



YEAR: 02 NUMBER: 02 • ISSN: 2149-5750

# FLORYA CHRONICLES

## OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

- **"New" Turkey, "New" Africa: A Gravity Analysis**  
*Sedat AYBAR*
- **Economic Development In Africa: Salient Trends and Priorities**  
*Mehmet ARDA*
- **Development as Systems: Systems Frameworks, Sub-Saharan African Development, and Health Systems**  
*Catherine LONG*
- **Turkey's Education Diplomacy With Africa**  
*Bahar Dilşa KAVALA*
- **Political Violence and Terrorism: Insight Into Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram**  
*Özüm Sezin UZUN, Yusuf Saheed ADEGBOYEGA*

# Florya Chronicles of Political Economy



**İSTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY**

Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Year 2 Number 2 - 2016

# Florya Chronicles of Political Economy

ISSN : 2149-5750

## Proprietor

Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

## Editor-in-Chief

Nigar ÇELİK

## Editor

Prof. Dr. Sedat AYBAR

## Editorial Board

Prof. Dr. Sedat AYBAR

Ms. Bahar Dilşa KAVALA

Ms. Audrey Ayşe WILLIAMS

## Language

English

## Publication Period

Published twice a year

October and April

## Academic Studies Coordination Office (ASCO)

## Administrative Coordinator

Nazan ÖZGÜR

## Technical Editor

Hakan TERZİ

## Visual Design

Nabi SARIBAŞ

## Correspondence Address

Beşyol Mahallesi, İnönü

Caddesi, No: 38 Sefaköy, 34295

Küçükçekmece/İstanbul

**Tel:** 0212 4441428

**Fax:** 0212 425 57 97

**Web:** www.aydin.edu.tr

**E-mail:** floryachronicles@aydin.edu.tr

## Printed by

Armoninuans Matbaa

Adres: Yukarıdudullu, Bostancı Yolu

Cad. Keyap Çarşı B- 1 Blk. N.24

Ümraniye/İst.

**Tel:** 0216 540 36 11 pbx

**Faks:** 0216 540 42 72

**E-Mail:** info@armoninuans.com

## Scientific Board

*Ertuğ TOMBUŞ, New School for Social Research*

*John WEEKS, University of London*

*Carlos OYA, University of London*

*Turan SUBAŞAT, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University*

*Özüm Sezin UZUN, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Nazım İREM, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Güneri AKALIN, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Ercan EYÜBOĞLU, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Gülümser ÜNKAYA, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Levent SOYSAL, Kadir Has University*

*Funda BARBAROS, Ege University*

*Deniz YÜKSEKER, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Mesut EREN, Istanbul Aydın University*

*Erginbay UĞURLU, Istanbul Aydın University*

*İzettin ÖNDER, Istanbul University*

*Oktar TÜREL, METU*

*Rıdvan KARLUK, Turgut Özal University*

*Çağlar KEYDER, NYU and Bosphorus University*

*Mehmet ARDA, Galatasaray University*

*Erinç YELDAN, Bilkent University*

*Ben FINE, University of London*

*Andy KILMISTER, Oxford Brookes University*

## **ABOUT THE JOURNAL**

*The Florya Chronicles Journal is the scholarly publication of the İstanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. The Journal is distributed on a twice a year basis. The Florya Chronicles Journal is a peer-reviewed in the area of economics, international relations, management and political studies and is published in both Turkish and English languages. Language support for Turkish translation is given to those manuscripts received in English and accepted for publication. The content of the Journal covers all aspects of economics and social sciences including but not limited to mainstream to heterodox approaches. The Journal aims to meet the needs of the public and private sector employees, specialists, academics, and research scholars of economics and social sciences as well as undergraduate and postgraduate level students. The Florya Chronicles offers a wide spectrum of publication including*

- Research Articles*
- Case Reports that adds value to empirical and policy oriented techniques, and topics on management*
- Opinions on areas of relevance*
- Reviews that comprehensively and systematically covers a specific aspect of economics and social sciences.*



# ***Table of Contents***

## **"New" Turkey, "New" Africa: A Gravity Analysis**

*Sedat AYBAR*..... 1

## **Economic Development In Africa: Salient Trends and Priorities**

*Mehmet ARDA*..... 29

## **Development as Systems: Systems Frameworks, Sub-Saharan African Development, and Health Systems**

*Catherine LONG*..... 67

## **Turkey's Education Diplomacy With Africa**

*Bahar Dilşa KAVALA*..... 93

## **Political Violence and Terrorism: Insight Into Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram**

*Özüm Sezin UZUN, Yusuf Saheed ADEGBOYEGA*..... 123



## ***From the Editor***

*This is the second issue of Florya Chronicles of Political Economy. In this issue we are dealing specifically with an important topic: Africa – Turkey relations. This has been growing exponentially for the last decade or so and not only in the sphere of trade and investments but also in the sphere of education, healthcare, development, migration and culture. In line with this growing interest, Istanbul Aydın University has inaugurated Africa Application and Research Center (AFRİKAM) that carries out a variety of Africa related academic events, including an annual international conference on African Affairs. In this issue of Florya Chronicles we have decided to publish a selection of articles of the the First International Conference on Africa held in May 2015. That event was attended by many high profile academics and policy makers and created a positive impact in enhancing awareness on African political economy, in Turkey.*

*Hence we present five selected articles all of which has gone through peer review. The first article is written by Sedat Aybar, Professor of Economics and Finance at İstanbul Aydın University dealing with the determinants of the pull-push factors between the continent of Africa and Turkey, using a gravity model. He argues that bilateral agreements are statistically more significant than other factors in determining gravitational pull between the two entities.*

*The following article is by Prof. Dr. Mehmet Arda, of Galatasaray University and an ex-UNCTAD Director of Department of Commodities. He focuses on trade performance of the continent and argues that as the prices of primary goods started to decline, African growth performance has been negatively affected. He argues that the need to reduce dependence on primary commodities and search for alternative development paths necessitates a return to the pre-2000s strategies. These strategies were employed for improving productivity and the quality of African products, as well as more effective participation in global value chains. According to Prof. Dr. Mehmet Arda, under the current circumstances they appear to be the appropriate policy to be followed. In this regard, he argues growing inflow of FDI can be used to stimulate growth as well as up-graded levels of education.*

*The next article is by Dr. Catherine Long of Kadir Has University, Africa and Middle Eastern Studies Center. She uses “systems framework” to explain*



*complex interactions of developmental networks by focusing on specific sub-categories of analytical, policy, and programmatic frameworks to determine how these are conceptualized. She argues that this is done in a context-specific way. The article uses the example of health systems and health systems strengthening in connection with the SSA development.*

*Education issue has been explored in more detail by Ms. Bahar Dilşa Kavala, Associate Director of Africa Application and Research Center at İstanbul Aydın University. She presents a comprehensive analysis of new diplomacy practices and non-state players, which is also prevalent in the area of education diplomacy. She discusses that Turkey's recent opening to Africa includes education diplomacy and this can play an important role in facilitating bilateral economic and humanitarian relations, as well as supporting the developmental goals of African countries.*

*Finally we have included one article by Asst. Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin Uzun and Mr. Yusuf Saheed Adegboyega on the political violence and terrorism in Nigeria. This article focuses on the resurgence of terrorist networks by tracing it to the colonial roots and to the formation of modern Nigerian state. Boko Haram and Niger Delta militancy has been studied in detail and offers alternative ways to address political violence. The security architecture seems to be an important area in which mutual collaboration with Nigeria and other SSA countries facing similar threats can produce beneficial outcomes.*

*We are happy to note that interest in our journal has grown and we started to receive positive comments. Our advisory board now added some renowned academics to whom we are grateful for accepting to take part in our effort. We also invite contributions for the coming issues that are particularly focusing on relevant issues through the political economy perspective.*

*As usual we are grateful to the staff at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of İstanbul Aydın University and to the Dean of the Faculty, Prof. Dr. Celal Nazım İrem. Naturally, none of this could have been possible without the support of Prof. Dr. Yadigar İzmirli, the Rector of the University and Dr. Mustafa Aydın, President of the Board of Directors, to both we are deeply indebted.*

**Prof. Dr. Sedat AYBAR**  
**Professor of Economics and Finance**  
**Editor**

# ***“New” Turkey, “New” Africa: A Gravity Analysis***

***Sedat AYBAR<sup>1</sup>***

## **Abstract**

Turkey’s “new” interest in the African continent has reached a level that merits academic investigation. There have been few if any robust study analyzing the social and economic dimensions of Turkey-Africa relations by employing technical methods. This paper aims to fill this gap by using a well established model within the discipline of international economics known as the “gravity model”. This model determines Turkey’s gravitational dynamics between specific African countries by examining pull and push factors. At the outset, however, a note of caution in relation to the use of this technical method is in order. When conducting technical research along this line, there are a number of potential problems to keep in mind, one of which relates to the reliability and availability of data. This problem is probably the main reason for the scarce number of technical analyses in this area.

***Keywords:*** *Gravity Model, African Economies, Turkey.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Professor of Economics and Finance, Head of Department of Economics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, IAU, Director of Africa Application and Research Center.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The paper is organised as follows: the first section establishes the evolution, breadth and scope of Turkey-Africa relations. The following section presents the gravity model and its operation as well as data specification. The next section presents the findings of the study and suggests alternative policy options to pave the way forward for a more advanced Turkey-Africa relations. The paper ends with a conclusion.

## **TURKISH INTEREST IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Turkey’s recent interest in the African continent has been receiving some attention from the media and community of commentators both in Turkey and abroad. It is unfortunate, however, that popular coverage of Africa, particularly in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring”, is full of misconceptions and unwarranted prejudices. In the Turkish press, images of the African continent revolve mostly around the concepts of poverty, famine, disease and violence. The African experience with development is widely viewed as a tragedy. Addressing these misconstrued views is not within the scope of this paper, though it is necessary to stress that academic contributions to developing a proper understanding of the continent that goes beyond a pessimistic view have been flimsy to date.

The Turkish mass media, mostly mimicking their Western counterparts, attempts to portray Turkish-African interactions through the prism of borrowed concepts, mostly with negative connotations (Aybar, 2006).

In this sense, African problems are viewed in pathological terms. Henceforth, developing a more balanced and objective view on the African continent requires a degree of academic endeavour that studies its problems as the outcome of the type of integration it has experienced within the global economic system. (Sender, Cramer, Oya, 2005)

The African continent has witnessed a wave of success as far as certain aspects of development are concerned, particularly in the areas of education, healthcare and infrastructure improvement (Hailu, 2008). These successes owe much of their realization to the independence movements of the 1960s, which brought about a promotion of these developmental areas as national priorities. However, it is imperative to note that some developmental outcomes have produced a mixture of success stories, as some countries have proven to be more successful than the others. In the meantime, old colonial ties have been re-established in a more innovative manner, which has given rise to a set of literature studying the “new-colonialism” (Glyn, 2006). More recently high growth rates in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India and the changing nature of production across the globe has spurred an increase in demand for African minerals and raw materials. The Chinese demand for African export items has grown over tenfold in the last decade. In return, the Chinese presence in Africa has grown considerably, as the Chinese are engaged in funding and building infrastructure projects (Knowledge@Wharton, 2016). It is also estimated that there are more than one million Chinese citizens, mainly from the poorer regions of the country, who have now emigrated to

Africa, settled even in small villages and engaged in trade, construction works and small scale businesses. This trend would have added strength to Chinese soft power if not for the nascent accusations by local communities that the Chinese are exploiting and plundering the continent in the same way as the old colonial powers. The integration of the “de-linked” African continent into the world economy has hence taken a new turn (Brautigam, 2015).

For instance, Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda – all of which are recovering from civil wars – have achieved high growth rates within the last decade. Mozambique, the largest coal exporter in the world, has become an energy hub after the discovery of natural gas reserves. Mozambique is also experiencing a construction boom. Oil discovery in Kenya has led to a rise in inward FDI. In fact, such developments are widespread across almost the entire continent (UNCTAD, 2014). In 2015, six of the world’s top 10 fastest growing economies were located in Africa. African economic growth on average in 2012 was 5.3%, and it was 5.6% in 2013, according to World Bank reports in 2013 and 2015. These positive developments have led to a rise in infrastructure investments, increased consumer demand and portfolio investments, particularly in the communications and finance sectors. In short, Africa is now offering attractive prospects for the rest of the world as it re-enters the world trade and economic sphere.

It can be argued that Turkey’s recent interest in the continent is also a part of this new type of integration. In this regard, Africa offers

promising prospects for Turkish industry and investments. At this stage of her development, Turkey can no longer ignore the opportunities and mutual benefits that Africa can offer. However, this is not to suggest that such an interaction is free of problems. The positive economic growth rate in Africa does not trickle down to alleviate widespread poverty. Although high economic growth rates have given rise to a middle class driven by strong demand and consumption habits, poverty is widespread and presents itself as the main developmental challenge on the continent. Hence, one of the important problem areas is the prevailing poverty, which also takes its toll on Turkey's involvement on the continent. Confronting such a problem necessitates that Turkey become a donor country, allowing it to ease its entry into the continent (Hausmann and Lungsgaarde, 2015).

In order to uncover the complex nature and scope of Turkey-Africa relations in the broader context of the existing world economic division of labour, it is necessary to investigate outcomes separately for each interacting partner. In this sense, tracing back relations to their historical roots helps us pinpoint the underlying economic processes that drive current economic and social interactions between Turkey and the continent of Africa.

The historical roots of Turkey-Africa relations date back to the Ottoman Empire, which developed political, economic and cultural ties with the continent. The last of the Ottoman territory on the continent, today's Libya, was lost in 1913. The Turkish presence in North Africa left

behind a large Turkish population as well as cultural and religious ties. However, it was not only North Africa where Ottomans extended their economic and political interests but also they were present in sub-Saharan Africa. Their presence can be detected today in Uganda, Sudan, Senegal, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Central Africa. Although Turkey-Africa relations entered a latent period after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the first Turkish embassy on the continent was opened in 1926 in Ethiopia, which was the only independent African country at the time. Turkey took a stand in support of Ethiopia against Italian aggression during the Italian occupation of the country. After the Second World War, as a result of rapprochement with NATO and the Western camp and formulation of domestic and foreign policies around the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey remained distant from African affairs during cold war. By following pro-Western policies during African independence struggles, Turkey further opened a gap between itself and Africa. It was only in 1955 that Turkey started to shift its position on Africa and began supporting the de-colonisation process, which included defending the admission of the African countries to the United Nations. (Hazar, 2003)

More recently, in the “new world order” that ensued after the collapse of the USSR, Turkish foreign policy has shifted from a uni-dimensional policy to a multi-dimensional one. The new Turkish security architecture, based on the Greater Middle-Eastern Project (GMP), has led Turkey to show some interest in African affairs. The end of Cold

War in 1989, the first Iraq War in 1992 and ensuing developments in the Middle East required Turkey to shift its security emphasis in Africa beyond the Sahara. In line with the shift in security concerns, a new operational plan known as the “Opening Up to Africa Policy” plan was developed in 1998. Since the beginning of the 21st century, as Africa began receiving interest from a variety of countries (such as China and India), Turkey has also heightened its interest in the African continent (hazar, 2003). This interest reached its peak during the Turkey-Africa Summit in 2008, which 44 African heads of state attended. Today, Turkey’s interest in Africa is strategic, and the African Union (AU) has also declared Turkey as a strategic partner (Aybar, 2009).

The “Opening Up to Africa Policy” encouraged mutual governmental visits, aimed to increase the number of Turkish embassies on the continent and sought to develop close relations with local and international organizations. It also proposed to explore ways to extend humanitarian aid as well as realize technical and scientific collaboration. Since then, Turkey has achieved a number of successful outcomes. In addition to becoming a member of the African Development Bank (ADB) in 2005, Turkey also became a member of the AU in the same year (Aybar, 2006).

Turkey declared 2005 as the “Africa Year” and organized a series of events celebrating African culture, history and arts. Then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and the Republic of South Africa in 2005 and Sudan in 2006. He also attended the AU



Summit in 2007. More recently, in 2016, now President of the Republic Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited three West African countries: Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea. In May 2016, further set of visits to Uganda, Kenya and Somalia took place (Aglionby, 2016). Turkey’s active Africa opening policy helped Turkey to secure sufficient support in the United Nations to assume a role in the UN Security Council during the 2009-2010 cycle.

The number of Turkish embassies on the continent has risen from 12 in 2009 to 39 in 2016. Turkey has decided to grant tertiary level education scholarships to a large number of African students<sup>2</sup>. Turkey is also seen as a destination country for many African migrants, whose numbers are increasing dramatically. In Africa, there exist a large Turkish diaspora.


Turkey also has become one of the largest emerging donor economies alongside India and Brazil. The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (known by its Turkish acronym of TİKA) was launched by the government during the 1990s and has expanded its operations into Africa. As of 2016, according to official figures TİKA has fifteen offices operating in sub-Saharan Africa (TİKA, 2016). Table 1 highlights the volume of Turkish aid part of which goes to Africa. TİKA has opened branches in Sudan, Ethiopia and Senegal and engaged its efforts in a wide variety projects in the areas of education, agricultural

---

<sup>2</sup> In 2006, Kadir Has University inaugurated an African Research Center, the first of its kind in Turkey. Today, nearly fifteen such Centers are in operation, including the one at Istanbul Aydın University. That same year, the community of Afro-Turks launched their own association, known as “Afrikalılar” (Africans), and this association took initiative to revitalize traditional Afro-Turk festivities, known as “Dana Bayramı” (Feast of the Beast).

development, irrigation and healthcare. In addition to TIKA's efforts, Turkey has carried out defense related collaboration with countries like Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Senegal.

**Table 1.** *The rise in Turkey's aid to developing countries*



It is also possible to see the scale of the enhanced Turkey-Africa relations from trade figures. In 2000, Turkey's trade volume with sub-Saharan Africa was USD 742 million, which increased to USD 6 billion in 2007 and nearly USD 16 billion in 2011, before falling again to USD 8.4 billion in 2014. Turkey's share in total African (including North Africa) trade is 2.2% (Shinn, 2015). The Turkish government projected that it would increase the trade volume to \$50 billion by 2015, but this target has now been postponed to 2018 (AA, 2014). To realize this goal, various business organizations have organized mutual fairs and meetings with their African counterparts, building a "trade bridge"

between Turkey and the continent. When we scrutinize the data, we see that Turkish imports from Africa have risen faster than Turkish exports to the continent. This is partly due to the rise in the prices of oil and gold but also due to the increased volume of raw material and mineral imports, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa (Aybar, 2008a).

This also encompasses visits, technical assistance and aid, and the economic relations have progressed according to the Enhancing Economic Relations with Africa Strategy (AUEIGS) that was put in force in 2003. The Council of External Economic Relations (DEIK) organized the Turkish-African Business Forum in 2008, where the formation of a Turkish-African Chamber of Commerce was initiated. Since then, private sector interactions have increased tremendously, and as Turkish goods and capital enter the African market, the importance of the African presence in Turkish markets has become more clear (Aybar, 2009).

One of the fundamental reasons behind this increase is the recent high growth performance of the Turkish economy. Recently released data on the performance of the Turkish economy shows that Turkish GDP growth was 8.8% in the second half of 2011, allowing Turkey to claim second place in the hierarchy of world economic growth rankings after China (Aybar, 2012). After shrinking by 4.6% in 2009, the Turkish economy recovered by achieving an 8.9% growth rate in 2010 and 11% in 2011. In 2015, Turkey registered near 4% in economic growth. This remarkable economic performance is actually accompanied by a

process of deeper transformation of the economy, which can be best captured in view of Turkey's fledgling Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI). It is now solidly established that Turkey has joined the ranks of capital exporting developing countries, alongside Brazil, Russia, India, China, etc. This follows the rise in Turkey's productive capacity, foreign trade performance and increased domestic demand (Sabah, 2015).

On the one hand, while Turkey can't ignore the African market for its own products, it must engage with the African continent for its raw materials, which are needed as inputs for the diversified Turkish industry. The stock of OFDI from Turkey into Africa reached a level of USD 16 billion in 2011, mostly in the construction sectors in Senegal, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This figure is expected to rise to \$24 billion at the end of 2016.

In order to improve trade with the continent, Turkey has signed bilateral trade agreements with a number of countries, including the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, the Republic of South Africa and Madagascar (all in 2005). The African market has been targeted particularly by Turkish small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In this sense, given the structural nature of the Turkish and African economies, they seem to be complimentary. Africa appears to be a market for Turkish firms, while Turkey offers a large market for African primary goods. The Republic of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco are at the top of the list for Turkish exports. These countries are also at the top of the list for Turkish

imports. In 2011, Turkey organized a popular campaign akin to Live Aid of the 1990s to raise help for Somalia. This campaign aimed to raise public awareness among the Turkish people of the famine in Somalia; as a result, following the Western pattern, pop stars, NGOs and government offices mobilized around this campaign.

In a nutshell, Turkey-Africa relations are following a positive trend, which also serves as an important input for the new Turkish multilateral foreign policy. Overall, such interactions with the African continent are also expected to help Turkey in its efforts to join the European Union as a full member. On the other hand, while Turkey is carefully crafting its Opening to Africa Strategy into a win-win equation, it is fearful of being seen as a colonial country entering Africa. In this sense, it aims to share its experience with economic development with the African partners.

But what is the driving force behind such interaction? In other words, to what extent do these two entities pull/push each other and to what extent selected factors played a role in this process? Questions relating to the strength of the interaction between Africa and Turkey are important to establish guiding principles to develop future relations. Briefly, if there exists gravitational force between the two, what are the determinants of such force and which factors appears to be the most significant ones? What are the determinant factors that has the strongest gravitational impact between Turkey and selected African countries. These questions require a more rigorous investigation of recent

interactions between Africa and Turkey by using a technical methodology. In this paper, we use the gravity model to measure the gravitational force between Africa and Turkey. The next section presents the gravity model and how it is operationalised in this paper.

### **THE GRAVITY MODEL AND DATA SPECIFICATION**

The gravity model was first formulated by Tinbergen (1962), where the author argues that trade among countries is determined by the size of their incomes (which Tinbergen measures in gross national product, or GNP) and the geographic distance between them. Linneman (1966) added the population variable to the model, which had been successful in explaining trade flows but initially lacked theoretical background. After a wave of criticism against the gravity model in the 1970s and 1980s, several authors – including Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989, and 1990), Deardorff (1998) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) – proved that the model had a strong theoretical background.

The gravity model is explained as a common formulation of the spatial interaction method. It is named after a similar formulation used by Newton's formulation of gravity. Accordingly, the pull between the two objects is proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to their respective distance. Consequently, the general formulation of spatial interactions can be adapted to reflect this basic assumption to form the elementary formulation of the gravity model:

$$T_{ij} = \frac{Y_i^\alpha Y_j^\beta}{D_{ij}^\theta} \quad (1)$$

where  $T_{ij}$  is trade between country  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $Y_i$  is country  $i$ 's gross domestic product (GDP),  $Y_j$  is country  $j$ 's GDP and  $D_{ij}$  is the physical distance between the two countries. Thus, spatial interactions between locations  $i$  and  $j$  are proportional to their respective importance divided by their distance. The parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\theta$  are generally estimated in the log-linear version of the model as follows:

$$\ln T_{ij} = \alpha \ln Y_i + \beta \ln Y_j - \theta \ln D_{ij} \quad (2)$$

As noted by both equations (1) and (2) above, the gravity model suggests that trade flows between the two countries are positively related to their economic size and negatively related to the physical distance between them, which refers to the transportation costs. Since Tinbergen (1962), the model has been developed and extended in a variety of forms, adding other variables that might affect trade flows such as prices (see: Bergstrand 1985 and 1989; Anderson, 1979). Other variables referring to trade costs – other than distance that indicates transportation costs – were added to the model, such as dummies on borders, cultural or historical (colonial) links among countries, language similarities, and membership in free trade area and/or other trade-related agreements.

There have been a number of studies aiming to analyze the determinants of Turkey's trade flows through gravity models. These studies analyze different aspects of trade, for instance, the role of the EU in Turkey's trade flows, the effects of Chinese exports on Turkish exports or the determinants of Turkish agricultural exports to the EU. However, there exists no reference in the broader literature of analysis that measures Turkey-Africa trade relations by using a specified gravity model. This paper fills this gap.


### **Data specification**

It is necessary to reiterate at this point a note of caution on the reliability and availability of data as already mentioned in the abstract of this article. This renders fieldwork based research more valuable, though it requires rather large financial resources. The present paper is not based on a fieldwork research but instead relies largely on available data. Hence, the findings presented here ought to be viewed as indicative rather than well grounded scientific facts. African data is difficult to find, and when found, it is with "time" gaps. In this study, with this in mind, we have collected data from a variety of sources for 52 countries covering the period of 2000 to 2009. Turkish trade data is gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade (Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı). Relevant data for Africa was gathered from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database (2010). More specifically, this covers the data for population, GDP, per capita GDP, inflation rates, etc. We used the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank for data on



unemployment. Google Earth was used to measure direct distances between Turkey and its trading African partners, typically between capital cities of each country, as is presented in the below graph 1. Collected data was then put into panel form. After having completed the data collection, we used e-views software to carry out our regressions.

**Graph 1.** *Distances from Ankara, Turkey to the capital cities of the selected sub-Saharan countries*



## EMPIRICAL TESTING AND FINDINGS

In the present study, we have extended the model by including variables to account for, tariffs (ACP), access to the sea (LL), history (HIST), and other variables of interest.

We estimated the following log linear regression:

$$\ln(X_{ta}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(GDP_{ta}) + \beta_2 \ln(M_{ta}) - \beta_3 \ln(DIS_{ta}) + \beta_4 \ln(INF_{ta}) + \beta_5 \ln(PER_{ta}) + \beta_6 \ln(POP_{ta}) + (HIST)_{ta} + (ACP)_{ta} + (LL)_{ta} + (BTA)_{ta} + \varepsilon_{ta}$$

- *HISTdum1*: historical affiliation
- *ACPdum2*: member of African, Caribbean and Pacific Integration
- *LLdum3*: landlock
- *BTAdum4*: bilateral trade agreement
- $\varepsilon_{ta}$ : is the error term

Findings in this study indicate that a rise in Turkey-Africa trade relations is heavily determined by bilateral trade agreements and historical ties.

It can be traced from below Annex 4 and 5, that Distance between trading partners has expected sign as it has a negative impact on trade. It is also important to note that while GDP plays a significant role in gravitational force, the size of the population has a negative impact.

When we consider exports from Turkey to Africa, historical ties appears to be significant but not as much as bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreements for Turkey’s imports has a negative sign. It is also important to note that contrary to the case with exports, Turkey’s imports are more significantly influenced with the size of exporting country population. This actually reflects the nature of trade between Turkey and the selected African countries. Turkish imports are more heavily dominated by extractive industries and labour intensive manufactures while exports are made up of intermediate and consumer manufactures.

It is also noteworthy to mention that for Turkish imports, presence in export markets are significant. Exports and imports appears to go hand in hand.

Although distance appears to have played a negative role in trade relations between Turkey and Africa, bilateral trade agreements appear to overcome such gravitational problems, as is the case with Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. Also, despite the negative impact of distance over Turkey-Africa trade relations, where complementarities over production exists, this gravitational problem seems to be less important, as is the case with Sudan. Turkish trade with Africa is not significantly influenced by price movements but can suffer from competition from other developing countries.

Trade creation appears to be an important aspect of Turkey-Africa relations. In order to increase the volume of trade, a strategy of secular reduction of mutual tariffs must be carried out on the basis of price elasticities of demand. However, at this stage of mutual relations, trade creation is not going to be sufficient to reach the desired level of interactions. Trade with the continent is in favor of Africa. In this case, Turkey should increase its FDI in the continent. This will necessitate active participation in the international institutions based in Africa. Collaboration with regard to the use of technology and scientific research should be promoted through academic exchange programs.

## **CONCLUSION**

Recent Turkish interest in the African continent has multi-dimensional causes. It is partly related to the economic performance of some African countries and partly to Turkey's ambitions to rise higher in the world's hierarchy of states.

According to our gravity model, although historical ties prove to be important for improving win-win scenarios, bilateral agreements appear to be statistically more significant. In the presence of widespread poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, this makes foreign aid an important vehicle for developing bilateral relations. Under existing conditions, whereby agency capacity and distribution links are lacking, aid goes from government to government.

This revelation of the importance of the flow of aid for developing bilateral relations necessitates greater and more detailed study on the conditions and effectiveness of aid. One of the immediate policy conclusions to achieve aid effectiveness would be to develop a database of Turkish aid to Africa on par with international standards. An improved database is also necessary to study complementarities between the Turkish and African productive sectors. Turkish trade and direct investments with the continent are mostly carried out by SMEs. These firms lack capacity and rigor in calculating risk and expected returns. Hence, governmental guidance to determine incentive schemes and target sectors is important for SMEs. These calculations can only be done with a reliable dataset that only becomes available through the adoption and promotion of international accounting standards.

During the Turkey-Africa summit of 2008, it was agreed that Turkey should seek to develop relations with the African continent in a variety of areas, such as trade, direct investments, agricultural development, water management, infrastructure, telecommunications, transport, environmental protection, health, peace and security. It was also decided that the Turkey-Africa summit will take place every five years, and the second summit took place in 2014 in Equatorial Guinea. Sectoral complementarities and aid were the main focus of that summit.

Our investigation in this paper also has shown that it would be erroneous to tie Turkey’s Africa odyssey merely to the economic

milieu. The humanitarian dimension appears to be important, particularly in the areas of education, food security and healthcare. It is safe to conclude that the build-up of Turkey's presence in sub-Saharan Africa has developed around humanitarian discourse surrounding these said areas.

## REFERENCES

- [1] AA (2014), Turkey FM: Trade with Africa to hit \$50 bn in five years, <http://aa.com.tr/en/world/turkey-fm-trade-with-africa-to-hit-50-bn-in-five-years/99677>
- [2] Aglionby John et. Al, (2016), The reasons behind Turkey leader Recep Erdogan's Africa tour, Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aaf3981a-27e5-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89.html>
- [3] Anderson, J. E. (1979). A theoretical foundation for the gravity equation. *The American Economic Review*, 69(1), 106-116.
- [4] Aybar, S. (2006). *Potential of Africa and limits of Afro-pessimism*. Paper presented at the 1<sup>st</sup> International Turkish-African Congress, Istanbul, Turkey.
- [5] Aybar, S. (2008a). Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri (Turkey-Africa relations). In *Almanak 2007 Analizleri* (pp. 353-373). Istanbul: Sosyal Araştırmaları Vakfı (SAV).

- [6] Aybar, S. (2008b). Türkiye Afrika ekonomik ilişkileri (Turkey Africa economic relations). *Stratejik Analiz*, 99, [pages].
- [7] Aybar, S. (2009). Emerging Markets Global Players Report – Turkey, with University of Columbia, Vale Columbia Center.
- [8] Aybar, S. (2012). Turkish economy and the development of its financial sector. In S. Aybar & Y. Charalambides (Eds.), *Turkey on the doorstep of Europe* (pp. 32-39). Athens: Panteion University.
- [9] Bergstrand, J. H. (1985). The gravity equation in international trade: Some microeconomic foundations and empirical evidence. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 67(3), 474-481.
- [10] Bergstrand, J. H. (1989). The generalized gravity equation, monopolistic competition, and the factor-proportions theory in international trade. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 71(1): 143-153.
- [11] Bergstrand, J. H. (1990). The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, the Linder hypothesis, and the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade. *The Economic Journal*, 100(403), 1216–1229.

- [12] Brautigam Deborah (2015), 5 Myths About Chinese Investments in Africa, Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-investment-in-africa/>
- [13] Cramer, C., Johnston, D. & Oya, C. (2009). Briefing: Africa and the credit crunch: From crisis to opportunity? *African Affairs*, 108(433), 643–654. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adp058
- [14] Deardorff, A. V. (1995). Determinants of bilateral trade: does gravity work in a neoclassical world? *NBER Working Paper No. 5377*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. doi: 10.3386/w5377.
- [15] Glyn, A. (2006), *Capitalism unleashed: Finance, globalization, and welfare (1<sup>st</sup> ed.)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [16] Hailu, D. (2008). Are the cheetahs tracking the tigers? Probing high growth rates in Africa. *One Pager No. 70*, Brasilia: International Poverty Centre–UN Development Programme.
- [17] Hausmann Jeannine and Erik Lundsgaarde (2015), *Turkey’s Role in Development Cooperation*, United Nations University, Centre for Policy Research Publication.



- [18] Numan Hazar (2003), *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Afrika ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri*, Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, Ankara.
- [19] Helpman, E., & Krugman, P. (1985). *Market structure and foreign trade*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- [20] Knowledge@Wharton (2016), China’s Investments in Africa: What’s the Real Story?,  
<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-investments-in-africa-whats-the-real-story/>
- [21] IMF (2009, 2010), ‘Regional economic outlook, sub-saharan Africa’, IMF, Washington, DC.
- [22] Sabah (2015), No Going Back for Turkey – Africa Trade,  
<http://www.dailysabah.com/money/2015/01/21/no-going-back-for-turkeyafrica-trade>
- [23] Shinn David (2015), Turkey’s Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa Shifting Alliances and Strategic Diversification, Chatham House Research Paper, London.
- [24] Sender, J., Cramer, C., & Oya, C. (2005). *Unequal prospects: Disparities in the quantity and quality of labour supply in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0525. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

- [25] TİKA (2016), Turkey to host landmark World Humanitarian Summit, [http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/turkey\\_to\\_host\\_landmark\\_world\\_humanitarian\\_summit-22648](http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/turkey_to_host_landmark_world_humanitarian_summit-22648)
- [26] Tinbergen, J. (1962). *Shaping the world economy: Suggestions for an international economic policy*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
- [27] UNCTAD, (2014), Economic Development in Africa Report, New York, UN [http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2014\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2014_en.pdf)
- [28] Wilson, J., Pallister, D., & Lashmar, P. (2004, August 26). Thatcher and a very African coup. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/aug/26/uk.south.africa1>.
- [29] World Bank. (2009a). *Global development finance: Charting a global recovery*. Washington, D.C.:The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
- [30] World Bank. (2009b). *Averting a human crisis during the global downturn: Policy options from the World Bank's Human Development Network*. Washington, D.C.:The World Bank.

- [31] World Bank (2013, 2015), Africa Competitiveness Report, WB, Washington DC,  
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/africa-competitiveness-report-2013-main-report-web.pdf>
- [32] World Bank (2014), Africa’s Pulse, WB, Washington DC,  
[http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/Africas-Pulse-brochure\\_Vol9.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/Africas-Pulse-brochure_Vol9.pdf).

## ANNEX

### 4. FINDINGS

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: X,  
 OBSERVATIONS 510

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1.05E+08	27656101	3.789850	0.0002
DIS	-19736.42	5014.063	-3.936212	0.0001
DUM1	1.88E+08	32188417	5.840630	0.0000
DUM4	3.14E+08	42845943	7.339323	0.0000
GDP	0.002435	0.000256	9.522638	0.0000
M	0.182114	0.025936	7.021722	0.0000
POP	-0.880959	0.330680	-2.664083	0.0080
R-squared	0.720282	Mean dependent var		84570568
Adjusted R-squared	0.716946	S.D. dependent var		2.51E+08
S.E. of regression	1.34E+08	Akaike info criterion		40.27170
Sum squared resid	8.97E+18	Schwarz criterion		40.32982
Log likelihood	-10262.28	F-statistic		215.8734
Durbin-Watson stat	0.578005	Prob(F-statistic)		0.000000

## 5.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: M

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	58939043	90939866	0.625118	0.5315
DIS	-5034.487	8644.632	-0.582383	0.5606
DUM1	3.21E+08	92420717	3.475011	0.0006
DUM2	-39282832	72267965	-0.543572	0.5870
DUM3	15874009	22933846	0.692165	0.4892
DUM4	-5.38E+08	70517030	-7.636110	0.0000
GDP	0.004174	0.000436	9.583688	0.0000
INF	83993.54	356192.9	0.235809	0.8137
PER	2091.306	4578.963	0.448957	0.6551
POP	-2.271959	0.574163	-3.956990	0.0001
X	0.485233	0.070296	6.902483	0.0000
R-squared	0.633319	Mean dependent var	1.02E+08	
Adjusted R-squared	0.625971	S.D. dependent var	3.89E+08	
S.E. of regression	2.20E+08	Akaike info criterion	41.27589	
Sum squared resid	2.41E+19	Schwarz criterion	41.38722	
Log likelihood	-10514.35	F-statistic	86.18658	
Durbin-Watson stat	0.694115	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000	



## ***Economic Development In Africa: Salient Trends and Priorities***

***Mehmet ARDA<sup>1</sup>***

### **Abstract**

Economic growth of African countries accelerated since the 2000s, and caught up with that of other developing regions. Rising prices of commodities, particularly minerals and metals as well as fuels, which comprise a large part of Africa's exports, had an important influence on this positive picture. However, as growth fades in China which was instrumental in stimulating demand and pushing up the commodity prices, Africa's economy will be negatively affected. A majority of Africa's international trade is with developing countries. African countries must reduce dependence on commodities and search for alternative development paths. This is a return to the pre-2000s, when commodity prices were considerably lower. Diversification, improving productivity and the quality of African products, as well as more effective participation in global value chains appear as the policy objectives to follow. Given the low levels of income, foreign direct investment can be instrumental in African development. Foreign direct investment has been mostly flowing into natural resources but intra-

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD, Retired Professor, Galatasaray University, Istanbul, Former Director of Commodities Branch, UN Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva Email: mehwarda@gmail.com

African investment favours manufactures and services. These sectors are closely related to the demands of the rising middle class. The allocation of natural resource rents to productive investments is also important. Better governance would help in this respect as well as in stimulating foreign direct investment. Education is an important component of all development policies.

**Keywords:** *Africa, economic development, commodities, natural resources, diversification, foreign direct investment, global value chains*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Although it is often done, generalizing and talking about the development of Africa, or even of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as if it were a homogeneous group of countries is very difficult, if not impossible. Some are large and some are small; some are coastal and others are landlocked. There are numerous countries whose economies depend on minerals or other natural resources for the generation of income, employment and foreign exchange. Across the continent, there are peoples with different socio-economic, political, and institutional histories, and all of them hold particular aspirations for the future. While cognizant of this complication, this paper attempts to identify a few common threads that are currently relevant for a significant group of SSA countries, particularly as they strive to participate effectively in the modern globalized world and draw from current economic realities to benefit their development.

In spite of the potential instructive value of individual success stories and stories of failure, this paper refrains from providing specific country examples. They can be found in some of the references provided below. The focus is on a few interrelated meso-level issues, which need to be tackled with priority from the point of view of attaining sustained and sustainable development for a significant number of African, and particularly SSA, countries. These reflect global and regional realities in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, when a period of relatively rapid global and regional growth spearheaded by China is ending. Among these issues, dependence on commodities (particularly minerals) and the consequent necessity of diversification has a long history, as does the need to attract investment funds and the constraints on doing so. These reflect some policy and institutional failures as well as resource endowments in these countries. They can be addressed to a limited extent by domestic measures in African countries. Another important issue that affects African development is the proliferation of global value chains (GVCs) and the prerequisites for effective participation in them. This is a relatively recent change in the fundamentals of international economic relations and remains outside the control of African countries. The impact on SSA of China's growth performance, which is currently slowing down, is an underlying theme that is also of relatively recent origin and outside the control of African countries. The best that African countries can do in the case of these new realities is to focus on how to adjust to them. The interrelated nature of all of these issues and the fact that they are by no means exhaustive cannot be overemphasized.



The basic argument of this paper is that African countries need to (a) either obtain more retained value added out of their commodity sectors or diversify (but preferably do both), and (b) prepare themselves for a situation where Chinese demand for commodities will not be as powerful an engine of growth as it was before. In this process, attracting funds for investment in physical and institutional infrastructure as well as human capital is a requirement, and effective participation in GVCs is a necessity for structural transformation. Due to lack of time and space, this paper and the presentation upon which it is based do not discuss the services sector, though it is crucial for development.

### **AFRICA'S DEPENDENCE ON COMMODITIES**

It is important to establish the place that commodities occupy in African economies, because it is on this basis that the development process, including diversification into more productive activities (whether commodity-based or otherwise), needs to be built.

By commodities, we mean agriculture, mining, fisheries, and forestry, including simple processing activities in these sectors. The share of commodity sectors in GDP and in export earnings is a significant indicator of dependence on commodities and where the domestic potential lies for the generation of savings and foreign exchange. Additionally, employment generation is a crucial indicator of a sector's importance in an economy. In this respect, agriculture, particularly small-scale agriculture, plays a significant positive role. Mining, however, often exhibits an enclave nature. It is not generally a labour

intensive activity, and the number of people working in the mining sector underestimates its macro-level importance for the country. In fact, from an employment perspective, using the savings generated by the mining sector for developing labour intensive and high productivity activities is a fundamental goal to be pursued.

In general, African countries are more dependent than developing countries in other regions on agriculture and natural resource based activities for employment, income, and foreign exchange generation. Table 1 compares African countries with other developing countries in general in terms of the share of agriculture, mining, construction, and utilities in GDP.<sup>2</sup> While dependence on agriculture is a common trait for many developing countries in all regions of the world, the portion of GDP provided by the mineral sector and utilities generally larger for African countries than for other developing countries. In spite of considerable differences among individual countries, Africa is by far the most commodity-dependent and least industrialized region of the world in terms of the share of agriculture, mining, forestry, and utilities in GDP. Only developing Oceania, a region dominated by small island states, is slightly less industrialized than Africa, and only Western Asia, dominated by major oil exporters, has a higher proportion of mining and utilities in its GDP than Africa. Therefore, any fluctuation in the demand for the products of the mining sector (including fuels)

---

<sup>2</sup> This information has been extracted from UNCTAD, <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>, accessed 25 August 2015. Agriculture is ISIC Rev.3, divisions 01-05; manufacturing is ISIC Rev.3, divisions 15-37, the group mining, and utilities is ISIC Rev. 3, divisions 10-14 and 38-44. Construction is ISIC Rev. 3, division 45 and Services is ISIC Rev.3 divisions 50-99.



Calculated from UNCTAD, UNCTADStats <http://unctadstat.unctad.org>, accessed 25 August 2015.

The importance of natural resources for African countries can also be observed from a different point of view, namely the share of total natural resource rents as a proportion of GDP. Total natural resource rents, calculated as the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents but excluding some mineral resources such as diamonds, uranium, and lithium,<sup>3</sup> as a proportion of GDP are the highest for the Middle East and North Africa, which is dominated by oil and gas, but SSA follows close behind. One of the particular characteristics of natural resource rents (and not only mineral rents) is that they are not really the outcome of free market forces but are normally negotiated between the buyers and those owning or extracting the resources. In most cases, the owners are national governments, and so the level of these appropriated rents (including through concessions and taxation) and their domestic distribution and eventual use are subject to governmental decisions. Transparency, democratic legitimacy, and accountability are crucial in these respects. From 1990 to 2000 and 2010, natural resource rents as per cent of GDP have risen, respectively, from 13.0 to 13.5 and 17.7 in 44 SSA countries for which data are available. The corresponding percentages for 130 other countries are 7.3, 8.0, and 7.9 (Lee & Gueye, p. 6). This proportional increase is the result of the expansion of natural

---

<sup>3</sup> This is because information about reserves and the costs of production is not generally available for these minerals. As a result, rents are underestimated, and this omission can be significant.

resource exploitation as well as favourable prices. Thus, many economies (and governments) have generated considerable earnings through these activities. In many cases, mining investments and activities have dominated economies.

### **Diversification**

Given this dependence on commodities and coupled with the traditional problems associated with the commodities sector – such as fluctuating prices, low productivity and the dominance of large firms in uncompetitive markets, as well as stagnant demand (contradicted at least temporarily by the expansion of Chinese demand) – diversification is an attractive policy objective for African countries. Nevertheless, even if constraints such as lack of skills and investable funds or market access and entry problems may be overcome and a supportive economic and institutional environment may be provided, diversification is fraught with difficulties. Provision of information to businesses is particularly important for encouraging initial entrepreneurs to undertake the necessary risks associated with developing and producing new products, entering (or creating) new markets, and embarking upon a discovery process. Therefore, temporary incentives and support practices (including financial), which were all amply used in the past, may be necessary (Rodrik, 2005).

What is important from the point of view of diversification is not only the production of items that were not produced and exported before but also the creation of ‘better’ products – those that create a higher

proportion of value added in the country and generate forward and backward linkages and positive externalities. Improving the quality of the product, differentiating the product so that it earns a premium, and supplying more of the associated services domestically are all different components of reducing the negative aspects of dependency on commodities (Arda, 2014, p. 197). One of the most obvious but difficult ways to add value to commodities is to differentiate one's product from the competitor's and display a real or perceived superiority of one's product. Though this is difficult, trademarks make it possible on a firm basis. Differentiation can also be envisaged by origin, but just like a trademark, success in this area calls for a strong, difficult, and possibly expensive marketing effort. Differentiation through fair trade or organic certification may be potentially more promising, as it requires less marketing skill, because certification largely takes care of that. 'Fair trade' certification is another means for differentiation and the retention of a higher value added. Seventeen agricultural products along with gold, all of which are among the commodities produced and exported by African countries, are subject to Fair Trade certification (Arda, 2014, p. 221).

Meeting the quality standards and other exigencies of buyers has become, arguably, the most important barrier to entering markets for African countries. Even when market 'access' is assured in terms of overcoming governmental trade barriers and exigencies, such as those implemented within the SPS agreement, private standards may prevent successful market 'entry'.

Diversification within the commodity sector, be it horizontal or vertical, may increase the apparent importance of commodities in the economy, but if it means moving away from low-value items with declining demand, it cannot be construed as perpetuating commodity dependence. It can cover the more positive aspects of manufacturing, such as the benefits attributable to better stability, stronger linkages, spillover effects, and positive externalities from higher skill content in sophisticated commodity production or manufacturing. Moreover, some low-skilled manufacturing activities (like basic garment making) are low-value-added and less productive than some high-value agricultural activities and are shown to be subject to serious deterioration in terms of trade, largely because of massive competition.

While vertical diversification into processing often seems as an attractive option, the critical concern is the optimal use of society's resources, which may not always be the case with vertical diversification. The optimal point of entry into GVCs may not always mean the more processed item. Further processing of mineral resources, in particular, often requires extensive funding and complementary inputs such as energy, which may not be readily available. Moreover, where semi-fabricated metal products are concerned, logistics and the ability to ship a wide range of products to different locations appears to be a significant constraint for African suppliers. Thus, emphasizing this connectivity along both information and physical lines is an important objective for African countries to pursue.

## **RELATIVELY RAPID GROWTH OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES**

Recently, Africa's growth performance has been positive compared to earlier periods and to other regions of the world except Asia, which reflects China's phenomenal growth. In the 1980-2000 period, Africa lagged behind all other regions, including the developed countries. Since 2000, however, this has changed, and Africa's growth is on par with other developing countries, with 2011 being an exception principally owing to the impact of the Arab Spring. Middle African countries – which, as a group, had lagged far behind all other regions and Africa as a whole in the 1980-2000 period – have surpassed Africa as a group since then.

### **Commodity prices**

Although economic reforms in some African countries cannot be overlooked, favourable conditions in global commodity markets were prompted particularly by Chinese demand, and Africa's commodity trade with China itself has been among the principal drivers of the relatively rapid GDP growth in Africa in the first fifteen years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is difficult, however, to say that this growth was accompanied by a structural transformation and development into a more productive economy.

The growth in Africa (and other commodity dependent regions) should be seen in light of the increase in commodity prices.<sup>4</sup> After steadily

---

<sup>4</sup> *The price indices are based on US Dollar prices and reflect to some extent the variations in exchange rates. This has to be taken into account when assessing the actual impacts.*



falling between 1980 and 2000 for all commodity groups, the trend reversed for about a decade before beginning to decline again. The growth rates quoted here reflect the period of high and rising prices. The influence of Chinese demand on both the rise and the subsequent fall, which continues unabated in 2015, is undisputed. While Africa has benefited from the increase in commodity prices, it is Middle Africa which has experienced the most favourable impact, as its economy is much more dependent on the kind of products whose prices have risen the most until the last few years. It is also noteworthy, however, that these are also the items whose prices have recently declined the most, and they continue to do so. It is also noteworthy that these are the product groups for which the importance of China as a destination of world trade has grown the most since 2000. Africa's share in world exports is the biggest in the two groups whose prices have increased the most, namely minerals, ores and metals, and fuels. In fact, for the first group, its share in world exports has slightly increased.

Over the last 15 years or so there has been an unprecedented boom in commodity prices, particularly in mineral and fuel prices, as a consequence of rising demand. Although agricultural prices rose as well, for most of the post-2000 period, this trend has not approached the increase in mineral and fuel prices. Moreover, given that the continent as a whole and many African countries are net food importers, the increase in food prices cannot be considered to present an overall favourable situation for Africa. A similar comment can also be made for fuel, but as a continent (even only looking at SSA), Africa is a large

net fuel exporter. Both the international and domestic distribution and utilization of gains from high prices is a crucial matter as far as poverty reduction and development are concerned. Although the earnings of African countries have increased, it is difficult to say that these countries have made the best use of the last commodity boom for developmental purposes.

### **Commodities in Africa's trade**

As seen in Table 2, the importance of commodities in African exports has grown from 74.2 per cent in 1995 to 81.5 per cent in 2014, partly as a result of favourable price movements. The biggest increase has been in fuels, even with prices declining near the end of 2014. Ores and metals have maintained their importance in spite of the large increase for fuels, meaning that their export values also increased considerably. In the countries that possess these resources, agricultural products have lost whatever importance they once held. Africa's share in world exports of all product groups has remained roughly the same during the boom period. Between 1995 and 2013, the only notable increase was for minerals, ores and metals which went up from 6.2 per cent of world exports to 7.6 per cent.

**Table 2: Export structure by commodity group, per cent of total**

	1995		2000		2005		2014	
	Developing economies		Developing economies		Developing economies		Developing economies	
	Africa	Africa	Africa	Africa	Africa	Africa	Africa	Africa
All food items	10,1	15,1	6,9	10,3	6,2	7,9	7,0	10,0
Agricultural raw materials	2,8	5,2	1,6	3,8	1,3	2,6	1,2	2,5
Ores and metals	3,8	8,8	2,9	6,4	3,6	6,4	3,6	8,8
Fuels	15,2	38,3	19,8	52,6	22,5	61,0	21,5	55,3
Pearls, precious stones and non-monetary gold	1,6	6,8	1,3	5,7	1,5	4,4	2,6	4,9
Manufactured goods	66,5	25,8	67,4	21,1	64,9	17,7	64,2	18,5

NOTE: All food items (SITC 0 + 1 + 22 + 4), Agricultural raw materials (SITC 2 less 22, 27 and 28) Ores and metals (SITC 27 + 28 + 68), Fuels (SITC 3), Pearls, precious stones and non-monetary gold (SITC 667 + 971), Manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 667 and 68)

Calculated from UNCTAD, UNCTADStats <http://unctadstat.unctad.org>, accessed 25 August 2015.

In spite of the weight that minerals and fuels have gained, agriculture is the mainstay of many African countries' economies in terms of export earnings and in most countries as a source of employment. While it shows much potential, and while some discussion will be made below when talking about GVCs, the potential is limited. Development calls for an industrialization of the economy, and thus, for diversification (which can fall outside of or within agriculture) towards higher value added products or processing activities, including operations such as bar coding for retail markets. Moreover, Africa is home to the largest reserves of uncultivated lands in the world. Thus, there are two ways of turning agriculture into an engine of growth and development. One is to improve productivity, and the other is to bring more of the land into sustainable cultivation. The ecological impacts and sustainability, both economic and environmental, of bringing land into cultivation make this option a difficult one. Improving productivity, including through irrigation and carefully increasing input use, seems to be the preferable option in most cases. There is also the potential of increasing value added by diversifying into products with higher value, as well as local processing. Any move from low productivity to high productivity almost certainly involves industrialization, which also creates products that are tradable (unlike most services) and generates (or saves) foreign exchange. Linkage with markets is crucial in all cases. The traditional crops that are exported as undifferentiated homogeneous commodities, such as coffee and cocoa, do not display much potential. Demand for agricultural raw materials, foodstuffs, and feedstuffs are likely to grow

as the world becomes richer and as poorer communities start to eat more nutritious foods such as meat.

### **CHINA IN AFRICA: TRADE**

China's growth has made it a very large importer of many products, including commodities, which is important from the point of view of many African countries. Between 1995 and 2013, for fuels, food, and metals, ores and minerals the share of China in world imports went up, respectively, from 1.5 to 8.7 per cent, 2.3 to 6.7 per cent and 2.5 to 19.5 per cent (UNCTAD 2014a Table 2.2a).

Looking at Africa's main trading partners in Table 3, it is seen that developing countries have overtaken developed countries, and that China has taken the lead, followed by India and other large emerging economies. According to data in UNCTADStat website, other large developing countries such as Brazil have lagged behind. Turkey's share in Africa's exports has remained steady at around one per cent, and its share as an origin of imports for Africa has barely surpassed two per cent. While China's importance as a destination for African exports has surged, fuel and mineral exporters have always composed the largest part of this trade. According to data on UNCTADStat website, however, some countries that had hardly exported to China in 2000 – such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Niger, Mali, and Ethiopia – had increased their exports to China markedly by 2014. The largest proportional increase in exports going to China has taken place in Africa among all developing regions.

**Table 3: Africa's export destinations and import origins**

<b>Destinations of exports as % of total exports</b>					
	1995	2000	2005	2010	2014
Africa	12,4	9,4	8,9	13,4	14,9
Developing economies	25,6	27,5	28,7	42,8	50,7
China	1,2	3,2	6,6	11,8	16,0
India	2,2	2,8	1,6	5,5	6,5
<b>Origin of imports as % of total imports</b>					
	1995	2000	2005	2010	2014
Africa	11,4	13,6	13,0	14,3	12,9
Developing economies	32,0	36,7	42,7	49,9	53,0
China	2,6	3,4	7,0	11,6	16,3
India	1,4	1,6	2,3	3,6	5,0

Calculated from UNCTAD, UNCTADStats <http://unctadstat.unctad.org>, accessed 25 August 2015.

## **THE NEED TO INCREASE INVESTMENTS AND ATTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT**

Development needs investment, and the amount of investment depends on both the savings rate and the level of income. In Africa, due to low levels of income, there is little income left for savings and investment. It is generally accepted that if Africa is to make significant progress in reducing poverty, it will have to sustain average growth rates of about seven per cent and above in the medium to long term, and this will

require investment rates of at least 25 per cent of GDP. In spite of some increase since 2010, over the past two decades the average investment rate in Africa has hovered around 18 per cent, which is well below the 25 per cent threshold, and so it is not surprising that the continent has not achieved the seven per cent average growth rate required to make significant progress in reducing poverty (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 4).

While the level of investment is important for the development process, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic transformation and sustained growth. In the African context, given the basis upon which development will proceed, investment must be allocated to strategic or priority sectors, particularly infrastructure, agribusiness, and manufacturing. Moreover, particularly in the area of public investments, the quality or productivity of investment must be improved to avoid resource waste and achieve maximum impact (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 6). Finally, investment in human capital and institutions is crucial in order to upgrade skills and productivity as well as to improve the environment. The aim is not only to attract foreign investment but also to induce domestic entrepreneurs to invest and to increase government resources through taxation. In recognition of the low levels of public funds generated through taxation in many developing countries, in particular African countries. The generation of domestic resources, just like diversification and a focus on high value added sectors, is an important element of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 8 related to decent work and economic growth.

With the low income levels in Africa, outside sources of finance comprise a large part of the available investable funds. As seen in Table 4, while oil-rich Africa has increased the ratio of domestic savings to Gross Capital Formation (GCF) and has surplus savings, domestic savings have declined as a ratio of GCF in other parts of Africa. For these countries, overseas development assistance (ODA) remains the principal source of GCF, and foreign direct investment (FDI) has also increased in prominence.

**Table 4: Sources of investment financing by categories of countries**

Category	Domestic saving/ GCF	ODA/GCF	FDI/GCF
<i>Averages for the period 2000–2012</i>			
Non-oil Africa	17.2	78.0	24.0
Oil-rich Africa	158.8	34.9	27.8
Non-Africa	59.9	23.1	18.8
Africa	52.6	68.8	25.0
<i>Averages over the period 1970–2012</i>			
Non-oil Africa	27.6	81.2	11.5
Oil-rich Africa	110.1	35.3	15.5
Non-Africa	61.4	25.5	12.4
Africa	48.4	70.7	12.5

NOTE: GCF = gross capital formation


Source: UNCTAD 2015, Computed based on data from World Development Indicators.



### **Foreign direct investment in Africa**

At a time when FDI is becoming an increasingly important source of investment in Africa, it is somewhat striking that greenfield investments in Africa originating from other African countries (principally South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria) have become proportionally more important over time, as have investments from India. In spite of much writing on the subject, Chinese investments in greenfield projects lag behind. As can be seen in Figure 1, both Europe and the US have also become proportionally less important in this area.

**Figure 1.** *Geographical distribution of sources of greenfield investments in Africa by number of projects 2003-2008 and 2009-2013 (per cent)*



Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets ([www.fDiMarkets.com](http://www.fDiMarkets.com)).

Source: UNCTAD 2014 p.42

It is also significant that compared with other foreign investment, intra-African projects are concentrated in manufacturing and services. Ninety

seven per cent of intra-African investments target non-primary sectors, compared with 76 per cent of investments from the rest of the world, with a particularly high difference in the share that targets the manufacturing sector. This directly contributes to the structural transformation of African economies. Smaller African economies rely more heavily on regional FDI. Thus, although in dollar terms the amount of FDI from non-African countries going to non-primary sectors (both services and manufacturing) is larger, a considerably greater proportion of intra-African FDI is directed to the structural transformation of Africa. From the point of view of the African firms investing in other African countries, this helps them enhance their competitiveness by increasing their scale, developing their production know-how, and preparing for global endeavors, following the example of Anglo American and South African Breweries (now SABMiller) (UNCTAD, 2014, pp. 39-41).

Many of the mega projects are in the extractive sectors. Negotiating the financing of mega projects so that the country obtains significant benefits is a complicated matter and is prone to irregularities and corruption. There are many fiscal and legal intricacies as well as uncertainties about the future. These may lead to suboptimal results without any wrongdoing. Moreover, the ‘benefits’ themselves are not easy to define, as they concern a variety of areas such as foreign exchange, fiscal revenues, and positive externalities such as the construction of roads to far-away projects. There is also the issue of

divergent time preference rates among the stakeholders, which can generate serious disagreements (Arda, 2014, p. 217).

Foreign investment comes to extractive industries and natural resource based sectors basically as a function of endowments, and Africa is well endowed in this respect. Naturally, policies and the general business environment play important but secondary roles. Attracting foreign exchange to non-extractive sectors, however, is a function of a wide variety of variables. Liberal foreign investment regimes help, but if they are to generate noticeable outcomes, they must be accompanied – if not preceded – by the establishment of proper regulatory and institutional frameworks, including such aspects as accountability, predictability, clarity, transparency, fairness, rule of law, and the absence of corruption (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 107). It is in such areas that many African countries must take significant strides in order to attract FDI, particularly from the developed countries.

In a recent study, the ease of doing business, the existence of a stable political environment, and the strong presence of rule of law were identified as the three most important factors influencing the selection of FDI location. Regarding specific rule of law conditions, the absence of corruption (both public and private) is felt to be the main factor, followed by political and social stability and the physical security of in-country personnel (The Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 8).

From the point of view of the most important factor in selecting the location of FDI, namely ease of doing business, the situation of African

countries is not very promising, although even some low ranking countries are favourable with regard to some indicators (World Bank Group, 2015). The best ranking African country is Mauritius, at 32<sup>th</sup> out of 189 countries. Botswana and South Africa are, respectively 72<sup>nd</sup> and 73<sup>rd</sup>).<sup>5</sup> Eleven out of the fifteen worst ranking, however, are African countries, although two of them – Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo, which ranked 184<sup>th</sup> and 176<sup>th</sup> respectively – received about 2 billion USD of FDI each in 2013, making them 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> among all African countries. As the rankings are based on starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency, these issues all stand out as priority areas for improvements in individual African countries.

It is difficult to measure and make conjectures about how to increase the second important factor for attracting FDI, namely political stability. Arguably, democracy helps. The most important aspect of rule of law, which is the third item affecting investment decisions, is the absence of corruption. This condition does not bode well for Africa's attractiveness as a destination for FDI. According to the Corruption Perception Index,<sup>6</sup> in 2014 only six African countries were among the 60 countries (that is, among the top one third of 179 included) with the least perceived corruption, namely Botswana (31<sup>st</sup>); Cape Verde (42<sup>nd</sup>);

---

<sup>5</sup> Turkey is ranked 55<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> (<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>)

Mauritius (47<sup>th</sup>); Lesotho, Namibia, and Rwanda (all ranked equally at 55<sup>th</sup>); and finally Ghana at a close 61<sup>st</sup>.<sup>7</sup> Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, and Eritrea are among the bottom ten.

In the real world, however, unlike the responses to surveys, these considerations do not seem to have had much impact. Or rather, the perception of corruption and the perceived difficulty of doing business do not seem to prevent investments by foreign firms. Other considerations seem to trump these. But a cursory examination of the evidence on FDI and corruption show that not only the “uncorrupt” countries but also both Somalia and Sudan have received considerable FDI. In fact, an examination of the amount of FDI received in 2013 as a proportion of GDP does not reveal a significant relation with either the Ease of Doing Business indicator or corruption perceptions. Improving rule of law, reducing corruption, and having a good business environment, however, are laudable objectives in and of themselves, whether they attract foreign investment or not. They would improve the functioning of the economy and the lives of citizens.

Large scale, natural resource based activities that are generally oriented towards exports, such as mining, forestry, and fisheries, are often undertaken with the involvement of large foreign firms. The retention of resource rents in the country and their conversion into productive investments depend crucially on concessions and foreign investment

---

<sup>7</sup> Turkey was 67<sup>th</sup>.

agreements. Owing to the large size of these rents, transparency and good governance – starting from negotiating the agreement through its implementation and oversight – are extremely important. National governance structures are of primary importance, but the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)<sup>8</sup> has become a significant instrument of international governance. Its members “disclose information on tax payments, licences, contracts, production and other key elements around resource extraction.” While the use of resource rents is the prerogative of the government, international governance (for example, through EITI) helps improve transparency, preventing (or at least, reducing) abuses and increasing the availability of resources for public benefit (Cortez & Arda, 2014, pp. 15-16). There are 18 EITI compliant African countries and three African candidates. The emphasis on EITI compliance is partly meant to stimulate FDI.

### **China as a foreign direct investor in Africa**

While China’s importance in Africa’s trade has burgeoned, its place in investment is not as large. It has, nevertheless, been the subject of much discussion because of observations (supported by the discourse of the Chinese government) that Chinese investments, unlike those of some Western countries, are not conditional upon good governance or similar considerations. There is also the impression that the purpose of Chinese investments are basically for natural resource exploitation. When looking at the frequency (not the amount) of investments, it is observed

---

<sup>8</sup> <http://eiti.org/>

that services are the most common sector, and there are significant investments in manufacturing as well. In terms of countries, Chinese investments are in resource-rich countries like Nigeria and South Africa, but also in non-resource-rich countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. In terms of resources committed, however, many of the large Chinese investments are in energy and minerals, along the same lines as Western investments.

One important difference between Chinese FDI and that from developed countries concerns governance: all other things equal, Western investment is concentrated in African countries with better property rights and rule of law; Chinese FDI is indifferent to the property rights/rule of law environment, and on the other hand tends to favor politically stable countries. This difference makes sense given that a significant part of the volume of Chinese investment is tied up in state-to-state resource deals. China is apparently more concerned with the political stability of the government than with the environment of rule of law in the domestic economy. Chinese investment tends to compose a large share of total investment in countries with poor rule of law (Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2015b).

### **Expanding middle classes as a source of dynamism**

As can be deduced from Table 3, industrialized countries are no more the biggest trading partners of African countries. The stimulus to the positive growth rates of recent years has come from China and to some extent other developing countries such as India. This is the case for both

exports, which stimulate production, and for imports, which provide cheap products, particularly but not only as consumption goods for the growing middle classes. The growth in Africa's own share as an export destination is also remarkable. This is an indication of the future potential of Africa as a source of demand, which is expanding due to increasing incomes, a growing population, and urbanization. The growing middle class has also been a factor for attracting FDI, even though recent news that Nestlé "is cutting 15 per cent of its workforce across 21 African countries because it says it overestimated the rise of the middle class" seems to contradict this impression. However, rather than disproving the growing importance of the African middle class, this episode is probably a case of a mismatch between the business model of a large company and local conditions in sub-Saharan markets, which are dominated by family businesses thriving on local know-how and the sale of cheap products tailored to individual countries (Manson, 2015).

Estimates about the size of the middle classes vary. Although in sheer numbers Africa's middle class will continue to be dwarfed by those in other parts of the world, it is expected to almost double between 2009 and 2020, and almost double again by 2030 (UNDP, p. 14). With this enlargement of a consuming public that is increasingly integrated with international markets, regional demand – both domestic and across countries – will become an important source of growth for Africa (and other regions). This may provide a comparative advantage to local enterprises, both producers and traders, who are more familiar with



local tastes and customs than global firms, as exemplified by the Nestlé story. Nevertheless, the dominance of GVCs, from electronics to basic foods, by global firms is an important factor to take into account, especially for African firms with intentions to grow and become international players. This requires upgrading their skills not only for export expansion but also domestic competitiveness.

### **GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND AFRICA**

The dominance of world production and trade by GVCs rather than vertically integrated firms and factories is a relatively recent phenomenon, spearheaded by breakthroughs in information and communication technologies and transportation. The world trade of parts and components comprising the links of global supply chains has steadily increased over the past decades. Currently, more than one quarter of world imports in manufactured goods is represented by intermediate imports (parts and components). Before the rise of global supply chains, nations had to build a deep and wide industrial base, either through the import substitution or export promotion routes, before becoming competitive. It is often argued that nowadays joining supply chains is a drastically faster and surer route to industrialization than the old import-substitution route (Elms & Low, 2013). However, the point at which a country (in fact, a firm) joins the value chain is an important variable in determining the benefits obtained.

Not only is the production process divided into distinct stages undertaken in different places, even finished products, such as garments

and food items, are traded within organized supply chains culminating at the retail end. In order to reach markets, many food items need to be part of the supply chains of supermarket chains. In this context, the organization of the domestic portion of the supply chain is crucially important for exporters. In many African countries, this is where developments are urgently needed. Most commodities pass through a complicated processing phase before reaching the final consumer. Even fresh fruit and vegetables require a cold chain and appropriate handling before being shipped out of the exporting country. The design and implementation of commodity development policies need to display a full consciousness of the complexities, intricacies, and interrelationships within that supply chain, both inside the exporting country and beyond. Production *per se* is not sufficient; what is needed is production that meets many exigencies, whether they are official or private standards – the latter becoming more important as production is internationalized. The provision of a wide variety of services ranging from information to quality control and financing is also indispensable. The chain is as strong as its weakest link, and development strategies should emphasize unlocking the bottlenecks (Arda, 2014, p. 212).

A key issue for developing countries is that gains in GVCs are often distributed very unequally. Especially disadvantaged are the stages that can be undertaken at almost any place on Earth. For instance, more than 95 per cent of personnel in the apparel value chain are employed in assembly line positions, mostly located in developing countries, yet

they receive less than 10 per cent of the product's value (Cortez & Arda, 2014).

In all sectors and not only in mining, value-added capture depends on the market structure, the extent of the competition, and the organization of the value chain. GVCs have provided opportunities for suppliers in developed countries that can meet exigencies and also increase the benefits that are appropriated by the lead firms and importing countries. For instance, in the coffee value chain, the share of total value of the final product going to major corporations from consuming countries has increased from 50 per cent to 75 per cent, while that retained by primary coffee producers has declined from about 20 per cent to 10 per cent since the 1970s (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). However, certain commodities, such as fruit and vegetables, as well as cut flowers generate relatively high value added, particularly when they undergo some transformation or preparation for the retail sector in importing countries (such as packaging). These items also have considerable linkages with the rest of the economy, which has a positive impact on development. Product differentiation through various means of certification (such as “organic” or “fair trade”), performing tasks associated with the retail end of the chain (such as packaging and bar coding), and quality assurance by trusted entities also augment retained value added. Export bans for unprocessed commodities, such as timber, have also helped in increasing processing and value added. However, such bans may generate the risk of some producers quitting the country. The possibility of facing World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes and trade barriers also arises. The danger remains that joining GVCs

could lead to a “shallow” industrialization, with countries – particularly low-income and LDCs – being unable to forge the necessary production linkages with the rest of the economy. With undeveloped or incipient production and technological structures, countries remain stuck in unprocessed low value commodities or simple assembling activities in the supply chain (where competition is intense and returns are low) (Cortez & Arda, 2014, pp. 8-11).

Based on this observation, African countries should aim to compete not only on cheap labour but also on skills and other specific attributes. Policies to upgrade skills are indispensable, but gains from process and product upgrading often do not accrue entirely for developing country suppliers or workers. At least some of the gains of such upgrading generally go to lead firms, because they typically command large bargaining power and can squeeze any of the supplier’s potential profits resulting from the upgrading process. Any upgrading and improved productivity is naturally beneficial, including through external economies. When the supplier also serves other parts of the domestic economy, it also benefits from an improved product and/or more competitive pricing. In the current international setting, with light manufacturing dominated by Asian countries, even African economies that are not heavily commodity dependent but further along the way in terms of industrialization are forced to rely more on the longer-term fundamentals of education and institutions (Rodrik, 2015). Improvements in skills and institutions are necessary for attracting

foreign investment and for creating the conditions of effective entry into GVCs not based solely on low wages.

FDI is often a catalyst for entering GVCs. But if the country wants to be more than a supplier of cheap labour in the GVC, the country itself has to undertake the necessary steps so that a sufficiently strong foundation with a minimum domestic manufacturing base or an efficient agriculture is available (beyond infrastructure and a disciplined labour force). It is unlikely that this required minimum base will be developed by the foreign investors, as the existence of that base is one of the reasons why FDI goes to that country in the first place. Moving forward, the question for developing countries as far as GVCs are concerned is how to integrate into the supply chain in a way that allows for the absorption of a growing labour force at increasing levels of productivity and incomes. For the successful emerging economies, joining a GVC or attracting multinational companies and FDI have not been ends in and of themselves but part of a clearly drafted strategy (Cortez & Arda, 2014, pp. 10-11).

Currently, as would be expected because of low industrialization, trade in intermediate products within Africa is much lower than all other regions. As industrialization progresses and regional value chains are developed, intra-African trade could also see a boost.

## CONCLUSION

Africa and its commodity dependent countries are facing a difficult time, as they have experienced almost continuously over decades. This time the difficulties come as a period of relative dynamism spearheaded by China is ending and international production and trade relations are increasingly dominated by GVCs. Therefore, diversification and industrialization, the traditional development priorities have to be placed in this framework. African countries must adjust their development policies and priorities to these new trends. Another aspect of the new development environment for Africa is the internal dynamism of the continent manifested in the increasing intra-African trade and investment relations, as well as the potential generated by the growing middle class. Emphasis on and investments in human resources and institutions are prerequisites for success.

## REFERENCES

- [1] Arda, M. (2014). Commodities and the Istanbul Programme of Action: The first two years. In LDCIV Monitor, *Istanbul Programme of Action for the LDCs (2011-2020) Monitoring Deliverables, Tracking Progress – Analytical Perspectives* (pp. 195-228). Commonwealth Secretariat, London
- [2] Chen, W., Dollar D., & Heiwai, T. (2015, August). Why is China investing in Africa? Evidence from the firm level. Retrieved on August 25, 2015.  
<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/>

08/why-china-is-investing-in-africa/why-is-china-investing-in-africa.pdf,

- [3] Corruption perceptions index 2014: Results. (n.d.). In *Transparency International*. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from. <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>.
  
- [4] Cortez, A. L., & Arda, M. (2014, September). Global trade rules for supporting development in the post-2015 era. *CDP Background Paper No. 19 (ST/ESA/2014/CDP/19)*, 1-23. Retrieved on August 25, 2015 from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp\\_background\\_papers/bp2014\\_19.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2014_19.pdf).
  
- [5] The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2015). Executive summary. In *Risk and return: Foreign direct investment and the rule of law* (pp. 8-11). London: Hogan Lovells. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from [http://www.biicl.org/documents/626\\_10071\\_d4\\_fdi\\_main\\_report\\_v4\\_-\\_final\\_exec\\_sum\\_only.pdf](http://www.biicl.org/documents/626_10071_d4_fdi_main_report_v4_-_final_exec_sum_only.pdf)
  
- [6] Elms, D. K., & Low, P. (eds.). (2013). *Global value chains in a changing world*. Switzerland: World Trade Organization Secretariat. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/booksp\\_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13\\_e.pdf](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf).

- [7] *Extractive industries transparency initiative*. (n.d.) Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from <https://eiti.org/>.
- [8] Food and Agriculture Organization. (2013). Part 3: Feed the world. In *Statistical Yearbook 2013* (pp. 123-199). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization August 25, 2015 of the United Nations. Retrieved on August 25, 2015 from <http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3107e/i3107e03.pdf>.
- [9] Lee, M., & Gueye, C. A. (2015, April). Do resource windfalls improve the standard of living in Sub-Saharan African countries? Evidence from a panel of countries. *International Monetary Fund Working Paper* (WP/15/83), 1-38. Retrieved on August 25, 2015 from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1583.pdf>.
- [10] Manson, K. (2015, June 16). Nestlé cuts Africa workforce as middle class growth disappoints. *Financial Times*. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de2aa98e-1360-11e5-ad26-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3kCLexBTi>.
- [11] Rodrik, D. (2005, December). Policies for economic diversification. *CEPAL Review*, 87: 7-23. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from



[http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/11111/87007023I\\_en.pdf?sequence=1](http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/11111/87007023I_en.pdf?sequence=1)

- [12] Rodrik, D. (2015, August 13). Back to fundamentals in emerging markets. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved on August 25, 2015, from <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/emerging-market-growth-by-dani-rodrik-2015-08#r5JKeqIASEkl6yIt.99>.
- [13] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2012). *World investment report 2012: Towards a new generation of investment policies*. Switzerland: United Nations (UNCTAD/WIR/2012).
- [14] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2014a). *World investment report – Investing in the SDGs: An action plan*. Switzerland: United Nations (UNCTAD/WIR/2014)
- [15] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2014b). *UNCTAD handbook of statistics: 2014*. New York: United Nations (TD/STAT.39).
- [16] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2014c). *Economic development in Africa report 2014:*

*Catalysing investment for transformative growth in Africa.*

New York: United Nations

(UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2014).

- [17] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2015). *The state of commodity dependence 2014*. Geneva: United Nations (UNCTAD/SUC/2014/7).
- [18] United Nations Development Program. (2013). *Human development report 2013 – The rise of the South: Human progress in a diverse world*. New York: United Nations.
- [19] World Bank Group. (2015). *Doing business 2015: Going beyond efficiency*. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank.



# ***Development as Systems: Systems Frameworks, Sub-Saharan African Development, and Health Systems***

***Catherine LONG<sup>1</sup>***

## **Abstract**

This article provides an introduction to and review of systems frameworks relevant to Sub-Saharan African (SSA) development. These systems frameworks – presented here in the sub-categories of analytical, policy, and programmatic frameworks – are important to development given their conceptualization of systems and emphasis on the complex interactions of the networks and network members that compose those systems. Because systems are context-specific, this article offers the example of health systems and health systems strengthening as the SSA development issue receiving the most systems-oriented attention. Of importance to SSA health systems and systems strengthening is the impact of the HIV/AIDS, SARS, and Ebola crises on the development of the global health system as well as the broad application of systems frameworks in SSA health-based development interventions.

---

<sup>1</sup> *PhD and MPH, Lecturer, Kadir Has University Department of Political Science and Public Administration Faculty, Kadir Has University Middle East and African Research Center (MARC). Email: catherine.long@khas.edu.tr*

**Keywords:** *Systems Frameworks, Health Systems Strengthening, Development, Sub-Saharan Africa, Networks, Ebola*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The following article, which served as the basis of a May 2015 presentation made to the Aydin University *International Conference on Africa* panel “Global and Regional Powers’ African Policies,” introduces systems-based analytical, policy, and programmatic frameworks that have yet to be sufficiently applied to development models, policies, and programs. The systems approach to development re-orientes traditional assessments relevant to global and regional powers’ Sub-Saharan African (SSA) policies. These traditional assessments generally fall into the following categories: cross-sectional or longitudinal assessments of bilateral SSA relationships; comparative assessments of types and eras of engagement including “traditional” north-south versus “new” south-south variants; comparative or critical assessments of vertical or top-down versus decentralized or bottom-up interventions; case-based assessments of international financial institutions (IFIs) and other international organizations’ engagement; technical assessments of SSA development funding mechanisms; and longitudinal assessments of applied and failed regional development theories and models. Although these assessments offer valuable contributions to development studies, this article focuses on systems frameworks that crosscut and compliment each of them. These frameworks – categorized here as complimentary analytical, policy, and programmatic systems frameworks – are ideal for theoretical

development studies and applied development interventions given their emphasis on dynamic complexity and change.

This article applies health systems strengthening (HSS) to exemplify systems frameworks' potential given the extensive variation between individual systems, systems' interactions, and SSA states' contextual development needs. Important to the HSS example of systems frameworks is the 2013-2015 West African outbreak of the Ebola virus disease (EVD).<sup>2</sup> The recent West African EVD outbreaks demonstrates the following: 1. the relationship of highly virulent transnational diseases' to post-domestic social, political, and economic systems as well as global health systems strategies; and 2. the challenging dynamics of such diseases' epidemiological and transmission traits, defined here as its pathogenic system.

The article begins by introducing the Social Science contribution of systems theory and its embodiment in analytic, policy, and programmatic frameworks. It follows with an overview of HSS, its relationship to development, and its SSA regional evolution. It also identifies the role played by HIV/AIDS, SARS, and West African EVD in global as well as SSA health systems. It concludes with a cursory

---

<sup>2</sup> *The World Health Organization defines EVD, a hemorrhagic fever, as an "acute, serious illness" first recognized internationally in the 1970s in an outbreak located close to the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Ebola River. EVD is transmitted by means of physical contact with various bodily secretions (blood, saliva, etc.) shed by those infected with the virus following its onset. The current West African outbreak is the first in the sub-region and represents the "largest and most complex" instance of EVD. For more on EVD, see: ("Ebola Virus Disease," 2015).*

review of the high-level strengths and limitations of development-oriented systems frameworks.

## **INTRODUCING THE SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT**

The article derives its interpretation of systems frameworks from systems theory's inter-disciplinary Social Science application. This application offers a means of capturing complex interactions within and between what is defined as systems structures and their component members. At a very high level, the Social Science application of systems theory addresses the overarching nature of systems exemplified by multi-agent or complex adaptive systems (MASs and CASs, respectively). This article generally applies CASs given their development-relevant recognition of systems as doing the following: 1. maintaining unique aggregate operations; 2. exhibiting constant yet somewhat unpredictable iterative change premised on internal and external stimuli such as programmatic interventions; 3. containing interconnected networks with linkages of varying distance, depth, and breadth; and 4. maintaining internal self-organization influenced by external or contextual factors such as financial dependence (Adam, 2014, p. 50; Holland, 1995; Scott, 2008; and Seybolt, 2009). Systems' more general characteristics may be generalized by Alter and Hage's (1993, as cited in Seybolt, 2009) itemized traits of size, complexity, stability, connectivity, and centrality. These characteristics' emphases on interactions are relevant to development because they suggest a means of achieving change "by adjusting the system to better suit its

environment” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1028) or vice-versa. Technical methods related to tracing, weighing, and predicting systems structures and their related members, inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes include social network theory, concept mapping, or dynamic systems modeling.

Systems themselves are not novel to Political Science or International Relations (IR), even if insufficiently maximized by those addressing development issues. IR applications usually focus on the argument of an international system, such as Jervis’ systems, as a unique aggregate entity composed of “a set of units or elements [that] is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system” (Jervis, 1997, p. 6). The three systems frameworks’ contribution to development applications models is the systems-based recognition that “[e]very intervention, from the simplest to the most complex, has an effect on the overall system, and the overall system has an effect on every intervention” (Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research and WHO, 2009, p. 19).

This recognition speaks to systems frameworks’ conceptualization of power, which is central to Political Science and IR. Specifically, the frameworks emphasize the creation and constant fluctuation of power within and between systems as well as the relative, simultaneous expression of various forms of power within complex intra- and inter-system interactions. This handling of power enables development models, policies, and programs to do the following: 1. address problems



or power dynamics according to complex systems structures and interactions; and 2. identify the appropriate system resources to achieve development interventions' goals while directing the interventions' systemic ripple effects.

The systems-based analytical framework complements development-oriented IR and related Political Science theories. The selected complementary theory is relevant to the given researchers' definitions of systems, the contexts in which they function, the networks or actants they encompass, and the forms of order and authority they maintain. For example, this article's definition of systems frameworks and the application of that definition to HSS offers more analytical power if combined with New Institutionalism, including Discursive New Institutionalism. Its definition of systems portrays them as non-static entities composed of structures and institutions. Structures are complex networks with relationship linkages varying in distance, depth, and breadth. Important for development models and programs, systems frameworks recognize that complex networks constantly change by adding, dropping, or altering the linkage between specific institutions or their included actants. These networks are trans-sectoral and transboundary in nature. Development-related networks include donor-recipient state hierarchical relationships such as north-south or south-south structures; contractual relationships between funding agents and implementing partners; Ministries, Departments, and Agency (MDAs) engaged by or with multiple foreign donor partners (DPs) and local government authorities (LGAs) in centralized or decentralized

structures; or public-private partnership (PPP) service delivery structures. More literal networks include transport or logistics systems. Institutions include formalized actants incorporated into systems' networks such as MDAs, LGAs, DPs, international organizations or regional communities, and established PPPs. Institutions also include development-related norms and regulations.

The systems framework has several different sub-categories, each with its unique contributions to development. Table 1 outlines the three systems frameworks relevant to development theory or models as well as their tangible applications.

These frameworks, given their unique development contributions, should be applied together in a coordinated manner; a systems-based program requires a sophisticated, dynamic systems-oriented development model with supportive policy.

Systems frameworks do not yet dominate SSA regional development models, policies, or programs. That said, the systems concept in itself is an increasingly dominant meme of globalized development discourse. A meme is a discursive concept with coordinative traction and growing communicative legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> The systems meme is gaining legitimacy by means of inclusion in development-oriented norm

---

<sup>3</sup> For more on discursive institutionalism and the role of coordinative (internal discourse among elite) and communicative (public discourse between the elite and the public) discourse, see: (Schmidt, 2005 & 2010).

cascades.<sup>4</sup> The systems meme's relative newness is reflected in ongoing debates regarding how to define, frame engagement of, and measure systems-related development processes and interventions. Despite its newness, this meme signals a future applied emphasis with an increasing inclusion of systems frameworks in development funding, programs and related projects, and even institutional departments.

### **THE HSS MEME AND ITS REGIONAL APPLICATION**

Although the specific concept or framework of systems has only been formally expressed as such in recent decades, those addressing the politics of international public health have engaged with a general systems concept in their identification of a global health system. The concept of the global health system arose before systems frameworks' emergence with sovereign state-driven international health regulations (IHRs). These regulations were premised on dominate trading states' 19<sup>th</sup> Century rational choice calculations regarding trade and national security. States' given IHR approaches changed between the 1950s and 1990s, at which time global powers minimized attention to the trade and security impacts of global health due in part to altered public health priorities and faith in the vaccine and antibiotic revolutions. They also came to define global health as a form of humanitarian concern to be incorporated into development assistance portfolios. With the debt crises beginning in the late 1970s, the global health system was further diminished thanks to the model of the minimized state and funding

---

<sup>4</sup> For example, see: (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1999).

efficiency. By the 1990s, the concept of systems had fallen from health-related development discourse and was replaced by carefully tracked DP funding provided by means of different mechanisms. This left few remnants of the global health system or SSA national and regional health systems.

Major changes have occurred in health systems since 2000. The concept of health systems strengthening (HSS) is now among the most dominant SSA development applications of the systems meme. As defined by Swanson et al., HSS “...is a complex, iterative, and learning process wherein the interactions between actors, structures, services, and subsystems are optimized over time while striving for health systems goals” (2015, p. 6)

They premise this definition on the two overarching health systems characteristics of 1. being “highly contextual and influenced fundamentally by institutional relationships” or networks, and 2. encompassing “people and organizations outside of what is generally thought of as a health system.”

There are a plethora of health systems and HSS definitions. However, this article traces the WHO’s treatment of health systems and HSS given the Organization’s influence over global health development trends. WHO initiated health systems and HSS memes with the 2000 World Health Report (WHR), the Organization’s flagship policy series that sets the global public health agenda and related discourse along

with recommended policies, approaches, and tools. The 2000 Report, *Health Systems: Improving Performance*, complimented the new Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with systems as the formula for the goals' realization. Seven years later, the WHO established a technical HSS framework with the strategy document *Everybody's Business: Strengthening Health Systems to Improve Health Outcomes*. The strategy's timing reflected the mid-point of the MDGs, with the WHO emphasizing its HSS framework as a means of realizing the health-related goals believed least likely to be achieved by 2015. This framework, however, offered contradictory recommendations. The framework defined health systems broadly as "all organizations, people and actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore or maintain health," including those that exercise any influence on health determinants<sup>5</sup> and going beyond "the pyramid of publicly owned facilities that deliver personal health services" (WHO, 2007, p. 2). This framework definition made the health systems difficult to systematically apply, operationalize, or otherwise track and compare. In contrast to this definition, the WHO framework limited the scope of health systems and HSS with its list of health systems components. These components, focused solely on health-related items, were: service delivery; health workforce; information, medical projects, vaccines, and technologies; financing; and leadership and governance or stewardship.

---

<sup>5</sup> *Determinants of health are factors that directly or indirectly affect health conditions, making them difficult to fully capture. In a systems analysis, indirect determinants may include system interactions.*

The WHO continued its health systems emphasis in 2009 with its report *Systems Thinking for Health Systems Strengthening*, followed three years later by the systems financing focus of its WHR. This second Report combined systems with its post-1978 Alma Ata primary care meme of universal health coverage. It also paralleled the general development memes of inclusive growth, financing for development (FfD), and post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Conceptualizations of health systems and HSS, including those of the WHO, contain weaknesses that must be addressed when applying the systems frameworks. First, as with most development models, the application of health systems may be used to support subjective models of “good” health systems. As recognized by the WHO in 2012:

In the last two decades, African governments and the global health community have formulated policies, designed programs and allocated funding for the delivery of health services, health systems strengthening and monitoring of MDG indicators based on their perceptions of the characteristics of a good health system. (WHO, 2012, p. 1)

Although the health systems meme discursively rejects such models given systems frameworks’ context-specific focus, there is still an expectation of “good” or “blueprint” systems.

Second, institutions usually do not maintain a single internal or shared definition of health systems and HSS, even when coordinating on health

systems development projects. Most institutions have not even identified who or what should play a role in such definitions or their operationalization. For example, in 2012, the WHO called its own and related HSS formulations problematic given their failure to incorporate health-systems' end-users (WHO, 2012). In 2014, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), although considered a DP health systems leader, finally committed to establishing a health systems framework for its programs in response to the House of Common's International Development Committee's investigation and subsequent report.<sup>6</sup>

Third, system interactions have yet to be fully understood. This article believes the fundamental weakness of DPs' references to health systems is their oversight of those systems' complex interaction with social, political, and economic systems. Monitoring, evaluating, strengthening, and otherwise changing health systems requires an understanding of this interaction, which is often one of dependence. For example, a health system is affected by the domestic political system's embedded interests and institutions as well as the economic systems' preferred development model. Both characteristics collectively shape public resource allocations and service delivery mechanisms relevant to health systems' inputs, operations, outputs, and outcomes. These interactions have affected regional health systems' trajectories. These trajectories may be traced to the structure of colonial political systems<sup>7</sup> as well as

---

<sup>6</sup> For an example of the IDC's HSS investigations, see: (United Kingdom House of Commons International Development Committee, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> For example, see: (Vaughan, 1991).

decades of changing, externally backed development models. Health systems' historical institutional traits emphasize the role of international development and aid systems. Least Developed Country (LDC) recipient states' health systems are frequently inefficient and/or ineffective due in part to their relationship with multiple external interventions and development models. Given these collective external and internal influences, SSA states' health systems were so weakened by the 1980s and 1990s that they could not prevent what became the regional HIV/AIDS crisis. This crisis, which exhibited negative iterative effects on regional systems of all forms, raised questions regarding why developing states' health systems were so vulnerable to the virus' pathogenic system and suggested the need to identify the inter-systemic transnational characteristics of pathogenic system itself and the health systems it affected.

SSA's crisis did prompt a degree of systems-based health responses, even by the large-scale vertical programs and global health initiatives (GHIs) created in response to the virus. One such program was the American Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) established by President George W. Bush in least developed and developing states with high HIV/AIDS morbidity and mortality rates. PEPFAR, representing one of history's largest vertical initiatives addressing a single disease, adopted certain systems-based approaches after a few years of iterative institutional learning. This adoption reflected the growing need to integrate HIV diagnosis and prevention, in addition to lifelong ARV treatment, into every aspect of the health



system. Unfortunately, PEPFAR and GHIs undermined the broader development of systems frameworks and responses. First, PEPFAR and other GHIs were vertical in nature. Second, they initiated expensive, resource-intensive, lifelong treatment for one specific disease without sufficient consideration of the long-term health systems demands that would remain even when DPs withdrew HIV/AIDS support in favor of a new health priority.

The reorientation of global health system initiated by the SSA HIV/AIDS was not sufficient enough to address the growing systems-based disease threats in time to respond to the 2003 outbreak of SARS. As stated by the Institute of Medicine's *Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, before SARS, the world faced "perfect [microbial] storms" in the form of "[r]epeated convergences of epidemiological, economic, political, and ecological factors that allow pathogens to emerge, spread, root themselves in human societies..." (2003, as cited in Fidler, 2004, p. 21-22).

SARS' emergence highlighted systems-oriented weaknesses that major health actors took into consideration given their interpretation of the syndrome's security threat. It therefore represented what Fidler (2004) defined as the "tipping point" for global health systems reform supported by the WHO and other major health actors. SARS elicited a different systems response than HIV/AIDS due in part to its different pathogenic system, which included the relative immediacy of its health impacts; its rapid, traceable transmission along essential travel and

trade routes; and, controversially, its outbreak in dominant global economies.

## **THE WEST AFRICAN EBOLA OUTBREAK AND SYSTEMS THINKING**

The global fear elicited by the late 2013 West African EVD outbreak, coupled with the inability of leading health institutions individually and collectively – in the form of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) – to check its spread in the three Mano River Union epicenter states, focused international strategic attention on SSA health systems. The WHO, other international organizations, and dominant health and/or SSA DPs (excepting Doctors Without Borders) did not mobilize in response to this outbreak until several months later, approximately mid-2014, despite the post-SARS reorientation of the global health system. Once they did mobilize, health systems and systems strengthening quickly became a dominant meme of the EVD international communicative discourse. For the outbreak states, the question was and remains<sup>8</sup> how to strengthen or even save their health systems given the extent of EVD's negative impact on their already challenged political and economic systems' trajectories. Also at question is the WHO response in terms of incorporating EVD-related lessons into the global health system.

---

<sup>8</sup> This reference is based on the time of writing in August 2015.

This EVD systems discourse represents a potential evolution of global health institutions towards the adoption of the systems frameworks introduced here, along with the sophistication of health systems and health systems thinking. Of greatest importance is this discourse's recognition of the iterative relationship between the development trajectories in the affected West African states and EVD's pathogenic system. The African Development Bank (AfDB) exemplifies this interaction with its US \$300 million contribution to the development of a Mano River Union road-based transport system designed for improved regional infrastructure and trade networks ("One year on," 2015). The World Bank's individual EVD response included specific funding programs and conferences emphasizing systems. This systems support includes its 2014 US \$70 million Health Systems Strengthening and Ebola Preparedness Project for the Ivory Coast as well as the July 2015 International Ebola Recovery Conference. At the Conference, participating institutions committed to "...a new approach which in some fundamental ways demands a paradigm shift in the way we look at health systems strengthening" (Kieny, 2014, p. 83)

The full implications of the referenced HSS paradigm shift have yet to be seen; however, to succeed, it should emphasize inter-system interaction. Similarly, the WHO recognizes EVD's direct economic impact on national fiscal systems, trade-related aversion, and reduced commodity production. Despite this sophistication, a predominance of systems interactions emphasized by DPs or other intervening organizations focuses on those of a direct, explicit nature. Such direct,

explicit systems interactions of EVD-affected states include logistics, public health procurement, sanitation, and human resource administration systems (UNDP, 2014).

UNMEER and other international organizations, including IFIs and AfDB, created a joint EVD recovery strategy in association with relevant regional organizations (the Mano River Union, ECOWAS, and the African Union) following a January 2015 West African exploratory mission and consultative process. This strategy, *Recovering from the Ebola Crisis*, addressed the three epicenter Mano River Union states' political and economic systems in addition to their health systems. The strategy's inter-system premise took into consideration the epicenter states' post-conflict recovery as well as regional and transnational trade networks. The Mano River Union states recognize and may increasingly leverage the inter-relationship and porousness of systems as exemplified by their EVD response strategies such as Liberia's April 2015 Economic Stabilization and Recovery Plan. These strategies, and those of intervening institutions, must be integrated with the states' medium-term and vision-based development strategies as well as political reform and regional integration processes.

Systems development in relationship to the West African EVD outbreak had a critical strategic window in 2014-2015 with which to leverage coordinative and communicative systems discourse for value-added global and SSA health systems development. The continuing crop-up of individual EVD cases revives this leverage yet also signals

the window's closure as attention turns to the Zika outbreak. Importantly, this window fell in a critical discursive development juncture vis-à-vis the coming reframing of the MDGs into the post-2015 SDGs and the ongoing elaboration of FfD. This window was closing at the time of this article's writing in August 2015, especially given the WHO's expectation that the outbreak would be defeated by the close of 2015, after which time health systems memes will be supplemented by those of another health crisis such as Zika ("Chance Ebola can be defeated," 2015).

Use of what remains of this critical but closing window should emphasize systems more generally, not just HSS, with a focus on the continuing development and deepening of regional economic communities; the expansion of regional infrastructure systems exemplified by Power Africa; and growing concern regarding systems-related factors driving SSA migrants, especially Eritrean and Somali, north to Libya and the Mediterranean. This emphasis should also incorporate, if not be premised on, the application of lessons learned from the EVD outbreak to the new health threat – such as Zika – in order to draw sufficient attention to the more fundamental systems concerns. In addition to a closing strategic window, the systems-based EVD response is also challenged by the global health discourse's emphasis on pre-1950 IHR concerns regarding domestic, transnational, and international security and trade. These concerns favor isolationist and other response strategies running counter to the systems frameworks.

## **LIMITATIONS OF THE SYSTEMS FRAMEWORKS**

Systems frameworks represent a tool with which to strengthen development and health development research, policy articulation, and program implementation. For example, researchers may use systems frameworks to move beyond the binary concepts generally applied by development theory and applied models by recognizing systems as “dynamic architectures of [iterative] interactions and synergies” (Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research and WHO, 2009, p. 19). These impacts and synergies not only affect the success of development interventions but also the long-term influence of development interventions on systems’ inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes. Policy makers may use systems frameworks during the policy processes of problem identification, recipient population targeting, response option selection, and policy adoption. The systems framework recommends context-specific over formulaic development programs relevant to existing social, political, and economic systems. It also expands targeted program recipients, application methods, timelines, outputs, and outcomes.

Applications of systems frameworks come with costs, generally related to the time and techniques necessary to strategically leverage the benefits of systems thinking. First, systems identification is highly subjective in terms of defining their boundaries, interactions, and network membership. This subjectivity is due in part to system complexity. Even members of the same system will define the systems of which they are a part in different ways. This subjectivity may even

lead to the manipulation of the systems concept, such as the presentation of the concept as static as opposed to complex and dynamic. In terms of HSS, the WHO has provided “ten steps to systems thinking” to guide systems interventions and intervention assessment as one means of controlling such subjectivity (Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research and WHO, 2009, p. 54).<sup>9</sup> However, such approaches only offer the appearance of limiting subjectivity.

Second, despite the WHO’s attention to health systems, “there is still a dearth in practical guidance on how systems thinking concepts, approaches, and tools can be applied in health systems research and practice to reach sustainable solutions” (Adam, 2014, p. 50). This dearth begins with those institutions – all of which have their particular subjective opinions and interests – that will lead the global and domestic application of the systems frameworks, especially in the cases of development-oriented interventions. The selection of institutions for systems intervention and strengthening in any sector is difficult and highly politicized. Globally, the WHO is positioned to play a unique role for health systems strengthening given its role in establishing and legitimizing global health norms, policies, methods, and metrics as well as its capacity to synthesize and analyze information from multiple sources (WHO, 2007, p. 1). However, many other DPs are developing public health specializations and will therefore expect to play a

---

<sup>9</sup> *Its four steps for systems-based designs are the following: 1. stakeholder interaction, 2. collective brainstorming, 3. effect conceptualization, and 4. adaptation with redesign. Its six steps for evaluation are the following: 1. indicator identification, 2. method selection, 3. design selection, 4. plan development, 5. budget design, and 6. funding identification and allocation.*

dominant role and will shape such a role in ways suited to their own political, social, and economic systems. LDCs, such as the EVD epicenter states, often cannot alter the humanitarian and other technical or service-oriented networks and processes associated with DPs' health systems assistance.

Third and finally, those applying systems frameworks may not necessarily apply them in a simultaneous and carefully orchestrated manner. Specifically, the same institutions may not apply all three primary frameworks – analytical, policy, and programmatic – even in one specific development intervention. This issue application is important because such comprehensive and simultaneous application is necessary to achieve systems-driven development success, including HSS. Often different institutions handle development model, policy, and program creation. DPs, as well as domestic institutions, therefore require a fundamental restructuring of and coordination between their administrative systems.

[insert text about any conflicts of interest or noting that there is no conflict of interest] Nothing in this article presents a conflict of interest in terms of the authors' former or current employers or with the publication's supporting institution.



## REFERENCES

- [1] Adam, T. (2014). Advancing the application of health systems thinking in health. *Health Research Policy and Systems*, 12(50), 1-5. doi: 10.1186/1478-4505-12-50.
- [2] Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research and WHO. (2009). *Systems thinking for health systems strengthening*. France: WHO Press.
- [3] Chance Ebola can be defeated by 2015 WHO chief tells security council. (2015, August 13). In *United Nations*. Retrieved on [January, 2016] from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12006.doc.htm>.
- [4] Ebola virus disease: Fact sheet 103. (2015, April). In *World Health Organization*. Retrieved on [January, 2016] from <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/>.
- [5] Fidler, D. P. (2004). *SARS, governance, and the globalization of disease*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [6] Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.

- [7] Holland, J. H. (1995). *Hidden order: How adaptation builds complexity*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
- [8] Jervis, R. (1997). *Systems effects: Complexity in political and social life*. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press.
- [9] Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). *Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics*. Oxford: UNESCO by Blackwell Publishers.
- [10] Kieny, M. P. (2014, December 12). Ebola and health systems: Now is the time for change. In *World Health Organization*. Retrieved on [January 2016] from <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/commentaries/health-systems-ebola/en/>.
- [11] One year on: AfDB's support of Ebola-affected countries continues. (2015, March 27). In *African Development Bank Group*. Retrieved on [date needed] from <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/one-year-on-afdb-support-of-ebola-affected-countries-continues-14103/>.
- [12] Schmidt, V. A. (2005, June). The role of public discourse in European social democratic reform projects. *European Integration Online Papers*, 9(8), 1-28. [doi needed].

- [13] Schmidt, V. A. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discourse institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism.' *European Political Science Review*, 2(1), 1-25. doi: 10.1017/S175577390999021X.
- [14] Scott, R. J. (Fall, 2008). International development in a complex adaptive system. *PAQ*, 32(3), pp. 339 - 366.
- [15] Seybolt, T. B. (2009). Harmonizing the humanitarian aid network: Adaptive change in a complex system. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53, 1027 - 1050. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00567.x.
- [16] Swanson, R. C., et al. (2015, February 12). Strengthening health systems in low-income countries by enhancing organizational capacities and improving institutions. *Globalization and Health*, 11(5), 1-8. doi: 10.1186/s12992-015-0090-3.
- [17] *The Economic Stabilization and Recovery Plan*. (2015, April). Republic of Liberia: Monrovia. UNDP. (2014, October 24). Ebola virus disease outbreak (EVD) is overstressing the fiscal capacity of governments in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. *UNDP Africa Policy Note*, 1(3), 1-7. Retrieved on [January 2016] from

[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP\\_RBA\\_PolicyNoteonEbolaVol1No3\\_ENG\\_31Octo2014.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/UNDP_RBA_PolicyNoteonEbolaVol1No3_ENG_31Octo2014.pdf).

- [18] United Kingdom House of Commons International Development Committee. (2014, September 2). *Strengthening health systems in developing countries: Fifth report of session 2014-2015*. London: Stationary Office Limited.
  
- [19] Vaughan, M. (1991). *Curing their ills: Colonial power and African illness*. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press.
  
- [20] World Health Organization. (2007). *Everybody's business: Strengthening health systems to improve health outcomes*. Geneva: WHO.
  
- [21] World Health Organization. (2012). *Health systems in Africa: Community perceptions and perspectives*. Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo: WHO Regional Office for Africa.

**Table 1. Framework Categories**

<b>Framework Category</b>	<b>Applicant Source</b>	<b>Description and Purposes</b>
<i>Analytic Framework</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Academics</li> <li>• Development technicians</li> <li>• DPs, including bilateral, regional, and multilateral institutions or other international organizations</li> </ul>	<p>Premised on systems theory’s high-level Social Science applications to assess development processes generally and to evaluate or formulate development models</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Offers a means to identify systems’ unique networks, inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes</li> <li>• Provides a framework for development model analysis</li> </ul>
<i>Policy Framework</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPs and recipients</li> <li>• SSA regional groupings (ECOWAS, the Mano River Union, etc.)</li> </ul>	<p>Applied to reframe or identify policy problems, target populations, policy options, estimated costs and benefits, and policy adoption as well as application</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expands policy scope in terms of identified network linkages, spillover effects, and inter-sectoral considerations</li> <li>• Bridges siloed technical policy decisions</li> <li>• Changes applied policy discourse among policy-making elites (coordinative discourse)</li> </ul>
<i>Program Framework</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPs</li> <li>• MDAs of recipients and DPs</li> <li>• NGOs and other international organizations or implementing partners</li> </ul>	<p>Applied as a programmatic design, management, and stakeholder inclusion tool</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expands the type and number of implementing and recipient stakeholders</li> <li>• Alters programmatic design, inputs, approaches, and surveillance</li> <li>• Reframes targeted outputs and outcomes</li> </ul>

## ***Turkey's Education Diplomacy With Africa***

***Bahar Dilşa KAVALA<sup>1</sup>***

### **Abstract**

The 21st century has witnessed the appearance of new diplomacy practices and non-state players, which has enhanced engagement between societies and shaped state policies by taking into consideration the outlooks and contributions of multiple stakeholders. This article argues that education diplomacy – which can be defined as an approach to develop education policies and achieve educational goals through the involvement of diverse stakeholders – furthers developmental efforts within societies. Within the education diplomacy framework, the article reviews Turkey's recent opening to Africa and the role that education diplomacy can play as a tool in facilitating bilateral economic and humanitarian relations, as well as support of the developmental goals of African countries.

***Keywords:*** *Sub-Saharan Africa, Development, Public Diplomacy, Education Diplomacy, Turkey-Africa Relations*

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD Candidate, Istanbul Aydın University, Africa Application and Research Center, Associate Director, Email: baharkavala@aydin.edu.tr

## **INTRODUCTION**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we are witnessing changes in the landscape of diplomacy, where old and new practices co-exist. Although diplomacy – which is the “representation of a polity vis-à-vis a recognized other” – is still related to states’ relations with the outside world, new state-society links have been established at the global level thanks to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors that are exploring new ways of using states’ diplomatic outreach while interacting with the external world. The study of diplomacy has primarily been concerned with developing typologies rather than theorizing, and the recent changes in the practice of diplomacy have so far been described using terms like para-diplomacy, catalytic diplomacy, triangular diplomacy, etc. (Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2011).

The flexible public diplomacy approach has become the most preferred tool for establishing external relations with other countries and societies in the new century. This approach aims to establish mutual understanding between countries and societies through soft power elements as defined by Nye (2008), such as culture, education, sport, etc. (Signitzer & Wamser, 2006, as cited in Özkan, 2015). Besides states, the main actors of public diplomacy are universities, schools, opinion leaders, media and news agencies, domestic mass media, global business, private sector industry, pressure groups, and supra-state institutions (Özkan, 2015).

Although there is some academic debate as to whether ‘public diplomacy’ is code for ‘propaganda’ (Gregory, 2008) – and though certain cultural diplomacy organizations have tried to distance themselves from the term ‘public diplomacy’ due to discomfort with the advocacy roles and apparent diplomatic objectives implied by the term – ‘public diplomacy’ can also be considered a two-way street where a state or other actors try to enhance engagement between societies and shape states’ own policies, taking into consideration foreign public opinion through a process of mutual influence (Cull, 2010). The tools of public diplomacy, such as education activities, exchange programs, and trainings, offer considerable opportunities for countries to develop mutual understanding and long-term, permanent relations (Özkan, 2015).

Today, besides public and cultural diplomacy, various types of diplomacies are being heralded in the public sphere, such as health diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, science diplomacy, etc. Those approaches use diplomatic tools to realize a positive impact in their respective fields. Education diplomacy has been realized through international education movements such as ‘Education for All,’ which is a commitment by 164 governments to achieve (by 2015) six global goals relating to the learning needs of all children, youth, and adults by working together with development agencies, civil society, and the private sector.



The role played by education in the development of societies is widely recognized, and this article argues that education diplomacy offers an important contribution to bringing together all stakeholders in education cooperation between Turkey and Africa and that it contributes to the achievement of Africa's development goals by developing bilateral relations at various levels.

### **THE COURSE OF TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE LAST DECADE**

The "Opening to Africa Action Plan" of the late 1990s is widely recognized as the starting point of Turkey's interest towards Africa in the modern Republican era. The plan was prepared and launched in 1998 by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was aimed at developing relations with Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries in almost every field, but specifically with regard to economic relations (Altan, 2005).

After the Marmara earthquake in 1999 and the financial crisis in 2001, which delayed the implementation of Turkey's opening to Africa plan, the Under-secretariat of Foreign Trade prepared a "Strategy on the Development of Economic Relations with African Countries" in 2003. Under this strategy, Turkey's share of 1.5 per cent in African countries' total trade volume was to be increased to 3 per cent within three years through support for greater access of Turkish small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) to African markets and the increase of Turkish contracting companies' market share in Africa. Within the framework

of this strategy, high level official visits and trade missions to many SSA countries were organized; bilateral trade agreements were concluded with more than twenty SSA countries by the end of 2004; and the frequency of Joint Economic Commission meetings was increased. Turkish companies attended sixteen trade exhibitions in SSA, seven of which were Turkish export products exhibitions (Altan, 2005).

After the declaration of 2005 as the “Year of Africa” by the Turkish government, mutual high level official visits were organized and new economic and trade agreements were concluded between Turkey and African countries. Then-Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in March 2005, and the African Union accorded observer status to Turkey in the same year.

Turkey became the 25<sup>th</sup> non-African member of the African Development Bank in 2008 and was declared a ‘strategic partner’ of the continent by the African Union. The ‘Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit’ was organized from August 18<sup>th</sup> to the 21<sup>st</sup> in 2008 in Istanbul, and “The Istanbul Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership: Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future” as well as the “Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership” were adopted during this summit. Among other things, these documents declared “[t]he need to consolidate and further expand Africa-Turkey Partnership at all levels and in all fields and to establish between African countries and Turkey a long-term and stable partnership based on equality and mutual

benefit,” and the areas for cooperation were defined as follows: 1) inter-governmental cooperation; 2) trade and investment; 3) agriculture, agribusiness, rural development, water resources management, and SMEs; 4) health; 5) peace and security; 6) infrastructure, energy, and transport; 7) culture, tourism, and education; 8) media, information, and communication technology; and 9) the environment.

In 2014, the “Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit” was organized in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with the participation of many African Heads of State and Government, and the “Declaration and Joint Implementation Plan for the Period of 2015-2019” was adopted at the summit. Under this plan, the total trade and investment volume between Turkey and Africa is intended to be expanded from USD 30 billion in 2013 to USD 50 billion by 2019. To reach this objective, cooperation in the fields of housing, finance, and banking was prioritized, as was the establishment of industrial zones.

This plan declared that “the relations between Turkey and Africa have reached the stage of a mutually reinforced Strategic Partnership building on both Parties policies,” and the areas for cooperation were redefined as follows: 1) institutional cooperation; 2) trade and investment; 3) agriculture, agribusiness, rural development, water resources management, and SMEs 4) health; 5) peace and security; 6) conflict resolution and mediation; 7) migration; 8) infrastructure, energy, mining, and transport; 9) culture, tourism, and education; 10)

media, information, and communication technologies; 11) the environment; and 12) youth and sport.

When we compare the declaration adopted at the end of the Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit with the previous one, we note that conflict resolution and mediation were added in addition to migration and youth and sport. This change reflects the strengthening of the security aspect in bilateral relations. Turkey has increasingly been interested in African conflict zones and has provided personnel and contributed financially to five of the nine UN missions in Africa – MONUSCO/DRC, UNAMID/Darfur, UNMISS/South Sudan, UNOCI/Cote d’Ivoire, and UNMIL/Liberia (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In November 2014, the Turkish Parliament voted for the deployment of peacekeeping troops to UN-approved EU missions in the Central African Republic and Mali. In the first half of 2014, the Turkish navy – which has the seventh highest number of vessels in the world – visited the ports of 28 African countries. Starting in 2009, Turkey has also contributed frigates to the multinational ‘Combined Task Force 151’ led by the U.S. for anti-piracy operations conducted in the Gulf of Aden (Shinn, 2015).

During this period, Turkey has not only developed its relations with the Africa Union but also with regional economic communities in Africa. The Turkish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, was accredited to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2005. Turkey has also become a member of the Intergovernmental Authority

on Development's (IGAD) International Partners Forum. The Turkish Embassy in Daressalaam, Tanzania, was accredited to the East African Community (EAC) in 2010, and the Turkish Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, has been accepted into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Numan Hazar, 2012, as cited in Karagül & Aslan, 2013).

Turkey's enhanced relations with Africa can also be recognized in the number of high-level bilateral visits between Turkey and Africa and the number of new Turkish embassies recently opened on the continent. Then-President Abdullah Gül paid visits to Senegal in 2008; Kenya and Tanzania in 2009; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Nigeria in 2010; and Ghana and Gabon in 2011. Then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia in 2005, 2007, and 2015; Sudan in 2006; Somalia in 2011 and 2015; South Africa in 2011; Gabon, Niger, and Senegal in January 2013; Equatorial Guinea in 2014; Djibouti in 2015; and the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana in 2016. On the other hand, the Presidents of Kenya, Niger, Cameroon, Ghana, Somalia, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Benin, Zanzibar, Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritania, Djibouti, Senegal, and Sudan have visited Turkey ("Yurt Dışı Ziyaretler").

It has also been observed that the number of diplomatic missions between Turkey and Africa have been mutually increased. While Turkey had twelve embassies in Africa in 2002, the number of Turkish embassies in Africa has reached thirty-nine as of 2015. In 2013, with

the opening of the Turkish embassy in Asmara, Eritrea, Turkey became the first country in the world to have ambassadorial representation in all countries of the Horn of Africa (Özkan & Orakçı, 2015). Most African countries with diplomatic representation in Ankara responded to Turkey's new policy only after 2005 (Wheeler, 2011). While South Africa was the only SSA country to have had an embassy in Turkey in 1997, today thirty-two African countries maintain diplomatic missions in Ankara.

Turkey's recent foreign policy towards Africa can be divided into three periods. The adoption of the "Opening to Africa Action Plan" in 1998 until the declaration of 2005 as the "Year of Africa" is considered the first period, during which Turkey concentrated on developing diplomatic infrastructure with Africa. The second period runs from 2005 until 2011, during which Turkey increased its efforts to further relations with Africa and established new embassies in Africa. During this second period and as a result of those efforts, Turkey was declared a strategic partner by the African Union. From 2011 to the present, the third period of relations has been marked by Turkey's active engagement in the Somali food crisis (Özkan et al., 2015).

Turkey's increased focus on Africa can be explained by various factors. From the geo-strategic point of view, it is claimed that the "Great Middle East and North Africa Project" proposed by the U.S. government under by President George W. Bush – with its emphasis on responsible and transparent governance and democracy – attracted the

interest of Turkey in the region. The increase in South-South trade and the demand for raw materials in emerging Turkish and other Asian economies, as well as the global economic recession in Western markets and Turkey's export-oriented economic strategy, are all claimed to be economics-based, external explications (Aybar, 2006; Karagül et al., 2013). Breaking Turkey's perceived isolation and receiving support for major international politics issues (such as Cyprus) in international forums like the United Nations have also been important drivers of Turkey's new policy towards Africa. The newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie that forms the major economic and political basis of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is also seen as one of the actors encouraging the AKP to open up to new markets (Bacık & Afacan, 2013).

Apart from these drivers, Turkey's increasing interest in the African continent is also explained by the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy within global politics as crafted by the then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Aras, 2009). Having "compatible global relations" in foreign policy was considered as one of the basic components of Turkey's new foreign policy (Davutoğlu 2009, as cited in Özkan, 2010), which also explains how Turkey's opening to Africa was not a directional change away from Western world but part of a newly developing, multidimensional foreign policy (Özkan, 2010; Özkan, 2012).

In parallel to Turkey's Opening to Africa and Strategic Partnership policies, Turkey's economic involvement in Africa has deepened. In 1998, Turkey's trade volume was USD 2.9 billion with North Africa and USD 581 million with SSA; in 2005, trade volumes with each sub-region rose to USD 4.1 billion and USD 2.7 billion, respectively; in 2011, USD 10 billion and USD 7 billion, respectively; and as of 2015, USD 11.5 billion and USD 6 billion, respectively. Turkey's investments in Africa have reached USD 6 billion and contracting services undertaken in Africa so far have reached USD 54 billion. Turkish Airlines has expanded its flight network to SSA countries to benefit from growing economic relations – and this expansion in turns has its own facilitating impact on the further increase in economic relations. While Turkish Airlines was flying to six destinations in five SSA countries in 2011 (Genç & Tekin, 2014), Turkish Airlines' Africa network now encompasses forty-eight destinations in thirty-one African countries, with the addition of Port Louis, Mauritius, and Antananarivo, Madagascar, in December 2015 (“Turkish Airlines again expands”). Turkish Airlines' increasing services have also facilitated tourism relations. While the number of people coming from Africa to Turkey for short-term visits/tourism was sixty thousand, this number almost doubled to 111 thousand in 2013. The number of Turkish citizens visiting Africa has also exceeded 116 thousand people.



## **ENHANCING RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND AFRICA AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY EDUCATION**

Although Turkey's economic relations with Africa gained momentum in the last decade and increased especially in terms of trade, investments, and contracting services, Africa's part in Turkey's overall foreign economic relations is still not at a considerable level. Despite the increase in the trade volume between Turkey and Africa, the part of African countries in Turkey's overall foreign trade has not changed considerably but instead fluctuated between 4 and 5 per cent in the last decade. This article argues that closer education relations through education diplomacy efforts could have a catalyzing effect on the development of economic relations and could increase the effectiveness of Turkey's humanitarian efforts as well.

The number of international students in Turkey has increased significantly in line with the global increase in international student mobility, and this number has more than doubled to 48 thousand between 2000 and 2013. According to the Council of Higher Education's statistics, 80 per cent of those students conduct their studies in public universities, whereas 20 per cent are hosted at foundation universities. 34 per cent of international students in Turkey are studying social sciences, business administration, and law, followed by human sciences, literature, and education at 21 per cent. On the list of top twenty countries from which Turkey received international students in 2013/2014, there are only two countries from Africa: Nigeria (11<sup>th</sup>) and

Somalia (20<sup>th</sup>) (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, - Ministry of Development, 2015).

Higher education scholarships granted to African students have become a considerable component of Turkey's aid towards the continent. Turkey's official scholarships granted from public sources have been restructured under the 'Türkiye Scholarships' program, and they are coordinated by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) as of 2012. According to the figures provided by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey granted 1079 scholarships to African students in the 2014/2015 academic year, whereas the total number of African students granted Turkish scholarships between 1991 and 2013 was 3254. 5437 students from African countries are pursuing their studies at Turkish higher education institutions, and Turkish universities are hosting 116 visiting professors and research assistants from those countries ("Turkey-Africa relations").

Scholarships are going to students from nearly all SSA countries, though some of them are better represented than others. In 2011, the Turkish government and private charities arranged scholarships for more than 350 Somalis, to study in Turkey, Sudan, and Egypt. 10 Djibouti students received scholarships from Turkey for the 2012/2013 academic year and 16 in 2013/2014; Sudan received 22 in 2013/2014; and Nigeria received 12 in 2012/2013. Nigerian students were offered 55 scholarships by Turkey between 2008 and 2011, and Kenyan

students were offered 20 annually. It has also been claimed that there were 70 Mozambican students studying in Turkey on scholarships in 2015 (Shinn, 2015).

The aim of scholarships is officially expressed as strengthening relations between countries and transferring experience gained by international students in the host country to their home countries (T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015). In a study conducted with students from Somalia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Guinea, Burundi, and Ethiopia, students expressed that they wanted to come to Turkey because of the underdeveloped status of their home countries, and they aimed to return to their countries and serve their own people after the completion of their studies in Turkey (Gündüz, 2012). In addition to supporting the developmental efforts of African countries, the increase in the number of African students studying in Turkey and the diversification of the fields in which scholarships are provided could accelerate economic relations between Turkey and Africa.

### **The role of education in facilitating bilateral trade relations**

Turkey's trade volume with the African continent was USD 3.7 billion in 2003, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), and it has increased by five times and arrived at USD 17 billion in 2015. While there has been an increase in the overall trade with Africa, Africa's part in Turkey's global trade has only increased from 3 per cent to 5 per cent. North Africa represents 66 per cent of Turkey's trade volume with the continent, whereas SSA represents 34 per cent. Five North African

countries and two SSA countries (South Africa and Nigeria) account for 76 per cent of all of Turkey's trade volume with the African continent. There are five countries (four North African and one SSA) with which Turkey's trade volume is above USD 1 billion. There are two countries (Tunisia and Nigeria) where Turkey's trade volume is between USD 500 million and 1 billion. There are only 13 SSA countries where trade with Turkey is above USD 100 million.

In addition to some structural problems, such as high customs duties in African countries for Turkish goods and high logistics costs, communication problems also play a part in hindering efforts for building partnerships and permanent commercial relations. In addition to English, French, Arabic, and Portuguese, an estimated 2,100 languages are spoken in Africa across its 54 countries. Language barriers may become an issue for Turkish SMEs in both their search for partners and any commercial disputes that may arise, hindering the establishment of permanent trade relations with Africa. At the same time, African students pursuing their studies in Turkey, both in foundation universities and public universities via 'Türkiye scholarships,' are learning Turkish language and culture, and they have a lot to offer for developing bilateral relations.

However, Mr. Tamer Taşkın, Coordinating Chairman of the Turkey-Africa Business Councils in DEİK, confirms the fact that, unfortunately, Turkish and African companies do not currently benefit from the potential provided by African students in Turkey (email to the

author, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2016). Turkish companies should be able to make contacts with those students while they are still continuing their education in Turkey and offer them internships or part-time employment, which would provide opportunities to get to know each other. African students would also obtain professional experience that could allow them to be the future partners for the Turkish business community and contribute to the developmental efforts of their countries by increasing trade relations. If education diplomacy efforts included Turkish private sector organizations in efforts to develop education-based relations with Africa, the distance between the Turkish private sector and international students from African countries in Turkey could be closed.

### **The role of education in facilitating Turkish investments and contracting services in Africa**

The role that international students from African countries in Turkey can play is not limited to the development of relations in trade. Turkish investments and contracting relations with Africa are increasing, and African students can also facilitate those relations, as confirmed by Mrs. Çiğdem Çınar, Deputy Secretary General of the Turkish Contractors Association, whose members' business volume encompasses almost 90 per cent of all international contracting projects undertaken by Turkish companies (email to the author, March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016),.

Turkey's actual investments in Africa are estimated at USD 6 billion, up from very low levels in 2003. Whereas 35 projects amounting to

USD 643 million were undertaken by Turkish contracting companies in 2013, in 2013 the figure rose to 50 projects amounting to USD 3 billion. The total value of 1150 projects undertaken in Africa has so far reached USD 55 billion. These projects represent 21 per cent of Turkey's total volume of global contracting projects, North Africa's portion being 19 per cent of that amount ("Turkey-Africa relations").

The difficulty of hiring a qualified workforce from local sources is one of the biggest problems encountered by Turkish companies doing business in Africa. Often they must bring technical employees from abroad, but again, they are facing difficulties, since most African countries want to promote local employment. In that case, they need to train the local workforce. Ethiopia is one SSA country where Turkish industrial investments are highly concentrated. 238 companies with Turkish capital have been established in Ethiopia so far, and investments from those companies worth USD 1.5 billion have been authorized. These companies have committed to employing 32 thousand people locally for their investments (DEİK, 2014). There are important steps to be taken within the framework of education diplomacy to solve the problems associated with local employment, which might actually be a more cost-effective solution.

### **The role of education in facilitating Turkey's humanitarian activities and development aid in Africa**

In the last decade, Turkey has also expanded its development assistance and humanitarian aid towards Africa (to the tune of USD 240 million

in 2012), and the continent became the second region after Asia in 2012 in terms of those receiving the most official development aid from Turkey. Somalia was among the top 10 countries benefiting from Turkey's official development aid in 2012 and 2013, and it has become the success story of this process, which has made Turkey's humanitarian aid impact in Africa more visible (Haşimi, 2014). Humanitarianism has become the main approach and official discourse since the beginning of Turkey's involvement in Somalia during the 2011 food security crises. This humanitarian approach has included a development aid aspect in addition to emergency aid, which helped Turkey become a leading international figure in Somalia, with a high sensitivity towards the country shown by the general Turkish public, the ruling and opposition parties, and the NGO community. Turkey's developmental and humanitarian projects have so far resulted in approximately USD 500 million aid to Somalia (Özkan et al., 2015).

Turkey's humanitarian approach has mainly been implemented through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), which maintains overseas coordination offices in 48 countries, 14 of them being in Africa. TİKA coordinates development projects in 26 African countries. In 2013, Africa was the largest beneficiary of assistance from TİKA and ranked first at 33.7 per cent of TİKA's total aid disbursement, with 525 projects in the areas of water and sanitation, health, administrative and civil infrastructure, economic infrastructure, agriculture and livestock, production sectors, education, and other

social infrastructure and services (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013).

The health sector has become one of the pioneering areas of Turkey's humanitarian aid. Turkey has concluded bilateral agreements in healthcare with almost 20 African countries. 21,600 patients have received operations under the 'Africa Cataract Project,' which was implemented in four African countries: Niger, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The Turkish-Sudanese Research and Training Hospital was constructed and completed by TİKA in Nyala in 2014; and Digfer Hospital, the biggest hospital in Mogadishu, was opened in January 2015 during the visit of President Erdoğan. Turkey has also contributed to the Education Hospital in Juba, South Sudan, and the Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ("Turkey-Africa relations").

The Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), which acts as a humanitarian agency in more than one hundred countries, has also been active in certain SSA countries. Red Crescent has supported a refugee camp for 15,000 people in Somalia (Özkan et al., 2015); opened a modern pharmacy at a hospital in N'Djamena, Chad; established a field hospital in Darfur, Sudan, in 2006; and organized a large national aid campaign for Somalia in 2011 (Shinn, 2015).

An important link between the education and humanitarian sectors was asserted during the meeting on 'Education Diplomacy with Africa' organized by Istanbul Aydın University's Africa Application and



Research Center (AFRİKAM) on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015. It was claimed that there is a considerable need for local manpower with regard to Red Crescent's activities. The scholarships provided by YTB and the language education activities of the Yunus Emre Institute are considered highly crucial for increasing the Turkish-speaking local manpower capacity in Africa, which would aid the humanitarian activities carried out by Turkish actors.

### **THE ROLE OF EDUCATION DIPLOMACY IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN AFRICA**

There are some critical sustainability challenges that affect the African continent's development efforts, such as the impacts of climate change; deforestation; the over-exploitation of resources; the deterioration of marine and coastal ecosystems and water quality issues; problems of poverty; food insecurity; wars and violence; HIV/AIDS, environmentally related diseases; drought; and water purity and sanitation (GUNI, IAU & AAU, 2011). Except for Mauritius, the Seychelles, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya – which are considered countries with high human development, according to the 2015 UNDP Human Development Index – and 10 other African countries with medium human development, most African countries are qualified as the countries with low human development (UNDP, 2015). In order to overcome threats to development and benefit from development opportunities and rich natural resources in a sustainable way, enhancing human capacity and skills is essential for Africa.

The Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, headed by Jacques Delors, emphasized that education can help to “foster a deeper and more harmonious form of human development and thereby to reduce poverty, exclusion, ignorance, oppression and war” (UNESCO, 1996, p. 13). Human capacity building is considered one of the most important challenges for the sustainable development of countries in the South. For that reason, higher education is considered a significant factor in the development process of Africa, and the African Union has started an initiative to revitalize higher education in Africa to support the continent’s development efforts (GUNI, IAU & AAU, 2011).

Developing education relations between Turkey and Africa will not only enhance bilateral economic relations but also support the developmental goals of Africa. This development dimension of relations in the field of education is increasingly becoming a concern. During the Working Luncheon on Education Diplomacy with Africa organized by AFRİKAM and DEİK, Ambassadors from African countries claimed that the selection of African students for scholarships to study in Turkey was not always in line with the national development priorities of African countries, or in areas that are of strategic importance to those countries. Most African countries have National Development Plans that identify critical areas for skills development, particularly in key areas such as construction and medicine. In order to organize education for African students in Turkey so as to best support Africa in achieving its development goals, such national plans should

be examined and scholarship granting bodies should match the critical areas in which they grant scholarships with skills shortages in Africa and areas of academic strength in Turkey (AFRIKAM, 2015).

When we go through the national development plans of SSA countries in which Turkey maintains diplomatic representation, the following key areas (as shown in Table 1) are identified as providing the potential to support the development efforts of Africa through scholarships for education in Turkey: 1) agriculture, aquaculture, and fisheries; 2) civil engineering; 3) electronics; 4) energy systems engineering; 5) food engineering; 6) information and communication technology; 7) logistics and transportation; 8) medicine; 9) metallurgy, mining and metallurgical engineering; 10) textile engineering; and 11) tourism.

### **AREAS OF COOPERATION IN EDUCATION THAT CAN BE DEVELOPED THROUGH EDUCATION DIPLOMACY**

The following are identified as the most common problems encountered by students from Africa in Turkey: 1) learning a new language and communication problems; 2) lack of information for applications to Turkish scholarships; 3) delays in getting visas for travel, especially for the citizens of African countries where there is no Turkish diplomatic representation; 4) crowded dormitories; 5) inadequate welcome information and orientation programs; 6) complicated bureaucratic processes; 7) lack of English speaking officials; and 8) insufficient TÖMER education programs for Turkish language instruction (Gündüz, 2012).

These problems should be addressed within education diplomacy forums that can bring together various stakeholders in education relations between Turkey and Africa. There is a need to establish a multi-stakeholder mechanism in Turkey for following up on problems in existing education relations and developing solutions accordingly. Already existing Joint Economic Commission mechanisms can be expanded so as to include universities and other non-state actors that could play a role in developing education relations, and they can be used as one forum for education diplomacy with Africa. This forum could be used to establish mechanisms for accelerating mutual recognition of diplomas and qualifications, which is also an important component of ensuring that African students studying in Turkey practice the valuable skills they earned during their studies in a way that furthers progress on the development goals of their countries.

Scholarships provided by Turkey to African students should take into consideration the developmental goals of each African country as identified in their national development plans or strategies, and African students pursuing their studies in Turkey should also be provided greater opportunities to connect with the Turkish business community, so as to benefit from internship or part-time employment within the context of projects to be developed by universities and private sector organizations.

## REFERENCES

- [1] Africa Application and Research Center (AFRİKAM), (2015), *Final Report of the Working Luncheon on Education Diplomacy with Africa*. Istanbul: Istanbul Aydın University.
- [2] Altan, C. (2005). Afrika ülkeleriyle ekonomik ve ticari ilişkilerimiz. *Uluslararası Ekonomik Sorunlar Dergisi*, 17, 1-20.
- [3] Aybar, S. (2006, February 1). Yeni Türk-Afrika ekonomik ilişkileri ve eski engelleyici söylem: Afro-pesimizim. In *Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*. Retrieved on [February, 2016], from [http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/4093/yeni\\_turk-afrika\\_ekonomik\\_iliskileri\\_ve\\_eski\\_engelleyici\\_soylem\\_afro-pesimizim](http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/4093/yeni_turk-afrika_ekonomik_iliskileri_ve_eski_engelleyici_soylem_afro-pesimizim).
- [4] Bacık, G., & Afacan, I. (2013). Turkey discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The critical role of agents in the construction of Turkish foreign-policy discourse. *Turkish Studies*, 14(3), 483-502. doi: 10.1080/14683849.2013.832040.
- [5] Cull, N. J. (2010). Public diplomacy: Seven lessons for its future from its past. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 6(1), 11-17. doi: 10.1057/pb.2010.4

- [6] Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu (DEİK). (2014). DEİK Ülke Özel Yayınları: Afrika, 63.
- [7] Genç, S., & Tekin, O. (2014). Turkey's increased engagement in Africa: The potential, limits and future perspectives of relations. *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, 7(1), 87-115.
- [8] Gregory, B. (2008). Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 274-290. doi: 10.1177/0002716207311723.
- [9] GUNI, IAU, & AAU. (2011). *The promotion of sustainable development by higher education institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Survey report*.
- [10] Gündüz, O. (2012). Uluslararası burslu öğrencilerin Türkiye'de eğitim görme beklentileri ve kariyer hedefleri: Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı uzmanlık tezi.
- [11] Haşimi, C. (2014). Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and development cooperation. *Insight Turkey*, 16(1), 127-145.

- [12] The Istanbul declaration on Africa-Turkey partnership: Solidarity and partnership for a common future. (2008). In *ISS Resource Centre*. Retrieved on January 12, 2016, from <https://www.issafrika.org/uploads/TURKEYAFRIDECAUG08.PDF>.
- [13] Karagül, S. & Aslan, İ. (2013). Türkiye'nin Afrika açılım politikası: Tarihsel arka plan, stratejik ortaklık ve geleceği. *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, 9(35), 21-55.
- [14] Nye, Jr., J. S. (2008). Public dipomacy and soft power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 94-109. doi: 10.1177/0002716207311699.
- [15] Özkan, A. (2015). Strategic practices of public diplomacy policies in educational field and Turkey's potential for cultural diplomacy. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 176, 35-43. doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.01.441.
- [16] Özkan, M. (2012). A new actor or passer-by? The political economy of Turkey's engagement with Africa. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 14(1), 113-133. doi: 10.1080/19448953.2012.656968.

- [17] Özkan, M. (2010). What drives Turkey's involvement in Africa? *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(126), 533-540. doi: 10.1080/03056244.2010.530952.
- [18] Özkan, M., & Orakçı, S. (2015). Viewpoint: Turkey as a "political" actor in Africa – an assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9(2), 343–352. doi: 10.1080/17531055.2015.1042629.
- [19] Yurt dışı ziyaretler. (n.d.). In *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı*. Retrieved on [2016], from [www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/yurtdisiziyaretler/](http://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/yurtdisiziyaretler/).
- [20] Sending, O. J., Pouliot, V., & Neumann, I. B. (2011). The future of diplomacy: Changing practices, evolving relationships. *International Journal*, 66(3), 527-542.
- [21] Shinn, D. (2015). *Turkey's engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: Shifting alliances and strategic diversification*. London: Chatham House.
- [22] T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı: Kalkınma Araştırmaları Merkezi. (2015) *Yükseköğretimin uluslararasılaşması çerçevesinde Türk üniversitelerinin uluslararası öğrenciler için çekim merkezi haline getirilmesi: Araştırma projesi raporu*. Ankara: Türk Cumhuriyeti.



- [23] Turkey-Africa relations. (n.d.). In *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved on [date needed], from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.
- [24] Turkish Airlines again expands its network. (2015, December 15). In *Turkish Airlines*. Retrieved on [2016], from <http://www.turkishairlines.com/en-int/corporate/press-room/press-releases/press-release-detail/turkish-airlines-again-expands-its-network-661>.
- [25] Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. (2013). *Annual Report 2013*. Ankara: Government of the Republic of Turkey.
- [26] United Nations Development Program. (2015). *Human development report 2015: Work for human development*. New York: United Nations.
- [27] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (1996). *Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century – Learning: The treasure within*. Paris: UNESCO.
- [28] Wheeler, T. (2011). Ankara to Africa: Turkey's outreach since 2005. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 18(1), 43-62. doi: 10.1080/10220461.2011.564426.





# ***Political Violence and Terrorism: Insight Into Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram***

***Özüm Sezin UZUN<sup>1</sup>***

***Yusuf Saheed ADEGBOYEGA<sup>2</sup>***

## **Abstract**

The aim of this article is to examine the nexus between the following: 1) the political violence and terrorism practiced by Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria, and 2) the governance of Nigeria. The article focuses on the historical trend of political violence since the amalgamation of the country and the impacts of terrorism. Before Nigerian independence, the country was organized by colonial powers under a protectorate system of both Northern and Southern regions, with people of different tribes and cultures living under different patterns of administrative governance. In 1914, colonial powers amalgamated the regions into one state, aiming for an easier administrative system. After amalgamation, a movement for self-governance emerged among the peoples of the newly united regions, though the only thing that both protectorates shared peacefully was the name of the country: Nigeria. The subsequent struggle for ethnic supremacy and the incidence of regional disparity, among other factors,

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Aydın University.

<sup>2</sup> MA Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Aydın University.

have stymied chances for sustained and formidable national unity, even after independence in the 1960s. Hence, this article considers the political amalgamation of Nigeria, the impact of amalgamation on the country's various ethnic groups, and its impact on the violent movements in the Northern and Southern regions. This article aims to understand the roots of modern terrorism (in the forms of the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency) in Nigeria and its impact on modern society, as well as provide possible recommendations for how to effectively address the country's myriad terrorist movements at the national and international levels.

**Keywords:** *Political Violence, Niger Delta, Boko Haram, Terrorism, Nigeria.*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Nigeria as an independent nation was formed out of separate Northern and Southern regions amalgamated in 1914 by colonial powers. After the formal amalgamation process, the peoples of the two regions united to embark on a struggle for independence. As Obasanjo (1981) stated, "The only point on which Nigerian political leaders spoke with one voice was for the granting of political independence by the British – and even then they did not agree on the timing". After Nigeria won its independence, however, the differences in regional identities were reawakened, fueling a struggle for political leadership in both regions and threatening the unity of the nation.

In retrospect, it can be said that this long-standing struggle for political leadership has transformed in the last decade into a national act of terrorism in the forms of militancy in the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram insurgency. This article aims to examine the roots and impacts of the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency through the context of historical developments in Nigeria, focusing on socio-economic, religious, cultural, and ethnic factors.

## **THE SEEDS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA**

Like many other African nations, Nigeria was divided into provinces by former colonial powers. Numerous independent and sometimes hostile regional protectorates exhibiting considerable linguistic and cultural diversity existed until 1900, when Frederick Lugard, the high commissioner administering the British colony, initiated a movement to unite the regions for ease of administration. By 1914, the Northern and Southern protectorates were amalgamated into the single unit of Nigeria. Since the amalgamation and even after independence from the British in the 1960s, the only thing that both protectorates have ever truly shared is the country's name. Both protectorates have maintained their previous ethnic, cultural, and administrative attributes, a fact that presents one of the many serious challenges to Nigeria's national unity.

Following amalgamation, Sir Hugh Clifford – who served as Governor General between 1920 and 1931 – described Nigeria at the 1920 Nigeria Council debates in Lagos as “a collection of independent Native States,

separated from one another by great distances, by differences of history and traditions and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers” (Atofarati, 1992, p. 3).

Even at that time, it was recognized that though colonial powers had succeeded in uniting the regions, the predominant ethnic divisions within the regions remained the same. To this day, the relatively unchanged ethnic makeup of the amalgamated regions continues to dominate daily life, hindering the regions’ abilities to live as a unified state within which the tolerance of ethnic diversity is essential. The predominant ethnic groups are the following: the Igbo, which form approximately 60 or 70 per cent of the population in the southeast; the Hausa-Fulani, which form approximately 65 per cent of the population in the northern region; and the Yoruba, which form approximately 75 per cent of the population in the southwest. Recognizing this ethnic diversity is essential in order to understand both the challenges to and necessity of consolidating the national unity (Frainc, 2014, p. 2).

Sir Hugu Clifford’s observation in 1920 aimed to increase political awareness of remaining divisions so as to help consolidate Nigerian unity. In recognition of this development, a constitution was enacted in 1922 that allowed elected members from different regions to sit on a Nigerian legislative council, even though the constitution did not endow them with full legislative powers in the Northern region. Being the first constitution to sensitize the people politically, it embodied the principle of governance of the country until 1940. In 1940, Nigeria was divided

into four administrative units. Under this system, the Lagos colony was granted the right to exist in the Northern, Eastern, and Western provinces. This administrative division, which increased power for the colony and the provinces, deepened a sense of separateness among the provinces. Following this, “the constitution established an Executive Council to advise the governor until 1943 that the first two unofficial Africans were appointed into the Executive Council” (Okonkwo, 1962, p. 211).

In 1946, Sir Arthur Richardson's Constitution inaugurated Nigeria's regionalism, by which the North and the South were legislatively integrated. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties, which represented the Southern region of the country, were at the forefront of the fight for independence from Britain.

By the time Macpherson's Constitution inaugurated a quasi-federal structure for the country in 1951, Nigeria was experiencing a robust struggle for self-governance. The leaders of the Northern part preferred the perpetuation of British rule because they thought that independence would bring more political and economic domination by the Westernized elites in the South. Therefore, for the first time, the North started to mention explicitly the possibility of secession rather than enduring what they perceived as humiliation and mistreatment by the rest of the country.



The 1951 constitution ushered in the formation of new political parties, but it was criticized for the following shortcomings: 1) the granting of an electoral franchise limited by economic status and sex; 2) the enactment of an electoral process into the Federal Legislative Council that was deemed to be unsatisfactory by some politicians; and 3) a further deepening of the ethnic gap in the country that the constitution was perceived to have caused. Hence, the political parties created under this constitution, such as the Action Group and Northern People Congress, were forged along ethnic lines, which eventually rendered strengthened and sustained national unity impossible.

In 1954, Lyttelton's Constitution provided greater representation and decision-making authority to the people of Nigeria, as the people were already strongly agitating for self-government following a 1953 movement for a motion of self-government that was led by a member of the House of Representatives, Chief Anthony Enahoro of the Action Group Party. By 1956, the movement had led to a crisis on the floor of the House as the Northern delegates opposed the movement on the grounds that the Northern delegates were unprepared for such sudden decision. Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was the leader of the NPC (Northern People's Congress) – which was a Northern regional party in the House – proposed a resolution on other challenges within the country before the motion for self-government, as the Northerners were worried that they would be marginalized by the more educated Southerners after independence. Based on this proposition, various demands were granted, such as the designation of Lagos as Federal Territory and the

creation of a national government recognizing Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the Prime Minister. “The leader of the NPC...in the House, Sir Ahmadu Bello proposed that the date 1956 should be substituted with ‘as practicable as possible’” (Olusanya, 1980, p. 536). Finally, the 1954 constitution confirmed and formalized the wishes of Nigerian leaders to move and remain as far apart as they possibly could by realizing the desire for self-government. Thereafter things developed quickly in the political arena, as there followed various constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960, finally culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1960.

Despite gaining independence, Nigeria remained like a state without unity, a society of 300 ethnic and cultural groups whose differences and grievances endured after independence. Although the Independence Constitution emphasized the civil and political rights of the people and adopted a federal structure with the intent to provide representation to each region, serious challenges to the unity of the nation started to emerge from the regional parties. The power struggles among the different ethnic groups inevitably transformed into ethnic-sponsored violence.

The growing violence led to the end of the first civilian rule (designated as the First Republic) by a military coup in 1966, which was followed by a counter-coup that resulted in a civil war between 1967 and 1970. Although the parties of the civil war reached a ceasefire in 1970, the psychological trauma among Nigerian society remained. By 1979, the

country returned to civilian rule and a new constitution was adopted. The 1979 Constitution reaffirmed civil and political rights through recognition of the rights to life, liberty, and human dignity. Despite recognition of these rights, the Second Republic held a poor record with regard to protection of them. Therefore, a power struggle among regional parties once again emerged between 1979 and 1983. Another military coup ushered in military rule lasting until 1999.

When the new civilian leader, President Olusegun Obasanjo, took power in 1999, he promised to reduce the military's influence and establish democracy. However, some marginalized regional groups that did not support the ruling administration became involved in criminal activities – such as promoting illicit flows of money, arms, and drugs – that later turned into terrorist activities. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the seeds of the current political violence and terrorism in Nigeria lie in the country's political history. It seems that political violence and terrorism in Nigeria are a part of the political struggles of opposing ethnic groups, which intend to dominate each other rather than live together in a united society. However, there are other factors behind the current political violence and terrorism in Nigeria that also need to be understood.

## **UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA**

Political violence and acts of terrorism are not a new phenomenon in world history; however, the magnitude of terrorist attacks around the

world has increased recently. Moreover, there has been an increase in regional political consciousness among ethnic groups, leading to challenges against current nation states, especially those that were formally colonized. In the case of Nigeria, the quest for political supremacy by religious, cultural, and ethnic groups throughout the country, which has intensified after independence, is the major current challenge to the country's national security. Even though 'national security' is a contested term – asking questions like 'security for whom' and 'which values' – it is at least certain that it aims to protect the territorial integrity and national social values. Therefore, the Nigerian government is initially expected to protect its citizens' right to life and property and ensure a balance in socio-economic life in order to promote reconciliation and harmony within a heterogeneous country. However, these expectations have not been realized, and Nigeria has become the 7<sup>th</sup> most terrorized country in the world (Osundefender, 2013, p: 1-2).

Like the term 'national security,' the term 'terrorism' is also contested. Although it is commonly defined as a violent act carried out with the aim of realizing a political objective by creating terror in a society, different approaches have made the identification of terrorism and terrorists in the real world more complicated. This controversial point is observed in the Nigerian case.

## **The Niger Delta Militant Groups**

The Niger Delta Militant groups are recognized terrorist groups in the southeastern part of Nigeria. Following the insensitivity of the government to their outcry after the crackdown on law and order in the late 1990s, their actions eventually escalated into a different dimension of violence, such as kidnapping national and international oil workers and destroying oil facilities and installations in the hope of gaining autonomy and self-control of the oil resources of the region. Since 1998, their violent actions have become known throughout the country, and their region has been labeled as “a lawless zone, where youths disrupt oil production activities in the region and the communities are frequently being engaged with conflicts and provocation, in destructive inter-and intra-community strife” (Niger-Delta Development Commission [NDDC], 2004).

Over time, the media has broadcast the deadly attacks of their terrorist actions in order to sensitize the general populace to the danger in the region. For instance, on July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2006, *The Punch* newspaper reported that combatants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) had killed four naval personnel and injured three soldiers who were escorting a Chevron oil tanker along the Chomoni Creeks in the Warri South Local Government Area of Delta State in the Southern part of the Nigeria. From April 18<sup>th</sup> to the 24<sup>th</sup> in 2007, *The Midweek Telegraph* also reported an attack on the Mini-Okoro, Elelenwo Police Station that left many police officers dead. In addition, on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008, the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by

Ateke Tom was reported to have attacked a police station and a five star hotel in Port Harcourt in River State. It was also reported that the MEND group carried out an attack at Eagle Square in Abuja on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010 during the nation's celebration of 50 years of independence.

In addition to deadly attacks, hostage taking and kidnapping with the purpose to demand ransoms have also been identified as components of their terrorist activities. "Between 2006 and 2009, there have been records of over 700s kidnapping cases" (Francis et al., 2011, p. 65). All of the public broadcasts of their successful attacks by the media and the fear incited by them have led to the emergence of many other militant groups, like the "Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade, among others" (Ogbonnaya et al., 2001, p. 6). All these new groups have spread across other parts of the Southern region, like Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom, and River State. The spread has led to the shut down of oil production in the area and an increase in violence, including the killing of oil workers and civil servants and the damaging of governmental and non-governmental properties alike.

Despite terrorizing the country, the Niger Delta Militant groups headed by the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) have termed their actions as a call to the government to recognize and address the injustice and deprivation in the region. According to Onduku (2002), the IYC is the peoples'

organization at the forefront of the struggle for resource control and environmental justice in the Niger Delta. It was formed on December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1998, with the issuance of the Kaiama Declaration, which emphasized the unabated environmental damage resulting from the uncontrolled exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas. The region has seen numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening up of forests to loggers, indiscriminate canalization, flooding, land subsistence, coastal erosion, earth tremors, etc., due to this exploration and exploitation.

These environmental disasters have been the driving force behind the aggravated terrorist actions of the militant groups, which accuse the government and oil companies (such as Shell and Chevron) of benefiting from the oil resources of the region without responding to the demands of the people in the region. It has been claimed that the activities of the oil companies have reduced the productivity of the land; thus, the region's communities have demanded robust social and infrastructural support from the government. As a result of this exploitation and the resulting environmental conditions, it has been argued that the hopeless youth of the region are being forced to take part in asymmetric warfare against the state in order to gain their political, economic, and social demands.

### **Boko Haram**

Boko Haram, as another terrorist group from the Northern part of the country, became stronger when the activities of the Niger Delta militant

groups decreased. The name ‘Boko Haram,’ “is derived from a combination of the Hausa word, boko (book), and the Arabic word, haram (forbidden). Put together, Boko Haram means ‘Western education is forbidden’” (Agbibo, 2014, p. 1). In that respect, the impact of globalization on Nigeria and the introduction of the Western type of education to Nigeria are seen by some as sufficient reason to pursue terrorist activities. The leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, criticized the process of globalization in an interview with BBC, stating “Western style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our believe in Islam,” and also argued that the country was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it into a “Kaffir” (infidel) land (Agbibo, 2014).

Through the capture of the founder of the group, Mohammed Yusuf, the attacks temporarily stopped. When the attacks started again, a change in both the organizational structure and modus operandi of the group was observed. Boko Haram had divided into multiple cells that were ruled by different, anonymous leaders, and the cells started to use different strategies and tactics, including suicide bombings and the targeting of all institutions represented by the national government, as well as the UN offices. In 2011, Abu Kakah, a spokesman of the group, stated, “We are responsible for the bomb attack carried out on the U.N. building in Abuja,” mentioning their standing view in opposition to Western education (CITATION NEEDED, and put it in the References section). They also started using highly sophisticated weapons, which raised suspicions of possible links with international terrorist groups



like Al-Qaeda. They began to conduct more provocative attacks, aiming to destabilize the unity of the nation. In addition, the group has been attempting to expand its influence into new areas such as Mubi in Yola, Baga in Borno, Potiskum in Yobe, and Malari and Sambisa in Maiduguri. They have also expanded operations in areas where they had already conducted attacks, namely Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Madalla (in Niger State), and Abuja. In these operations, thousands of policemen, soldiers, and civilians have lost their lives, and millions of people have been forced to flee their homes.

According to Agbibo (2014), the group has split into three factions: one that remains moderate and welcomes an end to the violence; another that wants a peace agreement; and a third that refuses to negotiate and wants to implement strict Sharia law across Nigeria. The division into different cells has complicated the attempts of the government to solve this issue peacefully (Nigerian Crime News, 2011). The attacks of Boko Haram have become a direct threat to the whole political system, aiming to create an Islamic state under Sharia law and the leadership of Abubakar Shekarau.

Like the Niger Delta militant groups, Boko Haram has also explained their terrorist acts as an asymmetric action carried out in order to create public awareness of the unfair policies of the government, which have made the region the poorest and the least developed part of the country. According to Siegle (2013), “in fact, a key element of the narrative put forward by Boko Haram is that the government is corrupt, uncaring,

and unrepresentative of interests in the north” (p. 89). It has become widely accepted that government betrayal of trust, political corruption, poverty, and youth unemployment in northern Nigeria (among other factors) have fueled Boko Haram’s activities and resulted in the pledge of loyalty by their supporters. Furthermore, Agbiboa (2014) argued that Boko Haram was symptomatic of what happens when the architecture of state are weighed down and destroyed by corruption.

In fact, it seems that terrorism in Nigeria has become a form of violent activism for the marginalized regional groups who have been demanding better political, economic, and social conditions – demands that have been ignored by the government over the years. In other words, one of the reasons behind the rise in political violence and terrorism in Nigeria has been the discontent of religious and ethnic groups vis-à-vis the policies of the government. It is also certain that economic factors have played an important role in the increase of political violence and terrorism in Nigeria. Oyeniya (2010) mentions that these problems have hindered the government’s ability to fund welfare projects. The impact of these policies ranges from job cuts, high inflation rates, and unemployment to a burgeoning informal sector.

Besides the political and economic factors behind the political violence and terrorism, the alleged support of the government of Nigeria for some groups has been perceived as one of the main factors behind the increase in political violence and terrorism. The Nigerian government has been accused of financing, training, and providing safe havens to

terrorist organizations. For instance, regarding the controversial allegation of Nigerian government involvement in the illegal finance and purchase of armed weapons in 2014, *The Premium Times* published confirmed reports claiming that “[t]he Nigerian government had (...) admitted that it owned the \$9.3 million cash smuggled into South Africa aboard a private jet and seized by the authorities of that country” (Usman, 2014). The acknowledgement of such reports identifies the government as one of the many actors driving violence and terrorism in the country.

### **IMPACTS ON THE NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY**

The ongoing terrorism in Nigeria, both from the Niger Delta militancy and the Boko Haram insurgency, has led to serious challenges in the country. Regarding security considerations, terrorism has been threatening the national unity of Nigeria, as noted by many elites, including the late Chief Gani Fawehinmi, who spoke on the matter in a speech titled “A Call for Genuine Sovereign National Conference: An Alternative to Chaos, Catastrophe and Disintegration” (2000, as cited in Nwaoga et al., 2014). The Boko Haram leader declared total jihad in 2009, stating, “We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western civilisation into the shores of Nigeria” (as cited in Vanguard, 2009, p. 8).

With regard to the economy, the continuation of terrorism and violence will inevitably impede Nigeria’s economic development, weakening

free trade and investment. Moreover, the biggest proportion of the national budget is being spent on security instead of developmental projects, which has invariably slowed down infrastructural development. For instance, in 2012, the Nigerian government planned to spend a considerable 20 per cent of its budget on security – equivalent to the share the U.S. spent on security following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks in 2001. In 2013, this proportion was increased to 27.11 per cent, but in 2014, N845 billion (USD 5.29 billion) was provided for recurrent and service-wide votes for the security sector in Nigeria (Oladimeji et al., 2014, p. 250). The implication is that there will be less spending on power infrastructure, education, and healthcare – among other sectors – as the security sector is already taking up 25 per cent of the national economy.

Last but not least, the image of Nigeria at the international level has certainly been influenced by the increased terrorism and violence. Nigeria is perceived as unsafe by foreign investors and travelers. Nigerian tourism has been negatively affected by this reputation, irrespective of the government's efforts under the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005 to kick start modern tourism in Nigeria. Under this program, potential tourism was “estimated to generate additional gross revenue of US\$224m/N29b” (Francesco, 2006, p. 2).

Regarding reports, governments at both the federal and state levels have made significant efforts at developing the tourism sector unilaterally

and in certain cases partnering with the private sector in designing special resorts based on international standards for tourism. Since tourism was seen as an important potential source of revenue, tourist sites at the national parks in the old Oyo, Yankari, and Akamkpa games reserves saw investments, as did the Nike Lake Resort in Enugu, the Obudu Range Resort, and the Tinapa Resort in Cross River State. However, the high incidence of kidnapping and hostage taking in Nigeria has led people to avoid visiting to the country and has jeopardized plans to increase gross estimated revenue from tourism.

## **CONCLUSION**

The political violence and terrorism in Nigeria, which is led by the Niger Delta militant groups and Boko Haram, cannot be understood without an understanding of Nigerian political history. The growing discontent of the people, including the aforementioned groups, regarding the regional inequalities and the government's policies has led them to become involved in terrorist activities. In other words, the inability of the government to address the political, cultural, and socio-economic demands of the people is a main factor driving discontented communities to terrorism against the state.

It is certain that the terrorism negatively impacts not only national security but also Nigeria's economy. Terrorism is a serious impediment to sustainable development in the country. Moreover, a gradual collapse of the economy due to political corruption has been deepening the gap between socio-economic classes, which will inevitably serve the

interests of terrorist groups and strengthen support for their activities. As such, the following structural reforms are recommended in order to stymie the increase in terrorism:

- The government should address the interests of the whole country equally and fairly, rather than those of particular regions to the detriment of others.
- The principles of rule of law should be applied adamantly and the checks and balances built into the political system should be ensured.

## REFERENCES

- [1] Abbas, F. (2013). Terrorism: Its genesis, causes, effects and solution. Mimeo.
- [2] Agbiboa, D. E. (2014). Peace at daggers drawn? Boko Haram and the state of emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37(1), 41-67. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602.
- [3] Beetseh, K., & Echikwonye, R. A. (2011). The impact of terrorism and global security on the development of Nigerian foreign policy: A challenge. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*, 3, 93-101.
- [4] Cocks, T. (2011, August 29). *Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian U.N. bombing*. Reuters News. Retrieved on June 6,

2015, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829>.

- [5] Frainc (screen name). (2014, July 16). History of Nigeria civil war. Message posted to <http://www.nairaland.com/1830123/history-nigeria-civil-war>.
- [6] Francis, P., LaPin, D., & Rossiasco, P. (2011). *Securing development and peace in the Niger Delta: A social and conflict analysis for change*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- [7] Held, D. & McGrew, A. (1998). The end of the old order? Globalization and the prospects for world order. *Review of International Studies*, 24(5), 219-245.
- [8] Iwundu, C. O., & Thom-Otuya, B. E. N. (2013). Security challenges as threats to national unity in Nigeria: Causes, prevention and treatment. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 14, 16-21.
- [9] Jauhari, A. (2011). Colonial and post-colonial human rights violations in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 1(5), 53-57.

- [10] Knutsen, T. L. (1992). *A history of international relations theory: An introduction*. Manchester: U.K.: Manchester University Press.
- [11] Nwaoga, C. T., Nche, G. C., & Olihe, A. O. (2014). The national conference, ethno-religious pluralism and the challenge of national unity in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2(3), 44-58.
- [12] Obara, I. (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian history*. Nigeria: HEBN Publishers.
- [13] Obasanjo, O. (1981). *My command: An account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70*. U.K.: Heinemann Publications.
- [14] Ogonnaya, U. M., & Ehigiamusoe, U. K. (2013). Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency: National security in Nigeria. *Global Security Studies*, 4(3), 1-14.
- [15] Okoli, A. C., & Iortyer, P. (2014). Terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram insurgency. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science: (F) Political Science*, 14(1), 39-50.



- [16] Okonkwo, D. O. (1962). *History of Nigeria in a new setting: From the earliest time to 1961*. Aba, Nigeria: International Press.
- [17] Oladimeji, M. S., & Oresanwo, A. M. (2014). Effects of terrorism on the international business in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 4(7.1): 247-255.
- [18] Olusanya, G. O. (1980). *Constitutional development in Nigeria, 1861-1960*.
- [19] Omale, D. J. O. (2013). Terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical paradigms and lessons for public policy. *Canadian Social Science*, 9(3), 96-103. doi: 10.3968/j.css.1923669720130903.2916
- [20] Onduku, A. (2003). The lingering crisis in the Niger Delta: A field report. *The Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, 3, 1-10. doi: 10.7246/pcd.0305.
- [21] Oyeniya, A. B. (2010). Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, activities, and politics'. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 1(1.1), 1-16.

- [22] Siegle, J. (2013). Boko Haram and the isolation of northern Nigeria: Regional and international implications. In I. Mantzikos (Ed.), *Boko Haram: Anatomy of a crisis* (pp. 85-90). Bristol, U.K.: e-International Relations.
- [23] Usman, T. (2014, July 19). Jonathan launches new e-passport, asks Nigerians to promote country's image. *Premium Times*. Retrieved on June 7, 2015, from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/165790-jonathan-launches-new-e-passport-asks-nigerians-to-promote-countrys-image.html>.
- [24] World Tourism Organization. (2006). *Nigeria tourism development master plan: Institutional capacity strengthening to the tourism sector in Nigeria*. NIR/03/002.



## **GUIDELINES TO THE AUTHORS**

### **Manuscript submission**

Please send your manuscript submissions via electronic mail to the Florya Chronicles Editor, Prof. Dr. Sedat Aybar, at [sedataybar@aydin.edu.tr](mailto:sedataybar@aydin.edu.tr). A cover letter with a statement of responsibility detailing what each author contributed to the manuscript should accompany the manuscript. An electronic mail will be sent to the corresponding author confirming receipt of the manuscript.

### **Editorial policy**

Submissions to Florya Chronicles are rigorously refereed using a double-blind peer review process; authors and reviewers are anonymous to each other. Within a period of eight to ten weeks, the contributors will be informed about the reviewers' comments together with the decision of the editor about the manuscript as acceptance, minor revisions, major revisions or rejection.

Authors submitting manuscripts for publication in Florya Chronicles warrant that their manuscripts are the work solely of the author(s) stated, that they have not been previously published elsewhere nor are currently under consideration by any other publication and that the material contained within the work is not subject to any other copyright, unless required consents have been obtained.

Upon acceptance of an article for publication, all authors will be asked to sign an author disclosure form before the manuscript is scheduled for publication.

For all manuscripts reporting data from studies involving empirical research Florya Chronicles requires that the study have received formal review and approval by an appropriate institutional review board or ethics committee. This review and approval should be described in the manuscript's Methods section. Written informed consent from the participating subjects must be obtained.

All manuscripts must be submitted in English. Upon acceptance, language support for Turkish translation is given to those manuscripts submitted from abroad. An English-written version will be requested from Turkish authors if their manuscript is accepted for publication. Page proofs (as PDF files) will be sent by e-mail to the corresponding author, which has to be returned within five days.

Following publication the corresponding author will receive a copy of the Florya Chronicles issue containing the article, and a PDF file of the article via e-mail.

Please note that Florya Chronicles holds the copyright to all material it publishes. All accepted manuscripts and their accompanying illustrations may not be published elsewhere in full or in part, in print or electronically, without written permission from the Florya Chronicles. Any party seeking copies of material published in the Florya Chronicles must request permission.

### **Types of articles**

Research Articles presenting ethical, original, critical, interdisciplinary, well-documented research with valid findings that add value to the existing knowledge, and with implications for policy are given preference.

Articles submitted as Case Studies are expected to have one of the following properties: cases challenging existing knowledge; novel technique, empirical or operative approach; management of social and private complications.

Reviews must include recent research and summarize important concepts. Use of diagrams, flow charts, tables and figures to enhance clarity rather than using block bulk of written information is encouraged.

Opinions should represent concise opinion pieces that address various topics of relevance to social sciences. These topics may highlight controversial opinions, or issues within the field. These topics may also include public sector management, mainstream and heterodox economics, management, government actions and policy, and commentaries on specific article or

editorial that has been published by the Florya Chronicles.

### **Manuscript format**

In preparation of their texts, the authors must pay attention to the points listed below:

Manuscripts should be prepared in A4 format with margins of 3cm from all the four sides. Pages must be numbered consecutively throughout the document. The entire manuscript should be typed in Times New Romans, 12 point font and half-spaced. Headings and subheadings should be typed in bold faced letters without a colon, or any other mark at the end. Headings should be typed in capitals while subheadings should be typed in lower-case, capitalize the first letter. Type all text justified margin. A blank line between paragraphs, between headings and text, and between references should be inserted, no indentation. The preferred submission format is Microsoft Word.

### **Manuscript sections**

Order of manuscript should follow as Title Page; Abstract and Key Words (for Research Articles and Reviews); Main Text; Conflict of Interest; Acknowledgements (optional); References; Appendix/Appendices (optional); Tables; Figure Legends and should be combined into a single Word document.

**Title Page:** Each manuscript should have a title page providing the article title (in capital and bold faced letters and no more than 12 words); full names of each author with degrees, professional title; authors' institutional affiliations including city and country; name, address, telephone, fax and email address of the author responsible for correspondence.

**Abstract and Key Words:** No abstract is included in Opinions. Research Articles, Case Reports and Reviews should be accompanied by an abstract. The abstract should not exceed 250 words for Research Articles and 150 words for case Reports and Reviews. The abstracts should be in a structured format. Research Article abstracts should be under subheadings of Background, Objective, Methods, Results and Conclusion. Review articles should be structured as Background, Objective, Types of Studies

Reviewed (a description of the types of studies reviewed), Results, and Practical Implications. Case Reports should have subheadings of Background, Objective, Case Description, and Practical Implications. Key words (3-10 words) highlighting the article's most important topics should be listed afterwards.

**Main Text:** The main text of articles reporting Research Article should be presented in the order of Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion sections. The main text of manuscripts submitted as Research Articles should have a limit of 3000 words, those submitted as Reviews should have a limit of 5000 words. The manuscripts submitted as Opinions and Case Reports should be no more than 1500 words.

**Conflict of interest:** Please disclose whether any authors received any financial support for the conduct of the research or any commercial affiliations that could be considered to pose a conflict of interest regarding the submitted manuscript. If so, briefly describe the role of the sponsor(s).

**Acknowledgements:** If applicable, acknowledgements should be grouped in a paragraph at the end of the text and before the references. Permission and approval of the wording must be obtained from the person thanked.

**Tables and Figures:** A maximum of four figures and four tables may be submitted. Tables and figures must be numbered consecutively. Ensure that each table and figure is cited in the text. Tables should contain information on Table number and a brief and explanatory title. Do not draw vertical rules in tables. Figures should be submitted separately in TIFF, JPEG or EPS format in grayscale. Figures should have a caption. **Citations:** Cite references in the text with regard to APA style<sup>1</sup>. In APA style, footnotes are not used to cite sources. Instead, you provide the authors' last names and publication dates within the body of your paper. Here are some examples.

One work by one author.

Example: Leary (2008) argued that...

Example: ...self-motives are actually interpersonal motives (Leary, 2008).

---

<sup>1</sup> APA citation style information is directly taken from the document prepared by Prof. Borton for Hamilton College, Department of Psychology.  
<http://www.hamilton.edu/documents/Citing%20Sources%20APA%20Style.pdf> last accessed on 03.06.2015.

Quoting directly . Example: When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion” (Snow, 1961, p. 24).

References: All references cited in the text must be included in the list of references at the end of the paper. The accuracy of references is the responsibility of the author. References are listed in the order in which they are cited in the text. A maximum of 30 references for Research Articles, 50 references for Reviews and 10 references for Opinions and Case Reports should be included.

**Examples of References:**

1. Journal article

Horberg, E. J., & Chen, S. (2010). Significant others and contingencies of self-worth: Activation and consequences of relationship-specific contingencies of self-worth. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98, 77 – 91. doi: 10.1037/a0016428.

2. Article or chapter in an edited book

Chang-Schneider, C., & Swann, W. B. The role of uncertainty in self-evaluative processes: Another look at the cognitive-affective crossfire. In R. M. Arkin, K. C. Oleson & P. J. Carroll (Eds.), *Handbook of the uncertain self* (pp. 216-231). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

3. Entire authored book

Gilovich, T., Keltner, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (2011). *Social psychology* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.

4. Entire edited book

Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (Eds.). 2011. *Handbook of self-regulation: Research, theory, and applications*. New York, NY: Guilford.

**For more information on APA citation style:**

**<http://www.apastyle.org>**