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China's Position on the Palestine-Israel Issue: A Historical Perspective

Abstract

The Question of Palestine is the core of Middle East issues and the one of the root factors of peace in the Middle East. From the historical perspective, China's position on this issue has always been clear, consistent and convergent with the international community, which is supporting the Palestinian just cause. But there are also some twists and turns between China on the one hand and Palestine and Israel on the other hand. It can be divided into the following periods: Friendly historical relations between China and the Jewish nation; Pro-Arab and Anti-Israel (1949-1979); Keep Balance between Arab and Israel (1979-2013); Active Participation of Palestine-Israel Issue under Belt & Road Initiative. Although China's position and recommendations on the Palestine-Israel issue are more easily accepted by both sides, the current Chinese Middle East policy is still trapped in the predicament of "morality" and "interest". On the one hand, China has to support Arab countries' just cause, but it is impossible to give up its friendly relations with Israel on the other hand. The Belt & Road Initiative will provide a great opportunity for China to actively engage in the hot issues in the Middle East.

Keywords: Palestine-Israel Issue; China; BRI; Middle East

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Çin'in Filistin-İsrail Meselesine Bakışı: Tarihsel Perspektif

Öz

Filistin Sorunu, Ortadoğu meselelerinin özü ve Ortadoğu'da barışın ana vesilelerinden biridir. Tarihsel açıdan bakıldığında, Çin'in bu konuda karşı-sındaki duruşu her zaman açık, tutarlı ve Filistin'in haklı davasını destekleyen uluslararası topluma yakın olmuştur. Ancak bir tarafta Çin diğer tarafta ise Filistin ile İsrail arasında bazı detaylar bulunmaktadır. Bunlar şu şekilde dönemlere ayrılabilir: Çin ile Yahudi milleti arasında dostane tarihsel ilişkiler; Arap yanlısı ve İsrail karşıtı (1949-1979); Araplar ile İsrail Arasındaki Dengeyi Korumak (1979-2013); Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi kapsamında Filistin-İsrail Sorununun Aktif Katılımı. Her ne kadar Çin'in Filistin-İsrail konusundaki konumu ve önerileri her iki tarafça da daha kolay kabul görse de, Çin'in şu anki Ortadoğu politikası halen "ahlak" ve "çıkar" çıkmazında sıkışmış durumda. Bir yandan Çin, Arap ülkelerinin haklı davasını desteklemek zorunda, ancak diğer taraftan İsrail ile dostane ilişkilerinden vazgeçmesi de imkansız. Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi, Çin'in Ortadoğu'daki sıcak sorunlara aktif olarak katılması için harika bir fırsat sağlayacak.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Filistin-İsrail meselesi, Çin, Kuşak ve Yol girişimi, Ortadoğu

موقف الصين تجاه المسألة الفلسطينية – الإسرائيلية: نظرة تاريخية

ملخص: الأزمة الفلسطينية، هي لب الأزمات في الشرق الأوسط و إحدى الطرق الأساسية للسلام في الشرق الأوسط. و عند النظر من الناحية التاريخية يتبين لنا أن موقف الصين حيال الأزمة الفلسطينية كان واضحا و ثابتا و داعما للقضية الفلسطينية المحقة و أقرب الى موقف المجتمع الدولي.

و لكن يوجد بعض التفاصيل بين الصين من جهة و فلسطين و إسرائيل من جهة أخرى. و يمكننا أن نفضلها الى فترات على الشكل التالي؛ العلاقات التاريخية الصديقة بين الصين و الأمة اليهودية؛ دعم العرب و الوقوف في وجه إسرائيل (1979 – 1979)؛ الموازنة بين العرب و إسرائيل (1979 – 2013)؛ المشاركة الفعالة للأزمة الفلسطينية الإسرائيلية في نطاق الحزام و الطريق. و مهما كانت الاقتراحات و المواقف الصينية في موضوع فلسطين – إسرائيل تلقى قبولا من كلا الطرفين بشكل أسهل الا أن سياسة الصين الحالية تجاه الشرق الأوسط مازالت منحصرة في مآزق «المصالح» و «الأخلاق». و من هذه الناحية فان الصين مجبرة على دعم قضية الدول العربية المحقة، و لكن من ناحية أخرى من المستحيل أن تتخلى عن العلاقات الصديقة مع إسرائيل. ستؤمن مبادرة الحزام و الطريق فرصة رائعة لمشاركة الصين بشكل فعال في الأزمات الحادة في

Introduction

The Question of Palestine is the core of Middle East issues and the one of the root causes of peace in the Middle East. However, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the never-ending civil war in Syria attracted the whole world's attention, making the once hot Palestinian-Israeli conflict to some extent "marginalized" in global politics, especially under the background of the stagnant of Palestinian-Israeli peace talks since 2014. For a long time, the United States wished to be the mediator in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict but in vain. However, US President Donald Trump's Pro-Israel and Anti-Palestine approach put the Question of Palestine into more dangerous situation and meanwhile bring complicated impacts to the regional reconfiguration. Ironically, Donald Trump's new policy brings the Palestine-Israel issue back into the center of Middle East politics.

On December 6, 2017, US President Trump announced that he would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and prepare to move the US Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It is said that this plan was supported by Saudi Arabia. On December 21, the UN General Assembly convened an emergency special meeting and finally passed an overwhelming majority vote to determine that any decision and action that claimed to change the status of Jerusalem was "invalid". In January 2018, the US State Department announced to freeze the financial assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), making the relationship between the United States and Palestine rapidly cold. On May 14, 2018, on the 70th anniversary of the founding of Israel State, the United States moved its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. For US's strong pressure, the reaction from Arab League was very restrained and now the fact is Turkey, as the rotating Organization of the Islamic Cooperation presidency, carrying the banner of opposing Israel.

For the Palestine-Israel issue, China's position has always been clear, consistent and convergent with international community. This can be seen from China's latest statements. On September 28, 2018, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, "The question of Palestine must not be marginalized. For more than seven decades, peace and justice have remained elusive in that part of the world. On this issue, what the international community needs most is not proposal or initiative, but rather resolve and action. To implement the two-state solution, a new round of peace-promoting efforts need to be made to explore a new mediation mechanism. To that end, China will play

its part and Chinese humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people will continue".¹

However, although China's position and recommendations on the Palestine-Israel issue are more easily accepted by both sides, the current China's Middle East policy is still trapped in the predicament of "morality" and "interest". On the one hand, China has to support Arab countries' just cause, but it is impossible to give up its friendly relations with Israel on the other hand. Therefore, "all parties can accept China's Middle East policy, but they are not very satisfied"². With the Belt and Road Initiative, China has become more active and more proactive on the hot issues in the Middle East, which has apparent changes compared to the past. This article tries to analyse China's position on the Palestine-Israel issue from a historical perspective, so as to take a look at the changes of China's Middle East policy and China's foreign policy in general.

Five Major Problems of the Palestine-Israel Issue

On September 13, 1993, in the wake of Bill Clinton's testimony, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel formally signed the *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements*, which is the famous Oslo Accords. The first peace agreement between Palestine and Israel let the world see the hope of peace but lasted not too long. Two years later, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Israeli extremists. Later, Palestinian extremist forces also launched attacks against Israel. The street conflict gradually escalated into armed confrontation between the two sides. Therefore, the implementation of the Oslo Accord was suspended indefinitely. Today, 25 years later, the peace between Palestine and Israel is still a dream. Issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the Palestine-Israel border, the return of Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements and the allocation of water resources have become real obstacles in the Palestine-Israel peace process.

Problem 1: The Status of Jerusalem

The Jerusalem issue is one of the crux of the Palestine-Israel peace process. Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967 and unilaterally declared Jerusalem

¹ Wang Yi, "Multilateralism, Shared Peace and Development," The 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 28, 2018. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjzbzd/t1600639.shtml>

² Mr. Sun Bigan, former China's Middle East envoy, former Chinese ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, expressed his views on China's position in the Middle East in an interview. <http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-04/1654066.html>

as the permanent capital of Israel, while Palestine demanded to establish the State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as the capital. The US administration haven't accepted Israel's annexation until 1995 that it passed the "Jerusalem Embassy Act". According to this act, US government recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and allowed to establish US embassy in Jerusalem before May 31, 1999. But it allowed the president to postpone the deadline for national security interests and to inform US congress every six months.

After this act, many US presidents have continuously postponed the deadline for setting up an US embassy in Jerusalem. However, Trump's position seems to support Israel, but in fact, this move will trigger a strong opposition wave from the Arab countries and make Israel more isolated in the Middle East. Trump's decision is bound to undermine the Palestine-Israel peace process and increase the instability in the Middle East.

Problem 2: Border Division

According to Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly, it was decided to establish a "Jewish State" and an "Arab State" in the 27,000-square-kilometer Palestinian area. Among them, the "Jewish State" accounted for approximately 14,900 square kilometers, and the "Arab States" accounted for approximately 11,500 square kilometers.

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was established. However, the "Arab State" was not born because the Arabs refused to accept the resolution. In the first and third Middle East wars that followed, Israel occupied all the territory of "Arab State" including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The Security Council of UN adopted resolutions 242 and 338 successively, requesting the Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

For a long time, the Palestinian side has persisted and determined to establish an independent Palestinian state within the border before the 1967 war, but Israel government insisted that the future Palestine-Israel border could not return to the state before the war of 1976.

Problem 3: Jewish settlements

After the third Middle East war in 1967, Israel began building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. In August 2005, Israel withdrew all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West Bank after implementation of unilateral action plan.

But in the following years, Israel did not stop building settlements. For a long time, Palestine has insisted that all settlements must be dismantled, while Israel emphasizes that settlement construction is based on the need for “natural growth”.

Problem 4: the Return of Refugees

The Palestinian refugee issue is the product of Middle East wars, especially the first and third Middle East wars. The war has led to the displacement of more than 1 million Palestinians. According to statistics, there are more than 4.7 million Palestinian refugees. Apart from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, these refugees are mainly distributed in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

According to UN Resolution 194, Palestinian refugees have the right to return. However, the questions like whether the refugees can return or not, and how many refugees can return will have great impacts on the ethnic composition, population proportion and social security of the Middle East countries. Therefore, in Palestine-Israel peace talks, Israel insisted on the local resettlement of the Palestinian refugees and opposed their return.

Problem 5: Water Resources Allocation

More than 60% of the Palestinian area is in arid and semi-arid areas, and the total amount of renewable water resources is estimated at 2 billion cubic meters. Israel occupy and consume 80% of all water resources while Palestine can only enjoy the remaining 20%.

In addition, the Palestine-Israel issue on water resources also involves issues such as border demarcation and the future of Jewish settlements. Therefore, Israel opposes the complete redistribution of water resources with Palestinians and advocates joint management of water resources to ensure that Israel's water resources are not threatened. Palestine insisted on taking back ownership of all water facilities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and refused to manage water resources together with Israel.

Up to now, it is the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Accords on September 13, 2018, but the problems between the Palestine and Israel are still there. For the five major problems between Palestine and Israel, China's understanding and position have undergone a long process. For example, before the 1960s, China had always regarded the question of Palestine as a refugee issue and the legacy of the war between the Arab countries and Israel. Therefore, the support for the Palestinian issue has only remained moral and verbal for a

long time. Then China began to support the armed struggle of the Palestinians for ideological reasons. After the reform and opening up since 1978, China realized the importance of Israel in the field of science and technology and turned to keep balance between Palestine and Israel.

China's Changing Positions on the Palestine-Israel Issue

For the conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, China has not always maintained the same views and will change according to the changing situation, be it ideological reason or self-interest considerations. In general, China's positions on the Palestine and Israel issue can be roughly divided into the following stages: before the founding of the People's Republic, China show sympathy towards the Arabs and the Jews equally; in 1949-1959, China-Israel relation changed from intimate contact to alienation; in 1959-1969, China's policy was pro-Arabs and anti-Israel, and give full support to the Palestine Liberation Organization; in 1969-1979, China reduced its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization and also its criticism towards Israel; in 1979-1989, China recognized Israel's "right of independence and survival" and persuade the two parties to negotiate and make peace; in 1989-1999, China actively promoted the Middle East peace process; in 1999-2013, China actively participated in the Middle East peace process; since 2013, China began to actively participate in the Middle East hot issues.³

There is another classification method according to the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Prof. Wang Jinglie said, the Arab-Israeli conflict can basically be divided into three stages: (1) the comprehensive confrontation phase (from the late 1940s to the late 1970s); (2) strategic stalemate phase (from the late 1970s to the early 1990s); (3) the political settlement phase (from the early 1990s to the present).⁴This division roughly corresponds to China's Mao Zedong era, Deng Xiaoping era, and Jiang Zemin era. Therefore, this paper combines the above two methods to explain the transformation of China's positions on the Palestine and Israel issue.

First Phase: Historical exchanges between China and the Jewish nation

The good relationship between China and the Jewish people can date back to the millennium. In 1163, the Jews who moved from Central Asia to

³ This classification is proposed by Professor Xiao Xian in his book *Contemporary China-Middle East Relations*.

⁴ Wang Jinglie, "Palestine-Israel Conflict: Theory Construction and Prospect Analysis," *Arab World Studies*, No.1, 2016, p.9.

the hinterland of China established a synagogue in Kaifeng (now is He Nan province, China), marking the formation of Jewish communities in China. Since then, the Jews who settled in China have been treated equally in the four dynasties of the Jin, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties by Chinese officials and common people. However, due to the following reasons like the attraction of the imperial examination system, the restrictions on the foreign languages, the closure of the Jewish community, and the break up with the outside world and etc., the Kaifeng Jewish community, which once reached thousands of people, disintegrated in the mid-19th century. During the late Qing Dynasty, Jewish synagogues were also built in Shanghai and Harbin. The Harbin Jewish community had more than 12,000 people. During World War II, Nazi Germany's anti-Semitic movement forced about 30,000 Jewish refugees into Shanghai. Jewish people even began lobbying the National Government to accept 100,000 refugees and negotiated a plan to establish a "Jewish settlement" in Tengchong, Yunang Province, but in the end the plan was abandoned. Due to the lack of anti-Semitic consciousness of China and Jewish community leaders' active lobbying and funding, the leading figures of the Kuomintang like Sun Yat-sen and Sun Ke all have a sympathetic stance toward the Zionist Movement.⁵

Before the establishment of People's Republic of China, it has official diplomatic relations with only six Middle Eastern countries⁶ because the constant internal wars during this period and the limited connection with Middle East countries, but it has similar sympathy towards both Arab countries and Zionism. It is believed that Palestinian Arabs and Jews are two weak ethnic groups that are simultaneously oppressed, and also the victims of British and French colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, the Kuomintang government voted abstained on the No. 181 resolution of the partition of Palestine and Israel in November 1947. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was born. On March 1, 1949, the Kuomintang government recognized it and on May 11 voted in favor of Israel to be accepted as a member of UN. However, the two sides did not establish formal diplomatic relationship because China is in a civil war.

Phase 2: Pro-Arab and Anti-Israel (1949-1979)

People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949. Less than 100 days, the Israeli government officially recognized the People's Republic

⁵ Yin Gang, "Restraint and Regret, Sixty-Year Relationship between China and Israel," *Journal of West Asia and North Africa*, No. 4, 2010.

⁶ Including Turkey (1934), Persia (1942), Egypt (1942), Iraq (1942), Afghanistan (1944), Saudi Arabia (1946)

of China on January 9, 1950 and became the first country in the Middle East to recognize the new China. In June 1950, the representatives of China and Israel held their first meeting in Moscow to discuss the specific issues for the establishment of diplomatic relations. But at that time, the Korean War broke out. The pressure from the United States caused the Israeli government to hesitate to establish diplomatic relations with China. This led the two countries lost the first opportunity to establish a normal relationship. After the end of the Korean War, China and Israel once again tried to make contacts due to the release of China and the West.

On April 24, 1955, the Bandung Conference adopted a communiqué to support the rights of Palestinian Arabs and put Israel in an isolated situation in the Asian and African world. Under this circumstance, the Israeli government rushed to present a note to China at the end of April, hoping to establish diplomatic relations as soon as possible. However, it is too late. The Chinese government has decided to adjust the Middle East policy according to the international situation and side with a large part of the Arab countries. From May to September 1956, China established diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. In October 1956, Israel invaded Egypt with the collaboration of Britain and France, and the Chinese government severely condemned it. Since then, the relationship between China and Israel has entered a period of “freezing” for 20 years.⁷ Between Israel and the Arab countries, China finally chose the Arab countries.

In March 1965, the PLO delegation visited China and was warmly received by leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi. China expressed its unreserved support for the struggle of the Palestinians, agreed to provide material assistance to the PLO including weapons, and announced the establishment of an office in Beijing which will enjoy the diplomatic treatment as an embassy. In this way, China became the first country outside the Arab world to give diplomatic recognition to the PLO.⁸ Subsequently, China not only provided weapons and various materials to the PLO, but also trained military personnel for it. According to relevant information, China provided about \$5 million worth of weapons to the Palestinian guerrillas during this period for free.⁹

⁷ Pan Guang, “On Historical Evolution of Sino-Israel Relations and Analysis on Present Situation,” *Social Sciences*, No. 12, 2009, pp. 156-157.

⁸ Yang Fuchang, “Retrospect and Prospect of Sino-Arab Relations,” *Arab World Studies*, No.2, 2006, pp. 6-7. Yang Fuchang, then president of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies, former deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador to Kuwait and Egypt.

⁹ Lillian Craig Harris, *China Considers the Middle East*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, p.119. Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China-Middle East Relations*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p. 94.

After the mid-1970s, China gradually reduced its support for the Palestinian armed struggle, and also decreased the material assistance to the PLO. This was mainly due to the following reasons. First, the differences and struggles between the various Palestinian forces. This makes China very difficult and disappointed and doubt which forces is worthy of supporting. Second, the complex relationship between the PLO and other Arab countries. Generally speaking, the Arab countries show sympathy and support for the PLO but this kind of support is conditional and limited. When the PLO threatens their own interests, the Arab countries will restrict, crack down or even eliminate the PLO. Therefore, China must constantly adjust its relationship with the PLO. Third, the PLO and the Soviet Union moved closer very quickly. After the October War of 1973, the Soviet Union began to give strong support to the PLO. In 1974, it agreed to establish an office in Moscow by the PLO. In 1976, the PLO was formally recognized as the sole legal representative of the Palestinians. The closer relationship between PLO and Soviet Union will inevitably mean the alienation of Palestine and China, but the relationship between China and the PLO has not been cut off, just reducing it from a special relationship to a general relationship.¹⁰

In short, China still criticizes Israel in this period, but in fact there is no direct conflict of interests between China and Israel. It is mainly because that China wishes to win over the Arab countries so as to deal with the overall situation of international struggle.

Phase 3: Keep Balance between Arab and Israel (1979-2013)

After 1979, a significant change in China's Middle East policy was that China was no longer "one-sided" on the Arab-Israeli conflict and began to conditionally support the related parties to resolve the conflict through political negotiations. This is closely related to the situation in the Middle East. In November 1977, Egypt President Anwar Sadat made a historic visit to Jerusalem. In September 1978, under the mediation of President Jimmy Carter, Egypt and Israel, which had been in a state of war for a long time, reached the *David Camp Agreement*, signed a peace treaty in March 1979 and established diplomatic relations in February 1980. Thus, Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula and the Arab-Israeli conflict entered into a phase of political settlement, marking the beginning of a long and difficult Middle East peace process.

¹⁰Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China-Middle East Relations*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, pp. 135-139.

China showed understanding towards the transformation of Egypt's foreign policy but has been criticized by other Arab countries. In September 1982, the 12th Arab League Summit proposed a common solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (the famous "Fez Plan"), which for the first time implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist. China supports this proposal. In November 1988, the PLO issued a political statement and announced the establishment of the State of Palestine. In December of the same year, the PLO proposed three peace initiatives, recognized Israel's right to exist and promised to abandon all forms of terrorist activities.

China was fully supportive of this announcement.¹¹In September 1989, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made a five-point proposal for China to resolve the Middle East issue when he visited Egypt: 1. The Middle East issue should be resolved through political means; 2. The occupied Arab territories should be returned, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be restored, and Israel's security should also be guaranteed; 3. Support the convening of the Middle East International Peace Conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council; 4. Support the various parties in the Middle East to conduct various forms of dialogue; 5. Mutual recognition between Palestine and Israel.

The "five-point proposal" is China's first Middle East peace plan and also China's efforts to promote Arab-Israeli reconciliation. At the same time, the Israeli government used various channels to contact China, hoping to end the stalemate between the two countries and establish diplomatic relations as soon as possible. Moreover, Israel's policy to engage China was supported by the two major political parties, the Likud Group and the Labor Party and also welcomed by people from all walks of life in Israel.¹²

With the end of the Gulf War and the convening of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, China and Israel have accelerated the pace of normalization of relations. This is mainly due to the easing of Arab-Israeli conflict and the internal division of Arab countries. Now the main obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel, the Arab factor, has gone. In December 1991, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang visited Israel and completed the diplomatic procedure for normalizing relations between the two countries. In January 1992, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister

¹¹ Zhang Shiliang, "A Review of the Middle East," *Journal of Foreign Affairs College*, No. 1, 2003, pp. 24-25.

¹² Pan Guang, "On Historical Evolution of Sino-Israel Relations and Analysis on Present Situation," *Social Sciences*, No. 12, 2009, p. 158.

and Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy visited China and signed a joint communique with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. In March and June of the same year, Israel's first ambassador to China and China's first ambassador to Israel assume office.¹³ Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is a major change in China's Middle East policy, marking that China will hold a more balanced stance between Arabs and Israelites.

In December 1997, Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed five points of the Chinese government's Middle East peace process in Cairo.¹⁴ These five points are broader than eight years ago and show China's more willing to participate in the Middle East peace process. On April 12-18, 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin was invited to visit Israel and Palestine simultaneously, which is the first time in China's history of foreign policy. This represented that China treats Palestine and Israel as equals, which has symbolic significance and diplomatic influence.

On December 2004, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan visited Palestine and Israel and proposed four points on the Middle East issue.¹⁵ In November 2007, the International Conference on the Middle East Issue was held in Maryland, USA. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended the meeting and proposed China's five-point proposal to push the Middle East peace process out of the de-

¹³ She Gangzheng, "Historical Analysis of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Israel and China: An Interpretation of the Declassified Documents in the Israel State Archives," *West Asia and North Africa*, No. 3, 2017, pp. 116-119.

¹⁴ Five points are as follows: 1. Based on the UN resolutions on the Middle East issue and the principle of "land for peace" as determined by the Madrid Peace Conference, Middle East peace talks should be continued; 2. Seriously implement the agreements and avoid all actions that hinder the Middle East peace process; 3. Abandon any form of terrorism and violence, the security of all countries and the normal life of the people should be fully guaranteed; 4. With the development of the peace process, regional economic cooperation should be strengthened. The Middle East countries, including the Arab countries and Israel, should gradually establish mutual trust, eliminate hostility and achieve common development and prosperity. 5. The international community has the responsibility to work with all parties in the Middle East to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. China is willing to make its own efforts to this end. See Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China's Relations with the Middle East*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p.224.

¹⁵ Namely: 1. Israel and Palestine should stop violent conflicts, build mutual trust and resume peace talks; 2. Restart the "road map" plan to establish an independent Palestinian state as soon as possible while fully guarantee Israel's security; 3. Actively seek to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East, strengthen regional economic cooperation and promote peace and stability in the region; 4. The international community should increase its efforts to promote peace and the United Nations should play a greater role. China will, as always, actively participate in the efforts of the international community to promote peace and play a constructive role. See Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China's Relations with the Middle East*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p.284.

adlock.¹⁶ This is also the fourth time that China has systematically put forward its own ideas and views on the Middle East peace talks. In November 2012, in retaliation for armed groups such as Hamas, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in Gaza Strip, causing a large number of Palestinian casualties. However, China has not severely condemned Israel as it has in the past, on the contrary it has shown a more impartial and neutral attitude.

During the first 10 years of the new millennium, China-Israel economic and trade relations have developed rapidly, but it has also caused collective anxiety in the Arab countries that they feared China will abandon the Arab brothers. In addition, the Arab countries hold that China's Middle East diplomatic strategy is too ambiguous. China is balancing on both sides, but in the end the two sides are not satisfied. Therefore, China must come up with a set of new methods to actively participate in the peace process, either by "creative intervention" or "constructive participation". In the changing global context, it will not keep up with the times if China continue to shout "non-intervention".

Phase 4: Active Participation of Palestine-Israel Issue under BRI Initiative

Since President Xi Jinping took office, China has become more involved in the Palestine-Israel issue. On May 5-10, 2013, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu were invited to visit China. The leaders of the two rivals rarely visited the same country at the same time, thus placing China, the host country, to be the focus of the world. This also showed that China attaches great importance to the Palestine-Israel conflict and is willing to promote the Middle East peace process with a more positive attitude. In his talks with President Abbas, President Xi Jinping proposed four points on promoting the settlement of the Palestinian issue.¹⁷ President

¹⁶Namely: : 1. Respect history, accommodate the interests of all parties, and grasp the direction of peace talks; 2. Abandon violence, eliminate interference, and hold firm belief in peace talks; 3. Promote comprehensive and balance development, and create good atmosphere for peace talks; 4. Attach importance to development, strengthen cooperation, and solidify the foundation of peace talks; 5. Consolidate consensus, increase investment, and strengthen peace talks. The international community should work closely to establish a broad-based, balanced and effective multilateral facilitation mechanism, monitoring mechanism and enforcement mechanism to provide security for peace. See Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China's Relations with the Middle East*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p.284.

¹⁷First, we should adhere to the correct direction of Palestinian independence and the peaceful coexistence of Palestine and Israel. Second, negotiations should be the only way to achieve peace between Palestine and Israel. Third, we should adhere to the principle of "land for peace". Fourth, the international community should provide important guarantees for advancing the peace process. During the talks with Prime Minister Netanyahu, China stressed that Israel should release goodwill in stopping the construction of settlements and improving humanitarianism in Gaza. See Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China's Relations with the Middle East*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p.286.

Xi Jinping's four-point proposal shows that the new leadership has dared to face hot issues and actively promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.¹⁸

In July 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a new four-point proposal on promoting the Palestinian issue during his talks with President Abbas. First, we must firmly advance the political settlement based on the "two-state solution." China firmly supports the "two-state solution" and the establishment of a fully sovereign, independent State of Palestine based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It will, as always, play a constructive role in resolving the Palestinian issue. Second, adhere to a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept. China calls for the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, ceases all settlement activities in the occupied territories immediately, and takes measures to prevent violence against civilians immediately. Resume peace talks as soon as possible, speed up the political settlement of the Palestinian issue, and fundamentally achieve common and lasting security. Third, further coordinate the efforts of the international community to strengthen and promote synergy. The international community should enhance coordination and launch joint participation initiatives as soon as possible. China is willing to join and support all efforts that are conducive to the political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is planned to hold a Palestine-Israel peace symposium so as to provide new ideas for solving the Palestinian issue. Fourth, adopt a comprehensive policy to promote peace through development. While advancing political negotiations, we should attach great importance to development issues and promote Palestine-Israel cooperation. China regards Palestine and Israel as important partners in the "Belt and Road Initiative" and is willing to carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in the spirit of "peace through development" to support the accelerated development of Palestine continually. China proposes to launch a tripartite dialogue mechanism with Palestine and Israel to coordinate and promote key projects for aiding the Palestine.¹⁹

The "four-point proposal" put forward by President Xi Jinping is China's new efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue based on the current situation and the international environment. It is also the general guide for China's subsequent efforts to promote political solution to the Palestinian issue in the next stage. China hopes to receive positive response from all parties and jointly make a breakthrough in the settlement of the Palestinian issue.

¹⁸ Wu Sike, "Experience the Adjustment of China's Middle East Diplomacy," *Contemporary World*, No. 10, 2015, p. 65.

¹⁹ "China Presents Four-Point Proposal to Solve the Palestine Issue", *The People's Daily*, July 2017. <http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0726/c1002-29428930.html>

Reasons for China's Changing of Positions on Palestine-Israel Issue

For a long time, the overall layout of China's diplomacy has been "the major country is the key, the neighborhood is the primary, the developing countries are the foundation, and the multilateral is an important stage". In the Middle East, there is neither a great power nor a Chinese neighborhood, which can only be regarded as "developing country". Therefore, China's policy objectives toward the Middle East have changed several times in the past 60 years.

In the early days of People's Republic of China, the main goal was to oppose Western imperialism and promote the national liberation movement of Asian and African countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, the main task was to counter the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union and strive for the support from the third world. After the reform and opening up, the focus of China was shifted from ideology to economy. Therefore, the economic relationships between China and the Middle East have developed rapidly on commodity trade, project contracting and mutual investment. When entering the new century, it has become an important consideration for China's Middle East diplomacy to ensure energy security supply.²⁰

Regarding the Palestine-Israel issue, China forms its own unique position, which is "Moral Supremacy with Palestine, Cooperation Supremacy with Israel". China will support the just cause of Palestinians while at the same time attach importance to the economic and trade relations with Israel. This is because China has no historical disputes and no real conflicts with the two sides.²¹

On the one hand, China has always supported the just cause of the Palestinian people from the moral perspectives. First, supporting Palestine is an international political correctness. There is only one country in the world that supports Israel which is the United States and the rest of the world supports Palestine including France, Germany, Britain, Japan, and sometimes even US. For example, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2334 with 14 votes in favor and 1 abstention from the United States, demanding that Israel has to immediately stop all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem.²²

²⁰ Xiao Xian, *Contemporary China's Relations with the Middle East*, Beijing: China Book Press, 2018, p.365.

²¹ Sun Degang, "On the Dynamics of China's Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle East," *Global Review*, No. 6, 2012.

²² "The United States finally abstained, and the Security Council passed a resolution urging Israel to stop building settlements," *The Observer*, December 24, 2016. https://www.guancha.cn/global-news/2016_12_24_385854.shtml

Second, from the founding of China to the present, it has always supported Arabs. China and Israel did not establish diplomatic relations until 1992. In contrast, China and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979, China and France established diplomatic relations in 1964, and China and Germany established diplomatic relations in 1972. Although China and Israel do not have direct conflicts of interest, there are no religious and ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Jewish nation, but the development of bilateral relations has always been hampered by external factors.

Third, China needs Arab countries' support for the solidarity of Asia and Africa. Although Israel won five wars in the Middle East, it is still a single country which can not compare with the Arab countries in number. For example, the member states of the "Islamic Cooperation Organization" are as high as 56, accounting for one fourth in UN. It is because of the strong support of these Arab countries that China can regain its seat in the United Nations. Today, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" is mainly related to and more dependent on the support of these Middle Eastern countries.

On the other hand, China and Israel do not have historical and practical contradictions and China relies on Israeli cooperation in science, innovation, economy, and even military technology. First, it took 42 years for China and Israel to finally establish diplomatic relations. Israel is the first country in the Middle East to recognize the People's Republic of China, but it is the last country in the region to establish diplomatic relations with China, which is a very rare and special case in the history of international relations. The external factors like US and Arab countries are the main reasons to hinder the establishment of diplomatic relations. Only when these two factors' influence become less can China-Israel's relations develop very fast, which is the main purpose of China to promote the peaceful settlement of the Palestine-Israel issue.

Second, Israel has never given up its contacts with China. In the first few years of the People's Republic of China, Israel has showed hesitation and missed the perfect opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with China. When China looks to the Arab countries, Israel still did not give up hope of establishing diplomatic relations with China. What needs to be affirmed is that Israel has consistently recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China for decades. It has never had official contacts with Taiwan and supported the People's Republic of China to resume its legitimate seat in the United Nations despite the pressure from the United States. This also shows that Israel always attaches importance to establishing good relations with major powers and strives to get rid of its diplomatic isolation in Asia and hopes to gain recognition from the third world countries.

Third, China and Israel have close cooperation in many fields, such as security, anti-terrorism cooperation, economy, trade, science, technology and etc. The 9/11 attacks, the Iraq war, and the Syrian war have led extremism and terrorism to spread across the globe. Both China and Israel face serious threats. Therefore, Israel's anti-terrorism experience is valued by China.²³

After the establishment of diplomatic relations, bilateral relations have developed smoothly. In November 2005, Israel officially recognized China's full market economy status. In 2017, bilateral trade volume was 13.121 billion US dollars, up 15.6% year-on-year, of which China exported 8.919 billion US dollars, up 9% year-on-year, and imported 4.202 billion US dollars, up 32.4% year-on-year.

The two countries have two cooperation platforms: the China-Israel Joint Commission on Innovation and Cooperation and the China-Israel Intergovernmental Economic and Technical Cooperation Mechanism.²⁴ Especially in the "high" field of military trade, Israel has carried out extensive and in-depth cooperation with China even under the pressure of the United States, and so far has become the second largest military cooperation partners (Russia No. 1) with China.²⁵

Conclusion

During the Cold War, the Middle East had a strategic significance to the two superpowers. Therefore, the Chinese government, in the absence of political, economic and military means to win Arab friendship, tried to establish close cooperation with Arab-Palestinians to fight against Israel so as to gain an advantage in the face of two superpowers. Since the 1980s, with the easing of the Palestine-Israeli conflict and the progress of the Middle East peace process, China has gradually shifted to a more neutral and balanced position on the Palestinian issue.

The international community has never lacked plans and programs to solve the Palestine-Israel issue. The problem is that many United Nations resolutions on the question of Palestine have been shelved. The "two-state solution" formulated by the four parties of the Middle East issue has a time limit

²³ Pan Guang, "On Historical Evolution of Sino-Israel Relations and Analysis on Present Situation," *Social Sciences*, No. 12, 2009, p. 162.

²⁴ "Relations between China and Israel," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, August 2018. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677196/sbgx_677200/t312274.shtml

²⁵ Hou Yuxiang, "China's Role Adjustments on the Palestine-Israel Issue," *Arab World Studies*, No. 1, 2014, p. 44.

and the Arab Peace Initiative has also been silent for many years. Although regional countries have occasionally raised the voices of the “one country program”, the “federation of Jordan and Palestine”, the “regional solution” and the “three states solution”, these voices lack a realistic basis and reflect more about the disappearance of patience and confidence of the Palestinian state-building demands.

Objectively speaking, China is not a member of the “quartet mechanism” in the Middle East issue. It lacks strategic influence on solving the Palestine-Israel issue, let alone to play a decisive role, but it also has its own advantages and can play a unique role. First, the impartiality of China’s position. China has maintained good relations with Palestine, Israel and the Arab world. Second, the stability of China’s policies. Even if the government changes will not lead to drastic transformations in its basic diplomatic principles. Third, the balance of China’s role. United States is still the biggest external factor of the Palestine-Israel conflict, but China has always held a balanced and neutral relation with the related parties and in this way can China play a greater political role.

The Middle East is an important location in the strategic road map of “Belt and Road Initiative”. It is in line with China’s overseas strategic interests to achieve regional stability. At present, the Palestinian issue still exists as a “storm eye” in the Middle East. Therefore, China’s more and deeper involvement in the Palestinian issue is a necessity. ²⁶For China, you can never learn to drive without getting on the train. By participating in the practical process of dealing with this problem, China can better learn the experience of governance and control of international conflicts and improve the ability to deal with various complex international disputes.

Of course, China should also seriously study the difficulty of solving this cross-century problem and fully understand the irreplaceable status and role of the United States on this issue. In fact, China and the United States share common interests on the Palestinian issue, namely, controlling, suppressing conflicts and maintaining stability in the region. While doing its best, China must do its utmost to coordinate and cooperate with all parties concerned to avoid the whirlpool of contradictions and conflicts between Palestine and Israel.

²⁶ Chen Shuangqing, “Palestine Issue: China can play bigger role,” *Contemporary International Relations*, No. 12, 2015, p. 8.

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Yahudilerde Devlet ve Toplum: Sosyal ve Ekonomik Temelleri

Öz

Toplumların devleti nasıl ortaya çıkardığı cevabı uzun dönemdir sosyal bilimciler tarafından aranan bir sorudur. Bu soruyu cevaplamak için ortaya konan çalışmalar hangi toplumların hangi sebeplerle devlete eriştiği kadar hangi toplumların ne gibi sebeplerle devlete ulaşamadıklarını da incelemektedir. Bu minvalde Yahudi toplumunun tarihi, devletin nasıl kurulduğu ve ortaya çıktığı sorusuna yeni bakış açıları getirmektedir. İsrail toplumunun tarihi, yalnızca kısa bir dönemde devlete sahip olmuş bir toplumun daha sonradan 1948'e kadar devletsiz olarak nasıl varlığını devam ettirebildiği gibi çeşitli soruları da beraberinde getirdi. Bu bakımdan, uzun bir dönem bir devlet çatısı altında yaşamayan Yahudi toplumunun devlet kurarken nasıl aynı zamanda toplumunu da dönüştürdüğü aydınlatılması gereken bir boyut kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma, bu boyutun bir miktar da olsa aydınlatılmasına imkân tanınması üzerine hazırlanmıştır. Çalışmada devletli toplumların sahip oldukları toplumsal yapılar ile Yahudi toplumunun devlet kurma aşamasından öncesi ve sonrası karşılaştırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Yahudi toplumunun devletsiz olarak var olduğu uzun geçmişinin toplumsal yapısını tamamıyla değiştirmesine neden olacak şekilde toplumunu yeniden yapılandığına dair bulgular elde edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yahudiler, İsrail, Devlet, Devletsizlik, Toplum

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State and Society in Jews: Social and Economic Basics

Abstract

The question of how societies have created the state is a long-term question sought by social scientists. The studies put forward to answer this question and also examine which societies was able to reach the state for what reasons and for what reasons the others was not. In this respect, the history of Jewish society brings new perspectives to the question of how the state was established and emerged. The history of Israeli society has brought with it a number of questions, such as how a society with which had a short period of state in time was able to continue to be stateless until 1948. In this respect, it should be clarified how the Jewish community, which has not lived under a state for a long time, has also transformed its society at the same time. This study is based on the fact that this dimension and is tried to make this a little clear. In the study, the social structures of the state-societies were compared with those of the Jewish community before and after the establishment of Israeli state. As a result, findings have been found that the long history of Jewish stateless-society, has restructured its society to cause it to completely change its social structure.

Keywords: Jews, Israel, State, Statelessness, Society

الدولة والمجتمع لدى اليهود: "إسرائيل" دولة من صناعة اليد

ملخص

منذ زمن طويل وعلماء الاجتماع يبحثون عن جواب ل كيفية تأسيس الدول من قبل المجتمعات. الأبحاث التي أجريت في هذا الصدد تبحث عن المجتمعات والأسباب التي دفعت هذه المجتمعات الى تأسيس أو انشاء دولة كما تبحث عن المجتمعات والأسباب التي حالت دون تأسيسها او انشائها للدولة. وفي هذا المنوال تظهر هذه الدراسة وجهات نظر جديدة حول تاريخ المجتمع اليهودي وكيفية ظهور وتأسيس دولتهم. ان تاريخ المجتمع الإسرائيلي، أثار أسئلة عديدة مثل كيفية استطاعة المجتمع الذي كان له دولة لفترة قصيرة الاستمرار في الحفاظ على بقاءه بدون دولة حتى عام 1948. وفي هذا السياق، اكتسبت مسألة كيفية تحويل المجتمع اليهودي الذي عاش لفترة طويلة بدون دولة لمجتمع أيضا أثناء تأسيسه للدولة بعدا يجب اسقاط الضوء عليه. ولقد تم كتابة هذا البحث بشكل يساعد على اسقاط الضوء نوعا ما على هذا البعد. ولقد تمت في هذه الدراسة مقايسة بين الهيكليات التي تمتلكها المجتمعات التي تمتلك دولة لها وبين المجتمع اليهودي قبل وبعد تأسيس دولتهم. وفي نتيجة البحث تم الوصول الى استنتاجات حول إعادة المجتمع اليهودي لتأهيل مجتمعه من جديد بحيث يغير تماما من هيكلية المجتمع اليهودي خلال الفترة الطويلة التي قضاها بدون دولة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: اليهود، إسرائيل، الدولة، بدون دولة

Giriş

İnsanlık tarihinin devletli geçmiřinin, henüz devleti icat etmeden önceki çağlarına nazaran oldukça az bir süre içerdığı düşünülse de bugünün devletli toplumları, devlete sahip olmayan diğer toplulukları garip bir gözle seyrederek onlara neredeyse yarım-toplum olma vasfını vermekte pek ivedi davranırlar. Elbette devleti icat etmiş bir toplumun diğer toplumlar karşısında daha ilerlemiş bir sosyal yapıda olduğunu savunmak mümkündür. Bundan, en azından, neredeyse keşfedilmiş dünyanın tamamına hâkim olan devlet yapılanmaları göz önüne alındığında, insanların devletten vazgeçemedikleri ve hatta devlete ulaşabilmek için çaba harcadıklarına dair bir ipucu yakalanmış olacaktır.

Yahudi toplumunda ve geleneksel inancında ise tarihinin çok az bir kısmında devlete sahip olmuş bir topluluğun hem çekmekle yükümlü olduğu bir sürgünün, bu sürgüne sebebiyet vermiş bir suçun ve nihayetinde onları bekleyen nihai bir sonun tasviri vardır. Devlet, özellikle Doğu toplumlarında kutsanmış bir kurum olması hasebiyle kaybedilmesinin beklenmedik felaketlere sebep olacağını düşündürür. Fakat Yahudiler¹, aslında Doğulu bir millet olarak hem dinleri hem de tarihlerinin kutsamasıyla iki kere yücelttikleri devleti kaybetmiş, yıllarca dini inançları nedeniyle çatıştıkları Hristiyan ve Müslümanlarla birlikte yaşamış; tüm bunlara rağmen de “devletsiz toplum” olarak da hiçbir zaman dağılarak yok olup gitmemiştir.

Yahudilerin neden ve nasıl yıllarca kendilerini düşman olarak gören toplumların arasında, en sonuncusu Holokost olarak adlandırılmış, defalarca kez gerçekleştirilmiş şiddet olaylarına maruz kalmış, en azından aralarında yaşadıkları toplumlarca dışlanmış olmalarına rağmen dağılmadıkları, farklı coğrafyalarda yine de Yahudi olmak bilincini muhafaza ederek tutundukları sorusu sosyal bilimciler tarafından incelenen bir meseledir. Bu çalışma da bu literatüre bir katkı sağlamak amacıyla hazırlanmış, lakin konunun geniş bir yelpazeyi içermesinden mütevellit, detaylar konunun uzmanlarına bırakılmıştır. Bu sebeple çalışmamız, konuya ilgi duyanlar için sadece bir giriş niteliği taşıyacak, fakat İsrail Devleti’ni ve değişimini özelde devlet toplum bağlamında tahlil etmek amacını güdecektir.

¹ Bir başka doğulu millet olarak Çingeneri de saymak mümkündür. Zira en az Yahudiler kadar, belki daha fazla bile, farklı coğrafyalarda farklı toplumlarla yan yana yaşamışlardır. Bu çalışmanın konusu Yahudiler üzerine olduğu için bu meseleyi şimdilik göz ardı etmekte fayda görüyoruz.

Erken Dönem Yahudiler’de Devlet ve Toplum

Yahudilerle ilgili yürütülen sosyopolitik çalışmalar, Yahudilere kendi kimliklerini ne kadar erken edindiklerine değinmeden geçemez. Zira bu kimlik, “Yehuda”nın çocukları olmak üzere dini bir kimlik ile bütünleşmiş etnik² bir potayı tanımlar (Gürsoy ve Çapçioğlu, 2009: 118-119; Kimmerling, 1999: 340; Davies, 2006: 144). İnanışları gereği kendilerini seçilmiş, insanlığa liderlik edecek bir millet olarak gören Yahudiler, kendi dinlerini de ancak irsî yollarla aktarılan bir patrimonial sisteme bağlamışlardır. Liderlik, Yahudilerin insanlara iyiliğe giden yolda öncülük etmeleri manasındadır ve Yahudilerin geleneksel inançlarında kendilerine bu konuda özellikle bir hedef belirlediği söylenebilir (Hadawi, 1990: 26-40). Bu amaçla, kendilerine vaat edildiğini iddia ettikleri topraklarda ilk Yahudi devletini kurmuşlardır. Kurdukları devlet, Sion³ adıyla anılan bölgede, Yahudi veya İsrail Krallığı adıyla anılan, antik Helenistik krallıklarla ve Romalılarla mücadele ederek yıpranıp (Erdemir ve Erdemir, 2010: 120-129) yıkılmıştır.

Yahudiler, Yahudilik temelinde bir devlet kurmazdan evvel, Elias Canetti’nin⁴ tespitine göre, edindikleri millet-topluluk olma bilinci⁵ sayesinde hayatlarını iki kavramla özdeşleştirilebilecek şekilde kurguladılar: kum ve

² Bu din-kimlik bütünleşmesinin daha sonraları zayıfladığı, seküler ve milliyetçi bir İsraililik kimliğinin daha yaygın hale geldiği; hatta Yahudi bir aileye sahip olmanın öneminin dahi karma evliliklerle yitirdiğinden bahsedilmektedir (Sheffer, 2012: 78-79). Hatta buna dair en açık vurgu İsrail devletinin bağımsızlığının ilanı olan metinde kendisini göstermektedir: “İsrail toprakları Yahudi halkının doğum yeridir. Burada ruhani, dini ve siyasi kimlikleri biçimlenmiştir. Burada ilk kez devletli olabileceklerini anladılar, ulusal ve evrensel öneme sahip kültürel değerler yarattılar...” (Ben Gurion, 1948: 1).

³ Yahudilerin, hatta antik dönemde ortaya çıkan “ethnie” bilincinin daha sonraları insan topluluklarına nasıl etnik bir bilinç kazandırmada teritorial bağlardan faydalandığına dair görüşler için bkz. Smith, Anthony D. (2002) Ulusların Etnik Kökeni, Dost Kitabevi, Ankara.

⁴ Kitle ve İktidar, adıyla anılan bir kitaba sahip olan yazarın kendisi de Yahudi asıllıdır. Kitleleri çözümlemede kullandığı yöntemleri analiz ederken milletleri doğanın bir parçası olarak görür. Çünkü zannımızca iktidar ve devleti de dolayısıyla insan bedeninin uzantısı olarak gören siyasi düşünce akımlarının etkisinde kalmıştır. Doğanın bir parçası olarak nitelenen kitleler, Almanları tanımlarken “orman”ı, İngilizleri tanımlarken “deniz”i kullanması gibi Yahudileri tanımlarken de “kum” ve “sürgün”ü tercih etmiştir. (Canetti, 2014: 173-191)

⁵ Yahudilerin millet olma bilincine dair detaylı çalışmaları, etnisite ve milliyetçilik çalışmalarının temellerinde de kendisini göstermektedir. Milliyetçilik, kimlik ve etnik gruplar üzerine çalışmalar yürüten Brass, Smith, Gellner ve Hroch gibi bilim adamları çalışmalarında Yahudilerin özellikle Avrupa’daki zamanlarına dair tespitlerini eserlerinde dile getirmişlerdir. Bu eserler için bkz Gellner, Ernest (1992) Uluslar ve Ulusçuluk, İnsan Yayınları, İstanbul ; Smith, 2002 ; Hroch, Miroslav (2015) European Nations: Explaining Their Formation, (published first in 2005 as “Das Europa der Nationen”) Verso, London and NY., Hroch, Miroslav (2011) Avrupa’da Milli Uyanış: Toplumsal Koşulların ve Toplulukların Karşılaştırmalı Analizi, çev. Ayşe Özdemir (Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations, 1985 Cambridge Press), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul., Brass, Paul (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, SAGE Publication, India.

sürgün. İlki Yahudilerin deniz kumu gibi çok ve davaları uğruna harcanmış, fakat harcandıkça da çoğalmış olduklarını anlatmak üzere temsilen seçilmiştir. Bu özellikleri sayesinde sürüldükleri onlarca farklı coğrafyada onlarca farklı zaman ve koşul altında hayatlarını ikame ettirebilecekleri, birliklerini devam ettirebilecekleri çoğunlukta bir sayıyı muhafaza edebilmişlerdir. Ayrıca bu sayede gittikleri bölgelerde karşılaştıkları bu farklılıklara uyum sağlayabilecek özellikte esnek bir toplum yapısına sahip olmaları da konu içerisine dâhil edilerek Yahudilerin nasıl kendi benliklerine farklı eklentiler yamamalarına rağmen hiçbir zaman öz kimliklerini kaybetmediklerini anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır⁶.

Sürgün konusu ise bir milletin kendi kimliğini nasıl sürgün üzerine oturttuğunu, Mısır'dan ayrılırken dahi aslında bu sürgün niteliğini göstererek hareket ettiklerini anlatmak çabasına dayanır. Bu sürgün hikâyesine, bir devlet kurduktan sonra başlanılacaksa eğer, Romalılara karşı "hükmetmek üzere" gönderildikleri topraklarda tekrar iktidarı ellerine alabilmek için defalarca kez isyan eden ve ardından son kez 132-135 yıllarında Kudüs'ten sürülen Yahudilerle başlamak gerekecektir. Ellerinde tuttıkları kutsal topraklar, geleneksel Yahudi inancı gereği, bu sürgünün ardından artık kendilerine yasal kılınmıştır ve dünya üzerinde farklı coğrafyalara dağılmaları istenmiştir. Bu yayılma, aslında tek bir tetiğin çekilmesiyle başlamış değildir. Yani öncelikle belli merkezlere yerleştirilen Yahudiler ardından ikinci kez fakat bu sefer koloncilik yapmak üzere başka topraklara giderek yerleşmişlerdir (Erdemir ve Erdemir, 2010: 127).⁷

Yahudiler, kendi kutsal topraklarını, özellikle Kudüs ve çevresini muhafaza edebilmek ve ellerinde tutabilmek için o dönem pagan inançtan olan Romalılarla savaşırken, Tanrı tarafından yardım olarak bu savaşı mutlaka kazanacaklarını, en azından toprakları ellerinde tutabilecekleri kadar bir güce sahip olarak savaştan çıkabileceklerini düşünüyorlardı. Roma gücüne karşı kaybettiklerinde ise bu sebeple, inanç üzerine kurulu yaşam biçimlerini tekrar gözden geçirdiler. Özellikle din bilgilerinin yorumlamaları

⁶ Yahudilikle ilgili olarak ve bu dinin ortaya koyduğu farklılık yaratan sosyal metaforları anlayabilmek adına detaylı bilgi için bkz. Neusner, Jacob "Israel: Judaism and Its Social Metaphors" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 55 No. 2 Summer 1987 p. 331-361.

⁷ Buna benzer bir davranış biçimini, İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde Yahudiler arasından yükselerek kapital sınıfına dahil olan Leo Pinsker ve Baron Rothschild gibilerinin, orta sınıf burjuva sınıfından olan ırkdaşlarına karşı, onları Avrupa sınırlarından çıkarmak istemelerinde tekrar görmek mümkündür. Böylece kapital Yahudiler, orta sınıf burjuva Yahudileri dünya üzerine sürerek hem onlardan birer potansiyel rakip olarak kurtulmuş, hem de öte yandan onları dünya üzerinde birer koloncilik faaliyetine benzer ticari işlerde kullanabilme imkânına ulaşmış olacaklardır (Ataöv, 1970: 32).

Yahudilerin artık bir Yahudi'nin kendi dinini ve kültürünü yaşaması gerektiği gibi yaşamadığı, atalarının yollarından ayrılarak artık başka milletlere benzemeye başladıkları yönündeydi. İşte tam da bu sebeple Tanrı kendilerine Mesih gelene kadar çekmeleri gereken bir ceza vermişti. Bu ceza, Yahudilerin peygamberleri Abraham'a vaat edildiğini savundukları (Gül ve Yüksel, 2016: 337-338) topraklardan sürgüne gönderilmeleriydi.

Bu dini yorumun iki sonucu oldu. İlki, Yahudilerin Mesih'in gelişine kadar sürgünde kalmayı ve bu yolla tanrılarının kendilerine verdiği cezayı çekmeyi uygun görmeleridir. Zaten böylelikle 20. yy'a kadar ciddi sayılabilecek herhangi bir devlet kurma girişiminde de bulunmayacaklardı⁸. Ayrıca kendilerine Tanrı yardımıyla verilecek bir devletin hem yeri hem de zamanı belliydi ve bunun haricinde kurulacak bir devlet, Tanrı'yı daha fazla öfkelen-dirmek anlamına geleceği için devlet kurmak için uğraşmanın manasızlığı bir tarafa, bunun için uğraşacak Yahudilerin de engellenmesi gerekecekti. İkincisi ise Yahudilerin bu cezayı kendilerine reva görmekteki sebepten, yani "başkalarına" ki bunlar Yahudi inancına göre Yahudilere tabii olarak yol gösterilmesi gereken topluluklardır, benzemekten kaynaklanır. Yahudiler sürgüne gittikleri topraklarda, kendi dinlerinin bir parçası olan milli değerlerini ellerinden geldiğince korumaya çalışmışlardır. Çünkü bu değerler kaybedildikçe tanrının sürgün cezası kalkmayacak, Yahudiler hiçbir zaman bir arada yaşayamayacaklardır.

Roma sürgününden itibaren aralarında İspanya, Almanya, Polonya-Rusya, Kuzey Afrika ülkeleri ve Yemen-Arabistan yarımadası gibi coğrafyaların bulunduğu Dünya'nın pek çok bölgesine göç eden Yahudiler 18. yy Aydınlanma Dönemine kadar kendi inançlarına bağlı, içinde yaşadıkları toplumdan dışlanmış ve hatta bazen de toplumsal saldırılara maruz kalarak yaşamaya devam ettiler. Fakat bu tarihin ardından özellikle Avrupa'da yaşayan, Avrupa düşün dünyasını oldukça etkileyen ve buradan etkilenen Yahudiler kendi inanç ve kültürel sistemlerini de değiştirmek yoluna gittiler. Bu değişiklikler Yahudilerin geleneksel yaşam tarzlarını köklü olarak değiştirecek bir dizi olayın başlangıcı olacaktı.

⁸ Devlet kurma girişiminde bulunmayışlarını elbette sadece bu şarta bağlamak, aşırı basite indirgemeci bir yaklaşım olacaktır. Bu durumun yanında konjonktürel şartların, ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal şartların bir devlet kurmak için yeterli şartları sağlamadığından; hatta bir devlet kurmak için belli sayıda bir nüfusa ve bu nüfusun üzerinde yaşayabileceği toprağa sahip olmayışları da eklenebilir.

Aydınlanma Dönemi ve Sonrasında Yahudiler ve Devlet Kavramı

Yahudiler, göç ettikleri Avrupa topraklarında pek de müsamahayla karşılanmadılar (Kızıloğlu, 2012: 44)⁹. Zira Hristiyanlık inancına göre İsa'yı öldürenler Yahudilerdi. Fakat bu durum ilk başta, her ne kadar problemlere neden olacak bir yol olsa da Yahudileri Avrupa topraklarından tamamen sürüp atacak kitlesel olayların yaşanmasına neden olmayacaktı. Endülüs'te ya da Haçlı Seferleri sırasında Yahudilere karşı gerçekleştirilen kitlesel saldırı hareketleri de düşünülürse, Nazi Almanya'sında yaşanan Holokost ve Sovyet Rusya'sında işlenen pogrom suçlarına kadar Yahudilerin Avrupa'da dışlanmış, fakat tamamen terkedilmemiş bir izole hayat yaşadıklarını savunmak mümkündür¹⁰. Bu katkı, ancak Avrupa'nın Reform hareketleri ile katı Hristiyan inançlarından uzaklaşmaları sonucunda imkân bulabilmiştir.

Değinilmesi gereken önemli bir diğer konu ise bir devleti oluşturan herhangi bir toplumun kendi toplumsal katmanlarının hangi ölçüde konuşlandırdığıdır. Bu çalışma, elbette hangi toplumsal tabakalaşmanın ne ölçüde gerçekleşirse ortaya bir devlet çıkacağı sorusunu formüle etmeyecek, ama Yahudiler için modern bir devlet kurmada karşılarına çıkan en önemli sorun olarak bu toplumsal tabakalaşmanın ne ifade ettiğini¹¹ ortaya koyamaya çalışacaktır. Zira bir devleti sadece "kurmak" ona, üzerinde inşa edileceği bir toprak parçası bulmaktan çok ötede bir eylemdir.

Modern Dönem Yahudi Toplumlarında Toplumsal Tabakalaşma

Modern dönem ile antik ve Ortaçağ dönemi Yahudiliği arasında klasik bir ayrıma gitmekte fayda vardır. Bu ayrım, Yahudilerin toplumsal yapılarının, iş ve meslek tercihlerinin, yaşam biçimlerinin ve nüfus yoğunluklarının daha öncesine göre farklılıklar göstermeye başladığı dönem olan modern çağlardan ayrılmasına dayanır. Bu farklılığı görmek İsrail devletinin güncel yapısına kavuşması yolunda İsrail'e gelen göçmen Yahudilerin mesleklerinde, aile yapılarında ve nüfuslarında görülebilir. Mesela özellikle Sovyet Rusya ve Polonya topraklarından gelen Yahudilerin işçi kökenli olmaları, daha ön-

⁹ Ancak buna karşılık, aynı dönemlerde Müslümanların idaresi altındaki topraklarda Yahudilere karşı benzer bir ayrımcılık uygulanmamış, hatta Yahudilerin Filistin topraklarına göç etmeleri, bölge Arapları tarafından dahi önyargıyla karşılanmamıştır (Ataöv, 1970: 31).

¹⁰ "Karl Marx Yahudi olarak doğmuş daha sonra Protestanlaşmıştır" (<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/timeline-for-the-history-of-judaism>). Bu ifade ile Yahudi toplumundan yetişmiş kişilerin Avrupa'ya sunduğu katkı kadar, onların toplumdan tamamen dışlanmadığını da ifade ettiği söylenebilir.

¹¹ Öyle ki toplumsal tabakaların politik temsilcileri dahi geç dönem İsrail Devletinde bile bu sınıf farklılıkları üzerinden yükselmiştir: "For purposes of political action each sector organized itself into a party or parties ..." (Gutmann, 1963: 704 ve ayrıca Kimmerling, 1999: 349)

celeri ülkelerinde işçi olarak çalışamayan bu nüfusun yapısında değişimlere yol açmıştır (Atmaca, 2012: 168).

Bu değişimin analiz edilebilmesi için, Yahudilerin toplumsal tabakalaşma şekillerinin incelenmesi önemlidir. Toplumsal tabakalaşma toplumda bireylerin meslekleri, gelirleri, sosyal güç ve başarı tanımlamaları, cinsiyetleri, aile bağlarından sosyal güç ve başarı tanımlamaları ve toplum içerisinde yer alan otorite kaynaklarına kadar somut ve soyut pek çok etkenden oluşur (Parsons, 1940: 848-849; Burke, 2013: 2). Tüm bunların sonucunda aynı toplumun içerisinde bu etkenlere bağlı olarak farklılaşmış gruplarından bahsedilmesi mümkündür.

Genel olarak değerlendirmek gerekirse, Yahudilerin yerleştikleri alanlara sonradan göç yoluyla gelmeleri kendilerinin toplumsal yapısını yeniden şekillendirecek bir dizi olayın ana etkenlerinden birisi olmuştur. Yahudiler, kendi devletlerine sahip oldukları zamanda toplumsal yapıları köylü, zanaatkâr, yönetici, asker, din adamları vs gibi katmanlardan oluşuyordu (Kızıloğlu, 2012: 38-40; Gottwald, 1993). Elbette bu sınıfların varlığı da bir devletin varlığını destekliyor, gerekli kılıyor hatta bir bakıma ondan destek de alıyordu. Fakat göç edilen yerlerde Yahudilerin kendilerine bir köylü sınıfı oluşturabilecek şekilde toprak mülkiyetine sahip olmalarının imkânı yoktu. Hem yerli halkın buna müsaadesi yoktu, hem de müsaade alınan yerlerde de köylü sınıfını bir "sınıf" olarak bilinçlendirmek imkânı doğmuyordu (Horowitz ve Lissak, 1989: 5-6). Yahudiler, kitlesel olarak kendi topraklarına İsrail Devleti'nin kurulmasıyla kavuşmuşlar, hatta kuruluşun hemen öncesindeki yıllarda Britanya kontrolündeki Filistin Komisyonerliğinde yerli Arap Lordlardan yüklü miktarlarda toprak satın almışlardı¹². Lakin toprak satın almanın başlı başına bir köylü sınıfı yarattığını savunmak gülünç olur. Gerçek anlamda bir köylü sınıfı oluşturmak için İsrail Devletinin toprağa bağlı bir nüfus dizayn etmesi, bunu yaparken de yine göç yoluyla İsrail topraklarına gelmiş eğitilmiş yüksek sınıfları takip eden nesilleri bu alana yöneltmesi gerekecekti. Özellikle bölgede tarım faaliyetlerini yürüten Arap nüfusun 1948 ve takip eden yıllarda bölgeden hızla kaçması¹³, bu alanda büyük

¹² Toprak satın almaları ve bölgeye gerçekleştirilecek göçlerin maddi olarak karşılanabilmesi amaçlarıyla 1901 yılında Yahudi Ulusal Fonu adında bir kuruluş teşkil edildi (Jewish National Fund, 2019).

¹³ Bölgedeki nüfus hareketlilikleri bugün Filistin ve İsrail arasında iskân, sınırların belirlenmesi, ikamet ve geri dönüş haklarının korunması gibi konularda hem ikili hem de uluslararası anlamda tartışma konularından birisini oluşturmaktadır. Ancak özellikle İsrail devletinin kuruluşuna kadar Britanya yönetimi altında bölgede Yahudi nüfusun artışı, toprak kazanımları ve bunun karşısında Arap nüfusun bölgeden uzaklaşması manidardır (Atmaca, 2012: 165-168). Arap nüfusun bölgedeki hareketlilikleri hakkında ayrıca bkz. Official Website for Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East (2004) Demographics of Historic Palestine Prior to 1948, Factsheet Series No 7, https://www.cjpme.org/fs_007 ; <https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001118>, Access 02.02.2018.

bir boşluk oluşturmuştu. Bu açığı kapatabilmek için göçle gelen nüfusun birincil iş sahası öncelikle tarım alanlarına yöneltilerek dolduruluyordu (Ben Rafael ve Sharot, 1991: 232-233). Aksi halde modern bir toplumu oluşturması gereken, dolayısıyla bir devleti var etmesi gereken toplum yapısı ve dinamizmi sağlanamazdı.

Köylü sınıfın olmayışının yanında Yahudilerin loncalara bağlı zanaat mesleklerini yapamamaları, el emeğiyle geçinen bu sınıfın da zamanla yok olmasına neden oldu. Yahudiler, bunun yerine geriye yerli toplumun geri kalanı tarafından oldukça riskli görülen mesleklere yönelmek zorunda kaldılar. Bu mecburiyet, Yahudilerin bankerlik, tefecilik, uzak mesafe kıtalararası ticaret veya altın işlemeciliği gibi meslekleri seçmesine neden oldu. Bunun yanında toplumun diğer kesimlerince kolay elde edilemeyen, ilim tahsil etmekle elde edilen doktorluk, mühendislik gibi eğitim gerektiren mesleklere de yönelmelerine vesile oldu (Sheffer, 2012: 78-79). Fakat bu meslekler hiçbir zaman kitlesel iş imkânlarına yol açan sektörler olmayarak, mesela üzerinde onlarca kişinin çalışıp geçinebileceği bir toprak parçası gibi, Yahudiler arasında kitlesel işsizliğe de sebep oldu¹⁴. Bu durum, Yahudilerin toplumla entegre yaşamasını daha da zorlaştırırken Yahudi seçkinlerin personel ihtiyaçlarını kendi çevrelerindeki Yahudilerden temin ederek kapalılaşmanın iki katına çıkmasına yol açtı.

Bir diğer eksiklik olarak, Yahudilerin göç ettikleri topraklarda yabancı bir millet olarak görülmesi ve güvenilmemesi sebepleriyle askere alınmamalarıydı (Penslar, 2013). Yahudiler, Kudüs'e hükmederken savaşçılarıyla ün salmış bir devletti. Fakat göç yıllarının ardından uzun zaman boyunca profesyonel askerlik bir yana, bireyleri askere dahi alınmamıştı. Böylece ellerinde askeri kolluk hizmetlerini yerine getirecek bir sınıf bulunmayan Yahudiler, diğer sınıflar gibi bunu da elleriyle inşa etmek zorunda kalacaklardı. Bu konuda ise kendilerine Britanya yardımcı olmuştur, denilebilir (Cesarani, 1989: 75). Çünkü hiçbir askeri eğitimi olmayan Yahudiler, Filistin idaresini elinde tutan İngilizlerden askeri eğitim ve teçhizat alarak, hemen ardından terör faaliyetlerine girişip askeri manevra ve taktikleri etüt etme zemini bularak faydalandılar. 1948 öncesinde kurdukları bu terör gruplarıyla zaman içerisinde hem lider teşkilatları hem de organizasyon yapılarıyla modern İsrail

¹⁴ Yahudi nüfus, modern çağlarda özellikle Doğu Avrupa'da işgücüne dahil oldular ve sanayi devriminin ulaştığı Avrupa bölgelerinde işçi olarak çalıştılar. Bu nüfus İsrail topraklarına 50'lerin ardından yoğun olarak da 60'larda göç ettiler (Sheffer, 2012: 78-79).

devletin askeri kanadını ve savunma gücünü¹⁵ oluşturdular (Fildiş, 2012: 340-341; Lishak, 1989: 316).

Eklenmesi gereken bir diğer konu ise Yahudilerin yaşadıkları devletlere diğer etnik gruplara nazaran daha fazla oranlarda vergi ödemiş olmalarıdır (Gottwald, 1993: 8). Bu yüksek vergilendirme, bir anlamda yapmadıkları askerlik vazifesine karşılık, bir noktada hayatlarını geçindirdikleri meslekler üzerinden ödedikleri yüksek haraçlar olsa da değişmemiş; özellikle Avrupa devletleri için gelir kapısı olarak görülmüşlerdir. Fakat bunun karşılığında, vergi verenlerin yasal haklara sahip olduğu yıllarda bile eşit vatandaşlar olarak görülmemiş, her ülkede farklı uygulamalarla karşılaşmışlardır (Cesarani, 1989: 72). Hatta yerleşim ve giyim-kuşam bakımından bile kısıtlanmış, çoğu zaman yasal otoritelerin uygun gördükleri yerlere yerleşmek zorunda kalmış ve geleneksel kıyafetlerini kullanmaktan men edinmişlerdir. Bu kısıtlamayı, elbette dini ritüellerini gerçekleştirmelerindeki engelleme ve düzenlemeler takip etmiştir.

Bu hayat şartlarını genel olarak çizmek bize gösteriyor ki Yahudiler modern toplumların üzerinde buldukları toplumsal tabakalaşmaya¹⁶ sahip bir şekillenmede değildi. Normal Batı toplumlarının yapısı bir hiyerarşi üçgeni üzerinde en alttan sırasıyla köylü-işçi, burjuva ve elitler tarafından oluşturulmaktayken Yahudiler bunun neredeyse tam tersini gerçekleştirmişlerdi.

Bunun aslında bir tercihten ötede zorunluluk olduğunu söylemek gerekir. Çünkü Yahudiler için, göçle yanlarına geldikleri toplumlarla aralarında kurdukları iletişim ve etkileşimin sonucunda böyle bir toplumsal yapılanmaya gitmiş, hatta bu toplumsal tabakalar arasındaki boşlukları değerlendirmişlerdir, denilebilir (Gellner, 1992: 181-182). Yani, Yahudilerin yerleştikleri toplumsal düzende ister istemez açıklık bulunan toplumsal tabakaya yerleştiklerini, bunların da çoğu kez istenmeyen pozisyonlar ve riskli makamlar oldukları savunulabilir. Elbette daha sonraları bir devlet kurarak kendi toplumlarına hâkim olmak isteyen Yahudiler için bu toplumsal yapı, tamamen tersine çevrilmesi gereken bir sorun teşkil etmeye başlayacaktı. Zira modern

¹⁵ Irgun, Lehi ve Haganah benzeri örgütler Yahudi silahlı örgütleri olarak Araplara karşı silahlı faaliyetlerde bulunmuşlardır. Bu faaliyetler Yahudilerin bölgeye Filistin üzerinde bir devlet kurmak amacıyla göç etmelerinin ardından başlamıştır. Bahsi geçen örgütler daha sonraları İsrail devletinin savunma ve askeri kurumlarına dönüşmüşlerdir. *Tablonun oluşturulmasında modern zamanlar için Avrupa toplumlarını (Almanya, Fransa, Rusya ve İngiltere için) değerlendiren çalışmalardan faydalanılmıştır (Seed, 2013: 116-117; Freeze, 2013: 47; Burke, 2013: 4).

¹⁶ Yahudilerin sınıf yapılarına dair daha detaylı bir çalışma için Prof. Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv'ün (1970) "Filistin Sorununun Ardındaki Gerçek: İsrail'in Kuruluşuna Kadar" adlı makalesinde "Siyonizmin Sınıfsal İncelemesi" başlığı incelenmeye değer.

yapı şemasıyla kurulan İsrail devletinin yaşamını devam ettirebilmesi için bu toplumsal tabakalaşma üzerinde yükselmesi elzemdi ve toplumun da bu ihtiyaçlar şemasına göre¹⁷ (Morag-Talmon, 1989: 27) örgütlendirilmesi gerekecekti.

Aydınlanma Çağı Avrupası'nda eşitlik, hak tanıma, özgürlük gibi kavramların doğması Avrupalı milletlerin bir azınlık olarak Yahudilere bakış açısında, pratik düzeyde farklılaşmalara yol açtı. Pratik düzeyde diyoruz, çünkü ulus-devlet yaratma peşinde olan merkezi devletlerin giderek din merkezli siyaset üretme politikalarından uzaklaşarak milli kültür¹⁸ temelinde siyasa geliştirmeyi tercih etmeleri, Yahudilere karşı dinleri üzerinden olan önyargıların da dolaylı olarak kalkmasına fayda sağlıyordu. Böylelikle Yahudileri de eşit vatandaşlar olarak devlete entegre edebilme imkanı bulunacaktı.

Bu politika Batı Avrupa topraklarında Yahudilere yüksek refah ve sosyal standartlara ulaşabilme imkânı sağlayacağı için Yahudiler tarafından da kabullenilmekte pek gecikilmeyecekti. Bu kültürel politikalar Yahudilere evlerinde İbrani dininin gereklerini yerine getirmeleri, kendilerine has kıyafetleri rahatlıkla giyebilmelerini sağlarken aynı zamanda sokakta modern bir Avrupalı ve devlet karşısında eşit vatandaş olma imkânlarını da sunuyordu. Lakin buna karşılık Doğu Avrupa benzer standartları sunmaktan çok uzaktı. Batı Avrupa özellikle Napoleon istilasından sonra Fransa ekolünden etkilenerek bürokrasiden askeri stratejiye reform hareketlerine girişirken Doğu'da klasik imparatorluk anlayışları hüküm sürüyordu. Bu şartlar altında hala Yahudiler üzerindeki kısıtlamalar devam ediyordu. Fakat Nikolai II dönemindeki zoraki entegrasyon çalışmaları Batı Avrupa'daki rızai entegrasyon politikalarından çok da farklı bir amaçla gerçekleştirilmiyordu. Doğu'da nihai amaç Yahudileri merkezi devlete bağlı, "ulus" içerisine karışmış ve özellikle de Hristiyanlaşmış olarak görmektir. Batı Avrupa Hristiyanlık konusunda bir nebze flu bir görüşe sahip olabilmiş olsa da tam da bu sırada yükselen ırkçı veya anti-semitizm içerikli akımlar Yahudileri yine Avrupa'ya dâhil olmaktan men¹⁹ edecekti.

¹⁷ Toplumsal tabakaların yeniden inşa edilmesinde kullanılan, hatta Yahudi grupları İsrail devletine çekme çabalarını da içeren kolektif bilince Gellner "diaspora milliyetçiliği" adını vermiştir (Gellner, 1992: 182).

¹⁸ Bu politikaları özellikle Napoleon dönemi Fransa'sında "Culte Mosaique" – mozaik kültür olarak tanımlayabiliriz.

¹⁹ Bu men edilme meselesi Fransa'da yaşanan "Dreyfus Affair" ve Rusya'da yaşanan pogromlar, çocukların kayıt altına alınması ve Hristiyanlaşmaları için askere gönderilmesi, Yahudilere ait yerleşim bölgelerinin belirlenmesi ve yerleşimin sadece buralarla kısıtlanması ile daha da detaylandırılabilir.

Tüm bu çabalar, Yahudilerin tarihinde beklenmedik sonuçlara yol açacaktı. Hem Rusya’da seküler eğitim görüp yükselen Yahudi aristokratlar hem de Batı Avrupa’da sekülerizmi savunarak Avrupa toplumuna dâhil olmanın hesaplarını yapan Yahudiler fikirde birleştiler. Kendilerini bir vatana sahip olmaktan uzak tutan dini fikir şemasını bırakarak Tanrı’nın cezalandırmasını, sürgününü ve Mesih gelinceye kadarki devletsiz yaşamı reddettiler. Bu görüşler, Yahudilerin ancak kendilerine ait, üzerinde özgürce var olabildikleri topraklara sahip olduklarında rahatlıkla hem dinlerini hem de kültürlerini yaşayabileceklerini savunmaktaydı.

Aslında Yahudilerin bu baskılara çözüm üretmesi üç ana yol üzerinden gerçekleşti. Birincisi Yahudilerin kendilerine daha fazla hak tanıyan ülkelere içerisinde Amerika da olmak üzere göç etmeleriydi. İkincisi Yahudilerin yaşadıkları bölgelerde hâkim kültürü kabullenerek asimile olmalarıydı. Sonuncusu ise azınlığa sahip olmalarına rağmen etkili bir lobi ve eğitilmiş bir kadroyla Sion topraklarında kendilerine ait bir devleti idare etme fikrini savunan milliyetçi-seküler Sionist Yahudilerdi. Bu grup Theodor Herzl öncülüğünde Dünya Sionist Örgütü adıyla toplanarak seminerler ve lobi faaliyetleri gerçekleştirdiler. Ana fikir, Orthodox Yahudilerin kendilerini ulaşımda cezalı saydıkları Sion topraklarına bir “kutsal toprak”- holy land olarak bakmak yerine “ana vatan”- homeland olarak görmekte yatıyordu. Bu fark, İngiltere’nin Herzl’e Uganda topraklarına göç etmelerini tavsiye ettiği patlak verdi. O zaman Osmanlı hâkimiyetindeki Filistin topraklarına göç etmek niyetinde olan “Practical Zionist”lerle sadece hükmedebilecekleri bir toprak parçası arayan “Political Zionist”ler aralarında sert tartışmalar yaşadılar²⁰ ve bu teklifi kesin olarak geri çevirmeseler de kabul etmiş de gözükmediler.

Sonuç Yerine: Filistin Topraklarında Kurulan Bir Devlet Olarak İsrail; ama Nasıl?

İsrail Devleti, devlet olarak bakıldığında modern devletler arasında sayılabilecek niteliklere sahiptir. Ancak gelişim bakımından incelendiğinde Avrupa devletleri gibi burjuvazi veya Doğu milletleri gibi toprak temelli gelişmelerden ayrı olarak yükselmiştir. Devlet, burada pek çok organı ve yapıyla farklı örneklerden devşirilmiş iyi fotokopilere sahip olmaya çalışmıştır.

²⁰ Bu tartışmalar günümüze Diaspora Yahudileri ve İsraili Yahudiler arasında yaşanan krizlerin de temellerini oluşturmaktaydı. Hakkında daha detaylı bilgi için bkz. Sheffer, Gabriel. (2012) “Loyalty and Criticism in the Relations between World Jewry and Israel” *Israel Studies*, Vol. 17 No 2 Summer, p. 77-85

Uluslararası dengelerin iç belirleyicilerle yoğun şekilde etkileştiği bir ülke olarak İsrail, aslında bariz anlamda kendi başına kurulmuş bir devlet değildir ve sırf bu özelliği ile bile diğer benzeri ülkelerin kuruluş hikâyelerinden farklı bir serüveni vardır.

Yahudiler İsrail devletini şekillendirirken aslında başından itibaren uluslararası dengeleri gözeterek hareket ettiler. Ellerindeki dış baskı kartlarıyla hem İngiltere hem Rusya hem de diğer Avrupalı devletlerle kurdukları pazarlıklar sonucunda bir ülke elde edebileceklerini düşünmeleri buna neden olmuştu. Herhangi bir toprak parçasında nüfus çoğunluğunu elde etmeleri Wilson Prensipleri çerçevesinde kazanacakları hâkimiyete uluslararası bir meşruiyet kazandıracaktı. Bu doğrultuda, aralarında Arjantin ve Uganda'nın da olduğu pek çok kara parçası düşünülse de İngilizlerin uygun gördüğü Filistin mandası Yahudiler için ideal devletin kurulacağı ana vatan toprakları sayıldı. Bu toprakları tekrar canlandırarak hâkimiyetlerine almak yalnız, yüzyıllardır devlet kurumlarından ve devlet altında örgütlenmiş tabakalaşmış bir toplum yapısından uzak kalmış Yahudiler için zor olacaktı. Bu zorluk, İngilizler tarafından 48 yılında ilan edilen bağımsızlıklarından önceki yaklaşık 30 yılda kurulmasına müsaade edilen hatta bizzat gözlem altında tutulan devlet-öncesi kurumlarla olabildiğince giderilmeye çalışıldı.

İç dengeler noktasında ise, yukarıda değindiğimiz üzere Yahudilerin bölgeye kitlesel olarak göç ediyor olması bölgede yaşayan Araplar tarafından hiç hoş karşılanmamıştı. Fakat bunu engelleyebilecek bir hâkim ve güçlü bir otoriteye sahip değillerdi ve üstelik Arap toprak lortları hiç işlemedikleri ve genellikle Avrupa'da yaşadıkları için de hiç görmedikleri bu toprakları Yahudilere yüksek fiyatlara satmaktan çekinmediler. Bir süre sonra Yahudi yerleşimcilerin bu toprakları çevre Arap köylerine karşı koruması gerekecekti. Çünkü Araplar Yahudilerin bölgeye yerleşmelerini meşru olarak görmüyor ve onları istilacı olarak kabul ediyorlardı. Yahudiler, bu toprak mülkiyetini korumak üzere kurdukları silahlı örgütleri bir zaman sonra Araplara karşı kitlesel terör saldırıları düzenleyecek, İngiliz askerlere suikastlarda bulunacak terör örgütlerine evireceklerdi. İsrail Devleti resmi olarak kurulduğunda İsrail Ordusunu ve Savunma Bakanlığının temellerini oluşturacak bu örgütler, içlerindeki marjinal grupları temizlemekte epeyce zorlanacaklardı. Bu bakımdan değerlendirildiğinde, İsrail devletine toprak mülkiyetinin paylaşımı üzerine yaşanan anlaşmazlıklarla kurulmuştur demek pek de yanlış olmaz. Fakat sadece bunun üzerine inşa edilmiştir tezini savunmak meseleyi basite indirmektedir. Zira savunulduğu gibi toprak paylaşımı üzerinden taba-

kalaşmaya başlayan toplumun devleti doğurduğu tezi, İsrail örneğinde zaten hâlihazırda var olan zıt kutupların, birbirine düşman toplumların kaynak paylaşımına gitmesiyle uygulanamaz görünmektedir.

Yahudiler İsrail topraklarına farklı göç dalgalarıyla farklı toplum kesimlerinden göç ederek gelmişlerdi; kimisi Almanya'da yaşayan bir tüccar, kimi Polonyalı sanayi işçisi kimisi de Fransalı bir profesördü ve İsrail topraklarına göç ederek geldikleri topraklardan farklı kültürler getirdiler. Bir anlamda, devletin yaşaması için gerekli olan tüm bu göç dalgaları yeni birer "fetih dalgası" yaratmaktaydı. Deyim yerindeyse Yahudilerin Filistin topraklarında hayatta kalabilmesi için devletlerini ilk önce Yahudileri fethetmek üzerine kurmaları gerekiyordu. Tüm bu sebeplerle İsrail, kendisini bu farklılıkları tek bir potada eritebilmek üzere modern devletin sol anahtarı sayılan ulus-devlet²¹ sistemiyle örgütlemiş, örneklerini de hiçbir zaman kendisinden olmadığı ama kendisine hiç de yabancı kalmadığı Avrupa topraklarından getirmişti.

²¹ Aslında "kutsal topraklar" üzerinde kurulan bu tür laik bir devletin varlığı Yahudiler arasında da karışıklıklara sebep olmaktadır. İleri okumalar için bakınız Pikar, Dr. Ariel "Dindar Siyonist Hahamların Fetvalarında İsrail Devleti'ndeki Yahudi Olmayanların Statüsü" Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, cilt XVII sayı 30, 2014/2

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Extended Abstract Introduction

The history of Jewish society brings new perspectives to the question of how the state was established and emerged. This has brought with it a number of questions, such as how a society with a short period of state was able to continue to be stateless until 1948. In this respect, it should be clarified how the Jewish community, which has not lived under a state for a long time, has also transformed its society at the same time.

State and Society in Jews

The sociopolitical studies of Jews cannot pass on to Jews the earlier they get their identity. Because this identity, "Yehuda" children, including a religious identity, integrated with an ethnic identification of a pot (Gürsoy and Çapçioğlu, 2009: 118-119; Kimmerling, 1999: 340; Davies, 2006: 144). The Jews, who believed in themselves as a nation to be elected as the leader of humanity because of their beliefs, connected their religions to a patrimonial system which was transmitted only by means. Leadership means that Jews lead the way to good people, and it can be said that Jews have set themselves a particular goal in the traditional beliefs (Hadawi, 1990: 26-40). To this end, they established the first Jewish state in the lands they claimed to be promised. The state they established was destroyed in the region called Sion by fighting with the ancient Hellenistic kingdoms and Romans, which were called the Jewish or the Kingdom of Israel (Erdemir and Erdemir, 2010: 120-129).

Before the Jews established a state on the basis of Judaism, according to Elias Canetti's discovery, they built their lives in a way that could be identified with two concepts, with the sense of being a nation-community: sand and exile. The first one was chosen for the sake of the Jews as sea sand and for the sake of their cause, but as they were spent to represent their reproduction. Thanks to these features, they were able to maintain a majority in dozens of different geographies in which they were able to substitute their lives and maintain their unity. In addition, the fact that they have a flexible social structure capable of adapting to these differences in the regions they are going to meet also helps us to understand how the Jews never lost their identity despite the fact that they do not patch different additions to their selves.

The Jews, who migrated to many regions of the world, where the geographies such as Spain, Germany, Poland-Russia, North African countries and the Yemen-Arabian Peninsula are located since the exile of Rome, have been deprived of their own society from the society they lived in until the 18th-century

Enlightenment. They survived by being exposed to social attacks. However, after this history, especially in Europe, the European world of thinking that is very influential and influenced by the Jews to change their belief and cultural systems went to change. These changes would be the beginning of a series of events that would radically change the traditional way of life of Jews.

This study will not, of course, formulate the question of the extent to which the social stratification will take place, but it will attempt to reveal what this social stratification means as the most important problem for Jews in establishing a modern state. Because establishing a state is an act far beyond finding a piece of land on which it will be built.

There is a classic distinction between the modern period and the ancient and medieval Judaism. This distinction is based on the separation of the social structures of the Jews from the modern ages, when their job and career choices, lifestyles and population densities began to show differences. Seeing this difference can be seen in the occupations, family structures and populations of immigrant Jews who came to Israel in order to reach the current state of Israel. For example, the fact that the Jews originating from Soviet Russia and Poland were workers' origin, has led to changes in the structure of this population, which previously could not work as a worker in their country (Atmaca, 2012: 168).

In order to analyze this change, it is important to examine the social stratification of the Jews. Social stratification is made up of many factors, concrete and abstract, ranging from individuals' professions, incomes, social power and definition of success, their gender, family strengths to social power and success definitions, and sources of authority in society (Parsons, 1940: 848-849; Burke, 2013: 2). As a result, it is possible to mention differentiated groups in the same society depending on these factors.

For the Jews, they came to such a social structure as a result of the communication and interaction they had with the societies they came with the migration, and even evaluated the gaps between these social strata (Gellner, 1992: 181-182). In other words, it can be argued that the Jews settled in the social stratum in the social order in which they settled, and they were often unwanted positions and risky authorities. Of course, for the Jews who wanted to dominate their lands by establishing a state later, this social structure would be a problem that would have to be completely reversed. Because the state of Israel established by the modern structure to survive on this social stratification to be able to continue to rise and society according to the needs scheme (Morag-Talmon, 1989: 27) would have to be organized.

Conclusion: Israel as a State in the Palestinian Territories; but how?

The State of Israel has the qualifications which can be considered as state among the modern states. However, in terms of development, European states, like the bourgeoisie or the Eastern nations, have risen separately from the land-based developments. The state has tried to have good photocopies, which are taken from different examples with many organs and structures. As a country in which international balances intensively interact with internal determinants, Israel is not, in fact, a blatantly self-established state, and even with this characteristic, it has an adventure different from the stories of other similar countries.

The Jews, by shaping the state of Israel, have acted in the international equilibrium from the beginning. This was the reason why they thought they could get a country as a result of the negotiations they had with the UK, Russia and other European countries.

At the point of internal balances, as we mentioned above, the immigration of Jews to the region was not welcomed by the Arabs living in the region. But they were not able to prevent this, and they did not have a strong authority. However, they took what they wanted in good interaction with Arab land lords. Obligation to protect the land they acquired was occurred. Because they did not see the settlements of the Jews as legitimate and accepted them as invaders. The Jews, armed organizations that they had established to protect this land ownership, would carry out massive terrorist attacks against the Arabs and transformed them into terrorist organizations that would assassinate British soldiers. When the State of Israel was officially established, these organizations, which would form the foundation of the Israeli Army and the Ministry of Defense, would have been forced to clean the marginalized groups within them. In this regard, it would not be wrong to say that the state of Israel was founded by disagreements over the sharing of land ownership. But it is only built upon that defending the thesis is to simplify the matter. Because, as it is defended, the thesis that society (and therefore state) started to stratify over land sharing seems to be impractical with the fact that the opposing poles already existed in the case of Israel in the case of hostile societies.

All these waves of migration necessary for the survival of the state of Israel were creating a new wave of conquest. Because a society from almost zero had to be built. So to speak, the Jews had to build their state on the conquest of the Jews in order to survive in the Palestinian territories. For all these reasons, Israel organized itself through the nation-state system, which was considered as the left key of the modern state in order to dissolve these differences in a single pot.

Saudi-Pak Defense Partnership: Past and Present

Abstract

An independent academic exercise has been organized to find out the intensity of defense partnership between the *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)* and the *Islamic Republic of Pakistan* through critically observing the discourse in the press releases of *Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) & Pakistan Air Force* and reviewing some quite relevant literature from key reports, journals and newspaper articles for just filling the gap of information. This study tries to answer the question of whether the Saudi-Pak defense partnership is sustainable or not. It explains that civil and military leadership of KSA and Pakistan are more cohesive and mostly adopt a unified stance on the issue of bilateral defense partnership. This partnership has been estimated from the historical defense related institutional relationship; recent visits of the civil-military leadership, their points of discussions and commitments; multidimensional joint ventures & defense exercises (army, navy and air force); and from significant recent developments for strengthening the defense of both countries. It concludes that the top leaderships of both countries are agreed to go to any extent at the time of security crisis either in Pakistan or in KSA.

Key words: KSA, Pakistan, Defense Partnership, Civil-Military Leadership, commitments.

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Suudi Arabistan-Pakistan Savunma Ortaklığı: Geçmiş ve Günümüz

Öz

Bilgi boşluğunu doldurmak için *Hizmetler Arası Halkla İlişkiler (ISPR) & Pakistan Hava Kuvvetleri* basın bildirimlerindeki söylemi eleştirel olarak gözlemleyerek ve kilit raporlardan, dergilerden ve gazete makalelerinden ilgili literatürü gözden geçirerek Suudi Arabistan Krallığı (SAK) ile Pakistan İslam Cumhuriyeti arasındaki savunma ortaklığının ne derece yoğun olduğunu anlamak amacıyla bağımsız bir akademik çalışma organize edilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Suudi Arabistan-Pakistan savunma ortaklığının sürdürülebilir olup olmadığı sorusunu cevaplamaya çalışmaktadır. SAK ve Pakistan'ın sivil ve askeri liderliklerinin daha tutarlı olduğunu ve ikili savunma ortaklığı konusunda çoğunlukla müşterek duruş sergilediklerini gözler önüne sermektedir. Bu ortaklık tarihi savunma ile ilgili kurumsal ilişki; sivil askeri liderliğin son ziyaretleri, tartışma ve taahhüt noktaları; çok boyutlu ortak girişimler ve savunma tatbikatları (ordu, deniz ve hava kuvvetleri); ve her iki ülkenin savunmasını güçlendirmek için önemli gelişmeler üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışma, her iki ülkenin üst düzey liderliklerinin Pakistan veya SAK'ta ortaya çıkabilecek bir güvenlik krizi esnasında her şeye başvurmaya kararlı oldukları sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: SAK, Pakistan, Savunma Ortaklığı, Sivil-Askeri Liderlik, taahhütler.

رضاحدا وبي ضامدا : عفدا لاجم بي فقينا تسة كبلدا يدوعسدا ة كلوشدا

حميسد بن يسايل مسحم

ملخص

تم تنظيم بحث أكاديمي حيادي لفهم قوة الشراكة الدفاعية بين جمهورية باكستان الإسلامية و المملكة العربية السعودية عن طريق النظر في الأدبيات المعنية الموجودة في التقارير الأساسية، المجالات و المقالات الصحفية و عن طريق مراقبة المصطلحات الموجودة في النشرات الصحفية لقوات الجو الباكستانية & العلاقات العامة بين الخدمات. و يحاول هذا البحث الرد على سؤال ما اذا كانت الشراكة السعودية الباكستانية في مجال الدفاع قابلة للاستمرار أم لا. كما يظهر لنا هذا البحث أن مواقف القيادة العسكرية و المدنية للمملكة العربية السعودية و باكستان ثابتة بشكل أكبر و انها في كثير من الأحيان يتخذون مواقفًا مشتركة في موضوع الشراكة الدفاعية الثنائية. تم تقييم هذه الشراكة حسب العلاقات المؤسسية المتعلقة بتاريخ الدفاع؛ الزيارات الأخيرة للقيادات العسكرية و المدنية، نقاط الجدل و التعهدات؛ المبادرات المشتركة المتعددة الأبعاد و التطبيقات الدفاعية (الجيش، القوات البحرية و الجوية) و التطورات و المستجدات المهمة لتقوية النظام الدفاعي لكلا البلدين. و يستنتج هذا البحث أن القيادات العليا لكلا البلدين مستعدين لفعل أي شيء حيال أي أزمة أمنية يتعرض لها أحد البلدين باكستان أو المملكة العربية السعودية. **الكلمات المفتاحية:** المملكة العربية السعودية، باكستان، الشراكة الدفاعية، القيادة العسكرية و المدنية، التعهدات.

Introduction

KSA and Islamic Republic of Pakistan are all weather strategic partner countries. Besides having multidimensional relationships, bilateral defense cooperation remains a priority of both countries. In this regard, tri-armed services of Pakistan provide a wide range of relative training and advice to the tri-armed services of KSA. Further, training staff, military advisors, and contingents of thousands of Pakistani troops remain stationed at the soil of KSA for serving the security interest of both countries. Furthermore, KSA's recruits, military officers and engineering staff get education, training, engineering works experience and much more in the military academies, war colleges, and defense industries of Pakistan. Moreover, tri-armed services of both countries frequently conduct very impressive and useful periodic exercises in Pakistan and at KSA for exchanging their first hand field experiences, increasing their combat efficiency, and enhancing their bilateral real-time force to force coordination [1]. Religion-based ideological orientation, geo-strategic location, uncompromised and original stance on some issues (Palestine¹ and Kashmir²), protracted security challenges and economic necessities and national consensus of KSA and Pakistan to promote Islamic interest comprises their outlook in the comity of nations of the world in general, and in the Muslim world in particular. Historically, KSA and Pakistan signed a *Treaty of Friendship* in 1951 [2]. According to a senator of Pakistan (Ms. Seher Kamran), Gulf countries are primary and integral partners of defense and foreign policy interests of Pakistan [3]. Therefore, the vision of Islamic Republic of Pakistan for Saudi-Arabia is part of its very composed understanding of universal Muslim brotherhood and Muslim nationalism. Both countries share a significant target legacy in the Muslim world that shares various fundamental constituents of commonalities in history, culture and strategic interests, which are bound by cohesive religious harmony and integral geostrategic importance of both countries. Further, a very soft nature of equation of very dignified give & take relationship is based on dominant mutualism on economic and military axis, where Saudi-Arabia believes upon strong and credible military assistance (ammunition, training and to some extent planning) from Pakistan, which encourages it for maintaining a huge

¹ Pakistan considers that Palestine has been occupied by Zionist Jews of Israel, who do not further recognize the right of self-determination of Palestinians in its real sense.

² Jammu & Kashmir is a disputed territory between Pakistan and India since 1947. Besides of multiple wars, negotiations and UN resolutions, the dispute has not been resolved yet. Therefore, armed forces of both countries remain in a state of war along line of control.

baggage of remittances³, bilateral and multilateral trade⁴ and investment⁵ in Pakistan as a primary components of its engagements [4], [5].

During 1960s, religious, strategic, geopolitical and economic necessities of both countries attracted each other for sticky defense cooperation, when Saud-Arabia supported Pakistan in its high intensity conflict (1965) with India both at defense and diplomatic levels. Later, *King Faisal* called (1967) Pakistan as “citadel of Islam” and called that it is the responsibility of all Muslims to contribute to protect Pakistan [6], [7].⁶ In 1954, *King Saud* wrote a letter to *Governor General of Pakistan* and wished that Pakistan should stand with his fellow Muslims to defend two Holy mosques. He further wished for stability and prosperity of Pakistan [8].

A level of intensity between defense relationships of both countries can be observed in the following examples, such as;

KSA and Pakistan started working together since 1952, but a great defense deal was signed in 1967 for training purposes of Royal armed forces of KSA, which started a non-stop flow of defense experience, planning, training and equipment from Pakistan to KSA and very little extent from KSA [6]. Now, Pakistan became partner of security of KSA’s territorial integrity through giving an effective response to Yemeni Intrusion (1969) by sending its fighting pilots (*Pakistan Air Force*) for effectively averting the target threat. Then, the incident of debacle of East Pakistan realized both countries to work together for having more credible defense against external threat. Therefore, continuation of joint ventures and provision of assistance to each other does not depend upon who is in power in the respective country. Further, Pakistan

³ More than two million overseas Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia, who send a huge amount (approximately \$6 Billion per year) back to Pakistan.

⁴ According to *Economic Complexity Index 2015*, Pakistan is the 66th largest exporting economy and the 110th most complex economy in the world. In contrast to Pakistan, KSA is the 25th largest exporting economy and the 29th most complex economy in the world. Generally, balance of trade remains in favor of KSA, because Pakistan imports (\$3.01B out of \$45.5B) very heavy consignments of crude petroleum and its products (such as; plastics, fertilizers, chemicals and sulfur etc.). Further, Pakistan exports (\$551M out of \$26.2B) to KSA include textiles, garments, sports goods, handicrafts, vegetables, fruits etc. Moreover, KSA is among first fifteen export partners of Pakistan.

⁵ KSA unilaterally invests in various sectors of Pakistan, such as; transport, energy, infrastructure, livestock etc.

⁶ A kind of dignified similar respect for Pakistan also can be observed in the ideological thoughts of founder and father of the nation of *Bosnia Herzegovina* named *Alija Izetbegovic*, who declared in his famous *Islamic Declaration*, as; Despite of a lot of failures, Pakistan is the outcome of collective efforts of Muslims for establishing an Islamic order. Its existence gives us confidence and hope to the Muslims of world that the revival of this order is possible even today. He further mentioned Pakistan in the following words; “*We still believe in Pakistan and its mission in the service of International Islam. There is no Muslim heart which will not bound at the mention of something as dear to us as Pakistan, even if this love, like any other knows fear and trembling. Pakistan is our great hope*”.

helped Saudi special forces during besiege of Mecca in 1979 and sent more troops (approximately 15,000 troops) to KSA for reinforcing the security of holy places right after the besiege. Then, Iran-Iraq war and the First Gulf War increased the Saudi defense needs. Therefore, a large number of troops and an armored brigade of the Pakistan Army continuously remained stationed at KSA [4]. *Associated Pakistan Press (APP)* further reported that 13,000 troops and 6,000 military advisors were deployed in KSA during the First Gulf war [3].

This is an independent academic exercise, which has been organized to find out the intensity of defense partnership between *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)* and *Islamic Republic of Pakistan* through critically observing the discourse given in the press releases of *Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)*⁷ and *Pakistan Air Force (2008-2018)* and reviewing some very relevant literature from key reports, journals and newspapers for just fulfilling the gap of information.

Agreed Saudi-Pak Defense Partnership

Pakistan and KSA signed various security deals with each other. Some of those not disclosed ever, but some of those are prominent. At the end of 1960s, a Beirutian newspaper named *Al-Safir* reported for airlifting of Pakistani troops to be deployed along Southern border of KSA with Yemen. It also reported that besides deploying a fighting force, a large number of training staff of the *Pakistan Army* had also been incorporated in the military training centers at KSA. This training staff had been specifically called for training of the *Royal Saudi Guards* and KSA's contingent as an Arab peace keeping force for Beirut. Then, the number of these troops in the contingents of Pakistan at KSA reached to 5,000. Later, it crossed 10,000 in a very short period of time, where military engineers and planners were made integral part of such contingents. The rumors of deputation of a senior military technician named *General Shams-ul-Rahman Kallu* was significant for international observers to feel a potential credible defense understanding between the two countries in throughout 1970s and 1980s. It was a rumor that the *Pakistan Army* had been agreed and assigned for formation of equal to three brigade armed force for protection of Royal family at KSA [9], [6]⁸. Besides of earlier defense relationships between two countries, an agreement titled *Mutual Cooperation*

⁷ ISPR is responsible to issue official press release about developments and news of Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy.

⁸ In response to Pakistan, KSA delivered a comprehensive package of financial return, aid and loan for Pakistan, which spent this amount for modernization and up gradation of competence of its armed forces, establishment of four heavy industries for advanced small, medium and larger weapons for defense production at Pakistan. This financial resources made Pakistan capable for buying modern defense machines and sign deals for joint ventures of defense production with friendly countries.

Program (1967) was signed for training of armed forces of KSA by armed forces of Pakistan. Further, a *Protocol Agreement* (1979) was signed for stationing the contingent of armed forces of Pakistan at KSA.

Furthermore, *Saudi-Pakistan Armed Forces Organization Agreement* (1982) was signed to institutionalize the process of stationing the Pakistani troops at KSA [4]. Then, an agreement on *Security Cooperation* was signed between armed forces for extension of defense cooperation, intelligence sharing on security and intelligence matters, and for combating the crimes [2]. The old agreement titled *Mutual Cooperation Program* (1967) was revised recently, where the scope of articles for provision of training to armed forces of KSA has been extended. Similarly, another previously signed agreement titled *Protocol Agreement* (1979) also has been revised for comprehensive cooperation in the field of defense related science and technology for production and supply of arms to KSA [3]. Moreover, *Pakistan Ordinance Factories* [10]⁹, *Heavy Industries Taxila*, *Pakistan Aeronautical Complex*, *National Radio & Telecommunication Corporation*, *Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works*, and *Institute of Industrial Control System* are also serving the better interests of two countries through provision of arms supply and technical assistance to the armed forces of KSA [3].

It is important to note that the intelligence sharing is one of the important and frequent components of effective defense engagements of the two countries, but their information and operations mostly remain secret [4]. For testing the intensity of defense cooperation, the mutual interest of KSA and Pakistan can be seen in the conclusive statements of *Chief of Army Staff* of Pakistan (COAS) (on January 20, 2017) to the Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan that “*Pakistan Army holds the defense of KSA at par with its own*” [11].

Official Visits and Defense Engagements

This part of the piece has been organized in accordance with the discourse of cooperation between Army to Army, Navy to Navy, Air Force to Air Force and civil-military relationships of both countries. It must be noted that civilian leadership of Pakistan, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee¹⁰ and

⁹ In May 2017, DAWN newspaper reported that *Chairman Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF)* disclosed that despite having a lot of limitations, Pakistan is exporting a number of defense equipment consignments frequently, where Saudi Arabia stands first of being the largest importer of small and medium conventional arms made up of ordinance factories of Pakistan.

¹⁰ CJCSC is the chief of tri-armed forces of Pakistan.

chiefs of tri-services of Pakistan visited KSA for having discussions with the top civil and military leadership of KSA. Similarly, their counterparts also come to Pakistan frequently for strengthening and extending their terms of engagements between armed forces of two countries. Therefore, this part is especially conversant of high profile recent (2008-2018) visits of defense related dignitaries from civil government and armed forces of two countries and a glimpse of recently conducted joint exercises by the armed forces of two countries.

Cooperation between Pakistan Army and Royal Saudi Land Forces

This portion is conversant of the discourse of defense cooperation between the *Pakistan Army* and the *Royal Saudi Land Forces*. A glimpse of land forces related recent visits, points of discussions and commitments of representatives of both countries can be observed as;

- Chief of Army Staff (COAS) called on Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and Assistant Minister of Defense for Military Affairs of KSA, where he discussed key matters of professional affairs and reaffirmed more cooperation between armed forces of two countries. He was awarded with a highest military medal of KSA titled "*King Abdul Aziz Medal of Excellence*" for recognizing his services and efforts for armed forces of both countries [12]. Next day, he was called on Prince and Minister of Interior, and Chief of General Staff of KSA, who appreciated a unique friendship of Pakistan Army with armed forces of KSA. Later, COAS visited the Staff College of KSA's armed forces, where he was briefed upon training affairs of Royal Saudi Land Forces [13];
- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC)¹¹ of Pakistan went on (4 days long) official visit to KSA, where he was called on Chief of General Staff and discussed the security situation of Middle East and South Asia. CJCSC and his counterpart realized for taking more initiatives through establishing a regular institutional mechanism between armed forces of two countries. Later, he was called on Prince and Commander Royal Saudi Naval Force; Prince and Commander Royal Saudi Air Force, where CJCSC reaffirmed more cohesive and multidimensional bilateral cooperation between the armed forces of two countries. He was awarded with a highest military medal of KSA titled "*King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud*" excellence

¹¹ He is the head of Chiefs of tri-armed services and the head of strategic nuclear forces of Pakistan.

medal for recognizing the services and efforts of CJCSC for armed forces of both countries [14]. Later, he was called on Prince and Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs and discussed the security situation of Middle East (particularly security situation in Palestine and Iraq); security situation at South Asia (particularly a possible misadventure of Indian forces on the basis of false flag operation, inside attack or terrorist activity at Taj Hotel in Mumbai; diminishing security situation at Afghanistan and ongoing military operations against terrorists at Tribal areas of Pakistan); and put a light upon the Revised US strategy for security in Afghanistan. Both dignitaries realized the importance of shifting the just bilateral cooperation to strategic partnership and institutional mechanism for dialogue on security and defense affairs of two countries on frequent basis. Later, CJCSC was called on Prince and Minister of Interior of KSA, where he discussed matters for intelligence sharing and diffusion of experience for De-indoctrination and Rehabilitation Program organized for captured terrorists and extremists for their mainstreaming into society. Then, the Minister of Interior of KSA appreciated the professionalism and standards of training of deputed trainers from Pakistan for training the armed forces of KSA. Target officials of KSA assured to CJCSC for every potential help to meet the “*security and economic challenges*” and in “*all required areas*” of Pakistan [15]. Earlier from his arrival at KSA, he held meetings with Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan [16], Defense Attaché of KSA and senior officers from Tri-Services of Pakistan [17];

- Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan Army was called on King of Saudi Arabia, where both dignitaries discussed mutual affairs of partnership. Saudi King, committed that Saudi Arabia will maintain its “*grand strategic relationship*” with Pakistan. Reciprocally, COAS pleased the leadership and people of KSA for having a time-tested and credible relationship with Pakistan. Then, Saudi King concluded the long meeting with COAS by pleasing the people and Armed Forces of Pakistan through saying “*Pakistan Zindabad (Long Live Pakistan)*” [18].
- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) of Pakistan called on a four days long visit to KSA. Prince and Assistant Minister of Defense awarded him “*King Abdul Aziz*” medal of excellence [19]. On next day, CJCSC was called on Crown Prince and Defense Minister of KSA, where he wished him and to the *Custodian of Two Holy Mosques* as good health and speedy recovery. They thanked to the wishes of CJCSC and va-

lued their relationship with Pakistan. Later, CJCSC held a meeting with Assistant Minister of Defense of KSA for enhancing more defense cooperation between two states. Then, CJCSC held a meeting with Chief of General Staff and chiefs of tri-services of KSA for more focused discussion upon avenues for expanding the defense cooperation between tri-armed forces of KSA and Pakistan [20];

- Commander of Royal Saudi Land Forces called on CJCSC and COAS of Pakistan separately, where he discussed the regional and geo-strategic challenges to both countries and realized the need of potential defense cooperation to check those challenges. Later, he was briefed upon operational preparedness of armed forces of Pakistan for operationalizing those commitments [21], [22];
- *Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)* routinely visited his counterparts and vice versa for strengthening intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and KSA. It is significant that such kinds of information and developments are mostly kept in secret [23];
- Commander of Royal Saudi Land Forces was awarded with *Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military)* of Pakistan by CJCSC of Pakistan for recognizing his excellent services at KSA and his efforts for more cohesion between armed forces of two countries [24];
- Director General of Saudi Armed Forces arrived in Pakistan with his delegation called on CJCSC, where the discussed mutual interest and professional matters of armed forces of two countries [25];
- Prince and Deputy Minister of Defense of KSA called on CJCSC and COAS of Pakistan separately, where he discussed the contemporary security challenges, professional matters and programs for training of armed forces of KSA. Further, he expressed his desire for enhancing more defense cooperation between armed forces of two countries. He highly appreciated the combat efficiency of Pakistan Army in operations against terrorists. He greatly acknowledged the sacrifices of Pakistan in the war on terror [26];
- CJCSC of Pakistan called on Crown Prince, where he condoled with the King of KSA for demise of King Abdullah. Later, he held separate meetings with Prince Minister of Defense; Commander of Saudi Arabian National Guards; Deputy Interior Minister; and Chief of General Staff of KSA. CJCSC discussed matters of defense production, training, exchange

programs and other relevant matters of mutual interest between the armed forces of two countries. Target dignitaries took a greater interest in progress and implementation on *National Action Plan, Operation Zarab-e-Azab*, relationships with Afghan Government and new emerging regional challenges in the South Asia and Middle East. CJCSC held a much focused discussion for more mutual understanding on relevant issues. Then, he went for a visit of King Abdul Aziz Military Academy (Riyadh), where he observed and appreciated the institution for applying necessary standards of training and education there [27];

- COAS of Pakistan held a meeting with Chief of General Staff of KSA and discussed defense matters and reviewed security situation in the region [28]. In the second day of his visit, he held meetings with the King, Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of KSA. They discussed upon defense cooperation between two countries and reiterated that KSA and Pakistan need to play their role to squeeze the influence of terrorism in Muslim world. COAS mentioned the commitment of Pakistan for "*safety, protection of Harain Ul Sharifain and territorial integrity of Kingdom*". Similarly, the King and Crown Prince of KSA committed that "*any threat to Pakistan's integrity is unacceptable*". They appreciated the efforts of Pakistan armed forces in *Operation Zarb-e-Azab* and its growing defense cooperation with KSA including intelligence sharing and checking the financial channels of terrorists [29];
- Assistant to Minister of Defense for Military Affairs of KSA called on COAS and discussed about defense collaboration, regional security and training (exchange) program for two armed forces [30];
- Minister for Foreign Affairs of KSA called on COAS and discussed regional security challenges. He was impressed from the phenomenal impact of military operations of Pakistan Army against terrorists [31];
- Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of KSA called on COAS and discussed regional security and defense cooperation of KSA with Pakistan. COAS stated that security of Gulf Cooperation Council countries is vital for Pakistan in general, but its relationships with KSA are more valued. He reiterated that any threat to KSA will evoke an unimaginable response from Pakistan. The visiting dignitary also stated that KSA will continue to support Pakistan in its all challenges. He also appreciated the phenomenal success of Pak Army against in its operations against terro-

rists [32];

- Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan called on COAS, where he discussed matters of mutual defense cooperation and training of armed forces of KSA. “COAS reassured the Ambassador that Pakistan Army holds the defense of KSA at par with its own” [11], [33].

- Besides of provision of training to the *Royal Saudi Land Forces*, both armies frequently conduct joint exercises for diffusion of their field experiences and modern skills for maneuvering in the respective battle fields or theaters of operation. A glimpse of those recent exercises is listed here, such as;

A contingent of Pak Army (PA) left (on October 09, 2009) for a three week long joint military exercise titled *Al-SAMSAAM-3 (Sharp Sword-3)* with the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF). This exercise is part of a series of joint ventures of PA & RSLF military exercises comprised of artillery, mechanized infantry and armor for enhancing “*combat efficiency, mutual cooperation and understanding*” between forces of both countries [34]. Before this exercise, Pakistan had hosted and participated in *Al-SAMSAAM-I & II* in 2004 and 2006 respectively. Then, Pak Army (PA) hosted and participated in a three week long joint military exercise titled *Al-SAMSAAM-IV-2011 (Sharp Sword-4-11)* with RSLF at Jhelum. The latest exercise is significant that troops are trained, deployed and operationalized at unit and brigade level for experiencing real time war experience for low intensity conflicts and execution of anti-terrorism operations through harnessing experiences of best drills and combat efficiencies of armed forces of two countries [35]. Inspector General Training & Evaluation also observed the opening ceremony and addressed the participating troops of both countries to take benefit from each other’s experience [36]. Then, *Al-SAMSAAM-V (2015)* and *Al-SAMSAAM-VI (2017)* held in KSA and in Pakistan respectively. These exercises mostly focused upon exchanging various modern and unconventional war fighting concepts [37], [38].

Special Forces of Pak Army (PA) hosted and participated in a two week long joint military training exercise with Special Forces of KSA titled *Al-Shihab-I* at *National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)*, Pabbi (Jhelum). This exercise held for execution of joint anti-terrorism training and real-time operations for enhancing cooperation and diffusion of war fighting skills and professionalism in Special Forces of both countries [39]. This training exercise was held for multipurpose including testing the multirole of Special Forces

to operate against terrorists (cordon, searching hideouts, airdropping etc.) COAS witnessed the exercise and appreciated the professionalism, dedication and motivation of participating troops. He expressed a time tested commitment of Pakistan that “*any threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia will evoke a strong response from Pakistan*”. This ceremony was also attended by the Commander of Special Forces of KSA and his six member delegation [40]. Similarly, *Al-Shahab-II* (2017) held in KSA, which focused upon counterterrorism skills and execution of military operations at open, hilly and mountainous areas. This joint exercise is composed of a series of small training sessions for enhancing the quick response capability of two forces [41], [42], [43].

Cooperation between Pakistan Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Force

Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has significance for KSA¹², which laid foundation and added a significant value in the relevant institutions at KSA. Even, Pakistan was one of the pioneers and primary partners of KSA for transferring skills and strengthening the target installations there. Later, both countries extended this cooperation for training and maintenance of defense forces to civil aviation of KSA too [44]. At a very minimum time, this collaboration sought its peak when approximately 3,000 instructors and technicians were observed as advisor to the *Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)* at KSA. They were capable enough to train the pilots and other relevant staff of RSAF with modern aircrafts for defense and civil aviation sectors. Moreover, Saudi recruits were/ are being trained at PAF’s advanced air force academies, schools, war colleges and air force industries at Pakistan too [6], [45]. The level of primitive trust of Saudis on Pakistan Air Forces was tested practically at KSA, when Pakistani pilots repelled the Yemeni intrusion (1969) on its Southern borders. Currently, Pakistan sells its indigenously made fighting and training aircrafts to RSAF such as; *Karakoram-8* and *Super Mashaq* (made in *Pakistan Aeronautical Complex*). Similarly, a number of deputed trainers of Pakistan Air Force are providing training to KSA forces at home [44].

A glimpse of air force related recent visits, points of discussions and commitments of representatives of both countries can be observed as;

¹²Earlier than Pakistan, KSA had agreement with Britain titled *Magic Carpet*, but KSA refused to renew it because of military and diplomatic gimmicks of Britain with KSA in the region. Therefore, KSA approached to Pakistan for target cooperation.

- Chief of Air Staff (CAS) of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was called on Prince and Assistant Defense Minister of KSA, where he was awarded with a highest award of KSA titled “*King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz*” for recognizing the services and efforts of CAS of PAF for air forces of both countries [46];
- Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan called on Chief of Air Staff (PAF). They discussed matters of professional and mutual interest about defense of both countries [47];
- Chief of Air Staff (PAF) was invited by Commander Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Chief of PAF shared the experience and performance of PAF in an ongoing *Operation Zarb-e-Azab* for precise air strikes for destroying the hideouts, training camps and other heinous activities of terrorists along Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Commander RSAF appreciated the achievements of PAF and shared his desire and interest to diffuse this experience, skills, higher standards and professionalism of PAF to RSAF through mutual defense cooperation and potential engagements. Later, CAS visited the King Faisal Air Academy and advised to the deputed contingent of PAF to maintain their professionalism and standards while working and training their Saudi brothers as ambassadors of Pakistan [10]. Later, CAS met with Deputy Crown Prince & Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff. He greatly expressed his satisfaction upon the effective performance of PAF both in Pakistan and at KSA. Chief of General Staff of KSA thanked to the visit of CAS of PAF and for agreed further potential engagements regarding training of Saudi cadets/airmen, joint ventures and futuristic projects with KSA [48].

Besides of provision of training to the *Royal Saudi Air Forces*, both forces frequently conduct joint exercises for diffusing their field experiences and modern skills for enhancing their air combat efficiencies. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) conducted two weeks long (January 06-19, 2011) joint exercise titled “*Al-Saqoor-II*” in Saudi air space. The participants were engaged into nearly real-time experiences of air operations for diffusion of experience, skills and professional matters. Chief of Air Staff (CAS) of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) also displayed his experience in the exercise through flying F-16 aircraft. Later, he met with his counterpart Commander Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and dignitaries discussed professional matters for enhancing potential cooperation between air forces of two countries [49]. During October 2017, Pakistan Air Force invited air forces

from about one dozen countries including KSA's Royal Saudi Air Force at its newly established Pakistan Air Power Center for Excellence. The two week long air exercise focused upon using air power during counterterrorism operations as Pakistan had to experience of doing precision air strikes at terrorist camps, hideouts and active positions during military operations against terrorists [50], [51].

Cooperation between Pakistan Navy and Royal Saudi Naval Force

It must be recognized as a limitation of naval force of Pakistan that it did not expand this force in the past rather to have a conventional credible minimum deterrence for its national security in maritime domain only. In spite of all limitations, its profile was recognized higher than many times greater navy of India, when Pakistan Navy scored well in Indo-Pak war in 1965. Then, Saudis found a credible naval force of Pakistan for having defense engagements. They offered their cadets for getting training at Pakistani naval academies, naval war colleges and engineering schools. Later, similar services were provided to KSA at home institutions too [6], [52]. It started contributing in building of Saudi naval defense at all possible levels [6]. Now, mutual cooperation, presence of Pakistan naval staff, and maritime build up at KSA significantly guarantees relative naval power balance, peace and stability in the *Indian Ocean* in general and in *Arabian Sea* in particular. Therefore, Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia said that KSA defines its relationship with Pakistan beyond the limits of paper based agreements. Similarly, Commander Royal Saudi Naval Force expressed this relationship that Pakistan and KSA consider national security of each other as their own [44]. Therefore, today Saudi Arab is among key naval partners of Pakistan¹³ [53], [54], [55], [56].

A glimpse of naval force related recent visits, points of discussions and commitments of representatives of both countries can be observed as;

- Leader of Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) of KSA called on Director General (DG) Foreign Military Cooperation of Pakistan and discussed matters of training of both navies [57];

¹³Chief of Naval Staff addressed the audience and announced the Saudi Midshipmen among 60 foreign trainees in the Pakistan Naval Academy. He further highlighted the ongoing training programs for sailors and officers of Pakistan Navy and friendly countries including Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Officers of Saudi armed forces graduated from the 45th Pakistan Navy Staff Course offered by Pakistan Navy War College.

- Commander Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) called on his counterparts in Pakistan. They discussed and committed upon several aspects of mutual naval cooperation;
- Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan (CNSP) called on Minister of Defense of KSA. They reviewed the existing cooperation between two navies and committed for more cohesion and enhancement in certain fields of naval powers of two countries. The Minister reiterated that relationship with Pakistan is priority of KSA. Further, Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan was awarded by the Minister for medal “*King Abdul Aziz Medal for Excellence*” upon the services and efforts for collaboration between two navies of brother countries [44];
- Commander of Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) called on Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan, where he appreciated the key role of Pakistan Navy for maritime security and peace at Arabian Sea. Both dignitaries discussed matters of mutual interest and professional affairs. Further, Naval Chief highlighted the role of Pakistan Navy in *Counter Piracy Operations* and *Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan* [58];
- A delegation from KSA visited *IDEAS 2016* (international arms exhibition in Pakistan) and called on Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan, where both dignitaries discussed professional matters of interest [59];
- Commander of Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) was called as a chief guest of passing out parade of officers and cadets at *Pakistan Naval Academy*. He appreciated the close partnership of Pakistan with RSNF [10];
- Pakistan Navy hosted and participated in its 5th international naval exercise titled “*AMAN-2017*”. Among 37 navies, Saudi navy also participated in the exercise, which was composed of ships, special forces and military observers [60];
- Very recently, a front line destroyer naval ship visited Saudi naval base as an initiative for cooperating the naval forces at the Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea areas. The crew and the officers of the ship interacted with the civil and naval staff of KSA and shared well wishes with them. Further, they visited the training facilities of KSA’s naval forces too [61].

Besides of provision of training to the *Royal Saudi Naval Forces* (RSNF), both forces frequently conduct joint exercises for diffusion of their field experiences and modern skills for enhancing their naval combat efficiency, maritime security and counter piracy operations. As, Pakistan Navy and Royal

Saudi Naval Force has a legacy of conducting a series of joint naval exercise titled *Naseem-Al-Bahar*. It was started in early 1990s, which carries a mixture of conventional operations and modern (and to some extent unconventional) naval warfare techniques for preparing the naval forces for meeting future maritime security challenges [10]. Further, continuation of this exercise is a big sign of naval cooperation of two countries [44]. Furthermore, *Aff'aa Al-Sahil* is a series of annual maritime exercise. It was started in 2011, which focuses to increase synergy of both navies for interoperability, antiterrorism & antipiracy operations in the maritime domain. Further, it checks to human trafficking and asymmetrical threats to the naval interests of both countries. Similarly, *Dera Al-Sahil* is another maritime exercise which engages marines of both navies for sharing their field experience about “*costal defense, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), joint beach landings and sniper training*” [1].

Further, Pakistan participated in a month long tri-armed services including Special Forces of 24 countries military exercise (Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition) in KSA. On the concluding ceremony, the Prime Minister, COAS and Defense Minister of Pakistan also present there [62]. Very recently, Saudi-Pak Naseem ul Bahar-11 joint naval exercise and Deraa Al-Sahil were kicked off in KSA in February 2018. These exercises include marines of two naval forces which specially focus upon “*Mine Counter Measures*” on naval fronts. Further, maritime surveillance are also part of these exercises which will increase the synergy and interoperability of brotherly naval forces [63]. At the same time, special naval forces of two countries conducted periodic joint naval exercise titled *Aff'aa Al-Sahil-4* in Pakistan. Besides of focusing upon traditional concepts of naval warfare, these exercises aimed for enhancing their skills and capabilities for countering terrorism, piracy, and human trafficking through conducting special maritime operations [64].

Sustainability in Saudi-Pak Defense Partnership

It is a propaganda that historical Saudi intensity of cooperation or defence partnership with armed forces of Pakistan is degenerating with the passage of time. In this regard, three historical events are mostly presented as indicators for highlighting it. First, Saudi Arabia had to face a difference of opinion from Pakistan during signing *Baghdad Pact* (1955). Second, Pakistan hesitated to provide artillery and armoured vehicles to KSA at the time of first Gulf War [8]. Third, Pakistan refused to send its troops to KSA for resisting Yemeni threat in 2015 through passing a resolution in its National Assembly [9]. Very logically, the above mentioned construct of reality and institutional discourse

is highlighting that KSA had increased its engagements with Pakistan rather to decrease, because they realize the significance of *Baghdad Pact* for Pakistan for balancing the protracted threat to its national security from USSR and its Warsaw Pact ally India which has a longer eastern border with Pakistan [8]. Later in 1990s, they realized the American trap behind the hesitation of Pakistan for provision of hard core war machines to KSA. Therefore, Pakistan sooner sent more contingents of its troops to KSA as an alternative strategy [9]. Further, the recognition of Government of *Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan* (Government of *Taliban*) was one of the great examples of cohesion of mutual interest of both countries during 1990s [8].

In the present situation, the Pakistani refusal for sending its troops to KSA (in 2015) also has been normalized through building the capacity of Saudi armed forces at home by sending 1200 Pakistani trainer troops for training the Saudi forces for border security and border warfare. It means, Saudis are more comfortable while being benefited a lot through equipping and training their own armed forces rather than stationing Pakistani troops at KSA [65], [9], [65]. Finally, Pakistan made the decision for sending a contingent of its troops to KSA in February 2018. Although, the strength of the soldiers has not been declared, but it has been specifically mentioned that these troops will never be deployed outside the border of KSA including Saudi mission for Yemen. Further, these soldiers will train and advise the Saudi armed forces at KSA, as earlier Pakistani contingents are performing same duties there [1].

Further, the statement of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is enough to refute the significance of disinformation, and propaganda of unfriendly countries and misguided analysts about any degeneration of defense ties between KSA and Pakistan. COAS expressed that Saudi-Pak relations are time tested and “*any threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia will evoke a strong response from Pakistan*” [40]. Moreover, Saudi defense and political establishment has made similar commitments with Pakistan. Even, Saudi establishment picked the retired ex-Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif as the commander and key advisor of Saudi-led military alliance named *Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition* (IMCTC). Therefore, he has left Pakistan (on April 21, 2017) in a special Saudi airplane with the consent of Government of Pakistan and *No Objection Certificate* (NOC) issued by the *General Head Quarter* (GHQ) of Pakistan Army [65], [66]. Furthermore, KSA is one of the biggest arms importer clients of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan does not hesitate while maintaining and continuing its defense partnership with KSA [8].

Conclusion

Target independent and academic exercise concludes that bonds of defense cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of KSA and Pakistan are strategically time tested and cohesive. Since the inception of understanding between these countries, every head of the Government, head of the state, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee (CJCSC), Chiefs of tri-services, Minister of Defense, and Minister for Foreign Affairs (including ambassadors) had invited and visited their counterparts very frequently for having more understanding, agreement and discussion upon defense and foreign affairs of both countries. Further, tri-armed forces of both countries conduct very impressive, effective and periodic joint exercises for increasing synergy, maximizing force to force coordination, diffusion of field experience, translating modern war fighting concepts, and preparing for multidimensional counter terrorism operations. Furthermore, bilateral procedures for intelligence sharing and crime control exercises contribute trust in this relationship. There is no doubt that each country has benefitted from each other in defense, diplomatic, economic and in other relevant fields, but it is significant that defense relationships are at priority of civil and armed leadership of both countries. They not only had managed the past crises, but also made progress and found new avenues for serving the interests of both countries. Therefore, this relationship is stronger, time tested and sustainable than the past. In short, security of *Two Holy Mosques* and stability of territorial integrity of KSA and Pakistan are committed priorities of armed forces of two countries.

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Fas'ta Sivil-Asker İlişkileri

Öz

Teoride sivil asker ilişkileri, sivil otorite ve askeri otorite arasındaki ilişkinin ya da sivil halk ve asker arasındaki ilişkinin, sivil kontrolün etkinliğinin ordunun görevlerinin sınırını çizme ve bunları rasyonelleştirme bakımından, iki tarafın da diğeri tarafından hâkimiyet altına alınması bakımından ve bu ilişkinin rekabetçi ya da işbirlikçi olup olmadığının incelenmesi anlamına gelir. Araştırmacıların ilgilendiği konu ise, orduyu siyasi liderliğe tabi kılan bir sivil kontrol mekanizması aracılığıyla, ordunun siyaset ile ilgilenmesinin engellenmesine olan ihtiyacıdır.

Eğer Batılı demokrasiler sivil halk ve asker ilişkisini, silahlı kuvvetlerinin siyasi tarafsızlığı modeli ile çözdüler ise, Üçüncü Dünya ülkeleri halen ordunun siyasi rolünün sadece doğrudan müdahale şeklinde krizi ile ilgili değil, siyasi hayat içerisinde kamusal bir rol aracılığıyla da müdahalesi olabileceği fikrindedirler.

İki darbe girişimi hariç olmak kaydıyla ve Fas rejiminin otoriter sistemini nedeniyle, ordu anayasal ve siyasal olarak, siyasi ve askeri nüfuzu birleştiren tek aktör olan monarşiye bağımlı hale gelmiştir. Ordu kendisine bir takım yeni roller oluşturarak monarşiyi destekleme aracı haline gelmiş olmasına rağmen, kral tarafından icra edilen kontrolün sivil gücü, aynı zamanda ordunun siyasete müdahalesine karşı bir veya siyasi elitlere karşı gelen askeri elitlere karşı bir güvenlik subabı görevi görmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fas, Sivil Otorite, Ordu, Monarşi, Elitler

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Başkanı, Fas.

Civil Military Relations in Morocco

Abstract

In theory, civil-military relations refer to the relationship between the civilian authority and the military authority or the relationship between civilians and military, in terms of whether they are competitive or cooperative, and in terms of either party being dominated by the other, on the basis that the effectiveness of civilian control is capable of rationalizing and demarcating the roles of the army. Researchers are interested in the need for the departure of military from the preoccupation with politics through the mechanism of civil control based on subjecting the military to the political leadership.

If the Western democracies have settled the relationship of civilians to military through the model of political neutrality of its armed forces, the Third World countries are still living on the rhythm of the political role of the military is not related only to the crisis in the form of direct intervention, but also through a public role in political life.

With the exception of two coup attempts, and by virtue of the Moroccan regime's civil authoritarian system, the army has become constitutionally and politically subordinate to the monarchy, the only actor that combines political and military influence. Although the military has become a tool to support the monarchy by engineering new roles for the army, the civilian power of control embodied by the king is at the same time a safety valve against military intervention in politics, or military elites turn into antagonism with political elites.

Keywords: Morocco, Civil Authority, Military, Monarchy, Elites

العلاقة بين الجيش والمدنيين في المغرب

ملخص

نظريا، تفيد العلاقات بين الجيش والمدنيين البحث عما إذا كانت العلاقة بين السلطة المدنية والسلطة العسكرية أو العلاقة بين الشعب والعسكر علاقة تنافسية أم تعاونية من ناحية مدى تأثير السيطرة المدنية في عقلنة ورسم حدود مهام ووظائف الجيش و من ناحية سيطرة طرف من الطرفين على الطرف الآخر. أما الموضوع الذي يثير اهتمام الباحثين فهو الحاجة الى منع اهتمام العسكر بالسياسة عن طريق آلية تحكم مدنية تجبر الجيش على أن يكون تابعا للقيادة السياسية.

إذا كانت الديمقراطيات الغربية قد حلت العلاقة بين الشعب والعسكر عن طريق نموذج الحيادية السياسية للقوات المسلحة فان دول العالم الثالثة مازالت تؤمن بأن الدور السياسي للجيش لا يكون متعلقا بالتدخل بشكل مباشر في الأزمات فحسب بل يمكن أن يكون عن طريق التدخل بشكل مؤسسي داخل الحياة السياسية.

لقد أصبح الجيش سياسيا ودستوريا باستثناء محاولتي الانقلاب مرتبطا بالنظام الملكي الذي يعتبر العامل الوحيد الذي يوحد النفوذ العسكري والسياسي بسبب النظام السلطوي للمغرب. وبالرغم من أن الجيش أصبح وسيلة لدعم الملكية عن طريق إيجاد أدوار جديدة لنفسه إلا أن القوة الشعبية للسيطرة التي تنفذ من قبل الملك تعمل كصمام أمان ضد تدخل الجيش بالسياسة أو ضد النخبة العسكرية التي تعارض النخبة السياسية أيضا

المغرب، السلطة المدنية، الجيش، الحكومة الملكية، النخب الكلمات المفتاحية:

Giriş

Üzerinde çalışılan olguya dair pek çok terim kullanılmaktadır. Şöyle ki, akademik çevreler “askeri kurumlar” terimini, askeri literatür “silahlı kuvvetler” ifadesini, siyasi kamuoyu “ordu” söylemini kullanırken, makale hepsini bir araya getirerek inceleyecek ve (siyasi ve toplumsal olmak üzere) sivil alanla olan bağlantısını ayırt etmek adına bu olguyu kanuni, siyasi ve sosyolojik açılardan ele alacaktır.

Peki, sivil ve askeri otorite arasındaki ya da siviller ve askerler arasındaki ilişki rekabete mi, yoksa işbirliğine mi dayalıdır? Ve hangisi hangisinin kontrolü altındadır?

Ordunun gücü ve toplumsal- siyasi etkisi özel durumlara göre belirlenir. Zira, silahlı kuvvetlerin alışılmışın dışında pek çok rolü vardır. Askeriyenin siyasi rolü, sadece darbe ve devrimler gibi doğrudan müdahaleye dayanan kriz durumlarıyla ilgili değildir. Aynı zamanda bilhassa dış tehditlerin yanı sıra siyaset hayatında da daimi ve genel bir role sahip olabilir.

Yıllardan beri askeri konularla ilgilenen araştırmacılar hala, askerlerin siyasetle uğraşmaması ve tamamen askeri tecrübe olan stratejik düzenlemeler

söz konusu olduğunda bile seçilmiş siyasi lidere tabi olmaları gerektiğine dikkat çekerek önceki ABD başkanı General Dwight Eisenhower'ın "Denetim ve kısıtlama olmadığında ordunun siyasal etkisi artarsa ne olur?"¹ sözünün altını çizmektedirler.

Silahlı kuvvetlerin siyasi tarafsızlığını sağlamak için tarih boyunca girişimlerde bulunuldu. Fransız sivil- asker ilişkileri teorisyenleri, ikinci cumhuriyeti bir tarafsızlık modeli olarak gördüler. Çünkü silahlı kuvvetler, bu aşamada sessiz ve itaatkâr kalmıştır. Bu itaat onlar için kendi içlerinde bir amaç teşkil ettiğinden sadece profesyonel meselelerle ve askeri taktiklerle ilgilenmişlerdir.²

Genel olarak üçüncü dünya ülkelerindeki ve özellikle de Arap ve Afrika ülkelerindeki askeriye, rejimleri içten koruyabilen ve değiştirebilen tek düzenli ve hiyerarşik kurumdur.³ Fas'ta ordu krala bağlıdır ve onları birbirinden ayırmak zordur. Kral, askeri ve siyasi merkezi birleştirir. Böylece kraliyet düzeyinde, sivil ve askeriye arasında ayırıcı sınırlar yoktur. Bu çalışma Fas askeri örgütünün metodolojik analizine dayanmaktadır. "Fas ordusu, siyasi ortamla nasıl etkileşim içine girer ve bu bağlamda Fas Ordusu'nun bağımsızlığının sınırları nelerdir?" sorularına cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır.

1. Ayrılma ve Birleşme Noktasında Askeri ve Siyasi Kurum

Silahlı kuvvetler, devletin güvenliğini muhafaza etmenin temel taşı olarak kabul edilmektedir ve bu alandaki faaliyetler ordunun asli görevi ile ilgilidir.⁴ Ancak güvenlik boyutunda iç siyasete dahil olmazlar. Eğer siyasi meseleler iç meseleler olarak kabul edilebiliyorsa ve bu meseleler sivillerin yetkisi dahilinde ise, dışişleri ve savunma alanı da, hem askerlerin hem de sivillerin müdahale edebildiği geleneksel ortak alandır.⁵

Sivil otorite zayıfladığında ordu, siyasi gücü kullanabilir. Samuel Huntington, "Asker ve Devlet" isimli kitabında, askeriyenin siyasete eğilimli olmasını, askerlerin siyasi faaliyetlerde aktif yer almasıyla ilişkilendirmiştir.

Devletin bir kurumu olarak ordu, bir iktidar aracına ve bir iktidar ordu-

¹ Cemil Matar, Dış Siyasette Askeri Oluşum...Amerikan Modeli, 5 Mayıs 2015: <http://assafir.com/Article/18/405669/AuthorArticle>

² Fuad El- Aga, **Askeri Sosyoloji**, Birinci Baskı, Ürdün: Usame Basın ve Yayın evi, 2008, s.214.

³ Leyla Seyyid Mustafa Erbab, "Sudan'da Ordu ve Siyasi İstikrar", **Arap Siyaset Bilimleri Dergisi**, sayı 36 (Sonbahar 2012), s. 9.

⁴ Yehuda bin Mayir, **İsrail'de Sivil- Askeriye İlişkileri**, Tercüme: Mustafa Er-Raz, (Mısır: Medbuli Kütüphanesi, 1998), s. 32.

⁵ Yehuda bin Mayir, **İsrail'de Sivil- Askeriye İlişkileri**, Tercüme: Mustafa Er-Raz, (Mısır: Medbuli Kütüphanesi, 1998), s. 32.

sunu indirgenmemelidir. Siyasi çatışmaların, yani siyasi kurumların etkisi dışında bırakılmalıdır. Ordunun bu tarafsız konumuna olan bağlılığı, anavatanın ve devletin koruyucusu olarak anayasal işlevine bağlı olduğu anlamına gelir. Modern demokratik sistemin iki politik gerçekliği vurgulanır: Birincisi; siyaset ve rekabetin sultadan bağımsız olması. İkincisi; şiddetin bu sistemde değişimin araç ve gereci olmadığı.⁶

Ne var ki, tarafsız ya da siyasileştirilmemiş bir ordu fikri, “gerçekçi bir politik gerçeklik” değil, yalnızca anayasal bir kavramdır.⁷ Kral, ordunun tarafsızlığının ve aynı zamanda ordunun başının tarafsızlığının garantörü olduğunda bile, ordu gerçek anlamda tarafsız değildir. Daha az rolü olan siyasi bir aktördür. Kraliyet kurumu ise en yetkili siyasi aktördür. Ordu, kraliyetten bağımsız değil, bilakis ona bağlıdır.

Ordunun krala olan bağlılığı, askeri arka planın neticesindedir. Aynı zamanda ordunun biat belgesini imzalamasına ve şahsileştirme konusunda iyi olan devlet mekanizmaları ile benzerlik göstermesine dayanır. Bu bağlılık, devlete ve yasaya olan sadakatinden önce gelebilir. Üst düzey subaylar kralı, Kraliyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri Komutanı rütbesinden dolayı bir asker olarak selamlarlar ve müminlerin emiri vasfıyla da elini öperler.

Askeri otoritenin Kraliyet yürütme Kurulu’na bağlanması, Fas’ın siyaset tarihi boyunca birçok sorun yaratmıştır. Kralın anayasanın gücü ile askeriyenin üstünde olduğu ve askeriyenin kanunun gücüyle krala tabi olduğu doğrudur. Fakat kral ya da siyasi bir aktör söz konusu olduğunda tarafsız ordudan sivil açıdan, askeriyenin başının tarafını tutmaması beklenir.

1.a) Askeri otorite kralın hâkimiyetinde olan bir alandır.

Kral ilk ordunun özgür Fas’ta kurulduğunu ilan ettiğinde, bu dünya çapında bir karar oldu. Ülke çapında askeriye, kralın tek otorite olduğunu temsil etti. En başından beri ordu, krala tabi ve bağlıdır. Özellikle parlamento, askeriyenin kurulmasına yönelik yasama görevi teşkil etmemiştir ve askeriyenin üzerinde bir denetime de sahip değildir.⁸ Kral V. Muhammed, Fransız ve İspanyol desteğine dayanarak ordunun kurulması görevini üstlenmiştir. Sömürgeci kuvvetlerdeki Faslı mensuplar ve Kurtuluş Ordusu mensup-

⁶ Abdulilah Bilkaziz, “Ordu ve Otorite Arasındaki İlişki Dengesinde Siyaset”, **Arap Dünyasında Ordu, Siyaset ve Otorite**, Birinci Baskı, (Lübnan: Arap Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2002), s. 18.

⁷ Alaaddin Hilal ve Nifin Mas’ad, **Modern Arap Siyasi Rejimi- Süreklilik ve Değişim Sorunları**, Dördüncü Baskı, (Lübnan: Arap Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2002), s. 66.

⁸ Muhammed Şakir, **Fas’ta Geçmişten Günümüze Askeriye**, (Fas: Doğu Afrika, 2008), s. 131.

ları arasından yüce tahta sadık kişiler seçmeye ve bunları Kraliyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri çatısı altında bir araya toplamaya çalışmıştır.

Kral, kurumsal yaşamın kilit noktası olarak kabul edilen devlet kuruluşlarının başkanı olması neticesinde büyük bir etkiye sahiptir. Askeri otorite ile olan ilişkisi, Kraliyet Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin en yüksek rütbeli komutanı sıfatıyla askeriyenin başı olması ve (anayasanın 53. maddesine göre) askeri görevlere atama yapması şeklindedir. Kral, ayrıca Anayasa'nın 54. maddesi kapsamında ilk kez kurulan Yüksek Güvenlik Konseyi'ne de başkanlık etmektedir.⁹

Ayrıca kral tarafından yönetilen Bakanlar Kurulu, askeri otorite ile bağlantılıdır. Askeri projeler ve devlet siyasetinin stratejik hamleleri, bu konseyin anayasanın 48. maddesine göre kararlaştırdığı önemli konularındandır. Bu da siyaset kuramında askeriye yönetiminin stratejik boyutuyla alakalıdır. Kral ayrıca, Bakanlar Kurulu'nun kendisini askeri lider kabul etmesi kapsamında başbakanın imzasıyla otuz gün boyunca kuşatma durumunu ya da parlamentonun bilgilendirilmesinden sonra savaş durumunu ilan etme hakkına sahiptir (anayasanın 99. maddesi). Buna ordunun iç ve dış güvenliğini savunmak için ordunun seferber edilmesi kararı da dahildir.

Savunma politikası, Bakanlar Kurulu tarafından kararlaştırılmaktadır. Önceden ise, hükümeti sadece belirlenmiş bir politika hakkında bilgilendiren ve hükümetle ortak karar almayan kral tarafından belirleniyordu.¹⁰ Abdullah İbrahim yönetiminin kaldırılmasının temel nedenlerinden biri de hükümetin bünyesindeki silahlı kuvvetlerin statüsünü talep etmesiydi.¹¹

Askeriye, kralın anayasadaki egemenliğine tabidir. Fas ordusunun krala olan bağlılığı, Fas'ın 1962'de anayasal döneme girmesinden önceye dayanır. Fas ordusu, her şeyden önce kralın ordusu olduğu olgusuyla, 1956' da kurulduğu andan itibaren "Fas Kraliyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri" ismini taşıdı. Bu isim, köklü kraliyet düzeninin gücünden kaynaklanmıştır. Fas ordusunun kabul ettiği armadaki düzenleme (Allah-vatan-kral) esas alınmıştır. Fas ordusunun krala bağlılığı, kraliyetin icraları konusunda Fas siyasi düzen yapısı ile uyum sağlamaktadır. Özellikle askeri alan, siyasi bir alandır ve kral, yüce egemenliğin tek temsilcisidir.

⁹ 54. Bölümün ilk paragrafında: "Ülkenin iç ve dış güvenlik stratejileri, kriz durumlarının yönetimi ve ayrıca güvenlik yönetiminde polis güçlerine nezaret etmek gibi konularda istişare organı sıfatıyla Yüksek Güvenlik Konseyi yer alacaktır." İfadesine yer verilir.

¹⁰ Ömer Benduru, *Fas Siyasi Rejimi*, İlk Baskı, Fas, 2002, s. 87.

¹¹ Ayrıntılı bilgi için bakınız, El-Ma'ti Mencib, "Kraliyet Silahlı Kuvvetleri ve Fas'ta Ordunun Rolünü Siyasallaştırmaya Yönelik Siyaset", *Bakış Açısı Dergisi*, sayı 35 (Kış, 2008), s. 9.

1.b) Ordunun iç siyaset tepkimelerine dâhil olması

Bağımsızlık sonrası çoğu Afrika lideri, muhalefetin bastırılması ve rejime yönelik siyasi desteği sağlama gibi politik amaçlarına ulaşmak için milli orduları politikada görevlendirdi. ¹² Kraliyetin güvenlik krizleri ve iç siyaset kapsamında ordudan yardım istemesi, 1959'da Rif bölgesinde ve 1965'te Kazablanka'daki halk ayaklanmaları karşısında Fas bağımsız siyaset yaşamında, sarayın vazgeçilmez bir müttefiki olan silahlı kuvvetlerin varlığına dayanmaktadır. Ordu emniyet kontrolünü sağlamış ve Fas'ın kritik anlarında zapt edici bir güç olmuştur. 1981 ve 1984'te Kazablanka'da ve 1990'da Fes'ten günümüze kadar ordu, peş peşe çatışmaları otorite lehine sonlandırmak için uygun zamanlarda müdahale ettiğini ispatlamıştır.¹³

Ordu, hükümetin devamlılığı kapsamında önemli bir unsur haline gelmiştir ve diğer iç güvenlik organlarının güçlü bir yardımcısı olarak asıl görevi iç güvenliği sağlamak olmuştur. Ordu eğitiminin niteliği ve kışlaların seçilmesi gibi iç güvenlik konularında orduya duyulan güven artmıştır. Ordu teşkilatları dışsal tehditlerle değil, içsel güvenlikle bağlantılı konulara yoğunlaşmıştır.¹⁴

Fas ordusu her zaman kral için içsel güvenliği sağlama aracı oldu. Siyasi arkaplanlı isyanların bastırılmasında kralın yardımcı ve sadık bir müttefiki idi. 60'lı yılların rejimine dayanan bir destek haline geldi ve ordu, 1965 yılından itibaren kralın "tek güç" olmasını sağladı.¹⁵

Ağustos 1964-1974 yılları arasındaki Kral II. Hasan zamanında Dışişleri Bakanı olarak görev yapan General Muhammed Efkir'in dönemi, ordunun Fas siyasi yaşamında en fazla etkiye sahip olduğu dönemdir. Efkir, kralın sağ koluydu. Hükümet kurulurken içişleri bakanlığına ya da diğer bakanlıkları kontrolünde tutan bakanlıklara bakanların atanmasında nihai söz söyleme yetkisine sahipti.¹⁶ Bu durum içişleri bakanlığını yöneten General Efkir'in askeri kimliğiyle bağlantılıydı. Daha sonra, akabindeki hükümetlerdeki içişleri bakanlığının ataerkilliği, bakanlığa başkanlık eden sivil şahsiyetler döneminde de devam etmiştir.

¹²Hamdi Abdurrahman, "Afrikalı üst tabaka...askeriyenin mücadelesi ve siyasi bölünme..", **Demokrasi Dergisi**", sayı 53 (Ocak 2014), s. 43.

¹³Abdurrahim El-Itri, **Fas'ta Üst Tabaka Yapısı**, İlk Baskı, (Fas: Defter ve Bakış Açısı Yayınları, 2006), s. 238.

¹⁴Manzar Süleyman, **Arap Dünyasında Ordu, Siyaset Ve Egemenlik**, "Arap Dünyasında Ordu ve Siyasete Bakış Açısı", İlk Baskı, (Lübnan: Arap Birliği Çalışmaları Merkezi, 2002), s. 85-86.

¹⁵Pierre Ver Mourin: **Bağımsızlıktan İtibaren Fas Tarihi**, Çeviri: Abdurrahim Hazel, (Fas: Doğu Afrika, 2010), s. 78.

¹⁶Said Es-Sadiki, **Fas Ordusunun İki Dönemi ve Tek Düzeni**, 23 Mart 2015 tarihli El-Cezira Çalışmaları Raporu, s. 7.

Generalin 1964 hükümetine dahil, askeri kurumun idari-siyasi yetkiyi kullanmasına yol açtı ve otorite üzerinde mücadeleye girişmesine neden oldu. II. Hasan 70'li yılların başlarında kralın yerini almak isteyen siyasi bir aktöre dönüşen askeriyenin isteklerinden bıktı.¹⁷ Ordu, kralın rejimine aykırı davranışlar bağlamında ilerleme kaydedememesinden sonra krallık otoritesi ile ilgili olası bir alternatife göre pozisyonunu değiştireceğine işaret ederek bir senede peş peşe iki darbe girişiminde bulundu.

Ordu, Fas'a karşı askeri tehditlerin bulunmadığını anladıktan sonra, kendisinde siyasi düzeni yeniden kurma görevini üstlenme fikrine zemin hazırlayan siyasi bir bilinç peyda olmuştur. Sonrasında da kral, görevlerini ihmal etmiştir. Ordunun siyasi eyleme dönüşümü, II. Hasan'ın rejimine karşı çıkan kuvvetlerin radikal bileşeni ile koordinasyon derecesine vardı. Öncesinde ise ordu, muhalefetleri bastırmak ve direnişçileri yatıştırmak yani kralla yaşanabilecek açıktan bir çatışmayı önlemekle vazifelendirilmişti. Siyasi tabakanın orduyu izole etme ve kralı kazanma çabası kapsamındaki düşmanlığından ordunun sıyrılması, siyasi tabaka ile uzlaşması sayesinde oldu. 2000 yılında haftalık "Dergi"nin yayınlanmasından sonra hükümete bir suikast hazırladı. Dergide Basralı ve Fıkıhçı siyasi bir muhalifin mesajı, Halk Kuvvetleri Ulusal Birliği liderlerinin ikinci bir askeri darbe hazırlığında olduklarına işaret etti. Yazar, o dönemde daha güçlü sol parti adına koordinasyon ve ordu içindeki bazı örgütlerle bağlantı görevini üstlendiğini onayladı. General Efkir şahsındaki ordunun, "hükümetin devredilmesinden sonra yeni bir otoritenin oluşumuna yardım eden parti liderlerine bırakıldığı ve partinin örgütlerini güçlendirmesine yardım etmek için ordudan genç subaylarla temaslarda bulunulduğu bildirildi. Bunların hükümetin ele geçirilmesini onaylayan darbe lideri Efkir ile yapılan anlaşmalara paralel olarak gerçekleştirildiği belirtildi.¹⁸ Yaşanan tüm bu gelişmeler ise, eninde sonunda ordunun iktidar gücünü zorla ele geçirmesine sebebiyet vermiştir.

Kral ve ordu arasındaki zıtlık olayları, sarayın şüphelendiğini ve krala karşı teyakkuzda olacağı iddia edilen organlara karşı kralın da tedbir aldığını tasdik etti.¹⁹ Ordudan başlanarak rejimin yapısı yenilendi. Öyle ki krallık askeriyeyi bir aktör olarak değil, koruyucu bir unsur olarak değiştirerek imajını yeniledi. Bunu için de önce askeriye üyelerinin yenilenmesi gereki-

¹⁷ Muhammed Zarif, **Baştan Sona Fas'ta Din ve Siyaset**, (Fas: Siyaset Sosyolojisinin Fas Dergisi Yayınları, 2000), s. 69.

¹⁸ Ayrıntılı bilgi için, Basralı Fıkıh Aliminin, Abdurrahman El-Yusufi Abdurrahman Buabid'e hitaben yazdığı 8 Ağustos 1974 tarihli mektuba buradan ulaşabilirsiniz: http://www.maroc-realites.com/web/maroc-realites-ar/lettre_fqih

¹⁹ Mustafa El-Ulvi, **Bir Gazetecinin ve Üç Kralın Notları**, (Fas: Günlük Haberle Yayınları, 2011), s. 133.

yordu. Ordunun siyasi etkisinin sona erdirilmesi kapsamında 1972’de Milli Savunma Bakanı’nın görevi iptal edildi ve kral başkomutan olarak yetkilerini bünyesinde topladı. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı’nın idaresini, 1997’de milli savunmadan sorumlu (halen başbakan olan) ilk bakanın garantörlüğünde yapılandırabilmek için geri almak karşılığında kralın idaresi altındaki bir genel sekretere verdi. Bu bakanlık kralın, başına partili olmayan kişileri getirerek egemenliği altında tuttuğu bakanlıklardandır. Sadece kraldan yetki alır. Başbakan, milli savunma bakanının görev ve yetkilerini kralı otoritesi altında belirler.²⁰ Kralın milli savunma yönetimini sivil bir kişiye devretmesi, savaş kararını askeri değil, siyasi kılması hedefiyledir. Bu ilgili bakanın siyasi bir pozisyona sahip olduğu anlamına gelmez, yetkilerini askeri ve siyasi merkez arasında bağ kuran kraldan alır. Bu durum savaş kararı için siyasi meşruluk sağlar.

1.c) Ordu, dış siyaset kararlarını uygulama aracıdır.

İç siyasete yönelik askeri yasakların aksine, silahlı kuvvetler açıkça, dış siyasete katkıda bulunabilir. Milli güvenlik ile ilgili stratejik kararlar alınmasına askeriye komutanlarının katılımı mecburidir. Bu kritik stratejik kararlar, devlet başkanının ya da silahlı kuvvetler başkomutanı sıfatıyla kralın aldığı savaş kararı gibi kararlardır. Bu kararlar münakaşa edilmek için başkana sunulmadan önce askeri komutanlık tarafından oluşturulur. Sonrasında ise yürütülmesi gereken bir savaş görevi olarak silahlı kuvvetlere geri döneceğinden nihai şekli onaylanır.²¹

Halen Fas ordusunun askeri doktrininin odak noktası olan ulusal toprak meseleleri ve ortak Arap savunma meseleleri, ordunun geleneksel askeri görevleri kapsamında kabul edilmiştir. Öte yandan ordu, yeni uluslararası görevlere yönlendirilmiştir. Geleneksel vazifesi çerçevesinde Fas ordusu, iki ülke arasında yer alan sınır bölgesi etrafında silahlандığı için Cezayir ile hila fa düşmüştür. Bu bölge, Ekim 1963’te üç gün süren kum savaşında mücadele edilen bölgedir. İlgili sorun çözüme kavuşmamış ve akabinde 1967 yılında askeri çatışma tekrarlanmıştır.

Yeşil Yürüyüş Bayramı, 6 Kasım 1975’te düzenlenmiştir. 14 Kasım’da İspanya ve Fas arasında anlaşma imzalanmıştır. İspanya, Fas çölünden geri çekilmiş, burası Fas ve Moritanya arasında paylaşılmıştır. “Silahlı kuvvetler

²⁰Said Es-Sadiki, *Fas Ordusunun İki Dönemi ve Tek Düzeni*, s. 6.

²¹Muhammed Abdulhalik Kaşkuş, “Ordunun Politik Rolünün Sınırları”, *Demokrasi Dergisi*, sayı 52, (Ekim, 2013), s. 52.

orayı Fas krallığına katmak için çölün kuzeyine girmiştir.”²² Çölde talep edilen sınıra giren Polisario, sorunu askerileştirmiş ve Fas ordusunun 1991 yılına kadar devam eden silahlı bir çatışmaya girmesine yol açmıştır. Daha sonra BM denetiminde iki taraf arasında ateşkes imzalanmıştır. Bununla birlikte ordu hala çölde geniş çaplı konuşlandırılmaktadır ve bir yandan Fas ve diğer yandan Cezayir-Polisario arasındaki sorun devam etmektedir.

Öte yandan ordu, 1973'te Siyonist oluşuma karşı olan savaşlarında Mısır ve Suriye'nin yanında savaşmak için askeri bir birliğe dahil olarak Arap meselelerinde Fas'tan taraf olarak alınan kararların uygulanmasında katkıda bulundu. Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgal etmesinden sonra Suudi Arabistan'ı korumak için Körfez'e askeri birliklerini yönlendirdi. Yemen'de meşrutiyyetin yeniden kazanılması davasıyla ilgili Suudi Arabistan'ın yönettiği “Kararlılık Fırtınası” operasyonuna katkısının yanı sıra Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri'ne askeri yardım hattından destek vererek DAESH örgütü ile yapılan savaşa da katıldı.²³

Ordu, sivil görevler kapsamında dış politika kararlarının uygulanmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Ayrıca ordunun Kongo, Bosna, Kosova, Fildişi Sahili ve Orta Afrika'da barışı koruma operasyonlarındaki askeri oluşumlara katıldığına dikkat çekmekteyiz. Ordu Gazze, Ürdün'ün Zaatarı örneğinde olduğu gibi Haiti ve Nijer'deki doğal afet mağdurlarına insani yardım veya seyyar hastanelerde yardım hizmeti de sağlamıştır.

2. Askeri Otorite Üzerinde Sivil Denetimin Olmaması

Askeriye, Fas için “Kara kutu” ya da “Dilsiz” olarak anılır. Krallıkla doğrudan bağlantılı olmasıyla da “kutsal sırlar” içerir. Anayasalar, bir önceki anayasaya kadar kralı kutsamaya devam etmiştir. Askeriye, sivil kuruluşlara olan bağlılığıyla da bir saygınlık elde etmiştir. Silahlı kuvvetler üzerinde sadece kralın egemenliği bulunmaktadır. Çünkü kral, bütün kurumların en yücesidir ve her şeyden önce devletin başıdır.

Anayasada kraliyet kurumunun kendisinin de tartışılmış olmasına rağmen, Fas anayasasında yapılan bütün değişikliklerde, ordunun anasadaki tutumunun genel siyasi tartışmalarda ya da siyasi partilerde gündeme getirildiği hiçbir zaman görülmemiştir. Ordu, siyasi rejimde askeriyyenin rolünü belirleyen anayasal çerçeve kapsamında sivil-askeri tartışmaların dışında kalmıştır.

²² Pierre Ver Mourin, **Fas Geçiş**, Çeviri: Ali Ayt Himad, (Fas: Tarık Yayınları, 2002), s. 199.

²³ İhsan El-Hafizi, “Fas ve Kararlılık Fırtınası'nın Askeri Doktrinindeki Değişimi”, **Arap Siyaset Dergisi**, sayı 14, (Mayıs 2015), s. 97.

Orduyu bir önceki anayasanın sınırlarına göre düzenleyen yasal metinler, parlamentodan geçmedi. Ancak kral, en yüce lider sıfatıyla bunları çıkardı. Parlatmentonun askeriye denetleme yetkisi yoktur. Zira milletvekilleri, siyasi denetim kapsamında yürütme otoritesine müdahale edemezler, askeri faaliyetler konusunda öneride bulunabilirler. Aynı durum mali kontrol için de geçerlidir. Çünkü ordunun bütçesi parlamento tarafından tartışılmaz. Aynı zamanda krallık sarayının bütçesi de bu kapsamdadır, öyle ki üzerinde değişiklik yapılması hatta eleştirilmesi bile mümkün değildir. Askeriye, idari ve adli kontrol çerçevesinde kamu maliyesinin denetimine tabidir.

Ayrıca, özellikle gizli dosyaların açıklanması söz konusu olduğunda, askeriye den medya olarak eleştirel bir görüş almaya yaklaşmak zordur. Ancak son yıllarda basın ve ordu arasındaki ilişki, kopukluk evresinden çatışma evresine girmiştir. Bu bağlamda gazeteciler, iki kurum arasında çizilen kırmızı çizgilere uymamaktadır. 2008 yılında "El-Vatan El-An" gazetesi gizli güvenlik belgelerini yayınlamıştır.

Fas ordusu, kahramanlık olgusuna dayanmadan yüce bir statüye sahiptir. BM, İsrail ve hatta Mısır gibi bazı devletler de orduyu halkın zihnine kurmaya çalışır. Ordusunun, kendisini vatanperver bir efsane ya da kahramanlık ve cesaret kaynağı olarak tanıtmaya gerekmez. Bu nedenle imajını iyileştirmek için, medya kampanyalarına, olağanüstü çabalara ya da yüksek bütçeler elde etmek için sivil kuruluşlara baskı yapmaya ihtiyaç duymaz. Ordunun yapılanması sadece kralın otoritesindedir, bu otorite de elindeki en uygun potansiyeli ortaya koymak için yeterlidir.

3. Kesişme Noktasında Askeri ve Siyasi Tabaka

Fas'ta devlet rejimi, askeri ve siyasi iki zümre arasında hem kan bağı ve akrabalık, hem de evlilik yoluyla akrabalıklarla iç içe, karmaşık ilişkilere dayanmaktadır. Müslümanların emiri ve kraliyet silahlı kuvvetlerinin başkomutanı olarak kralın hükmettiği devlet mantığına göre, Fas'taki hem askeri hem de siyasi egemen sınıf, tüm alanları tekelleştirip, askeri ve siyasi rolleri kendi içlerinde dağıtan sınırlı aileler arasında akrabalıklar, dostluklar ve çıkarlar bloğu oluşturuyor.²⁴ Çünkü siyasal sisteme göre krala olan yakınlık; kralın yakınlığı derecesine göre belirlenen özel bir otoritede, askeri şahsiyetlerin kazanılmasında önemli bir rol oynar.²⁵

²⁴ Muhammed Şakir, *Fas'ta Askeri Tabaka ve Otoritenin Ayrıcalıkları*, İlk Baskı, (Fas: Deftter ve Bakış Açısı Yayınları, 2011), s. 83.

²⁵ Muhammed Şakir, *Fas'ta Askeri Tabaka ve Otoritenin Ayrıcalıkları*, İlk Baskı, (Fas: Deftter ve Bakış Açısı Yayınları, 2011), s. 78.

Bazıları askeri tabakayı, siyasi tabakanın bir bölümü olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Bu görüş, kralın başkanlık ettiği ya da siyasi boyuttaki milli münasebetler ve olaylarda, siyasilerin yanında yer alan askerlerin belgelendirilmesiyle desteklenebilir. Ancak bu, ordu zümresini, güç ve egemenlik kıstasında askeri bir tabaka olarak dikkate almak anlamına gelmez. Fas'ta ideolojik ya da dini eğilimleri kontrol eden askeri bir tabaka mevcut değildir. Fakat bu bilgi ışığında askeri tabakanın laik olduğunu söylemek de yanlış olur.

Fas askeri zümrenin sosyal kökenleri açısından, eğer geçmişte ordu, orta sınıf ve yoksul kimselerden oluşturulsa, üst sosyal tabaka ilişkisi, askeri zümrenin kendi ayrıcalıklarını ve pozisyonlarını korumak için üst düzey askerlerle yakınlaşmaları şeklinde tezahür etmekle sınırlı kalırdı. Ordunun bugünkü sosyal kökenleri ise, Fas'ta evlilik yoluyla oluşturulan akrabalık ilişkileri ile askerlerin üst tabakanın parçası haline geldiği sosyo-politik dönüşümleri içerir.

Askeri zümre ilişkisinin seyri, takas yöntemine göre şekilleniyor ve askerlere hem toplumsal hem de bireysel olarak belirli maddi imkânlar sağlayarak takas aracılığıyla onların siyasi sadakatini kazanmalarına dayanıyor. Bunlar, kazançlı maaşların yanı sıra otomobiller için gümrük maliyetleri, eğlence eşyaları, eğitim kursları için yurt dışı seyahati ve askeri görevlendirme vb. imkânlardır.²⁶ Askeri kariyerin dışında ise, askeri zümrenin öngörülebilir bazı siyasi etkileri olabilir. Bu da askeri liderlerin yürütme, yasama ve parti çalışmalarına nüfuz etme gibi politik yetkileri emeklilerden devralması şeklindedir. Fakat ordunun siyasal sisteme müdahale etmesi bir yandan kraliyet aktörünün egemenliğini güçlendirmiş, diğer yandan da siyaseti kişiselleştirerek parti yapısını zayıflatmaya çalışmıştır.

Ordunun ayrıcalıklı durumu, orduya özel bir konum kazandırsa ve askerlere Fas toplumunda bir üstünlük verse bile, paralel bir askeri devlet oluşumuna karşı Fas'ı güçlendirmek için krallık güvencelerini sağlamlaştıran sivil kültürü kullanarak toplum üzerinde bir egemenliğe sahip olamaz.

Yeni anayasaya göre, askeri ve sivil tabaka arasındaki yakınlık boyutları, askerleri güvence altına alan yasanın çıkmasıyla genişledi. Bu yasa 5. madde gereğince ordu mensuplarına siyasi, sendikal, ya da dini olarak bir yere bağlı olmayan sivil toplum kuruluşları kurma, yahut bunlara dahil olma imkanı vermiştir. Sivil kurumların önceliklerinin örtüştüğü göz önüne alındığında bu mekanizmaların, askerleri siyasi yaşamdan ve kamu işlerinden daha çok, birbirleriyle yakınlaştırması beklenmektedir. Özellikle de aktif sivil kurum-

²⁶Hamdi Abdurrahman, **Afrikalı zümre**, s. 43.

ların çoğu ya siyasi partilere bağlıdır, ya da bunlardan etkilenmiştir. Bu nedenle, devlet tarafından ordunun sivil faaliyetlerinin sıkı bir denetime tabi tutulması ve askeri kurumdaki iç yasalarla kısıtlanması gerekmektedir.²⁷ Askeri tabaka ile sivil tabakaların bir noktada bir araya gelip bir noktada ayrılığa düşmesi, ordunun iç çerçevesinde sınırlı kalmalı ve sivil unsurlarla dış koordinasyon boyutuna varmamalıdır.

4.Sivil-askeri entegrasyonu ve ordunun askeri olmayan faaliyetleri

Fas ordusu özellikle askeri yoldan, hatta konuyla bir ilgili anayasal tüzük olmasa da sivil hayatın içinde yer alıyor. Silahlı kuvvetler, "hem askeriye-nin rolünü artırarak hem de sivil otoriteler ile ilgili belirli amaçlara ulaşmak için bir araç olarak"²⁸ askeriye-yi kullanarak kamu iç işlerine karışmaktadır. Askeriyenin sosyal ve ekonomik rolü, Kral II. Hasan'ın askeri tabakayı kamu işlerinin idaresine getirdiğinde belirginleşti. "Le Petit Marocain" dergisinin 15 Mart 1966 sayısında kendisinin şu ifadeleri yer aldı: "Askeri subayları bakan, işçi ve otoriteler olarak ülke yönetimine dâhil ettik. Çünkü ordumuz, İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın oluşumuna katkıda bulundu, dolayısıyla biz de ülke yönetiminde subayların özelliklerinden ve fiziksel yeteneklerinden faydalanmakta kararlıyız."²⁹

Ordu, kendisinin disiplini ve organize oluşu ile askeriye-nin de üstündeki görevlerle ilgilenmesi gerektiğini öngörmektedir. Ordunun kalkınmadaki rolünü savunanların tezi de aynısını söylemekte, hatta ordunun onu siyasi komplolara av edebilecek işsizlikten kaçınması, milli kalkınma çabalarına dahil olması ve teknik becerilerinden toplumun faydalanması gerektiğinin altını çizmektedir. Bu bağlamda ordu, eğitim (okuma-yazma seferberliği ve okullar inşa etme), sağlık (çocuklar ve hatta hayvanlar için aşı kampanyalarına katılım), kamu ve idari işler alanlarında pek çok görev üstlenmektedir.³⁰ Aynı zamanda, sellerden, kar yoğunluklarından ya da aşırı soğuktan kaynaklanan doğal afetlerin sonuçlarıyla başa çıkmaya da katkıda bulunur. Silahlı kuvvetler, burada helikopterler aracılığıyla zarar görenlere gıda yardımı sağlar ve uzak bölgelerdeki askeri hastaneleri donatır.

İlaveten Samuel Huntington'ın bildirdiği üzere profesyonel bir orduya dönüşmesi arkaplanında silahlı kuvvetler için yeni görevler oluşturuldu. Bu

²⁷ Sait Es-Sadiki: *Fas Ordusunun Gelişimi*, s. 11.

²⁸ Yehuda bin Mayir, *İsrail'de Sivil- Askeriye İlişkileri*, s. 34.

²⁹ Muhammed Şakir, *Fas'ta Askeri Tabaka ve Otoritenin Ayrıcılıkları*, s. 89.

³⁰ Nureddin Zimam, *Siyasi ve Kalkınma Güçleri- Üçüncü Dünya Sosyolojisi Çalışması*, (Cezayir: Arap Yazarlar Yayınevi, 2003), s. 285.

kapsamda ordu birlikleri 2005-2007 yılları arasında yasadışı göçle mücadeleye katıldı. Ordu, 2007 yılında terörle mücadele kapsamında Kazablanka kentinde sokaklara indi. Bu mücadele, 2014 yılında başlayan “tedbir” programıyla da Fas’ın en büyük şehirlerini kapsadı.

Özetle, askeriye'nin vazifesi geliştirici, ya da kurtarıcı bir boyutta değil, savunma boyutundadır. Kaydedilen tecrübeler ise, askeriye'nin tabii rolünden ayrılması, aksi yönde sonuçları doğurduğunu göstermiştir.³¹ Bu doğrultuda ordunun askeri mücadele ruhu zayıflamıştır. Silahlı kuvvetlerin sivil faaliyetlere entegrasyonu, bazı yönlerden sadece içeride sınırlandırılmamakta, “insani diplomasi” çerçevesinde ülkenin dış ilişkilerini de kapsamaktadır.

5. Reform Bağlamında Ordu

Özellikle değişim için sokak taleplerine yanıt olarak gelen 2011 anayasasından sonra yeni bir dönem ışığında Fas'ta yaşanan siyasi gelişmeler göz önüne alındığında, bunu akabinde bir askeri değişim izleyebilir mi? Çünkü askeri sektördeki reformlar siyasi reformların nihayetinde gelir. Belki de “Fas baharı” hükümetin yücelttiği “yolsuzlukla mücadele” sloganı altında açılması muhtemel olan dosyalardan biri, orduyu bireyselleştiren önceki gelir politikalarına dayanan askeri himaye sistemidir. Gelir politikaları, hala ayrıcalıklarla, kazançları yönetmektedir. Bu kazançlar ise olmadığı takdirde ülkeyi katlanamayacağı finansal yük seviyelerine ulaştırabileceğinden dolayı vazgeçilemezdir.

Siyasi ve ekonomik baskıların artması, küreselleşmenin olumsuz sonuçları, uluslararası ekonomik durgunluk, polis güçlerinin alıkoyulması, IMF'nin kuralları ve getirdikleri neticesinde er ya da geç askeriye mensuplarına verilen pek çok ayrıcalıklı hizmetler ve avantajlar geri alınacaktır.³² Ancak, politik sürece eşlik edebilecek bu tür liberal düzenlemeler, geleneksel olarak baskın bürokratik askeri zümreyle çatışmaya giremez. Fakat “Asker ve Devlet” isimli kitabında Samuel Huntington'a göre ordu ve sivil arasındaki temel farkı iki grupta kategorize etmiştir. İlk grup genellikle muhafazakâr eğilimleri benimserken, ikinci grup genellikle liberal eğilimleri benimsemektedir.³³

Enflasyon, temel gereksinim maddelerinin fiyatlarının artışı, satın alım gücünün ve milli paranın değerinin düşmesi sebebiyle yayılacak olan mad-

³¹ Abdulilah Bilkaziz, “Ordu ve Otorite Arasındaki İlişki Dengesinde Siyaset” s. 33.

³² Manzar Süleyman, *Orduya Bakış Açısı*, s. 91-92.

³³ Es-Seyyid Yasin, “Sivil-Askeriye İlişkileri Sorunsalı”, *Demokrasi Dergisi*, sayı 52, (Ekim 2013), s. 41.

di sarsıntılar, istikrarın bozulmasına yol açacaktır. Askeriye mensuplarının serzenişi daha şiddetli olacak ve sokak kitlelerine katılmaları daha hızlı gerçekleşecektir.³⁴

Ayrıca mali düzeyde harcamalar, özellikle hükümetin mali dengeleri koruyan kemer sıkma politikaları konusundaki gerekçeleri ışığında, kontrol edilerek ve askeri bütçenin ihtiyaçları karşılama gücü artırılarak gözden geçirilmelidir. Karşılıklı caydırıcılığın artması ve konvansiyonel çatışmaların azalmasıyla savaş ihtimallerinin azalması ekonomik rekabeti beraberinde getirir. Özellikle Fas'ın askeri kuvvetlere olan ihtiyacını artıran bölgesel etkileşimlere dahil olmaması kapsamında, mecburiyetlerin ve silah ithalatının tekrardan düzenlenmesi gerekir.

Sonuç

Yukarıdakiler aracılığıyla ağırlıklı olarak şu sonuçlara ulaşılabılır.

- Ordu, ülkeyi koruma, güvenliğini ve istikrarını muhafaza etme meşruiyetini bünyesinde bulunduran kraldan yasal olarak bağımsız değildir.
- Siyasi olarak ordu, Fas'ın karşılaştığı ve karşılaştacağı sorunlara müdahale ederek siyasi rejimde söz sahibidir. Kraliyet kurumu, askeriyeyi hâkimiyeti altına alır ve askeriye'nin faaliyetlerini kontrol eder.
- Ordunun uluslararası savaş ve barış görevlerine odaklanmasının paralelinde yerel rollerden bağımsızlığı düşünülemez. Ordu, kraliyet sivil otoritesinin kontrolü dışında bırakılamaz. Ordunun, daha büyük oranda siyasi süreçlere katılımını engellemek için yetkilerinin genişletilmesine imkân verilemez.
- Eğer ordu, yeni tehdit sorunlarını gidermek için gücünü artırma anlayışı ile teşkilatını yeniden yapılandırmayı ve organize etmeyi içeren kapsamlı kurumsal reforma ihtiyaç duyuyorsa, bahse konu olan bu reform orduyu demokratikleştirecektir. İlk olarak vatandaşlık ve sorumluluk değerlerini yükselten modern bir askeri eğitimi benimseyerek bünyesinde demokrasi kültürünü yaymalı, ikinci olarak ise çevresi ile olan ilişkisinde ordunun mirasını ve birikimini tüm askeri medya dergileri veya web siteleri vb. ile paylaşarak kurumu halka açmalıdır.

³⁴Manzar Süleyman, *Ordunya Bakış Açısı*, s. 91-92.

Extended Abstract

Civil-Military Relations in Morocco

Is the relationship between the civilian authority and the military authority or between civilians and soldiers based on competition? Throughout history, attempts have been made to ensure the political neutrality of the armed forces. The logic behind this is that when the civilian authority weakens, the army can use the political power. As an institution of the state, the army should not be reduced to a tool of power and a tool of the political power.

In theory, civil-military relations refer to the relationship between the civilian authority and the military authority or the relationship between civilians and military, in terms of whether they are competitive or cooperative, and in terms of either party being dominated by the other, on the basis that the effectiveness of civilian control is capable of rationalizing and demarcating the roles of the army. The issue has been dealt with by the researchers in academia many times.

Researchers are interested in the need for the departure of the military from the preoccupation with politics through the mechanism of civil control based on subjecting the military to the political leadership.

If the Western democracies have settled the relationship of civilians to military through the model of political neutrality of its armed forces, the Third World countries are still living on the rhythm of the political role of the military is not related only to the crisis in the form of direct intervention, but also through a public role in political life.

Except for two coup attempts, and under the Moroccan regime's civil authoritarian system, the army has become constitutionally and politically subordinate to the monarchy, the only actor that combines political and military influence. Although the army has become a tool to support the monarchy by engineering new roles for the army, the civilian power of control embodied by the king is at the same time a safety valve against military intervention in politics, or military elites turn into antagonism with political elites.

It might be stated that the army is not legally independent from the king, which has the legitimacy of protecting the country, protecting its security and stability. In parallel with the military's focus on global war and peace missions, its independence from social roles cannot be considered. The army cannot be excluded from the control of the royal civilian authority. It is not possible to expand the powers of the military to prevent the participation of

the army in the political process to a greater extent. If the military needs a comprehensive reform of its organization, with the understanding of increasing its power to address threats and restructuring and organizing its structure, this reform will democratize the army.

First of all, by adopting a modern military training that elevates the values of citizenship and responsibility, it should spread the culture of democracy, and secondly, in the relationship with the environment, the military's heritage and accumulation, all military media magazines or web sites etc. by sharing the institution with the public.

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Why Does an International Organization Fail? A Theoretical and Systemic Approach to the Developing Eight (D-8)

Abstract

The Developing Eight (D-8) grouping was one of the organizations that brought the key countries from the Islamic world. Initiated with huge enthusiasm by the leadership of Turkey in 1997, the D-8 has not been able to live up to expectations so far in terms of economic development and increasing inter-trade relations among members. In this article, first the failure of D-8 is analyzed from three major IR theories and shed some light on why the organization in the third world failed. Second, D-8 is located within the systemic character of the Muslim world. It is the argument of this article that any Muslim organization is likely to fail, should it not include Saudi Arabia. It is not the only mover-and-shaker of the Islamic world, but at least its silent approval is needed. Whatever the reason, from a Muslim world perspective the failure of D-8 to some extent should be attributed the absence of Saudi Arabia as a member.

Keywords: D-8 (the developing eight), International organizations, regional system, the Islamic world, the OIC

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Uluslararası Bir Organizasyon Neden Başarısız Olur? Gelişen Sekize (D-8) Teorik ve Sistemik Bir Yaklaşım

Öz

Gelişen Sekiz Ülke (D-8) gruplaması, İslam dünyasından kilit ülkeleri bir araya getiren örgütlerden biriydi. 1997'de Türkiye'nin öncülüğünde büyük bir coşkuyla yola çıkan D-8, ekonomik kalkınma ve üyeler arasında artan ticari ilişkileri geliştirme konusunda şu ana kadar beklentileri karşılayamamıştır. Bu makalede, ilk olarak D-8'in başarısızlığı üç ana Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi doğrultusunda analiz edilmiş ve organizasyonun üçüncü dünyada başarısız olmasının nedenlerine ışık tutulmuştur. Bununla birlikte D-8, Müslüman dünyasının sistemik karakteri içinde yer almaktadır. Bu makalenin argümanı, Suudi Arabistan'ı bünyesine dahil etmeyen herhangi bir Müslüman örgütün başarısız olacağıdır. Suudi Arabistan İslam dünyasına yön veren tek aktör değil, ancak en azından sessiz onayına ihtiyaç var. Sebep ne olursa olsun, Müslüman dünya bakış açısına göre D-8'in başarısızlığı bir dereceye kadar Suudi Arabistan'ın üye olmamasına bağlanmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: D-8 (Gelişen Sekiz Ülke), Uluslararası kuruluşlar, bölgesel sistem, İslam dünyası, İTT

«لماذا تفشل المنظمة الدولية؟ مقارنة نظرية ونظامية للدول النامية الثمان (د-8)»

الملخص

لقد كان تنظيم الدول الثماني النامية (د-8) أحد التنظيمات التي جمعت الدول الإسلامية المهمة تحت سقف واحد. ولكن لم يستطع هذا التنظيم الذي تم تأسيسه بقيادة تركيا في عام 1991 محملا بأمال كبيرة أن يحقق هذه الآمال المرتقبة منه حتى الآن في موضوع التطور الاقتصادي وتطوير العلاقات الاقتصادية بين الدول الأعضاء. ولقد تم في هذا البحث تحليل أسباب فشل تنظيم الدول الثماني النامية د-8 وفقا للنظريات الثلاثة الأساسية للعلاقات الدولية وتسليط الضوء على أسباب فشل هذا التنظيم في العالم الثالث. بالإضافة الى هذا يقع تنظيم الدول الثماني النامية ضمن الطابع النظامي للعالم الإسلامي. منطلق هذا البحث هو أن أي تنظيم إسلامي لا يضم المملكة العربية السعودية في بنيتها سيكون غير ناجح. المملكة العربية السعودية ليست الفاعل الوحيد الذي يوجه العالم الإسلامي ولكن موافقتها ولو بشكل ضمني سيزيد من نسبة النجاح. ومهما كان السبب فانه يجب ربط عدم نجاح تنظيم الدول الثماني النامية د-8 حسب وجهة نظر العالم الإسلامي بعدم كون المملكة العربية السعودية عضوا في هذا التنظيم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: د-8 (الدول الثماني النامية)، التنظيمات الدولية، النظام الإقليمي، العالم الإسلامي، منظمة التعاون الإسلامي

الإسلامي

Introduction

In the post-Cold War environment, the increasing importance of international organizations has been emphasized by many in understanding international relations and promoting stability. In this paper, the role of Developing 8 (D-8) will be analyzed from the perspective of promoting stability and economic development. Although initiated in 1997 with huge excitement and expectations, the D-8 has been in a recess period until recently. Why has the D-8 not been so successful in its aims, what was the obstacles and what should be done are the questions that this paper tries to answer. It organized in three parts. First, a general but concise history of the D-8 is introduced. Second, the D-8 is analyzed in the lens of three theories namely neo-realism, neo-liberalism and critical theory. Third, international and regional systemic settings of the Islamic world are discussed with regard to D-8. In the last section, what follow is the conclusion and general comments.

Developing Eight (D-8): A New Building in the Old Town

While one can see many regional/international groupings to further cooperation in the Islamic world; the Developing Eight (D-8) was founded among eight prominent Muslim countries, namely Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Egypt, and Nigeria on 15 June 1997. The main architect of the D-8 was Necmettin Erbakan who served as Turkey's prime minister in 1996-1997. The idea of establishing such an organization that brings 'key' countries from the Islamic world gripped during Erbakan's visits to some Muslim countries in Africa and Asia as prime minister in 1996. The members of D-8 have two main characteristics: they are part of developing world and Islam constitutes an overwhelming majority of the people in member countries.

Before one goes through details of the D-8 through the lens of theories, it is necessary to understand the environment in which D-8 grouping came to existence. Especially in the post-Cold War era, Muslims have increasingly felt isolated from global economic and political decision-making process. Despite constituting one fourth of global population, no Muslim state has representation in the United Nation Security Council- the main global body- with a veto power. Indifference of international community/society against killing of Muslims especially in Bosnia and Kosovo convinced Muslims in a way that they have no trust in international community or international organi-

zations. In addition, the double standard of international community against Muslims, such as while international community criticize Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons, not to do so in the case of Israel and India, has also contributed to develop such an understanding among Muslim masses. In the early period of the post-Cold War era, Islam (and Muslims) has experienced a 'geopolitical exclusion' from global politics and Muslims have lost their trust in international community/organizations as a 'neutral problem solver'.

Having depicted the environment in which D-8 was founded, it can be argued that D-8 grouping was a response by Muslim countries against this global exclusion and a try to be heard. Against economic and political marginalization from international community, D-8 sought to develop economic relations among the key Muslim states. As globalization is shrinking, in order not to be marginalized not least economically, D-8 countries found it necessary to cooperate extensively in the economic, commercial and financial fronts. D-8 countries in a way or other represent the 'core' of the Islamic countries, which represented by Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). With the exception of Saudi Arabia, all D-8 member countries are the mover and shakers of the Islamic world. As Aral indicates, the data shows that when D-8 was founded in 1997, its members had a share of 54 percent of the total exports and 55 percent of the total imports realized by Muslim countries. The total GDP of D-8 member states constituted nearly 60 percent of the total GDP of the OIC countries at the time. The total population of the D-8 countries was nearly 800 million, which meant that they made up about 65 percent of the overall population in the Islamic world. This corresponds to some 13.5 percent of the world population. Mainly due to rapid growth in the past, a large part of their population is and will continue to be young for the foreseeable future, constituting a factor of dynamism in D-8 countries.

It can also be argued that there are two main features at the time that affected the character of D-8 grouping. First of all, the 'urgency' to respond deteriorating global conditions against Muslims played a crucial role in 'exhilarate the process'. This led the initiative to be weak at the later stage, because the necessary political and economic strategic planning have not been done properly. This feature can also be found in the foreign policy approach of the Refah (Welfare) Party- then ruling party in Turkey- toward the Islamic world. Though Refah was in power for only eleven months, with its leader Erdogan it initiated and orchestrated huge projects like D-8. Second element that played a crucial role in establishing D-8, was to decrease bureaucracy if possible.

Not surprisingly, the founders of D-8 were aware of the pitfalls of proper functioning of Islamic organizations mainly of the OIC, which is undermined with too much bureaucracy and outside intervention. D-8 grouping wanted to overcome these obstacles while revitalizing a small but strong group of Islamic countries. In larger analysis it was to serve to revitalize Muslim world and thus participate in global politics, both economically and politically.

After the inaugural summit of D-8 grouping on 15 June 1997, the Istanbul Declaration identified the principles on which this cooperation ought to be based. D-8 leaders 'declare [d that] the main objective of D-8 to be socio-economic development in accordance with the following principles: peace instead of conflict; dialogue instead of confrontation; co-operation instead of exploitation; justice instead of double-standards; equality instead of discrimination; democracy instead of oppression'. In the same declaration D-8 countries have also identified the main goals and principal areas of cooperation among the members. These are mainly among others 'trade, industry, finance, banking and privatization, rural development energy, agriculture, science and technology'.

From the foreign policy perspective of Turkey, the initiator of the D-8, setting up of this new grouping was meant two elements that was also the foreign policy priorities of the then ruling party in Turkey, Refah Party. First, through this grouping, Turkey sought to restore its long-neglected ties with the Islamic world. And for the Refah Party and its leader Erbakan it would demonstrate their commitment to the unity of Muslims worldwide. Moreover, this initiative would spell out the conviction that Turkey should take up the role of leadership and be a catalyst in bringing Muslim nations together in developing world. Actually, Turkey's current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has actually taken such a role enforcing and expanding Ankara's interest Muslim world politics since 2002. Erdogan deepened Muslim dimension of Turkish foreign policy more than any other leader in the past. Second, Turkey's desire to find new markets for Turkish exports was equally important. To widen the economic horizons thoroughly by developing relations with the countries from Asia and Africa was not alternative to the existing the Custom Union agreement with the EU, but it was hoped that it would give a leverage power in Turkey's relations with Europe. Erbakan believed that the more Turkey has deep relations with the eastern part of the world, the more it will be powerful in its relations with the EU.

International Relations Theories and the Failure of the D-8

a. Neo-Realism

In general, the approach of international theories to international institutions rests on the belief that institutions are 'a key means of promoting world peace'. Except neo-realists, this idea has widespread support and most of the debate goes around this general claim.

From a neo-realist perspective, international system is a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other. International actors (only the states for neo-realists) have little trust in each other and therefore must behave in a self-help system. However, the strong emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only 'temporary marriages of convenience', since the states act according to their own self-interests. In that sense, neo-realists simply argue that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in current world politics and are based on the self-interested calculations of the states (mostly great powers). According to neo-realists, institutions have no independent effect on the state behavior and world politics in general without the authorization of member states. Basically, international institutions have no identity per se and are not an important cause of peace. For the neo-realists, institutions matter only on the margins.

From such an understanding, the establishment of the D-8 needs to be re-considered. In 1997, when the D-8 was initiated, the establishing members were concerned in different interests rather than purely economic development. Priorities of the members in joining any organization are as much critical as the common aim of the organization. If each member's motivations stem from different considerations and those considerations cannot be articulated through a 'common channel', the chances to success of such organizations are less. In other words, the means should be coherent with the ends. To illustrate this point, As Aral aptly argues, at the time when D-8 came to existence the motivations and goals of each member did not represent a united front with clear, well-defined and unified objectives. Rather than representing the general view of the founding members, each had its own reason to take part in this grouping driving largely from domestic consideration. This accounts for a couple of reasons. Of most important was that each member state has had different reasons to join the grouping, and through D-8, aimed at achieving different aims. To mention a few, Nigeria and Iran were trying to break isolation against them in international fore. Nigeria was then ruled by

a military government and was more or less ostracized by the international community. By the same token, due to America's 'dual containment' policy Iran was also ostracized. They hoped that D-8 would give a modicum of recognition to the both regimes, at least in respect of the Islamic world. Thus from the beginning, D-8 grouping faced such a dilemma that made the grouping 'ineffective'.

Besides emphasizing the difficulties of cooperation among states due to systemic reasons, neo-realists also argue that it is always difficult to sustain cooperation, be it under an institution or not. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gain considerations and concerns about cheating. Relative-gain consideration means that in the international system states are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities primarily defines the structure. The structure then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. In the case of D-8, the motivation for relative-gain consideration was existent when it was initiated. Through mutual projects, all the members would gain some sort of economic benefit and eventually leading to be a prosperous country. Unfortunately, none of the proposed projects was realized before the organization to be doomed. So relative-gain consideration of the member states does not explain the failure of D-8, since there was nothing to gain yet. Similarly, concerns about cheating do also fall into same category. The possibility of cheating the members` each other was not possible in terms of cooperating with the others, and nor they leave the group for the sake of other benefits.

Neo-realism contributes more to understand D-8 case from systemic level than cheating and relative-gain consideration issues. For the neo-realists, the nature of the international system, be it bipolar or unipolar, defines the behavioral scope of the actors. From the very beginning, the D-8 grouping was an Islamic initiative aimed at creating a common Islamic market among Muslim world. It was designed to be an alternative to G-8 summit and was ambitious in its standing. International community or great power(s) was hesitated what would be outcome of such initiative. Therefore, it was not surprising that almost all the governments who initiated the D-8 grouping was toppled from the power in a short time, making the D-8 almost dead-born.

Similarly, some circles (especially pro-Zionist lobbies) in the West and in particular in the US, expressed outright hostility to D-8 that, in their view, was unacceptably antagonistic towards the West. They blamed D-8 grou-

ping for harboring 'fundamentalist and anti-western' ambitions. Such an existing global environment towards D-8 made the grouping more cautious and their criticism of the prevailing economic and financial system and call for action were not couched in the confrontational language. Because, any language that used by D-8 against prevailing economic order was smacked as anti-Westernism. Under this condition that has become like the sword of Damocles, the D-8 has so far deemed to fail to deliver its promises.

b. Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalists, like neo-realists, argue that competition, exchange, and consequent pressures for efficiency are the dominant environmental characteristics driving the formation and behavior of organizations. According to neo-liberalists, institutions have capacity to change outcomes demonstrably, but they are not as autonomous as critical theorists assign. Similarly, international institutions do not have a purpose independent of the states that comprise them. International institutions exist, neo-realists argue, in a condition that power struggle dominate states' behaviors. They facilitate cooperation by reducing the costs of making agreements through established rules and practices, and most importantly by providing information about to what extent to which governments were following these rules.

In neo-liberalist understanding, the failures of international institutions are attributed more to the materialistic and other powers located outside of the organization. Neo-liberalists posit that state preferences and constraints are responsible for understanding of the behavior of international organizations' failure. They argue that international institutions are weak, as a general precaution, it is important not to put more weight (read as expectation) on such institutions that they can bear. According to neo-liberalists, putting too much weight on international institutions, before they are sufficiently legitimate to bear that responsibility, is 'a recipe for deadlock, disruption and failure'. Looking at the D-8 from this point of view does shed a light to understand why the D-8 is ineffective. From the very outset, the rhetoric and discourse regarding the expectations from the organization were very high. It is arguable whether such a notion led to failure itself, since the projects of the organization have never got off; but it is certain that such a notion created an understanding that the D-8 might be dangerous for global politics. As analyzed in the neo-realism section, some groups from the West have raised their objection. Success for an organization does not only depend on support

of others, sometimes, to gain the others neutrality or not objection at least might be crucial. The D-8 case, as an organization with the possibility of threatening or decreasing the role of others in the Muslim world, can also be understood from such perspective.

Inspired mostly by the metaphor of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), neo-liberalists also maintain that individually rational action by states could impede mutually beneficial cooperation. Institutions would be effective to the degree that they allowed states to avoid short-term temptations to renege, thus realizing available mutual benefits. In that sense, most of the D-8 members could not be able to avoid their short term temptations to realize the long-term mutual benefits. Since most of the short-term temptations originated from their domestic politics, neo-liberalists are not adequate to explain such development. As Martin and Simmons rightly observed, neo-liberalists have generally neglected the role of domestic politics over the international institutions. They treated the states as rational unitary actors and assigned preferences and beliefs, a similar approach with the neo-realists'.

c. Critical Theory

Critical theorists locate the institutions at the very centre of their understanding of international politics, as their central aim is to later the constitutive and regulative norms of the international system. They take ideas very seriously and in fact they believe that discourse or how we think and talk about the world largely shapes our knowledge and practice. In other words, ideas are the driving force of history. According to critical theorists, states behave according to the norms and institutions that they created, in turn, such norms and institutions underpin collective security. Furthermore, states would 'identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all'. In short, critical theorists argue that international system is 'characterized not by anarchy, but by community' that defines and decides about the future.

In the light of those above understanding of international politics, the establishment of D-8 can be seen as the reflection of the intentions, ideas and desires to change economic and political development in the Islamic world by enhancing the relations among them. Once the ideas are defined as driving force behind events, the existence of the D-8 has much to do with the rhetorical change in the Islamic world. Non-recognition of the demand of

Muslims for being heard and their anger toward the double standard of the West was clearly illustrated in the case of Bosnia. The West's reluctance to stop killings for years led the conviction that Muslims should not trust in the international system as 'a Neutral Problem-solver' anymore.

Critical theorists believe that international organizations can sometimes be dysfunctional and inefficient. This, more commonly, can emanate from the 'attempts to reconcile competing worldviews' that they attach to the organization. As Hass argued, organizations may develop contradictory sets of preferences that brought in by the members. Consequently the organization representing different normative views will suggest to or expect from the organization different goals, resulting in an overtly or covertly clash of perspectives that might generate organizational ineffectiveness.

The failure or ineffectiveness of the D-8 is understandable from such a perspective, since from the inception the members expected to reach different goals through the D-8 undermining the main goal of the organization: economic development. As Aral aptly argues, at the time when D-8 came to existence the motivations and goals of each member did not represent a united front with clear, well-defined and unified objectives. Rather than representing the general view of the founding members, each had its own reason to take part in this grouping driving largely from domestic consideration. This accounts for a couple of reasons. Of most important was that each member states have had different reasons to join the grouping, and through D-8, aimed at achieving different aims. To mention a few, Nigeria and Iran were trying to break isolation against them in international fore. Nigeria was then ruled by a military government and was more or less ostracized by the international community. By the same token, Iran due to America's 'dual containment' policy was also ostracized. They hoped that D-8 would thus give a modicum of recognition to the both regime, at least in respect of the Islamic world.

The failure or ineffectiveness of the D-8 can also be analyzed from the rhetorical perspective. However, such a change should be attributed more to the domestic rhetorical change rather than an international one. As Robert Putnam put it, states pursue their policies in an environment where 'two-level game' is in place. This understanding does also apply when a state involves in an international organization. As domestic problems have a tendency to spill over and become international problems, the international issues can have spill over effect on domestic issues creating instability.

Developments in Turkey just proved this point overwhelmingly. In Turkey, the leading country in the D-8, the setting up of D-8 eventually become 'the long-sought-for evidence' to oust Erbakan, the main driving force behind the D-8, from the government in Turkey on to base of his 'Islamist and anti-Western leanings'. D-8 initiative, mainly because of domestic contingencies of Turkey and the fear of political Islam, is regarded as a 'beginning of an alternative foreign policy based on Muslim solidarity'. His fall from power only a few months after the founding of D-8 through a 'post-modern coup' meant that the D-8 grouping had to proceed at the absence of its architect. Even some of foreign ministers emphasized the role of Erbakan and Turkey and they argued that D-8 would not move forward effectively without Erbakan as prime minister. After the then Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan was ousted from power and then, from politics altogether, similar domestic problems occurred in the others. Then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim was put in prison on a myriad of charges and only to be released in 2004. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan was likewise toppled by a military coup while similarly President Suharto of Indonesia forced to step down through a combination of domestic opposition and international pressure. Turkey and Malaysia have also been struck by devastating economic and financial crisis in the last five years due to poor performing of their economies. Nonetheless, there occurred good developments in the member states too. For instance, Nigeria has established democracy after the election in 1999 and Iran's had followed a more balanced foreign policy instead of purely anti-Western stand with the election of Mohammed Khatami. However, these developments were not able to produce any good results for the aim of D-8 grouping, because the turmoil in aforementioned countries was so apparent to dominate D-8 agenda.

As Barnett and Finnemore aptly argued, the demands from the states can be extremely important determinants of the organization's behavior. While a Turkey with Erbakan's premiership (mostly because of his Islamic orientations) was more prone to develop relations with the D-8 members and use the organization as the main vehicle, a Turkey under the leadership of other parties have not paid special attention to the D-8. Similar development was also observed before and after when Anwar Ibrahim and Nawaz Sharif lost their powers in Malaysia and Pakistan respectively.

Systemic Character of the Muslim World and the D-8

When the D-8 initiated, expectations to create Islamic economic zone, development of economic relations was very high. Given the statements and projects that were announced, this was not naïve at all. However, although it was possibly looked upon by many as the incipient model of a future 'Islamic common market' on account of pronounced goal of economic cooperation and deepening trade ties, as Aral rightly argues in his well-researched article D-8 was not designed specifically to constitute the nucleus of a future 'Islamic common market' or a 'Muslim custom union'. Rather it mainly aimed at enhancing economic relations among Muslim developing countries. From the beginning, the founders of the D-8 avoided any resort to terminology of an emerging bloc that would challenge existing international norms and institutions. Instead, they turned their attention to economics and trade among themselves. Because of this nature, some tends to argue that D-8 resembles the group of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) because of its emphasize on fair trade, economic cooperation among member states, justice and freedom.

However, it might be more explanatory if the D-8 grouping be located within the globalization and global governance context. The interconnectedness among different regions, as many researchers have recognized, is a response to the globalization. Globalization as a threat and opportunity needs to be problematized from international economy perspective as well as international global order. The ongoing process of political contest and transition with regard to global economy is directly related to global governance and might have far-fetched implications for global governance norms and institutions. As emphasized by Higgott, the global governance agenda is still 'driven by an understanding of governance as effectiveness and efficiency, not as greater representation, accountability and justice' (emphasis original). This is not only prone to generate new forms of resistance, but also to search for new alternatives. From the very beginning, the D-8 grouping was an economic as well as political response to globalization and increasing legitimacy deficit in international order. If that is the case, (how) can an Islamic organization without the involvement of Saudi Arabia, one of the key countries from economic and political perspective in the Islamic world, be successful?

In post-Cold War international environment especially in Islamic world, Saudi Arabia is one of the critical mover-and-shaker. It is not only the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, but also from religious perspective, Saudi Arabia is called 'the land of the two holy mosques', a reference to Mecca and

Medina, Islam's two holiest places; to which every year more than two million Muslims pay a visit to be pilgrim. Economically, with one billion barrels of oil reserves (about 24% of the world's proven total petroleum reserves, as of 2003), Saudi Arabia occupies the central place in economic development. Especially in a time, when oil prices are increasing and dependency to oil is a main concern, Riyadh's participation to any Islamic development project or organization is outmost important. The non-participation of Saudi Arabia to D-8 can be seen as a reason for the D-8's ineffectiveness. It is not because Saudi Arabia has prevented or blocked any project of D-8, but it is because of Riyadh's influence in moving things in the Islamic world that D-8 cannot succeed. Even it be so, it will be limited.

Non-participation of Saudi Arabia can be explained in the context of 1990. First, Riyadh did not want to be seemingly supporting Islamism in the Middle East and international level, as some considered D-8 as an expression of it. Second, Saudi Arabia has always been cautious in any newly emerging regional grouping, unless she is the main initiator of such a move. Thirdly, there is an unspoken rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in shaping the regional politics at several levels. The fact that Turkey has played a key role in the formulation of D-8, at least Saudi Arabia did not want to be part of this; perhaps considering that in future if the organization gains prominence at international level, Riyadh could consider joining it. One underlying point for this is that there is no officially negative expression toward D-8.

A historical account of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) illustrates this point. As the largest explicitly Islamic international organization, the OIC, is not a 'fundamentalist' Islamic organization but is clearly one of the significant institutions of global political Islam, or Islamic polity. It was established in 1969 by a group of Muslim states following an attack by an arsonist in Jerusalem on Al-Aqsa mosque, which at that time had just recently come under Israeli control. In retrospect, the inter-state dispute among the OIC members has always prevented the OIC to be a respective and credible international player, despite most of the OIC members have played critical role by supplying the most needed energy, oil, to the global market. Such disagreements and disputes among the OIC members have emanated from either intra-religious issues (e.g. Sunni- Shiite) or leadership competition. Especially the strong states within the OIC, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and even Egypt have turned the OIC into an arena where they sought the support of their own cause rather than the one for ummah.

In that regard, Sheikh argues that Saudi Arabia used the OIC to de-politicize global Islamism in 1970s by championing and supporting Islamic cause through the OIC. By the time, Islamic movements were on the verge and pan-Arabism was at its heyday. A Saudi sponsored OIC, by claiming a supreme representative of Muslims in the world, did not only de-politicize global Islamism, but also used as a balance to pan-Arabism. Interestingly enough, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Saudi Arabia has resorted pan-Arabism in order to prevent (and to some extent balance in global politics) Iranian exportation of Islamic revolution. Such an inclination from Saudi leadership has derived mostly from the seeking or surviving the leadership role of Saudi Arabia, which has gained especially through the OIC after the demise of pan-Arabism, rather than solving the problems of the Islamic ummah at large. Since establishment of the OIC, Saudi Arabia has served as a catalyst in direction of the OIC. Most of the OIC sub-organs have their headquarters in Saudi Arabia and receive major funding from the kingdom. This has created a de facto leadership or domination of Saudi Arabia in the OIC decision-making process, turning the OIC into a permanent institution through which the Saudis could express their views and their special role in the Islamic world.

Deriving from the OIC experience, Saudi Arabia's involvement or not rejection at least is needed and crucial for any organization in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia alone cannot sustain any Islamic project organization, but Saudi Arabia alone can disrupt them from political, economic and religious perspective. Therefore, one of the main failures of D-8 was not to include Saudi Arabia within the organization. Although, whether Saudis rejected the invitation, or they never received an invitation is not clear, but judging from today's understanding, non-inclusion of Saudi Arabia might have caused to dead-born of D-8 grouping.

Secondly, the inclusion of Nigeria to the D-8 initially had brought more harm to the organization than fruit. Nigeria, as the most populous country in Africa, is one of the key countries along with Egypt and South Africa. In principle, the choice to include Nigeria within the D-8 was politically and economically right. However, the timing and the domestic politics of Nigeria was harmful for the organization. After a brief democratic experience after 1990, Nigeria's democratic transition efforts were halted by then military leader General Abacha, after he removed all civilians from power through military coup in 1995. In that time, in African context, while there was a democratization process going on, especially with then the new-comer democratic South

Africa after decades of apartheid regime, Nigeria was turned its direction against such trend.

To put in a nutshell, by 1995 when Nigeria was being ruled by military leader Sani Abacha, South African President Nelson Mandela intervened personally after Abacha regime detained Chief Moshood Abiola who was the frontrunner in Nigeria's annulled June 1993 presidential election. During the Abacha regime in Nigeria, Pretoria pursued a policy of 'quiet diplomacy' that sought to save dissidents like Ken Saro-Wiwa and to push that regime toward democracy. Mandela attempted to rush to the rescue when a tribunal convicted former (and current) president General Olesagun Obasanjo and 39 others on coup-plotting charges. In November 1995, when Nigerian ruler Sani Abacha executed nine environmental activists, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, an enraged Mandela unilaterally called for boycott of Nigeria's oil and expulsion from the Commonwealth.

Mandela's call for boycott and expulsion put Nigeria in a difficult position. Mandela's international standing as a moral leader was also important, and contributed to gather support for his standing. When the D-8 initiated, Nigeria had been facing both a domestic instability problem and international exclusion/isolation. Nigeria's involvement in the D-8 process was seen as an opportunity to create a gateway to break international isolation cycle and to create some sort of legitimacy for the military regime. The main concern of Abacha regime was neither economic development among Muslim countries nor to create an 'Islamic common market' eventually, it was legitimacy and recognition. This affected the D-8 grouping negatively in two ways. First, as explained above, different intentions and expectations of members from the D-8 could not be able to create a common understanding and coherent policy implementation. Secondly, as also partly explained above, it gave a reason for international community to criticize and call the D-8 grouping anti-systemic.

Above all, domestic instability and turmoil in most of the member states victimized the D-8 grouping from the beginning as a project because it was located at the centre of domestic politics. As mentioned above, after Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan was ousted from power, then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim was put in prison on a myriad of charges and only to be released in 2004. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan and President Suharto of Indonesia either toppled down or forced to step down through a combination of domestic opposition and international pressure.

Overall, in spite of all talk about deepening co-operation and preferential trade arrangements, the intra-trade among D-8 member states has not increased in a significant way. The extent of industrial and agricultural cooperation remained well below than expected. According to the Commission that prepared the report for the 4th Summit of D-8 held in Tehran on 17-18 February 2004, intra trade among D-8 member states constituted a very small fraction of its overall trade with the rest of the world. Despite showing an increase of about 50 percent between 1999 and 2002, \$21.3 billion out of \$500 billion trade margin realized among the D-8 members. This statistic, in comparison to the trade indicators that the members conduct with their other partners, represents only a very small portion. The summit meetings held since 1997, from Dhaka (1999) and Cairo (2001) to Islamabad (2012) and Istanbul (2017) Summits of Head of States and Governments have discussed little advances (if not failures) rather than successes. They have discussed the global economic, financial and trading system and criticized them for their injustice natures; however, they failed to consider special needs of developing world.

In addition to economic cooperation, it was initially expected by the founders and supporters alike that D-8 would eventually extend its range of activities 'to cover cultural, social, political and even military cooperation in future'. This has not however materialized in any significant way due to same reasons for the economic one. In retrospect, a view from today to the place of D-8 grouping within the members states' foreign policy strategies shows that D-8 was never (and still not) rationalized as a development project, but victimized in a sense of emotional domestic policy context.

Conclusion

Organizational failure is one of the issues that international theories differ. Application of different understanding of organizational failure to the Developing Eight (D-8) shows this point clearly. For the neo-realist, D-8 failed because of systemic reasons, since D-8 was seen as a dangerous move by the key players. Neo-liberalists argue that the failure of D-8 should be attributed to huge expectations from the organization. Although this point is not exactly clear, it has certainly contributed in creating a psychological trauma after the initial failure, which has de-motivated the members, killing the revivalist optimism. Critical theory has a better chance to help understand D-8 failure. Since the ideas shape our actions, different expectations of the members from D-8 have made the organization redundant. Similarly the

changing of domestic political settings in the member countries has also played an important role in the failure of D-8.

From a systemic perspective, the inclusion or/and non-inclusion of a key player in Islamic world can determine the future of that organization. In D-8 case, the non-inclusion of Saudi Arabia was a great loss or wrong start for an organization that aimed to develop economic and political relations among Muslim countries. As the OIC experience shows, it is difficult to try to move things further in the Islamic world without involvement or at least a covert approval of Saudi Arabia. This does not mean that Saudis are great power and leader. Contrary, once they feel that they are excluded or not given enough credit that, according to them, they deserve, they have power to blow things up. Some states might not have enough power to construct ideas and action alone, but they might have enough power to destroy it. In that sense, Saudi Arabia is the mover-and-shaker not only in the Arab world, but also in the Islamic world in general.

The ends that an organization wishes to reach must be coherent with the means that this organization uses. As an increasingly isolated country in Africa and international arena, Nigeria's membership to D-8 was a wrong start. Similar to what is said above with regard to Saudi Arabia, is also true for Nigeria. A state might have much destructive power (albeit unwillingly) than to construct. Because of its international standing at the advent of D-8, Nigeria had been a destructive power for the organization in the international arena. It brought more criticism and distributed negative signals to outside world.

It has been a commonplace that in current world domestic politics plays key role in defining international political relations. Unstable domestic settings of D-8 members are also contributed to create 'unstable' organization, which has less coherence. And most importantly, some domestic contingencies in D-8 members used as a tool to support their position in internal politics and thus victimized it within their power struggle, rather than seeing it as truly a development project.

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Imaginations and Realities: Encoding Turkish Geopolitics in the Valley of the Wolves-Palestine

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the links between the film *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* and current geopolitical events, Turkey's geopolitical visions, and the geopolitical imaginations of the filmmakers, and real events and imaginations by recognizing the site of production. To do this, I included two interviews; one with a Mavi Marmara activist and another with one of the scriptwriters of the movie. Conversations with the interviewees highlighted those geopolitical imaginations and geographical codes that influenced the movie, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, to some extent, which has corresponded with the geographical imagination that is internalized by the practical geopolitics experts in Turkey.

Keywords: Geopolitical Imaginations, Popular Geopolitics, Valley of the Wolves, Palestine, Geopolitics of Turkish Cinema

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Tahayyüller ve Gerçekler: Türkiye Jeopolitiğinin Kurtlar Vadisi-Filistin'de Kodlanması

Öz

Bu makale, Kurtlar Vadisi-Filistin filmi ile mevcut jeopolitik olayları, Türkiye'nin jeopolitik vizyonları, film yapımcılarının jeopolitik tasavvurları ile yapım alanını tanıyarak gerçek olaylar ve tasavvurlar arasındaki bağlantıları incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yapmak amacıyla iki röportaj gerçekleştirdim; bunlardan biri Mavi Marmara aktivisti, diğeri ise filmin senaryo yazarlarından birisi. Görüşülen kişilerle yapılan röportajlar, Kurtlar Vadisi-Filistin filmi etkileyen jeopolitik tahayyüller ve coğrafi kodların bir dereceye kadar Türkiye'deki pratik jeopolitikçiler tarafından içselleştirilen coğrafi tasavvur gücü ile uyuştuğunu göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeopolitik Tasavvurlar, Popüler Jeopolitik, Kurtlar Vadisi, Filistin, Türk Sinemasının Jeopolitiği

لتصورات والحقائق: ترميز الجيوسياسية لتركيا في «وادي الذئاب - فلسطين»

ملخص

تهدف هذه المقالة الى دراسة الروابط بين التصورات و الحقائق الواقعية عن طريق معرفة المجال الانتاجي و التصورات الجيوسياسية لصانعي الفلم و الرؤى الجيوسياسية لتركيا و الوقائع الجيوسياسية الموجودة عن طريق فلم وادي الذئاب - فلسطين. و قد قمت بإجراء لقاءين صحفيين للقيام بذلك؛ اللقاء الأول كان مع ناشط سفينة مرمرة الزرقاء و الثاني أحد كتاب السيناريو في الفلم. و لقد تبين من خلال هذين اللقاءين أن التخيلات الجيوسياسية و الرموز الجغرافية التي أثرت في فلم وادي الذئاب فلسطين متناغمة نوعا ما مع قوة التصور الجغرافي الذي تم استيعابه من قبل الجيوسياسيين الفاعلين في تركيا.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التصورات الجيوسياسية, الجيوسياسية الشعبية, وادي الذئاب, فلسطين, الجيوسياسية للسينما التركية

Introduction

In the presidential proclamation in March 2019, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, announced on his Twitter account that the Golan Heights is a sovereign territory of Israel. The Golan Heights are recognized by the world, with the exception of the U.S. and Israel, as part of the Syrian territory that has been occupied by the Israeli military for years. This self-declaration of territorial recognition in favor of Israel is repudiated worldwide which violates the territorial integrity of states as one of the most fundamental principles of international law. Turkey's criticism of the U.S.' unilateral action and Israel's pachydermatous behavior in the region produced heated quarrel in Israel. This was not the first confrontation between Turkey and Israel. The Turkey-Israel conflict dates back to Recep Tayyip Erdogan's acrid conversation with Israeli President, Shimon Peres, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2009. Public resentment against Israel in Turkey reached its peak after "the height of humiliation", which occurred during a diplomatic meeting between the Turkish ambassador, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, and Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, in Jerusalem, in January 2010. The subsequent attack on the Mavi Marmara Gaza Flotilla in May 2010 (which resulted in nine deaths and the wounding of fifty Turkish citizens in international waters) by Israeli Special Forces gave the needed momentum for the political-action film *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* (2011). The Pana Film project's well-timed release accumulated public anger for Israel and was visible in the production. Film used the ongoing political tension as a propaganda tool to expose Turkish public resentment and show the political climate in Turkey following the Flotilla incident. The filmmakers wanted to produce a virtual platform to voice Turkish peoples' opinions on the matter. In this respect, this paper¹ aims to analyze the not so hidden links between the film *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* and current geopolitical events, Turkey's geopolitical visions, and the geopolitical imaginations of the filmmakers, and real events and imaginations by recognizing the site of production. To do this, I included two interviews; one with a Mavi Marmara activist and another with one of the scriptwriters of the film.

¹ This paper is revised and expanded version of the author's thesis chapter.

Valley of the Wolves-Palestine

The plot of the *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, as with the previous Pana film *Valley of the Wolves-Iraq* (2006)², follows well-trained Turkish agents led by Polat Alemdar (central character) on a quest for revenge against the Israeli general Moshe Ben Eliezer who was the prime planner and the executor of the Mavi Marmara raid. The film begins with Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) operation on the Turkish ship, Mavi Marmara, which sails to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and transport its load to Palestinians. From the beginning and throughout the movie, whenever and wherever Polat and his men engage with Israeli soldiers there are many shootings and killings during the Israeli soldiers' attack on Palestinian neighborhoods. Top of this, the film does not refrain from depicting IDF soldiers as ultimate killing machines of innocent Palestinian civilians.

The movie was banned in Germany (Spiegel, 2011) for being an anti-Israeli and was heavily criticized for premiering on January 27, International Holocaust Remembrances Day. After Pana Film appealed to the German court, the ban on the movie was removed, but it was restricted to audiences 18 years old and older. Other European countries such as the Netherlands, France, and United Kingdom posed similar restrictions on the movie by ruling that only 16 and older could view the movie.

As in previous Pana Film productions, this movie also aroused international tension and criticism as it stimulated national and international praise in various corners of the world. For example, Europe-based Jewish organizations appealed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann to condemn the movie and its glorifying violence and inciting anti-Israeli sentiments (Tribune, 2011). On the other hand, according to Ozdener (one of the scriptwriters), this new movie was poised to be the biggest movie in the Middle East. He says that the Pana Film would continue to bring the voices of the oppressed to the white screen and continue to criticize Israel. He said: "*Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* will only storyline what really goes on in Palestine. Israel will be demonstrated as bloody hands, cruel,

² Pana Film productions can be situated within the Milli Cinema which is believed that the term in general entered the cinema literature with the works of director Yucel Cakmakli. This paper omits the discussion of the movie's place in the Turkish cinema history for the sake of focus and the broadness of the subject. However, the paper argues that the Milli Cinema especially through the recent trend in the historical TV series contributes greatly to the development of literature about Turkey's geopolitical narratives domestically and internationally. Therefore, the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* should be situated particularly within the literature on popular geopolitics.

human slaughter, and disrespectful to human dignity" (Özdener, 2010). On other occasions, the producers emphasized that the movie was an effort to bring attention to the human drama in Palestine for the audiences of Turkey and other nations.

Whether one movie can dramatically harm Turkey-Israel relations is already a historically debated matter. It had significant potential as a medium to project social, political, moral, and cultural views to audiences in Turkey and around the world. This movie is action-packed and entertaining and employed novel forms of geopolitical representations and geographical imaginations for audiences worldwide. As the movie entertained millions in the dark rooms of cinema halls and in their living rooms, it spread epic tales of victorious Turkishness and confirmed Turkey's geographical and historical responsibilities as well as challenged orthodox geopolitical understandings of Palestine-Israel conflict and territoriality. Hence, the following part of the study attempts to analyze the geopolitical implications of the movie by including the site of production of meaning-making and asked these questions: What discourses are embedded in the movie's storyline and what goals and intentions do the producers possess? Through the interview I explore how an entertainment production is interpreted by informed audiences such as a humanitarian worker who witnessed Israel's Mavi Marmara raid.

Background: Movie and geopolitical narratives

Earlier studies on popular geopolitics argued that movies as geopolitical texts form an everyday image-based language that can provide better ways of understanding the radically changing geopolitical world (Power & Crampton, 2007). Even the most complicated and problematic issues of social and political life can be expressed smoothly through cinematic narrations and artistic forms. Under the circumstances, cinema's propagandist and undisputable ability to present places, events, and peoples appeals to politicians and world states (Dodds, 2008). Cinema, for that reason, has been and continues to be the concern of states and policymakers (Löffmann, 2013). Strada and Troper argue that "American foreign policy and movie...track each other through time as compulsively as symmetrical sundials" (Strada & Troper, 1997). Thus, it was not surprising that following the terrorist attack of September 11, executives of Hollywood and White House advisors came together to establish a theatrical exit strategy to the US's internationally dec-

lining image. Published in 2007, Power and Crampton in their edited book entitled *Cinema and Popular Geo-Politics* draw attention to the unwavering connection between cinema and (international) politics (Power & Crampton, 2007). The contributors from various disciplines for that reason interrogate how movies work to crystallize or firm up states' international identities and location on the world map. For example, Power and Crampton argue that Hollywood movies provide handy maps through which Americans imagine/ position themselves in the uncertainty of the geopolitical world. They note that "important questions can be raised about the ways in which geopolitical imaginations are expressed through a movie and about how different 'threats' and 'dangers' are constructed through various Hollywood narratives" (p.3). Besides statecrafts' discursive proclamations as in the case of President Trump, through movies and cinematic narratives, the importance of borders, boundaries, and sovereignty can be (re)explored, (re)mapped, and recognized. Therefore, it is no surprise that Turkish cinema products such as *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* takes geopolitical matters into the reel site to challenge established geopolitical narratives while it attempts to formalize one of its own. Thus, this paper investigates the movie within popular geopolitical writings and theories that much of the literature is situated (Toal & Agnew, 1992) (Sharp, 1998) (Dittmer & Bos, 2019).

The site of production

In order to understand geopolitical imaginations encoded within the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, we are obliged to pay attention to its production site (Rose, 2007). For this very reason, Gillian Rose asks us to delve into the image's author(s) be it a producer, a sculpture, or a painter. What is known as "auteur theory" examines the production site of an image to understand what its maker(s) intends to show. Although Rose and others argue that in a so-called postmodern era, how an image is understood (audience interpretation) is more important than what is intended to show (author), I argue that in order to grasp the full picture in the meaning-making circle, we don't have the luxury to omit an important element of image studies. Because the viewer is an active reader of an image does not mean that she/he is completely independent of other modalities that give meaning to the image (cinematic text). These kinds of social particularities to a sufficient degree influence the text-reader, as well as the author and construction of the text.

Even though the site of production includes computerized technologies, production materials, location, finance, and authorship, in this paper I will include the authorship of *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*. This is important because the way the movie is narrated, formed and/or edited has an enormous impact on its viewers. For example, the movie's formation is vital to a movie production which indicates that its material (people, place, and the story) is representative and corresponds to the viewers' experiences and expectations of how that certain object looks. In addition to this argument, a great movie, generally, means that two factors are present: "a good script and a director's inspiration, vision, intelligence, and supervision of all aspects of the movie's production" (Barsam, 2004). Based on particular expectations from the scriptwriter or the director, we make decisions to go to a movie or choose not to go. In the case of *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, I wanted to know what intentions were put forwarded by the production side to attract viewers, and what messages were meant to be infused in the movie. One interview with one scriptwriter may not tell the whole story behind the production line but it still gives important clues for what sort of geopolitical messages were imbedded in a movie. For this reason, I completed an hour-long semi-structured face-to-face interview³ with Cuneyt Aysan, one of the scriptwriters of the *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, about various aspects of the movie and reasons behind making such a political-action movie. This face-to-face conversation with the scriptwriter helped me better understand the cinematic codes of the *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* and motivations behind making such movie. This open-ended dialogue with the scriptwriter also helped to open new doors of understanding of the site of production and the fictionalized messages of the movie.

I also included an interview with an aid worker from the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) who was one of the activists in Mavi Marmara. He was also invited to see the premiere of *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*. I talked to him about the movie because of the extent the movie succeeded to be the voice for the Mavi Marmara and its ability to cinematize Palestinian drama⁴. The movie begins the scene with the IDF's raid of the ship in the Mediterranean. The idea to include an activist's opinion was to understand how reality is coded into the imaginary and how the imaginary created the truth-effect in reality.

³ The interviews are conducted in Istanbul by the author in 2011.

⁴ IHH was the organization responsible for galvanizing the international movement to break the Gaza blockade in 2010.

Imaginations are rehearsals of realities

My interview with the activist initially aimed to highlight how entertainment production helps us to understand Turkey's geopolitical vision in the world. As the interviewee notes, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* production is just one side of the series of events that give important clues about Turkish geopolitics and the Turkish people's understandings of regional affairs. For that reason, our conversation touched on various topics especially the movie's authenticity. In this sense, I asked if *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* producers had contacted IHH personnel to get inside information about the Mavi Marmara attack. Following are the answers and my interpretations of those answers and what they mean for a student of geopolitics. However, here you will only read the responses about insight the IHH provided for the production of the movie and how the Mavi Marmara activist sees non-government organizations' role on disseminating Turkey's new story to the kin geographies. In this paper, I excluded responses that related to what happened in Mavi Marmara for confidentiality.

The activist:

Yes, some of our friends, including myself, from the IHH are interviewed with the movie team. During this meeting, one of the scenarists, Raci Sasmaz, highlighted that one of their intentions was to contribute to the Palestinian cause and Turkey's firm stand on the issue. Sasmaz mentioned that the Pana Film also wanted to do something about the lawlessness of the raid as to honor Mavi Marmara activists' effort which only few could have attempted to do.

Then I wanted to know what the activist thought about the relationship between the current AK Party government's emphasis on extrovert Turkish foreign affairs and the recent productions of the conservative cinema that bombards the market with national and Turkish narratives.

The activist:

Of course, these are not so separate from each other. But, Turkish cinema's openings to the outside of the borders of Turkey should not be automatically associated with the current government's foreign policies only. Non-profit organizations' years-long works should be included as well. Owing to these organizations, Turkish society became aware of the outside world especially the geography that we were familiar with once. For example, our people went to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Africa, and so on. Our people have always been interested in Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Being the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire necessitated this interest. And Palestine is just one of these places. If movies such as *Valley of the*

Wolves-Palestine and *Iraq* are interested in these areas, it is because our people are interested in these areas. Jerusalem is no different than Istanbul in the eyes of the Turkish people. That is also why people support organizations such as the IHH and movies such as *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*.

The statement above draws attention to Turkey's abysmal relations with the former Ottoman territories from multiple dimensions. Thus, it would be too narrow thinking if we attribute Turkey's opening to former Ottoman territories solely on the basis of practical geopoliticians activities and Turkey's diplomatic missions. Different non-state actors in Turkey are also responsible for establishing and strengthening historical and geographical ties with the region. These actors' connections with people outside Turkey's formal boundaries should be taken in to account and considered part of civil diplomacy (Ozkan, 2010). Movies like *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* only enhance these connections and help diffuse cultural symbols that are familiar to people in the former Ottoman territories. In this sense, the activist also highlights the functionality of popular products abroad and their geopolitical visions that serve to Turkish soft power around the world.

The activist:

In the past, at borders, we would be questioned longer than any other nationals. But today, many countries around the world welcome the Turkish passport. And Turkish people surely enjoy this when they are treated welcomed. Let me share with you a story of mine. When I was in Nigeria, I stayed in a hotel that was owned by a Lebanese. When he saw my passport, he asked me if I watch *Valley of the Wolves* television series. First, I did not understand what he was talking about then he showed me the entire CD collection of the episodes. And he was a Christian man. Since then, I began thinking that besides non-profit organizations, Turkish popular cultural products are also active and useful in representing Turkey. In other words, what Hollywood has accomplished abroad that is what Turkish popular culture is achieving today.

The activist speaks cautiously not to generalize the changing perception of the Turkish passport simply with dissemination of popular culture. He also indicates other parameters such as a growing economy, political stability in the country, and Turkish people's international mobility that helps change Turkey's image in the world. But, the activist continuously emphasizes the importance of Turkish entertainment products abroad. Nevertheless, our conversation interestingly came back to Ottoman factors.

The activist:

Turkey and Turkish non-profit organizations are active in many countries. For example, they restore historical buildings such as mosques and bridges, send humanitarian aid to those in need, and organize cultural events in Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Albania, and in many other kin-states. These things were associated with developed countries like the US, England or France, but now with Turkey also. Turkey's international inactivity for almost a century is disconcerting, but now people are getting excited about moving beyond their borders.

As a follow-up question, I asked him this: Can we say that *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* is a cinematic way of saying sorry to former Ottoman subjects. We are sorry because we have ignored this geography for so long but we have not forgotten about you. From now on, the Palestinian cause is our cause.

The activist:

Imaginations are rehearsals of realities. In Turkey, there is this hope to embrace and unite the people of all these familiar geographies. This is my expectation too. Because, I went to these regions and I saw people oppressed, exploited and live in hardship while others enjoy their high living standards. And this upsets me. For example, I went to many parts of Africa. In those countries, I saw 400 years-old roads that arrive at ports. These are the only roads people still use today. But it still feels like slaves are being exported on these roads. Perhaps not slaves are moving on these roads today but this time their natural resources are exported while modern products are ushering in. Here, our people also see these people are still being slaved through this new importation and modern imperial policies. In this atmosphere, empathy emerges. This empathy feeds our imaginations. And ultimately our imaginations are reflected within our collective culture such as art, cinema, music, and education. Then these imaginations turn into realities. Therefore, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* is the reflection of our imagination put into the cinema.

Encoding Valley of the Wolves-Palestine

In this part of the interview, I wanted to go beyond the decoding process and to see what kinds of geopolitical imaginations fed the site of the production of the movie. It was my intention to gain clues about what kinds of geopolitical priorities are adorned in the movie. Through this interview, I also wanted to see how the opinions of an activist parallel with the scriptwriter in a movie with a storyline of the incident in which the activist was part

of. I began asking the scriptwriter Cuneyt Aysan about the motivations for making this movie.

Cuneyt Aysan:

This movie's priority is this geography, Middle Eastern geography and then the whole world. With this movie, we wanted to take people's attention to the region's trouble spots [Palestine]. We believe that without establishing permanent peace in this part of the geography, there won't be peace in the world. In addition to that, we believe that there is this human tragedy, genocide, on this soil and if this genocide continues, world peace won't be possible or the negative perception for the west among Muslims will not change radically. More or less, this is what we wanted to say.

The movie, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, serves to recall a century-long collective memory and forgotten knowledge about Palestinian drama via cinematizing Palestinians and their tattered and torn geography through the lenses of Turkish geopolitical imaginations and cinematic formations fed with Turkish narratives.

In this respect, Aysan emphasizes the power of cinema and its ability to influence hearts and minds to change the perceptions of millions. He is very aware of this particularity of movies and acknowledges the fact that through *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* the Western-oriented Palestinian perceptions can be changed or at least challenged. Aysan believes that the public opinion about the Israel-Palestine issue is very much a result of the manufactured news of the Western media. That is why he thinks that their ultimate assignment is at least to unveil different statements on the matter if they cannot reverse the common perception completely.

Aysan continues and adds:

Media perception is really important. Media always have the power of presenting oppressed as cruel and the just as unjust. If you pay close attention to the information about Israel-Palestine, you will notice that this information is slanted and manufactured. The west thinks that the struggle in Palestine is between the terror and the legitimate state. We want to change this perception.

Aysan does not attempt to hide the political agenda embedded in the movie. He charges the movie with a mission and that mission is to change the conditions not only in minds but also on the ground. In other words, if his movie cannot succeed in changing things in reality, it leastways aims to do it in the minds of millions in cinema halls and living rooms. I then asked him if the movie is successful in this respect.

Cuneyt Aysan:

Even if one person sees the movie, it means success. The quantitative majority is not an important matter here; what is important is that how successful we are able to present an alternative version of the story objectively if we cannot change the perceptions completely. As I said, we made this movie to explain the problems of the region because the western media are approaching this issue in an orientalist way.

I asked again if his approach is also sided with errors and how his opinion would be different from that of Fox news', for example.

Cuneyt Aysan:

In the end, we, too, are the children of this land but our approach is not a Turkish approach. We believe that the problem of this geography is the lack of justice. But for centuries we did bring justice to this geography. We had established justice on this land in the past that had begun with Saladin. We are saying that why not we provide justice in Palestine again and end the oppression of the powerful.

I certainly believe in this. A powerful Turkey means powerful Muslims. A rich Turkey means rich Muslims. Turk here should not be associated with a certain ethnicity automatically. It should be read as to how Europeans understood the concept: a combination of Turk and Muslim. The two cannot be separated. Now, there is this successful Turkish experience in this geography which we cannot ignore. For this reason, of course, our starting point will be our people because we live here, and then the Arab countries and ultimately the entire world. Because the borders are so artificial, we say that our natural borders stretch as far as the borders of Libya and Kazakhstan. In other words, there is no project that foresees only the area of 787 thousand kilometers. This project addresses the entire geography from Bosnia to China. But why I say the priority should be given to the people of this geography is because Turkey is the driving force. Arab brothers are newly recovering. More or less, Turkey has the experience of 80 years of recovery. This makes us one step ahead of them.

Aysan understands that Turkey's leadership in the region is undeniable. To him, Turkey is not a transient lodger of the Middle East, Balkans or the other familiar geographies. Turkey is the natural locomotive of these geographies if not the protectorate. For that, in the eyes of the scriptwriter it is natural and perhaps necessary to prioritize Turkey in the re-making of Middle Eastern geopolitics. In the absence of Turkey, neither Palestinian nor the Middle East problems can be solved. Aysan is not alone with the idea of that Turkey is necessary for Turkey to remake of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The online

survey conducted by the author also states that 55 percent of respondents believe that in the absence of Turkey, a fair solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be accomplished. And more, 35.7 percent of the same respondents indicate that Turkey is the only international actor that can be a fair mediator between Israel and Palestine (Anaz, 2014).

However, at the very root of the argument on Turkey's leadership in the Middle East and how the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* enforces this agenda meld in different aspects of the movie. For instance, what the movie portrays and narrates seems to promote Turkish heroism and undefeatability. Therefore, I furthered the conversation by provoking the idea that what the movie really employs is the idea that Turkish heroism and patriotism are more important than caring about the Palestinian cause. To delve into this issue, I asked this question: I am forming this question from the comments that the viewers made. Some of them think that the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* is not really about Palestine or the people in the occupied territories. On the contrary, it is more about Turkey and Turkishness especially when considering the story of the movie and the scenes in which we see repeatedly the actions of three immortal Turkish heroes⁵ (referring to main characters Polat Alemdar, Memati and Abduley).

Cuneyt Aysan:

There is nothing about Turkey's leadership there. But there is oppression and shedding light on this oppression. Illumination occurs wherever Polat goes. Before Polat's arrival, those places were in dark and unknown. When they were lightened then the oppression became visible. Why Polat? Polat is a hero here and in Arab countries. To me he is a virtual Caliph. People also accepted him as a Caliph and wherever he goes people think that there is oppression and the hero is going there to eliminate that oppression even he does this virtually. He is honoring the people of those lands so to speak.

I continue to delve into this notion further and asked: As you know there are James Bond series too and in every series Bond has a mission. During the Cold War, he fought against Communism, after September 11th he began fighting against the dark organizations of the east and international terrorism. We see these geopolitical shifts in James Bond scenarios according to the changing world geopolitics. Similar to this, we saw *Valley of the Wolves-I-*

⁵ Before the scriptwriter answers my question, the third person in the room (he is one of the actors in the television series, *Valley of the Wolves-Ambush*) defies my question by asking another: "Pardon me! Isn't it the same in American films", implying if I am underrating the film.

raq (Anaz & Purcell, 2010) then *Valley of the Wolves-Gladio* and then *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*. Are the *Valley of the Wolves* series corresponding conjectural changes regarding Turkey's changing geopolitics in the last decade?

Cuneyt Aysan:

If our products are seen at that level, we would be very proud. Turkey's problem has always been this: a big nation with a short horizon. Foreign policy actors have always been an open-sore of this nation. During the Cold War, they all said that 'we are defeated, we are a small country and we have to accept to be a spare tire of a big country and we cannot produce policies independently. They always evaluated everything from military power; they ignored the capacity of soft power. The era has changed. Along with military power, soft power has effects too. They [actors of foreign affairs] thought that boundaries were drawn in 1923 and that set everything for us. No! Borders never end there and won't end in the future. Beyond the 1923 borders, there are collective histories, sorrows, experiences, and victories. These borders were artificial and forced. When these artificial borders collapsed, everything came to its natural boundaries.

Aysan challenges the Cold War psychology that has dominated Turkish foreign policy for a long time. As discussed in many studies, former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also emphasizes the invalidity of these borders and puts forward Turkey's willingness to nullify these artificial lines (Aras, 2014). Indeed Davutoglu in one of his speeches about the Syrian crisis signals Turkey's de facto exterritorial jurisdiction on Syria and notes that Syria cannot be left to its destiny declaring that "Syria is our problem" (Anadolu-Ajansı, 2012). Parallel to what the interviewees underline, Turkey's foreign policies in the last fifteen years have been extravert and inclusive of former Ottoman territories. This evidently tells us that it is not surprising to see the discursive similarity in the language created by popular culture and practical geopolitics. In a sense, popular culture and statecrafts feed and complete with each other in creating and reshaping the grammar of Turkish geopolitics. As I discussed earlier, cinema along with other popular cultural products forms a language that can be utilized to simplify and signify geopolitical events for the viewers. In this sense, it is the language of cinema that also helps practical geopolitics experts to code foreign policies and geopolitical priorities for the public. When we deeply examine the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine*, we see that the producers of the movie continuously refer Turks' military victories in the past and geographies of justice on former Ottoman territories (Anaz, 2014). Therefore, the cinema as in the case of *Valley of the Wolves-Pales-*

tine and politics as in the hands of AK Party exaggeratedly use, re-produce and popularize historic and symbolic figures for the greater returns and justifications. Therefore, Polat Alemdar is presented as an imaginary historical figure that was undefeatable. Thus, Polat is not just an ordinary actor to entertain viewers. He also fights for Turkey and naturally for the entire Islamic world. In this sense, Aysan continues to explain how modern cinema language is blended with and internalized symbolic figures.

Cuneyt Aysan:

James Bond is not one man; he is a symbol. He is the symbol of Britain. Polat is the same. He is not a man, he is a symbol. First, he is a Turkish hero and then he becomes the hero of the Islamic world. In other words, he is not going into Iraq or Palestine alone. He is trying to say that when Muslims fight together, no one can resist against that power. So, the important thing here is to unite these geographies. When this unification is formed, then no other entity would intervene in any Islamic geography. Polat has undertaken this mission. What is seen virtually is the reflection of this mission. To put it differently, the attention should be paid to what is behind this metaphor. We provide an idol for people and say that we can do this because Polat did it. This might be virtually correct but our heroes had done it in reality in the past.

Aysan believes that the lack of heroism in this part of the world for years caused total disorder as well as weakness of will to question imposed policies and practices in the region. For him, a solution necessitates collective nurturing and awareness. In today's dynamic way of life, who can provide this education and awareness is the entertainment; movies and television series. Through cinema and heroes, this geography can get rid of outsiders and perhaps establish order and justice. Polat has accomplished this in the imaginary world; in that case, someone will do it in the real one.

Again, Polat is neither a simple man nor an ordinary actor in this case. He is a symbol of resistance and a brand name for success. Unlike Bond, Polat is not only a talented agent working for the state department but he is an immortal Turkish hero sent and protected by God to establish order and eternal peace once again. Thus, his first mission is to defeat fears and self-despair in the minds of millions so that defeating real enemies in real situations becomes possible. This is why Polat continuously travels through any kind of challenged borders and becomes an extraterritorial hero, a hero of hope and success. Aysan adds this question: why do you think a child in Libya, Bosnia or Kazakhstan wears Polat's T-shirt because he also thinks that Polat is his hero.

Cuneyt Aysan:

There is a need to find new ways of regaining the lost taste in the last eighty years and *Valley of the Wolves* series and movies are one of the vehicles to achieve it. Here, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* fixes this disconnection. It functions as a kind of cable to reconnect the historical, identity, and cultural disunity between the generations [Turkey and Ottoman]. It reconnects the past with the present. In this sense, the *Valley of the Wolves* movies and series succeeded. People said that they knew this taste from somewhere. That is what we wanted to give our viewers every week and to our audiences in our cinema productions.

It is my understanding that, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* and many other products of Pana Film are not just television or cinema entertainment programs that concern economic returns. These entertainment sets are formed to be the bridge between the modern and the traditional, the present and the past, today and tomorrow, and here and there. These products are not a random choice of art productions; they are made out of necessity, responsibility, and imagination. Throughout the conversation, it became clearer that the *Valley of the Wolves* series is more than a phenomenon. In the eyes of the producers, *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* is an attempt to sew eighty years of ripped relationships between Turkey and Ottoman geographies.

Conclusion

This paper introduced two interviews. Although the first interview cannot be situated within the production site of the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* per se, it reveals important insights about how a cinematic text can employ geopolitical imaginations side by side with non-profit organizations. An interview with an activist of the IHH indicated that movie producers greatly benefited from different social actors' globally resonating political and social activities. In the end, both served to form and disseminate geopolitical discourses expressed by practical geopolitics experts. According to the interviewee, the real scene in the middle of the Mediterranean and the reel scene in the movie *Valley of the Wolves-Palestine* served the same purpose.

In the second interview with one of the scriptwriters of the movie, I aimed to better understand what sort of geopolitical conditions played a role in formulating such movie that gathered the attention of people from all over the world. Conversations with the scriptwriter highlighted that geopolitical imaginations and geographical codes that influenced the movie *Valley of the*

Wolves-Palestine, to some extent, corresponded with the geographical imagination that is internalized by the practical geopolitics experts in Turkey. The scriptwriter of the movie clearly emphasized that the movie had a mission to accomplish and that was to contribute to the Palestinian cause, and bridge familiar geographies and people. The scriptwriter also emphasized that Turkey's new story needed to be told beyond its official borders in all directions because he believes that the story of the movie, in the end, is the story of this geography.

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KİTAP İNCELEMESİ

Christopher Phillips, *The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016)

5 yıl boyunca 14 farklı ülkede yapılan çalışma ve saha araştırmaları sonucunda Christopher Phillips tarafından kaleme alınan bu eser, Suriye iç savaşının uluslararası ilişkiler boyutunu kapsamlı bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Yazar, kitabı on başlık ve bir sonuç kısmı olarak bölümlendirmiştir. Fakat bu ana başlıklar hakkında yazmaya başlamadan önce, kitapta anlatılanların daha anlaşılır olabilmesi için Suriye iç savaşına müdahil olan devletlerin ve önemli aktörlerin kimler olduğunu “Esad rejiminin müttefikleri” ve “rejimin karşıtları” şeklinde iki kısım halinde ayrıştırarak anlaşılır bir şekilde tasnif etmiştir. Ayrıca yazar, giriş kısmına başlamadan önce ayrıntılı bir harita da vererek anlatılanların okurun zihninde canlanmasını amaçlamıştır.

Kitabın giriş bölümünde, Suriye iç savaşının yol açtığı can ve mal kaybı istatistiksel verilere dayandırılarak savaşın yıkıcı etkisi gözler önüne serilmiştir. Suriye iç savaşı hakkında birçok kitap ve makale yazılmış olmasına rağmen bu kitabın ne tür bir gereksinimle ve bakış açısıyla yazıldığı yine bu bölümde açıkça ortaya konmuştur. Daha önce bu konu ile ilgili yazılanların genellikle Suriye'nin iç dinamiklerine odaklandığı ve bu dinamiklerin merkeze konularak uluslararası müdahalelerin ikinci katmanda değerlendirildiği ifade edilirken, bu kitabın uluslararası müdahaleleri Suriye iç savaşının tam merkezine koyarak yeni bir bakış açısı geliştirdiği belirtilmektedir.

Hamza Haşıl

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ABD, Rusya, İran, Suudi Arabistan, Türkiye ve Katar dahil olmak üzere toplam altı ülkenin Suriye iç savaşı boyunca kendi ajandalarını uyguladığı ve bu sebeple de savaşın daha da uzamasına sebep olduğu ifade ediliyor. İngiltere, Fransa, Çin, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Lübnan, Ürdün, Irak ve Mısır gibi ülkelerin ise iç savaşta rol oynamalarına rağmen diğer altı ülke gibi bağımsız ajandalarını uygulayamadığının altı çiziliyor. Devlet dışı aktörler olarak da Hizbullah'ın daha çok İran güdümünde, PKK ve IŞİD'in ise devletlerden bağımsız olarak iç savaşta yer aldığı vurgulanmaktadır.

Kitabın birinci bölümünde tarihsel bağlama odaklanılmıştır. Suriye iç savaşı öncesinde Ortadoğu'daki uluslararası ilişkiler ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca bu bölümde ABD hegemonyası algısının Ortadoğu'yu nasıl etkilediği ve bu algının 2003 Irak Savaşı sonrası nasıl değiştiği üzerinde durulmuştur. İç savaşa dahil olan altı dış aktörün savaş öncesindeki amaçları ve bakış açıları da yine bu bölümde değerlendirilmiştir.

İki, üç ve dördüncü bölümler genel olarak Suriye krizinin ilk yıllarını anlatmakta ve krizin nasıl iç savaşa dönüştüğünü açıklamaktadır. İkinci bölüm, Suriye'deki ayaklanmaların başlamasına sebep olan durumları irdelerken, bu ayaklanmaları bastırmak için Esad rejiminin uyguladığı baskı politikalarının mantığını analiz etmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde altı ana aktörün Mayıs-Ağustos 2011 arasındaki durumları ve tutumları değerlendirilmektedir. Bu altı aktörün nasıl Esad yanlısı veya karşıtı olduğu bu bölümde incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'nin Esad karşıtı pozisyon alması özellikle üzerinde durulan konu olmuştur. Türkiye, daha öncesinde Esad ile iyi ilişkiler kurarken daha sonra hangi sebeplerden dolayı Esad'ın iktidarı bırakması gerektiğini savunan bir pozisyon aldığı ayrıntılı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde ise Esad'a iktidarı bırakması için yapılan çok boyutlu çabalar ele alınmıştır. Ekonomik yaptırımlar, Arap ligi ve AB girişimiyle hazırlanan barış planları bu bölüm içerisinde üzerinde durulan konular olmuştur. Bu girişimlerin niçin başarısız olduğuna da değinilerek özellikle Rusya faktörüne değinilmiştir. Esad'ın iktidarını sürdürmesi, Rusya'nın desteği ile açıklanmıştır.

Beşinci, altıncı ve yedinci bölümlerde genel olarak iç savaş başladığında isimleri geçen bu altı ülkenin niçin başka grupları desteklediği ve bu durumun savaşı nasıl daha kompleks bir hale sokarak uzamasına sebebiyet verdiği tartışılmıştır. Beşinci bölümde temel olarak Esad karşıtı ülkelerin muhaleflere verdiği destek ele alınmıştır. Suriye muhalefetinin dönüşümü ayrıntılı şekilde ele alınırken dış aktörlerin muhalefetin zayıflamasına sebebiyet verdiği ifade edilmiştir. Bu noktada özellikle Suudi Arabistan'ın yıkıcı rolüne

dikkat çekilmiştir. Altıncı bölümde Suriye içinde savaşıyan değişik gruplara yapılan destekler ele alınmış ve Katar'ın buradaki rolünün son derece dikkate değer olduğu belirtilmiştir. Savaşın daha ilk safhasından itibaren Katar'ın silahlı muhaliflerin yanı sıra siyasi muhalifleri de açıktan destekleyen ilk ülke olduğunun altı çizilmiştir. Katarın bu tutumu savaşın ilk evrelerini etkilemiş ve savaşı şekillendirmiştir. Ayrıca Katar'ın muhaliflere yapmış olduğu finansal yardımlara bu bölümde özellikle değinilmiştir. Yedinci bölümde ise rejimin müttefikleri konu edinilmiştir. İran'a özel atıf yapılarak savaşın başladığı günden itibaren Esad'a verdiği destek vurgulanmıştır. İran'ın Suriye politikasının savunmacı bir anlayışla iç ve dış politikadaki kaygılarının bir bütünü olarak oluştuğu ifade edilmektedir. Ayrıca İran'ın 2003'ten itibaren Irak, Lübnan, Yemen ve Filistin'de yayılcı bir politika izlediği ve elde ettiği kazanımları özellikle de bölgedeki rakibi Suudi Arabistan'a karşı korumak istediği ifade edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, kendisine yakın olan Esad yönetiminin kaderini Suudi Arabistan'ın ellerine terk etmek istememesi ve mevcut statükoyu sürdürmek istemesi İran'ın Suriye politikasının oluşumunda etkili olmuştur. Yine bu bölümde Suriye iç savaşının sahada en tanınan aktörlerinden olan İranlı general Kasım Süleymani ve Kudüs Gücü hakkında bilgiler verilerek, faaliyetleri değerlendirilmiştir. Bu noktada Süleymani'nin en önemli icraatlarından birisi olarak rejime destek için 2013'te 50 bin kişilik Ulusal Savunma Gücü (NDF)'nü kurduğu ve bu sayıyı 100 bine çıkarmak için çalışma yürüttüğü ifade edilmiştir.

Sekiz, dokuz ve onuncu bölümler genel olarak Suriye'ye doğrudan yapılan dış askeri müdahaleleri irdelemektedir. Sekizinci bölüm batının Suriye iç savaşına müdahale tarzını sorgularken, niçin rejimi değiştirmek adına hiçbir batılı ülkenin kendi askeriyesini doğrudan Suriye'de konuşlandırmadığı sorunsalı üzerinde durulmaktadır. ABD'nin bu yöndeki tutumu özellikle tartışılmaktadır. Dokuzuncu bölüm, Suriye'de IŞİD'in yükseldiği 2014 yılından itibaren batılı aktörlerin niçin Suriye'nin doğu kısmına müdahale etmeyi seçtiğine değinilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu bölüm Suriye'nin parçalanmış yapısının resmini de çizmektedir. Ayrıca, diğer bölgesel gelişmelerin Suriye'deki aktörlerin hesaplarını nasıl etkilediği de yine bu bölümde değerlendirilmiştir. Tematik bölümlerin sonuncusu olan onuncu bölümde ise 2015 yazının sonlarına doğru Rusya'nın hava kuvvetlerini Suriye'ye konuşlandırma kararı üzerinde durulmuştur. Böyle bir kararın alınmasında Rusya'nın motivasyonunun ve bu kararın çatışma ortamına etkisinin neler olduğu ayrıntılı olarak tartışılmıştır. Rusya'nın Suriye iç savaşına müdahale etmeden önce

bir takım meşruiyet araçlarını kullandığına dikkat çekilmiştir. Hmeymim üssünün Rusya tarafından süresiz kullanımı anlaşması ve Esad'ın resmi daveti uluslararası kamuoyu nezdinde Rusya'nın meşruiyet araçları olmuştur. Rusya, rejimin daveti ile IŞİD'e karşı mücadele retoriğini sıklıkla kullanmıştır. Rusya'nın Suriye iç savaşına müdahalesi bütün dengeleri değiştirmiştir. Askeri yetersizlikler sebebi ile rejimin birçok bölgeden çekilmeye başladığı bir dönemde Rusya'nın Suriye'ye girmesi, iç savaşın rejim lehine evrilmeye başlamasına yol açmıştır.

Sonuç bölümünde ise on tematik bölümde ele alınan temel argümanlara genel itibarıyla değinilmiştir. Bu bölümde, ABD'nin Suriye iç savaşına doğrudan müdahale etmemesi, ABD'nin değişen Ortadoğu algısı ile açıklanmış ve Suriyeli muhalifler kadar Türkiye, Katar ve Suudi Arabistan gibi ülkelerin ABD'nin bu değişen algısını okuyamadıkları belirtilmiştir. Bu ülkelerin varsayımları, eski düzen için doğru olmakla birlikte, Obama döneminin yeni post-Amerikan Ortadoğu'su için geçersiz kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla ABD'nin Suriye iç savaşına müdahale edeceğine yönelik kesin inançları hayal kırıklığı ile sonuçlanmıştır.

Sonuç bölümünde altı çizilen konulardan bir diğeri de bu savaşın bir kazananın olmadığı ve herkesi bir şekilde kaybettiği argümanıdır. Bu noktada Katar, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan en çok kaybeden ülkeler olarak belirtilmiştir. Phillips'in yaptığı değerlendirmeye göre, Türkiye 2011 öncesi Ortadoğu'da bölgesel lider olma yolunda adımlar atarken, iç savaşla birlikte Suriye fiziksel bir engel olarak karşısına çıkmıştır. Ayrıca, milyonlarca mülteciye ev sahipliği yapması ve şehirlerinin IŞİD ve PKK terör örgütlerinin saldırılarına uğraması yönüyle de Türkiye, savaştan en çok etkilenen dış aktör olmuştur. ABD'nin ise bu savaşta en büyük zararının Ortadoğu'daki imajının sarsılması olmuştur. Sadece muhalifleri destekleyen ülkelerin değil, rejimi destekleyen ülkelerin de aynı şekilde bu savaştan zararlı çıktığı belirtilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, Suriye iç savaşının son bularak uzun süreli bir barışın tesis edilebilmesi için bölgesel konsensüsün sağlanmasının önemine dikkat çekilmiştir.

ORTADOĐU MIDDLE
ETÜTLERİ EASTERN
STUDIES

Genel Hususular

Ortadoğu Etütleri, Ortadoğu çalışmalarına yoğunlaşmış bir düşünce kuruluşu olan Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi (ORSAM) tarafından basılı ve e-dergi olarak yayınlanan hakemli bir siyaset, uluslararası ilişkiler ve fikir dergisidir.

Yılda iki kez yayınlanmaktadır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nin amacı, Türkiye'de sosyal bilimlerde Ortadoğu çalışmalarının gelişimini teşvik etmek ve uluslararası alanda Ortadoğu literatürüne nitelikli katkılar yapılmasına imkân sağlamaktır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanan çalışmalardaki değerlendirmeler, ORSAM'ın kurumsal görüşünü yansıtmamaktadır.

Yayın Koşulları

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanacak makalelerin, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında Ortadoğu coğrafyasıyla ilgili siyaset, siyasi tarih, uluslararası hukuk ve iktisat gibi konuları kapsamaması beklenmektedir. Ortadoğu literatürüne katkı sağlayacak nitelikte kavramsal çerçevesi sağlam, özgün, eleştirel bakış açısı getiren, çözümlenmeli araştırma ve incelemelere öncelik verilmektedir.

Yayın dili Türkçe, İngilizce ve Arapça'dır.

Makalelerde anlatım dilinin düzgün olması, düşüncelerin doğru bir mantık örgüsü içinde ifade edilmesi, referansların uygun biçimde kullanılması, varsayımların güçlü biçimde desteklenmesi, konuyla ilgili literatüre nüfuz edilebilmiş olması gerekmektedir.

Kitap değerlendirmeleri/incelemeleri, makale biçiminde hazırlanmış olmaları halinde kabul edilmektedir. İncelenen kitabın bir kopyasının, makul bir sürede iade edilmek üzere, Editör'e ulaştırılması gerekmektedir.

Makaleler yayınlanmadan önce yazarlarla eser sözleşmesi akdedilmektedir.

Telif ödemeleri, derginin yayınlanmasından en geç bir ay sonra yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca, yazarlara dergiden 5 kopya verilmekte, derginin ulaştırılmasında fayda gördükleri kurumlar/kişilerle ilgili sundukları notlar dikkate alınabilmektedir.

Biçimsel Esaslar

- Makalelerin dili Türkçe ya da İngilizce olmalıdır. İngilizce makalelerde imla ve noktalama kuralları açısından İngiltere İngilizcesi'nin kullanılması tercih sebebidir. Yazıların uzunluğu 4000-8000 kelime aralığında olmalıdır.
- Çalışmanın hazırlanmasında takip edilmesi gereken sıra şöyledir: Başlık, öz (abstract), anahtar kelimeler, asıl metin, ekler, notlar, referanslar (kaynakça), tablolar (başlıklarıyla birlikte müstakil sayfalarda), şekil açıklamaları (liste halinde), özet (summary).
- Öz bölümü (abstract) ortalama 150 kelime uzunluğunda olmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce özeti de sunulmalıdır.
- Makalelerde 6 ila 10 anahtar kelime bulunmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce anahtar kelimeleri de sunulmalıdır.
- Özetler (summary) 400 kelime uzunluğunda olmalı ve yalnızca İngilizce hazırlanmalıdır.
- Makale sahiplerinin, Editör aksini belirtmedikçe bir özgeçmişlerini sunmaları istenmektedir.
- Görsellerin yüksek çözünürlüklü olması ve siyah-beyaz baskıya elverişli olmaları gerekmektedir. Renkli görsellerin siyah-beyaz baskılarında ortaya çıkabilecek tutarsızlıklar dikkate alınmalıdır. Materyalin en uygun çözünürlükte olduğundan emin olunmalı ve metin içine yerleştirilmeden bilgisayar ortamında ayrı bir dosya olarak olarak iletilmelidir.
- Anadili İngilizce veya Türkçe olmayan yazarların makalelerini göndermeden önce, metinlerini dil

konusunda ehil bir uzmana okutmaları ve düzeltirmeleri gerekmektedir. Yoğun dilbilgisi ve anlatım hatası olan metinler değerlendirmeye alınmamaktadır.

- Latin alfabesi kullanılan dillerde isim orijinal haliyle verilmektedir. Diğer dillerde yazılan isimler ise İngilizce veya Türkçe transliterasyonu ile kullanılmalıdır.

Dipnot Yazım Kuralları

Dipnotlar açıklayıcı olmalı ve mümkün olduğunca sık kullanılmalıdır. Dipnotlar makale içinde birbirlerini takip edecek şekilde artan rakamlar ile numaralandırılmalı ve metin sonunda yer alan ve açıklamaları içeren liste ile örtüşmelidir. Söz konusu listelerde kitap, makale ve metinlere dair verilen referanslarla uyumluluk ve isimler ile önemli sıfatların baş harflerinin büyük harf ile yazılması önemlidir. Aşağıdaki uygulamalı örneklerin dikkatle incelenmesi tavsiye edilir:

Kitaplar

Norman Stone, Kitabın Adı, (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67.

Norman Stone (ed.), Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67-9.

Norman Stone ve Sergei Podbolotov, Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2005), s. 99. Takip eden referanslar: Kıvrımlı, Kitabın Adı, s. 99.

Dergiler ve Makaleler

Norman Stone, "Makale Başlığı", Dergi Adı, Cilt. #, Sayı. # (Ay, Yıl), s. #. Takip eden referanslar: Kıvrımlı, "Makale Adı", s. #.

Derleme Kitap Makaleleri

Norman Stone, "Makale Adı", Hakan Kıvrımlı, "Kitap Adı" (London: Crimea Publis-hing Co., 2000), s.100.

Resmi Belgeler

Meclis Zabıtları: TBMM Yayınları (Meclis Yayınları, 1988, V), 111.

Tezler

E. Beytullah, "The Crimean Khans' relations with the Arab Amirs", yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Bilkent University, 1999, Bölüm 5, s.44.

Tekrarlar

Dipnotlarda uygun yerlerde "ibid." ibaresi kullanılmalı, ancak bu ibare önceki bilginin birden fazla kaynağa dayandığı durumlarda kullanılmamalıdır.

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