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İçindekiler/Table of Contents

EDİTÖRDEN

Durkheim Üzerine Dört Tip Entelektüel Üretim Biçimi ve Türkiye'deki Durkheim Yansımaları

Durkheim ömrünün sonlarında uzunca bir süre, belirtileri depresyon, kayıtsızlık ve halsizlik olan -o zamanki tıbbi adlandırmasıyla- nevrasteni hastalığından muzdarip olarak yaşadı. Oğlu André'nin I. Dünya Savaşı'nda cephede ölümüyle birlikte tüm direncini kaybeden Durkheim 1917 yılında öldü.

Fakat tam olarak hangi anlamda kesinlikle "öldü"? Gerçek anlamda öncü bir entelektüelin cenaze töreni asla bir son değildir. Daha doğru bir kavrayış, öncü entelektüellerin cenaze törenlerini hayatlarının ilk bölümünün kapanış sahnesi olarak düşünmek olacaktır. Konuyu bu şekilde ele almak, Durkheim hakkında kesinlikle daha verimli bir düşünme biçimidir. Bedenli bir varlık olarak değil aktör-ağ ilişkisi çerçevesinde ele alarak onun tedavüldeki metin ve fikirlerin kopmaz bir parçası olduğu kabul edilmeli ve kültürel sosyoloji yoluyla bir şekilde hem hayranları hem de muarızları için kesintisiz bir ilgi sembolü ve totemik bir odak olarak hayatına devam ettiği düşünülmelidir. Okurları, takipçileri ve eleştirmenleri sayesinde "Durkheim" geçmişin sıra dışı isimlerinden biri olmanın ötesine geçerek entelektüel açıdan hâlâ üretken ve yenilikçi olmaya devam ediyor. Ölümünü takip eden yüzyıl içinde mirası, onun hayattayken asla öngöremeyeceği biçimde, yeni fikirlerin, yeni araştırma alanlarının ve yeni ampirik uygulamaların türemesine sebep oldu. Durkheim'in, düşüncelerini kâğıda döken herhangi bir 19. yüzyıl sonu (fin-de-siècle) entelektüelinden çok daha girift ve daha çağdaş bir düşünür hâline geldiği kesindir. O, faal bir kuvvet olarak hâlâ bizimle yaşıyor.

Ölümünden sonraki bu alakanın ve üretkenliğin yönlendirici sebebi nedir? Bizler, bilim ve teknoloji alanında çalışan meslektaşlarımızın kullandıkları teknik bir tabiri ödünç alarak, "Durkheim"in 1917'den beri dört tip bilimsel araştırma için "elverişli" (affordance) zemin sağlayan esnek bir odak olduğunun artık ispatlandığı kanaatindeyiz.

Tip I: Durkheim, düşüncesinin olağanüstü entelektüel ve felsefi derinliği ve özgünlüğü ile sürekli bir ilgi odağı olmuştur. Ayrıca metinlerinin soyut, yoğun ve kapsayıcı olması ve yine anlaşılması zor ve çelişkili olma nitelikleri de onun mirasına duyulan ilgiyi sürekli kılmaktadır. Bu üç özellik, teorik akıl yürütme ve kavramsallaştırmalarda sorunsalı ortaya koyma, tasnif etme ve tanımlama için bol malzeme sağlar. Durkheim yorumlarının özerk bir alan hâline gelmesi ölçüsünde, kesintisiz bir hareket vasfı da varlık bulabilir. İlgili çabaların çoğu, bizim "Tip Ia" olarak adlandırdığımız, Durkheim düşüncesinin mümkün olan en kesin tasvirini sunmak veya onu "doğru kavramak" çerçevesinde şekillenmektedir. Bu tür makaleler, genel olarak, onun külliyatında oldukça belirgin olan ana temalara yoğunlaşmaktadırlar. Söz konusu ana temalar anomi, ahlak, dayanışma, bütünleşme, ritüel, meslekler, hukuk, eğitim, toplumsal evrim, toplumsal olgu ve din gibi konuları içermektedir. Bu temaları esas alan çalışmalar sıklıkla Durkheim düşüncesindeki hemen göze çarpmayan ince değişimlere ayna tutuyor ya da metinleri arasındaki veya içindeki gerilimler üzerine yoğunlaşıyorlar. Bu başlık altında değerlendirebileceğimiz çalışmaların bir kısmının kaliteli entelektüel biyografisinin yanı sıra Durkheim'in kavramlarının ve kuramının etraflıca tanımlanması ile de ilgili tarafları vardır. Bu son tarz, Durkheim incelemelerini (études Durkheimiennes) gerçekleştiren bilim adamlarının Durkheim'in hayatı, zamanı ve fikirleri hakkında inanılmaz derecede ayrıntılı bilgi sahibi olmaları ile yakından alakalıdır. Bu doğrultuda daha az rastlanan bir tema (Tip Ib), Durkheim'in çalışmalarının alımlanma ve yorumlanma biçimleriyle ilgilidir. Bilgi sosyolojisi veya toplumsal düşünce tarihi ile ilgili çalışmalardan oluşan bu araştırma öbeği, Durkheim'in belli fikirlerinin nasıl alımlandığını, kullanıldığını ve ona ait belli temaların nasıl vurgulandığını veya ihmal edildiğini incelemektedir.

Tip II: Tip I çalışmaları ne kadar merkezcil ve içedönük ise Tip II sayabileceğimiz çalışmalar o kadar merkezkaç ve dışa açıktır. Durkheim'in düşünceleri, genel sosyoloji ve sosyal teori alanlarındaki gelişmelerden kaynaklanan ya da bunlardan ilham alan fikir ayrılıklarına ve elverişli olma durumlarına oldukça açıktır ve bağlantı olanakları bizim hayal edebileceğimizden çok daha fazla geniştir. Bu boyutta, Durkheim genellikle yeni bir mercekle okunmaktadır. Bazen bu mercek, (Tip I araştırma çeşidinde olageldiği gibi) alıştığımız inceleme biçimlerinden daha fazla büyütme gücüne sahiptir; gene de sosyolojinin ilgi alanlarındaki değişimler sayesinde çoğu zaman yeni ve beklenmedik bir bakış açısı geliştirir. Bu tipte, daha önce görünür hâle gelmemelerinden ötürü fark etmediğimiz temalar ve ikinci dereceden önemli kavramlar çok daha önemli hâle gelmektedir. Durkheim metinlerinin bazı kısa bölümleri veya çok sayıda nispeten kısa yazısı, söz konusu yeni sosyolojik tema hakkında neler söyleyebilecekleri bakımından irdelenir. Bu metinler bazen bir bilim adamı tarafından derlenir ve biz Durkheim'in belli bir konuda ne kadar da çok yazdığını ilk defa görmüş oluruz. Bunları daha önce fark etmeyişimizin nedeni, belki belli bir bölüm başlığı altında olmayışlarından, belki de başlıkların dağınık oluşlarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Böylelikle Durkheim, ya entelektüel nirengi noktası belirleme sürecinde, genel olarak daha az önemli ve orta seviye kuramcılarla yan yana yerleştirilen bir isim olarak kavranır ya da önemli fikirler geliştirmesine rağmen bunları kusurlu ve eğreti bir biçimde ifade eden ileri görüşlü bir düşünür olarak ele alınır. Bu tip çalışmalarda karşımıza çıkan Durkheim, Tip I bilimsel incelemelere göre nispeten daha çağdaş bir düşünürdür. Kendi çağına daha az hapsolmuş bir görüntüye sahip bu yeni Durkheim portresi, "sistemli ve tutarlı" bir bilim adamından ziyade Simmel gibi entelektüel bir lafebesi gibi görünür. Bu figür sıklıkla, birçok alanda konuyu ilk ele alan olmanın avantajıyla avant la lettre kültürel sosyolog veya kültürel siyaset kuramcısıdır. Beden, maddî kültür ve sembolik/ikonik güç, kadercilik, etkileşim ritüelleri, cinsellik, insan hakları ve ceza gibi araştırma konuları etrafında gerçekleştirilen incelemeler bu bağlamda verilebilecek örneklerden sadece bazılarıdır.

Tip III: Parsons'a uzanan gelenek daha geniş ölçekli bir yaklaşım izlemektedir. Bu gelenek, Durkheim'i bütüncül olarak, sosyoloji kuramı kapsamındaki özel bir genel yaklaşımın ya da analitik tercihin temsilcisi olarak görme eğilimindedir. Bu bakış açısına göre o, toplumsal eylem, düzen, sistem entegrasyonu, modernite veya sosyal açıklama gibi konularda bir dizi temel çözüm sunmaktadır. Sosyal teoride genelde Marx ve Weber gibi bazen de Mead ve Goffman gibi büyük düşünürlerle yan yana gelebilecek temel bir yönelimi temsil ettiği söylenir. Bu tür bir okuma, özgün bir şekilde "büyük resim" çizer. Bu "büyük resim", entelektüel çabanın merkezinde yer alan yeni sentetik ve analitik çerçeve ile bakış açısı ötekilerden ayrılan özelliklere sahiptir. Durkheim, bu çerçevede, sosyal teori spektrumunda felsefi kanatta yer alan bir isim olarak tasvir edilir. O, soyut göndermelerini kanıtlamak için nadiren ampirik örneklere başvuran derin bir düşünürdür. Parsons (1937), Habermas (1984) ve Alexander (2014) gibi isimlerin monografi çalışmaları bu yaklaşımın örnekleri olarak düşünülebilir. Aynı şekilde, Durkheim'in sıklıkla olguları yanlış yorumladığını ve kötü teorik seçimler yaptığını iddia eden Lockwood (1992) ve Tilly (1981) gibi eleştirmenlerin çalışmaları da bu çerçevede ele alınabilir. Aleyhte olanlar için Durkheim, yapısal işlevselcilik, kültürel sosyoloji veya sistemler düzeyindeki açıklamalar açısından fena olan tüm hususların kullanışlı bir örneği hâline gelir.

Tip IV: Dördüncü tip bilimsel incelemeler öbeğini, "gerçek dünyada" ortaya çıkan ve açıklanması gereken olgular, olaylar, toplumsal gerçeklikler ve eğilimler üzerine yapılan çalışmalar oluşturmaktadır. Sıklıkla vuku bulan pek çok şaşırtıcı olay, sosyologlara meydan okur. Başka bazı zamanlarda, toplumda ortaya çıkan yeni eğilimler, disiplin eyleminin geçici bir odağı hâline gelirler. Kurumsal yaşamın tekrarlanan ve sabit özellikleri de hesaba katılmalıdır. Durkheim'in kavramsal araç seti ve uyarlanabilir teorik teçhizatı bu tür durumları düzenlemek ve açıklamak için genel geçer aletler temin eder. Buradaki ana motivasyon, genellikle, Durkheim'in hâlâ cazibesini muhafaza

ettiğini, mevcut dünyayla alakalı olduğunu veya olan bitenleri kavrama noktasında birçok farklı açılıma imkân sağlayan bir potansiyele sahip olduğunu göstermektir. Durkheim kendi içinde bir amaç olmaktan ziyade bilimsel faaliyet için bir araçtır. Bu tipolojinin nerede kullanışlı olduğuna bakacak olursak; tarihsel olarak taç giyme törenlerini ve cenazeleri, medya gösterilerini, savaşları, terör saldırılarını, ahlaki panik anlarını, seçimleri, anıtları, ihtilafları ve skandalları açıklama noktasında faydalı bir çerçeve sağladığını görürüz. Standart açıklama seti; en azından günümüzde, ritüel, dayanışma, kutsal ve profanın dâhil olduğu kültürel olana daha yakındır. Bununla birlikte, gündelik "gerçek dünyada" daha az dikkat çeken olaylar silsilesinin de, olduğu ve alışılageldiği üzere, teorik eğilimi daha az bilimsel faaliyetlerin hissesine düştüğü genelde unutulur. Bu noktada, İntihar ve Sosyolojik Metodun Kuralları'nda karşımıza çıkan pozitivist Durkheim'in nicel kriminoloji ve halk sağlığı gibi alanlarda hüküm sürmekte olan düşük ve görünmeyen etkisi kayda değerdir. Hâlbuki bu tür bir çabanın içince olan bilim adamları, Durkheim'in toplumsal olguları ve bunların yasa-benzeri özelliklerini incelemek için yaptığı metodolojik çağrısına kulak vermekten ziyade, sosyal bağlar ve bunların yoğunluğunu, demografik özellikleri, ahlaki inançlar ve din gibi daha özel Durkheimci değişkenlerin etkisini ölçmeye çalışacaklardır.

Yukarıda belirtilen tipolojiler uygulanabilir, faydalı ve eksiksiz mi? Burada derlenen makaleler söz konusu olasılıkları düzensiz bir şekilde örneklediği için kesin bir cevap sağlamamaktadır. Editörler olarak biz, yaptığımız tasnife uygunluk aramaktan ziyade başvuru koşullarına ve hakemlik süreçlerine sadık kaldık. Durkheim'in günümüzdeki etkisini ve canlılığını değerlendirmeyi amaçlayan bu sayıda, şaşırtıcı bir biçimde, pozitivist yöntemi uygulayan veya en makro yönelimli karşılaştırmalı büyük resim teorisine odaklanan makaleler bulunmadığı gibi çağdaş kültürel sosyoloji yöntemine uygun makaleler de eksik. Diğer bir şaşkınlığı, Durkheim'in Türk sosyolojisi, Türk sosyal düşüncesi ve devlet ile akademi arasındaki ilişkilerin ulus inşası sürecine olan etkisiyle ilgili güçlü makale başvuruları olmamasında yaşadık. Bundan dolayı eksik olan bu bilgileri kendimiz birkaç paragrafla da olsa aşağıda vermeyi uygun bulduk. Burada yayınlanan makaleler birçok açıdan melez bir nitelik gösteriyor ve Durkheim'in farklı düşünce tarzlarını ve kullanımlarını bir araya getiriyorlar. Bu sayıyı oluşturan makalelerde, sınıflandırıcı bir okuma ile desteklenen tipolojilendirmeyle ortaya çıkabilecek baskın ya da tali eğilimlerle karşılaşacaksınız. Bu yüzden tipolojilerimizi ideal tipler olarak önerirken okuma stratejileri geliştirmenin ve dolayısıyla "yazar burada ne yapıyor", "kime konuşuyor" sorularını cevaplamanın yeni keşiflere kapı aralayacağını ileri sürüyoruz.

Bu sayıda yer alan yazılar arasında, Tip IV kategorisinde değerlendirdiğimiz çalışma türüne en fazla uyan inceleme, çağdaş toplumsal gerçeklikleri açıklama yönündeki çabasıyla Charles Lemert'in katkısıdır. Bu katkı, yazarın kendi özgün entelektüel tarzını ve ufkunu sergilemesi bakımından daha yaygın olan vaka çalışması türünden ayrışmaktadır. Lemert, Durkheim'i bin yıllık klişelerden arındırmakta, 20. yüzyılda Durkheim'in hayaletleri ile ilgili görüşleri tartışmakta ve Fransız yapısalcılığı (dolayısıyla, çağdaş kültürel sosyolojiyi de mutlaka eklememiz gereken hat) boyunca uzanan mirasına işaret etmektedir. Bu tür bir okumanın arkasında birbiriyle karşılıklı örtüşme veya birbirini yansıtma olduğu düşüncesi vardır. Lemert'e göre Durkheim, modern dünyanın nasıl işlediğini görmemize yardımcı olmaktadır. Durkheim ayrıca iyi ve kötü tercihlerini yargılayabileceğimiz ahlaki beklentileri de ortaya koymaktadır. Esasen, Lemert için Durkheim, dayanışmacı içerme ve işbirliği olasılığına inanan evrenselci bir isimdir. Bu yazıda Lemert ayrıca, dünyadaki olayların hem teori üzerine tekrar düşünme imkânı sunduğunu hem de teorinin kesintisiz analitik ve ahlaki çekim merkezi olmaya devam ettiğini gözler önüne seriyor. Özel sayımızın konusu çerçevesinde bakıldığında, Lemert'in, Durkheim'in 20. yüzyıl Türkiye'sini nasıl anlayabileceği konusundaki düşünceleri özellikle ilgi çekicidir. O, dinin toplumsal dayanışma yaratmadaki rolünün altını çizmektedir. Meseleye damgasını vuracağını hissettiğimiz sorun alanına dair açıklamayı ise maalesef büyük oranda başka çalışmalara bırakmak zorundayız: Durkheim'in sistematik laïcité yakla-

şımının, devlet ve sivillik-sekülerlik-meslek-ahlak yaklaşımlarının Türkiye'nin Kemalist yeniden-inşa sürecinde etkin olma düzeylerinin karşılaştırması. Günümüzde daha seküler ve daha dini olan siyasi yönelim biçimleri arasında bölünmüş durumda olsa da Türkiye, bir bakıma, Durkheim'in modern Cumhuriyet vizyonunun uygulanabilirliğine dair bir tecrübe sunmaktadır.

Durkheim düşüncesinin Türkiye'deki bilinirliği ve etkisi 19. yüzyılın sonuna kadar götürülebilir. O dönemde Osmanlı Padişahı II. Abdülhamit'e karşı anayasacı muhalif hareketin örgütleyicileri Durkheim'in görüşlerine başvurarak modernleşme politikalarına yön vermeye çalıştılar. Durkheim, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduktan sonra da ulus-devletleşme sürecinin ilham kaynağı olmaya devam etti.

Emile Durkheim'in ismini Türkiye entelektüel dünyası ilk kez Ahmed Şuayb'ın yazılarında okudu. Servet-i Fünun dergisindeki yazılarını 1901 yılında Hayat ve Kitaplar başlığıyla kitaplaştıran Ahmed Şuayb, Durkheim ile birlikte onun rakibi Gabriel Tarde'ı da tanıtmıştı. Ancak bu yıllarda Durkheim'e ilgi entelektüel merakın ötesine geçmiyordu. Daha sonra yine Ahmed Şuayb'ın yayıncıları arasında bulunduğu Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası'nda bu entelektüel ilgi, Auguste Comte ve Herbert Spencer çizgisinde devam etti. 1912 yılında başlayan Balkan savaşları ve ardından Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın yaşandığı dönemde bireyci sosyoloji yerini toplumcu Durkheim sosyolojisine bıraktı. Bu bağlamda Durkheim düşüncesini Osmanlı ve Türkiye koşullarında yorumlayan Ziya Gökalp oldu. Gökalp'in Durkheim açılımı, siyaset dünyasına yönelik öneriler içeriyordu.

Durkheim'in politik düşüncesi, Fransa'nın kırılgan Üçüncü Cumhuriyetini güçlendirme gereğinden çok etkilenmişti. Gökalp bu temayı ele aldı ve Durkheim'in düşüncesinin dayanışmacı, ahlak ve devlet merkezli özelliklerini vurguladı. Komünizm ya da liberalizm gibi seçeneklere karşı solidarist korporatist modeli daha insancıl ve Türk toplumuna daha uygun buluyordu (Parla, 1989). Bu çerçevede Türkiye'nin modernleşerek ulus-devletleşme sürecine "İslamlaşmak, Türkleşmek, Muasırlaşmak" üçlü formülünü önerdi. Modernleşmesinin en önemli meselelerinden biri Müslüman bir toplumun Hristiyan Batı Medeniyetinin ne şekilde bir parçası olacağı ve bu medeniyetin maddi ve manevi sonuçlarını nasıl kendisine ekleyeceği idi. Bu sebeple Gökalp Alman romantiklerinin kültür-medeniyet karşıtlığını kuramsal açılımında kullandı ve ulus-devletleşmenin kültürel boyutunu oluşturacak olan Türkçülüğün inşası için Türklerin eski tarihlerini, geleneklerini, örf ve adetlerini araştırdı. Diğer taraftan muasırlaşmanın yolunun Batı medeniyetine dâhil olmak olduğunun altını çizdi. Fakat bu noktada Alman romantiklerinin bu iki kavrama yüklediği karşıtlık anlamından uzaklaşarak Durkheim'in kültür ve medeniyete yüklediği anlamı benimsedi (Kabakcı, 2011). Buna göre uluslar din, dil, hukuk, estetik, ahlak gibi unsurları içine alan kültürlerini muhafaza ederken bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişme anlamına gelen ve ulusların müşterek sosyal hayatlarından oluşan uluslararası medeniyetin parçası olabilirler.

Bu kuramsal çerçeve, Gökalp'e göre, Türk ve Müslüman kalırken Batı medeniyetine dâhil olma imkânını sağlamaktadır. Bu sebeple milliyetçi ideoloji çerçevesinde Türkçülüğün inşasını kültürel bir unsur olarak kabul etmiştir. Buna göre Türkler, eski çağlardan beri sahip oldukları kültürleriyle daha önce İslam medeniyetine dâhil olmuşlardır, şimdi ise Batı medeniyetinin bir parçası olacaklardır. Bu yeni durumda Müslümanlık Türklüğün kültürel ögesi hâline gelmekte ve dayanışma ahlakının sürdürülmesi, bireyciliğin değil toplumculuğun güçlendirilmesi noktasında işlev yüklenmektedir. Dolayısıyla Türklük ve Müslümanlık bu yeni işlevleri bakımından yeniden yorumlanmalı ve inşa edilmelidir.

Gökalp'in Durkheim'i yorumlayarak ulaştığı bu kavramsal çerçeve, Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılmasını önlemek için önce çeşitli dini ve etnik grupların temsiliyetinin sağlandığı korporatist yönetime ve yine ayrılıkçı gruplara karşı Türk milliyetçiliğinin tahkimi şeklinde ortaya çıkan siyasi

gelişmelere payanda oldu. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasıyla da yine Türk milliyetçiliğinin kültürel çerçevesinin oluşturulmasında ve İslam'ın hükümlerinin ihmal edilip ahlaki boyutunun işlevselleştirildiği laiklik anlayışının uygulanmasında Gökalp'in düşünceleri etkisini sürdürmüştür. Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca laikliğin ve milliyetçiliğin çeşitli yorumlarının etkin olduğu Türk düşünce ve siyasi hayatında çeşitli düşünsel ve siyasi ekollerin arasında Gökalp'in Durkheim yorumu zaman zaman etkili olmuştur.

Gökalp'in yaptığı Durkheim'in görüşlerini birebir aktarmak değil, onun düşüncesini Türkiye koşullarına uyarlamaktır. Bu, "küresel" bilgi düzeninin içinde bir düşünce sisteminin "yerel" olana aktarılmasından ve uyarlanmasıdan ibaret bir çabaydı. Örneğin Durkheim'in düzen ve ahlak kavramlarını ulus ve terakki ile kolektif bilinç kavramını ise millet şuuru ile karşılamaktadır. Zira Durkheim'in içinden konuştuğu Fransa toplumunun aksine Türkiye'de toplumsal düzen değil siyasi istikrar alanında yeni çözümlere ihtiyaç duyulmaktaydı. Çünkü her ne kadar Cumhuriyet idaresi ve yeni aydınlar sıcak bakmıyor olsalar da İslam hâlâ toplumsal düzeni sağlayan birleştirici olma özelliğini sürdürmekteydi. Bu sebeple Durkheim laikliği savunurken Gökalp için İslam millet şuurunun ve birliğinin önemli bir bileşenidir (Bulut, 2015).

Gökalp'in Durkheim'in kavramlarını ve düşüncesini Türkiye koşullarında yeniden üretmesinin genel olarak Türk sosyolojisinin Batı düşüncesiyle girdiği ilişkinin ana özelliklerinden biri olduğunu söylemek abartı olmayacaktır. Bundan dolayı da Durkheim'in etkisinin nerede başlayıp nerede bittiğinin tespiti de mümkün olmakla birlikte oldukça zordur. Bazı Türk siyasetçileri ve aydınları tarafından özellikle Durkheim'in dayanışma ve ahlak merkezli ulus-devlet yaklaşımı, Türkiye gündemine uyarlanabilirliği açısından elverişli bir çerçeve sunduğu için Durkheim Türk siyasi ve düşünce tarihinde önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu öneme rağmen Türkiye'deki Durkheim yorumlarıyla ilgili akademik çalışmaların azlığı ise söz konusu ilginin düşünsel olmaktan ziyade siyasi olduğunu düşünmemize neden oluyor. Özel sayımıza gönderilen yazılar arasında Türkiye'deki Durkheim yorumlarına dair bağlamın eksikliğinin bir sebebi de bu durum olabilir. Diğer taraftan Durkheim çalışmalarının bu bağlamının yukarıda açıkladığımız tipolojilerde yer almadığına da dikkat çekmeliyiz. Durkheim'i toplumsal mühendislikle ilgili normatif projeler çerçevesinde yorumlayan çalışmalar için Tip V kategorisi eklemek zorundayız. Bu tipoloji Durkheim'in toplumsal istikrar, kolektif ahlak ve ulusal kimlik arzusuna dayanır. Beklentilerimiz arasında olmasına rağmen özel sayımıza Durkheim'in bu tipolojiyle ele alınabilecek düşünsel mirasıyla ilgili bir katkı gelmediği için bu sayıda yer alan çalışmaları değerlendirmeye geri dönüyoruz.

Çağdaş kuramcılara sık sık atıfta bulunmakla birlikte çabalarını belli ölçüde gözden kaçan fedakârlık kavramı etrafında yoğunlaştıran Ronjon Paul Datta, Tip I ve Tip II arasında melez bir yorum biçimi sunmaktadır. Hızlı bir şekilde okuyup geçebileceğimiz fedakârlık kavramının Durkheim düşüncesine ciddi biçimde nüfuz ettiğini ve yeni bir görme biçimiyle bu kavramdan faydalanabileceğimizi göstererek bu kavramı merkeze yerleştirmektedir. Bununla birlikte onun çalışması biraz daha karmaşıktır. İyi niyetli okuyucular, bu yazının her şeyden biraz bahsettiğini dolayısıyla tipolojimizin "ideal tip" olma özelliğini örneklediğini söyleyeceklerdir. Diğerleri ise tipolojimize tam olarak uymadığını ve dolayısıyla onu geçersiz kılıp kılmadığını soracaktır. Datta'ya göre, neoliberal yönetimin gerçek dünyasının diğerkâmlığa karşı olan baskılayıcı tutumu, başarısızlıkları, israfı ve nihayet (kendi ilkelerini feda etme pahasına) finansal kurtarma politikalarıyla Durkheim'in isabetli bir biçimde kaynak olma durumunu (Tip IV) aydınlatan bir tarafı vardır. Durkheim, bu bakış açısına göre, taze, öngörülü ve çağdaş görünmesine rağmen eleştiriye de tabi tutulmalıdır. Datta, oldukça zeki bir biçimde, Durkheim'in Foucault gibi iktidarla daha fazla ilgilenen kuramcıların düzeltmesine ihtiyaç duyulan (Tip III, eleştirel pozisyon) idealist kültürel kuramın bir türünü temsil ettiğini tartışmaktadır.

Datta'nın tasnif edilmesi zor da olsa Graciella Inda'nın tamamen Tip I'e ait olduğundan eminiz. Inda, Durkheim'in entelektüel yaşamının çok sıkı tanımlanmış, iki yıllık bir dönemini merkeze alarak iyi tanımlanmış ana bir tema olan Devlet ile ilgili ayrıntılı bir açıklama sunmaktadır. Datta'nın bu sayıdaki makalesinde olduğu gibi, bu yazı da, Durkheim'in metinlerinin ayrıntılı bir biçimde yeniden okunmasının ne kadar değerli olduğunu gösteren bir katkı sunmaktadır. Inda, devletin Durkheim'in tahayyülünde nasıl olumlu bir rol oynadığını, büyüyen devlet otoritesinin bireysel haklar ve hürriyetlerle neden çelişmeyeceğini ve toplumsal dayanışmanın devletin ötesinde veya öncesinde nasıl var olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu tahayyül biçimi organik dayanışmanın ortaya çıkmış olması şartıyla bir bakıma kolaylaştırıcı devlet düşüncesini yansıtmaktadır. Bu tahayyül biçimi ile hem tarihsel bir dönem hem de siyasal bir örgütlenme kuramı olarak Kemalizm arasında ilişki kurulması gerektiğine işaret etmesi bakımından Inda'nın çalışması önemlidir.

Eric Malczewski'nin çalışması açıkça Tip II türündeki bilimsel incelemeler öbeğine uygun özellikler göstermektedir. Millet ve milliyetçilik alanındaki son tartışmalardan esinlenmekte ve bundan dolayı Durkheim'in çalışmalarında pek merkezî olmayan bu temalara yönelmektedir. Metinlerini derinlemesine inceledikten sonra, Durkheim'in keskin bir öngörü ve vukufiyetle ele aldığı kolektif vicdan ve hayali cemaatler konusunda günümüz bilim insanlarının ondan bazı şeyler öğrenebileceğini vurgulamaktadır. Metodolojik ve epistemolojik bir adım atmasına rağmen, Malczewski'nin makalesi ayrıca günümüz kültürel sosyolojisine ilhamını Durkheim'den alan bir ilgi göstermekte ve çağdaş dünyada milliyetçiliğin işleyişine yönelik açıklamalara katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu bir Tip IV çalışması özelliğidir. Bir anlamda, Lemert gibi, Durkheimci gelenek ile açıklama amaçlı kültürel sosyoloji arasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde meydana gelen üretken kaynaşmaya işaret etmektedir (Smith, yayınlanacak).

Bjørn Schiermer'ın Durkheim'in toplumsal eylem yaklaşımıyla ilgili araştırması, Tip I modelinin incelikli ve yaratıcı bir uygulamasıdır. Bununla birlikte, Schiermer, tek bir kavramı takip etmemekte ve Durkheim'in düşüncesindeki genel eğilimi izlemektedir; yani, dışsal ve kısıtlayıcı bir biçimde tahayyül edilen toplumsal olgulardan daha iradi olan yaratıcı eylem nosyonuna ve ortak, üretken sosyalliğe doğru bir izleği takip ediyor. Dini Hayatın İlksel Biçimleri'ndeki çokça bilinen bir dipnotta Durkheim, değiştiğini reddetmektedir. Fakat onun sözüne neden inanalım ki? Bireylerin mükemmel bir öz-kavrayışa sahip olup olmadıklarını sorgulamak için birçok neden bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca benliğin sunumu ile ilgili temel bir sorun bulunmaktadır: Entelektüeller genellikle düşüncelerinin tutarsız olduğunu kabul etme konusunda isteksizdirler. Schiermer, Durkheim'in, bireylerin toplumsal güçlere tabi olduğu hususunu didaktik olarak fazlasıyla vurgulamasına rağmen, moda ve kitle davranışı gibi toplumsal akımların daha olumlu ve sosyodinamik bir kavrayışın gerekliliğini ima ettiğinin farkında olduğunu ustalıkla ispatlamaktadır. Entegrasyonla ilgili temalar ve kolektiviteye olumlu bir biçimde bağlanma bu iki uç arasında geçici bir çözüm sunmaktadır. Nihai çözüm, Durkheim'in kolektif eylemin ve ortak katılımın kendilerinin kitlelere bir kutsallık duygusu bahşederek dayanışma ve biçimlendirilmiş davranışlar ürettiğini savunduğu Dini Hayatın İlksel Biçimleri'nde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Schiermer sadece birkaç tane anlamlı ampirik örnek sunmaktadır. Onun temel katkısı, değişen düşünce düzeninin analitik olarak yeniden-yapılandırılmasında yatmaktadır. Bunun yanında birçok okuyucu, bu makalenin nihaî yaklaşımının Randall Collins (2004) ve onun etkileşim ritüeli kuramıyla uyumlu belli yönleri olduğunu fark edecektir.

Schiermer'in yaklaşımına benzer bir şekilde, Abdulkerim Sönmez de Durkheim'in erken dönem düşüncesinin bazı özelliklerini vurgulamaktadır. Tönnies ve Marx ile kıyaslamalar içerdiği için Tip III izlenimi vermesine rağmen Durkheim'in derinlemesine incelenmesine odaklanan bu çalışma daha ziyade Tip I özelliği göstermektedir. Bu makalenin ana motifini, etkin aktör olarak toplum ve toplumsal olgular tarafından kısıtlanan bireyler ile toplumun hayatta kalmasının destekleyicisi olması açısından işlevsel sistem arasındaki ilişkiler oluşturmaktadır. Sönmez, Durkheim'in sosyo-

lojiyi bağımsız bir akademik disiplin hâline getirme çabası bağlamında toplumsal olana yaptığı vurgunun özneyi pasif bir konuma itmediğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Durkheim'in, toplumun bireylerin toplamı olmaktan öte kendisine bağımsız bir varlık atfedebileceğimiz bir sentez olduğunu söylese de, bireyin bir özne-fail olarak toplum içindeki bekasını önemsediğine dikkat çekmektedir.

Çağrı Eryılmaz'ın çalışması Durkheim'in kavramlarının çevre sosyolojisinin inşasına sunacağı imkânı ve Durkheim'in, çağdaş toplumun sosyolojisini yapıyor olsaydı eğer, toplum-çevre etkileşimini daha fazla önemseyebileceğini göstermeye çalışıyor. Eryılmaz'a göre, Durkheim sosyolojik metodolojisinde toplumsal bir analize ulaşabilmek için bir toplumsal olgunun ancak bir başka toplumsal olgu ile açıklanabileceğini öne sürdüğü için toplumsal olgular üzerindeki etkisini inkâr edemeyeceğimiz çevre etkenini dışarıda bırakmıştır. Ancak Durkheim metinlerinin çevre ile ilgili kavramlara sahip olması ve modernleşme sürecinde çevresel etkenleri hesaba katması onun çevreye tamamen kayıtsız olmadığının bir işareti olarak da değerlendirilebilir. Ayrıca işbölümü ve dayanışma kavramları bugün insanlığın karşı karşıya kaldığı iklim değişikliği gibi küresel çevre sorunları bağlamında yeniden yorumlanarak bir çevre sosyolojisi inşa edilebilir. Bu noktada Eryılmaz'ın çalışması, Durkheim'in metinlerinde ikincil derecede öneme sahip bazı göndermeleri yeniden yorumlayarak yeni bir teorik açılımı amaçladığı için Tip II kategorisi içinde değerlendirilebilir.

Pickering, Watts Miller ve Besnard'ın çalışmalarına yapılan yoğun atıflardan dolayı Alexander Goffman'ın makalesi Tip I sınıflamasına girme sinyalleri vermektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı daha fazla açımlamak yerine Durkheim'in hakkaniyetli bir yorumunu yapmaktır. Datta gibi o da, ikincil bir kavramı derinlemesine okuyarak soruşturmanın Durkheim düşüncesini netleştirmek ve yeni yollar deneyerek eleştirel teorik bir sorgulama geliştirmek için yararlı olabileceğini göstermektedir. Bu durumda Goffman, geleneğin normatif entegrasyonun bir unsuru olduğunu göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, Durkheim'e göre, yeni varoluş koşullarının ortaya çıktığı yoğun kolektif yaratıcılık dönemleri ile gelenek değişime uğramıştır. Bu yeni koşullar sırayla kendi geleneklerini yaratmışlardır. Goffman ayrıca, metninde, Tip II ve Tip IV düşünsel tarzlarının alt unsurlarını sergilemektedir. Ona göre, Durkheim, 20. yüzyılda Sovyet siyasal kültürünün unsurlarını açıklamaya yardımcı olduğu gibi (Tip IV'e has bir ilişkilendirme) çoklu modernite düşüncesindeki gelişmeleri ve bunun geleneksizleştirmeyle olan ilişkisini de (Tip II teması) öngörmüştür. Belirtmemiz gereken bir diğer husus, Goffman'a göre Durkheim'in Anne Swidler'in (1986) "Culture in Action" başlıklı "alet çantası" niteliğindeki önemli bir kaynak olan makalesinde ayrıntılı olarak tartıştığı istikrarlı ve istikrarsız dönemlerin sırayla birbirini takip etme durumunu da öngörmüş olmasıdır. Goffman'ın, Durkheim'in 1911'deki meşhur Bologna sunumundaki yaklaşımını yeniden inşa etmek suretiyle, Swidler'in yaklaşımını çok fazla bireyci ve pragmatik bulanlar için daha tatmin edici bir model teklif ettiği görülmektedir.

Sonuç

Daha önce belirttiğimiz gibi, beklentilerimizin aksine, buradaki makaleler Türkiye ya da dünyadaki çağdaş Durkheim çalışmalarının çeşitliliğini tam olarak yakalayamamaktadırlar. Birkaç sayfalık yazının dışında, elinizdeki özel sayı çağdaş ampirik uygulamaların temsilcisi ve toplumsal olanı açıklamayı önceleyen bakış açısının uzantısı çalışmalardan yoksundur. Hâlbuki bu tür çalışmalar Durkheim'den yararlanan çağdaş kültürel sosyolojinin tam merkezinde yer almaktadırlar. Durkheim'in normatif eylem kuramı, sistem yaklaşımı ve benzeri konulardaki öncü rolü de pek ele alınmamıştır. Yine de bu derleme, Durkheim'in yüksek düzeyli sosyal teoriye ilham verme veya bunu üretme yeteneğinin geçmişte olduğu gibi hâlâ "içeriden" hayatiyetini sürdürdüğünü gösteren bolca metin ihtiva etmektedir. Burada sunulan makaleler, bu düşüncenin ayrıntılı metinsel yeniden inşasının hâli hazırda sadece biraz daha kesin bildiğimiz şeyi ifade edemediğini gösteriyor. Bunun

yerine, makaleler, bizleri yeni düşünme yollarına sevk eden yaratıcı yeniden-okumalar sunabilme-
nin imkânı olarak analitik düşünceyi tahrik etmektedirler. Yazarların bazıları daha çağdaş kuramcı-
larla hesaplaşmakta ve onlarla bağlantılar kurmaktadırlar. Makaleleri inceledikten sonra devletin,
ulusun ve çevrenin rolü, fedakârlığın yaygın doğası, toplumsal eylemin ve toplumsal dayanışmanın
kökenleri ve bireyin kolektiviteyle olan ilişkisi hakkında yeni düşüncelere sahip olacağız. Aynı za-
manda, Durkheim'in entelektüel kapasitesini ve dehasını bir kez daha takdir edeceğiz. Bu muhteva
da, biz hedeflerimize ulaşamasak da, bir derginin bir sayısı için muhtemelen fazlasıyla yeterlidir.

Özel Sayı Editörleri

Philip Smith

Aynur Erdoğan Coşkun

EDITORIAL

Four Kinds of Intellectual Production in Durkheim with Reflections on Durkheim in Turkey

Emile Durkheim died in 1917. For a long time, he had been suffering from neurasthenia –a medical condition recognized at the time–the symptoms of which included depression and listlessness. His spirit was broken by the loss of his son André in the trenches.

But in what sense exactly did he really "die"? The funeral of a truly leading intellectual is never really the end. It can perhaps better be thought of as the closing of an initial chapter. This is certainly a productive way to think about Durkheim. Considered not as flesh and blood but in actor-network way as a tight-knit bundle of circulating texts and ideas, and in a cultural sociological way as a symbol and totemic focus of attention for admirers and detractors, he has lived on. With the assistance of readers, followers and critics "Durkheim" has continued to be not only remarkably important but also intellectually productive and innovative. Over the past one hundred years, new ideas, new lines of inquiry and new empirical applications have proliferated in ways that the living Durkheim could never have envisioned. Certainly, he has become a more complex and modern thinker than the fin-de-siècle intellectual who put pen to paper. He is still with us as an active force.

What has driven this remarkable posthumous relevance and productivity? We argue, borrowing some language from our friends in science and technology studies, that 'Durkheim' since 1917 has been proven to be a remarkably flexible assemblage that has offered affordances to four broad types of scholarship.

Type I: Durkheim stands out for the remarkable intellectual and philosophical depth and originality of his thought; the abstraction, density and size of his texts; and their often elusive and inconsistent qualities. In combination these three factors provide plenty of raw material for mining, aligning, clarifying and problematizing concepts or theoretical logics. There can be a perpetual motion quality here to the extent that Durkheim interpretation becomes an autonomous field. Many efforts, what we could designate "Type Ia" often center around "getting it right" or arriving at the most accurate possible representation of Durkheim's thought. Such papers generally address core themes that are highly visible in his oeuvre. These include anomie, morality, solidarity, integration, ritual, professions, law, education, societal evolution, social facts or religion. Scholars frequently highlight subtle shifts in thinking or observe tensions within or between various texts. A subset of work here has something of the quality of intellectual biography as well as dealing with concept and theory specification. This mode is most strongly associated with the scholars behind Durkheimian Studies/études Durkheimiennes with their incredibly detailed knowledge of Durkheim's life, times and ideas. A variation on this theme (Type Ib) that is less commonly found involves studying the reception and interpretation of Durkheim's texts. This is an exercise in the sociology of knowledge or the history of social thought. It explores how particular ideas get taken up and used, or how certain themes are given emphasis or are neglected.

Type II: If Type I scholarship tends to be centripetal and inward looking, Type II is centrifugal and reaches out. Durkheim's thoughts are unusually open to collisions and affordances arising from or inspired by developments in wider sociology and social theory. The connection possibilities are far more extensive than we might imagine. Here Durkheim is generally read with a new lens. Sometimes this lens is one with a greater power of magnification than we are used to (the usual tool of Type I research), but often it just has a new, unexpected angle of perspective thanks to shifts in sociological interest. Themes and second rank concepts we had not much noticed before, move

into visibility. Small sections of text or the myriad comparatively minor essays are scrutinized for what they say to have about this novel theme. Sometimes they are collected by a scholar and we see for the first time that Durkheim actually wrote quite a lot on a topic. Maybe we have missed this as there is no chapter heading and the entries were scattered. This Durkheim is often placed in juxtaposition to other generally less important and more middle range theorists in an operation of intellectual triangulation; or is seen as a prescient thinker who formulated significant ideas, but perhaps in an incomplete or provisional way. Our Durkheim here is often a little more contemporary in feel than the Durkheim we find in Type I scholarship. He seems less chained to his epoch and appears to be an intellectual magpie rather like Simmel rather than a scholar with 'joined up thinking'. This figure is frequently a cultural sociologist or cultural political theorist who was, to our surprise "first to market" or "avant la lettre" in multiple areas. Topics written about here might include –and these are just examples– the body, material culture and iconic power, fatalism, interaction ritual, sexuality, human rights, and punishment.

Type III: A tradition going back to Parsons takes a more macroscopic approach. It tends to look at Durkheim in toto as representing a particular general vision or analytic option in sociological theory. He offers a set of foundational solutions/stances with regard to issues such as social action, order, system integration, modernity or social explanation. He is said to articulate a fundamental orientation that can be juxtaposed to other major thinkers, typically Marx and Weber but sometimes also Meade or Goffman. The act of reading typically sketches out a 'big picture'. It has lines of perspective that are demarcated by the novel synthetic and analytic frame at the center of the intellectual effort. Here Durkheim is generally depicted towards the philosophical end of social theory continuum. He is a deep thinker who engages in occasional empirical illustrations to demonstrate his abstract points. Monograph efforts by Parsons (1937), Habermas (1984), and Alexander (2014) might be thought of as representative. So might the work of critics such as Lockwood (1992) or Tilly (1981) who want to assert that Durkheim often got things wrong and made poor theoretical choices. For such detractors, Durkheim tends to stand in for what is bad about structural functionalism, cultural sociology or systems level explanations as a whole. If there are fish to fry, why not fry the biggest fish?

Type IV: Finally, we have events, happenings, social facts and trends in the 'real world' that are to be explained. Often surprising events throw down the gauntlet to the sociologist. At other times emergent trends in society become a temporary focus for disciplinary activity. Recurrent and robust features of institutional life also need accounting. Durkheim's toolkit of concepts and his adaptable theoretical armature provides an off the peg set of resources for ordering and explaining. The impetus here is often to show that Durkheim has traction, is still relevant or that he mops up a lot of the variance when it comes to getting a grip on what is going on. He is a means to an end, not an end in himself for scholarship. When it comes to events, grist for this mill has historically included coronations and funerals, media spectacles, wars, terror attacks, moral panics, elections, memorials, controversies and scandals. The standard toolkit for explanation, at least today, tends to be the cultural one involving ritual, solidarity and the sacred and profane. It is easy to forget, however, that a less spectacular strand of everyday "real world" events also exists that are the stock in trade for a more routinized, less theoretically inclined body of scholarship. Notable here is the positivist Durkheim of "Suicide" and the "Rules of Sociological Method" and his continuing low-key, un-cited impacts on fields such as quantitative criminology and public health. Aside from drawing down on Durkheim's general methodological call to study social facts and their law-like properties, scholars engaged in this kind of work will seek to measure the impact of more specifically Durkheimian variables such as social ties and their density, demographics, moral beliefs and religion.

Is this typology viable, useful or complete? The essays collected here do not provide a definitive answer as they illustrate the possibilities in an uneven way. As editors we have been faithful to the pattern of submissions and the blind peer review process rather than box checking with an eye to validating our classification. Papers in the contemporary cultural sociology mode are very surprisingly missing, as are those that are positivist applications, and those which focus on the most macro levels of big picture theory comparison. We were also very surprised that there were no strong papers sent in looking at the impact of Durkheim on Turkish sociology, Turkish social thought or the interface between the state and the academy in the nation building process. For this reason, we have provided this information ourselves a paragraph or so down. In many cases the papers published here illustrate hybrid forms and bring together different thought styles and uses of Durkheim. There will be dominant and subordinated tendencies that can be uncovered by a typologically informed taxonomical reading. So, we suggest our typology is of ideal types –that it is a heuristic with which to develop reading strategies and so to answer the questions: What is the author doing here? To whom are they speaking?

Charles Lemert's contribution fits most closely with our Type IV cell in its concern with explaining contemporary social realities. It differs from the more common forms of case study orientation in that it displays Lemert's signature intellectual style and scope. He rubs Durkheim up against a thousand years of history, speculates on his ghost's views of the 20th century and indicates a legacy that extends through French structuralism (and thence, we would add, too much contemporary cultural sociology). The idea behind this kind of reading is one of mutual imbrication or mirroring. For Lemert, Durkheim helps us see how the modern world works. Durkheim also sets up moral expectations with which we can judge good and bad choices. Essentially, Durkheim for Lemert was a universalist who believed in the possibility of solidaristic inclusion and cooperation. In this essay we also see Lemert showing how world events in their turn offer a way to reflect back on the theory and to highlight its continuing relevance as an analytic and moral lodestone. From the perspective of our special edition, Lemert's thoughts on how Durkheim would have understood 20th century Turkey are particularly interesting. He notes the role of religion in generating solidarity. Unfortunately, it is largely left to others to reflect on what we feel is a signature issue here: a comparison of Durkheim's programmatic views of laïcité, the state and civic-secular-professional-moral integration with the Kemalist reconstruction of Turkey. In a sense Turkey - today torn between more secular and more religious modes of political orientation - provides a test for the viability of Durkheim's vision of a modern Republic.

In the case of Turkey, the deep relevance of Durkheim's thinking on such matters was recognized early. At the very end of the 19th century the organizers of the constitutionalist movement opposed to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II attempted to steer modernization policies by drawing down a little on Durkheim's views. Durkheim was to remain a source of inspiration in the nation-state formation process after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

The intellectual world of Turkey read the name of Emile Durkheim for the first time in the writings of Ahmad Shuaib whose writings were published in the journal Servet-i Fünun [The Wealth of Sciences] with the title Hayat ve Kitaplar [Life and Books] in 1899. These introduced Durkheim together with his rival Gabriel Tarde, yet levels of attention did not pass beyond those attending to intellectual curiosity at first. This interest also embraced Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer in Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası [The Discipline of Economics and the Social Corpus], again under the influence of Ahmed Shuaib. The anti-individualist and socialist sociology of Durkheim became more visible at the time of the Balkan Wars, which began in 1912, and which were followed by World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. In this context, Ziya Gökalp stepped forward as a central figure, applying and adapting the ideas of Durkheim to the conditions of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

Durkheim's political thought had been much influenced by the need to strengthen France's fragile Third Republic. Gökalp picked up this theme and emphasized the solidaristic, moralistic and state-centric qualities of Durkheim's thought. He found Durkheim's solidarist-corporatist model to be more humanistic compared to options like communism or liberalism and to be more appropriate than these to Turkish society (Parla, 1989). He proposed the triple formula of "Becoming Islamic, Turkish, and Contemporary" in the process of Turkey becoming modern nation-state. Among the most important issues in Turkey's modernization were the questions of how a Muslim society could be a part of the Christian and Western international system and how Turkey could manage material and spiritual tensions. For this reason, Gökalp used the culture-civilization contrast of German romanticism in his theoretical expansion. He researched the ancient histories, traditions, customs, and practices of Turks for the construction of a Turkism that would form the cultural dimension of the nation-state. Moreover, he also underlined a path of modernization as essential for Turkey. Gökalp adopted the meaning that Durkheim had imposed on these two concepts (culture, civilization) at this point (Kabakcı, 2011). According to this, nations can be a part of the international "civilization" of scientific and technological development and global exchange while maintaining cultures that included unique elements of religion, language, law, aesthetics, and morality.

According to Gökalp, his theoretical framework provided an opportunity to be part of Western civilization while remaining Turk and Muslim. Turkism was proposed as a pivotal cultural element in the context of the new nationalist ideology. Mohammedanism would become a cultural element of this Turkishness, and the function of maintaining solidarity would be imposed not on a strengthened individualism but on a strengthened socialism or collectivism. This conceptual framework, which Gökalp had reached by interpreting Durkheim, was to be a pillar for the promotion of a corporatist management approach that provided for the representation of various religious and ethnic groups with the aim of preventing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. These were linked to political developments for the arbitration of Turkish nationalism viz-a-viz separatist groups. With the creation of the Republic of Turkey Gökalp's ideas became more influential and somewhat institutionalized. Yet it is of interest to reflect that Gökalp's work was not a one-to-one transfer of Durkheim's ideas but an adaptation of his views to the conditions of Turkey. It was an act involving the translation and adaption of an idea-set to the 'local' within a 'global' knowledge order. For example, Gökalp counterbalances Durkheim's concepts of order and morality with nation and progress and his concept of collective consciousness with national consciousness. In contrast to the French society as discussed by Durkheim, in Turkey new solutions were felt especially necessary in the area of political stability not in the area of everyday social order. This was because, although the Republican administration and the new intellectual orderings were fragile, Islam already provided foundations for routine solidarity and individual purpose. So, while Durkheim advocated laïcité Gökalp saw a role for religion as an important component of a shared national consciousness and unity (Bulut, 2015).

Gökalp's application and adaptation of Durkheim's concepts and ideas to the case of Turkey was one of the most significant paths through which Turkish sociology engaged with Western thought. Because of this, determining where Durkheim's impact begins and where it ends is quite difficult. For many Turkish politicians and intellectuals in prior decades, Durkheim's nation-state-solidarity-morality approach was fundamental. Indeed, it might have become a kind of second nature and so account for the lack of any article about interpretations of Durkheim in Turkey among the submissions to our special edition. We also reflect that the case of Gökalp indicates the presence of a kind of Durkheim scholarship not indicated in our typology above. There is a Type V that uses Durkheim for normative projects with associated social engineering. This feeds off Durkheim's desire for social stability, collective morality and national identification. Having considered a legacy where

we might have expected but did not receive contributions, we are in a position to return to the items we are publishing here.

By centering his effort around the somewhat overlooked concept of sacrifice, but with frequent reference to more contemporary theorists, Ronjon Paul Datta offers something of a hybrid between a Type I and Type II paper. He shows that something we might quickly read past is actually quite pervasive in Durkheim and that we can profit by a new way of seeing - one that moves sacrifice to center stage. But his study is a little more complex than this. Charitable readers will say that it nicely illustrates the 'ideal type' quality of our typology, insofar as this paper seems to do a little of everything. Others might ask if it does not invalidate our apparatus given that the fit is so bad. For Datta the real world of neoliberal governance with its associated push against altruism, its failures, waste and finally fiscal bailouts (which sacrificed its own principles), is something that can be usefully illuminated with this Durkheimain resource (Type IV paper). And Durkheim, although he appears here as fresh, prescient and contemporary, is also subject to critique. Brilliant as he may be, Datta argues he represents the kind of idealistic cultural theory that needs a corrective from theorists whose theoretical logics are more concerned with power such as Foucault (Type III, critical position).

If Datta is hard to classify we are confident that Graciella Inda belongs squarely in Type I. She offers a really detailed account of a well-established core theme –the State– in a very tightly defined, two-year period of Durkheim's intellectual life. As with Datta's paper here we have a contribution that perfectly illustrates the ways in which Durkheim's texts continue to reward close reading and re-reading. Inda shows how the state had a broadly positive role in Durkheim's vision, how growing state authority was not incompatible with individual rights and liberties, and how social solidarity existed beyond or was prior to the state. In a sense, this vision is of the state as a facilitator under the condition of organic solidarity. Again, we are struck by the need for an engagement between this vision and Turkey's Kemalism, both as a historical period and as a theory of political organization.

Eric Malczewski's contribution would seem to be clearly identifiable as a Type II paper. He is inspired by recent developments in the field of nations and nationalism and so turns to this somewhat subordinate theme in Durkheim's work. After some excavation, Durkheim is shown to have had prescient insights about the collective conscience and imagined community from which we scholars can still learn today. Although making a methodological and epistemological pitch, Malczewski's paper also demonstrates an interest in contemporary cultural sociology that has been inspired by Durkheim and that has made progress in explaining the operation of nationalism in the world today. This is a Type IV paper characteristic. In a sense, like Lemert, he indicates the productive fusion that has taken place in the Unites States between the Durkheimian tradition and cultural sociological aimed at explanation (Smith, in press).

Bjørn Schiermer's exploration of Durkheim's orientation towards social action is a subtle and creative application of the Type I pattern. However in this case he does not track a single concept but rather traces a general movement or tendency in Durkheim's thought –namely from a vision of social facts as external and constraining towards a more voluntaristic understanding of creative action and shared, generative sociality. In a famous footnote in Elementary Forms Durkheim denied he had shifted. But why should we take him at his word? There are many reasons to question whether individuals have perfect self-understanding. Besides, there is the matter of presentation of self: Intellectuals are generally reluctant to flag that their thinking is inconsistent. Schiermer nicely demonstrates that even as Durkheim didactically belabored the point that individuals were subordinated to social forces, he was somewhat aware all along that social currents relating to things like fashion and crowd behavior hinted that a more positive and socio-dynamic understanding was requ-

ired. Themes relating to integration and positive attachment to the collectivity offered a temporary solution. The ultimate resolution came in Elementary Forms where Durkheim argued that collective action and shared participation themselves generated solidarity and shaped behavior by conferring a sense of sacrality. Schiermer offers just a few suggestive empirical illustrations and his main contribution lies in the analytic reconstruction of a changing pattern of thought. However, many readers will be aware of the ways in which Randall Collins (2004) and his theory of interaction ritual has already demonstrated the plausibility of the approach with which this paper terminates.

According to Schiermer's logic, Abdulkerim Sönmez highlights aspects of Durkheim's early thinking. The focus in this Type I paper is on a close reading of Durkheim, although comparisons with Tonnies and Marx also offer a Type III feel. The thrust here is to focus on society as the active agent, on functional system relations as supporting the survival of society, and of individuals as constrained by social facts. Sönmez tries to show that Durkheim did not push the subject to a passive position even as he emphasized the power of social facts in the context of his effort to have sociology become an independent academic discipline. Even though Durkheim said society is a synthesis where we can attribute an independent being to the self of society beyond the sum of individuals, he drew attention to the fact that the individual attaches importance to survival within society as a subject-actor.

Çağrı Eryılmaz's study attempts to show what Durkheim's concepts can provide for the construction of an environmental sociology. Likewise, the claim is made that Durkheim might have been able to give more importance to community-environment interactions if he had been engaged in a foundational sociology of contemporary society rather than the one of his time. According to Eryılmaz, Durkheim left out those environmental impacts whose effects on social phenomena are often significant. This is because Durkheim argued that social facts could only be explained via other social facts. However, concepts related to the environment can still be found in Durkheim's texts and environmental factors are somewhat acknowledged to play a role in the process of modernization. Environmental sociology in turn can benefit from reinterpreting concepts of solidarity and division of labor in the context of global environmental issues such as climate change, which humanity continues to face today. Generally speaking, Eryılmaz's study can be seen to belong in the Type II category because he makes theoretical expansion by reinterpreting themes of secondary importance in Durkheim's texts in light of present theoretical concerns.

With a pattern of heavy citation to Pickering, Watts Miller and Besnard, Alexander Goffman's paper signals that it belongs in our Type I classification. His mission is to get the interpretation right rather than to open things up. Like Datta he shows that interrogating a second-tier concept through close reading can be a useful way to clarify Durkheim's thought and propel critical theoretical inquiry in new directions. In this case Goffman shows that tradition was an element of normative integration. However, for Durkheim it alternated with periods of intense collective creativity wherein new conditions of existence were established. These would generate their own traditions in turn. Goffman also shows here subordinated elements of the Type II and Type IV intellectual style. Durkheim helps explain elements of Soviet political culture in the 20th century (a Type IV characteristic) and he anticipates developments in thinking about multiple modernities and their relationship to de-traditionalization (a Type II theme). We might add that by Goffman's telling Durkheim also anticipates the alternation between stable and unsettled periods that is elaborated in Anne Swidler's (1986) highly cited 'toolkit paper' entitled Culture in Action. From Goffman's reconstruction of the logic of Durkheim's famous 1911 presentation it would seem that he offers a model that will be perhaps more satisfying to those who see too much individualism and pragmatism in Swidler's approach.

Conclusion

As we noted earlier, contrary to our expectations, the presentation here does not fully capture the range of contemporary Durkheimian scholarship in Turkey or elsewhere. A few pages notwithstanding, we lack a representative body of empirical applications and extensions with an eye towards social outcome explanation. Such work lies at the core of the contemporary cultural sociology that has made use of Durkheim, especially in the United States. Durkheim's situation as the flag bearer for normative action theory, systems logics and so forth is also not much addressed. Still our collection amply documents Durkheim's continuing ability to inspire or generate high-level social theory "from within", as it were. The papers presented here show how detailed textual reconstructions of this thought do not just recapitulate what we already know a little more accurately. Rather they stimulate the analytic thinking that can offer creative re-readings that will send us off in new thought directions. So do the collisions and connections with more contemporary theorists made by some of the authors. After looking over the papers we will have new thoughts about the role of the state and of the nation and the environment, the widespread nature of sacrifice, the origins of social action and social solidarity, and the relationship of the individual to the collectivity. We will also appreciate yet again the intellectual scope and genius of Durkheim. Although we did not hit all our intended targets this is probably more than enough for one volume of one journal.

Guest Editors

Philip Smith

Aynur Erdoğan Coşkun

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Tradition, Morality and Solidarity in Durkheim's Theory

Alexander Gofman[1]

Abstract

This article examines Durkheim's approach to the interrelationship of tradition, morality and solidarity. One of its basic claims is that Durkheim was an epistemological and methodological rationalist, but not an ontological one. It means that he grounded rational and scientific knowledge about social reality, which itself, to his mind, is not rational. It concerns directly his treatment of tradition, morality and social solidarity. In spite of all Durkheim's statements about the decline of traditionalism in contemporary societies, he affirmed sometimes that traditional behaviour in general is almost identical to a moral one. We can see it namely in his reasoning about the close affinity and nearly identical character between "collective habits" and true morality. In industrial societies, according to him, two types of traditions coexist, namely old, "traditional" traditions inherited from the past on the one hand, and new, "rational" traditions, on the other hand. His statements about the alternation of historical periods dominated by traditions and ideals contains a kind of sketch on the philosophy of history, partly explaining the phenomena of time compression and time distension in different periods of social development. Durkheimian theory may be interpreted as a fruitful contribution to the present-day understanding of the processes of modernization.

Keywords

Tradition • Morality • Solidarity • Rules • Emile Durkheim

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Introductory Notes

It is well known that Durkheim considered morality as a main object of sociological study. He studied this domain for the entirety of his life. In his first fundamental work he tried to demonstrate that the division of labour in society fulfills the moral function, in other words, that it maintains social solidarity. His final, unfinished book, partly published posthumously, was about morality too (Durkheim, 1979a). For many years he delivered University lecture courses about the nature and different fields of this domain, including general morality, contractual morality, professional morals, civic morals, etc. (See for instance: Durkheim, 2012, 2015). Durkheim intended to create a specific science, or sociological discipline which he named either "science of moral facts", or "science of mores" ("science des moeurs"), "physique of mores", or "physique of mores and of law" ("physique des moeurs et du droit"). As a follower of Comte, and unlike Marx, he regarded morality to be a true productive force, a solid basic reality, and an even more "real reality" than the economy or politics.

According to Durkheim, solidarity and regulation, or rules, are two basic sides and at the same time, two distinctive features of morality.[2] Morality in his theory is inseparable from social solidarity and in a certain sense coincides with it: "… Morality consists in solidarity with the group, and varies according to that solidarity. Cause all social life to vanish, and moral life would vanish at the same time, having no object to cling to." (Durkheim, 1997, p. 331).

While morality in Durkheimian theory was extensively studied by sociologists for a long time (see, for instance Fish, 2005; Turner, 1993; Wallwork, 1972; Watts Miller, 1996), this cannot be said about his treatment of tradition, which had drawn little attention from analysts. Nevertheless, the problematics of tradition, explicitly and implicitly, occupy an important place in his general theory, as well as in his interpretation of some particular areas of sociological knowledge such as the sociology of morality, of religion, or of law. One of the main objects of the "science des moeurs", according to him, should become the specific traditional norms and practices of different societies. The purpose of this article is to analyze Durkheimian view of tradition in close relation to his treatment of morality and solidarity.

Durkheim and Weber on Reason and Tradition: A Comparison

To better understand Durkheim's approach to traditions it is useful to compare his views with those of Max Weber's. In spite of all the differences between their respective programs of sociology, in their own studies and reflections that *realized* these programmes, they had much more in common than it might have

2   On Durkheimian theory of social solidarity and social rules see (Gofman, 2014).

seemed, to themselves and to many of their interpreters. Besides, these very programmes of both classics at times were the reflections *post festum,* aimed at explaining, interpreting or justifying the studies that had already been made by them and that had not always exerted much influence on these studies.[3] Some similarity between their viewpoints is found - especially in their approaches to rationalism, traditions and traditionalism.

Durkheim, as well as Weber, considers the pre-industrial societies to be based on tradition. Just as the German sociologist does, he establishes the fact of the progressive decline of traditionalism and views this decline as a main tendency of social evolution. Both classics note that in contemporary Western societies the detraditionalization is accompanied by the processes of rationalization, intellectualization and, at the same time, by the "disenchantment of the world", as Weber's famous expression had put it. Both think the growing importance of science, technology, industry and corresponding innovations to be the main components of rationalization. Both testify to the crisis of contemporary European societies. Both recognize, if not so much the failure (as the theorists of the Frankfurt school or the "post-modernists" did), but the fundamental complexity and contradictory character of the so called "modernist project" of the Enlightenment.

In Weber's work we can distinguish two concepts of tradition.[4] One of them denotes a "traditional" action as one of his four famous types of action, along with "affective", "purposeful rational" ("zweck-rational") and "value rational" ("wertrational") actions. In this sense, tradition is identified by him to be a psychological inertia and is interpreted as a kind of action purely imitative, quasi-automatic and habitual. In the second sense Weber interprets tradition as a form of "value rational" action, that is, a social action in which the individual attributes to his behavioural act a subjective sense and orientation toward other individuals.

Doubtless both classics were aware of the crisis of rationalism as a social ideal and analyzed this crisis. Nevertheless, the degrees and the forms of their own rationalism were different. That's why they appreciated the role and the potential of science in the contemporary world in different ways. While, according to Weber, the science cannot intervene in the "eternal struggle of gods", for Durkheim science is just one of these gods (or rather goddess) that take and must take an active part in this struggle. The science which explains and clarifies the values, including sacred values, is itself a sacred value for him. Although both classics are more or less pessimistic in their appraisals of contemporary epoch, nevertheless, unlike Weber who relies only on the "fate", Durkheim believes in science and its ability to contribute to overcoming or reducing the contemporary crisis.

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3   On such situation with the Weberian theory of action see, for instance (Joas, 1996, pp. 44–45).

4   In more detail see (Gofman, 2015, pp. 109–124; in Russian).

In this connection it is important to clarify the specificity of Durkheim's rationalism. No doubt he was a confirmed rationalist and regarded himself to be a sort of Descartes in sociology, whose vocation was to develop "the rules of sociological method", just as Descartes had done two and a half hundred years before him on the "rules of method" in general. He asserts that his "main objective is to extend the scope of scientific rationalism to cover human behaviour by demonstrating that, in the light of the past, it is capable of being reduced to relationships of cause and effect, which, by an operation no less rational, can then be transformed into rules of action for the future." (Durkheim, 1992, p. 33). He sincerely believed in science and its great potential.

Nevertheless, Durkheim by no means belonged to these "big children in university chairs or editorial offices" who believed that science could explain the meaning of the world and of whom Max Weber spoke in his famous lecture "Science as a Vocation." (Weber, 1991, pp. 142–143). In that lecture he also formulated his rhetorical question: "What man will take upon himself the attempt to "refute scientifically" the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount?" (Weber, 1991, p. 148).

Durkheim, despite his fervent rationalism and scientism, would quite willingly accept Weber's rhetorical question because he never set for science such purposes. The aim of science, according to him, is *not to refute* but to *clarify the* ethic of the Sermon on the Mount as well as any other ethic. In this respect his point of view completely coincided with Weber's one. He asserted that even the most bizarre and "irrational" cultural and behavioural patterns were to be explained and clarified by science, but not to be refuted at all. He tried to find rational and functional foundation of every institution, custom or ritual. Durkheim wrote in "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life", that "the most bizarre or barbarous rites and the strangest myths translate some human need and some aspect of life, whether social or individual." (Durkheim, 1995, p. 2). And he claimed that "a fundamental postulate of sociology" is "that a human institution cannot rest upon error and falsehood." (Durkheim, 1995, p. 2). His religious and moral relativism was accompanied by a relativistic and non-universalistic interpretation of rationality.[5]

It can be concluded that in general Durkheim was an *epistemological* and *methodological* rationalist, but not an *ontological* one. It means that he grounded *rational* and *scientific* knowledge about social reality which itself, to his mind, *is not rational.* It is similar to the theory of Freud who meant to construct an *ultra-rational science of irrational human reality.*

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5   He said: "Every moral system has its own rationality."; "All moral systems have their own rationality." (Durkheim, 1979b, pp. 65, 66).

The Role of Tradition in Durkheim's Theory

Indeed, social reality in Durkheim's rationalistic interpretation is directed not so much by reason, but by "non-rational component", which consists of religion and morality, based on emotion to a high degree.[6] Though, according to him, in future societies "…religions will no longer be able to exert very deep or wide sway on consciences" (Durkheim, 1951, p. 375), he did not consider that religion would be replaced by science and believed in the eternity of religion on the whole because it is the primary foundation of social solidarity. He refrained from giving any specific statements concerning the religions of the future. Nevertheless, he expressed his opinion, or rather hopes about their main features. These would be, according to him, their rationalism and individual initiative; and most importantly "the social sense which had always been the soul of religions, will be established in them more straightly and expressly than in the past, not being hidden any more behind the myths and symbols" (La Question religieuse, 1907, p. 51). It means that even in his social ontology Durkheim assigned a certain role to the rational aspect of social life, believing somewhat naively in the direct sense of society without myths and symbols.

The Durkheimian "segmentary" societies with "mechanical" solidarity are based on the similarity or identity of individual consciousnesses which are completely dissolved in "collective" or "common" consciousness. This consciousness, in Durkheim's definition, "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society…" (Durkheim, 1997, pp. 38–39), is almost synonymous to the notion of *traditional consciousness* (Durkheim, 1997, p. 39).[7] In this respect, it has the same high degree of imperativeness and control over consciousness and behaviour of the individuals, as tradition does. Under the influence of the division of labor, the "mechanical" solidarity is replaced with the "organic" one. In societies with the predominance of "organic" solidarity the importance of tradition is less accentuated. They are based on the autonomy of individuals, on the division of functions, on functional interdependence and exchange. At the same time, in this type of societies the "collective" (traditional) consciousness does not disappear, but its prescriptions become vaguer, indefinite and its functioning embraces a much more narrow area of social life.

Although the Durkheimian distinction between two types of societies was largely analytical, he believed, however, that the main tendency of social evolution was the transition of societies with "mechanical" solidarity to more advanced societies with "organic" solidarity. This transition, as it had been noted, is caused by the progressive division of social labor. But, according to Durkheim, this division of labour itself does not create a society. It only transforms a society that *already exists*. And the pre-existing fundamental basis of society consists of a set of traditions realized in collective

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6   This thesis was emphasized by Jonathan Fish (Fish, 2005).

7   "…It does not change with every generation but, on the contrary, links successive generations to one another."

consciousness. In this connection he emphasizes the insufficiency of mere contractual relations for sustaining the social solidarity. This point in Durkheim's theory was once emphasized by Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1949, pp. 364–365, 461, etc.). Durkheim maintained that the contract presupposed a definite set of shared values and norms which are included into it, and without which its efficient functioning is impossible. He wrote, "But it is not only outside the sphere of contractual relationships, but also on the interplay between these relationships themselves that social action is to be felt. For in a contract not everything is contractual." (Durkheim, 1997, p. 158). In other words, he affirms that even the modern rational social relations cannot exist without sacred value foundation based on tradition to high extent.

Unlike Gabriel Tarde, who considered the decline of traditionalism a transitory phenomenon,[8] Durkheim claimed the general and steady weakening of the power of tradition in history. Even in cases of traditionalism revival which occur from time to time in different societies, it loses its former strength and efficiency. In order to understand this, it is necessary to compare the different social types at corresponding analogous phases of their development, and not with those which immediately precede these phases. According to Durkheim, "The new societies that replace extinct social types never embark on their course at the very spot where the others came to a halt. How could that be possible? What the child continues is not the old age or the years of maturity of his parents, but their own childhood. Thus if we wish to take stock of the course that has been run we must consider successive societies only at the same stage of their existence." (Durkheim, 1997, p. 121). Applying this principle to appreciating a general role of traditions in social evolution, he wrote, "Doubtless, if we compare the final days of one society with the beginnings of the one that follows it, we perceive a return to traditionalism. Only this phase, by which every social type begins, is always much less violent than it had been in the immediately preceding type. With us ancestral customs have never been the object of superstitious worship such as that devoted to them at Rome. … In other words the authority of custom is continually diminishing." (Durkheim, 1997, pp. 237–238).

General decline of traditionalism, Durkheim argued, is accompanied by a corresponding decrease of religiosity, its intensity and scale. Indeed, they are the almost identical processes. Among the factors weakening the influence of tradition he emphasized the increase of geographic and social mobility, migrations and urbanization. All these processes undermine the authority of traditions and, at the same time, they intensify the tendency to innovations. They reduce the influence of older generations on younger ones and prompt the progressive autonomy of the latter from the former. Now young people leave their parents' home more often and

8   Tarde treated social evolution as an alternation of traditional epochs based on the custom, and innovative ones based on the "fashion"; in these cases there are two kinds of imitation, namely the ancestors in the former case, and the contemporaries in the latter.

earlier than before, getting rid of the habitual social environment influence. Old people are real representatives of tradition and living mediators between the past and the present. With the development of civilization the authority and power of the old generations are waning. In contemporary societies the differences between the age groups become less important and the equality between them grows. As Durkheim pointed out, "Old men are pitied rather than feared. Age differences are levelled out. All men, once they have arrived at the age of maturity, treat one another as approximate equals. As a result of this leveling-out, the customs of one's forefathers lose their ascendancy, since for adults they lack anyone to represent them with authority." (Durkheim, 1997, p. 236).

Undoubtedly, in social and political scene of the Third Republic France Durkheim was a convinced anti-traditionalist. But in his general theory traditions play a much more important role than it might seem at first glance. According to him, tradition, as well as the social facts in general, has the coercive and extra-individual character. Besides, this phenomenon is transmitted from the past, and it is permanent, strong, continuous, efficient, and respected by the actors. Durkheim often exemplifies the social facts in general and their distinctive features by traditions, as well as by phenomena of the same order, namely by customs or rituals. The efficiency of any tradition is based on social sanctions and on respect inspired by it for the members of society. As Durkheim stated, "The traditional customs, even when they have nothing religious or moral, as the holidays, civil ceremonies and fashion are protected by a large variety of sanctions against individual attempts at rebellion. The economic organization is imposed on us by an imperative necessity too." (Durkheim, 1975, p. 27). The influence of tradition and respect for it explains in some degree the resistance to innovations. It depends particularly on the sphere of social life. In religion and morality the innovation and reform generally are labeled as heresy and sacrilege. Consequently, the possibility of changes is equal almost to zero, but in economic sphere the possibility is greater. (Durkheim, 1975, p. 29).

In spite of all Durkheim's statements about the decline of traditionalism in contemporary societies, he believed that the new industrial societies will be based on traditions in a great measure too. Only these new "rational" traditions, being in *status nascendi,* are quite different from the old, "traditional" traditions. These latter, according to him, will be mainly replaced by the former ones. Old traditions, partly inherited from societies with mechanical solidarity and contained in "collective consciousness", will take some, though small, place in new industrial societies. These latter, Durkheim thought, will be based on two kinds of traditions: old, "traditional" ones, inherited from traditional societies, and new, rational ones, developed in contemporary industrial societies. So, to paraphrase the famous saying, his viewpoint

on this subject might be formulated as follows: "La tradition est morte, vive la tradition!", "Tradition is dead, long live the tradition!".

It is important to note that Durkheim uses the concept of tradition not only when he uses the word "tradition". He attributes, for instance, the same significance to the expression the "collective habits" that he analyses in his lectures published under the title "The Moral Education" (1925). Here he treats this expression as a true synonym of tradition. He claims sometimes, that traditional behaviour in general is almost identical to moral one. He emphasizes the close affinity and nearly identical character between collective habits, on the one hand, and morality, on the other hand. In fact, from his point of view, a moral rule becomes truly moral and truly a rule only when it becomes traditional one, i.e. regular, continuous, habitual, long and so on. In this connection Durkheim spoke not only about the content of moral rules, but about the moral rules as such, and their traditional character as their specific feature. Regulation, according to him, is a fundamental function of morality. It means that moral behaviour is basically a constant, persistent and invariable phenomenon. It does not depend on contingency and vicissitudes of the present day. Durkheim asserted, "…The morality is essentially a constant phenomenon, always identical to itself…A moral act tomorrow must be the same as it was today, whatever were the personal dispositions of the agent who commits it." (Durkheim, 2012, p. 47). And he added, "Although all collective habits are not moral, all moral practices are collective habits. Therefore, everyone who is not susceptible to everything that is habit, risks also to be not susceptible to morality." (Durkheim, 2012, p. 47). It is evident from these quotations, that Durkheim's expression "collective habits" is synonymous to "tradition", in any case, to one of its basic meanings.

Alternation of Traditions and Ideals: On Durkheim's Philosophy of History

The Durkheimian concept of anomie is closely related to his interpretation of traditions, morality and social solidarity.[9] According to Durkheim, there are two primary anthropological needs of individuals, first, in social or group belonging and, second, in normative and value regulation. Anomie is the lack of the latter one. It must be emphasized here that in Durkheimian theory the decline of traditionalism and the rise of rationality in European civilization per se didn't imply anomie. This passage from traditional to modern, industrial, "rational" society is viewed by him as a main "normal" trend of social evolution. This process had begun in the XYIII century and continued up to the epoch that Durkheim could consider as contemporary for him. But, according to him, anomie consists above all in the fact that the decline of the old, "traditional" traditions, which itself is "normal" and fruitful, lasted too long, and for a too long time there was no necessary and worthy substitute for them in the sphere

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9   For the fundamental analysis of the concept of anomie see Besnard (1987).

of ideals. Anomie, and social crisis, consist not in transition from traditionalism to rationalism, but in the "abnormal" vacuum and uncertainty in the domain of norms and values, instead of the "normal" fullness and certainty of this domain.

Unlike Marx, for whom contemporary crisis was above all economic and political, Durkheim, as well as Comte, believed it was essentially a religious and moral one. He testifies to this view point, by saying, "Today traditional morality is shaken and no other has been brought forward to replace it." (Durkheim, 1965, p. 68). He concludes, "In short, the former gods are growing old or dying, and others have not been born." (Durkheim, 1995, p. 429).

It is evident from the above, that the interpretation of traditions in Durkheim's work is closely connected to his treatment of social ideals. He attaches great importance to the latter and thinks them to be a necessary condition for the existence of societies. In the formation and maintenance of ideals Durkheim sees one of the two principal social functions of religion, the second function being, according to him, the maintenance of social cohesion and solidarity. He wrote: "A society can neither create nor recreate itself without creating some kind of ideal by the same stroke." (Durkheim, 1995, p. 425).

The ideals are closely related to traditions in many respects. They are both the carriers, representatives and containers of social norms and values. They both include an element of sacredness, because sacred character has their common source, i.e. society. Finally, what is the most curious thing in Durkheimian theory, they can be transformed into each other.

In his famous paper presented at the International Congress in Bologne (1911), Durkheim outlined a kind of a brief philosophy of history based on the interpretation of the role and interrelations of traditions and ideals (Durkheim, 1979a, pp. 77–96).[10] He asserted that there was alternation of two types of periods replacing one another in social evolution, "creative" or "innovative", on the one hand, and "ordinary", on the other hand (Durkheim, 1965, pp. 91–92). Evidently, in this case he reproduced a well-known distinction between "critical" and "organic" periods in social evolution made by Saint-Simon and Comte.

But Durkheim introduced some new and special elements in the treatment of this distinction. "Creative" periods are those in which the great ideals are created. These ideals are the basis for civilization and the motor for its further development. This is the time of active exchange of ideas, of collective emotional excitement, close relations and frequent encounters between people. He said, "Such was the great crisis of Christendom,

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10 The similar ideas he developed later in "Conclusion" to his "Elementary Forms of Religious Life". See also his "Introduction à la morale" (1920).

the movement of collective enthusiasm which, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bringing together in Paris the scholars of Europe, gave birth to Scholasticism. Such were the Reformation and Renaissance, the revolutionary epoch and the Socialist upheavals of the nineteenth century." (Durkheim, 1965, p. 92). In such periods social life becomes very intensive, egoistic motives and troubles of everyday life everywhere yield to the general aspiration for the ideal. The ideal strives almost entirely to merge with the real, "At such times the ideal tends to become one with the real, and for this reason men have the impression that the time is close when the ideal will in fact be realized and the Kingdom of God established on earth." (Durkheim, 1965, p. 92). But this exaltation and at the same time illusion, cannot last too long, it is too tiring. When this creative period comes to an end, the intensity of social life, of intellectual and emotional contacts becomes weaker, the individuals return to their everyday, ordinary life.

All the ideas, feelings and actions of "the period of fruitful tempest" remain, but this time in the form of memories which merge no more with reality, they exist apart from it. These ideals are overturned in the past. In fact, they are traditionalized or transformed into traditions. They would die away, if they were not revived periodically by means of various holidays, public ceremonies, sermons in churches and schools, dramatic performances, manifestations, and so on. Nevertheless, all these means only partly and weakly revive the effervescence of innovative epochs and their influence is superficial and transitory. With time, in new "creative" period the ideals are revived again, they are actualized and approach reality anew. Then they are removed from it again, and thus the process goes on.

Traditions, Ideals and Soviet Society: A Durkheimian Perspective

These ideas of the late Durkheim allow us to understand better the alternation of the utopian and traditionalist types of collective mentality in history, the transformation of one type of mentality into another, as well as of some distinctive features of sociocultural time. The latter is compressed, short and rapid in the "innovative" historical periods, on the one hand, slow and long-winded in the "ordinary" ones, on the other hand. From this view point one can also explain some special features of sociocultural time during the political revolutions that Marx named "the locomotives of history", and the enigma of "impatience" observed very often in revolutionary consciousness.

Such phenomena in interpretation and temporal perception of the ideals can be observed, for instance, in the history of the Russian and Soviet societies. The generation of revolutionaries who made the October revolution in Russia in 1917 was in the grip of the utopian vision of reality. They sincerely believed that their children, let alone their grandchildren, would undoubtedly live in an earthly paradise, i.e. under communism. The communist ideal seemed to be so much in the offing. In 1920 Vladimir Lenin resolutely declared that the members of the Russian Komsomol (Young Communist League) of that time would "be able to start building the edifice of communist society

and bring it to completion." (Lenin, 1976, p. 17). He promised with confidence that "the generation of those who are now fifteen years old … will be living in a communist society in ten or twenty years' time…" (Lenin, 1976, p. 21). Today these declarations and predictions, or promises, seem strange and naïve, or, on the contrary, may be considered as hypocritical propaganda tricks. But in this case the chief of the young Soviet State most likely sincerely believed in what he said publicly.

The ideas of this kind in ordinary conditions would be soon enough replaced by more realistic ones. However, they persisted and rather were preserved by the Soviet political power during many decades, due to the various extreme measures, including repressions, brainwashing, isolation from the external world, etc. These ideas were presented even almost fifty years after the October revolution in the well-known declaration by Nikita Khrushchev that "the present generation" of the Soviet people would live under communism. Meanwhile, prudent silence was kept regarding what generation precisely was meant, babies that had just been born, old people or the middle-aged.

But during the period of "stagnation", under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982), the temporal perspective and retrospective were changed. It became evident in the theory of "developed", or "mature" socialism, elaborated by the Soviet propaganda of that time. This theory no longer mentioned communism, but instead claimed that in the Soviet society the "developed", or "mature" socialism was built and it had to be only perfected and improved. In other words, the achievement of the communist ideal, which in 1920 seemed so close to Lenin, was silently postponed to the vague and indefinite future, or even was recognized as non-existent. Even the word "communism" almost disappeared from the official documents and the media. At the same time, in the ideology and propaganda of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union an attitude to educating the people in the spirit of revolutionary, combatant and working traditions of Soviet society prevailed. This attitude was proclaimed in many official resolutions and documents of the Communist Party.

So, in the Soviet Union, quite in accordance with Durkheimian theory, there were traditionalization and ritualization of the communist ideal, its transfer from the "bright future" into the "glorious past". At the beginning of the Soviet period of the Russian history, just after the October revolution of 1917, the tradition was at the service and in obedience of utopia, whereas with time, on the contrary, the utopia found itself submitted to tradition, selected and constructed in a certain way by political power.

Morality of Traditions and Morality of Ideals

From what is written above, the Durkheim's view on the sources of basic sociocultural innovations becomes partly clear. These sources are the social ideals, "Ideals are not abstractions, cold intellectual concepts lacking efficient power. They are essentially

dynamic, for behind them are the powerful forces of the collective." (Durkheim, 1965, p. 93). These ideals in their essence are the innovative forces. They are based on reality, emerge from it, but they add something new to the existing reality. From already existing elements ideals make new combinations, produce new results, renew social reality.

Durkheim emphasized social, collective nature of ideals, as well as of innovations which he treated as results of the latter. The driving force of the ideals consists above all in provoking, especially in the "innovative" epochs, of the states of collective enthusiasm and emotional excitement, or "effervescence".

In this respect, the Durkheimian theory partly approaches the Weberian interpretation of charisma as an innovative and revolutionary force exposed to routinization. However, in contrast to Weber, Tarde and many others, he does not regard an individual to be a source and motor of innovations. According to Durkheim, an individual innovator is the same representative of society as an individual traditionalist. While discussing this question with one of his opponents, he said, "A rebellion against the traditional morality you conceive of as a revolt of the individual against the collective, of personal sentiments against the collective sentiments. However, what I am opposing to the collective is the collective itself, but more and better aware of itself." (Durkheim, 1965, p. 66). By the way, in the quoted statement, opposing collectivity which understands itself "more" and "better" to traditional morality, we see again the anti-traditionalist and "modernist" attitude of Durkheim.

Thus, even the individuals who are the agents and initiators of innovations represent, as Durkheim pointed out, a society or a group. Even the criminals, violating the established, traditional social norms may be considered innovators, bringing other norms, social as well, but in *status nascendi.* So, even a criminal innovator, opposing himself to a society, may follow the norms of this very society, but future norms, the coming ones, not yet established and not understood by society itself. An example of Socrates, mentioned by Durkheim as illustrating this situation is very characteristic in this connection. "According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal and his condemnation was entirely just. However, his crime - his independence of thought – was useful not only for humanity but for his country. It served to prepare a way for new morality and a new faith, which the Athenians then needed because the traditions by which they had hitherto lived no longer corresponded to the conditions of their existence." (Durkheim, 1992, p. 102).

It is evident that the most difficult sociological question in this kind of situations is which traditions correspond to the conditions of existence of a society, and which do not. Taking this into account, Durkheim constantly demanded studying these conditions, before judging about the role and significance of some traditional customs and institutions.

Durkheim made a considerable contribution to the study of the ritual as one of the important forms of traditional behaviour. In "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life" he developed a detailed classification and carried out a careful analysis of rituals in the totemic system of the Australian aborigines (Durkheim, 1995, Book III). He distinguished the negative (forbidding) and positive cults and thoroughly studied the rituals of sacrifice, imitative (mimetic), representative (commemorative) and piacular rituals. He thought the differences between the religious rituals (holidays, ceremonies, etc.) *stricto sensu,* on the one side, and non-religious, the profane ones, on the other side, to be unimportant. On the contrary, he stressed the essential similarity between them from a sociological viewpoint, thus continuing the tradition of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Comte. To maintain this principle, he asked rhetorically: "What basic difference is there between Christians' celebrating the principal dates of Christ's life, Jews' celebrating the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the Decalogue, and a citizens' meeting commemorating the advent of a new moral charter or some other great event of national life?" (Durkheim, 1995, p. 429).

Certainly, Durkheim believed the traditions to be one of the main factors of social solidarity. However, according to him, in some historical periods, in some social situations, they can hinder and destroy solidarity in society. This takes place at times when traditions no longer correspond to changed "social conditions". Meanwhile, innovations, which are partly the future traditions, become necessary for maintaining solidarity and generally for the development and even survival of societies. Thus, Durkheim for whom solidarity was synonymous to sociality, believed sociocultural innovations to be a kind of social imperative, as important for the social well-being as traditions are.

Conclusion

It follows from the above that Durkheimian theory of traditions, along with his theories of morality, ideals and innovations, is subtle enough and can be usefully applied today, at the time of high modernity or "postmodernity". Durkheim did not simply oppose tradition to innovation, but thought them to be interconnected, interactive and interpenetrating processes that can even be transformed into each other. His ideas are a fruitful contribution to the study of such phenomena as multiple modernities and functions of traditions in modernizations and post-modernizations of contemporary societies. Within the last decades in theoretical field we can observe the process that can be named "modernization of the theories of modernization". It consists, above all, in the understanding of spatial and temporal plurality and diversity of modernizations. In this connection the traditions may be appreciated not only as an opposite of and a hindrance to modernizations and innovations, but as their condition and basis. At the same time, one can witness the process of transformation of traditions as such, a kind of modernization of traditions themselves, their nature, content and formation processes. Today traditions

very often can exist and survive only because of innovations. Beside the "traditional traditions" based on the habit, there appear new forms of traditions derived from different sources, wherever by the means of fashion, informational and global innovations. So, the old idea of modernization as detraditionalization is now inconsistent with reality. Then, the *reflexive traditionalization* should be a necessary element, or an addition, of reflexive modernization, which was talked about by those social thinkers, as Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens or Ulrich Beck. Durkheim's theory of tradition may be considered as a fruitful contribution to understanding of this phenomenon.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Durkheim and the Nation

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Abstract

This article elucidates key elements of the Durkheimian framework that bear specifically on studies of nations and nationalism. Durkheim's theory of collective representations and his general theoretical view of the nature of human experience and the constitutive forces of social life are shown to offer leverage on problems of contemporary general interest to sociology. A Durkheimian approach to the study of nations and nationalism centers on three key elements: i) the definition of the form of collective consciousness characterizing the putative national unit; ii) a focus on the historical or genealogical development of the national unit; and, iii) the analysis of this unit in its theoretical aspect as a set of collective representations. Seeing nations and nationalism from a Durkheimian standpoint affords an understanding of these phenomena in terms of what they suggest about the nature of human social order as such. The contributions of Anthony Smith and Liah Greenfeld are discussed in light of this framework so as to make manifest the enduring significance of Durkheim's thought.

Keywords

Durkheim • Nations • Nationalism • Political Sociology • Anthony Smith • Liah Greenfeld

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Scholars of nations and nationalism have recognized the relevance of Émile Durkheim's thought in their endeavors, yet they have not approached their subject matter with a specific interest in Durkheim's general theoretical claims regarding the nature of collective representations (Guibernau, 1996, pp. 21–30, 1997; Hayes, 1926; Llobera, 1994; Mitchell, 1931; Phillips, 1996; Smith, 1983).[2] The result is that scholarship on nations and nationalism misses an opportunity to illuminate in a general theoretical manner the primary *explicanda* of the social sciences – i.e. the causes and functions of states of consciousness motivating action and giving rise to social transformation. To wit, on the question of economic nationalism Takeshi Nakano (2004) makes a compelling case for synthesizing political and economic theory (specifically, as it concerns the relationship between the nation, the state, and political and economic outcomes), although he does not engage with the broader theoretical implications of Durkheim's thought. Such engagement would clarify the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual (see Durkheim, 2003 [1937], 1958) as well as the significance of Nakano's claim that the state is autonomous *vis-à-vis* the nation (2004, pp. 211–216), thereby drawing attention to the difficulty of shaping or mobilizing nations for given ends.[3] Indeed, as Oliver Benoit's work demonstrates, the strength of national identity plays a key role in creating and sustaining regular patterns of action. Benoit's work also illustrates the manner in which other forms of collective representations (such as class identity, where it exists) may impede the formation of strong national identity (2011; 2007). Rogers Brubaker's work examining approaches to how the relation between religion and nationalism may be analyzed invokes Durkheim briefly, but sustained engagement with Durkheim's general theoretical claims is not in evidence (2012). Such an engagement would clarify the extent to which Durkheim anticipates Brubaker's claim that it may be productive to link religion and nationalism to general social structures and processes and to consider them as modes of identification, social organization, and ways of framing political claims (see Durkheim, 1893, 1912, 1915, 2003 [1957], 1938; and also Durkheim, 1958, 2003, p. 50; Cf. Giddens, 1971; Greenfeld, 1996). M. Marion Mitchell's classic paper on Durkheim and nationalism offers a sketch of the theoretical elements of Durkheim's thought as it relates to certain aspects of

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2 Although James Dingley's discussion offers an exception; in particular, the cases of Germany and Ireland that he develops do provide a suggestive view of the genealogical development of the collective consciousness (2008, pp. 133–161, 162–214). See also Türkay Salim Nefes' discussion of the influence of Durkheim's concept of collective consciousness on the political and sociological thought of Ziya Gökalp (2013).

3 Nakano claims, for instance, that the state creates individuals and that it also relieves them of communal constraints. These two claims overlook Durkheim's important argument that a more basic form of collective consciousness creates individuals as such and underlies the state. The release from communal constraints is effected by this basic form of collective consciousness and gives rise to regular patterns of action such as the state that facilitate its spread and reproduction (see Durkheim, 2003 [1957], pp. 1–109). Nakano's claim that the more developed the state is the stronger individualism is errs in seeing the state as primary – for instance, the German state of Durkheim's time was highly developed, yet Durkheim himself noted the essential collectivism characteristic of Germans (1915). It may be the case that some states function to secure the rights of individuals, but the state's undergirding principles are structured by the form of collective consciousness.

nationalism, but Mitchell does not develop what Durkheim's claims serve to draw out of scientific studies of nations and nationalism –that is to say that it does not offer a perspective on what studies of nations and nationalism can teach one about human social order in its generality (1931).[4]

The lack of emphasis on general theoretical claims in scholarship on nations and nationalism developed with Durkheim in mind may be attributable partially to the interpretation as to the nature and utility of Durkheim's thought being a controversial matter (Collins, 2005; Lukes, 1973; Malczewski, 2013; Mellor, 2002; Parsons, 1937; Pope, 1973, 1975; Ramp, 2008; Smith & Alexander, 2005; Cf. Alpert, 1939; Gehlke, 1915; Merton, 1934, 1938; Parsons, 1937) and to a constitutive general theory remaining the major lacuna in sociology (Alexander, 1982, 1990; Friedman, 2004; Greenfeld, 2004, 2005; Malczewski, 2014; Sewell, 2005; Tilly, 2005). Alexander Riley notes – quite soundly – that the interpretation of Durkheim (at least in English-speaking sociology) rests "largely on significant misreading" (2015, p. 2; see also pp. 1–6). As Warren Schmaus demonstrates, moreover, commentary on Durkheim generally bypasses questions concerning Durkheim's fundamental epistemological position and how he conceived of the nature of scientific knowledge[5] (including the status of theories and methods) – questions without the answer to which the attribution of any general theoretical view to Durkheim is wanting (Schmaus, 2004, pp. 1–26; Cf. Alexander, 1982, p. 214, 471 fn. 83; Schmaus, 1994, pp. 12–20; see also Vogt, 1976, pp. 38–41). In Smith and Alexander's review of scholarly debates over the interpretation of Durkheim's thought, they identify five typical standpoints of interpretation, three of which emphasize aspects of Durkheim's thought having a general-theoretical bearing (i.e. the structural, semiotic, and interactional/pragmatic aspects). Cultural sociology and, in particular, what Mustafa Emirbayer (2004) has called the Alexander School (centering on Jeffrey Alexander's contributions and his emphasis on the analytical autonomy of symbolic systems, the development of the Durkheimian insight concerning the role of binary oppositions in symbolic systems, and the centrality of ritual in fusing these systems to the embodied experience of actors) is perhaps the most ambitious contemporary program of Durkheimian research in its development of the standpoint concerned with the semiotic strand in Durkheim's work and the explicit aim of linking work on symbolic systems with structural and interactional/pragmatic theoretical entities and processes. In this way, contemporary sociology is offered an approach to the several widely-recognized facets of Durkheim's thought that aims for general theoretical coherence. Cultural sociologists building on a Durkheimian foundation have sought to reinvigorate

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4   Apart from his brief commentary (1931, p. 96), Mitchell does not offer a discussion of the defining characteristics of the nation. The nation is taken as given, and Mitchell does not advance an argument as to how Durkheim's theory helps make tractable or explain the *sui generis* qualities of the nation.

5   Schmaus regards Turner 1986 as a notable exception.

nations and nationalism scholarship by providing theoretical insight and raising empirical questions that focus attention on the collective symbolic constitution of identity in its several aspects (Debs, 2013; Greenfeld, 2013; Rose-Greenland, 2013; Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013; West, 2008, 2015; Woods & Debs, 2013; Wyrtzen, 2013; see also Alexander, 2013).

What ought not to be lost in theoretically-driven debates over Durkheim is what I take to be the key substantive implication of Durkheim's thought – the idea that each human society is specific and unique (e.g. 1938b, pp. 197–200). Put differently, the emphasis on Durkheimian explanation and its methods should not overshadow the key opportunity provided for by his thought – the opportunity to situate the description and explanation of any given society (whether or not it is a nation) in a general theoretical framework that makes more clearly intelligible the definite original qualities pertaining to the society in question (namely, those qualities constitutive of the set of that society's defining collective representations). In this way, the work of general theory is to illuminate the distinct nature of the relatively more basic phenomena out of which general theory itself is partially constructed.[6] Durkheim's claim that "In a sense, all that is historical is sociological" not only emphasizes the intimate relation between these two approaches to knowledge (at least when what is meant by history is history practiced as a science) but also calls attention to the historical variability of the phenomena that underlie any general sociological claim (1898c, p. v; also see Bellah, 1959, pp. 448–453).[7] On the question of nations and nationalism, Brad West argues that Durkheimian scholars "neglect an appreciation of historical variance in regards to the nation" (2015, p. 2). Indeed, variance between nations is one vital issue, as is variance within nations across time (West, 2008; see Kim & Schwartz, 2010). Durkheim emphasizes the importance of comparison so profoundly for the reason that it brings what is shared as well as what is distinct clearly into view. Studies of nations and nationalism that engage pointedly with general theory whilst focusing on the individuality and distinctness of particular nations are best at remaining sensitive to this implication.

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6   On this point, Durkheim argues the following in the *L'Année sociologique* (year six): national history… can only gain by being penetrated by the general principles at which sociology has arrived. For in order to make one people know its past well, it is still necessary to make a selection among the multitude of facts in order to retain those that are particularly vital; and for that some criteria which presuppose comparisons are necessary. Similarly, to be able with greater sureness to discover the way in which concrete events of a particular history are linked together, it is good to know the general relations of which these most particular relations are examples and applications. (Translation in Bellah, 1959, p. 448)

The original text reads as follows:

l'histoire nationale…ne peut que gagner à se pénétrer des principes généraux auxquels arrive le sociologue. Car pour bien faire connaître un peuple son passé, encore faut-il faire une sélection entre la multitude des faits pour ne retenir que ceux qui sont particulièrement vitaux et pour cela il faut des critères qui supposent des comparaisons. De même, pour pouvoir, avec plus de sûreté, découvrir la manière dont s'enchaînent les événements concrets d'une histoire déterminée, il est bon de connaître les rapports généraux dont ces rapports plus particuliers sont des exemples et comme des applications. (1901-1902, p. 125)

7   "En un sens, tout ce qui est historique est sociologique" (Durkheim, 1898c, p. v).

In what follows, I render explicit how key components of Durkheim's conceptual apparatus hang together so as to clarify what a Durkheimian approach to the study of nations and nationalism entails minimally. I illustrate my claims with an analysis of the implications of the work of Anthony Smith and Liah Greenfeld, two classic scholars of nations and nationalism whose Durkheimian approaches to nations and nationalism emphasize the importance of attention to general theoretical standpoints and substantive specificity. I contend that by leveraging Durkheim's general theoretical thought for the study of nations and nationalism the nature of human collectivities, consciousness, and social order in both their generality and specificity may be better known. Engagement with Durkheim also will help to counter tendencies in the scholarship on nations and nationalism to provide localized studies lacking a general theoretical perspective (or, minimally, empirical contextualization with processes of *long durée*) or to neglect to introduce macro-level analytical guideposts (see Eastwood, 2006, pp. 1–22). It will also serve to preclude, as it were, reinvention of the wheel or walking around in theoretical circles.[8]

Collective Representations, Collective Consciousness, History, and the Nation

As Durkheim understood well (1893; 1895), every research program must be distinguished by a central subject matter around which constellations of problems, approaches, concepts, and explanatory theories revolve (see Malczewski, 2013, 2014, 2015b). Given the significance of empirical justification in scientific scholarship, the definition of the relevant set of phenomena and specification of its qualities (to include relevant explanatory relationships within this set) must be the primary task (1895; 1898a). With this in mind, Durkheim built on a foundation of realized instances of action seen from the perspective of their putative social influences, and he linked his definitions to their empirical objects by indexing their distinctive characteristics. At the theoretical level, Durkheim established a link between the main phenomena to be explained (i.e. the theoretical entities he termed collective representations) and the relatively more basic objects (i.e. social facts) in whose principles and patterns the legitimacy of the more general theoretical entities is established (1893, p. xxxvii).

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8   Edward Shils' (1995, Cf. 1957) view of nationality as a state of "collective self-consciousness" has two significant theoretical shortcomings that lead him back to his starting point. The first is that Shils' foundational object –the individual– rests on an unexplained foundation: Shils seeks to understand how society is possible whilst leaving the question concerning how the individual is possible unaddressed. To wit, he regards nationality as a conscious state of mind in the sense that it is something added to the individual. The individual, in this way, is taken for granted, hence society rests on an unexplained foundation. The second shortcoming is that the theoretical distinction between regular patterns of action such as the state and a phenomenon such as the nation is blurred in that both forms of society reduce to intentionally-formed collectivities (despite Shils' position that there is something more basic or primordial about the nation). Beginning with the individual, as Shils does, does not permit him to adjudicate theoretically between more or less significant forms of society unless significance is determined quantitatively; given that some states contain a larger quantity of individuals than the several nations they compose, this poses a logical problem for Shils' claim regarding the more essential –putatively primordial– status of the nation.

Durkheim's explanatory claims thus are undergirded by reference to relevant sets of concrete empirical phenomena.[9]

Durkheim defined his most relatively basic set of facts as consisting of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling that are external to the individual and that manifest a power of coercion on him; he termed this basic set of facts *social facts* (1895, p. 5). These basic units of analysis are comprised of symbolically oriented action manifest not only in its performative facets but also in its concretized material ones (1911, 1912 –particularly Book II, Chapter 7).[10] The core categories of the sacred and the profane which Durkheim discusses in his most theoretically comprehensive work, *Les forms élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912), are categories that are essentially symbolic – i.e. they are categories of phenomena essentially characterized by an arbitrary law-, rule-, or convention-based organizing principle. To recognize the symbolic aspect of an entity is to see (from the standpoint of an actor or a collectivity) its conditioning elements as having undergone a transformation of kind.[11] The symbolic

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9   From the standpoint of the philosophy of science, Durkheim's approach has certain advantages. One, it acknowledges that the central subject matter (i.e. the relevant set of phenomena) of scientific inquiry is delineated along lines laid down by the guiding question (see Durkheim, 1901-1902, p. 125). Two, although the central subject matter contains the analytical element of art just mentioned, the empirical phenomena are seen as bearing inherent qualities that resist arbitrary interpretation (Durkheim, 1893, p. xiii; Durkheim, 1895). Three, theories are recognized as works of reason that function as tools for gaining leverage on understanding reality; theories are not true in some as if absolute sense. Durkheim's self-awareness of the nature of the activity he is undertaking remains persuasive (see Alexander, 1982, pp. 1–35; Schmaus, 1994).

10 The centrality of the symbolic in Durkheim's work is most widely recognized by those commentating on *Les forms élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912), where Durkheim seeks to discover the processes by which categorical principles are created (see Smith & Alexander, 2005). The symbolic aspect, however, is central to all of his work, from his analyses of principle-based action indexed in legal codes (1893), to his under-appreciated analyses of the systems of meaning (e.g. military honor codes, Indian funerary rituals, etc.) that exemplify and underlie the four types of suicide he identified (1897), to the value of the individual manifest in the "cult of the individual" typical of certain societies (1898a), to the meaningful bases of social solidarity as found in the collective consciousnesses of contemporary societies (1915; 1938a; 1938b), and in his emphasis on "*règles d'action*" in *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895). Even his early discussions in *De la division du travail social* (1893) and *Le suicide* (1897) concerning what he calls integration (functional solidarity) and regulation (action effectively guided by symbolic principles) show that the former is largely an effect of the latter – thereby locating the explanatory factors in symbolic principles – in the same way that social volume is a product of moral (also called social or dynamic) density, which refers to the social relations that exist between individuals and that implies a basis of shared meaning (see Johnson, Dandeker, & Ashworth, 1984, p. 159; Schmaus, 2004, pp. 137–145).This evidence demonstrates Durkheim's continuous engagement with symbolic phenomena throughout his career. Durkheim's views on social relationships and their transactional, systemic, and functional characteristics are well-known (e.g. Alpert, 1939; Emirbayer, 1996a, 1996b). For this reason, I emphasize the place of the symbolic element in Durkheim's studies which through most of the 20th century tended to be minimized or even overlooked in sociology outside of France (Morrison, 2001), although cultural sociology has offered a powerful corrective to this historical oversight (Alexander & Smith, 2001; see also Hunt, 1988; Kane, 2000).

11 Although ordering principles are arbitrary in the sense that they do not inhere in the motions, behaviors, or material objects that significantly constitute their phenomenal form (and which are essential conditions of their realization), they are not arbitrary in the sense that individuals may take them or leave them as they wish. One, the ordering principles are external both to individuals as well as to the group of individuals that comprise a given collectivity (Malczewski, 2013, 2014, 2015b). Durkheim's emphasis on the coercive nature of social facts is well known, but equally important is the implicit idea of an elementary reciprocity in recognizing and acting in accordance with an ordering principle – it is the principle itself that constitutes and

aspect is seen as concomitantly *in* the object (i.e. analytically, in the description of its relevant qualities) and *in* the actor or collectivity (i.e. theoretically, as a putative constitutive entity). Social facts refer to types or manners of principle-based or rule-based behaviors that both describe the symbolic aspect of behaviors and locate their scientifically relevant characteristics in patterned social relationships (1893, p. xxxvii).

The analysis of social facts prepares the ground for the creation of basic descriptive concepts, theoretical entities that contextualize and situate those concepts, and explanatory theories that order them.[12] Basic descriptive concepts and theoretical entities are the key elements harnessed in theoretical explanation. In his definition of sociology Durkheim identified its central subject matter (which he regarded as the definition of the central subject matter of social science itself) as *institutions*, or all of the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the collectivity (1895, p. xxii). The concept of institutions composes both social facts and theoretical entities that are based on such facts. Institutions are collective representations that endure, and they are seen as both putatively constitutive elements or points of orientation of consciousness and the organizing principles of forms of behavior. The term *collective representations* denotes a category of theoretical entities that serve to define and explain the cognitive states and cognitive functions (forms of consciousness, for short) of the individual actors responsible for creating social facts (1898b, 1901, 1912; see Schmaus, 1994).

As it regards the study of nations and nationalism (indeed, as it regards the study of any form of society whatsoever) the most important form of collective representation is what Durkheim terms collective consciousness (see Malczewski, 2015a). The concept of *collective consciousness* denotes the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average man in a given collectivity, and it is seen to form the basis of the process by which social units cohere, or social solidarity (1893, pp. 35–52). The concept of collective consciousness hence concerns the process of the production of social order in general. As a theoretical entity, this concept concomitantly does two jobs. One, it indexes the defining characteristics of a phenomenon. Two, it references the particular epistemic framework in which it is embedded (in this case, a scientific framework that regards the defining nature of human social order and experience as symbolically constituted and essentially social in the specific sense that individuals

explains social order. Two, the principles themselves are essential to and inseparable from the phenomenal form they take. A mathematical algorithm, for instance, is essentially constituted by its ordering principles – take away the ordering principles and the remaining phenomenon is nonsense. Likewise, observe the *intichiuma* ceremony or the representative, commemorative, or piacular rites discussed by Durkheim, which are only recognizable as coherent events by reference to the ordering principles (1912, pp. 330–354, 374–391, 392–417).

12 The term "theoretical entities" refers to processes or relationships as much as it does to more basic relatively substantial entities. Gravitational force, the American public, and anomie are common examples of relatively non-substantial theoretical entities. H_2O may be considered a relatively substantial theoretical entity (although it presupposes, for instance, the relatively non-substantial effect of gravitational force).

are seen as creatures of a collective process).[13] Beliefs and sentiments, which are two forms social facts take (n.b. there are also others, such as evaluations/value judgments), are phenomena shaped by and realized as symbolic ordering principles (see Durkheim 1911, 1912, 1897-1898). When Durkheim refers to elements of a given form of collective consciousness he is illuminating the symbolic ordering principles that characterize (and by which sense is made of) a body of phenomena, and these elements are always understood from the standpoint of his general theoretical framework. States of the collective consciousness are essentially states structured by symbolic ordering principles. As Durkheim argues, even the putatively most generalized basic categories of thought are seen to come under their control (1912).

Given his interest in explaining key features of modernity and his interest in testing his hypothesis regarding the primacy and causal efficacy of society in defining human experience, Durkheim tended to focus on forms of collective consciousness of the most general or salient nature. The concept of collective consciousness, however, applies by definition to every society of every size and shape. Collective consciousness takes many forms, such as religion, occupation, family, ethnicity, nationality, etc. Such general forms may encompass innumerable subtypes, such as Catholic, scholar, nuclear family, Arab, Russian, etc. There are as many forms of collective consciousness as there are societies. Indeed, the characteristics of a form of collective consciousness constitute the definition of the social entity itself: it is how the entity is recognized as being of a certain kind and is analytically delineated from all other social entities. On this view, even those societies that are seen to be formed by so-called transactional or otherwise structural causes would be seen as products of the process of collective representations insofar as they are societies and not mere heaps (in Aristotle's sense) of individuals sharing the characteristic of having been affected by one process or another. Economic behavior, social stratification, or states of enduring conflict are basically realized by actors guided by arbitrary symbolic ordering principles.[14] It is the orientation to those principles that reveals the existence of a collective consciousness. It is a mistake to conflate orientation to

13 In these ways, Durkheim's view anticipates a solution to two key problems raised by Eric Hobsbawm (1990, pp. 1–13). Firstly, it provides criteria for a scientific concept of the nation. Secondly, it demonstrates that symbolically constituted phenomena – such as members' consciousness of belonging to a nation – is valid as explanatory evidence bearing on the definition of the collective consciousness of a putative nation. Hobsbawm's claim that "defining a nation by its members' consciousness of belonging to it" leads to a tautological definition of the nation does not consider the theoretical view that such members may be creatures of a collective process and, therefore, on this view ought not to be assumed to select or choose their forms of consciousness qua individuals (7-8). Like Shils (see footnote vii above), Hobsbawn interprets such consciousness as a matter of individual choice, and he is rightly suspicious of this. As Durkheim shows, however, this is not the only way to view the matter.

14 Value, status, or justice, for example, are established arbitrarily and are not given as such in a particular ordering of human organisms or collective contexts. The labor theory of value, biological (i.e. race-based) explanation, or even as if universal principles of justice have received heavy criticism for their inability to explain empirically human action (A. Sandel, 2014; M. Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1983).

a set of principles or its functional or performative aspect with consensus, a concept alien to Durkheim's framework, as has been done (Alexander, 1988, pp. 195–198; Bernard, 1983; Dayan & Katz, pp. 161–166; Hunt, 1988, p. 30; Parsons, 1937). It is the voluntarism implied by consensus in which Durkheim is arguably least interested (see Schmaus, 1994, pp. 13–15). It is a strictly empirical matter whether a given individual participates in a form of collective consciousness. The ordering principles need not endure (as seen in social currents and fashions, the tendency of which is to pass quickly), although it is the enduring ones that often matter most for sociological explanation.

In studies of nations and nationalism, the collective consciousness of the putative national unit or group is the lodestar. The characteristics of such a form of collective consciousness constitute the definition of the nation itself and, once they are discovered, elucidation of the process of the formation of those characteristics serves to make sense of them in addition to contributing to what we know about the creation of social solidarity and social order in general. Forms of collective consciousness are seen by Durkheim to develop in history. Emphatically, although Durkheim sought to create a science that permitted sociological explanation, history plays a key role in his framework. In order to understand the place a given form of the collective consciousness has in social life as a whole, analysis of historical context is of paramount importance. Every characteristic element of a given form of collective consciousness is recognized as having a process of formation of its own, and the context of its creation reveals its role or function as well as its nature and significance. This holds for the form of collective consciousness as well as its elements.

Durkheim's emphasis on history makes clear that even when sociological analysis turns its attention to the individual or the historical event the significant phenomena are seen as socio-historically constituted. Durkheim's approach allows one both to identify the principles and significance of a given action or set of actions as well as to discover whether a particular form of the collective consciousness is a variety of another species or if it is to be regarded as a manifestation *sui generis* (1938a; 1938b). History thus entails accounting for contingent actions in addition to accounting for a series of such actions understood as cohering one way or another and illuminating the nature of that coherence (see Bellah, 1959). The choice regarding the taxonomic rank to be assigned to a particular form of collective consciousness is adjudicated best according to the degree of fit with the empirical data with reference to the guiding question.[15] By revealing the conditions and causes of the development of the elements of a given form of collective consciousness, the study of the past permits the sociological understanding of the present. Durkheim sees all human institutions

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15 For example, it is conceivable that some forms of ethnicity –say, African-American– may be varieties emergent from nations, which suggests an empirical reversal of the general pattern identified by Smith (see Du Bois, 1903; Smith, 1986).

as being rooted in history; hence history offers the key to understanding the genesis of such institutions and the role these institutions serve in a given historical context (1898c; 1901-1902). Methodologically speaking, the historical approach involves isolating the defining characteristics of the collective consciousness and examining how they developed in time. The elements of the collective consciousness must be isolated and explained, which is to say that their conditions and causes must be discovered (see 1938a; 1938b).

Durkheim never conducted a study of nations and nationalism, but he did develop certain arguments that illuminate phenomena of specific interest to scholars of nations and nationalism. His view of French and German collective consciousness and his conception of the state are two salient ones. First, his discussions of key features of French and German collective consciousness, although they are schematic, function as guiding lights that may lead scholars to the kind of phenomena he thought worthy of attention and systematic investigation (Malczewski, 2015a; see also Durkheim, 1961 [1925], p. 234; Fournier, 2013, pp. 75–78, 298–302, 451–453). He notes that the French are characterized by a basic Cartesianism and that the contemporary French of his day could be said to recognize the individual as a sacred being and to accord him supreme value (1898a, 1938a, b). The German collective consciousness, in contrast, is said to regard the state as the highest form of community, and, in this way, the state itself is sovereign and above or superior to the individual (1915). Durkheim claims that the state is power in the German collective consciousness, and through this we understand phenomena such as German conquest, annexation, and disregard of the rights of nationalities. Durkheim claims that these qualities are visible in the motto "*Deutschland über alles*" (or "Germany above all") as well as in the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke, the late-nineteenth century writer and political figure whom he takes to be a paradigmatic representative.[16] What is perhaps most clearly of enduring value in this short work is the manner in which Durkheim analyzes social facts such as mottos, texts, and historical events in order first to define the putative characteristics of the collective consciousness and then to posit how this form of collective consciousness developed and how it bears on action. Durkheim thus provides a strong complement to *Les forms élémentaires de la vie religieuse* in the demonstration of his methodological approach and theoretical ambition.

Second, Durkheim defines the state as "the people awakened to a consciousness of itself, of its needs and its aspirations" (1915, p. 27).[17] The conception of the people

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16 His commentary on Germany must be treated cautiously, however. The defining characteristics of the German collective consciousness are found in his essay *L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout: la mentalité allemande et la guerre*, which was written during the first part of World War I and may be said to lack scholarly detachment.

17 His definition of a *people* and his discussion of *civil society* provide context (1915, p. 27–34).

Durkheim has in mind is a collective he terms *political society*, which is "the coming together of a rather large number of secondary social groups, subject to the same one authority which is not itself subject to any other superior authority duly constituted" (1992 [1957], pp. 42–45). A people is thus a politically sovereign entity comprised of a number of various groups each having a form of collective consciousness of its own by which it may be recognized analytically.[18] In referring to the people being awakened to a consciousness of itself Durkheim means that the nature of the collective representations produced by the officials or agents of the state have an explicit nature –that is to say that the collective representations are relatively clear, vivid, and have a specific self-consciously recognized intent (1992 [1957], p. 50; see also 42–54). These representations differ markedly from those of the general collective consciousness in that the latter are several, diffuse, and often obscure (as in the case of myths or legends). The intensity with which the collective representations of the state are experienced Durkheim sees as being akin to the intensity of feeling corresponding to restitutive law that he discusses in chapter three of *De la division du travail social*, which is to say that not only are they not intense but also that they might not be felt at all (1893).

A Durkheimian approach to studies of nations and nationalism hence begins with the definition of the form of collective consciousness of the putative national unit and an understanding of how its characteristic elements developed in history. It then entails an analysis of the causes and functions of key qualities of that form of collective consciousness in its aspect as a putative set of collective representations conditioning and effecting action and social transformation. Put differently, a Durkheimian approach commences with a relatively basic descriptive and historical level of analysis to establish a key conceptual object and then proceeds to a higher-level inquiry into more complex relationships of causality, function, and theoretical significance. Durkheim's general theoretical view of collective representations – namely, the view that analysis of action can provide insight into the causes and functions of aspects of consciousness that are etiologically social and that structure action and social transformation – in this way situates the empirical phenomena at the center of studies of nations and nationalism in a framework befitting their supposed general significance. It also serves to make of each case a discrete contribution to the understanding of an actual, particular, historical collectivity.[19] This approach places an emphasis on the realm of symbolically constituted phenomena, which is

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18 This conception is nearly indistinguishable from his view of a *nationality*, which he defines as "a group of human beings, who for ethnical or perhaps merely for historical reasons desire to live under the same laws, and to form a single State, large or small, as it may be: and it is now a recognized principle among civilized peoples that, when this common desire has been persistently affirmed, it commands respect, and is indeed the only solid basis of a State" (1915, p. 40).

19 In this way, Durkheim's approach counters the tendency to treat nations as mere type cases or epiphenomena (e.g. Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990).

taken to be of key importance both to understanding the *sui generis* characteristics of nationalities and to shedding light on the general bases of human social order.

What is perhaps most useful for studies of nations and nationalism is that Durkheim's approach offers a theory with an explicit epistemological position (including a number of metatheoretical markers, such as his view – one that is rooted in empirical evidence – that the symbolic aspects of sacred entities are not fixed and tend to transform[20]), enabling the achievement of clarity regarding the general implications of scholarship on nations and nationalism carried out along these lines. Studying nations and nationalism from a Durkheimian standpoint affords an understanding of phenomena in terms of what they suggest about the constitutive principles of human collectivities and, in particular, provides insight into the relationship between the symbolic dimension of human experience and social transformation.

In order to illustrate the Durkheimian approach to the study of nations and nationalism, I discuss Anthony Smith's influential *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) and then turn attention to Liah Greenfeld's key contribution to the understanding of nationalism (1992) and her more recent work examining the functional implications of nationalism for contemporary society. The work of these two scholars has been singled out in order to draw attention to the general theoretical value of work on nations and nationalism and its basis in history as seen from the Durkheimian standpoint elaborated here.

Ethnies, Nations, and Nationalism

Although Anthony Smith and Liah Greenfeld pose questions concerning different facets of nations and nationalism, there is a striking convergence at the level of analysis and its significance for general social theory in the accounts they provide in explaining the nature, conditions, and causes of the form of society – i.e. the general type of collective consciousness – known as the nation (Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2014; Greenfeld, 1992, 2001). The Durkheimian intuitions driving their work are, in this way, perhaps clearest. At the center of their major studies is an engagement with social facts with an emphasis on the defining characteristics of collective consciousness and how they developed historically. Smith's and Greenfeld's views regarding the genealogical development and historical status of the nation have parallels, although Greenfeld makes a strong claim regarding the recent emergence of the nation that nuances Smith's classic refutation of "modernist" views and highlights the emergent and *sui generis* nature of the nation form and its import for modernity (Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1986, 6–18). Perhaps most importantly, Smith's and Greenfeld's work opens a vista on the nature of human society as such. A brief overview of their contributions in this regard follows.

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20 See for instance Durkheim's discussion of the impure sacred. Cf. Kurakin (2015).

Anthony Smith

In *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Smith traces the roots and ethnic foundations of nations (1986). The central object of inquiry is a particular pattern or tendency between one form of society (i.e. ethnic community, or "ethnie") and another (i.e. the nation). Smith's guiding question, in this way, has the aim of grasping the process of differentiation genealogically whilst delineating the characteristics of putative ethnies and nations. The study's theoretical power lies in the conjecture that the nation is significantly conditioned by a form of large-scale collective identity that has existed in various epochs and amongst different groups that suggests a general pattern of human social order. The focus on a specific form of collective identity –i.e. ethnie– brings one closer to understanding the *sui generis* qualities of that form (this meets the basic threshold for conceptual development) and the study of the relationship between that form and another –i.e. the nation– sheds theoretical light both on the general question of social transformation and on the nature of human social order as such.

Smith's concept of *ethnie* –defined as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity"– denotes a putatively general form of collective consciousness (1986, p. 32). This general form is proposed to be commensurable to other general forms such as religion, occupation, or family. Particular ethnies (e.g. Normans, Greeks, etc.) refer to specific types of collective consciousness within the general form, and, therefore, they denote specific empirical societies within the common type. To refer to a given collectivity as "Greek" from this perspective, for instance, is to say that the beliefs and sentiments common to the average man in that collectivity exhibit certain typical characteristics.

Smith places an emphasis on understanding a number of theoretical entities seen to drive action: sentiments, attitudes, and perceptions. These entities are regarded as key explanatory elements. They are the putatively effective forces of society that analysis of the collective consciousness allows one to see. Smith's adoption of Durkheim's theoretical view is here most in evidence insofar as Smith indicates it is where he expects explanatory power to be found. Smith acknowledges that mechanisms of diffusion and transmission help complete the account, but these mechanisms are analytically secondary. The significant empirical facts or more basic objects underlying Smith's concept of ethnie are myths, memories, values, and symbols. These more basic objects are seen to index the sentiments, attitudes, and perceptions that are regarded not only as the defining qualities of a particular form of social solidarity but also as the most telling indicators of the states of consciousness that drive action – i.e. the *explicanda* of sociology (1986, p. 15).

What Smith's work brings into view is the central importance of symbolic phenomena taking the form of myths, memories, and values in the construction of a general theoretical view. Ethnies are theoretical entities constructed out of essentially symbolic phenomena, and their process of development is explained historically. The epistemological relationship between the relatively more basic symbolic phenomena engaged at the descriptive level, the mid-level theoretical entities that he constructs out of them (i.e. sentiments, attitudes, and perceptions), and the more general and encompassing theoretical entities he postulates (e.g. the Greek ethnie) is in plain view. Such general theoretical entities comprehend the characteristic principles defining a putatively extant or once-extant form of consciousness that help illuminate the actions and ways of life of a particular population. Myths, memories, and values are symbolically constituted phenomena whose organizing principles may provide insight on the nature of human experience. With the adoption of a Durkheimian *attitude mentale*, the study of them in this way illuminates the extent to which some phenomena (e.g. collectivities, events, geographic locations, etc.) are relevant by ascribing analytical significance to them and conveys meaning to actions, events, and other phenomena.

Liah Greenfeld

A signal contribution of Liah Greenfeld's work is her focus on the processes of social transformation that give rise to nations. Her work offers a genealogical account of the emergence of nations and nationalism and examines the transformation of societies that became nations whilst accounting for both the roles of other forms of collective consciousness – such as, in the case of France, Catholicism and *noblesse* – as conditions providing the symbolic material out of which particular nations took shape and the roles that social carriers of these forms of consciousness came to play in spreading national consciousness (1992; 2001). Greenfeld argues that the nation form emerged in early sixteenth-century England. The *sui generis* qualities of the nation –the qualities that make this form of society distinct and that legitimate Greenfeld's claim about the nation's modernity– are the conceptual linkage of the "people" with an "elite" and the essentially secular view of reality whose essential status component entails the principles of fundamental equality of membership in a community and popular sovereignty (1992, pp. 3–26, 31–87, 2013, p. 2). Empirical instances of nations manifest characteristics that set them apart from one another in striking ways. To wit, the conception of a people as sovereign (originally, in England) was transformed as it spread to mean, in certain cases (e.g. Germany and Russia), a *unique* sovereign people. This crucial difference characterizes what Greenfeld terms "civic" versus "ethnic" nations and reflects a major difference in criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of members of specific nations.

Although Max Weber's influence stands out most clearly in Greenfeld's early work, her theoretical perspective is, at its base, essentially Durkheimian.[21] One of the core theoretical insights structuring her work is that the function of a form of collective consciousness provides insights reaching beyond the case of historical interest and illuminates essential social processes. The most salient manner in which Greenfeld's focus on function offers analytical purchase is her extensive treatment of moments of social transformation putatively brought on by the inadequacy of a form of consciousness in emergent social contexts (1992, pp. 44–51, 133–154, 293–314; 2001, pp. 242–267). One of her key explanatory concepts, anomie, develops Durkheim's concept and is embedded in an epistemic framework that sees nationalism as a first-order *explanans* for social order in modern societies. Her development of the concept of anomie into a theoretical entity denoting not only a structural insufficiency of symbolic order but also a psychological state of being with observable effects on the functionality of mind is more revealing (2005a, 2013, p. 5, 8, 27–31, 178–210, 620–626). Greenfeld argues that the structural inconsistency or experiential lack of fit between certain forms of consciousness and lived experience precipitated the national form of consciousness that better accounted for the experience of actors. She details the significant ways in which national consciousness came to reshape the key structures of the societies in question, and the historical evidence she marshals makes apparent the process of change –e.g. showing both how forms of collective consciousness precede the creation of regular patterns of activity such as modern economy and develop along the lines laid out by this form of consciousness (Greenfeld, 2001). This discussion suggests that the study of collective consciousness reveals the way that collective representations function at the level of the individual and, more specifically, that the core principles of nationalism create functional demands on individuals which are linked to creativity as well as mental disease (Greenfeld, 2013; see Cerulo, 2014). In this way, Greenfeld's first-order analysis of the genealogical development of the nation form and its specific characteristics in historical cases (e.g. English individualism, French civic collectivism, etc.) leads to the development of second-order analysis engaging the level of collective representations –in this case, their function.

Durkheimian theory is advanced by Greenfeld, moreover, by a theoretical conceptualization of the anatomy of the mind. Greenfeld places emphasis on collective representations and posits a model of how they manifest in a putative functional structure of the mind (2013), and she proposes a general model of the relationship between features of collective consciousness and the structures of mind and culture. Such explicit theoretical development of the several epistemological levels of analysis into a theory of mind and of culture not only owes a debt to Durkheim in

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21 Elsewhere Greenfeld has emphasized her relationship to Durkheim more strongly (Greenfeld, 2004, pp. 288–322, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, pp. 125–142, 2013).

the theoretical ambition he enabled, but it also thus ties together the implications of Durkheim's three major works in their emphasis on how collective representations transform human bodies (1893, 1897, 1912).

The endurance of certain social forms is an object that Durkheim's thought helps analyze and explain. Both Smith and Greenfeld wish to understand why it is that some forms of collective consciousness go so deep as to endure over long periods –especially in contexts of apparently widespread social change. The centrality of one's ethnic community is experienced, in Smith's words, as "natural" and "proper" (1986, pp. 48–49). Greenfeld argues that in societies defined as nations, national consciousness not only offers a view of one's general identity in a collective but also that the fundamental secularism and view of popular sovereignty provide the image of reality as such for members of the nation that extends well beyond the question of collective identity (1992, pp. 3–26, 2013, pp. 1–31).

Discussion

The implications of Durkheim's thought for studies of nations and nationalism for general sociology are patent. The empirical research noted above demonstrates that the constituent parts of forms of collective consciousness are adaptable, which is to say that the elements that comprise a form of society are seen as dynamic and malleable (Cf. Alexander, 2013, p. 694). This key point is in evidence on every page of Durkheim's two-volume *L'Évolution pédagogique en France* (1938a; 1938b) and directly challenges the misguided view of Durkheimian theory as being fundamentally conservative (Bernard, 1983) and unable to address social variability and transformation – indeed, the essence of Durkheimian theory may be said to be the problem of social variability and transformation. As Brad West's recent work demonstrates, Durkheimian theory offers an approach that helps make sense of the revitalization of forms of collective consciousness – including the nation (2008; 2015). The genealogical intuition guiding the Durkheimian approach to historical transformation stands out here, particularly in the linkage of micro- and macro-sociological analysis it affords; hence comparatively more subtle transformations of social order can be accounted for alongside more salient ones.

The Durkheimian approach entails an epistemic framework that interprets human social order as unfolding from symbolically constituted conditions. As seen in Smith's and Greenfeld's work, their basic first-order subject matter –i.e. myths, memories, values, etc.– is comprised of a set of reality that is symbolically constituted. Second-order analysis suggests that sentiments, attitudes, and perceptions are the theoretical entities that are the key to explanation given that they are posited to be the states of consciousness motivating action and bringing about social transformation. A

complete theoretical treatment of these entities demands a discovery of their causes and functions. Theoretical development on this front remains a major opportunity – as Durkheim notes, it is a mistake to leave these questions to psychology, given that the phenomena in question have peculiar qualities demanding methods and theories suited to them (1898b). As Greenfeld's work suggests, inquiry into the relative sufficiency or adequacy of the symbolic orders offered by various nationalisms can illuminate not only the functional processes of the societies in question but also may lead to the better understanding as to how variations in the levels of symbolic order (see Durkheim, 1897) may be productive of social transformation.

On this note, two of the biggest opportunities for contemporary studies of nations and nationalism pursued along Durkheimian lines is found in the focus on the symbolic element in, respectively, the study of ritual and the study of materiality. Smith's development of Durkheim's insights on the significance of ritual helps clarify the ways in which the symbolic aspect is tied to the repetitive element of performance (Smith, 2014). This insight is developed elsewhere to great effect by Robert Bellah and also in Rachel Tsang and Eric Taylor Woods' recent volume (Bellah, 2005; Tsang & Woods, 2014; Cf. Deacon, 1997). The constitutive and reproductive importance of the symbolic element in material reality is at the center of recent studies in materiality or what Jeffrey Alexander calls (in a most Durkheimian manner) "iconic consciousness" (2008; 2010; 2012; see also Bartmanski, 2012, 2014; Bartmanski & Alexander, 2012; Malczewski, 2016). The implications for studies of nations and nationalism appear clear (Rose-Greenland, 2013; Verdery, 1999; Zubrzycki, 2011).

Finally, taking forms of collective consciousness as the key explanatory variables, core features of political society –e.g. the state– are better understood. To be clear, on this view state processes and policies are in a key respect dependent on the society that enables and legitimates them. Although the state's organizing principles are products of the collective consciousness, the state is not a mere reflection of the collective consciousness.[22] The organizing principles reflect the collective consciousness partially and are conditioned by the historical milieu in which they were realized. More importantly, the localization of these principles in a specific pattern of action indicates a relatively autonomous form of society within the society of origin. In this way, the state and the society at large (of which the state is a part) reciprocally condition and shape one another.[23] Nevertheless, the difference between these two societies is marked. In the one case the society with the more encompassing form

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22 Smith appears to conflate nation and state (1991, p. 14; 1998), although he seeks to render the distinction clearer in his later work (2002, p. 15; see Guibernau, 2004).

23 Durkheim's under-read work on socialism and the role of professional guilds illustrates this point most clearly. See 1958 and 1938a, b. Also see the comprehensive discussion of professional guilds in the original introduction to the first edition of *De la division du travail social.* This discussion was truncated significantly for the second edition upon which translations in English are based and which is also the standard version reprinted in French.

of collective consciousness lacks a structure of which it is self-aware. In the case of the state there are organizing principles to be found that are concretely established and through which action is consciously and deliberately guided; there is as it were a self-consciousness in the collective consciousness of the state. Once instituted, however, the state is expected to develop according to a relatively autonomous logic (n.b. this is an empirical generalization). The aims and functions of the state develop along lines provided by the constitutive principles – i.e. the most sacred elements of its collective consciousness (see Durkheim, 1915, pp. 27–40, 1958, pp. 53–54, 2003 [1957], pp. 49–50; also see my footnote ix in the present article). Emphatically, Durkheim's view is not deterministic: the generative principles which guide the state remain open to change. The point is that this form of social organization develops in a deliberate manner, guided by principles that are objects of contemplation.[24]

The aim of the state in general is to enact the will of the sovereign authority, and the characteristic organizing principle is the form of collective order –i.e. the form of the political society– according to which the agents of sovereign authority pursue this aim. Durkheim's insight is that the generative principle that defines the form of collective order expresses the nature of the society in which it was born as well as the contexts of its historical origin.[25] The form of collective order of a given state is then seen to have organizing principles reflecting the nature of the society in which it emerged and the historical conditions that afforded its emergence. It follows that to grasp the nature of a state is to approach the question in a general theoretical manner seeking first and foremost to determine the qualities of the collective consciousness of the political society that gave rise to it and then to use the understanding of this collective consciousness to identify the nature of the symbolic ordering principles that constitute the state's domain and aims. To grasp the nature of a given state is thus to understand the collective consciousness of the political society it serves and to use this, for instance, as a measure to comprehend the degree to which the state in question is autonomous or the extent to which it shapes reciprocally the qualities of the political society in question.

These are just some of the ways that Émile Durkheim's theory of collective representations offers a framework that continues to bear fruit just over 100 years since the publication of his last major work. In its emphasis on questions tied to a general theoretical framework and an approach to historical subject matter that is scientific in its aims, it offers the study of nations and nationalism a clear route to progressive research. Rethinking the study of nations and nationalism and recognizing Durkheim's continued relevance on questions of general theory can help

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24 The state offers an exemplary instance of a "patterned activity" (Malczewski, 2014).

25 On this view, Durkheim owes a debt to Montesquieu, who sought to attain purchase on the underlying causes of political regimes (Durkheim, 1960, pp. 1–64; Montesquieu, 1989, pp. 308–336).

to reinvigorate sociology in the 21ˢᵗ century as well as programs of research that use sociology's guiding lights.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Under the Empire of Spontaneous Solidarity: State and Political Action in the Theoretical Durkheimian Project (1892-1893)

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Abstract

This paper aims at identifying and examining all the principles arisen from the issues of the state and politics in Durkheim's production during the period 1892-1893, signaled by the publication of his famous thesis on the cohesive role of the division of social labor. According to the in-depth analysis carried out in this article, the most important points of Durheim's politics are four. Firstly, the conception of the state as an organ that translates an automatic social solidarity because it is an entire entity preexisting any political relationships. Secondly, the distinction of despotism as a regime that implies the complete absorption of individuals by the political apparatus. Thirdly, the problem of the growing enlargement of the state interventions in the individuals' private life sphere. Finally, the incapacity of any political action to transform the society's morphology.

Keywords

Durkheim • 1892-1893 • State • Politics • Solidarity

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With the purpose of seeking a balance, Ottonello (2016) classifies the different interpretations that have dominated Durkheim's reception into four distinct groups: close collaborators who continued, spread and compiled his work (Davy, Mauss, Bouglé, Fauconnet and others between 1920 and 1940); collaborators' disciples who continued the study of other cultures while criticizing the main theoretical Durkheimian principles (Lévi-Strauss, Dumézil, between 1930 and 1980); new theoretical sociologists (Parsons, Giddens, Habermas, between 1930 and 1980); and those people in charge of detailed historiographical studies (Lukes, Besnard, Hirst, Karady, Tiryakian, Bellah, 1970 up to now[2]).

In this heterogeneous set of viewpoints, examining the specific form of the political dimension of different social processes does not occupy a prominent place in the Durkheimian project.[3] Derek (1991) dares to say that Durkheim's observations to the modern state and politics have been obviously dodged.

Even though they constitute a minority, there are some valuable analyses in specialists' literature not in tune with the hegemonic topics- (Birnbaum, 1976; Filloux, 1977; Giddens, 1986; Lacroix, 1981; Hawkins, 1981), which throw light on some unattended aspects of the Durkheimian political sociology.

To the rejection that a Parsonian interpretation generates of Durkheim's work as a sociology of order, controversies of the value and the limitations of his political theory can be added. Other interpretations consider this theory suspicious of an organicism tending to strengthen the state leviathan and they enter in dispute against those that highlight that it is the human being the one who limits the power of the State. Interpretations that praise its capacity not to remain caught in the narrowness of political phenomena with the purpose of sinking its roots in structural analysis, run counter to those that criticize its dismissal of the political institutions themselves. Those interpretations that recognize an important explicative potential in his theory are contradicted by those readings that consider it as a doctrine that conserves social control.

There exist some debates on the importance or not of differentiating stages or moments with different purposes. Lacroix (1981) claims that in Durkheim's work published in 1893 he does not present any further conceptualization because he presents his characteristic idea of absolute determinism together with the possibility of action and the autonomy of collective representations. In this sense, Alexander (1982) considers that all the issues related to his thesis in 1893, which put a lot of emphasis on social structure and density, should be distinguished from the ideas in

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2   It is also worth saying that the latest biographic work on Fournier's life (2007) complemented all the classical studies which attempt to illustrate Durkheim's intellectual trajectory.

3   The absence of Political Sociology in the Durkheimian classification of social sciences, pointed out by Favre (1982), constitutes undoubtedly one of the reasons that accounts for this disdain.

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, by means of which he tries to account for the effervescence of social action. On the contrary, Giddens (1979) puts forward that the postulates presented in the text regarding division of labor are not meaningless phrases. He adds that they are general frameworks in which all the rest of his texts could be placed. Also, Filloux (1977) y Joas (1993) highlight the unity and coherence in Durkheimian theorical project.

The purpose of this article, clearly located in the field opened by the aforementioned analyses, is specifically identifying the thesis and conceptual apparatuses that emerge from the issues of the state and politics in Durkheim´s production between 1892 and 1893.

In this short but productive period, the center of the scene is occupied by the problem of the cohesive function of division of social labor in modern societies. However, this does not prevent him from developing important definitions on the political action and on the modern state, its functions and its fields of action. All this will be shown next.

It is worth mentioning that the years 1892/1893 which are the focus of this analysis must be considered as a continuation of some problems that began to emerge by the middle of the previous decade.

In Durkheim's earlier interventions, asking about the role that the state played in the national integration of a nation was one of his main enquiries[4]. However, it must be assumed that as Durkheim came into contact with intellectual activity in German universities, he appeared to be more and more convinced of the inability of political power to bring all individuals together in an everlasting nation.

In fact, in the review *Les études de science sociale* (Durkheim, 1886), he asserts that those who claim that there is no law or moral before the appearance of the state are mistaken because they have both existed since men have lived side by side. Political bodies themselves cannot generate social cohesion, rather they reinforce, order and apply moral rules (these do have integrating strength) which are inscribed in the nature of social life. Therefore, no everlasting collectivity can emerge from individuals who are joint together by external impositions.

> A society is not a collection of individuals who are kept together by means of an enormous and monstrous machine. This is not a society. Solidarity comes from inside, not outside. Men are joint together naturally like the atoms of a certain mineral or the cells of an organism. (…)

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4   Even though there are more advances in the field of the enquiries than in the actual production of concepts, in some bibliographic reviews, speeches and courses carried out by Durkheim between 1883 and 1885, it can be noted an argumentative line according to which the cohesion of a nation, the main problem that moves him into reflection, depends at the same time but in different degrees on the pressure of the social moral and the behavior of an state understood as being the directive strength that rules and combines all the basic movements. For further analysis of this period, see Inda (2007).

> At all times in a society's development, said solidarity is expressed externally by means of an appropriate structure. The state is one of these structures. The state is the external and visible form of sociability (…). (Durkheim, 1886, p. 212)

According to the young Durkheim's words (1887a), a lack of national union requires constituting a new moral and teaching it: this is what he learnt from German professors. Professors' work must be civic, it must be useful to defend the nation, to enforce laws and to fight against individualism, which is the source of dissolution of all and any national bounds.

If moral authority is the driving potency that joins all the individuals together in a nation and the antidote against the anarchy which would rule if people give up to their selfish appetites, the state is responsible for transmitting the precepts of a moral and secular education (Durkheim, 1887a).

In the text *La science positive de la morale en Allemagne*[5] (Durkheim, 1887b), he goes further in his argumentation and he claims that the state is in charge of exerting its force to achieve the application of Law whose principles come from the inherent customs of collective life. However, he still points out that the coercion that is centered on the state is not enough to guarantee the compliance of the rules, as its legitimacy depends on the fact that this coercion is supported by collective feelings. He rejects the proposal of the German "Sociologists of the Chair" to define the moral principles of an state's action that fosters a fair distribution of social richness since he is firmly convinced that legal rules are not the result of a mere political action as legislators illustrated it.

He insists on the idea that the energy of the state lies in its capacity to represent common beliefs and feelings transmitted from generation to generation and that they carry a compulsory strength for all and any wills (Durkheim, 1888).

It is worth noting that in Durkheim's viewpoint, the state is a superior power to individuals, and as any other social phenomenon, it is so, in the sense that it is previous to them and it does not depend on their wills. However, this superiority cannot be considered as a possibility for the state to coercively interfere in the individuals' lives and absorb them. In fact, this interference is typical of despotic states.

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5   This decisive text in the trajectory of Durkheim's thoughts constitutes an exposition in front of French social philosophers about the progresses carried out by economists and jurists in the constitution of a positive science of moral. Here, he analyzes the approaches of the "sociologists of the chair" Wagner and Schmoller, Schäeffle's work, the theory of the jurist Jhering and professor Wundt's moral theory. In general words, it can be said that beyond certain specific criticisms, he rescues from these thinkers their insistence on considering the rules and moral actions as phenomena of social organization. He also takes from them their idea that a moral obligation is social in its origin and its nature, their criticism against orthodox economists based on an individualist utilitarianism, their aspiration to transform the study of moral into a positive science and their consideration of a society as something irreducible to the individuals, with its own strength.

A bit later, moved by reading Tönnies, Durkheim (1889) puts emphasis on his conclusion of 1886 related to the interiority of social solidarity and he insists that the regeneration of social tissues mainly depends on a moral attraction rather than on the force of the state.

To sum up, all the concepts presented by Durkheim in his famous texts of 1892 and 1893, come from an activity of going more deeply and precisely on some former readings and enquiries as it will be shown later. In them, it can be appreciated that the issue of social solidarity is transformed into the departing point of a moral science and in a key problem that articulates all the other topics, including those from the state and the exercise of politics.

Legislators as Customs Translators

In his latin thesis on Montesquieu, Durkheim concludes that an appropriate classification of societies cannot be limited to the forms of government, as morality, religion, commerce and family are the elements that express its essential nature, forming the true matter of social sciences.

If at first sight Montesquieu's classification seems to depend on the number of governors and the form of administration of public affairs; an attentive look shows, according to Durkheim (1892a)[6], that Montesquieu considers society as a whole; that is, the number, the disposition and the cohesion of its elements.

Different from a monarchy[7], that corresponds to societies where social division of labor is well-developed, the Republic, especially in its democratic form, can be displayed in societies composed by similar members, even in their fortunes and private lives, who are linked and juxtaposed by the same bonds among themselves. Political positions and magistrates are occupied for a fixed period of time and they do not imply a superior position (Durkheim, 1892a).

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6   Besides the referred French text, the recent version called Montesquieu by Watts Miller y Griffiths can be usefully consulted *Quid Secundatus Politicae Scientiae Instituendae Contulerit* which includes an English translation of the original Latin text as well as criticisms, corrections and explanations about the decisions made by the translator. It also presents an essay written by Watts Miller (1997) where he discusses the importance of his Latin thesis as a text about the nature of causality, the method and a comparative analysis, together with *The rules of sociological method,* these two texts must be read in order to understand the Durkheimian project.

7   Montesquieu claims that in monarchies we can prove the formula according to which power stops power, as the different organs of the social body limit the prince authority at the same time they stop each other reciprocally. The diversity of functions and its consequent persecution of personal interests are the source of cohesion in this type of societies. Believing that they are just pursuing individual advantages, they are unconsciously pursuing the common good, as honor is the basis of public life. A despotic state constitutes a degradation of the other forms. This takes place when in a monarchy, there does not exist any labor division, being differences abolished or when in a democracy, every citizen is the same in serfdom. Here, the basis of the political life is to be afraid of the prince (Durkheim, 1892a).

He does coincide with Montesquieu that loving your nation and state more than yourself is the basis of a Republic; but Durkheim (1892a) does not consider that this political virtue is the result of the fact that there exist laws that prohibit few people's enrichment – and with this, having large distances between fortunes- since laws do not have the power to originate common good.

In spite of all his merits, the classification made by the author of *De l'esprit des lois* implies, from a Durkheimian perspective, an overestimation of the legislators' roles and of the political[8] authority in general.

In Montesquieu's viewpoint, the legislator plays a fundamental role in every social organization in forging the laws that rule it. Opposite to the spontaneous customs emerged from collective life, laws require from a political will capable of examining society nature to distinguish its goal and the appropriate means to achieve it. Although laws cannot be arbitrary, and they must recognize the rooted customs of a society, they cannot exist without the creative and crucial intervention of a legislator.

However, Durkheim (1892a) considers that laws are not mainly the result from the legislator's task but that they come from customs. Laws are the same as customs, sometimes unconscious and obscure, defined and expressed in a clear way. When writing a law, the legislator acts as a tool for causes that exceed him completely.

Law does not need primarily anything from the State or from its forms of organization. It is not based on an external and artificial coercion but on an inner feeling, that is, the individual interdependence in the fight for existence and in the solidarity that joins them. The State, once formed, can regulate the execution of laws but do not constitute the law. Crimes, for example, are a natural fact whose conditions lie in the nature of the society itself and it does not depend on the will of the State men (Durkheim, 1893a).

Some of the most distinctive statements presented in *De la division du travail social* are already drafted in former efforts and as Lacroix (1981) points out: reading Montesquieu from a critical perspective paves the way to analyzing the different forms of solidarity.

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8   Even though he considers Montesquieu slightly exaggerates, Durkheim (1892a) values the key role Montesquieu provides to the inherent conditions of the nature of the societies (soil nature, size of population, weather conditions) in the definition of types of societies and the forms of the state. Considering the governing regime together with other characters of societies, he contradicts the restricted classifications based exclusively on political factors.

In effect, in this famous work, Durkheim (1893b) defines law as a visible symbol that expresses collective[9] will and he insists on the idea that the state organ in charge of dictating and applying law is a mere vehicle for said will. Although men working with laws play an organizing and clarifying role of diffused customs, they can neither act to their own judgements nor go against rooted collective feelings.

The Forms of State as a Reflection of the Forms of Solidarity

Towards 1893, the queries about the State and its political action, framed with insistence and emphasis on the previous decade, started to bring about precise conceptual effects.

Paradoxically, while the problem of the State leaves the center of the scene because Durkheim becomes certain that it does not have an own power but delegated in the maintenance of social cohesion; his formulation gets more precise and full of answers, not necessarily definitive ones, by the way.

How he deals with politics and State's nature, its functions and its historical forms, although secondary, is absolutely full of details in some aspects. In effect, a careful reading of the three books that make up *De la division du travail social*[10] makes us recognize a series of statements and principles that show a deeper complexity in his conception of State in general, and of Modern State in particular.

At first, we must point out that the thesis according to which the State is born in the society and expresses its degree of solidarity, which started to be developed in the last decade, acquires now more definitive edges than before.

From analyzing the genesis of punishment, Durkheim argued in favor of the historical precedence of society, or more exactly, of the social solidarity, in respect of the State.

The function of a court is firstly performed by the whole community met in an assembly who reacts as a unit, because even though the punishment is not fixed yet accurately, the crime is immediately recognized because it insults strong and defined states of the collective consciousness. When the assembly takes a long time to

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9   As it is well known, he distinguished two types of law: repressive law based on revenge, typical from societies where mechanic solidarity prevails, with a strong collective consciousness, which is extended and mainly with a religious character. The other type is the restitutive law, made by rules that pursue recovering disrupted relationships, corresponding to societies mainly bound by an organic solidarity due to the social division of labor.

10 It can be checked in the English edition carefully done by the well-known specialist Steven Lukes published in 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan editorial. Apart from being a revision of the original translation, in charge of W. D. Halls, it includes Lewis Coser's introduction from 1984 and a presentation of the above-mentioned Steven Lukes who studies the most important theorical concepts of this work in its specific historical circumstances.

embody a boss or a government organ, it is the nature of the collective feelings what explains both, the punishment and the crime (Durkheim, 1893b).

If the State expresses the social life, therefore, different types of states correspond to each type of society. This is the thesis that appears veiledly on Durkheim's pages devoted to differentiating societies that are kept cohesive around the similarities of their members who base their integration on the social division of labor.

In those societies whose social structure corresponds to a mechanic solidarity, it is common that the intense dependence that individuals have of the common consciousness is transmitted to the boss or central authority who embodies this role. The directing power that the controlling organ can reach in this type of societies is due to the fact that it conforms an emanation from the collective consciousness. What is more, in these conditions, the action of this collective consciousness can reach a maximum energy as it stops being diffused and it is channeled through a definite organ (Durkheim, 1893b).

Meanwhile in the societies with a predominance of organic solidarity, formed by organs, functionally different and with an inner differentiation, coordinated and subordinated to each other, the central organ does not bear an absolute power, but it only performs a moderate and temporary action. While there is some mutual dependence among the different organs, there are only differences in grade and none of them bears an absolute power[11] (Durkheim, 1893b).

Without being explicitly stated, we can recognize two types of relationships between the state and the individual which each of them is staged over a type of society. On one hand, there is a *despotic or absolutist* relationship that corresponds to primitive or old societies with a centralized power, tending to have a mechanic solidarity. On the other, there is a relationship which can be called *organic or functional* as Durkheim does not use any precise qualificative adjective for this type of relationship.

We can read between lines in Durkheim's speech that he makes the following conclusion: with a historic development, the state organ gets less and less despotic as a preponderance for organic solidarity grows because of an expandable division of social labor. The existence of differentiated organs and the dependence generated between them by the social division of labor prevents an excessive exercise of collective authority embodied by the state organs.

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11 It's worth saying that in Chapitre 7 you can find a definition of the state organ as a brain that leads the relations of the different social organs and it rules over every element or component. However, we must point out that this faculty which empowers the state to direct plays a marginal role because we can not make any precise conceptual interpretation or analogies. The most important concept he formulates is the one that considers the state as an intermediary and translator of the collective consciousness.

In other words, the nature of authoritarian governments comes from a social type determined by a state of homogeneity that leaves almost no room for individual life and that individuals are submitted to the state authority in the only way they know how to do it in this social type, by a complete determination, in an absolute way. With an advance of individualism, typical from social types which are closer in time, this form of despotism moves back and tends to disappear.[12]

The State as a Reinforcement of the Collective Consciousness

Even coming from the power that is diffuse in the society, the power of reaction that governing functions bear, once they have appeared, has as a primary and main function to guarantee the respect for beliefs and collective practices, in particular, as Durkheim states (1893b), to defend common consciousness against internal and external enemies.

How successful the state power can be in this crucial endeavor depends -according to a circular reasoning- on the capacity it has to become an exceptional embodiment of the collective type, a supreme representative of the collective strengths from where it gets its force.

The two modalities by means of which the state performs a function of strengthening common life, as we can infer from his thesis in 1893, consist on clarifying diffuse states and obscure social feelings that are part of the collective consciousness and on suppressing opposing social forces despite the society fails to feel their dangerousness.

Let's go back to the circle. The closer and more dependent the state apparatus gets to the collective consciousness and more attention pays to the survival of said consciousness, the more capable it will become to anticipate (standing for certain acts as crimes) or to decipher their needs (regulating diffuse social customs) and to foresee and repel any attacks against this collective consciousness.

The Extension of the State Sphere in Modern Societies

While arguing with spencer's utilitarianism, Durkheim specifies his definition of a modern state from the analysis of a question that keeps him awake from childhood: is social harmony absolutely spontaneous, or does it need any type of political intervention?

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12 Lately, different texts connecting Durkheim's work to the republican tradition have been highlighted. In France, Nicolet (1982), Rosanvallon (2004), and Spitz (2005) are works that should be mentioned, among others. In the United States, Bellah (1973), Cladis (1992), and Challenger (1994), are works that must be specially pointed out. According to Spitz, for example, Durkheim must be considered as a republican because of the fact that he has always rejected the mystic solution that confers to the state other objectives rather than safeguarding and constituting individual rights. Cladis also illustrates this when he claims that Durkheim must be considered as "a classic republican within Tocqueville's tradition" as he promotes a moral individualism as a common faith that supports dignity and the individual's rights and a plurality of spheres that allows diversity and individual autonomy (Cladis, 1992, p. 164).

In spencer's industrial societies, as individual activity grows and free trade increases, contractual relationships become widespread and solidarity turns automatic as the result of the spontaneous agreement of individual interests. Social relationships, mostly economic (exchanges, contracts) do not need any sort of regulations as they depend on the free initiative of the parties. That is how, the lose both, power and the scope of authority.

Durkheim denies sharing this belief as he considers that the stability of societies where the division of social work has been extended would be in danger if it were based on an individual interest, which only creates superficial and temporary bonds. If selfishness cannot be restricted, we can only expect conflicts.

Besides, from his viewpoint, spencer's ideas are not grounded on historical research. Social discipline has not been relaxed with the passing of time, it has only changed its form. Repressive law (criminal law) has lost ground while restitutive or cooperative laws have been developed intensely (civil, commercial, administrative, constitutional, etc.). The rules and practices tending to achieve uniformity are not numerous anymore as the forms of social discipline that rule complex social relationships have been multiplied among different social functions (Durkheim, 1893b).

It cannot be denied that contractual relationships are multiplied together with labor division, but non-contractual relationships are also developed, and a growing state intervention is present in them. Marriage, for example, is not contracted freely but the Church or a civil authority must intervene at the same time that more formalities are needed to celebrate this ceremony. Adoption conditions have also been multiplied through history. In short, obligations at home get more and more numerous and they get a more public character. Ruling organs must intervene to perform a moderating action on families because the family became an organ with specific functions and what takes place within a family may affect the rest of the society.[13]

In contracts, you can also see the state action because they always follow regulations as a result of social experience and tradition[14]. The role of society is not reduced to witness a free contract execution, but it intervenes in order to avoid contracts altering

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13 In the course about the family that he gives in Burdeos, this theme is exhaustively developed. Durkheim (1892b) establishes that the intervention of the state is the condition of a possible transformation of the patriarchal family into a conjugal family, since without that intervention the family ties based on the marriage would brake easily. At the same time, the state has become a factor of domestic life while it intercedes when the father authority exceeds certain limit, it protects orphans and it establishes, in certain cases, the loss of the parental rights, etc.

14 Durkheim revives from Schmoller the idea that the economic relations are always subject to customs and law regulation, that do not consist, therefore, on an abstract exchange between individuals (Durkheim, 1887).

the regular functioning of certain organs, to guarantee that justice is respected, to apply general rules in specific cases and to prevent social harmony to be at risk.[15]

Despite the ambiguous terms that he used in these sections[16] (social action, social intervention, public power), we can assure that he is talking about the growing intervention of the state organ that dictates the laws and regulations, enforces and penalizes their breach. Obviously, together with this organized and defined pression, you can find all the obligations imposed by customs that have not been penalized yet by law.

To sum up, from a position trusting in historical progress, Durkheim believes that not only is modern state less despotic than in the past but also it is characterized by an extension of its intervention in social relationships known as private, in a movement that does not generate any contradictions.

The Impotence of the Political Power in the Face of the Capitalist Crisis

When in his masterpiece published in 1893, Durkheim argues that it is the division of labor which plays ever more the integrating role that a strong and extended common conscious played before, he suggests certain unease. In fact, the division of labor in the capitalist societies does not generate solidarity but conflicts[17]. How does he "solve" this issue? By making a shif: if the division of labor does not originate solidarity, we are before an abnormal situation, consequence of the pathologic forms that it has assumed momentarily.

The two main abnormal forms in which the division of social labor does not produce solidarity are the anomic division of labor (that occurs when the growing specialization relegates the individuals to isolated and meaningless employment, in which each one does not take into account the common task, thus, turning into a source of disintegration) and the forced or coercive division (the one that is imposed to the individuals without taking into consideration aptitudes, abilities and hereditary dispositions).[18]

In normal conditions, the necessary rules for the development of the functions come from the division of labor, more precisely, they come from a sufficient and extended

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15 Simultaneously, against socialists, he puts forwards that the state must not perform economic functions, that is, it must not devote itself to the production, planning, or implementation of different reforms. The state reforms that pretend to redistribute the wealth, only alter the natural functioning of the social mechanisms and, besides, they do not work to reduce inequalities.

16 Sections I and II from Chapter VII (Durkheim, 1893b).

17 As it is known, the theoretical and political production of Durkheim takes place in a turbulent France for decades by the economic transformations involved by the consolidation of capitalism, by the popular struggles and by the bitter political struggles between the different capitalist fractions in order to achieve the hegemony in the state apparatuses and to impose the form of organization of the political power.

18 In what follows, the analysis is based on the extensive developments presented by Durkheim in Chapters 1 y 2, Book III (Durkheim, 1893b).

contact between the different organs. Despite not producing mutual interdependence, they express it in a clearly defined way, their existence is vital, mainly when the functions are more specialized, and their organization is more complex, since when the mutual obligations are not regulated, or they are regulated in an inappropriate manner (anomic state), they lead to conflicts and situations of uncertainty that obstruct the harmonious development of the functions.

Can the state in an anomic situation impose certain rules or regulations to get out of it? Can it improve the contact between the different economic functions?

Comte, with whom Durkheim argues openly about this matter, considers that as the variety of functions, and therefore, of feelings and interests, does not arise spontaneously the required unity, the state is responsible for the special function of constituting and keeping it.

Diametrically opposed to this position, Durkheim insists and maintains his conviction: the spontaneous consensus of the parties (or internal solidarity) is the necessary condition of the regulatory action of the superior centers. In order to have a direction of the whole on the parties, it is essential that the whole does exist, that is to say, that the parties should already be supportive to each other. If the division of labor does not produce solidarity, it is because its conditions of existence have not been conducted yet.

To Durkheim, it is a problem of unbalanced temporalities: when the economic transformations occur with extremely rapidity, the spontaneous but slow balancing processes of conflicting interests and of configuration of a set of customs cannot be displayed. Later on, if they are taken into the state apparatus, they become rules of law.

The solution imagined by Durkheim for the abnormal and exceptional problem of the anomic division of labor does not consist on giving an extraordinary power or special functions to the state. It would be useless. The moral uniformity cannot be maintained by force and it does not respond to political initiatives. At critical moments, the state officials and the political forces also act as translators.

The legal indeterminacy that prevails in the economic world, for example, in the relationships between the worker and the employer cannot be solved by a sovereign action of the state or by a program or political action. Only when a worker, instead of being isolated, acts in relation to the other workers and knows clearly the ultimate aim of his tasks, only when each function has constant relations with the others, the legislation will be able to promote solidarity.

In other words, the anomic crisis can only be overcome when in the division of the social labor the cooperation is set up, that is, when it began to function normally by

its own inertia. There is no action or political force -that Durkheim always defines as external- that can intervene in this process.

The treatment that the coercive division of labor receives, confirms the preceding conclusion. This abnormal situation in which the inferior classes (such is the term Durkheim uses), discontented with the role that custom and law have assigned to them, aim to perform functions that are prohibited for them, does not come from the division of labor but, on the contrary, from the use of state coercion.

When the division of labor is imposed from upper classes and coercively, in a more or less violent manner, the distance between interests, individual aptitudes and their daily occupations are experienced as a suffering because they do not respond to "natural talents". And in this way, you only achieve an imperfect and disturbed solidarity.

Only the spontaneity guarantees a division of labor that corresponds to the variety of abilities, that is, a division in which more competent individuals for each type of activities, can reach them. The coercion begins when a regulation, a right, instead of responding to natural talents and customs, it is based on force, and when the political power tries to change the existing inequalities, that is to say, when it seeks to alter the conditions in which the attendees dispute the functions.

Neither the state nor political forces, in short, must intervene in the development of that competence through which the different economic functions are distributed. They must also be careful to accept their results, even if they may seem unfair.

According to Durkheim, the only functions that correspond to the different state instances consist of materializing in rules, those habits and customs emerging from the nature of society (it should be understood as a field of dispute to perform the different social functions); of safeguarding (accessorily) the maintenance of the undertaken commitments[19] and of abstaining from modifying the rules of competition favoring certain workers to the detriment of others (the contracting parties, for example, must be in equal conditions and none must receive external help, only in this way, the unequal situations in the society are limited to clarify the internal inequalities[20]).

Socialism as a Commitment towards a Moralizing State

In his article of 1893 dedicated to study scientifically the socialist doctrine, Durkheim establishes that in its diverse variations, from the revolutionaries to

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19 Accessorily, because according to Durkheim, the public authority is not enough to maintain the contracts and it is essential that they be supported spontaneously.

20 It is necessary to take into account that for Durkheim the coercion does not derive only from the state, though it is the main way. For example, if a class is obliged to accept whatever price for its services, thanks to the fact that another class owns the resources and not due to some social superiority. In this case, it can be said that there is coercion of the second class on the first one.

teaching socialism, it is characterized not only by the plan of changing the current economic state but also by asking for a state regulation of the economic functions.

Emerging from a society with a division of labor increasingly marked, socialism expresses for Durkheim (1893c) an undeniable and clear necessity: the industrial and commercial functions, in order not to be diffuse, must be organized by the state.

Unlike communism, that corresponds to a historic stage of social indifference, socialism, that is, the demand of an increased intervention of the state in the economy, is consistent with more developed societies, composed of multiple and autonomous organs but interdependent between them. What does the intervention, that Durkheim agrees with, involve? It involves subordinating the individual purposes to the really social purposes, that is to say, moral (1893c).

We cannot fail to notice that there has been a discrepancy regarding the function attributed to the state. If on the pages referred to the moral function of de division of labor, it is unable to regulate the complex diversity of the economic functions of the modern societies, in his notes about socialism, there appear as an instance (not at all exclusive) of moral organization of the economic world. This second perspective, indeed, is emphasized in his immediately subsequent writings.

A few years later, in a situation of resurgence of the socialist thinking in France, in the midst of which some of his students begin to enlist (Lukes, 1985), Durkheim comes back to this issue[21], and he continues claiming the connection between the diffuse economic functions with the consciousness and directing centers of society[22].

He also confirms that socialism, emerged from the collective necessities, does not consist of placing the economic life in the hands of the state but of establishing a polished and permanent contact. In a socialist system, Durkheim will point out (1895-1896), the state will lose its specifically political character to focus on the direction and administration of the economy. The situation of the non-capitalist laborers and the workers, for example, can only improve through its approach to the centers that lead social life.

In other words, for him, the main component of socialism is not the workers' demands, or the negation of the individual property, or the despotic subordination of

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21 Between 1895 and 1896 in Burdeos, he gives a course about the history of socialism (published only in 1928) that expected to continue a few more years to cover the conceptions of Fourier, Proudhon, Lassalle and Marx, but finally it remains unfulfilled. He will always regret not having finished his history of socialism (Mauss, 1928, p. 38).

22 Durkheim (1895-1896) uses this expression instead of the word "state" deliberately. If the theorists of socialism suppose that the capitalist state, as we know it, will disappear to become the center of the economic life, this instance of organization that is still standing up cannot be called with the same name.

the individual, or the class struggles: it is the conception of a conscious reorganization of the economic life.

In his particular analysis of the socialist thinking, Durkheim transforms a structural economic problem in a moral one, that is to say, a lack of integration. At the same time, the state appears clearly to be placed above and aside the classes: it is the representative of the general interests of the society. Only in that way, it can perform its moderating role. The hypothesis of the state as an instrument of class domination, that prevents any vision of the state as a neutral arbitrator of the class conflict, is completely excluded by the sociologist.

An anthropological philosophy enters into scene to support the Durkheimian discourse: if the human appetites do not find a brake, a discipline, we can only expect social disorder and individual anxiety. For each individual to be content with his fortune and not to ask for more money than can be expected, it is necessary the existing of a moral authority, of a regulating influence.

There is no doubt that social functions, including the economic ones, need to be subject to a superior power, but that power cannot come from an economic policy outlined by the state. As it is well known, our sociologist assigns priority in that regulatory capacity of the economic life to the occupational groups properly-articulated with the state.[23]

Conclusion

In Durkheim's theoretical apparatus between 1892 and 1893 to account for all the integrating mechanisms which are typical of modern societies, a triple characterization of the state specificity can be distinguished. Firstly, a modern state is defined by its increasing intervention within familiar and private contractual relations, which become more and more rigorously regulated to maintain the harmony between all the members of a society. Secondly, the state is distinguished because of its less and less despotic relationship with its individuals. The individual sphere and the field of action of the state, in other words, evolve together. Thirdly, the modern state has reduced its autonomous capacity to define crimes and sanctions in relation to the states that have historically preceded it. This loss of legal autonomy represents the other side of the

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23 David Grusky together with other specialists in topics related to stratification and social inequality departs from Durkheim's idea about considering professional groups as a supportive way that counteracts anomic relationships (and he also adds, the overexploitation) to criticize both neo-Marxists who try to apply the category of classes to huge populations and the theorists who advocate the complete disappearance of the concept of classes. From his viewpoint, it is necessary to disaggregate the concept of class, that is, applying the distinctions of classes to occupational smaller groups instead of discarding it completely. In this respect, the following works should be checked: Grusky (2005), Grusky and Galescu (2005), and Grusky and Sørensen (2001).

thesis that considers the state as a translator or a social thinking organ. He considers that the less autonomy it has, the better effectiveness because the state organ is closer to collective consciousness.

As a backdrop of all his thoughts, there operates a thesis according to which the state expresses a pre-existing solidarity which was generated spontaneously by different social fabrics with no political interference. Consequently, both the state and political actions are unable to solve the crisis that affects social cohesion. Said crisis can be overcome exclusively by some slow automatic processes of regeneration of solidary contacts.

To result in this imperative social solidarity, the division of labor must be regulated by a right and a moral. Is that law a prerogative of the state? No, it is not. The generation of those common ideas and feelings, necessary to scaffold any society and the construction of a secular morality that fills the vacuum of a religious moral, corresponds in these years to professional groups.

In his analysis of a modern family as a marital association that is no longer able to fulfil the economic and moral functions it used to have, Durkheim (1892b) suggests facing the crisis through strengthening professional groups since he thinks that a professional may perform an integrating role similar to the one that a family used to have.

Continuously questioning the problem of the state and politics from the point of view of integration, Durkheim is solidly persuaded that the state instance does not have an important role in the resolution of the national crisis around 1893.

Lacroix (1981) takes the position held by the French intellectual in his thesis of 1893 with the name of geographic materialism, since the social phenomena studied there depended on the population's growth. Indeed, the historical genesis of the state is also determined by the phenomenon of dynamic density, which allows the transformation of primitive societies made up of simple segments in others, where differentiated organs start to form the state. Determined by morphological phenomena, the modern state grows in volume and functions just because it must follow the pace of the division of labor.

Equality in the external conditions of a struggle that would enable an ideal social state characterized by the fact that social differences would reproduce exactly the natural individual ones, is not unattainable for Durkheim under capitalist conditions. According to his words, in contemporary societies, there is a tendency for inequality of external conditions to become balanced. Some of these external conditions may be: the hereditary transmission of wealth, caste systems, the elitist access to certain university careers or to certain jobs, among others.

The position that claims that the state must not interfere actively on the economic world is supported in a naturalization of social inequalities by reducing them to individual inequalities and in considering the social economic field as an area of healthy competition that does not admit interventions. For Durkheim, organic solidarity is deployed when spontaneity reigns in the external conditions of the struggle.

Equality between competitors must be wisely combined with discipline. For Durkheim, there is no society without discipline, without limitations of the individual aspirations, that are always disproportionate in relation to possible satisfactions. In conclusion, he hopes that the growing of equality occurs spontaneously, without the state's intervention and without a mass mobilization. His concern for the French separation does not derive in political activism but in the defence of moral education as a means of installing nationalism and respect for the established laws.

There is no room for political action: everything is determined beforehand by the society's morphology. Overcoming the crisis depends completely on the reestablishment of the spontaneous consensus of all its members.

He does not believe that the stability of modern societies depends on an economic basis. From his reading of the socialist doctrine, Durkheim concludes that industrial and commercial relations are not ordered following market rules and that they must be subject to moral forces that regulate them and show them a higher purpose.

Instead of the minor role that the state had in *De la division du travail social*, it now has a new dignity: connecting and integrating the disorganized and dispersed economic activities. The harmful and undesirable state's intermediation became a necessary tendency to the order of things in Durkeim's analysis on socialism.

Can we conclude then that Durkheim begins to value the state as a supreme instance of social integration? Absolutely not. Although he admits in his studies about socialism the role of the state as a growing intervention in the economy, he does not give to the state the privilege of being an integrating influence and, therefore, moral. It continues being, basically, a translator, an appendix of solidarities that overflows it.

Some years later the problems of the state and politics will regain certain importance. The last chapter of *Le suicide* (1897)*, the *Préface de la seconde édition de la division du travail social* (1901) and the *Leçons de sociologie* (1890–1900)[24] contains precise instructions about the limitations of the state coercive policies to regenerate social fabrics. Besides, he also talks about the integrating and regulating

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24 These lessons constitute the last edition of some courses given in 1890 and 1900 in Burdeos and repeated in Sorbonne in 1904 and 1912. The first three chapters of these lessons, referred to professional moral were published by Marcel Mauss in 1937. The whole text, including the lessons on the state, was ultimately known in 1950 from a publication made by Istanbul University on the base of the original manuscripts of the definite text from the lessons dating back to years 1899-1900 (Kubali, 1950).

role that professional associations should perform and they are conceived as conveyor belts of the state organ representatives of general interest, in the moral crisis that modern societies are experiencing.

Faced with the threat of disintegration, Durkheim will insist on dismissing the solutions centered in traditional political institutions, such as political parties, the parliament and political leaders. He claims for the internalization of an integrating secular moral through the already mentioned professional groups subordinated to the state and the rational secular educational system. The state schools, guardians par excellence of our national type, as Durkheim will call them in his courses about *L'éducation morale*. (1899-1902), will appear as privileged spheres of the formal education of moral individuals.

Meanwhile, in other works, for example in the article *Deux lois de l'évolution pénale* (1900-1905) and in the course about *L'État (*1900-1905)[25], Durkheim will advance in the distinction between democracy and absolutism and recognize that the role of the state is not limited to express and summarize the impulsive thinking of a multitude but to conform "a power station" of rational and meditated representations with a certain directive power.

Later, religious problems will become gradually more hegemonic than political interrogations about Law, the state, professional associations, socialism, etc. Although it constitutes a complex process, it can be said that from 1902 the question for political power will begin to vanish and only war will give him grounds for some last reflections about national states (Inda, 2008).

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25 Course given between 1900 and 1905 and published posthumously in 1958 in the *Revue philosophique*.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

You Only Get What You Give? A New Radical Durkheimian Political Economy of Sacrifice*

Ronjon Paul Datta[1]

Abstract

Recognizing the convergence of renewed scholarly interest in the sacred, and debates about fiscal sacrifices in recent economic history, this rethinking of Durkheim develops a symptomatic reading of his theory of sacrifice in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. The paper argues that Durkheim's suppression of political economic sensibilities in *The Forms* leads him to generate a fetishistic account of sacrifice as a moral activity that renews existing bases of rule. His analysis does so because it inadequately accounts for the role of structured inequalities in the production of the rite. A radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice is reclaimed by critically synthesizing it with the Foucauldian concept of *dispositifs*, one better able to account for the combined impact of knowledge control, inequality, and exclusion on moral life. The critical theoretical work is then applied to the axiological implications of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on and disavows sacrifice, specifically the sacrificing of people's capacity for altruism (*or, the sacrifice of sacrifice*). Finally, Durkheim's heterological sensibilities about the constitutive potential of the sacred in moments of collective effervescence are used to put the politics back in this political economy of sacrifice.

Keywords

Radical Durkheimianism • Sacrifice • Neoliberalism • *Dispositif* • Morality • Heterology

> When I began 15 years ago, I too thought that I would find an answer to the questions that preoccupied me in political economy. I spent several years on it, and got nothing out of it, or only what one can learn from a negative experience (Durkheim [1896] as cited in Fournier, 2013, p. 219)

> Sacrifice and offerings do not go unaccompanied by privations that exact a price from the worshipper (Durkheim, 1995, p. 320).

Sacrifice, and the willingness to give sacrificially—joyously even—is a nodal point in Durkheim's sociological enterprise. In rethinking Durkheim, this paper argues for a radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice to redress theoretical discrepancies in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Durkheim, 1995, hereafter cited as EFRL, or *The Forms*). For Durkheim, people's dependence on society and on others obliges them to regularly sacrifice, laying aside self-interest and bodily appetites as guides to conduct to act in the interests of a group to which a person belongs and from which empowering benefits accrue. In many respects, reconciling the austere dimensions of the Kantian imperatives of duty with a Saint-Simonian love of humanity lay at the core of Durkheim's sociological project of explaining morality and how life with others was possible. Contemporary scholarship by Melissa Ptacek (2017), Phillipe Steiner (2017; 2012/2013; 2011), Ivan Strenski (2006), Alexander Riley (2015), Frank Pearce (2010) and Willie Watts Miller (2012) among others, has drawn new attention to Durkheim's account of sacrifice. These contributions are extended here by exploring the potentials and limitations of discrepancies in Durkheim's account of sacrifice in *The Forms*, especially those stemming from his equivocal use of political economy. Durkheim's model is critically inspected through the theoretical methodology of "symptomatic readings" developed by Althusser (1970; cf. Pearce, 2001). I contend that Durkheim's suppression of a political economy of sacrifice, elements of which are present in *The Forms*, leads him to generate a fetishistic account of sacrifice as a moral activity, one that typically renews existing mechanisms of rule. His analysis does so because it fails to adequately account for the role of structured inequalities in the production of the rite and the inherent volatility and political potentiality subtending it. This theoretical work is then applied to the axiological content of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on, and disavows, the *sacrifice of sacrifice*, i.e., the sacrificing of people's capacity for altruism. A radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice[2] is reclaimed by considering both mechanisms of "rule" (i.e., the reproduction of the *status quo*) and those of "politics" (i.e., how the existential reference points of collective life are contingently and creatively constituted) (Datta, 2008). The rule side is developed by critically synthesizing Durkheim's model with a neo-Foucauldian concept of a *dispositif* (Datta, 2007; Foucault, 1980; Hardy, 2015) to better account for the impact

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2   To my knowledge, a Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice does not exist, the closest contribution in my view being Georges Bataille's analysis of Aztec sacrifice in *The Accursed Share, Volume I* (1995a).

of knowledge control, inequality, and exclusion on sacrifice. Finally, Durkheim's heterological sensibilities about the constitutive potential of the sacred in moments of collective effervescence are used to put the politics back in this political economy of sacrifice.

Sacrifices Proliferating? The Current Conjuncture

Philosopher Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer* (1998) began a new period of theorizing the sacred and sacrifice. It displaced scholarly attention to Georges Bataille's analyses of the sacred that had arisen from interest in studies of poststructuralist thinkers such as Baudrillard (Pawlett, 1997) and Kristeva (1982), indebted to his conceptions of the sacred, ecstasy, abjection, heterology, communication, sacrifice, and economics. Bataille's heterological sensibilities refer to the ambivalent nature of the sacred as a source of both attraction and repulsion in social life (Pawlett, 2018). There was also renewed interest in the "sacred sociology" of *Collège de Sociologie* in which Bataille was a key member along with Roger Caillois and Michel Leiris, (Richman, 2002; Riley, 2010). This spurred a return to Durkheimian sociology, the touchstone for the *Collège*, and to the radical potential of Durkheim's sociology of religion in particular. Sacrifice was a central concern for Bataille since, in his view, it touched the depths of individual existence and its limits. The tragic identification with the sacrificial victim is the closest we can get to knowledge of our own death (Bataille, 1990). Sacrifice was also a great social display of what Bataille called the non-utilitarian "general economy" in motion, illustrating one modality of the movement and exchange of excesses of energy across the earth creating the need for the consumption of this fecundity through war or religion, for instance (Bataille, 1995a). Agamben disarticulated "the sacred" from religious studies and sociology and placed it at the centre of a post-humanist existential political philosophy. For him, the sovereign power of sacral exclusion is the constitutive socio-political paradigm of domination in the west (Agamben, 1998) and "profanation," returning the stuffs of social existence to unrestricted use, is key to the abolition of sacral dominance (Agamben, 2007). Alas, Agamben is dismissive of Durkheimian sociology (1998, p. 51), unfortunately neglecting Durkheim's attention to sacral exclusion in his studies of incest (1963) and property (1992), among others.

From Scholastic to Political Economic Events

The aleatory convergence of renewed scholarly interest in the sacred and sacrifice (cf. Martel, 2006) and the recent history of the global political economy, having got its footing after the Global Financial Crisis (hereafter, GFC), spawned academic discussion about sacrifice, morality and the economy (Brown, 2015; Fourcade, Steiner, Streek, & Woll, 2013; Sandel, 2010; Steiner, 2017). For the advanced

capitalist societies, economic health became more than a matter of sluggish growth, inequality, working-class incredulity towards liberal capitalist metanarratives, or general economic malaise. Rather, pronounced anxieties about persistent and massive debts on the part of governments, pensioners, students, or municipalities dealing with accumulating infrastructure debts, raised issues about the morality of indebtedness itself. The genesis of conditions described as "zombie capitalism" (Datta, 2018; Quiggin, 2010) in which people and governments find themselves reliant on various credit facilities to enable participation in social life (e.g., obtain education and training) and sustain themselves (e.g., housing), also drew attention. Politicians' and pundits' repeated calls for austerity and fiscal sacrifices in the wake of massive borrowing for economic stimulus, gained traction, repeating characteristic themes of neoliberal governmentality (Brown, 2015; Panitch & Gindin, 2012). This hegemonizing discourse set the terms of debate about how economic sacrifices would be in the best interest of the country and "our children." In this style of moral reasoning how can it be just to saddle our children and grandchildren with *our* debts? If it isn't, we need to rein in our borrowing and cut current government spending to repair balance sheets. That such cuts adversely affect "our children and grandchildren" *in the present* with diminished public capacity for education, healthcare, the arts and sports, affordable housing, clean air and water, and transportation, is revealing of this economic morality. The theoretical traditions contributing to this new critical assessment of sacrifice, morality, and the economy are quite varied, ranging from the radical Maussian anarchism of David Graeber (2012), to the poststructuralist Italian Marxisms of Mauricio Lazzarato (2015) and Christian Marazzi (2011), to noted political theorist Wendy Brown (2015). Closer to sociological home is the work of the Regulation School economists Michel Aglietta and André Oréleans that has drawn on French conceptions of the sacred and sacrifice to generate an account of money (Grahl, 2000; cf. Steiner, 2011, p. 147, 197). Marazzi, echoing radical Durkheimian tropes, distills his account of the current conjuncture as follows: "The demands of profitability imposed by financial capitalism on the entire society reinforce social regression under the pressure of a growth model that, in order to distribute wealth, voluntarily sacrifices social cohesion and the quality of life itself" (2011, p. 44).

Anglo-American neoliberal morality has a soteriology promising self-actualization and a vibrant citizenry constituted through individual initiative, innovation, and work, facilitated by the state constitution of competitive and largely self-regulating markets of various kinds (Brown, 2015; Rose, 1999). Neoliberal salvation though, is predicated on the "demands of sacrifice [to be made by workers], in the imposition of austerity and the authoritarianism of permanent crisis" (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 248). Arguably then, sacrifice lies at the moral core of capitalist political economy: "Since the dawn of humanity, the generations that have sacrificed the most time at work

are those that have had the misfortune of being born under capital" (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 249). In contrast to the Regulation School, Lazzarato rejects Rene Girard's universalistic conception of sacrifice (2015, p. 80). He also finds Marcel Mauss' Durkheimian model of sacrifice unpersuasive because of its purported holism and inability to explain some empirical cases, instead preferring Deleuze and Guattari's Nietzschean conception of morals and debts as his guide (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 84).

From Economics to the Ubiquity of Economic Sacrifices

The dominance of neoliberal ideas (and crucially, normative ideals for a vibrant society) supported by the hegemony of atomistic, rational-actor based economics (Brown, 2015; Quiggin, 2010), has unwittingly contributed to the appropriateness of applying the sacrificial trope to economic life. In some respects, this should come as no surprise given that main figures in economics from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman took morality seriously. As Marx astutely points out, for Adam Smith, "Labour [is] regarded merely as a *sacrifice*" and "the capitalist too brings a *sacrifice*, the sacrifice of *abstinence*, in that he grows wealthy instead of eating up his product directly" (1973, p. 612). Central to neoliberalism is that idea that governments, when they have properly constituted markets, can generate "*the good"* of inoculating people against unresponsive, costly bureaucratic bloat in the state to be replaced by a nimble, dynamic private sector. In turn, this dynamism offers an alternative to, and cure for, the sclerosis of socialist welfarism that breeds and rewards apathy for recipients while discouraging innovators and risks-takers offended by the morality of public support for slackers. The logic of resentment on the part of entrepreneurs goes something like this: "We're the ones taking the risks, making the sacrifices, working long hours, and missing our families to ensure the wealth of the nation –we make the value, not the parasitical government workers and welfare 'takers'. Our sacrifices lend moral authority to our approach to governing the body politic." Such logic has less is common with the noble salvific ethos of the individual entrepreneur described by Max Weber and more with the *ressentiment* conceptualized by Nietzsche. This "marketization of morals" (Datta, 2018, pp. 90–91) rests on a theoretical belief in a profoundly individualized basis of social causality, agency, and ethical responsibility. But such moral logics of sacrificing for the economy, combined with the promulgation of a market-inspired ethics, have sown the seeds for the proliferation of sacrificial discourse: *all and each* have a price to pay to obtain "the good."

Rousseau, and Durkheim following him (1960; 1961), recognized that modern civilization increases the possibilities for individual freedom and flourishing. This happens as social complexity, the division of labour, and a sophisticated education system develop. Suitable modern education provides opportunities for children to explore their interests and natural talents while also providing for the disciplined

cultivation of those talents and interests. The growth in the division of labour also encourages the emergence of new occupations and social niches as solutions to problems arising from competition (Durkheim, 1984; Plouin, 2010). The dynamics of the division of labour and modern pedagogy means that the diversity of individuals in society can increasingly harmonize with the diversity of occupations. People thus become freer since able to find an occupation better suited to their individual talents, inclinations, and specialized training: talent, training, and job align in a *normal and healthy organic division of labour*. As opportunities multiply, and as people are increasingly aware of a diversity of occupations and ways of life, so too multiply concerns with "opportunity costs": what is likely lost by pursuing one path as opposed to another? This is the ethical sting of civilizational growth: sacrifice or suffer with the existential impasses and disappointments of anomie, lacking criteria for choosing among an infinity of desires (Durkheim, 2006, p. 269ff). *Mutatis mutandis*, economics has thus reintroduced a mid-twentieth century existentialist theme: when one realizes that one's life, time, and resources are limited, *one must choose,* and the paths not taken are sacrificed. We thus have a current situation in which new academic theorizing about sacrifice has encountered circumstances in which economic sacrifices affect broad publics. The radical Durkheimian commitment to analyzing power, inequality, exclusion and moral irrationality, makes it a useful resource for considering this convergence (Gane, 1992; Pearce, 2001; Stedman Jones, 2001).

Re-Reading Durkheim Symptomatically

There are a variety of approaches to reading theory rigorously to a generate pertinent contemporary explanations of the social world. These include the influential humanities approach to reading Durkheim developed by Robert Alun Jones and continued by Ivan Strenski, geared toward understanding Durkheim's own intentions in the context of his broader milieu (Strenski, 2006, p. 9). Others include critical-rationalist reconstructions of Durkheim's work (e.g., Stedman Jones, 2001) and the reflexive sociology of intellectual production developed by Alexander Riley (2010). The approach to rethinking "Durkheim" taken here is located in the poststructuralist Althusserian methodology of "symptomatic" readings (Althusser, 1970; Pearce, 2001). Symptomatic readings recognize that knowledge is a language dependent enterprise (but not entirely so), and that "theory" is constitutive of knowledge production not least since social scientists make knowledge claims and develop research programmes in light of existing social scientific discourses (Pearce, 2001).

Althusser distinguishes between "symptomatic" readings and "dogmatic" ones in which already existing criteria or theories, implicitly or explicitly assumed to be correct, are used to judge other accounts of the world (1970). Dogmatic readings however, leave the foundation of those knowledge claims beyond the reach of

explicit rational scrutiny. They are also limited in their critical capacity because dependent on metatheoretical assertions about knowledge production. Empiricists, for instance, assume that through sense experience one can read the truth of the world (Althusser, 1970, p. 35). Or, as one finds in Marx's early works, political economy is read and criticized through a humanist materialism that Marx deemed correct. In contrast, a "symptomatic" reading tries first to grasp the terrain of the problematic in a text that aims to explain the world. A "problematic" is fundamentally organized by *the questions it poses* that render existing knowledge about the world a problem to be considered and transformed, questions intelligible because of the surrounding discursive terrain in which they occur (Althusser, 1970, p. 25). Both the knowing subject and the object of knowledge are constituted within this same discursive terrain. A theory is obliged to offer coherent answers to the questions it poses, drawing on the criteria immanent in the theoretical work itself. Here, Althusser aligns himself with Spinoza's rationalism: *"verum index sui et falsi"* ("what is true is the sign of itself and what is false"). Thus, one aims to read and assess theoretical works on their own terms for their questions, perspicacity, and coherence (Althusser, 1976, p. 122).

Althusser illustrates the symptomatic methodology by drawing on examples from Marx's reading of Adam Smith. Smith "naively borrowed from everyday life the category of 'price of labour' without any prior verification, and then asked the question, how is this price determined?" (Marx as cited in Althusser, 1970, p. 20). Smith fails to answer the question and unwittingly answers one he hadn't posed concerning the *value of labour power*. Smith's terrain is thus shown to be incoherent because combining two different incompatible discourses with different knowledge production criteria, one of his political economy, the other an everyday discourse geared toward the practicalities of life rather than rational scientific accounts. The irony is that Smith cannot see what his own theoretical terrain had unwittingly rendered visible, namely the need as an economist to conceptualize the determination of the value of labour power. Marx's theoretical revolution starts with posing the question of the determination of the value of labour power as the basis for transforming the terrain of classical political economy. He does so by decentring the economy as the central unit of analysis to conceptualize the totality of the material and practical social relations through which human life is produced and reproduced in definite forms. To (re-)read Durkheim symptomatically then, requires attending to the questions Durkheim poses and the "answers" rendered visible in his text, whether they be objects discussed (e.g., rituals and myths), or engagements with other theories.

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life & Sacrifice: A Distillation

The Forms offers a sociological account of the basic components of religious life, how they are put together, and the effects they generate, including the framework

of human existence itself (Datta, 2008). The focus on religion was a way to analyze the basic components of social institutions (e.g., kinship, marriage, and knowledge) to show how these components remain foundations in even very complex forms of societal organization. Deciding for methodological reasons to focus on the least complicated example of religious life for which there was ample data, he focused on Central Australian totemism. His analysis led to the following conclusion: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (EFRL, 1995, p. 44). Here I focus on the "practices relative to sacred things" and to issues of the "moral community" since most pertinent to sacrifice.

The Forms attends to the emergence of what Durkheim in his earlier work called "solidarity" (forms of moral rationality constitutive of enduring forms of social relations) to account for the causes of a sentiment of obligation to others (Fournier, 2013, p. 604). The book depicts social forces like solidarity that come from outside of the individual while also bringing individuals into (social) existence, flowing through them and linking them to others and their broader world. In this way, *The Forms* repeats a central problematic of Durkheim's entire *corpus*, stressing that the sociological analysis of human social life, in this case religion, was the path to understanding and cultivating new forms of morality in the present (Fournier 2013, p. 607; Watts Miller, 2012). For him, sociology must be capable of accounting for the constitution of persons as empowered moral agents able and willing to lay aside egotistic orientations and animalistic appetites to act in the interest of others and the greater good; altruism, as a valued and exercised concern for the other, cannot be assumed.

The basis of this real force capable of constituting the moral ordering of the social world practically, emotionally, epistemically, and aesthetically, lies in the "indefinite powers and anonymous force" (EFRL, 1995, p. 202) of society as it exists, is experienced, and is communicated between individuals. Durkheim's conception of the "the sacred" tends to refer to this basic but impersonal and anonymous force noting that belief in such powerful forces shaping people's lives and the fate of the group is found in quite a variety of different societies (EFRL, 1995, p. 196). Counter-intuitively then, neither religion nor altruism require belief in a deity *per se*. In Durkheim's account, a belief in such power is grounded in people's immersion in periodic moments of "collective effervescence" (EFRL, 1995, p. 217–218), when the assembled group engages in excessive behaviours including spontaneous dancing, music-making, intoxication, and transgressive sexual practices. This energizes participants as they are spurred by others' ecstatic conduct. All individuals thus feel and witness a transformative power radically

different from what governs everyday life, one greater than themselves and the group. When expressed, written, and commemorated as the collective representation of the totem symbol, this energy becomes attached to the totem, an object representing the transformational power witnessed, to become a shared reference point for belief in the sacred. Collective effervescence is thus a manifestation of a constitutive political potential in the group, one capable of renewing or completely reordering the social world by contingently attaching different collective representations ("words") to "things" (e.g., people, places, animals, practices, etc. [Datta, 2008]). In this respect, Durkheim is aiming to reframe both theological and philosophical conceptions of "transcendence" (that which exists prior to and independent of experience) with that of socio-historical "generality" (Ramp, 2008; Riley, 2010), but one that is immanent to all human groups.

Through religion, the sacred comes to be separated from the profane world (corporeal, empirical, and individualized) by forms of symbolic and practical exclusion applied to the profane world. Such divisions are a form of cosmological prophylaxis. Contact between the sacred and profane unregulated by religious administration is forbidden. Tattoos, like membership badges, illustrate how symbolic inclusion and exclusion work. Tattooing the body with a representation of the totemic species (EFRL, 1995, pp. 116–117) is exclusive to members of the clan, transforming the individual from a profane thing into a kind of sacred being, providing privileged access to that which belongs to the clan. The organization of time into a calendar of holy days is another example of symbolic exclusion: on certain days the regular or profane rules and tasks of daily life are suspended, and all are obliged to follow religious practices. Among practical exclusions are the interdictions about engaging with certain sacred objects like *churingas* or sacred places (e.g., *ertnatulunga* where churingas are kept). Human, social existence then, is thus characterised by an irresolvable but constitutive radical heterogeneity between the sacred and the profane (EFRL, 1995, p. 36), lending a certain dynamic volatility, both creative and destructive, to social life.

Sacred powers can be intentionally and beneficially administered in religious life and "spread" to individuals through initiation rites for priests and kings (Pearce, 2003). When such rites are not respected, sacral contagion becomes baneful, requiring the group to treat the entity polluted by the sacred with various interdictions up to expulsion and destruction. Sacrality can be "superadded" (EFRL, 1995, p. 349) to any person, place, thing, etc., in either regulated ways for benefit, or in unregulated ways portending harm. The obligation to respect the division between the sacred and profane, while also respecting and following the mechanisms of their intermingling, distinguishes religion from magic. As Durkheim states, "*There is no Church of magic*" (EFRL, 1995, p. 42) because magic, while referring to and drawing on the

same cosmology about the sacred found in religion, does not depend on the moral and reciprocal obligations pertinent to a group to which the practitioners belong (i.e., a "church"). Magic then, is more like commerce, driven by the contingent alignment of the interests of individuals; magicians have clients, not parishioners (EFRL, 1995, p. 42; Steiner, 2012/13 p. XI).

The always potentially volatile division between the sacred and the profane, between religion and individual economic activity, is not something peculiar to religion: it is the result of how social reality, that exists prior to and independently of any particular individual, regulates, shapes, and constitutes the haecceity of an individual body with its appetites, needs, feelings and potentials (including for language and reason) to make "it" a *person*, an individual *social being*, a member of a group capable of minimally organized, and maximally harmonious and expansive, life with others. As Durkheim stressed, humans are dual beings containing both a sacred-soul and a profane-body (EFRL, 1995, pp. 265–267). The radical heterogeneity of the sacred and profane, of (animalistic-empirical) individuality and (representational-transcendental) society, is thus *ontogenic*, being perpetually constituted and reconstituted in human societies. Finally, while religion "is a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine the society of which they are members" (EFRL, 1995, pp. 226–227) it is also a *misrecognition* of social forces (Lacroix, 1979). Durkheim's problematic can thus be distilled as a concern with the degrees of crystallization of collective representations that express real social forces external to individuals while also being constituted by the assembled group, in as much as social forces contribute to the moral forces at work inside of people (e.g., the fear and respect of the sacred, or feeling obliged), making it possible to live together and not be ruled by animalistic appetites or purely self-interested egotism, which if universalized would undermine the conditions of possibility of society itself. The basis of this real social power is constitutive since it can either reproduce and stabilize an existing *ordo rerum*, or be creative and revolutionary, expressing new totems that will then serve as new existential reference points for life with others.

Durkheim's Theory of Sacrifice in *The Forms*

Durkheim's theory of sacrifice is found in Book III of *The Forms*, "The Principle Modes of Religious Conduct," where he analyses "negative" and "positive" rites, emphasizing the obligatory character of both and their role in social reproduction. (Book II details the emergence of beliefs, especially those pertaining to the power of the totem symbol as an expression of the power of collective effervescence). Durkheim deems sacrifice a "great institution" (EFRL, 1995, p. 344) because it specifies how the sacred and the profane can and should be brought together, providing benefit to both domains, the world of the gods (and the group), and embodied human individuals.

Durkheim takes sacrifice to be a positive rite concerned with ensuring "the well-being of the [totemic] plant or animal species" (ERFL, p. 332). Rites are the practical result of myths that narrate the order of the world and the impact of the "totemic principle" in particular since it is the source that empowers the group. Durkheim's analysis of ritual conduct begins with "negative rites" that refer to prohibited or taboo actions, and those that are ascetic in nature. The purpose of negative rites is to maintain an enduring and beneficial separation between the sacred and the profane. In ascetic rites, the frequently painful renunciation of the body prepares the person for openness to transcendence through a practiced neglect of corporeal experience (EFRL, 1995, pp. 347, 320–321). The period surrounding a sacrifice is one of intensified religious prohibitions (EFRL, 1995, p. 338), serving as a reminder of the power of the group over the (profane) individual.

Initiation rites that renew both the sacred and profane are punishing ordeals designed to negate the influence of the profane in the novice while also demonstrating the power of a transcendental force. Initiation involves practices of periodic exclusion from the community, the initiate being sent away into the forest for instance, and then prepared for return, not just into the community, but into its exclusive sacred spheres (EFRL, 1995, p. 291ff). Sacrilege in contrast, involves a failure to maintain the separation of the sacred from the profane, resulting in serious harms to the offender and potentially the community as a whole. This movement between sacred and profane domains can be volatile. As Durkheim states, "There is no positive rite that does not fundamentally constitute a veritable sacrilege. Man[3] can have no dealings with sacred beings without crossing the barrier that must ordinarily keep him separate from them. All that matters is that the sacrilege be carried out with mitigating precautions" (EFRL, 1995, p. 342).

Durkheim's analysis focuses on the practices of the tribal Intichiuma rite celebrated by all Arunta. The Intichiuma has two main parts: the first concerns the well-being of the totem species and the second seeks to protect and enhance the power of the totem. The ceremony is concluded with the ritual preparation of a collective feast in which the group consumes the totem species. The other examples Durkheim discusses, a consequence of his commentary on William Robertson Smith, are taken from the Old Testament in which sacrifices are occasionally depicted as "a meal prepared before Yahweh" (EFRL, 1995, p. 341). Offering the "[f]irst products of the harvest" in the paschal meal for instance, illustrates that "food" is the sacrifice in the shared meal. For Robertson Smith, sacrifice is about communion and thus "not (essentially) renunciation" (EFRL, 1995, p. 342). Accepting part of this argument, Durkheim concedes that sacrifice characteristically involves a shared meal in which the group consumes some of the totem species in a reproductive act for securing the fecundity

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3   In Durkheim's day writing conventions were not gender inclusive. To avoid misleading corrections of his masculinist language, I have retained his usages and acknowledge that gender inclusive language today is a social right to be respected.

of the species as indicated by "abundant lizard births" in the face of uncertainty, for example (EFRL, 1995, p. 335, 342)

Durkheim departs from Robertson Smith's view that sacrifice is only a communal meal however, and instead advances an argument developed by his collaborators, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (Ptacek, 2017). He formulates his position as follows: "Sacrifice is certainly a process of communion in part. But it is also, and no less fundamentally, a gift, an act of renunciation. It always presupposed that the worshipper relinquishes to the gods some part of his substance or his goods. Any attempt to reduce one of these elements to the other is pointless. Indeed, the offering may have more lasting effect than the communion" (EFRL, 1995, p. 347). Characteristically, Durkheim stresses the relational moral element of *obligatory renunciation* rather than focusing on the exchange. Gifts to the gods/totem principle must be of high value. They thus reproduce representations of the group's ideals (e.g., of "perfection"). In the case of animal sacrifice and the shedding of blood, the life-principle/power in the organism is freed so that the gods or "impersonal energies" (EFRL, 1995, p. 320, 325) receive the food on which they also depend (EFRL, 1995, p. 346, 349). For instance, the old men ask the young to offer their blood to "infuse" the clan with new life.

Reflecting his rejection of sociological materialism Durkheim notes that "[w] hat the worshipper in reality gives his god is not the food he places on the altar or the blood that he causes to flow from his veins: It is his thought" (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). "Thought" here is important because of the role of collective representations in sacrifice that focus consciousness on the transcendental (EFRL, 1995, p. 232ff). The transcendental realm is but the enduring reality of the group's life and its superior worth relative to the individual members whose value is derived from the group. Sacrifice reminds the individual that they are dependent on something greater than themselves but in which they also participate (EFRL, 1995, p. 351). Durkheim concludes that, "The true *raison d'être* of even those cults that are most materialist in their appearance is not to be sought in the actions they prescribe but in the inward and moral renewal that the actions help to bring about" (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). The consequence of the renunciative exchange is that each donor receives "the best part of himself from society […] Let language, sciences, arts, and moral belief be taken from man, and he falls to the rank of animality" (EFRL, 1995, p. 351) – *you get more than you give*. But this exchange works in both directions since "it is man who makes his gods, one can say, or at least, it is man who makes them endure; but at the same time, it is through them that he himself endures" (EFRL, 1995, p. 345). Sacrifice then, is an elementary ritual because it perpetually constitutes and recreates "moral being" (EFRL, 1995, p. 352) and hence a condition of possibility for society, but at the "price of pain" (EFRL, 1995, p. 320).

Rethinking Durkheim's Attenuated Political Economy of Sacrifice

Durkheim distanced his sociological approach from liberal political economy, because of its reduction of sociality to the voluntary actions of human individuals (see Steiner, 2011), and from Marxist political economy, because of its neglect of the cultural and moral dimensions of social life (Durkheim, 2004; cf. Steiner, 2011, p. 57). After all, according to Durkheim, the real substance of the gift that the worshipper gives god is "thought" and the gods "can only live in human consciousnesses" (EFRL, 1995, p. 350, 351). Durkheim does not, however, go clear over into ontological idealism and he qualifies his position by stating that "the material interests that the great religious ceremonies satisfy are public and social. The whole society has an interest in an abundant harvest" (EFRL, 1995, p. 352). But, as shown below, he relies on an economic idiom while tellingly stating in a footnote near the end of the book that he was unable to link economic activity to religion (EFLR, p. 421; Steiner, 2011 p. 58). So, when read symptomatically, the text renders visible a political economy at work in sacrifice, something *hidden* in plain view *if* one accepts Durkheim's rejection of both political economy and ontologically reductionistic materialism. There are though, good reasons for inspecting this attenuated political economy of the sacred and sacrifice because it draws attention to the power relations and production conditions in which sacrifice as a rite is imbricated. The argument developed here to resolve the discrepancy between Durkheim's master discourse and his attenuated political economy is that sacrifice is a *dispositif* that has hegemonizing effects. These emerge from a *regime of valorization* and production conditions that involve monopolistic powers exercised by a small, dominant group with its own exclusive authoritative discourse.

A Regime of Valorization and the Four Moments of Production

Marx's comprehensive analysis of the terrain of classical economics in the *Grundrisse* will serve as a heuristic guide for identifying consonance between Durkheim's account of sacrifice and political economy. Marx identified four dialectically related moments in capitalist economies: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption (Marx, 1973, pp. 81–88), and famously elaborated a theory of value. Each of the moments are connected by the practical commonality of production-reproduction (e.g., the means of consumption must be produced and reproduced, etc.) but are dominated by the primacy of production, broadly understood as the synthetic combination of transformative human work on the material world. On the face of it, *The Forms* speaks most directly to value even if not referring to "the economy." Still we can note that sacrifice superadds the power of the social, as manifested in obligatory guides to conduct, to mundane objects, impressing on them a *social/moral value* to be respected by the group in exchange processes, much like money (cf. Grahl, 2000; Steiner 2011, p. 29, 35). In this respect, that "fetish" and

"totem" were synonyms in nineteenth century social science (Pietz, 1993) is telling for as Zizek notes, fetishizing something like money is a "condensation, a materialization of a network of social relations" (1989, p. 31). The sacred is also "ranked" (EFRL, 1995, p. 313) revealing the extent to which some things are deemed more valuable to the vitality of the group than others. Evaluative processes extend to humans as initiation rites test the "worth of the *novice*" (EFLR, p. 318). Other practices also reflect a relationship between domination and the moral criteria by which conduct is evaluated. For example, when it comes to the assessment of religious purity and what "ordinarily impassions men," the "elite set the goal too high" to counteract the baser inclinations of the masses (EFRL, 1995, p. 321). Given Durkheim's remarks then, it appears that we are dealing in a system of valuation controlled by an elite—*a regime of valorization*. The regime of valorization shapes morality through a dominant small group that assesses and regulates what is deemed acceptable for sacrificial exchange and doing the same for access to sacred spheres.

Concerning the production circuit of sacrifice, Durkheim remains true to the etymology of the word; the Latin phrase "*sacere facere*," from which "sacrifice" is derived, means "to make sacred" (Shilling & Mellor, 2013). As a rite, sacrifice is a *production*, a transformation of nature generated by assembling and synthesizing the profane stuff of individualized everyday life, and the collective sacred. As a form of renunciative giving, sacrifice also involves an *exchange* of something deemed of value (e.g., the "first fruits"). Moreover, Durkheim sees sacrifice as a form of reciprocal tribute as the worshipper "gives to sacred beings a little of what he receives from them and he receives from them, all that he gives them" (EFRL, 1995, p. 347). This is no simple form of exchange but one complicated by a *debt* concerning the "maintenance and repair of [one's] spiritual being" (EFRL, 1995, p. 345). Further, the moral obligation to engage in sacrificial exchange itself specifies the nature of the social relations involved as found the Latin formula, "'*do ut des*' I give in order that you might give" (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). Gift exchange produces and reproduces the exchange relationship by providing the recipient with an example to follow and the wherewithal to reciprocate. Sacrifice also has a form of *distribution* in space and time for group members, designating the circulation and frequency of access to the sacred power of the totem principle. Finally, the rite is completed with communal *consumption* that serves a reproductive function transferring value from the offering to communal members. Thus, we find each of the four moments of production, but only *analytically* because Durkheim fails to theorize their combination and preconditions. Granted, one could say that the above is a "dogmatic" reading since imposing a Marxist model on Durkheim's text but the intent is only to show how Durkheim's own economistic idiom can be theorized systematically.

Exclusivity and the Exercise of Monopoly Power

The most significant indicators of Durkheim's attenuated political economy of sacrifice concern the *exclusivity* surrounding the production of the rite, and the *monopoly power exercised*. Durkheim notes that access to sacred objects is restricted to those who are initiated (EFRL, 1995, p. 309), a sub-group that excludes women and children, and those who don't belong to the clan. Furthermore, initiated persons have an exclusive sacred language and others are forbidden to speak it: religious discourse, by which the moral ordering and re-ordering of the world is conducted, is a "rare" exclusive discourse (EFRL, 1995, p. 310; Foucault, 1972; cf. Gane, 1983). In short, we find a political economy of discourse in which the sacred language, the repository of dominant collective representations shaping how the group perceives itself and governs its conduct, is restricted in its deployment to a minority but dominant group.

Most tellingly, Durkheim describes how authoritative sacred persons (chiefs and elders) in part exercise their dominance: they use their sacred status "to monopolize the things they choose" (EFRL, 1995, p. 312), making what they want "set apart and forbidden" to non-sacred persons by means of sacral contagion. "In this way, religious prohibition becomes property right and administrative regulation" (EFRL, 1995, p. 312, n. 47; cf. Durkheim, 1992, p. 147ff; cf. Steiner, 2011, pp. 117–119). As Pearce notes "[g]iven that generally speaking, sacred objects are scarcer than profane ones it is likely that a normal pre-condition for the sacred is scarcity of some kind" (2014, p. 621) to which we must add that this scarcity can itself be the effect of this exercise of monopoly power in restricting supply via sacral contagion. So, while Durkheim distanced his sociology from political economy, his use of it suppresses its theoretical potential: the political economic discourse is there, with descriptive effect. A symptomatic reading thus indicates that we are dealing with two different discourses on sacrifice in *The Forms*: Durkheim's own sociological account of sacrifice as a moral mechanism mediating the cosmologically volatile but inescapable relations between the sacred and the profane, and a *descriptive (undertheorized) political economy of sacrifice*. The latter appears as descriptive *symptomatically* because of Durkheim's insistence on his own sociological problematic concerning the "moral community" and what belonging to a religious group existentially entails for the individual member and the group. Arguably, his failure to link economic activity to religion stems from this discrepancy, blinding him to the question of the economy in religious life itself. Durkheim's focus on morality abstracts sacrifice from the structural assemblage marginally described in political economic terms and instead fetishizes it as a preeminently social act.

From Institution to *Dispositif*

Durkheim's definition of sacrifice as an institution helpfully shows how the cult sustains collective representations about obligatory practices for group members, but

this obscures the extent to which broader relations of domination are conditions of the rite. Sacrifice cannot thus be treated in isolation as an institution without engaging in false abstractions. An established but arbitrary combination of the monopoly powers of sacred persons, how knowledge affects subjective orientations, the sacral regime of valorization, a system of inclusion and exclusion, the dominance of a minority group to which benefits accrue, and the role of authoritative persons in moments of social crisis, has the hallmarks of what Foucault calls a *dispositif*. The political economy of sacrifice is thus better conceptualized as a *dispositif* than an institution. Doing so facilitates attention to the contingencies surrounding the maintenance of societal rule. Here, I draw on some of my earlier work on *dispositifs*, totems, rule, and politics (Datta, 2008).

Foucault's concept of "*dispositif*" refers to an assemblage or "set-up" (Veyne, 2010) of elements combined from existing social materials to constitute modes of experience and existence in a civilization (Datta, 2007, 2008; Hardy, 2015). They shape how people assess themselves and their world, affecting what people do, and how people's activities and events are problematized, coordinated and subjected to policy remedies applied to populations to solve problems deemed "urgent" by experts (Foucault, 1980). *Dispositifs* like sexuality or government, consist of "[authoritative] discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decision, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions— in short the said as much as the unsaid" (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194–195). The effect of these contingent assemblages is to "dispose of" people's actions, putting them toward a tactical use typically in the support of some broader aim or goal postulated by experts. The term "*dispositif*" also captures the sense of "disposal toward" a set of values concerning what is worth doing in life.

A *dispositif* constantly depends on the discursive rendering of what is to be known ("veridiction") and what is to be done ("jurisdiction"), linking the "is" and the "ought," "words" and "things," through relations of domination (Foucault, 2003a). Veridiction is produced by dominant "truth regimes" that combine knowledge and power. Typically, agonistic power relations produce demands for knowledge, sustaining a will to know (Foucault, 2003b). *Dispositifs* also involve the formation of subjectivities that make veridical and juridical judgments. The overall effect of a *dispositif* is a pervasive social hegemony over what are deemed the "real problems" deserving both expert and societal attention in which the implementation of solutions unintentionally benefits already dominant groups, regardless of their effectiveness. For instance, the bourgeoisie are able to use the failures of the prison, like delinquents, in the service of their own illegalities (strike-breaking, prostitution, trafficking, etc.) (Foucault, 1979, pp. 278–282). Such assemblages of knowledge, power, and social institutions produce the generalized if contingent effects of class

domination in a society (Foucault, 1994, pp. 92–94). Sacrifice depends on much the same. An exclusive authoritative veridical discourse is used by an already dominant group of priests and elders to assess value and worth in the group. They decide on the deployment of the totem mark and how rites are to be conducted. This group uses institutionalized religion to secure and extend property rights through expropriative sacral contagion; once they touch something, their sacrality passes to the object and others can't touch or use it without going through the religious administration they control. And this dominance, combined with sacrificial rites that repeatedly combine these elements together, hegemonizes the problematization of well-being and fecundity for the group. The concept of *dispositif* thus helps one resolve the analytical discrepancy between Durkheim's moral and political economic accounts of sacrifice since the former refers to the inequalities described in the latter.

Durkheim's Heterological Realism: The Politics in the Political Economy of Sacrifice

Rethinking Durkheim's treatment of sacrifice this way provides a critical basis for assessing neoliberal morality today (cf. Steiner, 2017, p. 901). Durkheim understood that liberal political economy valorized a "utilitarian egoism," giving causal and normative priority to individual preferences (Durkheim & Lukes, 1969 p. 20; Steiner, 2017). Such egotism is characteristic of industrial societies with an advanced division of labour. Liberal political economy however, failed to adequately theorize the constitution of morality in society i.e., "the interests superior to the interests of the individual," rather assuming their existence (Durkheim & Lukes, 1969 p. 20). Foucault (2008) similarly recognized that the economics informing neoliberalism was a moral technology because providing marketized solutions to the problem of relating "all and each" (Foucault, 2003c) in which *individuals* are held responsible for the quality of their lives. Purportedly, the economy, through exchanges, becomes the clearing house of the "goodness" and "badness" of actions derived from the choices of individuals. In this respect, the economy is a biopolitical domain in which markets enact the minor utopianism of "police," generating information from exchanges and using it "to supply [people] with a little extra life" (Foucault, 2003c, p. 197). Financial value thus becomes the proxy for efficiently surveying moral values in a population but without thereby deontologically judging the absolute value of individuals' preferences.

Durkheim though, aids the consideration of the societal implications of the ascendance of the atomized utility maximizing individual that embodies an *ethos* necessary to making actual societies correspond more closely to an idealized image of one with "efficient markets" (Quiggin, 2010). In contrast to the neoliberal marketization of morals, altruism morally obliges individuals to value others and

the groups to which one belongs (including humanity) because they make possible one's constitution as an individual person and group member capable of deliberate moral action (cf. Steiner, 2017, p. 900). This raises the question of what happens to personhood (implying moral agency as it does) and society when *one is implored by experts to be to be selfish* and *morally obliged* to pursue self-interest? What happens to the pertinence of transcendental moral reasoning when one universalizes this obligation to be selfish, recognizing that others are in the same boat, with everyone doing what they must in order to survive? Moreover, feeling the social pressure to be selfish in accordance with a neoliberal ideal of the entrepreneurial self, exacerbates the sting of fiscal sacrifices. In neoliberal terms, fiscal sacrifices are tied to tax burdens and user fees, cuts in public services (education, healthcare, pensions, etc.) and infrastructure spending, threatening what one wishes one could otherwise spend on individual utility maximization.

The denigration of individual concern for the group's well-being suggests that neoliberal sacrificial *dispositifs* have a sordid, abjected dimension too. Bataille (1995, pp. 80–81) and Caillois (1959) both understood that social institutions constantly generate abjects like excrement and garbage that must be radically excluded from institutions to ensure their functioning. The obligatory neoliberal valorization of egotism thus abjects its axiological counter-part of individuals acting in the interest of the group to constitute neoliberal *unreason* (not rational but neither madness, nor art [cf. Foucault, 2006]). As noted political philosopher Michael Sandel incisively states, "Economists don't like gifts. Or to be more precise, they have a hard time making sense of gifts as a rational social practice" (2010, p. 99). Economistic axiology is far from the Durkheimian conception that altruism is morally rational and a truly social sensibility. Apart from wealthy philanthropists (i.e., those who have well paid themselves first!), today, the committed altruist risks playing the part of fool, chump, or easy prey for the utilitarian egoist. Furthermore, labour market precarity increases the necessity of having to spend one's time at work and preparing for work. But this concretely and practically means sacrificing *the capacity for sacrifice* for want of human time and energy for altruistic activities and actualizing one's potential as an active moral and political agent (cf. Brown, 2015; Datta & MacDonald, 2011, p. 91). The triumph of *homo economicus* over *homo politicus* in neoliberal axiology (Brown, 2015) has thus made a virtue of necessity, the necessity of focusing on one's own struggles for existence (cf. Plouin, 2010). Sacrifice then, is not a minor or arcane issue; it remains central to neoliberal axiology. In a performative contradiction, neoliberalism is thus dependent on sacrifice while disavowing it. The price and pain of this sacrifice of sacrifice, a sacrificing of altruism, is the abjection of the social virtue that lay at the heart of Durkheim's politics and pedagogy. The ideal of fostering virtuous subjects capable of puzzling through the balance of cultivating the self and participating in gestures of sacrificial giving, returning some portion of what we

receive from society, is thus reduced to the offal of our offerings to a now totemic capitalism. Altruism remains as an abjected virtuality, possible, but reviled, "set apart and forbidden" from a hegemonic morality.

The fiscal sacrifices required for the massive bailouts of firms whose activities precipitated the GFC poignantly illustrate the contemporary perversion of the value of sacrificing for the good of the group. Ostensibly, the benefit of bailouts is protection from a breakdown of civil society if institutions deemed "too big to fail" actually do (Datta, 2018). But bailouts highlight the failures of markets as effective bases of morality. Markets believed to be self-regulating, *given* that rational self-interest motivates socio-economic actors to assess and price risk, failed on a global scale. This new political economy of sacrifice constitutive of the tension between workers' sacrifices and obligatory taxation, illustrates the marginalized status of an adequate democratic and contestatory *political economy* (cf. Datta, 2017). Instead, excused by urgency, we had financial technocrats in central banks providing hegemonic advice for states *pragmatically* engaging in a political economy while disavowing the value of expressly *political* economic discourse itself (Streeck, 2017).

And yet, altruistic sacrifice haunted the GFC even if as something *Unheimlich*, the neoliberal "uncanny," something familiar yet that isn't supposed to be there and for that, horrifying (cf. Kristeva, 1982, p. 59). The autumn of 2008 saw a flurry of collective representations of the GFC. Screens around the world displayed volatile index fluctuations, stock prices and charts (Cosgrave, 2014), mass layoffs, and intense lobbying. The world was exposed to the elite, sacred language of finance and central banks (e.g., "swaps," ABS, Asset Backed Securities; CDOs, Collateralized Debt Obligations; QE, Quantitative Easing, etc). Effervescence was found in the rapid pace of deal-making and breaking, frantic calls between G8 finance ministers, analyses and prognostications from a cast of characters from Alan Greenspan to "Hank" Paulson, to leading economists such as Paul Krugman, and NYU's "Dr. Doom," Nouriel Roubini. As typical of collective effervescence, the normal rules were suspended. In an uncanny way, the quintessential neoliberal taboo against "nationalization" was repeatedly transgressed in massive governmental interventions on the side of capital, whether with Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK, General Motors and Chrysler in the US and Canada, or US mortgage lenders "Fannie Mae" and "Freddie Mac." *Something else, politically, was being done and ostensibly in the interest of the greater good* of securing global banking. These events are indicators of the power of creative collective effervescence— collective intervention in the interest of group fecundity was imperative. They revealed the doing of an inventive, transgressive politics in economic life even if partial to capital over labour.

An account of the contemporary political economy of sacrifice must thus include reference to the constitutive political potential of such moments of creative collective effervescence (Datta, 2008). While Foucault's concept of "*dispositif*" is limited by its concern with already established relations of domination, Durkheim's model of totemism inherently refers to the political potential of an effervescent assembly to constitute and reconstitute the central reference point for its existence. Since sacrifice involves an assembly, it also depends on the same social forces at work in creative collective effervescence: the potential to constitute a different *ordo rerum* is always present. The sacrificial festival then is different from a carnivalesque *inversion* of rule in which the system of social "places" remains while the "holders" change. Rather, the radical Durkheimian point is that the *effervescence* can break loose the structure of those places. This is not a question of the liberal agonic "political" *versus* a totalitarianism wrought by prioritizing the group above all else (Falasca-Zamponi, 2011). Rather, sacrificial rituals are a reminder that their success is not a given but must be assembled in the face of cosmological volatility, the rite perpetually flirting with the danger of sacrilege that undoes the *status quo* (cf. Pearce, 2003). Analytical then, the political economy of sacrifice requires incorporating both the "rule" and "creative politics" sides of the matter, attending to a "parallax" produced by *The Forms* itself. As Kojin Karatani (2005) explains, a parallax refers to a shift between opposing perspectives that are the effect of a work itself, oppositions that cannot be sublated dialectically. In this respect, Durkheim's conception of the sacred and social causality implies a *heterological realism* appropriate to the political economy of sacrifice. These heterological sensibilities are found both in the radical differences between the sacred and profane, *and* the difference between an existing *ordo rerum* and the potential of the group to constitute a new politics in moments of creative collective effervescence (Datta, 2008; cf. Pawlett, 2018). This indicates that there is a reality in excess of priests, elders, rituals, and group members, one none other than the potentiality of creative collective effervescence that lies at the core of sociality, a potential held in reserve by the group whether members know it or not, actualize it or not. Today, the ubiquitous pop culture depictions of zombie hordes well signify this latent potential of *the demos* as a massive and potentially revolutionary force, if tellingly portrayed as inarticulate, denied constitutive political symbols and rational discourse. The zombie hordes as the contemporary neoliberal residue of altruism? Maybe … at least they tend to stick together!

Conclusion

Above, I have argued for the contemporary relevance of Durkheim's approach to sacrifice in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* given both the scholarly context and recent economic history. Drawing on the theoretical methodology of symptomatic readings, I explicated discrepancies in Durkheim's account of sacrifice and retheorized

them to elucidate a radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice better attuned to social inequalities and their effects on the group. Foucault's concept of *dispositif* was used to provide a more comprehensive model of sacrifice than can be got by reliance on Durkheim's description of sacrifice as an institution. The results of this critical theoretical work were then applied to the axiological content of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on the sacrificing of people's capacity for altruistic sacrifices. In this respect, a radical Durkheimianism of this stripe returns one to the political economy of sacrifice, to questions of the values for which people make sacrifices, and the real basis through which those values can be collectively transformed in effervescent moments.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

From Holism to Participation: Three Phases in Durkheim's Work

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Abstract

The present paper seeks to read out important displacements regarding the understanding of the relation between the social and the individual in the course of Durkheim's oeuvre. *First*, I center on Durkheim's methodological program. I investigate how his insistence on the distinction between the individual and the social goes hand-in-hand with a repressive concept of the social centered on the concept of norms. I then, *second*, seek to contour an intermediary phase in Durkheim's work in which the coercive depiction of the social is complemented with a positive one; this phase then contains his ideas of "integration" and of a (positive) form of "attachment" to society. *Third*, I demonstrate how Durkheim in his late chief work, by opening up for forms of active collective participation, offers a corrective to the early holism and the idea of an overarching and decollectivized society. Fourth, to situate my interpretation of late Durkheim in a contemporary theoretical landscape, I compare my ideas to the approaches to late Durkheim found in, respectively, Randall Collins' work on Interaction Ritual Chains and in Jeffrey Alexander and collaborators' so-called Strong Program.

Keywords

Collectivity • Durkheim • Norm • Participation • Ritual • Structure

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Even though Durkheim insisted on the continuity and consistency of his life's work, there is no doubt that it contains important conceptual displacements and shifts; displacements which transcend mere changes to focus or interest and which entail fundamental shifts in sociological concerns and concepts centered on the very relation between the social and the individual. In this paper, I shall seek to highlight some of these shifts and critically read out their sociological-theoretical consequences.

In particular, I wish to show that Durkheim's *late* work –notably the descriptions of effervescent collectivity, the generalization of the concept of the sacred object, the emphasis placed on actual ritual participation– carries emphatic theoretical relocations, the scope of which transcends his own treatment or understanding of the issues at stake here. As I will try to show, taking these descriptions seriously not only entails a radical rupture with Durkheim's early work, but also with the very concept of society –in terms of an overarching normative structure– in favor of a contextual concept of collectivity. As I also intend to show, these developments in the late work, carry extensive empirical explanatory potential.

The paper is divided into three different scenarios or "phases". The *first phase* centers on *The Rules of Sociological Method* ([1895] 2013b).[2] I seek to show how Durkheim, forced by his wish to demarcate an object for his new science of sociology, ends up over-emphasizing the distinction between the individual and the social. The emphasis placed upon this distinction goes hand in hand with a "coercive" concept of the social, which understands the social as a mere structure of decontextualized norms imposing themselves on isolated individuals. It thus, consequently, blends out the collective dimension.

Thereupon I turn to what I deem the *second phase* in Durkheim's work, stretching all the way from *Suicide* ([1897] 2002a) to his late lectures on morality ([1906] 1965a). Here I focus on his writings on "integration" and morality and his attempt to complement the early "coercive" concept of the social with a positive aspect of "attachment" to the group or to society. I seek to show, however, that he remains influenced by the holism of the early work in ways which block his attempts to reintegrate the individual and the social.

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life ([1912] 1995) stands at the center of analysis in the *third phase* of Durkheim's work. I investigate Durkheim's late descriptions of effervescence and of the "ritual" charging of the sacred object. I demonstrate how these passages offer a corrective to the early holism by opening up for active participation and production of the social. I show how these descriptions entail

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2   In the following, to give the reader some temporal bearings, I have decided to list the year of original (French) publication or (if the year of publication differs decisively from the year it was first written down) of actual production [in brackets]. I quote from the English translations referenced in the bibliography. I have allowed myself to abbreviate recurring titles.

an alternative concept of normativity which is inseparable from the positive sense of collective attachment. By reintegrating the normative and coercive component in the concrete collective context – by decisively entangling or mixing the negative and the positive components, as it were – these descriptions move beyond the repressive concept of the social of the early work and, ultimately, beyond the very dichotomy between actor and structure. Finally, I sketch the sociological and empirical potential of these conceptual developments in Durkheim's late work.

In a fourth section, I seek to contrast my interpretation of late Durkheim with other contemporary approaches. I compare my ideas as to the progressive tendencies in the late work –my interpretation of the Durkheimian sacred and the relation between myth and ritual, culture and collectivity, it implies– to similar attempts to revitalize the late Durkheim found in, respectively, Randall Collins' work on Interaction Ritual Chains and in Jeffrey Alexander and collaborators' so-called Strong Program.

Two clarifications need to be made before we start: first, on a terminological level, I seek to enforce a distinction between the concepts of *sociality* and *collectivity*. As already indicated, at least in early Durkheim, the concept of the social is essentially to be understood as a structure or system of norms or rules. Contrastingly, when I use the concept of collectivity, I mean to imply actual relations with other persons –present or "mediated", intimate or anonymous– *as well as* the (conscious or unconscious) sentiment of sharing something with these other persons. This distinction is not consistently carried through though; sometimes I use the concept of the social against Durkheim himself. I hope it is clear from the context when I have such intentions. Second, the reader should understand the idea of three "phases" in Durkheim's work as merely analytical or "ideal-typical". It would be more correct to speak about a gradual evolution and a change in the relative importance of different conceptions. The collective and active dimension is present in glimpses even in Durkheim's earliest work just as the coercive, external and "de-collectivized" understanding of the social remains with him to the end.[3]

First Phase: Coercion

As is well known, Durkheim strongly insists in *Rules* ([1895] 2013b, pp. 36–38) on the "externality" of the social fact. The social is to be engaged with the same positivist attitude as in the sciences of nature, and thus as decoupled from psychological or introspective interpretation as possible. The social is to be studied analogously to the objects of natural science, i.e. as "real" –observable– forces and causes. Nevertheless,

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3 I will permit myself to overlook the earliest work of Durkheim, i.e. work from before *Division* ([1893] 2013a), both for reasons of space but also because I think *Rules* ([1895] 2013b) – which stands at the center of my analysis of the first phase – possesses a special status as the first elaborated and authoritative formulation of his ideas about the social and his sociological program.

it is obvious that Durkheim's idea of "externality" has a psychological component.[4] It is the sentiment or experience of suffering tangible negative sanction in one form or another which first of all defines the social fact:

> [T]here are ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual. Not only are these types of behavior and thinking external to the individual, but they are endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him. Undoubtedly when I conform to them of my own free will, this coercion is not felt or felt hardly at all, since it is unnecessary. None the less, it is intrinsically a characteristic of these facts; the proof of this is that it asserts itself as soon as I try to resist ([1895] 2013b, p. 21).

The sentiment of "coercion" then stands as a proof of the externality of social facts. Externality in this sense means first of all the acting of "society" upon the individual "from without" in terms of a normative force acutely *felt* by the individual if or when he or she breaches a norm. Durkheim imagines a normative grid which predates and outlasts the singular individual and which is largely taken over from previous generations through implicit or explicit socialization, internalization and education. It follows from this line of thinking that this lasting and transcending normative structure cannot *be explained* on the basis of the active behavior of the individuals, but rather *explains* (central aspects of) thereof. This is Durkheim's methodological holism. Society exists *sui generis*. It is not reducible to its parts, but has a reality of its own which determines the parts. It thus constitutes a demarcated object for a new science: sociology.

Now, to make sure that the eyes of the sociologist rests firmly placed on the external, Durkheim then coins his "first and most basic" methodological "rule": the imperative that "social facts" should be "considered […] as things" ([1895] 2013b, p. 29). Again, this is meant purely methodologically. The social is to be investigated on the basis of a scientific attitude as something external to the individual and psychological through, for example, statistical facts (as in *Suicide*) or the coming into being of certain (observable) juridical institutions (as in *Division*). Again, however, the psychological asserts itself, and again the social ends up being paradigmatically defined in terms of experience of coercion. Then, the thing-metaphor does not merely denote something external but rather a certain (selective) form of experience of physical *things*, more precisely an engagement with the external world in terms of resistant and impenetrable opposition:

> A thing is principally recognizable by virtue of not being capable of modification through a mere act of will. […] We have seen that social facts possess this property of resistance. Far

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4   Also *Suicide*, supposed to carry out the methodological program of *Rules* (see [1897] cf. 2002a, p. xxxvi), contains ample psychological "speculation", not least, of course, in the construction of the three "ideal types" of suicide (cf. Cuin, 2000).

from being a product of our will, they determine it from without. They are like moulds into which we are forced to cast our actions. This necessity is often ineluctable. Yet even when we succeed in triumphing, the opposition we have encountered suffices to alert us that we are faced with something independent of ourselves. Thus in considering facts as things, we shall be merely conforming to their nature ([1895] 2013b, p. 37).

Coercion is the very "nature" of the social. It is hard not to see an implied ontology here. As has been remarked by interpreters from different backgrounds, but equally critical to the Durkheimian tradition (cf. most radically Adorno, 1979; Latour, 2014), Durkheim's sociology is not bereft of a certain totalitarian attitude. We now see, in fact, how this attitude follows from the programmatic point of departure. Durkheim's understanding of the social in terms of authoritative norms (backed by sanctions) follows directly from his programmatic wish to demarcate the social fact. Durkheim then uses the metaphor of the thing to describe the action of social norms. The violent opposition between the individual and the social literally "reifies" the social, turns it into a question of "hard" repression or, at the very least, opposition, and this is not without consequences.

Even though Durkheim insists that the social "acts" upon us, the metaphor of the thing reduces this dimension to a question of mere hindrance or blockage. We may run the head against its hardened surface or occasionally even break through it, yet the social remains in the role of mere opposition. At this point traditional dichotomies assert themselves. Durkheim pits the principle of freedom, the "will", against external "determination", "inside" against "outside". The metaphor of the thing parallelizes the dichotomy of the mental versus the physical with the sociological dichotomy of actor versus structure. One cannot overestimate the ontological consequences of these metaphysical constructions.

The main consequence is that the social remains opposed to us. We may "triumph", assert ourselves against it, yet we are not allowed to unite with it or become part of it. The social and the individual cannot overlap. But something also happens to the social itself: it becomes decisively decollectivized or depopulated. Opposite the individual is an abstract structure of norms, a "society" which does not contain any real people, but is reduced to hindrances or blockages of isolated individuals. These individuals, on the other hand, are essentially understood as "free" in the sense of being self-contained and isolated principles of their own agency, it is only that they are forced by the external "moulds into which they are forced to cast their action" to limit themselves – like when a road is surrounded by high walls on both sides which hinder the traveler in diverging from it even though she wants to. The individuals do not meet, let alone merge and entrain. To this should be added that the very idea of reducing the social to normative authority de facto reduces solidarity to a question of fear. Society holds together because

the individuals fear being different – not because they wish to share, to become involved, to enjoy the social or to become the same.[5]

Now, to be fair to Durkheim's program in *The Rules*, it must be admitted that he explicitly concedes that not all engagement with the social is equally coercive. He lessens the sense of constraint in two ways.

First, as already intimated, social norms are often internalized through upbringing and education and transformed into transparent habits and traditions ([1895] 2013b, p. 23). This means that "our sentiments" largely "conform" to the norms surrounding us and, consequently, that we do not feel the limitations placed upon us ([1895] 2013b, p. 20). Yet, the idea of internalization merely places the normative structure inside the individuals, it does nothing to stop their isolation. In fact, it rather enhances it. At any rate, it is only because of the reduction of the social to an overarching structure of norms, that it can be placed inside the individual in the first place. Essentially, we are dealing with an explanation of the "conformism" of solitary individuals. Polemically, lessening of the opposition between the social and the individual through internalization may make the individuals "more social" – but it makes them decisively "less collective".

More important and more interesting is, secondly, Durkheim's admission that not all social facts are equally solid or stable (cf. [1895] 2013b, pp. 22–26). Long standing norms and traditions –some "externalized" in written form, some even backed up by sanctions and institutions, others for instance "objectified" in architecture– are the most "crystalized". These are the coercive and thing-like instances of the social analyzed above. However, other social facts are more fluid. Durkheim mentions "movements of opinion" in regards to "religious, political, literary and artistic matters" ([1895] 2013b, p. 23); he mentions the rate of "marriage or suicide" or "higher and lower birth rates" ([1895] 2013b, p. 24). Evidently, such dynamics haunting cultural fields and everyday practices, display a more disorderly or ephemeral nature than stable social norms and rules. Nevertheless, as Durkheim points out –and intends to demonstrate in his next book, *Suicide*– statistical analysis of such phenomena will show that their rates or relative frequency (in respective societies) are constant (or at least continuous); a fact which, in turn, shows us that we can short-circuit the eventual individual interpretation of the phenomenon and focus on the sheer social side to it as an independent –"external"– object of study. However, it is obvious that the concept of externality here changes dramatically in comparison with the thing-like externality of the solid facts. The social loses its coercive edge. The felt opposition between the

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5   The critic may reasonably object that Durkheim –as the Kantian he were– repeatedly insist that the social is not reducible to naked fear of sanctions but involve a sense of respect for the moral or normative command. This claim will be taken up in the next section. What is important here is that Durkheim –probably again inspired by Kant here– thinks of the social in terms of precepts, maxims, rules and norms 'followed' by the singular individual; a scenario which involve both coercion and de-collectivization.

social and the individual disappears on the psychological level –often the individual does not even know that she is part of such a "social current".⁶ Externality is reduced to the analytical fact that a posterior statistical "dissociation" of the individual and the social is possible, showing that these collective dynamics do possess a life *sui generis* (transcending the meaning the singular individuals allot to them in their actions).⁷

The real test for Durkheim, however, is whether he can make sense of the most spontaneous and participative instance of collectivity: the *crowd*. This topos was extremely salient in the period. We are in the midst of the industrial revolution and the masses on the street of the fast-growing Western cities are making themselves felt with an acute –and in the upper classes disquieting– presence. Gustave Le Bon's infamous essay on the *Psychologie des foules* ([1895] 1905) came out the same year as *Rules* and also Durkheim's rival Gabriel Tarde occupied himself with these themes. Durkheim had to accomodate the crowd –and he had to do so on the basis of the principles of his new and anti-psychologistic (and anti-mimetic) sociology. In my opinion this is where he runs into real difficulties. Evidently, this time the social is not yet there, but only comes into being with the assembled individuals. But how to make sense of concepts like "spontaneity" ([1895] 2013, p. 22) and "direct corporation" ([1895] 2013, p. 25) and at the same time insist that the social is "external" to the individual? How to feel part of something that you are not part of – but explicitly separated or "dissociated" from? Isn't it simply impossible to give voice to the feeling of excitement, presence and participation belonging to being part of a crowd, if one insists upon understanding the social in terms of an "external" normative structure "imposing" itself upon the individuals "from without". Durkheim's early accounts of effervescence are strongly impressed by these ambivalences:

> But there are other facts which do not present themselves in the already crystallized form but which also possess the same objectivity and ascendency over the individual. These are what are called social 'currents'. Thus in a public gathering the great waves of enthusiasm, indignation and pity that are produced, have their seat in no one individual consciousness. They come to each one of us from outside and can sweep us along in spite of ourselves. If perhaps I abandon myself to them, I may not be conscious of the pressure that they are exerting upon me, but that pressure makes itself felt immediately if I attempt to resist them.

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6 This should not be misunderstood: Durkheim does not, of course, investigate Suicide in terms of imitation or collective dynamics. The paradigmatic suicide is not the sectarian one –but indeed the one committed by an isolated individual without regard to others (see esp. [1987] 2002, p. 269). The social "forces" or "causes" behind the rate of suicide must be decollectivized.

7 Add to this that Durkheim's critical choice of the case of suicide makes matters even more complex. Then, given that one of the main findings in Durkheim's study is that modern suicide results from "anomie", the notion of the social fact in Suicide ends up meaning exactly the opposite of what a social fact means in the solid case. Generalizing from the case of suicide, the "externality" of the fluid social fact amounts to an absence of norms, whereas the "externality" of the stable social fact amounts to the imperative presence of norms. At any rate, it is hard to really make sense of what "force" and "externality" means under such privative circumstances (see again [1897] 2002a, p. 269). These questions, however, are not pursued. Durkheim merely uses the same words and the same rhetoric to cover over this discontinuity. As to the many definitions of the sense of constraint, see Lukes (1973, pp. 12–14).

[…] Now, if this external coercive power asserts itself so acutely in cases of resistance, it must be because it exists in the other instances cited above without our being conscious of it. Hence we are the victims of an illusion which leads us to believe we have ourselves produced what has been imposed upon us externally. But of the willingness with which we let ourselves be carried along disguises the pressure we have undergone, it does not eradicate it. […] Even when we have individually and spontaneously shared in the common emotion, the impression we have experienced is utterly different from what we would have felt if we had been alone. […] It is then we perceive that we have undergone the emotions much more than generated them ([1895] 2013a, p. 22).

Durkheim cannot allow the individuals an active role in the bringing about of the social. Rather the social descends on each of the individuals, as it were, from above. Even if such forms of "objectivity" are softer than the crystalized ones and we do not feel the same resistance and opposition, they are no less external and determining. Indeed, according to Durkheim it is mere "illusion" on the part of the members of the crowd to think that they have actually "generated" or "produced" the collective emotions they enjoy or "undergo". The active and the passive cannot overlap, and nor can the internal or the external or the individual and the social. The actual production of determination, the conflation of internality and externality finds no place in Durkheim's account. Rather he insists on observing the borders even when they are not there: he thus claims the presence of an external power even when we do not feel it. But this is simply phenomenologically wrong: when we are "willingly" "carried away" by the collective it is exactly because we do *not* feel the social as an "external coercive power" or "pressure". That it is possible (sometimes) for us to resist or object or refrain from participating does not mean that this "force" is *always* external. Most often –whether we are talking about the enjoyment of intimate social settings or concerts or festivals– we consciously produce and enjoy collectivity in the same breath, we simultaneously intensify and animate, on the one hand, and "undergo" and suffer these emotions and forces, on the other. Durkheim has no room for this simultaneity, this mixture of the individual or psychological and the social or sociological. He insists on artificial distinctions. He cannot leave the dichotomy between the internal and the external behind because his sociological program is tied to it. The result is that his descriptions violate phenomena and that he sees pressure and coercion where there is none. Again, the reader should remark how Durkheim's consistence in rhetoric – using the same expressions of "externality", "force", "pressure" and "coercion" –covers over deep ontological and phenomenological differences.

We cannot but conclude that the young Durkheim first and foremost understands the social in terms of coercion and externality – in fact he stretches these concepts beyond their breaking point. The impression that remains is the reification of the opposition between the social and the individual. The social is not simply to be "considered as a thing", but rather *is* like a thing. In fact, even though Durkheim repeatedly insists

–from the "Preface to the Second Edition" of *Rules* ([1901] 2013b, p. 16) all the way to *The elementary Forms of Religious Life* ([1912] 1995, p. 214)– that the priority given to social coercion in the early work is merely "methodological" (in the sense that he emphasized this dimension because it is the most striking aspect of the social fact), this is at best to be understood as a very selective reconstruction. There can be no doubt: in *Rules* the social *is* essentially normative coercion. As Durkheim tells us: "constraint is *the* characteristic trait of *every* social fact" ([1895] 2013b, p. 97, my emphasis). As indicated, moreover, this idea can be found all along Durkheim's work (cf. Durkheim's strongly dualistic 1914 paper on the "Homo Duplex" ([1914] 2010). Evidently, it is not in such passages that we find a more collectivist picture of the social or descriptions that may do justice to the crowd.

On the other hand, we *do* find instances even in his early work where Durkheim contours a different relation between the individual and the social. Already at this point he has opened a small space for the existence of *positive* forms of "attachment" to society ([1895] 2013b, p. 98).[8] The precondition, nevertheless, is highly individualistic: The individual should understand his "natural state of dependence and inferiority" vis-à-vis society, a being which is so "much richer and more complex and permanent" than his individual being ([1895] 2013b, p. 98). These ideas are further developed in the next phase of his work. In fact, already two years after the publication of *Rules* –and in the very book meant to carry out its sociological scientific program– the coercive dimension seems to have lost its hegemonic status. A dimension of "integration" emerges which is of equal importance to the dimension of coercion in constituting the social. This attempt by Durkheim to complement his coercive idea of the social as "regulation" with a dimension of positive "integration", is characteristic of the next phase in Durkheim's authorship.

Second Phase: Integration

The different types of suicide developed in *Suicide* ([1895] 2013b) are based on the above mentioned distinction between regulation and integration (to this distinction see Isambert, 2000; Steiner, 2011, pp. 42–51; and notably Besnard, 1887, pp. 48–88). Durkheim's idea is that deficits in these two aspects of the social bond then results in two different types of suicide: whereas a deficit in norms (and a corresponding lack of regulation and suppression of individual desires) as already indicated, leads to "anomic" suicide, a deficit in integration (and a corresponding lack of coherence and "attachment" to "society") leads to "egoistic" suicides.

So what is "integration"? Does Durkheim begin a much needed "re-collectivization" or "repopulation" of his idea of the social at this point? We cannot go through

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8   We find such positive attachments already in *Division* ([1893]; see for example 2013a, pp. 81–84).

Durkheim's two chapters on egoistic suicide here. Yet, Durkheim in fact starts out with a fairly collectivist interpretation of the concept:

> For [men] cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with the common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply. There is, in short, in a cohesive and animated society a constant interchange of ideas and feelings from all to each and from each to all, something like a mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the individual on his own resources, leads him to share in the collective energy and supports his own when exhausted ([1897] 2002a, p. 168).

Durkheim is close to preempting insights belonging to his late work here: The idea that the bond that unites a certain collective comes into being through a shared object or "common cause"; the idea that emphatically sharing "charges" what is shared and thus "attaches" the group to it and to each other at one and the same time. Indeed, through "uniting" with others, we "attach […] to life".

Yet, Durkheim does not go that far. First of all, as a close reading of the chapters on "egoistic suicide" will make clear, Durkheim again and again conflates the two aspects to the social; the dimension of regulation and discipline constantly threatens to colonize the dimension of integration (cf. Isambert [2000, pp. 102–104], on a more general level Riley [2012]).

It seems that Durkheim's very conception of the social contains an inherent bias in favor of the repressive dimension to the social and its limiting function in relation to the desires of the individual.[9] Indeed, in *Suicide* Durkheim has acute difficulties of conceiving of a positive –or simply non-coercive– force inherent to the social itself, in the sense of a form of social bond or production of order which is not built on norm-following. Tellingly, in Durkheim's account, deficiencies in "integration" does not primarily lead to isolation or loneliness (sentiments which still bear the (negative) imprint of collectivity) but rather to forms of individual fatigue, loss of élan and depression. In the end all concrete collective facets of the concept of integration disappear. The pages concluding the chapters on "egoistic" suicide and thus Durkheim's reflection on the phenomenon of "integration" ([1897] 2002a, pp. 168–174) entail a psychologizing and metaphysical tour de force which basically takes the reader from the enumeration of different collectivistic phenomena emerging among concrete humans beings or crowds or gatherings to a completely different and normatively laden scenario where isolated individuals are meant to cultivate a veneration for "society" *as such* –understood as the precondition for a civilized life and for (respect for) the moral law. It goes fast:

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9   This blind spot is equally found even in Durkheim's most able commentators; thus, tellingly, even the authoritative text on the distinction between integration and regulation in *Suicide* ([1897] 2002a) by Besnard (1987) still theorizes both dimensions in terms of "norms".

> The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us towards others; it is society which, fashioning us in its own image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions. […]

> Through the fact that these superior forms of human activity have collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society they have reference to it; rather they are society itself incarnated and individualized in each of us. But for them to have a raison d'être in our eyes, the purpose they envisage must be one not indifferent to us. We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society itself ([1897] 2002a, p. 170).

"Sympathy and solidarity" cannot play a role in the very constitution of the social, let alone *be* the social. Rather, a "society" –held together by "normative beliefs" meant to "control" action– has to be in place *before* such sentiments can develop. Not only does the integrative side to the social remain secondary; it is not something natural, instinctual or primordial –rather, in Durkheim, pre-social nature is egositic and anti-social– but ultimately it is "sublimated" into a celebration of "society" as such among isolated individuals. Attachment to other humans is replaced by attachment to society. But at the same time "society" is abstracted into a normative structure or a cultural reservoir which has lost any sense of the experience of other human beings or actual collective experiences.

This sublimation of the concept of "integration" or social "attachment" continues to gain salience in Durkheim's work – no doubt in relation to his discovery of the centrality of religion in the mid-1890s. Thus, in the "Preface to the Second Edition" to *The Rules* ([1901] 2013b, pp. 6–17), he has come so far as to openly assert that the "coercive power that [he attributed to the social fact in the first edition] "equally well" can "display the opposite characteristics" ([1901] 2013b, p. 16). The later course on *Moral Education* ([1902-3] 2002b, pp. 54–110) and the small lecture on "The Moral Fact" ([1906] 1965a) equally seeks to account for this positive dimension of attachment *as equally important* to the "disciplinary" side to the social ([1902-3] 2002b, pp. 17–54). Does this mean that Durkheim is ready to let in a more collectivistic and less norm-focused concept of the social? The answer is negative. The actual description of the positive side does not develop a lot from *Suicide* to "the moral fact". Even though salient descriptions of collectivity *are* to be found in these texts they all end up reiterating the sublimation of the social we already saw in *Suicide* ([1897] 2002a, pp. 168–174).

Nevertheless, let us move a bit closer to these ideas. Our attachment to society, Durkheim explains, is first and foremost due to the fact that society is not simply outside us, weighing down upon us, but also a part of us –just as we are a part of it:

> [T]here is in us a host of states, which something other than ourselves –that is to say, society– expresses in or through us. Such states constitute society itself, living and acting in us. Certainly, society is greater than, and goes beyond, us, for it is infinitely more vast than our individual being; but at the same time it enters into every part of us. We are fused with it. Just as our physical organism gets its nourishment outside itself, so our mental organism feeds itself on ideas, sentiments, and practices that come to us from society ([1902-3] 2002b, p. 71).

Durkheim essentially sees society as a form of cultural and moral container of "ideas, sentiments and practices" in which we all take part and which, conversely, owns a part of us. Yet this "taking part" is not understood, so much as is clear, in terms of active participation; rather we are dealing with passive "having access to" a "reservoir" of everything which is merely *common* to us. Neither is it collective in the sense of something we, wittingly or unwittingly, mediated or unmediated, *actively* cultivate together in concrete acts of emphatic shar*ing*. Again, tellingly, society is indeed "living and acting *in*" each individual (my emphasis), i.e. *inside* each of us taken separately. It is not to be found between or among us. Even though Durkheim seems to insist on the collective nature of the moral bond, the perspective remains paradoxically individualistic:

> Society is the producer and repository of all the riches of civilization, without which man would fall to the level of animals. We must then be receptive to its influence, rather than turning back jealously upon ourselves to protect our autonomy. ([1902-3] 2002b, p. 72).

> [I]s not civilized man a person in greater measure than the primitive; the adult, than the child? Morality in drawing us outside ourselves, and thrusting us into the nourishing milieu of society, puts us precisely in the position of developing our personalities. Someone who does not live exclusively of, and for, himself, who offers and gives himself, who merges with environing world and allows it to permeate his life – such a person certainly lives a richer and more vigorous life than the solitary egoist who bottles himself up and alienates himself from men and things ([1902-3] 2002b, p. 73).

I shall leave it to the reader to decide whether –or in what sense– the "person" mentioned by Durkheim here, for all her intellectual development and her access to the "repository" of the "riches of civilization", is really less "egoistic" or "solitary" than the child or the primitive? In such descriptions, obviously, becoming a social person only entails bonds to other persons in a very indirect sense.

This critique may not seem entirely fair. In fact, elaborating on his position, Durkheim explicitly insists that pure universalism –"mankind as source and object of morality"– suffers the "deficiency" that there is "no constituted society" on the universal level. He also breaks up the container image of "society" by insisting on a pluralism of scales and more concrete group "attachments":

> Since, in fact, man is complete only as he belongs to several societies, morality itself is complete only to the extent that we feel identified with those different groups in which we are involved – family, union, business, club, political party, country, humanity. Invariably,

however, these groups do not have an equal moral significance, and they perform functions by no means equally important in the collective life. […] There is one association that among all the others enjoy a genuine pre-eminence and represents the end, per excellence, of moral conduct. This is the political society, i.e. the nation […] ([1902-3] 2002b, p. 80).

Yet, even the smallest group must be de-psychologized and decollectivized: a "society" –no matter what size– remains a "social organism having its own consciousness, its own individuality and its own organization" ([1902-3] 2002b, p. 76). Moreover, the reader should notice that these groups –"family, union, business, club, political party, country, humanity"– seem to owe their "importance" to the "function" they fulfill in "collective life". Polemically speaking, even when he writes about "identification" or attachment, Durkheim lists only collectives which are important for "society" –functionally important, that is– and thus disregards the vast multitude of concrete and more or less ephemeral collective contexts that we actually *form*.[10]

To sum up, Durkheim's interest in positive "attachment" or the "integrative" side to the social does not bring us closer to any admission of collectivity into his work. Concrete participation in and production of the social cannot be allowed. At its worst, it seems that the positive sense of the social merely consists in celebrating the very fact of coerciveness and discipline. The following quote is from the second preface to *The Rules*:

> The coercive power that we contribute to the social fact represents so small a part of its totality that it can equally well display the opposite characteristics. For, while institutions bear down upon us, we nevertheless cling to them; they impose obligations upon us, and yet we love them; they place constrain upon us find satisfaction in the way they function, and in that very constraint. This antithesis is one that moralists have often pointed out as existing between the two notions of duty and the good ([1901] 2013b, p. 47).

Durkheim's claim that the social may equally well "display" the "characteristics" of "love" than of "coercion" can hardly be taken at face value – what he means is something completely different. In reality, the quote is about a tainted "love" for (social) "coercion". One understands why such passages rub salt in the critical sociologist's wounds.

For us it suffices to ascertain that such passages de facto reduce the social to its normative side. When Durkheim is at his most disciplinary, the positive and integrative side to the social simply disappears altogether –there are only norms– or is reduced to a meditation on this fact. There is no equal or merely dual relation between "duty

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10 Nevertheless, Durkheim's preference for the national "group" indeed contain collective and participative aspects – so much becomes clear at the beginning of the First World War. Otherwise, Durkheim engages the national in a kind of universalist or cosmopolitical perspective. Each national state, he emphasizes, is to be seen "as one of many agencies that must collaborate for the progressive realization of the conception of mankind" (2002b, p. 79).

and the good" here. At any rate, it remains difficult to make sense of what is really to be understood under a concept of "integration" or "attachment to society" which contains no concrete enactment (and enjoyment) of collectivity.

Yet this is not entirely true. Again, Durkheim has difficulties with the phenomenon of the crowd. This time however, the strategy is different. In fact, there is no doubt that the crowds of Suicide seems more collectivist than the example from Rules analyzed above:

> Let us analyze the phenomenon. A number of men in assembly are similarly affected by the same occurrence and perceive this at least partial unanimity by the identical signs through which each individual feeling is expressed. What happens then? Each one imperfectly imagines the state of those around him. Images expressing the various manifestations, with their different shades, from all parts of the crowd, are formed in the minds of all. Nothing to be called imitation has thus far occurred; there have been merely perceptible impressions, then sensations wholly identical with those produced in us by external bodies. (1966, pp. 125–126).

At the outset, Durkheim seems to tone down his insistence on externality. There is no abstract "force" rising above the heads of the individuals, affecting each of them singularly, or "causing" them to synchronize, as it were, from without. The quote does convey a sense of resonance among concrete individuals in as much as they all, Durkheim tells us, see or "imagine" the agitation of the others. Nevertheless, still, these individuals remain strangely inactive. They may "imagine" something about the emotional state of the other, but they do not actually *do* anything. They are not really co-producing collectivity or animating each other; they are not entraining or engrossing.

The dismissal of the concept of "imitation" at this particular instance –we are dealing with a rejoinder in Durkheim's debate with Gabriel Tarde– simply means that, according to Durkheim, "robotic" imitation –Durkheim thinks about unconscious and unidirectional "rays" of suggestion– cannot account for the production of collective energies. Only much later, when Durkheim engages with actual ethnographic empirical material on ritual (and the role of imitation in ritual) will he be forced to reconsider and enrich his idea of imitation –making it reciprocal and engrossing as well as active *and* passive, internal *and* external. This is not possible for the Durkheim of 1897. Arguing that these processes are felt in ways "wholly identical with those coming to us from external bodies" he falls back into his claim to an absolute dissociation of the social and the individual and thus to a complete exteriorization of the social.

Third Phase: Collectivity and objectivity

There is in fact a question in Durkheim that we have not yet investigated: Where does the special sense of obligation or authority come from, with which moral rules

are invested, and in which their "constraining" character originates. Durkheim does not tell us much about this in *Division* or *Rules*. At this point, it seems, he simply thinks that certain collective representations or beliefs –by their sheer fact of being collective– gain a phenomenological surplus of intensity or "prestige". There is no doubt either that Durkheim in his later work complimented these constraining norms with positive "ideals" symbolizing attachment and integration in the individualized and sublimated sense given to these words above. Undoubtedly, this second development is propelled by Durkheim's discovery of the sociology of religion in the mid-90s. What characterizes the third stage in Durkheim's work, however, is two further developments. The first is an enlargement, way beyond the religious sphere, of the very scope of objects subject to (positive or negative) projection; an enlargement which also implies an extension of the range of possible phenomenological powers, intensities or fascinations of these objects. The second is a concrete investigation into the mechanisms of projection. This is Durkheim's discovery of religious ritual. In a nutshell, as long as Durkheim has not concretely situated the actual production of collective emotions, the mechanism of projection remains elusive. Durkheim's idea of a "cult of man" illustrates this point.

Durkheim's reflections on the alleged universality of modern morals contain at least one possible point of connection to concrete collective energies and concrete attachments; a point where his thought –at least to a certain degree– detaches itself from the idea of society as a pre-existing "external" container forming and shaping the cognitive, moral and social life of isolated individuals so as to make room for descriptions of actual co-production of collective ties. This is the "cult of man".[11] This is one of the central instances in Durkheim's early thinking centered on the actual consecration of on object in a participatory and yet decisively modern context. Tellingly, even though we are dealing with a *topos*, the history of which stretches across Durkheim's entire work, the figure of the "cult of man" is rarely found in the context of Durkheim's reflections on "attachments" or "integration". We cannot here go into detail with the development of this idea in Durkheim, yet, obviously, the notion of the *cult* implies – potentially at least – a more active and contextual form of sharing than merely having something in common. This is the decisive step from the neo-Kantian framework into an ethnographic one. Already in *Division* Durkheim talks about a concrete "rallying point for so many minds" ([1893] 2013a, p. 312); yet it is only in *The elementary Forms* ([1912] 1995) that this cult really becomes something the individual does not merely suffer, but also actively participates in.

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11 Another example of a charged object which likewise is to be found across Durkheim's work is the charismatic leader; again it is significant how the earliest examples (see for instance [1993] 2013a, pp. 152–153; [1895] 2013b, p. 99) emphasize the leader's "authority" (instrumental in "commanding" merely passive subjects), while the late examples (see notably [1912] 1995, p. 212) focus on actual production of collective energies, positive attachments and spontaneous dynamics of projection: "opinion" can be "infatuated" with "a man" ([1912] 1995, p. 215).

It is only in The Elementary Forms that the relation between the collective and the objective really gains contour –even though, as we will see, it is never sufficiently elaborated on the theoretical level:

> It is by shouting the same cry, saying the same words, and performing the same action in regard to the same object that [the Australians] arrive at and experience agreement [...].

> The individual minds can meet and commune only if they come outside themselves, but they can do this only by the means of movement. It is the homogeneity of these movements that makes the group aware of itself, and that, in consequence, makes it be ([1912] 1995, p. 232).

There can be no doubt: the account of ritual given in *The Forms* includes entrainment and imitation as central ingredients (cf. also [1912] 1995, p. 218, 220). This is what engenders the collective emotions in the first place. Yet this time entering positively, imitation is not the mere "automatic" and passive form, Durkheim rallied against in *Suicide* ([1897: 2002a, pp. 74-82; on Durkheim and imitation see also Schiermer [2019]). The individuals here *actively produce* the sentiments which *will overtake them*; there is no sharp distinction between internality and externality. The "coercive" forms or "movements" spontaneously "crystalize"; "homogeneity" merely emerges on its own accord, as it were, *inseparable from the sense of positive attachment and enjoyment of participation*. There is no experience of external "imposition" to be found here, nor are there any "individuals" present whose desires or aspirations must be curbed and disciplined. Rather these desires and aspirations emerge out of the collective situation without any sense of imposition or coercion –and even with some room for individual expression. Making room for collectivity implies a rupture with the actor-structure or individual-society dichotomy. You cannot have both at the same time. In the late work the crowd moves to the centre– and the early idea of an abstract and stable system of norms and rules loses its paradigmatic status.

Durkheim's *early* account of the phenomenon of fashion is instructive as a form of contrastive folio in understanding this displacement. The following remark is found in *Rules:*

> If purely moral rules are at stake, the public conscience restricts any act which infringes them by the surveillance it exercises over the conduct of its citizens and by the special punishment it has as its disposal. In other cases the constraint is less violent; nevertheless it does not seize to exist. If I do not conform to ordinary conventions, if in my mode of dress I pay no head to what is customary in my country and my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as a real penalty ([1895] 2013b, p. 21).

This coercive account, however, is simply not sufficient for explaining why we choose the clothing items we do. Granted, there are clothing conventions the breaching of which would lead to me being isolated, ridiculed or "laughed" at. In certain situations

–funerals, formal dinners, business etc.– I may dress differently than I actually like to out of respect or simply not to stick out. Yet, there are also clothing *fashions* (in the narrow sense of the word), the following of which is not reducible to mere conformism. In fact, we follow fashion, not because we do *not* want to stand out, but because we *do* (cf. Simmel, 1997). The follower of fashion is seduced by the (collectively produced) luster of the fashionable object and hopes to stand out positively on this basis. In other words: fashion is not about *norms* but about *object*s; not about coercion but about positive "attachment", not about fear of being different (or of respect for "authoritative" rules) but about wanting to be the same. There is no need for potential sanctions. The "norm" in question –the appropriation of the same commodity, clothing item or object as other individuals– is inseparable from the effervescent and imitational appreciation and construction of its attraction. When we participate in something the normative and the integrative, the coercive and the regulative dimension coalesce.

These examples *combine collectivity and objectivity:* On the one hand, collective energies –"experience of agreement", tightening of social bonds– are enforced through *imitation*, mutual tuning-in, entrainment, emphatic shar*ing*. On the other hand, everything revolves around an *object* upon which these energies are *projected*. The imitational tightening of the common bond passes through an animation of what "it is all about", what *is* shared, the object *around* which the imitational processes occur (cf. Collins, 2004, 47–101 [Ch. 2]).

As is evident, we are dealing with a *generalization* of the sacred. In the late Durkheim quasi-sacred objects proliferate: "postage stamps" "pearls", "diamonds", "furs" and "laces", "articles of dress", "luxury", the "caprices of fashion" are placed on the same level as the national "flag", "blood", the "cult of man", religious "idols". The sacredness of a totem of a clan is seen as an expression of the same basic projective dynamic as the attribution of "value" to commodities or money (cf. [1912] 1995, p. 228–229; [1911] 1965b). The "authority", the prestige or charisma –the sheer "psychic energy" or "intensity" ([1912] 1995, p. 209)– radiating from popular cultural, political or religious "leaders" ([1912] 1995, p. 209) –is yet another recurrent theme in Durkheim when it comes to the modern sacred. In short:

> There is no active faith, how secular it may be, that has not its fetishes […] ([1911] 1965b, p. 87).

Or in even more generalized terms: There is no collective without its quasi-sacred object. All "actual" collectivity comes into being through the "active" charging of an object. What Durkheim writes about the Australian aboriginals, he could just as well have written about modern society:

> Never perhaps, has divinity been closer to man than at this moment in history, when it is present in the things that inhabit his immediate surroundings and, in part, is immanent in man himself. In sum, joyful confidence, rather than terror or constraint, is at the root of totemism ([1912] 1995, p. 225).

As is tangible for anyone who opens a fashion or lifestyle magazine, goes to a museum, participates in heated ideological discussion –in short: cultivates shared fascinations, emotions or opinions of whatever kind– there is no reason to think that the sacred has been expelled from the "things" that "inhabit the immediate surroundings of man".

Finally, once we have left behind the mere contemplative and individualized hypostatization of "society" as a sacred object "set apart", we can also leave the container image behind with its concomitant ideas of "society" as a benevolent "mother" or a cultural "enrichment" exclusively covered with positive connotations.[12] From now on, the nature of the sacred object exclusively depends upon the emotions projected upon it, and these emotions can be good or bad, full of love or desire or of fear or hatred –depending on whether we are consecrating a loving God, an attractive object of fashion, a democratic constitution or instigating a witch hunt or collectively constructing a shared enemy. Unfortunately, the enjoyment of these emotions, the energies released when these objects are animated and amplified collectively, are themselves beyond good and evil.

The explanatory power of this collectivist template of projection extrapolated from Durkheim's late work can hardly be overestimated. What Durkheim tells us is essentially that the social revolves around breathing life, fascination, importance, sensuous attraction, presence and actuality into emphatically shared objects. This goes on in the most intimate settings and it goes on in extended, mediated and anonymous collectives. All the time we animate social ties by animating what we talk about or do together – and all the time we animate what we talk about or do by animating social ties. What we emphatically share, what we center on together with others, enhances its powers and its hold upon us, increases its forces and its agency.[13] This happens around shopping windows, at scientific conferences or around the family table, in blog threads and fora on the internet, just as it happens to themes on the media agenda and in relation to all significant collective "events". Just like a dance gain control over the dancing couple who cultivate the "objective" contours or movements internal to this collective practice together, so an ongoing and focused discussion gains further

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12 For a critique of Durkheim's quasi-religious relation to "society" see again the critique in Adorno (1979) or in Latour (2014) –but see also the more loyal critique of Pickering (1984, p. 244). Durkheim is of course well aware, on the other hand, that the crowd is in no way necessarily a loving creature (cf. for instance [1895] 2013b, p. 22; [1912] 1995, p. 213). Yet, he never explains why the crowd may be ambivalent while society remains exclusively benevolent. However, part of the answer is that he has turned society into a sacred object by de-collectivizing it, detaching it from the crowd; of course, he cannot do the same thing to the crowd itself.

13 This dialectical reinforcement is also tangible in Durkheim's "sacred mission" (Riley, 2012) of founding and keeping afloat the *Année sociologique*. Doing something with others simply makes it more interesting (this relation between "integration" and personal motivation or energy is also documented in *Suicide* which is exactly from this period). Collectivity creates attachment to the shared object; it agitates and animates it. As Durkheim gratefully writes one of his younger collaborators, who he had been afraid to loose: "to remain attached to [the shared labour myself]", "I needed, to feel your attachment to it" (cited from Riley, 2012, p. 187).

contour, power and importance when the participant discussants become even more engaged, so the fashionable object further increases its aesthetical allure and its enigmatic attraction by being ardently desired together with others. The collective and the objective interweave.

Before concluding, and in the hope of further contouring my reading of Durkheim, I shall briefly compare my ideas – especially my distinct focus on the dialectical and projective relation between collectivity and objectivity – with two topical and imaginative readings of the late Durkheim. I am thinking of Jeffrey Alexander and colleagues' so-called "strong Program" (Alexander & Smith, 2006) and Randall Collins idea of *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Collins, 2004).

The Strong Program and Interaction Ritual

The late Durkheim plays a prominent role in both the "Strong Program" and in Collins' work. Just as I do in this paper, and for all their differences, the two "schools" equally highlight the timelessness of the late Durkheim's insights. They are both informed by Durkheim's concept of the sacred and the possibility of extending (the applicability of) this concept beyond the religious sphere. In this section, I will briefly situate my own 'collectivist' reading of Durkheim in relation to these two positions.

Now, whereas I tend to agree with the critique directed against Collins for remaining too focused on the interactionist level (Cf. Smith, 2012), I agree to Collins' placement of the dynamic of collective projection –the relation of enforcement between collective sentiment and shared object or focus– at the absolute center of sociological analysis (Collins, 2004, pp. 47–101). In my view, we find no comparable dialectics in the Strong Program. The latter instead emphasizes the importance and (relative) "autonomy" of culture as the point of departure and distances itself from Collins' point of departure in ritual (cf. Smith, 2012; Smith & Alexander, 2008). There is, however, a danger that this dichotomous framing pits ritual against myth –collectivity against culture– in ways that hinder the study of the dialectical interplay and dynamic of reinforcement between the two dimensions –indeed the exact relation between collectivity and objectivity which interests me in late Durkheim.

Let me give you some illustrations of this blind spot in the Strong Program. Alexander's meticulous analysis of Watergate is a good place to start. Here he applies the dichotomy between the good or evil sacred to analyze the dislocations in status or popularity of Nixon as the events unfold and the eventual recharging of universalist and republic values and important democratic institutions after the crises; he underlines the psychological and emotional *effects* of these dislocations (and criticizes structuralism for ignoring them); he spells out the details surrounding the televised Senate hearings in the Summer 1973, which were, no doubt, to have

enormous influence in creating a "ritual communitas for Americans to share" (1988, p. 200). However, such formulations should not lead the reader to believe that Alexander is interested in the collective level in its own right, let alone that he is ready to allow it a proper role in the analysis. The movement is only one-way. There are collective emotions to be found in Alexander, there may even be real gatherings or rituals, yet they do not, it seems, help to blow life and importance into these values and institutions from below. We find no descriptions in Alexander as to how the "Americans" actually *participate* (in any active sense of the word) in rejuvenating –sacralizing– these objects.

Or take another example: Alexander's meticulous analysis of the construction and generalization of the Holocaust as the paradigmatic example of absolute evil (2006, pp. 27–84). On the one hand, again, Alexander's analysis demonstrates that cultural "form" matters. Undoubtedly, the genre of tragedy, the dramatization of trauma, the uses (and dislocations) of prominent dualisms help to structure the material; once more, moreover, Alexander has a keen eye for the role of media and television in mediating and "personalizing" the terrible event; he even touches upon the dimension of monuments and museums and processes of collective remembrance.

Nevertheless, in my view, it still feels like Alexander's analysis only gives us half of what really happens. At best there is an "audience" to the "performance" or the "(trauma) drama", yet, as is clear, this audience remains strangely metaphorical, it does not make a difference; –as if a performance is really a performance without the energetic ambience created by (the sheer presence of) a *real* audience. Likewise, isn't the dynamic of "catharsis" –and, in fact, already in Aristotle– further enforced by its collective context (actually taking place in the Amphitheatre)? Don't the visitors to the Jewish museum in Berlin enact the architecture together to make the most of it all? Isn't the identification with Anne Frank cultivated in concrete school classes and friendships among American teenagers (are there no actual collective aspects to the enactment of rituals around her)? Isn't, ultimately, the sheer psychological *need* to tell the story, to enforce the numbers, to recall the magnitude, reanimate the atrocities, to enter into the "spiral of signification" (Alexander, 2006, p. 93) –that is, to cultivate and expand myth– isn't all this –at least also– an *effect* of actual collective energies, of concrete human beings wanting to entrain and actively enact the social (around the impure object). And the other way around: Isn't even the imposition to refrain from myth a negative rite? Isn't the very insistence on the non-representational or ineffable nature of the holocaust event among historians, writers and philosophers also a way to transmit the sheer fascination of a(n impure) sacred object, a form of enactment of collective emotions through *taboo*, reinforcing effervescent animation by insisting that the events *cannot* be told, cannot be done justice, that this is a profanation, that they must be held apart, that they are dangerous

and contagious ("it can happen again!"), –indeed there are rituals to observe and we ought all to do so. At any event, such taboos do not merely result from the sacred, but also help to create and enliven it.

Well, Alexander's insistence upon the "analytical autonomy" of culture (2015, p. 2) obfuscates exactly the possibility of focusing on the dialectical interplay –or *intra*play– of collectivity and culture. Unfortunately, to avoid making a "naturalistic fallacy" (2006, pp. 27–33, 91–93), Alexander ends up doing a *culturalist shortening*. Instead, we need to mix Collins and Alexander; find out how the cultural forms, Alexander has such a keen eye for, not only helps to create collective resonance, but also accommodates, transforms and channels it into discourse, making myth reverberate and expand, –in turn, further animating the collective. Whether such a dynamic of dialectical reinforcement actually takes place and how intense it becomes is of course an empirical question.

What is important analytically is, however, to remind the Strong Programmers of the fact that, without the collective, nothing happens. Also the collective side must be granted some autonomy. Then, ultimately, the collective decides for itself: sometimes the party just doesn't "happen", the applause dies half-way, a planned fashion or invention flops, a mass ritual or concert fails, the planned hearing fails to arouse the audience –and thus simply loses importance and impact. Now, to be sure, this dynamic may be catered for, manipulated, provoked through all kinds of means– notably, of course, through all kinds of staging and aestheticization of the sacred object, through synchronization through music, through excessive circulation, engagement of important critics or gatekeepers, through use of other sacred objects which may rub off on it, through taboos and forced rituals –and yet, ultimately, collective entrainment can neither be mastered nor produced on command. To answer Alexander's question polemically: "who controls the means of symbolic production?" the answer is ultimately: the collective. In the last instance it is the collective who creates the sacred. It is the collective that bestows it with its surplus energy, its force of fascination, its importance, its "super sensuous" attraction, its inviolability, that is with a special appearance or "surface", as Alexander wants it, that transcends all deliberate aesthetizisation.[14]

This is indeed where Alexander's recent "iconic turn" comes into the picture. With this reorientation Alexander not only seeks to do justice to the phenomenological

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14 Granted, Alexander does elsewhere emphasize the lack of power of the "producers" to "ensure and control audience reaction" (2015, pp. 4-5). However, merely conceding that the "aesthetic effectiveness of the icon remains unpredictable" since there is a "long way" "from icon to audience", does not entail thinking of the collective at the very least as "co-producer". Alexander's collective remains in the role of a passive or merely "re-active" "audience". Instead of, as Durkheim, to insist on the actual collective forces as the creators of the "delirium" of experience (esp. Durkheim, 1995, pp. 224–231), Alexander's icons seem to exist apart from the collectives needed to enliven them. Alexander does not seem to want to admit that the sacred –the fashionable commodity– needs to be "produced" at least partly by the consumers it wants to seduce.

surplus of the sacred and its ineffable and quasi-sensuous power of fascination. The new-found interest in the sensuous and aesthetic, moreover, has also allowed him to progressively extend the sacred (even further) beyond the political and moral areas focus his earlier work (and of Bellah's civic religion legacy). Alexander's work on celebrities and other popular icons (Alexander, 2008, 2010) shows his willingness to expand the scope of analysis beyond Durkheim's insistence on *la vie serieuse* and to do justice to the phenomenological intricacies of popular culture. This step can only be welcomed. The privileging of the political and moral over the cultural (in the narrow sense) is indeed a Durkheimian vice that should have been redirected long ago.[15]

Nevertheless, once more Alexanders' fear that the *sui generis* life of culture should somehow be reduced to the social instead leads him to reduce the social to the cultural. Alexander insists his icons are "social objects", yet they are so only in the sense that they "socialize" with the individual; that the intense relation between the subject and the iconic object is of central importance to the individual in question. Alexander does not refrain from calling upon Durkheim's notion of the social fact (2010, p. 332), yet how this "social" relation between the subjective and the objective is itself co-animated and co-agitated by collective energies is left out of the analysis. To be sure, Alexander has a keen eye for the fact that "sensuous qualities" or "aesthetics" may "command attention", "compel attachment", "trigger absorption" and fascination (2010, p. 324), yet he has little sensibility for the fact that it is also the sheer popularity or collective resonance of the object that creates its "sensuous qualities" and thus, consequently, also enforces its "depth". Then, the "depth" dimension to the object –the intellectual or cognitive expansion of its meaning, i.e. the dimension of myth or culture– is, as Alexander clearly sees, triggered by the ineffable aesthetic powers of the object's "surface", provoking the desire to convey and further enhance its beauty, rationalize its powers and its hold upon us.[16] Take Alexander's listing of enthusiastic celebrations of Givenchy's (version of the) famous "Little black dress" (originally created by Chanel) worn by Audrey Hepburn in the 1961 film "Breakfast at Tiffany's":

> The front severe, elegant, very clean, but at the back this very interesting neckline, somewhere between ethnic and Parisian; a softness that other designers in that time did not have (Riccardo Tisci (Givenchy) as cited in Alexander, 2010, p. 328).

> Givenchy's dresses complemented that in spite of their simplicity. It shows confidence to

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15 Durkheim insistence on the stable and enduring goes hand in hand with his mistrust of modern culture. In his eyes, the strong yet ephemeral and shifting collective formations, the volatile sharing of collective energies and objects found in cultural contexts – in the arts, in science, in fashion, in the entertainment industry, in modern commodity culture – merely qualify as forms of "malign" or "morbid" effervescence (see notably 2002a, pp. 328–351; [1993] 2013a, pp. 8–32; cf. Riley, 2012, p. 182). Apparently, it is only in political or religious contexts that effervescence has an integrating effect.

16 On the formal level, these mechanisms are no different from the impure case –Holocaust– touched upon above.

wear such simply graceful dress that is not calling attention to itself. Not showy, not flashy, just confidence that the woman herself will attract the gaze (Actress Natalie Portman as cited in Alexander, 2010, p. 328).

Such "accounts" present a form of cultural rationalization of a phenomenological surplus which, in turn, results from the projection of collective energies originating in a concrete (albeit largely mediated) cult. In a word: The attractions of the fashionable object, in reality the effect of a projection of collective energies upon the object, are ascribed to the object itself (or to its creator). Yet this rationalization also further animates the object, and this animation happens, obviously, via cultural and moral commonplaces, (gendered) binaries and values and authenticities with their own structuring affect. Ultimately, what takes place here is also a ritual act, helping to prolong and reanimate the cult around the sacred classic. But is it *only* a ritual act? Do we have to be reductionist? Do we have to follow Durkheim in his insistence that "any object could have played this role"? (1995, p. 230), that its inherent aesthetic properties do not mean anything. No we do not. But neither should we believe, along with Alexander, that the aesthetic qualities of the icon and the binaries and schemas which structure culture are enough to create the sacred and gather the crowd.

Conclusion – and a Word of Caution

Admittedly, my reading of Durkheim and my interest in the interplay between the collective and the objective as pictured in late Durkheim goes together with a certain "selectivity" on my part. I have criticized or downplayed a number of contrary impulses; aspects which in my view point back towards the early work and the programmatic – and problematic – idea of the "externality" the social, but which Durkheim in no way would renounce upon. To be sure, taking the theoretical and empirical consequences of the collectivism of the late Durkheim seriously leads to controversial positions – at odds, in fact, with some of Durkheim's most central tenets, notably his over-blown holism, his (concomitant) fascination with the disciplining and chastening side to the social (so tangible in the first phase) and his later sublimation of real collectivity (so tangible in the second phase). In my view, of course, it is Durkheim himself, who, blinded by inveterate theoretical and metaphysical presuppositions, refrains from drawing the full consequences of some of his most remarkable observations and his most brilliant phenomenological descriptions.

Durkheim never completely renounces upon the holism and the ideas of externality and coercion of the first phase nor of the idea of a form of religious relation between the individual and "society" of the second phase. Maybe this explains why, even while moving the active production of collectivity and the idea of attachment to the center, he still falls short of adequately theorizing this move. The idea of "society" as an extended and de-contextualized structure of norms and rules or as a mere container

of cultural values and forms, in both cases seen in relation with isolated individuals, still holds sway in his thinking. The distinction between individual and society still bars him from collectivizing the individual and repopulating the social, just as it hinders him from really appreciating –even while describing it in vivid terms– the true entanglement of the effervescent and the objective.

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ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Durkheim'da Toplum-Çevre Etkileşimi: Dışlayıcı Toplumsal Olgulara Karşı Çevreci Potansiyel

Çağrı Eryılmaz[1]

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı Durkheim'ın sosyolojik yaklaşımını toplum-çevre etkileşimi çerçevesinde incelemektir. Döneminin ilerlemeci endüstriyel toplumunun bir üyesi olan Durkheim'ın toplumsal olguların ancak diğer toplumsal olgular ile açıklanabileceği yönündeki yaklaşımı, sosyoloji disiplininin kuruluş sürecinde çevresel etkenleri dışlamıştır. Durkheim evrim sürecindeki toplumu, tarih boyunca değişmediğini vurguladığı doğal çevreden ayrı bir gerçeklik olarak ortaya koymuştur. Diğer yandan, Durkheim sosyolojiyi ayrı bir disiplin olarak kurarken döneminin güçlü ve meşru doğa bilimlerinin yöntemlerini kullanmıştır. Ayrıca çevrenin topluma etkisini; mekanik dayanışmadan organik dayanışmaya geçişte ekolojik kaynakların rolü örneğindeki gibi vurgulamıştır. Toplumsal gerçekliği açıklayan çalışmalarında sıklıkla nüfus, denge, organizma ve kaynak kıtlığı gibi doğa metaforları kullanmıştır. Dahası, toplumsal işbölümünün tüm canlı organizmalarda olup doğadan topluma geçtiğine dikkat çekmiştir. En önemlisi ise toplumu doğanın karmaşık bir parçası olarak tanımlamasıdır. Durkheim çevre sorunlarının ciddiyetinin ve yaygınlığının kabul edildiği; biyoloji ile ekoloji bilimlerinin çok geliştiği günümüzde yaşasaydı, toplum-çevre etkileşimi içeren sosyolojik bir yaklaşım geliştirme potansiyeline sahip olabilecekti. Zira vurguladığı dayanışma, kolektif bilinç ve işbölümü kavramlarının yeniden yorumlanmasının, küresel ölçekteki çevre sorunlarına karşı uluslararası bir işbirliği zemini oluşturması mümkündür.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Durkheim • Toplumsal olgular • Çevre • Toplum-çevre etkileşimi • Çevre sosyolojisi

Society-Environment Interaction in Durkheim: Exclusion of Social Facts versus Environmental Potential
Abstract

This paper aims to examine Durkheim's sociological approach in terms of society-environment interaction. Durkheim's methodological dictum indicates that social facts can only be explained by other social facts. This notion excludes environmental parameters in the early years of sociology. Hence, he kept separated evolving society from environment that hardly changed historically. On the other hand, Durkheim used the methodology of natural sciences in the establishment of sociology as a discipline. Moreover, he implied the role of natural resources in the transformation of mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. In fact, he often used metaphors from nature in his studies like population, balance, organism, and resource scarcity to explain social reality. The division of labor, one of his most important concepts, is taken from organisms. Above all, Durkheim defines society as a complex part of nature. If Durkheim lived in the modern world, where the severity of environmental problems is accepted and biology and ecology disciplines are highly developed, he would have a potential to develop a sociological approach that includes society-environment relations. In fact, the redefinition and reuse of concepts like solidarity, collective consciousness, and division of labor provide a base for international cooperation to solve global environmental problems.

Keywords

Durkheim • Social facts • Environment • Society-environment interaction • Environmental sociology

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Extended Summary

Since the 1950s, environmental sociology is hardly accepted despite existing social-environmental issues. These problems have been generated by the rapid industrialization and urbanization causing pollution in the post-war era. Environmental sociology was established in the 1970s when environmental problems gained public attention and the environmental movement emerged. The theories of sociologists Durkheim, Weber, who introduced the rationalization concept, and Marx, who introduced the theory of metabolic rift, were welcomed in environmental sociology. However, Durkheim was criticized that his methodological dictum was excluding society-environment interaction.

There are two explanations for the association between Durkheim and society-environment interaction. On the one hand, the industrialism of his era caused the exclusion of environment from sociology. On the other hand, Durkheim's works have significant references to environment that indicate a potential for environmental sociology.

This paper aims to examine Durkheim's sociological approach in terms of society-environment interaction. First, the foundation of environmental sociology is summarized. Then, both examples showing the exclusion of environment and society-environment interactions in Durkheim's studies are shown. The paper concludes with the assessment of Durkheim's contribution to current environmental sociology challenging ecological crisis that threatens society.

Although the first years of sociology were marked by geographical and biological determinism, sociologists favoring a "world view" of development, progress, and modernism in later years ignored environment as an issue (Hannigan, 2006). After a century, when environmental problems had surfaced and threatened industrialized Western societies, environmental concerns and movement were accepted in society and from the cultural perspective. Two pioneers of environmental sociology, Dunlap and Catton (1978) criticized human exceptionalism paradigm of causing the exploitation of nature and Durkheim's methodological dictum (Madappalli, 2016). The paradigm assumes nature as an endless resource and that the human progress is limitless, while human existence is unique as a result of its developed culture (Catton & Dunlap, 1978) that "covers the dependence of human societies to biophysical environment" (Rice, 2013, p. 238). However, environmental problems and restrictions in the 1960s shook this paradigm and Durkheim's methodological dictum that reportedly ignored society-environment interaction. Hence, environmental parameters were included in sociological researches. In fact, the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale, developed by environmental sociologists, introduced "environmental facts" against the social facts of Durkheim. The paradigm aims to consider the effects of

environmental problems like resource scarcity on main sociological research issues like stratification (Catton & Dunlap, 1978). Hence, environmental sociologists, by using the New Ecological Paradigm, challenge Durkheim's methodological dictum by accepting the effect of environment on society (Dunlap & Catton, 1979).

Durkheim was criticized for excluding the impact of the environment on sociology with his methodological dictum. Sociology, a social discipline excluding environment (Foster, 1999, p. 367), was positioned out of "psychology, biology, economics, and geography" by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, the three fathers of sociology (Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap, & Gijswijt, 2002, p. 5). However, Marx and Weber were applauded for their concepts, the metabolic rift and rationality, in environmental sociology, unlike Durkheim who was criticized for his methodological dictum that was believed to be against the use of biophysical parameters in sociology (Lidskog, Mol, & Oosterveer, 2015). Durkheim defined social facts only with other social facts, ignoring the biophysical environment (Dunlap, 2016), and implied examination of social systems without using environmental parameters (Norgaard, 1997, p. 159). Durkheim developed a social reductionism to resist biological reductionism (Benton, 1991, as cited in Konak, 2010). Hence, traditional sociology following Durkheim's approach excluded biophysical environment (Hoyen, 2013).

To objectify society within a scientific discipline (Durkheim, 2016, pp. 58, 59, 168), Durkheim defended the use of social facts and collective consciousness against biology and psychology (Hannigan, 2006, p. 5), that social facts can only be explained by social facts (Buttel, 2002) that have power over individuals and are different from non-human and organic facts (Durkheim, 2016). As a result, the methodological dictum made Durkheim and sociologists ignore biological and physical parameters (Dunlap, 1997; Dunlap & Catton, 2007). The exclusion of physical reality by Weberian and Durkheimian authors (Ritzer 1975; Choldin 1978, as cited in Dunlap & Catton, 2007) should be seen as a constructive approach in the early years of sociology (Buttel, 2002). The exclusion of environment was dominant and environmental parameters were ignored in other subdisciplines like rural sociology until the 1970s; these subdisciplines are the foundation of environmental sociology (Dunlap & Martin 1983, as cited in Dunlap, 2002).

Durkheim implied the static position of nature throughout history while society changes and evolves (Durkheim, 2010; Gross, 2000; Jarvikoski, 1996). Durkheim separated the concept of evolution, originated from ecology and biology, from nature and integrated it into the social sphere (Durkheim, 2014). Furthermore, he put a sharp distinction between human society and animals, as they lack of morality and collective consciousness (Durkheim, 2010) and they are static unlike human societies (Durkheim, 2014).

Although sociological theorists Durkheim, Weber, and Marx did not directly examine society-environment interaction; their studies indirectly included this issue (Hannigan, 2006, p. 5). Hence, Durkheim should be comprehended through the extensive framework of human-nature systems instead of narrow anthropocentricism (Rosa & Richter, 2008). In fact, Durkheim did not deny the importance of biological and physical parameters in sociology (Jarvikoski, 1996). Moreover, Durkheim followed the example of natural science during the exploration of social reality (Durkheim, 2016). Despite a strong and common prejudice in traditional sociology, Durkheim's studies involve many references to the environment. However, the methodological dictum of Durkheimian scholars reinstructed sociology (Catton, 2002), resulting in Dunlap and Catton, two founders of environmental sociology, strongly criticizing the Durkheimian theory.

Contrarily, the limited prevalence of social facts and the emphasis on the environmental parameters in Durkheim's studies are important objections to their critique (Rosa & Richter, 2008). Çelebi (2007, p. 159) highlighted the importance of the balance between population and land as social facts that affect society. Durkheim considered the effects of the position of sun and the condition of the atmosphere to people, and his social morphology notion had other environmental insights like the use of land (Gross, 2000). He also implied the coevolution of nature and society in his work of *Pragmatism and Sociology* (Foster, 1999). According to him, nature is not the reverse of society, but a part, the highest representation, and complex form of nature (Durkheim 2010; Jarvikoski, 1996). Moreover, Durkheim (2016) implied similarities between "physical environment" and society and defined society as part of nature.

Durkheim often referred to nature in his classical study of totemism. Tribe members lean toward plants, animals, and rocks in understanding their society. They imitate animals in their religious rituals. Safety and domination of nature make up their religion (Durkheim, 2010). Durkheim often used biological terms like species, population density, and resource scarcity in his explanation of social evolution and solidarity concepts (Buttel, 2002). He implied that division of labor exists in all living organisms, and transfers society from nature (Durkheim, 2014). On the other hand, his notion of competition and division of labor undermined environmental concerns like pollution and resource scarcity in urbanization (Lenski, 1984, as cited in Buttel & Humprey, 2002).

This paper aims to examine Durkheim's sociological approach in terms of society-environment interaction. The construction process of sociology as a distinct discipline excluded environmental parameters. However, urbanization and industrialization in the 1950s have caused environmental concerns and movements in Western societies.

The foundation of environmental sociology was challenged in the 1970s by the methodological dictum of Durkheim. Although some of his studies strongly separate society from environment like social facts, he often referred to environmental concepts like population, balance, organism, and resource scarcity. Durkheim also implied metabolic interaction between society and environment, and that society is a complex part of nature.

Durkheim'da Toplum-Çevre Etkileşimi: Dışlayıcı Toplumsal Olgulara Karşı Çevreci Potansiyel

Toplum-çevre etkileşimini temel alan çevre sosyolojisi, sosyoloji disiplininin kurucusu olarak kabul edilen Comte'un ölümünden ancak bir asır sonra kurulabilmiştir ve -tüm disiplin içinde olmasa da- kabul görebilmiştir. 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında hızla gelişen endüstrileşmenin ve kentleşmenin neden olduğu hava, toprak ve su kirliliğinin halk sağlığını tehdit etmesiyle, toplumda çevre kaygısı ve çevreci hareket ortaya çıkmıştır. Takip eden on yıllarda da çevre sosyolojisi akademideki yerini almıştır. Yarım yüzyıl sonra bugün; 21. yüzyılın başında iklim değişikliği gibi doğrudan toplumsal yaşamı tehdit eden çevre sorunlarının ciddiyetine ve küresel ölçekte etkinliğine rağmen, çevre konusu genel sosyoloji disiplini içinde hâlâ marjinal bir konumdadır.

Sosyoloji kuramlarının tarihine bakıldığında, 20. yüzyılın ilk yarısında Chicago Okulu'nca geliştirilen İnsan Ekolojisi gibi çevrenin topluma etkisini konu edinen yaklaşımlar yüzyıllık gecikme içinde istisna olarak gözükmektedir. Toplum-çevre etkileşiminin sosyolojinin çalışma alanına dâhil edilmesinde yaşanan yüzyıllık gecikmenin nedenleri araştırıldığında, ilk olarak klasik sosyoloji geleneğinin öncü isimleri olan Marx, Weber ve Durkheim'a bakılmaktadır. Marx ve Weber'in çalışmalarında metabolik yarılma ve araçsal rasyonalite gibi çevre sosyolojisi içinde farklı yaklaşımlara temel olan kavramlar ortaya konmaktadır. Ancak Durkheim, sosyolojide temel alınan toplumsal olgular yaklaşımının çevreyi dışlamasından sorumlu tutulmaktadır. Literatürde Durkheim ve çevre ilişkisi konusunda iki farklı eğilim dikkat çekmektedir: İlkine göre, Durkheim'ın yaşadığı döneme hâkim olan endüstrileşme, doğa bilimlerinin saygınlığı ve pozitif bir sosyal bilim ihtiyacı çevreyi dışlayan bir sosyoloji disiplini ve beraberinde toplumsal olgular tabusu ortaya çıkarmıştır. İkincisine göre ise, Durkheim'ın özgün çalışmaları içinde toplum-çevre etkileşimini ifade eden referanslara sıklıkla rastlanmaktadır; bunlar günümüzde yeni kuramsal yaklaşımlara temel olma potansiyeline sahiptir. Ayrıca, çevre sorunlarının ciddiyetinin toplumda ve sosyal bilimlerde kabul edildiği, biyoloji ve ekoloji bilimlerinin geliştiği günümüzde yaşasaydı, toplum-çevre etkileşimini içeren bir kuramsal çerçeve ortaya koyma potansiyeline sahip olacaktı.

Bu çalışmanın amacı Durkheim'ın sosyolojik yaklaşımını toplum-çevre etkileşimi açısından incelemektir. Makalede, önce çevre sosyolojisinin kuruluş süreci özetlenecektir. Sonra, Durkheim'ın çalışmalarında çevrenin dışlandığı örnekler açıklanacaktır. Devamında, yine Durkheim'ın çalışmalarından çevreye ve toplum-çevre etkileşimine dair referanslar başlıklar halinde ve alıntılarla sunulacaktır. Son bölümde, Durkheim'ın çalışmalarının toplum-çevre etkileşimini dışlayan ve kapsayan yönleri ile Durkheim'ın günümüzde çevre sosyolojisine katkıları değerlendirilecektir.

Durkheim ve Çevre Sosyolojisi

Sosyolojinin kuruluş yıllarında dönemin bilimsel topluluğuna hâkim olan coğrafi ve biyolojik belirlenimcilik eğilimi, sonraki dönemde etkisini kaybetmiştir. Doğanın güzelliğinin, zorluğunun ve iklim şartlarının topluma etkisi ile sosyal Darwinizm gibi temalar sosyoloji kuramlarında yer almamıştır. Zira kuruluş döneminin kalkınmacı, ilerlemeci ve modernist bir "dünya görüşü"nü savunan sosyologları için, çevre önemli bir konu değildir (Hannigan, 2006, s. 2–5). Toplum-çevre etkileşimini reddeden bu eğilimin değişmesi için bir yüzyıl geçmesi gerekmiştir. Çevre sorunlarının 1950'lerle birlikte endüstrileşmiş Batı ülkelerinde kent yaşamını ve halk sağlığını tehdit etmeye başlamasıyla topluma yayılan çevreci kaygılar ve ortaya çıkan çevreci hareketler, nihayet 1970'lerde çevre sosyolojisi disiplininin ortaya çıkmasına imkân sağlamıştır.

Çevre sosyolojisinin öncü isimlerinden Catton ve Dunlap'a göre (1978), sosyoloji disiplininin kuruluş sürecinde çevre konusunun dışlanması nedeniyle, sonraki dönemde ayrı bir alt disiplin olarak kurulması zor olmuştur. Bu durumun başlıca nedenleri, Batı dünyasına hâkim olan, doğayı dışlayan İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigması ve bu çerçevede yer alan Durkheim'ın toplumsal olgu[2] yaklaşımının sosyolojideki güçlü etkisidir. Zira Durkheim da İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigması kapsamında, insanın doğayı istediği kadar sömürebileceğini düşünmektedir (Madappalli, 2016, s. 1020). Ayrıca "işlevselcilik, sembolik etkileşimcilik, çatışma kuramı, Marksizm ve diğer sosyoloji kuramları", aralarındaki farklara rağmen toplum-çevre etkileşimine yaklaşımları açısından İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigması çerçevesinde yer almaktadır. Sosyoloji disiplininin de içinden çıktığı Batı kültürüne hâkim olan bu paradigmaya göre, doğal kaynaklar sınırsızdır ve "ilerleme" sonsuza kadar devam edecektir. İnsanlar geliştirdikleri kültür nedeniyle, diğer canlılar içinde "eşsiz" bir konumda yer almaktadır. Zira kültür, biyolojik özelliklerden daha hızlı değişmekte ve toplumsal değişim sayesinde biyolojik farklar kolayca aşılmaktadır. "Kültürel birikim" sayesinde, ilerlemenin kısıtlama olmaksızın devam ettiği ve her türlü toplumsal sorunun çözüldüğü kabul edilmektedir (Catton ve Dunlap, 1978, s. 42–43). Böylece, İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigması "insan toplumlarının biyofiziksel çevreye olan bağımlılıklarını gizlemektedir" (Rice, 2013, s. 238).

Endüstrileşmiş Batı dünyasının lideri konumundaki ABD'de hâkim olan toplumsal ilerleme, yükselme ve toplumsal düzen algısı, 1960'larda çevre kaynaklı sorunlar ve kısıtlar tarafından sarsılmıştır. Çevresel değişkenlerin toplumu etkilediğinin görülmesiyle birlikte, toplumsal olguların ancak diğer toplumsal olgular ile açıklandığı Durkheimcı geleneğe dayanan "sosyolojik saflık normu" da sarsılmaya başlamıştır. Çevre hareketleri, doğal afetler ve kaynak yönetimi gibi konularda toplum-çevre etkileşimini temel alan "çevresel değişkenler" sosyolojik araştırmalarda

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2   Kavramın Fransızca orijinali "fait social" olup İngilizceye "social fact" olarak çevrilmektedir. Türkçede ise "toplumsal gerçek", "sosyal olay" gibi çevirileri varsa da bu metinde en yaygın kullanımı olan "toplumsal olgu" tercih edilmiştir. Bu konuda danıştığım Prof. Dr. Himmet Hülür'e teşekkür ederim.

kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu çerçevede, 1970'lerde diğer sosyoloji derneklerini takip eden Amerikan Sosyoloji Derneği (American Sociological Association, 2017) ayrı bir "Çevre Sosyolojisi Bölümü" kurmuştur (Catton ve Dunlap, 1978, s. 42–44).

Toplum-çevre etkileşimi, sosyolojinin içinde ayrı bir bölüm olmanın ötesinde ayrı bir paradigma sunma potansiyeline sahiptir. Zira Catton ve Dunlap'ın 1978'de, İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigmasının karşısına çıkardığı Yeni Ekolojik Paradigma[3] toplumsal gerçekliği yeniden tanımlama iddiasındadır. Yeni Ekolojik Paradigmaya göre, insan yaşamı diğer canlılardan bağımsız değildir, aksine insan ve diğer canlılar karşılıklı etkileşim içindedirler. Dünya sınırsız değildir; toplumsal ilerlemeyi, ekonomik büyümeyi ve diğer toplumsal olguları kısıtlayan "fiziksel ve biyolojik sınırlar" vardır. Bu çerçevede, İnsan İstisnalığı Paradigmasına dayanan Durkheimci "toplumsal olgulara" karşı, çevre sosyologları tarafından Yeni Ekolojik Paradigma çerçevesinde yer alan "çevresel olgular" ortaya konmuştur. Doğanın sınırları ve kaynak kıtlığı gibi çevre sorunlarının topluma etkilerini dikkate alan çevresel olgular, tabakalaşma gibi sosyolojinin temel araştırma konularının sosyolojik analizinde de kullanılmaktadır (Catton ve Dunlap, 1978, s. 42–45). Yeni Ekolojik Paradigma çerçevesinde çalışmalarını yürüten çevre sosyologları, fiziksel çevrenin toplumsal davranışı etkilediğini kabul ederek Durkheim'ın toplumsal olgu hükmüne karşı çıkmışlardır (Dunlap ve Catton, 1979, s. 255). Sosyolojinin kuruluş sürecinde çevre konusunun dışlanmasından sorumlu tutulan Durkheim, ironik bir biçimde çevre sosyolojisinin ortaya çıkış sürecinde dışlanmıştır.

Toplumsal Olgu Anlayışının Çevreyi Dışlaması

Sosyoloji disiplininin, özellikle kuruluş sürecinde toplum-çevre etkileşiminin dışlanmasından Durkheim sorumlu tutulmaktadır; maruz kaldığı güçlü eleştiriler bu bölümde özetlenecektir: İlk olarak, toplumsal olguları sosyolojinin temel nesnesi olarak tanımlayan Durkheim'ın, dönemine hâkim olan biyolojik indirgemeciliğe karşı koymak isterken sosyolojik indirgemeciliğe kaydığı vurgulanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, doğayı insanlardan ayrı, değişmez ve etkisiz olarak tasavvur ederek toplum-çevre etkileşimini görmezden geldiği öne sürülmektedir.

Foster'a göre (1999, s. 367) çevre konusunu dışlayan sosyal bilimler arasında, sosyoloji en ön sırada yer almaktadır. Toplum-doğa ve sosyoloji-biyoloji ayrımlarına çalışmalarında yer veren sosyolojinin üç kurucu figürü olan Marx, Weber ve Durkheim, aralarındaki farklılıklara rağmen "sosyolojiyi psikoloji, biyoloji, iktisat ve coğrafya" gibi disiplinlerin dışında konumlandırmışlardır. Sosyolojik analizlerinde "toplumsal sınıf, güç ve kültür" gibi çevreyi dışlayan toplumsal kavramlar ve değişkenler kullanmışlardır (Buttel, Dickens, Dunlap ve Gijswijt 2002, s. 5). Diğer

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3   Başlangıçta "Yeni Çevresel Paradigma" olarak kullanılmış, sonradan "Yeni Ekolojik Paradigma" tercih edilmiştir.

yandan, sosyolojinin kuramsal geleneği içinde yer alan "Marx ve Weber'in çevre sosyolojisi içinde (Allan Schnaiberg, James O'Connor ve John Foster'ın Neo-Marksist çevre sosyolojisi ile Patrick West, Raymond Murphy, John Hannigan ve John Foster'ın Neo-Weberci çevre sosyolojisi) çokça takdir edilmesine karşın" Durkheim ise sıklıkla eleştirilmektedir. Zira Durkheim, "biyolojik değişkenlerin sosyolojide kullanılmasına karşıt olmasını içeren metodoloji tabusu" ile öne çıkmaktadır. Çevre sosyolojisinin önde gelen isimleri ve Yeni Ekolojik Paradigmanın kurucuları olan Dunlap ve Catton, yayınladıkları "hemen her makalede" bu tabuyu vurgulamışlardır (Lidskog, Mol ve Oosterveer, 2015, s. 4).

Durkheim insanın doğadan bağımsızlaşması sebebiyle, "toplumsal sistemlerin çevresel etkenlerden bağımsız" olarak incelenebileceğini savunmuştur (Norgaard, 1997, s. 159). Durkheim'a göre toplumsal olgular ancak diğer toplumsal olgular ile açıklanabilir, biyolojik, coğrafi ve psikolojik etkenlerle açıklanamazlar. Bu miras, çevre sosyologlarını "biyofiziksel çevrenin görmezlikten gelinmesi" ile mücadele etmek zorunda bırakmıştır (Dunlap, 2016). Aslında, Durkheim biyolojik indirgemeciliğe karşı çıkmaya çalışırken sosyal bir indirgemecilik ortaya koymuştur (Benton, 1991'den akt., Konak, 2010, s. 274). Bu geleneği takip eden klasik sosyoloji geleneği içinde, Durkheim'ın "toplumsal olgular ancak diğer toplumsal olgular ile açıklanmalı" hükmü nedeniyle "fiziksel dünya dışlanmıştır" (Hoyen, 2013).

Toplumsal Olgular Hükmünün Toplum-Çevre Etkileşimini Dışlaması

Durkheim, "sosyolojinin kuramsal bağımsızlığı"nı koruma amacı doğrultusunda biyoloji ile psikoloji gibi "sosyoloji dışı yaklaşımlara" karşı, toplumsal olgular ve kolektif bilinç kavramlarını kuvvetli bir biçimde savunmuştur (Hannigan, 2006, s. 5). Zira sosyoloji de psikolojinin yaptığı "devrim" gibi, öznelliği aşıp çalışma konusunu nesnelleştirmek durumundadır. Dahası, "sosyoloji felsefeden arındırılmalı" ve sosyolog "felsefeci gibi davranmaktan vazgeçme"lidir (Durkheim, 2016, s. 58, 59, 168). Sosyolojiyi psikoloji ve biyolojiden ayırma çabası içindeki Durkheim, sosyoloji disiplininde toplumsal olguların ancak diğer toplumsal olgular ile açıklanabileceğini vurgulamıştır (Buttel, 2002, s. 38).

Durkheim'a göre "sosyolojinin alanı yalnızca belli bir olgular grubundan oluşmaktadır. Toplumsal bir olgu, bireyler üzerinde uygulayabildiği veya uygulayabileceği dışsal bir zorlayıcı güçle kendisini gösterir" (2016, s. 39). Durkheim toplumsal olguları, toplum dışı doğal olgulardan kesin çizgilerle ayırmaktadır:

> Değişmez veya değişken nitelikte olan ve bireyin üzerinde dışsal bir zorlama yaratabilen bütün yapma biçimleri toplumsal bir olgudur; yahut kendine özgü bir varlığı olmakla birlikte, verili bir toplumun kapsamı içerisinde genellik niteliği taşıyan ve bireysel tezahürlerinden bağımsız olan bütün yapma biçimleri toplumsal bir olgudur... ...Bunlar bireyin dışında var olan davranış, düşünme ve duyumsama biçimlerine dayanırlar; bir zorlayıcılık gücüne

sahiptirler ve bu sayede bireye kendilerini dayatırlar. Dolayısıyla bunlar organik olgularla karıştırılmamalıdır, çünkü eylemlere ve temsillere dayanırlar (Durkheim, 2016, s. 33, 42, 43).

Toplumsal olguların ancak başka toplumsal olgularla açıklanmasının yanı sıra psikolojik ve biyolojik gerçekliklere karşıt olması, Durkheim'ı toplumsal gerçeklikte biyolojik ve fiziksel değişkenleri dışlamaya sevk etmiştir (Dunlap ve Catton, 2007, s. 116). Durkheim'ın fiziksel etkenleri dışlayan "toplumsal tanımlama" yaklaşımı ve coğrafi belirlenimcilikten kaçınması sosyologların da fiziksel çevreyi göz ardı etmelerine neden olmuştur (Dunlap, 1997, s. 21; Dunlap ve Catton, 2007, s. 118). Bu çerçevede, Durkheimcı geleneğin yanı sıra Weber'i takip eden Mead, Cooley ve diğerleri de toplumsal gerçekliği aktörlerin bağlamı çerçevesinde ele almış ve fiziksel gerçekliği dışlamışlardır (Ritzer 1975; Choldin 1978'den akt., Dunlap ve Catton, 2007, s. 117–118). Ancak vurgulamak gerekir ki, sosyolojinin kuruluş döneminde klasik kuramcıların "organizmacılık" ile diğer doğal ve sosyal bilimlerden uzak durması "yapıcı" bir yaklaşım olarak görülmelidir (Buttel, 2002, s. 39). Sosyolojinin ilk yıllarda ihtiyaç duyduğu bu yalıtım, disiplinin kendi alanını kurması ve geleneklerini oluşturması açısından gereklidir. Bu nedenle 1970'lere kadar çevresel değişkenler ciddi biçimde dışlanmıştır. Örneğin kır sosyolojisi alanındaki çalışmalarda yağmur ve toprak tipi toplumsal değişken olmadıkları gerekçesiyle, çiftçilerin yaş ve eğitim düzeyleri gibi toplumsal değişkenlerin yanında değerlendirilmemişlerdir (Dunlap ve Martin 1983'ten akt., Dunlap, 2002, s. 16).

Durkheim'ın Doğaya Bakışı

Durkheim'ın doğaya yaklaşımında evrim, değişim, kalıtım ve hayvanlar gibi başlıklar üzerinde toplumsal olguları doğadan ayrı bir konumda tanımlama çabası dikkat çekmektedir. Doğanın tarihsel süreçte ciddi bir değişim geçirmediğini ve toplumsal evrim sürecini önemli bir biçimde etkilemediğini vurgulamaktadır. Doğa içinde insanlar, toplumsal özellikleri nedeniyle hayvanlardan kesin çizgilerle ayrılmaktadır.

Durkheim'a göre tarih boyunca toplumlar değişirken fiziksel şartlar değişmemiştir; doğa "düzenli, hatta tekdüzedir" (Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 80). Doğa dengede kalıp değişmezken, doğanın bir parçası olmayan toplum ise (Durkheim bazen aksini iddia etse de) değişmektedir (Gross, 2000, s. 282). Doğa zaman ve mekâna göre de değişmemektedir:

> Doğanın, en temel özellikleri açısından, yere göre köklü farklılıklar göstermesi olanaksızdır... ...Doğa her zaman ve her yerde kendi kendisine benzer. Sınırsız genişlikte olmasının pek az önemi vardır: Görüşümün ulaşabildiği en uzak sınırın ötesinde, berisinde olduğundan daha farklı değildir. Ufkun ötesinde tasarladığım uzay da gördüğümün tıpkısı bir uzaydır. Sonu gelmez biçimde akmakta olan şu zaman, benim yaşamış olduklarımın tıpkı benzeri olan anlardan oluşmaktadır. Genişlik de süre gibi durmamacasına yinelenmektedir (Durkheim, 2010, s. 41, 127).

Durkheim fiziksel çevrenin değişmediği yönündeki iddiasını, toplumsal ve fiziksel koşulları karşılaştırdığı kalıtımın bireye etkisi konulu tartışmasında da vurgulamaktadır:

Bireylerin, hem fiziksel hem de toplumsal açıdan ortalama ortam denilebilecek koşullara, demek oluyor ki tür üyelerinin en büyük bölümünün içinde yaşadığı koşullara nasıl uyarlandıklarını gösterir. Bu ortalama koşullar, kendilerini bugün en yaygın duruma getiren aynı nedenlerden dolayı geçmişte de en sık görülen koşullardı; demek ki atalarımızın en geniş bölümünün içinde bulunduğu koşullar böyleydi. Zaman içinde değişmiş olabilecekleri doğrudur; ama değişmeleri genellikle yavaştır (Durkheim, 2014, s. 375).

Durkheim biyoloji ve ekoloji disiplininin temel kavramlarından biri olan evrim konusunu da doğadan ayırıp toplumsal alana dâhil etmektedir. İnsanlığın evrimsel gelişiminde doğal çevrenin değil toplumsal çevrenin etkili olduğunu düşünmektedir. Uygarlığın kaynağı, değişmeyen çevresel etkenler değil toplumsal gelişimdir. Bu noktada toplum-çevre etkileşimini açıkça dışlamaktadır:

Birey, eğer daha büyük mutluluk elde etmeyecek ise, kendisine her zaman bir acı veren değişimlere niçin kendiliğinden yol açmak istesin? Demek ki toplumsal evrimin belirleyici nedenleri bireylerin dışında, yani onu kuşatan ortamda bulunmaktadır. Eğer toplumlar değişiyor ve eğer birey değişiyorsa, çevre değiştiği içindir. Öte yandan fiziksel ortam görece kalıcı olduğundan, art arda gelen bu kesintisiz değişimleri onunla açıklayamayız. Bu nedenle onların temel koşullarını toplumsal ortamda aramak gerekir. Toplumlardaki ve bireylerdeki değişimlere yol açan şey, toplumsal ortamda ortaya çıkan değişimlerdir (Durkheim, 2014, s. 292–293).

Durkheim insanı, toplumsal özellikleri nedeniyle hayvanlardan ayrı tutmaktadır. Zira insan tüm özelliklerini toplumdan almıştır; toplumun yokluğunda ahlâkını, yani kolektif bilincini kaybederek hayvanların seviyesine düşmesi kaçınılmazdır:

Gerçekten de, tıpkı tapınma yaşamı gibi, toplumsal yaşam da bir daire içinde cereyan etmektedir. Bir yandan birey, kendisinde bulunan en iyi parçayı, başka varlıklar arasında kendisine ayrı bir yüz görünümü ve ayrı bir yer veren her şeyi, düşünsel ve ahlaki kültürünü hep toplumdan almaktadır. İnsandan dil, bilimler, inançlar, sanatlar, ahlâk alınacak olursa hayvan seviyesine düşer (Durkheim, 2010, s. 473).

Durkheim'a göre insanların küçük hayvan topluluklarından en önemli farkı çok değişken olmalarıdır. İnsanlar biyolojik ve çevresel sınırlarını toplumsal ilişkileri ve etkileşimleri sayesinde aşmaktadırlar:

Her şeyden önce bireyler organizmanın boyunduruğundan gittikçe daha çok kurtulmaktadırlar. Hayvan, hemen tümden fiziksel çevreye bağımlı durumdadır; biyolojik yapılanışı yaşam biçimini önceden belirlemektedir. İnsan ise, bunun tersine, toplumsal nedenlere bağlıdır. Kuşkusuz hayvanların da oluşturduğu toplumlar vardır, ama onlar çok dardır ve oradaki ortak yaşam çok yalınkattır; bu yaşam aynı zamanda çok durgundur, çünkü bunca küçük toplulukların dengesi zorunlu olarak durgundur... ...İnsanda ise durum tümden farklıdır, çünkü insanların oluşturduğu toplumlar çok daha geniştirler; bilinen en küçükleri bile,

hayvan topluluklarının pek çoğundan daha geniştir. Onlardan daha karmaşık da olduklarından aynı zamanda daha değişkendirler ve bu iki neden birlikte, insanlardaki toplumsal yaşamın biyolojik bir biçim altında donmasını engellemiştir. En yalınkat olduğu yerde bile özelliğini korumaktadır (Durkheim, 2014, s. 396–397).

Durkheim, hayvanların dar ölçekte de olsa toplum oluşturabildiklerini belirttikten sonra insan toplumlarının daha geniş, karmaşık ve değişken olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Hayvanlar ile insanlar arasındaki farkın yanı sıra tarihsel süreçte doğanın sabit kalırken toplumun evrimsel doğrultuda değişken olduğunu vurgulaması, Durkheim'ın kavramsallaştırmalarında toplum-çevre etkileşimini dışlama çabasına önemli birer örnektir. Yukarıdaki örneklere karşıt olarak Durkheim'ın çalışmalarında toplum-çevre etkileşimine dair örnekler de vardır ve aşağıdaki bölümlerde alıntılarla birlikte açıklanmaktadır.

Durkheim'da Çevreci Potansiyel

Genel kanının aksine, Durkheim'ın çalışmalarında çevre ile ilgili referanslar sıklıkla yer almaktadır. Sosyologlara metodolojik olarak doğa bilimcilerini örnek gösteren Durkheim, toplumu doğadan ayrı tutmaya çalışırken doğa bilimlerinin evrim, organizma ve hücre gibi metaforlarını da çekinmeden kullanmıştır. Çevre sosyologları tarafından sıklıkla eleştirilmesine neden olan toplumsal olgu kavramını açıklarken bile çevresel etkilere ve biyoloji disiplinine çalışmalarında yer vermiştir. Nüfus ve mekân gibi değişkenlerin topluma etkisini belirtmiştir; özellikle evrim konusunda toplum-çevre etkileşimini ortaya koymuştur. En çarpıcı örnek ise, toplumu doğanın bir parçası olarak görmesi ve arada "sadece bir derece farkı" olduğunu vurgulamasıdır. Durkheim'ın çevre ile ilgili kullandığı referanslara örnekler aşağıda verilmektedir.

Sosyolojinin klasik öncülerinden Marx, Weber ve Durkheim "doğa ve toplum" konusunu doğrudan ele almasalar da, çalışmalarında dolaylı ve içkin olarak bahsetmişlerdir (Hannigan, 2006, s. 5). Bu nedenle, Durkheim'a insanmerkezci ve dar bir çerçeve yerine geniş açıdan ve insan-doğa sistemleri ilişkisi üzerinden bakılmalıdır (Rosa ve Richter, 2008, s. 186). Durkheim sosyolojiyi ayrı bir bilim olarak kurma sürecinde, yaşadığı döneme hâkim olan doğa bilimlerinin üstünlüğü düşüncesinin etkisi altında kalmıştır. Toplumu ayrı bir çalışma nesnesi olarak kurgulayıp felsefe, psikoloji ve doğa bilimlerinden ısrarla ve titizlikle ayırırken doğa bilimlerinin yöntemlerini ve metaforlarını çokça kullanmıştır. İronik bir biçimde, doğa kategorisini dışlayan bir toplum bilimi tasarlarken doğadan uzak durmayı başaramamıştır.

Durkheim sosyolojinin kuruluş sürecinde psikolojik, biyolojik ve fiziksel etkenlerin önemini reddetmemiştir; ancak toplumsal olguların yanında daha az önem vermiştir

(Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 79). Sosyoloğu doğadan uzak tutmaya çalışan Durkheim, diğer yandan da kendisine doğa bilimcilerini örnek almaktadır:

> Bizim isteğimiz, bir fizikçi, kimyacı ve fizyolog kendi bilim dallarında henüz keşfedilmeyen bir alana adım attıklarında nasıl düşünüyorlarsa, sosyolog da öyle düşünsün. Toplumsal dünyaya nüfuz ederken, bilinmeyene nüfuz ettiğinin bilincinde olmalıdır; biyoloji biliminin henüz var olmadığı bir anda yaşamsal yasalar ne denli şüpheden uzaksa, o denli şüpheden uzak yasalara dayanan olgularla karşı karşıya olduğunu hissetmelidir; kendini şaşırtacak ve üzerine yerleştiği zemini kaydıracak keşifler yapmaya hazır olmalıdır. Sosyolojinin bu entelektüel olgunluk seviyesine ulaşması gerekir. Fiziksel doğayı inceleyen bilim insanı bu doğanın kendisine gösterdiği ve açmakta zorlandığı direnci canlı bir biçimde hissederken, aslında sosyolog, aklın karşısında saydam duran şeylerin içinde hareket ediyor gibidir; özellikle en karanlık sorunları büyük bir kolaylıkla çözdüğünü gördüğümüz zaman (Durkheim, 2016, s. 17).

Zira, sosyoloğun görevi doğa bilimcilerinden farklı değildir; doğa yasalarına tabi olan ve sosyolojinin çalışma nesnesi olan toplumsal olguları araştırmaktır. Sonuçta Durkheim sosyolojiden, fizik ve kimya gibi doğa bilimlerinin fiziksel doğayı incelemedeki yetkinliğine ulaşmasını beklemektedir.

Hâkim Toplumsal Olgu Anlayışının Eleştirisi

20. yüzyılda gerçekleşen hızlı nüfus artışı ve gelişen endüstriyel teknoloji "insanoğlunun biyosferdeki ekolojik durumu"nu değiştirmiştir. Aynı dönemde, Durkheim'ın "entelektüel mirasçılarının çoğu"nun toplumsal olgular anlayışını "aşırı vurgulaması" nedeniyle sosyoloji, çok dar bir alana sıkışmak zorunda kalmıştır (Catton, 2002, s. 90–91). Toplumsal olgular tabusu nedeniyle sürekli ve sert bir biçimde Durkheim'ı eleştirenlerin başında, çevre sosyolojisinin kurucu isimlerinden Catton ve Dunlap gelmektedir. Onlar için "sosyolojinin çevresel körlüğünün" temel nedeni Durkheim ve onun geleneğidir. 1978-2002 yılları arasında yayınlanan ve Catton'ın da ortak yazar olduğu çalışmalarda Dunlap, Durkheim'ın toplumsal olgular kavramını sosyolojinin çevreyi dışlamasından sorumlu tutmaktadır. Ancak bu eleştiriye karşı Rosa ve Richter (2008), üç güçlü itiraz öne sürmektedir: İlki, toplumsal olguların sadece toplumsal olgularla açıklanabileceği önermesinin geçerliliğine ve yaygınlığına yöneliktir. Örneğin, sosyoloji disiplininin önde gelen isimlerinden Homans ve Garfinkel gibi isimler toplumsal olguları sorgulamaktadır. İkinci itiraz ise Durkheim'ın kendisinin de çevrenin topluma etkisinden bahsetmesine yöneliktir. Örneğin, Durkheim mekanik dayanışmadan organik dayanışmaya geçilen evrim sürecinde, "ekolojik kaynaklar üzerindeki rekabetin artması"nı vurgulamaktadır. Son itiraz ise Durkheim'ın toplumsal olgu tanımında doğayı toplumdan tamamen ayırmadığını öne sürmektedir. Ayrıca, toplum tasavvurunda kullandığı organizma ve sistem kavramlarındaki biyoloji vurgusu ve yapısal-işlevselci ilkeler, çevre sosyolojisinin "sürdürülebilirlik" kavramını çağrıştırmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Durkheim'ın yaklaşımının toplumsal ve

doğal sistemlerin karşılıklı ilişkilerinin incelenmesinde yardımcı olabileceği kabul edilmektedir (Rosa ve Richter, 2008, s. 182–186).

Durkheim'ın toplumsal olgu kavramını açıklarken doğaya verdiği referanslar dikkat çekicidir. Toplumsal olguların dışsallığını ve bireye etkilerini örneklerken nüfus/arazi dengesindeki değişimlerin ekonomik sonuçlarının bireyle olan ilişkisini vurgulamaktadır (Çelebi, 2007, s. 159). Toplumsal olguları açıklarken "fiziksel ortam" olarak adlandırdığı çevre ile toplumsal ortamın benzerlik ve farklılıklarını anlatmaktadır:

> Gerçekte, her fiziksel ortamın, kendisinin etkisine maruz kalan varlıklar üzerinde bir zorlama yarattığı söylenmektedir; zira bu varlıklar, belli bir ölçüde, fiziksel ortama uyum sağlamak durumundadır. -Ancak, bu iki farklı zorlama biçimi arasında, fiziksel ortam ile sosyal ortamı ayıran bir fark vardır. Bir ya da birden fazla bedenin başka bedenler hatta iradeler üzerinde yarattığı baskı, bir grubun bilincinin kendi üyelerinin birinci üzerinde yarattığı baskıyla karıştırılamaz. Toplumsal baskının en spesifik yanı, bir takım moleküler düzenlemelerdeki zorunluluklara değil, bazı temsil ve tasavvurların taşıdığı değere ve saygınlığa dayanmasıdır... ...Doğadaki olguların, farklı biçimler altında, toplumsal olguları tanımlamak için başvurduğumuz niteliği taşımaları bizi şaşırtmamalıdır. Bu benzerlik hem doğal olguların hem de toplumsal olguların gerçek bir şey olmasından kaynaklanır (Durkheim, 2016, s. 25–26).

Toplumsal olguları tanımlarken Durkheim, çevresel etkileri ve biyoloji disiplinini kullanmaktan çekinmemektedir. Örneğin, birey-toplum ile parça-bütün farkını ve toplumun bireye üstünlüğünü açıklarken doğadaki tüm canlı organizmalarda yer alan atomları ve mineralleri referans göstermektedir ve biyolojide kullanılan bir ilkeyi sosyolojide uygulamaktadır:

> Canlı hücre yalnızca mineral parçacıkları içerir; aynı şekilde, toplum da bireylerin dışında hiçbir şey içermez; ancak, şurası kesindir ki, yaşamı oluşturan karakteristik olguların hidrojen, oksijen, karbon ve azot atomlarına dayanması mümkün değildir... ...Canlı hayat bu şekilde çözümlenemez; hayat birdir ve dolayısıyla onun dayanağı bir bütün olarak canlı özdektir. Hayat parçalarla değil, bütünün içindedir. Beslenen, üreyen, tek kelimeyle yaşayan şey hücredeki cansız parçacıklar değildir; hücrenin kendisidir yaşayan ve yalnızca odur. Hayat hakkında söylediklerimiz bütün muhtemel sentezler için de söylenebilir... ...Bu ilkeyi sosyoloji uygulayalım. Eğer her bir toplum oluşturan sui generis sentez bireysel bilinçlerde var olanlardan farklı ve yeni olgular yaratıyorsa (ki bu düşüncemiz kabul edilmektedir), o halde, bu özgül olguların bizzat onları yaratan topluma dayandığını, toplumun parçalarına yani üyelerine dayanmadığını kabul etmek gerekir. Bu anlamda, söz konusu olgular bireysel bilinçlere dışaldır (bireysel bilinçleri böyle kabul edersek); aynı şekilde, yaşamın belirleyici nitelikleri de canlı varlığı yaratan mineral maddelere dışaldır (Durkheim, 2016, s. 19–20).

Toplumsal olgulara dair bir başka alıntıda Durkheim, toplum ve organizma arasında "yalnızca derece farkları" gördüğünü ve "sosyolojideki çıkarımların biyolojide uygulanabileceğini" vurgulamaktadır:

Yaşam ile yapının, organ ile işlevin bu yakın ilişkisi sosyolojide kolaylıkla ortaya konabilir, çünkü bu iki uç arasında, dolaysız olarak gözlemlenebilen ve kendi aralarındaki bağı gösteren tam bir ara unsurlar dizisi vardır. Biyolojinin böyle bir kaynağı yoktur. Fakat bu konuyla ilgili sosyolojideki çıkarımların biyolojiye uygulanabileceğini ve toplumlarda olduğu gibi organizmalarda da bu iki olay dizisi arasında yalnızca derece farkları olduğunu düşünebiliriz (Durkheim, 2016, s. 43).

Durkheim'in toplumsal ortamı fiziksel ortam ile karşılaştırması, toplumsal olguların dışsallığını açıklarken tüm canlılardaki hücreleri ve içerdikleri mineralleri kullanması ve nihayet toplum ve canlı organizmalar arasında "yalnızca derece farkları" olduğunu vurgulaması sosyoloji disiplininde hâkim olan toplumsal olguların çevreyi dışladığı anlayışı ile çelişmektedir.

Toplum ve Çevre

Durkheim'in çalışmaları kendisinin "doğa toplum ilişkisi temasını tamamen dışlamadığını" göstermektedir. Örneğin mevsimler, güneşin pozisyonu ve atmosferin durumu gibi değişkenlerin toplumsal yaşama dair etkilerini dikkate almaktadır. Zira insan öznesi toplumsal ve çevresel dışsal gerçeklik tarafından kısıtlanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Durkheim, sosyolojiyi *genel sosyoloji, sosyal fizyoloji* ve *sosyal morfoloji* olarak üçe ayırmaktadır. Sosyal morfoloji "toplumun çevre temelinde çalışılması" anlamına gelmektedir ve şehir gibi yaşam alanlarının yanı sıra toprak kullanımını da içermektedir (Gross, 2000, s. 280–282).

Durkheim toplumu doğadan ayrı bir biçimde kavramsallaştırmaya çalışsa da toplum-çevre etkileşimini kabul etmektedir. Durkheim ve Weber "doğa ve toplum arasındaki metabolik etkileşim" konusunu kendi yaklaşımları çerçevesinde dikkate almışlardır. Bu konuda yeterli çalışma yapılmamış olmasına rağmen ikisinin de sosyolojik yaklaşımları "ekolojik sorunlara dair önemli kavrayışlar" içermektedir. Bir diğer toplum-çevre etkileşimi örneği de evrim konusunda görülmektedir. Durkheim, Darwin kuramı çerçevesinde doğanın ve toplumun birlikte evrim geçirdiklerini belirtmektedir. 1955'te yayınlanan *Pragmatizm ve Sosyoloji* adlı çalışmasında da toplum ve doğanın birlikte evrim geçirdiğini belirten "eşevrimci" bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir. Buna göre organik, fiziksel ve toplumsal dünyalar aralarında çatışma olmadan birlikte var olabilmektedir (Foster, 1999, s. 396–401).

Durkheim'a göre toplum ve doğa birbirine karşıt değildir. Zira toplum doğanın bir parçasıdır, onun en yüksek görüngüsüdür ve en karmaşık halidir. Dahası, "doğayı bir toplumsal kategori olarak görmektedir" (Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 73–79). Durkheim'in *Dinsel Yaşamın İlk Biçimleri* (1912/1982) adlı eserinde "doğa" kelimesi 476 kez geçmektedir. Bunların büyük çoğunluğunun "eşyanın tabiatı" anlamında kullanılmasına rağmen "doğal dünyayı" kasteden kullanımlar da dikkat çekici ölçüdedir. Örneğin Durkheim sosyolojik bilgi kuramı tartışmasında toplumu

doğanın bir parçası olarak görmekte ve arada sadece bir karmaşıklık farkı olduğunu vurgulamaktadır:

> Ama bir toplumbilimsel bilgi kuramını böyle yorumlamak, toplumun özel bir gerçeklik olmakla birlikte devlet içinde bir devlet olmadığını unutmak anlamına gelir; toplum doğanın bir parçasıdır, onun en yüksek biçimde belirişidir. Toplumsal alan da doğal bir alan olup başka doğal alanlardan yalnızca daha karmaşık oluşu dolayısıyla ayrılır (Durkheim, 2010, s. 41).

Durkheim normal ve anormal kavramlarını açıklarken yine canlı organizmaları referans vererek sosyolojik olgular ile biyolojik olguların benzerliğini örnek göstermektedir:

> Her sosyolojik olgu, tıpkı her biyolojik olguda olduğu gibi, temelde kendisi olarak kalmakla birlikte bazı durumlara göre farklı biçimler kazanabilir. Bu biçimler içinde iki ayrı tür ortaya çıkar... ...En genel biçimleri sergileyen olayları normal olarak adlandıracağız; diğer olaylara ise hastalıklı veya anormal adını vereceğiz (Durkheim, 2016, s. 84).

Durkheim farklı türler arasında yaptığı normal ve patolojik karşılaştırmasının sosyolojide de geçerli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır:

> Her türün kendine özgü bir sağlık ölçütü vardır, çünkü kendine özgü bir ortalama tipe sahiptir; en alt türlerin sağlık ölçütü en gelişmiş türlerin sağlık ölçütünden daha düşük değildir. Bu ilke sosyolojide çoğunlukla bilinmemekle birlikte, aynı şekilde sosyoloji için de geçerlidir. Bir kurumu, bir pratiği veya ahlaki bir düşünceyi sanki bunlar kendi içlerinde ve kendi başlarına kötü ya da iyiymiş gibi, bütün sosyal türler için aynı şekilde değerlendirmek şeklindeki yaygın alışkanlıktan vazgeçmek gerekir (Durkheim, 2016, s. 85).

İnsan dışı canlı organizmalar çevre kavramı içine girmektedir. Bu çerçevede Durkheim, biyolojinin doğa alanındaki yaklaşım ve ilkelerini örnek alarak kurmaya çalıştığı sosyoloji disiplinine ve toplumsal gerçekliğe uygulamaya çalışmaktadır.

Din Anlayışı ve Çevre

Durkheim'a göre din "kutsal, yani ayrı ve yasak sayılan şeylere ilişkin olan ve kendisine katılan herkesi tapınak denilen bir manevi topluluk durumunda birleştiren tutarlı inanç ve eylemler dizgesidir" (2010, s. 76). *Dinsel Yaşamın İlk Biçimleri* (1912/2010) adlı eserinin ilk yarısında odaklandığı Totemizm'i açıklarken ise sık sık doğaya referans vermiştir. Totemizm'deki kutsal ve kutsal olmayan ayrımının nedeni doğa değildir. Ancak, toplum kendisini anlamaya çalışırken doğaya bakmaktadır. Bu nedenle, her dinin temelinde animizm ve natürizmin "dinsel dizgeleri" vardır:

> Bunlardan biri rüzgârlar, seller, yıldızlar, gökyüzü vb. büyük göksel güçler, ya da yeryüzündeki bitkiler, hayvanlar, kayalar vb. her türden nesneler gibi doğa olgularına yöneliktir; bu nedenle ona doğacılık (natürizm) adı verilmektedir (Durkheim, 2010, s. 81–82).

Durkheim'a göre dinin oluşumunda insanın doğaya hâkim olma ve onun karşısında güven içinde olma ihtiyacı önemlidir. Din doğanın güçlerine ve insanın acizliğine anlam bulma yerine, doğa karşısında insanın kendine güvenmesine yardımcı olmaktadır. Modern bilimsel gelişmenin gücünden yoksun olan insan, doğaya hâkim olabilmek için dine sığınmaktadır:

> (İnsan) çevrenin öğeleri için yasa koyabileceğine, rüzgârı estirebileceğine, yağmuru yağdırabileceğine, bir işaretle güneşi durdurabileceğine vb. inanmaktadır. Dinin kendisi de insana bu güveni vermeye katkıda bulunmaktadır; çünkü dinin insanı doğa üzerinde büyük etkide bulunabileceği güçlerle donattığına inanılmaktadır. Dinsel törenler, bir ölçüde, insanın isteklerini dünyaya kabul ettirmesine yönelik araçlardır (Durkheim, 2010, s. 128).

Durkheim toplum ile Tanrının aynı olduğu çıkarımını; ironik bir biçimde toplumdan ayrı tuttuğu doğa ve onun simgeleri üzerinden açıklamaktadır:

> Yaptığımız çözümlemeden, totemin birbirinden farklı iki türlü şeyi anlatıp simgelediği sonucu çıkıyor. Bir yandan totem özü ya da tanrısı dediğimiz şeyin duyularla algılanabilir, dışsal biçimidir. Ama öte yandan oymak denilen belli bir topluluğun da simgesidir. Bu bir bayraktır; her oymağı ötekilerden ayırt eden işaret, oymak kişiliğinin gözle görülür damgasıdır; oymağın değişik türden bütün üyeleri, insanlar, hayvanlar ve eşya bu damgayı taşırlar... ...Demek ki oymağın tanrısı, yani totem ilkesi, oymağın kendisinden başka bir şey olamaz; yalnız bu tanrı, imgelemde, totem işini gören, duyularla algılanabilen bitki ya da hayvan türleri biçiminde kişileştirilip tasarlanmaktadır (Durkheim, 2010, s. 290).

Durkheim bireyin din aracılığıyla yaşadığı toplumsallaşma sürecini, totem simgesi üzerinden açıklarken hayvanlara referans vermektedir. İnsan toplumu, dini ritüellerde hayvanları taklit etmeye çalışmaktadır. Böylece, kendilerini hayvanların yerine koyarak inançlarını ve dolayısıyla toplum olmalarını algılayabilmektedirler. Durkheim ilkel toplumun kendi farkına varma sürecinde hayvanların önemini net bir biçimde vurgulamaktadır:

> (İnsanlar) Kendilerini hep, belli bir hayvanın niteliğine katılıyor gibi sayıyorlar. Bu koşullarda onlar için toplum durumundaki birlikte varoluşlarını anlatmanın yalnız bir yolu vardır: Kendilerinin de o türe giren birer hayvan olduklarını düşünmek ve bunu yalnız düşüncelerinin sessizliğinde bırakmayıp, maddi hareketlerle de sergilemek. İşte dinsel tapınmayı oluşturacak olan şey, bu hareketlerdir; bu hareketlerin de insanın kendisini özdeşleştirdiği hayvanı yansılayan hareketler olacağı açıktır. Bu anlamda alınınca yansılayıcı dinsel törenler dinin ilk biçimi olarak belirirler (Durkheim, 2010, s. 526).

Yukarıdaki alıntılarda gösterildiği üzere, Durkheim'ın başlıca araştırma konularından Totemizm çalışması yoğun bir biçimde doğa referansları içermektedir. Zira Totemizm, insan toplumunun doğaya hâkim olma ihtiyacını karşılamaktadır. Ayrıca, bireyler toplumsallaşma sürecinde hayvanları taklit etmektedirler. Sonuçta bitki veya hayvan türleri totem olarak toplumu simgelemektedir.

Evrim, Organizma ve İşbölümü Kavramlarında Çevre Konusu

Durkheim, çalışmalarında Marx gibi bir evrim şeması, organizmacı kavramlar ve "Darwinci evrimden metaforlar" kullanmıştır. *Sosyolojik Yöntemin Kuralları*'nda (1895/2016) toplumsal evrim ve dayanışma kavramlarını açıklarken "biyoloji kavramlarını" kullanmaktan çekinmemiştir. İlkel toplumdan modern topluma doğru ilerleyen evrim sürecini "türler veya toplumsal türler" kavramı üzerinden anlatmıştır. *Toplumsal İşbölümü* (1893/2014) adlı eserinde açıkladığı üzere, ilkel toplumdan modern topluma geçişte işbölümü karmaşıklaşmaktadır; anomi artarken "organik" dayanışma zayıflamaktadır. *Toplumsal İşbölümü* (1893/2014) adlı eseri, insan ekolojisi kuramının "klasik" versiyonu olarak görülmektedir. Zira mekanik dayanışmadan organik dayanışmaya geçiş sürecinde "nüfus yoğunluğu, kaynak kıtlığı ve hayatta kalmak için rekabet" kavramları, modern insan ekolojisinin terminolojisi ile benzeşmektedir (Buttel, 2002, s. 40). Örneğin Lenski'ye göre rekabetin daha üretken toplumsal örgütlenmelere yol açacağını öngören Durkheim'ın "iyimser etkisi", kentleşmenin yol açtığı çevre kirliliği ve doğal kaynakların tükenmesi sorunlarının dikkate alınmamasına neden olmuştur (Lenski 1984'ten akt., Buttel ve Humphrey, 2002, s. 40). Ayrıca, nüfus artışının ortaya çıkardığı Malthusçu sınırları aşmak için gerekli teknolojik ilerlemeler ve işbölümü anlayışı da yine Durkheim'ın toplumsal işbölümü çalışmasından alınmıştır (Buttel ve Humphrey 2002, s. 41).

Durkheim "doğa" kelimesini nadir olarak kullanmasına rağmen "fiziksel koşullar" ve "organizma" kavramlarını sıklıkla kullanmıştır. Organizmadan kastı insanın biyolojik organizmasıdır (Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 79). 1950'lerin ABD'sinin "öncü sosyoloji kuramı" olan yapısal işlevselci yaklaşım, "ironik" bir biçimde Durkheim'ın "toplumsal bir organizma" yaklaşımını takip etmiştir (Hannigan, 2006, s. 3). Durkheim toplumsal işbölümü tartışmasında işbölümünün "canlı organizmalarda" var olduğunu ve doğadan topluma geçtiğini vurgulamaktadır:

> ... işbölümü yasasının toplumlarda uygulandığı gibi canlı organizmalarda da uygulanmakta olduğunu biliyoruz. Dahası, bir organizmanın canlılar merdivenindeki göreli yerinin, içindeki etkinliklerin uzmanlaşmışlık ölçüsüyle doğru orantılı olduğu bile söylenebilmiştir. Bu buluş, işbölümünün etki alanının sınırsız bir ölçüde geniş olduğunun düşünülmesine yol açtığı gibi, yeryüzünde yaşamın doğmasıyla birlikte başladığı kabul edildiğine göre, kökenlerinin de en ilk zamanlara değin gerilerde aranması gerektiğini gösterdi. Böylece işbölümü, artık yalnız kaynağını zekâ ve istençlerinden alan bir toplumsal kurum olmaktan çıkmış, koşulları organik maddenin özelliklerinde aranması gerekli bir genel biyoloji olayı olmuştur. Bu durumda toplumsal işbölümü artık bu genel sürecin yalnızca özel bir biçimi olarak görülmektedir; toplumların da, bu yasaya uymakla, kendilerinden çok önce doğup tüm canlı dünyasına aynı yöne doğru sürüklediği anlaşılan bir akıma kapıldıkları düşünülmektedir (Durkheim, 2014, s. 65).

Durkheim metodoloji tartışmasında, sosyolojide kullandığı karşılaştırma yöntemini açıklarken toplum ile hayvanları karşılaştırmaktadır. Hayvanlarda yaşanan

değişimlerle karşılaştırıldığında, toplumsal değişimlerin çok daha zengin olduğunu vurgulamaktadır:

> Yalnızca tek bir deneysel yöntem kullanabildiği için sosyolojinin diğer bilimlere kıyasla hissedilir derecede aşağıda olduğunu düşünmemek gerekir. Aslında bu durum, sosyoloğun yaptığı karşılaştırmalarda kendiliğinden ortaya çıkan ve diğer doğal alanlarda bir benzeri bulunmayan değişkenlerin zenginliğiyle telafi edilmektedir. Bireysel bir yaşam sürdüren bir organizmada gerçekleşen değişimler az sayıda ve sınırlıdır; organizmanın yaşamını tehlikeye atmadan yapay olarak yaratılabilecek değişimler de dar sınırlar içinde kalmaktadır. Hayvansal evrim süresince çok daha önemli değişimlerin yaşandığı doğrudur; fakat bunlardan geriye yalnızca seyrek ve belirsiz izler kalmıştır ve onları belirleyen koşulları saptamak çok daha zordur. Buna karşın, toplumsal hayat kesintisiz bir değişimler dizisidir ve bu değişimler kolektif yaşamdaki koşullarda gerçekleşen diğer değişimlerle paraleldir; elimizde yalnızca yakın bir döneme ait değişimler yoktur; tarih sahnesinden silinen halkların geçirdiği çok sayıda değişim de bize kadar ulaşmıştır. Barındırdığı boşluklara rağmen, insanlık tarihi hayvan türlerinin tarihinden çok daha açık ve bütünlüklüdür (Durkheim, 2016, s. 161).

Sosyolojiyi biyoloji ve diğer doğa bilimlerinden ayrı tutmaya çalışmasına rağmen Darwin'in evrimci yaklaşımından etkilenmesi nedeniyle, Durkheim *Toplumsal İşbölümü* (1893/2014) adlı eserinde "evrimci bir çerçeve" sunmaktadır (Catton, 2002, s. 92). Eserde sunulan mekanik dayanışmadan organik dayanışmaya geçilen toplumsal evrim modelinde, "biyoloji kavramlarını ve metaforlarını" kullanmaktadır (Hannigan, 2006, s. 5). Örneğin, toplumdaki farklılaşmayı nüfus artışı, kısıtlı mekân ve kaynaklarla ilişkilendirmektedir (Gross, 2000, s. 280). Durkheim'ın toplumsal işbölümündeki değişime dair açıklaması, artan nüfusa karşı azalan kaynaklar sorununu içeren "ekolojik bir krize" çözüm bulma çabasıdır. Aslında Durkheim, 1880'lerde hâkim olan Darwinci evrim anlayışının etkisi altındadır. Ancak, kıt kaynaklar karşısında çeşitliliğin artışının rekabeti azalttığını öne sürerek Darwin'i yanlış anlamıştır. Zira Darwin'e göre, uzmanlaşma sürecindeki bir tür, diğeri ile rekabetinde avantaj elde etmektedir; Durkheim'ın düşündüğü gibi rekabet azalıp karşılıklı bağımlılık artmamaktadır. Modern ekoloji biliminde ise farklı türlerin bir aradalığı dengeli olmak zorunda değildir. Buna göre, iki tarafın birbirinden faydalandığı mutualizm; bir tarafın zarar vermeden faydalandığı komensalizm ve nihayet bir tarafın diğerinden zararına faydalandığı avcı ve parazit örnekleri görülmektedir (Catton, 2002, s. 92'den akt., Hannigan, 2006, s. 6–7). Sonuç olarak, Catton (2002, s. 91) Durkheim'ın Darwin okumasının "seçici" olduğunu ve bu seçici okumanın onu "yanlış yola sevk ettiğini" vurgulamaktadır.

Değerlendirme

Bu çalışmanın amacı Durkheim'ın sosyolojik yaklaşımını toplum-çevre etkileşimi açısından incelemektir. Bu çerçevede, önce çevre sosyolojisinin sosyoloji disiplini içindeki ortaya çıkış süreci anlatılmıştır. Sonra Durkheim'ın çalışmalarında

çevreyi dışlayan ve içeren örnekler sunulmuştur. Bu bölümde ise önceki bölümler değerlendirilecek ve Durkheim'ın özgün kavramları ile onları temel alarak geliştirilen yeni çevre sosyolojisi yaklaşımları özetlenecektir.

19. yüzyılda doğa bilimlerine öykünerek pozitivist bir bilim olarak kurulan sosyoloji disiplini içinde çevre ve diğer etkenler, Durkheim'ın "toplumsal olgular" yaklaşımı örneğinde olduğu gibi dışlanmıştır. Ancak 1950'lerde endüstrileşme ile kentleşme kaynaklı toprak ve hava kirliliği gibi çevre sorunlarının Batı toplumlarını tehdit etmesiyle, önce toplumda çevre kaygısı oluşmuş; sonra çevre hareketi ve akabinde çevre sosyolojisi ortaya çıkmıştır. Çevre sosyolojisinin, sosyoloji içinde dışlanmasından Durkheim ve onun "toplumsal olgular" kavramında örneğini bulan sosyal indirgemecilik sorumlu tutulmaktadır.

Marx ve Weber gibi diğer klasik sosyoloji öncülerinden farklı olarak, Durkheim'ın çevreyi dışladığı önermesi, çevre sosyolojisi literatüründe sıklıkla öne çıkarılmaktadır. Durkheim'ın -doğa bilimlerinden izole bir biçimde kurmak istediği- sosyolojinin temeline yerleştirdiği "toplumsal olguların ancak bir diğer toplumsal olguyla açıklanabilir" anlayışının toplum-çevre etkileşimini dışladığı düşüncesi, çevre sosyolojisinin kurucu isimlerinden Dunlap ve Catton'un hemen her çalışmasında vurgulanmaktadır. Durkheim da, bu görüşleri haklı çıkaracak biçimde toplum evrilirken doğanın pek değişmediğini, toplumu oluşturmuş insanlığın hayvanlardan çok farklı olduğunu ve genetik kalıtımın evrimde etkisinin çok sınırlı ve günümüzde etkisiz olduğunu öne sürmüştür.

Durkheim'ın çalışmalarında çevreyi dışlayan örnekler kadar çalışmalarına temel olan ve sıklıkla kullanılan doğa referansları da dikkat çekmektedir. Toplumu doğadan ayrı bir bilimsel nesne olarak ortaya koyarken biyoloji ve ekoloji gibi pozitif doğa bilimlerinin organizma, denge, kaynak kıtlığı ve nüfus yoğunluğu gibi metaforlarını sıklıkla kullanmıştır. Çevre sosyolojisinin öncülerinin iddia ettiğinin aksine, toplumsal olgular kavramında Durkheim çevresel etkenleri dikkate almıştır. Zira mekanik dayanışmadan organik dayanışmaya geçişin temel nedenlerinden birini doğal kaynakların kıtlığı olarak göstermiştir. Ayrıca, sosyolojide toplumsal olgular yaklaşımının kullanımı iddia edilenin aksine kısıtlı kalmıştır, tüm sosyoloji disiplinine yayılmamıştır.

Durkheim doğa ile toplum arasındaki metabolik etkileşime ve birlikte geçirilen evrim sürecine dikkat çekmektedir. En çarpıcı örnek ise toplumu doğanın karmaşık bir parçası olarak görmesidir. Totemizm çalışmasında, dinin hem toplumun kendisini algılamasını sağladığını hem de doğa güçlerine karşı insanlara güven verdiğini vurgulamaktadır. İlkel topluluklar, dini etkinliklerde hem bitki ve hayvan sembollerini kullanmakta hem de hayvan taklidi gibi ritüeller gerçekleştirmektedir. Durkheim dinin kaynağını açıklarken yine doğadan faydalanmaktadır.

Döneminin düşünce yapısının ve tarihsel bağlamının etkisindeki Durkheim, sosyoloji disiplinini kurma sürecinde biyolojik indirgemeciliğe meydan okumuştur. Bu nedenle Durkheim, biyoloji kuramlarının değiştiği ve geliştiği günümüzde yaşasaydı farklı bir yaklaşım ortaya koyma potansiyeline sahip olacaktı (Parsons, 1978, s. 217'den akt., Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 82). Çünkü 20. yüzyılın özellikle ikinci yarısında doğal çevre de toplumlar da büyük değişimler geçirmiştir. Özellikle 1950'lerden itibaren endüstrileşmenin neden olduğu çevre sorunları ortaya çıkmıştır ve günümüzde ülke sınırlarını aşarak küresel ölçeğe ulaşmıştır. Aynı zamanda, ulus-devletler birbirlerine ekonomi ve siyasetin yanı sıra çevre konularında da bağlı durumdadırlar. Bu çerçevede, çevresel sürdürülebilirlik ve gelişmiş ülkelerden gelişmemiş ülkelere para akışı konuları öne çıkmıştır. Döneminin insanmerkezci yaklaşımına sahip olan Durkheim'ın, günümüzün küresel vatandaşlık ve bağımlılık döneminde, nihayet farklı biçimde değerlendirilmesi mümkündür. Zira Durkheim'ın, yüzyıl önce Malthusçu ve insan karşıtı yaklaşımlara karşı geliştirdiği "entelektüel çözümlerin" (dayanışma ve işbölümü) yeniden tanımlanması, günümüzün çevresel ve toplumsal sorunları karşısında faydalı olabilir. Bu çerçevede, Durkheim'ın çalışmaları temel alınarak çevre koruma alanında ortak çalışmalar yapılması ve çevrenin duyarlı kullanılması imkân dahilindedir. Örneğin, iklim değişikliği ve buzulların erimesi gibi küresel sorunlar karşısında, uluslararası ölçekte işbölümü ve dayanışma kavramları yeniden tanımlanabilir (Madappalli, 2016, s. 1019–1025).

Önceki bölümlerde örneklenen Durkheim'ın doğaya dair referansları ve genel kavramları, toplum-çevre etkileşimini temel alan çalışmalara ilham verip geliştirilecek yeni kavramsal yaklaşımlara temel olma potansiyelini içermektedir. Örneğin, kültür ve kolektif bilinç kavramları, toplumda çevre bilincinin yayılmasında etkili bir araç olma potansiyeline sahiptir (Konak, 2010, s. 275). İkinci olarak, bugünün dünyasında nüfus artışı, kaynakların tüketilişi ve iklim değişikliği gibi sorunlar karşısında Durkheim'ın organik dayanışma yaklaşımı insanlığı bir arada tutabilir (Catton, 2002, s. 108). Üçüncüsü, doğanın nesnel gerçekliğinin yanında toplum tarafından algılanışı ve kültürel alandaki yeri önemlidir. Zira ilkel topluluk ile modern toplumun doğaya bakışı farklıdır (Jarvikoski, 1996, s. 81). *Dinsel Yaşamın İlk Biçimleri* (1912/2010) adlı eserinde yer alan "doğa ve evrenin öznel tanımlanması" ile kültürel uygulamalara dair "zengin analizler", Durkheim'daki doğal çevreye dair inşacı bir yaklaşıma işaret etmektedir (Gross, 2000, s. 282). Bütün bu olumlu etkilere rağmen, çevre sosyolojisi için zengin bir potansiyel içeren risk toplumu ve yeni dünya sistemleri kuramlarında Durkheim, şimdiye kadar geniş bir biçimde tartışılmamıştır (Madappalli, 2016, s. 1024).[4]

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İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ YAYINEVİ

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi

ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Durkheim'ın Toplumu Bir Özne, Toplumsalı Bir Nesne Olarak Kavramsallaştırma Çabası[*]

Abdulkerim Sönmez[1]

Öz

Bu deneme Durkheim'ın toplumu bir özne (fail) ve toplumsal olguları bir nesne olarak nasıl kavramsallaştırdığı hakkındadır. Onun temel çalışmalarından hareketle ve Marx ve Tönnies'in kolektif özne-faillik anlayışı ile yapılan bir karşılaştırmaya dayalı olarak denemenin temel iddiası şudur: Durkheim açısından bir özne fail olarak toplum, üyelerinin faaliyetlerinin aynı tekil ahlaki varlığın ortak bekasını temine yönetilmiş bilinçli kolektif çabada, bu çabayı gösterecek bireylerin sosyalizasyonunda ve bu varlığın varoluşunu tehdit eden eylemlere karşı düzeltici müeyyidelerin olduğu yerde bir fail olarak mevcuttur. Bunun dışındaki çabalar ve faaliyetler değişik derecelerde ve mahiyette olmak üzere, bir toplumdan daha az bir varlık ve faillik haline karşılık gelirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Durkheim • Bir özne olarak toplum • Bir özne olarak kamuoyu • Bir özne olarak sınıf

Durkheim's Conception of Society as a Subject and Social Fact as a Thing
Abstract

This essay examines Durkheim's conception of society as a subject (agent) and social fact as a thing. Through a close reading of his major works and by comparing his concept with that of Tönnies and Marx, the essay argues that in Durkheim's conception, society as a true and real subject exists insofar as it directs the efforts of its members toward securing its own collective survival as a single moral being by socializing its members who are committed to this objective and applying corrective sanctions against actions that threaten its survival. All other efforts and actions are manifestations of a subject that is lesser than a society.

Keywords

Durkheim • Society as a subject • Public opinion as a subject • Social class as a subject

Extended Summary

This essay examines Durkheim's conception of society as a subject (agent) and social fact as a thing. What makes this idea worth investigating is that almost all of the founding fathers of sociology, including Ibn Khaldun, Marx, Weber, and Tönnies, talk about society as if it has attributes of a true or real subject capable of agency that are comparable to attributes of an individual human being, but they never provide a precise definition of society through which its agency can easily be identified as a concrete phenomenon rather than a metaphoric expression. Instead, their concept of society and the nature of its agency must be construed from the content of their writings. This may be considered an insignificant issue since, in many cases, sociologists deal with a specific aspect of society conceived of as a group of people living within the boundaries of a given territory under the authority of a single political entity, as is the case in Durkheim's definition of horde as the simplest form of society. This lack of a precise definition is odd because Durkheim himself makes a strong methodological claim for the need to begin sociological investigation with clear and precise definitions of the objects under scrutiny by concentrating on their external traits and then proceeding to their inner essential natures. One such construction of Durkheim's conception of society has been provided by Poggi (2000), who argues that, for Durkheim, society begins where instinct ends, which means that it is cultural in nature and thus not a material thing to be observed existing in nature; therefore, it is, in essence, something that is both external to individuals' consciousness and finding its place of residence in the very thing to which it is external. It is this conception of a dual form of existence that, according to Poggi (2000, pp. 85-87, 96), leads Durkheim in his later works to an increasing awareness of the contingent nature of society stemming from the fact that it depends upon the individuals' willingness to act according to the rules or norms of that same society. According to Poggi (2000, p. 96), society in Durkheim's thought is the totality of collective representation guiding interactions between individuals by creating feelings of moral obligations. This paper argues that although this conception of society exists in Durkheim's thought, there is still room for an alternative interpretation of his concept of society not as contingent in its nature and not involving representations exercising authority over individuals; this alternative interpretation suggests that, for Durkheim, society is a moral being that is able to manifest itself and exercise its authority through these representations. This argument presents a different conception of society available in Durkheim's thought, which is that it exists and that its agency manifests itself in the act of turning this contingency into real action at the level of individuals.

Durkheim's conception of society as a real agent-subject and collective representations in the forms of rules and norms for conduct, currents of thought and action, and forms of organization is not given at once but seems to develop gradually in his major works. In its essence, society is the name of and the answer given by human

beings for their survival in nature. This concept finds its first expression in the *Division of Labour* (Durkheim, 1893; Lukes, 1973), where the forms of division of labor are examined by Durkheim as the manifestation and representations that give this survival its more concrete forms. The forms are not the society itself, but the external traits of its struggle for survival, and they provide the door to penetrate into society itself. In *the Rules of Sociological Method* (Durkheim, 2004), society is conceived of as an emergent moral being or a "moral density", transcending individuals and represented by forms of collective action for common or collective survival and also guiding and directing its members' efforts to this common goal. In *Suicide* (Durkheim, 2002), its agency is perceived through currents and norms of over- and under-performance in providing its members with guidance for a life balanced between responding to the demands of collective existence and the demands and requirements of becoming of an individual. These pressures are produced by and inserted into the minds and hearts of individuals by the society itself. The agency of society is also perceived through its over- and under-performance in providing its members with strong and weak attachments to the collective body. These states of performances and strengths of attachment, in turn, are considered as the causes of suicide and represented in material life by qualitatively different forms and rates of suicide. It is in *the Elementary Forms of Religious Life* that perhaps not a final but a last perception of society as an agent is presented by Durkheim (2005, p. 27) in his definition of religious phenomena and ceremonies as collective representations arising from actions of individuals in a group (in an over-exited state) that has come together to create and recreate itself and thus leads to the annihilation of all forms and states of individuality that its members might have had and maintained in their ordinary and mundane lives, with their efforts heightened in the hot spirit arising from feelings of group unity and solidarity.

The question of how to imagine and conceptualize society as a true subject capable of agency is not unique to Durkheim. On the contrary, there are many similarities between his approach to this issue and Marx's struggle to provide a precise definition of social class as an agent, and between his approach and Tönnies' conception of Public opinion. A short comparison of these ideas sheds some light on Durkheim's stance. For Marx (1983, pp. 173–182, 189–195, 212–217), social classes do not exist simply by being in a definite and objective position in the social relations of production, and this is expressed by the metaphor of peasants being like potatoes in a sack: although they look like a class with regard to their objective conditions of existence, they lack the quality of being a social class until they create for themselves a common consciousness, organization, and perform collective actions for the sake of their collective interests. Class formation and agency for now, and to change the course of history, can and should only be created with some intellectual input from outside—but only in the very conditions of existence that exist mostly in work places with the coming together of people who are objectively in the same class

position. Similarly, for Tönnies, according to Heberle (1948, pp. 155–157), "Public opinion" (which differs from public opinion with lower case p) does not simply mean a gathering of many diverse forms and currents of opinions about matters relating to public affairs. It must be created by intellectuals and should unify the energies, thoughts, and actions of all members of society as if it were the will of a single individual, and it has to be put in the service of or against the implementation of a particular policy relating to public affairs. There is, however, one essential difference that separates Durkheim's conception of society from Marx's conception of social class and Tönnies' conception of public opinion. The latter two forms of existence and agency have a temporal character: they have to be created and abandoned or annihilated when the objective is achieved. When created, they look like the moments in which a society feels itself and reinvigorates its collective consciousness. But Durkheim would consider these moments as secondary or lesser forms of existence and agency that do not necessarily attest to the existence of a full society in its single moral unity. On the contrary, these moments may arise simply because of group life somehow lacking the quality of being a society and looking more like a network of relations and exchange of atomic units, each trying to achieve its own objectives. This is because, in Durkheim's conception, society as a true and real subject exists insofar as it directs the efforts of all its members toward securing its own collective survival as a single moral being, in the socialization of its members who are committed to this objective, and the application of corrective sanctions against actions that threaten its survival. All efforts and actions other than these are but manifestations of a subject that is lesser than a society.

Durkheim'ın Toplumu Bir Özne, Toplumsalı Bir Nesne Olarak Kavramsallaştırma Çabası

David Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) sosyolojik düşünce tarihinde bir klasik olarak düşünülür.[2] Onu klasik yapan çalışmalarının sayıca çokluğu[3] ya da hacim olarak büyüklüğü değil, ilgilenmiş olduğu hususları ele alma biçimi ve içeriğinin kendi döneminde ve ardından gelen sosyologlar kuşağının üyelerince dikkate alınması veya eleştirilmeye ve aşılmaya değer görülmesinden kaynaklanır.

Durkheim'ın geride bıraktığı entelektüel mirasın temel konusu doktora tezinin ilk taslağını sunduğunda belirtmiş olduğu birey ile toplum arasındaki ilişkinin ruhsal ve ahlâki niteliğidir. Çözümünü aradığı temel sorun ahlaken yozlaşmadan ya da toplumu bütünüyle yok etmeden toplumun bekasının nasıl sağlanabileceğidir. Bu sorunun cevabını aradığı yer toplumun bizatihi kendisi ya da toplumun varoluş ve beka mücadelesinden ortaya çıkan olguların kendisi, cevabı sağlamasını umduğu araç ise sosyal bilimdir. Bu aynı sorular ve sorunlar bilimden daha önce felsefe, edebiyat, din, ideoloji, siyasetin de konusu olmuş ve olmaya devam ettiklerinden, fakat her şeyden önce bizzat sağduyu tarafından ele alınmış olmalarından dolayı Durkheim'ın entelektüel çabası ve tavrı çok farklı alanlarda hüküm süren çeşitli bilgi ve anlayış biçimleri ile aynı anda mücadele etme ve onlara bir nevi meydan okuma şeklinde de tarif edilebilir.[4]

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2   David Emile Durkheim, 15 Nisan 1858'de Fransa'nın kuzey doğusunda ve Almanya sınırında yer alan Lorraine vilayetinin merkezi yerleşimi olan Epinal'de doğdu ve 15 Kasım 1917'de Paris'te öldü. Üç nesildir din adamlığı yapan bir Yahudi ailesinin dördüncü ve son çocuğu olarak dünyaya gelen Durkheim'ın çocukluk ve ergenlik dönemi bu kentte yerleşik ve geleneksel Yahudi aile ve cemaat bağlarının güçlü olduğu bir cemaatin içinde geçti (Lukes, 1973, s. 39–40). 1878 yılında Paris'te Ecole Normale Supérieure'da üniversite öğrenimine başladı ve 1882 yılında ise üstün başarı ile mezun oldu (Lukes, 1973, s. 42–43). Mezuniyetinin ardından bir süre liselerde felsefe öğretmenliği yaptı ve 1887 yılında Bordeaux Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi'ne sosyal bilim dersi vermek üzere bir nevi okutman veya hoca olarak atandı (Lukes, 1973, s. 86–103). Sosyolojinin bir ders olarak Fransız üniversite sisteminde okutulmaya başlanmasının ve böylece akademide kendine müstakil bir yer edinmesinin başlangıcını da söz konusu bu girişim ve yıl oluşturmaktadır.

Durkheim 1887 ile 1902 yılları arasında Bordeaux Üniversite'sinde bir yandan eğitim ve sosyal bilim dersleri okuturken diğer yandan düzenli olarak halka açık konferanslar verdi ve onun sosyolojik düşünce tarihinde iyi tanınan eserlerinden üçünü yayınladı-*Toplumsal İşbölümü* (1893), *Sosyolojik Yöntemin Kuralları* (1895), *İntihar* (1897) ve sosyoloji alanındaki ampirik ve kuramsal çalışmaları bir araya getirmek amacında olan *Sosyoloji Yıllığı* dergisini (1898) yayınlamaya başladı (Lukes, 1973, s. 109–177).

Durkheim'ın Bordeaux üniversitesinde sosyoloji ile eğitim arasında kurduğu ilişki (yani teorinin hayata geçirilmesi) ve bunu hizmetine sunduğu toplum ülküsü nihayetinde onu, yöneticiler katında, Sorbonne Üniversite'sinde Bilim Eğitimi kürsüsünün başında bulunan ve 1879 ile 1896 yılları arasında Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın İlköğretim Dairesi'nin başkalığını yapmış olan Ferdinand Buisson'dan boşalan kürsüye atanmak için uygun bir aday kıldı ve atama 1902 yılında gerçekleşti. Durkheim'ın entelektüel mirasının önemli köşe taşlarından olan *Dini Hayatın İlkel Biçimleri* onun bu üniversitede çalıştığı dönemde, 1912 yılında yayınlandı (Lukes, 1973, s. 359–484).

3   Durkheim entelektüel üretimine A. Schaeffle'ın "Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers: Erster Band" isimli çalışması hakkında kaleme aldığı ve Revue Philosophique'de 1885 yılında yayınlanmış olan uzun bir inceleme yazısı ile başlamıştır. Otuz iki yıllık entelektüel üretim hayatı sonunda ise ardında toplam 154 çalışma bırakmıştır. Bunlardan toplam 11 cildini yayınladığı Sosyoloji Yıllıklarından her birini birer eser sayarsak bu çalışmaların 121'i o hayatta iken, diğer 33'ü onun ölümünde sonra yayınlanmıştır (bkz. Lukes, 1973, s. 561–589).

4   *Toplumsal İşbölümü* adlı doktora tezinin ardından Durkheim'ın Latince yazdığı ve İngilizceye *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology* adı ile çevrilen kitap hakkında kaleme aldığı inceleme yazısında

Giddens'a göre, bütün entelektüel hayatı boyunca Durkheim'ı meşgul eden dört temel husus veya sorun vardır. Bunlardan ilki Condorcet, Montesquieu ve Comte tarafından bir tarih felsefesi olarak bırakılmış olan sosyolojinin ampirik bir disiplin olarak kurulmasıdır. İkincisi, modern hayatta yükselişe geçmiş olan bireycilik sorununun nasıl ele alınması gerektiğidir. Fransız muhafazakârlarının kültürel dokunun yozlaşması ve çürümesinin bir ifadesi, dolayısıyla marazi-hastalıklı bir durum olarak gördükleri bu hususu Durkheim yeni bir tür toplumsal düzenin ortaya çıkması olarak ele alır. Üçüncü husus ahlaki otoritenin kaynağı ve doğasının anlaşılmasıdır. Durkheim'a göre, hem Fransız muhafazakârların hem de liberallerin görüşlerinin ve yaklaşımlarının aksine, modern toplumda ortaya çıkmakta olan yeni toplumsal işbölümünün ahlaki bir karakteri vardır çünkü toplumu bir akitleşme (ya da sözleşme) olarak gören liberallerin aksine, bir akit, kendisi bir akit olmayan ve onu bağlayıcı kılan bir otoriteye dayanır. Son olarak, sosyal bilim bilgisinin pratikte ne işe yaraması gerektiği sorunu (Giddens, 1978, s. 10) ya da toplumsal hayatı kurma ve sağlıklı bir şekilde sürdürmede sosyal bilim bilgisinin hangi vasıfları taşıması halinde bize kılavuzluk edebileceği sorunudur.

Bu soruların cevabını aramak adına giriştiği entelektüel tartışmalarda Durkheim muhatabı olan fikirler, yaklaşımlar ve tartışmalar karşısında kendi görüşlerinin doğruluğunu göstermek adına farklı yöntem veya stratejilere başvurmuştur. Lukes'in (1973, s. 30–34), tespitlerine göre bu yöntemleri şunlardan oluşur: 1) Önermeyi sonucu içerecek şekilde kurma (*petitio principi*), 2) eleme yöntemi ve 3) yanlışlayıcı kanıtı kabul etmeme.

Birinci yöntem olguların başka bir şekilde değil, ancak yazarın veya düşünürün kendi zihnindeki haliyle tarif edilebileceğini iddia etmeye karşılık gelir. Bu yaklaşımın bir örneği Durkheim'ın intihar olgusunu ele alma biçiminde görülür. Söz konusu çalışmada o, önce, intiharları sebeplerine göre tasnif eder, ardından intihar etmiş kişilerin kendileri ve içinde yaşamış oldukları toplumla ilgili durumu tarif eden yaş, cinsiyet, medeni durum, dini mensubiyet gibi bir dizi toplumsal vasfın başka değil, sadece onun ifade ettiği sebebi/sebepleri içerdiğini göstermeye girişir. *Dini Hayatın İlkel Biçimleri*nde dini ortaya çıkardığını düşündüğü kamusal ateşli coşku halinin üretiminin dinin aslında kendisinin mevcudiyetini varsayması sorununda izlediği tartışma tarzı bu tavrın bir diğer örneğidir.

Eleme yöntemi aynı soruya verilen alternatif cevaplar ya da aynı sorun hakkındaki alternatif açıklamalar arasından kendisinin muhatap alınmaya değer bulduklarının sistematik olarak reddedilip, kendi cevabının veya açıklamasının ilgili soruya ya da

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Harry Alpert, "bir kişilik olarak Durkheim'ı düzgün bir şekilde yansıtmaya [Michigan'ın] Madison Caddesi bile yetmezdi" der. Zira, Alpert'a göre göre, Durkheim'ın "karmaşık kişiliği en azından iki farklı görüntünün bir harmanlamasıydı. Biri mantıksal akıl yürütme ve katı metodolojik yordamları uygulama konusunda tavizsiz davranan ciddi, sert, otoriter ve asık suratlı profesör ve bilim adamı görüntüsü. Bununla eşit derecede geçerli diğer görüntü ise hararetli bir peygamber ve sosyal eleştirmen, tutkulu ahlakçı, ateşin vatansever ve akıl ve açıklık ile hakikati arayan gayretli bir filozof" (Alpert, 1960, s. 972–973).

soruna verilebilecek yegâne cevap olduğunu iddia etmeye karşılık gelir. Örneğin, toplumun ve toplumsal işbölümünün ortaya çıkışı ile ilgili yararcı veya toplumsal sözleşmeci açıklamalar (Durkheim, 2004, s. 191–242), intiharı sosyal olmayan yani "örgensel-ruhsal eğilimler ile fiziksel ortamın niteliği"ne bağlı sebeplere dayandıran açıklamalar (Durkheim, 2002, s. 39–151) ve dinin kaynağı ve mahiyeti hakkındaki ruhçu ve doğacı açıklamaları (Durkheim, 2005, s. 69–114) bu yolla reddeder. Bunun sebebi, hayatın ve dolayısıyla hayat olgularının tabakalaşmış olduğu kabulü ile hareket etmesi ve belli bir sonucun veya olgunun ancak kendi türünden, kendi tabakasında yer alan ve ancak ve ancak tek bir sebep tarafından meydana getirilebileceği ilkesini (Durkheim, 2004, s. 225–226, 236–237) benimsemiş olmasıdır.

Yanlışlayıcı kanıtı kabul etmeme ise ya eleme yönteminin bir uzantısı olarak kendi fikir veya kuramlarının aksine işaret eden kanıtları dikkate almama ya da bu aksi kanıtların yahut olguların karakter ve anlamının öyle olmadığı halde değişmiş olduğunu iddia etme şeklinde ilerlemektedir: örneğin *İlkel Sınıflama* üzerine çalışmasında toplumsal örgütlenme ile sembolik sınıflamanın örtüşmediği örneklerin yahut *Dini Hayatın İlkel Biçimleri*nde totemsiz kabile toplumları ile kabilesiz totem inanışlarının mevcut olduğu örneklerin kanıt olarak kabul edilmemesi veya dikkate alınmaması (Lukes, 1973, s. 33–34).

Lukes'e göre, Durkheim'ın birçok açıklaması aslında ve basitçe yanlış ya da yetersizdir ama aynı zamanda onun fikir ve açıklamaları intihardan dine toplumsal hayatın birçok özelliğini fikri planda düzenleme, açıklama ve aydınlatmada hatırı sayılır bir güce de sahiptir (1973, s. 34).

Bir Özne Fail ve Varlık Olarak Toplum ve Durkheim

Sosyolojinin kurucu şahsiyetlerinin, münhasıran İbn Haldun, Marx, Durkheim, Weber ve Tönnies gibi klasik kurucular arasında sayılan şahsiyetlerin, bir yandan topluma bilinçli bir özne-failde bulunabilecek eylem kapasitesi atfettikleri ya da bunu ima edecek nitelendirmede bulundukları halde bu özellikler bir araya geldiğinde toplumun tam olarak nasıl bir şey olduğu üzerinde pek durmamış olmaları ya da en azından öyle görünüyor olmaları hayli dikkat çekicidir. Örneğin İbn Haldun ilk kez kendisinin ihdas ettiğini söylediği umran ilminin konuları arasında doğrudan toplumun kendisine yer vermez. Aksine yeni ilmin konusu umranın aşamaları ile yine umrandan zorunlu veya arızi olarak ortaya çıkan fakat aynı zamanda onu şu veya bu şekilde kuran, geliştiren, çökerten veya onun bu vasıflarını yansıtan haller, süreçler veya olgulardır: "Şimdi biz bu kitapta mülk, kesb, ilimler ve sanatlar bakımından umranın ahvalinden olmak üzere beşeri içtimaa ve insan cemiyetlerine ârız olan hususları delile dayalı olarak beyan edeceğiz" (İbn Haldun, 1982, s. 207). Weber, kendi bakış açısından, sosyolojinin konusu olan şeyin toplumsal eylemin

seyrini ve sonucunu nedensel olarak yorumlamak ve açıklamak olduğunu belirtir (Weber, 1995, s. 10). Durkheim sosyolojinin konusunu bireysel bilinçlerin dışında ve onlar üzerinde etkide bulunan hissetme, düşünme ve eylemde bulunma biçimleri yani toplumsal olgular olarak tarif eder (Durkheim, 2004, s. 67). Dolayısıyla nasıl kurulduğu açıklanmaya muhtaç olduğu hallerde bile toplum varlığı kanıtlanmaya ihtiyaç duyulan bir şey değildir.

Ancak, bilimsel incelemeye önce incelenecek olguların dışsal özelliklerinden hareketle açık bir tanımının yapılarak başlanması gerektiğini yönteminin temel ilkelerinden biri (Durkheim, 2004, s. 102–103) olarak ilan eden Durkheim açısından toplumun açıkça ne olduğunun tanımlanmamış olması bir çelişki hali gibi de düşünülebilir.

Nitekim aynı husus Poggi'nin de dikkatini çekmiş görünmektedir. Poggi'ye (2000) göre, Durkheim'ın düşüncesinde toplum içgüdünün bittiği yerde başlamaktadır (s. 86) ve maddenin yasaları ya da içgüdü tarafından değil, insanların zihinlerindeki imajların yani temsillerin onların etkileşimlerini ve faaliyetlerini kontrol ettikleri müddetçe vardır (s. 87). Bu haliyle toplum bireysel psikolojilerin uzantısı ya da bireyler arasında cereyan eden etkileşimlerin toplamı değil, bu etkileşimlere yön veren toplumsal psikolojinin kendisidir (s. 86). Bireylerin etkileşimlerini kontrol eden örüntüler ya kurumsallaşmış olan kurallar ya da onları bir şey yapmaya mecbur bırakan kolektif nitelikteki duygu akımlarıdır. Toplum bir madde, olaylar veya faaliyetler dizisi veya bunların toplamı değil, bir enerji akımı gibi düşünülmelidir. Onun mevcudiyeti bazı şeylerin devamına bağlıdır (s. 85) Poggi'ye göre, söyledikleri bir araya getirildiğinde, Durkheim'a göre son tahlilde toplum

> … bireylerde bir ahlaki mecburiyet duygusu oluşturarak onlar arasındaki etkileşimlere hem kılavuzluk eden hem de onları kontrol eden kolektif nitelikteki temsillerdir. Toplum, bu temsiller bireyleri kendilerine uymaya teşvik ettikleri ya da kendilerine uyulmadığı takdirde yaptırımlar vasıtasıyla kendilerini teyit ettikleri müddetçe mevcuttur. Bu nedenle, kaçınılmaz olarak, toplum şartlara bağlı ya da arızi (contingent) bir gerçeklik, yani bireylerin kişisel çıkar düşüncelerinin üstesinden gelmeye istekli olmaları, kolektif olanın özel, kişisel çıkarlardan üstün olduğunu kabul ve teslim etmeleri ya da bu üstünlüğü güçlendirecek düzenlemelerin etkin olmaları şartına bağlıdır. Ahlâki bir gerçeklik olarak toplum ancak ve ancak kendisi dışında yegâne ahlaki varlık olan bireyler tarafından girişilmiş olan ahlâki ihlallerin cezalandırılması da dâhil olarak, çok sayıdaki ahlâki eylem içinde ve bu eylemler marifetiyle varlığını sürdürebilir (s. 96).

Poggi'nin olağanüstü güzellikteki bu özetlemesi toplum karşısında bireylerin bir şeye istekli olmaları ve istekli oldukları şeyi yapma konusunda irade göstermeleri gereğine öncelik veriyor görünmesi, buna karşılık Durkheim'ın ısrarla toplumu bireye öncelik ve üstünlük taşıyan bir konumda tutması ile pek de uyumlu görünmemektedir. Ayrıca, her ne kadar kastedilen öyle olmasa da kendi başına dikkate alındığında toplumu sadece bireylerin zihinlerinde mevcut bir varlık hüviyetine indirgemektedir.

Buna karşılık bu denemenin çok genel ve geçici bir hipotez olarak ifade etmek istediği şey bir varlık, ahlâkî bir otorite, enerji veya güç sıfatlarının ifade ettiğinden daha fazla bir şey olarak Durkheim'ın bir özne fail olarak bir toplum algısına da sahip olduğu; onun kendi entelektüel üretiminde mevcut olduğunu iddia ettiği bu şeyi göstermeye, öğretim faaliyetlerinde ise mevcudiyetini iddia ettiği şeyi yaratmaya veya yeniden yaratmaya çalıştığıdır ve onun bu konudaki anlayışı özetle şu şekilde ifade edilebilir:

Bir özne fail olarak toplum en genel anlamda ve en kâmil haliyle tek tek bireyler veya gruplar halinde üyelerinin düşüncelerini, duygularını, enerjilerini, faaliyetlerinin tekil hüviyetini kaynaştırıp ortak bir amaca yönelttiği ve elde ettikleri sonucun ahlaki değerini bu ortak amaca hizmetine kıyasla takdir ettikleri noktada mevcuttur. Dahası, bu sadece ulaşılması ve bir kere ulaşıldıktan sonra olduğu gibi sürdürülmesi gereken bir mevcudiyet hali değil, hem toplumun iç çevresinden hem de onu kuşatan dış çevreden gelen baskılar karşısında sürekli olarak ve şartların gerektirdiği ölçüde ve doğrultuda farklı bir şekilde yeniden üretilmesi ve konumlandırılması gereken bir *özne faillik* hâlidir. Bireyler veya gruplar arasındaki alışverişlerin, iktisadi veya diğer türden ilişki ve faaliyetlerin kusursuz bir şekilde koordine edildiği ve herkesin kendi istediğini elde ettiği, amacını gerçekleştirdiği bir yerde toplum değil, bir mübadele ağı veya şebekesi vardır. İnsanı ifade etmek adına onun fiziki varlığını ve bedenini dikkate almak ne ölçüde bir ağırlık taşıyorsa, benzer şekilde bir toplumdaki insanların ve grupların sayıları, mübadele vasıtaları, ağları, örgütleri ve işlemlerin türü, biçimi, sıklığı (yani toplumsal morfoloji) de aynı ölçüde bir değer ve anlam taşır.

Durkheim'ın, yukarıda ifade edilen "entelektüel muhatap ve muhasımları ile mücadele biçimleri veya stratejileri" kendi meramını onlara anlatmak ve toplumun asli mahiyetini ve bu mahiyetten ortaya çıkan halleri anlamak, gözlemek, ilişkilendirmek ve açıklamak için geliştirdiği yöntemin sadece bir parçasını veya boyutunu oluşturur. Dolayısıyla yöntem sorunu meramı anlatmanın yollarını da içerir fakat onun asıl amacını ve işlevini göstermez. Onun nazarında yöntem sorunun aslı iki şeyden oluşmaktadır. Bunlar: (i) toplumsal durum hakkında dini veya felsefi olarak değil de bilimsel yargıda bulunmaya ve bu suretle topluma kılavuzluk etmeye yarayacak bir sosyal bilimin hangi metodolojik temeller üzerine inşa edilebileceğini ortaya koymak ve (ii) neyin ne şekilde incelenmesi suretiyle bu yöntemin istenen veya ihtiyaç duyulan bilgiyi üretebileceğidir. *Sosyolojik Yöntemin Kuralları* adlı çalışması onun bu iki işlevi birlikte yerine getirecek bir bilimin kurucu ilke ve kurallarının nelerden oluşması gerektiği hakkında ürettiği bir manifesto niteliği taşır. Bu manifesto bir taslak veya nüve olarak *Toplumsal İşbölümü*'nün yazıldığı süreçte vücut bulmuş, önce parça parça, ardından bütünleşik ve sistematik bir bünye olarak yayınlanmış ve onun diğer çalışmalarına kılavuzluk etmiştir. Birinci amacı bakımından aslen felsefe ve dine karşı konumlandırılmış olan çalışma, ikinci amacı bakımından açıkça psikolojiye karşı konumlandırılmıştır. Dolayısıyla çalışma Durkheim'ın farklı sorunları ele alırken izlemiş olduğu tartışma stratejileri ka-

dar, izlemiş olduğu yöntemin ve bütün bu faaliyetlerinde sahip olmuş olduğu toplum anlayışının temel unsurlarını bünyesinde barındıran adeta bir kavşak noktasıdır.

Temel bir anlayış olarak Durkheim açısından toplum insanın tabiatta var olma yahut beka mücadelesinin hem adı hem de cevabıdır. Bu mücadele insanların bunun nasıl mümkün olacağına dair bir önsel fikre veya bu dünyaya geldikleri anda zihinlerine hali hazırda nakşedilmiş ve düşüncelerine şekil veren nazım-anlayışlara (master-conceptions) dayalı olarak bir belli bir çözüm yolu konusunda uzlaşma veya anlaşmaya varmaları neticesinde ortaya çıkmış bir şey değildir. Aksine, toplum, bilinçli veya bilinçsiz olarak fakat birlikte, birbirleriyle etkileşim içinde hareket ederek insanların duruma müdahale için giriştikleri eylemlerin önce alışkanlık, sonra kurallar ve aralarındaki hak ve sorumlulukları tayin eden kurallara dönüşmesi sonucunda ortaya çıkan bir şeydir.

Dışarıdan bakan gözlemci açısından görülebilecek olan şey bu mücadelenin kendisi değil, bir yanda belli bir toprak parçası üzerinde bulunan tabii varlıklar arasında bir varlık olarak insan bedenleri, onların değişik türden tekil veya tekrarlayan hareketleri ve onların eylemleri sonucunda toprak üzerinde oluşmuş olan kümelenmeler ve izlerdir. Dolayısıyla, dışarıdan bakan gözün görebileceği şey sebebi değil, sebepten kaynaklı olarak ortaya çıkmış olan halleri yani toplumsal olguların dışsallaşmış hallerini gösterir. Bu nedenle göze geleni kendisini meydana getiren sebebe bağlayacak başka bir göze veya anlayışa ihtiyaç vardır ki, onun da bulunduğu yer akıl veya zihindir. Bu haliyle toplum araştıran öznenin kendi zihninde kurguladığı bir şeydir ve bunun bir vehim mi yoksa gerçek mi olup olmadığının geriye dönülüp teyit edilmesi gerekir. Bundan dolayı Durkheim'ın yönteminin en temel ilkeleri *Sosyolojik Yöntemin Kuralları*'nın ayrıntılarında ifade edilmiş olanlar değil, bunların üzerine dayandığı daha genel iki temel ilkedir. Bunlar (i) bilimsel faaliyette zihinde kurulmuş olan bütünden onu oluşturan parçalara doğru gitmek ve bütünün ne marifetiyle bu bütünlüğü kazandığını açıkça ifade etmek, (ii) zihindeki bu kurgunun atıfta bulunduğu şeylerin gerçeklik alanında bir karşılığının olup olmadığını araştırmak ve gözlem verileri yoluyla teyit etmek (yani tekabüliyet kuramı).

Psikolojinin ilgilendiği olgulardan ayrı, onlardan farklı bir varlık düzleminde ve nevi şahsına münhasır olgular kümesi olarak toplumsal olgular ancak böyle bir ön anlayışın ardından göze gelen; fiziksel özelliklerinden veya kapasitelerinden dolayı değil, varoluş mücadelesinin içinden çıkmış, "düşünsel ya da ahlaki üstünlüklerinden dolayı" (Durkheim, 2004, s. 241, dipnot 1) kendilerine uyulması veya itibar edilmesi yönünde birey üzerinde manevi baskı uygulayan, ona dıştan gelen, yani bireyin toplumsallaştırılması marifetiyle kazandırılmış olan her türden "hissetme, düşünme ve eylemde bulunma biçimleri ve kalıplarıdır" (Durkheim, 2004, s. 49). Toplumsal olgular bu vasıfları ile hem bir yandan toplumun kuruluşuna tanıklık eden ama kendilerine müracaat edildikleri ve harekete geçirildikleri müddetçe de toplumu yeniden kuran ve üreten temsillerdir.

Örneğin, suç, bir toplumun üyelerinden bazılarının bir *toplum olma* halini veya bunu sürdürmeyi temsil eden duygu, düşünce veya kurallara aykırı veya onların sayınlığını incitici mahiyette olduğu düşünülen hareketlerine verilen addır ve böyle bir eyleme karşı bir yaptırım uygulama toplumun bir özne olarak mevcudiyetinin belirtisi veya kanıtıdır. Ancak, buradan hareketle, mahiyetleri itibariyle maşeri vicdanı incitmesi beklenen eylemlere karşı toplumun tepki göstermemiş olması onun kendisinin artık gayri-mevcut bir varlık olduğunun ifadesi olarak alınamaz. Çünkü bu halin maşeri vicdanın içeriğinin değişmesinden mi yoksa toplumun toplum olmaktan uzaklaşmış olmasından mı kaynakladığının incelenmesi ve değerlendirilmesi gerekir.

Bu genel metodolojik yönelimler çerçevesinde *Toplumsal İşbölümü* adlı çalışmasında Durkheim'ın temel meselesi çağdaş toplumda artan ve endişe ile karşılaşılan uzmanlaşma, mesleki ihtisaslaşma, bireycileşme, suç, sapma ve intihar gibi vakaların toplum olarak varoluşun yeni bir merhalesinin kolektif temsilleri mi yoksa bir yok oluşun belirtileri ve yansımaları mı olduğuna karar verme ve gelişmelerin ahlaki değerini bilimsel bir lisan ve anlayışla tespit ve takdir etme meselesidir. Yöntemsel ve kuramsal olarak bu mesele yüzeysel bir şekilde ve özellikle iktisadi işbölümünün kendisine bakmak suretiyle halledilemez. Zira "toplumsal işbölümü, bilhassa iktisadi işbölümü asli hüviyeti olarak toplumsal hayatın yüzeyinde meydana gelen devşirme ve tali (ikincil) bir olgudur. Bu nedenle bir toplumun toplumsal merdivenin hangi basamağında olduğuna onun uygarlığının, özellikle bir taklitten ibaret olabilecek olan iktisadi uygarlığının haline bakarak karar verilemez" (bk. Aron, 1967, s. 23).[5] Durkheim bu nedenle dikkatini özellikle "bütün gücünü toplumdan aldığı halde bireyi topluma değil, kendisine bağlayan "bireycileşme" olgusunun (Durkheim, 1893, s. 147'den akt., Lukes, 1973, s. 156) kendisine ve onun ahlaki niteliğinin anlaşılmasına yöneltir. Durkheim'ın cevabı bu olgunun her ne kadar varoluş mücadelesindeki bir safhaya işaret eden ve ondan ortaya çıkan yeni bir ahlâkın alameti olduğu yönünde olmakla birlikte, durum yine de net değildir. Bunun nedeni, böyle bir maşeri vicdan ortaya çıkıyor olsa bile bu çok zayıf ve birey ile toplum arasındaki bağı tek ve ince telli bir bağa indirmektedir. Hâlbuki kırılmalara ve kopmalara karşı dirençli bağlar çok telli, birbirlerinin gücünü destekleyen bağlardır. Dahası toplumdan güç alan bu bireycileşme olgusu bireyin fiziki varlığını kendi eliyle sonlandırmaya varacak ölçüde dizginlerinden boşalmış bir hal bile almaktadır. Dolayısıyla duruma toplumun müdahale etmesi gerekir. Bu müdahale, bir yandan bireyin ufkunu, faaliyetlerinin önünü açarken diğer yandan onu topluma bağlamalıdır. Çünkü toplum üyelerinin enerjisini ve ufkunu ortak varoluşa yöneltmiş olduğunda bile bunun dengesiz bir şekilde yapılması ya bireyleri suç ya da intihar yoluna saptırabilir veya toplumun bizatihi kendisinin fiziken sona ermesine varıncaya kadar değişik türden ve dereceden sonuçlar

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5   Tek tırnak içinde özet yorum biçiminde tercüme etmiş olduğum bu ifade Aron'nun kendi yorumuna değil onun sayfa belirtmeksizin *Toplumsal işbölümü (De la division du travail social)*'den yaptığı uzun bir alıntıya dayanmaktadır.

doğurabilir. Örneğin, Mestroviç'in tabir ettiği haliyle, Durkheim'a göre, "arzuların artması mutsuzluğu getirir. Bunun sebebi basittir, arzu edilenin bir nesnenin elde edilmesi demek kapsamının genişlemesi demektir; arzu edilen, elde edilen, tekrar arzu edilen nesneleri içeren bir sonsuzlukta" (Mestroviç, 2015, s. 104). Her şey işlerin tabiatına uygun, ölçülü ve dengeli bir şekilde yapılmalıdır. Zira yine Mestroviç'in tabir ettiği haliyle, Durkheim'a göre "tabiat ve gerçeklik yozlaşmış değildir, aksine yozlaşmayı yaratan insanoğludur" (Mestroviç, 2015, s. 105).

Durkheim'ın bir eğitimci olarak verdiği konferanslar ve geleceğin neslini yetiştirecek öğretmenlere ve entelektüellere verdiği dersler toplum adına birey düzeyindeki failliğin vücut bulmuş halidir. Bu derslerin amacı "bazı temel zihni yatkınlıklar ya da insanın zihninde doğuştan mevcut olmayan fakat bir tarihi olan ve mantıklı düşünmek için çerçeve ve araçlar sağlayan", gerçekliğin yorumlanmasına hükmeden (govern) ve içinde bulunulan zaman itibariyle temel bilimlerle uyumlu "kategoriler, nazım-algı ve anlayış odağı" kazanılmasına yardımcı olmaktır (Lukes, 1973, s. 120). Yapılan şey aslında sosyalizasyon denilen şeyin bir örneğidir ve dolayısıyla da genel veya özel, değişik biçim ve amaçları ile sosyalizasyon faaliyetleri toplumun özne-failliğinin ve bu suretle kendini yeniden yaratacak ve sürdürecek özne bireylerin varlığa getirilmesinin önemli bir veçhesidir. Bu Durkheim açısından oldukça anlaşılır bir şeydir zira toplum kendisinden önce var olan fikri bir tasarıma göre vücut bulmuş olmadığına, aksine kendisi hakkındaki fikirleri kendi faaliyetlerinden, kendi yönelimlerinden sonra ürettiğine göre onun failliğinin önemli bir veçhesi olarak da bu sürecin bizatihi kendisine işaret edilmesi yerindedir.

Entelektüel mirasının önemli bir halkasını oluşturan *Dini Hayatın İlkel Biçimleri*'nde Durkheim toplumun özne-failliğinin aslî vasfını ortaya koymaya yönelir. Sıkça alıntılanan başlangıç tanımına göre "bir din, kutsalla, yani diğerlerinden ayrılmış ve yasaklanmış şeyle ilgili inançlar ve amellerden oluşan tutarlı bir sistemdir. Bu inançlar ve ameller, kendilerine inanan bütün insanları kilise/cemaat diye isimlendirilen tek manevi bir toplum halinde bir araya getirir" (Durkheim, 2005, s. 67). Bu tanımda toplumun özne failliğine dair bir şey yoktur; tanımın amacı "mevcut bir dinin nelerden oluştuğunu" (s. 21) göstermek veya ona işaret etmektir. Ancak eğer amaç dinin asli mahiyetinin ne olduğu ise Durkheim'ın bu tanımı vermeden önce dikkat çektiği husus konumuz bakımından daha önemlidir: "Dini tasavvurlar, kolektif gerçeklikleri ifade eden müşterek tasavvurlardır; ayinler yalnızca, bir araya gelmiş gruplar arasında doğan hareket tarzlarıdır. Bu grupların hedefi, bu grupları meydana getirmek, onları devam ettirmek ya da yeniden yaratmaktır. Ancak, eğer kategoriler dini kökenli ise, o zaman onların, bütün dinlerde ortak olan şeye dâhil olmaları gerekir: Onlar[ın] da, toplumsal şeyler ve kolektif düşüncenin ürünü olmaları gerekir" (Durkheim, 2005, s. 27).

Çalışmanın devamında Durkheim ilkel toplulukların kendi bir araya gelişlerinden nasıl, hangi tasavvurları ve sembolleri üreterek kendilerini ürettikleri, yeniden ürettiklerini ve bu yolla nasıl aynı zamanda tarihsel gelişme dolayısıyla köken ile menzil arasındaki zamansal ve algısal mesafe açıldığı için görünemez hale gelmiş olan bilimsel ve felsefi düşüncenin temellerini oluşturan ilk kategorileri, yani "bilginin önemli bir parçası olan içeriğini değil, fakat aynı zamanda bilginin işlendiği şekli" (s. 26) yarattıklarını göstermeye girişmektedir. Durkheim'ın bu doğrultudaki iddialarının özü şöyle ifade edilebilir: Toplum, kendisinin iç çevresini oluşturan maddi ve beşeri varlıklar, bunların faaliyetleri ve üyelerinin aralarındaki ilişki ve bağları saygıya değer (kutsal) ve sıradan olarak ikiye ayırarak eş zamanlı olarak hem dini hem de kendini yaratır. Dolayısıyla dinin asli hüviyeti kutsal ve sıradanın birlikte ve bir bütün içinde toplum tarafından kendisinin, kendini oluşturan unsurların saygınlığının tanımlanmasıdır. Tanımlayan ve tanımlanan kendisi olduğu için tapılan ve taptıran da yine toplumun kendisidir. Dolayısıyla, toplum basitçe kendi mevcudiyetinden ayrışmış ve sistemleştirilmiş bir inançlar sistemi üreten bir din makinesi değildir, aksine din toplumu var eden ve tanımlayan şeyin bizatihi kendisidir:

> Bir tanrı, yalnızca bizim kendisine tabi olduğumuz bir yetke değil fakat aynı zamanda gücünüzün kendisine dayandığı bir kuvvettir. Kendi tanrısına boyun eğen ve bundan dolayı da tanrısının kendisiyle beraber olduğunu düşünen insan, dünyaya güvenle ve artan bir enerji hissiyle yaklaşır. Aynı şekilde, toplumsal eylem, bizden fedakârlıklar, yoksunluklar ve çabalar istemekle yetinmez. Çünkü, müşterek güç, bütünüyle bizim dışımızda değildir; bize bütünüyle dışarıdan etki etmez. Ancak toplum bireysel bilinçlilikte [bireysel vicdan ve şuurda] ve onun vasıtası olmaksızın var olamayacağından, bu gücün bize nüfuz etmesi ve kendisini içimizde yapılandırması gerekir; bunun sonucu olarak, varlığımızın bütüncül bir parçası haline gelir ve böylece onu yükseltir ve onu olgunlaştırır". Dolayısıyla, "bir tanrı, kendisine inanan için ne ise, bir toplum da üyeleri için odur (Durkheim, 2005, s. 256–257).

> O zaman esas olarak, yanlış olan hiçbir din yoktur. Bütün dinler, kendilerine göre doğrudurlar. Hepsi, beşeriyetin verili şartlarını, farklı yollarla da olsa yerine getirirler (Durkheim, 2005, s. 19).

O zaman bilim adamının görevi incelediği olguları önyargıları, tutkuları ve alışkanlıklarından hareketle incelemek ve yargılamak değil, bu olguların toplumun varoluş mücadelesinden ortaya çıkan maşeri vicdan halleri (kolektif bilinç) ve müşterek temsiller (kuralları, kurumları, hukuku) olduklarını fark etmek, onların kutsal olup olmadıklarını tartışmak değil, bu vasıfları nereden ve nasıl kazandıklarını veya kaybettiklerini, tarihsel olarak nasıl gelişip bugünkü hallerine ulaştıklarını veya ulaşamadan yok olup gittiklerini anlamak ve açıklamaktır. Olguları "bir şey gibi ele almak onları birer veri olarak ele almaktır ve bu bilimin başlangıç noktasını teşkil eder" (Durkheim, 2004, s. 91).

Marx ve Tönnies'in Özne-Fail Algısı ile Bir Karşılaştırma ve Sonuç

Bir özne fail olarak bir grubun veya toplumun tasavvur edilmesi sorunu sadece Durkheim'ın değil, ondan önce Marx'ın ve kendi çağdaşı olan Tönnies'in de sorunu olmuştur. Marx, kendi içinde ve kendi başına bir kuramsal muamma olarak toplum olma sorunu ile değil, bir özne olarak toplumsal sınıf olma sorunu ile ilgilenmiştir. Bununla birlikte toplumsal bir özne olarak sınıf olma sorununa verilecek kuramsal cevap toplum olma sorununa da uygulanabilir. Marx'ın bu soruya verdiği cevap şöyle özetlenebilir: Bir grup insanın üretimin toplumsal ilişkileri içinde belli bir mevki veya mahalde bulunuyor olmaları onları toplumsal özne niteliği kazanmış bir sınıf olarak tanımlamaya yetmez. Aksine bunun gerçekleşebilmesi içinde bulunulan mahallin maddi koşullarını ortak çıkar yönünde yorumlayan, enerjileri ve çabayı bu şartları aşma ülküsüne gerçekleştirmeye yönelten bir idrak ve eylemi gerektirir. Marx'a göre, ihtiyaç duyulan idrak ve anlayış içinde bulunulan maddi şartlardan zorunlu olarak yaratılacak veya ortaya çıkacaktır (bkz. Marx, 1983, s. 173–182, 189–195, 212–217). Ancak, yine de, bunun için gözlerdeki perdeyi kaldırıp, bireyleri harekete geçirecek bir anlayışa veya kavrayışa da ihtiyaç vardır ve kendisinin yaptığı şey de bu tetikleyici veya kurucu anlayışı üretmektir, yoksa sonunda ulaşılacak olan ülkünün somut toplumsal hayatta alması gereken biçimlerini tarif etmek değil.

Toplumu bir özne-fail olarak tanımlama ve yaratma konusunda Tönnies'in yaklaşımı onun Kamuoyu kuramında yer alır. Kuram, onun on yılı aşan kuramsal ve tarihsel çalışmaları sonunda vücut bulmuş, Birinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında Alman Kamuoyu Oluşturma Merkezi'nin başkanı olarak yaptığı çalışma ve uygulamalardan etkilenmiş ve *Kritik der öftenlilichen Meinung* (Berlin, 1922) ismi ile yayınlanmıştır. Heberle'ye (1948, s. 155–157) göre, Tönnies'in ilgisinin odağında bulunan asıl sorun kamu meseleleri ile alâkalı ve tek tek bireylerin veya grupların cılız, dağınık ve istikametsiz fikirleri anlamındaki *kamuoyu*ndan farklı olarak bir toplumun bireylerinin tek bir bireyin sergileyebileceği bir kararlılık ve iradeye benzer şekilde bir kamu meselesinin ardında nasıl tutulabileceği; fikirlerin, enerjinin ve eylemlerin yekvücut olarak ortak bir hedefe nasıl yönlendirilebileceği, yani bir özne-fail olarak *Kamuoyu*'nun nasıl yaratılabileceği meselesidir. Meselenin halli şu üç temel işlemin birlikte yapılması şartına bağlıdır: (i) Gösterilen hedefin ahlaki veya akılcı değerini bir dini varlık, ilke veya kuralın sahip olduğu değer mertebesine yükseltmek, (ii) Her makbul bireyin ve sadık vatanseverin başka değil, gösterilen veya tarif edilen şekilde inanması ve eylemde bulunması gerektiğini akılcı bir üslupla ifade etmek ve (iii) Bundan sapan veya sapmayı düşünenlerin vicdanları üzerinde eskiden sadık müminin dinden sapma halinde hissedebileceği türden bir duyguya kapılmalarına yol açacak bir manevi etki doğurmaktır.

Ancak, Tönnies her daim hazır ve nazır bir *Kamuoyu*'nun değil, amacını gerçekleştirdikten sonra dağılan ve yeni bir kamu meselesi etrafından yeniden oluş-

turulması gereken bir fail-özne *Kamuoyu*'nun yaratımı ile ilgilenmektedir. Buna karşılık, Marx'ın yaratılmasını arzu ettiği özne aslen kendini yok etmek için bir öznedir, ebediyen var olmak için değil. Zira ülküye erişmek demek öznenin kendisi var eden koşulların ortadan kaldırılması anlamına gelmektedir ve hiçbir şey ve bu arada hiçbir bilinç veya idrak kendini var edecek koşullar olmaksızın var olamaz. Bu iki düşünürün tavrı ile kıyaslandığında Durkheim'ın meselesi her zaman mevcut olabilecek bir özne-failin yaratılması ve değişen varoluş şartları altında bekasının temin edilmesi sorunudur. Zira Marx ve Tönnies'in yaratmak istedikleri yahut tasavvur ettikleri özne ancak kendisinin tasavvur ettiği ve yaratılmasına destek verdiği özne içinde mevcut olabilecek ve ahlaki bir değer ve anlam kazanabilecek ikincil öznelik halleridir. Durkheim açısından ise bir özne fail olarak toplum aynı tekil ahlaki varlığın ortak bir varoluş mücadelesine yöneltilmiş bilinçli kolektif çabada, bu çabayı gösterecek bireylerin sosyalizasyonunda ve bu varlığın varoluşunu tehdit eden eylemlere karşı düzeltici müeyyidelerin olduğu yerde bir fail olarak mevcuttur. Bunun dışındaki çabalar ve faaliyetler değişik derecelerde ve mahiyette olmak üzere, bir toplumdan daha az bir varlık ve faillik haline karşılık gelirler.

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Durkheim's Ghost:
The Century after His Death: France, Germany, Turkey

Charles Lemert[1]

Abstract

The essay is a kind of social science fiction meant to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Emile Durkheim's death in 1917. Durkheim's ghost, therefore, is used to imagine how his thinking would have dealt with the actual premodern and modern histories of France, Germany, and Turkey. .

Keywords

Durkheim • Treaty of Versailles • Collective representations • Ottoman Empire • Byzantium • Republic of Turkey

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Emile Durkheim[2] died on 15 November 1917 just when Europe's Great War was getting worse. He died of despair over the death of his son, André, who was killed in the war.

1917 was also the year of the beginning of the revolutions that ended Czarist Russia as well as the year in which the Americans entered the fight against Germany. Not quite two years later, on 28 June 1919, the disastrously punitive Treaty of Versailles assured that the Great War ending Europe's liberal nineteenth century would, in historical fact, turn out the have been a latter-day Thirty Years War. It threatened the very interstate system the Treaty of Westphalia inaugurated in 1648 to end the original Thirty Years' War. As time would tell, Hitler, in particular among the German people, was so obsessed by the disgracing wounds inflicted by Versailles that when France capitulated on 22 June 1940 he humbled the French by demanding that the Armistice be signed at *Compiègne* in the very train car in which Germany had been forced to capitulate on 11 November 1918. Then too when the Americans entered that grand but not-so-great war it would not turn out to be—as the American President Woodard Wilson had naively hoped—the war to end all wars. Anything but! On the contrary, the short twentieth century from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 28 June 1914 to the end of the Cold War with Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation on 25 December 1991 would be riddled by wars that grew more violent as they became ever more local.

Now, a full century since the war that killed Durkheim and so countless many others, the killing and violence continues at, if anything, a faster pace. He would not be happy. But, also, Durkheim might not be surprised that his noble ideas did so little social good. A differential diagnosis of Durkheim's cause of death would have to include not just the stroke and the anomic despair at the loss of his son, but also the deeply sad failure of his life's work to save France from the modern world.

What, specifically, would Durkheim have thought of the century following 1917? He had only lived 59 years, of which the last few, after 1914, he devoted to France. Had it not been for André's death, it might have been just as likely that he would have worked himself to death in national defense efforts and a strenuous schedule of teaching and lecturing. Through those terrible years he somehow remained cautiously optimistic (Lukes, 1975, pp. 547–555). But why, while still among the living, might Durkheim have been optimistic? Little in his personal or social time encouraged the notion that the very social disorder he meant to heal could be or would be healed. Then too he would surely have been deeply discouraged, to say the least, by the disaster that arose not more than a decade after his death.

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2   This article consists of two parts. The first section that was previously published in *Soziopolis* is cited in the special issue of Durkheim with the permission of the author and *Soziopolis*. The author wrote the second section as a continuation of the first section for the *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology*. The first section of the manuscript is also available at the following link: *https://soziopolis.de/erinnern/jubilaeen/artikel/durkheims-ghost/*

It is well known that Durkheim was born in rural Épinal to a long line of rabbis. What he could not have known is that the Jewish village of his birth was not far from the border with what would become Nazi Germany. Had Durkheim remained in Épinal to become a rabbi in the tradition of his father's fathers he very possibly would not have survived. He was, if nothing else, more than ready to go against the grain. Still, having left for the modern, secular world, had he lived to learn of *Kristallnacht* (9-10 November, 1938 when he would have been 71 years old), Durkheim would have understood more about the Nazi pseudo-religious cult that led to Hitler's "Jewish Problem." In truth, any prescient sociological study during the early years of the Nazi cult would have had to have been Durkheimian. (A Weberian study of the kind would likely not have been able to manage Hitler's attempt to fuse Weber's many spheres into a singular Aryan nation-state.)

Still, it is far from clear (to me at least) how much, if at all, Durkheim suffered from his ethnic identity. He of course joined Émile Zola in defending Captain Alfred Dreyfus (and was married to Louise Dreyfus who must have been related at a remove to Alfred). France today, as it was then, still experiences a virulent strain of anti-semitic violence, as do many other so-called modern societies. Anti-semitism and its rabid affines had not gone away in 2017, even if they are hidden under the cloak of post- (or, better, ill-) liberal politics. Whatever may have been Durkheim's personal struggles, there can be little doubt as to what he would have thought of the Nazi regime that was ever more severe an assault on a nation's social bond than the secularization that so troubled him in modernizing France.

Apart from the founding of scientific sociology, Durkheim devoted his life to saving France from the chaos he associated with the decline of religion as the moral glue holding together the splintering parts of a secular social order. In this respect, he shared, in his way, a version of Max Weber's belief that modernization, whatever its benefits, was an iron cage of rationality because it left scant room for the charismatic moment (of which the religious prophet was Weber's exemplar). By the comparison, the key passage in Durkheim's opening salvo on egoistic suicide in *Suicide* introduces a little remarked upon irony of modern religious life which must have had its origin in his childhood experiences in a Jewish family in Épinal. The irony is in the fact that Jewish people were among the most highly literate of modern people, yet they enjoyed a strong coefficient of preservation against suicide. Durkheim's idea was that education is individuating because (in a notion quite similar to Weber's thinking on the matter) learning breaks the bond with the traditional religious society, for which he takes Catholicism as the prime example. Protestants were more highly educated than Catholics, yet they suffered from a morbidly feeble immunity to egoistic suicide.

Hence, Durkheim's implied question: If among Protestants education induces a higher social suicide rate, how could it be that, of the three major European religious groups in that day, Jews were more immune to suicide than even Catholics who were protected by the social solidarity of a then very traditional religious community? The answer was that Jewish people, notwithstanding their supposedly individuating learning, were a persecuted minority which required a strong communal solidarity for defensive purposes. "The Jew, therefore, seeks to learn, not in order to replace his collective prejudices by reflective thought, but merely to be better armed for the struggle (Durkheim, 1951, p. 168)." Or, to rephrase in Weber's terms, Catholics then were subject to traditionalism and Protestants were the ideal type of the modern rational ethic. Thus, it is possible that Durkheim, were he to have used Weberian terminology, might have said that Jewish people were an ideal type of the after-modern person. It is only partly right to put "after-modern" in Durkheim's mouth because he showed little direct interest in the political economy of the modern world in Europe. As a consequence, Durkheim would have been far less likely than Weber—not to mention Marx—to consider that the actual history of the Protestant modern ethic has been the story of the nightmares Capitalism (whatever its benefits) has visited on those it exploits. One can only hope for an after-modern culture able to learn, as Durkheim's Jews are said to have, from a solidarity derived from a long history of persecution.

This being so, and granting that Durkheim died before he could have seen what came to pass after 1917, we can wonder still more what he would have made of Hitler's slaughter of so many Jews. From a moral point of view he would have been, needless to say, horrified. Still, from a scientific point of view, as a student of culture and its workings, Durkheim would have well understood how the Holocaust after *Kristallnacht* came to be. Hitler's culture of Aryan supremacy was the very antithesis of the healing moral culture Durkheim had hoped France's secular educational system might create. Hence another irony associated with Durkheim's thinking. As much or more than Weber, the son of rabbis upon rabbis became the interpreter of the role of religion in societies, traditional and modern. But also, Durkheim carefully argued in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* that religion was in the very inner workings of knowledge as inherent and necessary to social life itself. In this, Durkheim turned Marx on *his* head (though not in a Hegelian or even a Kantian sort of way). Alvin W. Gouldner once said in reference to Marx's *Camera Obscura* that the figure of speech was brilliant except for the fact that Marx had no way to account for cameraman. Durkheim, by contrast (and in spite of his thin theory of the individual), argued precisely that culture is anything but obscure because culture provides the only picture of the social world in which all social individuals are the picture-takers.

In this respect, Durkheim would have taken interest, perhaps pleasure, in the writings of the German critical theorists of culture whose very purpose was, in significant

degree, a response to the sad fate of Germany under the National Socialists. Durkheim would have well appreciated such works as Horkheimer's and Adorno's 1944-45 essay, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," for its critique of the deep structure of mass culture. Hitler's nationalism was, in effect, a forerunner of the mass culture that came to be so influential after 1945. Curiously, Durkheim might well have agreed both with their ideas on the industrialization of mass culture *and* their famous essay's critique of Enlightenment. But, Durkheim would have certainly held a more restrained attitude toward the German Enlightenment even though his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* in 1912 was a direct assault on Kant's mental categories of understanding from which issued the ideas of knowledge as based on a synthetic *a prior* and of the categorical imperative to act as though one's actions pertain to, and sustain, the moral order of social life.

Similarly, Durkheim would have been skeptical of the very idea of mass culture insofar as the expression has come down over the years as dismissive of any culture that might be appreciated by those not among the cultural elite. Yet, he did put forth a theory of mass culture in the more generous sense of a widely, perhaps universally, shared culture necessary not just to knowledge but also to the moral order that made social life possible in the first place. If Durkheim had somehow lived into the early 1940s (when he would have been just over 80 years old), even he—the most provincial of French intellectuals—would likely have reached out to the German critical theorists in exile in the United States. Had he done so, he might have been a more critical sociologist, as perhaps Horkheimer and Adorno might have come to a more robust appreciation of aspects of mass culture—and especially of cinema and jazz, if not television and all the other subsequent technomedia. Still one of early critical theory's heirs, Herbert Marcuse, was the first to describe in the plain language of *One Dimensional Man* (1964) how the newer mass cultural technomedia destroys the basic human genius for critical thinking. However mystified Durkheim surely would have been by televisual media, Marcuse's critique would have caught his eye.

Then too, one could well wonder what Durkheim would have thought of the state of global affairs after the end of the thirty years war in 1945? The first, and all-too-easy answer, is that it is likely that he would have been puzzled for more reasons than his by then extreme age. The confusion would not have had to do with Europe's post-war efforts to reconstruct its infrastructures, social institutions, and democratic cultures. Even if (improbably) Durkheim would have enjoyed another good decade of life to see the results in France, he would have relished the necessity of the reconstruction. Still, since Claude Lévi-Strauss lived to 101 years, it might not have been impossible that Durkheim could have, in principle, lived long enough to see the sensational effect of Pierre Bourdieu's 1964 *Les héritiers: les étudiants et la culture* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979) on the restructuring of France's university system. Durkheim would

have been delighted, one assumes, that Bourdieu's own Durkheimian disposition had the effect it had in and on French culture.

Durkheim's ghost would have certainly taken pleasure at Lévi-Strauss' *Collège de France Leçon Inaugurale* (Lévi-Strauss, 1967) on 5 January 1960. The Chair of Social Anthropology was created in 1958. Lévi-Strauss took the occasion of his appointment to it to acknowledge the year of Durkheim's birth a century earlier in 1858. The most striking aspect of that 1960 lecture was the way Lévi-Strauss claimed Durkheim as the inspiration for his own studies of culture. Not only that, but Lévi-Strauss honored Durkheim's nephew, Marcel Mauss who had previously held the *Collège* chair in Sociology. This of course was part of a general affirmation of Durkheim's *equipe* including Maurice Halbwachs as well as Mauss. Halbwachs is often considered more of a philosopher, yet his writings on collective memory are directly in the lineage of Durkheim's collective representations to Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology. Mauss was much more of a cultural ethnographer and, with Durkheim, the author of *De quelques formes primitives de classification* (Durkheim, 1967) which, in 1903, set down not only the basic principles of Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* in 1912, while also securing a footing for Durkheimian sociology's primitive notion of what today some would called comparative social research.

As a result, had Durkheim been alive to hear Lévi-Strauss' tribute to him he might have given thought to the limitations of his own sociologies of knowledge and culture. Whatever he carried forth from his 1903 essay with Mauss, after 1945 Durkheim might have realized that he had been too absorbed in a sociology *for* France. It is at least possible that he would have had to rethink his basic principles as, in the wake of its liberation from Nazi occupation, France had to rethink itself. I have long thought (Lemert, 2006) that, beyond the limitations of his scheme, even of his more famous concept, *anomie,* Durkheim's most enduring concept is *collective representations* in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* in 1912. There, and in Ferdinand de Saussure's courses in general linguistics[3] (offered in Geneva at about the same time, 1906-1911), are found the formal principles of the structuralism that earned Lévi-Strauss his chair in the *Collège de France*. Structural anthropology was but one line among the variety of structuralisms that, immediately after the war, rivaled Sartre's existentialism for the attentions of the Parisian intellectual elite. Structuralism won, if one can put it this way, because France—having been the victim of the Nazi effort to steal and otherwise destroy its political and artistic cultures—had to rethink itself as a whole. France, like Germany (but unlike Britain and the United States), very much needed a stronger program for understanding its national culture.

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3   Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (Fontana/Collins, 1977) is a transcription of Saussure's lectures, published in 1916.

Many (especially careless American readers) thought of the structuralisms (including so-called post-structuralism) as some sort of off-beat, even absurdist, digression. The structuralist moment in France was, in fact, part of a necessary rethinking of France's place in the world. The long, sorry reign of Gaullist politics was part of that rethinking. On the other hand, the Parisian literary elite stood firm as a culture of resistance (in spite of its, to some, excessively elegant *normalien* discourse). Still, as time went by, even a few Anglophone clear-thinkers begrudgingly took to heart some of the writings of France's public *vedettes* from Lévi-Strauss to Foucault, Derrida, Bourdieu—even the tragic Louis Althusser. It would be silly to suppose that Durkheim was behind all this. But he did contribute to the deep structural background of these movements by his habit of always taking a structural attitude toward culture, especially French national culture. Had it been possible that, after Versailles in 1919, for some version of Weimar culture to survive, perhaps Germany would have been able to stand up to the National Socialists. But the Versailles Treaty that Hitler so hated saw to it that what Weimar might have been would not survive to put a brake in his insanity. After 1933 many of the artists and intellectuals of Weimar culture were in exile.

Hence, also, another irony associated with Durkheim and his ghost. There is no reason to believe that his strong program for national education could have saved secular France from Hitler. But there is reason to consider that certain of Durkheim's core ideas would endure, not as ghosts, but as social scientific and cultural ideas that would contribute to the many attempts to come to terms with what we now think of as global realities. The Cold War from 1946 to 1991 would have made some sense to Durkheim, if only because it so obviously set two very different, post-national collective representations of societal cultures against each other. The West's over-determined attachment to its various and vague ideologies of a righteous democracy was to a considerable degree a shadow of Soviet and Maoist global ideologies. Mao's cultural revolution of the 1960s was not all that different culturally from the Red Scare in the 1950s in the United States. Mao's was vastly more violent, but on both sides lives were ruined, literally, for no good reason.

Just after the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, technomedia of many kinds contributed to what we now call globalization—a truly global reality of economic, political, as well as cultural change that has plunged national societies into a state of uncertainty. There are, it hardly needs to be said, lingering and palpable differences among American, British, German, and French national cultures—not to mention among other of the 195 entities considered as independent countries. Still, as soon as one crosses into any of these, they will recognize very familiar manners and institutions, if only Starbucks or Kentucky Fried Chicken.

Where the line between sameness and difference among national cultures now lies is hard to say. Such a world as ours after 2017 would have made the urban social conflict that so worried Durkheim more than a century ago seem like child's play. Yet, down to the 100th anniversary of his death in 2017, Durkheim's ghost would find a haven in any attempt to think, even to understand, the whole of social things— or, more to the Durkheimian point, to gather those social facts that would permit amelioration of our anomic world order.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

Then again[4], the story of Durkheim's after-life in this world could have been different. What if Durkheim's beloved son had not been killed on the Eastern Front of what the West called the Great War? Had he not grieved so deeply for André, Durkheim might not have died in 1917. One can never know of course, but without the terrible pain only a father feels following a son's death, he might have survived and spent his considerable energy on France's agony—then not just its war, but also the crisis he believed France faced in a world without a healing moral bond. What if also, after 1921, he might have felt himself free enough to travel?

If one can imagine Durkheim traveling, it is all but certain that he would not have gone on holiday to the South of France to lie on the beach after a long mid-day *déjeuner* with wine. More likely Durkheim would have ventured abroad where something sociologically interesting was happening. If so, he might well have thought of Turkey. Perhaps also—in this fantasy of Durkheim's ghostly after life—he would have paid poignant attention to Gallipoli as a great battle in the East of the West's Great War. Then, after 23 April 1920, the first steps toward Mustafa Kemal's Republic of Turkey would have been of unique sociological interest to Durkheim. That fact alone might well have caused him to plan a trip to Istanbul, if not Ankara— at least because it would have been a more direct and comfortable journey by the Orient Express from Paris. But also because, especially then, because Istanbul was, as still it is, the Turkish city where monuments to the long history of premodern and traditional religions was still in evidence.

If Durkheim were to have disembarked in Istanbul on any given day, perhaps in 1922, when the Republic of Turkey was well formed, he would have been drawn to the fact that Turkey under Mustafa Kemal (not yet Atatürk) was at the time engaged in precisely the kind of social and political reform he had imagined for France. In Turkey, as foreigners may not remember, the long declining Ottoman Empire, in spite of a brief revival in 1908, collapsed after the Great War ended. Then Ankara became the capital of the Republic. Istanbul, however, had been the capital of the Islamic Ottoman Empire since 1453 when Mehmed II, the Conqueror, led the overthrow

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4   This section is written by Lemert for the *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology*.

of Greek Orthodox Constantinople. Mehmed's diplomatic genius lay in forging an agreement that assured the Orthodox Church autonomy in exchange for granting state authority to the Ottoman Empire—an accord signified by Mehmed's having assumed the ridiculous titular name *Caesar Romanus*.

The Roman/Byzantine Empire held sway improbably from 330 to 1453—with a brief interlude from 1204 to 1261 created by the fervor of the Roman Catholic Crusades. Byzantium was, thus, the Greek Orthodox center of what remained of Roman Christianity after the fall of Rome in 410. Durkheim—had he prepared for the journey he could not make—would surely have been impressed by the fact that the Byzantine Empire endured more than a millennium as the global center of Christianity. Then too, if we were to extend this this prehistory to include the Ottoman period from 1453 to 1920, once Durkheim might have disembarked in Istanbul he would have probably come to the ever more sociological realization that for the better part of two millennia one or another global religion was a force in the deep history of the Turkey.

France, by contrast, could be said to have had something of a similar history—but only if Gaul under Roman rule is taken to be embryonic France unified to a degree under the Frankish King, Clovis I, in 481. If, however, the Frankish period is taken to be the origin of the modern France Durkheim knew, then its prehistory is wildly different from even the Frankish period that came to be a dominant force in Gaul by conquest and a succession of minor kingdoms and cultures. The Salians, Chamavi, Frisians, Ripuarians, and Merovingians followed one after the other until the Frankish but Christian Carolingians consolidated a vague sort of religious social order. Then too, there is a body of French opinion that France owes its beginnings to Vercingétorix who in 52 BC led a Celtic revolt against the Romans occupying Gaul. Soon after, Caesar "crushed the rebellion with extraordinary savagery." The very idea that the 52 BC rebellion could be considered the origin of France seems to be very French—elegantly imaginative if factually rickety.

Where Turkey was continuously religious from its prehistory after 330 AD late in the Roman period, France was a melange of what some still call barbarian tribes with a variety of cultic values of which even Gaul under Charlemagne (742-814)—that is: Charles the Great, King of the Franks, then of the Lombards—who like his predecessors served the papacy in order to serve his and Gaul's own independent interests. Charles the Great—often thought of as the Father of Europe—melded a collection of ethnic cultures into the so-called Holy Roman Empire in 800. Charlemagne's kingdom was, at best, a pretense for a political, only vaguely religious, accord with Pope Leo III in which the Carolingians agreed to protect the papacy from its political rivals. In due course, after 900, the Holy Roman Empire fell under the spell of the Byzantium. If Charles the Great deserves recognition as the Father of Europe it may be due him

only because his alleged Empire came to the beginning of its end with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 where the Holy Roman Empire was chief among the signatories who agreed to respect the autonomy of political entities in Europe, thus creating the modern, secular nation-state.

This sketch of the history line along which modern Europe was fashioned out of a vaguely religious Holy Roman Empire suggests just how different the religious history of Durkheim's France was from that of the Roman-Byzantine Empire. The definitive end of Charlemagne's Empire came, ironically, in the aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789. And here we come back to our *what-if* fantasy of Durkheim's life after death.

Durkheim was nothing if not preoccupied with France and its fate. Yes, he drew ethnographical and numeric as well as philosophical data from sources as distant and different as Hebrew and Hindu Laws, suicides in Württemberg and Saxon, totemic cultures among the Wotjobaluk in Australia and the Sioux in North America, and the philosophical ideas of Immanuel Kant in Königsberg. Yet, most, if not all, of what he did led to a program of discovering the underlying causes of the troubles of modern life—failed laws, suicides, loss of the moral bond religion traditionally provided. Hence, the irony that the social scientific prophet of education in the culture of France could be the moral glue that might hold its conflict-ridden society together. The irony of it all is that, unlike Turkey, France's deep history was anything but one of a continuous moral order arising from a coherent religious order. Again it seems that Durkheim was writing out of his childhood experience in Épinal the small traditional, Jewish village of his birth—not exactly the pervasive religious order his theory supposed France had lost in his day. The France he experienced upon entering the *École Normale Supérieure* in 1879 was quite unlike the Jewish schuls his rabbinical father and his father's fathers guided for generations. ENS then as now was sternly competitive. Students were meant to succeed intellectually even when only the special few can lead a given class. Their reading was not of scriptures except in the sense of that philosophy in particular is worshipped among the Parisian literati. Durkheim's sense of a national moral crisis may have been shaped as much by his personal experience as by the anti-clerical measures of France's 1789 revolution.

If Durkheim had disembarked the Orient Express in Istanbul, perhaps in 1922, he would have surely been impressed right off his first morning upon hearing the Islamic calls to prayer which, even without amplification, would have drifted across the Bosporous. He might also, on the first day, walked about to find the city's then still most famous architectural wonder, the *Ayasofya* in the *Fatih* district of Istanbul. In our time this miracle of human inspiration and art is the *Ayasofya Müzesi*—a secularized museum since 1935. But on Durkheim's imaginary visit to Istanbul early

in the 1920s he might have seen in the *Ayasofya* a surprising confirmation of his theory of the importance of religion in creating a social bond. *Ayasofya* had been the Eastern Orthodox Cathedral of Constantinople from the earliest days of Christian presence in the region Turkey would come to dominate under the Ottomans. Then in 1453 Mehmed the Conqueror had the Christian cathedral converted into the *Ayasofya*, the religious center of his Empire. It was the same building, ordained in time to serve two gods.

Even more, Durkheim would have been at least interested in the historical fact that the bouleversements of the Ottoman rise to power in 1453 seemed to have been a near letter-perfect confirmation of his idea that traditional religion—as opposed to any given religion—had served as the moral glue that held traditional societies together. This was a disposition formed it would seem by Durkheim's Jewish childhood in Épinal. Still, on this central point of his thinking, it is too bad that he hadn't known Max Weber better. Not long after Durkheim's writings on the *anomie* in *Suicide* (1897), Weber offered his own theory of the prehistory of modern urban societies in his stunning *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-05). When Durkheim published *Suicide*, Weber was still in the throes of the depression provoked by disputes with his father that seem to have led to Max Weber Sr's death in 1897. Given the differences between German and French intellectual life in the day, it would have been somewhat more likely that Weber, had he not been suffering so, would have discovered Durkheim's book.

Even in the early period of *L'Année Sociologique* (1896-1924) in which Durkheim's group was reviewing sociologies outside France, Weber could have taught his French peer about the effects of modern economics on the religious sphere. For whatever reason, Durkheim seems not to have taken seriously the then looming reality that the rational instrumental ethic of capitalism is not only destructive of traditional values but leads to an entirely different social order in which economic values dominate. It is likely that his attitude on the modern world was fixed by his obvious optimism as to the positive values of the organic division of labor as opposed to the mechanical solidarity:

> …[Mechanical] solidarity does not link men with the same force as the division of labor, and that, moreover, it leaves outside its scope the major part of phenomena actually social, it will become still more evident that social solidarity tends to become exclusively organic. It is the division of labor which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the *common conscience*. It is the principle bond of social aggregates of higher types.

This was Durkheim in 1893 launching his career with the *The Division of Labor in Society*. But was he not creating a double-bind for himself? If the modern "higher-type" of organic solidarity provides a place for "phenomena actually social" by its social division of labor, then what is to be made of the early appearance of *conscience collective* in this text?

It is worth noting that Steven Lukes makes the important point that here Durkheim is revising by inversion Ferdinand Toennies's famous gemeinschaft/gesellschaft dichotomy in which community is distinguished from society. Weber is known to have been of like mind with Toennies whose dichotomy is somewhere in the deep background of Weber's systematic formulation of traditional versus modern authorities. Likewise, Durkheim's knowledge of Toennies was likely to have been at work when the French sociologist was staking out new intellectual territory. In any case, the trouble Durkheim made for himself in the reversal of the German concepts is already evident in *The Division of Social Labor*. If organic solidarity is the higher, more modern division of labor then why does it seem to lack the conceptual sense of community captured by the German term *gemeinschaft*? If, as both Toennies and Weber thought (in different ways), traditional societies are more *gemeinschaftliche* than modern *gesellschaftliche* societies, then how could it be, as Durkheim thought, that the traditional is the instance of mechanical solidarity in which their communal order is so severely mechanical, and not (as he also thought) imbued with a viable collective consciousness while being organically dispersed among its socially divided social labors—or, as Weber called them, the spheres of the modern world. Hence, the not so obvious complications of Durkheim's *The Division of Social Labor* contributed to a contradiction in his subsequent concerns in *Suicide* with respect to the *anomic* aspects of the modern world. If *anomie* arose from a collective consciousness that was too feeble to ward off the deadly effects of the modern urban societies, then what is to be made of the proposed higher social values of the organic division of social labor?

Thus, if Durkheim's ghost had embodied itself as a Durkheim who survived death in 1917, a visit to Istanbul in 1922 might well have relieved the confusion he not only created for himself but which also would likely have caused him to rethink his last great book. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* in 1912 was as close as Durkheim came to writing something like an all but pure theory of knowledge. In this one respect his thinking was closer to the comparably theoretical *Division of Social Labor in 1893*, than to *Suicide* in 1897 and *Primitive Classifications* in 1903. Of course, theory for Durkheim was never pure theory (if there is such a thing). Still the richly empirical *Primitive Classifications* was the opening salvo that led, a decade later, to *Elementary Forms* in 1912 in which the organizing concept is the *collective representations* typical of elementary religions which, he thought, served as something of a model, if not the precursor of the ideal modern society.

> Collective representations are the result of an immense co-operation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united, and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge.

This from the beginning of *Elementary Forms* and repeated at the end of the book in his famous summary statement of *collective representations:* "The nature of the concept, thus defined, bespeaks its origin. If it is common to all, it is the work of community." Yet, this brilliant book betrays its title. Religious life, when all is said and done, is no more than the traditional basis of social life—thus the elementary form not of religion but of human knowledge, thus of culture and society itself.

It is possible that the Great War of 1914, coming just two years after Durkheim's optimistic *Elementary Forms*, might have shaken his intellectual assumptions as much as it seems to have disturbed his emotional and moral commitments. At the least, had André not been killed and had Emile survived to experience the short-lived triumph imposed on Germany in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Durkheim almost surely would have understood the reasons why John Maynard Keynes quit the British delegation that signed the vengeful treaty of 1919. Thus it is also possible that he could have gone to Istanbul for any number of reasons of which one, as I suggested, might have been to study the effects of the long enduring social role of traditional religions. Another, of course, would have been, as I have also said, to study the facts and features of the then burgeoning democratic republic. Then too, after realizing the potential for disaster in the flawed Treaty of 1919, he might have come to Istanbul, away from familiar intellectual territory, to reflect on the contradictions in his life's work.

If indeed he had taken the Orient Express to get away to dig deeper, he would surely have known enough to be intrigued by Mustafa Kemal's vision for a secularizing Turkey bent upon entering the modern world of Western Europe. As time then went by, the Republic of Turkey would in fact become its own version of democratic republic Durkheim had never experienced in France. France's 1789 Revolution was so structurally and morally flawed that whatever one thinks of the civilizing purposes that from time to time peeked out from its blanket of blood, French history in the 1800s until Durkheim's time was at best a still-born democracy shrouded by unrelenting conflict. In a certain sense one could say that Durkheim's complaint ought not to have been directed at French society so much as French politics.

Had Durkheim's ghost been patient enough to hover about well into the twentieth century to the decades after the Second World War it might have seen a better world. In the decades after recovering from the ruins of war, Europe formed itself into a union of people and politics. Such a political, even social, phenomenon would have surely moved Durkheim's ghost to report back beyond the grave in Épinal that a societal miracle had occurred. Beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the European Union fashioned a relatively stable accord of eventually 28 member nations that could be viewed as the fulfillment of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In 1959, the year after its founding, the EU entered into membership negotiations with Turkey. In 2018

those negotiations were stalled in light of President Recep Erdoğan's abandonment of modern Turkey's secular democratic ideals. Just the same, the Republic of Turkey would not have drawn so close to the rest of Europe had not Kemal Atatürk succeeded in fashioning a secularized Turkey—a nation with blemishes like all others but also one able from time to time to grow a robust economy and a modern state that served the EU's strategic interests in the Middle East.

Of course, the EU states had to be secure enough in their own values to look beyond the fact that, late Ottoman Turkey even as it was drifting toward a secular democracy, was responsible for the genocide of Turkish Armenians. Today, it might be objected that this was in Turkey's distant past. Yet, unlike Germany's attempt to remember so as not to forget Hitler's holocaust, modern Turkey does not recognize its holocaust that killed so many and sent others seeking refuge in Syria. In 2004 Turkey's most globally respected writer, Orhan Pamuk, was indicted for violating the specious Article 301 of the Penal Code making it a crime to insult the Republic. Pamuk's insult was that he had denounced his government's role in the violence done against both Armenians and Kurds. The charges were dropped in 2006 after world-wide protest led by the EU.

Then too, in our day, as before, more than a few EU member states have condoned, even approved, attitudes toward immigrants that, as in the United States after 2016, are at least racist and at worst inclined toward something like fascism.

Democracy is a hard game to play. It commits sins against its own high principle and nowhere more so than in the United States which has long had a preposterously high regard for its values while suffering the moral dilemma of having been a nation of slave holders, that also killed and removed its aboriginal people, put Japanese citizens in confinement camps during WWII, and most recently after 2018 incarcerated immigrants while splitting apart their families. This is my country and, as the saying goes, I love it—but love (if that is the word) always runs up against terrible truths of its own making. Durkheim, it would seem, loved the France of his day. He devoted his considerable intellectual powers to explaining its situation and seeking a way out of its dilemmas. Had he survived the war that killed him, he would have been at first excited then disappointed (to say the least) by what his ghost would have learned not just about Turkey but about most, if not all, modern democratic societies.

Yet, in our day, the world with all its blemishes (a far too innocent term) needs hopeful, perhaps gentle, souls like Durkheim. On that what he brought from Épinal could be broadcast to and, even, inscribed on this wider world! Perhaps our children will figure out how this can come to pass.[5]

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5   The views are those of the author and not the editors of the *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology*.

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İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi

ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Avrupa Refah Rejimleri ve Türkiye'de Öznel İyi Oluş

Ümmügülsüm Aysan[1]

Öz

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Avrupa Yaşam Kalitesi araştırması (2012) verilerine dayanarak, Avrupa ve Türkiye'deki öznel iyi oluş seviyelerinin, refah rejimi tartışmaları bağlamında mukayeseli analizini ortaya koymaktır. Öznel iyi oluş yaşam memnuniyeti ve mutluluk gibi bilişsel ve duygusal bileşenlerden oluşan çok boyutlu bir kavramdır. Kişilik yapısı, cinsiyet, yaş, gelir, medeni durum gibi bireysel özellikler yanında ülkenin ekonomik durumu, toplumsal yapı ve politik yapı gibi makro faktörlerden de etkilenir. Dolayısıyla bireylerin ve toplumların yaşam kalitesine etki eden refah devletinin ve sosyal politikaların nitelikleri de öznel iyi oluş seviyelerine tesir etmektedir. Analiz sonuçları sosyal politika uygulamalarının kurumsallaştığı gelişmiş refah rejimlerinde öznel iyi oluş seviyelerinin az gelişmiş refah rejimlerine göre daha yüksek olduğunu göstermektedir. Mutluluk ve yaşam memnuniyeti Sosyal Demokrat ülkelerde en yüksek iken, Güney Avrupa ve Post sosyalist refah rejimlerinde en düşük seviyelerdedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Öznel iyi oluş • Mutluluk • Yaşam memnuniyeti • Refah devleti • Eşitsizlik

Subjective Well-Being in European Welfare Regimes and Turkey
Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyze the subjective well-being levels of Europeans and Turkish citizens within the context of welfare-regime typology using the European Quality of Life Survey's (EQLS) 2012 data. Subjective well-being, which consists of cognitive factors such as life satisfaction and affective factors such as happiness, is affected by individual factors such as personality, gender, age, income, and marital status, as well as macro factors such as macroeconomic indicators, political institutions, and quality of society. Welfare-state types and the quality of social policies are also related to subjective well-being. This study demonstrates that the subjective well-being levels in institutionalized welfare regimes are higher through high levels of social expenditures and developed social services. Furthermore, differences between the lowest and highest income quartiles for subjective well-being are lowest in social-democratic welfare regimes.

Keywords

Subjective well-being • Happiness • Life satisfaction • Welfare state • Inequality

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Extended Summary

People have questioned the qualities of a good life since ancient times. Researchers of subjective well-being are interested in how humans feel about and judge the quality of their lives, notwithstanding others' opinions. Numerous causes are found, including health, marital status, job status, and income, for the variations of subjective well-being at the individual level. Furthermore, the populations of different countries have revealed marked differences in subjective well-being. A country's prevalent economic situation is the first plausible reason. Individuals in affluent societies are expected to be happier than people in economically poor countries. However, subjective well-being differences also are present among rich Western societies. Researchers have claimed that social democratic welfare states are able to produce more happiness for their citizens (Radcliff, 2001; Rothstein, 2010). Furthermore, differences in subjective well-being among various social groups such as the lowest and highest income groups are lower in these countries. This study will compare the subjective well-being levels of the welfare regimes in Europe and Turkey using 2012 data from the European Quality of Life Survey.

Subjective Well-Being

Subjective well-being is a field that studies the perceived quality of life. In other words, it is the psychology of quality of life, it refers to individuals' evaluations of their lives, and encompasses both cognitive judgments of satisfaction and affective appraisals of mood and emotion (Diener et al., 1999).

The field of subjective well-being has three characteristics. First, it is subjective and about individual experiences. Secondly, it requires both the absence of negative factors and presence of positive factors such as happiness. Last but not least, emphasis is usually placed on the global assessment of all aspects of an individual's life, not on specific domains like income satisfaction (Diener, 1984).

Two main approaches exist for measuring subjective well-being. While the hedonic approach defines well-being in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance with a focus on happiness, the eudaimonic approach targets meaning and self-realization, defining well-being with respect to the degree to which an individual fully functions (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Adopting a broader perspective in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being (2013), subjective well-being is maintained to encompass three elements: life evaluation, affect, and eudaimonia. Life evaluation is deliberate appraisal of a person's life, usually measured by life satisfaction. Affect is about both positive (happiness and joy) and negative (anger and fear) feelings and emotions while eudaimonia is related to meaningfulness and purpose in life (OECD, 2013).

Numerous causes exist for the variations in subjective well-being at the individual level. Empirical research has indicated that being married, having children, feeling free and healthy, and participating in religious activities increase individuals' subjective well-being. Mental and physical health problems, personal sorrows, long-term unemployment, and bereavements make people unhappy. Aside from individual factors, many macro factors are found to affect the level of subjective well-being. Economists are interested in the relationships among macroeconomic indicators such as gross national product inflation, unemployment, inequality, and happiness. Various studies have demonstrated people living in rich countries to be happier than those living in poor countries (Frey & Stutzer, 2010). Culture may be a good reason as to why people in the culturally similar countries of Latin America have high subjective well-being, whereas the subjective well-being of those in post-socialist countries is lower than their earnings would forecast.

Welfare regimes differ in how they create and distribute well-being. Tremendous literature exists on the classification of welfare regimes. In his seminal book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), Esping-Andersen classified 18 OECD countries up to the 1980s according to their social stratifications and levels of decommodification. Decommodification is "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 37). Three distinct welfare regimes are found in his classification: the Liberal (Anglo-Saxon or English Speaking), the Conservative (Continental European or Corporatist), and the Social Democratic (Scandinavian) regimes.

In liberal welfare regimes, market plays a crucial role while social expenditures are very limited compared to other welfare regimes. Rights and benefits are distributed through means-testing, and welfare recipients are generally stigmatized. In conservative welfare regimes, rights and benefits are distributed according to occupational status, and benefits increase as contributions increase. Conservative welfare regimes maintain and reinforce the existing social classes. The social democratic welfare regime is also defined as the universalistic welfare regime and has a broad range of social services and benefits covering the entire population. Benefits are delivered on the basis of uniform rules of eligibility (Rothstein, 2010). Later, Southern European welfare states and post-socialist welfare states were added to this classification (Aidukaite, 2009; Özdemir, 2007).

Although numerous studies exist on welfare regimes, most scholars are interested in the indicators of objective quality of life. Only a handful of studies are found to focus on how people genuinely assess their lives through indicators of subjective well-being. Radcliff (2001) found a strong positive relationship between welfare state

and life satisfaction. He claimed life satisfaction increase to the extent that states decrease market reliance and adopt social democratic welfare regimes. On the other hand, contrary to his expectations Veenhoven (2000) found no connection between welfare state and happiness.

Data and Method

This paper uses the European Foundation's (Eurofound) European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS; 2012) and its data. The questionnaire contains many questions about both the objective and subjective aspects of quality of life. The EQLS records many aspects of the quality of life in Europe and involves social, financial, and environmental determinants, alongside European societies' well-being and life quality. This survey is the third wave of quality-of-life surveys started in 2003. Eurofound has created a consolidated methodological approach and quality-assurance system through these cross-national studies, not only for the European Union but also for other nations in the region. This survey covers over 40,000 people from 28 EU member countries and six candidate countries (Iceland, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey), a total of 34 countries.

Results

Welch-ANOVA tests have been conducted to check whether statistically significant variations of subjective well-being exist among the means of different welfare regimes. Analysis has shown significant mean differences to exist among the welfare regimes for both life satisfaction ($F = 249.526$, $p < .000$) and happiness ($F = 154.422$, $p < .000$).

The Games-Howell post-hoc tests have been conducted to confirm where the differences occur among the groups. Life satisfaction has no statistically significant differences between the liberal ($M = 7.30$) and the corporatist ($M = 7.25$) regimes, which respectively rank second and third after the social democratic regime ($M = 7.94$). No statistically significant difference exists between the post socialist regime ($M = 6.62$) and Turkey ($M = 6.61$), both of which come after Southern European welfare regimes ($M = 7.02$).

Social democratic welfare regimes also have the best scores ($M = 7.89$) for happiness. The Games-Howell post-hoc tests show the differences among all groups to be statistically significant. The mean values are as follows: $M_{Liberal} = 7.89$, $M_{Conservative} = 7.43$, $M_{Southern European} = 7.28$, $M_{Post-Socialist} = 7.05$, and $M_{Turkey} = 6.87$.

Furthermore, the distribution of happiness is mostly even in these countries. The difference in life satisfaction between the first and fourth income quartiles (i.e., the

difference between the 25% with the highest income and the 25% with the lowest income) is lowest in social democratic welfare regimes (0.71). This difference is highest in post-socialist countries (1.48) and liberal countries (1.37).

Conclusion

This study has analyzed the variations in subjective well-being across welfare regimes, with particular focus on life satisfaction and happiness, using the individual data obtained from the third wave of the EQLS. The results provide evidence that the citizens of social democratic welfare regimes have reported the highest happiness and life satisfaction scores. These regimes also compensate best for income differences in subjective well-being compared to other welfare-state regimes. In light of the aforementioned variations across welfare regimes, social policies can be concluded to affect subjective well-being.

Avrupa Refah Rejimleri ve Türkiye'de Öznel İyi Oluş

Son yıllarda daha çok mutluluk ve yaşam memnuniyeti alt bileşenleriyle anılan öznel iyi oluş (subjective well-being) alanına olan ilgi artmıştır. Öncü çalışmalar psikologlar tarafından yapılmış olsa da (Diener, 1984; Veenhoven, 1996); ekonomist ve siyaset bilimcilerin de bu alana ilgisi artmaya başlamıştır. Yaş, eğitim, genetik yatkınlık, bireysel gelir, medeni durum, sağlık durumu, aile ve sosyal çevre gibi pek çok bireysel ve sosyal etmen yanında; enflasyon, işsizlik, milli gelir gibi makroekonomik etmen ile demokrasinin gelişmişlik düzeyi, kurumlara güven, yolsuzluk gibi kurumsal etmenlerin de öznel iyi oluşa etki ettiği tespit edilmiştir (Frey ve Stutzer, 2000).

Refah devleti ve sosyal politika ile öznel iyi oluş ilişkisi de, bu bağlamda çalışılmaktadır (Pacek ve Radcliff, 2008; Veenhoven, 2000). Temel amacı vatandaşlarının yaşam kalitesini yükseltmek olan refah devleti vatandaşlarını sosyal risklere karşı koruma altına alır; özellikle yaşlılar, engelliler, yoksullar, işsizler gibi toplumun en riskli gruplarını sosyal dışlanma tehlikesine karşı muhafaza eder; temel ihtiyaçlarını sağlamada sıkıntı yaşamadan toplum içinde varlıklarını sürdürebilmelerini sağlar. Bunun muhtemel sonucu ise gelişmiş refah devletlerinde öznel iyi oluş seviyelerinin diğer devletlere nazaran daha yüksek olmasıdır. Ancak bu konuda yapılan çalışmalar çelişkili sonuçlar ortaya koymaktadır. Veenhoven (2000) refah harcamalarının yüksek oluşu ile mutluluk arasında bir ilişki olmadığını belirtirken, Radcliff (2001) ve Rothstein (2010) gelişmiş refah devletlerinde mutluluk seviyelerinin daha yüksek olduğunu iddia eder.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Avrupa'da farklı refah rejimlerine dâhil ülkeler ile Türkiye'nin öznel iyi oluş seviyelerinin Avrupa Yaşam Koşulları Araştırması (EQLS, 2012) verileri kullanılarak karşılaştırmaktır. İlk bölümde öznel iyi oluş kavramının tanımı, bileşenleri ve öznel iyi oluşa etki eden faktörler ile refah devleti sınıflandırmasından bahsedilecektir. İkinci bölümde ise veri ve yöntem kısaca açıklanacak, araştırmanın bulguları sunulacaktır.

Öznel İyi Oluş

İnsanların yaşamlarını değerlendirmelerini anlamaya çalışan öznel iyi oluş genel olarak yaşam kalitesi olarak adlandırılan daha kapsamlı bir araştırma alanının parçasıdır. Alanın temel amacı "iyi yaşam" kriterlerinin belirlenmesi, mevcut durumun bu kriterlere ne kadar yakın olduğunun ve ideale ulaşmak için yapılması gerekenlerin tespit edilmesidir (Veenhoven, 1996).

Öznel iyi oluş kavramına dair pek çok tanım mevcuttur ancak en geçerli tanım alanda sayısız araştırma sahibi olan Ed Diener'e aittir. Diener'e göre öznel iyi oluş, bireyin sahip olduğu olumlu ve olumsuz duygular ile yaşamdan aldığı doyuma ilişkin

olarak yaptığı öznel değerlendirmelerin bütünüdür (Diener, 1984). Bireyin çeşitli olaylara verdiği tepkiler, içinde bulunduğu duygu durumu ve yaşamdan aldığı doyuma ilişkin düşünceleri, iş, arkadaşlık, okul, evlilik gibi çeşitli yaşam alanlarına ilişkin tatmin seviyeleri bu değerlendirmede dikkate alınır (Diener, Oishi ve Lucas, 2003). Öznel iyi olma üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda kişinin kendi yaşamını sevmesinin "iyi yaşam"ın en önemli öğelerinden biri olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Önemli olan kişinin kendi yaşamını değerlendirmesi ve yargı bildirmesidir. Yargılar oluşturulurken bireyin hem bilişsel hem de duygusal değerlendirmeleri önemlidir. Yani olaylara gösterilen duygusal reaksiyonlar da yaşam doyumuna dair bilişsel değerlendirmeler de yargıların oluşturulmasına etki eder (Diener, Lucas, Oishi, Snyder ve Lopez, 2002).

Öznel iyi olma kavramının üç unsuru; yaşam memnuniyeti, olumlu duygulanım ve olumsuz duygulanımdır. Yaşam memnuniyeti öznel iyi oluşun bilişsel boyutunu, olumlu ve olumsuz duygulanım ise duygusal boyutunu oluşturur. Öznel iyi olma halinin bilişsel boyutuna işaret eden *yaşam memnuniyeti*, kişinin kendi yaşamının, seçmiş olduğu kıstaslara uygunluğuna göre değerlendirmesidir. Kişinin kendi hayatıyla ilgili beklentileri ile sahip olduğu hayatın nitelikleri arasında yapılan karşılaştırma yaşam memnuniyeti düzeyini belirler. Kişi idealize ettiği hayata ne kadar uygun bir yaşam sürdüğünü düşünüyorsa yaşam memnuniyeti de o derece yüksek olacaktır (Diener, 1984).

Yaşamın genel olarak değerlendirmesi bireyin tüm değerlendirme kıstaslarını içerir: bireyin nasıl hissettiği, beklentilerinin ne derece karşılandığı, çeşitli değişkenlerin ne derece arzu edilir olduğu gibi sorular bu değerlendirmelere örnek olarak verilebilir (Saris, Veenhoven, Scherpenzeel ve Bunting, 1996). Hayatta başarı ve paraya büyük önem veren bir insan yaşam memnuniyeti değerlendirmesini yaparken bu alanlardaki mevcut durumuna daha büyük ağırlık atfederken; sosyal çevre ve aile ilişkilerine daha çok önem veren bir insan aile ve çevresi ile ilgili durumuna bakarak değerlendirme yapacaktır. İlk durumda kişinin başarılı ve zengin olması yaşam memnuniyetinin daha yüksek olmasına sebep olabilecekken, ikinci durumda sosyal ilişkiler ve aileden duyulan memnuniyet yüksek yaşam memnuniyeti getirebilecektir.

Duygulanım *(affect)* ise öznel iyi oluşun duygusal boyutunu ifade etmektedir. Türk Dil Kurumu duygulanımı "istenç(irade) ve anlıktan(bilme yetisi) ayrı görülen, duygusal tepkiler gösterme durumu" olarak tanımlamaktadır. Olumlu duygulanım içerisinde mutluluk, sevinç gibi genelde bireyler için kendilerini iyi hissedebilecekleri duyguları ifade eder. Olumsuz duygulanım ise bireyi kötü hissettirebilecek öfke, nefret, kızgınlık gibi duyguları kapsar (Diener ve ark., 2002). Olumlu ve olumsuz duygulanım birbiriyle ters orantılı ancak bağımsız yani birbirinin zıddı olmayan kavramlardır (Cacioppo ve Berntson, 1999). Mesela, olumsuz bir duygu olan stres ve

olumlu bir duygu olan gurur eş zamanlı olarak deneyimlenebilir. Yani olumlu duygu durumu her zaman olumsuz duygu durumuyla ters ilişkili olmayabilir. Öznel iyi oluşu yüksek olan kişinin yaşam memnuniyetinin yüksek olması, çoğunlukla hoş duygular, haz duyguları içerisinde olması ve nadiren üzüntü, gerginlik, tedirginlik gibi olumsuz duyguları hissetmesi beklenir. İyi oluşu düşük kişinin ise yaşam memnuniyetinin düşük olması, az düzeyde hoş duygular ve haz yaşaması, öfke, üzüntü, keder gibi olumsuz duyguları daha sıklıkla yaşaması beklenir (Diener, 1984).

Hedonik ve Eudaimonik Yaklaşım. İyi bir hayatın nasıl olacağına dair tartışmaların kökeni ilk çağ filozoflarına kadar uzanır. Günümüze kadar uzanan tartışmalarda iyi oluşa dair iki farklı yaklaşım göze çarpar. Aristippus ve Epikür'ün fikirlerine dayanan hedonist yaklaşım ile Aristo'nun fikirlerine dayanan eudaimonik yaklaşım. Hedonik yaklaşım mutluluğa odaklanır, iyi olmayı hazzı elde etme ve acıdan kaçış; yani pozitif ve negatif duyguların dengelenmesi olarak tanımlar. Aristippus hazzın mutlak iyi olduğunu, insan eylemlerinin sonucunda haz sağlayacak bir biçimde düzenlenmesi gerektiğini, en uygun davranış biçiminin sürekli haz verene yönelme olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Her davranışın nedeni mutlu olma isteğidir ve mutluluk haz dolu anların toplamıdır (Ryan ve Deci, 2001).

Eudaimonik yaklaşım ise bireyin kendini gerçekleştirmesi ve erdemli eylemlere odaklanır. Aristo'ya göre insan eylemleri sonucu ulaşılacak en yüksek iyi olan *eudaimonia* bireyin erdemli potansiyelini gerçekleştirmesi sonucu ortaya çıkar (Ryan ve Deci, 2001). Ona göre en yüksek iyi herkes için bireysel yetenek ve eğilimine göre değişen, kendini gerçekleştirme eylemidir. Aristo'ya göre bu eylemler aynı zamanda erdemli olmalıdır. Bir başka deyişle, kişi kendisini bilecek ve var olan potansiyelini maksimum seviyede gerçekleştirebilmek için erdemli davranışlarda bulunacaktır. Aristo'nun yaklaşımında gerçek mutluluk hazların tatmini sonucu ortaya çıkan bir sonuç değil, kendini gerçekleştirme yolculuğunda sergilenen erdemli davranışlar eşliğinde hissedilen bir durumdur. Yani bir sonuç değil bir süreçtir (Akarsu, 1998).

Öznel iyi oluş literatüründe hedonist yaklaşımın hâkim olduğu görülür. Ancak eudaimonik ve hedonik iyi olmayı birlikte ele alan çalışmalar da mevcuttur. Örneğin, OECD daha kapsayıcı yaklaşımı benimseyerek ulusal hesaplamalarda kullanılmak üzere hazırladığı OECD Öznel İyi oluş Ölçüm Kılavuzu'nda *(OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being)* Şekil 1'deki üçlü kavramsallaştırmayı kullanır (OECD, 2013). Bu yaklaşıma göre öznel iyi oluş hedonik ve eudaimonik bileşenlerden oluşmaktadır. Duygulanım iyi oluşun hedonist bileşenidir. Ancak yaşam memnuniyeti ya da yaşam değerlendirmeleri sadece hedonist değildir; eudaimonik boyutları da vardır (Ryan ve Deci, 2001). Ryff'in psikolojik iyi oluş kuramında (Ryff ve Keyes, 1995) belirttiği bağımsızlık, hayatın anlamı ve amacı, kendini gerçekleştirme ve yeterlik gibi eudaimonia bileşenleri de öznel iyi oluşun belirleyicilerindendir. Bireyler

yaşamlarını değerlendirirken bilinçli veya bilinçsiz bu boyutları da gözden geçirirler. Anlamlı ve kendini gerçekleştirebildiği bir hayat yaşadığını düşünen bireyin yaşam memnuniyeti değerlendirmesi bu durumdan olumlu etkilenecektir.

Şekil 1. Öznel iyi oluş (OECD, 2013, s. 33).

Öznel İyi Oluşun Ölçümü. Öznel iyi oluşun ölçümünde kişinin kendi öznel yargılarına dayalı, beyan esaslı taramalar kullanılır. Bunun sebebi ölçeği yanıtlayanın kendi iyi oluş deneyimini bilmede ve bunu bildirmede öncelikli olmasıdır. Yalnızca değerlendirmede bulunan kişi kendi hazlarını ve acılarını değerlendirip, içsel deneyimleri sonucunda yaşamının ne kadar değerli olduğunu hesaplayabilir. Öznel iyi oluş mutluluk, yaşam memnuniyeti, yaşam alanlarından memnuniyet gibi pek çok kavramı kapsayan üst bir kavramdır. Bu nedenle genellikle her bir kavramın ölçümünde farklı ölçekler kullanıldığı görülür. Ancak öznel iyi oluşu bir bütün olarak ölçen ölçek çalışmaları mevcuttur (Tuzgöl-Erdost, 2005).

Öznel iyi oluşun her bir boyutunu ölçen tek-nesne veya çoklu-nesne ölçümleri mevcuttur. Tek-nesne ölçeklerde katılımcılara tek bir soruyla yaşamlarından ne kadar memnun oldukları ya da ne kadar mutlu oldukları sorulur. Çoklu-nesne ölçekleri ise birden fazla soru sorularak genel memnuniyet seviyesi veya duygulanım düzeyi ölçülür. PANAS (Pozitif ve Negatif Duygu Durum Ölçeği) Watson, Clark ve Tellegen (1988) tarafından geliştirilmiş ve Gençöz (2000), tarafından Türkçeye uyarlanmıştır. Bu ölçekte bireylerin pozitif ve negatif duygulanımını belirlemek üzere toplam 20 ifade bulunmaktadır. Diener, Emmons, Larsen ve Griffin (1985) tarafından geliştirilen SWLS (Yaşam Memnuniyeti Ölçeği) 5 maddeden oluşan ve öznel iyi oluş çalışmalarında sıklıkla kullanılan bir ölçektir. Öznel iyi oluşu ölçen uluslararası araştırmalar Cantril (1965) ve Gallup'un (1976) çalışmalarıyla başlamıştır. Hali hazırda Dünya Değerler Araştırması, Gallup Dünya Araştırması, Avrupa Sosyal Taraması gibi pek çok uluslararası araştırmada tek maddeli öznel iyi oluş soruları sorulmaktadır. Bu araştırmalarda katılımcılara tek bir soruyla yaşamlarından ne kadar memnun oldukları, ya da ne kadar mutlu oldukları sorulur ve mutluluk ve/ya memnuniyetlerini derecelendirmeleri istenir. Ekonomi literatüründe bu araştırmalardan sıklıkla istifade edilmektedir.

Öznel İyi Oluşa Etki Eden Faktörler. Yaşam memnuniyeti üzerine ilk çalışmalardan birini yapan Wilson'a göre mutlu insan genç, sağlıklı, iyi eğitimli, iyi kazanan, dindar, evli, sosyal, öz güveni yüksek, işinden memnun, beklentileri orta seviyede olan, farklı zekâ seviyelerinden kadın veya erkektir (1967, s. 294). Bu çalışmanın üzerinden geçen yarım asır içinde yaşam memnuniyetini etkileyen faktörler üzerine çok sayıda araştırma yapılmıştır. Frey ve Stutzer (2010) öznel iyi oluşla ilişkili faktörleri 5 grupta inceler: i) kişilik yapısı; dışadönüklük, öz saygı, nevrotiklik, ii) sosyodemografik özellikler; yaş, cinsiyet, medeni durum, dindarlık, eğitim, iii) durumsal faktörler; Sağlık durumu, iş ve çalışma koşulları, kişilerarası ilişkiler, iv) ekonomik faktörler: gelir, iş durumu, milli gelir, v) kurumsal faktörler; demokratik kurumların kalitesi.

Bireylerin kişilik özellikleri, yaşama bakış ve olayları algılayışlarında çok etkilidir. Benzer şekilde kişilik özelliklerinin iyi olma hali üzerinde de diğer bütün faktörlerden çok daha fazla etkili olduğu görülmüştür (Lykken ve Tellegen, 1996). Yani bazı insanlar fıtratları gereği yaşama ve olaylara olumlu yaklaşırken, bazıları kötümser olabilmektedir. Myers ve Diener (1995) mutlu insanların özgüven sahibi, iyimser, dışa dönük ve içten denetimliliği yüksek bireyler olduğunu öne sürer.

Yaş ve öznel iyi oluş ilişkisini inceleyen pek çok araştırmaya göre ilerleyen yaşla birlikte objektif yaşam koşullarında gözle görülür gerilemeler yaşanır. Sağlık durumunda bozulmalar, emekli maaşı ile yaşamak zorunda kalmak, işlev kayıpları, yakınların kaybı nedeniyle sosyal ilişkilerin azalması öznel iyi oluşu olumsuz etkileyen önemli değişmelerdir. Ancak ilerleyen yaşlarda objektif koşullarda oluşan problemlere rağmen öznel iyi oluşun azalmadığını, hatta arttığını gösteren pek çok araştırma da mevcuttur (Gana, Bailly, Saada, Joulain ve Alaphilippe, 2013). Yaşlılığın getirdiği kayıplara rağmen, öznel iyi oluşun düşmemesi literatürde memnuniyet paradoksu olarak adlandırılmaktadır (Schilling, 2006).

Medeni durum ve öznel iyi oluş arasında kuvvetli bir ilişki mevcuttur. Yapılan araştırmaların ortak sonucu evli bireylerin, bekâr, dul veya eşinden ayrı yaşayan bireylerden daha yüksek yaşam memnuniyeti düzeyine sahip olduğudur. Yaş, eğitim, gelir düzeyi gibi faktörler kontrol edildiğinde dahi medeni durum yaşam memnuniyetini güçlü şekilde etkilemektedir (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis ve Diener, 2013).

Araştırmalar sağlık ve yaşam memnuniyetinin güçlü şekilde ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Sağlıklı kimseler kendilerini daha iyi hissettikleri, yapmak istedikleri şeyleri yapabildikleri, sosyal ve fiziksel olarak aktif oldukları için daha mutludur (Argyle, 1999). Bireylerin yalnızca nesnel sağlık göstergeleri değil sağlık durumları ile ilgili hissettikleri de yaşam memnuniyeti üzerine etkilidir. Diener bireylerin sağlık durumlarıyla ilgili değerlendirmelerinin öznel iyi oluş üzerindeki etkisinin, objektif sağlık durumlarının etkisinden daha büyük olduğunu iddia eder (Diener 1984).

İş durumu ve mutluluk ilişkisi üzerine yapılan çok sayıda araştırmanın ortak sonucu, işsizliğin yaşam memnuniyetini büyük ölçüde düşürdüğüdür (Aysan ve Aysan, 2017; DiTella, MacCulloch ve Oswald, 2003; Clark ve Oswald, 1994). İşsizliğin mutluluk seviyesine olumsuz etkisinin çok büyük olmasının temel sebeplerinden biri gelir seviyesindeki azalmadır. Gelir seviyesi kontrol edildiğinde işsizliğin olumsuz etkisinin azaldığı görülmektedir (Argyle, 1999; Aysan ve Aysan, 2017). Nitekim gelir öznel iyi oluşa etki eden en önemli etmenlerdendir, gelir seviyesi arttıkça yaşam memnuniyeti artmaktadır. 1975-1992 yılları arasında yapılan Eurobarometer araştırmalarına göre en üst gelir grubunda yaşamından memnun veya çok memnun olduğunu belirtenlerin oranı %88 iken, en alt gelir grubunda bu oran %66 seviyesindedir (DiTella ve ark., 2003)**.** İlgili alan yazında yapılan bazı çalışmalarda zengin olmayan toplumlarda gelir ve mutluluk arasındaki ilişkinin daha güçlü olduğu bulunmuştur (Diener ve Biswas-Diener, 2002). Yani geliri belli standartların altında kalan ülkelerde gelir artışları bireyleri daha fazla mutlu etmektedir. Çünkü bu gibi ülkelerde temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayacak asgari gelirden yoksun olan çok fazla kimse mevcuttur.

Ülkeler arası mukayeselerde gelir seviyesi yüksek toplumların yaşam memnuniyetlerinin düşük gelirli ülkelere göre daha yüksek olduğu görülür (Şekil 2). Ancak gelişmiş ülkelerde iyi oluşun yüksek olmasının tek sebebi yüksek hayat standartları değil; bu ülkelerin eşitlik, demokrasi, insan hakları, suç oranları, sağlık, eğitim gibi alanlardaki yüksek performansıdır (Frey ve Stutzer, 2010).

Şekil 2. GSYİH ve yaşam memnuniyeti ilişkisi (OECD, 2016).

Bir ülkedeki ortalama gelir artışının ise uzun vadede mutluluk seviyesini artırıp artırmadığına dair bir görüş birliği yoktur. Ekonomi literatüründe mutluluk alanındaki ses getiren çalışmalara imza atan Easterlin (1974); Amerika, Avrupa ve Japonya üzerine yaptığı çalışmalarda gayri safi yurt içi hâsıla (GSYİH) büyümesi ve mutluluk arasında net bir ilişki bulamamıştır. Bireysel mutluluk ve gelir düzeyi arasında pozitif bir ilişki olduğu halde, uzun vadede ülkelerdeki gelir artışının mutluluk seviyesini artırmaması Easterlin Paradoksu olarak adlandırılır.

Karşılaştırmalı araştırmalar devletlerarasında yaşam memnuniyeti değerlendirmelerinde tutarlı farklılıklar olduğunu göstermektedir. Örneğin, Japonya'nın yaşam memnuniyeti ortalaması 1958-1987 yılları arasında 10 üzerinden 6 civarında iken, aynı dönemde Danimarka'nın ortalaması 8 civarında seyretmiştir (Diener ve ark., 2003). Japonya yüksek gelirli bir ülke olmasına rağmen orta seviyede bir memnuniyet ortalamasına sahiptir. Aynı şekilde gelir düzeyi birbirine benzer olan Güney Amerika'daki yüksek, eski komünist Doğu Avrupa ülkelerindeki düşük memnuniyet ortalamaları dikkat çekicidir. Yani ülkelerin gelir durumu tek başına memnuniyet farklılıklarını açıklamakta yeterli olmamaktadır.

Farklı kültürlerin mutluluk algıları ve mutluluk kavramına yaklaşımları da yaşam memnuniyetine etki eder. Kolektivist kültürler ve bireysel kültürlerde mutluluk anlayışları dolayısıyla mutluluk ortalamaları da farklıdır (Oishi ve Gilbert, 2016). Örneğin, Amerikalılar için mutluluk, peşinde koşulan, maksimize edilmeye çalışılan bir duygu iken Çinliler mutluluk kavramını sükûnet ve dinlenme gibi düşük uyarıcı duygularla ilişkilendirirler (Joshanloo ve Weijers, 2014). Hazza yönelik olumsuz bakış açısı ile bilinen Konfüçyüs ahlakının Uzak Doğu'da mutluluğun düşük olmasının sebeplerinden biri olduğu iddia edilmektedir (Ng, 2002).

Gelir ve kültür dışında ülkeler arasında öznel iyi oluş farklılıkları oluşmasına sebep olan etmenler arasında gelir eşitsizliği, işsizlik oranları, enflasyon gibi ekonomik etmenler; refah ve sosyal güvenlik sistemleri ve demokrasinin gelişmişlik düzeyi gibi politik etmenler; kentleşme, iklim ve çevresel koşullar, çevrenin güvenlik ve yoksunluk düzeyi gibi etmenler yer almaktadır. Tüm bunlar bireylerin içerisinde yaşadığı toplumun gelişmişliğinin göstergeleridir ve öznel iyi oluşa eder.

Refah Devleti ve Öznel İyi Oluş

Refah devleti öznel iyi oluşa etki eden kurumsal faktörlerdendir. Ancak refah devleti tek tip homojen bir yapı değildir. Refah devletlerinde, dönemden döneme ve ülkeden ülkeye farklı sosyal politika uygulamaları gözlemlenmektedir. Refah devleti tanımları, minimum standartların sağlandığı refah devletinden, geniş bir faaliyet alanına sahip refah devletine doğru farklılık göstermektedir. Refah devletleri ile öznel iyi oluş ilişkisine geçmeden önce farklı refah rejimlerinin öne çıkan özelliklerine değinmek gerekir.

Vatandaşlarını hastalık, işsizlik, yaşlılık, yoksulluk vb. sosyal risklere karşı koruyarak yaşam kalitelerini artırmayı hedefleyen refah devletinin oldukça kapsamlı bir görev alanı vardır. Her ülkenin kendi sosyal refah modeline göre farklılaşan uygulamalarla karşılaşılmakla birlikte; öne çıkan beş büyük görev alanı sosyal güvenlik, barınma, eğitim, sağlık ve sosyal hizmetlerdir (Spicker, 2008). Refah devleti dezavantajlı gruplar olarak da ifade edilen yaşlılar, çocuklar, gençler, kadınlar ve ailelerin korunması; engellilere, yoksullara, düşkünlere yardım; çalışma koşullarının düzeltilmesi, istihdam hizmetleri gibi sosyal politika uygulamalarıyla toplumdaki farklı sosyoekonomik ve demografik gruplar arasındaki eşitsizlikleri gidermeye çalışmaktadır (Özdemir, 2007).

Refah devletlerinin sınıflandırmasına yönelik pek çok çalışma mevcuttur. Ancak uluslararası karşılaştırmalarda en çok kullanılan sınıflandırma Esping–Andersen'in 3'lü refah rejimi sınıflandırmasıdır; Liberal refah modeli (ABD, İngiltere), muhafazakâr veya Kıta Avrupası refah modeli (Fransa, Almanya, Belçika) ve sosyal–demokratik veya İskandinav refah modeli (İsveç, Danimarka) (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Sonrasında yapılan araştırmalarda üç rejim türü yetersiz görülmüş ve sınıflamaya daha başka rejimler de dâhil edilmiştir. Kurumsallaşmasını tam olarak tamamlayamamış "Güney Avrupa refah devletleri" (Ferrera, 1996) ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin ortadan kalkmasının ardından komünizmden liberal sisteme geçiş halindeki "Post-Sosyalist Refah devletleri" (Aidukaite, 2009) bunlara örnek olarak verilebilir.

Esping–Andersen'in sınıflandırması temelde üç boyut üzerine oturmaktadır. Bunlar; refah rejimlerinin ücretli işgücünü dekomodifikasyonu (*decommodification*), refah hizmetlerinden yararlananları tabakalaştırma (*stratification*) ve hizmet sağlayıcısı (devlet–piyasa–aile) boyutlarıdır. Esping–Andersen dekomodifikasyonu "bireylerin ya da ailelerin piyasadan bağımsız olarak sosyal açıdan kabul edilebilir bir yaşam standardını sürdürebilme dereceleri" olarak tanımlanır (Esping-Andersen, 1990, s. 37). Tabakalaşma, sosyal refah önlemlerinin farklı meslek mensuplarına ve sınıflara göre farklılaşmasıdır. Hizmet sağlayıcısı boyutu sosyal refah hizmetlerinin ağırlıklı olarak kimler tarafından sunulduğunu belirler. Esping–Andersen daha sonra bu üç boyuta "aileleri yükten kurtarmak ve bireylerin yakınları üzerindeki refah bağımlılığını azaltmak" anlamına gelen "aileden bağımsızlık" (defamilialization) boyutunu eklemiştir. İlk sınıflandırmasına ilave dördüncü bir grup olarak, Güney Avrupa refah devletleri olarak sınıflandırdığı ülkelerde (İtalya, Portekiz ve İspanya), kamunun aileler için yaptığı harcamalar ve dolayısıyla aileden bağımsızlık en düşük düzeydedir (Esping-Andersen, 1999).

Sosyal demokrat refah rejimi "evrensellik", "dayanışma" ve "dekomodifikasyon" üzerine kuruludur (Cox, 2004). Evrensellik sınıf ve statü ayrımı yapılmaksızın bütün vatandaşların aynı hak ve hizmetlerden yararlanmasını ifade eder. Buna göre

sosyal yardım ve hizmetler bütün bireylerin vatandaşlık hakkıdır ki bu da evrensellik ilkesine tekabül eder. Devlet refahın sağlanmasındaki esas aktördür ve minimum bir yaşam standardını garanti etmekle yükümlüdür. Dekomodifikasyonun en üst seviyede olduğu, tabakalaşmanın düşük olduğu ve devletin refahın sağlanmasındaki esas aktör olduğu bu rejimde yer alan ülkeler Norveç, Danimarka, İsveç, Finlandiya ve Hollanda'dır (Özdemir, 2007).

Liberal refah rejimlerinin en önemli özelliği piyasanın merkezi konumudur. Sosyal harcamaların minimum düzeyde tutulması ve refahın mümkün olduğunca piyasa tarafından sağlanması hedeflenir. Bireyler kendi refahlarını piyasa koşullarına göre sağlarlar, yani dekomodifikasyon düşüktür. Devlet en son başvurulan mercidir, yalnızca en düşkün ve en fakir vatandaşlar için devreye girmektedir. Bu yardımları alabilmek içinse damgalayıcı olarak nitelendirilen gelir testinden geçme koşulu aranır. Bu rejimin önde gelen örnekleri ABD, Kanada ve Avustralya'dır (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Pek çok çalışmada İngiltere ve Yeni Zelanda da bu rejime dâhil edilmektedir.

Korporatist veya muhafazakâr model olarak da adlandırılan kıta Avrupası modeli; güçlü ve muhafazakâr devlet, güçlü Kilise, güçlü aile ve mesleksel statülerin korunması esasları üzerine kuruludur. Sosyal harcamalar liberal ülkelere göre daha yüksektir; ancak haklar statü ve sınıf esasına dayalıdır. Örneğin, kamu çalışanlarına sağlanan haklar diğer gruplardan daha yüksektir. Sosyal demokrat ülkelerde olduğu gibi bütün vatandaşları kapsamaz. Sistem var olan bu sınıfların devamı esasına dayanır yani tabakalaşma yüksektir. Güçlü sosyal sigorta sistemi, sosyal sorunlarla karşılaşıldığında tazmin etme/gidermeyi öngörmektedir. Almanya, Fransa, Avusturya ve Belçika gibi ülkelerde görülür (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Özdemir, 2007).

İspanya, Portekiz, Yunanistan, İtalya ve bazı çalışmalarda Türkiye'nin de dâhil edildiği Güney Avrupa refah rejimi, "tam gelişmemiş refah rejimi" olarak da adlandırılmaktadır. Bunun nedeni, anayasalardaki güçlü refah devleti kuralları ve vurgusunun aksine, sosyal politika uygulamalarının oldukça yetersiz kalmasıdır. Çok parçalı sosyal koruma sistemleri, az gelişmiş kurumlar yoluyla kısmen gerçekleşen ulusal sağlık sistemleri ve hizmet sunumu, aile ve dini kurumların sosyal destek sağlamadaki güçlü konumu bu ülkelerin temel özellikleridir (Aysan, 2012; Ferrera, 1996).

Komünizmin sert çöküşünden sonra pek çok Doğu Avrupa ülkesi Sovyet tarzı sistemlerden liberal piyasa ekonomisine geçiş yapmaya başladı. Devletin refahı yeniden dağıttığı eski sistemin yerine, özelleştirme dalgalarıyla birlikte piyasanın sisteme hâkim olmaya başladığı, hızlı bir ekonomi politik dönüşüm yaşandı. Hem genel iktisadi düzen, hem de yeni devletlerin yönetim anlayışıyla ilgili olarak bu ülkelerde büyük dalgalanmalar ve dönüşümler ortaya çıktı (Aidukaite, 2009; Özdemir, 2007). Bu ülkelerdeki mevcut yapı homojen bir görünümde olmasa da

ortak sosyalist geçmişleri ve yaşadıkları dönüşüm itibariyle Post-Sosyalist ülkeler olarak adlandırılmaktadırlar. Bulgaristan, Romanya, Litvanya, Macaristan, Slovakya bu gruba dâhildir.

Refah rejimleri literatürü refaha vurgusu itibariyle mutluluk ve yaşam memnuniyetine de odaklanmaktadır. Ancak mukayeseli çalışmalar refah devletinin yaşam memnuniyetine etkisi üzerine farklı sonuçlar vermektedir. Veenhoven (2000) refah harcamaları ile yaşam memnuniyeti ortalamaları arasında herhangi bir ilişki olmadığını saptarken, DiTella ve arkadaşları (2003), Avrupa'da refah harcamaları ve yaşam memnuniyeti arasında pozitif bir ilişki tespit etmişlerdir. Radcliff (2001) ise sosyal demokrat refah devletlerinin vatandaşlarına en yüksek iyi oluşu sağladığını iddia etmektedir. Bu farklı sonuçlarda araştırmacıların kullandığı farklı değişkenler etkilidir. Veenhoven (2000) refah harcamalarındaki değişimin yaşam memnuniyetine etkisini değerlendirirken; DiTella ve arkadaşları (2003) ise sadece işsizlik yardımlarına odaklanmıştır. Radcliff (2001) ise dekomodifikasyon ve sol parti hâkimiyetinin yaşam memnuniyetine etkisini incelemiştir.

Bu çalışmada yukarıda bahsi geçen 5 refah rejimi ile Türkiye'nin öznel iyi oluş seviyeleri mukayese edilecektir. Türkiye bazı çalışmalarda Güney Avrupa refah rejimi içine dâhil edilmektedir; ancak bu çalışmada diğer rejimlerle mukayese edebilmek adına diğer gruplardan ayrı olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Veri ve Yöntem

Bu çalışmada Avrupa Yaşam ve Çalışma Koşullarını İyileştirme Vakfı (Eurofound) tarafından yaptırılan Avrupa Yaşam Koşulları Araştırması (EQLS) 2012 anketi ve mikro verisinden faydalanılmıştır (Eurofound, 2012). EQLS araştırmasının amacı hem Avrupa vatandaşlarının hayatlarına dair objektif koşulları, hem de vatandaşların bu koşullarla ve genel olarak yaşamlarıyla ilgili ne hissettiklerini incelemektir. İstihdam, gelir, eğitim, konut, aile, sağlık ve iş-yaşam dengesi gibi pek çok konuyu ele alır. Ayrıca katılımcılara mutluluk seviyeleri, yaşamlarından ne denli memnun oldukları ve yaşadıkları toplumun kalitesine dair pek çok soru yöneltilir.

2003 yılından beri 4 yılda bir tekrarlanan araştırmanın üçüncüsünün saha çalışması Mayıs-Ağustos 2012 tarihleri arasında yapılmıştır. AB'ye üye 28 ülke ile AB'ye üye olmayan 6 ülkede (İzlanda, Kosova, Makedonya Karadağ, Sırbistan, Türkiye) yapılan araştırma 18 yaş üstü tüm nüfusu kapsamaktadır. Bu geniş örneklem, farklı ülkeler ve ülke grupları arasında karşılaştırma yapmaya imkân sağlamaktadır. Hedef örneklem büyüklüğü daha küçük ülkelerde 1.000'den en büyüklerde 3.000'e kadar değişiklik göstermektedir. Ülkelerin refah gruplarına göre dağılımı ve memnuniyet ortalamaları Tablo 1'deki gibidir.

Tablo 1

Avrupa Ülkeleri ve Yaşam Memnuniyeti, 2012

Refah Rejimi ve Ortalamalar	Ülke	Memnuniyet Ortalaması	Refah Rejimi ve Ortalamalar	Ülke	Memnuniyet Ortalaması
Sosyal Demokrat (7,94)	Danimarka	8,37	**Liberal (7,30)**	İzlanda	8,32
	Finlandiya	8,08		İrlanda	7,39
	İsveç	8,03		İngiltere	7,29
	Hollanda	7,69	**Post-Sosyalist (6,62)**	Polonya	7,07
Muhafazakâr (7,25)	Lüksemburg	7,79		Slovenya	6,95
	Avusturya	7,66		Hırvatistan	6,78
	Belçika	7,38		Romanya	6,73
	Fransa	7,23		Litvanya	6,70
	Almanya	7,20		Çekya	6,43
Güney Avrupa (7,02)	İspanya	7,47		Slovakya	6,39
	Malta	7,23		Estonya	6,28
	Kıbrıs	7,16		Letonya	6,24
	İtalya	6,88		Macaristan	5,77
	Portekiz	6,77		Bulgaristan	5,55
	Yunanistan	6,16	**Türkiye**	**Türkiye**	**6,61**

Refah rejimleri arasındaki farkların istatistiksel olarak anlamlılığını ölçmek için tek faktörlü varyans analizi (one way ANOVA) kullanılmıştır. Tek faktörlü ANOVA, üç ya da daha çok grup arasında, belirli bir değişkene dayalı olarak farklılık olup olmadığını belirlemek amacıyla kullanılır. Gruplar arasındaki değişkenlik, grupların içindeki bireyler arasındaki değişkenliğe oranlanır. Temel amaç, gruplar arasındaki farklılaşmanın, bireyler arasındaki farklılaşmadan büyük olup olmadığının tespitidir. Hangi gruplar arasında farklılaşma olduğunu test etmek amacıyla çoklu karşılaştırma (Post-hoc) testleri kullanılmıştır.

ANOVA'nın önkoşullarından biri grup varyanslarının eşitliğidir. Levene testi ile bu varsayım test edilir. Grup varyansları eşit olmadığında Welch ve Brown-Forsythe gibi farklı testler uygulanması tavsiye edilir. Bu çalışmada Levene testi grup varyanslarının farklı olduğunu göstermektedir (Levene Statistic = 211,114, $p < .000$). Bunun temel sebebi farklı refah gruplarındaki katılımcı sayılarında farklılıklar olmasıdır. Welch testi farklı refah gruplarındaki nüfusun ortalama yaşam

memnuniyeti değerleri arasında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir farklılık olduğunu göstermektedir (F = 249,526, *p* < .000).

Hangi gruplar arasında farklılık olduğunu test etmek amacıyla, grup varyansları ve örneklem sayıları farklı olduğu için, Games-Howell çoklu karşılaştırma testi kullanılmıştır.

Bulgular

Avrupa Yaşam Koşulları Araştırmasında öznel iyi oluşun bilişsel boyutu olan yaşam memnuniyetini ölçmek üzere katılımcılara "Yaşadığınız her şeyi göz önünde bulundurarak, bugünlerde hayatınızdan ne derece memnun olduğunuzu 1-Hiç memnun değilim, 10- Çok memnunum olmak üzere 1 ila 10 arasında bir rakam kullanarak belirtir misiniz?" sorusu yöneltilmiştir.

Yaşam memnuniyeti literatürü, geçim sınırının üzerinde, yaşantısından memnun veya çok memnun olanların oranının memnun olmayanların oranından bir hayli yüksek olduğunu ortaya koyar. Benzer şekilde EQLS sonuçlarına göre tüm ülkeler toplamında yaşamından memnun olmadığını ifade edenlerin oranı %22'de kalırken memnun olanların oranı %78'dir.

Şekil 3, farklı refah rejimlerindeki ortalama yaşam memnuniyeti değerlerini göstermektedir. Sosyal Demokrat refah rejimi 7,9 ile en yüksek yaşam memnuniyeti ortalamasına sahiptir. Sosyal Demokratları sırasıyla Liberal, Muhafazakâr, Güney Avrupa grupları izlemektedir. Post-Sosyalist ülkeler ile Türkiye yaşam memnuniyeti ortalamasında bu ülkelerin altında yer almaktadır.


Şekil 3. Refah rejimlerinde yaşam memnuniyeti ortalamaları.

ANOVA bulguları Sosyal Demokrat gruptaki ülkelerde yaşam memnuniyetinin diğer tüm gruplardan istatistiki olarak anlamlı düzeyde yüksek olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu grubu takip eden Liberal ve Muhafazakâr ülkeler arasında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir farklılık yoktur. Güney Avrupa ülkelerindeki yaşam memnuniyeti ise Liberal ve Muhafazakâr ülkelerden istatistiksel olarak anlamlı ölçüde düşüktür. Sırasıyla en altta yer alan Post-Sosyalist ülkeler ile Türkiye'de ise yaşam memnuniyeti düzeyleri arasında anlamlı bir farklılık bulunmamaktadır. Ancak ülkeler arası farklılıklar detaylı incelendiğinde Türkiye'deki yaşam memnuniyeti ortalamasının post-Sosyalist grupta yer alan Bulgaristan, Macaristan gibi ülkelerin bir hayli üstünde yer aldığı görülmektedir.

EQLS araştırmasında öznel iyi oluşun duygusal yönünü (duygulanım) ölçen pek çok soru mevcuttur. Duygulanımın en yaygın ölçülen boyutu mutluluktur. Genel mutluluk durumunu ölçmek için "Peki bütün bu saydıklarımızı düşünürseniz hayatınızdan ne kadar mutlu olduğunuzu 1- Hiç mutlu değilim ve 10- Çok mutluyum olmak üzere 1 ila 10 arasında bir rakam kullanarak söyler misiniz?" sorusu kullanılmaktadır.

Welch testi ülke gruplarının mutluluk düzeyleri arasında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı farklılıklar olduğunu göstermektedir (F = 154,422, p < .000). Games-Howell post-hoc testi tüm refah gruplarının birbirlerinden istatistiksel olarak anlamlı ölçüde farklı olduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. En yüksek mutluluk ortalaması 7,89 ile Sosyal Demokrat gruptaki ülkelere aittir. Bu ülkeleri sırasıyla 7,63 ortalama ile Liberal, 7,43 ortalama ile Muhafazakâr, 7,28 ortalama ile Güney Avrupa ve 7,05 ortalama ile Post-Sosyalist rejimlerindeki ülkeler izlemektedir. Türkiye ise mutluluk seviyesinde 6,87 ortalama ile en alt sırada yer almaktadır (Şekil 4).

Şekil 4. Refah rejimlerinde mutluluk ortalamaları.

Sosyal Demokrat refah rejimlerinde en üst ve en alt gelir grupları arasındaki mutluluk farklarının en düşük olduğu görülmektedir. En yüksek mutluluk eşitsizlikleri Post-Sosyalist ülkeler ve Türkiye'dedir. Güney Avrupa memnuniyet eşitsizliklerinde olduğu gibi mutluluk eşitsizliğinde de ikinci sırada yer almaktadır.

Refah devletleri farklı gruplar arasındaki eşitsizlikleri giderme ve refahın yeniden dağıtımında değişen ölçülerde etkili olmaktadır. Memnuniyet eşitsizliklerinin en yaygın olduğu gruplar incelendiğinde gelir, istihdam durumu ve medeni halin memnuniyet eşitsizliğini önemli ölçüde etkilediği görülmektedir. Tablo 2 farklı gelir gruplarının memnuniyet ortalamaları ve bu gruplar arasındaki farkları göstermektedir.

Tablo 2

Gelir Gruplarına göre Yaşam Memnuniyeti ve Mutluluk

Refah Grubu	Ortalama Memnuniyet			Ortalama Mutluluk		
	En Alt Gelir	En Üst Gelir	Fark	En Alt Gelir	En Üst Gelir	Fark
Sosyal Demokrat	7,53	8,24	0,71	7,57	8,10	0,52
Güney Avrupa	6,34	7,33	0,99	6,80	7,48	0,67
Liberal	6,43	7,81	1,37	7,07	7,88	0,81
Muhafazakâr	6,57	7,67	1,10	6,91	7,88	0,97
Türkiye	5,89	7,20	1,31	6,22	7,49	1,27
Post-Sosyalist	5,82	7,30	1,48	6,29	7,61	1,32

Her refah grubu kendi içinde 4 gelir grubuna ayrılmış ve Tablo 2'de en alt ve en üst refah gruplarının ortalama yaşam memnuniyet ve mutluluk değerleri verilmiştir. Buna göre Sosyal Demokrat ülkelerde farklı gelir grupları arasındaki memnuniyet farkları en düşüktür. En yüksek refah memnuniyet eşitsizlikleri ise Post-Sosyalist ülkeler ile liberal gruptaki ülkelerde gözlenmektedir. Güney Avrupa'da memnuniyet ortalaması çok yüksek olmamakla birlikte en yüksek ve en düşük gelir grupları arasındaki memnuniyet eşitsizliğinin düşük olması dikkat çekicidir.

Bu veriler gelir adaletini sağlamaya çalışan vergi ve yardım politikaları uygulayan Sosyal Demokrat ülkelerin memnuniyet özelinde başarılı sonuçlar yakaladıklarını göstermektedir. Diğer taraftan Esping-Andersen'ın (1999) da vurguladığı gibi piyasa merkezli ve eşitsizliği azaltıcı sosyal politikaların zayıf olduğu liberal ülkelerde ise farklı gelir grupları arasındaki memnuniyet farkı oldukça yüksektir. Benzer bir şekilde piyasa ekonomisine geçişte ciddi sıkıntılar yaşayan, önemli yolsuzluk ve siyasi

çekişmelerle boğuşan Post-Sosyalist ülkelerde zengin ve fakirler arasındaki mutluluk farkı diğer gruplara göre oldukça yüksektir. Türkiye'nin memnuniyet eşitsizlikleri özelinde bu iki gruptan daha iyi bir performans sergilediği görülmektedir. Her ne kadar daha ayrıntılı analizler yapılması gerekse de özellikle son yıllarda yapılan sağlık reformlarıyla her vatandaşa genel sağlık sigortası sunulması, yoksullar için yapılan ayni ve nakdi desteklerin artması ve diğer sosyal politika hizmetleri zengin ve fakir arasındaki memnuniyet farkını azaltmada etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Tartışma

Farklı refah rejimlerinde öznel iyi oluşun iki temel etkeni yaşam memnuniyeti ve mutluluk boyutlarında istatistiksel olarak anlamlı farklılıklar olduğu görülmektedir. Gelişmiş refah kurumlarına sahip, refah harcamalarının yüksek olduğu refah devletlerinde hem memnuniyet, hem de mutluluk ortalamaları, refah devleti kurumsallaşmasını tamamlayamamış ve refah harcamalarının daha düşük olduğu ülkelere göre daha yüksektir. Radcliff (2001) Sosyal Demokrat refah devletlerinin, vatandaşlarını refahın temininde pazardan bağımsız kıldığı için daha yüksek memnuniyet değerlerine sahip olduğunu iddia eder. Benzer şekilde, DiTella ve arkadaşları (2003), Avrupa'da refah harcamaları ve yaşam memnuniyeti arasında pozitif bir ilişki tespit etmişlerdir. Bu çalışmada da Sosyal Demokrat refah devletlerinin hem yaşam memnuniyeti hem de mutluluk ortalamalarının en üst seviyede olduğu ve bunların anlamlı olarak diğer refah rejimlerinden farklı olduğu bulunmuştur.

Uluslararası anketler ve araştırmalar Post sosyalist ülkelerde öznel iyi oluş seviyelerinin gelişmiş Batı ülkelerine göre düşük seviyelerde olduğunu göstermektedir. Komünizm vatandaşlarına yüksek bir yaşam kalitesi sunmamış olsa da sağlık, eğitim ve iş güvencesi gibi önemli alanlarda sağladığı yüksek sosyal korumanın ortadan kalkmış olması bu ülkelerdeki düşük yaşam memnuniyetini açıklayan sebeplerden biri olarak gösterilir (Ono ve Lee, 2016). Bu çalışmada da Post-Sosyalist ülkelerde ve Türkiye'de öznel iyi oluşun Avrupa'nın gelişmiş refah rejimlerinin gerisinde kaldığı görülmektedir. Hayat standartlarının düşük olmasının yanında; devletin sosyal refah uygulamalarının bu ülkelerin gerisinde kalması bunun temel sebeplerindendir. Hayat standartlarının yükselmesi ve başarılı sosyal politika uygulamaları bu ülkelerde öznel iyi oluş seviyelerini yükseltecektir. Örneğin, Türkiye'de 2003 yılında 10 üzerinden ortalama yaşam memnuniyeti 5,6, mutluluk ise 6,5 iken; 2012 yılında bunlar sırasıyla 6,6 ve 6,9'a yükselmiştir. Yaşam memnuniyetindeki 1 puanlık artış standart sapması çok düşük olan bu değişken için oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Türkiye bu artışla bazı Avrupa ülkelerini geçerek AB ortalaması olan 7,1'lik değere yaklaşmıştır. Bu artışta hayat standartlarından duyulan memnuniyet artışının yanında (2003= 4,6; 2012= 5,9) kamu hizmetlerinden, özellikle sağlık hizmetlerinden duyulan memnuniyet (2003= 3,9; 2012= 6,7) artışı çok etkili olmuştur (Eurofound, 2014).

Sosyal Demokrat refah rejiminin başarılı olduğu bir diğer husus ise farklı gelir grupları arasındaki öznel iyi oluş eşitsizliklerinin en aza indirilmesidir. Ono ve Lee (2013) Sosyal demokrat ülkelerin mutluluğu çok imtiyazlı olanlardan az imtiyazlı olanlara doğru yeniden dağıttığını bu sebeple yüksek gelir grupları ile düşük gelir grupları arasındaki mutluluk farkının çok küçük olduğunu iddia eder. Bu çalışmada da Sosyal demokrat ülkelerdeki düşük memnuniyet eşitsizliklerine karşı, Liberal ve Post sosyalist ülkelerdeki yüksek memnuniyet eşitsizleri dikkat çekmektedir. Sosyal Demokrat refah rejimlerini diğerlerinden ayıran sosyal refah uygulamalarında evrensellik ve toplumsal uzlaşmaya verilen önemdir. Sosyal sigortalar ve yüksek kaliteli sosyal hizmet uygulamaları Muhafazakâr refah rejiminde de mevcuttur; ancak Sosyal Demokrat ülkelerde haklar korporatist değil evrenseldir, meslek gruplarına göre farklılaşmaz, ayrıca liberal ülkelerdeki gibi damgalayıcı değildir. Rothstein (2010) bunu risk altındaki bir birey örneğiyle açıklar. Eğitim düzeyi düşük bekâr bir anne gelir testi ile sosyal yardım verilen bir ülkede, kreş masrafını karşılayamadığı için muhtemelen işsiz olacaktır. Bu kadın ve çocuğu seçici sistemde damgalayıcı refah yardımları ile toplumda varlığını sürdürmeye çalışacak; ancak çalışmayan ve vergi ödemeyen biri olarak damgalanıp sosyal dışlanmaya maruz kalacaktır. Evrensel sistemde ise bu kadının çocuğu diğer bütün vatandaşlar gibi kreşe gidebilecek; kadın çalışıp düşük de olsa kazandığı para ve devletin sunduğu diğer imkânlar ile yaşamını idame ettirirken, sosyal dokunun bir parçası olmaya devam edebilecektir. Sonuçta bu iki örnekteki birey ve bu bireylerin yetiştirdiği çocuklar farklı öznel iyi oluş seviyelerine sahip olacaktır.

Sonuç olarak; neoliberalizmin yükselişi ve diğer çağdaş etmenlerle ortaya çıkan refah rejimi krizinden nasibini alan refah rejimleri içinde Sosyal Demokrat ülkelerin vatandaşları hala en yüksek öznel iyi oluş seviyelerine sahiptirler. Sosyal politika uygulamaları geliştirirken bu ülkelerdeki başarılı uygulamaların titizlikle analiz edilmesi vatandaşların yaşam memnuniyeti ve mutluluğunu yükseltebilmek adına oldukça önemlidir.

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İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi Yazarlara Notlar

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi ve Sosyoloji Bölümü geleneklerinden beslenmekte ve bu kurumlarda oluşan birikimin yeni bakışla ve ürünlerle sürdürülmesini önemsemektedir. İlk sayısı 1917 yılında basılan ve Türkçedeki ilk sosyoloji dergisi olan *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi,* hâlihazırda yılda iki kez (Haziran ve Aralık) yayımlanan hakemli akademik bir dergidir.

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, sosyoloji alanında çalışan akademisyenlerin yanı sıra, antropoloji, istatistik, ekonomi, eğitim, tarih, siyaset bilimi, din bilimleri gibi diğer sosyal bilim alanlarında çalışan bilim adamlarının sosyolojik perspektiften hazırlanmış katkılarına da açıktır. Dergi ayrıca değerlendirme yazıları, konferans, sempozyum ve atölye raporlarına da yer vermekte; belli konulara ayrılmış özel sayılar da yayınlanmaktadır.

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi'nde makaleler Türkçe, İngilizce, Fransızca ve Almanca dillerinde İngilizce geniş özetleriyle birlikte yayımlanmaktadır.

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi'nde yayına kabul edilmiş makaleler açık erişim olarak yayımlanmaktadır. Değerlendirilmek üzere sunulan başvurular 2015 yılından itibaren "iThenticate" intihal engelleme/analiz programında incelenerek akademik dürüstlük ve etik sağlanmaya çalışılmaktadır.

İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi'nde;

- Sosyoloji alanı ile ilgili nicel, nitel araştırmalara, en son literatürü kapsamlı biçimde değerlendiren derlemelere, meta-analiz çalışmalarına, model önerilerine ve benzeri özgün yazılara yer verilir.
- Çalışmaların yöntembilim açısından yetkinlikleri kadar alana orijinal ve yeni katkı sunmaları da temel yayımlanma kriteridir.
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Gönderilen çalışmaların aşağıda koyu yazılan bölümleri içermesi gerekmektedir;

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  Yöntem kısmında ise eğer yeni bir model kullanılmışsa model alt bölümü ile mutlaka örneklem/çalışma grubu, veri toplama araçları ve işlem alt bölümleri bulunmalıdır. Derleme türü çalışmalar ise problemi ortaya koymalı, ilgili literatürü yetkin bir biçimde analiz etmeli, literatürdeki eksiklikler, boşluklar ve çelişkilerin üzerinde durmalı ve çözüm için atılması gereken adımlardan bahsetmelidir. Diğer çalışmalarda ise konunun türüne göre değişiklik yapılabilir, fakat bunun okuyucuyu sıkacak ya da metinden faydalanmasını güçleştirecek detayda alt bölümler seklinde olmamasına özen gösterilmelidir.

- Tablo, şekil, resim, grafik vb. metin içerisinde yer almalıdır.
- *Kaynakça* (Hem metin içinde hem de kaynakçada Amerikan Psikologlar Birliği (APA) tarafından yayınlanan Publication Manual of American Psychological Association adlı kitapta belirtilen yazım kuralları uygulanmalıdır).

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