



## THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH BUREAUCRATIC ELITES\*

Yasin ÖZCAN\*\*

### Abstract

*The objective of this article is to study the bureaucratic elites which have always been the decision making and dominant class in Turkey within an elitist theory framework and the transforming impact of the EU membership process on these elites within a historical process. As a result of the Ottoman -Turkish state tradition the bureaucratic elites have had a major role in the modernization and westernization process. The power struggle of the bureaucratic elites as well as their relations with society has been studied from a historical and sociological and political perspective. The bureaucracy which was a disassociated class in society serving the Sultan with loyalty during the classic Ottoman period enhanced its influence during the recession period of the empire to become a partner in power. During the reform period the bureaucratic elites pioneered the westernization movements which were perceived as a solution to the collapse of the state and tried to redesign both the state and society with reforms from the top because they view the people as masses to be lead. The new Turkish Republic which inherited the political culture and state traditions of the empire was established by these bureaucratic elites. During the policy making process the bureaucratic elites who were always influential had their golden age during the first years of the republic. A power struggle between the power elected by the people and the bureaucratic elites started with the transition into democracy. There has always been a stressful relationship between the bureaucratic elites which perceived to know what was best for the state and society and the elected governments. At the culmination of these tensions the military wing of the bureaucratic elites would intervene and seize the administration. After such interventions the army implemented a system of*

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\*\* District Governor (Kaymakam), yasin.ozcan@icisleri.gov.tr.

*dominance over the political power and settled in a central position in society and the country. During the EU accession process and the implemented harmonization laws and reforms the position of the army has weakened. The Copenhagen political criteria which are a political condition of the EU have had a vital contribution in the democratization and normalization of Turkey.*

**Key Words:** *Elite Theory, Bureaucratic Elite, Turkish State Tradition, Civil- Military Relations, European Union.*

## TÜRK BÜROKRATİK ELİTLERİN AVRUPA DÖNÜŞÜMÜ\*\*\*

### Özet

*Bu makalenin amacı elitist teori çerçevesinde Türk toplumunda her zaman karar verici ve egemen sınıf olan bürokratik elitleri ve EU üyelik sürecinin bu elitler üzerindeki dönüştürücü etkisini tarihi süreç içerisinde incelemektir. Osmanlı-Türk devlet geleneğinin sonucu olarak bürokratik elitler modernleşme ve batılılaşma sürecinde önemli bir rol oynamışlardır. Çalışmada bürokratik elitlerin bu süreçte girdikleri iktidar mücadelesi ve topluma ilişkileri tarihsel olduğu kadar, sosyolojik ve politik açıdan da ele alınmıştır. Osmanlı'nın klasik döneminde toplumdaki kopuk bir zümre olarak sultana sadakatle hizmet eden bürokrasi, imparatorluğun gerileme döneminde devlet idaresinde etkinliği artırmış ve iktidara ortak olmuştur. Tanzimat döneminde devletin yıkılmasına çare olarak görülen batılılaşma hareketlerinin öncüsü olan bürokratik elitler, tepeden inme reformlarla hem devleti hem de toplumu dizayn etmeye çalışmışlar; halkı yönetilecek yığınlar olarak görmüşlerdir. İmparatorluğun siyasal kültürünü ve devlet geleneğini devralan Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti bu bürokratik elitler tarafından kurulmuştur. Politika yapma sürecinde her zaman etkin olan bürokratik elitler, cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında altın çağlarını yaşamışlardır. Demokrasiye geçişle birlikte halkın seçtiği iktidarlara bürokratik elit arasında güç mücadelesi başlamıştır. Devlet ve toplum için en iyi kararın kendileri tarafından verilmesi gerektiğine inanan bürokratik elitler ile seçilmiş hükümetler arasında her zaman gerilimli bir ilişki olmuştur. Bu gerilimlerin zirve yaptığı dönemlerde bürokratik elitlerin askeri kanadı askeri müdahalede bulunarak yönetime el koymuştur. Bu müdahaleler sonrasında siyasal iktidar üzerinde vesayet sistemi kuran ordu, toplumun ve ülkenin merkezine yerleşmiştir. Avrupa Birliğine giriş sürecinde yapılan uyum yasaları ve reformlarla ordunun bu konumu zayıflamıştır. Avrupa Birliğinin siyasal koşulu olan Kopenhag siyasi kriterlerinin Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesine ve normalleşmesine yaptığı katkı hayati-dir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Elit Teori, Bürokratik Elit, Türk Devlet Geleneği, Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, Avrupa Birliği.*

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## **Introduction**

In the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition bureaucracy is perceived as a power group, always endeavoring to maintain its power in the political and social system which desiring the sustainability of its status. In turn it's perceived as the protector of the state and steers the community. For this reason bureaucracy and bureaucratic elite in the Turkish community does not implement the decisions taken by political power but partakes in their making. The political culture is not acceptable in terms of democracy. To democratize and become a modern state in Turkey; the patrimonial and centralized nature of the political culture must changed. Besides, state (the ruler) and society (the ruled) relationship must be redefined. Turkey has created many harmonization laws and a constitutional amendment package in the process of accession to the EU. The EU has demanded further democratic reforms, human rights and the rule of law as part of the process of accession to the EU. Borrud& Jones (2010) report "European leaders have hailed the results of Turkey's constitutional reform referendum as an important step towards Europe. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele accepts that these reforms are a step in the right direction towards fully complying with European Union accession criteria". In this study Turkish bureaucratic elites which are significant actors in terms of administrative tradition and power affairs in Turkish society will be examined in detail. This research aims to contribute to how the transformation of Turkey from traditional conservative, highly bureaucratic state into a democracy which is respectful to human rights and upholds the rule of law.

A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. A choice of research design reflects decisions about priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process (Bryman 2011:46). There are four noticeable research designs, namely experimental design, cross-sectional design, longitudinal design and case study design. The basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. Yin (2009:4) confirms that as a research method, the case study is used in many situations, to contribute to our knowledge of individual group, social, political and related phenomena. I have chosen Ottoman Turkish state tradition and bureaucratic elites as an explanatory/causal case study. In this research I will try to find an answer: How does a strong, centralized, and highly bureaucratic state democratize? Will the relationship between State (the ruler) and Society (the ruled) change? What is the effect of EU membership on Bureaucratic elites and the traditional bureaucratic state? This research will systematically explore the range of possible connections between democratization and bureaucratic elites in Turkey. I will examine in detail Turkish bureaucratic elites and their effects to democratization and reforms.

The ontological and epistemological assumptions that we make subsequently inform the approach that we adopt when we come to do our political analy-

sis (Savigny& Marsden 2011:28). My position is ontologically anti-foundationalist and epistemologically interpretivist and hermeneutic approach. Ontology and Epistemology lead into particular methodologies and together constrain the methods that are appropriate for research. Qualitative researchers typically provide detailed descriptions of the settings they investigate. They ask questions such as what is going on. In this vein; qualitative research approach was selected in this project to explain and explore ‘what is going on’ transformation of Turkish state tradition in EU Accession Process. If the research design is a case study and the research strategy is qualitative, the typical form is that the intensive study by ethnography or qualitative interviewing of a single case, which may be an organization, life, family or community (Bryman 2011:76). Punch (2006:52) confirms that in qualitative research methods the researcher is seen as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. So when I do my research project I benefit from the personal experience. I have been working as a District Governor, a senior bureaucrat in a district in Turkey. A qualitative approach will allow me to interpret this topic. Qualitative data collection instruments are interviews, focus groups, observation and written materials such as documents, reports, journals (Punch 2006:52). Yin (2009: 101) stresses that the sources of evidence that are used in doing case studies are: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, and participant-observation. In this study official statistics, books, journals, articles, scholar websites have been used as secondary data sources. I have used primary documents in conjunction with secondary literature.

## **1. LITERATURE REVIEW: ELITE, ELITISM AND CLASSICAL ELITE THEORIES**

Political equality is a desired yet unattainable phenomenon in modern societies. Regardless of the administrative and socio-cultural structure a group consisting of small numbers who are more privileged than others hold the power in all modern societies. Many social scientists and political scientists have endeavoured to study and research society and the distribution of power, the power structure and power relations in society. Here the terminology of ‘power’ is used in the sense of “the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others” (Wrong, 1995 cited in Domhoff 2005). The main two theories which endeavour to understand and explain this situation are: the class theory and the elite theory (Etzioni 1993:13, Bottomore 1993).

A very general definition would be that the class theory (fathered by Karl Marx) separates society into two classes in terms of economy which are the ruling class and the subject class. The class definition and distinguishing of the Marxist theory according to the use of economic resources and economic inequalities (Bottomore 1993:15). Elite theory separates the minority which holds the power and administers and the remaining society which is administered. The minority group which administers the community and takes

all the important decisions is the elite while the administered mass is non-elite (Bottomore 1993:1, Meisel 1962:33, Mosca 1939:50, Etzioni 1997:47). Elite theory endeavours to explain society in terms of the relations between elite and non-elite groups. Elite theory was not limited only to the study of the elites but also endeavoured to study the social political events in society. It was a search to find answers as to who had the power in society and who administered society or commissioned its administration.

### A. Classical Elite Theories

Field & Higley (2013:1) holds the view that extensive bodies of classical elite theory were written by Mosca, Pareto and Michels. ‘The Ruling Class’ of Gaetano Mosca, ‘The Mind and Society’ of Vilfredo Pareto and ‘Political Parties’ of Robert Michels are significant elite studies (Parry 1988 :30).

#### a. Mosca: The Ruling Class

Bachrach (1967: 10) recognises that Mosca is the first elitist scholar. In his Ruling Class theory it is always a small minority group which rules the rest of society. Therefore, there are always at least two classes existing in every society at any give time: the ruling class and the ruled class (Mosca 1939:50). According to Mosca the ruling class is always a minority and ‘*the few*’ rules ‘*the many*’ (Meisel 1962:33; Jary&Jary 1991: 188). Mosca gives much emphasis to the capacity of minority’s organizations. According to Mosca there are two explanatory reasons of the minority supremacy: well organized and unity of purpose (Bachrach 1967: 12). The minority group always has more privileges than the majority. A small group can be organized easier than a large group. Mosca asserts that (1939:50)

*“...the dominion of an organized minority obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority.”*

The elite always maintain their superiority because of their power, their organizational abilities, their political abilities and their personal qualities (Parry 1988:30-33). Meisel (1962:16) formulated in *three Cs* the necessary features of the elite are group consciousness, coherence and conspiracy. For Mosca (1939:50) all societies are divided into two groups; one of them governs and other is governed. The former group is always the minority (elites) which are well organized and united. All political and government affairs are executed by the minority, they always retain the power and enjoy the advantages of power. The later group is always the majority (non-elites) which are disorganized, ruled and controlled by the minority. From this perspective the public or the masses have no power

and no options; they have to acquiesce dominance of the elites (Arslan 2006:3). The public (majority) is ruled and directed to maximize the benefit of the elites through the medium of ‘manipulation and violence’ (Bachrach 1967: 12). In this vein according to Mosca, representative system, political equality, free elections, majority rule are myth and these things are very difficult to realise in society. The ruling minority have decisive control over social forces in society. The ruling elites always need a moral and legal basis to justify their power. Mosca (1939:71-72) refers to it as ‘Political formula’. According to Mosca, while the elites rule the masses, they should respect the moral and ethical values of every segment of society (Pandey 1989:134). He believes that these practices help the elite’s governing stability.

### **b. Pareto: Circulation of Elites**

Mosca’s elite concept is held by Pareto; there are always two groups that exist in society: minority or majority, the ruling class and the ruled class. Pareto divides society into two classes the lower stratum (non elite) and the superior stratum (elite) (Etzioni 1997:47). The most talented and successful people of each professional group create elites in society. The elites are divided into two groups: One group of elite have an important role in governing (the governing elite). They play a crucial role directly or indirectly in policy making process. The other group of elite is not in the government (the non governing elite) (Pareto 1976:51, Bottomore 1993:2). Pareto (1935:1573) states that “...the governing elite include those who play a significant part in government and political life, while the non-governing elite comprise the rest of the elite personnel, those who have no significant role in government and politics.”

According to Pareto the governing elite consist of the: military elite, religious elite, economic elite, intellectual elite and political elite. The last group is direct user of political power in the governing elite. The governing elite are subdivided into ‘foxes’ and ‘lions’ by Pareto. Smart and cunning foxes use intrigue, diplomacy and deviousness when they rule the masses; lions choose force in ruling for power, stability and validity (Powers 1987:41). Pareto believes that ideal elite consist of a balanced mix of foxes and lions.

Pareto (1976:55) argues that “The governing elite is in a state of continuous and slow transformation”. The elite and non elite are subject to change, particularly in the governing elite. Some significant non elites have access to the governing elite in contemporary societies. While they rise from lower class to governing class, they bring their own moral and ethical values. It is a necessity as social mobility. On the other hand some of the governing elite fall in to non elite masses. Pareto (1976:55) calls this situation ‘circulation of the elites’. If this circulation occurs slowly and in an orderly way, social cohesion is not destroyed. But if it happens suddenly and severely (or elite resist to circulation),

revolutions occur in societies (Pareto 1976:55). In his view, the cycle of rise and fall of the governing class is inevitable and necessary (Pareto 1976:55, Borkenau 1936:127). Economic, social and cultural changes lead to transformation of the elite in society. The elite class is renewed by people rising from lower stratum. This ineluctable process is expressed that 'History is a graveyard of aristocracies' by Pareto (1935:1430).

### **c. Michels: The Iron Law of Oligarchy**

Michels is another important representative of elitist theory. He observes and examines socialist-democratic parties, unions and their organisation structures in the Europe (Etzioni 1993:21). According to his research, there is a supremacy of the leader in political parties and it is ineluctable and irremovable (Etzioni 1993:22). The oligarchs dominate the rest of the masses. He explains the reason for this division of labour and specialization in his words: 'psychology of organization itself' (Michels 1959:401). According to him the ruler and the ruled exist in each organisation in society. In Michels's view the oligarchs (elite) rule the rest of the membership (masses) in the organization (Etzioni 1993:22). Michels (1959:377) describe the 'iron law of oligarchy'. All organizations are ruled by a minority leader group which is intelligent and expert. "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels 1959:401). In this vain, inherently administration and organisation self-governance is impossible. Democracy is not majority rule and self-governance, but it is competition between oligarchies (political parties).

### **d. Wright Mills: The Power Elite**

After the Second World War elite theory was applied to the USA by C. Wright Mills. According to him society is directed and manipulated by political, military and economic elites. Their power arises from their strategic positions in institutions (Etzioni 1993:22). In their study of the elite phenomenon elite theoreticians used different methodological approaches. Mosca and Michels emphasized the importance of organization with the organizational approach (Parry 1988:35); while Pareto approached the issue from a psychological approach. Mills underlined the complex relations between elites and used the institutional approach by underlining the strategic and hierarchic phenomenon of 'us' established among the elites. According to Mills power is institutionalized in modern society and the elite is 'the institutional landscape' of the society (Parry 1988:52).

Instead of 'the ruling class' Mills has used the concept of 'the power elite'. Power is the most significant point of Mills' analysis. According to the Marxist outlook power is held by those who are the strongest in terms of economy to form the 'ruling class', according to the liberal outlook power is held by the politicians 'political elite' while others claim that power is held by the military (warlords) (Mills 1959:277, Bottomore 1993:22). According to Mills all these definitions are not adequate to explain the situation. According to him the best way to understand and explain the goings on at the top of society is 'the power elite' (Mills 1959:277). According to Mills "Power in modern American society is not attribute of classes or person but of institutions" (Parry 1988:53). The concept of the power elite not only indicates the important organizations of society but the relationships of those who are in charge of these organizations (Bottomore 1993:23).

The power elite is composed of political, economic and military men (Mills 1959:276). According to Mills this power elite consists of people who hold strategic positions in the community. As a result of studies made in the USA the power elite of this country is collected in three groups. The first group consists of political leaders and high level bureaucrats, the second group consists of proprietors of large companies and high level administrators and the third group consists of high level commanders (Hewitt 1974:47). All important decisions involving the country are taken as a result of the complicated coalition established by these elites from the political, economic and military areas. The Power elite involve mutual cooperation, solidarity and complex relations. These elites live in the same neighbourhood, go to the same clubs, are members of the same associations and interact in the same social activities (Mills 1959:287).

Elite theory emphasizes the fact that power is not distributed equally which divides the community into the elite and the administered masses. This theory could help explain social events in many countries. Furthermore, 'the power elite' concept which consists of a group which has complex relationships within itself, with a group awareness and sense of belonging, which lives an introverted social life, which prioritizes the continuation of the status quo, which is privileged and well to do compared to the others, has a homogenous structure and which has no opponent appears to be explanatory in terms of how the power relations operate in Turkey as well as the operation of the social structure and how the country is administered.

In addition the power elite concept presents some very valuable clues to understanding and comprehending the past as well as the present social, political, economic and cultural problems of the Turkish community. These power elites which have a rather influential position in the power structure of the Turkish society can be determined as political elites, bureaucratic elites and economic elites. The political elites consist of leader cadres of influential political parties in Turkey and influential politicians. Economic elites consist of the owners of companies which are significant for the Turkish economy and their high level executives. Bureaucratic elites-the focal point of this study- are high level offices deputized in the state administration, the high level members of the judiciary which occupy the most important positions in the power of justice and the high level commanders in the armed forces.

### **e. Bureaucratic Elite Concept**

Weber recommended bureaucracy as the ideal organization model for the modern society of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In Weber's definition of bureaucracy it is rational and legal; pre-determined rational legal orders and rules have replaced traditions (Weber 1964:329-332). Rules and regulations, hierarchy, division of labour and expertise, impersonality and standardization are the primary characteristics of bureaucracy (Gerth& Mills 1946:196-198, Beetham 1996:9). Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is managed by an objective structure which is due to its impersonal characteristic. (Weber 2006:6, Heper 1985:192). Weber's ideal/rational and legal type of bureaucracy is the product of the rational perspective generated by the enterprising class of social change in 19<sup>th</sup> century Western Europe. According to this perspective the bureaucracy in a modern state is not the organizations which makes political decisions but the organization which enforces the taken decisions. A look at this definition will not mean much when the words *bureaucrat* and *elite* come together. However, in communities which come from a patrimonial tradition, where central state organization is strong, where the enterprising class has not reached its potential, where it is believed that they are tasked with ensuring the continuity of the state, in communities in which it is not the entity which enforces political decisions but is active in the political decision making process itself, in communities in which elite are tasked with steering the community the words bureaucracy and elite have meaning when they are together.

According to some philosophers the world has become a bureaucracy, according to them bureaucratic elites can grow immensely and become the power which endangers democracy (Page and Wright 1999: 2). Weber described this state as the passivation of democracy (Gerth& Mills 1998:224-227).

In that case the definition of *bureaucratic elite* can be made as follows; a high level group of state employees which have the authority to use the will derived from the power of the state, having the knowledge and technical expertise and the will to control the community/state/economy with an 'elitist' approach by obstructing democratic processes and who have an influential role in the political decision making process. In this aspect the bureaucratic elites are not limited to being regular public employees which are involved in administrative affairs but a privileged group which holds the authority to regulate the political area (Suleiman 1984:4).

In the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition, bureaucracy is perceived as a power group that always endeavours to maintain its power in the political and social system, desires the sustainability of its status, which is perceived as the protector of the state and steers the community. For this reason bureaucracy in the Turkish community is not the kind which implements the decisions taken by political power but which partakes in their making. While Weber's rational legal bureaucracy applies are not decision makers but implementers the bureaucrats in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition are decision makers (Heper 1985:55). Particularly in the Reforms period when modern bureaucracy was born bureaucracy was the organization which made political decisions rather than implemented them. If expressed in Weberian terminology these bureaucrats were more oriented towards *substantive rationality* and less so on *instrumental rationality* (Heper 1985: 161). The more bureaucratic elites start to see themselves as the single authority in key issues such as public benefits, state security, the higher interests of the state which are vague in terms of content as well as limits into practice they are distanced from being a regular bureaucrat who is a representative of rationality in the Weberian understanding.

Bureaucratic elites such as those in Turkey example and (particularly if they come from a long line of paternalist management tradition) view themselves as protectors of the status quo, responsible for ensuring the continuity of the state and as the deputized class to steer the community (Chapman 1959:274).

The concept of the bureaucratic elite has been used in this study to portray the governing elite group consisting of high level cadres of civil bureaucracy and military bureaucracy. This was generated by the administrative structure of the Ottoman which bequeathed its political culture and state tradition to the new Republic of Turkey. A significant characteristics of Ottoman administration was the fact that the military and administration organizations were intertwined. The military command and public administration were executed under the orders of the same person (Ozdemir 2006:54). Scholars and historians define the ottoman community as two different classes: "The first one, called askeri, literally the 'military', included those to whom the Sultan had delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely officers of the court and the

army, civil servants, and Ulema [Doctors of Islamic law]. The second included the reaya, comprising of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects” (Inalcik 1964:44). It is evident that the military were used to cover all the administrative elite other than the Sultan. Since the Ottoman administrative structure was such that it was impossible to separate the civil and military bureaucracy clearly from one another and because the founding elites of the new Turkey consisted of military civil bureaucrats the concept of bureaucratic elite has been used to indicate administrative elites originating from civil and military organizations in this study.

This study, which portrays Turkey as an example the concept of bureaucracy, defines a formation of power in which the state is embodied, where the concept of the bureaucratic elite is the owner and protector of the state, which views citizens as a mass to be administered, the roots go way back to the period of reforms of the ottoman times where modern bureaucracy started to formulate and civilian and military statesmen who are directly or indirectly the owners of power and authority occupy high level positions in the state administration rather than an organization model. In the forthcoming parts of the study the historical development process and formation of Turkish state tradition, the structure of Turkish bureaucratic elites and their roles in the Turkish community will be studied.

## **1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH SOCIETY: MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITE**

In this section the social structure of the heritage of the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, its form of administration, political culture, bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic elites will be studied. Due to the fact that not enough scientific research has been carried out regarding the Ottoman state and administration system the thresholds and dates during the transition process from traditional administrative structure to modern bureaucracy may be less than clear-cut (Findley 1980:7, Weiker 1968:458). This structural transformation and institutionalization has developed gradually over a long timeline. Due to the limitation of space here it has been possible only to summarize the most important points.

### **A. The Classical Age of the Ottoman Empire**

*“The Ottoman Empire immediate predecessor of present day Turkey came to an end in 1928, after an uninterrupted sovereign existence of more than six centuries (1299-1918). In the course of the first three centuries of its existence it became the world’s most powerful country by gradually expanding from a small dominion in western Anatolia to the three known continents-Europe, Asia and Africa- through a highly efficient and tightly interwoven civil and military organization” Karpaz (1959:3)*

In the Ottoman Empire the ‘*Sultan*’ was the impersonation of the state as well as the proprietor of primarily land and all resources as well as the head of

enforcement (Karpas 2001:315, Tachau 1984:59). Yet this did not mean that the Sultan had unlimited absolute power. The State was administered by the Sultan and bureaucracy within an Islamic framework of rules with which they could limit each other in a balanced structure (Findley 1980: 8, Karpas 2001:315). A look at the Ottoman society – with a distinction similar to the elitist intellectuals - it is evident that there was a dual structure consisting of an executive class which dealt with administration affairs and served the Sultan and the people (masses) which produced, served in the military, paid taxes and ensures revenue to the state but which was not included in the administration (Inalcik 1964:44, Narli 2000:8). Zürcher (2007:11) state that :

*“According to the Ottoman ideology, society in the empire was organized around a – theoretically strict- distinction between a ruling elite and the mass of the population. The ruling elite consisted of all servants of the Sultan (the military, the clerks ‘katip’ and the royal household) and religious scholar ‘ulema’.”*

Due to the fact that the bureaucracy possessed characteristics such as being overly active in political matters as well as independent and accordingly high level bureaucrats were not involved only with administrative duty areas but were involved in the policy making structure which made them important actors the Ottoman Empire can be defined as a ‘historical bureaucratic empire’ (Durgun&Yayman 2005:93).

Before the periods of decline and dissolution in the classic period when the empire was strong the system of ‘Kul’ (servant of the sultan) as the source of military and civil bureaucracy was established in the Ottoman state system (Heper 1974:38, Tezel 2010:12, Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). The training of bureaucrats who would take their place in the *Kul* system of managing the state was done with the method of ‘*devshirmeh*’ (Barkey 1994:31, Mardin 1973:171, Weiker 1968:458). The *Devshirmeh* method consisted of selecting intelligent and talented Christian children from an early age and having them educated at the ‘*Enderrun*’ (palace school of the empire) and those who graduated were settled into state administration duty (Kunt 1974:234, Tachau 1984:60, Basgoz 1973:204, Tezel 2010:12). The bureaucracy group which was established this way did not have any relations and ties in society which was why they could devote their lives to serving the Sultan. In other words the bureaucrats of the Ottoman period were not elected by the people which segregated them from the community (Weiker 1968:458). Even if people were literate and wanted to serve the state with loyalty it was not possible for them to enter the echelons of bureaucracy (Weiker 1968:458). The reason for this was that, the Sultan did not want strong families occurring within the bureaucracy. This institutional structure which purports the gap between the bureaucratic elite and the people in Turkish state tradition Mardin (1973:172) is considered the border which determines the separation between the centre and the periphery.

Mardin (1973: 171-175) adapted the centre-periphery relationship analysis which Edward Shils (1975: 5-11) had developed to analyze the structure of society into a ruling-ruled relationship for Turkish society and political culture. The Centre indicates the values and judgments which are the values establishing the essence/disposition of the state – central value system and political central bureaucracy. The periphery is a social area and system of values which is outside the centre. During the classic period the Centre of the Ottoman society consisted of bureaucratic elites which were privileged, did not pay taxes, were cultured, educated, intellectual as a result of the *Kul* system while the periphery paid taxes, were uneducated, villagers who tilled the land and had no say so in administration. In the Classic period there was a symbolical separation between the periphery and the centre in terms of a political and values system which was not problematic because there was a consensus in fundamental values and judgments. However this situation changed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century when administrative, financial, military problems emerged in the empire. The bureaucrats who had gained power politically in the centre endeavored to redesign the state and society with modernizing reforms which they considered way to prevent collapse. While they were doing this they adopted a western positivist values system which was contrary to the values system of the periphery which was based on the Islam religion. As a result a separation over values was established between the centre and the periphery which was beyond symbolic (Mardin 1973:175). This separation continued into the new Republic of Turkey. While centres and peripheries are harmonized in western countries (Shils 1975: 93) the affairs between the centre and the periphery have been an area of separation and tension in Turkish society.

The administration system started to deteriorate in the 17<sup>th</sup> century due to internal and external factors; in this process the bureaucratic elite turned into a patrimonial structure (Mardin 2000:122, Heper 1974:63, Chambers 1964:303). Furthermore a sense of ‘us’ had developed among the bureaucrats and they started to take precautions to ensure that their elitist structure was nepotistic (Chambers 1964:303).

It would be incorrect to say that the *Kul*system of the classic period Ottoman administration was a modern bureaucracy because the bureaucrats were not serving the people who were loyal to the state but informed and educated servants to the Sultan who obeyed him unconditionally. These bureaucratic minions who were faultless in their obedience and loyalty to the Sultan were the shadows of the Sultan’s power among the people and held privileged positions (Heper 1985:110-111, Durgun&Yayman 2005:94).

In the course of time the high level bureaucrats were gradually and steadily transformed from the loyal servants of the ruler into statesmen who the ruler had to please, who refrained from confronting them, who considered it their right to take important decisions on behalf of the state and society and who did not feel

the need to be approved by the people (Heper 1985:115). Over time the servants of the Sultan who lived a privileged life detached from the people had transformed into an independent power centre consisting of bureaucratic elites (Zurcher 2007:12-13). By the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Ottoman state was administered and society was steered by an elite group consisting of military, religious, civil bureaucrats (Heper 1974:60).

## **B. The Stagnation Period and Emergence of Modern Ottoman Reforms**

For these emerging bureaucratic elites neither the Sultan nor the people were important, it was more vital to protect their own power and ensure the continuation of the system (Heper 1985:116). As indicated by Mardin (1973:175) during the recession period of the empire the bureaucrats had started to give signals regarding the establishment of their own competency areas against the Sultan as well as the implementation of a 'eastern style despotism' on the community. When the state system was engulfed in corruption the public servants relied on their power and recognized no rules and started to persecute society (Shaw 1971:4).

By this time the ideology of the bureaucratic elites had transformed from loyalty to the Sultan to loyalty to the state which was the sole reason for their existence (Karpas 1972:87). Their mission had become to restore order and protect the holy state against both the Sultan and society (the periphery which was in the process of initiating its own autonomous structure when the centre weakened) (Heper 1985:128). This was so pronounced that when the occasion arose they deposed the Sultan who was the continuity of the state. In future terms this tradition established the infrastructure for the idea of coups which is one of the incurable sicknesses of the political life of the Turkish Republic.

The bureaucrats of the Ottoman empire were always strong and solid in their positions, the reform efforts of weak Sultans who succeeded to the throne were central which was always in their favor ( Weiker 1968:456). The basic characteristic of a centralized state is a strong bureaucracy which has expertise and is large and high skilled (Ortaylı 2002: 123). Weiker (1968:456) explains this situation as follows; "Bureaucrats tended to be reformers, because reform furthered centralization, which increased the strength of the bureaucracy." As a result of the efforts to strengthen the central administration which started with Mahmut the IInd centralization had increased but this power had not passed onto the ruler but to the bureaucrats who advocated the realization of the reforms (Mardin 2000: 110). The developments which took place at that time have been indicated by the western historian Rosen (cited in Mardin 2000:110) as follows. "The status of servant of the government changed from that of slaves to the Sultan to that of servants of the states".

A study of the reasons for the crises of the Ottoman Empire has underlined two reasons. Firstly, the deterioration in the state administration and secondly the military supremacy of the west (Mardin 1994: 10). The most painful results of the crises was the loss of territory which caused a great depression and psychological breakdown the likes of which had never been encountered since the establishment of the Ottoman empire. Losses of territory in addition to the already existing administrative and financial problems of the empire was perceived as a sign of the path to perdition and the bureaucrats started to take precautions rapidly to prevent this ( Mardin 2000: 142-143). The driving force of the reform process started and executed by the bureaucratic elites was to prevent this bad ending. The deterioration of the economic and administrative structure due to internal and external reasons as of the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century increased the modernization initiatives. The military supremacy of the west was perceived as the reason for the loss of territory so the first reforms were executed in the military area (Lewis 2002:38-39). However when the recession continued it was believed that reform in the military area was not sufficient and reforms started in all areas of government.

The modernization of the Ottomans was actually a project to save the state and this project involved the bureaucratic elites that it did in society (Mardin1973:179). During the reform period of the Ottomans the bureaucrats were the only group who prepared and executed reforms ( Weiker 1968:457). While the state was reformed, in terms of administration and military aspects, the bureaucratic elites thought that it was necessary for society to change as well in order to solve the problems and they incepted on an adventure of also reforming the society. During this adventure which would last for long years, the wishes of the community and the bureaucratic elites were never in synch. Here we are faced with a critical question which is: why the reforming bureaucrat elites who were managing the reform process did not undertake reform of their own structures (of course some structural and cosmetic changes did take place). According to Weiker (1968:457) the answer is as follows : as bureaucratic elites obtained dominance and power they became conservative and it became more important for them to conserve and maintain their positions. In fact the bureaucratic elite had conflicts with elites such as the '*ulema*' (men of religion) who felt that the deliverance of the empire lay elsewhere and criticized the reforms for losing their influence with the new regulations, the '*ayan*' (notables, provincial magnates) and sometimes even the Sultan and fortified with their knowledge and experiences they came out of these conflicts stronger than ever and were able to maintain their existence. (Mardin 2000:146-149, Heper 1985:139).

### **C. The Period of Modern Reform: the Tanzimat and the Emergence of Modern Bureaucracy**

The word Tanzimat means reorganization in Turkish and it is used to indicate a period (1839-1878) in Turkish history when the Ottoman Empire was influenced by many political and social reforms from the west. (Mardin 2000:3). The

great transition in the Ottoman Empire started in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the major role in the reforms were undertaken by the bureaucratic elite (Mardin 2000:139). While the bureaucratic elites were busy modernizing the state they never forsook their instinctive protection of their own powers and privileges.

The Tanzimat period started with the *Hatt-ı Hümayun of Gulhane* (rescript of Gulhane) which has a semi-constitutional quality. The sultan believed that the rescript which drafted by bureaucrats was for the prevention of collapse and signed it. According to Heper (1985:153) this declaration has more to do with the bureaucrats protecting themselves against the arbitrary behavior of the Sultan than executing reforms in the state. The reason for this is that the lives of the bureaucrats working in the ‘*kul*’ system and everything they had could be taken away with the order of the ruler which is why they felt the need to establish an institutional structure where they would feel safe (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). The reason why the institutionalization initiatives of bureaucracy during the Tanzimat period were promoted as reforms was to obtain a more autonomous and safeguarded structure against the Sultan.

The Tanzimat period had limited the authorities of the Sultan and many public offices had been opened, public service had become a profession and enabled the strengthening of the central structure (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94, Lewis 2002:89). A review of the relationship between the administrator and society in the classic period Ottoman times shows that the Sultan was the single representative of power while the rest of people were ruled over (Zurcher 2007:12-13). During the Tanzimat period the kulbureaucracy, which was absolutely devoted to the ruler, had been replaced by a central bureaucracy which faced the ruler with a certain measure of security. “The administrative and political reforms of the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876) preserved the Sultan’s superior position, while giving the policy-making authority to the bureaucrats.” (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). During this period the administrative organs which were available in the administration system of the classic Ottoman period were transformed into ministries available in western European countries and as a result the need for the knowledge and technical expertise of the bureaucrats increased. For this reason it became a valuable commodity to be a bureaucrat and as a result the centre of power moved indirectly from the Sultan to the bureaucratic elites (Lewis 2002:96). In his memoirs European observer Frederick Millingen (cited in Mardin 2000: 112) depicts the bureaucratic elites which were institutionalized during the Tanzimat period as follows: ‘They are a strong power group which dominates all organs by turning their supremacy in administrative issues, their knowledge and technical expertise into an advantage. They use their unlimited authorities in politics as they do in all areas of life. Governors, ambassadors, ministers emerge from among these strong bureaucratic elites.’

The bureaucratic elites of the Tanzimat period perceived that the only way to resolve the existing problems was to structure the community (bureaucratic domination over society) (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94). This elite group perceived the community as a mass which must be steered and structured. This is why the modernization movement came from the top. The bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period had become the representatives of an authoritarian administration and this evolution continued in subsequent periods; power and the authority to administer the community was always gathered in the hands of the few and never passed to the people (Tezel 2010:64, Mardin 2000, Lewis 2002).

According to Lewis (2002:65-73) Turkish society had two choices in the 19<sup>th</sup> century either modernize or perish. The bureaucratic elites who were the driving forces of these reforms prepared and executed this reform movement which was mandatory yet never forgot to protect their own sovereignty and their desire to dominate society. With these desires the pro-Tanzimat transformed the state and society and undersigned many failures in the process. However, in spite of this, the Tanzimat period is perceived as a success because the activities of the bureaucrats laid the foundations for subsequent reforms (Lewis 2002:126-128). Findley advocates a similar view and purports this process is very significant by perceiving that the modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire did not only shape the Ottoman and Turkish state but the administration tradition of the whole Islamic world as well. Excluding Russian, one of the few non-western societies which carried out modernization and westernization efforts in the 19<sup>th</sup> century which was the age of empires was the Ottoman Turkish society (Findley 1980: 3-4).

#### **D. Legacy of the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic**

With the Tanzimat period, the servants of the Sultan who had been devoted to the Sultan and implemented his decisions and policies without questioning during the classic period achieved the status of public servants who served the state as well as an institutional structure (Durgun&Yayman 2005:94,). The bureaucratic cadre perceived the modernization of the state and society as a solution to the decline and dispersion of the state they served. This had two significant results. Firstly the institutionalized bureaucracy within the state gathered power and took the centre of power from the Sultan to the bureaucracy. Secondly the existing gap between society and the elites deepened as a result of the modernization for which there was no demand as well as no infrastructure in the community and the tension between the centre -periphery increased.

After the Tanzimat period the power conflict did not take place between the centre and the periphery but among the bureaucrats themselves (Heper 1985:126-127, Tezel 2010:64). While the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat were endeavoring to modernize and westernize the state to prevent its collapse in an authoritative

manner, another elite group which did not approve of this trend emerged. This formation called *The Young Ottomans* (Mardin 2000:10) consisted of intellectual state officers who were officers in the bureaucracy yet not elite and who were in search of a solution to prevent the dispersion of the state. *The Young Ottomans* had criticized the Tanzimat bureaucrats because they could not fully perceive modernization and viewed westernization as merely a superficial emulation of western habits such as style of dress and lifestyle (Mardin 2000:151). In their opinion the salvation of the Ottoman was embedded in their past and values (Mardin 2000:133). These ideas of *The Young Ottomans* were also supported by the *ulema* (men of religion) and the military who were uncomfortable with the regulations executed in the name of westernization (Mardin 2000:140-150).

At time the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat who believed they were the sole people to re-establish the splendor of the former Ottomans faded away and when most of the bureaucratic elite of the Tanzimat had passed away a new idealist bureaucratic elite which was nurtured by the ideas of *The Young Ottomans: The JeunesTurc* (The Young Turks) (Rustow 1959:516).

As a result of the struggles of *The Young Ottomans* and *The JeunesTurc* the empire was ruled with a constitutional monarchy. *the JeunesTurcs* who had been educated in secular schools and who had adopted western ideas were not involved only in state departments and the military during 1909-1918, they also became a dominant political group after establishing a political party called *The Committee of Union and Progress* (CUP, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) (Lewis 2002:198, Heper 1985:160-162 Rustow 1959:516). During the administration of this group the empire entered the First World War. The significance of the *JeuneTurc* in terms of recent history is that the founders of the Republic emerged from among these elites. Although there may have been social, political and ideological differences between the bureaucratic elite which transformed during the 19<sup>th</sup> century their common and sole target was to 'save the state'. This bureaucratic elitist structure was inherited by the Turkish Republic along with the political culture and administrative tradition of the Ottomans.

## 2. NEW TURKISH REPUBLIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITES

During the Tanzimat period the bureaucratic elites, which were detached from the people who they considered masses, had to be administered and had become institutionalized and gained in power. These civil military bureaucratic elites which administered the empire during the First World War became the founding elite of the new Republic of Turkey which emerged from the debris of the collapsed empire. The Ottoman did not only leave the new Republic of Turkey with a strong and central bureaucracy and a patrimonial state tradition but also an elitist bureaucratic cadre which used this structure like a power tool and which did not want to relinquish the power it held (Lewis 2002:463).

## A. Bureaucratic Elites (Civilian and Military) in the Early Period of the Turkish Republic

The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, inherited a strong, centralized, and highly bureaucratic state from the Ottoman Empire (Özbudun 1996, Durgun&Yayman 2005:95). Zürcher (2010:141) states that ‘the republic created out of the ruins of Ottoman Anatolia in October 1923 was, of course, legally and formally a new state’.

It was time for the bureaucratic elite which had become a power center and which used the modernization and westernization of the traditional empire as their justification to act on behalf of forming a modern nation state (Lewis 2002:485). This forming started with radical revolutions to change the social structure and culture (such as clothing, alphabet, calendar reforms).

According to Heper (1985:40) the Ottomans had left the new republic a legacy consisting of bureaucratic elite which believed itself to be the founder and protector of the state and had adopted the mission of elevating society to a civilized level and considered itself competent to decide on behalf of society. In addition Ottomans had left masses consisting mainly of uneducated peasants with no desire to modernize, unprepared to become a civilized society. The two elements which comprise this socio-cultural structure establishing the infrastructure of Turkish state tradition are the transcendent state and a weak society. Sozen& Shaw (2003:112) explain the transcendent state structure in the Turkish state tradition as follows: “the patrimonial and centralized nature of the political culture, coupled with the absence or weakness of any civil society, produced a relationship between the state (the ruler) and society (the ruled) resembling that of father with son. In folklore, *Devlet Baba* meant *Papa State*.”

According to this strong patrimonial state tradition which is a determinant element of Turkish political culture “*father state*, an institution that guarantees the livelihood of the broad strata of the population” (Onis& Webb 1994:135 ). Tachau (1984:59) describes this as “A strong tradition of the state also prevailed among the Turks, surviving folk expressions as the father state with the people cast in the role of children.” The sovereignty of a military civilian bureaucracy which is the founder and protector of the state and its dominance over the people is inevitable in a society that reveres the state to this degree.

In the early days of the republic the bureaucratic elites consisting of civilian and military who were the sole owners of the power had two basic tasks: the first one was to continue with the modernization and westernization activities which had started during the final throes of the Ottoman era and which had been interrupted due to the war. And the second was to pioneer a development program which was necessary to reach a modern civilization level (Zürcher 2010:136).

Modernization and westernization was a sacred duty for the bureaucratic elites from the past while the second task was something they had not undertaken previously. Accordingly the economic development in Turkey which had missed the industrial revolution and had no bourgeoisie in the western sense, would have to be state-assisted. For this purpose Atatürk convened the Izmir Economy Congress in 1923 to establish an economy and development program road map for the state and the following decisions were made: the private sector would be supported, national banks would be established to provide incentive credits to investors (Turan 1984:110, Finefrock 1981:381). However the economic crisis in 1929 unsettled the faith in liberalism and a 'Statist economy' policy was adopted (Hale 1984:154, Lewis 2002:281-285). According to statism, economic development project would be controlled by the state and industrial development would be executed by the government in a planned manner (Shaw & Shaw 2002:388-391). The bureaucratic elites were very enthusiastic in terms of this development model for two reasons. Firstly the statist economy model empowered the central bureaucracy even further and the authoritarian, bureaucratic and paternalistic state approach would continue for a while longer (Lewis 2002:466-471). The second reason was that they were concerned that sooner or later a liberal development model would promulgate a middle class and bourgeoisie which could become an elite group to challenge them and in time their power could diminish and they could evolve into a political opposition.

The bureaucratic elites were in a dilemma; on one hand they wanted to establish a modern nation state with western values while on the other they viewed the economic elites and political actors to be promulgated by the middle and bourgeois class which are the elements of modern society as their competitors and were concerned that their power would weaken. During the statist economy period, when the bureaucracy was dominant and the decision maker, these concerns were replaced with the significant and joyous results achieved in industry and development. Furthermore this period promulgated a social result which was much more important than the economic results : this was the emergence of *the Turkish middle class* consisting of business, managers and technicians which did not exist before and which is a requirement in becoming a modern western nation state and which would promulgate the local bourgeoisie in subsequent years ( Lewis 2002:472-474).

Atatürk who was the first president of the new state deemed that the basic task of the republican state was to elevate the people to a modern level of civilization. (Heper 1985:51, Lewis 2002:292). The activities for the transformation and modernization of society which started in the Tanzimat period would be continued by the new republican state which meant the bureaucratic elites. According to Atatürk who believed the people were easily misguided it was the business of the elite to ensure that the people were modernized and reached a modern level of civilization. According to Zürcher (2010:136) during the early years of the

Republic “the terms to make society ‘modern’ and ‘civilized’ were used as synonyms referring to Contemporary European civilization”.

During the first years of the establishment of the nation state there was no will nor capacity in the community to achieve a modern level of civilization. For this reason the reforms had to be implemented from above (Heper 1985:50-51). Since the people were easily misguided it was up to the national will to enlighten them and leave their civilization to the elites. According to Ataturk a society could modernize and become civilized but the elites should play an accelerating role in this process (Heper 1985:52). Ataturk who himself was a soldier and who had been affected by the long period of wars preferred military elite to civilian elites, trusted them more and held them sacrosanct.

### **B. 1923-1945 Single Party Era**

The legacy to a nation state which was struggling to establish itself after 600 years of ruling as an empire consisting of centralization, bureaucracy, patrimony and theocracy was an uneducated society of peasants which had not achieved a level of modern civilization nor had they participated in administration. According to Zürcher (2010:213) 10 percent of the population was literate when the republic was established. After a long period of war (Balkan Wars, First World War, Liberation War) and numerous social traumas the elites believed that this overwhelmed community could easily be misled and that the elites were competent to decide what was good for the community and they focused on targets which would ensure national integrity, economic progress and political modernization. The final target was to establish a modern nation state with western values and steer the community in this direction (Zürcher 2010:136,232). During this period the foundations of the new republic were laid and the political and social structures were molded by the state and westernization rather than modernization was prominent. The main characteristics to achieve the mentioned targets were statism, authoritarianism, command democracy, secularism, nation building. The single-party system which was implemented in the Republic of Turkey during 1923-1945 when the state and party were embedded emerged as a result of this whole socio-political pattern.

During the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey and the period of institutionalization the only party was the Republican People’s Party (RPP) which was established by Ataturk in 1923 (Zürcher 2010:222). Although RPP was separate from the state there was a central power which designed the bureaucracy (Turan 1984:110) and bureaucratic elites identified with RPP (Ross & Ross 1971:32). According to Frey (1965:304) RPP was a mechanism for social control from above; it was policy implementing rather than policy formulating by a quasi-official party organization. In this period RPP underwent a unification/identification with the state and became a state party (Frey 1965:233, Zürcher

2010:180). The Minister of the Interior and the secretary general of the party was same person, the governor was chairman of the provincial party organization after 1935 (Lewis 2002:381).

In 1945-1950 periods; the pro-liberal middle class which emerged with the application of a statist economy and the local bourgeoisie which emerged from this class became a driving force for the advocacy of liberal policies and democratization in the areas of economy and politics (Dodd 1990:8, Shaw & Shaw 2002:402, Frey 1965: 348). For the first time this group had found the courage and cognizance to query the bureaucratic elites and established an opposing structure which considered central bureaucracy and statism as an obstacle to development and progress. The demand of this group to pass into a multi-party application was also approved by the current President Inonu (Dodd 1990:8). With the start of the liberalization wave after the Second World War in the external world and as a result of the onset of democracy in Turkey when the west was used as example a transition into the multi-party system incurred and the first elections were held in 1946.

#### **A. 1945-1960 Multi Party Era and the First Step Towards Democracy**

Regardless of the fact that multi-party phase had been authorized, the single-party period continued in practice until the elections of 1950. In the 1950 elections the reaction of the people against the bureaucratic elites which had been ongoing for years accelerated a political development against the elite and the representative of this movement which was the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections with a landslide (DP won 86,2 % of 487 GNA seats) and Turkey's adventure into democracy started (Shaw & Shaw 2002:403-405). This election was a turning point for Turkish political life and social analysis. For the first time with this right which was recognized to the periphery the passive masses had achieved the opportunity to access the center and were able to assert their reaction in terms of the reforms of the elitist center which were promulgated from the top (Dodd 1990:8). In this context the contribution of the emergence of the middle class and local bourgeoisie in establishing a social awareness is vital. The masses which had been shaped with the 'for the people in spite of the people' understanding wanted to see and have the party of the periphery which they had elected in power instead of the bureaucratic elites which applied this understanding. According to Frey (1965: 349) at the end of this process '*alternative elite had developed*'. With the transmission into multi-party life a new elite group consisting of merchants from the middle class and periphery and which was supported by the people started to take shape (Karpas 1959:316).

After 1950 the bureaucratic elites were obliged to relinquish the political power which had been granted by the votes of the people and work under their orders. The DP and its leading cadre opposed elitism were concerned about the

hegemony of the bureaucratic elites and wanted them to be mechanical bureaucrats who implemented their decisions. They advocated pro-liberal policies against statism and prioritized private property and private enterprise. They prioritized the values and judgments of the masses who voted for them instead of top-down reforms. They endeavored to replace a positivist and secular central values system with a conservative and religious social values system. During this period the periphery was able to access the center for the first time. With these characteristics the DP was based on the nation instead of the state and shaping the administration of the state according to the nation was a situation which fundamentally upset the ideology that the bureaucratic elites had been endeavoring to implement for years. The DP, the party of the local bourgeoisie, the middle class and the peasants had started to change the gains of the republic which had taken years to achieve as well as the established regime. The bureaucratic elites were very much disturbed with this (Dodd 1990:10). According to them protecting the reforms which had been implemented from top-down '*for the people in spite of the people*' and protecting the regime were more important than the establishment of democracy and this trend had to be stopped.

In addition to this discontent, as a result of the critical mistakes the DP (which was just learning politics and democracy) made and the poor management of this transition period the bureaucratic elites were subjected to a coup when the army (which is defined as the vigorous forces) seized the administration in 1960. After the coup Prime Minister Menderes and two ministers stood trial and hanged by military court. These elites are the continuation of the historical bureaucratic elites who wanted to establish a society based on modern western values (Shaw & Shaw 2002:414). With the coup in 1960 the bureaucratic elites regained their strength and with the constitutional law they prepared they eliminated the parliament from being the single organ where the sovereignty of the nation was manifested and organized the administration of the state between the representatives elected by the people and bureaucratic elites and put this application under the protection of the constitution. This constitutional law gave the bureaucratic elites constitutional legality and supremacy.

## **B. 1960 Coup d'état and Status of the Turkish Military**

The Ottomans established their empire under challenging conditions and volatile foundations in Anatolia which is an intercontinental crossroads of world trade routes and religions. This required a bureaucratic state with a central structure and a strong army to be dominant in this geographical area. According to Lybyer (1913:90) "the Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else...". The army has always undertaken significant roles in Turkish society which is dominated by this political culture and state tradition; it has held a privilege and decisive position within the state and society. (Heper&Güney 1996:619-620). This political culture has also been reflected in the Republic of

Turkey and the high level commanders have become inevitable members of the Turkish bureaucratic elite. Narli (2000:108) states that:

*“Ottoman society was divided into two categories: the sultan, the military and the ulemaat, the top and subjects (reaya) comprising a large proportion of peasants at the bottom. The civil and military bureaucracies acted as intermediaries between the two classes. This political organisation and culture survived under the Turkish republic, and the position of the bureaucratic military elite at the higher echelon remained very important.”*

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire the land losses of the state were attributed to the military superiority of the west and during the terms of *Sultan Selim the 3rd* and *Mahmud the 2nd* the army was subjected to reforms. Another reason behind the reforms was to subordinate the army to the political authority (Heper&Güney 1996:619). The Ottomans started the modernization movement in the army and then proceeded to modernize all the organizations of the state. During this period the army was the subject of modernization and westernization and was transformed into an agent which shaped society and played a significant role in the establishment of the new republic after the war (Heper 2005:34). According to Jenkins (2001:8) instead of dissipating with the transition into a new republic and a parliamentary system the role of the army in the area of politics increased in Turkish society.

Ataturk relied more on military bureaucrats than civil bureaucrats in the new republic. He did not want the army involved in politics yet he considered the army worthy of guarding the regime. (Ahmad 1969: 48-50, Lerner & Robinson 1960:22). In civilian military relations Ataturk intended that the army would be a supra-political organization which was loyal to the regime (Harris 1965:56). In this case the army would not intervene in the political sphere as long as the regime was not threatened but would be make its presence felt in the background at all times.

From the establishment of the Republic to the coup in 1960 civil bureaucratic elites were prominent among the bureaucratic elites. They had executed the modernization and westernization reforms and their golden age of power was during the single party term. The military bureaucratic elite which supported and gave their patronage to the reform movements executed by the civil bureaucrat elites did not assert themselves in the political sphere until the 1950's (Jenkins 2001:8).

However the implementations of the DP which threatened the regime were perceived as threats by the army which considered itself to be the guard of the state and regime (Zurcher 2007:340). Furthermore the bureaucratic elites had lost their political and social influence during the DP era. In order to regain the power and authority they had lost and to save the system which was endangered (central

values system) the military bureaucracy commandeered the administration by intervening in the political system (Heper 2005:34).

After this intervention the military bureaucratic elites enacted the constitutional law of 1961 as the constituent power. With this new constitution parliament was removed from being the single organ which manifested the sovereignty of the nation and the state administration was organized between representatives elected by the people and bureaucratic elites. Authorities which should have been implemented by the political power were transferred to various organizations with the constitution. These organizations were designed in such a way that they were completely in the management and control of the bureaucratic elites. The objective of this arrangement was to place the parliament consisted of the elected and the government under the supervision and control of the bureaucratic elites. In this new order the bureaucratic elites gained constitutional legitimacy and superiority and their power was guaranteed under the constitutional law.

With the constitutional law of 1961 a bicameral parliamentary structure consisting of the National assembly and a senate, the members of which were mainly appointed from persons with a military background. The affiliation of the Chief of General Staff had been removed from the minister of national defense and affiliated with the prime minister as head of the armed forces. This change was in favor of the armed forces regarding civilian military relations. This status continues today and is one of the issues Turkey is being criticized for during the EU membership process. (Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:452).

These are some of the organizations which were established with the constitutional law of 1961. The Constitutional Court which had the duty of supervising that the laws enacted by Parliament were compliant with the constitutional law but in reality was keeping tabs on the assembly and under the title of 'supreme court' had the jurisdiction to prosecute the ministers if necessary. The State Planning Organization which is responsible for the implementation of statist policies instead of liberal market economy and prepare and implement economic development plans. Without question one of the most important organizations founded under the constitution of 1961 was The National Security Council (NSC) which consisted of appointed military bureaucrats and was tasked with supervising and steering the elected political power. This council consists of the president, prime minister, relevant ministers and the Chief of Staff, the commanders of the 4 armed forces and other high level commanders. It was founded as the authorized and tasked organ to inform the Council of Ministers the fundamental views regarding taking decisions involving national security and ensuring their coordination (Hale 1998:163). The NSC operated as a council which ensured that the military bureaucratic elites participated actively in the policy making process and had the authority to steer the practices of the council of ministers (Zucher 2004:245). As soon as it was founded the NSC became a real power center which established

policies regarding fundamental state issues. After each intervention of the army with the administration of the country the NSC was reorganized and became more powerful.. Because of its extraordinary authorities the NSC was defined as the 'shadow government' by Rouleau (2000:105) and indicated that this was one of the issues Turkey is being criticized for during the EU membership process.

Furthermore the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law was enacted in 1961. With this law the army's task to protect and be responsible for the regime became official (Jenkins 2001:44). Article 35 of this law which says 'to protect and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey which has been appointed with the Constitutional law' became the legal basis for the 1971 memorandum and the military coups in 1980 and 1997 and any other military interventions to be carried out thereafter. The post 1960 coup period is a major milestone in Turkish society which changed the class stratification. After this breaking point the elite mass segregation or the center periphery tension in the struggle for power gained a different dimension. After this the power struggle continued in the context of civil-military relations.

The 1960 coup did not resolve the problems and the economic and political problems of the country continued. The 1963 elections were won by the Justice Party (AP) which was a continuation of the DP. The political polarization between AP and CHP split the nation in two. As a result the bureaucracy was affected and became politicized (Zürcher 2004: 379). In 1971 when the political events turned into anarchy based on the Internal Service Law the army issued a memorandum declaring that if the government could not control the course of events it would have to commandeer the administration. With the issuance of this memorandum Prime Minister Demirel resigned and for long years political stability could not be achieved in the country.

Between the years 1971–1979 two government changes took place. During the political instability and coalition governments period efforts were made to politicize the bureaucrats and control them. For this reason the 1970's were the beginning of the end for the civil bureaucratic elites. During these years the influence of the bureaucracy in the political sphere and the understanding of seeing themselves as the guard of the state and spokesmen of the modernization process of the bureaucratic elites were broken. The civil bureaucratic elites started to accept the political authorities of the elected. However the military bureaucrats never relinquished the role of guardians of the regime and the state and continued to guard the center against the periphery. At the end of these developments the bureaucratic elites had legitimized their supremacy regarding the protection of their power which they considered their main task and which was important for them rather than the modernization and westernization missions. In summary the bureaucratic elites had lost their westernization missions on which they had based their actions for years. It was time to prioritize the protection of the state and

central values system – regime – and their current power.

In the 1970's the acts of violence between extremist left and right wings groups had escalated and there was no peace and security in the country. These years are defined as the years of chaos in the history of Turkish politics or the lost years. According to Hale (1998:200) as a result of the terror and violence carried out by right and left wing groups during 1978-1980 the state order had come to the threshold of disappearing. The army intervened in 1980 with a coup to remedy the course of events. The military enhanced its autonomy regarding administration as it did with each military intervention. An inscription was added into the constitution of 1982 saying that the decisions made by NSC would be given priority consideration by the council of ministers.

Özal who was a prime ministerial undersecretary before the coup established the party ANAP and participated in the elections of 1983. ANAP came to power alone. After the elections in 1983 Özal took care to avoid problems with the military and his priority in politics was the transition into a liberal market economy. In 1987 Özal applied for full membership with the EU (Evin 1994:26). In the elections of 1987 the party came into power for the second time and slowly Özal started the reforms which intended to eliminate the military domination.

## **1. THE EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN TURKEY**

### **A. Reforms, Modernization, Westernization and EU Membership**

The Turks migrated westward from central Asia and came to Anatolia. Because of the geographical characteristics of the territory the Ottoman Empire was established on it has always faced west. Although only 3% of the Republic of Turkey which was erected on the heritage of this empire the influence of the west are much more prevalent in Turkey than the influence of Asia and the Middle East. The source of this influence is sociological and cultural rather than geographical. It is assessed as the efforts of a state which has linked its entity and fate to becoming a European state through modernization without severing ties with its own traditions (Türköne 1995: 22). As most of the modern states are in the west the modernization process has developed as a westernization project. The concept of Westernization is used in the sense of adopting the organizations and life style of the west (Ülken 1998: 20). According to Findley (1980: 3-4) although westernization was not common in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Ottoman-Turkish society was one of the few societies which endeavored to westernize at that time.

The diplomats and bureaucratic elites who went to the capitals of Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> century for diplomatic relations observed the innovations in the political, social, economic and industrial areas and were impressed (Mardin 1994: 11). In the 18<sup>th</sup> century with the military defeat and loss of land the bureaucratic

elites and the sultan realized that they had deteriorated compared to the west and believed that westernization was the solution (Weiker 1968:456, Mardin 1973:179). The first westernization incurred in the military area. Subsequently the bureaucratic elites believed that the state and society must westernize as a whole and started to implement the westernization project (Lewis 2002:38-39). During the reform period efforts were made to insert administrative, military and social structures of the west but the westernization movements of this period did not go beyond a superficial mimicry of westernization and were not a cure for the recession (Mardin 2000:151). The recession of the state continued until the collapse of the empire and the speed of the westernization movements increased in parallel (Gungor 1990:101-102). The reforms executed by the bureaucratic elites were implemented from the top and were not adopted by society. The westernization movements and central bureaucracy and indirectly the bureaucratic elites had gained in strength, the elite-mass divide had deepened and the people were alienated from the system.

The new Republic of Turkey established by the civil-military bureaucratic elites of the final period of the Ottomans, modernization and westernization had become the fundamental task of the state (Lewis 2002:292). The bureaucratic elites had been tasked with the execution of a project consisting of establishing a modern nation state which had adopted western values and lead a society consisting of people who were easily misled (Zürcher 2010:136). On the other hand the people had difficulty accepting fascist and monotype reforms. With transition into a multi-party life the westernization project started to be executed by the political power elected by the people. Turkey drew closer to the west because of its membership in NATO in 1952 and its application to membership with the European Community in 1959 and its good relations with the US (Shaw & Shaw 2002:400, Frey 1965:349).

When Turkey launched into the world with liberal policies during the Özal period it wanted to be included in Europe which had lived through the EEC, EC and EU phases and realize its westernization wish which went back 200 years. As indicated by Sozen and Shaw (2003:115) ‘Turkey has turned her face towards Europe in order to become a modern, westernized country. Today, this historic aspiration finds expression in the wish to become a member state of the EU. Turkey’s accession to the EU as a full member state would mean the realization of her modernization project.’ The phenomenon of modernization which was known previously as reform, modernization, westernization and which was the sole legal source of the bureaucratic elites in terms of ideology as well as power had become identified with EU membership. The accession process towards the EU was led by the political power elected by the people instead of the bureaucratic elites. As of the 1960’s a social change incurred in Turkey due to internal factors such as industrialization, migration from rural areas to urban areas, enhanced level of education, liberal economy policies and external factors such as globalization,

developments in information and communication technologies and neo-liberal economy policies. Western values had gone through a period of acceptance and internalization by society and had adopted the EU accession process executed by the political power they had elected. According to a survey made in 1987 when Özal applied for full membership with the EC this membership was supported by 60% of the respondents (Bozkurt 2001:307). In 1989 this percentage was 63.95 according to the survey(Bozkurt 2001: 309). According to the survey carried out by the European Commission in 2001 71% of the respondents believed that EU membership would be beneficial for Turkey(Eurobarometer 2001).

The EU had been an opportunity during the Westernization and modernization process for the normalization of civil-military affairs. The reason for this was that the EU stipulated that elimination of the influence of the military over politics as a primary matter in terms of political conditions for the full membership of Turkey(Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:440). With the westernization movement, the decisiveness of the elected political power to enter the EU would accelerate and the influence of the bureaucratic elites in the political sphere would be reduced. It must be pointed out that the fact that Turkey is becoming a member of the EU does not mean that the adventure of westernizing which has taken two centuries is over and society has completely internalized western values and that the modernization project is concluded. Even if institutional changes have realized a cultural change cannot be expected immediately.

## **B. The Role of the Turkish Military in Politics**

After the coup in 1960 the strained relations in society continued between the political power elected with the votes of the people and the army which did not perceive the elected power to be worthy of this power. After the 1950's the civil wing of the bureaucratic elite had been estranged from being the nucleus of power. On the other hand the military wing of the bureaucratic elites had become the nucleus of power with their military interventions. The democratic consolidation of Turkey was delayed due to the continuous suspension of democracy.

Actually a look at the historical background reveals that the bureaucratic elite which made the mission of modernization and westernization its focal point is in a dilemma. Why has democracy the most precious commodity of the west been continuously suspended by the bureaucratic elites? In compliance with their mission of westernization the bureaucratic elites adopted democracy as a dimension of westernization and believed democracy to be the best regime. However they viewed politicians as persons, who spent state resources unwisely, caused economic crises and who were ready to take the country to the brink of an abyss at any time. For this reason the gains of the republic and the regime had to be protected against the inept politicians elected by the uneducated majority. It was the job of the bureaucratic elites to fix the order which had been disrupted by the

mistakes of the politicians and which endangered the regime. For this reason the army did not remain in power for long after military interventions and the democratic order was soon restored (Heper 1976:515).

The intervention of the army in Turkey in terms of politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980 differ from the interventions in Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Spain and Greece where the interventions were more tough or in which dictatorial regimes were established. The difference of the Turkish army was that after each intervention it held the power for a short time after which return to democracy was ensured (Rustow 1988:242). In the example of Turkey instead of administrating the army elected to be the protector of the constitutional order which it had prepared as a founding power and which was based on the dominance of the military (Cook 2007:38). After the interventions the bureaucratic elites released the power to the civilians of their own will.

The army did not disrupt this tradition after the coup in 1980 and allowed elections to be held in 1983. Özal emerged as prime minister from this election. The beginning of the 1980's was the starting point of privatization for the whole world, a time when states were downsized and liberal policies were implemented. As of 1983 the import substitution economy policies were eliminated, the living standards of people had increased and the economy was growing and Turkey had rapidly started to resemble other countries. It was during the era of Özal that privatization policy and struggle with bureaucracy could be discussed in Turkey for the first time. Even if the army was not completely subjugated to the civil administration its role in the political sphere had decreased. According to Ahmad (1993:13) the election victory of Özal in 1983 was a defeat of the military junta and a victory of civil administration. Özal also won the elections in 1987 and started to implement reforms which were targeting to decrease the impact of military bureaucratic elites in the political sphere.

### **C. Turkey EU Affairs**

The affairs between Turkey and the EU started with the application of prime minister Menderes in 1959 to join the European Community. In 1964 with the Ankara Convention Turkey became a partner member of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, because of the stormy years in the political life of Turkey the accession process into the community was interrupted and the application for full membership in the European Community was started again in 1987 by Özal's application. According to Onis & Webb (1994:128) in the 1980's significant structural reforms were carried out in the areas of political liberalization and economic reforms.

On the 1st of January in 1996 Turkey entered the Customs Union. In the report dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 1999 prepared for candidate countries the EU commis-

sion indicated that the Copenhagen criteria needed to be fulfilled in order to grant Turkey candidacy status. These criteria are:

- stability of organizations which ensure democracy and the continuation of democracy,
- human rights,
- respect and protection of minorities,
- ensure the rule of law.

The Copenhagen political criteria require a ‘democratic administration format’. A democratic administration format also entails the subjugation of the army under civilian oversight. Within this framework it was necessary that the army which had been influential in politics since the establishment of the republic with institutional or non-institutional mechanisms had to be subjected to civilian oversight. This was a feature that changed the traditional Turkish state and weakened the dominance of the bureaucratic elites. The period after the Helsinki summit was a milestone in the affairs of Turkey and the EU as well as a breaking point in the social structure of Turkey. All the constitutional and legal orders executed in order to ensure the Copenhagen criteria enhanced the civil-army relations in Turkey. As a natural result of this after the civil wing of the bureaucratic elites the military wing was eliminated as a power nucleus and started to lose its political independence.

#### **D. EU Membership Process and Its Effects on Turkish Civil-Military Relations**

Democratic consolidation requires that the army is subjugated to the democratically elected civil administration. The civil-military relations in Turkey differ from the relations in European countries. The army has always been intertwined with politics in Turkey, has eliminated four civil governments with coups and taken an active role in politics with the institutional structure it has established. Since there is no specific legislation regarding civil-military relations the EU requires that Turkey standardizes its administrative structure and applications with other member countries.

In order to ensure the political criteria which is a prerequisite Turkey has enacted constitutional reforms and nine legal harmonization packages between the years 2001 and 2004. During this period changes were made in 49 articles of the Constitution of 1982. The harmonization packages have ensured democratization in many areas and had a significant function in Turkey approaching the liberal democratic values of the EU. Reforms which expand the scope of fundamental rights and freedoms and strengthen and guarantee areas such as democracy, the rule of law, freedom of thought and expression and human rights have been made. These arrangements and the institutional reforms which are explained below have alienated the military from the political sphere and as a result the ac-

tors of the power struggle have also started to change. As Turkey approaches the EU standards the military bureaucratic elites have become alienated from being a power nucleus.

In the progress reports published by the EU as of 1998 until 2000 it has been indicated that there is no civilian oversight in Turkey in terms of the army and particularly the power of NSC in politics has been a source of criticism (EC Regular Reports 1998:13-14, 1999:10, 2000:14). The reports have emphasized that the NSC is a major factor in the formation of national security policies and has a fundamental role in many issues of interest in political life. With a change in the constitution in 2001 the number of civilian members in the NSC was increased and the decisions were given the status of recommendations to the council of Ministers. However the progress report of 2002 indicated that the NSC had a de facto influence on politicians and criticized NSC for expressing views which went beyond recommendations (EC Regular Reports 2002:24). As a result the reforms which targeted the democratization of civil-military relations in Turkey and turning the balance in favour of civilians was accepted as the most significant reforms in the 7th Harmonization package in 2003. This order turned the NSC into a consultant organ. The chairman could be a civilian, they would convene every two months instead of every month and the council of Ministers would be free to implement the NSC decisions. The NSC which was established with the constitution of 1961 and the tasks and structure of which was continuously changed in favour of the military after the memorandum of 1971 and the changes in the Constitution of 1982 lost a major part of its political power with the changes incurring during the EU harmonization process. This breaking point is also significant in terms of our study subject. The active army tradition over the political power was the institutional heritage of the Ottomans to Turkey has been eliminated.

The political power of the army in Turkey is beyond the level of organizations. Many factors deriving from the history and culture of Turkey – non-institutional – enable the army to be active in politics. The army has had a significant role in politics since the history of the Turks in Central Asia began. The Ottoman Empire was able to survive for 6 centuries because of its army and the army was the only organization which maintained its power from its initial establishment to the fall of the empire (Hale 1998:17). The army had an important role in the establishment of the nation-state. The army saw itself as the protector of the regime and the state. It was soldiers who established the Republican regime and subsequently structured the new Turkish state. According to Rustow as of the establishment of the republic until 1955 “men of military background have served as President of the Republic (17 years), Prime Minister (16.5 years), Minister of Defense (16.5 years), of Public Works (15 years), of Communications (9 years), and in other cabinet posts.” (Lerner & Robinson 1960:28). All the presidents between the years 1960- 1989 had military backgrounds.

Starting with 2003 when the comprehensive institutional reforms were being made and particularly in the MGK the EU Commission has repeated in all the published progress reports that the Turkish army has continued to influence politics through informal (non-institutional) mechanisms. As indicated by Jenkins (2001:41-42) the army has had an active role in public policies deriving from the autonomy and prestige it enjoys from Turkish political culture. The above mentioned institutional mechanisms which help the army to display power in terms of politics have deteriorated in a major way with the harmonization packages generated during the EU accession process. It is possible that institutions which have an impact on political decisions may change in time. The thing that will not change in a short time and which might take generations is culture. Culture may change of course but it takes much longer in comparison to changes involving organizations.

### **E. EU Membership and Turkish Democratic Consolidation**

According to Diamond (1997: xix -xxviii) the conditions for a democratic consolidation are as follows: a state with a strong structure, institutionalized political parties, a pluralist civil society, fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of law and finally the supremacy of a civilian administration. Diamond argues that as long as the army is not definitely subjected to civilian oversight and a solid democratic constitutional order, democratic consolidation cannot be achieved. These criteria of liberal democracy have always been problematic in Turkey throughout history. On the other hand according to Agüero (1995:19 who uses the concept of 'Civilian supremacy' an elected government is the undisputed authority in all political spheres. According to his opinion the army should have nothing to do with internal security and should hold a position which is restricted to subjects involving national defense under the supervision of the ministry of defense. When we look at Turkey we see an army which has undertaken the mission of guardian of the state and regime and protector against external threats. Through the NSC it has endeavored to affect and control the elected political powers during all policy making processes. However, during the recent period the institutional power of the army has been decreased in a major degree by the reforms executed within the scope of EU harmonization and significant progress has been achieved in establishing civilian supremacy.

No matter how much the institutional functions which assist in the intervention of the army with politics are weakened by constitutional changes and harmonization packages the army can still be effective through non-institutional mechanisms in politics particularly for reasons of 'internal threats'. Desch (1999:14-15) explains the increase or decrease of internal threats and external threats with the increase in the role of the army in politics and claims that the army is intervening on a maximum level in a country when internal threats rise and external threats are minimal. In Turkey the PKK terror organization and political

Islam continue to be internal threats which are factors in the continuation of the army's intervention in politics (Güney&Karatekelioğlu 2005:443).

In conclusion institutional mechanisms which are the structures of institutes or organizations can change within a certain time period but changing phenomenon which are not institutional such as culture and traditions takes generations to change. It will take time for the bureaucratic elites who have always maintained to hold on to their power in the political and social system of the Turkish state tradition, who have endeavored to ensure their existence and who perceived themselves to be a power nucleus with the mission of protecting the state to relinquish these positions. The more society adopts western values, democracy solidifies, transparency and accountability are embedded in state administration, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed, bureaucratic elites will become isolated and will be obliged to respect the values of society. At the point arrived today the full EU membership is an important phase in enabling the Turkish society to enjoy affluence on a modern civilized level.

## **Conclusion**

According to the elitist theory people are not politically equal in societies. Society is divided into two classes: the elites which are powerful privileged and take important decisions on behalf of society. The other class consists of the masses which are led by the decisions taken by the administrative minority. A look at the structure of the Ottoman-Turkish society structure reveals that most of the administrative elites came from bureaucracy. From this perspective bureaucracy can be defined as an elite group which wants to hold on to its own power rather than an organizational model which implements the decisions of the political power. Bureaucratic elites are removed from being regular bureaucrats representing rationality in the Weberian sense parallels the degree that bureaucratic elites start to view themselves as the single authority in implementing concepts with imprecise boundaries such as public benefit, state security and the surplus profits of the state.

In an ideal system with political stability bureaucracy implements political decisions, is not involved in the decision making mechanism and does not participate in any discussion. In societies where the position of the bureaucracy has not been completely determined, where organizations and agencies outside the bureaucracy are weak, bureaucracies want to get involved in the political decision making process and comply with the taken decisions. Such countries are in a constant state of tension. This tension reaches its summit when one of the groups seizes power through a coup. The bureaucracy in Turkey wants to be a power centre holding the policy making process and replace the legal political organs instead of being a tool for the execution of public services (rational-legal

in a Weberian sense).

The new Republic of Turkey was established by the Ottoman bureaucratic elites in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although the established republic is called new its political culture, tradition of administration, strong central bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic elites are the continuation of the Ottomans. The legacy to the Republic of Turkey: bureaucratic elites that were independent within the political system, that endeavoured to hold onto the power and preferred to be involved in political decision making in addition to dealing with administrative duties and the downtrodden people who were perceived as the masses to be administered.

In the classic Ottoman era the bureaucrats held a privileged position in society and lifestyles as servants of the Sultan. This system demanded a cadre which was isolated from society, without ties to family and society and who devoted themselves completely to serving the Sultan and the state. The bureaucracy was a community of people who served the Ottoman state with loyalty in the persona of the Sultan. During the deterioration and dispersion era of the Ottomans the central administration system, the military and economic systems deteriorated and the slave system was transformed in parallel and the bureaucrats became servants of the state rather than loyal servants of the Sultan. Two factors had a significant role in this transition. The first factor was the lack of skills and authority of the sultans who had taken the throne in the last stages of the Ottomans. The second factor was that the empire was inferior to the western states in terms of military and the economy issues which was the main source of encountered problems initially loss of land and it was realized that this would be the downfall of the empire. The bureaucratic elites believed that the only way to stop this poor trend was to modernize and westernize and the Sultans who supported this view started the modernization process. The bureaucratic elites became the nucleus of power as the decision makers and implementers of the modernization process of the state and society. In summary the bureaucratic servants isolated from society who served the Sultan unconditionally in the slave system underwent a long and slow transition process during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries to become regents to the authority and power of the Sultan they had served.

As of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the project of modernizing the state and society was executed by these strong bureaucratic elites. Since the modern states were in the west and with the influence of the bureaucrats deputized in the west the modernization movement turned into a westernization movement. During this period the Sultans had perceived the westernization movement as a cure for the collapse of the empire and they had acted in concert with the bureaucratic elites. The westernization carried out during this period is revealed as the transmission of the organizations and social life in the west by copying them into the Ottoman sphere.

During the reform period the bureaucrats wanted the state to be represented with various state organizations instead of the persona of the Sultan. This was a requirement of being modern and western. The bureaucrats advocated that they had to have the initiative in the Policy making process. For this to be possible the first thing that the bureaucrats needed to do was to guarantee themselves and their positions and achieve an autonomous structure. This was the main topic with the reform era bureaucrats. They were demanding rights and guarantees which were determined through legislation instead of the slave system in which lives and properties hung on the words of the Sultan. Within this framework the first regulation was prepared in the form of an imperial edict of reorganization which was presented to the Sultan for signature. Thus the bureaucrats were guaranteed against the Sultan and established organizations which ensured that the Sultan could not meddle in state affairs too much.

In the end the reform era which the Sultan had supported because he believed that it would prevent the poor trend had steered the active management of the state in Istanbul into the hands of the bureaucrats. Ministries resembling those in western countries and an institutionalized administrative organization had been established. This way bureaucracy became dominant in every phase of government. The bureaucratic elites of the reform period believed that the best policy for the 'state' was to ally and identify with the West, in other words to westernize. The bureaucratic elites of this era were a tight cadre which had been schooled in western style ideology, had a positive thought process and in which secularity prevailed.

This bureaucratic cadre which was transformed from doing as they were told to political independence and shaping policies would try their best in the future not to lose this habit and their political independence. This perspective regarding the political life of Turkey which is riddled with crises will help to understand the social and political crises in the new Republic of Turkey which was established on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

The newly established republic resumed the exact bureaucratic structure of the Ottomans. The 30 years that passed as of the declaration of the republic until transition into the multi-party system was the golden age for the bureaucratic elites. During this period the reforms were imposed on the people from the top by the bureaucracy. During the transition phase the elite cadres had to pioneer to enable the ignorant, easily deceived rural population without the necessary knowledge and skills to achieve the level of modern civilization. For this the single party administration was necessary because the easily confused people might be nonplussed if faced with a political system with more than one party and this in turn would have a negative impact on the success and speed of the reforms.

During this period the only decision making power were the bureaucratic elites. There was no competitive power to challenge their power. There was no awareness of civil society, labor unions and associations. With the transition into a multi-party system from a single party system due to internal and external factors competition to the power generated by the votes of the people emerged. For the first time the periphery got the opportunity to access the center through democracy. This opportunity was given by the votes which put Menderes into power. However, in the eyes of the bureaucratic elites politicians were unreliable people and could endanger the gains achieved by the republic and the regime. The political elites knew what was best for the state and society, not the elected politicians.

However the DP power did not agree with this idea and wanted to transform the bureaucracy into a structure which implemented its decisions. Consequently a conflict ensued between the elected political power and the bureaucratic elite. As a result of this tension the military wing of the bureaucratic elites executed a coup in 1960 and suspended the democratic regime. After the coup of 1960 the military wing of the bureaucratic elites came into power. After 1960 the interventions in 1971 and 1980 every time the military enhanced its political independence and influence. The new constitutional laws prepared after each intervention consolidated and strengthened the position of the bureaucratic elite within the constitutional system. The NSC included in these constitutional laws made military bureaucracy the most important actor in the state administration and policy generation mechanism.

Özal became the power in the elections of 1983 after the 1980 coup and the gates opened onto a new era. The years of Özal's power were a time when Turkey globalized and affairs with the west were revived. With Özal the EC membership process was reinstated and was continued by subsequent political powers. In 1996 Turkey became a member of the Customs Union. In 1999 it was decided that Turkey could achieve candidate country status if the EU Copenhagen political criteria could be fulfilled. These criteria foresee a democratic administration form. This means that bureaucracy and the military must be under the oversight of the elected power. On the path into the EU Turkey will democratize, civilian military affairs will normalize and a very important phase in the westernization process will be reached. One of the most important issues in the history of Turkish politics is elitism, in other words the tendency of a small privileged group to dominate society. The EU accession process has been an opportunity to resolve this problem and the enacted laws have changed the organizations and laws which enabled the dominance of bureaucratic elites over the political power. However in order for this problem to be fixed once and for all it is necessary that the political culture rather than organizations change and this will take a long time. There is the potential for political crises at any time in a Turkey in which the bureaucratic elites are not harmonized with the political power.

Putting everything to one side and looking at the general history of Turkish society which has always faced the west there is a long stable process albeit with interruptions which has gone from the reform period to constitutional monarchy, from there to the republic and thereafter to democracy. This process can be perceived as the successful journey of a Muslim society from an empire into a modern and western society.

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