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Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an interdisciplinary refereed journal focusing on the humanities and social sciences of the Balkan countries and the former Soviet republics. The journal welcomes contributions in the fields of history, economics, politics, international relations, culture, art, geography, literature, theology, ethnography and environmental sciences. The idea behind this initiative is to extend a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary approach over issues of regional importance. Under this light, the journal aspires to act as an academic forum for scholars in historical as well as contemporary context on a wide range of cross-regional issues and to provide the epistemological framework for a comparative investigation, which would enhance our understanding of the Balkan, and Black Sea societies, politics and communities. Furthermore, manuscripts connecting the region with wider scopes, such as technological applications, will be also considered.

The journal will be published online with two issues per year commencing in 2018 and themed issues are anticipated. Submitted manuscripts should be original and not published or under consideration for publication elsewhere. Their length should not exceed 8.000 words and will be subject to anonymous peer-review by at least two members of the scientific committee. The use of graphics and images in colour is encouraged and not subject to limitations (within reason). However, it is the responsibility of the individual authors to acquire copyright permission if needed. The language for submissions is English and Turkish. Articles, other than in English or Turkish, will be occasionally accepted. Articles must have an abstract of up to 150 words in English.

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You Need to Know About Global Politics

Elif Selin Çalık

MA Global Diplomacy at University of London, SOAS

Editorial



Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies as an Istanbul-based journal aims at strengthening academic exchange among social scientists from Turkey, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Eastern European countries.

The first number of the journal consists of six research articles in English and a book review in Turkish. The first article by *Tihomir Cipek* examines the relations between the European Union and Russia. The second article by *Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu* deals with population transfers, forced migration and negotiations for population transfers between the Ottoman Empire and Russia as well as in the Balkans. The third article by *Tsvetelina Tsvetkova* discusses the Turkish-Soviet Russian relations concerning the developments in the Caucasus in the aftermath of the First World War. The fourth article by *Boban Batrićević* deals with the Montenegrin discourse on Peter II Petrović in the Yugoslavia period. In the fifth article of this issue *Admir Mulaosmanović* examines the discourse and political developments in Bosnia in the period of dissolution of Yugoslavia. The sixth and last article of this issue by *Andelko Vlašić* deals with the image of Turkey in the Croatia press between 1923 and 1945. As the last part of this issue, the book by Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath*, is reviewed by *Cengiz Yolcu*; and the book by Tim Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics*, is reviewed by *Elif Selin Çalık*.

The managing editors, particularly Hakan Demir, contributed very much to the preparation of this issue. I would like to thank him and all colleagues who contributed to the publication of this issue. Last but not least, I would like to thank the authors and referees for their cooperation and patience.

Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Prof.

Editor in Chief

Russia and the European Union: What Remains of the Partnership?

Tihomir Cipek*

Abstract:

This text will analyse the determinants of the foreign policies of Russia and the European Union (EU) in order to present their mutual relations.¹ It is centred on an attempt to give an overview of the relations between Russia and the EU following the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The text will first identify the basic theoretical starting points for interpretations of international politics and the essential determinants of Russia's and the EU's foreign policies. The second part of the text will discuss the legal basis for the relationship between Russia and the EU that is regulated by the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and compare the energy politics of both sides. Finally, I will try to make a projection of the most important characteristics of future relations between Russia and the EU.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Russia, Vladimir Putin, European Union, Partnership in International Politics, State Interests.

Constructivist Theory of International Relations

The analysis of the relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) is based on the premise that Russian foreign policy is really determined by the process of shaping the Russian national identity. In the centre of this process lies Russia's attitude toward the West, represented in the analysed case by the European Union. On the other side, this is about a process of shaping the foreign policy

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¹ Part of this text was published in the book by Davor Boban and Tihomir Cipek, *Političku sustav Rusije*, (Sarajevo: University Press, Zagreb: Plejada, 2017).

identity of the EU. In my opinion, the traditional explanations offered by the realist and liberal approach to foreign policy provide just partial insight into its features. Realists think that the key to interpreting foreign policy is power. And the amount of power is measured by the military and economic strength of a country. The liberal approach to international politics claims that the world-wide prevalence of liberal democracy will bring forth the age of permanent peace and prosperity. Unlike the realist and liberal approach, the constructivist theory of international relations points out that national interests are shaped within a social and cultural system of a country. The starting point is that national interest of a country, and its actions in international politics arise out of its self-awareness. It seems inevitable that rich and military-dominant countries have a different perception of the world than others. In other words, the starting premise is that a country's foreign policy is determined by the way in which its political elites and people see themselves, but also the way they see Others. Are these Others perceived as a threat or not? Can we cooperate with them or not? These are the questions that are central to Russia's relationship with the EU. The answers that have been given vary; at different times, Russia answered these questions in different ways, ranging between the two extremes of total openness or total closure towards the West. And while Russia was seeking foreign-policy answers, the European Union was looking for a joint foreign policy. Problem for the EU lay in the fact that foreign policy, just like democracy, was historically and institutionally designed for nation states. That is why the main characteristic of EU's foreign policy is that – despite efforts to make it as coordinated and unitary as possible – it really remains in the domain of nation states. This is clearly demonstrated by voting practices in the UN, in which EU members vote differently from each other.

Russian Foreign Policy

Immediately after the fall of the USSR, in the first years of Yeltsin's government, Russian foreign policy was extremely pro-western. The ruling elite felt that Russia, pressed by the Bolshevik dictatorship, forgot its true, western identity. It was emphasised that western democracies, led by the US and the EU, were actually natural Russian allies. Those pro-western Russians hoped that the West, once it realised that Russia was actually its integral part, would foster its economic development by large foreign investments. But the West never came up with a new Marshall Plan for Russia, so a more

significant economic help never came. While it is true that western companies bought some Russian ones during the process of privatisation, this did not have any apparent positive results for the Russian economy.

On the contrary, an abrupt introduction of market economy through so called "shock therapy" wrecked Russia's economy. Between 1985 and 1992, Russia's gross domestic product plummeted by an unbelievable 60%.² "Shock therapy" undoubtedly justified its name. Such circumstances called for a reappraisal of the Russian national and state identity. The idea that Russia was only weakened by its pro-western orientation was gaining traction in large parts of the public.³ Due to the bad economic situation, Yeltsin's government was dependent on western payments connected with the privatisation of Russian state companies. Yeltsin tried to solve the economic crises by forming better connections with the European Union, with which he negotiated the formation of a free-trade zone. It should be said that free-trade zones generally anticipate greater economic, but also political integrations. It seems that those negotiations fell through precisely because of this fact. Simply put, the EU did not know what to do with Russia, but Russia also could not see what part it would play in the European Union. Nobody was ready for further economic and political integration.

New opportunities for cooperation arose when Vladimir Putin took over power in Russia. In the beginning, his foreign policy was decidedly focused on establishing good relations with the European Union and the United States. Therefore, the first period of Putin's foreign policy was substantially determined by attempts at forging bonds with the EU and the US. After being met with rejection, Putin turned towards building up Russia's might and leading an independent foreign policy. Such politics was his attempt to follow his own vision of Russian national interests without compromise. Russia was trying to re-establish itself as an important actor in international politics.⁴ This is reflected in two key foreign policy events: Crimean crisis and the war in Syria. Russia's actions in these events are the result of key principles of its foreign policy that were established and systemised by Putin and Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov. The main aim of Russian foreign policy is a division of power on a global level.

² Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham et al.: Roman & Littlefield, 2013), 54.

³ Idem, 61-62.

⁴ Davor Boban, "Povratak Rusije na svjetsku pozornicu," *Političke analize*, no. 7 (2011): 14-19.

Kremlin thinks that this should be achieved by organising some kind of second Yalta in order to establish new rules of behaviour in Europe and clearly divide zones of interest. The principle of dividing interest zones should also be implemented on the global level. The contemporary concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation was approved by Vladimir Putin on the 12th February 2013. The new foreign policy of the Russian Federation – we called it neorealism because it aims to view itself in a new way and adapt to the real distribution of power on the global stage – starts from several key principles:

- a) economic, which is based on the idea that Russia's actions on the international plane are meant to establish favourable conditions for the development of its economy, with the aim of improving the standard of living of its people on the domestic plane;
- b) security, which consists of Russia - a permanent member of the UN Security Council - standing up for general peace and security on Earth, with the aim of achieving the principle of multilateral division of power in global politics;
- c) political, which is based on the premise that it is in Russia's interest to decisively and consistently advocate for fundamental UN principle of state sovereignty, or rather the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states;
- d) the principle of unavoidable changes in international politics, to which Russian foreign policy must adapt, but which it also has to control and guide towards their national interest;
- e) the principle of respecting egalitarian dialogue between nations, which Russia believes can lead to a decrease of existing international conflicts and tensions.

To put it succinctly, it can be asserted that the goal of Russian foreign diplomacy is to support those global processes that would enable the formation of a stable, polycentric system of international relations. Russia thinks that the role of one of the main decision-making centres in this new system should be theirs. In this way, Moscow could counteract Washington's attempts to build a unipolar world dominated by the United States. Russian foreign politics believes that it is possible to build a polycentric world by using the method of network diplomacy. This method implies the creation of flexible alliances of sovereign states, based on the principle that one country can be a member of multiple associations. Moscow's public announcements therefore stress that the economic association of

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, known by the acronym BRICS, is a good example of successful network diplomacy and the formation of a new type of association of states.

It is also very likely that Russia will take advantage of the unstable situation in the Ukraine and the separatist movements in Luhansk and Donetsk to prevent the Ukraine from joining NATO. This could be Russia's first geopolitical victory since the end of the Cold War. The second victory is Russia's annexation of the Crimea, which now seems like a permanent, inalterable fact. The third is Russian success in Syria, where its military intervention prevented Islamic terrorist from taking power. This earned Russian foreign policy a great reputation among a big part of international community.⁵

EU Foreign Policy

The idea of the need to form a common foreign and security policy of the European Union was stated in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.⁶ This treaty also mentions basic guidelines for European foreign policy. In line with the process of greater EU integration, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, article 24, prescribes the rules for forming EU's common foreign and security policy.⁷ It is emphasised that EU's foreign policy is defined by unanimous decisions of the European Council and the Council of Europe, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. It is basically determined that EU's common foreign policy is defined by the governments, or rather the executive power of member states. In order to effectively pursue foreign policy, the EU established a new function within the European Commission (its de facto government), and that is the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. According to article 27 of the EU Treaty, the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and represents the EU in its diplomatic contacts with third parties. It has been proven that the Commission plays the main role in EU's foreign policy. The EU Treaty stipulates that policy is

⁵ This was indirectly acknowledged by the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when, in early March 2011, she said that Amerika was losing the "information war", which actually means propaganda war. (<https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/1384-clinton-on-propaganda-budget-us-losing-information-war>)

⁶ http://www.mvep.hr/custompages/static/hrv/files/EUugovori/11992M_Ugovor_o_EU-u_hrv.pdf

⁷ http://www.mvep.hr/custompages/static/hrv/files/EUugovori/12007L_Ugovor_iz_Lisabona_hrv.pdf

based on mutual political solidarity between Member States and the ever-increasing degree of their convergence, and that member states should refrain from any action that is contrary to the interests of the Union.

EU's foreign policy, its extent and content, directly depends not just on the policies of nation states and their mutual relations, but also on the political constellation, i.e. balance of power between the main European ideological-political groups. It is also certain that conservatives (People's Parties and Christian Democrats), social democrats and liberals often give different answers to the same questions. These differences are even more pronounced within party groups of the radical left and right represented in the European Parliament. They most often surface with the question of immigrants in the Union, and especially when connected with the question of EU's global ambitions. The key to answering these questions, especially the second one, lies not only in the relationship between the EU and Russia, but primarily in EU's relation with the United States. Namely, it is evident that the European Union will not be able to become a big global player if it does not emancipate itself from the US. The United States initially supported the formation of the European Economic Community (today EU), because it considered it as some sort of NATO's economic wing. Today, the EU is a real giant in the economic sense, and it is gradually trying to translate that economic power into a political one. EU elites are no longer satisfied with the Union being a political dwarf because it is evident that EU's economic power cannot be sustained unless it is backed by political might. This was clearly demonstrated by the crisis of the euro, EU core currency. That is why EU leadership decided to try and conduct independent foreign and security policies. It seems that we are entering a period of mutual rivalry and tensions in the relation between the EU and the US. This is becoming more noticeable with different attitudes concerning US sanctions against Russia and Iran, as well as in the American policy regarding the issue of Jerusalem.⁸ It also seems that differences are gradually emerging with regards to politics towards Syria, as well as the civil war and Saudi Arabia's aggression in Yemen. All these issues clearly demonstrate not just the difference in interests of the EU and the USA, but also of individual EU member states.

⁸ US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem, and thus demonstrate that it recognises Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, was met with condemnation from the majority of UN members. None of EU member states supported this decision, while Poland, Romania, Czech Republic and Croatia abstained. Latvia was not present for the vote. <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/rezucija-o-jerusalemu-kako-su-glasale-sve-drzave>

When it comes to foreign policy, there is a division between smaller powers, which are mostly oriented towards verbal actions and try to oppose the unilateral activities of big European states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and, until recently, Great Britain), which are more prone to unilateral steps and even – as the French and Italian aviation in Libya showed – military actions. As was already mentioned, EU politics is formed on two levels: the level of member states and European party groups. Political parties from the same country often don't represent the attitudes of the country they come from, but are guided by party ideologies, or rather the ideologies of their European party groups. This is undoubtedly another challenge standing in the way of the formation of EU's foreign and security policy, but it is also certain that EU elites have decided to accept it. This is demonstrated by the latest initiative from the European Commission which emphasises the need to establish a common security policy of the European Union.⁹ The need to form a common European foreign, security and financial policy was also emphasised by Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, in his 2017 State of the Union speech.¹⁰ It is perfectly clear that the European Union is facing a process in which it will try to become more integrated by forming a common foreign and security policy.

The Basis for Cooperation Between Russia and the EU

Relations between Russia and EU countries are determined by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This Agreement came into force in 1997,¹¹ and it pertains to other countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well, with the exception of Belarus and Tajikistan. After some Eastern European countries became part of the EU, the Agreement became primarily focused on Russia and the Ukraine.¹² Its aim was to establish space for political dialogue, provide support for a transition country in the consolidation of democracy and economy, monitor its transformation towards a market economy and foster trade and investments.

⁹ <https://publications.europa.eu/hr/publication-detail/-/publication/ef9668ab-5173-11e7-a5ca01aa75ed71a1/language-hr/format-PDF/source-31338248>

¹⁰ <https://publications.europa.eu/hr/publication-detail/-/publication/9c03bbc3-982d-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1/language-hr/format-PDF/source-43605408>

¹¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=201>

¹² The Agreement expired in 2007, since when it is automatically renewed every 12 months until it is terminated by one of the parties.

Of course, the effectiveness of the Agreement depends on the real-world politics, which shows that the relation between Russia and the European Union is determined by three facts. The first one is that, unlike Russia, which is a nation state, EU is a union of countries; the second being that a number of EU member states is dependent on Russian energy imports; and the third, that almost all EU member states are also members of NATO. The analysis should therefore be based on the understanding that the relations between Russia and the EU are primarily determined by the energy and security policies of both sides.

The deepening and widening of the cooperation between Russia and the European Union was the aim of the agreement signed in Moscow in May 2005, when it was agreed that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will serve as the basis for widening the cooperation to four areas: a) economy and the environment, b) freedom, security and justice, c) foreign security, and d) scientific research, education and culture. The related negotiations began in 2008, and were shortly interrupted because of the war in Georgia, but an agreement was eventually reached. Further cooperation was agreed upon in Rostov; this was the "Partnership for Modernisation" that was supposed to cover all economic and technical areas of modernisation. Just before Europe introduced sanctions against Russia - due to the annexation of Crimea and the support for pro-Russian separatists - the cooperation included efforts to establish a rule of law, strengthen the civil society, and contribute to economic and technical modernisation of Russia. Today, the agreement is practically frozen. However, economic cooperation continues because it is important to both partners.

Trouble between Russia and the EU began in 2008 when, at Poland's initiative, Latvia and Sweden initiated a programme called the Eastern Partnership. This was a program aimed at the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moscow saw it as an attempt by the EU to get those countries to join the NATO. Russian government accused the EU of ignoring suggestions for a new Russia-EU agreement, and of turning a blind eye to right-wing extremism and an incorrect attitude to ethnic Russians in the Ukraine. Certainly the biggest obstacle to the advancement of Russia and EU's cooperation is the situation in the Ukraine. Namely, the US and Russia have a diametrically opposite views of the Ukraine. While the US claims that the events in Ukraine constitute a process of democratisation and spread of liberty, Putin is convinced that the

toppling of a legally-elected, pro-Russian Ukrainian government was orchestrated by the US intelligence agencies. He claims that it is simply a continuation of US politics of encircling Russia through its economic and political isolation and the expansion of NATO. The positions of the two sides are therefore irreconcilable. The situation also reflected on Russia's relationship with the EU. After Russia intervened in the Ukraine and annexed Crimea, European Union responded with sanctions against it.

Economic Policy During Sanctions

Because of their foreign-policy and geopolitical significance, no deals connected with energy sources are simply a matter of free trade, but have a great political importance. This is something that governments of world countries are fully aware of,¹³ which is why 85% of oil and gas companies in the world are state-owned. In Russia, the percentage of state's ownership of the energy industry in Yeltsin's time was just around 10%. Only 14% of Russian oil production was controlled by the state; a year later, the state already had control over 35% of production. In 2005, Putin increased the share of state ownership of energy sources to 50%. At the same time, foreign companies were being pushed from the Russian market. It is clear that energy policy is one of the most important government policies, inextricably connected with foreign and security policies. That is why EU's economic sanctions against Russia also have a political dimension. The sanctions were introduced in March 2014, and were prompted by Russia's annexation of Crimea. The sanctions consist of several bans: The European Investment Bank was forbidden from investing in Russia, and Russian companies and banks from accessing EU's financial markets.

Furthermore, European companies could no longer sell arms and technical products with potential military use to Russia. EU also froze the assets of Russian business people who, according to the EU, supported Russian annexation of Crimea, and European companies were forbidden from doing business with Crimea.¹⁴

¹³ An illuminating exception is the Croatian government and the sale of Croatian state oil company INA to the Hungarian state company MOL. This was wrongly presented to the Croatian public as privatisation, and not what it really was, which is a sale of one state company to the company of another country.


¹⁴ Although Russia was hit by the sanctions, they did not have major effects on Russian economy. In 2015, unemployment was a little above 5%, and pensions and salaries are paid regularly.

In spite of sanctions, the economic interdependence of the EU and Russia is still significant. In 2014, the economic exchange with the EU made up 49.6% of total Russian trade. Russia meets as much as one third of European needs for crude oil and natural gas, and almost a fourth of European needs for coal and oil derivatives.¹⁵ Sanctions notwithstanding, the percentage of Russian gas in the total consumption of European state was still very high in 2016.

Map of the Percentage of Russian Gas in Total Consumption by EU Member States.

EU imports of Russian gas

Russia is Europe's biggest gas supplier, providing about a third of continental demand. Russia exports 300-450 million cubic metres per day to the EU, of which 40% is exported through Ukraine.



Sources: Gas Infrastructure Europe; Reuters; Industry data

W. Foo, 10/06/2014

REUTERS

Source: (<http://geoawesomeness.com/top-30-maps-charts-explain-european-union/eu-imports-of-russian-gas>, date of access 14th September 2018)

¹⁵ Boban and Cipek, *Politički sustav Rusije*, 335.

It should also be emphasised that the European Union had other reasons not to completely break off its economic cooperation with Russia. In 2014, Russia was EU's third largest trade partner. The value of their trade was 285 billion euros, and European companies are Russian economy's largest investor. After the EU changed its energy security policy, trying to decrease its dependence on Russian gas, Russia sought to replace the diminished demand from Europe by selling its gas to China.¹⁶ However, Russian energy income is still significantly dependent on the European Union. That is why Russia is still planning to build a pipeline in Europe, in spite of its plans for a pipeline called the South Stream falling through. In an effort to bypass the transport of energy sources through the Ukraine, Russia envisioned a pipeline through Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary to Austria and Italy. Due to pressure from the US, Serbia and Bulgaria began to reconsider their involvement, while the final blow was dealt by the European Commission. It stated that the South Stream might be contrary to the European law. Russia tried to make up for the failure of the South Stream by building the TurkStream. This plan became feasible after Erdoğan and Putin's reconciliation.

Furthermore, Russian companies tried to make up for the loss of the European market with the export of energy sources to China. Of course, the question is how much Chinese economy, and its need for energy sources, will grow. That is why, for the foreseeable future, the main role in Russian energy policy, as well as its relations to the European Union, will be played by pipelines in Europe. Of these, the most important is the construction of the second line of the Nord Stream, which transports Russian gas along the bottom of the North Sea directly to Germany.

¹⁶ Agreements have been reached for the construction of the Power of Siberia and the Altai pipelines. The Power of Siberia should become functional in 2018, while Altai still does not have an exact construction deadline. The capacity of the Power of Siberia should be 38 billion cubic meters per year, while the projected annual capacity for Altai is 30 billion of cubic meters (Gabuev, 2016: 10). For comparison, EU's consumption for 2013 was 430 billion cubic meters. That same year, China spent 162 billion of cubic meters (Gabuev, 2016).

Russian Pipelines in Europe



Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_in_the_European_energy_sector#/media/File:Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png (date of access 7th February 2018).

It is obvious that energy policies of the European Union and Russia are deeply interdependent, which is why they are forced to dealing with each other for the foreseeable time. A precondition for building a better relation is for Russia to provide even clearer evidence that it is not leading an aggressive politics, especially regarding the Baltic states and Poland, and for the EU to shape its integrated foreign and security policy and emancipate itself from the US. Namely, the interests of the US and the EU are compatible in

many ways, but they are not the same. This is proven even by the outcome of economic sanctions against Russia.¹⁷

What follows is a new rethinking of relations within the triangle of EU-USA-Russia, whose outcomes will clearly be affected by China as well. It seems that a unipolar world is simply not possible, and that the international politics will be determined by multipolar relations. One of the most important one will be the relationship between the European Union and Russia.

A New Partnership?

When thinking about new relations between Russia and the European Union, one should start from the fact that neither the Russian people nor their elites are anti-western oriented. Democracy and free market became magic words in Russia as well. Unlike the theses that push for continuing the policy of isolating and encircling Russia, European public expresses attitudes that advocate for a stronger policy of “cooperative security” with Russia. Therefore it seems that the policy of sanctions against Russia cannot be a strategy, but only a tactic of the EU.

The problem of Crimea remains a dark shadow over the relationship between Russia and the European Union. Namely, it is obvious that the Russian people think of Crimea as a part of Russia, and that no future political elite will return it to the Ukraine any time soon. The attitude of the Russian people can be clearly seen from the following tables:

Russian citizens answer the question whether they support the annexation of Crimea.

	For annexation	It's difficult to say	Against
March 2015	72%	14%	14%
March 2014	79%	13%	9%

Source: Survey conducted by the Levada-Center from the 13th - 16th May 2015, N= 1600. Published on the 24th May 2015. <http://www.levada.ru/print/23-03-2015/krym-i-rasshirenie-rossiiskikh-granits>)

¹⁷ In 2014, in the midst of sanctions, trade between Russia and the US increased by 6%, while at the same time, trade between Russia and the EU fell by 32% in the first two months of 2015 (<http://www.vecernji.hr/svijet/sad-trguje-eu-i-dalje-dosljedan-u-hladnom-ratu-s-moskvom-1008288>, date of access 12th September 2016).

When are asked whether they consider Russian decision to annex Crimea final and irreversible, most Russian citizens answer affirmatively.

Decision is final and irreversible	It is difficult to say	Russian decision can be changed under certain circumstances
85%	11%	4%

Source: Survey of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center WZIOM, conducted from 21st - 22nd February 2015, N= 1600.

Published on the 22nd March 2015

(<http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=115184>)

It is obvious that most Russians did not agree with Khrushchev's arbitrary 1954 decision to transfer the Crimean Peninsula to the Ukraine, which was then a Soviet Republic and part of the USSR. Thus Crimea remained an integral part of the Russian Federation. It is obvious that – if the goal is to improve the relations between EU and Russia – EU will have to act like the issue of Crimea does not exist, or use some diplomatic manoeuvre to simple „freeze“ it.

The key to improving relations is to challenge the premise that Russia is leading an imperialist politics. Within the Union, the fear of Russia is especially pronounced in Poland and the Baltic states. Even though it seems to be based on historical experiences, it is also obvious that it has a political dynamics. The USA wants to use this dynamics to implement the Three Seas Initiative (Baltic, Adriatic and the Black Sea). This is a plan that has the strongest backing of Poland and Croatia (especially its president, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović). The plan, which starts from the goals of US politics, advocates for the creation of some sort of a defence corridor towards Russia. Its chances of being realised are not very high. It is not just that it turns the nations at the Union's edge back into border patrols, but that some states from the Visegrád Group, which were supposed to be its pillars, are sceptical towards the Three Seas Initiative. These are primarily Czech Republic and Hungary, while Slovakia is wisely keeping its mouth shut. Scepticism is also expressed by some core EU countries: Germany, France and Italy. This clearly demonstrates the fact that they see their interests in cooperating with Russia, not fighting with it. They probably feel that the story of Russian imperialism is not totally credible, and not just because of Putin's claim that he was not

considering a return to imperial politics, as is pointed out by Sakwa.¹⁸ In politics, obviously, everyone's word is suspect. Scepticism towards the idea of mighty Russian imperialism is based on insights into the structures of Russian society, economy and politics. It seems that the core of the EU realised that Russia does not have the strength to re-establish itself as an empire. Russia is facing a demographic crisis; its population is in constant decline, and neither its military nor the economy are strong enough.¹⁹ The imperialism thesis often stems from insufficiently precise usage of concepts. Namely, those analyses do not differentiate between nation building and the establishment of an empire. Unlike an empire, which strives towards constant territorial expansion, a state has clear borders and population structure. According to this criterion, Russia is a national state. Like any other nation state – led by capable elites – Russia is trying to increase its power. It is doing it primarily through peaceful means: economic investments and energy policy. The Kremlin knows that conflicts with the West exhaust Russia. Russia's desire for power is therefore not inspired by the classic imperial idea of territorial expansion, but by the shaping of a distinct Russian identity in foreign policy – identity and interest, which they think is something that the international community should accept.

This is the context that should also be applied to the goals of Russian foreign policy towards the European Union. Here one should note that Southeast Europe is less important to the Russian politics, and that the key to the relationship between the EU and Russia is the position of the Federal Republic of Germany. This is a country that has interest in maintaining its cooperation with Russia but is, at the same time, an important European ally of the United States. Russia is unavoidable for Germany's supply of energy sources, while the US are (after France) the biggest importer of German products.

Hence, the future of European-Russian relations leads through Germany's attempt to square the circle. The solution could be found in the integration of European foreign and security policy. The pathway toward this integration has already been established by the

¹⁸ Richard Sakwa, *Putin. Russia's Choice* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) 173.

¹⁹ Russian population is around 146 million, versus 506 million of EU citizens. Russia's GDP per capita is 7,742 \$, while in the EU it amounts to 37,262 \$ per capita. Russia's military expenses for 2015 totalled 66,421 billion US dollars, France's 50,860 billion, and Germany 39,393 billion. It is clear that, even without taking into account other EU countries, military investments of France and Germany alone top that of Russia. Calculation done according to information from SIPRI, stated in: Boban and Cipek, *Op. cit.*, p. 308. Of course, this is not the only possible criteria – there is always a question of efficient gathering of EU forces – but the data undoubtedly show its predominance.

development of new EU programmes for a common foreign and security policy.²⁰ Since EU's foreign policy is based on the desire to cooperate with other countries, it should be concluded that, despite the crisis, the room for cooperation between Russia and the European Union, especially in energy policy, still exists.

²⁰<https://publications.europa.eu/hr/publication-detail/-/publication/ef9668ab-5173-11e7-a5ca-01aa75ed71a1/language-hr/format-PDF/source-31338248>

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Negotiations and Agreements for Population Transfers in the Balkans from the Beginning of the 19th Century until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

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Abstract:

The history of population transfers on the basis of decisions by ruling authorities dates back to ancient times. In modern times, however, the establishment of nation-states played a decisive role in forcible population transfers in the Balkans. Balkan historiographies tend to date back bilaterally agreed population transfers and population exchanges to the Balkan Wars in 1912/13. However, the process of establishing autonomous and independent states in the Ottoman Balkans saw multiple cases of forcible population transfer based on agreements and treaties. Some of them are well-known cases, for example, the forcible emigration of Muslims from the newly independent Greek state in 1830, the forcible emigration of Muslims from Serbian principality in 1862 and several cases of negotiations on the emigration of Muslims from different regions, such as Crete or newly established Bulgaria. This paper deals with these processes in the Balkans beginning already as early as in the 19th century.

Keywords: population transfer in the Balkans, population exchange, Greek Independence, Russo-Ottoman treaties, Muslim Minorities, ethnic cleansing, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Greece, Serbia

Introduction

At the end of the eighteenth century, a new era of population transfers began in the Balkans.¹ Almost all the Ottoman-Russian wars

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caused mass migrations in occupied territories, and the creation of the Balkan states in the nineteenth century was accompanied by migrations and population transfers also, for different reasons. But many historians view the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 as the starting point for population transfers imposed by government decisions or bilateral agreements, that is, for the forcible expulsion of population groups on the basis of nation-state policies. Sundhaussen, for example, treats forced ethnic migrations as a development of the twentieth century.² Similarly, most historians of the Balkans do not take into consideration the forced migrations and other forms of population transfers prior to the Balkan Wars. The field of Ottoman studies provides more information about the resettlements, but such events have a peripheral place within these studies.

This essay seeks to modify the present-day opinion that population transfers resulting from negotiations and ethnic purification policies began during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. I offer an overview of the population transfer processes by analyzing political decisions and agreements made during the long nineteenth century, before the Balkan Wars. I do not attempt to describe the migrations themselves,³ but rather the diplomatic negotiations and

¹ For earlier population transfer policies in the Balkans see Peter Charanis, "The Transfer of Population as a Policy in the Byzantine Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3, no. 2 (1961): 140-154; for the Ottoman policy of *sürgün* see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler" [Exile as a Method of Settlement and Colonization in the Ottoman Empire], *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 11 (1949): 524-569 and 13, no. 1-4 (1952): 56-78; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Functioning of a Plural Society*, vol. 1, *The Central Lands*, (New York, London: Holmes & Maier Publishers, 1982), 11-12.

² Holm Sundhaussen, "Forced Ethnic Migration," *Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO)*, Mainz European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-on-the-road/forced-ethnic-migration/holm-sundhaussen-forced-ethnic-migration>

³ On the migration of Muslims from the Balkans and other migration processes to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey see Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1996); Nedim İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri* [Emigration of Turks from the Balkans to Anatolia] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994); idem, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler* [Migrations from Empire to Republic] (Trabzon: Serander, 2006); Ahmet Halaçoğlu, *Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri, 1912-1913* [Turkish Migrations from the Balkans during the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995); Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler* [Ethnic Formation and Migrations from the Ottomans to the Present], translated by Bahar Tırnakçı (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010); Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, *Dış Politika ve Göç. Yugoslavya'dan Türkiye'ye Göçlerde Arnavutlar, 1920-1990* [Foreign Policy and Migration.

political decisions that led to them. Further, I try to classify the processes as the traditional imperial population policy or as a modern nation-state policy of homogenization. Finally, I discuss whether these processes served as examples for population transfers during the Balkan Wars and afterwards.

1. Russo-Ottoman wars and population transfers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

Most of the Russo-Ottoman conflicts during the second half of the eighteenth century ended with a loss of Ottoman territory on the northern coasts of the Black Sea, in the Balkans, and in the Caucasus. These areas were in large part inhabited by Muslims of various ethnic origins. The Russian expansion into the Ottoman lands usually caused mass migrations of Muslims from these areas. Almost all the peace treaties that concluded these wars included an article concerning population transfers by both sides, as described below:

Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, 1774

During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768–1774, Russian troops occupied the northern Black Sea region, including the Danubian Principalities. But under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed in 1774, only a small part of the occupied territories remained in Russian hands. Bessarabia, the fortresses of Bucak, Kili, Akkerman, and İsmail, the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Mediterranean islands occupied by the Russians were given back to the Ottomans.

Albanians in the Migrations from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1919–1990] (İstanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2011); Bayram Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler. Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar* [Hungarian and Polish Refugees. Refugees in the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2006); Fahriye Emgili, *Yeniden Kurulan Hayatlar. Boşnakların Türkiye'ye Göçleri, 1878–1934* [Re-established Lives. Migration of Bosniaks to Turkey, 1878–1934] (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2012); Süleyman Erkan, *Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçler, 1878–1908* [Crimean and Caucasian Migrations, 1878–1908] (Trabzon: KATÜ Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Ülkeleri Araştırma Merkezi, 1996; Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkasya Göçleri, 1856–1876* [Crimean and Caucasian Migrations, 1856–1876] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997); Yıldırım Ağanoglu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanların Makus Talihi: Göç* [III Fate of the Balkans from Empire to Republic: Migration], 7th ed. (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2012); Neriman Ersoy-Hacısalihoglu and Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, eds., *89 Göçü. Bulgaristan'da 1984–89 Azınlık Politikaları ve Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç* [Forced Migration of 1989. Minority Policy in Bulgaria between 1984 and 1989 and Forced Migration to Turkey] (İstanbul: BALKAR and BALMED, 2012); Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, *Doğu Rumeli'de Kayıp Köyler. İslimye Sancağı'nda 1878'den Günümüze Göçler, İsim Değişiklikleri ve Harabeler* [Lost Villages in Eastern Rumelia. Migrations, Name Changes and Ruins in the Province of İslimye/Sliven from 1878 to the Present] (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2008).

The treaty accorded to the population in these regions the right to sell or take their possessions with them and to migrate elsewhere. According to Point 5 of Article 16, families wishing to emigrate were allowed to do so within the term of one year.⁴ Article 17 of the treaty awarded to the Ottoman Empire all the Mediterranean islands that had been occupied by Russia during the war. Under Point 4 of Article 17, the Sublime Porte would allow those persons who wanted to leave their homes to settle elsewhere.⁵

These provisions concerned the Orthodox Christian population primarily. The imperial Russian policy was directed toward the establishment and consolidation of the Russian rule in the newly gained territories, and for that reason, the Russian government began to invite the Ottoman Orthodox population to emigrate from the Ottoman Empire to Russia. At the same time, the Muslim community of the occupied regions began to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. The Orthodox emigrants from the Ottoman Empire were to be settled in the places left by Muslims. In this way, the Russian government sought to strengthen the new Russian borders against the Ottoman

⁴ "D'accorder aux familles qui voudront abandonner leur patrie et se transporter dans d'autres pays, la faculté de le faire librement et d'emporter leurs biens avec elles; et pour que ces familles puissent avoir le temps nécessaire pour arranger leurs affaires, il leur sera accordé le terme d'un an pour émigrer librement de leur pays, lequel terme devra se compter du jour de l'échange du présent Traité" (Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. 1 [Paris: F. Pichon, 1897], 327); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* [Ottoman History], vol. 4, part 1, 5th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 424. For the Turkish text of Article 16: "Cümle Bucak memleketi Akkerman, ve Kili ve İsmail kaleleriyle sair kasabat ve kurâ derunlarında mevcut bulunan amme-i eşyalarile Rusya Devleti tarafından der-i aliyeme red olunub ve Bender kalesini dahi Devlet-i Aliye'ne red ider ve kezalik Eflâk ve Buğdan memleketlerini cümle kulâ ve şehirler ve kasabat ve kuraları derunlarında mevcut bulunan cümle eşyalarile kezalik Devlet-i Aliye'ne red ider. Devlet-i Aliye'm dahi atilbeyan şerait ile memalik-i merkumeyi kabul idüb işbu şeraiti tamamen ve kâmilin zabt ve hüraset eylesini va'd-i mamulünbih ile teahhüd eyleye [...] (Hamisen) Terk-i vatan idub ahar mahallere varmak gagbetinde olan hanedanlar eşyalarile nakl itmeye serbestiyet üzere me'zun olalar ve işbu hanedanlar kendu mesalihinin tanzimi için vakt-i kâfleri olmak için serbestiyet üzere vatanlarından nakl itmelerine bir sene müddeti imhal olunub işbu müddet mühlet-i ahidname-i mübarekenin mübadelesi tarihinden mâdud ve mehsul oluna" (Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri* [Texts of International Law and Political History], vol. 1, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları* [Treaties of the Ottoman Empire] [Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953], 127-128).

⁵ "A l'égard des familles qui désireront s'expatrier et se transporter ailleurs, il leur sera permis de s'en aller avec tous leurs biens; et afin qu'elles aient le temps d'arranger leurs affaires, il leur sera donné pour cela le terme d'une année, à compter du jour de l'échange du présent Traité" (Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux*, vol. 1, p. 328); A. Schopoff, *Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie 1673-1904* (Paris: Plon Nourrit et Cie, 1904), p. 11. For the Turkish text, see: Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 129.

Empire.

In 1774, Crimea, which had been under Ottoman rule since the 1480s, became autonomous. In 1783, the territory of Crimea was annexed by Russia. During the annexation, General Potemkin issued a declaration under which the Muslim population was allowed to leave the Crimea; Muslims who wanted to stay were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Russian Tsar. When Potemkin noticed, however, that nearly 30,000 Muslims began to emigrate after this declaration, he realised that it could cause a mass migration of Muslims and the depopulation of the region. According to Uzunçarşılı, he then halted the migration by force.⁶ This clearly shows that Russia was not seeking a total depopulation of the newly gained territories.

Treaty of Iași, 1792

The next Russo-Ottoman war, which began in 1787, ended with the Treaty of Iași (Jassy; Turkish: Yaş) in 1792. The Ottoman government hoped to recover the lost territories, above all the Crimea, but without success. Russia occupied new territories and, pursuant to the Treaty of Iași, its new borders stretched to the Dniester River (Turkish: Turla). Russia returned to the Ottoman Empire the Bender, Akkerman, Kili, and İsmail fortresses and the Principality of Moldavia, which had been occupied during the war. Article 4 of the treaty set forth conditions that the Ottoman Empire had to accept, one of which was, in Point 5, that the Ottoman Empire would allow in the places left to it under the treaty the free emigration of families who wanted to leave the country and go elsewhere.⁷ This provision again concerned primarily Ottoman Orthodox Christians, who were encouraged by the Russian army to migrate to Russian territory. Consequently, thousands of Orthodox Christians migrated to Russia at that time, among them the Turkish-speaking Orthodox population

⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 490-491. According to Turkish historian Uzunçarşılı, Potemkin ordered a massacre of these emigrants to prevent a mass migration.

⁷ "De permettre aux familles qui voudraient quitter leur pays et s'établir ailleurs, de sortir librement et d'emporter avec elles leurs biens; et, afin qu'elles aient le temps de prévenir leurs parents, sujets de l'Empire Ottoman, de vendre leurs biens meubles ou immeubles, selon les lois du pays, à d'autres sujets de l'Empire Ottoman et de mettre enfin ordre à leurs affaires, il leur sera accordé un délai de 14 mois, à dater du jour de l'échange de la ratification du présent Traité" (Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux*, vol. 1, 18). For Turkish text, see Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 189-190.

of Gagauz.⁸

Not only the treaties with Russia but also those with Austria-Hungary contained provisions regarding the emigration of the population, but there was a significant difference between the two. The 1791 Treaty of Svishtov (Ziştovi) between the Ottoman and Austrian Empires provided in Article 8 that all subjects of both empires who had emigrated from one to the other before or during the war would be accepted as subjects and would not be forced to return to their home country.⁹ But this article did not allow the emigration of the population after the war, nor did it encourage the population to emigrate. The right of free emigration can thus be viewed as a Russian policy toward Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

Treaty of Bucharest, 1812

The next Russo-Ottoman war, between 1806 and 1812, ended with a peace treaty signed in Bucharest. Russia was again the winner and occupied new territories. The Prut River became the new border. During the war, the Russian military had actively promoted the migration of the Orthodox Christian population in the Ottoman territories, in an effort to encourage or force this population group to resettle in Russia. Consequently, a large number of Christian emigrants were leaving their homes for Russia. For example, the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Gagauz people and many Bulgarians were forcibly transferred to Bucak (Bessarabia), mainly during the course of the war. In 1827, there were 48 villages of Bulgarian migrants in Bucak.¹⁰

⁸ Olga K. Radova, "Pereselencheskoe Dvizhenie v XVIII - Pervoi Polovine XIX vv. Osnovnye Etapy i ikh Osobennosti" [Migrations in the Eighteenth and First Half of the Nineteenth Centuries. The Principal Stages and Their Distinguishing Characteristics], in *Istoriia i Kultura Gagauzov*, edited by S. Bulgar (Komrat, Kishinev: Pontos, 2006), 71-88.

⁹ "(Sekinci madde) İşbu seferden mukaddem yahud sefer esnasında canib-i ahârın arazisine çekilmiş ve raiyyetini kabul idiüb rizaen ikamet iden reaya-yı canibeyn tabii devletleri tarafından bir vakitte iade olunmaları iddia olunmayıb tebeiiyet eyledikleri devletin reaya-yı sairesi gibi ad olunub min'bad oteçhile haklarında muamele oluna kezalik şol kimesneler ik iki devlette malik-i emlak olanlar kimesne tarafından muhalefet olunmaksızın hallerine çesbân gördükleri vech üzre meskenlerini devleteynin birinde diledikleri tarafda ihtiyar eylemeğe mezun olalar lâkin canib-i ahârın memalikinde malik oldukları emlakı furuht iderek ancak bir devlete ihtiyar-ı tebeiiyet itmeğe mecbur olalar" (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 172-173).

¹⁰ Ufuk Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ* [Forced Migration of the non-Muslims from the Balkans to Russia during the War of 1828-1829] (İstanbul: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1993), 24-25.

The Treaty of Bucharest contained a special provision, Article 7, addressing this population and the Muslims remaining under Russian rule. Pursuant to Article 7, Ottoman subjects were accorded the right to sell their estates and emigrate within 18 months. The same right was provided to a Tatar clan (Yedisian / Kavoussan in French text) under Russian rule. This was the first time in which Muslims in Russia received the right to emigrate under a peace treaty between the Ottoman and the Russian empires. The text thus provides:

Les sujets ottomans qui, par suite de la guerre, sont ou venus ou restés dans les pays cédés présentement à la Russie, pourront, avec leurs familles et toutes leurs propriétés, passer librement dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte, et s'y fixer sans que personne les en empêche. Ils seront libres de vendre leurs biens à qui bon leur semblera, et d'emporter tout ce qu'ils voudront. Cette permission s'étendra également aux habitants des pays cédés qui y possèdent des biens et qui se trouvent actuellement dans les Etats Ottomans: et il leur sera accordé aux uns et aux autres, pour pouvoir mettre ordre à leurs affaires, un délai de 18 mois à dater de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité.

Du même, les Tartares de la horde de Kavoussan qui, durant cette guerre, ont passé de la Bessarabie en Russie, pourront, s'ils le désirent, rentrer dans les Etats Ottomans, à condition toutefois que la Sublime Porte sera obligée de dédommager la Russie des frais que lui ont occasionnés l'émigration et l'établissement de ces Tartares. Pareillement, les Chrétiens qui ont des possessions dans les pays cédés à la Russie, ou qui y sont nés, mais qui se trouvent actuellement dans d'autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman peuvent, s'ils le désirent, revenir dans lesdits pays cédés et s'y établir avec leurs familles et leurs biens, sans que personne puisse y mettre obstacle; il leur sera également permis de vendre les biens quelconques qu'ils possèdent dans l'Empire Ottoman, et d'en faire passer le produit dans les Etats Russes, et ils jouiront pour cela du même délai de 18 mois depuis le jour de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité.¹¹

These provisions have the character of a voluntary population exchange similar to those in the Balkans during the first half of the twentieth century. The mention of a specific Muslim Tatar tribe, the Yedisian, in the treaty is, however, remarkable. We find an explanation for it in the work of the famous Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822–1895). According to him, the Tatar tribe was forcibly

¹¹ Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. 2 (Paris: F. Pichon, 1897), 89. For the Turkish text of the article see Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 251.

transferred to Russian territory during the war. When the Russians occupied Bessarabia, they relocated the Yedisian tribe of the Bessarabian Tatars from Bessarabia to the Russian lands across the Dniester River. The clan then applied to the Ottoman state for resettlement in the Ottoman lands. During the negotiations for peace, the Ottoman delegates raised this issue. The Russian delegates declared, "The people in the Ottoman lands which were ceded [to Russia] may if they want, migrate to the Ottoman lands with their homes and goods [*evi barkı ile*]." They said it was not necessary to mention separately the name of the Yedisian tribe. But, according to Cevdet Pasha, the tribe made repeated attempts to be included expressly, and the Ottoman delegates declared that this was a wish of the sultan. Consequently, the name of the Tatar clan was incorporated in the treaty in a special point of Article 7.¹² There are documents in the Ottoman archives showing that, on the basis of this treaty, some Muslims migrated to Ottoman territories.¹³

Treaty of Adrianople, 1829

The short period of peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire ended with another war in 1828 and 1829. During the conflict, the Russian troops occupied eastern Balkan provinces, including what now is Bulgaria and the city of Adrianople (Edirne), the largest Ottoman city in the Balkans and one of the most important seats of the sultans.

After this major defeat, a new peace treaty was signed on 2/14 September 1829. The Prut remained the Ottoman-Russian border. The Russian military administration in the eastern Balkans, including Adrianople, remained there more than eight months. Under the treaty, the Russians were to retreat from Adrianople and Kırkkilise (now Kırklareli) but receive the fortress of Yergögü. In a Russian proposal, the Russians linked their retreat from the Thracian lands to the Ottoman withdrawal from Yergögü. The Russians wanted the Ottoman military forces in the fortress to leave within two weeks and the [Muslim] population within four weeks; then the Russians would

¹² Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet* [History of Cevdet], vol. 10, simplified by Tevfik Temelkuran (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1974), 36.

¹³ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archive in Istanbul; hereafter, BOA), C.HR. 73/3627, 14 Rebi'ul-evvel 1228 [17 March 1813]. One of the documents shows that a certain Hüseyin and Ahmed from Kili, which was ceded to Russia, sought permission to sell their properties.

leave the Ottoman lands.¹⁴

During the war and under the subsequent military administration, the Russians again promoted the migration to Russia of the Orthodox population of the Balkans. An article of the peace treaty again secured the free emigration of the Orthodox population to Russia. Article 13 of the Treaty of Adrianople provided that the population could emigrate within 18 months. The same right was also given to the Muslim subjects of Russia.¹⁵ Like the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, this new treaty also contemplated a voluntary population exchange.

Archival documents describe the implementation of Article 13. Sultan Mahmud II sent a *ferman*, or edict, to the provinces and ordered the public announcement of the article. In response, the governor of Trabzon, Osman Pasha, who was also the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army, wrote to the sultan that he had made declarations explaining the content of Article 13 to the Christian population. According to the *ferman* of the sultan, Osman Pasha ordered compensation to be paid for the properties of the Armenians in Erzurum and other places that had been forcibly taken by the Kurds and insurgents.¹⁶

The emigration of the Orthodox population, however, was not really voluntary in practice. During their withdrawal from the Ottoman territories, the Russian military authorities tried to persuade the Orthodox population to emigrate and to depart with the Russian army. The Russians even promised money: Everybody who went with the Russian army would receive 100 asper (*kuruş*) as “marching money” (*harcırahı*) and would be exempt from all taxes for 20 years.

¹⁴ “Virilan takrirden malumları olduğu vechile kala-i merkume (Yergögü) kapularıyla iki aded tabyaları Rusya askerine teslim ve mustahfızın ile ahalişi çıkmğa başladıklarında tahliye hususu icra olunmuş ad olunacak ve mustahfızın iki hafta ve ahali dört haftada tahliye ideceklerdir” (BOA, HAT 1043/43144 E, 29 Zilhicce 1245 [21 June 1830]).

¹⁵ “[...]Il sera, en outre, accordé aux sujets respectifs, établis dans les pays restitués à la Sublime Porte ou cédés à la Cour Impériale de Russie, le même terme de dix-huit mois, à compter de l’échange de ratifications du présent Traité de paix, pour disposer, s’ils le jugent convenable, de leurs propriétés acquises soit avant, soit depuis la guerre, et se retirer avec leurs capitaux et leurs biens meubles des Etats de l’une des Puissances contractantes dans ceux de l’autre et réciproquement” (Noradounghian, *Recueil d’Actes Internationaux*, vol. 2, 172). For the Turkish text see Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 285-286. See also BOA, HAT, 1031/42875, 30 Rebi’ul-evvel 1245 [29 September 1829], f. 4.

¹⁶ BOA, HAT, 1045/43179 E, 27 Receb 1245 [22 January 1830]. The exact words are *ekrad ve eşkıya*.

The Russians also used Cossack units to force the population to migrate to Russia. Further, the Russian authorities spread the word that the Ottoman authorities would punish all Christians who helped the Russians and would impose high taxes on the Christians. When the Ottoman authorities sent a protest letter to the Russian commandant, Count Diebitsch, complaining that the Russian military was forcing the Orthodox population around Adrianople to migrate to Russia, Diebitsch declared that the Russian authorities recommended that the population not leave their homes. But there are many documents that attest to the forced emigration of the population to Russia.¹⁷

The Ottoman government and the local authorities also tried to halt the emigration of Ottoman subjects to Russia by grants of amnesty for collaboration with the Russian army, tax exemptions, and other means. The government also used the mediation of Orthodox clergy and notables (*kocabaşı*) to prevent emigration.¹⁸ But despite these efforts by the government, a large number of Orthodox Christians emigrated and the Russian government settled them in Walachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, and the Crimea. Ufuk Gülsoy emphasizes that this population transfer in 1828-1830 was wider and more systematic than previous ones.¹⁹ After repeated efforts by the Ottoman authorities to halt the emigration of the Orthodox population and particularly after promising them tax exemptions through the mediation of representatives of Orthodox communities, most of the migrants who were not satisfied with life in Russia returned to their homes between 1830 and 1840.²⁰

These population transfers were a consequence of the Russian imperial policy of colonization of newly annexed territories. They were not the product of a nation-state policy of ethnic purification. Instead, it was for military, political, and economic reasons that the Russian government sought to settle migrants in these areas. The migrants did not only come from the Ottoman territories but also, they came from the German principalities and other European countries. In 1778, for example, around 75,000 people were settled in

¹⁷ Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den*, 27-31; Kemal Beydilli, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan Rusya'ya Göçürülen Ermeniler* [Forced Migration of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia to Russia during the War of 1828-1829] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988).

¹⁸ Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den*, 41-64.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 71-82.

the territories left by the Tatars in the Crimea region. After the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783, Russia tried between 1784 and 1787 to attract settlers from the Italian and German principalities. In 1822, migrants from Württemberg and Bavaria were settled in Sarata (in Bessarabia), and in 1823, migrants from Switzerland were settled in Saba.²¹ The Ottoman response was similarly imperial rather than national.

2. The Greek uprising and the establishment of an independent Greek state

The process of establishing nation-states in the Balkans was usually accompanied by forcible emigration of population groups and, in some cases, even by the ethnic purification. It differed from the population transfers between the Ottoman and the Russian empires that took place before or during the same period. During the establishment of the Balkan states, population transfers became the main instrument of ethnic homogenization.²²

The first ethnic cleansing in the modern sense that took place in the Balkans began in 1921, during the Greek War of Independence. The Greek rebellion against the Ottoman forces in the Peloponnese (Morea) was successful, and the Muslim population of this area became victims of the uprising. The Greek insurgents attacked the Muslims there and killed many of them. The Greeks viewed these attacks as part of a legitimate struggle against Ottoman rule. Indeed, they tried to kill or expel almost all Muslims from the peninsula:

The patriotic cry of revolution, proclaimed by the Greek Archbishop Germanos, was 'Peace to the Christians! Respect to the Consuls! Death to the Turks!' The only Turks who survived were those who were able to take refuge in strongholds. They fled with their families into the few areas, such as the Acropolis of Athens, which were held by Ottoman garrison troops. They were either besieged and ultimately killed or, in rare cases, rescued by Ottoman forces.²³

²¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²² İlhan Tekeli, *Göç ve Ötesi* [Migration and Behind] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), 44–49. Turkish scholar İlhan Tekeli calls these kinds of migrations "Balkanization migrations" [*Balkanlaşma Göçleri*] and claims that because the concept of "nation" in the Balkans was based on the ideas of Herder, the Balkan national movements aimed at ethnic cleansing, which affected Muslims primarily but also Jews.

²³ McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 11.

The most famous incident was the massacre of Muslims in the administrative centre of Vilayet Mora, Tripolitsa, in October 1821. Because of the insurgents' success, the representatives of the governor of the Eyalet Mora had fallen back, with his soldiers, to the centre of the Eyalet Tripoliçe (Tripolitsa). The Greek insurgents besieged the city, and after five months, it fell, in October 1821. The population usually numbered around 5,000, but because of the attacks of the revolutionaries, many Muslims from other places had taken refuge in this city. Those Muslims who attempted to leave the city because of the problematic siege conditions were captured and killed. In the end, the representatives of the Muslims in Tripolitsa agreed to cede the city to the Greek revolutionaries, and they entered into an agreement that allowed the Muslims to leave the city freely. But when the Greek insurgents entered the city, they began to kill the Muslims. According to Cevdet Pasha, 40,000 Muslims in the city capitulated because the insurgents promised to bring them to the Ottoman borders. They were almost all killed; only a small number survived.²⁴

During the massacres in the Peloponnese, in June 1821 the Ottoman army and volunteer troops suppressed the Greek revolt on the island of Chios (Sakız), massacring many people and taking many Greeks away as slaves.²⁵ After the news of the "Massacre on Chios" reached Europe, the European public turned against the Ottomans, and the Philhellenes (friends of Greeks) in particular began to put pressure on the governments in Western Europe to intervene. In Russia, Tsar Alexander, who had founded the Holy Alliance, died in 1825, and his successor, Tsar Nicholas, aimed to bring the Ottoman Empire under Russian influence.

The Protocol of St. Petersburg, 1826: On 4 April 1826, Russia and England signed a protocol in St. Petersburg. England, Russia, and France signed another protocol in London on 6 July 1827. The protocols addressed the establishment of a Greek principality under the suzerainty of the sultan. The first article of the St. Petersburg Protocol contemplated a forcible relocation of Muslims that would separate them from Christians and thus foreclose the conflict between the two groups in the new principality. Muslims were to sell their lands to Greeks and to leave the principality.²⁶ The St. Petersburg

²⁴ Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. 12, 31-33.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 51-53.

²⁶ Ali Fuat Örenç, *Balkanlarda İlk Dram. Unuttuğumuz Mora Türkleri ve Eyaletten Bağımsızlığa Yunanistan* [First Drama in the Balkans. Forgotten Turks of the Peloponnese

Protocol was the first treaty to form the basis for a forced population transfer in the Balkans, as decided by two of the Great Powers, Russia and Great Britain. On the basis of this agreement, the Russian ambassador sent a note to the Sublime Porte in March 1827 demanding the execution of the provisions of the protocol.²⁷

The provisions of the 1827 London Protocol entered into other negotiations in 1829 and 1832.²⁸ The Greek insurgents met in Epitavro in 1829, and after eight meetings formulated their demands and asked the English ambassador in Istanbul to mediate between the Greeks and the Ottoman government. Their first demand was that in Greek lands, no Muslim should remain. They viewed it as impossible to live together with Muslims in light of previous events.²⁹ The expulsion of Muslims from Greece was thus a decision not only of the Great Powers but also of the Greek nationalists. The decisions for forcible transfer of Muslims from nation-states thus resulted from a consensus between the nationalist groups and the Great Powers, notably Russia and England.

Another protocol signed by France and England on 22 March 1829 regarding the establishment of the Greek Kingdom contained a provision concerning the right of free emigration of both Muslim and Greek subjects.³⁰ On 28 June/9 July 1829, the French and British ambassadors delivered a proposal (*takrir*) to the Ottoman government based on this protocol. Article 1 of the proposal established the borders of the Greek principality, and Article 3 concerned the lands and properties of the Muslim population. Pursuant to the latter article, the owners of ordinary goods and lands as well as the lands and properties belonging to the Muslim pious foundations within the borders of the Greek principality would be allowed to sell these properties within a period of one year. This article clearly concerns the consolidation of the Greek lands from which the Muslim population

and Greece from Province to Independence] (İstanbul: Babiali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2009), 130-131.

²⁷ BOA, HAT, 1317/51346D, 24 Şa'ban 1242 [23 March 1827]. Referring to the protocol of 23 March 1826 between Russia and Britain in St. Petersburg, the Russian ambassador demanded that the Ottoman government stop the war and comply with the provisions of the protocol.

²⁸ Öreñç, *Mora Türkleri*, 240-253.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 173-174.

³⁰ Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux*, vol. 2, p. 163. "Note des Ambassadeurs de France et de la Grande-Bretagne relativement aux bases de pacification et d'organisation de la Grèce en exécution du Protocole du 22 Mars 1829," dated 9 July 1829.

had already been expelled. Article 5 of the proposal contemplated general amnesty for the population associated with the revolt on both sides; the right of free emigration for Greeks in the Ottoman Empire; and the sale by Muslims in the Greek principality of their properties within one year.³¹ The negotiations again concerned the establishment of a Greek state, but still more the creation of a Greek state without a Muslim population.³²

While these negotiations continued, Russia defeated the Ottoman army and entered Adrianople, thus forcing the Ottoman government to request an armistice. On 14 September 1829, the parties signed a peace treaty in Adrianople, Article 10 of which determined the establishment of a Greek principality on the basis of the previous protocols and agreements.³³

On 3 February 1830, France, England, and Russia prepared another protocol for the establishment of an independent Greek kingdom. Article 5 of this document provided that Muslims who wanted to stay in the Greek state could live there under the guarantee of the Greek government. Article 6 recognized the right of free emigration for the subjects of the Greek kingdom and the Ottoman Empire.³⁴ This provision concerned mainly the Muslim population of territories that were still under Ottoman rule and were to be ceded to the Greek government within an agreed period of time.

During negotiations with the Russian ambassador, the Ottoman

³¹ “*devolet-i aliyye Rum tebasından memalik-i mahruseyi terk etmek istiyarlara emlak ve eşyalarını fîruhat etmeleri için bir sene mühlet ve serbestiyet üzere çıkub gitmelerine ruhsat ita ile ve Rum hükümeti dahi Yunan ahalisinden memalik-i mahrusede temekkün etmek istiyarlara ruhsat oire. Kaldı ki ticaret muamelatı bunlardan haric olarak [...]*” (BOA, HAT, 950/40835E, 25 Zilhicce 1244 [28 June 1829], f. 1). The French text: “*La Sublime Porte accordera à ceux de ses sujets Grecs qui désireront quitter le territoire musulman, un délai d'un an pour vendre leurs propriétés et sortir librement du pays. Le Gouvernement grec laissera la même faculté à ceux des habitants de la Grèce qui préféreront rentrer sur le territoire Ottoman*” (Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux*, vol. 2, 163).

³² For more details see Öreñç, *Mora Türkleri*, 175–177.

³³ The treaties or protocols before the Treaty of Adrianople were the Treaty of London, 6 July 1827 and 10/22 March 1829 (quoted above), which are mentioned in Article 10 of the Treaty of Adrianople.

³⁴ Öreñç, *Mora Türkleri*, 187–188. In the Protocol of London, 3 February 1830, concerning the independence of Greece, Article 5 deals with amnesty on both sides, and Article 6 says: “*La Porte Ottomane accordera à ceux de ses sujets Grecs qui désireraient quitter le territoire turc, un délai d'un an pour vendre leurs propriétés et sortir librement du pays. Le Gouvernement grec laissera la même faculté aux habitants de la Grèce qui voudraient se transporter sur le territoire turc.*” (Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux*, vol. 2, 179).

government opposed the free emigration abroad of the Greek Ottoman subjects as contemplated by Article 6. The Ottoman representative pointed to the 1,500 Greeks working in the Ottoman navy yard and demanded that the right to free emigration be restricted to the new Greek state. This response by the Ottoman government is interesting because it shows the difference of perspective between a nation-state and an empire. The Ottoman Empire did not want to lose its subjects, despite the revolts and separation movements of their given ethnic or religious groups.

On 27 March / 7 April 1830, the French, British, and Russian ambassadors in Istanbul sent a note to the Ottoman government regarding Greek independence.³⁵ Acting under pressure from Russia and other Great Powers, Sultan Mahmud II on 24 April 1830 declared his acceptance of the decisions of 3 February.³⁶ The provisions of the 3 February protocol were accepted in another protocol of 22 August 1830. After long negotiations between the Ottoman government and the representatives of the Great Powers, under the leadership of Stratford Canning, concerning the borders of the new Greek state, the compensation of Muslim estates, and Muslim emigration, a convention was signed in Istanbul on 21 July 1832. The evacuation of Muslims from places ceded to Greece pursuant to the agreements became difficult because of Greek attacks on Muslims. In particular, the compensation of Muslim estates became a vexed issue and a protracted process.³⁷ The Ottoman government even obtained a *fatwa* (justifying statement) from Sheikh-ul-Islam to persuade the Muslim population, for example in Ağriboz (Eubea), to relocate from the places that were to be ceded to Greece, and the government sent instructions for their evacuation.³⁸ The evacuation of the Muslims took place parallel to the evacuation of the Ottoman authorities and soldiers. In 1833 Athens and other places were handed over to Greek authorities.³⁹ During the evacuation of the majority, a small group of Muslims remained in their homes. In 1834 there were about 15,000 Muslim households, according to the Greek ambassador, Zografos. But they were systematically attacked by Greeks and forced to flee.

³⁵ BOA, HAT, 1220/47741B, 29 Zilhicce 1246 (10 June 1831), f. 1.

³⁶ Öreñç, *Mora Türkleri*, 192–198.

³⁷ BOA, HAT, 1294/50276, 29 Zilhicce 1250 [28 April 1835]. The Greek authorities hindered the sale of Muslim estates. The Ottoman government sent a note to the Greek ambassador in Istanbul concerning this problem. For a copy of the note see BOA, HAT, 1294/50276, 29 Zilhicce 1250 (28 April 1835).

³⁸ Öreñç, *Mora Türkleri*, 242–243.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 252.

The disposition of Muslim estates, houses, and *vakfs* (pious foundations) could not be resolved satisfyingly for the Muslim population.⁴⁰

Although the evacuation of Muslims from Greece was not compulsory in the final official versions of the international agreements, the establishment of the Greek kingdom ended with the expulsion of Muslims from the region. The consequence was that Greece became the first homogeneous nation-state in the Balkans. It then served as an example for other nationalist movements in the region.

3. Establishment of Serbia and fate of the Muslim population

The First Serbian Uprising began in 1804 and continued until 1812. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 contained an article (Article 8) giving some autonomy rights to the Serbs, but there was no separate provision regarding the emigration of the population from or into Serbian-populated areas.

On 7 October 1826, the Ottoman and Russian governments signed the Akkerman Convention, a treaty that revised the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest. In Article 5 of the convention, the Ottoman government agreed to issue a *ferman* granting privileges to the Serbs.⁴¹ A further provision of the convention dealt with Serbian demands that had already been submitted to the Ottoman government. This article included measures regarding the Muslim population in Serbia. They provided that "all goods of the Muslims were to be left under the direction of the Serbs" and "the settlement of Muslims in Serbia was to be banned except the Muslims serving to defend fortresses."⁴² This article shows clearly that among the national demands of the Serbs, as among those of the Greek national movement, was the expulsion of Muslims from Serbia.

Accordingly, the *ferman* of Sultan Mahmud II dated 17 October 1830 awarded the Serbs an autonomous administration under Miloš

⁴⁰ Ibid., 263–285.

⁴¹ Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 265–266.

⁴² "[...] hükümet-i dahiliye-i memleketleri müstakil olmak ve ifraz olunan Sırp kazaları iltihak ve izafe olunmak [...] ve aidatını cizyelerile beraber tediye ve ita etmeleri üzere ehl-i islâma müteallik ve raci olan cemî emval ve emlâkin emr-i idaresi Sırp'lare terk ve havale olunmak." "[...] velhasil kıla muhafazasına mahsus olanlardan başka ehl-i islâmın Sırp memleketinde sâkin olmaları memnu olmak misillü bazı mevadda dair Sırp milleti hahiş ve emniyesini mukaddidema Südde-i Seniye'ye ba arzuhal arz ve inba etmiş [...]" (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 273).

Obrenović as hereditary prince (*knez*). It provided that Serbian districts, except fortresses under the rule of the Sultan, would be left to Serbian administration and Muslims who wished to leave their lands could sell their estates within a year and leave their homes. The incomes from the estates of Muslims who did not want to leave would be given to the treasury in Belgrade, which would give them to their owners. Another provision forbade the settlement of Muslims in the Serbian lands, with the exception of Muslims serving in the fortresses under the sultan's rule.⁴³ As a result, no Muslim could live in Serbia except in certain places.⁴⁴

In another *ferman*, dated 1833, that fixed the borders of the Serbian principality, the time limit (one year) for Muslims to sell their estates was extended to five years because one year was not enough. Within five years, Muslims in Serbian districts had to leave their homes. From that time on, no Muslim would be allowed to settle in the Serbian lands. But the Muslims in the vicinity of the fortress of Belgrade could live there forever.⁴⁵

Serbian Chief *knez* Miloš Obrenović tried to expel Muslims from the Serbian principality, and in this effort he was supported by the Russian ambassador in Istanbul. In July 1834, Serbian troops attacked the Muslim population in Sokol.⁴⁶ There were many other, similar, attacks on Muslims. Estates left by Muslims were taken by the leaders of the Serbian insurgents.⁴⁷

Between 1840 and 1860, there were many political developments, revolts, and changes in the government of the Serbian Principality. The Serbian authorities took measures to force Muslims still living in the vicinities of the fortresses to leave their homes. In 1862 an incident between Ottoman and Serbian soldiers caused Serbs to attack Muslims in Belgrade. For the solution of this conflict, a conference was held in Kanlıca, a district of Istanbul. Russia, France, England, Austria, Prussia, and Italy were represented. On 4 September 1862, the Kanlıca Protocol, consisting of 12 articles, was signed. Article 1 provided that, to prevent possible conflicts between Muslims and

⁴³ Ayşe Özkan, *Miloš'tan Milan'a Sırp Bağımsızlığı (1830-1878)* [Serbian Independence from Miloš to Milan (1830-1878)] (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2011), 23-24.

⁴⁴ Alexandre Popovic, *Balkanlarda İslam* [translation of: *L'Islam Balkanique*] (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995), 191.

⁴⁵ Özkan, *Sırp Bağımsızlığı*, 30-31.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-41.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

Serbs, the Ottoman government would transfer the estates of Muslims living around Belgrade to Serbs, and the Serbian government would pay for these estates. Pursuant to Article 8, Muslims in Serbia would sell their estates and leave Serbia as soon as possible, but within five months.⁴⁸ The European powers thus decided again for the forcible emigration of the remaining Muslim population from Serbia, as demanded by the Serbian government.

After this conference, the Ottoman government sent a functionary to regulate the sale of Muslim properties, and the Muslims from Užice and Sokol were transferred to Bosnia. Nearly 8,000 Muslims were transferred to the Ottoman territories from the fortress of Belgrade and other fortresses. Only Ottoman military forces remained in the fortress of Belgrade and other fortresses, including Šabac, Smederevo, and Kaladovo. These fortresses themselves were finally ceded to the Serbian government in 1867.⁴⁹

4. Muslims in the Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia

One of the provisions added to the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 concerned the Muslims in the principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. This provision prohibited Muslims from settling on the banks of the Danube, and required the Muslim population there to leave their estates within 18 months.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ibid., 192-199; Safet Bandžović, *Iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća* [Emigration of Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century] (Sarajevo: El-kalem, 1998), 18-25.

⁴⁹ Özkan, *Sırp Bağımsızlığı*, 200-204; Popovic, *Balkanlarda İslam*, 191.

⁵⁰ Eflâk ve Buğdan Hakkında Edirne Andlaşmasına Bağlı Senet: [Act regarding Walachia and Moldavia, attached to the Treaty of Adrianople] "[...] Tuna'nın sahil-i yesarisi kurbinde kâin bilcümle adalar Eflâk ve Buğdan toprağının ecza-yı mütemmimesi addoluna ve nehr-i mezkûrun vasati memalik-i mahrusaya duhul ettiği mahalden Purut nehrine munsap olduğu mahalle kadar memleketeyn-i mezkûreteyn beyninde hudut ola Devlet-i Aliye Eflâk ve Buğdan arazisini taaddi ve taarruzdan ziyade temin için Tuna'nın sahil-i yesarisinde bir gûna müstahkem mahal alıkonamak ev ehl-i islâmdan olan tebasının sahil-i mezkûrda bir gûna mesken ve imarını tecviz eylememek üzere taahhüt eder binaberin katiyen kavil ve karar olundu ki sahil-i mezkûrun cemiinde Eflâk ve Karayova memleketlerinde ve kezalik Buğdan memleketinde ehl-i islâmdan birisi hiç bir vakitte temekkün etmeyüp yalnız Dersaadet lâzimesiçün kendiliğinden hububat veyahut sair eşyanın iştirası zımında yedlerinde emr-i âli olarak gelen tüccarın memleketeyn-i mezkûreteyne dühulü caiz ola ve Tuna nehrinin sahil-i yesarında kâin bilâd-ı islâmiye ve anlara ait arazi badezin Eflâk memleketine munzam olmak üzere memleket-i mezkûreye red oluna ve sahil-i mezkûrda mukaddema mevcut olan istihkâmat hiç bir vakitte tecdit ve ipka olunmaya ve ehl-i islâm taifesi ahad-i nastan mağsup olmayarak gerek bilâd-ı mezkûrede ve gerek Tuna'nın sahil-i yesarisinde kâin sair mahallerde olan emlâk ve

Even the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which followed the Crimean War (1853–1856), included an article concerning the population issue. Article 21 granted the Orthodox population of the territory that had been occupied earlier by Russia and was now ceded to Moldavia the right to emigrate to another country within three years.⁵¹

5. San Stefano Negotiations in 1878 and the Russian Proposal for the Expulsion of all Muslims from Bulgaria

The Muslims in the Balkans became a topic of negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1878. In the existing Balkan historiography there is so special emphasis on these negotiations. Only a few studies mainly by Turkish historians deal with the Russian proposal for an exodus of all Muslims from the newly created Bulgarian Principality.⁵²

During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–1878, the largest mass migration of Muslims from the Balkans took place. The reports of the British ambassador in Istanbul, A. H. Layard, give a detailed picture of these migrations. In his report on 16 January 1878, A. H. Layard writes that “*the Mussulman population, with the horrors committed upon the Mahomedans during General Gourko’s raid of last summer fresh in their memories, are flying terrified before the Russians’ advance. In many districts, the Christians, and the Jews, who were the special victims of*

arazilerini onsekiz mah zarfında yerlilere furuht eyliyeler[...]” (Erim, Devletlerarası Hukuku, 290–291).

⁵¹ “*Le territoire cédé par la Russie sera annexé à la Principauté de Moldavie, sous la suzeraineté de la Sublime Porte. Les habitants de ce territoire jouiront des droits et privilèges assurés aux Principautés, et, pendant l’espace de trois années, il leur sera permis de transporter ailleurs leur domicile, en disposant librement de leurs propriétés” (Gabriel Noradounghian, Recueil d’Actes Internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman., vol. 3, 1856–1878 [Paris: F. Pichon, 1902], 77). For the Turkish text see Erim, Devletlerarası Hukuku, 350.*

⁵² For a detailed discussion of this issue, see: Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, “San Stefano Negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1878 and the Question of Muslim Population”, *International Balkan Annual Conference Prishtina*, Ed. Özgür Oral et al. Istanbul University (in publication); Bilal Şimşir, *Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri/Turkish Emigration from the Balkans, Belgeler/Documents*, Vol. II, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989, CLXVI–CLXX; Karpat, *Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler*, 175–182; Wolfgang Höpken, “Flucht vor dem Kreuz? Muslimische Emigration aus Südosteuropa nach dem Ende der osmanischen Herrschaft (19./20. Jahrhundert),” in *Zwangsmigrationen in Mittel- und Südosteuropa*, edited by Wolfgang Höpken (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1996), 1–24, here, 7; Fikret Adanır, “Bevölkerungsverschiebungen, Siedlungspolitik und Ethnisch-kulturelle Homogenisierung: Nationsbildung auf dem Balkan und Kleinasien, 1878–1923,” in *Ausweisung – Abschiebung – Vertreibung in Europa 16. – 20. Jahrhundert*, edited by Sylvia Hahn, Andrea Komlosy, and Ilse Reiter (Innsbruck, Vienna, Bolzano: Studienverlag, 2006), 172–192, here, 175.

Bulgarian cruelties, are accompanying them. The towns and villages are deserted, and the property of their inhabitants abandoned".⁵³ On 21 January 1878, Layard reports of "cruel treatment and massacres of those who have remained in the districts occupied by the Russians and their auxiliaries."⁵⁴ He emphasizes in his report from 6 February 1878 the attacks "by the Cossacks and armed Bulgarians upon the inoffensive populations" and their flight "in a continuous stream forwards Constantinople and Gallipoli."⁵⁵

The treatment of the Muslim population in the occupied territories gives evidence that Russia aimed at the expulsion of all Muslims from the Eastern Balkans and establishment of a Bulgarian state without Muslims. To the question why Russia wanted to establish a Bulgarian state without Muslims gives the British ambassador a comprehensible answer: "it has been the policy of Russia all along to have only Bulgarians in Bulgaria, and to exclude from it Mussulmans, Greeks, and all others who might interfere with the design to render the new State a mere Russian dependency".⁵⁶

After the Ottoman request, an Armistice Protocol between the Ottoman and Russian governments was signed on 19/31 January 1878 in Adrianople by Grand Duke Nicholas and the Ottoman representatives Server and Namik. The protocol consisting of five articles decides in the first article the establishment of a Bulgarian principality, "determined by the majority of the Bulgarian population."⁵⁷ The other articles were on Montenegro, Serbia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵⁸ In a document titled

⁵³ Foreign Office, F.O. 424/66, Confidential 3508, pp. 95-96, published in Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri / Turkish Emigration from the Balkans*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1968), 973-975.

⁵⁴ F.O. 424/67, Confidential 3598, pp. 37-38, published in *ibid.*, 283-285.

⁵⁵ FO. 424/67, Confidential 3598, pp. 279-280, published in *ibid.*, 331-332.

⁵⁶ Layard to the Earl of Derby, British Foreign Secretary, No. 278, February 26, 1878, F.O. 424/68, Confidential 3602, pp. 90-91, published in *ibid.*, 350. Emphasis by the author.

⁵⁷ "La Bulgarie dans les limites déterminées par la majorité de la population bulgare et qui, en aucun cas, ne sauraient être moindres que celles indiquées par la conférence de Constantinople, sera érigée en Principauté autonome, tributaire avec un gou[vernement] national, chrétien et une milice indigène, l'armée ottomane n'y séjournera plus" (BOA, HR. SYS. 1220/2, f. 28, 29).

⁵⁸ The second article granted independence and a territorial extension to Montenegro. The third article granted Romania and Serbia their independence. The fourth article granted Bosnia and Herzegovina an autonomous administration and guarantees of reforms for other "Ottoman Christian territories." The fifth article addressed the war reparations that the Ottoman government would have to pay to Russia. BOA, HR. SYS. 1220/2, f. 28, 29.

“Observations sur le Protocole d’Adrianople du 19/31 Janvier 1878,”⁵⁹ it was noted that the Bulgarian principality would contain the territories in which Bulgarians were the majority population. After the mass migration of Muslims during the war, now almost everywhere was a Bulgarian majority. On the other hand, the Russian delegates refused to make a survey of the population proportion before the war.⁶⁰ In this way, the Russian government secured the creation of a large Bulgarian state reaching the Aegean coasts.

On the first day of San Stefano negotiations on 14 February 1878 Russian delegates demanded the total expulsion of all Muslims from the Bulgarian principality. Before the beginning of the official negotiations in Adrianople, the Ottoman plenipotentiary Safvet Pasha visited the Russian plenipotentiaries Ignatiev and Nelidov on 13 February and according to Safvet Pasha the Russian plenipotentiaries talked in this meeting mainly about the “inability of the two races now to live together.”⁶¹ In this way they gave the sign for their official

⁵⁹ BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/2, f. 65, 66.

⁶⁰ *“Ce mode de procéder, appliqué dans d’autres circonstances, pour fixer la destinée politique d’un pays, pourrait paraître rationnel, mais si l’on sache que, par suite de l’invasion, la population Musulmane qui était en majorité de ce côté-ci des Balkans a émigré en masse, on comprend immédiatement le danger et l’iniquité de cette méthode. En effet les Bulgares sont assurés d’être presque partout en majorité, puisqu’à part un nombre relativement restreint de Grecs et de Juifs, ils se trouvent être aujourd’hui les seuls occupants de tous les pays en vue.*

Le correctif naturel de ce procédé dérisoire, c’est de poser en principe que l’on prendra pour base du rapport entre la population Bulgare et la population non Bulgare l’état des choses avant l’invasion de permet impossible que les Plénipotentiaires Russes rejettent ce mode de procédé et refusent de la laisser introduire dans les instructions à donner à la commission qu’ils ont sans doute instituée pour fait une enquête à ce sujet.

Il semble également nécessaire qu’il soit appliqué dans les Préliminaires de paix que l’on opérera sur chaque sandjak ou district pris dans son ensemble et non sur chaque commune considérée isolément. Enfin aucune localité où la majorité Bulgare existerait ne pourra faire partie de la Principauté si elle s’en trouve séparée par des localités non annexées.

Dans les contrées où la population non Bulgare contrebalancerait à peu près la population Bulgare l’on devrait prendre en considération, comme élément de décision, la proportion des terres possédées par l’une et l’autre catégorie.

Il n’est pas besoin qu’il soit dit que les Musulmans établi sur le territoire de la Principauté pourront continuer à l’habiter; c’est de plein droit; mais il faudra stipuler lors des Préliminaires de paix, que les propriétaires Musulmans qui fixeraient leur résidence personnelle hors de la Principauté, pourront toujours y conserver leurs immeubles les feront valoir par d’autres mains, autrement le gouvernement de la Principauté pourrait faire une loi déclarant que tous les émigrants sont tenus de rentrer dans un délai déterminé, faute de quoi leurs immeubles seraient considérés comme vacants” (BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/2, f. 65, 66).

⁶¹ *“J’ai reçu ce matin la visite du Comte Ignatiev et de M. Nélidoff. Les négociations commenceront demain. Le langage des Plénipotentiaires Russes semble faire prévoir une grande rigueur pour le maintien et le développement des bases déjà fixées, particulièrement en ce qui touche la Bulgarie et l’impossibilité de faire vivre désormais ensemble les deux races. L’idée russe paraît être l’assimilation complète de la nouvelle Principauté de Bulgarie avec la Serbie telle*

demand in the first session of formal negotiations.

On 14 February the first official meeting took place, and the first proposal of the Russian delegates was about a "radical" solution of the Muslim question in Bulgaria:

Mr. Nelidow responded that the situation had been radically changed since then, that Bulgaria was completely stripped of its Muslim inhabitants, who had emigrated *en masse* at the instigation of the Ottoman commanders themselves, with the sole exception of Osman Pasha, who, by reassuring the Muslim population, was able to keep it in Plevna. To the question how the fate of the Muslims in Bulgaria will be determined, the Russian representatives stated that it was now impossible for them to remain in Bulgaria and that, as for the question of organization of Bulgaria, the solution must be radical.⁶²

On the other hand, the Russian delegates demanded the return of all exiled Bulgarians to Bulgaria: "during this discussion, the Russian representatives declared that they had received an absolute order to require the return to Bulgaria of all exiled Bulgarians."⁶³

Safvet Pasha reported this Russian proposal to the Ottoman government. The Ottoman government knew that Great Britain would resist this Russian demand and informed the British ambassador about this issue immediately. On 16 February 1878 the British ambassador, Layard, reported this to his government:

Prime Minister informs me that at Conference with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries at Adrianople yesterday the Russian Plenipotentiary

qu'elle a existé jusqu' à présent" (BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 28, Safvet Pasha to Premier Ministre, No. 2, 13 February 1878, Adrianople).

⁶² *"Monsieur Nelidow a répondu que la situation s'était depuis lors profondément modifiée, que la Bulgarie s'était complètement dépeuplée de ses habitants Musulmans qui avaient émigré en masse à l'instigation même des Commandants Ottomans à l'exception seulement d'Osman Pacha qui en rassurant la population Musulmane, avait pu la maintenir à Pleona. Ayant alors demandé comment serait réglé le sort des Musulmans en Bulgarie, les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont déclaré que leur séjour en Bulgarie était désormais impossible et que la solution devait être radicale quant à la question de l'organisation de la Bulgarie"* (Report of Safvet Pasha to Ahmed Vefik Pasha, President of the Council of the Ministers, on 14 February 1878, Adrianople, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 28, p. 4; translated and underlined by the author).

⁶³ *"Dans le cours de cette discussion les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont déclaré qu'ils avaient reçu l'ordre absolu de demander le retour en Bulgarie de tous les exilés bulgares"* (Report of Safvet Pasha to Ahmed Vefik Pasha, President of the Council of the Ministers, on 14 February 1878, Adrianople, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 28, pp. 6-7).

insisted that the Mussulmans who had left territories comprised in new Bulgarian State should not return and that endeavors should be made to remove the whole Mahommedan population.⁶⁴

The British Foreign Ministry informed the Austro-Hungarian government. The foreign minister Count Andrassy also rejected this idea as a “monstrous” proposal:

As directed by your Lordship, I have asked Count Andrassy what he thought of the demand of Russia for the expulsion of the Mahommedan population from Bulgaria. I found his Excellency boiling over with indignation at the proposal, for which it would be necessary to go back to the time of the barbarians to find a parallel. When Europe had called upon Turkey for toleration, it was monstrous to see such a proposal brought forward.⁶⁵

6. Safvet Pasha’s proposal for a population exchange

In response to the Russian proposal to expel all Muslims from Bulgaria, the Ottoman representative Safvet Pasha prepared a proposal for population exchange and represented it to the Russian delegates on 15 February 1878. According to this proposal all Muslims from the northern part of the Balkan Mountains would be exchanged with Bulgarians in the southern part of the Balkan Mountains and the Muslim and Bulgarian population would be divided along the Balkan Mountains. Both sides would be compensated “by mutual substitution of their estates on each side of the Balkans.”⁶⁶ As Safvet Pasha reported, “This plan was refused by the Russian delegates as it

⁶⁴ F.O. 424/67, Confidential 3598, p. 334, no. 699, published in *ibid.*, 346.

⁶⁵ After receiving this information, the British Foreign Ministry contacted the British ambassador in Vienna on 19 February to ask Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Andrassy his opinion regarding the expulsion of Muslims from Bulgaria. In a telegram on 20 February 1878, the British ambassador in Vienna, H. Elliot, reported the reaction of Count Andrassy. F.O. 424/67, Confidential 3598, p. 383, No. 833, published in *ibid.*, 347.

⁶⁶ “*Tout en réservant la question de la constatation des points du territoire où existe la majorité bulgare, nous avons longuement discutés les limites de la Principauté, après avoir proposé dans intérêt de la tranquillité des populations de limiter la Principauté de Bulgarie à la partie située au-delà des Balkans et avoir constaté que dans le pays situé en deçà des Balkans la propriété Musulmane représentait les deux tiers de terre des bulgares, j’ai émis l’idée de ramener les habitants Musulmans au-delà des Balkans de ce côté-ci et de faire passer les bulgares établis dans cette dernière partie du pays de l’autre côté des montagnes en indemnisant les uns et les autres par la substitution réciproque des terres possédées de chaque côté des Balkans*” (BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 44, 45, 46, 47, p. 6-8, Report from Safvet Pasha to Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Président du Conseil des Ministres, No. 13, 15 February 1878). For the Turkish text see B. Şimşir, *Rumeli’den*, CLXIX-CLXX.

ran counter to the fundamental principles already accepted by the Ottoman government [in the armistice protocol]."⁶⁷

This proposal of population exchange occurred during a very critical situation for the Ottoman Empire. The San Stefano negotiations were a dictate and the acceptance of the Russian proposal would end not only the existence of the Ottoman Empire but also the existence of the Muslims in the Balkans. The Ottoman proposal aimed at securing at least one part of the Balkan territories in the Ottoman hands.

After the negative reactions of the British and Austrian governments, the Russian government did not insist on this point and withdrew its proposal to expel the Muslim population. The Russian semiofficial newspapers denied even the news about this Russian proposal as "utterly untrue".⁶⁸ The British ambassador of Istanbul, Layard, commented this Russian denial in his report from 26 February 1878. Layard regards this as "one of many audacious statements that the Russian Government is in the habit of making when it wishes to deceive Europe or to retreat from a false position." He confirms that "the demand for the removal of the Mahommedans from the new Principality was made at the first Conference between Safvet Pasha and Russian Plenipotentiaries. Of this fact, there is documentary evidence. The demand was resisted by Safvet Pasha, and does not appear among the last conditions of peace to which the assent of the Porte was required." According to the report of Layard "the demand of Russia has been modified to the extent that the Mussulmans who have remained in the provinces occupied by the Russians are to be

⁶⁷ "Ce projet a été repoussé par les Plénipotentiaires Russes comme étant contraire aux bases déjà acceptées par le gouvernement Ottoman" (Report of Safvet Pasha, No. 13, p. 8).

⁶⁸ The Agence Russe published a semiofficial article: "[...] denying, as utterly untrue, the telegraphic intelligence reported by the foreign press, that the Russian Government had demanded the expulsion of all Mussulmans from Bulgaria. It states that Russia, where the greatest tolerance exists, and where thousands of Mussulmans live peaceably under her rule, has instituted the principle of perfect equality between the Mussulman and Christian population of Bulgaria, where now, perfect security, happy in their deliverance from Turkish functionaries, from Turkish troops, from Bashi-Bozouks, and Circassians, the curse equally fatal to Mussulmans and Christians, from which Russia wishes to deliver Bulgaria for ever." Ibid, 348. The British ambassador of St Petersburg expresses his suspicion saying "Experience has led me to distrust Russian humanitarian principles. With regard, therefore, to this article I can only say, 'Credat Judaeus appelles non ego' ['Let Appella the Jew believe, not I']." Augustus Loftus, British ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Earl of Derby, British Foreign Secretary, February 22, 1878, F.O. 424/67, Confidential 3598, p. 451, no. 956, p. 482, no. 1036, published in *ibid.*, 348.

allowed to reside in certain places, but those who fled in consequence of the outrages of the Bulgarians and Cossacks are not to be allowed to return." Layard emphasized that "the dreadful massacres of the Mahommedans that have taken place and are still taking place, and the general exodus of the Turkish population, have greatly reduced their numbers. No one acquainted with Bulgarian fanaticism, and with what occurred in Servia, will entertain a doubt that the few Mussulmans who may be permitted to reside for the present in Bulgaria will be speedily driven out of the Principality." Finally, Layard expresses his opinion on the Russian Balkan policy and says that Russia wanted to have "only Bulgarians in Bulgaria, and to exclude from it Mussulmans, Greeks, and all others who might interfere with the design to render the new State a mere Russian dependency".⁶⁹

Russia reached the Aegean Sea via the new Bulgarian principality, which had received the vital port of Kavala. However, Russia could not achieve the creation of an ethnically cleansed Bulgarian nation-state during the negotiations of San Stefano. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary resisted this Russian plan, and the balance of powers in Europe hindered Russia from implementing an expulsion of Muslims from the Balkans. Particularly Great Britain was concerned and saw in the territorial extension of Bulgaria a danger to British interests in the Mediterranean. When Russian troops advanced to the vicinity of the Ottoman capital, Great Britain sent a naval force to the Sea of Marmara on 16 February; the Austro-Hungarian government also opposed a Russian advance toward the Ottoman capital.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Layard to the Earl of Derby, British Foreign Secretary, No. 278, February 26, 1878, F.O. 424/68, Confidential 3602, pp. 90-91, published in *ibid.*, p. 350. Emphasis by the author.

⁷⁰ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya* [Turkey and Russia] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), 85. As a pretext for its action, the British government cited the need to save the Christians and foreigners in Istanbul from a possible attack by the Muslim refugees. British Foreign Secretary Lord Derby declared to the Ottoman ambassador in London that the British Navy came as an ally of the Ottoman Empire. But he also talked about the Russian atrocities against the Muslim population and expressed his fear that similar atrocities could be carried out among the Muslim refugees and Christians and foreigners in Istanbul. "*Partout où les russes entrent, les bulgares procèdent contre les musulmans par le massacre, le feu et le pillage. En présence de ces actes de vandalisme, confirmés par nos dernières informations, il est naturel que nous redoutions précisément de voir Constantinople devenir le théâtre de scènes analogues. Quant aux projets hostiles que les Musulmans nourrissent à l'endroit de leurs concitoyens chrétiens et des étrangers, le Gouvernement Impérial irait, étant donné le moindre indice, de telles dispositions, jusqu'à demander le concours d'une force étrangère*" (telegram of Server Pacha to Musurus Pacha, London, 14 February 1878, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 39).

After seeing the Ottoman refusal and the British resistance, the Russian delegates declared that the Russian government did not want to separate Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire although the Russian public wished the establishment of an independent Bulgarian principality.⁷¹

The San Stefano negotiations continued, addressing the fate of the *vakfs* of Muslims and the properties and estates of Muslims in Bulgaria and Serbia. Safvet Pasha demanded that Muslims who took up residence outside Bulgaria should keep their properties.⁷² Russia insisted also on the ceding of territories in the Balkans and in Eastern Anatolia as war reparations.⁷³ On 14/26 February 1878, an agreement regarding the population issue was signed. According to this agreement, the Sublime Porte would not punish Ottoman subjects who were in contact with the Russian army during the war, and if some individuals wanted to leave with their families behind the Russian army, the Ottoman authorities would not hinder them.⁷⁴

⁷¹ "Ils ont ajouté que si l'on avait dû céder au sentiment public qui s'est manifesté en Russie, la Bulgarie aurait dû être érigée en Principauté indépendante, mais que le Gouvernement Russe n'avait pas voulu la détacher de l'Empire Ottoman" (Report of Safvet Pasha, No. 13, p. 6).

⁷² "Ayant ensuite discuté les questions relatives au sort réservé aux propriétés possédées par les Musulmans en Bulgarie et dans le territoire à annexer à la Serbie, j'ai demandé que l'on tint compte des droits des Vakoufs, ce qui a été consenti par les Plénipotentiaires Russes en ce sens que les Vakoufs donneraient lieu à une indemnité. J'ai demandé en outre que les propriétaires Musulmans qui fixeraient leur résidence hors de la Principauté fussent autorisés à y conserver leurs biens qu'ils feraient valoir par d'autres mains. Cette disposition n'a point paru soulever des difficultés sérieuses" (BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 44, 45, 46, 47, f. 47, Report on 15 February 1878 by Safvet Pasha, p. 9).

⁷³ The sultan sent a telegram to the Russian tsar, stating that acceptance of these demands was impossible, and also informed Safvet Pasha in Adrianople. The Russian delegate Ignatiev then declared that if the negotiations did not end in eight days, he would be obliged to issue an ultimatum. BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 58, Telegram of Safvet Pasha to Prime Minister, 17 February 1878.

⁷⁴ BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/2, f. 51. The entire article signed by the Ottoman delegates (Safvet and Sadullah) and the Russian delegates (Ignatiev and Nelidov) on 14/26 February 1878 was as follows (BOA, HR.SYS.1220/3, f. 31):

"Tant que les troupes Impériales Russes séjourneront dans les localités qui, conformément au présent acte, seront restituées à la Sublime Porte, l'administration et l'ordre des choses resteront dans le même état que depuis l'occupation. La Sublime Porte ne devra y prendre aucune part durant tout ce temps et jusqu'à l'entière sortie de toutes les troupes.

Les troupes Ottomanes ne devront entrer dans les localités qui seront restituées à la Sublime Porte, et cette dernière ne pourra commencer à y exercer son autorité, que lorsque pour chaque place et province qui aura été évacuée par les troupes russes, le Commandant de ces troupes en aura donné connaissance à l'officier désigné à cet effet de la part de la Sublime Porte.

La Sublime Porte rend l'engagement de ne sévir d'aucune manière, ni laisser sévir contre les sujets Ottomans qui auraient été compromis par leurs relations avec l'armée Russe pendant la guerre. Dans le cas où quelques personnes voudraient se retirer avec leurs familles à la suite des troupes Russes, les autorités Ottomanes ne s'opposeront pas à leur départ.

The borders of the principality of Bulgaria were set on 17 February / 1 March 1878,⁷⁵ and on 18 February / 2 March 1878, the document was signed.⁷⁶ On the same day an agreement concerning the population in the regions ceded to Russia, mainly the territories in northeastern Anatolia, Batum, Ardahan, and Kars, was signed by Ignatiev, Nelidov, Safvet, and Sadullah. According to this agreement, the population in these territories could emigrate within three years of the ratification of the treaty. After three years those who remained would be regarded as Russian subjects.⁷⁷

The Preliminary Treaty was signed on 3 March 1878 in San Stefano (Yeşilköy). According to this treaty, Muslims in the territories ceded to Serbia and those in the Bulgarian principality could sell their properties and emigrate within three years.⁷⁸ On the other hand, the

Immédiatement après la ratification des préliminaires de paix, les prisonniers de guerre seront rendus réciproquement par les soins des Commissaires spéciaux nommés de part et d'autre et qui se rendront à cet effet à Odessa et à Sébastopol.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman payera tous les frais de l'entretien des prisonniers qui lui seront restitués, en dix-huit termes égaux dans l'espace de six années, d'après les comptes qui seront établis par les Commissaires susmentionnés.

L'échange des prisonniers entre le Gouvernement Ottoman et ceux de la Roumanie, de la Serbie et du Monténégro aura lieu sur les mêmes bases, en déduisant toutefois dans le décompte à établir, le nombre de prisonniers restitués par le gouvernement Ottoman du nombre de prisonniers qui lui seront restitués. [Signed by] Safvet, Sadoullah, Ch. N. Ignatiev, Nélidov. San Stéfano, le 14/26 Février 1878."

⁷⁵BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/3, f.17.

⁷⁶BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/3, f. 39.

⁷⁷"Les habitants des localités cédées à la Russie, et qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de ces territoires, seront libres de se retirer, en vendant leurs propriétés immobilières. Un délai de trois ans leur est accordé à cet effet, à partir de la ratification de présent acte. Passé ce délai, les habitants qui n'auront pas quitté le pays et vendu leurs immeubles, resteront sujets russes.

Les biens immeubles appartenant à l'Etat ou aux fondations pieuses, sises en dehors des localités précitées, devront être vendus dans le même délai de trois années, suivant le mode qui sera réglé par une Commission spéciale Russo-Turque. La même Commission sera chargée de déterminer le mode de retrait par le Gouvernement Ottoman, du matériel de guerre, des munitions, des approvisionnements et autres objets appartenant à l'Etat, et qui existeraient dans les places, villes et localités cédées à la Russie et non occupées actuellement par les troupes russes" (BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/3, f. 41).

⁷⁸Article 4: "Les musulmans qui possèdent des propriétés dans les territoires annexés à la Serbie, et qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de la principauté, pourront y conserver leurs immeubles en les faisant affermer ou administrer par d'autres. [...]" The same regulation was made in Article 11 regarding the Muslims who emigrated from Bulgaria and had property in that principality; Schopoff, *Les Réformes*, pp. 357 and 361. Article 21 of the same treaty says: "Les habitants des localités cédées à la Russie, qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de ces territoires, seront libres de se retirer, en vendant leurs propriétés immobilières. Un délai de trois ans leur est accordé à cet effet à partir de la ratification du présent acte. Passé ce délai, les habitants qui n'auront pas quitté le pays et vendu leurs immeubles resteront sujets russes. [...]" (Schopoff, *Les Réformes*, 265). "(Yirmibirinci madde) Rusya'ya terk olunan mahaller ahalsi başka mahalle gidüb ikamet itmek isterler ise emlaklerini

Treaty of San Stefano (Annex 13) proposed reforms were for Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia (Kosovo), and Thrace which remained in the Ottoman hands.⁷⁹

7. Revision of the “Preliminary” Treaty of San Stefano and the issue of refugees

Here I will summarize the debate on the population issue during the diplomatic negotiations and meetings for the organization of a congress to revise the Treaty of San Stefano.

After the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, the European powers began to discuss its revision. The fate of the Muslims in Bulgaria was also debated. During a meeting with Count Andrassy on 8 April 1878 on Bulgaria, Essad Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, declared that the rights of Muslims must be guaranteed.⁸⁰ According to another report from Vienna, on 9 April 1878, the Austro-Hungarian government again addressed the Russian government concerning the establishment of a Bulgarian state and demanded the protection of the “Greek population” in the region.⁸¹

During the discussions concerning the revision of the treaty, now called the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, various Ottoman representatives contacted the ministers of different European countries. Ottoman politicians and diplomats, including Safvet Pasha, the foreign minister, and certain ambassadors – Karatheodori Pasha in Brussels, Halil Bey in Budapest, Musurus Pasha in London, Turhan Bey in Rome, Esad Bey in Vienna, Sadullah Bey in Berlin – tried to win the support of various European states for the Ottoman cause. During this effort, the Ottoman foreign minister prepared a draft describing the composition of the population in the Bulgarian principality. The

satub çekilmekte serbest ve muhtar olacaklardır ve bu babda kendilerine işbu mukavelenamenin tasdiki tarihinden itibaren üç sene mühlet verilmiştir mühlet-i mezkûrenin inkizasında emlâklerini satub memleketden çıkmamış olanlar Rusya tebeiyetinde kalacaklardır [...]” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 397). The same article deals further with property issues and pious foundations.

⁷⁹ “*Dans les provinces de l’Epire, de la Thessalie et le restant de la Macédoine de la vieille Serbie (vilayets de Prizren et Kossowo) et de la Thrace, les règlements élaborés pour la Bosnie et Herzégovine par la Conférence de Constantinople, seront mis en vigueur après avoir été adaptés aux besoins locaux*” (BOA, HR.SYS. 1220/2, f. 8).

⁸⁰ Essad Bey to Safvet Pacha, No. 9275/237, 8 April 1878, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 187, p. 3: “*Il a ajouté qu’il se proposait d’exiger des garanties pour les Musulmans qui continueraient à résider en Bulgarie tant sous le rapport de leur indépendance politique et religieuse qu’à l’égard de leurs droits de propriété.*”

⁸¹ Annex to 9283/238, Vienna, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 199.

Ottoman ambassador in London, Musurus Pasha, met on 20 April 1878 with the British foreign secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury. Lord Salisbury informed him that the British government supported the limitation of the Bulgarian principality to the territory between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains.⁸²

On 9 June 1878, Safvet Pasha sent a telegram to the Ottoman ambassadors in Paris, Rome, London, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, notifying them that the newspapers in Europe had published a memorandum purporting to be from the Sublime Porte and describing the pressure exerted by the Russian delegates during the negotiations of San Stefano.⁸³ The European public criticized the Treaty of San Stefano as a document dictated by Russia.⁸⁴

In July 1878, the European Commission of the Rhodope undertook an investigation in Thrace and interviewed refugees in different places. According to a report by the Ottoman members of the commission, Yusuf Rıza and Nashid Rashid, on 17 July 1294 (1878), every Muslim refugee reported sufferings among family members and countless killings committed by the Russians, particularly the Cossacks, and the refugees declared that they would not return to their homes until the Russian troops withdrew and the Ottoman administration returned.⁸⁵ However, the Russian member of the

⁸² "Il est spécialement de l'avis du gouvernement Impérial de limiter la Principauté de Bulgarie à la partie comprise entre le Danube et les Balkans" (confidential telegram from Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, No. 7236/197, 20 April 1878, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 203, p. 2).

⁸³ This memorandum was apocryphal: "Nous venons d'apprendre que les journaux de l'Europe ont publié un mémorandum comme émanant de la S. Porte sur la pression exercée par les Plénipotentiaires Russes lors des négociations du Traité de San Stefano. Le mémorandum est apocryphe. La S. Porte n'a jamais adressé à personne une telle pièce: vous pouvez l'affirmer de la façon la plus catégorique" (BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 233 and 234, Telegram of Safvet Pasha to the Ottoman Representatives, No. 51/409/55, 9 June 1878).

⁸⁴ Correspondence Politique, Edition Française, XVIème année, Vienne, 5 Juin 1878, No. 129, describes the negotiations between 2/14 February and 19 February/3 March in Adrianople and San Stefano, pointing out the pressure applied by Russian delegates. BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/5, f. 237.

⁸⁵ "Muhacirin-i merkumenin suret-i hal ve kallerinden anlaşıldığına göre içlerinde az çok zulüm ve taaddi görmemiş eşyalarını heman kâffeten gayb etmişler ise de familyası azasından dahi zayıfatı olmayarak toplica gelebilmiş hiç bir şahs yokdur. Bunlar meyanında kırk elli biçarenin bir ipele bağlı olduğu halde katil edildiğini gören adamlar ve beş on gurus almak için gözü önünde çocuklarının kanına girilmiş ve razz-ı irz ve namusunu Kazakların elinden kurtarmak kasdıyla firar ederken cigerparesini yol üzerine tesadüf eden caylara atmağa mecbur olmuş baba ve analar dahi müşahade olunmuşdur ki herbirinin yürekler dayanmayan süz ü güdâzı komisyon azasınca başka başka tesirâtı mucib olmakda idi. Kasabada ırzına tasallut ve bekareti izale edilmiş bir hayli kadın bulunduğî haber alınarak anlarda komisyon celb ile görüldüğü gibi takrirleri dahi mazbataya derc etdirildi. [...] bu biçarelerin hedef oldukları tîr-i taaddiyat ekseriyet üzere Rus

commission, seeing the adverse effects of these statements by the refugees, opposed questioning the refugees about their reasons for emigration and difficulties during emigration and tried to terminate the work of the commission. In this effort, he was supported by the German member of the commission. The French, and mainly the British, members of the commission, however, declared energetically that the commission would continue to function. "Since the Russian commissioner was ashamed to hear the statements of the refugees," he rarely participated in the work of the commission.⁸⁶ This kind of investigation helped to revise the territorial settlements of the Treaty of San Stefano.

The Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which revised the Treaty of San Stefano, also has provisions concerning the right of emigration of Muslims and their property in the Bulgarian principality and Serbia.⁸⁷

8. 1879 Treaty of Istanbul between the Ottoman Empire and Russia

Russia viewed the Treaty of Berlin as a defeat and insisted on concluding a separate treaty with the Ottoman Empire. Lord Salisbury declared to the Ottoman ambassador in London that Russia did not want to regulate the issue of withdrawal from the occupied Ottoman territories in the Treaty of Berlin. According to him, Russia wanted a separate treaty with the Ottoman Empire and connected this issue with the preparation of a new treaty.⁸⁸

askeri semtinden gelmiş ve irad olunan es'ileye her takımın cevapları başka başka ise de fakat vatanlarına gitmek arzusunda bulunup bulunmadıkları hakkındaki suale kadın erkek heman cümlesi tarafından 'vatanımız gözümüzde tütüyor. Şimdi gitmege hazırız. Ancak yüzlerinden ırz ve can ve malca bu derecelerde zarar gördüğümüz Rus askeri oradan çıkub hükümet-i Osmaniye gitmeyince kendimizi denize atar avdet etmeyiz' tarzında cevap verilmiştir" (Rapport, No. 231, BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/2, f. 27, p. 1).

⁸⁶ BOA, HR.SYS. 1219/2, f. 27, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁷ Article 2 (establishment of Bulgarian principality), Point 12, states with respect to Muslims who do not want to live in Bulgaria and their property: "*Les propriétés musulmanes ou autres qui fixeraient leur résidence personnelle hors de la principauté pourront y conserver leurs immeubles en les affermant ou en les faisant administrer par des tiers*" (Schopoff, *Les Réformes*, 376). Further, the point deals with a commission to address the issue of property and pious foundations in Bulgaria. For the Turkish text see Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 409. The same provision applies to the Muslims from Serbia in Point 39; see Schopoff, 386. The Muslims who wanted to leave their lands that were ceded to Serbia were allowed to sell the lands within three years; Özkan, *Sırp Bağımsızlığı*, 324-325.

⁸⁸ BOA, Y. PRK. HR. 3/77, f. 2, 19 Teşrin-i sani [November] 1878 [1 December 1878], telegram from the Ottoman embassy in London.

The Treaty of Istanbul of 8 February 1879 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was based on previously signed treaties, notably the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano (*Ayastefanos mukaddemat-ı sulhiyesi*) and the Treaty of Berlin.⁸⁹ Seven states signed the Treaty of Berlin. The Treaty of Istanbul would replace the Treaty of San Stefano, which was signed by the two states. According to the official Ottoman documents, the demand for a separate treaty came from the Russian government, because there were points, which were not included in the Treaty of Berlin, and the Ottoman-Russian issues that were to be addressed separately. According to the Ottoman representatives, the Russian proposal sought to revitalize or confirm the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Ottoman government did not want to negotiate a new treaty and postponed the undertaking, but Russia put pressure on the Ottoman government by prolonging the Russian military occupation of the province of Edirne. Finally, the British government recommended that the Ottoman government negotiate a separate peace treaty with Russia. The Ottoman delegates negotiated and, according to their report to the Ottoman government, they obtained "big" changes in the Russian treaty draft.⁹⁰

In this treaty too, population transfer and the right of emigration were central issues. In the Russian draft, there was an article concerning the Muslims in the territories ceded to Russia, mainly in Eastern Anatolia, Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.⁹¹ Article 7 provided that Muslims in the territories ceded to Russia (*Rusya'ya terk olunan mahaller ahalisi*) were to be allowed to sell their properties and emigrate (*çekilmekte muhtardır*) within three years. If they remained in their lands, they would become Russian subjects.⁹² In the Russian draft, it was noted that this provision was taken from the Treaty of

⁸⁹ BOA, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 1. Mukavelename, 29 Zilhicce 1295. In the first article of the draft, the treaties of 30 March 1856, Paris; 13 March 1871, London; 19 February 1878, San Stefano (*Ayastefanos Treaty Mukaddemat-ı sulhiyesi*; the word "treaty" is deleted); and 13 July 1878, Berlin were mentioned as the basis of the new treaty.

⁹⁰ BOA, Y.A.RES. 2/13, f. 1, 16 Safer 1296 [9 February 1879]. Meclis-i Mahsus-ı Vükela mazbatası suretidir.

⁹¹ However, in the eventual article, the names of these territories and the identification of the population group as Muslims were omitted.

⁹² Rusya ile İstanbul Andlaşması, "(Yedinci madde) Rusya'ya terkolunan mahaller ahalisi bu ilkâlar haricinde ikamet etmek istedikleri halde emlaklerini satıp çekilmekte muhtardır bunun için kendilerine muahede-i haziranın tasdiki tarihinden itibaren üç sene mühlet verilmiştir mühlet-i mezkûrenin inkizasında emlaklerini satıp memleketten çıkmamış bulunanlar Rusya tabiiyetinde kalacaklardır" (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 426). For the draft of this article see BOA, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 12.

San Stefano, Article 21.⁹³

Another article of the treaty concerns the Orthodox Ottoman subjects and their emigration to Russia. In the Russian draft (*layiha*), Article 7 declared a general amnesty for Ottoman subjects (both Russian and Ottoman subjects, in the final version) who had had a relationship with the Russian army (both armies, in the final version) and provided that the Ottoman authorities would engage in no opposition if some of them (in the final version, the word “some” was deleted) departed behind the retreating Russian army.⁹⁴ This article too was taken from the Treaty of San Stefano, Article 27. After some changes, including renumbering the article as Article 8, it was accepted.⁹⁵ In this way, Russia tried to secure the emigration to Russia of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects. Russia was thus continuing its settlement policy and its policy toward the Ottoman Orthodox subjects. Concerning the population issue, the Treaty of Istanbul was a confirmation of the Treaty of San Stefano. The comments of the Ottoman authorities on the Russian draft indicate that there were no disagreements or disputes regarding the content of these two articles.

9. Greek-Muslim conflicts over Crete in 1897

In the 1890s, there were revolts and conflicts involving the Greek insurgents on Crete. The insurgents attacked the Muslim population and forced many people to leave their lands and migrate to the city centers. During these conflicts, England, Russia, and France

⁹³ BOA, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 20, p. 5.

⁹⁴ “Rusya askerinin arkası sıra familyaları ile beraber çekilmek isteyecek bazı kesanın azimetine memurin-i Osmaniye tarafından muhalefet olunmayacaktır (Ayastefanos muahedesinin yigirmiyedinci bendi)” (BOA, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 19, p. 4, 1878.2.8). Changes in the article as Article 8, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 13.

⁹⁵ “Sekizinci madde: Devlet-i aliyye ile Rusya devleti esna-yı muharebede tarafeyn ordularıyla icra ettikleri münasebatdan dolayı müttehim bulunan Rusya veya Osmanlı tebası hakkında hiç bir suretle mücazat etmemekliği ve etdirilmekliği müteakibilen taahhüd ederler. Rusya askerinin arkası sıra familyalarıyla beraber çekilmek isteyecek kesanın azimetine memurin-i Osmaniye tarafından muhalefet olunmayacaktır” (BOA, HR.TO. 476/19, f. 13). For the final form of the treaty in French see BOA, Y.A.RES. 2/13, f. 5, 27 January / 8 February 1879. Articles VII and VIII: “Article VII. Les habitants des localités cédées à la Russie qui voudraient fixer leurs résidences hors de ces territoires seront libres de se retirer en vendant leurs propriétés immobilières. Un délai de trois ans leur sera accordé à ces effets à partir de la ratification du présent acte. Passé ce délai, les habitants qui n’auraient pas quitté le pays et vendus leurs immeubles resteront sujets russes. Article VIII. Les deux parties prennent mutuellement l’engagement de ne sévir ni de laisser sévir d’aucune manière contre les sujets russes ou ottomans qui auraient été compromis par leurs relations avec les armées des deux Empires pendant la guerre. Dans le cas ou quelques personnes voudraient se retirer avec leurs familles à la suite des troupes russes, les autorités ottomanes ne s’opposent pas à leur départ.”

intervened. They negotiated with the Ottoman government and made proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Ottoman military forces from Crete and the appointment of Prince George, the son of the Greek king, as governor of the island. According to the study by Pınar Şenişik, during these negotiations, the representatives of the European powers favored a forced expulsion of Muslims from the island and argued that this measure would halt interethnic conflicts or at least the clash between the Greeks and the Muslims.

Interestingly, it was the British representatives in particular who insisted on the expulsion of Muslims from the island.⁹⁶

After the Ottoman-Greek war of 1897, a peace treaty was signed on 22 November / 4 December 1897. Article 7 of the treaty provided that the Muslims in Thessaly were free to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire within three years. The same right was also given to Greeks who were living in the territories ceded to the Ottoman Empire after the war. It is useful to study the negotiations to see the respective attitudes of the two countries regarding the issue of emigration:

The changes to Article 7, as drafted, were made during the negotiations.⁹⁷ The Ottoman representatives reported on 26 October 1897 (29 Cemaziyelevvel 1315/14 Teşrin-ievvel 1313) to the grand vizier that in the fourth and fifth sessions with the Greek representatives, the latter demanded changes in Article 7.⁹⁸ They demanded a reciprocal right (*mütekabiliyet*) for the population in the region ceded to the Ottoman Empire to migrate to Greece. Another demand concerned the right of the population in the territory ceded to Greece to emigrate. Here the Greek representatives claimed that the article, as drafted, obliged non-Muslims who would come to the

⁹⁶ Pınar Şenişik, *The Transformation of Ottoman Crete. Revolts, Politics and Identity in late Nineteenth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 169, 195.

⁹⁷ BOA, BEO, 1056/79137, f. 14 and the draft of the treaty f. 16.

⁹⁸ At the beginning of the negotiations, the draft of Article 7 of the peace treaty was as follows: "*Bu kere muharebe sebebiyle asakir-i şahane tarafından işgal olunub Yunanistan'a iade kılınan mahallerin seknesi ile ahali-i asliyesi memalik-i şahaneye muhaceretde ve orada ikametgâhlarını tayinde serbest olacıkları gibi muahede-i hazıra tasdiknamelerinin mübadelesi tarihinden itibaren beş sene müddet zarfında evvelce memurin-i aideye ita olunacak bir beyanname mucebince tabiiyyet-i osmaniyeyi kabul ve ihtiyar etmek hakkını haiz olacaklar ve bununla beraber 24 Mayıs 1881 tarihli mukavelename mucebince Yunanistan'da kain emlaklarından tamamıyla ve bila mani' istifade ve bunları idarede devam eyeleyeceklerdir. Huudun yeniden tashihî münasebetyile devlet-i aliyeye iade kılınan mahallerin seknesinden ve ahali-i asliyesinden bulunan teb'a-i Yunaniyeye aynı fevaid bahşolunmuşdur. Muahede-i hazıranın tasdikından itibaren Tesalya'da mütemekkin ahali-i Müslime beş sene için hudmet-i askeriyeden muaf olacaktır"* (BOA, BEO, 1056/79137, f. 17).

Ottoman Empire for trade reasons to accept Ottoman citizenship, a requirement they regarded as unacceptable. They stated that the article should address only the Muslims of Thessaly.⁹⁹ In the following sessions, the Greek representatives received a proposal for revision of this article. According to the new proposal, the territory of Thessaly was given to Greece in 1881, and although the region was occupied by the Ottoman army during the war of 1897, it did not become an Ottoman territory but remained a Greek one. According to Article 4 of the preliminary treaty, only the population of the ceded territories had the right to emigrate freely, so that this provision could not be applied to the population of Thessaly. However, the Ottoman representatives insisted upon giving the right to free emigration to the population in the areas that had been occupied by the Ottoman army and returned to Greece after the war. The Greek representatives decided to consult the Greek government in Athens.¹⁰⁰ In the next session, the Greek representatives requested some changes and the Ottoman representatives accepted them: 1) One word was changed in the first point of Article 7, based on Article 8 of the agreement of 24 May 1881, which determined the right to free emigration of the

⁹⁹ “[...] işbu muhaceretleri veya ikametleri sebebiyle memalik-i şahanede tabiiyet-i osmaniyeyi ihraz edecekler hakkındaki son fıkranın Tesalya’dan gelecek ahalinin tabiiyet-i devlet-i aliyeyi kabule mecbur olmaları manasını mutazammın olub işbu fikra hükmünün yalnız İslamlara hasrına birşey dinemeyub hükümet-i seniyyenin bu suret-i tahrirden maksadı dahi bundan ibaret olmak melfuz olduğuna ve ikametkah tayiniyle laeclülticare[?] gelecek olan ahali-i gayri müslimenin tabiiyet-i saltanat-ı seniyyeyi kabule fikra-i mezkure hükmünce mecbur olması lazım gelüb bu ise biloücuh muvafık maslahat ve şayan-ı kabul olmayacağına mebni işbu fıkranın dahi şu mülahazata tevofiken suret-i münasibde tebdili taleb olunması üzerine”, BOA, BEO 1056/79137, f. 14, 14 Teşrin-i evvel 1313/29 Cemaziyellevvel 1315 [26 October 1897].

¹⁰⁰ In the seventh and eighth sessions the Greek representatives represented the order regarding the change in the Article 7, which they recieved from Athens: “29 Cemizyelevvel 1315 [26 October 1897] tezkire-i cakeranemizle arz olunan yedinci maddesine bu kere Atinadan aldıkları talimata istinaden zikr olunan murahhaslar tarafından mukaddemat-ı sulhiyenin dördüncü maddesinin buna dair olan fıkrasında ‘yalnız iade idilan arazide mütemekkin ahalinin serbesti-i muhacereti’ tabiri kullanılmış ve Tesalya kıtası her ne kadar asakir-i şahane tarafından işgal edilmiş ise de hükümet-i seniyyenin taht-ı tasarruf-ı hakikiyesine girmeyub oralaradaki arazi ise hükümet-i Yunaniyeye aid olduğu ve mukaddemat-ı mezkûrenin bu suretle tahriri dahi yalnız bu kere idilecek kat’i tahdid-i hududdan sonra iade olunacak arazideki ahalinin serbesti-i hicreti maksadına müstenid olduğunu bil-beyan madde-i mezkûrenin ol vechile tashihi taleb olunması üzerine mukaddemat-ı mezkûrenin fikra-i mebhusesinin asakir-i merkume canibinden işgal olunan mahallere şamil olacağı bu maddenin süfere-yı düvel-i muazzama ile hin-i müzakeresinde karargir olmuş ve bu yerlerin asakir-i şahane tarafından zabt ve işgali dahi oraların kaideten taht-ı idarei-i saltanat-ı seniyyeye girmiş olduğu cihetle bu yolda itiraz dermianına kat’a mahal olmadığı [...] taraf-ı cakeranemizden bil etraf beyan edilmesine mebni muma ileyhima keyfiyeti bu suretle Atina’ya bil-işar yemiden talimat isteyeceklerini ifade eylemelerinden naşi bu babda bir karar ittihazı atıye talik olunmuş” (BOA, BEO. 1056/79137, f. 4, p. 1, 10 Cemaziyelahir 1315/25 Teşrinievvel 1313 [6 November 1897]).

Muslim population, whether Greek subjects or not: *iktisab* instead of *ihtiyar*, which did not change the meaning of the article and therefore was accepted by the Ottoman representatives. 2) In Article 3, “its districts” (*nevahisi*) was added to the sentence *Tesalya’da emlaki olan müessesat*; this too was accepted. The Greek representatives demanded the addition of a fourth point to the article, granting the same right to the population in the region ceded to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰¹ This too was accepted.¹⁰²

In the end, the Ottoman demand to provide a free emigration right to the population of Thessaly was accepted, but with the limitation that only the Muslims of Thessaly had the right.¹⁰³ The desire of Greek representatives during the negotiations to limit the right to Muslims can be interpreted as an indication that the Greek government was fearful of a voluntary migration of its Greek population to the Ottoman Empire.

10. Treaties in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913

This section aims to describe the parallels between the treaties after the Balkan Wars and the nineteenth-century treaties discussed above, to support the primary contention of this paper that forced population transfers, ethnic cleansing policies, and negotiations for population exchange in the Balkans existed before the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century. There were several peace treaties and

¹⁰¹ The Greek wish for an additional fourth point to the article: “*gerek Tesalya sekine veya ahali-yi asliyesine ve gerek orada bulunan ve devlet-i aliyyeye iade kılınan arazide emlaki mutasarrıf olan müessesat veya navahi vekillerine aynı fevaid ita olunmuşdur*” (BOA, BEO, 1056/79131, f. 12, 20 Cemaziyelahir 1315/4 Teşrinisani 1313 [16 November 1897]).

¹⁰² BOA, BEO, 1056/79131, f. 12. In the end it was as follows: “*Madde 7 – Tisalya’nın sekencesile ahali-i asliyesinden olup 24 Mayıs sene 1881 tarihli mukavelenamenin on üçüncü maddesi mucubince tabiiyeti Yunaniye’yi iktisab etmiş veya etmemiş olan müslümanlar memalik-i şahaneye muhacerette ve orada ikâmetgâhlarını tayinde serbest olacaklardır. Tabiiyyet-i Yunaniye’yi iktisab etmiş olanlar muahede-i hazıra tasdiknamelerinin mübadelesi tarihinden itibaren üç sene müddet zarfında evvelce memurin-i aideye ita olunacak bir beyanname mucebince tabiiyyet-i Osmaniye’yi kabul ve ihtiyar etmek selâhiyetini haiz olacaklardır. Muhacirin-i merkumenin cümlesi marüzzikr mukavelenameye teofikan Yunanistan’da kâin emlaklerinden tamamiyle ve bilâ mani istifade ve bunları idare devam eyliyeceklerdir. Hududun yeniden tashihî münasebetile Devlet-i Aliye’ye iade kılınan mahallerin [sekinesinden] ve ahali-yi asliyesinden olanlara veyahut elyevm mahal-i mezkûrede mukim bulunanlara müteakiben aynı fevaid bahşolunmuştur.*” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 439–440.)

¹⁰³ The Ottoman archives contain documents concerning the emigration of some population groups by this agreement. After the settlement of the borderline, the village of Koçkılani / Koçoklani remained on the Ottoman side, and part of the population of the village used the right to emigrate (“*hicret hakkı*”) to Greece. BOA, BEO. 1501/112516, 12 Safer 1318 [12 June 1900].

agreements concerning migration of population groups in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. When we compare these agreements with those of the second half of the nineteenth century, we find no considerable difference. The treaties remain in the tradition of the treaties of the nineteenth century and continue it:

The *Treaty of Istanbul* between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, signed on 16/29 September 1913, provides in Article 7 that the [Muslim] population in the territories ceded to Bulgaria will become Bulgarian citizens. However, if they wish, they can obtain Ottoman citizenship by applying within four years.¹⁰⁴ Article 8 provides that the members of the Bulgarian population who left their homes during the war have the right to keep their properties and return to their homes within two years.¹⁰⁵

An annex to the same treaty, Protocol No. 1, provides in Article C for an exchange of population within the area along the Ottoman-Bulgarian borders to a distance of 15 kilometers. According to the protocol, villages are to be exchanged in their entirety and the population is to be compensated through the substitution of estates on each side.¹⁰⁶

The *Treaty of Athens* of 1/14 November 1913 between the

¹⁰⁴ “Madde 7: Canib-, Hükümet-i Seniyyeden Bulgaristan’a terk edilen arazinin ahali-i asliyesinden olup orada ihtiyar-ı ikamet etmiş bulunan eşhas Bulgar tebaası olacaklardır. Ahali-i merkumeden bu suretle Bulgar tabiiyetine geçmiş olanlar Bulgar memurin-i mahalliyesine sadece bir beyanname itası ve Osmanlı şebenderhanelerinde bir muamele-i kaydiye icrası suretiyle dört sene zarfında bulundukları yerlerde tabiiyet-i Osmaniyeyi ihtiyariyle eylemek salâhiyetini haiz olacaklardır. [...] İhtiyar-ı tabiiyet keyfiyeti şahsî olup hükümet-i Osmaniyeye mecburî değildir. Elyeom sağır bulunanlar sin-ni rüşde vusullerinden itibaren dört sene zarfında hak-kı hiyarlarını istimal edeceklerdir. [...] Mamafih ahali-i merkume şehir ve kasabat ile karyelerde bulunan her gûna emval-i gayri menkulelerini muhafaza edebilirler ve bunları eşhas-ı sâlise marifetiyle idare ettirebilirler”. (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 462–463).

¹⁰⁵ The rights of the Bulgarians in Article 8: “Memalik-i Osmaniyedeki Bulgar cemaati memâlik-i mezkûredeki camaat-ı saire-i huristyaniyenin elyem haiz oldukları aynı hukuku haiz olacaklardır. Tebea-i Osmaniyeden olan Bulgarlar emval-i menkule ve gayri menkulelerini muhafaza edecekler ve hukuk-ı şahsiye ve tasarrufiyelerinin istimal ve intifaı hususunda zerrece iz’âç edilmeyeceklerdir. Vakayi-i ahire esnasında mesken ve mevalarını terk etmiş olanlar nihayet iki sene zarfında vâdet edebileceklerdir” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 463–464).

¹⁰⁶ “Her iki taraftaki Bulgar ve Müslüman ahalinin bir de onların bütün hudud-i müşterek boyunca nihayet on beş kilometroluk bir muntaka dahilindeki emlâkinin ihtiyarî olarak müteakilen mübadelesi teshil hususunda iki hükümet beyinde ittifak hasıl olmuştur. Mübadele köylerin tamamile mübadelesi suretinde vukubulacaktır. Nefs-i kurâ ile etrafındaki emvalin mübadelesi iki hükümetin himayesi tahtında ve mübadele olunacak köyler heyet-i ihtiyariyesinin iştirakile icra olunacaktır. İki hükümet canibinden tayin olunacak muhtelif komisyonlar mebhusun anı karyeler ile efrad-ı ahali beyinde mübadele-i emvale ve icab ederse bu mübadelâtan mübeis farkları tavize iptidar edeceklerdir” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 466).

Ottoman Empire and Greece provides in Article 4 for the granting of Greek citizenship to the population in the territories ceded to Greece. Those who want to obtain Ottoman citizenship must apply within three years to the Greek authorities and the Ottoman representatives in Greece. Further, Article 6 provides that these Muslims will retain their right to the properties they have left.¹⁰⁷

The provisions of these treaties were not always easy to implement. One of the documents in the Ottoman archives shows, for example, that the interruption of the Ottoman-Greek diplomatic relations because of the World War I made it impossible to handle according to the Treaty of Athens.¹⁰⁸

The *Treaty of Istanbul* of 13 March 1913 between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire provides in Article 4 that members of the population in the areas ceded to Serbia will become Serbian subjects and, if they wish, within three years after the signing of the treaty they can receive Ottoman citizenship.¹⁰⁹

Again, the *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk* of 3 March 1918 between Russia and the Ottoman government, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, provides in Article 11 that Muslim subjects have the right to sell their estates and migrate to the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁰ According to archival documents, many Muslims in Russia petitioned the Ottoman embassy in Moscow for permission to emigrate to the Ottoman

¹⁰⁷ “Yunanistan’ın zir-i idaresine intikal eden arazi-i Osmaniyyede mütemekkin kesân Yunan tebeası olacaklar. Ve Yunan memur-ini aidesine bir beyanname itası ve Osmanlı şehbenderhanelerinde bir muamele-i kaydiye icrası suretiyle bugünden itibaren üç sene zarfında tabiiyet-i Osmaniyyeyi ihtiyar eylemek salâhiyetini haiz olacaklardır.” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 478–479).

¹⁰⁸ BOA, M.V. (Meclis-i Vükela) 208/115, f. 1: 20 Temmuz 1333 [1 August 1897]: “Yunan hükümeti ile münakid Atina muahedesi mucebince Yunan tabiiyetini ihraz idiüb tabiiyet-i Osmaniyyeyi ihtiyar itmeksizin mahalın Osmaniyyeye gelmiş olan eşhasdan hakk-ı hayarlarını bilistimal Osmanlı tabiiyetini ihraz etmek isteyenlerin suret-i kaydları ve Yunanilik sıfatını muhafazada ihtar edenlerin hudud-ı Osmaniyyeden ihracları hakkında müttehiz karar üzerine vilayat ve elviye-i müstakileye tebligat icra edilmiş isede ahiren hükümet-i mezkure ile münasebat-ı siyasiyenin münkat’ olmasına mebni vaz’-ı hazıra göre eşhas-ı merkume hakkında olunacak muameleyi müstefid dahiliye nezaretinin 19 Temmuz 1333 tarihli ve 409 numarolu tezkiresi okundu.”

¹⁰⁹ “Sırbistan’a terkedilen arazide sakin bulunan eşhas Sırp tebeası olacaklar ve muahede-i hazranın imzasından itibaren üç sene zarfında Sırp memur-ini müteallikasına bir beyanname itası suretiyle tabiiyet-i Osmaniyyeyi ihtiyar eylemek salâhiyetini haiz bulunacaklardır”. (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 490–491).

¹¹⁰ “İslâm dininde bulunan Rus tebeası emval ve emlaklerini nakde tahvil etmek ve emval-i mevcudelerini beraberlerinde götürmek suretiyle memalik-i Osmaniyye’ye hicret etmek hakkını haiz olacaklardır” (Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, 516).

Empire.¹¹¹

The negotiations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire for a population exchange in 1914 were canceled because of the beginning of the First World War. The Bulgarian-Greek voluntary population exchange after the First World War, the Turkish-Greek agreement for a compulsory population exchange in 1923,¹¹² and other such exchanges can be regarded as the continuation of a tradition that began in the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

The primary conclusion of this article is that the forced migrations, ethnic cleansing policies, and population exchanges in the Balkans did not begin with the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, but had a long tradition beginning at the latest in the first half of the nineteenth century and renewed several times during the century. Expulsions and massacres during and after the Balkan Wars were only a continuation of what had been practiced for more than a century.

As a further conclusion, we can distinguish different forms of population transfers during the nineteenth century. Between the Ottoman and the Russian empires, there was a competition for the Orthodox population, which both empires wanted on their side. As the Russian ambassador in Istanbul notes: "*The sympathies of our co-religionists in Turkey have always formed the real basis of our influence in the East*".¹¹³ In contrast, the attitude of Russia toward Muslims during the war of 1877–1878 and the Russian proposal for the total expulsion of Muslims represent ethnic purification policies that would be described today as ethnic cleansing.

During the establishment of Greece and Serbia as nation-states, however, the population issue was characterized by the expulsion of

¹¹¹BOA, HR.SYS. 2296 A/4 A, 1 January 1918.

¹¹² Renée Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean. An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003); Turkish translation: *Ege'yi Geçerken. 1923 Türk-Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi*, translated by Müfide Pekin and Ertuğ Altınay (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005); Nedim İpek, *Mübadele ve Samsun* [Population Exchange and Samsun] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000); İbrahim Erdal, *Mübadele. Uluslaşma Sürecinde Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923–1925* [Population Exchange. Turkey and Greece in the Process of Nation-Building, 1923–1925] (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2012).

¹¹³ Rossiyskiy Gosudarstveniy Istoricheskiy Archiv, Fond 1561, Op. 1, Ed. 3 (1877), p. 3, Zapiski I. P. Ignatieva (in French).

Muslims. The expulsion of Muslims from Greece and Serbia was primarily carried out according to multilateral agreements. Russia and the European powers played a crucial role in this process. It seems that the nationalist movements in the Balkans viewed the fight against Ottoman rule almost as a fight against their Muslim neighbors. The leaders of the national movements considered the expulsion of Muslims a prerequisite for genuine autonomy of the nation-state. Greece became the first example of a "homogenized" nation-state in the Balkans. It had already expelled most of its Muslims during the war of independence. The Great Powers, notably Russia, played a decisive role in this process. Under the pretext of ending conflicts between Muslims and Greeks, or Muslims and Serbs, the European states agreed concerning the forced emigration of Muslims from Greece and Serbia. They regarded the Muslims as a threat to the independence of the Balkan states.¹¹⁴ Justin McCarthy supports this conclusion. As he writes in the first chapter of his detailed book on the expulsion of the Muslims,

As will be seen, creating a nation by expelling Turks and other Muslims was a principle that was to be followed by Bulgarians, Russians, and Armenians. It was the misfortune of the Muslim communities of the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Caucasus that they lay in the path of the new nationalisms. Their misfortune was compounded by the fact that the power upon which they depended, the Ottoman Empire, did not have the strength to defend them.¹¹⁵

Another prominent historian on the migration of Muslims, Nedim İpek, also emphasizes the policy of the Balkan nations to establish ethnically "purified" nation-states as one of the main reasons for the emigration of Muslims. He regards the anti-Turkish attitude of the European powers or their policy in the Near East as the general reason for this emigration. He quotes, for example, Theodore Roosevelt, who said during the First World War, "to leave the Turks in Europe is a crime against humanity!"¹¹⁶

Why are these "early" forced population transfers not well

¹¹⁴ We find the same explanation in the studies by Kemal H. Karpat. He writes that the Muslims, who were a strong minority and owned the larger part of the lands, were regarded as a hindrance to the establishment of nation-states, and that the success of the establishment of nation-states depended on the expulsion of the Muslims. Karpat, *Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler*, 175.

¹¹⁵ McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, 13.

¹¹⁶ İpek, *Mübadele ve Samsun*, 2.

known in the Balkan historiography and why do the historians in the Balkans tend to view the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 as the beginning of forced population transfers, ethnic cleansing, and population exchange? In my opinion, the main reason for this attitude is that before the Balkan Wars mainly the "Turks" (Muslims of different ethnic origins) suffered from the population transfers, but during and after the Balkan Wars, the Balkan Christians also became victims of treaties and agreements. The latter attracted much greater attention by the Balkan historians or historians from the Balkans than the Muslims and their sufferings.

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Turkish National Movement and Soviet Russia in Caucasus (1919-1922)*

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Abstract:

The article presents the role of Caucasus in the establishment of new political relations between Soviet Russia and the Turkish National Movement during the eventful period between 1919 and 1922. It examines the politics used by two different regimes, whose common enemy made them realize collaborative actions while finding an approach to achieve their own interests. In the framework of this complicated process, the region of an age-old confrontation between Russian and Ottoman empires - Caucasus, had again crucial importance in the post-war period to facilitate the overall connection between Soviet Russia and Ankara Government.

Keywords: Turkish National Movement, Soviet Russia, Caucasus, collaboration, border question

Introduction

The end of the First World War brought a serious reshaping of the European map and of the international relations. Being in confrontation for many years in the Caucasian region, now the successors of the Ottoman and Russian empires - Ankara government of Mustafa Kemal and Soviet government of Vladimir Ulyanov - Lenin, had to solve the "Caucasian question", which included not only the determination of the

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borderline and territorial pretensions, but the role of the region that it would play in the mutual relation in the hostile international environment. The solution was complicated given the fact that after the October Revolution the Caucasian nations started their fight for independence and establishment of their own countries. The instability of the new states and their dependency on the "big players", made them part of a game for distribution of political impact and reaffirming of the control over key territories. At the same time, the exposure of Soviet Russia and Turkey*** to international intervention, the source of which was the same enemy in the face of the Entente, raised the natural necessity for cooperation. Thus, the common interests made the Caucasus figuratively and directly bridging Soviet-Turkish strategies whereas the new Caucasian states turned out to be just a tool of implementation, doomed to fail in their struggle for independence.

The October Revolution and the following withdrawal of Russia from the First World War drastically changed the political and international situation in the Black Sea-Caspian region. A total transformation of the socio-political system and relations within the society of the former Russian empire were followed by the total change in the foreign policy of the new Soviet government. Three important decrees¹ issued by the new Soviet government of Vladimir Lenin, spread the influence of the revolutionary movement for freedom of the oppressed by the capitalist nations, peace, equality and self-determination. At the same time, a Civil war marked the beginning of the Soviet rule as the fight had to bring the final solution for the future of the state political system.

The new political situation opened a vacuum of power of the non-Russian populated periphery territories. Especially the in Caucasus, with the abdication of the Tsar, the Caucasian nations started to struggle first for broader autonomy status, and after the October Revolution, for establishing independent countries. This process went along with a search of powerful assistance in the process of self-determination and sovereignty formation among the Entente allies,

***In the present article the term "Turkey" has a particular role as a synonym of the new formation, established with the beginning of the Turkish National Movement in Ankara and represented by the Grand National Assembly and the government there.

¹ "Dekret o Mire", *Izvestiya*, No. 208 (27 October 1917): 1; "Deklaratsiya Pravnaródoov Rossii", *Dekrety Sovetskoy Vlasti* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi literatury, 1957), Eds. N. Lebedev, Vol. 1, 39-41; "Obrashchenie Kovsemtrudiyashchimsya Musul'manam Rossii i Vostoka", *Ibid.*, 113-115.

while the latter put their efforts to destroy the Bolshevik thread, at the same time where purposefully striving to fill out the power vacuum the on Caucasus, of special importance to Great Britain in geostrategic and economical aspect. The situation in Northern Caucasus was more complicated due to the social realities and cultural specifics, but both societies - in Northern Caucasus and in Transcaucasia, were extremely divided on political base, which at the end was in favour of the Soviet regime.

Russian withdrawal from the war, gave strong reason to the Ottoman Empire to regain the lost Caucasian territories and to establish its own rule there. These plans were realised only for a couple of months in 1918 as in November the Ottoman Empire left the war as a defeated side and on its turn in 1919 its territories were occupied by the Allied powers. This led to the natural zeal among the nascent Turkish nation to protect its territories and sovereignty. Being in isolation the newly established government of Mustafa Kemal was ready to cooperate with the Soviet regime, as both were more or less exposed to similar threads. Having been once the most serious enemy, now the Russians in the face of the Soviet regime were seen as the most natural ally. Still, the historical collisions left many problems to be solved between the two governments which made them use complicated political game and diplomacy, especially concerning Caucasian issues.

Establishment of Turkish-Soviet relations and the significance of the Caucasus

In the first period of the Turkish National Movement (June 1919–March 1920)², when there was a hope among its leaders to achieve their aims peacefully and in collaboration with the Ottoman government, Mustafa Kemal initiated an investigation for possible relations with the Soviet government and unofficial contacts were established. It was also a period when still the only internationally recognized authority was that of the Sultan and the Entente showed total neglect of the National Movement, accepting it as a threat to their interests, which they should deal quickly with. In the second period (March 1920–October 1922), when the military confrontation was seen as inevitable, vigorous and decisive steps were undertaken to establish official relations with Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), connected with the strong reliance on their material and financial support. At the same time the fear of the Entente powers for the eventual formation of Soviet-

² William Hal, *Turkish foreign policy, 1744-2000* (London: Routledge, 2002), 46.

Nationalistic bloc was well exploited by Mustafa Kemal.

The Soviets accepted the revolution in Turkey as close to theirs or same as it was directed against the imperialists. In his article the editor of *Izvestiya* newspaper, Yuri Steklov, characterized the Turkish revolution as a counterpart and an elongation of the October Revolution³. They relied that Turkey would also convert to communism and through it Bolsheviks would spread their political influence to the Near and Middle East. Thus, the Bolshevik regime would receive official recognition and come out of the isolation. Of great importance was the fact that "Revolutionary Turkey was expected to protect the exposed Russian flank in the Caucasus and to serve as bulwark likewise for revolutionary Hungary."⁴ Additionally, the Greek expansion in Asia Minor, considered to be controlled by Russia's enemy Great Britain, "could have in the long term blocked the Soviet access to the Mediterranean"⁵. Thus, it was in Moscow's interest to establish contacts with the National Movement, which opposed to the plans of the Entente.

For the Turkish Nationalists establishing relations with the Bolsheviks had several advantages: all claims to Constantinople and the Straits were renounced; both were not in favour of strong and independent Armenia; Soviet Russia wanted the withdrawal of the Western Powers from Caucasus and Turkey as much as the Turks⁶. In addition, through this cooperation they received support, an exit of the international isolation, and a "trump card" in their negotiation with the Entente - they could blackmail the latter for strengthening their connections with the Soviets, but also they could offer their help against them. "Whenever Turks were hard-pressed by the Entente and threatened with the dismemberment of their country, they turned inevitably, even though reluctantly, to the Soviet Union for support. On the other hand, in proportion as the Entente powers eased their pressure and displayed a willingness to compromise, the Soviet - Turkish rapprochement cooled off appreciably"⁷. And not last of importance, the Nationalists secured their northern border during the

³ Yuri Steklov, "Turetskaya Revolyutsiya", *Izvestiya*, No. 85 (637) (23 April 1919): 1.

⁴ Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958* (Washington: Univ. of Washington Press, 1959), 64.

⁵ Bülent Gökay, "Turkish Settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-20", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1996): 59.

⁶ Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan* (Geneva: V. Chevalier, 1966), 90-91.

⁷ Spector, *The Soviet Union*, 68.

war with Greece.

The first unofficial contact between the Nationalists and Bolsheviks according to some authors⁸ was on 25 May, 1919 in Havza, where Mustafa Kemal met personally with Bolshevik delegation led the Colonel (later marshal – a.n.) Semyon Budyonny. As this information is based on one historical source – the memories of Hüsametdin Ertürk, a former colonel of the Ottoman intelligence⁹, one can speculate whether there was such meeting or not, who were the exact participants and what was discussed on it. According to Ertürk, financial and military help was promised to Mustafa Kemal if he provided support against the Entente. Later, during Erzurum Congress, according to the memories of Gen. Kazım Karabekir, Dr. Ömer Lütfi and Dr. Fuat Sabit were sent to establish relations with the Bolsheviks and to familiarize with the situation in Baku, after that the latter went to Moscow¹⁰. In Baku, they accomplished the task to contact with the Bolsheviks and to investigate the possibilities for support. It is of peculiar interest that during the Sivas Congress the Bolsheviks sent as an observer their representative – Mahmudov¹¹, whose visit most probably was connected not only with the initial investigation the of situation and future opportunities for cooperation, but with the organization of revolt against the Entente by the Turkish workers and peasants¹². On September 1919, Nuri Pasha and later Halil Pasha were sent again to Baku for receiving material and financial support for the Turkish National Movement. The Azerbaijani government, by contrast with Azerbaijani communists, were not willing to cooperate with the Turkish Nationalists for fear not to estrange the British support¹³. The development of connections also continued through the secret society "Karakol", which representing a Temporary Revolutionary Government signed an agreement¹⁴ with the Soviet government on 11

⁸ Vasif Gafarov, "Russko-Turetskoe Sblizheniei Nezavisimost Azerbaydzhana (1919-1921 gg.)", *Kavkaz i Globalizatsiya*, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2 (2010): 241; Hal, *Turkish foreign policy*, 49-50; Gökay, "Turkish Settlement", 59; Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri: Ekim Devriminden Milli Mücadele'ye* (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1979), 108.

⁹ Samih Nafiz Tansu, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Başkanı Hüsametdin Ertürk* (İstanbul: ParolaYayımları, 2016), 336-339.

¹⁰ Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, Vol. 1, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2005), 406-407.

¹¹ Çağatay Benhür, "1920'li Yıllarda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: Kronolojik Bir Çalışma", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No: 24 (2008): 279.

¹² İsmet Konak, *Rus Devrimi ve Mustafa Kemal. Rus İç Savaşı (1918-1922) Döneminde Türk-Bolşevik İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2017), 287.

¹³ Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 161.

¹⁴ Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, Vol. 3, 1093-1095.

January, 1920, having the main aim the "liberation of all Muslim people from the imperialist slavery of Western Europe". Soviet Russia took responsibility to provide aid for the Turkish Revolution such as money, military and other material support, while the Turkish side – to support the Soviets against Gen. Anton Denikin, Admiral Alexander Kolchak and other enemies, and backing anti-British revolts in Batumi, Iran, Afghanistan and India. Both representative bodies would cooperate in the Caucasus to initiate movement against English and Russian imperialists and the obstructive governments of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, acting under the dictate of the imperialists. Other groups in Azerbaijan, led by Halil Pasha and Fuat Sabit, united in a "Turkish Communist Party", worked in close connection with the local Bolsheviks and Mustafa Kemal. The aim – receiving Soviet help in return for achieving sovietisation of Azerbaijan¹⁵ as it lied on the road to Anatolia, where military aid from RSFSR was expected.

The geostrategic position of Caucasus turned it into a bridge, across which Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists could join forces. It could provide a vital connection for the struggle against the British – the common enemy, and the events, taking place there, influenced both Bolshevik Russia and the Turkish National Movement. "Therefore, it was not a coincidence that the rapprochement of the Turkish National Movement with the Russian Bolsheviks was first materialized in this region in the form of Turco-Bolshevik cooperation for the Soviet-controlled Caucasus."¹⁶ Otherwise, the bridge could turn into a barrier or a springboard for aggression, realized by the British and the Caucasian governments that supported them. It was also the White Movement that with the financial and military support of the British continued the fight with the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the newly-born Turkish National Movement could be put under fire from two sides – one, already implemented with the occupation by the Entente of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the other – could come from the North, from the British controlled Caucasus. As Mustafa Kemal wrote to Gen. Kazim Karabekir on 6 February, 1920, the creation of a "Caucasian rampart" by the Entente countries as a part of a plan for the elimination of Turkey, would compel the leaders of the National Movement to undertake most extreme measures to prevent it. Also, if the Caucasian nations decided to be a barrier, then an agreement with the Bolsheviks for a joint offensive against them had to be made¹⁷.

¹⁵ Karabekir, *Istiklal Harbimiz*, Vol. 3, 1302-1308.

¹⁶ Gökay, "Turkish Settlement", 61.

¹⁷ Karabekir, *Istiklal Harbimiz*, Vol. 2, 997-999.

Special attention was to be paid not only to Azerbaijan but to Dagestan, too.

Northern Caucasus was also important part of the Caucasian "domino". After the establishment of the Mountain Republic¹⁸, it was often its representatives to discuss their unification with Azerbaijan with the support of the Ottomans and later, with that of the British. Announcing its sovereignty, the Mountain Republic searched for help from Georgia and Azerbaijan for its international recognition and for its struggle against the "Whites" and "Reds". There was even idea they to unite with the Transcaucasian Federative Republic¹⁹. The interest was mutual as Georgia and Azerbaijan supported the mountaineers in order to use them in the struggle against Gen. A. Denikin. At his strong offensive in beginning of 1919 in Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan already as a separate country, turned again to the idea for unification and continued to support the mountaineers with materials and financially. On 6 April, 1919 the Azerbaijani government issued a decision to provide military support for the mountaineers but as it could not be regular force a volunteer regiments were to be sent²⁰. When the territories of the Mountain Republic were occupied by the Russian White forces, the government continue to act from Tbilisi, searching for help against the occupier. As a step in this direction, most of the mountaineers were ready to unify with Azerbaijan. And yet, to accept the Mountain Republic as part of its country, meant for Baku government to open another front, as already there was one with the Armenians, and to worsen the relations with the Armed Forces of South Russia (AFSR)²¹, which was accepted as a serious threat is already at the border of Azerbaijan. In fact, due to the many revolts that arouse against Gen. A. Denikin and the fight with the Bolsheviks, he could hardly continue his way to occupy Georgia and Azerbaijan, even having the wish to do so.

¹⁸ V. Dzidzoev, "Osnovnyy etap Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy i Natsional'no-Gosudarstvennogo Stroitel'stvana Severnom Kavkaze (1917-1925 gg.)", *Vestnik Vladikavkazskogo Nauchnogo Tsentra*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2008): 2.

¹⁹ Sevindzh Alieva, "Azerbaydzhanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika i Gorskaya respublika: Sotrudnichestvo, proekty obedineniya i Vzaimodeystviya s Osmanskoy imperii (Podokumentam, Dogovoram i Notam 1918-1920 Godov)", *Severo-Kavkazskiy Yuridicheskiy Vestnik*, No. 4 (2015): 120.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

²¹ Sevindzh Alieva, "Azerbaydzhanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika i Gorskaya respublika": Sotrudnichestvo, Proekty Obedineniya i Vzaimodeystviya s Osmanskoy Imperii (Podokumentam, Dogovoram i Notam 1918-1920 Godov)", *Severo-Kavkazskiy Yuridicheskiy Vestnik*, No. 1 (2016): 91.

When the Bolsheviks got the upper hand over the AFSR at the end of 1919, the Georgian government started to warn Azerbaijan that the Turkish military officers, who at that time were in Northern Caucasus, namely Nuri Pasha, established connections with the Bolsheviks and it was very possible a Soviet Mountain Republic to be created²². This was not so far from the reality, as at that time already to the Turkish Nationalists became more and more clear that they would use the cooperation with Soviet Russia against the common enemy. On 17 March, 1920, Kazim Karabekir wrote to Nuri Pasha, who at that time was in Azerbaijan, that "For coming of Bolshevism, to our country which is already ready and to our borders, an immediate invasion of Caucasus and moreover Bolsheviks with a small force arriving in Azerbaijan, with Azerbaijanis together to move to our border will be quite enough for ensuring our aim.... It would be very proper the Bolshevik idea to be predominate in Azerbaijan and Dagestan and if necessary to support Batum Bolsheviks and also providing Georgia's participation to Bolshevism."²³

The Turkish national cadres had an important role in sovietisation of the mentioned territories in order to turn the Caucasus from a hostile barrier into a bridge for mutual cooperation. The process was facilitated by the decision of the British government in March, 1919 to retreat from the region until the end of the year, leaving only one regiment in Batumi, as Britain could not bear any more the financial burden of sustaining an army on two fronts, especially when it was obvious the Bolsheviks were winning against the ASFR. Then, the only obstacles for receiving the crucial Soviet military help were the independent republics at the Caucasus, which were cooperating with Bolsheviks and Nationalists' common enemy – the Entente.

Three days after the opening of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), on 26 April, 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent his first foreign document (a note) to V. I. Lenin offering the latter to establish diplomatic relations and to fight together against the imperialism. In order to strengthen their power for the struggle with the enemy, a financial support was requested from the Soviets - five million Turkish liras in gold, arms, and military supplies, military-technical means and medical materials, as well as food for the Turkish forces. One part of the document, concerning directly the Caucasus, reveal very well the attitude toward the republics there: "...if Soviet forces propose opening

²² *Ibid.*, 100.

²³ Karabekir, *Istiklal Harbimiz*, Vol. 3, 1155-1156.

military operations against Georgia or by a diplomatic path seek to use their influence to force Georgia to enter into a union and undertake the expulsion of the English from the territory of the Caucasus, the Turkish Government will commit itself to military operations against imperialist Armenia and to force the Azerbaijani Republic to enter the range of Soviet states."²⁴ Even though a question about the authenticity of the note was raised²⁵, the fact is that it very clearly depicted proven facts, namely – the request for the material and financial support, which was received by the Turks from the Bolsheviks; the later taken actions against Armenia and Georgia; the sovietisation of Azerbaijan against which GNA didn't oppose, on the contrary – as written above Turkish cadres facilitated the process on spot. In addition, the transfer of the Soviet support could not be carried out through hostile territories – there was a strong need of free passage for crucial interstate connection between Bolsheviks` and Nationalists` governments.

Northern Caucasus on the Road to Sovietisation

The internal situation in Northern Caucasus was complicated regarding several aspects of political, social and religious life such as land shortage, imperial migration policy, issues connected with educational and health problems and so on. The national movements gave another due to that problem and to the interethnic relations of the North-Caucasian people. After the October Revolution a more outlined political division put an obstacle in front of the state-building process in Northern Caucasus. The main reason was the growing separation between supporters of the "Whites" and the "Reds", which escalated the interethnic collision and put different social groups in conditions they were forced to cooperate according to common political aims. Thus, several formations appeared from time to time in order to find an exit from the political chaos in the former empire. One of them, already mentioned, the Alliance of the United Caucasian mountaineers and Dagestan - transforming to the Mountain Republic in May 1918, with the deepening of the Civil war, was trying to maneuver according to

²⁴ Letter of Mustafa Kemal-Pasha to the Soviet Government, 26 April 1920, RSASPH, f. 5, op. 2, d. 315, l. 38, quoted in Jamil Hasanly, "Russian-Turkish Relations between the Sovietization of Azerbaijan and the Sovietization of Armenia", *ADA Biweekly*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2012), http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol_5_no_2/Russian_Turkish_relations_between_the_Sovietization_of_Azerbaijan_and_the_Sovietization_of_Armenia_PART1A.htm (accessed on April 23, 2018).

²⁵ Hasan Bulent Paksoy, "U.S. and Bolshevik Relations with the TBMM Government: the First Contacts, 1919-1921", *The Journal of Sophia Asian Studies* No. 12 (1994): 211-251.

the different political perspectives, relying on the support first of the Germans and Ottomans, later on the Allied powers, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Another important moment connected with these processes was the role of the religion in the North-Caucasian societies. The Muslim leaders were also influenced by the political situation and some of them tried to get an advantage of it to realise their plans for the future social and political development of the mountaineers. This made some of them vulnerable to the Soviet propaganda and they openly supported the establishment of the Soviet regime among the mountaineers. On its turn, the Soviet Government was also ready to cooperate with the Muslim leaders and to pretend not being against the religious rights of the mountaineers. Generally, the Bolsheviks, by attracting the Muslims at their side, aimed at spreading the Bolshevik and socialist ideas not only among the Muslim population of Russia, but also among Near East peoples. This was one of the important objectives when Soviet Russia established official relations with Turkish GNA. Muslims could be used as well as a means in the struggle with other confessions and social classes of the non-Muslim societies²⁶.

The famous slogan “Long live the Soviet power and *sharia!*”²⁷, propagated by Nazir Kathanov and his comrades, was a reflection of the belief that cooperation with Bolsheviks would bring equality, freedom of religion and fair division of land as well as would save mountaineers from the “Whites”, who wanted to turn back the old despotic regime. The hopes of the “red shariatists” from Kabarda and Balkaria regions, as they became popular among the society, were also based on “The Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies”²⁸, proclaimed by the Council of the People’s Commissars. Additionally, in order to fight with the anti-Bolshevik powers in Terek Oblast, the extraordinary commissar of South Russia S. Ordzhonikidze established within the Eleventh Red Army a

²⁶ Nadezhda Emel'yanova, “Esliumyt'sya Krov'yu...” Islam i Revolyutsiya na Severnom Kavkaze”, *Rodina*, No. 9 (2008): 52.

²⁷ Fatima Shahaliev, “Islamskiy Faktor v Kabarde i Balkarii v kontekste Grazhdanskoj Voyny (1918– Nachalo 1920 g.)”, *Rossiyskiy Gumanitarnyy Zhurnal*, Vol. 5, Issue 5 (2016): 509.

²⁸ “Dekret o Svobode Sovesti, Tserkovnykh i Religioznykh Obshtestvah”, *Dekrety Sovetskoy Vlasti* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy literatury, 1957), Vol. I, 373-374, http://istmat.info/files/uploads/53273/dekrety_sovetskoy_vlasti_t.1.pdf (accessed May 5, 2018).

regiment called "Shariatskaya column", consisting of local mountaineer's soldiers. The general enemy there was Z. Dautokov-Serebriakov and his military political formation "Svobodnaya Kabarda"²⁹.

Other Islamic leaders such as Uzun-Hadzhi and Nazhmudin Gotsinskiy from Dagestan announced the October Revolution being creature of the Devil and the Bolsheviks main enemies of Islam and Sharia³⁰. They wanted to establish Islamic state following the example of Imam Shamil, with the support of the Ottoman empire, as the steps in this direction were undertaken in promulgating N. Gotsinskiy for Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan in 19 August (1 September) 1917 on the Second Congress of the Mountaineer Peoples, which was left by the socialist group after rejecting to accept the Bolshevik rule³¹. Later, N. Gotsinskiy, became part of the Mountain Republic government, participated in delegation for negotiations with Gen. Denikin and was not so much against his control over Chechnya and Dagestan. He also took active part in the struggle with the Bolsheviks³².

The position of Gotsinskiy toward the "Whites" led to separation with Uzun-Hadzhi, who established in September 1919 North-Caucasian Emirate in Chechnya and Dagestan as a response to the occupation of the AFSR and announced his monarchy being under the protection of the Ottoman Sultan³³. The emir announced "holy war" against Denikin, relying on the military and financial support of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Ottoman Empire. Weapons and ammunition were received from Georgia, while in Azerbaijan a voluntary corps was ready to be sent to help the Emirate, and Ottoman advisors appeared as military advisors of Uzun-Hadzhi³⁴.

As already hinted, the external factors had serious influence on political and social life in Northern Caucasus, which included not only the Soviet government, but the "Whites" - the Armed Forces of South Russia (AFSR), established in early 1919, and the British occupational

²⁹ Shahaliev, "Islamskiy Faktor", 508-510.

³⁰ Emelyanova, "Esli umyt'sya Krov'yu...", 53.

³¹ YusupIdrisov, "Dagestanskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Gruppy v Usloviyah Revolyutsionnogo Krizisa 1917 Nachala 1918 Goda", *Izvestiya Rossiyskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Universiteta im. A.I. Gertsena*, Vol. 19, No. 45 (2007): 104.

³² Murad Donogo, "N. Gotsinskiy i povstancheskayabor'ba v Dagestane i Chechne (1922–1925 rr.)", *Novyy istoricheskiy vestnik*, № 18 (2008): 136.

³³ Vladimir Lobanov, *Istoriya anti bol'shevistskogo dvizheniya na Severnom Kavkaze, 1917-1920 gg. na materialah Terekai Dagestana* (Sankt-Peterburg : Poltorak, 2013), 306.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 308.

forces. The “Whites” were struggling for preservation not only of the territories of the Russian empire, but also for the old political and social order. Russia united and undivided was the official political “creed” of Gen. A. Denikin. In early 1919 Gen. Denikin invaded the Northern Caucasus and managed to put an end to the Mountain Republic. He was supported in his actions by the British occupational forces, commanded by Gen. Thompson, aiming to secure for the “Whites” strong support among the mountaineers in the struggle with the Bolsheviks. Because of this the British were keeping for some period the hope of the Mountain government for independence and made it fulfill given instructions such as keeping the order, recovery of railway and steamship transport connections, cancellation of any Ottoman or German propaganda etc., which were more or less possible for implementation³⁵ However, the request for governmental changes to have highly representation of all ethnical groups, which meant to include Cossacks and the close cooperation with A. Denikin, was sign of total neglect of the inter-ethnical and inter-social relations. The conquered with their conquerors in common government supporting the tsarist White Movement – it would be ironic if not real suggestion. The British by all means followed their most important aim, namely to defeat the Bolsheviks and to broaden their influence. In addition, due to the fast development of natural sources exploitation of the region in the end of XIX century, the control over it had one more important aspect for the Entente.

The British managed to discredit themselves when they allowed Gen. Denikin to establish control over Northern Caucasus and restore the tsarist style military-administrative rule over the mountaineers. The mistake to press mountaineers to cooperate with the Voluntary Army leaders neither of whom want to recognise any separatist movement on the territory of former Russia, contributed additionally for broadening the support for the Soviet power. The discontent of the mountaineers came to its most when it became clear that the general would not only purge the region from the Bolsheviks but started to exercise his power over the North-Caucasian people without regard to their wish for non-interference in their internal matters and right of self-governing within the independent Mountain Republic. Not only Gen. Denikin started to appoint the governors of the different Caucasian peoples returning old police servants, but introduced forcible mobilisation in the White

³⁵ V. Dzidzoev, “Severnnyy Kavkaz kak Mikrosub’ekt Geopoliticheskogo Protsessa (1917-1921 gg.)”, *Vestnik Vladikavkazskogo Nauchnogo Tsentra* Vol. 4, No. 4 (2004): 3.

Army³⁶. The revolts against A. Denikin in Ingushetia and Dagestan, which were suppressed with cruelty, the ultimatums toward mountaineers; protection of interests of Cossack at expense of the mountaineers; the abrogation of the Soviet decrees and restoration of the private property – all these brought mountaineers to the point of great disconnect and readiness to collaborate with the Bolsheviks.

The escalation of the conflict with Gen. Denikin made Uzun-Hadzhi more inclined to search for support from Bolsheviks in order to oppose the “Whites”. If in 1917-1918 the cooperation between the Islamic leader and Bolsheviks was inconceivable, changing the situation led to this “queer union”³⁷. Several representatives of the “Reds” entered the emir’s government, such as Nikolay Gikalo, who was commander of Red Army in Northern Caucasus, became commander of the 5th regiment of the Emirate’s Army, and N. Kathanov was a commander of the 1st regiment of the Emirate, including Kabardians and Balkars. Representatives of the Bolsheviks were also Gen. Habala Beslaneev as Minister of internal affairs, and Magomet Haniev – chief of Staff of the Emirate Army³⁸. In March 1920, having achieved the expulsion of the “Whites”, Bolsheviks put an ultimatum to Uzun-Hadzhi to accept the Soviet authority, to resign and to disband his military formations. He died at the end of the month and with him the Emirate ceased to exist giving way to the full establishment of the Soviet regime in Chechnya³⁹. In the beginning of 1920 Kathanov managed to gather many volunteers from Ossetia, Kabarda and Balkaria, who united under the “Green flag” against Denikin. On 10 March 1920 he captured Nalchik and on 20 March issued a “Proclamation” announcing the establishment of the Soviet power in Kabardino-Balkaria region and urged people to build a new fair society⁴⁰.

Several big operations of the Eleventh Army together with local

³⁶ V. Dzidzoev, “SevernyyKavkaz kak Mikrosub`ekt”, 7.

³⁷ Vladimir Lobanov, “Dobrovol’cheskaya Armiyana Severnom Kavkaze, Noyabr’ 1917 – May 1919 gg.: Periodizatsiya”, *Vestnik SPbGUKI* No. 3 (2014): 186.

³⁸ M. Tekueva, “Islamskoe Dvizhenie v Kabardei Balkarii vo Vremya Grazhdanskoy Voyny na Tereke”, in *Islam i Politika na Severnom Kavkaze. Sbornik Nauchnykh Statey* Vol. 1. Ed. Viktor Chernous (Rostov-na-Donu: “Izdatel'stvo SKNTS VSH”, 2001), <http://regiment.ru/Lib/D/93.htm> (accessed on September 30, 2018)

³⁹ Abdula Bugaev and Zarina Alhastova, “Stanovlenie Sovetskoy Politicheskoy Sistemy i v Chechne: Nachal’nyi Etap”, *Istoricheskie Nauki: Teoriya i Praktika Obshtestvennogo Razvitiya*, No. 20 (2014): 125-128.

⁴⁰ M. Tekueva, “Islamskoe Dvizhenie”.

guerilla managed to “purge” the “Whites” in Dagestan and to capture Derbent and almost all Hasavyurt region in the beginning of 1920 and later in March Temir-Han-Shura, Hasav-Yurt, and Port-Petrovsk. With the advent of the Red Army in Dagestan, the restoration of the Soviet authority began through formation of revolutionary committees, which implemented first socio-economic activities. On 8 April, 1920 Kavkazskoe byuro (Kavbyuro) to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party was established, which had to monitor the subordination of Caucasus to the Soviet government. Same year the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were proclaimed⁴¹.

One of the last outbreaks of resistance was that of N. Gotsinskiy, who continued to fight against the Bolsheviks for independence of Dagestan, as his efforts were supported by the representatives of the former Mountain government in Tiflis, the Georgian Mensheviks, the Entente, as well as some Caucasian migrant circles in Turkey by establishing conspiratorial political organization, hidden under the coverage of a trade company⁴². The strong resistance and activities of N. Gotsinskiy continued until September 1925, when big operation of Soviet detachments, he and his supporters were arrested and later sentenced to death.

Transcaucasia and the process of sovietisation

Azerbaijan and the first Turkish-Soviet negotiations

In the spring of 1920 Azerbaijan was in a complicated external and internal situation – engaged in a military conflict with Armenia for Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh; Red Army approaching its borders after the defeat of the Denikin’s ASFR in Northern Caucasus and occupying Dagestan; strong activation of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and their preparation for the “proletarian revolution”; governmental crisis, which led to the lack of government in the most crucial moment for the republic⁴³. The last attempt of the Entente to

⁴¹ Anatoliy Tetuev, “Natsional’no-Gosudarstvennoe Stroitel’stvo na Severnom Kavkaze (1917-1941)”, *Vestnik RUDN. Seriya “Isotriya Rossii”*, No. 4 (2005): 138; B. Kashkaev, *Bor’ba za Vlast’ Sovetov v Dagestane (Mart 1917 - Mart 1920 g.)*, *Voprosy istorii* No. 1 (1960): 3-24, <http://libmonster.ru/m/articles/view/БОРЬБА-ЗА-ВЛАСТЬ-СОБЕТОВ-В-ДАГЕСТАНЕ-МАРТ-1917-МАРТ-1920-Г> (accessed on September 30, 2018).

⁴² Murad Donogo, “N. Gotsinskiy”, 137.

⁴³ Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921)* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 277-278, 281-282.

strengthen the Caucasian barrier against the Soviet advance was the de facto recognition of the South Caucasian Republics in January 1920 by the Allied Supreme Council and "behind this sudden recognition there was a weighty reason: the failure of Denikin"⁴⁴. This belated step had no effect. The insistence of Azerbaijan to be officially recognized by Moscow was also in vain as no response was received, concerning this proposal.

On 27 April 1920, one day after Mustafa Kemal sent his first note to Lenin, the Eleventh Army of the Red Army crossed the border of Azerbaijan after an ultimatum was handed to Azerbaijani government by the communists to surrender within 12 hours. The established earlier Turkish communist party in Baku by the Turkish cadres was at Bolsheviks' disposal as well as other Turkish officers, making pro-Bolshevik propaganda and assuring the population the Red Army would stay a couple of days as it had to continue on its way to Anatolia. After the Temporary Revolutionary Military Committee of Azerbaijan invited the Red Army for a fraternal struggle with the imperialism, the destiny of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was predetermined. The Turkish Communist Party even issued a proclamation to the Azerbaijanis in which they called them to support the new Bolshevik government⁴⁵. A lot of Turkish officers, who served in the Azerbaijani army in Baku, helped many important buildings and railways to be occupied by the Bolsheviks⁴⁶. Taking Baku meant not only to put a hand on the petroleum and transport connections, but posing a control over both Northern and Southern Caucasus, over the Caspian Sea, and paving a road toward Central Asia⁴⁷. Due to this it opened the way for the sovietisation of the rest of the Southern Caucasus.

After the establishment of the Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan, Halil Pasha and Fuat Sabit received an order from Gen. Karabekir to leave for Moscow to negotiate the Soviet support for the Turkish National Movement. The official delegation sent by Ankara was led by Bekir Sami Bey – Turkish minister of foreign affairs, including Yusuf Kemal Bey – minister of economy, and Dr. Miralay Ibrahim Tali, Mebusu Osman from Lazistan, Lieutenant Colonel Shevket Seyfi, who

⁴⁴ Ibid., 268.

⁴⁵ Vasif Gafarov, "Russko-Turetskoe Sblizhenie", 246; Musa Gasymlı, "Azerbaydzhan mezhdu Rossiei i Turtsiei v 1920-1922 gg.", *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 11 (2010): 28-29.

⁴⁶ Vasif Gafarov, "Russko-Turetskoe Sblizhenie", 247.

⁴⁷ Musa Gasymlı, "Azerbaydzhan", 27.

left for Moscow on 11 May 1920⁴⁸. On behalf of the Soviet government Iosif V. Stalin, Grigory Chicherin and vice-deputy Lev Karahan took part in the negotiations for the future treaty, as additionally the Turkish delegation had a meeting with V.I. Lenin, too. During the meetings it became clear that both governments had some serious debatable grounds, concerning Armenian and Georgian territories – those of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, as well as opening the road between Soviet Russia and Turkish Nationalists through Armenia (of great importance was the line Baku-Erzurum, which greater part was controlled by Armenian government⁴⁹). Soon, these would turn into serious collision points, which would try the stability of the relations and cooperation.

Turkish Nationalists continued to insist that the mentioned territories remain part of new Turkey, based on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The last was denounced by RSFSR after the capitulation of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and the Soviets did not accept it anymore as a starting point for negotiations⁵⁰. The Soviets did not respond to some other expectations during the negotiations in Moscow, too. A joint operation against Armenia was not possible as at that time Moscow was in a war with Poland and with Gen. Pyotr Wrangel, who took control of the AFSR after A. Denikin was defeated⁵¹. Another one, the wish of Nationalists to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance could not be achieved, regarding the fact that same time Bolsheviks were in negotiations with the Great Britain for trade agreement and the only they could offer was a Treaty of friendship⁵². But still, it should be not regarded as underestimating the importance of the treaty with GNA or the relations with it, because even before signing the Treaty of friendship the Nationalists started to receive the promised material and financial support in 1920 and it continued until 1922, when both treaties were already signed – with Great Britain and with GNA. So, the negotiations with the British didn't change the plans of the Bolsheviks for the Caucasus and Turkey and their commitment to the Turkish National Movement.

⁴⁸ Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları. Milli Mücadele ve Bolşevik Rusya* (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları., 2017), 106-107.

⁴⁹ Gökay, "Turkish Settlement", 67.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁵¹ Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 108, 118-119.

⁵² Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 95.

Armenia and escalation of Turkish-Soviet collision

The Democratic Republic of Armenia was in catastrophic economic⁵³ and political conditions, which, having in mind the future developments, just deepened and more or less predicted the consequences from the short-sighted policy of Dashnak government. It exercised full power over the administrative and legislative institutions, and over the population, half of whom were displaced persons⁵⁴. Still, the territorial claims of Armenia surpassed their ability to defend even those six *vilayets* which composed the so-called "Turkish Armenia" and the occupation of which the Democratic Republic announced on 28 May, 1919, renouncing the Treaty of Batumi⁵⁵ after the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Treaty of Sevres⁵⁶ the Ottoman government recognized Armenia as independent state and agreed "to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the *vilayets* of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier."⁵⁷ And additionally, after the decision for the border came into power, Ottomans renounced all their rights over the transferred territory. The clauses were never to be accepted by Mustafa Kemal and his adherents, and this entire situation just escalated the hostility between the two nations. The spark was the occupation of Olti in June 1920 by the Armenian troops and as the first prime minister of Armenia wrote: "...the hasty occupation of Olti was the gauntlet which we threw down, as if intentionally, to the Turks; as though we ourselves were desirous of war and sought it"⁵⁸.

On 3 June, concerned by the eventual serious conflict between

⁵³ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 212.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁵⁵ Charlotte Mathilde Louise Hille, *State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus* (Leiden [the Netherlands]; Boston: Brill, 2010), 7

⁵⁶ "The Treaty of Sevres, 1920",

https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I_Articles_1_-_260 (accessed on July 2, 2018)

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Hovhannes Katchaznoui, *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) has Nothing to Do anymore. The Manifesto of First Prime Minister of the Independent Armenian Republic* (New York: Armenian Information Service: 1955), quoted in Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 287.

Armenia and GNA⁵⁹, Soviet Russia offered its mediation, which was accepted by Mustafa Kemal for solving the conflict through diplomatic means. He didn't want this to intervene the understanding with Russians, whose support still was to be negotiated. While on the road, Bekir Sami also sent two notes to the Armenian government for protesting against the attack on Olti and demanding the establishment of normal relationship based on Brest-Litovsk and Batumi treaties⁶⁰, which was totally unacceptable for the Armenians.

The Armenian side also accepted Moscow's mediation and received some assurances from G. Chicherin, that Soviets would secure some territories for Armenia, referring to the disputable with Azerbaijan Zangezur and Nakhchivan, while Nagorno-Karabakh's fate to be solved via referendum, and outlet to the Black Sea to be provided⁶¹. At that time, a delegation of the Republic of Armenia was in Moscow for negotiations in the quest of security guarantees for its independence and official recognition. After being left without military assistance from the West and the League of Nations, as well as the mandatory responsibilities of USA were rejected by the Congress, Armenia had no chance but to try to establish at least non-threatening relations with the Soviets, while still keeping its pro-Western orientation.

While negotiations between Turkish and Soviet delegations in Moscow were entering a deadlock, the Soviets signed a temporary treaty with Armenia on 10 August, 1920, according to which, based on the premise the territories of Nakhchivan, Zangezur and Karabakh would be occupied by the troops of RSFSR, which in fact just confirmed the current situation, and gave the administrative operation of the railway in the Shahtaght-Julfa district to Armenia "with the proviso that it will not be used for military purposes"⁶². Cease of fire and stop of military operations with the free passage of Armenian troops on their way to Armenia through the territories to be occupied by RSFSR were among the other important clauses. In fact, the treaty never entered in complete implementation, as there continued to be some clashes in the disputed regions and Armenia could not exercise the administrative control on the railway due to its conflict with Azerbaijan. This treaty

⁵⁹ Richard Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia, Vol. 4: Between Crescent and Sickle - Partition and Sovietization* (California: University of California Press, 1996), 146.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁶¹ Charlotte Mathilde Louise Hille, *State Building*, 149.

⁶² Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, 95.

was expected to give some security to Armenia for its independence and for giving it possibility to concentrate forces to defend its territorial pretention in Turkish Armenia. Regarding RSFSR, they gained time during very important period of the war with Poland – the battle for Warsaw, where they concentrated strong military efforts. In addition, revolts on Kuban and battle with P. Wrangel, made Soviets follow the Treaty at least while they deal with the conflicts that were priority.

Nevertheless, the Turkish delegation protested against the temporary treaty between RSFSR and Armenia, mainly because it blocked the connection between Soviets and Anatolia. The negotiations continued finalizing a draft agreement at 24 August. But again the "Armenian question" became an obstacle to conclude the undertaking, especially when Chicherin tried to put the delivery of material support in dependence on cession of territories to Armenia. Still, information was coming to Ankara from several channels that Moscow would not help Armenia in case Turkish army attacked⁶³ because the RSFSR recognized Armenia only temporarily until solving the conflicts on the other fronts and waiting for the right time for sovietisation of the Armenian Republic.

The information proved its authenticity when at the end of September, a full-scale war started between Turkish Nationalists and Dashnak Armenia. It was reposted in *Pravda* that "The responsibility for the blood spilled falls exceptionally on the Armenians and their patrons the imperialists"⁶⁴, which clearly showed the lack of support by the Soviets. Turkish Army's fast advance was the "awakening blow" to the Armenian government, which underestimated the enemy's military power. Sarikamish, Kars, Alexandropol fell under Turkish control, while Armenia totally exhausted her sources, and support from Entente countries, which except expressing sympathy, did not provide the expected protection⁶⁵. The Red Army was at the borders and the Soviets pressing diplomatically the Armenian government. The last was forced to conclude a truce on 18 November under terms of Turks keeping Alexandropol and their control over Armenian railways⁶⁶. On 26 November, 1920 negotiations between the hostile powers started in the above-mentioned city.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁶⁴ "V Armeniya. K Turetsko-armyanskoy voyne", *Pravda* № 265 (25 November 1920): 2.

⁶⁵ E. Sarkisyan, "Sovetsko-Turetskie Otnosheniya i Zakavkaz'e v 1920-1921 Godakh", *Literaturnaya Armeniya* No. 6 (1967): 86.

⁶⁶ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 288; Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 97.

The Red Army was ready to intervene. After the truce with Poland and the defeat of gen. Wrangel's army in Crimea, Soviet Russia was ready to start the sovietisation of Armenia especially after it was weakened enough by the Turkish offensive. The new situation interfered in the interests of Moscow on Caucasus "for it could not possibly allow the Turks to increase their influence in Armenia"⁶⁷. RSFSR offered again mediation to Armenia, which was accepted by Dashnaks but rejected by the Turks, the latter being in a better position now. Then, the Soviets decided to act, sending a note that Armenian government had to reject Turkish demands and let the Red Army to enter Armenia. While hesitation stopped the official reaction of Dashnaks, another note by Boris Legran – Soviet plenipotentiary in Erevan, posed an ultimatum of surrendering the power to the Revolutionary Committee of Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, situated at the Azerbaijani region of Kazakh on 29 November. This was followed by the advance of the Eleventh Army, which crossed Armenian border⁶⁸. On 2 December Boris Legran concluded an agreement with the Armenian government and the independent Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia was proclaimed. The news reached Baku, provoked a special session of the Baku Soviet on which Neriman Nerimanov, Chairman of the Council of People`s Commissars of Azerbaijan, read a declaration that Azerbaijan gave up in favour of Soviet Armenia the districts of Zangezur, Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh⁶⁹ (in order to return them to Azerbaijan few months later – a.n.).

While these processes were taking place and the Soviet government requested the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from Armenia, the representatives of Dashnak government continued negotiations with the Turkish GNA in Alexandropol, which resulted in a treaty on the very same 2 December, and then resigned. According to the treaty Armenia renounced all its claims on the disputed territories in Anatolia, Armenian Army was to be limited to 1500 men, Armenian railways to be under Turkish control "in order to prevent treacherous acts against its integrity and totality by imperialists until complete peace is established" and also Turks obtained the right to "take temporary military preventive measures in Armenia against attacks that may threaten its territorial integrity on condition that such

⁶⁷ Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 97.

⁶⁸ Gökay, "Turkish Settlement", 68; Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 99.

⁶⁹ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 291-292; *Pravda o Nagornom-Karabakhe: (Materialy i Dokumenty)* (Erevan: Yerevanskiy Gosudarstvenyy Universitet, 1989), 101.

measures do not disturb the rights of the Republic of Erevan conceded in this territory"⁷⁰. As it is obvious the issue with the Republic of Armenia had not to be considered only through the prism of opening the "bridge" among the Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists or only as territorial pretensions, referring the "National Pact" or Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Security from North and the very existence of Turkish National Movement was concerned the by need of prevention of any hostile attacks by the Entente, using the territory of the countries on Caucasus, which supported the Allied powers, while Turks were fighting with the Greeks.

The new socialist government in Armenia rejected to recognize the Treaty of Alexandropol and proposed a conference to negotiate a new treaty. The Soviet government, as mentioned earlier, insisted on Turkish troops withdrawal from Alexandropol, also gave instructions to its representative in Armenia in this direction and even warned Mustafa Kemal that if he decided to risk a military adventure against Soviet troops "it will be sufficient to deal him one or two blows and his army will fall to pieces like a house of cards."⁷¹ Still, both Moscow and Ankara could not sacrifice their relations and cooperation due to the Armenian conflict. As B. Gökay stated: "It was more than ever before that the cooperation was like a business partnership then a unity of principles. The Turks did not attempt to go further towards historically Russian-held parts of Armenia and the Russian did not move further down into Turkish Armenia"⁷². The final decision about Armenia was to be taken by RSFSR and GNA.

Sovietisation of Georgia and Turkish-Soviet rivalry

This collision was not the only which disturbed Soviet-Turkish "cordial" engagement against the imperialists. The last fortress of theirs was Georgia, ruled by the social-democrats, who tried to be flexible in their attempt to evade Red or Turkish Army's proceeding to Georgian territories. From the three Transcaucasian states, Georgian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Menshevik) government was trying hard to implement social and economic reforms after they won a stable

⁷⁰ "Treaty of Alexandropol", <http://www.deutscharmenischegesellschaft.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Vertrag-von-Alexandropol-2.-Dezember-1920.pdf> (accessed on July 26, 2018).

⁷¹ Mikhail Pavlovich, "The Turkish Offensive against Armenia", *Soviet Russia*, Vol. V, №7 (1921), quoted in Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 100.

⁷² Gökay, "Turkish Settlement", 68.

majority in the parliament. They introduced several reforms connected with the nationalisation of land, of key industries and railway transportation, of labour work, which brought to several revolts and activation of Bolshevik propaganda⁷³.

Even though the treasury was in a high deficit⁷⁴, Georgia was preoccupied with territorial pretensions toward its neighbours being part from the nationalistic “wave” at that period, concerning mainly Borchalo district, Kazakh and Akhalkalaki, which provoked protest from Azerbaijan and short war with Armenia in December 1918, ceased with the intervention of the Entente.

After the sovietisation of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia was the last part of the Caucasian “puzzle”, that had to provide stable communication and transportation route between Russian Soviets and Turkish Nationalists. Still, the collision for Batumi region between Ankara and Moscow made the “Georgian case” more complicated and put to the test the close cooperation between the two governments.

Soviet-Georgian relations started to deteriorate after the capitulation of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, when all contracted treaties between the lasts and Soviet Russia ceased to be valid. In late 1918 RSFSR not only did not recognise the Georgian Republic but proclaimed that “all persons who consider themselves Georgian citizens are recognised as Russian citizens and as such are subject to all the decrees and the enactments of the Soviet authority of the RSFSR.”⁷⁵ Then, until the beginning of 1920, Soviet Russia did not have any specific relations with Georgia, when it invited the latter to participate in the struggle against Gen. Denikin. Georgian minister of foreign affairs refused to get involved his country into the Civil war, which provoked the hostility of the Soviet government. After the sovietisation of Azerbaijan, Bolsheviks made an attempt for uprising in Tiflis on 2 May, 1920, which had to be accompanied by military intervention, but it failed as Georgian army managed to stop the offensive. Being seriously engaged in the war with Poland and the escalation of a revolt

⁷³ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 192.

⁷⁴ Simon Ter-Petrosyan (Kamo), “V Gruzinskoy Demokratii”, *Izvestiya*, No.177 (729) (19 August 1919): 1.

⁷⁵ “Postanovlenie Narodnogo Komissariata po Inostrannym Delam RSFSR o Nepriznanii Gruzii Samostoyatel’nym Gosudarstvomot 24 Dekabrya 1918 Goda”, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika Noveyshego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakhi Deklaratsiyakh*. Eds. Yuriy V. Klyuchnikov and Andrey Sabanin (Moskva: Izd. Litizdata N.K.I.D., 1925-1929), Vol. 2 (1926): Ot Imperialisticheskoy Voyny do Snyatiya Blokady s Sovetskoy Rossii, 209-210.

in Azerbaijani rural area, Soviet government decided to postpone the operation against the Georgian Republic. On 7 May, 1920, after secret negotiations, a Georgian-Soviet Moscow Treaty was signed⁷⁶. In general, RSFSR recognised de jure independent Georgia, declared abstaining from interference in internal affairs, demilitarisation of the established border between the two countries, both states having the responsibility to prevent every group trying to organise anti-governmental activities on their territories, and in secret supplement Georgia recognised the right of existence and activity of the Communist party. Unfortunately, this clause could not save Georgians "willing to buy independence from Soviet Russia"⁷⁷.

In interview for *Pravda* newspaper on 30 November, 1920, Stalin underlined the great importance of Caucasus and especially the most important economic and strategic roads between Soviet Russia and Ankara government – Batumi-Baku, Batumi-Tavriz, Batumi-Tavriz-Erzurum⁷⁸. The key word definitely is "Batumi", seen as the main counterpoint on the Black Sea against the Entente, "which, owing now Constantinople, this key to the Black Sea, wants to preserve direct road to the East through the Transcaucasia"⁷⁹. Soviet Russia could not let even a friendly country like Turkey to occupy Batumi and it was a matter of a couple of months the port to come in Soviet hands. Since the signing of the Soviet-Georgian agreement and the arrival of the Soviet ambassador in Tiflis Sergey Kirov, a gradual escalation in the relations could be observed until the end of 1920⁸⁰. Additionally, rumours about the renewal of the British occupation of Batumi⁸¹ aggravated the situation. Meanwhile, the occupation of Batumi by the Georgian army

⁷⁶ "Peace Treaty, Concluded in Moscow on 7 May 1920 between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and the Democratic Republic of Georgia. May 7, 1920", <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1921-2/transcaucasia/transcaucasia-texts/georgian-independence/> (accessed on May 20, 2018)

⁷⁷ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 300.

⁷⁸ Yosif Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 4 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), 408.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Rejection of Transit of Goods for Armenia; Georgian Occupation of Borchalo; Persecution of Communist Activists; Material Support to Imam Nazhmudin Gotsinskiy in Dagestan, etc. See more at: Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 302-313; "Na Kavkaze. Arestyi Kommunistov", *Pravda*, No.14 (3 July 1920): 2; Vadim Muhanov, "K istorii sovetizatsii Zakavkaz'ya (1920-1921)", *Kavkazskiy Sbornik*, Vol. 8 (40) (2014), 193.

⁸¹ Information about new planned attack the on Caucasus by Great Britain given also in the following articles: "Angliya. Novyi Plan na Padenia na Kavkaz", *Izvestiya*, No. 15 (862) (24 January 1920): 1; "Kak Vedut Voynu posle Zaklyucheniya Mira", *Pravda*, No. 239 (26 October 1920): 1; "U Vorot Baku", *Pravda*, No. 258 (17 November 1920): 1; "K okupatsii Batuma", *Pravda*, № 265 (25 November 1920): 2.

after the British left in July 1920, provoked the protests of Ankara government, which still accepted the region as part of the country⁸². Later, a Turkish representative – Kazim Bey, was sent in Tiflis for solving the matters concerning the establishment of official relations. As further developments showed, the Turks were not ready to give up from the important regions of Batumi, Ardahan and Artvin. Even the official recognition of Georgia by the Allies on 27 January, 1921, could not stop the escalation of its conflict with Soviet Russia and GNA.

After the intensification of the collision with the Menshevik government and a final provocation on the Georgian border with Azerbaijan SSR at the end of January 1921, Soviet Russia was ready to take action and instructions were given to the local communist party to raise a revolt against the Menshevik government. It started on the night of 11 to 12 February, 1921, in Lori neutral zone (occupied by Georgian army during Turkish-Armenian war for three months according to the agreement with Armenia, as on 12 February, 1921 this period expired⁸³). Following the model in Azerbaijan and Armenia, a Revolutionary Committee was established, which proclaimed a Soviet regime and appealed Soviet Russia and the Red Army for help. The Eleventh Army crossed the Georgian border on 16 February and 25 February it entered Tiflis.

The Soviet attack of Georgia, provoked an unexpected rebellion in Armenia, where the economic and social conditions totally deteriorated after the inauguration of the Soviet regime due to the obligatory requisitions and confiscations of food and properties, not enough care for peasants and refugees, and as final blow – the heavy winter conditions, which totally isolated Armenia. The revolt was organised by a group of Dashnaks, who in the beginning cooperated with the Bolsheviks. Their leader Simon Vratzian managed to gather several thousand men and on 18 February entered Yerevan and proclaimed the disposition of the Soviet regime⁸⁴. The new Armenian government searched for European help, which could be foreseen, but more curious

⁸² Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 101.

⁸³ Avtandil Menteshashvili. *Iz Istarii Vzaimootnosheniy Gruzinskoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki s Sovetskoy Rossiei i Antantoy. 1918-1921 gg.* (Tbilisi: 1990), <http://sisauri.tripod.com/politic/chapter2.html> (accessed on July 18, 2018); Full text of the agreement quoted in: Guram Marhuliya, *Armyano-Gruzinskiye Vzaimootnosheniya v 1918-1920 Godah* (Tbilisi: 2007), <https://iberiana.wordpress.com/armenia-georgia/1918-1920/7-8/#8> (accessed on July 18, 2018).

⁸⁴ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 321; Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, 405.

was the fact Vratzian sent an appeal to Turkish GNA on 18 March, 1921. Based "on the friendly relations that have been established with the treaty of Alexandropol", he requested Turkish military support against the Bolsheviks – releasing of Armenian prisoners of war, ammunitions and military aid⁸⁵. At that time, GNA was already a step away from signing the final agreement with Soviet Russia, even though being in a complicated dubious situation after the Turkish army occupied Batumi. Still, there is information that Kazim Karabekir agreed on releasing the Armenian prisoners of war⁸⁶.

Following the intervention of the Red Army, the Turkish army started an offensive on 11 March, 1921 ordered by the commander Gen. Kazim Karabekir to occupy Batumi, Ozurgeti and Akhaltsikhe uезд. These territories of Batumi, Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe were surrendered by Georgians themselves⁸⁷, hoping to receive military assistance against the Red Army, but very soon after realising this move would not help them. On the one side the presence of the Turkish army facilitated the Red Army advance through Akhaltsikhe uезд to Batumi. On the other side, the Turkish command on spot didn't want to give up their pretensions of the occupied territories and on 17 March they took under control positions in Batumi and announcing it under Turkish control. This happened one day after the Treaty of Moscow⁸⁸ was signed by Turkish and Soviet delegations in Moscow; according to which GNA officially surrendered the territories of Batumi, Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki in favour of Georgia and Alexandropol in favour of Armenia, receiving Artvin, Ardahan and Kars on its turn. In addition, the Turkish occupation of Batumi provoked the nationalistic feelings of the Georgians, who were ready to fight for the city to stay as part of Georgia aside from political views and no matter of the political power that would control the country. On 18 March, 1921 the Menshevik government signed an agreement with the Revolutionary Committee, which generally established the joint

⁸⁵ Kapriel Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: a Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the so-called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: BaikaPress, 1934), 77-78.

⁸⁶ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi 1838'den 1995'e*, 2. Kitap (Istanbul: 1993), quoted in Natal'ya Ul'chenko, "Izistorii Podpisaniya Karsskogo Dogovora (Mart-Oktyabr' 1921 g.)", *Turcica et Ottomanica: sbornik v Chest' 70-Letiya M. S. Neyera*. Eds. I. Zaytsev and S. Oreshkova (Moscow: 2006), 359.

⁸⁷ Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, 197-198; Muhanov, "K Istorii Sovetizatsii", 222.

⁸⁸ "Moskovskiy Dogovor mezhdu Rossiei i Turtsiei 16 Marta 1921 Goda", <http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/sab/moskovi.html> (accessed May 5, 2018)

defense of Batumi⁸⁹. The armies were under the command of Gen. Manziev, who earlier cooperated with the Entente with the support of the Red Army division and of the communists, who were released from jail. As described by V. Muhanov, a quite peculiar conflict situation occurred: “Georgian army under the command of Georgian commander with European weapons and European uniform, appointed by the Entente, united with the Bolsheviks to defense Batumi from Turkish divisions with Russian rifles and bullets, outfitted and provided by Soviet gold”⁹⁰. Until 21 March the Soviet Army took control over Batumi and the whole region⁹¹, the Turkish army retreated to their former positions, and the Georgian Menshevik government left the country earlier on 18 March. Concluding this operation Soviet Russia turned to Armenia again and on 2 April Yerevan was taken again by the Soviet troops. The sovietisation of Transcaucasia was finished and the transportation corridor between Soviet Russia and GNA opened.

The Treaty of Moscow and Soviet material support to Ankara government

Due to the border disputes, the Soviet-Turkish negotiations for a treaty were in a deadlock at the beginning of 1921. When the Georgian sovietisation was on the agenda, the Turkish troops won the first battle at İnönü in January, convincing the Allies that they could not anymore ignore Ankara government and had to try to deal with it, still having the upper hand. Following the unsuccessful attempt to reach a settlement between the Entente, Turkey and Greece in Near East on London Conference (23.02.-12.03.1921)⁹², negotiations with Moscow were resumed as an effort to overcome the border dispute, showing the importance of the Soviet support for the Turkish National Movement and for Mustafa Kemal. On 18 February, 1921 a Turkish delegation, led by Yusuf Kemal Bey arrived in Moscow to reach a final agreement with

⁸⁹ Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia*, 326-327.

⁹⁰ Muhanov, “K Istorii Sovetizatsii”, 222.

⁹¹ The Comintern greeted specially the proletariat of Tiflis and Batumi in a telegram to the Revkom of Georgia for the liberation from the imperialists and the national-Mensheviks and unification with RSPSR: “Privet Kominterna Sovetskoy Gruzii”, *Pravda*, No. 61 (22 March 1921): 1.

⁹² Parvin Darabadi, “Geopoliticheskoe Sopernichestvo na Kavkaze v Nachale XX Veka (Geoistoricheskii Ocherk)”, *Kavkaz i Globalizatsiya*, Vol. 1 (1) (2006): 208. Spector, *The Soviet Union*, 74-75.

the Soviet government.

On 16 March, 1921 a final "Treaty of Brotherhood" (or Treaty of Moscow – a.n.) between RSFSR and Ankara government was signed. Several important issues were solved by it. All previous treaties were annulled, capitulatory regime abrogated, financial obligations of the Ottoman Empire to former Russian government cancelled. The "term" of Turkey bore the meaning of all the territories included in the Turkish National Pact of 28 January, 1920, proclaimed by the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople. It was confirmed that "the Turkish territory referred to in this article means the territory under the direct military and civil administration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey"⁹³. These important articles brought the official recognition of GNA and Ankara government, strengthening their position in military aspect concerning the Liberation War, as well as diplomatic aspect regarding the struggle with Great Britain and other Entente powers, giving the possibility for better deal for the Turkish side.

In return, the GNA agreed the future of the Straits and the status of the Black Sea to be decided on a future conference with "delegates from the littoral states" (a condition, which later was changed – a.n.). This was definite success for the Soviet diplomacy because thus they excluded Entente powers from the decision-making process about the strategic region. The RSFSR would have a predominant voice as easy to be guessed due to the fact that all littoral states on the eastern coast of the Black Sea were sovietised and under its control.

The question with the frontier was also solved as Turkey received the territories of Artvin, Ardahan and Kars, surrendering Batumi and its region to Georgia, Alexandropol and its region to Armenian, and obtaining a success concerning Nakhchivan, which was given to Azerbaijan as an autonomous region. The corrections of the so established border would be done by mixed commission and an additional agreement would be signed with the three Transcaucasian Republics.

The RSFSR ratified the agreement on 20 March but GNA did it not until 22 July, 1921, as the planned agreement with the Transcaucasian states could not also be signed in April as planned in advance. The

⁹³ "Moskovskiy Dogovor mezhdru Rossiey i Turtsiey 16 Marta 1921 Goda", <http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/sab/moskovi.html> (accessed on May 5, 2018)

apparent reason was the rejection of Turks to withdraw their troops from Alexandropol, waiting for the final blow of the Soviets over the Dashnaks, while secretly hoping the last to win and the Treaty of Alexandropol to be confirmed as suggested by N. Ul'chenko⁹⁴. And yet under the surface, a mutual mistrust was taking place due to several developments, concerning again the Entente. In March the RSFSR signed a trade agreement with England, while the GNA signed an agreement with France for evacuation of its troops from Cilicia. Rumours on the agenda guessed Turkey would reconcile with the Entente, as Soviet Russia would attack through Transcaucasia⁹⁵. Additionally, tension aggravated due to the activity of Enver Pasha, who arrived in Moscow spring or summer 1920 and who with the unofficial support of the Soviet government tried to organize parallel movement for liberation of Turkey from the imperialist⁹⁶.

The suspicion that Ankara government would not follow the Treaty of Moscow and the non-withdrawing of Turkish troops from Alexandropol led to the suspension of Soviet military support. It was one more "diplomatic" tool to exert pressure on Ankara government. In April the Red Army started its offensive against the last centre of Dashnak power and after regaining Yerevan, Chicherin sent official note to Ali Fuat Cebesoy – Turkish envoy in Moscow, that the Turkish troops had to leave Alexandropol after installation of Soviet government in Armenia and that the wish to implement Alexandropol Treaty would be equal to annulment of the Treaty of Moscow. An ultimatum was sent to Kazim Karabekir by S. Orzhonikidze – commander of Eleventh Army, on 13 April, requiring immediate withdrawal of the Turkish army and rejecting any responsibility for the entrance of the Red Army in the city as a consequence of eventual denial⁹⁷. A war with Soviet Russia was for sure not the result Ankara government was persuading from the arisen situation and on 23 April, 1921, the Turkish troops left Alexandropol. Solving this last issue and the Greek offence to Ankara in the beginning of July intensified the decision process in the Turkish government by ratification of the Treaty

⁹⁴ Natal'ya Ul'chenko, "Iz Istorii Podpisaniya Karsskogo Dogovora (Mart-Oktyabr' 1921 g.)", *Turcica et Ottomanica: Sbornik v Chest' 70-Letiya M. S. Neyera*. Eds. I. Zaytsev and S. Oreshkova (Moscow: 2006): 360.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 361; Rumours for Turkish readiness to attack Soviet Russian in Caucasus were also disturbing the population. See: Mihail Frunze, *Sobranie Sochineniy* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1929), Vol. 1 (1905-1923 Gody), 355-356.

⁹⁶ Salahi Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1989): 511.

⁹⁷ Natal'ya Ul'chenko, "Iz Istorii Podpisaniya", 362.

of Moscow and organisation of a conference in Kars for signing the treaty with the Transcaucasian countries. This happened on 13 October, 1921, when, with the mediation of RSFSR, the Treaty of Kars was signed between Turkish GNA, Georgian SSR, Armenian SSR and Azerbaijani SSR⁹⁸, and the borderline, which did not change until nowadays, was defined. Even though, it could be assumed just as formality that reaffirmed the negotiated territorial demarcation under the Treaty of Moscow, the Treaty of Kars came after the "bridging" over difficulties and a consecutive collision. In addition, the predominant Soviet role over the Transcaucasian countries and their becoming part of the Soviet sphere was thus consolidated and affirmed by the Turkish side. Not last, the support for the Turkish government was resumed at the end of 1921.

As already mentioned, the continuous material support for the Ankara government was also a tool that facilitates the finalisation of the treaties. According to S. Kuznetsova "during 1921 in disposition of the Turkish government there were sent 6,5 mln. golden rubbles, 33275 rifles, 57 986 cartridges, 327 machine guns, 54 artillery guns, 129 479 shells, 1500 swords, 20 thousand gas masks and a huge amount of other military equipment. On 3 October, 1921 to the Turkish military command in Trabzon 2 marine fighters were handled - "Jivoi" and "Jutkyi"⁹⁹. According to an interview with Gen. Ali Fuat Gebesoy in 1958, aid for the Turks was as follows: ten million golden rubles, 30 000 Russian rifles with 1000 rounds of ammunition for each rifle, 30 000 bayonets, from 250 to 300 machine guns with 10 000 cartridges for each gun, some cavalry swords, from 20 to 25 mountain cannon, some cavalry swords, a large number of hand grenades. According to Gen. Cebesoy these were enough to equip three Turkish divisions. The Soviet government deposited in Berlin one million Russian rubles to the credit of the Turks, who were thereby enabled to secure replacements for German weapons obtained before and during the First World War¹⁰⁰. This significant support was considered to have a crucial role for the success in the war against the Greeks, as for Moscow "the Turks were fighting Soviet battles and that the Turkish defeat of

⁹⁸ "Dogovor o Druzhebe mezhdu Armyanskoy SSR, Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR i Gruzinskoy SSR, s Odnoystorony, i Turtsiy - s Drugoy, Zaklyuchennyi Priuchastii RSFSR v Karse", <http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/sab/yarsi.html>(accessed on May 6, 2018).

⁹⁹ S. Kuznetsova, *Ustanovlenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy: k 40-Letiyu Moskovskogo Dogovoramezhdu RSFSR i Turtsiy* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1961), quoted in: Muhanov, "K Istorii Sovetizatsii", 220.

¹⁰⁰ Spector, *The Soviet Union*, 78.

the Greeks spread dissension among the Allies¹⁰¹. In December 1921, the arrival of Gen. Mihail Frunze in Ankara¹⁰², commander-in-chief of the Soviet Forces in Ukraine, not only Turkish-Ukrainian relations were officially established, but his visit had to shatter all doubts and prove the inconsistency of all rumours for the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations and an eventual future military conflict on Caucasus between them. In addition, equipment and munitions were provided for the Turks. As a proof of the still existing high-level of mutual trust M. Frunze presented in his report for the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine that "An access to the most important military secrets was opened for me, I became acquainted with the battle schedule of the Turkish and Greek Army, I became acquainted with all the necessities of these armies, with the number of soldiers, with quantity and quality of the military equipment, with the condition of the rear etc. I can say that I have almost the same general idea of the Turkish armed forces as for Ukraine army."¹⁰³

After M. Frunze, on 26 January, 1922, the newly appointed Soviet envoy to Turkey Semen Aralov strengthened the trust in Russia's moral and material support in the final period of the Turkish Liberation War. In the Turkish press Mustafa Kemal was criticized for his fiduciary relations with Aralov, but under the cover of drinking tea, evening events etc. they managed to discuss and prepare the offensive against the Greek positions¹⁰⁴. S. Aralov together with his colleagues the military attaché Zvonarev and the Azerbaijani envoy had the opportunity to visit the front line personally invited by Mustafa Kemal in the period of the preparation of the general Turkish offensive against the Greeks – March-April 1922¹⁰⁵. The Entente's proposal for peace was also discussed with Aralov, which was rejected by Ankara government following the confidence of Mustafa Kemal that Soviet Russia would continue to help Turkey¹⁰⁶. In May 1922 a final balance of the given credit of 10 million rubles was done in a period when the Entente made an attempt to end the war between Greece and Turkey¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.,76.

¹⁰² Mihail Frunze, *Sobranie Sochineniy*, 319-321.

¹⁰³ Ibid.,359.

¹⁰⁴ Rasim Ors, *Russkiy Ataturkurk i Rozhdyeniye Turyetskoy Respubliki: v Zerkale Sovyetskoy Pressy 1920-h godov*, (Moskva: Ves' Mir, 2012), 78.

¹⁰⁵ Semen Aralov, *Vospominaniya Sovetskogo diplomata. 1922-1923* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1960), 76-110.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 83.

¹⁰⁷ Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia*, 114; Semen Aralov, *Vospominaniya*, 104.

The material support was a definite "trump card" in the hands of the Moscow government, which used it as a catalyst to achieve its aims, but at the same time, the Turks knew how to play the "Entente card" well enough to receive what they needed in the most important period of the Turkish National Movement in order to finish the war with the Greeks. The availability of counter balance move was always the approach that didn't allow some of the sides to fall into total dependence but helped in establishing mutual beneficial relations.

The relations between the Turkish National Movement and Soviet Russia in Caucasus during the period of 1919-1922 followed the dynamics of the incipient new international order after the First World War. Both governments – that of Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists, being in extreme circumstances for preserving their very existence against the common enemy – the Entente, came to the logical decision for cooperation, which could be of a mutual benefit. Situated in the neighbouring Caucasian region they could not be non-dependent on the local situation there and similar developments with the Caucasian nations, which established new state formations and were also seeking for support for official recognition of their independence and sovereignty. Their wrong perception of the local and international situation, the interethnic military conflicts for territories and political power, economic critical condition were among the factors that made those states vulnerable to foreign interests and political strategies, preventing the separate existence of the Caucasian states. Their geostrategic position between Europe and Asia, the proximity with the Anatolian plateau, the key ports Batumi and Baku situated on the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and being a gate respectively toward the Straits and the Far East, the natural resource and the transportation infrastructure, secure strong positions of the power controlling the Caucasus. When this power was the Great Britain, which thus tried to establish strategic positions directed against Southern parts of Russia and Northern parts of Turkey, the existence of the Caucasian independent democratic states for Soviet Russia and the Turkish GNA became not only unacceptable, but also dangerous for their own security. The Caucasian "place d'armes" used by the Ottoman and the Russian Empires for many centuries of conflict, had to be now transformed into a "bridge" to enhance the Soviet-Turkish coordination of actions and provide a transportation route for the material support to the Ankara government.

Nevertheless, the common problems that both governments faced

and that became ground for cooperation could not hide their main expectations for benefits from it. Soviet Russia expected through Turkey to spread communism to the Near and the Middle East as a tool for political influence to strengthen the struggle against imperialism. The fact that Turkey would be ally was of importance for the protection of the Soviet Russia's flank in the Caucasus. Bolsheviks were also against the Greek expansion as it was supported by Great Britain, considering this could block access to the Mediterranean. Not last, establishing close relations with GNA strengthened Soviet Russia positions on the international scene where they tried to return as a key political factor. After renouncing all treaties and claims to Constantinople and the Straits, Russians were not seen any more as an enemy and Turkish National Movement could benefit significantly from close relations. Turkish nationalists would receive the needed material and financial support also securing their northern border during the war with Greece. The cooperation with the Bolsheviks could balance the pressure exercised by the Entente and their unwillingness to recognise the Turkish GNA as a stakeholder in the future peace negotiations. The Soviet - Turkish rapprochement was skillfully used by the Ankara government to achieve better conditions, official recognition and preservation of the territories under the "National Pact".

No matter that the realisation of the mutual support was not a stable process, this did not hinder the Soviet-Turkish main cooperation and the process of sovietisation seemed as very well coordinated operation, including following steps: 1. Establishment of perfunctory diplomatic relations, which had to keep the delusion for normalisation of bilateral relations; 2. Organising/provoking unrests/revolts based on socio-political ethno-religious differences; 3. Military attack from both sides (with exception of Azerbaijan where it was not attacked by the Turkish army, but still Turkish officers support the process of sovietisation). And while in Northern Caucasus the Turkish non-interference and pro-Bolshevik position has a crucial role for providing Bolsheviks advantage in this aspect, in the Southern Caucasus intentionally or unintentionally the presented above scheme was duly followed by the partnering Soviet and Turkish governments.

Last, but not least, the mistrust and suspicions that followed the Soviet-Turkish relations in the period under consideration could be accepted as typical characteristics in the initial period of establishing new type of relations between two sides, whose historical background

was woven by political and military conflicts. More than expected was they to be ready to use a backup plan if mutual cooperation turned out to be not beneficial even dangerous for their security. In addition, the means to provide balance or upper hand in negotiations were always in favour of finding better solutions and strengthening the goodwill for continuing the close relations. In regard to the latter, very important was the fact that the leading Soviet and Turkish policy and decision-makers were all the time in direct contact and communication, which "quenched the tension" when needed and turned back the focus on the main aims of cooperation. Concerning the Caucasus, they were fulfilled at the expense of the independence of the newly-born states, which led to the facilitation of Soviet-Turkish struggle against the Entente for self-preservation and returning on the international stage as a key factor in the new European order.

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The Red Njegoš: Petar II Petrović in Yugoslav and Communist Ideology and Propaganda of Montenegrin Communists

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Abstract:

This paper analyzes different levels of use of the character and the work of a significant Montenegrin poet and ruler Petar II Petrović-Njegoš for the purpose of promoting the ideas of Montenegrin communists. By analyzing speeches from public celebrations in honour of Njegoš and by presenting the sources in the main communist media, this paper tries to present the key in which the communists interpreted Njegoš and his work. The canonization of Njegoš as Yugoslav national poet during the communist reign is observed from the aspect of the significance of that poet for authorities. This paper searches for narrative constructions and ideologemes that the Communist intellectuals and politicians constructed to promote their ideas through Njegoš and his character.

Keywords: Njegoš, Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Communists, Ideology, Propaganda

Introduction

Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (1813-1851) was a Montenegrin ruler, a bishop and a poet. He is one of the most important poets in the South Slavic area. He created during the era of romanticism and managed to express the collective identity or 'spirit of the people' through his most famous works such as *Gorski vijenac* (*The Mountain Wreath*) or *Lažni car Šćepan Mali* (*Fake emperor Šćepan Mali*), which made him very popular among the audience of that time. During his reign (1830-

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1851), he led an intense campaign for the liberation of the South Slavs, spending a lot of time in towns where a large number of Slavs lived, such as Trieste, Vienna, Zagreb and Belgrade. He associated with the leaders of 'Yugoslavian' idea and in every way promoted their communion and liberation through his work. That is why, after his death, he became very important to all Yugoslav and nationalist movements. In the symbolic sense, Njegoš played a very important role in the creation of the first South Slavic common state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. In 1925, with the greatest state honors, he would in fact be canonized for the national poet of the 'nation with three names (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes)', when King Aleksandar Karađorđević buried him on the Montenegrin mountain Lovćen, which was celebrated throughout the country as the greatest state ceremony. In the interwar period, Njegoš was interpreted as the predecessor - messiah of the Yugoslav unification. His combative verses were celebrated as the most important sparks that sparked the national maturity and emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Since 1929., when Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes changed its name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and when 'integral Yugoslavism' became propagated instead of 'nation with three names', Njegoš again became the symbol of communion, this time represented as one of the fathers of Yugoslavia, since on the cover of his final work printed in Trieste in 1851, it is imprinted that it was 'printed in Yugoslavia'. Nevertheless, Njegoš will become very important for the authorities, since his verses will often be quoted on public occasions and monuments to him will be erected throughout Yugoslavia. After communists took over the authority in 1945, they too were aware of the significance of Njegoš in the interwar period, so they also, only on the other grounds, canonized Njegoš as the national poet of Yugoslavia. In promoting their ideology, Njegoš became an important component, since his complete work began having a function of self-promotion.

After the end of the Second World War, the Communists managed to retain authority in Yugoslavia and eliminate their opposition. A new state was created on a federal basis, oriented towards the 'building of socialism'. Six republics got their constitutions and proclaimed equality. The Constitution of the People's Republic of Montenegro adopted on December 31, 1946, which symbolized the return of its historical individuality, will define, among other important provisions, its new coat-of-arms - Lovćen with

Njegoš's chapel surrounded by laurel wreath connected at the bottom to the Montenegrin flag.¹ The communist authorities were genuinely trying to fully adjust Njegoš's character and work to their ideological needs, although the linking of Njegoš and Communism seemed impossible, since Peter II was a representative of a dynasty, not a working class, an Orthodox bishop, a poet of romanticism without any expressed aspiration for social thought, and above all the archetype of the father of the nation in the greater state project interpretations of the previous authorities. With the extraordinary interpretative acrobatics, the new authorities will soon succeed in overcoming all the challenges of ideologizing. As noted by American Slavist Andrew B. Wachtel, the essential question posed before the communist authorities during creation of new Yugoslavia was which works can be used to divert the cultural focus of the country from synthetic multiculturalism to transnational internationalism proclaimed by the communists.² He believes that Yugoslav communists have learned from Soviet teachers more than just the tactics of governance, more precisely how most works from the past can be used in socialist reality with the appropriate deviation in interpretation - the canon had not had to be changed significantly, but only reinterpreted. 'Inconvenient interwar interpretations could be attributed to the ideological mistakes of that time, and not to the author and his work,'³ he claims, which bypassed the former setting of Njegoš into the center of multicultural Yugoslavian culture and the fondness of Petar II by King Aleksandar. Njegoš was interpreted as a forerunner of Yugoslavism in the socialist reality of Yugoslavia, and his role in 1848, which was taken as a turning point in Yugoslavism, was especially emphasized. Montenegrin historian Niko S. Martinović wrote in 1946 that even before the people's revolution, Njegoš prepared the Yugoslavians for major events, quoting his poem 'Pozdrav rodu iz Beča 1847' in which the poet noted that 'Lepo, lipo, lijepo i ljepo' (words for 'beautiful' in Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Bosnian) are the petals of one flower.⁴ Njegoš's Yugoslavism was treated as the culmination of the liberating-unifying fight, as it relied on the aspirations of rebellion actions against two great empires, which fully fit into the communist exclusivity of dogmatic anti-

¹ Živko Andrijašević and Šerbo Rastoder, *Istorija Crne Gore - od najstarijih vremena do 2003*. (Podgorica: Zavod za iseljenike Crne Gore, 2003), 437.

² Endru Baruh Vahtel, *Stvaranje nacije, razaranje nacije: književnost i kulturna politika u Jugoslaviji*, (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2001), 174.

³ Vahtel, *Stvaranje nacije, razaranje nacije*, 177.

⁴ Niko S. Martinović, „Njegoš i 1848“, *Stvaranje*, br. 1, (1946): 43.

reactionaryism in theory and rebellion actions from the latter war in practice.

The first real opportunity for the Yugoslav authorities to celebrate a more significant cultural jubilee and to promote new values at that level happened in 1947 when the 100 years since the first edition of 'The Mountain Wreath' was marked, which also gave a chance to the creation of a centralized culture of Yugoslavian people. In the new political and ideological concepts Njegoš's ethnic root happened to be a lucky circumstance - aware of the fact that the main strife in the former Yugoslavia was between Serbs and Croats, Njegoš's ethnic origin as a Montenegrin, made it possible to circumvent the possible favors of the legacies of both sides.⁵ Since the Montenegrins were not accused of hegemonic aspirations, Petar II could be accepted by everyone.⁶ Since the authorities after the Second World War acknowledged the Montenegrins as an independent nation with the right to self-determination, this enabled the consideration of Njegoš as a Montenegrin and Yugoslav writer, thus avoiding earlier interpretations.

Jubilee of 'The Mountain Wreath' represented the canonization of Njegoš in a completely new way when it comes to all organization levels, the sent messages and the discourse that was present during the event in general.⁷ Like the construction of the chapel in 1925, this event had greatest importance in (well-controlled) state propaganda. Croatian newspaper *Hrvatski Vjesnik* has published a large Njegoš portrait on the cover with the message 'Celebration of the hundredth anniversary of 'The Mountain Wreath' is a holiday for all people of Yugoslavia', while the new editions of this work were printed in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the second translation was published in Slovenia, and for the first time 'The Mountain Wreath' was translated and published in Macedonia. In *Borba*, the organ of the ruling party, 'four of the six columns were dedicated to Njegoš, and his picture was five times larger than Tito's (...) Considering Tito's tendency to magnify his own pictures, this graphic

⁵ What supports the fact that Njegoš was the most suitable person for the first major promotion is the abstraction of Mažuranić's *The Death of Smail-aga Čengić* in 1946 at the state level.

⁶ Vahtel, *Stvaranje nacije, razaranje nacije*, 177.

⁷ Jubilee details processed in detail by Dragutin Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji 1945–1989“, *Matica*, (2013): 231-254.

solution really represents a rarity'.⁸ The central celebration was organized in Cetinje (Montenegro) in June 1947, with the presence of the most important figures of Montenegro and high representatives of other Yugoslav republics from the political and cultural life. Montenegrin President Blažo Jovanović said that Njegoš fought against the 'soullessness of Christian capitalist Europe' and that he was a great admirer of Russia, Yugoslavism and the freedom of Montenegro and Montenegrins, who fought against the Turkish occupiers and domestic traitors.⁹ Jovanović, like many before him, again reminded of a historical myth from Njegoš's work and determined that „istraga poturica“¹⁰ in *The Mountain Wreath* is represented unusually vivid and true. According to him, 'istraga' was an exemplar during National Liberation War and he stated that 'the truthfulness and lasting poetic value of the 'Mountain Wreath' were confirmed in the war stronger than ever before, that Njegoš's character fluttered on the flags of Tito's army and that Njegoš was a subordinate and a partisan teacher during the war.'¹¹ The main interpretator of Njegoš's work at the anniversary was the writer Radovan Zogović. He promoted the ideas seen by authorities in Njegoš's work. Zogović argued that Njegoš interpreted the revolutionary 1848 year just like Karl Marx, and that in 'The Mountain Wreath' Njegoš fought against Turkish feudalism and the Turkish exploiters and the Venetian capitalist world. Zogović interpreted Njegoš's work as a class struggle, and stated that beneath the main conflict in 'The Mountain Wreath' there was a conflict between the class of feudal lords and the class of enslaved and exploited peasantry. In 'The Mountain Wreath' he saw evidence that a new righteous social order can only be established on the ruins of the old one and can only be achieved with a revolutionary fight. Zogović stated that the entire 'The Mountain Wreath' was an anthem of revolutionary struggle for the destruction of unjust and unreasonable social relations and institutions. With the help of Njegoš's work, Zogović justified the goals of the socialist revolution in

⁸ Vahtel, *Stvaranje nacije, razaranje nacije*, 178.

⁹ Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 236.

¹⁰ The myth about the slaughter of Muslims in the Cetinje region at the end of the 17th century, about which there is no mention in historical sources before the nineteenth century. More details: Vojislav P. Nikčević (2000), *Istraga poturica: mit ili stvarnost*. Podgorica, Almanah. 'Istraga' will later trigger vigorous controversy over Njegoš's view of the Muslims, and his work will be misused by the nationalists like Radovan Karadžić i Ratko Mladić during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. About the use of 'The Mountain Wreath' by Radovan Karadžić see: Slavoj Žižek, „Notes on a poetic military complex“, *Third text*, Volume 23, Issue 5, (2009): 503–509.


¹¹ Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 236.

Montenegro. Zogović claimed that Njegoš considered himself both a Montenegrin and a Serb and that he belongs both to Serbian and Yugoslavian literature, but that his Montenegrin nationality is undeniable.¹²

Such maneuvers in the interpretation of Njegoš can be summarized in several analytical opinions: World War II Partisans are legitimized as a contemporary version of Njegoš's liberators from *The Mountain Wreath*; an unpleasant motive - the slaughter of Muslims, is removed by circumventing the religious connotation and using the very popular communist epithet of "domestic traitors"; representing him as a national poet, the communists addressed directly the workers and peasants who were the foundation of the newly established society, and Njegoš's work was well known to them - thus the receiving of communist slogans and proclamations among the people was easier. In addition to this, what should also be mentioned is the emphatic popularization of Njegoš's non-saintly life and non-compliance with the priestly regulations, which fully corresponded with the communist attitude towards faith.

It is also interesting to analyze the role 'The Mountain Wreath' had in the popularization of Marxist values. Undoubtedly, for most Montenegrins, 'dialectical materialism' was complicated to explain. To depict the history as seen by Karl Marx, it was necessary to find a Montenegrin counterpart, so that technological-economic phrases would be more receptive to the local audience. As we saw from the speech, the commentators tried to show 'The Mountain Wreath' more or less as an act describing the struggle of the peasants against the feudal lords; the Montenegrin-Turkish war and the 'Istraga poturica' are considered as a certain 'conflict of classes'. Since Marx sees the emergence of history in the class conflict, the hostile act of the Montenegrins towards Muslims from Njegoš's work was the beginning of Montenegrin history; and the Communists are the heirs of that Montenegro, the continuers and the guards of that tradition.

¹² Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 236-237.



Scheme 1: Official interpretation of *The Mountain Wreath* during the centenary of its publishing

Neither Njegoš's new great anniversary will pass without actualization of the most tangible social and political issues through his character and work. Since that year the conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR reached climax because of the Cominform, the jubilee will be used to criticize Stalin and his supporters in Yugoslavia. Speaking at the jubilee about Njegoš's attitude towards Russia, Blažo Jovanović represented that relationship in a negative context - he stated that the attitude of Russian diplomacy has always been utilitarian and assistance to Montenegro has always been measured in accordance with Russian interests.¹³ For every received rubble from Russia, Jovanović says, a big reproof followed. The Montenegrin conditions from the 19th century are presented as the current reality - which can be interpreted as the following - when the great Njegoš could turn his back on Russia, so can we. Thus, the past was again evoked to the extent that the split among the communists will be compared with the events from 'The Mountain Wreath'. The famous Njegoš's syntagm 'the slave of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) moods' was the informal motto of the entire celebration. Commentator Vladimir Kolar published the text with that title in *Pobjeda* for the 100th anniversary. In that text, he gave a historical review of Njegoš's political biography, with a special accent on relations between Russia

¹³ *Pobjeda*, September 6, 1951, 2-3.

and Montenegro since the time of Bishop Danilo Petrović, ruler of Montenegro (1696-1735). Below the text, on the same page, we find Stalin's caricature that stands on the imperial throne in front of the kneeling subjects with a message 'Consistent with the tradition of autocrats'.¹⁴ In his text Kolar presented the whole history of Russian-Montenegrin relations as deeply for interest. For him, Russia has never shown sincere love for the Montenegrins, but had been buying their combative strength with rubles in order to jeopardize the Ottoman Empire. Most of the text is devoted to the bitter experience of Petar II with imperial Russia and there is a detailed explication of the tendency towards the independence of the Yugoslav people from the ruling circles in Petrograd (St. Petersburg).

Conflicts between Italy and Yugoslavia regarding the city of Trieste after World War II and its surroundings have also been mentioned during Njegoš's celebration. Blažo Jovanović noted that he was very pleased that Trieste left a trace in the extensive Njegoš's heritage, and that the roads to strengthen the freedom of his own people led him through that city. 'He glorified Trieste and its future firmly convinced that Trieste will always serve its people, that Trieste will always be closely connected with its hinterland for which it originated and hence suffered its well-being, and that is mostly Slavic hinterland. Indications of the great spirit were always accomplished because they relied on deep knowledge. Therefore, the Italian occupation of Trieste was only a temporary interruption of the 'long progress', therefore neither the present situation will last forever.'¹⁵ The delegates of the 'free Territory of Trieste' (mostly Slovenians who lives there) were invited to the main celebration, and in the greeting speech they emphasized that the Slovenes from Trieste, despite spilled blood, could not achieve the aspirations implied a hundred years ago by Petar II and Slovenian national poet Franc Prešeren - unification with their people and other Yugoslav people.¹⁶

Isolation of Yugoslavia due to the conflict with the East concerning the Cominform and disagreements with the West due to the so-called Trieste crisis has reflected on the great manifestation and promotion of patriotism, heroism and fighting in the spirit of Njegoš. Commentator M. Zečević wrote about 'The Mountain Wreath' as a patriotic act, representing Njegoš as a very conscious 'people's

¹⁴ V. Kolar, „Rob petrogradskih ćudi“, *Pobjeda*, br. 209 (5. 9. 1951): 9.

¹⁵ *Pobjeda*, September 6, 1951, 2.

¹⁶ *Pobjeda*, September 6, 1951, 12.

liberator' whose epic heroes are true representatives of the Montenegrin people and patriotic values.¹⁷ Montenegrin historian Dimitrije Dimo Vujović wrote the work 'Njegoš's work and our National Liberation War' ('Njegoš's work and our National Liberation War') in which he interpreted *The Mountain Wreath* as the main drive of the anti-fascist struggle, contextualizing the partisan campaign of 1941-1945 with events and personalities from Njegoš's epic poem.¹⁸ That is why the author says that Njegoš's work is a textbook of patriotism and that young fighters in 1941 collectively read the most important Njegoš lines.

In 1951 Njegoš will get museum in the building of Biljarda in Cetinje, which was the first time in Montenegro to dedicate a museum to one person. The authorities did not miss the opportunity to announce on the cover of their propaganda newsletter that Tito, as the first man of Yugoslavia, and Blažo Jovanović, as the first man of Montenegro, donated artefacts to the Njegoš museum.¹⁹ A few years later there were suggestions that a special scientific institute should also be opened in Biljarda in Njegoš's honor.²⁰ The dimensions of the celebration are best illustrated by the fact that the Njegoš's centenary in Montenegro was marked in almost all towns, even villages, and special performance for this occasion was organized by students of the Agricultural Technical High School in Bijelo Polje.²¹

Since 1952, the so-called view of Njegoš will not be a priority since the communists at the VI Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia proclaimed the freedom of form in artistic expression, so so-called no longer imposed itself as a unique direction and method in the interpretation of literary works. Njegoš's character and work were slowly liberated from adjusting to socialist ideology, so the new interpretative fields were opened. During this gradual transition from the socialist to the national narrative, which would intensify in the 1960s, Njegoš mostly served the constant popularization of the interwar communist and NLW heritage. "The memories of the victors' were being refreshed by the insertion of Njegoš into anecdotal narrative of fame and struggle for a better and more advanced

¹⁷ M. Zečević, „Patriotizam u Gorskom vijencu“, *Omladinski pokret*, br. 22, (1951): 6.

¹⁸ Dimitrije Vujović, „Njegoš's work and our National Liberation War“, *Stvaranje*, br. 5–6, (1951): 303.

¹⁹ *Pobjeda*, September 5, 1951, 1.

²⁰ M. Kažić, „Institut za proučavanje Njegoša“, *Stvaranje*, br. 10, (1960): 860.

²¹ *Omladinski pokret*, May 5, 1951, 3.

society.²²

As the discourse on the identity of the Yugoslav people of the 1960s increasingly began to tackle the issue of primordial national identities, the Communist authorities increasingly adapted Njegoš to the official national ideology. The Montenegrin authorities maintained the opinion that Njegoš as a Montenegrin ruler and poet is a part of the Montenegrin cultural heritage, but considered that he could be referred to as a Yugoslav writer. At the first major jubilee in the new circumstances, 150 years after Njegoš's birth, the Montenegrin government organized a great celebration with new interpretative practices that primarily emphasized Yugoslavism. Blažo Jovanović saw the celebration of the 150 years since Njegoš's birth in 1963 as an assembling of the artistic and cultural values of the Yugoslav people in a unique socialist culture. Njegoš was interpreted as an integrative factor of Yugoslavism and a value that has always strived for progress.²³ *Pobjeda* described the celebration as the best way to achieve 'a more firm and systematic connection of all the people of Yugoslavia, all linguistic areas, especially more permanent and thorough rapprochement of cultural workers and artistic creators'.²⁴ One of the central moments of the whole event was the decision of the Montenegrin republic authorities to establish the Njegoš Prize for Literature. In the Law regulating the award, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro for 1963, we find that the first article clearly states that the prize is established 'in the memory of the great Yugoslav writer Petar II Petrović Njegoš'.²⁵ On account of this decision, *Pobjeda* made a poll with well-known literary critics from all over Yugoslavia, and one of the questions was: what do you think about the Yugoslav character of Njegoš's award? All interlocutors made very positive judgments, believing that the Yugoslav character is a fundament of its strength. One of the critics pointed out: 'For us, Yugoslavism is a new material, moral, psychological and spiritual quality. It is actual and we know it, but those who already believe that it can be reduced to the actuality of the moment are mistaken. The more we become Yugoslavs, the more we will be men: free producers

²² See: Milo Kralj, „Gorski vijenac u zatvoru“, *Pobjeda*, br. 6 (5. 2. 1961): 16 and br. 7 (12. 2. 1961): 16; Puniša Perović, „Kako smo primali Njegoša“, *Stvaranje*, br. 5 (1952): 240–256.

²³ *Pobjeda*, September 8, 1963, 12.

²⁴ *Pobjeda*, September 1, 1963, 1.

²⁵ *Službeni list SR CG*, 1963, 489.

and managers - no matter where we are and what we do'.²⁶ The first winner of this highest Yugoslav literary award at that time was Montenegrin Mihailo Lalić, for the novel *Lelejska gora*. He thought that Njegoš's award symbolizes the bringing of Yugoslav people together, the unification of national literatures, and that its Yugoslav broadness should be a model for other awards.²⁷ When awarding the prize at a central celebration to the winner, the president of the Montenegrin Parliament, Andrija Mugoša, said that considering the spirit of the work and the aspirations of the great poet, the prize has a Yugoslav character, and that's why it is very firmly fixed and ranked among the top values of 'our socialist reality'.²⁸ Apart from the emphasis on integrative tendencies in the approaches to Yugoslav culture, the entire discourse of the celebration abounded by emphasizing the efforts to put Njegoš's work in the service of progress, primarily by promoting his humanism in the fight against tyranny. The actuality of Njegoš in the modern age was also mentioned. By the end of the 1960s, there were no major changes in the interpretation of Njegoš's identity. In the lexicographical and encyclopaedic editions, the universal value of his verses was highlighted, and the national characterization was moving in the direction of the Montenegrin / Yugoslavian poet. However, at the end of that decade, nationalisms will intensify within the Yugoslav community, which will be particularly reflected in the treatment of Njegoš's national and cultural qualification. His multilayered identity had again become topical. *Književne novine*, published by The Association of Serbian writers, started a debate on the question of whether Petar II Petrović is a Montenegrin or a Serb, to which culture he belongs, whose writer he is and what is the nature of his Montenegrin or Serbian nationality.²⁹ This created the first major field of disagreement between Serbian and Montenegrin intellectuals on the issues of national cultures and the characteristics of Montenegrin identity. Montenegrin authorities held a major symposium on roads and the development of Montenegrin culture in January 1968. Then, in the defense of Njegoš, the successor of Blažo Jovanović as the first man of the party and authorities in Montenegro - Veselin Đuranović, claimed that Njegoš is a Montenegrin and Yugoslav writer and that any serbianization of Njegoš means nationalism.³⁰ The additional heat to the conflicts surrounding Njegoš

²⁶ *Pobjeda*, July 13, 1963, 9.

²⁷ *Pobjeda*, September 1, 1963, 3.

²⁸ *Pobjeda*, September 8, 1963, 3.

²⁹ Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 242.

³⁰ *Pobjeda*, February 4, 1968, 9.

will be caused by intensification of preparations and works on raising Njegoš's mausoleum at Lovćen and removing the chapel built by King Aleksandar Karađorđević. Although this project had been prepared for more than a decade and a half and its realization for 1963 was largely announced, the preparation of the mountainous terrain and the construction of the access road were delayed due to difficult geographical conditions and large financial expenditures.³¹ The well-known Croatian and Yugoslav sculptor Ivan Meštrović was responsible for the draft of the mausoleum and its artistic-conceptual look. This work was mostly completed before his death in 1962. The works were completely suspended for some time, but after the proclamation of the Cetinje authorities in January 1968 the works continued. Representatives of the communist authorities noted the general Yugoslav orientation of Njegoš's work and called for state solidarity in collecting money for the final realization of the construction of mausoleum.³² From that moment, all the official Montenegrin propaganda were organized in promoting the justification of this act, but the media also gave space to opponents of the removal of the chapel. Opponents also had a well-organized propaganda action, largely stating their views in the more liberal press in Serbia. Thus, after several years of quarrels in the pro et contra polemics of the new Njegoš's crypt, a real *polemos* began, which revealed the deep social conflict and the polarization of Montenegrin society over the issue of the ethnic identity of Montenegrins.

Nevertheless, despite the polemic, the Mausoleum was officially opened on July 28, 1974. Official propaganda emphasized that the new time requires a more modern approach to Njegoš and that a new monument should represent 'abortion of Orthodox and political misconceptions, romanticism and sentimentality' to a part of the Montenegrin society.³³ The main person at the ceremony was the first man of Montenegro, Veljko Milatović, the personification of more active Montenegrin identity emancipation, who greatly contributed to the strengthening of cultural and educational institutions in this regard. It is interesting to note that in the same year a new federal

³¹ About the chapel / mausoleum, the controversy and the problems it has produced, more detailed: František Šitek, *Narativi o identitetu - izabrane studije o crnogorskoj istoriji*, (Podgorica: Matica crnogorska, 2016), 126–132.

³² Blažo Kilibarda (ed.), *Lovćen, Njegoš, Meštrović, Projekt Njegoševa mauzoleja na Lovćenu i njegova realizacija (1952-1974)*, (Zagreb: Nacionalna zajednica Crnogoraca Hrvatske, Matica crnogorska, 2004), 48.

³³ Kilibarda (ed.), *Lovćen, Njegoš, Meštrović, Projekt Njegoševa*, 107.

constitution that guaranteed a greater degree of independence for the Yugoslav republics was adopted. Regarding Montenegrin situation, all of that reflected on the discourse on Njegoš. In his solemn speech, Milatović emphasized that the Mausoleum of 'Montenegrin struggle and freedom is not an endowment to the glory of throne and altar, a decoration of power and an addition that glorifies the investor' nor 'a cold marble case on top of the honoured mountain, nor a sanctuary isolated from mortals to provoke awe', but represents for him an inseparable part of Lovćen, and a symbol that connects the 'Njegoš-poet' with present and future generations.³⁴ Milatović recognized Njegoš's exclusivity in modern times in his fighting humanism, heroism, the ethics of verse, freedom, the necessity of the constant fight for humanity and dignity, the fight against enemy, darkness and disgrace. Special treatment was given to the emphasis of Njegoš's Montenegrin nationality - Njegoš's work was presented as 'a superb expression created in the Montenegrin area'. This made it clear that the Montenegrin authorities firmly reject any kind of appropriation of Njegoš and see him exclusively as a reflection of the Montenegrin spirit within the Yugoslav community. Milatović concluded that the Lovćen Mausoleum is a symbol of collective Yugoslav solidarity, and that the largest monument to Njegoš is 'free Montenegro in a free community' of equal Yugoslav people and nationalities of Yugoslavia. Montenegrin Njegoš was once again a link, which is what the daily press headlines about the opening of the mausoleum say: 'The manifestation of brotherhood and unity', 'Monument to the solidarity of all people of Yugoslavia', 'Contribution to mutual understanding and rapprochement'. In order for the whole ceremony of the mausoleum opening to be in the spirit of the Titoist propaganda, the organizers decided to finish the ceremony by giving a gold medal with Njegoš's character to Tito.³⁵ Njegoš's mausoleum will be widely used as a symbol on many logos. In accordance with the already mentioned new course in the direction of strengthening the national emancipation of Montenegrins, a number of cultural and scientific institutions that contain the Njegoš mausoleum in their emblem will be established, among which the University of Montenegro and the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts are especially important. The coat of arms of Montenegro will also experience the transformation in 1974, since the chapel surrounded by a wreath was replaced by a mausoleum.

³⁴ *Pobjeda*, August 1, 1974, 1.

³⁵ *Pobjeda*, August 1, 1974, 1.

From the mid-seventies of the 20th century until the beginning of the crisis of the Yugoslavia at the end of the next decade, interpretation of Njegoš did not change significantly. His Montenegrin nationality and belonging to Montenegrin culture and general-Yugoslav character were the main frames of interpretation. The emphasis on Montenegrin and Yugoslavian nationality was important because of the affirmation of the current state policy, while Njegoš's 'Serbian nationality' was reduced to some of the messages he promoted in his literature. Literary interpretations played a very important role in this field, since the interpreters of Njegoš's work obtained the arguments that were on the same path proclaimed by the Yugoslav authorities as well as by the Montenegrin Communist Party. This general climate was confirmed by Njegoš's award - in 1978 it was given to the Serbian writer Oskar Davičo, who in his speech spoke of the power of Njegoš's statement, which can not represent an expression of hatred, but a statement of freedom.³⁶ Davičo also spoke about the action of the Serbian Orthodox Church and like-minded against the raising of the mausoleum, pointing out that this 'noise' came from a patriarchy - 'whether in civilian clothes or mantia' - who, as prisoners of the past, 'out of the fridge of historical forgetfulness' pulled out the harmful construction how a Croat and a Catholic can not raise a monument to an Orthodox ruler and a bishop, and thus created an unpleasant atmosphere. Even more precise than Davičo in determining Njegoš's essence was the winner of this literary award for 1981, Slovenian writer Josip Vidmar. He considered that 'Njegoš is Montenegro and that Montenegro is Njegoš' and that this can hardly be said of other poets. He compared *The Mountain Wreath* with its 'wise and free instinct' with the national liberation struggle, and the fluctuations of Bishop Danilo from that epic poem were compared with the challenges they had during the war.³⁷

The awarding of Njegoš's award in 1981 is very important also from another angle - due to certain socio-national phenomena in post-Tito Yugoslavia (died in 1980) which announced the internal crisis. Among Serbian writers and intellectuals, the thesis about Njegoš's Serbian nationality and Njegoš as a part of Serbian culture was increasingly emphasized. In June 1980, a meeting on the valorization of the Montenegrin cultural heritage on Marxist grounds was held in the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of League of Communists

³⁶ Oskar Davičo, „O Njegošu, o pesništvu“, *Ovdje*, br. 14, (1978): 12.

³⁷ *Cetinjski list*, October 25, 1981, 9.

of Montenegro. The President of the Montenegrin Presidency Veljko Milatović claimed that the Montenegrins are a separate nation and that the appropriation and treatment of Montenegrin culture as a bi-national one can not be allowed and that Njegoš can only belong to the Montenegrin people.³⁸ The problems concerning national literature shook also the other republics on various issues, so the Commission of the Yugoslav Writers' Union in 1981 suggested a 'Proposal for a common minimum of program basis for teaching literature in secondary schools in Yugoslavia.'³⁹ Basically, this proposal was accepted by all literary associations in the country, except the Association of Serbian Writers. They considered that Serbian literature was damaged the most by this document and in their proposal, among other things, emphasized that Njegoš belongs to Serbian tradition and that along with national poetry he had the greatest influence on the formation of Serbian national consciousness.⁴⁰ The reaction from Montenegro came quickly - in the official newsletter of the Montenegrin authorities - *Pobjeda* - an anonymous text appeared, in which Veljko Milatović's view is repeated: that the thesis of the dual nationality of Njegoš is unsustainable: that he belongs to Montenegrin culture and the Montenegrin nation.⁴¹ Discussions regarding Njegoš's nationality and his affiliation to national culture were transferred into encyclopedias. When writing the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia*, Montenegrin and Serbian editors had a misunderstanding, so the editor of the Montenegrin literature for the encyclopedia - writer Sreten Asanović, pointed out that the Montenegrin editorial staff at its meeting on November 3, 1981 rejected the proposal to classify Njegoš as Serbian writer, while, for the sake of interconnections and permeation, approved the processing of some Montenegrin writers in Serbian literature, but with the condition that their names have Montenegrin national definition.⁴² The Montenegrin editorial staff for the *Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia* met in April 1982 and officially discarded the dual characteristics of national culture and adopted the view that everything that emerged in the national history of the Montenegrin nation belongs to the Montenegrin people and that Njegoš's creativity expresses the historical reality of the Montenegrin people with its subject, ethics, worldview and lexical characteristics

³⁸ Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 247.

³⁹ Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 248.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Pobjeda*, June 20, 1981, 11.

⁴² Papović, „Njegoš u socijalističkoj i nacionalnoj ideologiji“, 250.

and their aesthetic and artistic expression and that it strongly influenced the national and cultural constitution of the Montenegrins.⁴³ According to literary values, Njegoš's work is characterized as a heritage of world and Yugoslav culture, so it can be written about in other literatures, especially those from the Serbo-Croat linguistic area. Such an approach, according to the members of the editorial staff, enabled the politics of fraternity and unity and further consolidation of the Yugoslav communion.

The memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 1986 had big consequences regarding the interpretation of Njegoš in the near future. In addition to Serbian national problems, the signatories also mentioned the problem of dilution and disintegration of Serbian culture and literature - indicating that Njegoš is a Serbian writer.⁴⁴ Such allegations did not have a stronger impact on the current Montenegrin authority that maintained its established attitudes, but after its shift in 1989, the views expressed in the Memorandum became extremely actual in Montenegro. Strong nationalistic tones towards the Montenegrin cultural heritage came from Serbia and through some Montenegrins who lived and worked in Belgrade. In 1986, in Belgrade, historian Batrić Jovanović published a book called *Crnogorci o sebi (od vladike Danila do 1941) – prilog istoriji crnogorske nacije (Montenegrins about themselves (from Bishop Danilo until 1941) - a contribution to the history of the Montenegrin nation)*, in which, as the main motivation for its emergence, he indicates the presentation of evidence that all the Montenegrins' ancestors felt both like Serbs and Montenegrins and that the book affirms the thesis that Montenegrins are of Serbian ethnic origin.⁴⁵ 'The duality' of the Montenegrin nation in this setting undoubtedly places Njegoš in Serbian literature, for whom Jovanović directly says that he can also be considered a Serbian writer. The Presidency of the Central Committee of League of Communists of Montenegro criticized Jovanović's writing and stated that a member of League of Communists and a participant of the revolution with such conclusions harms the political situation in Montenegro and brings confusion among the members of League of Communists of Montenegro.⁴⁶ And this confusion (of course not

⁴³ *Pobjeda*, May 29, 1981, 9.

⁴⁴ The memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts available at: <http://www.helsinki.org.rs/serbian/doc/memorandum%20sanu.pdf> Visited on: 5. 12. 2017.

⁴⁵ Dragutin Papović, *Intelektualci i vlast u Crnoj Gori 1945-1990*. (Podgorica: Matica crnogorska, 2016), 381.

⁴⁶ Papović, *Intelektualci i vlast*, 382.

spurred by Jovanović's writing, but by the new climate in Yugoslavia) continued to grow in the coming years, since the Montenegrin Communists did not have monolithic national views.

Conclusion

As Montenegrin historian Dragutin Papović noticed, the designation of Njegoš as the dominantly Montenegrin writer and ruler, and then as the writer who, according to the messages from his work, belongs to Yugoslavism and Serbdom, was official in Montenegro from 1945 to 1989; when the entire proclaimed paradigm would be changed, which would fundamentally change the attitude towards Njegoš and put it into new ideological molds. What should be acknowledged to the communist authorities of that period is that in the official interpretation of Petar II they made a deviation from the nationalist-religious symbolism of his character and work, so he could not become an archetype of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism, but, on the contrary, if we eliminate the communist phraseology, Njegoš became a symbol of combative humanism and Yugoslav communion. Nevertheless, we cannot say that Njegoš was not "misused" in some way by the Montenegrin communists. His popularity among the people was successfully used to promote communism and Yugoslavism. The official interpreters of Njegoš in the period from 1945 to 1989 tried to portray him as the forerunner of Marxism, social thought, revolutionism, Yugoslav idea. The communists will, similar as Kingdom SCS/Yugoslavia, make Njegoš a national poet of Yugoslavia, but on different grounds. The Communist authorities were genuinely trying to fully adjust Njegoš's character and work to their ideological needs, although the linking of Njegoš and Communism seemed impossible, since Petar II was a representative of a dynasty, not a working class, an Orthodox bishop, a romantic poet without any expressed aspirations for social thought, and above all the archetype of the father of the nation in the greater state project interpretations of the previous authorities. With the extraordinary interpretative acrobatics, the new authorities soon succeeded in overcoming all the challenges of ideologizing. World War II Partisans are legitimized as a contemporary version of Njegoš's liberators from *The Mountain Wreath*; an unpleasant motive - the slaughter of Muslims, is removed by circumventing the religious connotation and using the very popular communist epithet of "domestic traitors"; representing him as a national poet, the

communists addressed directly the workers and peasants who were the foundation of the newly established society, and Njegoš's work was well known to them – thus the receiving of communist slogans and proclamations among the people was easier. In addition to this, what should also be mentioned is the emphatic popularization of Njegoš's non-saintly life and non-compliance with the priestly regulations, which fully corresponded with the communist attitude towards faith. The Montenegrin communists especially emphasized Njegoš's Montenegrin and Yugoslavian interests, defending his legacy from the Greater Serbian interpretations. But after 1989, things would change. Overnight, after the Communist paradigm fell, Njegoš started to be celebrated as the "father" of Greater Serbian nationalism. In today's independent Montenegro, though, Njegoš is a symbol of Montenegro and its European road.

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Key Political Processes in the Former SFRY 1990-1992 and the Bosniak Respond

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Abstract:

This paper discusses some of the fundamental political processes in the former Yugoslavia in the first two years of the last decade of the 20th century, which led to its disappearance and then to aggressive Serbian military campaigns. The aim is to present the overall political context and the reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia by detecting points that the process led in the negative direction. It also wants to underline the role of global socio-political flows, primarily fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Particular aim is to underline position of Bosniaks as a political factor and their ability to organize people during these processes on the basis of recognizable political and national goals.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Disintegration, Communism, Democracy, War, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

During the eighties of the 20th century, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), at least as defined in the 1974 constitution, was in a deadly situation and great torment. The Yugoslavians were increasingly aware of the threats of the disappearance of a common state that inevitably wore heavy political processes partly related to internal unresolved and accumulated problems, but also to the beginning of the fall of the Soviet Union and Communism in Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia could not be in a better position because of the program of political elites - Slovenian, Croat

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and Serbian - who were already offensive with the desire to gain the best positions for their people and the republic in the upcoming crucial political events. Redefining the Federation was a fundamental requirement of all.

In the context of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, it became clear that Yugoslavia lost its position before the beginning of democratic changes affecting the Eastern bloc, above all Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, after the collapse of the USSR, Yugoslavia lost its strategic significance gained after 1945/8. Conclusion was that SFRY is no longer a "regional force, a key Balkan country that separates two super powers, simultaneously influencing the ideological erosion of the socialist bloc".¹ Even earlier, at the beginning of the eighties, US and USSR diplomats discussed that issue. In February 1980, while Josip Broz Tito was in a coma, a conversation in Vienna between Andrei Gromijk, Soviet Foreign Minister and Cyrus Vance (Syrus Venus), US Secretary of State, highlighted the common stance and opinion that Yugoslavia is facing the future the peripheral Balkan state. Disappearance of SFRY testifies to their good analysis.²

Constitutional Reforms and Economic Stabilization

One problem in Yugoslav politics was almost ubiquitous in the seventies and eighties. The problem of constitutional reform, both at federal and republic level, has risen to the political scene and was among the main topics in public discussions. At the end of the 1980s, this situation was well-directed by everyday life marked by political turmoil between Slovenia and Serbia due to the arrest of "Janša Four" and the tense situation in Autonomous Region of Kosovo.³ The Province of Kosovo immediately after the death of Josip Broz Tito came in the focus because of the great Albanian protests in 1981 that led to massive police intervention. After this situation in Kosovo was not normalized soon, it became ace in the hands of the Greater Serbian ideology in pressure on all other political factors in

¹ Branko Petranović, "Unutrašnje i međunarodne pretpostavke raspada dve Jugoslavije (Nacionalni sukobi i promenljivost međunarodnog položaja Jugoslavije kao uzročnici sloma)". *Filozofija i društvo* VI (1994): 121-141.

² Petranović, "Unutrašnje i međunarodne pretpostavke," 122.

³ In mid-1988, the military authorities arrested a group of Slovenes headed by Janez Jansa for "giving military secrets". Military trials and convictions of three of these prisoners triggered large protests in Slovenia during 1988 and 1989 and strengthened the Slovenes in their demands.

Yugoslavia. In May 1989, Slovenes demanded the release of "Four" with the threat of treating this problem solely as internal Slovenes, which had undermined already disrupted federal reputation and institutions.⁴ They went a step further and the amendments to the Slovenian constitution, which were discussed in the summer of 1989, showed determination in the desire to prevent Milošević from imposing on his plan. Also in mid-1989, at the session of the Presidency of the SFRY, drafts for the drafting of a new constitution (the Initiative for the Change of the Constitution of the SFRY) were discussed. It was more about Serbian desires than true aspirations for the functional organization of the Federation. All this witnessed the conflict between the two visions of the future of Yugoslavia, which reached the zenith. Federal Secretary for National Defense, Veljko Kadijević, was under great pressure due to such political relations and disrupted reputation of federal institutions.⁵ Precisely because of the Slovene amendments, it seemed the *coup d'état* became a logical consequence and a way of interrupting the tensions caused by a stronger critical relationship to the political system and its structures.⁶ But Army's indecisiveness had a reason: radical moves were not made so that the focus remained on politicians and their capabilities.

On the other hand, the appearance of Prime Minister Ante Marković on the political scene and his stabilization program, published on 18 December 1989, opened additional trenches between Milošević and the rest of Yugoslavia for interpreting the prime minister's action by the Serbian political circles as counter-Serbian. Economic measures that have improved the situation in Yugoslavia have been treated as "plundering of the Serbian economy".⁷ It is interesting that the Serbian leader was not clear about the prime minister's concept of economic recovery and stabilization. While Milošević sharply attacked Marković, as he did at the Congress of SK Serbia on December 16, 1989, another influential Serbian politician, Borisav Jović, had different approach. During session of "Serbian Coordination" (gathering of Serb politicians from different parts of Yugoslavia) in Serbia's Presidency on January 4, 1990, he said that "Serbia should accept the program in global, and criticize the details".⁸ Finally Milošević's plan was accepted. Milošević's speech in Kosovo

⁴ Borisav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ. Izvodi iz dnevnika*. (Beograd: Politika, 1995), 14-15.

⁵ Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 37.

⁶ Josip Glaurdić, *Vrijeme Europe. Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije*. (Zagreb: Mate, 2011), 53.

⁷ Glaurdić, *Vrijeme Europe*, 61.

⁸ Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 87.

(the view that 'new battles are in front of us') on marking the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle (1389) were definitely the last drop of poison in the relations between the Yugoslav peoples and the republic, which also marked the beginning of the SFRY's disappearance.

Precisely because of such development the Slovene position, judged by the then pro-Serb and regime media, became increasingly "anti-Yugoslavian", while the Slovenes, in fact, were only trying to provide political defense against the Greater Serbian concept of Yugoslavia. Slovenian amendments on the constitution voted on September 28, 1989, the Greater Serbian politicians were considered as a beginning and the trigger of the already mentioned end of the common state.⁹ During discussion between a member of the Yugoslav Presidency from Serbia Borisav Jovic and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević both have clearly stated this and have shown willingness to accept the departure of Slovenia. They concluded that maybe the disintegration of the state began for Slovenes but not for other nations, sending such a signal that their plans to have Greater Serbia do not include Slovenia in any way.¹⁰ Six months later, again on 'Serbian coordination' on March 26, 1990, it was estimated that "the SFRY disintegration process was unstoppable" and therefore should ensure the borders within which there will be no war, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina will not and cannot survive.¹¹

A similar stance on the future of Yugoslavia could be found half a year later in the CIA report of October 18, 1990.¹² The United States (USA), as alleged, changed attitude in 1989 toward Yugoslavia and began to notice, on the example of Serb politics in Kosovo/toward Albanians in that province, Milošević's open negative use of national narratives.¹³ The last US ambassador to the SFRY, Warren Zimmerman, considered Kosovo to be the most serious European problem west of the USSR, and US senators led by Bob Dole, said that Milošević's approach to Kosovo would undermine the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States.¹⁴ Yet these attitudes of Zimmermann and a few senators and congressmen did not contribute

⁹ Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 54.

¹⁰ Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 77-78.

¹¹ Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 131.

¹² Kosta Nikolić and Vladimir Petrović, *Rat u Sloveniji. Dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ jun-jul 1991*. (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), 27-28.

¹³ Warren Zimmerman, *Izvori jedne katastrofe*. (Zagreb: Globus, 1997), 25.

¹⁴ Zimmerman, *Izvori jedne katastrofe*, 30-31.

to the American heavy turn when it comes to Yugoslavia, but they were a minority and 'silent voice' that did not reach significantly the ears of US President George Bush Senior and Secretary of State James Baker at the time.

The reluctance to normalization of relations at the federal level did not prevent Milošević from establishing a new order within the Serbian corps. The 'Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution', as Milošević's blow and the assumption to establish absolute authority in Serbia after the 8th Session of the Serbian Communists (1987) and the political elimination of Ivan Stambolic, had already been completed by the formal and factual abolition of the status of the province of Vojvodina and Kosovo by mid-1989 but and change of government in Montenegro. Indeed, this coup, after its 'success' in SR Serbia and Montenegro, has been transferred to federal, Yugoslav level with new contents and different bases.¹⁵ This Initiative for the Revision of the Constitution of the SFRY, in fact, testifies about it.

It can be argued that, for this reason, Milošević and the ruling Serbian oligarchy have made a strategic mistake because they "misrepresented US attitudes and misunderstood messages and warnings from the beginning, inadvertently interpreted American motives and interests (...) and lived in the illusion that things could be ended in the field (in practice), and then the Americans and Europe will not have anything else but to agree with the new state of affairs".¹⁶ One of the reasons for such Milošević's relationship lies in the fact that Markovic's visit to the United States in October 1989, when he sought financial assistance of \$ 4 billion, was completely unsuccessful.¹⁷ However, the positive outcome of the visit was the meeting with Jaffrey Sacks, who was suggested to talk with to Markovic by SFRY Presidency President Janez Drnovsek. Sacks urged prime minister to make the Yugoslav dinar a convertible to solid currency what he accepted.¹⁸

On the other hand, Milošević was for long time perceived as a reformer of Gorbachev's type. In mid-March 1989, Lawrence Eagleberger, Assistant Secretary of State, spoke before the Senate Foreign Policy Committee and indicated that Milošević had good

¹⁵ Olivera Milosavljević, "Antibirokratska revolucija 1987-1989. godine", *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 8 (2004): 319-335.

¹⁶ Živorad Kovačević, *Amerika i raspad Jugoslavije*. (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 2007), 41-42.

¹⁷ Zimmerman. *Izvori jedne katastrofe*, 65.

¹⁸ Zimmerman. *Izvori jedne katastrofe*, 66.

views on the market economy and that his moves would have a positive impact on the central government.¹⁹ But the American initial lack of interest and the support of "communist reformers" did not remain as the basic principle of their political relationship with the former Yugoslavia, but over time shifted and expanded to sanction the problem, especially in the context of an aggressive attack on BiH. This is what Milošević did not count.

Bosniaks in the Eve of Dissolution

The only South Slav people, as certain intellectuals have argued, who did not have a plan or solution for the Yugoslav crisis were Bosniaks.²⁰ Certain reasons to give weight to this statement can be seen. The political leader of the League of Communists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Bosniak representatives in it, was too Yugoslavian, so the idea of a state's failure was strange for them. On the other hand the particular political reflection on the position of its own people was considered nationalistic and hostile to the constitutional- legal order. Appreciation of the solution and positioning of the people and its policies within the Federation and possible political processes was, therefore, far from the political thought and action of Bosniaks within the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC/Party).

Also, there was no significant critical mass that could raise the voice and stand opposite to the party's hawks. The existence of a living cultural scene in Sarajevo and elsewhere in the Republic did not have too much influence on the League of Communists of BiH (SK BiH). Precisely about this creative energy in BiH during the 1980s, which fails to change certain political relations, the distinguished Bosnian-Herzegovinian intellectual Ivan Lovrenović said a remarkable fact: "These miraculous eighties were an exciting time in which one sees and hears that monolithic regimes crunches and lifts but it is still holding and freedom is not yet won but it is on the move, we are already practicing it, and it is only a question of the day when it will become complete... ".²¹ The monolith was crushed slowly because of the lack of political avant-garde as it was the case with the sub/cultural scene.

¹⁹ Glaurdić. *Vrijeme Europe*, 37.

²⁰ Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u 20. stoljeću*, (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998): 355.

²¹ Admir Mulaosmanović, *Iskušenje opstanka. Izetbegovićevih deset godina*, (Sarajevo: Dobra knjiga, 2013), 32.

Before the concrete moves were made by the resurgent Bosniak political factor, besides the overwhelming political conflict between Slovenia and Serbia and Markovic's activity, also the Fourteenth Congress SKJ (held in Belgrade from 20 to 22 January 1990) happened what produced conflict between the Slovene and Croats together with the Serbian communists, what sparked abandoning of the assembly hall of these first. By it, in fact, the disappearance of the unique LYC was happened and the opening of gates for a political alternative that has been waiting its moment.

Relatively shortly after the idea of establishment of MSUJ (Muslim Party in Yugoslavia) failed and new approach became successful (to start political movement based on the Bosniakhood instead of Islam religion), a press conference was held in the Sarajevo Holiday Inn Hotel (March 27, 1990), on which the SDA (Party of Democratic Action) was formed.²² It was about a year after Croatia's initiative to establish the first opposition parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance, later the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSL).²³ This act of the establishment of the SDA, formally defined as a party of Yugoslavia citizens belonging to the Muslim historical and cultural circle, was followed by the process of political organization of the Serb (on 12 July 1990, the SDS B&H) and Croat (18 August 1990, the HDZ B&H) people.²⁴ In the meantime on the Yugoslav level things were falling apart. Elections in Slovenia and Croatia have turned political processes in the radical direction. The Serbs in Croatia on amendments to the Croatian constitution adopted by the Croatian Parliament on July 25, 1990, responded by a nationalistic rally in small town Knin (Croatia), where according to media around 120,000 people gathered. About a month before that, June 27, a community of six municipalities was formed with Knin as the center what actually announced the Serbian uprising in Croatia. Same pattern was used by Bosnian Serb politicians a about year after.²⁵

After general elections in B&H (18 November, 1990) coalition of winning people's parties was formed. Significant issues have already been raised at the one of the first sessions of the Bosnian Presidency,

²² Interview with Muhamed Čengić, 15. July, 2011. (U arhivi autora)

²³ Glaurdić. *Vrijeme Europe*, 77.

²⁴ Ivo Lučić, "Bosna i Hercegovina od prvih izbora do međunarodnog priznanja", *Status* 12, (2007): 189-204.

²⁵ Glaurdić. *Vrijeme Europe*, 87.

which affected political relations in B&H. The money supply from Serbia has disrupted the financial and economic flows throughout Yugoslavia and there was a need to find an adequate solution. Another important thing was to harmonize the principles that will lead Alija Izetbegovic in the upcoming talks on future of the state of the leadership of the Yugoslav republics in Belgrade.²⁶ The Yugoslav situation was burdened, in addition to the Serbian invasion and appropriation of funds, by the adoption of the Croatian Constitution on December 21, 1990 as well as by the Slovenian referendum. Pre-Christmas celebration Slovenia sought to embellish by a referendum on the secession of December 23, but in this period was held another round of elections in Serbia over which Milošević won, the said declaration of the Croatian constitution; the proclamation of the Statute of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia. These three things - the Slovene referendum, Serbian insurrection, and the Croatian constitution - to certain political scientists stand out as key moments in the collapse of Yugoslavia.²⁷

The negotiations that started at the Yugoslav level had a strong influence on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegovic clarified topics in talks, inter alia, he had with the Croatian and Serbian sides in mid-January 1991. Main issue was the attitude of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the future of Yugoslavia and Bosnians gave effort while were discussing it and tried to give contribution to peaceful solution. He said that in talks with Croats as well as with Serbs it was emphasized that the Yugoslav community should survive or try to define characteristics of the future community by avoiding federal or confederation dilemmas, federal states or state alliances, but all agree that there should be one unique army.²⁸

For Bosnia-Herzegovina's negotiating delegation, Izetbegovic as a leader should in the first place, look for the equal position of the republics. It was precondition for political stability. That's why political action was taken at the beginning of 1991. with a goal to reestablish shattered equal status of Bosnia and Herzegovina within SFRY. Explaining the reasons for initiating the process of adopting *the Declaration on Independence and Sovereignty* in Bosnian Parliament, Izetbegović also mentioned this as a powerful factor. The other thing that Izetbegovic seemed to be ignorant was the JNA (Army) position.

²⁶ Mulaosmanović, *Iskušenje opstanka*, 43.

²⁷ Glaurdić. *Vrijeme Europe*, 118.

²⁸ Alija Izetbegović, *Tajna zvana Bosna*, (Sarajevo: GIKOKO, 2005), 117.

Until the outbreak of the conflict, in April 1992, he tried to keep the Army in a neutral position or at least prevent it from being publicly acceded to the Greater Serbian concept. At the presidency session of June, 21 1991, attended by General Kadijevic, Izetbegovic pointed out what he considered important, and what two sides, the Presidency of the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina and the JNA, should do. He took care that "both the Presidency and the Army are in the standpoint of preserving Bosnian integrity and that the Army will oppose any attempt to violate Bosnian integrity in accordance with its constitutional obligations", and the other thing should be condemnation of the intrusion of paramilitary units from Croatia (Serb units) in the Bosanska Krajina - are about the invasion of Martić's specialists - that the Army will oppose such a case as any other attempt, "from whence to come".²⁹

That session of Bosnian presidency with presence of general Kadijević showed a complex situation Bosnia and Herzegovina was facing at the time. Radical approaches were triggered what endangered stability and introduced various scenarios for Yugoslav crisis. Most vulnerable republic was Bosnia and Herzegovina while most vulnerable ethnic group were Bosniaks. Situation in Macedonia was not easy but southern republic escaped deadly hug of Serb and Croat nationalists because there were no Serb-Croat issues. It was impossible to find common ground between all parties what minimized possibility of creating positive communication and cooperative environment.

Actually the last attempt to find a satisfactory solution to the Yugoslav problem was offered by Izetbegović and Kiro Gligorov, the Macedonian president, during the talks of the President of Yugoslav republics in Sarajevo on June 4, 1991, with the concept of *The Alliance of Sovereign Republics*. It seemed that the *Platforma* for the Establishment of Yugoslavia could be supported, and two days later it was also welcomed by the European Community. However, talks in Split/Croatia between same participants (June 12) showed that the verbal support of the *Platforma* by Tuđman and Milošević was only a media show. The Bosnian-Herzegovinian President of Presidency was aware that it would be difficult to reach an agreement, but he stressed

²⁹ Magnetofonski snimak sjednice Predsjedništva SRBiH sa generalom Veljkom Kadijevićem, održane u Sarajevu 21. juna 1991. Godine. U: Tomo Šimić, *Dokumenti Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine 1991. - 1994. National Security and the Future (7/3)*, (Zagreb: Udruga Svetog Jurja, 2006), 14.

that *Paltforma* meets the demands of the 'West and East Bloc' in Yugoslavia.³⁰ Izetbegović believed that Western republics (Slovenia and Croatia) will be satisfied by more autonomy while Eastern (Serbia and Monte Negro) should fulfill their goals by survive of Yugoslavia.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov has characterized his cooperation with Izetbegovic as a co-operation of those who are in similar positions, so they are all related to each other. *The Alliance of Sovereign Republics* meant that all republics could become members of the Organization of United Nations (OUN), the military would be at federal level as well as a part of foreign affairs.³¹ Of all the republican presidents Izetbegovic worked best with Slovenian (Milan Kucan) and Macedonian (Kiro Gligorov) presidents. In one sense, it is understandable because there were no territorial pretensions and similar open questions among them. Izetbegovic acknowledged that Slovenia was definitely on the path of independence but even Yugoslavia without Slovenia could survive and represent good solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks in particular. Milan Kucan confirmed Slovenian attitude and determination to James Baker during the June visit when he rejected the Izetbegović-Gligorov plan and once again emphasize Slovenian goal to separate from Yugoslavia.³²

Consequently, the Izetbegovic-Gligorov concept that was already known to the public did not receive support. The SDS BiH (Serbian Democratic Party led by Radovan Karadjic) leadership criticized this initiative and stated that "this Izetbegovic proposal was inadmissible and represents a further departure of Izetbegovic from the pre-election speech of a" reasonable federation".³³ The Serbian leaders, at thze first place Slobodan Milošević, considered that the *European Community* (EC) and *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO) are working to accept the Izetbegovic-Gligorov plan of four republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and BiH) and isolate Serbia and Montenegro. Borisav Jovic, member of the Yugoslav Presidency and strong supporter of Greater Serbian policy, therefore considered that "although the proposal is stupid, it should be accepted" and then

³⁰ Nikolić-Petrović. *Rat u Sloveniji*, 19.

³¹ Karabeg, Omer (2008): "Podela živog mesa /Intervju sa Kirom Gligorovom, 27. 2. 2008./". www.radioslobodnaevropa.org (pp. 10. 4. 2012.)

³² Zimmerman. *Izvori jedne katastrofe*, 165.

³³ Kolja Besarović, "Odbačena Platforma Gligorov – Izetbegović". *Javnost*, br. 34 (8. 6. 1991): 3.

evolve it into the Serbian concept.³⁴ By it Jovic meant about establishment of Serbian supremacy and hegemony.

Therefore the mid-1991 from Bosniak perspective opened gates of hell. Izetbegovic became aware of agreement between Tudjman and Milošević (Treaty of Karadjordjevo, March, 25 1991) about partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina while on the other side Bosnian Serbs began with their separatist moves by establishing autonomous regions on ethnic basis. The basic principle of Treaty of Karadjordjevo was mutual aid between Serbs and Croats – "the Croatian side will provide help for the constitution of the Serbian state, the Serb side will provide help the constitution of the Croatian state".³⁵ *The Platforma*, the last chance for Yugoslavia was rejected by key political figures so Bosniak leadership had huge dilemma what to do to keep situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina peaceful. Moreover it became big task when war started firstly in Slovenia than in Croatia what automatically retracted Bosnia and Herzegovina in political and even military turmoil after proclamations of independence (June, 25 1991).

Representatives of European Community (European Troika) successfully established three-month moratorium on July, 7 1991 on the decision on the independence of Slovenia and Croatia trying to stop military operations. For Milošević it was trigger for the creation of a Greater Serbia and he rushed to benefit from that situation through preparations at the ground. So, while the Slovenes, for their own reasons and interests, accepted this offer, Bosniaks remained on the position of an independent and equal BiH which is essentially undermined Milošević's plan. It is important to note that certain circles within the European Community considered that it necessary to re-examine the possibility of changing borders and that might be a viable option. Exactly on July, 13 1991, the Dutch government proposed the possibility of changing borders in Yugoslavia. Lord David Owen, one of the key international negotiators (EEC/EU co-chair of the conference for the Former Yugoslavia from August 1992) during Bosnian War regretted that this proposal promptly was rejected because it was worth to discuss about.³⁶

³⁴ Jović. *Poslednji dani SFRJ*, 338.

³⁵ Zapisnik sa sastanka predsednika Republike Hrvatske Franje Tuđmana i saradnika sa članovima Predsedništva Bosne i Hercegovine Nikolom Koljevićem i Franjom Borasom (Zagreb: 8. 1. 1992.). U: Nikolić. *Bosna i Hercegovina u vreme raspada SFRJ 1990-1992*, 67.

³⁶ David Owen. *Balkanska odiseja*. (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada-Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998), 66.

At that time one of the goals of Bosniak politics was to enable cooperation among them and Serbs, on both ethnic and state level. Reason was very simple, to ensure security because media propaganda against Bosnia, Bosniaks and Islam reached high level while political threat from Milošević regime was essentially dangerous. Hostility was main platform for Greater Serbian politics and Bosniaks started to suffer from imposed guilt for political development in Yugoslavia. In that narrowed political space, former SDA officials, and then MBO (Muslim Bosniak Party) leaders Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic tried to implement, as they themselves called, *the historic agreement* between Serbs and Bosniaks. The MBO officials (which was basically not a significant political factor in BiH), initiated talks with the top of SDS (Karadjic, Krajisnik and Koljevic) in mid-July 1991, as they said, to preserve peace in BiH. Zulfikarpasic, as the creator of the idea, said: "When I saw that we went into an open conflict with the Serbs, I went to Alija and asked him if he saw it (that conflict with Serbs are approaching), whether the guarantees of a world powers and whether there are any contacts with the Army, some agreement with Kadijevic, he have answered me negatively".³⁷

Prior to the idea of a Serb-Bosniak agreement, Zulfikarpasic advocated the joint performance of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH towards Milošević, but when he realized that Tuđman was conducting separate negotiations with Milošević at the expense of BiH, he decided to try to prevent such negotiations between Bosniaks and Serbs.³⁸ Talks (the historical agreement) were held under supervision of Alija Izetbegovic and he authorized Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic to represent Bosniaks. Main problem between negotiators was concept of the state, while Milošević and Serb side wanted to install federal state, Bosniaks were for confederal principle (Union of Sovereign Republics). Also, Izetbegovic's aim was to keep that agreement open to Croats what in Milošević's mind was totally unnecessary.

In Izetbegovic's subsequent interpretation, it is evident that he was concerned how the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the political establishment of Croatia would position themselves toward Bosnia and Herzegovina under those new circumstances. The

³⁷ Milovan Đilas and Nadežda Gaće, *Bošnjak Adil Zulfikarpašić*. (Zurich: Bošnjački institute, 1995), 184.

³⁸ Husnija Kamberović. *Hod po trnju. Iz bosanskohercegovačke historije 20 stoljeća*. (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju. 2011), 269.

support he had from the HDZ BiH (Croatian Democratic Community) was subsiding, and after the publication of the Agreement (beginning of August 1991), Croat politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina fought the same by calling it, among other things, the betrayal. One of them was Ivo Komšić, then vice-president of SDP BiH (Social Democratic Party), who reacted very sharply.³⁹ All that situation actually proved that Serbs wanted Bosniaks on their side while there are finalizing political issues with Slovenians and Croats which final outcome will be establishment of Greater Serbia. The "historical agreement" was also considered by Serbian leaders as a difficult political project. The most iconic among Serbian politicians, as well as the person who announced that the negotiations were successful (Nikola Koljević) how the Serbian side acted said: "It was, as you know, attempts, which I personally did not believe with Zulfikarpasić, to get a Muslim nation".⁴⁰

On August 14, 1991, Slovenes and Serbs achieve and expand the agreement from January of the same year, supporting the solution to the crisis based on the 'self-determination'. Slovenes agreed to stay out of the Serb-Croat conflict, supporting the creation of the Federation of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also refused international mediation in relations between Slovenia and Serbia, and in return for all this, they received Serbian support for their independence.⁴¹ In addition to the Serbian-Croatian Settlement which "assisted each other in the formation of their states on the historical aspirations of the two peoples" also happened to the Slovene-Serbian on the same basis. Late summer and early fall 1991 put Bosniaks in the front of strategically most important decision - to continue with democratic process and follow their goal, approaching to Western European democracies or to make an alliance with last European communist dictator. The choice was democracy.

Conclusion

Two-year period (1990-1992) between first democratic elections held in Yugoslavia and open attack and aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina are crucial for understanding the collapse and fall of that

³⁹ Izetbegović. *Sjećanja*, 109.

⁴⁰ Zapisnik sa sastanka predsednika Republike Hrvatske Franje Tuđmana i saradnika sa članovima Predsedništva Bosne i Hercegovine Nikolom Koljevićem i Franjom Borasom: 63-64.

⁴¹ Glaurdić. *Vrijeme Europe*, 185.

socialist state. Economic crisis produced different approaches to stabilization what at the end brought political instability and hostility, at the first place between Slovenia and Croatia on one side versus Serbia on the other. Obsolete socialist political structure just enforced such development by acting irrationally and without agenda how to reform the state.

In that period Bosniaks were at the beginning of political organization. It was more than obvious that Yugoslavia was in great turmoil, nationalisms were awakened and possibility of conflict was on high scale. During the eighties Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced massive attack on its republican status what produced a lot of worries, especially for Bosniaks as a small nation. That's why the political party which was established (Party of Democratic Action with Alija Izetbegović as a President) required two political goals; equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina among other Yugoslav republics and equality of Bosniaks among other Yugoslav nations. Unfortunately, no one was ready to truly negotiate.

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The Perception of the Republic of Turkey in the Croatian Press (1923-1945)

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Abstract:

The article analyzes the perception of the Republic of Turkey from 1923 to 1945 in Croatian press. The articles mainly addressed political issues relating to Turkey, but there were also numerous articles about Turkey's history, economy, culture etc. The emergence of the Republic of Turkey after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 came as an incentive for the Croatian press to set aside the negative connotations concerning the Ottoman Empire and the critique of its socio-political order, and to praise the results of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) and the institutional changes introduced by the new Republican regime. Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the person mentioned the most in Turkey-related articles in the Croatian press of the period, as his emergence as the Turkish national leader, his reform efforts and his death in 1938 were widely explored. The creation of the Independent State of Croatia in 1941 was characterized by the new regime's interest in the chance to acquire Turkey's international recognition of the Independent State of Croatia. Therefore the Ustasha press propaganda used every opportunity to commend Turkey's neutral diplomatic stance between the warring coalitions of World War II, and introduced Turkey as the most mentioned of the non-Axis countries in the Croatian press of the period.

Keywords: Turkey, Croatia, Newspapers, Croatian-Turkish Relations, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Introduction

The term "Croatian press" in the title of this article denotes periodical publications released in the Southeast European territories widely populated by Croats, i.e. in the territories of the Kingdom of

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Yugoslavia in the period from 1923 to 1941 and the Independent State of Croatia from 1941 to 1945, notably in the cities of Zagreb, Split, Osijek, Sarajevo etc. There are numerous publications which fall within this description, to name only a few: daily newspapers *Jutarnji list*, *Narodne novine*, *Obzor* and *Novosti*, as well as other weekly, biweekly and monthly press: *Hrvatski dnevnik*, *Seljački dom*, *Hrvatski radnik*, etc. Their general characteristics will be explained below. For the purpose of this article, almost all of the periodicals published during the interwar period were examined, because the aim was not to include only the few most important newspapers, but to give a comprehensive overview of the Croatian press of the period. Furthermore, all Turkey-related aspects were examined, from political to economic and cultural issues.

The period noted in the title was examined in order to demonstrate how the Republic of Turkey was perceived among Croats during Turkey's formative years. The Croatian nation in 1918 became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (or Kingdom of SHS), a country deeply involved in the political issues in Southeast Europe, because during this period Balkan countries experienced Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany's political penetration into their peninsula. Considerable socio-political changes in the first decades of the new Turkish republic aroused the interest of the public opinion in numerous European countries, as well as in the Kingdom of SHS, partly because of the possibilities of Yugoslav cooperation with the new Turkish state. The interest partly grew out of the fact that for centuries the Ottoman Empire and Turks were perceived among Croats and other Balkan nations as the oppressors who caused destruction and backwardness in Southeast Europe.¹ With the emergence of the Republic of Turkey, the Croatian press and their readers began to change their view of the Turks for the better, as will be shown below. The Croatian interest toward Turkey grew even stronger in the final four years of the investigated period (1941-1945), during the existence of the Independent State of Croatia (Croatian: *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, abbreviation: NDH), a World War II fascist puppet state which was fighting for its international recognition and thus intended to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey.

The aim of the article is to research the breadth of interest the

¹ Dino Mujadžević, "The Image of Ottomans in Croatian Historiography: Changing Narratives in Elementary School Textbooks in Croatia - 1980s to 2000s," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 34, No. 3 (2014): 295.

Croatian press toward Turkey, and to ascertain whether the Croatian press and public exhibited the same fascination with interwar Turkey's comprehensive Kemalist transformation as did the public in countries throughout Europe of the period.²

The Period of Croatia's Inclusion in the Kingdom of SHS / Kingdom of Yugoslavia

The Kingdom of SHS was established in 1918 by the merging of the provisional and short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (formerly a part of Austria-Hungary) with the Kingdom of Serbia. The Croatian nation thus became a part of the Yugoslav state, which changed its name in 1929 to Kingdom of Yugoslavia. From its very beginning, the Kingdom of SHS was in political turmoil because of the clash of the proponents of a centralized state (Serbian politicians, including the ruling Serbian Karađorđević dynasty) and the proponents of a federalized state (the Croatian and Slovene parties). In 1929, after ten years of political struggle, King Alexander I Karađorđević (1888-1934) proclaimed a dictatorship with the hope to curb separatist tendencies. This event instigated even harsher political clashes and the emergence of the Ustasha movement, established in 1929 as a Croatian extreme nationalist response to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's pro-Serb policy and repression of Croatian nationalism. The Ustasas would subsequently take over the rule in Croatia in 1941, with the outbreak of World War II on the Yugoslav territory.

As regards the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Kingdom of SHS, they were fully established in 1926³ and the two countries reached a rapprochement characterized by a fruitful cooperation and a series of treaties (in 1932, 1933, and 1934), including the Balkan Pact in 1934. Moreover, personal relations between Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) and Kingdom of SHS's King Alexander I were very cordial.⁴ Those events, however, did not have a significant impact on the Croatian press because, for the period

² For more on this topic see: Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder: Westview Press; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984).

³ Negotiations for the establishment of friendly relations started on August 24, 1925: "Uspostava odnošaja sa Turskom," *Jutarnji list* 14 (1925), No. 4869, August 25, 1925, 1.

⁴ Tonka Župančić, "Poslanstvo Kraljevine Jugoslavije u Turskoj - Carigrad, Ankara 1919-1945. (1890-1945), istorijat stvaraoća i značaj arhivske građe fonda," *Arhiv* 5, No. 2 (2004): 11-14; Ömer Erden, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'yi Ziyaret Eden Devlet Başkanları* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 14-17.

1923-1926, diplomatic relations were not established and newspapers did not have an official diplomatic stance on which to model their own opinion. Ordinary articles relaying news from Turkey remained neutral, and newspapers objectively described Turkish events. For example, the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, and the designation of Atatürk as its president, was an event that was merely mentioned in the Croatian press, as the majority of Croatian publications preserved a politically neutral position.⁵ The Zagreb-based weekly newspaper *Slobodni dom*, however, already in November of 1923 published an article stating that it was “undoubtedly a remarkably significant event for the Turkish people, as well as for the entire world of Islam”, because after the fall of the Russian, German and Austrian empires, “this wonderful deed was completed with the fall of the Turkish monarchy [...] Honest, brave and patriotic Kemal-Pasha at the helm of the Turkish people freed his country from the foreign enemy [...] When the Turkish nation attains enlightenment and better education, they will be able to see how great a deed has been done by destroying the monarchist form, and only then will they glorify the men who had done it, and only then will they know the importance of this event for the happiness and prosperity of the Turkish people...”⁶ As can be seen from this excerpt, the Croatian press still used to identify Turks with their Ottoman ancestors and Islam, but the sense of new reformist tendencies taking shape in Turkey was slowly finding its way into Croatian newspapers. The rise of Turkey after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 came as an incentive for the Croatian press to set aside negative connotations vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire and the critique of its socio-political order, and to praise the results of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) and the institutional changes introduced by the new Turkish republican regime in the 1920s and 1930s. Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean was not viewed anymore through the prism of the Ottoman Empire’s hegemonist policies in Southeast Europe, but rather neutrally or even favorably when opposed to Italian imperialistic aims in the Mediterranean Sea

⁵ “Turska republika. Kemal paša prvi predsjednik”, *Novosti* (Zagreb) 17 (1923), No. 297, October 31, 1923, 1; “Proglašenje republike u Angori,” *Jutarnji list*, 12 (1923), No. 4224, October 31, 1923, 1; “Točke turskog državnog ustava,” 12 (1923), No. 4225, November 1, 1923, 1.

⁶ Edhem Miralem, “Turska republika”, *Slobodni Dom. Glavne Novine Hrvatske Republikanske Seljačke Stranke* 17 (1923), No. 43, November 7, 1923, 3.

and in the Balkans.⁷

When the Turkish National Assembly abolished the Caliphate on March 3, 1924 and the last Caliph Abdülmecid was sent into exile along with the remaining members of the Ottoman House, the Croatian press followed the event with a neutral attitude, probably because this event had not had direct influence on the Croatian people and the Kingdom of SHS. Some of the articles seemed almost sympathetic toward Abdülmecid and his family, one of the articles stating the Ottoman House "would lose even the rights of Turkish subjects in general, and would have to leave the country in ten days..."⁸This is probably owing to the fact that Yugoslavia was a monarchy, and that the Yugoslav King Alexander I still did not develop friendly relations with Atatürk; or maybe the authors of those articles were not sure how the Muslim (and also Turkish) minority living in Yugoslavia would accept the abolition of the Caliphate. Furthermore, in respect of the political system in Turkey, the Croatian press generally discussed the authoritarian aspects of the Kemalist rule, but in a positive light, as in this article in the general-readership daily newspaper *Novo doba*: "The political and the economic life are ruled by the iron will of the creator of the new Turkey, Gazi Kemal. Through his associates, Prime Minister İsmet Pasha, Minister of the Army Fevzi Pasha, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras, he carries out new reforms through a firmly organized system."⁹The Yugoslavs also experienced authoritarianism throughout the interwar period, and it was probably seen among them as the 'normal' system of governance. Therefore it is not surprising to see comments in the Croatian press praising Atatürk's "great political authority" and the firmness of one-party rule in Turkey. Croatian journalists of the interwar years reflected also on the long-lasting effect of Kemalist reforms¹⁰ which were, as they saw it, "in extreme contradiction with

⁷ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 182; "Turci i Talijanska Politika na Balkanu," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 18 (1924), No. 114, April 25, 1924, 3.

⁸ "Predloženo Ukidanje Kalifata," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 18 (1924), No. 84, March 4, 1924, 1. Other Articles on the Same Topic: "Abolicija Kalifata u Turskoj," *Jutarnji List* 13 (1924), no. 4344, March 5, 1924, 1; "Temelji Nove Turske," *Jutarnji List* 22 (1933), No. 7815, October 31, 1933, 13.

⁹ "Splićanin u Kemalovoj Ankari," *Novo Doba* (Split) 18 (1935), No. 295, December 18, 1935, 3.

¹⁰ "Nova Turska i Njene Reforme," *Dom* (Zagreb) 23 (1929), No. 69, December 11, 1929, 2-3; Grga Novak, "Deset Godina Velike Turske Narodne Skupštine," *Riječ. Nezavisna Novinska Revija* 10 (1930), No. 15, December 11, 1930, 13-16.

everything” in Turkish people’s history.¹¹ Although Yugoslavia also experienced numerous socio-political reforms during this period, the Croatian press regarded Turkey’s Kemalist transformation as an inexhaustible source of information for their articles during this period and as a phenomenon without precedent.

Not only Yugoslav Muslim journalists – whose affinity towards Turkey generally does not surprise observers – but all Yugoslav journalists of the interwar period alike wrote very favorably about the Turkish War of Independence and subsequent Kemalist reforms. The reasons for such behavior most likely lied in the inclination to stand on the winner’s side in the Turkish War of Independence, and in the admiration for Turkey’s and especially Atatürk’s military and political successes. One exemplary article entitled “The meaning of Kemal’s revolution” and released on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in October of 1933 in the general-readership daily paper *Novostistates*: “The Turkish Empire [...] started to decline in the early 18th century [...] The whole world called this country ‘the sick man’ [...] The [First] world war finally brought down the Ottoman Empire [...] But the Turkish nation categorically refused to accept [the dismemberment of Turkey] and, gathered around Mustafa Kemal, started its epic battle against injustice, not caring for the obstacles and the suffering it had to endure. [...] Turkish revolutionaries [...] created in the middle of Anatolia a new state, led by the genius of Mustafa Kemal [...] they achieved a great military victory at Dumlupınar and a brilliant diplomatic victory in Lausanne...”¹² The author of the article continues by praising the accomplishments of the Republican People’s Party¹³ and Atatürk’s foreign policy, which “relies on friendships it created and to which it always remained loyal”.¹⁴ In the warmongering atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s, Croatian periodicals emphasized Turkey’s peacekeeping policy and its friendly relations with the Soviet Union, as well as with Muslim countries in Asia, namely Saudi Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan. Commentators emphasized the importance of such

¹¹ Bogdan Radica, “Kroz Novu Tursku: Augustova Ostavština i Kemalova Fikcija,” *Novosti* (Zagreb) 25 (1931), No. 4, January 4, 1931, 10.

¹² “Značaj Kemalove Revolucije,” *Novosti* (Zagreb) 27 (1933), No. 299, October 30, 1933, 11.

¹³ Another article concerning the Republican People’s Party: Antun Šenda, “Nova Turska i Njezino Mjesto u Svijetu,” *Hrvatski Dnevnik* (Zagreb), 5 (1940), No. 1657, December 8, 1940, 14-15.

¹⁴ “Značaj Kemalove Revolucije,” *Novosti* (Zagreb) 27 (1933), No. 299, October 30, 1933, 11.

alliances for the stability in Western Asia. Turkey, however, attracted the biggest attention among Croatian newspapers for its political and economic ties with the Balkan countries, because these Turkish activities concerned Yugoslavia's immediate vicinity. Croatian commentators were of the opinion that it was Atatürk's "wise foreign policy" what ultimately allowed Turkey to obtain approval in 1936 in Geneva for the re-militarization of the Dardanelles, thus reflecting the leadership cult around Atatürk.¹⁵ Atatürk's deeds were idealistically portrayed in another general-readership daily *Jutarnji list*: "Kemal [...] destroys the old traditional notions of friends and enemies. He follows the old Turkish noble spirit – when the causes of disputes are removed – Kemal is the first to offer his hand in peace to yesterday's rival, turning him into an ally."¹⁶ The admiration for Atatürk was so great that even the negative aspects of the Kemalist rule, such as the persecution of political opponents, or the abolishment of Muslim religious orders and dervish lodges,¹⁷ were viewed favorably by the Croatian press throughout the interwar period – presumably because they were in favor of the perceived modernization taking place.

One of the most important events connecting interwar Turkey and Yugoslavia was the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1934 when the two countries, together with Greece and Romania, declared their guarantee of mutual security in the Balkans. This agreement significantly influenced the two countries' relations and the fate of the Peninsula in the years to come. The signing of the Pact was positively received by the Croatian press, as the majority of commentators expressed hope that the Pact would quell the aggressive tendencies of the Axis Powers. The Croatian public began to view Turkey and Yugoslavia as sharers of a common interest, this being peace in the Balkans.¹⁸ As one commentator stated: "This is how the five-hundred-

¹⁵ "Kemal Atatürk. Život i Djela Velikog Turskog Vojskovođe i Državnika," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 32 (1938), No. 310, November 11, 1938, 3.

¹⁶ "Ličnost Kemala Ata Turka. Njegovo Svjetsko-Povjesno Značenje," *Jutarnji List* 27 (1938), No. 9625, November 11, 1938, 2. Other articles on the topic of Turkey's pacifism: Stjepan Radić, "Nova Turska kao Seljačka Republika," *Narodni Val Čovječnosti, Pravice i Slobode*, 1 (1927), No. 126, December 16, 1927, 1; Šenda, "Nova Turska," 14-15.

¹⁷ Đorđe Bukilica, "Odlučni Koraci Protiv Derviša," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 25 (1931), No. 9, January 9, 1931, 8.

¹⁸ Nasrullah Uzman, "Balkan Pakta ve Basındaki Yansımaları," in *Yedinci Uluslararası Atatürk Kongresi*, ed. Orhan Neçare (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2015), Vol. II, 1278-1280; Dilek Barlas and Anđelko Vlašić, "The Balkan Entente in Turkish-Yugoslav Relations (1934-41): The Yugoslav Perspective," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52 (2016), No. 6, 1012.

years-old memories of Balkan peoples' bloody fighting with the Turks are irreversibly cast away - Kemal liquidates the struggle between the cross and the crescent by putting in its place the concept of a Balkan treaty."¹⁹

One of the topics of bilateral relations of Turkey and the Kingdom of SHS / Yugoslavia was the migration of Muslim population from Yugoslavia to Turkey, mostly from the Yugoslav regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo. This phenomenon continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s because the Yugoslav Muslims, in frequent cases with justification, felt that the Yugoslav regime was not favorable toward them, or that the life in a Christian country was not suitable for Muslims. In any case, the Croatian press attentively followed their migration, as Croatian reporters investigated the conditions among the Yugoslav Muslim immigrants in Turkey.²⁰ In an article entitled "Bosnians in Turkey" its author relates the conditions of life among the Bosnian Muslim immigrant community in Turkey and their role in the progress of contemporary Turkey, where their undereducated members were "the mainstay of conservatism" and "propagators of the Muslim faith". Moreover, the educated members of the Bosnian immigrant community were "the mainstay of Kemal-pasha's reforms". The author continues by naming the prominent members of Turkish society who were of Bosnian origin and laments on the fact that "they live in another country, which became their new home. And today they live and work for it sincerely. And for us, they remain a dear, but sad memory, because they are still - ours..."²¹ This last comment was not an exception in the Croatian press of the period, because articles were generally filled with emotional rhetoric regarding their former compatriots currently living in Turkey. This particular topic, aside from the general political developments, was another impulse for the Croatian press to widen their knowledge of the situation in interwar Turkey.

¹⁹ "Ličnost Kemala Ata Turka. Njegovo Svjetsko-Povjesno Značenje," 2.

²⁰ Branko Jovanović, "Bosna - zemlja nikada, nikada[...]," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 26 (1932), No. 127, May 8, 1932, 10; Radica, "Kroz Novu Tursku. U Sumraku Carigrada," 11; Bogdan Radica, "Kroz Novu Tursku. U Sumraku Carigrada," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 26 (1932), No. 16, January 10, 1931, 12; "Splićanin u Kemalovoj Ankari," 3.

²¹ Branko Jovanović, "Bosanci u Turskoj," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 26 (1932), No.145, May 28, 1932, 9.

Articles Relating to Atatürk's Death and Legacy

During 1937, indications of Atatürk's worsening health started to appear. As he spent his last months at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, the news of his illness were published throughout the world, as were in the Croatian press.²² Atatürk died on November 10, 1938, and the next day all Croatian periodicals published comprehensive articles on front pages regarding official Turkish statements and condolences sent by the Yugoslav political leaders.²³ The next day, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara convened and elected İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) as the new president.²⁴ The Croatian workers' weekly newspaper *Hrvatski radnik* on November 27, 1938 wrote about the funeral ceremonies in Ankara on November 21, when Atatürk's casket was placed on a catafalque in front of the Parliament building and thousands of Turks paid their respects.²⁵ The cortege with the casket of "the greatest son of the new Turkey", escorted by many Turkish and foreign dignitaries, processed to the Ethnography Museum of Ankara through a line of people two kilometers long.²⁶ According to the article, "most of the representatives of the world press think that there would be no shift in the course of Turkish politics regarding the newly executed changes of government officials. However, in diplomatic circles it had not gone unnoticed that, with the death of Atatürk, the people who were giving the direction to Turkish foreign policy in the last couple of years, disappeared from the stage of Turkish public life."²⁷ This insinuation was not clarified later in the article. Similar insinuations can be found

²² "Ponovno pogoršano zdravstveno stanje Ataturka," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 32 (1938), No. 309, November 30, 1938, 3.

²³ Ilija Jukić, "Umro je otac Turaka - Kamal Ataturk, veliki državnik, vojnik i reformator," *Hrvatski dnevnik* (Zagreb) 3 (1938), no. 904, November 11, 1938, 2; "O posljednjim časovima Ataturka: opis liječnika Dr. Nihat Rešada," *Jugoslavenski list* (Sarajevo) 21 (1938), no. 289, December 8, 1938, 3; "Duboka žalost u cijeloj Turskoj. Saopćenje turske vlade narodu povodom smrti Pretsjednika Republike. Saučešće Nj. Kr. Vis. Kneza Namjesnika Pavla," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 32 (1938), No. 310, November 11, 1938, 1; "Kemal Ata Türk umro. Potankosti o posljednjim časovima uskrisitelja i prvog predsjednika Turske Republike," *Jutarnji list* 27 (1938), No. 9625, November 11, 1938, 1.

²⁴ "Smrt Kemala Ataturka: proklamacija vlade turskom narodu," *Jugoslavenski list* (Sarajevo) 21 (1938), No. 266, November 11, 1938, 1.

²⁵ "İsmet İnönü - predsjednik Republike Turske: priprema za pogreb Kemala Ataturka," *Jugoslavenski list* (Sarajevo) 21 (1938), No. 276, November 12, 1938, 1.

²⁶ "Čestitka Kneza namjestnika, I. İnönü: jugoslavenska delegacija na sahrani Kemala," *Jugoslavenski list* (Sarajevo) 21 (1938), No. 268, November 13, 1938, 1.

²⁷ "Sahrana Kemala Ataturka", *Hrvatski radnik. Glasilo Hrvatskog Radničkog Saveza* 17 (1938), No. 48, November 27, 1938, 2.

in the article relating the news of İsmet İnönü's naming as the new president, after which the author states that İnönü was maybe elected against Atatürk's will, but that he still was a "sincere adherent to the political principles of the late Kemal".²⁸ Presumably the events in Turkey aroused such an interest in the Croatian press that not even rumors were discarded in the process of reporting from Turkey. One has to take into account that the second half of the 1930s was marked by the fear of looming war, and inquietude spread as regards the future of Southeast European countries.

Numerous Croatian publications released articles describing Atatürk's life and political actions, and dealt with his legacy.²⁹ Even the Catholic newspapers recognized the importance of Atatürk by publishing long articles devoted to his life. As the author of an article in the Catholic weekly *Katolička riječ* entitled "After Atatürk's death" wrote, his death was "not such an event for a Catholic weekly to deserve a special article. But if the event is not so important, what is important is the personality that descended from the world stage, and the revolution which the deceased Kemal produced."³⁰ The Catholic newspaper *Vrhbosna*, published in Sarajevo and read by Bosnian Croats, published interesting and prophetic thoughts on Atatürk: "Not even the smallest review books of Turkish history will be without his name. He was a gravedigger who buried the mighty, great, imperialist, all-Islamic, Turkish Empire [...] and a reformist of a small, young and healthy Turkey."³¹ Numerous other newspapers published articles detailing Atatürk's biography and listing his accomplishments, in which Croatian commentators indiscriminately included practically all socio-political changes introduced in interwar Turkey up until 1938. Among the most mentioned of these changes were the propagation of Western attire and Western music, the introduction of the Latin script, German trade law, Italian criminal law and Swiss civil law, and especially the emancipation of women,³² which will be discussed in the following chapter. Catholic newspapers mention also the negative aspects of the Kemalist rule, for instance,

²⁸ "Turska je dobila novog predsjednika u osobi dugogodišnjeg premijera Izmet İnönija," *Jutarnji list* 27 (1938), No. 9626, November 12, 1938, 1.

²⁹ "Kemal Atatürk. Život i djela velikog turskog vojskovođe i državnika," 2; "Ličnost Kemala Ata Turka. Njegovo svjetsko-povjesno značenje," 2.

³⁰ Antun Pilepić, "Poslije Atatürkove smrti," *Katolička riječ* 4 (1938), No. 46, November 17, 1938, 3.

³¹ Anto Livajušić, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal", *Vrhbosna* 12 (1938), No. 12, December 1938, 268-270.

³² *Ibid*, 270.

that the Kemalist reforms instigated numerous rebellions throughout Turkey, especially in the years 1926, 1929 and 1930, which were crushed in blood. During these events, "catholic missions suffered" and "the number of Catholic priests was reduced almost to zero."³³ Nevertheless, Croatian authors did not blame Atatürk for such negative occurrences. His actions were almost exclusively presented as positive, and his death prompted even more positive comments and the perpetuation of his uncritical admiration in the Croatian press. Two years after Atatürk's death, the Croatian Peasant Party's daily *Hrvatski dnevnik* published an article in which its author stated: "Even when Atatürk was still alive, some have wondered whether his work will die with him. Today we see that Turkey has been set up on a healthy and strong foundation and has happily weathered that critical moment."³⁴ The mentioned daily promoted Croatian nationalism based on the cult of a strong leader, so the Kemalist model based on Atatürk's and then İnönü's leadership was close to their agenda.³⁵

Articles Relating to Turkey's Social and Economic Issues in the Interwar Period

The abundance of articles relating to the political situation in Turkey does not mean that Turkey's social issues were under-represented in the Croatian press; the same applies to economic and cultural issues. One social aspect of Turkey that was frequently mentioned in the Croatian press was the social status of Turkish women and their emancipation, as opposed to the generally negatively viewed status of Ottoman women. In contrast to the latter, women in the republican Turkey had a "substantially better social position than women in many European countries. [...] Women work in offices; they do sports like in other European countries."³⁶ Articles praising Kemalist reforms regarding women were published in numerous Croatian periodicals, regardless of their political affiliation and readership,³⁷ and represent a peculiar phenomenon because

³³ Pilepić, "Poslije Ataturkove smrti," 3.

³⁴ Šenda, "Nova Turska," 15.

³⁵ Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey. Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 17.

³⁶ "Spličanin u Kemalovoj Ankari," 3.

³⁷ Adolf Gomerčić, "O svemu i svačemu iz Kemalove Turske," *Jutarnji list* 18 (1929), no. 6280, July 30, 1929, 11; "Temelji nove Turske," *Jutarnji list* 22 (1933), No. 7815, October 31, 1933, 13; Léon Pierre Quint, "Od harema do fox-trota," *Jutarnji list* 22 (1933), No. 7862, December 17, 1933, 21; "Turska nastoji razviti jaki i

commentators very rarely bothered to compare the status of women's rights in Turkey and Yugoslavia.

With regard to religious problematic, the Kemalist reforms encompassed also the introduction of many radical reforms with the aim of transforming the old Ottoman state into a new secular republic.³⁸ The Croatian press generally regarded these reforms in a positive light. In fact, some Croatian journalists were extremely critical toward the old religious system and stated that "all schools of theology and seminaries were closed as places where future priests were fanaticized and becoming the janissaries of their people."³⁹ Others were pointing out that the religious reform was not as radical as it had seemed to be, stating that the divorce of religious and governmental organizations was performed without hostility toward Islamic institutions.⁴⁰

Croatian newspapers seemed to be also very interested in Turkish capital Ankara, its development during the Republican era, and the contrast between Ankara and the old capital Istanbul. As one article published in 1935 stated, "Ankara is a completely new city", and "throughout the twelve years of the Turkish republic, it has been built in the most modern way according to projects designed by German engineers, and is still being built. It has a number of wonderful streets, which could stand in every Western European city."⁴¹ There are many similar articles describing Ankara as some European capital, in Croatians' eyes seemingly detached from its "Asian" surroundings, i.e. its rugged and underdeveloped Anatolian interior. Istanbul, on the other hand, was described as very lively and "still orientally colorful and interesting,"⁴² as if Ankara was therefore boring. Thus even during the interwar era of admiration for Kemalist modernization and denigration of all things Ottoman, the Croatian

zdravi podmladak," *Jutarnji list* 24 (1935), no. 8576, December 11, 1935, 10; "Muslimanska žena kod nas i u Turskoj," *Jutarnji list* 28 (1939), No. 9980, 20; "Iz života suvremene Turkinje," *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), No. 121, June 18, 1944, 7.

³⁸Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey*, 9-12.

³⁹ Stjepan Radić, "Nova Turska kao seljačka republika," *Narodni val čovječnosti, pravice i slobode* 1 (1927), No. 126, December 16, 1927, 1.

⁴⁰ Šenda, "Nova Turska," 14-15.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 3. Other articles on the topic of Ankara: Radica, "Kroz novu Tursku. U sumraku Carigrada," 11; "Nagli razvoj Ankare - modernog pustinjskog grada," *Jutarnji list* 24 (1935), no. 8568, December 3, 1935, 10; "Turska nastoji razviti jaki i zdravi podmladak," 10; "Turska na pragu dvaju svijetova," *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), No. 16, June 14, 1942, 2.

public could still read articles perpetuating the fame of Istanbul as an oriental spectacle.

Croatian periodicals published a number of articles describing Turkish economy and giving generally positive assessments of its economic reforms, which were qualified as positive as its socio-political reforms. One article published in 1933 stated: "The abolishment of *dhimmi*, distribution of the land among peasants, favoritism of agriculture, especially of wheat culture, liberation of peasants from usurious debts by giving long-term loans, creation of peasant cooperation, establishment of big loan institutes, construction of railroads, all of that without any loans or help from abroad, creation of an independent national industry, development of maritime trade [...] are living testimonials of success".⁴³ These changes were viewed as exceptional undertakings evolving with an unprecedented pace, as the country's infrastructure, industrial facilities and cultural institutions were being built.⁴⁴ Weekly newspaper *Ekonomska politika*, which focused on Yugoslav and international economic issues, on July 20, 1935 published an article praising Turkish economy. The article was authored by Mehmet Kemal, ambassador of Turkey in Switzerland and Turkish delegate at the League of Nations. In his article Kemal described the aspects of Turkey's planned economy, namely its aims toward progress in the fields of industrialization, agrarian development and public works. He emphasized that in the last twelve years Turkey built 3,000 km of railroads and 9,600 km of roads. The economic development was combined with the amelioration of workers' rights, claimed Kemal, and concluded that Turkey "consolidates its firm will to be the factor of social peace, prosperity and success in the circle of the international family".⁴⁵ This seemingly propagandist article, whose discourse is very similar to the articles published by Croatian authors previously cited, was published without any comments or explanations – as if the stated facts were widely known or accepted among the readers of this economic weekly. Articles containing the same level of trust in Turkey's economic capacities can be found in many other Croatian newspapers of the period. All in all, Croatian publications in general chose to convey only the positive aspects of Turkish interwar

⁴³ "Značaj Kemalove revolucije," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 27 (1933), No. 299, October 30, 1933, 11.

⁴⁴ "Kemal Atatürk. Život i djela velikog turskog vojskovođe i državnika," 3.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Kemal, "Planska privreda Kemalove Turske," *Ekonomska politika* 1 (1935), No. 13, July 20, 1935, 7.

economy, and the Croatian public was deprived of any balanced analysis.

Articles on Cultural Issues and Events in Turkey in the Interwar Years

Croatian newspapers regularly published articles about Turkish culture, mainly about Turkish language, literature and arts. The articles regarding the Ottoman heritage in Croatia were widespread during the analyzed period, especially in the 1930s.⁴⁶ The general perception of Turkish culture was, expectedly, that it experienced a complete revival when the Turkish republic was formed, and that the Kemalist government decided to model its culture on Western European cultural trends. One paradigmatic article, entitled "The renaissance of Turkish music: from Sultans' 'janissary orchestras' to contemporary symphony orchestras - modern Turkish music is based on Anatolian musical folklore", states: "The true folk melody remained alive in the countryside. Anatolia is the heart of present Turkey and that is from where the new Turkey takes its musical treasure [...] The Young Turkish revolution threw away the weight of Sultan-like lavishness and Oriental mentality and started a powerful life under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk. [...] In Kemal's Turkey, modern musical schools are being opened, symphonic and chamber orchestras are being founded, vocal societies organized." The commentators also put emphasis on the revolutionary aspect of the cultural development, stating that "the Kemalist revolution was not only a political, but in the full sense a cultural revolution too."⁴⁷ The Croatian press in a similar fashion viewed the Turkish literature: as a revived art which benefited greatly from the Kemalist endeavor.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Kasim Gujić, "Naponi Bosne za Oslobođenje ispod turske vlasti. Hercegovački ustanak (1875.-1878.) doveo je do izгона Turaka iz Bosne i Hercegovine," *Narodne novine* (Zagreb) 99 (1933), No. 251, 3; Emilij Laszowski, "Izdajica Blaž Krpić. Tko je nevjeroj pomogao Turke, kad su god. 1536. zauzimali Požegu i druge neke slavonske gradove," *Hrvatski list* (Osijek) 19 (1938), No. 190, 12; Savić Marković Štedimlija, "Carigradski 'Hrvatbaša'," *Jutarnji list* 28 (1939), No. 10015, December 10, 1939, 17.

⁴⁷ Milan Katić, "Renesansa turske muzike: od sultanovih 'janjičarskih orkestrara' do savremenih simfonijskih orkestrara - moderna turska muzika bazira na anatolskom muzičkom folkloru," *Novosti* (Zagreb) 32 (1938), No. 108, April 21, 1938, 13.

⁴⁸ "Roman Kemal-pašine Turske. Pabirci po turskoj književnosti," *Jutarnji list* 25 (1936), No. 8827, August 23, 1936, 23.

Turkey in the Croatian Press During the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945)

The NDH was a puppet state of the Axis Powers Germany and Italy from 1941 to 1945. It was established on April 10, 1941, after the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the Axis Powers. The NDH consisted of the territories of modern-day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as some parts of modern-day Serbia. It was controlled by the Ustasha movement with its leader Ante Pavelić, the self-proclaimed Poglavnik (i.e. headman). The NDH was granted international recognition only by the Axis Powers and by countries under Axis occupation. It was also recognized by Spain, but other neutral nations did not recognize the NDH. Therefore the Croatian authorities aspired to acquire the recognition from some neutral countries, for instance Turkey – especially because the Ustasha movement espoused Islam and Bosnian Muslims as part of their definition of the Croatian nation, and hoped it would help them in their intention of approaching Turkey. With this aim, the NDH leaders sent four diplomatic missions to Turkey, but all four missions were unsuccessful, because Turkey insisted on its neutrality in the world conflict. The Croatian government changed its approach and tried to achieve the same goal by introducing a pro-Turkish newspaper in Turkish language, which would strengthen Croatian-Turkish ties. In addition, Croatian newspapers of the time were publishing numerous articles regarding Turkey's foreign policy, economy, culture, etc. Especially political matters were extensively followed; for instance, the news of retirement of diplomat Tevfik Rüşti Aras from the position of the Turkish Ambassador in London in 1942 was deemed to be important enough to be printed in Croatian newspapers.⁴⁹ It is important to mention that all newspapers of this period were under the influence of the Ustasha propaganda; otherwise, they would have been prohibited. In such conditions, articles praising Turkey's socio-political structure were a normal occurrence. One typical Turkey-related article of the mentioned era, published in the Sarajevo-based Muslim daily *Osvit* in 1942, states as follows: "Kemalist Turkey [...] carried out the process of Europeanisation, finally connecting itself spiritually, civilizationally and economically with Europe. [...] One who wishes to get to know the Turkey of today must visit at least Ankara and a number of other

⁴⁹ "Ruždi Aras umirovljen," *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), no. 1, February 22, 1942, 3; "Umirovljen Aras turski poklisar u Londonu," *Hrvatska svijest* 7 (1942), No. 115, August 1, 1942, 3.

important Anatolian cities. Only on Anatolian soil one comes to understand the image of a changed Turkey, a land of work and prosperity. Today, Ankara is a symbol of a comprehensive turnaround in the new Turkey: the name of this city became a symbol of revival and renaissance of a rejuvenated nation.”⁵⁰ Numerous other articles having the same laudatory tone were published in the Croatian press, especially between 1941 and 1943, when Turkey was still viewed in Croatia as undecided between the Allies and the Axis Powers.

The aforementioned Turkish language newspaper published in Zagreb, entitled *Doğu ve Batı* (East and West), was published monthly from April 6, 1943 to August 15, 1944, and it had the financial support of the NDH Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The editorial board stated that the purpose of the newspaper was to “strengthen friendly ties” between Turkey and the NDH, and to “first set up cultural ties, then economic ties, and through these also political ties” between the two countries.⁵¹ Articles dealing with political, economic and cultural events in contemporary Turkey were published in the newspaper’s every edition. The editorship stressed the importance given to Turkey in the Croatian press: “Every news, every article and statement given by the official Turkish sources comes across great interest here [i.e. in the Croatian public]. At the same time, political figures at the head of the Turkish government protect their people with a realistic outlook from war and war aspirations, because until now they had implemented their policy with such wisdom and clairvoyance [...] The Croatian press, and especially the leading newspapers: *Hrvatski narod* and *Nova Hrvatska*, publish more and more news and articles on Turkey.”⁵² According to the editors of *Doğu ve Batı*, the level of attention the Croatian public, and especially its Muslim part, paid to events in Turkey, was extremely high. An example of this phenomenon is the article published in the *Doğu ve Batı* and relating the earthquake in the Turkish city of Adapazarı on June 20, 1943, which states: “From the first day, the Croatian press has posted news of the damage caused by the earthquake in Adapazarı and its surroundings. The horrors that befell its inhabitants shook the hearts of Croats, who sympathize with the sorrow of the Turkish people on

⁵⁰ “Turska na pragu dvaju svijetova,” 2.

⁵¹ Hifzi Bjelevac, “Hrvat Müslüman Basımevi Doğu ve Batı,” *Doğu ve Batı* 2 (1944), No. 8, August 15, 1944, 13-14.

⁵² Hifzi Bjelevac, “Hrvatların Türkiye’ye karşı ilgisi,” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 2, June 7, 1943, 6.

the account of its victims".⁵³ We have to take into consideration, however, that it was in the interest of the editorship of the *Doğu ve Batı* (even falsely) claim that the level of the attention of the Croatian public toward Turkey was high.

Croatian newspapers of the period were publishing numerous texts relating to Turkey and, especially, its international stance, but a genuine current of Turkey-related articles was issued almost daily in the Sarajevo-based newspapers *Osvit* and *Muslimanska svijest* (in 1941 renamed *Hrvatska svijest*). The reason for this occurrence was the fact that the Bosnian and Herzegovinian region of the NDH had the greatest concentration of Muslims, who traditionally nurtured close ties with Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. This is owed to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. Thus, a large portion of Turkey-related articles concerned historical ties of Ottomans and Croats and accentuated this topic. Examples are numerous; for instance, the article entitled "Croatia and Turkey", published in the *Doğu ve Batı*, starts with the sentence: "History has for more than four centuries linked the Croatian and Turkish peoples."⁵⁴ The weekly paper *Hrvatska svijest* published not one, but two articles in the same edition, praising Ottoman rulers as artists and poets, and boasting with the fact that 23 Ottoman grand viziers were supposedly "of Croatian descent".⁵⁵ Those kinds of articles are multitudinous, as intellectuals were presumably encouraged, in one way or the other, to publish similar articles.⁵⁶ One person that needs to be mentioned in this context is Bosnian-Herzegovinian journalist and publicist Munir Šahinović Ekremov (1910-1945), who was the main propagator of Croatian nationalism among Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims from 1935 to 1945.⁵⁷ In 1939, Šahinović published a book entitled *Turkey - today and tomorrow*, an extensive overview of Turkey's socio-political, economic

⁵³ Hifzi Bjelevac, "Adapazarı'daki Ağır Felaketler Münasebetiyle," *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 3, July 15, 1943, 3.

⁵⁴ Salih Baljić, "Hrvatistan ve Türkiye", *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 2, June 7, 1943, 1-2.

⁵⁵ Mehmed Sulejmanpašić, "Turski vladari kao umjetnici i pjesnici", *Hrvatska svijest* 6 (1941), No. 104-105, October 22, 1941, 7; Mehmed Sulejmanpašić, "Hrvatski narod dao je Turskoj Carevini dvadeset i tri velika vezira", *Hrvatska svijest* 6 (1941), No. 104-105, October 22, 1941, 11-12.

⁵⁶ Hazim Šabanović, "Dopisivanje bosanskih vezira sa zapovjednicima u Hrvatskoj", *Hrvatska svijest* 6 (1941), no. 107-108, November 5, 1941, 10.

⁵⁷ Zlatko Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu 1878.-1945. Doba utemeljenja* (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu; Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), 423-424.

and cultural position during the period 1923-1939.⁵⁸ His book was widely advertised both in Yugoslavia and the NDH⁵⁹ and large sections of it were published on the pages of Šahinović's Sarajevo-based newspaper *Muslimanska svijest* from June 29, 1939 to February 1, 1941. Thus, its readers were able to become familiar with all sorts of aspects of life in contemporary Turkey.

As regards the articles relating to Turkey's international position, those generally tended to describe Turkey's position as leaning towards the Axis Powers, because it would have suited the wishes of the Ustasha government in seek for another ally in the war; it was a sort of wishful thinking.⁶⁰ According to one article published on May 3, 1942 in the *Osvit* (which, one has to bear in mind, was a state-influenced newspaper), entitled "Relations between Germany and Turkey are still developing in terms of friendship which was never clouded".⁶¹ Another *Osvit* article – entitled "On whose side is Turkey?" and published on March 8, 1942 – states that "it seems as though, from the beginning of the war, the decision of Turkey to actively join the war was expected at any moment". The author continues by comparing Atatürk, who opposed the Versailles Treaty's decisions concerning Turkey, with Adolf Hitler, "a God-given leader" of Germany who also opposed the Versailles Treaty and "united all nations of Europe", and concludes that Turkey "by nature of things" can only be on Hitler's side in the current war. Furthermore, the author lists a number of other reasons and states that "there are no reasons not to believe the repeated claims about the sympathies Turkish people today have towards Germany", which "through every new victory" in the fight against the Soviet Union "more and more rips the ring around Turkey", so that "the Turkish people have even more reasons to help Germany's fight and not to do anything that would harm this fight. Therefore, the only way for Turkey is the one we Croats are following. Any other way would mean its

⁵⁸ Munir Šahinović Ekremov, *Turska – danas i sutra. Prosjek kroz život jedne države* (Sarajevo: Muslimanska svijest, 1939).

⁵⁹ "Turska – danas i sutra[...]" od Munira Šahinovića Ekremova," *Muslimanska svijest* 4 (1939), No. 61, June 29, 1939, 1; Antun Šenda, "Hrvatsko djelo o Turskoj," *Hrvatski dnevnik* (Zagreb) 5 (1940), No. 1657, December 8, 1940, 14; "Turska – danas i sutra," *Hrvatska svijest* 7 (1942), No. 109, February 10, 1942, 1.

⁶⁰ Šahinović Ekremov, "Politički položaj Republike Turske," 1-2.

⁶¹ "Vojnička suradnja Turske i Njemačke," *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), No. 10, May 3, 1942, 2.

suicide.”⁶²Another reason for Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis were the “tensions in Russian-Turkish [i.e. Soviet-Turkish] relations” in early June 1942, which forced the author of the article published in the *Osvit* on June 7, 1942 to conclude that “the armed conflict between Russia and Turkey is unavoidable”. These tensions and the “shipping of army material” from Germany to Turkey “shows on whose side Turkey is”.⁶³ Nevertheless, the Croatian press also defended Turkey’s right to neutrality and condemned the Allies for “showing open aspiration to use Turkey, which is strictly neutral, as a passage to the threatened Soviets. This means that they have in mind breaking Turkish neutrality and exposing them to the mournful fate of the peoples of Syria, Iraq and Iran.”⁶⁴ The Ustasha movement’s newsletter *Spremnost* even denied the rumors of Turkey’s rapprochement towards the Allies: “The visit of the President of the English government to Turkey [...] gave rise to enemy propaganda to prematurely and unreasonably show a wholehearted wish for Turkey to enter the world war on the side of England and the United States. Some have even gone so far to have seen Turkey in a state of war! Clearheaded politicians [...] have not been agitated by the visit of Winston Churchill to Turkey...”⁶⁵ When the tide of war shifted in favor of the Allies, the Croatian press still assumed that Turkey would keep its neutrality. Moreover, when it was obvious that Turkey would join the Allies, Croatian articles were full of justification for such an act, on the grounds that Turkey was probably forced to join the Allies.⁶⁶

Another aspect of Turkish-Croatian ties during the existence of the NDH is the aforementioned large number of immigrants in Turkey from Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were called “Croatian

⁶² Nazif Bubić, “Na čijoj je strani Turska?”, *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), No. 3, March 8, 1942, 2.

⁶³ “Zategnutost u rusko-turskim odnosima može dovesti do oružanog sukoba,” *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), No. 15, June 7, 1942, 1.

⁶⁴ “Anglosasko shvaćanje neutralnosti Turske,” *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 1 (1942), no. 19, July 5, 1942, 8. Further articles on the topic of Turkey’s neutrality: Šenda, “Nova Turska,” 14-15; “Odgovor turske vlade Londonu,” *Hrvatski narod. Glasilo Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta* 5 (1943), No. 892, November 23, 1943, 1; “Nakon prvog koraka Turske,” *Hrvatski narod. Glasilo Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta* 6 (1944), no. 1110, August 16, 1944, 1; “Turska u igri ‘saveznika’,” *Hrvatski narod. Glasilo Hrvatskog ustaškog pokreta* 7 (1945), No. 1288, March 18, 1945, 1-2.

⁶⁵ Matija Kovačić, “Položaj i probitci Turske,” *Spremnost. Misao i volja ustaške Hrvatske* 2 (1943), No. 51, February 12, 1943, 1.

⁶⁶ Ivo Vučićević, “Između dva zaraćena tabora. Oko problematike sadašnje turske politike,” *Spremnost. Misao i volja ustaške Hrvatske* 2 (1943), No. 95, December 17, 1943, 2.

Muslims" by the Ustasha propaganda. As one article in the *Doğu ve Batı* puts it: „Everyone knows how great closeness toward the Republic of Turkey feels the Muslim part of our nation [i.e. the Croatian nation]. It is clear that the rest of our nation nourishes the same feelings. We can say that we are in family ties with Turkey; because a huge part of our nation has relatives in Turkey“.⁶⁷ Another example comes from the newspaper *Osvit*: “Today, a couple of hundreds of thousands of our people, having been forced by troubles to leave their homes, in Turkey enjoy all rights, work freely and prosper, and no one tried to take away their Croatian honor, customs and the purest Croatian language.”⁶⁸ The authors of such articles exaggerated the number of immigrants, the strength of their ethnic affiliation and the quality of Croatian language skills, but the effect of these articles must have been significant. The indicator of this effect is the column in the *Osvit*, entitled “Ours in Turkey”, with two sub-columns, “News from Turkey” and “Voices from the homeland”. In the first one, messages arriving from the Croatian (i.e. Bosnian) immigrants in Turkey were published, and in the second one, the messages from the Muslims in the NDH, and both were looking for their family members living in Turkey and the NDH, respectively. Usually the messages were sent by the people who could not find their relatives and were hoping that the readers of the *Osvit* could help them in any way. This column was a regular column and dozens of messages were published during 1944.⁶⁹

Articles Relating to Turkey’s Economy (1941-1945)

During the existence of the NDH, Croatian newspapers shifted from the mere description of Turkish economy to encouraging a Turkish-Croatian economic cooperation. In the article published in April, 1943, under the title “The possibility of economic and trade transactions between the Republic of Turkey and the Independent State of Croatia” the author ascertains that the NDH had the wish to renew trade with its “close neighbor Turkey” (although they were not

⁶⁷ Hifzi Bjelevac, „Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Müstakil Hırvatistan Hükümeti Arasında İktisadi ve Ticari Muamelaatın İmkânı,” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 1, April 6, 1943, 3.

⁶⁸ Bubić, “Na čijoj je strani Turska?”, 2.

⁶⁹ “Naši u Turskoj”, *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), No. 118, May 28, 1944, 5; “Naši u Turskoj,” *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), No. 119, June 4, 1944, 5; “Naši u Turskoj,” *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), No. 120, June 11, 1944, 5; “Naši u Turskoj,” *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), no. 121, June 18, 1944, 5. The column continues in the following editions.

neighbors) because of the "affinity of the Muslim population of the NDH towards Turkey". The fact was that they had relatives in Turkey and were in close contact with them. Considering the level of trade between Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1939, stated the article's author, "there is no reason for such a fruitful trade in goods not to continue between the NDH and Turkey". The author proceeds by stating that a Trans-Danubian Joint-Stock Company for compensatory works with Southeast European countries had been founded in Zagreb "with the goal of starting economic transaction, first of all with Turkey".⁷⁰ There is no information on the result of this economic endeavor. The general direction of World War II, however, in 1943 turned decisively in favor of the Allied Powers and thus against the NDH and its economic plans.

Even the articles on economic issues justified Turkish neutrality in the war. The article entitled "Problems with currency in Turkey" alleges that, in early 1943, "the rise of the cash turnover [of the National Bank of Turkey] originated mostly from the economic needs arising from keeping the army on standby with the aim of preserving Turkish neutrality in the war". In comparison with the pre-war period, Turkey significantly increased the wages of its army, which is "the guardian of neutrality and constantly under arms".⁷¹ Unbiased articles concerning ordinary and regular events were also published, for example, the article about the annual Izmir International Fair in August 1943.⁷² Other economic topics covered in the Croatian press, for example, were the state of Turkish cooperatives and agriculture,⁷³ the development of Turkey's railway network,⁷⁴ etc.

Culture-Related Articles about Turkey (1941-1945)

The interest for reports on Turkey-related cultural developments was far greater during the NDH period than it was in the former period. The *Doğu ve Batı* published a number of articles relating to famous Ottoman and Turkish personas, for example, architect Sinan the Great,⁷⁵ statesman Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha⁷⁶ and writer Tefik

⁷⁰ Bjelevac, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Müstakil Hırvatistan Hükümeti", 3.

⁷¹ "Türkiye'nin Valuta Mes'eleleri," *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 6, November 1, 1943, 11.

⁷² Hifzi Bjelevac, "İzmir," *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 4, August 15, 1943, 2-3.

⁷³ "Tursko zadruگارstvo," *Osvit* (Sarajevo) 3 (1944), No. 120, June 11, 1944, 2.

⁷⁴ Šenda, "Nova Turska," 15.

⁷⁵ Hifzi Bjelevac, "Mimar Sinan ve Heykeltraş Ivan Meštrović," *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 5, September 15, 1943, 1-2.

Fikret.⁷⁷ Some of the articles were copied from Turkish newspapers.⁷⁸ Other Turkish cultural aspects examined in the Croatian press during the analyzed period were Turkish theater, visual arts, museums, educational system, Turkish language, and research institutions.⁷⁹ As regards Croatia-based cultural projects, when Croatian publicist and translator Ivan Esih in 1942 published his book on the subject of Turkish loanwords in Croatian language, the *Doğu ve Batı* chief editor wrote that Turks have “for five hundred years ruled the Balkan countries. The Turks have never wanted to impose their own language to foreign nations. Some words stayed in the Bulgarian, Greek, Albanian, Croatian and Serbian languages in its original form and with the beautiful harmony of the Turkish language.” The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina “do not know Turkish, but they know so many Turkish words which other Croats, who were not born in Bosnia, do not understand. To remove this obstacle,” Ivan Esih “wrote a manual for Turkish [...] With this small manual we find out that the Croatian language uses more than four thousand Turkish words.”⁸⁰ The *Doğu ve Batı* issued also an article about Muhamed Garčević, translator from Arabic and Turkish and employee of the Croatian Ethnographic Museum in the city of Banja Luka, where Garčević intended to initiate Turkish language courses. The article stated that “the people [of Banja Luka] showed great interest in the Turkish language”.⁸¹ This event must also be viewed in the context of the Ustasha government’s initiative to influence greater Croatian-

⁷⁶ Reşad Kaynar, “Mithat Paşa - Bir İdealistin Hayatı,” *Doğu ve Batı* 2 (1944), No. 8, August 15, 1944, 5-6. The original article was published in the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet*: Reşad Kaynar, “Mithat Paşa,” *Cumhuriyet* 21 (1944), April 24, 1944, 2.

⁷⁷ Ziyaeddin Fahri Findikoğlu, “Tevfik Fikret’in Ahlak Felsefesi,” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 5, September 15, 1943, 5-6. The original article was published in the *Cumhuriyet*: Ziyaeddin Fahri Findikoğlu, “Tevfik Fikret’in Ahlak Felsefesi,” *Cumhuriyet* 20 (1943), August 19, 1943, 2.

⁷⁸ For instance, the article published by writer and publicist Selim Nüzhet Gerçek and relating the book *Ayasofya ve Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1943) by Ali Sami Boyar, Turkish painter and journalist: Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, “Ayasofya ve Tarihi,” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 4, August 15, 1943, 12.

⁷⁹ Gomerčić, “O svemu i svačemu iz Kemalove Turske,” 11; Quint, “Od harema do fox-trota,” 21; Annie Penić-Zloch, “U hramu turske umjetnosti. Zemlja, gdje je umjetnost još u povojima,” *Jutarnji list* 23 (1934), no. 7943, March 11, 1934, 21-22; “Turska nastoji razviti jaki i zdravi podmladak,” 10; “Higijenske, umjetničke, propagandističke i znanstvene ustanove Ankare,” *Jutarnji list* 24 (1935), No. 8587, December 22, 1935, 33.

⁸⁰ Hifzi Bjelevac, “Dr I. Esih: Turcizmi (Hrvat Dilinde Türk Lisanının İzleri),” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 1, April 6, 1943, 10.

⁸¹ Hifzi Bjelevac, “Banja Luka’da Türkçe Öğretme,” *Doğu ve Batı* 1 (1943), No. 2, June 7, 1943, 8.

Turkish rapprochement. But the biggest cultural project concerning Turkey was to be the publishing project announced on August 15, 1944 on the pages of the *Doğu ve Batı*. According to the newspaper, the NDH government offered financial resources for the publication of a Turkish grammar book which would “follow all the rules of Turkish orthography and utilize new terminology”. Furthermore, the NDH government opened a tender for a “practical Turkish-Croatian and Croatian-Turkish dictionary”, a “collection of poems in Turkish” and for the publication of “the chosen works of ten to twelve of the best Turkish storytellers and essayists, members of the new Kemalist literature”.⁸² Furthermore, the editorship of the *Doğu ve Batı* was intent on publishing one of the classical Turkish novels, *Nur Baba*, written by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, which was being translated in Sarajevo at the time.⁸³ Unfortunately, none of these ideas came to life because of the imminent fall of the NDH with the end of World War II.

Conclusion

The analysis of Turkey-related articles in the Croatian press during the period 1923-1945 reveals that the Croatian public was, through the Croatian newspaper medium, extremely well acquainted with the socio-political, economic and cultural situation in the Republic of Turkey. In the second part of the 1930s and in the early 1940s, Turkey-related topics were a habitual phenomenon in the Croatian press, and the average Croatian reader of the period had the potentiality to be very well informed on the situation in Turkey. The frequency of Turkey-related topics had its peak in 1938 around the death of Atatürk, when Croatian newspapers published a great number of articles detailing Atatürk's life and deeds, the influence of Kemalist reforms and the possible impact his death could have had on Turkey's future. Another peak of interest for all things Turkish was during the Independent State of Croatia, when the Ustasha propaganda machinery attempted to influence Turkey's involvement in World War II on the side of the Axis and greater Croatian-Turkish rapprochement by publishing all sorts of Turkey-related articles. This subsequently propelled Turkey to the top of the list of the most mentioned of the non-Axis countries in the Croatian press of the

⁸² Hifzi Bjelevac, “Edebi Müsabaka,” *Doğu ve Batı* 2 (1944), No. 8, August 15, 1944, 13.

⁸³ Hifzi Bjelevac, “Hırvat Müslüman Basımevi Doğu ve Batı,” *Doğu ve Batı* 2 (1944), No. 8, August 15, 1944, 13-14. The novel *Nur Baba* was eventually printed in 1957 in Sarajevo in translation by Fetah Sulejmanpašić.

period. Although Turkey was not a neighboring country of neither the Kingdom of SHS / Yugoslavia nor the Independent State of Croatia, the research showed that it apparently was a country of special interest, as the Croatian press regarded it important enough to publish numerous articles about various Turkey-related events. During the Yugoslav period, Turkey's perception in the Croatian press was generally favorable or at least neutral, and mostly based on the contrast between the negativity of the old Ottoman Empire and the positivity of the new, modern, Western-oriented, republican and reformed Turkey. As for the period between 1941 and 1945, Turkey's perception in the Croatian press became extremely positive, but one has to bear in mind that the Ustasha propaganda machinery controlled all Croatian newspapers, and most likely it was the Ustasha propagandists' wishes – and not the Croatian journalists' free choice – what was responsible for numerous and very favorable articles about Turkey.

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BOOK REVIEW

Eyal Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath*, London: Hurst & Company, 2016. 377 p, ISBN: 978-1-84904-541-4

Cengiz Yolcu*

Balkan Savaşı, hem Osmanlı hem de dünya tarihinde yalnızca sonuçları itibarıyla değil, harp tekniklerine getirdiği yenilikler bakımından da bir dönüm noktası teşkil eder. Öyle ki, bu savaş, cephe savaşının yerleşim yerlerine taşınması ve cephede savaşan askerlerin yanı sıra cephe haricindeki sivillerin de katılımlarıyla birlikte “modern harp mekanizması”nın ilk ve küçük ölçekteki bir örneği olmuştur. Balkan Savaşı esnasında sivil halk, ilk defa “askerî hedef” ve “düşman” olarak addedilmiştir.

Osmanlı Devleti bakımından Balkan Savaşı'nın sosyal ve ekonomik neticeleri çok çarpıcı olmuştur. Savaşın neticesinde Rumeli'nin kaybıyla birlikte imparatorluk yalnızca geniş toprakları değil, aynı zamanda yüksek oranda gelir kaynağı sayılan arazileri de yitirmiştir, ki bu durum Osmanlı Devleti'ne ağır bir ekonomik yük teşkil etmiştir. Ekonomik tesirinin yanı sıra savaş insani trajedilere sebep olan zorunlu göçleri de başlatmıştır. Öyle ki Balkan Savaşı'nın yaralarını neredeyse tüm yirminci yüzyıl boyunca iyileştirmek mümkün olmamıştır. *Hürriyet'inîllâmı*

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(İkinci Meşrutiyet) ile başlayan Osmanlı Müslümanları ve Gayrimüslimleri arasındaki “uhuvvet asrı” da, savaşın sonunda, üstünden daha beş yıl geçmişken hitam bulmuştur.

Balkan Savaşı'nı takip eden yıllar yeni bir millet idealinin şekillenmesi ve öne çıkmasına zemin hazırlamıştır. Toplumda öne çıkan dinî karakterin yanı sıra Balkan Savaşı'nda yaşanan şok ve travma ile, daha öncesinde belli bir aydın grubu çerçevesinde kalan Türk milliyetçiliği ideali hem halk arasında yaygınlık kazanmaya başlamış hem de devletin idarî kadrolarında ve politik kültürde destekçi bulmaya başlamıştır. Böylelikle Osmanlılık terk edilirken Türk milliyetçiliği gittikçe kuvvetlenerek destekçi kazanmıştır.

Osmanlı Devleti'nin siyasal ve sosyal tarihindeki dönüm noktalarından biri olan 1912-1913 yıllarında meydana Balkan Savaşı'nın yüzüncü sene-i devriyesini takip eden yıllarda mevcut literatüre birçok yeni eser ilave olundu. Askerî ve siyasî veçheleri ağırlıklı olarak ele alınan harbin sosyal ve kültürel boyutlarını ve tesirlerini değerlendiren çalışmalarla zenginleşen literatüre bir katkı da Eyal Gınio'nun *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath* başlıklı eseriyle geldi.

Eyal Gınio'nun, mevcut literatürde kökleşmiş iki anlayışın, yani Balkan Savaşı'nın Osmanlı Devleti'nin “imparatorluk” vasfını “ulus-devlet”e dönüştürmekteki rolünü ve adeta bir savaşlar yüzyılı olan yirminci asırda meydana gelecek kitlesel kıyımların bir öncülü olmak sıfatını yani ağırlıklı olarak harbin siyasî boyutlarını ele alan ve tartışan çizgiyi terk etmek taraftarı olduğu anlaşılıyor. Bunun yerine Balkan Harbi'nin yalnızca Müslümanlar değil halihazırda imparatorluk tebaası Hıristiyan ve Yahudilerin sosyal hayatları üzerindeki etkilerini ve aynı dönemde Avrupa'da revaçta olan tartışmaları dikkate alıp değerlendirmeyi tercih ettiğini söylemek mümkün.

The Ottoman Culture of Defeat, giriş ve sonuç bölümlerinin yanı sıra altı ana bölümden oluşmakta. Balkan Savaşı'nda Osmanlıların mağlubiyeti ve bu yenilginin meydana getirdiği felaket hissiyatı üzerine bina edilen kitabın giriş kısmında Osmanlıların “küçük komşu” olarak nitelediği Balkan devletlerinin bağımsızlıklarını elde etmelerinden 1912 yılı sonbaharında yakın zamana değin tâbi oldukları Osmanlı Devleti'ne savaş ilan etmelerine kadar geçen süreçte meydana gelen siyasi hadiseler ana hatlarıyla belirtilmekte, Balkan

Savaşı'nun tarihyazımında ne şekilde ele alındığı ortaya konulmaktadır. Askerî yenilgilerin modern toplumların -bilhassa Batı ve Japonya cemiyeti- mobilizasyonu ve yeniden şekillendirilmesi üzerindeki etkisini Wolfgang Schivelbusch'un "mağlubiyet kültürü" (*culture of defeat*) kavramı bakımından değerlendirilmesi Gino'nun çalışmasının da hareket noktasını teşkil etmektedir. Schivelbusch'un Amerikan İç Savaşı'nda güney eyaletlerinin, sonrasında Fransa ve Almanya'nın tarihsel belirleyiciliği olan savaşlarda yaşadıkları mağlubiyetlerin neden olduğu psikolojik ve kültürel sorunların ilgili toplumlardaki tesirlerini açıklamak için kullandığı "mağlubiyet kültürü" tabiri Gino tarafından Balkan Savaşı "hezimetini" tecrübe eden Osmanlı toplumunun durumunu değerlendirmek amacıyla tartışılmaktadır.

Kitabın birinci bölümünde Balkan Savaşı, ağırlıklı olarak Osmanlı kaynakları ve ikincil literatür kullanılarak kronolojik bir biçimde anlatılıyor. Yazarın bu bölümde altını çizdiği husus kendine güvenli ve coşkulu bir halde savaşa başlayan Osmanlıların çok geçmeden alınan yenilgiler üzerine mahcup ve şaşkın mağluplar haline gelmesidir.

İkinci bölüm aynı zamanda kitabın teorik çerçevesi de olan "mağlubiyet kültürü" kavramına ve Balkan Harbi hezimetinin Osmanlı toplumunu sosyal, siyasal, kültürel ve düşünsel olarak ne şekilde etkilediğine ayrılmış. Zira cephede yaşanan kayıpların yarattığı etki cephe gerisinde manevî olarak savuşturulmaya çalışılmış, eli kalem tutan Osmanlıların başını çektiği siviller mağlubiyetten ders çıkarmanın ve savaş sonrasında yeniden canlanmanın yollarını aramaya başlamışlardır.

Mevcut durumun karamsarlığından kaçış, ütopyik bir gelecekteki iyileşme ve millî uyanış imkanlarının araştırılması atmosferinin hakim olduğu dönemi tasvir eden üçüncü bölümde ayrıca Osmanlı yazarları ve entelektüellerinin başını çektiği değişim, uyanış, kurtuluş, canlanış söylemlerinin toplumun yeniden biçimlendirilmesindeki etkileri tartışılmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölümün ana unsurlarından olan değişim, yenilenme söylemi dördüncü bölümde yeniden gündeme getirilir. Ancak bu bölümde geleceğin yenilenip arınmış, kendine güvenli Osmanlı toplumunu yaratacak özneler olarak çocuklar ön plana çıkarılmışlardır. Yeni Osmanlı cemiyetinin tesis edecek çocuklar için üretilen eserler, bu eserlerde kullanılan dil ve söylem

doğrudan doğruya Balkan Savaşı'nda karşılaşılan hezimete bir karşı tepki olarak meydana getirilmiştir. Dönemin çocuklara yönelik literatüründe kullanılan ana kavramların "intikam" ve "kin" olması söz konusu tepkiselliğe işaret etmektedir.

Beşinci bölümde Ginio, savaşın yaralarının iktisadî alanda nasıl sarılacağı yönünde döneme hakim olan havayı tartışmaktadır. Gayrimüslimlerin hakim olduğu iktisadi alanın Müslümanlar eline geçmesini hedefleyen ve "sivil muharebe" olarak da tabir edilen "millî iktisad" kavramı Balkan Savaşı ile zarar gören Osmanlı kuderetini yeniden diriltecek en önemli unsurlardan birisi olarak görülmektedir. İstanbul ve İzmir başta olmak üzere imparatorluğun diğer ticarî merkezleri bu yeni muharebe alanının cepheleri addedilmişlerdir. Balkan Savaşı'nda fitili yakılan millî iktisad düşüncesi takip eden yıllarda özellikle de Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında iktisadî hakimiyetin Müslümanlar eline geçmesi şeklinde tezahür edecektir.

Ginio'nun kitabının altıncı bölümü Balkan Harbi'nde özellikle Müslüman Osmanlılar için yegane ümit kaynağı olan Edirne'nin Bulgar ve Sırp ordularının elinden geri alınması üzerinde durmaktadır. Edirne'nin, "eski payitaht"ın istirdadı Müslüman Osmanlılar için kısa süreli bir "zafer kültürü" meydana getirmiş, ancak belki de daha dikkat çekici bir biçimde 1908'de "Hürriyet Kahramanı" olarak ortaya çıkan Enver kültürünü bir adım daha ileriye taşıyarak "Edirne Kahramanı" Enver'i yaratmıştır.

Son bölümde ise Balkan Harbi ve bu savaşta karşılaşılan yenilginin mirası değerlendirilmekte, Ginio, Osmanlı yönetici kadrolarının ya da yazarın ifadesiyle "mağlubiyet kuşağının" gelecek yıllardaki politikalarını şekillendirmedeki önemini işaret etmektedir. Mağlubiyet, geri çekilme ve bozgunun sebep olduğu korku özellikle Müslüman Osmanlılar için bir felaket olarak addedilmiş, Rumeli'nin terk edilmesi sonrasında Anadolu'nun yeni yaşam alanı haline getirilmesi için bu coğrafyadaki Hristiyanların da kaderini şekillendirilmiştir. Balkan İttifakı ordularının işgalinde kalan Trakya'daki Bulgar ve Rum ahalinin Osmanlı Devleti'ne bağlılığı sorgulanır hale gelmiş, hatta literatürde üzerinde yeterince durulmadığını düşündüğüm bir hadise Trakya'daki Bulgar cemaati ve Bulgaristan'ın Osmanlı sınırındaki Müslümanların mübadelesi yaşanmıştır.

Eyal Ginio'nun çalışması Balkan Savaşı literatüründe geniş

yer kaplayan, savařın askerî hareket muvacehesinden deęerlendirilmesi eęiliminin ötesinde savařa cephe gerisinden bakan, sivil halk üzerindeki etkilerini de göz önünde bulunduran ve tartışan bir eser olması bakımından dikkate deęerdir. Kitap aynı zamanda savař zamanında neřredilen Osmanlıca, Arapça, Fransızca ve Ladino dillerindeki süreli yayınlar, kitaplar ve arşival malzemenin kullanılması ve deęerlendirilmiş olması, böylelikle harbin cephe gerisini ne şekilde etkilediğini, “sıradan halkın” hissettięi korku, endişe ve yılgınlık duygularını yansıtmayı dolayısıyla da gayet önemlidir.

BOOK REVIEW

Tim Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To Know About Global Politics*, London: Elliott & Thompson Limited, 2015, 303 p., ISBN: 978-1-78396-243-3

Elif Selin Çalık*

Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics

“Is geography destiny?”, “Why, with so rich a natural resource base, did the Balkans slip so far behind Europe although they are regionally in Europe?”. *Prisoners of Geography* is a book that you can find some informative answers for these kinds of questions.

Tim Marshall, in his book “*Prisoners of Geography*” argues that topography imprisons leaders. As he says in the introduction part; “This was true of the Greek Empire, the Persians, the Babylonians, and before them, it was true for every leader seeking the high ground on which to build on to protect the tribe. Rivers, mountains, lakes, deserts, islands, and the seas, are determining factors in history.” Actually, this theory is not new, but one rarely explained.

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Economic, social and demographic changes with the rapid technological changes, have globally affected the times we live in now from those that went before. This may be the reason why we talk so much about geopolitics. As it is written in the part of foreword, the author is unusually well qualified, personally and professionally, to contribute to this debate. He reminds us in the introduction part that he has been on the front line in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Syria. This shows the readers that he has witnessed how decisions and events, international conflicts and civil wars, can only be understood by taking full account of the hopes, fears and preconceptions formed by history and how these in turn are driven by the physical surroundings in which individuals, societies and countries have developed.

-River Ibar in Kosovo

Marshall mentions about the Balkan region as he worked in this region as a British journalist.

To better explain these geopolitical realities and how crucial the physical landscape was in reporting news in the Balkans, he leads readers on the example of River Ibar in Kosovo.

After he underlines that individual leaders, ideas and technologies are temporary and they play an important role in shaping events then they left, he says he first became interested in this subject when covering the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. He watched close at hand as the leaders of various peoples, be they Serbian, Croat or Bosniak, deliberately reminded their tribes of the ancient divisions and ancient suspicions in a region filled with diversity. He states that once they had pulled the peoples apart, it didn't take much to then push them against each other. He gives the River Ibar in Kosovo as a prime example to explain this issue. Ottoman rule over Serbia was cemented by the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, fought near where the Ibar flows through the city of Mitrovica. Over the following centuries the Serb population began to withdraw behind the Ibar as Muslim Albanians gradually descended from the mountainous Malesija region into Kosovo, where they became a majority by the mid eighteenth century.

He sheds light to twentieth century and we're told that there was still a clear ethnic/religious division roughly marked by the river: Then in 1999, battered by NATO from the air and the Kosovo

Liberation Army on the ground, the Yugoslav (Serbian) military retreated across the Ibar, quickly followed by most of the remaining Serb population. The river became the de facto border what some countries now recognise as the independent state of Kosovo. Mitrovica was also where the advancing NATO ground forces came to a halt. During the three-month war there had been veiled threats that NATO intended to invade all of Serbia. But in truth, Marshall tells because of the restrictions of both the geography and politics in the region, NATO leaders never really had that option. He explains the other option of NATO that entering from Hungary, but he says Hungary didn't allow an invasion from its territory because it feared reprisals against the 350 thousand ethnic Hungarians in northern Serbia. The last option for NATO, Marshall tells, was an invasion from the South, which would have got them to the Ibar in double-quick time; but NATO would then have faced the mountains above them.

This example, happened in the Balkan region, shows us no matter how powerful and huge army you have like NATO, the geography effects the course of the events. The readers can find many examples about the Balkans especially in the chapter of "Russia" and "Western Europe".

To understand how geographical factors influence the tactics of decision makers and how geography shapes international politics, Marshall's book is a reference book which explains the balance between geography and politics with the flashbacks from history and with his own experiences.

Briefly, Tim Marshall's book is a reminder of that "ideologies may come and go but such geopolitical facts of life endure". Therefore, Prisoners of Geography breaks the globe up into 10 distinct regions and examines just what the implications are behind the lie of the land.