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**Assoc.Prof.Dr. Fikret BİRDİŞLİ**

İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY

Phone: +90 422 3774261/4383

e-mail [fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr](mailto:fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr)

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Phone: +90 422 3774288

e-mail [karadag.ahmet@inonu.edu.tr](mailto:karadag.ahmet@inonu.edu.tr)

*International Relations and Security Studies Editor/ Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Çalışmaları Editörü*

Assoc.Prof.Dr. Fikret Birdişli

İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY

Phone: +90 422 3774261/4383

e-mail [fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr](mailto:fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr)

## **CONTACT INFORMATION / İLETİŞİM BİLGİLERİ**

İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches (INUSAM), 44280, Malatya-TURKEY

Phone: +90 422 3774261

İnönü Üniversitesi, Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, İİBF Ek Bina, Kat:3, 44280, Malatya-TÜRKİYE

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Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Love in the Time of Cholera*, trans. Edith Grossman (London: Cape, 1988), 242-55.

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Glenn Gould, "Streisand as Schwarzkopf," in *the Glenn Gould Reader*, ed. Tim Page (New York: Vintage, 1984), 310.

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Walter Blair, "Americanized Comic Braggarts," *Critical Inquiry* 4, no. 2 (1977): 331-32.

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## Editörden

Uluslararası Politika ve Güvenlik (IJPS) dergisinin ikinci sayısını akademik dünyanın görüş ve istifadesine sunmanın kıvancını yaşıyoruz.

Bu sayıda altı makaleye ve bir kitap değerlendirmesine yer verilmiştir. Sayının ilk makalesi *Tianyang LIU* tarafından kaleme alınan "*Between Representation and the 'Real': the Remaking of Terrorism in Modernity*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

İkinci makale *Israel Nyaburi NYADERA* tarafından hazırlanmış olan "*Algeria's Turbulent Path to Democracy: Missed Chances and The Fall of Abdelaziz Bouteflika*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

Üçüncü makalemiz *Gerry F. ARAMBALA* tarafından hazırlanan "*The Return of the Political: Chantal Mouffe and Ozamiz City Politics*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

Dördüncü makalemiz *Salim KURNAZ, S. Mustafa ÖNEN* tarafından hazırlanmış olan "*Avrupa Birliğine Uyum Sürecinde Turkey'nin Siber Güvenlik Stratejileri*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

Beşinci makalemiz *Yusuf SAYIN* tarafından yazılmış olan "*Arap Baharı ve Tunus'un Yasemin Devrimi'ni Yeniden Anlamak*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

İkinci sayının son makalesi ise *Fikret Birdiqli* tarafından hazırlanmış olan "*Political Philosophy of Al Farabi and the Logic of the Integration and Solidarity in the International Area*" başlığını taşımaktadır.

Bu sayıda bir adet kitap özetine yer verilmiştir. Bu kitap özeti *Emre Baran Pak* tarafından kaleme alınmıştır. Pak, bu çalışmasında *Richard Wyn Jones*'ün editörlüğünü yaptığı "*Critical Theory and World Politics*" isimli kitabı okuyuculara tanıtmaktadır.

Bu sayıya katkı sağlayan yazar ve hakemlerimize teşekkür eder, faydalı olması dileğiyle, iyi okumalar dileriz.

IJPS Editörü

## Editorial

We are in proud of to release of the second issue of the IJPS for evaluation of the academic community.

Second issue include six articles and one book reviews. The first article is "Between Representation and the 'Real': the Remaking of Terrorism in Modernity" written by *Tianyang Liu*.

The second article is about "Algeria's Turbulent Path to Democracy: Missed Chances and The Fall of Abdelaziz Bouteflika " and written by *Israel Nyaburi Nyadera*.

Third article, is entitled with " The Return of the Political: Chantal Mouffe and Ozamiz City Politics" and written by *Gerry F. Arambala*.

The fourth article is titled with "Avrupa Birliği'ne Uyum Sürecinde Turkey'nin Siber Güvenlik Stratejileri" that is written by *Salim Kurnaz and S. Mustafa Önen*.

The fifth article is titled with "Arap Baharı ve Tunus'un Yasemin Devrimi'ni Yeniden Anlamak" by *Yusuf Sayin*.

Last article of this issue is titled as "Political Philosophy of Al Farabi and the Logic of the Integration and Solidarity in the International Area" and written by *Fikret Birdiqli*.

This book contains one review also. The book of "*Critical Theory and World Politics*" edited by *Richard Wyn Jones* and reviewed by *Emre Baran Pak*.

We would like to thanks to the authors and referees who contributed to this issue, and wish good reading.

IJPS Chief Editor





## Between Representation and the ‘Real’: the Remaking of Terrorism in Modernity

Tianyang LIU\*

### *Abstract*

*Terrorism Studies have long been dominated by the language of security studies. This domination obscures our understanding of terrorism as a social process constructed through discourse and inter-subjective practices. This research will examine the processes of representing and remaking terrorism in self-consciousness, systemic rationalities of sovereign state and modernity itself, by which to illuminate the distortion, alienation and mistranslation between the interpretation of terrorism and the ‘reality’ of terrorism. To this end, it will critically engage with existing literature about academic understanding of terrorism and re-categorize it into three dominant modes—mythic mode, objectification mode and re-subjectification mode. Then it will demonstrate and examine the gap between different modes of representation of terrorism and the acts of terrorism by investigating the ways in which the phenomenon of terrorism is reconstructed through modern subjectivity and mistranslated in political systemic representation of terrorism. This research will conclude by illuminating the basic trend behind the perception of terrorism; that is, the subjectivity presented in the individual understanding of terrorist threat is increasingly eroded, subordinated and dominated by the social systemic interpretation of terrorism in modernity.*

**Keywords:** *Critical terrorism studies, Modernity, Subjectivity, Systemic rationality, Representation*

### **1. Introduction**

Modernity as the context of terrorism examined in this research is always staged as representation, a work of imagination<sup>1</sup>. In this age of representation, the immediacy of the really real is promised by what appears in contrast to be the mere abstractions of structure, subjectivity, text, plan, or idea, which makes a distinctive imagination of the real<sup>2</sup>. This myth

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\* Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, jaspers.sato@gmail.com ORCID: 0000-0002-5462-5714(+61)424421776

<sup>1</sup> Mitchell, T. ‘The Stage of Modernity,’ in Mitchell T (ed.), *Questions of Modernity* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 1-34.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 17-8.



of modernity is the context in which the topic of representation and reality of terrorism becomes the primary concern of this work, and this is why I have put the ‘real’ under commas in the title.

To re-think the ‘real’ of terrorism in modernity, this research will examine the processes of representing and remaking terrorism, by which to illuminate the distortion, alienation and mistranslation between the interpretation of terrorism and the ‘reality’ of terrorism. To this end, the research is divided into two sections. In the first section, it will critically engage with existing literature about academic understanding of terrorism and re-categorize it into three dominant modes—mythic mode, objectification mode and re-subjectification mode. This categorization is based on the basic distinction of dispositions indicated in the existing academic analysis of terrorism. That is, whether terrorism has been analyzed within a framework of split between subject and object. The second section will demonstrate and examine the gap between different modes of representation of terrorism and the acts of terrorism. This section will be divided into two parts—Part I will draw on two cases to investigate how the phenomenon of terrorism is reshaped and reconstructed as individual subjective representation; Part II will show how the ways in which the nature of terrorism is distorted and mistranslated in political systemic representation of terrorism. To elaborate the problems in political systemic representation of terrorism, Part II will discuss three strategies of representing terrorism by state—making terrorism as pure political argument, constructing terrorism as rhetoric opposite of political discursive structure, and sovereign denial of control predicament. The research will conclude by illuminating the basic trend behind the perception of terrorism; that is, the subjectivity presented in the individual understanding of terrorist threat is increasingly eroded, subordinated and dominated by the social systemic interpretation of terrorism in modernity.

This paper uses a qualitative method, which not only synthesizes the extant literature on terrorism and identifies the gaps in knowledge that the existing terrorism study addresses, but also attempts to provide a new theoretical perspective to the development of terrorism studies.



## 2. Literature Review

This section is a theoretical review of the existing literature exploring how terrorism is perceived by its audience and how its nature is revealed or remade in this process of individual and social perception. To this end, the section will first categorize the perceptual characteristics on terrorist phenomenon in existing academic literature into three modes—mythic mode, objectification mode and re-subjectification mode of terrorism. This categorization is my own and its aim is to render the hidden chain of discourse embedded in the academic understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism visible. By manifesting the dominant discourse underpinning the theorization of terrorism it will present the larger picture of how terrorism is perceived or construed at individual and social level in existing terrorism studies, the foundational structural characteristics of perception on terrorist threat, as well as the kind of knowledge concerning the different modes of revealing or reconstituting about the very existence of terrorism. Questions will be raised based on this introspection and mediation about the way in which terrorism is understood and constructed in academic writing of terrorism research. That is, what fundamentally causes the particular perceptual tendencies in the conceptions of terrorism, and how this perceptual structure remakes or re-constitutes the phenomenon of terrorism?

### 2.1. The Linguistic Origin of Categorization

The linguistic origin of the word terror can be derived from Latin *terror*, from *terrere*, ‘to fill with fear, frighten’, akin to the Greek *trein*, ‘to flee from fear’<sup>3</sup>. Terror is thus revealed as a state of intense fright, of stark fear<sup>4</sup>. Terrorism comes from Latin *terror*, but it is more commonly understood from specific sense of government intimidation during the Reign of Terror in France (1793-1794). In other words, terrorism appears to be a systematic use of terror as a means in policy or to achieve certain other political aims. Therefore, from etymological dimension and semantic changes in terror, terrorism can be described either as an existential

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<sup>3</sup> Verene, D P. ‘International terrorism and the Human Condition’, *The Pluralist* 2, no. 3 (2007), 3.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.



experience of subject or an object instrumentalized and reserved for certain political change. Terrorism as an existential experience is inherent in subjectivity, reflecting and creating ontological meaning for the very existence of subject. Terrorism as means for political change reflects a split between subject and object, and terrorism in this dichotomizing structure is objectified as technique or tool. The first semantic tendency that depicts terrorism as a subjectivity is presented in two sets of literature, myth-based ancient text and contemporary academic literature of terrorism studies. The research will describe mythological expression of terrorism as mythic mode of terrorism, and the modern subjectivity of terrorism in contemporary terrorism research as a re-subjectification mode of terrorism. The research will use objectification mode of terrorism to describe terrorism as a product of objectifying process in existing literature of terrorism studies<sup>5</sup>. The following discussion will examine how three modes in terrorism and counterterrorism literature is classified and labeled as such, and through which to find the remaining questions in the existing literature.

## 2.2. Mythic Mode

In the mythic understanding of terror, terror is the most primordial passions of the soul, which connects the human to the divine<sup>6</sup>. Bestioni, the giant offspring of the sons of Noah, is without human custom but 'humanized by the sudden appearance of lightning in the thunderous sky, caused by the drying out of the earth after the Flood'<sup>7</sup>. In this primal scene adopted from the biblical phenomenon of universal flood by Giambattista Vico, humanity is formed from the experience of unprecedented fear and terror incited within the giants. Therefore, terror in mythological literature is understood from within the subjectivity or the existential experience

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<sup>5</sup> This categorization is not a historical classification, which means it is not based on chronological sequence. For instance, the second tendency of understanding terrorism, the mode of objectification, can also be traced back to the rich examples in ancient India. Chanakya (b.280BC) as adviser to Indian ruler Chandragupta suggested many clandestine methods to subdue enemies through use of terror; He also suggested that "agents costumed as demon-serpents and flesh-eating tigers should terrorise civilians to lure the enemy king outside the city walls to perform rites of appeasement, whereupon he should be ambushed and killed" (Law, R., 2009. [Terrorism: A History](#), Cambridge: Polity). Thus, the defining point to differentiate these three modes in existing literature is to identify whether terrorism is seen as object or means to the subject.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.



of the subject, producing ontological and foundational social meanings from this feeling of terror. Ansell-Pearson<sup>8</sup> argues that recognition of the terror of existence leads Greeks to invent art in order to experience life as an aesthetic phenomenon in which human beings transcends a merely individual nature. In Homeric epics, heroes always encounter the dilemma of conflicting values: the importance of heroic achievement measured against comfort and pleasure; and all of this in the midst of mortality and terror<sup>9</sup>. The terror of war and hostility, and noble value of warriors are structured together with reciprocal force<sup>10</sup>. In Homeric world, concealing truth is a capacious virtue for success in certain contexts of practice in the face of terror, danger and threat<sup>11</sup>. Terror in Greek mythological literature is primarily expressed as an intrinsic meaning for subjectivity, and an existential condition for the production of Greek values.

### 2.3. Objectification Mode

When terror as internal source of meaning production in the mythological interpretation is first translated into French *terrorisme* (1798) the nature of terror is changed significantly. Terrorism, in the context of Reign of Terror was used to ‘delegitimize and discredit political opponents, through demonization and exaggerated accounts of the atrocities committed by revolutionaries’<sup>12</sup>. Therefore, terrorism is transformed from its semantic archetype as a productive form of subjectivity to a political tactics, a tool, an object, a pejorative term describing or imposing dehumanized labels on particular groups thereby legitimating the elimination of them. The semantic transformation from terror to terrorism is deeply embedded in an objectifying and externalizing process, in which terrorism as a form of systematic use of terror converts terror from a particular ontological or existential experience into objective existence, an identifiable enemy of humanity, a visible, manageable, calculable and

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<sup>8</sup> Ansell-Pearson, K. *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1994), 65.

<sup>9</sup> Hatab, L. *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: An Introduction*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Cameron G & Goldstein J D, ‘The Ontology of Modern Terrorism: Hegel, Terrorism Studies, and Dynamics of Violence,’ *The Journal of National and Social Philosophy* 6, no.1 (2010), 62.



measurable object in modern political science. Edmund Burke in his writing *Reflections on the Revolution in France* ‘sought to discredit the revolutionaries’ policies and principles by portraying them as enemies of humanity—inhuman brutes who abandoned reason and politics in favor of destruction and terror’<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, terrorism in its early portrait in modern political writing is externalized from the dominant political community with particular identifiable properties such as irrationality, inhumanity and destruction. This essentialization approach in modern political literature about terrorists and revolutionaries does not merely split terrorism as an object or an exogenous entity from ‘us’, the subject, but also polarizes this imaginary opposition and differentiation. The moral judgment made through the categorization and polarization between human and inhuman, rational and irrational erects boundary which makes terrorism ‘other’ for ‘us’.

The objectification, territorialization and polarization embedded in the narrative of early modern writings of terrorism culminate in the dominant contemporary literature on terrorism. Bruce Hoffman identifies terrorism as primarily a subnational group or non-state entity<sup>14</sup>. Twenty years before Bruce Hoffman’s definition, Walter Laqueur had accepted the notion of ‘terrorism from above’ and its severer material and social destruction than ‘terrorism from below’, as he clarified that state terrorism was not his focus<sup>15</sup>. The consequence of this conceptual practice is that terrorism is understood and studied solely as violence carried out by non-state groups, and terrorism by state remains invisible in dominant discourse of terrorism studies. ‘When state is examined, it is usually limited to descriptions of “state-sponsored terrorism” by so-called “rogue states”’<sup>16</sup>. ‘Objective’ database on terrorism such as Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and Terrorism Incident Database was established to

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<sup>13</sup> Messer, P G. ‘Feel the Terror: Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France’ in Land I (ed.), *Enemies of Humanity: The Nineteenth Century War on Terrorism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

<sup>14</sup> Hoffman, B. ‘Current Research on Terrorism and Low-intensity Conflict,’ *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 15, no.1 (1992), 25–37.

<sup>15</sup> Laqueur, W., *Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1977), 6

<sup>16</sup> Jackson, R. ‘Knowledge, Power and Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism,’ in Gunning J et al (ed.), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 70.



assist the construction of positivist model and scientific basis of terrorism studies<sup>17</sup>. These conceptual practices and positivist methods on data collection systematically objectify, delegitimize and identify terrorism as the opposite of sovereign state and enemy of legitimating power. In addition, Mishal and Rosenthal<sup>18</sup> argue that terrorism is ‘one of the most significant threats to the Western world in general and US national security in particular’. Marc Sageman makes similar argument that ‘terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals’<sup>19</sup>. Based on these perspectives, terrorism has been portrayed as an external threat, and isolated as a sign of anti-democracy, barbarism and immoral. The externalization and polarization is intensified when the terrorism research concentrates on particular organization and religion. For instance, Jessica Stern<sup>20</sup> asserts that ‘by September 11, 2001, between 70,000 and 110,000 radical Muslims had graduated from Al Qaeda training camps’. The source of terrorism threat has been concretized and isolated as a clash between two antagonistic camps of religions, i.e., Christian versus Muslim; western versus eastern, and democracy versus authoritarianism. The Muslim extremists identified as the ‘real’ threat to western civilization and political legitimacy are further demonized, as Stern argues<sup>21</sup>, ‘religious terrorist groups are more violent than their secular counterparts and are probably more likely to use weapons of mass destruction’. In addition to construct terrorism as visible threat, contemporary literature on terrorism also ‘promote the view that the root and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological deviance, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of “radicalization”’<sup>22</sup>. For example, John Horgan<sup>23</sup>, in a review of terrorist

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<sup>17</sup>RAND. ‘RAND-MIP Terrorism Incident Database Project’ (2006), accessed 15 May 2013, <[www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/index.html](http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/index.html)>.

<sup>18</sup> Mishal, S and Rosenthal M. ‘Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations.’ *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28 (2005), 276.

<sup>19</sup> Sageman, M. *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2004), vii.

<sup>20</sup> Stern, J. *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2003), 260.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. xxxii

<sup>22</sup> Jackson, R. ‘Knowledge, Power and Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism,’ 72

<sup>23</sup> Horgan, J. ‘The Search for the Terrorist Personality,’ in Silke A (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences* (West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).



personality literature, points out that psychopathy was the feature most commonly associated with terrorists. In the words of Andrew Silke<sup>24</sup>, ‘in the early 1970s. . .it was widely believed that terrorists suffered from personality disorders and that there would be an exceptionally high number of clinical psychopaths, narcissists and paranoids in the ranks of the average terrorist group’. The approach adopted by the literature on terrorist personality resembles the medical model of psychopathology in portraying terrorism as a kind of disease with identifiable etiological properties<sup>25</sup>. This approach of medicalization affirms and rationalizes the claims of opposition between ‘us’ and terrorism as a heterogeneous threat to our boundary of legitimating humanity, demarcating and delegitimizing terrorists from the modern conception of human as rational being. Therefore, the objectification mode in understanding the phenomenon of terrorism based on existing literature about the nature of terrorism is to externalize and demarcate terrorism from the position of ‘us’, followed by diagnosing terrorism as immoral and morbid, and by so doing it ultimately eradicates the subjectivity of terrorism. In this sense, objectification model is also a paradigm of de-humanization of terrorism.

To dehumanize terrorism and construe it as chaotic, dangerous and destructive object threatening social identity and regularity reduces terrorism into a security issue. Bounded by realist security discourse, the perceptual model of objectification is to produce etic knowledge, perceiving and re-making the nature of terrorism through the eyes of dominant political power and the every interest of sovereign control. This etic structure of knowledge production forms a prism which refracts, more fundamentally, fabricates the nature of terrorism by interpretation based on interest of external condition. The re-subjectification mode of understanding terrorism in existing literature revitalizes the subjectivity of terrorism, presenting a blending between emic and etic knowledge. For example, in *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*<sup>26</sup>, Gunaratna attempts to ‘unearth terrorists’ motivation<sup>27</sup>, explaining terrorism as a

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<sup>24</sup> Silke, A. ‘Becoming a Terrorist,’ in Silke A (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences*, (West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 30.

<sup>25</sup> Fishman, S & Kruglanski, AW. ‘The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives,’ *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (2006), 194.

<sup>26</sup> Gunaratna, R. *Inside AL Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002).

<sup>27</sup> Ahmad, I. ‘Is there an Ethics of Terrorism? Islam, Globalization, Militancy,’ *Journal of South Asia Studies*





religious construction at the expense of its political and socio-economic motivation. Nonetheless Gunaratna asserts that he interviews ‘almost all the leaders of the Kashmiri *Muhajidin*’<sup>28</sup> and ‘spent several hundred hours interviewing over 200 terrorists including Al Qaeda members in more than fifteen countries in Asia (including Central Asia), Africa, the Middle East and Western Europe’<sup>29</sup>. The underlying intention of this assertion is to establish the legitimacy of the research by blending the analysis of terrorism from external religious interpretation with the opinions and experience from inside the terrorist groups<sup>30</sup>.

#### 2.4. Re-subjectification Mode

The subjectivity of terrorism is recovered as key to understand and grasp the nature of the phenomenon of terrorism in re-subjectification mode. The contemporary literature on terrorism studies revitalizes the subjectivity of terrorism by re-theorizing globalization through great events that ‘stand at the threshold of modern age and determine its character’<sup>31</sup>. The invention of the telescope marks a fundamental transformation in people’s relation to their surroundings, by which people start to ‘handle nature from a point in the universe outside the earth and thereby viewing earth as but one more object within that frame’<sup>32</sup>. Ahmad echoes this observation in discovering the source of globalization. ‘it is the atom bomb and the moon landing, the later enabling viewing of the globe as an object from elsewhere, which fashioned the concept of a globe linking people—regardless of their ethnicities, religions and geographies—together’<sup>33</sup>. Therefore, in globalization, universality as new standpoint of modern subjectivity destroys territoriality of identity while the geopolitical boundaries are still erected through conception of nation-states, ethnicities and religions. The co-existence of de-territorialization

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XXXIII, no. 3 (2010), 489.

<sup>28</sup> Gunaratna, R. *Inside AL Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 1.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. vii-viii.

<sup>30</sup> Gunaratna in his *Inside AL Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* eventually externalizes the motivation of terrorism. Therefore, although there is intention in his work to integrate inside knowledge with outside explanation, the external viewpoint on terrorism still dominates his analysis.

<sup>31</sup> Arendt, H. *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 248.

<sup>32</sup> Villa, D R. *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 190.

<sup>33</sup> Ahmad, I. ‘Is there an Ethics of Terrorism? Islam, Globalization, Militancy,’ 495.



of identity in globalization and territorial rationality bounded in modern geopolitical reality transmute terrorism from space-defined security problems into ‘a conceptual-ethical challenge’<sup>34</sup>. Terrorism in globalization is re-interpreted as a new form of subjectivity emerging through the common humanity and suicidal humanity, and portrayed as ‘sublime ideals of courage and sacrifice, and in so doing manifest humanity as an active agent rather than a mere victim of the ongoing onslaught of dehumanization’<sup>35</sup>. This subjectivity recovering process or re-humanization in existing literature also comes from historical and cultural investigation of terrorism. In Claudia Verhoeven’s *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism*<sup>36</sup>, she focuses on investigation of Dmitry Karakozov’s attempted assassination of Alexander II in 1866<sup>37</sup> to explore the birth of modern subjectivity of terrorism. Verhoeven argues that Dmitry Karakozov’s desire to assassinate Alexander II not as a particular individual but as a generic head of a political system marks the emergence of a new, modern political subjectivity<sup>38</sup>. A modern subjectivity through particular mode of political action seeks to directly experience and intervene in the historical process<sup>39</sup>. This new subjectivity is expressed through the form of terrorism under the condition of blocked development, that is, as Verhoeven explained<sup>40</sup>, the onset of modernity creates the ‘conditions for the coming of a historically conscious and politically sovereign subject’, but when this subject’s desire to act in accordance with its nature is blocked, terrorism can emerge’. Therefore, according to this observation, the re-subjectification mode in terrorism studies does not assume that there is subjectivity inherent in terrorism with certain identifiable properties, rather terrorists as

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid. 494.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 497.

<sup>36</sup> Verhoeven, C. *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism* (NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

<sup>37</sup> Dmitry Vladimirovich Karakozov was the first [Russian revolutionary](#) to make an attempt on the life of a [tsar](#). In the spring of 1866, Karakozov arrived in [St Petersburg](#) to assassinate [Alexander II](#). But Alexander II survived that assassination attempt. ‘Long related to the margins of history...Karakozov’s act has been dismissed as precipitate, the man himself as suicidal, irrational, and deranged’ (Morrissey 2011 p.215). Verhoeven attempts to ‘restore this case to its rightful place at the very birth of modern terrorism’ (ibid).

<sup>38</sup> Morrissey, S K. ‘Terrorism, Modernity, and the Question of Origins,’ *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011), 215.

<sup>39</sup> Verhoeven, C. *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism*, 6.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 7.



historically conscious subject take particular form of political action as the unique means to represent their political subjectivity in different historical background. The re-subjectification mode of terrorism, or in other terms, terrorism as a way of representation of certain political subjectivity, also can be found in existing literature about radicalization process of terrorism. Moghaddam<sup>41</sup> draws on the approach of cognitive development to construct a staircase model to illuminate the formation of terrorist subjectivity at individual level. From perception of fraternal deprivation, to perceived absence of procedural justice, to the displacement of aggression onto out-groups, to moral disengagement and re-engagement, and ultimately to the actual conduct of terrorist activities, the alternative options to redress or overcome individual negative emotions are constantly narrowed to the point in which terrorism becomes the unique legitimate solution, or a means to rescue the internal world.<sup>42</sup> Moghaddam's research illuminates the particular developmental trajectory of the subjectivity of terrorism. According to Fishman and Kruglanski research<sup>43</sup>, the self-understanding and identity of terrorists are constituted by a complex interaction between their personality traits such as cognitive style and sensation seeking, and situational conditions such as poverty, oppression, and relative deprivation.

To sum up, the three dominant modes of interpretation of terrorism are neither chronological nor historically concomitant stages but structurally complementary tendencies of understanding phenomenon of terrorism. The mythological representation of terror does not assume the split of terror from the knowing subject; rather, terror is experienced more as an ontological shock, as the fundamental source of existential and social meaning production. However, in the objectification mode, when terror is employed in a systematic way for political change, it becomes a political technique, a form of political manipulation. In this way, terror is transformed into terrorism, which is objectified, externalized and territorialized as the 'other' or an exogenous threat against 'us', the dominant or normalizing social existence. Thus, terror

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<sup>41</sup> Moghaddam, F M. 'The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration', *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005), 161-169.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 162-166.

<sup>43</sup> Fishman, S & Kruglanski, AW. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: "Syndrome" Versus "Tool" Perspectives,' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (2006), 193-215.



in this understanding of terrorism is moving outward as an inhuman object opposed to the subject. In contrast, re-subjectification mode attempts to revive the subjectivity of terrorism, i.e., re-humanizing terrorists through re-interpreting the human condition under globalization. Therefore, re-subjectification mode can be seen as an inward looking model of perception from external structural changes, in which the ontological and existential meanings of terrorism is retrieved at the center of understanding of the phenomenon. Based on above critical summary of existing literature about how people perceive the phenomenon of terrorism, it is worth asking what is the basic trend beyond those different and even contrasting modes of understanding? A structural reversal, or something else? More importantly, how those modes of perception influence people's understanding of the nature of terrorism? Is the 'real' of terrorism hidden from our view under those particular ways of understanding as manifest in existing literature on terrorism? If so, how?<sup>44</sup>

### **3. Remaking Terrorism: From Individual Subjectivity to Political Systemic Representation**

The section aims to answer two questions generated from the observation on existing literature on terrorism: what is the main trend beyond different modes of interpretation about terrorism, and how do they influence people's understanding of the nature of terrorism. By examining the way in which terrorism is constructed through modernizing process of subjectivity and institutional rationalities, this section will reveal the gap of representation of terrorism in modernity and the 'reality' of terrorism. To this end, it will be divided into two parts—Part I will demonstrate the distance between representation and categorization of terrorism by individual subjectivity, and terrorism as fact; Part II will elaborate the remaking of terrorism through political systemic representation<sup>45</sup>. Two cases will be discussed and

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<sup>44</sup> This survey of literature is purposive, not exhaustive. Given the booming industry that terrorism has become—one new book on terrorism is being published every six hours (Silke 2008 p.28)—my selection of literature is admittedly limited and purposive to the argument I make in this research.

<sup>45</sup> Systemic representation means collective form of representation about terrorism vis-à-vis the individual representation of terrorism or the representation through self-consciousness. The terrorism studies from the dimension of social representation focus on the structure and dynamics of collective/cultural thinking, and particularly the social construction of reality (Hewer & Taylor 2007 p.206). The political systemic representation



examined in Part I to show how terrorism is re-created, mistranslated or distorted by subjectivity. Three strategies of political systemic representation of terrorism will be elaborated in Part II to demonstrate the way in which terrorism is manipulated, fabricated and manufactured by modern institutional rationalities. Concomitantly, it will explain the subjectivity presented in the individual understanding of terrorist threat as being increasingly eroded, subordinated and dominated by the political systemic interpretation of terrorism in modernity. It will demonstrate this deepening process of subordination of individual subjectivity in perceiving terrorist problem as a transformation of representation from individual subjectivity to systemic rationalities.

### **3.1. Part I: Distance Between Terrorism Categorized by Subjectivity and Terrorism as Fact**

First, terrorism has been submerged into the particular patterns of self-consciousness in modernity, becoming a product of objectification and externalization of subjectivity. Modernity is viewed by Heidegger as an age of the autonomous subject and boundless human self-assertion, which dissolves ground of truth into inauthenticity<sup>46</sup>. This inauthenticity results from Descartes's appeal to self-consciousness of the subject as one indubitable point, that which is firmly fixed, which makes it the ground of truth. This re-grounding of everything through self-consciousness remakes the 'real' through subjective representation. As Heidegger points out, the unique nature of this remaking process is: 'I am as one representing, but that my representation decides about the being present of everything that is represented' and about presence of what is meant in it; thus, everything referred back as to the unshakeable ground is the full essence of representation itself<sup>47</sup> (Heidegger 1979 p.114). Therefore, reality is subjectified, or in other words, submerged into the stream of consciousness, becoming a product of objectifying and externalizing of the subject. The phenomenon of terrorism in this modern epistemological structure is reduced into individual subjective representation or in other words

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is a way to understand how the interpretation of terrorist event by the state or media results in the dissemination of a 'processed' version of reality, which ultimately reinforces the collective understanding of community (ibid).

<sup>46</sup> Villa, D R. *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, 175.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, M. *Nietzsche*, Krell D F (ed.) (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 114.



the objectifying and externalizing process of self-consciousness. The remaking of new ‘truth’ or ‘genuine’ knowledge about the nature of terrorism is not completed by its reduction into subjective representation in self-consciousness; rather it is also created by ‘an “objective” ordering of representations’<sup>48</sup>. This ‘objective’ ordering as active agent to re-create the nature of terrorism is embedded in certain patterns of subjectivity as ultimate point of reference in approaching the terrorism problem. Splitting, polarization, territorialization between us and the imaginary other are typical patterns or tactics of representation emerging from consciousness of the self to re-constitute the ‘objective’ understanding of terrorism. These patterns in subjective representation of terrorism translate terrorism into something calculable, manageable, measurable and controllable in modern political science and public realm of society. Therefore, the evil of terrorism is not inherent in action of terror but constructed through its representation in the human minds as demonized existence or concrete threat to our individual and social identity. Those techniques of nature-remaking in individual self-consciousness enable individual and society to target and expel the threat, and thus to re-securing and re-affirming the self and the certainty of self-consciousness. Hence, to approach terrorism using those techniques or patterns of representation from self-consciousness is at the same time to distance the subject from the nature of terrorism. In this sense, individual representation of terrorism in self-consciousness leads to the inauthenticity of terrorism.

Second, the dislocation between subjective categorization of terrorism and terrorism as fact leads to excessive interpretation which imposes non-empirical elements upon the understanding of terrorism. The interpretive techniques in subjective representation of terrorism such as polarization, exaggeration and demonization are used to form the rhetorical dimensions of terrorism discourse, leading to disastrous reality making power. In Richard Jackson’s<sup>49</sup> examination of post-9/11 discursive investment in the war on terrorism, the public interpretation of terrorism is manipulated to create a myth of exceptional grievance that legitimates and

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<sup>48</sup> Villa, D R. *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, 194.

<sup>49</sup> Jackson, R. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).



perpetuate American as primary victims of terrorism. By demarcating and categorizing America and her potential target in the War on Terror into victims and perpetrators, civilization and barbarism, democracy and evil, the realities of terrorism is concealed and represented by the excessive and distorted interpretations. According to Copjec<sup>50</sup>, categorization of numbers always creates 'objects' that fall within them, but there are real objects that are not reducible to any category. Thus, there are two different objects, i.e., object logically projected by particular categorization, and object in reality. According to this observation, terrorism is a prime instance of the power to constitute the phenomenon<sup>51</sup>. The actual evidence might be missing, yet people still infer its reality from the traces left by the interpretations given by their audiences<sup>52</sup>. Therefore, the desire or motivation of terrorism is inferred through rhetoric of public discourse; in other words, the manipulation of interpretation. Terrorism in reality, in contrast to its rhetoric construction, is irreducible to any single political and scientific category. Hence, there is dislocation or mismatch between categorization used in perceiving the problem of terrorism and terrorism in reality, between terrorism as a political label and as an objective phenomenon of history and political conflict, between terrorism as signifier and signified. In other words, 'there is a gap, between the evidence and that which the evidence establishes, which means there is something that is not visible in the evidence'<sup>53</sup>. Social understanding of terrorism is formed on this dislocation or gap. The impotence of social categorizing and representing the real of terrorism confronts society with ever-present threat of terror. To suture the gap a supplementary element is ADDED to the LACK of a signifier that could close the field<sup>54</sup>. In so doing the 'lack' turns into 'excess' and thereby interpretation establishes the evidence's meanings<sup>55</sup>. This excessive interpretation imposes non-empirical elements upon people's understanding of terrorism, which ultimately distorts the nature of terrorism. In what follows I

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<sup>50</sup> Copjec, J. *Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1994), 171.

<sup>51</sup> Douglass, W A & Zulaika J. 'The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity,' *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008), 31.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid

<sup>53</sup> Copjec, J. *Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists*, 176.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 174.

<sup>55</sup> Douglass, W A & Zulaika J. 'The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity,' 32.



present two examples of how subjective representation and categorization of terrorism produce the inauthenticity of phenomenon of terrorism.

***Case one: Libyan terrorism as a non-empirical interpretation of the Gulf of Sidra Incident***

In August of 1987, US Tomcat fighter aircraft shot down two Libyan Su-22s over the Gulf of Sirte in Libyan territorial water, 60 miles from the Libyan coast<sup>56</sup>. After the shoot-out over the Mediterranean, security arrangement for the US president were tightened<sup>57</sup>. Raymond W. Copson<sup>58</sup> of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division reported in a governmental brief: ‘there was speculation in the press that these arrangements might be related to the threat of a (possible) Libyan-sponsored assassination attempt in retaliation for the Gulf of Sirte Incident. The speculation seemed to be confirmed in early December, when press reports indicated that the US intelligence officials had received information from an unnamed non-American source with first-hand knowledge of Libyan plans indicating that a Libyan assassination team, including Libyan and other Middle Eastern Nationals as well as an East German might have entered the United States from Canada over the November 30 weekend...’. However, no proof of Libyan hit-team was forthcoming from the US administration<sup>59</sup>. The media cited in the official report as source of evidence to give credibility to the Libyan hit-team caper are also unable to deliver sufficient evidence. As Jeff Gralnick, executive producer of A.B.C.’s World News Tonight stated: ‘No news organization had any finite proof at all’<sup>60</sup>. However, the networks still attempted to create and impose a sensational image of Libyan terrorism with distortions and conflicting details on the lack of evidence. For example, two

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<sup>56</sup> The Gulf of Sidra Incident is a highly controversial case not merely because of the legal and geopolitical dispute on the Gulf of Sidra (see for example Blum 1986) but also, more importantly, the complexities of Libyan-U.S. relation (see Perdue 1989). In spite of those highly contested aspects, my aim is to demonstrate how the US government relies on ad hominem arguments that shift its argument away from merits of logic and evidence to national chauvinism, so as to institute the category of Libyan terrorism.

<sup>57</sup> Perdue, W D. *Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear* (New York: Preager, 1989), 52.

<sup>58</sup> Copson, R W ‘Libyan: U.S. Relations,’ *Issue Brief*, Number IB81152, (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1982), 96.

<sup>59</sup> Perdue, W D. *Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear*; 53.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.





assassins were reported to have entered the US from Canada and Mexico, which indicates there are two teams<sup>61</sup>. A.B.C reported that team included three Libyans, two Iranians, no Syrians, one Palestinian, one East German, and one Lebanese; C.B.S. reported *no* Libyans, three Iranians, one East German, no Syrians, one Palestinian and one Lebanese<sup>62</sup>. Those conflicting and unconfirmed details manufacture a sensational tale of Libyan terrorism, objectify and concretize the threat to the US society from the imaginary source of terror, and thus justify the US military action against Qaddafi and his regime. The whole thing about Qaddafi sponsored assassination and terrorist threat was a complete fabrication<sup>63</sup>. This fabrication in form of objectification and exaggeration underpins the subjective representation of terrorism, filling Libyan terrorism label with territoriality, ethnicity, immorality and concretized horror. To differentiate and separate ‘them’ from ‘us’ means to erect or realize and legitimate the border for the audience of this fabricated terror against imaginary threat. More fundamentally, although actual evidence of terrorist threat is wanting, it can be inferred and produced from distorted interpretation and fabricated details. Those unjustifiable speculations about Libyan terrorist motivation and action are indeed a non-empirical addition or a signifier without signified in realities. The excess of interpreting Libyan threat forms a deceptive cocoon for the lack of actual evidence of the threat, which leads to a superabundance of signifier to the signified in the real. This excess or non-empirical addition re-creates its own subjectified or categorized terrorism that cannot be referred back to the existence in actualities. This terrorist label thus is itself devoid of content, that is, it is zero<sup>64</sup>. But it is this zero, this non-empirical addition or excess in signifying, enables newsmaker ‘to play a key role in the marshaling of crucial public support<sup>65</sup>. And, it is this remaking power of language, this non-reality, which justifies political

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<sup>61</sup> Weisman, J. ‘Why American TV is so Vulnerable to Foreign Disinformation’, *TV Guide*, (12 June, 1982), 5-16.

<sup>62</sup> Perdue, W D. *Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear*, 53.

<sup>63</sup> Hersh, S. ‘Target Qaddafi,’ *New York Times Magazine* (2 Feb, 1987), accessed 9/5/2013, <<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/22/magazine/target-qaddafi.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>>.

<sup>64</sup> Douglass, W A & Zulaika J. ‘The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity,’ *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008), 31.

<sup>65</sup> Perdue, W D. *Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear*, 53.



and military intervention and assassination by the US, and creates terrorism as exogenous threat to our legitimating boundary of humanity.

***Case two: reconstructing Jihad through binary language***

The dislocation of subjective representation of terrorism and the nature of terrorism manifests in the binary language used to describe Jihad and emergence of Taliban. Asad<sup>66</sup> observed that in contrast to the earlier violent groups in Europe who are all operating within the framework of nation-state and were therefore insider, ‘the present adversaries (Muslim terrorists) are outsider—even when they are citizens of the liberal democratic state or inhabitants of its governed territories’. The violence of Islamic groups is incomprehensible precisely because it is not embedded in a historical narrative and is thereby seen as irrational threat<sup>67</sup>. Therefore, Islamic terrorism is portrayed as a clash of civilization, which is constructed in a binary language—Islam versus western, outsider versus insider, and irrational versus rational. The antagonistic categorization is extended into the interpretation of jihad that is always seen as the religious ideology behind terrorism. Jihad is understood as a culturally distinctive expression of Muslim intolerance and arrogance towards non-Muslims<sup>68</sup>. ‘With the decline of Islamic civilization and the triumph of West, Islamist violence came to represent a fanatical resentment against modernity’ (ibid). This subjective representation reframes the nature of jihad as ideological source of terrorism into an oversimplified binary structure, that is, a conflict of Muslim against non-Muslim, of pre-modern against modernity, of religious against infidels. Demarcating and polarizing interpretation of terrorism leads to the fragmentation and distortion of the source of terrorism. Representing jihad in an assumed clash of civilization between two antagonistic and exclusive categories ignores not merely the rich history of mutual borrowings and continuous interactions among Christians, Jews, and Muslims but also the fact that the very identity of a people as European (or Islamic) depends on the

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<sup>66</sup> Asad, T. *On Suicide Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 8.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 9.



definition of a highly selective civilizational heritage<sup>69</sup>. In addition, the distance between the actual making of terrorism and subjective making of terrorism is also manifested through scrutinizing the formation of jihads in Afghanistan. The modern state of Afghanistan was created in 1893 as a buffer state between the Russia Empire and British Empire. With the proliferation of tribal groups from different language and ethnic groups there is little sense of national identity in Afghanistan<sup>70</sup>. Jihad was drawn by mullahs as rallying call to first resist the British invasion and later the terror campaigns instituted by Russia's national Security Council. Therefore, jihadism presumed to be as source of terrorism is not an ideological identity which is firmly fixed or inherent in religious tradition of Muslim as source of violence or radicalization, but rather a spontaneous form uniting diversified identities against external threat. The actual radicalization is more complicated and produced in a field of competing political interests between the US, Soviet Union, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Afghan extremist groups were initially supported by the US as a tool to set a bear trap for Soviet Union. But the US government, from the beginning, had adopted a hand-off policy which left the day-to-day operations and direct contact with mujahedeen groups to Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Pakistani motivation and interests often differed from those of the US government, particular in respect to its support of the more extremist mujahedeen groups<sup>71</sup>, consequently, there is a proliferation and amplification of the extremist groups and radical mood among Afghan rebels. As CIA station chief reported: 'they were all brutal, fierce, bloodthirsty, and basically fundamentalist'<sup>72</sup>. In this sense, terrorism is neither a separate entity from 'us', nor inherently evil made by particular ideology; rather it is a process of radicalization cultivated and amplified in the battle ground of conflicting and competing interests and motivations. Fundamentalist ideology is further internalized through indoctrination. The chain of *madrassas* along Afghan-Pakistan border co-funded by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan educated students with

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>70</sup> Murphy, E. *Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 101.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. 108.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 109.



crude Deobandi and Wahhabi teachings, which were not only anti-Soviet but also anti-Shia. The ideological indoctrination from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and financial support from the US facilitated the process of radicalization, contributing to the emergence of Taliban. Taliban in this sense is a mixed and vague identity produced by this complex historical web of conflict and competing interest. Therefore, the subjective representation or interpretation in demarcation discourse does not grasp this complex web of interaction and conflict on which jihad or terrorism is formed.

### **3.2. Part II: Remaking Terrorism through Political Systemic Representation**

Part I has demonstrated the way in which terrorism is mistranslated, distorted or even re-created by subjectivity. Part II will move our analytical focus from individual subjective representation of terrorism to social systemic representation of terrorism. Instead of interpreting the representation of terrorism on individual subjectivity, this part will first explain how terrorism is objectified, re-shaped or produced by the technicizing and universalizing processes of modernity. Sovereign state is institutionalized presence of these processes of modernity. Part II will specify and discuss three typical strategies of systemic representation of terrorism used by state to justify its own rationalities and interests. The subject position of individual subjectivity in representing terrorism in modernizing process is gradually eroded, dominated and replaced by the rationality of modern political system.

The nature of terrorist phenomenon is re-shaped and manufactured by the technicizing process of modernity. In Strauss's *An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays*<sup>73</sup>, the first wave of modernity is marked by the reduction of moral and political problem into technical problem, which on the one hand dissolves all pre-understanding about existence, and reconstructs the center of politics as a technical problem of controllability and manageability on the other. In this technicizing process, man presumed as maker of everything is seen as capable of developing particular tactics on socio- and politico-psychological dimensions to

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<sup>73</sup> Strauss, L. *An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays*, Gildin H (ed.) (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1989).



conquer the immanent disturbing and disruptive elements of self. The techniques used to manage the disruptive elements of self in modernity involve the identification, externalization, objectification and moralization. As Strauss argued<sup>74</sup>, knowing is kind of making. Those techniques help constitute a particular knowing process to re-shape and manufacture the nature of the disruptive elements. Terrorism can be seen as such a disturbing and disruptive factor in society because of its threat to not merely the regularity on which the social operation is based but also the very consciousness of routine on which the self-identity is formed. The consciousness of routine, in Giddens' view<sup>75</sup>, is the origin of self-identity through the learning of what is not-me, the constructing of other, and the cultivating of a sense of being through non-being. Therefore, to restore the ontological security of social self it is essential to conquer the problem of terrorism through conquering our understanding of terrorism. To this end, terrorism as a source of internal or existential anxiety is externalized as an object opposing 'me', as evil, irrationality and disorder, as something exogenous and antagonistic to 'us'. The boundary of routine and regularity on which the legitimacy of political society is built is re-drawn by reframing our knowing of terrorism, in other words, by systemically expelling terrorism as heterogeneity or foreign body to our political society. The nature of terrorism is re-constructed through this systematic reframing of the understanding of terrorism in modernity. Terrorism as internal crisis of the identity in modern political society is suspended and then replaced as an imaginary enemy in remoteness.

Moreover, terrorism is also produced by the separation from the universal community of modernity. Gavin Cameron and Joshua D. Goldstein state: 'modernity's animating principle is prior to ideological content and it is indeed the pre-condition for the development of any truly modern ideologies by establishing the modern relation of individuals to the world'<sup>76</sup>. Hence, instead of understanding terrorism as a concrete ideological pursuance, the primary task is to

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 88.

<sup>75</sup> Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 43-44.

<sup>76</sup> Cameron G & Goldstein J D, 'The Ontology of Modern Terrorism: Hegel, Terrorism Studies, and Dynamics of Violence,' *The Journal of National and Social Philosophy* 6, no.1 (2010), 71.



see how modernity self-consciously produces relational criteria for a new world, in which terrorism is transformed from an ideological category to an ontological category<sup>77</sup>. Modern membership as one such relational criteria produced by Rousseau's conception of general will is not something externally conferred but internally produced<sup>78</sup>. It is the membership, more fundamentally, the act of will rather than the empirical shared content or common essence that dictates the possibilities of community. Concomitantly, this formation of community, the process of willing together and pure universality determines and validates the subjectivity of individual. Thus a paradox emerges from the mutuality of individual will and community; that is, the modern community begins foundationally with being commonly willed by individual subjectivity, but when community becomes the absolute truth of individual subjectivity then individual loses his or her validity to act against the community. The immanent consequence of this contradiction is an ideational rather than ideological destruction of the validity of any particularity in existent world<sup>79</sup>. In this way, the new shape of earthly violence of modernity 'let nothing break loose to become a free object standing over against it'<sup>80</sup>. In other words, modern political society under the guise of universal laws is marked by its sheer negativity, the impossibility to create or preserve independent and meaningful values. Terrorism with its will to reshape the world and fully realize the common values from within is both inside (rediscovering common values and principles) and outside (posing existential threat to individual and social identity) of community. This dual role of terrorism makes it not object of society but abject of society. As a social abject, it is inside of me but what excludes me, what disturbs my identity, system and order<sup>81</sup>. Therefore, terrorism is perceived as heterogeneous and antagonistic to universal community. Terrorism label is produced from its particularity, whether its act or effect, which constitutes its separation from the universal political community. In other words, the 'real' of terrorism is constituted not merely through individual

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid. 60, 71.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. 72.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. 77.

<sup>80</sup> Hegel, G W F. *Philosophy of Spirit*, Miller A V (trans.) (New York: Oxford University Press 1977), 588.

<sup>81</sup> Kristeva, J. 'Approaching Abjection,' *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1-2, 4.



subjective representation but more fundamentally in the very logic of totalized process of modernity. The nature of terrorism is remade and recognized through its separation from the dominant community of modernity. Terrorism is thus construed and represented in the systemic exclusion by universal community in modernity.

Sovereign state and mass media are institutional presence of technicizing and universalizing processes of modernity. The technicizing and universalizing processes of modernity are embedded in the particular strategies developed by the modern political institutions. Thus, to further elaborate my point that a) terrorism is re-shaped by the technological nature of modernity to conquer and control reality, b) terrorism is produced by its separation from universal community in modernity, it is worth investigating the particular strategies of representation of terrorism used by modern state. Below will present three strategies of representing terrorism by modern political and communication institutions, and illuminate how these strategies ultimately reinforce and legitimate the modern rationalities and predispositions underpinning the state.

***Strategy one: terrorism as pure political argument***

The US administration uses terrorism as an argument or a more 'legitimate' justification for its policy commitment. As observed by Friedman<sup>82</sup>, people see threats as more legitimate justification or persuasive argument for policies than ideological ends. Therefore, policymakers in the US justify their policies, whether to promote liberty or serve bureaucratic interests, with an argument about security even if this justification does not match the motivation of security<sup>83</sup>. Driven by this political mentality, one strategy used by the US government to enact policy change is to repackage policies, particularly new ones, as security project<sup>84</sup>. Terrorism is manipulated in the US politics to create a sense of crises or a form of alarm to ensure the support

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<sup>82</sup> Friedman, B H. 'Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,' *Political Science Quarterly* 126, no.1 (2011), 30-77.

<sup>83</sup> Friedman, B H. 'Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,' *Political Science Quarterly* 126, no.1 (2011), 30-77.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.



and compliance from other players in executive branch of bureaucracy and Congress. Iraq war is a prominent example using counterterrorism as a pretext or justification. But the main reason for the war seems to have been to spread liberalism in the Middle East<sup>85</sup>. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick also used the September 11 tragedy to call for fast-track negotiating authority to assist President Bush expend the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) into a Free Trade Area of the Americas<sup>86</sup>. Trade, Robert Zoellick<sup>87</sup> said in *The Washington Post*, is about more than economic sufficiency, it promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle against international terrorists who attack international finance, globalization and the United State. Another example is that terrorism is used as pretext to push Bush's energy plan, including proposal to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. This systemic representation of terrorism based on institutional motivation and constant searches for enemy, then, produces the public fear to sell policy, which does not merely intensify the fear itself but also conceal its cause. Terrorism is processed by the political logic of the US administration thereby being alienated from its social and historical realities and recreated as an argument rather than evidence for the political change. The establishment of Homeland Security is an institutionalized way to objectify terrorism and potentially increase 'the incentives to herald the terrorist threat to the United States'<sup>88</sup>. The justification of the institutional existence relies on magnification and intensification of the fear. Therefore, to preserve the mission of the institution is to preserve, even promote, the sense of threat<sup>89</sup>.

***Strategy two: terrorism as rhetoric construction through political discursive structure***

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<sup>85</sup> McClellan, S. *What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington's Culture of Deception* (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008), 128-9; Harlow, B & Tenet., G. *At the Center of the Storm: My Time at the CIA* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 321.

<sup>86</sup>Rampton, S., Fall. 'Terrorism as Pretext', *P R Watch*, (2001), pp.8, <<http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/2001Q4/terror.html>>.

<sup>87</sup> Zoellick, R B. "Countering Terror with Trade", *The Washington Post*, (20 Sep.2001).

<sup>88</sup> Friedman, B H. 'Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,' 92.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. 93.





Turkish government adopts a biased political discursive structure to presume the existence of separatist terrorism of Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) at a rhetoric level. Security related to the recognition of national identity is always the core element in the political discursive structure of any polity. In the Turkish case, 'national security' is defined by National Security Council (NSC) as the 'preservation and protection against the collective internal and external threats to the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, integrity, all of its political, social, cultural and economic interests and contractual rights in the international arena'<sup>90</sup>. This conception constructs a political discursive structure in which the state is granted with supreme validity and individual is robbed of any valid claim that she or he can make against the regime. The use of expressions such as 'national existence', 'integrity' or 'constitutional order of the state' narrows the understanding of security, validity and identity, making some political options logical and legitimate whereas others evil and threatening. The naming of the 'other' is conditioned by this biased structure<sup>91</sup>. Based on this political rhetoric strategy, Turkish Land Forces Commander, General Basbug, defines separatist terrorism as ethnic nationalists aiming to destroy the Turkish state and the unitary structure of Turkey<sup>92</sup>. The nature of separatist terrorism of Turkey is produced on a rhetoric level by distancing it from the given language of legitimacy and validity such as unity, constitutional order or unitary structure of Turkey. In other words, the labeling of the political dissident group as separatist terrorists reflects the binary structure of concepts, in which any concept contains its significance as well as its opposite<sup>93</sup>. Separatist terrorism in Turkey exists as rhetoric opposite of the dominant discursive validity such as national integrity, unitary structure and sovereignty. By constructing PKK as an opposite of political discursive legitimacy in Turkey, it is transformed to terrorist organization in Turkish political system. The differentiation process in terrorism labeling does

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<sup>90</sup> Arslan, Z. "Government" in Cizre, Ü (ed.), *Almanac Turkey 2005. Security sector democratic oversight* (Istanbul: TESEV/DCAF, 26–35 2006), 26.

<sup>91</sup> Barrinha, A. 'The Political Importance of Labeling: Terrorism and Turkey's Discourse on the PKK,' *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 2 (2011), 166.

<sup>92</sup> Turkish Weekly. 'Turkey Cries for her Losses in Sirnak', *Journal of Turkish Weekly* (11 June, 2007), accessed 03/8/2007, <<http://turkishweekly.net/>>.

<sup>93</sup> Jackson, R. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism*, 21.



not end here; there is also a concern with separating the terrorists from the average Kurds and externalizing the label to outside actors such as the Kurdish President of Iraq and the president of the autonomous Kurdish region in the north of the country<sup>94</sup>. The separation and externalization make PKK an external threat to the sovereign order of Turkey, which reinforces the opposing position of PKK against dominant discursiveness of political validity. The labeling of terrorism in Turkish case reflects how discursive structure of dominant political system colonizes the understanding of terrorism and re-constitutes the nature of the phenomenon.

### ***Strategy three: sovereign denial of control predicament***

The final strategy of systemic representation of terrorism is operated through the sovereign denial of control predicament. According to Garland<sup>95</sup>, one of the foundational myths of sovereign state is that it is capable of providing security, law and order, and the crime control within its territorial boundaries. The predicament of control for modern state limits its role as a primary provider of security and crime control. The decentralization and fragmentation of terrorist threat produce the unprecedented predicament of sovereign control, that is, the looser operational connections and more polycentric Islamist terrorism make it harder for intelligence to uncover exploitable links<sup>96</sup>. A single penetration of a conventional or pyramid type of organization can lead to the deconstruction of the whole, whereas fragmented operation units present no single opportunity for state to destroy a significant portion of the resistance<sup>97</sup>. Therefore, the decentralized terrorism has been more adaptable, flexible, versatile, robust and resilient in the face of attack, increasing its ability to defy counterleadership targeting and absorb a number of attacks on its distributed nodes<sup>98</sup>. This control predicament of sovereign state over terrorist threat results in government to 'hysterical denial of this predicament', that is, to symbolically reassert the myth of sovereign control with ultra-punitive and exclusionary

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<sup>94</sup> Barrinha, A. 'The Political Importance of Labeling: Terrorism and Turkey's Discourse on the PKK,' 172-3.

<sup>95</sup> Garland, D. 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society,' *British Journal of Criminology* 36, no. 4 (1996), 445-71.

<sup>96</sup> Pillar, P R. 'Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda,' *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2004), 104.

<sup>97</sup> Beam, L. 'Leaderless Resistance,' *The Seditonist*, (1992) accessed 04/08/11, <<http://www-personal.umich.edu/~satran/PoliSci 06/Wk 11-1 Terrorism Networks leaderless-resistance.pdf>>.

<sup>98</sup> Sageman, M. *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2004), 12-3.



policies of harsher sentences<sup>99</sup>. Terrorists who challenge the limits of sovereign state is pathologized and demonized in the sovereign reassertion of crime control. However, the nature of terrorist threat to de-legitimate sovereign control is not because it is inherent more evil or pathological but rather it is embedded in heterogeneous form of power with the sovereign state. The fluid and decentralized form of terrorism privilege it with 'power of rapid movement, across, over and under many apparent regions, disappearing and then reappearing, transmuting their form...unexpectedly and chaotically<sup>100</sup>.' This nature of new terrorism, the fluid and dispersed power, constitutes the real source of predicament of sovereign control. But the approach adopted by the state to combat this threat and re-legitimate its role of primary provider of security is to increase its prohibitive and punitive power such as harsher policy and sentence against terrorists. Therefore, the representation of terrorism through harsher punishment, or in other words, the hard power of state as a form of hysterical denial of sovereign failure mismatches the actual presentation of terrorism as new form of power.

The other way of sovereign denial of control predicament is to eliminate the uncertain sign of terror, which also leads to distorted representation of terrorism. Terrorism is the systematic use of terror to create a climate of fear on target population, thus it is essentially a manipulation of mental state of fear or being terrorized. In this sense, the real danger of terrorism as an unlawful or de-legitimate form of violence against sovereign power is not manifested in its immediate material damage but its power to generate an epistemologically disruptive effect on the target population. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt argued<sup>101</sup>, terrorist threat is fundamentally epistemological, which tends to be about disruption more than destruction. For instance, drawing on global media as its amplifier a single attack of terrorism with very limited damages will create a much broader atmosphere of horror at regional or even global level.

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<sup>99</sup> Brown, D & Gray, J. "“Devils and Dust”: Extending the “Uncivil Politics of Law and Order” to the “War on Terror”,’ in *Counter-Terrorism and the Post-Democratic State*, Hocking J and Lewis C (ed.) (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2007), 153-171.

<sup>100</sup> Urry J, "The global complexities of September 11th" *Theory, Culture and Society* 19 (2002) 65.

<sup>101</sup> Arquilla, J & Ronfeldt, D. 'Chapter 1 - The Advent of Netwar (revisited),’ in Arquilla J & Ronfeldt, D (ed.), *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001). Also, available at <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf>>.



Horror is the ‘perception of the precariousness of human identity, to the perception that it may be lost or invaded’<sup>102</sup>. The traumatic images of terrorist attack disseminated through media are bound up with an uncertainty or anxiety concerning the meaning of objects or attitudes<sup>103</sup>. The anxiety or insecurity on the ontological level of the audience is fundamentally diffuse, free-floating, lacking a specific object<sup>104</sup>. This disruptive effect or uncertainty on the psychological and ontological level of the general population produces even more threats than the fluid form of terrorist violence to the role of sovereign state as primary provider of security to its population. Even if government can symbolically re-demonstrate its capability to control through a range of ultra-punitive and exclusionary policies of harsher and mandatory sentences, it fails to control the psychological uncertainty and insecurity of the amplified terrorist signs. Hence, in every society various techniques are developed that are intended to fix the floating chain of signified in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs<sup>105</sup>. In other words, society attempts to fix, or in more accurate terms, create the meaning beneath the uncertain signs of terrorism, thereby restoring the meaning of community and securing the identity of individuals. The technique used to eliminate uncertainty or manufacture a new one by sovereign power is embedded in the form of official hermeneutics. Official hermeneutics is an official form of pre-supposition that ‘what appears on the surface is not the truth and seeks to control what lies beneath – through interpretation it converts absences into signs’<sup>106</sup>. For instance, Ford Hood shooting in 2009 appeared to be a typical case of lone-wolf terrorism. The shooting creates highly disruptive and chaotic effect, which produces a fear in American society about the internal crisis of military system and American political community. But following the investigation by FBI, government attempts to establish the evidence to prove the external affiliation of Nidal to Islamic Jihadi movement through his contact with US-born militant

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<sup>102</sup> Asad, T. *On Suicide Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 68.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. 30.

<sup>104</sup> Giddens, A. *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 44.

<sup>105</sup> Barthes, R. ‘Rhetoric of the Image’, *Image, Music, Text*, Heath S (Ed and trans.) (New York: Hill and Wang 1977), 39.

<sup>106</sup> Asad, T. *On Suicide Bombing* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 31.



Moslem cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Therefore, the mortal threat from Islamic extremist and jihadi ideology, and its presence in American community, emerge as the ultimate reading of event, which overlooks the actual cause and course of Nidal's radicalization.

Last but not least, in re-subjectification mode of terrorism, instead of being transformed from a negative agent re-constructed by individual consciousness or sovereign discourse to a positive or creative agent, terrorism is instrumentalized and integrated into the surviving logic of the world in modernity. In the above analysis of this section, terrorism, whether it is represented by individual consciousness or sovereign state, appears to be a negative phenomenon manipulated or given by 'us'. The objectification mode is the typical technique used in the distorted representation of terrorism by individual or state. However, the re-subjectification mode of terrorism seems to revitalize the subjectivity of terrorists so that eliminating the problem of inauthenticity of terrorism. However, by scrutinizing the modern global conditions and terrorism, the operation of world system<sup>107</sup> is no longer built on rejecting and re-constituting of terrorism but the very existence of the subjectivity of terrorism. The universal standpoint of modern science underlines the necessity of taking up a position outside the world and thus viewing the earth as object within the frame of universe. The withdrawal from terrestrial proximity contained in the discovery of the global as a whole places the representing subject at an infinitely vaster imaginary distance from the earth<sup>108</sup>. The fruit of this project of earth alienation—of the desire to dispose of the earth from the outside—is nuclear weapon<sup>109</sup>. This earth alienation or in other terms, de-worldly rationalization, and its fatal consequences constitute the context in which common humanity and suicidal humanity are emerged. The humanity in this globalization has been deprived of any possible certainty, of any firm ground for knowledge of or action upon the world<sup>110</sup>. The terrorism in this globalization

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<sup>107</sup> World system refers to the dominant political rationality of international political system in the context of globalization rather than a socioeconomic system that encompasses all of globe. The paper has argued that states attempt to fabricate the 'real' of terrorism to legitimate its sovereign power. Here it will argue that the working of world system in globalization depends on the subjectivity of terrorism.

<sup>108</sup> Arendt, H. *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 264.

<sup>109</sup> Kateb, G. *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil* (Totowa, J.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983).

<sup>110</sup> Villa, D R. *Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, 193.



process is revived of its subjectivity as rescuing power to this internal crisis of humanity by sacrifice. ‘They [terrorists] simply wish to reshape it [the world] from within; not by destroying common values and principles but by constantly striving to fully realize them’<sup>111</sup>. Al-Qaeda’s terror, in this sense, is driven by the impulse to truly universalize the security so that it can be enjoyed by everyone or by no one<sup>112</sup>. The action of suicide bomber is thus a sacrifice to fully realize the shared humanity and ethical politics of the world. Terrorism is not sheer opposite or separate from common humanity any more but an inevitable part of it, without which people are blocked possibilities for full realization of existing shared value of public common world, and retrieval of the firm ground of humanity. The subjectivity of terrorism is integrated into the very logic of survival of the world in modernity. The real of terrorism is instrumentalized for the self-preservation of self-destructive system of the world politics.

#### 4. Conclusion

The research essay has examined the problems in the processes of representing and remaking terrorism through individual subjectivity and systemic rationality of modernity so as to analyze and to describe the distortion, alienation and mistranslation between the interpretation of terrorism and the ‘reality’ of terrorism. From individual representation of terrorism through self-consciousness and subjective categorization to systemic representation of terrorism by modernizing process and sovereign state, the subject position of individual perception of terrorism is eroded and subordinated by the institution-or process-dominant perception from state and society in modernity. Compared with the representation of terrorism through self-consciousness in which man is creator of everything, the interpretation of terrorism by political or social systems is dominated by the rationality embedded in political or social system. There is a constant decline of the subject position of individual self-

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<sup>111</sup> Ahmad, I. ‘Is there an Ethics of Terrorism? Islam, Globalization, Militancy,’ *Journal of South Asia Studies* XXXIII, no. 3 (2010), 495.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. 496.



consciousness for terrorist phenomenon. Concomitantly, there is a domination of institutional rationality, of the process of modernity in representing the problem of terrorism.

Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass write: ‘only through the intervention of one’s own desire can analysis interpret what “terrorism” is telling us. The terrorist’s desire, the terrorist’s real, can only be understood through the analyst’s desire’<sup>113</sup>. The aim of this essay was to catch this real of terrorism by exploring the desire deep inside the appearance of its interpretation. The essay demonstrated the complexities of the nature of terrorism, and the significance of the way to approach terrorism as symbolic interaction. The aim of critical terrorism studies, to cite Jackson<sup>114</sup> (2007 p.246), is to understand terrorism ‘as a social process constructed through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices’. In line with this framework of critical terrorism studies this essay also aspired for a more thorough and democratic understanding of terrorism. It is up to the reader to judge if my attempt has been effective.

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<sup>113</sup> Douglass, W A & Zulaika J. ‘The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity,’ 32.

<sup>114</sup> Jackson, R. ‘The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,’ *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007), 246.



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## **Algeria's Turbulent Path to Democracy: Missed Chances and The Fall of Abdelaziz Bouteflika**

*Israel Nyaburi Nyadera\**

*Billy Agwanda\*\**

### **Abstract**

*The disastrous consequences some Middle East and North African countries experienced as a result of the Arab Spring diluted any hopes that another wave of people driven demands for democracy would be on the horizon in the region. Therefore, when protestors poured on the streets of major cities in Algeria demanding an end to the reign of president Bouteflika, who was contesting the presidency for a fifth term, many remained sceptical that this would result to a now familiar case of bloodshed and destruction as being witnessed in Yemen, Syria and Libya. This article seeks to examine Algeria's turbulent journey in search of democracy, the missed opportunities and the bloodless fall of Bouteflika. It argues that the involvement of the military in Algeria's politics has been the biggest obstacle to democracy, and the recent events that led to the fall of the military supported regime of Bouteflika could mark the beginning of a hopeful path to political reforms.*

**Key Words:** *Algeria, Democracy, Bouteflika, Army, Revolution*

### **1. Introduction**

Compared to the other regional neighbours, since the early 1990s, Algeria has been in a status of relatively 'stable instability'. Subsequent regimes after independence prior to the 1990s experienced domestic political challenges from time to time in the form of extensive economic crisis in the mid-1990s with the situation deteriorating to a near state bankruptcy in the early 1990s. Additionally, there were serious instances of severe armed conflicts between security forces and Islamist insurgents due to the interruptions on parliamentary elections by the army in January 1992. However, from 1995, the government of the day took measures to restore and redress the economic situation supported by the structural adjustment programmes under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund and the United States as well as obtaining economic life-lease from the rescheduled debt repayments. These developments enabled the regime to maintain command and secure firmly urban centres within the country as well as maintain Western support for the government.

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\* Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, inyadera@gmail.com

\*\* Department of African Studies and International Relations, Istanbul Commerce University, agwandabilly@gmail.com



The critical moment in Algeria's domestic situation was marked by the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1989 as the first civilian president. His successful election to the presidency came at the backdrop of his domestic political popularity founded on his experiences in public career as a foreign minister in the periods between the 1960s-1970s. Moreover, his election campaign was premised on his promise to re-establish peace, rebuild the economy and bring to an end the isolation of Algeria at the international system. Indeed, the first decade of his administration witnessed appreciable developments. However, collectively in his 3 decades at the helm of political leadership of Algeria, these reforms seemed to have halted and did not reflect changes in the structure of socio-political and economic affairs of Algeria that continue to persist today. Continuous decline in democratic practices and the rule of law has alienated the masses and deepened tensions in relations between the state and the society and this has been vividly expressed in a series of riots within the last three decades and currently, the revolution against the Bouteflika regime as will be discussed in the later sections of this article. The Algerian state dynamics represents a heavy dependence on hydrocarbon industries as source of employment especially those under the age of 30 years who also happen to constitute the largest share of the population. Previously, even though violence subsided during the 1990s with the election of Bouteflika, terrorist groups were still active both in the north and south posing real threats to Algerian national and foreign interests.

As such, despite experiencing relatively stable political environment since the election of Bouteflika, a majority of the Algerian population have continued to suffer from the long-term effects of underlying currents of poor economic environment that at different stages has threatened the survival of the state. Despite having experienced the same political change in 2011 that was characterised by the emergence of the Arab springs in the Middle East and in the North African countries, Algerian polity became more conscious about governance and the possibility of standing up to authoritarian regimes in the quest for change. For three decades Algeria remained isolated from the revolutionary political developments that was being experienced in the neighbouring countries.

This paper will therefore identify the key factors that have continuously threatened the Algerian polity relative to the failed political transition and democratic reforms as well as analyse Algeria's immediate post-independence socio-political developments and the condition of the 'stable instability' that prevailed for the closed to three decades period since 1995 through constant aversion of severe



political conflict and radical changes. Additionally, the paper will focus on periods during the accession of Bouteflika to power, his political reforms through the restoration of presidential authority at the expense of military command which has characterised the region by their influence on media, parliament and political parties. Lastly the paper will address the impact of the Arab springs on Algeria and the path that has led to the resignation of Bouteflika from political power after mass protests.

## **2. Post -Independence Algeria**

Algeria was a French colony and attained independence in 1962 becoming a major regional power in the North African region. However, just like a majority of other independent African countries, Algeria has gone through a myriad of political challenges that present an interesting analysis for political developments and democratization. Historically, the French invaded Algeria in 1830<sup>115</sup> and was integrated as an integral part of the French provinces after 1848 therefore transforming the country into socio-economic, intellectual and administrative region. However, this colonial rule came to an end following an 8-year independence war leading to the death of approximately one million people. During this period, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which was established in 1954, emerged as the leading front for the liberation struggle and was constituted of different clusters of the society from secular groups, socialists, Islamists and nationalists. At independence, the new republic established under the FLN leadership began a 3-decade single party rule under military influence on the republic. During the leadership of Colonel Houari Boumediene between 1965 and 1978, the party developed its identity around Arab nationalism and socialism.

Upon Boumediene's death in 1979, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid took over the leadership of Algeria and continued his rule under political party authority but with a strong military support. In as much as the early socialist economic policies benefited the Algerian society in the early years of independence, the political incompetency of this regime coupled with a declining economy in the 1980s resulted in discontent with the Bendjedid regime leading to widespread riots in 1988 and constitutional reforms in

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<sup>115</sup> Halaçoğlu, Canan C. Occupation and the Colonization Of Algeria From 1830 To 1870: A Struggle For Dominance, Doctoral Dissertation, Middle East Technical University (2013).



1989 as the regime resort to adopt strategies that can ensure its continued political survival.<sup>116</sup> The result of these constitutional reforms was the introduction of a multiparty system with more than 20 political parties registered within the first year of this legislative reform with key parties such as the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) that was constituted of both hardliner and soft-liner Islamist factions.<sup>117</sup> With the FIS developing into a major leading political party in Algeria, they advanced for a sharia-based regime while deconstructing democracy as a Western invention and promising major political transformations in the Algerian political system.

The first ever multi-party elections in Algeria were held in 1990 in what was understood as the first steps towards democratic transition in the republic. The independence ruling party backed by the state military support lost to the newly established and popular FIS who won with a majority vote of 55% of the votes. In 1991, the legislative elections were held and again the FIS party won with a 47% of all the votes representing 188 elected legislative seats.<sup>118</sup> The huge loss on the FLN alarmed the army who responded by executing a coup d'état which cancelled the election outcomes, banned the FIS and forced Bendjedid to resign bring to an end the democratization process and the beginning of authoritarian regime that culminated into an 8-year long civil war between the army and the various Islamic forces. This civil war claimed around 100,000 lives and despite the surrender of the country leadership by the army back to the civilian rule, authoritarian regime dominated the domestic politics.

Abdelaziz Bouteflika vied for the presidency in 1999 with the military support and won the elections following the withdrawal of the other candidates who cited plans of systematic rigging. However, following his election, Bouteflika embarked on systematic actions for the purposes of national reconciliation with the opposition parties and pardoning of some Islamist insurgents putting to an end a decade of vicious civil war. By consolidating power, order and unity after the civil war, Bouteflika went on to win four consecutive presidential elections between 1999 and 2014 in multiparty elections. However, the democratic space continued to be very limited under Bouteflika as the military continued

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<sup>116</sup> Dessi, Andrea. *Algeria at the Crossroads: Between Continuity and Change*. Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, (2011).

<sup>117</sup> Addi, Lahouari. "Political Islam and democracy: the case of Algeria." (1997).

<sup>118</sup> Brumberg, Daniel. "Islam, elections, and reform in Algeria." *Journal of democracy* 2, no. 1 (1991): 58-71.



have an influential role in domestic politics. This limitation however was an upgrade in comparison to the decades before Bouteflika came to power. There were elements of civil society participation, political parties and electoral democracy.

The earlier struggles for democracy in Algeria was not only relevant for the country but also for the North African region and the Middle East in extension which only had Lebanon as the only country with multi-party democracy even though one complicated by the concessional system and long civil wars<sup>119</sup>. As such, the constitutional reforms witnessed in Algeria became a source of hope for political transformation not only within North Africa but also in the Middle East. However, ultimately, the challenges and failure of the democratization processes equally had an influence in the region. For example, the success of FIS illustrated concerns of authoritarian regimes of Islamist political takeover were not baseless. Consequently, authoritarian leaders became more occupied with ensuring the political survival of their regimes and secular factions became even wearier of working with the Islamist groups. Secondly, the coup d'état was a clear message to other opposition groups within the region of the difficulties in democratization and this was demonstrated with a decline in democratization struggle by opposition groups in the region for close to two decades until the onset of the Arab springs in 2011. Thirdly, lessons learnt during the past civil wars became arguably a deciding factor on whether or not Algeria would be involved in the Arab springs like other countries within the region.<sup>120</sup> The regime also understood the cost of another civil war and therefore, through the previous gains made in constitutional reforms that were still preserved, the regime was able to compromise with the demands of the people by agreeing to concessions in order to alleviate demonstrations.

### **3. Democratic Efforts and Military Intervention**

The democratic wave that had wrapped the country in 1989 with the introduction of multiparty politics were quickly eroded following the coup d'état by the army in 1992 who intervened to prevent the *Front Islamique fu Salut* (FIS) from winning the majority seats in the first ever free legislative elections during the 1991 elections held in Algeria. In as much the army was not the only actor in the Algerian political system opposed to the establishment of an Islamic state, the army acted outside the constitutional

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<sup>119</sup> Sutton, Keith. "Political changes in Algeria: an emerging electoral geography." *Maghreb Review* 17, no. 1-2 (1992): 3-27.

<sup>120</sup> Volpi, Frédéric. "Algeria versus the Arab spring." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 104-115



mandate and continued to dominate the political scene as the arbiter of power in Algeria until 1999 when a civilian regime of Bouteflika came to power. The reputation damage by the coup d'état orchestrated by the army in 1992 led to change of position within the army high command structures in favour of a subtler and less visible role in Algerian politics.

Bouteflika's ascension to political power after elections as the first democratically elected president following 8 years of civil war in Algeria was with the support of the army. However, in his agenda he had also promised to bring about reforms and restore and re-establish civil peace and open a new chapter in the history of Algeria that would lead to prosperity. This agenda provided a reconciliatory platform between the FIS Islamists and the military bureaucracy who equally supported his new policies such as on the Law on Civil Concord of 1999 and the Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation that was introduced in 2005. These two initiatives provided amnesty to several members of the insurgent groups in exchange for the acknowledgement and submission to state authority. Also, the two initiatives partially acknowledged the role played by these insurgents in the violence by compensating families of those who had 'disappeared'.<sup>121</sup> Notably, these two initiatives were subjected to referendum and passed with overwhelming support of the Algerian polity. Having come to power based on his agenda for reconciliation and peace, these two initiatives were central to Bouteflika during his first two terms in presidential office between 1999-2004, and 2004-2009.<sup>122</sup>

These initiatives spearheaded by Bouteflika to a large extent were successful in consolidating the gains made by the military in taming the radical political wing under the Islamists into accepting a truce leading to substantive decline in political violence and conflict. But these policies also had a number of shortcomings. For example, neither of the two initiatives were hatched from a true and genuine desire for the search of truth and reconciliation that would ensure justice is served by establishing the responsibilities of various factions in the Algerian civil war. According to the International Crisis Group the major reason for this shortcoming was due to the nature of the Algerian political system and that the truce though

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<sup>121</sup> Tlemçani, Rachid. *Algeria under Bouteflika: Civil strife and national reconciliation*. Vol. 7. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.

<sup>122</sup> Joffé, George. "National reconciliation and general amnesty in Algeria." *Mediterranean Politics* 13, no. 2 (2008): 213-228.





holding at the time, left different sides of the political divides bitterly dissatisfied.<sup>123</sup> Secondly, the policies failed to account for a process of rehabilitation of the outlawed FIS party, thereby failing to provide a political solution to the crisis. The consequence of this failure was seen in part of the regime failing to recognise the political nature of the crisis and therefore failing to gain the support of the Islamist movement who were main actors in the civil war. Finally, the two initiatives failed to completely bring an end to the violence with as weekly attacks targeting security forces were witnessed especially during the early months of the year 2000. Moreover, with the integration of the splinter groups, such as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), there was an increase in terroristic violence in Algeria due to increased global influence of jihadist networks that was manifested in the style of terrorist attacks in the use of suicide bombings.<sup>124</sup>

However, despite the mixed results experienced in implementation, Bouteflika came out with more political authority in domestic politics as well as in diplomatic spheres and was widely considered as the right man to provide the urgently needed political stability and peace to Algeria. Additionally, his regime's decision to subject these two initiatives to popular vote on a referendum, provided him with a much more founded legitimacy that allowed him to have a stringer bargaining power with the military bureaucracy and a more credible interlocutor with foreign partners. This was a key step towards restoring civilian rule in Algerian politics through the office of the presidency at the expense of military rule and power structure. According to Roberts Bouteflika stressed the importance of him having the full prerogative of the constitutional authority of the presidency in exercising his power<sup>125</sup>. Additionally, Mortimer, argues that Bouteflika would not have succeeded in changing the distribution of power away from the military leadership absent persuasion that the interests of the military and the military leadership both in the future and that moment would be better served by imposing himself as the reliable choice and partner of the West in issues of security and economic cooperation<sup>126</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup> International Crisis Group, *The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet*, Africa Report No. 24, Algiers/Paris/London/Brussels (2000)

<sup>124</sup> Filiu, Jean-Pierre. "Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?." (2009).

<sup>125</sup> Roberts, Hugh. *Demilitarizing Algeria*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.

<sup>126</sup> Mortimer, Robert. "State and army in Algeria: the 'Bouteflika effect'." *Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. (2006): 155-171.



Indeed, in consolidating democratization processes in any country, the importance of having proper check and balances on the military cannot be emphasized enough. However, in the Algerian case, Bouteflika's political endeavours towards reestablishment and consolidation of civilian rule came with extensive consequences on democratic rule. Some of these consequences were directly linked with Bouteflika's actions in rationalisation of political authority in Algeria such that platforms for political expressions such as political parties, civil societies and media became part and parcel of factions that characterised and previously encouraged by the military dominance in Algerian politics. Bouteflika's take on these organisations was that they represented and, or, acted as pawns in military leadership and therefore had to be dealt with as such leading to side-lining of political parties, closure of certain media outlets and the jailing of journalists on claims of defamation under very tough defamation laws as he attempted to manoeuvre against military grip on Algerian politics.<sup>127</sup> However, despite these actions, the French press continued to advocate vote media freedoms and rights and indeed, made gains to develop as one of the most diversified and independent in North Africa and Middle East.

Another cause for the lack of democratic space under Bouteflika was his populist and paternalistic political outlook<sup>128</sup>. Despite his campaign promises for extensive socio political and economic reforms in Algeria, it soon became clear that much of these liberal thoughts were only directed to the West purposely to attract support of Western powers which he desperately needed to stamp his domestic political authority. The political reality was that Bouteflika was not contented with the political structure as institutionalised and provided for in the Algerian constitution as he had very little space for political tolerance for critics and embarked on a political process to consolidate his power and take over the absolute control of decision-making process in several key policy areas. Consequently, this path led to the marginalization of parliament as presidential decrees became the new means of legislation including on important aspects of national interest such as economic and fiscal policies. There was no space for debate.

Despite several applications for establishment of political parties between 1999 and 2011, only one political party; the nationalist Front National Algérien (FNA) headed by Moussa Touati, a former

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<sup>127</sup> Darbouche, Hakim. "Algeria's chequered democracy experiment." *Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties: Democratisation's Trials in the European Neighbourhood*, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels (2009).

<sup>128</sup> Evans, M., & Phillips, J. (2007). *Algeria: Anger of the dispossessed*. Yale University Press.



military officer was approved in September 1999. Additionally, audio-visual media services for a long time remained under the tight grip of absolute state control and the state of emergency introduced in 1992 remaining in effect until February 2011 in what was viewed as a government contradiction of its claim of victory over the defeat of Islamist splinter military groups by the state forces<sup>129</sup>

#### **4. Consolidation Of Power Under President Bouteflika**

These calculated actions by Bouteflika enabled him to consolidate power and by the end of 2005, he had successfully secured his ascendancy over top military leadership in policy decisions and debates as well as successfully winning a re-election in 2004 despite facing a fierce opposition in the campaign trails which was composed of influential figures from the military. His re-election however, provided him with the best opportunity to send this crop of military leaders into retirement as well as enabled him to regain control of the FLN party into his fold after it had slipped into the hands of his opponents. These brought with it a wide network of trade unions and local religious organisations stretching his administrative influence. This influence manifested itself when despite his failing health since 2005 through to the Arab springs and into early 2008, Bouteflika managed to maintain a strong influence in the face of emboldened opponents and even succeeding in amending the constitution in 2008 to pave his way for his 3rd term re-election bid which he still won.

Bouteflika's health continued to be an issue of concern especially after 2005 as he was reduced to making very few public appearances. Political debate was therefore reduced to succession politics because in as much as he succeeded in dismantling the military system of the political structure he inherited when he ascended to the presidential position, Bouteflika did not formulate a clear and visible alternative to himself. Even though he made it clear through actions on his preference for a presidential system of governance as was expressed in the presidential term limit amendments in 2008, this has proved not to be ideal to the long-term needs of Algeria. Instead of pursuing an agenda that would enhance smooth power transition, he emphasized on concentrating political power and failed to prepare a guideline that would prepare for any even of political succession. Instead, the opposition and legislature continued to stand-by and watch or participate in corruption in catastrophic levels than ever experienced before. These setbacks in the democratization of Algeria have cast shadows on any past achievements made by Bouteflika and

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<sup>129</sup> Aghrout, Ahmed, and Yahia H. Zoubir. "Introducing Algeria's President-for-life." *Middle East Report* (2009).



reduced any enthusiasm for another 5th term of Bouteflika rule in the country<sup>130</sup>. A majority of the Algerian polity who had conceived short-term authoritarian rule a small price to pay for reducing military influence in political, social and economic spheres of the country began questioning whether it was really worth it.

With Arab springs wave sweeping hastily across the Arabian world, Bouteflika took swift actions to announce raft measures by his regime towards constitutional and political reforms in 2012. These reforms however did not convince the larger section of the Algerian polity who continued to remain sceptical of the implementation processes and whether the reforms would be inclusive and transparent. With an authoritarian political outlook both in the government and opposition, coupled with relatively good financial standing of Algeria at the time, the Algerian polity averted the Arab springs even though a false sense of security was perceived within the political administration in Algeria. Moreover, Bouteflika's political influence and international support continued wade of in comparison to his earlier years when he took helm of Algerian political leadership. His shaky health conditions also rendered unable to sum up his previous drive and energy to lobby for new political support and establish stronger political alliances.

In all the three decades of Bouteflika's leadership, the Algerian polity continue to experience systematic economic decline and became even much less able to identify themselves with the decision-makers and the decision-making processes at all levels of government. This made citizens to be constantly suspicious of the state and very sceptical of state agendas as expressed in previous regular protests and low participation in electoral process such as voting during national elections that continue to characterise the Algerian political landscape. The grievances and low legitimacy claim on the regime gradually accumulated over the years of Bouteflika's rule to spark a final protest over his regime in 2019 leading to his resignation from the presidency. This had been further compounded by persistent microeconomic failures of development policies of Algeria.

### **5. The Arab Spring and Algeria**

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid (2009).



The Arab springs contend as the most significant development in the first quarter of the 21st century in North Africa and the Middle East regions. Founded on small but rather spontaneous domestic grass-root coalitions by younger populations fed up with poor governance that has been characterised by corruption and runaway impunity, these movements spread like bush fires across the North Africa and Middle East regions to achieve success where traditional opposition groups have time and again failed to register success. The Arab springs highlighted a new sense of political agency for the general masses who have been chocked in oppression and succeeded in forcing out traditional political despots out of leadership and one again challenged the perceived perception of political conduct and philosophy in the Arabian world. In as much as the political foundations of the Arabian world has been shaken, the extent of success on Arabian polity can only be comprehensively measured on long-term basis.

However, in all the uncertainty that has consume the long-term impact of the Arab springs on the general masses, a short-term pattern has emerged relative to their transformative effects. Foremost, those that experienced the Arab Springs phenomena were those with nominal republican political systems and leaders who had continued to stay in power for more than a decade or two and who were allegedly involved in acts of nepotism, tribalism and a propensity for dynastic succession at the expense of political and economic inclusivity. Indeed, this political environment was found in abundance in countries such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt. It is no coincidence however, that Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon previously saw little or no unrest. Besides having some degree of effective political pluralism, all the three had suffered from very traumatic domestic conflicts in the recent past. In other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the contagion effect of the Arab springs manifested through emboldened demands for political reforms some of which were based on sectarian grievances.

In the North African and Middle East region, Algeria had the highest ranking of a revolution risk assessment before the outbreak of the Arab springs. This is because protests or demonstrations were a key element of the political system in Algeria and this was expounded further by the political tensions created with the re-election of Bouteflika for a third term in office in 2009 following the 2008 presidential term constitutional amendment<sup>131</sup>. The outbreak of revolts in Tunisia put Algeria top on the risk

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<sup>131</sup> Volpi, Frédéric. "Algeria versus the Arab spring." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 104-115.



assessment list especially following another widespread demonstration not witnessed since the October 1988 protests. These protests shared the similarity of both being spearheaded by the young generations. But on the contrary too, the state of government preparedness between the 1988 protests and the 2011 demonstrations were different. The government in 2011 was well experienced in dealing with protests in terms of policy and government response and used a lot of money and economic reforms<sup>132</sup>. Additionally, the government has enough financial resources to spend and buy itself out of trouble with the masses. The protesters also lacked formal channels such as the Islamist networks or civil society organizations to facilitate the protesters in channelling their grievances and articulating clear political demands<sup>133</sup>. As a result, the riots only lasted for four days and achieved very little except remind the Algerian authorities that the young generation were still as discontented as those who took part in the 1988 protests.

The ouster of presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt sent chilling shockwaves to the Algerian political elites who were surprised by the resolutions of these relatively two powerful Arabic countries<sup>134</sup>. These events emboldened the opposition groups and organisations led by the secular *Berberist Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie*, RCD party and the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights established the National Coordination for Change and Democracy purposely to channel the drive witnessed during the previous protests in Algeria to oust the government just like it had happened in both Egypt and Tunisia. However, there efforts were received with a surprisingly muted response from the masses only attracting a few thousand protesters. This can however be attributed to the large mobilisation of police forces by the regime and the lack of credibility among some of the leading figures in the National Coordination for Change and Democracy which failed to attract a majority of the Algerians<sup>135</sup>.

Even more conspicuously, as the protest were spreading in neighbouring Tunisia and other Arabic countries, despite Algerians clearly sharing a lot of the grievances and aspirations of the masses of other

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<sup>132</sup> Ross, Michael L. "Will oil drown the Arab Spring: Democracy and the resource curse." *Foreign Aff.* 90 (2011):

<sup>133</sup> Lorch, J., & Bunk, B. (2017). Using civil society as an authoritarian legitimation strategy: Algeria and Mozambique in comparative perspective. *Democratization*, 24(6), 987-1005.

<sup>134</sup> Syed, Maria. "Egypt and Tunisia: Testing Grounds for Goldstone's Assertions on the Revolutionary Process." *Security Strategies Journal* 9, no. 18 (2013).

<sup>135</sup> Parks, Robert P. "Algeria and the Arab uprisings." In *The Arab Spring*, pp. 101-125. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012.



Arabic countries, they were not ready to participate or engage in another cycle of mass protests and violence. 50 years since independence, Algerians had lived through two major cycles of violence that included the war for independence and the war on Islamic insurgency confrontation which rendered the country in a psychological mood of revolutionary fatigue. As such, it was to a greater extent the common and shared assumption of aversion to political violence and any further instability among a large section of the Algerian polity that mitigated the spread of Arab springs in Algeria at the time. In as much as the younger generations could have been susceptible to these inhibitions, the absence of credible civil society organizations left them handicapped in as far as articulating political demands is concerned.

Formulating demands during the 2011 Arab springs wave was a difficult task for the Algerian society as there was no clear figure to whom all the blames in the society could be put on the same way it was witnessed in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya were. The key issues pertaining to the quality of governance which was the basis of the Algerian polity grievances was spread across all the institutions and at different levels. As such, despite all his shortcomings, Bouteflika was still accredited for his role in restoring peace and some elements of relative political stability in Algeria as well as minor gains in the investments on socio-economic development<sup>136</sup>. This was a key reason for his continued stay in power during his 3rd and 4th quests for presidential elections even though he had previously failed to deal with issues of fighting corruption within his government and becoming increasingly withdrawn from the masses majorly due to his deteriorating health conditions. Even the newly formed opposition group; the National Coordination for Change and Democracy perceived it as not practical as his departure at the time could have severely worsened Algeria's political stability<sup>137</sup>. Therefore, Bouteflika was comparatively not extremely resented as did his neighbouring counterparts in Tunisia or Egypt and did not also have any hidden agenda regarding a dynastic succession plans despite suggestions despite suggestions to the contrary by his political detractors.

Having remained the only North African country to escape the Arab Springs wave in 2011 by avoiding long periods of mass demonstrations, the regime embarked on making a few political

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<sup>136</sup> Silverstein, Paul. "States of fragmentation in North Africa." *Middle East Report* (2005): 26-33.

<sup>137</sup> Entelis, John P. "Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?." *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 4 (2011): 653-678.



concessions such as lifting a 19-year old ban on state of emergency. Additionally, the government made concessions to increase budgetary expenditures for the financial year 2011/12 by \$25 billion distributed across projects for increased social housing, increased public service salaries, increased subsidies on basic commodities such as food items and easier access to credit facilities by the younger generations<sup>138</sup>. In what was seen as a major step in recognising the Arab springs that had consumed the region, Bouteflika made a public televised address to the nation on 15th April 2011, in which he acknowledged the significance of the unfolding events in the region and promised constitutional and political reforms<sup>139</sup>. Interestingly, rather than stimulate a public debate on the nature of the reforms to be undertaken, his televised public address sparked debate about his status of health because of his condition in which he appeared during the address.

These counteractions by the Algerian state reflected a sense of security from the face value. However, beneath the straight face worn by the government existed a deeply rooted concerns, sense of confusion and apprehension<sup>140</sup>. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt did not steer much concern to the regime. However, when both Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were ousted, it is when the government clearly appreciated the significance and scale of the Arab springs and immediately responded by offering support and acknowledged the choice of the Egyptian and Tunisian citizens pledging to respect their decisions. The Algerian government gave \$100 million to the Tunisian interim government with further pledge of support during the transition phase<sup>141</sup>. Regarding the Libyan case, the conflict that ensued caused a lot of controversy as the Algerian regime was apprehensive of the violent nature of the uprising from the beginnings. The Libyan uprising had a very strong presence of Islamist insurgents and the involvement of foreign powers did not attract the support of the Algerian regime to the insurgency. However, Algeria in all, did not vote against the Arab League resolution that opened path to the passing of the UN Resolution of 1973 that provided for NATO intervention in Libya as was purported to have been wrongly reported

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<sup>138</sup> Aghrout, Ahmed, and Yahia H. Zoubir. "Algeria: reforms without change?." *North African Politics: Change and Continuity*. Londres: Routledge (2015): 145-155.

<sup>139</sup> Darbouche, Hakim. "Algeria's failed transitions to a sustainable polity: Coming to yet another crossroads." *MEDPRO Technical Paper* 7 (2011).

<sup>140</sup> Zoubir, Yahia H., and Ahmed Aghrout. "Algeria's Path to Reform: Authentic Change?." *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 2 (2012): 66.

<sup>141</sup> Darbouche, Hakim. "Algeria's Failed Transitions to a Sustainable Polity: Coming to yet another crossroads. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 8/October 2011." (2011).






by the media<sup>142</sup>. Due to this, the Algerian regime stood accused of providing support to the Muammar Gaddafi regime by the Libyan National Transitional Council. As a consequence of these allegations, the relationship between the Algerian government and the National Transitional Council drastically declined and thus was epitomised when the Algerian government offered refuge to members of the Gaddafi family refuge in the wake of government collapse in Tripoli.

### 5.1. Algeria's Democratic Trend

In the previous years, Algeria has been leading in the measurement of democratic index in the North African region comparatively to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya in the early 1990 before drastically dropping to lower levels in 1992 before experiencing another cycle of democratic space in the 2000s after the election of Bouteflika. The decline in Algerian democracy was first experienced in the mid-1960s when president Boumediene was consolidating the FNL rule after successfully carrying out a coup d'état against President Ben Bella in 1965<sup>143</sup>. This decline was further experienced between 2015 and 2019 if figures compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit are anything to go by. The democracy index report of January 2019 showed that Algeria had fallen back other regional countries to be ranked 126 out of the 167 countries examined. Other countries in the region registered 63<sup>rd</sup> for Tunisia and 100<sup>th</sup> for Morocco. Out of a scale of 9-10 for full democracies and 0-3.99 for authoritarian regimes, Algeria declined from 3.95 in 2015 to 3.5 in 2018 as seen below;



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit democracy index (January 2019)

<sup>142</sup> Rousseau, Richard. "Why Germany Abstained on UN Resolution 1973 on Libya." *Foreign Policy Journal* 22 (2011).

<sup>143</sup> Sivan, Emmanuel. "Constraints & Opportunities in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 2 (1997): 103-113.



Boumediene governed the country under the title of "Chairman of the Revolutionary Council." The measure of democracy can be captured through the electoral cycle and system. In as much as there were elections conducted during the one-party rule of FLN, this could not pass for democratic elections. Additionally, the introduction of the multiparty politics and the subsequent parliamentary elections in 1991, to a small extent, increased the democratic space of Algeria. However, as discussed in earlier sections herein, this was short-lived because of the coup d'état in 1992 that marked the beginning of authoritarian leadership in Algeria all through to 1999 in which all opposition presidential candidates boycotted the elections citing fraud in the electoral process.

**a. Civil Liberties in Algeria**

Relative to the question on civil liberties, Algeria has had a poor record of civil liberties. This is fundamentally due to the absence of liberal democracy that stresses the significance of individual rights, minority rights, rule of law and a system of effective checks and balances. In as much minor improvement in civil liberties was witnessed with end of Boumediene's rule in the mid-1970s, the constitutional reforms in 1989 eroded what was left of civil liberties<sup>144</sup>. The coup d'état experience resulted in decline of liberal democracy both during the military regime and post-coup era which witnessed less protection of human rights, political assassinations, personal integrity, persecution of FIS activists and use of torture by the military in Algeria. However, these improved during the early years of Bouteflika's regime but steadily declined over time.

**b. Civil Societies**

On civil societies, since the independence of Algeria in 1962, the civil society presence has been very weak in Algeria<sup>145</sup>. The absence of a vibrant and effective civil society sector was deeply entrenched into the political system of Algeria more so during the one-party rule system of the FLN. However, notable developments in the civil society sector was first experienced during Bendjedid regime in which protests through labour unions became common through to 1988<sup>146</sup>. But after the coup, the civil society was crushed, and Algeria witnessed occasional protest movements such as the Black Spring spearheaded by

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<sup>144</sup> Testas, Abdelaziz. "Political repression, democratization and civil conflict in post-independence Algeria." *Democratization* 9, no. 4 (2002): 106-121.

<sup>145</sup> Liverani, Andrea. *Civil society in Algeria: the political functions of associational life*. Routledge, 2008.

<sup>146</sup> Cheriet, Boutheina. "Gender, civil society and citizenship in Algeria." *Middle East Report* (1996): 22-26.



the Berber minorities in 2001 in the Kabylie region<sup>147</sup>. By late 2018, the role of civil society was considered to be weak and incapable of holding the government accountable. The government used fear as a tool to silence civil society groups and activists until the protests broke out in March 2019 that we see the civil society revive itself to being a key player in organising street protest that brought down the regime of Bouteflika.

**c. Political Party System**

Regarding the political party system, one of the significant developments in post-independence Algeria was witnessed in the party system whereby for three decades after independence, Algeria continued to be a de jure single party state<sup>148</sup>. The 1989 constitutional reforms however, transformed this single party system into a multiparty system that allowed for opposition participation in politics as well as created the platform for the high-level institutionalization of political parties which sustained multiparty politics through the 8-year civil war<sup>149</sup>. Although the authoritarian political system did not provide any opportunity for the opposition to attain political leadership, there still existed a vibrant system of multiparty politics under the authoritarian system.

**5.2. 2019 Elections and the Fall of Bouteflika**

The rise to power of Abdelaziz Bouteflika occurred at a time Algeria was facing severe economic and political crisis characterised by constant interventions of the military and failed economic policies<sup>150</sup>. The former foreign minister was however able to quickly consolidate power and gain control of both the military and the ruling part which helped him become president in 1999. Nonetheless, it is the events that begun in February 2019 when president Bouteflika declared his candidature for the forthcoming presidential elections that marked a critical turning point in the politics of the North African country. Should Bouteflika have contested and won the elections, it would have been the fifth term in power for the ailing 82-year-old.

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<sup>147</sup> Lorch, Jasmin, and Bettina Bunk. "Using civil society as an authoritarian legitimation strategy: Algeria and Mozambique in comparative perspective." *Democratization* 24, no. 6 (2017): 987-1005.

<sup>148</sup> Bouandel, Youcef. "Reforming the Algerian electoral system." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 3 (2005): 393-415.

<sup>149</sup> Bouandel, Youcef, and Yahia H. Zoubir. "Algeria's elections: The prelude to democratisation." *Third World Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1998): 177-190.

<sup>150</sup> Mortimer, Robert. "State and army in Algeria: the 'Bouteflika effect'." *Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 155-171.



Having maintained office despite being diagnosed with stomach cancer in 2008 and later suffering from stroke 2013 as well as little political resistance during the Arab spring at a time Algeria was facing high levels of corruption, nepotism and socio-economic explosion means it was not easy to remove him.<sup>151</sup> Indeed Bouteflika enjoyed significant electoral success clinching during his tenure, for example he won the seat with over 81% of the votes in 1999–2004, 85% in 2004–09, 90.24% in 2009–14 despite him starting to develop health complications and the most recently in 2014–2019 where he got 81%.<sup>152</sup> Nonetheless, a new wave of bloodless protests proved too strong not only for president Bouteflika but also for his close political allies.

The protests begun on 22 February 2019 when thousands of youths marched into the streets to express anger and disappointment over the attempts by Bouteflika to be a candidate in the 28<sup>th</sup> April 2019 presidential elections<sup>153</sup>. Despite an existing ban on demonstration in Algeria dating back to 2001, the "No fifth mandate!" movement spread fast into various social media platforms which became effective avenues of mobilisation.<sup>154</sup> As the crowds begun to grow bigger in various cities across the country, earlier response by the security forces was to use teargas to disperse the protesters but the people proved resilient. The Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia of Algeria in referring to the protesters made a comparison with what transpired in Syria in 2011. By 26<sup>th</sup> of February, students and other civilian organisations were actively involved in the protests demanding, initially, that the president shelve his political ambitions<sup>155</sup>.

In an attempt to please the protesters, President Bouteflika on the 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2019 while in Switzerland sent a letter to the news rooms stating that he was running for presidency for the last time and that even if he won, he would not complete the fifth term. At the same time, he dismissed Mr. Abdelmalek Sellal as his campaign manager. The new campaign manager then submitted Bouteflika's nomination papers for candidacy in the election few hours before the deadline of the exercise. The formal application

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<sup>151</sup> Zoubir, Yahia H., and Ahmed Aghrout. "Algeria's Path to Reform: Authentic Change?." *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 2 (2012): 66.

<sup>152</sup> Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Encyclopædia Britannica Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (April 2, 2019) <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdelaziz-Bouteflika>

<sup>153</sup> Holm, Ulla. "Algeria: President Bouteflika's Second Term." *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005): 117-122.

<sup>154</sup> Amir A., Charlotte B., & Madjid Z., (23 February 2019). "Algérie:révolte inédite contre le pouvoir". *Le Monde*

<sup>155</sup> Guliyev, Farid. "End of term limits: Monarchical presidencies on the rise." *Harvard International Review*, February 28 (2009).



by Bouteflika's campaign team sparked more protests between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> February 2019 with the president warning of possible 'chaos' sentiments that were echoed by the head of the army General Ahmed Gaid Salah who criticised an unidentified individual for wanting to return the country back to the "painful years" in reference to the civil war of 1992-2002.

March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2019 a day after he returned from Switzerland was a significant date for the protesters as Bouteflika accepted their demands for him to withdraw from the elections. However, the president announced that the elections slated for 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019 were suspended for an unidentified date and that he would remain as president until the country got a new constitution. Major reshuffles also took place as Noureddine Bedoui the then interior minister was appointed the new prime minister. The protesters who were now protesting every Friday of the week changed their demands and wanted Bouteflika to step down immediately as protests engulfed major cities. The ruling party National Liberation Front (FLN) on 20<sup>th</sup> March threw its support to the protestors and called for an inclusive dialogue to end the crisis.

Nearly a month later, Ahmed Gaid Salah the Army chief read a statement on the 28<sup>th</sup> of March declaring president Bouteflika unfit to hold office calling upon the constitutional council to invoke Article 102 of the constitution that gives the organ power to remove a president. This pronouncement got support from unlikely sources such as the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and Mr. Abdelmadjid Sidi the head of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA). Further calls for Bouteflika to resign came from business leaders and civil societies. The statements from these important and influential figures and organisations previously allied to the president gave protesters more hope in keep demanding the resignation of the president. On the contrary, some of the protesters rejected the Army's so called 'constitutional path' to solving the Algerian crisis.

Many critics termed the declaration by General Ahmed Gaid Salah that the president was unfit based on health reasons hypocritical since the president was already incapacitated since 2013 after he suffered from the stroke but instead of asking him to step aside then, the regime was still fronting him for a fifth term in 2019. Protestors therefore declared that their goal is to end *le système*, meaning the system. The president responded by making further reforms in government by overhauling the executive and naming Noureddine Bedoui as the new head of government. This did not convince the protestors and finally President Bouteflika resigned on the 1<sup>st</sup> April 2019 marking an end to 20 years of his rule.



## 6. Conclusion

Algeria has gone through turbulent events in its political spheres, partly due to acts of authoritarianism which were being supported by security agencies and in part the absence or existence of weak institutions. The government of Bouteflika may have brought about stability to the country following a series of civil wars and political crises in the past. However, growing dictatorial tendencies and health conditions of Bouteflika made many to believe that the country was headed towards the wrong direction. The believe that a shadow group was running the government behind the ailing president was strengthened when the ruling party fronted the president as the party's candidate for the fifth time despite his worsening condition. The people responded with unending calls for the president and his entire government to resign and demanded that the government be handed over to a civilian lead transitional authority. This bloodless overthrow of president Bouteflika has brought back hope that revolutions can work without necessarily threatening human security. More importantly is the patience the protestors have shown and the nature of response by the security forces has helped avert a major crisis in the North African countries. This paper concludes with the believe that the aspirations of the people of Algeria to finally enjoy the elusive fruits of democracy will come to pass.

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## The Return of the Political: Chantal Mouffe and Ozamiz City Politics<sup>156</sup>

Gerry F. Arambala\*

### **Abstract**

*For nearly two decades, Ozamiz city was ruled by a political dynasty whose predatory politics has brought about the radical deficit of democracy in the state. Politics in the city is characterized with political harassments and violence. For three decades the ruling family succeeded in reformulating the democratic values of popular sovereignty and political antagonism in the city's democratic institutions, that they were able to rule the city without any threats of popular uprising and protestations. With their political machinery they were able to hostage the people of Ozamiz; often denying most of the citizens' freedom to insist on their fundamental democratic rights and entitlements. However, with the advent of the radical leadership exemplified by Chief Inspector Jovi Espenido, the fate of democracy in the city is changed from an authoritarian predatory system to a more open and democratic system. From a predatory state ruled by warlords and power predators to a liberal democratic state which embraces the fundamental democratic principles of liberty and equality. This paper intends to examine the state of politics of Ozamiz city following Chantal Mouffe's radical democratic paradigm. It aims to elucidate how Mouffe's antagonistic democracy fits to the state of politics in Ozamiz after the progressive leadership of Jovi Espenido was realized.*

**Keywords:** *Ozamiz city, Political dynasty, Chantal Mouffe, Radical Democracy, Warlords, Agonistic Pluralism*

### **1. Introduction**

This paper intends to examine the nature of politics in Ozamiz city, seen through the lenses of Chantal Mouffe's "Agonistic Democracy". For decades Ozamiz was under the predatory rule of the Parojinog political dynasty whose incompetence of running a democratic society is exhibited in the state of economic development of the district which for many years and despite its strategic location remained to be a third class city, while the majority of the people are living in abject poverty. For many years the power predators of Ozamiz preyed on the district's weak and incoherent bureaucracy; they enriched themselves by milking on the city's resources while taking the city and the people of Ozamiz under hostage by means of political violence and intimidation. For almost 2 decades the Parojinogs, whose power-rule rests

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\* Chairman Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, La Salle University-Ozamiz, gerryarambala@yahoo.com, ORCID ID: 0000-0001-6814-5124, 09500982664





primarily from their immediate affiliation to the local mafia and their popular background, was able to flourish in their monopolistic rule by taking advantage of the country's predatory system of democracy.

For centuries the Philippines is suffering from democratic deficit caused primarily by the proliferation of national power-brokers and local warlords, who manipulate the country's politics and immure the people with fraudulence and political violence. They loot the country of its resources and divide among themselves the spoils, thereby enriching themselves while leaving the people in dire poverty and absolute misery. Elite-patrimonial democracy flourished in the Philippines due to its rootedness in the country's political narrative. The rise to power of local elites to becoming national oligarchs in modern Philippine democracy is traced during the Spanish colonization period; when the Spanish government introduced the *Principalia* which was the colonial aristocracy of the Spanish Philippines. It consisted of the *gobernadorcillo* who acted as the chief head of a particular municipality and whose power to rule encompassed that of the *cabezas de barangay* who were heads of the colonial villages. Together they ruled the districts they were appointed to oversee. They were the elites of the time who plundered the state of its resources and who enriched themselves by sharing the spoils available among themselves. They live in prosperity and wellbeing while the people who were under their supervisions are living in dire poverty.

Furthermore, when the Americans took over the country after the mock battle of Manila Bay in August 13, 1898, these colonial elites were given the same privileges by the new colonizers. The elite predatory system of governance proliferated by the Spaniards was not totally replaced, neither there was any intention of really exterminating the unjust system imposed by the country's first colonizers, rather it was simply transformed into a hybrid of crude feudalism and authoritarian democracy which resulted into an oligarchic-patrimonial democracy. The Americans succeeded in asserting and furthering their rule over the country with their introduction of their pseudo democratic institutions. It was a pseudo democracy that was designed to cater the local elites' hold of power over their districts with the intention of



securing America's hold over these local caciques. Such democratic arrangement paved the way for the proliferation of elite democracy in Philippine politics. Democracy, in this regard, is empty of its original sense of popular sovereignty. The ruling elites succeeded in reformulating, and to some extent eliminating, the fundamental democratic principle of popular sovereignty and replacing it with their own imposed rationality, that they were able to flourish without contestations from the people.

Deliberative democracy, for this matter, is exhibiting its fundamental limitation with its insistence of a universal rationality and consensus whereupon antagonism is cancelled out being a threat to the entire enterprise of liberal democracy. Chantal Mouffe argues that to insist for a universal consensus in a democracy is to eliminate the legitimacy of political antagonisms and contestations. Democracy must not aim for a universal consensus, rather it must allow for a conflictual consensus to transpire. This is for the reason that modern democratic societies are pluralistic in value, that is, it presupposes differences in the ethico-political bearings of each individual member that a presumed universal consensus cannot ignore. The country's democratic deficit is brought about by such limiting idea of deliberative democracy by its faulty representative system and by its predatory design of democratic governance. What is necessitated then is to reinstitute the political in Philippine politics by radicalizing democracy in the country. A radicalization that does not presuppose a new revolution from the outside, but rather from within; a revolution that puts into practice the fundamental principles of liberal democracy: equality and liberty.

## **2. Background**

The Philippines, it is often said, has a predatory system of democratic state and institutional arrangements. So that most of the prominent political theorists in the contemporary period, who venture into the study of Philippine democracy, argue that the country's political state is in dire need of serious reformulation and restructuring being in the state of political decadence. Paul Hutchcroft for that matter emphatically asserts that "Philippine democracy is,



indeed, in a state of crisis.”<sup>157</sup> This is despite of the fact that there is no other country in Asia that has more experience in running a democratic state other than the Philippines. Walden Bello further expresses that in the entire history of East Asia, the Philippines was the first nation to wage war for national liberation which eventually led to the establishment of the first republic in the region in 1898. The Philippines is likewise the first in the region to have embraced modern parliamentary democracy as its system of governance.<sup>158</sup> What Bello is conveying is that with the country’s long years of experience in running a democratic society it should have perfected, by this time, the practice and the mobilization of the fundamental democratic principles of liberty and equality and must have already benefitted the poor members, yet what transpired in the present is actually the contradictory. Horrendous inequalities and unjust structural schemes proliferated over the years which serve the purpose of most self-serving and corrupt politicians, while most of the Filipino people remained poor. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora echoed the same sentiment saying that the Philippines is the only country in Asia which has more experience with democratic institutions. That over a century, from the Malolos republic to the political midwifery of the US colonial rule, from the cacique democracy to the restorative democracy in the post EDSA uprising of 1986, the Filipinos know what modern liberal democracy is, its benefits and shortcomings.<sup>159</sup> However, though the country has been democratic for over a century, the structure it embraces is undemocratic. Hutchcroft further asserts that the crisis in Philippine democracy is manifested, “in a deepening frustration over the inability of democratic institutions to deliver the goods, specifically goods of a public character.”<sup>160</sup> This is because the country’s democratic institutions are under the control and the manipulative schemes of self-serving politicians and landlords who loot the land of its resources and divide among themselves the spoils; thereby enriching themselves while leaving the people in dire state of existence. That is, while the country’s democratic system is having

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<sup>157</sup> Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3 (2003), 259.

<sup>158</sup> Walden Bello, *Sociology and the Centennial: Considerations on Democracy in the Philippines and South East Asia*, [Article Online], <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>, accessed on January 30, 2019.

<sup>159</sup> Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, Strong Demands and Weak Institution, 259.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.



problems of providing goods that are public in character; those in the favorable position, the elected public officials and the oligarchs, take advantage of the country's incoherent and often immature bureaucracy and milk the system for their own private welfare. Moreover, with the prevalent existence of power predators in Philippine democratic system, Hutchcroft refers to the country's state of democracy as patrimonial/elite democracy. It is a weak state preyed by political power predators who act as bosses and warlords; who impose absolute political power and longevity over their subordinates; and who loot the country of its resources, while leaving the people in abject poverty.

Albert Quimpo further explains that the main problematic of the country's developmental bog lies primarily in the Philippines' weakness in its political development. This is because the prevalent political system in the country is patrimonial. That is, the "Philippine state is itself patrimonial, specifically a patrimonial oligarchic state. It is a weak state preyed upon by a powerful oligarch that has an economic base largely independent of the state but depends upon access to the state machinery as the major means to accumulate wealth."<sup>161</sup> The Oligarchs, in order to remain in power, took advantage of the immature and hastened proliferation of provincial and local electoral offices during the American reformulation of Philippine politics, thus paved the way for, what Quimpo referred as, "palm days" of Philippine political dynasties.<sup>162</sup> The rise of political dynasties and monopolistic agents in Philippine politics have entrenched power predators and warlords in most local districts in the country, they are those who utilized political violence and intimidations in order to remain in power. Hutchcroft stresses that there was "nothing inevitable about this economic elite being transformed into powerful political-economic elite; rather, this change came about through the very deliberate creation of new political institutions by the American colonial leadership."<sup>163</sup> Such political institutions willfully allowed for the marrying of the past colonial structure of domination, discussed in the introduction of this paper, with the semi-feudal institutions

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<sup>161</sup> Gilbert Quimpo, *Oligarchic Patrimonial, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines*, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.37, no.2 (January, 2005), 231.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>163</sup> Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, *Strong Demands and Weak Institution*, 263.



introduced by the Americans to manipulate the people to believe on their propaganda of democratization.

John Sidel in furthering the claims of Hutchcroft, contrasted the kind of semi-feudalistic system that was introduced by the Americans in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century to that of the Spanish *principalia*. He asserted that while the Spanish colonial regime delegated persons -caciques- to rule certain municipalities under the close supervision of a Spanish priest in the locality; the Americans in marrying and extending the 'primitive accumulation' "expanded the structure of private control over the local coercive and extractive agencies of the state upwards through the subordination of a national state apparatus to provincial and national level elected officials."<sup>164</sup> For Sidel the subordination of local coercive and extractive agencies to state apparatus combined with the primitive capital accumulation during the American colonial regime paved the way for the emergence and entrenchment of local elites and warlords in Philippine democratic system.<sup>165</sup> This is where he departs from the common description of Philippine democratic institution as being a weak state preyed upon by oligarchs. He argues that it is rather precisely of its strong state constitution from the American colonial regime muddled with elitist and predatory ideologies that the country's democratic deficit is rooted upon.

The prevalent nature of Philippine democracy: patrimonial/elite democracy, Bossism, Oligarchic politics, Patron-client factional politics, necessarily paved the way for the proliferation of local bosses and political predators. Political dynasty is a necessary by product of the aforementioned nature of Philippine politics. Most of the country's political offices, from the local to national offices, are occupied by elite politicians coming from different factions of political clans. It is in fact the case that a certain municipality is ruled by one political family who subjugates the people by oppressive and subtle enforcement of policies that serve the purpose of securing for them their hold of power over such district. Mindanao is not immune from the presence of political power predators; majority of the archipelago's cities and

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<sup>164</sup> John Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, [Article online], <https://www.uio.no/studies.emner/SV/ISS/SGO2400/h05>, Accessed on, February 5, 2019, 1.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., 4.



municipalities are occupied by political families whose immediate members occupy municipal and local offices. These political clans amass huge amount of resources during their being in office. They loot their district of its resources to enrich themselves from the money they get from budget allocations coming from the national government, while leaving their people in absolute misery and poverty. It is a political phenomenon in the country that whenever a provincial community is under a political dynasty the community is poor, poverty for this matter is due to the absence of competitive and functioning political system. Political dynasties worsen poverty and the capability deficit of the people; likewise they slow the growth of the provincial per capita income with their extorting activities and corruptions. Moreover, with the country's weak competitive nature of politics and with its limited choices of persons running for public offices – mostly are elites – political dynasties' rule over the masses is immortalized. It is the case that a certain municipality is ruled by one political clan for decades without opposition but if ever one political clan loses in the election another rival power predator will replace and will continue the past oppression and injustices. These warlords remain in power because of their fraudulent electoral practices such as, vote buying coupled with violence and intimidation every election. They win local elections with the use of political harassments and killings; they bribe the electorates; they intimidate prospect political competitors by their private armies. Such is the case that in most of the provinces where political dynasts rule and are engaged with active political disputes against another dynasty, election times are often identified with political harassments and violence.

Furthermore, the persistent existence of political dynasties and local warlords in Mindanao is one of the reasons why most of the people in the region are poor. Poverty is not a contingent phenomenon caused primarily by the socio-political atmosphere of the place; rather it is willed and designed by these political predators for power preservation. Poverty, in this regard, is a developmental deficit that is caused primarily by the proliferation of systemic deprivations designed by the ruling dynasty for power holding. This explains why most districts ran by political dynasties are often poor, especially in most rural areas. They allow the people



surrounding them to remain poor and ignorant, for in the poverty of the people the entrenchment of these political families is secured. Political dynasty breeds poverty, for such systemic capability deficit is the best alternative for controlling the people and of maintaining political power. The poor are seen as expendables, mercilessly exploited and used until they are exhausted, while these predators live in extravagance and prosperity.

### 3. Ozamis City and the Rise of a Political Dynasty

Among the many provinces and cities that are ruled by political elite families in Mindanao is Ozamis city. Historically Ozamis was not its original name; accordingly, it was named after a Subanen word *Kuyamis* which refers to a variety of coconut named after its original settlers who were the Subanen people. Then it was later on changed into *Misamis* during the Spanish colonization period. Moreover, before the coming of the Spanish colonizers, the town was constantly ravaged by the “Marauding pirates” who caused the Subanen settlers to flee to the neighboring provinces of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga Del Norte, there to create their own communities even up to the present. *Misamis* was not conquered by arm but by religion, shortly after the coming of Jesuit missionaries the place was made as the “principal anchorage in Mindanao by the Spanish conquistadors in 1757 with the building of the stone fort –*Cotta*-.”<sup>166</sup> Moreover, its foundation as a city was on July 16, 1948 roughly three years after the Second World War. And by virtue of the House Bill No. 1656, the name Misamis was changed into Ozamiz in honor of the late senator Jose Ozamiz. “Ozamis has gone a long way from an Old Spanish settlement to its present enviable economic position in the region. It is now emerging as one of the fastest growing cities in Northwestern Mindanao.”<sup>167</sup>

Different from the usual bailiwicks that are ruled by oppressive warlords of elite and landed descendants; Ozamis city’s ruling elite did not come from such background. Their rising into power was not due to their wealth and control over the local coercive and material resources, but rather from their popular root thanks to their patriarch who gave to them such political advantage. The Parojinogs’ eventual rise to power was linked to their patriarch’s

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<sup>166</sup> History of Ozamis City, [article on line] <http://ozamizcity.com/CityProfile.htm>

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.



sympathetic character towards the poor people of Ozamiz. Octavio “Ongkoy” Parojinog was imagined to be a kind-hearted man, whose sympathy is always towards helping the poor in “Lawis” thereby earning the name for himself the “Robin Hood of Lawis”.<sup>168</sup> He would give a portion of the money he gets from their illegal activities to the people; the locals verify this saying that Ongkoy would distribute his share to the poor people of Lawis. And whenever somebody from his neighborhood asked for help, he was always ready to give a hand. Such sympathetic character of the patriarch of the clan persisted even to the present day, it is true that when individuals ask for help (provided that such request will serve the interests of the family) the family, especially the late mayor Aldong Parojinog, is easy to approach and is always willing to help. The late Mayor was conceived to be a good man, in his speech in Davao city, President Rodrigo Duterte admits that, being friends with him in politics, Aldong was a good man.<sup>169</sup> The late Mayor, Aldong, commands respect and approval from the people of Ozamiz because of his persistent resolution of cleaning the city from malefactors and petty drug peddlers. The late Mayor’s all-out war against criminality and illegal drug trade in the city received positive reactions from the people and even from the church.<sup>170</sup> Aldong, the son of the founder of the Kuratong, was resolved to cleaning the city of illegal drug trade and crime that in an interview he empathically asserted that: “I am committed to even use the whip if necessary as proof of my determination to curb the city’s rising criminality and illegal drug trade.”<sup>171</sup> It is for this reason that the family’s power-rule is paradoxical. They present themselves to be for the poor people in the city, but at the same time they are looting and depriving these same people from the life that is proper for them. In fact, most of the employees in public offices who were active during their time, never received monetary incentives during special holidays like Christmas and the like; it was only after they were dethroned by Chief Espinido, that local

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<sup>168</sup>Patrick Quintos, “Who are the Parojinogs of Ozamiz?”, [article online]<http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/07/3017/who-are-the-parojinogs-of-ozamiz>, Accessed on April 7, 2019.

<sup>169</sup> Anonymous, “Duterte admits Parojinog’s friendship, sack of crabs didn’t save Ozamiz city Mayor from Bloody End,” [article online] <http://politics.com.ph/duterte-admits-parojinog’s-friendship-sack-of-crabs-didn’t-save-ozamiz-city-mayor-from-bloody-end>, Accessed on April 5, 2019.

<sup>170</sup> Jose Torres Jr. “The Making of a Mindanao Mafia”, [article online] <http://josetorres.blogspot.com>.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.





public employees started to receive their due incentives. The family gained overwhelming support from their close constituents despite allegations of corruption and involvements to illegal drugs. In 2008, both Reynaldo and the then Vice Mayor Nova Princess Parojinog, his daughter, was accused of corruption because of the allegation that they gave the award for the renovation of the city's gymnasium to their own construction company. In February of 2016 both were arrested, though they were never convicted because the Sandiganbayan decided to dismiss the case in June 2017 due to the prosecution's failure to ground their claims against them.<sup>172</sup> But the biggest allegation was made by the President himself in August 2016, when in his speech he included three of the Parojinog family members, Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Nova Princess, in his list of 150 narco-politicians in the country.<sup>173</sup>

Furthermore, their fame and power started in 1986, when army Maj. Franco Calanog organized the *Kuratong Baleleng Group* which was at that time a counter-insurgency organization intended to battle against the growing threat from the communist guerillas in Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.<sup>174</sup> By the time the threats from the communist group deescalated in 1988, the *Kuratong Baleleng* were disassembled and were left to function on their own without military and government supervision. After the group's disorganization, Torres writes that: "Without military supervision, the group rapidly metamorphosed into an organized criminal syndicate. A lot of kidnapping, robberies, smuggling, murders, and extortion were attributed to the group."<sup>175</sup> What started as an anti-insurgency group intended to fight against the growing threat from the left, the *Kuratong* had metamorphosed into a criminal group and with the growing influence and notoriety of the gang, a Mindanao organized mafia was born. At the peak of the *Karatong's* power reports claim that there were over 40, 000 active members scattered all over the country.<sup>176</sup> In a 1999 news

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<sup>172</sup> Katerina Francisco and Jodesz Gavilan, "From Kuratong Baleleng to elected gov't: The rise of the Parojinogs" [article online] <http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/ig/177255-parojinog-family-history-kuratong-baleleng>, Accessed on April 5, 2019.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Jose Torres Jr. "The Making of a Mindanao Mafia", [article online] <http://josetorres.blogspot.com>.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Nicai De Guzman, "Most Wanted: Kuratong Baleleng Gang," [article online] [://www.esquiremag.ph/long-reads/features/kuratong-baleleng-parojinog-al729-20180918-lfrm](http://www.esquiremag.ph/long-reads/features/kuratong-baleleng-parojinog-al729-20180918-lfrm), Accessed on April 3, 2019.



interview Aldong was asked how many people of Ozamiz were members of the Kuratong gang, he categorically answered that almost everyone in the city are members.<sup>177</sup>

With the unprecedented success and power of the Kuratong “Ongkoy” allegedly engaged himself and the gang members to illegal activities; from bank robberies, extortions, kidnapping, smuggling, illegal gambling to illegal drug trades in the entire country. But what distinguishes the Parojinog patriarch from a typical bandit leader was his magnanimous character towards the poor people of “Lawis”. It is said that the patriarch would distribute a portion of the money they get from their lootings to the people, thereby earning the name “Robin Hood”. In 1990, Octavio met his tragic end when he was gunned down by two soldiers of the Philippine Constabulary while serving an arrest warrant against him.<sup>178</sup> The incident led also to the death of the arresting officers after Renato took over the leadership of the gang and one by one killed the arresting officers.<sup>179</sup> The death of the patriarch of the Parojinog clan and the leader of the notorious Mindanao mafia had led to the splitting of the gang into three main groups. According to the National Bureau of Investigations, with their father dead, the gang splintered into three groups of Renato “Nato” and Reynaldo “Aldong”, the sons of Ongkoy, who operated in Mindanao, Cebu, Negros, and Metro Manila. The Carlito “Dodo Miklo” Calasan group, “Miklo” is the nephew of the late patriarch whose group operated in Iligan, General Santos City, Cebu City, and Metro Manila. The last group is that of the Ozamiz Boys group which consisted of the original members of the Kuratong who stayed in Ozamiz.<sup>180</sup> All these main groups, and their subgroups that emerged later as the group started to gain support from national politicians and powerful oligarchs of the country, proliferated criminal activities mentioned above. According to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) report the Kuratong Baleleng syndicate was behind “the P2 million robbery of Solid Bank in Tangub City in 1988, the P12 milion Monte de Piedad armored van robbery on Roxas

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Katerina Francisco and Jodesz Gavilan, “From Kuratong Baleleng to elected gov’t: The rise of the Parojinogs”[article online].

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Nicai De Guzman, “Most Wanted: Kuratong Baleleng Gang,” [article online].



Blvd.in 1990, the P5 million heist at an RCBC bank in Pampanga, and the P12 million Traders Royal Bank robbery in Buendia in 1991.<sup>181</sup>

The influence and the impression made by the late Octavio parojinog to the people of Ozamis was partly the reason why the late mayor Aldong Parojinog won the 2001 mayoral election by a landslide. The Kuratong Baleleng gained respect and trust from the residents of Lawis and from some people of Ozamis with their “charitable acts” of dividing the produce of their loot to the poor. This, the Parojinog used as their political machinery to completely place the entire city under their power over the past decades. In effect, the rise of the Parojinog clan to power was actualized by their immediate affiliation to the *Kuratong Baleleng* syndicate and their populist ideology of putting the people’s welfare at the core of their political projects. The use of political violence, intimidations and harassments is prevalent in Ozamis city every election period, so that nobody would dare go against them every election; they were able to preserve their power without contestations and they managed to put in office their own immediate relatives. Despite of the Parojinogs’ latent inefficiency in running a democratic government and their political machinery’s apparent notoriety they remained to be popular among the people and maintained their power-rule in Ozamis city for decades. For almost 20 years the family ruled the city almost without contestations. They ruled the place with their political machinery and they were able to cast a long shadow of control over the state’s bureaucracy. They were the local power brokers who milked in the incoherent bureaucracy of the land and enriched themselves in the process. What transpired during their rule was a government marked by oppression and neglect of public welfare. Democracy during their time was a sheer abstraction characterized by systemic political and economic deprivation. Popular sovereignty was a sheer idea in the minds of those people who wanted to liberate themselves from the oppressive control of the ruling elite of the Ozamiz. The people wanted to liberate themselves from the control of the family due to their abject existence, while most of the family members are living a life of absolute lavishness and the prodigality. They amassed huge amount

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<sup>181</sup>Patrick Quintos, “Who are the Parojinogs of Ozamiz?”, [article online], <http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/017/30/17/who-are-the-parojinogs-of-ozamiz>, Accessed on April 7, 2019.



of wealth by plundering the city and the people of their resources and wealth. With the help of their most potent political machinery, the Kuratong Baleleng, “[the family and] the gang extort[s] money from most of the business establishments in the cities they control. Those who were not able to pay were punished by having their stores looted and burned.”<sup>182</sup> Accordingly, in Ozamiz alone, majority of the business establishments (except those owned by the family and immediate relatives of the clan) are forced to give money to the gang; a reliable source disclosed that most of the large establishments are forced to pay two hundred to three hundred thousand pesos monthly, aside from those instances that a certain gang leader will asked from the owners additional pay for recreational purposes, like birthday celebrations, town fiestas, holidays and the like. Even the smallest business establishments and to the last street vendor, the group extorts money.

### **3.1. Political Bosses of Ozamiz City**

During their rule, democracy in the place was an abstraction, an ideal that exists only in literatures and in the minds of the ruling elites who use it for their own benefit. Democracy posits no practical sense to everyone in the city, for while the ruling clan lived in absolute prosperity and pleasure, the poor remained miserable. The people were alienated from the state, for reasons that they were simply made to abide with the imposed bureaucracy designed by the family whose ultimate intention is for them to flourish and preserve their power in the city. The poor people of Ozamiz are reduced to sheer expendables used by the ruling power predators to secure their power-hold. Democracy was no longer intended to serve the people; it was made to serve the interest of one family whose intentions in running a democratic state is only to enrich themselves and to hold absolute control over the city, while leaving the people and the state in dire poverty and political decadence. They were the bosses of the land whom Sidel refers as the “local brokers who enjoy an enduring monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks.”<sup>183</sup> As mentioned above, the family was able to preserve power for decades because of their affiliation to the notorious *Kuratong*

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<sup>182</sup> Nicai De Guzman, “Most Wanted: Kuratong Baleleng Gang,” [article online].

<sup>183</sup> John Sidel, *Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines*, 3.



*Baleleng* syndicate and their popular propaganda of putting the people's welfare in priority; so that the idea that they were loved by the people due to their supposed good charisma cannot explain their uncontested rule over the place and the fear they have made in the impression of the people of Ozamiz. Sidel asserts that such idea of people supporting warlords because of their presumed ethico-political charisma is utterly ridiculous; especially when we are confronted by boss violence.<sup>184</sup> It is enough to ask the people of Ozamiz how violent the ruling family is towards their perceived political enemy. For them, democracy is to serve only their interests so that anyone who tries to contest their legitimacy as the ruling elite will incur for herself the wrath of the family's anger. It is for this reason that for the past decades no one would dare go against the family during elections. So that for roughly more than 20 years they hold power uninterruptedly.

Furthermore, their success in monopolizing power in Ozamis did not come from the lone support they get from the people, for as I argued such an idea is ridiculous; their success is derivative from the support that they get from, what Sidel calls, "superordinate power brokers, whose backing has underpinned their emergence, entrenchment, and survival and whose hostility has spelled their downfall or death."<sup>185</sup> This is materialized by the alleged link of the former President Joseph Estrada and senator Panfilo Lacson. Jose Torres Jr. in his article "The Making of a Mindanao Mafia" asserts, quoting a certain Danny Devnani, who during the senate hearing claimed that the former mayor of Ozamis was in frequent communication with the then President Joseph Estrada and Panfilo Lacson who was then National Police Chief and PAOCTF head,<sup>186</sup> for the political link and patronage of the then president Estrada to the Parojinog family. Accordingly, when Renato, the elder son of the Ongkoy, ran for a congressional position under the Laban ng Makabayang Masamang Pilipino (LAMP) in the 1998 national election he was convinced to run by Atong Ang who was Estrada's close

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<sup>184</sup> Oona Thommes Paredes, *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* by John T. Sidel, Stanford: Stanford University Press. East-West Center Series on Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific, 1999, 137.

<sup>185</sup> John Sidel, *Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines*, 5.

<sup>186</sup> Jose Torres Jr., *The Making of a Mindanao Mafia*, [Article Online] <http://josetorres.blogspot.com/2004/06/>, Accessed on February 5, 2019.



gambling friend.<sup>187</sup> Moreover, as the news of President Rodrigo Duterte identifying the family as narco-politicians surfaced; known personalities from the national government offices and high-ranking officials from the country's law enforcement agencies were identified as protectors and as having immediate linkages to the family's allegedly illegal trade. Most of their networks are woven through an entangled web of the country's biggest drug lords. According to the Philippine National Police report, two of the Parojinog daughters were allegedly having affairs with the country's biggest drug personalities. Maychell, the daughter of Renato, was married to Remy "Waway" Gumapac Jr, who was among Misamis Occidental's biggest drug dealer and criminal personality. Reynaldo's daughter Nova Princess, the former mayor of Ozamiz, was romantically involved with Herbert Colanggo, the country's known drug personality who, even while in the penitentiary, continued to operate his drug operations outside.<sup>188</sup>

It is of a general knowledge among the people of Ozamiz that the center of illegal trade (of illegal drugs and gambling) is in barangay Lawis. It is referred by the locals as "the cave", rightly so, for upon arriving in the vicinity one is confronted by a typical community of illegal settlers whose housing states are very poor and the place is densely populated. And that in order for one to enter the place, one must pass through closely connected and aligned makeshift houses like walls of a cave. Illegal drug trade and illegal gambling are rampant in the vicinity to the extent that majority of the households are directly engaged in the aforementioned illegalities. Most of the houses cater drug trades and illegal gambling, "Karera" in the local dialect, in a small room situated inside the house where the transactions happen and where drug users consume their "shabu". The place was so well known with drugs that as accorded by my source, "from morning to late night the place is filled with people coming from different places of the region." The person further adds that, "Shabu was so rampant that even before you get

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<sup>187</sup> Katerina Francisco and Jodesz Gavilan, "From Kuratong Baleleng to elected gov't: The rise of the Parojinogs"[article online].

<sup>188</sup> Bea Cupin, "The Parojinog and the Tangled Webs they Wove," [article online] <http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/177255-the-parojinog-and-the-tangled-webs-they-wove>, Accessed on April 8, 2019.



to arrive at house of your frequent seller, you will be offered along the way, some from their small window like ventilation of their makeshift house.” The place is actually strategic for protecting the local’s illegal drug trades. Accordingly, everyone who are engaged in the illegal trades are obligated to give what the local calls “SOPs” of their proceeds to some of the family’s close constituents whom they refer as the dragons. Furthermore, robberies are so well structured and planned in the city, that if one is robbed in any specific place and time, one can ask for the object taken from the exact person by presenting herself in Lawis, (of course under the condition that you will pay for your robbed belongings). Stolen objects are bought back by the owners without any sort of legal intervention from the local police. Moreover, robberies are so well planned that each of the city’s strategic blocks are occupied by members of the gang whose main objective is only to rob the un-expecting public of their things regardless of the time. Illegal activities flourish in the place being under the protection of the heads of the Kuratong Baleleng.

John Sidel’s description, of how some local warlords persist in power over their local district, fits precisely to that of the Parojinog’s dynasty. He explains that “many of the entrenched politicians and magnates in the country have derived their power and wealth not from private landownership but from state resources and commercial capital, and many of those entrenched politicians and landed elites who have accumulated large landholdings did so after -rather than before-assuming elected office.”<sup>189</sup> Such is truly the case for the Parojinogs. As I have stated above, the Parojinogs did not start as a wealthy political clan of high stature in life; rather they were simply coming from an ordinary family of relatively meager stature being vigilantes in the beginning. Their rise to power was partly caused by their Father’s charismatic character towards the people of Lawis, and their affiliation to the notorious syndicate, the *Kuratong Baleleng*. With their political machinery and their use of political violence and intimidations, they were able to control the local government and manipulated the state’s bureaucracy to serve for their interests. Businesses are mandated to give their monthly “SOP’s”

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<sup>189</sup> John Sidel, *Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines*, 5.



to the family's close constituents for them to continue their business transactions in the city. Each establishment has their own lord to pay every month otherwise one's business will be forced to close due to frequent harassment and looting accentuated by the members of the syndicate.

### **3.2. Radical Democracy and the Return of the Political:**

Joshua Cohen's "Radical Democracy" argues for a positive outlook the specifications of radical principles may bring to the present discourse of democracy. Cohen explicates that discussions on radical democracy posit an ideological bearing to the contemporary debates on democracy. Its relevance rests in its critique to the conventional deliberative democratic schemes that – according to proponents of radical democracy – are insufficient to represent the people's ideals of the best alternative life that each one has reason to value. Radical democracy is skeptical to the liberal's project of consensual agreement and its tendency to reduce the pluralistic nature of the good life to an ideal general consensus thereby disregarding the relevance of ordinary citizens freely engaging in public reasoning and debates about social and political problems.<sup>190</sup> He further explicates that radical democracy is identified with the merging of two democratic principles of participation and deliberation. The former, on the one hand, posits the active participation of the people in public decision making. The citizens in this respect are given "greater direct roles in public choices or at least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgments."<sup>191</sup> The later, on the other hand, posits that rather than concentrate on power and interests, democratic arrangements should be deliberative. That is a deliberative democracy "in which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them, in which no force is at work ... except that of the better arguments."<sup>192</sup> The liberal insistence of an inclusive rational consensus is what makes deliberative democracy inefficient to answer the prevailing struggles presupposed in modern democracy. Such hope of an inclusive rational

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<sup>190</sup> Joshua Cohen, Radical Democracy, [article online]

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.





consensus rejects the prevalent existence of pluralism of values in the polity. It denies all forms of legitimate contestations, and hence, any legitimate assertions of one's own project of the good life. What transpires instead is that with the presupposition of a sound rational judgment, given that the consensus is determined by rational representatives, what will be agreed upon will be the general will of everyone. And inasmuch as the principles of the good life is a product of rational individuals whose decisions reflect that of the general will, citizens for that matter are simply to abide and rationally obey. This is a problem, especially in most underdeveloped democracies in the world, because it prioritizes the majority's goals over the minority's projects; aside from the fact that it merely reduces the heterogeneous nature of moral valuing in the society to an abstract universality. What happens therefore is that most of the marginalized sector's project of the good life is set aside in view of the supposed greater good the majority is proposing in the actual deliberative process. This explains why most of the indigenous people in the country are banished from their ancestral lands, and whose cry for justice and equality are silenced.

It is for this reason that Chantal Mouffe criticizes deliberative democracy's main goal of "securing a strong link between democracy and liberalism," while, "refuting all those critics who – from the right as well as from the left – have proclaimed the contradictory nature of liberal democracy."<sup>193</sup> This is so because the liberals see popular contestations and antagonism as posing a threat to the values of liberal democracy. The main goal, therefore, of deliberative democracy is to limit if not eliminate all sorts of contestations, by reformulating the democratic principle of popular sovereignty.<sup>194</sup> The reformulation has led to the demise of power in the public sphere while being replaced by an inclusive rational consensus between two pre-constituted identities. Mouffe sees this to be problematic, precisely because it fails to consider the social dimension of power; that power is vital for social relation. Moreover, the necessary constitution of power in the social sphere rests in the very nature of the polity; modern

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<sup>193</sup>Chantal Mouffe, *Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism*, Reihe Politikwissenschaft Political Science Series, December 2000, 3.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.



democratic societies are pluralistic in value. That is, modern political societies posit differences of rationalities relative to the socio-ethico principles embraced by many of its members. It is for this reason Mouffe asserts that power must not be seen as “external relation taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities themselves.”<sup>195</sup> That is, since any social relation is a manifestation of hegemony – of power relation – democracy for this matter should not direct its goal to eliminating antagonism, but rather to see to it that such contestations are given due legitimacy. “Democracy requires, therefore, that the purely constructed nature of social relations finds its complement in the purely pragmatic grounds of the claims of power legitimacy.”<sup>196</sup> The legitimation of power in the public sphere entails that, democracy should not aim for a universal consensus among socially constructed identities, rather it should allow for the possibility of counter-hegemonic moves and contestations. That is, “agonistic democracy should provide the possibility of contestation between different and conflicting interpretations of the shared ethico-political principles.”<sup>197</sup> Agonistic democracy presupposes the idea of power legitimacy among socially and politically diversified identities. An antagonism that does not see the opposing party as an enemy to be destroyed and silenced, rather, it sees the other’s claim for development to be equally legitimate. Radical democracy insists on the idea of struggle that is imminent in liberal democratic institutions; a struggle from within liberal democracy that attempts to radically put into practice the liberal principles of equality and liberty.

### 3.3. Agonistic Pluralism

Mouffe, in “The Return of the Political” argues that the main problematic of deliberative democracy rests in its reductionism of the nature of the political to sheer politics. Liberal democracy in its insistence of an inclusive rationality portrays a society that is empty of contestations and antagonism. The reductionism of the political to that of politics means that political antagonism is determined by norms and laws set by an inclusivist rational consensus

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid.14.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Allen Dreyer Hanse; Andre Sonnichsen, Radical Democracy, Agonism and the Limits of Pluralism: An Interview with Chantal Mouffe, *Distinktion*, 4.



in the public sphere. Legitimacy of protestations, in this regard, is limited to legislative regulations. Antagonism and contestations, for that matter, are seen to posit an immediate threat to liberal democratic institutions. So that the main goal of deliberative democracy is to limit, if not eliminate, all forms of contestations. The elimination of contestations is realized in the creation of the public sphere whereupon adequate procedures of deliberations, ruled by a rational consensus, take the place of legitimate power relation. Following Mouffe, such elimination of power in the political is itself the very limitation of liberal democracy; for it fails to give a substantive account of the pluralism of values prevalent in modern democratic societies. She asserts thus: “Radical democracy demands that we acknowledge differences – the particular, the multiple, the heterogenous – in effect, everything that has been included by the concept of man in the abstract. Universalism is not rejected but particularized; what is needed is a new kind of articulation between the universal and the particular.”<sup>198</sup> That radicalization of democracy is realized in the acknowledgement of differences in rationality and judgments among men whose nature of social relation is determined by hegemonic power relations. It is in the acknowledgement of the necessity of antagonism that democracy will flourish. She further writes that: “Pluralism lies at the very core of modern democracy; if we want a more democratic society, we need to increase that pluralism and make room for a multiplicity of democratically managed forms of associations and communities.”<sup>199</sup> Therefore democracy should abandon all hopes of a perfectly reconciled society under a universal and rational consensus. That is, democracy should not aim for a unified consensus; rather, it should create a space for conflictual consensus among diversified individuals to flourish. Agonistic pluralism, according to Mouffe, embraces the idea that antagonism is vital for a truly democratic institution to flourish. So that “the aim of democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary”, i.e., somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into

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<sup>198</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (London: Verso, 1993), 13.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.



question.”<sup>200</sup> The legitimacy of antagonism in agonistic democracy lies in the very idea that agonistic confrontations and contestations are the very foundations of a truly functioning democracy. “A well-functioning democracy”, Mouffe argues, “calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.”<sup>201</sup> It is for this reason that agonistic democracy denies all possibilities of rational consensus to flourish, for such inclusive rationality rejects the legitimacy of antagonistic confrontations in the polity by eliminating all forms of political antagonism in the public sphere and replacing them with a general consensus. However, such elimination of power in the public sphere, realized by a rational consensus and the insistence of legitimacy that is utterly individualistic, for Mouffe, is an illusion that posits an essential danger to pluralistic democracy. “This is why”, she writes, “a project of radical and plural democracy recognizes the impossibility of the complete realization of democracy and the final achievement of the political community.”<sup>202</sup>

### **3.4. The Return of the Political in Ozamiz Politics**

For almost 20 years the Parojinog clan had thrived in Ozamiz city and was successful in establishing a political dynasty almost without contestations. They made themselves the local bosses who control all aspects of the city’s bureaucracy and economy; they loot the city of its political and economic resources for their own gains and satisfactions. Though it is undeniable that the family, especially the late mayor, had helped in establishing the city’s institutions and political structures as a democratic polity, it is likewise equally undeniable that they were the reasons why the city’s economy is bogged down and the people’s development is neglected. Furthermore, they succeeded in continuing their hold of power in the city not because they were loved by the people of Ozamiz – though it is true that some of the citizens, especially those who are close constituents of the family, loved them – rather because of their most effective political machinery characterized with violence and intimidation. Their affiliation with the *Kuratong Baleleng* group has secured for them a seemingly endless hold of power and control over the

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<sup>200</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *Deliberative Democracy of Agonistic Pluralism*, 15.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>202</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, 72.



people of Ozamiz; to the extent that the locals call them the “Dragons” whose names are mentioned in whispers and fear. Despite the rampant irregularities and illegal activities (illegal drug trade in Lawis, illegal gambling, robberies, extortions and the like) that some of the family’s constituents are doing, the people choose to be silent over the aforementioned irregularities in the city, for they fear about what the dragons might do to them. More often than not, when I approached random people to talk about the topic of Ozamiz politics their common concerns are, “Will my name be mentioned in the paper?”, “I am afraid that their associates will know about me.”, “Are you going to record everything that I will say?”, “Is this only between the two of us?”, while some tend simply to be indifferent and remain silent.

For many years the family held in hostage the city and the people of Ozamiz. They were enjoying a totally monopolistic rule over the city’s political and economic resources, while most of the people remained poor and ignorant. Mendoza, Hutchcroft, Sidel and Quimpo were right in their contention that where a political power predator flourishes, there exists extreme capability deficit. Poverty and political dynasty, especially in rural areas, are necessarily inter-correlated. Poverty, in this regard, is not a contingent phenomenon caused by environmental and social principles; rather poverty is intended, designed by the ruling elites to keep the people in constant need for their patronage help in the process of rent-seeking activities. Ignorance and poverty are the two main tools of subjugation. The more the people remain poor and miserably in need, the easier to control and manipulate them. Such is the case of the people in Ozamiz city, they were not just controlled by the manipulative schemes of the ruling family but most especially by the fear they instill in the people with their immediate linkage to the infamous gang of the place.

But their seemingly absolute hold of power in Ozamiz will soon come to its end; when a progressive leadership was introduced by the person of Police Chief Inspector Jovie Espindo and which totally changed the fate of the city. Reynaldo Parojinog’s hold to power suddenly stop in the dawn of July 30 2017, when he together with his brother Octavio Jr, his wife Susan, his sister Mona and 11 others were killed in an attempt of serving search warrants against the



family. News report say that in the act of serving the purpose of the police officers the Parojinog side fired against the officers leading to the policemen to fire back, killing them.<sup>203</sup> The incident has led also to the apprehension of his daughter Nova Princess who was then mayor of the Ozamiz and his son Reynaldo Jr. After the death of the Aldong and the following incarcerations and the disbandment of the Ozamiz group, the people are finally freed from the ruling family's control. For the first time, for almost two decades; the people of the Ozamiz have experience true bureaucracy. Though the system, designed by the ruling family, remained to be problematic, but from the ruins of the past dynasty the people of Ozamiz city started to build a new democracy. The radicalization of democracy in Ozamiz was necessitated, disruption was deemed essential in order to salvage the dying politics in the city. For years antagonism ceased to exist in the place; political protestations and contestations were long been immured in the tombs of monopolistic power-rule that the family built for decades. The political was denied of its being and was replaced with a self-serving rationality and universalism designed by the Parojinogs in order to proliferate in power. Moreover, what transpired in Ozamiz during the rule of the family is precisely the danger that Mouffe referred as inevitable when deliberative democracy is left on its own to insist for too much consensus. The main problematic of our country's liberal democracy is that it is predatory, power is centralized within elites and warlords who immure the land with violence and intimidation, and in the process loot the country of her resources and divide among themselves the spoils. They milk in the country's strong but predatory system of democracy; thereby enriching themselves from the often-incoherent bureaucracy of the land. The Parojinogs have understood this very well, to the extent that they have made a political dynasty fortified by systemic political deprivations and injustices. But in the advent of a progressive leadership, the radicalization of democracy of the city was realized. Strong policies were promulgated and implemented without discretion. The city begun to see the dawn of democracy from above, power was no longer centralized within the political clan and the people were slowly empowered.

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<sup>203</sup> Bea Cupin, "The Parojinogs and the Tangled Webs they Wove", [article online].



However, the radicalization of the city's democracy was not without contestation from the ruling family that eventually led to the death of some of the family's constituents and close relatives. The return of the political in Ozamiz city was effected by a leader whose courage and faith in his God have brought about the downfall of a dynasty whose power control has been rooted for decades. For some, PCI Jovie Espinido is a hero, someone whose name will be part of the entire history of Ozamiz. His progressive leadership has freed the city from the clasp of the power predators who held hostage the people and whose incompetence in running a democratic state is exhibited in the dire lives the people of Ozamiz are living. Espinido revolutionized the state by enforcing policies with an iron hand. He knew that it is only through fire that the crooked ways the people were accustomed to doing and living in Ozamiz will be straightened. What Mouffe calls the "particularization" of the masses was reinstated; the public sphere was cleansed from the capricious and oppressive rationality imposed by the former ruling bosses. The return of the political in Ozamis city is slowly coming to its realization. Though right now one must not be complaisant for, as Mouffe says, democracy presupposes a paradox. She writes: "Central to this approach [radical/agonistic democracy] is the awareness that a pluralist democracy contains a paradox, since the very moment of its realization would see its disintegration. It should be conceived as a good that only exists as good so long as it cannot be reached. Such a democracy will therefore always be a democracy 'to come', as conflict and antagonism are at the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full realization."<sup>204</sup>

#### **4. Conclusion**

Ozamis city is one of the many bailiwicks in Mindanao that was under the rule of a political dynasty. Taking advantage of the predatory nature of Philippine state, the Parojinogs was able to establish a dynasty within the city. Though it is undeniable that the family somehow was responsible to the growth of the city but it cannot likewise be denied that during their reign of power corruption and other irregularities and social injustices were rampant. With their most

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<sup>204</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, 8.



effective political machinery, I argue above that, they were able to flourish without contestations as the bosses of land. All form of political contestations and antagonism were canceled out, if not silenced by the very political machinery they are using. They live in absolute prosperity and prodigality while most of the people are poor and in dire misery. The political, for decades was silenced, immured by the violent force the ruling family in the past has imposed. But in the advent of the progressive leadership of PCI Jovie Espinido, the political was radically reinstated. The prevailing force of the ruling family was demised to the minimal and was replaced by a sense of democracy from below. Democracy is no longer in service of the power predators, but was reinstated to the people of Ozamiz. The autonomization of the people is realized, the political is reborn; for the first time in the history of Ozamiz, a mass protestation was made in front of the Capitol ground, where the people finally raised their head and shouted for justice against their long standing oppressors. The radicalization of democracy in Ozamiz was effected not by a revolution that came from the outside, but rather from within. The democratization of Ozamiz democracy marked the return of the political in Ozamiz politics.

### **3.5. Conflict of Interest**

The research was done by the author without any external aid whatsoever; may it be monetary funding or co-authorship arrangement. The data gathered are taken with full consent from the people who consented to be asked about the matter that is being studied. Since there was nothing of any sort of writings about the state of politics here during the reign of the former ruling family that is the subject of the study, the researcher opted to interview people (local persons) who were willing to share their experiences in Ozamiz. And due to the controversiality of the topic, the researcher opted not to disclose their names and their exact statements. With that the author declares that there is no conflict of interest whatsoever in the making of the research.

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## Avrupa Birliği'ne Uyum Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Siber Güvenlik Stratejileri<sup>205</sup>

Salim KURNAZ\*,  
S. Mustafa ÖNEN\*\*

### Öz

Her ülke, kendi bilişim sistemlerini siber saldırılardan korumak ve sahip olduğu bilgi ve verileri güvenliğini sağlamak için etkin ve sürdürülebilir bir siber güvenlik stratejisi geliştirmek ve uygulamak zorundadır. Günümüzde siber güvenlik olgusu, artık her ülkenin ulusal güvenliğinin birer parçası haline almıştır. Yaşadığı siber saldırılar sonrası AB; siber güvenliğe yönelik stratejilerini ve yasal düzenlemelerini 2000'li yıllar itibari ile oluşturmuştur. Ayrıca AB, siber güvenlik stratejilerini uygulamak üzere gerekli kurumlarını da hayata geçirmiştir. Buna karşılık Türkiye'deki siber güvenlik stratejilerinin belirlenmesi ve iyileştirilmesi konusunun AB'nin siber güvenlik stratejileri ile karşılaştırıldığında; Türkiye'deki yapının henüz oluşum safhasında olduğu fark edilmektedir. Bu noktada Türkiye'nin AB uyum sürecinde AB'nin siber güvenlik stratejileri ile ilgili yasal ve kurumsal düzenlemelerini öncelikle gözden geçirmesi gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmanın esas amacı, AB tarafından hayata geçirilen siber güvenlik stratejilerinin yasal ve kurumsal boyutunu inceleyerek Türkiye'deki siber güvenlik stratejilerinin oluşturulmasına ve geliştirilmesine belli ölçüde katkı sağlamaktır. Çalışmada ilk olarak siber güvenlik kavramı ve türleri ele alınacaktır. Ardından Avrupa Birliği tarafından uygulanan siber güvenlik stratejileri ile Türkiye'de uygulamaya konan belli başlı siber güvenlik stratejileri kapsamında başlıca yasal ve kurumsal düzenlemeleri incelenecektir. Çalışmanın sonunda ise, ulusal siber güvenlik stratejilerinin oluşturulması ve iyileştirilmesi kapsamında mevcut düzenlemeler kısaca değerlendirilerek birtakım öneriler geliştirilecektir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Siber Uzay, Siber Güvenlik, Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi, Siber Güvenlik Yönetimi.

## Turkey's Cyber Security Strategies in the Adaptation Process to European

### Union

#### Abstract

Each country had to develop and implement an effective and sustainable cyber security strategy to protect its information systems from cyber attacks and to secure the information and data it has. Today, the cyber security phenomenon has become a part of the national security of every country. After the cyber attacks, the strategies and legal arrangements of the EU for cyber security were formed by the years 2000s. In addition, the EU has generated the necessary institutions to implement cyber security strategies. In

<sup>205</sup> 18-20 Nisan 2019 tarihinde Gaziantep'te "13. Uluslararası Kamu Yönetimi Sempozyumu"nda sunulan ve tam metin olarak yayınlanmamış bildirinin geliştirilmiş halidir.

\* Dr., Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, salimkurnaz@hotmail.com

\*\* Prof. Dr., İnönü Üniversitesi İİBF Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, mustafa.onen@inonu.edu.tr



*contrast, in comparison with the EU's cyber security strategy, the structure in Turkey is yet to be realized as in the formation stage. At this point Turkey, in EU accession process, should revise "the EU Cyber Security Strategies" primarily related to legal and institutional arrangements. The main purpose of this study is to provide a certain degree of contribution to the creation and development of Turkey's cyber security strategy by examining the legal and institutional aspects of cyber security strategy implemented by EU. Firstly, cyber security concept and its types will be discussed. Then the main legal and institutional arrangements will be examined within the scope of major cyber security strategies implemented in Turkey and in the European Union. Finally, some proposals will be developed by briefly evaluating the existing regulations within the scope of the creation and improvement of national cyber security strategies.*

**Key Words:** *Cyber Space, Cyber Security, Cyber Security Strategy, Cyber Security Management.*

## 1. Giriş

Bilgi teknolojilerinin kullanımı her geçen gün artmaktadır. Günümüzde internetin sağladığı kolaylıklar, teknolojik ve elektronik aletler aracılığıyla yaygın bir şekilde gerçekleştirilmektedir. Geçmişte devletten bir belge almak veya vermek için kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarına bizzat başvurmak gerekir iken; artık işlemler, bilgi teknolojileri yardımıyla daha rahat ve pratik olarak yapılmaktadır. Kamusal hizmetlerin bilişim teknolojileri aracılığıyla fiziki ortamlardan kurtularak siber uzay olarak adlandırılan sanal ortama taşınması, hizmetlerin daha hızlı ve kolay sunulmasına yol açmaktadır. İnternetin hayatımıza sağladığı kuşkusuz birtakım yararlar kadar, birçok yeni tehlikenin de hayatımıza girmesi söz konusu olmuştur. Elektronik ortamda bulunan veya saklanan kişisel bilgiler, teknolojik gelişmelerle birlikte siber saldırılara daha açık hale gelmiştir. Hizmet kalitesi ve müşteri memnuniyeti gibi nedenlerle kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarınca kullanımı yaygınlaşan bilgi teknolojileri kapsamında veri tabanları ve e-hizmetler aracılığıyla saklanılan kişisel bilgiler, bu gelişmeler doğrultusunda daha çok siber saldırılara maruz kalmıştır.

Avrupa Birliği (AB), üye veya aday ülkelere birçok alanda önderlik ve yol gösterici özelliğe sahip bir kuruluştur. Bu alanlardan birisi de son dönemde giderek yoğunlaşan siber saldırılara karşı geliştirilmesi gereken bazı hareket tarzları ve ulusal siber güvenliğin sağlanmasına yönelik tedbirler olmuştur. AB üyelik sürecinde bulunan Türkiye, siber güvenliğine yönelik çalışmalarına son dönemde yoğunlaşmasına rağmen; Türkiye'nin bu konuda yeterli güvenlik seviyesini sağladığını söylemek



güçtür. Türkiye; vatandaşlarının temel hak ve hürriyetlerini sağlamak, güvenli hizmet sunabilmek için hızlı bir şekilde kamusal hizmet ve faaliyetlere entegre ettiği bilişim teknolojilerini siber güvenliğe uygun hale getirecek gerekli tedbirleri biran önce hayata geçirmesi esastır. Bu kapsamda AB tarafından hayata geçirilen siber güvenlik stratejileri ve buna ilişkin düzenlemeler, Türkiye'deki çalışmalara belli ölçüde yol gösterici olabilir.

AB genel yasal düzenlemeler ve siber güvenlik kapsamında üye ülkelere öncülük etme özelliğine sahip olduğundan almış olduğu kararların incelenmesinde fayda vardır. Aslında üye ülkelerin temsilcilerinden oluşan Avrupa Komisyonunun aldığı kararlar, bütün üye ülkelerin uyma ve uygulama zorunluluğu olan bağlayıcı nitelikte düzenlemelerdir. Bu kapsamda Avrupa Komisyonu güncel hayattan ekonomik ve sosyal hayata kadar birçok düzenlemeye imza atmaktadır. Avrupa Komisyonu 2013 yılında yayınladığı son siber güvenlik stratejisini yaşanan teknolojik gelişmeler, siber saldırı ve risk analizleri kapsamında 2017 yılında güncellemiştir. Güncellenmiş strateji, özellikle kritik altyapıların güvenliği ve bölgesel siber güvenliğin sağlanmasına odaklanan geniş kapsamlı yenilikler içermektedir. Bu güncelleme kapsamında hayata geçirilen yeniliklerin Türkiye tarafından uygulanan siber güvenlik tedbirleri, yasal düzenleme ve kurumsal yapılanmaya entegre edilmesiyle vatandaşlara sunulan hizmetlerin güvenlik ve kalitesi de artmış olacaktır.

Bu çalışmada öncelikle siber güvenliğe yönelik kavramlara değinilmiş; ardından ise, Türkiye'deki siber güvenliğe yönelik mevcut durum analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmada Türkiye'de yapılacak düzenlemelere yol gösterici olabileceği değerlendirilen AB tarafından uygulanan siber güvenlik stratejilerine temel oluşturan yasal ve kurumsal düzenlemeler incelendikten sonra, çalışmanın sonunda konuya ilişkin birtakım değerlendirme ve önerilere yer verilmiştir.

## **2. Siber Güvenlik Kavramı**

Sınırsız ve çok katmanlı internet ve bilişim teknolojilerinin kullanımı devlet gözetimi ve denetimi olmadan küresel ilerlemenin güçlü bir aracı haline gelmiştir. Özel sektör internetin yapımında ve günlük yönetiminde lider bir rol oynamaya devam etse de, şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve güvenlik gereksinimlerine olan ihtiyaç gittikçe daha fazla önem kazanmaya başlamıştır. Bu kapsamda devletlerin ve uluslararası kuruluşların siber güvenlik politikasına rehberlik etmesi gereken ilke ve yasal düzenlemelerin biran önce belirlenmesi gerekmektedir.



Siber uzay; dünyada ve uzayda yer alan bilişim sistemlerinin ve ilgili ağların oluşturduğu ya da bağımsız bilgi sistemlerinde bulunan sayısal ortama denilmektedir<sup>206</sup>. Buna göre internete bağlanabilen her türlü elektronik cihaz, bilgisayar ve teknolojik alet siber uzayın bir parçası olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Siber güvenlik ise, siber uzayda oluşan bilişime yönelik saldırılardan korumak, bilişim sistemindeki bilgiyi/verinin gizliliğini, bütünlük ve erişilebilirliği güvenceye almak, saldırıları ve siber güvenlik olaylarını tespit etmek ve bununla ilgili mekanizmaları devreye almak ve sistemleri siber saldırı öncesine döndürmektir<sup>207</sup>. Birçok çalışmada siber güvenliğe yönelik tanımlamalar yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmada siber güvenlik genel olarak siber alanlara, birbirleriyle bağlantılı ağlara ve bilgi altyapısına zarar verebilecek tehditlere karşı korumak için sivil ve askeri alanlarda atılması gerekli adımları ifade etmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle siber güvenlik, ağların ve altyapının kullanılabilirliğini ve bütünlüğünü ve içerdiği bilgilerin gizliliğini korumak için çaba göstermektedir<sup>208</sup>. AB ve ülkemizde oluşturulan siber uzay ve siber güvenlik tanımları birbirlerine büyük ölçüde benzerlik göstermektedir.

Siber tehdit kavramı ise; siber alanda bireysel veya kurumsal verilere dönük olarak güvenliği ortadan kaldırılacak her tür siber saldırıdır<sup>209</sup>. Bu tanım ile siber tehditleri klasik tehditlerden ayıran temel özelliklerin başında tehditlerin siber uzayda karşımıza çıkması gelmektedir. Siber uzayda ortaya çıkan tehditlerin önceden tahmin edilmesi ve önlem alınması son derece zordur. Siber alanda gerçekleştirilecek bir saldırı her hangi bir zaman ve yerden gerçekleştirilebilmektedir.

Siber suç, genellikle bilgisayarların ve bilgi sistemlerinin birincil bir araç veya hedef olarak yer aldığı çok çeşitli suç faaliyetlerini kapsamaktadır. Siber suçlara aldatma, sahtekarlık veya kimlik bilgilerini çalma gibi “geleneksel suçlar”; çocuk pornografisinin dağıtımı ve ırkçılıkla ilgili nefreti yayma gibi “içerikle ilgili suçlar” ve bilgi sistemlerine yönelik saldırılar, kötü niyetli bilgisayar

<sup>206</sup> Ulaştırma Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, (UDHB), “Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi ve 2013-2014 Eylem Planı”, <https://www.btk.gov.tr/uploads/pages/2-1-strateji-eylem-plani-2013-2014-5a3412cf8f45a.pdf>, 2013, s. 8, (04.01.2019).

<sup>207</sup> Age, s. 8.

<sup>208</sup> European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec\\_comm\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf), (20.01.2019).

<sup>209</sup> Kamil Tahran, “Uluslararası Güvenliğin Bir Bileşeni Olarak Siber Güvenlik”, (Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2018).



yazılımları ise “bilgi sistemlerine özgü suçlar” olarak örnek gösterilebilir<sup>210</sup>. AB tarafından oluşturulan siber suç tanımı siber uzayda işlenebilecek suçları detaylı olarak ele almıştır. Ülkemizde ise, siber suçun kapsam ve sonuçları üzerine daha detaylı bir çalışmaya ihtiyaç vardır.

Siber caydırıcılık, sanal ortamda karşı karşıya kalınacak tehdit ve tehlikeleri önlemek veya engellemek için birtakım önlemlerin alınması durumudur. Diğer bir deyişle siber caydırıcılık, saldırıyı yapanları saldırıdan vazgeçirme, korkutma ile cesaretini kırma veya vazgeçirme amacıyla yapılan girişimler şeklinde tanımlanabilir<sup>211</sup>. Kamu kurumları dikkate alındığında siber caydırıcılık, kamu kurumları tarafından atılması gerekli koruyucu ve engelleyici tedbirleri içermektedir. Bu tedbirlerin vatandaşların kullanım düzeylerini etkilemeyecek, ama kötü amaçlı kullanım ve saldırıları vazgeçirecek seviyede olması öngörülmektedir. Aşırı güvenlik tedbirleri vatandaşların hizmet alımlarını, dolayısıyla sistemin etkinliğini olumsuz yönde etkiler iken; buna karşılık yetersiz güvenlik tedbirleri ise, kötü amaçlı kullanım ve saldırıların artmasına neden olmaktadır.

Siber saldırılara maruz kalan sistemler, TÜBİTAK tarafından şu şekilde ortaya konmuştur<sup>212</sup>:

- *Bilgi Sistemleri*, bir kuruma ve paydaşlarına hizmet veren bilgisayar sistemleridir.
- *İletişim Sistemleri*, coğrafi olarak çok geniş bir alana yayılmış bileşenlerden oluşan, pek çok kurum ve kuruluşta iletişim hizmeti sağlayan sistemlerdir.
- *Merkezi Denetleme Kontrol ve Veri Toplama Sistemleri*, coğrafi olarak çok geniş bir alana yayılmış bir sistemin bileşenlerini merkezi olarak izlemek ve kontrol etmek için kullanılan sistemlerdir.
- *Dağıtık Kontrol Sistemleri*, belli bir tesis ve konumla sınırlı bir endüstriyel süreci izlemek ve kontrol etmek için, tesisin tümüne yayılmış kontrol bileşenleri bulunan sistemlerdir.

<sup>210</sup> European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, (20.01.2019).

<sup>211</sup> Şeref Sağıroğlu, “Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma: Önem, Tanımlar, Unsurlar ve Önlemler”, *Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma Farkındalık ve Caydırıcılık* içinde, ed. Şeref Sağıroğlu ve Mustafa Alkan, (2018), 26.

<sup>212</sup> TÜBİTAK, “Kritik Bilgi Sistem Altyapıları için Asgari Güvenlik Önlemleri Dokümanı”, <http://hgm.ubak.gov.tr/Content/UploadedFile/Kritik%20Bilgi%20Sistem%20Altyapıları%20İçin%20Asgari%20Güvenlik%20Önlemleri&&6445b90e-b2ad-4e5e-9c13-6ae19ba10e37.pdf>, 2019, s. 6-7, (04.01.2019).



### 3. Türkiye'nin Siber Güvenlik Stratejileri

Türkiye'deki siber güvenliğe yönelik çalışmaların ve yasal düzenlemelerin çok yeni olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Siber güvenlik kapsamındaki çalışmalar 2012 yılına kadar Bilim Teknoloji ve İletişim Kurumu (BTK) tarafından yürütülmüştür. 2012 yılında siber güvenlik faaliyetlerini yürütme ve koordinasyon görevi, Bakanlar Kurulu'nun 2012/3842 sayılı "Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Çalışmalarının Yürütülmesi, Yönetilmesi ve Koordinasyonuna İlişkin Kararı" (USGÇYYKİK) ile Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı'na (UDHB) devredilmiş ve Siber Güvenlik Kurulu oluşturulmuştur<sup>213</sup>. 2012 yılından itibaren UDHB tarafından atılan adımlar ile Türkiye'nin siber güvenlik faaliyetlerine ise önemli ölçüde yön vermiştir.

#### 3.1. Siber Güvenlik Kurulu

Ulusal siber güveniğin sadece tek bir kurum tarafından yürütülecek bir uygulamayla değil de bütün kamu kurumları ve özel sektör kuruluşlarının katılımı ve dayanışmasıyla yürütülmesi gerektiği anlaşılmıştır. Bu gerçeğin anlaşılması ile uluslararası düzenlemelere paralel olarak bir üst yönetim ve karar organının kurulması ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bakanlar Kurulunun 2012 yılındaki USGÇYYKİK ile Siber Güvenlik Kurulu oluşturulmuştur. Stratejik plan kapsamında tüm kamu kuruluşlarıyla bütün tarafların Siber Güvenlik Kurulu'nun belirlediği politikalara, stratejilere ve eylem planlarına uyması ve bununla ilgili yükümlülükleri<sup>214</sup> yerine getirmesi istenmiştir. 2016-2019 Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi kapsamında bilişim teknolojileriyle güvenlik konusunda öncü kimi kamu ve özel sektör kuruluşları Siber Güvenlik Kurulu üyeleri olarak sayılmıştır.

#### 3.2. Ulaştırma ve Altyapı Bakanlığı

Bakanlar Kurulunun 2012/3842 sayılı USGÇYYKİK ile siber güvenlik ile ilgili temel görevler ve eylem planlarının hazırlanması görevi UDHB'na verilmiştir. UDHB ulusal çapta yürütülen siber güvenlik çalışmalarına önderlik etmekte, yasal düzenlemeler oluşturmakta, ulusal siber güvenlik stratejisini belirlemekte ve tatbikatlar ile kurum ve kuruluşların siber saldırılara karşı hazırlıklı olma

<sup>213</sup> Seda Yılmaz ve Şeref Sağıroğlu. "Siber Saldırı Hedefleri ve Türkiye'de Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi", 6.

*Uluslararası Bilgi Güvenliği ve Kriptoloji Konferansı Bildiriler Kitabı*, (2013b):329.

<sup>214</sup> Ulaştırma Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, (UDHB), "2016-2019 Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi", <http://www.udhb.gov.tr/doc/siber/2016-2019guvenlik.pdf>, 2016, s. 6, (04.01.2019).



seviyeleri arttırmaya çalışılmaktadır. Siber güvenliğe yönelik ulusal çaptaki ilk tatbikat 25-28 Ocak 2011 tarihinde 41 kurum ve kuruluşun katılımı ile gerçekleştirilmiştir<sup>215</sup>. Bu tatbikat sonucunda tespit edilen hata ve eksiklikler giderilmeye çalışılmıştır.

2018 yılında gerçekleştirilen başkanlık sistemine geçiş ile birlikte UDHB'lığı Ulaştırma ve Altyapı Bakanlığı şeklinde tekrar düzenlenmiştir. Siber güvenlik faaliyetlerinin koordinasyon ve siber güvenlik kurulu başkanlık görevi aynen devam etmiştir. Siber güvenliğin artırılması kapsamında UDHB tarafından iki adet strateji ve eylem planı yayınlanmıştır.

### **3.3. Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi ve 2013-2014 Eylem Planı**

İlgili plan Bakanlar Kurulu'nun 2012/3842 sayılı kararı gereği hazırlanmıştır. Eylem planında öncelikle 2013-2014 yıllarında siber güvenliğin artırılmasına yönelik alınması gerekli planlar ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra bu tarihleri aşan ve sürekli yürütülmesi gereken faaliyet, eğitim ve geliştirme çalışmalarına yer verilmiştir. Bundan dolayı eylem planı her ne kadar 2013-2014 yılları için hazırlanmış olsa da uzun süreli bir doküman haline gelmiştir.

İlgili Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi ve Eylem Planının amacı,<sup>216</sup> öncelikle kamusal bilgi teknolojilerinin ve sistemleri üzerinden sağlanan sistemlerin güvenliğinin sağlanması olarak belirlenmiştir. İkinci amaç olarak kamusal kritik altyapılar ve bunlara ilişkin sistemlerinin güvenliğinin sağlanması olarak tayin edilmiştir. Son olarak ise, siber saldırılar sonucu zarar gören sistemlerin normal çalışma düzenlerine döndürülmesi ve saldırıyı gerçekleştirenlere yönelik adli makam ve kolluk kuvvetlerince yürütülecek faaliyetlerin koordinesine yönelik altyapı çalışmaları oluşturmuştur.

İlgili Eylem Planı kapsamında kamu bilişim sistemleri, gerek kamuda gerekse özel sektörde gerçekleştirilen altyapılara ilişkin bilişim sistemleri şeklinde tespit edilmiştir. Eylem planı kapsamında yedi adet stratejik siber güvenlik eylemi tanımlanmıştır. Tespit edilen stratejik siber güvenlik eylem planları ise şunlardır<sup>217</sup>:

- Hukuki düzenlemelere yer verilmesi,

<sup>215</sup> Faruk Aydın, "Cyber Security in National Protection of Turkey", (Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Çankaya Üniversitesi, 2012).

<sup>216</sup> UDHB, "Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi ve 2013-2014 Eylem Planı", s. 10.

<sup>217</sup> Age, s. 10.





- Adliye süreçlerine destek olan faaliyetlerin yapılması,
- Ulusal siber olaylarını denetleyecek organizasyonların kurulması,
- Ulusal siber güvenlik altyapısını güçlendirmeye yer verilmesi,
- Siber güvenliğe ilişkin personel yetiştirilmesine ve bilinçlendirilmesine imkan tanınması,
- Siber güvenlikle ilgili yerli teknolojilerin daha çok kullanılması,
- Ulusal güvenlikle ilgili mekanizmaların yaygınlaştırılmasıdır.

İlgili strateji ve 2013-2014 Eylem Planı, değerlendirildiğinde öncelikle ülkemize özgü olmadığı ve kamu ve özel sektör kuruluşlarının görev ve sorumluluklarını açıklamadığı, eylem planlarında belirtilen sürelerin aşıldığı, yasal altyapının yetersiz olduğu, eğitim ihtiyaçlarının tespit edilemediği, kritik altyapılara yeterli önemin verilmediği ve bütçelendirmenin yapılamadığı<sup>218</sup> gibi konularda çeşitli eleştiriler yöneltilmiştir.

### **3.4. 2016-2019 Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi**

2013-2014 Eylem Planındaki düzenlemelerin geçerliğini yitirmesi üzerine UDHB öncülüğünde bütün paydaşların katılımıyla yeni stratejik planın oluşturulması çalışmalarına daha hızlı ve bilinçli bir şekilde başlanmıştır. Öncelikle eski stratejik plandaki hedeflerin gerçekleşmesi üzerinde durulmuştur. Daha sonra geniş kapsamlı bir katılım ve uluslararası kuruluşlar ve gelişmiş ülke örnekleri de dikkate alınarak stratejik plana son hali verilmiştir.

2016-2019 siber güvenliğe ilişkin Strateji ve Eylem Planında öncelikli amaç olarak siber güvenliğin ulusal güvenliğin bir parçası kabul edilmesi ve ulusal siber uzaydaki sistemler ve paydaşların güvenliğinin sağlanması için gerekli tedbirlerin alınmasına ilişkin yetkinliklerin sağlanması esası benimsenmiştir<sup>219</sup>. Bu düşünce doğrultusunda oluşturulan stratejik planın kapsamı, ulusal siber uzayda yer alan tüm bileşenler şeklinde kamu ve özel sektörün bilişim sistemleriyle ilgili tüm taraflarını kapsamaktadır<sup>220</sup>. Bu amaç ve kapsam doğrultusunda hazırlanan stratejik plan

<sup>218</sup> Akın Aytekin, “Türkiye’nin Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi ve Eylem Planının Değerlendirmesi”, (Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2015)

<sup>219</sup> UDHB, “2016-2019 Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi”, s. 9.

<sup>220</sup> Age, s. 9.



kapsamında beş adet siber güvenlik stratejik eylemi tespit edilmiştir. Tespit edilen siber güvenlik stratejik eylemleri şunlar olmuştur<sup>221</sup>:

- Siber savunmayı güçlendirmek ve kritik altyapıları korumak,
- Siber suçlar ile mücadele etmek,
- Farkındalığı ve insan kaynağını geliştirmek,
- Siber güvenlikle ilgili ekosistemi geliştirmek,
- Siber güvenliği milli güvenlikle bütünleştirmektir.

Eylem planları genel olarak değerlendirildiğinde, öncelikle kritik altyapıların korunması kavramının eylem planlarına dahil edilmesi, konunun öneminin kavrandığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca siber güvenlik kapsamında personel eğitimine önem verilmesi de gelmektedir. Siber güvenliğe yönelik sorumlulukların tespit edilmemiş ve bütçe tahsis edilmemiş olması, stratejik plana yönelik getirilebilecek önemli eleştiriler arasında sayılabilir. Ayrıca genel olarak değerlendirildiğinde stratejik eylemlerin bir önceki stratejik planın tekrarı konumunda olduğu görülmektedir.

### **3.5. Kamu Güvenliği Ağı (Kamu-Net)**

Kamu-Net'in projesi Ulaştırma ve Altyapı Bakanlığı tarafından; Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Stratejisinde ve 5809 sayılı Elektronik Haberleşme Kanunu'nda (md.5/1) belirtilen hükümler gereğince yürütülmeye başlanmıştır. Kamu-Net projesinin amacı olarak şunlar kabul edilmiştir:

- Vatandaşlara internet hizmetini kapalı ve güvenli bir sanal ağla sunmak,
- Siber güvenliği sanal ortamda belli standartlar altında sağlamak,
- Kamu kurumlarının uyumlu çalışabileceği alt yapıyı hazırlamaktır.

Sayılan amaçlara ulaşılabilmesi için birçok yasal düzenlemeye gidilmiştir. Kamu-Net'in kurulmasına ilişkin Protokolü UHDB ile Türk Telekomünikasyon arasında 2015 yılında imzalandıktan sonra; kamu kurumlarının Kamu-Net ağına girmesi için 2016 yılında 2016/28 sayılı Başbakanlık Genelgesi kabul edilmiştir. Ardından "Kamu-Net Ağına Bağlanmasına ve Denetimine İlişkin Tebliğ" 2017 yılında yayımlanmıştır. Bu tebliğle Aralık 2018 tarihi itibarıyla 146 kamu kurumun daha Kamu-Net'e dâhil olması hedeflenmiştir.

<sup>221</sup> Age, s. 10.



#### 4. Avrupa Birliđinin Siber Güvenlik Stratejileri

Avrupa Birliđi'nin siber saldırılara karřı en önemli silahı hayata geçireceđi yasal düzenlemelerdir. Çünkü AB'nin saldırılara karřı doğrudan operasyonel kapasitesi ve yasal kurumları mevcut bulunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle AB'nin yürürlüğe koyacađı yasal düzenlemeler ile üye ülkelerin siber güvenliđinin artırılması ve siber saldırılar karřısında hazırlıklı olması istenmektedir. AB üye ülkeleri, siber güvenlik yatırımlarını arttırmaya, personel eğitime önem vermeye ve teknolojik yatırımlarını cesaretlendirmeye çalışmaktadır<sup>222</sup>. Bu sayede operasyonel kapasitesi veya yasal kurumları olmamasına rağmen hayata geçirdiđi öncü danışma kurumları ve çıkardıđı yasal düzenlemeler ile üye ülkelere öncülük etmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Siber saldırıların sadece tek bir kiři ya da ülkeyi hedef alan bir tehdit olmamasından ve kişisel, kurumsal veya ulusal birçok siber saldırı yaşanmasından dolayı AB, kendi kurumlarını ve üye ülkelere yol gösterici bir strateji izlemek amacıyla siber güvenlik politikalarını sürekli güncellemektedir. Bu kapsamda hayata geçirilen kurum ve yasal düzenlemelerin arasında başlıca; 2004 Avrupa Komitesi'nin Siber Suç Sözleşmesi, 2004'de Avrupa Birliđi Ağ ve Bilgi Güvenliđi Ajansı (ENISA)<sup>223</sup>, 2005'de Bilgi sistemlerinin Korunmasına Yönelik Düzenleme ve 2013'de Europol İçerisinde Siber Suçlar Merkezi'nin oluşturulması<sup>224</sup>, 2013'de Avrupa Birliđi Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi, 2015'de Avrupa Birliđi Güvenlik Ajandası ve 2016'da ise, Avrupa Siber Güvenlik Kurumu (ECSSO) sayılabilir.

Siber saldırılara karřı konulurken bilgi güvenliđine yönelik politikaların amaç, kapsam ve seviyesini en iyi açıklayan dokümanların başında yasal düzenlemeler gelmektedir. Aynı zamanda yasal düzenlemeler, kamu politikalarının resmi düzenlemelere yansıdıđı ve üzerinde uzlaşa sağlandıđı politik düzenlemeler olmaktadır. Bu tür düzenlemeler ile siber saldırılarda kullanılan yazılımların engellenmesi

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<sup>222</sup> Camino M. Martinez, "Game Over? Europe's Cyber Problem", Centre for European Reform, <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2018/game-over-europes-cyber-problem>, (20.01.2019).

<sup>223</sup> European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for Europe", [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01)&from=EN), 2010:16, (20.01.2019).

<sup>224</sup> Helena Carrapico ve Aandre Barrinha. "European Union Cyber Security as an Emerging Research and Policy Field", *European Politics and Society* 19, no. 3, (2018): 299.



mümkün olmasa da bu zararlı yazılımların kullanılmasının nasıl değerlendirileceği baştan belirlenebilir. AB düzenleme, direktif ve yönetmelikler ile üye ülkelere yön gösterici düzenlemeleri hayata geçirirken; üye ülkeler ise, AB düzenlemeleri ve uluslararası sözleşmelere bağlı kalarak kendi iç hukuklarını saptayabilmektedirler<sup>225</sup>. Bu sayede ideal bir siber güvenlik seviyesi yakalanmaya çalışılmaktadır.

AB tarafından siber güvenliğe yönelik atılan ilk adımlardan birisi, 2001 yılında online dolandırıcılığa karşı hayata geçirilen düzenleme olmuştur<sup>226</sup>. Bu düzenleme ile AB bütün üye ülkelerin online dolandırıcılık faaliyetlerinde (online bilgi sistemlerine saldırı, bilgi hırsızlığı, izinsiz erişim, kişisel bilgilerin çalınması vb.) yasa dışı ilan etmelerini yasal yükümlülük altına almak istemiştir. Bu düzenleme aynı zamanda suç tanımına yeni kavramlar ekleyerek casus yazılımların üretilmesini, alımı ve satımı ve siber suçlar amacıyla kullanımını da yasaklamıştır. Bu suçları işleyenlere 5 yıla kadar hapis cezası öngörülmüş ve üye ülkelerin bu suçu kişisel bilgilere ulaşma ve çalma amacıyla kasıtlı olarak işleyenlere yüksek cezalar vermesi önerilmiştir<sup>227</sup>. Bu ilk düzenleme ile siber güvenliğin temelleri atılırken; aynı zamanda siber uzayda işlenen suçların cezalandırılması ve caydırıcılık seviyesinin artırılması da amaçlanmaktadır.

Bireysel veya bilgi sistemlerine yönelik saldırıların ardından 2004 yılında İspanya'nın başkenti Madrid'de gerçekleşen ve yolcu trenlerini hedef alan terörist saldırılar sonrasında Avrupa Komisyonu kritik altyapıların korunmasına yönelik olarak "Terörizmle Mücadele Kapsamında Kritik Altyapıların Korunması"na ilişkin tebliğini yayınlamıştır<sup>228</sup>. Bu tebliğ ile temelleri atılan kritik altyapıların korunmasına daha sonra hazırlanan Avrupa Komisyonununun 2005/576, 2006/786, 2006/787 ve 2008/676 sayılı komisyon çalışmaları sonucu hazırlanan 2008/114 sayılı direktifi oluşturulmuştur. Direktif enerji, ulaşım, bilgi teknolojileri ve iletişim sektörüne yönelik düzenlemeler içermiştir<sup>229</sup>. Kritik alt yapılara yönelik saldırılar toplumsal hayatı yakından etkilediği için bu kurumların siber güvenliğinin önemi artmıştır. Özellikle son dönemde AB ve Türkiye'de hazırlanan siber güvenlik stratejik planlarında kritik alt yapıların ağırlığı

<sup>225</sup> Türkay Henkoğlu ve Bülent Yılmaz, "Avrupa Birliği (AB) Bilgi Güvenliği Politikaları", *Türk Kütüphaneciliği* 27, sy.3, (2003): 460.

<sup>226</sup> Camino M. Martinez, "Game Over? Europe's Cyber Problem", s. 4.

<sup>227</sup> Age, s. 4.

<sup>228</sup> Mustafa Ünver vd. *Kritik Altyapıların Korunması*, (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, 2011b, s. 13).

<sup>229</sup> Age, s. 13-26.



giderek ön plana çıkmıştır.

#### **4.1. Avrupa Birliği Ağ ve Bilgi Güvenliği Ajansı (European Union for Network and Information Security- ENISA)**

AB Ağ ve Bilgi Güvenliği Ajansı (ENISA) 2004 yılında çıkarılan bir düzenleme (EC Regulation No 460/2004) ile kurulmuş olup, merkezi Yunanistan'ın başkenti Atina'dadır<sup>230</sup>. ENISA'nın ana görevi, AB içindeki ağ ve bilgi güvenliği sorunlarını önleme ve bunlara yanıt verme yeteneğini arttırmak için ulusal ve birlik kapasitesini geliştirmektir. ENISA ağ ve bilgi sistemlerinin güvenliği hakkında 2016/1148 sayılı Direktifin (NIS Direktifi) uygulanmasına destek olmak için özel ilave roller ve sorumluluklar üstlenmiştir<sup>231</sup>. Ajansın faaliyetleri, AB organları ve üye devletler tarafından bilinçlendirme ve işbirliğinin desteklenmesinin yanı sıra tavsiye ve önerilerde bulunma, veri analizi sağlamadan oluşmaktadır. Ulusal ve topluluk çabalarına dayanarak, ajans bu alanda bir uzmanlık merkezi konumundadır. ENISA uzmanlığı üye devletler arasında, kamu ve özel sektörden gelen eylemler arasındaki işbirliğini geliştirmek ve kapasite geliştirmeyi desteklemek için kullanılmaktadır. ENISA, stratejik hedeflere ulaşmak için yönetmeliğe uygun olarak aşağıdaki dört temel görevi üstlenmektedir<sup>232 233 234</sup>.

- Avrupa Komisyon'a ve üye devletlere bilgi güvenliği konusunda danışmanlık yapmak ve onlara yardım etmek,
- Avrupa'daki artan riskler ve saldırılar hakkında veri toplama ve analiz etmek,
- AB'nin bilgi güvenliği tehditlerine ilişkin risk değerlendirmesi ve risk yönetimi

<sup>230</sup> Mustafa Ünver vd. *Uluslararası Kuruluşların Siber Güvenlik Faaliyetleri*, (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, 2011a, s. 22).

<sup>231</sup> European Commission, "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the EU Cybersecurity Agency, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification. COM(2017)477 final.

<sup>232</sup> European Commission, "Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the "EU Cybersecurity Agency", and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology Cybersecurity certification "Cybersecurity Act", <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-477-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>, , 2017b, s. 3, (20.01.2019).

<sup>233</sup> European Commission, "Study on the Evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security", <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-evaluation-european-union-agency-network-and-information-security-enisa>, 2017e, s. 9-10, (20.01.2019).

<sup>234</sup> Mustafa Ünver, Cafer Canbay ve Ayşe G. Mirzaoğlu, *Uluslararası Kuruluşların Siber Güvenlik Faaliyetleri*, s. 22.



yöntemlerini teşvik etmek,

- Bilgi güvenliği alanındaki farkındalığın artırılması ve işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesini sağlamaktır.

Bu kapsamda ENISA üye devletlerin katılımıyla gerçek zamanlı olay senaryolarının canlandırıldığı tatbikatları koordine etmektedir. Bu tatbikatlar sayesinde üye devletlerin ağ ve bilgi sistemlerinin güvenliği ile ilgili hazırlık ve işbirliği seviyeleri test edilmektedir. Bu tatbikatlar sonucu üye devletlere siber güvenlik düzeylerini geliştirebilmeleri için öneriler hazırlanmaktadır<sup>235</sup>. Her ne kadar operasyonel gücü ve kurumları olmasa da ENISA; üye ülkelerin siber güvenlik kurumlarının oluşturulmasında ve güvenlik seviyelerinin artırılmasında aktif ve etkin bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu sayede birliğin siber güvenlik seviyesine önemli katkılar sağlanmaktadır.

#### **4.2. Avrupa Siber Güvenlik Kurumu (European Cyber Security Organization ECS)**

Kendi finans kaynakları olan ve kar amacı gütmeyen Avrupa Siber Güvenlik Kurumu (ECSO), 2016 yılında kurulmuştur. Kurumun amacı, AB içerisindeki siber faaliyetlere ilişkin güvenlik önlemlerini artırmak, güçlendirmek ve bu kapsamda atılacak her girişimi desteklemektir<sup>236</sup>. ECSO üyesi kuruluşlar; büyük şirketler, KOBİ'ler ve kuruluşlar, araştırma merkezleri, üniversiteler, son kullanıcılar, operatörler, kümeler ve derneğin yanı sıra AB üye devletlerinin yerel, bölgesel ve ulusal yönetimleri, ülkelerin bir parçası olan çok çeşitli menfaat sahipleri ve Avrupa Ekonomik Alanı (EEA), Avrupa Serbest Ticaret Birliği (EFTA) ve AB araştırma ve geliştirme programı olan Horizon 2020 ile ilişkili ülkeler oluşturmaktadır.

ECSO'nun temel amacı, Avrupa siber güvenliğini geliştirmeyi ve teşvik etmeyi amaçlayan her türlü girişim veya projeyi desteklemek ve özellikle kendisine verilen aşağıdaki görevleri yerine getirmektir<sup>237</sup>:

- Siber tehditlere karşı Avrupa Dijital Tek Pazarının büyümesini teşvik etmek ve korumak;

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<sup>235</sup> European Union, “Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union”, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=EN>, 2016, s. 7, (20.01.2019).

<sup>236</sup> European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO), [www.ecs-org.eu](http://www.ecs-org.eu), (21.01.2019)

<sup>237</sup> European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO), “About ECSO–Mission& Objectives”, <http://ecs.org.eu/about>, (16.01.2019).



- Avrupa'daki siber güvenlik piyasasını geliştirmek ve artan pazar konumu ile rekabetçi bir siber güvenlik ve bilgi ve iletişim teknolojileri endüstrisinin gelişmesini sağlamak;
- Avrupa'nın lider olduğu sektörel uygulamalarda, güvenilir tedarik zincirlerinin kritik adımları için siber güvenlik çözümleri geliştirmek ve uygulamaktır.

#### **4.3. Avrupa Komitesi Siber Suç Sözleşmesi 2004 (EU Cyber Security Act)**

Avrupa Komitesi'nin Siber Suç Sözleşmesi (European Committee on Crime Problems-CDPC), 2001 yılında üye ülkelerin imzasına açılarak 2004 yılında yürürlüğe giren siber suçlara ilişkin ilk uluslararası antlaşma özelliğine sahiptir<sup>238</sup>. Siber ortamların güvenliği konusunda AB'nde kabul edilen en önemli hukuki metindir. Sözleşmeyi Türkiye, 10 Kasım 2010 tarihinde imzalamış; 2014 yılında ise, buna yönelik olarak 6533 sayılı Sanal Ortamda İşlenen Suçlar Sözleşmesine İlişkin Kanun kabul edilmiştir<sup>239</sup>. Bu sözleşme ile siber alanın tamamen güvenli hale getirilmesi imkansız gibi gözükse de ilgili sözleşme, AB üyesi ülkelerin bir araya gelerek hazırladığı ve zamanının en kapsamlı düzenlemeleri arasındadır. Sözleşmeye taraf olmak, ülkemiz açısından siber güvenliğe verilen önemin bir göstergesi sayılabilir.

Avrupa'da bilgi güvenliği politikalarının oluşturulması kapsamında Avrupa Komisyonu tarafından Kasım-2005 tarihinde yayımlanan “Kritik Altyapıları Koruma Programına Yönelik Yeşil Kitap” diğer önemli bir belgedir<sup>240</sup>. Bu belgeyle kritik türden bilgi ve iletişim altyapısıyla olabilecek saldırılardan ve doğabilecek her türlü zarardan korunması öngörülmüş ve bireylerin bu tür felaketlerden korunmasını amaçlayan tedbirlere başvurulmuştur<sup>241</sup>. Siber saldırılarda yaşanan artışlar nedeniyle kısmi ya da kısıtlı kapsamlı çalışmalardan sonra daha kapsamlı bir stratejik plan yapılması ihtiyacı doğmuştur.

#### **4.4. Avrupa Birliği'nin 2013 Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi**

AB tarafından siber güvenliğe ve siber savunmaya yönelik hayata geçirilen birçok uygulama diğer ülke ve kuruluşlara örnek olmuştur. Özellikle 2013 yılında AB siber güvenlik politikasının temellerini

<sup>238</sup> Murat Önok, “Avrupa Konseyi Siber Suç Sözleşmesi Işığında Siber Suçlarla Mücadelede Uluslar Arası İşbirliği”, *Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi* 19, sy.2, (2013): 1241.

<sup>239</sup> Nusret O. Akpek, “Siber Suçlar Sözleşmesinin Getirdikleri ve İç Hukuk Açısından Konuya Yaklaşım”, (Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2015)

<sup>240</sup> European Commission, “Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection”, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0576&from=EN>, (16.01.2019).

<sup>241</sup> Türkay Henkoğlu ve Bülent Yılmaz, “Avrupa Birliği (AB) Bilgi Güvenliği Politikaları”, s. 461.



oluşturacak olan ve Avrupa Ekonomik ve Sosyal Komite ve Bölgesel Komite tarafından hazırlanan “Avrupa Birliği Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi” raporu siber güvenlik kapsamında önemli bir adımdır. Raporda AB’nin siber güvenlik stratejisinin temeli “açık, emniyetli ve güvenli siber ortam” sloganı ile oluşturulması amaçlanmıştır. AB ve uluslararası siber güvenlik politikalarına rehberlik etmesi amacıyla oluşturulan raporda, siber güvenliğin etkin ve etkili bir şekilde sağlanması için siber güvenlik politikalarının temel hak ve özgürlükleri kısıtlamadan uygulanması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. AB’nin siber güvenliğe ilişkin dayandığı temel ilkeler olarak şunlar belirlenmiştir<sup>242 243</sup>:

- Fiziksel ortamda sağlanan Avrupa Birliği temel değerlerinin dijital ortamda da oluşturulması,
- Temel hak ve özgürlüklerin, ifade özgürlüğü ve kişisel bilgilerin ve mahremiyetin korunması,
- Herkese açık internet ortamının oluşturulması,
- Demokratik ve etkin katılımlı yönetimini oluşturulması,
- Sorumluluk paylaşımı ile güvenliğin sağlanmasıdır.

Bu ilkeler üzerine kurulan 2013 stratejisinde siber esnekliği sağlamak için, kamu otoriteleri ve özel sektör işbirliği, siber kapasite, kaynak ve verimliliğin geliştirilmesi öngörülmüştür. Ancak, siber güvenlik olaylarının tespit edilmesi, önlenmesi ve yönetilmesi iyileştirilmeden ve AB düzeyinde koordine edilmeden bu hedeflere ulaşmak mümkün değildir. Bu nedenle 2013 stratejisi, üye devletlerdeki siber dayanıklılığı güçlendirmek amacıyla ENISA (Avrupa Birliği Ağ ve Bilgi Güvenliği Ajansı) için özel ve belirgin bir rol oynamıştır<sup>244</sup>. Bundan dolayı stratejik plan kapsamında ENISA’nın etkinliği artırılarak siber güvenliğin sağlanması konusunda daha etkin ve öncü hale getirilmesinin gerekliliği dile getirilmiştir.

2013 ve 2017 yılları arasında yaşanan siber saldırıların Avrupa ekonomisine verdiği zararın beş

<sup>242</sup> European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”, s. 3-4.

<sup>243</sup> European Commission, “EU Cybersecurity Initiatives- Working Towards a more Secure Online Environment. Factsheet”, s. 2.

<sup>244</sup> Laszlo Kovacs, , “Cyber Security Policy and Strategy in the European Union and NATO”, *Military Art and Science*, 1(89), 2018, s. 17-18)





katına çıktığı ve bu zararın 2019 yılına kadar üç kat daha artacağı değerlendirilmektedir<sup>245</sup>. Bu yüzden AB 2013 siber güvenlik stratejisi yaşanan teknolojik ve ekonomik gelişmeler ve risk algısındaki değişim nedeniyle Eylül 2017 tarihinde revize edilmiştir. Revize kapsamında yapılan değişikliklerde kritik altyapıların güvenliği ve bölgesel siber güvenlik kavramları ön plana çıkmıştır. Güncellenen siber güvenlik stratejisi beş temel reform hareketini içermiştir<sup>246</sup>. Bu reform hareketlerinden birincisi, Avrupa Siber Güvenlik Araştırma ve Yeterlilik Merkezi'nin kurulmasıdır. İkincisi, Avrupa çapında yaşanacak büyük çaplı saldırılara karşı koruyucu ve önleyici tedbirleri uygulayacak Avrupa çapında acil durum müdahale mekanizmasının sağlanmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, siber güvenlik acil durum fonunun oluşturulması; dördüncüsü, Avrupa savunma fonunun yardımıyla askeri siber güvenliğin bir parçası olacak ortak projelerin geliştirilmesidir. Son olarak ise, dünya çapında siber risklerin azaltılması için güven verici önlemlerin hayata geçirilmesi ve ülkesel sorumlulukların düzenlenmesidir. Bütün bu geliştirme önerileri AB'nin siber saldırılar karşısındaki esneklik, caydırıcılık ve güvenliğini arttırmayı amaçlamaktadır<sup>247</sup>. Bu reform hareketinin ortak noktaları, üye ülkelerini katılımı ile operasyonel kurumların oluşturulmaya çalışılması ve siber güvenlik faaliyetlerine yönelik ortak mali fonların kurulması olarak dikkat çekmektedir.

#### **4.5. Avrupa Birliği Güvenlik Ajandası (2015) European Agenda on Security**

AB komisyonu tarafından Nisan 2015 tarihinde kabul edilen AB Güvenlik Ajandası 2015-2020'nin üç hedefinden biri, siber suçlar ile daha etkin bir şekilde mücadele edilmesidir. Siber suçlarla birlik seviyesinde koordine edilmiş ortak tepki verilerek mücadele edilebileceği kabul edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda oluşturulan hareket tarzları ise şunlardır<sup>248</sup>:

- Mevcut siber güvenlik önlemlerine yeni bir bakış açısı getirilmesi,
- Yasal düzenlemelerin genişletilmesi ve güncellenmesi,

<sup>245</sup> European Commission, "Resilience, Deterrence and Defense: Building Strong Cyber Security for the EU", <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0450&from=EN>, 2017a, s. 2, (20.01.2019).

<sup>246</sup> Annegret Bendiek vd. "The EU's Revised Cybersecurity Strategy Half-Hearted Progress on Far-reaching Challenges", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, SWP Comments 47. İng. Cev. T.Genrich, 2017, s. 2.

<sup>247</sup> Age, s. 2.

<sup>248</sup> European Commission, "EU Cybersecurity Initiatives- Working Towards a more Secure Online Environment. Factsheet". [http://ec.europa.eu/information\\_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-3/factsheet\\_cyber\\_security\\_update\\_january\\_2017\\_41543.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-3/factsheet_cyber_security_update_january_2017_41543.pdf), 2017c, s. 2, (20.01.2019).



- Siber suçlara yönelik adli arařtırmaları geliřtirilmesi,
- Siber suçlar ile m¼cadele kapasitesinin uluslararası kuruluřlar yardımıyla iyileřtirilmesidir.

#### **4.6. Dijital Tek Pazar Stratejisi (2015) (Digital Single Market Strategy)**

Dijital ekonominin temeli g¼ven ve emniyettir. Bu y¼zden AB, Mayıs 2015 tarihinde kamu ve ¼zel sekt¼r kuruluřlarında katılımı ile Dijital Tek Pazar Stratejisini hazırlamıřtır. Bu stratejinin amacı, Avrupa'nın rekabetçilięini teřvik etmek ve yenilikler yoluyla siber g¼venlik pazarının parçalanmasını engellemek, ¼ye devletler ile sanayi akt¼rleri arasında g¼ven oluřturmak ve siber g¼venlik ¼r¼nleri ve ç¼z¼mleri iin talep ve tedarik sekt¼rlerinin eřitlenmesine yardımcı olmaktır. Ayrıca bu stratejinin, Avrupa'da dijital g¼venlik end¼strisi kaynaklarını yapılandırılmakta ve koordine etmekte etkili olması beklenmektedir. Strateji yenilikçi KOBİ'lerden bileřen ve ekipman ¼reticisine, kritik altyapı operat¼rlerine ve arařtırma enstit¼lerine kadar ok eřitli akt¼rleri iermektedir. Son olarak ortaklık, siber g¼venlięe yapılan yatırımları artırmak iin AB, ulusal, b¼lgesel ve ¼zel kurum ve kaynaklardan (arařtırma ve inovasyon fonları dahil) yararlanmaktadır<sup>249</sup>. Siber g¼venlięin ¼nemli etkenlerinden biri de kullanılan biliřim ve iletiřim sistemlerinin ¼retiminden itibaren kontrol altına alınması ve dıř baęımlılıktan kurtarılmasıdır. Siber g¼venlik ile cihaz ve yazılımlarının ¼retiminden itibaren kontrol altında bulundurulması ve dıř kaynaklı saldırıların azaltılması hedeflenmektedir. Bu y¼zden AB i kaynaklarda yapılacak her t¼rl¼ yatırımı desteklemekte ve teřvik etmektedir.

#### **5. Deęerlendirme ve ¼neriler**

Teknoloji ve bilgi teknolojilerinin g¼nl¼k hayatımızın ayrılmaz birer parçası haline gelmesinin yanında, kamu ve ¼zel sekt¼r tarafından sunulan hizmetlerin de b¼y¼k bir kısmı siber ortamlara tařınmıř durumdadır. Bilginin eriřim ve kullanımının siber g¼venlik ortamında ve emniyet ilkelerine riayet edilerek yapılması ok ¼nemlidir. Bunun iin ¼zellikle siber g¼venlik stratejileri kapsamında kiřisel g¼venlikten bařlayarak ulusal g¼venlięe kadar deęiřen seviye ve kapsamda detaylı planlama, uygulama, koordine ve denetlemeye ihtiya vardır. Ayrıca, bu alıřmaların uluslararası kurumlar ile iřbirlięi ve uyum iinde yapılması, kamu kurumları ve ¼zel sekt¼r kuruluřları arasında koordine edilecek bir tarzda y¼r¼t¼lmesi siber g¼venlik stratejilerinin etkinlięini ve bařarısını olumlu y¼nde etkileyecektir.

<sup>249</sup> Age, s. 3.



Son zamanlarda devletler ve kamu kurumları tarafından siber güvenliğin önemi daha çok kavrandığı, alınan güvenlik tedbirlerinin ve siber güvenliğe yönelik ilginin artmasından anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak günümüzde siber güvenlik tedbirlerinin tamamen yeterli seviyelerde olduğunu söylemek de pek mümkün gözükmemektedir. Siber tehdit, her geçen gün büyümekte; bireysel, kurumsal veya ulusal düzeylerde daha da belirgin hale gelmektedir. Bu kapsamda Türkiye'nin AB'nin siber güvenlik stratejilerini dikkate alarak mevcut stratejilerini gözden geçirmesi ve gelecekte karşılabileceği muhtemel siber saldırılara karşı daha dayanıklı, etkili ve uygulanabilir stratejilerini acilen hayata geçirmesi gerekmektedir.

Siber güvenlik stratejileri daha çok yasal düzenlemeler ve kurumsal yapıların oluşturulması şeklinde düşünüldüğünde, Türkiye'de siber güvenlik stratejilerine ilişkin temel unsurlar olarak öncelikle şu tedbirlerin uygulanması kaçınılmaz gözükmemektedir<sup>250 251</sup>:

- *Ulusal Politika ve Stratejinin Geliştirilmesi*: Öncelikle stratejik planların geliştirilerek, daha detaylı şekilde sorumlulukların tespit edilmesi, sektörel bazda özel eylem planlarının ve hareket tarzlarının belirlenmesi ve kritik altyapılara ilişkin rehber, standart ve çerçeve dokümanlarının hazırlanması gerekmektedir. Standart hareket tarzlarının ve çerçeve dokümanlarının hazırlanması yaşanabilecek saldırılara karşı alınacak tedbirlerin başarı olasılığını arttıracaktır.

- *Yasal Çerçevenin Oluşturulması*: Siber saldırılara yönelik hukuki ve yasal çerçevenin oluşturulması, uygulama ve denetimine ait kuralların belirlenmesi ve saldırılara karşı caydırıcılığı yüksek hukuki düzenlemelerin yapılmasını zorunlu hale getirmektedir.

- *Kurumsal Yapılanmanın Belirlenmesi*: 2016-2019 Ulusal Siber Güvenlik Strateji planında başlatılan kurumsal sorumlulukların belirlenmesinin yanında, ilgili tüm tarafların görev, sorumluluk ve yasal dayanaklarının en iyi şekilde belirlenmesi esastır.

- *Ulusal Teknoloji Kullanımı*: Siber saldırılar ile mücadelenin en önemli etmenlerinden biri de bütün yönetim ve düzenleme yetkileri kendimize ait olan ulusal teknolojilerin kullanımının ön plana çıkarılmasından geçmektedir.

<sup>250</sup> Seda Yılmaz ve Şeref Sağıroğlu, "Siber Güvenlik Risk Analizi, Tehdit ve Hazırlık Seviyeleri", 6. *Uluslararası Bilgi Güvenliği ve Kriptoloji Konferansı Bildiriler Kitabı*, (2013a): 158-159.

<sup>251</sup> Seda Yılmaz ve Şeref Sağıroğlu, "Siber Saldırı Hedefleri ve Türkiye'de Siber Güvenlik Stratejisi", 6. *Uluslararası Bilgi Güvenliği ve Kriptoloji Konferansı Bildiriler Kitabı*, (2013b): 329-330.



• *Ulusal İşbirliğinin Arttırılması:* Ulusal siber güvenlik kapsamında bütün paydaşların işbirliği içinde çalışması ve kurumlar arası koordinasyonun tam sağlanması, siber saldırılara karşı verilecek tepkilerin etkinliğinin de artmasına yol açacaktır.

• *Personel Eğitimi:* Yaşanacak siber saldırılara karşı personelin bilinçlendirilmesi ve eğitilmesi de ayrı bir önem arz etmektedir. Özellikle siber saldırı tatbikatlarında personelin hazır bulunması siber saldırılara karşı başarı oranını yükseltecektir.

• *Uluslar Arası İşbirliği ve Uyumun Sağlanması:* Öncelikle gelişmiş ülkelerin siber güvenlik uygulamalarının ülkemize transferi kapsamında uluslararası işbirliğine gidilmelidir. Ayrıca siber saldırıların sadece ülke içerisinden değil, internet vasıtasıyla dünyanın herhangi bir yerinde yapılabileceği dikkate alındığında, diğer ülkeler ile işbirliği ve uyum bu açıdan önemli olmaktadır.

Ulusal güvenlik, ekonomi, insan hakları ve sivil özgürlükler dahil bir çok konu ile ilişkili olan siber güvenlik kavramı, teknoloji çağının yaşandığı şu günlerde politikacı ve akademisyenler için de en zorlu uğraşlar arasında yer almaktadır. Siber güvenliğin önemi, ilgili yasal düzenlemeler ve akademik çalışmalardan anlaşılrsa da sorunun çözümüne yönelik arayışlar hala devam etmektedir. Özellikle siber güvenliğin sağlanmasında kritik altyapıların özelleştirilmiş olması, yani güvenliğin özel sektör tarafından işletiliyor olması, siber güvenlik alanında kamu ile özel sektör işbirliğini de kaçınılmaz hale getirmektedir<sup>252</sup>.

Siber saldırı veya tehdit, aslında Türkiye'nin gelecekte karşılaşması muhtemel önemli riskler arasında yer almaktadır. Türkiye'nin şu anda siber tehditten tamamen korunması veya gelecekte yoğun bir siber saldırıyla karşılaşmayacağını şimdiden kestirmesi de mümkün değildir. Ancak Türkiye'nin siber güvenlik stratejilerini çeşitlendirmesi ve gelecekte maruz kalabileceği siber saldırılara karşı baştan hazırlıklı olması son derece önemlidir. Bunun için Türkiye, AB'nin siber güvenlik stratejilerinin temelini oluşturan yasal ve kurumsal düzenlemelerini özellikle ilgili antlaşmalarla iç hukuk haline dönüştürebilir veya mevcut düzenlemelerini bu şekilde güncelleyebilir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin gelecekte karşılaşabileceği siber saldırılara kendi siber güvenlik stratejilerini AB'nin stratejileriyle yenileyerek

<sup>252</sup> Madeline Carr, "Public-Private Partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies", *International Affairs* 43, no. 62, (2016): 43.



güçlendirmesi veya muhtemel zararlarını bu şekilde en az düzeye düşürmesi mümkündür. Hatta Türkiye'nin siber güvenlik stratejilerini AB normları çerçevesinde sürekli olarak dinamik, yenilikçi ve hızlı hareket etme kabiliyetine sahip kılacak tarzda yeniden yapılandırması tamamen kendi yararına olacaktır.

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## Arap Baharı ve Tunus'un Yasemin Devrimi'ni Yeniden Anlamak

Yusuf SAYIN\*

### Öz

*Bu çalışma, sömürgecilik sonrası süreçte önemli bir kırılma noktası olan, Tunus Yasemin Devrimi'nin sekizinci yılında değerlendirilmesine odaklanmaktadır. "Arap Baharı" olarak adlandırılan, etkilediği Ortadoğu ülkelerine kaos, devrim ve karşı-devrim ve darbe süreçleri yaşatan bu yeni aşama, bilhassa bölgesel değişim ve dönüşüm temalı yeni sürecin gölgesi altında gerçekleşmiştir. Arap Baharı sürecinde yaşanan Tunus tecrübesi, diğer ülkelere kıyasla daha çatışmasız ve yumuşak bir sürece işaret ederken, bu durumun ortaya çıkışında özellikle hareketlenmelerin başlarında Tunus'ta sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve siyasal partilerinin faaliyetleri önündeki yasal ve siyasi engellerin kaldırılmasının ve Nahda Hareketi'nin ve lideri Raşid El Gannuşi'nin sergilediği uzlaşmacı liderlik anlayışının etkisi olduğu ifade edilebilir. Bu çalışmada, Tunus'ta gerçekleşen Yasemin Devrimi sürecine, Devrimin bölgesel ve uluslararası yansımalarına ve sekizinci yılında Devrimin geldiği aşamaya değinilmiştir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Tunus, Yasemin Devrimi, Arap Baharı, Nahda Hareketi, Değişim

## Reunderstanding the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution in the Eighth

### Anniversary

#### Abstract

*This study focuses on the evaluation of the eighth year of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution as an important breaking point in the post-colonization process. This new phase, which is called the "Arab Spring", brings chaos, revolution and counter-revolution, and coup processes to the Middle Eastern countries under the shadow of new process of change and transformation. While the Tunisian experience in the Arab Spring evolves as a non-conflicting and soft process compared to the other countries in the region, the fact that the legal and political barriers to the activities of non-governmental organizations and political parties in Tunisia at the beginning of this movement, especially in the beginning of this situation, had a great effect on the understanding of the conciliatory leadership of the Nahda Movement and its leader Rashid al-Ghannushi. In this study, the process of Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, its regional and international reflections, and the stage of the Revolution in its eighth year are discussed.*

**Keywords:** Tunisia, Jasmine Revolution, Arab Spring, Nahda Movement, Change

\* Doç.Dr., Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, ORCID 0000-0003-4246-9416





## 1. Giriş

“Arap Baharı” ifadesi, Arap ayaklanmalarını anlatmak üzere ilk kez *Foreign Policy* dergisinde, Amerikalı siyaset bilimci Marc Lynch tarafından kullanılmıştı. Arap Baharı kendi içinde şiddet içeren bir hareketi ihtiva ederken, (bölge yönetimlerince uygulanan) şiddete yönelik protesto ve iç savaş sürecini başlatmıştır<sup>253</sup>. Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan süreçte, birçok Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu ülkesinde ayaklanmalar ve halk hareketleri neşvünema bulurken, bazı ülkeler bu değişim sürecini daha yumuşak atlatırken kimilerinde ise durum hayli ciddi boyutlara ulaşmıştır. Tunus ise bu değişim rüzgârını başlatan ve Devrim ateşinin yakan ülke olmuştur. Tunus'ta 2010 yılında başlayan halk hareketlerinde ön plana çıkan unsur, ömür boyu liderlik anlayışının terk edilerek seçimlerin şeffaf, demokratik bir şekilde yapılması ve sonucunun hazmedilmesi olurken, yolsuzlukların ciddi şekilde üzerine gidilerek halkın güveninin kazanılması, her muhalif grubun kendini özgürce ifade edebilmesinin sağlanması, basın-yayın üzerindeki sansürün kaldırılması ve mümkün olduğu kadar ekonomide adaletli dağıtımın sağlanması gerektiği olmuştur<sup>254</sup>.

“Arap Uyanışı”, son zamanlarda akademik çalışmalara pek çok acıdan konu olmaktadır. Bölgede yaşananlar dikkati, uyanışın genel yapısına çekmektedir. Arap Baharının ilk halkasını oluşturan Tunus, kısa fakat kanlı bir geçiş sahne olmuştur. “Yasemin Devrimi” adı verilen bu geçiş, yerleşik iktidarın muhalefete geçişiyle son bulurken, olayların ortaya çıkışında ekonomik sebepler etkili olsa da demokrasi ve insan hakları taleplerini beraberinde getirmiştir<sup>255</sup>.

‘Arap Baharı’ sürecinde siyasi ve özellikle ekonomik memnuniyetsizlikleri artan Arap halklarının kendi hükümetlerinden birtakım istekleri söz konusu olmuştur. Yönetimin aldığı kararlarda daha çok yer almayı ve yönetimi belirlemede etkinlik sağlamayı talep etmişlerdir. Başka bir deyişle, Arap halkları, çok partili bir yaşama geçişi, partiler arasında rekabeti, belli aralıklarla yapılacak seçimleri, ifade özgürlüğünü, hukuk devleti anlayışını ve bağımsız bir yargı ve basın hürriyetini arzulamışlardır.

<sup>253</sup> Mushtaq, Abdul Qadir, Afzal, Muhammad, “Arab Spring: Its Causes and Consequences”, *JPUHS*, Vol.30, No.1, January-June, (2017): p.1.

<sup>254</sup> Orsam, “Tunus, Halk Devrimi ve Türkiye Deneyimi”, *Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (ORSAM)*, Rapor No: 29, (Şubat 2011).

<sup>255</sup> Başak Akar Yüksel ve Yılmaz Bingöl, “The Arab Spring in Tunisia: A Liberal Democratic Transition?”, *Electronic Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol.12, Issue:47, (2013): 310.



Tunus gibi bilhassa yoksul Arap ülkelerinde görülen halk isyanları yönetimlerin değişmesi durumunda ekonominin hızlı bir şekilde iyileşeceğini ve bir değişim süreci yaşanacağını düşündürmüştür<sup>256</sup>.

Tunus'ta başlayan değişim süreci sadece Tunus'la sınırlı kalmamış, tüm Ortadoğu ve Arap coğrafyasını derinden etkilemiştir. Bu süreç bölgede çok taşı yerinden oynatmıştır. Bu çalışmada, Tunus'ta 2010 yılında başlayan Yasemin Devrimi sürecine, etkileri ve yansımalarına ve sekizinci yılda Devrimin geldiği aşamaya değinilmiştir.

## 2. Tunus ve Yasemin Devrimi Süreci

Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu Bölgesinin kavşak noktası sayılan bir coğrafyada bulunan Tunus, jeopolitik ve jeostratejik bakımdan önemli bir konuma sahip bulunmaktadır. Tunus'un sahip olduğu bu konumu, topraklarında başlayan Yasemin Devriminin (14 Ocak Devrimi) diğer Arap ülkelere daha kolay ve hızlı bir şekilde tesirde bulunmasında oldukça etkili olmuştur. Uzun bir süre Fransız sömürgesi altında kalmış; Fransız dili ve kültürünün etkisinde bir toplum yapısına sahip bulunan Tunus, özellikle din-siyaset ilişkisi çerçevesinde laiklik tartışmalarının yoğun bir şekilde yaşandığı bir ülke olmuştur. Yeraltı kaynakları yönünden önemli zenginliklere sahip olması, Tunus'a stratejik bir konum kazandırmıştır. Tarihsel olarak çeşitli ilhak ve işgallere maruz kalmış Tunus, siyasal sistemi bakımından genelde bir istikrar arayışında olmuştur. Bu noktada Arap Baharı sürecini başlatan Yasemin Devrimi de bu arayışın bir tezahürü sayılabilir.

Topraklarında başlayan 'Yasemin Devrimi' ile anılmaya başlanan Tunus'ta üniversite mezunu bir seyyar satıcı olan Muhammed Buazizi<sup>257</sup> devlet görevlileri tarafından tezgâhına el konulması üzerine 17 Aralık 2010'da kendini yakmıştı. Sonrasında başlayan "Yasemin Devrimi"<sup>258</sup>, ülkede yaşanan işsizlik, yönetimin baskıcı uygulamaları, gıda fiyatlarında yaşanan aşırı yükselişler genç gruplar başta olmak üzere, kitle iletişim araçlarının de etkisiyle<sup>259</sup> ülkeyi büyük kaosa sürüklemiş; yaşanan olaylarda

<sup>256</sup> Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, "Arap Devrimleri ve Ortadoğu'nun Yeniden Yapılanması", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, No: 3, (2011): 48.

<sup>257</sup> Yasmine Ryan, "How Tunisia's Revolution Began", *Al Jazeera*, 26 Jan. 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html>.

<sup>258</sup> Birol Akgün, "Yasemin Devrimi Sömürge Sonrası Düzenin Çöküşü mü?", *Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü (SDE)*, 18 Ocak 2011, <http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/kose-yazilari/719/yasemin-devrimi-somurge-sonrasi-duzenin-cokusu-mu.aspx>.

<sup>259</sup> Timothy G. Ash, "Tunisia's Revolution Isn't a Product of Twitter or Wikileaks. But They Do Help", *Guardian*



onlarca kişi yaşamını yitirirken yüzlercesi yaralanmıştır. Cumhurbaşkanı Bin Ali, 12 Ocak'ta bir açıklama yaparak, basın üzerindeki sınırlamaların kalkacağı ve 2014 seçimlerinde de aday olmayacağını ilan etmesine<sup>260</sup> rağmen olaylar durmak bilmemiştir.

14 Ocak'ta Bin Ali, hükümeti görevden aldığını açıklamış ve aynı gün ise Bin Ali'nin, Suudi Arabistan'a kaçtığı ajanslarca duyurulmuştur. İslam Konferansı Örgütü, resmi ve özel kuruluşların mal varlıklarının korunması gerektiğini bildirirken, Arap Birliği Tunus'taki siyasi güçlere ve diğer gruplara sükûnet çağrısında bulunmuştur. Cezayir, Yasemin Devrimi'ni memnuniyetle karşıladığını açıklarken Almanya Şansölyesi Angela Merkel, demokrasinin bir an önce tesis edilmesi gerektiğini söylemiştir. İngiliz Dışişleri ise şiddet olayları hakkında kınamada bulunarak, yetkilileri sükûnete ve barışçıl ortamın sağlanmasına davet etmiştir<sup>261</sup>. Devrim'e giden yolda, işsizlik ve istihdam sorunu gibi ekonomik nedenlerle hareket eden genç nüfus ve çeşitli halk kesimlerinin oluşturduğu sivil toplum hareketleri etkili olmakla birlikte, ülke içindeki "Selefilere, Hizb-et Tahrir, Tebliğciler ve Şii akımlar"<sup>262</sup>, Bin Ali karşısında muhalefet tarafını oluşturmuştur. İktidar karşısı muhalefet sadece İslami hareketlerden teşekkül etmemiş; çok sayıda toplumsal kesim bu süreçte önemli roller oynamıştır. Raşid Gannuşi'nin liderliğini yaptığı En-Nahda/İslami Yöneliş Hareketi ise bunların en önemlisidir.

İslami Yöneliş Hareketi'nin temelleri, 1970'lerde "Hidaye" adlı derneğin Raşid Gannuşi ve Abdelfettah Moro tarafından faaliyete geçirilmesi ile atıldı. 1989'a gelindiğinde Gannuşi hareketi, Bin Ali tarafından terörist grup olarak ilan edildi ve faaliyetleri ülke içinde yasaklandı ve Hareket'in lideri Gannuşi, Yasemin Devrimine kadar, yaklaşık 22 yıl sürgünde yaşamak zorunda kaldı. Tunus'ta devrimin yaşanması ve Bin Ali'nin ülkeyi terk etmesi üzerine Gannuşi 30 Ocak'ta ülkesine döndü. Uzunca bir süredir yasaklı olan En-Nahda hareketi, 1 Mart 2011'de ise resmi olarak yasalastı ve seçimlere katılmasına izin verilerek, ülke içindeki faaliyetleri serbest bırakıldı. İslamcı Arap

*Newspaper*, 19 Jan. 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/19/tunisia-revolution-twitter-facebook>.

<sup>260</sup> Michael Koplow, "Why Tunisian Revolution is Islamist-Free?", *Foreign Policy*, 14 Jan. 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/14/why\\_tunisia\\_revolution\\_is\\_islamist\\_free](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/14/why_tunisia_revolution_is_islamist_free).

<sup>261</sup> Cnntürk, "Yasemin Devrimi'ne gelen tepkiler konusunda Bk. "Tunus'ta Devrimin Adı 'Yasemin' ", 17 Ocak 2011, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/dunya/01/15/tunusta.devrimin.adi.yasemin/603335.0/index.html>.

<sup>262</sup> Abdullah Aydoğan Kalabalık, "Tunus Devrimi'nin Arkasındaki İslami Hareketler", 24 Ocak 2011, <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=144287>.



politikasında en liberal ve en ilerici tutumu temsil ettiğini iddia eden Hareketin lideri Gannuşi, sık sık demokrasi vurgusu yapmakta, Tunus devriminden çıkarılacak en temel dersin, İslamcıların başkalarıyla çalışmaları ve kendi başlarına yönetebilecekleri görüşünü bırakmaları gerektiği olduğunu söylemektedir<sup>263</sup>.

Devrim'e giden yolda ön plana çıkan unsurlardan birisi de işsizlik, istihdam, eğitim gibi birçok alanda sorunlar yaşayan genç kesimdir. Dünya Bankası'nın 1994 verilerine göre Tunus'ta yükseköğrenim mezunları arasında işsizlik % 5'in altında iken, 2009 yılında bu rakam % 23'e ulaşmış; üniversiteden mezun olan gençlerin mezuniyetlerinden 18 ay sonra ölçülen işsizlik oranları % 46 seviyesinde olmuştur<sup>264</sup>. Bilhassa üniversite mezunlarından oluşan Tunuslu kesim, istihdam olanaklarının yetersizliğinden Avrupa ülkelerine gelecek ve iş beklentisiyle<sup>265</sup> göç etmişler; bu ülkelerde Tunus'taki sosyal, siyasi ve ekonomik durumu daha rahat gözlemlene fırsatı bulduklarından, Yasemin Devrimi esnasında taleplerini daha yüksek bir sesle ifade etmişlerdir. Tunus'ta yaşanan halk hareketlerinde ön saflarda bulunanlar çoğunlukla gençler olmuştur. Düzenledikleri miting ve gösterilerle Bin Ali ve Tunus yönetiminden özgürlük, iş, eğitim ve demokrasi taleplerinde bulunmuşlar, Bin Ali'nin iktidarı bırakmasında ve yönetimin devrilmesinde çok önemli roller üstlenmişlerdir.

Özetle; devrim sürecinin ilk eylemleri, Buazizi'nin aile ve akrabalarının Sidi Buzid'de düzenledikleri küçük çaptaki eylemlerle baş göstermiş; bölge halkı, hükümetin sert uygulamalarına yönelik eleştirilerini sokaklarda sergilemeye başlamıştır. Protestolar, katılanların sayısının zamanla artmasıyla da eylemler Sidi Buzid ile sınırlı olmaktan çıkarak Tunus'un diğer şehirlerine yayılmıştır. Daha iyi yaşam koşulları ve istihdam talep eden Tunus halkının başkent Tunus'taki ilk gösterisi 25 Aralık 2010'da gerçekleşmiş; fakat katılım oldukça sınırlı düzeyde kalmıştır. Artan gösterilere yerel

<sup>263</sup> Radikal Gazetesi, "Tunuslu Muhalif Gannuşi 22 Yıl Sonra Ülkesine Döndü", 30.01.2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1038445&Date=30.01.2011&CategoryID=81>; Cnntürk, "Yasemin Devrimi'ne gelen tepkiler konusunda Bk. "Tunus'ta Devrimin Adı 'Yasemin' ", 17 Ocak 2011, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/dunya/01/15/tunusta.devrimin.adi.yasemin/603335.0/index.html>.

<sup>264</sup> Rania Abouzeid, "After the Revolution: Young Tunisians Are Still Looking for Work", 07 Feb. 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046731,00.html>.

<sup>265</sup> Kamil Tekin Sürek, "Tunus Gençliği Ön Saflarda", 22.02.2011, <http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=619>. Ayrıca Bk. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/13/tunisia-youth-revolution>; <http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/14/tunisia-riots-the-youth-revolution.html>.



sendikaların yanı sıra yasaklı siyasî partiler de destek olmuştur<sup>266</sup>. Devrim süreci esnasında yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi ekonomik sorunlar yaşayan ve hareketlenmelerin ilk başlarında tam olarak örgütlü bir yapı arz etmeyen genç nüfus, genellikle spontane gelişen halk hareketlerinde öncü bir rol oynamış; Tunuslu sivil toplum hareketleri ve diğer siyasal organizasyonların da tesiriyle Devrim sürecinde daha aktif ve örgütlü bir yapı kazanmışlardır.

### 3. Devrimin Küresel Yansımaları

Arap Baharı ile Tunus'ta Yasemin Devrimi ile başlayıp diğer Arap ülkelerine yayılan olaylar dünya kamuoyunda önemli bir gündem maddesi haline gelmiştir. Bu devrim hareketlerinin Arap Baharının tesiri altındaki bölge ülkelerinin uluslararası ilişkileri ve dış politikalarında da dönüşümlere yol açarken, uluslararası aktörlerin olaylara tepkilerini de şekillendiren bir süreci beraberinde getirmiştir. Tunus özelinde cereyan eden olaylara dair başta ABD ve Fransa gibi Batılı güçler güçlü tepkilerde bulunurlarken, Avrupa Birliği olayları daha temkinle karşılama eğiliminde olmuştur. İlk başta AB tarafından ciddi bir olay olarak algılanmayan Arap Baharı, otoriter rejimlere yönelik cılız muhalif hareketler olarak görülmüştür. Ancak olayların Suriye, Libya ve Yemen gibi ülkelerde giderek iç savaş boyutuna ulaşması AB açısından da güvenlik bakımından tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Özellikle bu ülkelerde terör örgütlerinin artan faaliyetleri ve göç sorunu Avrupa Birliği'nin dış politika gündemini belirleyen önemli konular haline gelmiştir<sup>267</sup>.

Yasemin Devrimi esnasında Tunus-ABD ile ilişkilerine bakıldığında; Devrim boyunca ise ABD, protesto gösterilerini hedef almak yerine, Tunus'ta ekonomik reformların yapılmasını ve siyasi özgürlüklerin bir an önce sağlanması gerektiğini ifade etmiştir<sup>268</sup>. Dış politikasını Arap Birliği ile yakın temas ve başını Fransa ve ABD'nin çektiği Batı ile sıkı ittifak ilişkisi çerçevesinde<sup>269</sup> yürüten Tunus'a karşı devrimin başlangıcından bu yana ABD ve Fransa'nın tavrı Tunus'ta özgürlüklerin sağlanması,

<sup>266</sup> Konur Alp Koçak, "Yasemin Devrimi'nden 'Arap Baharı'na Tunus", *Yasama Dergisi*, Sayı 22, (Eylül 2012): 40-42.

<sup>267</sup> Mustafa Cem Ünal, " 'Arap Baharı' Sonrası Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının Geleceği", *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, Cilt:16, No:2 (Yıl: 2017): 20.

<sup>268</sup> Americanpowerblog, "Tunisia's Revolution," 15 Jan. 2011; <http://americanpowerblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisia-revolution.html>.

<sup>269</sup> Walid Phares, "Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution vs. the Forces of Counter-democracy", 21 Jan. 2011, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/01/tunisia-jasmine-revolution-vs.html>.



gerekli reformların bir an önce yapılması ve şiddet olaylarının durdurulması yönünde olmuştur. Devrim sonrasında Dönemin Dışişleri Bakanı Hillary Clinton, Tunus geçici Cumhurbaşkanı Fuad Mubzi ile yaptığı görüşmede<sup>270</sup> ekonomik kalkınmanın ve reformların bir an önce gerçekleştirilmesi gerektiğini ve kendilerinin de Tunus'un kalkınması ve sorunlarını çözmesi için ellerinden geleni yapacaklarını belirtmiştir. Tunus'ta "taraf tutan" olmadıklarını vurgulayan ve "sömürgecilik" iddialarına karşı çıkan Clinton, Tunus devrimini Tunusluların gerçekleştirdiğini belirterek, Birleşik Devletler'in, Devrim'den sonra İslam topraklarına vasilik yapmayacağını ifade etmiştir. Yeni hükümete desteğini sunan Clinton, Amerika'nın yardımlarını sürdüreceğini ve Tunus'un yeniden inşasına yardımcı olacaklarını ifade etmiştir. Başkan Obama ise Bin Ali'nin ülkeyi terk etmesi sonrasında yaptığı açıklamada Tunus'u tebrik ettiğini, hükümetin en yakın bir zamanda seçimlere gitmesi gerektiğinin altını çizmiştir<sup>271</sup>. Devrim sürecinde ABD'nin Tunus'a karşı izlediği politika, genelde özgürlükçü ve demokrasi yanlısı, sık sık halka referans veren bir içerikte olmuştur.

Dönemin Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-moon, Tunus'ta yaşanan ve ölümlerle sonuçlanan şiddet olaylarını kınayan birçok açıklamada bulunmuş; Bin Ali'nin Tunus'u terk etmesinin ardından geniş tabanlı istişarelerin yapılması ve serbest seçimleri temin edecek kapsayıcı bir geçiş hükümetinin kurulması gerektiği çağrısında bulunarak, Birleşmiş Milletlerin Tunus halkının yanında bulunacağını belirtmiştir. Ban Ki-moon, daha sonraki tarihlerde Tunus'a yaptığı ziyaretlerde, Tunus'un gerçek bir demokrasi olma yolunda olduğunu ilerlediğini kaydederek, Tunus'taki gelişmelerden duyduğu memnuniyeti ve sürece dair taşıdığı iyimserliği dile getirmiştir<sup>272</sup>.

Avrupa Birliği yetkililerinden Tunus'ta yaşananlara ilişkin ilk resmî açıklama ise, 10 Ocak 2011 tarihinde yapılmıştır. Dönemin AB Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek temsilcisi Catherine Ashton ve Genişlemeden Sorumlu Komisyon Üyesi Stefan Füle, yaptıkları açıklamada Tunus'ta yaşanan

<sup>270</sup> Alarabiya, "Clinton Pushes for Jobs & Reform in Tunisia", 17 March 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/17/141997.html>.

<sup>271</sup> Washingtonpost, "Tunisia's Revolution Should Be A Wake-Up Call To Mideast Autocrats", Saturday, January 15, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/15/AR2011011503141.html>.

<sup>272</sup> United Nations, "Ban pledges full UN help for Tunisia's transition to democracy", <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/03/369902-ban-pledges-full-un-help-tunisia-transition-democracy>; "Remarks to Meeting of Civil Society Groups", <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-03-22/remarks-meeting-civil-society-groups>, 2011.



süreçten kaygı duyduklarını ve hükümetin şiddet kullanmasını kınadıklarını belirtirken, barışçıl gösterilerde buldukları esnada tutuklananların serbest bırakılmasını talep etmişler ve taraflara itidal çağrısında bulunarak, insan hakları ihlalleri konusunda dikkatli olunmasını istemişlerdir<sup>273</sup>.

Devrimin Türkiye-Tunus ilişkilerine yansımaları bağlamında; resmi olarak Türk Dışişleri yaptığı açıklamada, “Dost ve kardeş Tunus’ta mevcut gerginliğin daha da tırmanmamasını, ülkede biran evvel asayiş ve huzurun yeniden tesis edilmesini ve Tunus halkının daha demokratik ve özgür bir toplum yönündeki taleplerini desteklediklerini, yaşanan geçiş sürecinin bu talepleri karşılayacak şekilde demokratik, çoğulcu, katılımcı ve insan haklarına saygılı yöntemlerle tamamlanmasını temenni ettiklerini; şeffaf, özgür ve adil seçimler düzenlenmesi, siyasi yasakların kaldırılması, yolsuzlukların soruşturulması ve güvenliğin tesis edilmesi yönündeki açıklamaları memnuniyetle karşıladıklarını<sup>274</sup> ifade etmiştir. Tunus devrimi sırasında ve Devrim’den sonra Türkiye’nin izlediği tavır, Tunus’ta bir an önce barış ortamının sağlanması ve Tunus’un geleceğinin, herhangi bir dış müdahale olmaksızın Tunuslular tarafından belirlenmesinden ve Tunus’ta insani hassasiyetlerin öncelenmesinden yana olmuştur<sup>275</sup>.

#### 4. Sekizinci Yılında Tunus ve Yasemin Devrimi

Tunus’ta gerçekleşen devrim sonrasında siyasal iktidarların önünde işsizlik, yoksulluk, güvenlik, eğitim ve sağlık sorunları gibi çok sayıda ve çetrefilli çözüm bekleyen konular vardı ve halkın talebi, biran evvel demokratik bir sistemin kurulması yönündeydi. Devrimden beklentilerin aşırı yüksekliği ve istikrarlı bir yönetimin kurulup kurulamayacağı tartışmaları, gösterileri ve grevleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Ayrıca, devrimden önce de Tunus siyasetinin temel belirleyicisi konumundaki İslamcı-laik ayrışması ve kışması çok daha şiddetli ve keskin olmaya başlamıştır. Bu sorunlara ilave olarak, daha önce siyaset sahnesinde var olmayan radikal Selefi grupların, Tunus’ta faaliyet gösteren içkili lokanta, gazino ve barlar ile peçeye (nikap) izin vermeyen okullara karşı gösterilerde bulunmaları ve

<sup>273</sup> EEAS, “EU-Tunisia Association Council.” *European External Action Service*. 19 November 2012. [http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133635.pdf](http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133635.pdf).

<sup>274</sup> Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın Tunus hakkındaki açıklamaları; [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-14\\_-14-ocak-2011\\_-tunus\\_ta-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk\\_tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-14_-14-ocak-2011_-tunus_ta-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_tr.mfa); 14.01.2011, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_-36\\_-28-ocak-2011\\_-tunus\\_taki-olaylar-hk\\_tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-36_-28-ocak-2011_-tunus_taki-olaylar-hk_tr.mfa).

<sup>275</sup> Habertürk, “Türkiye’nin Desteğini Bekliyor”, 18.01.2011, <http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/592875-tunus-turkiyenin-destegini-bekliyor>; “Tunus Türkiye’yi Örnek Alıyor”, 23.02.2011.



hatta saldırılar düzenlemeleri Tunus'ta gerginliklerin yaşanmasına yol açmıştır. Aynı gruplar, Şeriat hükümlerinin biran önce uygulanması için de hükümete baskı uygulamış ve gösteriler düzenlemişlerdir. Tunus'ta Nahda hükümetinin içindeki şahin kanadın Selefi gruplara sempatik bakması ve şiddete başvurabileceklerini öngörememesi, Selefileleri büyük bir sorun haline getiren bir etmen olmuştur. Ensar el-Şeria gibi radikal grupların Tunus'a olumsuz tesiri, laik figürlere karşı yapılan siyasi cinayetlerden sonra daha açıkça anlaşılmıştır<sup>276</sup>.

Bin Ali'nin ülkeyi terk etmesiyle başlayan süreçte eski Meclis Başkanı Fuad Mubzi geçici devlet başkanı, Muhammed Gannuşi ise Başbakan olmuştur. 8–10 Mayıs tarihlerinde hükümetin ülkeyi demokrasiye taşıdığından endişe eden halk, sokaklara dökülmüş, çıkan olaylarda 200 kadar gösterici tutuklanmıştır. Bu gösterilerin yol açtığı gerginlik ortamına yatıştırmak üzere geçici devlet başkanı el-Mubzi 10 Mayıs'ta, Kurucu Ulusal Meclis Seçimlerine ilişkin kararnameyi onaylamıştır. 1 Ekim'de Tunus'ta ilk özgür seçimlerin propaganda kampanya dönemi başlamış ve 11 bin aday kurucu meclisteki 217 sandalye için rekabete girişmiştir. Tunus kurucu meclis seçimleri, Arap Baharının yaşandığı ülkeler içerisindeki ilk demokratik seçimler olması yönünden özel bir öneme sahiptir. Seçim sonucu oluşan kurucu meclis, anayasayı hazırlamak gibi geniş yetkileri dolayısıyla Tunus'un siyasi kaderini tayin etmiştir<sup>277</sup>.

Kurucu Meclis çalışmalarının başlamasının ardından üç yıl geçmeden, 26 Ocak 2014 tarihinde yapılan oylama sonucunda Tunus'un yeni anayasası 4 çekimser ve 12 ret oyuna karşılık 200 kabul oyu ile onaylanmıştır. Bu şekilde Tunus, demokratik geçiş sürecini, ortaya çıkan uzlaşma ortamının sağladığı güçle tamamlayabilmiştir. Hiyerarşik anayasa yapım yöntemlerinin aksine, Tunus halkı hiçbir zaman süreci takip etmeyi bırakmamış; devrim sürecinin her aşamasına sahip çıkmayı bilmiştir. Anayasa yapım sürecinde farklı krizler yaşanmış olmasına rağmen, halkın ve sivil toplum örgütlerinin aracılığı ile bu krizler aşılabilmektedir<sup>278</sup>.

<sup>276</sup> Ahmet Uysal, "Tunus Arap Baharı'na Model Olabilir Mi?", *Al Jazeera*, 25.01.2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/tunus-arap-baharina-model-olabilir-mi?>

<sup>277</sup> Ufuk Ulutaş, Furkan Torlak, "Devrimden Demokrasiye Tunus'un Seçimi", *SETA*, (Kasım 2011): 7.

<sup>278</sup> Murat Açıl, "Tunus'un Demokratik Dönüşümü ve Anayasa Yapım Süreci", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt.25, Sayı.1, (2017): 197-198.





Yasemin Devrimi ile birlikte yeni bir siyasal aşamaya geçen Tunus halkı, devrim sonrasında gerçekleştirdiği seçimlere yoğun katılımında bulunarak, yönetime katılma sürecine yeni dönemde daha aktif katılacağına işaretlerini vermiştir. Tunus Yüksek Seçim Kurumu Genel Sekreteri Bubekr Binsayir, seçim listelerinde kayıtlı 4,1 milyon seçmenin % 90'ının sandık başına giderek oylarını kullandığını; kayıtlı olmayan seçmenlerin çoğunun da oy kullananlar arasında olduğunu açıklamıştır<sup>279</sup>.

Bağımsızlıktan bu yana tam bir serbestlik içinde gerçekleştirilen ilk seçim olma niteliği taşıyan Kurucu Meclis seçimi sonuçlarına göre; on dokuz parti Kurucu Meclis'te temsil şansı bulmuştur. Bin Ali döneminde faaliyet gösteren Sosyalist Demokratlar Hareketi, Halkın Birliği Partisi, Birlikçi Demokrasi Birliği, Sosyal Liberal Parti, İlerlemeci Yeşiller Partisi ve Yenilenme Hareketi gibi partiler halk tarafından desteklenmemiştir. El Nahda ve Cumhuriyetçi Kongre Partisi gibi devrim öncesinde yasaklı konumda bulunan partiler ise büyük bir başarı sağlayamamıştır. Birinci sıradaki Nahda hareketi %37,4 oy oranı ile sandalyelerin %41'ini kazanırken, ikinci sıradaki Cumhuriyetçi Kongre Partisi ise %8.71 oy oranı ile sandalyelerin %13.36'sını elde etmiştir. Bu sonuçlar, yeni anayasanın geniş bir yelpazeye yayılan yeni aktörler tarafından uzlaşıyla yapılmasına imkân tanımıştır<sup>280</sup>.

Yeni süreçte siyasal partiler kadar sivil toplum kuruluşları ve halk kitleleri de oldukça aktif bir rol oynamıştır. Devrim sonrasında düzenlenen seçimlerde müşahit konumundaki uluslararası gözlemcilerin raporlarında<sup>281</sup> seçimlerin adil, şeffaf ve demokratik olarak gerçekleştiği yönündedir. Tunus halkı, Arap Baharı sürecinin etkisi altında kalan ve ülkelerinde zorunlu bir dönüşüm ve değişim sürecine maruz kalan diğer Arap halklarına kıyasla yönetimine ve devletine daha çok sahip çıkmış; sürecin biran evvel tamamlanabilmesi için yoğun demokratik katılımında bulunmuştur. Her ne kadar çeşitli siyasal krizler ve hükümet bunalımları yaşasa da tercihini demokrasiden yana kullanmıştır.

Tunus devrimi esnasında sivil toplumun taşıdığı önem dikkate değerdir. Zira devrim sürecinde sivil toplumun siyasetçilerle halk arasında köprü vazifesi görmesi, halkı demokratik süreçlerde

<sup>279</sup> Aljazeera, "Muşareke Tefugu Kulle Tevekku Bi'n Tihabati Tunus", El Cezire, 24 Ekim 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/88C0C477-666C-411D-8534-B006236EBC20.htm>; Ulutaş ve Torlak, a.g.m., 12.

<sup>280</sup> Açıl, agm., 192.

<sup>281</sup> Ulutaş ve Torlak, a.g.m., 4.



bilinçlendirmesi ve hükümetle yürütülen diyaloglarda aktif rol oynaması, Tunus'ta sivil toplumun demokrasiye verdiği önemi göstermektedir. Özetle, Arap Baharının yaşandığı ülkelerde etnik, mezhebi, sosyo-kültürel, ekonomik ve ordu gibi diğer faktörler nedeniyle süreci Tunus'a kıyasla farklı şekillerde yaşarken, Tunus örneği sivil toplumunun ve diğer sosyal hareketlerin süreç içindeki etkin varlığıyla kendi yolunu çizbildiğini göstermiştir<sup>282</sup>.

Tunus Devrimi, Ortadoğu bölgesinin yeniden şekillenmesi ve eski düzenin artık sürdürülemeyeceği noktasında bir nevi işaret fişeği olmuştur. Tunus'ta yaşanan süreç her ne kadar diğer ülkelerle bazı alanlarda paralellik arz etse de nevi şahsına münhasırdır. Devrim sonrasında ülke ve halk, sömürge geçmişi ve sömürge sonrasında kurulan Burgiba ve Bin Ali yönetimleri ve uygulamalarıyla hesaplaşmak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu hesaplaşma süreci, Tunus'ta işlerin eskisinden daha iyiye gideceğine dair bir ümit taşısa da, beklenenin aksine, yönetimdeki istikrarsızlıklarda ve halkın ekonomik refah durumunda bir iyileşme yaşanmamıştır.

Devrimden bu yana Tunus, siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal olarak zor zamanlar yaşamıştır. Devrim'den bu yana dokuz hükümet kurulurken, ülke içinde zaman zaman yaşanan siyasi suikastlar ve intihar saldırıları, zaten çok sancılı bir süreç yaşayan Tunus'u siyasi ve ekonomik (turizm vs.) olarak zor durumda bırakmıştır. IMF kredileri ile ekonomisini düze çıkarmaya çalışan Tunus, bütçe açıkları ve yüksek enflasyon gibi ciddi ekonomik ve finansal sorunlarla uğraşmaktadır. Sekizinci yılında Devrim, Tunus halkının bir kesimi tarafından işsizlik ve ekonomik sıkıntılar nedeniyle protesto hareketleriyle karşılanırsa da önemli bir kesim devrim sürecini bir "kurtuluş" olarak görmektedir<sup>283</sup>.

Arap Baharı süreci, tek-karakterlilik arz etmediği gibi, süreçte rolü olan aktörler de tekillik göstermemektedir. Bu çerçevede, bölgedeki diğer Arap ülkelerinde ortaya çıkan karşı devrim (Mısır), iç savaş (Suriye) ve kaos (Libya) ortamına rağmen Tunus'ta istikrarın arkasında üç sacayağı bulunmuştur: Demokrasinin vazgeçilmez unsurlarından biri olan çok partili hayat, sivil toplum

<sup>282</sup> Merve Birdane, "Arap Baharı Sürecinde Tunus'un Demokrasiye Geçişinde Sivil Toplumun Rolü", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, Volume. 6 Issue.10, October. 2017, [http://ijhssi.org/papers/v6\(10\)/Version-3/L06100387101.pdf](http://ijhssi.org/papers/v6(10)/Version-3/L06100387101.pdf).

<sup>283</sup> Milliyet Gazetesi, "Yasemin Devrimi'nin 7. Yılında Tunus", 17.01.2018, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yasemin-Devrimi-nin-7-yilinda-Tunus-molatik-75>.



kuruluşları ve Raşid Gannuşi'nin siyasi liderliğidir. Tunus'ta bu şekilde gerçekleşen sürecin diğer ülkeler için de bir model olma potansiyeli taşıdığı ifade edilebilir. Zira Arap Bahar'ının barışçıl-çatışmasız bir şekilde geçiş yaptığı tek ülke Tunus olmuştur. Bunun arka planında, Nahda hareketinin konsensüs ve demokratik çerçevede mücadele etmesi yer alırken, “Yasemin Devrimi” sonrası süreçte oluşan siyasal serbestlik ortamı ve STK'ların açılması ve faaliyetlerinin önündeki engellerin kaldırılması da bir başka etken olmuştur. Burada özellikle demokrasiyi derinleştiren siyasal çoğulculuğa izin verilmesi ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının fonksiyonel çalışması, Tunus'taki söz konusu başarının unsurları olarak ifade edilebilir<sup>284</sup>.

Bugün sekiz yılını dolduran Devrim sürecinde Tunus halkının gündeminde çok çeşitli konular yer almaktadır. Tunus'ta binlerce ortaokul ve lise öğretmeni, maaş artışı, erken emeklilik ve eğitim reformu talepleriyle gösteriler düzenlemişlerdir. Öğrenci velileri ise öğretmenlerin özlük hakları ve eğitim sisteminin iyileştirilmesi talebiyle düzenledikleri eylemler kapsamında imtihanları boykot etmesine tepki göstererek, okullardaki sorunlara dikkati çeken pankartlar taşımışlardır. Tunus Genel İşçi Sendikası (UGTT) ise hükümetle ortaokul ve lise öğretmenleri arasında aylardır süren krizin anlaşmaya bağlandığını, kamu sektöründeki 650 binden fazla çalışan için zam öngören taslak üzerinde hükümetle anlaşmalarını açıklamıştır. Tunus'ta yolsuzlukla mücadele alanında faaliyet gösteren “*Ben Uyanığım*” örgütünün düzenlediği gösteriye katılanlar, “Tunus yaşasın ama siz yaşamayın”, “Tunus hanedanların mülkü değil” pankartları açarken, Örgütün Koordinatörü Eşref el-Avvadi, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, Fransa hükümetinin baskısı sonucu AB'nin Mebruk'un mal varlığının dondurulması kararını kaldırdığını söylemiştir<sup>285</sup>.

Buna ilave olarak Arap Baharının Tunus ekonomisi üzerinde ciddi olumsuz etkileri olmuştur. 2011, 2012 ve 2013 yıllarında, sırasıyla, kişi başına düşen GSYİH, tahmini 600 Amerikan dolarından (bu rakam GSYİH'nin yüzde 5,5'idir), 574 dolara (GSYİH'nin % 5,1'i) düşmüş ve ardından 735 doları (GSYİH'nin yüzde 6,4) görmüştür. Ayrıca, Arap Baharının Tunus ekonomisini olumsuz yönde

<sup>284</sup> Yusuf Yaman, “Tunus'ta İstikrarın Formülü: Üç Sacayağı”, *Bilecik Şeyh Edebalı Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt.3, Sayı.1, 2018, s.19, 35.

<sup>285</sup> Anadolu Ajansı, “Tunus Haberleri”, <https://www.aa.com.tr>; <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/tunus-ta-bir-devrin-sonu/1544066>.



etkilediği temel konu, yatırımcıların yatırım kararlarını ertelemelerine neden olabilecek politik, yasal ve ekonomik ortam konusundaki belirsizliği artıran unsurlar olmuştur<sup>286</sup>. Özetle, kaybedenin Tunus vatandaşları olduğu bu süreçte çok net bir şekilde ortaya çıkmıştır. Ekonomiyi iyileştirmeye yönelik önlemlere ve yeni adımlara başvurulsa da, Tunus ekonomisi üzerinde beklenen etkiyi gösterememiştir.

2018 yılının sonunda, Yasemin Devriminin fitilini ateşleyen, bir seyyar satıcının kendini yakması olayına benzer bir hadise daha yaşandı. Tunus'un Kasrin vilayetinde, kameraman Abdurrezzak Zerki'nin ekonomik şartları protesto için kendini yakmasının ardından protesto gösterileri başladı. Zerki'nin kendini yakmadan önce sosyal medya hesabından paylaştığı videoda, Kasrin halkına “*Bu, Kasrin halkına bir çağrı. Ben, kendi başıma devrim yapacağım*” ifadelerini kullanarak, yaptığı çağrı sonrası gece boyunca protesto gösterilerinin düzenlendiği görüldü. Zerki'nin kendisini yakmasının ardından, yerel medya bunun yeni bir ‘Yasemin Devrimi’ olup olmayacağını sorgulamaya başladı<sup>287</sup>.

Ekonomik gerekçelerle başlayan isyan kısa sürede büyümüş; ülke geneline ve ardından tüm bölgeye yayılmıştı. Sonuç olarak, Bin Ali'nin 14 Ocak'ta görevi bırakması üzerine süreci, Başbakanlık görevini yürüten Muhammed Gannuşi yürütmüştür. Abidin bin Ali'ye yakınlığı ile bilinen Gannuşi, kendisi aleyhindeki protestoların artması üzerine, “Baskıcı bir başbakan olmayacağım”<sup>288</sup> diyerek, 27 Şubatta görevi bıraktığını açıklamıştır. Ayrıca Devrim sonrasında Bin Ali'nin partisi feshedilmiş ve ülke, yapılan kimi yasal değişikliklerle geçici yönetimin kurulmasıyla seçimlere doğru yol almaya başlamıştır. Halen otuzun üzerinde siyasi parti olmasına rağmen ülke içinde tam olarak siyasi bir birlik sağlanamamış durumdadır ve Tunus'u gelecekte koalisyon hükümetlerinin beklediği ifade edilebilir.

##### **5. Sonuç Yerine: Yasemin Devriminden Çıkarılabilecek Dersler**

2019'un sonunda gerçekleştirilecek seçimlere hazırlanırken Tunus, yeniden çalkantılı günler yaşıyor. Sürecin lider partisi konumunda bulunan Nida Partisi'nden peş peşe gelen istifa haberleri ve

<sup>286</sup> Matta et al., “The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Tunisian Economy”, *CREDIT Research Paper*, No: 15/9, 2015, [www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit](http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit) (06.08.2019): 3-4.

<sup>287</sup> Sabah Gazetesi, “Tunus'ta Kameramanın Kendini Yakmasının Ardından Protesto Gösterileri Başladı”, 26.12.2018, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/avrupa/2018/12/26/tunusta-kameramanin-kendini-yakmasinin-ardindan-protesto-gosterileri-basladi>.

<sup>288</sup> Euronews, “Tunus'ta Gannuşi de Gitti”, 27.02.2011, <http://tr.euronews.net/2011/02/27/tunusta-gannusi-de-gitti>.



parti içindeki anlaşmazlıklar, Tunus halkı açısından yeni sorunları ve yeni denge arayışlarını beraberinde getiriyor. 4 yıl önceki seçimleri ilk sırada tamamlayan Nida Tunus Partisi, 217 sandalyeli meclise 86 vekil göndermişti. Fakat 2015-2016 döneminde yaşanan siyasal sorunlar nedeniyle 30 vekilin istifasıyla ikinci sırada bulunuyor. Bu sürece gelinirken, muhafazakâr karakterli Nahda Hareketi ile ulusalcı-laik karaktere sahip Nida Partisi arasında uyumlu bir uzlaşma söz konusuydu. Bu uzlaşma, Tunus'un karşı karşıya kaldığı pek çok ulusal ve uluslararası sorunun üstesinden gelinmede oldukça öneme sahip olmuştu. Bugün Tunus, iç siyasetindeki ve partilerin kendi içindeki çekişmeler nedeniyle, uzun bir süredir rakip ideolojik tabakalara rağmen devam ettirdikleri Tunus ulusal uzlaşmasını sekteye uğratmaktalar. Zira Devrim ve Arap Baharıyla ortaya çıkan; ülke içindeki farklı görüşteki kesimlerim ülkeleri için bir araya gelmeleri durumunda barış ve uzlaşma iklimini sağlayacaklardır.

Arap Baharı süreci, sekiz yıl önce Tunus'ta başlamıştı. Birçok siyasi kriz ve kırılma noktası yaşamasına rağmen Tunus, demokratik ve liberal kazanımlarını korumayı bir ölçüde başarmıştır. Ülkedeki devrim hareketleri, daha fazla özgürlük ve temsiliyet getirmesine rağmen, ülkenin içinden geçmekte olduğu ekonomik beklentileri tam manasıyla karşılayamamıştır. Tunus'ta devrimden bu yana çok sayıda siyasi bunalım yaşansa da, halk belli bir noktada uzlaşmaya ulaşabilmiştir. Ancak ekonomi alanında aynı başarı sağlamadığından, ülke genelinde zaman zaman protesto gösterileri düzenlenmektedir. Sekiz yıldır bölgede büyük bir dönüşüm ivmesini ateşleyen Tunus Yasemin devrimi, gerek bölgesel gerekse de uluslararası düzeyde bazı derslerin alınabilmesine sebep olmuştur.

Devrimden önceki Tunus yönetiminde şahit olunduğu üzere; otoriter ve baskıcı rejimlerin hayatiyeti, demokratik-liberal devlet sistemlerine kıyasla daha az sürmektedir. Baskıcı sistemler cebre dayalı olarak varlıklarını devam ettirmeye çalışsalar da Tunus'ta, Mısır'da ve diğer örneklerde görüldüğü gibi rejimlerinin siyasal ömürlerinin çok uzun sürmediği görülmüştür. Devrim, darbe veya benzer iktidar değişiklikleri genellikle ilgili süreçlerin öncülleri/liderleri/elitleri marifetiyle yürütülmektedir. Tunus deneyimi, bu tür politik geçiş süreçlerinde elitlerin ılımlı, demokrat-liberal tandanslı ve uzlaşmaya açık kesimlerden oluşması, muadillerine kıyasla süreçleri daha başarılı kıldığını ortaya koymuştur.



Bir ülkede devrim/darbe vb. keskin kırılmalarla gerçekleşen siyasal dönüşüm süreçlerinde genellikle dış/yabancı güçlerin müdahil bir pozisyonda bulunduğu müşahede edilir. Dış müdahalede bulunmanın politik açıdan bazen olumlu, çoğu zaman da olumsuz veçhelerinin olabileceği söylenebilir. Tunus devrimi, bir ülkede siyasal partilerin ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının faaliyetleri önündeki yasal ve idari engellerin bütünüyle kaldırılması durumunda, siyasal sistemdeki kırılma ve değişim/dönüşüm taleplerinin uzlaşıyla karşılanacağını öğretmiştir. Buna ilave olarak, Raşid Gannuşi örneğinde olduğu gibi, çatışma dilinden ziyade siyasi uzlaşma ve müzakere yöntemini benimseyen süreç liderliğinin ilgili ülkede yaşanan süreci, kaos, iç savaş veya karşı devrim gibi ciddi kırılmaların eşliğine getirmeden sürdürebileceğini göstermiştir.

Bir ülkenin beka sorununun, sadece dışarıdan veya içeriden gelen güvenlik tehdit ve riskleriyle orantılı olmadığı, Tunus örneğinde görülmektedir. Ülke içinde ekonomik sorunların üstesinden gelememiş, gençlerine yeteri kadar istihdam alanları açamamış, baskıcı ve hukuk-dışı uygulamalarıyla halkın kendisine olan inancını yitirmiş ve ciddi meşruiyet sorunları yaşamaya başlamış, bilhassa da laiklik uygulamalarıyla halkının en temel ihtiyaçları arasında yer alan din ve vicdan hürriyetini askıya almış bir yönetim de kaçınılmaz olarak beka problemi yaşayacaktır. Mutlu ve her yönden tatmin olmuş bir halkın iktidarına karşı bir başkaldırı hareketi içinde bulunması çok olası gözükmemektedir.

Tunus pratiği, istidam olanaklarının yetersizliği, ekonomik sıkıntılara ilave olarak baskıcı bir yönetim anlayışının benimsenmesi ve temel insan hakları konusunda ciddi ihlallerde bulunulduğunu göstermiştir. Siyasi tarih, bu tarz pratikler içinde olan devletlerin yaşadıkları meşruiyet krizleri ve ciddi siyasal kırılmalarla doludur. Gelecekte Tunus yönetiminin nasıl şekilleneceği belirsizliğini korumakla birlikte, devrim ateşinin yandığı diğer coğrafyalarda da olduğu üzere Devrim, halkın daha çok bilinçlenmesinin önünü açmış ve kendi geleceklerini kendilerinin belirlemesi gerektiğini öğretmiştir. Yasemin Devrimi ayrıca sivil direnişle geldiğinden, baskıcı Arap ve Ortadoğu devletlerine ülke içinde gerekli reformların biran önce yapılması ve halkın sesine kulak verilmesi gerektiğini göstermiştir.



### Kaynakça

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## Political Philosophy of Al Farabi and the Logic of the Integration and Solidarity in the International Area

*Fikret BİRDİŞLİ\**

### **Abstract**

*The classical theories and literature dominated by the ideas of Western philosophers and thinkers in the Political Philosophy. Therefore, the western centrism perceived as a problem because of univocally denseness of in this field.*

*This article scrutinize ideas of Al Farabi in context of classical idealism, because of his different approach or comment to same logical design. Famous theory of Al Farabi, the ideal state, expose different logic of the collaboration and solidarity from classical idealism by defining core value on personal perfectness and maturity instead of maximizing material interest. According to Al Farabi, solidarity and collaboration not only creating ideal conditions for having good governance, but also caused to the personal perfectness which is better serve to the stable integration and durable political system. The meaning of the collaboration and integration is a kind of societal evolution of the personality that begin from family and extend to the international community for serving better world by creating of ideal citizenship.*

*In this context, ideas of Al Farabi contribute different meaning to the logic of collaboration, besides explanations of the idealism and liberalism. In addition, his contemplation about ideal city has include many reference for modern political ideas and concept. Therefore, Al Farabi may a reference from Eastern world and Islamic teaching for the modern political contemplations such a democracy, international integration, cosmopolitanism etc.*

**Key Words:** Al Farabi, Political Philosophy, Idealism, Collaboration and solidarity

### **Farabi'nin Siyaset Felsefesi ve Uluslararası Alanda Entegrasyon ile Dayanışmanın Mantığı**

#### **Özet**

*Siyaset felsefesi genellikle Batılı filozofların ve düşünürlerin fikirlerinin hâkimiyeti altındadır. Bu durum kaynak çeşitliliği yerine tek sesliliğin yoğunluğu nedeniyle Batı merkezilik olarak tanımlanıp eleştirilmektedir. Bu makale, Farabi'nin fikirlerini aynı mantıksal tasarıma farklı yaklaşımları veya yorumları nedeniyle klasik idealizm bağlamında incelemektedir. Farabi'nin ünlü teorisi İdeal Devlette, maddi çıkarları maksimize etmek yerine kişisel kusursuzluk ve olgunlukta temel bir değer tanımlayarak,*

\* Assoc.Prof.Dr. İnönü University, Center for Strategic Researches(INUSAM), [fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr](mailto:fikret.birdisli@inonu.edu.tr), ORCID ID:0000-0003-3832-7749



*işbirliğinin ve dayanışmanın klasik idealizmden farklı bir mantığını ortaya koymaktadır. Farabi'ye göre, dayanışma ve işbirliği sadece iyi yönetişime sahip olmak için ideal koşullar yaratmakla kalmıyor, aynı zamanda istikrarlı entegrasyon ve dayanıklı bir siyasi sisteme daha iyi hizmet eden kişisel mükemmelliğe de neden oluyor. Buna göre Farabi'de İşbirliği ve entegrasyonun anlamı, ideal vatandaşlık yaratarak daha iyi bir dünyaya hizmet etmek için aileden başlayan ve uluslararası topluluğa kadar uzanan kişiliğin bir tür toplumsal evrimidir.*

*Bu bağlamda, Farabi'nin fikirleri, idealizm ve liberalizmin açıklamalarının yanı sıra işbirliği mantığına farklı anlamsal derinlikler kazandırıyor. Bunlara ek olarak, Farabi'nin ideal devlet hakkındaki fikirleri çağdaş siyaset bilimi ve felsefesinde için referans olabilecek niteliktedir. Bu nedenle Farabi, modern siyaset biliminde yer alan demokrasi, uluslararası bütünleşme, kozmopolitanizm ve hümanizm gibi pek çok çağdaş kavram için doğu ve İslam düşünce dünyasından bir referans olabilir.*

**Anahtar Kavramlar:** *Farabi, Siyaset Felsefesi, İdealizm, Dayanışma ve İşbirliği.*

## 1. Introduction

Al Farabi (A.C. 870-950) is one of the prominent philosopher of classical thinking. He well known as synthesizer of the classical Hellenic philosophy and Islamic theology in the medieval Islamic Golden Age.<sup>289</sup> He was born in Farab/Turkestan and be famous as second master after Aristotle in Islamic world. Indeed, Al Farabi was remarkable thinker in many fields like cosmology, logic and music beside of the dialectic philosophy. Al Farabi explained and commented philosophical ideas of Aristotle and Plato by metaphysical, psychological and philosophical implications of the Islamic principles. Therefore, Farabi has been perceived as an excellent represent of the “renaissance” of the Islamic thinking in the medieval age.

Al Farabi usually well known by the books of *Kitab-el Siyaset'ül Medeniye* (Book of Politics) and *Mebadi'i ara'i Ehl el-Medinet'il Fadla* (virtues city) which are include utopian philosophy about ideal state and administration. Many thinks that Al Farabi inspired from Plato's Republic and Laws for his idea of the ideal society. Additionally, Farabian epistemology described as the Neoplatonist, because of the Aristotelian influence also.

<sup>289</sup> Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*; Zimmerman, *Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretations*; Netton, 'Al Farabi and His School'; Mahdi, *Al Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy*.



Like other all-classical philosopher, Al Farabi also says that the ultimate goal of life is to reach to the “true happiness”. However, according to the Al Farabi the meaning of the true happiness related with the idealized personality, which may achieve by the self-philosophical enlightenment.<sup>290</sup> In this point, core principles of the creation of ideal personality depends on the collaboration and solidarity. Because, everybody have different talent and nobody may reach to the ideal maturity and perfect personality without contribution of diversification of others. In this point, Al Farabi gives crucial role to the politics to provide necessary conditions for suitable collaboration and solidarity between humans in socio- political level also. Therefore, the meaning of politic is not related only distribution allocation of resources but also related with the harmonizing of different talent by providing ideal condition for development of society by collaboration. Additionally, Al Farabi agree with classical philosophers (Peripatetic) about general functionality of politics and he calls politics as a kind of art like the others. However, differences of Al Farabi is that he explain this functionality by Islamic theology in a special kind of socio-political form also.<sup>291</sup>

According to the Farabi, the collaboration is a sociopolitical form of development, which is growing systematically. This collaborative development begin from family and expand until society and state level. Ultimate level of this collaborative development is universalization. Therefore, the idea of the virtuous society (ma'mura al- fadila) is depends on the dynamic, holistic and humanistic collaborative development which may called as a kind of political maturity also.

Political philosophy of Farabi reminds of Stoic philosophy because of using analogy of human biology while explain his theory.<sup>292</sup> Besides, Al Farabi probably may have been inspired from ideas such a Eudaimonia<sup>293</sup> and the other ancient philosophy. Additional it possible to find

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<sup>290</sup> Arslan, *Farabi; Ideal Devlet*, 20.

<sup>291</sup> Hines, ‘The Influence of Plato and Aristotle on Al Farabi’, 7.

<sup>292</sup> Netton, ‘Al Farabi and His School’.

<sup>293</sup> Eudaimonia or Eudaemonism is a Greek word, which refers to a state of having a good permanent and stable spirit or being in a contented state of being healthy, happy and prosperous.



many correlations between ideas of modern age philosopher like Immanuel Kant, Karl Deutsch and Keen Booth and Al Farabi about solidarity and collaboration also.<sup>294</sup>

In this context, this paper aims to contribute to the classical idealism by scrutinize on the ideas of Al Farabi. It is hoped that this effort may serve to fill vacuum between East and West about political philosophy, it is hoped that this effort may serve to fill vacuum between East and West about political philosophy, which often mentioned and criticized by many, because of the Western centrism or hegemony.

## 2. Classical Philosophy and Ideas of Al Farabi

Al Farabi has been famous with the sobriquet of “second master” after Aristotle.<sup>295</sup> Nevertheless, actually his ideas represents Platoon idealism more than Aristotle’s realism. Hence, Al Farabi has had a parallel posture with Plato by establishing a relationship between ideal political structure and universal dominance.<sup>296</sup>

Al Farabi focused on resolving of “the problem of ideal political system” like other classical philosophers. However, He has advantages of having legacy of ideas of his predecessors like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, he was able to synthesize between classical ancient philosophies with Islamic thought. This advantage facilitated him to develop more reasonable and stable theory about ideal state and political order. For example, the relationship between political system and theology (gods and divine) was not clear in the book of the State of Plato. Al Farabi completed missing part of the Plato’s ideal city about “the wise president” by the concept of “first leader or president” which he inspired and coined from Islamic thought.

Actually, both Aristotle and Al Farabi always believed that religion and philosophy are two faces of the same truth. However, Al Farabi probably was the first philosopher who

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<sup>294</sup> Nysanbaev, ‘Al Farabi’s Spiritual Heritage, P. Dialogue of the East and West Cultures’, 7.

Booth, *Dünya Güvenliği Teorisi*, 20; Buzan, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 19; Bilgin, ‘The “Western-Centrism” of Security Studies, P. “Blind Spot” or Constitutive Practice?’, 616.

<sup>295</sup> Walzer, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*; Zimmerman, *Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretations*; Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 6; Kaya, *İslam Filozoflarından Felsefe Metinleri*, 108.

<sup>296</sup> Hines, ‘The Influence of Plato and Aristotle on Al Farabi’, 2; Çilingir, *Farabi ve İbn Haldun’da Siyaset*, 9.



systematized and harmonized this reality in the requirement of the real world.<sup>297</sup> Additionally, it requires understanding of the meaning of his "world state theory" to determine real value of Al Farabi among classical philosophers.

First postulate in this point is that fundamental mission of the philosophy is to expose a certain behavior or understanding, which reflects a world perception. In this conjunction, the main problematic of philosophy is that right positioning of the human among the other creatures in this perceived world. The phenomena of true happiness appeared from this problematic which new and old philosophers' efforts to determine real meaning and ways of this reality by their mental activities in this human centric universe perception. The power, justice and political systems are even the key words for political philosophy in this endeavor.

Another remarkable fact is that, the context of these key words were determined by the effect of the exogenous factors such as time, wars and conflicts in political philosophy. Hence, the philosophers also used these words, which the meaning has been shaped by their time's turmoil in their mental activities.

For example, Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta for power and wealth have has deep influence on the ideas and emotions of both Socrates and Plato.<sup>298</sup> Besides, Ideas of Plato has deeply affected by the executed of his master because of political reasons and he suspected on the meaning of the "pluralist Athena's democracy" after that. This event has been effected on the rationality of Plato while try to find an answer about meaning of "ideal administration" and "virtuous life".<sup>299</sup> Another example is Machiavelli. He was anxious about the unity of Italy and tried to find reasonable solution in turmoil of furious rivalry of city-states of Italy. Thomas Hobbes who prominent thinker of the realist theory also, lived in political chaos of Britain's throne fights.

Immanuel Kant has dreamed a united Europe in the age of turmoil of Europe and he developed "perpetual peace theory" by the vision of economic integration and solidarity.

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<sup>297</sup> Macarimbang, 'Envisioning a Perfect City, An Introduction to Al Farabi's Political Philosophy', 3; Çilingir, *Farabi ve İbn Haldun'da Siyaset*, 36.

<sup>298</sup> Bagby, *Political Thought*, 2.


<sup>299</sup> Platon, *Phaidon*, 78.



Different from all these examples, Al Farabi was the man of peaceful times and he was create his theories and hypothesis far from political tensions and turmoil. Therefore, his ideas free from instability and extremist paroxysm.

### 3. Political Philosophy of Al Farabi

The political philosophy of Al Farabi stands on the ontological bases. He was tried to find an answer to the core problem of philosophy about that how to be get “true happiness” also. According to the Al Farabi, the meaning of “true happiness” is that to achieve idealized personality by some kind of self-philosophical enlightenment. Moreover, the keywords of this achievement are the collaboration and the solidarity. Because, according to Al Farabi, nobody may able to get this ideal level alone without collaboration and solidarity, because of the diversifications and distribution of talents. In this context, the politics has play important role because of its mission about distribution of resources and regulation of social dynamics. This mission are important for collaboration and solidarity. Therefore, the politics (*ilmi siyaset*) is a kind of art to reach to the true happiness as a source of theory and praxis in the way of personal perfection and maturity.<sup>300</sup>



**Graphic 1.** The Relationship between Philosophy and Politics in the Idea of Al Farabi

<sup>300</sup> Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 31.



Al Farabi realized that philosophical efforts has restricted by intellectual activity without practical offers.<sup>301</sup> Therefore, he divided general philosophy in politics as Political Philosophy (el-felsefet's siyase) and State Philosophy (el-felsefetü'l mediniye).<sup>302</sup> This typology has been detailed in the Graphic 1.

The book of *Mabadi Ara Ehl al-Madina al Fadila* which is shortly known as "Medinetü'l Fazıla" includes this original typology. According to Badavi, the meaning of "Al Medina" is not equal to the "Police" which was used by Plato and Aristotle in their philosophy in this category. The meaning of "Al Medina" is the state, regime, government or administration.<sup>303</sup> So, true happiness related with the practical politics and understanding of the world by developing of his conscious.

In second phase, all material world should be exceed by a strong perspicacity.<sup>304</sup> Therefore, development of cognitive abilities (philosophical enlightenment) depends on the presence of qualitative and quantitative conditions. The collaboration and solidarity helps to overcome all these challenges through the sharing of different talents and qualifications.

In Al Farabi philosophy, the human cannot live alone or isolated from communal life because of his social nature. Hence, everybody need help from others to get over all requirement of the life. This obligation creates the community where everybody needs each other to preserve themselves and to attain perfection. This community serve to the pleasure and acquisition of wealth by self-realization for everybody. In shortly, it is obviously clear that humankind needs to collaboration and solidarity to get true happiness.<sup>305</sup> Politics is a kind of art or practical science for organizing community to reach this objective. In the philosophy of Al Farabi, ethics and politics are inseparable in this context. Because ethics is phenomenological approach to the true happiness and the policy is practice of it.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Aydın, *Es-Siyasetü'l- Medeniye Veya Mebadi 'ül-Mevcudat*, 16.

<sup>302</sup> Al-Farabi, *İhsa 'ül Ulum-İlimlerin Sayımı*, 129.

<sup>303</sup> Arslan, *Farabi;İdeal Devlet*, 21.

<sup>304</sup> Arslan, 20.

<sup>305</sup> Macarimbang, 'Envisioning a Perfect City, An Introduction to Al Farabi's Political Philosophy', 6.

<sup>306</sup> Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 93; Aydın, *Es-Siyasetü'l- Medeniye Veya Mebadi 'ül-Mevcudat*, 13.





According to Farabi, virtuous cities consist of the virtuous citizens or persons. Therefore, in this context, a good character and a sound power of discrimination between right and wrong are essential prerequisites of attaining happiness at the practical level by virtuous personal character.<sup>307</sup>

Adivar says that, Al Farabi was founder of peculiar philosophical school of intellectualism that followed by Avicenna (İbn-i Sina) and Averroes (İbn-i Rüşd). However, some researchers claim that the philosophy of the Al Farabi is a kind of eclectic philosophy under the influence of Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus.<sup>308</sup>

Actually, Al Farabi has transformed the transcendental peripatetic doctrine to the systemic theory by synthesizing of Aristotle and Plato. In this manner, he has established his own perspective and school. Nevertheless, Al Farabi has not touch to subject of the political power, legality, property and fundamental rights in his theory. This could be accept as a failure of the perfect political theory, but it is possible to deduce his ideas about that from details of his ideas. As a result, Al Farabi gives us a succinct account of the stages, through which philosophy passed and his own position in the chain of Greek, Hellenistic, Syrian and Muslim philosophers while explaining of his theory.<sup>309</sup>

#### **4. Theory of State and Universalism in the Philosophy of Al Farabi**

Political conflicts and regional problems have deep influence over intellectual minds of philosophers. For example, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle have been shaped under the shade of political conflicts and problems of the ancient Greek city-states.<sup>310</sup> Machiavelli cared about union of Italy and tried to find some solution for city-states furious rivalry.<sup>311</sup> Hobbes, another representative of the realism, lived in political turmoil of Britain. Kant dreamed of a united Europe and theorized his “perpetual peace” in course of international economy and peace.

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<sup>307</sup> Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 94.

<sup>308</sup> Adamson, ‘In the Age of Al Farabi, Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century’, 23; Arslan, *Farabi: İdeal Devlet*, 13; Çilingir, *Farabi ve İbn Haldun’da Siyaset*, 43.

<sup>309</sup> Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 10.


<sup>310</sup> Bayraklı, *Farabi’de Devlet Felsefesi*, 10.

<sup>311</sup> Heywood, *Siyaset*, 25.



Common side of these philosophers was that they analyzed political problems in locally. Therefore, original Universalist ideas emerged from Stoic and Farabian thought.

Actually, Stoics developed universal ideas after the rising of the Empire of Alexander. Great Alexander was conquered Greek cities and founded a universal empire in unprecedented manner. This reality has reflected on the political ideas of the Stoic philosophers as a universalism also. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the how universalist ideas of Al Farabi were shaped in this context.<sup>312</sup> Nevertheless, the real values of ideas of Al Farabi related with the different classification of states and politics, already (Graphic 2).



**Graphic 2.** The Communities According to Al Farabi <sup>313</sup>.

As Plato did, Al-Farabi also thought that human was a social creature who has ontological proclivity to form the community and social life. However, Al-Farabi thought that ultimate goal of being community not only related with this life but also for hereafter.<sup>314</sup> So, the quality of the political communities would evaluated by ability of serving to this ultimate goal. In this context, Al Farabi does not perceive the state as a perfect model of political organization to serve this goal. Besides, he takes attention to the personal quality of the administrators' also. In this context, perfect communities classified in three categories as the small, middle and large communities according to

<sup>312</sup> Bayraklı, *Farabi'de Devlet Felsefesi*, 10.

<sup>313</sup> Bayraklı, 65.

<sup>314</sup> El-Farabi, *El Medinetü'l Fazıla*, 75; Macarimbang, 'Envisioning a Perfect City, An Introduction to Al Farabi's Political Philosophy', 13.



Al Farabi. The large communities consist of large groups of people who agree to merge to help each other and cooperate in this category. This explanation seems to match to the creation of the United Nation. A medium level community consists of one group of people living in an area. This could be associate with the meaning of national state.

A small community consists of the residents of a city also. This is an explanation of the city in the theory of Al Farabi. The villages, districts or families are incomplete communities because of include limited or small amount of solidarity according to this theory. In other word, a family is part of a street community; a street community is a part of a village community; and a village community is a part of a city community. But, these are imperfect and insufficient communities in context of economic, social, cultural and spiritual level for their members.<sup>315</sup>

According to Al Farabi, a political community reaches to the perfectness in greater scale of collaboration. So, Al Farabi's "World State" model depends on the evolutionary model which begin from local community untill regional or international collaboration.<sup>316</sup>

Al Farabi has developed this theory by modeling similarities between universal cosmos and social order. Therefore, socio-political solidarity between states or communities would cause a cybernetic order and harmony with natural order of universe. Besides, Al Farabi beacons to the bio-organism for strengthening of this theory also. Especially, he uses functionality of human body to explain importance of departments in any state. While the classical philosophers found a metaphoric similarity between brain and president, Al Farabi was though the position of the president is similar to the position of heart in a human body. Furthermore, while Plato advised that a king should be selected from the between philosophers Al Farabi explained characteristic of an ideal president systematically. Therefore, he advises to be having a council for consulting for ideal states like the modern parliaments.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> Abu Nas'r al-Farabi, *On the Perfect State of Al-Farabi*, 231; Macarimbang, 'Envisioning a Perfect City, An Introduction to Al Farabi's Political Philosophy', 13.

<sup>316</sup> Bayraklı, *Farabi'de Devlet Felsefesi*, 31.

<sup>317</sup> Aydın, *Es-Siyasetü'l-Medeniye Veya Mebadi'ül-Mevcudat*, 21; Adivar, *Farabi*, 51.



In this perspective, the ideas of Al Farabi is more realistic than the ideas of classical thinkers and it was more similar to the modern state systems. Hereby, Al Farabi proves the necessity of regional or universal integration by his political ideas.

#### **4.1. Regional and Universal Integration According to Al Farabi**

As if mentioned before, political philosophy of Al Farabi depends on two analogies; biological and divine analogy. According to Al Farabi, a perfect or a virtuous city is similar to the healthy and perfect body that has different parts and organs function in a harmony via bio collaboration. So, virtuous city, which has been created by sociopolitical collaboration and economic justice, is crucial for sustainable growth and harmony.<sup>318</sup>

Second analogy was related with the divine arguments. Al Farabi claims that all part of the universe ranks under the First Cause. Therefore, relation between governor/ leader and citizens are similar to the relation between First Cause and other existence. He says that the ranks of immaterial existences were close to the First Cause and beneath them were "heavenly bodies", and beneath the "heavenly bodies" were material bodies. Moreover, all these existents in order of rank were in conformity with the First Cause.<sup>319</sup>

Al Farabi analyzes both society and its social relationship with political context through these analogies. Therefore, some communities such as family, street, district and village have been accepted as the imperfect models, due to their apolitical character. In this point, it should be remember that Al Farabi says it is impossible to reach true happiness in the place which smaller than a city.<sup>320</sup> Therefore, ideal model will be developed by greater scale collaboration from city than state until having universal collaboration.

As a result, the true happiness is a kind of socio-political success that get through integration of communities. In all long of history, core reason for ideal collaboration has been change according to the requirement. Usually, common interests for collaboration have been related with security reasons or economic matters. The reasons that make collaboration easier are:

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<sup>318</sup> Bayraklı, *Farabi'de Devlet Felsefesi*, 37.

<sup>319</sup> Macarimbang, 'Envisioning a Perfect City, An Introduction to Al Farabi's Political Philosophy', 5.

<sup>320</sup> El-Farabi, *Es-Siyasetü'l-Medeniye Veya Mebadi'ül-Mevcudat*, 98.



- a) Common interests
- b) Defense or security problems
- c) Geographic proximity

**a) Common interests:** Unequal distribution of the natural resources in the world is requiring collaboration while seeking to maximization of their national interest for states. Especially, modernism and post-industrial relationship are accelerating intercultural interaction through transportation, communication and human trafficking. Therefore, it will not be an exaggeration to tell that Al Farabi's philosophy represents a historical prototype of a modern intercultural dialogue and model of historically carried out dialogue of cultures of the East and the West according to Nysanbaev.<sup>321</sup> Besides, nothing is local anymore, so, the reason for collaboration in the ideal society should not be restricted with common interests also. More reasons may be countable for more stable collaboration.

**b) Defense and security reasons:** Defense and security are prominent reasons of the collaboration and integration between states. According to Al Farabi, the security matter has internal and external dimensions. Internal dimension of the security related with the keeping of public order by the punishment of criminals. The externality of security is the related with the defending of the virtues city from aggression. Therefore, the war is undesirable obligation as the context of the just war.

**c) Geographic proximity:** According to Al Farabi, large communities consist of many smaller communities through collaboration and solidarity. Therefore, stable communities have harmonized this structure by good collaboration to getting it durable. In this point, remarkable idea of Al Farabi about nations is the related with national culture and character. According to Al Farabi, nations differ from each other in three criteria; nature, geographic character and language. He says that the geography has distinguished effect on the national culture and character, approximately four centuries before Ibn Khaldun.<sup>322</sup> Therefore, he explains effect of geographic position of the nations in earth on their national characters. According to Al Farabi, celestial bodies of the sky on

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<sup>321</sup> Nysanbaev, 'Al Farabi's Spiritual Heritage, P. Dialogue of the East and West Cultures', 9.

<sup>322</sup> El-Farabi, *El Medinetü'l Fazıla*, 76.



a region have different effect on national character also. Ibrahim Hakkı who was a Sufi and scholar in eighteenth century explained this theory.

According to Al Farabi, the collaboration and solidarity between nations creates the new political cultures through the fusion of the different cultures and characters. For example, Huns are the ancestors of Mongols and Turks, the Teutons are the ancestors of German and British. So, the meaning of the environment in the theory of Al Farabi is not only restricted with nature but it includes space and celestial bodies as well. Therefore, it can be deduced from the explanations that geographic proximity is ideal for harmonized collaboration.<sup>323</sup>

#### **4.2. Ideal Conditions for the Ideal Collaboration**

Al Farabi is agree with the other classical philosophers on the idea of the reaching to the ideal society and the true happiness by the developing of the societies. Nevertheless, ideas of Plato and Aristotle has not gone beyond of the city state model of ancient Greek while explaining of the political integration and collaboration. However, Al Farabi has developed more universal ideas and models about political collaboration and solidarity because of the universalist character of Islam. Therefore, the meaning of the true happiness embraces the governing of community by the sociopolitical solidarity and collaboration. The integration of communities is key word of the true happiness.<sup>324</sup>

Al Farabi declared that the love and justice are two factors that are indispensable for ideal integration, but he has not explained about their meaning in detail. However, it seems the meaning of love is different in philosophy of Al Farabi. He says that the love is the will of keeping and pursuance of the ideal conditions. Hence, we can explain the concept of the love in the philosophy of Al Farabi as that social attractiveness and a guarantee with justice for stable collaboration. According to Al Farabi the ideal conditions for safe integration requires:

- a) Common committee or council
- b) Education program
- c) Socio-political attractiveness and justice

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<sup>323</sup> El-Farabi, *İhsa'ül Ulum*, 77.

<sup>324</sup> Aydın, *Es-Siyasetü'l- Medeniye Veya Mebadi'ül-Mevcudat*, 18.



### **a) Common committee or council**

The governor or ruler of the city is the prominent characters of the virtues city because they resembling of the First Cause in the philosophy of creation. So, the leaders resembles to the heart in the body in analogy of Al Farabi.<sup>325</sup>

Al-Farabi emphasize that the leaders should establish a "virtuous" society by justice and forwarding community to the "true happiness". Therefore, the qualification of the leaders for the ideal state is crucial, as it has been in classical philosophy also. However, Plato and Aristotle says that only philosophers may achieve this goal as a ruler or governor. Actually, Al Farabi is more realistic and reasonable about who must be ruler. He says that the leaders or rulers should have twelve quality for being good leader in perfect city or community. These are: physically ability, intelligence, well education, fast learning, fast memorizing, articulation of himself, justice, sincerity, honesty, chastity and strong-willed.<sup>326</sup> Nevertheless, he thinks that nobody can have all required characteristic, so he advices a council for governing.<sup>327</sup>

### **b) Education Program**

Knowledge is crucial for an advanced community, according to Al Farabi. He discovered the limits of the knowledge in his school of early Islamic philosophy. Therefore, the meaning of theology for Al Farabi is also more than metaphysics. Actually, Al Farabi intended to outline a political program in his writings, so he converged the political philosophy and practice in the sphere of politics. Whereas, philosophy has had been away from practice in generally.

Al Farabi says that ideal state or virtue society may not only depend on the qualification or characterization of a leader. Well-programmed education may take a community to the high level. Additionally, functionality of education serve to the formation of characters according to Al Farabi. In this context, Al Farabi also agree with the philosophers about important of the philosophical education for administrators. He says that the philosophy is the elite education not for the ordinary people. Because most of the people has tendency for follow others instead of struggling for reaching

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<sup>325</sup> Fakhry, *Al Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism*, 102.

<sup>326</sup> Chafik, 'United Nation Virtuous City Project', 15.

<sup>327</sup> Aydın, *Es-Siyasetü'l- Medeniye Veya Mebadi'ül-Mevcudat*, 21.



real knowledge. Therefore, education of ordinary people should base on the persuasion, in first step, not philosophy.<sup>328</sup>

### **c) Socio-political Attractiveness and Justice:**

Another difference of Al Farabi is that his using of some unusual words in politics. For example, he accepts that love and justice are two things that attract and get people closer to each other. The love is an emotional attractiveness and it serves to keep community more integrated and harmonized. The justice serves to keep society in union also. People who are citizens of the ideal state feel loyalty to the state or union because of material and emotional satisfaction.<sup>329</sup> Hence, people have wills to keep this socio-political integration forever. Besides, the other peoples who are outside of ideal states or communities will have desire to participate in this community because of high level freedom and development. So, this attractiveness of ideal state is a kind of socio-political love. Besides, the justice will serve to sustain social cohesion and permanence of a union.

In this context, the ideal city of Al Farbi is a cosmopolitan one in comparison with other political models of philosophers. Al Farabi consider that intermarriage among different groups to be one of the factors that strengthen the bonds between communities and create cooperation in society. This is the attractiveness of the democratic city despite of extreme diversity.<sup>330</sup>

## **5. Conclusion**

The Ultimate goal of the political philosophy and philosophers is to reach ideal condition of the sociopolitical life. Therefore, philosophers thought and developed different models for ideal political system and ideal life.

Actually, many models and offers has depended on the personal experience of the political philosophers in turmoil of their times. Classical philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato; modern thinkers and philosophers such as Machiavelli Hobbes and Kant have had been anxious about their times and options while their mental activities.

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<sup>328</sup> El-Farabi, *Ihsa'ul Ulum*, 15.

<sup>329</sup> Khalidi, 'Al Farabi on the Democratic City', 385.

<sup>330</sup> Khalidi, 386.





Al Farabi is the one of the prominent classical philosopher of the Islamic thought and he well known as synthesizers and commentator of the Aristotle and Plato. Nevertheless, his ideas have eclectically and original dimension about political philosophy. His utopia about “virtues city (Medine-ul Fazila) represent an ideal city, political system and citizen which depends on the collaboration and solidarity between people and community is creatively similar to the today’s democracies and international organizations.

Political ideas and offers of the Al Farabi free from all kind of excessiveness and exaggerations because it was production of the peaceful time and stability instead of other political philosophers controversial eras. Besides, he completed the missing parts of the classical philosophy about political system, community and leaders by the Islamic doctrine about universe and creation perception.

Necessity of the solidarity and collaboration between human and society not depends on the reciprocity or material interest as it was in liberal theory in Al Farabi philosophy. It related with the self-realization and personal maturity by getting help from the other people to reach true happiness.

Al Farabi has modeled similarities between universal cosmos and social order in his ideal city design. Therefore, he proposes collaboration and solidarity for ideal political order for being in harmony like universal order. Perfect communities may evaluate in three categories as the small, middle and large communities according to Al Farabi. The large communities consist of many groups of people who agree to merge to help each other and cooperate. This idea remind that the emergence of by the United Nation.

Surely, the classification and description of the communities by Al Farabi seems to explain many modern political context also. For example, medium level community consists of one group of people living in an area on this earth explain the national state. A small community consists of the residents of a place that they in a collaboration and solidarity, this is a city. The others community such as villages, districts or families also are incomplete communities because of the limited solidarity according to this theory.



The all requirements for the ideal city has been explained in context of the rational and reasonable manner in the contemplation of the Al Farabi, Therefore this political projection is away from a being political utopia.

Another originality of the ideas of Al Farabi is that he fined a relation between environment and national culture and character. Therefore, he emphasized that celestial body of the sky on a region, geographic specification of a place and nature effect on the national character and language.

Origin of the political ideas of Al Farabi depends on ideas of Aristotle and Plato. He was explained philosophical systems of both and converged them with Islamic thoughts by metaphysical, psychological, and political theories. Therefore, his offers about political system were a synthesis like his intellectual background.

Finally, we can say that, Al Farabi is prominent philosopher of the classical thinking as the synthesizer of the Aristoteles, Plato and Islamic thinking in the intersection of both West and East. His ideas is compatible with the modern political theories, definitions and concept. Therefore, Al Farabi may a reference from Eastern world and Islamic teaching for the modern political contemplations such a democracy, international integration, cosmopolitanism etc.

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## BOOK REVIEW

*Critical Theory and World Politics*, Richard Wyn Jones (Ed.), Lynne Rienner, London, 2001,  
259 sayfa,  
ISBN: 1-55587-802-4  
Emre Baran PAK\*

Eleştirel Teori'nin Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini ile özdeşleştirilmesine yönelik çabalara sıklıkla rastlanılmaktadır. Richard Wyn Jones tarafından editörlüğü üstlenilen "Critical Theory and World Politics" adlı eser de böyle bir amaç gütmekte ve Eleştirel Teori çerçevesinde siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkiler arasında köprü kurmayı amaçlayan bir bağlam sunmaktadır.

Marxist yaklaşımlar ve Eleştirel Teori üzerine yayımlanmış birçok eseri bulunan ve halen Cardiff Üniversitesi'nde çalışmalarını sürdüren Richard Wyn Jones'un editörlüğünü üstlendiği bu eser, Wales (Galler) Üniversitesi'nde gerçekleştirilen bir kongrenin bildiri metninin derlenmesinden oluşmaktadır.

Jones, eserin iki temel amacının olduğunu savunmaktadır: İlk olarak, Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'nin evrimini ve geleceğini tartışmak için bir diyalog oluşturmak ve ikinci olarak, lisansüstü öğrencilere bu teoriyi tanıtmak (ss. viii-2).

Kitap, Jones tarafından yazılan bir giriş metninden ve konularına göre ayrılmış kitap bölümlerinden oluşmaktadır. Giriş metninde Jones, Eleştirel Teori'nin bazı katkılarına yer vermektedir. Bu kapsamda, Eleştirel Teori'nin temel katkısının "özgürleşme" kavramını literatüre kazandırması ile ilgili olduğunu düşünmektedir. Eleştirel Teori'nin diğer bir potansiyel katkısının ise Gramsciyen üretimsel ve Habermasyen iletişimsel paradigmlar arasında köprü kurulması ile sağlanabileceğini kanaatindedir (ss. 15-16). Eleştirel Teori'nin, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerine katkısını ise Konstruktivizm ile Eleştirel Teori arasındaki özne-yapı diyalektiği kapsamındaki ilişkisi bağlamında değerlendirmektedir (s. 13). Jones'un giriş bölümünde Frankfurt Ekolü mensuplarına değinmesine rağmen özne-yapı diyalektiği konusundaki tartışmaların aynı ekol

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\* Doktora Öğrencisi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler (Siyasal) Doktora Programı, İstanbul, pakemre@ymail.com



içerisindeki zenginliğine değinmediği görülmektedir. Özellikle Frankfurt Ekolü'nün psikanaliz, kültür ve estetik ile ilgili çalışmalarına yer verilmemesi ise dikkat çekmektedir.<sup>331</sup>

Kitabın “Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'nin Kontuarları” (The Contours of Critical International Relations Theory) isimli ilk bölümünde Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox ve Craig N. Murphy'nin kitap bölümlerine yer verilmektedir.

Andrew Linklater, “Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisinin Değişen Kontuarları” (The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory) isimli kitap bölümünde Eleştirel Ekol'ün üretim paradigmasından yola çıktığını belirterek, günümüzde kamu politikası ve yönetişimine katkılarının ne olabileceğini sorguluyor. Bu kapsamda, yalnızca Habermas'ın düşüncelerine, her ne kadar, Eleştirel Teori'nin bütüncül bir değerlendirilmesi iddiasını ortaya atsa da, yer veriyor. Linklater'a göre Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'nin değişen kontuarları kendisini, her ne kadar Habermas uluslararası ilişkilere dönük olarak açık bir çıkarımda bulunmasa da, diyalog, farklılık ve dışlamada kendini gösteriyor (s. 43).

Robert W. Cox ise bu eserde “Karşıdaki Yol: Dünya Düzeninin Yeni Bir Ontolojisine Doğru” (The Way Ahead: Toward A New Ontology of World Order) isimli bölümde Eleştirel Teori'yi ontolojik varsayımları kapsamında ele almaktadır. Fakat bunu yaparken daha önce ortaya koyduğu<sup>332</sup> Neo-Gramsciyeen perspektife bağlı kalmaktadır. Cox bu çalışmasında dünyanın 21. yy'da değişen sosyal yapısını üç aşamada değerlendirmektedir. İlk katmanda, dünya ekonomisine entegre olan insanlar yer almaktadır. İkinci katmanda ise daha alt seviyede dünya ekonomisine entegre olanlara hizmet verenler yer almaktadır. Üçüncü ve en alt katman küresel ekonomiden dışlananlar tarafından oluşturulmaktadır (s. 48). Cox ayrıca bu bölümde hem Neoliberal hem de Marxist yaklaşımları kapitalizmi monolitik küresel güç olarak gördüklerinden dolayı eleştirmektedir. Ayrıca sınıf kimliklerinin etnik, kültürel ve cinsel kimlikler tarafından değişime uğratıldığını savunarak Eleştirel Ekol içerisinde birçok yazar tarafından eleştirilen<sup>333</sup> pozitivist

<sup>331</sup> Bottemore Frankfurt Okulu'nun tarihine bu bağlamda yer vermektedir: Tom Bottomore, *Frankfurt Okulu*, çev. Ahmet Çiğdem (Ankara: Vadi, 1994), 17.

<sup>332</sup> Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, Power and Production, Volume 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

<sup>333</sup> Max Horkheimer, *Geleneksel ve Eleştirel Kuram*, çev. Mustafa Tüzel (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2005), 92; Max Horkheimer ve Theodor Adorno, *Aydınlanmanın Diyalektiği*, çev. Nihat Ülner ve Elif Öztarhan Karadoğan



özdeşleştirmeye yer vermektedir (ss. 53-58). Bununla birlikte, Cox'ın iddia ettiğinin aksine, Marx'ın üretimi günümüz iktisatçılarının yüklediği anlamla ortaya koymadığı, bilakis üretimi, “doğadan ayrı bir alan oluşturma süreci” olarak ele aldığını da vurgulamak gerekir.<sup>334</sup>

Craig N. Murphy de uluslararası ilişkilerde Eleştirel Teori'nin gelişimine “Eleştirel Teori ve Demokratik Dürtü: Bir Yüzyıllık Geleneği Anlamak” (Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Understanding A Century Old Tradition) isimli kitap bölümü içerisinde yer vermektedir. Murphy'nin bu geleneği yorumlarken yalnızca Cox tarafından<sup>335</sup> ortaya atılan Neo-Gramsciye bakış açısına ve Habermas'ın “açık diyalog veya müzakere” düşüncesinin farklı görüşlere sahip uluslararası akademisyenler tarafından da paylaşılması gerektiğine yer verdiği görülmektedir (ss. 70-74). Böylece Murphy, bir yandan Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin gelişiminde sol görüşlü akademisyenlerin çabalarına yer verirken, bu çabaları salt Neo-Gramsciye ve Habermasyen perspektifle sınırlandırmaktadır.

Kitabın ikinci bölümü Kimberly Hutchings, N. J. Rengger, Jeffrey Harrod ve Mark Neufeld tarafından yazılan “Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisinde Eleştiri” (Critique in Critical International Relations Theory) isimli bölüme ayrılmıştır.

Kimberly Hutchings, bu bölümde yer alan “Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisinde Eleştirinin Doğası” (The Nature of Critique in Critical International Relations Theory) isimli çalışmasında Eleştirel Teori'nin uluslararası ilişkilerde yer aldığı temel pozisyonları zayıf bir perspektiften tartışmaktadır. Zira Hutchings, Neo-Gramsciye ve Habermasyen uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmaları haricinde post-modernist ve feminist yaklaşımları Eleştirel Teori çerçevesinde ele almaktadır (s. 80). Bu durumda, büyük anlatıların karşısına başka bir büyük anlatı koyan post-modernist yaklaşımların nasıl eleştirel olabileceği sorusu akla gelmektedir.<sup>336</sup> Ayrıca Hutchings, “özgürleşme” kavramını zımnen negatif edim olarak ele almaktadır (s. 89). Nitekim bunun yanlış

(İstanbul: Kabalıcı, 2014), 30.

<sup>334</sup> TESAD Röportaj Birimi, “Doç. Dr. Ateş USLU ile Siyaset Teorisi, Siyasi Düşünceler Üzerine”, *TESAD*, 2019, <https://www.tesadernegi.org/doc-dr-ates-uslu-ile-siyaset-teorisi-siyasi-dusunceler-tarihi-uzerine.html> (30.03.2019).

<sup>335</sup> Cox'un ilgili eseri için; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, sy 2 (Haziran 1981): 126-55.

<sup>336</sup> Taylan Ayrılmaz, “Lukács: Marx'a Giden Yol”, *Ek Dergi*, 2018, <http://www.ekdergi.com/lukacs-marxa-giden-yol/>. (22.10.2018).



bir saptama olduğu görülmektedir. Zira özgürleşme, pozitif edimlerle ilişkilendirilebilecek bir kavramdır.

Bu bölümde “Negatif Diyalektik? Dünya Politikasında Eleştirel Teorinin İki Üslubu” (Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics) isimli çalışmasıyla N. J. Rengger, Eleştirel Teori’nin dünya politikasını başarılı bir şekilde değerlendirirken ve potansiyel olarak değiştirirken yerine getirmesi gereken koşulları, ilgili farklı yaklaşımları ele alarak tartışmaktadır. Rengger’a göre, eğer Eleştirel Teori dünyaya bir değişiklik getirmek istiyorsa, Linklater ve Habermas’ın yaptığı gibi adalet ve nihilizm tartışmalarında adaleti öncelikle ve nihilizmi görmezden gelmelidir. Nitekim değişim de araçsal rasyonalitenin amaçlara yönelik olarak kısmen benimsenmesiyle ortaya çıkabilir (ss. 95-105). Bu bağlamda Rengger, Negatif Diyalektik kavramının Eleştirel Teori’nin amaçladığı pratiğe dökülmüş değişimi getiremeyeceği kanaatinde. Fakat Bonefeld’in de vurguladığı gibi “Negatif Diyalektik” durum tespitine ilişkin bir kavramlaştırmadır. Buradan hareketle zaten proaktif bir öneri sunmaz.<sup>337</sup>

Bu bölümde yer alan bir diğer çalışmada ise “Küresel Realizm: Uluslararası Politik Ekonomide Gücün Maskesini Düşürmek” (Global Realism: Unmasking Power in International Political Economy) isimli kitap bölümüyle Jeffrey Harrod, realist varsayımları Eleştirel Teori içerisinde yer alan Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi’ye dönük yaklaşımlar üzerinden ele almaktadır. Harrod, uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe Ricardo gibi ekonomistlerin ortaya attığı soyut varsayımlardan etkilenen realist uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin, Morgenthau ve Schwarzenberger tarafından ortaya atılan fikirlerden ayrıştığı görüşündedir. Buna göre Morgenthau ve Schwarzenberger’in “toplumsal” (societal) realizmi, gücün kaynaklarına ve mekanizmalarına yer veren bir içerik sunmaktadır (s. 117). Ekonomik soyutlamalardan yola çıkan realist uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımları ise güce yeterince değer vermemektedir. Fakat Harrod bu tanımlamaları yaparken, Morgenthau ve Schwarzenberger’in epistemolojik yaklaşımlarına eğilmemektedir ve belli bir dönemde herhangi bir toplumsal gücün rasyonalite olarak algılanmasının tartışmasını

<sup>337</sup> Werner Bonefeld, “Negative Dialectics and the Critique of Economic Objectivity”, *History of the Human Sciences* 29, sy 2 (Nisan 2016): 71.



yalnızca Robert Cox'un çalışmalarına atıfla yapmakta ve geniş bir tartışma çerçevesinden kaçınmaktadır.

Aynı bölümde Mark Neufeld ise "Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisinde Eleştirel Olan Nedir?" (What is Critical About Critical International Relations Theory?) isimli kitap bölümüyle Uluslararası İlişkiler yazınında eleştirel yaklaşımı, benimseyen Alexander Wendt, Cynthia Weber ve Justin Rosenberg gibi yazarlar üzerinden incelemektedir. Neufeld'e göre Eleştirel Teori'yi değerli kılan husus normatif değerleri de içerisinde barındıran bir meta-teori olarak kullanılabilmesidir (s. 144). Ayrıca teori ve meta-teori arasındaki ilişkiyi irdelerken meselenin epistemolojik ve ontolojik taraflarını bu bölümde tartışmamaktadır.

Kitabın üçüncü bölümünde ise Sandra Whitworth, Kenneth Baynes ve Deiniol Lloyd Jones'un "Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisinin Uygulama ve Praksisi" (The Practice and Praxis of Critical International Relations Theory) isimli bölüme yer verilmektedir.

Sandra Whitworth, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Feminist Araştırmanın Uygulaması ve Praksisi" (The Practice, and Praxis, of Feminist Research in International Relations) isimli kitap bölümüyle feminist bir perspektiften "özdüşünümsel" (self-reflexive) yaklaşımın değerini tartışmaktadır. Smith'in vurguladığı gibi<sup>338</sup>, Whitworth da öznenin yapılan çalışmada nesneden ayrı tutulabileceği varsayımını reddetmektedir (s. 150). Bu özdüşünümsel yaklaşımın avantajlarını Kamboçya örneği üzerinden anlatan Whitworth, özdüşünümsel yaklaşımda eksik olanın eylem olduğu kanısındadır (s. 158). Fakat bu eleştiriye yaparken Feminist Teori'yi Eleştirel Teori içerisinde konumlandırması bir yana, Eleştirel Teori'nin praksise yönelik tartışmalarına yer vermemektedir ve bu bağlamda, eylemin nasıl gerçekleştirilebileceği sorusunu dar bir çerçevede okuyucuya bırakmaktadır. "Katılımcı Politika, Kamusal Alan ve Küresel Demokrasi" (Deliberative Politics, The Public Sphere and Global Democracy) isimli kitap bölümünde ise Kenneth Baynes, Habermas'ın radikal demokrasi yaklaşımının uluslararası seviyede uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını tartışmaktadır. Buna göre Habermas'ın devlete yönelik yaklaşımı uluslararası seviyede devlet egemenliğine yöneltilmelidir. Bu sayede, hem uluslararası alanda güçlü bir kamusal alan

<sup>338</sup> Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", içinde *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, ve Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11-44.





oluşturulabilir hem de uluslararası seviyede sorumluluk ilkesinin uygulanabilmesi söz konusu olabilir (ss. 164-169). Fakat bu yaklaşımdaki temel sorun meşruiyetin sağlanması ile ilgili olarak Baynes'in kabul ettiği bir biçimde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Diğer yandan bu yaklaşım üretim paradigmasını dikkate almamaktadır. Ayrıca Wendt'in belirttiği gibi bu tip Yeni Orta Çağ'cı yaklaşımlar yani hem devletlerin hem de supranasyonel kurumların bulunduğu bir dünya düzeni tarifi yaparken, Hegel'in Tanınma için Mücadale (Kampf um Anerkennung) kavramı daha kapsamlı bir bakış açısı geliştirilebilmesini sağlayabilir.<sup>339</sup>

Bu kesimde yer alan başka bir kitap bölümünde ise Deiniol Lloyd James "Kozmopolit Güç Yaratmak: İletişimsel Eylem Olarak Uluslararası Arabuluculuk" (Creating Cosmopolitan Power: International Mediation As Communicative Action) adlı çalışmasıyla Habermas'ın iletişimsel eylem ve söyleşimsel (dialogic) topluluk kurma konusundaki fikirlerinin uluslararası arabuluculuk faaliyetlerine uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını araştırmaktadır. Ama bunu yaparken Habermas'ın iç politikaya yönelik iletişimsel eyleme dair fikirlerini bağlamından kopararak arabuluculuk faaliyetlerini uluslararası seviyede incelemektedir. Nitekim etkili veya kozmopolit arabuluculuk faaliyetinde bulunabilecek olan da bölgesel güvenlik yapıları arasında bulunan devletler veya supranasyonel örgütlenmelerdir (s. 185). James bu çeşit bir arabuluculuk faaliyetinden bahsederken ise Baynes'in yaptığı gibi Eleştirel Teori içerisinde yer alan üretim paradigmasına yönelik tartışmalara değinmemekte ve Habermasyen iletişim odaklı bir yaklaşım sergilemektedir.

Kitabın son bölümü ise Chris Brown ve Alexander Wendt tarafından yazılan hem kitaptaki diğer bölümler üzerine genel bir değerlendirmeye hem de uluslararası ilişkilerde Eleştirel Teori'ye ilişkin son tartışmaya ayrılmıştır. Chris Brown "“Bizim Taraf”? Eleştirel Teori ve Uluslararası İlişkiler" ("Our Side"? Critical Theory and International Relations) kitap bölümünde Eleştirel Teori'nin Uluslararası İlişkiler çalışmalarına en büyük katkılarından birinin özne-nesne ayrımına yönelik itirazından kaynaklandığını belirterek, Eleştirel Teori kapsamında Frankfurt Ekolü'nün tarihçesini sunmaktadır. Ayrıca Eleştirel Ekol'ün Uluslararası İlişkiler çalışmalarına taşınmasında Neo-Gramsciye ve Habermasyen vurgulara hem bu kitap çerçevesinde hem de genel çalışma

<sup>339</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable", *European Journal of International Relations* 9, sy 4 (Aralık 2003): 491-542.



eğilimleri bağlamında dikkat çekmektedir (ss. 191-201). Brown'un Frankfurt Ekolü'nü değerlendirirken György Lukács gibi yazarların Ekol'ün oluşumundaki önemine değinmediği görülmektedir.

Bu bölümde yer alan başka bir çalışmada “Uluslararası İlişkiler Ne İçindir? Posteleştirel Görüşe Doğru Notlar” (What Is International Relations For? Notes Toward A Postcritical View) isimli kitap bölümüyle Alexander Wendt, eleştirel ve pozitivist yaklaşımların nasıl siyasaların oluşturabilmesiyle ilgili hem bir araştırma programı oluşturabileceklerini hem de eleştirel yaklaşımların hedefleri bağlamında özgürleşmenin nasıl sağlanabileceğini tartışmaktadır (s. 206). Wendt'in bu noktadaki önerisi, eleştirel yaklaşımların uzun vadeli özgürleşme hedefi ile pozitivist yaklaşımların kısa vadeli araçsal akılcılığının birleştirilerek bir araştırma programı oluşturulmasıdır (s. 208). Wendt bunu posteleştirel bir yaklaşım olarak anlatsa da, bilhassa Eleştirel Teori içerisinde yer alan Frankfurt Ekolü gibi ekollerin Aydınlanma'nın mirası tam olarak reddetmediğini dikkate almamaktadır. Ayrıca Eleştirel Ekol içerisinde yer alan birçok yazarın neden uzun vadeli süreçleri ele aldığına yönelik diyalektik materyalist yaklaşıma da yer vermemektedir. Bu noktada Wendt'in diğer bir hatası, esasen epistemolojik bir tartışmanın parçası olan pozitivist yaklaşımı, ontolojik ve metodolojik yanları da olan eleştirel yaklaşımlarla karşılaştırmasıdır.

### **Sonuç**

Richard Wyn Jones'un editörlüğünde hazırlanan “Critical Theory and World Politics” (Eleştirel Teori ve Dünya Politikası) isimli bu kitap Eleştirel Teori içerisindeki bazı tartışmaların Uluslararası İlişkilere yazınına taşınması için önemli bir çabayı içerisinde barındırmaktadır. Fakat kitabın hedeflerinden biri olan Eleştirel Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi'ni lisansüstü öğrencilere tanıtmaya amacına ulaştığı tartışmalıdır. Zira Richard Wyn Jones, N. J. Rengger ve Chris Brown tarafından yazılan kitap bölümleri haricinde Eleştirel Teori'nin zengin geleneğine yönelik tarihsel tartışmalara yer verilmemektedir. Kitapta bu yazarlar haricinde hazırlanan bölümlerde ise Eleştirel Teori, alışılmış Neo-Gramsciyan ve Habermasyen çerçevede, kısır tartışmalar dahilinde ele alınmaktadır ve yeni bir bakış açısı sunmamaktadır. Kitapta Eleştirel Teori'nin tarihine ağırlık verilen bölümlerde ise tarihi tartışmanın Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileriyle nasıl bağdaştırılabileceğine yönelik sarf edilen çok az çabaya rastlanılmaktadır.