SALAFISM

• Presentation - M. Yavuz COŞKUN

• In the Beginning - Şehmus DEMİR

• Editorial - Halil HACIMÜFTÜOĞLU

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Throughout the history of mankind, religion has influenced human societies in various ways which has led to new forms of thought. From this point of view, it is possible to define human history as mostly a history of religion, and religious events. Therefore, seeing religion as a static structure that is independent of society and which does not ever change in any way, is incompatible with social reality.

In modern times, many approaches in the fields of society and ideas underwent a rapid change which has virtually become the paradigm of the last century. When looking at religion from a social dimension, it is not possible to exclude the field of religion from this process of change and to express that religion is not affected by this process. For this reason, it is inevitable that there will be a certain change in at least in a part of religious understanding, or religious perception and interpretation, due to the changing knowledge and cultural structure. This cause, which is the result of differentiating historical positions, can be defined as the guarantee for the Qur'an's universal nature. Because it is clear that by limiting interpretation, or a perception of revelation which was brought down in the seventh century, to the context of the time when it was brought down or for that matter, any period of time, would remove the universal attributes of the revelation since it would then cease to be an infinite element. In this context, religion can be likened to a stream that keeps carving its own riverbed and is partially shaped according to the characteristics of the places it travels through. Considering that the stream is in constant motion and renewal, it is a known fact that religion forms its own bed, and thus the change taking place is a necessity rather than a negativity.

While change is inevitable in the process of interpreting divine revelations, the scale of this change and whether the change is of a positive or a negative nature are very pressing issues. What is important here is the ability to not to fall into the illusion to think that any change is an advancement. Because decaying or rotting are forms of change too and this change cannot be evaluated positively.

The truth that is immediately recognized by those who are interested in a religion and want to know that religion better, is that there are different viewpoints of religion which is caused by adopting religious truths by various sub-identities at different points of time. In the shortest of explanations is the sect problem. Thus, the ways of understanding, and the perception and interpretations formed by these viewpoints, sometimes makes it immensely difficult to reach the pure and original message of religion. Historically and theologically, attempts to reach the essence of religion have brought the question of how to construe religious differentiation. As it has been throughout the course of history, this continues to be the main problem in understanding and resolving the problems related to religion.

In today's world, Islam is one of the world's most discussed subjects in terms of history, politics, geography and culture. In today's global world, where political, economic and cultural relations are becoming more frequent and intense, efforts aimed at understanding Islam, as well as efforts aimed to manipulate those efforts are very visible. In this context, the global media is apparently aiming to create a sharp Islamophobic perception using means of every communication tool. On the other hand, it is our duty to reiterate that religious approaches which claim that they follow the trail of the Prophet and the solution to current problems of the Islamic world lies in a return to Asr al-Saadat era, limit Islam into strict viewpoints and very limited models and inflict violence using the name of the Messenger of Allah, which only feeds islamophobia.

It is a known issue that after the Arab Spring, power struggles in the Middle East was mostly realized between sects. The fact that sectarian identities strictly define emotions and thoughts of the masses and have even more weight than religion leads to many problems. What needs to be done at this point is to let experts handle the subject from a scientific point of view and determine solutions.

Gaziantep University, which is one of the most important universities in the region and which aims to be active in all fields of social life, to not stay behind isolating walls, assumed a very important mission. We decided to handle the matter of *Salafism* in the first issue of The Journal of Theological Academia, which will begin its publishing life under the leadership of our Faculty of Theology. The historical roots, mentality, reflections on modern times, comparison of its current state to its very early approaches and other subjects related to Salafism, which is one of the most popular recent topics in the national and global scale and which has greatly affected the Islamic world too were approached by field experts with a scientific point of view.

We hope that this subject is correctly understood and that it is remembered that sects and religious formations are not the essence of religion, but interpretations of it. The establishment of exemplary societies can only be achieved when inspired by the Prophet who formed the esteemed society and stated "I was sent to complement the benevolent morals".

Prof. Dr. M. Yavuz COŞKUN
Rector

Başlarken / In the beginning

It is fair to state that Islam has undergone a period of great depression and trauma. It is a fact that this process, that has spanned for more than two centuries has caused a deep ideological crisis. The aggressive - reactional approaches of different views that range from holistically imitating traditions, to imitating the Western world and adapting modernity can be found in this process, which caused

singular fact-based approaches to expand and opposition within the Islamic world with low tolerance levels towards one another to emerge and deepen. However, scientific research in social sciences should be based on analyzing a subject in its cultural system rather than focusing on accepting or rejecting it. By doing so, the genetic sources of the issues faced by people can be determined.

Calculating the historical process of the last couple of centuries is inevitable for the present time. It is a must that this settlement should be performed with a realistic and critical approach and without the reflexes of advocacy or rejection, or the artificiality of absolute objectivism.

This journal, which will be published in Gaziantep, is a city with a great accumulation of culture with a door opening to the Middle East, and has a distinctive mission. Gaziantep undertakes its activities in line with a purpose and a statement that reaches beyond the only purpose of contributing to the literature or serving as another journal for the academy. In a period when an approach that is far from deep meanings and a section of the history is presented as the historical experience itself, which causes severe misinformation, we will have a style and presence without sacrificing a critical attitude, serving as the back yard of anybody and by avoiding ideological obsessions... We promise to present the truth at all costs...

Prof. Dr. Şehmus DEMİR
Dean

Editörden/ Editorial

> "A journal is the castle of a free ideology. Maybe a bit roving, but a fresh and new ideology. A book is often a work and reflection of a single person while a journal indicates a collection of different minds. A journal is the testament, or more precisely the message of a generation. Any terminated journals mean a lost battle, defeat or suicide."
>
> Cemil MERİÇ

Hello to all,

The Journal of *İlahiyat Akademi*, the formal academic media of the Faculty of Divinity of Gaziantep University, started its publication life after publishing the first issue you are currently holding. I hope that this new journal, a delayed initiative I should say, will bring our academic society a new breath, movement and dynamism.

The subject of our first issue is '**Salafism**' from different aspects. Considering the fact that the number of Turkey's faculties of divinity has reached ninety in the last couple of years, and each has a formal faculty journal active or soon-to-be active, starting a journal of divinity with a particular subject and having the ambition to continue in this way later may appear difficult or even risky for the journal's future. However, the faculty administration and us, as the publication team, are all aware of this difficulty and risk, but we have the mentality that "significant efforts should be made" in this period. May Allah help us in this path we have taken with sincere intentions and efforts.

It must not be that hard to predict the reason why we preferred the mentioned topic. We could not have stayed indifferent to the developments in our geography, where active changes have taken place in the last ten to fifteen years, and in the intellectual, scientific, religious, sectarian, social and political backgrounds of these developments, we had to present our ideas. In addition to conducting extensive studies in our fields, we as the academicians, have the responsibility to share the results and findings of our studies with society and illuminate people. We are expected by government and society to thoroughly analyze and explain what happened in the Islamic science field in the past and present time, the real reasons for what we have experienced, and the relevant reasons and outcomes. We decided that '**Salafism**' is the most appropriate subject for our first issue in the relevant considerations.

The articles, which were published in this current issue, were written by scientists in Turkey who are the most competent people in their fields. These articles can also illuminate academic societies and society itself, and each of them is particularly significant and important. Making such a great start like this makes us both happy and hopeful for the future.

I take this opportunity to extend my deepest gratitude primarily to the administration of our university and faculty that provided both financial and spiritual contributions, and to the editorial board, publishing advisory board, authors and reviewers of the articles, and editorial, publication and distribution teams. Moreover, I extend my heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Dr. Metin YURDAGÜR, academic member of the Faculty of Divinity of Marmara University, who proofread this issue.

I expect demands, suggestions and criticisms from you, our esteemed readers. May Allah grant you peace and wellness until we meet in our next issue entitled '**Religion (Religiousness) and Alienation**'.

Sincerely Yours...

Asst. Prof. Dr. Halil HACIMÜFTÜOĞLU
Editor of *The Journal of Theological Academia*

The History of Salafi Thinking[*]

Mehmet Zeki İŞCAN[**]

Abstract

The development and transformation of Salafism is the topic of this study. Salafism means turning back to the salaf and rejecting imitation which corresponds with the idea of cleaning religion from *bidaths*. Cleaning religion from "foreign components" and the intention of returning to the "purity" of the first Islamic society are mentioned in Salafism. Salafism means turning back to Quran and sunnah, contrary to the usage of the mind and 'new trends'. It is following the way of the Shabis by leaving philosophy and kalam for the sake of loyalty to 'ilm' condensed in the experience of ancestors in the Salaf era. The salafi movement acknowledges that life has been completed in the "past" by the beloved first generations, and that the thinking the style of the present, future and past has a meaning through time. The only standard for the practice as a human being, individual and society, is 'âsar' which has emerged in the past. In other words, religion is 'âsar'.

Keywords: Salafism, ahl al hadith, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya

Tarih Boyunca Selefî Söylem

Özet

Bu çalışmada Selefiliğin tarihi süreçteki gelişimi ve dönüşümü ele alınacaktır. Selefilik, selefe dönüş, taklidi red, dini bidatlerden arındırma anlayışına karşılık gelmektedir. Selefilikte "yabancı unsurlardan" dini temizleme ve ilk İslam toplumunun 'saf'lığına dönme niyeti söz konusudur. Selefilik, aklın kullanımını esas alan 'yeni yönelişler' karşısında, Kitap ve Sünnet'e dönmek, rey ile konuşmamak, sahabe ve tabiinin yolunu takip etmek, felsefe ve kelamı bırakıp, 'ilm'e yani geçmişte (self dönemi) atalar tarafından tecrübe edilerek bilinene tabi olmaktır. Selefi yöneliş, yaratanın elinden çıkmış olarak hayatın "geçmişte", "Allah ve Rasulü'nün övdüğü" ilk nesiller eliyle tamamlanmış olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Bu zihniyette 'şimdi' ve 'gelecek', "geçmiş" zaman içinde anlam kazanmaktadır. İnsan, fert ve toplum için amelin tek hüküm standardı, geçmişte ortaya konmuş 'âsar'dır; din 'âsar'dır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefilik, ehl-i hadîs, Ahmed b. Hanbel, İbn Teymiyye

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Introduction

There is confusion regarding the ideological content of Salafism. Salafism is occasionally regarded as strict traditionalism, primary traditionalism, denial of traditions, revival of religion, clearing the religion and mind from superstitions and innovations, or even religious innovation and Islamic modernism[1].

The concept of Salafism suggests an aim to rebuild Islam against the process of innovation from an outer source, rather than a remarkable doctrinal source. There are two elements that complement this concept. The first indicates analyzing everything based on Quran, sunnah and sharia, and reviewing sources with absolute literalism. Consequently, humans' actions and behaviors in salafism are holistically examined from a religious aspect. The second indicates innovation, which suggests anything added to pure traditions and is regarded as an anomaly. Even though the added element is harmless, Salafism aims to terminate what is new. The most significant characteristic of Salafism is extremist refusing.

Salafism appears to be a religious improvement movement with its evidence throughout history. Islamism in the twentieth century with the partisanship toward Ahl al-Hadith and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah movement, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab movement and many other aspects considered its main principles as transformation to religious basics, clearing the innovative actions toward the basics, and adapting the Quran and hadiths while paying less importance to sects. In addition, the concept of Salafism suggests the adaptation of the salaf formed within a tawhid principle is explained from the aspect of religious practices, refusing imitations, and removing the religious innovations from Islam.

However, the concept of improvement and reformation in Salafism does not aim to bring innovation or to protect the religion and mind from the pressure of various factors. Instead, it aims to remove the foreign elements from Islam to adapt back to the the purist form of the first Islamic society. Improvement means adapting the Quran and sunnah against the "new trends" that are based on rationalism, interpreting without ra'y, and following the sahabah and tabi'un. It also indicates abandoning rational comparisons or Greek concepts, philosophy and kalam, and adapting Islamic philosophy, which was experienced and performed by the ancestors in the past (Salafism era)[2].

Although this discourse is not regarded as an independent sect, the efforts to determine when it emerged in the Islamic philosophy history should be based on criteria above. Salafism should be considered as an objection against the actions that took place in the religious context and the relevant historical process should be based on this aspect.

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[1] See: Muhammad Ammara, *as-Salafiyyah*, Dar al-Maarif, Tunisia, trans., p. 5-6.

[2] See: Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwa*, Dar al-Alam al-Kutub, Riyadh 1991, XII, 349-350, XVI, 471-476.

I. The Supporters of Islamic Works as the Pioneers of Salafism

Salafism is based on the idea of calling the "Salafism era" as a "spiritual" or "golden era", which makes the interest in the relevant history, nostalgia, and truths of the past unique. Within this context, humanity develops itself by adapting the ethical life that emerged in the past and acquired an ontological value[3]. Accordingly, Salafism followers acquire a functional charismatic role, and the great names of the past become 'homoreligious.'

Assigning a functional charisma to Salafism followers occurs as a result of the actions happening within religious theory. Religious theory was revealed through revelations and declared to Muslims by the founder of Islam, thus gaining its final form. However, various actions that necessitated reviewing this concept again also took place. As a result of these actions, the need to organize theory and to balance different sections emerged. The Quran was interpreted and explained for that purpose. These actions also necessitated the consideration of Islamic theory. The most important element directing individuals to religious theory with compulsion is the contact between the religious theory and other theories[4], and the efforts to provide a universal identity to religious theory, which is a result of this new process.

The actions within the religious theory causes an objection against the separation of religion from doctrinaire characteristics[5]. The efforts based on explaining and interpretation activities are occasionally regarded as the importation of certain factors that are not included in religious content. Thus, the aim to remove the additions and changes from the religion and to restore the religion back to its basics emerges. The inclination to adapt the simple philosophy and lifestyle of the first Islamic society becomes dominant in these objections. Adapting the 'basics of the religion' by following the teachings of the first congregations is advocated[6]. Accordingly, the religious authority of the Salafism followers emerges in a functional manner.

The equivalent of the same case in Islam is accepting the first two or three generations, which emerged as a reaction to the development of kalam and fiqh activities, as the religious authority.

If Salafism is accepted as the period when the salaf developed as a religious authority, the earliest history may suggest the era when efforts were made to find a solution for the problem of integrating the public and culture of the first region conquered in the Islamic history to Arabic-Islamic congregation.

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[3] Steven Lukes, "Rulership and Authority", trans. Sabri Tekay, *History of Sociological Analysis*, Tom Bottomore-Robert Nisbet, pub. prep. Mete Tuncay- Aydın Uğur, Ayraç Yayınevi, Ankara 1997, p. 643-646.

[4] Hans Freyer, *Din Sosyolojisi*, trans. Turgut Kalpsüz, A.U. İlahiyat Fak. Yay., Ankara 1964, p. 54.

[5] Joachim Wach, *Din Sosyolojisi*, trans. Ünver Günay, M.U. İlahiyat Fak. Vakfı Yay., Istanbul 1995, p. 216.

[6] Freyer, *ibid.*, p. 60-61; Wach, *ibid.*, p. 216; Âmiran Kurtkan Bilgeseven, *Religious Sociology*, Filiz Kitabevi, Istanbul, 1985, p. 278.

Consequently, it is fair to state that the concept of salaf started to gain a religious identity in the era of 'Umar ibn Abd al-aziz (d. 101/720) (late Hijri first century and early second century). 'Umar ibn Abd al-aziz believed that Muslims' methods should be determined when different methods emerged. According to him, those who followed the sunnah presented in the salaf period would be rewarded, but those who objected to this sunnah would have followed another method[7]. The caliph formally declared that it is necessary to be a "follower rather than a beginner", to adapt to the sunnah, and to abandon innovations. What should be done is to revive the sunnah (i.e. the old lifestyle) and abandon innovative actions[8].

The terms used to refer these religious inclinations in the classic sources of that era and later are "ahl al-asar", "ahl al-hadith" or "ashab al-hadith." These terms mean adapting to what was left from the ancestors, adapting to the sunnah, and adapting to hadiths[9].

The partisanship towards Islamic works follows the social authority of the Islamic pioneers' teachings against the ideas formed in the context and philosophy of rationalism based on the concepts such as ra'y, interpretation and explaining. The term, work, is defined as the opposite of the sunnah, hadith, and innovation. In other words, the partisanship towards the sunnah suggests firmly adapting the salafism method (minhaj as-salaf) against the 'new' methods[10]. Ahl al-asar suggests the adaptation of Islamic works away from rationalism and innovation[11]. The partisanship toward the works means following the narratives from the sahabah and tabi'un, and abandoning ra'y and interperative activities[12]. Thus, the partisanship towards the works was also regarded as *ahl ar-rivayah* (the movement of those believing that religion only consists of the narratives)[13].

II. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, The First Imam of Salafism

As the most distinctive characteristic of partisanship towards work and hadiths is to consider the sunans as a religion, it is fair to state that the first representatives were those who attempted to make the traces of past dominant in every aspect of daily life. Ahmad ibn Hanbal is known as the person who improved this movement in the third

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[7] See: Ibn Abdilberr, Jamii *Bayan al-Ilm wa Fadlihi,* presentation: Abd al-karim al-Hatib, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, Cairo 1982, p. 556.

[8] See: Ibn Sa'd, *at-Tabakat al-Kubra*, Dar as-Sadir, Beirut, trans., V, 342.

[9] See: Abu Ubaid al-Kasim ibn Sallam, *Kitab al-Iman*, inv. Muhammad Nasuriddin al-Albani, al-Maktabat al-Islami, Beirut 1983, p. 19; Al-Tabari, *Tarih al-Umam wa'l-Muluk,* inv. Muhammad Abu al-Fadl İbrahim İbrahim, Beirut trans., I, 28, 74, 66.

[10] Abu Ubaid, *Kitab al-Iman*, p. 9, 29, 35.

[11] Muhammad ibn Nasr ibn al-Hajjaj al-Marwazi (d. 294/906) *as-Sunnah*, inv. Salim Ahmad as-Salafi, Beirut 1408, p. 97-99.

[12] al-Lalakai, Habatullah ibn Hasan ibn Mansur, *I'tikadu Ahl as-Sunnah*, Riyadh 1402, I, 179-182.

[13] See: Abdullah ibn Adiyy ibn Abdillah ibn Muhammad Jurjani (d. 365/975), *al-Kamil fi Duafa ar-Rijal*, Beirut 1998, VI, 291; VII, 145.

century. Ahmad ibn Hanbal was the leader of the partisans for hadiths in the improvement era. Following his efforts, the partisanship towards hadiths acquired a political focus and identity (with an oppositional aspect), which may be the reason why it gained a fanatical dimension. Ahmad ibn Hanbal supported the divine kalam, that is the religious base for the authority of hadith ulama and thus the legitimacy of works against the concept, "Quran is a creature." Therefore, ashab al-hadith was associated with him[14].

Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ashab al-hadith concepts affected the political activities with the control of ideas by a local cultural essentialism, colonization of religious life, bringing elements with local characteristics to the forefront in Islam, and the claim that Islam, the religion that is closed with certain historical matters, is universal.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal's religious view paved the way for confining religious ideas and beliefs with the revealed text and sunnah. Interpreting hadiths and the Quran literally resulted in making the sharia more Islamic. According to this belief, no legal provision that is not directly derived from the divine sources can be valid. The provision of Allah and Prophet is the result of the absolute will that determines every mortal element in the World, including people's actions[15].

In other words, the law that is practiced through the Prophet's sunnah represents the religious authority, not only before the caliph's authority, but also before the mind, ra'y, beliefs, kalam efforts, and philosophy. With Ashab al-Hadith, hadiths became as important as the Quran. This brought the superiority of Salaf ideas to canonists' personal ideas closer to being a religion. Therefore, fiqh and hadiths were largely equalized. Ra'y partisanship and the interest of the indefinite seen in the fiqh area have been atrophied. Until that day, ahl ar-ra'y meant the freedom of mortal world or "a sort of view from the below." Fiqh tamed and secularized the religious provisions, thus making them closer to humans. "The superiority of hadiths to fiqh legitimized the intervention of past lifestyles towards social processes.

It is not possible to separate the principles of ahl al-asar and ashab al-hadith, that are related to doctrines and eternal world as an argumentative ideology, from the practical emergence of Islam. God, in this context, is combined with tribal traditions and has turned into judgment for social cases. Thus, the concept of God and doctrine acquires a protest identity against the changing world. In addition, the doctrine work courses of partisans lack spirituality, wisdom and knowledge.

God is reflected from an ideological and local perspective in the ashab al-hadith. God is thought to have limbs, sit on a throne and descend to the world from the sky, and holistically related to a physical power.

[14] Qadi Abi Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, inv. Muhammad Hamid al-Faki, Matbaat as-Sunnet al-Muhammadiyyah, Cairo 1952, I, 92.

[15] Sami Zubaida, *İslam Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, trans. Burcu Koçoğlu Birinci- Hasan Acak, Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay., Istanbul 2008, p. 130.

The eschatological themes are intensively used in ashab al-hadith. The terms in Quran such as the world of sky, the ninth heaven, and sky, were mentioned with the typical content reflecting certain truths with the support of hadiths.

Metaphysical philosophy of ashab al-hadith suggests the primary theodicy types. Personal lives are embedded within social lives in these types regardless of whether they are humane or not. The whole universe is surrounded by the 'divine powers.' People's lives are not totally separated from the universal life extending from one side to the other side of the globe[16].

III. Ibn Taymiyyah, The Second Imam

Ahmad ibn Hanbal is the person seen as the second imam by the Salafism followers is Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728/1328), who was a Hanbali member that reviewed tawhid doctrines with an approach different than that of other theological sects, and presented it as a religious-social principal. According to him, tawhid should only be associated to the commitment to the Quran and sunnah because considering people's ideas and ra'ys while making decision is also within the context of polytheism. Ra'y means using the religious works with a mortal approach, which indicates polytheism and acts against the divine tawhid.

The concept of Salafiyyah is often seen in Ibn Taymiyyah's and Ibn Kayyim's works. Thus, it is fair to state that the first use was performed by Ibn Taymiyyah. Another appropriate point is that concept of "salafiyyah" was first achieved by Ibn Taymiyyah[17].

The conceptual preference of Ibn Taymiyyah indicates that Salafism suggests the aim of removing foreign elements that breached through the Islamic philosophy from the religion and adapt to the pureness of the first Islamic society. Salafi direction (al jihad as-salafiyyah), in Ibn Taymiyyah adopts the Quran and sunnah against the 'new inclinations' (al jihad al-bidiyyah) that are based on using the rationalist approach in the basics of religion. Nabawi and salafi direction (at-tarikat an-nabaviyyah as-salafiyyah) means abandoning ra'y while talking about Allah and following the methods of sahabah and tabi'un. It also indicates abandoning the rationalist comparison or Greek rationalism, philosophy and kalam, and adapting Islamic philosophy.[18].

Salafiyyah indicates commitment to the Quran and the sunnah, to avoid any explaining which was also avoided by the sahabah and tabi'un. According to Ibn Taymiyyah however, Allah depicted himself and however the Prophet depicted Allah should be accepted. The sahabah 'as-Sabikun al-avvalun' did not do anything out of Quran and hadiths. 'Mazhab as-salaf' followed a policy, the context of which is regarded to be similar to both 'ta'dil' (rejecting Allah's titles) and tamsil (considering

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[16] See: Mehmet Zeki İşcan, *Selefilik İslami Köktenciliğin Tarihi Temelleri*, Kitap Yayınevi, Istanbul 2006, p. 247-248.

[17] İşcan, *Salafism*, p. 29.

[18] İşcan, *Salafism*, p. 29.

Allah to be similar to creatures), which is the salafi inclination (at-tarikat as-salafiyyah). For example, the Salafiyyah sect does not explain the term, 'divine light', in the verse, "Allah is the light of heavens and skies." They do not accept the action of descending in the hadith, 'Allah descends to the sky of the world' as a metaphor[19].

The preference of Ibn Taymiyyah indicates that although salafiyyah accepted Ahmad ibn Hanbal as the imam, they also intended to improve their understanding, as ahl al-hadith and ashab al-hadith became uncertain and complex in time and lost their simple structure. However, the meaning of salafiyyah in the ahl al-hadith for Ibn Taymiyyah was not extensive, and essentially no improvement was made.

For example, the concept of true mind for Ibn Taymiyyah is the extension of the belief that 'The only correct sources are the Quran and sunnah which explains the Quran.' According to Ibn Taymiyyah, religion and narration are essential. The mind only serves to understand and confirm a matter or action. People have different mindsets, and the mindsets of the present do not match those of the future. Narration, on the other hand, is always integrative. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah's 'true mind' cannot be regarded as an indicator that he pays importance to the mind. In addition, Ibn Taymiyyah bases his opinion on a sort of rationalist approach associated with Fahreddin Razi, and he objects to the following statement: "Rationalistic evidence is accepted when they contradict with Prophetic evidence because Prophetic evidence cannot provide accurate information.

Ibn Taymiyyah's call for adaptation to the salaf serves as a literal law that is implemented without the need for any interpretations or revisions. The salaf were sacralized and made a part of religion, rather than history in this context.[20] Afterwards, the Salafist transformation turned into a radical purist movement, which terminated all Islamic collections and acted in a manner to improve the Asr as-Saadah era, with an unserious attitude arising from having no historical mission.

Ibn Taymiyyah considered the unity of the existence movement in Sufism as a religious innovation, and criticized it severely.[21] Kalam authorities of Ibn Taymiyyah were accused of neglecting Quran-based evidence, the main religious source, while accepting philosophical evidence. Ibn Taymiyyah suggested that Islamic doctrines should be based on the Quran, and the sunnah which serves as Quran's explanations.

These processes reflect the efforts to identify Islam with the confined attitude of congregation. Kalam, Sufism, philosophy, ra'y and ideological opposition indicate the following in Ibn Taymiyyah: I have the truth. Commitment to this truth is a must. No

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[19] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu Fatawa*, V, 28; VI, 51-56, 374-379; X, 99; XII, 309.

[20] Fazlurrahman, *İslâm*, trans. Mehmet Dağ-Mehmet Aydın, Selçuk Yay., Istanbul 1981, p. 288-289.

[21] See: Fazlurrahman, *Islam*, p. 209, 245.

truth other than mine can be found. Nothing humanly can be valuable. Nothing from outside (the scope of 'outside' is quite broad) can be received.[22]

Ibn Taymiyyah, who was such a partisan authority that he stated 'I would be willing to live under the authority of a cruel sultan rather than living without the authority of a sultan for one day', and attempted to stop the collapse of Arabic authority and culture with the 'shariah unity' thesis as the Mongols captured the authority. He mentioned the religious aspect of the government with the following statement: "Unserious religious actions should be abolished by the Sultan." Therefore, he stated that Mongols are not Muslims although they considered themselves as so, and thus it would be necessary to revolt against them[23].

These ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah corresponded to the modern Salafists' emphasis on the presence of an order and political system where Islamic shariah is dominant. In addition, his ideas on Mongols supported the action of rejecting and revolting against 'foreign authorities and government styles' that were believed to be dominant in the Islamic world. This trend, which killed Sadat in Egypt, is known to associate this action to Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwa on Mongols.

Rejecting the innovations results from the concern of protecting a certain lifestyle, as seen in Ashab al-hadith, for Ibn Taymiyyah. Rejecting imitation suggests the condemnation of the evaluation of new social forms through mind, idea, reports and ta'vil. It also means rejecting the mind, rational interpretation, and expression of religion on a universal basis. The reason why Ibn Taymiyyah regarded Sufism as a non-Islamic movement is that he did not accept the philosophical-religious concept. According to him, rational phantasm such as philosophy and kalam cannot be used for forming a religion.

Ibn Taymiyyah inspired the Salafists and Political Islamists holistically with his ideas. These processes transformed into the form of avoiding all non-Islamic orders in the modern Salafiyyah. In other words, these ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah meant rejecting the ideological background of non-Islamic social and political inclinations and Western trends in Salafism.

IV. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Wahabism

The movement of Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab (1703-1787), who was inspired by the Hanbali movement in the depressed cultural and political environment of the eighteenth century, *constitutes one of the most significant sources of Salafiyyah.* According

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[22] See: Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhaj as-Sunnah*, inv. Muhammad Rashad Salim, Maktabatu Ibn Taymiyyah, Cairo 1989, II, 62; III, 98-102, 289-290.

[23] See: Nazih Ayubi, *Arap Dünyasında Din ve Siyaset*, trans. Yavuz Alagon, Cep kitapları, Istanbul 1992, p. 25, 31, 44-45.

to what Ibn Taymiyyah's followers stated, the target of this movement is to turn Islam back to its pure basics and fight against innovations in Islam[24].

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab evaluated the tawhid from a practice-based perspective as Ibn Taymiyyah did. According to him, the true tawhid indicates recognizing the orders of Allah and Prophet as the only valid orders, considering anything that is not from the Prophetic era as innovation, and accepting Allah as the one and only, abandoning the mediators. This is called practicing the tawhid[25]. Tawhid separates faith from sacrilege. Thus, recognizing tawhid as only a belief, and degrading it to a belief-based level, means polytheism. The aim is to fight against those with this belief. Their blood and goods are lawful[26]. Accordingly, the Prophet fought against the Jews with the motto, 'La ilaha illallah.' The sahabah fought against a tribe named Bani Hanifi although the members of this tribe used the same motto and prayed[27].

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated that the absolute evidence are the apparent provisions of the Quran and hadith that are far from ta'wil. The evidence of the provisions in the Quran and sunnah are adapted, and all matters are interpreted through this evidence without commitment to any sects. Making judgments by imitating others is similar to polytheism[28].

Muhammad ibn It is possible to summarize all ideas of Abd al-Wahhab as follows: "tawhid takes place by following any orders but those of Allah and the Prophet."[29] Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's thesis based on Allah's unity, indicates in Modern Salafism that the 'law-making role' only belongs to Allah. 'It is not possible to mention a humanly involvement in this process.'

Wahhabism reflects an introversion as it was raised in a *'sand civilization'*[30] and **'Proto-Muslim'[31]** culture. Wahhabism consists of a reactive activity that carries Hariji elements due to its strict characteristics. Wahhabism insists on the Quran and hadiths wordings so intensively that it achieves an absolute literalism.[32] Rationalism in this trend is regarded as abandoning the religious principles.[33] The fight against innovations transformed their jihad concept into a fight against Muslims. This

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[24] Hamit İnayet, *Arap Siyasi Düşüncenin Seyri,* trans. Hicabi Kırlangıç, Yöneliş Yay., Istanbul 1991, p. 20.

[25] Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, *Günümüz İslam Mezhepleri,* Selçuk Yayınevi, Ankara 1986, p. 103.

[26] See: Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 'Kashfush-Shabahat', *Muallafat ash-Shayh al-Imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,* Riyadh, trans., p. 156-157.

[27] Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, *ibid.,* p. 175-176.

[28] Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, *ibid.,* p. 116-117.

[29] See: Ahmet Vehbi Ecer, Tarihte Vehhabi Hareketleri ve Etkileri, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yay., Ankara 2001, p. 68.

[30] See: Zekeriya Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devleti'nin Ortaya Çıkışı, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yay., Ankara 1998, p. 11.

[31] See: Kurşun, *Ottoman Authority in Najd and Al-Ahsa,* p. 60.

[32] Fazlurrahman, *Islam,* p. 249.

[33] Hüsnü Ezber Bodur, *Dinî İhya Hareketi Olarak Vahhabiliğin Doğuşu,* an Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Erzurum 1986, p. 11.

concept directed Wahhabis to strict and tyrannical precautions, and stressed Muslims with typical manifestations of the Hariji mindset in the last century.[34]

Wahhabism's call for 'renovating religion' is the result of a political stance. This movement started with the purpose of purifying Islam from non-Arabic opinions.[35] Wahhabism's stance toward innovation, polytheism and true tawhid, focused on adapting the religious basics, and call for a return to the salafi period indicated the following meanings: The Ottoman caliphate did not represent the true religion. Thus, it is obligatory to revolt against Ottomans[36].

Considering this aspect of Wahhabism, it is stated that Wahhabism represented a preparatory stage for Arabic nationalism. While evaluating the Wahhabism movement, Yusuf Akçura made the following statement while noting that Wahhabism followers aimed to abandon the Ottoman authority and form an independent Arabi state in the 19th century: 'Wahhabism is a national Arabic movement. It aims to disclaim the Turkish authority based on the sectarian and religious principles, and to form an Arabic state in Arabia. It even managed to do so in the early periods of the movement[37].'

Enver Ziya Karal finds the Wahhabi movement important for serving as a basis for the nationalist trends of nineteenth century[38]. Some people interpret Salafism, which is almost equalized to Wahhabism, as the Islamic view of Arabic nationalism against the non-Arabic arguments, and Western values and ideologies[39].

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed an alliance with the forces of a small family managed by Ibn Suud in Central Arabia, which resulted in controlling Hejaz.[40] After controlling Hejaz, Salafism started to be a movement with two different characters while acting as a governmental religion with a typical militant jihad movement and approving the legitimacy of the Saudi state.

Wahhabism-Saudi relationships brought certain concepts such as the following: "All humanly systems other than the Islamic government are innovation and sacrilege. Those who believe in concepts such as democracy or secularism are the believers of a new religion." Therefore, the concept of one and only Islam became the main determinant of the internal and external policy as it reflects the legitimacy of Saudi regime.[41]

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[34] Fığlalı, *ibid.*, p. 115.

[35] İnayet, *Arap Siyaset Düşüncesi*, 10.

[36] Yusuf Akçura, *Osmanlı Devletinin Dağılma Devri XVIII. Ve XIX Yüzyıllarda*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1985, p. 22.

[37] Akçura, *ibid.*, p. 22.

[38] See: Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III'ün Hat-tı Hümayunları / Nizam-ı Cedit (1789-1807)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yay., Ankara 1999, p. 152.

[39] Muhammad Ammara, *as-Salafiyyah*, p. 6-7.

[40] Hüseyin Gazi Yurdaydın, *Islamic History Courses*, Ankara Ünv. İlahiyat Fak. Yayınları, Ankara 1988, p 183-184.

[41] See: Olivier Roy, *Küreselleşen İslâm*, transl.. Haldun Bayrı, Metis Yay., İstanbul 2003, p. 127.

With King Faisal, Wahhabism turned into a "Pan-Islamist" discourse. The aim was to ensure that Pan-Arabism would not be affected by projects such as Pan-Arabism or Socialist Arabic Unity[42]. This policy ensured that Salafism turned into a modern ideology such as political Islam.

V. Modern Salafism

Salafism acquired the characteristics that represented various political attitudes. The moderate side includes the *conservatives* that insist on purifying Islam and worship in the conservative re-Islamization activities. They are followed by the *preacher militants* (Declaration Congregation and Hizb at-Tahrir) that are focused on invitation and declaration, and object to participating to dominant culture and society, by the *jihadist* fighting against the Western world.

The conservative salafiyyah deals with the codification of hadith books and hosts wealthy people that have various joint-stock companies. With the support from Saudi Arabia, they perform various manufacturing activities in Egypt and other regions of Islamic geography. Thus, salafists come in second after Ikhwans in terms of wealth[43].

The formulation of tawhid as a lifestyle is intensively performed by the Salafism followers. According to them, believing in tawhid is not a doctrine. It means fulfilling the necessities, which is the taqwa. Believing in tawhid suggests worshipping only one Allah, performing worship only for Allah, and denying fulfilling the orders of anything other than Allah.

This principle, which may look innocent, has only one purpose, which is to reveal anything determined by the religion. For example, adapting a rational view may look like following the orders of anything other than Allah.

Ibn Baz makes the following statement: "Those who accept the humanly ideas and beliefs as more benevolent than the provisions of Allah and the Prophet, or adapt the humanly systems and laws abandoning the divine provisions, are regarded to be non-believers."[44]

According to Abdurrahman Abd al-halik, following the non-believers in anything that they have proposed means accepting them as the saints[45]. He answers the following statements considering the verses on polytheists: "Those before us could not touch anyone who said 'la ilaha illallah.' However, you attempt to murder us saying that we are polytheist even if we say the same words. What should we do to prevent you from touching us?" Tawhid suggests taqwa, removing innovations, avoiding of playing instruments, sacrificing anything other than for Allah, and even

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[42] Gilles Kepel, *Ciha İslamcılığın Yükselişi ve Gerilemesi*, trans. Haldun Bayrı, Doğan Kitap, Istanbul 2001, p. 82.

[43] See: Sâlih el-Verdânî, *Mısır'da İslami Akımlar*, trans. H. Acar-Ş. Duman, Fecr Yay., Ankara 1988, p. 157.

[44] al-Vardani, *ibid.*, p. 154.

[45] al-Vardani, *ibid.*, p. 148

performing jihad. The bodies and bloods of those who followed the above-mentioned principles are protected. A Muslim should sincerely believe in tawhid, which can be performed by fulfilling the relevant necessities. Therefore, the societies that abandon these three main principles are fought: *Tawhid;* the simple lawful rights of Allah before servants. *Prayer;* the only element that separates sacrilege from Islam•. *Zakat;* a worship performed by Ashab against those who abandon principles[46].

One of the congregations in the militant preacher category is the Indian Tabligh Congregation, which was founded by Muhammad Ilyas who primarily aimed to invite Indian Muslims who are affected by the Indian culture and who lost their pure Islamic commitment, to absolute faith with intensive practices. To do so, he recommends to accurately follow the life of the Prophet, the complete mortal indicator of Islamic characteristics. Muslims can abandon non-religious habits that contradict Islam through this recommendation[47]. According to Fuller, the Tabligh Congregation does not contain any ideological message or intellectual content beyond the improvement of Muslims' statuses through propaganda and purification of Islamic teachings. Although the congregation attempted to stay outside the political discipline, their attitude toward the authority suggests a criticism toward the non-Islamic characteristics of many regime in the Islamic world.[48]

The Islamic Party of Liberation was founded by Takayyuddin an-Nabhani, a Palestinian lawyer, in 1953. He clearly defined this party as a political party with its principles based on Islam and practices based on policy. All Muslims in the world aim to found the Muslim caliphate again as a unitary state rather than a federal state. He adopts jihad as a general strategy and states that no Muslim countries practice Islam how it should be, and these countries are 'Dar al-kufur (the place of sacrilege)' although they regarded themselves as Muslims[49]. Considering the fact that the movement had a concept of 'caliphate before jihad', they avoided any armed or terrorist activities. Accordingly, it is stated that they were not included in the terrorist movement list declared by USA and UK in 2001.[50]. A person who regarded himself as the official spokesman of Hizb at-Tahir in Turkey recently stated that ten

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• Prayer is very important for Ahl al-Hadith and modern versions of this movement such as Salafiyyah. Not performing a prayer is equal to sacrilege. Abd al-Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz stated that failing to perform a prayer suggests sacrilege, even if the obligatory characteristics of prayer are not denied. According to him, whoever abandons prayer and accepts no advice after becoming an adolescent, is reported to shariah courts. They are asked to foreswear; if not, they are executed. See: Abd al-Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz, *Important Answers to the Questions regarding the Five Elements of Islam*, trans. Muhammed Şahin, p. 127, 131 (No details regarding the publication place and time).

[46] See: Geocities.com/İbnurrefik/tevhidkitabi

[47] See: Kepel, *Jihad, Rise and Fall of Islamism*, p. 48-49.

[48] See: Fuller, *Siyasal İslâm'ın Geleceği*, Timaş Yay., İstanbul 2004, p. 219-220.

[49] See: Ayubi, *Religion and Policy in Arabic World*, p. 113.

[50] See: Roy, *Küreselleşen İslam*, p. 129.

thousands of party members in Uzbekistan could not react to massacres due to the 'ban of using a weapon.'[51]

Two of the modern jihadist Salafiyyah representatives are the organizations named Jihad and Jamaat-e-Islami. The status of governments, administrators, and the public in countries where there is no Islamic order, are one of the greatest intellectual problems. Generally, the government is non-believer, the administrators are non-believer, and the public are excusable or thought to be obliged to perform jihad.

Jihadist Salafiyyah took its new form from the 'Afghan Arabs'[52]. 'Afghan Arabs' is the term used to refer the Arabic fighters who migrated to Afghanistan with an international campaign to fight against the Soviet occupation. Their number is expected to be more than twenty thousand, and they were the primary actors in fighting against the Soviet occupation. Not only did they direct the war, but they also performed salafi propaganda against the religious traditions in Afghanistan. Taliban emerged as a result of these efforts.

The only way for the USA to win the fight against Soviet Russia was based on a "continuous jihad" and the "pure Islam" concept presented by Salafism. In Afghanistan, where tribal traditions are dominant, legitimating the supra-tribal fight was possible in this way in Afghanistan.

Salafism's pure Islam and jihad concepts aim to remove the conflicts that could distort the Afghan jihad. As Salafism was a call for Islam's early days, it enabled intertribal dialogue. This is the only way to make people, who only fought for their tribes, focus on a superior purpose. The concept of 'continuous jihad' raised the purpose over the tribal context and assigned the leadership to non-tribal people who claimed to represent religion. In other words, Islamic concepts of jihad and Salafism provided the tribal unity for the Afghan people.[53].

Afghan Arabs were leaders of their own regimes in Egypt, Yemen, and Algeria following the Afghan jihad. Some of them moved to the crisis regions such as Bosna, Kashmir, Chechnya and Somali, which brought forward the internationalization of Jihadist salafi argument. Algerians, Iraqis, Egyptians and Saudis lived together and fought against the Soviets, northern alliance, and Russia. They knew each other very well, and some of them were even relatives[54].

The last product of internationalized or 'globalized' Islam as described by Oliver Roy, is global terrorism.

According to this belief, Islamist terror of the present time resulted from the combination of three factors: *The ideological element* reflects the characteristic ideas of

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[51] See: *Tempo Dergisi*, issue: 34/924, 23 August 2005, p. 40-43.

[52] See: Olivier Roy, *ibid.*, p. 172.

[53] See: Olivier Roy, *Afganistan'da Direniş ve İslam*, trans. Mustafa Kadri Oroğlu, Yöneliş Yay., Istanbul 1990, p. 255.

[54] Roy, *Küreselleşen İslam*, p. 173.

Mawdudi and S. Kutub, based on Wahhabism. *The organizational element* suggests the efforts of the USA who reflected the Afghan jihad as a particular international campaign like the Crusades. *The Political element* suggests the efforts to associate Islam with terror after the Cold War and September 11 incident[55].

It is fair to state that an opinion that suggests that certain religious concepts necessitate terror will not be appropriate. However, it should be noted that when a religion emerges as a factor that legitimizes humanly matters, it may be used as an effective means of maintaining malevolent beliefs[56].

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[55] Mamdani, *İyi Müslüman Kötü Müslüman, Amerika Soğuk Savaş ve Terörün Kökenleri*, trans. Sevinç Altınçekiç, 1001 Kitap, Istanbul 2005, p. 178-179.

[56] See: Peter L. Berger, *Kutsal Şemsiye*, trans. Ali Coşkun, Rağbet Yay., Istanbul 2005, p. 153-154.

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Salafism in The History of Islamic Thought: Its Historical Journey and General Characteristics[*]

Ferhat KOCA[**]

Abstract

Salafism is a conservative and traditional understanding which takes the first three generations of Islam as the model for understanding, interpreting and living Islam.

Salafism's historical experience can be analyzed as; Salafism as a methodological principle, as a systematic theory, as a political and Islamic movement, and as a radical and warrior structure.

In this study, the characteristics of Salafism can be grouped under seven main points. These are 1) Their denial of interpretation on God's Attributes and *mutashabih,* while defending *tafwid* 2) Their belief on unity of faith and acts 3) Their defense of the idea of the Quran is not created 4) Their claim that *naql* is superior to reason 5) Their claim on equality of Quran and Sunnah 6) Taking salafs' views and practices as a religious source and as an authority. 7) Believing that Caliphate is the right of *Qurayhsi* tribe.

All the discussions on Salafism, in the history of Islamic thought, are based on those basic premises.

Keywords: Salafism, Ahl al-Hadith, Hanbali Sect, Wahhabism, Saudi Salafism

İslâm Düşünce Tarihinde Selefîlik: Tarihsel Serüveni ve Genel Karakteristiği

Özet

Selefîlik (selefiyye); İslâm'ı anlama, yorumlama ve yaşama konusunda İslâm'ın ilk üç neslini model olarak kabul eden ve bu modelin korunması mücadelesini veren gelenekçi ve muhafazakâr bir anlayıştır.

İslâm düşünce ve kültür tarihine makro bir bakışla bakıldığı zaman selefîlik düşüncesinin tarihsel serüveni; metodolojik bir ilke olarak selefîlik, sistematik bir nazariye

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olarak selefîlik, dinî ve siyâsî bir akım olarak selefîlik, radikal ve savaşçı bir yapı olarak selefîlik şeklinde dört başlık altında incelenebilir.

Biz burada selefî düşüncenin karakteristik özelliklerini yedi noktada toplamaya çalıştık: Bunlar: 1) Allah'ın sıfatları ve müteşâbihler konusunda te'vîli reddedip teslim ve tefvîzi benimsemeleri; 2) İman-amel birlikteliğine inanmaları; 3) Kur'ân'ın mahlûk olmadığını savunmaları; 4) Akıl - nakil ilişkisinde naklin üstün olduğuna inanmaları; 5) Kur'ân ve sünneti eşit kategoride saymaları; 6) Selefin görüş ve uygulamalarını dinî bir kaynak ve otorite olarak kabul etmeleri; 7) Hilâfetin Kureyş kabilesinin hakkı olduğuna inanmaları.

İslâm düşünce tarihinde selefîlikle ilgili yapılan bütün tartışmalar bu temel kabuller veya bunların sebep olduğu komplikasyonlar çevresinde gerçekleşmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefiyye, Ehl-i Hadîs, Hanbelî Mezhebi, Vehhâbîlik, Suudî Selefîliği

I. Introduction: What Does Salafism Mean?

The term, salaf, means "preceding or remaining in the past". This term reflects the sahabah generation, the friends of the Prophet (p.b.u.h.), and the following generation (tabi'un) in the history of Islamic thought. Accordingly, salafi indicates those who are committed to the ideas of the sahabah and tabi'un, while Salafism suggests the belief and ideology that the practices and ideas of the sahabah and tabi'un should be strictly followed in Islamic thought. Ataba at-tabi'un, the second generation of Islam, is generally included in these two groups for general Islamic discussions.

Those supporting the Salafism movement called themselves "Ahl al-Asar, Ahl al-Hadith, Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-jamaat, Ahl al-Hadith wa's-Sunnah, Ahl al-hak, Sifatiyyah, Isbatiyyah, Salafiyyah, Hanbaliyyah and Zahiriyyah" while their opponents called them "Asariyyah, Hashviyyah and Mushabbiha".[1]

The first generations of Islam positively reacted to Prophet's call, fought for tawhid next to him, never hesitated to do anything for this fight, and conveyed all Islamic ideas and national elements, primarily the Quran and the Prophet's sunnah, to the next generations. The Prophet was believed to have made the following statement about these generations: *"The most benevolent people are my ashab in my era. Tabi'un follows them, and ataba at-tabi'un follows tabi'un. There will come certain communities such that the testimony of some will be superior to their oath, and the oath of some will be superior to their testimony."*[2] Thus, ideas and practices of such people were greatly valued in Islamic cultural history, and following them (ittiba as-salaf)

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[1]   For the definition of Salafism, see Adem Apak, "The Definitions of Salaf and Salafism Concepts Throughout the History of Islam", *Salafism in the Past and Present, International Debate on Islamic Science*, 08-10 November 2013, Topkapı Eresin Hotel, İstanbul 2014, p. 39-50; M. Sait Özervarlı, "Salafiyyah", *DİA*, XXXVI, 399-402.

[2]   Bukhari, "Fadail al-ashab", 1; "Shahadah", 9.

was regarded to be an ethical attitude. However, certain individuals or groups in the Islamic society paid further respect to the ideas and practices of these first Islamic generations and accepted these as a methodological principle, while basing these ideas and practices on the center of religious and legal practices. Salafiyyah (Salafism) is a traditionalist and conservative ideology that accepts the first three generations of Islam as a model for understanding, interpreting and practicing Islam, and turns this model into a part of Islam rather than the history, and fights to protect this model.

We would like to imply that Salafism is not a particular group or sect that emerged in the history of Islam; instead, it is a movement or ideology that should be considered while interpreting Islamic works and issuing fiqh provisions [3], which can be explained in Turkish with the terms, "nationalist" and "nationalism". Nationalist means a person who advocates national values, while nationalism indicates the ideology and mentality of advocating national values. Nationalism is not the name of a group or party, it is a general ideology and mentality that is supported by various groups or parties. However, this statement does not mean that any groups or parties can call themselves "nationalist". Salafism (salafiyyah) means the ideology or mentality of following the salaf as-salih as the Islamic ideology history, which does not prevent any groups or parties from calling themselves as "salaf". Moreover, the historical development of Salafism which took place will be outlined accordingly below.

II. Historical Journey of Salafism

A macro overview toward Islamic ideology and culture history indicates that Salafism reached the present time undergoing various historical processes.

These periods can be divided into four periods:

1. The First Period: Salafism as a Methodological Principle

The differentiation between "Ahl al-Hijaz" and "Ahl al-Iraq", which emerged based on the differences of environments and individuals between the hadith and fiqh authorities of the tabi'un generation in regard to using ra'y and judicial opinions while interpreting the Islamic works, and revealing the fiqh provisions,

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[3] Muhammad Ramazan al-Buti stated that salafism is not a sect, and such a sectarian concept is nothing but an imagination of something that never existed before. See Muhammad Ramazan al-Buti, as-Salafiyyah: *Marhalatun Zamaniyyatun Mubarakatun La Mazhabun Islamiyyun, Damascus 1408/1988, Dar al-Fiqr, p.* 223-227.

shortly turned into a methodological differentiation as "Ah al-Asar" and "Ahl al-Ra'y" during the late first Hijri century and early second century.[4]

Ahl al-Asar, among these groups, stated that the ideas and practices of the Prophet's friends (sahabah) and tabi'un generation should be followed, after the Quran and sunnah, to understand and interpret the doctrines, and works in tafsir, hadith and fiqh. In addition, they rejected various ra'y and rationalism methods.[5]

With certain insignificant differences, these scholars from Ahl al-Asar[6] were divided into certain movements such as Malikiyyah (Maliki Sect), Shafiyyah (Shafi Sect), Hanbaliyyah (Hanbali Sect) and Zahiriyyah (Zahiri Sect). The first members of these sects were called "Ahl al- Sunnah al-hassa" or "Mutakadimun" (precedents, old salafis). However, particularly with Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari (d. 324/938) and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333/944) in the fifth Hijri century (tenth century), a new era started in Islamic doctrines with Ahl al-Sunnah and the previously mentioned scholars caused two new movements, namely Ash'ariyyah (Ash'ari Sect) and Maturidiyyah (Maturidi Sect), to emerge. The members of these new movements were named "Ahl al-Sunnah ammah".[7]

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[4] Ignaz Goldziher, "Fiqh", İslâm Ansiklopedisi, İstanbul 1977, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, IV, 605-606; Muhammad al-Hasan al-Hajwi, al-Fiqr as-sami fi tarih al-fiqh al-Islami (inv. Abd al-aziz Abd al-fattah al-Qari), Medina 1976, II, 383-384; Hayreddin Karaman, Islamic Law History, İstanbul 1989, p. 175; a.mlf., "Fiqh", Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA), XIII, 7. For Ahl al-ra'y, see Esat Kılıçer, Ray Supporters in Islamic Fiqh, Ankara 1975; a.mlf., "Ahl al-ra'y", DİA, X, 520-524.

[5] Abdurrahman Haçkalı, "Ehl-i Hadis-Ehl-i Re'y Ayrışması Fıkhî mi, İtikâdî mi?", İslâm Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2003, no. 2, p. 59-68; Adnan Koşum, "Akıl (Re'y)-Nakil (Eser/Hadis) Ayrışmasının Fıkhî Boyutları", İslâm Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2008, no. 12, p. 87-98.

[6] Ibn Kutaybah (d. 276/889) considered many Islamic law interpreters including Maliq and Awzai as Ashab al-Ra'y, while he regarded those only interested in hadith narratives as Ashab al-Hadith. He excluded Ahmad ibn Hanbal from both groups (Ibn Kutaybah, al-Maarif (published by Servet Ukkasha), Cairo 1969, p. 494 et al.). Tirmidhi (d. 279/892) who considered Shafi an Ashab al-Hadith member (Tirmidhi, "Buyu'", 12, 14). Al-Makdisi (d. 380/990) accepted Shafi members to be from Ashab al-Hadith in a certain work, while he regarded them to be from Ahl al-Ray with Abu Hanifah in another work (Al-Makdisi, al-Ma'arif, p. 37, 179-180). According to Shahristani, (d. 548/1153), Islamic law interpreters are divided into groups, Ashab al-Hadith and Ashab al-Ra'y. Ashab al-Hadith reflects those from Hijaz, namely Maliq, Shafi, Sufian as-Sawri, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Dawud ibn Ali, and their friends. Ahba al-Ray, on the other hand, consists of Iraqi scholars, namely Abu Hanifa and his friends (Shahristani, Kitab al-Milal wa'n-nihal (inv. Abd al-aziz Muhammad al-Wakil), Cairo 1388/1968, II, 11-12). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah considered three great fiqh sects, other than Hanafi movement, as Ahl al-Hadith (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, I'lam al-muwakkin (inv. M. Muhyiddin Abd al-hamidh), Cairo 1955, I, 101, II, 294; III, 362). For more information on the subject, see İgnaz Goldziher, Zahiris "Their System and History" (trans. Cihad Tunç), Ankara 1982, p. 3-5; Hayreddin Karaman, Islamic Law History, İstanbul 1989, p. 182-183; a.mlf., "Fiqh", DİA, XIII, 7; Abdullah Aydınlı, "Ahl al-Hadith", DİA, X, 507; Salim Öğüt, "Ahl al-Hadith", DİA, X, 509; Esat Kılıçer, "Ahl al-Ra'y", DİA, X, 523.

[7] İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Yeni İlm-I Kelam, Ankara 1981, Umran Yayınevi, p. 61.

This group, which was included in Ahl al-Sunnah al-hassa and mostly was formed with the followers of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's (d. 241/855)[8] followers, rejected these newly-emerged Sunni movements and stated that they represented the "true" Ahl al-Sunnah.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal aimed to present the basics of Salafism in *ar-Rad 'al az-Zanadika wa'l-Jahmiyyah*, while Bukhari (d. 256/870) aimed for the same in *Halk af'al al-ibad*, Ibn Kutaybah (d. 276/889) in *Ta'wilu muhtalif al-hadith* and Abu Said ad-Darimi (d. 280/894) in *ar-Rad al al-Jahmiyyah*. Many Hanbali scholars who adopted the Salafism movement in this long period include the following: Abu Bakir al-Hallal (d. 311/923), Abu Muhammad al-Barbahari (d. 329/941), Abu Bakir Abd al-aziz ibn Jaf'ar (Gulam al-Hallal) (d. 363/974), Ibn Batta al-Ukbari (d. 387/997), Abu Abdallah ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005), Qadi Abu Ya'la al-Farrah (d. 458/1066), Sharif Abu Ja'far al-Hashimi (d. 470/1077-8), Haja Abdullah al-Harawi (d. 481/1089), Abu al-Wafa ibn Akil (d. 513/1119-20), Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1200) and Mawaffakuddin ibn Kudamah (d. 620/1223).

The basic characteristics of Salafism in this era when it was a methodological principle, an approach in doctrine and a fiqh-based field are as follows: Avoiding the descriptions that would present Allah as an object, regarding the cognates seen in religious works (sanctification), confirming any issues revealed by the Prophet (confirmation), accepting the incompetence and deficiency in issues that are hard to understand (confession of incompetence), avoidance of asking unnecessary questions regarding issues about which humans cannot have an insight (silence), avoidance of performing rational interpretations regarding the wordings that cannot be understood thoroughly (sobriety), avoidance of performing research and studies on these issues (avoidance), and leaving the issue to the relevant authorities and divine knowledge (delegation).[9]

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[8] Certain Ahl al-hadith and salafi individuals made the following exaggerated comments about Ahmad ibn Hanbal: Ali ibn Madini: "Allah consolidated Islam with two men who do not have a third follower. They are Abu Bakir as-Siddiq in the Riddah period and Ahmad ibn Hanbali in the Mihnah Period." According to Rabi ibn Suleiman, Shafi made the following statement: "Whoever dislikes Ahmad ibn Hanbal becomes a non-believer." Kutaybah ibn said: "Ahmad ibn Hanbal is our imam. Whoever does not accept him, is an innovator." Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn Ibrahim al-Hanzali states that he heard the following from his father: "Ahmed ibn Hanbal is evidence of Allah for his servants on earth." According to Maymuni, Ali ibn Madini stated the following: "Following the Prophet, nobody could do what Ahmad ibn Hanbal did for Islam". I said to him: "O! Abu al-Hasan! Are not you neglecting Abu Bakir as-Siddiq?" He answered: "Not even Abu Bakir as-Siddiq, because he had certain friends and assistants, but Ahmad ibn Hanbal had none." See Ibn Abu Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah* (inv. Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqhi), Cairo 1371/1952, I, 13–17.

[9] Al-Ghazali, Iljam al-awam an ilm al-kalam, (in Majmuat ar-rasail al-Ghazali), Beirut trs., Dar al-kutub al-ilmiyyah, I, 42; İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Yeni İlm-i Kelâm, p. 61-63; Bekir Topaloğlu, Kalam Discipline (Introduction), İstanbul 1981, Damla Yayınevi, p. 114-16; Neşet Çağatay – İbrahim Agâh Çubukçu, History of Islamic Sects, Ankara 1985, Second Edition, p. 192-95. For various evaluations

For approximately six centuries, starting from the Hijri second century (ninth century) to eight century (fourteenth century), also known as the era of Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1327) who ensured an awakening within the Hanbali sect, Salafism continued to exist as a conservative and traditionalist ideology and methodological principle in various fields such as doctrines, kalam, tafsir, hadith and fiqh.

2. The Second Period: Salafism as a Systematical Theory

The Salafism movement abandoned the identity of being a methodological principle and conservative ideology after Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, a competent imam from the Hanbali sect[10], and it became a systematical and consistent theory within the Islamic ideology. With many analyses and criticisms, Ibn Taymiyyah brought the Salafi ideology to an alternative level before disciplines such as kalam, Sufism and philosophy in Islamic ideology.

The representatives of Salafi ideology in its first period supported the Salafi ideology, but they did not propose a systematical or consistent theory while building this ideology. Instead, they produced reactive rebuttal works for criticizing the ideas they rejected. However, Ibn Taymiyyah implied a religious rationalism within the borders of Quran and sunnah to consolidate Muslims' religion and unity, during a period when Crusades and the Mongol invasion took place. As such, he developed a promoter and active attitude abandoning the passive, reactive and rejectionist position.

The Salafi ideology for Ibn Taymiyyah reflects adapting the Quran and Sunnah, instead of rationalism, for the basics of Islam. The Nabawi and salafi method means avoiding making statements about Allah with ra'y, following the sahabah and

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regarding these principles, see Burhan Baltacı, "Evaluation of Al-Ghazali's 'Salaf' Definition Within the Context of Habari Titles", Marafah, Kış 2009, year: 9, issue no. 3, p. 113-123.

[10] For Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah's life and works, see Ibn Hajar, *ad-Durer al-caminah fi a'yan al-miet as-saminah*, Beirut, trs. (Dar al-Jil), I, 144-160; Ibn Kasir, al-Bidayah wa'n-nihayah, Beirut 1981, XIV, 135-141; Ibn Rajab *Kitab az-Zail ala Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, Beirut, trs. (Dar al-Ma'rifah), II, 387-408; Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratüre* (*GAL*), Lieden 1943, II, 125-7; a.mlf., *Suppl.*, II, 119-26; Henri Laoust, "La Bibliographie d'Ibn Taymiyya d'apres Ibn Kathîr, *Bulletin d'Études Orientales Institut Français de Damas, (BÉO),* IX (Damas 1942-3), 115-162; a.mlf., Le Hanbalisme sous les Mamlûks Bahrîdes", *Revue des Études Islamiques*, (*RÉI),* Paris 1960, XXVIII, 1-71; D. P. Little, "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya", *International Journal of the Middle East Studies*, Cambridge 1973, IV/3, 311-327; a.mlf., "Did Ibn Taymiyya Have a Screw Loose?", *Stvdia Islamica*, Paris 1975, XLI, 93-111; George Makdisi, "Ibn Taimiya: A Sûfi of the Qâdiriya Order", *American Journal of Arabic Studies*, Leiden 1974, I, 118-129; S. A. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, Oxford 1994, XXXIX/1, 41-86; Ferhat Koca, "Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ad-Din", *DİA,* XX, 391-405.

tabi'un, and adapting the Islamic philosophy, abandoning the Greek philosophy and kalam.[11]

Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers were called "Mutaahhirun" (following salafis) in Salafi ideology. These followers include his most well-known students, also scholars, such as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350), Ibn Rajab (795/1392), Alaaddin Ali ibn Suleiman al-Mardawi (d. 885/1480), Sharafuddin Musa ibn Ahmad al-Hajjawi (d. 968/1560) and Mansur ibn Younes al-Bukhuti (Bahuti) (d. 1051/1641).

This period, when Salafism became a systematic theory, continued until the time of Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab, who opened a new era for the Hanbali sect and Salafism ideology.

3. The Third Period: Salafism as a Religious and Political Movement

This period started as Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab (d. 1206/1792)[12] gained the support of Emir Muhammad ibn Suud in Diriyah 1157 (1744), and they supported and respected each other in war and peace on the condition that the emirate is left to Ibn Suud and his lineage, whilst the sheikhdom is left to him and his lineage, for the purpose of building Allah's sovereignty on earth.

This history does not only reflect the start of the formation of a small Badawi emirate into a great state, but it also demonstrates the fact that Saudi Arabic Kingdom adapted the Hanbali sect as its formal sect and Salafism movement as its formal ideology. The historical and political conditions for this era indicate that Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab is needed to consolidate the political authority of ash-Sheikh Muhammad ibn Suud, and an emir like Muhammad ibn Suud is needed to spread his Abd al-wahhab's call.[13]

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[11] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawah* (published by. Abd ar-rahman ibn Qassim), Cairo 1404, XII, 349-350; XVI, 469-476.

[12] Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab's life and works, see Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, T*arihu Najd al-Hanbali*, Mecca 1349, p. 6-89; Omar Risa al-Kahhalah, *Mu'jam al-muallifin*, Damascus 1957, I, 269; X, 269; Brockelmann, GAL, II, 512; a.mlf., Suppl., II, 531; Ahmad Amin, "Muhammad ibn Abdilvehhâb", *Études Arabes Dossiers*, no. 82, Rome 1992-1, p. 6-31; Abd ar-rahim Abd ar-rahman Abd ar-rahim, *Tarih al-Arab al-hadith wa'l-mu'asi*r, Qatar 1402/1982, p. 62-67; Muhsin Abd al-hamid, *Min aimmat at-tajdid al-Islami*, Rabat 1407/1986, p. 9-47; Ahmad Fahim Matar, "A scholar like Abd al-wahhab Abkariyyal-'asri and ustaz al-jili", *Majallat al-Bukhus al-Islamiyyah*, Riyadh 1405/1985, XIII, 233-247; Abdallah as-Salih al-Usaymin, "ash-Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab hayatuhu and fiqruhu", *Études Arabes Dossiers*, no. 82, Rome 1991-2, p. 34-43; M. Cook, "On the Origins of Wahhâbism", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS)*, , 2 (London 1992), III/2, p.191-202.

[13] Muhammad ibn Suud and his period, see Husein Ibn Gannam, Tarihu Najd (published by. Nasıruddin al-Asad) Cairo, 1402/1982, I, 77-78, 64-70, 80, 89, 93-97, 136; Abd ar-rahim Abd ar-rahman Abd ar-rahim, *Tarih al-Arab al-hadîth wa'l-muasir*, p. 81-86; Husein Halaf ash-Sheikh Haz'al, *Tarih al-Jazirat al-Arabiyyati fi asri'ash-Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-wahhab,* Beirut 1968, p. 157-164,

Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab's doctrine consists of the principle that uniting Allah's titles and actions is not sufficient for tawhid because servants should also combine their actions with Allah's actions (tawhid-i ma'budiyah, amali tawhid). Those who failed in this tawhid are regarded as non-believers, whose goods and lives are halal for those who believed in one Allah. This evidence is reflected in cognate verses, but it is not permissible to gloss and interpret these verses. Resorting is sacrilege, and intercession is only peculiar to Allah. Thus, there is no guide other than the Quran, and no director other than Allah. It is even unlawful to wish intercession from the prophets. Anything that is not included in the Quran and sunnah is innovation, and any innovation suggests aberration. The mind is not a fiqh evidence, and judicial opinions, comparisons, and juristic preference other than the current Islamic works cannot be used. It is obligatory to work or fight, when required, to order benevolence and to ban malevolence.[14]

In an environment, where the authority of the Ottoman Empire weakened due to various internal and external incidents, and the period, when the Ottoman Empire failed to send a special army to the region to follow Wahhabism and attempted to assign the emirs of Mecca and Medina to perform the task, the Ottoman Empire fell from its dominant days. In addition, Wahhabi-Suudi armies occupied Taif and Mecca in 1924, and Medina and Jeddah in 1925.[15]

Abd al-Aziz ibn Suud, the leader of Saudis, declared himself as the King of Hejaz in 1926 and King of Nejd in 1927. He executed the Treaty of Jeddah with the English officials on 17 September 1927.[16] The provisions of this treaty indicate that

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263-271; Salahaddin al-Mukhtar, *Tarih al-Mamlakat al-Arabiyyat as-Suudiyyati fi madiha wa hadiriha*, Beirut 1957, I, 41-46.

[14] For the rise and development of Wahhabi movement, see M. J. Crawford, *Wahhâbî 'ulamâ' and the Law, 1745-1932*, Oxford 1980; Aziz al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities*, London 1993, p. 104-121; S. M. Zwemer, "The Wahhâbîs; their origin, history, tenets, and influence", *Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute*, London 1901, XXXIII, 311-333; G. J. L. Soulie, "Formes et action actuelle du Wahabisme", *African et l'Asie*, 74 (1966), 3-10; Michael Cook, "On the Origins of Wahhâbism", 2 (1992), *JRAS*, III/2, 191-202; Mahmudul Haq, "Wahhabi Tradition: Origins and Impact", *The Gulf in Transition* (ed. M. S. Agwani), Delhi 1987, p. 15-25; G. Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia", *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics* (ed. D. Hopwood), London 1972; E. Sirriyeh, "Wahhâbîs, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism", *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin*, Oxford 1989, XVI/2, 123-132; Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, "Wahhabism", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara 1953, XXVII, 51-67; M. Safiullah, "Wahhâsm: A Conceptual Relationship Between Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb and Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya", *Hamdard Islamicus*, Karachi 1987, X/1, 67-83.

[15] For the events that precede the establishment of the modern Saudi Arabic Kingdom, see J. Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State*, New York-Oxford 1993, p. 13-70; Amin Said, *Tarih ad-Dawlat as-Suudiyyah*, I-II, Riyadh trs., (Matbaatu Dar ata'l-Malik Abd al-aziz); Salahaddin al-Mukhtar, *Tarih al-Mamlakat al-Arabiyyat as-Suudiyyah fi mazihah wa hadiriha*, I-II, Beirut, trs., (Daru Maktabat al-hayat); Ismail Yagi, "Britain wa'd-davlat as-Suudiyyat al-ula", *Majallatu Kulliyyat al-Ijtimaiyyah*, I (Riyadh 1977), 417-447.

[16] For the content of the Treaty of Jeddah, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the near and middle east*, New York 1958, II, 149-150.

English people recognized the sovereignty of Saudis over Hejaz.[17]Hejaz and Nejd regions, managed as two separate units, were united under the name of Saudi Arabia Kingdom in 1932.

Within the historical period starting from the establishment of Saudi Arabia Kingdom to the present time, Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab stayed as the greatest theoretician of Wahhabi movement and the Saudi Kingdom.

Wahhabism not only influenced the Arabic Peninsula in regard to religious ideology, but it also affected a geography extending from Northern Africa to Far East.[18]

The most significant representatives of Saudi Salafism in Saudi Arabia Kingdom are the scholars who provide religious education in governmental institutions such as Hay'atu Kibar al-Ulama, Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami and Idarat al-Bukhus. The most well-known ones among these scholars are Abd al-Aziz ibn Abdallah ibn Baz (d. 1999), Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (d. 1999), Muhammad ibn Salah ibn al-Useymin at-Tamimi (d. 2001) and Mukbil al-Vadii (d. 2001).[19]

4. The Fourth Period: Salafism as a Radical and Warrior Movement

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, various religious and nationalist groups rejected this invasion, and they initiated a long-term fight against the Soviet Union. During this war, large public masses had to take refuge in neighboring countries. The largest of these refugee movements took place in Pakistan, and millions of Afghans lived in poverty and had many difficulties. During the war that lasted ten years against the Soviets, many local and foreign people educated the refugee Afghan children (students, taliban). These people included different educators with the Salafi ideology who were raised in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and neighboring countries.

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[17] For the relationship between the Wahhabi movement and the English, see J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880*, Oxford 1991, p. 99-138; D. G. Hogarth, "Wahabism and British Interests", *International Affaires*, 1925, IV, 70-81.

[18] For the effects of Wahhabism in the regions (other than Saudi Arabia), see L. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa*, Evanston, Illinois 1974; M. S. Zaharaddin, "Wahhabism and its influence outside Arabia", *The Islamic Quarterly*, 1979, XXIII/3, 146-157; Muhammad Mohar Ali, "Impact of the Salafia Movement on the South Asian Sub-continent", *Mecelletü Külliyyeti'l-Ulûmi'l-İctimâiyyeti*, Riyad 1980, IV, 3-15; A. H. Green, "A Tunisian Reply to a Wahhabi Proclamation: Texts and Contexts", *In Quest of an Islamic Humanism* (ed. A. H. Green), Cairo 1984, p. 155-177.

[19] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "Modern Salafism and Its Influence on Islamic Movements", *Salafism in the Past and Present, International Debate on Islamic Science*, 08-10 November 2013, Topkapı Eresin Hotel, İstanbul 2014, p. 491-492.

Although the local groups in Afghanistan defeated the Soviet Union and deported the Soviet units from their home country, they had domestic problems with one another and thus entered into a devastating war. Upon these events, these refugee students (Taliban) raised by many people and groups with Salafi ideology took a side against all these groups fighting in their country, and thus a new actor joined the civil war in Afghanistan. These students, who were essentially the members of Hanafi sect, agreed with Osama bin Laden (d. 2011), the leader of Al-Qaeda who followed the Salafi ideology, and was one of the greatest supporters of these students, upon the jihad of Afghanistan. Afghanistan became a country where not only Afghans fought, but where also the radical and warrior groups (jihadi, jihadist) with Salafism ideology had training.

The classical Wahhabism/Salafism influence started to weaken in this era, and a new ulama generation began including those who named themselves shuy as-sahwa (scholars of awakening) such as Salman al-Awdah, Safar al-Hawali, Nasir al-Umar, Aiz al-Qarni, Ibrahim ad-Dawish and Muhammad ibn Said al-Qahtari, who were a different group than traditional salafis such as Ibn Baz and Ibn al-Usaymin.[20] However, these people criticized, abandoned and accused Usama ibn Laden of sacrilege without referring to the Muslim administrators and scholars as al-Qaeda organized bloody campaigns, thus turned Muslim countries into a war arena, and targeted innocent civilians in contravention of the Islamic war law.[21]

While the civil war continued in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda of Usamah bin Laden attacked certain targets in the United States of America on 11 September 2001, and upon these attacks, USA invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, which caused many jihadist and terrorists organizations to be formed from the elements acquired with the ideology that was created via the educational institutions and non-governmental organizations founded in various Islamic countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somali, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. As a result of the emergence of these organizations, many bloody civil wars took place.

These groups, which brought the Salafi ideology and values to a vastly point different from when it first emerged and became radicalized to a degree that it could not represent Salafism ideology anymore, have become non-believer, extremist organizations that imply the form of the religion rather than its essence, neglect its moral aspects, reject Muslims' historical experiences and cultural wealth, and turn into a form that is no longer familiar with Islam and Muslims. Their exclusionary, repressive and monopolist concepts have not been seen in either the salaf (precedents) group named "Ahl al-Sunnah al-Hassah" or the halaf (followers) group named "Ahl al-Sunnah al-Ammah".

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[20] Büyükkara, "Modern Salafism and Its Influence on Islamic Movements", p. 501.
[21] Büyükkara, "Modern Salafism and Its Influence on Islamic Movements", p. 503.

After providing information on the history of Salafism, it is fair to state the following: All radical sunni/salafi organizations that emerged not only in Islamic countries, but also over the whole globe, and drifted the world into chaos are a product of Salafism in Saudi Arabia, which is the result of Wahhabism. Wahhabism was inspired by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah who was an ideologist raised by the classical salafi ideology. In conclusion, all radical Sunni movements and organizations are a product of Salafism as Salafism is based on making a certain historical period divine and inviolable. Such conservatism is against the course and change of time, in other words, nature. Like Don Quixote's fighting of windmills, the salafi warriors constantly fight with the modern "windmills" named "azmanin tagayyur" for the purpose of protecting the "divine period".

III. The General Characteristics of Salafism

As briefly summarized before, Salafism was a conservative approach and methodological principle, but it turned into a theory with a systematical integrity, a religious and political movement, and finally a radical and bloody organization. Thus, many questions exist about what to understand, when Salafism is mentioned. In addition, there are a few modern people or groups that still adapt Salafism as a methodological principle and conservative ideology, interpret the religious works accordingly, and name themselves "Ahl al-Hadith", "Ahl al-Asar", or "Hanbali". Thus, determining the characteristic features of Salafism by considering the manifestations that emerged in certain periods may be misleading. Melting all Salafist groups which do not have an integral structure, and have differences in topics such as doctrine, kalam, hadith, fiqh or Sufism, or even with geography and time, putting together in the same pot and associating the ideas of one of them to those of another will not be accurate. Thus, an effort is made to avoid generic approaches and to present certain characteristics that separate the Salafism ideology from other ideologies and movements by directly using their sources.

1. Allah's Titles: Orientation from Ta'wil to Tafwiz, and Tafakkur to Tashbih

The most basic characteristic of Islam is that it has a "tawhid" belief, which is summarized as "There is no creator but Allah, and Muhammad is Allah's servant and messenger."

Allah's names and titles mentioned in this sentence reflect certain meanings and concepts that are associated with Allah.

Muslim scholars accepted that Allah does not have any faults and flaws, and Allah has all sorts of perfection (kamal). Thus, Allah's titles are divided into two groups, namely salbi (tanzihi/zati) and subuti.

Salbi titles are those that reject the characteristics which do not match with Allah's divine position, and thus reflect what "Allah is not". These titles can be related to vujud, seniority, survival, monotheism, kiyam bi-nafsihi (needing nobody to exist) and muhalafatun lal-havadis (possessing no similarity to creatures). Subuti titles (sifat al-maani, titles on appearance), on the other hand, reflect Allah's presence, activities and perfectionism, thus indicate what Allah is. These titles are based on life, Islamic aspects, will, strength, hearing, seeing, kalam, and takwin (creating out of nothing). In addition, there are certain titles that are associated with Allah in religious works and evaluated as the exception of salbi titles or as a separate group named as "habari titles". Concepts that include mortal meanings such as yad, wajh, nuzul (hands, faces, or revelation) can be provided as examples to these titles.[22]

Ahmad ibn Hanbal, among the Salafi imams, stated that Allah can only be reflected with the titles reported in Quran and sunnah, the titles are tawkifi, and human mind cannot generate or explain a title for Allah by itself without considering the religious works because thw Mind inevitably fails into errors about the divinity of titles and actions as it does not know the nature and condition of these titles and actions. According to Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Allah has Islamic titles based on Islamic philosophy, life, will, strength, kalam, hearing and seeing because the Quran also mentions Allah's philosophy[23] and strength[24] in addition to the titles of alim, hay and qadir. Philosophy was associated with the title of alim while strength was related to qadir. All titles of Allah are eternal and ever-lasting. As a hadith becomes correct along with its conveyor and titles, Allah is eternal with divine presence and titles.[25]

According to Ahmad ibn Hanbal, qualifying Allah with the titles seen in religious works does not necessitate comparisons. It is wrong to consider Allah similar to creatures, but it is as wrong to assign a negative meaning to the titles reported in religious works for the purpose of avoiding describing Allah.[26] The only way of abandoning the drawbacks of comparison and excessive criticism is to accept the titles reported in religious works and to believe that these are different from the titles of creatures in regard to their natures and conditions.

According to Ahmad ibn Hanbal; yad, wajh, nefs, wrath and consent, the Hanbali titles, are peculiar to Allah, and it is wrong to assign metaphoric meanings

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[22] Bekir Topaloğlu, "Al Asma ul-Husna", DİA, XI, 404, 410, 412. For the number of titles, see H. Hüseyin Tunçbilek, "Demonstration, Number, and Sections of Divine Titles, and Name-Title Relationship", *Harran Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2006, XI/15, 5-28.

[23] al-A'raf 7/7.

[24] az-Zariyah 51/58.

[25] Abd al-wahid ibn Abd al-aziz at-Tamimi, *Itikad al-imam al-munbal Abi Abdallah Ahmad ibn Hanbal (in Tabakat al-Hanabilah), II, 293-300*.

[26] Ahmed ibn Hanbel, *ar-Rad ala'z-Zanadika wa'l-Jahmiyyah* (in Akaid as-salaf, published by. Ali Sami an-Nashar Ammar Talibi), İskenderiye 1971, p. 90.

to these titles because they do not have appropriate tawils that can be understood by people.[27]

Abu Said Usman ibn Said ad-Darimi, who is among the representatives of Salafi ideology, stated that all of Allah's names and titles are eternal. According to him, Allah was alim, qadir, mutakallim and halik before creating the world. These titles are not essential or to be evaluated separately. Like Allah's essential titles, the actual titles of Allah are also eternal. Management, revelation, arrival, consent and wrath are among the actions that are peculiar to Allah.[28]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all titles of Allah are eternal, and there is not a carrier of these titles. Thus, understanding tawhid as a negative aspect of titles and even Al-Asma Ul-Husna is wrong because such a divine ideology can be conceived only in minds rather than the realm of existence. Similarly, a composition between essence and titles is not possible, due to recognizing titles as there are not any concepts that refer to the facts which are separate and independent from Allah's presence. The obligatory presence is not only related to essence or titles, but also to the essence reflected with kamal titles. Thus titles cannot be evaluated separately from essence.[29]

Ibn Taymiyyah, who turned the salafi ideology into a systematical theory, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab, who transformed Salafism into a political movement, particularly implied the unity of Allah (tawhid) and divided tawhid into three sections, namely, "tawhid ar-rububiyyah, tawhid al-uluhiyyah (tawhid al-ibadah), and tawhid al-asma wa's-sifat".[30]

Tawhid ar-rububiyyah means believing that Allah created humans, granted them their foods and earnings, claimed their lives or resurrected them, accepting Allah's fortune and destiny, and believing the existence of one Allah (monotheism).

Tawhid al-uluhiyyah (tawhid al-ibadah) means that servants recognize Allah as the one and only with all their actions. According to this tawhid, which is also called as "ibadah tawhid", all ibadah, such as prayers, fasting, alms, and religious

[27] Abd al-wahid ibn Abd al-aziz at-Tamimi, *ibid.*, II, 249; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Ahmed ibn Hanbal", DİA, II, 83-84.

[28] Al-Darimi, *ar-Rad al al-Jahmiyyah* (published by.Gõsta Wiestam), Leiden 1960, p. 59-62, 82, 90; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Al-Darimi, Osman ibn Said – Ideas on Doctrines", DİA, VIII, 497. For Al-Darimi's ideas on Allah's titles, see Kamil Çakın, "Abu Said ad-Darimi's Ideas on Allah's Titles", *Dinî Araştırmalar*, Ankara 2000, III/8, 47-56.

[29] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Iktiza as-sirat al-mustakim* (published by. Nasir ibn Abd al-qarim al-Akl), Riyadh 1404, II, 844-845; a.mlf.,*Dar at-taarud al-akl wa'n-nakl* (published by. Muhammad Rashad Salim), Riyadh 1399/1979, III, 292-293, 402; M. Sait Özervarlı, "Ibn Taymiyyah Taqī ad-Dīn – Theological Ideas", DİA, XX, 406.

[30] For Ibn Taymiyyah's tawhid ideology Ibn Taymiyyah, *Prayer and Tawhid* (trs. Abdi Keskinsoy), İstanbul 2006, Pınar Yayınları; a.mlf., *Tawhid al-Asma wa's-Sifat, (Name and Title Tawhid)*, (trans. Heyet), Tevhîd Yayınları, İstanbul 1996; Hüseyin Aydın, "Allah's Description for Ibn Taymiyyah", *Kelam Araştırmaları*, 2006, 4/2, p. 39-86; Berat Sarıkaya, *Tawhid in Islamic Ideology – Ibn Taymiyyah Case*, Gümüşhane 2013; a.mlf., "Ibn Taymiyyah's Tawhid Ideology and Practical Tawhid Implication", *Gümüşhane Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2015, IV/7, 91-114.

sacrifices should be performed only for Allah. To fulfill this tawhid, it is obligatory to perform all ibadah only for Allah, and to assign any divine matters or titles to anybody but Allah. To do so, all prayers should be performed in accordance to the Quran and sunnah. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the most extreme factor disrupting this tawhid is the idea of embodiment and consolidation that reflects an association between Allah and creatures, and the theory of unity of existence that represents this association. Similarly, he objected to the actions of canonizing virtuous people, particularly the prophets, requesting help from them, mentioning them as mediators in prayers (tawassul), visiting their graves for the purpose of praying, and dhikr, and religious music and dancing performed by the sheikhs or followers of various movements, and he considered these as the behaviors that may disrupt the tawhid belief and direct people to polytheism and superstition.[31] Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab stated that ibadah such as praying, requesting spiritual help, making a vow or trusting in Allah should only be performed for Allah as per the tawhid al-ibadah ideology. Thus, using a mediator or intercessor for the communication with Allah or benefiting from the spiritual strength of somebody is superstitious. In addition, travelling for the purpose of visiting certain people's graves, hanging wishes on these graves, and asking them to accept their prays suggests polytheism.

Tawhid al-asma wa's-sifat means accepting and acknowledging all of Allah's names and titles in the Quran and Sunnah with an absolute belief without any alterations, recessions, conditions or representations.[32] Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab stated that a person who claimed "Allah is dependent upon another element (interlocutory)" or suggested otherwise would be an innovator. According to him, Allah's titles should not be limited with any numbers, and contents of religious Works should be accepted as they are.[33]

Salafi ideology followers stated that habari titles such as yad, wajh, nuzul and istiwa that suggest "an appearance similar to creatures" (hadith)[34] are archaic, and

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[31] Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmuu fatawa, I, 199-243; a.mlf., *Iktiza as-sirat al-mustakim*, II, 845-850; Ferhat Koca, "Ibn Taymiyyah Taqi ad-Din – His Fiqh-Based Ideas", *DİA*, XX, 403-404; M. Sait Özervarlı, "Ibn Taymiyyah Taqi ad-Din – His Theological Ideas", *DİA*, XX, 407.

[32] Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmuu fatawa, III, 3.

[33] Mustafa Öz, "Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab – His Scholar Personality", DİA, XXX, 492-493.

[34] For the discussions on Habari titles, see Metin Yurdagür, "The Method in Understanding the Habari Titles", *Erciyes Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1983, issue no. 1, p. 249-264; İbrahim Çelik, "Habari Titles in Quran and Tashbih Idea Associated with Mukatil ibn Suleiman", *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1987, II/2, 151-160; Ömer Aydın, "The Ways of Understanding the Habari Titles", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1999, issue no. 1, p. 133-158; a.mlf., "Ta'wil of Certain Habari Titles in Quran", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2000, issue no. 2, p. 143-177; Sabri Erdem, "Habari Titles and Semantics", *Dinî Araştırmalar*, 2003, V/15, p. 109-120; Mustafa Yüce, Habari Titles According to Haris al-Mahasibi", *Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2014, XII/2, 274-294; Mehmet Sait Uzundağ, "XIX. Siddiq Hasan Khan, the Great Indian Hadith Scholar (d. 1307/1890), and His Ideas on Allah's Habari Titles", *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2014, XIX/1, 125-145; Nurullah Agitoğlu, "Suyuti's Approach Toward Certain Habari Titles as an Hadith

these titles indicate that Allah's essence is neither humanly nor material, which caused a vicious circle for these followers. While explaining the nature of these titles, they got closer to the borders of tashbih and tajsim, and they claimed that these titles are cognate, cognates cannot be understood rationally, thus they should not be glossed, and their meaning should be left to Allah (tafwiz). For example, al-Darimi stated that Allah can be comprehended through senses because the Quran reports that Allah talked to Moses directly, he will also talk to Muslims and can be seen by them in the afterlife.[35] Regardless of the conditions, "seeing" and "talking" means comprehending a subject or object with senses. Moreover, an object that cannot be comprehended with senses cannot be regarded as physically existing. However, Allah qualified the divine characteristics "non-destroyable".[36] This verse indicates that Allah is a "real" being which is present physically without the rational borders. Anything that exists physically should have a border and certain titles. The verses which indicate that Allah is in the skies, able to mortify or stone humans, and all elegant words reach to Allah[37], and the hadiths suggesting that Allah is in the sky is the evidence that suggests his borders. However, nobody other than Allah can know the divine borders.[38]

These words indicate how Salafism stays between tashbih and tanzih regarding Allah's titles.

Ibn Taymiyyah claimed that tashbih or tajsim that would require ta'wil did not take place, as previously thought for titles in the religious works on the Quran and sunnah. Although certain titles of Allah are also used by humans to suggest certain humanly characteristics, the similarity is only present in the wordings, and the content of divine titles is completely different than what is suggested for humans and this content only aims to reflect Allah's divine characteristics.[39]

These ideas of Salafi imams on Allah's names and titles only serve to explain the following statement by Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), an Ahl al-Hadith imam: "Istiwa[40] is clear (rational); its conditions are unclear. It is necessary to believe in

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Authority – With Regard to His Work named *at-Tawshih*", *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2014, XIX/2, 103-123.

[35] an-Nisa 4/164; ali-'Imran 3/77; al-Qiyamah 75/22.

[36] al-Qasas 28/88.

[37] Taha 20/5; al-Mulk 67/16-17; al-Fatir 35/10.

[38] Al-Darimi, *Rad al-Imam ad-Darimi Osman ibn Said ala Bishr al-Marisi (published by.* Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi), Beirut, trans., Dar al-Kutub al-ilmiyyah, p. 6, 23-24; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Darimi, Osman ibn Said – Their Ideas on Doctrine", DİA, VIII, 496-497.

[39]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawa*, III, 1-5, 25-27; M. Sait Özervarlı, "Ibn Taymiyyah Tawi ad-Din - His Theological Ideas", DİA, XX, 406.

[40] For more details about istiwa, see Ibn Taymiyyah, *Istiwa Booklet* (trans. Heyet), İstanbul 1996, Tevhîd Yayınları; Veysel Kasar, "The Concept of Istiwa from the Cognates in Quran", *Harran Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1997, issue no. 3, p. 201-227; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Istiwa", *DİA*, XXIII, 402-404.

istiwa, but asking questions about this issue suggests the concept of innovation"[41]. The ta'wil process cannot be performed for the cognates and the issue is left to Allah's will (tafwiz), which is among the basic characteristics of Salafism.[42] As mentioned before, these characteristics indicate that the actions and features of consecration, confirmation, accepting weaknesses, sobriety and avoidance are left to the scholars and Allah's philosophy (tafwiz).[43]

Salafism adopted the process of confirming Allah's titles and cognates, rather than performing the process of ta'wil for them, and by leaving the issue to Allah, it focused on tashbih through understanding the religious works on this issue, with the meanings of the wordings in these works. Allah sent the Quran with a clear and understandable Arabic to enable us to read and the understand Quran.[44] If the Quran has a verse with an ambiguous meaning, another verse or sunnah that can explain this verse can be found. If such evidence is not present, this does not mean that the ambiguous verse should be left so, because the process of explaining the meaning of this verse could be left to humans (deliberately), and, humans can understand and explain the ambiguous verse within the general principles of Quran and sunnah. In addition, Rabia ibn Abi Abd ar-Rahman (d. 136/753), the faqih (Islamic jurist) narrated by Malik ibn Anas, made the following statement: "Allah revealed the divine book to the Prophet and left the certain areas of ambiguity (space) to the Prophet's sunnah. The Prophet formed Sunnah and left certain areas to the process of ra'y."[45] In addition, Allah does not address humans with a non-understandable language and hold them responsible for what has been revealed to them with this language, because otherwise this would be against Allah's philosophy and wisdom. Moreover, majority of usul scholars stated that statements should be present in shariah only when needed (no suspension)[46] and

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[41] Abu Mansur Abd al-qahir ibn Tahir at-Tamimi al-Baghdadi, *Usul ad-din*, Beirut 1401/1981, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, p. 113; Muhammad Jamaladdin al-Qasimi, *Tafsir al-Qasimi (Mahasin at-ta'wil)*, (published by Muhammad Fuad Abd al-baqi), Cairo trans., Dar al-Ihyai kutub al-Arabi, VII, 2704; Yavuz, "Istiwa", DİA, XXIII, 402.

[42] For more details about Salafism as a method of understanding and interpretation, see Mustafa Selim Yılmaz, "An Essay on Salafism as a Method of Understanding and Interpretation in Islamic Ideology History", *İnsan Ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2014, III/3, 532-553.

[43] For more details on this subject, see the title "The First Period: Salafism as a Natural Ideology: From Ahl al-sunnah al-Hassa to Hanbalism" in the "Historical Adventure of Salafism" section of the present study.

[44] For the verses on the Arabic revelation of the Quran, see Yusuf 12/2; ar Ra'd 13/37; an-Nahl 16/103; Taha 20/113; ash-Shuara 26/190; az-Zumar 39/28; Fussilat 41/3, 44; ash-Shura 42/7; az-Zukhruf 43/3; al-Ahqaf 46/1.

[45] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *al-Fakih wa'l-mutafakkih* (inv. Adil ibn Yussuf al-Azazi), al-Mamlakat al-Arabiyyat as-Suudiyyah, 1417/1996, Dar al-Ibn al-Jawzi, I, 501.

[46] For the discussions on whether statements are suspended for the period following the requirement, see Abu al-Husein al-Basri, al-Mu'tamad fi usul al-fiqh (inv. Muhammad Hamidallah), Damascus 1964, I, 251, 342-358; Abu Ishak ash-Shirazi, Sharh al-Luma' (inv. Abd al-majid Turki), Beirut 1988, I, 473; Sarahsi, *Usul as-Sarahsi* (inv. Abu al-Wafa al-Afghani), Beirut 1973, II, 29, 73; Fahraddin ar-Razi, *al-Mahsul fi ilmi usul al-fiqh* (inv. Taha Jabir al-Ulvani), Riyadh 1979, I, 3/279-323; Shawkani, *Irshad al-*

the actions that are subject to provisions/offers (al-mahkum fikh) should be known by the liable[47].

As Salafism strictly fought for the areas which should not be interpreted, Salafism followers suggest that people should not express an idea, they should accept their weakness, and leave the issue to Allah to avoid any errors that may arise from ta'wil and rationalism towards the divine titles and cognate works which cause people to stay uneducated and become a toy for Western actors.

2. Unity of Faith-Religious Practice: Radical Moralism and Takfir Practice

According to Ahmad ibn Hanbal states that faith consists of "statements and religious practices" or faith can be achieved "with confirmation from the heart, acknowledgement from the tongue, and practices from the limbs."[48]Similarly, Ahl al-Hadith states that faith consists of "statements, practices, and conditions." Faith suggests statements and practices, intentions and incidences. Faith can be increased, reduced or absent, if Allah orders so. Faith increases with obedience, but decreases upon revolting.[49]

Ahmad ibn, Hanbal aimed to reject the Murji'ah that considered confirmation from the heart as sufficient for proper faith, when he claimed in the faith definitions that religious practices were included in faith. In addition, according to an idea associated with him, a person who is not polytheist and who prays facing toward the kiblah cannot be declared as a non-believer. According to another belief, he stated that all Ahl al-Bidah groups that form different opinions to explain Allah's titles and faith-based principles, compared to Ahl al-Sunnah, will be considered as non-believers.[50] Sources indicate different narratives indicating that he considered those who supported and pioneered innovative ideas as non-believers.[51]Ahmad

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fuhul ila tahkik al-hak min ilm al-usul, Beirut, trans. (Dar al-Ma'rifah), p. 174-175; Ferhat Koca, *Consecration in Islamic Law Methodology*, İstanbul 1996, p. 122, 159-163, 229

[47] For the issue that actions subject to provisions/offers (al-mahkum fikh) should be known by the liable, see Ibn Hazm, *al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam*, Beirut 1405/1985, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, I-IV, 60-64; Abd al-karim Zaidan, *al-Wajiz fi usul al-fiqh*, Beirut 1427/2006, Muassasat ar-Risalah, p. 76-77; Zaki ad-Din Sha'ban, *Basics of Islamic Law* (trans. İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez), Ankara 1990, p. 235-236.

[48] According to Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Kitab as-Sunnah*, (published by Muhammad ibn Said Basiuni), Beirut 1405/1985, p. 81; Ibn Abi Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, I, 130; Abd al-wahid ibn Abd al-aziz at-Tamimi, *I'tikad al-imam al-munbal*, II, 301; Zahabi, *Siyaru a'lam an-nubalah* (published by Shuaib al-Arnaut et al.), Beirut 1401-1405/1981-85, XI, 302.

[49] Abu Muhammad Hasan ibn Ali ibn Halaf al-Barbahari, Sharhu as-Sunnah (published by Abd ar-rahman ibn Ahmad al-Jumayzi), Riyadh 1426, Maktabatu Dar al-Minhaj, p. 52; Abu Osman Ismail ibn Abd ar-rahman as-Sabuni, Akidet as-salaf wa ashab al-hadith (published by Nasir ibn Abd ar-rahman al-Jadi'), Riyadh 1419/1988, Dar al-asimah, p. 264.

[50] Ahmad ibn, Hanbal, *Kitab as-Sunnah*, p. 10, 71, 104-105, 119; al-Darimi, *ar-Rad 'al al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 101-102; Ibn Abi Ya'la, *Tabakah*, I, 26-27, 132, 142,145.

[51] Ahmad ibn, Hanbal, *Kitab as-Sunnah*, p. 10, 71; Ibn Abi Ya'la, *Tabakah*, I, 95.

ibn, Hanbal and certain Salafi scholars stated that anyone who intentionally abandons prayers is a sacrilege as per the unity of faith, and religious practice.[52]

The individuals and groups that adapted the Salafism movement supported such a faith and practice unity, which directed towards a radical moralism, or even takfir practice. They searched for a "complete" unity between practice and faith in the political, social, cultural and economic fields of personal and social life, and they were accused of being a takfir (non-believer). In addition, this approach fits their tawhid ideology (tawhid al-mabudiyah amel al-tawhid) or even a natural result of this ideology.

However, the unity of faith and practice in the development of Salafism turned into an instrument that supported the related practices, and the good deeds that should be possessed by Muslims in their daily lives transformed into an "organizational act" which should be performed a member of the jihadist-radical Salafism organizations.

3. Non-Created Identity of Quran: Maintaining the Social Status Quo

People have started to discuss whether the Quran was created in an early period, the early Hijri second century, in the Islamic ideology. There are certain people who associate these discussions with certain Greek or Christian activities,[53] or with the effects of Greek Philosophy on Islamic ideology, and there are those who relate these controversial issues to the internal factors stating that these

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[52] Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Usul as-sunnah* (Basics of Ahl as-Sunnah), (trans. Abu Muaz Saifallah Erdoghmush), y., trans., p. 5 (www.islah.de); Abu Usman Ismail ibn Abd ar-rahman as-Sabuni, *Akidat as-salaf wa ashab al-hadith*, p. 278-279.

[53] Yuhanna al-Dimashqi (d. 132/750) who was a clerk in the palace during the era of Hisham ibn Abd al-Maliq (d. 125/743) proposed the idea that divine words, i.e. the Quran, is not a creature considering the fact that Jesus is reflected as "Kalimat Allah" to prove the divine characteristics of Jesus (Ali 'Imran 3/39, 45; An-Nisa, 4/171). Yuhanna tells a Christian how to act when they see a Muslim, as follows: If a Muslim asks you "What is the Messiah?", answer without hesitation "The Messiah is Allah's word", and ask "What does your divine book tell about the Messiah?" If that Muslim understands your question but still attempts to pass to another topic by asking different questions, do not answer their questions without receiving a certain answer. You will see that Muslim will have to answer as follows: "According to my divine book, the Messiah is Allah's word and essence." Upon that answer, ask the following: "Are those words creatures or not?" If that Muslim answers "They are not", state the following: "Then we are of the same opinion, because the eternal one is Allah." If that Muslim rejects your statement and says, "They are creatures", ask: "Then who created the essence and words?" The answer will be "Allah". Then ask: "You mean that Allah did not have any words or essence before creating these words?" You will see your opponent will be disappointed and not be able to answer your question. See Muharrem Akoğlu, *Mu'tazilah During Mihnah Process*, İstanbul ts., İz Yayıcılık, p. 104; Ramazan Yıldırım, "The Political Abuse of Halk al-Quran Issue", *Milal and Nihal*: *Belief, Kültür ve Mitoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2011, VIII/1, 54-55.*

discussions result from the issues related to Allah's eternal titles.[54] The author believes that Islamic society would inevitably discuss the "kalam" title of Allah and evaluate whether the Quran was created in this regard because this issue is directly related to Allah's title and regarded as an internal issue caused by the nature, style and content of the Quran.

Jahmiyyah, Harijis, Mu'tazilah and Shia scholars stated that the Quran is a divine work, and it is the reflection of divine attribution and actual titles that consists of the letters and sounds of Lawh al-mahfouz, Gabriel and the Prophet, other than Allah. According to them, the Quran is no different to human words as it can be heard and understood. Accordingly, the Quran is a creature and a muhdas (created afterwards).

Majority of Ahl al-Sunnah kalam authorities that consist of Ash'ariyyah and Maturidiyyah presented their opinions on whether the Quran is a creature and stated that the Quran's wordings and meanings should be separated. According to them, the Quran's essential meaning, that is present upon Allah's pure existence or cleared from the wordings, is eternal rather than a creature. The Quran's wordings (kalam al-lafzi) that present this meaning which is called kalam al-nafsi (zhati), for the understanding of humans, is created.

Karamiyyah indicated that Allah's kalam title, which is eternal, meant the divine ability to talk, but the Quran consisting of divine words is hadith (creature).[55]

According to many Ahl al-Hadith and Salafist scholars such as Jafar ibn Muhammad as-Sadiq (d. 148/765), Malik ibn Anas, Abdallah ibn Mubarak (d. 181/797), Waqi' ibn al-Jarrah (d. 197/812), Abd ar-rahman ibn Mahdi (d. 198/813-14), Imam Al-Shafi'i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the Quran is Allah's statement and thus not a creature, and the Quran's wordings and meanings are eternal as they reflect the presence of Allah. They suggest that as the Quran is Allah's kalam and thus a

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[54] For these ideas, see Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Halk al-Quran", DİA; XV, 371.

[55] Qadi Abd al-jabbar, *Sharh al-usul al-hamsah* (Abd al-qarim Usman), Cairo 1988, p. 528-531; Abu al-Yusr Muhammad Pazdawi, *Ahl al-Sunnah Akaid* (trans. Şerafeddin Gölcük), İstanbul 1980, Kayıhan Yayınevi, p. 77-99; Abu al-Muin an-Nasafi, *Tabsirat al-adilla* (inv. Claude Salamé), Damascus 1990, al-Ma'had al-Ilm al-Firansi, I, 259-299. For Mu'tazila's ideas on halk al-Quran, see Osman Aydınlı, "Creation of the Quran" and Its Place in Mu'tazilah History" I-II, Dinî Araştırmalar, 2001, III/9, 45-62; IV/10, 37-52; Hasan Türkmen, "Abu Hashim al-Jubbai's Fonetics-Based Approach Toward the Concept of Kalam", *Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2014, XII/1, 353-370. For Kalam al-nafsi (zati) and kalam al-lafzi, see Şamil Öçal, "Dual Nature of Kalamallah: Kalam al-Lafzi and Kalam al-Nafsi", İslâmiyât, II/1 (January-March 1999), Ankara 1999, 61–84; Mustafa Altundağ, "The Differentiation of 'Kalam al-Nafsi – Kalam a-Lafzi' in Regard to the Discussions of Kalamallah – Halk al-Quran", *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, XVIII (2000), p. 149-181. For the ideas of certain Sunni scholars, particularly Abu Hanifah, on halk al-Quran, see Fatih Tok, "Two Claims / Accusations on Abu Hanifah: Murji'ah and Halk al-Quran", *İslâm Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2012, issue no. 19, p. 245-267; Sabri Yılmaz - Mehmet İlhan, "Kalamullah and Kalam al-Nafsi according to Juwayni", *Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2011, IX/1, 215-232.

divine title, it is not a creature no matter where and how they are referred or written. Considering the Quran as a creature is sacrilege because religious works indicate that the Quran can be heard and is written as Allah's Kalam,[56] and all the ummah agree on this issue. The Quran consists of all religious meanings or wordings. The Quran is not the wording (the story) of meaning revealed to the Prophet through Gabriel, but it is the essential and eternal kalam of Allah in regard to its wording and meaning.[57] According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the terms lafiz, qiraat and tilawat suggest reading or a work that is read. Thus, the aim of stating that the Quran is a creature and reading it is a mortal act will be wrong because the Quran is eternal, but not a creature with its wording and meaning. However, when the action of reading is mentioned, it is not appropriate to state that reading the Quran is a mortal action although it can be said so. Even this statement can be regarded from a mortal aspect and result in assigning the title of creature to the Quran.[58] Certain Salafi scholars such as Abu Hatim ar-Razi (d. 277/890), Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and Ibn Hamid (d. 403/1012) claimed that neither reading or writing the Quran, nor the sounds and letters formed while reading or writing it are mortal elements and actions.[59]

It is fair to state that majority of these ideas on Halk al-Quran adapted by scholars of different movements is related to Allah's "kalam" title, which arise from the fact that "kalam" is regarded as an essential, or actual title.[60]

Although the issue of the Quran's creation is a scientific topic, it turned into a political crisis in Abbasid era.

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[56] See al-Jinn 72/1.

[57] Ahmad ibn, Hanbal, *Kitab as-Sunnah*, p. 36; Abu Bawir Ahmad ibn Husein al-Bayhaqi, *Kitab al-Asma wa's-sifat* (inv. Imaduddin Ahmad Haidar), Beirut 1415/1994, Second Edition, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, I, 374-408; Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Mu'tamad fi usul ad-din* (published by Wadi' Zaidan Haddad), Beirut 1974, p. 89, 155-156; Abd al-Fattah Abu Guddah, "The Issue of Halk al-Quran: Its Influences on Narrators, Hadith Scholars, and al-Jarh and Ta'dil Books" (trans. Mücteba Uğur), *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1975, XX, 307-321; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Halk al-Quran", DİA; XV, 373.

[58] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuat ar-rasail wa'l-masail* (published by Hayat Ma'mun Shayha)), Beirut 1416/1996, Dar al-fiqr, I (III), 358; a.mlf., Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar at-taarad al-akl wa'n-nakl*, I, 257-270. For Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas on this issue, see Muammer Esen, "Ibn Taymiyyah's Place in Kalamallah Discussions", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2001, XLII, 257-271.

[59] Yavuz, "Halk al-Quran", DİA; XV, 373-374.

[60] For certain discussions on Halk al-Quran, see Ali Sayı, "The Issue of Halk al-Quran and Its Evaluation in Regard to Tafsir Movement", *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1989, issue no. 6, p. 599-618; Muharram Akoğlu, "Halkal-Quran Discussions Based on al-Haidah", *Bilimname: Düşünce Platformu*, 2005/2, III/8, 13-32; İbrahim Arslan, "The Nature of Words and Kalamallah in this Regard (A Linguistic Approach)", Kelam Araştırmaları, 3/1 (2005), www.kelam.org, p. 141–163; Harun Öğmüş, "Influence of Halk al-Quran Discussions on the Considerations Regarding the Revelation of Verses from Allah to Humans", *Selçuk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2009, issue no. 28, p. 17-44; Nurullah Agitoğlu, "Ibn al-Mulaqqin's Approach toward al-Bukhari's Section Titles in Regard to the Halk al-Quran and Ru'yatallah Issues", *Şırnak Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2014/2, V/10, 99-123; Hasan Türkmen, "The Issue of the Creation of the Quran in regard to kalam's nature", *Kelam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2014, XII/2, 335-362.

Ma'mun (d. 218/833), one of Abbasid caliphs, sent a letter to Ishaq ibn Ibrahim, who was left as a deputy in Baghdad, while he was resting in Raqqa on the journey to Tarsus in 218/833, and he made the Halk al-Quran issue a formal policy of the government. Ma'mun stated in his letter that caliphs should follow Allah's orders for the purpose of fulfilling their religious responsibilities and acting as a successor to the Prophet, and they should spread their knowledge on this issue. However, people who lack Islamic philosophy regard Allah and revealed the Quran as equal, without making a differentiation between "Haliq" and "mahluq", and they consider Quran as eternal. In his letter, Ma'mun presented severe accusations toward those who spread these ideas and regarded themselves an Ahl al-Haq (Ahl al-Haq wa'd-din wa'l-jamaa) follower. According to the caliph, they are the evils of the ummah, leaders of the lunatics (perversion) who benefited from tawhid and faith at the lowest degree, served for ignorance, acted as the leaders of liars, adapted a devil language used to talk to their friends, acted as an enemy to the followers of Allah's religion and performed unreliable practices with unreliable statements, and whose testimony was not worth accepting.[61]

It is clear from the letter that Caliph Ma'mun was disturbed by Ashab al-Hadith's statements and their effects over the public because Ashab al-Hadith supported Amin (d. 198/813), who was Ma'mun's brother and represented Arabic elements, in the power struggle between Amin and Ma'mun who was supported by the non-Arabic elements (mawali)[62]. In addition, Ahmad ibn Nasr al-Huzai (d. 231/846) who opposed Ma'mun during the latest periods of his era was a friend of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who was an Ahl al-Hadith imam, and he followed the same movement with Hanbal.[63] In addition, Ashab al-Hadith stated that they paid the utmost importance to the Quran and sunnah, and that they were those who narrated the religious works from the sahabah and tabi'un. They also claimed that they holistically represented the social and religious status quo. Considering the Quran as the divine book with its wordings and meaning and accepting that the Quran is eternal, and not mortal (gayr al-muhdas), is highly critical. The Quran's eternal meaning can only be explained with sunnah, and statements and practices of salaf al-salihi. Statements and practices of sunnah and salaf al-salihi are the greatest instrument and advantage of Ashab al-Hadith (Ahl al-Hadith) rather than the caliph or another group. Thus, the idea of regarding the Quran as eternal constituted the theological basis of an eternal religion and constant social structure. Naturally, this will consolidate the authority of the scholars (Ahl al-Hadith) who

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[61] Abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari, *Tarih at-Tabari* (published by.Muhammad Abu al-Fazl Ibrahim), Cairo 1979, Dar al-Ma'rifah, VIII, 631-634; Ramazan Yıldırım, "The Political Abuse of Halk al-Quran", p. 55-56.

[62] Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, "Amin", *DİA*, XI, 113.

[63] Fahmi Jad'an, *al-Mihnah, Bahsun fi Jadaliyyat ad-Diniyyi wa's-Siyasiyyi fi a-Islam*, Beirut 2000, al-Muassasat al-Arabiyyah li ad-Dirasatah wa'n-Nashr, p. 347-349; Ramazan Yıldırım, "The Political Abuse of Halk al-Quran Issue", p. 63; M. Yaşar Kandemir, "Ahmad ibn Nasr al-Huzai", DİA, II, 110.

are referred to as those that narrated the unchangeable hadiths. In other words, the fact that the Quran is eternal, is an attribution to the eternal characteristics of Salafi ideology. Therefore, the "untouchable" characteristic of Allah's kalam reflects the domination of the sunnah over the religion and untouchable characteristics of social structure and status quo for Salafism followers.[64]

4. The Relationship Between Intelligence and Narration: The Superiority of Narration

One of the most significant characteristics that separate Salafism ideology from other Islamic ideologies are the approaches towards the relationship between intelligence and narration. Before mentioning further ideas and evaluations on this issue, the author would like to briefly give information about the concepts of intelligence and narration.

Intelligence, which meant "to hold, retain, obligate, prevent, preclude"[65] in the dictionaries, was regarded by Vasil ibn Ata (d. 131/748), one of the founding imams of Mu'tazilah, as "the resource that enables us to know to truth"[66] while Qadi Abd al-jabbar (d. 415/1025) regarded it as "the total information that enables people to think and be held responsible for what they have done."[67]

Abu Mansur al-Maturidi regarded intelligence as "the unit that collects elements with the same characteristics and separates those with different characteristics".[68]

According to Bakillani, an Ashari kalam authority (d. 403/1013), intelligence is "to know obligatory, possible and impossible points"[69] while al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) stated that "intelligence is to know necessities such as possibilities, impossibilities and obligations, and to acquire information through experience" and "the ability to gain information, which is a natural human characteristic."[70]

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[64]   Mehmet Zeki İşcan, "Emergence of 'Salaf' Idea as a Religious authority in Ahl al-Sunnah", EKEV Akademi Dergisi, Erzurum 2005, IX/25, 22-23; a.mlf., "Basics of Salafism and the Socio-Political Background", Salafism in the Past and Present, *International Debate on Islamic Science*, 08-10 November 2013, Topkapı Eresin Hotel, İstanbul 2014, p. 100.

[65]   Ragib al-Isfahani, *al-Mufradat fi garib al-Quran* (inv. Muhammad Sayyid Kilani), Beirut trans., Dar al-ma'rifah, p. 342; Ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-Arab*, Beirut, trans. (Daru Sadir), XI, 458-466.

[66]   Husni Zainah, *al-Akl 'ind al-mu'tazilah*, Beirut 1978, p. 18-19; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Intelligence", DİA, II, 242.

[67]   Qadi Abd al-jabbar, *al-Mughni fi abwab at-tawhid wa'l-adl*, Cairo 1963, XI, 375; Husni Zainah, *al-Akl ind al-Mu'tazila*, p. 18-21.

[68]   Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, Kitab at-tawhid (inv. Fethullah Huleif), İstanbul 1979, al-Maktabat al-Islamiyyah, p. 5.

[69]   Tahanawi, Kitabu Kashafu istilahat al-funun, İstanbul 1984, II, 1033 (akl md).

[70]   Al-Ghazali, *Mishkat al-anwar* (inv. Abu al-Ala Afifi), Cairo 1964, p. 48; a.mlf., *Mi'yar al-ilm*, Beirut trans., Dar al-Endelus, p. 286; a.mlf., *Sharaf al-akl wa mahiyyatuhu* (inv. Mustafa A. Ata), Beirut 1986, p. 58.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a Salafi imam, regarded intelligence as a natural natal human characteristic.[71] Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, regarded the mind as "the nature that enables people to identify the current and wrong elements, and to direct their attitudes in this regard (garizah)" whether it is a title or an indication.[72]

These different definitions of intelligence indicate that scholars who are members of different sects consider intelligence, "as the mental ability that can provide speculative information by using the necessary information, identify and interpret the elements that will significantly perform the action of thinking, provide consistent provisions about them, and separate humans from other creatures".[73]

All evidence, the premises of which are based on intelligence in doctrine, kalam, fiqh and fiqh-based disciplines, are named as "akli (intelligence) evidence".

Narration, however, has various meanings such as conveying, transmitting, carrying, communicating, telling and narrating. The concept of narration means "conveying the statements of somebody as they are". The person who conveys these statements are named "narrator".[74] The concept of narration in a religious context means narrating the religious texts or provisions verbally.

The intention of mentioning the concept of narration in "intelligence-narration relationship" is to suggest the fiqh evidences, the premises which are based on hearing. The certainty of this evidence was verbally proved (hearing-based) in the first periods of Islam, thus this evidence was named as "hearing-based evidence".

Islamic scholars state that the Quran, sunnah (hadiths) and scholars' evidence-based provisions are the primary sources of information conveyed through narration.

All Islamic scholars, including the Salafis, agreed on the point that the Quran is a narration-based evidence.

In addition, Islamic scholars were of the same belief that tawatur (rumor-based) hadiths (mutawatir) should be regarded as narration-based evidence. Regarding the hadiths that do not achieve the tawatur status (ahad), some Mu'tazilah scholars holistically rejected these hadiths, but the majority used these hadiths for guidance under certain conditions. The majority of Ash'ariyyah and Maturidiyyah scholars regarded the ahad hadiths as among the evidence of the doctrines based on the condition that they do not contradict with the essence and general principles of the Quran.

Certain Mu'tazilah scholars such as Abu Ishaq an-Nazzam (d. 231/845) claimed that evidence-based provisions cannot be evidence for doctrines but most of the

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[71]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawa*, IX, 287.

[72]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawa*, VII, 24, 539; IX, 271-288.

[73]   Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "The place of Revelation and Intelligence for Doctrine Discipline", *The Scientific Specialization Meeting and Debate on the place of Revelation and Intelligence for Doctrine and Kalam Discipline 20-21 October 2012*, İstanbul 2013, p. 35-36.

[74]   For the concept of narration, see Tahanawi, *Kashafu istilahat al-funun*, II, 1426 (nar art.).

kalam authorities considered these provisions as evidence that certifies religious works in doctrine-based issues.[75]

According to the Salafi imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, sunnah, among the before-mentioned evidences is the statement that determines the meanings and indicators of these meanings in the Quran, and religion can only be learned though sunnah. Those who attempt to learn religion through the Quran without using the sunnah guidance cannot find the correct path.[76] Therefore, according to Salafism followers, the concept of sunnah is equal to Quran in regard to narration-based evidences, which will be detailed later.

For Salafism, it is not significant to separate the sunnah as tawatur and ahad in regard to certainty. Because Ahmad ibn Hanbal states that mutawatir khabar reflects certain information[77], and ahad khabar also suggests true information. For example, according to a narrative from Abu Bakir al-Marruzi (d. 275/889), Imam Ahmad was asked "A man right there says 'Khabar requires practice, but does not require science.' What does that mean?", and he answered as follows: "I do not know what that means".[78] This dialogue indicates that Ahmad ibn Hanbal considers the information from the ahad khabar (scientific information) and practicing with this information as equal.

Regarding the issue of evidence-based provisions, Ahmad ibn Hanbal made the following statement when asked: "When sahabah members give a provision about an issue, how about abandoning their ideas?" "This is a disgraceful statement; their statements reflect the words of ahl al-bidat; even when sahabah members disagree on an issue, their statements are to be followed".[79] Ibn Taymiyyah stated that Imam Ahmad accepted the provisions of sahabah, tabi'un and atbaa't-tabii.[80]

These statements suggest that the narration and narration-based evidence in doctrines are clearly the Quran, sunnah (with the types of mutawatir and ahad) and evidence-based provisions (the provisions of the first three generations) according to Salafism followers.

This study will now examine the relationship between intelligence and narration, the characteristics of which were detailed before.

Kalam authorities agreed on the point that intelligence is the source of information. The differences and contradictions seen in intelligence-based provisions arise from the failure of individuals in achieving the scientific tafakkur

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[75] Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Evidence - Kalam", DİA, IX, 137.

[76] Muhammad Abu Zahra, *Ahmad Ibn Hanbal* (trans. Osman Keskioğlu), Ankara 1984, p. 240, 241, 250.

[77] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah fi usul al-fiqh* (published by Ahmad ibn, Ali Sair Mubaraki), I-V, Riyadh 1993, III, 845.

[78] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, III, 899-900.

[79] Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Masail al-Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal: Rivayah ibnihi Abdallah* (published by Zuhair Shavish), Beirut 1988, p. 438–439; Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, IV, 1059–60.

[80] Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Musawada fi usul al-fiqh*, Cairo 1983, p. 283–84.

level or meeting the conditions of this level, rather than resulting from intelligence itself.[81]

The kalam authorities, who agreed on the point that intelligence is an information source, disagreed on the issue of what intelligence can know, and the place of intelligence before narration.[82]

Mu'tazilah stated that the guidance of intelligence is adequate to evidence, that actions are benevolent and malevolent in their essence, and that these can be realized with intelligence separately from religion, and the requirements of Shari's orders are based on these benevolent and malevolent actions.[83]

Ash'ariyyah claimed that intelligence cannot determine the benevolent and malevolent aspects of certain characteristics, and that this can only be possible through a fiqh notification; actions do not have benevolent or malevolent characteristics that necessitates the orders of Allah, and these can only be possible with Allah's orders; and Allah's actions cannot be qualified with benevolence and malevolence.[84]

Maturidiyyah stayed in these two opposite sides and stated that intelligence cannot be adequate on its own, but intelligence should not be neglected as Ash'ariyyah stated. In addition, they claimed that intelligence can determine the benevolent and malevolent characteristics of certain characteristics, but Allah is the

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[81] Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, *Kitab at-tawhid*, p. 4-5; Pazdawi, *Ahl al-sunnah Doctrine*, p. 8-22; Nuraddin as-Sabuni, *Maturidi Doctrine* (trans. Bekir Topaloğlu), Ankara 1991, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, p. 56-57; Taftazani, *Kalam Discipline and Its Islamic Doctrine (Sharhu al-Akaid)* (trans. Süleyman Uludağ), İstanbul 1980, Dergâh Yayınları, p. 115-122.

[82] For discussions on the relationship of intelligence and narration, see. Ramazan Altıntaş, "Value of Intelligence in Kalami Epistemology", *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2001, V/2, 97-129; a. mlf., "The Value and Status of Intelligence before Religious Works", *Kelâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2003, I, 1, p. 11-20; a.mlf., "Abu Hanifah's (d. 150/767) Concept of Intelligence-Revelation", *Kelâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2004, c. II/1, 3-22; Cemalettin Erdemci, "*The Issue of the Effectiveness of Intelligence and Narration in Kalam Discipline*", The Place of traditional in Rebuilding the Kalam Discipline, Elazığ 2004, p. 329-344; a.mlf., "Revelation in Kalam Discipline", *Milal and Nihal: İnanç, Kültür ve Mitoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2011, VIII/1, 119-142; Mehmet Kubat, "The Status of Intelligence Before Revelation in the Islamic Ideology", *Milal and Nihal: İnanç, Kültür ve Mitoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2011, VIII/1, 71-118; Hülya Alper, "*The Place of Intelligence and Revelation in the Kalam Discipline*", *The Scientific Specialization Meeting and Debate on the Place of Revelation and Intelligence for Doctrine and the Kalam Discipline 20-21 October 2012*, İstanbul 2013, p. 115-154;

[83] Qadi Abd al-jabbar, *al-Mughni*, VI, 30-31; a.mlf., *Sharhu al-usul al-hamsah*, p. 310, 564; Abd al-aziz al-Bukhari, *Kashf al-asrar ala Usul al-Pazdawi*, İstanbul 1890, IV, 230; Ali Bardakoğlu, "The Role of Intelligence in Husn and Kubh, and Imam Maturidi", EÜİFD, issue no. 4, p. 62-63; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "The Place of Revelation and Intelligence in Doctrine Discipline", p. 37. For Mu'tazilah's approach toward intelligence, see Ramazan Altıntaş, "The Concept of Intelligence for Mu'tazilah", *The Place of Tradition in Rebuilding the Kalam Discipline*, 2004, p. 311-322.

[84] Al-Ghazali, *al-Mustasfa min ilm al-usul*, Cairo 1322/1904, I, 57-59; Ibn Amir al-Haj, *at-Takrir wa't-tahbir sharhu at-Tahrir*, Beirut 1983, II, 91; Muhammad ibn Nizamuddin al-Ansari, *Fawatih ar-rahamut*, Cairo 1322/1904, I, 33 (With *al-Mustasfa* by al-Ghazali).

only one who makes actions and statements obligatory, and intelligence has a function to explain these obligations (a describer).[85]

Salafism followers accepted that an intelligence-based examination is necessary for explaining and understanding narrations, but they consider intelligence as an inadequate source (on its own) for understanding and explaining the facts proposed by the religion. For example, according to al-Darimi, the issues that are thought to be determined through intelligence (ma'kulat) are not those that can be agreed by the people. In addition, as the Quran indicates[86], each party states that their ideas are the correct ones, and criticizes the opinions of the opposing side. Thus, religious works should be used to determine which intelligence-based principle is correct.[87]

Ibn Taymiyyah often stated that the Quran's guidance should be followed in religious practices and mentioned that the sahabah, tabi'un and imams did not accept an intelligence-based action that was against the Quran, and they did not adapt any beliefs that were followed before the Quran.[88]

Fahraddain ar-Razi, one of Ash'ari kalam authorities, (d. 606/1210), stated that narration-based evidence does not indicate correctness and certainty because any possibilities regarding meanings, synonymous words and metaphors that emerge by grammar rules, narration, presentation, retardation, assignment, and contrariness to religious works and intelligence should not exist, and, narration-based evidences suggest suspicion while intelligence-based indicate certainty.[89]

Ibn Taymiyyah wrote a broad book named *Daru taaruz al-akl wa'n-nakl av Muvafakatu sahih al-mankul li-sarih al-ma'kul* for the purpose of rejecting the principle that was turned into "kanun al-kulli" by Fahraddin ar-Razi and his followers, and stated that "intelligence should be used and narration should be interpreted" when intelligence and narration conflict, and he claimed that this concept by Fahraddin ar-Razi appeared similar to those adapted by Jewish and Christian scholars

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[85] Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi, *Kitab at-tawhid*, p. 176-185; Pazdawi, *Ahl al-sunnah* Doctrine, 298-304; Abd al-aziz al-Bukhari, *Kashf al-asrar*, IV, 230, 234-236. For Maturidi's opinions on the relationship between intelligence and narration, see J. Meric Pessagno, "Intelligence and Religion-Based Confirmation According to Maturidi" (trans. İlhami Güler), *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara 1996, XXXV, 425-435; Hülya Alper, "The Relationship Between Intelligence and Revelation for Imam Maturidi: Primary Role of Intelligence and Necessity of Revelation", *Milal and Nihal: İnanç, Kültür ve Mitoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2010, VII/2, 7-29;

[86] ar-Rum 30/32.

[87] Al-Darimi, *ar-Rad al al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 57; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Al-Darimi, Osman ibn Said – His Opinions of Doctrine", *DİA*, VIII, 496.

[88] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawa*, XVI, 471-472.

[89] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *Maalimu usul ad-din*, Cairo 1905, p. 9; a.mlf.,*al-Muhassal, -Introduction to Kalam* (trans. Hüseyin Atay), Ankara 1978, p. 45-46.

between Torah and Bible. He also stated that these scholars are much closer to the truth than the followers of ar-Razi in regard to respect to prophets.[90]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahl al-hak members did not oppose the intelligence-based provisions and other provisions accepted by intelligence. What they rejected was the claim that intelligence can propose anything that could oppose the Quran and Sunnah. However, anything contradicting with religion is regarded as wrong by intelligence.[91]

Ahl al-sunnah scholars substantially agreed on the point that when a provision that is found through intelligence-based evidence which contradicts with narration (shariah), the narration-based provision should be interpreted because intelligence is not the element that should go through ta'wil process. In addition, Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), stated that a fiqh evidence that can witness or get close to the degree of witnessing the process of ta'wil for intelligence can definitely be found for all issues that are mentioned by shariah, and found opposite to the evidence by their characteristics.[92] Intelligence is both a principal method for narration and accessing certain information. Refuting the main point of an idea for revising its details means refuting both the main point and its details.[93]

Ibn Taymiyyah stated that intelligence is not evidence that should be followed to determine the certainty of fiqh elements, but the fiqh elements that were revealed by Allah are unchangeable, and are superior to our science and intelligence.[94]

On the other hand, this evidence ideology of Salafis is valid not only in the doctrine field, but also in fiqh and usul disciplines. For Example, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350) mentioned the fatwa of sahabah after the religious works on the Quran and Sunnah in Ahmad ibn Hanbal's fatwa method. Ahmad would use the fatwa from a sahabah member, who was known to have no rivals, and he

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[90] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar'u taaruz al-akl wa'n-nakl*, I, 4-8.

[91] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar'u taaruz al-akl wa'n-nakl*, I, 194-195; M. Said Özervarlı, "Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ad-Din – His Theological Ideas", DİA, XX, 405.

[92] Ibn Rushd, *Fasl al-makal* (inv. Muhammad Ammarah), Cairo trans. , Dar al-ma'rifah, p. 33.

[93] Qadi Abd al-jabbar, *Sharhu usul al-hamsah*, p. 88; Fahraddin ar-Razi, *al-Mahsul fi ilmi usul al-fiqh* (inv. Taha Jabir al-Ulvani), Riyadh 1979, I, 3/112; Adudiddin al-Iji, *al-Mawakif fi 'ilm al-kalam*, Cairo trans., Maktabat al-Mutanabbi, p. 40.

[94] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Muwafakatu sahih al-mankul li-sarihi al-ma'kul*, Beirut 1405/1985, Dar al-kutub al-ilmiyyah, I, 82-83. For Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas on the relationship between intelligence and narration, see Heer, Nicholas, "The Priority of Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture: Ibn Taymiyyah and The Mutakallimun", *Literary Heritage of Classical Islam Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of James A. Bellamy* (Ed. Mustansir Mir), Princeton: The Darwin Press 1993; M. Sait Özervarlı, *Ibn Taymiyyah's Ideology Methodology and His Criticisms Toward the Kalam Authorities*, İstanbul 2008, İSAM Yayınları; Burhaneddin Kıyıcı, *The Relationship Between Intelligence and Narration for Ibn Taymiyyah* (unpublished doctoral thesis), Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara 2009; Bünyamin Abrahamov, "Ibn Taymiyyah's Approach Towards the Accordance Between Intelligence and Narration" (trans. Salih Özer), *İslâmî İlimler Dergisi*, 2009, IV/1-2, 385-400.

would not look for any other evidence. Whenever he found a fatwa from the sahabah, he would not present either a religious practice, ra'y or comparisons.[95]

Ahmad ibn Hanbal, when a religious work, a sahabah opinion, and a true or weak work on an issue are not present, comparison is performed in that order and practices based on this comparison are performed necessarily. Abu Bakr al-Hallal (d. 311/923) narrated that Ahmad ibn Hanbal made the following statement: "I asked Shafi about the issue of comparison. He stated that comparison can only be performed when it is necessary or when he said something similar."[96] Accordingly, Ahmad ibn Hanbal et al. considered comparison equal to the extent of dry ablutions. As dry ablutions are performed when the absence of water is confirmed, comparison is performed when the absence of religious works is confirmed.[97]

The issue of whether intelligence or narration is to be preferred when a conflict emerges is no longer significant after the narration-based radical approaches of Salafism followers with "a broader content" toward the relationship between intelligence and narration became clearer. They held intelligence subject to narration with their approaches, which regarded narration as superior to intelligence, and stated that narration consists of the basis of intelligence. They also considered intelligence to consist of religious works. Mu'tezilah held narration subject to intelligence, while Salafis considered intelligence subject to narration and thus these two opposite sides agreed on the point of combining intelligence and narration in perfect equality.[98]

According to Salafism followers, the intelligence-narration conflict can be easily solved through this combination because there cannot be a real conflict between a true narration and clear intelligence, and both of these evidence sorts should match one another (muwafik); if there is a conflict between these two, it means the religious work is not true or the mind is not clear.[99]

The followers of Salafism ideology paid a remarkable importance to the real intentions of people (subjective will) in order not to experience a methodological deadlock in fiqh discipline, after these radical approaches, based on religious works. Hanafism and Shafism propose the condition of following the wordings, grammar rules, comparisons and principles used for doctrines with the concern of providing objective criteria to control the validity and invalidity of legal actions. Hanbalism based its approaches on intentions rather than on wordings, and religious works rather than comparisons; and they broadly used the types of

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[95] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin an Rabb al-alamin* (inv. M. Muhyiddin Abd al-hamid), Cairo 1955, I, 30–31.

[96] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin*, I, 32.

[97] Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Musawwada*, p. 330–331.

[98] Süleyman Uludağ, *İslâm Düşüncesinin Yapısı*, İstanbul 1979, p. 80-81.

[99] For Ibn Taymiyyah's formula for solving the conflict between intelligence and narration, see Ibn Taymiyyah, *Muwafakatu sahih al-mankul*, I, 76-79; a.mlf., *Majmuu fatawa*, III, 338-340; VI, 245; VII, 665; X, 435-453; XVI, 252-254, 442-443; XIX, 228-234.

contracts and other procedures considering the principle of istishab al-hal unless prohibited by the religious works.[100] This process granted them a narrow point of view in theology and ibadah issues, while enabling them a broad point of view in procedures.[101]

Another result of holding narration superior to intelligence in the relationship between these evidence sources is that ra'y members (Ahl a-ra'y) and kalam authorities who used different methods of intelligence use were blemished and excluded. Salafis, who act with the idea of being the sole representative and protector of narration (Islamic science and facts), have fought for blemishing ra'y and kalam, decrying Ahl ar-ra'y and ahl al-kalam, and removing their scientific and religious legitimacy.

All malevolent, rejectionist and exclusionist literary works[102], threats[103], pressures[104] and terrorist actions [105] towards Ahl ar-ra'y, Ahl al-ta'wil, Ahl al-bidat

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[100] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin*, I, 218-219, 344-346; III, 75, 107, 110-119, 123, 140-143, 176; IV, 199.

[101] About the general characteristics of Hanbalism, see Ferhat Koca, *The Salafi Discourse in Islamic Law History*: *Hanbalism*, Ankara 2002, p. 198-210.

[102] For the rebuttals of Ahl al-hadith written in the first three hijri centuries against certain groups including Ahl ar-ra'y and kalam authorities, see Ahmet Özer, Rejectionist Literature of *Ahlal-hadith* (unpublished master's thesis), Marmara University, Institute of Social Sciences, İstanbul 2008. For the examples of rebuttals written by Ahl al-hadith and Salafism followers after the Hijri third century, see Haja Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Ansari Harawi, *Zamm* al-kalam (inv. Semih Dugaym), Beirut 1994, Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani; Muvaffakuddin Ibn Kudamah, *Zamm at-ta'wil* (published by Badr ibn Abdullah Badr), Kuwait 14161995, Daru Ibn al-Asir; a.mlf., *Ibn Qudâma's Censure of speculative theology = Tahrim an-nazar fi kutubi ahl al-kalam* (ed. George Makdisi), 2nd edition -- Norfolk 1985, Gibb Memorial Trust; Abu al'Fazl Abd ar-rahman ibn Ahmad ibn Hasan ibn Bundar Abu al-Fazl Razi, Ahadis fi *zammal-kalami wa ahlihi* (published by Nasir ibn Abdurrahman Jad'i), Riyadh 1996/1417, Daru Atlas; Ab al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzi, *Zammal-hawa* (published by Ahmed Abd as-salam Ata), Beirut 1987, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah. On the other hand, the modern followers of Salafism still act the same way against the Ahl ar-ra'y and Ahl al-kalam. They maintain the Salafism and Wahhabism claims on many different media platforms in different languages such ash anfal media, dar as-sunnah, dar al-ittiba, dar al-tawhid, hakk al-jihad, amelioration, Islam house, improving the Quran and sunnah, salafi khabar, salafi call, salafi manhaj, salafi talk, tawhid, tawhid academia, tawhidi call and tawhid school. Some of them presented different attributions and reflections written in uncontrolled subjectivism in the jarh, ta'dil, zuafa, and matrukin books of Salafism scholars for the purpose of blemishing Imam- al-Azam Abu Hanifa, who has been followed by the Turkish people for more than a millennium, in accordance with the fatwa "the blind leading the blind". These individuals who sold religion in Hanafi neighborhood were unaware of the fact that all legal Islamic sects had equal legitimacy and reputation. However, Salafism is an abdication of reason like that! There is no difference in burying your head in sand and living in a time tunnel. Insulting and deriding Imam Abu Hanifa, who has been followed by the majority of Muslims for determining their religious and mortal ideas and beliefs for centuries, in the name of Islam! It is worth sighing about the Islam that has been trapped by such an ideology!

[103] For example, Abd ar-rahman Ibn Mahdi (d. 198/814), one of Hanbal's masters, Mahdi (d. before the mihnah incidents started about halk al-Quran issue: "If I had the authority, I would cut the heads off of those who said Quran is a creature, and throw them to Tigris. See Zahabi, *Tazkirat al-huffaz*, Beirut, trans., Daru Ihyai at-Turas al-Arabi, I, 331. Yahya ibn Ammar, an Ibn Hanbal supporter, made the

and Ahl al-kalam are caused and formed primarily by Hanbalism followers, and Salafis in the Islamic ideology, and culture history.[106] Therefore, as stated by Ignaz Goldziher, "A trustworthy Hanbali is as rare as a white crow".[107]

5. Religious Fiqh Works: Equality of the Quran and Sunnah

(a) Islamic scholars, with almost all of their parties, agreed upon the point that the Quran is the primary source (evidence) in doctrines and fiqh.[108]

(b) Similarly, Ahl al-sunnah scholars united over the idea that sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad is the secondary source in doctrines and fiqh, with different conditions proposed in regards to certainty and degrees of signifance.

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following statement about Ibn Hibban (d. 354/965), a hadith authority: "He was a knowledgeable person, but he was weak in regards to Islam. He rejected the ideas that Allah is limited in space, thus we expelled him from Sijistan". See Zahabi, *Tazkirat al-huffaz*, III, 921-922.

[104] For example, Baghdadi Hanbalism followers surrounded the house of Al-Tabari because Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (d. 310/923), a famous historian and faqih, accepted Ahmad ibn Hanbal as only a hadith authority rather than a faqih and did not include his opinions in *Ihtilaf al-fukaha*, and they prevented at-Tabari's students from going to his house to receive education. After al-Tabari passed away, the body was buried in the house due to the fears related to the protests of these followers. See Al-Tabari, *Ihtilaf al-fukaha*, Beirut trans., Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, p. 8 (introduction of the publisher); Taqi ad-din Ali as-Subki, *Tabakat ash-Shafiiyyah*, published by Abd al-fattah Muhammad al-Hulv-Mahmud Muhammad at-Tinahi, Cairo 1385/1966, III, 124-125. Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (d. 256/870), one of the greatest representatives of Ahl al-sunnah and Ahl al-hadith, was assaulted by ibn Hanbal's followers due to his ideas on halk al-Quran, and thus he had to abandon Nishapur. See M. Mustafa al-A'zami, "Al-Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Ismail", DİA, VI, 369.

[105] Although Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 324/938) clearly sent praises to Ahmad ibn Hanbal and stated that he adopted Hanbal's beliefs, his mausoleum was assaulted by Hanbalism followers many times (Ibn Asakir, *Tabyinu kazib al-muftari fi ma nusiba ila al-Imam Abi a-Hasan al-Ash'ar*i, Beirut 1404/1984, p. 413), and the grave was obligatorily hidden after his mausoleum was demolished. See Ash'ari, *al-Ibanah* (published by Fawkiyyah Husein Mahmud), Cairo, trans., Dar al-Kutub, p. 37 (introduction of the publisher); Irfan Abd al-hamid, "Ash'ari, Ab al-Hasan", DİA, XI, 445). In addition, some Hanbali followers, despite the leadership of Hanbali Sharif Abu Ja'far ibn Abu Musa, assaulted the faqih Abu Ishak ash-Shirazi and his students, and twenty people lost their lives in these incidents in 470 (1077). See Taqi ad-din Ali as-Subki, *Tabakat ash-Shafiyyah*, IV, 235. Abu Mansur Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Barruwi at-Tusi (d. 567/1171), a member of Ash'ari sect, was killed with his wife and child due to the poisoned halva sent by the Hanbalism followers. See Taqi ad-din Ali as-Subki, *Tabakat ash-Shafiyyah*, VI, 390-391).

[106] For Hanbalism followers' violent attitudes toward other sects and groups and various incidents caused by them, see Taqi ad-din Ali as-Subki, *Tabakat ash-Shafiiyyah*, IV, 234-235; VI, 172, 390-391; VII, 161-162; VIII, 178, 184-185, 218, 230; Ignaz Goldziher, "Zur Geschichte der hanbalitischen Bewegungen", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Leipzig 1908, p. 1-28; S. Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires à Bagdad à l'époque 'Abbasside, IXe-XIe siècles*, Paris 1981, p. 112-120; W. Madelung, "The Vigilante Movement of Sahl b. Salâma al-Khurâsânî and the Origins of Hanbalism reconsidered", *Journal of Turkish Studies (Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları)*, 1990, XIV (A Gift by Fahir İz, -I-), 331-337; A. Azmeh, "Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism", *Arabica,* XXXV/3 (1988), 260-266; Ferhat Koca, *Salafi Discourse in Islamic Law History: Hanbali Sect, p.* 201-206.

[107] Goldziher, "Zur Geschichte der hanbalitischen Bewegungen", p. 25.

[108] Ibn Hazm, *al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam*, I, 104.

The most significant point that separates Salafism followers, primarily the Hanbalism supporters, from other Islamic sects regarding the sunnah of the Prophet, is that Salafism followers regarded sunnah equal to the Quran rather than considering sunnah as hierarchically the second source after the divine book.

These approaches arise from their ideas on the role of sunnah in explaining the Quran directly and identity sunnah as a direct product of revelation.

Yahya ibn Abi Qasir (d. 129/747), an early-period Ahl al-hadith representative who implied the function of sunnah in explaining the Quran, made the following extravagant statement "Sunnah has authority over the Quran (Sunnah can determine Quran's meanings) but the Quran does not have the same over sunnah"[109] When Ahmad ibn Hanbal was asked about this statement, he said "I cannot say the same. But, I would say 'Sunnah would interpret and explain the Quran' in that regard."[110] Ahmad ibn Hanbal's comment indicates how daring and radical Ahl al-Hadith is in supporting the sunnah. Awzai (d. 157/774), a faqih who was one of the significant representatives of Ahl al-asar, implied the explanative aspect of sunnah with the following statement: "The Quran needs sunnah more than sunnah needs the Quran"[111] This statement was also associated with Makhul (d. 112/730), an Ahl al-Hadith member.[112]

Al-Shafi'I, one of Ahl al-Asar imams, expressed his ideas on the function of sunnah in explaining the Quran, that sunnah states the Quran's concise aspects, assigns the general aspects of Quran and restricts its absolute limits, and such a statement cannot be regarded as opposing the Quran.[113] According to him, "Sunnah of the Prophet explains the meanings in the private and general provisions ordered by Allah."[114] Imam Shafi stated that each sunnah of the Prophet is in accordance with the Quran for the issues included in the Quran and in regard to being a similar religious work, making a concise explanation in the name of Allah, and this statement made by the Prophet meant that concise verses should be explained more.[115] Similarly, he underlined the fact that the Prophet's sunnah will never oppose the Quran; instead, it will explain the visible and concise aspects of the Quran.[116] Imam Shafi considered the Prophet's sunnah over the issues, which were

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[109] "Ibn Abd al-bar, J*amiu bayan al-ilm wa fadlih* (inv. Abu al-Ashbal az-Zuhayri), Suudiyyah 1414/1994, Daru Ibn al-Jawzi, II, 1194.

[110] Ibn Abd al-bar, *Jamiu bayan al-ilm*, II, 1194.

[111] Marwan Muhammad ash-Sha'ar, *Sunan al-Awzai* (trans. Ali Pekcan et al.), Konya 2012, Armağan Kitaplar, p. 33; Ibn Abd al-bar, *Jamiu bayan al-ilm*, II, 1193.

[112] Ibn Abd al-bar, *Jamiu bayan al-ilm*, II, 1194.

[113] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah* (inv. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir), Cairo 1979, p. 173, 212, 228.

[114] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 79.

[115] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 212.

[116] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 228.

not detailed in any religious works, as Allah's statement, and he related his idea to the verses which Allah ordered obedience (as revealed to the Prophets).[117]

On the other hand, the idea that sunnah was directly revealed, which was the second reason why Ahl al-hadith and salafi ideology followers considered sunnah equal to Quran, is based on the verses about the Prophet: *"Nor does he speak from [his own] inclination. It is not but a revelation revealed"*[118]and *"And if Muhammad had made up some [false] sayings about us, we would have seized him by the right hand; then we would have cut from him the aorta. And there is no one of you who could prevent [Us] from him."*[119], and on the hadith: "I was revealed the Quran and a similar book"[120]

The Islamic scholars were divided into three groups on the issue of whether sunnah was revealed: The first includes those who claimed that sunnah is completely a result of revelation; the second includes those who stated that sunnah has no relationship with the revelation and consists only of the Prophet's personal experiences and doctrines; and the third includes those who state that sunnah contains the Prophet's personal doctrines as sunnah is the result of a revelation.

The first of these groups consists of the people who follow ideologies such as Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism; the second consists of people such as Harijis, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali, Ahmad Parwiz, Tawfiq Siddiq and Abu Rayyah; and the third consists of the scholars such as Hanafi and Maliki members.[121]

Those who claimed that sunnah is a product of revelation included Ahl al-hadith and Salafi authorities such as Hassan ibn Atiyyah (d. 130/748), Awzai, Shafi, Bukhari, Ibn Hibban (d. 354/965), Abu Hafs Omar ibn Ibrahim al-Ukbari (d. 387/997), Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah.

Hassan ibn Atiyyah (d. 130/748), an early-period Ahl al-hadith representative, is one of the first persons who claimed that sunnah is an example of revelation like the Quran with the following statement: "The Prophet revealed the Quran and Gabriel spoke about the sunnah that will explain the Quran to the Prophet"[122]. Suleiman ibn Tarhan at-Taymi (d. 143/761) clearly reflected the equivalence

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[117] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 11.

[118] An-Najm 53/3-4.

[119] Al-Haqqah 69/44-47.

[120] Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad, İstanbul 1982, IV, 130-133; Abu Dawud, "Sunnah" 5; Tirmidhî, "Science", 10.

[121] For the ideas on the issue of whether sunnah is revealed, see Mustafa Genç, *The Relationship Between Sunnah and Revelatio*n (unpublished doctoral thesis), Selçuk University Institute of Social Sciences, Konya 2005, p. 60-168; Ahmet Önkal, "The Relationship Between Revelation and Sunnah and Verses That Included and Not Included in Quran", *Quran and Sunnah Symposium* (1-2 November 1997) Reports, Ankara 1999, p. 55-69; Saffet Sancaklı, "The Relationship Between Revelation and Sunnah", *Diyanet İlmi Dergi*, 1998, XXXIV/3, 55-70; Ahmet Keleş, "The Relationship Between Revelation and Sunnah", *Dicle Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Diyarbakır 1999, I, 151-194; H. Musa Bağcı, "The Effect of Ahl al-hadith's Extraordinary Prophetic Description on Understanding Sunnah and Hadiths", *Understanding Sunnah Today (Notification and Negotiations Regarding the Symposium), 29-30 May 2004*, Bursa 2005, p. 67-88.

[122] Ibn Abd al-bar, *Jamiu bayan al-ilm*, II, 1193.

between sunnah and the Quran stating that "the Prophet's hadiths are like Tanzil (the Quran)" and "Sunnah of the Prophet is like Allah's statements to us"[123]. Awzai claimed that sunnah arose from revelation with the following statement: "When a hadith from the Prophet is told to you, never state the opposite of that hadith! Because the Prophet learned from Allah and told that hadith to you."[124]

Imam Shafi stated that there is no difference between the provisions of Allah and the Prophet, and both have the same status[125], and he made the following statement: "For a scholar, the best characteristic to be acquired is to avoid doubting the obligatory aspect of sunnah, to know that there is no disagreement between the provisions of Allah and prophet, and to consider them to be at the same level".[126] He also mentioned that Allah presented the divine provisions to people in two ways, and essence of both of these ways is included in the Quran. The first way is the verses of Quran, and the second way is the sunnah of the Prophet because Allah made it obligatory to follow the sunnah of the Prophet in the Quran.[127] In addition, Imam Shafii accepted the wisdom that was provided to the Prophet in the Quran[128] as "the sunnah of the Prophet"[129], and he stated that this wisdom was granted to the mind and heart of the Prophet by Allah.[130] Accordingly, "Allah considered the wisdom of his Prophet equal to the Quran, and Allah associated his wisdom with the Quran."[131] Imam Shafi used the concept of "religious work" to express both pieces of evidence as there is no difference between the Quran and sunnah according to him.[132]

Ibn Hibban (d. 354/965), an Ahl al-Hadith representative, stated in Sahih that sunnah is completely a result of revelation with the following title: "The khabar indicating that Prophet's (p.b.u.h) sunnah is revealed by Allah rather than emerging by itself''[133].

Abu Hafs Omar ibn Ibrahim al-Ukbari (d. 387/997), a Salafism follower, made the following statement: "The sunnah provided by the Prophet was formed upon the order of Allah".[134]

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[123] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *al-Fakih wa'l-mutafakkih*, I, 265.

[124] Zahabi, *Tazkirat al-Huffaz*, I, 180.

[125] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 173.

[126] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 104.

[127] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 131.

[128] al-Baqarah 2/151.

[129] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 78.

[130] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 93.

[131] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 79.

[132] Al-Shafi'i, *ar-Risalah*, p. 22, 62; a.mlf., "Jima al-Ilm: Discussions on the Sources of Islamic Law", (trans. Osman Şahin - Mithat Yaylı), *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2004, issue no. 17, p. 333.

[133] Ibn Hibban, *al-Ihsan fi takribi Sahih al-Ibn Hibban* (inv. Shuaib al-Arnaud), Beirut 1408/1988, Muassasat ar-Risalah, I, 189.

[134] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, V, 1580.

Ibn Hazm divided revelation into groups as those that are included, and not included in the Quran. He described the verses in the Quran as divine statements that are read in different languages, miraculous for the daily life activities and compiled as a book, and the verses that are included in the Quran were described by him as the statements that are narrated, not recorded when revealed, not miraculous for the daily life, not read in any language, and conveyed to us as khabar by the Prophet. He stated that these two khabar groups are the evidence that explains the divine purposes of Allah.[135] Accordingly, although the Quran and sunnah works are different in tilawat, they are no different in regard to provisions and obligation because the Quran and sunnah are equal as they reflect the orders and presence of Allah. Like the Quran, the kalam of the Prophet means revelation. According to the verse, *"Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an and indeed, We will be its guardian"*[136], revelation means the Quran, and the Quran is protected.[137]

Ibn Taymiyyah, a Salafi imam, believes that sunnah was revealed to the Prophet like the Quran, but sunnah is not included in Quran and read.[138] Ibn Taymiyyah assigned the first place of legal evidence (as religious fiqh works) hierarchy to the Quran and sunnah, and stated that no interpreter imams intentionally acted against the sunnah of the Prophet. He also added that they agreed on following the Prophet and considering following him as a must, and that statements of the people other than those of the Prophet could be used or ignored. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the reasons for interpreter imams to act against a true hadith may be related to their disbelief that the Prophet made that statement or the belief that the Prophet did not mean the before-mentioned issue, or that the issue does not exist.[139]

According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, who maintained the mission of Ibn Taymiyyah, Allah granted the authority of explaining the divine statements and giving provisions on these statements on Allah's behalf to the Prophet. The Prophet explained the meanings of Allah's orders, and his provisions and fatwa were in accordance with these orders. In addition, all kalam of the Prophet reflects the statements made on behalf of Allah.[140]

As mentioned earlier, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah considered the sources, from which the fiqh provisions were understood, as comparisons with the religious works, sahaba fatwa, and true and weak hadiths.[141] The remarkable point in this order is that the Quran and sunnah were combined under the religious works without paying no importance to the differences of degree as seen in the Shafi movement earlier.

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[135]   Ibn Hazm, *al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam* I, 95.

[136]   al-Hijr 15/9.

[137]   Ibn Hazm, *al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam*, I, 96.

[138]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu Fatawa*, XIII, 364.

[139]   Ferhat Koca, "Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ad-Din", DİA, XX, 401-402.

[140]   Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkiin*, II, 313.

[141]   Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin*, I, 29-33.

According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, the sunnah has three aspects, the first of which is in accordance with the divine books, the second explains the Quran, describes Allah's orders and confirms Allah's eternal presence, and the third explains a provision not recorded in the Quran initially. Rejecting any of these is not permissible, and sunnah has no fourth position before the Quran. Thus, there is no single true sunnah that is against the Quran and contradicts with the divine book.[142]

While mentioning about his era, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah stated that religious works were lowered to the degree of weak caliphs, in whose name coins were made and sermons were delivered but who do not have a valid authority, and religious works do not receive the necessary respect.[143]

According to those who consider sunnah as equal to the Quran, sunnah from all degrees, regardless of whether it is mutawatir or al-khabar al-wahid, can assign the orders of the Quran because the state that the indicators of these orders are assumption-based. Therefore, the certainty of the verse that is provided in the Quran is present but its indicators are assumption-based, and the certainty of true khabar al-wahid is assumption based, but its indicators are present. Thus, these two pieces of evidences that are equal to one another in terms of certainty and assumption-based characteristics.[144]

However, Hanbalism followers who regarded sunnah and the Quran as equal could not display a clear attitude in the issue of abrogation of the Quran by sunnah. A narration by Fazl ibn Ziyadh and Abu al-Haris indicated that Ibn Hanbal made the following statement when asked about whether sunnah can abrogate the Quran: "The Quran can only be abrogated by another verse revealed later; sunnah can only explain the Quran".[145] Abu Ya'la stated that there is no authorization for sunnah in abrogating the Quran in regard to intelligence, and he mentioned that it is not permissible to abrogate the Quran with sunnah, and there is no relevant example from the past.[146] Abu al-Hattab al-Kalwazani (d. 510/1116), a student of Abu Ya'la, adopted the idea that the Quran can be abrogated with mutawatir sunnah. In addition, a narrative from Ahmad, the father of Salih (d. 265/878), supports those who accept abrogation. According to them, this means the abrogation by Allah "through the expression of the Prophet".[147] Abrogation of the Quran and mutawatir hadith through Khabar al-wahid is permissible by

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[142] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkiin*, II, 307; H. Yunus Apaydın, "Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah", DİA, XX, 114.

[143] Apaydın, "Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah", *DİA*, XX, 115.

[144] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, II, 550-551; Abu al-Hattab al-Kalwazani, *at-Tamhid fi usul al-fiqh* (published by. Mufid Muhammad Abu Amasha), Mecca 1985, II, 111; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkiin*, II, 297-299; Ferhat Koca, *Allocation in Islamic Law Methodology*, İstanbul 1996, p. 212-220.

[145] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, III, 788-789; Abu al-Hattab al-Kalwazani, *at-Tamhid*, II, 369.

[146] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, III, 801.

[147] Abu al-Hattab al-Kalwazani, at-Tamhid, II, 369.

intelligence, but not permissible in a fiqh-based aspect.[148] However, abrogation of sunnah by the Quran is totally permissible and various examples were narrated from Imam Ahmad on this issue.[149]

In the discussion of considering sunnah equal to the Quran, sunnah's role of explaining the Quran is implied, which is generally agreed by all Islamic scholars. However, the fact that sunnah explains the Quran does not mean that it is equal to the Quran because sunnah is already the "second" separate source of Islam. In addition, the Quran is a divine statement/book sent to all humans, but sunnah is a "humanly" statement, action or act that is historical and belongs to a certain period of time. It is certain that these statements or actions are the most appropriate elements that were in accordance with the wording and essence of Quran during the period where it was revealed. These statements and actions, even the narratives of the meanings of which were accepted along with the wordings of the Prophet, are not under divine protection but they still reached today through many methods, including the highest and lowest accuracy levels. In addition, Although Ibn Hazm stated that sunnah was protected as much as the Quran[150], it is a historical fact that all statements and actions of the Prophet during the pre and post-Prophecy periods were not recorded except a few. In addition, Abu Bakr, the father-in-law of the Prophet and his companion in Gar al-Hira, 'Umar (r.a.), the Prophet's friend and father-in-law, Osman, the friend of the Prophet and husband of Prophet's two daughters, (Zu an-nurain/The one with two divine lights), and Ali (Bab al-ilm/The Door of Science), son of the Prophet's uncle and Prophet's son-in-law, conveyed the least amount or lesser narratives from him compared to other narrators. Various sahabah members did not welcome hadith narratives due to the concerns that these narratives may be confused with the Quran, and they asked the narratives to swear on the correctness of their narratives and bring a witness, which is known and accepted by many authorities of Hadith History. If we consider sunnah as equal to the Quran and accept that it is protected by Allah, how will the sunnah and their provisions that do not reach present day be evaluated along with the different conditions and discussions on separating the true and wrong narratives that reached the current time? Should the sunnah that reached today be regarded as "protected", "revealed like Quran", and "the divine statement that represented Islam" with the concept of "Incomers have benevolence"? Should the sunnah that do not reach the present time be regarded as the divine elements that have "no religious value and thus cause no deficiency for the religion" and the elements, "the provisions/meanings and wordings of which were abrogated"? This is such a fatalist and subjective comment!

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[148] Ibn Kudamah, Rawzat an-nazir (published by. Abd al-karim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad an-Namlah), Riyadh 1414/1993, I, 327-329.

[149] Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, III, 802-807; Abu a-Hattab al-Kalwazani, *at-Tamhid*, II, 384-387.

[150] Ibn Hazm, *al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam*, I, 96.

In addition, we do not find the action of lowering the status of the Prophet to the degree of "messenger" in the discussions of whether sunnah is directly a divine revelation. Because the Prophet was assigned the duties of declaring and explaining Allah's orders[151], and he was under the "auto-control" of the divine authority while doing so. If any of his statements or behaviors did not match with the religious authority, these would be corrected through revelation. According to our belief, accepting all statements and behaviors of the Prophet as pure divine revelation is not appropriate, Because the Prophet having certain humanly behaviors along with the Prophecy and imamah characteristics. He was the president, qadi, teacher, father, grandfather, relative and friend to many. The Prophet formed judicial opinions in accordance with makasid al-shariah and masalih al-nasa with his personal knowledge and experience, and the wisdom and experience granted by Allah. All of his behaviors were not a direct result of divine revelation. Instead, the were within the borders of the divine revelation. The members of Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism movements, particularly Imam al-Shafi'i, lowered the status of sunnahto the degree of a written text, and they held the hadiths with permissible narratives equal to the Quran under the title of "religious text", which is an approach to remove all humanly aspects of the Prophet including his personal will and intelligence-based efforts.[152] The Prophet's thinking that the Prophet acted against the revelation of Allah and the Quran in any periods of his life as a Prophet because such an opposition would mean "sin", "unlawful act" and "crime", which is against his "ismat (virtuous)" title. However, this does not mean that all of his behaviors are purely a revelation result.

In conclusion, the fact that Salafism followers considered sunnah as equal to the Quran contradicts with the ideology of khabar al-sadiq in Ahl al-Sunnah epistemology because khabar al-sadik, regarded as the absolute information source by Ahl al-Sunnah, is the "divine revelation". Considering any statements and actions of the Prophet, regardless of their degrees of certainty, are equal with the Quran, the one and only divine book of Islam, may turn din al-Islam (Islam religion) into din al-Muhammadi (Muhammad religion). In addition, considering sunnah as pure revelation results in ignoring the humanly characteristics of the Prophet, making his "actions of seeking advice from other people in mortal issues" [153], rejecting the reasons of formation, context, and historical and geographical factors and elements of sunnah, turning sunnah into a religious "fiction" and

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[151] For the Prophet's duty of explanation, see al-Maidah 5/67; an-Nahl 16/44; al-Ankabut 29/18.

[152] İlhami Güler, "The Theological Meaning of al-Shafi's Approach Toward Sunnah and the Issue of Divine and Humanly Aspects of Religion", *İslâm ve Modernizm Fazlur Rahman Tecrübesi*, İstanbul 1997, p. 270.

[153]*"So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. "And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him] (Ali 'Imran 3/159).*

"role", and making the Prophet an automatic "revelation receiver and sender". On the other hand, considering all the Prophet's sunnah as having no relation to divine revelation, and as a product of his humanly abilities and capacity results in a "secular" Prophet concept that explains the shariah independently from Allah. Such a Prophet is not a "messenger". Instead, he becomes the sole owner of the religion.

6. Considering Salafism as the Religious Authority: The Longing for the Golden Generation

The number of literate people was quite low in Arabic society before Islam. Thus, culture was transmitted from generations to generations through verbal expression (shifaha, samai). The Prophet took certain measures to enable Muslims to become more literate during the Medina era, but the verbal expression culture still existed in society. Both the Quran and the Prophets' statements and advice were verbally known by more people in the society except a few sahabah members who were literate and thus recorded the revelation of the Quran. This process continued to exist until the periods when the number of literate people increased, and Islamic society started to adapt to a written culture abandoning the verbal culture. Actually, a transition from verbal culture to written culture is one of the greatest changes that could be seen in society. This cultural transformation gradually took place first, in the Islamic society. Therefore, it is not possible assign the completion of this period to a certain date. However, considering the periods of great hadith authorities such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855), Bukhari (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875) and Abu Dawud (d. 275/889), who collected hadiths through verbal methods, it is clear that verbal narration tradition continued to exist in a period when ra'y and work-based movements started to emerge (late Hijri third century) and all founder imams and their students continued to live, therefore the transition to written culture was not complete.

On the other hand, the conquers that started in the period of Hulafa al-rashid were maintained by the Umayyad and first Abbasid caliphs. Thus, the borders of Islamic countries in the period when most of the members of tabi'un generation lived (approximately Hijri 60-150/680-768), reached a geographical area from Hijaz peninsula to Anatolia, going beyond Palestine and Damascus, Iraq, Iran, Caucasia and Transoxiana, Egypt and Northern Africa coasts. However, this expansion in borders brought many problems. The people living in the conquered regions such as Persians, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Coptic and Barbaries filled Arabic streets. Moreover, these people brought their religious, political, economic and cultural problems along with themselves. Thus, the number and variety of new problems and issues seen in the Islamic society increased and deepened. On the other hand, Muslims started to disagree with one another on certain political, legal and doctrine-based issues due to various internal conflicts, comparisons, and political riots. It was occasionally difficult for individuals to find a direct solution from the

Quran, the Prophet's sunnah and ashab's ideas or practices for the issues caused by these sudden developments. While presenting provisions on these new issues, a great discussion regarding whether ra'y and other intelligence methods will be used with the works narrated from the Quran, Prophet's sunnah and ashab's ideas and practices started. Tabi'un scholars were divided into two in this discussion: The scholars, who were previously named Ahl al-Hijaz (Hijaziyyun), stated that the religion consisted of asar and khabar, and using ra'y and intelligence-based methods are not permissible unless required. These individuals were mentioned as Ahl al-Hadith (Ahl al-Asar) or Ahab al-Hadith in the society and Islamic science discipline. A group of scholars who were previously named Ahl al-Iraq (Iraqiyyun) and who consisted of non-Arabic members (mawali) claimed that ra'y and intelligence-based methods can be used along with the Quran, sunnah and sahabah ideas and practices while providing fiqh provisions. These scholars were named as Ahl al-Ray (Ra'y authorities) later.

The followers of Salafism ideology were raised in a culture of verbal expression, and they were the members of a movement named Ahl al-Asar which made effort to solve all issues based on the ideas and suggestions of previous generations because to them, religion means works (narratives), and knowledge (Islamic science) means hadith and khabar. These narrative and conveyance actions were performed by the sahabah and tabi'un, the first and "golden" generations of Islam. Due to their esteemed services, they were named as "salaf al-salihin (benevolent people from the past, the golden generation)", and their ideas and practices were considered in every issue.

It is an undeniable fact that Prophet's sunnah, and ideas and practices of ashab and tabi'un were the elements that provided great contribution to the formation of Islamic ideology and civilization. However, another undeniable fact is that a great section of the sunnah consisted of humanly aspects and doctrines of the Prophet and thus carried historical elements. In addition, almost all ideas and practices of salaf al-salihin are the products of a humanly consideration. These ideas and suggestions underwent certain changes and differences after time, place, opportunities and needs changed. The members of Ahl al-Hadith and salafi ideology failed to discover that Islamic society underwent the greatest transformation in tabi'un era after the Prophetic period, and they believed that the time repeated monotonously. They made efforts to keep the conditions, opportunities and needs, organic and structural forms of the sahabah and tabi'un periods (golden era), to assimilate these into "Islamic religion", and to make these universal. However, each incident of the past has certain anthropological, psychological, social, economic and cultural reasons and factors. Therefore, these incidents and their related solutions and details are "unique." Life is like a river; it always flows, but each drip is new and "unique." It is possible to wash in this water only once at a time.

The followers of Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism ideology, who missed the truth of changing time, started to support the narratives and works they had been familiar for a long time and to refer the previous golden generations. They turned the respect paid to these generations khabar narrated from them (asar) into a methodological principle rather than a moral attitude. For example, Masruk ibn Ajda (d. 63/683), a tabi'un faqih and hadith authority, stated "Avoid comparisons and ra'y. Because ra'y would insult"[154] while Sha'bi (d. 104/722) stated "You will be punished only when you abandon asar and adopt comparison"[155], Ibn Sirin (d. 110/729) stated "We will not deviate from the current ideology as long as we follow asar"[156], and Yazid ibn Zurei (d. 182/798), a hadith hafiz, stated "Ra'y is the enemy of ashab al-sunnah"[157], all of which indicates the methodological, or even the ideological differentiation based on "asar-ra'y" and "correct-wrong path" contradictions. Certain Ahl al-Hadith members related this sentence with a Ra'y master, such as 'Umar (r.a.) whose assumptions and ideas were supported even by the revelations[158], and claimed that he made the following statement: "Ra'y members are the enemies of Islam. If Islam was related to ra'y, the bottom of leather socks would be more appropriate for anointing than the top side."[159] Awzai (d. 157/774), one of Ahl al-Asar faqih, implied that works of Salafism (asar) should be followed with the following statement: "Follow the narratives from the even if people exclude you, reject you or find you strange. Avoid their ra'y even if people show it flamboyantly! The truth will definitely emerge if you do so"[160]. Sufian as-Sawri (d. 161/778) mentioned that Islam can only be understood and practiced with narratives:"Islam consists of asar rather than ra'y"[161]. Imam Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795) made the following statement: "The Prophet and following administrators (vulat al-amr) presented sunnah. Following them means confirming the Quran, completing total obedience to Allah, and acting in accordance to Islam. Whoever practices with the sunnah achieves hidayah; they can finish their works following

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[154] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *al-Faqih wa'l-mutafaqqih*, I, 459.

[155] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *al-Fakih wa'l-mutafakkih*, I, 462.

[156] Al-Darimi, *Rad al-Imam ad-Darimi Osman ibn Said ala Bishr al-Marisi*, p. 145.

[157] Hatib al-Baghadi, *Sharafu Ashab al-hadith* (published by M. Said Hatipoğlu), Ankara 1991, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, p. 7.

[158] The ideas of 'Umar (r.a) approved with verses are named "Muwafakatu 'Umar". For his ideas on this issue, see Zeliha Bengü Özarslan, *The Agreement Point Between Humanly Determination and Revelation: "Muwafaqqat" Phenomenon* (unpublished master's thesis), Adana 2006, Çukurova University Institute of Social Sciences, p. 8-26; Selim Arık, "Muwafakat al-'Umar (r.a.) in The Context Of Wisdom and Understanding", *Diyanet İlmi Dergi*, 2005, v. XLI, issue no. 4, p. 115-128; Gökhan Atmaca, "'Umar (r.a.) and His Consents as Addressee in the Revelation Period", *Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2010, issue no. 21, p. 43-67; Mustafa Fayda, "'Umar", DİA, XXXIV, 46.

[159] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *al-Fakih wa'l-mutafakkih*, I, 455. The similar sentences associated with 'Umar (r.a.), see *ibid., I, 453, 454.*

[160] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *Sharafu Ashab al-hadith*, p. 7; Zahabi, *Tazkirat al-huffaz*, I, 180.

[161] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *Sharafu Ashab al-hadith*, p. 6.

the sunnah. But, whoever opposes sunnah follows a path other than that of Muslims".[162]

Accordingly, the sahabah and tabi'un generation are the people who know the revelation's meanings and explanations. Thus, science (khabar, asar) is learned from them. With their khabar, Allah's orders are correctly understood and practiced. Those who divert from the heritage of Salafism would adopt their own actions as a religion and perform ta'wil with their own ra'y in opposition of what Allah meant. The person who does not accept asar (narrative/khabar) aims to follow a "path" other than that of Muslims. However, Allah orders are as follows: "*And whoever opposes the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him and then follows other than the way of the believers - We will give him what he has taken and drive him into Hell, and evil it is a destination*"[163].[164]

Thus, according to ahl al-hadith, asar suggests the correct path and unchanged truth against the newly-formed ideologies (muhdasat-innovation) while ra'y indicates innovation and sacrilege. Therefore, following asar means following the correct direction. When a new ideology emerges, what should be done first is to adopt the basics, because "the ideology to follow is basics (ma al-amru illa al-amr al-awwal); if we were informed that only a nail was to be washed, we would not do anything opposing."[165]

All Salafism followers, particularly Ahl al-Hadith and Hanbalism followers, assigned second place to salaf al-salihin ideas practices in fiqh evidence hierarchy after religious works (the Quran and sunnah) as a result of their religious ideologies based on narrative and asar. This ideology is essentially adopted by almost all Ahl al-Sunnah sects at certain degrees. For example, using the ideas and practices of sahabah as the sources of Islamic law after Quran and sunnah[166], and Malikis adopted the practices of the people from Medina (amal al-ahl al-Medina)[167]. However, those who assigned the ideas and practices of the first generations, among the Islamic groups and sects, to the center of their own ideological concepts

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[162] Hatib al-Baghdadi, *Sharafu Ashab al-hadith*, 7; a.mlf.,*al-Faqih wa'l-mutafakkih*, I, 435-436.

[163] an-Nisa 4/115.

[164] Al-Darimi, *ar-Rad al al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 55-58.

[165] Al-Darimi, *Rad al-Imam ad-Darimi Osman ibn Said, p.* 145; Mehmet Zeki İşcan, "The Basics of Salafism and Socio-Political Background", *Salafism in the Past and Present, International Debate on Islamic Science*, 08-10 November 2013, Topkapı Eresin Hotel, İstanbul 2013, p. 96.

[166] For the sections, along with the sections about "sahaba statements" and "sahabah sect" in the classical fiqh books on the sahabah sect, see Abu Said Salahaddin Khalil ibn Kaykaldi al-Alai, *Ijcmal al-isabah fi akwal as-sahabah* (inv. M. Suleiman Ashkar), Kuwait 1987; Sha'ban Muhammad Ismail, *Kawl as-sahabi wa asaruhu fi al-fiqhi al-Islami*, y., 1988, Dar as-Salam; Ali Toksarı, "Sahabah Statements and Its Importance for Hadith Discipline", *Erciyes Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, issue no. 2, p. 339-357.

[167] For the practices of the people from Medina, see İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez, "Amal al-ahl al-Medina", DİA, III, 21-25.

and came to the forefront with their insistence and emphasis on this issue, were generally the members of Salafism ideology such as Ahl al-Hadith, Hanbali and Zahiris.

The followers of this ideology stated that the principles of salaf al-salihin should be understood and adopted to live Islam in the correct way, and thus their ideas and practices are the irreplaceable sources of Islam. For example, for Ahmad ibn Hanbal, religion means "following the Quran, asar, sunan, the Prophet, sahabah, tabi'un and taba al-tabiin, and the narratives from imams and reliable scholars, who are not known for sacrilege and abandoning religion, that are seen as models, accept sunnah and protect asar. They are not the individuals who supported comparison and ra'y because comparison is valueless for Islam, and ra'y is no different. The supporters of ra'y and comparison in Islam commit sacrilege and make a great mistake except in the cases where there is no reliable works from reliable Salafism imams."[168]

The following statement by Ibn Taymiyyah is among the most concrete examples presenting the typical approach of Salafism followers toward the religious authority of the past generations: "Every statement made separately from the previous generations for the first time is erroneous because Ahmad ibn Hanbal stated 'Avoid talking about an issue for which an imam is not present'."[169]

Hanbalism followers, the representatives of Salafi ideology, based their theory of fiqh sources on religious works (the Quran and sunnah) and the ideas and practices of the sahabah as mentioned earlier. When Ahmad ibn Hanbal was asked "How about abandoning the ideas of the sahabah when forming an opinion on that issue?", he made the following statement: "This is a disgraceful statement that belongs to ahl al-bidat; the opinions of the sahabah are followed even when they disagree on an issue".[170]

Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, who interpreted ibn Hanbal's statements on the issue of agreement, stated that ibn Hanbal did not accept the agreement of tabi'un and atbaat at-tabiin, and he mentioned that there are no indicators on his statements that the agreements which are claimed to be formed in the next centuries will serve as evidence. Ibn Taymiyyah made the following statement: "We rely on the agreement on the Quran, sunnah, and kalams of Omar ibn al-Hattab, Abdullah ibn Mes'ud (d. 32/652) and other sahabah. Because each of these sahabah members stated 'I make my decision with the provisions in Quran; if no relevant provision is

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[168] W. Montgomery Watt, *Formation Period of Islamic Ideology* (trans. E. Ruhi Fığlalı), Ankara 1981, Umran Yayınları, p. 366.

[169] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuu fatawah* (inv. Abd ar-rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Qasim), Beirut 1398, Dar al-Arabiyyah, XXI, 291.

[170] Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Masail al-Imam Ahmad*, p. 438–439; Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, IV, 1059–60.

present in Quran, then I use the sunnah of the Prophet. If no relevant sunnah is present, then I use what was agreed by the benevolent (salih) people'."[171]

Similarly, a narrative from Marruzi indicates that Imam Ahmad made the following statement in the issue of using a religious source for making a decision: "Sunnah is considered. If no relevant sunnah is present, then ashab's practices and ideas are considered. If still absent, the practices and statements of tabi'un are considered". Another narrative from Abu Dawud indicated that following means "following the principles of statements of the Prophet and his ashab". The following of the tabi'un was regarded as reliable and appropriate to follow.[172]

As mentioned earlier, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah assigned the first degree to the Quran and sunnah works, and the second degree mentioned the fatwa of sahabah after the religious works on the Quran and Sunnah in Ahmad ibn Hanbal's fatwa method. Accordingly, ibn Hanbal used the fatwa of a sahabah member, who was known to have to opposition, and he needed no further evidence. Ibn Hanbal used neither ra'y nor comparison when he found such a fatwa from the sahabah.[173]

These indicate the commitment of Ahmad ibn Hanbal to the ideology of Salafism. He did not approve of providing a fatwa on an issue that had no related works (narrative, idea) from Salafism, and he absolutely prevented people from doing so.[174]

According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, sahabah members were the best faqih, scholar Muslims that know the meanings and wisdoms of Islam. The difference between the knowledge of sahabah members and following the generations is like the difference between the fazilah (benefits) of different knowledge.[175] Ibn Qayyim stated that there is nothing greater than the guidance of sahabah and tabi'un.[176]

Salafism followers, who accept the first three generations of Islam as the religious authority, considered all ideological developments and contributions of the following centuries as the innovations and new elements that were not included in the content of Islam. The most significant duty of Salafism followers was to protect the basics and nature of Islam and to fight against all kinds of innovation up to the last degree. A book (amirnamah) narrated by Ibn Sa'd (d. 230/845) and conveyed by Omar ibn Abd al-aziz (d. 101/720), an Umayyad caliph, stated that "reviving sunnah" (ihya al-sunnah) or "finishing innovations" (itfa al-bid'a)[177]

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[171] Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Musawwada*, p. 283–84.
[172] 1090–439; Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah*, IV, 1090.
[173] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwaqqiin*, I, 30–31.
[174] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin*, I, 32.
[175] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwakkin*, I, 175.
[176] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lam al-muwaqqiin*, IV, 195; H. Yunus Apaydın, "Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah", DİA, XX, 115.
[177] Ibn Sa'd, *at-Tabakat al-kubra*, Beirut trans., Daru Sadir, V, 342.

became a formal duty of the government. In regards to the fight against innovations, according to what Ahmad ibn Jafar Abu al-Abbas al-Istahri narrated, Ahmad ibn Hanbal made the following statement about Ashab ar-ra'y: "They are innovation supporters, perverts, and enemies of sunnah and asar. They abrogate the hadiths and oppose the Prophet (p.b.u.h.); they regard Abu Hanifa and those with the same ideas as their imams, and they adopt their religions. Is there a clearer sacrilege than that of those who abandon the statements and ideas of the Prophet and adopt these? ...Whoever adopts, confirms or approves these ideas would contradict the sunnah, abandon the congregation and contradict with religious works, and adopt innovation."[178]

Ahmad ibn Hanbal's statement was followed by Abu Muhammad Hasan ibn Ali al-Barbahari (d. 329/941), one of his radical followers who made the following statement: "Do not present an idea about an issue without thinking. Did any sahabah or ulamah members state anything about that issue? If you find any works narrated from them, follow these works and do not oppose them, and do not prefer anything over these works or else you will be burned… There is no room for comparison. Do not attempt to find equivalent to these works. Do not follow the desires on that issue. Only the asar of the Prophet is confirmed and accepted without examining the details or making interpretations. Do not ask 'Why? How?" Kalam, discussion and discussion mean innovation. Although the performers or providers of these correspond to sunnah, these innovation-based elements cause suspicion… If you realize that somebody blemishes, rejects or denies asar, question their identities as Muslims because those individuals are malevolent people with malevolent statements. They blemish the Prophet and his ashab. We learnt Allah, the Prophet, the Quran, benevolence and malevolence, and the mortal and eternal worlds through asar. The Quran's need for sunnah is higher than that of sunnah to the Quran… Anybody who rejects a hadith of the Prophet would also reject the whole book. That person would reject the one and only Allah. Follow asar and accompany Ahl al-asar. Ask them questions, sit with them and quote them… If you hear that somebody blemishes or rejects asar or desires something else than asar, question their identities as Muslims. There is no doubt that these people are innovators. Follow Ahl al-asar and the basics! Because Islam consists of following the Prophet and ashab."[179]

The generations of Islam, who were raised under the guidance of the Prophet, conveyed what they learnt from the Prophet to the following generations with a great sincerity and dedication in a period where written culture was not adopted yet. Due to their efforts, they deserved the greatest respect in Islamic history, and

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[178] Ibn Abu Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, I, 35; M. Emin Özafşar, "Ra'y-Work Conflict in our Cultural History", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara 2000, XLI/247-248.

[179] Ibn Abi Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, II, 15-39; M. Emin Özafşar, "Ra'y-Work Conflict in Our Cultural History", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Ankara 2000, XLI, p. 250-251.

they left irreplaceable influences on the Islamic ideology and society. However, turning their ideas and advice into "irreplaceable" or "non-abandonable" religious works violates both the principle of "khabar al-sadiq" and acts against the change-based truth of the time. Thus, Salafism followers, who imitated the period of the first Islamic generations and transformed their ideas and practices into a defensive and cooperative platform, failed to realize the "past" as past, and while preserving the past they turned past actions into the absolute determinants of the "present" and "future". Therefore, the past captured the present and future, and Salafism turned into a radical conservatism and traditionalism. One of the reasons for the Islamic society to fail to develop itself, and to start repeating itself and adopt the actions of the past is due to Islamic ideology being adversely influenced by the conservative movement named Salafism.[180]

7. Qurayhsi Characteristics of Caliphate: The Source of Inspiration for Arabic Nationalism

All Salafi groups, particularly those who were the members of the Hanbali sect had, more or less, roles and influences on Islamic history because Salafism suggests preserving the religious concept of the past and thus the political and social structure supporting this movement. Therefore, each Salafism follower is included in the political context as a divine protector of the present system. In addition, the differentiation of Ahl ar-ray and Ahl al-Asar, which occurred in the tabi'un era, the Arabic people were included in Ahl al-Asar or Ashab al-Hadith [181]; and the non-

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[180] For similar considerations on Salafism see İlhami Güler, "Sunni Movement as Rightism", *Tezkire: Düşünce, Siyâset, Sosyal Bilim Dergisi,* 2000, IX/17, 90-100; Sönmez Kutlu, "The Concept of Historical Religious Discourses in Islamic Ideology", *İslâmiyât*, Ankara 2001, IV/4, 15-36; Mustafa Acar, "A Rebuttal Work Towards Radical Salafi Ideology", *Muhafazakâr Düşünce*, Fall - 2005, Year 2, issue no 6, p. 163-196; Fethi Kerim Kazanç, "Religious Ideology and Its Results in Regard to Religious Works and Methods of Salafiyyah", *Kelâm Araştırmaları*, 8/1 (2010), p. 93-121; Mehmet Zeki İşcan, "Hatred and Violence-Based Discourse of Salafism in Regard to Shia Evaluations", *e-Makâlât Mezhep Araştırmaları*, Fall - 2013, VI/2, 151-172 (ISSN 1309-5803), p. 156; a.mlf., "The Basics of Salafism and Socio-Political Background", p. 91-110; Ahmet Akbulut, "The Theological and Ideological Basis of Salafism", *Salafism in the Past and Present*, p. 113-133;

[181] Being a hadith narrator is different than being an Ahl al-Asar or Ashab al-Hadith member. However, the number of hadith narrators who were Arabic and members of mawali was examined in various studies. Mustafa Ozturk, who conducted studies on the place of Mawali in hadith narratives, used at-Tabakat al-kubra by Ibn Sa'd (d. 230/844), whose year of death was no later than 200 (815), and he found the number of Arabic hadith scholars as 129 while he determined that the number of mawali was 120 in the study performed on the generations following the sahabah. According to the same author, Zahabi claimed in Tazkirat al-huffaz that the number of hadith authorities increased in Arabs' favor. The number of people who were present in *Tazkirah* by the principle of classification and who died before the year of 200 was 316. Of them, 23 were members of sahabah while one was a mawali member (Abdullah ibn Salam). Among the remaining 293 people who consisted of tabi'un members, 128 were mawali members, 156 were Arabic, and two were introduced as Abnawi (Persian) without the condition of a mawla record. Seven people could not be determined as Arabic

Arabic people who were underestimated[182] and named "Mawali"[183] were included in Ahl ar-ra'y[184] or were even regarded to be among the leaders of this movement.[185]

Certain ideas of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his opposition to the Hariji movement and Shia put Salafism followers among the significant actors of political discussions.

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or mawla. On the other hand, 1158 people in at-Tarih al-Kabir by al-Bukhari, which included the biography of approximately 13,000 narrators, were introduced as mawla. *Tahzib at-Tahzib* by Ibn Hajar, which included the biography of 8826 narrators, included 285 mawali narrators whose date of death was presented to be before Hijri 200. The number of mawali narrators whose dates of death were not recorded was 741. In addition, the number of mawali people who died after Hijri 200 was 245. The total number of mawali people in *Tahzib at-Tahzib* is 1271. These figures indicate that almost all of the hadith authorities in the sahabah period were Arabic. However, the number of mawalin people in the period from the tabi'un period to the second century increased significantly. The number of Arabic narrators was still higher than that of mawali narrators. See Mustafa Öztürk, "The Influence of Mawali Narrators and Past Cultures: The First Two Hijri Centuries", *Hadis Tetkikleri Dergisi*, 2006, IV/1, 17-19. For more details on this issue, see Mustafa Öztürk, *The Place of Mawali on Hadith Narratives* (unpublished doctoral thesis), İstanbul 2002, Marmara University, Institute of Social Sciences.

[182] For example, when Said ibn Jubair (d. 95/714), a Sudanese mawali, was assigned as Kufah qadi, certain people objected because they believed this profession is unique to Arabic people. See Abu al-Abbas Muhammad ibn Yazid al-Mubarrad, *al-Kamil fi al-luga wa'l-adab* (published by Muhammad Ahmad ad-Dali), Beirut 1993, II, 622.

[183] For the position of mawali in the first periods of Islam and its place in the social, political and cultural life, see Adnan Demircan, *The relationship Between Arab-Mawali in the First Islamic Period*, İstanbul 1996; Mahmud Mikdad, *al-Mawali wa nizam al-wala min al-Jahiliyyah ila awahir al-asr al-Amawi*, Damascus 1408/1988; İsmail Hakkı Atçeken, "Mawali Policies of Amawi Authorities following the era of Omar ibn Abd al-aziz", *Selçuk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Konya 2002, issue no. 13, p. 69-88.

[184] A narrative from Sufian ibn Uyayna indicated that those who formed ra'y had three slave children, named Rabia in Medina, Osman al-Batti (d. 143/760) in Basra, and Abu Hanifa in Kufa. See Esat Kılıçer, "Ahl ar-ra'y", DİA, X, 523.

[185] Scholars of Mawali made great contributions to the development of fiqh. Abd ar-rahman ibn Zaid ibn Aslam (d. 182/798) was narrated to state the following: "After the death of Abadilah -Ibn Abbas (d. 68/687), Ibn az-Zubair (d. 73/692), Ibn Omar (d. 73/692) and Abdullah ibn Amr (d. 65/684)- fiqh knowledge was transmitted to mawali in all towns. The faqih of Mecca was Ata (d. 114/732) while the faqih of Yemen was Tavus (d. 106/724), the faqih of al-Yamama was Yahya ibn Abi Kasir (d. 129/747), the faqih of Basra was Hasan al-Basri, the faqih of Kufa was Ibrahim an-Nahai (d. 96/715), the faqih of Syria was Makhul (d. 112/730), and the faqih of Khorasan was Ata al-Horasani (d. 135/752). The only exception was Medina. Allah assigned Said ibn Musayyab (d. 94/713), the well-known faqih from Quraysh tribe, to Medina." See Abu Ishak ash-Shirazi, *Tabakat al-fuqaha*, published by İhsan Abbas, Beirut 1401/1981, p. 58. However, it is clear from the name order that Ibrahim an-Nahai, the imam of Kufa, is Arabic. See Ibn Sa'd, *at-Tabakat al-kubra*, VI, 270; Zahabi, *Siyaru a'lam an-nubala*, V/520. In addition, for Mawali roles in the development of Islamic law sects, see Harald Motzki, "The Role of Non-Arab Converts in the Development of Early Islamic Law", *Islamic Law and Society*, Leiden 1999, 6 (3), p. 293-317. For the roles of certain mawali scholars in the formation of different kalam sects and Quran interpretations, see Osman Aydınlı, "The Role of Mawali in the Formation of Sects", *Gazi Üniversitesi Çorum İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, II/3, 1-26; Nur Ahmet Kurban, "Contributions of Mawali Tafsir Authorities to the Formation of Quran Tafsir and Criticisms Toward Them", *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2011, IV/16, 259-273.

According to certain contemporary scholars such as Abu Zahira, Ahmad ibn Hanbal did not indicate that the caliphate is only assigned as somebody or a tribe from an Arabic nation[186], while Abu al Abbas Ahmad ibn Ja'far al-Istahri clearly stated that Ahmad ibn Hanbal adopted the ideology that can be summarized as "All Imams are from Quraysh" in his narrative on theological ideas, the caliphate is to the right of the Quraysh tribe until there are two people left on the world, other people do not have the right to fight with them or act against them in this issue, and the caliphate of other people will not be accepted until judgment day.[187]

It is fair to state that with the differentiation of Arabic and non-Arabic (mawali) which emerged in the early periods of Islam, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his supporters presented their ideas on the Qurayshi characteristics of caliphate, which is the first source of inspiration for Arabic nationalism.

Due to Hanbalism ideology that caliphate belongs to the Quraysh tribe and their claims that they represent Ahl al-sunnah against Shia, Hanbalism followers supported the Abbasid state and opposed any actions that could blemish this authority throughout history. For example, after Shia Buwaihids controlled the caliphate of Baghdad Abbasid state (334-447/945-1055), Hanbalism followers undertook the role of political opposition, and they supported the process of consolidating Ahl al-sunnah against Shia, and the Abbasid state against other elements and states, particularly Buwaihids and Seljuks. Similarly, Hanbalism followers supported Mamluks as the representatives of Ahl al-sunnah in Syria and Egypt, after the Mongols invaded Baghdad (656/1258).

During the Ottoman era, Muhammad ibn Abd al-wahhab agreed with Muhammad ibn Suud, the emir of the Saudi tribe, in Diriyah in 1744 and they were engaged in a political acts against the Ottomans, thus causing the emergence of Saudi Arabic Kingdom. The Saudi Arabian Kingdom has always remained distant to Turkey and Turkish people in interstate and international issues since its establishment.

Certain Asian, African and Balkan states, which were founded on the lands of the Ottoman Empire and which adopted the ideology of hostility toward Turkish, preferred countries with the Salafism ideology rather than Turkey for the religious education of Muslim people in their countries. For example, different socialist countries such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia sent their students to countries with Salafism ideology such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Algeria rather than Turkey for the purpose of providing them a high religious education. Similarly, Saudi Arabian Kingdom provides education to

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[186] Muhammad Abu Zahra, *Ibn Hanbal hayatuhu wa asruhu*, Cairo 1981, p. 162.
[187] Ibn Abu Ya'la, *Tabakat al-Hanabilah*, I, 26. For general considerations on this issue, see Ziauddin Ahmad, "Some Aspects of the Political Theology of Ahmad b. Hanbal", Islamic Studies, Pakistan 1973, XII/1, 54.

many students from Hanafi countries such Middle Asian and Balkan countries with large non-refundable scholarships, and some of these students return to their countries as a Salafi missionary or an enemy of Ottoman/Turkish history and culture. The written and visual media in Gulf countries and other Arabic countries with Salafism ideology such as Saudi Arabia, competes with the media of various international powers, which do not approve the unity, integrity and development of Turkey, in various negative news and comments on Turkey.

The relevant reasons include that Turkish people are regarded as "mawali", which were regarded as the second-grade citizens, during the Umayyad and Abbasid era, and that Turkish people are the members of Hanafism, i.e. Ah lar-ra'y, the opposite and antidote of Salafism. Intelligence and ra'y sank into the cultural genes of Turkish people and thus, there has been no Turkish tribe or city that has adopted Hanbalism throughout the Islamic history[188], and there has been no Turkish people who have come to the forefront in the Hanbalism sect and literature.[189] It is fair to state that certain modern Turkish people who are under the influence of Wahhabism/Saudi Salafism do not have adequate historical knowledge and awareness.[190]

We will end the topic by providing the following recall as an indicator to the political ideology of Salafism: The battle, in which Selim the Grim defeated Al-Ashraf Qansuh Al-Ghuri, and thus the Islamic caliphate was transmitted and all doors to the Middle East and Africa (Egypt and other countries) were opened to the Ottoman Empire, took place in Marj Dabiq located around Kilis at the northside of

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[188] For the geography of Hanbalism followers, see Ferhat Koca, *The Salafi Discourse in Islamic Law History*: *Hanbali Sect, p.* 118-120.

[189] The fiqh sects active during Islamic law history are Hanafism, Shafi'ism, Hanbalism and Zahirism ordered based on a preference from ra'y to works. In addition, this order reflects these sects' degree from being the most common to least. The relationships, competition and tensions of these sects took place not as two radical poles but between sects that are close to one another. For example, no transitions, tensions and competition have taken place between Hanafism, Zahirism and Hanbalism throughout history. Because Hanafism followers represented the largest mass while Zahirism and Hanbalism followers were the smallest and marginal sects in the Islamic world, thus no transitions or tensions took place between two radical poles. For the Hanbalism followers, inter-sectarian tension, competition or transitions rather took place in the relationships with the Shafi sect. In addition, certain religious discussions took place between Abu Hanifa and his students, and Imam Malik and his students. However, Shafi'ism, Malikism, Hanbalism and Zahirism were always in conflict with one another, and inter-sectarian transition took place between these sects.

[190] The author of this study believes that people have the right to prefer any sect, group, policy, ideology or religion in absolute religious, conscious and ideological freedom, all religious and social groups have the right to express themselves and organize, and everybody should respect these basic rights. What is criticized here is that members of certain sects, groups, ideologies and religions make efforts to export their religion, sect and ideologies by using basic rights and abusing countries' social, economic, cultural and demographic frailties and needs, but they breathe down the necks of others with absolute fascism and create dictatorships in their areas while making their sect, group, ideology or religion dominant. We cannot help but to say, like Ziya Pasha (1829-1880), "Do you consider everybody as blind, while regarding them as an idiot?"

Aleppo (24 August 1516). One of the most well-known sources of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), among the bloody Salafism-based organizations of the area, reflects where this battle took place: "Dabiq"!

IV. Conclusion

Salafism is a conservative ideology that consecrates any period of history with a longing for the "golden era" and the "golden generation", that prefers previous generations to new generations, and considers all additions to traditions as corruption and sacrilege. With these characteristics, Salafism is seen not only in Islamic culture and ideology history, but also in almost every religion, ideology, political and social movement, and formation.

Salafism covers a broad field ranging from a normal conservative attitude supporting the action of benefiting from experiences in the past, to a radical and terrorist approach that excludes all ideas other than those of itself or even aims to end their lives.

Salafism emerged in an early period of Islamic culture and ideological history. It considered the first three generations of Islam as models in understanding, interpreting and practicing Islam, turned these models as a part of Islam rather than the history, and fought to protect these models.

A macro overview on the Islamic science and cultural history indicates that the historical adventure of Salafism can be examined in four periods as; Salafism as a methodological principle, Salafism as a systematical theory, Salafism as a religious and political movement, and Salafism as a radical and warrior organization.

Salafism has been represented by various groups with slight differences such as Ahl al-Asar, Ahl al-Hadith (Ashab al-hadith), Ahl al-haq, Sifatiyyah, Isbatiyyah, Hanbaliyyah, Zahiriyyah, Wahhabiyyah and Salafiyyah.

This study aimed to collect the characteristics of Salafism ideology in seven parts.

The first is the approaches of Salafism followers toward Allah's titles and cognates. Salafism followers suggested commitment to Allah rather than interpreting Allah's titles and cognates, and they approached tashbih and tajsim after understanding the apparent meanings of the religious works on these issues.

Their second basic characteristic is their belief in faith-practice unity. This belief directed Salafism followers into a radical moralism within their daily lives. They considered all elements with no faith-practice unity as non-Islamic.

One of the most significant of Salafism that separates them from other Islamic groups is that they believe with a strong insistence that the Quran is not a creature. The Quran's identity as a non-creature element means its meanings can be

explained only through the statements and practices of sunnah and salaf as-salihin. Therefore, the eternal characteristic of the Quran is essentially a reference to the eternal Salafism ideology. Therefore, the "untouchable" characteristic of Allah's kalam reflects the domination of the sunnah over the religion and untouchable characteristics of social structure and status quo for Salafism followers.

Another basic characteristic of Salafism followers is that they consider narration as superior to intelligence in relations between these two concepts. Salafism followers held intelligence only subject to narration and stated that intelligence is based on narration and religious works. Salafism followers, who regarded themselves as the sole representative and protector of Islamic science, have blemished ra'y and kalam throughout Islamic history and made efforts to remove the scientific and religious legitimacy of Ahl ar-ra'y and ahl al-kalam.

One of the most basic characteristics of Salafism is that they regard the Quran and sunnah as equal. This approach contradicts with the concept of khabar al-sadiq in Ahl al-sunnah epistemology because khabar al-sadik, regarded as the absolute information source by Ahl al-Sunnah, is the "divine revelation". Regardless of their degree of certainty, including each statement and action of the Prophet into this revelation may turn din al-Islam into din al-Muhammad.

The most significant characteristic of Salafism that separates it from other ideologies and grants this name, is that Salafism considered the ideas and practices of the first Islamic generations as an irreplaceable religious authority and source. According to this ideology that reflects the longing for the golden generation (salaf as-salihin) in Islamic ideology, Salafism followers considered all fiqh-based developments and contributions that emerged after the first three Islamic generations as the innovations and new elements that are not included in the main content of Islam, and Salafism followers fought hard against these developments and contributions severely. Therefore, Salafism became a defensive and solidarity platform against external threats and new challenges.

Another characteristic that separated Salafism followers from other Islamic groups is that they believed that the caliphate will be the right of Qurayshi tribe until Judgment Day. This belief became one of the sources of inspiration for Arabic nationalism. In addition, Salafism followers have supported the Abbasid caliphate throughout history, and they have opposed any elements that would blemish or harm this caliphate. Therefore, Salafism followers have been engaged in certain political roles and activities throughout the Islamic period.

Salafism, the ideology which missed the fact that time and places change and differ, made efforts to make the organic form of the first Islamic society equal to Islam. A reactive, exclusionary and threatening language was used against the complications caused by historical errors, and anachronism with the purposes of declaring these complications as non-Islamic. This reactionary ideology in the history of Islam still exists today as a terrifying element that covers every aspect of

life, and as a divine shackle on the minds. If Islamic ideology is to be developed or renewed, one of the first actions is to remove this element, and detach this divine shackle from our minds sending it back to its historical place.

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Salafism as a Crisis Theology and Social Movement -An Analysis of Salafi Ideology and Its Impacts on the Muslim World-[*]

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Abstract

Salafisim is one of the most vivid problems of Islamic thought. It is becoming a stronger barrier for the Islamic world, in their search for civilization and a place in the global world. Salafism stresses the return to the essence of Islam. By this emphasis, it has a unsettling effect on sect identities, which are part of Islamic tradition. Salafism, also as a political movement, unsettles the political balances and has a negative impact on the stability of Muslim world. Salafism is a basic problem from the perspective of the Sunni paradigm. The Sunni tradition has observed Salafi tradition to a certain extent, historically and theologically, for this reason there is a representational crisis. Sunnis experience a crisis due to the accusations of Salafism, and Salafism is forcing the Sunni tradition to confront this crisis. Salafism is appearing as an option for the masses because of a regional political crisis. As a response, Islamic thought must answer this crisis by using its theological heritage. This confrontation will enable a dynamism for Islamic thought. In this situation, the Islamic world take into account the modern world's values, as well as its own tradition. The conclusion derived out of inadequate discussions which exclude sect movements and philosophical roots are unhelpful. There is a need to explain that Salafi discourse has no right to monopolize Islamic thought and the history of Islam.

Keywords: Salafism, Sunni Tradition, Sects, Ahl al-Sunnah

Bir Kriz Teolojisi ve Toplumsal Hareket Olarak Selefîlik -Selefî İdeoloji ve İslâm Dünyasındaki Etkileri Üzerine Bir Analiz-

Özet

Selefîlik, günümüzde İslâm düşüncesinin en canlı problemlerinden biridir. İslâm dünyasının medeniyet arayışı ve küresel dünyada kendi değerleriyle var olma çabalarında, gittikçe gücünü artıran bir bariyer haline gelmiştir. Öze dönüş vurgusuyla Selefîlik, İslâm geleneğinin bir parçası olan mezhebî kimlikleri sarsıcı bir etki yapmaktadır. Siyâsal bir hareket olarak da var olan politik dengeleri dağıtmakta ve Müslüman dünyayı istikrarsızlaştırmaktadır.

Teolojik açıdan selefîlik, en çok da Sünnî paradigma için temel bir sorunudur. Târihsel ve teolojik olarak selefî düşünceyi belirli ölçüde içselleştirmiş olan Sünnîlik, bir temsil krizi yaşamaktadır. Selefî söylemin suçlamaları karşısında var oluş bunalımı geçiren Sünnîlik, selefilik ile gecikmiş yüzleşmesini gerçekleştirmeye zorlanmaktadır. Yaşanan bölgesel politik sorunlar kitlelerin zihninde selefiliği bir seçenek olarak öne çıkarmaktadır. Bununla birlikte bunu yapabildiği ölçüde hayattaki yürüyüşüne devam edecek olan İslâm düşüncesi, teolojik olarak kendi mirasının imkânlarından yararlanacak performansı göstermek zorundadır. Küresel dünyanın çok yönlü ve ani hamleleri karşısında derin anlam ve değer sorunları yaşayan İslâm düşüncesi, târihsel ve teolojik dinamizmini, bu yüzleşme sonucu elde edecek gibi görünmektedir. Kendi mirası kadar modern dünyanın değerlerini de dikkate alması gereken İslâm dünyası çok yönlü bir aydınlanmaya mecbur kalmış durumdadır.

Mezheplerin ve felsefe hareketinin birikimini reddetmeksizin İslâm öğretisi ekseninde bir yeniden yapılanma üzerinde düşünmeksizin kısmî tartışmalarla elde edilecek sonuçların yararlı olamayacağı açıktır. Selefî söylemin eski ve dayanakları tartışıldığında, bu radikal özcü akımın hiç de İslâm'ın öğretisini ve târihini tekelinde bulundurmaya hakkı olmadığı anlaşılmakta, bu durum İslâmî bir üslûp çerçevesinde ortaya konulabilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefîlik, Sünnî Paradigma, Mezhepler, Ehl-i Sünnet

Dimensions of the Problem

In recent years, an obviously huge literature has emerged regarding Salafism. The reason behind this growth is both the political developments in the Islamic world, and the extant competition among the traditional Islamic schools of thought, each struggling to monopolize the Islamic reality. For instance; some topics like the definition of Ahl al-Sunnah, how and where its limits can be identified, by whom it is represented, whether it can be considered as a sect, and what its principles are ,have been matters of opinion once again. In these discussions, Salafism has become the most frequently mentioned concept. Besides conventional institutions in Islamic world (such as madrasahs, teaching circles, public sermons), Salafism has been exercising the modern communication channels (such as TV, the Internet, press, printed and visual media) and it has been gaining popularity, particularly among Sunni geographies or at least earning sympathy because of the propaganda path it follows.

Shiite-Sunni relations have always ended up as a certain consistency in their own historical process and political routines. Moreover, the political ideology and bureaucratic heritage of the parties that represent these two fractions have a significant effect in this regard. Persian and Turkish communities, each having a certain perception of government and state, have been able to maintain the balance between Shiite and Sunni populations based on a common political mindset. However, the recent popularity of Salafism in Sunni communities have radically jeopardized these relations.

This understanding, which has been tried as a basis of the 'jihad until death' principle and a possible civil war by the communities having a political mindset and a discourse based on 'takfir' and hostility, is not even a political understanding. Indeed, political thinking brings negotiation, protection of common interests and tolerance. It is obvious that the global powers could not resurrect the historical Iran-Turan conflicts, but this target was achieved through the Salafi groups, financially supported by Arabic

entities. From the perspectives of international relations and global policies, Salafi activist groups are known to have embarked on this endeavor to make the Islamic world operational throughout periodical and regional instabilities and this issue should be discussed as an independent issue.

Salafism is the absolute opposite to the Shiite understanding. Thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah, who is considered as the inspirer of Salafism, have significant impacts on this understanding.[1] As is known, Ibn Taymiyyah was born in Harran. And the challenging conditions of the Islamic world in that time inevitably made an impact of him. Due to the Mongol invasion and the crusades, he settled in Egypt, which was a safer country to live. As a scholar of the period of dissolution, the impact of Ibn Taymiyyah on current school of thoughts stems from the depth he brought to the movement, in theory and theology. As a characteristic that is peculiar to the scholars of the period of dissolution, the intellectual depression is more obviously seen in his thoughts. In such periods, the more sensitive a scholar becomes toward his own environment and its problems, the sharper the discourse he develops in his cast of mind gets. Ibn Taymiyyah is indeed a deep and sensitive scholar. However, he concentrated his intelligence in a rejectionist and radical model to solve the problems of Islamic communities. As Islam is the most perfect religion and Allah promises victories in this world and in the afterlife to those who believe in this religion, the reasons of this actual derogation and tragedy must be found in Muslims who turn away from the teachings of religion and do not fulfill religious duties. The scholar, who tries to reveal the theology of deviationism, points to Sufism, philosophy and kalam as its drivers. In addition, he tries to turn toward Salafism and ground a new understanding abstracted from the aforementioned disciplines.

As a strong scholar and a master polemicist, Ibn Taymiyyah had a knowledge of philosophy and logic that could paradoxically beat many philosophers and the ability to use this knowledge to refute ideas of others in an effective manner. The work (Naqd al-Mantiq) he authored as a rejection to Aristo's philosophy is outstanding as it is a product of a scholar who prefers philosophy to takfir in logic. Today's Salafi Muslims, on the other hand, do not focus on the efforts Ibn Taymiyyah made in philosophical debates, but on the conclusions reached. These communities often tend to conclude historically and scholarly prominent discussions with a verse or a hadith and this indicates how close they are to mutual dialogue, discussion and mutual understanding. This attitude is also a rough representation of the instinct of possessing the truth. You may possess the truth, but this belief should not restrain you from getting involved in truth-related discussions and philosophizing. Otherwise, the attitude can only be named as anti-culturalism. Discussions, paying attention, self-expression, being open to criticism and similar other behaviors are the real determinants and refreshers of any culture. Being associated with the illusion of possessing the truth, anti-culturalism can even form the most thrilling

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[1] Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly voices his hostility against the Shiite understanding in that time, which he names *rafidah* (rejectionist). He explains through examples that in some cases they conspired with Mongols and let them cause trouble to Muslims, while in others they allied with the Crusaders and left behind huge damage in the Islamic world. See: Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhâcü's-Sünne*, Cairo 1986, VII, 414.

composition in the world. Unlike the perception of Salafi Muslims, this kind of manipulation on religious norms is nothing that was adopted by the salaf.

Seeking solutions through utilization of religious norms is a belatedly systematized approach. Taking Qur'anic verses as reference to solve theological and legal problems was systematized after the emergence of sects. The outlook of the Prophet's companions on the Qur'an was most probably not this way. They were not familiar with the idea of "using verses as a means of discussion". As they interiorized the meanings of religious norms and the purpose of religion as a system of values, they rather based their ideas and behaviors on public interests and rational grounds. They did not demand a norm for every effort they made and every utterance expressed. This is a particularly significant characteristic. The contrary approach that leads to incompatible ideas and behaviors with the ultimate purpose and internal values of the religion by interpreting the norms with their literal meanings and overusing them was systematized within the period the four major sects, when ideological manipulation of texts was considered natural. Salafism opposes ta'wil so as to prevent repetition of mistakes made by the sects, while objecting to the ideological interpretation and manipulation of the Qur'an. Holding on to the wording without resorting to ta'wil and ra'y is considered as a way to preserve the religious faith in its natural form.

This classical attitude is preserved in the texts about the modern Salafism. Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, a Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, authored an introduction where he consubstantiated the belief of Islam and the belief of Ahl al-Sunnah and lists the fundamental characteristics. Regarding the ease and comprehensibility of the relevance between these two beliefs, he says, "This is such an easy and obviously seen fact as the sun in the middle of the day. There is neither obliqueness nor complexity in this regard. The words are evident; their meanings are clear. From scholars to a common man, everyone can understand them. The Messenger of Allah brought it as a snow-white and spotless belief."[2] This emphasis on the clarity of belief is similar to statements of Islamic scholars about the harmony between Islam and the nature of human beings.

The emphasis put by the Salafi discourse on "clarity and ease of comprehension in the belief" refers to a reasoning of religious principles and a manifest against the approach of ta'wil. According to this, Allah revealed the truth as a clear, comprehensible and easy to understand religion. If there were any difficulty related to the religion, attributions of "truth" and "mercy" would be meaningless. On the contrary, ta'wil contradicts with the argument of clarity in belief with regards to its aim to explain the principles. You can't explain something which is already clear! At the very most, you can pollute and complicate it with explanations and interpretations and even make it unrecognizable. The reason behind the Salafi discourse's firm attitude against ta'wil and the structures institutionalized as outcomes of ta'wil can be understood. Philosophy is based on speculation,kalam refers to consciousness in understanding and explaining the principles, while Sufism often resorts to ta'wil. For Salafi scholars, all of these disciplines complicate and distort religion.

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[2] Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al-Hamad, *Ehl-i Sünnet'in Seçkin Özellikleri*, p. 30.

The Sunni-Shiite relations were tense in Ibn Taymiyyah's time. The perception that Shiite Muslims allied with the Mongols and betrayed Sunni Muslims caused indignation. As an expression of this indignation, Ibn Taymiyyah authored written works that almost accused Shiite Muslims of being unbelievers. The hostility of Salafi scholars against Shiite Muslims stems from this reality. On the other hand, it is not difficult to guess the attitude of Salafism, as an Arabic ideology, toward Shiah, which they regard as politically and theologically deviant. The roots of this thought date back to the ideology of "Arabism", which was exposed during the Umayyad period but had always found a place in the ideology of Ahl al-Hadith. Arabs enhanced the political superiority of the Quraysh by using theological arguments and started to regard political dominance as a natural right. In response to this, the non-Arab Muslims turned towards other fields having seen that the doors of politics had been closed to them.

The most significant fields which the mawali (non-Arab) Muslims turned towards were science and arts.[3] At this point, it should be noted that Arabic communities did not necessarily isolate themselves from scientific activities, but they had different perceptions in this regard. In mawali mindset, science was equal to reasoning and some other fields that expose the creativity of human beings, such as philosophy, arts, and theology, while Arabs believed that science requires only a limited extent of reasoning which is sufficient for narration and narrating. Even this perception of science alone reveals the differences between these two cultural paradigms. This is exactly why the movement of Ahl al-Hadith undertook the duty of carrying the Arabic culturalism behind the scenes, while Ahl al-Ra'y had an intention to open new fields for cultural values of mawali Muslims through philosophy, kalam, and Sufism. For this reason, Ahl al-Hadith dignified narrations and grounded their ideology upon the argument that "religion is only a matter of narration" and argued against ta'wil, which they regarded as a method that spoils and distorts narratives. As an expression of the grudge held against Islam through Arabs, communities that could not accept the Arabic political rule regard the products of Ahl al-Ra'y (kalam, philosophy, Sufism, arts etc.) as deviance. The fact that lies behind the Salafi hostility against kalam, philosophy, and Sufism is the forgotten trace of the protracted conflicts between Arabs and mawali Muslims.[4]

In reality, the Salafi ideology had thoughts about Sunni sects similar to those they had about Shiah. Salafi scholars regard the theological heritage of Sunni Muslims as deviancy due to the assumption that it was distorted by Sufism, philosophy, and kalam. Seeing Sufism as an absolute shirk (polytheism), the Salafi ideology was against all cultures that value images of Sufism. The modern Salafi discourse that regards

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[3] For an analysis of the rise of mawali as a new social power in Islamic world and its positive returns, see: Muhammad Abid Al-Jabiri, *Arap-İslâm Siyasal Aklı*, p. 314 et al.

[4] For the explanation suggesting that the political views of Ahl al-Hadith were centered around Damascus, Umayyad, Muawiya etc., Ahmad ibn Hanbal was interested in the Suyfani rebellion and another group held a grudge against Khorasan and more examples see: Mehmet Zeki İşcan, *Selefîlik-İslâmî Köktenciliğin Tarihî Temelleri*, p. 152 et al.

Maturidiyya[5], which is a significant branch of Sunni kalam understanding, as a follow up of Murji'ah, considers another school of Sunni kalam, Ash'arism, in the same category.[6] As a movement emerged in Islamic world, certain issues such as Murji'ah's definition of belief, attitudes toward the relationship between humans and practice and sin are not far from the efforts to attribute a more flexible and comprehensive meaning to the Muslim identity. This attitude provided the community with ease and more space by balancing the theological oppression of Kharijites on the Islamic world and help non-Arab Muslims, who are named as mawali and were even perceived as asylees in Islam, to gain reputation and value. The socio-cultural and political meaning of Murji'ah's distinction between belief and practice by dignifying the former is an expression of the need to ensure social equality. Accordingly, mawali Muslims could gain the equality and reputation they wished to have only through an intrinsic and abstract value such as belief, rather than practice.[7]

In short, Salafism represents a movement similar to the Western anarchism in Islamic word and adopted a completely opposition attitude towards any structure called society, history, culture, arts, philosophy and similar other fields. Against this abnegative attitude, the sects have to be reconsidered. Reconstructive movements in the Islamic world basically considered traditional and sectarian identities as problems, and aimed to ensure an expansion through criticism of them. However, the radical Salafi renunciation policy against heritage led to an awareness which looks for positive sides of sects and emphasizes their positive impacts on culture, daily lives and social structure. This is because of the fact that the competition among sects seem to be more temperate and peaceful than the conflicts that Salafism passionately fuels.

Understanding the Salafi Paradigm

The terms Salaf and Salafi are often interchangeably used and replaced. However, the difference between these two concepts is in meaning, rather than being semantic. The semantic relevance and the uncertainty it creates is a problem left either intentionally or unintentionally unsolved by the Salafi ideology, which actually exploits the situation. The other schools of thought ostracized by the Salafi discourse are obviously timid in their feelings regarding Salafism. This asymmetrical and unbalanced situation stems from the gaps in epistemologies of the aforementioned schools of thought.

Firstly, as it dignifies purity, gentility, roots, and first experience, the passionate and ambitious attitude of the Salafi discourse puts the thought in an honorary position, establishing a psychological superiority over the other schools and fueling

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[5]   For more information about Maturidiyya from the perspective of modern Salafism, see: Al-Shams al-Salafi al-Afghani, *A'dâu'l-Mâtüîidiyyeli'l-Akîdeti's-Selefiyye*, Peshawar 1998.

[6]   al-Hamed, *ibid*. p. 74.

[7]   Mehmet Evkuran, "İslâm'da Eşitlik ve İtibâr Talebinin Teolojik Dili- Mukallidin İmanı ve İmanda İstisna Tartışmalarının Sosyo-politik ve Kültürel Bağlamı", *Uluslararası İmâm Mâtürîdî ve Mâtürîdîlik Sempozyumu,* http://www.bilgelerzirvesi.org/bildiri/maturidi/Prof-Dr-Mehmet-EVKURAN.pdf

the feeling of tolerance among their followers. This creates an environment of almost insolvable uncertainties because of the thought that Salafism cannot be coped with unless one takes the risk of "falling into a sin" and "supporting bid'ah".

There is a gap in this issue due to the fact that Islamic world could not produce a strong discourse to balance ideas of Salafism or not update the inherited tendencies coming from the past. For this reason, all initiatives confronting the Salafi movement fall under the influence of the harsh Salafi discourse and embrace a similar language that resorts to "takfir" others. Therefore, the Salafi movement has versatile impacts in terms of both its mission and practices, and its influence on its opponents that make them think the same way.

In this regard, one of the steps that should be taken to contribute to Islamic thought is to recall the texts and the discourse that theorize the legitimacy of kalam and philosophy movements, and re-interpret these two concepts. The course of kalam and philosophy, which are respectively based upon reasoning in religious issues and independent thinking over the religion, as well as their contributions to the religion, and the principles they have provided should be explored. This kind of studies would contribute to the awareness that Salafism, which is an ideology that totally ostracizes or amputates the act of reasoning, bears inconsistencies and risks to the religion. As Islamic thought and theology is represented with its weakest and most conservative sides in today's world, it is obviously seen that Islamic world is incapable of bringing about such an approach. Moreover, historical and political conditions contribute to the rising Salafism as an ideology based on a crisis theology and restrain the rich content and diversity of Islamic thought from coming to light.

Then, what does Salafism have that others do not? The partial acknowledgement of being isolated from history and the first meaning is a characteristic that is also seen in other schools of thought. In response to this, the claim regarding purity and being emotionally bonded to origins and using this claim for criticizing everything produced thereafter are the main characteristics of the Salafi discourse. For this reason, the development of a well-balanced and reasonable contra-discourse in Islamic thought against Salafism fell at this aforementioned psycho-theological hurdle. Due to the so-called privileged and honorary place it has gained, all initiatives that confront Salafism internally feel lowly against this psycho-theological privilege. Especially among the Sunni communities and schools of thought this situation extends as a complete dilemma.

On the other side, the conflict between the schools of thought in theology often exceeds the limits of politics, and this situation feeds the thought of returning to origins and eliminating the bid'ah, which is ambitiously supported by Salafism, in a number of aspects. Although these two schools make different and even contradictory definitions of bid'ah and misdeeds, the ambition of returning to origins and roots is kept fresh as a cult. Keeping alive the wish to return to origins and to get rid of misdeeds also keeps the Salafi ideology as a paradigm that is encountered every time and everywhere. This is the fundamental reason behind recognition of

Salafism as a modern ideology due to its perspective and discourse, and the need to analyze it from this aspect.

Essentially, behind the harsh and strict approach of Salafi circles, against other Islamic thoughts lies the attitude of seeing themselves as the core belief in Islam. This is an expected and natural outcome. Because, the absolutist and monopolist characteristic of the Salafi ideology ostracizes all kinds of tolerance, reconciliation, moderation and withdrawal behaviors beforehand. Accordingly, all of these were considered as indifference, looseness, and negligence against backsliding and efforts to deface the religion. This is the motive that drove Azariqa, which was one of the first groups of Kharijites, to declare those (qaade) who followed the movement but did not join wars as unbelievers. Considering itself the same as divine truth and adopting this as a firm belief, the only act that may stem from this way of thinking would be sustained, non-conciliatory and undiscussable intervention. Therefore, in political terms, this ideology means civil war to Muslim communities.

The Relationship Between Salafism and Salaf: Did the Salaf support Salafism?

A discourse that ambitiously claims firm and strong bonds with history is doomed to transform into an ideology. From a positive persperctive, an ideology is an outcome of the efforts of human beings to explore or establish meanings and values. However, this process does not sever ties with reality and the fact-value distinction is balanced in a way through the critical and questioning function of the ideology. On the other hand, once ties with reality are severed, the tension to emerge between thought and reality and the resultant dissolution drive the ideology to become introverted. The gap caused by the severance from reality attempts to be filled with ideological firmness. This is the reason why all dogmatic people hate reality and the real world. The world, which contradicts their ideology in every reference, is the actual target of their hatred. The construing part of an ideology works in the most pathological way possible. And it is something that does not exist today. Rather than reality, it exists as fantasy. For that reason, any discourse that claims to have been confirmed by history needs proof to ground this assumption.

When it comes to Salafism, it must be expressed that this ideology perverted and commoditized history in a selective and reductive way and through the most naive discourse. In fact, any thought or belief that looks for a place in history and rests upon history as a reference, as Salafism has done, and refers to the religious principles, as well as experiences of the first Muslim generations.

During the first periods when the cultural and institutional transformation was disciplined, there was only a little need for ta'wil and qiyas. Therefore, the Salafi approach, which opposes the phenomenon of meaning enrichment and schoolization (philosophy, kalam, Sufism etc.) and regards them as deviation from religion, falls into a mistake in this regard. The facts authored by scholars of kalam and Sufism for defending themselves against the rejectionist claims of Ahl al-Hadith are considered as arguments that aim to convert Islam into a discipline maintained by human beings. Otherwise, there would be no other option than to spread Islam using power and

sword. Accordingly, it is a natural outcome of this perception that the former and new Salafi groups are prone to violence.

As opposed to the argument of Salafiyyah, the Salaf were not Salafi. This is an allegation put forward within the period of dissolution. Although there are findings that support the argument propounded Salafiyyah, the perception of the first generations about the religion and the world was built on a feeling of self-confidence grounded on reason, public interests, and experience, besides religious principles. Although the system of diwan did not exist within the first period, Umar ibn Khattab, who adapted it from the Persian culture of politics to meet the bureaucratic needs of the state, did not think that he did something against the principles of Islam. Neither did the companions of the Prophet opposed to this idea. Thereby, the definition of Salafism that Salafi Muslims put forward by referring their thoughts to the Salaf is only a matter of fantasy.[8] This is a result of misevaluation of theology history. Moreover, the reason behind its impact is the successful efforts that raised the religious heroism. In addition, the suspicion and distrust that arouse from the sometimes exaggerated commentaries of the schools of philosophy and Sufism exacerbated the situation.

Salafism as a Modern Ideology: A Writhing Thought Between Angry Crowds and the Gulf Lobby

The first issue that causes confusion about Salafism is the problem of finding a way and method to define its foundation. As the Salafi discourse obviously and ambitiously refers its roots to the early periods of Islam in both historical and theological terms, regarding this thought as a turn of mind or a type of understanding would mean objectifying the religion itself. This is the proof that the Salafi discourse furthers its possessive approach regarding the divine truth.

Understanding the Salafi aggression is today an intellectual and academic problem besides being theological. Regarding Salafism as an ideological structure would be an eye-opening contribution to the field when the current knowledge level in today's divinity studies is taken into consideration.

In fact, the necessary steps in this regard are to review the relevant thoughts within time and re-define them in light of new conditions and needs. This is such a natural and necessary endeavor that no significant effort is needed to ground this idea on a solid basis. However, supporting the phenomenon of innovation, which is

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[8] The conflicts between different mindsets in Islamic culture can be read through cities. For instance; Kufa is the center of opposition against the Arab rule. Historians name these people as "ahl al-shiqaqwa al-nifaq". In response to this, the literature of Ahl al-Hadith speaks highly of Damascus, as a symbol of the Umayyad-Arab authority. In addition, the intellectual infrastructure of Kufa was established by Abdullah ibn Masud, who was assigned by 'Umar ibn Khattab himself. As is known, Kufa was one of the important centers where the school of ra'y and the movement of kalam took active roles. The fact that Umar ibn Khattab and Abdullah ibn Masud, who influenced the foundation of this center of scholarship, were members of the Salaf exposes a huge paradox to explain regarding Salafism. Salafism was in an effort politically to sustain the Arab rule. Ahmet Akbulut, "SelefiliğinTeolojikveDüşünselTemelleri", *TarihteveGünümüzdeSelefilik*, p. 129.

as natural as life itself, and providing a structured rationale before other beliefs was entailed by the so-called "essentialist" thoughts which exploitatively benefited from all sensitivities and aspirations of the intellectual orthodoxy and melted them in a total ideology.

In this regard, we should retrieve a frequent unjust practice. Returning to origins is also uttered by another group or, to better define, another movement of Islamic thought: "Islamic Modernists". Islamic Modernism is an ideology in Islamic thought which was exhausted in a short period of time. Probably, this ideology encountered ostracization, suspicion, and prejudices due to the term "modernism" used in its definition. One of the most fundamental arguments of Islamic Modernists was the call to return to the origins of Islam. From this aspect, there may be an impression that it is similar to the Salafi argument that supposes returning to Asr al-Saa'dat and the pure essence of Islam.

These two paradigms that supposed returning to the essence of Islam inherently inferred different meanings from regarding this target. The Salafi discourse considered returning to the essence of Islam as sanctification of the first experience, which was free of ta'wil and commentaries. On the other hand, the definition of returning to the essence of Islam was not that simple and straightforward according to Islamic Modernists. The relationship they aimed to establish with the essence of Islam was more interpretive and did not exclude ta'wil completely. Reconsidering the early period Islam and identifying the universal principles of the message is inherently an interpretive process. An Islamic modernist is aware of this reality and the fact that the process is an act of explication, interpretation, and inference. Unfortunately, this approach has never been realized by the conservative circles and unjustly suppressed by their "orientalist disciples".

So, why would an Islamic modernist wish to return to their roots? In response to the allegations that the modernists idolize that time and try to reduce Islam against the dominant mindset of the time, Islamic modernists paradoxically desire to explore the history and roots of Islam. Isn't it a contradiction? Why are they in such a tendency? The shortest answer to this is: Creating the necessary environment for interpretation in order to create modern values by putting historical Islam and tradition identities in parentheses. The masses living under the heavy and tiresome pressure of a future in Islamic world can find the courage to create a vision for their future only in Islam. However, a rough and literal interpretation of Islam cannot save Muslim communities from the dullness they have fallen into and thus, continues to be the reason behind a lot of different problems. Therefore, there should be a distance that may enable them to look at tradition and historical contexts in a critical way.

As the valid and long-lasting solution for problems of Muslims can be found within Islam, modernists attempted to establish a more creative and problem-solving relation with Islam, to think more, and re-interpret the religion through its meaning, aims, and values. The first historical experience in this relationship with Islam is considered as a structure that contains the necessary principles for the solution in itself, rather than a ready and holistic solution. Modernist scholars believe that it is

impossible to explore these principles without evaluating and interpreting the religion, and prioritizes interpretation and reasoning.

Salafi scholars and Islamic modernists are often confused with each other due to this similarity in ideas about returning back to the early period of Islam and regarding those not seen in the first experience as bid'ah. However, the similarity is only seen as a claim. How the content of this claim can be meaningful is seen as an indicator of two disparate paradigms. In addition, the failed Islamic modernism that could not reach its targets would probably take shelter in Salafism after this turmoil. Nihilism is another alternative. As once the history is discussed with an objectifying approach despite its richness in meaning and sacredness, then all other holy beliefs and values will be seen as hermeneutical constructs.

Associating Salafism with only the mindset of angry and uncontrolled crowds would be a deficient and insufficient endeavor within this modern world. The Arab countries that support the movement's socialization by allocating financial sources and developing policies for this reason bring an international dimension to the issue. From the viewpoint of international relations, it may be thought that, as a political method, Salafism may constrain and restrict administrations. This is due to the expectation that the hard-line and activist side of Salafism would not allow development of rational policies in this modern world, which is full of pragmatic and day-to-day relationships.

However, this is not the reality at all. It would not be fair to judge the situation by only looking at practices of the groups that adopted Salafi ideology. Administrations that support this ideology build disciplined societies through internal policies and find a broad and free area in relations with the modern world, particularly the Western countries, without feeling obliged to be dependent on a specific political culture in foreign affairs. Referring to this period of simple and basic relations and bureaucratic institutionalization requires putting the Muslim traditions of politics and bureaucratic background aside. And this ignorance allows for the legitimization of the strangest, most distractive and complicated relations and policies. So indeed, relations of countries that rest upon the Salafi ideology with the outer world are different from other Muslim countries. These countries further their relations with other Muslim countries in a reluctant and discreet manner, while establishing high-level political, strategic, and economic relations with the developed Western countries.

Salafism as AnAnticulturalist Theology

The main argument of Salafi doctrine is its alleged bonds with the origins and essence of religion. The most fundamental assumption of this argument hinges upon the idea that Islam has been distorted after the generation called Salaf. The Salafi discourse feeds the prejudiced suspicion and the feeling of distrust against everything that emerged after a certain period and keeps this feeling consistent. The mechanism of distortion and backsliding is explained with the prioritization of reasoning about the principles. Ta'wil and reasoning are condemned as the means of losing the

essence, while the submission to dogmas is dignified. The Salafi ideology represents the transformability of the perception of a "cultural childhood" into belief, and a paradigm of action as an expression of the desire to live the culture at zero point.

Salafism places an imaginary religious experience against culture. As a concept, culture depends on the assumption that human beings could perform qualified actions on earth even in the beginning of human life and produce outputs within an arranged environment, called community, based on repetition or creativity. Even this reality alone gives human beings freedom to use their wills and perform acts in their lives or experiences shared with others.

Unlike nature, society is not given. It is an arranged structure, which could be something else, but became what it is today. As opposed to the imperative characteristic of nature, it is possible and full of possibilities.

What enables the existence of a society is the will of human beings. This will is also the source of culture. Although humans will work in a way that may result in self-elimination once it is formed and institutionalized, this does not change the reality that society is an ontologically possible and arranged phenomenon. Postmodernist scholars are not the only ones who realized the reality that the will of human beings, who are the constituent elements of the culture-society relationship, is unpredictable. All essentialist, radical, universalist and dogmatic people showed excessive reaction against the concept of human will, which is the constituent and diversifying element of cultures, and tried to suppress this idea. At this point, it is possible to see the desire to constrain human will under the feeling of absolute submission to the divine truth, which is a fundamental principle that Salafism rests upon. The principles dignified by Salafism against religious principles, such as tasleem, kaff, imsak, and al-i'tiraf bi al-'ajz, aim at limiting willpower, which form the essence of being human, while the opposition to ta'wil, qiyas, aql, and ijtihad try to straightforwardly prevent human will.[9]

The understanding of pure religion, pure and sharp experience and the takfir-oriented rhetoric as a complement of this understanding preaches that the essential aim of jihad is to eliminate any kind of cultural commentary and diversification. As cultural diversification is inevitable even in the toughest and most introverted communities, it can be assumed as an eternal jihad against culture. All achievements and values obtained by Muslims throughout history are considered and criticized as part of bid'ah that distorts the purity of Islam. In this regard, the interesting fundamental reality is that Salafi anticulturalism has harmed the Muslim world the most. Non-Muslim communities and particularly the western Ahl al-Kitab are placed in a more secure and privileged position through attributions like Dar al-Ahd. Despite occasional conflicts based on the conjuncture, they all turned out to be strategic moves. The actual area of practice used by the Salafi understanding of jihad is the Muslim world and the Muslim communities themselves.

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[9] For a short presentation about the fundamental principles of Salafism and examples of accusations addressed to the Sunni school of ra'y, see: SüleymanUludağ, *İslâmDüşüncesininYapısı*, p. 44-65.

In that case, the feelings and thoughts which are dominant in Salafi teachings and movement should be talked about. Returning to the essence and unadulterated religion defines the thoughts, while the despair and anger against the current situation describes the feelings. These can be interchanged and fuels each other depending on the historical and political experience of Muslim communities. Sometimes, feelings can be expressed as a thought and a religious understanding. As a crisis theology, Salafism is distinguished as a reaction to the cultural and social deadlock and the failed restructuring efforts. From this perspective, not only the current situation but also the whole historical background of Muslims are seen as deviation from religion.

Angry crowds cannot produce culture, embrace cultural heritage, or even exhaust it. The target group of culture is the conservative middle-class that has successfully established balanced, reasonable and pragmatic relations with the history and the world. Development and institutionalization of sects are achievements obtained through joint efforts led by the middle-class. As a means of self-expression, the angry crowds in the Islamic world resort to the low-level aggressive approach of Salafism against culture and sects as one of its inseparable parts. They are aggressive, discontent, and destructive. They radically stand against institutions and values, particularly the cultural and historical heritage, insult them with a religious discourse and try to eliminate them.

A significant point in the background of Salafism in Islam is the Arabic political power that provides both intellectual and economic resources to the movement. Using the material wealth they have, Saudi Arabia and some gulf countries provide logistics for Salafism and especially its educational and civil organizations. As the philosophy and lifestyle of the rich Arab elites, Salafism is driven by a different motivation behind the angry crowds. These countries' perspective on the issue is maintained through policies about international relations and strategic priorities. These communities feel more privileged and place themselves in a distinctive position in Islamic world, which can be explained with the aim to create a free and productive area in international relations.

Reconsidering Sects Against the Salafi Nihilism

Looking at today's circles that support the Salafi ideology and their fundamental written resources, the topic of sects is seen to be considered as a rejectionist manner thereof. The terms sect and sub-sect are used to define communities that left the origins of religion and choose the way of bid'ah. Therefore, these concepts have negative meanings in Salafi mindset, which associates them with deviance. This is a natural and logical outcome of their outlook on culture. When it comes to the sect imitated by today's Salafism, we will see that they follow the belief of Salaf. The most frequently used concepts in Salafi literature are salaf and salah al-shalih. They are of such an attitude supposing that Islam has only recently been distorted. The Salafi consciousness cannot stand and be sufficient against the pace of time, flow of life, and emergence of problems to solve, and thus resorts to dogmas in a naive manner.

The first Islamic approach about sects is the rejectionist approach adopted by Salafism for the reason of returning to the origins. According to this approach, all sects refer to deviation from Islam and deviance in general. The ideas propounded by them are not legitimate at all. The other approach is the conservative approach that is drawn to the misperception of religion-sect equality. This approach dignifies sectarian identities instead of Islam. Owners of this approach believe that their sects are the absolute representation of Islam and all other sects are void and misguided movements.

It is possible to adopt more balanced and realistic points of view containing a critical assessment of these understandings. The radical Salafi approach, which radically rejects all sects, is not aware that it actually supports ideas of a specific sect. This approach ignores the institutions and values established by Muslims throughout history in favor of returning to origins and either intentionally or unintentionally tries to dehistoricize Muslims. As is the case in every civilization, the one built by Muslims may also have positive and negative sides. Building a new civilization is only possible through thinking over, discussing, and segregating these positive and negative characteristics. In this regard, the aforementioned approach idealizes a pastless and futureless primitive understanding of religion by ostracizing the rich historical heritage. This approach is simply equal to eradicating a whole life cycle.

Criticism of sects is necessary. Unlike the Salafi grudge against history and culture, this approach should be based on religion, reason, culture and values. Therefore, the language used to criticize sects should initially allow Muslims to think over Islam, produce values, and philosophize. It is possible to benefit from the cultural and theological heritage and produce valuable outputs, only through such an acceptance. On the other hand, the Salafi paradigm, which tries to produce a truth using a dull picture of time and space, by nature lacks the capability to produce culture.

Does Salafism Have a "Butterfly Effect"? Sunni-Salafi Relations

Salafi-Sunni comparisons can be hard to maintain. Of course, every research has a certain level of complexity. The complexity thereof stems from the Sunni side. As Salafism has a quite clear, accurate, and sharp image, the identification of its limits is rather easy. The Salafi discourse explicitly reveals its relations with the other schools of thought both in theory and practice, without overstraining the researcher. However, it is not quite possible to claim the same for the Sunni Islam. The Sunni paradigm has softened its borders with an inclusive and embracing environment. Two significant schools of kalam, namely, Ashʿarism and Maturidiyya, and Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki schools of kalam come together under the roof of the Sunni Islam. In fact, this has never happened in history. However, when the Sunni Islam was defined in a structured why, the whole theological knowledge of Islamic world (except for Shiah, Muʿtazila, and Kharijite Islam) was preserved in this

definition.[10] For this reason, Salafism was also included in this association under Sunni Islam as a turn of mind. Especially the Hanbalischool represented the values of Salafism and sympathized its image within the Sunni Islam as the nearest sect to the Salafi ideology. Salafi scholars are not confused about the Sunni Islam; they have rather clear opinions. On the other hand, the Sunni world lives with uncertainties in understanding and positioning Salafism.

The Islamic Encyclopedia published by the Turkish Diyanet Foundation defines "Salafiyya" in the relevant article as follows: "A school of thought which is adhesive to the wording of the Qur'an and the sunnah and does not accept ta'wil". In addition: "It is also defined as the path of fiqh and hadith Scholars who follow the way of companions of the Prophet and their successors (Tabi'un) "[11]

If analyzed carefully, this definition of Salafism is put forward by scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah. Regarding Salafism as the essence of Ahl al-Sunnah drives Sunni Islam to a vulnerable and embarrassed position. The tendency of an average Sunni mindset that tries to tolerate Salafism in every platform of discussion indicates that, though partially, the Sunni Muslims have deferred to the Salafi ideology and accepted it as a supervisory authority.

On the other hand, it is seen that things are easier for the Salafi side. Salafi scholars try to outclass the other Islamic organizations using the argument of "deviant sub-sects that spoil Islam" in their texts and become successful in this regard. Basically, the Salafi discourse claims of being followers of the path and belief of Salaf. They particularly emphasize this statement. In addition, they also use the term "Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah" in order to unclose and define the way of Salafism. However, through this use of the aforementioned term, the Salafi ideology aims neither to establish a bond with today's Sunni world, nor to contain it. On the contrary, they use this term to emphasize the claim that the "real Sunni Islam" is represented by Salafism and to marginalize all other communities that claim being parts of Ahl al-Sunnah and presenting them as outside of this definition.

It is clear that within the modern Salafi texts reveals this viewpoint of Salafism towards the others, a specific logic is used to ostracize the schools of kalam by claims of misdeed and harms. The Sunni world, excluding the Salafi communities, consists of the geographies where the Ashʿari and Maturidi thoughts of kalam are predominant. The Salafi discourse isolates the religious understanding of these geographies by talking about their relations with Murji'ah, Mu'tazili, and Sufism.

The explanations and commentaries written in Ibn Taymiyyah's work about *aqa'id*discuss the issue of attributives and the following statement can be given as an example of the perception about the way of Ashari and Maturidikalam scholars: "One of the indispensable principles of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah is to prove the supreme characteristics of Allah over the creatures and His istiwa over His *arsh* and *taht*. This is a significant and essential principle that differentiates Ahl al-Sunnah from

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[10]   Mehmet Evkuran, *Sünnî Paradigmayı Anlamak-Bir Ekolün Politik ve Teolojik Yapılanması*, 2nd Edition, Ankara 2015.

[11]   M. Sait Özervarlı, "Selefiyye", *DİA*, XXXVI, 399.

Jahmiyya, Muʿtazila, and Ashariyya (and also Maturidiyya)."[12] The same work explains the differences between Ahl al-Sunnah and ahl al-bid'ah by stating that Ahl al-Sunnah proves all divine attributives without exiling, interpretation, distortion, and figuration, and the two groups of ahl al-bid'ah are opposed to this situation. Jahmiyya and Muʿtazilaforms the first group of ahl al-bid'ah. The second group is known as the Ashʿari (and Maturidi) sub-sect and those following this movement. Another interesting point here is that the name of Maturidiyya is mentioned in parentheses together with Ashʿarism.[13]

Ashʿarism and Maturidiyya are criticized for their relations with Murji'ah and supporting some of their ideas and regarded as far from the way of Salafism.[14] While criticizing the opinions of kalam scholars about the definition and meaning of faith and its relation with practice, it is suggested that they were under the influence of Murji'ah. The role of Murji'ahfiqh scholars within this process is highlighted and the first degree responsibility is referred to the Hanafi scholars.[15]

The attempts to regard the Sunni Islam as far from and unbound to Salafism based on some reasons are obviously unfortunate and do not coincide with the historical-theological information. Institutionally, Sunni Muslims regard themselves within the same category which includes Hanbali and Maliki schools and thus, have always been vulnerable to criticism by these radical essentialist groups. Based on the Ottoman-Turkish experience within history, the definition of Sunni Islam has gained a more inclusive, flexible, and pluralist character. The perception of Sunni Islam has been enriched and diversified due to the variety of religious identities that have ever lived in this geography and therefore, it seems more loose, vast, and risky. A competition between two different perceptions about Sunni Islam is faced. The global and regional developments have left an erosive impact on the current organizations in the Islamic world and both sectarian and religious identities have failed to solve the problems of Muslims. Accordingly, the rebirth of Salafism in such a critical period is both meaningful and expected.

A powerful culture feeds on production of meanings and values and its environment that enables living through time with no interruption between the past and the future. There seems to be two options for those that cannot produce

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[12] Ibn Taymiyyah ,*el-Akîdetü'l-Vâsitiyye ve İhtiva Ettiği Yüce Mebâhise Dair Tenbihât,* Commentary: Abd al-Rahman ibn Nasir as-Sa'di, Author: Abdul Aziz Abdullah ibn ibn Baz, p. 60-61.

[13] *ibid.*, p. 64-65.

[14] Abu Hanifah was aware of this accusation of being in relation with Murji'ah. In a letter he sent to his disciple Osman al-Batti, he clarifies the situation saying, *"In your letter, you say that you have received information about my being one of Murji'ah and I see that you are overwhelmed by my words declaring them 'astray and sinful believers (fasiq)'"* and thereof states that his words were misunderstood and perverted. The interesting point here is that Abu Hanifah straight-forwardly rejects his alleged kinship to Murji'ah and tries to clarify the situation by explaining the positive and exaggerated meanings related to the idea of irja'. This mindset is also seen in the successor Hanafi-Maturidi scholars. They divide Murji'ah in two groups as pure Murjites and Murjites of Ahl al-Sunnah, and endeavors to ensure its legitimacy. *İmâm-ıAʿzâm Ebû Hanîfe ve Eserleri*, "Osman el-Bettî'ye YazdığıRisâle", trans. Abdulvvab Öztürk, p. 110.

[15] Safar bin Abdul-Rahman al-Hawali, *MürcieİnancıveİslâmÜmmetiÜzerindekiKötüTesirleri*, p. 330-332.

meanings and values: The first option consists of isolation from self and pragmatizing cultures. The other option is retracing back to the roots of a culture and desiring rebirth... When the whole picture is analyzed, Salafism is quite a radical rejection against the social and cultural organizations in the Islamic world that goes through a deadlock and cannot produce any meaningful value. It is reproaching these cultures with the nihilism that emerged in the Islamic world as an outcome of the isolation from knowledge, values, and aesthetics despite the Islamic world's economic and political achievements. Hence, it is inevitable for the deadlocked Sunni paradigm to confront Salafism, which often introduces itself as a questioning power. Being used as a mechanism of reaction and rejection, the Salafi ideology is an historically and theologically important part of Islam, just as the Sunni understanding is. A new hope may always appear if the Islamic thought, especially the Sunni understanding, finds the Salafi stimulation in itself and makes peace with it.

It would be more reasonable to struggle with the Salafi impacts and identify the actual problem, instead of a historical and theological self-objectification and a resultant religious consciousness that fails in self-criticism. It would not be easy to struggle against the essentialist mindset, which introduces itself as the divine truth and unadulterated, pure reality. Neither is standing against this understanding and coping with its extremities easy at all. For this reason, it is important to be at least as successful as the Salafi ideology in protecting the divine truth and showing respect to it. Moreover, this confrontation and identification with the divine truth should be realized through meaning, aiming, and values, rather than wording, history, and formalism. For a solution that presents itself as an interpretation, approach, or school of thought, it seems impossible to mitigate the possessive attitude of the Salafi discourse or even find a position to stand against it.

Being a crisis theology before anything else, the Salafi ideology has the necessary opportunities to transform the feelings of despair, grudge, and deadlock aggregated against all bad things and problems of this era into a firm essentialist ideology using a theological discourse. Regardless of the historical period it emerged in, the psycho-theology has always been the "updated" and appealed masses besides reflecting the values and feelings of the historical downfall. Therefore, all interpretations are seen as empty efforts or concession, and all solution suggestions are "deification of enthusiasm" against the firmness of Salafism as a modern ideology.

An outstanding reality of today's picture is that Salafism maintains its prestige and influence among Sunni Muslims. This honorary position is not a unilateral achievement of Salafism. In this regard, the institutional and paradigmatic structure of Sunni Islam and its acquiescent attitude should also be analyzed. Today, either as a political institution or a turn of mind, the Salafi ideology exercises influence over the Sunni world. The role of rising and expanding Shiite movement in this influence should also be taken into consideration. Although Shiah has always been in a strengthening and enlargement process throughout its history, today it is seen that the Salafi-Hanbali understanding has emerged as a reaction to this situation and to protect their own values. The increasing influence of this understanding and the

resultant social actions cause a crisis of representation for the Sunni paradigm. However, the actual reason behind this situation is the dullness and deadlock experienced by the Sunni world in terms of knowledge and values. Being unable to create the necessary reform conditions and opportunities, the Sunni world furthers its conventional practices, thus adopts a pragmatic attitude toward the recent developments and tries to find the balance between reactional and reactive behaviors falling behind events.

Unless an honest self-criticism is made, it seems that the Sunni paradigm cannot develop a command and vision to solve problems that arise from different religious understandings, particularly Salafism.

Today's Sunni world seems unguarded and vulnerable against the pressure of Salafi groups. The Sunni geography does not have the capacity to consider Salafism as a scholarly and theological matter. As a result of this incapability, Sunni Muslims cannot develop a discourse against Salafism keeping their arguments safe from politicization. The root cause of this failure in developing theological criticism is a structural problem and the Sunni world will never be ready for a restrained confrontation unless it does not contend the Salafi values in itself.

The Problem of Knowledge in Salafism

The development of knowledge-based intellectual thought in Islamic world encounters two different divine or divine-looking barriers. The first barrier is Sufi theology, which forms an unfortunate relationship of contradiction between knowledge and intuition, and replaces science with wisdom. According to this, knowledge divides in itself and be categorized as zahir and batin. Batin (inward) methodology is one that leads to the actual and pure knowledge of existence. Being caught up in zahir knowledge, scholars are at a lower level than urafa/arifin, who pursue the batin. The only thing they do is being busy with the mortal knowledge of the visible world. On the contrary, ahl al-'irfan upholds another way of enlightenment against the conventional methods of reading, writing, and reasoning. Looking at the perspective of the scholars of zahir (apparent) knowledge, which underestimates or at least looks down upon the intellectual efforts, it is not impossible to say that the knowledge and the efforts to achieve knowledge did not mean much to them.

However, the real deathblow to knowledge comes from the Salafi epistemology. According to Salafism, the Prophet communicated the religion to His companions in a pure and accurate way and they understood, practiced, and handed down the next generations what they listened directly from Him. In order to comprehend the religion properly, one should follow the way of this generation, called as Salaf, and the imams that narrate their opinions. Trying to understand the religion through methods like reasoning, ta'wil, and inspiration means using intermediary factors and complication the religion, which is, in fact, simple to understand. This justification inevitably results in prominence of narration and written works. Salafi epistemology

considers the concepts of science and narration equal to each other. The Ahl al-Hadith movement of Sunni Muslims shows the same mindset with Salafism.

Even in narrations there are texts that deliver metaphysical issues, especially about Allah. Although the existence and oneness of Allah is an accepted fact, interpretation of the characteristics and actions mentioned in the Qur'an poses a significant problem. Understanding certain narratives, such as Allah's coming, smiling, face, foot, fingers, hands, taht, and kursi is a serious issue for human minds. The Salafi ideology, which accepts all of these narratives without ta'wil and takyif, considers the exclusion of reasoning of religious principles as a correct approach. However, as their opponents claim, they fall into similitude and figuration. This situation might never disturb Salafi Muslims, on the other hand, it might impose the idea that this is a natural outcome of sticking to the principles and even if it is strange for human minds, it can never be questioned.

The only thing to do is to submit when the dogmatic principles and narratives are hard to accept. Avoiding ta'wil is not sufficient and takyif (questioning the quality) should also be abstained: "Even they understand the reason, they submit to the dogmas. They do not introduce these principles to their minds. On the contrary, they introduce their minds to these principles and understand them just like the salaf al-shalih."[16]

According to another work that discusses the Salafi perspective of reasoning and kalam: "The Salafi perception about kalam in Muʿtazila, Ashariyya, and Maturidiyya is as follows: Kalam scholars have expelled dogmatic principles and put reasoning in its throne. They always took its advice and were always dependent on it."[17]

The same passion and desires have glared down on them. A state of feeling and thought called "Playing God" is the essence in both of these paradigms. The target identified as "fanafillah" by the first paradigm opens a path to "be like God" (tahallaku bi ahlakillah) and becoming a god. The second one dramatizes the same play but chooses epistemology as the means, instead of ontology. In any case, regarding people as believer or unbeliever, then again deciding to "keep them alive or kill them" based on this judgment is nothing but playing God.

Mitigating the Theological Grudge is Only Possible Through Increasing Awareness...

Grudge and anger are the most evident and remarkable characteristics of Salafi groups. On one hand indulgence in worshipping and the humanist sensibility that appears when the sahaba are mentioned, on the other hand the anger and disappointment caused after failing to find the necessary means to practice this in the real world, present a picture of modern Salafism. In fact, the reason behind this theological grudge is the Salafi ideology itself.

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[16]   Osman Ali Hasan, *Kavâidü'l-İ'tikâdalâMesâlihi'l-İtikâd*, p. 143.

[17]   Süleyman Uludağ, *İslâmDüşüncesininYapısı*, p. 53.

Can a theological analysis be made on the grudge and anger of Salafism through the principle of "love for Allah and hate for Allah" only? The struggle to recover the lost truth of religion embodied in hatred and hostility against the opponents is considered as the cause of loss. Although Salafism thinks that the truth died away and was distorted long ago, the structural outcomes of this deviation and the figures supporting these outcomes are today's actors. As it is impossible to go back to history and punish the old ahl al-bid'ah, their modern supporters can be hit. Moreover, the awakened religious heroism cannot wander in nothingness, it has to find a current object and target to struggle against. In this way, the love for Allah and His Messenger can immediately be converted into the action of "jihad" against His enemies.

Misguided awareness causes apathy, unjustness, and destructiveness. In this modern world, Salafism does not only theologically and culturally exhaust Muslims, but also drives them to political and social instabilities. The fact that new generations in rich Arabic countries where this ideology is predominantly accepted have quickly been integrated in the Western values and lifestyles, instead of sharing sensitivities of Muslims, is proof that this paradigm will submit the Islamic world to a psychology of exploitation in the long run.

Therefore, the first theological step to take is to raise awareness based on a certain level of reasoning. Particularly the Middle East is full of unjust treatments and persecution between honest and sensitive people who are highly loyal to their faith. Accordingly, firm beliefs do not help us make efforts to increase the religious awareness. On the contrary, it is a definitely the source of the problem if not maintained by a more sound and humanist reasoning.

The Islamic world is in need of a radical questioning on the purpose of religion, the reason for prophecy, the values that should be preserved in religion-human relations, and the role of religion as a system of meanings and values in earthly journeys of humans and their relations with Allah. Muslims should reason about the message of Islam and the meaning of the Prophet's struggle, while trying to lay foundations for enlightenment within Islam, at the same time being aware of the claims put forward by other cultures.

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Hanbalism Between Law and Theology: A Research on Theological Background of Salafism[*]

Muhyettin İĞDE[**]

Abstract

In this article, aim is to understand Hanbalism, formed around ideas of Ahmad b. Hanbal. From its emergence to nowadays, Hanbalism sect have been mentioned around some debates. Although it has been accepted as one of the four of Sunni schools of law (*fiqh*), is Hanbalism a real Sunni school of law (*fiqh*)? Is it a theological (*itiqâd*) sect? If it is a theological (*itiqâd*) sect, why it has been accepted as one of the four of Sunni schools of law (*fiqh*)? Or is this sect transformed through history to a law (*fiqh*) sect by losing its theological (*itiqâd*) traits? This study put emphasis on such topics.

Keywords: Ahmad b. Hanbal, Hanbalism, Mihna, Fiqh, Itiqad

Fıkıh ve İtikad Arasında Hanbelîlik: Selefiliğin Teolojik Arka Planı Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Özet

Bu makale Ahmed b. Hanbel'in görüşleri etrafında oluşan Hanbelîliğin nasıl bir mezhep olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Ortaya çıkış sürecinden günümüze kadar Hanbelî mezhebi ile ilgili çeşitli tartışmalar gündeme gelmiştir. Dört Sünnî fıkıh mezhebinden biri olarak kabul edilen Hanbelîlik gerçekte fıkhî bir mezhep midir? İtikadî bir mezhep midir? Şâyet itikadî bir mezhep ise Hanbelîliğin dört Sünnî fıkıh mezhebi arasında yer almasının sebebi nedir? Ya da mezhep, sonraki süreçte geçirdiği bazı evrilmelerin sonucunda itikadî yönünü kaybederek bir fıkıh mezhebine mi dönüşmüştür? Elinizdeki çalışmada bu ve benzeri konular üzerinde durulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahmed b. Hanbel, Hanbelîlik, Mihne, Fıkıh, İtikad

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Introduction

Hanbalism is a sect that has been formed around the ideology of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who is regarded as its founding imam, and is often referred to him. Although Hanbalism is a sect that completed its institutionalization process after the death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, its roots date back to Ahl al-Hadith of the period even before the founding imam. Also, Hanbalism forms the foundation of the Modern Salafi Movements. In this regard, both the movement as a sect and the Islamic thought should be understood to expose the historical development of Ahl al-Hadith and understand the Modern Salafi movements.

Hanbalism is a religious-political movement based on the ground of Ahl al-Sunnah ideology and has become the representative of Ahl al-Hadith within time. Having emerged as a reaction to Ahl al-Ra'y, which focuses on the new schools of thought and personal opinions, Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith often passed judgments based on hadith-centered narratives without resorting to ta'wil and tafsir (interpretation) and accepted the religious principles as they are without any commentary.[1] According to Ahl al-Hadith, religion can be known through "evidence." Therefore, the information brought by narratives is accepted without discussion, ta'wil and tafsir.[2] Representatives of Ahl al-Hadith are seen even in the first periods of the religion. Al-Shafi'i (d. 204/820) is a prominent representative of this ideology. According to the general opinion, Al-Shafi'i is a member of Ahl al-Hadith and he holds their principles in high esteem.[3] Ahmad ibn ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855), says that Al-Shafi'i has the deepest understanding of the Book of Allah and sunnah of the Prophet and Ashab al-Hadith could get free from the molestation of Abu Hanifah only with the help of Al-Shafi'i.[4]

Abbasids and particularly the Caliph Al-Ma'mun (198-218/813-833) practiced the Mihna policies. These policies were furthered by his successors and caused reactions among Ashab al-Hadith. As a result, the developments allowed Ahmad ibn Hanbal to rise to prominence among the other scholars. Ahmad ibn Hanbal gained significant reputation due to his stand point against Mihna policies and became accepted as the representative of Ahl al-Hadith.[5] In the later periods, Ahl al-

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[1]   Mehmet Zeki İşcan, *Selefilik İslami Köktenciliğin Tarihi Temelleri*, Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul 2006, p. 20, 22.

[2]   İşcan, *Selefilik*, p. 20.

[3]   Abu Nu`aym Ahmad ibn. Abdullah al-Isfahani, *Hilyetü'l-Evliyâ' ve Tabakâtu'l-Asfiyâ'*, Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye, Beirut 1409/1988, IX, 112.

[4]   Abi Muhammad 'Abdul Rahman Ibn Abi Hatim Al-Razi, *Âdâbu'ş-Şafi'î ve Menâkibihi*, inv.: Abd al-Ghani Abd al-Khaliq, Dâru'l-Kutubi'l-İlmiyye, Beirut 1424/2003, p. 42.

[5]   George Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim İslam Dünyası ve Hristiyan Batı*, trans. A. Hakan Çavuşoğlu, H. Tuncay Başoğlu, Gelenek Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, p. 44-45, 276-277; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "The Caliphs, The 'Ulamâ', and the Law: Defining The Role and Function of The Early 'Abbâsid Period", *Islamic Law and Society*, 4 (1), 1997, p. 30-31; Michael Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Biography The Heirs of the Prophets in The Age of al-Ma'mûn*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 111; Duncan B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and*

Hadith identified with him and he was even considered as the first imam of Ashab al-Hadith.[6]

Together with the reputation gained through his attitude toward the Mihna, Ahmad Hanbal became a model for Ahl al-Hadith. He was even compared with and considered equivalent to the companions of the Prophet and their successors due to his resistance against the Mihna.[7] Within the following periods, people were judged based on their attitude toward the Mihna and opinions about Ahmad ibn Hanbal.[8]

The Mihna incident caused "fractionism" within Ahl al-Hadith. This trend of "fractionism" became the determinant among members of Ahl al-Hadith in terms of attitudes toward the Abbasid rule and their policies. Those keeping silent against the rulers' "Qur'an is a creation" claim or some others who generally argued that Qur'an was not a creation but unintentionally used the word "creation" in definition of the wording and the Arabic words in Qur'an were excluded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers regardless of their attachment to Ahl al-Hadith. Ali ibn al-Madini (d. 234/848-9), Yahya ibn Ma'in (d. 233/847), Al-Husayn ibn Ali al-Qarabisi (d. 245/859) and the well-known hadith scholar Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (d. 256-869) are only some of the scholars who were exposed to the pressures of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers, and were excluded from the community due to their attitudes toward the Mihna or opinions about *Khalq al-Qur'an*.[9]

Initiated by al-Ma'mun, the Mihna policies were ended by the following Caliph, al-Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861), but its effects became persistent for a long time. Although he was an important scholar within the period before the Mihna, Ahmad bin Hanbal was not the first one coming to mind in hadith studies. He gained his highest reputation thanks to his resistance against the policies imposed

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Constitutional Theory, Darf Publishers Limited, London, 1985, p. 158; Ziaul Haque, "Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: The Saint-Scholar of Baghdad", *Hamdard Islamicus*, 8 (3), 1985, p. 67; Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki, "el-Mezhebu'l-Hanbelî Menhecuhu'l-Fıkhî ve Eşheru Ricâlihi", *ed-Dirâsâtu'l-İslamiyye*, 23 (2), 1408/1988, p. 6; Sami Zubayda, *İslâm Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, trans. Burcu Koçoğlu Birinci, Hasan Hacak, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2008, p. 130; Abd al-Majid, 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, *el-İtticahâtü'l-Fıkhiyye 'İnde Ashâbi'l-Hadîs fi'l-Karnî's-Sâlis el-Hicrî*, Mektebetü'l-Hâncî, Cairo 1399/1979, p. 127-128.

6   Abu al-Husayn ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Ya'la al-Farra, *Tabakâtu'l-Hanâbile*, inv. Abd al-Rahman ibn Sulayman al-Useymin, Mektebetü'l-Ubeykân, Riyad 1425/2005, III, 391; İşcan, *Selefilik*, p. 23-24.

7   See: Muhyettin İğde, "Mihne Sürecinde Ahmed b. Hanbel ve Taraftarları", M. Mahfuz Söylemez (Ed.), *Mihne Süreci ve İslami İlimlere Etkisi*, (p. 153-173), Ankara Okulu Yayınları, Ankara 2012, p. 163-165.

8   W. Montgomery Watt, *İslam Düşüncesinin Teşekkül Devri*, trans. Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, Sarkaç Yayınları, Ankara 2010, p. 405; Patricia Crone, *Ortaçağ İslam Dünyasında Siyasi Düşünce*, trans.: Hakan Köni, Kapı yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 199-200; Mehmet Emin Özafşar, *İdeolojik Hadisçiliğin Tarihi Arka Planı Mihne Olayı ve Haşeviyye Olgusu*, Ankara Okulu, Ankara 1999, p. 66-67.

9   İğde, "Mihne Sürecinde Ahmed b. Hanbel ve Taraftarları", p. 165-170.

by the caliph and this reputation encouraged a significant number of students to gather around him.

Based on the idea that the Qur'an was a created text, the Mihna practices have been considered as politically motivated practices by a lot of researchers.[10]The theoretical discussions about *Khalq al-Qurʾan* are seen as a camouflage for the situation. The Mihna persecution has become a turning point for both the political and the intellectual history and redirected the Islamic thought. Above all, the victory of Ahl al-Hadith at the end of the Mihna period laid a foundation for them to be the major repressive power and for Muʿtazila, their opponents, to disappear gradually. On the other hand, the Mihna period gave birth to Ahmad ibn Hanbal as a hero,[11] caused fractions among Ahl al-Hadith[12] and the emergence of Hanbalism as a religious denomination.[13]

Various arguments have been put forward within the historical process regarding Hanbalism, having emerged as a result of the Mihna incidents that were predominantly socio-political, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who is regarded as its founding imam. Is Ahmad ibn Hanbal a scholar of fiqh or a scholar of hadith?[14] Is Hanbalism a sect of fiqh? Is it a theological sect? The following part of this study aims to discuss the arguments about this issue.

The Theological Background Behind the Formation of Hanbalism

Modern studies on Hanbalism put forward different opinions regarding the determinant factors of the sect's formation process. These opinions can be divided into four main categories, namely, law *(fiqh)*, social background and political structure, social activism and moral structure, and kalam discussions.[15]

According to some scholars of legal history, such as Schacht and Spectorsky, Hanbalism was formed by "firm hadith followers" that did not accept any human

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[10]   Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *İslâm'ın Serüveni Bir Dünya Tarihinde Bilinç ve Tarih*, Ed.: Metin Karabaşoğlu, İz Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1995, I, 458-459; Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Biography*, p. 115.

[11]   Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim*, p. 44-45, 276-277; Zaman, "The Caliphs, The 'Ulamâ', and the Law", p. 30-31; Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Biography*, p. 111; Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 158; Haque, "Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: The Saint-Scholar of Baghdad", p. 67; Al-Turki, "el-Mezhebu'l-Hanbelî Menhecuhu'l-Fıkhî ve Eşheru Ricâlihi", p. 6; Zubayda, *İslâm Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, p. 130.

[12]   Sönmez Kutlu, *İslam Düşüncesinde İlk Gelenekçiler Hadis Taraftarlarının İman Anlayışı Bağlamında Bir Araştırma*, Kitabiyât, Ankara 2002, p. 56.

[13]   Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Biography*, p. 149.

[14]   For more information about this issue, see. Muhyettin İğde, "Ahmed b. Hanbel'in Fakihliğiyle İlgili Tartışmalar", *Atatürk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2014, p.42, p. 193-208.

[15]   Nimrod Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Ḥanbalî Madhhab", *Islamic Law and Society*, 2000, VII/1, 46-47.

inference based on the grudge held against the Shafii legal system.[16] According to this argument, despite being based on the grounds of hadith and sunnah, the legal system of Shafii scholars did not satisfy these "firm hadith followers." It was because of the fact that they tried to refer all possible doctrines to the Prophet and never did accept human inference in this regard. According to Schacht, a section of Ahl al-Hadith having the aforementioned opinion gathered around Ahmad ibn. Hanbal and founded Hanbalism as a sect after his death.[17] Ahmad ibn might have considered the inference method of al-Shafi'i as a deviation. For this reason, a partial "separation" is seen possible within the Shafii community. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr's suggestion that Ahmad ibn Hanbal was a follower of al-Shafi'i[18] confirms this hypothesis. In this regard, Schacht's argument can be accurate. However, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the majority of his first students took the Shafi'i ideology as a reference and adopted and practiced its leading legal principle, qiyas (analogy).[19] However, this was not because they followed the way of al-Shafi'i, but only needed his principles. Accordingly, in the researchers' opinion, it would not be true to say that all students of Ahmad ibn Hanbal gathered around him due to theological concerns.

Hallaq suggests that Hanbalism did not emerge as a theological sect, instead, it was a essentially a kalam community. According to Hallaq, fiqh studies were initiated by the generation after Ahmad ibn Hanbal, but that generation could not produce any legal product that could be considered as a doctrine.[20]

Another suggestion put forward regarding the formation of Hanbalism is that Hanbalism emerged as a result of the separation of responsibilities between ulama and umara. According to this suggestion, the Mihna period ended with the victory of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and then the responsibilities of ulama and umara were separated by giving the authority to speak and decide in religious issues from the latter to the former.[21] This suggestion is uttered by some orientalists and especially

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[16] Joseph Schacht, *İslâm Hukukuna Giriş*, trans. Mehmet Dağ, Abdulkadir Şener, Ankara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara, 1986, p. 72-73; Susan A. Spectorsky, "Ahmad Ibn Hanbal's Fiqh", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 102 (3), 1982, p. 462-463.

[17] Schacht, *İslâm Hukukuna Giriş*, p. 72-73; a.mlf., "The Schools of Law and Later Developments of Jurisprudence", Majid Khadduri, Herbert J. Liebesny (Ed.), Law in the Middle East, (p. 57-85), The Middle East Institue, Wasinghton D.C. 1995, p. 66-67.

[18] İbn Abdilberr, *el-İntikâ'*, p. 107.

[19] Ahmad ibn For opinions suggesting that Hanbal used qiyas, see: Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn Khalaf ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Farra, *el-Udde fî Usuli'l-Fıkh*, inv., Ahmed ibn Ali ibn Ali Sayr al-Mubaraki, y.y., Riyad, 1410/1990, IV, 1280; Abu Muhammad Muwaffaq al-Din 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisee, *Ravdatü'n-Nâzır ve Cennetü'l-Münâzır fî Usûli'l-Fıkh alâ Mezhebi'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel*, inv.: Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Rahman as-Said, Cami'atu'l-İmam Muhammed b. Suud, Riyad 1399, p. 279 Henry Laoust, "Ahmad b. Hanbal", *EI²*, I, 276.

[20] Wael B. Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 159-160.

[21] Ira M. Lapidus, "State and Religion in Islamic Societies", *The Past&Present*, 151, 1996, p. 11-12; a.mlf., *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2002, p. 136-137; Crone,

by Lapidus postulating that the caliph and ulama were in a dramatical state of conflict about the religious authority. The Ulama adopted an explicit attitude and argued that the voice about religious affairs belonged to them and this authority was equally binding for the caliph and his companions. The caliph lost this competition after the Mihna period ended with the victory of Ahl al-Hadith, and the caliph was disempowered in terms of the voice and the authority to make decisions about religious affairs. The ulama's victory in the Mihna period and relations with the state prepared the necessary conditions for emergence of Hanbalism.[22]

It is obvious that the Mihna period affected the formation process of Hanbalism. However, a weakness of this opinion is its suggestion that it was a separation between religious and state affairs. The opinion that there was a strict separation between authorities of ulama and umara within the Mihna period and after that the caliph was only engaged in state affairs, while religious issues were completely handled by ulama does not corresponded with the historical facts.[23] The ulama's intention was not a strict separation from the sultan, but to be theologically legitimized by being consulted by the sultan about political and social activities. Accordingly, it was not suggesting a sultan independent from the ulama, but a caliph dependent on them. On the other hand, the right point of Lapidus' opinion is that the caliph could never achieve his actual power within the following process. Accordingly, Crone suggests that the status of the caliph was not clear within the post-Mihna period and this uncertainty caused much harm to establishment of a centralized administration.[24]

The suggestion that the close interest given by the post-Mihna period of Abbasid caliphs to Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his students was a determinant factor in the formation of Hanbalism as a sect, cannot explain the situation alone. It is a fact that Ahmad ibn Hanbal avoided political engagement and stood away from government officials and recommended the same to his family and students. Considering this political apathy of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers and the fact that they criticized those in closer relationship with politicians, it is hard to say

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Ortaçağ İslam Dünyasında Siyasi Düşünce, p. 199-200; Hodgson, *İslâm'ın Serüveni*, I, 451-452; Zubayda, *İslâm Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, p. 125-126.

[22] Lapidus, "State and Religion in Islamic Societies", s. 11-12; Zubayda, *İslâm Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, p. 125-126; Zaman, "The Caliphs, The 'Ulamâ', and the Law", p. 2; Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Ḥanbalî Madhhab", p. 48.

[23] Zaman, "The Caliphs, The 'Ulamâ', and the Law", p. 32-33, 36; Crone, *Ortaçağ İslam Dünyasında Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 199-200.

[24] Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of The İslamic Polity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980, p. 62.

that politics had deep impacts in the formation of this denomination.[25] Accordingly, as a Hanbali scholar, Ibn Aqil explains the limited propagation of Hanbalism with the non-appearance of its students in governmental positions saying, "The most harm caused to this sect was by its own students. Employment in government could contribute to their education and scholarly activities. As for Ahmad's companions; only a few of them did not engage in scholarly activities, worshipping or asceticism. In the circumstances, they even stopped being engaged in scholarly activities."[26] However, there might be some other motives behind non-involvement of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his companions in official duties. This attitude was probably because of a being new organization that had just removed the Mihna practices and the resultant cautious approach.

The third element considered important in the formation of Hanbalism is its moral appearance and social activism. Based on the modest daily life, piety, and other characteristics of his, Ahmad ibn Hanbal was presented as an ascetic, and Hanbalism was introduced as an institution formed around his moral rules. Particularly the biographic content about him shows that Ahmad ibn Hanbal did not accept any gift from the caliph, preferred a modest life, ate simple food, wore used clothes and thus he can be considered as an ascetic and sufi.[27] Besides these characteristics of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Laoust mentions his sympathy toward Al-Fudayl ibn 'Iyad (d. 187/803) and many other sufi scholars and his meetings with them and suggests that, contrary to general belief, he was not against Sufism, but a follower of the sufi philosophy.[28] Hurvits states that this attitude of Ahmad ibn Hanbal was also furthered by the following Hanbali scholars. For him, "mild asceticism" was a distinctive moral attribute of Hanbali Muslims and there are a lot of clues indicating this.[29] In the researchers' opinion, these attributes are not sufficient to define someone as a sufi. Moreover, as mentioned by Melchert, Ahmad

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[25]   Abu al-Fadl Salih ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Sîretü'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel*, inv. taliq: Fu'ad 'Abd al-Mun'im Ahmad, Dârü's-Selef, Riyâd 1415/1995, p. 42, 92-102; Abu Al-Faraj Abd Al-Rahman ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Al-Jawzi, *Menâkibu'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel*, inv. Abdullah ibn Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki, Dâru Hicr, Cîze, 1409, p. 360-363; Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Hanbalî Madhhab", p. 48-49; Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in İslamic Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 123-124; Bakr ibn `Abdullah Abu Zayd, *el-Medhalü'l-Mufassal ilâ Fıkhi'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel ve Tahrîcâti'l-Ashâb*, Dârü'l-Âsıme, Riyad, 1417/1997, I, 499-509; Saud Saleh AlSarhan, *Early Muslim Traditionalism: A Critical Study of the Works and Political Theology of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal*, (Unpublished Thesis Dissertation), University of Exeter, United Kingdom 2011, p. 201-207.

[26]   Ibn Rajab, *ez-Zeyl 'alâ Tabakâti'l-Hanâbile*, I, 348.

[27]   H. Laoust, "Hanâbila", *EI2*, III, 158; Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Hanbalî Madhhab", p. 50-54; a.mlf., "Biographies and Mild Asceticism: A Study of Islamic Moral Imagination", *Studia Islamica*, 85, 1997, p. 41-65; Haque, "Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: The Saint-Scholar of Baghdad", p.70-72; Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Biography*, p. 112-115, 146-147.

[28]   Henry Laoust, "Le Hanbalisme Sous le Califat de Bagdad (241/855-656/1258)", *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 27, 1959, p. 70-71.

[29]   Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Ḥanbalî Madhhab", p. 51-63.

ibn Hanbal has never had rapport with a leading and prominent classical sufi, instead, he opposed two of them, namely, Sari as-Sakati (d. 251/865) and Haris Al-Muhasibi (d. 243/857).[30] Ahmad ibn The aforementioned characteristics that generally refer to concepts like *qillat al-kalam, qillat at-ta'am, qillat al-manam,* and similar others have been perceived as part of the piety in Islam and not only for followers of Sufism, but all other Muslims who try to live a religious life triy to practice these principles. Therefore, it would be unacceptable and deficient to define someone as a sufi based on these behaviors.[31]

The last opinion put forward regarding the formation of Hanbalism suggests that Hanbalism emerged as a result of theological-political conflicts in the 8th/9th centuries. As a prominent advocate of this opinion, George Maksidi suggests that "Hanbalism did not emerge as a result of the attitude of its imam toward the fiqh field, instead, as an outcome of the traditionalist kalam-oriented attitude against Muʿtazila's arguments about the creation of the Qur'an (*Khalq al-Qur'an*)."[32] What is important in this statement is the alleged relationship between the Mihna period and the formation of Hanbalism.

When the aforementioned opinions about the formation of Hanbalism are taken into consideration, it is seen that, although they do not explicitly indicate, all of them are associated with the Mihna and thus, the formation of the sect was affected by *Khalq al-Qur'an*, which is a kalam-related issue, or the Mihna understanding in general.

The Development of Hanbalism During and After the Formation Process

Max Weber, who is a German sociologist, defines three types of authority within societies, namely, traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic.[33] By the charismatic authority, Weber refers to organizations that gather around an individual who has won the sympathy and affection of society.[34] In reality, it is possible to regard students or companions who form circles around prophets or leaders of sects as "charismatic groups."[35] In this regard, the community of students who gathered

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[30] Christopher Melchert, "The Hanabila and The Early Sufis", *Arabica*, 48 (3), 2001, p. 353, 367.

[31] Ahmad ibn Hanbal's relations with Sufism and Sufis, see: Melchert, "The Hanabila and The Early Sufis", p. 352-360.

[32] George Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim İslam Dünyası ve Hristiyan Batı*, trans.: A. Hakan Çavuşoğlu, H. Tuncay Başoğlu, Gelenek Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, p. 46.

[33] Max Weber, *Sosyoloji Yazıları*, trans. Taha Parla, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p. 217-222; Hans Freyer, *Din Sosyolojisi*, trans. Turgut Kalpsüz, Prepared by: M. Rahmi Ayas, Doğu Batı Yayınları, Ankara 2013, p. 80.

[34] Niyazi Akyüz-İhsan Çapcıoğlu (Ed.), *Ana Başlıklarıyla Din Sosyolojisi*, Gündüz Eğitim ve Yayıncılık, Ankara, t.y., p. 267.

[35] Freyer, *Din Sosyolojisi*, p. 81; Mehmet Zeki İşcan, "Ehl-i Sünet'te Dinî Bir Otorite Olarak 'Selef' Fikrinin Ortaya Çıkışı", *EKEV Akademi Dergisi*, 9 (25), Güz 2005, p. 9.

around Ahmad ibn Hanbal and then institutionalized Hanbalism can also be defined as a "charismatic group."

Ahmad ibn Hanbal never did be involved in an effort to found a sect in his lifetime. After his death, his students initiated studies to compile the narratives which would be the fundamental resources of Hanbalism, also called as *Al-Masail* or *As-Sunnah*.[36] These efforts laid the foundation of the sect and Hanbalism was introduced as a collective institution/denomination because of these students' activities.[37]

Beyond Hanbalism's being as a theological sect, the theologist identity of Ahmad ibn Hanbal has been discussed since the first periods. Many scholars did not mention Ahmad ibn Hanbal among theologists or did not consider Hanbalism as a theological sect.[38] Moreover, a well-known historian, Abu Jaʿfar Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Ṭabari, faced some problems and got across Hanbali Muslims as he did not accept Ahmad ibn Hanbal as a theologist.[39]

A lot of scholars agree on the opinion that Hanbalism is not a theological sect. George Makdisi states thatHanbalism did not emerge as a result of the attitude of its imam toward the fiqh field, instead, as an outcome of the traditionalist kalam-oriented attitude against Muʿtazila's arguments about the creation of the Qur'an (*Khalq al-Qur'an)*.[40] Similarly, Jabiri also states that it is a "political-theological" sect as it emerged as a result of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's conflict with Muʿtazila on the issue of *Khalq al-Qur'an.*[41] Vikor suggested that it is interesting to regard Hanbalism as a completely theological sect when there is no book of theology authored by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who gained his reputation due to "his standpoint against the Mihna." This is because of the fact that Ahmad ibn Hanbal was, in general, an opponent to theology and often based his opinions on the grounds of hadith.[42]

From this point of view, it is possible to say that Hanbalism emerged as an outcome of the reaction against the Mihna, which is a theological problem, and thus it can be defined as a "reactionary" sect.[43]

After the death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in 241/855, his students got involved in the efforts to lay the foundation for Hanbalism as a denomination by compiling the narratives about him. The formation period of Hanbalism can be divided in two

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[36] Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 110-111.

[37] Laoust, "Le Hanbalisme Sous le Califat de Bagdad", p. 74

[38] İğde, "Ahmed b. Hanbel'in Fakihliğiyle İlgili Tartışmalar", p. 193-208.

[39] Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim*, p. 47, 222.

[40] Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim*, p. 46.

[41] Muhammad Abid Al-Jabiri, *el-Musakkafûn fi'l-Hadareti'l-Arabiyye Mihnetu İbn Hanbel ve Nükbetu İbn Rüşd*, Merkezu Dirâsâti'l-Vahdeti'l-Arabiyye, Beirut 2000, p. 99.

[42] Knut Vikor, *Between God and The Sultan: A History of Islamic Law*, Hurst&Company, London, 2005, p. 101-102.

[43] Laoust, "Le Hanbalisme Sous le Califat de Bagdad", p. 74; Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, p. 111.

phases. During the first phase, the ideas of Ahmad ibn Hanbal were brought together and codified, and thus the doctrine of the ideology emerged as an inevitable development. These efforts that had been made since the 8th/mid 9th century were supported by the first students of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. These activities conducted after Ahmad ibn Hanbal could only produce raw material. The efforts that would result in the formation of the sect are seen in the period that started with Abu Bakr al-Hallal (d. 311/923). This second phase includes processing of the compiled raw materials, strengthening evidence, and theorization and systematization of the sect. The formation process was almost completed after the second phase.[44]

In this period of Hanbalism, which can also be called as its codification period, students were engaged with the compilation of narratives belonging to Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Within this context, there were two outstanding works in the Hanbali literature. The *As-Sunnah* or *Kitab as-Sunnah* covers issues of aqaid. On the other hand, narratives gathered in Al-Masail, which is generally accepted as the source of fiqh in Hanbalism, based all theological issues on the ground of hadith. Aqaid issues, such as *Khalq al-Qur'an* and the dispraise of *Jahmiyya*, were widely covered in Al-Masail, besides theological topics.

For instance; *Al-Masail* Salih (213-266/818-880), who was the eldest son of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, is generally about fiqh, but also covers theological narratives.[45] Likewise, one of the first students of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ishaq ibn Ibrahim ibn Hani's (d. 275/889) Al-Masail includes certain theological topics, such as "Bab As-Sunnah", "Bab Al-Iman", "Bab Al-Ra'y wal-ilm", and "Bab Al-Tafdil."[46] Abu-Dawud Sulaiman ibn Ash`ath al-Azadi al-Sijistani (d. 275/889), who is an author of Kutub al-Sittah, 275/889) covers "Babun fi'l Jahmiyyah", "Babun fi'l Iman", "Babun fi'l Jahmiyyah", "Babun fi'r Ra'y", "Babun fi't Tafdil", and some other theological issues.[47]

Even this limited number of instances mentioned here explicitly indicate that Hanbali Muslims studied theological issues intensely within the first period.

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[44] Ali Hakan Çavuşoğlu, "Cristopher Melchert ve Mezheb: Gelenekçi Bir Oryantalistin İslâm Hukuk Tarihi ve Ehl-i Sünnet Yorumu", *İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 4, 2004, p. 309-310; Sa`di Abu Jayb, *Ahmed b. Hanbel: es-Sîre ve'l-Mezheb*, Dâru İbn Kesîr, Damascus, 1998/1418, p. 323-325; Al-Turki, "el-Mezhebu'l-Hanbelî Menhecuhu'l-Fıkhî ve Eşheru Ricâlihi", p. 24.

[45] For instances of Salih's narratives regarding aqaid, see: Abu al-Fadl Salih ibn Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Mesâilu'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel Rivâyetu İbnihi Ebi'l-Fadl Sâlih*, published by Târık 'Avdullâh b. Muhammed, Dâru'l-Vatan li'n-Neşr, Riyad 1420/1999, p. 98-99, 115, 118, 121, 149, 164-165, 210, 240-241, 316-317, 345-346 et al.

[46] For Ishaq ibn Ibrahim ibn Hani's *Al-Masail*, see: Ishaq ibn Ibrahim ibn Hani al-Nisaburi, *Mesâilu'l-İmâm Ahmed b. Hanbel Rivâyetu İshâk b. Ibrahim ibn Hânî' en-Nîsâbûrî*, inv.: Zuhayr Al-Shawish, el-Mektebü'l-İslâmî, Beirut 1400.

[47] For Abu Dawud's *Al-Masail*, see: Abu-Dawud Sulaiman ibn Ash`ath al-Azadi al-Sijistani, *Mesâilu'l-İmâm Ahmed Rivâyetu* Abu-Dawud Sulaiman ibn Ash`ath al-Azadi al-Sijistani, inv.: Abu Muadh Tariq ibn 'Awd Allah ibn Muhammad, Mektebetu Ibn Taymiyyah, Egypt 1420/1999.

Accordingly, Hallaq states that Hanbali Muslims were intense in the 8th/9th centuries and its adherents were more engaged in theological studies within this period, but no significant initiative was made in the field of fiqh.[48] Melchert suggests that the conflicts between Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra'y have increasingly continued since the 9th/10th century, while there is no clue of discussion on fiqh[49]. Moreover, Makdisi states that Hanbalism has a relatively modest position among other sects but holds a significant place for Ahl al-Hadith as a theological power.[50]

The most significant characteristic of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's first students was their capability to hand down the imam's opinions about theology, law, morality and similar other topics to the next generations.[51] Fiqh narratives of these students were mainly composed of the responses given by Ahmad ibn Hanbal to questions addressed to him. None of these students were engaged in efforts to produce a system of law (usul al-fiqh) while maintaining the aforementioned activities.[52] Moreover, a significant number of them did not have the necessary intellectual depth.[53]

Al-Muhatasar,[54] which is considered as the first book of fiqh authored by Hanbali Muslims, belongs to Abu al-Qasim 'Umar ibn Husayn ibn Abdullah al-Hiraki (d. 334/946). The usul al-fiqh book of the sect was only authored in the fifth Hijri century. Gürkan states in his "Hanbelî Fıkıh Usulünün Doğuşu ve Gelişimi-I" that it is impossible to regard Hanbali usul al-fiqh as an independent school of thought.[55]

Based on the information provided until this point, it is understood that the theological side of Hanbalism, which is accepted as a religious sect, is more dominant. Therefore, this institution should be defined as a "political-theological" sect. At this point, the following questions are important for understanding the development of this denomination. Is Hanbalism a theological institution which does not have a specific method of fiqh? If Hanbalism is a theological sect, what is the reason for regarding it as one of the four major sects of Sunni Muslims? Or, has it transformed into a sect of fiqh by losing its theological aspects as a result of a transformation that happened within the following periods?

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[48] Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, p. 177.
[49] Cristopher Melchert, "Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law", *Islamic Law and Society*, 8 (3), 2001, p. 406.
[50] Makdisi, "Hanbalite Islam", p. 238-239.
[51] Nimrod Hurvitz, *The Formation of Hanbalism: Piety into Power*, Routledge Curzon, London 2002, p. 78.
[52] Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, p. 159-160; Menderes Gürkan, "Hanbeli Fıkıh Usulünün Doğuşu ve Gelişimi-I", Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 9, 2000, p. 464.
[53] Nimrod Hurvitz, The Formation of Hanbalism, p. 77-78.
[54] Laoust, "Le Hanbalisme Sous le Califat de Bagdad", p. 84.
[55] Gürkan, "Hanbeli Fıkıh Usulünün Doğuşu ve Gelişimi-I", p. 464-465.

Knowledge of the responses of these questions is closely related with the knowledge of the place of fiqh in Islam. Before anything else, Islam is a nomocracy. In Islam, fiqh is a tool for both legitimization and moderation. Throughout history, numerous movements have tried to merge with a sect of fiqh to ensure legitimization.[56] The same fact is also seen in systems of thought and theological sects. Survival of a system of thought is dependent on its affiliation with a school of law. Kalam systems had to be adopted by a system of law in order to be considered legitimate, propagate their doctrines and ensure sustainability. In this respect, Muʿtazila subsisted within Hanafi ideology, while Ash'arism continued its existence largely within the body of Shafi'i Islam.[57]

A similar situation was seen in Hanbalism. As a "political-theological" institution, Hanbalism had to gain the fiqh dimension in order to survive.[58] Taking both its structure and evolution within the historical period into consideration, Makdisi explains the difference between Hanbalism and the other sects as follows: "Hanbalism is unique for being a sect of both fiqh and kalam at the same time."[59]. In this statement, Makdisi defines Hanbali as a sect that has both a legal system and a theological (itiqad-fiqh) side, and also adds that the sect reached to the present day by preserving its original texture.[60] Mughni bases the success of Hanbalism and its dominance in the politics of Baghdad within the following years of the concurrent development in both fiqh and aqaid systems.[61] Some scholars explain that Hanbalism has gained a different fiqh dimension after Ahl al-Hadith became closer to Ahl al-Ra'y. According to these scholars, within the post-Mihna period, the convergence was not only from Ahl al-Ra'y to Ahl al-Hadith, but was also bilateral with a number of fiqh understandings, including Hanbalism, emerged as outcomes of this rapprochement.[62] However, looking at the course of historical development, it would be better to say that the convergence was from Ahl al-Ra'y to Ahl al-Hadith.

The reason behind Hanbalism's independence from all other sects of fiqh, such as Muʿtazila or Ash'arism is the perspective of Ahl al-Sunnah toward the field of

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[56] Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim*, p. 44-46.

[57] George Makdisi, "Hanbalite Islam", *Studies on Islam*, Merlin L. Swartz (Ed., trans.), Oxford University Press, Newyork, 1981, p. 239; amlf., *İslâm'ın Klasik Çağında Din Hukuk Eğitim*, trans.: Hasan Tuncay Başoğlu, Klasik, İstanbul 2007, p. 43.

[58] Makdisi, *İslâm'ın Klasik Çağında Din Hukuk Eğitim*, p. 43, 373-374; Christopher Melchert, *The Formation of The Sunni Schools of Law 9th-10th Centuries C.E.*, Brill, Leiden&New York&Köln 1997, p. 31.

[59] Makdisi, "Hanbalite Islam", p. 239.

[60] Makdisi, *Orta Çağ'da Yüksek Öğretim*, p. 46.

[61] Syafiq A. Mughni, *Hanbalî Movements in Baghdâd from Abû Muhammad al-Barbahârî (d. 329/941) to Abû Ja'far al-Hashimî (d. 470/1077)*, (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), University of California, Los Angeles 1990, p. 150.

[62] Melchert, *The Formation of The Sunni Schools of Law*, p. 31; Çavuşoğlu, Cristopher Melchert ve Mezheb", p. 298-302; Makdisi, *İslâm'ın Klasik Çağında Din Hukuk Eğitim*, p. 14, 373-374; Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, p. 127.

fiqh, especially after the Mihna period. One of the most significant results of the idea that the Qur'an is a creation, is the loss of dynamism in fiqh and its equalization with hadith. The victory of Ahl al-Hadith in general, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal in specific, at the end of the Mihna period resulted in equalization of the hadith and fiqh. This equalization between hadith and fiqh after the Mihna period made Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who previously had no obvious approach of fiqh, the imam of both a sect of fiqh and the whole Ahl al-Hadith.[63] Hadith narratives do not support Ahmad ibn Hanbal's opinions, they are actually his opinions.[64] As Ahl al-Hadith, who do not accept any other source than the Qur'an and hadith in the fields of law and theology, specialization in hadith is almost equal to specialization in law or fiqh. When a legal/fiqh-related question addressed, they often preferred to respond by narrating related hadith narratives (which include opinions of the Companions and Tabi'un about fiqh).[65] As a result of Ahl al-Hadith's victory over the Mihna, Ahl al-Ra'y lost its authority in fiqh, revision of its understanding of fiqh, and finally the convergence to Ahl al-Hadith.[66] Within the following process, this understanding was based on the ground of hadith and al-asar and scholars of Ahl al-Hadith were naturally considered as scholars of fiqh. The perception that accepts Hanbalism as a sect of fiqh should be analyzed from this perspective.

Conclusion

Hanbalism is a religious sect that emerged as a result of the Mihna policies of Abbasids and has a significant place and impact in the history of Islamic thought. The termination of Mihna policies in a short time showed that if a political power imposes a religious standard to people, it will eventually become incapable of this effort and the endeavor will end with failure. Moreover, this policy caused a counter-effect and the Mihna period facilitated the rise of Ahl al-Hadith and made them more reputable. As a scholar of hadith, Ahmad ibn Hanbal became politicized due to his political-theological standing and determined attitude against the Abbasids who supported the Muʿtazila ideology throughout the Mihna period. Thus, he gained reputation, people started to follow him, and his opinions were considered reliable. From this point of view, it is possible to define the movement as a political-theological sect as it emerged as a result of the stance against the Mihna policies.

Looking at its historical development, it is seen that Hanbalism has generally played the role of political opposition. It is also seen that theological issues were at

[63] Abd al-Majid, 'Abd al-Majid Maḥmud, *el-İtticahâtü'l-Fıkhiyye 'İnde Ashâbi'l-Hadîs fi'l-Karni's-Sâlis el-Hicrî*, p. 127-131.
[64] Melchert, "Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law", p. 389.
[65] Cristopher Melchert, "Ibn Mujâhid and the Establishment of Seven Qur'anic Readings", *Studia Islamica*, 91, 2000, p. 6.
[66] Çavuşoğlu, Cristopher Melchert ve Mezheb", p. 298-299.

the forefront in both works of his students and social activities of the adherents who lived within the period after the death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

Hanbalism gained the identity of being a religious sect as a result of Abu Bakr al-Hallal's efforts to compile the narratives of Ahmad ibn Hanbal within the 9th/10th century and its dimension of fiqh started to be recognized with Hiraki's handbook of fiqh titled as *Al-Muhtasar*. Considering further studies conducted by the adherents of this religious sect, it is seen that theological works have always been undertaken in addition to the studies in the field of fiqh. Also, it is obviously seen in its history that theological issues were more predominant in social life and activities of adherents, rather than fiqh-related topics.

Activities of Hanbali Muslims in the 9th/10th century to ensure *Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi 'anil Munkar,* under the guidance of Al-Barbahari and the opposition block formed against the Shiite-Buwayhid rule and the local Shiite community, indicate that this institution was the dominant group in theological-political dimension of the Hanbali-Shiite conflicts emerged in this period. Ar-Risâlah al-Qadiriyyah, jointly published in the period of Buwayhids by Hanbali Muslims and the Abbasid Caliphate, also reveals that it was a political-theological organization.

In conclusion, it may be argued that Hanbalism is a political-theological sect in terms of its emergence, and it gained a fiqh dimension within the historical period. In light of this information, it would be accurate to define Hanbalism as a sect of theology and law. Hanbalism has undertaken this structure up to the present day and formed the foundation of the Modern Salafi movements. Awareness of these structural characteristics of Hanbalism is highly significant to understand the modern Salafi movements.

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Dilemma of Muslims Who Lost Islam as the Common Denominator: Shia-Salafi Polarization[*]

Hasan ONAT[**]

Abstract

Muslims have lost their common denominator. Despite the Quran's 14th century old warnings, each group prides each-self on their Islamic interpretation and otherizes various other traditions easily. Religion separates, rather than unites. The separatist groups use religious discourse to gain legitimacy, however the dimensions of religion that give meaning to human life have been omitted. Muslims avoid using reason effectively, they sanctify tradition and discredit knowledge. Muslims are the group who experience terror, violence, identity crisis and are most profoundly seeking meaning. Muslims live in the territories in which basic rights and freedoms are violated the most and where a culture of trust cannot be created. The rule of life is simple: the ones who cannot use creative forces effectively resort to violence, death and destruction.

The easiest way to legitimize the power and authority clashes, and the conflicts and deaths, is by the creation of an enemy and use of the existing meaning's frameworks in the collective memory. In this framework, the Shiite-Salafi conflict appears as a reflection of historical Shiite-Sunni contradictions. Iran sees the Shia population as a power which can be mobilized whenever needed. For this purpose, Iran keeps the historical 'enemy' perception alive and tries to build a Shia identity. Rather than battle with broad Sunni mass, Iran seeks power and authority by a vague 'salafism' conceptualization, which is loaded by any meaning. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia uses 'Salafism' instead of Wahhabism to attract the sympathy of the Sunni population because while Wahhabism lost its attraction, Salafism evokes past nostalgia. With this policy, Saudi Arabia tries to alienate critics against it, as well to gain legitimacy against Iran.

Although Salafism appears to be a sect, it is not, it is a mentality. There has not been a separate sect called Salafism in the past. However Salafis have always existed. Each generation is the Salaf for the previous generation. The Salafi-Shiite polarization is a reflection of the legitimization of the power and authority struggle within religion.

Keywords: Sunni, Salafism, Shia, Sect

İslâm Ortak Paydasını Kaybetmiş Müslümanların Açmazı: Şiî- Selefî Kutuplaşması

Özet

Müslümanlar İslam ortak paydasını kaybetmişlerdir. Kur'an'ın 14 asır önceki uyarısına rağmen, her grup kendi sahip olduğu ile övünmekte; İslam'ı kendi görüşünden ibaret zannetmekte, kendisi gibi olmayanlar da kolayca ötekileştirebilmektedir. Din, birleştirmek yerine ayrıştırmakta; ayrılıkçı duruşlar dini kullanarak meşruiyet kazanmaya çalışmaktadır. Dinin insan hayatına anlam kazandıran boyutu etkisiz hale gelmiştir. Müslümanlar, Allah'ın insana bahşettiği aklı etkin kullanmaktan kaçınmakta, geleneği kutsallaştırmakta, bilgiyi itibarsızlaştırmakta, bilgi ve değer üreterek özne olmayı başaramamaktadırlar. Bütün dünyayı etkileyen, küresel boyut kazanan başta şiddet-terör, kimlik krizi ve anlam arayışı olmak üzere bütün sorunları en derin yaşayanlar Müslümanlardır. Temel hak ve özgürlüklerin en çok ihlal edildiği, yüksek güven kültürünün yaratılamadığı yerlerde Müslümanlar yaşamaktadırlar. Hayatın kuralı çok basittir: Yaratıcı yetilerini etkin kullanmayı beceremeyenler, yıkarak, yakarak, yok ederek, öldürerek yaratma sürecine katılmaya çalışırlar.

İslam dünyasında yaşanan olumsuzlukları meşrulaştırabilmenin, Müslümanlar arasındaki güç ve iktidar mücadelesini, bunun sonucu olan çatışma ve ölümleri akla uygun hale getirebilmenin en kolay yolu, toplumsal bellekte diri olan anlam çerçevelerini kullanmak ve düşman algısı yaratmaktır. İşte esası iktidar ve güç kavgası olan çatışmalar, tarihteki adıyla Şii-Sünni, günümüzdeki tezahürleri ile Şii-Selefi kutuplaşması olarak karşımızda durmaktadır. İran, dünyanın her yerindeki Şiileri, kendi egemenliği için her zaman harekete geçirebileceği bir güç olarak görmekte; tarihten yararlanarak "düşman" algısını diri tutmakta, büyük Şii kimliği inşa etmeye çalışmaktadır. Geniş Sünni kitleyi karşısına almak yerine, daha belirsiz, ancak içinin istenildiği şekilde doldurulması mümkün ve kolay olan "Selefilik" üzerinden güç ve egemenlik arayışını sürdürmektedir. Suudi Arabistan ise, çekiciliğini kaybetmiş Vehhabilik yerine, "Selefilik" gibi, geçmişe yönelik özlemleri çağrıştıran bir kavramla hem Şii olmayanları sempatisini kazanmaya, hem iktidarına yönelik eleştirileri hafifletmeye, hem de en büyük tehdit olarak gördüğü İran'a karşı destek ve meşruiyet kazanmaya çalışmaktadır.

Selefilik, her ne kadar günümüzde mezhep gibi görünse de, bir mezhep değil, bir zihniyettir. Geçmişte selefiyye adıyla bir mezhep, tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla hiç olmamıştır. Selef ise her zaman mevcuttur. Her nesil için bir önceki nesil seleftir. Selefi-Şii kutuplaşması, iktidar kavgasının ve güç mücadelesinin din sayesinde meşrulaştırılması ile ilgili arayışların bir tezahürü olarak anlaşılabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sünnî, Selefilik, Şîa, Mezhep

Introduction

The main argument of this paper is to present the opinion that the prevention of conflicts among Muslim groups and the bloodshed is conditioned by the development in consciousness of freedom and individualism, as well as an

awareness of Islam as a common denominator, having the power of knowledge, and creating universal values. As Muslims who have lost the consciousness of "Freedom and Islam as a Common Denominator," they have also lost their creativity, resorting to burning, devastating, demolishing, and consuming for survival. Those who cannot be involved in the universal process of existential creation and those who cannot turn energy into good deeds, fall into emptiness and into a crisis of meaning and identity, while being condemned to a vicious circle of the illusion that makes devastation and killing meaningful. The reasons behind the conflicts, that have intensified within the last two centuries by gaining power from religious doctrines, are the disorientation in religious codes that make human lives meaningful, the degradation of religion to formalism, and the grounding of separatist ideologies onto the religion itself. The way out is to re-establish the reputation of knowledge, remembering that being rational is a way of worshipping, converting energy to production by enabling creative abilities, and the success of Muslims of being the actors of their own lives again.

On the other hand, conflicts among Muslims feed upon equalization of the past and history, and thus the past and the religion being dependent on traditions, rather than the Qur'an itself, as a source of fundamental religious knowledge, and the misperception regarding the fact that Islam leaves political issues to human beings. The vessels in our culture that feed the improper perception that renders "humans" as invisible, have trivialized the high value attached by Islam to "human beings". The unpleasant experiences encountered within the past two centuries have prevented a proper understanding of the real value of "humans". Colonization of a significant part of the Muslim geography has eased the degradation of the religion to ideology and the language of religion has lost its associative manner under the influence of the discriminative political discourse. For this reason, religion is placed at the center of both issues, and the solution seeking efforts. The isolation of religion from being a source of problem or the problem itself, is a necessity and a possible target. For this purpose, the fundamental doctrines of Islam should be extracted from the Qur'an and it should be highlighted that religion is something natural. However, it is not a proper approach to seek solutions for every single problem inside religion. Islam leaves decisions on political issues to humans. According to Imam al-Maturidi, "Religion is a thing, politics is another". The different political theories put forward by Muslims and the political quest that emerged after the death of the Prophet can be perceived as evidence of the fact that Islam leaves political issues to humans.

To have a better understanding of this topic, it might be helpful to remind of the verses that are thought to be fundamental in this study:

"O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female, and made you people and tribes so that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you

in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted." [1]

"Indeed, those who have said, 'Our Lord is Allah,' and then remained on a right course - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. Those are the companions of Paradise, abiding eternally therein as reward for what they used to do."[2]

"Indeed, those who have said, 'Our Lord is Allah' and then remained on a right course - the angels will descend upon them, [saying], "Do not fear, and do not grieve but receive good tidings of Paradise, which you were promised."[3]

"Indeed, Allah does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He will. And he who associates others with Allah has certainly fabricated a tremendous sin."[4]

"Indeed, Allah does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He will. And he who associates others with Allah has certainly gone far astray."[5]

"establish the religion and not be divided therein..."[6] "[Adhere to it], turning in repentance to Him, and fear Him and establish prayer and do not be of those who associate others with Allah. [Or] of those who have divided their religion and become sects, every faction rejoicing in what it has."[7]

The Quran is the only determinant source of Islam. It is human beings who can understand and interpret the Qur'an, and use it to understand the meaning of life and create scientific outputs and values. Revelations were sent so that they could support the reasons for humans. The 13th and 14th verses of Surah al-Ahqaf, and the 30th verse of Surah Fussilat provides us the ground to base the idea that Islam is a common denominator. As Muslims lose the awareness of Islam as a common denominator, the religion loses its associative aspect under current conditions. This results in the legitimization of some separatist approaches benefiting from the religion itself. The problem is more serious than meets the eye. The conflicts that emerged as a result of the Shia-Salafi polarization do not help us understand implicit situations or possible future developments, but indeed complicates it. Those concerned about the future of Islam and Muslims must understand that today we are on the verge of a radical shift of meaning in Islam.

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[1] al-Hujurat 49/13.

[2] al-Ahqaf 15/13, 14.

[3] Fussilat 41/30

[4] an-Nisa 4/48

[5] an-Nisa 4/116

[6] ash-Shuraa 26/13

[7] ar-Rum 30/32

The second argument of this paper is that the term "Salafism" complicates the dilemmas Muslims that face, while easing the habits that make Muslims doomed to history, because of its content and the arbitrariness of its use. Accurate information is the most significant condition that should be met so as to understand both the consciousness that Islam is the common denominator for Muslims, and the gravity of the conflicts they face based on different understandings about the religion, as well as the idiocy it brings, to find proper solutions for these problems. Without accurate information, it is impossible to find durable solutions for problems. With the persistent ignorance of the fact that religion is a matter of knowledge before anything else, we can neither prevent conflicts nor become righteous Muslims. The Qur'an states that knowledge is a value and Muslims should never pursue unknowns[8], but to learn and to listen to every detail and thus follow good. Muslims should also think and act according to the evidence and written proof. The biggest problem of modern Muslims is the gap of knowledge regarding to the religion. Religion is intertwined with tradition. Thus, it would not be untrue to argue that the Qur'an targets Muslims with its criticism based on the concept of "the religion of ancestors". The identification of the past with the history and Islam itself dooms Muslims to the past, while hindering an accurate understanding of Islam as well as prominence of its associative and holistic dimensions. Sacralization of the history causes arbitrariness in definitions of the term "Salafism" and leads up to the legitimization of perceptions and behaviors that have no common ground with Islam. Only through accurate knowledge can we understand events and phenomena. From this point of view, first of all I would like to describe the methodology of this study. After that I will try to explain how Islam is the common denominator for Muslims, as well as the details regarding the Shia-Salafi polarization.

Methodology

Here, I will not ignite a discussion of methodology. However, the questions about the characteristics of the necessary scientific knowledge and how it can be produced in order to ensure proper discussions over Salafism unavoidably necessitate attention to at least the matters that are directly related to the topic. It is impossible to understand that Islam is the common denominator without seeing the distortion in perceptions of Muslims and to understand the roots of current conflicts without raising an awareness regarding social change and processes. We cannot see the change and the resultant loss in fundamental functions of the religion, which have transformed into traditions, without a proper consciousness of history. In this regard, I would like to mention three important factors to help us have better understanding of the topic.

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[8] al- Isra 17/ 36.

First; Muslims' perception of history that forms the foundation for their religious understanding ignores the fact that history is a built expression and identifies the past with history. However, the past represents a whole of events, experiences and products of interest to people seen in a given period of time. The past is the name of everything that lived and has happened before today. Although history, as a term, is sometimes used interchangeably with the past, the knowledge, evidence and findings that have been inherited by the past is nothing but a human-made artefact and discourse. We can give the way that human memory works as an example to understand the difference between the past and the history. Our memories store all the data we receive throughout our lives. In our memory, we have both projections of creatures that exist in the outer world and the words and concepts we produce, as well as the experiences we go through. Human memories store everything in accordance with the semantic frameworks we have in mind after a process of interpretation. This is exactly the way the history is created. The data inherited from the past is rebuilt through an interpretation and inherited by us after one or more process of filtering. Then, we try to rebuild a part of the past in accordance with the data received. History is nothing but this man-made discourse. History, as a whole, cannot align with the past. In other words, history can never represent the whole truth. This doesn't mean that it has nothing to do with the truth, and also refers to the possibility of a perception of history which is far from reality. Activities to build history with scientific methods, and based on justice and scientific mindsets, can be more realistic than others.

As human reason cannot process without data in the mind, communities also cannot function without history, which serves as a memory for them. In other words, the knowledge and perception inherited from the past play significant roles for both today and tomorrow. Now, we can ask some questions about our subject: How far are Muslims aware of the difference between the past and history? Do Muslims know that the extant information, evidence, and findings related to the early period of Islam have reached the present day after passing through different processes of rebuilding? To what extent does Muslims' perception of the early period of Islam align with the past that was the reality of that time? Does the fact that the majority of knowledge that forms the foundation of history does not match up with the past mean there could be different histories referring to same periods of time? For sure, we can easily say that there are at least three different histories referring to the early period of Islam. These are represented by the Kharijite, Shiite and Sunni perceptions of history. The Kharijites idealize the periods of Abu Bakr and 'Umar. They declare Uthman ibn Affan after his sixth year and Ali ibn Abi Talib after Tahkim as unbelievers. As they believe that the caliphate/imamate belongs to Ali, Shiite Muslims think that Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and Uthman were unfair to Ali. Besides, they sanctify the periods of Ali and the Twelve Imams. On the other hand, Ahl al-Sunnah regards the period of Rashidun Caliphs as the ideal period of time, together with the time that the Prophet lived, and accepts the order of caliphate as an indicator of merit. Is it possible that these significantly different

perceptions about the history of a period when the Islamic values were brought to life allow unity and solidarity among Muslims and the development of the consciousness that is built upon the common denominator role of Islam? I think that it would not be unjust to argue that failure to regard history as an artefact is one of the most fundamental reasons behind the separation of Muslims into different sects, and the sectarian conflicts of each group tries to take over Islam with its own perception of history. Prevention of the Shiite-Salafi polarization and a possible conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, is only possible through a process that may build peace and a culture of high-level trust among Muslims, while eliminating arbitrary ones and establishing a realistic perception of history.

Secondly; the viewpoint of social change and process in the Islamic perception of history is not reliable. A failure to build consciousness of the differences between the past and history would result in efforts to protect the past, using sacredness as a shield, and bring it to the future as it currently is. However, as the name implies, past experiences have been left in the past and only certain factors can infiltrate into the future. It is impossible to understand the past as a whole and bring it to the future. If we consider the lifetime of mankind as a stream; as the water that flew a second ago is not the same that followed a minute later, neither the social life navigates the same way. It continuously changes, revolves, and varies. Indeed, existence is continuous and it continuously flows toward the future. From this point of view, just like the human memory, history can be rebuilt. There is no sect that can reach future periods of time without changing its original characteristics. No sect can emerge all of a sudden. Also, none of the perceptions about religious sects can reach the next generations without any change or transformation. The common perception among Muslims about the early period Islam does not consider social change and processes, therefore they often ignore the differences between the evidence inherited from the past, and Islam itself. In other words, the Shiite, Sunni and Kharijite understandings of history also represent their perceptions of Islam. Each religious sect regards its own perception as the true Islam, and its group as the saved group (*Firqah an-Najiyah*). It is possible to argue that one of the most significant dilemmas seen in Islamic world is that each community, congregation, order, and sect identifies its perception with Islam itself. It is obvious that this perception is a reason behind the ease in the mechanism of takfir (ostracism) used by Muslims and their readily provoked conflict motive.

The problem about the perception of social change and process does not allow others to see that all religious organizations that emerged after the death of the Prophet are man-made. There was not sect, congregation, and denomination when the Prophet was alive. The Qur'an invites Muslims to unity and criticizes separatist views by saying, "And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided." As the door for revelation was closed after the Prophet Muhammad, treating other sources of information as revelation would be against the Qur'an. Moreover, ignoring the human side of the Prophet Muhammad,

although the Qur'an explicitly mentions it and creating a perception that regards him as a miraculous prophet, can be described as a by-product of this distorted ideology. The ideology that regards the words and acts of the Prophet as apocalyptical, the perception that canonizes thoughts and opinions of the next generations under the title of "Salaf al-Shalih", and even the suggestion that perceives them as the religion itself can be defined as different appearances of this understanding. Salafi perception about the companions of the Prophet (Sahabi) and identifying the Islamic understanding and viewpoint seen in its first three centuries with Islam itself, tarnishes Islam's nature to be a compatible formation and complicates the efforts to highlight universality.

Thirdly; Muslims' perceptions about the past and the history does not pay the necessary attention to the relation between idea and incident, as well as time and place. Herein, anachronism, a shift in time, place, idea, and concepts, is seen at the highest level. Above all, every sect, congregation, and denomination try to associate its understanding with the one supported in the period of the Prophet in an attempt to show that it upholds the true understanding of Islam. The efforts to manipulate words of the Prophet for the purpose of criticizing a religious group can also be mentioned within this regard. In fact, no idea can be born in emptiness. Every sect and every ideology has a place and time of emergence. Every organization has fundamental concepts and main ideas that have affected the period of formation and shaped the back bone of a system of thought. To prove existence of an ideology and a sectarian organization, we have to identify the time its suggestions took an important place in the target community, the characteristics of the process in which it emerged, and the concepts which its ideas or structure are presented. It is possible to find many more examples in the common perception of history among Muslims about how previous concepts and ideas have been readily associated with subsequent incidents and organizations. However, the otherwise is also possible. Subsequent ideas and concepts can be easily associated with some previous incidents. The most stunning example of the latter is Salafism. Those who talk about Salafism often behave in accordance with their purposeful perspective and their own perception of history. The reality which is ignored at this point is that every sect or ideology take steps to put forth fruits into the past and the future at the same time, once it takes a proper shape and its suggestions are supported by society. In other words, every sect or ideology builds its own history and past during this process. Accordingly, it should be noted that histories are retroactive and perceptions about the past are reconstructed together with histories.

In order to have a better understanding of the topic, we may take an acorn as a metaphor. An acorn that falls from top of an oak tree meets the ground, and the shell around it cracks if it finds the expected level of humidity and heat. After that, it starts to put down roots and shoot above-ground. If we are not aware of this phenomenon, we can never understand that the huge oak tree was once a small acorn but branched out within time putting forth thousands of acorns. This is

exactly how sects and ideologies emerge and develop. They sink into the depths of the past, while growing towards the future and shooting out branches. Herein we should as the following question: Is Salafism a theological sect? Where, when, and based on which ideas did the organization we call Salafism today emerge? How did it associate itself with the past? How did it revolve, change, and transform and take its current shape? Let's talk about how Islam is a common denominator for these ideologies and then try to find answers for the aforementioned questions.

Islam as a Common Denominator

Being a common denominator is one of the most fundamental principles of Islam that helps anyone feel themselves as a Muslim. There is no doubt that the core principle is tawhid, which forms the essence of all prophetic calls. Believing in the afterlife and the prophecy are two significant supporting principles to this essence. These are also explicitly mentioned among the six pillars of faith by the Qur'an. If a human, regardless of their personality, sect or congregation followed, or the denomination belonged to, believes in these fundamental principles, they are a Muslim who lives within the circle of Islam. To put it more explicitly, as a common denominator, Islam is identified as tawhid in terms of faith and being on "the straight path" in terms of behavior. Accordingly, this reality is also expressed by the Verse 13 of Al-Ahqaf, which identifies the fundamental components of Islam, as we mentioned above. We may understand this issue in a more efficient way if we continue our discussion based on this example. Let's think about the pagan 'Umar, who attempted to kill the Prophet Muhammad. Seeing his furious state, when someone asked where he was going to, "to kill Muhammad" he responded without hesitation. That person could understand the gravity of the situation and told him that his sister and brother-in-law had already been Muslims and it would be better if he dealt with them before anyone else, as an attempt to create time to inform the Prophet.   Heading toward his sister's house in a rage, 'Umar encountered the reality of the Qur'an and asked them to take him to Muhammad. Appearing as a pagan before the Prophet Muhammad, 'Umar left the place as a Muslim. Is it possible to say that anything other than the faith based on tawhid changed in the meantime? As is seen, this incident is not complicated to understand.

We may list some of the founding principles required to rebuild Islam as a common denominator as follows:

The Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by Allah and it is the word of Allah. The Qur'an is the only determinant source of Islam. Muhammad is also responsible before the Qur'an. No other source of information other than the Qur'an can be treated as revelation.

The Prophet Muhammad is a human who is inspired through revelation and he is the "quintessential example" for us. His scribes were compiled into manuscripts with the revelations He was inspired to write without any change. The Prophet Muhammad cannot have knowledge of the invisible world. All hadiths narrated from Him should be considered as products of human intelligence.

The only sin that Allah will never forgive is deification anyone besides Him (shirk).

All religious organizations that emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad are man-made.

A Muslim should be open to new information, listen to everyone, understand them and follow the good.

Islam does not allow anything irrational. Reason and revelation complements each other.

In Islam, faith and responsibility are individual. One should deserve it to ascend to heaven.

For sure, it is possible to increase the number of these principles. As expressed above, Allah sent the revelation to support reason. Islam has provided the necessary fundamental principles for humans to live humanely and has showed the path and roadmap to live a meaningful life. However, today's Muslims has lost the necessary consciousness, particularly the perception of Islam as a common denominator. Each group idealizes its own understanding as the only belief in Islam, regards its disciples as the saved group and even worse, close doors to prevent entrance of other Muslims.

Being members of different groups, sects, congregations, and denominations and even emergence of such organizations are essentially not matters of concern, but of human being's social entities and the broad realm of freedom Islam provided for thought/reasoning. We could regard them as parts of wealth, if the disease to takfir had never emerged and the bigotry of groups, congregations, and sects had not overshadowed Islam's being the common denominator. Humans live in societies, and organization is a part of their nature. Basically, established by human beings, these organizations can be used as the means to compete in performing good deeds and create synergy. However, when Islam's characteristic as the common denominator disappears, the human side is forgotten and then each community starts to build its own understanding by monopolizing the religion.

The emergence of different groups among Muslims is not a new phenomenon. The first Islamic sect in history is the group of Kharijites who gathered in Harura after the battle of Siffin. Only in late first century of Islam different other Islamic ideologies, such as Murji'ah, Shia, and Mu'tazilah started to be formed. Looking back at the history, we will see that not 73 but more than 773 sub-sects have

emerged. These sub-sects have occasionally been involved in conflicts with the political powers and between themselves. Despite all previous incidents and unpleasant experiences, the main Muslim population has never lost freedom and those whose impact is evident even in today's world have managed to create a great civilization which was known to have existed until the early 18th century. However, Muslims have lost freedom and the consciousness of freedom, together with the quality of being active actors. Under these negative circumstances, the common religious understanding, unfortunately, deepens the problems and dooms Muslims to the past. For that reason, if the understanding of Islam as a common denominator is re-established through the realm of freedom, Muslims can be saved from the dilemmas that drive them to the deep wells of the past and the disease of takfir.

There are a number of different reasons behind the loss of the understanding that Islam is a common denominator for Muslims. First of these reasons is that each religious sect and congregation regards its own perception as the true Islam and its group as the saved group (*Firqah an-Najiyah*). Lets further the discussion over the well-known or supposedly well-known issue of "four major true sects of Islam". These "true" sects are represented by Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi'i Muslims. The term "true" used for a sect or a group of sect naturally differentiates that or them from the other groups that are regarded as "invalid" or un-Islamic. Above all, describing a religious sect as "true" or "invalid" or "sahih" or "not sahih" is against a founding principle of Islam suggesting that faith and responsibility are individual issues. Being member of a "true" sect does not mean that one is also "true" in their faith, thought, and behaviors. Sectarian identities develop in traditions and naturally instead. The otherwise is also possible. No one can argue that individuals cannot have "true" beliefs, thoughts, and behaviors just because they are members of a so-called "invalid" religious sect.

On the other hand, the understanding of the "four main true sects" necessarily creates another understanding that reduces Islam to these four groups. Considering that Abu Hani passed away in 150/767 but the earliest sect of Islam, which is Hanafism, emerged a long time after his death, we can understand that the term "four main true sects" is rather political than religious. Herein, it would not be unjust to think that the collapsing political powers often carried out policies that resort to otherization of their opponents and closing the ranks between them and their supporters. A lot of people, either in the past or today, have not regarded themselves as members of these four religious sects. So, shall we see them as non-Muslims? Who has the right to describe religious sects as "true" or "invalid"? Shall we not accept the Shiites, who form 10-12% of today's Muslim population, as Muslims, although they believe in tawhid, the afterlife, and prophecy?

A person does never need to be member of a sect, congregation or denomination to be a Muslim. Essentially, it is sufficient to choose Islam with free will and to believe in its fundamental theological principles. According to Islam, faith is

something individual. One can either believe or disbelieve with free will. "There shall be no compulsion in the religion" means that people cannot be forced to believe or be exposed to pressure about worshipping, such as praying and fasting. The Qur'an does not set any earthly sanction against those who do not perform the worships. According to Islam, responsibility is also an individual matter. No one can suffer for sins of others. In Islam, one should deserve it to ascend to the heaven. Every human gets the rewards in return of their efforts. A group reservation in heaven is something impossible. The Salafi understanding prevents a universal understanding of Islam, and development of the ideology that perceives Islam as the common denominator as it religionizes traditions by casting the anchor of Islamic ideology in the past and excludes reasoning in religious affairs. Indeed, the issue regarding Salafism is more complicated than it is perceived.

Salafism, Its Roots and Branches

It is clearly seen that there a significant uncertainty and complicacy regarding the concepts related to Salafism and the period of time which they are associated with. A major reason behind this is that we often ignore the fact that Salafism is nothing but a man-made ideology. Salafism has never been qualified to be accepted as a sect. The organizations that claim to be followers of Salafism, such as al-Qaeda, form the most obvious evidence of this finding. Such modern organizations put certain ideological targets such as "caliphate" and "Islamic state" first and resort to violence as a means to achieve these targets. The core of Salafism is made up of the longing for the past, which becomes evident particularly in societies that are on the decline. It can also be defined as a kind of old age psychology. When the creative skills of a human becomes atrophied, they try to hold on to life by recalling the periods of high creativity. It is possible to see similar other ideologies to Salafism both in the past of Islamic societies and among non-Muslim communities. Each religious sect has a specific mindset. However, not every mindset can be defined as a sect.

For a social organization to be regarded as a sect, it should have peculiar ideas and these ideas should influence societies. For that reason, we defined religious sects as "human organizations that emerge when differentiations in religious understanding institutionalize".[9] Each religious sect builds a peculiar mindset. In some cases, mindsets emerge within the pace of life, without being influenced by a specific sect, or group. The emergence of these mindsets is often stimulated by trends and quests that cannot easily be controlled. These mindsets that cannot essentially be considered as a sect, can be considered so by some groups over time. Mindsets that cannot be handled, or easily identified, are open to be used for good or bad purposes. The likeliest example to this situation it the Batini ideology that

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[9]   Hasan Onat, "Concept of Sect and Causes of Birth of Sects", *Oş İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, Oş 2005.

feeds on mystical trends. In almost all religious sects we may encounter people with batini mindset. However, this ideology may also emerge in unpredictable shapes and concepts, and in unexpected places. Batini ideas that emerged in Qarmatians are regarded as deviant, while those originating from the Sunni tradition of Sufism can be supported with fabricated evidence. Some other mindsets may exist in different times, places, and identities but gain a place within the history when appropriate representatives are found, and the ideology is supported by society. Salafism is an example of this definition. It emerged as an emphasis on "Salaf" or "Salaf al-Shalih" in different regions and with different representatives in the late 19th century. Based upon the ground that was formed by the reform movements, this emphasis often showed up either as an expression of the stance against colonialization or anti-Ottoman sentiments and Arabic nationalism. On the other hand, it was seen as different trends and an expression of different quests developed by the struggle to survive by holding onto the past. For that reason, it is not hard to associate Salafism with the depths of history, the Wahabi ideology, and endeavors of Muhammad Abduh.

Before Salafism was used as a term, different appearances that this term can be associated with, such as those of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taybiyyah, were expressed with the term "Salaf al-Shalih". Probably for that reason the different terms used to build the history of Salafism, such as "Mutaqaddimun or Mutaahhirun Salafism" or periods of "Ijmal" and "Tafsil", were not questioned.[10] Ahmad ibn Hanbal is considered as a member of Mutaqaddimun Salafism, while Ibn Taymiyyah is seen as among Mutaahhirun Salafism.[11] (In this regard, considering the historical relevant historical flow, this understand allows us to mention the Wahhabi ideology together with Salafism since its emergence, and even identify with the Salafism itself. However, Wahhabis name themselves "Muwahhid" and do not like being called as "Wahhabi". Associating Wahhabism with Salafism was partially caused by the efforts of Rasyid Ridha in the early 20th century and the Wahhabis did not only regard themselves as Salafi, but also took on the duty of representing this ideology. Accordingly, many people today consider Wahhabism and Salafism as the same. We can also argue that it would be unjust to identify Salafism with the quests of tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) in line with the ideologies of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. In order to have proper knowledge about Salafism and to perform healthy assessments, the first question to answer is as follows: When, where, by who, and for whom was Salafism first used as a term to define a group? What are the core details about this concept? How has this term changed throughout the history before reaching present time?

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[10]   Zeki İşcan, *Selefilik*, İstanbul 2006, p. 31.

[11]   İzmirli, İsmail Hakkı, *Yeni İlm-i Kelâm*, I, 105.

As we attempted to remark before, the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire led to emergence of different trends of "reform movements" or critical quests in different geographies of the Islamic world. These trends essentially aimed to end the retrogressive situation. According to David Dean Commins, Salafism could emerge as a distinctive group only in 1896, in Damascus. A group (group of mujtahids) led by Ahmad al-Jazairi, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi and Abd al-Razzaq al-Biṭar, that regularly gathered to discuss on religious issues was judged and charged with organizing a conspiracy against the state. At the end of the process, all indictments were acquitted. Commins regards this incident as the first appearance of Salafism.[12] (David Dean Commins, *Osmanlı Suriyesi'nde Islâhat Hareketleri*, trans. S. Ayaz, Ist. 1993, 99 et al.) In a poem supposedly composed by Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi after this incident, he identifies himself as "Salafi": "Once you ask them / They say my way is Jamalism, / For them when they ask me / I answer so! / No, never! The truth is that / I am Salafi! / In truth, my way is the book of Allah, / Book of the Almighty! / And the hadiths, which are not fabricated, / The hadiths that are valid! / Honestly, I don't lend my ear to human words / But to the truth! / And for me imitation is ignorance, / Everywhere, every time / It's blindness, that's it!"[13]

According to Commins, "The modern Islamic reform movement we see in the Ottoman Syria is a part of a large-scale movement, which is called Salafism, and has ties with the other Arabic regions. Supporters of this movement asked for a return to states and behaviors of their ancestors (Salaf as-Salih or the precedent Salihs), who, according them, were pious Muslims. That's the reason why the movement was named as "Salafism" and its supporters were called "Salafi"."[14] This study of Commins reveals the reform movements in Syria of the 19th century were based on first-hand findings about the issue. However, it is possible to say that there is an uncertainty in terms of the meaning of "Salafism" and the aspects that Salafis are different from the other reformists. Solid knowledge is needed to explain in particular the first appearance of "Salafism" in the history.

According to the findings we have obtained, unlike the reformist movements, "Salafism" could find a space in history as a community formed by the ideology and its followers in history by the end of 19th and the early 20th century. Certain evidence that allowed us to reach this conclusion can be listed as follows: **1.** Although the appearance in Damascus, as remarked by Commins, is different, the fact that "Salafism" was used as a term during the reformist movements can be considered as the first sign indicating that Salafism existed as an ideology in that way. **2.** "Al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya" was a publishing house founded in Cairo in 1909. During his youth, Hasan al-Banna frequently visited this house (Memories). The place is a symbol for Salafism. **3.** "Salafism" was one of the core principles of

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[12]   David Dean Commins, *Osmanlı Suriyesi'nde Islahat Hareketleri*, trans. S. Ayaz, İstanbul 1993, p. 99 et al.

[13]   Commins, *ibid., p.* 109.

[14]   Commins, *ibid., p.* 11.

the *Menar* journal published by Rashid Reza. It can also be said that Rahsid Reza was the key person that helped Wahhabism and Salafism be associated together.[15]

Salafism has reached the present day passing through a process of change and transformation. On this matter, Ramazan Yıldırım prepared a research report for SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research). The findings he mentions in this report are as follow:

"The emergence of movements called "Salafi movements" in the Arab world dates back to a century ago. Though small compared to the regions where they emerged, these movements with different characteristics had the chance to "become communities" particularly in Egypt. Salafi movements have begun to draw more attention since January 25, 2011 when grassroots movements reached a peak in Egypt and launched a new process called the "Arab spring" or "Arab revolutions." These movements have become strong political actors in many Arab countries, notably Egypt, in the wake of the Arab revolutions and they have been fed by some traditional religious structures defined as Salafi in Egypt. Dwelling on the history, founders and traditional opinions of these Salafi-religious movements will enable us to be closely acquainted with today's political parties of the Salafi origin. As Salafism today does not have a homogenous structure in terms of opinions and actions like the Muslim Brotherhood, it is difficult to categorize these groups according to certain criteria. The principles of faith they defend and the cultural atmosphere where they emerged are quite similar. However, it is possible to put these movements under four categories in terms of their views on social and political domain, and their perceptions of politics and society. **1.** Traditional Salafism based on learning and dawah (invitation to Islam). These Salafi groups invite people to join their principles, provide religious education and refuse all political participation. Focusing on Akaid (doctrines of religious faith), this Salafism tries to clear principles of akaid from bid'ah (innovation in religious matters) and hurafa (superstition). It considers other sects such as Mu'tazilah, Kharijism and Shiism as deviating from proper teachings. It keeps its distance from Ash'arism and Matudirism, casting out Sufi movements in particular. This Salafism is widespread in Saudi Arabia in particular, with the mission for disseminating opinions and ideas of figures such as Abdulaziz bin Baz and Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani. **2.** Salafism known for its harsh attitude towards politics and political parties. By supporting "obedience to rulers", these Salafis oppose all kinds of political opposition and support political parties in power against other Islamist movements that desire to come to power by means of political parties. These groups are widespread in the Arab region notably in Saudi and Gulf countries. Their efficiency in society has weakened in the wake of the Arab revolutions. **3.** Salafism is commonly called "jihadist." These are the groups who declare that regimes in the

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[15] For an interesting article on this issue, see: Henri Lauziere, "The Consruction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, V/42, August 2010, no.3, pp. 369-389.

Arab world are unbelievers, resort to violence against these regimes, and are held responsible for most of the attacks in the Islam world. **4.** Salafism adopting a reformist line. This group adopts a more moderate attitude towards social and political issues. It not only defends Salafi beliefs and principles but also supports active involvement in every domain in public life. This group argues that social and political change should be gradual and peacefully made. Salafis in this group failed to do active politics before the Arab revolutions due to lack of a favorable environment; however, they joined politics by means of different political parties in Egypt in particular and Tunisia, Libya and Yemen in the wake of the revolutions."[16]

It is possible to argue that the organization that emerged under the name of "Salafism" adopted a stance against Shia during its formation process. In this regard, the activities that can actually be defined as a "conflict" originate from the "Jihadist" groups, where al-Qaeda and similar other organizations have central place.[17]

Salafism-Wahhabism

Wahhabism is the name given to the political movement that emerged around the ideas of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) in the 18th century, by those outside of the movement. Members of this movement name themselves as Ahl al-Tawhid or Muwahidun. The father of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was the kadi of al-Uyaynah, was an Islamic jurist influenced by the Hanbali tradition. After the agreement was signed between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Emir of Dariyya, Ibn Saud, in 1744, which was about the "Islam abides even with the power of weapons", ideas of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and gained a political dimension that could serve as the fundamentals of a possible Wahhabi state. This state was planned to be founded in Ottoman Lands, based on the principle of tawhid, by fighting against bid'ah and with the purpose of reestablishing the Islam enjoyed in Asr Al-Saadah. However, the head of this movement contradicted the classical Sunni understanding and the ease of abuse of the takfir mechanism prevented the emergence of positive opinions about Wahhabism. Particularly the understanding that regards everything associated with Sufism and denominations as "shirk" resulted in a burst of anger against Wahhabism.

The figures that influenced Abd al-Wahhab most are Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. However, it should be noted that he did not pay significant attention to the classical Sunni understanding of Ibn Taymiyyah about "obedience to the leader (ulu al-amr)". "In defiance of the doctrines set by Ibn Taymiyyah, he

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[16] Ramazan Yıldırım, *Cemaatten Partiye Dönüşen Selefilik*, SETA Analiz, December 2013, issue 73.

[17] See: Richard Whelan, *el Kaidecilik, İslâm'a Tehdit Dünyaya Tehdit*, trans. H. Bağcı, B. Sinkaya, P.Arıkan, Ankara 2006.

rioted against the Muslims that he excluded for infidelity using armed forces".[18] Later on, these two figures formed the ground that allows the future association between Wahhabism and Salafism. Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya are among the most significant references of Salafism.

Like Kharijites, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered practices within the limits of faith and claimed that deficiency in worshipping or sins could drive someone to disbelief[19] and stated that visits to shrines of saints and asking intercessions from them are signs of bid'ah and disbelief[20].

It is known that Wahhabis also declared Shiites as disbelievers. One of the two interesting incidents in this regard happened when Wahhabis attacked the city of Karbala in 1802, during the Ghadir Khumm celebrations, and the grave of Husayn ibn Ali. A number of Shiite Muslims lost their lives during the incident.

The convergence between Wahhabism and Salafism began in the early 1900s when Salafi Muslims started to have opinions and thoughts that considered Wahhabis as a part of Ahl al-Sunnah. It can also be argued that, besides the pursuit of legitimacy for Wahhabism, the pursuit of support led by Salafis, to struggle against bid'ah, executed particularly by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and similar other issues such as the emphasis placed on Salaf al-Shalih's way also influenced this process. Also, Rashid Reza has an determining role within this regard. "While some Shiite and Sunni scholars stand against Wahhabism, according to Rashid Reza it is a Sunni sect that is on the right path and adopts the Salaf understanding in faith, and the way of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in practices. Accusations of perversion and disbelief against Wahhabi Muslims do not root in the religion or religious knowledge, but in the conflict of political interests".[21]

Over time, Wahhabi Muslims embraced this name and published books under the name of Salafiyya. An interesting example of this development is the book authored by Abu Abd al-Rahman Amr Abd al-Mun'im Salim and titled as *"Al-Ta'liqat al-Saniyya al-Sharah al-Dawat al-Salafiyya"*, which consist of commentaries to a book of Syaikh Muhammad Nashiruddin al-Albani. This book was translated into Turkish as *"Selefî Dâvet Usûlü"*. Online access to the book is available.[22]

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[18]   Fazlur Rahman, *İslâm'da İhya* ve Reform, Ankara Okulu Yay., trans. Fehrullah Terkan, Ankara 2006 p. 208

[19]   Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, *Kitabu't-Tevhid*, 1988, p. 9-11.

[20]   Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, *ibid.*, 1988, p. 39 et al.

[21]   Hayrettin Karaman, *Gerçek İslâm'da Birlik*, İstanbul 2003, p.196.

[22]   http://d1.İslâmhouse.com/data/tk/ih_books/single/tk_Selef%C3%AE_D%C3%A2vet_Us%C3%BBl%C3%BC.pdf)...For an interesting paper about Al-Albani, see. http://www.livingislam.org/alb e.html.

Another book in which Wahhabi Muslims associate themselves with Salafism, is authored by Abu al-Hasan al-Aqdar and translated into Turkish by Abdülkerim Çobanoğlu with the title *"Selefiyye Hakkında Yanılgılar"*. [23]

Shiite-Salafi Polarization or the Power Struggle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia appears in different forms, such as a furious competition, or a rather digital and modern struggle that is fed by mutual claims of "disbelief", which may also be called as a cold war. Also, there are hot conflicts over third countries such as Syria and Bahrain.

This competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia also appears as a struggle for influence in Asia, Caucasia, and the Balkans. Iran is closely interested in the Bektashi population in Albania and tries to establish a bond between the Bektashi Order and Shia through economic incentives. Similarly, Saudi Arabia goes to all lengths to impose the Wahhabi understanding onto the Muslim communities it approaches through economic assistance.

The tension, which is seen as a Shiite-Salafi polarization, but essentially is a struggle for influence and power between Iran and Saudi Arabia, will be better understood if the developments in Syria and attitudes of these two countries on this matter are centered. Iran supports Bashar Asad, who is the current power in Syria and a Nusairi. On the other hand, it is a known fact that Jafari (Ithna Ashari) scholars were ill-disposed to the Nusairi community until very recently. However, Iran has a close relationship with Syria. And this relationship between Iran and Syria gained a new dimension after the conflicts took place in the latter. Not only did Iran explicitly support Asad's regime in Syria, but also sent Hezbollah forces, who have been actively involved in affairs regarding the Palestine crisis until the present day, to fight on the side of Asad's forces. Hezbollah is an organization transformed from the Islamic Amal movement, which is one of the resultant organizations which emerged after the Shiite Amal Movement of Lebanon was divided into two different organizations, Shiite Amal and Islamic Amal, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Of course, there are some connections between this support of Iran and Hezbollah towards Asad's regime and the Shiite characteristics of Nusairism, where the understanding of Asad originates from. Considering its activity and interests in the Middle East, Iran cannot disregard Syria. It would also not be sufficient to think that Iran's support is limited to the canalization of Hezbollah. Syria is also quite important for the Shiite community in Lebanon. A possible fall of the regime in Syria would mean a loss of power and influence on Iran's side in its active role in the Middle East and especially its impact on Lebanon.

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[23]   www.islah.de/mehec/men00017.pdf

Iran-Syria relations are also closely related to the affairs in Iraq. The recent developments in the region can be interpreted as Iran increasingly putting more emphasis on Shia.

In the Syrian crisis, Saudi Arabia supported the opposition forces against Asad. It should be noted that anti-Asad forces are not a single group. Among them, Jihadist Salafi organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, stand out. In fact, the sufferers of the Syrian crisis are the whole Muslim community. Both Asad's forces and the opposition kill yelling "Allahu Akbar" to each other.

These incidents in the Middle east explicitly reveal that Iran regards itself as the protector of the Shiite communities all around the world, and tries to establish close relations with them in order to expand its influence. The most interesting part is that the ratio of Shiite population in Saudi Arabia's petrol-rich region is 10-15%. There are also significant Shiite populations in some Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, which cannot be disregarded by Saudi Arabia. To have an idea about the issue, we may have a look at the countries where Shiite Muslims live, as well as their ratio to the general population of these countries. However, we have only unreliable data at hand to evaluate Muslim countries in terms of population, and rates of people from different sects and religious ideologies. Herein, a table given in a article of Vali Nasr's "When the Shiites Rise", which is an article published in *Foreign Affairs* issue July/August of 2006, can help us:

Country	Percentage of Shiite population	Total population	Shiite population
Iran	90%	68.7 million	61.8 million
Pakistan	20%	165.8 million	33.2 million
Iraq	65%	26.8 million	17.4 million
India	1%	1,095.4 million	11.0 million

Dilemma of Muslims Who Lost Islam as a Common Denominator

Azerbaijan	75%	8.0 million	6.0 million
Afghanistan	19%	31.1 million	5.9 million
Saudi Arabia	10%	27.0 million	2.7 million
Lebanon	45%	3.9 million	1.7 million
Kuwait	30%	2.4 million	730,000
Bahrain	75%	700,000	520,000
Syria	1%	18.9 million	190,000
UAE	6%	2.6 million	160,000
Qatar	16%	890,000	140,000

Note: "Shiites" in this table refer to Imami Shia. **It does not cover Nusayriyah,**

Islam'ilism, and Zaidiyah. The ratios are estimated.

For sure, populations of these countries increased in 2013. But we can also say that the ratios of Shiite populations did not show any significant change. It should be noted that the data about Syria given in this table only covers those adopting the understanding of Imami Shia. In addition to this, the ratio of Nusairis in Syria is estimated as 10-12%.

Rather than a Shiite-Salafi polarization, this table reveals a possible severe Shiite-Sunni conflict that may spread to everywhere around the Islamic world with a domino effect. Probably, Iran tries to sustain the tension and struggle through Wahhabism/Salafism in order not to expand the frontiers of conflicts. On the other hand, Wahhabis expect support of all non-Shiite Muslims against Iran's policies and do not hesitate to bring this bellicosity wherever they go.

In the table above, the Shiite population in Saudi Arabia is given as 10%. Given that the Shiite population is rather dense in cities like al-Qatif and al-Hasa which have rich oil reservoirs, this ratio has strategic importance for both countries.

We have mentioned that there is also a cut-throat competition on the Internet. The heaviest weapon used in this competition is takfir. Iran weighs on Wahhabism to prevent expansion of the fronts and even declares followers of the Baha'i faith as disbelievers and invites Sunni Muslims to declare Wahhabis as non-Muslims. These words of Hujjat al-Islam Ahmad Khatami, Tehran's Friday prayer leader, are notable: "All Shiite scholars explicitly announce that the Baha'i faith has nothing to do with Islam. We expect the same from Ahl al-Sunnah. Today, scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah should explicitly announce that Wahhabism also has nothing to do with Islam".[24]

On the other hand, disciples of Wahhabism spread books and articles over the Internet which declare Shiah as a belief outside of Islam. A significant example[25] of these is the one authored by Abu Bakr al-Jazairi, which was translated into Turkish by Mehmet Şahin as *Şia Mensubuna Nasihat*. Another example is Muhibbudeen al-Khateeb's *Al-Khutoot Al-'Areedah*.

Conclusion

Muslims have lost the understanding that regards Islam as a common denominator. Although the Qur'an warned us 14 centuries ago, each group prides its followers on what they have, considers that Islam only fits to their ideas, and readily marginalizes others. The religion does not unite, but discriminates. Separatist ideologies misuse religion to gain legitimacy. The dimension of religion

[24] www.suriyegerçekleri.com
[25] www.islah.de/menhec/men00024.pdf

that makes human life meaningful has been deactivated. Muslims abstain from proper use of the reason gifted to them, hallow their traditions, disgrace knowledge, and fail to be actors of their lives and to produce knowledge and value. The most severe sufferers of all problems that took on this global dimension, particularly terrorism, identity crises, and quests of meaning, are Muslims themselves. Muslims live in regions where fundamental rights and freedoms are violated the most, and people fail to create a culture of high-level trust. The ground rule of life is quite simple: Those who cannot use their creative skills properly, often resort to demolition, vandalism, destruction, and slaughter to be involved in the process of creation.

The easiest way to legitimize the negativities experienced in the Islamic world and to rationalize the struggle of power among Muslims and the resultant conflicts and deaths, is to use the frameworks of meaning that are alive in the social memory and to create a perception of hostility. These conflicts, essentially based on the fight for power and influence historically called the Shiite-Sunni polarization, are served to us today as the Shiite-Salafi conflicts. Iran regards Shiite Muslims all around the world as a power that can be mobilized to ensure its hegemony, keeps the perception of "hostility" alive using its history, and tries to build the identity of a great Shia. Instead of taking the Sunni population on, they sustain a quest of power and hegemony through "Salafism", which is a rather uncertain but easily maintainable ideology. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, tries to gain the sympathy of non-Shiite Muslims by using concepts like "Salafism", instead of the obsolete Wahhabism, that evokes the longing for the past, while mitigating criticism against its power and gaining support and legitimacy against Iran, which is considered as the biggest threat. The Salafi-Shiite polarization can be interpreted as an expression of the struggle for power and the quest for legitimacy under the cover of religion.

Salafism is a concept that can be easily filled through different understandings, purposes, and expectations in any period of time and by any ideology. As the phrase goes, it can be considered as a "skeleton key". Although it appears as religious sect today, Salafism is indeed not a sect, but a mentality. There has never been a sect named Salafiyya in the past. On the other hand, Salafi have always existed. Every generation is a salaf for its successor. The term "Salaf al-Shalih", which is used to refer especially to the period of the first three centuries of Islam, opened a way for finding the roots of an imaginary "Salafiyya". "Salafiyya" was embraced in social lives, in other words, the existence of people who felt a belonging to a community called "Salafiyya" was first seen in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Later on, Wahhabis began to use different names, such as Salafi or Salafiyya, in order to be free from the negative perceptions attributed to the name "Wahhabi". Both in the past and today, it is possible to find a large variety of fractions within Salafism and Salafiyya, which have "the wish to canonize the early Islamic period" and "the demand to return back to the true religion, which is free of bid'ah". According to the findings which we have

obtained, the influence and transformative power of Western Civilization in every aspect of life drove some Muslims to turn towards the past and have the impression that survival is only possible through canonization of the past. This shallow purpose resulted in the emergence of a number of different Salafi groups, which regard themselves as "the saved group/Firqa al-Najiyah" and consider others who do not think the same way as beyond of the Islamic circle. Jihadi Salafism, Political Salafism, and Scholarly Salafism are the first Salafi communities that come to mind.

On one hand, Salafism is mentioned together with Wahhabism, while on the other hand, it is associated with the reform movements using certain figures, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Reza. Although it seems possible to associate Rahsid Reza and Salafism, it is hard to say that Salafi Muslims would like Muhammad Abduh. We are of the opinion that, the negative perception around the name "Salafism" should not be allowed to tarnish ideas and thoughts of exceptional scholars, such as Abduh, for the sake of the future of Muslims. The action that should immediately be taken is to prevent further disgrace of the knowledge and neutralization of the reason on behalf of religion, while reminding Muslims of the fact that every human being has value. Otherwise, it would be impossible to prevent Muslims from murdering each other and to even imagine creating the high-level Islamic values that humanity needs and founding a new Islamic civilization.

It is possible to argue that the main reason behind this ruthlessness among Muslims is the perceptual disorder regarding Islam. As the perception that upholds Islam as a common denominator has been lost, each group thinks that they are the real Muslims and they have guaranteed heaven, while closing the doors to the outside world to prevent any other persons from entering. A Muslims' perception of Islam is similar to Rumi's description of a person who tries to know an elephant by touching. In defiance of the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammed, each group perceives its own understanding as the only and true Islam, and keeps on being proud of its own ideas and thoughts. This creates an ease in the use of takfir mechanisms.

Muslims have problematic periods throughout their histories over fourteen centuries. However, the struggle for power has always become the focus of these problems. Today's conflicts are also nothing but a power struggle in essence. First, we should say that the perception that considers politics and seizing political power as the solution of problems, is a serious mistake. A political power that does not recognize the power of science, expects its every single act to be accepted only by society, and tries to legitimize its efforts through religion, would naturally begin to consider Islam as nothing but a means to gain legitimacy. Such political powers would also not hesitate to use the discriminative discourse of politics and the religious arguments to ostracize people. We may talk about the Umayyad rule to have a better understanding of this topic. On one hand, the policies of the Umayyad rule that associate persecution and religion even with each other, damage the

harmony between Islam and the nature of human beings; on the other hand, the Khariji understanding that sees everything as shirk and makes life unbearable by religionizing every aspect of life, channeled Muslims to new quests. Murji'ah emerged as a result of this understanding and before anything else, revealed that practices cannot be identified with faith and that every Muslim is equal in this regard. Today, we still thirst after this and similar other principles presented to humanity by the Murji'ah. Aside from the freedom and production, it is even not possible to survive without reading Islam through freedom and liberating religion from politicians and those who do not hesitate to misuse it, to seize political power. Islam cannot exist without freedom. Creative skills cannot be used before creating a culture of high-level trust. And, on the top of human creativity there comes science, arts, and sports. It is not possible for communities that do not transform their energies into good practices to be actively involved in these discussions.

We would like to end these words reminding of the 13th verse of Surah al-Ahqaf and the 30th verse of Surah Fussilat, which we mentioned before:

"Indeed, those who have said, 'Our Lord is Allah,' and then remained on a right course - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. Those are the companions of Paradise, abiding eternally therein as reward for what they used to do."[26]

"Indeed, those who have said, 'Our Lord is Allah' and then remained on a right course - the angels will descend upon them, [saying], 'Do not fear and do not grieve but receive good tidings of Paradise, which you were promised.'"[27]

These verses provide us the ground to base upon the idea that Islam is a common denominator. Every human who believes in the fundamental essentials of faith (Tawhid, Afterlife, Prophecy) as specified in the Qur'an is regarded as a Muslim and is within the circle of Islam. Ignorance and idiocy are the main reasons behind these divisions, and ruthlessness among Muslims.

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Shia-Sunni Relations and Salafism[*]

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Abstract

It can be claimed that the approaches from the Shia and Sunni traditions are one of the areas that not much change experienced. One of the important reasons of this is that Iran and other Muslim Middle Eastern countries which are on the opposite of fast modernizing Turkish society have not become a part of global network.

In essence, Iran has affected from Ottoman modernisation and declared constitutional monarchy by this influence. However, Shia ulema attempts interrupted this modernisation attempt which leads Iran's Islamic Revolution. Iran's politics has a coution against global actors and modernisation. Politics held by frontiers of the revolution maintains Iranian people in alert position against global actors and this alert situation cause them to stay out of modernization. This approach leads to perpetuation of middle age sect understanding as well as exacerbation of conflicts in the Middle East. One of the important reasons of Iraq's civil war is the religious understanding which is similar to Iran Islamic State's. The ongoing harresment of the global forces against Iran is giving motivation to Iran to perpetuate their politics. It is an interesting question to ask to which point Iran will continue to follow this policy as long as the policies of global intruders. However, it is confident to say that continuing a healthy modernisation and globalisation will not be experienced sect-based. This analysis shows that the traditional conflicts would be influential on Middle East for a long period of time.

Keywords: Sunni, Shia, Modernization, Globalization, Sunni-Shia Relations

Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri ve Selefîlik

Özet

Modernleşme ve küreselleşmenin dünya üzerinde çok büyük etkilerinin tartışıldığı günümüzde, henüz çok fazla değişimin yaşanmadığı alanlardan birsinin, Şiî-Sünnî temelli mezhepsel yaklaşımlar olduğu söylenebilir. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinin birisi, hızla modernleşen Türk toplumu karşısında komşusu İran başta olmak üzere Müslüman Ortadoğu ülkelerinin hala daha küresel bağın içerisine girmemiş olmasıdır.

Aslında İran, Osmanlı modernleşmesinden bir hayli etkilenmiş ve bu doğrultuda ülkede meşrutiyet ilan edilmişti. Ancak Şiî ulemanın toplum üzerindeki nüfuzu, söz konusu

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girişimlerin sekteye uğramasına neden olmuş ve İran İslam Devrimi'ne yol açan süreci başlatmıştır. Devrimin ileri gelenlerinin O günden buyana izlemiş oldukları siyasetle İran halkını küresel aktörlere karşı sürekli teyakkuzda tutmaları, onların modernleşmenin dışında kalmalarına neden olmaktadır. Bu durum bir taraftan İran Şiîlerinin geleneksel ortaçağ mezhep anlayışlarını devam ettirmelerine yol açarken diğer taraftan ise Ortadoğu'daki kadim çatışmaların tekrar alevlenmesine neden olmaktadır. Özellikle Irak'ın sürüklendiği iç savaşın en önemli araçlarından birinin, hala daha küreselleşmeye karşı durmayı söylem haline getiren İran modeli bir devlet yapılanmasının savunduğu din anlayışından kaynaklandığı rahatlıkla söylenebilir. Küresel güçlerin İran'a karşı sürekli tacizde bulunmaları, söz konusu politikalarını devam ettirmeleri yönünde onlara direnç kazandırmaktadır. Küreselleşen ve bu doğrultuda geleneksel din anlayışlarını revize etmeye çalışan Türk toplumu karşısında İran'ın ne zamana kadar böyle devam edeceği merak konusu. Ancak küresel işgalcilerin bu bölge üzerindeki hesapları devam ettiği sürece sağlıklı bir modernleşme ve küreselleşme sürecinin tecrübe edilemeyeceği rahatlıkla söylenebilir. Söz konusu durumun, mezhep temelli geleneksel çatışma politikalarının uzun bir süre daha Ortadoğu üzerinde etkisini hissettireceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sünni, Şii, Modernizm, Küreselleşme, Sünni-Şii İlişkileri

Introduction

Shia-Sunni based sectarian approaches can be given as an example of a relatively stationary field of discussion in today's world, where modernism and globalism is discussed in terms of their great influences all around the world. One of the most significant reasons behind this is that, unlike modern Turkish society, the other Islamic Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran, have not yet been involved in global relations.

The history of Turkish-Iranian relations have a pattern that expresses competition and conflict between these two major countries with a sectarian discourse. The relations between these aforementioned states date back to the foundation of the Safevid State and the adoption of Shia as its sect.

Safevid State's adoption of Shia as its official sect drove the Ottoman Empire into the process of transformation into a more rigid Sunni state. Rushing into sectarian extremes in fundamental issues, particularly in politics and religious affairs, these two states caused an increase in bigotry and intolerance within society. Dominating for a long period of time starting from the sixteenth century, this process could only be reversed in the eighteenth century. Attempts by Western countries to invade both the Ottoman and Iranian territories in this period forced these two societies to an inevitable reconciliation. Certain movements that gained political dimensions through the policies of Islamic unity brought about the reconciliation among religious sects, particularly between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and some other initiatives that can be considered as supra-sectarian ideologies.

While mutual relations were furthered on this fragile ground, the emergence of new Turkish and Iranian nation states in the early twentieth century resulted in the foundation of some regional monarchies. As a consequence, the sectarian discourse, especially in interstate relations, was thrown out of focus. However, Iran's initiatives to spread the Shiite understanding towards the end of this century and particularly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution brought the sectarian discourse into the forefront again.

Indeed, Iran had been influenced by the Ottoman modernization to a great extent and declared the state as a constitutional monarchy. However, the influence of Shiite scholars upon society disrupted these initiatives and initiated the process that ended up with Iran's Islamic Revolution. Since then, the elites of this revolution have been keeping the Iranian society on alert against the global actors, which results in isolation from the endeavors of modernization. On one hand, this situation drives Iranian Shiites to sustain their traditional medievalist sectarian understanding, while on the other hand it fuels the ever-present conflicts in the Middle East. It can easily be suggested that the Iranian model in religious understanding, which adopts resistance against globalization as it principal discourse, is one of the most significant tools used in the civil war that the Iranian society has been drawn into. Continuous involvement of global powers in Iran's affairs brings more resolution to the state to further these aforementioned policies. Compared to the Turkish society, which is globalizing and trying to revise its traditional religious understanding, the lifetime of Iran's persistence remains as an issue of concern. On the other hand, it can easily be suggested that proper modernization and globalization cannot be experienced as long as global invaders sustain their plans on the region. This aforementioned situations indicate that the traditional sectarian conflict policies will effect the Middle East for quite some time.

Historical Background of Sunni-Shia Relations

The history of Sunni-Shia relations dates back to the first periods of the Islam's history, which corresponds to the emergence of Shia as an independent sect. Some claims of Shiite Muslims, which were put forward in the first quarter of the eighth century, evolved into a structure that prioritizes the dimension of faith within time and turned into a belief that accepts Ali and Fatimah "as the imams of religion with the order and assignment from Allah and the Prophet, besides the testament of the previous imam".

Coming to the forefront as a structure that accepts Ali and some others descending from him as the imams of religion, the Shia gathered the opposition groups, which were in conflict with the governments throughout the historical period for a reason, from the Umayyads to the Abbasids around itself and eventually turned into huge sectarian flock. That's to say that Shia became the main opposition party of Muslims, as the phrase goes. In parallel with the intense trend

of writing in the Islamic world that started in the second half of the ninth century, Shia has created its own literature. Being economic studies, which were based on the imamate ideology, in the first place, they have created original works in different other fields, such as Hadith, Fiqh, and Tafsir (interpretation).

One of the most significant periods that witnessed important and original works of Islamic thought is the one starting with the Caliph Harun al-Rashid and ending with the Caliph Mutawakkil. By means of contributions by the Barmakids, Harun al-Rashid's intellectual viziers, the scientific discussions, which had been carried out in quite a free environment, could be furthered within the period of the Caliph Ma'mun after a short time of interruption with this period continuing until Mutawakkil came to power. The translations of philosophical works in this period and the concomitant kalam discussions lied behind the kalam understandings of Mu'tazilah, Shia and Sunni sects. Therefore, the Islamic thought gained a strong theological foundation that brought competitiveness against its rivals and the major religions of that time, namely, Christianity and Zoroastrianism.

During the second half of the ninth century, a period when sectarian organizations were shaped and differences became evident, the Abbasid policies that allowed different understandings and even the "Mihna" understanding, initiated by Caliph Ma'mun, abused this tolerance as a means of oppression hassled some Arab communities who had considered the kalam understanding, which emerged as a result of efforts by the Mevali community, as a relapse and corruption from the beginning. Their dissatisfaction affected the political direction of the caliphate within time and eventually, these policies were terminated within the period of Caliph Mutawakkil. Together with this new political environment, this now brings Ashab al-Hadith's era forward with every aspect.

The new tone was set and a significant paradigm shift was witnessed after Ashab al-Hadith came to power and shone as a star among others. The psychological state caused by both the frustration and inability to give responses to strong rival theological understandings turned into aggression. Accordingly, kalam was prohibited in debates and other similar scientific discussions. Because of this lack in scientific discussions, these topics started to be discussed by the commons. This state of mind, which may be called "militant conservatism" based on today's political understanding, affected different other groups, particularly Shiite Muslims, and turned cosmopolitan cities like Baghdad into areas of fights with stones and sticks.

After the institutionalization of the Divinity Schools of Islam, it was inevitable for politics not to transform into a sect-oriented structure. Accordingly, religious sects can also be regarded as the political parties of that period. The transformation of Shia into a broad-based movement, unlike Sunni sects, presented it as an important political actor that had to be taken into consideration by political powers. For that reason, the politics of Muslims states have been related to Shia since the

period of Harun al-Rashid, who was one of the first rulers of Abbasids. Caliph Ma'mun had to declare Ali al-Ridha, who was regarded as an imam by Shiite Muslims, as his heir. Mutawakkil, on the other hand, acted in accordance with his other policies by prohibiting kalam and taking stringent measures against Shiite Muslims at the same time. Despite these stringent precautions, Abbasids failed to end the conflicts between Shiite Muslims and others, particularly Hanbalis who formed the most extreme group within Ashab al-Hadith.

Although the Shiite caliphate established by Fatimids in the North Africa brought some relief to Shiite Muslims, this state was controlled by İsma'ili Shiites. On the other hand, Imami or Ithna'ashari Shiites subsisted as dissatisfied groups in the East, such as Iraq, which was the center of the Abbasid Caliphate, and Khorasan. As a result of the impact caused by these developments mentioned above, Abbasids started to weaken and Buwaihids seized the caliphate, causing relief and counterattacks in Shia. However, Buwaihids also tried to pursue balanced policies toward different sects after being resettled.

After Fatimids founded the Al-Azhar University in Cairo and assigned the da'is they raised there to the East, with the purpose of spreading the Isma'ili understanding, Hassan-iSabbah established a Shiite-Isma'ili state in Alamut and upset the balances once again. Isma'ili Shiites in Alamut created a significant level of disturbance and thus the Seljuks preferred more rigid Sunni policies. Achieving dominance in the region of the Abbasid caliphate, which was actually seized by Buwaihids, the Seljuks set about protecting the Sunni caliphate as an ultimate goal. Alp Arslan, the successor of TughrilBey, assigned Nizam al-Mulk as his vizier and asked him to found the Nizamiyyah madrasahs in retaliation for Al-Azhar.

The Sunni-Shia relations remained still throughout the period of Seljuks until the Mongol invasion opened a new era. In the mid-thirteenth century, the Seljuks were dissolved after the Mongol invasion in Abbasid territories. The policies of this period were in favor of Shiite Muslims thanks to certain Shiite scholars, such as al-Allamah al-Hilli and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, advisors of Hulagu Khan. However, the former understanding was brought back when the Mongol Emperor Abu Sa'id embraced Sunnism.

While the Iraq and Khorasan regions were trying to heal the wounds left by the Mongol invasion, the tribes who migrated to Anatolia founded a basis for new political structures that would defend the Sunni Islam in the future. It can be suggested that Shia grew stronger day by day in Iran during this period. The Sufi-like organizations that took advantage of the chaos and the gap witnessed in the region became indicators of the future Shiitization. Eventually, the School of Ardabil, which had been founded by Sunni Muslims in the 14th century, naturalized some Shiite principles and the prior Shiitization of Kubrawiya paved the way for the foundation of the Shiite Safavid state. Accordingly, Shia was adopted as the official sect of the state after the Safavid state was founded in 1501

and Shiite Iran, which has subsisted to the present day, was shaped after this development.

Acceptance of Shia as the official sect of Iran and the competition between the two countries changed the Ottoman Empire, which was essentially as Sunni state, from a tolerant state to a more rigid Sunni organization built upon the anti-Rafida (Shia) ideology. From then on, the Ottomans regarded themselves as the only defenders of the Sunni caliphate.

As it was a process to prove themselves, the foundation phase of the Safevid state witnessed slaughters committed for the sake of sectarianism. However, states had clear borders over time and the conflicts were mitigated. Meanwhile, the Safevid state collapsed in 1736. However, as Shia started to be identified with Iran, subsequent authorities acted in this direction. Ending the Safevid state and building his own rule, Nader Shah initiated an unprecedented process that alienated Sunni and Shiite Muslims. His plan was to make the Ottoman Empire, which he regarded as the great caliphate, accept the Ja'fari school of thought as the fifth major sect of Islam and put an end to the discussions and the conflicts between these two denominations.

Nader Shah's plan to help the Ja'fari ideology be accepted as the fifth Sunni sect and compromise the Shiite and Sunni Muslims was a good-natured suggestion. However, this plan could not be implemented as it could not be more than a political decision of one of these two parties[1]. Except for a limited number of scholars, neither the Iranian hierarchy nor the Ottoman bureaucracy was capable of moving beyond the traditional sectarian stereotypes. This unfounded plan did not yield permanent solutions. The affirmative arguments of exceptional Ottoman scholars, such as Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha, underwhelmed.[2]

It is not a coincidence that the first attempt to compromise Sunni and Shiite Muslims was ordered by Nader Shah. As is known, the early 18th century was the period when certain parts of Muslim territories were invaded by Russia and Western countries. Therefore, it was no more possible for Muslims to irresponsibly and pertly conflict with each other without the interruption of rivals around them. As stated by Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha, resolution of the hostility between Ottoman and Iranian states was important, considering the Russian existence that was equally threatening for both societies. Accordingly, Russia made similar moves against the Ottoman and Kadjar Iranian states in 1768-1774 and 1804-1813,

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[1] ShahbandarZadeh Ahmad Hilmi, *İslâmTarihi*, (I-II), rev. Mümin Çelik, Doğan Güneş Yayınları, İstanbul 1971, p. 501.

[2] Negotiations and correspondences were recorded by Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha. See. Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha, *TahkikveTevfik*, ed. Ahmet Zekiİzgören, Kitabevi, İstanbul 2003, vr. 197-a et al. By order of Sultan Mahmud I, Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha asked to resolve the conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims and, going further, made contributions to both parties for the possible union of these two communities in a single state in his *TahkikveTevfik* regarding the conciliation hearings that he authored, presumably, in 1149(1736). Koca Mehmet Ragıp Pasha, *TahkikveTevfik*, vr. 175-b.

respectively. These two conflicts caused significant damage to both countries.[3] Feeling the gradually increasing Russian impact, Iran started to offer collective actions to the Ottoman Empire, which suffered from similar problems, against Christian Russians. Therefore, these two biggest Muslim states of the region intensified this pursuit of alliance which was initiated in the 19th century. As a reaction against the invasion of Muslim territories, the ideology of "Islamic Unity" started to take shape within Muslim communities towards the middle of this century.[4]

Movements of Modernization and Sunni-Shia Relations

The 19th century witnessed an intense period that was dominated by movements of modernization all around the Islamic world. Leaving his mark on the late periods of this century, Sultan Abdul Hamid II planned to keep the Shiite Muslims living in Ottoman territories and Iraq in line with the pan-Islamism policies he attempted to carry out and to initiate good relations with the Iranian state that suffered the same fate in terms of the struggle against invasions and transformation. For that reason, the Sultan invited Jamal al-Din Afghani to Istanbul in 1892 and commenced joint efforts immediately.

Together with a team organized to assist him, Jamal al-Din Afghani posted letters to prominent figures of the Islamic world in different regions. Some of these letters were sent to the Shiite scholars in Iraq. In return, he received positive responses and maintained affirmative relations at various levels. However, in 1904, the Ottoman Empire started to sever its ties with the Shiite Muslims in Iraq due to the pressures of Russian and Iranian states, and relations with England's community. The Empire even prohibited certain political activities of this group. Accordingly, Iraqi Shiites interfered more in Iran's internal affairs by toppling the pro-Russian prime minister and started to provoke the Shiites in Central Asia. On the other hand, they developed intimacy with England, who were in a struggle against the Russian state for influence in Iran.[5]

While the Ottoman rule was in a pursuit of official and mutual convergence with Iran and Iraqi Shiites, it can be seen that the most significant interactions were achieved after a pair of unofficial initiatives. In other words, the actual

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[3] The wars Iran lost against Russia and the resultant treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay they had to sign represents one of the most unpleasant and humiliating periods of Iran's history. As a result of these treaties, the most fertile territories of the country, namely, the South Caucasia, Georgia, and Armenia, as well as the Caspian Sea and its commercially significant ports were ceded to Russia. See. Yılmaz Karadeniz, *İran'da Sömürgecilik Mücadelesive KaçarHanedanı (1795–1925)*, İstanbul 2006, p. 118.

[4] For more information, see: CemilHakyemez, *Osmanlı İran İlişkileriveSünni-Şiiİttifakı*, Kitapyayınevi, İstanbul 2014.

[5] GökhanÇetinsaya, "Osmanlı Irakı'nda Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi (1890-1908)", *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Din veVicdan Hürriyeti*, ed. Azmi Özcan, İstanbul 2000, p. 144-145.

reconciliation between Sunni and Shiite Muslims were realized as a result of some civil initiatives and especially the mutual cultural relations between constitutionalist groups. Visits of a group of Iranian elites to Istanbul and some members of the Young Ottomans, such as Namık Kemal and Şinasi, and supporting publications of prominent newspapers like *Ahter* facilitated the constitutionalist movements in Iran. Similarly, newspapers like *Tanin*, which were published by the Young Turks, supported the constitutional revolution in Iran, which continued throughout the period of counterrevolution that started in June 1908 and ended in July 1909.[6]

This manner in which the official and unofficial convergence and interactions between the two parties remained same, but the Shiite Muslims in Iraq did not keep away from this trend and relations were necessarily carried to another dimension. After the declaration of the Second Constitutional Era in 1908, Shiite children were forced to enroll in state schools in certain regions of Iraq. In fact, the Ottoman Empire had been keeping Shiite Muslims living in its territories in Iraq away from official duties as the state regarded Shia as an opposing view and did not consider them as an essential part of the community.[7]

Foreign invasions, the developing pan-Islamist policies, and the convergence caused by the constitutional movements yielded some positive outcomes in the relations between the Ottoman rule and Shiite Muslims of Iraq. Although they did not regard the Ottoman Empire as a legitimate Islamic state, probably due to the impact that emerged as a result of the convergence between two parties, Shiite authorities of the region called the Muslims to join the jihad against the British, considering the Empire as a lesser evil.[8] A number of Shiite groups in the region showed a similar reaction against the British hegemony in Iraq in 1920 and took joint actions with Sunni Muslims.[9] Despite all these positive developments, it is not possible to say that everything went well during this period of time. For instance; the incidents that happened in Karbala, Najar and Hillah between May 1915 and May 1916 posed a problem in relations. Accordingly, the Ottomans blamed the Shiite scholars for the defeat in Shaiba.[10]

In fact, the Shiite tribes living in Iraq were not in unity but often independent from each other. What held the Shiite groups in rural areas together was not Shia but tribalism. A considerable part of the Shiite tribes depended on the sayyids they

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[6] *Tanin*, no. 4, June 1908, İstanbul Atatürk Kütüphanesi.

[7] Ali al-Wardi, *Lemahât ictimâ'iyye min tarîhi'l-Irakı'l-hadîs*, (I-VI), Kufan 1991, v.III, p.263; Ahmad al-Khatib, "ŞiaveModernizm, DireniştenBilinçliAçılıma", trans. Yaşar Daşkıran, *İslâmiyât*, VII/4, 152.

[8] Sadi al-Samarrai, *et-Taifiyyefi'l-Irak: el-vâkîve'l-hâl, Müessesetü'l-Fecr*, London, 1993, p.53; Ziya Abbas, *Irak'ta Şii Merciliği'ninS iyasî Rolü*, Önsöz Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2013, p. 118.

[9] Hamid Enayat, *ÇağdaşİslâmiSiyasiDüşünce*, trans. Yusuf Ziya, YönelişYayınları, İstanbul 1995, p. 82-83.

[10] Abd al-Halim al-Ruhaymi, *Tarîhu'l-hareketi'l-İslâmiyye fi'l-Irak 1900-1924*, Dârü'l-âlemiyyeli't-Tibaave'n-Neşr, Beirut 1985, p. 174; Ziya Abbas, *Irak'taŞiiMerciliği'ninSiyasîRolü*, p. 123.

lived together with, rather than the Shiite scholars in Najaf.[11] Also, there was a serious competition between these groups and families of clerics settled in certain cities, such as Najaf and Kadhimiya. The discussions among the interpreters of religion were at a high level that even triggered street fights among their proponents.[12]

Having all these in mind, one can easily say that the pan-Islamist policies did not achieve its target within a period of 30 years until 1908[13] and could not create opportunities for a cultural exchange between Muslim communities. Besides[14], convergence and interactions were achieved between the two parties particularly due to constitutional reforms. The most outstanding reaction of the constitutionalists of that time was the opposition against foregrounding of sectarian identities like Shia and Sunnism and the emphasis put on "Islam" as a superordinate identity.

Eventually, it is obvious that the trends of modernism that started to increase among Muslims in the second half of the 19th century brought some organizations which contributed to the efforts of breaking down prejudices between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.[15] Accordingly, the emergence of "nation-state" as a notion led to a mitigation of sectarian conflicts and a shift to ethnic identities as the new bones of contention.

The Aftermath of World War I

Due to the reasons mentioned above, the movements of modernization that emerged in Ottoman and Iranian societies resulted in a significant level of convergence between members of different sects. However, this trend started to change after the World War I. The Ottoman and Kadjar dynasties collapsed at the end of the war and nation-states of Turkey and Iran were founded. Together with the abolition of the caliphate, Turkey did not have further the pan-Islamist policies, while Iran got involved in a process when the Islamic scholars were eliminated. On the other side, Iraq was subjugated by the British rule and drifted apart from the Ottomans. In addition, the Shiite scholars in the region also felt out of touch with Iran. The defeat suffered at the end of the war ruined the ideal of ummah among all Sunni and Shiite communities. Following the elimination of the Ottoman Empire

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[11] Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Shia: Their Political Role and the Process of Their Integration into Society", *Islamic Impulse*, ed. B.F. Stowasser, Washington 1986, p. 204; Faleh A. Jabar, *Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş*, In Turkish: HikmetHalis, İstanbul 2004, p. 79-81.

[12] Ali el-Wardi, Lemahâtictimâ'iyye min tarîhi'l-Irakı'l-hadîs, (I-VI), Kufan 1991, I, 21-22; Faleh A. Jabar, Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş, p. 81.

[13] Metin Hülagü, (İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre Milli Mücadelede İslâmcılık ve Turancılık) *İslâm Birliği ve Mustafa Kemal*, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul 2008, p. 158.

[14] İlber Ortaylı, *Gelenekten Geleceğe*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul 2007, p. 21.

[15] Cmp. Hamid Enayat, *Çağdaş İslâmi Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 80-81.

and Iran, Iraq was turned into a free space for British rule. In fact, they had already laid this foundation through certain policies, such as retaining some of the Shiite scholars in Iraq.

To prevent any possible opposition from Shiite scholars with Persian origin against their rule and the system of monarchy, the British started to impose the idea of citizenship in Iraq starting as of 1924.[16] In particular, the Shiite scholars in Najaf made a significant contribution to the emergence of Iraqi nationalism or "the nation of Iraq" as a notion under their control, both being planned as a joint initiative of Shiite and Sunni Muslims[17]. However, it was observed over time that both the political power and the Sunni people in the region did not give the right to participate in government to the Iraqi Shiites, who were actually the native Arabs living in the country, mistaking them for the Iranian immigrants[18]. This resulted in a trend among the isolated Shiite youth to support the increasingly popular global leftist movements against central governments.

The Communist Party founded in Iraq in 1930 grew with the support of a group majorly composed of young Shiites until 1950s. With concerns regarding this situation, the Shiite scholars took action to protect the youth from the social deterioration and established the Islamic Dawa Party in 1957 under the guidance of some outstanding figures such as Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and Muhammad Baqir. The scholars declared participation of the Communist Party as unlawful with a fatwa issued in 1960. This had repercussions in Shiite communities and the popularity of communism among young people declined.[19]

As the founder of the Islamic Dawa Party, one of the most significant Islamic movements in modern Iraq, the Shiite leader Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (d. 1980) did not focus on sectarianism in his efforts. For instance; he had never run after a discriminatory purpose, such as replacing the Sunni executives with Shiites.[20]

The popularity of the globally developing ideology of communism among young Muslims was a matter of concern for both Shiite and Sunni scholars. Some Sunni and Shiite scholars who did not have power to share commenced an initiative in Egypt in order to come together again, this time with the impact of the hostility against leftist ideologies. Therefore, the Sunni-Shiite reconciliation was reinitiated with this movement around a half century later than the end of the late Ottoman period pan-Islamist policies.

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[16]   Faleh A. Jabar, Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş, p. 89.

[17]   Faleh A. Jabar, Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş, p. 375.

[18]   Said al-Samarrai, *et-Taifiyyefi'l-Irak: el-vâkîve'l-hâl*,Müessesetü'l-Fecr, London 1993, p. 50; Ziya Abbas, *Irak'taŞiiMerciliği'ninSiyasîRolü*, p. 178.

[19]   MuharremAkoğlu, "Irak'ta Şiî Varlığı", *Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği Açısından Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri*, ed. Mesut Okumuş – Cemil Hakyemez, Çorum Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Çorum 2014, p. 263.

[20]   Joyce N. Wiley, *Irak Şiileri*, trans. Ekin Yayınları, İstanbul trans., p. 13.

With the purpose of ensuring convergence between Ahl al-Sunnah and Shia, the parties founded an organization called "Dar al-Taqrib" (Institute for Reconciliation) in 1945 in Egypt. Kashif al-Ghita', a Shiite Iraqi scholar, initiated correspondence with Egypt's interim president Mohamed Naguib in 1953 with the intent of contributing to the Shiite-Sunni reconciliation. Even before, he had already paid a number of visits to Egypt for this purpose.[21] However, the aforementioned "taqrib movement" started to dissolve based on the claim that the Shiite scholars in particular were in an attempt to spread their own sectarian ideas and collapsed after 30 years of activity.[22] On the other hand, the rector of Al-Azhar University issued a highly important fatwa for Shia in February 1959, regarding the foundation of Dar al-Taqrib. In a fatwa published in the Institute's journal, Mahmud Shaltut stated that practices based on the judgments of Imami or Ithna'ashari Shia are allowable and Muslims should abstain from sectarian fanaticism. This fatwa of his that allows Muslims to learn the Shiite fiqh was a significant step in terms of the Shiite-Sunni dialogue.[23] It was probably the first time Shia was accepted as a true sect of Islam by a Sunni scholar.

Similarly, the Fedayeen (Devotees) of Islam was founded by a group of Shiite Muslims in Najaf, as a result of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. This organization declared its ultimate goal as to ensure the unity of Shiite and Sunni Muslims. For that purpose, they translated the works of Al-Ghazali and SayyidQutb into Persian. However, their activities that sometimes appeared as armed struggles were not supported by the prominent Shiite scholars.[24]

Meanwhile, in 1975 a civil war broke out in Lebanon, which was an artificial state established after the World War I, and the level of togetherness among different groups and sects in the region declined to the minimum level whereby people resorted to sectarian or congregational belonging to protect their lives. This situation necessarily exacerbated the sectarian conflicts[25] and thus caused adverse effects in reconciliation efforts.

Another significant factor to mention regarding the Sunni-Shia relations within the aftermath of the World War I is the existence of Wahhabism and the Saudi state. Wahhabism and the Saudi organization have been a threat to the sectarian balance in the region since the 18th century. The meeting held by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in January 1927 with the leaders of the Brotherhood, tribal chiefs in Najd, and prominent Wahhabi scholars resulted in indicating their approach toward the Shiite

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[21] Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita, *el-Musûlü'l-Ulyâfi'l-İslâm lâ fî Bahamdun*, Beyrut 1980, p. 123; Faleh A. Jabar, *Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş*, p. 160.

[22] For more information, see: İlyas Üzüm, "Sünnî-Şiî Yakınlaşması: Dârü't-Takrîb Tecrübesi", *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1998, p. 2, p. 171-185.

[23] Hamid Enayat, *Çağdaş İslâmi Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 92-93.

[24] Sayyid Muhammad Ali Huseynzadeh, *İslâm-iSiyasi Der İran*, İntişârât-ı Dânişgah-I Müfid, Qum 1386, p. 175.; M. SerkanTaflıoğlu, *Humeynî (İran İslâmDevrimi)*, Ankara 2010, p. 114-115.

[25] John L. Esposito, *İslâm Tehdidi Efsanesi*, Ufuk Kitapları, İstanbul 2002, p. 255.

Muslims in these territories. The important decisions made in this meeting regarding the Shiite Muslims in Al-Ahsa and Al-Qatifinclude:

a-All education opportunities will be used to ensure that Shiite Muslims accept Wahhabi Islam.

b-Ashura Celebrations and other innovations of Shiites will be strictly forbidden.

c-Places that are visited by Shiites will be destroyed and they will not be allowed to travel to Karbala and Najaf.

d-Shiites will pray five times together with Sunni Muslims in mosques.

e-The migrant Shiite tribes in Iraq will not be allowed to graze their cattle in Najd.

f-All Shiites who do not obey these rules will be deported from the country.[26]

However, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud were not attentive to the enforcement of these seemingly strict prohibitions imposed to Shiites due to the pressure put by Wahhabi scholars. Accordingly, the Saudi administration has been exposed to an inevitable change after taking the control in Hejaz due the established and traditional Ottoman organizational structure in the region and different other factors, such as the heterogenous and cosmopolitan population formed as a result of pilgrimages.[27] Therefore, they started to fall out with Wahhabi scholars. A significant indicator of this rift was the Grand Mosque seizure organized by Juhayman al-Otaybi and his fellows.

Juhayman al-Otaybi, the leading man of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, fulminated Ibn Saud and the scholars around him, blaming them for stopping Brotherhood forces that were planning to fight against the Shiites in Iraq and declaring them as Kharijites. According to him, these Shiites were polytheist as they were praying for Ali, Fatimah, Hasan, and Husayn besides Allah.[28]

As it could be understood from the abovementioned facts, the Sunni-Shia relations were in a golden era due to the movements of modernization and constitutionalism. Later on, the environment that was particularly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood started to take effect on Shiites who were raised by modern education institutions and led to new initiatives of reconciliation between two parties. In addition, known as the rebel boys of the Sunni world, the Saudi Wahhabi Muslims continued the anti-Shia movement which they started with the incidents of Karbala in 1802, which corresponds to the early periods of the group, though to a lesser extent.

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[26]   Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, Rağbet Yay., İstanbul 2013, p. 111.

[27]   Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 250.

[28]   Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-Otaybi, *Resâilü Cuheymân el-Uteybî*, ed. and rev. Rıf'atSeyyid Ahmed, Kahire 1988, p. 89-90; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 204.

Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution

The Islamic Revolution in Iran resulted in transition to a very important phase in Sunni-Shia relations.[29] The official dimension of religious affairs, which was ignored for a set while due to the collapse of dynasties and efforts of nation building that emerged after the World War I, started to gain functionality together again with the revolution. Soon after that, communism lost favor as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and thus religious ideologies and sectarian affairs, as well as the sectarian movements that had fallen into oblivion, were remobilized.

Graced with an anti-imperialist and anti-American discourse, in the 1970s and later, Ayatollah Khomeini maintained a political campaign against the Shah of Iran and had a great influence on the Shiite groups, which had become closer to the leftist ideology as they represented the opposition, to turn towards Islamism once again.[30] Thanks to Amal and Hezbollah, which were inspired by Khomeini and Musa al-Sadr, Lebanon Shiites started to establish their own organizations. These Shiite group awakened particularly with the influence of Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal, and turned into a broad-based organization with militia forces in 1980s. Owing to Musa al-Sadr's efforts as a charismatic leader, the stand taken by leftist and communist groups had a Shiite alternative to show their flags in mass demonstrations.[31]

Accordingly, the Hezbollah Al-Hejaz was founded in Saudi Arabia as a Shiite organization to take revenge at Saudi Arabians after the murder of Iranian pilgrims in 1987. Emerging as an affiliate of Hezbollah and being involved in violence through a number of bomb attacks, this movement was advocating Iran's *wilayat al-faqih*(authority of the jurist) theory. However, the late period Saudi Shiites did not support this movement known in relation with Iran, just as it gave no support to similar initiatives in 1980s.[32]

For sure, 1979 Revolution of Iran was not the only reason behind the religion-oriented trends in Islamic world and the resultant revitalization of sectarian drives. Organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, which had started to take shape long time ago, contributed to the revolution in Iran and led to an ideology of Islamism in general among Muslim communities all around the world.

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[29] Cmp. İsmail Kara, "Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi Üzerine Birkaç Not", *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi*, ed. İsmail Kara, AsımÖz, Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul 2013, p. 34.

[30] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 240.

[31] John L. Esposito, *İslâm Tehdidi Efsanesi*, p. 252-253. The sudden disappearance of Musa al-Sadr in Libya stunned his followers. So that, his disappearance was identified with the Twelfth Imam, who was believed to have been occulted by Allah from mankind in 260/873. Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, Cornell University Pres, 1986, p. 189-190; John L. Esposito, *İslâm Tehdidi Efsanesi*, p. 256.

[32] Toby Matthiesen, "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi'a Opposition Group", *The Middle East Journal*, vol: 64, no: 2, Spring 2010, p. 179-197.

As mentioned above, the revolution led by Khomeini was an Islamist movement. Therefore, although it was a Shiite revolution, this movement inspired many other political movements with its emphasis on Islamism seen in its early phases and contributed to different organizations that would support sectarian reconciliation. For instance; approximately 20 volumes of hadith books were authored after the revolution and accepted as common sources by both Shiite and Sunni Muslims. It can even be claimed that this revolution shaped the Salafi movements in Islamic world. With the spirit they gained from Iran's revolution, they shifted to a more political approach. Afghan Mujahids can be considered as the first example of this trend in practice.[33]

Although Khomeini's emphasis on "Islam" for all Muslims and his consciousness of being ummah had great influence not only on Shia but also some other religious movements that emerged in the Islamic world, this understanding gradually shifted to a different paradigm after his death and more emphasis was put on "Shia" than "Islam". Today we observe that the sympathy of some Muslim communities toward Khomeini and Iran because of the Islamic revolution has turned into a silence over time and even transformed into hatred within the past few years.[34] Therefore, in one sense the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran can be defined as a national movement of liberation which includes a number of different factors, such as ideological, political, and socio-economic ones, rather than pure Islamism. A huge group of Islamists guided by scholars manipulated the revolution to eliminate others from the system and called this movement, which they took in full as the "Islamic Revolution".[35]

Khomeini did not only gain sympathy from all Muslims with the emphasis he put on Islamism in Iran's Islamic Revolution, but also influenced a significant change in Imami Shia by putting the principle of "*wilayat al-faqih*" at the center of his political system. According to Article 5 of Iran's constitution, which was entered into force under his guidance, "the sovereignty of the command [of God] and religious leadership of the community [of believers] in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the responsibility of the faqih who is just, pious..."[36] From this point of view, one can also say that the Shiite scholars, who had been isolated from the government since the collapse of the Safevid state in 1736, gained a stronger central position in political administration, a position similar to its role in religious affairs. In another aspect, this situation can be considered as a new start for the process of heading

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[33] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 253.

[34] Hasan Onat, "İran İslâm Devrimi ve Şiîlik", *Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği Açısından Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri*, ed. Mesut Okumuş – Cemil Hakyemez, Çorum Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Çorum 2014, p. 149.

[35] Hamid Dabashi, *İran: Ketlenmiş Halk*, trans. Emine Ayhan, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul 2008, p. 161.

[36] Article 5: During the absence (ghayba) of his holiness, the Lord of the Age, May God all mighty hasten his appearance, the sovereignty of the command of [of God] and religious leadership of the community [of believers] in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the responsibility of the faqih who is just, pious, knowledgeable about his era, courageous, and a capable and efficient administrator, as indicated in Article 107.

toward nationalism and sectarianism in Iran, concurrently. Shiite scholars of a newly independent Iraq, which had been a community within the Ottoman society for centuries, did not support the principle of Khomeini *wilayat al-faqih of* Khomeini probably for this reason.

As also mentioned above, another reason behind the abstention of the Iraqi Shiite scholars in this period from the idea of *wilayat al-faqih* was that the revolution had to naturalize the nationalist ideologies in Iran in time. Similar to the period of Ayatollah Khomeini, against the Iraqi Shiite scholars, who had ties with the Islamist internationalism, Iranian Shiite understanding was rather associated with Iranian nationalism.[37] The nationalist feelings that shined outwards with the excitement caused by the war against Iraq, were combined with Islam and converted into a strong syntheses with a wider base and higher persuasiveness in the eyes of the public. Moreover, the opposition front, which was consolidated just after the revolution with some disappointed groups, was correlated with the enemy army and was eliminated in this way.[38]

On the other hand, although a significant part of Iraqi Shiites stood aloof from the revolution, there were some activists among them, who scrambled to realize the revolutions in their countries were similar to the one that occurred in Iran. However, they changed their minds after observing the practices in Iran. Ahmad al-Khatib was one of these activists.

According to Ahmad al-Khatib, the principle of *wilayat al-faqih,* as executed in Iran, was not approved by majority of the Shiite scholars of Iraq. On the contrary, Al-Khatib states that they were rather in favor of the consultative assembly, which can also be called as democracy. Again according to Al-Khatib, a common political thought would naturally emerge if the modern Shiites can go beyond the understanding of *wilayat al-faqih*and embrace democracy, while ensuring the participation of Sunni Muslims within this process. Moreover, dispensing with the political ideology of Imamiyah or *wilayat al-faqih* would bring the Shiite communities to Sunni Muslims who adopt a political ideology based on a consultative parliamentary system.[39]

As attempted to be explained above, the shift to both politicization and nationalism seen in the post-revolution Shia in Iran was not favored by Shiite scholars of Iraq. Some of these scholars realized the negative sides of politicization and started to question the Shiite thought of imamate, which gave birth to the understanding of *wilayat al-faqih*. The eventual point reached by these scholars was accepting Islam as a supra-sectarian notion and a common denominator, just as

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[37]   Faleh A . Jabar, Irak't aŞii Hareketi ve Direniş, p. 337.

[38]   Hasan Onat, İran İslâm Devrimi ve Şiîlik, p. 151.

[39]   Ahmad al-Khatib, Nedenleri Tarihte Kalmış Siyasi Ayrılık, Sünnilik-Şiilik, İslâm Birliği, trans. Muharrem Tan, İstanbul 2009, p. 348-349.

argued by previous modernist scholars. The difference between their ideology and modernism was that they put stronger emphasis on religion than others.

The post-revolution practices and Iran's transnational efforts to spread the revolution created unrest among Muslims and stimulated the reactional anti-Shia policies. A similar attitude to the one adopted by the Ottoman Empire against Shiitization policies of the Safevid State that had accepted Shia as its official sect, was seen in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's rule. According to Ahmad al-Khatib[40], the secular and Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein mobilized all classical means that could be held against Rafida (Shia). In this way, they were planning to declare Shia as infidelity and legitimize the Iran-Iraq War.

Besides Iraq, Saudi Arabia also had troubles within this context under the Wahhabi Saudi regime. In addition to the Hanbali sternness, the grim struggle against all bid'ah and innovations initiated by Wahhabis posed a fundamentalist threat against Shia to an unprecedented extent.[41] The foundation of the Hejaz Hezbollah by Shiite Muslims supported by Iran in the northeastern regions of the country caused a considerable disturbance for them. However, due to the positive attitude of Ibn Saud toward their economic achievements and certain social requests, the Saudi Shiites remained aloof to radical calls and invitations of Khomeini and some other Shiite leaders[42]. On the other hand, Khomeini had alleged in a work he authored in 1971 that the Saudi regime were indeed in the service of imperialist powers by writing books to slander Shiite Muslims and trying to break them away from the rest of ummah.[43]

Despite all problems mentioned above, Islam came to the front as a common denominator for these different groups just after the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran and the impact of the early period spirit of Islamism and revolutionism had an undeniable importance in this regard. Even a detente could easily be identified among Shiite Muslims when the first periods of Iran's Islamic Revolution are taken into consideration. Immediately after the Revolution, Hamid Enayat[44] authored a book in 1982 and stated that there was a trend among Shiites of his period to abstain from libelous attitudes toward, particularly, the first three caliphs. A trend of moderation in relations and reconciliation between sects was also mentioned by some Sunni scholars. For instance, HüseyinAtay[45] states that he authored his *Ehl-*

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[40] Ahmad al-Khatib, Nedenleri Tarihte Kalmış Siyasi Ayrılık, p. 345.

[41] Hamid Enayat, *Çağdaş İslâmi Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 79-80.

[42] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 251-252.

[43] Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Impact of American Policies on Iranian-Arab relations", *Iran and the Arab Worl*, ed. H. Amirahmadi, N. Entessar, London 1993, p. 133-134; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *Suûdi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, p. 240.

[44] According to him, the claims suggesting that other caliphs belligerent acts against Ali by exploiting his rights have remained unchanged. Hamid İnâyet, *ÇağdaşİslâmîSiyâsîDüşünce*, p. 79-80.

[45] Hüseyin Atay, *Ehl-iSünnet ve Şia*, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara 1983, p. 187.

iSünnetveŞîa in 1983 with the purpose of ending the hatred and hostility between these two groups. For similar purposes, in 1993 a symposium was held in Istanbul to bring Sunni and Shiite scholars together.[46]

While the sectarian affairs between Sunni and Shiite Muslims were sustained in this way in the post-revolution period, a change can be seen in consideration of the real outcomes of the revolution that came to light. Iranian scholar Hamid Dabashi summarizes this situation as follows: "As an expression of the two-century accumulation, the revolution has destroyed the cosmopolitan culture of Iranian society, which was holding together the anti-imperialist and modernist movement and different beliefs and entities of the country".[47]

Eventually, in a certain while after the revolution, the emergence of Amal in Lebanon, Ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya in Iraq, Tehrik-e-Jafaria in Pakistan, and HezbeWahdat in Afghanistan and similar others since the 1980s, with support, encouragement or guidance of the Iranian government which was pursuing goals of Shiite communities, and their increasingly visible sectarian activities created counter-effects in relations which had been moderate since the revolution. However, the situation was still recoverable, until the US invasion of Iraq.

After the Invasion of Iraq

As it is for all religious movements in the Islamic world, the invasion of some Muslims countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, by the United States and coalition forces is also a turning point for Sunni-Shia relations.

When we look at the recent developments in relations between members of Sunni and Shiite groups, a similar pursuit of reconciliation to the past efforts catches attention. For instance; in an interview the authords had with Hujjat al-Islam Dr. Zamani, the vice chancellor of Dar al-Mustafa, in June 8, 2013, in Iran, he stated that he had been involved in studies about taqrib for the past 30 years, organized meetings to discuss relevant issues in 20 different countries, and engaged in joint activities with Muhammad SayyidTantawy of Al-Azhar.

Looking at the Sunni side, we see that they have been engaged in some activities regarding the issue of taqrib. In a summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which was held in August 14-15, 2012, in Mecca, Abdullah of Saudi Arabia offered a Center of Dialogue (Markaz al-Hiwar) in Riyadh to create a common understanding among different sects of Islam and this offer was accepted by representatives of the other member countries.[48] Similarly, according to an

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[46] Milletlerarası Tarihte ve Günümüzde Şiîlik Sempozyumu, Ensar Neşriyat, İstanbul 1994.

[47] Hamid Dabashi, *İran: KetlenmişHalk*, p. 152.

[48] Merkezlil-Hıvârbeyne'l-Mezâhibi'l-İslâmiyye. "el-Beyânü'l-Hıtâmî", p. 2, Article 2, http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/is/ex-4/is_ex4_fc_ar_02.pdf, 04.10.2013. For more information, see: Adem Arıkan,

Iranian news agency, Ahmed el-Tayeb, one of the most outstanding scholars of the Sunni Al-Azhar University stated that it would be for the benefit of all Muslims if the Islamic triangle, formed by Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, pursues non-discriminatory policies for both Sunni and Shiite Muslims.[49] According to another news, Dr. Ahmad Khaled Babaker, the secretary general of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, emphasized among his opening remarks at the "Council for Reconciliation and Consultation Among Islamic Sects" that the necessary activities had to be immediately initiated to ensure convergence among sects.[50]

As seen in the examples given above, there are some activities in today's Islamic world that aim to improve sectarian relations among different groups of Muslims. However, it not a coincidence that a majority of these activities are offered by Iran and Saudi Arabia, both known for their sectarian discourses. This situation raises questions in the mind regarding whether "these two countries are engaged in campaigns of perception management to cover up their efforts of sectarianism". In addition, the sincerity of these countries and thus, their impacts on Muslims are also questioned. In other words, promises and commitments are empty and unconvincing for Muslims. Underground efforts of certain countries, such as Saudi and Iranian states, to influence Muslim communities are the real factors that determine the true colors of the picture.

As mentioned above, the explicit activities carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its policies that expose a desire to spread Shiitization of Muslim communities have gradually warded off the influence of the Islamic Revolution in the Islamic world. [51] Let alone the whole Muslim youth, today's religious organization, emerged after the revolution and dominated by conservative scholars in all aspects, cannot even create an ideal for the young citizens of Iran and quite the contrary, it excites their feelings of grudge and hatred against the revolution.[52] Today, expressions like "reconciliation among religious sects" cannot go beyond being mottos and small talks for both Sunni and Shiite Muslims. On the contrary, today we observe an Islamic world where expressions like "conflict among religious sects" draw more attention.

In an attempt to re-shape the Islamic world and within the framework of the new world order they have been pursuing since the invasion of Iraq, the authorities

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"Şiîlerin Takrîbi ve Suûdîlerin Teklifi",*Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği Açısından Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri*, ed. Mesut Okumuş – Cemil Hakyemez, Çorum Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Çorum 2014, p. 177 et al.

[49] http://irananders.de/nachrichten/news/article/rektor-der-al-azhar-schlaegt-partnerschaft-zwischen-iran-tuerkei-und-aegypten-vor.html (17.08.2011)

[50] During this meeting, Prof. Dr. Ali Mohyi Al-Din Al-Qaradaghi, the Secretary General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, was elected as the President of the Council for Reconciliation and Consultation Among Islamic Sects. http://iina.me/wp_ar/?p=1009225 (15.09.2011)

[51] Ergün Yıldırım, "İslâmizm, İslâmlaşma ve İttihad-ıİslâm", *Türkiye'de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi*, ed. İsmail Kara, Asım Öz, Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul 2013, p. 125.

[52] Farhad Khosrokhavar-Olivier Roy, *İran: Bir Devrimin Tükenişi*, trans. İsmail Yerguz, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul 2013, p.189; Hasan Onat, *İran İslâm Devrimi ve Şiîlik*, p. 160-161.

of the United States are willing to stay in touch with some Shiite groups they considered relatively friendly in Iraq and use them as the engine power of the planned socio-political change.[53] Different phenomena and incidents that happened in the region affect today's relations and can be called as phases of an Islamic awakening, or a movement of Islamism, and the US authorities consciously try to explain them through sectarian and ethnic identities. It can be seen that they often emphasize certain expressions during assessments of the past incidents, such as minority-majority, or Shia-Salafism polarizations. As an engagement zone of conflicts, people in Iraq are classified by the US forces by their sectarian identities and the Shiite and Sunni Muslims, who live together in common settlements, are displaced and resettled for their sectarian beliefs. Sunni Muslims living in the al-Qazimiyya district of Baghdad, where Shiite Muslims constitute the majority, were forced to immigrate. The fairly common marriages between the children of particularly the Sunni and Shiite elites living in urban areas have declined to minimum levels since the US invasion. Moreover, every Sunni Muslim in the country was misrepresented as supporters of Saddam Hussein, while all Shiite Muslims were introduced as freedom fighters who fight against oppression.[54]

These policies of the United States and its allies in Iraq and the presentation of Shiite Muslims in the regions as the new actors were named as "the Shia Revival" by Vali Nasr, an American Shiite advisor. According to Vali Nasr, neither Arab nationalism nor national identities are determinant factors in today's Middle East. The real determinant factor in the region is the Shiite revival and the reaction of Sunni Muslims against this movement.[55]

Unlike the Islamic awakening, Vali Nasr's "Shia Revival" did not emerge as a reaction to certain factors such as colonialism, economic rout, and secularism. On the contrary, the authors see that completely sectarian realities, such as a "Sunni persecution" or a "Shiite rule", are brought forward in this regard.[56]

In parallel with the Shia Revival discussions, the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan also raised advantages for the benefit of Iran. In an article of January 2014, Vali Nasr narrated that the traditional alliances, such as the one between the US and Saudi Arabia or Jordan, had lost their legitimacy and therefore, the cyclical situation required the States to approach Iran.[57] By means of the nascent Shiite

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[53] Muharrem Akoğlu, *Irak'ta Şiî Varlığı*, p. 283.

[54] For more information, see: Sönmez Kutlu, "Şiî Uyanış Tezi ve Geleceği Tartışmaları İle İlgili Değerlendirmeler", *Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği Açısından Şiî-Sünnî İlişkileri*, ed. Mesut Okumuş – Cemil Hakyemez, Çorum Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Çorum 2014, p. 315-316, 331.

[55] Vali Nasr, The Shia Revivavl: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future, New York 2006, p. 179.

[56] Sönmez Kutlu, "Şiî Uyanış Tezi", p. 317.

[57] Vali Nasr, "On the Conflict between Shiites and Sunnis: We Need Engagement with Iran", http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/vali-nasr-on-the-conflict-between-shiites-and-sunnis-we-need-engagement-with-iran-a-444709.html

generation, Iran was able to break the siege led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Taliban's Afghanistan.

According to Vali Nasr, the popularity of sectarianism in the region is a result of the Shia Revival, which emerged after the end of Saddam's regime.[58] In addition, the official Shiite understanding of Iran, which has been built upon the system of *wilayat al-faqih*, could lead to a pan-Shiite solidarity and thus, the Najaf-based Shiite organization could be a model for the new Shia Revival under the guidance of Al-Sistani.[59]

Vali Nasr's "Shia Revival" and the ideas he puts forward within this context are criticized by experts of the field. According to SreeramChaulia, this book presents the image of Muslims in the eyes of the West, which is based on their understandings of fundamentalism, orientalism, and women rights, as a perception which is oriented around sectarian conflicts.[60] Looking at the recent developments in Iraq, the parallelism between them and Vali Nasr's suggestions proves SreeramChaulia's opinions. The disclosure of the monetary assistance of 200 million dollars the United States had given to Sistani before the invasion of Iraq, throughout the period starting from 1987,[61] lays bare the spiral of relations behind the scenes and the way that the process is managed.

This underlying reason of Vali Nasr's suggestion was to create a different model of resistance against the Iran model, which is known for feeding the violence, the jihadist Sunni approach, and the Salafi Wahhabi understanding at the same time.[62] However, the current impression shows that there are larger plans behind this situation and the aim of these plans is to redesign the whole Middle East. The first move that come to mind as active determinants of this process is to encourage the Shiite population, who are ready to strangle Salafi Muslims anytime, for action.

In conclusion, on one hand, the invasion of Iraq has resulted in more power and propagation in Islamic geography for the Salafi movements, while on the other hand, picture that puts a strong emphasis on Shia under the umbrella of the so-called "Shia Revival" can be observed. Accordingly, history states that the rise and falls in both Shiite and Salafi movements have oftentimes been in parallel with each other.

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[58] Vali Nasr, "The Shi Revival", *Military Review*, 83/3(2007), p. 9.

[59] As a prominent *marja al-taqlid* (source to follow) living in Iraq, Sayyid Ali al-Sistani does not approve the ideology of *wilayat al-faqih*. He takes one step further in terms of democratization and states that not a totally republican system of government, rather *wilayat al-faqih,* would be more beneficial for the country. In this manner, he puts support behind a democratic state in Iraq. Ahmad al-Khatib, "Şia ve Modernizm, Direnişten Bilinçli Açılıma", p. 157.

[60] Sönmez Kutlu, "Şiî Uyanış Tezi ve Geleceği", p. 340.

[61] http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2011/04/19/sistani-rumsfeld-den-rusvet-aldigini-itiraf-etti.html#.VSdqldysWVM

[62] Cmp. Sönmez Kutlu, "Şiî Uyanış Tezi ve Geleceği", p. 323.

Discussion and Conclusion

According to "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity" report published by the Pew Research Center on August 9, 2012, only 42% of Egyptians, 37% of Moroccans, and 38% of Palestinians regarded Shiites as real Muslims.[63] It appears that significantly different results will be obtained if a similar survey, this time about Sunni Muslims, is carried out in Shiite populations. On the other hand, both Sunni and Shiite populations identify themselves as Muslims. So, is there any strong religious foundation of this emphasis on sectarian differences among today's Muslims? If not, what are the actual factors lying behind this conflict?

This question can be answered in two aspects. In the author's opinion, the main point should be searched in the mindsets and perceptions of history. With Hasan Onat's words, "every sect or ideology builds its own history and past during this process. Accordingly, it should be noted that histories are retroactive and perceptions about the past are reconstructed together with histories."[64] "Prevention of the Shiite-Salafi polarization and a possible conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, is only possible through a process that may build peace and a culture of high-level trust among Muslims, while eliminating arbitrary ones and establishing a realistic perception of history."[65]

In other words, the emergence process of sects before anything else has to be known to comprehend the fact that some religious issues, perceived as matters of faith and are discussed, are actually results of the early period political debates. Similarly, do the factors that trigger modern sectarian conflicts stem from popular interstate political competitions or internal policies of independent states?

A sacred cause like spreading Shia is known for contributing to the strength of the state, which had depreciated in the eyes of Iranian population, and its supporter Shiite scholars. Their mutual arguments with the monarchy-based rules of Arab countries respite both themselves and the Arab authorities that keep distance from the local communities. However, Muslims are again the worst-hit victims of this situation and the feelings of grudge and hatred between Sunni and Shiite communities are gradually increasing.

Although the current government of Iran tries to abstain from a sectarian discourse, the authorities still depend their actual existence and legitimacy on the cause of spreading Shia and Shiitization. Another reason behind their attachment for Shia or emphasis on sectarian identities is that a significant part of the country's population is composed of non-Persian ethnic groups. By placing emphasis on Shia as a common ground, ethnic demands of these groups can be thrown out of focus.

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[63]   http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-Muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/

[64]   Hasan Onat, "İslâm Ortak Paydasını Kaybetmiş Müslümanların Açmazı: Şi'î-Selefî Kutuplaşması", *Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefîlik*, İSAV, İstanbul 2014, p. 532.

[65]   Hasan Onat, "İslâm Ortak Paydasını Kaybetmiş Müslümanların Açmazı, p. 530.

Similarly, anti-American and anti-Zionist ideologies are kept alive to shift the agenda to foreign policies and to cover up internal problems, particularly in fields of economy and governance, in this way. Today, there are serious concerns about the mainstay of Iran's economy, which is struggling to survive against the embargo.

Developments of the past few years and the emergent alliances and conflicts explicitly reveal the political dimension of this issue. Within this scope, after Iran's attitudes toward Iraq and especially about the issue of Syria, its historical relations and activities started to be questioned more. For instance; today, questions like "Were the operations of Lebanon's Hezbollah in the region actually for the people of Palestine?", or, "Did they bring any benefit to the Palestinian society?" are being asked in an explicit way. Likewise, connections of the Saudi government with Salafi organizations and its conflicting attitudes regarding relations with religious groups in Egypt and Yemen are some other issues being questioned by Muslims.

Nowadays, Iran's and Saudi Arabia's leading roles in the polarized (Sunni-Shia) Islamic world planned by the western states are understood better than the developments regarding the issue of Yemen. In other words, as the distorted historical background of this plot, which is staged as a conflict between Shia-Salafism, is already planned so the issues can be easier to manipulate. It is not by confidence that the companion of the Prophet who is referred mostly by both Salafi and Shiite Muslims as a model and most hated figure, respectively, is the same person, namely, 'Umar ibn Al-Khattab. Moreover, it is a result of the distorted and retrospectively established perception of sectarianism. Another interesting point in this regard is that both Shiite and Salafi Muslims resort to the conflict-provoking discourse of Islam's period of stagnation, which corresponds to 10th-18th centuries. Adding foreign interventions to Muslims' internal conflicts, the situation becomes completely insolvable. The extraordinary conditions observed in the Islamic world and the foreign invasions similar to those of western states have further upset the traditional balances between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. During the Mongol invasions, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274) and similar other great Shiite scholars caused significant unrest for Sunni scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), as they stayed by the Mongol emperors of the time.

Today, we urge members of these two sects, particularly the religious scholars, to prioritize a theological discourse that will prevent conflicts and write a new history that will question mistakes as more urgent steps to take for a solution. In addition to these, as mentioned by Hamid Enayat[66]; unlike Sunni Muslims, it is relatively unlikely to expect elastic behaviors from Shiites. Before anything else, the theological foundations of the two sects differ from each other. The relatively less assertive evidence of the Sunni understanding of the caliphate than the Shiite belief of imamate brings more elasticity to the former under changing conditions. Some prominent Sunni theoreticians of caliphate who had reputable position in

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[66] Cmp. Hamid Enayat, *Çağdaş İslâmî Siyasî Düşünce*, p. 29-30.

governments of Abbasid, Seljuk or Mamluk rules, such as al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058), Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) and Badr al-Din Ibn Jamaah (d. 732/1332), were able to put forward new ideas to legitimize the political power thanks to this characteristic of the relevant sect. However, the Shiite belief of imamate and the correspondingly emerging ideas of *marja al-taqlid* and *wilayat al-faqih* continue to be more influentially determinant in Shiite communities. Although the modern Shiite Muslims are engaged in certain efforts to break this siege, these efforts are often restrained due to the environment of increasing tension.

The existence of some intellectual Shiite scholars are known, such as Ahmad al-Khatib, who tried to realize a similar movement to Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the idea of wilayat al-faqih, which is based on the Shiite belief of imamate, to Iraq. However, these scholars were disappointed after witnessing the course of affairs in Iran after the revolution, desisted from that idea and instead, came to believe that the efforts should be focused on settlement of disputes between Shiite-Sunni communities. It is also known that a majority of the Shiite *maraji'* were against the system as they were of the opinion that the idea of *wilayat al-faqih*, as adopted in Iran, would make Shia extremely politicized. Nevertheless, the encompassing nature of the current system of marja al-taqlid and the current environment of turmoil and conflict make the aforementioned conciliatory discourse pale besides others.

As for Iran's government, which is in an effort to place the system of *wilayat al-faqih* on solid ground; this initiative may have a lot of impacts in society as long as the economic situation in the country improves. Apparently, if the process remains within its ordinary course in the a environment, where demands for modernization are expected to become more effective, the impact of scholars on society will decrease. However, it is understood that the escalated sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and now in Yemen will inevitably affect the natural course of this process.

At this point, it is worth repeating again that foreign interventions will continue to be determinant factors of the process. Interestingly, the West imposes the traditional and medieval governance models upon Muslim countries, while living modernization to the utmost in its geography. Within this context, the author believes that the persistence calls of the first Muslim modernists, such as Namık Kemal, Jamal al-Din Afghani (d. 1897), and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), for the Sunni-Shia unity and similar expressions that are put into words by today's intellectuals may significantly contribute to the process as impeding factors against sectarian conflicts. Accordingly, it should be noted that the most seamless period of interdenominational relations was similar to the period of Mu'tazila, which corresponds to heated debates over kalam issues, and the 19th century is a period of time that was marked by modernist Muslim intellectuals. It can be observed that the Salafi understanding that emerged as a reaction to them and similar other Shiite groups, are the real sources of conflicts, as they derail discussions off the intellectual track to the streets. As mentioned in the author's previous study,

"Taking its arguments from Mu'tazila and its sprit from Hanbalism, the section which is under the thumb of the ideological, conflict-provoking mentality of the 19th and 20th centuries, and growing up on provocations of the 21th century's Islamophobia, is the real source of the sectarian conflicts witnessed in the Middle East."[67] On the other hand, the opposing groups, which are trying to legitimize the Shiite fanaticism on the pretext of the conflict-provoking discourse of these groups, indeed play into their hands. To be brief; Shia rises in parallel with the growth of Salafism. Looking at their target groups, it is understood that both of them are factors that nurture extremism.

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[67] CemilHakyemez, "Ehl-iSünnet'in Şiîlik Algısı ve TemelEtmenler", *Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği Açısından Şiî-Sünnîİlişkileri*, ed. Mesut Okumuş – Cemil Hakyemez, Çorum Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, Çorum 2014, p. 116.

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Value and Nature of Tradition on The Axis of Separation Between Religion – Religious Knowledge[*]

Şehmus DEMİR[**]

Abstract

If we express shortly this by transforming the themes that we will dwell on, to the questions: What is the tradition? What is the value correlation between the Islam and the tradition that emerged in historical process? Have it been to make enough distinction between the tradition and traditionalism? Is it right to have been seen the tradition responsible of the Islamic world collapse? Is the tradition a valid auxiliary or a unnecessary data must be throw? Do the Muslim who live in modern age know the tradition sufficiently. What is the relation between idea of turn to the essence and tradition.

Keywords : Quran, Tradition, Traditionalism, Turn to the Essence, Islamic World

Din – Dinî Bilgi Ayrımı Ekseninde Geleneğin Ne'liği ve Değersel Boyutu[***]

Özet

Üzerinde duracağımız konuları soruya dönüştürerek özetleyecek olursak, şunları ifade etmek mümkündür: Gelenek nedir? İslâm'ın kendisi ile tarihî süreçte ortaya çıkan gelenek arasında değersel anlamda ne tür bir bağıntı vardır? Gelenek ile gelenekçilik arasında yeterince ayırım yapılmakta mıdır? İslâm dünyasının özelde son iki yüzyılda çöküşünün sorumlusu olarak geleneğin görülmesi doğru mudur? Gelenek geçerliliğini sürdüren bir yardımcı mı, yoksa atılması gereken lüzumsuz bir veri midir? Modern dönemde yaşayan

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[***] It is very important that before salafism, we should discuss how to set our approach towards tradition, that is, the historical experience of Islam. For this reason we found it best to re-publish a reviewed version of this article (Marife 2008/1), which aims to establish a perspective in terms of tradition (issue editor).

Müslüman, geleneği yeterince tanımakta mıdır? Öze dönüş düşüncesi ile gelenek arasında ne tür bir ilgi vardır?

Anahtar Kelimeler : Kur'an, Gelenek, Gelenekçilik, Öze Dönüş, İslâm Dünyası

In a sociological sense, tradition is the accumulation of knowledge, ideas and culture which descends through generations. In this sense, tradition represents the past. In a religious sense, tradition is the whole of interpretations, attributes and evolutions which survives through time and reaches us.

The problem here is how to approach tradition. Tradition is rooted within the actual existence of the Islamic community, but should it also be accepted as a starting point from where we can build up our future which also helps us understand our times, and does it validly survive time? And if not, should it be accepted as a passive object which belongs to the historical interpretation process? Is it possible to evaluate tradition as a whole? Does a Muslim living in modern times know tradition well enough? Is the distinction between tradition and traditionalism sufficiently emphasized? What kind of relation exists between Islam itself and the tradition that emerges in the course of history? Would it make sense to blame tradition for the downfall of the Islamic World during the last two centuries?

We could further elaborate these questions. However, first we need to discuss the **nature** of the value dimension of tradition. In this context, we believe that accumulation of, which we can refer to as "religious knowledge" that comes into existence through an understanding of religion in the course of history, and religion itself must be distinguished from one another, which should enable a clearer comprehension of this nature. In other words, religion and what people understand from it should not be considered equal.

Religion is embodied in revelations coming from Allah and through prophets, prophets' lives, the evolutions they start and the perspectives and worldviews they construct. In this respect, religion is perfect, complete and it does not have any shortcomings. However the efforts to understand and interpret religion throughout history have always been human efforts, and naturally they are not perfect. Therefore, since there is no deficiency in religion, there is no aspect to correct or reclaim.

If there is to be any reclaimed or corrected, then it should be about religious knowledge rather than about religion itself. Otherwise the humble human mind would be given the very impossible task of "perfecting and maturing religion", which is far too much for it to handle. The mind can only put forward its best efforts to mature what it has gathered from religion up until the current day. In this context, religious knowledge has a mass identity and it guides the accumulation of information which is rooted in a mutual knowledge sharing, competition and

cooperation between scientists, rather than reflecting the knowledge or attributes of a single person. This religious knowledge is open to change, improvement and deterioration, and it is in a constant exchange with aspects of other humane cultures. At this point we need to distinguish religious knowledge and personal knowledge too. Because personal knowledge does not concern the masses, in other words, it is not validated by scientists[1], therefore it is exclusive to the person. This distinction we aim to make, that is, distinguishing religion and religious knowledge, should at the same time be regarded as the fundamental point of moving forward in order to understand the difference between Islam and tradition.

Tradition means an accumulation of knowledge which, within different civilizations during different eras, emerged due to their cultures, needs and problems. Innovation, on the other hand, points to the effort of reinterpreting tradition, taking into account the needs of the age. In other words, innovation is the grounding and improvement of a given situation, and it also means social change. Therefore even when one mentions innovation, there are still ties to tradition. Because innovation is rooted in a pre-existing original. However, we should immediately point out that tradition is not really a homogenous structure or process. It becomes differentiated and varied, depending on the characteristics of its pillars. Tradition is also not a monotonous data, it is rather a journal of tendencies and currents which are expressed in ideologies, social powers and opinions.[2] Tradition is the total experience which should be evaluated, processed and further developed within the process of structuring human beings' relationship with the world.

Change is inevitable and where there is no change there is inertia and immobility. But this mobility and change, which is ever-present in the universe, also carries forward the reservoir of the past and whatever the extent of social change that happens, it still carries elements of the past within itself.[3] Therefore tradition constitutes the foundation of a society's existence and at the same time is the starting point of constructing its future. In other words, tradition is among the fundamental elements which will help us understand today and construct our future.

Renowned philosopher Thomas Kuhn emphasized the fact that the past validates the future, which in a way curbs our hubris. Because even from a scientific point of view the past is not a history of mistakes, but an ongoing effort to understand human beings and nature. Therefore, this very approach might as well get lost in the historical moments of the future. This however, does not mean that it

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[1]   Suruş, Abdülkerim, "Dini Bilginin Evrimi ve Çağdaşlaşma", trans. Kenan Çamurcu, *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, 1994/8, p. 79-80.

[2]   Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid, *İlahi Hitabın Tabiatı*, trans. Mehmet Emin Maşalı, Kitabiyat Yay., Ankara 2001, p. 38.

[3]   Muhammed İkbal, *İslâm'da Dini Düşüncenin Yeniden Doğuşu*, trans. N. Ahmet Asrar, Birleşik Yay., İstanbul, trans., p. 225.

is completely wrong, and its current accomplishment will not render it completely truthful either.[4]

The recent opinions in the context of development sociology, which suggests that tradition is inert, it does not carry any purpose and leads people against innovation[5] does not reflect any reality and is a distinction so clearly made would undoubtedly cease all connections of humanity with its traditions.

The effects of tradition cannot be underestimated in historical moments and situations experienced. It is not possible to think of tradition independently of different historical contexts. As mentioned earlier, tradition refers to the accumulation of interpretations and ideas that were suggested by different people or groups of people over a historical process. Therefore, it will be quite wrong to read the accumulation of ideas and interpretations in the Islamic tradition as universal realities.

Then, when evaluating the value of tradition, we need to be aware of how sensitive a subject it is that we are treading on. If we are to think within the above context of separating religion and religious knowledge, tradition is not religion itself, but an accumulation of views on religion. It would be wrong to confuse these two. While it is wrong to perceive tradition as the very religion itself, on the other hand it is also wrong to completely disregard and overlook tradition and only accept the Qur'an and its sunnah as true knowledge.

At this point it would be useful to iterate that society or scientific circles do not have sufficient knowledge regarding historical heritage, which constitutes tradition. Touching upon the subject, Fazl al-Rahman states that when an ordinary young Muslim person, who receives a modern education, and knows very little about historical heritage same as an ordinary outsider does, they are a danger to be realized.[6] This insufficient knowledge regarding tradition is not only limited to a lack of information, but also in some (or most) cases it brings with it certain generalizations, therefore leading people to construe tradition within their context.

The need and how to sort through tradition is a problem in itself, but there is a more pressing issue of how to correctly interpret tradition. Then we need to focus on what kind of methodological principles to use in order to sort through tradition. In other words, it is a serious problem to be addressed, to recognize what principles are set when sorting through historical evolutions and interpretations in the process of establishing how to understand and practice religion, as well as to taking heed of the historical and cultural accumulation of religion that is carried over to our day. Methodological efforts and searches directed to sort through tradition are very

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[4]   Rabinow, Paul – Sullivan, William, "Yorumcu Eğilim: Bir Yaklaşımın Doğuşu" *Toplum Bilimlerinde Yorumcu Yaklaşım*, trans. Taha Parla, Hürriyet Vakfı Yay., İstanbul 1990, p. 14.

[5]   Turner, Bryan S., *Max Weber ve İslam*, trans. Yasin Aktay, Vadi Yay., Ankara 1991, p. 165.

[6]   Fazl al-Rahman, "Revival and Reform In Islam", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. P.M. Holt – Ann K. S. Lambton – Bernard Lewis, Cambridge University Press, New York 1970, II, p. 641.

important in that they can define what elements can still be useful, and what elements can be left in the past as antique elements of interest.

Throughout the course of history, many interpretations were written as the products of efforts to understand and interpret the Qur'an, which is the foundational and the most important source of reference for Islam. These interpretations were classified according to various criteria. At this point, the classification by Muhammad Abduh on interpretations of Islamic tradition are very important. Abduh states that the principal purpose of interpretation is to understand the Qur'an and anything other than this is of secondary importance, and goes on to categorize interpretations as follows:

1. Those who study the Qur'ans wording, meanings and rhetoric examples (such as Al-Zamakhshari).

2. Those who focus on the grammatical properties of the Qur'an, studying types of irab and the meanings of various types of wordings.

3. Those who prioritize expanded meanings and anecdotal details (these persons added explanations from Hebrew works and historical books to the Qur'an anecdotes. Not satisfied with the Torah and the Bible, they also included every possible piece of information available in relation to the subject matter, disregarding any truthfulness).

4. Those who focused on explaining the *garib* (unused; difficult to understand since they are not frequently used in daily life) words.

5. Those who focus on verses of judgment, praying and procedures (i.e. Abu Bakr ibn al-Arabi).

6. Those who prioritize the principles of belief (i.e. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi).

7. Interpretations mainly aimed on *zuhd* (asceticism) and advice.

8. Symbolic interpretations.

Having separated interpretations into eight categories according to their subjects and areas of interest, Abduh continues and to suggests that focusing on only one category will lead one away from the true intention of the Qur'an and make one forget its meaning.[7]

The traditional interpreters of the Qur'an specifically focused on what appealed to their interest and shaped their interpretations around them. This gave way to the emergence of many interpretations which were different in terms of structure and methods and widened the context in the field interpretation. In terms of the general situation of interpretations, it is possible to say that form and formalistic issues are

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[7]   Abduh, Muhammad – Rızâ, Reşîd, *Tefsîru'l- Menâr*, Mektebetu'l-Kahire, Egypt 1960, I, 17-18.

more focused on, which occasionally leads to pulling away from the main purpose,[8] leading to scattered and unorganized information. It is for this reason that Abduh, in order to cope with this and clarify the approaches on interpretation of the Qur'an, continuously emphasized "the right path" and advised that it must always be taken heed of when interpreting the Qur'an. The ideas of Abduh are not meant to be understood as overlooking the rhetoric, fluency and irab of the Qur'an, it is rather a reminder that these must not take precedence over the priorities of interpreting the Qur'an.[9]

Another aspect to pay utmost attention to is the requirement to protect the essence of tradition, which has an important place in Islamic thinking, rather than keeping it alive in all of its formalistic aspects. Because trying to formally preserve various elements of tradition will bring about the imitation of tradition. In fact, it is possible to talk about two sides of this tension. One of them is conservatism, and the other is modernity. However, we should immediately state that conservatism is about prioritizing and striving to protect what is valuable and the essence, rather than trying to completely preserve the past.[10] In other words, it is the duty of protecting tradition and at the same time being open to innovation and modernization.

At this point, protecting every tradition is one end of negativity and danger, while the other is to imitate the ways of the West.[11] While we are on the subject of evaluation and sorting through tradition, it would be quite short-sighted to ignore the issue of West, which has severely influenced the Islamic world over the last two centuries. Therefore, as wrong as it is to blindly imitate the practices of imitation, and as critical as is it to study the influence of the West and the resulting imitation of its practices. Otherwise a mind which has been shaped with a Western understanding of culture, science and religion would risk a re-evaluation and question the tradition of Islam.

Another issue that needs to be taken into consideration when dealing with tradition is the idea of "*returning to essence*" which is constantly being raised, and the position of this idea against tradition.

First of all, it is necessary to state that in the first reform movements, returning to the foundation, to essence, points to the prioritization of the very first practices of the Qur'an, sunnah and tradition. In the modern era, returning to essence sometimes means a worldview which consists of a complete disregard of tradition, and what is more, a disregard of sunnah as well and only taking the content of the Qur'an into account.

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8   Erten, Mevlüt, *"Nass – Yorum İlişkisi"* (Unpublished PhD), Ankara U. Soc. Sci. Ins., Ankara 1998, p. 70.

9   Abduh – Rızâ, I, 19.

10   Fazl al-Rahman, *İslam*, trans. M. Aydın – M. Dağ, Selçuk Yay., İstanbul 1993, p. 348.

11   Garaudy, Roger, *20. Yüzyıl Biyografisi*, trans. Ahmet Zeki Ünal, Fecr Yay., Ankara 1998, p. 319

A striking example at this point is Syed Ahmad Khan, who died in 1905 and who is regarded by Hindu Islamic scholars as a pioneer of modernism. Ahmad Khan suggested that the Islamic world's lag is due to moving away from its essence and advised that Muslims should start considering the Qur'an as their guide. He argued that the spirit of the Qur'an is the foundation of Islam, and that the Qur'an must be Muslims' only guide. While Ahmad Khan was suggesting a return to the Qur'an as a guide, he was in fact advising to disregard tradition and even hadiths. As the reformist movements did before him, he suggested that true hadiths must be separated from those that aren't, and then adopted. However he concluded this suggestion with advice to completely disregard hadiths and only take heed of the Qur'an. In this way he greatly influenced his successors and led to formation of a group, under the name "*Ahl-i-Qur'an*" which rejected all hadiths and only accepted the Qur'an[12]. Adopting a critical view towards traditional interpretations, Ahmad Khan stressed that the Qur'an's relationship with scientific branches such as fiqh, kalam and theology deals with issues such as the laconic aspect and methods of the Qur'an, which are completely of secondary importance[13]. In summary, Ahmad Khan believed that the Qur'an must be the only guide, and all data pertaining to tradition must be rejected. He spent great efforts to avoid going against intellectual and natural rules in his interpretation of the Qur'an.[14] Therefore the two pillars of Ahmad Khan's modernization were "the mind" and "nature"[15] and within this context, tradition was very severely criticized.

It is rational to say that the modern-era idea of "returning to essentials", which continuously criticizes and undermines tradition, is mostly a product of the Western modernization process. In addition, one of the underlying foundational elements of this idea is to reduce the conflict between religion and the modern world into the text of the Qur'an in an effort to resolve it. In fact, the strange or ironical aspect of this is that the "return to essentials" idea, which accepts as the starting point, to return to the Qur'an and sunnah and severely criticizes tradition, rarely ever mentions how much of an influence the West has on us in terms of society, politics, science, technology and economy and the formation of our intellectual map, and instead spends every effort to severely criticize tradition. In other words, severing the Qur'an from tradition leaves a more vulnerable environment for the West to influence, either wittingly or unwittingly.

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[12] Fazl al-Rahman, *İslam*, trans. Mehmet Dağ – Mehmet Aydın, Selçuk Yay., Ankara 1993, p. 305-306; Id, *"Revival and Reform in Islam"*, II, 645-646; Zobairi, R.H., "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's Interpretation of Muslim Society and his Reform Movement in the Indian Context", *Islamic Culture*, Vol. LVII, 1983/3, p. 177-178.

[13] Aziz Ahmad, *Hindistan ve Pakistan'da Modernizm ve İslam*, trans. Ahmet Küskün, Yöneliş Yay, İst. 1990, p. 53; Daabla, Basheer A., "Muslim Political Thought in Colonical India: A Comparative Study of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Mawlana Abu al-Kalam Azad", *Islamic Culture*, Vol. LXI, 1987/2, p. 29-30.

[14] Ahmed Han, trans. from *Tahrir fi Usuli't-Tefsir* Muhammad Daud Rahbar, (:"Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Principles of Exegesis II",) *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVI, 1956/4, p. 329.

[15] Aziz Ahmad, p. 330; Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, *Modern Islam in India*, New Delhi, 1979, p. 58.

Therefore, instead of using the expressions of "returning to essentials" and "returning to the Qur'an and sunnah", we need to embody them effectively first. This requires a clearer explanation of "returning to essentials". What does "returning to essentials" mean? Does it mean to return to tradition, to the Qur'an and sunnah, to the practices of very first Muslims or to the very text of the Qur'an? What necessitates this question is the fact that every one of these points of view will lead to a worldview of its own.

On the other hand, the idea of returning to the Qur'an is, as pointed out above, not really hand in hand with tradition. Therefore with it, there is the covert idea that the methodologies of interpretation, hadith, fiqh and kalam, which are products of tradition, and in particular, methodologies of interpretation, are to be overlooked and disregarded. In tradition, there are various methodologies aimed at understanding and interpreting a verse, a word or a concept. Therefore, when a comment is to be made, it is made in a systematic way based on these methodologies. When only the text of the Qur'an is taken as a base, all of these methodologies become meaningless and lose their meaning. Another dimension is that this approach ignores the historical process and tradition between the Qur'an and us, leaving us with a delusion that we can think within the context of the nuzul period.

This problem aside, we should also emphasize that it means to distance one from the Qur'an, that the Qur'an is not sufficiently read in the society, even at least by the devout part of it so it is well understood, and that religious knowledge is mostly acquired from other books. Therefore, while it is not correct to disregard tradition altogether, it is also not correct to turn the Qur'an into some text which is only read, without being understood, as a good deed. Hence it is better to approach the subject from a holistic point of view rather than focusing on just one aspect.

One of the most important reasons of distancing oneself from, or continuously criticizing tradition, is that the Islamic community has been constantly regressing the last several centuries and has assumed a passive role, while the Western community has gained power. The fact that the Islamic community is in a weak state has led people to think about possible causes.

However, the Islamic community has created a very strong foundation in the first period. Many major works and methodologies were produced during the period called "Tadwin", and especially in the first three centuries of it. The structure of Islamic thinking at a methodological level during the tadwin period was shaped by fundamental disciplines such as Interpretation, Hadith, Fiqh Procedure, Doctrines, Kalam-Doctrines, History and Language. The Islamic community was always in a controlling position throughout the medieval age thanks to this and some other elements. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Renaissance and Reformist movements which signaled the end of the medieval era, Western civilization achieving advances in science and gaining power over the last

four centuries, and the simultaneous and increasing weakening of the Islamic community, led Muslims to question some well established pillars of Islam, as first mentioned above. This questioning, has been going on for more than two decades, continues to be effective. However, we should point out immediately that although this questioning has been going on for a long time, whatever the cause, the Islamic community has still managed to emerge from its weak and passive position.

The reasons for the lagging of the Islamic world have been discussed in modern times and are still being debated. In this process, one can say that especially the internal aspects of this regression are emphasized and that the tradition has been sacrificed as the scapegoat. In this context, the methodologies of science branches such as Interpretation, Hadith, Fiqh and Kalam are subjected to severe criticism. Some of the most prominent representatives of Hindu-Islam modernism, who have recently been heavily criticizing tradition, are Syed Ahmad Khan, Fazl al-Rahman, Muhammad Arkoun, Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri and Nasr Abu Zayd.[16]

Fazl al-Rahman criticizes those who attribute the inertia in the Islamic world to the collapse of the caliphate authority in the middle of the 13th century which led to the shredding of the political unity in the Islamic world, and points out that inertia started long before this time, and that it is caused by the foundations of Islamic law.[17] Fazl al-Rahman, by criticizing the structure of Islamic law, expresses that the Islamic legal system is based on the Quran, and sunnah randomly and without order, and that since the beginning of the Islamic legal literature, there are only theoretical studies which are disconnected from the needs of daily life and cannot be defined as law.[18]

As stated at the beginning, tradition is in no way religion itself, it is the version of perceptions on religion. We also have no way of expressing that tradition is true or false, as a whole. Therefore, particularly in our modern period, the problem is not in the tradition itself but in our approach towards religion and tradition. Although tradition has been criticized for a long time, we cannot say that the Islamic world still gains power and is in an active position in the world. Therefore the problem must not be attributed to being a scapegoat, but rather based on all the aspects of the Islamic community's lagging, which is a more analytical way to approach the situation. Otherwise, all we do will be deceiving ourselves and blindly trying to evade responsibility.

Another important thing to note is that the desire to make do with the traditional accumulation of knowledge, to return to it and bring it to life, and the

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[16] See. Güler, İlhami, "Muhtar Bir İrade (Allah'ın iradesi) ve Mümkün Bir Tarihin (610-632) 'Kelâm-ı Kadim'e 'Zorunlu Tarih'e Dönüşmesi", *III. Kur'an Sempozyumu*, Fecr Yay., Ankara 1998, p. 216-217.

[17] Fazlur Rahman, *İslam ve Çağdaşlık*, trans. Alparslan Açıkgenç – M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, Ankara Okulu Yay., Ankara 1996, p. 94.

[18] Fazlur Rahman, ibid., p. 98; See also Paçacı, Mehmet, "Çağdaş Dönemde Kur'an'a ve Tefsire Ne Oldu?", *İslâmiyât*, 2003/4, p. 98.

approach to blame tradition as the reason of our lagging are two wrong and extremist approaches. Tradition must not be a wall between the Qur'an and us, who have lived and have been living in various progressing slices of time, nor it must be deemed as an obsolete data which should be left to die. Muhammad Iqbal sets his approach on the matter as follows: *"It is not rewarding, in any way, for a civilization to reject their past. Because the past is what puts forth a civilization's identity"[19]*. At this point, we need to point out that, it would be a rather prudent practice to approach, with skepticism, the perspectives which abolish the material requirement of historical accumulation of knowledge. Instead of a perspective which accepts or rejects tradition as a whole, or is selective towards it, it would be a more useful approach to handle the elements of tradition within their own historical contexts.

It is inevitable for the Islamic world to test itself in the modern times in which we live, to analyze its tradition and to awaken. However, it should be noted that the issue is not merely a matter of awakening. Because for a person, who goes to sleep only to wake up the next day, waking up is a routine and is not really a difference. However, for Ashab al-Kahf, whose anecdotes are given in the Qur'an, and other communities like them, an awakening is not enough for them to continue living their lives in their routine order. In addition to awakening, they will also need to awaken/renew their consciousness so that they can understand the reality of life and continue their lives in this context.

Hence what needs to be done is to read into the changing world and the conditions, keeping up with them and presenting the message that the world needs, while preserving our own identity and parameters. Otherwise, we continue to live like the people in the cave of Plato, who are cuffed facing the wall, and think that life is only about the dreams and shadows casted upon the cave's wall by the light outside.[20]

In fields where religious interpretation not religion, the Qur'an or sunnah itself, can seem to be out of date, or rather, out of sync with the current conditions of its time, new perspectives and readings are absolutely necessary. In other words, it is surely possible -and required- to revive not only religion itself, but also religious interpretation. Because the Qur'an was brought down by Allah, but the ones trying to understand and interpret it are people in different historical positions. Therefore, a religious correction would not count as "modernization", but rather a correction of statuses and positions of people in different periods of time according to their conditions. By this way, obsolete and insufficient information would be updated, and once again made effective.

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[19] Iqbal, Muhammad, *İslâm'da Dini Düşüncenin Yeniden Doğuşu*, trans. N. Ahmet Asrar, Birleşik Yay., İstanbul, trans., p. 225.

[20] Mohammad Abed al-Jabri, *Çağdaş Arap – İslam Düşüncesinde Yeniden Yapılanma*, trans. Ali İhsan Pala – Mehmet Şirin Çıkar, Kitâbiyât Yay., Ankara 2001, p. 39-40.

As pointed out by the hadith *"Allah sends a new restorer to this ummah at the beginning of every century to update religious (perception, thoughts and practices) affairs"*[21] the renewing of thought is required, as in the words of Mehmed Akif, *"Presenting the Qur'an to the interpretation of the current times"*. In other words, this perspective should be a part of life. What is more, the Prophet's statement for who it becomes true will be rewarded with two good needs and whoever comes up with a wrong judgment will be rewarded with one[22] should be deemed as aiming to have this point of view internalized by society.

To conclude, tradition should not be considered as a ladder that can be thrown away after climbing to higher ground.[23] Tradition is of great importance in order for an idea to be based on a foundation, to institutionalize and develop. Therefore, it would be quite wrong to approach tradition with an exclusionary mindset. What needs to be opposed is not tradition itself, which is a natural product of the progression of time and also became the solution to it, it is rather traditionalism, which advocates the sufficiency and effectiveness of tradition. In other words, it is the point of view that opposes change. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between tradition and traditionalism. Because tradition indicates the routine of continuity and change; traditionalism points to the status quo, to oppose change, with the belief that religious thinking has completed all the evolution it needs and is in its final state. However, it should be noted that this point of view does not mean anything other than a delusion. Respecting tradition is knowing all elements of tradition well without affording any sacred status to them, and undertaking the duty of preserving what is useful in them and to bequeath them to the next generations, and at the same time the requirements to evaluate and question tradition in its own historical context and form new perspectives, which overall, is a holistic approach. We should also point out that it is wrong for the traditionalist approach to label the criticism of tradition as opposing tradition.

One cannot say that a religion which accepts human, historical and social life in a continuous movement, opposes change. Change exists in nature and in the absence of change, there is death. It is necessary to emphasize change and properly define modernity too. In other words, it would be quite wrong to regard modernity as the epicenter of anti-tradition and position modernity and tradition as two very different fields or perspectives which are the exact opposites of each other. Modernity should not mean that tradition should be completely omitted, ignored, and accepted as a barrier to understanding religion. Modernity should be construed as the efforts to complete the shortcomings of religious knowledge in the modern era, not of religion itself. It goes without saying that any other perspective would mean to shoot oneself in the foot. Necip Fazıl's famous expression *"We had an*

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[21] Abu Dawood, *Sünen*, "Melâhim", 1.

[22] Buhârî, *Sahîh*, "İ'tisam", 21; Müslim, *Sahîh*, "Akdiye", 15.

[23] Gasset, Ortega Y., *Kütlelerin İsyanı*, trans. Nejat Muallimoğlu, Bedir Yay., İstanbul 1976 (translator's preamble), p. 11-12.

iceberg in the middle. We melted it away with our hot breaths, but now there's mud everywhere" also supports that excluding tradition as a whole is not useful. What is more, one should not forget that we too are historical beings and are part of tradition as well. A perspective, which rejects the accumulation of fourteen centuries may as well reject the fifteenth in the future, therefore rendering us and what we produced obsolete as well.

While in the end it is a mistake, that stout defenders of tradition regard the Qur'an as a thing that is in the monopoly of past scholars, it is another that those who intend to oppose traditionalism do not seem to be able to comprehend that the Qur'an is not a farm of their subjective ideas[24]. One should stay away from both of these perspectives...

In order to enable a person of modern times to benefit from the Qur'an as much as possible and we can further interpret the meaning of the Qur'an, we need to recognize the requirement to firstly take one step into the past and then contemplate reforming Islamic tradition particularly in the fields of fiqh and interpretation through new methods, and then subject these new methods to rigorous examination, and finally come up with steady, reliable interpretation methods which are not based on reactions or imitation psychology. Otherwise, any interpretation which disregards tradition will not yield any reliable results and could even lead to harmful results, which means that just while we are aiming for better, we could lose what we already have.

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[24] Jansen, J.J.G., *Kur'an'a Bilimsel – Filolojik – Pratik Yaklaşımlar*, trans. Halilrahman Açar, Fecr Yay., Ankara 1993, p. XXI (translator's preamble).

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A Remarkable Interpretation Observing the Present Against the Alterations[*]

Sadık KILIÇ[**]

Abstract

In terms of the Islamic faith, the holiest text is the Koran. And since the Koran's target is the universe in which the human being lives, it has been "revealed" from the domain of transcendence to "here"; and therefore, it has selected a language as a human and social phenomenon, i. e., Arabic, as a communicative tool. It is not possible for the Divine Word in its form expressed in the text of the Koran and sent to the humanity ("resm") to contain verbally the Divine purposes, all particular facts and human answers. This is because possibilities of

"language" cannot express the divine ontology in its entirety!

Although it is transcendental in terms of its relation with God, language is limited to being a human nexus, and therefore, is restricted in its possibilities. In its broadest sense, man and world are in continual change, and therefore, people require more refined solutions, implying that the classical interpretation tradition should be made more dynamic, and implicit and explicit fanaticism walls built around the Book should be eliminated. ln short, "tawil" (glossing) should be reconsidered as ci serious reviving interpretation instrument.

Keywords: Koran, Language (Arabic), Human quality ofinterpretation, Social change,

Değişim Karşısında Varolan'ı da Gözeten 'Diri Yorum'

Özet

İslam inanışı bakımından en kutsal dini metin, Kur'an'dır. Ve Kur'an, insanın yaşadığı evreni hedeflemiş olması nedeniyle, Aşkınlık alanından 'bura'ya 'nüzûl' etmiştir; bu nedenle de, insanî ve içtimaî bir olgu olarak, bir dili: Arapçayı iletişim aracı olarak seçmiştir. Kur'an metninde ifadesini bulduğu ve insanlara ulaştığı şekliyle ('resm') İlahi Kelâm'ın, İlahi amaçları; bütün tikel olguları ve insani cevapları sözel-lafzî olarak içermiş olması mümkün değildir. Çünkü 'dil'in imkânları, ilahi ontolojiyi bütünüyle ifade edemez! İşte, Allah ile münasebeti bakımından ('hadd') her ne kadar Müteâl ise de, beşeri bir örgü olmanın dışına çıkamayan 'dil'in imkânlarının sınırlı olması; en geniş anlamıyla, insan ve dünyasının kesintisiz bir değişim içinde bulunması, böylece de daha rafine çözümler talep

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edilmesi nedeniyle, klasik yorum geleneğinin bir dinamizme kavuşturulması; bu bağlamda, Kitâb'ın etrafında örülmek istenen açık ve örtük fanatizm setlerinin aşılması, kısaca 'tevil', ciddi diriltici yorum enstrümanı olarak yeniden gündeme alınması gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kur'an, Dil (Arapça), Yorumun beşerîliği, Toplumsal değişim.

An Overview

As there is always a gate for questions, speaking or having `the ability to speak` has been gifted to humanity as a distinctive characteristic. The ability to ask is the act that opens windows of the soul to other egos and souls, and a universe of objects and phenomena that surround it. It is the journey of being in the sky of egos, a breath it takes or filling itself with "the energy of consciousness." Maybe due to this, "Wittgenstein (1889-1951) says that what is important in philosophy is not the answer but the question, emphasizing that the philosophy was born with questions and it opens gates for new questions".[1]

All fields of science, especially social sciences, humanities, and religions, present particular 'questions' about 'here and I'' and 'us.' To the end that they leave this world only after checking the right and the best answers, without having left something undone. Also without a doubt, the answers always depend on the way an individual addresses the question.

If we want to say it similar to Heidegger's words, 'isolated from existential density and anxiety, shallow in the grip of obedience, perhaps in a 'distilled' life, we ask the question of our conscious self-integrity; We always seem to be speaking about the crimes of others, not the indispensable crimes that the identity of the people has placed on us. In a sense, we start looking for answers by asking questions that are not our own, that are not internalized in our opinion; we become a 'so-called me' captured by other moles, consumed and reduced to passive object position; a kind of 'alienation'. In other words, "a person becomes a tool that can be used by others. Therefore, the anonymous entity loses its identity and lives on traditions and daily habits. It loses against the oblivion of being, as called by Heidegger…".[2] Let us say conflicts and similarities between these questions are unavoidable, but lets at least try to answer on our own. Let us give it as 'our answer'! Let it belong to me, or us, with its full rigor and concreteness, and the excitement and vibes it contains. At least, let me give my answers to common questions and attach my meanings to them!

Although it is unique to the respondent, each answer is meaningful in terms of a first-hand orientation of a self into the existence; merging its presence to the internal or external objects and phenomena that surround it, and internalizing it.

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[1] Yavuz, Hilmi, *Felsefe Yazıları*, İstanbul, Boyut Kitapları, 1st Edition, 1997, p. 98.

[2] Magill, Frank, *Egzistansiyalist Felsefenin Beş Klasiği*, trans. Vahap Mutal, İstanbul, Hareket Yayınları, 1971, p. 53.

We can say that answers, again depending on the human, settles on various acceptance and reality steps. Those placed at high levels according to some; might be put on low steps by others, or the exact opposite happens. In other words, each individual has correct or almost correct, wrong or almost wrong, and different other answers. It means that there is no one and inarguably correct or wrong answer! Possibilities transition from nebulous to earth field and follow a path,, questions and answers create the sum of our lives, the life that we have left suspended in the space as beams of light, and the cognition of the existence, don't they? Yes; it even consists of our existence and the efforts to answer the questions we ask.

We can and should ask our questions at any time. In its best form, asking questions should turn into a process. We should continue on our way by asking questions and giving answers. The paths will have separate questions and separate answers, because they will ask questions and find answers, and will be like a song of existence in our minds; always fresh, shaky, lively, excited, irritable and cowardly… It would be to ask questions, seek answers, drop in the deserts, at the root of a plant; the resistance of a violet, a Lotus in the mountains to high peak breezes, storms, and jolts; consuming numbers of stars in the sky adorned with endless stars… will become as painful, scary, provocative, and create cliffs in front of us...

Those who never step down onto the valley of the quest may neither ask questions nor hunt for answers. For all of these, the only thing we need is the "quest"! We need to burn for the soul and love of the quest. We need to fall into the gap of it that absorbs us. Be enlightened in the skies of the quest; while enlightening the darkness of roads that lead us to the untouched questions and the answers to give. Heading out after the "self," or "the human as a great loss of the truth" in this road that is furnished with deserts, challenging peaks, cliffs, oceans, or worlds of headwaters. Asking is an arrow that flies us to the "limits of existence"; to the secret borders where the joy of knowledge and wisdom turns into cyclones.

Uncertainty rules these borders. Moreover 'Science' is more about 'sharpening questions and sharpening them like a razor' than answering them, taking them to the very end of probability. Therefore, "What is important here is the type of people, questioning what is said to him without too much respect."[3] In the dialectics of questions and answers, it is the one who makes it self-contained, and who reproduces it in a way that is a harmony of infinite answers. Is it something different than "respecting the old laws, traditions, and beliefs, which are the roots of all evil in the world, without even thinking"?[4]

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[3] May, Lord Robert (President of the British Academy of Sciences), trans. Reyhan Oksay, *Cumhuriyet Bilim Teknik*, 13 Kasım 2004, year: 18, volume: 921, p. 11 (Cited from Discover, November 2004).

[4] Lichtenberg (1742-1799), Georg Christoph, *Aforizmalar*, trans. Tevfik Duran, Ankara, Dost Kitabevi, 2000, p. 40.

The quest. The hurting and maddening love! Falling into this love, could the questions and answer step on the lands of the continuous quest for the good?

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A tradition where intellectual products are not tested through equipped workbenches and not composed with the ideal sparkles of belief; where the commitment to "the truth through scientific transcendence and freedom" is sacrificed to "the respect for the past and the nobles"; where the interpretation of the early-period scholars are seen sufficient, and the modern scholars are limited to convey them, without any doubt, will drive us to a very dangerous end in social life. Holding on to the natural characteristics of comments and turning them into a "dogma," considering these so-called "eternal truths" as the "final knowledge," or turning "knowledge" into a "religion," and "superstitions" day by day.[5]

First observation: The scientific and mental trauma of this attitude will be in the form of 'interpretation' and 'knowledge,' which is human data, and the identification of the human and the divine, and the dress of sanctity to the human and historical ones!

Second observation: This will increasingly condemn us to a mental collapse and stasis, which can be summarized as "the perpetuation of the phenomenon and the push of mankind to more loneliness in this phenomenon; to be placed alongside the dynamics of decline against the dynamics of progress in a way that contradicts this image of the religious discourse that calls for change, progress."[6]

However, in the process of textual understanding, the "humane codes" are the main element, and the "divine codes" are the second element. "Because there is no other fiction in the mind that precedes the fiction of human codes; it is this human fiction skill that makes fiction and the resulting provision possible. On the other hand, it is the divine origin, its reputation, and [in terms of the mind] it is a posteriori because it is obtained by a posteriori method; therefore it needs thinking and reasoning. In other words, thus, the human being is the principal in mind, and the divine one is through him and established upon him; that is, it is formed through reason and knowledge."[7]

The clear message of this is: In the act of 'understanding,' the practical and essential place of humans can never be ignored! Because, neither before or after the human being, that is, 'without humans being taken into account, an understanding

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[5]   Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *Mefhûmu'n-Nass (Dirâse fî Ulûmi'l-Kur'ân)*, Cairo,1990, p. 251.

[6]   Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *Dinsel Söylemin Eleştirisi*, trans. Fethi Ahmet Polat, Ankara, Kitâbiyât Yayınları, 2002, p. 64, 65 [We have made these and the following emphases. S.K.].

[7]   Harb, Ali, *Nakdu'l-Hakîka (en-Nassu ve'l-Hakîka II)*, Beirut, 1993, p. 67.

cannot be claimed!' As Ernst says, "whether it is in philosophical or religious texts, the essence of being, always involves human." In this direction, the questioning arises from a certain preliminary understanding of existence –Bultmann (1884-1976) calls it "the conception of existence/Existenz verstandnis. Without such a preliminary understanding, the texts will stay mute. [Therefore], pre-comprehension should never be eliminated, but rather raised to the light of consciousness. Critical supervision in understanding the text should be involved in the game (spiel)".[8] In this cognitive process, human perception and fiction are active, whereas the text is passive against them, or the fictionalized, in other words.

"Sword of Damocles" to the Thought?

Let's continue our journey with an analysis on a representation: "In the case of the Qur'an and Islam in general; the attitude of the commons can be regarded as subjective and emotional by modern theologians, who may be regarded as intellectuals, while the attitude of theologians is at best regarded as disrespectful to religion and the book by the 'commons'. This is generally a form of 'alienation,' as seen by the scholars, between the colonial intellectuals and folk culture that has emerged in the last two centuries".[9]

It is very thought-provoking: efforts to bring religious texts to a dynamic level of understanding and interpretation are sought to be discredited, and sometimes suppressed through concepts laden with pejorative meanings!

These tendencies which deliver the dominant religious discourse and refer to the past, or regard continuously renewing or internalizing it as the only determinant, categorize the views contrary to them as damaged, or loathsome comments or, at most, 'condemned opinion, comment' and this way condemn and oppress the others.[10] Being deprived of the capability to create ideas, leaving the result to arbitrariness by not showing the respect that the issue deserves; in accordance with this unfounded subjective tendency, in order to show (prove) the accuracy of its intention, pursuing an arbitrary interpretation of the Qur'an according to personal wishes; being observers of the data without evidence, and thus untenable[11],

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[8] Ernst, Josef, "Yorumlama Tarihinin Değişim Sürecinde Hermenötik Problem," *Schriftauslegung Beitrage zur Hermeneutik des Neuen Testamentes und im Neuen Testament* (Münih), 1972, p. 17-53, trans. M. Faik Yılmaz, p. 23-24. (Unpublished).

[9] Görgün, Tahsin, "…Kur'ân-ı Kerîm'in Tamamına Muhatabız" (interview), *Diyanet Aylık Dergi*, volume: 166, Ekim 2004, p. 38.

[10] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 248. see. "the scholars connected with the truth gave the name of 'at-ta'wil al-munqad' (the true and legitimate ta'wil), and gave it as an example of loathsome interpretation (ta'wil) by attributing a meaning that is not relevant, or far from the meaning that it carried, ignoring those appropriate to the soul of the revelation" (M. Nazif Şahinoğlu, "Te'vîl", *M.E.B. İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul, M.E. Basımevi, 1979, 12/I, 216.)

[11] Gazâlî (d. 505/1111), *İhyâu Ulûmi'd-Dîn*, Dâru ihyâi'l-Kütübi'l-'Arabiyye, Îsâ el-Bâbî el-Halebî ve Şürekâhû, Egypt, nd., I/292.

condemning attitudes such as, those who leave the path of God" emerges against the prophetic verse, "whoever talks on behalf of the Qur'an but with his own opinions, falls into a wrong even though he does something good!" [12]and as an aphorism against the "contemplation, a realistic exegesis and interpretation (ta'wil)" attempts.

However, the interpretation of the text as the only 'reference' can not be satisfied with the quotation, for example, Tahir Ibn Ashur (1296-1394/1879-1973), while studying the technique of interpretation (ta'wil) used by al-Tabari (d. 310/922), says: "Certainly Tabari, although in his interpretation has limited himself to the information transmitted from the companions of the prophet and their followers, he immediately takes a new step after each verse and chooses one of the narrated opinions, accompanied by the evidence presented by the words of the Arabs (ikhtiyar)."[13] In other words, Tabari, although his most prominent skill is 'narration,' never ceases to offer resistance and confidence to the pleasure and choice of the mind.

Attempts to intimidate and suppress them, are not limited to certain historicity because these debilitating attitudes, which can be observed today, have been extended to actual blocking and annihilation in the past tense! This is like the common denominator of the Eastern and Western worlds. For example, in the Christian West this is done by the church through excommunication and inquisition, while in the context of the Islamic world using labels like "zandaka", "ilhad", "i'tizal', "ahl al-bid'ah", "batini", "hurufi", etc. which are religious-political-ideological concepts. In these tragic time sections of history, in the West, Socrates (BC 470-399), was condemned to death by drinking hemlock poison, allegedly because of "corrupting the morals of the youth in the Athenian site", [14]Aristotle's opinions on substance and views was confronted by the opinion that "the format and appearance of the substance come not from the outside, but from their own hearts; thus, the substance 'is a real and active being,' not even saying that it's a common thing, maybe a divine (Cosa Divina); Giordano Bruno (1548-1600)[15] was burnt to death, or Galileo (1564-1642)[16] was buried in silence by the Inquisition, because of the allegedly mixture of science, hermetic views, and magic

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[12]   al-Zarkashi (d. 794/1392), Bedruddin, *el-Burhân fî Ulûmi'l-Kur'ân*, II/162, 163. For more about this prophetic word, see İbn Aşûr, *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, ed-Dâru't-Tunûsiyye li'n-Neşr, nd., I/28-31

[13]   *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/33.

[14]   For more about his life, see Ronan, Colin A., *Bilim Tarihi*, trans., Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Feza Günergun, Ankara, Tübitak Yayınları, First Edition., 2003, p. 90-92.

[15]   His last words to the judges that sentences him to death by burning: "*It is not me who fears listening to the judgment you passed but you trembling when reading it to me!*" (A. Adnan Adıvar, *Tarih Boyunca İlim ve Din*, İstanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, İkinci Basım, , 1969, p. 168; Ronan, *ibid.*, p. 368-371.

[16]   Adivar says, "after repenting of all ideas and inventions before the judges of the inquisition, who doesn't know anything but to kill the scholastic knowledge, the idea, and the mind (1632), said these legendary words as called by Bertrand Russel: "*Epur si mouve: And yet it moves!*", (A. Adnan Adıvar, *İlim ve Din*, p. 179, 180; Ronan, *ibid.*, p. 235, 379-384 et al.

in their thoughts, etc. In the East, the mystic ideas, being sacrificed for the sake of love of Allah and "the destruction of the divine body" words were interpreted as the holy land of Muslims after a riot was started by the Qarmatians in Hijaz; "Ana al-Haq: I am the truth!" was regarded as a revolution and exploration[17]; and according to Massignon, "because of a state of tension, a spirit devoted to a single love"[18] or because of the audacity to "say the unspeakable"[19], by the fatwa of the Maliqi judge, Abu Omar Hammadi, the defender of dogma, Mansur Al-Hallaj was executed by "being whipped, mutilated, beheaded and burned by hanging on a scaffold" (Baghdad, 24 Zulkaidah 309, March 26, 922)[20]. Molla Lutfi was stabbed in the neck with a sword and executed under torture, as he entered the scourge of jealousy because of the sharpness of his tongue in scientific criticism (d.899/1494). Sheikh Ismail-i Mashuki (d. 1538) was beheaded being accused of "declaring prohibited things as acceptable". In the context of the glorification of man, for example, Nesimi (d. 837/1422 [?]), who, like Mansur, was skinned alive because he regarded the face of man as the "throne of the Beneficent" contrary to dominant discourse, and spreading the joy of political Hurufism, and many others.[21] There is no difference between them! All these flashes in the sky of the stars unite in the deep denominator of humbly navigating, and voicing the reality, in the name of seeking the freedom and honor of being humans on the shores of the "limitless truth."

The chief instrument in all these reactions is the 'fear,' which almost fills the horizons as a thousand winged 'fear dragons.' Stories of this dragon that aim to capture and kill the minds inside are some labels that block the roads. Despite 'zandaka', 'tafalsuf', 'ilhad', 'i'tizal', 'ahl al-bid'ah' and other labels used in the past as the arrows of death, today we have 'enemy of tradition', 'innovator', 'hermeneuticist', 'historicist', 'supporter of ta'wil' besides concepts like 'alienated',

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[17]   Massignon, Louis, "Hallâc", *M.E.Bakanlığı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul M.E. Basımevi, 1977, V/1, 168.

[18]   Massignon, ibid., V/1, 170. In addition, according to Massignon's citation from Lexique, in the final brews of his breath, he said: *"Forgive them and don't forgive me! Since you are dissolving my humanity in your grace, in the name of the right of my humanity over your grace, I ask you to have mercy on those who have worked to kill me!"* (*Essai Sur Les Origines du Lexique Technique de la Mystique Musulmane*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1954, 18).

[19]   Şahin Uçar, "İnsan, Varlık ve Zaman", *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume: 6, Year: 2001, p. 137. Cf. "*Ego sum qui sum: I am who I am!*" (Thomas Aquinas) (ibid.).

[20]   Massignon, Louis, *ibid.*, 5/I, 168. For more about Mansur Al-Hallaj, see Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, *Aşk ve Hak Şehidi Hallâc-ı Mansûr ve Eseri*, İstanbul, Yeni Boyut, 1996.

[21]   For more about the people who have been punished because of their thoughts, beliefs, imagination and arbitrariness and their experiences, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-17. Yüzyıllar)*, İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998; Yurdaydın, Hüseyin G., *İslâm Tarihi Dersleri*, Ank. Üniv. İlahiyat Fak. Yayınları, Ankara 1971, p. 100, 109, 111-114, et al.; For about Imadaddin Nasimi, see Ayan, Hüseyin, *Nesîmî Divanı*, Ankara, Akçağ Yayınları, , 1990, p. 11-43; for about the interrogation and execution of Molla Lutfi, see Özen, Şükrü, "İslâm Hukukuna Göre Zındıklık Suçu ve Molla Lutfî'nin İdamının Fıkhîliği", *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume: 6, Year: 2001, p. 17-62.

'colonized mentality' and others, as the abstract dragons that darken the light of thought suing them as effective tools of this wave of intimidation and destruction.

Question: Why not only confine the world of meanings and the mind map to the horizon of the past, and not fastening the intention and purpose of the text into a certain age (Asr al-Saadah: 'Golden Age'); on the other hand, bringing the text closer to the historicity of the present and the future with the enthusiasm and intuition that human history is an impenetrable leap forward (élan vitale) and wave[22], bringing the text closer to the historicality of the present and the future; in this way, healthy, self-confident, deserving of the effort of new moves, intellectual leaps and depictions in reality, why morbid, destructive and solvent (anomique) is an arbitrary 'alienation'[23]

Explanation: It is evident that the existence of human beings sustains in the objective world they belong to, with the impact of values and judgments created beforehand. This continuum resembles an endless 'migration' movement: to stay in the ranges without interruption, then to fall back on the roads. In other words; resting and departure, then abstraction and heading toward new horizons. If so; isn't mankind, as it is in the material, biological plan, a product of 'abstractions, joining, and syntheses' at the level of mind and action? In fact, can't we say that mental and spiritual breaks can become the only way to achieve the least imperfect? This allows us to be 'free and the self we have to be!' Because, as emphasized by Nietzsche (1844-1900), "the original person is the one who is self-educated, who leaves himself behind, who changes himself, who is never stuck in something. It may be said that the test of a man's independence is: not to be mired in science; although this seduces man with his most precious, seemingly complete inventions that await us..."[24]

Or, not to make our mental tradition and our customary codes of knowledge a set of new expansions and insights that can be revealed through the text; thus not to fall into the state of historical Christianity, which has made the tradition of church a criterion of reality and a reference to confirmation of the holy text. It is stated that [Tertullianus] (circa, 155-222), in his work on "The Definition of Perverts," in all its clarity, had put forward the church tradition as a definite norm of faith alongside the authority of the Holy Book. Thus, the church became the legal owner of the faith, and at the same time, the Bible was something that belonged to the church. The tradition established by the apostles alone now guarantees the correct and meaningful interpretation of the Holy Book, and all other special explanations are

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[22] Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, p. 252.
[23] *"The ego's being no one... Setting distances within itself... Falling of the sail that billows in itself... Or its being stranded…"*, Yavuz, Hilmi, *Geçmiş Yaz Defterleri,* İstanbul, Can Yayınları, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 115.
[24] Kuçuradi, İonna, *Nietzsche ve İnsan*, Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 1997, p. 63.

rejected from the outset[25], laying down the paths of the Middle Ages, which eventually became the chief symbol of the dark centuries.

Accordingly, beyond the surrender options of 'rejection or acceptance,' 'relentless real hunting' is the main founder for New Horizons! It's an exit that is humane enough to refuse to hand over to others the obligation to understand and make sense in their own subjective world; 'an existential commitment, adjacent to the self of all of us.' This 'uninterrupted quest and exit' always reveals itself with its grasping, brooding, selective, and re-founding mission. In such a process aimed at sheer truth, "...free human sifts through the moral values of time and its surroundings, the virtues of fashion, and places a new meaning on them: the meaning of free humanity; the virtues of free humans, thus creating the characteristics that make it free"[26]. The most fundamental and direct nature of knowledge, 'sets out towards freedom'; or touches on the freedom of truth!

And in the horizon of Tafsir studies...

As it turns out, the works carried out in the field of Qur'an and interpretation, as an overall quality, do not go beyond the 'informational' level. The Qur'an is spoken in accordance with the adopted linguistic, religious, legal templates and is text-centric; at the verbal level and from the historical lodge, inevitably spoken in the name of the Qur'an. Just as the phrase "The Voice of People, The Voice of God"[27], which was first discovered in works of theologian Peter of Blois (circa M. 1130-1200), the voice of the interpreter or the text reader becomes the voice of God. Briefly, "Vox tradura vox dei!"

Is this interpretation the voice of God? Accordingly, "Religion is divine in its origin and source, but it is humanized and worldly by interpretation and practice. The commentator (mujtahid) is based on admiration and assumption in his views and his judgments, no matter how high his scientific rank and degree of understanding are. So he cannot reach 'unquestionably true knowledge (yakin).' It is from this luminous thought that Islamic scholars refrain from the words that express certainty and absolutism in their explanations, and on the contrary, their investigations and researches are always ended with, 'Allah knows better!' Indeed, this is well explained by these words attributed to Imam Shafi'i (d. 204/819): 'My opinion is true, but there is also the possibility that it is wrong; someone else's opinion is wrong, but there is also the possibility that it may be right.'[28] Therefore, the following suggestion would be inevitable: "a theological text shall be given in its historical context. Within it, we can separate the essence, that is, the godly

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[25] Ernst, ibid., p. 9, cited from Tertullian, *De preascriptione haeraticorum,* 15-19.

[26] Kuçuradi, *Nietzsche*, p. 67.

[27] Lichtenberg, *Aforizmalar*, p. 35.

[28] Harb, Ali, *(en-Nassu ve'l-Hakika-II) Nakdu'l-Hakika*, Beyrut, el-Merkezü's-Sekâfe el-Arabî, 1993, p. 65.

message, and the time-dependent, the non-essential knowledge. If this is not done, the actuality of the sacred text may always be compromised. The actuality of the holy book depends on its responsiveness within human lives, against psychological, intellectual, social, and cultural needs; the actuality of the divine message, on the other hand, is based on the separation between the immutable and the obligatory and the unnecessary, depending on the historical conditions, in order to preserve the true nature of the faith. This leads us to take an existential stand in the face of theological text. So, what do we understand from the word 'existential'? By this, we mean the whole of the bio-psycho-social conditions in which the human being lives in hic et nunc (here and now)."[29]

So, seeing the interpretation as definitive and immutable truth is like equating it with a blessing, a dogma[30]. However, in the words of tradition, "the Qur'an's revelation is finished, but its 'condescension' continues until the Apocalypse"[31]; is it not that 'the miracles of the Qur'an are endless[32]; it is a source that no model can obsolete[33], but only make even more dynamic,' and 'continuous interpretation' is the only way to make uninterrupted use of this source. Here comes a witness from tradition in Sehl ibn Abd Allah [al-Tustari] (d. 283/896), in the context of stressing that the Qur'an can be the source of infinite interpretations, he said: "Even if a servant is given a thousand understandings for each letter of the Qur'an, he cannot reach the end of the meanings that God has placed in a single verse from his Book, because the book is the word of God; His word is his adjective; Just as There is no end to God, there is no end to understanding such a word!.. However, everyone understands only as far as Allah bestows on him."[34] This means that no interpreter and commentator, "no matter how much he thinks of the ore of godly thought in the text, can finish it. The theologian, who has such insight, has the idea of, implicitly, extending the meaning to get all the comments he needs."[35]

The perception that a single word of the Qur'an can have many pieces of evidence showed its most concrete manifestation and effect in the context of the testimony of history, in the conflicts between Ali (d. 41/661) and Kharijites. As cited in Itqan, Ali sends Abdullah ibn Abbas (d. 68/687) to the Kharijites for talks, and

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[29] Zeki Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik*, İstanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 1998, p. 45.

[30] "*Dogma*": Derived from the Greek root, *'dokein,'* the religious doctrine which must be accepted by all believers based on any authority, such as the divine revelation, council, holy text (Ecriture) or a famous theologian, without being confirmed in the light of reason and adopted as truth; beyond any discussion, approved and based on any evidence, the principle believed by the person (Foulquié, *Dictionnaire de Langue Philosophique*, p. 186-187; Pike, E Royston, *Dictionnaire des Religions*, p. 110; Bedevî, Ahmed Zeki, *A Dictionary of The Social Sciences*, Librairie du Liban, 1986, p. 116).

[31] Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 161.

[32] *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/45.

[33] Gazâlî, *İhyâu Ulûmi'd-Dîn*, Îsâ el-Bâbî el-Halebî ve Şürekâhû, Mısır, Dâru ihyâi'l-Kutubi'l-'Arabiyye, , nd., I/291.

[34] Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 9.

[35] Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik*, p. 180 (Charles Guingnebert, *Libération des dogmes*, Flammarion, Paris, 1910, p. 132, direct citation).

says to him, "go to them and discuss with them, but do not bring them the Qur'an as evidence, for it is a book of various meanings, but discuss with them by bringing about evidence from the Sunnah." According to another variant, Ibn Abbas said, "O leader of the believers, I know The Book of Allah better than them!" Ali replied, "You said the truth, but the Qur'an bears many concepts (Hammal al-Wujuh); you say, they say..." in order to draw attention to the fact that a single word in the Qur'an may have different meanings.[36]

Muqatil ibn Sulaiman (d. 150/767), is stated to be one of the first scholars to travel to the heart of this subject. In order to emphasize the possibility of multiple meanings to be understood from a single word 'depending on the change and differentiation of context and context,' he named these possible meanings as "wujuh: aspects of understanding." Prof. Özek says, in his justification he delivered in the Introduction part, "the words are fluent [flowing] and can take a new meaning according to the subject mentioned. As it is in all textual works, especially in a book such as the Qur'an, this is more important!"[37] While expressing this intuition of the intertwined relationship between 'context and meaning' in words, Muqatil ibn Sulaiman does not hold back from emphasizing that magnificent principle stated by Abu ad-Darda (d. 32/652): "One cannot have a deep understanding, unless he sees many aspects of meaning for the Qur'an!"[38] Accordingly, as the source Person of the interpretation, "The Qur'an is a book, 'zalul: the subjugator,' with many possible aspects of meaning. Then interpret it to the most beautiful aspects of meaning"[39] said the Prophet in a narration conveyed by Ibn Abbas. According to Zarkashi's analysis, the word 'zalul' mentioned in the sentence shows "the Qur'an's submission to those who interpret it and addressing through them; 'zu wujuh' phrase indicates that there are words conducive to various interpretations".[40] In short, this prophetic revelation combined the reality that 'the dynamism and dialectics of interpretation are above certain historicity with its own qualities!' Because, "...the multiple meaning nature of words now leaves its place into a multiple meaning text. The multiple meaning text also calls us to a plural reading. The discovery of the multi-meaning nature (polysémie) of a text begins at the moment when interpretation begins and results in the technical exegesis of texts."[41] This is because of the existential aspect and co-existence between the text of the Qur'an and the language-being-meaning relationship; Prof.

[36] Suyûtî, Celâlüddin, (d. 911/1505) I/142; and see Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûmu'n-Nass*, p. 97

[37] Mukâtil ibn Süleyman, *el-Vücûh ve'n-Nazâir*, prepared by: Ali Özek, İstanbul, İSAV, 1993, p. 27 (Introduction).

[38] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 97, 98.

[39] Dârakutnî (d. 385/995), *Sünen*, Ed. Abdullah Hâşim Yemânî el-Medenî, el-Medinetü'l-Münavvara, el-Hicâz, 1386/1966, VI/145; ed-Deylemî (ö. 509/1115), *el-Firdevsu bi Me'sûri'l-Hıtâb*, Ed. Es-Sa'îd ibn el-Besyûnî ez-Zağlûl, Beirut, Dâru'l-Kutubi'l-Ilmiyye, 1986, III/228 (Hadith no. 4672); el-Hindî, Alâuddin (ö. 975/1567), *Kenzu'l-'Ummâl*, Müessesetü'r-Risâle, Beirut, 1399/1979, I/551 (Hadith no 2469).

[40] Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 163.

[41] Zeki Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik*, p. 154.

Ali Özek provides the following encouraging guidance: "This style should continue in every century since it is the basis of the knowledge of Tafsir, and new meanings and explanations should be given to the verses of the Qur'an with new works on it."[42]

Therefore, the studies in the field of Tafsir, whose numbers are expressed in thousands, must form the eternal essence of the Qur'an, the substructure of making it close to the human soul and social movements, a waterfall of thought and the building block of the intellectual monument ranges. Alternatively, as might be said, a platform of monumental knowledge before the resurrection of humanity.

However, these studies face the risk of not being able to accompany the human and society structures in continuous movement by turning into a series of non-excited studies at the point of transportation to the building of a consciousness that resurrects man and society, thus adapting itself to the principle of 'unstoppable movement in existence and substance' (panta rei).

The Qur'an is not responsible for the situation that places it in an inoperative position; on the contrary, the collection of interpretations that has a significant space in the memory of history and academic, has been canonized to the point of being the end of the scholarly thoughts and the Qur'anic interpretations, as well as impassable thresholds. Therefore, the researchers are responsible for the situation as they since then sneered to every other methodology and perspective, and canonized the movement of repetition and passivism. Moreover, despite the verses the Qur'an that encourage people to think (tadabbur), reason (ta'akkul), and create ideas, they claimed that some scholars had already revealed its message about human and universe within the history and their followers should only follow them.[43] For this reason, it is an extremely vicious effort to squeeze it into a single mangle of meaning and interpretation. The sine qua non-requirement for religious text is 'always to be life-oriented' because, "the interpretation accomplishes its purpose to the extent that it gives life to the text. The criterion of life, however, is the capacity to change itself. A text with insufficient meaning is a dead text. A truly meaningful text is always open to changes in meaning, instilling new perspectives, invoking new interpretations, showing possible developments".[44] Then the Qur'an encourages one to think, to produce ideas, and to make comparisons (reputations), while on the other hand, it is a whole of religious doctrines and commandments. Because of this purposeful dynamism, it is far broader than the understanding that claims to be its [final] interpretation and that the foundation of the divine law...

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[42] *el-Vücûh*, p. 27 (Introduction).

[43] "It is because the Qur'an itself invites us to such an effort and endeavor to think about and understand its verses (*ijtihad*)" (es-Sâlih, Subhî, *Mebâhis fî Ulûmi'l-Kur'ân*, Beirut, Dâru'l-'Ilm li'l-Melâyîn, 10th Edition, 1977, p. 292)

[44] Zeki Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik*, p. 165.

Also to use the ability of intellect is both a duty and a right. Because 'Allah has not distributed to his servants anything more valuable than reason!'[45]

"Religious text" as lingual data and face to face with the reality of language!

This means that the meanings, the production of information, and the reflection of perception will be different from a text, and it is a situation that should not be denied. The main reason for this is that, even if perfect care is taken, the source of the text is: The paradoxical overlap of the Will of God with the linguistic symbols, that is, the impossibility of transcendent will to the dimension of a human being with this nature. This impossibility is the imperative result of the 'language of the text' carrying its characters 'here', 'to this world', world of conditions; indeed, the Qur'an says, "And We did not send any messenger except [speaking] in the language of his people to state clearly for them, and Allah sends astray [thereby] whom He wills and guides whom He wills. Also He is the Exalted in Might, the Wise." (Ibrahim, 4) The passage also draws our attention to this sociological reality. Therefore, the Qur'an, in one sense, can be considered in terms of the relation with Allah Almighty (hadd), and the 'form and appearance it reaches to humans' (resm). In terms of *hadd*, "It consists of meanings and words that of Allah Almighty, which is independent of words and letters, and extant with His Being. In this sense, it is not meant to say that the Qur'an is a creature. (...)The fact that the Qur'an is Arabic as it reaches people shows that on the one hand it is expressed in a *tebii* language shows that it is expressed in the rules of this language, on the other hand, and beyond this, it also indicates that it bears all the characteristics of being '*lisani*'".[46]

In this sense, it can be said that "a language is always a product of historical factors,"[47]even though many in-text and non-text elements elicit it from other languages! In more concrete words, as it is a mere social fiction, the linguistic product never, 'gets out of the phenomenon of sociality. Because, according to the testimony of Mengüşoğlu, a phenomenon that finds a basis in the structure of the entity of human[48]; in Nietzsche's words, no matter how primitive or advanced, because it exists where ever there are human beings, being "a condition of human

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[45] See: "As *narrated by Aisha, 'I said to the Prophet: "How can a human on earth be superior to another?" He said, "By reason...'" When I asked,* "Aren't people going to be punished for what they've done?" *He answered: "Don't they do practices based on the reason gifted to them? Then, their practices must be in the extent of their reason.* Consequently, they will be punished according to the value of their deeds!!" el-Aclûnî (d. 1162/1749), *Keşfu'l-Hafâ*, I/237.

[46] Tahsin Görgün, *Anlam ve Yorum*, İstanbul, Gelenek Yayınları, 2003, p. 156.

[47] De Suassure, Ferdinand, *Genel Dilbilim Dersleri I-II*, trans. Berke Vardar, Ankara, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1976, I/66.

[48] "Ontolojik Esaslara Dayanan Felsefî Antropoloji Hakkında Düşünceler", *Yüzyılımızda İnsan Felsefesi (Takiyyettin Mengüşoğlu'nun Anısına),* Ed. İonna Kuçuradi, Ankara, Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 1997, p. 4.

existence"[49] languages are indicative semiotic appearances between the subjects, who perceives and attaches meanings, and the object. And in this case, it can be verbalized as, "social existence is an internal characteristics of the language."[50] Besides this social character, Macit Gökberk emphasizes that its definition is 'the horizon that derives from a phenomenon that occurs in people," while establishing a "source-result" relation between "lingual and moral instincts." As it reveals the situation which every living culture emerges in as a verbal treasure, although it is considered as dead, a language carries some codes and contents that reveal the way of existence[51]. In another study he says, "language is an appearance of the spiritual being, that is to say, the roots of language is in a spiritual instinct."[52] Regarding this dimension of spirituality, Ernst Cassier states that "humans are not only intellectual beings" but also "creatures that form meaningful signs."[53] He also emphasizes that human beings live in a "world of signs" that also bears the reality of "language."[54]

At this point, it can be said that the religious text has an intertwined relationship with the cultural world and the framework, which is in the desire to gain reality through language, with the view that the 'language' phenomenon may have a godly origin. Such that, the meanings of religious texts cannot be independent of the linguistic/cultural system in which they are part! Therefore, the language and the cultural environment of the language is also a reference to Tafsir and Ta'wil![55] It is evident because of the natural relation between the society, the variant reality, and the language that "language, which is a reference to Tafsir and Ta'wil, is not static and invariant; on the contrary, it is dynamic and shows improvement [in both its morphology and semantic content] in parallel with the development of phenomena and culture"[56], thus its indicators and concept charts are re-formed.

Emphasis: Because of the paradoxical situation just mentioned, it is not possible that the Will of Allah takes place in the religious text, the Qur'an, with a divine and transcendent completeness. Instead, in the face of the modality of the Divine Transcendence, the restriction of the 'textual language.'[57] Which is an

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[49] The other conditions of the human existence are: *1) Knowing, 2) activity, 3) feeling of value and adoption of attitudes, 4) pre-sensing and determination, 5) wishing and freedom, 6) self-determination, love, 7) training and being trained, 8) ideation, 9) becoming a historical entity, 10) creating art and technique, 12) sociality, 13) feeling of tension, 14) working, bio-psychic integrity...* (Mengüşoğlu, Takiyyettin, ibid. p. 5).

[50] De Saussure, I/71.

[51] Macit Gökberk, *Değişen Dünya Değişen Dil*, İstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 4th Edition, 2004, p. 71.

[52] Macit Gökberk, *Değişen Dünya...*, p. 69.

[53] Yusuf Örnek, "Felsefede Antropoloji Geleneği ve Takiyyettin Mengüşoğlu", *Yüzyılımızda İnsan Felsefesi* (Takiyyettin Mengüşoğlu'nun Anısına), p. 70; Ernst Cassier, *İnsan Üstüne Bir Deneme* (1944), trans. N. Arat, İstanbul, 1980, p. 34 direct citation).

[54] Yusuf Örnek, "Felsefede Antropoloji Geleneği ve Takiyyettin Mengüşoğlu", p. 70.

[55] Ebû Zeyd, *Dinsel Söylemin Eleştirisi*, p. 186, and see p. 75, 183.

[56] Ebû Zeyd, *Dinsel Söylemin Eleştirisi*, p. 186-187.

[57] For analyses of whether language is a consensual (muwada'a) or divine teaching, see İbn Cinnî (d. 392/1002), *el-Hasâis*, ed., Muhammed Ali en-Neccâr, Beyrut, Dâru'l-Hudâ li't-Tıbâ'a ve'n-Neşr, - 1372/1952 (?), I/40, 46, 47; er-Râzi Fahreddin (d. 606/1209), *el-Mahsûl fî 'Ilmi Usûli'l-Fıkh*, I/177-192; el-

anthropological and consensual phenomenon, lies on the basis of the impossibility of being able to escape from belonging to the realm of creation and occurrences. Therefore, although it is characterized by transcendence in terms of resources, when it becomes 'symbols that belong here,' it is now recorded with the possibilities of 'those who belong to the world.' Heidegger (1903-1975) describes the language as 'the house of existence' from a philosophical perspective[58], while Wittgenstein (1889-1951) turns it into an adage with the following sentence: "the limits of my language signifies [signs, shows!...] the limits of my world.[59] Through language, beings emerge into 'existence and the disclosure of being (aletheia)[60],' born into freedom from being a faceless nature – which is unknown to us. To point out this ontological imperative, Heraclitus points this out in Fragment 1: "Logos, though always present, was not understood by humans, before they heard it..." Heraclitus' sentence, which says 'dark and closed,' is clear. Here, he means that "people didn't understand the truth before it became a word, in other words, spelled out in a language."[61]Even W. Von Humboldt states that 'language' is an 'energy' that profoundly influences all relations between mind and being, and that 'language is a finished thing, not a product (ergon), but an activity (energeia).' He emphasizes that language is one of the major creative forces in human history.[62]

Here, that profound truth that the feeling of trust and respect we hold against the original text of religion should always be remembered and even questioned: "Where can the letters/words/phrases that are innovated and created be pointed out to what is beyond, to the qualities and situations that belong to Him? In other words, how far could His eternal will be expressed through the text? Where is the one beyond words? How and to what extent can letters delineate to a [transcendent] being [and will] from which all things are created, exposed and formed emerged? Moreover, the letters are also a part of these creatures, and Almighty Allah is superior to the whole of these letters. In addition, minds cannot find a way to grasp Him with a particular name!"[63]

Hamiduddin Ahmed Al-Kirmani (d. 411/1020)[64], who examines this aspect, suggests that herein, while exploring the infinite meaning or (meta sensus) paradox

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Hafâcî (d. 466/1073), İbn Sinân, *Sırru'l-Fesâha*, Dâru'l-Kutubi'l-'Ilmiyye, Beirut, 1402/1982, p. 48, 49; İbn Aşûr, Tâhir, *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/411; Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *el-İtticâhu'l-'Aklî fî't-Tefsîr*, Beyrut, Dâru't-Tenvîr, 1983, p. 70-82; De Saussure, I/29-38.

[58] *Uber der Humanismus*, Bern, 1947, p. 5; Cited in Hüseyin Sesli, *Dil Alanı Üzerine*, Erzurum, Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, No: 56, -1968, p. 7.

[59] *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. Oruç Aruoba, Yapı Kredi Yayınları., 1st Edition, March-1985, 5.6.

[60] For '*Aletheia*'s meaning in terms of existentialism, see De Towarnicki, Frederic, *Martin Heidegger-Anılar ve Günlükler*, trans. Zeynep Durukal, Istanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002, p. 34-35.

[61] Herakleitos, *Kırık Taşlar*, In Turkish: Alova, Istanbul, Bordo Siyah Klasik Yayınlar, 2003, p. 13; Akarsu, Bedia, "Felsefe Açısından Dil," *http://www.turkischweb.com/anadilim/seite45.htm, p. 1*

[62] Akarsu, "ibid.", p. 2.

[63] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 160; Cited in el-Kirmânî, Ahmed Hamîdüddîn, *Râhatu'l-Akl*, p. 50).

[64] For about Hamîdüddin el-Kirmânî, see Daftary, Farhad, "Kirmânî (İsmâ'îlî dâ'îsi)," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Ankara, 2002, XXVI/63-64.

of the religious text between the language that belongs to 'here: this world' and the transcendence of its source, we get driven to sharp edges that can be expressed as the absolute impossibility of expressing something beyond phenomenal and material existence in the language of the phenomenal and material world[65]; at the point of depiction, it proposes to solve this problem by using the 'nafy: negation' method, instead of attributing any adjective indicated by the human language to the transcendent God.

What Eliade describes as the 'great secret' (mystérium tremendum) as the limitation and history of the holy (Hiérohanie); This is a process that is seen as Kalâm (Logos) in Christian theology in the context of Jesus... Eliade says: "The Great Secret is the phenomenon of the manifestation of the holy; (...) limits and enshrines the holy self by manifesting itself." Eliade goes on as follows: "God Himself agrees to be limited and to become historicized by appearing as Jésus-Christ. (...) [For this reason], Jésus-Christ was speaking Aramaic: He spoke neither Sanskrit nor Chinese... He had agreed to be limited in life and history!"[66]

Because of this textual limitation against the Will of God (intentio auctoris: the intention of the author), which cannot be identified with the Hadith and its world of possibilities, the reader or commentator of the text, as an explorer of meaning, will try to expand the possibilities of meaning in the text by asking questions on behalf of himself/herself or the person seeking answers. Since there is no single absolute and unshakable reading, and thus meaning, of the text, -if it was though, it should have been a transcendent affirmation of God, namely a lectio divino: godly reading- there may be 'various readings' and 'specific reflections' for the readers from different existential, mental, social areas and interests. And thus, the variety rising out of the text will give us some clues regarding the will of God and the holy traces to achieve it.

Therefore, in the interpretation of the religious text, the position of the interpreter and his object and the intentions that deeply direct his reading (intentio lectoris: the intention of the reader)[67] must be taken into account with due consideration. On the other hand, the works that form the tradition of interpretation, for which we attribute reference value –especially the classical ones-are simply the products of human effort, and they are not indisputable! On this occasion, 'The efforts and interpretations of the text can be seen as a process of sensing God's will through the Qur'an and preparing a solid foundation for the projects of actuating it!' They are valued as a human reflection and never be attributed to the divine meaning that is eternal, no matter to which scholar they belong, as they will never have the immunity and certainty of a divine reading!

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[65] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 160; Cited in el-Kirmânî, *Râhatu'l-Akl*, p. 42-43).

[66] Eliade, Mircea, *Mythes, Rêves et Mystères*, p. 157.

[67] See Eco, Umberto, *Yorum ve Aşırı Yorum*, trans. Kemal Atakay, Can Yayınları, 2nd Edition, 1997, p. 35 et al.

However, ignoring this point of view,- in the most general sense - the glorification, the sanctification of the tafsir acquis, has forced those who approach it with enthusiasm and hope, and wait for answers, solutions distilled from it to obey this cognitive and scientific reflections of this series of historicity unconditionally, excepting them from asking questions to the Qur'an on behalf of themselves and attributing a role of silence to them by driving them to a religious cognitive passiveness and consumers of the provided. However, "psychic being: man" is a world in itself, and this world is always "unique" to itself!' Dilthey says: "...the psychic being [human], who realizes value in the integrity of its being, is a world in itself that has a separate whole within its union, having the consciousness of its being. This indivisible whole is contained within the historical and social[68] reality. Each psychic union takes place within a specific community, in history and culture. The individuals live in this whole, which surrounds them, are influenced by and have an impact on it all over again."[69] From this perspective, the studies of tafsir took a list of unilateral demands into consideration, ignored where the target person stands and where he's going, the expanding dimensions of his world, and toward what kind of tensions he is being driven. To be more specific, they persistently ignored all these matters. Therefore, it can be suggested that the non-qua requirement in the efforts to revive the Qur'anic Text, which has been placed in human hands, is to come out of the consternation, despair to do better, inadequacy, and other blocked feelings against this glorious scientific heritage and to be filled with motivation and passion for success as much as the dynamism and enthusiasm for life by getting involved in the 'calmness and rhythm' of it!

Considering that the process of revelation followed a parallel course to the human reality in accordance with the situations of both the Messenger and the believers (tajawub al-wahy)[70], after the 'age of text': to continue in the era of 'interpretation and practice,' i.e., our subjective history; It is necessary to travel to their world of reason and soul by transcuring beyond the meaning of the shell of letters and abandonments. Because, "in many cases, texts are doomed to remain closed and incomprehensible, as long as they are tried to be understood according to the literal meaning. [Therefore], implicit meaning or spiritual meaning must be liberated from the shell of letters and brought to light.]"[71] Or, it can be said that "the most effective, coherent form of interpretation is to connect to the soul rather than the utterance of the text. [Because], ...if wording kills the text, meaning makes it live."[72]

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[68] The original word is '*sosial*' [S.K.]

[69] Birand, Kâmıran, *Mânevi İlimler Metodu Olarak Anlama*, , Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960, p. 27.

[70] es-Sâlih, Subhî, *Mebâhis*, p. 50, 52, 56 et al.

[71] Ernst, ibid., p. 6, and see p. 10.

[72] Zeki Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik*, p. 180.

An offer to ourselves...

After (cognitive) studies aimed at obtaining knowledge and purpose of observation, there should be studies that will meet the demands of the people, transform enthusiasm of faith into dynamism and productivity. The coolness of being the founding power and yeast of history, link man to life, hand-to-hand with the religious text, and shape the particular enthusiasms of transcendence within aesthetic, scientific, and human dimensions.

This may happen not only by reading the Qur'an through the point of view that considers it as revealed to centuries, but in contrast, through novel studies of interpretation which will be understood in the light of new eyes and new voices, as a living source consistent with the divine will, which is doped with the attributes of Jamal, and which has been revealed for the people of the following centuries shining out beams, showing the true path for those in pursuit of the infinite way of understanding. In a definite statement, we now move to an understanding of 'ta'wil' with a firm stance, together with the activity of 'tafsir,' freeing the word 'ta'wil' from the sinister burden of deadly meanings and connotations under which it is left to be crushed!

This is in connection with the fact that the text of the Qur'an is not regarded as confined text, which is frozen and no longer touchable by certain historicity. In other words, it has not or had not only been 'read,' but will always be 'read.' Humans will always maintain the living and its organic bond with mankind and the universe from all categories: Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, Animist, Totemist, Agnostic, Deist, Atheist... The deep existential relationship with these humans will always be maintained, to give them 'hands' in a text in a readily available horizon, in a place that will stand close to our hearts. In fact, it is about seeing it in every aspect of life. Because of its essential bond to the process of existence, the Holy Book "cannot be read as a dogmatic work. Because it contains a correct answer to every problem and every situation. (...) If the Holy Book holds the word of God/Wort Gottes alive, then this word would like to be constantly expressed and found in the concrete life of the listener,"[73] this is why we find the explanations comprehensible for our religious text and our position! On the other hand, the will of Allah is not a 'staggering' invasion, but a revelation to the Messenger that shows a relation with the 'history' and rises above the compassion of the contact with it. This is like making us feel how the concept of divine freedom can be framed by a 'godly ethic'. In Özcan's words, "...this dialogue (revelation), if the phrase goes, is limited not with free will but historical and cultural conditions. For instance, many explanations in the Qur'an have been revealed as answers to the questions asked to the Prophet. Selection of exemplary anecdotes, as well as

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[73] Ernst, "ibid.", p. 36, 37.

chronological and astronomical concepts and measurements to explain the acts of Allah is a result of contingent conditions."[74]

Therefore, the observation is: It is inevitable to transform the 'age of Tafsir' into the age of ta'wil and expansion; to root out and internalize the relationship between us and the 'text' through our self-initiative! As Zarqashi explained, one should not forget that the unquestionable interpretation and definitive proofs of the Qur'an can only be known by hearing from the messenger of Allah and that it can only be possible about a small number of verses. Because of this obligation, the meaning and will to be distilled from the Divine Word can only be revealed by the istinbat method through several clues and proofs. Allah asks His servants to think about the Book, so he does not order His prophet to give an explicit meaning of what was intended by His word. On the other hand, the Prophet accepts the opinions of a group of interpreters, which is proving that interpretation can be made without hearing from Allah and His messenger. [75]As a result of this license, and even encouragement, which He gave to His servants regarding the interpretation of the Book of Almighty Allah, interpretation studies have continued at various levels, thus creating an enormous collection for the interpretation and expansion phase to be realized from now on.

An Alternative Suggestion: From Tafsir to Ta'wil...

1- The horizon of tafsir, or 'mundus litteratus'...

When it comes to the etymological world of the term 'Tafsir,' which represents the first branch of science[76] to appear in Islamic Sciences, the word and its activity lead us in our sources to definitions made with expressions close to each other. 1) "Interpretation is to explain the word of God (statement); or Tafsir is the science that explains the words of the Qur'an and their meanings"[77]; 2) Tafsir "is to express what is the will of Allah as delivered in His divine word"[78]; 3) Tafsir "is the science that makes people understand the Book revealed by Allah to His messenger and its meaning and evidence are brought to the light"[79]; 4) Tafsir "is the science that mentions the Qur'an in terms of how to read it, its denotations, the provisions alone or in compound form, the meanings that it can be ascribed to them, and their complementary elements"[80]; 5) and again, "Tafsir is to explain the reason, condition, the story of revelation, its intention, etc. It can only be accepted through

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[74] Zeki Özcan, *Teolojik Hermenötik,* p. 153.

[75] al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, I/16.

[76] İbn Aşûr, *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/13, 14.

[77] Ez-Zehebî, Muhammed, *et-Tefsîr ve'l-Müfessirûn*, Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-Hadîse, 2nd Edition, 1396/1976, I/14.

[78] İbn Aşûr, *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/13.

[79] al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, I/13; ez-Zehebî, *et-Tefsîr*, I/15

[80] ez-Zehebî, I/14-15.

narration"[81]. Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen's (1883-1971) definition embraces all other definitions, while attracting attention to 'the dynamic and active dimension of tafsir, which should be achieved': 6) Tafsir "explains the meaning of words, propositions of verses, judgments, stories behind them, both the firm and cognate or living and extinct ones through words and expressions that are self-explanatory and self-expressive"[82]. As it can be seen in the definitions given above, in general, 'tafsir' is on the axis of wording and 'expresses the meanings that the words can explicitly bear,' as it is explained by the scholars of usul.

On the other hand, as we will mention in detail, the ta'wil studies that should be at the center of our new interpretation efforts declare that "the word can attach meanings internally and implicitly[83]; but, by remaining in unity before and after the word, without contradicting the certainty of the Book and the Sunnah.[84]

In short, we can say that 'Tafsir' is more dependent on words, takes advantage of the inside of the words and their composition, while it appears as a discipline that prioritizes 'narration' and 'hearing' in this regard. The words of the Qur'an, however, correspond to other indicators and purposes in connection with different interests, beyond the meaning derived from words; this potential situation necessitates the emergence of new 'peculiar meaning codes' in the process and historicism that flow toward the future. This is an exceptional characteristic that distinguishes ta'wil from tafsir and takes it one step further. Because, "Tafsir, does not take the phrase out of the meaning it refers to and is based on the idea of jurisprudence. And ta'wil, on the other hand, takes things out of explicit meanings because of another piece of evidence."[85]

The primary way of this is that the interpretation does not limit itself solely to 'transmission and narration' but leans into the world of 'ta'wil'! That is the requirement which al-Ghazali draws attention. He says: "Then it is unlawful to stipulate the transmission and the narration in interpretation, and it is permissible for all to draw provisions from the Qur'an though limited to personal insights and in the measure of their sanity."[86] More encouraging, however, is the following statement where he expresses the breadth of the world of meaning provided by the Qur'an: "Understanding the meaning of the Qur'an is a vast field and vast space without borders! Surely what has been conveyed in relation to the interpretation of the seen is not the last point of understanding!"[87] It can even be said that "if the

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[81]   Fenârî (d. 834/1434), Şemseddin, 'Aynu'l-A'yân, Âsitâne, Rif'at Bey Matba'ası, H.1325, p. 5.

[82]   Bilmen (1883-1971), Ömer Nasûhi, Büyük Tefsir Tarihi, Istanbul, Bilmen Yayınevi, 1973, I/97.

[83]   Fenârî, ibid., p. 7.

[84]   Fenârî, ibid., p. 5.

[85]   Ebû Zehra, Muhammed, İslam Hukuku Metodolojisi (Fıkıh Usulü), trans. Abdülkadir Şener, Ankara, Ank. Üniv. İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara, 1973, p. 127.

[86]   İhyâu Ulûmi'd-Din, İsa el-Bâbî el-Halebî ve Şurekâhu, Egypt, Dâru ihyâi'l-Kutubi'l-'Arabiyye, Ed., I/292; and see ez-Zehebî, et-Tefsîr ve'l-Mufessirîn, I/263.

[87]   İhyâ, I/291; and see ez-Zehebî, et-Tefsir, I/263.

meaning we understand from the Qur'an is nothing more than a translated translation, it cannot be considered an 'understanding'!"[88].

Therefore, we can say that if the Divine Discourse, which has its own method, has carried out communication in the human language through 'tanzil' despite all its knowledge, philosophy, power and wisdom, then human discourse, despite all its ignorance, imperfection, urgency and prejudice, will be able to communicate with this discourse through 'ta'wil'![89]

2- The Horizon of Ta'wil, or 'mundus herméneuticus'

The term 'ta'wil,' which can be described as a dynamic and advanced interpretation effort, is etymologically shaped by the transfer of the 'al-awlu' root[90], which contains the meanings of 'return, arrive, return to origins,' to the form of 'taf'il,' which means multiplicity, but also mobility and calmness. As a result of the fact that it is the term of focus of a creative understanding, being connected to its root meaning, it refers to be aware of the inner-face and truth of an event; conclusion and punishment; and understanding and deeds[91]. This term also refers to meanings, such as "transform of the wording from the primary to secondary or third meanings or commentary on its explicit meaning through interpretation to the secondary meaning"[92]; in short, "it is to convert the word to the meaning intended through it"[93]; Abu Zahra offers a description that may in some way be the definition of the science of fiqh: "Ta'wil is to remove the provision from its explicit meaning and to refer it to another meaning which it is likely to be involved in".[94] According to the honorable preacher İsmail Cerrahoğlu, it is "to reject one of two explicit and agreed possibility"[95], while "muawwil", which is at the center of the process, guides the wording to the most meaningful and useful one of the possible meanings.[96]

This means that every phenomenon, action, or word has an explicit and implicit meaning, and this implicit dimension can only be revealed through ta'wil, which returns it to its true principles and causes.[97] In the ta'wil process, which requires a

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88 Gazâlî, *İhyâ*, I/290.

89 Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *Dinsel Söylem*, p. 73.

90 El-Isfehânî, Râğıb (d. 502/1108), *el-Müfredât fî Garîbi'l-Kur'ân*, Ed. Muhammed Seyyid Geylânî, Beyrut, Ed., p. 31; İbn Fâris, Ahmed (d. 395/1005), *Mücmelü'l-Lüğa*, Ed. Zübeyr Abdulmuhsin Sultan, Beyrut, Müessesetu'r-Risâle, 1406/1986, I/107.

91 Şahinoğlu, Nazif, "Te'vîl", *M.E.B. İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, M.E. Basımevi, 1979, XII/1, 215.

92 Ez-Zehebî, *et-Tefsîr*, I/18

93 İbn Aşûr, *Tefsîru't-Tahrîr*, I/16.

94 Ebû Zehra, Muhammed, *İslam Hukuku Metodolojisi (Fıkıh Usulü)*, trans. Abdülkadir Şener, Ankara, Ank. Üniv. İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1973, p. 138.

95 İsmail Cerrahoğlu*Tefsir Usûlü*, Ankara, Ank. Üniv. İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1971, 210.

96 Ez-Zehebî, *et-Tefsîr*, I/16

97 Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *Mefhûmu'n-Nass*, p. 259.

superior intellectual effort (ijtihad), the commentator (muawwil), in contrast to the 'mufassir' who often remains in a position of narrator, is an active subject who discovers the 'folds and depths of the word' in the face of human and factual demands through different methods, such as 'composing judgments[98], privatization, etc'.[99] In the efforts of ta'wil, there is a distinctive vividness that transcends the 'textual objectivity' and 'textual abstraction' framework in which the interpretation is bounded. This vividness comes from the existent and active subjective elements that are in connection to individual and social identities that carry out this function, besides the objective elements that are implicitly existent in the lingual structure of the text.[100] In contrast to the objective and external/textual method of tafsir, which reduces the interpreter to a passive position against the wording, this subjective character, which is close to the human world, brings vividness and factuality to the ta'wil process. In ta'wil efforts, the activity to process and shape the text is given to the interpreter, and it can be coded as 'the subjective and special role of the interpreter.'[101]

The text is processed in the horizon of ta'wil, in the face of facts by a non-verbal method and in the way of istinbat, and it is moved from the 'meaning' horizon in the wording to the 'intention' horizon in it through a mental and cognitive process! The term ta'wil itself refers to 'a movement, dynamism' with its morphology, and shows a dialectical line of the formation. Because, the conflict point of the meanings referred to by the term ta'wil, which are 'returning to origins' and 'achieving the goal and the result,' is the spirit of 'movement' as indicated by 'taf'il - ta'wil' modality. This is the key term for moving something in the direction of the source (original) or the course of the ultimate goal and outcome (irja) through surveillance (ri'ayah) and management (siyasah). But the movement here is not a movement in the material sense, but rather a mental and cognitive movement in the way of understanding facts.[102]

This calmness that exists in the ta'wil movement gives the commentator the power of finding the reflections of meanings and knowledge in the Qur'an, as well as creating new criteria, concepts, and new reconciliations between the facts and the text in the heaven of unlimited purposes; as stated by Abdullah ibn Masud (d.

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[98] *Istinbat*: "Finding water as a result of excavation." It also refers to a revelation of the secrets (*izhar*). Accordingly, in Arabic, if something hidden is revealed, it is expressed as *"it has been revealed."* It also refers to the efforts of interpreters and scholars of fiqh to expose meanings and hidden provisions through their understanding and scholarly activity" ([Mütercim Ahmed Âsım [Efendi] (d. 1819) *Kâmûs Tercemesi [el-Okyânûsu'l-Basît fi Tercemeti'l-Kâmûsi'l-Muhît ve'l-Kâbûsi'l-Vasît]*, Istanbul, Cemal Efendi Matbaası, H. 1325, III/139)

[99] al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, II/166.

[100] Abdurrahmân, Abdü'l-Hâdî, *Sultatu'n-Nass*, Beyrut, el-Merkezu's-Sekâfî el-Arabî, 1993, p. 196.

[101] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 264.

[102] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 260; "Emir, or expressed "al al-emir al-ra'iyatahu" when he governs his people" (İbn Fâris, *Mucmelu'l-Luğa*, I/107; and see *"al-awlu: as-siyasah al-allati tura'i maalaha: the act of management, governance, that takes the result into consideration"* (el-İsfehânî (d. 502/1108), Râğıb, *el-Müfredât*, p. 31)

32/652), it is the mission of involving the Qur'an into the world of existence letter by letter, word by word, and sentence by sentence, and cultivating it just like a field that is a source of infinite spikes (taswir al-Qur'an)[103]. According to Abu ad-Darda (d. 32/652), it would present the movement to find the infinite levels of meaning (wujuh)[104] that shines with the Divine revelations. If said in a stressed expression, 'the dynamism of life lived' between 'the text' and 'the interpretation of it or interpreted for itself,' should be included as a point of reference and a concise relationship. In Bultmann's words, there must be a life connection between the commentator in person and what is commented on in the text![105]

Thus, the main purpose of the ta'wil activity would be to liberate the Qur'an from the meaning of the historicity of the 'partial meaning' and turn it into a source of value and suggestions for the whole historicity. Accordingly, the text always draws us from the private (particular) one to the general (universal) one with a fluidity [with the attraction of its deep concise and purposeful dimensions]. We know that the specific denotation aspect of the text is "the semantic aspect that directly points to the cultural-historical phenomenon; the amm [aspect of denotation] is the direction that can be dynamic, continuous and open to new meanings with each reading…"[106] Therefore, in the effort to understand and implement that turns ta'wil into a system, the road will be taken from the sections of 'certain meaning' to the valleys of 'purpose and intention', which form a navigational map open to all dimensions of historicity. This can be done by metaphorical means, which can be described as 'broadening of true meaning' in short, even if it is expressed in different words by different scholars.[107]

The acquittal of ta'wil! In this case, 'ta'wil' is highly valuable as a dynamic, living means of building a bridge between the Qur'an and the human being and the concrete appearance of humanity for transcendent purposes, not as a way to express the passions and ideas that alienate the individual to the purpose of 'moral

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[103] *"Whoever demands knowledge should read the Qur'an thoroughly, for it is the knowledge of the before and the after!" (al-Zarqashi, Al-Burhan, I / 8; II / 154); "this does not happen only by the interpretation of its explicit meaning!.." (Ihya, I/290); "In the Qur'an, there is knowledge of those before and those after; there is nothing in it that may not be possible for those gifted the ability to understand it by Allah to take out from it!" (al-Zarqashi, Al-Burhan, II / 189).*

[104] *"One cannot achieve a deep understanding (fiqh) before exploring the Qur'an through different meanings it refers to (wuhuj)!" (Gazâlî, İhyâ, I/290; al-Zarqashi, Al-Burhan, II/154).*

[105] Ernst, "ibid.", p. 23.

[106] Ebû Zeyd, *Dinsel Söylem*, p. 190.

[107] *"el-Mecâz, et-Tecâvüz, et-Tecevvüz* (Ebû Ubeyde (d. 210/825)); *el-İttisâ'* (el-Ferrâ (d. 207/822)); *el-Mecâz, el-Mesel, et-Teşbîh, el-Kinâye, el-İştikâk* (Câhız (d. 255/868)), et al. For more comprehensive information, see Ebû Zeyd, Nasr Hamid, *el-İtticâhu'l-Aklî fi't-Tefsîr-Dirâse fî Kadıyyeti'l-Mecâz fi'l-Kur'ân 'ınde'l-Mu'tezile*, Beyrut, Dâru't-Tenvîr, , 1983. And see Sedat Şensoy, "Belâgat Geleneğinde Aklî Mecaz Tartışması", *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume: 8, Year: 2002, p. 1-37; Durmuş, İsmail, "Mecâz", *T.D.V. İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Ankara, 2003, XXVIII/217-220; Birışık, Abdulhamit, "Mecâzu'l-Kur'ân", *T.D.V. İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Ankara, 2003, XVIII/223-225; Gündüzöz, Soner, *Arapçada Kelime Türetimi/Kavramlar-Kuramlar-Kurumlar*, Samsun, Din ve Bilim Kitapları, 2005, p. 153 et al.

conformity, utility and solution.' Just as the prayer of the Prophet for Abdullah ibn Abbas (d. 68/687): "O Allah! Let him (Abdullah ibn Abbas) have a comprehensive understanding in the religion and teach him the ta'wil (understanding the meanings of the Qur'an)[108]."[109] Again, the Prophet's words about him, which are "what a great interpreter of the Qur'an you are,"[110] has taken its place as an encouraging maxim in this regard.

Then we say,

Let's run to the expansion of meaning or metaphorical exuberance!

So what is the 'metaphor' that comes across as the way to produce new meanings through the words based on various interests and situations? Jahiz (d. 255/868) is the scholar who accepted the metaphor as contrast and the opposite of the fact in meaning and clarified it for the first time.[111] To him, the metaphor is to use the phrase in a way that is outside the real meaning, with a breadth of language being used by those who speak it.[112] So if the word is used in the sense that it is expected to indicate, it becomes the truth. If it is transferred to a different meaning from the actual meaning, and a blocker (qarinah) against using it in its real meaning is seen, this use case will also be metaphorical.[113] Abu Ubaydah (d. 210/825), who is the author of the most renowned studies on the metaphors in the Qur'an, on the other hand, expresses the metaphor in the form of 'the ways and methods (turuq) that the Qur'an follows in its expressions,' very different from the definitions put forward by the scholars of wording.[114]

In a metaphor application that takes its origin from the text, there must be a deep-rooted relationship (ta'alluq) reached by the interpreter beyond the literal meaning and the wording[115]; otherwise, ensuring a new interpretation through the metaphor becomes an attempt to produce a meaning that is far from its origin and based on a fictionalized text! However, in order to gain authority and valid interpretations based on the divine text, it is necessary that the language be kept within its natural and obligatory relevance; the meaning to be acquired in the process of reconciliation, regardless of its degree, should have a connection with the

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[108] İbn Aşûr, *Tefsîr…*, I/16.

[109] El-Isbehânî, Ebû Nu'aym (d. 430/1039), *Hilyetu'l-Evliyâ ve Tabakâtu'l-Esfıyâ*, Beyrût, Dâru'l-Kuttâbi'l-Arabî, 2nd Edition, 1387/1967, I/316; Gazâlî, *İhyâ*, I/292.

[110] el-Isbehânî, *Hilye*, I/316.

[111] *Mefhûm*, p. 93.

[112] Halefullah, Muhammed Ahmed, *Selâsü Resâil*, p. 162. And see el-Cürcânî, Seyyid Şerîf (816/1413), *Kitâbü't-Ta'rifât*, Ed. p. 202, 203.

[113] Mevlevî, Tâhir-ül, *Edebiyat Lügatı*, p. 96; Bilgegil, Kaya, *Edebiyat Bilgi ve Teorileri*, p. 130; el-Hâşimî, *Cevâhiru'l-Belâğa*, p. 179, 180. And see Sabbagh, T., *La Métaphore dans Le Coran*, Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris, 1943, p. 10.

[114] İbnü'l-Müsennâ, Ebû Ubeyde Ma'mer (d. 210/825), *Mecâzu'l-Kurân*, Ed. M. Fuâd Sezgin, Beyrut, Müessesetu'r-Risâle, 3rd Edition, 1401/1981, I/19 (presentation).

[115] Ebû Zeyd, *Mefhûm*, p. 94.

word. At this point, it would be appropriate to convey Ghazali's following observation: "Whoever claims to understand the secrets of the Qur'an, he/she is like someone who claims to have been inside a home without passing through the door! (...) There is no doubt that the explicit dimension of tafsir is in the position of a language that is necessary for understanding!"[116]

In short, the other meaning in which the wording is interpreted should certainly be contained in the wording itself, either explicitly or implicitly.

While some scholars do not accept the metaphorical statements in the Qur'an on the grounds that "the speaker only deviates and becomes directed to metaphors when it is difficult for him/her to express the truth, then he uses provisional expression; this is something impossible to be expected from Allah." the majority favor the view that metaphors are present in the Qur'an. These scholars say that if there were no metaphors in the Qur'an, the emphasis (ta'kid), certain statements not explicitly mentioned (hazf), repetition of the stories, etc. should also not exist in it. Furthermore, if no metaphor was found in the Qur'an, half of the literary beauty in it would have gone."[117] So it can be said that metaphors are one of the important possibilities and expression forms in the Qur'an in terms of interpretation method as well as aesthetic aspects.

Thus, a meaning that marks the particular and special horizon in the word reaches the vastness of a platform of universal and general meaning through a method of interpretation that uses the metaphor. In the meantime, it should be stated that "...the development of the historical-social phenomenon takes some particular meanings –especially in the case of provisions and legislative verses - out of being functional and then these meanings become semantic and historical testimonies. This means that we are facing three levels in terms of the indications existing in religious texts: the level of meaning in the work of historical testimony that is not open to metaphorical interpretation or any other interpretation; the level of meaning that is open to metaphorical interpretation; and finally the level of meaning that is able to expand in the direction of 'intention,' which can be derived from the sociocultural context.[118] The 'metaphor,' which stands as a leap threshold in 'interpretation,' serves as an important bridge that conveys us to these second and third levels of meaning.

The new trail to be blazed by the ta'wil processes in the world of minds and phenomena would be to extend the 'dimension of meaning' of the 'divine teaching,' which is characterized by a certain historicity and thus 'addresses the moment and relevant sections of the history' to the present and the future in order to raise it to the level of 'intention and purpose,' which represents the second and third levels of

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[116] *İhyâ*, I/292.

[117] al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, II/255; and see Kuteybe, İbn (d. 276/889), *Te'vîlu Müşkili'l-Kur'ân*, comments and publication: Ahmed Sakr, Kahire, Dârû't-Türâs, 2nd Edition, 1393/1973, p. 132-134.

[118] Ebû Zeyd, *Dinsel Söylem*, p. 190-191.

meaning. Therefore, the 'existential framework,' which restricts the text as a reflection of a particular condition will be put aside and be dressed with 'divine will and criteria' and the depth of the dimension of 'subsequent present times,' which bear the aim to appear through the motives that are meaningful witnesses of the history. Otherwise, it would be "only emphasizing the historical meaning of the word, freezing the text in a certain period, and transforming it to a historical phenomenon or example."[119] To be more concrete, it would be obsolescence or "the death of religious text."

And a call!

The Divine Will will experience fractions twice: first, through the language that is a human element and means. Herein, in the world and in the field of immanence, it bears a format of transcendence and essence. Then, 'the text that is a will that has already been transformed through language' undergoes a second fraction by being interpreted in the face of the world's conditions and requirements. Despite this fact, reflecting this purely human activity, called 'interpretation,' as 'the divine will itself' would be the distortion and exhaustion of this transcendence, –a paradoxical situation! Therefore, tafsir, 'historical analyses' and material supply, linguistic, semantic and practical studies related to the Qur'an's wording, have largely completed their mission to reveal the dimensions of the meaning of the word as it is delivered to the first circle of addressees. In principle, it is inevitable to aim a human-oriented praxis, rather than a 'divine theoria,' in today's environment where we embrace new horizons and concepts and to initiate the process of 'ta'wil,' which holds tafsir near as a must si non-qua world of reference. In fact, drawing attention to this fact, Ghazali states as quoted above that the tafsir of the explicit meaning holds the place the effort to learn the wording, which is necessary for meaning and highly relevant to listening, on the other hand, that all or at least most of the language must be known, and also that many meanings related to the essence and the outside of the Qur'an must be known.[120] He adds that the ultimate goal of all these efforts is to put an emphasis on this truth: Allah, who gave us the Qur'an, does not have a limit and neither understanding His word has![121] Or, "Whoever does not have knowledge, understanding, piety and the ability to think of matters, he/she will not get any flavor from the Qur'an. Therefore, it is not enough for a person to know the interpretation of the explicit meaning, which means to know the meaning of the words in the language, to understand the truths of the meaning!"[122]

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[119] Ebû Zeyd, ibid., p. 204.

[120] *İhyâ*, I/292; and see, al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, II/155.

[121] *İhyâ*, I/290.

[122] al-Zarqashi, *Al-Burhan*, II/155.

Because of this, it is necessary to interpret the Qur'an from other perspectives by freeing it from the weight of the temporal and relative methodical, mental and social concepts created by the ages. Accordingly, "the interpretation is only itself; moreover, it is not the evidence"[123]; also "there is no verse that has ever been practiced by a community but no others will in the future."[124] In other words, the 'interpretation' activity, which has become 'the interpretation of interpretation,' should be transferred to 'ta'wil,' which is mainly aimed at the interpretation of the text; thus, it should remain independent in the face of the "sense of security and trust given by tradition,"[125] which is a refuge, a deceleration, a rasp of self-confidence and an evocative attraction of laziness.

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Salafism In Tafsir Tradition[*]

Mustafa ÖZTÜRK[**]

Abstract

Salafi thinking, defended by significant Hadith scholar Ahmed b. Hanbel in IX. century and systematised by İbn Teymiyye and İbn Kayyim el-Cevziyye, has a important role in classical Sunni tafsir tradition. Salafism in Islamic tafsir tradition should be issued under three categories which are related but quite different from each other. First category is Ahl al-Hadith tradition which base systematic Salafism. This tradition, also named as Ashâb al-Hadith, Ahl al-Athar, Ahl al-Sunna al-Hâssa, is remembered with Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855). Second category is the religious tradition which is symbolised with İbn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and his famous students like İbn Kayyim el-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) and Abu'l-Fidâ İbn Kathîr (d. 774/1373). Third category is new Salafism which is emerged in modern time and has a discourse of *islah-tajdid*.

Keywords: Salafism, Tafsir, Ahl al-Hadith, Ibn Taymiyya

Tefsir Geleneğinde Selefîlik Ekolü

Özet

Hicrî III. (IX.) asırda Ehl-i Hadis ekolünün sembol ismi Ahmed b. Hanbel tarafından savunulan, daha sonra İbn Teymiyye ve İbn Kayyim el-Cevziyye'nin gayretleriyle sistematik yapıya kavuşan Selef düşüncesi klasik dönem Sünnî tefsir geleneğinde belirleyici konuma sahiptir. İslam tefsir geleneğinde Selefîlik, birbiriyle bağlantılı ve aynı zamanda birbirinden oldukça farklı üç kategoride ele alınması gereken bir konudur. İlk katregori, sistematik Selefîliğe alt yapı oluşturan Ehl-i Hadis ekolüdür. Ashâb-ı Hadîs, Ehl-i Eser, Ehl-i Sünnet-i Hâssa gibi farklı isimlerle de anılan bu ekolün sembol ismi Ahmed b. Hanbel (ö. 241/855)'dir. İkinci kategori, hicrî VII. asrın ikinci yarısında yetişen İbn Teymiyye (ö. 728/1328) ile onun İbn Kayyim el-Cevziyye (ö. 751/1350) ve Ebü'l-Fidâ İbn Kesîr (ö. 774/1373) gibi meşhur talebelerince temsil edilen dinî düşünce çizgisidir. Selefîlik ve tefsir konusunda üçüncü kategori, modern dönemdeki ıslah-tecdit söylemiyle ön plana çıkan yeni Selefîliktir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefîlik, Tefsir, Ehl-i Hadîs, İbn Teymiyye

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Introduction

Salafism, within the Islamic tafsir tradition, is a topic that should be reviewed through three different categories that are related to one another. The first category is the Ahl al-Hadith movement that formed the basis of a systematic Salafism. The most significant name of this movement, which is also called Ashab al-Hadith, Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Sunnah al-Hassa, is Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855). The Ahl al-Hadith movement, which became more dominant with the supports of Ishaq ibn Rakhawayah (d. 238/853), Imam al-Bukhari (d. 256/870) and Abu Said ad-Darimi (d. 280/894) in Hijri third century, were represented by Baghdadi Hanbalism imams in the upcoming periods such as Abu Bakr al-Hallal (d. 311/923), Abu Muhammad al-Barbakhari (d. 329/941) and Ibn Battah al-Ukhbari (d. 387/997).

The second category in Salafism and tafsir is the religious ideology concept represented by Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) and his well-known students such as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d. 751/1350) and Abu al-Fida Ibn Qasir (d. 774/1373). Salafism was particularly systematized by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. It is certain that systematic Salafism is based on Ahl al-Hadith movement represented by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Hanbalism supporters. In addition, Ibn Taymiyyah were asked the following, and similar questions: "What are your thoughts on the Salafism sect/method in doctrines, and on other sects in later periods? Which one of them is on the right track? Are the methods of Ahl al-Hadith the most benevolent? Does Firqa al-najiyah mean Ahl al-Hadith?" He answered these as follows: "Ahl al-Hadith is the movement that is the most mature by intelligence, proper by comparison, suitable by ra'y, concrete and true by ideology, best for deduction, authorized for disputes, perfect for perception, appropriate for inspiration, precise for discretion and psychology, suitable for listening and talking, and beautiful for the state (of enjoyment-satisfaction) for Muslims/humanity. In conclusion, Ahl al-Hadith and Sunnah has the position, which is the same as that of Muslims against other religions, against other Islamic sects."[1]

The main reference of Ahl al-Hadith, which was praised as such by Ibn Taymiyyah, is sahabah, tabi'un and taba al-tabi'in scholars named as "salaf as-salihin". Verses such as Al-Tawba 9/100, al-Anfal 8/75 and al-Hashr 59/10, and hadith narratives such as "The most benevolent generation is the Muslim generation to which I was sent as a prophet. The second most benevolent generation is the one that follows the first, and the other most benevolent generation are those that follow (sahabah, tabi'un, taba-i tabi'in)"[2] indicate to Ibn Taymiyyah that Salafism is the most benevolent after the prophets. According to him, "Knowing Salafism scholars ideas and practices about Islamic science, and religion is much more benevolent and useful than knowing the ideas and practices

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[1]   Abu al-Abbas Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, Cairo, 1951, p.1-8.

[2]   Muslim, "Fazail as-Sahabah", 210-215; Ibn Hanbal, *al-Musnad*, II, 328; V, 327; VI, 156.

of the following generations. It is necessary to know the ideas and practices of Salafism ulama about tafsir, usul ad-din, furu al-fiqh, zukhd, praying, ethics, jihad and other fields. As the Quran and Sunnah indicates, Salafism is more benevolent than all following generations. Therefore, following them is more benevolent than following the later generations, and knowing their ideas and discussions on Islamic science and religion is more benevolent than knowing that of later generations. The provisions of Salafism ulama are pure."[3]

The third category regarding Salafism and tafsir is neo-Salafism that draws attention with its statement on reformation-renewal in the modern area. While searching for the reasons of defeat against the western world in the nineteenth century and seeking solutions to this defeat, many Muslim ideologists and scientists associated the crisis of depression/decline with the loss of religious essence in historical experiences and with the misunderstanding and misperception of religious works. Accordingly, various superstitions and innovations were included in Islam, the imitation-based ideology became more common among the ulama, personal beliefs and ideologies of scholars of fiqh and kalam and tafsir authorities became more significant, and Sufism and other movements made the public lazy, all of which caused the Islamic world to regress, and be defeated by Ahl al-Qufur. It is inevitable to adapt the basics of Islam and reform the Islamic ideology to turn the negative progress of the historical state into a positive one in Muslims' favor.[4]

This reformation-renewal ideology supported by scholars such as Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1890), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Muhammad Rashid Riza (d. 1935), Jamaladdin al-Qasimi (d. 1914) and Mahmud Shukri Alusi (d. 1924) was related to Salafism as it was parallel to Ibn Taymiyyah's critical ideas and beliefs. Among the scholars who supported reformation and renewal in Islam, Rashid Riza has a particular place for ensuring that Salafism acquired dynamism. He often quoted from Salafism scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah and Shavkani (d. 1250/1834) in *Manar*, updated the tafsir concept of classic Salafism, and assigned a social/sociological function to Quran tafsir through the concept of hidayah. The *Manar* tafsir which clearly reflected neo-Salafism tendencies of Rashid Riza left great traces on the Quran and tafsir concepts of Turkish Muslims along with Abd al-aziz Chavish (d. 1929), Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi (d. 1945), Ahmad Mustafa al-Maraghi (d. 1952), Ferid Wajdi (d. 1954) and Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1964).

A religious-political movement named Wahhabism, which has been associated with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1206/1792), should be briefly mentioned in regard to Salafism. It is known that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab often referred to Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah in his works. Accordingly,

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[3]   Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatawa*, Beirut 2000, XIII, 13-14.

[4]   Mustafa Öztürk, Çağdaş İslâm Düşüncesi ve Kur'âncılık, Ankara 2013, p. 19.

it should be stated that Wahhabism is used by non-Salafi people to refer to the Salafism movements. In regards to the Salafism - Wahhabism relationship, although it is possible to mention purification from innovation and superstitions, and about ensuring that the discourse of pure religious practice and life belonging to the first Muslim generations are adopted by the Muslims, there is an essential disagreement between Salafism and Wahhabism rather than an essential agreement. It is clear that Rashid Riza, one of the well-known names of modern Salafism, has Wahhabism-related inclinations[5], but the ideology he represented was quite different from Wahhabism due to its reformist, modernist and eclectic characteristics. Although Wahhabism claimed that it rebuilt Islamic ethics and spirituality with its prior pure form, it lost the control of its religious reformation-renewal claim due to its excessive actions such as the absolute literalism in Sunnah and the demolition of graves for the purpose of removing innovations from Islam.[6]

The Salafism concept, which was transmitted to the twentieth century following the repute acquired after the Pan-Islamist movement became popular in the nineteenth century, was strictly adopted by the majority of people who did not like the term of Wahhabi and were the members of Saudi Ahl al-Hadith/Hanbalism tradition. Salafism, as a more esteemed concept was used as a replacement of Wahabiyyah to reflect the representatives of Ahl al-Hadith concept with the influential propaganda conducted in the second half of the twentieth century.[7] In addition, as economic and social conditions became more severe after World War I, dependence on the Western world increased, and pressures on the freedom of religion and belief, Salafism started to become more strict and radical, and it showed itself as various political organizations. This period, which started with the movements of Ihwan al-Muslimin under the leadership of al-Banna (d. 1949) in Egypt and Jamaat al-Islami under the leadership of Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (d. 1979), turned Salafism into a religious ideology.[8] Today, Salafism in on a radical path showing interest in the wording and style of Islam, rather than its essence and spirit, neglecting the ethical-moral dimensions many times, and reducing the level of historical experiences and accumulations to a level of innovation and innovation

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[5] *Al-Wahhabiyyun wa'l-Hijaz* (Cairo, 1344), which was written on Suud's kingdom proclamation in Hijaz and in the improvement and deepening of Wahhabism, indicated that this movement was suitable to Islam, and he supported Saudis in the struggle for power between Sharif Husein (d. 1931) and the Saudi family. On the other hand, Rashid Riza, who regarded the Saudi Kingdom as a state that would serve Islam and made efforts to prevent the growth of any conflicts between the Saudi Kingdom and other Islamic states, developed a discourse on Arabic nationalism in time, and his discourse style was considered by some researchers as Arabism and/or Pan-Arabism. see E. Tauber, "Rashîd Ridâ as Pan-Arabist before Wold War I", *The Moslem World*, LXXIX/2,(1989), p. 272-286; Albert Hourani, *Çağdaş Arap Düşüncesi*, trans. Lâtif Boyacı-Hüseyin Yılmaz, İstanbul 2000, p. 241-242.

[6] Öztürk, *Çağdaş İslâm Düşüncesi ve Kur'âncılık*, p. 20-21.

[7] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "11 Eylül'le Derinleşen Ayrılık: Suudî Selefiyye ve Cihadî Selefiyye, Dinî Araştırmalar,2004, 7, issue: 20, p. 206-208.

[8] Mehmet Zeki İşcan, , *Selefilik İslâmi Kökenciliğin Tarihi Temelleri*, İstanbul 2009, p. 38 -49; "11 Eylül'de Derinleşen Ayrılık", p. 208-234.

patriotism. Furthermore, Salafism made great contributions to the development of a intolerant Muslim/Mohammedanism image that does not match with the general inclinations of modern Islamic societies, as this image drew too much attention in policy.[9]

In addition to these developments in the modern era, the concept of Salafism primarily reflects a religious ideology represented by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. One of the most significant characteristics of these two scholars is that they attempted to base their Ahl al-Hadith-related ideas and beliefs with multi-dimensional analyses and arguments, rather than advocating these with ala al-matlub style. However, the first representatives of Ahl al-Hadith advocated certain ideas conveyed from the sahabah and tabi'un period, but they did not make extensive efforts to base and rebuild these ideas on a concept. Therefore, their beliefs did not go beyond rebuttals and repetitions. Thus, the Salafism that is reflected in Ibn Taymiyyah's beliefs and ideas is particularly significant for the entire Ahl al-Hadith tradition.[10] In addition, the same Salafism is also quite significant for the classic Sunni tradition.

The Nature and Function of Tafsir in Salafism

Salafi tafsir was almost completely formed by Ibn Taymiyyah. According to him, tafsir means revealing the meaning, which should be referred to as the first and original meaning, which was previously understood, and gaining information about this meaning. Revealing this first meaning is based on communication and language, and it consists of simple explanation activities that correspond to concepts such as statements and tawzih. The Prophet holistically explained the religion in terms of usul, lineage, clear issues, science and other practices. To be clearer, Allah explained everything in the Quran while the Prophet clarified all issues through the hadiths, which left nothing for us to explain.[11] The divine words, *li-tubayyina li an-nasi ma nuzzila ilayhim*, in surah An-Nahl 16/44 express that the Prophet explained the wording and meanings in the Qur'an to the ashab.[12] The Qur'an's meaning was explained within the nuzul environment. Thus, Muslims should be committed to the Prophet's statements rather than re-explaining and interpreting the Qur'an.

Ibn Taymiyyah aimed to determine a method that attempts to minimize the subjective personal actions and interventions in the Quran tafsir or totally abolish these because of his faith principle towards the Quran, Sunnah and Salaf belief, rejection toward philosophical kalam and ta'wil method, and efforts to protect pure

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9   M. Ali Büyükkara, "Selefiliğin Yakın Tarihinden Önemli Bir Yaprak: Yeni Bilgiler Işığında Cuheymân el-Uteybî ve Cemaati", *Marife: Bilimsel Birikim (Selefilik)*, 2009, IX/3, p. 21-46.

10   M. Sait Özervarlı, *İbn Teymiyye'nin Düşünce Metodolojisi ve Kelâmcılara Eleştirisi*, p. 63.

11   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, VII. p. 71-72.

12   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, p. 148.

Islam and essential meaning. According to the method named by Ibn Taymiyyah as "ahsanu turuk at-tafsir" (the best tafsir methods), the Quran should be explained with itself first. An issue that is mentioned in a concise way in one verse, is explained in another verse in the Qur'an. The Nabawi sunnah (hadith) should be considered as a second source for tafsir. Because the Prophet is the most authorized commentator and authority of hadith. Therefore, Imam Shafii (d. 204/820) made the following statement: "What is ordered by the Prophet constitutes what he understands from Quran." This was expressed in the verses an-Nisa 4/105, an-Nahl 16/44 and 64. On the other hand, Sunnah was revealed to the Prophet like the Quran, and Sunnah was also read like the Quran. Imam Shafi and other great scholars have agreed upon this issue.

If tafsir information is not present in the Quran and Sunnah, sahabah words are considered. Members of the sahabah have an indisputable authority in tafsir as they witnessed the revelation of the Qur'an and directly heard the hadiths relating to the verses. In addition, the sahabah generation had a remarkable capability for understanding and performing true Islamic practices. The four caliphs and great scholars such as Ibn Masud and Ibn Abbas had these characteristics. If the details of tafsir cannot be found in the statements of the sahabah, the statements of tabi'un such as Mujahid ibn Jabr, who was educated by the sahabah glossators, are considered. The tabi'un scholars presented different ideas on verses, but these ideas essentially had the same meaning although they were conveyed using different wording. The following objections can be brought to the forefront in this context: "How can tabi'un statements be regarded as hujjat when their words are not hujjat on legal issues?" This objection is correct considering the following provision: "The statements of a tabi'un scholar does not mean to be hujjat for another tabi'un scholar who objects to his ideas." However, it is not rational to question whether an issue-based agreement between tabi'un scholars is meant to be hujjat. In addition, when tabi'un scholars do not agree on an issue, the statements of a tabi'un scholar do not mean to be hujjat for another tabi'un scholar or for the following generations. The Qur'an, sunnah, general use of Arabic, or statements from the sahabah are used in this case. By regarding the Qur'anic tafsir based only on ra'y means that this tafsir approach is unlawful.[13]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the best tafsir method is to explain the Quran with itself, sunnah, sahabah ideas, and tabi'un opinions later under certain conditions. The main point in tafsir is the apparent meaning that is based on narration/narratives. However, what is meant by apparent is the clear elements of Salafism tradition. Tafsir based on salt ra'y is certainly unlawful. In addition, a ra'y based action does not mean tafsir. It is actually innovation and ta'wil that is no different than manipulation. From the perspective of Ibn Taymiyyah, tafsir is related to what the Quran ordered when it was revealed, what was understood

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[13]   Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatawa*, Riyadh 2000, XIII, 162-169.

from the Quran, and how orders were practiced. Accordingly, tafsir is the "me'sur tafsir" (narrative tafsir) that has been known and repeated for a long time. This corresponds to the following statement of Abu Nasr Abd ar-Rahim al-Kushayri (d. 514/1120): "Tefsir consists of obedience and firmament." Therefore, it is fair to state that tafsir is related to narratives while ta'wil is associated with sagacity. [14] In addition, the following statement can be made: While tafsir is simply a tawzih activity, ta'wil is effortful, risky and ominous just like making provisions, assumptions and particular decisions.

Ibn Taymiyyah, who believed that tafsir is formed with the narratives of salaf, criticized *at-Tafsir al-Qabir* by Fahraddin ar-Razi stating "This work is anything but tafsir."[15] However, according to Razi, meanings in the Quran are not limited with the explanations conveyed from the Prophet and salaf scholars. On the contrary, "The Quran is the essence/pioneer of all sciences (a*nna al-qur'anah aslu al-ulumi kulliha*). The Kalam discipline is totally included in the Quran. The Fiqh discipline was totally formed out of the Quran. This is also valid for syntax and lexicology, ascetism/Sufism, afterlife khabars and ethics."[16]

Ar-Razi, who regarded the Quran as the source of all sciences, made the following statement in the introduction of his tafsir in al-Fatiha: "Please be aware that I made the statement 'With the meanings and guidance of this surah [al-Fatiha], it is possible to review ten thousand issues' in certain times; but some jealous, ignorant, deviant and stubborn people regarded the message in my statement as impossible (…) When I started to organize/form this book, I proposed this introduction to point out that my afore-mentioned statement/claim is possible."[17] With his statement "I can review ten thousand issues with the surah al-Fatiha", ar-Razi did not neglect to imply that the meanings and messages of this period are not limited, and reaching beyond the topics and borders in this period is not possible for humans. Ar-Razi's statement indicates that surah al-Fatiha includes limitless issues and infinite borders. Therefore, the statement 'This surah includes ten thousand issues' was formulated in accordance with the capabilities of those who heard this statement."[18]

The infiniteness here is related to the fact that the Quran consists of Allah's words, divine titles, actions and reflections for the mortal world are limitless. This infiniteness indicates that meanings in the Quran cannot be associated with the

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[14] Ebü'l-Fazl Celaleddîn es-Süyûtî, *el-İtkân fî Ulûmi'l-Kur'ân*, Beyrut 2002, II, 1190.

[15] Certain researchers associated this statement with Tajuddin as-Subki (d. 771/1370) (see Fathullah Hulaif, *Fahruddin ar-Razi*, Iskandariyyah, 1976, p. 41-42). However, this relation is wrong. Because this statement was made not by Tajuddin as-Subki, but by his father Abu al-Hasan Taqi ad-Din Ali ibn Abdilqafi as-Subki. See Abu as-Safa Salahuddin as-Safadi, *al-Vafi bi al-Vafayat*, edit. Ahmad al-Arnaut-Turki Mustafa, Beirut 2000, IV, 179.

[16] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabir (Mafatih al-Ghayb)*, Beirut 2004, II, 107.

[17] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabi*r, I, 15.

[18] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabi*r, I, 20-21.

meanings only understood in a certain period. In addition, the basic purpose of all Islamic sciences is that the servant can reach Allah.[19] Thus, people should know Allah before anything. The most basic science in this regard is certainly the discipline of kalam. The value of a science is determined by the scientists of that science. Kalam is the most basic and significant science as it is related to knowing Allah's identity, titles and actions. Accordingly, tafsir is secondary not primary, and nominal not collective. Furthermore, it is not a science. Instead, it is the action of providing information on different issues. According to ar-Razi's statements in Ajaib al-Quran, tafsir is related to religious sciences, essentials, or other issues. What a tafsir authority does is related to researching the meanings in Allah's kalam. Therefore, tafsir is secondary when compared to the science of knowing Allah (kalam). However, a hadith authority examines the authenticity of the narratives regarding the Prophets' statements. However, this discipline is secondary, too, when compared to the discipline of confirming the Propet's prophecy. In conclusion, these science branches are used to explain the method/kalam discipline.[20]

One of the most irreplaceable elements of kalam discipline is definitely the method of ta'wil that is strictly related to ra'y and intelligence. Ar-Razi related ta'wil to intelligence facts while explaining certain verses. For example, in al-Fajr 89/27, he regarded his interpretation on the term "mutmainnah" as "the ta'wil suiting the intelligence motives" (ta'wil an mutabık an li al-hakaik al-akliyyah).[21] He also referred in his work entitled *Lubab al-Isharat*. This reference indicates the source of the aforementioned ta'wil. Accordingly, ar-Riza's work serves as a summary of *al-Isharat wa't-Tanbihat* by Avicenna (d. 428/1037) which contains Ishraqi themes rather than an Aristotelian character.

While explaining certain verses, ar-Razi stated "What is assigned to intelligence as follows" (hazz al-akli, hazz al-bahsi al-akli, hazz al-akli min haza), and he used the same ta'wil method in his explanations starting with these statements.[22] One of the comments reflecting ar-Razi's Ishraqi inclination is found where al-Gazali referred Mishqat al-Anvar, in which a theosophic and hermetical theology was

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19   Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabi*r, I, 88.

20   Fahraddin ar-Razi, *Ajaib al-Quraân*, edit. Sayyid al-Jamili, Beirut 1985, p. 32-33.

21   Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabi*r, XXXI, 160.

22   For example, he made the following statement after saying "Intelligence's share from this issue is this/that" about the explanation of surah Ibrahim 14/49-50: "Spirit is a shining gem that is from the divine world and cannot be understood by humanly intelligence. The body is like the shirt of the spirit. All pains and sorrows of spirit are caused by this body. Thus, the body holds the spirit tightly and causes troubles for this spirit. Feelings of lust, greed and anger are assigned to the spirit by the body. The shine of the spirit is hidden as the body is physical, blurry and dark. The body is the reason for fears and putrefaction. Thus, the body seems like a shirt made of tar." Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabir*, XIX, p. 152.

developed considering the verse surah al-Nur 24/35, (Tafsir of al-Nur 24/35). Ar-Razi refers to Ibn Sina in the tafsir of this work.[23]

After these details about Fahraddin ar-Razi and his tafsir, Ibn Taymiyyah's views on the question of "What is tafsir not?" indicate that tafsir is not an activity within which personal ideas and beliefs can be presented as hujjat, for any Muslims that aim to understand and explain the Quran as understood from Ibn Taymiyyah's views in regards to the context of "ahsanu turuk at-tafsir". On the contrary, tafsir is an action that requires consideration or following a statement that is present in the Qur'an, the sunnah, statements from the sahabah or tabi'un remarks. This requirement indicates that tafsir is not the discovery of meaning. Instead, it is the specification of meaning that has been present since the time of revelations. Thus, what a tafsir authority does is conveyance. Therefore, "a tafsir authority is a conveyor while a ta'wil authority is a researcher" (*fa al-mufassiru nakilun wa'l-muavvilu mustanbitun*).[24]

In this regard, it is fair to state that narration is definitely more significant and prioritized than intelligence in Salafi epistemology. However, the narration can only function within the limits defined with religious works. Intelligence serves like a subject without object in this epistemological system. The function of intelligence is to present a result that was found earlier, and to show the correctness and certainty of this result. It is not possible to have anything more perfect than those in the past. All facts have been formed in the past. Truth cannot be searched in the present and future. Thus, in the case of a religious issue, either religious works or Salafi works should be used. Ra'y or jurisprudence is not needed as there is a religious work for any issues that Muslims need or would need. In Salafiyyah, religious works and narration has the privilege of religious exemption. Narration is the absolute guide, as a divine and Mubarak information source. The dominance only belongs to narration, and people should be committed only to it. Making religious works a topic of objection, opposition, criticism and ta'wil is absolutely unlawful.[25]

Ibn Taymiyyah's views in regard to "ahsanu turuki at-tafsir" are important in that they are significant and determinant for many issues ranging from tafsir sources to the well-known concept of "narrative tafsir" (ma'sur tafsir or tafsir as-salaf) in the present time. In addition, *al-Itkan* by al-Suyuti (d. 911/1505) started chapter 78 on the conditions and manners for being a tafsir authority with the summary of Ibn Taymiyyah's views under the "ahsanu turuki at-tafsir" title, and reviewed the other issues under this title with Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas in the booklet entitled Mukaddimat at-Tafsir.[26] Contemporary authors such as Muhammad

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[23] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabir*, XXIII, 194-204.

[24] Abu Abdillah Badraddin az-Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan fi Ulum al-Quran*, Beirut, n.d., II, 166.

[25] Fethi Kerim Kazanç, "Selefiyye'nin Nass ve Metot Ekseninde Din Anlayışı ve Sonuçları", *Kelâm Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1 (2010), 2010, VIII/1, p. 110-111.

[26] Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1197-1204.

Husein az-Zahabi and Zurkani considered Ibn Taymiyyah's views and defined the "ma'sur tafsir" (tafsir bi'r-rivayah) concept in accordance with the "ahsanu turuki at-tafsir" method. This definition indicates that ma'sur tafsir reflects the explanation method based on the Quran's statements, and narratives regarding the Prophet, sahabah and tabi'un.[27]

This definition, adopted by the majority of tafsir authorities in Turkey[28] is based on Ibn Taymiyyah's ideology, thus on Salafism. In addition, the article "tafsir of Quran with Quran" is problematic both in the method formulated under the title "ahsanu turuki at-tafsir" by Ibn Tayiyyah and the definition of "ma'sur tafsir" developed using this method because this definition is related to an explanation style that is based on narration (ma'sur), present independently from ra'y and jurisprudence, and thus not open to subjectivity. However, the issue of interpretation between the verses is generally related to the sagacity of the interpreter. Sagacity makes the sect, kalam-based pre-admissions and subjectivities inevitable. Ibn Taymiyyah, who was the source for the definition of Ma'sur tafsir, is definitely aware of the situation, however what he meant by "the tafsir of the Quran with the Quran" is related to a paradigmatic context that refers to more extensive issues such as the description of Islam and religious provisions, rather than the efforts to understand and explain the Quran on a technical level.

To be clearer, Ibn Taymiyyah adopted a religious description based on religious works and Salafi authority, and he followed the Ahl al-Hadith movement that does not allow ra'y and ta'wil in the use of religious works. According to the belief in this movement, Allah (Quran), the Prophet (Sunnah) and the sahabah explained and clarified the issues that may be needed by all Muslims throughout history. This movement also indicates that the Quran (divine statement) is clear and understandable. Thus, religious works should not be subject to arbitrary comments. As Allah's orders were truly understood when verses were revealed, what Muslims should do is to learn the meanings (sama) through narration and follow these. Despite the simple and explicit tafsir conveyed from Salaf to us, efforts to provide new provisions by making assumptions from religious works through ta'wil are nothing but innovation.

The fact that Ibn Taymiyyah referred to Imam al-Shafi'i regarding the paradigmatic role assigned to Sunnah and stated that Sunnah is revealed like the Quran through narration is interesting and significant. Ibn Taymiyyah used al-Shafii's sunnah concept as a reference for "the best tafsir methods", which indicates that he adopted the idea that religion is actually based on religious works and thus all provisions related to life events should absolutely be based on a religious work

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[27] Muhammad Husein az-Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassirun*, Beirut n.d., I, 105; Muhammad Abd al-azim az-Zurkani, *Manahil al-Irfan fi Ulum al-Qur'an*, Beirut 1988, II, 12.

[28] See: İsmail Cerrahoğlu, *Tefsir Usûlü*, Ankara 1989, p. 228; Muhsin Demirci, *Tefsir Tarihi*, İstanbul 2003, p. 228; Abdülhamit Birışık, "Tefsir", *DİA*, İstanbul 2011, XL, 285.

or even the Quran as a single source. This idea was formulated by Imam Shafi'i as follows: "What ummah states [comparison, jurisprudence and research] explains Sunnah, and what Sunnah reflects explains the Quran".[29] We believe that what Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to reflect within the context of "ahsanu turuki at-tafsir" is like the explanation of this statement that is thought to be made by al-Shafi'i.

Al-Shafi'i reduced the number of religious works to one (the Quran) with the idea that "Sunnah is equal to the Quran" for advocating Sunnah, and Ibn Taymiyyah claimed "The truest and most reliable method for tafsir is the one that is performed using the Quran", which served for the Quran-based inclination that is not related to narratives in the modern era in general, or with the Sunnah and traditions in particular, and that implies that Islam should be learned from the Quran as the most reliable and concrete source and also from the translation of the Quran.

This is, without a doubt, an irony. Another irony here is that the inclination of "Perceiving the Quran as a written text that is completely consistent from the beginning to the end", which has drawn attention in the modern era, is often related to the statement of Ibn Taymiyyah "Tafsir of the Quran with the Quran". While mentioning the tafsir of the Quran with the Quran, Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to imply that considering only grammar and ra'y with an approach that is independent from narration and Salafi authority for understanding Islam and religious works is not lawful, however his method in this regard is used today as a means that serves for the unmethodical method of reading, understanding, and interpreting the Quran as a written text is particularly and personally revealed. This misconception is significantly based on imposing negligence towards the traditional tafsir accumulation, as a principle, in the jurisprudent and guidance-based method led by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Riza.

Another irony is relating the religious ideology of Abduh and Rashid Riza[30], who presented severe criticism towards the tradition in the introduction of *Manar* tafsir, with Salafism. The emphasis on Salafism in this ideology is similar to the motto, "Dear Ataturk, we follow your path", which is used in several cases by Kemalist and secular people. The Salafism emphasis of Abduh and Rashid Riza serves as a means for being based upon a concrete basis against the accusations

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[29]   Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, I, 6; Suyuti, *al-Itkân*, II, 1025.

[30]   Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rica certainly stated that it is necessary to be competent in Arabic, methodology and narration, and they even mentioned the afore-mentioned ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah. However, they stated that the traditional tafsir literature is a great obstacle before understanding the Quran and they also mentioned that every Muslim who strictly follows the Quran and consider the verses can easily understand the divine kalam (see Muhammad Rashid Riza, *Tafsir al-Manar*, Beirut 1999, I, 9-15). It is actually not necessary to be a tafsir authority to understand Allah's basic orders towards humanity. If this is the essential purpose of understanding the Quran, which indeed it is, Abduh's statement is correct, but his words on existential perception were technically associated with tafsir, which often resulted in the general acceptance of a misunderstanding that it is lawful to make arbitrary and random comments on the traditional scientific accumulation without referring to anything.

such as derivativeness, non-belongingness, and rootlessness that may arise from opposing people and for forming an economical legitimacy for the supported ideology. However, the organization of practical life is enacted upon modern ideology, consciousness and paradigms. In addition, adaptation of the basics is implied in modern Salafi reformation, and the traditions are still followed, while referring the Islamic consideration and devotion, but modern and modernizing paradigms are followed in regard to the targets of the present and future. This implication reflects the will of using Ibn Taymiyyah's critical language and style, and forming a concrete reference for views rather than a commitment to the classical Salafi paradigm.

Additionally, the path led by Abduh and Rashid was significant for the generalization of the inclination to perceive the Quran as a text that was thematically and systematically written considering the possible readers' perceptional issues. However, tradition implied that the perception of, "The Quran is like a single verse; because Allah's kalam is the one and only" is not correct.[31] Certain scholars stated that efforts to relate all verses and sunnah to one another are pointless, and while providing reasons for this statement, they implied that the Quran text was not thematically or systematically consistent, as verses were revealed over twenty three years and these verses were gradually revealed due to different reasons and events in time.[32]

The Issue of Tafsir Rootlessness

In *al-Itkan*, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the symbol name of Salafism, made the following well-known statement: "Three things are groundless: Tafsir, malahim and maghazi"[33].[34] Although Hatib al-Baghdadi (d. 463/1071) related this statement to the weak tafsir, malahim and maghazi works, and the incompetency of tafsirs by certain tafsir authorities such as Qalbî and Mukatil ibn Suleiman,[35] the main message of the statement by Ibn Hanbal is related to the imputation problems in tafsir narratives. The following statement by Ibn Taymiyyah confirms this evidence:

"As known to all, the majority of tafsir-related narratives are like the narratives related to malahim and maghazi. Therefore, Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal said: "There is no imputation for the narratives on malahim and maghazi." The narratives in this field are conveyed without any evidence or imputation. Furthermore, most of these narratives are mursal just like the narratives conveyed by certain maghazi authors

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[31] Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 17.

[32] Mustafa Öztürk, *Tefsirin Hâlleri*, Ankara 2013, p. 13-14.

[33] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII. 154; Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1202.

[34] Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1202.

[35] Abu Bakr Hatîb al-Baghdadi, *al-Jami' li-Ahlaki ar-Rawi*, Riyadh 1983, II, 162.

such as Urwa ibn Zubair, Sha'bi Zuhri, Musa ibn Uqbah, Ibn Ishaq, and their followers, Yahya ibn Said al-Amawi, Valid ibn Muslim and Waqidi."[36]

Although tafsir is essentially narrative-based, it is not performed with care, as done in hadith narration or the criteria regarding the certainty of hadiths are not applied carefully to the tafsir narratives. Therefore, the tafsir-related texts have a narration tradition different to that of the hadiths, all of which are related to the source of religious provisions and adila al-shariyyah. In other words, the Quran and Sunnah share the first two positions in the hierarchy of religious evidence. Ibn Hanbal's views indicate that true/concrete tafsir texts can only be understood from the Quran, Sunnah and Salaf. Accordingly, hadith works are new religious provisional sources. The fact that a hadith is a religious element makes the processes of verification obligatory to ensure certainty. This obligation is directed towards presenting canon provisions on hadiths. However, tafsir narratives are not religious works. Instead, they are historical documents that investigate the essential meanings of the Quran and provides information about what the sahabah and tabi'un understood from the verses.

In the investigation of tafsir narratives, the care shown in the hadith works is not shown in these narratives, which may arise from the afore-mentioned statement. However, it is not fair to state that tafsir-related narratives have not undergone any criticisms regarding imputation/certainty. It is a well-known fact that tafsir narratives from certain sahabah members were subject to criticism with regards to the care shown. For example, a couple of different explanations on each verse were conveyed from Ibn Abbas. Due to the complexity of narratives and differences in explanations on these narratives, Imam Shafi'i stated that there are only approximately 100 narratives on tafsir from Ibn Abbas. According to the evaluations of critics regarding the narratives of Ibn Abbas, Muawiyah ibn Salih, who was preferred by tafsir authorities such as Tabari and Ibn Abi Hatim, is the most reliable source. Scholars such as Kais ibn Muslim al-Qufi, Ibn Ishaq and Suddi al-Qabir are more or less reliable, too. However, sources such as Dahhaq ibn Muzahim, Atiyyah al-Awfi, Mukatil ibn Suleiman and particularly Muhammad ibn Saib al-Qalbi are not reliable.[37]

In a period when imputation is regarded as a religious warranty or basic guarantee factor, Muqatil's failure to present the narratives in his works with concrete documents and occasional contradictions drew criticisms, and he was regarded as "kazzab", "matruk al-hadith" and "mahjur al-kawl"[38], which arises from the fact that he remained unresponsive to the dominant scientific inclination of the previous era. The "tahammul al-ilm" concept of the era required that the discipline that one aims to study should be in the course circle of the lecturers of

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[36]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 154-155.

[37]   Al-Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1230-1233; Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassirun*, I, 71-75.

[38]   Abu Adillah Shamsaddin Zahabi, *Tarih al-Islam*, Beirut 1991, IX, 640-641.

that discipline, thus the right to narrative should be obtained, and educational activities should be performed based on this scientific tradition. It is clear that Muqatil did not follow these principles but conveyed narratives from unheard scholars, thus he was accused of interpreting the Quran arbitrarily. In addition, his tafsir was thought to be equal to Muhammad ibn Said al-Qalbi's (d. 146/763) tafsir, which was severely criticized as "Full of lies; even taking a look at this work is not lawful" and referred to as Tafsir al-Qur'an, Tafsir al-Qalbi with the manuscripts still present today, and according to the belief, this tafsir was not to be read and thus terminated by burying in the ground.[39] Ahmad ibn Hanbal said "I do not like conveying a hadith from Muqatil"[40], and he stated that his tafsir is almost full of lies.[41] Imam Shafi'i, however, made a complimentary statement "In regards to the tafsir discipline, people are like the students of Muqatil."[42]

To sum up, Muqatil was mainly criticized by Ahl al-Hadith, which arose from the fact that he reflected his tafsir knowledge in accordance with the common scientific approach of the era and in a style that does not suit the conveyance/narration tradition of the era, and that he adopted a style that was opposed to the dominant approach. He conveyed the information on the Quran tafsir without an imputation, which caused discussions on the authenticity of his tafsir. Ibn Hanbal's well-known statement, "Three things are groundless: tafsir, malahim and maghazi."[43], can be regarded as a general form of the afore-mentioned criticism regarding the tafsir of Muqatil. In addition, as mentioned before, Ibn Hanbal meant the tafsir narratives are generally deprived of true and contiguous imputation series while saying "The tafsir has no grounds".

The Issue of Israiliyyah in Tafsir

Israiliyyah is an issue that is related to many disciplines such as hadith, fiqh, fitan and malahim. The information and khabar that has been transmitted into Islamic tafsir and hadith sources from other religions and cultures such as Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism is called as "**Israiliyyah**." The information and narration details regarded as Israeli (Israel-related) in the studies on this issue consist of the prophets sent to Israeli people, warnings of these prophets to the sinners and related divine punishments, statements and behaviors of the ascetic people, and the spiritual grace of these people. According to certain Western scholars, Israiliyyah also covers fitan and malahim-related issues such as the

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[39] Abu Muhammad Ibn Abi Hatim, *Kitab al-Jarh wa't-Ta'dil*, Beirut, n.d., VIII, 354.

[40] Ibn Abi Hatim, *al-Jarh wa't-Ta'dil*, VIII, 355; Zahabi, *Tarih al-İslam*, IX, 641.

[41] Abu al-Fida İsmail al-Ajluni, *Kashf al-Haifa*, Beirut 2001, II, 370.

[42] Zahabi, *Tarih al-Islam*, IX, 642, Ibn Adi stated that most of the hadiths narrated by Muqatil are true, and many well-known narrators conveyed narratives from him. Abu Ahmad Ibn Adi, *al-Qamil fi Duafai ar-Rijal*, Beirut, n.d., VIII, 192.

[43] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 154; Al-Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1202.

prophets, caliphs, administrators, downfall of the sultanates, mahdi belief and judgment day signs. However, as tafsir books are the works in which Israiliyyah is often mentioned, the discussions in this discipline have been largely conducted on tafsir. These discussions focus on the issues of whether the Israeli information and narratives in Islamic sources are false and included in mutadawil divine texts, and whether a Israiliyyah narrative is reliable, along with the narratives from the tabi'un generation members such as Qa'b al-Ahbar (d. 32/653) and Wahb ibn Munabbih (d. 114/732).

The significant role in the adverse conceptualization of the term Israiliyyah belongs to Ibn Taymiyyah and his student, Ibn Qasir. In *Majmuat ar-Rasail*, Ibn Taymiyyah discussed whether certain letters were revealed to Adam along with religious teachings, and stated that narratives indicating that Adam was provided religious books and leaflets were groundless. He also mentioned that even though a narrative ground is found in Ahl al-Hadith tradition, the Quran and hadiths do not have the evidence that could be verified. Therefore, these khabars are from the Israeli hadiths and statements (*al-ahadis al-Israiliyyah*) which it is not obligatory to rely upon, and it is not lawful to confirm these without hujjat because the Prophet said: "Neither confirm nor refute the narratives conveyed to you by Ahl al-Kitab".[44] However, Israiliyyah provisions are not regarded as certain when there is an imputation absence. In addition, an Israeli khabar known to be true can be regarded to be from the istishhad context.[45]

Ibn Taymiyyah sets a clearer frame in Mukaddimat at-Tafsir. He says "Israeli hadiths are mentioned as istishhad, not in terms of theology", and he states that these can be evaluated in three categories. (1) Israiliyyah which we know to be true for reflecting the religious works we have; (2) Israiliyyah which we know to be false for contradicting with the religious works we have; (3) Israiliyyah which is not regarded positively or negatively in the religious works we have. The third group Israiliyyah is neither believed, nor regarded as false. The authorized provisions are valid for the conveyance of these narratives, but most of them still have no useful religious contents. To be clearer, there are no benefits for the mortal and eternal actions of the people in determining and assigning the issues that are left uncertain such as the names and number of Ashab al-Qaif, color of their dogs, the tree species which Moses' stick was made of, and the names of the birds revived by Allah for Abraham.[46]

After Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qasir both consolidated the adverse approach in Israiliyyah and made it more technical and systematical.[47] In the introduction to his tafsir, Ibn Qasir conveyed the statements of Ibn Taymiyyah in Mukaddimat at-

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[44] Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuat ar-Rasail wa'l-Masail*, Beirut 1992, III, 383.

[45] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmuat ar-Rasail*, III, 451.

[46] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 163-164.

[47] For a broader evaluation, see Roberto Tottoli, *Biblical Prophets in the Qur'an and Muslim Literature*, Surrey/Curzon 2002, p. 170-174.

Tafsir as they are, and he made the following statement regarding the Salaf narratives that the letter "qaf" in the beginning of the surah Qaf is a mountain named "Mount Qaf" that surrounds the world:

"According to a narrative, certain Salaf scholars stated that the letter qaf indicates a mountain that surrounded the whole globe and was named "Mount Qaf". It appears that this is a superstition obtained from the Israeli people, but Allah knows best. The people who conveyed this superstition believe that it is lawful to convey the Israeli khabars, which cannot be confirmed and refuted, from Ahl al-kitab. The author of this study believes that, this and similar khabars are just made up by certain atheists among Israeli people. They abuse people's beliefs with these khabars. Although the Prophet [who passed away as recently as yesterday] and many great scholars and hadith authorities still live, consider what sorts of tricks the atheists from Israel have done against the people from their ummah in such a long time, considering the fact that even certain Muslims still made up certain hadiths despite the guidance of the Prophet and scholars who are still alive. Additionally, hadith authorities who are also critics within the Israeli people are too few. These Israeli people would drink alcohol, and the scholars among them distort the meanings in the religious texts (falsification) and alter Allah's books and verses (tabdil). Yes, Shari [Rasulallah] stated "You can narrate from the Israeli people; there is no harm in that", but he assigned the authority to the elements regarded as acceptable by intelligence. Regarding the issues that are believed to be impossible and superstition, and accepted to be false by the dominant belief, the authority-related provision is not valid. Therefore, many tafsir authorities in the early periods and certain scholars from the next generations conveyed certain stories from the texts of Ahl al-kitab for the tafsir of the Quran. However, these tafsir authorities do not need the khabars/narratives of Ahl al-Kitab for the tafsir of Quran."[48]

Ibn Qasir, who stated that he would present narratives on a variety of topics ranging from the creation of sky and earth, to creatures, from the creation of Adam to anecdotes of other prophets, and from the Prophet's attitudes on fitan and malahim in the introduction of *al-Bidayah wa-n-Nihayah* in parallel to the attitudes in Tafsir, and who mentioned that he would perform narration on the condition that it suited the Quran and Sunnah and as long as Shari'I permitted, made the brief statement about the issues that are not to be confirmed and refuted, presented broadly and truly in Israeli narratives but regarded as short and/or impossible in our religious works: "We will still convey these narratives even if doing so would bring no goods to us; and while doing so, we will aim to include a [different] motive not because we need or find them reliable. The source to be relied upon and accepted is the Quran and the Prophet's true sunnah."[49]

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48   Abu al-Fida Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim*, Beirut 1983, IV, 221.
49   Abu al-Fida Ibn Qasir, *al-Bidayah wa'n-Nihayah*, Al-Jiza 1998, I, 5-6.

These statements indicate that the mature but adverse usage of the term, Israiliyyah, belongs to Ibn Qasir. These views reflecting the ideology of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qasir, were also adopted by Shah Waliyallah ad-Dahlawi (d. 1176/1762). Ad-Dahlawi, who is renowned for his reform-based ideas, emphasis of the Quran and Sunnah-related intelligence, attitudes against innovation, commitment to Ibn Taymiyyah's ideology and staying closed to the ideas of Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi (d. 638/1240) with the opinions such as vahdat al-vujud and alam al-misal, and combined these two different beliefs in his own, reviewed the issue of Israiliyyah in relation to the details of the the Quran anecdotes and implied that tafsir authorities should provide details as much as needed in his work al-Fawz al-Qabir. Ad-Dahlawi stated that Israeli people's efforts to determine and clarify the issue that the animal they should sacrifice is a cow or ox are unnecessary actions, and furthermore, he stated "Narrating from Israeli people is a fraud in Islam". He also implied that the hadith, "Neither confirm nor refute Ahl al-kitab", is a main principle. According to ad-Dahlawi, this main principle requires the following: (1) Narration from Ahl al-kitab is not performed when there is a prophetic statement regarding an anecdote briefly referred to by the Quran. (2) In regard to necessity, narration from ahl al-kitab can be performed as much as needed.[50]

The conservative attitude regarding Israiliyyah was also adopted by Siddiq Hasan Khan al-Kannawji (d. 1307/1890). Siddiq Hasan Khan was one of the leaders of the Ahl al-hadith movement that had an institutional structure in the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth century, who aimed to solve the problems of the Muslims considering the Quran and Sunnah in relation to Shah Waliyallah's ideas but started to be more inclined to regard fiqh sects and Sufism as innovation and superstition sources. In addition, he paid attention to avoid Israiliyyah in his tafsir entitled *Fath al-Bayan* in which he often presented narratives from *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim* by Ibn Qasir.

The opposite movement of Israiliyyah, which is formed within the Salafi ideology, can be found in the tafsir entitled *Ruh al-Maani* by Shihabuddin Al-Alusi (d. 1270/1854). Alusi, who adopted an ideology that is similar to that of Ibn Taymiyyah regarding the verses on Kalam, used certain Israeli narratives for certain verses or preferred interpretation stating that these narratives are Israeli, as can be seen in Haroot-Maroot anecdote, which is contradictory according to certain researchers[51], and he also strictly criticized Israeli narratives that do not match the ismat al-anbiyah ideology. Accordingly, criticisms in this regard continued and became stronger in the modern Salafism movement, and an anti-Israiliyyah discourse was proposed by many tafsir authorities such as Muhammad Abduh,

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[50]   Shah Waliyyallah ad-Dahlawi, *al-Fawz al-Qabir*, trans. M. Sofuoğlu, İstanbul 1980, p. 105-107.

[51]   Remzi Na'na, *al-Israiliyyah ve Asaruha fi Kutub at-Tafsir*, Beirut 1970, p. 347.

Jamaladdin al-Qasimi, Rashid Riza and Ahmad Mustafa al-Maraghi. For example, in Mahasin at-Ta'wil, Qasimi stated the following:

"To sum up, the divine books of Jews and Christians are like their own ideas. These books cannot be thoroughly trusted. Because these books provided nothing but lies, contradictions, and confusions between truth and superstitions. Divine texts of Ahl al-Kitab are like the anecdotal books of our culture. There are citations of the Quran and Sunnah in these books, but there are also the ideas conveyed from the ummah who presented false beliefs and ideas."[52]

Regarding the criteria of Israiliyyah evaluation in the Salafism tradition, one of the main criteria in this regard in the classic periods or the first criterion is related to certainty in narration. As known to all, narratives, tafsir in general and Israiliyyah in particular, are regarded to be problematic for certainty. The tafsir narratives associated with Ibn Abbas reflects the issues in this field. Due to the contradictions in the tafsir narratives of Ibn Abbas, the works regarding certain narratives were separately determined, works of Muawiyah ibn Salah-Ali ibn Abi Talha were found to be most reliable, and works of Muhammad ibn Said al-Qalbi were found to be the weakest and problematic.[53] The statement by Ibn Hanbal, "Three things are groundless: Tafsir, malahim and maghazi" was mentioned in certain sources regarding the issue of whether narration from Ahl al-Kitab is lawful, and how narratives from Ahl al-Kitab in the early periods should be reviewed[54], which indicates that the idea of certainty/authenticity had a key role in the scientific approach of Ahl al-Hadith.

On the other hand, the reasoning methods and styles of Salafi scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qasir, match with the scientific ideology of Ahl al-Hadith movement. According to Ahl al-Hadith movement, Islamic science suggests narration in general or means hadith with the types such as marfu, mawquf or maqtu in particular. Thus, the authenticity of Islamic science is related to the concrete status of the narration series rather than the content. In other words, an imputation should not have any issues and narrators within that imputation should be regarded as reliable to ensure that a narration process/narrative on the Quran tafsir is regarded as true and reliable. Accordingly, it is difficult to certify most of the narratives in tafsir books in regards to imputation and narrators.

The negative attitude of Ibn Taymiyyah regarding Israiliyyah was influenced by the Ahl al-Hadith ideology followed, and certain great events such as the Mongol occupation and Crusades. Ibn Taymiyyah's concerns about these two great events are not only political, but also religious and scientific. He referred to Rashid ad-din, a Mongol vizier and historian, in one of his fatwas, and stated that they aimed to distort Islam by promoting Jewish, philosophy and Rafisism. He also implied that

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[52]   Jamaladdin al-Qasimi, *Tafsir al-Qasimi (Mahasin at-Ta'wîl)*, Cairo 2003, I, 53.

[53]   Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassiru*n, I, 53-55.

[54]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwa*, XIII, 154; Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1202.

Mamluks would be terminated if they would not strictly protect and follow shariah against the laws of Genghis Khan. Another point that indicates that Ibn Taymiyyah paid importance to protect the Islamic world against external threats and preserve their religious identity is that he often preached fatwas warning Muslims as Christian traditions and cultures that started to emerge in Damascus following the Crusades which influenced Muslims more or less. Ibn Taymiyyah, who evaluated knowledge with actions as he regarded the scientific actions as a social counseling mission rather than a personal effort, provided personal works against the belief/ideology crisis created or to be created by the Crusades and against the Christian discourse suggesting the regionality of the Prophet's acts. For example, he wrote a broad work entitled *al-Jawab as-Sahih li-man Baddala Din al-Masih* which was a refutal against the work associated to Sayda Piskoposu Pavlus. Moreover, he wrote a work entitled *Sarim al-Maslul ala Shatimi ar-Rasul* with the awareness that protecting the personality and place of the Prophet in Islam, and making efforts to avoid blemishing his name, is equal to protecting Islam.[55] However, the content of this work indicates that Ibn Taymiyyah often cited from Kitab al-Muqaddas to form a ground for his ideas as also seen in Rashid Riza's discourse against Israiliyyah, and he used these citations as evidences within bashar an-nubuwwah.[56]

It is fair to state that the conflicts, issues and combats between Muslims, Jewish people and Christians had a key role in the negative attitudes of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qasir regarding the Israiliyyah issue, and this assumption can be confirmed with the following statement of Ibn Qasir for the question "Is Zabih Ishaq or Ismael?":

"Some scientific scholars stated that Zabih is Ishaq. This belief was also conveyed by certain Salafi scholars and even sahabah members. However, the Quran and sunnah reflects a different evidence. The author believes that this belief was conveyed from Qitabi (Jewish) scholars and accepted as correct, even if it lacks evidences."[57]

As can be seen, Ibn Qasir stated the belief that Ibrahim's son, who was to be sacrificed was Ishaq, was based on Ahl al-kitab ideology and had no evidence. However, this belief was conveyed as the idea of ulama for centuries. Nahhas (d. 338/950) stated that the majority of the scholars regarded the person to be sacrificed as "Ishaq" and mentioned Abbas ibn Abd al-muttalib, Abdullah ibn Abbas, Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, Jabir ibn Abdillah, Ali (r.a.), 'Umar (r.a.), and Abdullah ibn Omar from sahabah, and Said ibn Jubair, Mujahid, Iqrimah, Qatadah, Ata, Zuhri, Suddi, Alkamah, Sha'bi, Masruk, Malik ibn Anas, Qa'b al-Ahbar, Qasim ibn Abi Bazzah, Abdullah ibn Abi Huzail and Muqatil from tabi'un and taba al-tabiin as the

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[55]   Özervarlı, *İbn Teymiyye'nin Düşünce Metodolojisi*, p. 35-38.

[56]   Taqi ad-din ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Jawab as-Sahih li-man Baddala Din al-Masih*, Riyadh 1999, V, 5-318.

[57]   Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an*, IV, 14.

people who also adopted this belief;[58] in addition, Tabari (d. 310/923) insisted that Zabih was Ishaq.[59]

As can be understood from his preference regarding the Zabih issue, Ibn Qasir considered the narrative information on acceptance and rejection coming from Jewish scholars and failure to be based on concrete evidence as the determinant criteria, but he did not hesitate to present his ideas that are parallel to the statements which were considered to contradict the ismat al-anbiyah idea and thus were rejected by Sunni tafsir authorities such as Fahraddin ar-Razi. To provide a relevant example, according to the explanation of the surah al-Sad 38/33-34 in early-period tafsir sources, Suleiman forgot to pray while his interest was in noble horses and explained the situation as "My interest in horses prevented me from mentioning (praying to) Allah" (*inni ahbabtu hubb al-hayri an zikri rabbi*), and then he decapitated these horses and cut their legs (*fa-tafika mashan bi's-suki wa'l-a'na*k). This claim was not regarded to be true by Tabari with the statement "A Prophet would not torture animal and kill his own animals for no reason…",[60] and Fahraddin ar-Razi also strictly rejected this claim. However, Ibn Qasir found the afore-mentioned statement preferred by many Salaf scholars to be true and referred to the historical event that the Prophet Muhammad missed the afternoon prayer in the Battle of Handaq.[61]

As can be understood from this example, the main criteria in accepting an Israiliyyah narrative for Ibn Qasir are that the content of the relevant narrative has an equivalent in the Islamic shariah, and a certain narrative should confirm that the hadith or sunnah in the narrative belongs to the Prophet. If such a narrative is present, this narrative is hujjat in regards to accepting or rejecting the Israeli narrative. Otherwise, the aforementioned narrative can be rejected. For example, Ibn Qasir, who stated that tafsir authorities conveyed many Israiliyyah narratives on the anecdote regarding Dawud, two opponents, ninety-nine sheep/women, implied that there is no certain khabar belonging to the Prophet. He also mentioned "Ibn Abi Hatim narrated a hadith but the imputation of this hadith is problematic" and added: "As there is no hadith with concrete imputations, the most correct action to take is to read and understand what the Quran orders and assign the meanings in these verses and the rest to Allah."[62]

Regarding the modern era, Israiliyyah is regarded as a great problem by the tafsir authorities of this era. This perception and understanding is similar to the opposite ideology of Salafi against Salafiyyah, and a severe distortion of self-confidence can also be realized. The Islamic world was under the multi-

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[58]   Abu Jafar an-Nahhas, I'rab al-Qur'an, Beirut 1988, III, 431-432.

[59]   Abi Ja'far at-Tabari, *Jami al-Bayan (Tafsir at-Tabari)*, Beirut 1999, X, 514-515.

[60]   Al-Tabari, *Jami al-Bayan*, XI, 579.

[61]   Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an*, IV, 33-34.

[62]   Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an*, IV, 31.

dimensional influence of the Western world in the nineteenth century and had to protect itself against the actions that had military, political, ideological and cultural dimensions. Many Muslim scholars and philosophers who adopted the renovation and reformation ideology in this period made efforts to remove the superstitions and wrong beliefs in Islam in order to show a reaction to the occupation and colonization of many Muslim countries by Western countries, and to the strong reflection of Western ideologies and beliefs on the Islamic world. They also attempted to strictly follow the idea that Islam should be learned from the Quran as the purest and truest source with the assistance and indications of intelligence. On the other hand, many contemporary Muslim researchers tried to reflect what Islam is with a defending style against the claims and accusations in the orientalist studies.

The argument against the Israiliyyah discourse in the modern era is Salafism, which was particularly represented by Rashid Riza. However, the main reasons of negative attitudes against Israiliyyah are quite different than the classical Salafism (Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qasir Salafism). In other words, the anti-Israiliyyah attitude of the classical Salafism is related to the issue of certainty. Moreover, the opposing reasons that are regarded to be against Islamic shariah and intelligence can be mentioned. However, the issue of certainty is more important and prioritized than these reasons. In addition, if a narrative is true and correct in terms of certainty, its content cannot be against shariah and intelligence. According to Ahl al-Hadith and Salafi paradigm, if a narrative was confirmed to belong to the Prophet and sahabah, its content cannot be considered against shariah. Otherwise, the Prophet and sahabah would have acted against the Islamic shariah, which is impossible. To sum up, according to Ahl al-Hadith and classical Salafism, true narratives that are regarded to be certain, in relation to imputations, cannot have content that is against shariah; if such content is present, then these narratives cannot be accepted as true. This provision is also largely valid for irrationality.

The main reason of the anti-Israiliyyah attitude of neo-Salafism is related to the issue of significance rather than certainty. The purpose in the issue of significance is that Israiliyyah has a limitless amount of innovation and superstitions, and contents that are irrational. Considering the fact that this Salafism was regarded as "Salafi rationalism", the intelligence criteria of the modern-day anti-Israiliyyah approach was accepted to be significant, thus it was used as one of the most basic criteria of rationalism in determining the value of Israiliyyah-type narratives. This is related to the fact that metaphysical issues have been examined with a critical approach following the Illumination in the Western world, the Islamic world have had people who supported this approach due to cultural interaction, and efforts have been made to form a concrete defense line against criticisms presented against Islam through Israiliyyah. Rashid Riza's following statements reflects the afore-mentioned issue:

"If the Quran had not mentioned about the miracles confirming Jesus and Moses, European liberal scholars would adopt Islam at a greater rate, more commonly and faster. Because Islam was built on basic principles such as suitability to science and humanly characteristics, ensuring that people's souls are purified and development is maintained is in favor of the public. The miracle indicating that Islam is a revelation from Allah is that first Quran and then the Prophet was ummi. This miracle can be realized through intelligence, senses and will. Regarding the Kawni supernatural actions (miracles), there are certain suspicions regarding these, and many ta'wils on their narration, authenticity and significance were generated. In addition, similar incidents are reported by many people, anywhere and anytime. The number of narratives/stories assigned to the Indian and Muslim scholars is higher than that of the anecdotes regarding the miracles and saints mentioned in the Torah and the Bible. One of the main reasons why the modern scientists drifted away from Islam is these kawni supernatural acts."[63]

The emphasis of Rashid Riza on intelligence and science in this passage was also adopted by Indian Muslim modernists, represented by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his students. The intelligence mentioned here is close to the naturalist, rationalist, logical and positivist system. According to the criteria of this intelligence, which becomes absolute through experiments, observation and modern science, Islam should be free of religious superstitions, innovations and Israiliyyah. However, the intelligence mentioned in Quran is beyond the modern rational intelligence. It reflects the mawhub intelligence that believes in the metaphysical elements (ghaib) and, more importantly, acts in accordance to faith. Therefore, according to a narrative, the phrase *wa-ma ya'qiluha illa al-alimun* at the end of al-Anqabut 29/43 was explained by the Prophet as follows: "The person who knows Allah by intelligence, obeys Allah and avoids from opposing Allah".[64] In addition, Al-Hajj 22/46, al-A'raf 7/170, al-Muhammad 47/24 and al-Qâf 50/37 indicate that the humanly actions of understanding, thinking and knowing is referred through the term of "qalp (heart)" It is clear that the terms fuad, sadr, lub, nuha in Quran and hadiths were used to mean qalp. Accordingly, it is also understood that intelligence also has an emotional characteristic. However, the intelligence mentioned by Rashid Riza in the afore-mentioned passage seems to reflect a rational intelligence serving the Western naturalist philosophy, rather than a spiritual intelligence.

Rashid Riza, who was quite meticulous in regards to Israiliyyah, believed that one of the greatest obstacles before understanding the Quran correctly is Israiliyyah. According to him, Israiliyyah cannot be trusted and presented as evidence in any case. Rashid Riza rejected Israiliyah and accused Jewish narrators such as Qa'b al-Ahbar and Wahb ibn Munabbah of distorting Islam with severe statements. He even created fictions that can be regarded as a conspiracy theory,

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[63] Rashid Riza, *al-Wahy al-Muhammadi*, Beirut 1406, p. 105; Id, *Tafsir al-Manar*, XI, 145.

[64] Abu Muhammad Ibn Atiyyah, *al-Muharrar al-Wajiz*, Beirut 2001, III, 319.

and anti-Arabic approaches came to prominence in these fictions. For example, he stated the following in the tafsir of al-A'raf 7/107:

"Although there are narratives indicating that Wahb ibn Munabbah was fond of praying, my personal idea on him is completely adverse. According the the author, Wahb had a deep love for the Persian society of which he was a member. However, Persian people have made efforts to set tricks for Islam and Arabic people, and to present false beliefs and superstitions to the Arabic society through narratives and Shia… I believe Israeli Qa'b al-Ahbar is like Wahb ibn Munabbah. These people from the tabi'un generation proposed many narratives on strange topics without any concrete or rational evidence or grounds. The societies of these two never hesitate to organize malevolent plans for the Muslim Arabs who conquered the Persian land and sent the Jewish people to exile to Hijaz. Furthermore, the person who killed the second caliph ('Umar [r.a.]) was a Persian who was sent/assigned by a secret organization of the society of these scholars. The killers of Uthman, the third caliph, are the people who were tricked by a Jewish named Abdullah ibn Sabah. All political complexities in the early-period of the Islamic world and narrative-based lies are based on the Sabaiyyah organization and Persian resistance movements."[65]

Although Rashid Riza had an intolerant attitude toward Israiliyyah, he referred to the Old Testament in the explanations of many verses, compared the narratives of Muslim tafsir authorities to the information in Old Testament and preferred this information to those in Islamic sources,[66] which was regarded to be a surprising inconsistency by Zahabi.[67] In addition, the most significant issue in Rashid Riza's critical statements is that an ethnical sensitivity criticizing Israeli and Persian people for advocating Arabic society, which was deemed equal to Islam and Muslim characteristics, was added to the religious sensitivity reflected in regard to the context of anti-Israiliyyah. The ethnicity emphasis here is the reflection of nationalism and national state ideology that became dominant in the early twentieth century. Another indication of this reflection is that Rashid Riza supported Saudi and Wahhabi movements in al-Wahhabiyyun wa'l-Hijaz and proposed in the discussions on caliphate that caliphate be taken from the Ottoman Empire and İstanbul and assigned to a place such as Mosul where Arabs, Turks and Kurds live together.[68]

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[65] Rashid Riza, *Tafsir al-Manar*, IX, 39.

[66] Mustafa Öztürk, "Neo-Selefîlik ve Kur'ân: Reşîd Rızâ'nın Kur'ân ve Yorum Anlayışı Üzerine", *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2004, IV/2, 99-100.

[67] Muhammad Husein az-Zahabi, *al-Israiliyyah fi't-Tafsir wa'l-Hadith*, Cairo 1990, p. 181-190.

[68] Muhammed Rashid Riza, *al-Hilafa*, Cairo 1994, p. 85-86.

The Issue of Tafsir with Ra'y (Dirayah Tafsir?)

According to the basic belief in Ahl al-Hadith and Salaf ideology, the Quran tafsir that is based on only ra'y is not lawful. This ideology is related to the religious description. In other words, according to Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Islam consists of the religious works that have been truly conveyed from the Quran, Sunnah, the sahabah, and the Salafi scholars such as tabi'un and taba al-tabi'un. There is no place for ra'y and comparison in Islam.[69] According to Abu Muhammad al-Barbahari, who was one of the significant representatives of Ahl al-Hadith movement in the Hijri third and fourth centuries, Islam consists of commitment to narration and imitation. Ra'y and comparison in Islam is not appropriate. What is suitable and appropriate is to follow what the religious works indicate, and to avoid performing explanations independently from the evidence based on narration. To sum up, following the hadiths and religious works is a must in Islam. Intelligence is not a criterion. In addition, intelligence cannot grasp what certain hadiths aim to reflect. In other words, intelligence cannot grasp the essential meanings of the following hadiths: "Servants' hearts are between the two fingers of Allah", "Allah descends upon the sky of the world; Allah descends on Arafah day, and Allah will do the same in the Judgment day", "Allah put his divine foot on jahannam", "Allah created Adam with a divine form". Thus, it should be accepted in advance that the statements in these hadiths are the truth, and personal ideas should not be used or considered here.[70]

Regarding the issue of ra'y, Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas match with Ibn Hanbal and Barbahari because tafsir based on pure ra'y is unlawful according to him. However, while mentioning ra'y, Ibn Taymiyyah reflects on intelligence, rather than acting in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah, and rational evidence searches of kalam authorities, philosophers and Batinis. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, there cannot be a problem and conflict between true intelligence and narration. The most significant work reflecting Ibn Taymiyyah's ideological methodology is entitled as Mawafakatu Sahiha al-Mankul li-Sarih al-Ma'kul, which is interesting. The main idea supported in this work is that both intelligence and narration can be regarded as free of problems and conflicts on the condition that both are true against the approach of considering intelligence, and assigning the narration to second position in the conflict between intelligence and narration, which was transformed into a basic rule by Fahraddin ar-Razi and his followers. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, when intelligence and narration conflicts, the correctness of narration should be examined first, and in the event of a conflict between these two with proved correctness, intelligence-based information should be considered in regard to the error, mistake or deficiency. Only intelligence-based data that has imaginary facts and that are based on uncertain evidence can conflict with the true narratives. If

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[69]   M. Montgomery Watt, *İslâm Düşüncesinin Teşekkül Devri,* trans. E. Rûhi Fığlalı, Ankara 1981, p. 366.

[70]   Ibn Abi Ya'la, Tabakat al-Hanabilah, Riyadh 1999, III, 37-38, 45, 55, 58, 66-67, 70.

there is a conflict between intelligence and narration, either the intelligence-related issues are not based on true evidence, or narratives are related to issues that are not in the Quran and sunnah or weak khabar.[71]

Ibn Taymiyyah, who believed that intelligence would not drift away from the current path when acted in the light of the Quran and Sunnah, implied intelligence, in regards to the Quran, Sunnah and these two sources, as an alternative to the philosophical kalam ideology. According to him, religion and religious orders should be based upon religious works. Because Allah reported the provisions that are included in zarurah ad-diniyyah and reflected the intelligence-related indicators that would prove these, or act as a supplement. These indicators in religious works were understood and practiced by the sahabah and tabi'un, thus a revelation-based intelligence method based on revelation was formed. The Salaf scholars who followed them did not need any other intelligence aspects.[72]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the Quran includes intelligence evidence clearly. In addition, his examples and explanations regarding the correctness of the prophets and demonstration of titles are in the intelligence evidence group. In addition, the intelligence-related evidence in religious works are more concrete than the intelligence methods, indicators or kalam authorities, as regarding the issue of indicators and intelligence, rather than the religious works, has conflicts. Performing a differentiation between the intelligence-narration and creating an intelligence-based usul ad-din is not correct. Religious works do not enable mentioning about a conflict between intelligence and narration. The issues that should be obligatorily believed can only be based on canon or divine evidence. Canon evidence are based on revelations but also supported by intelligence. Thus, they are both narration and intelligence-related. Therefore, there is no place for a differentiation between intelligence and narration evidences that are independent from one another in Islam. In addition, there is no agreement on the intelligence-related evidence. A point that may be grounded with intelligence may not be done so by another person, or an issue that is accepted to be based on intelligence may not be accepted so by another person. Thus, there are too many conflicts regarding the intelligence-related evidence and information. Therefore, it is not correct to assign intelligence as superior to narration.[73]

In Ahl al-Hadith and Salafi ideology, the Quran tafsir based on intelligence and ra'y was not accepted to be lawful, which is supported with the warnings in the narratives assigned to the Prophet. The narratives conveyed by the hadith authorities such as Abu Dawud (d. 275/889) and al-Tirmidhi (d. 279/892) are as follows: "Whoever express an idea about the Quran without scientific evidence

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[71]   Taqi ad-din Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar'u Taaruz al-Aql wa'n-Naql*, Riyadh 1991, I, 155-156.

[72]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwa*, XVI, 259-260.

[73]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar'u Taaruz al-Akl wa'n-Nakl*, I, 20-38, 170-200; Id, *Majmu al-Fatwa*, XVI, 244-246, 255-258; Özervarlı, *İbn Teymiyye'nin Düşünce Metodolojisi*, p. 82-97.

would prepare their place in Jahannam" (*man qala fi al-qur'ani bi-ghayri ilmin falyatabawwah' mak'adahu mina'n-nar*) and/or "Whoever talks about Allah's book with their own ra'y would make a great mistake even if their statements/comments are true" (man qala fi kitabillahi azzah wa jalla bi-ra'yihi fa-asabah faqad ahtahah).[74]

These two narratives did not include the phrase, "man fassara". Instead, the words were selected with care and the phrase, "man qala", was used. Because tafsir is based on samah and narration rather than ra'y. As Quran presented certain orders to its addressees, tafsir is the explanation of what has been stated, which can only be performed through narratives. The activity that is essentially based on ra'y and reflects the formation of personal ideas is ta'wil, instead of tafsir. However, the concepts of tafsir and a'wil are interchangeably used today, and formation of Quran researchers' ideologies is named tafsir.

It should be noted that tafsir and ta'wil are interchangeably used not only in the present time, but also in the early periods. For example, al-Tabari (d. 310/923) is known to interchangeably use tafsir and ta'wil. Regarding the verses, Tabari conveyed the current narratives with imputation first, and then he performed selection among the explanations based on the narratives. Accordingly, Jami al-Bayan by Tabari combined tafsir and ta'wil and interchangeably used these concepts. On the other hand, it is certain that the concept, "tafsir with ra'y", was used in the classical periods. However, we believe that the concepts such as "tafsir with ra'y" and "ra'y tafsir" are not appropriate because tafsir is based on narratives. If tafsir and ta'wil are used interchangeably, the possibility of separating the Quran's messages from other messages presented through citation, or separating the first and essential meaning of Quran from the meanings assigned to it later is nullified, which would cause a serious issue such as proposing the personal ideas under the title of "As per the Quran" which is often the case today.

Therefore, certain tafsir authorities believed that "tafsir with ra'y is definitely lawful". For example, Qurtubah (d. 671/1273) said: "Some scholars stated that tafsir is based on samah (narration) and they indicated surah al-Nisah 4/49, but this idea is problematic". Qurtubah also made the following statement:

"It cannot be possible that the prohibited provision in the hadiths associated with the Prophet regarding the Quran tafsir means "One should talk about Quran only through narration" because sahabah members read Quran but they had different ideas on its tafsir. Their ideas on Quran tafsir are not completely heard from the Prophet. Moreover, he wrote a work entitled the Prophet prayed for Abdullah ibn Abbas as follows: "My Allah, let him have a deep knowledge and

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[74]   Abu Dawud, "Science", 5; Ad-Tirmidhi, "Tafsir", 1.

perception of religion, and teach him ta'wil." If ta'wil was based on hearing like tanzil, then this prayer for Ibn Abbas would be meaningless."[75]

These statements indicate two significant points. The first is that Qurtubah used tafsir and ta'wil interchangeably and/or considered tafsir ad ta'wil as equal. It should be noted again that ta'wil is based on ra'y, but the concept, "tafsir with ra'y", is not appropriate for ta'wil because this would cause the idea that there is no difference regarding hujjiyah between the meaning the sahabah understood from the revelation period and the meaning generated by any Muslim tafsir authority from the following periods through ta'wil on the Quran. Another inevitable result of such an ideology is that any contemporary Quran interpreters would regard their own ta'wil as equal to those of sahabah and tabi'un generation in terms of hujjiyat, which is often seen today.

Regarding the methods, the place and hujjat value of sahabah and tabi'un members in the hierarchy of religious evidences can be discussed;[76] but the hujjat value and authority of the explanations that have been safely and truly conveyed to us from the sahabah and tabi'un ulama and of the statements that reflect the general meanings in the verses cannot be discussed. If tafsir aims to explain what Allah orders in the Quran's verses, the ideas and works of the first Muslim generations, particularly the sahabah, are irreplaceable resources for determining the divine orders. However, it is a fact that sahabah members did not explain every verse, and not all of their explanations are based on the statements of the Prophet. The second most significant point in the statements of Qurtubah absolutely refers to this issue. Qurtubah says: "Sahabah members had disagreements regarding the tafsir. In addition, their ideas on tafsir are not completely heard from the Prophet", which is a correct statement.

It is certain that the method of presenting personal provisions that are based on revelation/religious works in regards to the limited meanings in ra'y or fiqh, and that do not oppose religious works was used by the Prophet and the sahabah generation. In addition, a narrative, "I use my own ra'y about the issues that were not revealed", was conveyed from the Prophet, and the Prophet answered as "ra'y" to a sahabah question of whether the location of the encampment was determined through Allah's orders or ra'y in the Battle of Badir.[77] On the other hand, many sahabah members made statements such as "I tell this with my own ra'y".[78] Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085) stated that the sahabah, tabi'un and following generations agreed on practicing with ra'y, and that nine-tenth of their

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[75] Abu Abdillah Muhammad al-Qurtubah, *al-Jami' li-Ahkam al-Qur'an*, Beirut 1988, I, 26.

[76] For method discussions on this issue, see Abu Zaid Ubayd allah ad-Dabusi, *Taqwim al-Adilla fi Usul al-Fiqh*, Beirut 2007, p. 256-259; Abu Ya'la al-Farra, *al-Uddah fi Usul al-Fiqh*, Riyadh 1993, IV, 1178-1197.

[77] Ibn Hisham, *as-Sirat an-Nabawwiyyah*, Beirut 1411, III, 167-168.

[78] See: Ibn Hanbal, *al-Musnad*, IV, 279; Ad-Darimi, "Faraiz", 26.

fatwa and kazai provisions were not related to the clear meanings of verses and hadiths, which were based on their ra'y.[79]

Considering the fact that ra'y was used in the sahabah period and many verses were explained and interpreted through ra'y as can be seen in Ibn Abbas case, it is fair to state that the concept named as narrative tafsir (ma'sur tafsir) is largely the sagacity of the sahabah generation. Therefore, sahabah members' explanations based on sagacity were transformed into a narrative tafsir in regard to the marfu context by default. In addition, Haqim an-Nisaburi (d. 405/1015) stated that sahabah tafsir has the same position with marfu hadith.[80] This is related to the religious and scientific ideology of Ahl al-Hadith in generally, and to holistically regarding the sahabah generation as adil and siqha. Ibn Taymiyyah had a great role in evaluating the sahabah members' ra'y and sagacity-based explanations in the marfu category by default, and in excluding these explanations from ra'y. Ibn Taymiyyah actually aimed to remove ra'y from tafsir. in regardsto the religious ideology of Ahl al-Hadith, and he assigned the authority of the Quran, the Prophet, sahabah and tabi'un to the gap arising from ra'y. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the Prophet taught the wordings and meanings of the Quran to his ashab as indicated by the verse An-Nahl 16/44. Sahabah members learned the tafsir methods from the Prophet, and tabi'un learned the same from the sahabah despite proposing ideas on different religious concepts such as istinbat and istidhlal. The sahabah members had disagreements on tafsir, but the number of disagreement topics among them is limited. In addition, they do not contradict; instead, their ideas vary.[81]

Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned Quran tafsir with the Quran under the title "ahsanu turuk at-tafsir" first, and tafsir with sunnah, and tafsir with sahabah ideas later.[82] In addition, he stated that the Prophet interpreted the Quran completely and considered the tafsir by the Prophet as equal to that of the sahabah. In addition, Ibn Taymiyyah aimed to prove his thesis, "Muslims need to understand and perceive the clear, understandable and explained meaning of the Quran rather than interpreting it" by stating "The Prophet interpreted the Quran totally" and nullifying ra'y and sagacity method for the tafsir authorities, but he also made a statement under ahsanu turuk at-tafsir title "If you cannot find tafsir in the Quran and sunnah"[83] and partially denied that the Prophet did not totally interpret the Quran, thus made his own thesis problematic, in regards to consistency. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah did not recognize any means or ideological fields rather than explaining the Quran with the Quran, and commitment to an explanation based on the marwiyyah from the Prophet and sahabah in the work

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[79]   Abu al-Maali Ruknuddin *al-Juwayni, al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh*, Dawha 1399, II, 768-771.

[80]   Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 157.

[81]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 148-149.

[82]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 162.

[83]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 164.

Muqaddimat at-Tafsir. He also made efforts to perform interpretation in *Dar'u Taaruz al-Aql wa'n-Naql* independently from many narratives.

Regarding the analysis of the narratives reporting that tafsir with ra'y is prohibited, two narratives come to forefront as stated before. The first is the following narrative conveyed by the hadith authorities such as Abu Dawud (d. 275/888), Tirmidhi (d. 279/892), Nasai (d. 303/915), Abu Ya'la (d. 307/919), Tabarani (d. 360/971) from the sahabah member Jundub ibn Abdullah al-Bajali (d. 70/689): "*Whoever talks about Allah's book with their own ra'y would make a great mistake even if their statements/comments are true.*" The second is related to the narrative conveyed by the hadith authorities such as Ibn Abi Shaybah (d. 235/849), Ahmad ibn (d. 241/855), ad-Tirmidhi and Nasai from the sahabah member Abdullah ibn Abbas (d. 68/687): "*Whoever expresses an idea about the Quran without scientific evidence would prepare their place in Jahannam*" .[84]

These narratives are interesting in regards to certain aspects: The first is related to the evidence that the phrase in the first narrative, "man qala fi al-qur'ani bi-ghayri ilm", corresponds to the phrase in the second narrative "man qala fi al-qur'ani bi-ra'yihi". In other words, the correspondent of the phrase, "bi-ghayri ilmin", in the first narrative is the wording, "bi-ra'yihi", in the second narrative. "Bi-ghayri ilmin" actually means "bi-ra'yihi". In addition, the wording "bi-ghayri ilm" does not mean "ignorant". Instead, the ignorance mentioned here implies presenting ideas on the interpretation of the Quran independently from narration (hadith, khabar, works, narratives). We know that the concept of "science (ilm)" means hadith/khabar/works in Ahl al-Hadith terminology. For example, Abu Haysamah Zuhair ibn Harb (d. 234/849), a hadith expert, used the term of ilm as equal to hadith in *Kitab al-Ilm*, and he stated that hadith knowledge is superior to ra'y and comparison. In J*amiu Bayan al-Ilm* by Ibn Abdilbar an-Namari (d. 463/1071) and *Taqyid al-Ilm* by Hatib al-Baghdadi (d. 463/1071), both of which are related to writing hadiths, the concept of ilm was used interchangeably with hadith.

On the other hand, in *al-Jami as-Sahih* by Bukhari (d. 256/870), the methods of learning and teaching hadith information were mentioned under the title "Kitab al-Ilm" In the work with same title by Muslim (d. 261/875), the short section with the title "Kitab al-Ilm" implies that the true Islamic scholars are Ahl al-Hadith. As understood from the subtitle-named "Prohibiting ittibah for the scholars of Quran and making them avoid these", methods such as ra'y and ta'wil are not suitable for Quran tafsir, and the paths to follow include adopting the clear messages of religious works such as Ahl al-Hadith, avoiding ta'wil, and presenting the faith and

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[84] For more details and evaluations regarding the different variants and resources of the narratives, see Kadir Gürler, "Kur'ân'ın Re'y İle Tefsirini Yasaklayan Rivâyetlere Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım", *Gazi Üniversitesi Çorum İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2004/1, III/5, 18-29.

commitment as those "who have a deep knowledge in science" mentioned in the surah Al-Imran 3/7. This attitude was believed to belong to Ahl al-Hadith.[85]

In addition, it is well-known that the concepts and terms in the Islamic literature such as *talab al-ilm*, *tahammul al-ilm*, *taqyid al-ilm*, *ar-rihlah fi talab al-ilmh* were used for the methods of learning, teaching and conveying hadith. Accordingly, the wording "bi-ghari ilmin" in the narrative suggests presenting personal ideas independently from the narratives in the Quran's tafsir. The concepts of ilm and ra'y in the relevant narratives reflect two different inclinations and epistemological paradigms related to the sources of religious considerations and epistemological paradigms in the anti-context of Ahl al-Hadith (Ashab al-Hadith) and Ah lar-Ra'y (Asha bar-Ra'y). The opposition between Ahl al-Hadith and Ah lar-Ray can be reflected with the differentiation of narration-intelligence (narrative-sagacity). Ibn Abdilbarr made the following relevant statement under the title "The person who performs ta'wil on the Quran without knowing Sunnah and presents ideas on the Quran": "After attempting to abandon Sunnah and perform ta'wil on the Quran as contrary to the explanations in the sunnah, Ahl al-Bid'at stunned both themselves and others. We trust Allah against such extreme actions"[86].

The fact that the term of "ra'y" receives contents as "the ideas/beliefs that refer to no basics or the Quran and Sunnah, and that are based on the pure data of intelligence" in classical sources indicates that the prohibition of expressing ra'y-based ideas on the Quran is actually related to consolidating Ahl al-Hadith paradigm. In addition, Abu Baqr Ibn al-Anbari (d. 328/940) stated the following about Jundub narrative:

"Certain scientific scholars (Ahl al-Hadith) assigned the meaning of intention/ambition to the concept of ra'y and explained the hadith as follows: 'Whoever express ideas on the Quran reflects their ambitions and intentions without referring to the great Salafi scholars, they would make a great mistake even if their statements/comments are true. Because a person acting like that would assign an idea/claim to the Quran without knowing the relevant ideas of hadith-narration authorities."[87]

In conclusion, the concept of ra'y in that narrative reflects the inclinations to reach beyond Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism in particular, and Ahl al-Sunnah in general, and to form ideas outside of these traditions. Qurtubah's following statement on how the prohibition on explaining and interpreting the Quran with ra'y supports the afore-mentioned statement:

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[85] For the details and evaluations in regard to using the concept of "ilm" as hadith before Ahl al-Hadith, see Kadir Gürler, *Ehl-i Hadisin Düşünce Yapısı*, (unpublished doctoral thesis), Ankara 2002, p. 132-141.

[86] Abu Omar Ibn Abdilbarr, *Jamiu Bayan al-Ilm wa Fazlih*, Beirut, n.d., II, 1199.

[87] Qurtubah, *al-Jami'*, I, 26.

"The prohibition on tafsir with ra'y is assigned to one of the following forms: The first is that the person who interprets the Quran with ra'y may have a certain idea and an interest and inclination toward this idea. Accordingly, that person performs ta'wil on the Quran according to the personal intentions and ambitions, thus aims to present the personal ideas and intentions before the confirmation of the Quran. However, the meaning obtained in this way has no correspondence in the Quran. The only correspondence is the ideology and approach in the minds of the interpreters. These ta'wil-based actions are occasionally based on knowledge and performed deliberately just like some groups that make efforts to base their own innovative ideologies with the verses in the Quran. The authorities of this discipline know very well that the meaning they suggested was not aimed for in the verse they presented as evidence. However, the main purpose here is to confuse the opposition, so this misinterpretation is deliberately preferred. These arbitrary interpretations are occasionally performed unconsciously. In other words, the verse may have different meanings, which direct the interpreters' minds toward meanings which suit their own purposes and targets. Thus, they prefer these meanings, considering their own ra'y and desires. Therefore, they also explain the Quran in accordance to their own ra'y… Wrong interpretations occasionally can be related to a true intention. The interpreters know that the meaning they are looking for is not included in the Quran, but they still search for evidence. Just like referring al-Taha 20/24 "Go to Pharaoh; because he lost control" that is related to inviting people with malevolent intentions to Islam, the inviter says, "Allah indicated galb in this verse" and implies galb is meant with the name Pharaoh… Such interpretations are used by preachers from time to time; however, they observe true intentions of beautifying this statement and promoting religious sensitivity among the congregation. These interpretations are illicit and unlawful as they have no linguistic correspondence. Similar interpretations are occasionally formed by Batinis (Batiniyyah), but this group has certain malevolent intentions such as tricking people and inviting them to their superstitious sects. In conclusion, Batinis reduce the rate of the Quran to the level of a book that confirms their own wrong ta'wil-based actions, and although they know their statements and actions have no correspondence in the Quran, they still abuse the Quran for the ideologies and concepts in their sects."[88]

The narratives that prohibit explaining and interpreting the Quran with ra'y are reflections of the discussions of whether the disagreements between Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl ar-Ra'y, and relevant interpretations that are independent from narration should be included in the tafsir category. Therefore, it is fair to mention about the possibility that the statements of salaf ulama that suggest acting carefully in regards to ra'y and Quran tafsir are assigned to the Prophet and considered as a marfu hadith. Moreover, Ibn Abi Shaybah conveyed the narrative, "Whoever expresses an idea about the Quran without scientific evidence would prepare their place in

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[88] Qurtubah, *al-Jami'*, I, 26-27.

Jahannam", as the statement of Ibn Abbas rather than the Prophet. Certain sources indicate that Ibn Abbas stated the following as a response to a question: "I express what I know; I avoid talking about an issue I do not know". Considering this narrative, it is fair to state that ra'y based speaking prohibition can be regarded as an invitation of the salaf ulama to be cautious. In addition, according to another evaluation, these narratives which have severe accusations such as labeling the use of ra'y in Quran tafsir as a sacrilege in certain variants were created to refute the movement known as ra'y that is adopted by the dogmatic people who used intelligence with narratives along with the issue of whether the Prophet would present such as accusation against those who believed in him.[89] As it is certain that there is no concept as Quran tafsir with ra'y in the period of the Prophet, it is easily understood that this statement is invalid with anachronism. In conclusion, it is not be hard to realize that this narrative was a result of the plans of a group to be superior to another by using the authority of the Prophet or abusing his authority.[90]

Considering the anachronistic content, the authors believe it is possible to detect that these narratives are the statements formed as hadiths to provide a ground to the Quran and the tafsir concept of Ahl al-Hadith and to control Ahl ar-Ra'y. Because in both narratives, the Prophet mentions the technical tafsir of the Quran and the issue of tafsir methods. Accordingly, the Quran was a topic of tafsir activity, and different methods and approaches were formed, thus the Prophet took an action and mentioned about the narratives and sagacity in tafsir. It is an undeniable fact that the Quran was not an information and interpretation object during the revelation period. On the contrary, it was perceived and practiced by the Prophet and sahabah members as the orders sent by Allah. In regards to this fact, thinking that the Prophet mentioned a technical tafsir activity and informed the sahabah members about the method of this activity and warned them against the misuse is as anachronic as stating "The Prophet ordered this/that while watching television".

Another issue that is similar to the problem seen in the narratives reflecting that Ra'y based Quran interpretation was prohibited can also be found in the narrative that the Prophet warned Aisha (r.a.) about the people who were committed to the cognates of Quran.[91] In addition, although the characteristics of being a cognate have not been conveyed to us until the present time, it can also be found in the narrative that the Prophet warned Aisha (r.a.) about the people who were using similar words to Aisha (r.a.) becoming popular, which evokes different beliefs. The

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[89] Gürler, "Kur'ân'ın Re'y ile Tefsirini Yasaklayan Rivâyetlere Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım", p. 45

[90] M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, , "İstismara Elverişli Münbit Toprak: Hadisler", *İslâmiyât*, 2000, III/ 3, 125-126. It is remarkable that these narratives were interpreted as "If true" by certain scholars such as Bayhaki (d. 470/1077) and Mawardi (d. 450/1058) with caution or as "This hadith is problematic (*fi haz al-hadisi nazar*). See Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 161-162.

[91] For the narrative, see al-Bukhari, *as-Sahih*, "Tafsir", 3; Muslim, *al-Jami as-sahih* "Ilm", 1; Abu Dawud, *as-Sunan*, "Sunnah", 2.

authors of this study are of the opinion that this narrative emerged as the anti-approach to the "anti-ta'wil" ideology of Salafi scholars. This is definitely a possibility, but also a strong possibility. Due to neither the Quran nor the Prophet's hadiths have no true information about which verses are cognate and/or which topics reflect the identity of being cognate. Therefore, each sect evaluated the verses in their own kalam systems as specific, and the verses in the kalam systems of the opposing sects as cognate. Fahraddin ar-Razi honestly confessed this fact in the explanation of Ali 'Imran 3/7 as follows:

"Members of each sect regard the verses suiting their own beliefs (kalami approached) as specific and consider the verses fitting the ideologies of their opponents as cognate. For example, a Mu'tazilah member states that the verse "whoever wills - let him believe; and whoever wills - let him disbelieve" (al-Kahf 18/29) is specific, and the verse "And you do not will except that Allah wills - Lord of the worlds" (at-Taqwir 81/29) is cognate. Sunni adopts an opposite ideology in this topic.

It should be known that each group (sub-sect) in the world names the verses that suit their beliefs as specific, and considers the verses suiting the ideas of the opponents as cognate. It is not possible to witness the presence of a group that does not adopt this attitude.

As is clear from these statements, the main rule/principle that is valid for the majority of the people (Muslims) is as follows: Verses suiting certain individuals' sect are named as specific by those individuals, and verses that are in accordance with the beliefs of the opponent individuals are named as cognate."[92]

These critical statements of ar-Razi indicate that it is not possible to mention about a common rule that is obligatory for all sects in the issue of which verses are specific and which are cognate. On the contrary, each sect has different rules in regards to the kalam system. Therefore, the following question should be asked: Who was meant by the Prophet when he made Aisha (r.a.) avoid the people who are committed to the cognates of Quran? The kalam-based conflicts of the past suggest that the Prophet meant Ash'aris according to Mu'tazilah, Mu'tazilah according to Ash'aris, Jahmiyyah and Ahl ar-Ra'y according to Ahl al-Hadith, and Ahl al-Hadith and Hashwiyyah according to Ahl ar-Ra'y. The authors believe the Prophet did not mean anybody because he did not make such a statement "When you see the people following the cognates, keep away from them", or at least he did not make this statement for Muslims. Furthermore, the concepts of "cognate" and "ta'wil" in Ali 'Imran 3/7 reflected the attitudes of some Christians from Najran who discussed with the Prophet about the theological identity of Jesus.[93]

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[92] Fahraddin ar-Razi, *at-Tafsir al-Qabîr*, VII, 146, 152.

[93] Ibn Sa'd, *at-Tabakat al-Qubra*, Beirut, n.d., I, 357-358; Al-Tabari, *Jami al-Bayan*, III, 162-164; Abu Muhammad al-Baghawi, *Ma'alim at-Tanzil*, Beirut 1995, I, 276.

It should be noted that ra'y tafsir and/or tafsir with ra'y are not appropriate concepts, and the term, ta'wil, should be used in place of ra'y tafsir. In addition, evidence indicates that Imam Maturidi's (d. 333/944) statement "Tafsir is performed by the sahabah" and the function assigned to the sahabah generation by Ibn Taymiyyah under the title "ahsanu turuk at-tafsir" largely matched. However, the proposal, "Tafsir is performed by the sahabah", seems to be open to discussion. This is due to no narratives regarding the explanation of all verses were conveyed from the sahabah, and sahabah members were not the authorized people in this regard. Thus, conveying Ibn Mas'ud's statement "I swear I know the addressee of each verse and where each verse was revealed" or implying that Ibn Abbas was regarded as "Tarjuman al-Qur'an"[94] does not mean that all sahabah members were tafsir authorities. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah who conveyed these details related to Ibn Mas'ud and Ibn Abbas made statements similar to the following: "Scholars and significant characters of the sahabah", "If the statements of sahabah do not contain narration-based information about Quran tafsir, then…" Thus, the hypothesis "Tafsir is performed by the sahabah" should be understood as follows rather than "Sahabah are the most authorized people who explained Quran thoroughly":

The authority of the tafsir information conveyed by sahabah members cannot be discussed as the information in these narratives reflect the essential and historical meaning of the Quran. In addition, comments of Quran researchers based on their own experiences are not the same. These comments can be true or false. Thus, the explanations that are conveyed from the Salafism followers should be named as tafsir while the other interpretations should be regarded as ta'wil, and these two categories should be interchangeably used. On the other hand, although majority of the comments made by the sahabah and tabi'un ulama are based on ra'y, the explanations/statements of the first Muslim generation should not technically regarded as ta'wil due to being close to the environment of revelation, familiarity with Quran's language, and living in a period before the emergence of sectarian issues. However, as seen in Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism paradigm, efforts to provide the evidence as seen in Ahl al-Hadith and Salafism paradigm, should be made.

Although tafsir is based on hadith and narratives, the emergence of scientific, ideological and political movements in the history of Islamic ideology resulted in the common belief that "tafsir with ra'y" formed a separate discipline and ra'y-based tafsir is lawful. The political conflicts that came to prominence following the first Hijri century, the sectarian conflicts that emerged later, and theological discussions resulted in using the Quran as a basic reference text and evolution of tafsir activities from narration and narratives to ra'y and dirayah. M. Husein az-Zahabi regarded this period as the fifth stage of tafsir development and mentioned the Abbasid period as the date. In this period starting from the Abbasid era and

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94   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 163.

reaching the present time, tafsir became an activity in which the conveyable narratives from Salaf were not the only source and intelligence also had a role. Many issues that almost had no relationship with the Quran were included in the books named "tafsir", thus tafsir became an activity of understanding and explaining the Quran, and a different concept than tafsir as the result of this activity. Zahabi stated the following in regard to the progress of this development:

"[During the Abbasid period] the disciplines of dictionaries, grammar and syntax were codified, conflicts regarding the fiqh issues turned into movements, and kalam-based issues emerged. Moreover, the concept of sectarian fanaticism emerged in the Abbasid era, and Islamic sub-sects started to spread and promote their own ideas. In addition, many philosophical books were acquired by Islamic culture through translation. These different scientific branches and relevant topics were included in tafsir discipline and even exceeded the status of tafsir. Accordingly, the role and function of intelligence in tafsir became more dominant than narration. Moreover, intelligence was not totally independent from the narration material such as asbab al-nuzul, but it became the most significant characteristic of tafsir books."[95]

The Issue of Ta'wil

Another issue that should be separately reviewed in the context of Salafism and tafsir is ta'wil. Ta'wil, which was conceptualized as "associating wording in the religious works with a possible meaning different than its essential meaning based on evidence" or "Associating a wording with a secondary meaning other than its initial/apparent meaning", has been discussed as a methodological issue of understanding and interpreting in regard to cognate titles. Ibn Taymiyyah, who implied that assigning the identity of "tafsir" to ta'wil concept which is often mentioned in the Quran is inappropriate and stated that innovations of the Islamic ideology emerged from misunderstanding and misinterpreting the Quran, pointed out the principle of "One should avoid performing ta'wil and falsification of the Quran and follow Salafism" whenever possible.

According to this principle, assigning certain Batini and Sufism-related meanings to the verses while disregarding the statements of the Prophet and Salaf and producing pure intelligence-based interpretations for providing a basis for a certain idea with the sectarian motives, is nothing but ta'wil and ta'wil patriotism that is equal to falsification. It is certain that ta'wil has a quite negative content in this regard. However, the meaning and use of ta'wil in the Quran is completely different. To be clearer, ta'wil in the Quran is suggested to be the truth reflected with kalam or the result of an activity or statement rather than "associating a statement with its secondary meaning instead of its initial and essential meaning".

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[95] Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassiru*n, I, 101.

Kalam (statement) has two types, either as constitutive kalam or notification-based kalam. The ta'wil of the constitutive kalam/statement reflecting orders means fulfilling what was ordered. The statement of Aisha (r.a.) "Sunnah is the ta'wil of the orders in the Quran" means the same. Similarly, the statement of Aisha (r.a.) "The Prophet performed taawwul on the Quran while praying" suggests the prayer of the Prophet as "Subhanakallahummah..." as per the order in an-Nasr 110/3: "Then exalt [Him] with praise of your Lord" (*fa-sabbih bi-hamdi rabbik*). If kalam/statement is constitutive, the meaning of ta'wil in this regard is the continuous existence of the action/situation reported in that kalam/statement. For example, the meaning of ta'wil in al-A'raf 7/53 is the occurrence of the actions such as the judgment day, divine interrogation, and punishment. In al-Yusuf 12/101, the meaning of "ta'wil al-ahadis" is the occurrence of dreams in the mortal world.[96]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, whose explanation on the meaning and use of Ta'wil in Quran is appropriate, ta'wil was generally used as "tafsir" by the tafsir authorities. For example, al-Tabari used these terms interchangeably. Additionally, the statement of Mujahid, a tafsir authority, that he knows the ta'wil of the cognates in regard to Ali 'Imran 3/7 indicated the meaning of "tafsir". It is possible that he considered interpreting or explaining the cognates as the same action with ta'wil before the presence of Allah. The fact is that there is an agreement between the meaning and use of ta'wil concept because this term is occasionally used as indicated in the Quran and in accordance to the methodologies of Salaf scholars and scholars of fiqh, methodologists and kalam authorities in the following periods. The main reason for the agreement in the use of Ta'wil concept is the belief that the meaning assigned by everybody to this concept is the same in the Quran.[97]

The definition of ta'wil as "association of kalam with the secondary meaning rather than the initial and essential meaning, due to a relevant evidence" belongs to the individuals who were interested in the disciplines such as fiqh, kalam and methods in the following periods. Ta'wil was not used with this meaning in the traditions of Salaf ulama. Salaf scholars used ta'wil interchangeably with tafsir as Tabari did or in the context as "the truth indicated by kalam itself" which suited the Quran. As expressed before, if statements are constitutive as per this use, ta'wil means fulfilling the order presented in that statement, and if the statements are notification-based, ta'wil meant the occurrence of what was announced.[98]

According to what Ibn Taymiyyah specified, scholars of fiqh and kalam authorities in the following periods believed that the concept of ta'wil in Ali 'Imran 3/7 was used in regard to the meaning in their methodologies, and they divided the cognates into two groups regarding the ta'wil. One group stated that ta'wil of the cognates can only be known by Allah, but the other group adopted the idea that

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[96]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, III, 30-31, XIII, 124; Id, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 57.

[97]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 127-128.

[98]   Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XVII, 195-216, XIII, 128-129.

people authorized in Islamic science were included in this context; but both groups made mistakes in the end.[99] Because the ta'wil in Ali 'Imran 3/7 means the real nature of the cognates rather than understanding and interpreting a statement. Thus, the interest in the ta'wil of cognate verses reflects the claim of assigning the meaning in these verses or having the final word in this regard (fasl al-hitab). Certain people such as Huyay ibn Ahtab from the Jewish community came to Medina, interpreted huruf al-mukatta'a with regard to jumal, and attempted to determine the durations of lives of Muslims and/or a group of Christians from Najran stated that Allah is one of the three hypostases considering the wordings in the Quran such as *inna*, *nahnu* (we), all of which correspond to the "interest in the ta'wil of cognates" indicated in Ali 'Imran 3/7.[100]

To sum up, the ta'wil decried in the verses related to the attempt to determine the real nature of the factors in these religious works, rather than the inability to know the meaning in the cognate religious works. In this respect, devotion is needed to follow the phrase *wa-ma ya'lamu ta'wilahu illallah* in the verse. Moreover, the ideas of the sahabah and jumhur al-tabiin indicate that devotion is necessary here. Accordingly, knowing the ta'wil of the cognate verses is only specific to Allah. However, this does not mean that verses in this regard cannot be interpreted and explained by the people because Allah made no statement like "Humans cannot know the tafsir of the cognates". On the contrary, Allah ordered in surah Sad 38/29 as follows: [This is] a blessed Book which We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], that they might reflect upon its verses and that those of understanding would be reminded. Similarly, Allah ordered in surah-Muhammad 47/24 as follows: "Then do they not reflect upon the Qur'an, or are there locks upon [their] hearts?"

The reflection in these verses are toward all verses with specific and cognate aspects. Moreover, reflection and consideration cannot be possible for kalam, the meaning and message of which cannot be understood. Allah criticized those, who are interested in the ta'wil of the cognates for creating instigation of Ali 'Imran 3/7, but those who tried to understand the meanings of the Quran considering the specific and cognate verses as ordered by Allah were not criticized. Instead, they were praised by Allah.[101] Furthermore, nobody from sahabah or tabi'un prevented any verses in the Quran from tafsir; nobody among them said "This is a cognate verse with unknown meaning", and similarly, none of the great Salafi scholars stated "There are verses with unknown meanings in the Quran. Neither the Prophet nor anyone from any Islamic discipline understood these".[102]

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[99] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 57-58.

[100] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 123.

[101] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 123.

[102] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 136-138.

The issue of the presence of verses with unknown meanings was created by certain parties in the following periods. These people talked offensively about divine names and titles, destiny and similar issues, and asked the following strange question: "Is it possible for the Quran to include verses with unknown meanings?" A group of Hashwiyyah members who strictly followed the apparent meanings of verses believed that the Quran has verses with unknown meanings in regard to the idea that Allah may test the servants however he wishes, but other groups adopted the opposite belief for the purpose of providing basis to their own opinions with ta'wils that are equal to falsification. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, people who claim that those with a scientific background know the ta'wil of the cognates definitely make a mistake. The concept of ta'wil as reflected by deviant sects such as Batiniyyah-Qaramitah, Jahmiyyah-Mu'tazilah, Mutafalsifah is nothing but Quran interpretations that are equal to falsification.[103]

The anti-ta'wil approach of Ibn Taymiyyah is related to the interpretation of verses on Allah's titles and conditions of the eternal world by Batiniyyah-Ismailiyyah, Ihvan al-Safa and other Islamic philosophers, Mu'tazili-Jahmi and Ash'ari kalam authorities to a degree. According to the ideology of Ibn Taymiyyah, all of Allah's titles are eternal. The absence of these titles is impossible. In addition, titles are not the concepts that reflect the facts which are independent from Allah's presence. The subjects or objects that are obliged to be present are not only the people or titles, but also the qualified individuals who hold the kamal titles. Therefore, titles cannot be regarded separately from the subjects/objects. As it is not possible to consider the existence of a subject with no qualifications in the external world, rejecting the titles carry the risk of rejecting the presence of the subject in a logical sense.[104] However, ta'wil of the titles would direct individuals to different concepts other than those related to Allah, as directly reported by the religious works, thus this activity can be regarded as falsification. Moreover, a comparison or embodiment that would require ta'wil for the titles in the religious works is not the case because although certain titles are used to reflect both the divine and humanly characteristics, this only takes place in a wording-based context, and the content/ta'wil of the words used for the divine titles is completely different than that of humans. This finding is also valid for the qualifications such as the divine residence (in skies) and revelation which are clamed to evoke anthropomorphism.[105] Thus, the Salaf ulama stated that Allah's names and titles should be believed as how they are reflected in the religious works. According to this concept, how Allah qualified and named himself should be accepted as so, without any additions or extractions and without interpreting the divine names and titles as opposite to their apparent meanings. In addition, Allah's names and titles should not be regarded similar to those of creatures (comparison). In conclusion,

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[103] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 128.

[104] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Dar'u Taaruz al-Akl wa'n-Nakl*, III, 292-294.

[105] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, III, 5-6.

the Salaf ulama did not perform ta'wil on the verses related to titles, and they did not adopt the idea of comparison. If the opposite would be the case, narratives would certainly reflect the state to the next generations.[106]

As no risk of comparison for the "kalam" and "basar" titles that are associated with Allah in the verses was mentioned by the kalam authorities, "divine residence" and "revelation" should not be regarded separately from the general title concept of the Islamic theology because accepting some of the titles while rejecting others due to the idea of fictitious comparison would be a contradiction. On the other hand, metaphysical elements such as Allah's titles and eternal world can only be defined as reported in the religious works, and the true nature of these can only be known by Allah. From a humanly point of view, the khabars and depictions regarding the eternal world can be understood only through the names and titles used in the mortal world. It is clear that a limited understanding toward the eternal world depicted with the linguistic forms used in the mortal world does not mean that both worlds are the same.[107]

The main principle regarding the titles is based on the statement of Imam Maliq "The divine residence is obvious but its nature is unknown" or "The divine residence is not an unknown case, but its nature is not within the limits of intelligence." This statement is a sufficient answer to the possible questions regarding the khabar-based titles such as revelation, maji', yad and wajh.[108] In conclusion, ta'wil that is made specific to Allah by Allah is the true nature of Allah's presence and titles as reflected by Imam Malik's statement "The nature (of divine residence) is unknown." Therefore, the following is the best response to be

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[106] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 2-3.

[107] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, III, 30-31.

[108] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 3. According to Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, this statement by Malik ibn Anas has more than one contradiction at different degrees. "The contradiction at the first degree is as follows: Any maruf subjects/objects must have been perceived through senses, intelligence or muhayyilah, thus their nature cannot be unknown in any case. The subjects/objects with an unknown nature cannot be maruf as nature is the concept that determines the content or characteristics of anything. The contradiction at the second degree is as follows: Divine residence is religious data that can be clarified only from the context. This context reflects the sentence at least, then the meaning and continuation of the sentence, and the total text in the end. Accordingly, the statement "The divine residence is maruf" contains the meaning in the minds reflected by the statement and there is no relationship with this statement and the Quran. The contradiction at the third degree is that mentioning divine residence is adversely regarded as innovation while the Quran mentioned about it as a divine action (…) It is certain that the literal meaning of this statement is "obvious" (divine residence is maruf). Mu'tazilah ta'wil is regarded as "false" (its nature is not known), and the process is totally considered as innovation (each innovation is an indication and each indication will result in Jahannam). A captivating effect takes place when "maruf", and the "unknown" and "innovation" concepts are preached with a rising rhythm. Therefore, the Muslim public and relatively educated sections are incited against ta'wil and in favor of tafsir. Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, "Tarihte ve Günümüzde 'Kur'ân Te'vîli' Sorunsalı", *İslâmî Araştırmalar*, 1996, IX/1-4, 28.

given to a question like "What is the true nature of Allah's titles?": "This is the truth specific to Allah (ta'wil)."[109]

While accepting that comparison and embodiment is not included in Islamic theology, Ibn Taymiyyah reminded that Ahl al-Sunnah kalam authorities made efforts to perform ta'wil on the khabari titles such as skies, divine residence and yad for the purpose of imposing no prejudice to tanzih, and he strictly opposed to these efforts. On the other hand, he regarded the statements on the blessings of the eternal world described in the religious works as cognate, and he indicated that they might suggest different meanings. With this attitude, Ibn Taymiyyah seems to act overreactive in his first idea.[110]

Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah regarded the statement and comments of the Salaf in general and himself in particular, as a result of a tafsir activity that is equal to tadabbur and tafakkur in the Quran, but he considers the statements of certain sub-sects such as Mu'tazilah, Murji'ah or Jahmiyya in a general sense as ta'wil in the sense of the meaning in Ali-'Imran 3/7. Thus, he accuses these sub-sects of being interested in the ta'wil of the cognates, which can only be grasped by Allah. However, adopting the idea that divine titles should be interpreted in a way to praise Allah's glory within the limits of Arabic, and stating that the words in regard to these titles have true meanings-Ibn Taymiyyah, states that Salaf aims to reflect this-[111] does not mean assigning the true meanings and nature of the titles.

However, Ibn Taymiyyah regards the statements of Ahl al-Hadith and Salafi-Hanbali scholars as "true tafsir" and considers the statements of Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah as ta'wil in regard to presenting the final word. It is fair to state that this evaluation is reactional, and this reactions arises from the anti Jahmiyyah-Mu'tazilah approach. Additionally, Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned in a confession-based manner that Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and other Salaf ulama stated that no verse in the Quran have incomprehensible characteristics, and these scholars rejected the ta'wil of the Jahmiyya[112]. He confessed that he had an ideological attitude in this regard. When heard that "Ahl al-Hadith performs imitation. Its members are not the people of religious works and deduction", he said "No, this is not true! Because Ahl al-Hadith had a reputation and deduced as Allah ordered following the religious principles, reputation and tadabbur. No Salaf or Sunnah Imams rejected this. However, religious works, reputation and deduction are the common wordings. Ahl al-Hadith rejected the superstitious works and deductions in the

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[109] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, p. 139.

[110] M. Sait Özervarlı, "İbn Teymiyye (İtikadî Görüşleri)", *DİA*, İstanbul 1999, XX, 406.

[111] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 131.

[112] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 131.

context of kalam authorities"[113]. He also clearly mentioned the ideological attitude in favor of Ahl al-Hadith or Salafism-Hanbalism.[114]

Reasons for the Anti-Ta'wil Approach

The anti-ta'wil approach of Salafism is not under the context of an absolute discourse as people believe. To be clearer, the negative attitudes of Salafi scholars generally arise from the opposition to Jahmiyya. As known to all, Jahmiyya is the name of the sub-sect associated with Abu Muhris Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128/745). According to the members of this sub-sect who are believed to be the pioneers of the interest in the cognates' ta'wil in the history of Islamic ideology, intelligence may contradict with narration, and the process of ta'wil should be performed on narration in accordance with intelligence. In this regard, the process of ta'wil should be performed on the khabari titles such as divine residence, revelation, yad and wajh which enables an anthropomorphic Allah depiction in relation to apparent meaning associated with Allah in the religious works. Moreover, Allah does not stay or descend upon anywhere (revelation). Therefore, the meaning of divine residence is the authority of Allah over the skies. In addition, divine descending suggests the revelation of Allah's mercy or orders. On the other hand, Allah cannot be regarded as an object, as Allah is free from all forms a mind can grasp. The title of kalam cannot be assigned to Allah either. Allah did not talk in the past and will not do so in the future because an organ is needed to talk. Allah's conversation with Moses must have taken place with the reflection of divine words from a creature reaching the ears of Moses. Moreover, it is not possible to see Allah in the mortal and eternal world. Allah can only be seen with the divine actions. The verse "Vision perceives Him not, but He perceives [all] vision; and He is the Subtle, the Acquainted" (al-An'am 6/103) is clear evidence that Allah cannot be seen.[115]

Jahmiyya interpreted religious works, especially those related to khabari titles, based on intelligence and language for the purpose of exonerating Allah, and it distorted the conservative structure in the theological field that continued to exist since the Prophetic era, which evoked severe criticisms from the Salafi scholars.[116] The works such as ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyya wa'z-Zanadika by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *ar-Red ala al-Jahmiyya and ar-Rad ala al-Marisi (Nakz al-Imam Abi Said Osman ibn Said ala al-Marisiyyi al-Jahmiyyi al-Anid fima'ftarah alallahi mina at-Tawhid)* by Abu Said ad

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[113] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 47.

[114] For a broader consideration of Ibn Taymiyyah's ideological attitude regarding tafsir, ta'wil and metaphors, see M. Emin Maşalı"İbn Teymiyye'ye Göre Hatalı Tefsir Kuramları" Bilimnâme, 2008/2, issue, XV, p. 123-146.

[115] For broader details on Jahm ibn Sahwan and Jahmiyya, see Abu al-Husein al-Malati, *at-Tanbih wa'r-Rad ala Ahl al-Ahwa wa'l-Bida'*, Cairo 1993, p. 97-99; Abu al-Fath ash-Shahristani, *al-Milal wa'n-Nihal*, Beirut 1996, I, 97-99; Watt, *Formation Period of Islamic Ideology*, p. 178-185; Şerafettin Gölcük, "Cehm b. Safvân", DİA, VII, 233-234; Id, "Jahmiyya", DİA, VII, 236-237.

[116] Gölcük, "Cehmiyye",, *DİA*, VII, 236.

Darimi (d. 280/894), *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyya* by Ibn Abi Hatim ar-Razi (d. 327/938) and *Ijtima al-Juyushi al-Islamiyyah ala Gazwi al-Muattila wa'l-Jahmiyya* by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) are the results of these severe criticisms. However, certain people such as Abdullah ibn Mubarak, Salam ibn Abi Muti`, Abd al-wahhab al-Warrak, Yazid ibn Kharun and Harijah ibn Mus'ab severely criticized and regarded the Jahmiyya followers as "Non-believers", "Atheists", "The most malevolent members of Ahl al-bidat", and Ibrahim ibn Abi Nuaym said "If I had the authority, Jahmiyya followers would be buried in the Muslims' graveyard",[117] which indicates that the anti-ta'wil approach of the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith or Salafiyyah arose from the opposition to Jahmiyya. Ibn Qutayba's (d. 276/889) "Ashab al-hadith" -this title is the technical equivalent of Salafiyyah in fiqh- presented a statement as those who do not associate the religious issue with juristic preference, comparison or intelligence-based activities, books of mutakaddimun philosophers or kalam authorities of the following periods"[118], which indicates that anti-ta'wil approach of Salafiyyah arose from the general Jahmiyya concepts.

It should be noted that Jahmiyya, which was referred with a great hatred by Ibn Hanbal, Abu Said ad-Darimi, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, is a concept that covers the entire Ahl ar-Ray movement, rather than serving as a term that reflects a certain sub-sect or the followers of Jahm ibn Safwan, which pays importance to intelligence, instead of khabar and religious works, in understanding-interpreting certain sectarian or religious texts from movements such as Mu'tazilah, Murji'ah or even Hanafism. In addition, according to the narrative of al-Bukhari (d. 256/870) from Yazid ibn Kharun, Imam Abu Hanifa's favorite student was Muhammad ibn Hasan ash-Shaybani who was a Jahmiyya follower.[119] We learned from the works of the opposing scholars such as Abu Said ad-Darimi, Bishr ibn Gias al-Marisi (d. 218/833), who presented parallel ideas to those of Jahm ibn Safwan, was both Jahmi and Murji'ah.[120]

As these evidences indicate, Jahmi and/or Jahmiyya is a concept used by the Salafi scholars to decry Ahl ar-Ray and possibly indicated as an "enemy of Islam", or "traitor", which was first used by M. Watt.[121] In addition, Jahmiyya did not have any significant individuals other than Jahm ibn Safwan and Bishr ibn Giyas al-Marisi, who were believed to have had the same ideology and influenced Mu'tazilah in general, Murji'ah in the issue of faith, Jabriyya in the issue of will, and Ash'ariyya to a certain degree, which indicates that the concept of Jahmiyya indicated the groups other than Ahl al-Hadith rather than reflecting the name of a

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[117] Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah wa'z-Zanadikah*, Riyadh 2003, p. 11-12, [Publisher's introduction].

[118] Abu Muhammad Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wilu Muhtalaf al-Hadith*, Beirut 1993, p. 83.

[119] See: Abu Abdillah al-Bukhari, *Supporting the Divine Kalam in the light of Hadith al-Sharif (Halku Ef'ali al-Ibad)*, trs. Yusuf Özbek, İstanbul 1992, p. 24.

[120] For more information about Bishr al-Marisi and his ideas, see Ahmed Sâim Kılavuz, "Bishr ibn Gıyâs", *DİA*, VI, p. 220-221.

[121] Watt, *Formation Period of Islamic Ideology*, p. 182-183.

specific sub-sect. Abu Bakr al-Humaydi (d. 219/834), the master of al-Bukhari, stated "We say 'Allah resided in the skies'. Whoever says anything other than this about the divine residence would be Jahmi",[122] while Ibn Taymiyya said "The issue of Mihna in Halifa Ma'mun era was an instigation of Jahmiyya"[123], which confirms that Jahmiyya actually meant the people opposing Ahl al-Hadith.

It should be noted again that Salafiyyah's rejection of the ta'wil of the religious works on the divine names and titles was not an absolute rejection. However, certain scholars such as Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) stated that Ibn Hanbal referred to the apparent meanings of the religious works and supported the idea that the practice of ta'wil should not performed on cognates.[124] However, this is not correct because scholars like Bayhaki (d. 458/1066) and Ibn Taymiyyah stated that Ibn Hanbal only rejected the ta'wil of Jahmiyya and Mu'tazila[125], which is the correct aspect of the issue. The fact that *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah wa'z-Zanadikah* was written to reject the sub-sects which neglected the explanations of the Prophet and randomly interpreted the Quran without paying attention to the connections between the verses, which clarifies the anti-ta'wil approach of Ibn Hanbal.[126] Moreover, Ibn Hanbal stated that certain verses in the Quran had metaphors, and he added as a response to the claim of Zanadiqa that an-Nisa 4/56 has contradiction[127] that the Quran has amm, khas and many terms with multiple meanings, and the real meanings in these terms can only be found by the authorities of Islamic science.[128]

Imam Ghazali, who stated in *Faysal at-Tafrika* "According to what I heard from the Hanbali authorities in Baghdad", mentioned that Ibn Hanbal performed the process of ta'wil on three hadiths: "Hajar al-Aswad is the right hand of Allah on the earth", "Muslims' hearts are between the two fingers of Allah", "I can feel the breath of Allah around Yemen".[129] In addition, Ibn Hanbal performed the same

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[122] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 5-6.

[123] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Nakz al-Mantiq*, p. 20.

[124] Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, *Ihyau Ulum ad-Din*, Beirut 1982, I, 103-104.

[125] See: Bayhaqi, *Kitab al-Asma' wa's-Sifat*, Beirut 1984, p. 304; Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 131.

[126] Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Ahmad ibn Hanbal", *DİA*, II, 83.

[127] According to what Ibn Hanbal conveyed, Zanadiqa's claim of contradiction in An-Nisa 4/56 with the meaning "Indeed, those who disbelieve in Our verses - We will drive them into a Fire. Every time their skins are roasted through We will replace them with other skins so they may taste punishment. Indeed, Allah is ever Exalted in Might and Wisdom." is as follows: "How come will Allah replace the sinful skins of the non-believers with other skins? We can only understand the following from this verse: The divine statement *baddalnahum juludan ghayraha* meant the skins that committed no sins will be tortured". Ibn Hanbal, *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 60.

[128] Ibn Hanbal, *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 60.

[129] Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, *Faisal at-Tafrika*, edit. Mahmûd Bîcû, y., 1993, p. 41-43. Ibn Taymiyyah stated the following in regard to the narrative conveyed by Ghazzali: "Regarding the information on the ta'wil of three hadiths Ghazzali conveyed from the Hanbali followers, this story was made up in the name of Ibn Hanbal. Because nobody narrated anything like that from Ibn Hanbal, and it is unknown whether there is anybody who conveyed such narrative from his ashab. Hanbali, who was

toward the khabari titles in certain verses. For example, he understood and interpreted the concept of "maiyyah (unity)" from a metaphorical aspect in the verses reflecting that Allah is with the prophets in particular and Muslims in general, and he assigned meanings such as the divine help, divine knowledge or observance to the concept in question.[130] On the other hand, Ibn Qasir (d. 774/1373), a Salafi tafsir authority, narrated that Ibn Hanbal read these two couplets in the tafsir of the concept of maiyyah in al-Hadid 57/4:

"Even if you spend all of your life alone, do not say

"I was alone";

Instead, say, "There has always been an observer for me."

Do not think that Allah does not observe you even for a moment.

Do not consider what you hid as hidden."[131]

Regarding certain verses that were related to the metaphysical world and thus impossible to know what they mean, Ibn Hanbal performed interpretation in a sense to neglect the secondary meanings. For example, he made the following statement against the objections of the non-believers who stated that there was a contradiction about the time intervals such as a thousand or fifty thousand years in al-Haj 22/47, al-Sajdah 32/5 and al-Ma'arij 70/4:

"The intention in expressing a thousand years in al-Haj 22/47 is the days when Allah created the skies and earth, each of which is like a thousand years. The meaning of a thousand years in al-Sajdah 32/5 is as follows: Djibril descended upon the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) in a thousand years and rises to the sky once again. Descendance from the sky to earth indicates five hundred years while rising to sky means another five hundred years. The total is a thousand years. Regarding the fifty thousand years mentioned in al-Ma'arij 70/4, Allah orders the following: If anyone other than Allah would undertake the responsibility of settling the accounts of servants, that would take fifty thousand years. However, Allah can do it as quickly as half of a mortal day."[132]

As evidences indicate, Ibn Hanbal performs the action of ta'wil here, and he ridicules the eternal world while doing so. It is clear that Ibn Hanbal's anti-ta'wil ideology has a limited meaning with the ta'wil of Jahmiyya, and regarded as equal to Zanadiqa, which can be understood from the name and content of the work rather than the absolute context of ta'wil. On the other hand, although there is a general belief that Ibn Hanbal strictly followed the religious works and thus

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referred by Ghazzali, is an unknown person whose statements are also unknown in regard to being a correct information source". Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, V, 197.

[130] Ibn Hanbal, *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyya*, p. 92-93, 158-159.

[131] Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an*, IV, 304.

[132] Ibn Hanbal, *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah*, p. 70-71.

rejected the kalam method, it is known that he discussed with the Mu'tazila members and used evidence that can be regarded as kalami. Moreover, in *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyya wa'z-Zanadiqa*, he used the method of "researching the possibilities" that has often been used in kalam discipline. In addition, although Ibn Hanbal considered discussing the issues which were not explained by the Prophet and ashab as innovation, it seems that he abandoned this principle due to certain incidents he personally experienced. Regarding the Halq al-Quran issue, which was one of the most significant discussion issues in his era, he adopted the idea that the Quran is not a creature, which was not clearly included in Quran and Sunnah, which is a clear example in this regard.[133]

The statement that Ibn Hanbal opposed the ta'wil of Jahmiyya rather than the concept of ta'wil is also valid for Abu Said Osman ibn Said ad-Darimi (d. 280/894), an early period Salafiyyah follower. In addition, it was noted that Ibn Taymiyyah opposed the ta'wil of Jahmiyyah in the works of Hanbal and other great Salafiyyah scholars, who certainly included ad-Darimi.[134] Ad-Darimi stated in *ar-Rad ala al-Jahmiyyah* and *ar-Rad ala al-Marisi* that khabari titles should be associated with Allah without performing ta'wil. According to this belief, ta'wil is not the method of avoiding comparison. In addition, according to ad-Darimi, ta'wil of Jahmiyya followers who are certainly non-believers according to the indicators in the Quran and Sunnah, and who should be asked to forswear and be killed if they do not do so[135] is nothing but sacrilege in regard to religious works. For example, considering the concept of "yad" that is associated with Allah in the Quran as "blessing", "wajh" as "favor, beneficence, virtue", and Allah's descending upon the earth as "the revelation of divine orders and mercy" is under this context. Darimi: "If the meaning of 'blessing' is assigned to the concept of "yad", the question 'Did Allah create Adam with two blessings?" should be asked in regard to Sad 38/75. According to ad-Darimi, the question "Are only two blessings, among many, of Allah are open or broad?" in regard to the verse "Allah's both hands are open".[136] When the terms such as blessing or livelihood are associated with the concept of yad, the verse reflecting that the whole universe will be in Allah's hands on judgment day (Zumar 39/67) should be assigned the following strange meaning: "The whole universe will be the living source of Allah that day, and the skies will be in a rolled position in Allah's living source".[137]

According to ad-Darimi, these are the interpretations that have no imputation and that totally mean sacrilege. Allah has hands, face, eyes, feet and fingers in reality. Moreover, Allah is not an eternal and limitless creature that cannot be

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[133] Ferhat Koca, *İslâm Hukuk Tarihinde Selefî Söylem*, Ankara 2002, p. 46.

[134] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 131.

[135] Abu Said Osman ibn Said ad-Darimi, *ar-Rad al al-Jahmiyyah*, Kuwait 1985, p. 171-182.

[136] Abu Said Osman ibn Said ad-Darimi, *Nakzu Usman ibn Said ala al-Marisi (ar-Rad ala al-Marisi)*, edit. Mansur ibn Abd al-aziz as-Simari, Riyadh 1999, p. 122.

[137] Darimi, *Nakzu Usman ibn Said ala al-Marisi*, p. 73, 90.

sensed through senses as claimed by Jahmiyya; instead, it is a limited creature that can be understood with the senses because the Quran indicates that Allah talked to Moses without any messengers and that Allah will talk to Muslims who will see Allah in the eternal world (Nisa 4/164; Ali 'Imran 3/77; Al-Kiyamah 75/22). Regardless of the conditions, "seeing" and "talking" is the clearest manner of comprehending a subject or object with senses. The creature that cannot be realized with senses exists not physically but spiritually in the intelligence, which does not reflect a physically-existent creature. However, Allah orders that everything will be destroyed except His Face (al-Qasas 28/88). This indicates that he is also present physically. Anything that exists physically should have a border and certain titles according to intelligence. The verses which indicate that Allah is in the skies, is able to mortify or stone humans, and all elegant words reach to Allah (at-Taha 20/5, al-Mulk 67/16-17; al-Fatir 35/10), and the hadiths suggesting that Allah is in the sky is the evidence that suggests the divine presence has borders.[138]

Ad-Darimi, who mentioned these statements under the titles such as "Bounds and Skies", "Ayniyyah wa'l-Makan", expressed the following strange statements in regard to Allah's residence in sky: "Except erratic Marisi and his followers, Muslims and non-believers agreed upon the belief that Allah resides in the sky and they assigned such a border to Allah. Even the children who are not old enough to be held responsible for their actions knew Allah as so. When children are in trouble, they raise their hands to Allah and pray to Allah believing that Allah is in the sky, not anywhere else. Everybody knows Allah and where Allah is better than Jahmiyya."[139]

Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855), Ibn Abi Shaybah (d. 235/849) and Abu Ubaid Qasim ibn Sallam (d. 224/838), was severely criticized by certain scholars such as Muhammad Zahid al-Qawsari (d. 1952) because he determined a boundary and direction to Allah stating that Allah has limitations, and he was even thought to have accepted Allah as an object.[140] Although ad-Darimi repeated the "bilaqaif" principle of Salaf while stating that Allah does not look like creatures while determining the borders and limits for Allah, it is fair to state that this contradicts with the idea that a title that is not found as a wording in the religious works cannot be assigned to Allah.[141] It should be noted that ad-Darimi used constrained ta'wils to justify his own ideas. For example, Bishr al-Marisi interpreted the phrase of *fa-innaka bi-a'yunina* in at-Tur 52/48 as "You are under our protection and surveillance" as a dedication to Ibn Abbas. Accordingly, ad-Darimi claimed that the statement of Ibn Abbas justified himself, not Marisi, in regards to the statement

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[138] Ad-Darimi, *Nakzu Usman ibn Said ala al-Marisi*, p. 57-59, 274-280.

[139] Darimi, *Nakzu Usman ibn Said ala al-Marisi*, p. 62.

[140] Muhammad Zahid al-Qawsari, *Makalah*, Humus 1388, p. 354-371.

[141] Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Ad-Darimi, Osman ibn Said", *DİA*, VIII, 497.

"Defining anybody under the context of protection and surveillance can be possible for those who have eyes."[142]

The evidence that the anti-ta'wil concept of Salafism meant the anti-Murji'ah and Mu'tazila movement under the name of Jahmiyya, is positioned upon a truer and more concrete basis with the attitude of Ibn Taymiyyah regarding the metaphors. Ibn Taymiyyah, who opposed metaphors, stating that the differentiation between the literal and metaphorical meaning in Arabic was not present in the early periods, but created by certain sub-sects like Mu'tazila after the Hijri third century. He suggested that the Salaf ulama do not mention about the differentiation between the literal meanings and metaphors,[143] and considered no risk in using ra'y and jurisprudence in his fatwas. This indicates that Ibn Taymiyyah's anti-ta'wil and metaphor approach was ideological. The following passage justifies this evaluation:

"The Interpretation method based on Ra'y and language is specific to ahl al-bidat. Therefore, Ibn Hanbal stated "People made the most mistakes in ta'wil and comparison issue." In addition, innovative sub-sects such as Murji'ah, Rafizah and others explained the Quran in regards to their subjective beliefs and linguistic ta'wils they formed, and they neglected what the sahabah, tabi'un and great Islamic ulama stated. Moreover, these sub-sects did not accept Sunnah, the practices of Salaf or the ideas conveyed from them as a basis. These sub-sects only use the data of intelligence and language. They also disregard the narrative tafsirs, Hadiths and Salaf's words, and they used the kalam books formed by the leaders of Arabic language and literature and the pioneers of their own movements. This is an interpretation method also adopted by the deviant people because they use the philosophical, linguistic and literary books and totally ignore tafsir, hadiths and narratives. They neglect the religious works on the prophets because these works have no scientific value for them. To sum up, they interpret the Quran in accordance to their beliefs. They ignore the statements of the Prophet and ashab in these actions."[144]

These statements indicate that Ibn Taymiyyah did not absolutely oppose ra'y, opinions, deduction, ta'wil and metaphors. Instead, he used these when needed. He opposed to the afore-mentioned concepts which belonged to the "others". Therefore, tafsir, ta'wil and the deductions of Ahl al-Hadith and/or Salafi-Hanbali scholars are correct, but the tafsir and ta'wils of the others such as the sub-sects of Jahmiyya, Mu'tazila and Murji'ah are generally superstitious, or at least invalid and false. The interpretations of Ahl al-Hadith should be named as "tafsir" as a statement of differentiation between the truth and superstition, or authenticity and

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[142] Darimi, *Nakzu Usman ibn Said ala al-Marisi*, p. 537.

[143] Taqi ad-din Ibn Taymiyyah, *Kitab al-Iman*, Beirut 1983, p. 79-80.

[144] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Kitab al-Iman*, p. 107.

falseness, but the interpretations of the others should be named as "ta'wil" in regard to falsification, which is performed by Ibn Taymiyyah.

Ibn Qasir had the same approach with his master Ibn Taymiyyah in rejecting ta'wil and metaphors but using metaphoric ta'wils when needed. To be clearer, Ibn Qasir stated that no ta'wil action should be performed for the tafsir of the verses on Allah's khabari and actual titles (mutashabih as-sifat) and the verse on the divine residence in the sky (al-A'raf 7/54), and ideas of Salaf scholars such as Maliq, Awzai Sawri, Lais ibn Sa'd, Shafi'i, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ishaq ibn Rahawayh who rejected comparison and denying of Allah's titles. He adopted the ta'wil approach of following Ahl al-Sunnah kalam authorities regarding the khabari titles, and he interpreted the phrase of "two hands" in al-Maidah 5/64 as the "abundance of divine blessing and beneficence". [145]

The Tafsir Value of Ishari-Sufi Interpretation

Various concepts and terms such as indication, reputation, fact, latifah and secrets were used to reflect the Sufis' ideas and comments on verses, and the concept of ishari tafsir has been commonly used recently, and in the latest periods. The authors believe that the concept of ishari tafsir is problematic in terms of both meaning and use. The relevant concepts and terms are used carelessly as the concepts of "ra'y tafsir" or "tafsir with ra'y". In other words, Zurkani reviewed the comments of Sufis towards the Quran under the "ishari tafsir" (*at-tafsirat al-ishari*) title in Manahil al-Irfan but he the defined this interpretation style as "Performing ta'wil differently from the apparent meaning in the Quran while providing the intended aspects and enabling compilation due to the secret indication seen by the Suluq and Sufism members" (*huwa ta'wil al-qur'ani bi-ghayri zahirihi li-isharatin hafiyyatin tazharu li-arbab as-suluki wa't-tasawuf wa yumkin al-jam'u baynaha wa bayna az-zahiri al-muradi ayzan*).[146] This definition indicates that "ishari tafsir" is actually ta'wil instead of being tafsir. Therefore, Zurkani kept on using the definition of "ishari tafsir", and he even regarded the extreme comments of Batinis as *tafsir al-batiniyyat al-malahidati*. While performing this evaluation, he mentioned the following remark referring the classic Ulum al-Qur'an sources: "It was stated that Sufis' ideas and comments on the Quran were not tafsir".[147]

These kind of careless actions in the use of terms and concepts can also be seen in the works of other contemporary authors. For example, Zahabi conceptualized Sufis' Quran interpretations as "tafsir as-Sufiyyah", and he used the phrase "at-tafsir as-sufi an-nazari" (nazari Sufi tafsir) regarding the reckless interpretations of wahdad al-vujud partisans such as Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi (d. 638/1240) and Abd

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[145] Ibn Qasir, *Tafsir al-Qur'an*, II, 75, 220, 499; Mustafa Öztürk, "Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim", *DİA*, XL, 296.

[146] Zurkani, *Manahih al-Irfan*, II, 78.

[147] Zurkani, *Manahih al-Irfan*, II, 79.

ar-razzak al-Qashani (d. 736/1335).[148] Many Quran and tafsir researchers in Turkey repeated these concepts, which must have arisen from the statement "galat al-meshur is better than lugat al-fash". However, the ulama of the past were meticulous in selecting concepts and terms. For example, Zarkashi (d. 794/1392) said "It is stated that Sufis' statements as Quran tafsir are actually not tafsir. These statements must be the spiritual facts and trance/wajd states realized and experienced by the Sufis while reading and listening to the Quran".[149] Al-Suyuti stated (d. 911/1505) in a truer and more careful manner "Sufis' ideas and interpretations on the Quran are not tafsir" (wa-amma kalam as-sufiyyati fi al-Qur'an fa-laysa bi-tafsir).[150]

As the concepts of hakaik, lataif and kashf indicate, Sufis' interpretations of thet Quran have characteristics that are different to those of the tafsir. The authors are of the opinion that the most convenient qualification regarding these interpretations is "tasawwuf al-irfani ta'wil".[151] Ta'wil of Sufis is the result of the wisdom-based ideology and comparison that are under the context of "i'tibar". The concept of i'tibar that was formed from the bases of *abr/ubur*, which meant "to pass, advance" in Arabic, means understanding an element by considering the characteristics of a similar concept to obtain a result by performing an intellectual transition between two elements in the terminology of logic.[152] Sufis used i'tibar as a wisdom-based comparison, and therefore the possibility of transition from the apparent meaning, as seen in the statement "Similar concepts reflect one another" and/or "Similar concepts recall one another", to batin (deep meaning).

According to the wisdom-based epistemology, in addition to the apparent/clear (zahr) meanings of the words, wordings and sentences in the Quran, there are deep meanings that expand by the degree of the competency of Sufis. Achieving these deep meanings requires open information sources such as discovery and inspiration in addition to the accumulation of knowledge, consideration ability and moral maturity. The verses suggesting reading the Quran with consideration and tadabbur among the legitimate evidences regarding the indicators and/or deep meanings of Sufis are significant. Abu Nasr as-Sarraj (d. 378/988) said in regard to al-Muhammad 47/24: "Allah is in contact with the Prophet and enables the people who purify themselves and practice with what they know to be informed about a discipline they do not know. This is the discipline of semiotics".[153] Among the legitimacy-related evidences of Sufi interpretations, the narratives indicating that

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[148] Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassiru*n, II, 236-241.

[149] Zarkashi, *al-Burkhan*, II, 170.

[150] Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 1218.

[151] For the conceptualization of wisdom-based ta'wil, see Mustafa Öztürk, *Studies of Tafsir History*, Ankara 2011, p. 57-61; Muhammed Âbid el-Câbirî, *Arap-İslâm Kültürünün Akıl Yapısı*, trans. Burhan Köroğlu et al., İstanbul 1999, p. 353-406.

[152] For the concept of I'tibar (reputation), see Tahanawi, *Kashshafu Istilahat al-Funun*, Beirut 1996, I, 227; Abu al-Baka al-Kafawi, *al-Kulliyyah*, Beirut 1993, p. 147-148.

[153] Abu Nasr as-Sarraj, *al-Luma'*, Cairo 1960, p. 147-148.

the Quran has four different meaning dimensions which are zahr, batn, had and matla/muttalah are significant.[154]

According to many sources, Abu al Hasan al-Wahidi (d. 468/1076) criticized *Hakikat at-Tafsir* by the well-known Sufi Abu Abd ar-rahman as-Suleimi (d. 402/1021) as "If Suleimi believes that this work is under the context of tafsir, he has performed sacrilege" because Suleimi compiled different ideas and interpretations of Sufism followers on the verses in the work entitled "Tafsir Facts", majority of which are Sufi aphorisms. Regarding the ishari-deep meanings, which emerge in the spiritual worlds of the Sufism followers and which are achieved through i'tibar, as "tafsir" means making false statements about the meanings and purposes in Allah's verses or blemishing Allah's statements. In addition, calling Sufism followers' aphorism-based interpretations as tafsir has the same meaning with "What Allah aimed to reflect is the meaning, is the interpretation of this orthat Sufi", which means making false statements about the Quran and taking a step toward sacrilege.

Wahidi's perception towards the nature of the Quran tafsir is in parallel with the ideology of the Ahl al-Hadith in regards to the commitment to the apparent meaning of wordings, particularly with emphasis on the sahabah and Salaf ulama.[155] Ibn as-Salah (d. 643/1245), who is one of the compiler of a basic Sunni hadith work, has the same ideology with Wahidi in this regard, which supports this evidence. Ibn as-Salah states the following after mentioning the criticism of Wahidi: "To me, a reliable Sufi can perform interpretation [similar to those mentioned in the work of Sulaimi] but if he does not state that these are tafsir and adopt this interpretation style as a method of explaining a word in the Quran, he would not be a non-believer. If he did so, he would have adopted the ta'wil style of Batinis. Sufis' interpretations in regards to having concepts consist of the expression the meanings/mafhum in Quran with their similar aspects/concepts. Because similar concepts reflect one another, and/or similar concepts recall one another. This is how Sufism followers understood at-Tawbah 9/123 "O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous" as 'We were held responsible for fighting against our essences and thus the non-believers around us'. However, one would wish that Sufis would not have acted as gently in the interpretations. Because these interpretations cause misunderstandings and confusions."[156]

As it is clear, Ibn as-Salah agrees with Wahidi on the issue of what is tafsir and

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[154] Suyuti, *Ta'yid al-Hakikat al-Aliyyah*, Aleppo 2002, p. 17; Id, *al-Itkan*, II, 1219-1221.

[155] Despite the emphasis on narration and Salaf in tafsir, Wahidi was particularly criticized by Salafism scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, which may sound strange at first. However, considering the fact that Muqatil ibn Suleiman was used as the basic tafsir source by Salabi, who was also used as so by Wahidi, it is understood that this is a paradigmatic criticism, rather than being particular to individuals.

[156] Ibn as-Salah, *Fatawa wa Masailu Ibn as-Salah*, Beirut 1986, II, 196-197.

how it should be. To be clearer, Ibn as-Salah states that Sufis' Quran interpretations are not tafsir, but, as opposed to Wahidi, he noted that these interpretations should be evaluated more moderately and in a more tolerant manner. This approach of Ibn as-Salah can be regarded as the effort to form a legitimate basis for Sufi interpretation tradition within the Sunni-kalami paradigm. This approach is actually a part and reflection of the efforts of Qalabazi (d. 380/990), Qushayri (d. 465/1072) and Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) to add Sufism to the context of Ahl al-Sunnah with the consecutive efforts and to remove the connection between Shia wisdom and Sufism. As known to all, Qalabazi adapted Sufism to the theological approach of Ahl al-Sunnah in *at-Ta'arruf*, Qushayri defined the basics and concepts of Sufism *ar-Risala* in accordance with the same theological approach, and Ghazzali banished the anti-truth-shariah approach in *Ihya al-Ulum ad-Din* and ensured an agreement between Sufism and fiqh in a paradigmatic sense. As a result of these efforts, the Sufis' Quran interpretations are not included in the category of tafsir, and a total rejection-based approach is not adopted. On the contrary, these are regarded as a wisdom-based variety and richness in the Quran interpretations. However, interpretations of Sufis such as Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi, Abd ar-razzak al-Qashani were regarded as rejected in deep ta'wil category by many sub-sects, particularly the extremist Shia sub-sects such as Ismailiyya and Qarmatiyya.

The categorical differentiation between the appropriate ishari interpretations and rejected deep ta'wil was justified by Taftazani (d. 793/1390) as follows: "The people with rejectionist approach were named as Batini. Because they claimed that the apparent meanings of religious works are regarded as nullified, and only Muallim (Imam) knows a couple of deep, hidden meanings. The main purpose of their claims is to totally abrogate shariah. However, certain people with true Islamic knowledge adopted the idea that religious works are to be interpreted in accordance with the apparent meanings, but they also accepted the presence of certain hidden indicators that are toward the suluq individuals and understood the apparent meanings."[157]

Certain researchers in the contemporary era mentioned certain conditions regarding the acceptability of ishari interpretation. Accordingly, ishari interpretation should not oppose the apparent meaning of the Qur'an, the claim that the essential purpose is to reflect deep-ishari meaning/interpretation should not be proposed, a canon and intelligence-based opponent should not be present, and a canon witness supporting ishari interpretation should be present.[158] These conditions serve to adapt Sufi-ishari interpretation style to Sunni statement system in a controlled manner, and totally abandon and exclude the Batinism-based ta'wil style. Due to the different inclinations in Sufism tradition, more specific differentiations were made regarding the appropriateness and inconvenience of

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[157] Suyuti, *al-Itkan*, II, 405.

[158] Süleyman Ateş, *İşârî Tefsir Okulu*, Ankara, p. 21.

ishari interpretations. According to the author, the ishari interpretations that do not contradict with the apparent meanings of the Quran and general canon and theological principles of the Quran were categorized as "appropriate ishari tafsir", while the interpretations that do not suit the interpretations were categorized as "speculative Sufi tafsir". In other words, Sufis' Quran interpretations were divided into two as fayzi-ishari sufi tafsir and speculative sufi tafsir in regard to the practice-speculation based Sufi differentiation. Therefore, a definite border was to be drawn to the ishari interpretation in terms of appropriateness and inconvenience. According to the evaluation of M. Husein Zahabi, ishari Sufi tafsir (interpretation) is appropriate with the idea that it is based on Sufis' spiritual asceticism. The speculative Sufi tafsir is inconvenient due to the belief that it is based on the arbitrary ideas and speculations of Sufis or philosophers. For example, the ishari interpretations in Tustari and Sulaimi's works are generally acceptable. However, many interpretations of Sufis such as Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi and Abd ar-razzak al-Khashani, who were rather interested in Sufism philosophy, are not acceptable.[159]

The conditions and categorical differentiations regarding the Sufi-ishari interpretations were mostly performed by Ibn Taymiyyah. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, who answered the question of whether the ishari interpretation "The Quran has apparent and hidden meanings" -a statement among the most basic legitimacy evidences of ishari interpretation- in the paper on deep and apparent meanings in the Quran (*Risala fi Ilm al-Batin wa'z-Zahir*) is a hadith, and whether Wahidi's criticism toward Sulaimi's *Hakaik at-Tafsir* was true, the belief that "the Quran has apparent and hidden meanings" is a false hadith conveyed by no-one from the Islamic ideology. Such a narrative is not included in hadith books. However, the following mawquf or mursal statement was narrated from Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728): "Each verse has an apparent, a hidden meaning and a matla/muttalah." For the concepts such as apparent and hidden meanings, scholars of apparent and hidden meanings became common for many people, but the context of these concepts included not only true concepts but also the wrong elements.[160] If the purpose in the studies of hidden meanings is a type of science that has been hidden from the majority or a certain group of people, then either the hidden meanings against the apparent meanings or the hidden meanings that do not contradict with the apparent meanings can be suggested.[161] The first of these is superstitions. Whoever claims that they have knowledge of hidden meanings that contradict the apparent meanings, or of such a hidden meaning would make a great mistake. Those who make such a claim are rejectionist-nonbeliever or ignorant people who have lost the correct path.

The deep meanings that do not contradict with the apparent meanings are at the

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[159] Zahabi, *at-Tafsir wa'l-Mufassirun*, II, 241-246; Ateş, *Ishari Tafsir Movement*, p. 19-21.

[160] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 124-125.

[161] İbn Teymiyye, Mecmûu'l-Fetâvâ, XIII, 126-127.

degree of presenting ideas in accordance with apparent meanings. These ideas can be true or false. Hidden meanings are regarded as correct as long as they do not contradict the apparent meanings, and are not known as false in relation to the apparent meanings. It would be rejected if it is known as superstitious. If hidden meanings are known as neither correct nor wrong, neither a positive nor negative statement is made. The example of hidden meaning that is against the apparent meaning accepted by many people can be found in the claims made by Batini Qarmatis, Nusairis and similar movements, and the philosophers, fanatic Sufis and kalam authorities. The most malevolent one of these movements is Qarmatis. They mention that the Quran and Islam has a hidden meaning that is against the apparent meaning, and they make claims similar to the following: "The prayer that is obligatory is not a canon prayer or such prayer is obligatory for the ordinary people. Regarding the chosen ones, their prayers consist of knowing our secrets. Fasting does not reveal our secrets. Pilgrimage is a voyage performed to visit our esteemed masters." They state that the jannah of the selected people is to benefit from the pleasures in this world, while the jahannam is to follow the orders of shariah and severe canon obligations. According to their claims, Dabbat a-Arz will emerge from the earth upon Allah's order, scholars who talk with Islamic science anytime and anywhere, Israfil that will blow the trumpet, the scholar who reflect science to the essences for reviving, the active intelligence used by the creatures (mawjudah) in their moves, "Kalam", the first intelligence regarded as the first creator by the philosophers, the stars, moon and sun seen by Ibrahim; nafs, intelligence and obligatory creature; four rivers seen by the Prophet during miraj, four basic elements (anasir ar-arbaah); and the prophets seen by the Prophet in the sky are the planets. Accordingly, Adam is the moon, Yusuf is the star, and Idris is the sun.

The inconvenient batini ta'wils can be found in the ideas of many Sufi and kalam authorities. But these two groups are different than Batinis. In other words, the apparent meaning for Batinis is Rafisism, while the hidden meaning is pure sacrilege. However, most of the Sufis and kalam authorities are not Rafizi. They accuse the sahabah members of committing great sins but do not regard them as non-believers. Shia-Rafizi Batinis regard the Imam in the verse "all things We have enumerated in a clear register." (Surah Ya-sin 36/12) as Ali (r.a.), regarded Abu Lahab in the verse "May the hands of Abu Lahab be ruined, and ruined is he!" (Surah al-Masad/Lahab 111/1) as Abu Bakr and 'Umar (r.a.) Ömer; regarded the people in the verse "...then fight the leaders of disbelief" (at-Tawbah 9/12) as Talha and Zubair; regarded the accursed tree in the verse "Accursed tree in Quran" (al-Isra 17/60) as Umayyah people (Umayyad). Sufi Batinis regarded the pharaoh in the verse "Go to Pharaoh" (an-Naziat 79/17) as qalp, regarded the "baqara" in the verse "Indeed, Allah commands you to slaughter a cow" (Bakara 2/67) as the essence, while Shia Batinis claim that this symbolizes Aisha (r.a.). Moreover, Sufi Batinis and philosophers explain the conversation between Moses and Allah as the wisdom that has been transmitted to him through the active intelligence or another element

that guided him. They also regard "Indeed, I am your Lord, so remove your sandals" (at-Taha 20/12) as abandoning the mortal and eternal world. They interpret the tree Moses talked to, the divine valley where he was addressed by Allah and similar statements as the states emerging in qalp while exploration and inspiration took place. The author of *Mishkat al-Anwar* (Ghazzali) and those with similar ideologies are among the people who adopted this interpretation method.

The philosopher Batinis regards the angels and demons as "forces of the essence". According to them, the statements regarding the things promised to people in the eternal world are symbolic statements proposed to reflect pleasure and sorrow, the essence will be experienced after death, and these statements do not correspond with the elements of an independent presence. Many statements from the Sufis have been reflected from the following periods. However, their statements were not conveyed from their own Salafs or Sufism pioneers. In addition, contrary to their salaf and science leaders, many relevant statements were made by the late kalam authorities.[162]

Sufis in the following period believe that the Islam ummah are more knowledgeable and competent than the salaf scholars despite their malevolent and ignorant actions. In addition, they raised their claims to the level of uniting existence [vahdet-i vücûd]. Just like Ibn al-Arabi, the author of *Fusus al-Hiqam,* and those with similar approaches did. On the other hand, Sufis of this latest period claim that they know Allah better than the prophets and that prophets benefited from their knowledge in marifatullah. They interpret the Quran in accordance with the superstitious generations. For example, they regard the verse "Because of their sins they were drowned." (Surah Nuh 71/25) as "they were drowned in the marifatullah sea" and claim that the term, azap (wrath), arose from the base "azb" meaning sweetness. They state that Noah's statement on his own nation meant praising with a critical style. They also interpret the verse "Indeed, those who disbelieve - it is all the same for them whether you warn them or do not warn them - they will not believe." (al-Baqarah 2/6) as "They do not believe with the apparent science" and they regard the verse "Allah has set a seal upon their hearts" (al-Baqarah 2/7) as "They do not know anything other than Allah".[163]

Ibn Taymiyyah assessed batini and ishari ta'wils under two categories. The first is the erroneous ta'wils at evidence and madlul level, and the second is the erroneous ta'wil based on evidences. The meaning proposed with ta'wil capacity in the first category is indeed superstitious. Therefore, its evidence is superstitious, too. Presenting evidence that would necessitate the correctness of superstitions is not the case here. This type of ta'wils is specific to Shia, Sufi and philosophical Batinism. The meaning of the ta'wil in the second category is essentially correct . These ta'wils belong to Sufis. However, Sufis use certain wordings to reflect a

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[162] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 127-128.

[163] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 128-129.

meaning that is the Quran and hadiths but indicate a different context to form a basis for the meaning they formed, and they name the meanings in this regard as the indicators (isharat).[50] It is possible to find many examples related to these interpretations in *Hakaik at-Tafsir* by Abu Abd ar-rahman. The superstitious interpretations and meanings can be easily found in the ideas of Qarmatis and philosophers who oppose to Muslims in regards to the basic principles of Islam. Those who know the salaf scholars of the first period are aware of the fact that all ideas advocated by these groups contradicted with Salaf ideology and were superstitious. Whoever accepts that prayer is obligatory for any people with a sound mind would understand that those who interpret the religious work on prayer as "Certain people are exempt from prayer" clearly lie.

The correct Sufi/ishari interpretations and meanings can be true with the Quran and indirect Sunnah indication. However, there are two cases regarding the position of wording that indicated the ishari meaning. The first is making the following claim: "This ishari meaning was meant in the wording". Such a claim means besmirching Allah. Whoever claims that the term of "baqara (cow)" in "Indeed, Allah commands you to slaughter a cow" (al-Baqarah 2/67) meant essence, the term of pharaoh in the verse "Go to Pharaoh" (an-Naziat 79/17) meant qalb, Abu Baqr was meant in the verse "and those with him are forceful against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves." (al-Fath 48/29), 'Umar (r.a.) was meant in the verse "and those with him are forceful against the disbelievers", Osman (r.a.) was meant in the verse "merciful among themselves", and Ali (r.a.) was meant in the verse "You see them bowing and prostrating [in prayer]", they would have lied in the name of Allah deliberately or accidentally.

It is possible that the meaning proposed in the Sufi interpretation has i'tibar and comparison characteristics, which is named as "comparison" by the scholars of fiqh and "indication" by the Sufis. I'tibar is divided into two as true and superstitious. Whoever hears the verse "None touch it, except the purified." (al-Vaqi'ah 56/79), state what was mentioned in this verse is Lawh al-Mahfuz or Quran, and produce a comparison as "the Quran's meanings and messages can only be grasped by those with pure hearts just like those who can touch the Lawh al-Mahfuz where Quran letters are written", this becomes a true meaning and i'tibar. In addition, similar views were conveyed from Salaf scholars. Similarly, considering the hadith "Angels do not visit the houses where there is a dog or a junub individual"[164], the following would be an appropriate comparison: "As long as a person has habits that would foul the essence such as pride and jealousy, that person cannot grasp the truth of faith". In this regard, Allah ordered as follows: "Those are the ones for whom Allah does not intend to purify their hearts." (al-Ma'idah 5/41), "I will turn away from My signs those who are arrogant upon the earth without right. and if they should see every sign, they will not believe in it. And if they see the way of consciousness, they will not adopt it as a way; but if they see the

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[164] al-Bukhari, *as-Sahih*, "Maghazi", 12; "Libas", 88; "Taharat", 89; at-Tirmidhi, *as-Sunan*, "Edeb", 44; Nasai, *as-Sunan*, "Taharat", 167.

way of error, they will adopt it as a way. That is because they have denied Our signs and they were heedless of them." (al-A'raf 7/146).[165]

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, every meaning and interpretation that contradicts with the Quran and Sunnah are superstitious and have no truth value. It is wrong to interpret a statement, which suits the Quran and Sunnah but has a different meaning in the manner of addressing, differently than its essential meanings. Even if it is stated that this is a meaning formed through i'tibar and comparison, it is wrong. Because such a meaning can be true or superstitious. To sum up, those who interpret and perform the action of ta'wil on the religious works of the Quran and/or Sunnah differently than the sahabah and tabi'un would besmirch Allah, adopt a rejectionist approach and distort the facts, which is nothing but disbelieving and opening the doors of rejectionism. It is unquestionable that this is not Islamic.[166]

The categorical differentiation of Ibn Taymiyyah in regards to hidden and Sufi ta'wil as "those who make mistakes in both evidence and meanings" and "those who make mistakes in evidence rather than meanings" is related to the strict border between the ishari-Sufi ta'wil and philosophical-kalami ta'wil. The kalam authorities such as Jahmiyya, Mu'tazila and Murji'ah represent kalami ta'wil while the Shia Batinis and Sufis such as Ibn al-Arabi represent philosophical Batini ta'wil. Regarding the Sunni Sufis evaluated in the second group "those who make mistakes in evidences rather than meanings", these Sufis correspond to the representatives of Sufi-Ishari ta'wil.[167] In conclusion, Ibn Taymiyyah and the Salafi ideology played a key role in assigning and determining the criteria of appropriateness and inconvenience regarding the ishari interpretation. Considering the fact that Salafism is the developed and systematized form of Ahl al-Hadith movement, it is fair to state that the paradigm determining whether the Sufi interpretations are true or not, is basically an Ahl al-Hadith paradigm.

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[165] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 129-130. A similar approach was adopted by Abu Ishaq ash-Shatibi (d. 790/1388). According to Shatibi, apparent meanings indicate a linguistical understanding within the limits of Arabic, and hidden meanings suggest understanding and grasping the divine intention in verses. He also mentions that those who differentiate between the apparent and hidden meanings would provide a new tafsir method, and they should definitely provide a concrete basis to their specific concept of apparent and hidden meanings. He also implies the condition of suiting Arabic data and the presence of external data (religious work) that would support this meaning. He notes in some of his examples that certain Sufi interpretations enable Muslims to evaluate the Quran consistently as a whole, but he regards certain interpretations, such as the term "na'lain (two clogs)" interpreted as "two worlds" in the phrase "fahla na'laik" in al-Taha 20/12, as unacceptable. According to Shatibi, this and similar interpretations do not have the understanding of Salafism followers who are the first addressee of the Quran and who understand and interpret it in the best way. See *al-Muwafakat fi Usul ash-Sharia*, Beirut 1997, III, 346-367.

[166] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 130-131.

[167] Maşalı, "İbn Teymiyye'ye Göre Hatalı Tefsir Kuramları", p. 131.

Discussion and Conclusion

The Salafi ideology, supported by Ahmad ibn Hanbal and made a systematical movement upon the orders of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the most basic characteristic of which is extreme conservatism and traditionalism, has a determinant role regarding the classical Sunni tafsir tradition. For determining this evidence, it is sufficient to see how the content of *Mukaddimat at-Tafsir* by Ibn Taymiyyah is reflected to *al-Burkhan* and *al-Itkan* by Zarkashi and Suyuti, which are used as the most basic sources of Quran sciences and Tafsir. Moreover, the categorical classifications by Ibn Taymiyyah, which is presented as "ahsanu turuk at-tafsir (the best/most appropriate tafsir methods)" and means "Quran tafsir with the Quran and Quran tafsir with Sunnah" are still used as tafsir principles. These categorical classifications also determine the frame of "narrative tafsir (ma'sur tafsir)".

The conditions for accepting the Sufi/ishari interpretations are largely based on the beliefs and evaluations of Ibn Taymiyyah in *Risalah fi ilm al-Batin wa'z-Zahir*. The conditions for accepting the ishari interpretation and ta'wil largely match, which is interesting evidence. The focus of this match is formed by the condition of suiting the apparent meaning of religious works in Sufi and kalami ta'wil. Ibn Taymiyyah remained significantly distant to kalam and ta'wil method, speculative wisdom and Sufism, and he used a critic approach in this regard, which indicates that he meticulously investigated the acceptance conditions for ta'wil in the statement epistemology in Ahl al-Sunnah tradition because of the effect of systematic Salafism. A similar assumption can be made for the classical discussions of whether a ra'y-based Quran interpretation is lawful.

In addition, the social/hidayah-based tafsir movement which is commonly accepted in the modern Islamic world, arose from Salafism represented by certain people such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Riza. To sum up, the dominant tafsir paradigm in the Ahl al-Sunnah tradition largely belongs to Ibn Taymiyyah and Salafism. The inclination of certain tafsir authorities such as Imam Maturidi, Fahraddin ar-Razi and Bayzawi to combine the sagacity tafsir/ta'wil that became clearly visible with Molla Fanari in the Ottoman era and adopted by many Ottoman tafsir authorities later with ishari interpretation style, is mentioned as a strong Sunni tafsir aspect. However, since the latest century, the most dynamic aspect that has been represented by certain scholars such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Riza, Mustafa Maraghi, Mawdudi, and Sayyid Kutubis has a Salafi social/hidayah-based tafsir inclination.

The basic emphasis in Ibn Taymiyyah's Salafi tafsir concept is related to detecting the initial/essential meaning in the Quran and maintaining this meaning as it is. This emphasis is a serious criticism toward the approach of presenting sectarian, political and philosophical premises for the approval of the Quran under the concept of ta'wil rather than answering the following question: "What does

Quran essentially order?" Making the Quran a divine book that is in parallel to any premise is possible by removing the historical context of the divine book. To remove the historical context, one should neglect the narratives of Salafis with historical meanings. Ibn Taymiyyah's emphasis of Salaf and narration in tafsir is thus critical. The emphasis on the commitment to apparent/valuable meaning in Arabic is important for preventing the arbitrary considerations toward meanings. However, the tafsir style based on pure Arabic is problematic for the Salafi ideology. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah stated the following in regards to determining the meaning in the Quran considering the pure wording: "Certain interpreters aimed to explain the Quran verses in a way to be understood by a person who speaks pure Arabic while neglecting the statements of the Prophet who received the verses and became the first addressee of Quran… These interpreters were committed to pure wordings, and they considered the meanings that could not have been in Quran without paying attention to Prophet's advice, verses' indications and expression styles."[168]

Arabic is without doubt significant for determining the main meaning and purpose in Quran, but the linguistic characteristics are not solely adequate. This is due to correctly understanding and explaining Quran is more than what can linguistics grasp. Moreover, those who understand the Quran the best are not those who speak Arabic the best. Scholars of fiqh can understand and interpret the Quran better than Arabic linguists.[169] The maximum amount of attention should be paid to the expression style of the Quran in tafsir. Ibn Taymiyyah made the following statement: "Wording can become meaningful only if the language, addressing style and habits of the speaker is known. Because the indication of wording to meaning is not random, but voluntary and cautionary. The speaker aims for their wording to correspond to a certain meaning. When the speaker presents an ordinary style in regards to expressions with a certain wording, this style becomes a habit of this. Thus, whoever pays attention to Prophet's wordings and what he meant with these wordings knows the details in his statements. Thus, the intention that could not be found by somebody else can be understood easily by those people."[170]

As this explanation indicates, the meanings Shari assigned to Arabic terms should be regarded in Quran tafsir. Because Shari assigned much content, which are different than the meanings and use in Arabic, to many Arabic words. The details of these meanings can be achieved through the statements from the Prophet and Salaf statements. Therefore, whoever performs ta'wil on Quran just by considering the Arabic meanings and use without paying attention to the meanings

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[168] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 191.

[169] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, III, 38; XVII, 222.

[170] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, VII, 77.

in Prophet and/or sahabah statements conducts a ta'wil process specific to innovation followers.[171]

According to Salafi tafsir ideology, the essential meaning of a word in the Quran is limited to what the sahabah generation understood from that word. The theoretical and terminological aspects gained by the words in time should be disregarded in Quran tafsir. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya regarded assigning terminological meanings to the words in Quran as superstitious (groundless, invalid) ta'wil. According to him, associating a word in the Quran with a special term, rather than the meaning known in the revelation period, that emerged in the following periods, is a completely superstitious ta'wil. Many people had confused ideologies and problematic approaches with this issue. These people associated the wordings in the Quran with the meanings that are in the terminologies of late periods but have no correspondence in Arabic in the revelation period. This aspect should be considered carefully. Otherwise, they could make a great mistake such as accusing Allah and the Messenger of lying under the name of ta'wil. Certain people interpreted the phrase *fa-lamma afala* (An'am 6/76) as "movement" and presented the ability to move as in a superstitious regard. However, there is not a single statement where the term "uful" is used to mean movement in the period when the Quran was revealed. Moreover, some scholars regarded the term "ahad" used in the Quran to refer Allah as "the element from which it is impossible to separate and gain an independent presence", and they stated the following: "If Allah was really over the sky, he would not have had the ahad title and characteristics." However, neither Arabs nor the linguists know that the term "ahad" has this meaning. In Arabic, there is not a single example where this term has the afore-mentioned meaning. The judgment regarding this meaning belongs to Jahmiyya, falasifah, Mu'tazila and their followers.[172]

Ideological motives occasionally affect the criticisms of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim regarding ta'wil, but the basic motive here is the efforts to avoid sacrificing the epistemological and methodological principles based on Ahl al-Hadith. This statement can be found with the answer of Ibn Taymiyyah for the following question: "What is the most suitable tafsir of the Quran and Sunnah?" According to Ibn Taymiyyah, the most reliable tafsir for Muslims is *Jami al-Bayan* by al-Tabari. Al-Tabari conveyed the narratives from Salafi scholars with imputations and presented no innovations. In addition, he made efforts to avoid conveying narratives from refuted scholars such as Muqatil ibn Suleiman and Qalbi.[173] The

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[171] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmu al-Fatwah*, VII, 243-244.

[172] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *as-Sawaik al-Mursala*, Riyadh 1998, I, 189-191.

[173] According to Ibn Taymiyyah, almost all of tafsirs of scholars such as Sufian ibn Uyayna (d. 198/814), Abd ar-razzak ibn Hammam (d. 211/826), Ishaq ibn Rakhawayah (d. 238/853), Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855), Abd ibn Humaid (d. 249/863), Baqi ibn Makhlad (d. 276/889), Ibn al-Munzir (d. 318/930) and Ibn Abi Hatim (d. 327/938) contain the ideas and practices of sahabah and tabi'un, and they are among the appropriate and valid tafsirs. See *Majmu al-Fatwah*, XIII, 190.

tafsirs of certain scholars such as Sa'labi, Baghawi and Wahidi are useful although they have certain problematic narratives and innovations. The tafsir of Ibn Atiyya and Qurtubah are suitable for the Quran and Sunnah, and they do not include innovation. However, *al-Kashshaf* by Zamahshari completely includes innovations. The most concrete and reliable tafsir among these works belongs to al-Tabari.[174]

It is clear that Ibn Taymiyyah presented reasons consolidating the commitment to Ahl al-Hadith and Salaf ideology, while stating that *Jami al-Bayan* is the most reliable tafsir, and he considered the same reasons while evaluating the tafsirs of other Sunni tafsir authorities. However, in his evaluation toward *al-Kashshaf* by Zamahshari, he acted ideologically due to his anti-approach toward Jahmiyya and Mu'tazila. He had a similar attitude while criticizing *at-Tafsir al-Qabir* by Fahraddin ar-Razi stating "It has anything but tafsir".

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History of Relationships Between Salafism and Sufism[*]

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Abstract

The value that Salafis have cultivated from Sufism varies depending on the development of mysticism, and the different shapes it receives in various periods. As Sufism's name is not present within the initial periods of the Sufi movement, it is not in question whether Salafism adopts or opposes Sufi mysticism. The Sufi movement began to emerge since the second half of the II/VIII century, and had become widespread in the III/IX century and from then on, the Salafi scholars began to criticize the Sufis. Therefore, some scholars say, "there is asceticism but no mysticism in Islam", which is suggested as the reason why asceticism (zuhd) is accepted and not criticized, whereas Sufism is discussed a subject of debate. In this article, the historical relationship between mysticism with Salafism will be discussed.

Keywords: Salafiyya, Salafism, Mysticism, Sufism, Asceticism, Zuhd

Tarihî Süreçte Selefîlik-Tasavvuf İlişkileri

Özet

Selefîlerin tasavvufa biçtikleri değer, tasavvufun gelişmesine ve çeşitli dönemlerde aldığı değişik şekillere bağlı olarak farklılık gösterir. İlk dönemlerde tasavvuf hareketi ve adı mevcut olmadığından selefîn tasavvufu benimsemesi veya ona karşı çıkması söz konusu değildir. Tasavvuf hareketi II/VIII. asrın ikinci yarısından itibaren ortaya çıkmaya başlamış III/IX. asırda yaygınlaşmıştı. Bundan sonra selef âlimleri, sûfîleri eleştirmeye başlamışlardır. Bu nedenle bazı âlimler "İslâm'da zühd var ama tasavvuf yoktur", demiş, bunun sebebi olarak zühdün kabul gördüğünü ve eleştirilmediğini, halbuki tasavvufun tartışma konusu olduğunu ileri sürmüşlerdir. Bu makalede Selefîlikle tasavvufun târihî süreçteki ilişkileri ele alınacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefîyye, Tasavvuf, Sufi, Zühd

Introduction

The hadith which mentions that the ummah will be divided into more than 70 sub-sects, also indicates that only one of them will reach salvation, the one which is "walking the path of the Prophet and his companions".[1] Although the authenticity of this hadith is controversial, it is important as it has influenced scholars on their views on the issues of guidance-error and ruin-salvation, other than merely reflecting its historical development. Furthermore, based on this hadith, each sect and denomination have claimed to be the path that reaches salvation (the sect of salvation), and others were destroyed and ruined.

Followers of the Salafi sect said at every opportunity that they are on the path of the Prophet and his companions, and even on the path of Tabi' al-Tabi'in (the first three generations from the time of the Prophet). This path was referred to as the "Salafi Sect." Those who hold this path are called "followers of the Work" (*Eseriyye*) because of their commitment to the conveyor and the narrations. They sometimes identify themselves as the *Ahl al-Hadith.*

Due to their new and different interpretations of the names of Allah and some verses of the Qur'an, Jahmiyya and Mu'tazila were referred to as the "Nufat-Muattes". "Ithbatiyya-Sifatiyah" is another name given to those who hold the path of the Salaf, because they reject such new interpretations and adhere to the apparent meaning of the principles and the wording. All these which we call the Salafiyyah, and how firmly they are connected to the period of the Prophet and his companions, in a more comprehensive expression - the first three generations - which is considered the most auspicious generations with a religious-Islamic lifestyle, mostly views new interpretations, explanations and analysis as innovations or heresy and, for that matter, it is important to note that they sometimes opposed this as falsification or blasphemy. When the traditionalist aspect of this sect is taken into consideration, it is not difficult to predict how they view new developments, interpretations and intellectual currents in Islam, including the movements of asceticism and mysticism.

Being attributed to Abu al Hasan Ali ibn Ismail (d. 324/936) and Muhammad ibn Muhammad (d. 333/944), respectively, before the sects of Ash'arism and Maturidiyya came to existence and assumed the duty of qalam, all Muslims who accorded with the tradition of Islam and undertook the principle of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah were followers of the path of the Salaf. In fact, Imam Al-Ash'ari and Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi also declared themselves as the followers of the Salafi understanding. In this respect, the term Salafism includes Maturidites, Ash'arites, and all Ahl al-Sunnah, and more specifically, the traditional Muslims that lived before these two aforementioned groups and the subsequent groups who lived among Salafi or Ahl al-Hadith communities but never identified themselves

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[1] Abu Dawud, *es- Sünen*, "Sünnet",1; ;Tirmidhi, *es-Sünen*, "Îmân",18; İbnMâce, *es-Sünen*, "Fiten",17; Al-'Ajluni, *Keşfü'l-Hafâ*, I, 309.

as Ash'arites or Maturidites. Like the Salaf (plural As-Laf), the sunnah also refers to traditions and customs. In this respect, Salafis define themselves also as "Ahl as-Sunna".

Mysticism According to Salafi Scholars

If the spiritual state, as well as the deeds, worshipping, submission, taqwa, morals and decency, in addition to receiving the revelation of Allah, worship or praying to the Lord, or preaching to his companions, and the profound and intense sensations and ecstasy (enthusiasm) in different ways and the degree of reflection of all of them in their communities are meant, it is clear that these points constitute the essence and spirit of Islam. Sufism is the name of the spiritual life in Islam in the sense of a relationship (contact, joining) that is established between the Lord the believer. There has been an unnamed mysticism in Islam from the beginning. Sufism is the name that is subsequently given to this spiritual and ethereal life in question. In earlier periods, this ideology used to be defined using a certain terminology, including the terms ihsan, taqwa, zuhd, ikhlas, hushu, fear of Allah, and love of Allah. Just as Sufism, the names tafseer, qira'at, hadith, fiqh, and qalam were attributed to the other Islamic sciences in later periods. The differentiation, disintegration, and transformation into scientific branches of issues and questions that are closely related with the Qur'an and sunnah seen in times, are inevitable results of this natural process.

The Value of Sufism According to the Salaf

The value that the Salafis have cultivated from Sufism varies depending on its development and different shapes it has taken in various periods. As Sufism's name is not present in the initial periods of the Sufi movement, it is not in question whether Salafism adopts or opposes Sufi mysticism. There is no dispute regarding the Qur'an, which we identify as the essence and soul of Islam, and mysticism, the intensively deep and spiritual experience, seen in the life of the Prophet, as both are embraced by all believers from the bottom of their hearts. However, it is known that some believers such as Abdullah ibn Amr, Abu Darda, Abdullah ibn 'Umar and Abu Dhar al-Ghifari, who took worshipping and asceticism to extremes, were warned by the Prophet and extremism is not allowed by the religion. More believers with extremist tendencies were seen in the following periods. Besides, abid, nasiq, qurra, and zahid Muslims, salih believers who lived with taqwa, and faithful Muslims were always respected in Islamic communities.

In early periods, the first devotional Muslim scholars, who are called Salaf or Ahl al-Sunnah, authored refutations against innovative ideas of Jahmiyah and Mu'tazila, which are attributed to Jahm bin Safwan (d. 128/745). Ibn Said al-Qullab (d. 240/854), Haris Al-Muhasibi (d. 243/857), and Abu al-Abbas al-Qalanisi (d.

355/965), are among the scholars of the Salaf who authored refutations against Jahmiyya, Qadariyya, and Mu'tazila and provided a basis for Ash'arism and Maturidism.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal's (d.241/855-856) *Kitâbü'r-Red ale'z-zenâdika ve'l-Cehmiyye, which was published by* Ali Sami Nashshar and Ammar at-Talibi, Abu 'Abd Allah al-Bukhari's (d.256/870) *Halku ef'âli'l-İbâd*, Ibn Qutaybah's (d.240/855) *el-İhtilâf fi'l-lafz ve'r-red ale'c-Cehmiyye ve'l-müşebbihe*, and Al-Darimi's (d.255/869) *er-Redd ale'l-Cehmiyye er-Red ale'l-Merîsî* were authored as refutations of the aforementioned sects of bid'ah.[2] During this period, Salafi scholars did not criticize zahid and sufi scholars and did not author any refutation against them. Ahmad ibn Hanbal's criticism against Haris Al-Muhasibi was not based on his ideas about zuhd and mysticism, but his engagement in qalam studies. Abu Zur'a (d. 281/894), on the other hand, criticized his ideas of mysticism.[3] Abu Abdallah al-Basri (d.369/979), who is regarded as the leader of Salimiyya sub-sect, and Muhammad ibn al-Fadhl Al-Balkhi (d. 319/931) were criticized for the same reason, not because they were followers of Sufism.

The Sufi movement began to emerge in the second half of the II/VIII century, and became widespread in the III/IX century. After that, Salafi scholars, particularly those engaged in fiqh studies, started to criticize Sufi Muslims. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274) gives information about Sufi scholars, who were blamed for being disbelievers and zindiq, while suggesting that Sufi Muslims were unjustly treated.[4] Husayn ibn Mansur Al-Hallaj (d. 309/921) were executed for being zindiq and mulhid.[5]

In this period, scholars of fiqh and qalam, other than Salafis, also criticized some followers of Sufism.

Those supporting the idea that "there is asceticism but no mysticism in Islam" suggest that as the reason that asceticism is accepted and not criticized, whereas Sufism remains to be a subject of debate. This suggestion is partly true. Accordingly, besides Ahl al-Sunnah and the Salafis, Mu'tazila, Kharijites, and Shiah also claimed the concept of zuhd. However, just as the extreme ends of Sufism (mysticism), the extreme ends of zuhd were often criticized. Accordingly, Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 514/1120) dedicated the 9th chapter of his *Telbîsu İblîs* (Cairo, 1368, p. 145-155) to the criticism against zahid and abid Muslims.[6] In another work titled as *Sıfatü's-Safve*, the same scholar summarized Abu Nuaym's (d.228/843) *Hilyetü'l-Evliyâ* and transformed it into a more referable resource. Just as the out of

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[2] See. 'Ali Sami Nashshar et al. *Akâidü's-Selef*, Alexandria 1970.

[3] Al-Dhahabi, Abu `Abdullah ibn `Uthman, *Siyerüa'lâmi'n-nübelâ*, XIII,311.

[4] al-Tusi Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, *el-Lüm'a*, Cairo 1960, p. 492-515.

[5] For accused and punished Sufi scholars, see: Shaarani, Abu'l-Mawahib ibn Ali, *et-Tabakâtü'l-Kübrâ*, Cairo 1954, I, 5-17.

[6] Ibn al-Jawzi, *Telbîsu iblis*, Cairo 1368, p.145-155.

line/marginal (heretical, rafidhi) Sufi scholars were, zahid Muslims and zuhd as a concept were also perpetually criticized. However, while embracing the concept of zuhd and praising zahid Muslims, Salafi scholars in general chose to be aloof from Sufism and Sufi scholars. In the first two periods, zuhd was inclusive of the essence of Sufism (mysticism). In later periods, this essence grew into a tawhid, kashf, and zuhd oriented movement based on worshipping and zuhd, then named Sufism. This time, zuhd turned into the beginning and an essential part of Sufism. Those suggesting that "Sufism (mysticism) is more than zuhd; zuhd is the starting point of Sufism" indeed refers to this aforementioned opinion. (Ibn al-Jawzi, *Telbîsü İblîs*, Cairo 1368, 155, 159). Moreover, independently of Sufism, followers of Salafism, Mu'tazila, Kharijites, Shiah, and scholars of fiqh always praised the concept of zuhd as a sentimental value of religion.

Salafism, as a 14-century-old religious sect, is not a homogeneous and monolithic ideology, it has a number of branches and forms.[7] Therefore, different forms of Salafism emerged in different times, places, geographies, and societies.

In terms of their understanding of mysticism (Sufism), Salafi Muslims can be divided into two sections. The first section divides mysticism in two categories. They accept its conservative side, but deny the extreme (ghali) ends. Ibn Taymiyyah and his loyal follower Ibn Qayyim are considered in this section. Even they have peculiar ways of mysticism. In specific, they can also be named as Sufi. The other section claims that "Neither Shiites nor Sufis can be conservative. They are all extreme and out-of-line". They deny mysticism radically. Ehsan Elahi Zaheer in *Tasavvuf el-menşe ve'l-masâdır*[8], Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil in *el-Fikru's-sûfî fi'd-dâri'l-kitâb ve sünnet*[9], Muhammad F. Shafaqa in *et-Tasavvuf beyne'l-hak ve'l-halk*[10] and e*t-Tasavvufu'l-İslâmi beyne'd-dîn ve'l-felsefe*, and Nadir al-Nasri in *et-Tasavvufu'l-İslâmî*[11], Takiyyuddîn el-Hilâlî in *el-Hediyyetü'l-hâdiyye ile't-Tarikâti't-Ticâniyye* defend this opinion. A significant part of orientalists are also of this opinion. In this respect, critical approaches of Salafi scholars against mysticism may differ. It should

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[7]   Al-Ghazali, mentions seven fundamental principles of the Salaf in his *İlcâmu'l-avâm an ilmi'l-kelâm*. These are iman-tasdiq, ajz and i'tiraf, suqut, avoiding tasarruf, and leaving qeff and marifat to the qualified. These principles suffice enough to define the Salaf, but the interpretation of them resulted in emergence of many branches under them. Salafi Muslims should not be considered as inclusive of only Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Muhammad Birgivi and his followers Kadızadelis should also be considered as members of this group. It is unjust and prejudicial to evaluate Salafism only based on militant groups, such as al-Shabaab, al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda. Cairo 1309, I, 42.

[8]   See. Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, *Tasavvuf el-menşe ve'l-masâdır*, Lahor 1986.

[9]   See. Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil, *el-Fikru's-sûfî fi'd-dâri'l-kitâb ve sünnet*, Kuwait 1984.

[10] See. Muhammad F. Shafaqa, *et-Tasavvuf beyne'l-hak ve'l-halk*, al-Dar al-Salafiyya, 1983; Muhammad F. Shafaqa,
      e*t-Tasavvufu'l-İslâmî beyne'd-din ve'l-felsefe*, Cairo 1975.

[11] See. Nadir al-Nasri, *et-Tasavvufu'l-İslâmî*, Beirut 1960.

especially be noted that Salafis admit the existence of inspired miracles, which is a significant matter for Sufism.

In *el-Felsefetu's-sûfiyye* (Cairo, 1966), Abd Al-Qadir Mahmud divides the movement of Sufism into three categories[12]:

First category: Salafi Sufism

This branch of Sufism starts with Muqatil ibn Sulayman (d. 150/767) Qarramiyya (Muhammad ibn Qarram (d. 255/868), Salimiyya (Abu Abdullah ibn. Salim (d. 297/909), develops with Imam Malik (d. 179/795) and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855), and ends with Abdullah Ansari (d. 481/1088). Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) and Ibn Qayyim (d. 751/1330) are also outstanding figures of Salafi Sufism. As they are members of Hanbalism, Ibn al-Aqil (d. 513/1119) and Abdul Qadir Gilani (d.481/1089) are also regarded as followers of Salafism.

It is possible to see indications of Sufism, which we previously defined as the "soul and gem" of Islam, within this movement. However, followers of Salafi Sufism are significantly different from the other Sufis.[13]

Second category: Sunni Sufism

This understanding begins with Zayn al-Abidin (d. 94/712), Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 141/765), Sufyan ath-Thawri (d.161/778), Ibrahim ibn Adham (d. 161/ 778), Jabir ibn Hayyan (d. 200/815), Rabi'a al-ʻAdawiyya (d. 185/801) and Haris Al-Muhasibi (d. 243/857), develops with Junayd al-Baghdadi (ö. 297/ 909), reaches its peak with Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), and subsists in the Shadhili Tariqa and the ideology of Muhammad Iqbal (ö.1938).

Third category: Philosophical Sufism

Begins with Dhul-Nun al-Misri (d. 245/859) and Bayazid Bastami (d. 261/874), Al-Hallaj (d.309/922), Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d.320/932), Shibli (d.957/ 1550) and Farid ud-Din Attar (d. 618/1221), develops with Suhrawardi (d. 587/ 1191), Al-Halabi (ö.578/1191), Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi (d. 1050/1641), and takes its final shape with Ibn Arabi (d. 957/ 1550), Ibn al-Farid (d. 632/ 1295), Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (d. 672/ 1273), Ibn Sab'in (d.669/1270), Al-Sustari (d. 1019/ 1610) and Abd al-Karim al-Jili (d. 832/ 1428). The branch of Sufism that lives in Iran is named Irfaniyya and represents the Iranian version of Philosophical Sufism.

Most Salafi Muslims consider Philosophical Sufism as outside of Islam, while they do not stay away from criticizing, despite relatively moderate and soft approaches toward Sunni Sufism. Some even deny this philosophy. Naturally,

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[12] See. Abd Al-Qadir Mahmud, *el-Felsefetü's-sûfiyye*, Cairo 1966.

[13] See. Abd Al-Qadir Mahmud, *ibid.* p. 78-148, ʻAli Sami Nashshar, *el-Neş'etü'l-fikri'l-felsefi'l-İslâm*, Cairo 1977, I, 285-313;III, 105-216; Massignon, L., *İslâm Tasavvufu*, trans. Osman Türer, İstanbul 2006, p. 113-134.

there is neither denomination or monastery in Salafi Sufism, nor religious rituals or ceremonies between sheikhs and disciples, as they do not have spiritual masters. Salafi Muslims essentially go against these kind of practices.

Suhrawardi Halabi was executed for being stigmatized as a zindiq. Salafi Muslims consider the information provided in al-Ghazali's major works, such as *Mişkâtü'l-envâr*, *el-Madnûn el-kebîr*, *el-Madnûn es-sağîr*[14], and *Meâricu'l-Kuds*, as philosophical and deny them. According to them, al-Ghazali was poisoned by Ibn Sina's (d. 428/ 1037) *eş-Şifa*.[15]Salafi Muslims also considered some Sufis, who support and follow the idea of unity of existence, such as Ibn Arabi, Ibn Barrajan (d.536/1142), Ibn Sab'in (d.669/1279), Al-Sustari, Ibn al-Dahhak (d. 661/1214), Ibn Qasi (d. 546/1151), Ibn Sudkin, Abdul Karim Al-Jili, Ibn al-Farid, Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi (d. 597/ 1200) as mulhid (heretic) and zindiq. Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1200) criticized Sufism and Sufi scholars who lived until the 9th/12th century in *Telbîsü İblis*'te (*Nakdü'l-ilm ve'l-ulemâ*) and his other works. Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple and follower Ibn Qayyim being in the forefront, Ala'uddin al-Bukhari (d. 841/1437), Al-Biqa'i (d. 885/1480), Ali al-Qari (d. 1014/1650) and similar other critics of Sufism intensified their criticism against followers of the unity of existence, particularly Ibn Arabi.[16]

Including Sheikhs of Naqshbandiyah before Imam Rabbani (d. 1034/1624), the ideology of the unity of existence spread and gained wide recognition among the disciples of denominations and this development facilitated ideas that regard the subsequent Salafi Sufis and disciples as members of a non-Islamic movement. Today's disputes and conflicts between Salafi and Sufi scholars are outcomes of the aforementioned historical background.

Faults of Sufism and Sufis According to Salafis

As mentioned above, radical Salafis deny both Sufism and Sufi Muslims and regard them as mistakes and faults in every aspect. Conservative and rational Salafis, on the other hand, deny some aspects of Sufism, just as radical ones do, but differently, as they accept and defend certain aspects. While denying some Sufi scholar, such as al-Hallaj and similar others, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim accept legitimacy of the first Sufi scholars. However, they radically deny the defenders of the Unity of Existence ideology, such as Ibn Arabi, Ibn al-Farid, Ibn Sab'in, Ibn

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[14] Al-Ghazali, *Mişkâtü'l-envâr*; *el-Madnûn el-kebîr*; *el-Madnûn es-sağîr*, Cairo 1309.

[15] Ibn Taymiyyah, *en-Nübüvvât*, 114-218.

[16] See. `Ala' al-Din al-Bukhari, *Vahdetü'l-vücûd*, Istanbul 1294; Ali al-Qari, *Vahdet-i Vücûd*, Istanbul 1294, p. 52-116; al-Biqa'i, *Tenbîhu'l-gabî alâ tekfiri İbn Arabî*, Cairo 1980; same aut. *Tahzîru'l-ibâd*, Cairo 1980; Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil published his book titled *Mesrau't-tasavvuf* and potentiated his judgmental suggestions. İsmail Fenni (Ertuğrul) answered all these criticisms and defended the ideology of the Unity of Existence and Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi.

Barrajan, and Ibn Dahqan. A part of qalam and fiqh scholars think like Salafis in this regard. Ibn Haldun is one of these scholars.[17]

Salafis perceive the mistakes and faults mentioned here as ilhad (heresy), qufr (blasphemy), zandaqa, and sometimes dalalah and bid'ah. Now, the following will provide a brief explanation about some of these mistakes and faults:

1. Appealing to cemeteries and souls of the dead. When they mention about the well-known Sufi saint Maruf Karkhi, they regard his grave as a proven cure and a remedy.[18] They claim that his prayers are easily accepted and his grave remedies and cures any suffering.[19] Visiting cemeteries for remembrance or praying for the dead is allowable, however Salafi scholars regard appealing to souls of alleged saints or holy people in cemeteries and shrines, asking for their help and seeing them as a mediator, helper and intercessor between humans and Allah as inappropriate. Some even consider this behavior as a sign of disbelief and the same as polytheism that uses icons as mediators; while others think that it is a cardinal sin.[20]

2. Being opposed to asking for help from souls of the dead, Salafi scholars did never allow the building of shrines or buildings over the graves of Muslims or the decorating of them with marble stones, and covering marble or wooden coffins with fabric. They believe that these kind of graves should totally be destroyed.[21] According to them, Muslim cemeteries should be like Jannat Al-Baqi' in Medina. Even scholars of fiqh consider exaggerated graves as 'disliked' in Islam.

3. Salafis do not allow worshipping, sacrificing, or almsgiving at tombs of saints, shrines, and monasteries. Because, they are not different or more special than any other place. Saudi Muslims, who defend the opinions of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, destroyed all idolized places that are visited by Muslims in Mecca and Medina. Birgivi and Kadizadelis also think the same way. For that reason, these people were called as "*Hüddâmü'l-Meâbid"*, which means "temple destroyers".[22]

A lot of Muslims, other than Sufis, sheikhs, and darwishes, visit cemeteries, pray there, and ask for help from Allah by means of the entombed saint. However, those paying more attention to and defending these practices are often Sufis, disciples of denominations, and especially Shiites. Just as Sufis do, Shiites also attribute holiness to places they visit, under the name of "Al-'Atabat al-Muqaddasa" or "Al-'Atabat al-'Aliyat".

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[17] Ibn Haldun, *Şifâu's-sâil li tehzîbi'l-mesâil*, Ankara 1958, p. 70; *İbnHaldûn'un Fetvâsı*, p. 110, *Mukaddime*, Tunisia 1984, p. 584-97.

[18] As-Sulami, *Tabakâtü's-Sûfiyye*, p. 84.

[19] Al-Qushayri, *Risâletü'l-Kuşeyrî*, p. 60.

[20] Ibn Taymiyyah, *et-Tevessül ve'l-vesîle*, Cairo 1374, p. 17, 23.

[21] See. Tirmidhi, *es-Sünen*, "Cenâiz", 56; Muslim, *es-Sahîh*, "Cenâiz", 94

[22] İbn Kayyim, *İgâsetu'l-lehfân*, Cairo 1961, I, 201-242.

4. All Sufis value sama and hymns, which refer to religious music, and especially gatherings for dhikr. Being relatively positive toward profane music, Salafis object to the sama practices (devran, dance) of Sufis.[23] They claim that sama is not a way of worshipping.

5. Salafis deny shathiya practices of Sufis, claiming that they are nonsense, delusions, and false (tammat, turrahat). They consider Al-Hallaj's saying "Ana'l-Ḥaqq" as a sign of disbelief. According to them, opinions that consider the saying "Ana'l-Ḥaqq" as the highest level of annihilation (fana) and tawhid are unreasonable and senseless. Moreover, Abu al-Wafa Ali Ibn Aqil (d. 513/1119), Abdullah Ansari and similar other Salafi scholars have more moderate views regarding this issue.

6. Riyazah (abstinence), mujahadah (struggle), khalwat (solitude), arbain, and passion (suffering). Salafis regard riyazah and mujahadah, also called passion (suffering)/arbain practices of Sufis, the suffering they endure for non-indulgence, self-devotion to worship in small, narrow and dark cells built in some monasteries and hermitages for forty days and in this way reaching a moral asceticism as bid'ah and dalalah. According to them, this suffering in Sufism is against both shariah (Islamic law) and reason and the nature of humans.

7. Submitting to a sheikh without any condition and imitating them imprudently. Salafis criticize Sufis scholars and mention certain phrases which can be seen in books of Sufism, such as *"asceticism is denial of objection"*, *"whoever does not submit to a sheikh, submits to Satan"*, *"a disciple asking 'why' to their sheikh is hopeless"*, *"a disciple should follow their sheikh just as observing someone holding the blind on the verge of a cliff"*, *a disciple before a sheikh should be like a corpse in front of a bather"*, *"a disciple should prefer a mistake of his sheikh to his right opinion"* etc. They insistently claim that these sayings are against both shariah and reason.

8. Salafis deny some beliefs of Sufis, such as those regarding Rijal al-ghayb (invisible beings), threes, sevens, forties, qutb and ghaus, regarding them as unreasoning thoughts and superstitions. (Al-Hukumat Al-Sufiyah)

9. Jihad, amr bil ma'ruf wa nahy an al-munkar. Salafis criticize Sufi scholars also for their way of tabligh and dawah. According to them, Sufis perceive jihad rather as struggling against desires, and desires as their biggest enemies[24], they regard fighting against desires as the major jihad, and battling against disbelievers as the

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[23] Ibn Taymiyyah, *Mecmuatü'r-resaili'l-kübrâ*, Beirut 1972, II, 293. According to Ibn Qayyim, all shrines and places visited by Muslims that are converted into sanctuaries should be destroyed. Ibn Qayyim, *İgâsetu'l-lehfân*, Cairo 1961, I, 242-285; same aut. *Medâricu's-sâlikîn*, Beirut 1983, I, 516-542.

[24] See. Al-'Ajluni, *Ibid*. I, 143. According to the Salafi comparison; although al-Ghazali lived for 12 more years after the invasion of Jerusalem by the Crusaders, he never mentioned this incident in his books. Against this, Ibn Taymiyyah joined the battle fought and won against the Mongols in and around Damascus. The efforts of important commanders with a tendency towards Sufism, such as Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi and Imam Shamil, in the 19th Century should also be noted. Sanusi Muslims are also considered as both Sufi and Salafi.

minor jihad. According to Salafis, Sufis weaken their bodies by hunger and they weaken the strength and capability of Muslims to fight by abstaining from marriage and decreasing the population. Sometimes, treating both Muslims and non-Muslims in the same manner takes the heat of Muslims societies, together with the spirit of jihad.

10. Salafis deny some stories and miracles of Sufis, and their fortune telling practices that resemble augury and sortilege, and regard them as unreasonable and unallowable shariah. However, Salafi scholars essentially accept the existence of both inspiration and miracles.

11. Salafi scholars accept the existence of inspiration and miracles, defend these phenomena and regard them essential parts of Islam. This approach is explicitly seen in opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah's and Ibn Qayyim.[25] However, they suggest that a miracle or an inspiration should not contradict with the Qur'an and the true hadiths in order to be accepted. A significant part of the miracles and inspirations in Sufi books of anecdotes do not meet the conditions and are full of superstitions.

12. In some occasions, Salafis also considered Sufi scholars as compradors of cruel and tyrannical sultans, statesmen, imperialists, and dictators, and claimed that they were abused by these figures. Instances were observed during the Mongol Invasion, the Crusades and when Muslim countries were colonized.

In the second half of the 20th century, prospering with the petrodollar in the Arabian Peninsula, Salafis got involved in tabligh and Islamic dawah campaigns in different countries, including those in Africa, by establishing a number of foundations and associations and collecting charity. *Rabithah al-ʾAlam al-Islami* is the most renowned example among them. Islamic University of Medina, Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab University in Riyad received disciples from a large Muslim geography to spread Salafism, provided all their necessary material needs, and raised them with the Salafi ideology before sending them back to their countries. After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union (SSRs) in 1991, Salafism was spread around the Balkans, Caucasia, Kazan, and the Central Asia. Salafis conflicted wiith members of other denominations in this region and contradicted the traditions of Hanafi-Maturidi Muslims. Accordingly, in their most tolerant approach, Salafis regard members of denominations, darwishes, and sheikhs as perpetrators of dalalah and bid'ah. It was not rare even that they declared them as polytheist and faithless.

During the Arab Spring that broke out in 2012, the Salafi groups in Egypt especially left the struggling and jihad aside and acted in line with the orders of the Gulf countries, which were heavily influenced by the USA and European Union.

However, positive contributions of Salafi Muslims, who must be regarded within the understanding of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, should not be ignored

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[25] Ibn Taymiyyah, *el-Furkân beyne evliyâi'r-Rahmân ve'ş-şeytân*, Cairo 1378, p. 31-34, 73-88.

and the gentle, reasonable, tolerant, wise, and experienced figures among them should be esteemed.

Indeed, the real conflict has been experienced between Salafis and non-Salafis,or Salafis and Sufis. Also, there are a number of fault lines and issues between non-Salafi Sunni Muslims and Sufi scholars. Salafism is even not a homogeneous organization in itself. It is also fractioned in different groups and conflicts among them are at a remarkable level.

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Arab Spring and Salafism
-Case of Egypt-*

Ramazan YILDIRIM**

Abstract

The emergence of groups who call themselves 'Salafi' dates back to two centuries ago. Those movements, which have small regional differences, had the opportunity of forming a community in Egypt. On the other hand, a new community era began in the Arab world with public riots in Tunusia which spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. In Egypt, which is the most important country in the Arab and African region, every group that found an opportunity to participate in politics, has been transformed into political parties. There is no doubt that among those groups, the Salafi movement has attracted more attention than others. Salafis have established several political parties, although in previous periods, they refrained from engaging in politics and were more prone to educational and social activities. In this study, the views and structures of Salafis will be analyzed before and after the January 25 revolution in Egypt where Salafis entered the political area.

Keywords: Egypt, Salafis, Politics, Arab Spring.

Arap Baharı ve Sonrasında Selefîlik
-Mısır Örneği-

Özet

Arap dünyasında kendisini "selefî" olarak tanımlayan hareketlerin ortaya çıkışı yaklaşık olarak bir asır öncesine dayanmaktadır. Ortaya çıktıkları bölgelere göre kendi içinde küçük de olsa bir takım farklılıklar barındıran bu hareketler, daha çok Mısır'da "cemâatleşme" imkânı bulmuşlardır. Diğer taraftan 2011 yılında Tunus'ta başlayıp kısa bir süre içinde Mısır, Libya, Suriye ve Yemen'de devam eden halk isyanları sonucunda Arap dünyasında yeni bir dönem başladı. Arap ve Afrika coğrafyasının en önemli ülkesi olan Mısır'da yaşanan yeni süreçle birlikte, legal siyaset yapma imkânı bulan tüm toplumsal kesimler, hızla partileşerek siyaset arenasındaki yerini aldı. Hiç şüphesiz bu kesimler içinde Selefî hareketler diğerlerine göre daha fazla ilgi odağı haline geldi. Daha önceleri aktif siyasetten uzak duran ve daha çok eğitim, dâvet ve diğer sosyal faaliyetlerde bulunan ve demokrasi, seçim ve parlamento gibi mekanizmaları dinî açıdan sakıncalı gördükleri için kabul etmeyen Selefîler, hızlı bir şekilde birçok siyasî parti kurarak politikaya atıldılar. Bu makalede 25 Ocak devrimiyle birlikte

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Mısır'da siyasî hayata atılan Selefilerin devrim öncesi yapıları, fikirleri ve devrim sonrası kurdukları partiler ile siyasî tutum ve görüşleri üzerinde durulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Selefîler, Siyaset, Arap Baharı.

Introduction: Which Salafism

A mentality unique to itself in terms of a way of thinking or interpretation of religious texts, Salafism has been become a movement of ideas in the last century. The current movement of Salafism, which only looks for solutions to Islam's problems today in the Asr al-Saa'dat and reduced this way of thinking into merely a very formalistic way of piety, originated in Egypt, as did other Islamic movements which then evolved as it spread into other parts of the world. The current movements of Salafi origin can be divided into different categories in terms of the methods adopted to bring about social change. A movement, which emerged within the Salafi groups that mainly focused on communication of and invitation to Islam, emphasized the idea of jihad and embodied it in practices, while other groups focused on the possibility of becoming a better religious person, and in that path they called for a formalistic understanding of religion which is reflected in appearance.

As in all the movements after the Arabic evolutions, Salafis experienced a large-scale evolution of their own. Salafis deemed it a blasphemy to participate in or establish any kind of political organization or to be in a parliament and heavily criticized other Islamic movements which allowed these practices. Nevertheless, the majority of Salafis behaved rather pragmatically and went on to establish their own political parties and participated in elections. Despite the differences in their methods, the interpretation of religion in all the groups which consider themselves as Salafis, is almost the same. Salafis have common point of view in terms of the literal interpretation of religious texts, formalistic piety, disregarding of different social traditions in the name of strict religious outlines and classifying every new idea and interpretation as bid'ah.

The emergence of the movements called "Salafi" in the Arab world dates back to nearly a century ago. Though of a small scale compared to the regions which they emerged from, these movements had internal differences of their own, and the real opportunity of becoming "congregations" was found in Egypt. Salafi movements began to draw more attention since January 25, 2011 when grassroots movements reached a peak in Egypt and launched a new process called the "Arab spring" or "Arab revolutions." These movements have become strong political actors in many Arab countries, notably Egypt, in the wake of the Arab revolutions and they have been fed by some traditional religious structures defined as Salafi in Egypt. Dwelling on the history, the founders and the traditional opinions of these Salafi-religious movements will enable us to be closely acquainted with today's political parties of Salafi origin.

Salafism today does not comprise of a homogenous structure in terms of thinking and practices as the Ikhwan Movement. Therefore it is hard to categorize according to precise criteria. The principles of faith they defend and the cultural atmosphere where they emerged are quite similar. However, it is possible to put these movements under four categories in terms of their views on the social and political domain and their perceptions of politics and society.[1]

The first group is the traditional salafism, which has a basis of science and invitation. These Salafi groups invite people to their principles, provide religious education and refuse all political participation. They focus on doctrines and aim to cleanse the essentials of doctrines from bid'ah and untrue knowledge. To them, other sub-sects such as Mu'tazila, Kharijites and Shia are erring. It keeps its distance from Ash'arism and Matudirism, casting out the Sufi movements in particular. This movement of Salafism is particularly widespread in Saudi Arabia and it aims to spread the thoughts of people such as Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani.

The salafi movement's the second group who comes forward with its stance which is strictly against politics and political parties. Supporting "obedience to rulers", these Salafis oppose all kinds of political opposition and support political parties in power against other Islamist movements that desire to come to power through political parties. These groups are widespread in the Arab region notably in Saudi and Gulf countries and their efficiency in society has weakened in the wake of the Arab revolutions.

The third group of salafis is rather named "jihadist salafism". These are the groups who declare regimes in the Arab world as unbelievers, resort to violence against these regimes, and are held responsible for most of the attacks in the Islam world.

The fourth group adopts a reformist approach. This group adopts a more moderate attitude towards social and political issues. It not only defends Salafi beliefs and principles but also supports active involvement in every domain in public life. This group argues that social and political change should be gradually and peacefully made. Salafis in this group failed in active politics before the Arab revolutions due to lack of favorable environment; however, they joined politics by means of different political parties in Egypt in particular, and Tunisia, Libya and Yemen in the wake of the revolutions.

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[1] Mohammad Abu Rumman, *es-Selefiyyûn ve'r-Rebîu'l-Arabî*, Beyrut, Merkezü Dirâsâti'l-Vahdeti'l-'Arabiyye, 2013, p. 47-51.

A. Traditional Salafi Movements Before Arab Revolutions
1. Al-Jamiat Al-Shariah

Going by the full name "el-Cem'iyyetu'ş-Şer'iyye li-teâvüni'l-Âmilîne bi'l-Kitâb ve's-Sünne", this group was founded by Sheik Mahmud Hattab as-Subkhi of al-Azhar scholars in 1912. This organization, which emerged as a reaction to debates about matters that surged after the English invasion of Egypt such as new reforms in education, increasing westernization tendencies, the place of religion in social life, the effectiveness of female individuals in society, is the first organized assembly of Egypt.[2] When it emerged, it attracted great global attention, but it was much later when the movement started to be referred to in the context of salafism. This formation rather focused on social activities and gaining an institutional structure when it first emerged, but Mahmud Hattab its founder, reiterated "salafi doctrines" when defining the outlines of the movement as a scholar from Azhar. According to him, a person who is a member of this group "must be based on the salafi doctrine and as long as they are Muslims they will never claim that their predecessors are defiers of Allah or doers of bid'ah. A person also must not have any bigotry about any fiqh sect or defend any sect against another. All followers of sunnah are reliable in terms of correctly understanding people..."[3]

As-Subki, founder of the community, openly expressed that he does not find it right to deal with politics and he acted with the principle of "following politics and but not doing it". They never did enter into an attitude that is in conflict with the political authorities.

The community considered the new situation that emerged in Egypt after the 25 January revolution, and started to openly express its thoughts against political events, which they used to stay silent against in the past. For instance they openly announced in a press meeting, with reasons, that they would support Muhammad Mursi, the candidate of Muslim Brotherhood movement in the second stage of presidential elections.[4]

The fact that it doesn't strictly require a political stance of its people and it treated all sects of sunnism as equal, turned this movement into a base, from which other religious movements emerged later on which became prominent in Egypt. It carries the greater purposes of saving and protecting Muslims from wrong beliefs and for this purpose it aims to spread Islamic culture and true religious principles, opening courses where people can memorize the Qur'an, constructing mosques where needed, tending to people in need, founding hospitals for people in need

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[2]   Ahmed Zaglul Sellata, *el-Hâletü's-Selefiyyetu'l-Muâsıra fi Mısr*, Cairo, Mektebetu'l-Mebdûlî, 2011, p. 201.

[3]   http://alshareyah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115&Itemid=639

[4]   المؤتمر الصحفي للجمعية الشرعية لإعلان موقفها من الانتخابات الرئاسية في جولة الإعادة
       http://alshareyah.com/index.php?option=com_seyret&Itemid=386&task=videodirectlink&id=711

and instilling in the whole nation the understanding of social solidarity from an Islamic point of view.[5]

2. Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah

This group was established formally in 1926 by Muhammad Hamid al-Faki, a scholar of Ezher. Keeping its distance from cults which had been widespread in Egypt since the beginning of 1910s, Muhammad al-Faki shared his thoughts to his close acquaintances that there were now much more bid'ah and superstitions in the society, which almost got to the point of becoming shirk, and that the way to deal with this is to get back in line with the Prophet's sunnah. This also constitutes the moment where he started his works. Previously in a movement which defined itself as a salafi formation under the name "Al-Jamiat Al-Shariah", Muhammad al-Faki entered debates with the leaders of this movements regarding the concepts of "al-Asma' wa al-Sifat", which is one of the basics of Kalan discipline, which prompted him to leave the movement. He then communicated his thoughts in masjids, coffee houses and other locations where there were crowds, which is how he was able to gather people around him. The people around him and some sect members had tension between them because of religious dissidence.

In order to move in a more regular fashion and institutionalize based on his principles, al-Faki established a foundation to continue his activities. Later on, he criticized the revolution demonstrations held in 1919 against the English invasion. Because according to him, termination of the English invasion wouldn't be possible with protest demonstrations in areas where there are uncovered women. In this way, the principle of full adherence to Allah and His Messenger cannot be implemented. Egypt's liberation from occupation would only be possible by embracing the Sunnah of the Prophet and leaving bid'ah and superstitions. Muhammad al-Faki also objected to the statement of "Religion belongs to Allah, homeland belongs to everyone" which was the slogan in the 1919 revolution.[6] The congregation has been growing since it was founded; it has 200 branches only in Egypt and has 1750 mosques under its jurisdiction. Apart from Egypt, it has many members in various African countries such as Sudan, Chad and Somalia.

The members of Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah made their mission and the main principles is to invite people to pure tawhid, which is free of any kind of shirk and is in the ways of salaf, to explain the principles of the Qur'an to people and to adopt as principles to stay away from all kinds of bid'ah and superstition. To them, Islam is both religion and state; it regulates at all times and in all spaces. A Muslim society has to be founded and it has to be regulated using what Allah brought down for us. Failure to implement shariah in any worldly affair is to get

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[5]   Memdûh eş-Şeyh, *Selefiyyûn*, Cairo, Dâru Ahbâri'l-Yevm, 2011., p. 68.

[6]   http://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/pageother-659.html

ahead of one's scale. In order to substitute Allah's shariah on earth, one should follow wise politics without hurrying and with no conflict. "The congregation believes that democracy is a heretic order. Because democracy grants people the power to make laws, which, in truth, only belongs to Allah. The order of Islam has particularities of its own and those have nothing to do with modern Western orders. Instead, the congregation believes that implementing preferences in nomination and voting is duly lawful. Because it is lawful to compete with democrats in elections of all scales, in order to reduce the malice they would do. But when doing all this, one has to observe the principles of shariah and see to it that "masalih" rules "mafasid"."[7] Adopting these principles at a theoretical level, the congregation is against political parties in practice and argues that establishment of the Islamic state is only possible through dissemination of pure tawhid. The return of caliphate and realization of the victory Allah has promised depends on dissemination of tawhid. Strictly opposed to armed struggles against political powers, the congregation deems acts of this kind as "Khariji" (erring) and suggests that this can bring no outcome but spreading of sedition.

The Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah congregation did not officially take place in any political parties after the Egyptian Revolution on 25 January 2011, but it released a memorandum which covered its stance in many internal and external country affairs. For instance they published a memorandum on 22.08.2011, in which they hailed the resistance which defeated Qaddafi in Libya and congratulated their victory.[8] They also published a memorandum which stated they would be supporting Hazem Salah Abu Ismail in the presidential elections.[9] However the candidacy of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail was vetoed by the Egyptian Supreme Election Board. As a principle, the congregation adopted the idea to support all Islamist candidates in the first stage of the presidential elections. Then, in the second stage they published a justified memorandum where they stated that they would be supporting Muhammad Mursi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood movement: "After the announcing of results of the first stage of the elections, the Scholars Council evaluated the current situation, after which they invited Muhammad Mursi, who succeeded into the second stage, to learn his thoughts about the implementation of shariah and Shia. Then the Council obtained an "an oath and a covenant" from Muhammad Mursi and decided to support him so that he could spend his efforts to implement shariah using the method of Sunni Islam, be a brother with Muslim men and women without any partisanship, spend efforts

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[7] Salahuddin Hasan, ''Harîtatu't-Teyyârâti's-Selefiyye fi Mısr'',
      http://www.onislam.net/arabic/islamyoon/salafists/113039-2010-03-09%2014-32-04.html

[8] البيان التاسع بخصوص سقوط نظام القذافي
http://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/play-5935.html

[9] البيان التاسع عشر لمجلس شورى العلماء لتأييد الشيخ حازم أبواسماعيل لرئاسة الجمهورية
http://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/play-6533.html

to help people in need, increase the living standards of all Egyptians, care for poor people and not live his life away or be detached from his society.[10]

3. Salafi Invitation / Salafis of Iskandariya

After the 1970s, student movements in Egypt universities increased and a new movement emerged, which was known as "al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya". Many members of this movement then joined the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, but a group led by some people from Iskandariya declined, and decided to move on their own. This group was especially influenced by Saudi-rooted salafi formations and as from the 1980s they named themselves as "Al Madrasatul Salafiyah / the School of Salafiyah".[11] Spreading into other parts of Egypt rather quickly, this movement existed in preaches, in mosques, and in personal direction, but then they established many TV channels, therefore becoming a much wider voice to appeal to a much wider audience.[12]

After the revolution on 25 January, the salafi-rooted political parties made a fast entry to Egyptian politics and the leading groups of these parties came from these movements. There will be a separate section dedicated to the political parties established after the revolution, therefore for now some opinions held before the revolution will be briefly discussed.

Based in Iskandariya, this movement established a school named "al-Furqan li-I'dadi'd-Duat" in order to train their own communicators who would disseminate their ideas to society, therefore adding another dimension to their activities. They also published their views on the monthly periodical *"Savtu'd-Da've"*. In this period, they were accused of being "imported salafis" since they had relations with people such as Abd al-Aziz bin Baz and Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen who were among the pioneers of Saudi-rooted salafism.

The Salafis of Iskandariya were very widely spread and active in the society, but contrary to other Islamic sects, they didn't have an organized structure. Rather than being an institution-centered organization, they have been a person-oriented formation. They also do not adopt principles such as allegiance and secrecy, which other sects do, and believe that any work can be done openly and without allegiance to anyone.

The salafi summoners attach special importance to subjects such as tawhid and akaid, suggesting that true examples of Islam must be taken from the Qur'an and Sunnah through an understanding of the sahabah and tabi'un. They fight against

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[10] البيان الثالث والعشرون بخصوص دعم الدكتور محمد مرسي لرئاسة الجمهورية

http://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/play-6537.html

[11] Salahuddin Hasan, *es-Selefiyyûn fi Mısr*, Mısır, 2012, p. 21.

[12] Ali Abdulal, *ed-Da'vetü's-Selefiyye bi'l-İskenderiyye*, Beyrut, Müessesetu'l-İntişâri'l-Arabî, 2012., p. 36.

bid'ah and superstitions and they express that whoever adopts their principles must gain competency in religious branches of science. In order to gradually transform society and create an Islamic community, they adopted a four-stage method. The first stage is **cleansing**, where it is required to free Muslims' beliefs from everything that is against shariah, convince them to adopt salafi methods in their lives, and free all Islamic scholars and religious books from weakly founded and made-up narratives, Israel-based content and fiqh opinions which are against true hadiths. The second stage is **education/training**. A person who surpasses this stage becomes a good salafi. Individuals, who complete their education using religious books which are free of all sorts of errors, can summon Muslims to start educating them too. In a society where all individuals have completed these steps, an Islamic state can be established without any need for elections or reforms. The third stage is **al-mufasalah/divergence**. At this point Muslims announce that they are severing their ties with rulers who do not rule within the order that Allah has brought down. They express that these rules are in err and warn them and their helpers to return from superstition, and that otherwise they would be facing an Islamic jihad. It must be clearly expressed that all Muslims must state their sides, whether they are on the side of the truth, or power, and that if they are on the side of the power, than they'd be deemed to be on the side of superstition. The fourth stage is **jihad.** In this stage, if rulers don't accept to be ruled by Islamic rules and oversee the previous warning, the defenders of truth start jihad against them. At this point, the opposing sides are very clear. Part of society defends the truth, while the other part is pro superstition.[13]

According to this movement, which was free from all kinds of political activities before the January 25 revolution, it adopts democracy as a western system in the political order in Egypt. This system contradicts some of the principles of religion and is also a product of western culture, and is placed far from the principles of Islam. Therefore, democracy is not an alternative to the scholarship principle of Islam. In the case of democracy implementation, there is a possibility that someone who is not a Muslim or is a woman, or someone who is openly hostile to the religion, can be in a position to rule the Islamic State, which is unacceptable. The Salafis of Iskandariya softened their views in light of later developments and turned positively towards a possible democratic order. According to them, as long as one rejects all things superstitious as well as rejection of participation in foreign-originated actions, democracy can be utilized as a method to implement Islamic shariah.[14]

In the time of Husnu Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood were very interested in and successful at gathering support of student unions, syndicates, law societies, commercial chambers, etc. since these establishments did not have any powers to

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[13] Salahuddin Hasan, *Harîtatu't-Teyyârâti's-Selefiyye fi Mısr*,
http://www.onislam.net/arabic/islamyoon/salafists/113039-2010-03-09%2014-32-04.html

[14] Ali Abdulal, ibid, p.55.

make laws. In parliamentary elections they couldn't reach any consensus to preserve the same point of view. However, immediately after the revolution of 25 January they self-transformed into a political party and became an important part of Egyptian politics.

This moment, which comes from the same pool as Iskandariya salafis can be evaluated and is rather rooted in Cairo, but later diverged and named itself as "**al Salafiyah al Hareqia**", in the same group.[15] This movement was different from the Iskandariya movement in that it voiced its opinions about rules more openly and harshly. According to them it is not sufficient to announce that rulers who do not rule by what Allah brought down is not sufficient, one needs to announce them as blasphemers too, and very openly. Clothes that are against the rules of Islam and other behaviors classified as sin are also signs of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance). It is blasphemy to add anything to or subtract anything from shariah. And to them, it is unlawful to participate in parliaments too, because parliaments can choose to implement decisions that may not necessarily be rooted in Allah's shariah and therefore deem their constitutions to be better than religion. These salafi members are also known to harshly criticize other salafi groups. To them, some salafi groups spend half-hearted efforts in terms of the concept of sin, and limited the concept of blasphemy to reject or deny religion. Therefore they named them "the current murji'ah".

Mainly leaning on activities, this group does not accept the establishment of their own congregation in order to not to divide the Muslims into even more groups, and to encourage their supporters to work together with other congregations who work on the same areas they focus on in the field. Therefore it is not in their principle to reject working together with other organizations or congregations which aim to establish an Islamic state and re-construct the state of caliphate.[16]

B.   Salafis which Transformed from Congregations into Political Parties

Together with Arabic revolutions which started out in Tunisia and spread in a short time into Egypt, Libya and Syria, all political and intellectual movements in the Arabic world faced a new issue. There were religious groups with very little preparation for these developments, which, after a short period of flounder, quickly re-structured and the most obvious of them was salafi movements. Their views on political and social events were not very clear, their movements had no theoretical outlines and they acted according to the "fatwa" they received from their leaders. Salafi movements participated in political processes, which they sometimes had

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[15]   Abd al-Munim Munib, *Delîlu'l-Harekâti'l-İslâmiyyeti'l-Mısriyye*, Cairo, Mektebetu'l- Medbûlî, 2010, p. 131.

[16]   Salahuddin Hasan, ibid.

previously deemed as "non-religious", through various political parties which they established themselves.

Previously evaluated under "traditional/scientific" or "field action" categories, these movements then transformed into a "political/modern" identity. Before evaluating salafi rallies under political parties, there needs to be a focus firstly on their attributes to the events which led to the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 2011, which was the starting point of their political journey.

1. The Revolution on 25 January and Salafi Movements

The public movements in Egypt on 25 January 2011 were effective on salafi groups, and salafi ideas on political and social events were transformed at a great scale. When the events, which also promoted Husnu Mubarak to leave office started, the salafi movements in Egypt and salafi individuals assumed different attributes towards the country's agenda. We can group these attributes as follows.

a. Supporters and Active Participants of the 25 January Revolution

Known as the salafis of Cairo, or jihadist, or activist salafis from before, these groups supported the 25 January revolution and actively participated in the process which led to it. Prominent leaders of this movement, such as Sheik Muhammad Abd al-Maqsud, Sheik Neset Ahmad and Sheik Fevzi Said, participated in the demonstrations in Tahrir Square and supported the coup by influencing demonstrators with their speeches. They participated in the demonstrations held in all big cities of Egypt, starting with Cairo and Iskandariya and held independent public rallies of their own, but at times they also acted together with other liberal or nationalist groups which were against Husnu Mubarak in some areas. This support campaign, started by the Cairo salafis, turned into a platform in a short time with the support from some Azhar scholars and Iskandariya salafis. Consequently named "el-Hey'etü'ş-Şer'iyye li-Himâyeti'l-Hukûk ve'l-Hürriyâti'l-Meşrûa", this platform published memoranda supporting mass demonstrations, also voicing warnings that legitimate demands of the public must be met, the second article[17] of the constitution must be left untouched, no excess actions must be taken in demonstrations and public property must be unharmed.

b. Groups Clearly Opposing the January 25 Revolution

The salafis in Egypt did not have a homogeneous structure among themselves. For this reason, although they adopted similar ideas and approaches, they exhibited

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[17] "The state religion is Islam. Arabic is the official language. The principles of Islamic shariah are the main source of legislation."

very different attitudes in politics and social affairs. These fragmented approaches and dragging their supporting masses into arguments of kalam/fiqh did not bother the political rule before the revolution and quite the contrary, it was secretly supported too. However, with the start of mass demonstrations, when the base of Salafis who were not alien to political and social issues took to the streets, some Salafi leaders tried to prevent this according to the principle of "acting in line with divine rule". Salafi preachers such as Sheikh Mahmud Mursi, Sheikh Mustafa al-Adevi and Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Yakûb opposed the process of revolution by saying that it was not legitimate to participate in these demonstrations in their television speeches and took part in the side of the status quo. In their explanations they reiterated some verses and fitan hadiths and demanded that demonstrators leave the squares, return to their homes, go to masjids and pray for forgiveness, stay silent and firm to prevent deterioration, but they were rather ignored by society and were isolated. These Salafis, better known as the "Ansār al-Sunnah" group, stated that it was unlawful to protest against the demonstrations and the manager, in a statement issued after Husnu Mubarak, had to explain that he had delegated his powers over the mass events.

c. Those Hesitant Against the 25 January Revolution

Holding a very strong and important position among salafis, the Iskandariya salafis were against an organized leadership structure such as the Muslim Brotherhood and they were rather an organized group in itself in terms of social and cultural organizations. These groups took a rather pragmatic approach in terms of the revolution when they acted according to how the events of the revolution played out, and set their attitude according to relevant hadiths. When a call was made using social networks for 25 January demonstrations, Yasir Burhami, one of the prominent leaders of Iskandariya Salafis announced the following: "in the name of our attachment to our religion, our sense of responsibility for our country, our sensitivity to the benefits of our country, our prioritization of the safety of our country and our citizens in this testing time and our aim to eradicate the desire of our enemies which aim to lay instigation among us, we will not participate in the 25 January demonstrations…"[18]. The demonstration started in all squares in Egypt, Tahrir first, and then security forces left the squares which led to some street fights, which were then condemned by Iskandariya salafis as did other groups who participated in the revolution process. Seeing that a new era is starting, the Iskandariya Salafis acted in line with hadiths, and in time they changed their political stances and tried to demonstrate that this was caused by the difference in opinions, in which there is always room for mistake. Having had no clear attribute towards demonstrations during the times of revolution, Iskandariya Salafis actively participated in the later discussions of constitution and related matters, and quickly

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[18]   http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=5115.

organized themselves into becoming parties, taking their political roles in the country.

Salafi Movements Turning into Political Parties

Salafis were the most affected group by the intellectual and political changes that occurred after the Arab revolutions. Traditional salafism, which is not much concerned with intellectual and political issues, has found itself at the center of politics, especially with the change in Egypt. Both institutionalized salafism and charismatic personality-oriented salafism entered into a process of organization and party-establishment in the political arena where they were not much interested or involved before. Having no homogenous structure among themselves, the salafis started to join in politics by forming different political parties because they could not come together under a single party when they entered politics. Each political party established by the Salafis also emerged as an extension of the salafi tendencies they held before. The Iskandariya Salafis had very strict ideas before and during the revolution in terms of democracy and political parties, and they rejected democracy completely in their statements. For instance, Sheik Abd al-Munim Sahhat, one of the official spokespersons of the Salafi Invitation, stated that "We don't only say that democracy is unlawful, we say that it is also blasphemy..."[19] and "Democracy is a branch of secularism which separates religion from life. Islamists may or may not use democracy, but according to shariah, it cannot be accepted..."[20]. However, with the constitutional referendum in Egypt after the revolution, when the obstacles to establishing a political party were lifted, all the sections, especially the salafis who made these statements, quickly turned into political parties. After the revolution of 25 January 2011, the salafis who entered the parliamentary and senate elections in Egypt under three different party groups maintained their differences by establishing new parties in the following process. The political parties established by the salafis in Egypt after the revolution are the following.

a. Hizb al-Nour / Party of Divine Light

Known as the political branch of the salafis of Iskandariya, Hizb al-Nour was a party formed after the January 25 revolution. Iskandariya salafis, who have different tendencies, joined politics with this party. Since the establishment of the party, differences of opinion have emerged among the salafi leaders who have different tendencies. The fact that Salafist leaders who made statements on the basis of religious references and that democracy and political participation were illegitimate, seemed to give up their views in a very short period of time led to

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[19]   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kFirseQTQE&noredirect=1

[20]   Nawaf bin Abd al-Rahman al-Qadim, ''el-İslâmiyyûn ve Rebîu's-Sevrât'', *Merkezu'l-Arabî li'l-Ebhâs ve'd- Dirâsâti's-Siyâsiyye*, Qatar, 2012, p. 47.

internal and external debates in the party. The rulers of the Salafist leaders and the Nour Party had to remain in a position of constant defense by responding to accusations of being inconsistent, pragmatic, unprincipled from outside the party and discussions of "legitimacy" within. Despite all these debates, the party captured the wind of salafi discourse, which had for long years been effective on suburban population, and went on to become the biggest political salafi party. In the parliamentary elections held at the end of 2011, it entered into elections in an alliance they made with two other salafi parties and won 123 seats to become the second largest party in Egypt by gaining 24% representation in parliament. When the MPs of its two ally parties started doing politics under the roofs of their own parties, the Nour Party with its 108 MPs became subject to internal debates. A medical doctor, the party president Imad Abd al-Ghafur, delayed the party congress which was supposed to be held in time, but the congress still attempted to convene and rendered the president ineffective.[21]

Within the party, a reformist group, which called themselves the "Nour Party Reform Front", said that the party administration should separate the way with the "Salafi Invitation" and furthered the community-party debate. As a result of these discussions, two different tendencies emerged in the party, and each tendency appointed a leader for themselves and paved the way for the party to go to congress with a double lead. Although leaders of the Salafi Invitation intervened and tried to freeze the problems temporarily, Imad Abd al-Ghafur, the first founding president of the Nour Party, left the party with his team and established a new party under the name of "Hizbul Vatan". Yunus Mahyun, who lead the traditionalists against reformists in the party before, was brought to be head of the Nour Party. In the statement made in the name of the Salafi invitation, it was emphasized that there is no party representing the political party other than the Nour Party, and a distant attitude to the newly formed party was exhibited.[22]

In their program, the Nour Party extensively explained their perspective on Egypt's problems, stated that the most important problems of Egypt after the revolution were in the fields of politics, economy and security, but attracted attention with their discourse on "identity and religion". Accordingly, the Party aims at building a civilized and developed state that holds tradition and modernity together. The identity of Egypt is an Arab-Islamic identity. The second article in the Egyptian constitution should be protected as it is and the Islamic Sharia should determine the general framework of all political, economic, legal and social arrangements as the supreme base of the political system that will rule Egypt. The

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[21] http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=786801&SecID=65&IssueID=0#.UmuKteJrPmQ

[22] http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=31122012&id=ff819e94-715d-4175-84b1-85417419ed18

principles of Islamic sharia being the foundation of a constitution also preserves religious freedom of the Coptic people living in Egypt.[23]

In the first stage of Presidential elections in 2012, the Nour Party decided to support Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, who they considered as close to their ideas, but then when his candidacy was vetoed by the Supreme Military Council, they then gave their support to Abd al-Munim Abu Futuh, who separated from the Muslim Brotherhood Movement. In the second round of the presidential elections, they supported the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Mursi.

The Nour Party has been the focus of criticism of the liberal and Coptic groups in Egypt, both in the process of making the constitution and in its frequent press releases. They overthrew Muhammad Mursi, who was the first civilian President of the country elected through a democratic process on 3 July 2013, and supported the military coup which suspended the constitution, thus weakening their mass support.

After the decision to participate in the parliamentary elections, the Nour Party has included 15 female candidates in the candidate lists, leading to major debates among the Salafis. The party administration was then forced to announce that the female candidates were placed in the last rows of the lists and that the pictures of these candidates would not be used on the propaganda posters, and that they would use rose pictures instead.[24] MPs, who were elected as members of parliament after the election process, could not generate a stable and sustainable policy on behalf of the party by making constantly contradictory statements.

b. Hizb Al Adala Wa Tanmia / The Construction and Development Party

The group called "al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya", which has an important place in the Islamic community in Egypt is held responsible for the assassination of Enver Sedât, and took an active part in the 25 January revolution as well as giving support to the new process. It is mentioned among the party as having "salafi origin" because it is known for its proximity to salafi movements rather than the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.In the late 1990s, the leaders of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya entered a self-criticism process in their time in prison and announced to the public that they rejected all forms of violence.

Established by prominent names of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya such as Abbud Zumur, who was sentenced due to the assassination of Anwar Sedat and was set free in the process of the revolution, his brother Tariq Zumhur, Saffet Abdulgani and Ashraf Tawfik, the party defined itself with the slogan "construction, development, Islam sharia, political freedom and social justice". The party was a

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[23] http://www.alnourparty.com/page/program_culture

[24] Ahmed Zağlûl, *el-İslâmiyyûn ve's-Sevra*, Cairo, Evrâk li'n-Neşr ve't-Tevzî, 2012, p. 101.

pioneer in the establishment of the "Islamic block" union together with the Nour and the Assad parties.[25] In the first round of the presidential elections, they stated that they would support Abu Futuh but they would not interfere with Muhammad Mursi's supporters.

The founders of the construction and development party expressed that the revolution had taken place as a result of the acceptance of the prayers of the Egyptians who emerged with the slogan "the public wants the regime to fall", and that the repression, oppression and dictatorship order was over, and that they set out to pay their debts to their homeland Egypt and contribute to Egypt's march to development. According to the party's founding statement, the purpose of the party is to "First gain Allah's support, then realize the benefits which would bring prosperity to the country and its citizens in this world and in the afterworld, and prepare Egypt for a forefront position among developed nations". The purposes of the party include protecting the Arab and Islamic identity of Egypt, opposing obstacles to this, fighting against the erosion of values and morality as an attempt to prevent all kinds of westernization attempts, carrying out legal, constitutional and political reforms that will not exclude any political movement or social sector, working to build a new Egypt upon principles that protect the rights of every citizen, protect the safety of foreigners and observe equality, freedom, justice and pluralism.[26]

The Construction and Development party opposed the military coup of July 3 and took part in anti-coup demonstrations in all parts of Egypt.

c. Hizb al-Fadhila / The Virtue Party

The Virtue Party, which was founded in 2011 and is the first party known with a salafi identity, emerged with the slogan "The party that wants to spread the values of justice and equality in accordance with the principles of Islam Sharia and to re-establish the leadership position of Egypt in all areas". The party's founders, Mahmoud Mohammad Bedr, Mohammad Abduh al-Imam, Khaldid Saith and Sheikh Ferhat Ramadan, one of the pioneers of the salafi movement, announced that they would not be participating in parliamentary elections, which started quite shortly after their establishment, because they wouldn't be able to complete their preparations. After Adel Abd al-Maqsud, who was presiding the party, resigned from the party due to a variety of reasons and started works to establish a new party, some internal debate ensued in the party.

The Virtue Party, which continues its path with the slogan, "Altogether for the welfare of Egypt", announced that they will work for the improvement of the society and civil institutions in accordance with the provisions of the constitution,

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[25] http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=518618&SecID=65&IssueID=0#.Um4k2OI5nmQ

[26] http://albenaa-tanmea.com/Program.aspx

re-establish Egypt's leader position in the Islamic world with a development project which will take efforts of all citizens, provide justice and equality for all citizens of the country, observe the principle of a just income share, warrant constitutional rights and freedom for every single individual in the country and finally, support the younger population by respecting their opportunities.[27] In its program, the party established that democracy is similar to the scholarship principle in Islam, that both regimes put first as the priority of the public in rule as political interpretation, that a political power can only be legitimate through public election and will, therefore demonstrating its attitude against the theological discussions in the subject of democracy.[28]

As the other parties of salafi roots, the Virtue Party announced that all Egyptians must support Palestinians so that a Palestine Country can be established around a capital city of Jerusalem. In the first round of the presidential elections, the party supported Abu Futuh, and Muhammed Mursi in the second round. The members of the Virtue Party, who opposed the military coup of July 3, 2013, also supported the anti-coup demonstrations.

d. Hizb al-Asalah / The Authenticity Party

The Authenticity Party, which was established in 2011 by Abd al-Maqsud and his colleagues, who left the position of President of the Virtue Party, is another party known for salafi disposition. Adel Abd al-Maqsud, a military officer, vice President of Internal affairs to the principal Habib al-Adli and previously an officer of the Presidency of Internal Affairs, announced, together with several colleagues, that the other executives in the Virtue Party, which he presided, "became distanced from a disposition which respects legitimacy, respects the supremacy of law and adopts mild salafi Islamic management and got into a conspiracy which inclines towards too harsh ideas that would harm Islamic activities and general benefits" and that he resigned from the party.[29]

Emerging with the principle "A modern point of view established in the rooted tradition", the Party of Nobility affiliated the revolution of 25 January to the society's noble stance, and suggested that Egypt was recently ruled in a wrong way and therefore distanced itself from its true character, and that corruption has become very widespread. In its program, the party announced that Sharia is considered to be the basic source of the constitution, that justice is guaranteed to all sections of the public by constitution and that Muslims are free to implement their own private law; persons of competency must be appointed to relevant positions,

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27 http://www.alfadyla.com/aboutus

28 http://www.alfadyla.com/program

29 http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=452334#.Um5PFeI5nmQ

that political power would change hands only through elections and that all elected rulers, the President included, are responsible to the public for their actions.[30]

The party nominated Abdullah al-Ashal, who was a retired ambassador for the presidential elections, but when the candidate withdrew in favor of Muhammad Mursi, with the concern that the votes of the Islamists would be divided, the Nobility Party followed a different policy from the parties of the other salafi parties by supporting Mursi in both rounds of these elections. As a result of the discussions in the party in 2013, an election was held for leadership, and Ehab Shiha was elected as the president with the support of the party members.

The members of the party who opposed the military coup took part in the anti-coup demonstrations. The coup management's abolishment of the constitution, which was set with 65% of positive votes from the Egyptian public, was harshly criticized by the Nobility Party. The party management, which strongly opposed the 50-person commission appointed by the coup management to make a new constitution, supported the constitution which was suspended, and accused the coup plotters of intending to cancel the constitution and position themselves as the only legitimate power, and also accused the individuals appointed to the comission by the junta of being the coup plotters' robbers.[31]

Sheik Muhammad Abd al-Maqsud, known by his closeness to the party, and who is also the brother of Adel Abd al-Maqsud, founder leader of the Nobility Party, addressed the demonstrators in the Rabia Square, as a person of influence on the Egyptian salafis, and harshly criticized the coup plotters. His attitude also affected the party's anti-coup policy. The Nobility Party took part in the "National Alliance Against the Coup" founded after the coup and organized anti-coup demonstrations by defending the elected President Mohammed Mursi.

e. Hizb al-Watan / The Homeland Party

The disagreements among the salafi opinions, mainly between Iskandariya and other salafi movements of Egypt, which were reflected onto the Nour Party, their political branch, and resulted in deep controversies and resignations from within the party. The founding chairman of the Nour Party, Imad Abd al-Ghafur acted as the leader of the reformers within the party and had to leave the party. Setting out with the purpose of cleansing the party management from the hands of salafi congregations, Imad Abd al-Ghafur founded the Homeland Party in 2013. Abd al-Ghafur, trying to adopt a moderate path between the other salafi parties and the political branch of the Muslim Brothers, Freedom and Justice Party, was appointed vice-president by Muhammad Mursi. Abd al-Ghafur carried out this duty until the

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[30]   http://www.alasalah.org/files/alasalah%20party.pdf

[31]   http://www.alasalah.org/show-266.html

military coup, opposed the coup rule and supported the anti-coup demonstrations as a party.

The fact that the leader of the Nour Party, Yunus Mahyun, supported the coup plotters, and the fact that he took part in the coup coalition together with the representative of the liberals, Muhammad Baradei and the Copts, gave the impression that the newly formed Motherland Party's predecessors took precedence in terms of representation. Because many Salafi circles, who had previously supported the Nour Party, actively participated in anti-coup demonstrations. Moreover, it disturbed the party base that the commission appointed for the construction of a new constitution by the coup management, stated that they would not place some of the articles in the new constitution which were added to the last constitution as a result of the intense pressure of the salafis.

The Homeland Party, which has attracted the attention of other Salafi circles, especially the members of the Nour Party, opposed the practices of the coup management by defending the constitutional situation in the era after the military coup.[32]

Conclusion

The most ancient religious-civil structures of Egypt, "Al-Jamiah Al-Shariah" and "Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah", have been the source of all the religious movements and communities of Egypt today. All the other salafi-prone formations of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement have emerged from the main pool of these two big establishments. The founders and leaders of both structures are of Azhar origin. Both took stands against the traditional sects common in Egypt and affected large sections of society. In particular, they struggled against bid'ah and superstitions, which were considered in connection with these sufi tendencies. Both of them have adopted the same understanding of religious missions such as the cleansing of religion from bid'ah and superstition, asking for help at tombs, making sacrifices to them and praying there. However, they have adopted different attitudes in terms of evaluating sects. The Al-Jamiah Al-Shariah formation did not reject all the sufi structures and favored those who remained attached to sunnah. Therefore it was always in closer relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood members. The formation of "Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah" was in close cooperation with salafi movements because it considered it a principle to combat sufism and sects. It was the roots to many salafi movements of today.

Salafis, who reorganized rather quickly after the revolution of 25 January and entered parliament and senate elections under Nour Party, became successful at such a scale which greatly shifted the balance in the Middle East and became an alternative to the political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since their

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[32]   https://www.facebook.com/watanpartyeg

foundation, they stayed away from political actions and even deemed democracy and elections as illegitimate affairs according to Islamic doctrines, stating clearly that the main contradiction between them and the Ihvan was that Ihvan considered democracy and parliament as a legitimate alternative, therefore their plunge into the political world and establishing parties meant that they were dragged into quite an uncharted territory for them. Wavering between their political theories and political actions, salafi movements failed to produce solutions for political, social and economical problems concerning the country and in addition, they became divided at every internal problem they encountered. Their statements and activities in the short term parliamentary activities showed that they were not ready for politics.

Salafis took place in the constitution's production commission established in 2012 and took great efforts to add certain articles to the constitution, which was accepted and effected with a referendum on 25 December 2012 but was suspended in a military coup on 3 July 2013. There were intense debates on the second article of the former constitution, which was transferred into the new one likewise; "The State's religion is Islam, the official language is Arabic and principles of Islam shariah are the main source of law"[33]. Salafis insisted that this article was ambiguous, open to different interpretations and therefore it has to be explained in a new article, and they went into quite harsh arguments with the representatives of liberals, leftists and Copts in the same commission. After these groups left the commission, the intense pressure coming from the Salafists gave way to addition of article 219 to the newly constructed constitution. This article interprets the second article as follows: "The principles of Islamic shariah includes Islamic shariah's universal evidence, procedural and fiqh rules and recognized sources of Sunni Islam methods". The Nour Party, the political representative of the same Salafi groups, stands beside the Military junta with representatives of the liberal and Copts, who abandoned the constitutional commission as a result of their persistent attitude in this article of the constitution, and adopted a unprincipled policy in support of the coup.

In the Arab Islamic world, the issue of transformation from a congregation to a political party is not only a problem of the Salafi groups, but also for the other Islamic communities. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements such as Nahda, who had the opportunity to do legal politics after the Arab revolutions, have shown that they have an advantageous position in practical politics than the Salafis because they have a stronger literature and a clearer point of view with the theoretical debates over democracy and parliament. Salafi movements, however, close the gap between "fatwa" and "politics" and have a problem to base every political attitude on the basis of religious references. Therefore, their political statements made for emerging economic, social, etc. issues, which required an

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[33] ''Düstûru Cumhûriyyeti Mısr el-Arabiyye'', *Metâbiu'l-Hey'eti'l-Âmme li'l-İsti'lâmât*, Cairo, 2012.

active political stand were always the subject of criticism from their congregation's perspective. For instance, the position of women in social life, whether they can participate in party affairs or even be nominated, whether credit with interest can be taken from international monetary funds and many other issues were approached by the party but then criticized by the congregation.

The military coup on July 3, 2013 against Mohammad Moussi, who came to power in Egypt in a free election, and the events that developed after it, led to a radical separation between the Salafist groups. Many of the founding members of the Nour Party, a great salafi coalition, opposed the military coup and left the party, and some were arrested for their criticism of the coup. The Nour Party, which is merely a symbolic party today, has lost a great deal of support throughout the Egyptian region due to its support to the military junta.

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Salafies in Nigeria*

Adem ARIKAN**

Abstract

Nigeria is an important country where population is mainly composed of by Muslims. Salafism has an important place in the Nigerian Muslim's history. Osman B. Fudi, who has an important rollin spread of Islam in Nigeria, struggled against bid'ah, and who struggled to perform Sunnah. Another movement which struggled against bid'ah is Izala al-bida Community. Also Boko Haram is a popular Salafi Cihadist group which is widely mentioned in the media. In this study, the history, views and the connections of those groups with each other and with Salafism would be analysed.

Keywords: Nigeria, Salafi, Uthman b. Fodio, Izala, Boko Haram.

Nijerya'da Selefîler

Özet

Nijerya, nüfusunun çoğunluğu Müslümanlardan oluşan önemli bir Afrika ülkesidir. Nijerya Müslümanlarının tarihinde Selefîlik önemli bir yere sahiptir. Nijerya halkının Müslüman olmasında büyük katkısı olan Osman b. Fûdî, bid'atler ile mücadele etmiş, sünneti ihya etmeye gayret göstermiştir. Bid'atler ile mücadele eden bir diğer hareket İzâletü'l-bid'a cematidir. "Boko Haram" diye meşhur Selefî Cihâdî grup da sıklıkla basında kendinden söz etirmektedir. Bu çalışmayla bu hareketlerin tarihleri, görüşleri ve birbirleri ve Selefîlik ile olan ilgilerinin ortaya konulması hedeflenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nijerya, Selefîler, Osman b. Fûdî, İzâle, Boko Haram.

I. Introduction

The groups who refer to themselves as "Salafis" are divided into several sub-branches. According to a classification, there are three groups within Salafis: Saudis/Wahhabists, Jihadists, and Politicians.[1] This classification can also be divided into further new sub-branches. Among the other groups, Wahhabism and

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1 Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "Günümüzde Selefilik ve İslâmî Hareketlere Olan Etkisi", *Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik*, ed. Ahmet Kavas, İstanbul, Ensar Neşriyat, 2014, p.485-524.

its impacts have been the subject of much research. "Although it is a common thesis that the first impact of Wahhabism on Muslims was seen on some public resistance movements which emerged in the 19th century, it is not a thesis based on strong evidence." One of these movements is the one started by Uthman ibn Fodio, which emerged in West Africa. "The impacts of Wahhabism became clear mainly in the 20th century." The developments in transportation and communication made it easy for different congregations and organizations in different countries to get in contact with the scholars in Najd. These groups include *Jama'atu Izala al-Bid'a wa Iqamat al-Sunna* in Nigeria.[2]

The reform movement, started by Uthman ibn Fodio, concerns northern Nigeria and a vast area which is now within the borders of different states. *Izala* is a Salafi group institutionalized in 1978 in Nigeria, where Boko Haram, which is regarded as a Jihadist Salafi group, emerged in the same region.[3] The literature on these three groups focuses mainly on their history.[4] The aim of this article is to give introductory information based on their relationship with Salafism.

II - Uthman ibn Fodio Movement

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Africa had witnessed some movements aiming to spread Islam and to counter colonialism of European countries. The most significant pre-colonial Islamic Jihadist movement in West Africa was started by the Fulani descendant Uthman ibn Fodio (Uthman Dan Fodio, dan Fodio).[5] The reform movement, started by Uthman ibn, has the greatest effect in spreading and strengthening Islam in West Africa.[6]

Uthman ibn Fodio was born in Maratta, a village near the city of Galmi in northern Hausaland, in 1168/1754. He is referred to as Uthman ibn Fodio due to his father's title "Fodio"[7], which means "fiqh scholar" in the Fulani language. He was taught by his father and various scholars, many of whom were his relatives. He

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[2] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "Vehhâbilik", *DIA*, XLII, 611-615.

[3] Tijani el-Miskin, "The Salaf, Jihadi Salafism and the Insurgency in Nigeria", *Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik*, ed. Ahmet Kavas, İstanbul, Ensar Neşriyat, 2014, p. 157-171; Freedom Onuoha, "Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria", *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria*, ed. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Ibadan, African Studies Centre (ASC), 2014, (p.158-191), p.160.

[4] For example, John Azumah's study reveals the history of these three groups in a chronological order. John Azumah, "Boko Haram in Retrospect", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 26 (1), 2015, p.33-52.

[5] Rıza Kurtuluş, "Afrika, Afrika'da Başlıca İslâmî Cihad ve Direniş Hareketleri", *DİA*, I, 426-428.

[6] Abdurrahman Zekî, "Batı Afrika'da Dinî Islah Hareketleri", *Batı Gözüyle Tecdid: İslâm Dünyasında Tecdid Hareketleri 1700-1850*, ed. Nail Okuyucu, İstanbul, Klasik, 2014, (p. 261-275), p. 267.

[7] Abdullah ibn Fodio, *Ida' Al-Nusukh Man Akha'ztu Min Al-Shuyukh*, p.552 (M. Hiskett, "Material Relating to the State of Learning among the Fulani before Their Jihād", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, XIX/3(1957), p. 550-578, with the text in Arabic and the translation into English).

started to communicate religious messages and give scholarly lessons. The focus of his preachings were on reviving the sunnah and eliminating bid'ah (innovation). A great number of people became Muslims through his guidance, which became disadvantageous to the local government. Nafata, the then ruler of Gobir (1794–1801) assumed a tough attitude against him. In 1798, he issued an edict ordering the converts to revert back to the traditions of their fathers, and banned the wearing of turbans and veils.[8] When Nafata's son Yunfa[9] came to the throne in 1803, he behaved well to Uthman and his congregation, who helped Yunfa in his struggle for the throne. However, he attempted to assassinate Uthman soon afterwards. In 1218/1804, Uthman decided to immigrate to Gudu together with his congregation.[10] He sent an ambassador to Yunfa from Gudu. Upon Yunfa's declining his offer, he declared his leadership, receiving the titles *amir al-mu'minin* and *caliph*.[11] Then, he called for jihad against Yunfa. The long-lasting wars resulted in the victory of Uthman and death of Yunfa in 1223/1808.[12] Following the wars with other neighboring administrations, a state called *Sokoto Caliphate* was founded in 1812.[13]

It is noted that Uthman ibn Fodio saw his political dissidents as apostates, and ruled that they must be killed. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d.908/1504), who was involved in the political struggle in the Nigeria region and affected the region through his works, is claimed to be the person he took as his model.[14] It is understood that he started to defend his opinion that those committing major sins (murtakib al-kabira) should also be regarded as Muslims[15] again after the wars ended[16], information on which can be found in the correspondence exchanged during the wars against Bornu. One of the prominent scholars in the region, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi[17] (1775-1837) started to defend Bornu. He said in the letters he wrote to the rulers of Sokoto that some sins

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[8] Muhammad Bello, Infaq al-Maysur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Takrur, inv. Bahija Chadli, Rabat, Jamʿat Mohammed al-Khamis, 1996, p.142.

[9] M. Hiskett, "The nineteenth-century jihads in West Africa", The Cambridge History of Africa, 1790-1870, 7.bs., ed. J. E. Flint, Cambridge, 2004, V, (p. 125-169), p. 135.

[10] Bello, Infaq al-Maysur, p. 143; Kadir Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar (Fülani Islahat Hareketi*, 2nd edition, Konya, Ensar Neşriyat, 2008, p. 101-103.

[11] Bello, Infaq al-Maysur, p. 147.

[12] Muhammed Bello, the son of Uthman ibn Fodio, gives a wide coverage to these wars in his work, *Infaq al-Maysur* (p. 247 ff.). See also: Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 112-137.

[13] Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 170.

[14] Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 251. See also: Ahmad Mohammad Kani, *Nijerya'da İslami Cihad*, trans. Ömer Gündüz, İstanbul, Şafak Yayınları, 1991, p. 82; Hasan 'Isa 'Abd al-Zahir, "Beyne'd-Daveti'is-Selefiyye ve'd-Daveti'l-Fûlâniyye", *Havliyye Külliyetu'ş-Şerîa ve'l-Kânûn ve'd-Dirâsâti'l-İslâmiyye* (Journal of Faculty of Sharia, Law & Islamic Studies), issue 1, Qatar, 1401/1980, (p. 135-162), p. 144.

[15] For the texts on the topic in Uthman ibn Fodio's *Nasa'ih al-Ummat al-Muhammadiyya*, see: M. Hiskett, "An Islamic Tradition of Reform in Western Sudan from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, XXV, No. 1/3, 1962, (p. 577-596), p. 558.

[16] Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 249-256.

[17] See: Ahmet Kavas, "Kânimî", *DİA*, XXIV, 311-312.

committed commonly within society could not be a reason for charging them with blasphemy.[18]

After the state was founded, Uthman ibn Fodio left the administration in the east of the country to his son Muhammad Bello (d. 1253/1837) and in the west to his brother Abdullah (d. 1245/1829). Uthman ibn Fodio died on 20th April 1817 (3 Jumada al-Akhirah 1232). His grave is still an important place for Muslims in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad to visit.[19]

The state, founded by Uthman ibn Fodio continued to administer the region for almost a century. After Attahiru, the last ruler of the Sokoto caliphate, was killed during the war against Britain, which colonized the region, and the political sovereignty ended (1903). The British colonial rule did not completely eliminate the family of Uthman ibn Fodio. Losing their political authority, the family has been the religious leader of the Muslims in the country since then. Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar, succeeding Ibrahim Muhammadu Maccido, the nineteenth sultan of Sokoto, after his death in a airplane crash on 29th October 2006, is the secretary general of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA)[20]. Another member of the same family, Ahmadu Bello, who had been chosen as the spokesman of the Northern House of Assembly, founded an organization called "The Society for the *Jamaat Nasr al-Islam*" to promulgate Islam. He was assassinated during a coup on 15th January 1966.[21]

There were people relating Uthman ibn Fodio's movement with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's invitation and many researchers have conducted a number of studies on Wahhabism's impact on this movement. It was claimed that Uthman ibn Fodio's state was founded upon the Wahhabist invitation.[22]

Wahhabism has been claimed to have influenced many movements that emerged after Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's invitation. According to these claims, when the leaders of these movements came to Mecca for their pilgrimage duty, they met the Wahhabist scholars of Najd, and were influenced by their invitation and conveyed those Wahhabist views to their homeland. Researchers

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[18] Kadir Özköse, "Fülâni Hareketi Önderleri İle Bornu Ulemasından el-Kânimî Arasında Gerçekleşen, Savaş Barış, Tekfir Uhuvvet Tartışmalarının Yer Aldığı Mektuplaşmalar", *Tasavvuf*, 2004, V-13, p.189-230. See also: Bello, Infaq al-Maysur, p.232; H. A. S. Johnston, *Sokoto Halifeliği Dönemi Nijerya'da Etnik ve Dini Çatışma,* trans. Kadir Özköse, Konya, Ensar Neşriyat, 2008, p.156.

[19] Ahmet Kavas, "Uthman ibn Fodio", *DİA*, XXXIII, 466-467.

[20] www.nscia.com.ng

[21] Ahmet Kavas, "Sokoto", *DİA*, XXXVII, 351-352.

[22] Wahbah al-Zuhayli, "Teessüru'd-Da'vâti'l-Islâhiyyeti'l-İslâmiyye bi-Da'veti'ş-Şeyh Muhammed b. Abdilvehhâb", *Buhûsu Usbûi'ş-Şeyh Muhammed b. Andilvehhâb,* Riyad, Câmiatü'l-İmâm Muhammed b. Suûd el-İslâmiyye, 1403/1983, (p. 293-341), p. 329.

"should not base their judgements only on assumptions but should support them with hard evidence."[23]

The people claiming Uthman ibn Fodio's movement was influenced by Wahhabism focus mainly on pilgrimage. Uthman is considered to have pilgrimaged or been influenced by the Wahhabist invitation through his teacher Jibril ibn 'Umar, who had pilgrimaged.[24]

The historians make clear statements about the influence which mentions the date, as well. Uthman went to Mecca for his pilgrimage duty in 1220/1806 and copied some of the books written by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab there. These new ideas aroused a desire to combat the bid'ahs in his own country.[25] It is impossible to determine where this information, which is about his pilgrimage including its date, and the copying of the books he saw during his travel, is obtained from. Because those who talk about the pilgrimage with these details did not cite any sources. The sources refute this information. In his book that he penned in 1227/1812[26], which is after the date (1220/1806) Uthman allegedly went on a pilgrimage, Abdullah ibn Fodio, Uthman's brother, writes that Uthman wanted to go pilgrimaging but his father didn't allow him.[27] In addition, it is understood from some of Uthman's poems that he couldn't go pilgrimaging.[28]

Some researchers who studied Fodio, led it to Wahhabism and made different findings. Mervyn Hiskett determined that "Hausa reformists were never Wahhabists". Sheikh (Uthman) is "far from Wahhabist extremism on fundamental principles." His teacher, Jibril ibn Umar also "was not a person who adopted Wahhabists' ideas completely."[29] B.G. Martin notes that Uthman ibn Fodio refused

[23] *Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Muhammad Sakakir, Dawat al-Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab wa-Dawat al-Shaykh Uthman ibn Fudi; Dirasah Tarikhiyah Muqaranah*, and Jamiat al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud al-Islamiyah, 1421/2000, p. 293.

[24] Mustafa Mis'ad, "Eseru Da'veti'ş-Şeyh Muhammed b. Abdilvehhâb fî Hareketi Osman b. Fûdî el-Islâhiyyei fî Garbi Afrîkıyyâ", *Buhûsu Usbûi'ş-Şeyh Muhammed b. Andilvehhâb,* Riyad, Câmiatü'l-İmâm Muhammed b. Saud al-Islamiyah, 1403/1983, (p.423-444), p.432, 441-442; ; Muhammed Abbas, "ed-Dâiyetu'l-Mucâhid Osman dan Fodyu", *Mecelletu'l-Vayu'l-İslâmî,* volume 21, issue 243, 1405/1984, (p. 52-56), p. 54; Thomas Walker Arnold, *İslam'ın Tebliğ Tarihi,* trans. Bekir Yıldırım, Cenker İlhan Polat, İstanbul, İnkılap, 2007, p. 418; Johnston, *Sokoto Halifeliği Dönemi Nijerya'da Etnik ve Dini Çatışma,* p. 154.

[25] Abd el-Fattah el-Guneymi, "Eserü Da'veti Muhammed b. Abd el-Wahhab fi Garbi Ifrikiyah", *Buhûsu Usbûi'ş-Şeyh Muhammed b. Andilvehhâb,* Riyad, Câmiatü'l-İmâm Muhammed b. Suûd el-İslâmiyye, 1403/1983, (p. 343-368), p. 353; Abd al-Qadr Muhammad al-Sibai, "min Alâmi's-Selefiyye fî Afrîkıyâ; eş-Şeyh Osman İbn Fûdî", *Mecelletu't-Tevhîd,* Cairo, Cemâatu Ensari's-Sunneti'l-Muhammediyye, 21st Year, issue 5, 1413/1992, (p. 44-47), p. 45.

[26] Abdullah b. Fûdî, *Îdâu'n-Nusûh,* p. 550.

[27] Abdullah b. Fûdî, *Îdâu'n-Nusûh,* p. 555.

[28] *el-İslâm fî Nîceryâ ve Devru'ş-Şeyh Osman b. Fûdî fî Tersîhihî,* Beirut, Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye, 2009, p. 88, 90-95, 143.

[29] Mervyn Hiskett, *Hakikat Yolu,* trans. Kadir Özköse, Konya, Ensar Neşriyat, 2008, p. 185.

Wahhabism.[30] It is also seen that researchers who seem to lean towards Shiites argue that Uthman ibn Fodio was completely detached from any influence of Wahhabist movements in every stage of his jihad. [31]

Uthman ibn Fodio is a Sufi who is a member of the Qadiriyya order. Kadir Özköse extensively discussed the Sufi understanding of Fodio.[32] Citations from the manuscripts of Uthman shows that he was a member of the Qadiriyya order.[33] The argument Fodio's movement "was not based on the Sufi understanding and life style"[34] is not true. It is seen that those who link Uthman's movement to Wahhabism usually do not mention his Sufi aspect.

Uthman ibn Fodio wrote around 150 books and risalahs[35], of which 115 were identified.[36] In addition to the printed books and manuscripts that have reached today, some of these are credited to Uthman through citations.[37] His son, Muhammed Bello's 100 works were also identified.[38] Uthman's book named *İhyâu's-Sünne ve İhmâdü'l-Bid'a* was printed. The content of this book, which draws attention with its name, contains important details about its author when examined carefully. Uthman ibn Fodio repeats a very important expression in terms of this subject many times at the end of each topic. Uthman prays: "O Allah! Make us succeed in obeying the sunnah of the prophet, Muhammad (p.b.u.h.), for the sake of him." He also ends the topic of bid'ah with this statement.[39] Fodio's phrase "for the sake of Muhammad" is bid'ah according to the Wahhabist views on this subject. For example, according to al-Ghamidi, this statement is a type of resorting that is bid'ah.[40] According to Misbah ed-Din Junaid, the phrase "for the sake of Muhammad" and this type of resorting is "the most obvious indicator of the

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[30] Bradford G. Martin, *Sömürgeciliğe Karşı Afrika'da Sufi Direniş,* trans. Fatih Tatlılıoğlu, İstanbul, İnsan Yayınları, 1988, p. 27, 39.

[31] Writers are especially interested in Uthman's opinions on Mahdi. Taheer Yusuf al-Waili and Ilham Mahmud al-Jadr, "el-İmbiraturiyyetu'l-Fûâniyyetu'l-İslâmiyye ve Tesaddîhâ el-Biritanî fî Garbi Afrikiyyâ", *Mecelletu'l-Kulliyeti'l-İslâmiyye, volume* 3, issue 10, 1430/2009, (p. 21-40), p. 25.

[32] Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 175. See also: Kani, *Nijerya'da İslami Cihad, p*. 85; Hasan Isa Abd al-Zahr, *ed-Davetu'l-İslâmiyye fî Garbi Afrikiyâ ve Kıyâmu'd-Devleti'l-Fûlânî,* Riyad, 1401/1981, p. 315.

[33] Muhammed S.Umar, "Movements and Opposers of Sufism in Nigeria", p.", trans. Süleyman Derin, *Tasavvuf*, IV-10, 2003, (p. 377-398), p. 381; Abdullah Abdürrezzak İbrahim, *Afrika'da Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar*, trans. Kadir Özköse, Konya, Ensar Yayıncılık, 2008, p. 39-46.

[34] Abdurrahman Zeki, "Batı Afrika'da Dinî Islah Hareketleri", p. 275.

[35] The works of Fodio's digital texts and their English translations can be found at: http://siiasi.org/digital-archive/shaykh-uthman-ibn-fuduye/, 24.05.2015.

[36] Ahmet Kavas, "Uthman ibn Fodio", *DİA*, v.33, p. 466-467.

[37] For further information and references to these works, see: Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 75.

[38] Bahija al-Shazeli lists 101 references to his books and their library records. Muhammad Bello, *İnfâku'l-Meysûr*, ("Tajamatu al-Muellef wa asaruh"), p. 17.

[39] Uthman ibn Fodio, *İhyâu's-Sünne ve İhmâdü'l-Bid'a,* 2nd ed., inv. Ahmad Abdullah Bajur, Cairo, 1406/1985, p. 56, 68.

[40] Said ibn Nasir al-Ghamidi, *Hakîkatü'l-Bid'ati ve Ahkâmihâ*, I-II, 3rd ed., Riyad, Maktabat al-Rushd, 1419/1999, vol.I, p.191-193.

difference between the faith of Fodio and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was influenced by ibn Taymiyyah and spread his sect."[41]

In the books of Abdallah ibn Fodio, Uthman's brother, there were three citations of Ibn al-Qayyım al-Jawziya who is a student of Ibn Taymiyya. This situation caused suspicions that the Uthman's movement was influenced by Wahhabist sources. It is impossible to say that Uthman was influenced by Wahhabists or his movement was a part of Wahhabism.[42] Muhammad al-Bahiy, opened a title on the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah in the introduction written by Uthman to his work titled Ihya al-Sunnah. According to al-Bahiy, Uthman was a student of Ibn Taymiyyah's books.[43] This claim is rejected as Uthman said on the grounds that "resorting to the Prophet is considered as shirk by Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd al-Wahhab."[44]

It is possible to determine sectarian differences which are important for this article's subject. Wahhabism has been claimed to have influenced Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab who believes in *Ahl al-Sunnah, firqa-i najiyyah.* Uthman ibn Fodio expresses his own denomination in his works with the words "Ash'ari".[45] His work titled *"Usûlü'l-Vilâye ve Şurûtuhâ"* begins with the words "Uthman ibn Muhammad ibn Uthman, who is Fulani in birth, Maliki in sect, Ash'ari in faith says". His opinions are also suitable for the Ash'ari method .[46]

The researchers who claim that Uthman was not affected by the Wahhabist invitation makes these points in particular: (1) Uthman is a Sufi member of an order with Ash'ari faith and Maliki sect. According to the faith of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which is the faith of Ahl al-Sunnah and his sect is the sect of Ahmad in Hanbal. He is not a Sufi, on the contrary, he fought against the extremism of Sufis. (2) Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is from the school of Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn Qayyım. But Uthman adhered to the sheikhs of Sufism and the order. (3) Although Uthman cites his sources in his works, there were no references to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab or Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyım. (4) If there had been an influence, Uthman would have also established an Ibn Taymiyyah madrasah in the Hausa states and announced it like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. (5) A Wahhabist influence is claimed through Jibril ibn Umar, who had pilgrimaged. Sheikh Jibril went on his second pilgrimage around 1200/1785. If the

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[41] Misbah ed-Din Junaid, *eş-Şeyh Osman b. Fodio al-Fulani and Akidatuhu ala Daw'i al-Qitab wa al-Sunnah,* (Mecca), Câmiatu Ummi'l-Kurâ, 1402/1982, p. 203.

[42] Johnston, *Sokoto Halifeliği Dönemi Nijerya'da Etnik ve Dini Çatışma,* p. 153.

[43] Uthman ibn Fodio, *İhyâu's-Sünne,* ("Introduction"), p. 14.

[44] Fathi Hasan al-Masri, "Introduction", Uthman ibn Fodio (Uthman Ibn Foduye), *Beyânu Vucûbi'l-Hicra ala'l-İbâd (Bayan wujub al-hijra ala'l-ibad),* Sokota, Khartoum University, 1397/1977, p. 18.

[45] For example, see: Uthman ibn Fodio, *Tarîku'l-Cenne,* p. 6, http://siiasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/tariql-janna-arabic.pdf, 24.05.2015.

[46] al-Sakakir, p. 178-179, 285-286; Abd al-Zahr, "Beyne'd-Daveti'is-Selefiyye ve'd-Daveti'l-Fûlâniyye", p. 144; Abd al-Zahr, *ed-Davetu'l-İslâmiyye,* p. 330; Fathi Hasan al-Masri, "Introduction", Uthman ibn Fodio, *Beyânu Vucûbi'l-Hicra,* p. 2.

jihad had occurred with the encouragement of the Sheikh Jibril, it should have started thirty years ago. Uthman explains the reason for the jihad as that it was the only way left. Osman declared jihad in order to defend himself and his congregation. Hanbali sect was widespread within the community of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and th Ash'ari faith wasn't present in Najd. Therefore, he was a member of the Hanbali sect. However, the environment which Uthman came from was different. Sufism was widespread there. Sufi sheikhs were followers of Ash'arism and the Maliki sect, as well. Therefore, Uthman's invitation was inclined to these factors forming the community he lived in.[47]

Nigerian al-Iluri also notes that Uthman was a mujtahid who is Qadiri in Sufism, Ash'ari in faith, Maliki in fiqh. Uthman ibn Fodio's and Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's invitations are not connected. The assumption that Uthman went on pilgrimage, was influenced by Wahhabism there, and started the reform when he returned to his country is a presumption and prediction. Uthman did not go on pilgrimage or umrah, or even to any Arab area. Uthman ibn Fodio was in the Maliki sect, Ash'ari in faith and Qadiri in order. Whereas Muhammed Abd al-Wahhab is Hanbali and Salafi. Uthman cites the scholars he referenced in his works and he never referred to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Uthman ibn Fodio accepts resorting to the prophet and the saints.[48]

Uthman ibn Fodio's statements in his works also reflect his mentality. His view on the discipline of Kalam is one evidence that shows this. Uthman ibn Fodio argues that Kalam is fard al-kifayah.[49] He also criticizes the extremist opinions arguing that knowing Kalam is obligatory for belief validity which causes disputes and misconception.[50] Uthman ibn Fodio's views on the adjectives are in line with the Ash'ari sect. Misbah ed-Din Junaid determines that Uthman was one of the following Ash'aris. For example, on the subject of ru'yatullah, the exile of the direction is criticized for not following the opinion of the Salaf. Uthman considers acknowledgement sufficient enough for faith. His exclusion of deeds in faith is criticized via a comparison with Salaf's opinion. Uthman did not decry the discipline of Kalam or prevent engagement in Kalam; his references the books of Kalam and he praised some of the scholars of Kalam. Uthman ibn Fodio commits

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[47] al-Sakakir, p. 294; Abd al-Zahr, "Beyne'd-Daveti'is-Selefiyye ve'd-Daveti'l-Fûlâniyye", p. 152; Abd al-Zahr, *ed-Davetu'l-İslâmiyye*, p. 325.

[48] *al-Iluri, al-Islam fi Njarya and al-Sheikh Uthman ibn Fodio al-Fulani,* Cairo, Mektebetü'l-İskenderiyye, 1435/2014, p. 135, 136, 138, 140, 141-145. Cf. Andawi al-Tijani, "Osman dan Fudyu; Ebû Haraketi'l-Islâh fî Garbi Afrikiyyâ", *Majalat al-Ummah, volume* 4, issue 38, Qatar, 1404/1983, (p. 77-79), p. 78.

[49] Uthman ibn Fodio, *Fath al-Basair li-Tajkîki Waz'ı Ulumi el-Bewatin wa al-Zevâhir,* inv. Seyni Moumouni et Salou El-Hassan, Lyon: ENS Editions, 2012, p. 35-36.

[50] Hasan Isa Abd al-Zahr, *al-Dawatu'l-Islamiyyah fi Garbi Afrikiyah wa Qiyamu'd-Dawlati'l-Fulani,* Riyad, 1401/1981, p. 218; Özköse, *Sufi ve İktidar*, p. 276.

by resorting to bid'ah in terms of Wahhabist views by saying "for the sake of Muhammad."[51]

After finishing the topics with short explanations in the *Ihya al-Sunnah* chapter, with the statements from *Kavâidü'l-Ahkâm* of Abd al-Salam (d. 660/1262) he explains his opinion that the public doesn't need to know the details of Kalam. Uthman says that the heedful ones should produce ideas in regards to theological principles. Uthman ibn Fodio in Kalam is the *Şerhu Cevhereti't-Tevhîd* of Abd al-Salam ibn Ibrahim al-Lakani (d. 1078/1668). He conveys his view that "only acknowledgement is enough for faith in the world." [52] Abu Abdillah Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Senusi (d. 895/1490) has statements confirming this view in his book. Uthman ibn Fodio says "Those who praise the discipline of Kalam does it from one aspect and those who decry it does it from another. Both praising and decrying without a detailed explanation is wrong."[53]

Uthman did not only write statements about Kalam in his book, but also taught them. Abdullah, Uthman's brother, notes that he had been receiving lectures from his older brother since the age of 13 and explains the lessons and texts that he received from him. Abdullah writes that he received books and commentaries of al-Sunusi from Uthman on the discipline of Tawhid.[54]

Uthman ibn Fodio is a Sufi from the order of Qadiri from the Ash'ari and Maliki sect. He is a reformist against bid'ah and defended the recovery of sunnah. His efforts to recover sunnah and eliminate the bid'ahs caused him to be introduced as a Wahhabist. Like many movement leaders of his period, Uthman emphasized the Quran and the sunnah. Therefore, he is considered to have a Salafi aspect.[55] However, by taking his views which we see in his works into consideration, linking him to Wahhabism as a sect does not seem possible.

III - Izalatu'l-Bid'ah and Iqamatu's-Sunna Congregation

Today, Muslims in Nigeria love Uthman ibn Fodio as the most famous scholar and administrator.[56] In addition to the differences, the congregations in Nigeria boast by relating themselves to the Fodio movement. Today, Salafi summoners in

[51] Misbah ed-Din Junaid, eş-Şeyh Osman b. *Fodio al-Fulani wa Akidatuhu ala Daw'i'l-Qitab wa's-Sunnah*, (Mecca), Câmiatü Ummi'l-Kurâ, 1402/1982, p. 101, 108-109, 167-171, 175-178, 231-233, 236-237.

[52] *İhyâu's-Sünne*, p. 73-77.

[53] Abdullah b. Fûdî, *Îdâu'n-Nusûh*, p. 555.

[54] Abd al-Zahr, *ed-Davetu'l-İslâmiyye*, p. 323.

[55] Kani, *The Islamic Jihad in Nigeria*, p. 21.

[56] Yasir Badawi Abd al-Majl Mustafa, Muhammad Bawa al-Nijayri, "ed-Da'vetü's-Selefiyye ve Eseruhâ ale'l-Müctemei'n-Nîceyrî eş-Şîmâlî; Dirâse Meydâniyye alâ Cemâ'ati İzâleti'l-Bid'ati ve İkâmeti's-Sünne", *Mecelletü'l-Ulûm ve'l-Buhûsi'l-İslâmiyye*, Câmiatü's-Sudân li'l-Ulûm ve't-Teknuliciya, 15 (2), 2014, (p.1-11), p. 4.

the region also say that they have adopted his method.[57] Abubakar Gumi[58] (Jumi), who influenced the establishment of the Izalatu'l-Bid'ah and Iqamatu's-Sunna congregation, speaks of Uthman ibn Fodio with appreciation. In the interview he gave in September, 1987, he says: "Our efforts for novation would have been in vain if not for the achievements of Uthman ibn Fodio.[59] Gumi refers to the views of Fodio especially when talking about the bid'ah.[60]

The findings regarding some schools which opened in Nigeria during the British colonial period (1903-1960) are important for this topic. For example, the Kano Law School, which was established in 1934 by the British to enable judgeships, is one of these. This school was changed in 1947 to train teachers and was renamed School of Arabic Studies (SAS). SAS became a center of development for the new generation of ulama in Nigeria. Almost all of its graduates were anti-Sufism. Abubakar Gumi also graduated from this school.[61]

Nigeria gained independence in 1960. In the northern part of Nigeria, which was managed by the Federation, Ahmadu Bello, one of Uthman's family members, became the ruler between the years of 1954 and 1966. Abubakar Gumi also worked with Ahmadu Bello. In Mecca, where he pilgrimaged, Gumi was the interpreter of Ahmadu Bello. Ahmadu Bello appointed Gumi as the head of Nigeria Pilgrimage Office in 1957. Gumi accompanied Bello during his travels to the Arab states. In 1960, Gumi was appointed as the deputy grand kadi of Northern Nigeria, and in 1962 as the kadi. Bello, in 1961, led many people to become Muslims with the Jama'atu Nasril Islam, JNI organization. Under the name of Osmaniyyah, he tried to bring Muslims from the orders of Tijani and Qadiri together. Some research stated that the *Jama'atu Nasril Islam* (JNI) organization was founded by Gumi.[62] Gumi received financial support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait when he was the head of JNI.[63] Today, the head of the JNI congregation is Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar, who is one of the descendants of Uthman ibn Fodio.[64]

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[57] Gumi's life can be read by his narration in his book. The copyright page of this book, which cannot be seen, is as follows: Abubakar Gumi, with Ismaila Tsiga, *Where I Stand*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1992.

[58] Roman Loimeier, "Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria", *African Islam and Islam in Africa. Encounters between Sufis and Islamists*, edit. Evers Rosanderve David Westerlund, London, Hurstand Company, 1997, (p.286-307), p. 286.

[59] Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, el-Akîdetü's-Sahîhabi-Muvâfakati'ş-Şerîa (The right belief is based on the shari'ah), Ankara, Hilal Yayınları, 1392/1972, p. 38, 41, 42, 56.

[60] Umar, "Nijerya'da Tasavvuf Hareketleri ve Muhalifleri", p. 389.

[61] Ramzi Ben Amara, "Shaykh Ismaila Idris (1937-2000), the Founder of the Izala Movement in Nigeria", *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, 11, 2012 , (p. 74-78), p. 74.

[62] Ramzi Ben Amara, *The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharia Re-Implementation*, Ph.D. Thesis, Bayreuth University, 2011, p. 110.

[63] www.jni.com.ng

[64] Loimeier, "Islamic Reform and…", p. 288-291.

Ahmadu Bello was assassinated during the 1966 coup. Gumi was deprived of political support with the assassination of Bello, but he began to act more independently. In 1967, he started making speeches on Kaduna radio. In 1970, he started writing in the newspaper. When Gumi wrote the book *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha bi-Muvâfakati'ş-Şerîa* in 1972, the dispute between Tijaniyyah and Qadiriyya orders began. Since the book was in Arabic, the dispute was limited between the struggling scholars. However, when his book that he wrote in Hausa language, was published in Zaria in 1981, the disagreement between Gumi and members of Sufism turned into a conflict in the village and town mosques of northern Nigeria.[65]

Gumi's book, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, is not a systematic text of faith or Kalam. For example, the book does not include adjectives. Criticism of Sufism draws attention through the classical texts of the order of Tijaniyyah. It is possible to determine the sources of his statements on Kalam. Gumi defines faith as confirmation and acknowledgement. It is understood that he took the statement here from Tahawi's (d. 321/933) text of faith. He must have taken the statement about "equality in faith" Ibn Ebi al-Iz (d. 792/1390), who is the commentator of the Tahawi text.[66] Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999) receives objections and criticisms about the texts and his commentary.[67] These critics of Ibn Baz, who represent Wahhabi opinions, indirectly object to Gumi's citation and criticism. Abd al-Aziz ibn addresses Gumi himself about another subject. Gumi, who wrote a book about the death of Isa, wrote a book named Hallu'n-Niza fi Mas'alati Nuzuli Isa ibn Maryam and argued that Isa will not descend on the day of judgment. Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz asked Gumi to change this opinion of his.[68] In addition, in his tafsir titled *Raddal-Adhan* that was completed in 1392/1972, Gumi writes that he followed the faith of Salafism in regards to names and adjectives and that he benefited from the books of Abd al-Wahhab and the guidance of Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz.[69]

In 1407/1987, Gumi was given the "King Faisal Service to Islam Award." The reasons for the award included his penned jihad to explain the true Islamic faith and his stance against bid'ahs and superstitions. His efforts in this field included his translation of the Quran into the Hausa language and compiling his book titled *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha bi-Muvâfekati'ş-Şerîa* and his tafsir titled Reddü'l-Ezhân.[70]

[65] Yet to be seen in this article, these are written about Gumi's book: Alex Thurston, "Abubakar Gumi's al-ʿAqida al-Sahiha bi-Muwafaqat al-Shariʿa: Global Salafism and Locally Oriented Polemics in a Northern Nigerian Text", *Islamic Africa*, Vol. 2, no: 2, (Winter 2011), p. 9-21.

[66] Ibn Ebi'l-İzz, Şerhu'l-Akîdeti't-Tahâviyye, ed. et-Türkî, el-Arnaut, Beirut, Müessesetü'r-Risâle, 1411/1990, p. 459, 464.

[67] Ibn Baz, et-Talîkâti'l-Bâziyye alâ Şerhi't-Tahâviyye, Riyad, Dâru İbn Kesîr, 1429/2008, p. 747.

[68] http://www.binbaz.org.sa/node/8601, 28.05.2015.

[69] Gumi's sources include the Jalalayn tafsir, Suleiman ibn Umar's book titled *elfutûhâtu'l-İlâhiyye bi-Tavzîhi Tefsîri'l-Celâleyn li'd-Dakâik'l-Hafiyye* on this tafsir, Sayyid Kutub's *Fî Zilâli'l-*Kur'ân and Ismail ibn Kasir's tafsir as well. Abubakar Mahmud Jumi (Gumi), *Reddu'l-Ezhân ilâ Me'ânî'l-Kur'ân,* Kaduna (Nigeria), Müessesetu Gumbî li'l-Ticâra, 1408/1987, p. 828.

[70] http://kfip.org/ar/shaikh-abu-bakr-mahmoud-gumi/

Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, the king of Saudi Arabia (1964-1975), is not known as a Wahhabist imam but as a Muslim leader with an Islamic view of the world. Rabita (Rabitatu'l-Alami'l-Islami, Muslim World League), founded in Mecca with the conference held during the pilgrimage in 1962 is considered to be a project of Faisal.[71] Gumi is among the founders of Rabita.

Gumi's book titled *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha* is his greatest work against Sufism. Gumi is also a former order member. However, he left the Qadiri order in the 1950's. His criticism on Sufism mostly targets the Tijanniyyah order.[72]

Two short salawats named "Salâtü'l-fâtih" and "Cevheretü'l-kemâl" which they consider that Ahmet al-Tijani (d. 1230/1815) received from the Prophet form basis of moral and method in the Tijanniyyah order. Gumi, believed that Salâtü'l-fâtih and Cevheretü'l-kemâl are more virtuous than the invocations recited by the members of other orders, and the non-Tijanis can not benefit from them even if they recite them.[73] Gumi's criticism includes these salawats, as well.

According to Gumi, "Salâtü'l-fâtih" is one of the malign bid'ahs practiced in his country. It not appropriate to use practices like this that are related to the Prophet. Gumi, criticizes the views on the life of the Prophet after his death in Ali Harazim's book titled *Cevâhirü'l-Me'ânî*, which is one of the classical sources of Tijanniyyah.[74] Gumi argues that the content of this book exceeds the limits of the religion.[75]

Gumi states that in Sufism, for some people, religious rankings such as gaws and kutub are designated, and that all kinds of deeds of the people in these positions are accepted. It is requested that if these people do not follow the rules of the religion, they should not be disregarded. It is believed that these people know what parapsychology is, eliminate the faith of whom they wish, strengthen the faith of their beloved ones and know the unseen. But according to Gumi, these are all superstitions and false. Those who believe that these people are capable of doing these things are disbelievers.[76]

According to Gumi, one should avoid books on the rankings of saints and Qadiriyyah prayers, books like Cevâhiru'l-Me'ânî that belong to the Tijaniyyah order, as well as all the books that take away from the religious and Arabic

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[71] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *İhvan'dan Cüheyman'a Suudi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, İstanbul, Rağbet Yayınları, 2004, p. 183, 184, 188.

[72] Muhammad S.Umar, "Nijerya'da Tasavvuf Hareketleri ve Muhalifleri", p. 389-390.

[73] Kadir Özköse, "Ticânî, Ahmad b. Muhammed", *DİA*, XLI, 130-133. For details, see: Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *Son Dönem Tasavvuf Akımlarından Ticaniyye ve Tekrur Hareketi, trans.* Kadir Özköse, Ankara, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 2000, p. 59.

[74] Ali Harâzim, *Cevâhirü'l-meânî*, edit. *Abd al-Latif Abdurrahman*, Beirut, Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye, 1417/1997, p. 103.

[75] Gumi, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, p. 19-20, 23, 35.

[76] Gumi, *al-Akidatu's-Sahiha*, p. 44.

sciences, and the books calling people to enter into the service of one of the sheikhs. Gumi calls these books "*kutubu'd-dasisa*".[77]

Regarding the prominent Tijaniyyah sheikh of the period, Ibrahim Niass[78] (Ibrahim Niasse, d. 1975), Gumi says "Hypocrisy came to Nigeria through sacrilege and impiety." In an interview on 27 June 1978, Gumi, who stated that he contacts every scholar in order to benefit from customs, told that after the sacrilege of Ibrahim Niass was exposed, he broke off his relationship and became distant.[79]

Every believer is a saint according to Gumi. One who says the confession of faith and does not have anything to eliminate it in themselves is a Muslim and is to be treated as a Muslim. The one who accepts everything brought by the Prophet in their heart is a believer. There is no way for us to know this. It is a secret between Allah and his servant. It will be different depending on the owner's confirmation and the extent of his practice. Anyone, whose confirmation transcends their desire and wrath, and whose every act is for Allah, who fears Allah and has hope in Allah, they are the saint[80] mentioned in the verse.[81] These views of Gumi were also the subject of Protestant Islam debates.[82]

According to Gumi, the enemies of Islam tried to prevent Muslim children from learning their religion and Arabic. They received support with the writing of the books that destroyed Sunnah in the name of discovery and power. They opened schools that teach the devastation of western culture. The children of the pagans whose fathers went around naked, were educated there and served in the state. They began to direct Muslims to daydream within the superstitions.[83]

Together with the criticism of Gumi's Sufism, the Tijannis and Qadiris who had been discussing some issues earlier, cooperated and started to defend each other. They emphasized that those against Sufism had graduated from the schools opened by the British. These graduates misinterpret the Quran and insult the saints. This group was portrayed as the product of Gumi's Wahhabist supporters and of the British occupation's schools.[84]

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[77] Gumi, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, p. 79-80.

[78] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *Son Dönem Tasavvuf Akımlarından Ticaniyye ve Tekrur Hareketi*, p. 182.

[79] Muhammad al-Sani Umar Musa, "Ârâu'ş-Şeyh İbrahim İnyâs es-Senegâlî fi'l-Mîzân", *Kırââtun İfrikiyye,* issue: 5, 1431/2010, (p.4-21), p.8. For more details on the crisis between Gumi and Ibrahim Niass, see also: Rüdiger Seesemann, *The Divine Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-century Sufi Revival*. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 227-229.

[80] Jonah, 62, 63: Unquestionably, for the allies of Allah there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. Those who believed were fearing Allah.

[81] Gumi, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, p. 9, 17.

[82] Roman Loimeier, "Is There Something like Protestant Islam?", *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 45, Issue 2, 2005, p. 216-254.

[83] Gumi, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, p. 78.

[84] Umar, p. 388, 390, 396.

The organization of Izalatu'l-Bid'ah wa Ikamatu's-Sunnah[85], which conformed with Gumi's views, was founded on 8 February 1978 by İsmail İdris (1937-2000).[86] The struggle between Sufis and its allies was intensified by the establishment of the Izala. In the schools of the Izala groups, *Kitâbü't-Tevhîd* of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab was taught and the books of Ibn Taymiyyah were brought from Saudi Arabia and distributed.[87]

One of the issues discussed in Nigeria's recent history is the implementation of religious law in the country. In Nigeria, there were partial sharia practices in different regions. In 2001, Ahmad Sani Yerima, the administrator of the Zamfara region, implemented Shari'ah in the region he directed and called for other administrations in the northern regions. The public also demanded this.[88] Islamic sharia was previously recognized in Nigeria on issues of people. Conflicts arose with confrontations of the Christians when the state of Zamfara declared that they were putting Shari'ah in full force. In 2003, the number of states that implemented sharia was increased to eleven. [89]

According to Gumi, the kadi who does not judge by Allah when he can, is fasiq if he believes that what he is doing is haram. If he believes that this is halal, he is a disbeliever. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers / wrongdoers / defiantly disobedient (al-Maidah 44, 45, 47). One, who takes a subject of the court of to a non-Muslim kadi when there is the possibility of taking it to a Muslim one, is fasiq; if she/he accepts that this is lawful, she/he is a disbeliever.[90]

Jihadî Salafi Boko Haram congregation is another group in Nigeria that wants to implement religious rules. As can be seen below, the leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, states that those who judge with the civil law (al-kawanibu'l-waz'iyya) are disbelievers.

IV - Boko Haram

The group known as "*Boko Haram*" calls itself "*Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li'd-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad.*" *Boko Haram* means "The Western education system is haram" in Hausa

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[85] www.jibwisnigeria.org
[86] Ramzi Ben Amara, "Shaykh Ismaila Idris (1937-2000), the Founder of the Izala movement in Nigeria", p. 74-78.
[87] Umar, "Nijerya'da Tasavvuf Hareketleri ve Muhalifleri",p. 393.
[88] Ahmad Murtada, "Cemâ'atü Boko Haram: Neş'etühâ ve Mebâdiuhâ ve A'mâluhâ fî Niceryâ", *Kırââtun İfrikiyye,* issue: 12, 1433/2012, p. 14.
[89] These are Niger, Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Bauchi, Borno, Youbi, Kaduna and Gombe. Muhammed Livauddin Ahmed, el-İslâm fî Niceryâ, p. 219-223 Lapidus says "In 2001, 20 Northern countries adopted Islamic law." Ira M. Lapidus, İslâm Toplumları Tarihi, trans. Yasin Aktay, M. A. Aktay, İstanbul; İletişim, 2013, II, p. 465.
[90] Gumi, *el-Akîdetü's-Sahîha*, p. 76.

language. It is also associated with the English word "*book.*"[91] The name of Boko Haram became more well-known after the conflicts in August 2009. This group was named as "Yusufiyyah" in the name of Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009) who is considered to be the founder.[92]

It is noted that the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, was a student of Abu Bakar Gumi's [93] or a follower of Ja'far Adam (d.2007) who is a member of the Izala.[94] According to a study, Ja'far Adam criticized Muhammad Yusuf about the deprivation of Muslims for opposing Western-style education.[95] On 13 April 2007, Sheikh Ja'far Adam was killed by unidentified persons during his morning prayers at Dorayi Juma'at Mosque in Kano.[96]

There are also those who base the origin of Boko Haram on the Maitatsine movement in Nigeria.[97] The leader of the Maitatsine Movement, Muhammad Marwa, (d. 1980) is distinguished by his activities in Kano in northern Nigeria. Some extreme views such as the claim of being the prophet and rejection of Qiblah are being linked to Muhammad Marwa. His congregation is also introduced as being anti-western and anti-technology. Thousands have died in the conflicts involving the supporters of Muhammad Marwa.[98] It was recorded that Boko Haram's founder Mohammed Yusuf said what he was opposing was the cultural side of Western education, and that he was not against technology.[99]

According to Ahmad Murtada, Muhammed Yusuf was a member of the *Muslim Brothers'* (Ikhwan) group in Nigeria. When an inclination towards Shia began, under the leadership of Ibrahim Zakzaky[100] in Ikhwan, another group approached Salafism.[101] At that time, Muhammad Yusuf got closer to the Izalat al-Bid'a wa Ikamat al-Sunnah congregation and became the ruler (sadr) of the Yobe and Borno

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[91] Paul Newman, "The Etymology of Hausa boko", http://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman-2013-Etymology-of-Hausa-boko.pdf, 09.06.2015.

[92] Ahmed Murtaza, "Cemâ'atü Boko Haram…", p. 13-24.

[93] Ahmet Göksel Uluer, *Nijerya'da silahlı örgütler: Boko Haram ve Mend*, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences Department of International Relations, Department of African Studies, 2014, p. 54.

[94] Gérard Chouin, Manuel Reinert&Elodie Apard, "Body count and religion in the Boko Haram crisis", *Boko Haram: Islamism…*,(p. 2013-236), p. 214.

[95] Freedom Onuoha, "Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria", p.168.

[96] http://www.nmfuk.org/jaafar.htm, 10.08.2015.

[97] Abdurrahim Sıradağ, "The Rise of Terrorist Groups in the Sub-Saharan Africa: Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, SETA Analiz, May 2015, p. 11.

[98] Uluer, *Armed Organizations in Nigeria: Boko Haram and Mend*, p. 50-53. See also: Elizabeth AlloIsichei, "The Maitatsine risings in Nigeria 1980-85: a revolt of the disinherited", *Journal of religion in Africa*, XVII/3, 1987, p.194-208; Mervyn Hiskett, "The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment", *Journal of Religion in Africa,* Vol. 17, no. 3, 1987, p. 209-223.

[99] Tijani el-Miskin, "The Salaf, Jihadi Salafism and the Insurgency in Nigeria", p. 161.

[100] For the movement under the leadership of Ibrahim Zakzaky, see: www.alharakah.net, www.islamicmovement.org

[101] Ahmad Murtada, "Jamaat Boko Haram…", p. 13-24.

regions. However, the supporters of Mohammed Yusuf started to disagree with *Izalat* over time, which caused them to leave *Izalat* and found a new group called *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li'd-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad* in 2002. After a year, in 2003, some conflicts started to arise between the group and the security forces. The security forces caught Mohammed Yusuf alive in Ibn Taymiyyah Center/Mosque, which Muhammad Yusuf used, in 2009. Muhammad Yusuf's limbs were torn off and his corpse was left on the street.[102] It has been questioned why he was not taken to court.[103] Boko Haram increased their number of attacks after their leader had been killed.[104]

The text *Hâzihî Akîdetünâ ve Menhecünâ* is considered to belong to Mohemmed Yusuf.[105] And the present leader of Boko Haram, Abu Bakar Shekau reads an epistle which he wrote to introduce his congregation to his religious fellows in a video, saying that his doctrines belong to Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jamaah and that he aims to invite people to the Qur'an and true hadiths. There are some subjects such as dividing tawhid into two or three fractions, considering someone committing a major sin not to be an apostate, and making a distinction between the major and minor (akbar and asghar) sins among the subjects covered in the epistle. Shekau says that they accept what they see in Allah's book, the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Salaf ulama. He conveys the statements of Ibn Taymiyyah stating that if he does not declare anyone a disbeliever because of his/her sins unless he considers it halal. He refers to *al-Jawabu'l-Mufid* of Abdurrahman ibn Abd al-Hamid who interprets Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his records in terms of polytheism. He conveys his statement, which belongs to Abdurrahman ibn Hasan, who is the grandson of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and refers to a consensus on the idea that one can not be a Muslim unless one is away from grand shirk, is from Muhammad al-Asimi's *ed-Duraru's-Seniyye fi'l-Ecvibeti'n-Necdiyye*. Although Shekau opposes opinions accusing them of declaring people disbelievers, he uses statements declaring people disbelievers about certain groups. Those who are subject to democracy, those who judge by civil law (al-kawanibu'l-waz'iyyah) and those who go to foreign and Western schools are considered to be disbelievers.[106]

Ahmad Murtaza listed the books that Boko Haram members read. These include the books of Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Saudi fatwa institution.[107]

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[102] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/02/2010298114949112.html,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0Yj5EnP-xU, 10.06.2014.

[103] Ahmad Murtada, "Jamaatu Boko Haram", p.14.

[104] Sıradağ, "Sahra Altı Afrikası'nda Terörist Grupların Yükselişi: Boko Haram ve Eş-Şebab (The Rise of Terrorist Groups in the Sub-Saharan Africa: Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab", p. 13.

[105] This text is available online: http://www.leechworld.com/files/download/1874/3.rar, 10.06.2015.

[106] The video found was published on 26 January 2015.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xbUBZ7uk1Q, 09.06.2015.

[107] Ahmad Murtada, "Cemâ'atü Boko Haram…", p. 22.

Although their source person and books are the same, the explanation of the Saudi mufti about Boko Haram is noteworthy. In April 2014, female students were kidnapped from a school in Chibok in the Borno state in northern Nigeria.[108] During this incident that had worldwide repercussions, many celebrities called for attention with the statement "Bring Back Our Girls."[109] The mufti of Saudi Arabia made a statement on this incident, as they had dissociated themselves from similar Salafi groups in the past.[110] Although they take the same person and books as their base, mufti Abdulaziz Al ash-Sheikh considered Boko Haram from the Kharijite sect and called it a deviated (dallah) group. According to him, Boko Haram causes Islam to look bad.[111]

A few days after the Saudi mufti's statement, Sheikh Muhammad Sani Yahya Jingir, the head of the group *Izalatu'l-Bid'ah*, made a similar statement about Boko Haram and talked about "dishonoring Islam."[112] In the city of Jos in Ramadan (on 6 July 2015), many people died in the attack on the mosque, where Sheikh Muhammad Sani Yahya Jingir was in, the sheikh remained alive. It is noted that the sheikh has a book called *Boko Halal*.[113] A number of accusations have been reported between the Izala group and Boko Haram regarding criticism, threats and suspicious events.[114]

On 1 February 2014, Sheikh Mohamed Awwal Adam Albani, who was described as a scholar and was engaged in scientific studies of Salafi movements in Nigeria, was assassinated.[115] While some of the reporting websites related to the incident to Boko Haram and noted that the sheikh criticized the group,[116] some of them added the information on the fact that the sheikh was against the government and was arrested many times.[117]

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[108] http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/314297--nijeryada-yaklasik-200-kiz-ogrenci-kacirildi, 11.06.2015.

[109] http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/rss/324995--kacirilan-kiz-ogrencilere-destek-artiyor, 11.06.2015.

[110] Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "Separation That Became Deeper with 9/11: Suudî Selefiyye ve Cihadî Selefiyye", Dinî Araştırmalar, 2004, volume: VII, issue: 20, p. 205-234.

[111] http://alhayat.com/Articles/2235083/, 11.06.2015.

[112] http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-was-sponsored-to-smear-islam-jingir/, 09.08.2015.

[113] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33406537, 09.08.2015.

[114] For a compilation of these news, see: Omar S. Mahmood, "Is Boko Haram Targeting Izala?", http://africaconflictblog.com/2015/01/15/is-boko-haram-targeting-izala/, 11.08.2015.

[115] According to Nigerian Maiduguri university professor Tijani Al-Miskin, there are many Islamic movements in Nigeria. More than ninety percent of Islamic movements are inviting peacefully. Salafi movements can be categorized into three groups. The first one is engaging in scientific studies like Albani. Another group is focusing on summoning, preaching and education. The third group of Salafi movements is engaged in armed struggle like Boko Haram. http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/251332--nijeryada-islami-hareketler-bariscil, 09.08.2015.

[116] http://www.worldbulletin.net/muslim-world/128112/nigerias-leading-salafist-scholar-shot-dead, 09.08.2015.

[117] http://www.alukah.net/world_muslims/0/66091/, 09.08.2015.

Boko Haram is also frequently reported in the press. The Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa'ad Abu Bakar, who is one of the descendants of Fodio, called for Nigerians to unite to defeat[118] the Boko Haram organization.[119]

V - Conclusion

The three movements that left their mark on the history of Muslims in Nigeria are addressed in their Salafi aspects. Uthman ibn Fodio, who contributed greatly to the spread of Islam in the region, amd is a leader whose sect is the Maliki sect and who is a member of the Qadiri order. Taking his works into consideration, it can be concluded that Uthman is a member of the Ash'ari order. The fight against bid'ahs and the efforts to recover the sunnah made this movement look Salafi. There were also people associating this movement with Wahhabism. However, these claimants could not prove this relationship, and the assumptions put forward were not valid, and they were rejected by the evidence of those who opposed the claim of the Wahhabist influence on the movement.

Abu Bakar Gumi, who is known for his harsh criticism against the common orders in Nigeria, particularly the Tijaniyyah order and the *Izalatu'l-bid'a wa Ikamatu's-Sunnah* organization share closer opinions with the Wahhabists. Gumi notes that he followed the Salafi faith in regards to the names and adjectives and he he benefited from the books of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and explanations of Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz. Gumi was given the "Service to Islam Award" by Saudi Arabia.

Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li'd-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad or famously known as *Boko Haram* which is a Jihadist Salafi is a congregation founded by Muhammad Yusuf who was in the Izalat for a while. The Saudi mufti and Sheikh Jingir, the leader of the Izala group, criticize Boko Haram. There are media reports stating the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa'ad Abu Bakar, who represents the Uthman ibn Fodio family, wants the public to fight against Boko Haram.

It is understood that the three movements, which are called Salafi in Nigeria, are different from each other. Individual studies are needed on each one. Although there are a wide range of literature in different languages related to these groups, Turkish studies are not yet at a sufficient level.

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[118] There are some video footage on the internet that features efforts to fight against Boko Haram. For example, images, if they are true, in the documentary "Nigeria's Hidden War" show people's despair.
See: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/on-demand/58946-001,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOf8_ecDk3c, 11.06.2015.

[119] http://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/boko-harama-kinama-128957.html, 27.05.2015.

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Kadızâdelis as a Typical Example of Salafi Thinking in Ottoman Society[*]

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Abstract

Some ideas raised in 16th and 17th centuries as opposed to Sunni-Hanefi theology tradition of Ottoman society has certain characteristics of Salafi thinking. The people who defend such ideas by adapting them to their time's political and scientific conditions named as Kadizadelis/Fakis but they overlooked as being considered an anti-Sufi group of people in the pursuit of personal and political interest rather than presenting Salafi dynamics in their thinking. This article aims to evaluate that group of people in terms of their similarity and differences with Salafi thinking in the history of Islam.

Keywords: Salafism, innovations (bid'at), Al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wal-nahy an al-Munkar, Birgivî, Kadızadelis.

Osmanlı Toplumunda Selefî Düşüncenin Tipik Bir Temsilcisi Olarak Kadızâdeliler

Özet

XVI. ve XVII. yüzyıl Osmanlı toplumunda, Sünnî-Hanefî çizgideki ilim geleneğine aykırı olarak ortaya çıkan bazı fikirlerin, Selefî düşüncenin karakteristik özelliklerini taşıdığı söylenebilir. Bu fikirleri o dönemin siyâsî ve ilmî şartlarına uyarlayarak sahiplenen kişiler, târihî kaynaklarda "Kadızâdeliler/Fakılar (Fakîhler)" ismiyle anılmış; ancak düşünce tarzlarında etkisini gösteren Selefî dinamikler gözden kaçırıldığı için sadece, siyâsî idarenin güdümünde hareket eden tasavvuf düşmanı bir zümre olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Oysa sözü edilen ekolün Selefî söylemle benzeşen ve ayrışan yönleri üzerine odaklanılması daha tutarlı görülmekte olup, bu makalenin de konusunu teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Selefîlik, bid'at, emir bil-ma'rûf nehiy an'il-münker, Birgivî, Kadızâdeliler.

Introduction: Emergence of Salafi Discourse in the Ottoman Era

The first traces of sympathy felt towards the Salafi ideology by the Ottoman society are related to Birgiwi Mehmet Efendi (d. 981/1573).[1] Imam Birgiwi, who worked as a professor and preacher in İstanbul and neighboring cities, objected to the scientific Ottoman tradition that philosophical sciences should be learned besides the classical sciences, and he directed criticisms towards the Sufism concept which had gained a significant place in this tradition.

Certain researchers found the knowledge level of Birgiwi, who provided approximately 60 works in various disciplines, as superficial and inconsistent compared to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), who was a significant name for the Salafi ideology taken as a model by Birgiwi.[2] In addition, he supported the idea of *adapting the basics of Islam* to solve the social and political issues throughout his life, which indicates that he was close to the ideology of Ibn Taymiyyah. Birgiwi's efforts to rehabilitate a society which, according to him, was exposed to great religious and ethical corruption largely resembled the *reformation concept* of Salafi ideology. Moreover, it should be noted that he kept his desires related to reformation and improvement alive with the concept of *the fight against innovations* seen in Salafism. As a result of this motivation, his religious works often criticize certain issues such as constructing mausoleums on graves, reading the Quran for a fee, using musical instruments, and performing nafilah prayer with the congregation.

In addition, his works indicate that he had a mood reflecting that *he is not satisfied with his era*[3] on certain days. This *dissatisfied* feeling that is rather specific to Salafism ideology brought Birgiwi to such a point that he estranged himself from social life after giving up his hopes that society will abandon innovations. However, he returned back to the madrasah life upon his master's persistence and encouragement. This statement from him reflects his pessimistic mood: *"Well, there is no way that people will abandon innovations and accept my words. They consider me a hypocrite who talks recklessly and only aims for the position of presidency, while regarding those who state that their actions are lawful and sunnah as experienced scholars. How can they come to accept my words?"*[4]

Katib Chalabi (d. 1067/1657), who separately analyzed the issues of a certain period, stated that Birgiwi presented an attitude against the intelligence-related

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1. M. Raşit Akpınar, *Kadızâdeliler ve Sivâsîler Arasındaki Fıkhî Tartışmalar* (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Marmara University ISS, İstanbul, 2009, p. 23-27.

2. Kenan Yakuboğlu, *Osmanlı Medrese Eğitimi ve Felsefesi*, Gökkubbe Yay., İstanbul, 2006.

3. Mehmet Zeki İşcan, "Selefiliğin Şiilik Değerlendirmeleri Bağlamında Nefret ve Şiddet Söylemi", *e-makâlât Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2013 VI/2, p. 161.

4. Ahmet Turan Arslan, *İmâm Birgivî Hayatı, Eserleri ve Arapça Tedrisatındaki Yeri*, İstanbul, Seha Neşriyat, 1992, p. 52. Kadizade, who believed that malevolence spreads everywhere and people get stuck in sins, has similar ideas. See Kadızâde Mehmed, *Mabhas al-iman*, Süleymaniye library, Yazma Bağışlar, nr. 5570, vr. 250.

sciences as these did not suit his characteristics, although he was knowledgeable about the sharia discipline. In addition, he noted that Birgiwi had an adverse approach toward social traditions as he did not study history. This anti-tradition characteristics of Birgiwi are believed to have played a significant role for him to write a rebuttal against the 'monetary organizations'[5] fatwa given by Shayk al-Islam Abusuud Efendi considering social needs.[6] Moreover, it was stated that he isolated Islam from social life while fighting against innovations and believed that the Islamic ummah could end the hundred-years-old cultural accumulation and experiences.[7]

In this regard, he did not consider traditions as variety, which had a key role for him to be called as the 'first purist person' in the Ottoman Empire.[8] It is appropriate to note that this *purist approach* which suggests purifying the religious beliefs from the traditionalist interpretations and comments has an aspect that evokes Salafism.

Traces of Salafism in Kadizadeli Movement

These ideas, which consider that Birgiwi's ideological background had a key role in the development of Salafism in the Ottoman society, were inherited by his students and came to the agenda with more interest by Kadizade Mehmet Efendi (d. 1045/1635), who was among the second-generation students of Birgiwi school.

Mehmet Efendi, who was called Kadizade due to his father's profession, taught classical texts for a certain period, and he was assigned as a preacher for the Hagia Sofia Mosque that represented the top position for his occupation. He created a particular audience because of his effective preaching and managed to be well-known in İstanbul in a short period of time. However, his reputation was essentially based on the movement, which was called as his name and led by him, by expanding the improvement movement that was projected by Birgiwi and his followers in a broader context. This evidence includes significant clues indicating that Salafism was typically adapted to Ottoman society.

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[5] In the Hanafi doctrine, Abussuud Efendi granted permission to monetary foundations that were not deemed permissible due to their inconsistent characteristics considering a narrative from Imam Zufar. Birgiwi stated his opposing by ideas writing a booklet entitled "*as-Sayfu as sarim fi adam al-jawaz al wakfi al mankul al-va ad darahim*" (*The Sharp Sword (Definitive Judgment) Reflecting Movable Goods and Monetary Organizations are not Permissible*).

[6] Katib Chalabi, *Mizan al-haq fi ihtiyar al-ahakk*, İstanbul, Mârifet Yayınları, 2001, p. 135; Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, *The Kadizadeli Movement: An Attempt Of Seriat-Minded Reform In The Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1990, p. 58.

[7] Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, , "XVII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dinde Tasfiye (Pürütanizm) Teşebbüslerine Bir Bakış, "Kadızâdeliler Hareketi", *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları*, 1983, Ankara, XXI-XXI/1-2, p. 212.

[8] Evidence indicates that the first purist movement started with Ibn Taymiyyah and continued with Birgiwi into the 16th century, with Kadizadelis in the 17th century, and with Wahhabis in the 18th century. See Ocak, "Movement of Kadizadelis, p. 208, 213.

Kadizade Mehmet Efendi continually stated during his career that corruption, that was felt in many fields ranging from administrative vulnerabilities in political management to deterioration of the social structure, was an inevitable result of presenting opposing attitudes towards Islam, and this issue could not be solved as long as this opposition continued. According to him, the main problem in this way is that society accepted many innovations and superstitions, considering that these are appropriate for Islam. He considered Sufis as the people who were responsible for the expansion of innovations and superstitions, which can be regarded as the reflection of Salafism, that has been known with its anti-Sufism approach in the Ottoman society.

Mehmed Efendi's accusations towards the Sufi sheikhs formed an opposition among Sufism followers and caused severe discussions between sides. These discussions, which were named 'Kadizadeli-Sivasi Conflict' in regards to Kadizade and Abd al-Majid Efendi (d. 1049/1639) who were against him, continued for a few generations and saw a great interest from government and society.

Kadizade's ideas were supported by Ustuwani Mehmed Efendi (d. 1072/1668) who was also a preacher from the next generation. It should be stated that it is not surprising for anyone to realize that Ustuwani, who came to İstanbul and was a Hanbalism member before, adopted these ideas that he was familiar from his earlier teachings. His rhetorical skills and good relationship with the people from the palace paved the way for Kadizadeli philosophy to be adopted by many sections and become an effective movement. In other words, the Salafism movement, which was just a verbal argument and concept for rebuttals and therefore had ideological characteristics, was put into practice with Ustuwani. Moreover, Ustuwani and other preachers following him who were supported by the government, started to put pressure on cult members rather than the those who preach, and sent threatening letters indicating that they should stop their Sufi rituals, all of which took place during this period.[9]

Ustuwani Efendi made great efforts to fight against superstitions and invited everybody to contribute to this fight. He considered all believers to be responsible for notification, which was an inevitable result of the idea mentioned by Kadizade earlier in which faith and practice cannot be separated. (Kadizade gave discretionary penalties such as exile to those who did not know the pillars of faith or prayer.[10]) As a result of this concept, it is fair to state that for practicing religious orders, Ustuwani legalized certain precautions that can be taken by the public under the principle of *amir bil-ma'ruf nahiy an al-munkar*.

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[9] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi,* III, 368; Nâimâ, *Tarih a-Naima*, trans., Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yay., 2007, V, 56-58.

[10] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. 258a.

In this regard, the Kadizadelis effort to invite every member of the society to take part in the fight appears as a reflection of the *challenging ideology* [11]formulated as 'practice-based tawhid' by Salafism. This challenging ideology can be holistically found in the aggressive assaults towards Sufism followers in the Ustuwani period. Narratives indicate that he had key roles in issuing orders to remove lodges with the *belief that lands that were soiled with polytheism and can only be cleansed in the sea*, that he participated in destructive activities, and that he directed actual assaults on Sufism followers whenever possible.[12] Interventionism must have been integrated into Ustuwani's genes to such degree that he advised his followers to carry a stick with their clothes and promoted them to beat women who cried during funeral ceremonies, considering that it was an innovation.[13]

This extremism drove him to meet with his followers and organize a revolt 'with the longing for Istanbul that looks like Prophet's Madina'[14] by purifying Islam from innovations. It was claimed that his purpose was to demolish all minarets of the sultanate mosques except one, carry out raids on lodges and invite the sheikhs and dervishes to renew their faiths, kill those who do not accept this invitation, and clear the city (Istanbul) from all innovations.[15] Therefore, a crowded group that gathered in Fatih Mosque under his leadership aimed to dismiss muezzins who read the Quran with a particular reading style on Fridays, due to the belief that it was innovation to do so, and they invited the congregation showing resistance to them to perform the amir bil-ma'ruf nahiy an al-munkar duty. Consequently, their plans resulted in exile to Cyprus, for the purpose of preventing any outbursts, based on a fatwa and governmental claim that Kadizadelis did not act in accordance to Sunnah.[16]

Considering these examples, it is fair to state that Ustuwani's ideology included many characteristics that adopted the exclusionary language of Salafism, considered all sorts of new actions as innovation and presented a challenging attitude towards others[17].

It is clear that Kadizadelis' severe innovation-based theories, which were mentioned before, were opposed by certain people in society, the reality of which was neglected by Kadizadelis. A preacher named Turk Ahmed, who was close to Kadizade Salafism, had the following polemic with a person during his preaching,

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[11] Ferhat Koca, *İslâm Hukuk Târihinde Selefî Söylem,*, Ankara, 2000, p. 200-202; İşcan, "Selefîliğin Şiilik Değerlendirmeleri Bağlamında Nefret ve Şiddet Söylemi*"*, p. 165.

[12] Naima, *Târih,* II, 1709; Madalinah Zilfi, "Kadızâdeliler: Onyedinci Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Dinde İhyâ Hareketleri", trans. M. Hulusi Lekesiz, *Türkiye Günlüğü,* Ankara, November-December 1999, issue no: 58, p. 71.

[13] Muhibbi, Amin ibn Fazlullah ad-Dimashqi, *Hulasat al-asar fi a'yan al-karni al-hadi ashar*, Daru'Sadir, Beirut, trans., III, 387.

[14] Zilfi, "Kadızâdeliler", p. 74.

[15] Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın, *İslâm Târihi*, p. 129; Ocak, "Movement of Kadizadelis", p. 222.

[16] Yurdaydın, *İslâm Târihi*, p. 129.

[17] İşcan, "Selefîliğin Şiilik Değerlendirmeleri Bağlamında Nefret ve Şiddet Söylemi, p. 161.

which is a critical example in this regard: One of the audience members asked Turk Ahmed, who lived during the same era with Ustuwani Efendi and aimed to remove all innovations: *"There were no baggy trousers and underwear during the Prophet's era. Now, according to you, it is innovation to wear these. Will you also remove these?, Turk Ahmed*: *"Yes, we will. They should wear izar and loincloth."* The asker: *"Using a spoon is an innovation, too."* How about those who use spoons?"* Turk Ahmed: *"They should use their hands to eat. What is wrong with using hands while eating?"* The questioner presented his opposition: *"Gentlemen! You just aim to take peoples' clothes off and make them wear the clothes of naked desert Arabs."* One of the people from the audience: *"How about the people selling spoons when spoons will be prohibited?"* Turk Ahmed: *"They should make miswak and rosary and sell those!"*[18]

This case can be regarded as a handicap of a *repressive mindset* that targets society's traditions and their results reflecting on daily lives without reviewing these in regards to their benefits and harms. This narrow mindset, which causes new problems while seeking for solution, can be related to the Salafi *literal interpretation method*. Therefore, sources indicate that another polemic issue has clues suggesting that Kadizade read religious works with an obvious perspective. According to the narrative, during the discussion taking place before the sultan and Sheikh al-Islam, Kadizade declared Sivasi Efendi, who said *"There are dervishes who can hear/understand the dhikr of the objects"*, a disbeliever stating that he objected to the verse *"And there is not a thing except that it exalts [Allah] by His praise, but you do not understand their [way of] exalting."* (al-Isra 17/44) Sivasi Efendi aimed to prove that Kadizade was not familiar with the disciplines of logic and tafsir by stating that the addressee here are the disbelievers and the verse can be interpreted as "*Not all of you could understand, but some can hear and understand*" based on the rule "infraction of salb al-kulliyah is appropriate for the fascicles'.[19]

The innovation concept of Salafism was always discussed as a requirement of presenting Salafi ideology as the sole representative of truth, and those who rejected this truth were regarded as Ahl al-Bid'at and thus, the opposing side. Due to their ideas in this regard, Kadizadelis' innovation concepts in all of their preaching and booklets were always kept alive. Mehmed Efendi made the following explanation to state that innovations mean accusing the Prophet and sect imams in a booklet called in his name: "*How correct would it be if somebody prepares two hundred and twenty four meals and serve these plates to their guests, but their guests prefer other meals despite this service and neglect the offerings? Like this case, the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) is hurt by those who neglect his orders and actions and prefer innovations that are made up later. Stating that prayers that cannot be performed with the congregation can actually be done with them is an accusation towards the apparent Allah. The prayers*

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[18] Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi*, III, 365.

[19] Cengiz Gündoğdu, , "XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlısında Siyâsî Otoritenin Ulemâ-Sûfî Yaklaşımına Dair Bir Örnek: IV. Murat-Kadızâde-Sivâsî", *Dinî Araştırmalar,*, 1999, II/ 5, p. 215-216.

performed by ignorant beginners are the accusations towards all scholars and canonists, particularly the Prophet."[20]

According to Kadizade, who often referred to the hadith "*Any actions or elements that are formed later are innovation*"[21] in his works, certain precautionary actions must be performed for people who preferred innovations. The following fatwa stated by him in the booklet named *Masail al-Ahl al-Sunnah* provides the details of the punishment he projected: "*If somebody preferred/did an innovation, they are beaten two hundred and fifty times with a stick as per the canon law.*"[22]

Similar concepts of fighting against innovations can be found in other representatives of the movement. For example, according to Ustuwani, handshaking after Friday and eid prayers is an innovation. If somebody would tell other people to follow superstitions and innovations stating that "These are facts and prayers", it would be a great innovation that would result in sacrilege.[23]

In this regard, it should be noted that Wani Efendi (d. 1096/1685), the third-generation representative of the sect, evaluated those who opposed the imams of the sect under the context of Ahl al-Bid'at. In his work named *The Booklet of Avoiding Sufi Innovations*, the ideology approving the punishment for these people are reflected as follows: "*Whoever claims that they imitate their sects and oppose a provision of their sects, it means they would prefer innovation, commit a sin and abandon their sects. They should be prevented from doing so and corrected in this regard.*"[24]

It is fair to state that people's insistence on using innovations was a justification for Kadizadelis' harsh linguistic and practical styles because they regarded society as a group that presented a casual attitude toward Islam, failed to pay the utmost importance to learning religious sciences and ridiculed scholars. Therefore, they possibly mentioned 'alfaz al-qufur issues' at the end of many works. However, it should be noted that their efforts to keep the takfir movement alive evoked the exclusionary characteristics of Salafism regardless of the reasons.

Some of his fatwas that are believed to justify this approach include the following: "*The number of sacrilege-related words and actions is eight hundred and eighty eight. These have been formed in Islamic countries by the disbelievers. These were not said or done in the early periods because death would be the result. Any modern disbelievers who would say these words or perform these actions (akabir taifah) would come to social activities, wedding ceremonies, meetings and other activities, and they would sing songs, have fun and smile there in the present time. Both these people and those who laugh with*

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[20]   Kadizade, *Risala al-Kadizade*, vr. 76b-77a.

[21]   Müslim, "Friday" 43; Abu Dawud, "Sunnah" 6; Nasai, "Iydain" 21.

[22]   Kadizade, *Masail al-Ahl al-Sunnah*, vr. 152a.

[23]   Vânî Mehmed Efendi, *Tasavvufî Bid'atlardan Sakınmaya Dair Risâle,* Süleymaniye library library, Fatih, nr. 2770, vr. 75b, 193b.

[24]   Vânî Mehmed Efendi, *Tasavvufî Bid'atlardan Sakınmaya Dair Risâle,* Süleymaniye library, Hacı Beşir Ağa, nr. 406, vr. 190b.

them would be disbelievers and thus should be killed if they do not renew and confirm their faith."[25] People who say an immoral statement about mashayihah (great scholars of sects) should be killed for preventing any instigations if they do not regret and withdraw their statements.[26] If one tells the other to cut their nails because it is Sunnah, and if the recipient says they would not cut even if it was Sunnah, that person would be disbeliever. If somebody says 'May it be mubarak' to a sinner who is drinking wine, they would be disbelievers. If somebody makes a sacrilegious statement and those around them would laugh voluntarily, they all would be disbelievers. If somebody imitates their masters at school and beats their friends with a stick just like their masters for the purpose of ridiculing, they would be disbelievers.[27] If somebody says 'you look ugly' to a canonist who shaved his moustache, they would be disbelievers. If somebody imitates and laughs at preaching, and if the congregation around them accompanies, they all would be disbelievers.[28] If somebody invites a person to pray with the congregation and would be responded as "I will pray alone as Allah ordered "inna as-salatah tanha", that person would have ridiculed the verse and thus become a disbeliever.[29] Those who do not know alfaz al-kufur would be disbeliever and be regarded to have no wives. His children would be the results of an unlawful relationship. His hunts could not be eaten, and he would have no difference than the French disbelievers. Little children, slaves and servants should be taught the ethical Islamic aspects and alfaz al-kufur. Those who do not want to learn should be corrected or sold to other people. If slaves do not want to learn, they would be sold. If handmaids do not want to learn, they would be rejected. If children do not want to learn and if they could not be taught, a judge would be consulted.[30]

Evidence indicates that takfir activities have been reflected on the fatwas as the instruments that were used in the other controversial issues of the era. For example, according to Kadizade who believed that there were no jurisprudence authorities left in his era, scholars have not stated an opinion on smoking until his time. If these authorities were present, they would state that smokers are disbelievers, just like wearing belts and hats is sacrilege.[31] Similarly, Abussuud Efendi stated that even coffee is unlawful even if it does not have an odor, and other scholars would accept the provisions of the earlier scholars on smoking."[32]

Kadizadelis associated takfir with Sufi scholars who are regarded as the source of innovation and superstition, which is interesting. Noting that a tradition which is against the essence of shariah cannot be legitimate by being welcomed by the society, as Sufis claimed. Therefore, they considered Sufi rituals such as dhikr,

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[25] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. 50.

[26] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. 75a.

[27] Ustuwani, *Fawaid*, vr. 198a.

[28] Ustuwani, *Fawaid*, vr. 199b.

[29] Ustuwani, *Fawaid*, vr. 201.

[30] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. *247 b, 248a.*

[31] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. 261a, 267b-268a; Ergin, *The Differentiation of Apparent and Deep Meanings*, p. 119-121.

[32] Kadizade, *Mabhas al-iman*, vr. 267b-268a.

samah and dawran as an innovation. For example, Wani Efendi claimed that Sufi people who read dhikr aloud opposed the sect imams. He noted that no fiqh books regarded dhikr aloud as legitimate, and when he was told that there were great Sufi people who allowed such dhikr, he stated *"We are the members of the sect of Imam al-Azam, not the sects of these sheiks. We address the people from Hanafi sect. We are not interested in the states and practices of these Sufis"* and he meant that they were excluded from their sects.[33]

Kadizadelis extreme anti-Sufism ideologies partially result from the belief that Sufism provides an institutional contribution to the legitimization of innovations.[34] The following statements of Abd al-ahad Nuri (d. 1061/1650), among the defenders of Sivasi side, can be used to summarize the 'tolerant attitude' of Sufis toward the innovations, which had a role in the formation of such a belief: *"If an innovation becomes a hadith for the ummah, those who have a role in this are prevented. If the public never abandons these innovations, these actions are not mentioned to be sacrilege, and different evidence to justify or declare these actions as lawful are sought.[35] Therefore, these actions can be regarded as permissible based on the juristic preference principle or claim that provisions may change as time changes, rather than declaring all these people disbelievers and accusing them of sacrilege, as they preferred innovations.[36] Moreover, religious works performed for a price, nafilah prayers performed with the congregation, and the issues of coffee and opium have all become lawful due to these juristic preferences."*[37]

These statements were effective justifications for Kadizadelis' concerns that innovations are legitimized under the context of tradition. Therefore, they had no solution but to fight against this ideology who accepted wrong actions and innovations with their own methods. The other side, on the other hand, continued efforts to remove innovations which were adopted by society, under the principle of *amir bil-ma'ruf nahiy an al-munkar* as Kadizadelis did as "stupidity" and "ignorance".[38]

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[33] Wani, *Sufi innovations*, vr. 187-189.

[34] This joke told by Kadizade during preaching, which was also heard by the sultan and Sufism followers, reflect that they had the beforementioned ideology: *While plowing, Nasreddin Hodja would beat the bigger ox when the smaller one shows bad temper. He answered the people asking for the reason as "The smaller ox would not act without the indication of the bigger one."* The sources indicate that Kadizade targeted the Sufis and ulama with the reference of bigger ox. See Naima, *History*, II, 758.

[35] Nuri, *Riyaz al-azkar*, vr. 11b

[36] Nuri, *Riyaz al-azkar*, vr. 11a-11b.

[37] Nuri, *Riyaz al-azkar*, vr. 11b

[38] The continuation of Katib Chalabi's statements, who directed these accusations and had the same ideology with Siwasis, is as follows: *"The public does not abandon actions or elements, whether they are Sunnah or innovation, that have become a habit for them. The would not abandon their habits even if they all were killed by swords. Sharia authorities, other relevant authorities and preachers failed to make people leave innovations although they were committed to do so for many years. The public does not abandon their habits. Whatever is done will last as long as Allah orders. However, judges should protect the order of Muslims and preserve the basic pillars and methods of Islam among the public. Preachers should kindly encourage people to follow the Sunnah and avoid innovations, after which they will have completed their jobs. It is up to the public*

It should also be noted that the idea to do something for the improvement of the society encouraged the Kadizadelis to form relationships with administrative groups in a way that is similar to Salafi reformism. In other words, Kadizade translated Ibn Taymiyyah's Arabic booklet named *as-Siyasat as-Shar'iyya* and presented his work entitled *Taju ar-rasail fi manahij al-vasail* to Murad IV, the sultan, with certain additions. It is known that he presented his booklets named *Nushu al-hukkam wa sababu an-nizam*, which reviewed the reforms that should be completed for governmental administration and public management, to the sultan. Similarly, Ustuwani and Wani Efendi presented their advice to the sultan when they served as preachers of the privy chamber.[39]

Certain researchers believed that Kadizade's translation of *as-Siyasat ash-Shariyya* by Ibn Taymiyyah cannot be used as an argument of Salafi influences on the Ottoman Empire. The reasons for their ideas are that this book was already translated and presented to the sultan by Ashiq Chalabi. Aiming to have different positions, Kadizade cited these translations that cannot serve as evidence as being influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah.[40] This study accepts that representing the Salafi discourse in the systematics of Hanafi sect may contain different contradictions, and suggests the Kadizadeli movement can be related to Salafi ideology due to the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah and other aspects mentioned earlier. In addition, many texts indicated the Kadizadeli movement as *Orthodoxian, Salafism-based, purist and reformist*, which evoked the Salafism discourse.[41]

This study partially supports the evaluations that the Kadizade-Sivasi conflict was a part of Sufism-Ulama conflict,[42] a result of the governmental policy of controlling groups threatening their authority, or a reflection of the interest-based conflicts between two sides[43], but reducing the status of the issue to these will not be appropriate for a healthy analysis. Moreover, as certain sources indicate, focusing on how their ideas are based rather than accusing them of *ignorance, corruption, hypocrisy and immorality[44]* would be more appropriate.

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to follow this advice and preaching. Obligation is not the case here. Working meticulously or investigating deep aspects are not beneficial." See Kâtib Çelebi, *Mizan*, p. 100.

[39] Naima, *Târih, p.* 54.

[40] Ahmed Hamdi Furat, "Selefîliğin Osmanlıya Etkisi Bağlamında Kullanılan Bir Argüman: İbn Teymiyye'nin es-Siyâsetü'ş-şeriyye İsimli Eserinin Osmanlı Dünyasında XVI. ve XVII. Asırdaki Tercümeleri", *Mârife,* Konya, 2009, issue no: 3, p. 225.

[41] Hayrettin Karaman, "Osmanlı'da Selefî Damar", *Yeni Şafak Gazetesi,* 17.02.2013; Çavuşoğlu, *The Kadizadeli Movement,* p. 42, 45, 47, 309; Necati Öztürk, *Islamic Orthodoxy Among the Ottomans in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Qadi-Zade Movement,* University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 416; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Kadızâdeliler Hareketi, p. 209; M. Sait Özervarlı, "Selefiyye",, *DİA,* XXXVI, 402.

[42] Gündoğdu, *"An Example of the Approach of Governmental Authority Toward the Ulama-Sufi Issue in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th Century",* p. 203-222.

[43] Naima, *Târih,* II, 356.

[44] Zilfi, *Dindarlık Siyâseti Osmanlı Ulemâsı,* Birleşik Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p. 143.

Therefore, a certain amount of their religious works, which is remarkable considering the conditions of the era, were examined despite the criticisms toward their scientific status[45], and it was found that the discussion items, which were ordered with a particular approach while neglecting the philosophy formed in the background, cannot be reviewed without these three concepts: Tradition, innovation and emir bil-ma'ruf nahiy an al-munkar. When the relationship between these concepts is clearly found, the Kadizadeli philosophy will be clear and the popularity of the movement that lasted for a century will be based on an understandable ground. Otherwise, it is hard for an ideology that does not have a scientific basis and ideology to preserve its activity for such a long time.

This thought, the outlines of which have been implied in the trivet in the figure, can be summarized under three stages: 1. It is not possible to accept adopted social behaviors, that oppose the practices of the first scholars, as traditions. 2. No matter how deeply these practices formed later are adopted by the public, they are still innovations which should be fought. 3. As per the principle of *amir bil-ma'ruf nahiy an al-munkar*, fighting against these innovations is the common duty of all Muslims.

Certain aspects of the Kadizadeli movement that differs from Salafism ideology should be mentioned here. An attitude that neglects traditions, which should be evaluated in the political conjuncture of the era, could not be presented against the customary law in force, and fatwas supporting the sultan's practices were given, as seen in the case of tobacco ban, which suggests that the Kadizadeli philosophy has moved away from this ideology. However, it should be noted that Kadizadelis adopted a zealotry-based sect against the Salafi attitude of rejecting imitation. In addition, the practices that opposed sahabah members and sectarian imams, other than the Prophet, were also regarded as innovation. They supported commitment to a sect, particularly the Hanafi sect which was accused of including Salafism innovations, should be regarded as another aspect contradicting with the Salafism ideology that rejected being trapped in the sectarian borders. Their efforts to maintain their activities within the Hanafi ideology rather than Hanbali teachings within which the Salafi ideology, has been present throughout history and can be defined as a difference.

Örf Karşıtı Tutum — Kadızâdeli Felsefesi — Bid'at Nazariyesi — Emir bil-ma'rûf nehiy an'il-münker

It should be highlighted that the ulama, to the highest degree, was uninterested in the preachers' discussions representing the lowest degree of Islamic science. The relevant sources have narratives indicating that the government regarded certain

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[45] For detailed information about the works, see Akpınar, *Kadızâdeliler ve Sivâsîler Arasındaki Fıkhî Tartışmalar*, p. 40-44, 49-50, 55-58.

Sufi groups that grew in an uncontrolled manner as a threat toward its authority and therefore validated the Kadizadelis in certain periods, and that Kadizadelis intimidated muftis, qadis and Sheikh al-Islams with governmental power. In addition, the influence over society was lost due to the claims of bribery and favoritism which emerged during the silence of the ulama, which is believed to have played a role. While evaluating, it should be considered that various issues in Islamic science exhausted these educational organization to such a degree that they cannot provide solutions to new issues. However, evidence indicates that certain scholars acted to reconcile the Kadizadelis and their opposition from time to time, and they gave fatwas legitimizing their assaults on one another.[46]

Conclusion

Many characteristics of a *purist, exclusionary, monopoly-based interventionist* ideology that is believed to be dominant for Salafism appear in the ideological approaches of Birgiwi and Kadizadelis in the Ottoman Empire. Both the Birgiwi and the Kadizadelis who were inspired, made efforts to adapt Ibn Taymiyyah's solution, who was believed to influence them, in the *Adaptation of Islamic Basics* against religious and political corruption in their own societies. These efforts, which contained certain Salafi traces, had a significant place in the agenda of the Ottoman Empire. However, this movement, which had certain benefits and solutions, brought an unpredictable blockage to the process and caused an extensive conflict with opposing ideas. In conclusion, it is fair to state that this movement, which faced a strong resistance as it targeted the practices adopted by society for a long time, was not permanent in the long term due to the incompatibility of the geography where Hanafism is dominant. However, expressing that every nation can be inclined to have these ideas, in accordance with conditions, but regardless of the period and time would be a more realistic evaluation considering the historical experiences.

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Inquiry

Mehmet Ali BÜYÜKKARA*

M. Hayri KIRBAŞOĞLU*

- Could you please give some information about the sources of Salafism as a concept?
- What are the historical grounds that Salafism is based on?
- What are the positions of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Salafi ideology? Should the initial and essential separation in Salafi ideology be associated with Ibn Taymiyyah or Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab?
- Is it correct to define Wahhabism and Salafism as the same concept?
- Could you please give information about the relationship of Salafism/Salafis with Ahl al-Sunnah?
- We know that there is a dissociation between Salafis in the modern era. Could you elaborate on these groups and the reasons for dissociation?
- How do Salafi groups feel towards one another?
- Is it possible to form a relationship between Salafism and Political Islam, or Salafism and Islamism? How do followers of Salafism feel towards Political Islamists in this regard?
- Is there a relationship between Salafism and Islamic Modernism? Is it correct to consider them together?
- We know that Salafism has been active in many countries, particularly those in Middle Asia and Europe. Where are they more dominant in this regard?
- What is the reason for the expansion of Salafism in recent times?

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Inquiry - I*

Mehmet Ali BÜYÜKKARA**

- **Could you please give some information about the sources of Salafism as a concept?**

  As a concept, Salafism has its origins in the term *salaf*, which means "previous generations" in Turkish. They are the first generations of Islam's history. According to Salafism, the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) mentions these generations in a hadith. As narrated by al-Bukhari, in this hadith the Prophet said: "The best of you (people) are my generation, and *the second* best will be those who will follow them, and then those *who will follow* the second *generation*." To understand and practice Islam in a proper way, one should follow the doctrines and practices of this generation, who were praised as *al-salaf al-salih* (righteous antecedents). According to Salafism, these generations dominated the first two centuries of Islam and are the closest references to the fundamental sources (the Qur'an and sunnah).

  The opposite of *Salaf* is called *khalaf* (subsequent generations). According to Salafism, these generations became distant to the Qur'an and sunnah and held on to a religious understanding that is considered "bid'ah and dalalah" by deviating from Islam's pure, lucid, and right path as a result of preferring "rationalized" religious methods to others, referring to "sectarianized" codes of mind that emerged around the thoughts and judgments of some schools' founders of theology and fiqh, instead of the fundamental principles, and living lives based on doctrines of "denominations" instead of zuhd and takwa as recommended in hadith. So, they follow the wrong path. They misunderstand, misact and misrepresent Islam.

- **What are the historical grounds that Salafism is based on?**
  The historical grounds of Salafism are based on the Sunni school of thought, which is called Ahl al-Hadith or Ashab al-Hadith. This school is the opposite of another Sunni school, which is Ahl al-Ra'y or Ashab al-Ra'y. Being the essence

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of ijtihad (reasoning), Ra'y is a mental activity that is exercised by following the ways of logical thinking. Most of them being Iraqi scholars, the group that included Ra'y in religious resources and their followers are called as Ahl al-Ra'y. The most well-known figure among these scholars are Abu Hanifah and his disciples. They are known for finding religious solutions for society's challenges by deriving law regarding issues that are not directly addressed by the Qur'an and hadiths, based on the reason and purpose of relevant verses and hadiths.

On the other hand, the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith, who define themselves as the only representatives of Ahl al-Sunnah, regarded every judgment and law arising from the activities of Ra'y, in either theology or fiqh, as non-religious solutions. According to Ahl al-Hadith; as Imam al-Barbahari says, "Islam is the Sunnah". As they practiced religion based on hadiths, this school of thought was named *ahl al-athar wa ahl al-ittiba*. As they identified themselves as the only representatives of Sunni Muslims, they also used different other names, such as *firqa al-najiyah* (the saved group), *ahl al-istiqamah* (the people of the right path), or *al-ta'ifa al-mansurah* (the group that deserves divine relief) for self-representation. We may also mention Ahmad ibn Hanbal, as the most important figure of the early period school of Ahl al-Hadith-Salafism. Imam Ahmad and the scholars who followed the same path devoted most of their efforts to listening to and narrating hadiths, and classifying them by topics through writing out. The great scholars of hadiths, such as Imam al-Bukhari and Imam Muslim, are known for such efforts.

The Ahl al-Hadith-Salafism line represented a conservative wing in Islamic thought. Unlike Ahl al-Ra'y, this movement could neither take significant steps, nor reach large masses due to its anti-rationalist, bookish literalism, parochial mindset, and exclusivist attitude. However, it succeeded in remaining as the sect of a prominent group, though in marginal measures. Ibn Qutayba, Hallal, al-Barbahari, Ibn Battah, al-Qadi Abu Ya'la, Ibn Aqil, Ibn al-Jawzi, and Ibn Kudamah are among the scholars raised by this school.

- **What are the positions of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Salafi ideology? Should the initial and essential separation in Salafi ideology be associated with Ibn Taymiyyah or Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab?**
  The one who shined Salafism throughout Islamic thought again is, undoubtedly, Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, who died in 728 (1328). He revived this dulled ideology through a scholarly competition against scholars of qalam, philosophy, Shiah and some Sufi circles. He brought up and popularized Salafism once again on the agenda of scholars and the public through discussions. Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a seriously challenging period of Islam due to the Mongol invasion. He was among those who resisted this invasion and actually fought against the invaders with his own weapons. With his strong language, detailed investigation works, didactical approach, and laws and judgements that occasionally contradict the line of Ahl al-Hadith, Ibn Taymiyyah became an

important scholar and interpreter of Islamic law who left his mark on his own time period and the following eras.

He turned into a central point that is frequently referred to by the subsequent scholars of Salafism.

With all these characteristics, Ibn Taymiyyah was, as the phrase goes, in the position of renovating the traditional Salafi line. For that reason, it would be pointless to regard him as a breakpoint. However, one of his relatively late period followers, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, can be considered as the real subject of the separation mentioned in the question. This change in Salafism that we consider as "separation" or "fraction" is actually a politicization and its transformation into a sect in the eyes of the Saudi dynasty. However, it emerges as the violence committed against Muslim communities that have been marginalized due to the overuse of excommunication.

- **Is it correct to define Wahhabism and Salafism as the same concepts?**
  Due to the separation in Salafism mentioned, Wahhabism was put into circulation as a new sect of Islam. However, we can suggest that: Rather than introducing Wahhabism as a separate and independent sect, it would be scientifically a more realistic and correct suggestion to understand the movement as a reintroduction of Salafism, which was on the verge of fraction, under the political auspices of Saudis. On the other hand, the term Wahhabism has always been used by their opposition until today. Members of this movement, either in history or today, have in every time and everywhere defined themselves as Salafiyyah or Ahl al-Hadith.

- **Could you please give information about the relationship of Salafism/Salafis with Ahl al-Sunnah?**
  As we mentioned in the first part of this conversation, the ground that Salafism is based on, namely, Ahl Al-Hadith, is one of two early period appearances of Sunnism. However, we should emphasize the following two issues:
  The first issue is the typical monopolistic approach of the Salafiyyah. They have always felt themselves as the monopoly over Sunnism. Today, Hanafi Muslims, who constitute the majority of Ahl al-Ra'y, and the sects of fiqh, such as Shafi'i, Maliki schools of thought, Maturidi and Ashʿari theologies, and denominations and congregations that define themselves as parts of Ahl al-Sunnah are considered as followers of "the way of bid'ah and dalalah" by Salafi scholars. Moreover, they do not hesitate to express this prejudice either in verbal or written communication. This situation does not only pose a problem for Sunni groups, but also causes serious conditions that damages harmony and peace.
  The second issue is that the majority of Ahl al-Sunnah, that forms almost 90 percent of the community, regards Salafism as a society that has deviated from the way of Sunni Muslims for various reasons. We can explain this situation with an action-reaction relationship. In other words, we can consider the

situation as an "exclusion of exclusionary groups". For this reason, Salafism has occasionally been identified with the Kharijites and were alienated from the Sunni understanding. The opinion that "faith depends on practices", which emerged as a result of the understanding in Salafism that regards practices as a significant part of faith, resulted in the views that consider Salafism and Kharijites in the same league. Similarly, as they often avoided interpreting allegorical verses about the attributes of Allah, due to speculative interpretations, such as His existence in skies, the establishment of the Throne (istiwa), and comments about His hand or face that may cause misunderstandings, qalam scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah referred to the sub-sects of Mushabbiha and Mujassima when they mentioned Salafi scholars. These mutual allegations continue even today.

- **We know that there is a dissociation between Salafis in the modern era. Could you elaborate on these groups and the reasons for this dissociation?**
  As a significant actor in the process of founding the Saudi Arabian state, Wahhabism lost its military characteristics and has been gradually institutionalized since 1930. This change was a result of the gradually implemented policies by the Saudi authorities in order to prevent Wahhabism taking a position against the state. The authorities of Wahhabi scholars have completely been integrated into public religious institutions. In particular, the secular legalization efforts in the fields of commerce, labor, and public administration, relations with the US and the other Western countries after oil drillings, and modernization in education caused religious unrest in some cases but led to legitimization of the "official Wahhabi scholarship".

  In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had an opportunity to be closely acquainted with modern Islamic thought and practices. The real actors behind this acquaintance were the Muslim academicians and activities, most of them having origins in the Muslim Brotherhood who took refuge in Saudi Arabia fleeing from the oppressive regimes in Egypt or Syria, and the students who came to the country or go abroad for academic reasons.

  In the 1980s, although they were not accepted as a sect, just as many other Islamic groups, Salafis were motivated to take part in politics via Iran's Islamic Revolution. On the other hand, the Afghan Jihad created actual and logistical opportunities to put the political consciousness obtained into practice. The volunteer Arabic mujahids, most of who were in favor of Salafism, went to Afghanistan and became radicalized in this jihad environment. Therefore, the weight of Salafism weakened in the new religious discourse that emerged within this process, while modern Islamist tones gained strength.

  Proponents of this new discourse started to question the legitimacy of the Saudi state due to its western-oriented policies, especially after the First Gulf War. This was a serious separation in Wahhabism-Salafism, which gained an official "identity" under the Saudi authority. This new discourse, which defends political

and military methods against both imperialist and zionist groups but also their local compradors, is named "Jihadi Salafism". We may see Jihadi Salafism as a synthesis of Wahhabism and modern political Islamism. The old generation that furthers obedience to the Saudi regime can be called "Saudi Salafism".

Besides the armed groups that adopt terrorist methods under the name of "global jihad", such as al-Qaeda, Jihadi Salafism also involves non-militarist, civil radical Islamists groups, which are collectively named "Sahwa (awakening) circles". On the other hand, we see different trends within the Saudi Salafism. For instance; the Salafism perceived by Saudi Arabian scholars, such as Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Ibn al-Uthaymeen, and Sheikh al-Fawzan, and the Salafism as interpreted by the Albanian origin, Syrian immigrant Sheikh Albani and Yemeni immigrant Sheikh Muqbil do not align with each other. We see that sheiks like Albani and Muqbil regard the Salafi/Wahhabi accumulation, inherited from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and passed down by Wahhabi scholars as unnecessary, and act more freely and independently, in terms of legal issues and arbitration, within the area created by the Salafi understanding with a broad perspective. Similarly, it is known that another pro-Saudi group, called as al-Madkhaliyya with reference to Rabee' Ibn Haadee al-Madkhalee, declared all Salafi and non-Salafi Muslim groups that do not adopt their way of Salafism, and even declared them as disbelievers by exaggerating certain trivial aspects.

In addition to Saudi and Jihadist movements, we should mention the Political Salafism in this regard, which gained popularity during the Arab Spring, especially after 2011. In essence, this movement was not a surprise when we consider Jihadist movements, which are essentially political as well. However, the change in the attitude of Saudi Salafism in particular was surprising. These circles stood close to all monarchic and oligarchic trends but were aloof from civil and democratic initiatives. Moreover, they regarded certain modern political concepts, such as representational democracy and civil participation, as bid'ah. However, these circles passively or actively became involved in the revolution process in Arab countries other than Saudi Arabia. In time, they transformed this participation into a political party in Egypt and gained a significant level of support in free elections. The support provided by the Saudi regime to this Salafi movement should be interpreted as a step directed to balance the weight of the Muslim Brotherhood which they had always been weary of. It is obvious that there is a purpose of confronting the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and designing the politics in these countries through manipulation behind this huge support of the Saudi regime given to the Salafi parties in Egypt and Tunisia, despite prohibiting Salafi organizations at home.

Moreover, we should also note that the ideology of Ahl al-Hadith that made advances in 19th-century India with the thoughts and efforts of Shah Ismail Shaheed who died in 1831, was not totally independent from the developments in the Arab world, but in general made its own way and developed a style that is peculiar to Indian countries.

- **How are the feelings of Salafi groups towards each other?**

  As is seen, we observe different fractions of "Salafism" that are introduced with different tones, rather than a single Salafi understanding. As expected, this disunity brings together the attitudes of discrimination, mutual accusation, and separations within Salafism, which already has a monopolist approach. Accordingly, the gap between Saudi and Jihadi groups are getting deeper. Besides the Salafi groups in Islamic countries, those in Europe and America had also seperated. Saudi Salafism seeks to clear blocks through identifying the just and the denied groups via written works about Salafi figures, which resembles the classical ways of refutation and biographical evaluation in the science of Hadith. Saudi Salafism also tries to exclude Jihadi Salafism from Ahl al-Sunnah through sub-sects they have created under the titles resembling the names of groups mentioned as followers of the way of bid'ah, such as Mawdudiyya, Qutbiyya, or Ihwaniyya.

  On the other side, a significant dissolution is seen in the authority of the jihadist al-Qaeda, especially with the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/DAESH) as a movement of Jihadi Salafism and an authoritative force in Iraq and Syria in 2013. The Salafi organizations that adopt terrorists methods have been in a heated debate since 2014 about the real representative of the heritage passed down by the founder of al-Qaeda, namely, Osama bin Laden. This debate, in company with references to the Kharijites and the weapon of takfir (declaring as disbeliever), leaves deep scars in Salafi ideology, triggers fractions, and exacerbates separation. Similar attitudes are also seen between partizan groups and the Salafis who are in competition under the roof of political parties.

- **Is it possible to form a relationship between Salafism and Political Islam or Salafism and Islamism? How are the feelings of Salafism followers towards Political Islamists in this regard?**

  As known, non-Salafi Islamist movements have so far had a notable position in the eyes of Saudi and Jihadi Salafi circles due to their "dogmatic corruption". The main issue is the relationship between these traditionalist circles and people and organization who enjoy Islamist methods besides the Salafi understanding. Based on the regime it a part of, we can suggest that Saudi Salafism is more strict and exclusivist in this regard. Accordingly, modern Islamism is a movement that takes a critical and contrarian stand against autocratic regimes like the Saudi government. Therefore, it is seen throughout history that Saudi Salafi scholars have been refusing individuals and organizations, especially those having relations with the Muslim Brotherhood after 1990, by labeling them with similar names to those mentioned in the hadith about the well-known 73 sub-sects of bid'ah. For instance; they call members of the Brotherhood and the Salafis who have the same political ideas, Ihwaniyya; the political parties in countries like Jordan and Kuwait, Hizbiyya; the concept of "Islamic movement", Harakiyya; the takfiri thought, Takfiriyya; rebellious and takfiri Islamic

organizations that resemble Kharijites, Kharijites al-Asriyya (Modern Kharijites); and the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, Qutbiyya. Saudi scholars regard Sayyid Qutb as the instigator of both the political dissension and the jihadist extremism. According to them; before anything else, Qutb does not know Islam and he has no educational background in religion. He does not refer to hadiths in his book, especially in *Fî Zilâli'l Kur'ân*, which is a work of interpretation of the Qur'an, and interprets entirely with his own opinions. Accordingly, Sheikh Muqbil does not identify him as a scholar of interpretation but as an ordinary author and recommends others not to read his books, including *Fî Zilâl.*

On the other hand, Jihadi Salafism criticizes Islamism in a more moderate way. It is also seen that the Sahwa (awakening) circles have close relationships with Islamist individuals and organizations and tries every opportunity to cooperate, including non-Salafis. When it comes to the Jihadi organizations that adopt the idea of a global jihad and enjoy terrorist methods; it is understood that cooperation with militarist Islamic groups, even non-Salafi ones, is allowed "by necessity" to form a strong frontier against the infidel imperialist forces. The alliance of al-Qaeda and Taliban is the most obvious proof of this. However; as for the democratic activities they consider as "infidelity", it is seen that they reprehend movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and accuse them of "efforts to achieve power in a way that is not allowed by Allah" and following a reconciliatory and concessive methodology by leaving the obligatory duty of jihad aside. This political attitude is identified with sometimes bid'ah and dalalah, and sometimes with infidelity and polytheism and as required by the Salafi methodology, distance between these groups are always kept far away. It should also be noted that Political Salafism, which started to rise after the Arab Spring, also faced the same challenge.

- **Is there a relationship between Salafism and Islamic Modernism? Is it correct to consider them together?**
  The Pan-Islamist movement of thought and action, which began with scholars like Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the second half of the 19th-century, was called "Salafiyya", because they emerged with the purpose of making a pure religious understanding as lived by "the first generations", without artificial or superstitious thoughts within the ummah. To distinguish this movement from Traditional Salafism, it was also called the New Salafiyya or the Reformist Salafiyya. The tendency of Rashid Riza, an outstanding figure of this movement, towards Wahhabism supported to this naming pattern.

  However, the movement had never been close enough to the well-known Salafi/Wahhabi ideology, due to its strong intellectual, rational, scientific, developmental, activist, and eclectic character. The "first references" they refer to are the verses of the Qur'an. Although the true (sahih) sunnah is also mentioned as a reference, they often analyze the narratives that constitute the sunnah through textual criticism and rational references, rather than the

classical hadith methodology of Sunni Ahl al-Hadith. Therefore, we see that they ignores a lot of hadith references regarded as referable by Ahl al-Sunnah. They realized that the sunnah, which they refer to for understanding the religion as interpreted and lived by the first generations, also called as Salaf al-Salih, had been a significant problem for the religion which they planned to "renew" and the ground of the wrong beliefs and practices they were to winnow out the religion was some hadiths. Therefore, this modernist movement came to the forefront with its Qur'anist character, and even today furthers this understanding. This is a completely opposite standpoint against the well-known Ahl al-Hadith and Salafi understandings that have a hadith-oriented religious understanding and declare Islam as a religion of hadith. Although these supra-sectarian attitudes looks similar in terms of the opposition to denominations and the classical fiqh criticism, the paths they follow are obviously different.

- **We know that Salafism has been active in many countries, particularly those in Middle Asia and Europe. Where are they more dominant in this regard? What is the reason for the expansion of Salafism in recent years?**
  We can say that Salafism is quite widespread especially in Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism came to existence, and the Gulf countries. As Arab countries do not have the historical and traditional sectarian feelings of the people in non-Arab countries, it is possible to declare Salafism in the Arabic world has a natural and spontaneous follower group.

  However, it is a known fact that the Saudi Arabian state made efforts to spread the Salafi understanding through the whole Islamic world and in Western countries with Muslim populations as a subtle political power, with the financial help of the petrodollar obtained especially after 1960. The students attracted to the religious educational institutions in Saudi Arabia with inviting scholarships and Salafi scholars and missionaries sent abroad, as well as the mosques, foundations, and universities built in those countries paved the way for Salafism's organized development for the last 20-30 years in Islamic countries which are traditionally far from Salafism. The traditionally Hanafi Turkish-Indian Islamic world and Balkans, Shafii Malay, Kurdish, and Caucasian populations, and Maliki North and West African Muslims were strongly affected by this movement.

  The issue of voluntary militants joining the extremist Salafi organizations with Kharijite characteristics, from countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Chechenia, Uzbekistan, and similar other Central Asian nations, as well as Caucasian and Balkan populations, should also be taken into consideration. We can interpret this trend as a reaction of the Muslim communities that accept every ideology presented to them as they embrace their religion once again after a long interregnum.

  The active participation of these organizations from young generations of Europe and the USA, is also noteworthy. We can understand this interest and

sympathy of the third and fourth generations of the Muslims immigrants as their dangerous quest which is triggered by being isolated in their own societies, deprived of employment and educational opportunities, and having a serious identity crisis. When learned from incorrect and insufficient resources, religion can interact with an identity crisis in company with the feeling of vengeance to create environments that may bring people to dangerous paths. The eye witnesses state that the members of ISIS/DAESH who come from Western countries behave and act in a more barbarous way than the local militants. This observation is closely related to the pathological situation as mentioned before. Sensation, slogans, deprivation of love and disproportionate rebellions are the most obvious symptoms of this pathology.

Eventually, we should refer to online propaganda in this growth of Salafism. In this modern time, where young people are far from mosques and local religious groups, the mosque and community centered, traditional gatherings, solidarity, and activities have been replaced by a kind of "online congregations". Alleviating the feeling of loneliness through online platforms, youth are in search of a random identity within a so-called "online ummah". Being far from control, this space has turned into a unique field for Salafi organizations like al-Qaeda or ISIS/DAESH, which are specialized in the use of the Internet and online propaganda, to gain sympathizers.

Inquiry - II*

Mehmet Hayri KIRBAŞOĞLU**

- **Could you please give some information about the sources of Salafism as a concept?**

  Salafism (as-Salafiyya) is a concept from late periods that was not present in the early centuries of Islam. (It should be noted that the concept of Salafism, which was used in Arabic in the pre-Islamic period, has been used as a religious term since the early periods, reaching beyond its basic meaning). It is fair to state that the intense use of Salafiyya concept in modern times dates back to the second half of the twentieth century.

  Salafiyyah as a religious concept suggests that the truest and most perfect Islamic interpretation was made by the Muslim generations of the first century, particularly the sahabah, tabi'un and taba at-tabi'un generations. However, while referring to the first generations, a selective attitude is adopted, and only the certain sections and people are cited rather than all of these generations. For that purpose, the phrase "as-salaf as-salih" was developed. It is a fact that this concept was interpreted differently by any group or person. Moreover, another fact is that people who had been regarded as "halaf" for a period were considered as "salaf" later. To summarize, the concepts of "salaf", comprehended and interpreted differently by different sections and people, may differ.

  Although it is believed that the concept of Salafiyyah is associated with Sunni Muslims, it should be noted that this concept is also referred to in other sects. For example, Shia Salafism is mentioned currently, in the present time.

- **What are the historical grounds that Salafism is based on?**

  Salafism currently can be accepted as the continuation of historical and traditional Salafism. Traditional Salafism is essentially the continuation of Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith traditions and conceptually the subsequent concepts of Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith. However, the roots of this movement, which dictates that ideologically the successors (al-halaf) should follow or even imitate

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the predecessors (as-salaf), date back to the sahabah period. It is fair to state that sahabah members like Abdullah ibn Umar, who gave particular importance to imitating the Prophet, were the founding ancestors of Salafism according to the differentiation that was made by Hanafi ulama between the well-known sahabah members interested in fiqh and in narratives. However, it should be noted that tabi'un, who adopted "imitation" and followed the sahabah members, had a great role in the formation of Salafism ideology. After the tabi'un, this ideological movement was largely represented by Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith. The reason we preferred the word largely is that Ahl al-Hadith does not completely contain a homogenous structure. Instead, there are members of the Ahl al-Hadith movement who have reached beyond the method of imitation. However, it would not be wrong to state that the dominant approach in Ahl al-Hadith is based on "imitation".

This Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith ideology was represented by Hanbalism followers later, and the relevant approach was conveyed to the present time, revived and developed by people such as Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who was influenced by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Hanbali himself.

- **What are the positions of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Salafi ideology? Should the initial and essential separation in Salafi ideology be associated with Ibn Taymiyyah or Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab?**

Certainly with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab! As Salafism became a political project with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, such a separation can be mentioned in this regard. Moreover, if a comparison is to be made between Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, it is understood that Wahhabism represents an intellectual regression rather than advancement. As one of the cornerstones of Ibn Taymiyyah Salafism, he had philosophical/logical and Sufism/philosophical Sufism/theosophy knowledge to such degree that he could discuss various philosophical and theosophical traditions that reached his time. It should be implied that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not have the same knowledge. Many problems faced by Wahhabism today are probably based on these anti-intellectualism tendencies.

- **Is it correct to define Wahhabism and Salafism as the same concepts?**

All sects, including those regarded as the most homogenous and other various movements, have included certain differences up until now. The relationship between Salafism and Wahhabism, one of modern Salafism versions, has these characteristics. There is a great common ground based on ideology, methodology and the epistemology between Salafism and Wahhabism.

Wahhabism can be considered as the adaptation of Salafi ideology to the culture and conditions of the Najd region. However, it should be noted that modern day Salafism does not only consist of Wahhabism. Moreover, Wahhabism has become the formal sect of the Saudi dynasty with the political-financial support of the Saudi family. Accordingly, Wahhabism has been interacting with the Saudi administration and differed from other civil Salafism movements at certain points.

- **Could you please give information about the relationship of Salafism/Salafis with Ahl al-Sunnah?**

It is fair to state that these two concepts have had a parallel and integrated development stage. In our doctoral thesis entitled *The Founding Fathers of Ahl al-Sunnah,* we aimed to indicate that these two concepts and Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith have been integrated and parallel in the historical process while referring to the relevant sources. This study indicated the common misbelief of the concept that Ahl al-Sunnah was formed by Al-Ashari and Al-Maturidi, and found that the founding fathers of Ahl al-Sunnah were Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith. One of the phrases used to reflect the theologies of Ahl al-Hadith/Ashab al-Hadith is "Akidat us-Salaf (and) Ashab al-Hadith", which clearly reflects the integration between Salafism and Ahl al-Hadith.

However, no movement has been represented by Ahl al-Hadith or Salafiyyah in any period in Ahl al-Sunnah history. To be clearer, Ahl al-Sunnah should be regarded as an "umbrella (comprehensive) concept" that contains many sub-groups within its context rather than being the name of a particular sect. Moreover, it is the name of many sub-groups, such as; four Sunni fiqh sects, Ashari and Maturidi sects, Ahl al-Sunnah imams including Ibn Qullab, al-Qalanasi and Al-Qarabisi, Ahl al-Hadith and Sufism scholars, Islamic philosophers, and other apparent ideologies. None of these groups has the authority or capacity to represent Ahl al-Sunnah, and the claims of these groups in this regard are nothing but simple statements. A similar case is valid for Shia which is the extensive concept covering all sub-groups such as Imamiyya, Zaydiyya, Ismailiyya, Nusayriyya and Durziyya.

- **We know that there is a dissociation between Salafis in the modern era. Could you elaborate on these groups and the reasons for this dissociation?**

Salafism has certain differences not only in the present time but also during the classical period. It can be roughly divided into two, as Intellectual Salafism and Public Salafism. However, it is fair to state that Salafism followers have had different approaches in a broad range, from notification to violence, in terms of expanding their Salafi ideologies. Moreover, nuances based on geographical

differences and regional cultures can be present among the Salafi trends. Their approaches towards policy can be among the reasons for difference between them.

- **How are the feelings of Salafi groups towards each other?**
  It is difficult to present a certain statement about this issue since the relevant studies are not extensive. However, their ideas and approaches towards political, economic, and social issues can be a determinant for the relationships between them. The most distinctive example for this can be found in the Egyptian policy strategies of Ikhwan al-Muslim, which supports a Salafi ideology, and other Salafi groups in Egypt. Ikhwan follows a regime-opposing path while some other Salafi groups and parties easily cooperate with the Egyptian regime. In this regard, it would not be wrong to state that relationships between the Salafi groups have been developed on many different grounds ranging from difference to competition, competition to animosity, and animosity to conflict.

- **Is it possible to form a relationship between Salafism and Political Islam or Salafism and Islamism? How are the feelings of Salafism followers towards Political Islamists in this regard?**

  It is certainly possible to establish such a relationship. Political or semi-political activities of Ikhwan al-Muslim, which is the most common Islamic movement of the modern Islamic world, and the political Islamic movement of Abu al A'la al-Mawdudi, another Salafi movement, in Pakistan are among the significant indicators regarding the reality of this relationship. However, the Salaf of the political Islamic movement in Turkey is popular/public/Sufi rather than having characteristics features, which clearly indicates that an obligatory relationship between all Islamic movements cannot be established.

- **Is there a relationship between Salafism and Islamic Modernism? Is it correct to consider them together?**

  Such a relationship is definitely present. It is fair to state that almost all Innovative Islamic philosophers ranging from Al-Afghani and Muhammad Ikhbal, who are regarded as two masters of Innovative Islamic Ideology, to Turkish Mehmet Akif, followed a path that is parallel to Salafism on issues such as adaptation of the basics of the Quran and Sunnah, opposition to innovations and superstitions, and sensitivity of Tawhid. However, it should be noted that these innovative philosophers are intellectuals who are closer to the intellectual Salafism concept but far away from the concept of public Salafism. Thus,

melting these two movements in the same pot despite some common characteristics is definitely not appropriate.

- **We know that Salafism has been active in many countries, particularly those in Middle Asia and Europe. Where are they more dominant in this regard? What is the reason for the expansion of Salafism in recent times?**

  The main reasons of the expansion of public Salafism include the instrumentalization of Salafism by Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, using petrodollars for the purpose of establishing a political-religious hegemony, the weakness and vulnerabilities of the traditional Islamic culture, failure of this traditional culture to react to the challenges of modern times, offering the Islamic basic works for large masses to access, the idea and longing to adopt the first era — asr al-Saadah — of the Islamic society, which has moved away from its basics and thus deviated from its path, for the purpose of recovering from its current state, idealizing the first centuries — hayr al-quruni qarni summallazinah yalunahum...— as well as the problematic, complicated and contradictory picture presented by the sects, congregations and cults in the religious field, and finally the central role assigned to the concepts of "Tawhid", "jihad" and "amr al-ma'ruf and nahy al-munkar" are among the most significant reasons for a more attractive appearance of Salafi ideology to the people. However, it is obvious that field studies in this discipline are greatly needed.