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- Turkey in The Syrian Crisis: The Limits of A Middle Power Foreign Policy
Mehmet Şahin / Buğra Sarı
- Why Armies Reacted Differently to The Arab Uprisings? Dynamics Affecting The Decision of Military
Caner Korhan Demir
- Weak States, Strong Non-State Actors: Theory of Competitive Control in Northern Syria
Akın Ünver
- Iran and Turkey Relations After The Nuclear Deal: A Case for Compartmentalization
Bayram Sinkaya
- 70. Yılında Truman Doktrini: Türkiye ve Soğuk Savaş
Kaan Kutlu Ataç

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ORTADOĐU ETÜTLERİ

CONTENTS / İÇİNDEKİLER

- Turkey in The Syrian Crisis: The Limits of A Middle Power Foreign Policy ... 8**
Suriye Krizi'nde Türkiye: Orta Büyüklükte Gücün Dış Politika Limitleri
Mehmet Şahin / Buğra Sarı
- Why Armies Reacted Differently to The Arab Uprisings? Dynamics Affecting
The Decision of Military 26**
*Ordular Arap Ayaklanmalarına Neden Farklı Tepki Verdiler? Silahlı Kuvvetlerin
Kararını Etkileyen Faktörler*
Cenker Korhan Demir
- Weak States, Strong Non-State Actors: Theory of Competitive Control in
Northern Syria 58**
Kuzey Suriye'de 'Rekabetçi Kontrol' Teorisi
Akın ÜNVER
- Iran and Turkey Relations After The Nuclear Deal: A Case for
Compartmentalization 80**
*Nükleer Anlaşmadan Sonra İran-Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Kompartmantalizasyon
Örnek Olayı*
Bayram SİNKAYA
- 70. Yılında Truman Doktrini: Türkiye ve Soğuk Savaş 102**
Truman Doctrine at 70: Turkey and the Cold War
Kaan Kutlu ATAÇ

From the Editor

This issue of the *Ortadoğu Etütleri* features four theoretically informed articles that look at the various issues on the agenda of Middle Eastern international relations, as well as an article from the field of diplomatic history. The first article, entitled *Turkey in The Syrian Crisis: The Limits of A Middle Power Foreign Policy*, delves deeper into the theoretical discussions on conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy. It uses the concept of “middle power” to analyze Turkey’s policy in the Syrian crisis. The authors argue that the role and effectiveness of middle powers in international system is mainly determined by the quality of the relationship between great powers and the relationship between the middle power and great powers. Since Turkey is a middle power, this determinant factor constitutes one of the main limitations to Turkish Foreign Policy. The article then analyzes the consequences of this limitation of Turkey in the Syrian crisis.

The second article, entitled *Why Armies Reacted Differently to The Arab Uprisings? Dynamics Affecting The Decision of Military*, analyzes the behavior of armies at a critical juncture in Middle East politics. The author asserts that, during the wave of Arab uprisings, the reactions of armies to the orders of their respective governments have varied from loyalty to defection. He then examines the reciprocal and combined effect of government and military institutions on the issue. The effects of institutionalization of governments and the professionalization of armies have been studied in this article along with the consequences of uprisings in five separate cases: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The article finds that while instability has indeed occurred at different levels in all of these cases, the interaction of the institutionalization of government and the professionalization of the military have played decisive effects more than the effect of each one on the reaction of armies.

The third article, *Weak States, Strong Non-State Actors: Theory of Competitive Control in Northern Syria*, examines a novel phenomenon in the Middle East, created by state weakness and the empowerment of non-state actors, namely governance practices by non-state actors. The author contends that state weakening in Syria unearthed long-dormant processes of disenfranchisement, contributing to the regime’s loss of territory in the north-eastern half of the country. Out of this state weakening, two major armed non-state groups emerged: Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The author shows how non-state armed groups emerge in the wake of state weakening is best

conceptualized by David Kilcullen, who introduced the concept of ‘theory of competitive control to identify how challengers to state authority need to prove their capacity in administration.

The fourth article, *Iran and Turkey Relations After The Nuclear Deal: A Case for Compartmentalization*, analyzes Turkish-Iranian relationship in the wake of the controversial nuclear deal, with a theoretical insight. The author underlines that the relations between Turkey and Iran worsened considerably soon after the nuclear deal, arguably for geopolitical reasons. The author contends that while the two countries quickly reinstated their relations, as signified by high-level visits between Ankara and Tehran, they have not overcome their differences and geopolitical concerns. The article draws attention to the two simultaneously working but contrasting trends in Iran-Turkey relations: one working for conflict and competition and the other for cooperation and dialogue. In order to explain the seemingly rapid changes in relations between Ankara and Tehran through the simultaneous operation of these two contrasting trends, this study offers the concept of compartmentalization.

The last article, *Truman Doctrine at 70: Turkey and the Cold War*, is a study in diplomatic history. The author reminds the readers that after the end of the Second World War there were political and economic pressures causing President Truman’s foreign policy towards more forceful stand against the USSR. This was a action away from the direction taken by the traditional US policies. Negotiation and co-operation were no longer seen as productive tools of dealing with the wartime alliance Moscow. Truman’s actions were aimed at restricting the USSR power and influence. The main feture of this new approach was the Truman Doctrine announced on 12 March 1947. The author contends that the Truman Doctrine was mainly a response to the political and social upheaval taking place in Greece and Turkey. The Doctrine was a decisive turning point in the origins of the Cold War.

Harun Öztürkler

TURKEY IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS: THE LIMITS OF A MIDDLE POWER FOREIGN POLICY

ABSTRACT

There are two main strands that define the concept of “middle power”. One defines the concept based on material capabilities, and the other one through the foreign policy characteristics. Based on its material capabilities and foreign policy characteristics, Turkey can be defined as a middle power in international relations. The role and effectiveness of middle powers in international system is mainly determined by the quality of the relationship between great powers and the relationship between the middle power and great powers. Since Turkey is a middle power, this determinant factor constitutes one of the main limitations to Turkish Foreign Policy. This article analyzes the consequences of this limitation of Turkey in the Syrian crisis. Syrian crisis is chosen as the case study, because it is one of the most serious current problems in international politics and Turkish Foreign Policy.

Keywords: Middle Power, Great Power, Smart Power, Turkish Foreign Policy, Arab Revolutionary Movements, Syrian Crisis

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Introduction

Turkey, especially during the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) period, has been referred to as a 'central country', 'regional great power', 'pivotal country', 'trading state', 'rising power' and/or a 'model country' both in the academia and in the discourse of its leaders. In this article, through a careful and detailed conceptualization of the term, we seek to understand whether Turkey can be defined as a "middle power" because a state's foreign policy primarily depends on its national power in international politics. Having made a case for defining Turkey as a middle power, we then analyze the limits of Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis.

Accordingly, this article has two parts: one theoretical/conceptual and one empirical. In the theoretical part, we analyze the implications of two different middle power conceptualizations, arguing that it is necessary to integrate both conceptualizations to gain a complete understanding of the concept. The second part explains why Turkey can be defined as a middle power through an analysis of Turkey's material capabilities and new foreign policy principles introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Finally, we analyze the limits of Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis using the concept of middle power.

The reason for choosing the Syrian crisis as the case study is that it is one of the most serious current problems in international politics, significantly affecting both regional and global affairs. Alongside its regional and global impact, the crisis constitutes the primary challenge for Turkey's foreign policy, because Turkish-Syrian relations were the centerpiece of Turkey's policies towards the Middle East in the last decade. Since it shares 911 km. border with Syria, Turkey can be described one of the most affected countries by the crisis.

The Concept of Middle Power

Middle power has become a popular concept in the IR literature, especially in the last decade, being widely applied to explain the power status of various states in the international power hierarchy. However, although there are many studies using the concept, it is hard to claim that there is agreement on what it means, considering that different traditions in the literature focus on different aspects of the concept based on their own theoretical foundations. Overall, two main strands can be identified that define the concept of middle power: realist one and liberal one. While the realist strand defines middle power based on material capabilities, the liberal strand focuses on states' foreign policy characteristics and behaviors.¹

1 While we classify definitions of *middle power* into realist strand and liberal perspectives, Chapnick presents three distinct models: functional, hierarchical, and behavioral. However, since we view Chapnick's functional and behavioral models similar, we find it more appropriate to place them within the same liberal category. For more information about Chapnick's three models, see Adam Chapnick, "The

Holbraad is one of the leading thinkers of the realist strand on the concept of middle power. He defines a middle power as “a state occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power, a country much stronger than the small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the state system.”² In order to determine power status of a state, Holbraad focuses on tangible resources. Accordingly, he considers GNP and population as primary indicators, and the size of the military, military expenditure and quantity of particular armaments as secondary indicators.³ In this regard, a middle power is a state that possesses fewer tangible resources than great powers, but more than small powers. Based on these resources, a middle power has far greater freedom of movement in international politics than a small power. This is to say that, as White states, a middle power, rather than simply obeying the great powers, has the capability to negotiate with and even resist them to some extent.⁴ However, this is not to say that middle powers are immune to the influence of great powers. On the contrary, middle powers’ capability to pursue their own interests in international politics is limited compared to great powers. Therefore, even though a middle power desires to escape from the total influence of great powers, the major determinant of its role in international politics is the quality of relationships that exist among great powers, if there are multiple great powers in the international system.⁵ In addition, the quality of the relationship between a middle power and great powers is another determinant of a middle power’s policies in international politics.

For proponents of the liberal perspective, the realists’ analysis in terms of material power ranking is problematic because it is highly dependent on quantifiable measures of power.⁶ Liberals criticize the realist neglect of the nature of middle power behavior, soft power capabilities and foreign policy strategies. To overcome this, the liberal strand defines a state as a middle power based on analyzing its behavior in international politics. Evans and Grant, for example, list certain behavior modes of middle powers, such as “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of good international citizenship to guide their diplomacy.”⁷ Similarly, Higgott and Cooper claim that middle powers fol-

Middle Power”, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol.7, No.2 (1999), p.73. In addition, Yalçın classifies definitions of *middle power* as realist or liberal; see Hasan Basri Yalçın, “The Concept of Middle Power and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism”, *Afro Eurasian Studies*, Vol.1, No.1 (2012), p.199.

2 Carsten Holbraad, “The Role of Middle Powers”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.6, No.1 (1971), p.78.

3 Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p.77-9.

4 Hugh White, “Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing”, *Quarterly Essay*, No.39 (2010), p.67.

5 Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, p.178.

6 A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott and K. R. Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), p.17.

7 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of 1990s*, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991), p.19.

low, support, maintain and strengthen the norms of the international system,⁸ while Cooper et al., characterize middle power behavior in terms of three patterns: catalyst, facilitator and manager. Being a catalyst refers to the capacity to trigger an initiative on an international issue and gather followers around it. Being a facilitator represents the capability to form collaborative and coalitional activities on issue-specific areas. Lastly, being a manager involves the ability to build institutions and develop norms in international politics.⁹

Thus, the basic behavior characteristic of middle powers is that they seek multilateral cooperation. As Keohane claims, middle powers are states that cannot act alone effectively but are able to have an important impact in a group or through an international institution.¹⁰ Mares, too, argues that middle powers are able to increase their influence in international system through building and actively participating in coalitions.¹¹ It can be said that middle powers seek multilateral cooperation in order to escape from the influence of great powers. Since multilateral settings provide platforms on which middle powers are able to express and pursue their interests more freely than in bilateral settings.

Although the realist and liberal strands offer two different perspectives on middle power, they should not be seen as competitors. On the contrary, as Müftüler and Yüksel argue, in order to gain a complete definition of the concept and a broader understanding of the power status of states, these two strands should be integrated.¹² Accordingly, a middle power, first, occupies an intermediate position in terms of material resources between great powers and small powers. Second, a middle power, thanks to its tangible (economic and military) and intangible (diplomatic and political) resources, builds coalitions, triggers initiatives to gather other states around it and actively participates in international institutions to realize its own interests, behaving as a good international citizen that follows the norms and rules of the international system.

8 R. A. Higgott and A. F. Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations", *International Organization*, Vol.44, No.4 (1990), p.606.

9 Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers...*, p.19-25. Also see Sook Jong Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of Its Public Diplomacy", Jan Melissen and Yul Sohn, *Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia: Middle Powers in a Troubled Region* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.111.

10 Robert Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol.23, No.2 (1969), p.298.

11 David Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: to Challenge or to Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.32, No.4 (1988), p.456.

12 Meltem Müftüler and Müberra Yüksel, "Turkey: A Middle Power in the New World Order", Andrew, F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p.185.

Turkey as a Middle Power

Having given broad definition of the concept of middle power that incorporates both realist and liberal perspectives, we can now explain why Turkey can be regarded as a middle power due to its material capabilities and foreign policy behaviors. In terms of the realist strand, Turkey occupies an intermediate position in the international system based on its tangible resources such as its geography, GDP, military strength and population. First of all, Turkey occupies an advantageous geographic location positioned between the industrialized West and the Middle East and Caspian basin with their rich energy resources.¹³ In addition, the strategic value of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits increases Turkey's influence in international politics.¹⁴

Economic indicators are also a crucial factor for a middle power. Following chronic economic crises and instabilities in the 1990s, Turkey recovered in the 2000s to achieve a GDP (nominal) in 2014 estimated at 798,429 billion US dollars, making it the world's 18th largest economy.¹⁵ Turkey's GDP (purchasing power parity) in 2014, at 1,457,863 billion US dollars, was the 17th largest.¹⁶ With these numbers, Turkey's economy has a place in the Group of 20 (G-20). Alongside its powerful economy, Turkey also has a considerable, young and dynamic population which stood at 78,741,053 on 31 December 2015. 67.8% of the population was between 15-64 years old,¹⁷ with about 50% under 30. Turkey's population is expected to reach around 94.6 million by 2050.¹⁸

Regarding military strength, the Turkish Armed Forces is NATO's second largest at 687,089 personnel,¹⁹ while military expenditure was 22,755 billion US dollars (15th in the world), or 2.2% of GDP (nominal) in 2014.²⁰ In

13 Baskın Oran, "TDP'nin Uygulanması", Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, I. ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p.20.

14 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p.xiii.

15 World Bank, *Gross Domestic Product 2014*, accessed 5 February 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>.

16 World Bank, *Gross Domestic Product 2014, PPP*, accessed 5 February 2016, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf.

17 "Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi Sonuçları 2015", Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistics Institute), 28 January 2016, accessed 5 February 2016, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21507>.

18 "Türkiye'nin Demografik Yapısı ve Geleceği: 2010-2050", Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistics Institute), 11 January 2012, accessed 5 February 2016, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13140>.

19 "Personel Mevcutları 2015", Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces), May 2015, accessed 5 February 2016, http://www.tsk.tr/3_basin_yayin_faaliyetleri/3_4_tskdan_haberler/2015/tsk_haberler_34.html.

20 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database", The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed 5 February 2016, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

order to meet the military's equipment needs, Turkey has been investing on its defense industry, which has reduced its military dependency on other states. Currently, it supplies 55% of its military needs from domestic sources.²¹

In addition to its middle power capability in terms of tangible resources, Turkey constitutes a middle power with respect to its foreign policy behavior. As outlined above, according to the liberal strand, middle powers tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, play mediator roles internationally, comply with international system norms and guide their diplomacy on the basis of good international citizenship. Especially since the AK Party took power in 2002, Turkey has conducted a foreign policy compatible with the behavior characteristics of middle powers. In this respect, the current government's *Strategic Depth Approach* or *Davutoğlu Doctrine* provides a useful framework for understanding Turkey's new foreign policy orientation under the AK Party. This orientation is built on five principles, introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu.²²

The first principle is *balance between security and democracy* which aims to enlarge freedoms without sacrificing security needs. With this perspective, Turkey has developed policies that simultaneously provide security and expand freedoms.²³ For example, even in the post-September 11 international environment, Turkey incorporated European Union norms into its domestic structure. As a result, Turkey has been reviewing and revising its laws in order to improve its democratic credentials. At the same time, as Davutoğlu states, Turkey has been waging its own "war on terror" against the PKK without harming the freedoms and liberties of its citizens.²⁴

The second principle is *zero problems and maximum cooperation with neighbors*.²⁵ In the past, Turkey believed that it was surrounded by enemies, which

21 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Savunma Bakanlığı (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Defense), Teknoloji Yönetim Stratejisi 2011-2016, (Ankara: Milli Savunma Bakanlığı, 2011), accessed 5 February 2016, http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Documents/201116_TYY.pdf; "Savunma Sanayinde Yıllık Oranı Yüzde %55'i Geçti," TRT Haber, 25 February 2015, accessed 5 February 2016, <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/ekonomi/savunma-sanayinde-yerlilik-orani-yuzde-55i-gecti-169966.html>.

22 Davutoğlu served as Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister's office from 2003 to 2009 before serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014. Between August 2014 and May 2016, he was the leader of AK Party and Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey.

23 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", Insight Turkey, Vol.10, No.1 (2008), p.79.

24 Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", p.79.

25 Today, Turkey has problematic relations with its neighbors, especially with Syria and Iraq. However, this does not constitute a contradiction with the zero problem principle since it emphasizes a change in the geographic imagination of Turkish society in which its decision-makers and elites imply to ordinary citizens that Turkey's neighborhood is not full of risks but there are also opportunities. Turkey should therefore not approach its environment with a hostile paranoia that alienates it from its neighbors. Instead, it should seek to create a cooperative environment based on mutual trust. Zero-problem principle

had some adverse effect on Turkish foreign policy, as it alienated from neighboring countries.²⁶ To eradicate such thinking, Turkey has begun to rediscover neighboring regions and build economic and political interdependence. Economically, researchers have discussed whether Turkey has become a trading state,²⁷ which fits well with middle power behavior characteristics. Moreover, Turkish leaders, diplomats and officials have emphasized cultural and historical ties with Turkey's neighborhood. This rhetorical change has been reflected in its geographic imagination as Turkey has started to identify its geography with respect to social, political and commercial opportunities rather than security concerns.²⁸

The third principle is *developing relations with the neighboring regions and beyond*. This principle promotes policies to contribute to the security and stability of the international system,²⁹ which necessitates pro-active diplomacy. Turkey has achieved this in its foreign policy through establishing mediation and peacekeeping mechanisms, contributing to high-level political and diplomatic dialogue platforms and integrating economically with its neighbors and multi-cultural formations. Turkey's mediation initiatives between Syria and Israel, Syria and Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia and Hamas and Fatah, and its contribution to a peace settlement in Gaza and the Lebanon wars were the outcomes of this third principle. Turkey was also elected to co-chair with Spain of the UN's Alliance of Civilizations initiative in 2005. Turkey has emerged as an important donor for humanitarian development in the world. In 2013, for example, Turkey increased its humanitarian aid to 1.6 billion US dollars, making it the world's third largest contributor to humanitarian assistance. It should be also noted that Turkey was the largest contributor in terms of the ratio of humanitarian aid to GDP.³⁰ In addition, Turkey increased its foreign aid to 3.3 billion US dollars in 2013. Turkey has supported developments in education, health, water and water sanitation, agriculture, shelter,

is concerned with establishing this new thinking to replace the former paranoid psychology in the minds of Turkish people.

26 Bülent Aras, "The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No.3 (2009), p.128.

27 Kemal Kirişçi, "Transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40 (2009), p.42-52.

28 Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No.40 (2009), p.197.

29 "Article by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu published in Estado de Sao Paulo Newspaper (Brazil) on 9 October 2011", Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 9 October 2011, accessed 3 February 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_ahmet-davutoglu-published-in-estado-de-sao-paulo-newspaper-_brazil_-on-9-october-2011.en.mfa.

30 The biggest contributor was the United States (4,7 billion US dollars) and the second biggest the United Kingdom (1,8 billion dollars). See "Uluslararası Yardımlarda 'En Cömert Ülke' Unvanını Taşıyan Türkiye'nin Yardım Seferberliği Sürüyor", Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy), accessed 7 February 2016, <http://kdk.gov.tr/haber/turkiyenin-dis-yardimlari-2013/494>.

and administrative and civil infrastructure in 48 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Balkans, Central Asia, Latin America and Caucasus.³¹ These indicators demonstrate Turkey's increasing soft power capabilities which is an important middle power currency in international politics.³²

The fourth principle is *rhythmic diplomacy*, aiming to bring activism to Turkish foreign policy through participating in international organizations.³³ This aim is also in line with one of the basic characteristics of a middle power, namely multilateralism. In this regard, Turkey's active participation in the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations (UN), D-8, the G20 and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization are reflections of this principle.

The fifth principle is *multi-dimensional foreign policy*, according to which Turkey's relations with global actors should be complementary instead of conflictual.³⁴ Under this principle, it is important for Turkey to simultaneously develop relations with the United States, Russia, China and the European Union countries. This principle also reflects an important characteristic of a middle power since it necessitates multi-dimensionality in relations with all global actors. Hence, Turkey aims to diversify its ties as much as possible to increase the effectiveness of its policies on the liberal premise that a middle power's role in international politics depends on the quality of relations among great powers and the quality of its own relations with them.

In sum, based on its material capabilities and foreign policy behavior, especially in the last decade, Turkey can be described as a middle power in terms of both the realist and liberal strands. It possesses more tangible resources than small powers, though less than great powers. Moreover, it conducts an active foreign policy in international politics by following the norms of the international system, protecting the balance between security and democracy in its domestic affairs, contributing to the peace and stability of its neighborhood and beyond as a good international citizen, seeking active representation in international organizations and diversifying its relations with multiple global actors. The following sections analyze Turkey's policies in the Syrian crisis in

31 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Annual Report 2013, (Ankara: TİKA), accessed 7 February 2016, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TİKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf>.

32 For an analysis on Turkey's soft power capabilities see Meliha Benli Altunışık, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.2 (2008): 41-54; Mehmet Şahin and B. Senem Çevik, *Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2015).

33 "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy", SETA Foundation's Washington D.C. Branch, 8 December 2009, accessed 2 February 2016, <http://setad.org/multimedia/texts/202-unofficial-transcript-of-foreign-minister-ahmed-davutoglus-speech>.

34 Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", p.82.

order to investigate the limits of a middle power in an ongoing domestic and international conflict that involves the intervention of great powers.

The Limits of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Syrian Crisis

The Syrian crisis is one of the most serious and urgent problems in world politics. It is one of the extensions of the Arab revolutionary movements, or the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010 before spreading to many other Middle Eastern countries. However, the revolutionary protests in Syria took a different direction, leading to a civil war that has continued for 5 years so far. This has caused a humanitarian disaster in which over 250,000 Syrians have died and 12 million people have been displaced.³⁵ Among these, 4.5 million Syrians have become refugees in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt,³⁶ meaning that the civil war has affected not only the lives of its own citizens but also regional and global politics.

Since the Syrian crisis has such an impact, foreign powers have become involved in the civil war to secure their competing interests in Syria's future. As a result, both the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition³⁷ have received military, diplomatic and financial support from foreign countries, while the conflict has created complex patterns of alliances and enmities between global powers, regional powers and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations in Syria. Although it is difficult to fully portray the complexity of these alliances and enmities, the table below simplifies this web of relations in Syria.

As the table suggests, the alliance and enmity patterns in the Syrian civil war are too complex even to easily categorize the patterns as pro or anti-Assad because there is not even unity within these camps. For example, while both Turkey and ISIS oppose the Assad regime, they also oppose each other. Likewise, Turkey and the US belong to the anti-ISIS coalition yet have contradictory attitudes towards the PYD. While the United States sees it as an important component in the fight against ISIS, for Turkey, both the PYD and ISIS are terrorist organizations, and therefore a threat to international peace and security.

This complexity has prevented an international solution of the crisis, with the UN Security Council unable to pass any resolution to stop the civil war due to Russian and Chinese vetoes.³⁸ Likewise, although the Arab League ini-

35 "Alarmed by Continuing Syria Crisis, Security Council Affirms Its Support for Special Envoy's Approach in Moving Political Solution Forward", United Nations Coverage and Press Releases, 17 August 2015, accessed 3 February 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12008.doc.htm>.

36 "Syrian Regional Refugee Response", UNHCR, 7 February 2016, accessed 10 February 2016, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>.

37 It is impossible to consider the Syrian opposition as a unified body. Instead, when we talk about the Syrian opposition, we refer to diverse factions that are variously friendly or hostile to one another.

38 "Syria Resolution vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations", *The Guardian*, 4 February 2012,

tiated an observer mission on 24 December 2011 and the Annan peace plan was launched in March 2012 under the mandate of both the Arab League and the UN, the bloodshed and humanitarian disaster could not be prevented.

Table: Complex Patterns of Alliances and Enmities in the Syrian Civil War³⁹

	Assad Regime	ISIS/DAESH*	PYD**	Islamist Groups	Moderate Groups
US	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Support with diplomacy or logistics
Russia	Support with military action	Oppose with military action ¹	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Oppose with military action
UK	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics
France	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics
Turkey	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Oppose with military action	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics
Iran	Support with military action	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action
Saudi Arabia	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Oppose with military action	Oppose with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics	Support with diplomacy or logistics
Assad Regime	Support with military action	Oppose with military action	Not Clear ²	Oppose with military action	Oppose with military action

* Known as both “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” and “ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fi ‘l-‘Irāq wa-sh-Shām”, ISIS/Daesh is a Salafi Jihadist terrorist group.

** Known as the “Democratic Union Party” or “Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat”, it is the Syrian branch of PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a terrorist organization targeting Turkey. The People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the PYD’s armed units.

accessed 29 January 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution>.

³⁹ The table is a modified version of a chart in The Guardian. See Kareem Shaheen et al., “Who Backs Whom in the Syrian Conflict”, The Guardian, 2 December 2015, accessed 7 February 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/oct/09/who-backs-whom-in-the-syrian-conflict>.

In the Syrian crisis, Turkey has pursued a typical middle power foreign policy. Firstly, it tried to persuade the Assad regime to introduce democratic reforms and hold elections to meet the demands of the Syrian people.⁴⁰ However, the Assad regime rejected Turkey's reform calls and bloodily repressed domestic demonstrations. In response, Turkey changed its attitude towards regime, supplying diplomatic and logistic support to the Syrian opposition.⁴¹ In doing so, Turkey was actually demonstrating a consistent foreign policy towards the Arab Spring since the beginning, Turkey had supported the demands of Arab people in the region for democracy. For example, Turkey's then Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan described the protests in many Arab countries as a struggle for freedom and democracy against authoritarian regimes.⁴² As Cebeci and Üstün put it, "Turkey did not ... endorse the authoritarian *status quo*; on the contrary, Turkey advocated for reform, change, and responsiveness to the 'legitimate demands of the people'".⁴³ Consistent with this, Turkey has also hosted a massive refugee influx. According to the UNHCR, Turkey is currently hosting 2,503,549 Syrian refugees, which is the world's largest refugee population.⁴⁴

As a middle power, Turkey advocates multilateralism in the Syrian crisis, first by seeking regional solutions. It thus supported the Arab League's measures against the Assad regime, such as diplomatic and economic sanctions and suspension of Syria's membership on 12 November 2011.⁴⁵ During this period, Turkey was against an international intervention in Syria since it believed such an action could have unexpected harmful consequences.⁴⁶ However, upon the failure of Arab League's initiatives, Turkey called for international support for the establishment of no-fly/buffer zone in northern Syria to create a safe environment for refugees and bolster Turkey's border security.⁴⁷ However, Turkey's call was ignored due to disagreements on the future of Syria among great powers.

40 Ian Black, "Turkey Tells Bashar al- Assad to Cease Syria Repression", The Guardian, 23 June 2011, accessed 29 January 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/23/syria-bashar-al-assad-turkey-refugees>.

41 Erol Cebeci and Kadir Üstün, "The Syrian Quagmire: What's Holding Turkey Back?", Insight Turkey, Vol.14, No.2 (2012), p.15; Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building", The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 17 February 2012, accessed 30 January 2016, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-challenge-coalition-building>.

42 "Erdoğan'dan Kahire'de Tarihi Konuşma", Sabah, 13 September 2011, accessed 1 February 2016, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2011/09/13/erdogan-kahirede-konusuyor>.

43 Cebeci and Üstün, "The Syrian Quagmire", p.15.

44 "Syria Regional Refugee Response- Turkey," UNHCR, 31 December 2015, accessed 1 February 2016, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>.

45 Müjge Küçükkeleş, "Arab League's Syrian Policy", SETA Policy Brief, No.56, April 2012, accessed 4 February 2016, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/arab-league%E2%80%99s-syrian-policy.pdf>.

46 Zenonas Tziarras, "Turkey's Syria Problem: A Talking Timeline of Events", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.11, No.3 (2012), p.133.

47 Tziarras, "Turkey's Syria Problem", p.134.

Turkey has also behaved as a good international citizen by actively participating in the international coalition against ISIS.⁴⁸ Apart from allowing the coalition to use its airbases, its own warplanes have joined coalition air raids. In addition to its contribution to the war on terror, Turkey has respected the norms and rules of the international system, with its response following the downing of a Turkish RF-4 Phantom by the Assad regime being a good example. Instead of taking military action against the Assad regime, Turkey put the issue on the agenda of the UN and invoked Article 4 of the NATO charter. In addition, Turkey called on the United States and the United Kingdom to intervene in Syria.⁴⁹ This demonstrates a typical middle power behavior in that Turkey abstained from unilateral action and respected international law. However, Turkey's calls were ignored by the US, UK and other NATO members, while other powers, such as Russia and China, opposed direct intervention.

The ways that these developments limited Turkey's options in the Syrian crisis can be usefully explained through the concept of middle power. Recalling the middle power conceptualization, two factors determine the role of a middle power in international politics. The first is the state of relationships between the great powers. In this respect, Syria constitutes a battlefield in which, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, both the US and Russia are militarily engaged in the pursuit of their conflicting interests. While Russia has deployed its forces in order to support the Assad regime and has been bombing mainly Western-backed opposition groups, the United States has accused the Assad regime of widespread atrocities, and has been providing arms to moderate opposition groups. Such a context dramatically reduces a middle power's freedom of movement.

The second factor is the quality of relationships between the middle power and great powers. Although Turkey can be put in the same camp as the United States since both wish to topple the Assad regime, they have pursued different policies with respect to the PYD and Islamist groups within the Syrian opposition. Moreover, whereas Turkey is a strong advocate of taking more decisive steps to bring down the Assad regime, the US has conducted a more cautious strategy, even signaling that it may accept a transitional role for Assad in any negotiated settlement for the future of Syria.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, concerning the relations with Russia, Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 fighter jet that had violated Turkish airspace despite warnings while Russia has been conducting air

48 Gül Tüysüz and Zeynep Bilginsoy, "Ministry: Turkey Joins Coalition Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria", CNN, 29 August 2015, accessed 5 February 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/29/europe/turkey-airstrikes/>.

49 Simon Tisdall, "Turkey Calls on Major Powers to Intervene in Syria," *The Guardian*, 19 October 2012, accessed 6 February 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/19/turkey-britain-us-intervene-syria>.

50 Shaheen, "Who Backs Whom in the Syrian Conflict".

raids against Turkish-backed Turkmen groups in northern Latakia. In short, Turkey has a fragile relationship with both great powers involved in the Syrian crisis, which has limited the effectiveness of its middle power foreign policy.

Conclusion

Turkey is a middle power in terms of the international power hierarchy based on both material capabilities and foreign policy behavior characteristics. It possesses more resources, particularly geography, GDP, military capacity and population, than a small power, but less than a great power. Hence, Turkey's power status lies between that of a small power and a great power in international politics, making it a middle power. In addition, since it actively participates in international organizations, follows the norms and rules of the international system, contributes to international peace and stability and seeks diplomatic and multilateral solutions to international problems, Turkey's foreign policy exemplifies typical middle power behavior.

In the Syrian crisis, specifically, Turkey has pursued a foreign policy with middle power behavior. It has brought the issue to multilateral platforms, implemented policies to prevent a humanitarian disaster, particularly by welcoming huge numbers of refugees, and respected the norms of the international system. However, Turkey's effectiveness in the crisis has been limited because its interests have contradicted those of the great powers. Moreover, disagreement and conflict between the great powers has further limited Turkey's foreign policy because it has made it impossible to find the international solution to the crisis that Turkey advocates. To overcome this middle power limitations, Turkey should reformulate its strategies in the Syrian crisis by taking more into account the state of relationships between the great powers and its own relations with them. This is also a necessity in the Middle East since its dynamic geography requires a dynamic foreign policy. In this regard, Turkey needs to adopt a well-planned strategy based on a combination of hard and soft power assets, consistent with its actual strength towards well-designed foreign policy objectives. In other words, to borrow Nye's concept, Turkey should act more as a "smart power" in the Syrian crisis.⁵¹

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51 For the concept of smart power see Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.88, No.4 (2009).

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ORDULAR ARAP AYAKLANMALARINA NEDEN FARKLI TEPKİ VERDİLER? SİLAHLI KUVVETLERİN KARARINI ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER

ÖZ

Tunus'la başlayan ve daha önce tahmin edilemeyen bir hızda ve yoğunlukta yayılan ayaklanmalar, çok geçmeden neredeyse bütün Arap devletlerini etkisi altına almıştır. Bu kitlesel karışıklıklar her birinde kendine özgü şekilde yaşanmış ve etkileri halen yaşamaya devam etmektedir. Öte yandan, bu ayaklanmaları bastırmakla ilgili emir alan silahlı kuvvetler emrin gereğini yapmaktan, emirlere itaat etmemeye kadar değişen biçimlerde tepkiler göstermişlerdir. Bu makalenin temel amacı, önceki çalışmaların bıraktığı boşluğun doldurulmasını hedefleyerek, yönetimlerde kurumsallaşma ve ordularda profesyonelleşmenin kitlesel ayaklanmalarla karşılaşan askerlerin müdahale etme yönünde emir aldıklarında gösterecekleri reaksiyona nasıl etkide bulduklarını araştırmaktır. İki değişkenin birleşik etkisi Tunus, Mısır, Libya, Yemen ve Suriye örnekleri üzerinde incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın önemli bulgularından birisi, kitlesel ayaklanmalarla karşılaşan orduların müdahale etme yönünde kararlarına ve bu müdahalenin nasıl sonuçlanacağına yönetimde kurumsallaşma ve orduların profesyonelleşme düzeylerinin birleşik olarak etkisinin, ikisinin tek başına etkisinden daha önemli olduğu yönündedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumsallaşma, Profesyonelleşme, Arap Ayaklanmaları, Silahlı Kuvvetler, Sivil Asker İlişkileri.

لماذا اختلفت ردود فعل الجيوش على الثورات العربية ؟ العوامل التي أثرت على قرار القوات المسلحة

ان الثورات التي بدأت بتونس والتي انتشرت بصورة سريعة وكثيفة لم يكن بوسع احد ان يتوقعها سلفا، لم تلبث كثيرا الا وقد اخضعت جميع الدول العربية تحت تأثيرها. ان هذه الاضطرابات الجماعية ظهرت في كل منها بشكل خاص بها، ولا تزال تأثيراتها دائمة لحد الان. ومن جانب اخر، فان القوات المسلحة التي تلقت اوامر باخماد هذه الثورات اظهرت ردود فعل تراوحت بين تنفيذ الاوامر وبين عدم اطاعتها. ان الهدف الرئيسي من هذا المقال هو املاء الفراغ الذي تركته الدراسات السابقة، والبحث عن تأثير المؤسساتية في الادارات والاحتراف في الجيوش، على كيفية ابداء الجنود الذين يتلقون اوامر بمواجهة ثورات شعبية او جماعية ردود فعل تجاه هذه الاوامر. وقد تمت دراسة التأثير الموحد لهذين المتغيرين بناء على نماذج تونس ومصر وليبيا واليمن وسوريا. وان احد الامور الهامة التي توصلت اليها هذه الدراسة، هو التأثير المزدوج للمؤسساتية في الادارة وتحول الجيوش نحو الاحتراف، على قرار الجيوش التي تجابه بثورات جماهيرية بالتدخل لقمعها، ومصير هذا التدخل، وكذلك توضيح كون تأثير هذين الامرين اكثر من تأثير الامر المنفرد لكل منهما.

الكلمات الدالة : المؤسساتية ، الاحتراف، الثورات العربية، القوات المسلحة، العلاقات العسكرية - المدنية

WHY ARMIES REACTED DIFFERENTLY TO THE ARAB UPRISINGS? DYNAMICS AFFECTING THE DECISION OF MILITARY

ABSTRACT

The uprisings, which began in Tunisia, have spread at a rapid pace and with an unprecedented intensity. These uprisings have influenced all Arab countries in a variety of ways, followed particular pathways and ended differently. However, the reactions of armies to the orders of their respective governments have varied from loyalty to defection. This paper aims to examine the reciprocal and combined effect of government and military institutions on the issue. The qualitative method with some quantitative figures has been used. The effects of institutionalization of governments and the professionalization of armies have been studied in this article along with the consequences of uprisings in five separate cases: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. It is found that while instability has indeed occurred at different levels in all of these cases, the interaction of the institutionalization of government and the professionalization of the military have played decisive effects more than the effect of each one on the reaction of armies.

Keywords: Institutionalism, Professionalism, Arab Uprising, Armed Forces, Civil Military Relations

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1. Introduction

The Arab uprisings¹ were sparked by the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor on 17 December 2010, protesting corruption and ill treatment at the hands of the Tunisian government. The ensuing civil disturbances have spread like wildfire through almost all of the North African and Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the uprisings have not followed the same path, nor have they reached the same ends.

The governments of these countries have reacted differently in countering the threats, though all of them have experienced some level of political or militarily challenges. Some regimes have been able to handle the upheavals more successfully than others and have maintained their stability, while others have suffered greatly in comparison. On the other hand, the most effective instrument at the governments' disposal has been the military; and yet, the response of militaries in countering demonstrations has also varied from one country to another.

One of the questions, which emerged from the uprisings, is why armies² reacted differently to the orders of the regime. Previous research has concentrated on answering this question from two perspectives. One perspective pertains to governmental institutions and their effectiveness, while the other one solely emphasizes the role of armies during the uprisings. However, there has been no adequate research that examines the reciprocal and combined effect of government and military institutions on the issue. This paper aims to fill that gap in discussions centering on the differences of armies' reaction which can be seen as whether loyalty or defection.

The paper, firstly, elaborates on the concepts of the institutionalization of government and the professionalization of armies affecting the decision of armies on whether being loyal or defection. Secondly, these two variables and their relationship are examined further with the case studies focusing on Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. In conclusion, some general observations are presented on the institutionalization of government and professionalization of military in countering instability.³

1 At the outset of the Arab uprisings, the revolts called emotionally as "Arab Spring" by some politicians and academicians. They evoked the upheavals as "the Spring of Nations" in reference to the revolutions across Europe of 1848 or as "Prague Spring" in reference to the revolts in escaping communist winter at 1968 or referring a seasonal change the events of 1989. See, Michael Zantovsky, "1989 and 2011, Compare and Contrast", *World Affairs*, Vol.174, No.2 (July/August 2011), pp.13-24.

2 "Military", "army" "armed forces" are used interchangeably with the same meaning in this study.

3 Nevertheless, this article does not investigate the causes of the uprisings. Some of the countries, which are researched for the article, are in fact wrestling with their own civil wars; and some continue to struggle against armed groups. It is, therefore, difficult to make conclusive assessments before the armed fighting ends; and as in any social research, this paper risks drawing premature conclusions. Furthermore, the international setting or the international linkages of unrest are not examined in this article, though they are indeed one of the significant determinants of how conflicts may end.

2. The Institutionalization of Government

The process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy generates fragile conditions for the upheavals motivated by political grievances in the absence of the institutionalization of governments.⁴ Yet, swift changes in the political and social environment with newly emerged groups have destabilizing effects and threatening potential especially if there is no efficient political institution to counteract this kind of volatility. Huntington states that instability and violence are “in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions”.⁵ The governments can successfully manage the deteriorating effects or the shocks of the transition by utilizing through developed and competent state institutions.⁶

Several researchers have revealed that there are some generic features of the institutionalized political system. According to one of these researchers, the institutionalization is defined as the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.⁷ It is also suggested that governments should embody the rule of law, impartial courts, and election commissions, independent and professionalized journalists, and competent bureaucrats in order to keep their stability.⁸

Moreover, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project aggregates some indicators for the measurement of institutionalization of governments. These include the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of civil service and degree of its dependence from political pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.⁹

It can be inferred from these indicators that the institutionalization of a state generally allows for the institutional capability to manage disturbing challenges, which may emerge in the international or domestic political environment, and provide stability during all threatening occasions. Besides, if the civilian government is neither effective nor institutionalized, it will be

4 Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.3-6.

5 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press ,1969), p. 4.

6 Ian Bremmer, *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall* (New York: Simon Schuster, 2006), pp.6-10.

7 *Ibid.*, p.12.

8 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War”, *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 297-337.

9 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, (2010), <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5430> (Accessed at: 12 Jan. 2016).

incompetent to control the military. The failure of executive power may end up a praetorian state in which the military tends to intervene or has the potential to do it.¹⁰ Yet, having vulnerable state structures but having the military as a most coherent organization, the weak or failed states are unwilling but unavoidable candidates to face with these threatening conditions.¹¹

Political transition may cause instability or armed conflict, unless it can be observed and controlled by robust and coherent government institutions. In such an environment, if the military, as a coercive apparatus of government, has not been subordinated to civil authority, it may very well exacerbate the emergence or continuity of the conflict. As Skocpol argues, mass based revolts have not any chance to be successful without the support of government's coercive organizations.¹²

3. The Professionalization of Military

During the fragile political transition process, robust, strong, and professional armed forces are essential organizations for governments to secure the state against possible threats or armed conflicts. Although much of the current literature on civil-military relations pays particular attention to the professionalization of armies, there seems no common understanding on the definition or characteristics of the professionalization. One of the pioneers of the research on civil-military relations, Huntington explains it as the de-politicization of the security establishment, and the complete subordination of the military command to civilian officials. He highlights that the job of military officer has three common characteristics, such as corporateness, expertness, and responsibility.¹³

However, the definition and features of these characteristics have always been interpreted in various ways. For instance, Kamrava describes this type of professionalization in a broader sense; one that encompasses the introduction of modern military equipment and technology into the armed forces, the upgrading of training facilities and procedures, making recruitment and promotions less arbitrary, and developing professional cadres of specialist officers and military experts at various levels and branches of the armed forces.¹⁴

Yet, the dimensions of professionalization have been conceptualized differently. One of these dimensions, the expertness, has been interpreted as mili-

10 Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp.9-13.

11 According to Perlmutter, "...modern praetorianism is the most conspicuous political arrangement of weak states." See *Ibid.*, p.258.

12 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.32.

13 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.11-18.

14 Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil Military Relations in the Middle East", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.115, No.1 (2000), pp.69-70.

tary effectiveness, and construed its attributes as integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality.¹⁵ Some other researches elaborate corporateness as institutionalism of armies and “institutionalized armies” are characterized by having an organizational identity, as well as career paths determined by meritocratic principles. Institutionalized security organizations are rule-governed, predictable, and they have distinctive organizational culture and character. They tend to be not corrupt nor abuse power and they generally adhere to the rule of law. However, at the other end, there are “the patrimonial security organizations”. These are ruled by cronyism and nepotism, with even discipline and promotion in the army maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage or personal relations. Individuals who are part of this type of organization are also against political reforms that might threaten their current organizational exploitation, and they fear the loss of their own personal status.¹⁶ Patrimony leads to corruption and abuse of power, even as it endangers the integrity of military which is an essential attribute of effective armies.

Although there is an ambiguity on the concept and characteristics of professionalization, the differences just refer to semantic interpretation of the term but not in essence.¹⁷ Therefore, this study uses the term “military professionalism” as a generic concept that comprises expertise, responsibility, and institutionalism.

Besides, Huntington’s claim about the professionalization of armies paves the way for the de-politicization of the security establishment and the complete subordination of the military command to civilian officials¹⁸ triggered a long-standing debate over civil-military literature. First of all, the definition has been determined as tautological since his acceptance of ethics of subordination and it is stated that the military’s acceptance of civilian supremacy is a separate and distinct matter.¹⁹

Scholars argue that professional armies are inherently political institutions. Welch emphasizes that armed forces’ participation in politics is inevitable, but the extent and the kind of this participation is a matter of civilian control.²⁰ Janowitz accepts that the armed forces are always politicized at some

15 Risa Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and Internal Forces on Military Effectiveness”, Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (ed.), *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp.1-26.

16 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No.2 (January 2004), p.145.

17 Alejandro Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia During the ‘Arab Spring’”, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.37, No.4 (2014), p.511.

18 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp.8-10.

19 Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.2 (1999), p.235; Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp.21-22.

20 Claude E. Welch, (ed.) *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), p.2.

point and that they try to gain or reinforce their leverage on national security matters.²¹ Likewise, Perlmutter contends that when the military is the most cohesive and politically best organized group in a state, the probability of replacing the regime by military rises.²² It is pointed that when military recognizes itself a professionalized organization, it may claim to serve to state rather than the government in power. The military feels itself most competent structure on security issues and wants to have full authority on the matters of size, organization, recruitment, and equipment of the forces. It expresses its discomfort at having to act against citizens and blames civilian authorities, if ordered to do so.²³

However, the argument that professionalization leads armies' subordination to civil supremacy has been partly supported by other scholars. For example, Welch surmises that focused responsibilities of armed forces estrange them from political system and may result in technical specialization and institutional complexity, which are organizational obstacles to mounting a successful coup as well.²⁴ Likewise, Quinlivan purports that increasing the expertness of military in technical issues while dissolving its corporate identity and corporate loyalty may become a regime coup-proof.²⁵ Bellin adds that when the military is more institutionalized, it will be more likely for the military to disengage from power politics and allow political reform to proceed.²⁶

Besides, some scholars argue that the character of civil-military relations is a matter of negotiation between civil authorities and armies. Schiff suggests 'concordance theory', which states that the behavior pattern of military is determined by military, political elites, and society. According to this approach, the social composition of the officer corps, the recruitment method of armies, and the military lifestyle are among the indicators for achieving harmony among the military, the political elites, and the society.²⁷

However, some factors such as armies' interests and the governments' control strategies might deteriorate the professionalization of military. These interests may emerge as personal or organizational particularly in political, economic, and security issues. Moreover, some of these interests are perceived as existential,²⁸ which might provoke the intervention or defection of armies

21 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p.435.

22 Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, p.21.

23 Finer, *The Man on the Horseback...*, pp.22-23.

24 Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p.32.

25 James T. Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing", *International Security*, Vol.24, No.2 (Fall 1999), pp.131-165.

26 Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East", p.145.

27 Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.22, No.1 (Fall 1995), pp.8-12.

28 Steven Cook, *Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp.17-22.

to protect themselves against these ‘threats’, particularly in mass based political upheavals. As Nordlinger states, the disobedience behavior of armies may be motivated by the inadequate military budget, having less initiative on security issues, and the most importantly feeling threatened for their survival.²⁹ Indeed, it is indicated that the likelihood of defection emerges when the military has been poorly paid, trained, and equipped, and has gained little political influence, particularly in probable political succession.³⁰

Nonetheless, if the military is quite strong and possesses significant power to affect the state structure, there is a possible risk of the military engaging in political intervention or at least having political influence. One can argue that professionalization enhances the autonomy of the military, but if politically unchecked, it can similarly increase the tendency for the military to intervene in the affairs of the state.³¹ Powerful armies may engender another problem as Feaver calls “civil-military problematique” which points to a paradox that the institution created to protect the polity would become a threat to the polity.³² Hence, in order to bring the armies under their control, some governments deliberately weaken military as an institution; some of them overlook the exploitation of armies over economic assets and political positions; and the others let armies to be professional institution with the expectation of lessening leverage on political authority.

The civilian control strategies of military are prevalent in democratic or autocratic regimes with various methods and various intensities. Huntington presumes subjective and objective civilian control measures, whereby the former implies the maximizing of the power of civilian groups, such as government institutions, social groups, and other constitutional forms, against armies, while the latter indicates the maximizing of military professionalism. Although he suggests that objective civilian control makes military politically futile and disinterested by “militarizing the military”, Huntington accepts that the best method to manage unprofessionalized militaries is subjective civilian control.³³ Welch argues that there are two civilian control strategies. The first approach concentrates on organizational essentials of the military institution, while the second one focuses more on the civilian political institutions, particularly on their legitimacy.³⁴ He asserts that civilian control

29 Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp.66-68.

30 Denis Prieur, “Defend or Defect Military Roles in Popular Revolts”, SSRN, 15 Dec. 2011, p.7, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2115062 (Accessed at: 04 Feb. 2016).

31 Kamrava, “Military Professionalization...”, p.69.

32 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.23, No.2 (1996), pp.149-178.

33 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp.80-85.

34 Welch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p.318.

of armies is never absolute and it mainly comes through the legitimate and effective government organs.³⁵

Furthermore, scholars studying on coup-proofing techniques point some characteristics shared by the states that are prone to military interventions. One of these scholars argues that the exploitation of familial, ethnic, and religious loyalties, the building of security institutions parallel to the regular military, and the development of multiple internal security agencies that monitor the loyalty of the military are among these measures.³⁶ Makara agrees these measures and adds that material incentives distributed to the army may build mutual interest relationship between the regime and military.³⁷ Feaver suggests that various monitoring mechanisms may help lessen the military's tendency to intervene. These mechanisms are audits, investigations, rules of engagement; civilian staffs with expertise and oversight responsibilities; and the media and defense think tanks.³⁸

However, the control strategies that aim to inhibit the intervention of armies to civil politics may instigate various problems such as unity of command, cleavages in organizational structure, and competition within the security apparatus. The institutional integrity problems might have been aggravated particularly in political upheavals; and once the disobedience behavior emerges at these conditions, mass defections can occur, since no part of military wants to be on the losing side.³⁹ Besides, Makara draws attention to an exception in which employing communal ties between regime and military can mitigate these effects and maintain organizational unity.⁴⁰

It should be pointed that the control strategies of militaries have an essential adverse effect on undermining of armies' power. Indeed, the measures taken by governments without enhancing the professionalization of military may result in politicization and ineffectiveness of armies to fight whenever needed.⁴¹ Thus, the important point with regard to military and civilian affairs is that the military has to be strong enough to protect the state and to ensure regime stability, but, at the same time, it has to be professional and institutionalized enough to subordinate itself to the civilian authorities. Additionally, if the military gets respect from the civilian community, and if the

35 Ibid., p. 35.

36 Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing", p.133.

37 Michael Makara, "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring", *Democracy and Security*, Vol.9, No.4 (2013), p.335.

38 Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations", p.229.

39 Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.42, No.5 (2009), pp.646-647.

40 Makara, "Coup-Proofing...", p.335.

41 Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing...", pp.131-165; Risa Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay", *International Security*, Vol.28, No.2 (2003), p.162.

government in turn has the capacity to check the military, then the proper balance between the military and the government may be maintained successfully.

4. The Interaction of Armies and Governments in the Arab Uprisings

The Arab states that ruled by authoritarian regimes for decades and the population generally become accustomed to or at least acquiesced to their governments' will, particularly following instances of severe repression by government security forces when any potential revolt has appeared. Examining this issue from a different perspective, this article looks at behavioral patterns of military on mass based political upheavals, considering the interaction between institutionalization of governments and professionalization of their armies. The interaction of armies and governments in uprisings might vary according to their position in the continuum of two research concepts as seen in Table-1 below.

Table-1: The Interaction of Military and Governments

		Professionalization of Military	
		Very Low-----	Very High
Institutionalization of Government	Very High	It may not be swift and easy to overcome potential security and political problems.	The military forces might be able to suppress an uprising successfully in a relatively short period of time, and pave the way for the institutions of government to ensure political stability smoothly.
	Very Low	Neither military nor government could contain uprisings; civil war conditions emerge.	Uprisings can be suppressed, but it is possible for the military to overthrow the government.

Since the institutionalization of government or professionalization of military is not dichotomous, but they are indeed continuously changing concepts, interpretations on them might fall into anywhere at the levels of “very low, low, medium, high, very high”.⁴² So, the explanations in the cells of Table-1 should be perceived as generic conditions.

⁴² As in any qualitative research, there are some problems in measuring these abstract and inferential concepts. Although there are some indexes to estimate the institutionalization of government, there is no

The comparative case study method is used to deal with this study's problem areas, and five countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria) are selected. In all cases, each country suffered from considerable level of uprisings, and each ruler ordered his military and security agencies to suppress the uprisings by force.⁴³ The countries that have experienced uprisings and that were used in this article were presidential monarchies, at least at the outset of the unrest.

4.1. Tunisia

After gaining its independence, Tunisia had two presidents, Habib Bourguiba and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled the country for thirty years and twenty-four years, respectively. They governed the country by controlling the media, and hindering opposition political parties from representing themselves in the parliament.⁴⁴ Also, there were no efficient non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or trade unions and other sectors of civil society have avoided generally direct confrontation with the regime. Ben Ali even fired ministers who showed too much leadership or gained popular support.⁴⁵ Thus, the governance of Tunisia before the uprisings was a prime example of a repressive regime.

The incident, which thrust the Arab world into widespread upheaval, was the self-immolation of a Tunisian vendor. Nobody expected that such an event would spread throughout the country and had such devastating repercussions among the wider Arab population. Although Tunisian security forces were experienced in suppressing previous nonviolent civil resistance, particularly in the southern cities, the intensity and the pace of resistance were beyond any pessimistic prediction at that time. Moreover, the internal security forces, police, and intelligence services had all cultivated new grievances among the people by abusing their authority.

Ben Ali and his family were encircled by the corruption and cronyism claims; in fact, more than half of Tunisia's commercial elites were personally related to Ben Ali or his family.⁴⁶ The corruption was particularly notable in Tunisia due to high unemployment, limited opportunities for economic advancement, and

dataset to measure the professionalization of military. For this reason, quantitative and qualitative data collection methods are used congruously in order to explore and interpret the indicators of two concepts in depth.

43 Zoltan Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.22, No.4 (2011), pp.28-39.

44 Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.90, No.3 (May/June 2011), pp.2-7.

45 Shadi Hamid, "Tunisia: Birthplace of the Revolution", Kenneth Pollack (et al.), *The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p.113.

46 Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring", pp.2-7.

severe disparities between the relatively wealthy coastal areas and the struggling interior.⁴⁷

Despite the corruption scandals surrounding the president’s family and the many inequalities in living conditions, the Tunisian governmental institutions were working better than the other countries’ comparable organizations in the article. Tunisia had a well-established educational system, a large middle class, and the strongest organized labor movement.⁴⁸ Therefore, the scores relating to Tunisian governmental effectiveness were relatively better than the other countries’ scores noted on the Table-2 below.

Table-2: The Institutionalization of Governments⁴⁹

		Tunisia		Egypt		Libya		Yemen		Syria	
		2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
Control of Corruption	Est.	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-1.17	-1.3	-1.02	-1.2	-1.07	-1.1
	Rank	56.46	54.8	41.15	34.3	8.13	5.2	15.79	10	12.92	12.9
Government Effectiveness	Est.	0.4	0.2	-0.27	-0.4	-1.08	-1.1	-1.08	-1	-0.59	-0.6
	Rank	65.55	63.2	47.37	43.1	12.92	12.9	12.44	14.4	34.45	32.5
Rule of Law	Est.	0.2	0.1	-0.06	-0.1	-0.85	-0.9	-1	-1.1	-0.49	-0.5
	Rank	60.66	59.7	54.03	51.2	20.85	19	14.22	13.3	37.91	36.5
Regime Type		-4	-4	-3	-3	-7	-7	-2	-2	-7	-7

As the uprising spread, President Ben Ali tried to repress the protestors by using disproportionate force and even live ammunition. Nonetheless, it never helped lessen the conflict and the situation deteriorated rapidly.⁵⁰ Then, Ben Ali called out the Tunisian Army and ordered it to confront the demonstra-

47 Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), p.73.

48 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring”, pp.2-7.

49 Although, the measurement capability is limited since they are based on individual perceptions, these are fairly reliable indicators having been collected from different sources; and they have been used to develop an idea on the institutionalization of government in each specific case. “Control of Corruption” captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. “Government Effectiveness” captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. “Rule of Law” captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Governance indicators, ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, and in percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries worldwide. See Daniel Kaufmann et al., *The Worldwide Governance Indicators* (2010). “Regime Type” scores are extracted from POLITY IV Database polity2 indicators, and it ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). See Monthly G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, *POLITY IV Project Data Users’ Manual*, Center for Systemic Peace (2013), www.systemicpeace.org (Accessed at: 23 Jan. 2016).

50 Noureddine Jebnoun, “In the Shadow of Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Tunisian Popular Uprising”, *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol.19, No.3 (2014), p.304.

tions. However, the Army chose not to react to the protestors in the manner desired by the president. The Chief of Staff, General Rachid Ammar, had forbidden his soldiers from firing on demonstrators,⁵¹ issued a warning to the Tunisian police that the army would retaliate in kind if the police shot at the protestors,⁵² and expelled the National Guard from areas assigned to the Army.⁵³

It has been argued that the Army was influenced by fears of losing prestige among the population, social esteem, and the integrity of their own organization if they would have fired on unarmed people.⁵⁴ The choice made by the strongest security institution of the state to take side with the protestors proved to be the decisive point in the conflict. As Lynch states, “the very strength of the Tunisian authoritarian state became a weakness, once mobilization reached a critical point.”⁵⁵ Revolts snowballed to such a critical stage that Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia,⁵⁶ and the new government was established through free elections under the oversight and the support of Army.⁵⁷ Tunisian military had many opportunities during and after the uprisings to overthrow the government, but it has never attempted to intervene in politics. Jebnoun explains this as a result of army’s spirit of professionalism and political neutrality.⁵⁸

Although it played significant role during the uprisings, the Tunisian Army maintained its position as an independent institution of the state and, therefore, refrained from getting involved in politics. Some have conjectured that the underlying reasons for the Army to have remained neutral were the facts that the Army had not played an essential role in gaining Tunisian independence, that it never experienced combat, and that it had no particular economic or political stake in the regime’s survival.⁵⁹ In fact, Ben Ali had limited the army’s role in security issues as border patrol, disaster relief, and peacekeeping force.⁶⁰ The internal security and intelligence institutions orga-

51 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia”, 17 Jan. 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/world/africa/17tunis.html?_r=1 (Accessed at: 11 Jan. 2016).

52 Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.39, No.1 (2013), p.35.

53 Jebnoun, “In the Shadow of Power...”, p.305.

54 Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011”, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.36, No.2 (2013), pp.205-220.

55 Lynch, *The Arab Uprising...*, p.75.

56 The Guardian, “Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protestors claim victory”, 14 Jan. 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests> (Accessed at: 01 Feb. 2016).

57 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’”, 25 Jan. 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html> (Accessed at: 03 Jan. 2016).

58 Jebnoun, “In the Shadow of Power...”, p.314.

59 Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring”, pp.2-7.

60 Daniel Silverman, *The Arab Military in the Arab Spring: Agent of Continuity of Change*, 2012, p.20,

nized under the Ministry of Interior (MoI)⁶¹ had been employed in suppressing political upheavals. Besides, in economic terms, Tunisian army has lowest share (1.4 %) in GDP compared with other cases in the article.⁶²

Furthermore, ever since Tunisian independence, the regime had tried to keep the military away from politics by banning any political activities of its members and by enhancing its professional and technical expertise. The term “*la grande muette*” (the big silent one) has been used in Tunisia to describe the Armed Forces, highlighting its discreet nature and its noninterference in public affairs.⁶³ Consequently, the military has remained a relatively professional and largely apolitical force, and free from corruption and cronyism, in stark contrast to the office of the President.

4.2. Egypt

The first signs of protest appeared in Egypt almost one month after the beginning of the Tunisian uprising. An uprising in Egypt, as one of the largest and most populous countries in the Arab world, was sure to have had greater influence on all Arab populations than any other country in the region. Living under similar conditions of corruption, bad governance, and economic grievances, Egyptians had been greatly encouraged by the Tunisian protests to revolt against their own authority.

Some scholars have postulated that the application of neoliberal policies tends to exacerbate the disparities in living conditions between the rich and the poor.⁶⁴ In Egypt, the President Hosnu Mubarak’s family had gained economic and administrative advantages over a lengthy period of time, particularly by acquiring public enterprises and by privatizing government assets. In the political environment, though, as elections had previously attested, the government of Egypt had indeed allowed a limited number of seats in the parliament to be occupied by opposing political parties.⁶⁵ Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Table-2 above, indicators of corruption, government effectiveness, the rule of law, and regime type are all below than those of half of the other countries of the world. A widening disparity between government

<http://politicalscience.osu.edu/intranet/cprw/Silverman%20CPRW%202012.pdf> (Accessed at: 11 Nov. 2015); Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection...”, p.513.

61 There were four different organizations operating in MoI: Department of State Security, Presidential Guard, National Guard, and Police. See Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection...”, p.528.

62 SIPRI, *Military Expenditure Database*, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (Accessed at: 12 Jan. 2015).

63 Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings...”, p.34.

64 James L. Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.34-40.

65 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Arab Spring”, *International Interactions*, Vol.38, No.5 (2012), pp.722-733.

elites and the people and a constrained political environment both added fuel to the fire as sought by the protestors.

When the first protests began, the police were unable to dissolve or even mitigate the effects of the mass gatherings. As a result, the turmoil spread throughout the country's big cities, such as Cairo and Alexandria and the number of people in the protests similarly increased. When the MoI could not handle the demonstrations, Mubarak deployed the Army. However, the police were pulled out of the cities several hours before the Army was able to take control. Consequently, making use of this opportunity, the protesters occupied *Tahrir* (Liberation) Square in Cairo, a landmark that would become the symbol of the Egyptian uprising.⁶⁶

Moreover, the Army had, likewise, not demonstrated any intention to use force against the protests, especially with live ammunition; and further the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) publically declared that they would not use lethal force against the Egyptian people. This was the last option for the President Mubarak to regain control of the streets; however it was lost. The uprisings showed no sign of ceasing until the Mubarak's resignation, yet economy worsened by general strikes and workers' closures of enterprises. Ultimately, Mubarak was forced to leave the Presidency, and he charged SCAF to run the country. SCAF assumed the reins of government until the first elections occurred in a relatively calm environment. Nevertheless, as the transition process dragged on, protests erupted again, appealing for the quick transfer of power to a civilian government.

Even after the Presidential elections, the renewed rioting had not ended by the inauguration of the new president. This new president, Mohamed Morsi, initially belittled the demonstrations and then he fired the Head of the Military Police, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, and the heads of the Army, the Navy, and Air Forces; and he replaced them with considerably younger officers.⁶⁷ These actions, though, did not help curb the recurring disruptions and mass gatherings and Egyptian Armed Forces eventually ousted Morsi while the riots were taking place on the streets.

Although all three previous presidents of Egypt before the uprisings had been drawn from the ranks of the military, all three of them had attempted to lessen the political ambitions of the Army. The process of demilitarizing the government began under Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was accelerated by Anwar Sadat. They provided the military with a different reason for existence, by making it a major player in the Egyptian economy. The military arguably controls from 35 to 40 percent of the economy and, according to the

66 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.46.

67 Hillel Frisch, "The Egyptian Army and Egypt's 'Spring'", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 36, No.2 (2013), pp.180-204.

International Monetary Fund (IMF), it oversees almost half of all Egyptian manufacturing.⁶⁸ Mubarak had allowed military to acquire profitable business assets as a way to keep officers loyal,⁶⁹ and attempted to weaken the army by enhancing the power of the police. As Sayigh pointed, just before Mubarak's departure, the MoI had 1.4 million employees.⁷⁰ One of the organizations operating under MoI, the Central Security Forces (CSF), is responsible for checking the military's power.⁷¹

Despite all of these efforts to prevent military's appetite for entering into politics, Egyptian military had never loosened its close interest to politics. Cook called this position of Egyptian Army as "ruling but not governing".⁷² Indeed, the Army ousted the government one more time. It has been argued that one of the main reasons for the *coup d'état* was the worry on the part of SCAF that they would lose a great deal of lucrative holdings. Scholars argue that the military felt threatened from losing economic privileges, since there was a high probability of succession of Hosni Mubarak with his son Gamal. The Egyptian military's decision to side with the nonviolent movement was also shaped by the perception of regime fragility and by the belief that defectors would not be punished.⁷³ Military defected from the regime as whole, because the army figured that the possibility of the fall of Mubarak regime was very soon.

Moreover, researchers asserted that one of the underlining causes of new president's ousting was again the interest of army. Housden argues that essential motives for toppling the new president were his unsuccessful management of the interests of military, civil, and judiciary elites, and his ignorance of grassroots support.⁷⁴ It is contended that the military has protected its economic advantages, retained its budget and governance immunity in the new constitution process.⁷⁵

In terms of personnel and equipment, the Egyptian Army is relatively large and strong in comparison to other Middle Eastern armies. It had 947,500

68 Tarek Masoud, "The Road to (and from) Liberation Square", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No.3 (2011), p.25; Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.62.

69 Ahmed Hashim, "The Egyptian Military, part two: From Mubarak Onward", *Middle East Policy*, Vol.18, No.4 (2011), pp.106-128.

70 Yezid Sayigh, "Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.43, No.3 (2011), p.403.

71 Makara, 'Coup-Proofing...', p.345.

72 Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing*, pp.63-92.

73 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.50, No.3 (2013), pp.342-343.

74 Oliver Housden, "Egypt: Coup d'Etat or a Revolution Protected", *The RUSI Journal*, Vol.158, No.5 (2013), pp.72-78.

75 Makara, "Coup-Proofing...", pp.346-347.

men (including reservists) under arms and 397,000 men (325,000 under CSF) as paramilitary organizations.⁷⁶ But officers' assignments and careers have created a different mixture of professionalism among its ranks. They have been based not only on performance, modernization, and a strong corporate identity, but also on cronyism, patrimonialism, the preferential treatment of some high officers close to the regime, and a strictly apolitical stance.⁷⁷

4.3. Libya

Four days after the overthrow of the Egyptian president, protests began in Libya aimed at toppling Muammar Gaddafi, a former military officer and the ruler of Libya since 1969. Libya had exposed idiosyncratic characteristics under the regime of Gaddafi. Beyond the common corruption and repression, the country seemed as the Libyan leader's own personal asset, including all its institutions as well as its military. Gaddafi had believed in direct democracy, his so-called *jamahiriya* (to rule by the masses), instead of representative democracy. Thus, he had disassembled the representative institutions and had established the "people's congresses". Gaddafi and his family had pragmatically managed the whole government body. By the time of the uprisings, there were no sign of pluralism in Libya, such as trade unions, political parties, or independent media.⁷⁸ As indicated on Table-2, the institutionalization scores for the Libyan government were very low. It was among the worst of the world's governments in terms of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, and regime type.

Besides, Gaddafi had established multiple security institutions fearing a *coup d'état*, a common worry throughout Libyan political history. The Revolutionary Committees, the Revolutionary Guards, and the People Guards were among the organizations established mainly to protect the regime and its ideology.⁷⁹ In particular, the members of the Revolutionary Committees had been embedded in every institution in order to ensure commitment and loyalty to the regime; and they had punished and even assassinated many perpetrators involved in attempts at disobedience.⁸⁰ Furthermore, because of Gaddafi's aim at coup-proofing, the strength of the military had been weakened through several different methods. Gaddafi had assigned leaders of the Army by ethnic or religious affiliation, or personal loyalty, but not according to meritocratic principles, and rotated them frequently in order to hinder the cohesiveness of units. As a result of his efforts to largely disable the military, leaders had been subverted, the officers could not develop leadership skills or

76 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance* (2010), pp.248-250.

77 Philippe Droz-Vincent, "The Role of the Military in Arab Transitions", *Panorama* (Med. 2012), pp.136-140.

78 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, pp.71-72.

79 Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings...", p.40.

80 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.72.

cultivate unity between themselves and their enlisted personnel, and therefore, Libyan Army had lost its war-fighting capacity.⁸¹

Once the uprising began, at first the Revolutionary Guards and the police were employed, and then Libyan military were ordered to suppress the protests.⁸² In addition to the regular Libyan security institutions, Gaddafi relied heavily on foreign mercenaries composed mainly from poorer Sahelian countries to quell the uprising.⁸³ The security forces and the military used brutal force, including live ammunition, to crush the rioting.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the overall ill treatment of the population at the hands of the security forces engendered bitter conditions, transforming the conflict into virtually protracted civil war conditions. In addition to that, tribal loyalties, the institutionalization shortfalls, and severe armed conflict paved the way for the eventual disintegration and defection of the military.⁸⁵

The significant characteristics of Libyan Armed Forces were the frequent rotation of military leaders, centralized structures discouraging personal initiative, and also promotions and assignments based on ethnic and religious affiliations.⁸⁶ The military hadn't got any organizational economic and political interest with the regime, but personal.⁸⁷ For instance, when Libya's uprising began, personnel from eastern Libyan clans defected in their entirety.⁸⁸ The emphasized conditions exacerbated the integrity of military forces. It can be clearly said, with the indications of ineffectiveness and disunity of army, the Libyan army was not professionalized well.⁸⁹ Moreover, the regime survival

81 Under Gaddafi governance, Libya's military became corrupt and ineffective, performing miserably on battlefields in Uganda in the 1970s and Chad in the 1980s. See Florence Gaub, 'The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup Proofing and Repression', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.36, No.2 (2013), pp.221-244.

82 Ibid.

83 Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings...", p.40.

84 Escalating the level of violence by security forces and mercenaries caused an increase in the defection of military personnel and resignation of ambassadors of Libya in foreign countries and in the mission in United Nations as well. Even it is argued that the pilots who were ordered to bomb civilian protesters in Benghazi fled to Malta in their aircraft. See The Guardian, "Libya defectors: Pilots told to bomb protesters flee to Malta", 21 Feb. 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-flee-to-malta> (Accessed at: 23 Dec. 2015).

85 Gaub, "The Libyan Armed Forces...", p.235; The Guardian, "Libya: Defections leave Muammar Gaddafi isolated in Tripoli bolthole", 23 Feb. 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/23/muammar-gaddafi-libya-tripoli-uprising> (Accessed at: 24 Jan. 2016). The most high profile defection within the Libyan armed forces was General Abdul Fatah Younis, Gaddafi's Interior Minister. See Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings...", p.40. Libya's ambassador to the United Nations Abd al-Rahman resigned in protest over the reported killing of civilians by denouncing Gaddafi. See Lynch, *The Arab Uprising*, p.169.

86 Gaub, "The Libyan Armed Forces...", p.231.

87 Silverman, *The Arab Military in the Arab Spring...*, p.33.

88 Makara, "Coup-Proofing...", p.353.

89 Ann Marlowe, "Libya's De-professionalized Army Needs Help", 2012, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/ann-marlowe/libya%E2%80%99s-de-professionalized-army-needs-help> (Accessed at: 12 Dec. 2015).

was not an important matter for the army especially after seeing the close possibility of fall of Gaddafi regime.

4.4. Yemen

The uprisings in Yemen occurred almost simultaneously with Egypt's unrest, but they had greater similarities with the uprisings in Libya in terms of pre-conditions and underlying causes. When the first demonstrations began in Yemen's capital, Sana'a, at the end of January 2011, a coalition of opposition parties called as the Joint Meeting Party gathered to protest the plan adopted by parliament to eliminate presidential term limits. The President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was the first president of a united Yemen since 1990, though at first he had not been motivated, offered some concessions to protestors. However, the crowds were not convinced by his remarks. Moreover, shortly after the resignation of the Egyptian President Mubarak, young Yemeni protestors from the universities in Yemen joined the protests and added momentum to the demonstrations.⁹⁰

The Yemeni security services reacted harshly from the outset of the protests, with the most bitter and bloodiest day of the uprisings occurring on 18 March 2011 during which snipers arguably from the Republican Guard and the Central Security Organization (CSO) troops, opened fire on protestors outside Sana'a University killing more than 50 people. This severe reaction backfired and culminated in mass defections and resignations across the government and military,⁹¹ though the Republican Guard, the Special Forces and the Intelligence Organization had largely kept their loyalty.⁹²

The popular and tribal rebellion against the President Saleh was accelerated by the defection of many of Yemen's most senior generals, including powerful General Ali Mohsen, who had been presumed as a successor of Saleh.⁹³ However, before the uprisings began, Saleh's attempts to leave the presidency to his son outraged Mohsen and his clan.⁹⁴ These factional disputes and presidential motives aggravated the tensions. After a long series of protests, Saleh finally agreed to transfer the powers of presidency to his deputy within 30 days, and to formally step down once the new presidential elections occurred

90 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.78.

91 Lynch, *The Arab Uprising...*, p.155.

92 Makara, "Coup-Proofing", p.352.

93 Michael Knights, "The Military Role in Yemen's Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the Tribal Republic", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.36, No.2 (2013), pp.278-284.

94 In fact, though, Mohsen and Saleh were the members of the same Sanhan tribe, there were family differences that Mohsen was related to Qadhi whereas Saleh was related to Afaash clan. Mohsen was sitting above Saleh in the Sanhan tribal hierarchy. See Sarah Phillips, "Who Tried to Kill Ali Abdullah Saleh?", *Foreign Policy*, 13 June 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/13/who-tried-to-kill-ali-abdullah-saleh/> (Accessed at: 21 Jan. 2016).

on 21 February 2012; in exchange, he would receive immunity from prosecution for himself and his family.

Yemen had previously been divided between the north and the south, and had suffered armed conflict for almost 40 years. In 1990, though, the two sides were able to merge into one state, officially called the Republic of Yemen. Due to the weakness or absence of necessary government institutions, however, Yemen had needed to deftly balance the tribal, political, and military affiliations, and to rely on them in order to perform ordinary governmental functions.⁹⁵ These conditions resulted in a situation in which Yemen was labelled as “tribal republic”.⁹⁶ Being aware of the impossibility of enforcement of his will without the participation of tribal forces,⁹⁷ President Saleh had allowed the tribal leaders and their relatives to hold prominent positions in government institutions in order to ensure their loyalty to the unity of Yemen.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, though, they had abused their positions to enrich themselves while the general population had suffered drastically from poverty and unemployment. Corruption, graft and bribery had been common throughout the regime, and it had been estimated that 30% of state revenues had not reached the government coffers.⁹⁹ As might be expected, Yemen had the worst governmental institutionalism scores along with Libya on Table-2.

As previously seen in other cases, President Saleh had also built some parallel security institutions, such as the Republican Guard, Special Operations Forces operating under Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the CSO acting under MoI. These forces were managed by Saleh’s inner circle,¹⁰⁰ and all units in military structure were reflections of complexity and hegemony of clans and tribal coalitions. Armed forces of Yemen were not an effective security apparatus of central authority, and Yemeni leaders have traditionally relied on the tribes to maintain security.¹⁰¹ Accordingly, Yemen military has never appeared as an institutionalized security organization.¹⁰²

95 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.78.

96 Knights, “The Military Role...”, pp.261-288; Khaled Fattah, “A Political History of Civil-Military Relations in Yemen”, *Alternative Politics*, Special Issue 1 (November 2010), pp.25-47.

97 Fattah, “A Political History...”, p.43.

98 Phillips, “Who Tried to Kill...”.

99 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.68.

100 Knights, “The Military Role...”, pp.273-274.

101 Fattah, “A Political History...”, pp.44-45. Besides, the military was not the sole group carrying firearms within Yemen. Yemenis have traditionally possessed more weapons than any other Arab population with the government having no effective authority over these arms. And it has been assumed that Yemen’s tribes hold about four times as many firearms as the country’s state security forces. See Derek Miller, ‘Demand, Stockpiles and Social Controls: Small Arms in Yemen’, *Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 9* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey 2003), p.28.

102 Daniel Steiman, “Military Decision-Making During the Arab Spring”, 2012, http://muftah.org/military-decision-making-during-the-arab-spring/#_cdn13 (Accessed at: 13 Nov. 2015).

Cronyism in the security institutions of Yemen was common, particularly at the top-level of military officials. They had been appointed based on their tribal and familial affiliations, and mostly based on personal allegiances to Ali Saleh. Besides cronyism, corruption among the security forces was claimed to be particularly rampant. It was claimed that military officers derived considerable profits from diesel and food smuggling.¹⁰³

Additionally, military services had been virtually immune from civilian oversight and had operated largely outside the law. According to an International Crisis Group Report, “powerful commanders from the president’s family manage divisions more like private fiefdoms than components of a national institution.”¹⁰⁴ So it is safe to say that the military apparatus of the regime was highly fractured, deinstitutionalized, and ineffective.

4.5. Syria

After gaining independence, the Sunni majority had ruled Syria until 1966 *coup d’etat*; through which the traditional leaders of the Ba’ath party were ousted. Then, after succession of coups, Hafez Al-Assad took over the government and became president in 1971. Since that date, Syria has been predominantly ruled by the Assad family and their religious sect, the Alawites. There have been two presidents of Syria since then; Hafez Al-Assad ruled from 1971 until 2000, and after Hafez Al-Assad’s death, his son, Bashar Al-Assad, inherited governmental control.

In contrast to the deep horizontal fissures among Syrian society, there are no political parties or fractions in Syria except for the ruling Ba’ath party, which is the sole legitimate political organization of the state. The primary function of the Ba’ath party is to defend and sustain the ruling Assad family’s monopoly on political activities. Thus, as Perlmutter argues, “the Ba’ath party has become a party in uniform after the February 1966 coup”.¹⁰⁵

The influence of the Assad family and the Ba’ath party has included not only the political environment but has extended also to the military and business sectors as well. Syria’s private economy is dominated by an exceptionally small group, which has political and familial linkages with Assad family.¹⁰⁶ As shown on Table-2 above, the government’s effectiveness, rule of law, corrup-

103 Knights, “The Military Role...”, p.268

104 International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North African and The Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform and Revolution*, Middle East/North Africa Report No.102 (10 March 2011), p.15

105 Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, p.33.

106 Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh, ‘The Ghosts of Hama’, Kenneth Pollack (et al.), *The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), pp.232-233.

tion, and regime type scores are all very low, even lower than the scores of Egypt and Tunisia.

The consequences and methods of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have encouraged suppressed people in Syria as well.¹⁰⁷ At the very beginning of protests in Syria in March 2011, several youth, aged fifteen or younger, were arrested by the security forces in the city of Deraa for committing crimes against the regime. Their “crime” was to have written anti-regime graffiti, such as “down with the regime (*nizam*)”, words that ultimately led to their imprisonment and torture.¹⁰⁸ What happened afterwards, though, is more important; one needs to understand the manner of response of the security forces and of the regime to the crowds. These children were held in custody for a very long time and they suffered great physical and mental anguish.¹⁰⁹ As a consequence, their families blamed the government and took to the streets. In reaction, the Syrian security forces forcefully repressed the protests, and killed some of those involved.

However, this incident was just a precursor to how the regime would ultimately respond to other protests. The youth of Syria suffering from high unemployment and low living conditions began to gather in the streets. After these early demonstrations had spread across the country and the participants had surged against the government, the Syrian Army responded in a tougher and more brutal manner than ever before. The Army went so far as to use tanks, snipers, and live ammunition to counter the unarmed protesters.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the government either refused to return the bodies of dead protesters to their families or forced families to bury their dead in private in order to prevent protesters from gathering at funeral processions.¹¹¹ This only increased the anger of people.

Syria maintained a rather homogenous group at the higher levels within the government and security bodies, in contrast to the large sectarian differences among the populace. Under the rule of both Assads, the Alawites dominated Syria’s political system, armed forces, and other security agencies. The homogenizing of army was initiated with the 1963 Baath coup in order to purge Sunni officers from military, and Alawites, Druzes, and Isma’ilis entered

107 Christopher Phillips, “Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring”, pp. 37-42, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/sr011/final_lse_ideas_syriasbloodyarabspring_phillips.pdf (Accessed at: 02 Feb. 2016).

108 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.103.

109 Agents of the secret police working for General Atef Najeeb, a cousin of President Bashar al-Assad, detained the boys and tortured them by pulling out their fingernails. See Hugh Macleod, “Inside Deraa”, *Al Jazeera*, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/201141918352728300.html> (Accessed at: 14 September 2015).

110 Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings...”, p.48.

111 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, pp.105-106.

Syria's military academy.¹¹² After the late 1970s, officer corps had been subjected to the "Alewitaziton" and to the discrimination policies against Sunni officers.¹¹³ Zisser argued that more than 90% of the generals were Alawites at the time of Hafez Assad's death.¹¹⁴ Additionally, though there were some promotions based on competence rather than loyalty at the junior levels, the positions at senior levels were filled with the people based on their political considerations or personal commitment to Assad.¹¹⁵

The Syrian regime bolstered its repressive power by maintaining multiple security and intelligence agencies, which were ready to counter any religious sects' revolt or the military attempt to overthrow the government. Parallel institutions were created and positioned in the near vicinity of capital to prevent military interventions. The Defense Companies, the 3rd Armored Division, and the Special Forces were among these organizations, and they were subordinated directly to the president.¹¹⁶ Alongside these armed units, Hafez Assad established internal security agencies to monitor military personnel, such as Air Force Intelligence and Military Security.¹¹⁷ These intelligence organizations penetrated military forces through appointment of a security officer to each regiment, brigade, and company of the regular armed forces.¹¹⁸ However, these coup-proofing methods weakened Syrian armed forces.¹¹⁹ As Nassif argues, combat preparedness of military forces had been gradually deteriorated since the early 1990s and it was at the lowest level when the uprisings began.¹²⁰

Besides, the Syrian army had particularly penetrated defense-related sectors of the economy, such as construction, agriculture, and food processing. As previously noted with respect to Egypt, the primary purpose of institutional military economies and the tolerance of officer penetration of the economy were to ensure the loyalty of officers.¹²¹ Another method in maintaining the

112 Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing...", p.140.

113 It is argued that Sunni officers' disaffection with the Asad regime were threefold such as professional, corporatist, and ideational. See Hicham Bou Nassif, "'Second-Class': The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.38, No.5 (2015), pp.626-649.

114 Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and the External Fronts", *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol.5, No.1 (2001), <http://www.rubincenter.org/2001/03/zisser-2001-03-01/> (05 Jan. 2016).

115 Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings...", p.46.

116 Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing...", p.147.

117 Zisser, "The Syrian Army..."; Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing...", p.151.

118 Nassif, "Second Class...", p.643.

119 Quinlivan, "Coup Proofing...", pp.131-165.

120 Nassif, "Second Class...", p.646.

121 Robert Springborg, "Economic Involvements of Militaries", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.43, No.3 (2011), pp.403-405.

loyalty of the military was for government authorities to overlook the smuggling and other illicit profits gained by military personnel.¹²²

Despite their patrimonial characteristics and ongoing civil war, Syrian Armed Forces do indeed have some legitimate combat experience and a relatively capable fighting force.¹²³ Syrian Military has been viewed as a relatively coherent and semi-institutionalized body. Although some defections have occurred over time, they are not commonplace. It is argued that defection was a Sunni phenomenon, since almost no Alawite officer participated.¹²⁴ One of the most important reasons for this argument is the tightly interwoven personnel structure of the ruling circle, security forces, and the military.¹²⁵

5. Institutionalism of Government and Professionalism of Military in the Perspective of Arab Uprisings

In this study, the effects of the institutionalism of governments and the professionalism of militaries on the armies' decisions in Arab uprisings have been scrutinized. The effects of the variables on the cases presented in this study are listed in the Table-3 below.

Table-3: Institutionalism of Government and Professionalism of Military

	Tunisia	Egypt	Libya	Yemen	Syria
Institutionalism of Government	High	Medium	Very low	Very low	Low
Professionalism of Military	Medium	High	Very low	Very low	Medium

Tunisia had the highest degree of institutionalism of government among the examined cases. Though it had relatively independent organizations, Tunisian institutionalism has been assessed as “high” because of the corruption and cronyism concerning the president and his family and because of the repressive manner of governance practiced by the president. In terms of the military, the Tunisian army is relatively small, and has typically remained free from political issues and, as a result, it has never attempted to overthrow the government – a sharp contrast to almost all other countries in the Arab states. The Tunisian military did not have any ethnic, tribal, or sectarian ties to the ruler either. Additionally, the government had kept the army out of political

122 Barry Rubin, “The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol.5, No.1 (March 2001), p.49.

123 Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts...”, p. 36; There were 639,000 men (including 314,000 reserve) under arms, and 108,000 men in paramilitary units in 2009. See *Military Balance* (2010), pp.272-275.

124 Nassif, “Second Class...”, p.644.

125 Gelvin, *What Everyone Needs...*, p.103.

and economic issues through legal statutes. Since the Tunisian Army had previously had no interest in economic and political issues and since Tunisia has a relatively institutionalized government, the Army returned to its barracks after the uprising was settled.

Egypt's case provides an example of the higher institutionalism of the military in comparison to the government. The high management levels of government institutions had been allocated to the president's family or his close circle. The dependence of institutions on the President and widespread corruption among the administrative levels both resulted in bad management practices. On the other hand, the Egyptian military has been the most experienced and strongest army in the Arab world. The Egyptian military retained its independent organizational structure with its own promotion and education system, and politicians have not been able to easily intervene in these. However, the deep involvement of the army in the economic realm has decreased its overall professionalism. In fact, safeguarding its interests in financial activities and preserving its organizational structure have both played a significant role in the decision of the Egyptian military to side with protestors in taking over the government.

Libya and Yemen have similarities in the institutionalization of their governments and armies. In both states, all of the national institutions, including the military, have been formed to balance the tribal distribution across various management levels, particularly, in order to hinder their possible revolt against the regime. Yet, Libya had its own management characteristics, which had originated under Gaddafi's rule, configuring the state structure as his own personal asset. As Anderson argues, Libya was a failed state, and the state structure was divided by cleavages of kinship and region.¹²⁶ On the other hand, Yemen had not yet established a coherent and united government structure at the time of their uprisings. It had endured great political unrest and even numerous armed conflicts in the 50 years prior to the uprisings.

However, the military institutions of Yemen and Libya have minor differences. Neither of them has been known as national armies in the traditional sense. The Libyan armed forces were established simply to protect the Gaddafi regime, with high-level leaders of the army being appointed from close family or tribal members of Gaddafi. On the other hand, the Yemeni army has had many shortfalls in terms of professionalism. Both of the Libyan and Yemeni armies have suffered from widely distributed cronyism across the management structure, financial interests in economical activities, and there has been no civilian supervision over both of them. Therefore, these armies have had no real institutional bonds to the military or the government and, as a result, they have preferred to take sides with the winning parties, following mass de-

126 Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring", pp.2-7.

fections once the armed conflict had expanded. Furthermore, these so-called revolutions have led to violent civil war-like conditions, with no robust and coherent government and military institutions to counter them.

Lastly, Syria has been ruled by the Assad family for almost 50 years. The institutions of government, particularly at the highest levels, have been filled by those with familial ties or those from the religious sect, the Alawites, during this period. Additionally, they established a police state with different security institutions for overseeing the daily life of the population. Although Syria has had a repressive governing body made up of those with familial and religious ties, it has had a coherent and relatively robust structure due to these linkages. These institutions and units within the army have stayed loyal to the state, with the exception of a few defections, largely due to the knowledge that the collapse of regime would endanger the integrity of the military. Therefore, the institutionalism of the Syrian government has been assessed as “low”; nevertheless, the professionalism of the army has been noted as “medium”, having legitimate war experience, middle sized organization, and a coherent military structure.

6. Conclusions

The variables discussed in this article have had significant effects on the management of the turmoil in each case, as well as the aftermath. If the institutionalization level of government is higher than the military's, and the professionalization of the military is not high at all, as it was the case in Tunisia, the revolt may indeed end smoothly. The Army has enough coherent structure and capability to tackle the uprisings, and yet it is also prepared to return to its barracks after containing the unrest and maintaining subordination to civilian control. Additionally, the government can manage the transformation process with relatively settled institutions.

However, if the degree of the professionalization of military is higher than the institutionalization of government, as was the case in Egypt, the Army may decide to take over the governmental reins. This is particularly the case when a condition of deadlock is achieved between insurgents and security forces, and then the military may defy the orders of the government in order to pursue its own organizational interests. Once the uprisings are quelled, the military may feel itself to be the best arbiter in the new political environment.

In those cases where the institutionalization of the government and the professionalization of military are very low, as seen in Libya and Yemen, the probability of disorder may become greater than in any other instance. Additionally, if the armies have insufficient professionalism but no capability to contain the revolts, there will be a high probability of armed conflict or civil war. The conditions mentioned above are among the most difficult condi-

tions, that a country can confront, and it may lead to the collapse of the whole governmental structure.

On the other hand, if the army is subordinated to civilian control and it has moderate professionalization, as in Syria, these conditions of low institutionalization of government institutions may again provoke armed conflict or civil war. However, this situation reveals some differences from the previous cases. The Syrian Army, at least a large part of it, has remained loyal, because high-level officers are inextricably linked to the regime. At the same time, if the insurgents are rooted in the population and also have international support, the probability of a protracted armed conflict increases.

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KUZAY SURİYE'DE 'REKABETÇİ KONTROL' TEORİSİ

ÖZ

Suriye'de devlet zayıflaması, uzun süredir sessiz bir şekilde devam eden mahrumiyetleri gün ışığına çıkartarak rejimin, ülkenin kuzey-doğusunda güç kaybetmesine sebep oldu. Bu devlet zayıflamasından iki ana devlet-dışı aktör ortaya çıktı: PYD ve IŞİD. İki grup da, ortaya çıktıkları bölgelerde merkezi hükümetin kontrol mekanizmalarını devralarak bir nevi devlet-vari bir idari performans sergilemiş ve bölgelerin günlük idaresini ele almıştır. Devlet-dışı aktörlerin belli bölgelerde nasıl devlet faaliyeti yürüttüğü ve yerel halkın desteğini bu idari performans ile kazandığı konusunda en yeni kavramsallaştırmalardan biri David Kilcullen'ın 'rekabetçi kontrol teorisi'dir. Bu teoriye göre devletler zayıfladığında hangi devlet-dışı aktör idari altyapıyı oluşturacak şekilde bölge halkının taleplerini ve ihtiyaçlarını karşılarsa, o bölgenin aidiyeti bir süre sonra bu gruba dönük olacaktır. Bu teori hem PYD/YPG hem de IŞİD gibi grupların neden sadece askeri yöntemlerle yenilemeyeceğini de açıklamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: devlet başarısızlığı, devlet-dışı aktörler, IŞİD, PYD, Suriye

نظرية «الرقابة المنافسة» في سوريا الشمالية

ان ضعف الدولة في سوريا اظهر للعيان الحرمان الذي يعاني منه الشعب والذي يستمر بشكل صامت منذ مدة طويلة، وهذا ما أدى الى فقدان النظام لقوته في المناطق الشمالية الشرقية من هذا البلد. وقد نتج عن ضعف الدولة هذا بروز فاعلين اساسيين هنالك وهما: حزب الوحدة الديمقراطية و داعش. وقد تسلّمت كلتا المجموعتين آلية نفوذ الحكومة المركزية في المناطق التي ظهرت فيها. و اظهرت كلتا القوتين، اللتين يمكن ان يطلق عليهما اشباه دولة، قدرة ادارية، واخذتا زمام السلطة الادارية بايديهما. وان خير مثال مندرج كمفهوم متكامل على كيفية تمثية الفاعلين خارج نطاق الدولة فعاليات الدولة نفسها في مناطق معينة، وكسبها رضا السكان المحليين عن طريق هذه الادارة، هو نظرية «الرقابة المنافسة» للكاتب David Kilcullen. ووفقا لهذه النظرية، فانه عندما تضعف الدول، فان اي فاعل خارج نطاق الدولة يستطيع تاسيس البنية التحتية الادارية و تلبية طلبات واحتياجات سكان المنطقة، فان عائدية تلك المنطقة ستعود بعد فترة ما الى تلك المجموعة. ان هذه النظرية تفسّر لنا سبب عدم امكان اندحار بعض المجاميع من امثال حزب الوحدة الديمقراطية والمنظومة المسلحة التابعة لهذا الحزب وتنظيم الدولة (داعش) بالوسائل العسكرية وحدها.

الكلمات الدالة : اخفاق الدولة، الفاعلون خارج نطاق الدولة، داعش، حزب الوحدة الديمقراطية، سوريا.

WEAK STATES, STRONG NON-STATE ACTORS: THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL IN NORTHERN SYRIA

ABSTRACT

State weakening in Syria unearthed long-dormant processes of disenfranchisement, contributing to the regime's loss of territory in the north-eastern half of the country. Out of this state weakening, two major armed non-state groups emerged: Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Both groups have uprooted the control tools and actors of the central authority, taking on an increasingly state-like dual role of security provision and day-to-day administration. How non-state armed groups emerge in the wake of state weakening is best conceptualized by David Kilcullen, who introduced the concept of 'theory of competitive control' to identify how challengers to state authority need to prove their capacity in administration. Kilcullen further argues that when states fail, whichever non-state actor emerges most capable of providing administration will convert the loyalties of the local population over time. This perspective is important to understand why Rojava and ISIS are long-term phenomena and will be impossible to eliminate through military-only methods.

Keywords: State failure, non-state actors, ISIS, PYD, Syria

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1. Introduction

The emergence of armed non-state groups since the end of the Cold War inherits from the refocus of threat perceptions from systemic to national. Bereft of the imminent nuclear threat, which was a hallmark of the Cold War, states had to deal with increasingly more difficult questions of legitimacy and loyalty within their diverse demography, as well as maintaining a degree of cosmopolitanism and openness to the world economy. States that had administered over a high percentage of disenfranchisement, be it ideological, identity-related or economic, have begun to see increasingly stronger formations of non-state armed groups as a form of state-society power negotiations. Lack or insufficiency of legitimacy, thus, evolved into greater internal security threats after the Cold War and generated a vicious circle of greater repression and counter-violence by non-state armed groups in response. While states could predominantly devise military-only strategies in response to these new challenges, such strategies have paradoxically led to the strengthening and endurance of the very groups that states sought to eliminate, mainly through the transfer of knowledge, tactics and training. As states increasingly apply violent measures against questions of legitimacy, armed non-state groups begin establishing self-defense zones within certain urban areas, initiating *de facto* control zones.

Syrian Civil War brought back the debate on failed or weak states and how such weakening or failure impact non-state actors. The ripple effect of state weakness has been diagnosed by Robert I. Rothberg, who argued that a state's gradual demise leads to weakening in neighboring states as well.¹ This, according to Rothberg, happens because of how state weakening unearths identity-based discontent within a territorial entity and how that discontent affects people of the same or similar identity or ideology in the wider geopolitical space. In that, state weakening is a discontent exporting event, which activates identity-based disenfranchisements in its surrounding environment, leading to the emergence of transnational, identity-based conflicts. These challenges can be conceptualized as vertical (within a territorial entity) and horizontal (between adjacent territorial entities) security dilemmas, as identified by Anthony Vinci, who further discussed how state weakening in one territory leads to the emergence of armed groups that export such weakening to adjacent territories.² From the point of Vinci, lack of legitimacy in one state automatically translates into a security problem for adjacent states over the long-term. This has indeed been the case with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh) and Democratic Union Party (PYD -Partiya Yekîtiya

1 Robert Rothberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States" in Robert Rothberg (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003)

2 Antonio Vinci (2008) "Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis", *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp. 295–314

Demokrat), along with its military wing YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or People's Protection Units) which emerged from the dual state weakening in Syria and Iraq. It also gives us a good idea on why they compete horizontally (with other non-state armed groups) and vertically (with the standing armies of states they inhabit) not only through armed confrontation, but also practices or administration, taxation and territorial control.

2. Theoretical Framework

Most non-state actors like ISIS and PYD-YPG inherit the capabilities of the state they inhabit. Such inheritance can both be in the form of the know-how of violence (recruitment, training, and deployment of armed units) and also of administration (taxation, services provision, law and order). Klaus Schlichte drew a blueprint of how non-state armed groups model the states they emerge within and how within state institutions that the core skills needed for armed rebellion are transmitted.³ A state possessing well-functioning military, institutional and knowledge capacity is not, by itself, a limiting factor to the emergence of armed groups, if that capacity is tasked with dealing with a question of legitimacy. Schlichte claims that states that lack democracy, always face the challenge of facing their own capacity for violence in the form of internal armed groups.⁴ The very military/security measures states take to subdue such groups, without making progress in political representation, also paradoxically strengthen them, as new military knowledge, equipment and training types travel well within a single border, in addition to such equipment being lost or stolen in conflict. However, over time, non-state armed groups also start to mimic the states they are fighting with, along with their ceremonial, symbolic and mobilization procedures. This is why many armed non-state groups use symbols associated with the states they are fighting against: flags, anthems and, in some cases, their own currency, to foster group cohesion and acceptance. The methodical use of these symbols become more commonplace, as armed groups begin administering territory and population, thus becoming the main security providers of that area.⁵ In turn, such non-state groups become proto-statelets and engage in a horizontal competition of territorial control with states.

Security provision and territorial control are interlinked, and this is perhaps the most fundamental linkage in administrative competition. Robert Bunker emphasized that the dual failure in Iraq and Syria has brought about a three-tier process whereby, one, there is a consistent decline in the supply of state protection, two, consistent increase in the demand for protection and,

3 Klaus Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)

4 *Ibid.* p. 146-154

5 Sukanya Podder (2013). "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion". *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 34, Issue 1, (2007) 16-39

three, sporadic increase in non-state actors' supply of protection.⁶ The combination of these factors increasingly leads to the rise in demand for local armed groups that behave like states by dislodging both the armed and non-armed functions of the central authority. This brings two additional questions: one, in terms of the Weberian notion on the monopoly of the use of force as a basic form of legitimacy of a state and two, in terms of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, structured upon the presumed social contract (state's main duty is to protect citizens' well-being and security) between those who govern and those that are governed. In Weberian terms, the monopoly on the use of force existed even in feudalism, where organized use of violence has been permitted through a loose set of unwritten laws.⁷

Weber conceded that in modern state system, states are not the only sources of violence, but they are the only *legitimate* source of violence – an observation, which builds on Hobbesian and Machiavellian understandings of statehood. While this view explains the relationship between states and their legitimate use of violence for the most part of the 20th century, recurring problems of legitimacy in the Middle East, which culminated with the Iraq War in 2003 and the Syrian Civil War of 2011, have obscured such Weberian interpretations. The Westphalian debate, on the other hand, where non-intervention is the main structural norm of international relations, becomes further complicated.⁸

If we are to see central authorities as the only sources of legitimacy in international relations, if they are the only sources of legitimate violence and if this legitimacy acts as the foundation of our respect for non-intervention principle, what happens when these central authorities grow unable to respond to the challenges of non-state actors and fail in establishing security in parts of their legitimate territory? While this reasoning acts as the foundational logic of the responsibility-to-protect (R2P) literature,⁹ that literature in turn, fails to address a more local and existential problem of territorial control and administration.

The events that unfolded in Iraq and Syria in the last half decade demonstrated that central governments are not necessarily the main source of stability in world politics. Depending on regime type and depth of representation, certain governments can indeed export instability into its wider system through exacerbating existing divisions. Once a disenfranchising central government

6 Robert Mandel, *Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013)

7 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, (1921) p. 29

8 Andreas Osiander (2001). "Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth". *International organization*, Vol. 55, Issue 2, (2001) pp. 251-287.

9 See for example; Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, "The responsibility to protect", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 81, Issue 6 (2002) pp. 1-8.

uses indiscriminate force on an essentially demographic problem, it paradoxically loses control over the territory and is forced to exert increasing strength with increasingly low returns – a policy, which eventually departs from purely rationalistic explanations of conflict. In this context, the dislodged state authority gives way to a different form of legitimacy; that of armed non-state actors providing both security and basic services to a limited population. This creates a new form of relationship between local population that used to obey the previous form of legitimacy (state-centric) and the newly emerging armed non-state actors that come with their own symbols, ideology and objectives. This transition between state and non-state types of legitimacy is particularly difficult to situate in international law, which has traditionally been state-centric just like Weberian and Westphalian notions of sovereignty.

One of the theoretical approaches that aim to resolve this deadlock is David Kilcullen's 'theory of competitive control', which outlines how non-state armed groups interact with the populations, which they control.¹⁰ In a nutshell, the theory predicts that in irregular conflicts the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system, namely a "set of behavioral rules correlated with a set of predictable consequences" of control, is most likely to dominate that population in its residential area and develop legitimacy.¹¹

Kilcullen's theory posits that in the absence of a central authority, armed groups that best simulate state functions such as security, taxation, services provision in a consistent and predictable fashion will, over time, successfully steer that population's loyalties. Kilcullen's definition of an armed non-state actor is "any group that includes armed individuals who apply violence but who aren't members of the regular forces of a nation-state,"¹² which expands as far as to street gangs, militias, insurgents and even pirates, rendering such specific definitions irrelevant due to these groups' performance of essentially the same function.

While Kilcullen believes that armed non-state groups corrupt the social fabric of the society by undermining the authority and legitimacy of a central administration, and by creating a new social class which he terms as 'conflict entrepreneurs',¹³ he somehow contradicts himself by admitting that the very emergence of such groups result from state weakening and malfunction to begin with. In that, Kilcullen yields that such 'conflict entrepreneurs' feed on the most disenfranchised segments of a population – those who have lost all

10 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) pp. 116-169

11 *Ibid.* p. 132

12 *Ibid.* p. 126

13 *Ibid.* p. 66

hope for the future and see war as the only way to achieve upward mobility and in most cases, mere survival.

Kilcullen's theory brings a new perspective into the study of statist theories by arguing that the collapse of central state authority doesn't necessarily lead to *homo homini lupus* in Hobbesian sense, nor will it shatter the very foundations of a society in Machiavellian view, but may in certain circumstances, lead to the emergence of local buffer institutions (such as non-state armed actors) that fill-in to provide security and services.

Kilcullen also localizes its analysis of conflict entrepreneurs. In his view, just as city-states in history have developed a largely autonomous profile, becoming centers of arts, culture and science of their time, the rise of non-state armed groups have created militancy city-states that have grown into 'urban no-go areas.' Able to defend entire districts and, in some cases the entire city, from organized state military and police forces, these urban no-go areas become "safe havens for criminal networks or non-state armed groups, creating a vacuum that is filled by local youth who have no shortage of grievances, whether arising from their new urban circumstances or imported from their home villages."¹⁴

The theory of competitive control thus conceptualizes the emerging security question posed by ungoverned spaces, both for their respective central governments and for the regional security of their strategic habitus. Regardless of whether they are supportive of, or against, Western military intervention, all non-state armed groups have demonstrated similar patterns of behavior with regard to establishing alternative regimes and localized control zones. RAND defines 'ungoverned spaces' as: "... failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government's authority does not extend."¹⁵ US Department of Defense on the other hand offer this definition:

A place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior... the term 'ungoverned areas' encompasses under-governed, misgoverned, contested, and exploitable areas as well as ungoverned areas.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 40

¹⁵ Rand Corporation, "Ungoverned Territories: Unique Front in the War on Terrorism". RAND Project Air Force Research Brief #233, (2007)

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB233/index1.html] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

¹⁶ Robert D. Lamb, "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens – Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project." Prepared for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy by the Office of

Competitive control for the administration of ungoverned spaces can be especially useful in explaining how issue and policy compartmentalizations occur. For example, a non-state group can provide local security, food and garbage disposal, whereas a state can still be providing electricity, water and banking services. This equilibrium between state and non-state administration can range from ghetto-ization, where non-state groups maintain security in small districts and streets, to full state collapse, where non-state actors provide all components of administration, including infrastructure, municipality and financial services. One of the best examples to this was the case of Mosul, where civil servants continued to receive salaries from Baghdad, long after the capture of the city by ISIS.¹⁷ In other words, the extent to which non-state actors assume state-like roles depends entirely on the relative balance of power between those actors and standing armies of states.

With the onset of the Syrian Civil War, local and external pressures have led to a weakening of state authority in Syria. Following the emergence of numerous armed groups, the Islamic State proclaimed itself a caliphate in June 2014, rapidly expanding in territorial control and number of people it brought under control in Syria and Iraq. Likewise, in 2014, Syrian Kurdish groups under the control of PYD have expanded along the Turkish border and consolidated a formidable amount of territory there. Both ISIS and PYD thus merit deeper research into how they manage and oversee their territorial gains, how they consolidate populations and how they administer them.

3. *Dawa* and *Hisba*: How ISIS Controls and Administers

The most comprehensive study on the territorial methodology of ISIS was conducted by Aaron Zelin.¹⁸ Zelin divides his study into pre- and post-territorial control methodologies, explaining how and where ISIS decides to expand, and how the territory it has expanded determines its administrative style. Within pre- and post-territorial control types, there are five different approaches: ‘intelligence, military, *dawa* (missionary activities), *hisba* (moral policing and consumer protection), and governance.’¹⁹

In Zelin’s account, the first phase includes sleeper cell implantation and infiltrating other armed groups, as well as ‘buying’ local clans and smaller

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, as quoted in: David Fisher and Cristina Mercado, “Competitive Control: How to Evaluate the Threats Posed by Ungoverned Spaces”, *Small Wars Journal*. (2007)

17 Isabel Coles, “Despair, hardship as Iraq cuts off wages in Islamic State cities”. Reuters, (2 October 2015) [<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-salaries-idUSKCN0RW0V620151002>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

18 Aaron Zelin, “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology”. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Research Note No. 29 (January 2016) [<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote29-Zelin.pdf>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

19 *Ibid.* pp. 1-3

insurgents. This takes place through the pledging of allegiance (*baya*) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, after which training camps begin to form, which is the final step of the first phase. In the second phase, which the group defines as ‘*dawa* program’, IS commences outreach to establish communications with the local populace – from ‘softer’ methods such as games and competitions to more direct methods as literature and pamphlet distribution as a way of conducting initial propaganda and image building.

A dedicated PR office, which organizes meals and gatherings with powerful tribes and notables is also part of this process. In the third phase, the organization begins taxing the population and enforces law through dedicated legal outlets, with specific attention to resolving long-standing disputes as a way of demonstrating administrative capacity. In post-territorial control, i.e., after ISIS establishes initial control of a recently expanded territory, it begins to rule the area as a state-like entity, extracting resources (manpower, capital and supplies) while exercising a more direct application of its ideology, in terms of cultural codes and production maximization.

Zelin posits that once ISIS establishes stronger control over a territory, it starts to fight with heavier weapons and equipment from there, assuming an open warfare posture. While the softer, initial contact method of *dawa* enables ISIS to control the territory, the next *hisba* phase introduces penalties, punishments and stricter interpretation and enforcement of cultural norms. Final forms of control include raising ISIS black flag in the city, in important buildings, lamp posts and key public areas and manufacturing custom road signs as a form of municipality work and demonstrating bid for statehood. In more extreme cases, ISIS also changes the name of the town it successfully employed all components of administration.

In demonstrating its competence as a source of administration, ISIS engages in substantial municipality work; from paving the roads to fixing electric and phone lines, to garbage collection and ‘beautification’ projects, including new mosque, market and shop constructions. As a form of communicating to the local populace that ISIS’ arrival effectively ends the conflict and provides safety (one of the most welcome changes to a population under prolonged duress), the group also restarts industries (quarries, poultry farms, glass, brick and wood workshops) that halted due to conflict. Mass-production of food – especially bread, rice and potato – is also one of the final phases of ISIS administrative methodology.

4. Social Economy and Cooperatives: How PYD Administers

Syrian Civil War has allowed the Kurds to benefit from the disappearance of borders. PYD and YPG, with differing levels of connections to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have already redrawn the map of northern Syria, establishing a *de facto* control zone – Rojava. Assisted by US air strikes,

PYD has managed to push back the Islamic State and acquire a territorial form, albeit at a high human cost. Nonetheless, the goal of establishing an autonomous, self-administered territory has so far enabled PYD to mobilize some segment of the Syrian Kurds to keep fighting and take territory from both ISIS and the Assad regime.

PYD doesn't have the kind of maximalist expansion aims like ISIS. Rather, PYD has so far acted in more minimalist terms, aiming to capitalize on an ethno-nationalist territorialization, where Kurdish demography renders PYD presence conducive. In that, PYD doesn't enjoy a large territory like ISIS, but benefits from greater consolidation and support, owing to ethno-nationalist and ideological cohesion. This in turn means that PYD has less incentive to focus on pre-territorial control methods like intelligence gathering and propaganda, and more on administration and consolidation. Indeed, as PYD expands into territories with a larger majority of Kurdish population, there is faster and easier consolidation of administration, whereas as it expands into more ethnically mixed areas, it is forced to fine tune and improvise its approach. Following its territorial gains after its capture of Tal Abyad from ISIS in the summer 2015, it has rapidly expanded territory in ethnically mixed areas, which posed a challenge to its initial model.

First types of administrative action PYD takes is to establish a framework for municipality and infrastructure projects. Akram Hasso, PYD's self-declared Prime Minister, has defined these project types as "health, sewerage, medical, agricultural projects, and local municipality services [such as asphalt road connections]."²⁰ Rojava Kurds believe that their region was left backward deliberately by the Assad regime for decades, which led to the region's development of a kind of colonial relationship to Damascus by supplying wheat, cotton and oil.²¹ In return, however, there are few factories, infrastructure or workshops built by the regime, as the Damascus has attempted to deny further development in bid to restrict the Kurds' ability to generate extra resources that may be used in rebellion against the state. This one-sided arrangement, according to the discourse of Rojava, had led to the emergence of private fiefdoms, controlled by pro-government officials, all of which fled after the onset of the civil war, leaving a backward and mal-administered territory behind.²²

20 Tom Perry, "Syrian Kurds' spending plans reflect rising ambition". Reuters. (28 July 2015) [<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-idUSKCN0Q21BK20150728>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

21 Carne Ross, "The Kurds' Democratic Experiment". New York Times. (30 September 2015) [<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/the-kurds-democratic-experiment.html>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

22 Erika Solomon "Amid Syria's violence, Kurds carve out autonomy". Reuters. (22 January 2014) [<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-kurdistan-specialreport-idUSBREA0L17320140122>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

In order to re-create administration in a region that had poor connection to the nation's capital, PYD emphasizes 'social economy' – a combination of cooperatives across economic sectors in order to meet basic supplies of food and fuel.²³ The idea of a cooperative, as well as 'social economy,' import a lot from the Soviet concept of *kolkhoz*²⁴ as well as its Israeli counterpart, *kibbutz*,²⁵ both of which have been integral components of early state- and community-building in both countries. The idea of self-governing farming collectives has thus been central to Rojava's political economy and act as a pivot towards possible statehood.²⁶

If statehood is not achieved, then, collectives are still integral to Rojava, as they will be the basis of economic independence from any central administration. Rations of food, produced by these collectives have both been used to supply adjacent collectives, and also wider towns and villages as well, rendering these collectives integral to food security for a larger area. In that, Rojava revolution has also been – among other things – a land re-appropriation project from former government-controlled fiefdoms into self-governing farming collectives that feed their immediate neighborhoods.²⁷

This is indeed a socialist experiment, as one of the stated aims of the revolution has been the eventual connection of cooperatives into a larger network economy, within which money is either minimized or eliminated altogether.²⁸ In the town of Derik (within Jazira canton), for example, as of September 2014, municipality payment for the employees were made based on need (number of dependents), rather than merit, and establishment of food aid networks across communes and municipality workers were also conducted in a similar fashion.²⁹

At the time of writing this article, Syrian currency was still used in PYD-administered areas and loans were made – albeit, without interest.³⁰ While the

23 Ahmed Yousef, "The Social Economy in Rojava". FairCoop, (11 October 2016) [<https://fair.coop/the-social-economy-in-rojava/>] (Accessed: 26 October 2016)

24 Tomasso Trevisani, "After the Kolkhoz: rural elites in competition". Central Asian Survey, Volume 26, Issue 1, (2007) pp. 85-104.

25 Yonina Talmon, Family and Community in the Kibbutz. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972)

26 On Rojava's economy, one of the best accounts is ANF's interview with Ahmet Yusuf, who was made President of the Committee On Economy and Trade of the Afrin Autonomous Canton. See: Seyit Evran, "Dr. Yusuf: Rojava's Economic Model is a Communal Model". Firat News Agency (ANF), (14 September 2014). Available at: [<https://rojavarreport.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/dr-yusuf-rojavas-economic-model-is-a-communal-model/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

27 Ibid.

28 Joseph Kay, "Rojava Economy and Class Structure". LibCom.Org, (17 October 2014) [<http://kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/rojava-s-threifold-economy.html>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

29 Ibid.

30 Evran, 2014

model seems to be working for now and in smaller administrative areas, it poses questions over the future of banking and finance – two essential economic questions if the PYD project pushed to administer over a larger population and territory, which seeks sustainability.

5. Comparing and Contrasting ISIS and PYD's Competitive Control

Theory of competitive control helps us understand why ISIS and PYD are both long-term and local phenomena. As the level of analysis problem in modern conflicts are reduced to the size of cities and even districts, understanding competition for territorial control through administrative practice is key. In that, a military-only thinking of both organizations prevents a proper contextualization of why they have sustained popular support and social base. Both groups construct authority based on coercive, persuasive and administrative approaches in which intertwined and dynamic processes of conflicts co-exist. In comparing and contrasting both groups' territorial methods, two layers of analysis are required: population-economy (resources) and centralization-autonomy (type of rule).

In terms of resources, ISIS controls both a larger territory and population, as well as a more expansive economy. In February 2015, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross estimated that ISIS rules over a population of around 6,750,000; 2,247,000 of which is in Syria and 3,900,000 - 4,600,000 living in Iraq.³¹ In Syria, the most concentrated ISIS population centers are Raqqa (around 1 million) and Dair az-Zor Province (also around 1 million) in Syria, whereas in Iraq these are Ninawa Province (1,480,000) and parts of Kirkuk, including al-Dibs, Daquq and Hawija (525,000).³² For PYD-controlled areas, on the other hand, one of the earliest measurements of population was 4,6 million as of late 2014, based on New World Academy report,³³ although a more recent census has been unforthcoming. Even with the 2014 figure, an important majority of those are thought of as internally displaced people. In Rojava, the most populated cantons are Jazira (1.5 million), Kobani (1 million) and Afrin (1.3 million) as of May 2014.³⁴ Both groups control similar sizes of population and, in that regard, identifying a clear long-term demographic winner is difficult at this point. At a time when a proper census is unforthcoming, a

31 David Gartenstein-Ross, "How many fighters does the Islamic State really have?". War on the Rocks. (9 February 2015) [<http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-have/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

32 Ibid.

33 René in der Maur and Jonas Staal (eds.) *Stateless Democracy*, (Utrecht: New World Academy, 2015) [<http://newworldsummit.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NWA5-Stateless-Democracy.pdf>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

34 "Canton Based Democratic Autonomy of Rojava". Kurdistan National Congress (KNK). (May 2014) [<https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/rojava-info-may-2014.pdf>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

statistical survey on the birthrates – a reliable measurement of long-term demography – is also hard to conduct. Therefore, based on available data, ISIS and Rojava seem to be tied down in a draw over competition for demographic superiority. Nonetheless, the territorial gains of PYD at the expense of ISIS in Syria and the rollback of ISIS in Iraq is likely to change this picture.

In terms of financial resources, there is a more complicated picture. In December 2015, *Financial Times* ran one of the most detailed accounts of ISIS finances, including provincial microeconomic policy.³⁵ There are two types of economy in ISIS run parts of Iraq and Syria – for ISIS members and outsiders. According to FT account, prices for commodity goods and services for ISIS members are about half of outsider prices. Rather than maintaining and improving existing economy in administered territories, ISIS has so far relied more on conquest economy, where confiscation and re-appropriation of newly acquired resources have generated more revenue than the sale of oil or taxation.³⁶ ISIS employs a governor (or *wali*), who coordinates the local *Zakat* Council, which in turn collects tax, depending on the territory's income and level of loyalty. Taxation includes cash, as well as grain and cotton. *Zakat* is taken at a 2.5% rate from all businesses regardless of size – regular grain is taxed 5% and rain-fed crops is taxed 10%.³⁷ In generating a sanction-proof economy, ISIS has structured its financial system in a way that sanctions hurt the population more than ISIS leadership or militant network – this is also part of ISIS military strategy, whereby it has successfully embedded its command rooms inside dense civilian areas, rendering it costly to hit through aerial bombing.³⁸ This dual military-financial embedding into civilian areas ensure public support (or at least loyalty) to the organization, while preventing break-aways or external pressures to destabilize the group's control.³⁹

As far as economy in PYD-controlled areas is concerned, there are multiple insider accounts from different cantons. As solidarity economy and cooperatives are based on the idea of political autonomy and de-centralization, a fixed

35 Sam Jones and Erika Solomon, "ISIS Inc: Jihadis fund war machine but squeeze citizens". *Financial Times*. (15 December 2015) [<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2ef519a6-a23d-11e5-bc70-7ff6d4fd203a.html#axzz4C2haXZPo>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

36 Erika Solomon and Sam Jones, "ISIS Inc: Loot and taxes keep jihadi economy churning". *Financial Times* (14 December 2016) [<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ace89a00-9ff1-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46.html#axzz4C2haXZPo>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

37 Jose Pagliery, "Inside the \$2 billion ISIS war machine". *CNN Money*. (11 December 2015) [<http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/06/news/isis-funding/index.html?category=home-international>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

38 Karoun Demirjian, "Congress wants to strengthen financial sanctions against ISIS". *The Washington Post*. (24 December 2015) [<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/12/24/congress-wants-to-strengthen-financial-sanctions-against-isis/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

39 Jonah Goldberg, "US Mandates ISIS embed deeper into civilian populations". *National Review*. (24 June 2015) [<http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/420230/us-mandates-isis-embed-deeper-civilian-populations-jonah-goldberg>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

policy is difficult to track. Rojava's Constitution⁴⁰ specifically states a preference for democratic autonomy over the homogeneity of the nation-state, while equally emphasizing 'not being opposed to the state' and 'not seeking to form a state', meaning its understanding of autonomy is not against territorial integrity of neighboring countries. Contrasting with ISIS's understanding of ownership, PYD governance pursues a pro-private property approach, somewhat contradicting the socialist foundations of its collective communalization system.⁴¹ Rather than taxation or zakat, however, PYD focuses more on collective production – collective consumption and the eventual goal of minimizing the role of currency in economy.⁴² Overall, however, given the proximity of the main population centers to conflict and different practices of economic policy in the cantons, a clear-cut, functioning economic policy is difficult to identify there, in contrast to ISIS's economic policy, which is more centrally administered.

As far as population and economy are concerned, it is hard to identify a clear long-term winner between ISIS and PYD. Both groups have only recently emerged from what Kilcullen defines as 'shadow governance'⁴³ (which exists in parallel to the reach of a central authority) to active governance (where central authority does not exist). While ISIS controls a larger population, its rigid conquest economy creates too many disenfranchisements away from these territories, inevitably leading to economic shrinkage. Indeed, ISIS has already begun banning travels outside its control zones (*Dar al-Harb*) following large numbers of defections of people whose properties were confiscated from cities under its control.⁴⁴

To that extent, ISIS' economic survival depends on constant conquest, for its economic administration and taxation policy not only prevents further development of businesses and workshops into more advanced forms of production, but it also structured the very basis of its economy on the accumulation of outside resources, such as pillaging and extortion. PYD governance, on the other hand, seems to be more understanding of the necessity of attracting capital, rather than overtax or restrict the movement of goods and services. However, its co-op economy may run into bigger problems as territory and

40 Charter of the Social Contract in Rojava (Syria), available online: [<http://www.kurdishinstitute.be/charter-of-the-social-contract/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

41 C. Massey (2016) "A new co-operative economy: Democratic confederalism in Rojava and Bakur". Institute for Solidarity Economics. (7 June 2016) [<http://solidarityeconomics.org/2016/06/07/a-new-co-operative-economy-democratic-confederalism-in-rojava-and-bakur/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

42 Evran, 2014

43 Kilcullen, 151

44 Lizzie Dearden, "Isis 'bans all Christians from leaving Raqqa' as military operations against group intensify in Syria". The Independent. (31 March 2016) [<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-bans-all-christians-from-leaving-raqqa-as-military-operations-against-group-intensify-in-syria-a6962331.html>](Accessed: 19 June 2016)

population expands into a size, which may require more efficient financial planning. In addition, PYD itself is not immune from accusations of extortion and other abuses of power,⁴⁵ which may complicate its bid to emerge as a more progressive and accommodating alternative to ISIS. Nonetheless, both ISIS and PYD have effectively filled-in the need for the administration of basic goods and services in a conflict setting, providing security, food and basic activities of livelihood to an otherwise ungoverned territory.

In terms of political administration, ISIS favors direct centralization, whereas PYD is the complete opposite, advocating canton-style autonomy. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi made a detailed account of the evolution in ISIS' administration, tracking it back to 2006, when the group was a fringe organization in Iraq.⁴⁶ ISIS adopts a mixture of technocratic and ideological approach to appointments, where 'important' ministries such as oil and health were headed by engineers and doctors with due specialization. By 2014, ISIS had already developed an administrative model with 14 'ministries,' including education, resources, currency, public relations and agriculture.⁴⁷

Strong cultural adherence is required in the application of such administration, such as a common policy on *Zakat*, or other practices such as the closure of businesses during prayer times. In the application of administration, harsh justice and rigid religious-legal apparatus have helped to bring order in ISIS controlled places that have suffered from extended fighting. ISIS's centralization becomes easier to enforce as warring sides have been fully polarized across clear-cut trenches, unlike the fragmented picture that emerged soon after the Iraq War in 2003. Also, the populace is more war-weary now, compared to 2003 and is more receptive to the idea of harsh justice in exchange for security and basic stability. In that, the structure of ISIS administration has a clear-cut hierarchy, where Caliph is the ultimate source of authority, which rules over a cabinet of advisors. In turn, the Caliph has two deputies, one for Syria and one for Iraq, each of which rule over 12 governors in Syria and 12 in Iraq. A separate *Shura* Council, which administers religious and military affairs counsel both the Caliph and his deputies.⁴⁸

45 "Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-run Enclaves of Syria". Human Rights Watch. (19 June 2014). [https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/19/under-kurdish-rule/abuses-pyd-run-enclaves-syria] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

46 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (2015) "The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence", Perspective on Terrorism. (5 August 2015) [http://www.meforum.org/5515/isis-administration-evolution] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

47 Ibid.

48 Nick Thompson and Atika Shubert. "The anatomy of ISIS: How the 'Islamic State' is run, from oil to beheadings". CNN International Edition. (14 January 2015). [http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

Rojava, on the other hand, has a different structure, which follows an interlinked set up of institutions that address administration at different levels.⁴⁹ While different cantons have individual models, the best-defined example is the Jazira administration, where Executive Council acts as a government with 22 ministries, with a Kurdish President and two deputies – one Arab and one Syriac. A Judicial Council oversees legal processes, whereas a Supreme Constitutional Court and High Commission of Election act within a checks and balances system. For the Legislative Council, made up of 101 members, and the Judicial Council, Supreme Constitutional Court and High Commission of Election, there is a gender quota of at least %40 women. In addition, there is also a Local Administration Council, which handles local affairs in 10 cities of the Jazira Canton. Yet, the planned structure is currently lagging behind, due to the persistence of the conflict and the proximity of population centers to active combat. In addition, despite an autonomous and loosely linked decision-making, the ‘Rojava project’ is still viewed by different groups of Kurds as a ‘PYD project,’ which prevents further consolidation and unification.⁵⁰ Other criticisms exist in terms of Rojava project being ‘too ethno-nationalist,’ as well as denouncement for being too rigid from its ideological standpoint and its harsh stance against other local Kurdish political parties.⁵¹

6. Conclusion

This article aimed to outline David Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control by focusing on Rojava and ISIS administrative models. Ungoverned spaces are becoming increasingly important in the study of modern conflicts, where non-state armed actors establish no-go zones in parts of urban centers. In Syria case, such no-go zones achieve a larger territorial expression as the weakening of central authorities necessitate the emergence of non-state armed groups that are expected to grow out of their role as mere security providers and take on more elaborate set of administrative duties. In Kilcullen’s analysis, ‘whichever actor takes on the wider range of capabilities, covering more of the spectrum from persuasion to coercion’ will dominate a particular territory, uproot central state authority and redirect the loyalties of the local populace.

Both ISIS and PYD have been developing administrative models for a long period of time, as the methods and tools they use have been honed and tested against multiple scenarios. For ISIS, administrative experimentation go back to the Iraq War in 2003, when the fragmentation of the war brought

49 Kurdistan National Congress, p. 15

50 “Kurdish National Council in Syria condemns federalism declaration by Kurdish rival” ARA News. (19 March 2016) [<http://aranews.net/2016/03/kurdish-national-council-syria-condemns-federalism-declaration-kurdish-rival/>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

51 Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “This is a new Syria, not a new Kurdistan”. Middle East Eye. (17 March 2016) [<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-kurds-syria-rojava-1925945786>] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

the necessity of strengthening the Sunni bid for statehood with a more successful practice of administration. For PYD, on the other hand, the 'Rojava experiment' go as far back as to 1999, when outlawed PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan had outlined the basic premises of administration and state-building in Kobani.⁵²

ISIS has a more expansive, conquest-based approach to administration with clear-cut methodologies on pre- and post-territorial control. With intelligence, network-building, propaganda and municipality approaches, the group follows a direct hierarchy and a well-defined standard operating procedure. PYD project, on the other hand, defines its territorial aims in a more limited fashion, aiming to capitalize on Kurdish-majority territories along the Turkish-Syrian border and connect all three cantons of Rojava into a single territorial expression. It has a more fragmented decision-making system where autonomy, self-rule and gender equality in political participation are prized.

In terms of resources, both ISIS and PYD control comparable portions of population, where ISIS administers over a negative demography (where incentive to flee is greater), whereas PYD rules over static one (where those that flee and join leave the population in equilibrium). In terms of economic resource-generation, ISIS has more resources, but less incentive to cultivate/maximize them, instead of focusing on conquest economy. PYD, on the other hand, focuses more on the cultivation and efficiency of existing resources through the establishment of communes where resources are produced and consumed based on ability and need, respectively. While both groups use currency and lending, PYD seeks to minimize and eliminate currency and monetary interest as a form of resource.

To conclude, theory of competitive control is a crucial approach that explains why both ISIS and PYD will not be eliminated through military means. Both groups have entrenched themselves into their respective populations through the complex use of security, financial and administrative tools. Both groups have successfully challenged weakening state authority in Syria and capitalized on the population's demand for security and stability in order to pursue their political goals. Over time, the debate over PYD and ISIS will shape along the lines, of which ideology and administrative style fits best to the demands of their populations and their geopolitical necessities, as well as which group will leave a lasting legacy in the region – regardless of whether Syria disintegrates, or a new political arrangement is made at the end of the war.

52 Güneş Yıldız, "Kobani, PKK ve barış süreci için neden önemli?". BBC Türkçe. (1 October 2014) [http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ozeldosyalar/2014/10/141001_kobani_baris_surec] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)

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NÜKLEER ANLAŞMADAN SONRA İRAN-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ: BİR KOMPARTMANTALİZASYON ÖRNEK OLAYI

ÖZ

Birçok gözlemcinin beklentisinin aksine Türkiye, İran'ın nükleer programı etrafında uzun süreden beri devam eden anlaşmazlığın siyasi yoldan çözümünü amaçlayan ve P5+1 grubu ülkeleri ile İran arasında Temmuz 2015'te uzlaşmaya varılan nükleer anlaşmaya karşı 'ihtiyatlı' bir tutum aldı. Türkiye ve İran arasındaki ilişkiler nükleer anlaşmadan kısa bir süre sonra, muhtemelen jeopolitik kaygılar nedeniyle ciddi şekilde kötüleşti. İki ülke ilişkileri Ankara ve Tahran arasında üst düzey ziyaretlerde görüldüğü gibi kısa sürede normalleşti, fakat görüş ayrılıkları ve jeopolitik kaygılar aşılmadı. Bu makalede İran-Türkiye ilişkilerinde eşzamanlı olarak ortaya çıkan fakat birbirine zıt, birisi çatışma ve rekabet, diğeri işbirliği ve diyalog doğrultusunda etkili olan iki eğilime dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu iki zıt eğilimin eşzamanlı olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla Ankara ile Tahran arasında görünürde hızlı şekilde değişen ilişkileri açıklamak için bu çalışmada 'kompartmentleşme' kavramı önerilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-İran ilişkileri, nükleer anlaşma, Ortadoğu, Erdoğan, Ruhani, kompartmentleştirme, Suriye krizi, mezhepçilik

العلاقات الإيرانية – التركية بعد الاتفاقية النووية : نموذج واقعي للتمايز

على عكس توقعات كثير من المتابعين، فإن تركيا اتخذت موقفا متحفظا ازاء الاتفاق النووي الذي يرمي الى حل الخلاف الدائر منذ مدة طويلة حول برنامج ايران النووي والذي انتهى بالاتفاق الذي حصل بين ايران ومجموعة 5 + 1 في شهر تموز/ يوليو من عام 2015. وقد ساءت العلاقات القائمة بين تركيا وايران بشكل جدي بعد فترة قصيرة من ابرام الاتفاق النووي، ويحتمل ان يكون ذلك قد جرى بسبب مخاوف جيوبوليتيكية. وكما لوحظ في الزيارات القصيرة التي تمت على المستويات العليا بين انقرة وطهران، فإن العلاقات بين الطرفين عادت الى وضعها الطبيعي خلال فترة قصيرة، غير انه لم يمكن تحطّي الاختلافات في وجهات النظر والمخاوف الجيوبوليتيكية. ويلفت هذا المقال الى لفت الانتباه الى منعطفين مؤثرين ومتضادين ظهرا في وقت واحد في العلاقات الإيرانية – التركية، اذ يستند احدهما على الصراع والمنافسة، بينما يستند الآخر على التعاون والحوار. وقد تم استعمال مفهوم «التوافق» في هذه الدراسة لتوضيح العلاقات المتغيرة بشكل سريع بين انقرة وطهران ازاء ظهور هذين المنعطفين المتضادين في وقت متزامن.

الكلمات الدالّة : العلاقات التركية – الإيرانية، الاتفاق النووي، الشرق الأوسط، اردوغان، روحاني، التوافق، الأزمة السورية، الطائفية.

IRAN AND TURKEY RELATIONS AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL: A CASE FOR COMPARTMENTALIZATION

ABSTRACT

Contrary to the expectations of many observers, Turkey adopted a 'cautious' stand with regard to the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1, finalized in July 2015, which aimed at a political solution to the long-lasting controversy over Iran's nuclear program. Relations between Turkey and Iran worsened considerably soon after the nuclear deal, arguably for geopolitical reasons. While the two countries quickly reinstated their relations, as signified by high-level visits between Ankara and Tehran, they have not overcome their differences and geopolitical concerns. This article draws attention to the two simultaneously working but contrasting trends in Iran-Turkey relations: one working for conflict and competition and the other for cooperation and dialogue. In order to explain the seemingly rapid changes in relations between Ankara and Tehran through the simultaneous operation of these two contrasting trends, this study offers the concept of compartmentalization.

Keywords: Turkish-Iranian Relations, Nuclear Deal, Middle East, Erdoğan, Rouhani, Compartmentalization, Syrian Crisis, Sectarianism.

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Introduction

Iran and Turkey are two neighboring countries that have experienced a complicated relationship for a long time. As underlined by Gökhan Çetinsaya, a survey of the history of relations between Iran and Turkey displays two contrasting, but virtually simultaneous trends.¹ On the one hand, there is a trend of cooperation and dialogue on certain political, economic and security issues. On the other hand, there is a trend of competition and conflict that may be derived from some geopolitical and ideological factors. Despite the profound differences and disagreements on many issues, the two countries have managed to maintain their relations at a certain level. Pragmatism, conflict and cooperation are inherent parts of this relationship. Hence, we cannot talk about an all-out friendship or hostility between Iran and Turkey.

The complicated nature of bilateral relations between the two countries has become very clear over the last decade. Ankara and Tehran achieved an unprecedented period of improvement in their economic and political relations between 2001-2011. But even then, Turkish-Iranian relations did not evolve into a strategic partnership because of fundamental differences between the two countries in their alliances, political strategies and regional perspectives.² Furthermore, a number of regional developments, including the uprising in Syria and competition over Iraq, have stirred disagreement and tension between the two countries. Their differences on regional issues did not, however, cease the existence of cooperation and dialogue between Iran and Turkey on bilateral political and economic issues. Indeed, in order to promote their relations, Ankara and Tehran agreed to establish High-Level Cooperation Council and signed preferential trade agreement in January 2014.

Likewise, Turkey's relations with Iran after the nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) have illustrated the complicated nature of their relations. The aspect of competition and conflict prevailed over Ankara-Tehran relations for a while after the deal. Turkey was branded by some as the "lawyer" of the Iranian nuclear program because of its vocal support for Iran's "peaceful nuclear program", and its criticism of the sanctions imposed on that country.³ It was estimated in many circles, therefore, that

1 Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish Iranian Relations", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 16-32. See also Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in Middle-Power States*, (New York: Routledge, 2013); Robert W. Olson, *Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, coups and geopolitics*, (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Pub., 2004).

2 S. Gülden Ayman, "Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 6-26; Bayram Sinkaya, "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 12 (Spring 2012), pp. 137-156.

3 Semih İdiz, "Erdoğan İran'ın Avukatı değil," *Milliyet*, 27 October 2009; Yigal Schleifer, "Ankara is Wild Card in Effort to Slap Iran with UN Sanctions," *Eurasinet.org*, 15 April 2010, <http://www.eur->

Turkey would welcome the deal between Iran and the P5+1, which achieved a diplomatic solution for the long time controversy over the Iranian nuclear program.⁴ Accordingly, Turkey was estimated to be one of the major winners of the deal both because of the removal of sanctions in the neighboring country and because of the resilient Turkish-Iranian friendship. Contrary to the expectation that Turkey would welcome the deal between Iran and the P5+1, statements by Turkish officials with regard to implications of the deal were extremely cautious. By welcoming the deal, they asked Iran to revise its regional policies. Moreover, relations between Ankara and Tehran worsened soon after the nuclear deal, as shown in the last minute cancelation of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's visit to Turkey in August 2015. After that, relations between Ankara and Tehran worsened still further because of continuous mutual accusations, mostly voiced by official and pro-government media in Iran and Turkey respectively. Against this background, the trend of cooperation and dialogue resurfaced with a visit paid by then Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to Tehran on March 4, 2016. Soon after this visit, Iran's President Hassan Rouhani went to Ankara and, together with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, co-chaired the third meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council on April 16, 2016.

This article aims to analyze the interplay between the competing trends of conflict and cooperation between Iran and Turkey. It argues that the two neighbors have compartmentalized their relations particularly after 2002, which has allowed them to keep their differences at a certain point, and to be able to improve bilateral relations. The compartmentalization of relations between Ankara and Tehran could be observed after the nuclear deal that helped Iran and Turkey to develop bilateral relations despite their differences on a number of regional issues.

Compartmentalization of Relations between Ankara and Tehran

The competing trends have raised two different difficulties when trying to understand the complicated nature of Iran-Turkey relations. First, the competing trends lead to a perception of an apparent rise and fall of friendly or contentious relations between Ankara and Tehran. Then, a considerable part of the relevant literature attempts to explain one of the rising trends, either conflict or cooperation.⁵ However, despite the perception of swift changes in

asianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041610.shtml [Last visited 8 June 2016]. See also, Robert Tait, "Turkish PM Exposes Nuclear Rift in NATO," *The Guardian*, 26 October 2009.

4 See, Altay Atlı, "Turkey's Euphoria over Iran Nuclear Deal," *Asia Times*, 17 July 2015, <http://atimes.com/2015/07/turkeys-euphoria-over-iran-nuclear-deal/> [Last visited 8 June 2016].

5 See, Stephen Larrabee, "The Turkish-Iranian Alliance That Wasn't", *Foreign Affairs*, 11 July 2012, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2012-07-11/turkish-iranian-alliance-wasnt> [Last visited 8 June 2016]; Gareth Jenkins, "Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran," *Central Asia – Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Paper*, (May 2012); Daphne Mccurdy, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: When Opposites Attract", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2008), pp. 87-106.

relations between the two countries, neither the competition and conflict, nor the cooperation and dialogue decisively prevail over bilateral relations between the two countries. Turkey's relations with post-deal Iran, first worsening and then improving in a short span of time, prove this conclusion. This situation raises the second question in addressing Turkey-Iran relations: how can we explain the existence of virtually simultaneous but contrasting trends in Iranian-Turkish relations? In other words, how can one explain Turkey's cautious optimism to the deal that was ensued by a worsening of bilateral relations with Iran, and the later improvements in bilateral ties under the same ruling governments in a short period?

Most analysts were tempted to explain the complicated nature of bilateral relations as pragmatism. This view assumes that Iran-Turkey relations are centered on a historical rivalry which was accompanied by interwoven geopolitical and ideological considerations. However, given their economic and political settings, the two countries found it pragmatic to enhance their bilateral political and economic relations.⁶ Actually, this is a common tendency in the literature to explain improvements in Iranian-Turkish relations through pragmatism, and conflicts through geopolitical and ideological reasons. However, this perspective falls short of explaining the reasons for change between pragmatism and rivalry. It also underestimates the simultaneous operation of the two trends of conflict and cooperation.

In order to overcome these questions, this article offers the concept of "compartmentalization" to explain the complicated nature of bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey.⁷ Actually, it is a foreign policy behavior that has been practiced by many governments to cope with complex interactions in contemporary world affairs.⁸ When they cannot afford abandoning dividends of cooperation, the acting governments tend to compartmentalize their

6 See, Şafak Baş, "Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2013); Merve Tahiroğlu & Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Turkey and Iran: The Best of Frenemies", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 123-134.

7 This concept is already employed in some analyses of Iranian-Turkish relations. See, Michael Rubin, "Iran-Turkey trade jumps again", *American Enterprise Institute*, 5 March, 2013, <http://www.aei.org/publication/iran-turkey-trade-jumps-again/> [Last visited 8 May 2016]; Samuel Brannen, "The Turkey, Iran, Russia Nexus: Evolving Power Dynamics in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia", *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 12 November 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/131112_Brannen_TurkeyRussiaIranNexus_Web.pdf [Last visited 8 May 2016]; Bayram Sinkaya, "Turkish PM Erdoğan's Visit to Tehran: A New Milestone in Relations Between Turkey and Iran", *ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis*, 31 January 2014, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2586> [Last visited 8 May 2016]; Aaron Stein, "Turkey-Iran Compartmentalize Ties to Sidestep Differences", *World Politics Review*, 11 June 2014, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13852/turkey-iran-compartmentalize-ties-to-sidestep-differences> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

8 For instance see, Stewart M. Patrick, "Learning to Compartmentalize: How to Prevent Big Power Frictions from Becoming Major Global Headaches", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 4 June 2014, <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/06/04/learning-to-compartmentalize-how-to-prevent-big-power-frictions-from-becoming-major-global-headaches/> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

relations in order to differentiate sources of conflict and possible forms of cooperation. The compartmentalization of foreign policy issues may be built on common concerns, shared interests and issues of divergence. It does not mean the elimination of disagreements and conflictual issues between the states; however, the acting governments are willing and careful to keep potentially adverse effects of their disagreements on overall relations at a minimum level. In other words, they do not allow their differences, the trend of conflict and competition, to spoil and dominate over spheres of cooperation.

The compartmentalization of relations between Iran and Turkey could be observed particularly after 2002, when Turkish President Ahmet N. Sezer paid an official visit to Tehran. This visit paved the ground for a “rationalization” of Iran-Turkey relations, that is, keeping their ideological differences aside and focusing on common interests and cooperation.⁹ Subsequently, political, economic, and security relations between Ankara and Tehran improved considerably. The AK Party government that came to power in Turkey in November 2002 bolstered this process. Once regarded as a threat among the Turkish elites, Iran came to be viewed as a partner in Ankara on regional security issues and fighting against PKK terrorism.¹⁰ The volume of bilateral trade between the two countries increased from its level of 1.2 billion USD in 2001 to 15 billion USD in 2011,¹¹ and 2009 was designated “Turkey-Iran Culture Year.” Meanwhile, Turkey lent support to Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities.

However, the rationalization and compartmentalization of relations between Iran and Turkey did not evolve into a “strategic partnership.” A number of factors limited further progress in Iran-Turkey relations. In other words, the trend of competition and conflict continued to affect relations between the two countries.¹² First of all, fundamental political differences between Iran and Turkey shaped their foreign policy orientations towards contradictory ways. Despite moderation in its internal and external policies, still “revolutionary” Iran has a particular vision on international relations and perspectives on regional issues that differ from those of liberal and Western-oriented Turkey. As an extension of their different worldviews, Iran and Turkey have developed strategic relations and alliances confronting each other. Additionally, the rationalized and compartmentalized relations between Ankara and Tehran

9 Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits”, pp.138-42.

10 Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations,” *Perceptions*, Vol.9 (2004), pp.103-117; Bülent Aras and Rabia K. Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No.5 (2008), pp. 495-515.

11 “İran-Türkiye ticaret hacmi 15 milyar dolara ulaştı,” *Mehr Haber Ajansı*, 4 January 2012, <http://haber.irankulturevi.com/Iran-Turkiye-ticaret-hacmi-15-milyar-dolara-ulasti-1134i.cgi> [Last visited 8 June 2016].

12 Ayman, “Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry”, pp.12-22; Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits”, pp.148-51.

have been challenged by the regional implications of the Arab Spring.¹³ The two countries' regional policies greatly diverged particularly over the crisis in Syria, where Turkey staunchly supported the opposition that fights against the Assad administration, who has been resolutely backed by Iran.

Despite their divergence on regional issues and disagreements on the Syrian issue, Ankara and Tehran maintained good relations on a bilateral level.¹⁴ Mutual high-level visits at the level of prime minister and president continued. Moreover, the two countries signed a Preferential Trade Agreement and established a High-level Cooperation Council in 2014. Thus, the two neighbors managed to keep the effects of their regional differences contained and they improved their bilateral relations.

Turkey and Iran's Nuclear Program

Iranian nuclear program turned into a controversial issue between Iran and the West after the revelation of undeclared nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak in August 2002. Accordingly, Iran was building a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy-water reactor, which arguably accelerated the weaponization of Iran's nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also raised some concerns about the Iranian government's failure to conform to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regulations and the existence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran. Some officials and security elite in Turkey, including the Chief of the General Staff, voiced their concerns with the nuclear program of Iran, describing it as a threat to regional security and to Turkey's national interests. However, the ruling AK Party government, which was keen on improving economic relations with Iran, remained almost indifferent to the issue and adopted a wait-and-see policy. Additionally, Turkey acknowledged Iran's right to have peaceful nuclear technology, provided that it was operated under international agreements and the NPT, and advocated a diplomatic solution to the issue.¹⁵

13 Bülent Aras & Emirhan Yorulmazlar, "Turkey and Iran After the Arab Spring: Finding A Middle Ground," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2014); Hamid Ahmadi & Fahimeh Ghorbani, "The Impact of Syrian Crisis on Iran-Turkey Relations," *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2014).

14 Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Tehran in March 2012 and January 2014. His Iranian counterpart, Deputy President Mohammad Riza Rahimi visited Turkey in October 2012, which was followed by the visit of Iranian President Rouhani in June 2014. Erdoğan, who became president of Turkey in August 2014, paid a visit to Tehran in April 2015.

15 For Turkey's conventional position towards the Iranian nuclear program see, Bayram Sinkaya "Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Issue: From a Passive Stance to the Actual Contributor to the Peaceful Solution?" *ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis*, December 2010 <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=323> [Last visited 8 June 2016]; Aylin G. Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy, "Turkey and Iran's nuclear program," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2012), pp. 37-50; R.G. Bonab, "Turkey's Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran's Nuclear Activities," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp.161-175; Kadir Üstün, "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), pp. 19-26.

The initial attempts by the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) to find a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue had failed by mid-2005, when hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the new president of Iran. At that point, the Iranian nuclear file was transferred by the IAEA to the UN Security Council. Consequently, Turkey was forced by its Western allies to clarify its position with regard to the nuclear issue. US officials in particular asked for precise Turkish cooperation with the measures to be taken against Iran's nuclear program. The ensuing conflict and the rise of the tension between Iran and the United States further disturbed Turkey. The Turkish government was anxious about a possible American military operation to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities, or heavy sanctions aimed at isolating Iran, which, they feared, would worsen regional instability. On the other hand, Turkey wished to preserve good neighborly relations with Iran, which is a promising worthwhile market for Turkish goods and provides for a remarkable proportion of Turkish demand for oil and natural gas.

Consequently Turkey abandoned its passive policy and decided to play the role of facilitator in order to achieve a political solution to the nuclear controversy. A diplomatic solution for the issue would relieve Turkey from the difficult task of balancing between its close allies and its warm relations with its neighbor, and would prevent the potential adverse effects of a growing confrontation between Iran and the West. In this regard, Turkey hosted a meeting between Javier Solana, then High Commissioner of the EU in charge of negotiations with Iran, and Ali Laricani, then chief negotiator of Iran, in Ankara in April 2007. Having repeated the recognition of Iranian nuclear rights, Turkish officials asked their Iranian counterparts to play an affirmative role during the negotiations and to increase Iran's cooperation with the IAEA in order to allay various Western concerns. However, several rounds of negotiations remained inconclusive and the UN Security Council issued a number of resolutions [Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008)], which asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program and have complete cooperation with the IAEA, and envisaged limited sanctions against Iran for its nuclear and missile programs.

After the failure of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent five states sitting in the UN Security Council plus Germany, which replaced the EU-3 to negotiate with Iran in June 2006, also called EU3+3),¹⁶ Turkey took a further step and attempted to mediate officially between the parties, in order to prevent the rise of tensions and to solve the conflict through diplomatic channels. In a visit to Washington D.C. in November 2008, then Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey, relying on its previous experienc-

16 See, Oliver Meier, "European Efforts to Solve the Conflict Over Iran's Nuclear Programme: How has the European Union Performed?", EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 27, February 2013, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-27.pdf [Last visited 8 June 2016].

es, could officially mediate between the United States and Iran.¹⁷ Although Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State of the United States, welcomed the Turkish bid for the mediation, Iran publicly rejected it, with President Ahmadinejad stating that there was no need for Turkey's mediation.¹⁸ Despite the rejection of its mediation attempt, the Turkish government adopted a stand, which was perceived as pro-Iranian. Prime Minister Erdoğan admonished the West on several occasions of being hypocritical by having nuclear weapons themselves and remaining silent towards some other nuclear countries that are not a party to the NPT, and stated that no one has the right to threaten Iran for its peaceful nuclear program.¹⁹ It was statements like these that had some pundits criticizing Erdoğan of playing the "lawyer" of Iran role.²⁰

Nevertheless, Turkey actually became a mediator following the failure of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on a proposition to provide the Tehran Research Reactor with uranium fuel in return for Iran shipping its enriched uranium stockpile abroad. Then, Mohamad El-Baradei, Director of the IAEA at the time, put forward the idea of placing Iran's low-enriched uranium in the custody of neighboring Turkey, until the Vienna group – Britain, United States and France – could supply Iran with uranium fuel. The idea was immediately accepted by Turkey and backed by the United States and Russia. Iran, however, was cautious towards Baradei's suggestion and announced that it would not ship its low-enriched uranium outside the country. Nevertheless, Turkey continued to press Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap agreement, and continuously talked to officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA.²¹ In April 2010, upon the request of President Obama, Brazil also got involved in Turkey's mediation efforts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey persuaded Iran to sign the Tehran Declaration in May 2010 as a framework for the swap deal between the Vienna group and Iran. However, the Vienna group found the declaration inadequate and rejected it, which ensued a new round of UN Security Council resolution (RES 1929) against Iran. Turkey, then occupying one of the temporary seats on the UN Security Council, voted against Resolution 1929, which imposed heavy sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

17 "Erdoğan Washington'da Konuştu," *Hürriyet*, 14 November 2008.

18 "Ahmadinejad: No need for Turkish mediation," *Press TV*, 11 March 2009.

19 Erdoğan said, "The permanent members of the UN Security Council all have nuclear arsenals and then there are countries which are not members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which also have nuclear weapons. So although Iran doesn't have a weapon, those who say Iran shouldn't have them are those countries which do." Robert Tait, "Turkish PM Exposes Nuclear Rift in NATO," *The Guardian*, 26 October 2009.

20 İdiz, "Erdoğan İran'ın Avukatı değil,"; Schleifer, "Ankara is Wild Card in Effort to Slap Iran with UN Sanctions."

21 Bayram Sinkaya, "İran'ın Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye'nin Tutumu ve Uranyum Takası Muhabakatı," *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol.2, No.18 (June 2010), pp. 66-78.

Having been disappointed by both the rejection of the Tehran Declaration and the adoption of new sanctions against Iran, Turkey publicly criticized the West. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated that the rejection of the declaration that accomplished nearly everything demanded by Western officials meant that the West wished to keep its monopoly over nuclear technology.²² Additionally, Turkey blamed the Western countries for acting hypocritical because they did not recognize Iran's peaceful nuclear rights, while at the same time they ignored Israel's undeclared nuclear weapons. Moreover, Turkey became critical of the sanctions that were arguably drafted by a few countries and forced on the remaining members of the UN to adopt them. Turkey also criticized the sanctions themselves, arguing that they would be inconclusive, but would result in further radicalization of an isolated Iran. Although it followed suit in adopting the sanctions designated by the UN Security Council, the Turkish government publicly challenged and criticized the unilateral US and EU sanctions on Iran.

Turkey's active mediation attempts ceased after the rejection of the Tehran declaration and it returned to the role of facilitator. In order to facilitate a diplomatic solution, Turkey willingly hosted a new round of negotiations in Istanbul, on January 21-22, 2011, between Catherine Ashton, then High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and representing the P5+1, and Said Jalili, then chief nuclear negotiator for Iran.²³ The parties met again in Istanbul in April 2012. However, because of simmering tensions between Ankara and Tehran as a result of their differences on regional policies, particularly with regard to Syria, the venue for the later negotiations was changed.²⁴ Still, Turkey hosted low-level talks between the P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul in July 2012.

Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated as the new president of Iran in August 2013, and promised to reach a diplomatic solution over the nuclear controversy. Turkish President Abdullah Gül met his Iranian counterpart in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, in September 2013. Then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Turkey asked Iran to assume a constructive role to reach a solution in Syria and declared its readiness to facilitate negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, which were expected to restart within a short time. The talks between the P5+1 and Iran started in November 2013 in Geneva, alongside secret talks between Iran and the United States. But this time, Turkey did not

22 Murat Yetkin, "Davutoğlu: Bugün İran'a, Yarın Türkiye'ye," *Radikal*, 25 September 2010. Also, see: "Ne Müeyyide Uygulayacağımızı İsrail Biliyor," *Newsweek Türkiye* – Interview, retrieved in, *Habertürk* (website), 10 July 2010, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/531166-ne-mueyyide-uygulayacagimizi-israil-biliyor> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

23 "Iran nuclear talks start in Turkey," *The Guardian*, 21 January 2011.

24 Aaron Stein, "Turkey and Iran's Complicated Relationship," *EDAM Non-Proliferation Policy Briefs*, no. 3, November 2012.

play a considerable role in the negotiation process other than encouraging the parties to reach a peaceful solution.

Despite the high-level visits between Ankara and Tehran, the nuclear issue lost its prominent place in Turkey-Iran relations. However, both Turkish and Iranian officials declared their happiness with the initial achievements in the talks on Iran's nuclear program and their joint opposition to the existence of WMDs in the region. Iranian officials also thanked Turkey for its support for the Iranian nuclear program, and its efforts to find a political solution and the removal of sanctions against Iran.²⁵ Furthermore, Zarif stated that Turkey provided a good model for neighborly relations between Iran and the surrounding countries.²⁶

Turkish Reactions to the Deal: “Cautious Optimism”

After twenty-months of negotiations, Iran agreed with the P5+1 on JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2014. Thus, the long-standing controversy between Iran and the West was resolved through diplomatic channels. Accordingly, Iran agreed to limit its enrichment activities and open all nuclear facilities to verification of the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, in return for removal of all sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program.²⁷

The deal between Iran and the West stirred widespread interest around the world. However, Turkish public opinion and the elite were divided in their view of the potential effects of the deal on Turkey. A great part of the elite were concerned with the implications of the deal on Turkey-Iran relations and regional affairs, anxious that the deal would give Iran a free hand in regional politics, which would make it more powerful and aggressive.²⁸ The removal of sanctions and the transfer of frozen Iranian assets estimated at around 100 billion USD might embolden Iran to pursue an aggressive agenda in the Middle East. Additionally, they were concerned with the idea of a ‘grand bargain’ between Iran and the United States, and fears that growing cooperation between Iran and the United States in the region could eventually work against

25 “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Arasında Yayınlanan Ortak Bildiri,” T.C. Başbakanlık, 10 June 2014, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=ac-f5a83e-d621-4619-b9da-a23854a66a38 [Last visited 8 June 2016].

26 Zarif stated, “I wish our other neighbors would follow Turkey’s example and help in finding a solution to the nuclear issue. Our nuclear program is to no one’s detriment, they shouldn’t be worried ... Turkey has all along supported our right to peaceful nuclear activities.” See, “Iran says sees more steps ahead in nuclear talks,” Reuters, 17 December 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-zarif-idUSKBN0JV0RE20141217> [Last visited 30 May 2016].

27 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Vienna, 14 July 2015, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf [Last visited 30 May 2016].

28 İbrahim Karagül, “Tanklar Kabe’ye dayanacak,” Yeni Şafak, 12 August 2015.

Turkey's interests.²⁹ In addition to the bombastic statements of some Iranian politicians claiming the rise of Iranian power in the region to "control four Arab capitals"³⁰, the spread of views arguing that the United States decided to side with "Shiite Iran" in regional politics contributed to a negative presentation in Turkey of the deal.³¹ Given the highly polarized situation in the Middle East, an 'implicit alignment' between the two former enemies would upset the regional balances not only against Saudi Arabia and Israel, but also against Turkey.³²

A considerable number of Turkish elites were, however, optimistic with regard to the outcomes of the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1.³³ First of all, the deal would decrease the tension over the nuclear program and relieve Turkey of having to balance its relations with Iran and the West. Moreover, the deal would end – at least temporarily – potential risks for Turkish security deriving from a nuclear Iran.³⁴ Additionally, Iran's political and economic reintegration into the international system with the removal of sanctions would improve overall security and economic conditions around the region. Finally, the removal of the sanctions as part of the deal would help to boost Turkey-Iran trade relations. Iran has been a promising market for Turkish exports. Rıza Eser, Chair of the Turkish-Iranian Business Council, estimated that Turkish exports to Iran could reach 8-10 billion USD from its current level of 4 billion USD.³⁵ Iran was also regarded by some parts of the Turkish elite as a viable source of oil and gas. Furthermore, considering the fact that Turkey has been trying to be an energy hub in the region, the improvement of relations between Iran and the West would facilitate Iranian participation in transnational gas pipelines. Finally, if the current process should result in Iranian membership in the WTO, then commercial standards would be set up, and tariffs would be decreased, which would boost Turkey-Iran economic relations.

29 Abdullah Muradoğlu, "İran'da çifte kavrulmuş bayram!" *Yeni Şafak*, 19 July 2015; Hilal Kaplan, "Türkiye'ye Karşı İran Birliği," *Sabah*, 19 August 2015.

30 "Sanaa is the forth Arab capital to join the Iranian revolution," *Middle East Monitor*, 27 September 2014, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140927-sanaa-is-the-fourth-arab-capital-to-join-the-iranian-revolution/> [Last visited 30 May 2016]; Samia Nakhoul, "Iran expands regional 'empire' ahead of nuclear deal," *Reuters*, 23 March 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-region-insight-idUSKBN0MJ1G520150323> [Last visited 30 May 2016].

31 Robert Fisk, "Iran nuclear deal: America has taken Iran's side – to the fury of Israel and Saudi Arabia," *Independent*, 15 July 2015.

32 "İran bölgede güven vermiyor," *Anadolu Agency*, 12 August 2015, <http://www.haberler.com/iran-bolgede-guven-vermiyor-7591323-haber/> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

33 Sinan Ülgen, Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Doruk Ergun, "Ankara Neden İran ile İmzalanan Anlaşmayı Memnuniyetle Karşılmalı," *EDAM Tartışma Kağıtları Serisi*, No.3, 15 July 2015.

34 Mensur Akgün, "İran uzlaşması Türkiye için ne demek?" *Star*, 19 July 2015.

35 "İran'a ambargo kaldırılırsa..." *CNN Türk*, 7April 2015, <http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/ekonomi/dunya/irana-ambargo-kaldirilirs>[Last visited 8 May 2016].

The Turkish government's approach to the deal was indecisive, and was dubbed by some analysts as "cautious optimism."³⁶ For instance, the then Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek shared his views immediately via Twitter, where he wrote, "the Iran nuclear deal is great news for the Turkish economy and will boost bilateral trade and investments."³⁷ Likewise, Taner Yıldız, then Energy Minister, also welcomed the deal, anticipating that it would help energy relations between Turkey and Iran.³⁸ In the same vein, Nihat Zeybekçi, then Minister of Economy, called Iran "a country for opportunities."³⁹ According to these figures, the removal of sanctions would be important for the flow of foreign investments into Iran, as well as for the price of oil. Prime Minister Davutoğlu expressed his pleasure with the deal and called the removal of sanctions a positive development. Reminding people of the similarities between the recent deal and the Tehran declaration that had been mediated by Turkey and Brazil, he added, "I wish this agreement had been reached earlier."⁴⁰ President Erdoğan congratulated his Iranian counterpart on a phone call. The uncertain effects of the deal on Iran's regional policies, however, fueled Turkey's concerns. The official statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated the parties for achieving a diplomatic solution, and underlined that "full implementation of the deal is vital for regional security, stability, and peace." Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister, stated that he welcomed the deal, but asked Iran to "review its role particularly in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen" and asked it to "give up sectarian-driven policies."⁴¹

In fact, Turkey was accusing Iran for some time of seeking domination in the region, destabilizing regional countries, and pursuing a sectarian agenda. On one occasion, President Erdoğan, just before his visit to Tehran in April 2015, blamed Iran for "seeking domination" in the region and asked Iran to withdraw its forces and advisors from Syria, Iraq and Yemen. He asked Iran to respect the territorial integrity of those countries.⁴² Various Turkish officials have also raised similar concerns with regard to Iran's regional policies on different accounts.

36 Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and Iran nuclear negotiations: cautious optimism," Daily Sabah, 9 June 2015.

37 "İran'ın nükleer anlaşması Türkiye'yi nasıl etkileyecek?" Habertürk Ekonomi, 14 July 2015, <http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/ekonomi/haber/1102928-iran-pazari-aciliyor-yatirimcilar-kapida-bekliyor> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

38 "Taner Yıldız'dan nükleer anlaşmaya ilk yorum," Star, 14 July 2015, <http://haber.star.com.tr/guncel/taner-yildizdan-nukleer-anlasmaya-ilk-yorum/haber-1043786> [Last visited 1 June 2016].

39 "İran fırsatlar ülkesi haline gelecek," TRT Haber, 2 October 2015, <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/ekonomi/iran-firsatlar-ulkesi-haline-gelecek-206471.html> [Last visited 1 June 2016].

40 "World leaders welcome Iran nuclear deal," AA, 14 July 2015, <http://aa.com.tr/en/politics/world-leaders-welcome-iran-nuclear-deal/26174> [Last visited 30 May 2016].

41 "Çavuşoğlu'ndan İran açıklaması," NTV, 14 July 2015 <http://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/cavusoglundan-iran-aciklamasi,GHcso1DOIEyZYtXNgFBww> [Last visited 30 May 2016]; "Turkish FM welcomes nuke deal, but calls on Iran to revize regional policies," Hürriyet Daily News, 14 July 2015.

42 "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan İran'a Tepki," Hürriyet, 27 March 2015.

On the occasion of the deal's 'implementation day' in January 2016, welcoming the removal of sanctions imposed on Iran, then Prime Minister Davutoğlu asked Iran for "constructive contribution" on regional politics. He expressed hope that the development paved the way for "a perspective for joint efforts aimed at ending destruction and violence in the region."⁴³ The Turkish call for Iran to "help reestablish security and stability in the region" was repeated in a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which added that Iran should act "responsibly in a manner that does not encourage disintegration."⁴⁴ While addressing Turkish ambassadors currently serving in different countries, in January 2016, President Erdoğan reiterated his criticisms of Iranian foreign policy towards the region. He stated that Iran has been "using conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in order to expand its sphere of influence in the region," and blamed Iran for "turning sectarian divisions into conflicts by lighting the fuse of a new and dangerous course."⁴⁵

The Competing Trends in Iran-Turkey Relations after the Deal: A Showcase of Compartmentalization

Surprisingly, relations between Iran and Turkey worsened in the aftermath of the deal. In other words, the trend of conflict and competition dominated Ankara-Tehran relations—at least for a while. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif cancelled his planned visit to Ankara in August 2015 at the last minute. He stated that the visit was cancelled because there wasn't enough time to meet Turkish officials—President Erdoğan being in İstanbul while Prime Minister Davutoğlu and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu were in Ankara. However, it was reported that President Erdoğan did not accept to receive Zarif in reaction to some inappropriate news about his family that had appeared in official Iranian media.⁴⁶ This political tension coincided with the rise of terror attacks perpetrated by the PKK. Some analysts claimed that it was not surprising that terror events in Turkey escalated after the nuclear-deal and pointed out increasing Iranian support for the PKK.⁴⁷ This was followed by mutual ac-

43 "Turkey welcomes Iran nuclear deal, hopes for 'constructive contribution' on regional conflict," *Hürriyet Daily News*, 18 January 2016.

44 "Turkey welcomes Iran nuclear deal, hopes for 'constructive contribution' on regional conflict."

45 "Turkey have paid the heaviest price in the struggle against terror," Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 12 January 2016, <https://www.tcgb.gov.tr/en/news/542/37543/turkey-has-paid-the-heaviest-price-in-the-struggle-against-terror.html> [Last visited 30 May 2016]; Emre Peker, "Turkey hails Iran nuclear deal," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 January 2016.

46 "Erdoğan daughter heads hospital for ISIL," *Press TV*, 21 July 2015.

47 Ardan Zentürk, "Kürtler'in değil, İran'ın PKK'lı 'vekalet savaşı'," *Star*, 13 August 2015; Musa Kartoğlu, "Yerli İstihbarat ve İran-Kandil trafiği," *Star*, 20 August 2015. See also, Joshua Walker and Gabriel Mitchell, "Is Turkey's War on Terror a Consequence of the Iran Deal?" *War on the Rocks* (<http://warontherocks.com>), 25 August 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/is-turkeys-war-on-terror-a-consequence-of-the-iran-deal/> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

cusations between the high-level officials in Ankara and Tehran and severe critiques of each other in official or pro-government media.⁴⁸

The sudden and unexpected deterioration in Turkey-Iran relations is mostly attributed to and explained by the resurfacing of an historical rivalry between the two countries, which was accelerated by the rise of Iran's regional power.⁴⁹ Accordingly, the two countries are destined to compete with each other either on religious/ideological or geopolitical grounds. Indeed, the nuclear deal has contributed to Iran's regional status in two ways. First, it has ended the international campaign to isolate Iran from regional and international affairs. Moreover, Iran has started to be seen as a partner in the solution of regional issues such as the Syrian crisis and the fight against violent extremism represented by ISIS. For example, Iran became a member of the International Syria Support Group, a number of countries brought together by Russia and the United States. Second, with the removal of sanctions, Iran has become able to reach its frozen assets outside the country, which have been estimated to be tens of billions of dollars, adding the prospect of a flourishing Iranian economy.

Yet, one can hardly conceive that the decline in Turkish-Iranian relations stemmed from the rise of Iranian regional power. First of all, the deal did solve a lasting issue, but did not suddenly change regional settings. If the Iranian economy really booms, Turkey is most likely to benefit from such a development. As for treating Iran as a partner in the solution of regional issues, it has been a long-time call of Turkey. Then, how can we explain the cautious optimism on the Turkish side towards the deal and the worsening relations between Ankara and Tehran?

Above all else, contrary to Turkey's expectations, Iran did not revise its regional policies. In other words, Iranian policy of so-called 'constructive interaction' was not reflected in the Middle East. Whatever the reasons for the failure of a policy change on the Iranian side, Tehran increased its strategic cooperation with Russia. After the cancellation of his visit to Ankara, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif went to Beirut, Damascus and Moscow. The strategic

48 Some of the Turkish media blamed Iran for supporting Russian crusade that kill many innocent Muslims, while the Iranian media claimed Turkey supports extremist organizations like ISIS. See, Semih İdiz, "Turkish, Iranian media trade barbs," *Al-Monitor*, 18 August 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/08/turkey-iran-syria-media-war-isis.html> [Last visited 28 May 2016]; Dorian Jones, "Turkey-Iran Tensions on Rise," *Voice of America*, 19 August 2015, <http://www.voanews.com/content/turkish-iranian-tensions-on-the-increase/2923792.html> [Last visited 28 May 2016]; "Turkey, Iran in war of words over Syria," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 6 December 2015; Arash Karami, "Did Erdogan threaten Iran," *Al-Monitor*, 8 December 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/erdogan-islamic-state-oil-iran-media-warn.html> [Last visited 30 May 2016].

49 Cengiz Çandar, "Are Turkey and Iran reviving a 16th century conflict?" *Al-Monitor*, 10 December 2015. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-iran-rivalry-in-mesopotamia-revisited.html> [Last visited 30 May 2016].

partnership between Iran and Russia covering economic and military cooperation was consolidated by Putin's visit to Tehran in November 2015. Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis in September 2015, and the Russian-Iranian cooperation to support the Assad administration, turned balances on the ground against the allies of Turkey, which was followed by a rise in hostilities between Turkey and Russia. Thus, Turkey became very anxious with growing Russian and Iranian cooperation in Syria. In the meantime, Turkey fostered its relations with Saudi Arabia, to the dismay of Tehran. Given the polarization of the region over the last decade across the two camps led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, the growing relations between Ankara and Riyadh led to some concerns on the Iranian side.

In fact, Turkey has been wary of that polarization that has led to a deepening of sectarian cleavages in the region. According to Turkish officials, Iran has played a major role in this process. The culminating geopolitical challenges increased Turkish concerns. First, Turkish officials thought that the sectarian policies pursued by Iran have led to regional instability and the rise of extremist groups that are regarded as threats to regional peace and Turkish security. Additionally, Iran was regarded to be exploiting regional crises and sectarian divisions in order to increase its regional power. Moreover, Turkey felt surrounded by Iran-led sectarian forces in Iraq and the PKK affiliated Kurds in Syria, arguably supported by Iran throughout its southern borders. Under these conditions, the pro-government media both in Turkey and in Iran severely criticized and attacked each other. The baseless reports in the Iranian media claiming the involvement of President Erdoğan's family in some activities allegedly supporting ISIS further increased the tensions between Ankara and Tehran.⁵⁰ Consequently, the growing geopolitical concerns in Ankara with regard to Iran's regional policies and media wars between the two countries led to a decline in Turkish-Iranian relations.

Against the rising trend of conflict and competition in the aftermath of the nuclear deal, a simultaneous trend of cooperation and dialogue also continued to affect Iran-Turkey relations.⁵¹ Despite the worsening political relations between Ankara and Tehran, a growing number of Turkish businessmen turned towards Iran after the deal. Besides small and medium-sized companies that had a long-time interest in the Iranian market, Turkish conglomerates also started to show their interest in Iran. Additionally, new regional developments, including the consolidation of Kurdish autonomy in the north of Syria, alerted both Ankara and Tehran. Meanwhile the growing great-pow-

50 "Iranian media full of lies against Turkey," AA, 26 July 2015, at <http://aa.com.tr/en/world/iranian-media-full-of-lies-against-turkey/18626> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

51 Bayram Sinkaya, "PM Davutoğlu's Visit to Tehran: A New Momentum in Turkey-Iran Relations", ORSAM Foreign Policy Analysis, 7 March 2016, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2967> [Last visited 8 May 2016]; Hassan Ahmadian, "Is Turkey Swaying Back to Iran?", Al-Monitor, 22 March 2016, at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/iran-turkey-political-cooperation-davutoglu-zarif.html> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

er involvement in the Syrian crisis lessened the roles of Iran and Turkey on the ground, which led to resentment against the United States and Russia in the two capitals. Eventually, Prime Minister Davutoğlu paid a visit to Tehran on 4 March 2016. On his way to Tehran, he talked on the significance of cooperation with Iran, particularly on economic issues. Davutoğlu also underscored the importance of dialogue between Iran and Turkey, even on issues of disagreement. He stated that disagreements between the countries on regional issues are quite natural, but the lack of interaction is unusual. In Tehran, Davutoğlu publicly stated that they “should not leave the fate of the region to extra-regional powers,” illustrating the resentment against the United States and Russia.

Davutoğlu’s visit to Tehran gave a new momentum to Iran-Turkey relations, and was followed by the visit of President Rouhani to Ankara on 16 April 2016. It is noteworthy that, this visit took place right after the OIC Summit held in İstanbul that heavily criticized Iran for the attacks against the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, and for its alleged support for terrorism and its interference in internal affairs of other Muslim countries. Against those criticisms, Rouhani went to Ankara for official bilateral meetings. President Erdoğan and President Rouhani chaired the third meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council, which brought together various ministers from each country to review overall relations. At the end of the meeting, eight memorandums of understanding and agreements on various issues were signed. The parties also renewed their commitment to increase the total amount of bilateral economic transactions to the level of 30 billion USD in a short time. Admitting the existence of disagreements on “certain issues” President Erdoğan stated that the two countries should minimalize differences and maximize commonalities between them.⁵² Rouhani called the differences between Iran and Turkey on some regional issues as “minor differences of opinion” and underlined the commitment of both countries “to bolster their relations in all fields”. In addition to boosting bilateral relations on economic and energy issues, Rouhani and his Turkish colleagues talked on converging interests on preserving the territorial integrity of regional countries, putting an end to war in the region, and fighting against terrorism.⁵³

Conclusion

A survey of the history of Iran-Turkey relations and an analysis of contemporary relations between the two countries shows that it is difficult to talk about a long-term, structural conflict or cooperation between the two coun-

52 “Erdoğan: İran ile Türkiye Arasındaki İş Hacmi Artırılacak”, Haberler.com, 16 April 2016, at <http://www.haberler.com/erdogan-iran-ile-turkiye-arasindaki-is-hacmi-8363333-haber/> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

53 “Iran, Turkey must up anti-terror efforts: Rouhani”, Press TV, 16 April 2016, <http://www.presstv.it/Detail/2016/04/16/461052/Iran-Turkey-Rouhani-Erdogan-Ankara> [Last visited 8 May 2016].

tries. Instead, there are two competing trends that simultaneously lead to both competition and dialogue between Ankara and Tehran. There is no structural foundation for conflict and competition between Iran and Turkey, the two countries sharing a common border that has rarely changed for almost four centuries. There is no historical and territorial disagreement that prevents the two countries from developing good neighborly relations. However, ideological differences, geopolitical concerns and regional rivalry between the two countries can occasionally turn into crises. Notwithstanding ideological and regional differences, Turkey and Iran have managed to develop their relations, particularly since 2002, on the grounds of rationalization and compartmentalization, when they implicitly agreed to put their differences aside and focus on common interests and threats. Additionally, there has been an implicit understanding between Ankara and Tehran to minimize the potential adverse effects of regional differences on bilateral issues and cooperation.

Since the Iranian nuclear program turned into a crisis between Tehran and the West, Turkey was stuck between good neighborly relations with Iran and maintaining its alliance with the United States. In order to ease the tensions and prevent the emergence of another conflict in its region, Turkey attempted to facilitate and mediate nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. However, after the conclusion of the deal between the parties, Turkey became cautious with its geopolitical implications. Its caution is not drawn by the deal itself, but related to the deal's potential impact on Iran's regional policies. Criticisms that were raised by Turkish officials, led by President Erdoğan, towards Iran's regional policies preceded the finalization of the deal. However, post-deal developments in the Middle East against the interests of Turkey, the rise of PKK terrorism, and baseless claims in respective official and pro-government media, resulted in deterioration of Ankara-Tehran relations. In other words, the trend of conflict and competition has prevailed over cooperative relations between the two countries.

In the meantime, however, there have been some factors that have forced dialogue and cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. On the one hand, Turkey has been increasingly concerned with Iranian regional ambitions and policies, on the other hand the removal of sanctions made Iran a favorable destination for Turkish businesses and a reliable source of energy. Additionally, geopolitical developments such as the rise of religious extremism, consolidation of Kurdish autonomy in the north of Syria, and growing involvement of extra-regional great powers in regional issues, pushed the two countries to manage their differences and focus on common interests. Under these conditions, the Iranian and Turkish governments agreed to put their differences and sources of contention aside, and focus on common interests and shared concerns. Thus, they have compartmentalized their relations into different sectors in order to contain differences, and controversies. In other words, Turkey and Iran have learned to manage regional differences by placing them in

different compartments. However, it does not mean the complete elimination of differences and disagreements, but managing the conflicts to facilitate cooperation and dialogue. With regard to the recent developments in Iran-Turkey relations, geopolitical concerns and regional issues denote the trend of conflict and competition; however, economic opportunities and some other geopolitical developments signify cooperation and dialogue. The ensuing compartmentalization of relations explains the simultaneous existence of two contrasting trends.

The complicated nature of bilateral relations and the simultaneous existence of contrasting trends of cooperation and conflict are by no means peculiar to Iran-Turkey relations. Likewise, the policy of compartmentalization of relations is not limited to the Iran-Turkey case. Thus, the concept of compartmentalization could be employed in other cases in order to explain contrasting trends in bilateral relations.

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TRUMAN DOCTRINE AT 70: TURKEY AND THE COLD WAR

ABSTRACT

After the end of the Second World War there were political and economic pressures causing President Truman's foreign policy towards more forceful stand against the USSR. This was a action away from the direction taken by the traditional US policies. Negotiation and co-operation were no longer seen as productive tools of dealing with the wartime alliance Moscow. Truman's actions were aimed at restricting the USSR power and influence. In February 1947, the British announced the ending of British military and financial support for both Greece and Turkey. Washington feared with the international communism would have a significant gains in the Near East swiftly adopted a new foreign policy. The main feture of this new approach was the Truman Doctrine announced on 12 March 1947. The Truman Doctrine was mainly a response to the political and social upheaval taking place in Greece and Turkey. The Doctrine was a decisive turning point in the origins of the Cold War. After this announcement, the foreign policy of the USA took a more militant character in the containment of what was perceived as Soviet-communist expansionism.

Keywords: President Truman, Truman Doctrine, USSR, international communism, Cold War, Turkey, Greece.

مبدأ ترومان في عامه السبعين: تركيا والحرب الباردة

خلاصة

اضطر الرئيس ترومان في اعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية وبننتيجة المصاعب السياسية والاقتصادية، الى ان يتخذ موقفا اكثر قوة وصلابة في السياسة الامريكية ضمن الصراع مع الاتحاد السوفياتي. ولم تعد واشنطن ترى المفاوضات والتعاون المشترك مع موسكو حليفها اَبان الحرب، اداة سياسية مناسبة. وكان هدف ترومان هو الحد من قوة وتأثير الاتحاد السوفياتي. وفي فبراير من عام ١٩٤٧ اعلنت انكلترا انها ستنتهي مساعداتها العسكرية والاقتصادية الى اليونان وتركيا اللتين كانتا تعانيان من مصاعب سياسية واقتصادية. وفي ١٢ مارس من عام ١٩٤٧ اعلنت ادارة ترومان الذي كان يشعر بالقلق من تزايد تأثير السوفيات في الشرق الأدنى « مبدأ ترومان». واضحى هذا المبدأ احد العناصر المهمة للحرب الباردة. واضحى اعلان هذا المبدأ سببا في بروز الخيارات العسكرية ضمن سياسة تأطير التوسّع السوفيتي – الشيوعي.

الكلمات الدالّة : الرئيس ترومان، مبدأ ترومان، الاتحاد السوفياتي، الشيوعية الدولية، الحرب الباردة، تركيا، اليونان.

70. YILINDA TRUMAN DOKTRİNİ: TÜRKİYE VE SOĞUK SAVAŞ

ÖZ

İkinci Dünya savaşı sonrasında Başkan Truman siyasi ve ekonomik zorluklar sonucunda Amerikan dış politikasında Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı yürütülen mücadelede daha güçlü bir duruş sergilemek zorunda kalmıştı. Washington, savaş dönemi müttefiki Moskova'yla müzakere ve işbirliğini artık uygun siyasi araç olarak görmüyordu. Truman'ın amacı Sovyetler Birliği'nin gücünü ve etkisini sınırlandırmaktı. Şubat 1947'de İngiltere, siyasi ve ekonomik sıkıntılarla boğuşan Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye askeri ve ekonomik yardımı sonlandıracağını bildirdi. Yakın Doğu'da Sovyet etkisinin artacağından endişe eden Truman yönetimi 12 Mart 1947'de Truman Doktrinini ilan etti. Doktrin, Soğuk Savaş'ın önemli kilometre taşlarından biri oldu. Doktrin'in ilanı Sovyet-komünist yayılcılığının çevrenmesi siyasetinde askerî niteliklerin ön plana çıkmasına neden oldu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Başkan Truman, Truman Doktrinini, Sovyetler Birliği, uluslararası komünizm, Soğuk Savaş, Türkiye, Yunanistan.

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“[Orta Doğu’daki] petrol rezervleri stratejik gücün muazzam kaynağını oluşturuyor ve dünya tarihindeki maddi ödüllerin en büyüklerinden birisi.”¹

ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın Başkan Truman’a bilgi notu, 1944.

“Büyük bir gücün [Birleşmiş Milletler] Sözleşmesi’nin ihlali ve savaşın çıkması durumunda Genel Kurmay Başkanlığımız hükümetimizi, son iki savaşta da durumun ortaya koyduğu gibi, Orta Doğu’nun Birleşik Krallık dışında, eğer aynı derecede önemli değilse, ikinci derecede önemli stratejik alan olacağı konusunda bilgilendirdi.”²

16 Ekim 1947’de Washington’da, Orta Doğu ile ilgili Birleşik Devletler-Birleşik Krallık Görüşmeleri Açılış Konuşmasında İngiliz Heyeti.

1. Giriş

21 Şubat 1947 Cuma öğleden sonra, İngiltere’nin Washington Büyükelçisi Özel Sekreteri, ABD Dışişleri Bakanı’nın ofisini arayarak, Büyükelçi’nin Londra’dan gelen bir talimatla Bakan’a bizzat iletmesi gereken çok önemli bir not için aynı gün randevu talebini ilettiler. Dışişleri Bakanı George C. Marshall ofisinde değildi ve Pazartesi gününe kadar şehir dışındaydı. Konuyla ilgili bilgilendirilen Bakan Yardımcısı Dean Acheson, Büyükelçi’yi telefonla aradığında, kendisine notun İngiltere’nin Yunanistan’a yardımıyla ilgili ve çok önemli olduğu söylendi. Bakan Yardımcısı, Büyükelçilik Birinci Sekreteri’nin, Bakanlığın Yakın Doğu ve Afrika İşleri Müdürü Loy Henderson’a notun bir kopyasını iletmesini istedi. Büyükelçi, notun orijinalini Pazartesi sabahı Bakan’a iletcekti.³

İngilizler, 21 Şubat günü öğleden sonra Amerikalılara bir değil iki not ilettiler. Notlardan birisi söylendiği gibi Yunanistan, diğeri ise Türkiye hakkındaydı.⁴ Birinci notta, Yunanistan’ın içerisinde bulunduğu iç savaş ve ekonomik durumun ülkeyi çökme noktasına getirdiği belirtiliyordu. Komünist gerilla hareketi, Sovyetler Birliği’nin Balkanlar’daki yayılmacı etkisini Yunanistan’a getirmek üzeriydi. Sovyetler Birliği’nin Akdeniz’e inmesi an meselesiydi. Ekonomik sıkıntı içerisindeki İngiltere, 1944’ten beri ülkeye sağladığı askerî ve ekonomik yardımı 31 Mart’tan sonra durduracaktı. İngiltere, ABD’nin bu yükü üzerine alabileceğini ummaktaydı.⁵

1 *Foreign Relation of the United States* 8 (1945): 45. Bundan sonra *FRUS* olarak belirtilecektir.

2 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 566.

3 Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: The Viking Press, 1964), 3-4.

4 Yunanistan ile ilgili not için bkz. *FRUS* 5 (1947): 32-35; Türkiye ile ilgili not için bkz. *FRUS* 5 (1947): 35-37.

5 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 32.

İkinci notta da, Sovyetler Birliği'nin baskısına karşı İngiltere'den askerî ve ekonomik yardım alan Türkiye'ye yönelik yardımların da 31 Mart'tan sonra yapılamayacağı belirtiliyordu. Rusların sıcak denizlere inmesini önlemede etkin olan İngiltere, kaynaklarını sonuna kadar kullanmıştı ve Orta Doğu coğrafyasının sorumluluğunu ABD'ye devretmek üzeriydi. Doğu Akdeniz açık bir Sovyet tehdidi altındayken, bölgede yaşanması muhtemel güç boşluğunun doldurulması için verilen süre 38 gündü. İngiltere iki ülkeye yaptığı yardımların fişini çekmişti. İngiltere, ABD'nin ve Batı demokrasilerinin siyasi-askerî ve petrol güvenliğine yönelik hayati çıkarlarının devamının sağlanmasında ve mevcut "çok acil" kritik durumda eksikliğin ABD tarafından giderileceğini umuyordu. ABD de bölgedeki dengelerin Sovyetler Birliği lehine kaymasından endişe ediyordu. Notları inceleyen ve Dışişleri Bakanı Marshall'ın yokluğunda Bakanlığa vekâlet eden Acheson, Hendersan'a personelinin toplanmasını ve bütün hafta sonu çalışarak pazartesi sabahı Bakan'a sunulmak üzere bir cevap hazırlaması talimatını verdi. Acheson, İngiltere'nin 21 Şubat'ta verdiği bu iki notu yıllar sonra "şok" olarak hatırlayacaktı.⁶ Aslında ABD, İngiltere'nin notlarından önce 20 Şubat'ta Yunanistan'daki çöküş konusunda Atina'daki Büyükelçisi tarafından uyarılmıştı. Schwarzenberger'in ifade ettiği gibi "Yunanistan ve Türkiye'nin Batılı güçlerce kontrol edilmesi, Doğu Akdeniz ve Yakın Doğu'nun petrol kaynaklarını tutması için elzemdi."⁷

2. Truman Doktrini ve Türkiye: Tarihsel Arka Plan

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye'den toprak talebi ve Boğazların yönetiminde hak iddiaları Türkiye'nin Atlantik politikalarının temelini oluşturur. Sovyet taleplerinin yarattığı güvenlik endişesinin, Türkiye'nin savaşın galiplerinden olan ABD'yle ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediği ve Türk-Amerikan yakınlaşmasının temelini oluşturan ortak güvenlik arayışları bu anlamda önemlidir. Truman Doktrinini oluşturan süreci, bu güvenlik endişesine giden yol oluşturmuştu.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve sonrasındaki gelişmelerde Türkiye, kendisine bir yön bulma çabası içerisindeyken iki mühim gelişmenin etkisinde kaldı. Birincisi, Eylül-Ekim 1939'da Sovyetler Birliği ile Türkiye arasında gerçekleştirilen Moskova görüşmeleridir. Bu görüşmelerde Sovyet tarafı Türkiye'den Boğazların statüsünde değişiklik yapılmasını ve kendilerine üs verilmesini talep etmişti. Rusların bu talebi karşısında Türkiye, İngiliz-Fransız ekseninde bir dış politikayla denge arayışına girmiş ve bu ülkelerle ittifak kurmuştu. Sovyet baskısı savaş boyunca devam etti ve Türkiye, Batı ekseninde bir güvenlik arayışına girdi. İkinci gelişme ise, önce İngiltere, ardından da ABD'ye doğru kayıştı. Batı merkezli güvenlik arayışında İngiltere'nin genelde Orta Doğu, özelde de Türkiye politikalarında ABD'yi bölgeye dâhil etme çabası önemli-

6 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 217; *FRUS* 5 (1947): 32.

7 Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power-Politics: A Study of International Society* (2. ed. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1951), 414.

dir. Bu çaba 1943 Kazablanka Konferansı'nda ABD-İngiltere görüşmelerinde İngiltere tarafından net olarak belirtilmişti. Türkiye, Soğuk Savaş'ın iki kutuplu yapılanmasında Batı'nın desteğini alarak Washington merkezli Atlantik kuşağına dâhil oldu. Bu dönem, 1939'dan Türkiye'nin NATO'ya üye olduğu 1952'ye kadar olan tarihsel alt yapıdır. Türkiye'nin Batı bloğu içinde İngiliz ekseninden ABD eksenine geçişin en önemli evresi 1947 Truman Doktrindir.

Ancak Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı ardından bir bloğa yönelmesi kolay olmamıştır.⁸ Criss'in ifadesiyle,

[Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda] müttefiklerini serbest iradesiyle seçmemek Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na çok pahalıya mal olmuştu. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin güvenliği açısından bir daha böyle bir duruma düşülmemesi, İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e miras kalan önemli bir dış politika ilkesidir.⁹

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında ve sonrasında şekillenen dünyada Türkiye'nin zihninde toprak bütünlüğü ve güvenli bir ittifak arayışı hâkimdi. Nitekim savaş sonrasında Avrupada, güç dengelerinin Sovyetler Birliği eline geçeceği endişesini duyan Türkiye, sorunlu ilişkileri olan kuzey komşusu lehine kuvvetler dengesinin oluşacağını görmüştü. Bu durum, savaşın son döneminde ve sonrasında Türkiye'yi Batı'nın etki sahasına sürükledi. Bu sürükleniş Türkiye'yi, Batı ve Transatlantik neredeyse bir bağımlılık derecesinde karmaşık ilişkiler manzumesinin kucağına itti. Batı'yla ilişkiler ve toprak bütünlüğü konuları Türk siyasi tarihine damga vurdu.

Sovyetler Birliği, 1941'de Bulgarlarla yapılan görüşmelerde Trakya'da Midye-Enez hattına kadar olan bölgenin Bulgarlara, boğazlara kadar olan bölgenin da kendilerine verilmesi önerisinde bulunmuştu. Bulgaristan, komşu ülkelerin yapılan görüşmelerden haberdar edilmesi anlaşması uyarınca Türk hükümetini bu öneri hakkında bilgilendirmişti. Türklerin konuyla ilgili olarak Moskova nezdindeki girişimleri cevapsız kaldı.¹⁰ Türkiye Sovyetlerin talepleri karşısında gerekli güvenlik garantilerini ABD ve İngiltere'den sağlamaya çalıştı.¹¹ Nitekim Ocak 1943'te İngiliz tarafı savaşa katılması durumunda Türkiye'nin Sovyetlere karşı toprak bütünlüğünün korunacağını taahhüt etti.¹²

8 Edward Weisband, *2. Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2002), 107-109.

9 Nur Bilge Criss, "Önsöz", *Türkiye'nin Batı İle İttifaka Yönelişi*, Melih Esenbel (İstanbul: İsis Yayıncılık, 2000), 13.

10 *FRUS* 3 (1941): 871. Bu bilgiler, Numan Menemencioğlu'nun ABD Ankara Büyükelçisiyle yaptığı görüşmenin içeriğinin söz konusu büyükelçi tarafından Washington'a yazılan telgrafta yer almaktadır.

11 *FRUS* 4 (1943): 1063-1064. Örneğin, Almanların 1941'de Barbarossa Harekâtı ile Sovyetlere saldırdığını öğrendiği zaman İnönü'nün zaman uzun uzun gülmesi, hatta zeybek oynadığı rivayeti bu anlamda hoş bir anekdottur. Saraçoğlu ayrıca, "Bu şans, yani Rusya'nın tamamen yok edilebilmesi fırsatı doğmuştur" diyecektir. Cemal Madanoğlu, *Anılar (1911-1953)* (İstanbul: Evrim Yayınevi, 1982), 302; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), 192.

12 Adana görüşmelerine katılan İngiliz Büyükelçisi Ankara'ya döndüğü akşam ABD'li meslektaşını görüşmenin sonuçları hakkında bilgilendirmişti.

Sovyet Birliği-Türkiye ilişkilerinde kuvvet dengesizliğinin yarattığı sorunlar 1950'lerin sonuna değin Türkiye için önemli bir endişe kaynağı olmaya devam etti. Bu endişeyle,

Türkiye 1945-46'daki Sovyet isteklerinden ve tehditlerinden sonra Batılı devletlerle ilişkilerini öyle bir biçimde geliştirmiştir ki, bütün dış politika felsefesini sadece Batı'yla işbirliği yapmak ilkesi üzerine kurmuştur.¹³

Ancak Türkiye, Sovyet tehdit algılaması konusunda yalnız değildi. ABD Dışişleri Bakanı James F. Byrnes'in Mayıs 1946'da Sovyet dış politikasının temelini ne olduğu sorusuna Fransız meslektaşı "yayılmacılık yoluyla güvenlik" şeklinde cevap vermişti.¹⁴ İkinci Dünya Savaşı boyunca "aktif tarafsızlık" politikası izlemiş olan Türkiye, savaşın Avrupa ayağının sonucu belli olmaya başladığı andan itibaren kuzey komşusu SSCB'nin belirgin tehdidi ile karşı karşıyaydı.

Fas'ın Kazablanka kentinde 14-24 Ocak 1943 tarihlerinde bir araya gelen ABD ve Birleşik Krallık liderleri, Sovyetler Birliği'nin katılmadığı konferansta, Türkiye'nin savaşa dâhil edilmesi konusunu da gündeme getirdi. ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı belgelerine göre, 18 Ocak'taki görüşmelerde ABD Başkanı Roosevelt, askerî konulardaki gelişmelerin ABD'ye bildirilmesi kaydıyla Türkiye söz konusu olduğunda ilk söz sahibinin İngiltere olduğunu kabul etmiştir.¹⁵ Savaş süresince Türkiye ile ilgili askerî konulardaki görüşmelerde ABD, tarihsel olarak Orta Doğu coğrafyasında "tabii" hakkı olan İngiltere'nin bölgedeki askerî politikalarına geniş bir serbestlik tanımıştı. Ancak, ilerleyen günlerde Türkiye'nin durumunu ilgilendiren konularda, Kazablanka Konferansı'ndaki mutabakatın ne olduğu hususunda ABD ile İngiltere arasında anlaşmazlık olduğu ortaya çıktı. ABD'liler hiçbir şekilde siyasi ve ekonomik konularda İngiltere'nin istediği gibi politika oluşturamayacağını ifade ederken, İngilizler ise konferansta kendilerine "Türklere karşı kâğıtları istedikleri gibi kullanacakları"¹⁶ sözünün verildiğinde ısrar etti. ABD ise, Türkiye'nin siyasi ve ekonomik durumuyla ilgili konularda böylesi bir serbestliği tanımayacağını net bir şekilde İngiltere'ye belirtti.

Truman Doktrin'in ilanı olan 1947'nin ilk aylarına kadar Orta Doğu coğrafyasında ABD dış politikasının temel çizgilerini şu şekilde belirtmek mümkündür:

13 Mehmet Gönlübol vd., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000), 248.

14 Howard Jones, *New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1997), 7.

15 *FRUS* 4 (1943): 634, 650, 659. Konferans'ta Türkiye'nin müttefikler safında savaşa girmesi karşılığında Suriye ve Bulgaristan'dan toprak dahi verilmesi gündeme gelmişti.

16 "Başkan Türkiye ile kartların oynanması konusunda esas sorumluluğu Başbakan'a bıraktı." Bu konudaki anlaşmazlık Dışişleri Bakanı'nın İngiltere'nin Washington Büyükelçisi'ne nota yazmasına kadar vardı. *FRUS* 4 (1943): 1067.

1. İngiltere'nin tarihsel rolü ve dönemin klasik ABD dış politikası gereği, İngiltere'nin "meşru haklara sahip" etki sahasına müdahale etmeme.
2. Mümkün olan en az şekilde tesir ederek bu politikayı takip etmek ve bu konuda İngiltere'ye garanti vermek.¹⁷

Kazablanka'nın ardından İngiltere ile ABD arasında Türkiye'nin siyasi ve ekonomik sahalarında kimin söz sahibi olacağı yönündeki yanlış anlamadan kaynaklanan tartışma, ABD'nin bölge üzerindeki etkinlik sahasını yayma amacının ilk işaretlerinden birisiydi. Bu temel etrafında ABD, Orta Doğu bölgesinde daha derin bir stratejik anlayışı tedricen geliştirmeye başladı. Bu, "özgür dünya"nın liderliğine soyunan ABD için bir nevi kaslarını gösterme mücadelesiydi. Bu daha önce İngiltere'nin sorumluluğunu kabul etmiş olan ABD açısından siyasi planlama ve algıda da değişiklikti.¹⁸

Nitekim savaş süresince müttefik liderler arasında devam eden ve Kazablanka ile başlayan konferanslar zincirinde (Kazablanka, Québec, Kahire, Moskova ve Tahran), Türkiye'nin savaşa dâhil edilmesi konusu gündeme geldiği zamanlarda sadece ABD, Türkiye'yle ilgili politikalar konusunda kararlı bir tavır sergiledi.

Savaş sonrası kurulacak Birleşmiş Milletler'e üyeliğin Almanya ve Japonya'ya savaş ilan eden ülkelere açık olacağı yönündeki müttefik güçlerin kararı, Türkiye'nin 23 Şubat 1945'de bu ülkelere savaş ilan etmesine neden oldu. Ancak, Sovyetler bunu çok geç kalmış bir karar olarak gördü. Bu esnada ABD'nin Moskova Büyükelçiliği, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye'den Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi'nde günün şartlarına uygun değişikliklerin yapılması yönünde talepte bulunduğu haberdardı.¹⁹ Sovyet Dışişleri Bakanı Molotov, Moskova Büyükelçisi Selim Sarper'e 19 Mart 1945'de bir nota vererek iki ülke arasında imzalanmış olan 1925 Türk-Sovyet Dostluk ve Tarafsızlık Antlaşması'nın yenilenmeyeceğini bildirdi.²⁰ Bu, Türk tarafınca beklenen bir durumdu.²¹ Türk büyükelçisi Ankara'yı iki ay önce bu konuda uyarıyordu.²² 1945 Baharında savaşın Almanya'nın yenilgiyle sona ereceği artık belli olduğunda Moskova'nın boğazlar üzerindeki iştahı yeniden kabardı. Dışişleri Bakanı Hasan Saka, Molotov'un notasına cevaben 4 Nisan 1945'te Sovyetler

17 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 514.

18 Savaş boyunca ABD, İran, Suudi Arabistan ve Mısır'da İngiliz kuvvetleriyle birlikte asker ve teknik danışmanlar bulundurmuş, deniz ve hava kuvvetleri için bakım onarım merkezleri tesis etmişti. ABD bu bölgede İngilizlere ve Sovyetlere uygulanan ödünç verme ve kiralama anlaşmaları gereği lojistik destek sağlamıştı. *FRUS* 5 (1947): 513.

19 *FRUS* 8 (1945): 1219.

20 *FRUS* 8 (1945): 1219-1920.

21 1925 tarihli anlaşmanın 7 Kasım 1935 yılında tashih edilen şekline göre anlaşma 10 yıllık süre için tekrardan uzatılmış, taraflardan birisinin altı ay öncesinden uzatmanın olmayacağı yönündeki beyanı olmadığı takdirde iki yıllık süre için tekrardan devam edeceği belirtilmişti.

22 *FRUS* 8 (1945): 1221.

Birliği'nin Ankara Büyükelçisi Vinogradov'u çağırması ve Türkiye'nin antlaşmanın iki tarafın çıkarlarına uyacak şekilde değiştirilmesini kabul ettiğini ve Sovyet tekliflerini dikkatle ve iyimserlikle inceleyeceklerini bildirdi.²³

Türkiye, Birleşmiş Milletler'in (BM) kuruluşu sürecinde 25 Nisan 1945'de başlayan San Francisco Konferansı'na Sovyet taleplerinin tedirgin edici ağırlığı altında katıldı. 19 Mart-13 Ekim 1946 arasında Türkiye-Sovyet Birliği ilişkilerinde "notalar savaşı" olarak tanımlanabilecek bir yalnızlık süreci başladığında, Türkiye toprak bütünlüğünün korunması için açıkça güvenebileceği ve yardım alabileceği kesin bir destekten yoksundu. Bu dönemde SSCB'nin boğazlarda üs ve Doğu Anadolu'da toprak talepleri karşısında Türkiye, Aydın'ın yorumuyla, "yalnız kaldığı endişesine kapılacaktı".²⁴

Aralık 1945 SSCB'nin İran'daki etkinliği bu ülkede özerk Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti ve Kürt Mehâbâd Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasına yol açtı. Aynı süreç içerisinde Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nın da SSCB tarafından işgal edilmesiyle Türkiye açık bir şekilde Sovyetler Birliği tarafından çevrelenmişti. Sovyet lideri Stalin'in yayılcı iştahı bu anlamda doymak bilmez gibi görünüyordu.²⁵ Nitekim Stalin, Türkiye üzerindeki toprak taleplerini Aralık 1945'te Moskova'da gerçekleştirilen ABD-İngiliz-Sovyet dışişleri bakanları toplantısında net bir şekilde ifade etmişti.²⁶ İngiltere açısından SSCB politikası "rahatsız edici"ydi ve "İngiliz Hükümeti bu tehditler karşısında tarafsız

23 Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidini Karşılarında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Girişi, III. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeler* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2000), 72.

24 Mustafa Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye", *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran (14. Baskı, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2009), 474.

25 Gaddis'in Stalin'in kişiliği ile ilgili tespiti ilginçtir: "Stalin her şeyin ötesinde bir Büyük Rusya milliyetçisiydi...Tutkuları, Moskova prenslerinin çevrelerindeki toprakları alma ve hükmetme kararlılığını takip etti. Stalin, bu amacını, gerçek kökenlerini ve karakterini gizlemeye gerek görmeden proleter enternasyonalizm ideolojisi içerisinde sakladı: Onunla ilgili en kapsayıcı biyografiyi yazan Robert C. Tucker'ın yeni ortaya koyduğu gibi Stalin'in rol modelleri Lenin, hatta Marx değil; Büyük Petro ve nihayetinde Korkunç İvan'dı..." John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History: Reflections on Revisionism", *Foreign Affairs* 73/1 (Ocak-Şubat 1994): 144-145.

26 *FRUS*, 2 (1945): 690-691. 1949'da *The Russian View*'deki makalesinde Kucherov, Rusya'nın emperyalist emelleri ile ilgili şu tespiti yapmıştır: "Rusya'nın kaderinin çağdaş oluşturucuları Çarist rejimin birçok siyasi geleneğini almıştır. Bu gelenekler arasında Rusya'nın kısıtlama olmaksızın boğazları kullanmayı garanti altına alması ve aynı zamanda da Karadeniz ülkesi olmayan milletlerin donanmalarının bu garantiden yoksun bırakılması vardır. Bu emelin Rusya'nın siyasi, stratejik ve ekonomik çıkarları ile uyumlu olduğuna şüphe yoktur. (...) Her ne kadar Rus çıkarları açısından İstanbul ve boğazlardaki Rus emelleri iyi temele dayanıyor olsa da mevcut durumda bunlar Batılı güçlerce şüphe ve kötü niyetle karşılanmaktadır. Bu şüphe ve kötü niyetle karşılanmada, SSCB'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra uyguladığı genel yayılcı ve emperyalist politikaları sorumludur." Samuel Kucherov, "The Problem of Constantinople and the Straits", *The Russian Review* 8/3 (Temmuz 1949): 220. Stalin ile ilgili ilginç bir anekdotu Zubok şöyle aktarır: "Partinin teorik dergisi, Friedrich Engels'in Çarist Rusya'nın dış politikasını yayılcı ve tehlikeli olarak tanımladığı bir makalesini basmak istediğinde Stalin, Marksizm'in ortak kurucusunun görüşlerinin değil, Çarist politikaların yanında yer aldı." Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 18 ve n. 88.

kalamayacak, Türkiye'nin yanında olacaktı". İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı Ernest Bevin'e göre SSCB'nin Boğazlarda üs ve Kars-Ardahan talepleriyle²⁷ mutabık olmaları mümkün değildi. İngiltere açısından Rus siyaseti basitti: Ruslar İngilizleri Akdeniz'in rakipsiz sahibi ve Atlantik'ten İskandinavya, oradan da Akdeniz'e uzanan sahillerin muhtemel lideri olarak görüyorlardı. İngiltere'nin bu denli güçlü bir pozisyonda bulunması, Rusya'nın güvenliği için muhtemel bir tehditti, dolayısıyla İngilizler buralardan atılmalıydı.²⁸

İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı Ernest Bevin, Ocak 1946'da Orta Doğu'daki Sovyet tehdidine karşı Amerikalı liderleri sürekli tetikte tutma ve İngiliz "özel çıkarları"nın korunması adına ABD'nin bölgeye girmesinin şartlarını sağlayacak siyasi hazırlıkların yapılması hususunda Washington'u ziyaret etti.²⁹ İngiltere'nin, ABD'yi Orta Doğu'ya sokma siyaseti Rusya'nın izlediği politikayla karşılıksız kalmadı. Dönemin ABD Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Dean Acheson anılarında Sovyetler Birliği'nin takip ettiği politikaların ABD'yi eğittiğini aktarır:

[Ruslar] Boğazlar ve İran üzerinde baskı kurarak barbarların klasik Yunanlar ve Roma, sonra da çarların kullandıkları sıcak denizlere istila güzergâhını takip ettiler. Thermopylae'dan Kırım'a bu noktalarda baskı kurmak gelenek halini almıştır. Bazı Amerikalılar Rusların tarihini paslı bir geçmiş olarak görse de, İngilizler ve [ABD] Başkan[ı] için durum böyle değildir.³⁰

ABD resmi kaynaklarında da SSCB'nin boğazlar üzerindeki emellerinin salt askerî düzeyde olmadığı belirtilmektedir. Acheson'un ifade ettiği gibi, SSCB'nin amacı "önce Türkiye'de, devamında da Yakın Doğu'nun geri kalanında hakimiyeti ele geçirmek"ti.³¹ Savaşın sonuna doğru Orta ve Güney Avrupa'da işgaller yoluyla toprak kazanmış olan Stalin, dikkatini yine Sovyet-

27 SSCB'nin Türkiye'den toprak talebinde bulunduğu dair resmi bir bildirim ve/veya belge bulunmadığı için tartışmalı bir konu olarak görülebilir. Örneğin, ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yakın Doğu ve Afrika İşleri Genel Müdürü Loy W. Henderson, SSCB'nin resmi bir toprak talebi olmadığını kabul etmektedir. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952", *The Journal of American History* 71/4 (1985): 809 ve not 5. Ancak Sovyet taleplerinin Türk dış politikasını meşgul ettiği günlerde, Türk Dışişleri Bakan Vekilinin yeryüzünde hatırı sayılır ölçüde toprağı olan bir ülkenin ilave toprağı ihtiyacı olup olmadığını sorusuna SSCB'nin Ankara Büyükelçisinin verdiği cevap dikkat çekicidir: Sovyetler Birliği'nin ilave toprağı ihtiyacı yok; ancak Ermenistan çok küçük ve toprağı ihtiyacı var." *FRUS* 1 (1945): 1025.

28 Piers Dixon, *Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon* (Londra: Hutchinson, 1968), 193-194'ten nakleden Zulkanain Abdul Rahman, Amer Saifude Ghazali, Rosmadi Fauzi ve Norazlan Hadi Yaacob, "Britain, the United Nations and the Iranian Crisis of 1946", *Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research* 18/11 (2013): 1549.

29 Toplantı tutanağını hazırlayan Sir Pierson Dixon'ın notlarından aktaran John Saville, *The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government 1945-1946* (Londra ve New York: Verso, 1993), 63.

30 Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 196.

31 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 537-538; Arthur Schlesinger, "Origins of the Cold War", *Foreign Affairs* 46 (Ekim 1967): 30-31.

lerin güney kanadına çevirmiş ve Kafkaslar'ı işaret ederek "buradaki sınırları beğenmiyorum" değerlendirmesini yapmıştı. Moskova iştahını bir kez daha Dışişleri Bakanı Molotov aracılığıyla Türkiye üzerinde gösterdi:

[Stalin] Türkiye'den toprak isteğinin yanı sıra Türk Boğazlarının SSCB tarafından etkin bir şekilde kontrolünü sağlayacak üsler verilmesini talep etti. (...) Hemen anlaşıldı ki çok ileri gitmişti. Patronuna karşı normal olarak hoşgörülü olan Molotov, Boğazları kastederek "Buna izin vermezler!" dedi. Sınırlanan patronu "Sen devam et, ortak mülkiyet için baskı kur" şeklinde cevap verdi.³²

Türkiye, Sovyet işgali altındaki Orta ve Güney Avrupa'nın dışında Sovyet yayılmasını en yakın hisseden ülkedydi.³³ Aslında, savaş henüz sona ermeden Nisan 1945'de toplanan San Francisco Konferansı'nda Sovyet Ermenistan'ı ve İran Kürtleri Türkiye'den toprak talebinde bulunmuştu. Bu dönemde Türkiye, ulusal güvenliğini sağlama alabileceği sakin bir limanı bulmak için yoğun bir çabaya girmişti. Türkiye için güvenlik anlamında gerekli olan koruma, önce askerî ve sivil yardımlar, arkasından da siyasi ve askerî yapılanmalar aracılığıyla ABD'de arandı. Fakat savaşın ardından hâlâ Sovyetlerle savaş dönemi işbirliğini sürdürebileceğine inanan ABD, açıkça Sovyet yayılmacılığının kendi çıkarlarına zarar verdiğini hissettiği ana kadar iyimserliğini korudu. Türkiye, Sovyet taleplerinden ABD'yi yanında olduğunu hissettiği döneme kadar, yani çok kritik bir devre olan yedi ay zarfında yalnız kaldı.

Türkiye bu dönemde güvenliğinin sağlanması için ABD ve İngiltere'den destek arayışındaydı. 19 Mart 1945-17 Ağustos 1946 dönemi Türkiye'nin güvenliği konusunda SSCB'yle İngiltere-ABD-Türkiye arasında notalar savaşı olarak geçti. Bu süreç, Sovyetlerin ABD-İngiltere ve Türkiye'ye gönderdiği notaya,³⁴ ABD'nin 19 Ağustos'ta savaş riskini göze alarak cevap vermesiyle en üst seviyeye ulaştı. Sever, bu notayla Türkiye'nin "Amerika'nın Sovyetlere karşı gerçek tavırla ilgili endişeleri[nin] (...) son buldu[ğunu]" ifade eder.³⁵ Bu

32 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: The Deals The Spies The Truth* (Londra: Penguin Books, 2005), 28.

33 Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1980), 335-347.

34 Notalar konusunda Türkiye'nin teziyle ilgili o günlerin havası içerisinde detaylı bir anlatım için bkz. Cemil Bilsel, "The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence", *The American Journal of International Law* 41/4 (Ekim 1947): 727-747. Bilsel, Rus/Sovyet politikalarını emperyalist olarak tanımlar ve boğazlarla ilgili Rus tutumunun günün şartlarına uygun olarak üç şekilde geliştiğini ifade eder : (i) Zorlu zamanlarda Ruslar Boğazların savaş gemilerine açılmasını önerir (açık kapı politikası); (ii) Rusya zayıf hissettiği zamanlarda Boğazların tüm savaş gemilerine kapatılmasını talep eder (savunmacı politika); (iii) Rusya kendini güçlü hissettiği zaman Boğazların yalnızca Rus savaş gemilerine açık tutulmasını ve Boğazların sahipliğini amaçladığı saldırgan bir politika izler (emperyalist politika). Bu durum Rusya'nın açık bir saldırganlığı, emperyalist politikasıydı. Öte yandan, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Ankara Büyükelçisi, ABD'li mevkidaşı nezdinde Türkiye üzerindeki baskıyı devam ettirmiş, ilişkilerde Sovyetlerin yükselen gücünün gözönüne alınmasını istemişti. *FRUS* 7 (1946): 813-817.

35 Ayşegül Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Ortadoğu 1945-1958* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997), 42.

noktada Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri artık yeni bir döneme girmiştir.³⁶ 15 Ağustos'ta Beyaz Saray'da yapılan güvenlik toplantısı Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini şekillendirecek olan karara sahne olmuştur. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yakın Doğu Dairesi'nin aynı gün tarihli bilgi notunda Başkan Truman yaklaşan tehlike karşısında uyarılmıştı: "Sovyetler Birliği'nin birinci amacı Türkiye'nin kontrolünü ele geçirmektir." Eğer Sovyetler bu girişimlerinde başarılı olursa, ABD, "imkânsız olmasa da, oldukça zor bir şekilde, Sovyetler Birliği'nin Yunanistan üzerinden, ardından tüm Yakın ve Orta Doğu'nun kontrolünü ele geçirmesini önleyebilecektir".³⁷ Amerika açısından konunun geciktirilmeye tahammülü yoktu. Bakanlığın Yakın Doğu Bölümü Başkanı Henderson, daha sonra bu günü "karar anı" olarak hatırlayacaktır:

Herhangi bir Sovyet saldırganlığına ve özellikle Türkiye örneğinde açıkça görüldüğü gibi, Türkiye'ye karşı herhangi bir Sovyet saldırganlığına karşı elimizdeki mevcut tüm imkânlarla direnmemizi gerektirecek karar anı gelip çatmıştı.³⁸

Truman Dışişleri Bakanı, Savaş Bakanı, Donanma Bakanı ve Genelkurmay Başkanının görüşleri doğrultusunda Sovyet taleplerini Türkiye'nin geri çevirmesi önerisini kabul etti. Buna göre ABD, Türkiye'ye desteğini göstermek üzere bir donanma gücünü Doğu Akdeniz'e gönderdi.³⁹ Truman'ın Türkiye'ye destek vermesi, Kara Kuvvetleri Plan ve Operasyonlar Dairesi Komutanı General Norstad'a göre Truman Doktrinin doğumunun işaretiydi.⁴⁰ 19 Ağustos'ta ABD Moskova Büyükelçiliği SSCB'ye verdiği notayla Boğazlar konusunda ABD'nin duruşunu ortaya kodu: Boğazlar konusu "yalnızca Karadeniz güçlerini ilgilendiren bir mesele değildir, ABD'nin de dâhil olduğu diğer güçleri de ilgilendirmektedir".⁴¹ Kanımızca bu nota, Nisan 1946'da USS Missouri zırhlısının Türkiye ziyaretinden daha önemli bir Amerikan desteğidir. Stalin dönemindeki politikaların Türkiye'yi Batı'nın kucağına ittiğini yıllar sonra dönemin Sovyet lideri Kruşçev, 28 Haziran 1957'deki Sovyet Komünist Partisi Merkez Komitesi toplantısında şöyle ifade etmiştir:

Hatırlayın [Stalin dönemi politikalar] ne tür üzücü sonuçlara yol açtı, komşularımız olan Türkiye ve İran'la dostane ilişkilerimizi bozdu. Türkiye'ye yönelik yanlış politikamızla Amerikan emperyalizmine yardım ettik. Türkler Voroşilov'u kardeş gibi karşıladılar, onun adını bir meydana vermişlerdi. Fakat İkinci Dünya Savaşı sona erdiğinde Türkiye'ye dostluk antlaşmasını yırttığımızı söyleyen bir nota verdik. Neden? Çünkü sizler [Türkler] Çanakkale

36 Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye*, 42.

37 *FRUS* 7 (1946): 840.

38 LWH Oral History (Truman Library), 234-235.

39 Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Henry S. Truman, 1945-1948* (New York: Norton, 1977), 251; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 263-264; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 63-65.

40 Stephen G. Xydis, "Truman Doctrine in Perspective", *Balkan Studies* 8 (1967): 248, not 40 ve s. 249.

41 *FRUS* 7 (1946): 847.

Boğazı'nı vermiyorsunuz. Dinleyin, yalnızca bir sarhoş böyle bir şey yazabilir. Her şeyin ötesinde hiçbir ülke Çanakkale Boğazı'nı gönüllü olarak vermez... Kısa görüşlü politikalarımızla Türkiye ve İran'ı ABD, İngiltere ve Bağdat Paketi'nin kucağına ittik.⁴²

Ağustos 1946 itibarıyla ABD artık geleneksel tecrit politikasından uzaklaşmaya başlamış ve Sovyet etkisine karşı bir tutum takınmıştı. Bu durum Churchill'in ABD'nin Fulton kasabasında 5 Mart 1946'da ünlü "Demir Perde" konuşmasıyla bir arada düşünülürse daha da anlamlı olacaktır. Halle'in ifadeyle "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri işe yarar bir dış politika" arayışındadır. Bu arayışın siyasi planlamaya dönüşmesi ise, somut gelişmeler paralelinde ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın Rus uzmanı George Kennan'ın 22 Şubat'ta Moskova'dan Washington'a gönderdiği "Uzun Telgraf"ta (*The Long Telegram*) kendini bulmuştur. Bu telgrafın öngördüğü siyasi temel çizgiler ABD'nin SSCB'ye karşı yürüttüğü 45 yıllık Soğuk Savaş'ın temeliydi.⁴³ ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Byrnes, Aralık 1945 sonunda Moskova'dan döndüğü zaman, Başkan Truman da bakanıyla yapacağı görüşme için bir not hazırlamıştı. Truman dönemi tarihçisi Robert Messer'in yıllar sonra ortaya çıkardığı bu notta Truman'ın Sovyetlerle ilgili düşüncesinin değiştiğine yönelik çarpıcı ipuçları vardı. Zira Truman, Stalin'in Balkanlar, Avrupa ve İran üzerindeki politikalarından iyice rahatsız olmaya başlamıştı. Truman notta düşüncelerini açıklıkla belirtmişti:

Rusların Türkiye'yi işgal ve Karadeniz Boğazlarından Akdeniz'e kadar bölgeyi ele geçirme niyetleri konusunda aklımda hiçbir şüphe kalmadı. Eğer Ruslar demir bir yumruk ve sert dille mukabele görmezse başka bir savaş olacaktır. Yalnızca tek bir dilden anlıyorlar: "Ne kadar tümeniniz var?" Artık daha fazla tavizkar olmamıza gerek olmadığını düşünmüyorum. (...) Sovyetlere bebek bakıcılığı yapmaktan yoruldum.⁴⁴

Truman, bu düşünceler içerisindeyken tam da zamanında Kennan'ın "Uzun Telgraf"ı Washington'a ulaşmıştı. Sovyet politikalarını analiz eden Kennan, Sovyetlerin belirli bir politikası olmadığını, iç ve dış politika anlamında bir muğlaklık süreci yaşandığını, askerî olarak da ABD'ye bir muka-

42 "CC CPSU Plenum, Evening 28 June 1957", *Istoricheski arkhiv* 3-6 (1993) ve 1-2(1994), çev. Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F03A-96B6-175C-997CF0E22D8D3F3E&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20Foreign%20Policy (Son erişim tarihi: 18 Mayıs 2012.)

Kruşçev'in bahsettiği Vorosilov, Kurtuluş Savaşı döneminde Mustafa Kemal ile görüşmelerde bulunmuş, akabinde Cumhuriyet'in 10. yıl kutlamalarına katılan Sovyet heyetinin başkanlığını yürütmüş olan General Kliment Vevremoviç Vorosilov'dur. Taksim anıtında Mustafa Kemal'in arkasında diğer Sovyet Generali Frunze ile birlikte durmaktadır. Vorosilov ile ilgili olarak bkz. Erdal Aydoğan, "Kliment Yefromoviç Vorosilov'un Türkiye'yi Ziyareti ve Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya İlişkilerine Katkısı", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 39 (Mayıs 2007): 337-357.

43 *FRUS*, 1946, Vol.6, s.696-709.

44 Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 79-80.

belede bulunamayacağını belirtmiş, Sovyetlere “güçlü bir karşılık” verilmesi önerisinde bulunmuştu. Eğer ABD, yeterli gücü toplayabilir ve bu gücü kullanma konusunda dirayet gösterebilirse, Moskova bu politikaya karşılık verecek durumda olamayacaktı. Batı, siyasal ve ekonomik anlamda savaş yorgunu olsa da, Sovyetlerin durumu daha da kötüydü. Komünist sistemin ekonomik mucizesi görünürde bir başarıydı. Komünizm kendi insanlarıncı dışlanmaktaydı.⁴⁵ Kennan, Uzun Telgraf’tan bir yıl sonra “Mr. X” takma adıyla “Sovyet Kuşatmasının Kaynakları” başlıklı bir makale yayınlayarak görüşlerini kamuoyuyla paylaştı. Kennan’a göre, Sovyet insanı “fiziksel ve ruhsal açıdan yorgun”du.

Öte yandan Türkiye açısından 19 Mart 1946’da Sovyet zırhlı birliklerini İran sınırında görmek Sovyet tehdidinin somut haliydi.⁴⁶ ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Byrnes’in Sovyetlerin İran Azerbaycan’ında askerî üs açmalardan birkaç hafta sonra yaptığı konuşmalar (Mart-Nisan 1946) Sovyetler üzerinde etkili oldu. Sovyetlerin İran’da tam bir hakimiyet sağlamaktan ziyade petrole yönelik bir taviz arayışında olmaları, İran buhranının hızla ortadan kalkmasına neden olmuş gibidir.⁴⁷ İran buhranı 4 Nisan tarihli İran-Sovyet nota teatisiyle düşüşle geçerken, bundan bir gün sonra Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde tam bir dönüm noktası olan ABD zırhlısı USS Missouri’nin İstanbul ziyareti başladı. 21 Mart’ta ABD donanmasının⁴⁸ Cezayir ve Tanca limanında başladığı liman ziyaretleri kapsamında donanma dört gün boyunca İstanbul’da kaldı. Akdeniz liman ziyaretlerinin asıl amacı, tek bir güç gösterisiyle Sovyetlere yönelik bir mesajdı: Sovyetlerin Yunanistan’daki komünist gerillalarla yaşanan iç savaş, İran’dan geri çekilme sorunu ve Türkiye üzerine uyguladıkları baskılara karşı tek bir hamlede etkin bir cevap verme arayışı. Balkanlar ve Doğu Avrupa üzerinde başlayan ABD-SSCB politik ayrımlaşması, Türkiye açısından da önemlidir. ABD-SSCB ilişkilerinde savaş boyunca devam eden işbirliği artık hasım bir çizgide seyredecektir. Gaddis, Truman yönetiminin artık Sovyetlere yönelik *quid pro quo* stratejisinin terk edildiğini, “ABD’nin geçmişteki uygulamalarından birkaç noktada ayrıldığı”nı belirtir:

45 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (New York: Bantam, 1969), 596. Uzun Telgraf’tan bir yıl sonra Kennan, “Mr. X” takma adıyla “Sovyet Kuşatmasının Kaynakları” başlıklı bir makale yayınlayarak, Uzun Telgraf’taki görüşlerini açık yayında ifade etti. Mr. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs* (Temmuz 1947): 566-582.

46 Sovyet zırhlı birlik hareketini gösterir harita için George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO Entry Contained Soviets* (Londra: Macmillan, 1990), 15.

47 *FRUS* 7 (1946): 564-565, 566-567; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 55; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990* (6th ed., New York: Edition McGraw-Hill, 1991), 28; *FRUS* 7 (1946): 399-401; *FRUS* 5 (1947): 915. *FRUS* editörleri Truman’ın Sovyetlere bir mesaj gönderdiği konusunda kesinlikle bir kayıt olmadığını belirtiyorlar; *FRUS* 7 (1946): 348-349.

48 Geziye USS Missouri zırhlısı, USS Cleveland kruvazörü ve USS Power destroyeri görev almıştır. Missouri’nin ziyaretindeki resmi neden 11 Kasım 1944’de vefat eden Türk Büyükelçisi Mehmet Münir Ertegün’ün naaşının getirilmesidir.

(i) Ruslarla anlaşmazlıkları saklayacak daha fazla çaba gösterilmeyecektir; aksine, bu anlaşmazlıklar samimi bir şekilde ifşa edilecektir, fakat bunlar kışkırtıcı tarzda olmayacaktır. (ii) Sovyetler Birliği'ne daha fazla taviz verilmeyecektir: Birleşik Devletler, gerçekte, gelecekteki Sovyet yayılmacılığının hedeflerine karşı savunulacak "hatları çizecektir", fakat halen Moskova'nın kontrolündeki bölgelerin "özgürleştirilmesi"ne yönelik girişimde bulunmayacaktır. (iii) Bu amacı gerçekleştirmek için Birleşik Devletler askerî gücü yeniden oluşturulacaktır, müttefiklerden ekonomik ve askerî yardım talepleri olumlu olarak düşünülecektir. (iv) Sovyetler Birliği ile müzakerelere devam edilecek, fakat bunda yalnızca Moskova'nın Amerika'nın pozisyonlarını tasdik etme veya Sovyet ihtilaflarının kamuoyuna duyurulmasıyla yurtdışında destek bulma ve yurtdışında müttefikler kazanma amacı olacaktır.⁴⁹

Gaddis, bu değişikliğin amacının altını, Truman'a sunulan Eylül 1946 tarihli çok gizli bir rapordan yaptığı alıntıyla çizer:

Umudumuz odur ki, onlar [Sovyetler] bizim yenilmeyecek kadar güçlü ve korkmayacak kadar kararlı olduğumuzu kabul ettikleri zaman bu düşüncelerini değiştirirler ve bizimle âdil ve tarafsız uzlaşma sağlarlar.⁵⁰

İlginçtir, büyük devlet olmanın getirdiği küresel oyunculuk anlayışı, hemen hemen aynı dönemde Sovyet dışişlerinin diplomatları arasında da benzer bir savaş sonrası rol tanımı yapılmasına neden olmuştu. Sovyet diplomat Ivan M. Maisky, Sovyetlerin önceliğini iki aşamalı olarak belirlemiştir:

Sovyetler Birliği, Avrupa veya Asya'daki herhangi bir saldırgan tarafından tehdit edilemeyecek kadar güçlü olmalıdır. İkinci olarak Avrupa, en azından kıta düzeyinde dünyanın bu bölgesinde kendisini savaş ihtimalinin dışında tutabilmelidir. (...) [Sovyetlerin stratejik amacı] Avrupa'da herhangi bir gücün veya güçler kombinasyonunun güçlü ordulara sahip olmasını engellemektir. Bizim için en iyi yol, Avrupa'da bir kara gücü (SSCB) ve bir deniz gücüdür (İngiltere).⁵¹

Maisky, Türkiye'nin savaş sonrası pozisyonuyla ilgili olarak stratejik önemini ortaya koymuştur:

49 John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, gözden geçirilmiş ve genişletilmiş baskı), 21 not 59.

50 Clark M. Clifford'tan Truman'a "American Relations with Soviet Union", 24 Eylül 1946, Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 419-422'den naklen Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 21.

51 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with The United States and Great Britain", Working Paper No. 13 (1995), Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 1-2. Ivan M. Maisky, Sovyet Dışişleri Bakanı Molotov'un program hazırlamadan sorumlu asistanı olarak görev yapmıştır.

Bir bütün olarak Balkanlar'da SSCB Romanya, Yugoslavya ve Bulgaristan ile birlikte Türkiye'nin etkisini azaltacak (ve nihayetinde "dışlayacak") bir karşılıklı savunma paktları arayışında olmalıdır. Türkiye'nin boğazların "bekçisi" pozisyonunu bozmak gereklidir.⁵²

Maisky'nin Orta Doğu ile ilgili tespitleri de ilginçtir; her ne kadar mevcutta Sovyetlerin "koloniler"de ekonomik çıkarı olmasa da, gelecekte bu bölgede "ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasi" anlamda bir fırsat yatmaktaydı, dolayısıyla bu konudan istifade edebilmek için hazırlıklı olmak gerekiyordu. ABD ve İngiltere ile çatışmadan kaçınma Maisky'nin önerileri arasındaydı. Maisky bir kehanette de bulundu: Sömürge bölgeleri, Birleşik Devletler'in "ekonomik araçlarla İngiltere'nin yerini alacağı" İngiliz-Amerikan rekabetine sahne olacaktı.⁵³ Amerika'nın, Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve siyasi meselelerinde İngiltere'ye "kartları istediği gibi oynamayabilme hakkını" tanımadığı düşünülürse, Sovyet diplomatın Orta Doğu'nun tarihsel akışta nasıl bir yol izleyeceğini ön görmesi önemlidir. Nitekim 1947'nin ilk aylarından itibaren Orta Doğu'da İngiltere'nin yaratacağı boşluk ve akabinde ortaya çıkan "vakum"dan sıklıkla bahsedilmiştir. Maisky'nin dikkatlice hazırlanmış raporu, Türkiye üzerindeki temel politikaların istikrarlı bir uyumla Sovyet planlamacılar ve karar alıcılar tarafından takip edildiğini göstermektedir. Bu anlamda, Gönlübol'a göre Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerinde dengesizlik vardı:

Türkiye'nin imkânları sınırlı olduğu ve bu imkânlar ancak diğer devletlerle işbirliğiyle arttırılabileceği için işbirliğinin kendisine sağladığı imkânlardan, hemen tekrar bulacağına emin olmadan süratle vazgeçmesi güçtür. Bu sebeple Türkiye'nin dış politikasında kesin değişimlerden ziyade tedrici gelişmeler görülmüştür. Sonuç olarak Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki münasebetleri sınırlı bir politika izleyen bir devletle genel dünya politikası izleyen bir devlet arasındaki münasebetler olarak değerlendirmek, bir yanılma olarak nitelendirilemez.⁵⁴

Kaynaklar arasındaki dengesizlikten doğan güç farkı, Türkiye açısından ABD gibi güçlü bir ülkeyle aynı saflarda yer alarak giderilmişti. 1939'da Savaşın Moskova ziyaretiyle başlayan Sovyet tehdidi, ABD'nin güvenlik şemsiyesi altında, Batı bloğuna sığınmış Türkiye yarattı. İngiltere'nin Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye yardım yapamayacağını açıklaması, Türkiye açısından karmaşık bir süreci doğurmuştu.⁵⁵ Birçok araştırmacı 1946'nın ilk aylarını Soğuk Savaş'ın şekillenmeye başladığı dönem olarak görür: İran sorunu yüzünden

52 Pechatnov, "The Big Three After World War II", 3.

53 Pechatnov, "The Big Three After World War II", 4.

54 Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 388.

55 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1972), özellikle 9. Bl. Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91* (Londra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), özellikle 19.

ABD ve SSCB'nin Birleşmiş Milletler'de karşı karşıya gelmesi, Churchill'in "Demir Perde" konuşması", Kennan'ın "Uzun Telgrafı" uluslararası kronoloji açısından kilometre taşlarıdır. Bu gelişmelere paralel olarak Türkiye'nin kendi Soğuk Savaşı da aynı oranda gelişmişti. Sovyetlerin yarattığı güvenlik tehdidi ve topraklarının bütünlüğü kaygısı, Türkiye için Soğuk Savaş'ın ana kriterini oluşturdu. Bu süreçte ABD'nin tereddütlü tavrının ardından siyasi, askerî ve ekonomik alanlardaki desteğiyle Türkiye küresel mücadeleye dâhil olmuştur.

Bu anlamda, Sovyetlere bebek bakıcılığı yapmaktan bıktığını ifade eden Başkan Truman, ABD Kongresi'nin de desteğiyle Sovyet yayılmacılığına karşı bir güvence olarak Türkiye'nin arkasında olduğunu Mart 1947'e ilan etti. Türkiye'nin savaş sonrası toprak bütünlüğünün muhafazası için müttefik arayışı, savaşın mutlak galipleri olan ABD ve SSCB'nin birbirleri üzerinden sergiledikleri güç oyunları çerçevesinde bu anlamda değer kazanmaktadır. Türkiye, son sözün söylenmesinde ABD'nin rol almasına gönülden razı olmuş ve Batı'nın hamiliğini bir siyasi kazanç olarak görmüştü. Nitekim 12 Mart 1947'de ilan edilen Truman Doktrininin öznesi olarak Türkiye, Sovyetlerin yayılmacı siyasetinin karşısında en etkin ve güçlü desteği de resmen sağlamış oldu. Truman Doktrini, Türkiye'nin Batı bloğuna eklemlenmesinde etkileri bugün dahi hissedilen tarihî bir dönüm noktasıdır.

3. Truman Yönetimi ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Dünya

Truman yönetiminin Sovyetlerin yayılmacı politikalarına karşı nasıl bir tutum sergileyeceği Şubat 1946'da netleşmeye başlamıştı. Stalin'in 9 Şubat 1946'da Bolşoy Tiyatrosu'nda yaptığı seçim zaferi konuşması Washington'da alarm zillerinin çalmasına neden oldu. Bu konuşmasında Stalin, Batılı başkentlerde sürekli sorulan "Stalin savaş sonrasında ne istiyor?" sorusuna cevap verir gibiydi.⁵⁶ Klasik Leninist emperyalizm söylemini kullandığı bu konuşmasında Stalin, piyasaların bölünmesinin ve dünya kaynakları için mücadelenin kapitalist dünyada bir savaş çıkaracağından, dolayısıyla savaş yorgunu Sovyet halkının yine çok çalışması, kapitalist dünyanın çıkaracağı savaşa hazırlanması ve büyük fedakârlıklara hazır olması çağrısında bulundu. Bunlar Sovyet vatandaşları için hiç de yabancı olmadıkları bir şeydi: Sovyetler Birliği dünyası 1920'ler ve 1930'lardan itibaren yaptığı gibi çok çalışmak, tüketim ve lüks mallardaki azlığa katlanmak, sürekli bir gerginlik içerisinde kapitalist dünya ile yapılacak nihai savaş için hazırlanmak durumundaydı. Bu seçim konuşmasının nasıl yorumlanacağı Kennan'ın "Uzun Telgraf"ında yer aldı. Kennan, Sovyet liderlerinin ABD ile sürekli bir *modus vivendi* içerisinde olamayacağını belirtti. Kennan'a göre, Moskova, Sovyet taleplerini reddeden güçlü Batılı ülkelerin

56 Joseph Stalin, *Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of The Stalin Electoral District, Moscow* (Moskova: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), 19-44.

zayıflatılması ve diğer ülke hükümetlerinin de devrilmesi yönünde bir siyaset gütmektedir. Fakat Sovyetler Birliği,

(...) güce dayalı mantığa karşı da çok hassastır. Bu sebepten dolayı, herhangi bir noktada direnişle karşılaşmış gibi –genellikle yaptığı gibi– kolaylıkla geri çekilirdi. Dolayısıyla Batılı milletler Birleşik Devletler’in liderliğinde hep birlikte daha kararlı bir blok oluşturulmalıydı.⁵⁷

Kennan’ın telgrafı, bir süredir Washington’daki üst düzey siyasi planlamacılar ve entelektüeller arasında Sovyetlere karşı sağlam bir duruş sergilenmesi yönündeki düşünceler için de bir zemin oluşturdu. Nitekim savaş sonrasında ortaya çıkan ilk krizlerde de ABD’nin liderliğindeki Batılı devletlerin siyasetlerinde bu duruş kendini gösterdi. Bu anlamda ilk test, İran buhranının BM’de çözüme kavuşmasıyla gerçekleşti. Sovyetlerin tepkisi yalnızca güçlü protesto notalarıyla ve İran petrolerinden Sovyetlere imtiyaz sözü verilmesiyle sınırlı kalmıştı. Fakat ABD desteğindeki İran parlamentosu Sovyetlere petrol imtiyazı öngören anlaşmayı Ekim 1947’de 102’ye karşı 2 oyla reddetti. ABD Genelkurmay Başkanlığı’nın ifadesiyle ABD’nin güvenliği için “kesinlikle hayati” öneme sahip Orta Doğu’daki petrol kaynakları Sovyet etkisinden kurtulmuştu.⁵⁸ Ruslara karşı sert tutum izlenmesi yönündeki görüşün savunucuları bu politikalarının ilk sonucunu almıştı.

Dış politikada bu gelişmeler yaşanırken, savaş sonrası ekonomik ve mali zorluklar altında ezilen Batı Avrupa ülkelerinin durumu, ekonomik alanda da ABD’nin bir dizi önleyici tedbirlere başvurmasına neden oldu. Bu tedbirler yine Sovyet tehdidinin azaltılmasına yönelikti. ABD’nin ekonomik ve mali alanda Batı Avrupa’ya yönelik politik amacı, Sovyet etki sahası dışında kalan bölgelerde ekonominin istikrar kazanması ve nihayetinde de komünist yayılmacılığın set çekilmesiydi. Neticede, Sovyet etki sahasında olmayan ve Sovyet kampı dışında kalan Batı Avrupa’ya toplamda 5,7 milyar dolar mali yardım aktarıldı.⁵⁹

1946 yılı Truman yönetiminde görev alan planlamacıların Doğu Avrupa ve Orta Doğu’daki Sovyet politikalarının küresel yayılmacılık güttüğüne ve bunun önlenmesinin de ABD tarafından sağlanabileceğine inanmalarını destekleyecek gelişmelerle doluydu. Bu dönemde –özelikle– Truman’ın Sovyet yayılmacılığı konusundaki görüşlerinin netleşmeye başlamasını sağlayan bir Beyaz Saray raporu da önemlidir. Sovyetlerin faaliyetlerinden rahatsızlık duymaya başlayan Başkan Truman, Sovyetler Birliği’ne karşı kararlı bir tutum sergilenmesi yönündeki düşüncesini Temmuz 1946’da yakın danışmanı Clark Clifford’la paylaştı. Truman Clifford’a “itilip kakılmaktan yorulduğunu, Sov-

57 Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1949* (Londra: Pearson Longman, 1995), 72; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 168-171. 58 *FRUS* 7 (1946): 524.

59 McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 78-79.

yetlerin ABD'den biraz oradan biraz buradan tırtıklama yaptığını ve dik durmanın vaktinin geldiğini düşündüğünü” söyledi.⁶⁰

SSCB'nin anlaşmaların gereğini yerine getirmediğinin bütün dünya tarafından öğrenilmesini sağlamakla görevlendirilen Clifford'ın, “Sovyetler Birliği ile Amerika'nın İlişkileri” başlığını taşıyan raporunda ABD-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri detaylı olarak analiz ediliyordu. Rapor 24 Eylül 1946'da Başkan'a sunuldu.⁶¹ Raporun sonuçları o kadar etkileyiciydi ki, Truman raporun yalnızca kendinde kalmasını istedi, dağıtımını yasakladı ve diğer nüshaların da kendisine getirilmesini söyledi. Truman “Eğer rapor sızarsa, Beyaz Saray'ın tavanı havaya uçar. (...) Muhtemelen Kremlin'in de tavanı havaya uçar” demişti.⁶² Truman yönetimin raporun hazırlandığı zamana kadar karşılaştığı en ciddi durum, Sovyetlere karşı nasıl bir politika izleneceğiydi. Rapor, Kennan'ın telgrafıyla oldukça yakın sonuçlara ulaşıyordu: Sovyetler, kapitalist dünya ile yapılacak savaşı kaçınılmaz olarak görüyordu. Bu savaşa hazırlanmak için Sovyetler Birliği güçlerini en üst seviyeye çıkarmayı amaçlıyordu. Bu amaçla dolaylı veya dolaysız yıkıcı faaliyetlerle komünist olmayan hükümetlerin devrilmesi ve “atom bombası ve biyolojik silahlar”ın da kullanılması ihtimal dâhilindeydi. Dolayısıyla ABD kendi güvenliği adına hayati öneme sahip askerî bölgelerin korunması için gerekli tedbirleri almalı ve Sovyetler tarafından tehdit edilen demokratik ülkelerin savunulmasına hazır olmalıydı. Ancak raporda, askerî yardımlar “son çare olarak” belirtiliyordu. Ekonomik zorluklarla mücadele eden ülkelere destek, “komünizme karşı daha etkili bir engeldi”. Rapor, Sovyet faaliyetlerine karşı sert tedbirlerin alınmasını ve mevcut şartlar altında rakip blokların dünyanın bölünmesini engelleyememe durumunda hazırlıklı olunması önerisiyle sonuçlanıyordu.⁶³ Bu rapor sonrasında yönetim içerisinde Sovyetlerle hâlâ ortak bir zeminde buluşulabileceğini düşünenler kendilerini tecrit edilmiş halde buldular. Nitekim önceki Başkan Roosevelt'in iki dönem yardımcılığını yapan ve Truman yönetiminde Ticaret Bakanı olan Henry Wallece'ın, Eylül'de yönetimi eleştiren demeçleri basında yer almaya başlayınca Truman istifasını istedi ve Wallece görevden ayrıldı.⁶⁴

Fakat büyük bir savaştan henüz iki yıl sonra Amerikan halkı ve Kongre'nin iki kanadı yeni fedakârlıklar demek olan silahlı kuvvetlerin genişletilmesi ve

60 Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 369, not 185.

61 Clark Clifford, “Report: American Relations With The Soviet Union”, 24 Eylül 1946. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/sectioned.php?documentid=4-1&pagenumber=1&groupid=1 (Son erişim tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2014).

62 Interview with Clark Clifford <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-2/clifford1.html> (Son erişim tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2014).

63 Randall Woods ve Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States Quest for Order* (Athens, Georgia: University Of Georgia Press, 1991) s. 136-137; Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 369-371.

64 David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976), 105-106.

yabancı ülkelere yardımların arttırılmasıyla sonuçlanacak bütçe artışlarına sıcak bakmıyordu. Kaldı ki, 1946 seçimlerinde Kongre'nin iki kanadında da çoğunluk Cumhuriyetçi Parti'ye geçmişti. Cumhuriyetçiler, her ne kadar Truman'ı komünizme karşı yumuşak bir politika izlemekle suçlasalar da, yeni dış politikanın getireceği yükümlülüklerden kaçınmak istiyorlardı: Truman'ın açıkladığı 47 milyar dolarlık 1947 bütçesinden yaklaşık %17lik bir kesinti taahhüdünde bulunmuşlardı. Bu arada, Sovyet tehdidinin yanı sıra Avrupa'da da ciddi sorunlar ortaya çıkmıştı: Savaştan iki yıl sonra olumlu beklentilerin aksine İngiltere, ekonomisini canlandıramadığı gibi, Avrupa'da yaşanan sert kış şartları, üretimdeki ciddi düşüşler, yoksulluk ve geleceğe dair endişeler tüm Batı Avrupa'da karamsarlığa yol açmıştı. Savaştan galip olarak çıkmasına rağmen İngiltere, 1945 sonu itibariyle çok büyük ekonomik sorumluluklarla boğuşmak zorundaydı: İhracat 1938 yılına göre %40 azalmıştı; deniz taşımacılığında tonaj $\frac{3}{4}$ 'ten daha az seviyedeydi; İngiliz Sterlini bazındaki borçlanma çok yüksekti. Bunların da ötesinde İngiltere tarihinde olmadığı kadar büyük bir coğrafyanın güvenlik ve askerî sorumluluğuyla başa çıkmak zorundaydı. İngiliz Maliye Bakanı 8 Şubat 1946'da, denizaşırı askerî harcamaların ciddi miktarda ve acilen kısıtlanmaması ve daha fazla denizaşırı yükümlülüklerden kaçınılması durumunda, makine ve hammadde ithalatındaki kesintiler yoluyla karneye bağlı malzemelerin kesilmesi ve işçi sayısının azaltılması gerektiğini kabine üyelerine bildirdi. "Bu aritmetikten başka bir yol bulunmuyor ve bizim tüm denizaşırı politikamız buna bağlı."⁶⁵

Truman yönetimindeki endişe, sorunlarla mücadelede yetersiz kalan hükümetlerin ve moralsiz toplumların komünizmin etkisine girmesiydi. Komünizmin yayılma endişesi, Truman'ın ihtiyaç duyduğu Cumhuriyetçi Parti desteğini sağlayabilirdi. Nitekim 1946 ortalarında komünizm yayılmacılığına karşı direneceğine yönelik tutumu nedeniyle Kongre İngiltere'ye 3,75 milyar dolarlık borç verilmesini onaylamıştı.⁶⁶ Öte yandan Truman yönetimi, 1946 başlarında İngiltere'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ni "çevreleme" politikasını kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda oluşturmaya başladığının da farkındaydı: 1946 Mart ayında İran petrol yatakları ve Ağustos ayında Boğazlar üzerinden Türkiye politikaları buna işarettti. Komünizm ve Sovyet yayılmacılığı tehdidi üzerinden ABD'yle işbirliğinde olan İngiltere, 1946 Sonbaharında Yunanistan üzerinden Güney Balkanlar'da ortaya çıkan bu tehdit ve yayılmacılık endişesini bir kez daha kullanmıştı. İngilizlerin amacı millî çıkarların korunmasıyla ilgili ağır askerî ve ekonomik yükün ABD tarafından da omuzlanmasını sağlamaktı.

İngilizlerin Doğu Akdeniz'deki sorumluluklarını aktarma süreci Şubat 1947'de ABD'ye verilen iki notayla fiilî politika sürecine girmişti. Öte yandan, Aralık 1945'te ABD'nin Atina Büyükelçiliği Washington'u Atina'nın bir

65 Michael Asteris, "British Overseas Military Commitments 1945-47: Making Painful Choices", *Contemporary British History* 27/3 (2013): 353.

66 McLellan, *Dean Acheson*, 94-95.

“Sovyet kuklası” olabileceği yönünde uyarılmıştı.⁶⁷ Büyükelçiliğe göre zayıf hükümet, komünist gerilla faaliyetleri, merkezî ordunun iç savaşta komünistlerle mücadelede etkisiz oluşu, çökmüş ekonomi ve altyapı, Rusların Yunanistan’da etki sahasını genişletebilmesi için verimli alanlardı. Ocak 1946’da ABD’nin Yunanistan’a 25 milyon dolar borç vermesi, Pire Limanı’na ABD donanmasının ziyareti ve Mart 1946’daki seçimlerde ABD’nin gözlemciler göndermesi, bu ülkeye olan ABD ilgisinin somut göstergeleriydi. ABD Yunanistan’a ekonomik ve finansal desteği sağlarken İngiltere de askerî yardımlara devam etmişti.⁶⁸ Ağustos 1946’da Paris Barış Konferansı’nda Yunan hükümetinin aşırı sağcı tutumu ve komşu ülkelere karşı genişleme politikaları eleştirisi konusu yapıldığı zaman ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Byrnes, savaşta Yunan kahramanlıklarını hatırlatmış ve “Yunan halkına olan borçlarının unutulmaması” gerektiğini gündeme getirmişti.⁶⁹ Ekim 1946’da ise Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Acheson, Atina Büyükelçisine Yunanistan’a yönelik olumlu siyasetin tüm alanlarda sağlanacağını belirterek, “Birleşik Devletler[in], Yugoslavya ve Arnavutluk tarafından desteklenen komünist güçlerce saldırı altındayken [Yunan] hükümetin[in] düşmesi riskini artık alamayacağını” bildirmişti.⁷⁰

Aynı ay içerisinde ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın Yakın Doğu Dairesi’nce hazırlanan ve Dışişleri Bakanı Byrnes tarafından da onaylanan bir memorandum, “SSCB, pek çok milleti kendi kontrolü altına almak amacıyla agresif şekilde davranıyor. (...) Ekonomik ve stratejik olarak hayati öneme sahip bölge olan Doğu Akdeniz’deki Sovyet hakimiyetinin önündeki tek engel Yunanistan ve Türkiye’dir” değerlendirmesini yaptı. Memoranduma göre, eğer Yunanistan’ın Sovyet etki sahasına girmesine müsaade edilirse, Sovyetler Birliği Türkiye üzerinde de dayanılmaz bir baskı kuracaktı. Bu tehdit karşısında ABD, çok geç kalmamak şartıyla Yunanistan’a siyasi ve ekonomik desteğini acilen arttırmalıydı.⁷¹ Sovyetlerin bu dönemde Yunanistan’daki Dedeğaç’ta üs talepleri de ABD’nin Sovyet yayılmacılığı karşısındaki endişelerini arttırdı. Sovyetler açısından da durum karışık görünmekteydi: Örneğin Mayıs 1947’de Stalin’in veliahdı olarak görülen Zudanov, Yunan komünistlerinden gelen askerî ve ekonomik yardım talebini geri çevirmişti. Stalin de, Truman Doktrini çerçevesinde Amerikan yardımı Yunanistan’a akmaya başladığı zaman Moskovada temaslarda bulunan Yugoslav temsilcilere, Yunanistan’daki ayaklanmanın en kısa sürede durması gerektiğini, söyledi.⁷² Stalin’in endişesi, ayaklanma devam ettiği sürece ABD’nin Akdeniz’deki varlığının derinleşecegiydi. Bu halde de

67 Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 185.

68 Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 188; *FRUS* 7 (1947): 31.

69 Judith Jeffery, *Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2000), 17-35; *FRUS* 7 (1946): 235-237.

70 *FRUS*, vol.7, 1946, s.235-237.

71 *FRUS* 7 (1946): 242-243.

72 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1962), 182.

Doğu Avrupa'da ve Balkanlar'da kazanılmış olan, fakat tam olarak sağlamlaşmamış Sovyet pozisyonu da tehlikeye girecekti.⁷³

11 Aralık 1946'da Acheson, bir Amerikan ekonomik heyetinin Yunanistan'da, Yunan hükümetinin ileride yabancı devletler ve uluslararası kurumlardan talepte bulunacağı altyapı ihtiyaçlarıyla ilgili çalışma yapacağını duyurdu.⁷⁴ 28 Aralık'ta da ABD'nin Atina Büyükelçisi, gerekli Kongre çalışmaları ve düzenlemelerin en az iki üç ay alacağı öngörüsüyle Yunanistan için bir yardım programının hazırlandığı yönünde bilgilendirildi.⁷⁵ Ocak 1947'de Amerikan yardım heyeti Yunanistan'a vardığında, sahadaki durumun öngörülünden daha vahim olduğunu tespit etti. Hükümet çalışmaz haldeydi, siyasiler kişisel çıkar mücadelesi içerisindeydi, yolsuzluk ve karaborsa ülkeye hâkimdi. Heyetin değerlendirmesi Washington'un Sovyetlerle ilgili endişelerini körükleyecek nitelikteydi: "Sovyetler, Yunanistan'ı birkaç hafta içerisinde kucaklarına düşecek olgun bir şeftali olarak görmektedir. Böylesi bir durum yalnızca Yakın Doğu ile sınırlı kalmayacaktır, Fransa ve İtalya gibi Avrupa devletleri de sıradadır." Öte yandan Yunanistan'daki Fransız temsilcisinin Şubat 1946'da söyledikleri Amerikalıların bu endişelerini arttırmış olmalıdır: "Eğer Yunanistan, İngiltere ve Amerika'dan uygun desteği alamayıp Sovyet yörüngesine girerse, Fransa baskıya dayanamaz."⁷⁶

20 Şubat 1947'de Atina'daki Amerikan yardım heyeti ve büyükelçisi 21 Ocak'ta göreve başlayan Dışişleri Bakanı Marshall'a Yunanistan'ın çöküşünün yakın zamanda olabileceğini ve durumun güvenli olmayacağını bildiren bir telgraf çekti.⁷⁷ Atina ile Washington arasında Yunanistan'daki alarm zillerini yansıtan bir dizi telgraf teatisinden sonra Acheson, Bakan Marshall için bir bilgi notu hazırladı. 21 Şubat tarihli bu notta, gerillaların kontrolündeki bölgelerin genişlediği ifade edilmişti: "Eğer Yunanistan'a acil destek sağlanmazsa, Yunan hükümeti muhtemelen düşecek ve aşırı sol bir totaliter rejim iktidara gelecektir." Sovyet hakimiyetindeki bir Yunanistan, neticede tüm Yakın Doğu'nun ve Kuzey Afrika'nın kaybına yol açacaktı. Acheson, Yunanistan'a doğrudan borç vermeyi öngören acil bir kanunun Kongre'ye sunulması ve Yunanistan'a askerî donanım sağlanması konusunda karar verilmesini tavsiye etti. İngiliz notlarının bakanlığa ulaşmasından önce Marshall, Acheson'a tavsiyelerini hayata geçirecek eylemleri öngören bir çalışma yapılması talimatını vermişti. Neticede, İngilizlerin Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye yardımları keseceğini resmen bildirmesinden önce, ABD'li yetkililerin kafasında kriz durumundan çıkış için nasıl bir politika izleneceğine dair net çerçeve belirmeye başlamıştı.⁷⁸

73 Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, 182.

74 Department of State, Press release, 9 Ocak 1947.

75 Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 405.

76 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 23-25.

77 *FRUS* 5 (1947): 28-29.

78 Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 131; Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 408.

İngiliz notaları, Washington açısından Yunanistan ve Türkiye konularının aciliyetini ve önemini arttırmıştı. Olayların tanığı olan Jones, krizi “eğer Birleşik Devletler Yunanistan’ın erken çöküşünü engelleyemezse, durum bir ihtimalden çıkıp kesinliğe dönüşecektir” diye belirtir.⁷⁹

Acheson, İngiliz notalarının ulaşmasının ardından, Yakın Doğu Dairesi’ne tüm hafta sonu çalışarak Pazartesi sabahı Bakan Marshall’a sunulmak üzere bir yardım programı hazırlanması talimatını verdiğinde, Türkiye de bu çalışmaya dâhil edildi. Genelkurmay adına bilgi notunu hazırlayan dönemin Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Türkiye’ye verilmesi gereken destek konusunda uyarıda bulunmuştu: “Somut yardımı içeren olumlu garantiler verilmezse, Türkiye’nin gelecekte, Sovyet baskısı sonucunda doğrudan askerî tedbirlerin alınacağı şeklinde yorumlayacağı tehlikesi bulunmaktadır.” Eisenhower’a göre eğer Türkiye yenilirse, “yüksek ihtimaldir ki, tüm Orta Doğu o zaman hızla benzer bir Sovyet hakimiyetine girecektir”.⁸⁰ Türkiye’nin Kongre tarafından onaylanacak bir yardım programına dâhil edilmesinin şansı, komünist yayılcı tehdidinin genelleştirilerek Yunanistan’la birlikte ele alınmasıyla arttırılmıştı. Yunanistan’ın demokrasi ve Batı medeniyetinin beşiği olarak görülmesinin aksine ABD siyasi çevrelerinde ve kamuoyundaki Türkiye algısı, tarihsel nedenlerden dolayı olumlu intibalar taşımamaktaydı. Harris’in ifadesiyle, “Türkiye’ye yardımın Kongre tarafından onaylanması, Yunanistan’la ilgili endişelerle bağdaştırılmasıyla garanti altına alınmıştı”.⁸¹ Eisenhower 1947’de gelişmeleri yıllar sonra şöyle hatırlayacaktı:

Yunanistan ve Türkiye’nin bağımsızlığına ve varlığına yönelik komünist saldırganlık tehdidi Amerika’nın güvenliği için öylesine büyüktü ki, bu ülkelere askerî ve ekonomik destek verdik. Bu politika bu milletleri korudu. Bu da Amerikalıların hayatlarına mal olmadan sağlandı.⁸²

Truman, Yunanistan ve Türkiye’ye yapılacak yardımlarda Kongre’nin desteğini almak adına 27 Şubat’ta Beyaz Saray’da Kongre liderlerini topladı. Ancak Beyaz Saray’daki toplantıda Marshall’ın sorunun çözümüyle ilgili önerilerini sunduğu konuşması, Kongre liderlerini ikna etmekten daha çok kafa karışıklığına yol açtı.⁸³ Yunanistan krizine ABD müdahalesi noktasındaki kafa

79 Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 131.

80 H. W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 18.

81 George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-71* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 26.

82 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1957* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1999), 387.

83 Dışişleri Bakanlığı’ndan önceki bir yılı Çin’de geçiren General Marshall, özellikle Avrupa’daki sorunlarda uzak kalmış gibiydi. Nitekim Yunanistan ve Türkiye’yle ilgili İngiliz notlarından bir hafta önceki Kongre savunmasında söyledikleri konuya hakimiyeti açısından dikkate değer: “MARSHALL: Konu Almanya ve Avusturya’ya geldiği zaman, hâlâ eğitim aşamasında olduğum için, bu sabah sizlere

karışıklığı, liderlerin toplantıdaki sorularına da yansdı: İngilizlerin ateşe attığı kestaneleri ABD mi ateşten çıkaracaktı? ABD'nin bu işten çıkarı ne olacaktı? Tam da bu noktada, Yakın Doğu Dairesi Başkanı Acheson konuya müdahale ederek, ABD kamuoyunda da gittikçe artan “kızıl tehdit” üzerinden Sovyetlerin saldırganlığını canlı bir şekilde anlatmaya başladı: Ruslar saldırıya geçmişti. Türkiye ve Almanya'yı kuşatma adına en inatçı ve cüretkâr çabaları gösteriyorlardı. Önlerinde Rusya hakimiyetine açık üç kıta duruyordu. Türkiye'nin kuşatılmasının iki kanadı vardı; İran ve Yunanistan. Türkiye Rusları geri püskürtmüştü. İran'a yönelik hareketi ise şimdilik başarısız olmuştu. Komünist baskı şimdi de Yunanistan'a yoğunlaşmıştı, Yunanistan'da büyük oranda başarı kazanmışlardı; ama henüz tam başarıya ulaşmamışlardı. Raporlara göre Yunanistan'ın tümünün düşüşü birkaç haftalık meseleydi. Macaristan, İtalya, Fransa ve Avusturya'da ilerleme kaydetmişlerdi. Acheson'un sunumu bu noktadan sonra oldukça dramatik bir söyleme dönüştü:

Antik tarihten bu yana emsali görülmemiş bir duruma geldik. Dünya şu anda iki büyük gücün hakimiyeti altında. Atina ve Isparta, Roma ve Kartaca'dan bu yana gücün böylesine kutuplaştığını görmemiştik. Sorun İngiliz kestanelerini ateşten almak değil. Sorun Birleşik Devletler'in güvenliği sorunu. Sorun dünyanın üçte ikisinin ve topraklarının dörtte üçünün komünistler tarafından kontrol edilip edilmeyeceğidir.⁸⁴

Acheson'un konuşmasında ortaya koyduğu argüman, daha sonra Eisenhower döneminde ortaya atılacak olan *domino teorisinin* erken dönem uyarısı niteliğindedir: Sepetteki çürük bir elmanın diğer elmaları çürütmesi gibi, Yunanistan'daki çürüme İran'ı ve tüm Doğu'yu etkileyecekti. Çürüme Küçük Asya üzerinden Afrika, Mısır ve zaten güçlü komünist partiler aracılığıyla tehdit altında olan İtalya ve Fransa'ya yayılacaktı. Jones'a göre, toplantıya katılanlar yönetimin politikasına karşı çıkmamış, aksine toplantı sonucundan hayli etkilenmişlerdi. Kongre liderlerinin “Yunanistan ve Türkiye'yi kurtarma adına her türlü gerekli önlemin alınması için destek verecekleri yönünde kesin izlenim edinilmişti”. Acheson'un stratejisi işe yaramıştı. Toplantı çıkışında Senato Dışilişkiler Komitesi Başkanı Arthur Vandenberg, Truman'a, “Bay Başkan, eğer istediğiniz buysa, bunu elde etmenin tek bir yolu var. Kongre önüne şahsen çıkın ve ülkeyi korkutun.”⁸⁵

çok tatmin edici bir rapor verebilecek durumda değilim. Hepsinin üzerinden geçtim ancak tamamen başlangıç düzeyindeyim. Olumlu bir kanaatin oluşması için henüz zaman gelmedi.” Marshall, “Testimony of February 14, 1947: Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee”, (Historical Series) Volume Eightieth: *Congress, First and Second Sessions 1947-1948* (Washington:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-2.

84 Toplantı metni için bkz. “Meeting Notes, ca. February 1947, J.M. Jones Papers, Drafts of Truman Doctrine”http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-02-00&documentid=8-4&pagenumber=1 (Son erişim tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2014); Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 131; Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 408.

85 Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 412 not. 88.

Bu anlamda Truman'ın Kongre'de yapacağı konuşmada kullanacağı dil Kongre'nin ve kamuoyunun desteğinin alınmasında önemliydi. Yunanistan ve Türkiye'nin karşılaştığı sıkıntılar aslında daha büyük bir coğrafyada etkin olan Sovyet yayılmacılığının yarattığı bir bölgesel krizdi. Henderson ifadesiyle eğer Amerikan halkına dünya ölçeğinde bir komünist komplosuyla karşı karşıya bulunulduğu net bir biçimde anlatılmazsa "Kongre ihtiyaç duyulan düzenlemenin yasalaşması için gerekli desteği vermeyecekti".⁸⁶

4. Doktrinin İlanı ve Sonuç

12 Mart 1947'de Kongre'nin ortak toplantısında Başkan Truman dış politika ve Yunanistan ile Türkiye'deki durumla ilgili konuşmasını yaptı.⁸⁷ Truman konuşmasında, Yunanistan'ın varlığının terörist faaliyet gösteren komünistler liderliğindeki silahlı kişilerce tehdit edildiğini, ekonomik durumun ve hayat şartlarının kötülüğünden bahsetti. Amerika'dan resmî yardım talebinde bulunan Yunanistan'ın eğer kendi kendine yeterli ve kendine saygısı olan bir demokrasi olacaksa, Amerika'nın bunu sağlayabilecek tek ülke olduğunu vurguladı. Truman konuşmasında Türkiye'deki demokrasiyle ilgili bir atıfta bulunulmadı, Türkiye'nin de modernleşmesini gerçekleştirilmesi için gerekli ulusal bütünlüğünün devamının sağlanması adına finansal yardıma ihtiyacı vardı. Bu ulusal bütünlük, Orta Doğu'da düzenin sağlanması için gerekliydi.

Truman, Amerika'dan bu kadar uzak bu iki ülkedeki gelişmelerin Amerikan yardımına neden ihtiyaç duyduğunu açıklayarak konuşmasına devam etti: Dünya milletlerinin baskıdan bağımsız olmaları uluslararası barış ve dolayısıyla Birleşik Devletler'in güvenliği için hayati öneme sahipti. Bu yüzden Almanya ve Japonya ile savaşılmıştı. Şimdi de benzer bir acil durum vardı. Polonya, Romanya ve Bulgaristan, kendi isteklerinin dışında totaliter rejimlere sahipti. Dünya halkları şimdi "alternatif hayat tarzları arasında bir seçim yapmak zorunda"ydı. ABD, ekonomik ve mali destekle bu seçimde özgür milletlerin yanında yer alacaktı.⁸⁸ Eğer Yunanistan düşerse, tehdit altındaki Türkiye bunu takip edecekti. Bunun etkisi ise, karmaşa ve düzensizlik içerisindeki tüm Doğu'ya, hatta savaş sonrası sıkıntılarla boğuşan Batılı ülkeler de kendi bağımsızlıklarını koruma yönündeki isteklerini kaybedebileceklerdi. Dolayısıyla, acil yardımın yapılması kaçınılmazdı. Başkan Truman bu çerçevede Yunanistan'a 300, Türkiye'ye 100 milyon dolar yardım teklifinde bulundu. Yardım içerisinde, mahalli personelin eğitimi, altyapı çalışmalarının desteklenmesi ve

86 Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 151.

87 Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 12 Mart 1947. Harry S. Truman Administration, Elsey Papers, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-12&documentid=5-9&pagenumber=1 (Son erişim tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2014).

88 Ancak, Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye yapılacak yardımın çok önemli bir kısmı askerî yardım olacaktır. İki ülkeye verilecek 400 milyon dolarlık yardımın 128.125.000 doları ekonomik yardımdır. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 202.

kaynakların kullanımını gözetecek Amerikalı uzmanların bu ülkelere gönderilmesi de bulunuyordu. ABD tarihinde ilk kez Batı yarım küresi dışındaki ülkelere barış zamanında yardımla müdahalede bulunma özelliğini taşıyan bu isteğe Kongre ve ABD kamuoyunun tepki göstereceği de muhakkaktı. Bu gerçeğin farkında olan Truman, “üzerimizde ciddi bir yük bulunuyor. Alternatifinin daha ciddi sonuçlar doğuracağı bir durumu önermem mümkün değil. Dünyanın özgür milletleri özgürlüklerini muhafaza ettirmek konusunda destek için bize bakıyor” dedikten sonra yardımın aslında Amerikan çıkarlarına hizmet edeceğini ilan etti: “Liderliğimizde başarısız olursak dünya barışını ve kendi milletimizin refahını da tehlikeye atmış oluruz.”⁸⁹

Truman’ın konuşması, dış politikada özgürlüklerin korunması yönündeki inanca atıfta bulunuyordu. İkinci Dünya Savaşı mücadelesinde de Amerikan dış politikasında özgürlüklerin korunması ve ABD’nin buna bağlı güvenliğinin sağlanması vurgusu hatırlanırsa, Truman’ın konuşması etkileyiciydi. Bu anlamda konuşmanın özü ideolojikti. Truman, acil müdahale edilmediği takdirde komünizmin demokrasi üzerinde zafer kazanarak çok sayıda umutsuz insanın köleleşeceği uyarısında bulunmuştu. Bu önemli bir uyarıydı: Eğer liberal demokrasi dünya genelinde zemin kaybederse, Amerikan yaşam tarzı da yok olacaktı. Konuşmada, Amerika’nın jeopolitik ve ekonomik çıkarlarının nasıl tehlikeye gireceği hususu açık değildi. Kamuoyuna Amerikan değerlerinin tehlikede olduğu mesajı verilirken, örneğin Orta Doğu’daki petrol rezervlerinin korunmasının öneminden hiç bahsedilmiyordu.⁹⁰

Stratejik nedenlerin yanında, iş dünyası için de Orta Doğu petrolünün korunmasında Yunanistan ve Türkiye önemliydi. Donanma Bakanı James Forrestal’ın ifadesiyle petrolün deniz yoluyla taşınması “gerektiğinden Akdeniz bağımsız bir yol olmalıydı”.⁹¹ Siyasi karar alıcılar açısından güvenlik endişeleri ekonomik çıkarlar iç içe geçmişti.

Amerikan kamuoyunda yükselen anti-komünist duygular çerçevesinde, Truman’ın söylemi büyük destek buldu.⁹² Cumhuriyetçilerin çoğunlukta ol-

89 Truman’ın Kongre konuşması için bkz. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-12&documentid=5-9&pagenumber=1 (Son erişim tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2014).

90 Truman’ın konuşma metninin hazırlanması sırasında Beyaz Saray’daki danışmanların, “Orta Doğu’daki büyük doğal kaynakların tek bir devletin egemenliği altına girmemesi” ile ilgili önerdikleri cümle nihai metinde yer almamıştır. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 156. Nihai metinden çıkartılan bir başka bölüm ise şu şekildedir: “Eğer dünyanın geri kalan milletlerindeki hür teşebbüsün yok olmasına müsaade edersek, kendi ekonomimiz ve demokrasimiz de hayati derecede tehdit edilecektir.” Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 198, not 96.

91 Nakleden Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 56. 1953 yılı itibari ile Amerikalı şirketler Orta Doğu petrolünün %70’ni üretmektedir, Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 206, not 125.

92 Kasım 1946’da yapılan Kongre seçimlerinde Cumhuriyetçilerin seçim propagandalarında özellikle komünizm tehdidi ve yayılmacılığı tehlikesini kullandıkları göz önüne alınırsa Truman’ın bu vurguları

duğu Kongre’de Truman’ın ortaya koyduğu tehdit algısı Kongre’nin Başkan’ın arkasında yer almasını sağladı. Başkan’ın konuşması, “savaş ilanı için Başkanlık önerisi gibiydi” ve Kongre’ye böyle bir durumda ülkenin başkomutanının yanında olmaktan başka seçenek bırakmamıştı.⁹³ Ancak, Truman’ın konuşmasına eleştiriler de vardı. Daha önce Truman’a destek alması için Amerikan halkını korkutması yönünde öneri getiren Senatör Vandenberg’e göre konuşma “dünyada nerede ortaya çıkarsa çıksın zincirleme tepki olarak adlandırılacak bir saldırganlığı ABD’nin savunması” gerektiği iddiasındaydı. Acheson’un Vandenberg’e cevabı, küresel düzeyde bir yaklaşım benimsese de her durumda ABD’nin tepkisinin aynı olmayacağı yönündeydi: “Bir durumda yaptığımızı diğer bir başka durumda yapamazsınız. Nerede olursa olsun komünist baskı ortaya çıkması durumunda bu ABD’yi ilgilendirecektir. Fakat özellikle Yunanistan ve Türkiye örneklerinde olduğu gibi, direkt bir ABD müdahalesini gerektirmez.”⁹⁴

Truman’ın konuşmasında belirttiği yardımı hak eden “özgür milletler”in kim olduğu açık değildi. Yunanistan’daki aşırı sağcı ve yolsuzluğa batmış merkezî hükümet herhalde bu tanımlamaya girmez. Öte yandan Truman konuşmasında Türkiye’yi özellikle demokratik ülke olarak da adlandırmamıştı. Bu yöndeki eleştirilere Truman, totalitarizm karşısında mükemmel olmayan demokrasilerden hangisinin tercih edilmesi gerektiği sorusuyla cevap vermişti. Soğuk Savaş’ın ilk evrelerinde Amerika’nın kendi koruması altındaki devletlerin iç siyasette izledikleri yöntemlerle çok fazla ilgilenmediği göz önüne alınırsa, gelecek yıllarda Amerikan dış politikasının en büyük zaafının da bu olduğunu söylemek yerinde olacaktır. Ambrose, Truman’ın komünizm karşıtlığı için silahlanma çağrısının, “özgür milletler ve anti-komünistliğin aynı anlamda kullanılmasından dolayı herhangi bir devrimci harekete karşı kapıların kapatmış olduğunu” belirterek, “Yunan hükümetinin veya herhangi bir diktatörlüğün Amerikan yardımını alabilmesi için muhaliflerinin komünist olduğunu iddia etmesi yeterli olacaktır” değerlendirmesini yapar.⁹⁵

Yunanistan ve Türkiye’ye yardım kanunu Kongre’nin her iki kanadında da büyük çoğunlukla kabul edildi ve Truman 22 Mart 1947’de kanunu imzaladı. Konuşmanın ardından yardım konusu yalnızca iki ülkeyle sınırlı kalmadı. Truman’ın konuşması, silahlı azınlıklarla veya dış baskılarla mücadele eden özgür milletlere desteğin küresel çapta bir dış politika uygulaması olarak da değerlendirildi. Nitekim konuşmanın özünü oluşturan bu dış politika anlayışı *Truman Doktrini* olarak adlandırıldı. Doktrin, özellikle Kennan’ın telgrafında ortaya konulan komünizme karşı küresel çevreleme politikası önerisinin de

daha iyi anlaşılabilir. Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 284-285. Truman konuşmasında Sovyetler Birliği’ni hiç anmamış komünizmden ise bir kez bahsetmişti.

93 LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 56.

94 Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 190,194.

95 Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (7th ed., New York: Penguin Books,1993), 82.

ete keme bürünmüş haliydi. ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı uzun zamandır karşı karşıya oldukları komünizmle mücadelede önemli bir değişikliğin yaşandığını ve “dünya tarihinde yeni bir sayfa açıldığını” düşünüyordu.⁹⁶ Frazier’e göre “Truman Doktrini Soğuk Savaş’ın asıl başlangıcı”ydı: Doktrin, Batı ve Doğu arasındaki çatışmanın en önemli ayrıştırıcı niteliği olan ideoloji farklılığını da ortaya koyuyordu.⁹⁷ Öte yandan, Bartlett ise, Sovyetler Birliği’nin Yunanistan ve Türkiye üzerindeki Batı etkisini uzun zamandır kabul ettiğini, Truman Doktrininin Soğuk Savaş’ın oluşumunu şekillendiren etkenlerden bir tanesi olduğunu ifade eder.⁹⁸ Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Amerika’nın küresel politikaları içerisinde, özellikle Asya-Pasifik bölgesindeki devam eden yardımların Doğu Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu alanlarına yayıldığı değerlendirilebilir.

Soğuk Savaş tarihçiliğinin önemli isimlerden Gaddis de, Truman Doktrininin Amerikan dış politikasında gerçek bir dönüm noktası olmadığını, Sovyet yayılcılığına karşı koymanın 1946’nın ilk dönemlerinden itibaren bir Amerikan politikası oluşunu belirtir. Gaddis’e göre Amerikan politikasında gerçek dönüm noktası 1950’de başlamış olan Kore Savaşı’dır. Bu savaş ile birlikte ABD, küresel komünizm yayılcılık tehdidine karşı çevreleme politikasıyla dönüşü olmayan gerçek bir direnişe geçmişti.⁹⁹ Acheson ve Jones ise, Yunanistan ve Türkiye’de hissedilen Sovyet yayılcılığı tehdidine karşı “hızlı, etkin ve kararlı” bir tutum sergilenerek önemli bir politika değişikliğine gidildiği iddiasındaydı.¹⁰⁰

Öte yandan LaFeber, Truman Doktrininin Amerikan tarihinde bir “kilo-metre taşı” olmasını dört nedene bağlar:

(i) Truman Doktrini, hem yurtiçinde hem de yurtdışında Amerikalıların kucaklayacakları bir Soğuk Savaş dış politikasını Amerika’nın komünizm korkusunu kullanarak oluşturdu. (ii) Kongre, Başkana uygun gördüğü şekilde Soğuk Savaşı yürütebileceği büyük güçler verdi. (iii) Savaş sonrası dönemde ilk defa, Amerikalılar başka bir milletin iç savaşına yoğun bir şekilde dâhil oldular. Bu müdahale komünizm karşıtlığı temelinde haklı hale getirildi. (iv)

96 Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 146-147; Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 282.

97 Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming Of The Cold War 1942-47* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 159.

98 C. J. Bartlett, *The Global Conflict 1880-1970: International Rivalry Great Powers* (Londra: Longman, 1986), 264.

99 John Lewis Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?”, *Foreign Affairs* 52/2 (Ocak 1974): 386-402. “Önerim, [doktrin] Avrupa’daki güçler dengesindeki değişimlerle başa çıkma yönünde daha önce uygulamaya konulan politikalarla bir uyum içerisinde olduğudur. Truman yönetiminin 1947-1950 arasındaki genel çerçevede kullanılan diline rağmen, dünyanın geri kalanıyla ilgili bu politikayı uygulayabilecek ne bir niyeti ne de imkânı vardı. Komünizmi her yerde kuşatmaya karşı gerçek niyet, Yunanistan ve Türkiye’deki krizlerle değil, Kore Savaşı’nın etrafında gelişen olaylar neticesinde gelişti.”, 386.

100 Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations with Greece*, 161-164; Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 420-422.

Truman, Avrupa ve Amerikan ekonomilerinin çöküşünü engellemek için muazzam bir yardım programını kullandı. Daha sonra bu tür yardım programları küresel düzeyde genişletildi.¹⁰¹

Truman Doktriniyle ilgili farklı görüşler olsa da, Amerikan dış politikası yapım sürecinde önemli bir noktayı işaret ettiği ve Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinde etkileri günümüze değin devam eden bir süreci başlattığı konusunda şüphe yoktur. Amerikan tarihinde ilk kez barış ortamında Güney ve Kuzey Amerika dışında bir bölgeye komünizmle mücadele çerçevesinde direkt Amerikan yardımı şeklindeki müdahale Truman Doktriniyle başlamıştır. Truman sonrası dönemlerde Soğuk Savaş'ın *düalist yapı* çerçevesinde (Amerikan hayat tarzı/totaliter hayat tarzı; özgür milletler/baskıya boyun eğmiş milletler; demokrasi/totalitarizm; özgür Batı/komünist Doğu) tanımlanmasının temeli de, Truman'ın Kongre'deki konuşmasında ilk izlerini bulmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliğine uzanan süreç de Truman Doktrininin ilanı ile başlamıştı. Yukarıda ifade edildiği gibi Truman Doktrininin iki temel amacı vardı: Türkiye'nin Sovyet saldırganlığına karşı direnmesi ve bu mücadelede savunma bütçesinin Türk ekonomisinde yarattığı ağırlığın azaltılması.¹⁰² Amerikan yönetimi bir Sovyet saldırısı karşısında Türkiye'nin kendisini savunma kapasitesine sahip olmadığını farkındaydı. Bu farkındalığa rağmen, Türkiye'nin Sovyet tehdidini ciddi oranda hissettiği dönemde ABD yardımından beklediği olumlu etkiyi anında elde ettiğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Nitekim Haziran 1948 itibarıyla Truman yardımında ifade edilen 100 milyon dolarlık yardımın ancak 38 milyon dolarlık bir bölümü Türkiye'ye ulaşmıştı.¹⁰³ Sovyetlerin Türkiye'ye saldırı ihtimali şüpheli olsa da, Truman Doktrininin Türkiye'ye sağladığı güvenlik şemsiyesinin askerî ve ekonomik yardımdan daha çok siyasi bir anlam ve ağırlık taşıdığını söylemek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla Truman Doktrini, Türkiye'nin askerî ve ekonomik anlamda güçlenmesine yardımcı olmasından daha çok, Türkiye'nin Atlantik ötesiyle eklemlenmesinde siyaseten bir dış politika aracı olarak önemlidir. Bu anlamıyla Soğuk Savaş'ın ilk yıllarındaki bu ilk eklemlenme sürecinde Sovyetlerin Truman Doktrinine getirdiği eleştiri, Türkiye tarafından çok da önemsenmemiştir.¹⁰⁴ Türkiye'nin Truman Doktrinini ilanından sonra iki kutuplu dünyada

101 LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 3. Bölüm.

102 Gönülöbol vd., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 234.

103 U.S. Department of State, *Reports to Congress on Assistance Greece and Turkey*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office 1947-1949).

104 Gönülöbol vd., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, 231-233. Truman Doktrinini Sovyetler Birliği'ne yönelik siyasi bir araç olarak kullanıldığı yönündeki erken dönem bir Sovyet eleştirisi için bkz. Andrei Vyshinsky, "A Soviet Criticism of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, September 18, 1947", <http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps142j/documents/vyshinsky-criticism-of-truman-doctrine.html> (Son erişim tarihi: 16 Mart 2009). Vyshinsky'nin eleştirisinin temeli şu görüşe dayanmaktadır: "Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı BM ilklerinin ihlal edildiği ve örgütün göz ardı edildiği yönünde özellikle önemli örneklerdir. Son birkaç aydaki tecrübelerin göstermiş olduğu gibi bu doktrinini ilanının anlamı, ABD hükümetinin

Batı Bloğu içerisinde yer alması ve bu bloğun görüşlerinin güçlü bir bölgesel savunucusu olması, Türk dış politikasının 1947'den sonraki en belirgin özelliğidir.¹⁰⁵

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uluslararası işbirliğinin ilkelerine karşı (...) yardım amacıyla ekonomik kaynakların (...) doğrudan bir ihlale diğer bağımsız ülkelerin arzularına karşı bir baskı kurma teşebbüsüdür. (...) Bu politika Genel Kurul'un 11 Aralık 1946 tarihli diğer ülkelere yardım desteklerinin 'hiçbir zaman siyasi silah olarak kullanılamayacağı' yönündeki kararıyla da gelişmektedir."

105 Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri: 1947-1964* (Ankara: SBF Yayınları), 37.

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Kitaplar

Norman Stone, *Kitabın Adı*, (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67.

Norman Stone (ed.), *Kitabın Adı* (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67-9.

Norman Stone ve Sergei Podbolotov, *Kitabın Adı* (London: Basic Books, 2005), s. 99.

Takip eden referanslar: Kıvrımlı, *Kitabın Adı*, s. 99.

Dergiler ve Makaleler

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Derleme Kitap Makaleleri

Norman Stone, “Makale Adı”, Hakan Kırımlı, “Kitap Adı” (London: Crimea Publishing Co., 2000), s.100.

Resmi Belgeler

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Tezler

E. Beytullah, “The Crimean Khans’ relations with the Arab Amirs”, yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Bilkent University, 1999, Bölüm 5, s.44.

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