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CONTENT

ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEW

ARTICLES

EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL
ERJ, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 7-25, Winter 2023

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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GREATER EURASIA PARTNERSHIP: DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY CONVERGENCE

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ABSTRACT

China-Russia strategic partnership has evolved into a new stage where the two great powers share increasing overlapping and complementary interests. The Greater Eurasia Partnership (GEP) framework offers an integrated approach to conducting their relations by deepening collaborative partnerships through regional development and security cooperation. This article aims to analyze evolving nature of the GEP by focusing on domestic and regional elements of foreign policy convergence. Although connecting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the GEP illustrates the domestic level of convergence in their foreign policies, the regional context reflects a partial convergence that entails further policy coordination in managing potential risks and challenges, particularly in Central Asia and more broadly in Eurasia. In examining the evolving nature of GEP, the international political economy perspective is applied to foreign policy analysis with a particular focus on the development-security nexus. The article concludes with a discussion of the main drivers and future trajectory of the GEP with regard to regional and global stability.

Keywords: China, Russia, Greater Eurasia Partnership, Belt and Road Initiative, Foreign policy.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Economic and political repercussions of the post-COVID-19 global environment, including deteriorating relations of China with the West, China-India border crisis and the Russia-Ukraine War with its broader implications, indicate much uncertainty about the ongoing transformation of the international system. The security aspect of relations among great powers has been heightened and natural geopolitical limitations on their multiple interactions have become more evident. Preserving global stability and peace has attracted the world's attention at most and emerged as an urgent necessity for the international community. And most recently, Xi Jinping has announced China's new "Global Security Initiative" which is devoted to being as a response to the challenges in the global security environment.

Additionally, the vital need to change the functioning of the international economic order has increased with the current post-pandemic recession. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the liberal international economic order has been under significant scrutiny as well as criticism due to the fact that it lacked far behind to respond existing problems with regard to global developmental issues and the issues related to unbalanced and unequal development in the world. The global economic crisis, which was coupled with the trade war and protectionism during the Trump era, often described as a "lost decade", continues to be a major challenge and the globalization process is slowing down. The failure to manage existing economic difficulties has coincided with increasing dissatisfaction from the developing world by demanding a more fair and equitable trade system and playing a more active role in developing a new global economic order has also been strengthened. Within this broader global economic context, global reshuffling has begun to be taken place after the post-pandemic recession and the world's largest trade agreement of RCEP has settled in 2022. Its significant impact on South-South trade is currently leading to some considerations on new financial initiatives for depolarization efforts especially in the areas of new currency use, the use of digital currency, and the internalization of the renminbi.

In the last two decades, the economic and political interests of China and Russia have been gradually aligned in significant ways and levels. This strategic alignment has come to a new stage where the two great powers have begun to redefine the rules and norms of a much more comprehensive framework for Eurasian integration. The ongoing structural transition from unipolarity to multipolarity has taken place not only in economic terms but also in security terms. From a regional order formation perspective, some scholars address the emergence of non-Western regionalism differently than the Western type of regional integration and institution-building models (Kaczmarski, 2017). In this regard, while China and Russia have separate visions and initiatives on regional order formation, their attempts overlap in altering the existing Eurasian order. Another different view emphasizes the "adaptation" process in Eurasian regional order formation through carefully managed interactions between China and Russia and the promotion of their attempts to increase strategic interdependence for creating a "regional system" (Christoffersen, 2018). On the other hand, some others suggest that Beijing and Moscow, sharing common geopolitical purposes and concerns, have already begun to establish a new platform for security and economic cooperation in the making of the Greater Eurasia community

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

(Lukin and Novikov, 2021). In order to provide geoeconomic and geopolitical consolidation as the foundation of the Community of Greater Eurasia, a number of theoretical constructs have been built upon new concepts such as "Central Eurasia" and some other new models of trans-regionalism encompassing East and Southeast Asia and Europe (Karaganov, 2018; Bordachev, 2018). On the other hand, instead of political and strategic considerations, some other views concentrate on common economic interests resulting from the formation of Greater Eurasia (Li, 2018). Eventually, it is also necessary to reconsider expected economic benefits with potential security risks for further Eurasian integration. From a broader security perspective, the question of European security within the framework of Greater Eurasia is raised as an essential component of a feasible regional integration process in the long term. According to this view, the Greater Eurasia project without Europe presents both geopolitical and geoeconomic risks (Wang and Duan, 2022).

In order to understand the future trajectory of regional development and security cooperation in Eurasia, this article aims to analyze evolving nature of the Greater Eurasia Partnership (GEP) by concentrating on the domestic and regional level of foreign policy convergence. Although both great powers principally agree upon moving towards deepening their relations within the new framework of GEP, in practice, they have different views on how to manage the dynamic interplay between economic and security dimensions of extended integration in Eurasia. Given the fact that Russia's GEP and China's BRI have been linked to each other, a much more effective policy coordination between the two becomes more essential. What is missing in the existing literature is to investigate the interactions between the economic and security dimensions of Greater Eurasia more closely in general and the role of domestic politics in the foreign policies of China and Russia in particular. For filling this gap, China-Russia's strategic partnership is analyzed through their respective foreign policies with a particular focus on their attempts to facilitate regional development and security cooperation in Eurasia. In addition to the assessment of their efforts to increase mutual developmental benefits through infrastructure and trade connectivity, the major concerns for reducing potential security risks are also evaluated by paying attention to their national and foreign security policies.

The first part of the article introduces the theoretical framework that helps to explain the development-security connection by applying the international political economy perspective to foreign policy analysis. The second part focuses on the main underlying motivations of Russia's new approach to foreign policy in formulating the GEP. The third part explicates multiple dimensions of the BRI as China's grand policy initiative. The fourth part examines the mutual developmental benefits of linking BRI to GEP by illustrating the domestic context of their foreign policy convergence. The last part explores the partial convergence in regional bilateral and multilateral settings which indicates both advantages and potential risks for further Greater Eurasia integration.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In employing the international political economy perspective in foreign policy analysis, the domestic context of foreign policy and the relationship between domestic and foreign policies are mainly examined through the concept of developmental state (Tonami, 2016). In this regard, it helps to develop a better

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

theoretical approach to the development-security nexus in explaining the evolving nature of the China-Russia strategic partnership and its implications for practical regional diplomacy. It also helps to explain how developmental states engage in their bilateral and multilateral relations in responding to changing international environment.

The domestic level of convergence relies on state-led developmentalism that leads states to pursue similar foreign policies for achieving mutual developmental benefits according to their domestic needs. Development-security connection is based on the basic presumption of the inseparable nature of national development and security policies of states. They are considered mutually dependent and reinforcing each other. National development needs a secure external environment, which means that a secure external environment provides suitable conditions for economic development. On the other hand, national and external security requires stability, which is provided and supported by economic resources. National development supports a stable internal and external security environment and brings sustainable stability in the long term. Besides, national development provides potential means and opportunities to alter domestic and external security.

Foreign policy convergence in a regional bilateral or multilateral context, however, is constituted by strategic alignment practices which are affected by domestic and external factors. In economic alignment, economic interdependence plays a role in accommodating interactions toward common economic interests. In political alignment, strategic partnerships, as an alternative to formal security alliances, serve to coordinate competing interests into common goals and actions as a response to uncertainty in the international security environment (Wilkins, 2008). Developmentalist states tend to involve building collaborative partnerships through the means and tools of economic alignment and attempt to establish political alignment towards regional development and security cooperation. Strategic partnerships play a key role in establishing complementarity between economics and politics as such international trade tends to complement a state's strategic partnership, "trade follows the flag" (Watson, 2001: 1488).

RUSSIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY: GREATER EURASIA PARTNERSHIP

Russia's foreign policy shift to "pivot to Asia" in 2013 has been reformulated as "Greater Eurasia Partnership" (GEP) since 2016. The main underlying motivations behind this significant foreign policy shift can be understood from the two major challenges: the need to establish relations with the region that is gradually becoming a new center of the world economy; and the need to achieve Russia's strategic goal of developing its Siberian and Far Eastern regions (Lukin, 2018: 174). But, from a broader historical point of view, it is understood that Russia's expectations from its relations with the West were not met in the last several decades. In addition to fundamental geopolitical challenges resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was unable to create its own national development strategy to integrate the world economy successfully. As a result, Russia was excluded from the process of developing the rules of the global economy as well.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

With the practical impact of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia's decision to shift its foreign policy toward the East was encouraged by gradual diplomatic steps in different platforms. Initially, President Vladimir Putin addressed Russia's intention to form a new economic partnership between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the SCO, and ASEAN at the Federal Assembly in December 2015 (Putin, 2015). After that Putin gave a speech at the Russian-ASEAN summit by noticing that Russia was willing to create "a common free trade zone between the EAEU and ASEAN" in May 2016 (Putin, 2016). The so-called "Sochi Declaration" in the same year reflected a much clear diplomatic move towards a Greater Eurasia Partnership by proposing to establish a comprehensive free trade area between ASEAN and the EAEU and building greater cooperation among ASEAN, the EAEU, and the SCO. As Russia's strategic reorientation towards Greater Eurasia had been decisively reformulated, a more extensive Eurasian partnership has been involved in improving relations between the EAEU and the countries with which Russia already has close partnerships including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the SCO countries. Putin especially emphasized that the GEP promotes comprehensive economic relations and trade, based on the rules of WTO. For this purpose, he added, it is essential to build a network of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between all the members and organizations.

On the other hand, Valdai Discussion Club suggests that the GEP is "a conceptual framework for Russia's geostrategic and geoeconomic self-identification as the center and north of the rising continent". It also defines it as a new security framework that would replace a "failed European security project" (Valdai Discussion Club, 2017: 25). Although Russia views China as the central and most significant partner within the framework of GEP, Russian foreign policy aims to diversify its economic ties with the wider region rather than fostering dependence on China. For example, after the Russian Far East (RFE) was included in the Silk Road Economic Belt's (SREB) action plan, the China-Russia strategic partnership has become dependent upon Chinese Northeast-RFE economic integration. This local-level regional development project turned into a national security issue, mainly because of the increasing significance of the Northern Sea Route to the Arctic Ocean (Shi, 2017). Moreover, the different priorities of the two sides for the Chinese Northeast-RFE integration project, political purposes and administrative concerns of Russia and local market-oriented priorities of Chinese provinces, had to be converged carefully (Cheng 2015). Heilongjiang province, for instance, was incorporated into the SREB linking with Central Asia and assumed that the Chinese Northeast-RFE integration project would provide access to the Northern Sea Route through transport corridors in southern Primorye. But more importantly, the construction of the GEP reflects Russia's diversification attempts in foreign policy through expanding connectivity by linking the RFE and the EAEU to the RCEP (Suslov, 2016). Even though RCEP agreement was reached without Russia's participation in 2022, RCEP's strategic value is still important for Russia in order to place the RFE and the EAEU within the Asia Pacific context and achieve increased connections with Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

From national development and security perspective, Russia's fundamental domestic weakness lies in its insufficient economic development. Russia's

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

weakening economic position creates more vulnerabilities and insecurities. The Russian policymaking circles have come to realize that Russia will not achieve strategic modernization goals without increasing cooperation with Asia's rising economies. In this sense, one of the key strategic objectives is considered to be developing the economic conditions of the Siberian and Far Eastern territories (Lukin, 2018). In considering Russia's national security priorities, the sources of potential strength and weakness will largely affect its future foreign policy behaviour. While energy strategy has a central place in its national security posture, institutional underdevelopment, sub-regional weakness and political vulnerability play a constraining role in its foreign economic and security policy (Sussex, 2022: 158-159). In this regard, Russia's pivot to Asia is primarily based on its aspiration to create strategic leverage as a premier energy supplier to the East. However, its domestic weaknesses and vulnerabilities entail Russia pursuing other economic and political means and instruments, particularly building trade connectivity, to ensure its national economic and security interests.

CHINA'S GRAND POLICY INITIATIVE: BRI

BRI as China's grand policy initiative includes two major policy initiatives, namely Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). These two initiatives are interlinked and designed as mutually reinforcing to each other. In the grand policy design of the BRI, while the former is mainly driven by economic and commercial interests, the maritime security dimension is considered to be the integral component of foreign economic policy in the latter. The potential security risks in the South China Sea, including naval blockade by the US and China's vulnerability to maritime transport routes, are aimed to be reduced by diversifying its import and export routes through the SREB (Gabuev, 2015). Additionally, some of the projects within these initiatives are closely related to each other and some others largely overlap in policy terms. For example, the Arctic Polar Silk Road project is officially situated within the MSR, but it can also be considered a part of SREB in terms of geographic imperative and policy implementation. Moreover, China's overall strategic attempts to integrate Southeast Asia into Central Asia have become more visible through recent developments, especially in its increasing trade relations with ASEAN and the SCO countries. Thus, it is strategically important to recognize interconnection or interoperability between these two main aspects of BRI in considering their long-term implications. And specifically, the broader strategic linkage between land and maritime Silk Road ensures the feasibility of the Greater Eurasia plan in a way that both China and Russia will continue to facilitate their joint efforts towards deeper strategic cooperation. Some scholars have started to discuss the need for developing the maritime dimension of the China-Russia strategic partnership (Zhao, 2021a; Trenin, 2020).

BRI's economic rationale reflects a new design of shaping the global energy and trading system, which allows China to rebalance its international investment by providing itself with a global presence. With the help of China's proactive policy approach, the security rationale of BRI seeks to achieve much more comprehensive security cooperation by shifting its focus from East Asia to Central and West Asia in the medium term. As a combination of both continental

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

and maritime strategy, the BRI is designed to support continental transportation roads with significant maritime ports. Furthermore, the crisis management element of BRI aims to create suitable conditions and mechanisms for a stable regional environment by helping to reduce destabilizing effects of economic, financial, and security crises and promising to ease the tensions in its regional neighbourhood. From a broader perspective, in terms of BRI's political rationale, it is reasonable to assume that China's need for gaining political support from developing countries and regional neighbours in enhancing its legitimate actions is the foundational rationale for explaining the BRI as a grand policy initiative. Stabilizing the surrounding environment is the essential strategic objective of China's BRI.

BRI as an initiative for international cooperation primarily focuses on stimulating regional economic development. Strengthening cooperation on infrastructure development is also enhanced by improving connections in the fields of energy, trade, and finance. In this regard, developing BRI for regional and international cooperation requires increased connectivity and coordinated attempts of participant countries in their national development strategies (Chen, 2017). The domestic context of BRI is linked to China's national development strategies in promoting economic reforms as well as solving the problems of regional economic inequalities between underdeveloped continental and more developed maritime regions (Leverett and Wu, 2017). BRI serves to stimulate social and economic development by coordinating different competing policies in multiple domains of national development (Jones and Zeng, 2019). As it helps to resolve socio-economic issues which are increasingly becoming connected to the world economy, it also contributes to the development of China's other regions, especially the Northeast and Northwest regions.

The problem of overcapacity and the increasing need to build collaborative partnerships in the third market, particularly in Central Asia, is also another significant domestic political factor that influences China's external BRI policy. The economic rationale is strongly associated with China's domestic needs. Stimulating demand for Chinese exports in third markets requires reducing the cost of trade and increasing connectivity through infrastructure building. And most recently supply chain management and cooperation, which is an essential component of trade and finance, has become critical after COVID-19 for China's domestic economic transition from an old growth model to a "dual circulation" strategy. Furthermore, building a large-scale infrastructure industry has produced excess labor force capacity and overproduction. The BRI, on the other hand, makes it possible to explore new opportunities in emerging markets such as Central Asia, Russia, Iran, and others.

In terms of the national security priorities of China, separatist and terrorist movements are perceived as major threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Development-security connection is much visible in some underdeveloped Western regions, particularly in China's Xinjiang autonomous region. The attempts in solving major security problems are supported by the idea of encouraging Xinjiang's economic development through the BRI projects. Furthermore, Xi Jinping's leadership created a new concept of "Comprehensive National Security" for national prosperity that involves extensive policymaking and implementation systems in various issue areas,

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

such as energy security, foreign trade and finance, migration, demography, and so on. It helps systematically calculate new risks and challenges to overall Chinese interests. While it regards national development as a core national interest, China's "Comprehensive National Security" contains "the combination of internal security and national stability with external security", leading to "the combination of traditional and non-traditional fields of security policy" (Drinhausen and Legarda, 2022). Development-security connection reflects a circular understanding of mutually dependent aspects and organizing principle of overall strategy development in Chinese strategic thinking.

DOMESTIC CONVERGENCE: CONNECTING BRI TO THE GEP

Both China and Russia, as developmental states, pursue similar approaches to building new collaborative partnerships for achieving mutual developmental benefits. The domestic convergence in their foreign policies relies on certain commonalities such as giving higher priority to domestic economic transition, determination in responding to developmental needs, choosing its own developmental path, and increasing institutional efforts for strengthening state capacity and national security. Thus, the domestic and foreign policy decision-making in China and Russia are similar and getting gradually converging even though they are not likely to be identical. In this context, it is possible to suggest that China and Russia increasingly share "parallel interests" rather than identical interests (Rozman, 2014).

In terms of the driving pattern of their bilateral relations, economic interdependence with various dimensions including energy, trade, and finance has been enhanced. After the energy-driven regional connectivity cooperation was established with a big energy deal in 2014, their bilateral relations were economically realigned and politically improved. However, mutual developmental benefits need to be enlarged by forging trade interdependence through increasing connectivities for creating new growth poles. In order to improve Eurasian regional development, established energy connectivity should be supported by trade connectivity. In international trade, the largest trade partner of China has shifted from the EU to ASEAN, and both China and the EU have surpassed Russia in their economic exchanges with Central Asia. China and Russia are willing to improve trade diversification by utilizing the GEP framework. As a result of this significant change, the GEP framework is offered as an opportunity to identify new sources of growth and drivers of development for all interested countries and regions. For this purpose, in 2018, a joint agreement on linking the BRI and the EAEU was signed between China and Russia, which systematically formulated the common interests of both countries such as customs cooperation, reducing trade barriers, and strengthening trade facilitation (CGTN, 2019).

Chinese Northeast-Russian Far East Integration

One of the necessary component of connecting the BRI to the GEP is to integrate China's Northeast with Russia's Far East (Shen, 2016: 28-29). The Chinese Northeast-RFE integration has been driven by strong domestic factors, such as local-center institutional development and state transformation, in both countries. The Russian government approved its Far East development strategy for 2015-2025 after Eastern Economic Forum was held in 2015. Russia's state-led developmentalism involves promoting state capacity with a wider strategic

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

vision of Far East development and integration with the Asia Pacific. Practically, it is essential to understand how the BRI affects the RFE development particularly. As of 2018, China became the largest trading partner of the RFE region, accounting for 83.5% of the total foreign trade of the Amur, 52.7% in Primorsky Krai, and 59.6% in Khabarovsk Kai (Kapoor, 2020). The critical juncture is the two transport corridors, called Primorye-1 and Primorye-2. The expected benefits from foreign trade after Primorskiy Krai is connected with Northeast China has been one of the key driving force. These two corridors will create a logistical chain that links the hinterland Chinese coastal provinces with Russian ports.

In terms of the border planning process in Chinese Northesat-RFE integration, the state-building efforts of China and Russia appear to be in parallel development despite some problems regarding center-local relations exist in both countries (Christoffersen, 2021). Their joint integration programs focus on certain issues such as border-free trade zones, infrastructure building, developing resource industries, and investment cooperation. The close coordination between the two sides on border planning and development influences each other's domestic processes in local-center coordination of state-building efforts. The local-level actors in both countries have been significantly transformed to become more active players in domestic and foreign policymaking (Sergunin, 2020). While Heilongjiang provincial government has been successfully elevating local border trade to the national level in BRI's implementation, Russia created the Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East as a federal body that provides coordination between the central government and local authorities (Troyakova, 2018). This ministry was reconstructed later as the Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic as a response to the need of improving the efficiency of developing the Arctic zone. This institutional reform was put forward with the new Arctic strategy in 2020 labeled as "Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035".

Chinese Northwest-Central Asia Connection

Even before the BRI has launched, China's "Going West" strategy was adopted for developing Northwest China. Xinjiang province was regarded as a new center for the oil and gas industry and it attempted to build new infrastructure to connect the province to the coastal areas within China (Wishnick, 2012: 84). Within the BRI framework, however, Xinjiang's geographical advantages as key transportation and trade hub have become much a matter of utilization by creating connections with the neighboring states in Central Asia and South Asia (Zimmerman, 2015: 6). For the development of Northwest of China, the three different corridors are designed within the SREB: the New Eurasian Land Bridge and Silk Road Railway from Xinjiang to Western Russia through Kazakhstan; China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor from Xinjiang to Türkiye and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan.

In order to improve the Chinese Northwest-Central Asia connection, the main effort has been devoted to creating a free trade zone among the SCO countries. While the SCO mainly focuses on security matters, economic and trade cooperation among its members and other partners has increasingly become an important aspect. Because of its geographic location and its potential to grow,

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

the Xinjiang region is regarded as a "core development" area to deepen the SCO ties (Chu, 2022). A new plan for establishing an "SCO-themed pilot free trade zone" in Xinjiang has been announced for bolstering trade activities, including e-commerce, and expanding cooperative areas in Eurasia. In addition to that China established the China-SCO Local Economic and Trade Cooperation Demonstration Area in Qingdao, East China's Shandong province, in 2018. This area allows the SCO business groups to develop new areas of collaboration in trade and finance. It also serves as a link to the sea for landlocked Central Asian countries with 17 international freight train services, running to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as Hamburg and Germany.

As of 2022, Xinjiang's regional and global connectivity has reached 118 international transport roads, 26 international optical cables, and 6,242 direct trains to Europe and Central Asia. The Xinjiang autonomous region's foreign trade volume has significantly developed up to 21 billion dollars. Two of its major rail ports, Alataw Pass and Horgos Port, achieved a high record in handling 8,701 China-Europe freight train journeys last year (Li, 2022). Another important aspect of Xinjiang's development is related to the region's fast-growing wind power and photovoltaic product manufacturing industrial sector. This is especially crucial for other Central Asian countries to ensure sufficient power supplies in the coming years. Xinjiang is expected to be a production center for wind and solar equipment, which increasingly becomes essential for the global transition toward clean energy. According to the estimation, the building of clean energy generation hardware and grid networks will require an investment of some 99.8 billion dollars by 2030, when 70 percent of electricity is expected to come from wind and solar (Chu, 2022).

The different policy initiatives of relevant countries within the BRI framework include the Bright Road of Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor of Türkiye, the Development Road of Mongolia, and the Two Corridors, One Economic Circle of Vietnam. Besides, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity represents another important cooperative mechanism that has already been taken seriously by both China and Russia. With regard to the corridors in Central Asia, one of the main concerns of Russia was about the use of the Caspian Sea as an alternative route to bypass Russia and Belarus. In practice, a Finnish company has started a route from China via Kazakhstan by using the Caspian Sea, connecting to Azerbaijan then by rail to Georgia and across the Black Sea to Romania (Briginshaw, 2022). Essentially, Russia diplomatically intends to develop the "Trans-Eurasian Development Belt", including the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railway and the Northern Sea route, in order to contribute to the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia (Lukin and Yakunin, 2018). However, the negative impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War practically have increased the significance of alternative routes in Central Asia. More generally, for improving the linkage between the BRI and the GEP the existing mechanisms need to be coordinated successfully.

REGIONAL PARTIAL CONVERGENCE: TOWARD GREATER EURASIA

The fundamental difference between Chinese and Russian foreign policies rest on primary motivations to expand their strategic partnership at the regional level. While China prioritizes economic development and attempts to translate

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

economic power into political gains, Russia uses geopolitical means and tools to achieve economic benefits. Their diverging approaches become evident in promoting the role of SCO and its future development trajectory as either more security-driven or economic-driven multilateral cooperation. However, both countries seek to put economic relations at the center of their strategic partnership. Besides, they have gradually come to recognize that security can often be achieved only in cooperation. So, it means they are well aware that extended regional security cooperation requires long-term coordination of their foreign economic and security policies. In 2019, Moscow and Beijing needed to reformulate their bilateral orientations by emphasizing the term "coordination" and accepting to use of new terminology of "comprehensive strategic partnership coordination in the new era" (Xinhua, 2019). As the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) indicates, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is based on a political compromise for linking the SREB with the EAEU. According to this view, Beijing recognized the EAEU as its "equal negotiating partner" and Russia accepted China's presence in Central Asia (Kuznetsova, 2017). Although asymmetric economic relationship remains to be managed, the alignment of political interests towards regional development and security cooperation stimulates their efforts for further Eurasian integration.

Advantages and Potential Risks in Central Asia

The GEP framework would positively help to contribute to redefining the evolving nature of China-Russia interaction in Central Asia (Guo and Liu, 2016). On the other hand, the policy discussions on the GEP do not sufficiently address common interests but rather point out security challenges with regard to Central Asia under current circumstances. In this sense, Russia's new foreign policy still tends to regard Central Asia as a security buffer zone against external security threats as it did in the post-soviet era before. The conception of "Central Eurasia", which is often used by Russian analysts, implies the increasing significance of the Central Asia region within the GEP (Karaganov, 2018). This conception also refers to the need to build a common political understanding of the Eurasian condominium between Beijing and Moscow in a broader sense. It is based on a new type of great power relations in which Russia accepts China's economic presence in Central Asia, and in return, China would support maintaining Russia's role as a security provider in the region. Although it is less likely to expect two-power condominiums in Eurasia under current circumstances, it is important to pay attention to this proposal in order to understand some potential political risks and security challenges that Central Asian countries face in the region. The regional security dimension of the GEP involves dealing with certain major threats such as the radicalization of Central Asian states; the possible spillover effect of instability from Afghanistan; the domestic instability in Iran and the uncertainty in Iran's foreign policy and more recently the impacts of Russia-Ukraine War. Yet, more specifically, both China and Russia have always been primarily concerned with stability and security in their domestic environments, China's Xinjiang region and Russia's Tatarstan and Volga districts, and their connections to the near external environment in Central Asia.

The GEP framework involves strengthening political and security coordination among China, Russia, and other member states within the SCO in order to solve

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

security issues and reduce potential risks in the region. Regarding the inclusion of new members to the SCO, the effectiveness of the multilateral organization needs to be reconsidered. Even though with new memberships it became an international regional organization, which brings it more legitimacy and prestige at the international level, there raise some other questions about what impact this will have on internal unity and how it creates an impact on the effectiveness of mechanisms for diverse cooperation within the SCO (Kortunov, 2018).

In addition to infrastructure-driven trade connectivity, the institutional connection needs to be strengthened in order to develop the GEP (Xing, 2017). The SCO presents a larger potential to achieve this purpose. If the SCO is recognized as a central mechanism for policy coordination, it would be relatively easier to overcome the existing difficulties. For example, the institutional structure and operation of the EAEU do not match consistently with the general implementation of the BRI. The EAEU Commission tends to define BRI as a minor element of the GEP and continues to emphasize a "network of trade agreements" rather than only transport and infrastructural projects (Shakhanova and Garlick, 2020: 35). The mechanisms of the Commission through which BRI-EAEU coordination is implemented at the supranational level reveal that it operates two-sided approach to the BRI as the EAEU's collective rival. One of the most important reasons behind the Russia-Kazakhstan contestation over the BRI-EAEU coordination can be understood from the Commission's two-sided approach.

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the SCO has been expected to undertake a new role as a central mechanism for regional economic development and security cooperation. This brings up the question of whether Afghanistan's membership would follow Pakistan, India, and Iran in the near future. This critical decision will depend on how much China and Russia would really be willing to extend Eurasian integration. Given the increasing expectation for support from regional countries in order to solve development-security problems in Afghanistan with new regime change after the US withdrawal, how much risks China and Russia would take according to their risk assessments will be critically important. Risk sharing dimension is one of the salient factors affecting the development of strategic partnerships. What is known until now is that Xi Jinping's leadership has been especially concerned with the changed situation in Afghanistan and his security team has already been involved in adapting China's policy over the Afghanistan-Pakistan protracted conflict area (Zhao, 2016, 2021b). Another highlighting tendency of China's approach to terrorism defines "economic terrorism" differently than separatism (Lantaigne, 2008). Economic terrorism is worth to be mentioned, not just for maritime security, due to the increasing significance of regional trade and energy connectivity in Greater Eurasia.

The Problem of Third Party: European Security

Even if Russia's new foreign policy intends to shift to the Asia-Pacific region, the geographical imperative entails the GEP to put European security and stability into consideration. Not only because Russia has big energy cooperation projects, such as Nord Stream 2, with Europe but also because China's BRI's future development largely depends on its connections with the West. With regard to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, the deteriorating relations between

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Russia and European countries pose potential risks and obstacles to the future development of BRI-GEP coordination.

Regarding the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia has repositioned itself strongly in Greater Eurasia by using military force. For the Russian side, the Ukraine conflict is perceived as a result of NATO's eastward expansion and natural response to the geopolitical consolidation of post-Soviet space. The Russian leadership takes political risks in expecting to obtain long-term strategic benefits. The creation of the EAEU was an important attempt for restoring economic integration in the former Soviet space, but the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014 as the biggest setback to the EAEU integration made the possibility of Ukraine joining the EAEU unrealistic. Russia's decision to wage a war in Ukraine reflects broader domestic consensus as well as long-term historical reflection on the role of Ukraine in Russia's foreign policy calculations. The most likely strategic outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War will be Russia's accelerated and deepened reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific.

Any post-war settlement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict cannot be achieved without a broader perspective on Eurasian, including Europe, long-term security by reconsidering the concept of "indivisible security". In Xi Jinping's new "Global Security Initiative", "indivisible security" is defined as building a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture without one's national security on the basis of other's insecurity (Xinhua, 2022). The notion of "indivisible security" has its historical roots in the Helsinki Final Act (1975), which provided a framework of action to both sides in the detente period of the Cold War. It was exclusively mentioned in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 1999 Charter for European Security. It has become again a significant proposal in seeking a solution to the current situation of the Russia-Ukraine War. What makes it currently remarkable would be its practical value in the GEP framework. The "indivisible security" practically refers to the significance of the development-security connection in which the development of any Eurasian country requires regional security and stability. In this context, the long-term vision which provides interconnection between the GEP and the EU needs a much more comprehensive security framework (Wang and Duang, 2022). Any type of proposal has practical value for considering a new Helsinki Act for Greater Eurasia which provides a common understanding for solving problems related to Eurasian integration, managing differences and promoting policy coordination among different countries, and redefining fundamental principles and rules of interactions among them. Neither China nor Russia enjoy the expectation to be part of NATO or the EU. Therefore they have no option but to rely on indivisible security. Especially for Russia, Greater Eurasia means that "several collective security frameworks can merge into a common space of indivisible security" (Kvartalnov, 2021: 21). The necessary balancing act between collective security and indivisible security, as the two different approaches on international security order, can possibly be attained through establishing well-functioning regional security mechanisms based on indivisible security in Eurasia. Even though China and Russia perform a strong reaction to NATO's expansionism, they would not be completely satisfied with the absence of NATO as a collective security organization. In the end, both great powers support the UN-centered international order, which is also based on the collective security concept.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

CONCLUSION

The emergence and possible impacts of the GEP can be understood from multiple dimensions: the decline of Europe and the rise of Asia, the structural change towards a multipolar world, the changing nature of China-Russia bilateral relations, and the need to link the BRI to the GEP. The GEP is mainly driven by the common economic and political interests of China and Russia, which are based on their national development and security priorities. However, it would be difficult to achieve the expected results if policy coordination cannot be sustained successfully between the two great powers under given potential security risks and challenges. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that China-Russia strategic partnership has evolved into a new stage where their common interests have converged in significant ways and levels. Even though domestic convergence of their foreign policies is based on their shared understanding of developing an integrated approach to linking BRI into the GEP, foreign policy convergence in regional and global contexts reflects partial alignment which also indicates existing disagreements about how to manage potential security risks surrounding Greater Eurasia. In security terms, it is not realistic to expect an alliance formed between the two great powers at the expanse of any other great power. But they tend to expand security partnerships on the basis of indivisible security with respect to their positions at the UN Security Council.

While the creation of EAEU can be regarded as a counterweight to external economic expansion to Central Asia, the new framework of GEP focuses relatively more on the development of the Russian Far East and Siberia for establishing new trade connectivities. More broadly, the development of RFE is regarded as the national priority for the 21st century and the strategic value of Asia-Pacific has recently increased in terms of Russia's national interests. It is expected that the shifting focus of regional development by creating common interests on the basis of an integrated approach to their developmental efforts will be helpful to manage China-Russia strategic competition and maintain stability in Eurasia. On the other hand, the uncertainty of Russia's behavior regarding how to engage in Central Asia would be an obstacle to the future development of BRI. Russia's domestic development priorities for Russian Far East and Siberia might exceed China's overall plans in BRI, including priorities and concerns for developing Northwest China. Additionally, as Russia seeks to diversify its energy and trade relations with the Asia-Pacific region, China pursues multiple diversification attempts in energy and trade connectivities. The Eurasian integration and development will largely be dependent on building new trade connections. This remains to be seen how China-Russia strategic partnership will continue to be shaped with regard to the GEP. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that India's selective engagement to regional reorganization, the SCO and the AIIB, does not include the trade connectivity dimension, the BRI, and RCEP. So, India's position with respect to the future development of GEP also remains to be uncertain under current circumstances.

Thus, the medium-to-long-term outlook of the China-Russia strategic partnership will be affected by the developments in the international security environment. The US unilateralism, NATO's expansionism, and Western interventionism were the most important factors to establish a strategic partnership between China and

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Russia, including their coordination in the UN Security Council and security collaborations within the SCO framework. As long as the structural change moves from a unipolar to a multipolar world, it will continue to be deepened. However, from a short-to-medium-term perspective, it is more likely to be influenced much by the domestic context of their foreign policies. At this point, it might be useful to remember the failure of the US New Silk Road strategy mainly because of domestic political factors. Even though the US administration had already well-experienced how to connect economics to security in its foreign policy, this economic-security connection could not have been institutionalized (Rosenberger, 2017). In this regard, the increasing Western pressure on the Eurasian region has led both China and Russia much focused on their domestic transformation. It is imperative for both countries to adapt the domestic political environment to changing international circumstances. Their political priorities for national development in order to ensure national security still remain to be unresolved.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Winter 2023
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Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Research Article

NEW PHASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – CENTRAL ASIA COOPERATION: TEMPORARY OR STRATEGIC RAPPROCHEMENT?

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ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) is one of the key economic and political partners of the countries of Central Asia (CA). The EU adopted two strategies toward CA and acts through partnership and cooperation agreements. The recent geopolitical crisis in Eurasia improved bilateral relations between the regions. The EU reconsidered its CA strategy. The paper aims to analyze the current accelerated rapprochement between the EU and CA. Its main findings are as follows. First, bilateral trade between the regions became less diversified, increasing risks for Central Asia as trade became an important political tool. Second, the EU-CA strategic rapprochement will require institutional reforms in Central Asia, while for now, the EU pursues its geopolitical and economic goals in the region.

Keywords: Central Asia, European Union, International trade, Geopolitics, Energy cooperation.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Countries of Central Asia (CA) consider cooperation with the European Union (EU-27) as one of the most important strategic directions. They intend to intensify trade with the EU countries and attract investments. New geopolitical realities caused substantial changes in Eurasian politics. Russia's invasion of Ukraine disrupted production, transportation and supply chains. As a result, many countries' trade links were put at risk. In these circumstances, the EU together with the United States adopted a tough policy against Russia by imposing sanctions and providing Ukraine with weapons. Russia responded by countersanctions. CA countries preferred to keep neutrality and not be affected by western sanctions. In these circumstances, many important issues in bilateral relations between the EU and CA appeared. These include the future of trade, transportation, energy, and institutional cooperation as the Northern corridor was closed, and pipeline transportation through Russia became uncertain. As a result, the EU has reconsidered its policy towards CA making it more resilient and based on economic and political interests rather than the promotion of norms and values. As a consequence, mutual relations intensified at both regional and bilateral levels. The EU started to conduct an aggressive policy openly expressing its goals to reduce Russian influence in the region and promote new areas of cooperation. Countries of Central Asia, deeply affected by Russia's policy, were interested in cooperation. Therefore, the paper aims to analyze the current accelerated rapprochement between the EU and CA, reveal its consequences, and assess its time limits. The methodology of the paper includes desk research and statistical analysis. The paper is organized as follows. The first section analyses the comprehensive policy of the EU towards CA by focusing on its CA strategies adopted in 2007 and 2019, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. It shows that the EU pursues its political and economic goals by providing trade preferences. Section 2 analyzes the level of diversification of bilateral trade and finds that the CA countries became more dependent on the EU market and their exports mainly consist of mineral fuels. At the same time, it shows new cooperation areas for the EU and CA. Section 3 provides new developments in the EU-CA relations, explains reasons for the aggressive rhetoric of the EU, and further changes in its policy. It shows future risks for the countries of Central Asia and provides policy recommendations.

EU POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Since the independence of Central Asian states, the European Union has been one of the key actors in the region promoting bilateral relations through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA). Later, the EU adopted two strategies towards Central Asia. The first one, adopted in 2007, focused on responding to security threats, protecting human rights, promoting economic development, transport and energy links, and ensuring environmental protection. The second Strategy of 2019 updates the previous one and pursues three priority areas for bilateral cooperation. These priority directions include partnering with CA for resilience, prosperity and supporting regional cooperation in Central Asia. Under cooperation for resilience, the EU promotes human rights and democracy, security, and environmental challenges. Cooperation for prosperity includes economic diversification and private sector development, and enhancement of

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

intra-regional trade. The EU also pays special attention to supporting integration processes in Central Asia. Thus, the new Strategy shows the importance of the Central Asian states for the EU. Besides being a key trade and investment partner, the EU also remains the number one donor in the region, the assistance of which reached €1.1 billion for the period 2014-2020. Moreover, the EU mobilized €123 million for Central Asia during the pandemic, adopted special assistance programs for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (with a €3 million budget), and delivered vaccines to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (European External Action Service (EEAS, 2022).

Some experts are very skeptical about the EU's new strategy on CA blaming it for not offering new positions. As before, the CA's importance for the EU is in its strategic location, energy resources, market and regional security, promotion of democracy, and improvement of human rights. These wide varieties of areas also appeared in the 2007 version, but the CA states achieved almost no progress, especially in the development of democratic institutions and human rights. There are also critics of the EU approaches such as training opportunities on human rights and advocacy skills for civil society activists. According to experts, "the new EU Central Asia strategy is the old EU Central Asia strategy in a fresh PDF" with no changes in priorities and built on Uzbekistan-inspired optimism. However, European diplomats can and will influence regional politics, but the new strategy does not put forward any new ideas on how they plan to do so (Putz, 2019).

The EU also pays special attention to deepening bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia. Kazakhstan is the EU's key partner in the region. In December 2015, the European Union and Kazakhstan signed the EPCA, which entered into force on March 1, 2020, and replaced the PCA of 1999. Kazakhstan became the first country to sign the EPCA from the CA region. One of the objectives of the EPCA is to strengthen cooperation by ensuring a better regulatory environment for EU and Kazakhstan's companies. The parties use the annual Cooperation Council of the EU and Kazakhstan, a high-level EU-Kazakhstan Business Platform, to deepen bilateral relations. The EU supported Kazakhstan's accession to the World Trade Organization and remains the country's first trade and investment partner representing 40% of its external trade and 48% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Energy products play a key role in bilateral relations between the EU and Kazakhstan. In 2006, the parties signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation, which addresses energy security and investment, construction/upgrading of transportation infrastructure, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan exports more than 70% of its oil to the EU (6% of EU oil demand). Energy companies played a major role in Kazakhstan's oil industry with substantial investments. Kazakhstan ranks first in the world in terms of the production and export of raw uranium. It is the single largest supplier to the EU nuclear energy industry and meets more than 21% of the EU uranium demand. There are also several cooperation agreements in the field of nuclear energy (EEAS, 2021).

The EU and Kyrgyzstan signed the PCA in 1999 and initiated negotiations on the EPCA in July 2019. The EU granted Kyrgyzstan Generalized Scheme of Preferences plus (GSP+), which allows the country to export 6200 products to the EU without any tariffs. As a GSP+ beneficiary, Kyrgyzstan is responsible

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

for the ratification and implementation of the 27 conventions. The EU's efforts in development cooperation with Kyrgyzstan are significant. Over the period 2014-2020, the EU allocated €174 million to projects strengthening rule of law, and the development of education and rural areas (EEAS, 2021a).

In November 2019, Tajikistan requested to upgrade the current PCA of 1999 through the negotiation of the EPCA. Tajikistan remains the smallest trade partner of the EU in Central Asia and its exports to the EU are concentrated in two sectors, industrial products such as base metals and textiles. The EU plays an important role in development and technical cooperation. It implemented the Country strategy and multi-annual implementation program for 2014-2020, with an allocated bilateral financial envelope of €231 million. During the same period, the EU planned to provide Tajikistan €251 million as grants (EEAS, 2021b).

Energy-rich Turkmenistan is of high interest to the European Union. The country signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy with the EU, which facilitates the information exchange on energy policies, and the diversification of transit routes. The Memorandum also promotes the development of renewables and energy efficiency. Bilateral relations between the EU and Turkmenistan are part of the Interim Trade Agreement, signed in 2010. The PCA between the parties is under ratification by the European Parliament. The EU also proposes its assistance through the Development Cooperation Instrument in implementing economic reforms and privatization, education and legal reforms, and education and vocational training (EEAS, 2021c).

Uzbekistan's new open economic policy improved its bilateral relations with the EU, which were based on the PCA of 1999. The EU supports ongoing reforms in Uzbekistan and provides financial assistance to Uzbekistan annually. During 2014-2020, the EU allocated €168 million in financial aid to Uzbekistan, a 124% increase over the 2007-2013 period. Key priority areas for assistance are rural development, sustainable management of water resources, irrigation, horticulture, and livestock. For 2021-2027, the EU will concentrate its efforts on effective governance and digital transformation, inclusive, digital and green growth, and development of the agri-food sector. The EU granted Uzbekistan the GSP+ status and in April 2021 started applying preferential tariffs for products imported from Uzbekistan. This arrangement is an opportunity for export growth and investment attraction (EEAS, 2021d). In July 2022, the European Union and Uzbekistan successfully concluded and initialed the new EPCA, the main areas of cooperation under which would include political and economic reforms, foreign and security policies, justice and freedom. The EPCA aims to improve trade relations, regulatory environments, partnerships in transport and energy sectors, and intellectual property rights. In addition to the signing ceremony, the EU and Uzbekistan held their 18th annual Cooperation Committee meeting, where the parties discussed trade and economic relations, including Uzbekistan's membership in the EU's GSP+ scheme, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (EEAS, 2022a). The implementation of institutional reforms affects bilateral relations between the Central Asian states and the EU members. The EU granted Uzbekistan privileges of the GSP+ scheme due to positive economic and political reforms. The GSP+ will allow Uzbekistan to export more than 6200 commodity items to the EU countries without tariffs (UzReport, 2021a).

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Uzbekistan also became the first beneficiary of the United Kingdom's Extended Scheme of Generalized System of Preferences. Thus, more than 7800 types of goods produced in Uzbekistan will be imported into the UK at zero import duty (UzReport, 2021b).

The European Union and Central Asia use economic forums for the improvement of bilateral relations. In November 2021, the European Union – Central Asia Economic Forum took place in Kyrgyzstan with the participation of Prime Ministers of Central Asian countries as well as Ministers and high-level officials from more than 15 EU member states. The parties committed to strengthening bilateral cooperation to support the transformation of Central Asian economies into diversified and competitive private-sector-driven economies (European Commission, 2021). Talking at the Forum, the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Askar Mamin noted that during the last decade, the EU members invested more than €105 billion or $121.3 billion in Central Asian countries, which exceeded 40% of the total amount of FDI in the region. Mamin proposed to boost the EU investments in Central Asia using the Astana International Financial Centre as nearly 70 European companies were registered there. Additionally, he proposed to establish the European Union – Central Asia Business Council (Astana Times, 2021). In November 2021, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had a meeting with the President of the European Council Charles Michel. While discussing a comprehensive partnership, President Tokayev mentioned that the EU was one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan's economy with a total amount of investments of $160 billion (Kazinform, 2021).

Thus, the European Union implements a comprehensive policy towards Central Asia, which includes both bilateral and regional agendas promoting its values and norms. The EU also supports CA in multilateral formats, for instance, in the accession of the regional countries to the World Trade Organization. It plays an important role in terms of trade, investments and financial assistance. It provides the countries of the region with trade preferences. Three of the five CA countries benefit from favorable access to the EU market through the GSP (Tajikistan) or GSP+ (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). It is worth noting that the EU has the largest trade network in the world, with 42 trade agreements fully in force or provisionally applied. The EU trade agreements cover Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs) of a political (human rights, democracy), security and peace (combating terrorism and corruption), and economic nature (environmental protection). The EU pursues political NTPOs in agreements with smaller countries, offering them preferential access to its market, in exchange for political concessions. In trade agreements with larger countries, the EU proposes economic NTPOs. The EU includes both political and economic NTPOs in the GSP programs. GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis. The EU can thus reward countries that fulfill conditions related to NTPOs by granting them better GSP preferences. At the same time, it can punish trading partners that do not fulfill these conditions (Borchert et al., 2021). Therefore, the GSPs should be considered as another political and economic tool of the EU's Central Asia policy. The countries of Central Asia, in turn, lack the EU policy and pursue country-based interests, including retaining markets, attracting investments and financial aid, and obtaining trade preferences.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

DID THE EU-CA TRADE BECOME MORE DIVERSIFIED?

International trade plays an important role in establishing close economic ties between countries and regions. The impacts of trade are wide and positive. Foreign trade affects a country's economic growth through its openness to international trade, its preferential trade agreements and its trade structure (Singh, 2010). Trade increases revenue and boosts productivity, contributing to poverty reduction (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sapsford and Garikipati, 2006). Facilitating trade with reforms to improve customs procedures has a significant positive impact. It is worth noting that diversification is not necessarily a product of state support through industrial policy, but a natural result of trade intensification, including through integration (Dennis and Shepher, 2011). Trade's positive impacts also include contributions to the development of infrastructure and political stability. These effects are important as the countries of Central Asia aim to diversify their export by trade intensification with the EU, which in turn, supports the region's trade-related programs. Traditionally, the CA countries specialize in the production and export of raw materials such as crude oil, natural gas, cotton, and metals. Agricultural production is also an important source of revenue for the regional countries, but they still heavily depend on food imports.

Trade with the countries of the European Union is of high interest to the CA states. For Kazakhstan, the EU's market remains key for its major products such as crude oil. In the early 1990-s, European energy investments in the region (mainly in Kazakhstan) established early trade ties, which intensified following the 2000-s resource boom. Both higher prices and production brought Kazakhstan substantial revenues and allowed it to conduct modernization policies. Figure 1 shows the total trade between the regions. The indicator increased from almost $5.5 billion in 2002 to more than $34 billion in 2021. Mutual trade peaked in 2014 reaching nearly $58 billion. Following the end of the 'energy supercycle', the figure dropped significantly. A key trade partner of the European Union in Central Asia is Kazakhstan, total trade with which increased from $3.6 billion to almost $29 billion for the reported period. A share of Kazakhstan in Central Asia's total trade with the EU changed from 65% to 85% in the same period. During the peak periods, the share varied between 90-92%.

Figure 1. *Total trade between Central Asia and the EU-27, million $*



Source: The Author's compilation using the International Trade Centre (ITC, 2022) data.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 1 shows Central Asia's exports to and imports from the EU countries. The region's exports surged from nearly $3 billion in 2002 to more than $24 billion in 2021, increasing by eight times. During the same period, the imports of the countries of Central Asia changed from $2.5 billion to more than $10 billion, demonstrating four times growth. During the reported period, the share of Kazakhstan in total exports of the region increased from 67% to 96%. The shares of the rest of the countries of Central Asia experienced a significant reduction. For instance, the indicator of Uzbekistan decreased from 15% to a low 2%. However, the share of Kazakhstan in the region's total imports decreased from 64% to 56% during the reported period. At the same time, Uzbekistan's imports changed substantially, increasing from nearly $0.5 billion to almost $3.2 billion, demonstrating 6.4 times growth. As a result, the share of Uzbekistan grew from 19% to 31%. Turkmenistan's share also experienced a reduction, Tajikistan's share increased, while Kyrgyzstan's indicator remained the same.

Product-based analysis of the bilateral trade flows (Tables 2-3) shows that Central Asia has a trade deficit in manufacturing and agricultural products, while raw materials provide a substantial trade surplus. For instance, in 2021, the top three products with substantial trade deficits included machinery (almost $2.5 billion), pharmaceutical products ($1.5 billion), and electrical machinery and equipment ($0.9 billion). In the same period, mineral fuels ($21.4 billion), inorganic chemicals ($0.5 billion), and iron and steel ($0.4 billion) provided a significant trade surplus.

Table 1. *Central Asian exports to and imports from the EU-27, million $*

Exporters	**2002**	**2005**	**2010**	**2015**	**2020**	**2021**
Central Asian total exports	2984	13089	30337	24390	18247	24108
Kazakhstan	1999	11161	29423	23617	17650	23254
	67%	85%	97%	97%	97%	96%
Uzbekistan	452	637	378	282	206	388
	15%	5%	1%	1%	1%	2%
Turkmenistan	271	1110	392	415	276	302
	9%	8%	1%	2%	2%	1%
Tajikistan	237	155	74	28	65	117
	7,9%	1,2%	0,2%	0,1%	0,4%	0,5%
Kyrgyzstan	27	26	70	48	50	48
	0,9%	0,2%	0,2%	0,2%	0,3%	0,2%
Importers	2002	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021
Central Asian total imports	2505	5279	9455	9852	10169	10100
Kazakhstan	1592	3962	6531	6502	5814	5656
	64%	75%	69%	66%	57%	56%
Uzbekistan	485	718	1577	1647	3317	3168
	19%	14%	17%	17%	33%	31%
Turkmenistan	304	382	880	1183	565	676
	12%	7%	9%	12%	6%	7%
Tajikistan	37	99	185	212	214	315
	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%
Kyrgyzstan	87	117	282	307	259	285
	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%

Source: The Author's calculations and compilation using the ITC (2022) data.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 2. *Trade deficit between CA and the EU, by products, million $*

	2002	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021
All products	480	7810	20883	14538	8078	14009
Machinery	-790	-1596	-2427	-2485	-3131	-2488
Pharmaceutical products	-119	-336	-882	-1236	-1395	-1527
Electrical machinery and equipment	-233	-684	-1096	-988	-693	-927
Optical, photographic, and other equipment	-75	-148	-383	-373	-568	-605
Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock	-178	-457	-450	-652	-586	-563
Aircraft, spacecraft	-22	-6	-592	-28	-251	-388
Miscellaneous chemical products	-73	-117	-179	-207	-323	-337
Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery	-47	-112	-215	-219	-212	-280
Articles of iron or steel	-144	-385	-508	-909	-336	-206
Plastics and articles thereof	-62	-134	-230	-196	-167	-192
Rubber and articles thereof	-29	-60	-103	-80	-160	-139
Paper and paperboard	-72	-131	-221	-104	-96	-131
Railway or tramway locomotives	-8	-40	-22	-70	-71	-128
Furniture	-74	-93	-390	-161	-139	-123
Live animals	-2	-3	-12	-41	-98	-110
Miscellaneous edible preparations	-9	-34	-64	-74	-98	-100
Tanning or dyeing extracts	-24	-38	-73	-73	-68	-82
Beverages, spirits and vinegar	-10	-19	-45	-60	-54	-79
Residues and waste from the food industries	-1	-5	-15	-15	-63	-74
Live trees and other plants	-2	-5	-30	-35	-57	-68
Toys, games and sports requisites	-5	-14	-11	-25	-19	-66
Soap, washing preparations	-12	-28	-58	-54	-59	-65
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey	-10	-19	-39	-72	-69	-59

Source: The Author's compilation using the ITC (2022) data.

Top export partners of the Central Asian republics from the European Union include Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain, and Germany (Figure 2). Central Asia has a trade surplus with the majority of the EU countries. For instance, in 2021, the indicator amounted to $7.6 billion with Italy, $3.9 billion – with the Netherlands, and $1.4 billion – with France. However, the region has a trade deficit with Germany, which in 2021 equaled almost $2.4 billion. This deficit can be explained by the lower supply of raw materials to Germany than other EU countries. An analysis of individual countries' trade shows that all countries of Central Asia except Kazakhstan have trade deficits with their EU partners. For instance, in 2021, the trade deficit of Kyrgyzstan amounted to $238 million, Tajikistan – $198 million, Turkmenistan – $373 million, and Uzbekistan – $2.8 billion. Kazakhstan's trade surplus was equal to $17.6 billion.

Table 3. *Trade surplus between CA and the EU, by products, million $*

	2002	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021
Lead and articles thereof	5	38	69	135	38	68
Cereals	35	34	59	32	28	70
Fertilizers	0	-1	52	1	30	85
Copper and articles thereof	289	951	27	530	82	117
Other base metals; cermets;	30	43	36	85	80	136
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits	-3	-9	6	89	85	136
Cotton	476	369	203	87	112	149
Aluminium and articles thereof	139	29	26	-3	107	218
Iron and steel	105	478	558	219	177	388
Inorganic chemicals	68	181	583	660	332	479
Mineral fuels	1502	10281	27700	21873	16259	21404

Source: The Author's compilation using the ITC (2022) data.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Figure 2. *Trade balance of Central Asian states with individual countries of the EU, million $*



Source: The Author's compilation using the ITC (2022) data.

These trade data shows that bilateral trade flows between the EU and CA became less diversified with the increasing dependence of the CA countries on raw materials exports, which provide a significant trade surplus for Kazakhstan. Other countries have trade deficits. This trade pattern puts countries of CA at risk. First, price fluctuations may substantially reduce CA exports in value terms making its imports from the EU complicated. Second, the EU's green policy and its aim to reduce dependence on fossil fuels is an important challenge for CA countries. However, this policy can become an opportunity for the CA states as the EU is desperately looking for new energy suppliers, preferably green ones. Bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU is deepening in rare earth metals and green hydrogen. On the sidelines of the COP27 climate change conference in Egypt, the European Commission signed an agreement with Kazakhstan's government to develop supplies of green hydrogen and raw materials to manufacture equipment such as wind turbines and batteries for electric cars. The parties expect that the deal will boost the green and digital transformation of both sides' economies. The agreement focuses on three areas, such as economic and industrial integration in the strategic value chains of raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen, cooperation on capacity building, skills development and research and innovation, and increasing the resilience of raw material, battery and renewable hydrogen supply chains. The particular interests of the EU include rare earth magnates for wind turbines, lithium and cobalt for batteries, and polysilicon for semiconductors. Kazakhstan has some 50,000 metric tons in deposits (Lillis, 2022a). Svevind, the company behind Europe's largest wind farm in Sweden, is running a green hydrogen project called Hyrasia One in the Mangystau Region of Kazakhstan. According to the company's CEO Wolfgang Kropp, the project can transform Kazakhstan into a reliable supplier of green energy in the form of hydrogen and ammonia for the global markets. The company also sees significant potential for export to Europe, and the plant's production capacity is estimated at one-fifth of the amount the EU will import in 2030. The project's preliminary cost ranges from €40 billion to €50 billion. It will contribute to the development potential of the region by creating new high-level and long-term jobs (Satubaldina, 2022). For the countries of Central Asia, it is important not to substitute one dependence

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

(oil and gas) for another (rare earth metals). Cooperation in new areas should be complemented by the development of manufacturing projects to achieve diversification. Third, transportation of fossil fuels remains complicated due to the geopolitical situation putting CA exports at additional risk. Finally, political dependence on the EU may increase given the size of the EU in Kazakhstan's mineral fuel exports. The EU also may reconsider the CA policy putting more pressure on the countries of the region to reach its political and economic goals. For instance, the EU institutions and multinationals (MNCs) in the energy sector have different understandings of how to achieve the objective of energy security. While the EU was losing interest in Central Asian energy resources, its MNCs' consistent search for profit jeopardized its general Strategy in the region. The initial European strategy to achieve energy security in cooperation with the governments of Central Asia was not entirely pertinent, while China proved to be a faster and more convincing partner, often overpaying for projects to secure gas and oil supplies to satisfy its growing internal energy demand. The EU progressively changed its strategy on how to achieve energy security by greater involvement of the EU members defending the positions of the European MNCs against Central Asian governments' policies seeking compensation or attempting to increase their shares in different project consortia. This policy of the EU contrasts the EU strategies, which aimed at strengthening human rights and the rule of law in the region (Moisé and Sorbello, 2022). High dependence of the region on the European market, low diversification of its exports, and new areas of cooperation in the development of raw materials are important factors in the EU's new policy towards Central Asia.

GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF THE EU-CA COOPERATION

The current EU foreign policy is applicable to a rules-based international order. The EU started its new era with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Union's policy against Russia is recognized as a "birth of a geopolitical Europe." Because of geopolitical changes, many EU policies, including trade, investment, competition, and research and technology, will take into consideration power politics and become both tougher and more flexible. The EU enhances resilience by reducing asymmetric dependencies, building capacity in strategic sectors, and protecting the EU from external coercion (Lehne, 2022).

After the war in Ukraine, the EU politicians reconsidered the role of Central Asia in the Union's foreign policy. The organization increased its efforts in engaging with Central Asia using different formats. In October 2022, President of the European Council Charles Michel paid his first official visit to Kazakhstan's capital and held a Summit with the Presidents of the CA states. According to Michel, the regions are coming closer together and the summit was more than just a dialogue. In the new obstacles of the geopolitical crisis in Eurasia, the EU pursues geopolitical, geoeconomic, and security objectives. The European Union has the ambition to adjust its status as a secondary actor in the CA region, which historically is of strategic importance for Russia, China, and the United States. Russia's comprehensive policy includes regional cooperation through key organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Eurasian Economic Union. China implements the Belt and Road Initiative, which has both economic and political goals. The US promotes

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

institutional reforms. To compete with the rivals, the EU's foreign policy took into consideration the differences between the states in the region. The EU politicians openly announce their goal to reduce Central Asia's dependence on Russia and China. In terms of geoeconomics, the EU is interested in energy and transport cooperation. Regarding security, the EU members are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan (Komilov, 2022).

In a joint declaration, the participants of the EU-CA summit stressed the crucial importance of developing a regional vision of and cooperation in building sustainable connectivity. They also mentioned the key role of transport and transit development within the EU Global Gateway strategy and national strategies of the countries of Central Asia. Presidents of Central Asia highly appreciated the EU's contribution to intensifying economic development after the pandemic and the importance of the creation of a favorable business environment to boost investments and trade in the region. Kazakhstan plays an important role in bilateral cooperation between the EU and CA. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Astana tries to diversify export routes for oil, around three-quarters of which transit Russia. President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev pledged greater energy cooperation with the EU, proposed cooperation in areas such as the transportation of critical raw materials and green energy, developing international transport routes to secure global supply chains. It is worth noting that Tokayev and Michel discussed how to avoid an "unintended negative impact on Kazakhstan's economy" of EU sanctions against Russia and relocating to Kazakhstan European manufacturing companies (Brzozowski, 2022). According to Michel, Kazakhstan is a bridge between Europe and Asia, and Central Asia is an increasingly important region in its own right. Integration processes in Central Asia will make the region stronger. European politicians are always concerned about democracy and human rights. However, the situation in these areas in Central Asia is not a serious concern for Europe for now. Europe would win no friends in Astana if it came with overly critical remarks about Kazakhstan's internal politics, or those of any other Central Asian state. Discussing these issues will alienate the regions and will restrict their strategic interaction. It is important to note that the joint communiqué after the EU-Central Asia Leaders' Meeting did not mention Ukraine directly, which was a sign of Central Asia's desire for neutrality on the matter (Putz, 2022).

On November 17-18, 2022 the EU's top diplomat Josep Borrell visited Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) to meet Central Asian foreign ministers at the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference. Borrell promoted new links between the regions and talked about excessive dependencies, which come at a cost. According to Borrell, the EU respects and endorses the desire of Central Asia to reject dependency on any single international partner, regardless of history or geography. He called for wider networks and emphasized that EU-CA connectivity would not be at the expense of other connections. It is important to note that the EU has allocated €300 million in funding for the region over the next four years (Lillis, 2022).

At the invitation of President of France Emmanuel Macron, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev paid an official visit to France on November 29-30, 2022. Emmanuel Macron confirmed his support for the deep ongoing reforms in Kazakhstan aimed at strengthening the rule of law, fundamental

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

freedoms and social justice. France and Kazakhstan expressed concern about the situation around Ukraine, its humanitarian consequences and its impact on the global economy, and the food security of the most vulnerable countries. The Presidents welcomed the major transport initiatives in Central Asia, in particular, those related to the development of the Trans-Caspian international transport route (Middle Corridor). They expressed support for the implementation of the European Union's Global Gateway project (Akorda, 2022).

In November 2022, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev paid a two-day official visit to France, where he had meetings with his French counterpart and business circles of this country. In total, 14 agreements were signed aimed at further expansion of Uzbek-French relations, including bilateral economic agreements worth more than €6 billion and documents on the fight against corruption and advanced training of judges (KUN.UZ, 2022). According to the EU delegation in Uzbekistan, all areas of the EU cooperation with Central Asia, varying from water resources to digitalization will be aimed at reducing the region's dependence on Russia. The EU Ambassador to Uzbekistan Charlotte Adrian explained that the EU did not want the exclusivity of the relationship between the regions. It aims to ensure freedom of choice. The EU Ambassador mentioned that Uzbekistan remained a driver of regional integration in Central Asia and the EU allocated €83 million to finance the Multi-Year Indicative Program for 2021-2027, including €7 million to support the development of civil society and human rights. Priority areas for bilateral cooperation include digital and green growth and the development of a smart and environmentally friendly agricultural sector (Gazeta.uz, 2022).

The countries of Central Asia are of high interest in maintaining trade with the European Union. The situation in Ukraine disrupted transport routes due to the closure of the Northern corridors through Russia. In these circumstances, the Middle Corridor, which goes through Central Asia and the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus towards Türkiye and Europe, became an alternative. The states of Central Asia have already used the route to start exporting products to the European market. For instance, Uzbekistan for the first time sent a train loaded with copper to Europe through the Middle Corridor. The train delivered 46 rail cars and 91 units of 20-foot containers of copper concentrate from the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine over 4,000 km to Bulgaria. The EU supports the promotion of the Middle Corridor and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced that it was ready to invest in the development of cargo routes between the regions that bypass Russia (Reuters, 2022).

Previously, it was claimed that the EU has been making progress in learning about Central Asia, but it did not adopt a more country-specific approach and continues its practice of seeing and framing the CA countries as a fairly homogenous region and trying to artificially reshape this region by linking it with Afghanistan. As it was mentioned above, the 2019 EU–Central Asia Strategy did not significantly differ from the previous one. Despite the improvements in the learning practices, the main lens through which the EU looks at the region remains geopolitical, and this determines the limits of EU learning from the start. EU officials recognize a small number of imports from Central Asia, which makes the EU pursue solely geopolitical goals such as securing borders between the CA region and Afghanistan for the best outcomes for the EU. It is worth noting that the EU

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

wants to learn more about Central Asia to find a better approach to win over local actors in this region, and it does so by creating an impression of congruence of interests (Korneev and Kluczewska, 2022). Its institution-building and human rights policy in Central Asia kept the Union out of geopolitical competition with China and Russia in the region. As a result, the EU started reformulating its policy towards CA recognizing that geography continues to shape geopolitics in Central Asia, putting more emphasis on state resilience rather than democratization in Central Asia, and engaging with other actors in the wider region. During the pandemic, the EU's policy was determined by pragmatism and help for the states of the region to become more resilient (Winn and Gänzle, 2022). To promote its goals, the EU acts together with other international organizations such as the OCSE, maximizing EU attractiveness to Central Asian governments. The EU tries to shape the arena of competition to its strengths in education, legality, and environmental protection and seeks to be more responsive to local needs, implying a contrast with others (Fawn, 2022). In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the EU is mainly perceived positively. However, depending on a particular issue area, the EU's image may change from that of an opportunity to a threat. Compared to other actors such as the United States, China and Russia, the EU is more trusted and provokes less suspicion. The EU's positive image is an advantage for the implementation of the regional policy. The EU needs to invest in preserving and strengthening its positive image and soft power (Arynov, 2022).

Thus, the EU's approach changed substantially. The Union is involved in the regional game using all its comparative advantages and taking into consideration country-specific features. Announcements of the EU politicians to reduce the Russian or other influences in the region show the vulnerability of Central Asia to external pressure and its weakening positions. To achieve its geopolitical goals, the EU will need to compete with other actors such as Russia and China, who have a long-lasting economic and political impact on the region. To gain importance, the EU needs to substantially increase investments in the region to assist diversification of Central Asian economies. It is important for the EU to implement joint projects. For the countries of Central Asia, it is important not to become a side of geopolitical conflicts and they need to pursue their economic goals by implementing structural reforms. By engaging with the EU, states of Central Asia need to increase the freedom of choice, not substituting one dependence for another. Countries of the region should remember that trade and other economic dependencies became important political tools the EU can use to promote its norms and values demanding corresponding changes from its partners. It is important to note that the geopolitical crisis caused the current rapprochement and each side tries to find solutions to the war-induced challenges such as energy crisis or transportation disruptions. The EU-CA strategic rapprochement, in turn, will depend on the ability of the Central Asian states to implement gradual institutional reforms.

CONCLUSION

The European Union remains a key economic and political partner of the Central Asian republics. The EU conducts a comprehensive policy towards Central Asia at both bilateral and regional agendas providing support at the multilateral level. For instance, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed EPCAs, while other members requested updating the existing PCAs. Within the CA strategies, the EU calls

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

for institutional changes and grants trade preferences for effective reforms. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are beneficiaries of the GSP+ status, which is an opportunity for the intensification of bilateral trade. At the same time, the EU can use the GSP+ status as a tool to achieve its political and economic goals. The Union allocates financial assistance to the CA countries. Central Asia, in turn, lacks regional or country-specific policies toward the EU.

The EU is a major export market for the products exported by CA. Analysis of bilateral trade shows that CA exports became less diversified and mainly rely on mineral fuels with Kazakhstan playing a key role. All countries of the region excluding Kazakhstan have a trade deficit with the EU, which increases economic and political risks for Central Asia. The parties discuss new areas of trade cooperation such as the development of rare earth metals and green energy. Transportation through the Middle Corridor is another priority area for interregional cooperation. The countries of Central Asia should use these opportunities for diversification and not for substituting existing energy dependencies for new ones.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused substantial shocks in the global economy, which negatively affected both regions and accelerated their rapprochement. Consequently, the EU reconsidered its CA policy and its regional engagement increased. Using its positive image, the EU tries to compete with other regional actors and gain geopolitical importance. It clearly announces its goals to reduce Russia's influence in the region, which shows the vulnerability of Central Asia to external pressures. The EU currently pursues geopolitical and economic goals. However, this does not mean that the Union gives up its norm and value promotion strategy. Rather, the EU postponed this policy. Thus, Central Asia needs to attract more investment from the EU and develop joint projects aiming at diversification. At the same time, it should remember the importance of institutional development and its role as a political tool. The strategic rapprochement between the regions will require gradual institutional reforms in Central Asia.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL
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Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Research Article

SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATIONS OF URBAN SYSTEM: CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN FROM 1979 TO 2022

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the transformation of the urban system in Kazakhstan from 1979 to 2022 by studying the interrelationship between population change in large cities and demographic trends in nearby towns and rural areas. The findings suggest that the collapse of the USSR triggered a large-scale spatial realignment of the population leading to dramatic changes in the population size of urban settlements. The estimations largely failed to confirm relationships between the growth of large cities vs population change in mid-size and small urban settlements that would hold throughout the entire sample period. However, the analysis of district-level data showed that remote and rural areas were more prone to depopulation while districts around rapidly growing large cities had significantly higher rates of population growth. The population in large cities and regional centers was found to be growing much faster than in periphery areas, which is very much in line with findings from studies done on other former Soviet states.

Keywords: Urban system, Urban settlements, Districts, Kazakhstan, Post-Soviet Urbanization.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the last half a century, Kazakhstan has seen several waves of radical socio-demographic transformations that have largely determined the current state of the country's population distribution and urban structure (UNDP, 2019). The collapse of the USSR has been followed by a period of adjustment from a Soviet disequilibrium to a post-Soviet equilibrium state of social, economic, political, and demographic processes (Becker et al., 2012). The Soviet period was characterized by strong centralized control over the city system and spatial demographics were largely regulated by the government. We can distinguish two different schools of thought regarding the regional planning policies in the USSR (Fedorov, 2019). One of them proposed accelerated urbanization and prioritized urban systems based on large cities that would sustain heavy industries (Pivovarov, 1976; Lappo, 1978). The other one promoted a unified administrative scheme of a settlement hierarchy, in which each region would have a system of four-tier hierarchical inter-settlement infrastructure and would be economically autonomous to a certain extent (Khorev, 1981). However, the real policy of the Soviet government regarding regional territorial planning had elements from both schools with gradual predomination of the latter by the end of the Soviet period as the republics gained more autonomous power.

The abolition of the system of control of the spatial movement of the population unleashed a large-scale migration of the population across the borders between the newly formed Post-Soviet states (World Bank, 2006; Oka, 2007). The transition not only implied a switch from rigid centralized spatial planning of urban settlements but also the inclusion of the market forces as factors shaping the spatial distribution of the population (Becker et al., 2012). At the same time, fundamental changes in political and economic paradigms triggered a mass relocation of the population including within the former Soviet republics (Heleniak, 2001). The urbanization trends went somewhat ambiguous though after the collapse of the Soviet system. On the other hand, practically all former Soviet countries have experienced stagnation in rates of urbanization or even a decline in the proportion of the population living in urban areas (Lutz, 2010). On the other hand, with the abandonment of the Soviet rural policies, the movement of the population from rural areas to cities became a major trend (Becker et al., 2012; Karachurina and Mkrtchyan, 2015). The effects of the transition processes on urban settlements in former communist countries were manifold. The exposure to international trade and the sudden contraction of the state demand for manufacturing goods had serious negative effects on industries in mid-size and small urban settlements (monotowns) leading to their rapid decline (Shastitko and Fatikhova, 2015). The patterns of depopulation in small towns and cities during the 1990s became sufficiently strong to offset the overall relocation of the population from rural areas to cities. The net effect was that only large cities capable of sustaining urban amenities and service sectors became the absolute net gainers of the population (Becker et al., 2012).

Studies on Post-Soviet spatial demographics, urbanization, and other related fields are mainly focused geographically on Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (Antipoval, et al., 2012; Fedorov, 2019; Karachurina & Mkrtchyan, 2015) and conceptually on population change in major cities (Anacker, 2004; Seitz, 2020). Usually, studies in this field consider population change in major urban settlements separately from demographics in rural areas and surrounding

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

territories. Smaller and mid-size urban settlements usually do not receive much attention. This study seeks to provide an understanding of the processes of transformation of the urban system and urbanization of Kazakhstan from 1979 to 2022. By choosing this particular period of time, we can analyze the change in the population size of urban settlements in Kazakhstan from the earliest reliable data from the USSR census of 1979 to the latest preliminary data from the census conducted in Kazakhstan in 2021. The analysis relies on the most reliable available population data from censuses of 1979, 1989, 1999, 2009, and 2021. It also aims to identify other patterns and processes that shaped the population distribution across space after the collapse of the communist system in Kazakhstan and incorporate them into the contemporary discussion of urbanization and spatial demographics. In technical terms, the contribution of the study is twofold. Firstly, unlike many previous studies, we build our analysis based on population data for territorial subdivisions equivalent to NUTS 3 in the EU covering the totality of the population and territory of Kazakhstan. By increasing the spatial granularity, the study intends to obtain more detailed information about the spatial aspects of population change over the course of the last four decades. Secondly, the analysis covers the last decade before the collapse of the USSR and three decades afterward allowing us to isolate the effects of the transition on urbanization and transformations of spatial demographics.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The transformations of urbanization and urban systems in Eastern Europe should be understood as a long process of convergence to Western-style urbanization. In general, post-socialist cities and regions are less populated, less urbanized, and more dispersed than regions in the West. Eastern European urbanization is passing through a hybrid stage manifesting some typical features of capitalist urbanization, but relics of the socialist past will be present yet for many years to come (Taubenbock et al., 2019). Eastern post-socialist Europe could be understood as a departure point when studying cases from former Soviet countries because, generally, the trends and patterns of change of urban systems in Eastern Europe usually tend to be more pronounced in Post-Soviet states.

Skryzhevska and Karácsonyi (2012) conducted a study with a district-level analysis of demographic variations in Ukraine since 1979 with a special focus on the rural population. The study reveals a very significant decline in the rural population since the collapse of the USSR due to the overall decrease in birth rates, outmigration to other countries, and urbanization of the Ukrainian population. The authors point out the devastating socio-economic effects of the rural population decline.

Antipoval et al. (2012) did similar research on Belarus to study the spatial patterns of population change using the map-image transformation method. The study emphasizes the trends of the spatial population change in rural areas of Belarus from 1959 to 2009. The authors of the study note a population decline during the period from 1979 to 1989 due to the environmental effects of the Chornobyl accident and the stagnation of the overall socioeconomic development of the country. The process of urbanization that had started much earlier in the 1950s continued during the period prior to the collapse of the USSR contributing to rural depopulation. Antipoval et al. (2012) note an accelerated migration during the 1990s with persisting outmigration from rural areas. The authors emphasize

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

that the negative spatial demographic trends with rural decline, net outmigration, and negative natural population growth that aroused in the 1990s turned into long-lasting trends characterizing the Belarusian geo-demographics.

A study by Karachurina and Mkrtchyan (2015) covers spatial population change dynamics in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus throughout 1990-2000 at the NUTS-3 territorial unit level. The study finds strong depopulation trends in rural and periphery areas in all three republics confirming Skryzhevska and Karácsonyi (2012) and Antipoval et al. (2012). The population growth in regional centers and capital cities was caused by migration, which indicates that urbanization processes had not been completed. Karachurina and Mkrtchyan (2015) point out that the population decline rates were the highest in the central regions of Russia.

Studies on spatial demographics and the urban system of Kazakhstan are relatively scarce. Most of them are outdated and have limited temporal coverage (Lewis and Rowland, 1995; Rowland 1989, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, and 2001). Rowland (1999) provides one of the most informative studies on urban and spatial population change in Kazakhstan during the 1990s based on data from official Goskomstat publications as well as from preliminary results of the census of 1999. The study notes an overall population decline (-4.9%) in the 1990s with urban population decline (-8.1%) being much faster than rural (-0.6%). Out of all 270 urban centers, 174 or nearly two-thirds presented a population decline during 1989-1998.

Rakhmetova et al. (2018) made a valuable study evaluating the economic and social development potential of the cities of Kazakhstan, including small and mid-size urban settlements since its independence in 1991. The authors concluded that most of the cities surveyed were found to have low potential in spite of current sustainable development. Most of the poorly developed cities were monocities that were highly dependent on single partially operating backbone enterprises. The population distribution in Kazakhstan was described by authors as dispersed and but the pace of population concentration was noted as high with nearly one-fifth of the total population living in the three largest urban agglomerations.

Studies covering the demographics of all urban settlements of Kazakhstan are very rare. Rakhmetova et al. (2018) cover only about half of all cities and towns of the country. Most of them are mainly focused on major agglomerations and are not quite centered on urban demographics and the city system (Dodonov 2017, Seitz 2020, Kabdesov, 2020). This study intends to provide insight into the urban system of Kazakhstan by analyzing the demographic changes in all urban settlements of the country during 1979-2022.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study uses complete demographic data on districts and urban settlements, which allows us to analyze the spatial demographic processes that took place in Kazakhstan during 1979-2022. The data set used for the analysis is a compilation of spatial demographic information from a restored version of the censuses of the USSR of 1979 and 1989 as well as various yearly open-access demographic data publications of the official state statistics service of Kazakhstan. In total, the study uses data on 173 districts and 95 urban settlements covering 100% of the population of the country. The official classification of the status of settlements

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

in the official statistical records of Kazakhstan is rather arbitrary. Some rural settlements could be larger than those that are officially counted as towns and/or cities and vice versa. Moreover, the statuses of some settlements changed over time. Therefore, for the sake of consistency and take a generally accepted threshold of 10 thousand people between rural and urban. All settlements under 10 thousand people are rural and once they exceed 10 thousand they become urban.

The article aims to study the patterns of urbanization encompassing the totality of spatial demographics including rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban migration. The division between towns (small and mid-size cities) and cities (large cities) is not arbitrary but rather based on certain functionalities and demographic features that arise at certain population size thresholds. All urban settlements with a population of 200 thousand and more are considered cities throughout this study. In total, there were 15 cities, 13 of them being regional capitals. These have been the main points of concentration of the population and the demographic significance of the cities has become disproportionately greater over the sample period. For instance, the 15 major cities of Kazakhstan are home to about 44% of the total population of the country. Since 1979, their combined population increased by 110.8% adding around 4.7 million people, while the total population of the country went up by nearly 33.9%. The towns, by contrast, have a combined population of roughly 3.5 million people and have added only about 1,233 thousand people since 1979. (Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, 1999, 2009, 2019).

Table 1. *Some of the Main Differences between Cities and Towns*

	Cities	**Towns**
Size threshold	200 thousand<	10-200 thousand
Number	15	77
Combined population in 2022	8,973.9 thousand	3,545.8 thousand
Average population size in 2022	560.9 thousand	46.0 thousand
Combined population change during 1979-2022	+4,717.1 thousand	+1,233.2 thousand
% in total population growth during 1979-2022	110.8%	53.3%

Source: Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, 2022.

By dividing urban settlements into two categories (cities and towns), this study intends to shed light on urbanization and spatial demographic dynamics in Kazakhstan over the last four decades, at the same time distinguishing urban-to-urban from the rural-to-urban type of urbanization. The spatial demographic analysis uses similar methods used in previous studies done on other former Soviet states but not covering Kazakhstan (Antipoval et al., 2012, Skryzhevska and Karácsonyi 2012, Karachurina and Mkrtchyan, 2015). By doing so we attempt to identify the linkages between the transformation of the urban system and the spatial distribution of the population of Kazakhstan throughout the last four decades. One of the arguments for opting for this approach is that Soviet central planning replicated to some extent the traditional central place theory scheme. Within the central command administrative system of urban management, it was quite easy to incorporate hierarchical urban structures at all levels (Vladimirov and Naimark, 2002). Hence, these hierarchy schemes could have shaped the internal migration flows in Kazakhstan that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. This can also be viewed as an argument for focusing on urban-to-urban migration, which in our case is referred as migration from towns to cities.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

POST-SOVIET URBANIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN SETTLEMENTS

The USSR and the Eastern-European states of the Socialist Bloc have undergone rapid urbanization once they switched to Moscow-imposed communism after WWII. The process was mainly driven by extensive industrialization policies in these countries (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007). By the end of 1980, the rates of urbanization in these states have started to stagnate as the Eastern Bloc started to disintegrate, switching from a socialist/communist planned economy to market economic systems. For instance, from 1980 to 1990, Eastern Europe has seen a fast increase in the share of the urban population from 63.8% to 68.0%. Over the same decade, this figure for the USSR increased from 62.6% to 65.6% (UNDESA, 2014). However, these urbanization rates slowed down after the 1990s in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet states as they went through dramatic changes in the political paradigm. It is worth noting that these urbanization trends in Former Soviet and Socialist states did not match with urbanization patterns in most other parts of the world, where urbanization has been a rather monotonous and continuous process. Although Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states have seen some growth in urbanization rates after the 1990s, it was nothing nearly as fast as in other middle-income countries or the rest of the world in general. It can be said that Kazakhstan as well as other Former Soviet states started to diverge from the global urbanization context after the 1990s (see Table 2). Although former Soviet republics are consistent with global urbanization trends, the rates of urbanization in these countries have not been very. In this regard, they are very different from other developing countries where the urbanization rates are significantly faster.

Table 2. *Share of Urban Population in Kazakhstan compared to other regions of the world*

	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Kazakhstan	54.1	56.3	56.1	56.8	57.7
Central Asia	45.2	45.2	45.7	48.0	48.3
Former Soviet states	62.6	65.6	65.3	65.7	65.4
Eastern Europe	63.8	68.0	68.2	68.9	69.9
Middle-income countries	31.7	36.7	41.6	47.9	53.7
World	39.3	43.0	46.7	51.7	56.2

Source: UNDESA, 2022.

Among the former Soviet states, Kazakhstan has had by far the largest population decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, during 1990-2000 its population dropped by 8.9% primarily due to the exodus of ethnic minorities (Rowland, 2001). The statistical records on the population of urban settlements in Kazakhstan clearly show a drastic realignment of the hierarchy and quantity of urban settlements. In particular, there has been a continuous decrease in the number of urban settlements (gorodskiye poseleniya), which are communities with populations ranging from several thousand to tens of thousands of people. These are settlements that are neither villages due to their large size, nor fully functioning cities and could also be referred to as towns. This classification and the term itself were preserved throughout most of the Post-Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 3. *Demographic evolution of cities of Kazakhstan compared to some post-Soviet countries*

	1979	1989	1999	2009	2019	2022
Cities						
Kazakhstan	-	84	87	87	88	89
Russia	-	1037	1098	1100	1099	1101
Ukraine	-	434	436	434	461	461
Urban settlements						
Kazakhstan	-	294	272	185	182	-
Russia	-	3230	2940	1734	1494	-
Ukraine	-	1361	927	927	841	-
Number of cities with more than 1 million inhabitants						
Kazakhstan	0	1	1	1	3	3
Russia	8	12	13	12	15	16
Ukraine	5	5	5	3	3	3
Post-Socialist Europe	6	6	6	6	6	6
% of population living in cities above 1 million						
Kazakhstan	0	6.8	7.6	8.5	21.4	23.7
Russia	14.4	17.7	18.9	19.7	22.9	24.5
Ukraine	13.5	14.7	14.8	16.0	16.6	12.3
Post-Socialist Europe	11.7	11.9	11.6	12.5	14.0	10.0

Source: Goskomstat, 1990; Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, 1999, 2009, 2019, 2022; State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2022.

One of the main trends that marked the sample period is the strong outmigration of the population from small urban settlements to urban centers. The number of urban settlements has decreased dramatically from 294 in 1989 to 182 in 2019. At the same, time the number of settlements classified as cities has increased from 84 to 89. Throughout the sample period, there has been a very significant growth of population in mid-size and large cities, while that of small urban settlements has mostly dwindled. Regional administrative centers and capital cities have seen a large influx of population coming mainly from rural areas and smaller towns. This pattern is especially clear in the national capitals and other cities with a population of over one million people. For instance, at the end of the Soviet period, Kazakhstan had only one city with a population exceeding one million people and by 2019, this number tripled and so did the share of the total population living in those cities (see Table 3). Interestingly, these trends did not really match either with the overall fluctuations of the population or the urbanization trends, suggesting a strong presence of urban-to-urban migration over the sample period.

ANALYSIS

Estimation

Based on preliminary statistics on the development of cities and evolution of urban settlements, we estimate the following OLS model for cities vs towns:

$$Y\_i=(\beta\_0)\hat{}+(\beta\_1)\hat{}X\_1i+(\beta\_2)\hat{}X\_2i+(\beta\_3)\hat{}X\_3i+(\beta\_4)\hat{}X\_4i+\epsilon\_i$$

Y_i = Population growth in town i

X_1 - Population growth in the nearest major city

X_2 - Distance to the nearest major city

X_3 - Access to railroad network (dummy=1 for towns with rail transport and dummy=0 otherwise)

X_4 - Access to major republican or international routes (dummy=1 for towns located along major transport routes and dummy=0 otherwise)

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

The reasons for which these variables are suspected of being explanatory for the growth of mid-size and small urban settlements are rather straightforward. Since aggregate statistical data show significant population growth in most of the large cities and decline in many smaller and mid-sized towns, we presuppose that these processes were interrelated and large cities have grown attracting population from nearby smaller cities and towns. The more population in towns declines, the greater would be the growth of the nearest cities. If this is true, then we think that distance from towns to the nearest cities would be a relevant variable to include. The smaller the distance, the more significant is the relationship. We also add access to railroads and major routes of national and international significance without fearing that they could be too correlated because the correlation between the two dummy variables is only 0.17. 11 out of 77 towns have access to railroads and do not have access to major highways. At the same time, 10 towns are located along national and international routes but do not have access to railroad networks. We expect that towns located along major transport corridors will tend to grow faster compared to towns that are more isolated.

The following cities vs districts model were used to estimate the population growth in districts of Kazakhstan over the last four decades:

$$Y_i=(\beta_0)\hat{}+(\beta_1)\hat{}X_{1i}+(\beta_2)\hat{}X_{2i}+(\beta_3)\hat{}X_{3i}+\epsilon_i$$

Y_i = population growth in district i

X_1 - Population growth in the nearest major city

X_2 - Distance to the nearest major city

X_3 - Ruralness of districts (% of the rural population living in districts)

With the same token, we admit that population growth in districts depends on the proximity of districts to large cities because of rural-to-urban migration. In order to reveal the role of the demographic interrelationship between active urban growth and change of rural population, we specify the growth rate of the nearest major city and the distance to the nearest major city as potential explanatory variables for population change in districts. Since we are also interested in isolating the rural-to-urban migration, we include the share of the rural population (ruralness) in the districts as an explanatory variable.

Results

The estimation of the model largely invalidates the idea of the interrelationship between towns and cities based on specified variables. It turns out that none of the explanatory variables stays statistically significant throughout all four periods. Interestingly though, population growth in towns and major cities was positively related throughout 1979-1999 and the variable was significant enough statistically. Access to major national and international roads was a relevant factor in explaining population changes in towns during 1989-2009. However, it is quite surprising to acknowledge that access to railroads is not a relevant factor in explaining the population change in towns. Moreover, in 1989-1999 being statistically significant this variable turns out to be even more negatively related to population change in towns.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 4. *Determinants of population growth in towns*

	1979-1989	1989-1999	1999-2009	2009-2022
	n=75	n=75	n=80	n=80
	R^2=0.0970	R^2=0.2186	R^2=0.1122	R^2=0.1065
p-value (of F)	*(0.1230)*	*(0.0015)*	*(0.0600)*	(0.0700)
Coeff. of growth of nearest major city in %	0.6376**	0.3719***	0.0519	−0.1285
(std. dev.)	*(0.2615)*	*(0.1279)*	*(0.1291)*	*(0.1260)*
(p-value)	*(0.0173)*	*(0.0049)*	*(0.6887)*	*(0.3112)*
Coeff. of Distance to a nearest major city in km	−0.0561	−0.2228	−0.4288*	−0.1701
(std. dev.)	*(0.2162)*	*(0.1401)*	*(0.2165)*	*(0.2131)*
(p-value)	*(0.7958)*	*(0.1162)*	*(0.0513)*	*(0.4677)*
Coeff. of Access to railroad	5.7915	−7.5247*	−0.3745	1.1994
(std. dev.)	*(6.7070)*	*(4.4395)*	*(7.0350)*	*(6.3782)*
(p-value)	*(0.3908)*	*(0.0945)*	*(0.9577)*	*(0.5123)*
Coeff. of Access to major routes	2.9367	11.7097***	17.0701**	14.3602**
(std. dev.)	*(6.3106)*	*(4.1685)*	*(6.6907)*	*(7.1075)*
(p-value)	*(0.6431)*	*(0.0064)*	*(0.0128)*	*(0.0469)*

Source: Estimates by author.

The variables of the second model for cities vs districts relationship turn out to be statistically significant throughout most of the sample period. The population change in the nearest major city turns out to be a relevant variable for describing the overall population change in districts of Kazakhstan. For instance, in 2009-2022, one percentage point growth of population in the nearest major city on average could lead to 0.15% growth in districts. This coefficient was higher for 1979-1989 (0.23) and 1989-1999 (0.35). Moreover, the relationship between population change in districts and distance to large cities appears to be negative, suggesting that districts located closer to major cities have grown faster than those lying in remote areas. The ruralness factor also presents high statistical significance throughout most of the sample period being negatively related to the overall population growth. This clearly suggests that districts with a larger share of the rural population were more prone to depopulation compared to more urbanized districts, which confirms the ongoing migration from rural areas to cities.

DISCUSSION

It might seem at first that the estimated model for population change in towns could be discarded as irrelevant. But within the context of countries in transition with deep economic and socio-demographic changes, the results do not seem highly unexpected. Instead, it confirms that the urban system in Post-Communist Kazakhstan is passing through a period of adjustment from a Soviet disequilibrium to a Post-Soviet equilibrium. It is highly likely that the factors determining the population dynamics in urban settlements could have been relevant for very short-term periods and not relevant in longer timeframes. The irrelevance of variables in the first model for urban-to-urban migration clearly suggests that towns were not very closely connected by migration flows with the nearby large regional centers. The proximity of large cities was not a relevant factor in determining the migration from small and mid-size urban settlements to larger cities. In other words, large cities with high rates of population growth did not necessarily act as primary points of attraction for migrants from nearby towns. Hence, it could be concluded that some other factors were at play in determining migration flows from small and mid-size towns to large urban cities or abroad. The most likely option in

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 5. *Determinants of population growth in districts*

	1979-1989	**1989-1999**	**1999-2009**	**2009-2022**
p-value (of F)	n=173 R^2=0.1857 *(<0.00001)*	n=173 R^2=0.1469 *(<0.00001)*	n=173 R^2=0.1363 *(<0.000005)*	n=173 R^2=0.1883 *(<0,00001)*
Estimator of population change in the nearest major city in % (std. dev.) p-value	0.2341*** (0.0881) *(0.0086)*	0.3541*** (0.0763) *(0.00001)*	0.0873 (0.0575) *(0.1305)*	0.1481*** (0.0392) *(0,0002)*
Estimator of distance to a nearest major city in km (std. dev.) p-value	−0.0065 (0.0660) *(0.9207)*	−0.1975** (0.0769) *(0,0112)*	−0.3116*** (0.1128) *(0.0064)*	−0.1926** (0.0808) *(0,0183)*
Estimator of ruralness of districts in % (std. dev.) p-value	−0.1727*** (0.0293) *(0,00001)*	−0.0194 (0.0345) *(0,5728)*	−0.1701*** (0.0471) *(0.0004)*	−0.1415*** (0.0339) *(0,00005)*

Source: Estimates by author.

this case that led to more than the national average population decline in small and midsized cities would be that some large cities were significantly more successful in attracting population from smaller urban settlements than others. Therefore, the distance to the nearest city might not be a considerable factor in choosing among large cities to emigrate to. Instead, migrants from small towns might consider other factors like income, employment opportunities, housing, urban amenities etc. more important than distance when choosing a major city to live in.

Figure 1. *Population change in cities, towns and districts of Kazakhstan during 1979-2022*



Source: Prepared by author.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

At the same time, it is interesting to note that the proximity to large cities did positively affect the population growth in districts indicating that the rural population living close to major urban areas has grown faster than in remote areas. In fact, remote rural areas were the ones that experienced the largest outmigration, which is totally in line with studies done on other former Soviet states (Antipoval et al., 2012; Skryzhevska and Karácsonyi, 2012; Karachurina and Mkrtchyan, 2015). The continuation of these trends can lead to a deep transformation of the urban system in Kazakhstan as rural settlements located around large cities will develop into urban areas or incorporate into nodal cities.

It follows from this study that although the urbanization rates in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan are low in nominal terms, most of the ongoing urbanization is hidden due to population decline in many small and mid-size cities. At the same time, Kazakhstan has seen fairly large population growth in large cities. For instance, over the last four decades, large cities with a population above 200 thousand people have grown on average more than twice as fast as the total population of the country and five times faster than towns with a population below 200 thousand people (Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, 2022). The analysis shows that population growth around major cities creates centripetal forces creating areas of concentration of rural population around themselves, which has the potential to accelerate the urbanization process in the future. Hence, there is also a significant rural-to-urban type migration component in overall urbanization.

It is important to admit though that the complexity of the issue of transformation of the urban system in former Soviet states is immense and cannot be easily encompassed within a few narrow academic fields. Unlike in other countries, the transformations of urban systems and spatial distribution of population in Post-Soviet states are very much driven by deep changes in other political, socio-economic, institutional, and other spheres rather than demographic processes. Studying complex relationships between the spatial and the social in post-communist cities requires a more holistic view of transition as a triad of democratization, marketization, and state-building, as well as the interplay of these factors in explaining urban dynamics (Kinossian, 2017). It should be admitted that urbanization and major agglomerations are also gaining importance for governments of former Soviet states. Apart from prevention and overcoming of negative consequences of demographic transition, adaptation measures for demographic change (Sidorenko, 2019), cities and public perception of urban images are becoming political and cultural instruments. Large cities and especially capital cities could also act as a place for the manifestation of governments' policies of nation-building and function as symbols of national identities (Anacker, 2004). In this light, we can expect that urban policy and urban systems in the Post-Soviet space will be subject to interventions and manipulations by the governments.

Another question to address regarding this issue is in which way urban systems in former Soviet states will develop. Should we expect that former Soviet states will gradually be converging to western-style

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

urbanization, which would be similar to what happened in Eastern European states after the transition to a market economy (Taubenbock et al., 2019) where prosperous cities have become centers of western-style consumption, peripheral regions, and many smaller towns were succumbed by structural problems and population decline (Lang, 2015)? These are questions that certainly will stimulate further research in this field.

It should be mentioned that the interpretations of the estimates ought to be done taking into account certain limitations. Firstly, the number of districts used for the analysis (173) is different from the official one, which is 170. This difference arises from the fact that some major cities are administratively counted jointly with adjacent extensive land areas with a predominantly rural population. Since we are interested in studying the functionality of cities and rural areas, we separate the cities from adjacent rural territories that are administratively attached to the city. Secondly, the growth rate of population in large cities in some cases is not only a sum of natural population growth and migration but also an aggregation of small nearby rural communities that get merged with the growing city both geographically and statistically. This might mislead when comparing the growth rates of large cities as they can appear exceptionally high.

CONCLUSION

The urbanization trends and changes in urban systems that emerged in former Soviet states after the collapse of the USSR were unique and bizarre within the context of contemporary urbanization. However, the anomalies observed in spatial demographic trends and the change in the urban system in Kazakhstan over the last decades fit into the context of major readjustment from a rigid system of disequilibrium to a new equilibrium described in (Becker et al., 2012). Studies on other Post-Soviet states note similar trends in the change of spatial distribution of population and urban systems such as rising urban primacy, very rapid population growth in large urban areas, and regional capitals, the decline in a significant part of smaller urban settlements, and strong rural depopulation. The processes in Kazakhstan that took place over the last four decades in this regard appear to be very similar to those of other large countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In spite of the small pace of urbanization in nominal terms, there has been a very significant concentration of population in the large urban areas with a population of over 200 thousand people that are typically regional capitals. On the other hand, many smaller urban centers have seen severe depopulation, partially balancing the overall growth of the urban population. A closer look at the change in the urban system generally indicates a weak linkage between small urban settlements and nearby large cities. However, the analysis reveals fairly strong linkages between districts and nearby major cities. Districts located closer to major cities have experienced significantly faster population growth than remote districts, which resonates very with the existing literature on other Post-Soviet republics.

The study attempts to shed light on the basic spatial demographic patterns

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

of Kazakhstan encompassing late-Soviet and post-Soviet periods. From the general academic perspective, it can be considered as a building block for future research and serve as a reference point in studying urbanization and spatial demographic processes in Kazakhstan. In particular, the findings of the study help better understand the sources of growth of urban population in major cities of Kazakhstan and the concentration of population in areas around major cities which could be useful in e.g. studying the formation and dynamics of functional regions in Kazakhstan.

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL
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Research Article

ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS BY THE ASYMMETRIC TVP-VAR METHOD

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ABSTRACT

It is the expenditure on consumption that constitutes the basic share of the expenditures of the households that supply labor as a factor of production in an economy. These expenditures have an indirect effect on the input costs of the companies that demand labor as a production factor. The change in food prices determines both the relative price structure of the economy and the inflationary trend in the economy for the future, depending on the changes in labor and goods markets. For this reason, households that make the consumption decisions of companies as a producer decision unit in the economy are highly sensitive to changes in food commodity prices. A continuous and permanent change in food commodity prices has a direct impact on consumption expenditures and investment decisions. This effect causes supply shocks that may arise as a result of food and commodity prices to turn into demand shocks at the same time. From this point of view, this study investigates the distribution of volatility in global commodity prices, food commodity prices, Baltic dry indices, and crude oil prices, which are the indicators of price trends of basic inputs in international markets. Thus, the mechanism of spillover of a possible supply shock is revealed at the international level under the restrictions of the asymmetric TVP-VAR approach.

Keywords: Asymmetric TVP-VAR, Global inflation rate, Food commodity prices, Connectedness approach, Diebold-Yilmaz methodology.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

INTRODUCTION

The rise in the price of oil, which is an economically basic input, is the most important reason for the increase in the costs of biomass energy production, foodstuffs, and other materials, depending on the direct energy costs and its use in other fields and its share in the input (Hanson et al., 1993). In this respect, changes in oil prices have both supply and demand effects on commodity prices. On the supply side, the increase in oil prices increases fertilizer, transportation costs, and overall costs (Pindyck, 2004). This situation leads to a decrease in food commodities, which represents all foodstuffs, and causes an increase in their prices. On the demand side, the biomass energy production of energy products that can be a substitute for oil causes an increase in energy production. This situation increases the demand for foodstuffs such as corn and soybean used for biomass production, especially considering the waste for circular economy and environmental protection.

According to the business cycles in the economy, the diffusion effect through oil prices and commodity prices also differs (Khalfaoui et al., 2023). However, the diffusion effect through crude oil prices and commodity prices differs according to commodity types (Cao & Cheng, 2021; Hanif et al., 2021; Balcilar et al., 2021). Therefore, the dynamic linkage of dynamic aggregate return and volatility in crude oil price and food commodity markets changes over time, and asymmetrical effects on volatility increase in times of economic crisis (Umar et al., 2021). In addition, the addiction effect among oil price and food commodity prices also demonstrates that there is an asymmetrical relationship in different market conditions. In other words, it shows that there are risk spillover effects among the global crude oil market and commodities (Meng et al., 2020; Dahl et al., 2020).

In general, the volume of basic logistics maritime trade in international trade also shows the global demand for industrial goods and end products. Therefore, this index not only measures the amount of international commodities flows but also their associated costs (Bildirici et al., 2015:416). The increase in transportation and logistics costs causes changes in other economic indicators related to exchange rates, depending on its effect on the exchange rate of internationally traded goods (Sun et al., 2020). The effects that occur when changes in commodity prices spread to the freight market lead to an interaction that will again lead to the spread of commodity prices to their own prices. This process also applies to the relationship between oil, freight and commodity prices.

In this respect, the analysis of alteration in oil prices, which will be defined as a supply shock, can be analyzed from the said supply shock itself and the spillover effect due to other effects. This will be analyzed with the approach used in this study. However, the spread between oil, Baltic dry price (freight) and different commodities can be asymmetrical (Bandyopadhyay & Rajib, 2021).

Changes in the prices of input factors in the economy affect inflation expectations depending on their supply-side effects. Inflation expectations cause changes in economic preferences and behaviors of households to maintain their welfare level. The reason for this is that the effect of the food commodity price and oil price on the consumption expenditures of the households is also high in their sensitivity to the shocks that may occur in these markets. Secondly, food

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

prices determine the production costs, as it also affects the interaction of labor with other sectors of the economy. The main reason for the increase in food prices is the increase in energy costs and the price of basic foodstuffs. This situation causes both the inflation rate and the core inflation rate to increase in the economy.

One of the approaches that provide important information about the spread of the supply and demand indicator relations of the economy is the connectivity analysis. Considering this analysis, the relationship between the spillover effect of Crude oil price, Baltic dry price, global inflation rate, and food commodity prices and positive/negative changes in the markets will be investigated. Therefore, this article will expand on previous work in the following aspects. First, determining the spillover through these markets allows us to determine the direction of the connection between the markets and where the spread of change is higher in other markets. Therefore, determining the spread of change from one market to another senables economic decision-makers to decide on these changes in a timely and effective manner. Second, the literature is often based on traditional VAR, GARCH, and their derivative models, which cannot determine the extent and direction of spillover effects. Therefore, previous studies on the subject do not measure spillovers sufficiently in detail. For this reason, in this research, we discuss in detail these spillovers between markets. Moreover, the effects of negative/positive changes are different between these markets which allow for the examination of heterogeneous volatility links. Because the effect of negative/positive changes on the markets and the determination of the markets that are net receiver/transmitter of the change between markets, facilitate the determination of the dynamics of the transmission of the change. Therefore, this study provides a more comprehensive analysis of the spillover of dynamic and temporal changes between markets.

In the following parts of this research the data set, and the econometric method is presented in the second part, empirical findings would be mentioned in the third part and in the fourth part we present the results of the analysis.

DATASET AND ECONOMETRIC METHOD

In this study, monthly data from 2003M3 to 2022M9, the Global Price Index of All Commodities, Food commodity price index, Baltic Dry Index, and Crude oil prices are used. The Baltic Dry Index and Crude oil price were obtained from the Investing website, the global price index was obtained from the World Bank, and the food commodity price index was obtained from the database of the Food and Agriculture Organization. In addition to that Baltic Dry Index shows transportation costs.

The asymmetric TVP-VAR method was used to examine the spillover relationship between the markets. The asymmetric TPV-VAR method was developed by Adekoya et al., (2022) based on the Diebold & Yilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014) methodology. This method has been developed as a new dynamic connectedness method that structurally explains the asymmetries in the spillover between markets. This method is a new extension of the time-varying parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model. In this method, the approach spillover interaction is estimated by separating the total change, positive and negative change according to three effects. Thus, parameters are calculated by the TVP-VAR technique to examine the different characteristics of the asymmetric change

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

spillover effect between markets. Thus, when a change occurs, it is determined which market is a net receiver or a net transmitter. Thus, the spillover relation of the change between the markets is obtained.

It is aimed to make three different analyzes from the results obtained regarding the relations between the markets representing the available variables. First, the relationships between markets are examined more extensively. Because the TPV-VAR connectivity method also shows the relationships and interdependencies of the markets with each other. Second, the connectivity approach shows how a change in relative prices affects another global price over the course of the time series. Thirdly, the effect of the asymmetric behavior of producers regarding uncertainty and risk on the asymmetry in the transmission of change is discussed. In this context, the heterogeneity of the sensitivity of economic decision units plays an important role in causing the asymmetry of information transmission patterns and transmission density among markets. Fourth, the effect of increases in transportation costs on inflation will be discussed.

EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

In this study, the distribution relationship among the return series will be estimated within the framework of the asymmetric TVP-VAR model. Before moving on to the model estimation, the return estimations of all markets are shown in Figure 1. Then, the basic statistical specialty and stationarity of all return series were tested. These results are shown in Table 1. The correlation matrix showing the relationship between the return series is also shown in Table 2.

Figure 1. *Return Forecasts For All Markets*



Changes in oil prices and commodity prices reveal the propagation effect of shocks through the feedback effect between themselves (Narayan & Narayan, 2007). Especially during the period under consideration, food commodity prices vary greatly in connection with the price of oil (Baffes, 2007). Changes between oil prices and commodity prices reveal the propagation effect of shocks through the feedback effect between themselves. Finding such a relationship also shows that there is a direct interaction between these variables. Considering the alteration in the Baltic dry price index, there has been a positive change in transportation costs since the second half of 2020. 'By October 2021, indicators of the cost of shipping containers by sea have increased by over 5 percent from pre-pandemic levels, while the cost of shipping bulk cargoes by sea has tripled' (Carrière-Swallow et al., 2022:4). 'This will first increase the global import price level and consumer price levels, according to UNCTAD. Second, supply chains will be impacted by higher shipping costs. Third, these effects may cause changes in the terms of trade

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

of low-value-added products produced in small economies. Fourth, the increase in transportation costs has an impact on exports and imports, which also leads to an asymmetrical effect on global trade. In this context, increases in freight rates will have an impact on global production and inflation, but these effects will not be the same for each country.'

Table 1. *Basic Statistics Estimation*

	Mean	Variance	Skewness	Ex.Kurtosis	JB	ERS	Q(20)	Q2(20)
Food Commodity	1,003***	0,001***	(-0.481***)	3,895***	158,945***	(-6,050***)	48,997***	47,045***
prices	0,00		-0,003	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Global Inflation	1,001***	0,000***	(-0,909***)	2,385***	88,799***	(-5,375***)	42,356***	41,615***
Rate	0,00		0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Baltic Dry Cargo	0,998***	0,071***	(-0,439***)	4,200***	181,797***	(-8,218***)	22,133***	19,478**
Prices	0,00		-0,006	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	-0,022
Crude Petrol	1,004***	0,013***	(-1,027***)	11,630***	1377,317***	(-7,664***)	16,497*	15.110
Prices	0,00		0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	-0,117

Notes: The results are based on a TVP-VAR model with a first order lag length (BIC) and 20 steps forward generalized prediction error variance decomposition.

Variance values can be expressed as a measure of the variability of the price in the market. Series representing the variables show negative skewness and kurtosis is greater than three. This gives information that each market has the characteristics of a fat-tailed distribution. JB test statistics reject the null hypothesis that all variables used in this study are normally distributed. When we look at the ERS[1] values, being significant in all markets also shows that these series are stationary. The LjungBox (Q(20)) test rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation. When the value of $Q^2(20)$[2] is taken into account, it is statistically significant in all markets except the crude oil market. In other words, it gives information that the effects of a shock in these markets will be permanent.

Considering the Kernell correlation matrix coefficients estimation results, there is a positive correlation among all markets. The high correlation between the crude oil price and the global inflation rate causes a difference in the crude oil price to change the production inflation rate in the same direction. Considering the correlation between crude oil prices and food commodity prices, positive or negative changes in oil prices generally affect commodity prices in the long run. In other words, a change in oil prices can cause inflation to change in the same direction.

Table 2. *Kernell Correlation Matrix Estimation*

kendall	LNFPI	LNGP	LNBDI	LNCP
LNFPI	1.000***	0.293***	0.043	0.116***
LNGP	0.293***	1.000***	0.046	0.316***
LNBDI	0.043	0.046	1.000***	0.074
LNCP	0.116***	0.316***	0.074	1.000***

The existence of a positive correlation relationship between markets also means that a shock in one market will have an impact on other markets. However, the extent of the impact of this change on the markets is caused by economic dependence between countries (Guo & Tanaka, 2022) and a strong economic integration or a large impact of the country's exports/imports on global commodity markets.

[1] See for detailed information. Elliott et al., (1996).

[2] See for detailed information. Fisher and Gallagher (2012).

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Table 3. *Averaged Connectedness Estimate Results*

Indicator	Food Commodity Prices	Global Inflation Rate	Baltic Dry Cargo Prices	Crude Petrol Prices	FROM
Food Commodity Prices	86,10	6,69	6,64	0,57	13,90
Global Inflation Rate	5,32	84,79	2,88	7,02	15,21
Baltic Dry Cargo Prices	0,08	0,95	96,21	2,77	3,79
Crude Petrol Prices	0,70	1,46	5,75	92,1	7,90
TO	6,09	9,09	15,27	10,36	40,81
Inc.Own	92,19	93,87	111,48	102,46	cTCI/TCI
NET	-7,81	-6,13	11,48	2,46	13,60/10,20
NPT	1	1	3	1	

Notes: The results are based on a TVP-VAR model with a first order lag length (BIC) and 20 steps forward generalized prediction error variance decomposition.

Looking at the average connectivity estimation results, food commodity markets explain 86.10% of their variance. Food Commodity prices have a connectedness effect on the highest global inflation rate (6.69%) and the Baltic dry price (6.64%). This means that the variance of commodity prices is explained by the global inflation rate of 6.69% (6.64%) and the Baltic dry price. Moreover, the highest interconnectedness effect on food commodity prices is the global inflation rate (5.32%). In other words, while food commodity prices affect the global inflation rate the most, they are also most affected by the global inflation rate. Therefore, an increase in the price of Baltic dry transportation increases the transportation costs and is the base reason for the price increases in food commodity prices. In addition to this, the price of crude oil and food commodities prices are effective on the Baltic dry price. Therefore, an alteration in the oil price also causes an alteration in the Baltic dry price (Choi & Yoon, 2020).

When we look at the TO value in Table 2, it shows the spillover effect of the change from one market to another. In this framework, the market with the highest spillover of change overall markets is the Baltic dry index market. In other words, an increase/decrease in transportation costs may be the cause of both the inflation rate and the increase in food commodity prices. Because a rise in transportation costs has an impact on consumer prices. First, they can directly impact import prices, as the local price of imported goods increases in proportion to the cost of transportation. Second, when there is a rise in the cost of transportation of intermediate goods, it creates supplemental cost pressures for producers and puts oppression on local consumers to demand higher prices. Third, it can have an impact on core inflation, for instance, when wage bargaining is indexed to past inflation (Carrière-Swallow et al., 2022:4). When we look at the FROM value, it shows the effect of the change in one market from the other. The global inflation rate, food commodity prices and Baltic dry prices show that they are the markets where the change is most effective during an economic recession or crisis period. In particular, the fact that food commodity prices are the market with the highest effects of change also shows that many factors are effective on the dynamics of this market. In the framework of these effects, it states that monetary policies in both global and domestic markets should be handled carefully.

The NET spillover value reveals the difference between the change spillover or received from one market to another market. A positive value indicates that the market acts as a transmitter of change, and a negative value indicates that the market acts as a net receiver. In this context, while the crude oil price and the

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Baltic dry price are the net transmitters of the change, the global inflation rate and food commodity prices are the net receiver of the change. When we look at the NPT value, it shows the changes that occur in a market. Therefore, the highest change occurred in the price of Baltic dry price. 'The reason for this situation is first, the strong increase in the demand for intermediate goods due to increased manufacturing activities has increased the demand for container transportation. Second, shipping capacity has been constrained by logistical barriers and deficiencies in container shipping equipment, often associated with pandemic disruptions. Tariffs and congestion at ports have also led to an increase in fees, including delay and detention fees' (Carrière-Swallow et al., 2022:4). Considering the findings obtained in this framework, it can be stated that the most effective factor on global markets is the increase of costs caused by supply shocks.

Figure 2. *Dynamic Total Connectivity Estimation Results*



Figure 2 shows the black-shaded area total connectivity (TCI) in the Dynamic total connectivity estimation. Also, the green line represents the positive change and the red line progression of TCI over time based on the negative change. This frame also shows high volatility (more than approximately 50%) of TCI. Therefore, it shows that the reaction of a change in these markets to different economic and political events is high. The total, negative, and positive change varies in similar time intervals until 2010-2020 when dynamic connectivity is taken into account. After 2020, it shows different changes. Especially after 2020, while positive change decreases, TCI increases with negative change. However, there are common inequalities between positive and negative change. Also, dependency based on mostly negative changes is high during the period under consideration. In other words, since the markets are more sensitive to negative news than positive news, it is stated that the change in negative information has a stronger effect on all markets than negative information.

In 2021, negative changes were more effective in the markets. The reason for this situation is primarily the disruptions in oil and grain shipments in Ukraine due to the war. In other words, according to the IMF, Russia's blocking of Ukraine's export shipments caused a shock in the grain supply. Thus, barriers to export shipping would decrease global wheat and maize supplies by 1.5 percent compared to current expectations, while increasing grain prices by 10 percent within a year. Secondly, a 1 percent decrease in global harvest due to the global climate crisis causes food commodity prices to increase by 8.5 percent. Weather events such as temperature increases, regional imbalances in precipitation and drought increase the change in food prices, that is, negative

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

supply shocks surge food prices due to a decrease in production. Thirdly, the 1 percent increase in fertilizer prices, which has recently amplified due to the increase in natural gas prices, rises the food commodity prices by 0.45 percent. Thus, an escalation in natural gas prices pushes production costs to go higher. Fourth, a 1 percent rise in oil prices increases food commodity prices by 0.2 percent[3] (Price, 2022). In this context, shocks in the markets due to various factors are the main reason for the rise in global inflation.

Figure 3. *Dynamic Net Total Directional Connectedness*



Dynamic net directional interconnectivity estimation results[4] show the role of net receiving or net transmitting in the spillover of change in the markets during the time period under consideration. In this frame, positive values show net transmitters in the system, and negative values show net receivers. While food commodity prices and the global inflation rate are net receivers, crude oil prices and Baltic dry prices are net transmitters. In this context, a change in the Baltic dry price and crude oil price causes changes in other markets. Positive change is effective in the oil market until 2006-2005. In all markets except food commodity prices, the effect of negative change on the market increased between 2009 and 2020. In particular, the effects of the COVID-19 epidemic are seen in all markets.

It shows the connectivity dynamics between the series pairs of change in dynamic dual connectivity estimation. For example, when we look at the price of food commodities and the global inflation rate, the change shows that the variable between these two markets is the net receiving and which variable is the net transmitter. In food commodity prices, the black shadowy area, the red straight line and the green continuous line are below zero. This situation shows that there is a spillover to food commodity prices at a higher rate than the global inflation rate price. The effect of a positive or negative spillover in the global inflation rate creates an asymmetrical effect on both the food commodity prices and the Baltic dry price. Therefore, while food commodity prices are the net receiving of change until 2020, they become the net transmitting market of change after 2020. However, there is heterogeneity in price responses in all

[3] See for detailed information. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/12/09/global-food-prices-to-remain-elevated-amid-war-costly-energy-la-nina

[4] Variables used in estimation; LNFPI shows the global food commodity return series, LNGP shows the global inflation rate return series, LNBDI Baltic dry return series and LNCP crude oil return series.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Figure 4. *Dynamic Net Pairwise Directional Connectedness*



markets depending on the change. In other words, whether a negative change in a particular market spillovers more to other markets than positive changes, and the reactions to prices in all markets are different. For this reason, it causes the expectations and price sensitivity of producers and consumers are different (Chen et al., 2022). In other words, both the heterogeneity between countries and the differentiation in the expectations of the economic decision-making units affect the spillover of change in the markets.

Figure 5. *Dynamic Pairwise Connectedness*



The black area stands for the symmetrical dual connectedness, while the green and red lines show the dual connectedness measures of positive and negative alteration respectively. Spillover effects under positive and negative alteration are significantly different in all markets. That is, the disposition between the

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

return series is different. During the time period under consideration, spillover effects under negative change are greater than spillover effects of positive alternation, except for the Baltic dry price and crude oil price (LNBDI-LNCP) markets. This shows that the risk of spread of negative changes in the markets is dominant.

Considering the findings, the rapid spillover of negative changes across markets may also cause a reaction in the markets that can affect the general instability. This situation may have an impact on prices and employment policies, taking into account the expectations of companies. Because, depending on the inflation beliefs of the firms according to the price changes observed along the supply chain, it causes heterogeneous expectations among the firms. Therefore, the input prices of the firms constitute inflation and the total inflation expectations according to heterogeneous prices. This situation states that companies use the boundedly rational expectations hypothesis in the decision process instead of the Rational expectations hypothesis (Albagli et al., 2022).

CONCLUSION

In this study, monthly data were used between 2003M1-2022M9 periods. Positive/negative changes between these markets were analyzed by taking into account food commodity prices, crude oil prices, Baltic dry prices and global inflation rate. In this analysis, the asymmetric TVP-VAR method was used. Considering the findings from this analysis, it can be said that spillovers respond differently based on qualitative differences in market dynamics. In addition, the spillovers of negative changes associated with uncertainty and decreases in prices are more effective on the markets during the period under consideration. We can conclude that the spread of negative changes in the markets is driven by it. For this reason, results have been obtained that support the literature on the fact that negative changes are more effective on the markets. This result also supports the existence of asymmetric spillover between markets.

Changes in food commodity prices and Baltic dry prices increase the national inflation rate. This also indicates that these changes are more strongly transmitted to the global inflation rate. Especially when global inflation is high, it will cause the rate of spillover of supply-side shocks to global inflation to increase, both directly and indirectly. In other words, the irregular demand development and unexpected supply disruptions in these markets also cause these markets to face the problem of delays in adjusting supply. However, global inflation is spreading to the domestic markets of countries where the consumption of imported products is high. This situation varies according to the characteristics of the countries and the monetary policy applied. For this reason, it is necessary to determine the monetary policies to be applied correctly.

The monetary policy gives insufficient results when faced with persistent supply shocks that cause inflation expectations to change. For this reason, it is especially important for effective monetary policy to understand from which market negative changes could occur and spill over due to supply and demand shocks.

The findings support the view that cost-side shocks have a greater impact on inflation. In this context, while preparing monetary policy targets, policies should be prepared under flexible inflation targeting, taking into account the changes that may occur in inflation expectations due to supply shocks. Because

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

the ability of economic decision-making units to react to market price volatility varies according to positive and negative changes. This situation causes asymmetrical risk spillover between markets and differences between markets. The most important result of this situation is the differentiation of the change in company expectations. In other words, firms make decisions under boundly rational expectations.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

This review article aims to comprehend which themes sociologists should focus on when discussing climate change. To conduct the study, the systematic review method was adopted. By scanning the sources, six major themes were identified based on the codes extracted from the documents that establish a relationship between sociology and climate change. This is followed by a discussion of reflections on these themes among Central Asian countries. The final part of the paper presents various academic and action-oriented suggestions to Central Asian academicians about the sociological context of climate change. It seems necessary to increase sociological studies and academic activities on climate change in Central Asia, given the current inequalities and potential dangers.

Keywords: Climate change, Central Asia, Environmental Sociology, Social inequalities.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Global climate change has significant impacts on society and the environment and is one of the most pressing global challenges of our time. Climate change is not only a matter of the natural sciences; it is a complex issue that encompasses various disciplines, including sociology, economics, anthropology, and political science. As a result of climate change, human behavior, social systems, and cultural values are profoundly impacted.

In line with the frame above, the main purpose of this article is to explore how sociology can contribute to our understanding of climate change, and how it can facilitate a more equitable and just policy decision-making process. It is because the sociological approach to studying this problem is uniquely equipped to examine the societal dimensions of this problem.

It is not the only article to emphasize the importance of sociology in climate change research (Pettenger, 2007; Lever-Tracy, 2011; Shue, 2014; Dunlap and Brulle, 2015; Carolan, 2016; Pastor and Morello-Frosch, 2018). The importance of the paper lies in merging the role of sociology in climate change studies under subheadings and illustrating it with examples from Central Asia. By using the systematic review method, scientific studies that examine climate change from a sociological perspective were analyzed. A thematic presentation was used to convey the findings of the study. There are six themes to the sociological effects of climate change according to the article. These can be summarized as follows:

1) Disadvantaged groups (lower classes, indigenous peoples,communities in underdeveloped countries, women, the elderly, etc.) suffer disproportionately more than others from the results of climate change.

2) Social norms and values that are embedded in human societies are at the root of climate change, and its consequences will also have an impact on social norms and values.

3) Climate change mitigation and adaptation policies have and will have social and economic repercussions as a result of climate change.

4) Several effects of climate change will escalate and intensify conflicts between regional and global governments over natural resources.

5) Disasters caused by climate change will trigger migrations, and these migrations could serve as fuel for populist nationalism in the future.

6) There is no doubt that climate change has an adverse impact on the political agenda, and social movements in this area will grow as they become more diverse as a consequence.

These six themes are discussed under each subheading in the results section of the article. We provide examples of how Central Asian societies are affected by climate change in the section that follows. Because numerous international reports indicate that Central Asia is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. In the conclusion of the article, the measures to be taken are listed. One of the central claims of the paper is that it is critical to establish climate change research centers where sociologists are active to observe the social effects of the

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

phenomenon. This would enable them to present predictions for the future and to provide policymakers with relevant scientific material.

METHODOLOGY

In order to conduct this study, the systematic review method was adopted. Systematic reviews are standardized and comprehensive methods for synthesizing existing research. This method involves finding relevant studies, using explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria, and synthesizing them (Russell et al., 2009). Historically, systematic reviews have been used in pharmacy and health research, but currently, social scientists are increasingly using them (Chapman, 2021). In contrast to a literature review, a systematic review aims not only to provide summary information about a subject but also to produce coherent output. Systematic reviews could be repeated and have concrete findings (Kysh, 2013).

In general, systematic reviews could cover meta-analyses and be long-term studies. Despite this, this research does not adhere to such a framework. The study has benefited from a systematic review of articles and books that deal with climate change in a sociological context, which may be viewed in the references. Basically, the time and the limitations of the article constraint are the main reasons for conducting the research in this manner. Nonetheless, it is hoped that in the future there will be further development of the research.

The following reputable databases were searched to get access to articles and books written in the field of sociology: JSTOR, Google Scholar, ProQuest Social Science Journals, Wiley Online Library, and Sage Journals. By examining the sources obtained, we focused on sociological debates on the causes and consequences of climate change. To categorize the codes, these were clustered among themselves. Following the clustering of the categories, we arrived at the six themes listed above and elaborated below.

RESULTING THEMES

Social Injustice and Climate Change

Several factors contribute to the disproportionate impact of climate change on marginalized social groups, including low-income communities, communities of color, and indigenous communities (Moss, 2009; Posner and Weisbach, 2010; Savoy and Deming, 2011; Shue, 2014; von Lucke, 2021). It is often difficult for these communities to address the impacts of climate change due to a lack of resources and political power.

Climate change disproportionately impacts marginalized communities through extreme weather events, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, and storms (Robinson, 2018). These events can result in deaths, property damage, and displacement. Disadvantaged people are more likely to live in low-lying coastal areas or areas with poor infrastructure, which are more open to being affected by these types of events. In addition, they have fewer resources for preparing for and recovering from crises.

The impacts of sea level rise and coastal erosion are two other ways climate change unequally affects marginalized social groups. As a result of these impacts,

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

land, and property can be lost, and communities can be displaced. Indigenous communities have strong cultural and spiritual ties to their land, and the loss of that land can have devastating effects on them (Berkes, 2012).

Due to increased exposure to heat, air pollution, and disease, climate change also adversely affects disadvantaged communities' health. The impacts of heat waves and air pollution are more severe in low-income communities and communities of color since these communities live near polluting industrial facilities and highways. Furthermore, underprivileged communities often do not have access to green space, healthy foods, or clean water, which can expose them to the adverse effects of climate change (Vermeulen et al., 2012; Kracht and Schulz, 1999).

There is also evidence that the impacts of climate change are compounding existing social inequalities, such as poverty and lack of access to education and healthcare. These inequalities unevenly affect disadvantaged groups. The development of mitigation and adaptation strategies for climate change has to take into account the specific vulnerabilities of marginalized communities when it comes to determining policy and decision-making processes (Ustun and Cizreli, 2022).

Climate Change, Social Norms, and Values

Social norms and values play a noteworthy role in shaping individuals' and communities' responses to climate change. Values describe what society believes is significant or desirable, while social norms describe the unwritten rules and expectations that govern behavior. Norms such as consumerism, which emphasizes the acquisition of goods and services constantly, may discourage individuals from taking action on climate change. Despite their cultural expectations, individuals may find it difficult to lessen their consumption and emissions as a result of this norm (Wheeler and Beatley, 2014; Conca et al., 2002).

People's values can also influence their perceptions of climate change and how they respond to its effects. Economic growth and development might be more prominent for a community than protecting the environment, so they may not support policies that reduce carbon emissions. In contrast, a community might have values that may support policies that encourage sustainable practices and back investments in renewable energy sources (Wolf and Moser, 2011).

It is important to note that social norms and values can have a remarkable impact on how individuals and communities perceive and respond to climate change's impacts. Individuals and communities may take action on climate change to protect future generations if they have a strong social norm of intergenerational responsibility, as is the case in some cultures. Other cultures might have a norm of individualism, making it challenging for people to see themselves as part of the climate change solution (Skillington, 2020).

We should keep in mind that social norms and values are dynamic and continuously changing, rather than static. Climate change can be addressed more effectively by policymakers and practitioners by understanding how social norms and values shape responses. In light of this, moral movements hold substantial potential. In this regard, the social sciences, especially cultural theory, are important tools for combating climate change (Dunlap and Brulle, 2015).

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Results of Mitigation and Adaptation Policies

It is important to understand how climate change mitigation and adaptation policies impact different groups of people and how they affect the distribution of costs and benefits. There is a difference between this theme and the adverse impacts of climate change on disadvantaged groups. In this case, the triggering source is not climate change, but our struggle to deal with it. By considering the social repercussions of policies to tackle climate change, fair policies can be pursued.

For example, by building sea walls to protect coastal communities from storm surges or planting drought-resistant crops, climate change adaptation policies may notably reduce the vulnerability of communities and ecosystems to the impacts of climate change. However, the negative effects of these policies, particularly on vulnerable groups, on the whole, and in social life should not be ignored. Renewable energy investments and carbon taxes are examples of climate change mitigation policies that reduce or prevent greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, the cost of energy and transportation may increase for low-income households if a carbon tax is implemented (Ligthart, 1998; Andersson and Atkinson, 2011).

In terms of economics, these policies play a role in the distribution of costs and benefits within society. Investments in renewable energy can create jobs and stimulate economic growth, but they may also increase costs for consumers and businesses. Policies can have different impacts on different groups of people based on their social and economic status. It is essential to balance protecting vulnerable communities and economic growth when developing an effective policy. Some cities almost exist with coal mining around the world, for instance. People living in these cities perceive the coal phase-out process as a threat due to green policies (Ustun and Cizreli, 2021).

Specifically, social scientists are becoming increasingly interested in the concept of a "just transition" for this reason (Wang and Lo, 2021). Energy efficiency and renewable energy policies, for example, may create jobs and stimulate economic growth, while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, therefore benefiting society and the environment. Climate change mitigation and adaptation policies should consider social and economic aspects, as well as balance the need to address climate change with protecting vulnerable groups and supporting economic escalation. It is possible to predict potential problems affecting vulnerable groups and working sectors through the approach of just transition (Rosemberg, 2010).

Urbanization policies can be significantly affected by mitigation and adaptation policies. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change, changes must be made in urban planning, building designs (Kuttah, 2022), transportation systems, and energy consumption (Chai, 2022). The results of these initiatives may have a positive consequence for sustainability and resilience in cities, but they may also entail new challenges and trade-offs, such as a rise in costs, alterations to land use patterns, and an increase in social inequities. Urbanization policies that have the potential to be effective must consider the interplay between climate change and urban development. Experts must strive to balance economic, environmental, and social interests (Srivastava, 2020).

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Climate change can create or exacerbate conflicts over resources and territory in several ways. As the climate changes, it can lead to alterations in the availability and distribution of resources, such as water and food, and can also lead to changes in the location and suitability of land for human habitation and economic activities. These can create competition and tensions between different groups, leading to conflicts.

Conflicts over Natural Resources

Water scarcity and competition for access to water can result from rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns. Farmers, urban dwellers, and industries use water in different ways, which may cause conflicts. Likewise, coastal areas may be forced to relocate inland as sea levels rise and storm overflows and flooding become more prevalent. Conflicts over territory can be exacerbated by competition for land and resources in these areas. According to research by Hsiang et al. (2013), climate change has a direct effect on regional conflicts.

Land suitability for different types of economic activities can also be affected by climate change. As temperatures increase, certain crops can be more difficult to grow in certain regions, resulting in changes in land use and resource competition. For example, grazing land is at risk of being in conflict with farmland in rain-dependent regions of Africa (Scheffran et al., 2019). As a result of climate change, fish stocks can also be affected in a different way, leading to conflict between different fishing communities and even countries (Mendenhall et al., 2020). The fact that many major rivers flow through multiple countries may further exacerbate conflicts over the use of transboundary water resources caused by climate change (Schaar, 2019).

The effects of climate change can exacerbate existing conflicts and tensions, but they do not cause them. Climate change can contribute to the severity of existing problems by acting as a "threat multiplier." A comprehensive and integrated approach is required to resolve conflicts over resources and territory, which have often complex and multifaceted nature. The impact of social dynamics on conflict would be understood through sociology.

Immigrants and Rising Nationalism

Changing weather patterns, rising sea levels, and the increased frequency of natural disasters are likely to result in large numbers of people being displaced from their homes because of climate change. Existing vulnerabilities can be aggravated, and new ones can be created, such as crop failures, water scarcity, famine, and sea-level rise, which can cause migration. It has previously been predicted that global migration would reach 200 million people by 2050 as a result of climate change (IOM, 2008). Nevertheless, these estimates are rising. Globally, 216 million people could be climate migrants by 2050, according to another study conducted by the World Bank (Clement et al., 2021).

Migrations induced by climate change may take various forms, including temporary or permanent displacements within and across national borders. Most people displaced by climate change will likely remain in their own countries. However, some people may also be forced to move on cross-national borders as climate refugees. Local communities and governments can be affected by these

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

displacements, resulting in tensions on a social and political level. South Asia has experienced the consequences of the abovementioned factors in recent years (Bhagat and Rajan, 2019).

Various other factors influence migration, including economic opportunities, political instability, and social factors. It is critical to note that climate change can interact with and make more severe these factors, which can result in complex and dynamic migration patterns (McLeman, 2014). To reduce the impact of climate change on migration, it is imperative to address the root causes of climate change and provide support to those who are displaced.

The influx of forced migration caused by wars and economic recessions in the receiving countries in recent years has triggered populist and nationalist movements. It is predicted that this trend could deepen with climate change. In addition, the claim that global measures are a threat to national interests is a rhetorical device used by populist nationalists. Xenophobia and radical movements would gain a rhetorical opportunity throughout the world as a result of the cross-border transition caused by climate change (Ahuja, 2021).

Social Movements and Activism

In addition to being an environmental issue, climate change also has social, economic, and political dimensions, so it may affect various social-political groups in different ways. People organize to protest environmental problems, adapt to their impacts, and mitigate their causes, as well as influence and shape existing movements. The impacts of climate change may be particularly severe for people living in vulnerable areas, such as low-income and marginalized communities, who may demand that more investment be made in adaptation measures. Extreme weather events, such as floods and storms, may cause people to demand more action to prevent them in the future. It is the responsibility of environmental justice movements to ensure that marginalized communities are not unequally affected by the negative outcomes of climate change. Peru, for instance, has many non-governmental organizations that target combating the effects of climate change (Orlove, 2009).

Different groups of people may have divergent interests and priorities when it comes to addressing climate change, which can also alter political power dynamics. The fossil fuel industry, for instance, may have an interest in maintaining the status quo, whereas environmental and social justice groups may advocate for more ambitious climate policies (EBC, 2022). Similarly, climate change may result in changes in the political landscape, such as the emergence of new parties or movements that prioritize climate action, or the decline of those that do not (Dessler and Parson, 2010). Even religious movements have been influenced in such a way as to become environmental activists in the face of climate change (Kearns, 2011).

There is also strong evidence that political leaders can influence the societal discourse around climate change in a significant way. This influence can have a salient impact on public opinion and the level of public engagement with climate change. It is possible to discourage public engagement and support for climate action when political leaders deny the existence of climate change or do not accept its human-caused characteristics. Conversely, leaders who

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

encourage climate action and engage with the public can help mobilize action and build support for climate policies (Kousser and Tranter, 2018). In addition, governmental systems and institutions can influence how society responds to climate change. It is possible for authoritarian and strongly centralized governments to implement climate policies more quickly and efficiently, but they may also be less transparent and responsive. Compared to countries with more decentralized systems and more democratic governance, they might be more responsive to public opinion and more transparent in their decision-making processes. However, they may be less efficient (Burnell, 2012).

Putting it briefly, climate change can be seen as a complex interaction between government policy and regulation, public opinion, and engagement, as well as the broader social, economic, and political context of society at large. These interactions need to be understood to effectively address the issue.

DISCUSSION ON CENTRAL ASIA

Rising temperatures and diminishing precipitation are expected to negatively impact Central Asia's water resources, making it particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Malsy et al., 2012). Agricultural activities in the region are also expected to be adversely affected by climate change, due to changes in precipitation patterns and temperature, which may lead to crop failures and food shortages. Central Asian countries are experiencing serious desertification since a decrease in water resources caused by melting glaciers and soil loss (Sorg et al., 2012).

In Central Asian countries as well, climate change has significant impacts, especially on vulnerable groups. In Central Asia, mountain communities face severe challenges because of their remote location, difficult access, poorly maintained infrastructure, and distinct continental climate (Xenarios et al., 2019). The decrease in water resources threatens the existence of groups engaged in animal husbandry. Additionally, having cross-border water resources in the region increases political tensions. The region has been identified as prone to water conflict in recent decades (Berndtsson and Tussupova, 2020). In the next three decades, these problems may increase conflicts in Central Asian countries and may also have severe socio-political consequences (Guo et al., 2016).

Desertification is also caused by human activities like mining and inappropriate agricultural methods (Sternberg, 2019). Therefore, Central Asia should also be discussed in terms of human activities and habits. Environmental problems are becoming more prevalent and severe in Central Asian countries due to their rapid development. In 2016, the Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program for Central Asia (CAMP4ASIA) was launched with support from the World Bank to develop an economic model that could overcome these problems and create a common program for the region. Nevertheless, this program has been inactive in recent years.

It is predicted that climate change will trigger migration in Central Asia, a region that has great water stress. In the region, natural disasters caused by rising winter temperatures and an imbalance in precipitation are thought to have triggered economic migration (Murakami, 2020). According to research by Lukyanets et al. (2020), Central Asian countries are notably fragile to extreme temperatures,

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

floods, and soil loss due to climate change. The long-term consequence of these marginal events is a serious loss in soil fertility and a threat to food security. It is worth investigating migration caused by these developments and the loss of labor related to migration from a sociological perspective.

CONCLUSION

As climate change affects many vulnerable groups and developing countries the most, it raises questions about fairness and justice. Moreover, climate change will open up the discussion of production patterns and consumption habits, which are the main causes, and individual and collective human behaviors, which are their sources. Comprehensive mitigation and adaptation policies are required to put forward a realistic response to the problem. However, the social consequences of these policies should also be considered. Furthermore, climate change has security-related dimensions. Shortage of food and degradation of natural resources can have significant reflections on regional and international relations, resulting in escalation or the emergence of new conflicts. There is no doubt that climate change would trigger migration, which also could lead to a rise in populist nationalism. The environmental movement is also a stream that has a strong presence on the political scene today. The demands of environmental movements should not be ignored by politicians or governments.

Although climate change has created and is likely to create dangers for Central Asia, the subject has not yet received sufficient attention from academic and scientific circles (Vakulchuk et al., 2022). Sociologists should study these six dimensions in collaboration with other disciplines. The theoretical depth and research methods of sociology have the opportunity to inquire about and analyze the social consequences of climate change, and to present solutions to the problems caused by climate change. This article offers six themes for Central Asian academics to use when studying climate change from a sociological perspective.

Sociologists in Central Asia should take advantage of the potential of sociology to engage in more scholarly activities and take action on an academic basis. These recommendations are for both orientations. To begin with, here are some recommendations for academic studies:

- Since it is a complex and multifaceted problem, a multidisciplinary approach is required to address climate change. For a comprehensive understanding of the issue, social scientists should work with environmental scientists, economists, and political scientists.

- The impacts of climate change on disadvantaged communities and underdeveloped countries should be studied.

- Studies on cultural beliefs and values can shed light on how public attitudes and behaviors towards climate change are being shaped. A communication and engagement strategy can be developed based on this information to encourage collective action.

- Social scientists can study the effectiveness of existing policies and governance mechanisms that address climate change.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

Social scientists can take action by following these suggestions:

● Establishing a research center or institute to study social dimensions of climate change. Scholars from a variety of disciplines can collaborate on research and study in this regard.

● Share knowledge and engage with the community by organizing and participating in conferences, workshops, and events.

● Create and implement community-based solutions to tackle the impacts of climate change in partnership with community organizations and activist groups.

● Training the next generation of social scientists and practitioners through the development of interdisciplinary educational programs.

● Enhance investment in climate science and promote evidence-based policies and solutions with policymakers.

● Disseminated research results in academic journals, mainstream media, and social media to positively affect the attitudes and behaviors of the public.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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BOOK REVIEW

EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL
ERJ, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 87-89, Winter 2023

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

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Book Review

PROSPECTS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19

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Thorsten Beck and Yung Chul Park (Eds.). Prospects of the Global Economy after COVID-19. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Press. 2022. pp. 131.

The pandemic was one of the major global shocks, which affected all countries. It brought substantial challenges and led to a significant transformation of the global economy.

The book "Prospects of the Global Economy after COVID-19", edited by Thorsten Beck and Yung Chul Park, shows prospects of the global economy by taking into account those pandemic-related economic and financial challenges. The book consists of three chapters, which were written by prominent economists.

Daron Acemoglu, author of the first chapter "Facing the challenges of the post-COVID world," distinguishes four major existential challenges for the global economy, including the rise in inequality, climate change, population aging, and weakening of democratic institutions. The author also mentions a lack of global cooperation in the example of decreasing influence of international organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization. According to Acemoglu, these challenges provide opportunities for restructuring the current institutions more inclusively. To do so, it is important to re-assess the responsibilities and priorities of high-power businesses such as BigTech, which are mainly motivated by the maximization of profits and lack of responsibility. Acemoglu mentions that many of the challenges are technological in nature. For instance, inequality is fueled by automation, while industrial technologies pour out massive amounts of carbon emissions. Hence, the global economy needs a new direction of technological change. Global cooperation remains one of the key factors to address the aforementioned post-pandemic challenges such as misuse of digital technologies and surveillance, including excessive use of facial recognition. Acemoglu blames the 'great power' rivalry between the United States and China for decreasing the influence of international organizations.

To create a new model of 'welfare state 3.0', Acemoglu suggests developing a new framework for the regulation of technology and other institutional arrangements so that technological choices are not completely insulated from societal priorities. The new regulation should be complemented by a stronger social safety net, greater opportunities for children from disadvantaged backgrounds,

Eurasian Research Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

better health care, better infrastructure and better protection for disadvantaged groups. These institutions need to address inefficiencies of the early state institutions such as bureaucracy and involve the significant extension of the responsibility of the state. The private sector has to be at the forefront of technological change. However, new regulations must therefore push firms to be held accountable for their broader responsibilities – to the environment, to their workers and democracy.

Maurice Obstfeld wrote the second chapter of the book "The international financial system after COVID-19". The author mentions that the pandemic became a stress test for the international financial system. Central Banks around the world played an active role and applied a wide range of policy instruments varying from standard interest rate cuts to large-scale purchases of domestic assets and measures to promote bank loans to businesses. Advanced countries provided massive monetary and financial stimulus to developing economies, which was beneficial for recipients. International banking sector reforms that followed the 2008–09 crisis and the euro area crisis, contributed positively to addressing the pandemic-related financial risks. Obstfeld proposes reforms to strengthen the global financial system, including the global financial safety net. There is a need for more thinking about financial stability risks coming from the areas besides bank sector such as the pandemic and climate change. He points out that the spread of innovative FinTech platforms also increases the risks, including from cybersecurity breaches. Obstfeld notes that despite some improvements, the current international architecture for external debt restructuring is inadequate, and calls for mandatory private-sector participation in debt restructurings.

Besides individual efforts of countries, global financial institutions and regional organizations also directed their efforts to address the crisis and mitigate its consequences. The International Monetary Fund proposed an Integrated Policy Framework that conceptualizes the use of monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policies as distinct instruments, and the approach of which was in line with the recent recommendations of a group of ASEAN central banks. The OECD also revised the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements.

Despite the global financial situation impacting all countries, higher-income economies seem to absorb the resulting shocks more easily. Moreover, it is being mentioned that developing countries significantly benefited from the assistance from macroeconomic support policies of advanced economies. Thus, in order to address future challenges to global financial stability, in particular from non-financial risks such as the pandemic, it is important to strengthen global cooperation.

Editors of the book Thorsten Beck and Yung Chul Park are the authors of the third chapter "Finance for the post-COVID world: risks and opportunities". In their chapter, they focused on digitalization in the financial sector, increasing sectoral competition and perspectives of financial technologies. They state that during the pandemic, governments used banks as transmission channels to support households and enterprises. Digitalization accelerated competition and traditional banks face increasing competition from new players such as FinTech startups, technological platform companies and cryptocurrencies. The pandemic caused a boom in e-commerce, which intensified the shift to digital payments and created opportunities for FinTech and BigTech companies to develop other

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Winter 2023
Vol. 5, No. 1

online financial services such as consumer credit, investment counseling and account management. Mobile and information technologies enabled quicker information exchange, better exploitation of economies of scale, use of 'big data' and applied statistics for financial risk measurement and management.

In the post-pandemic world, the authors predicted a process of 'creative destruction', when existing firms would transform their policies to develop new products and services, while new firms are created in sectors and industries with growth opportunities. Government support, keeping all firms' current structure alive, can become a significant obstacle to this process. Beck and Park note that financial innovations can both accelerate growth and increase the vulnerability of the financial system, while digitalization poses significant non-financial risks, which stem from the broader use of artificial intelligence in finance and overly automated or IT-oriented services, which may become targets for cyber-attacks.

Developed digital systems positively affect not only countries at the individual level, but are beneficial at the global scale. Digital financial systems of the countries may contribute to the addressing of the climate change issue. According to estimates, carbon emissions per capita are lower in economies that are relatively more market-based than bank-based. Thus, global financial and digital cooperation remains key for addressing future challenges.

The book stands out with its analysis on the post-pandemic perspectives of the global economy based on a wide range of important factors such as technological changes, digitalization, globalization COVID, financial development, institutional and demographic changes, involvement of private sector and global cooperation. The findings of the authors, based on comparative analysis, and statistical and econometric methods, contribute to addressing many important issues and challenges at country and global levels, including inequality, climate change, and potential non-economic shocks. The recommendations provided in the book are useful for developing a new generation of welfare states. This book is beneficial for policymakers and scholars. Policymakers can find and apply the practical suggestions of prominent economists. Scholars, in turn, may extend this research. In particular, the future study may analyze and evaluate the post-pandemic behavior of labor markets, migration processes, and development in different sectors such as energy and manufacturing. Thus, this book can be considered one of starting points for comprehensive reforms and future academic research.

Eurasian Research Journal

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Review of Articles
Articles submitted to *Eurasian Research Journal* are first reviewed by the Editorial Board in terms of the journal's editorial principles. Those found unsuitable are returned to their authors for revision. Academic objectivity and scientific quality are considered of paramount importance. Submissions found suitable are referred to two referees working in relevant fields. The names of the referees are kept confidential and referee reports are archived for five years. If one of the referee reports is positive and the other negative, the article may be forwarded to a third referee for further assessment or alternatively, the Editorial Board may make a final decision based on the nature of the two reports. The authors are responsible for revising their articles in line with the criticism and suggestions made by the referees and the Editorial Board. If they disagree with any issues, they may make an objection by providing clearly-stated reasons. Submissions which are not accepted for publication are not returned to their authors.

The royalty rights of the articles accepted for publication are considered transferred to Eurasian Research Institute of Akhmet Yassawi University. Authors have full responsibility for the views expressed in their articles and for their stylistic preferences. Quotations from other articles and duplication of photographs are permitted as long as they are fully referenced and cited.

Language of Publication
The language of the journal is English.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING RESEARCH ARTICLES

Please follow the steps listed below in order to register in the system:

1. Click the "Manuscript Handling System". Select "New User" and register in the system by filling in your title, name, surname and other information.

2. Log into the system by entering your user name and password. Then click "Edit" under "My Profile". On the page that appears fill in your personal

information, and area of research (for associate professorship or tenure). Do not forget to click "Save" for each section.

3. If you would like to serve as a reviewer for our journal, click "Yes" for the relevant question found at the bottom of the screen. Then "Save" your answer.

4. In case of a mulfunction of the system or you simply cannot submit the article through the system for any reason, you can send your article directly to erj@eurasian-research.org after making it comply with the style guidelines below.

Please follow the steps listed below to submit an article:

1. Log into the system by entering your user name and password. Then click "Author" on the upper menu.

2. Click "New Submission".

3. Fill in all the required information concerning your submission and then upload the word file of your article to the system. **Make sure** that the word file you upload **does not** include an author name.

4. Once you make sure that all the required areas have been filled in, click "Send".

5. After submitting your article, make sure you see this statement on the screen: "Your data have been successfully entered."

6. Check to see if your article has been submitted from "My Submissions".

NOTES:

1. You will receive automatically generated emails when your article has been received and at every stage of the evaluation process.

2. Enter the information on your area of research even if you are not an Associate Professor or have not received tenure. It is essential that you fill in this information since articles are assigned to reviewers by using this information.

3. Please email info@eurasian-research.org regarding any queries regarding the system.

Publication fees

There are no submission fees, publication fees or page charges for this journal.

Style Guidelines

The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *Eurasıan Research Journal*:

1. Title of the article: The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in **bold** characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

3. Abstract: The article should include an abstract in English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 75 and a maximum of 150 words. The abstract should not include references to sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end

of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article. The English and Russian versions of the title, abstract and keywords should be placed at the end of the article. In case the Russian abstract is not submitted, it will be added later by the journal.

4. Body Text: The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 8.000 words excluding the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided.

5. Section Titles: The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appedices) should be fully capitalized while the sub-titles should have only their first letters capitalized and should be written in bold characters.

6. Tables and Figures: Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left, and should not be in italics. The caption should be written in italics, and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be centered right below the figures. The figure numbers should be written in italics followed by a full-stop. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written in italics, and the first letter of each word should be capitalized. Below is an example table.

Table 1. *Information Concerning Publications in Eurasian Research Journal*

Publication type	Number of publication	Number of pages			Number of references		
		N	X	SS	N	X	SS
Article	96	2,042	21.3	7.5	2,646	27.6	15.8
Book review	4	30	7.5	4.4	31	7.8	8.3
Total	100	2,072	20.7	7.9	2,677	26.8	16.1

Source: Statistical Country Profiles

7. Pictures: Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures.

The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

Below is an example of a picture.

Picture 1. *Ancient Rune script*



Source: en.wiktionary.org

8. Quotations and Citations: Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. Quotations shorter than 2.5 lines should be placed within the flowing text. If the quotation is longer that 2.5 lines, it should be turned into a block quote with a 1.5 cm indentation on the right and left, and the font size should be 1 point smaller. Footnotes and endnotes should be avoided as much as possible. They should only be used for essential explanations and should be numbered automatically.

Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Koprulu 1944: 15)

When sources with several authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and 'et. al' is added.

(Gokay et al. 2002: 18)

If the text already includes the name of the author, only the date should be given:

In this respect, Tanpinar (1976: 131) says …

In sources and manuscripts with no publication date, only the surname of the author should be written; in encyclopedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written.

While quoting from a quotation, the original source should also be specified:

Koprulu (1926, qtd. in Celik 1998).

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates; they should also be cited in the bibliography. Internet references should always include date of access and be cited in the bibliography.

www.turkedebiyatiisimlersozlugu.com [Accessed: 15.12.2014]

9. Transliteration of Ukrainian to English

Transliteration from the Ukrainian to the Latin alphabet should follow the system officially approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in 2010 (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegn/docs/26th-gegn-docs/WP/WP21_Roma_system_Ukraine%20_engl._.pdf). When transliterating place names, Ukrainian names are preferred to Russian equivalents: for example, Mykolaiv rather than Nikolaev, Kyiv rather than Kiev. However, for historical references to Ukrainian cities, it may be appropriate to use Russian names if they were in wide use at the time.

Please, use UK English in your manuscript.

10. References: References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

Isen, Mustafa (2010). *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Istanbul: Kapi Yay.

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat (1961). *Azeri Edebiyatinin Tekamulu*. Istanbul: MEB Yay.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika and Asim Bezirci (1981). *Edebiyatimizda Secme Hikayeler*. Basvuru Kitaplari. Istanbul: Gozlem Yay.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Akyuz, Kenan et al. (1958). *Fuzuli Turkce Divan*. Ankara: Is Bankasi Yay.

The titles of books and journals should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, Ilhan (1997). *Poetika*. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yay.

Demir, Nurettin (2012). "Turkcede Evidensiyel". *Eurasıan Research Journal*, *Turk Dunyasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 62(2): 97-117. doi: https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2021.2-01.

Translator's, compiler's and editor's names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example:

Shaw, Stanford (1982). *Osmanli Imparatorlugu*. Trans. Mehmet Harmanci. Istanbul: Sermet Matb.

If several references by the same author need to be cited, then the name and surname of the author need not be repeated for subsequent entries following the first entry. A long dash may be used instead. Several references by the same author should be listed according to the alphabetical order of work titles.

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar.* Ankara: TDK Yay.

_____ (2003). *XVIII. Yuzyil İstanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe.* Istanbul: Kitabevi.

If **more than one work by the same author of the same date** need to be cited, they should be indicated by (a, b).

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002a). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar.* Ankara: TDK Yay.

Develi, Hayati (2002b). *XVIII. Yuzyil Istanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe.* Istanbul: Kitabevi

For **encylopedia entries**, if the author of the encylopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

Ipekten, Haluk (1991). "Azmi-zâde Mustafa Haleti". *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. C. 4. Istanbul: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yay. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the following order should be followed: surname and name of the author, date, full title of thesis in italics, thesis type, city where the university is located, and the name of the university:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu (2012). *Garibi'nin Yusuf u Zuleyha'si: Inceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin*. Master's Thesis. Kirsehir: Ahi Evran Universitesi.

Handwritten manuscripts should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number. sheet.

Example:

Asım. *Zeyl-i Zubdetu'l-Es'ar*. Millet Kutuphanesi. A. Emiri Efendi. No. 1326. vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, the following order should be followed: Author surname, Author name. "Title of message". Internet address. (Date of Access)

Example:

Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi. "Gecinme Endeksi (Ucretliler)" Elektronik Veri Dagitim Sistemi. http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/ (Accessed: 04.02.2009).

An article accepted for publication but not yet published can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Atilim, Murat ve Ekin Tokat (2008). "Forecasting Oil Price Movements with Crack Spread Futures". *Energy Economics*. In print (doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.07.008).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING BOOK REVIEWS

Apart from Academic Articles, the Eurasian Research Journal (ERJ) publishes Book Reviews. Usually, there are two Book Reviews published in each issue of the journal. The following rules should be observed while preparing a Book Review for submission to the ERJ:

1. The topic of the book should match with the scope of the ERJ.

2. Only reviews on recently published books are accepted. The book that is to be to reviewed must be published within less than a year before the intended date of the publication of ERJ.

3. A Book Review should contain a concise description, critical view, and/or evaluation of the meaning and significance of a book. A normal Book Review should contain approximately 800-1000 words.

4. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in bold characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

5. The text of a Book Review should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1.5 line spacing. Margins of 2.5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered.

6. Tables and Figures should not be used in a Book Review.

7. All Author(s) should refrain from using contractions, first or second person viewpoints, incomplete sentences, ambiguous terminology, and slang, informal style as well as wordy phrases.

8. Author(s) are recommended to proofread and copyedit their Book Review prior to submitting.

Book Reviews should be submitted using the Manuscript Handling System option at http://erj.eurasian-research.org/yonetim/login/index.php