiği 2009'daki seçimlerde de İran'ın büyük kentlerindeki hükümet karşıtı gösterilerde de gençler önemli bir rol oynadı.[52] 1980'lerden başlayarak 2008'e kadar sürekli artış gösteren genç nüfusun işsizlik oranı ise gençlerin hoşnutsuzluklarının ekonomik gerekçelerini göstermesi açısından dikkat çekicidir.[53] Başka bir araştırma üniversite gençliğinin 1997, 2000 ve 2001 cumhurbaşkanlığı ve parlamento seçimlerinde anayasal hakların ve sivil özgürlüklerin öncelikli meseleler olmasını sağlamalarına işaret ederek şunları vurgulamaktadır:

> Reform hareketinin başarısızlığından sonra dahi üniversite öğrencileri
> (kadınlar, emek[çiler] ve aydınların yanı sıra) İran'da 2000'lerde kötüleşen
> demokratikleşme sürecinin ve insan haklarının anlatılmasında/tasvirinde en
> faal ve yüksek sesli (*vocal*) grup olmuşlardır.[54]

Kadınlar ve gençlerin yanı sıra 2000'lerde İran toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamında etnik ve dini azınlıkların da hak taleplerinin ülkenin siyasi gündeminde yer aldığı görülmektedir. 1997'den 2005'e kadarki ulusal seçimlerde oy verme davranışının etnik-coğrafi dağılımını inceleyen bir çalışma dikkat çeki-

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50 Mehdi Semati, "Living with Globalization and the Islamic State: an Introduction to Media, Culture, and Society in Iran," in Mehdi Semati (ed.) *Living with Globalization and the Islamic State: an Introduction to Media, Culture, and Society in Iran* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 6. Orijinali: "Khatami's platform for presidential election advocated civil society, rule of law, and greater social freedoms, including greater openness for the media. Khatami's platform had appealed to youth, women, and the larger middle class who had been sidelined since their participation in the popular revolution of 1979."
51 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, "Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis," *Iranian Studies* 44: 6 (2011), 789.
52 Ibid., 789.
53 Ibid., 796.
54 Majid Mohammadi, "Iranian University Students' Politics in the Post-Reform Movement Era: A Discourse Analysis," *Iranian Studies* 40: 5 (2007), 623. Orijinali: "Even after the failure of the reform movement, university students (beside women, labor, and intellectuals) have been the most active and vocal group in depicting the deteriorating situation of the democratization process and human rights in Iran in the 2000s."

ci sonuçlara varmaktadır.[55] Bu araştırmaya göre, "daha yoksul, daha kırsal, ve okuryazarlığın daha az olduğu Batı Azerbaycan, Doğu Azerbaycan, Golestan, Hormozgan, İlam, Kermanşah, Kürdistan, Sistan ve Baluçistan" gibi etnik azınlıkların yoğunlaştığı bölgeler 1997, 2000, 2001 ve 2005'teki ulusal seçimlerde 50%'den yüksek bir düzeyde reformcu adayları desteklemişlerdir.[56] Ali Gheissari ve Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji bu tablonun ekonomik hoşnutsuzlukların yanı sıra "merkezi hükümetin ayrımcı 'tektipleştirici' siyasetine cevap" olduğunu kaydetmektedirler.[57] Nayereh Tohidi tarafından kaleme alınan bir araştırma ise 2005 cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim sonuçlarının etnik kimlik —özellikle Kürtler ve Azeriler— açısından net bir resim ortaya koyduğunu vurgulamaktadır.[58] Tohidi'nin bu çalışmasında altını çizdiği önemli bir nokta bölgesel ve uluslararası dinamiklerin İran'daki azınlıklar üzerindeki etkisidir. Bu bağlamda, Tohidi 2003'te ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali sonrası Türkiye'de ve Irak'ta Kürt meselesinde yaşanan gelişmelerin İran'daki Kürtlerin milliyetçi hislerine katkıda bulunduğunu kaydetmektedir.[59]

2000'li yıllarda devletçe desteklenen *Da*'yı kadınlar, gençler ve etnik azınlıkların önemli aktörleri olduğu bu toplumsal, siyasal ve ekonomik bağlama yerleştirerek yorumlamak isabetli görünmektedir. Bu anlamda Kürt, Şii ve kadın olan Zehra Hoseyni'nin 2008'de yayımlanan hatıratı kadınların, gençlerin ve Kürtlerin yukarıda çerçevesi çizilen özgül bağlamda dillendirdikleri hoşnutsuzluklarına karşılık olarak geliştirilen resmi ideolojik bir operasyon olarak yorumlanabilir.

Sonuç

Edward Said 1978'de yayımlanan *Şarkiyatçılık* adlı eserinde 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Amerika'da Orta Doğu üzerine yapılan sosyal bilim çalışmalarında tek bir edebiyat göndermesine rastlanmamasının "gayrı insanileştirilmiş" bir Orta Doğu manzarasına sebep olduğunu vurgulamaktadır.[60] Yıllar sonra yayımlanan *Kültür ve Emperyalizm* adlı eserinde ise Said Batılı edebiyat eserlerini iktidar ilişkileri bağlamında eleştirel bir incelemeye tabi tutmaktadır.[61] Said'in bu eleştirilerinden ilham alan bu çalışma 2000'lerde İran'da devlet eliyle destekle-

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55 Ali Gheissari ve Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji, "New Conservative Politics and Electoral Behaviour," *in* Ali Gheissari (ed.) *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 286. Bu önemli çalışmaya dikkatimi çeken Dr. Metin Atmaca'ya müteşekkirim.

56 Ibid., 286-289.

57 Ibid., 290.

58 Nayereh Tohidi, "Ethnicity and Religious Minority Politics in Iran," *in* Ali Gheissari (ed.) *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 307.

59 Ibid., 311.

60 Edward W. Said, *Şarkiyatçılık* (İstanbul: Metis, 1999).

61 Edward W. Said, *Kültür ve Emperyalizm* (İstanbul: Hil, 2004).

nen İran-Irak Savaşı'na dair *Da* adlı hatıratı iki düzlemde bağlamsallaştırarak yorumlama denemesidir. Bu anlamda bu çalışma öncelikle hatırlama, sözlü tarih ve hatırat yazımının gerçekleştikleri toplumsal, tarihsel ve siyasal bağlamın dolaysız ürünü oldukları gözleminin altını çizmektedir. İkinci olarak, *Da*'yı 1990'lar ve 2000'lerde İran'da kadınlar, gençler ve azınlıkların hoşnutsuzluklarına cevaben geliştirilmiş bir resmi ideolojik proje olarak yorumlamak mümkün görünmektedir.

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THE NEW MIDDLE EAST: PROTEST AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Rümeysa Eldoğan[*]

Ortadoğu bölgesinde 2011 yılında başlamış olan Arap devrimleri bugün hala bölgede siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal alanda etkin belirleyiciliğini sürdürmekte ve önümüzdeki yıllarda da bölgenin kaderini büyük ölçüde etkileyecek gibi gözükmektedir. 2011 yılında başlayan devrimlerin ardından üç yılı geride bıraktıktan sonra bölgede öne çıkan en önemli özellik ayaklanmaların her ülkede farklı bir yapılanmaya ve hem bölgesel hem küresel ölçekte yeni dinamiklerin ortaya çıkışına sebebiyet vermiş olduğudur. Bu sebeple devrimlerin ardından Ortadoğu'da bugün gelinen noktada bölgenin bugünü ve yarını hakkında değerlendirmelerde bulunabilmek, ayaklanmalarla ilgili oldukça kapsamlı bir analizi gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Fawaz Gerges'in *Yeni Ortadoğu: Arap Dünyasında Protesto ve Devrim* isimli kitabı Ortadoğu'da devrimlerden sonra ortaya çıkan yeni dinamikler ışığında bölgeyi anlamaya, değerlendirmeye

yönelik atılmış önemli bir adımdır. Gerges'in editörlüğünü yapmış olduğu bu kitabın en temel iddiası ise bölgede devrimler ile epistemolojik ve psikolojik bir kopuşun yaşandığı (s.1) ve bu sebeple bölgede bir daha asla geriye dönüşün mümkün olmayacağıdır. (s. 34)

Gerges, ana iddiası temelinde bölgenin sosyolojik ve politik olarak mikro ve makro alanlarda yeniden okunmasını amaçlamış olduğu bu çalışmada Ortadoğu hakkında politik, ekonomik, tarihi ve sosyal alanlarda uzun yıllardan beri çalışmış olan uzman ve araştırmacıların makalelerine yer vermiştir. Bu doğrultuda devrimler ve akabinde yaşanan gelişmeleri farklı dinamiklerden hareketle ele alan makalelerden oluşan kitapta bu makalelerin konularına göre ayrılmış dört bölüm yer almaktadır. Kitapta Gerges'in kaleme aldığı giriş kısmından sonra Arap ayaklanmaları "Bağlamı ve Nedenleri" ile ele alınmıştır. İkinci kısımda

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ayaklanmalar daha derin bir analiz için "Tematik ve Karşılaştırmalı Yönleri" ile değerlendirilmiş, üçüncü kısımda ise "Kargaşa içindeki Ülkeler" başlığı ile ayaklanmaların yaşanmış olduğu ülkeler tek tek ele alınmıştır. Son kısımda ise Arap ayaklanmaları "Bölgesel ve Uluslararası Etkileri" çerçevesinde değerlendirilerek bölgesel ve uluslararası siyaset temelinde makro bir çerçeve içerisine yerleştirilmiştir.

Gerges, "Kopuş" alt başlığı ile kitabının giriş kısmında devrimin yaşanmış olduğu ülkeleri tek tek ele alarak bu ülkelerde halkı ayaklanmaya sevk eden nedenleri ve ayaklanmaların söz konusu ülkelerdeki gidişatını değerlendirmiştir. Bu kısa analizlerden sonra ise yazar Ortadoğu'da Arap Devrimleri ile ciddi bir kopuşun yaşanmış olduğu iddiasından hareketle Mısır'ı örnek olay olarak ele almıştır. Bu kısımda Mısır'da devrim sürecinden bu yana yaşanmış olan gelişmeleri ayrıntılı bir şekilde inceleyen yazar, Arap ülkelerinde devrimlerden sonra geriye dönüşün bir daha mümkün olamayacağı yönündeki savını Mısır örneği ile güçlendirmeye çalışmıştır.

Kitabın en uzun kısmını oluşturan giriş kısmından sonra "Bağlam ve Nedenler" başlığı altında ilk olarak Lisa Anderson'un "Otoriter Miras ve Rejim Değişikliği" başlığındaki makalesi yer almaktadır. Anderson bu makalesinde Arap devrimleri ışığında siyaset bilimi açısından otoriteryanizmin yeniden bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutulması gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Zira Anderson'a göre bölgedeki politik geçişi değerlendirmek ve demokrasinin inşa yollarını tartışmak

için öncelikli şart otoriter mirasın iyi bir şekilde okunmasıdır. Bu sebeple Arap devrimlerinin siyaset biliminde otokrasi tanımında bir yenilenme talep ettiği görüşünden hareketle yazar bu makalede otokrasi, isyan ve direniş kavramlarını bölgedeki gelişmeler ışığında farklı boyutları ile değerlendirmektedir.

Arap devrimlerinin bağlamları çerçevesinde değerlendirildiği ilk kısımda Anderson'dan sonra Ali Kadri devrimlerin en önemli sebeplerinden birine ışık tutarak ayaklanmaların arkasındaki ekonomik gerekçeleri ayrıntılı bir şekilde ortaya koymuştur. Kadri'nin, "Ayaklanmalar Öncesi Depresif Ekonomik Performans" başlığını taşıyan makalesindeki temel savı, ayaklanmaların Arap devletlerinin ekonomik politikaları ile doğrudan ilişkili olduğudur. Bu savını desteklemek amacıyla Kadri, Arap dünyasındaki ekonomik gelişmeleri istatiksel olarak ortaya koyarak 1980'li yıllardan itibaren Ortadoğu'da gözlenen ekonomik duraklamayı sorunsallaştırmıştır. Kadri'ye göre söz konusu duraklamanın sebebi Arap dünyasında yaşanan askeri yenilgiler ve bölgedeki petrol konusunda izlenen emperyalist politikalardır. Özellikle de bölgenin petrol üretimi ile küresel sermayenin çarkına girmesi bölge ekonomisini yerel üretimden kopararak petrole bağımlı hale getirmiştir. Bu durum da hem bölgedeki ekonomik gelişmeyi önlemiş hem de Kadri'nin makaledeki temel iddiasına paralel olarak yönetici ve elit kesim ile halk arasında büyük bir uçuruma yol açarak devlet egemenliğine zarar vermiştir. Netice olarak ekonomik politikalar ile bağlantılı olarak devlet

egemenliğinde oluşan zaaf da ayaklanmaları başlatan en temel etkendir.

Ali Kadri'nin makalesini besleyecek şekilde Rami Zurayk ve Anne Gough "Ekmek ve Zeytinyağı: Arap Ayaklanmalarının Tarımsal Kökenleri" isimli makalelerinde devrimler ile Arap devletlerinin ekonomik ve sosyal politikaları arasındaki bağlantıyı, bu politikaların tarımla uğraşan kesim üzerindeki etkisi bağlamında irdelemiştir. Yazarlar Mısır, Tunus, Yemen ve Suriye'deki tarım politikalarını değerlendirmiş ve bu değerlendirmelerden hareketle söz konusu politikaların tarımsal halkın ihmal ve sömürüsüne, böylelikle de ekonomik ve sosyal anlamda marjinalleştirilmelerine yol açtığına vurgu yapmışlardır. Böylelikle Zurayk ve Gough'un makalesi ayaklanmaların en temel sebeplerinden olan devlet ve halk arasındaki kopuşu tarımsal kesim gibi mikro bir çerçeveden ele alan bir analiz sunmaktadır.

Arap devrimlerinin "Tematik ve Karşılaştırmalı Yönleri"ni ele alan kitabın ikinci kısmında Charles Tripp'in kaleminden ilk makalede Arap ayaklanmalarındaki direniş teması öne çıkarılmıştır. "Direniş Politikası ve Devrimler" başlığını taşıyan makalede Tripp'in temel iddiası Arap devrimlerinin analizinde bu ayaklanmaların öncelikle birer direniş politikasını yansıttığının göz önünde bulundurulmasıdır. Zira yazara göre ayaklanmalar Arap ülkelerindeki kamu kaynakları ve alanlarının tahsisine yönelik bir direniş eylemini yansıtmaktadır ve halka kararlı olma, kendi hakkını savunma gücünü veren de bu direniş eylemidir. Tripp makalesinin sonunda söz konusu direniş eylemlerinin devrim sonrası yeni düzen ve kurumsallaşmaya dönüştürülmesinde yaşanacak birtakım zorluklara dikkat çekmiştir. Fakat yazara göre devrimler sonrası geçiş sürecinde birtakım zorluklar muhtemel gözükse de en azından eski günlere dönüş bir daha mümkün olmayacaktır, çünkü halk artık yapmış olduğu direniş eylemleri ile devlete karşı sesini yükselterek, hakkını arayarak yönetim ve kamu kaynakları ile arasındaki mesafeyi kapatmıştır.

Arap devrimlerinde direniş temasının öne çıkarılmasından sonra Philippe Droz-Vincent, Arap devrimleri ile öne çıkan bir başka önemli konuya dikkat çekerek "Arap Dünyasında İsyanlar ve Geçiş Süreçleri Ortasında Asker" başlıklı makalesi ile devrimlerde ordunun rolüne ilişkin ayrıntılı bir analiz sunmuştur. Vincent'in, Tunus, Mısır, Libya, Yemen, Bahreyn ve Suriye'de ayaklanmalar esnasında ve geçiş süreçlerinde ordunun rolüne dair kapsamlı bir değerlendirme yaptıktan sonra makaledeki temel iddiası, devrim süreçlerini yaşayan ülkelerin tümünde de askerin hep iktidara yakın olduğu ölçüde iktidar ile arasındaki mesafeyi de daima koruduğuna yöneliktir. Yazar bahsi geçen ülkelerde orduyu kapalı ve gizli bir sektör olarak değerlendirmiş ve ordunun, ekonomik faydalar ile halk gözündeki itibarını da gözeterek iktidar ile mesafeli bir işbirliğinde olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Yazarın makalenin sonunda dikkat çektiği ana mesele ise devrimlerden sonra söz konusu ülkelerde ordunun ülke içerisindeki rolüne ilişkin yeni bir tanımlama yapılması gerektiğidir.

"Kargaşa İçindeki Ülkeler" başlığını taşıyan kitabın üçüncü kısmında ilk olarak Roger Owen'in devrimin ilk başladığı ülkeler olan Tunus ve Mısır'da devrim süreçlerine dair yapmış olduğu analiz yer almaktadır. Owen makalesinde diktatörlerin devrilmesinden anayasal düzene geçişe kadar Tunus ve Mısır'da yaşanan gelişmeleri ayrıntılı bir şekilde değerlendirmiştir. Yazarın yapmış olduğu değerlendirmeler sonucunda vardığı sonuç ise gerek siyasi, ekonomik gerekse toplumsal olarak iki ülkede de devrimin nihai amaçlarına ulaşmadığıdır. Fakat Gerges'in de kitaptaki temel iddiasını destekleyecek şekilde Owen, Mısır ve Tunus'un geleceği için karamsar bir tablo da çizmemektedir. Zira devrimler amacına tam olarak ulaşmamış olsa da en azından eski düzenin yeniden gelmesi mümkün olmayacaktır.

Yemen'deki devrim sürecine dair değerlendirmelerin bulunduğu "Yemen: Askıda bir Devrim mi?" başlıklı makalede Gabriele vom Bruck, Atiaf Alwazir ve Benjamin Wiacek'in temel argümanı Yemen'deki devrimin diğer devrimlerin tümünden farklı olduğudur. Yazarlar bu argümanı desteklemek için Yemen'deki ayaklanmaları, sokak gösterileri, iç ve dış politikadaki aktörlerin etkisi ile ayrıntılı bir şekilde sunmuştur. Yapmış oldukları değerlendirmeler sonucu ulaşmış oldukları sonuç ise, Yemen'de devrimin hedeflediği iktidarın devrilmediği yalnızca yenilenmiş olduğudur. Çünkü diğer ülkelerden farklı olarak Yemen'de devlet başkanı Ali Abdullah Salih'in rakipleri devrime dahil olmuş ve halk ayaklanmaları ile başlayan devrim süreci, sonrasında seçkinlerin kendi arasındaki rekabete dönüşmüştür. Netice olarak Yemen'deki devrim sonucunda ortaya çıkan sonuç, "protestocuların ateş değil, yalnızca bir kıvılcım olduğu" (s. 306) ve demokratik reform taleplerinin Yemen'deki seçkin kesimin iktidar mücadelesi ile gölgelenmiş olmasıdır.

"Geçiş Sürecinde Libya" başlıklı makalesi ile Karim Mezran Libya'daki devrim sürecini, ayaklanmaların arkasındaki sosyo-ekonomik faktörler ve devrim sürecinde rol alan iç ve dış etkenler çerçevesinde değerlendirmiştir. Mezran makalesinde başlığından da anlaşılabileceği gibi daha çok geçiş sürecine odaklanmış ve bu süreçte özellikle iki hususa dikkat çekmiştir. İlk olarak Libya'da düzenli bir ordu olmaması sebebiyle iktidarın çatı bir kurumdan ziyade aşiretler gibi yerel güçlerin eline geçtiğine dikkat çeken yazar, bu sebeple devrim sonrası ülkede yeni ve farklı sosyal, siyasi değerlerin ortaya çıktığını ve Libya'daki gidişatın oldukça parçalı bir yapıya doğru seyrettiğini belirtmiştir. Yazarın ilk husus ile bağlantılı olarak altını çizdiği ikinci önemli nokta ise Libya'ya yapılan dış müdahale ile ülke içerisinde, zaten var olmayan, bütünlüğün oldukça zedelenmiş olmasıdır. Netice olarak yazara göre Libya geçiş sürecinde, devrim sırasındaki gelişmeler sebebiyle devrimin hedeflerinden çok parçalanmaya karşı koymanın ve birliğini sağlamanın savaşını vermektedir.

Kitabın üçüncü kısmında yer alan son makalede "Bahreyn Devrimi" başlığı ile Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Bahreyn'de devrimin niçin zarar gördüğüne yönelik kapsamlı bir değer-

lendirme sunmuştur. Öncelikle Bahreyn'deki ayaklanmaları yerel boyutta ele alan yazar sonrasında devrimin gidişatında etkin olması bağlamında jeopolitik açıdan Bahreyn'in bölgesel ve küresel ölçekteki konumuna dair değerlendirmelerde bulunmuştur. Yapmış olduğu analizler neticesinde Ulrichsen, Bahreyn'in Batı ve Körfez ülkeleri için ticari ve jeostratejik önemini ortaya koyarak Bahreyn'de devrimin etkilerinin krallığın sınırlarını aştığı tespitinde bulunmuştur. Makalesinin sonunda ise yazar okuyucuyu bir soru ile başbaşa bırakmaktadır: Bahreyn'de yaşananlar, devrimin başarısızlığına rağmen, acaba diğer Körfez ülkelerinin ciddi bir ders almasına sebep olmuş mudur?

Kitabın dördüncü ve son kısmında ise Arap ayaklanmaları "Bölgesel ve Uluslararası Etkileri" bağlamında tartışılmış, böylelikle devrimler bölgesel ve uluslararası siyaset ile daha büyük bir resmin içerisinde okunmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kısımda ilk olarak Madawi Al-Rasheed, "Arap Baharı Karşısında Suudi İç İkilemleri ve Bölgesel Tepkileri" başlığı altında Suudi Arabistan'ın ayaklanmalara tepkisini sosyal ve bölgesel ikilemleri çerçevesinde yorumlamıştır. Al-Rasheed Suudi krallığının, ayaklanmalara karşı verdiği tepkiyi ülkelere göre tek tek değerlendirmiş ve netice olarak Suudi Arabistan'ın ayaklanmalar karşısındaki tepkisini belirleyen en önemli kriterin krallığın statükosunun korunması olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır.

"İsrail, Filistin ve Arap Devrimleri" isimli makalesi ile Avi Shlaim, İsrail'in askeri ve siyasi elitinin ayaklanmalara vermiş olduğu tepkiyi Fi-

listin meselesi üzerinden okuyarak bölgenin kaderinde uzun yıllardır etkin olan bir mesele perspektifinde devrimlere yönelik bir değerlendirme sunmuştur. Yazar, makalesinde öncelikle devrimler ile Filistin meselesi arasındaki bağlantıya dikkat çekmiştir. Shlaim'e göre devrimlerin yaşandığı ülkelerdeki protestolar siyasi otoritenin ülke içerisindeki eşitsiz ve adaletsiz uygulamalarına olduğu kadar, siyasilerin Filistin meselesine gösterdiği tepki ile de yakından alakalıdır ve bu alaka ölçüsünde de aynı zamanda İsrail ve Amerika karşıtıdır. Yazarın ikinci argümanı ise İsrail'in bölgede en önemli kaygısının ontolojik olduğu ve bu sebeple önceliğinin de bölgedeki statükonun devamı ve kendi kimliğinin korunması olduğudur. Dolayısıyla demokratik reform talepleri ile başlayan ayaklanmalar İsrail için hem bölgesel istikrarın zarara uğraması hem de gerek bölgesel gerekse uluslararası ilişkilerinde Arap ülkeleri karşısında kendi kimliğini kurma konusunda ciddi sıkıntılara düşmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Yazarın sonuç olarak vurguladığı husus ise devrimler sonrası eski statükonun Arap ülkelerinde bir daha geçerli olmayacağı ve sebeple de İsrail'in, Arap ülkelerindeki reform talepleri karşısında durduğu ölçüde bölgesel ilişkilerinde git gide daha büyük sorunlar yaşayacağıdır.

Arap devrimlerinden sonra yeni Ortadoğu'yu Türkiye ve İran'ın bölgedeki etkinliği üzerinden yorumlayan Mohammed Ayoob'un "Arap İsyanları Döneminde Türkiye ve İran" başlıklı makalesinin temel iddiası, yeni Ortadoğu'nun kaderinin belirlenmesinde büyük ölçüde Türkiye ve

İran'ın etkin olacağıdır. Yazar bu tezini desteklemek için öncelikle devrimlerin yaşandığı ülkelerdeki gelişmeleri değerlendirmiş ve söz konusu ülkelerin orta ve uzun vadedeki asıl meselelerinin kendi iç sorunları ve yeni düzenin oturtulması olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Bu durumda da yazara göre bölgesel dengelerin oluşması büyük ölçüde Türkiye ve İran'ın etkinliğine bağlıdır. Bu noktada yazar Türkiye ve İran'ın bölgesel etkinliği hususunda Irak ve Suriye meselelerinde düşmüş oldukları ihtilafa dikkat çeker. Fakat Ayoob'a göre bu ihtilaflar her iki ülkenin de bölgesel denge konusundaki etkinliğine zarar vermeyecektir, çünkü iki ülkeyi birbirine bağlayan çok önemli ticari anlaşmalar ve ekonomik çıkarlar söz konusudur.

Dördüncü kısmın son iki makalesi ise Amerika ve Avrupa'nın Arap devrimleri karşısındaki tutumunu irdelemiştir. İlk olarak William B. Quandt, "Amerikan Politikası ve 2011 Arap Devrimleri" başlıklı makalesinde Obama yönetiminin ayaklanmalara yönelik politikalarını değerlendirmiştir. Quandt'nin temel iddiası Obama'nın ayaklanmalara yönelik basiretli bir duruş sergileyemediği, ayaklanmaların yaşandığı her ülkede farklı bir strateji geliştirmek zorunda kaldığı, yetkin bir politik duruş ortaya koyamadığıdır. Federica Bicchi ise "Avrupa ve Arap Devrimleri" başlığı altında Avrupa'nın Arap ayaklanmaları karşısındaki tutumunu

genel olarak ilgisiz olarak yorumlamış ve bu tutumu eleştirmiştir. Yazar özellikle de bu eleştirisini beslemek amacıyla Avrupa ülkelerinin devrimler sonrası yeni rejimlerle diyalog konusunda çok yavaş hareket ettiklerine, rejim değişikliği hususunda muhafazakâr bir tavır sergilediklerine dikkat çekmiştir. Netice olarak makalesini bir öneri ile bitiren yazar, demokrasi konusunda oldukça ilerlemiş ve bu konudaki yol göstericiliği oldukça güvenilir olabilecek Avrupa ülkelerinin Arap ülkelerindeki demokratik geçiş süreçlerine destek vermeleri hususunun önemine dikkat çekmiştir.

Sonuç olarak genel bir değerlendirme yapmak gerekirse Fawaz Gerges'in editörlüğünü yapmış olduğu *Yeni Ortadoğu: Arap Dünyasında Protesto ve Devrim* başlıklı kitabın, 2011 Arap Devrimleri hususunda tarihsel, sosyolojik, ekonomik, bölgesel ve uluslararası siyaset etkenleri çerçevesinde panaromik bir resim sunduğu söylenmelidir. Kitapta dikkat çeken tek eksiklik ise çoğu makalede değinilmiş olmasına rağmen Suriye konusunda ayrı bir makaleye yer ayrılmamış olmasıdır. Fakat bu eksikliğe rağmen kitap, Gerges'in de temel iddiasına paralel bir şekilde, ciddi ve geriye dönülmesi mümkün olmayan bir kopuş sonrası yeni Ortadoğu'yu farklı boyutları ile okumak ve farklı açılardan değerlendirmelerde bulunabilmek konusunda oldukça yol göstericidir.

Genel Hususlar

Ortadoğu Etütleri, Ortadoğu çalışmalarına yoğunlaşmış bir düşünce kuruluşu olan Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM) tarafından basılı ve e-dergi olarak yayınlanan hakemli bir siyaset, uluslararası ilişkiler ve fikir dergisidir.

Editörlüğünü ORSAM Danışmanı Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür'ün yaptığı dergi, yılda iki kez yayınlanmaktadır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nin amacı, Türkiye'de sosyal bilimlerde Ortadoğu çalışmalarının gelişimini teşvik etmek ve uluslararası alanda Ortadoğu literatürüne nitelikli katkılar yapılmasına imkân sağlamaktır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanan çalışmalardaki değerlendirmeler, ORSAM'ın kurumsal görüşünü yansıtmamaktadır.

Yayın Koşulları

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanacak makalelerin, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında Ortadoğu coğrafyasıyla ilgili siyaset, siyasi tarih, uluslararası hukuk ve iktisat gibi konuları kapsaması beklenmektedir. Ortadoğu literatürüne katkı sağlayacak nitelikte kavramsal çerçevesi sağlam, özgün, eleştirel bakış açısı getiren, çözümlemeli araştırma ve incelemelere öncelik verilmektedir.

Yayın dili Türkçe ve İngilizce'dir. Derginin son sayfalarında tüm özetlerin Arapça versiyonu da yayınlanmaktadır.

Makalelerde anlatım dilinin düzgün olması, düşüncelerin doğru bir mantık örgüsü içinde ifade edilmesi, referansların uygun biçimde kullanılması, varsayımların güçlü biçimde desteklenmesi, konuyla ilgili literatüre nüfuz edilebilmiş olması gerekmektedir.

Kitap değerlendirmeleri/incelemeleri, makale biçiminde hazırlanmış olmaları halinde kabul edilmektedir. İncelenen kitabın bir kopyasının, makul bir sürede iade edilmek üzere, Editör'e ulaştırılması gerekmektedir.

Makaleler yayınlanmadan önce yazarlarla eser sözleşmesi akdedilmektedir.

Telif ödemeleri, derginin yayınlanmasından en geç bir ay sonra yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca, yazarlara dergiden 5 kopya verilmekte, derginin ulaştırılmasında fayda gördükleri kurumlar/kişilerle ilgili sundukları notlar dikkate alınabilmektedir.

Biçimsel Esaslar
- Makalelerin dili Türkçe ya da İngilizce olmalıdır. İngilizce makalelerde imla ve noktalama kuralları açısından İngiltere İngilizcesi'nin kullanılması tercih sebebidir. Yazıların uzunluğu 4000-8000 kelime aralığında olmalıdır.
- Çalışmanın hazırlanmasında takip edilmesi gereken sıra şöyledir: Başlık, öz (abst-

ract), anahtar kelimeler, asıl metin, ekler, notlar, referanslar (kaynakça), tablolar (başlıklarıyla birlikte müstakil sayfalarda), şekil açıklamaları (liste halinde), özet (summary).

- Öz bölümü (abstract) ortalama 150 kelime uzunluğunda olmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce özeti de sunulmalıdır.

- Makalelerde 6 ila 10 anahtar kelime bulunmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce anahtar kelimeleri de sunulmalıdır.

- Özetler (summary) 400 kelime uzunluğunda olmalı ve yalnızca İngilizce hazırlanmalıdır.

- Makale sahiplerinin, Editör aksini belirtmedikçe bir özgeçmişlerini sunmaları istenmektedir.

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- Anadili İngilizce veya Türkçe olmayan yazarların makalelerini göndermeden önce, metinlerini dil konusunda ehil bir uzmana okutmaları ve düzelttirmeleri gerekmektedir. Yoğun dilbilgisi ve anlatım hatası olan metinler değerlendirmeye alınmamaktadır.

- Latin alfabesi kullanılan dillerde isim orijinal haliyle verilmektedir. Diğer dillerde yazılan isimler ise İngilizce veya Türkçe transliterasyonuyla kullanılmalıdır.

Dipnot Yazım Kuralları

Dipnotlar açıklayıcı olmalı ve mümkün olduğunca sık kullanılmalıdır. Dipnotlar makale içinde birbirlerini takip edecek şekilde artan rakamlar ile numaralandırılmalı ve metin sonunda yer alan ve açıklamaları içeren liste ile örtüşmelidir. Söz konusu listelerde kitap, makale ve metinlere dair verilen referanslarla uyumluluk ve isimler ile önemli sıfatların baş harflerinin büyük harf ile yazılması önemlidir. Aşağıdaki uygulamalı örneklerin dikkatle incelenmesi tavsiye edilir:

Kitaplar
Norman Stone, *Kitabın Adı,* (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67.
Norman Stone (ed.), *Kitabın Adı* (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67-9.
Norman Stone ve Sergei Podbolotov, *Kitabın Adı* (London: Basic Books, 2005), s. 99.
Takip eden referanslar: Kırımlı, *Kitabın Adı, s.* 99.

Dergiler ve Makaleler
Norman Stone, "Makale Başlığı", Dergi Adı, *Cilt*. #, Sayı. # (Ay, Yıl), s. #.
Takip eden referanslar: Kırımlı, "Makale Adı", s. #.

Derleme Kitap Makaleleri
Norman Stone, "Makale Adı", Hakan Kırımlı, "Kitap Adı" (London: Crimea Publishing Co., 2000), s.100.

Resmi Belgeler
Meclis Zabıtları: TBMM Yayınları (Meclis Yayınları, 1988, V), *111*.

Tezler
E. Beytullah, "The Crimean Khans' relations with the Arab Amirs", yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Bilkent University, 1999, Bölüm 5, s.44.

Tekrarlar
Dipnotlarda uygun yerlerde "ibid." ibaresi kullanılmalı, ancak bu ibare önceki bilginin birden fazla kaynağa dayandığı durumlarda kullanılmamalıdır.

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