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## Who Was Ahmet Robenson?

Gareth M. Winrow<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Surprisingly, little is known about the background and life of Ahmet Robenson, the celebrated Galatasaray sportsman and a founder of the Scouting movement in the Ottoman Empire. Much of what is known has become distorted or exaggerated as myths about Ahmet Robenson and his family have taken shape. Some accounts, including a story recounted by Ahmet Robenson himself, note that the Robensons were a family of English stock who converted to Islam, relocated to the Ottoman Empire, and established close ties with the Ottoman court. Others claim that Ahmet Robenson was the son of "Abdullah" Quilliam, the well-known Liverpool-based lawyer, who established one of the first mosques in Victorian England, and who became a close confidante of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Myths may have some element of truth, as in the case of the Robensons. What is clear, though, is that Ahmet Robenson's mother came from an impoverished family. There were unsubstantiated claims that Ahmet Robenson was a British spy, and in the 1920s hard-line Turkish nationalists frustrated his work. Representatives of the Turkish Hearths opposed his involvement with the YMCA, which promoted and sought to fund various social, cultural and educational projects in Ankara and Izmir. This probably forced Ahmet Robenson to abandon Turkey and emigrate to the US in 1929. His life in New York is not well-documented. He worked as a seller of oriental rugs, and in his later years was employed as a caretaker at the Lyndhurst estate in Tarrytown. Certain myths about Ahmet Robenson and his family are debunked, in part at least, in this article. Nevertheless, Ahmet Robenson was certainly a fascinating and complex character who contributed much to social life in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish republic.

**Key Words:** Galatasaray, Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Quilliam, Turkish Hearths, myth.

### 1. Introduction

A supporter of the Galatasaray football team would think that they knew the answer to the above question. Ahmet Robenson (also known as Ahmed Robenson) was one of the first goalkeepers to play for the team before the First World War, and he then briefly served as President of the Galatasaray Sports Club in 1925. He also played a key role in introducing basketball to the Ottoman Empire and helped popularise other sports such as tennis and field hockey. On the website of the Galatasaray Sports Club, Ahmet and his brother, Abdurrahman, are listed in a small group of individuals "whose names are engraved in Turkish sports history today".<sup>2</sup> While employed as a teacher of physical education at the Galatasaray High School, Ahmet, together with Abdurrahman, also helped launch the Scouting and Girl Guide movements in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps surprisingly, however, much is still unknown about Ahmet Robenson. And, apart from details of his contributions to sports and Scouting, a lot of what is reported about Ahmet Robenson's life is not accurate. It seems as if he suddenly disappears from the records after serving as President of the Galatasaray Sports Club. This would appear difficult to explain, given how he became a legend for Galatasaray, and given how stories of his early life and that of his family became, in effect, a part of the national fabric in Turkey.

What is generally known about Ahmet Robenson's life has been embellished and even fabricated by various commentators. There are fascinating stories about how he was raised by an English woman who had converted to Islam and had come to live in the Ottoman Empire, and how he and his brothers had fought in the First World War against the British and their allies. These are also timeless tales which can resonate across different generations and which

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<sup>2</sup> Galatasaray Sports Club, "Galatasaray: Story of our Foundation," accessed April 12, 2020, <https://www.galatasaray.org/en/s/galatasaray-spor-kulubu-1905/3> .

<sup>3</sup> For details of Ahmet Robenson's early life and his achievements in sports and Scouting, see my, *Whispers Across Continents: In Search of the Robinsons* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing, 2019).

cast a favourable light on the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. There is also some truth in them. However, there is also an opposing counter-narrative which throws suspicion on the activities of the Robenson family and their supposed loyalty to the Ottoman/Turkish cause. Questions have been raised over whether Ahmet Robenson, at one time, operated as a spy for the British government. Evidence suggests that hard-line Turkish nationalist opposition may have compelled Ahmet Robenson to abandon Turkey in 1929 and emigrate to the United States (US).

It is even more difficult to understand the life of Ahmet Robenson because of how he, in his later years, spun various stories about himself and his family which were obviously not true. Why did he feel the need to exaggerate the status and pedigree of his family? A case may be made that Ahmet Robenson depicted his family in such a way in order to secure a modicum of revenge for how he perceived himself and his relatives to have been unfairly treated in the past.

There is inevitably some speculation here, and certain questions about Ahmet Robenson may never be fully answered. Nevertheless, the aim of this article is to acquire a more accurate and better understanding of Ahmet Robenson. In my research, I have made use of my close ties with members of the Robenson family and I have been fortunate to be able to read some of Ahmet Robenson's personal correspondence. I have also made full use of census records in the UK and the US and consulted documents in the National Archives of the UK in London. The picture, though, remains far from complete. At times, I have had to acknowledge that family recollections of Ahmet Robenson may have been unintentionally distorted or exaggerated to fit in with or reinforce what have become certain myths about the Robensons. This article will partially bust some of the myths about Ahmet Robenson and his family which have been cultivated over the years by commentators and historians. Nevertheless, the life of Ahmet Robenson remains a fascinating one.

## 2. The Myth

Search for Ahmet Robenson on Google, and what immediately appears are entries in Wikipedia, and its Turkish version, Vikipedi. According to Wikipedia, Ahmet Robenson was born in Liverpool in 1886 and lived much of his life in Istanbul before dying in the US in 1968.<sup>4</sup> A little more detail is provided in Vikipedi, where it is noted that Ahmet Robenson's father served in the British army in India. After his conversion to Islam, his father contacted Sultan Abdülhamid II, came to the Ottoman Empire, and then served in the Ottoman military.<sup>5</sup> In reality, Ahmet Robenson was not born in Liverpool in 1886 and he spent a long period of his life living and working in the US. Most of the information about his father is wrong. Also inaccurate is an entry in the highly respected *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, which referred to Ahmet Robenson's father as "Sir Rhodes", who ostensibly married a Muslim Indian woman.<sup>6</sup>

A myth about the Robenson family has been handed down. The origins of this myth remain obscure. The story goes that Ahmet Robenson's English parents, named Spencer and Sarah, both decided to convert to Islam after witnessing the brutal treatment of the Muslim natives in India by the ruling British authorities. Spencer and Sarah adopted new names - Abdullah and Fatma - and they decided to relocate to Istanbul. Their three sons, now known as Yakup, Abdurrahman and Ahmet, volunteered to fight against the British in the First World War. Ahmet survived, but his two brothers were martyred. The tale of the Robensons apparently

<sup>4</sup> "Ahmet Robenson," accessed April 12, 2020, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet\\_Robenson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Robenson) .

<sup>5</sup> "Ahmet Robenson," accessed April 12, 2020, [https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet\\_Robenson](https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Robenson) .

<sup>6</sup> Cem Atabeyoğlu, "Ahmed Robenson," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Cilt 1* (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı'nın Ortak Yayınıdır, 1993), 132.



demonstrated that not only ethnic Turks, but also people of English descent could be a part of Atatürk's Turkey because of their love and service to the homeland.<sup>7</sup> A version of this eye-catching story has been published in a children's comic strip booklet.<sup>8</sup> Other sources have noted that Ahmet Robenson's mother was actually known as "Lady Sarah".<sup>9</sup> Clearly, the story of a family of very high pedigree deciding to convert to Islam and choosing to abandon the British Empire to live in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey would be of considerable propaganda value to Turkish nationalists.

Myths are not necessarily judged on their truth, but rather on the value of their memory and of their possible symbolic and metaphorical importance. They involve stories of significant events and celebrated individuals which have been passed down from generation to generation.<sup>10</sup> Myths may help bolster nationalism and national identity.<sup>11</sup> It can be argued that myths are in part based on truth, but they have been worked upon and remoulded by governments or other institutions. Obviously, the story of the Robensons provides a rich source of materials for Turkish officials to make use of if they so wished.

According to the UK census records, Ahmet Robenson was actually born and baptised as Peele (or Peel) Harold Robinson in Kalimpong in British-ruled India in May 1889. His father, Spencer Robinson, was originally a tenant farmer from East Keal in Lincolnshire who had migrated to India in the 1870s after the death of his first wife. In Bengal, Spencer worked as a tea planter and a wool trader, and was employed for a time to help manage the newly constructed Darjeeling Himalayan Railway. Spencer did not serve in the British military in India, but he did make use of his knowledge of the territory to give advice and help supply provisions for the British Expeditionary Force which fought against the Tibetans in Sikkim in 1888. Spencer Robinson died in Kalimpong in 1889, six months after the birth of Peele (Ahmet).

Peele's mother, Hannah, came from very humble origins. Hannah Rodda was raised in the slums of London's impoverished East End in the 1850s. She worked as a domestic servant before somehow meeting and then marrying Spencer in England in 1880. Following Spencer's death, Hannah returned to England from India bringing her children with her – at the time, one daughter and four boys. Hannah converted to Islam after meeting "Dr Gholab Shah", a supposed famous Afghan warlord. The couple were married in Liverpool in one of England's first mosques, in 1891, and then moved to Istanbul. Hannah and her children adopted new names after becoming Muslims. The marriage was a disaster. Hannah's husband was an imposter who had a reputation for marrying women for their money. The plight of Fatma (ie Hannah) attracted the interest of Sultan Abdülhamid II. She secured a divorce, received financial support from the Sultan, and eventually married Ahmed Bahri, one of the Sultan's rising military officers, with whom she had another child - Fevzi. Ahmet, together with his brothers, Yakup and Abdurrahman, were taken under the wing of Mustafa Zeki Pasha, one of the Sultan's chief military advisers, and they were provided free education at the prestigious

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<sup>7</sup> Ali Sami Alkış, *Yedi Kandilli Avize: Çanakkale'de Şehit Düşen Futbolcular* (Istanbul: Yarımada Yayınları, 2008), 53-64.

<sup>8</sup> *Galatasaraylı Hasnun Galip ve Robensonlar'ın Çanakkale Destanı* (Mavi Medya Yayıncılık, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Rifat N. Bali, *The Saga of a Friendship: Asa Kent Jennings and the American Friends of Turkey* (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2009), 175.

<sup>10</sup> Jonathan Rose, "Government and Advertising and the Creation of National Myths: The Canadian Case," *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing* 8, no.2 (2003): 154.

<sup>11</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9.

Kuleli military school. Later, the brothers were transferred to the Galatasaray High School. Another brother of Ahmet from his mother's first marriage, Abdül Kadir, died in his infancy.

After graduating, Ahmet Robenson ("Robenson" being the Turkified version of the surname, "Robinson") worked at Galatasaray High School, and also at the Vefa School in Istanbul, as an instructor of physical education. Various anecdotes from former students reveal that he was a highly popular teacher who bonded well with his pupils. Apparently, over half of the period of his class would be taken up with Ahmet Robenson telling comic stories about sporting life in England and in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>12</sup> Students could not work out if their teacher was English or Turkish.<sup>13</sup>

Established by Ahmet and Abdurrahman Robenson in 1911 in Istanbul, the Scouting movement was initially frowned upon by the Ottoman authorities. It was suspected that the movement could be used as a vehicle to indoctrinate the Ottoman youth with Christian values.<sup>14</sup> These concerns were quickly dispelled and the potential value of Scouting realised in the wake of the humiliating military defeats of the Ottoman Empire in north Africa and in the Balkans. Seizing power in a coup in January 1913, when it appeared that the Ottoman government was about to abandon Edirne to the Bulgarians, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) swiftly purged the armed forces and introduced a more centralised system of education. A project of Turkification was launched in an attempt to boost morale. The Turkish Hearths, organised by a group of intellectuals, and formally established in 1912, promoted Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism. The CUP set up the Turkish Strength Association to improve the physical education of the youth, and thereby bolster the fighting effectiveness of the Ottoman armed forces. The argument was made that the Turkish race was naturally strong and robust.<sup>15</sup> These newly founded institutions coordinated their work with the Scouting movement. Boy Scouts became members of the Turkish Strength Association upon reaching the age of seventeen.<sup>16</sup>

How did the Robenson brothers react to this turn of events? It seemed that they did not complain about the CUP effectively co-opting the Scouting movement. The Robenson family appeared to be adept at adopting to rapidly changing circumstances in the Ottoman Empire. For example, their previous very close connections with the regime of Abdülhamid II did not seem to work against them after the deposition of the Sultan in 1909 in the wake of the upheavals following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. In a photograph taken in December 1915, Ahmet Robenson is present in his full Scout's uniform posing with military officers (including Mustafa Kemal, the later founder of the Republic of Turkey) and members of the General Inspectorate of the Ottoman Strength League – the successor organisation to the Turkish Strength Association.<sup>17</sup> This should not be surprising. For example, the Boy Scouts in the UK also played a useful supporting role in the war effort. After defeat in the First Balkan War, the Turkification policy of the CUP was primarily aimed against the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire who had been largely managing the economy. Coming from a family whose

<sup>12</sup> Suat Aray, *Bir Galatasaraylımın Hatıraları* (Ankara: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1959), 78.

<sup>13</sup> İ. Hakkı Sunata, *İstibdattan Meşrutiyete Çocukluktan Gençliğe* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 331.

<sup>14</sup> Zafer Toprak, "Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Yıllarında Türkiye'de İzcilik," *Toplumsal Tarih* 52 (April 1998): 15.

<sup>15</sup> Bora Isyar, "The Origins of Turkish Republican Citizenship: The Birth of Race," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no.3 (2005): 355-56.

<sup>16</sup> Handan Nezir Atameşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War One* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 170.

<sup>17</sup> "Ata ve Ahmet Robenson," accessed April 16, 2020, [www.girgin.org/galatasaray-lisesi-ve-spor-kulubunden-kesitler/ata-ve-ahmet-robenson/](http://www.girgin.org/galatasaray-lisesi-ve-spor-kulubunden-kesitler/ata-ve-ahmet-robenson/).

mother had converted to Islam, and who had then married an officer in the Ottoman army, Ahmet Robenson appeared to be safe from possible attacks by Turkish nationalists.

### **3. The Purported Son of "Abdullah" Quilliam**

William Henry "Abdullah" Quilliam was a solicitor who converted to Islam and who by 1889 had set up one of the first functioning mosques in Victorian England in Liverpool. Sultan Abdülhamid II was soon attracted to Quilliam's work and close ties between the two developed. In 1894, the Sultan appointed Quilliam as his personal representative in the UK – the Sheikh al-Islam of Britain. Regularly received by Abdülhamid, Quilliam attempted to further relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1908 Quilliam was accused of forging evidence in a notorious divorce case in favour of his client, Mrs Martha May Thompson. A discredited Quilliam was struck off the Rolls, and the disgraced lawyer left England and spent a period of time in the Ottoman Empire. In his absence, activities at the mosque in Liverpool soon came to an end.

Another myth has been cultivated with regard to Quilliam and Ahmet Robenson. The story goes that Ahmet, Abdurrahman, and Yakup were the sons of Quilliam, who had had a relationship with Hannah/Fatma. This line of argument, for example, has been pushed by the Turkish historian, Melih Şabanoğlu, and is evidently based on documents found in the Ottoman Archives. Challenging the official history of the Galatasaray Sports Club, Şabanoğlu noted that Quilliam, on his final visit to Istanbul, left his partner and three sons who would become Ottoman citizens.<sup>18</sup> No mention is made of Maud (Adile), the daughter of Spencer and Hannah Robinson. In the Ottoman Archives, there is a reference to Yakup being the son of "Abdullah Gevilyan" (ie Quilliam). This is to be found in a report which stated that Yakup was executed by the Ottoman authorities in December 1916 because he had committed treason by passing on intelligence to the British.<sup>19</sup> This report challenges the account of the Galatasaray Sports Club, which claims that Yakup was martyred while fighting the British in the Sinai Desert.

Clearly, Hannah/Fatma and Quilliam did know one another. Quilliam, himself, may have officiated at the wedding of Hannah in the mosque in Liverpool in November 1891. He may also have earlier encouraged Hannah to convert to Islam. With her marriage in tatters, Hannah/Fatma made use of her connection to Quilliam. In a pleading letter in June 1892 addressed to the Grand Vizier, Ahmed Cevat Pasha, appealing for support from the Sultan, Hannah/Fatma mentioned that she had ties with Quilliam.<sup>20</sup> The Liverpool lawyer did have a reputation as a womaniser and so it is quite possible that Quilliam may have had a relationship with Hannah/Fatma. However, the evidence clearly indicates that Quilliam was not the father of the Robenson brothers. The boys were born in India in the 1880s. Quilliam never travelled to India.

This myth associating the Robensons with Quilliam has not gained as much traction as the official storyline of the Galatasaray Sports Club. However, the Robenson-Quilliam linkage could be used by an Islamist government in Turkey, for example, to bolster the religious credentials of Ahmet Robenson. The current administration of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) appears to be taking an increased interest in the life of Quilliam. A recent glowing

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<sup>18</sup> Melih Şabanoğlu, "Sütlü Kahve Renginde..." accessed April 16, 2020, [www.iskenderbaydar.com/galatasarayli-muttalib/](http://www.iskenderbaydar.com/galatasarayli-muttalib/).

<sup>19</sup> Celil Bozkurt, "I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Filistin Suriye Cephesi'nde Nili Casusluk Örgütünün Faaliyetleri," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 30, no.88 (March 2014): 108.

<sup>20</sup> A. Ebru Akcasu, "Migrants to Citizens: An Evaluation of the Expansionist Features of Hamidian Ottomanism, 1876-1909," *Die Welt des Islams* 56, nos.3-4 (2016): 411.

report in the state-run *Anadolu Ajansı* has noted how Quilliam, with his charismatic oratory, defended Islam in Victorian Britain.<sup>21</sup>

However, the Robenson-Quilliam connection would need to be handled with caution. This is because there is evidence which indicates that Mrs Martha May Thompson, the woman directly involved in the 1908 divorce case, was at one time engaged to Ahmet Robenson. A letter, dated November 6, 1917, is in the UK National Archives, in which Martha May makes inquiries to the British Foreign Office with regard to the whereabouts of her fiancé, "Ahmed Robinson Bey". The letter is full of details which demonstrate that Martha May was fully acquainted with the Robensons.<sup>22</sup> We may never know if Martha May was, indeed, engaged to Ahmet. There are rumours, though, that Martha May was in Istanbul with Quilliam at the time when the divorce case was collapsing.<sup>23</sup> It is quite possible, therefore, given Quilliam's ties with the Robensons, that Martha May could have been a guest of Hannah/Fatma where she would have been introduced to Ahmet. Martha May worked as an assistant in a tobacco stall in a railway station in Liverpool. Presumably, she had never previously ventured abroad. Staying with the Robensons would have made Martha May's time in Istanbul a more comfortable one. Certainly, by the time of the national census in the UK in 1911, Martha May had returned to Liverpool.

#### 4. The Foreigner

There is a well-known saying in Turkey: "The only friend a Turk has is another Turk". This expression may have originated at the time of the Balkan Wars when the beleaguered Turks of the Ottoman Empire were confronted by nationalists of many sorts. These included Albanian nationalists who were Muslim. In the face of this widespread opposition, the CUP would decide to downplay the importance of Islam and stress more the significance of Turkism. The attempted dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious powers at the end of the First World War at the conference in Sevres, would have heightened the feeling that outsiders were determined to crush the Turks. The suspicion in Turkey, today, of the activities of foreigners, and the tendency for many Turks to believe in certain international conspiracy theories directed against Turkey's interests, may be traced back to events immediately before and after the First World War. The above-quoted phrase, though, leads to another question - Who, exactly, is a Turk?

The civic form of nationalism espoused in the first years of the Republic of Turkey, in which Turks were deemed to be inhabitants and citizens of Turkey, irrespective of their race or religion, would be increasingly challenged in the late 1920s. The revived Turkish Hearths played here a prominent role, as officials in the embryonic Republic of Turkey sought to consolidate the regime by appealing more and more to Turkishness. The First General Congress of the Turkish Hearths in 1924 appeared to favour cultural over racist criteria when determining who could become a member of the Turkish Hearths. Membership was open to those who were Turkish by descent, or to individuals who had culturally embraced "Turkish aspirations and

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<sup>21</sup> Bekir Aydoğan and Faruk Zorlu, "Şeyh Abdullah Quilliam: Britanya'da İslam'ı Savunan İngiliz-Müslüman," April 11, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/seyh-abdullah-quilliam-britanya-da-islam-i-savunan-ingiliz-musluman-/1800949>.

<sup>22</sup> The National Archives (TNA), Kew, "Message of Mrs M.M. Thompson to her Fiancé – Ahmed Robinson Bey," November 6, 1917, FO383/345.

<sup>23</sup> Ron Geaves, *Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam* (Markfield, Leics.: Kube Publishing, 2013), 258.

feelings" and who had demonstrated "their faithfulness to Turkishness".<sup>24</sup> Turkey's first prime minister, İsmet İnönü, himself a member of the Turkish Hearths, declared in 1925 that there was an "immediate duty" to ensure that all those who lived in the Turkish fatherland were Turks, and that minorities "opposing Turks and Turkism" should be cast aside.<sup>25</sup> The Turkish language became increasingly important. The "Citizens Speak Turkish" campaign was launched in April 1927. It seemed that an individual who was Muslim, who supported Turkish culture, and who had a proficient knowledge of the Turkish language, would be accepted as a Turk. But, these criteria soon threatened to be superseded, as more emphasis was given to the importance of race. In this context, myths about the origins of the Turks in Central Asia would take hold as officials sought to construct a homogenous Turkish nation.

The post-First World War period in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic would be a difficult time for Ahmet Robenson. He had appeared to benefit earlier from his conversion to Islam together with his mother, and his services to sports and Scouting had been appreciated by the authorities. He was fluent in Ottoman Turkish. Letters he wrote to his brothers in the First World War demonstrated a masterly command of the language. Nevertheless, he was of English descent. In the eyes of hard-line Turkish nationalists, convinced of the importance of blood and race, Ahmet Robenson would always be a foreigner. This was in spite of the fact that in the war Ahmet Robenson had fought against Britain and its allies by serving as a sledge instructor for the Ottoman Third Army on the Russian front.<sup>26</sup>

There was a suspicion that Ahmet Robenson worked as a spy for the British in the months immediately following the end of the First World War. In 1919, he was employed as a translator and interpreter for the Kars Islamic Council, which would later form the government of the short-lived South West Caucasus Democratic Republic. Ahmet Robenson participated in high-level negotiations with the occupying British forces in the Caucasus. Concerns were raised with regard to correspondence between Ahmet Robenson and his family about the future of occupied Istanbul and its possible partition or transformation to an international city. This captured the attention of Kazım Karabekir, the then commander of Turkish nationalist forces in the Caucasus. Karabekir pondered whether Ahmet Robenson and his family were British spies and in a telegraph, dated August 24, 1919, he requested the military authorities to begin an investigation into the Robensons.<sup>27</sup> Ironically, at the same time, the British forces in the Caucasus suspected that Ahmet Robenson was an Ottoman agent.<sup>28</sup> If Yakup Robenson had, indeed, been executed earlier for treason, the loyalties of the Robensons may have been seriously questioned. However, there is no evidence that Ahmet Robenson's life in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey in the 1920s was directly hindered by lingering suspicions that he may have previously worked as a British spy.

While in Kars, Ahmet Robenson met Nina Yankovski, a Polish woman born in Grodno who worked with the Kars-based government. The two married but would have no children. By the early 1920s, Ahmet Robenson was employed by the Beyoğlu branch of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) as the head of physical education. He would maintain a keen

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<sup>24</sup> Sibel Özbudun Demirer, "Anthropology as a Nation-building Rhetoric: The Shaping of Turkish Anthropology (from 1850s to 1940s)," *Dialect Anthropol* 35 (2011): 123-24.

<sup>25</sup> Banu Turnaoğlu, *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), 248.

<sup>26</sup> Murat Cihan Yıldız, "Strengthening Male Bodies and Building Robust Communities: Physical Culture in the Late Ottoman Empire" (PhD diss., University of California, 2015), 67.

<sup>27</sup> Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz*, *Cilt 1* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 2010), 355.

<sup>28</sup> TNA, Kew, "G.H.Q. General Staff – Intelligence – no.3640 'I' – Report on the Self-Styled 'SW Caucasus State'," FO371/3658.

interest in sports and played an instrumental role in the construction of the Taksim stadium in the centre of Istanbul. This was the first proper sports stadium built in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmet Robenson worked together with the American, Asa Jennings, a prominent local representative of the YMCA, to coordinate various educational, social and cultural projects in Ankara and Izmir. However, in his activities, Ahmet Robenson was repeatedly frustrated by opposition from Turkish nationalists.

"Mr P.H. Robinson" was a secretary of the committee which made preparations for the Istanbul Games. These "Mini-Olympics" were to be held to coincide with the official opening of the Taksim Stadium in June 1922. But, at the last minute, Turkish sports clubs decided to boycott the Istanbul Games. Only the Kadıköy Union Club confirmed their participation.<sup>29</sup> Other Turkish sports clubs had not been happy at preparatory meetings being held in the office of the YMCA at Beyoğlu, given the organisation's Christian and American links. They also objected to the invitations extended to athletes from the occupying forces and from the local Jewish, Greek and Armenian communities.<sup>30</sup>

The Turkish Hearths opposed the involvement of the YMCA in the funding and planning for the construction of a building in Ankara which would offer social, cultural and physical educational programmes. This was intended to be, in effect, the flagship project for an envisaged Turkish-American Friendship Association. Ahmet Robenson served as a translator and an intermediary for Asa Jennings in talks with Turkish officials, including negotiations with Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the education minister and a long-time president of the Turkish Hearths. In spite of attempted mediation by Ahmet Robenson, the negotiations collapsed in 1926, although a facility would later be built in Ankara by the Americans without the involvement of the YMCA.<sup>31</sup>

Representatives of the Turkish Hearths also obstructed work on the YMCA-backed Smyrna Welfare Council Project, which aimed to establish a comprehensive social welfare programme as part of plans to rebuild and modernise Izmir. Ahmet Robenson worked energetically as head of the Council's Physical Education Committee, and was responsible for the construction of the first public playground in Turkey. However, the work of the Council came to an abrupt end in 1928 as local members of the Turkish Hearths objected to plans to transform the Council into a fully-fledged association. Ahmet Robenson, himself, was personally criticised for printing and distributing leaflets in Turkish and French to promote a public health campaign for the children in Izmir to be provided with clean milk. A furious Ahmet Robenson responded by declaring that he was the only person in 1908 "to take a brush and paint in my hands and go out in Constantinople to paint over foreign languages and write 'here is Turkey, write in Turkish'".<sup>32</sup>

Continuing opposition from hard-line Turkish nationalists may well have prompted Ahmet Robenson to decide to abandon Turkey and emigrate to the US in 1929. Ahmet Robenson had worked together with the Turkish Hearths before the First World War. However, the political environment in the 1920s in Turkey was different. Views on race were gaining more publicity and support, and "non-Turks" were regarded with increased hostility. In practice, the supporters of civic nationalism receded into the background as the sponsors of theories of Turkish race became more emboldened. It must have been exceedingly difficult for

<sup>29</sup> Zafer Toprak, "Taksim Stadında Mini-Olimpiyat, 1922," *Toplumsal Tarih* 4 (April 1994): 17-18.

<sup>30</sup> Mehmet Yüce, *Ale'l-ıtlak Baldırı Çıplak: Hatırat, Makalat, Mulakat* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2018), 241.

<sup>31</sup> Bali, *The Saga*, 178-81.

<sup>32</sup> Bali, *The Saga*, 227.

Ahmet Robenson to leave Turkey with his wife. Letters reveal that he had a particularly close relationship with his aging mother. Hannah/Fatma had lived together with her son and daughter-in-law in Izmir. Leaving his mother behind and departing for New York, Ahmet Robenson would commence a new and less well-known phase in his life in the US.

## 5. In the US

Many people in Turkey are unaware of the details of Ahmet Robenson's life in the US. This latter period of his life would have no direct relevance for the myths which evolved around Ahmet Robenson and his family. Indeed, closer attention to his career after his arrival in New York would, perhaps, partly tarnish the carefully constructed depiction of the sporting legend that is and was Ahmet Robenson. He lived with his wife in downtown Manhattan and then in Tarrytown by the banks of the Hudson River for over thirty-five years. Working from home as a seller of oriental rugs, he apparently suffered financial difficulties as his business partner went bankrupt. Ahmet Robenson had no previous experience in this line of work, and much of the market in New York at that time was dominated by carpet sellers from Armenia. According to family members, Ahmet Robenson may then have owned and operated gas stations in the New York area. Life was difficult, and the Robensons had to make do living in rented accommodation. However, by 1956, Ahmet Robenson was employed as a caretaker and groundskeeper on the famous Lyndhurst estate in Tarrytown. At that time, the mansion and grounds were owned by the socialite, Anna Gould, the daughter of the notorious "robber baron", Jay Gould. Ahmet Robenson may have secured this position through his past work with the YMCA. The previous owner of the estate, Anna's sister, Helen, had been a generous benefactor of the YMCA.

One intriguing and puzzling aspect of Ahmet Robenson's life in the US, was his use of different names in official records. In the censuses of 1930 and 1940, not surprisingly he is listed as "Ahmet Robinson" and "Ahmed Robinson" respectively. In his draft registration card for the Second World War, as the American authorities took stock of the manpower resources available in the US for the war effort, he is referred to as "Ahmet Abdullah Robinson". However, on the record, his birth details are given as born on February 23, 1884, in Kurseong in India. These details were actually those of his older brother, Yakup, who was baptised Spencer John Bernard Robinson. Later, in January 1956, when Ahmet Robenson applied to be naturalised and become a US citizen, he again gave the 1884 birth details and referred to himself as Spencer John Bernard Robinson. When working at Lyndhurst, Ahmet Robenson was known as Mr Spencer Robinson. A Spencer Robinson – ie Ahmet Robenson - died in Tarrytown on 3 October 1965. It is not clear why Ahmet Robenson chose to adopt his brother's name instead of using his own birth name.

More controversially, in his final years, Ahmet Robenson presented misleading and contradictory accounts of his earlier life. Only weeks before his death, a correspondent from the Turkish publication, *Hayat*, encountered Ahmet Robenson by chance at the Lyndhurst estate. In an interview he gave, Ahmet Robenson explained how he came from a family which had given England prime ministers, and that he was connected to Cecil Rhodes, the wealthy businessman and promoter of the British Empire. The close connection between the surnames "Rhodes" and "Rodda" should here be noted, and the reference in the *İstanbul Ansiklopesi* to "Sir Rhodes" should be recalled. Ahmet Robenson continued to describe how his mother came from a family which was famous in the fields of art, education and literature. In reality, his mother was the grand-daughter of a bricklayer from Bethnal Green, a poor neighbourhood of London, and the daughter of a humble seaman from Cornwall. Ahmet Robenson went on to recount how he was received at the palace by the Sultan who had taken a personal interest in

the family.<sup>33</sup> This part of his reminiscences may well have been true. Why, in his old age, would Ahmet Robenson have felt the need to spin such a story? Perhaps this was one way for him to have a measure of revenge for the way that he and his family had been treated in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey after the First World War? He would have known that his story would have aroused considerable interest among the Turkish readers of *Hayat*. And, who would have been able to dispute his account? This depiction of his family would have served to reinforce the myth of Ahmet Robenson and the Robensons.

I have learned a little more about Ahmet Robenson's life in Tarrytown. Richard Miller is the former official historian of the village. When he was a student in the early 1960s, Miller helped catalogue the books at the Lyndhurst estate after the death of Anna Gould. This was immediately before the estate became a national museum. Ahmet Robenson was still working on the property at the time and Miller bumped into him on several occasions. According to Miller, Mr Robenson would always make time to talk to him. Miller recalled how "Spencer Robinson" was "always soft spoken" and he was "a true gentleman".<sup>34</sup> Ray Phillips, at the time, was a young doctor who made house calls on "Spencer Robinson". Ahmet Robenson was suffering from cancer of the lung and knew that he was dying. In spite of this, Phillips recalls how Ahmet Robenson was very gracious and was more concerned about the future well-being of his wife who had developed serious mental health issues. Ahmet Robenson was determined to ensure that after his death the managers of the Lyndhurst estate would guarantee that Nina would continue to receive proper medical treatment.<sup>35</sup>

Most fascinating of all were the conversations Dr Phillips had with Ahmet Robenson. "Spencer" had supposedly been the wealthy owner of a country estate in England. According to the story Ahmet Robenson recounted, he had lost almost all of his money after the Second World War when the British government imposed stringent tax measures on holders of substantial landed property. Almost overnight, he moved, as it were, from "Upstairs to Downstairs". Because he had only known the life of a country gentleman, the only job he then felt capable of doing was to work as a butler in the employ of another rich property owner. Hence, "Spencer" had taken up work on the Lyndhurst estate. In this particular narrative spun by Ahmet Robenson, there was no mention at all of his life in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey and no reference to his sporting successes. Perhaps, we may never know why Ahmet Robenson had decided to present himself as an English country gentleman who had fallen on harsh times.

## 6. Conclusion

So, who was the real Ahmet Robenson, or Peele Harold Robinson? There are many gaps in the narrative which remain to be explored and a number of questions which are still to be answered. Why, for instance, did Ahmet Robenson decide to emigrate to the US rather than relocate to England where he had relatives with whom he could stay? And, was he actually engaged to Mrs Martha May Thompson? There is a lot of misinformation about the life of Ahmet Robenson, and Ahmet Robenson himself was partly responsible for this. Nevertheless, it has been possible to establish a clearer picture of his family background and to learn a little more about his later life.

Certain myths associated with the Robenson family and Ahmet Robenson have been debunked to some extent, but, as with all myths arguably, there are elements of truth in the way that the Robensons have been depicted. The story of the Robenson family and Ahmet Robenson

<sup>33</sup> Sara Korle, "Ahmet Robenson'u New York'ta buldum!" *Hayat*, 26, June 24, 1965, 9.

<sup>34</sup> Personal correspondence with Richard Miller.

<sup>35</sup> Personal correspondence with Dr Ray Phillips.



is a rich and multi-coloured one. Kemalists and Islamists, as well as football and basketball fans, for example, may each be attracted to parts of the different narratives of Ahmet Robenson's life which have evolved or been constructed.

Undoubtedly, Ahmet Robenson was a great sportsman, and he played a crucial role in the development of Scouting in Turkey. An organiser and a go-getter, he appeared to be at ease mixing with high-level military officers and prominent officials and politicians. A gentle and gracious man, he was also a devoted husband and son. Although Ahmet Robenson achieved much in his life, he could have achieved considerably more under different circumstances. In effect, his career was cut off at its prime, and it would not have been surprising if, in his later years, he harboured a degree of resentment with the way his life had unfolded.

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## The Legal Background of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: The United Nations Security Council Resolution 186

Mehmet Şükrü Güzel<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 186 adopted on 4 March 1964 was misunderstood as the UN's recognition of the effective control of the Greek Cypriot Community over the establishments of the Republic of Cyprus. However, analysis of this resolution shows that it gave a binding decision on the restoration of the 1960 Constitution to the Republic of Cyprus under the effective control of the Greek Cypriot Community (CRUGC). Namely, the obligation to give back the right to external self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community in their partnership Republic. The Republic of Cyprus was formed in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution 1287 of 1958 following the decolonization of the island. Together with the Greek Cypriot Community, the Turkish Cypriot Community used their recognized right to external self-determination given by the UN General Assembly with the foundation of the Republic in 1960. This right afforded the Turkish Cypriots was rescinded in 1963 with the Thirteen Amendments to the Cyprus Constitution by the Greek Cypriot Community. The obligation given to CRUGC by resolution 186 was not fulfilled until 1983 with the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Security Council decisions bind not only member states, but also the Council itself. When the UN Security Council considered the TRNC as legally invalid according to resolution 541 of 1983, it did not meet its obligation of due diligence control for the realization of the that given to the CRUGC by resolution 186. Decolonization is based on the principle of "leaving no one behind" for the right of the peoples to external self-determination under Article 73 of the UN Charter. Once the external right to self-determination is realized by decolonization, it becomes a *jus cogens* norm, that is, an inalienable right on which no derogation is permitted. As the Security Council did not fulfil its own responsibility for its resolution for the protection of this absolute right of the Turkish Cypriot Community, the Turkish Cypriot Community has a legal right to form its own state under the "leaving no one behind" principle of the UN Charter.

**Key Words:** Cyprus, Decolonization, Self-Determination, *Jus Cogens*, United Nations Security Council Resolution 186.

## Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin Hukuki Temeli: Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi 186 Sayılı Kararı

### Özet

4 Mart 1964'te kabul edilen Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 186. Sayılı kararı ne yazık ki yanlış bir şekilde bugüne kadar Kıbrıs Rum toplumunun, BM tarafından Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurumları üzerindeki etkin kontrolünün tanınması olarak anlaşılmıştır. Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 186 nolu kararı incelendiğinde görülmektedir ki, ilgili karar 1960 Anayasasının yeniden işlevsel olması konusunda Kıbrıs Rumlarının etkin kontrolü altındaki Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne (CRUGC) Kıbrıs Türk toplumunun, ortak Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ndeki dışsal kendi kaderini tayin hakkını iade etmesi konusunda bağlayıcı bir karar verdiği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, Dekolonisasyon üzerine BM Genel Kurulu'nun 1958 tarihli 1287 sayılı kararına göre kurulmuştur. Kıbrıslı Türk toplumu, BM Genel Kurulu tarafından tanınmış dışsal kendi kaderini tayin hakkını, Kıbrıs Rum toplumu ile birlikte Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetini kurarak kullanmıştır. Kıbrıslı Türklerin, uluslararası tanınmış dışsal kendi kaderini tayin hakkı, 1963 yılında Kıbrıs Rum Toplumunun Kıbrıs Anayasası'nda gerçekleştirdikleri On üç Değişikliği ile ortadan kaldırılmıştır. CRUG'ye Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 186 sayılı kararı ile verilen yükümlülük, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin (KKTC) 1983'te kurulduğu tarihe kadar asla yerine getirilmemiştir. Güvenlik Konseyi kararları sadece üye devletleri değil, kendisi için de bağlayıcıdır. BM Güvenlik Konseyi, KKTC'ni yasal olarak geçersiz kabul ettiği 1983 yılındaki 541 sayılı kararını verir iken, CRUGC'ya 186 sayılı kararı ile vermiş olduğu yükümlülüğü yerine getirip getirmediğine ilişkin durum tespitini yapmamıştır. Dekolonisasyon, BM Sözleşmesinin 73. maddesi çerçevesinde halkların dışsal kendi kaderini tayin hakkı "kimseyi geride bırakmama" ilkesine dayanmaktadır. Dekolonisasyon sürecinde bir kez, bir halk kendi kaderini tayin hakkını kullanır ise, bu hakkın bir "jus cogens norm" olarak vazgeçilemez hak olduğu kabul edilir ve hiçbir değişikliğe izin verilmez. Güvenlik Konseyi, Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun vazgeçilemez dışsal kendi kaderini tayin hakkını korumak konusunda kendi sorumluluğunu yerine getirmediği için Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun BM Sözleşmesi'nden kaynaklanan "hiç kimseyi geride bırakmama" prensibi çerçevesinde kendi devletini korumak için yasal hakkı mevcut bulunmaktadır.

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kıbrıs, Dekolonizasyon, Kendi Kaderini Tayin Hakkı, Jus Cogens, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Kararı 186.

### **Introduction**

The General Assembly of the UN placed Cyprus on the decolonization list with its resolution 66 (I) on 14 December 1946. On 5 December 1958, with the resolution 1287, the General Assembly took its last decision on the decolonization problem of Cyprus. In resolution 1287, the General Assembly expressed: "its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic, and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

With this resolution, the General Assembly of the UN capacitated not only Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom (UK) for a peaceful solution to the decolonization problem of Cyprus within the principle of *uti possidetis*; but also to the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot Communities by referring to the *parties*.<sup>2</sup> After the resolution 1287, Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers met in Zurich in February 1959. They agreed on a draft plan for the independence of Cyprus under a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot president and vice-president respectively. In Zurich, the parties adopted three main agreements (1) The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, (2) The Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the UK and Cyprus, (3) The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece.<sup>3</sup> The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were signed on the 16 August 1960, together with the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus was established as a bi-communal state based on the partnership between Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities with the authorization of the UN General Assembly resolution 1287.

Thus drafted, the Constitution was signed on 16 August 1960 by the then Governor of Cyprus on behalf of the UK; by representatives of the Governments of Greece and Turkey; by Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek Cypriot Community; and Dr Küçük on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community. At the same time, three treaties were signed by the same parties: the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the UK, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus; the Treaty of Guarantee between the same parties; and the Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. The Constitution and all these Treaties were put into force on the same date. When the five-party Treaties were signed, the UK transferred sovereignty to the two communities on the island. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus came into being as an independent partnership state. Under Article 181 of the Constitution, the two Treaties would "have constitutional force". Article 182<sup>4</sup> stipulates that these are basic articles of the Constitution, and "cannot in any way be amended whether by way of variation

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<sup>2</sup> Prof. Dr. h.c Mehmet Şükrü Güzel, The Doctrine of Necessity and the Thirteen Points Amendments to the Cyprus Constitution, last modified May 15, 2020, [https://www.academia.edu/38979237/THE\\_DOCTRINE\\_OF\\_NECESSITY\\_AND\\_THE\\_THIRTEEN\\_POINTS\\_AMENDMENTS\\_TO\\_THE\\_CYPRUS\\_CONSTITUION](https://www.academia.edu/38979237/THE_DOCTRINE_OF_NECESSITY_AND_THE_THIRTEEN_POINTS_AMENDMENTS_TO_THE_CYPRUS_CONSTITUION).

<sup>3</sup> Samuel Kwaw Nyameke Blay, "Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of an Old Conflict", *Australian Year Book of International Law*, 10, 72, V.10: 72 (1983): 72.67-100 (Blay, 1983, p.72)

<sup>4</sup> Article 182 of the constitution states that there are certain fundamental articles, which have been incorporated from the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959. These fifty-five paragraphs (Annex III) deal with the basic structure of the Republic and "cannot in any way be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal." Any other provision of the constitution, however, can be amended "by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of Representatives belonging to the Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish Community.

addition or repeal".<sup>5</sup> Articles 149, 180, 181 and 182 of the Constitution give the structure of an international treaty by linking the obligations to the Zurich and London Agreements.

The communal partnership and, hence, the Constitutional arrangements at the foundation of the Republic, lasted only three years. The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was abrogated in November 1963 by the then President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, who tried to create a unitary Greek Cypriot state based on a majority rule, in which Turkish Cypriots would be considered a minority in the same way as the Turkish minority in Western Thrace.<sup>6</sup> The Thirteen Points proposed by Archbishop Makarios in the name of the Greek Cypriots on 30 November 1963 undermined the principles of bi-communality and were not accepted by the Turkish Cypriot members of the government.<sup>7</sup> Turkish Cypriots filed a lawsuit against the Thirteen Points in Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus (SCCC)<sup>8</sup>. Archbishop Makarios stated that he would not comply with whatever decision the SCCC made, and defended his amendments as being necessary "to resolve constitutional deadlocks" as opposed to the stance of SCCC. On 25 April 1963, SCCC decided that Archbishop Makarios' the Thirteen Points were illegal. On 21 May, the President of SCCC resigned due to Makarios' disobedience to the laws of SCCC, and thereby disobedience to those of Cyprus. On 15 July, Archbishop Makarios ignored the decision of SCCC. On 30 November, Archbishop Makarios legalized the Thirteen Points.<sup>9</sup>

The situation gradually deteriorated, and disturbances and communal fighting erupted in December 1963 after the *de facto* change of the Constitution in 1963 by the Greek-Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios beginning with the Greek Cypriot Community's attack on the Turkish Cypriot Community. 21 December 1963 is known and remembered throughout Cyprus history, in particular, for the Turkish Cypriot Community as the Bloody Christmas or the Black Christmas because of the EOKA gun-men's organized attacks on the Community.<sup>10</sup>

When the Security Council took up the question on 27 December with the demand of CRUGC, the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were invited to participate in the debate without the right to vote. The Greek Cypriot representative said that the "root of the trouble" lay with the Constitution of Cyprus. The Turkish representative added that on the night of 21-22 December, a serious campaign had been undertaken to annihilate the Turkish

<sup>5</sup> "Cyprus (Historical Overview)", Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed May 15, 2020, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-\\_historical-overview\\_.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa) Cyprus.

<sup>6</sup> T. W. Adams, "The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution", *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19, no. 3 (September 1966): 489, pp. 475-490, p. 489.

<sup>7</sup> Olgas Campbell-Thomson, *Pride and Prejudice: The Failure of UN Peace Brokering Efforts in Cyprus*, accessed, May 15, 2020, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291165851\\_Pride\\_and\\_Prejudice\\_The\\_Failure\\_of\\_UN\\_Peace\\_Brokering\\_Efforts\\_in\\_Cyprus](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291165851_Pride_and_Prejudice_The_Failure_of_UN_Peace_Brokering_Efforts_in_Cyprus).

<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Constitutional Court (Articles 133-151 of the Constitution of Cyprus) The Constitutional Court is composed of a Greek, a Turkish, and a neutral judge, appointed jointly by the president and the vice-president. The Greek and Turkish judges are appointed "from amongst lawyers of high professional and moral standard." The neutral judge, ex officio president of the Court, is appointed for a six-year period and is always from outside the island. The Supreme Constitutional Court passes on any controversy arising from, or relating to, an interpretation or violation of the constitution. Particularly important are disputes and matters relating to the separation of powers established under the constitution, and on these matters the highest organ of the judiciary must pass. No legal action, which would alter conditions of service in a disadvantageous manner, may be taken against any member of the judiciary as a result of a legal decision performed in the line duty.

<sup>9</sup> History North Cyprus, accessed May 15, 2020, <http://www.studyinnorthcyprus.com.ng/index.php/study-in-northcyprus/history-of-north-cyprus.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Ulvi Keser, "Bloody Christmas of 1963 in Cyprus in the Light of American Documents", *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies* 26 (Spring 2013), 265-266.

population of Cyprus. The Security Council decided to be reconvened when and if it was considered appropriate by the members.<sup>11</sup>

To find a solution for the existing dangerous position in the island as the reason of the Thirteen Amendments to the Cyprus constitution, on 15 January 1964, a conference was opened in London in which representatives of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK participated. The conference did not produce any agreement. The Turkish Cypriot leaders requested the geographical separation of the two main communities. In response to a UK suggestion that its force in Cyprus should be replaced by military contingents from member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other countries, the CRUGC insisted that any peacekeeping force should come under the direct control of the UN, and that the whole issue should be brought before the Security Council.<sup>12</sup>

A request made on 15 February, both by the UK and CRUGC requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council and debates in the Security Council were held between 18 February and 4 March 1964 and led to the adoption on 4 March of resolution 186.

During the debates on 18 February, the UK representative reminded the Security Council that on 16 August 1960 Cyprus was a British Crown Colony<sup>13</sup>. He added that the Constitution of Cyprus would provide an instrument that would enable the two communities to sink their previous differences in a common concern for the future of Cyprus and to work harmoniously together towards this end.<sup>14</sup> The UK representative added that at the London Conference in December 1963, the representatives of Greece, and Turkey and of the two Cypriot communities had stated their positions on the problem.<sup>15</sup> With this, the UK verified that the dispute was between the two Cypriot communities, not between the CRUGC and the Turkish Cypriot Community during the Security Council debates.

The CRUGC representative opposed the validity of the Zurich and London Agreements and mentioned Greek Cypriots opposition to the validity of the treaties.<sup>16</sup>

The representative of Turkey stated that Zurich and London treaties and the foundation articles of the Constitution represented a compromise formula acceptable to all the parties and constituted the very *raison d'être* of the independence of Cyprus. He added that the independence of Cyprus was in complete accord with resolution 1287 of the UN General Assembly resolution 1287<sup>17</sup>. The representative of Turkey mentioned that in November 1963, Archbishop Makarios submitted to the Vice-President, Dr Fazıl Küçük, and to the three guarantor Powers, a memorandum in which he put forward thirteen proposals for amending the basic articles of the Constitution. The proposals were designed to alter radically the present status of the island and to take away from the Turkish Cypriot Community the rights which were considered as essential for its protection by the Zurich and London Agreements. The Turkish Cypriot Community indicated that it could not accept such proposals which would endanger its very existence. The Turkish Government, as one of the guarantor Powers, also made known its objection to the proposals of Archbishop Makarios.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Year Book of the United Nations 1963, (New York, UN Office of the Public Information, 1964) 51-52.

<sup>12</sup> Year Book of the United Nations 1964, (New York, UN Office of the Public Information, 1965) 151.

<sup>13</sup> Security Council Official Records, 1095th Meeting, 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, 8, paragraph 34.

<sup>14</sup> Security Council Official Records, 1095th Meeting, 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, 10, paragraph 41.

<sup>15</sup> Security Council Official Records, 1095th Meeting, 18 February 1964, S/PV.1095, 12, paragraph 52.

<sup>16</sup> Security Council Official Records, "S/PV.1095", 18 paragraph 99.

<sup>17</sup> Security Council Official Records, "S/PV.1095", 34, paragraph 192-193.

<sup>18</sup> Security Council Official Records, "S/PV.1095", 34, paragraph 199.

Under the rule of procedure 39, Mr Rauf Denktash, Chairman of the Turkish Communal Chamber in Cyprus, was invited by the President to speak in the Security Council. Mr Rauf Denktash stated that when the Greeks took up arms in 1955, it was not for independence, which was crucial for the Security Council and the UN, but for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Therefore, it was inevitable that the Turks would oppose the Greeks because the former would be taken from the rule of one colony to another. This opposition brought violence. Turks reacted, inter-communal relations became estranged, bitter and full of mistrust and animosity. The Cyprus question came before the United Nations several times during 1966 and 1958.<sup>19</sup> The conflict arose because the Greeks wanted union and offered the Turkish Cypriots the position of a minority. The Turkish Cypriots refused this and demanded union with Turkey, or at least partition.<sup>20</sup>

On 2 February, the representative of Brazil in the name of the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Norway introduced the draft resolution. The representative of Brazil expressed that the situation regarding Cyprus was likely to threaten international peace and security and might further deteriorate unless prompt measures were taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution. In paragraph 2 of the preamble<sup>21</sup>, the representative of Brazil informed that the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, on which the political life of the Republic of Cyprus is based, are mentioned in relation to the view expressed on them by the interested parties and the members of the Council.<sup>22</sup> In operative paragraph 2<sup>23</sup>, the draft resolution asks the Government of Cyprus to take all measures necessary to maintain law and order and to stop violence and bloodshed.<sup>24</sup>

After the debates on the draft resolution in the Security Council, on the same date, the CRUGC made a unilateral declaration by sending a letter to the UN Security Council which was distributed the next day to the member states. In their unilateral declaration, the CRUGC defined the Turkish Cypriot Community as a minority<sup>25</sup> and tried to legalize the illegal thirteen amendments to the Constitution.<sup>26</sup> With this unilateral declaration, the CRUGC made known that they would not be bound by the preamble and operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution if the resolution was to be accepted by the Security Council. The unilateral declaration of the CRUGC conflicted not only with Article 25 of the UN Charter, but also with a peremptory norm of the contemporary international law that was the unalienable right to external self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots. The declaration automatically made CRUGC a *de facto* state in the UN system.

The draft resolution was approved on 4 March 1964 without any change to the 186<sup>th</sup> resolution of the Security Council. The Security Council asked the CRUGC to restore law and order accordingly to the positions taken by the parties regarding the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. But before resolution 186 accepted, the CRUGC had already declared that

<sup>19</sup> Security Council Official Records, 1099th meeting, 28 February 1964, S/PV.1099, 9, paragraph 56.

<sup>20</sup> Security Council Official Records, "S/PV.1099", 10 paragraph 58.

<sup>21</sup> Preamble Paragraph 2: Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

<sup>22</sup> Security Council Official Records, 1100th Meeting, 2 March 1964, S/PV.1100, 2, paragraph 9.

<sup>23</sup> Operative paragraph 2: Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

<sup>24</sup> Security Council Official Records, "S/PV.1100", 3, paragraph 24.

<sup>25</sup> Letter dated 64/03/02 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/5573, 3-4.

<sup>26</sup> Letter, "S/5573", 3.

they are not to abide by the resolution. Until the declaration of Independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, the Security Council never fulfilled its responsibility for the implementation on the law and order as defined in the operative paragraph 2 from the CRUGC which constitutes a serious breach of an obligation of an international organization.

The Turkish Cypriots exercised their right to external self-determination in 1983 as the result of the non-implementation of the operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution 186. In the unilateral Declaration of Independence, the *raison d'être* of the declaration was written as the thirteen points amendments to the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 that entailed the usurping of the rights of Turkish Cypriots and degrading their equal co-founder status to that of a minority on the island.<sup>27</sup>

After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of TRNC, the Security Council found the declaration as legally invalid incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in its resolutions 541 and 550. However, in these resolutions, the Security Council did not ask for the implementation of operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 186 from the CRUGC. The Security Council did not try to bring a breach to a peremptory norm, the violation of the external right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community to an end from 1964 until the time of the declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriot Community in 1983. The Security Council did not fulfil its responsibility for its resolution for the protection of the inalienable right to external self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community and had left the Turkish Cypriot Community behind.

The Turkish Cypriot Community has a legal right to found its own State under Article 73 of the UN Charter, which was recognized once more by the Security Council resolution 186 as the Security Council had left the Turkish Cypriots behind for 19 years.

The legal background of the unilateral Declaration of Independence of TRNC is the non-implementation of the operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 186.

The principle *ex injuria jus non oritur* is one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to the wrongdoer. The UNSC resolutions 541 and 550 are under the definition of the internationally wrongful acts of an international organization as the resolutions are the legitimization the violation of the right to external right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community with the Greek Cypriot Community, a *jus cogens* norm of which no derogation is permitted. The Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 gave the wrongdoer illegal legality. With this, there exists an *erga omnes* obligation of non-recognition by the international community as a whole for the validity of the Security Council resolutions 541 and 550.

### **Binding Character of Article 25 of the UN Charter to the Member States**

When the CRUGC sent a letter on 15 February 1964 to the UN Security Council and requested an emergency meeting by using the wording "international peace and security",<sup>28</sup> the CRUGC asked the emergency meeting under Chapter V, Article 24<sup>29</sup> of the UN Charter. By

<sup>27</sup> "Historical Background", Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, accessed May 15, 2020, <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/cyprus-negotiation-process/historical-background/>.

<sup>28</sup> Letter dated 64/02/15 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/5545, 4.

<sup>29</sup> Article 24: 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 2. In discharging



sending the letter, the CRUGC agreed to accept and carry out any future outcome of the Security Council meetings following the UN Charter as written in Article 25 of the UN Charter as an obligation.

The Security Council has general powers under articles 24 and 25 to adopt binding decisions, and such decisions do not always need to be taken under Chapter VII. Even when the Council does use its Chapter VII powers, it is not essential to have an explicit reference to Chapter VII or a particular article thereof. Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII may also (and usually do) include provisions that are non-binding.<sup>30</sup> Although the Charter does not expressly prescribe a particular form for adopting binding decisions, Council practice suggests that resolutions are the primary vehicle for binding decisions. Presidential and press statements are not used as vehicles for such decisions. The Security Council decisions bind member states and the UN itself.<sup>31</sup>

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion on “Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo” of 22 July 2010 in paragraph 85 specified that within the legal framework of the UN Charter, notably on the basis of Articles 24, 25 and Chapter VII thereof, the Security Council may adopt resolutions imposing obligations under international law. The ICJ has had the occasion to interpret and apply such Security Council resolutions on a number of occasions and has consistently treated them as part of the framework of obligations under international law (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 15, paras. 39-41; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya vs. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, pp. 126-127, paras. 42-44).<sup>32</sup>

The ICJ made these points clear in its “Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)” (Namibia) advisory opinion of 21 June 1971. The ICJ was considering the juridical implications of provisions of Security Council Resolution 276, which had similarly been adopted with no textual indication that the Council was acting in exercise of its Chapter VII powers. The ICJ held that:<sup>33</sup>

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these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

<sup>30</sup> Security Council Special Report, “Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities”, No.1, 2008, accessed May 15, 2020, 1, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Research%20Report%20Chapter%20VII%2023%20June%202008.pdf> .

<sup>31</sup> Security Council Special Report, “Myths and Realities”.

<sup>32</sup> “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo Advisory Opinion of July 2010, ICJ, 53, paragraph 46.

<sup>33</sup> Don Joyner, “Legal Bindingness of Security Council Resolutions Generally, and Resolution 2334 on the Israeli Settlements in Particular”, *Blog of the European Journal of International Law*, accessed May 15, 2020, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-bindingness-of-security-council-resolutions-generally-and-resolution-2334-on-the-israeli-settlements-in-particular/> .

"It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view... It has also been contended that the relevant Security Council resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal duty on any State nor to affect any right of any State. The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council."<sup>34</sup>

We have examples from the past resolution of the Security Council. Resolution 54 (1948) determined that the situation in Palestine was a threat to international peace and security and ordered a cessation of hostilities - utilising articles 39 and 40 (provisional measures). Although the chapeau "Acting under Chapter VII" was never mentioned as a basis for the action then taken, the chapter's authority was being used.<sup>35</sup> In other words, the resolutions of the Security Council may not be minded by the member States and the *raison d'être* of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security can disappear.<sup>36</sup> In proceedings before the ICJ on the Corfu Channel Case, a dispute between the UK and Albania in 1949, the UK argued before the Court that, under article 25, "one could not find in the Charter a shred of support for the view that Article 25 is limited in its application to Chapter VII of the Charter... all decisions of the Security Council are binding... [the article] is categorical in its terms."<sup>37</sup> In 1954, during the debates on whether Egypt was under obligation to comply with resolution 95 (1951)—which did not mention Chapter VII—the representative of France stated that the call on Egypt was based on article 25 with the usage of the word "*calls upon*".<sup>38</sup>

As the ICJ addressed this aspect of the issue in the Namibia opinion, indicating that: "when the Security Council adopts a decision under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that decision... To hold otherwise would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and powers under the Charter."<sup>39</sup>

### **Parts of a Resolution and the Language**

Resolutions are formal expression of the opinion or will of the UN organs. They generally have two distinct sections, with a preamble followed by an operative part.<sup>40</sup>

Preambles are used to introduce a resolution. Not numbered, they serve to present the background to the action part of the resolution. The preamble of a resolution states the reasons for which the UN body is addressing the topic and highlights past international action on the

<sup>34</sup> "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970) Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971", *ICJ* 53, paragraph 113-114.

<sup>35</sup> Security Council Special Report, "Myths and Realities", 3.

<sup>36</sup> Security Council Special Report, "Myths and Realities", 4.

<sup>37</sup> Security Council Special Report, "Myths and Realities", 8.

<sup>38</sup> Security Council Special Report, "Myths and Realities", 9.

<sup>39</sup> Security Council Official Records, 663rd Meeting 25 March 1954, S/PV.663, 9, paragraph 42.

<sup>40</sup> "General information on draft resolutions and draft decisions", *Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, accessed May 15, 2020, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND\\_Sessions/CND\\_58/Revised\\_note\\_on\\_draft\\_resolutions\\_and\\_decisions\\_final\\_website.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_58/Revised_note_on_draft_resolutions_and_decisions_final_website.pdf)

issue. Each clause begins with a present participle and ends with a comma.<sup>41</sup> In the preambular part of a resolution, each paragraph is set out individually and begins with an italicized participle or adjective (e.g. recalling, taking note of, having considered, welcoming, concerned, determined, aware). Those paragraphs are not numbered in the text and are normally referred to as "first preambular paragraph", "second preambular paragraph" and so forth. Introductory paragraphs may be referred to as "the chapeau".<sup>42</sup>

Operative paragraphs are actionable solutions to the problems raised in the perambulatory clauses. Operative paragraphs are action-oriented.<sup>43</sup> Operative paragraphs in a resolution, each of which begins with an italicized active verb in the present tense (e.g. endorses, calls upon, reaffirms, invites) are numbered sequentially. They are referred to by their cardinal number (paragraph 1, paragraph 7, etc.). There are no "bis" or "ter" paragraphs.<sup>44</sup> Operative paragraphs, which are numbered, express the opinions of member states and contain the action that they agree to take. Operative paragraphs begin with an action verb.<sup>45</sup> When drafting resolutions, the Security Council uses a cornucopia of words and phrases to attach particular meanings to its statements. As of this printing, no other researcher has published a study of the wording used in Security Council resolutions, emotive words, instructive words, and modifiers.<sup>46</sup> The question of which words will indicate the Security Council's intent to create binding obligation is one that has been discussed in scholarly literature, neither the UN nor the Security Council has created any definitions or hierarchical classification systems from which targeted Entities or researchers can analyse the Security Council's word selection. Furthermore, many of the divergent words used are considered synonyms of each other according to the dictionary, yet appear to convey messages of different intensities.<sup>47</sup>

### **Emotive Wording**

The Security Council uses a wide vocabulary to describe its institutional feelings towards particular actions. Such as concerned, grieved, deplored, condemned, alarmed shocked, indignant, censured.

### **Instructive Wording**

The words that matter most to the target of a Security Council resolution are typically the instructive words. These words indicate the amount of authority the Security Council intends to convey to the Entity of each resolution in order to make the Entity recognize the severity of the Subject. The stronger the instructive word, the greater risk an Entity takes by ignoring it. If disregarded long enough, the Security Council may impose sanctions or authorize military

<sup>41</sup> Writing a Resolution, *MS MUM*, accessed May 15, 2020, [https://asb.learning.powerschool.com/\\_geldc\\_\\_1460539611\\_/msmun/cms\\_page/view/7826507](https://asb.learning.powerschool.com/_geldc__1460539611_/msmun/cms_page/view/7826507)

<sup>42</sup> "General information on draft resolutions and draft decisions", *Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, accessed May 15, 2020, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND\\_Sessions/CND\\_58/Revised\\_note\\_on\\_draft\\_resolutions\\_and\\_decisions\\_final\\_website.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_58/Revised_note_on_draft_resolutions_and_decisions_final_website.pdf)

<sup>43</sup> Preambulatory and Operative Clauses, *Wisemee*, accessed May 15, 2020, <https://www.wisemee.com/preambulatory-and-operative-clauses/>.

<sup>44</sup> "General information on draft resolutions and draft decisions", *Commission on Narcotic Drugs and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, accessed May 15, 2020, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND\\_Sessions/CND\\_58/Revised\\_note\\_on\\_draft\\_resolutions\\_and\\_decisions\\_final\\_website.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_58/Revised_note_on_draft_resolutions_and_decisions_final_website.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> "Editing of Resolutions at the United Nations", *UN*, accessed May 15, 2020, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/second/70/editorialguidelines.pdf>,

<sup>46</sup> Justin S. Gruenberg, "An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally?" *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 41 No.2, (2009): 482.

<sup>47</sup> Justin S. Gruenberg, "An Analysis", 482-483.

engagement.<sup>48</sup> The operative verb or phrase at the beginning of each paragraph of the operative part such as decides to, recommends that, expresses its appreciation to, requests the Secretary-General to, also requests the Secretary-General to, expresses the hope that, takes note with satisfaction of the, calls upon the Governments, calls for etc.<sup>49</sup>

### **Analysis of the Security Council Resolution 186**

To apply a test for determining bindingness of operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution 186, we can use the Namibia case in the ICJ in 1971 as an example. The ICJ determined that the provisions in operative paragraphs 2<sup>50</sup> and 5<sup>51</sup> of Resolution 276 on Namibia were legally binding on all UN member states. This included the determination by the Security Council in operative paragraph 2 that the presence of South African forces on the territory of Namibia was unlawful, and the Council's call in operative paragraph 5 for all states to refrain from any dealings with South Africa that were inconsistent with this determination.<sup>52</sup> Operative paragraph 5 begins with the word *call upon*... It is interesting to note in this context that in the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ found to be legally binding a provision (which began with the words "Calls upon all States...". Most scholarly commentary over the succeeding decades has, however, categorized "calls upon" language as legally non-binding.

In the preamble paragraph 1<sup>53</sup>, the Security Council resolution had given the reference to Article 24 of its Charter by noting the present situation in Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security. In preamble paragraph 2<sup>54</sup>, the Security Council had given the legal background of its decision to act in the operative paragraph 2. The Security Council accepted treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 as the legal framework of the Cyprus Republic by using the word "considering".

As operative paragraphs are describing the actions that need to be taken in order to solve the problem. In the operative paragraph 2<sup>55</sup>, the Security Council asked to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus by giving responsibility to the Greek Cypriots to maintenance and restore of law and order according to treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 as written in the second preamble paragraph. "Ask" is a word that has been used by the Security Council to command an addressee to abide by its obligations. The law and order asked by the Security Council was the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, the legal framework of the Cyprus Republic that the Greek Cypriots to abide by its existence obligation within the UN decolonization system.

<sup>48</sup> Justin S. Gruenberg, "An Analysis", 485.

<sup>49</sup> "Resolutions and other formal decisions of United Nations organs", *United Nations Editorial Manual Online*, accessed May 15, 2020, [http://dd.dgacm.org/editorialmanual/ed-guidelines/types\\_documents/res\\_dec\\_draft\\_edit.htm](http://dd.dgacm.org/editorialmanual/ed-guidelines/types_documents/res_dec_draft_edit.htm).

<sup>50</sup> Operative Paragraph 2: Declares further that the defiant attitude of the Government of South Africa towards the Council's decisions undermines the authority of the United Nations;

<sup>51</sup> Operative Paragraph 5: Calls upon all States, particularly those which have economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of South Africa which are inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

<sup>52</sup> Joyner, "Legal Bindingness".

<sup>53</sup> First Preamble Paragraph; Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

<sup>54</sup> Second Preamble Paragraph; Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

<sup>55</sup> Operative Paragraph Two: Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

The violence and bloodshed as written in the operative paragraph two in Cyprus was the outcome of the 13 points amendments to the Cyprus Constitution by the Greek Cypriots which was well defined by the representative of Greece during the Security Council debates by giving responsibility to the Greek Cypriot President Makarios in 1974 as<sup>56</sup>: "He insisted on proposing the 13 points for the amendment of the Zurich Constitution, thus opening Aeolus' bags, which resulted in the tragic clashes of December 1963."

The CRUGC's international legal responsibility to the UN and the international community in March 1964 was defined as the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 by the Security Council resolution in 186 and the nullification of the thirteen amendments to the Constitution by the Greek Cypriots in the operative paragraph 2. Not to fulfil the obligation arising from operative paragraph 2 by the CRUGC means exactly the same as mentioned in the Namibia decision of the ICJ of the operative paragraph 2 of the resolution 276 of the Security Council, as the defiant attitude of the Government of South Africa towards the Council's decisions undermines the authority of the United Nations

### **Analysis of the UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550**

In operative paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution 550, resolution 541 was reaffirmed. When the word reaffirm is used in a resolution, it means that the UN body is repeating something it has said in a previous resolution.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, we need only analyse resolution 541.

In preambular paragraph 3<sup>58</sup> of the resolution 541, the Security Council begins with the same word "considering" as the second preamble paragraph of the resolution 186 and with this word stated that the Declaration of Independence of TRNC is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

In the operative paragraph 2, the Security Council by giving reference to the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 1960 and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, considered the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. In operative paragraph 7, the Security Council called upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus.

On 30 November 1963, Greek Cypriot Community leader Makarios nullified not only the Cyprus Republic Constitution but the General Assembly resolution 1287 as well when he made the Thirteen Points Amendments to the Cyprus Constitution even if there existed the decision of the SCCC against the amendments on 30 November 1963. The *principle ex injuria jus non oritur* is one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to the wrongdoer. When the Security Council did not ask the implementation of operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 186 from the CRUGC for 19 years, the Security Council legitimized the nullification of the external right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community.

The Security Council had violated not only the Charter of the UN, its own resolution 186 but general international law principle *principle ex injuria jus non oritur* as well and left the Turkish Cypriot Community behind.

Leaving behind of the Turkish Community by the Security Council is a breach of *jus cogens* norm of which no derogation is permitted. Contrary operative paragraph 7 of the

<sup>56</sup> Security Council official records, 29th year, 1780th meeting, 19 July 1974, S/PV.1780, 6, para.46,

<sup>57</sup> "UN, "Editing".

<sup>58</sup> Third Preambular Paragraph: Considering that this declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 1960 and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

resolution 541, there exists an *an erga omnes partes* obligation of non-recognition for the Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 by the international community as a whole and accept as legal the Declaration of Independence of the TRNC.

### **Obligation of Non-Recognition**

The political organs of the UN have frequently called upon States not to recognize illegal States such as Rhodesia, the South African Bantustans, the annexation of territory, governments installed by an illegal foreign occupying power, the legality of the presence and administration of an occupying power, and even the result of elections.<sup>59</sup> As a minimum, the rationale of the obligation of non-recognition is to prevent, in so far as possible, the validation of an unlawful situation by seeking to ensure that a *fait accompli* resulting from serious illegalities do not consolidate and crystallize over time into situations recognized by the international legal order.<sup>60</sup>

In the Namibia advisory opinion of 1971<sup>61</sup>, the ICJ held that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that States Members of the UN were under an obligation to refrain from any act and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying the recognition of the legality of South Africa's presence and administration.<sup>62</sup> In the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ advised that the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, were contrary to international law. It held that Israel had violated certain obligations *erga omnes* including the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and added that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian<sup>63</sup>

In its Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), the International Law Commission (ILC) has extended the obligation "not to recognize as lawful" beyond aggression and the illegal use of force to all situations created by a serious breach of a *jus cogens* obligation. The ILC in the ARSIWA introduces the notion of "serious violations of peremptory norms of international law" in order to spell out an aggravated regime of State responsibility. Article 41(2) provides for the obligation for States not to "recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious violation" of a peremptory norm, together with the additional obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.

An international organization can be held responsible only for the breach of obligations that are imposed on them. International organizations are bound by the treaties which constitute them. No international organization can create its own powers and competences. These are

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<sup>59</sup> Stefan Talmon, "The Duty Not to 'Recognize as Lawful' a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation without Real Substance?", accessed May 15, 2020, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sann2029/6.%20Talmon%2099-126.pdf>.

<sup>60</sup> Martin Dawidowicz, "The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation", Ed. James Crawford, Allain Pellet and Simon Olleson, *The Law of International Responsibility*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.677.

<sup>61</sup> Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.

<sup>62</sup> Talmon, "The Duty".

<sup>63</sup> Stefan Talmon, "The Constitutive Versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?", *British Yearbook of International Law*, 75, No: 1, (2004), .104.

defined by the will of the Member States, as a rule through international treaties.<sup>64</sup> In August 2011, the ILC adopted the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO). In Article 1<sup>65</sup> of ARIO, an international organization may be held responsible if it aids or assists a state or another organization in committing an internationally wrongful act; if it directs and controls a state or another organization in the commission of such an act; or if it coerces a state or another organization to commit an act that would, but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act. Another case in which an international organization may be held responsible is that of an internationally wrongful act committed by another international organization of which the first organization is a member.<sup>66</sup>

Article 4 of ARIO<sup>67</sup> expresses, with regard to international organizations, a general principle that applies to every internationally wrongful act, whoever its author. As in the case of states, the attribution of conduct to an international organization is one of the two essential elements of an internationally wrongful act to occur. The term "conduct" is intended to cover both acts and omissions on the part of the international organization. The obligation may result from either a treaty binding the international organization or any other source of international law applicable to the organization. As the ICJ noted in its advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March, 1951, between the World Health Organization and Egypt, international organizations "are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them.

Under general Article 42<sup>68</sup> sets out that should an international organization commit a serious breach of an obligation under a peremptory norm of general international law, states and international organizations have duties corresponding to those applying to states according to Article 41 of the ARSIWA. Therefore, the same wording is used here as in that article, with the addition of the words "and international organizations" in paragraph 1 and "or international organization" in paragraph 2. In response to a question raised by the Commission in its 2006 report to the General Assembly, several States expressed the view that the legal situation of an international organization should be the same as that of a State having committed a similar breach. Moreover, several States maintained that international organizations would also be under an obligation to cooperate to bring the breach to an end. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons made the following observation: "States should definitely be under an obligation to cooperate to bring such a breach to an end because in the case when an

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<sup>64</sup> Matthias Hartwig, "International Organizations or Institutions, Responsibility and Liability", *Oxford Public International Law*, accessed May 15, 2020, <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e509>.

<sup>65</sup> Article 1. Scope of the present Draft Articles: The present draft articles apply to the international responsibility of an international organization for an internationally wrongful act. 2. The present draft articles also apply to the international responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act in connection with the conduct of an international organization.

<sup>66</sup> "Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organization", ILC, accessed May 15, 2020, [http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9\\_11\\_2011.pdf](http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf).

<sup>67</sup> Article 4. Elements of an internationally wrongful act of an international organization: There is an internationally wrongful act of an international organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to that organization under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that organization

<sup>68</sup> Article 42. Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter: 1. States and international organizations shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of article 41.2. No State or international organization shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 41, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law.

international organization acts in breach of a peremptory norm of general international law, its position is not much different from that of a State."

### **Conclusion**

It was the 1959/1960 Agreements that facilitated independence from the UK and that gave international legal personality to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities as two distinct and equal constituent peoples. The objects and purposes of the treaties` (written in the Security Council resolutions 186, 541 and 550) are on the implementation of Article 73 of the UN Charter. That is the usage of the right to external self-determination of two communities on decolonization in the form of bi-communal establishment of a republic under the principle of *uti possidetis*. The Constitutional Treaty of 1960 recognizes the Turkish Cypriots` *jus cogens* right of external self-determination under the principle of *uti possidetis* with the Greek Cypriot Community in a bi-communal state under the constitutional guarantees such as SCCC.

The right to external self-determination of the two communities are the very object and purpose that can never be sacrificed or frustrated as written in the description of the ICJ on the East Timor Case the right to self-determination as one of the "essential principles of contemporary international law" having an *erga omnes* character is profoundly significant because it appears to amount to its elevation as a norm of *jus cogens*.

SCCC decided that Archbishop Makarios' the Thirteen Points were illegal. President of SCCC resigned due to the Makarios' disobedience to the laws of SCCC, thereby disobedience to the laws of Cyprus. On 15 July, Archbishop Makarios ignored the decision of SCCC. On 30 November, Archbishop Makarios legalized the Thirteen Points. The Thirteen Points amendments to the Constitution of Cyprus as a breach of a peremptory norm and as well an international treaty.

When the CRUGC sent a letter on 15 February 1964 to the UN Security Council and requested an emergency meeting, the CRUGC agreed to accept and carry out any future outcome of the Security Council meetings in accordance with the UN Charter as written in Article 25 of the UN Charter as an obligation. After the debates on the draft resolution in the Security Council, on 2 March 1964, the CRUGC made a unilateral declaration by sending a letter to the UN Security Council. With this unilateral declaration, the CRUGC made known that they are not to bind by the preamble and operative paragraph two of the draft resolution if the resolution was to be accepted by the Security Council. The unilateral declaration of the CRUGC is in conflict not only with Article 25 of the UN Charter but with a peremptory norm of the contemporary international law that is the unalienable right to external self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots. The declaration automatically made CRUGC a *de facto* state in the UN system.

The draft resolution was approved on 4 March 1964 without any change as the 186<sup>th</sup> resolution of the Security Council. The Security Council asked the CRUGC to restore law and order accordingly to the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. Until the Declaration of Independence of the TRNC in 1983, the Security Council never fulfilled its responsibility for the implementation on the law and order as defined in the operative paragraph 2 from the CRUGC which constitutes a serious breach of an obligation of an international organization. The Turkish Cypriot Community exercised their right to external self-determination in 1983 was the result of the non-implementation of the operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution 186.

In the preambular paragraph 3 of the resolution 541 the Security Council stated that the Declaration of Independence of TRNC is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. In the operative



paragraph 2, the Security Council by giving reference to with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus 1960 and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, considered the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. In the operative paragraph 7, the Security Council called upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus.

When the Security Council did not ask the implementation of operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 186 from the CRUGC for 19 years, the Security Council legitimized the nullification of the external right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots and violated not only the Charter of the UN, its own resolution 186 but general international law principle *principle ex injuria jus non oritur* as well and left the Turkish Cypriot Community behind.

Leaving behind of the Turkish Community by the Security Council is a breach of *jus cogens* norm that no derogation is permitted. Contrary to the operative paragraph 7 of the resolution 541, there exists an *an erga omnes partes* obligation of non-recognition for the Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 by the international community as a whole and accept as legal the Declaration of Independence of the TRNC as the implementation of the external right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot Community, the inalienable right of the Turkish Cypriot Community that was taken away by the non-implementation of the Security Council resolution 186 for years.

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## **For the Defence of the British Empire: Edwin Montagu and the Turkish Peace Settlement in a Transnational Context**

**Hazal Papuçular<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

This article aims to analyse the position of Edwin Montagu, the renowned British politician and the Secretary of State for India between 1917 and 1922, towards the Turkish peace settlement in the post-war period. Montagu supported the fair treatment of Turkey by the Allies, reflecting a deep discrepancy within the British policy making given the stern anti-Turkish positions of the Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Foreign Office headed by George Curzon. This study suggests that Montagu's ideas regarding Turkey were shaped by the necessities that his job entailed – to keep the British Raj intact – as millions of Muslims living in India were highly interested in the future of the Caliphate and organized under the banner of Khilafat Movement. Thus, this article emphasizes that the attitude of Montagu was closely related to the defence of the British Empire although the British interests were formulated differently by the different organs of the state. In this respect, the Secretary's political duty to serve the national interests in an anxious international and transnational setting made him pro-Turkish in a compulsory way, leading to his eventual forced resignation in 1922.

**Key Words:** Edwin Montagu, The Treaty of Sevres, Khilafat Movement, Turkish War of Independence, transnationalism

### **Introduction**

When the Ottomans signed the Mudros Armistice in October 1918, the renowned "Eastern Question" of the West had entered its final phase. Both before and during the Great War, the Ottomans had already lost bulk of lands in the Balkans and Arab populated regions. In the post-war period, the majority of the remaining Ottoman territories, including its capital city Istanbul, were occupied by the Entente armies. It may well be suggested that the empire had de facto collapsed in 1918, although the official end would come in 1922, with the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly over the abolition of the Sultanate.

This article deals with what happened in between, namely 1918 and 1922, based on the position of Edwin Montagu, the British Secretary of State for India, towards the British plans for the Turkish peace settlement. In this respect, it aims to show Montagu's opposition to the stern anti-Turkish position of the British Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Curzon, examining the official correspondences. It argues that Montagu's 'pro-Turkish' attitude was strictly related to the politics in India at the time. On the one hand, the Indian Muslims under the banner of the Khilafat started to pursue an active policy towards the Caliphate in Istanbul, the future of which was unclear. On the other hand, the national and international developments, specifically the Turkish case, constituted a pretext for an alliance between the Hindus and the Muslims based on an anti-colonial understanding, being a potential danger to the British rule in India. Thus, Montagu compulsorily became an advocate of Turkey since he acted on a fragile international and transnational setting. He frequently challenged and criticized the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that eventually led to his forced resignation in 1922.

Although the subject of this article seems somehow parochial, it actually transcends the story of one man who opposed his own government's views. This situation makes the ideas of Montagu important for several reasons. First, this narrative is a significant example showing that the Turkish peace settlement was both a national and transnational issue as the connection

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of the Indian Muslims with Turkey reveals. Second, it depicts well how this transnational setting had the power to shape the views of a cabinet member, creating disunity within the British state regarding the Turkish peace settlement. Third, the correspondences of Montagu have the ability to set forth the evolution of Turkey's international position that gradually disrupted the Allied unity as a result of the success of the War of Independence (*Kurtuluş Savaşı*).

Since this article analyses the views of Montagu towards Turkey which were mostly shaped by a transnational setting, it will first deal with the possible novel ways of addressing the post-war Turkish history. Then, it will show the Allied discussions that supported the expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul and Montagu's opposition to such a decision, with regard to the challenge of the rising Khilafat activity in and outside of India. Thereafter, Montagu's ideas about the revision of the Turkish settlement will be analysed in relation to the success of the Kemalist movement. Last, the final remarks will emphasize how the attitude of one cabinet member towards the Turkish settlement actually indicates broader issues, from the disunity within the British government in the post-war period to the transnational nature of the Turkish national movement.

### **Necessity for New Approaches to the Post-War Turkish History**

Margaret Macmillan, in her famous book *Paris 1919* rightly writes that there were two conflictual realities in 1919: one was taking place in Paris in which the peace discussions were held while the other was materialized in the places where people were making their own decisions and fighting their own battles.<sup>2</sup> Actually, the Turkish case is one of the most outstanding examples of this statement, as the Turks refused the impositions of the winners and created their own path with the War of Independence.

It is possible to analyse the Turkish War of Independence from different lenses. On the one hand, it is the Turkish national movement headed by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) that resisted the occupation of the Entente powers in Turkey; refused the Treaty of Sevres; and constituted the independent Turkish state based on Anatolia, as a result of the final nationalist victory of 1922. On the other hand, it is a process through which the war against the Entente powers went hand in hand with the creation of the new Turkish nation-state in place of the Ottoman Empire, making this period the last phase of the transformation of Turkey from an empire to republic.

Regardless of the perspective, one should emphasize that the Turkish War of Independence – or the post-war period of Turkey in general terms – has usually been analysed within the confines of modern Turkey, and mostly under the framework of diplomatic and/or international history until the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, thanks to the rise of transnational<sup>3</sup> history as well as the increasing number of academic works emphasizing transnational relations, the historiography of the Turkish War of Independence started to be diversified. For instance, in his work "The Other Jihad" Alp Yenen shows the "global moment" of imperial penetration of

<sup>2</sup> Margaret Macmillan, *Barış Yapanlar, Dünyayı Değiştiren 6 Ay*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2015), p. 23

<sup>3</sup> In this article transnational is used within two related contexts. First use is the transnational history. It is not easy to make a clear-cut definition of transnational history. Yet, in this article, the term transnational history means the narratives, concepts or phenomena that transcend the national borders, and looks at interconnections between the boundaries. See, Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1-18. The second use is the transnational relations, which as Nye and Keohane suggested, "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across the state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments", meaning that the actors in transnational relations should be composed of state and non-state actors. Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971), pp. 330-31.

the Muslim world that resulted in the interrelated Muslim anti-colonialism, which led to several revolts and resistance movements in Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan and India,<sup>4</sup> emphasizing the interconnectedness of these movements. Apart from the reference to interconnectedness, Tutku Vardağlı in her study on the Lausanne Conference shows that the Turkish delegation dealt not only with the state but also with the non-state actors, displaying how the delegation conducted its "international", and "transnational" relations.<sup>5</sup>

These studies on Turkey emphasizing the connections between the borders are likely to increase in the next decade given the rising popularity of transnational and global history. These different approaches are also relevant for this article. Although the focal point of this study is Edward Montagu's position towards the Turkish peace settlement, analysis of his political standing needs to take the transnational setting on which he acted into consideration. On the one hand, the Indian Muslims, who had come together under the Khilafat Movement, were binding Turkey to India, thus to Montagu, based on Muslim nationalism. On the other hand, the initiatives that the Khilafat undertook, from sending petitions to the European capitals to attempting to join the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference on behalf of the Caliphate constituted transnational relations. The effort of the group specifically with the rise of nationalism in India, in return, became one of the factors that determined the position of Montagu who challenged his own cabinet with a discourse of protecting the interests of the empire. In the next part, the interaction between the parties and impact of this interaction on Montagu's position in the context of the future of Istanbul will be analysed.

#### **"Disastrous and Incredible": Expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul**

The political interaction between the Muslims of India and the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul is not restricted to the twentieth century or the Khilafat movement. In the late nineteenth century, pan-Islamist policies of Sultan Abdülhamit II towards the Muslims of the world also targeted India, which created discontent among the British officials.<sup>6</sup> However, although this interaction continued after the Hamidian era in different contexts, such as the Balkan Wars,<sup>7</sup> the Indian Muslims contributed to the war efforts of the British during the First World War.

According to Koloğlu, the position of the Indian Muslims was not affected by the Jihad call of the Ottomans because of the British promises made to them during the war.<sup>8</sup> However, the post-war period changed their position and they started to organize under the framework of the Khilafat movement. Their foremost aim was to support the Ottoman Empire before the peace conference to make sure that the Caliphate would be fairly treated as the British had

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<sup>4</sup> Alp Yenen, "The Other Jihad: Enver Pasha, Bolsheviks, and Politics of Anticolonial Muslim Nationalism during the Baku Congress 1920," in *The First World War and Its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Middle East*, edited by Fraser T. G., (London: Gingko, 2015), pp. 275-276.

<sup>5</sup> E. Tutku Vardağlı, "Transnational Issues, Non-governmental Organizations and the Genesis of Modern Turkish Diplomacy," in *A Transnational Account of Turkish Foreign Policy* edited by H. Papuççular and D. Kuru (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 97-120.

<sup>6</sup> For more information, see Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991), pp. 345-59.

<sup>7</sup> For an important study on this topic see, Burak Akçapar, *People's Mission to the Ottoman Empire: M.A. Ansari and Indian Medical Mission* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>8</sup> The Muslims constituted the majority of the Indian troops in the British army. Orhan Koloğlu, "Religious Ties for Peace: India's Support in the Turkish War of Independence," in *38. Icanas: International Congress of Asian and North African Studies Proceedings* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2011), p. 985.

pledged during the war.<sup>9</sup> However, the armistice and the discussions for the peace settlements were not showing any signs that the former pledges had been remembered by the British. Therefore, the Khilafat movement stood for the Ottomans, with different strategies, from sending petitions to the British officials and institutions, to lobbying for the Ottoman government in European capitals. Later on, they would also expand their support to the Turkish War of Independence.

However, although the originating point of the movement was the fate of the Caliphate, it should not be analysed solely based on the Ottomans either. Meleady argues that the Khilafat movement was "an important episode in the historiography of the Indian and Pakistani independence movements, and one in which the caliphate ostensibly plays the central role, but which modern scholarship has come to regard principally as uniquely Indian."<sup>10</sup> That means, the Khilafat was also directly connected to the Indian politics, having major impact on the relationship of the Indian Muslims with both the British rule and the Hindus. The Khilafat aimed to obtain autonomy and independence for India, while it also wanted to increase the bargaining power of the Muslims vis-à-vis the Hindus.<sup>11</sup>

Obviously, the post-war period was not the best years for British colonialism in India. The Indian nationalism was on the rise in an environment that the Wilsonian self-determination became a popular motto globally. This shift paved the way for the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms for the formation of self-governing mechanisms in India, even if in a limited way.<sup>12</sup> In these conditions of the post-war period, the anti-colonial attitude of the Indian Muslims posed a serious danger to the turbulent British rule in India. Thus, the Khilafat changed the mutual positions of the Muslims and the British to each other in a serious way. Yet, it also transformed the Muslim-Hindu relationship, leading to their alliance. In this "grand alliance", the Hindus, mostly led by the Indian National Congress, supported the Khilafat's efforts about the Ottoman Empire, while the Muslims did the same about the non-cooperation movement of Gandhi.<sup>13</sup> The increasing alignment between these two communities became so troubling for the British that Montagu frequently emphasized in his memoranda prepared for the cabinet.

It is in these post-war conditions of India that the Allied powers started to negotiate the peace terms for Turkey. The future of the Turkish cities, specifically that of Istanbul, became one of the most important discussion topics of several meetings and conferences that the British held within their own institutions or with their allies. In December 1919, just a couple of days before an Anglo-French meeting that would be held at the British Foreign Office in order to discuss the Turkish peace settlement, Edwin Montagu wrote a memorandum to the cabinet, explaining his views. Montagu, in the memorandum, warned the cabinet that the Indian people, regardless of their ethnic or religious differences, were so united on the future of Turkey that could have the power to jeopardize the peace in the British Empire.<sup>14</sup> The Secretary, not only

<sup>9</sup> Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)* (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1997), pp. 189-190.

<sup>10</sup> Conor, Meleady, "Negotiating the Caliphate: British Responses to Pan-Islamic Appeals, 1914–1924", *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no.2 (2016), p. 182.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.189.

<sup>12</sup> For a good analysis of these reforms see Philip Woods, "The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919): A Reassessment" *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 17, no.1 (1994), pp. 25-42.

<sup>13</sup> M. Raisur Rahman, "We can Leave Neither': Mohamed Ali, Islam and Nationalism in Colonial India," *South Asian History and Culture* 3, no.2 (2012), p. 260.

<sup>14</sup> "The Turkish Peace" in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

in this memorandum but also in the subsequent memoranda and letters, referred to a particular statement that the Prime Minister Lloyd George had once made: "nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned land of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race."<sup>15</sup> This statement constituted the basis of Montagu's ideas regarding the Turkish settlement.

According to the Secretary of State for India, in case of expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul the danger would transcend the British Empire in Asia and disturb the British position throughout the Middle East since the Turks would join hands with the Bolsheviks and fight back many years.<sup>16</sup> The then Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Alfred Milner also agreed with the ideas of Montagu, suggesting that keeping the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, Adrianople and Anatolia intact under the authority of the Sultan was the best option for Britain both for the sake of Egypt and of India.<sup>17</sup>

However, the Foreign Office as well the Prime Minister were of a totally different opinion regarding the Turkish settlement. The decisions taken during the abovementioned Anglo-French Conference several days after Montagu's memorandum became a real blow to the advocates of a less severe settlement for Turkey. In this conference, George Curzon and the then Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Philip Berthelot compromised on the formation of two new states: one being in Istanbul – normally including the Straits – and the other being in a small part of Anatolia. While the former would be ruled by an international bloc, the latter would be governed by the Turks themselves, yet under international supervision.<sup>18</sup> Although there were rejections to this plan even inside the conference, specifically related to the possible economic difficulties that the expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul could create, Curzon rigorously objected all of these arguments.<sup>19</sup> According to the plan, Turkish capital would be either Bursa or Konya. While the French preferred Konya that was distant from Istanbul, with a rationale to suppress possible future Turkish aims to recapture the city; the British preferred Bursa which was closer to Istanbul, thus easier to control and dominate.<sup>20</sup> The British-French alliance was determined to expel the Turks from their capital city, and to turn the new Turkish state in Asia into a mandate.

This conference ignited a quarrel between Montagu and Curzon. In another memorandum dated January 1920, Montagu wrote "disastrous and incredible" for the decisions agreed upon in the Anglo-French Conference.<sup>21</sup> He emphasized two points. On the one hand, he complained about the attitude of Curzon, who discarded other opinions without considering or discussing them. In this respect, the Secretary emphasized that these neglected views were coming from the "parts of the British Empire whose man power and resources were mainly responsible for the defeat of Turkey."<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, he reiterated that the British security in India depended on the Turkish peace, which could lead to further military burden for Britain since

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> "Anglo-French Conference on the Turkish Settlement," in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> "The Turkish Peace-II" in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.



the war could not come to an end with such a settlement.<sup>23</sup> Montagu was right about the wars, because the Kemalist movement had already started to get a foothold in Anatolia in 1920.

According to Montagu, "it would be disastrous to dictate a peace which the Allies had not the military strength to enforce" as Curzon had once declared.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, for the sake of the British interests in India and the Middle East, he kept on suggesting the reconsideration or the rejection of the conference proposals by the cabinet. Montagu's discomfort was stemming from the ascending influence of the Khilafat movement in early 1920. The branches of the movement were sending petitions to the Indian government and to London. They were also organizing conferences to impress public opinion. Besides, they were planning strikes and boycotts, and even cession of relationship with the British in case the Caliphate was disrupted.<sup>25</sup> It should also be remembered that the British were not on good terms with the Hindus either at that time. The renowned Non-Cooperation Movement of Gandhi would start in 1920, several months after the activities of the Khilafat intensified. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that Edwin Montagu pushed hard for the fair treatment of the Turks regarding the peace settlement as well as for keeping them in Istanbul.

The position of Montagu made Curzon furious. Lord Curzon had also been the Viceroy of India at the turn of the century. But these two statesmen had different views about protecting the British rule in Asia. Montagu thought that a kind of compromise should have been made with the Indians in order to defend the empire. However, for Curzon, the defence of the British rule in India was starting from the Near East and the Black Sea, controlling of which was strictly tied to the Straits.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, Curzon reacted Montagu's position by writing several counter-memoranda. According to him, the unanimity of the Indians towards the Caliphate was an artificial agitation.<sup>27</sup> When he was the governor of India, there was no such importance attached to Istanbul by the Indian Muslims given the fact that the city was not a religious but a political centre.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, according to the Foreign Secretary, the expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul would solve a 500 year old problem of Europe. While Curzon had a tendency to underestimate the possible impact of the Turkish peace settlement on Indian politics and society, Montagu tried to prove his point by sending all of the memoranda that had been written by the different organs of the Indian government.<sup>29</sup>

In the end, the plans of Lloyd George and George Curzon were rejected by the British cabinet. Yet, it should also be emphasized that it was the War Office that primarily contributed to the ultimate decision,<sup>30</sup> rather than the ideas of Montagu. According to the War Office, a large number of troops would be necessary in order to control 'Turkey in Asia' as opposed to

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Meleady, pp.189-190.

<sup>26</sup> Sean Kelly, "How far West?: Lord Curzon's Transcaucasian (Mis)Adventure and the Defence of British India, 1918-23," *The International History Review* 35, no.2 (2012), p. 284

<sup>27</sup> "The Future of Constantinople" in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>28</sup> He writes: "Khalif is khalif, wherever he resides." Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> "The Turkish Peace" in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>30</sup> G. H. Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 80.

the sufficiency of naval existence in order to dominate 'Turkey in Istanbul.'<sup>31</sup> Even if the outcome principally stemmed from the position of the War Office, it was in support of the ideas of Montagu. However, Istanbul constituted only one part of the problem with regard to the relationship between the British and Indians. Although the seat of the Caliphate had remained in Istanbul, the Treaty of Sevres would dismember the Ottoman Empire, not appeasing the Indian Muslims at all. Besides, the fate of the Ottoman Empire was not just tied to Istanbul anymore since the Kemalist movement gained strength step by step in Anatolia. Therefore, Montagu's focus would shift on the future of Anatolia after 1920, again based on the Indian dynamics.

### **The Indispensability of a Revision: The Future of Anatolia**

The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed in August 1920, allowed the Caliphate to remain in Istanbul. But the terms about the Turkish sovereignty both in the capital and in other parts of the so-called Turkish Empire was nominal everywhere. Majority of the pre-war territories were separated from the Ottoman Empire, mostly being the mandates of Britain and France.<sup>32</sup> While the west of Çatalca in Thrace was given to Greece, Izmir was also recognized under the control of the Greek authorities to whom the Ottoman Empire transferred its sovereignty.<sup>33</sup> However, as Fromkin writes, the major problem that Venizelos and Lloyd George faced about the treaty was their ability to implement its terms regarding the Asia Minor.<sup>34</sup>

This was a genuine problem for them given the fact that the Kemalist movement in Anatolia had become a far more important parameter than the Sultan and his government in Istanbul. When the Entente powers were discussing the expulsion of the Turks from Istanbul in 1919, Mustafa Kemal Paşa had already moved to Anatolia where he organized a resistance movement, with a quest for sovereignty and independence. In April 1920, a new parliament had been commenced in Ankara, as the claimant of national sovereignty in Turkey and the executive body of the War of Independence. Therefore, although the Treaty of Sevres was signed by Istanbul government, Ankara never accepted these terms. In this respect, the period between 1920 and 1922 is actually the narrative that the Allied powers tried to impose the Treaty of Sevres with different means including the Greek army, yet had to discuss the possible revision of the treaty after each defeat in Western Anatolia by the Kemalist forces.

What was the position of the Secretary of State for India towards these developments? It was undoubtedly linked to the position of the Indians, who were furious about the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, although much debated problem of Istanbul had been resolved in favour of the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, the unity between the Hindus and Muslims, which Curzon had regarded as an artificial one, became apparent. While Gandhi sent letter to the Viceroy asking his resignation because of the Turkish settlement, Muslims participated in the Non-Cooperation Movement.<sup>35</sup> The Turkish peace had become one of the apparent driving forces of the national movement of India, emphasizing the abovementioned transnational dynamics. On the other hand, acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres by Istanbul, creating a

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> For the full text of the Treaty, see "Treaty of Peace Between the Allied & Associated Powers and Turkey" in *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1924*, vol.2, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), also available at < [http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Sevres\\_ENG.pdf](http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Sevres_ENG.pdf) > (accessed 30 May 2020).

<sup>33</sup> Article 69 suggests that Smyrna would remain under Turkish sovereignty, but Turkey "transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty over the city of Smyrna and the said territory." *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> David Fromkin, *Barışa Son Veren Barış, Modern Ortadoğu Nasıl Yaratıldı?* (Istanbul: Epsilon, 2013), p. 358.

<sup>35</sup> Özcan, p.194.

disappointment in India, shifted the focus of the Indians from Istanbul to Ankara.<sup>36</sup> As the Indians lobbied for the Kemalists, Montagu started to support the idea of the revision of the peace settlement. Two issues, namely the future of Edirne and Izmir and the Anglo-French alliance, were paid a great deal of attention by the Secretary of State for India.

### **Mutatis Mutandis: The cases of Izmir and Edirne**

The future settlement in Western Anatolia and Thrace had been one of the contentious, and also connected issues of the Turkish peace negotiations before the Treaty of Sevres. For instance, during the aforementioned Anglo-French Conference of 1919, the French representative Berthelot had offered a special regime for Izmir in favour of the Greeks, in return for the withdrawal of the Greek army from the region. However, Curzon had suggested that the withdrawal depended on the Greek sovereignty in the Eastern Thrace, directly associating these two issues with each other.<sup>37</sup> At the end, the Treaty of Sevres decided in favour of Greece in both cases, transferring the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire over Izmir to the Greek government, in addition to the direct Greek sovereignty over Edirne.

However, after a couple of months, the Allied powers started to discuss the future of these two cities one more time since the Greeks were defeated by the Kemalist army in January 1921, in the First Battle of İnönü (*I. İnönü Muharebesi*). One of the major diplomatic consequences of this Turkish victory was the invitation of Ankara government – somehow indirectly – to London in order to discuss a possible revision of the peace treaty.<sup>38</sup> In the end, the conference did not yield a positive outcome because the Turks were offered a slightly revised Sévres that was against the *raison d'être* of Ankara.

Despite its failure, this new round of diplomatic negotiations was rigorously followed by Montagu, once again creating tension and exposing the differences between the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for India. While the British Foreign Office did not offer any revision acceptable to the Turks in London, Montagu was trying to open Izmir and Edirne to discussion in early 1921. Montagu, in his memoranda, reminded the former statements of the Prime Minister about the future of the predominantly Turkish territories all over again.<sup>39</sup> According to Montagu, although the solution about the problematic cases such as Izmir and Edirne was dependent on the accurate statistics, no reliable data had been obtained since 1919.<sup>40</sup> Thus, Montagu emphasized the necessity to make plebiscites for these cities. Stressing that the Foreign Office had always acknowledged the existence of a statistical problem, he actually targeted Curzon who was keenly against the plebiscite option.

Montagu tried to form a reciprocity between the cases of Edirne and Izmir in order to obtain better terms for the Turks. According to him, Edirne was "a predominantly Turkish city of great veneration to the Turks and to Mohammedans generally, containing places which may

<sup>36</sup> Koloğlu, p. 999-1000.

<sup>37</sup> "Anglo-French Conference on the Turkish Settlement," in *Official: Cabinet: Various papers (5 February 1919-17 January 1920)*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/1), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F1> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>38</sup> Celal Erikan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi*, compiled by Rıdvan Akın, (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), p. 184.

<sup>39</sup> "Memorandum by Edwin Montagu proposing a plebiscite among Greek and Turkish populations in the area of pre-war Turkey because the nationality and population statistics on which the provisions of the Treaty..." The Churchill Papers (CHAR 2/114/63-65), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+2%2F114%2F63-65> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

almost be described by Holy" and the "most ancient settlement of Turkey in Europe."<sup>41</sup> He did not suggest the return of the city to the Turks frankly, but he recommended that the sovereignty of Edirne could be equated with that of Izmir. At the time, Izmir was also under discussion regarding a nominal sovereignty of the Turks, whose flag would be hoisted in the city but would be ruled with a Greek administration.<sup>42</sup> Thus, if a similar model could be implemented on Edirne, with a nominal Greek sovereignty but with Turkish administration, the revised treaty could have a chance to satisfy the Turks.<sup>43</sup>

Clearly Montagu regarded Edirne as a way to appease the Muslims of India, as he emphasized the Muslim character of the city. He was aware of the fact that the Greeks did not have an intention to change the status quo in Edirne vis-à-vis Izmir. Yet, to what extent he was aware that the Turks would not be satisfied by such an arrangement in the conditions of early 1921 seems like an important question mark. Nevertheless, he kept on emphasizing that the anti-Turkish policy of Britain was not serving the British interests in his correspondences.<sup>44</sup> This obstinately pro-Greek attitude of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would also create a rift between the British and French eventually, leading to the Treaty of Ankara (1921). This treaty became a major blow to British foreign policy that Montagu would frequently refer to in his discussions.

#### **"An Unfriendly Act:" The Treaty of Ankara and the Competition with the French**

After the inconclusive London Conference, the Turkish position further strengthened owing to the victory in the Second Battle of İnönü (*II. İnönü Savaşı*). One of the most important results of this Turkish victory with regard to the Allied powers became the rift between Britain and France. In 1921, France had a different opinion than that of Britain about the power of the Greek army which had once been formulated as an instrument to implement the peace settlement.<sup>45</sup> However, the stubbornly pro-Greek position of the British Prime Minister was not the only divergence between these two powers. They had mutual distrust especially with regard to the Near East. During the summer months, France and Ankara discussed the terms of a possible treaty about which Winston Churchill said; "the most diplomatic application of the phrase could only be deemed an 'unfriendly act,'"<sup>46</sup> indicating the strained relationship between Paris and London.

It was after the Battle of Sakarya (*Sakarya Savaşı*) that the Treaty of Ankara was signed, ending the war between Ankara and France and leading to the withdrawal of the latter from Anatolia.<sup>47</sup> The Battle of Sakarya became a real blow to the policies of Lloyd George. In September, General Harington, who was the Commander of the Allied Occupation Forces in

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>"Letter from [Edwin Montagu] (Breccles Hall, Attleborough, Norfolk) to WSC urging him to act to prevent the damage which Montagu thinks will be done by David Lloyd George's anti-Turkey and pro-Greece policy...." The Churchill Papers (CHAR 2/114/11), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://www.churchillarchive.com/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+2%2F114%2F11> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>45</sup> Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *İki Savaş Sırası ve Arasında Türk Dış Politikası* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2011), p. 170.

<sup>46</sup> "French Negotiations with Ankara" in *Official: Colonial Office: Cabinet Papers*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 17/13A-B), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+17%2F13A-B> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>47</sup> Sönmezoğlu, p.176.

Istanbul wrote a letter to Churchill, the then Secretary of State for Colonies, emphasizing the necessity of a settlement and complaining about the worsening situation in Istanbul.<sup>48</sup> He frankly expressed the discomfort of the Indian troops therein.<sup>49</sup> Churchill, on the other hand, was emphasizing the necessity of a settlement specifically for the future of Mesopotamia in which he was keenly interested.<sup>50</sup> Even Curzon, while reacting both to Churchill and Montagu for their positions, started to acknowledge the need to revise the Treaty of Sevres in a way that would "reasonably" and "likely" satisfy Ankara.<sup>51</sup> What could be acceptable to Ankara, however, was being discussed by the Foreign Office with the previous mentality, in other words, without an option of the Greek withdrawal for which the Kemalists were fighting.

Since the Secretary of State for India could not convince Curzon, who referred to Montagu's assumptions as "unfounded,"<sup>52</sup> he started to seek help mostly from Churchill, or send the memoranda by the British officials in India to prove the difficulties that the British rule was facing therein, due to the nationalist surge and the related question of Turkish settlement.<sup>53</sup> In this respect, the Treaty of Ankara became another major issue through which Montagu tried to express the danger that British foreign policy posed to the empire in India. In a letter he sent to Churchill, he described the Treaty of Ankara, as a "diplomatic triumph at the cost of the English."<sup>54</sup> According to him, France had depicted Britain as a warmongering power to the whole world with this treaty.<sup>55</sup> This appearance of Britain undoubtedly obstructed the job of Montagu concerning India, in which he had major problems.

After the Treaty of Ankara, Montagu frequently emphasized the British position towards Turkey, vis-a-vis that of the French. For instance, during the negotiation process among the Allies in order to revise the Treaty of Sevres in December 1921, he warned the cabinet about France, which could offer more revision in favour of the Turks than the British would do in Thrace.<sup>56</sup> This would be a disaster for the British international interests in case such an offer was rejected by the Foreign Office,<sup>57</sup> proving the aforementioned point about Britain as a

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<sup>48</sup> "General Harington on the Fighting Between Turkey and Greece" in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> "Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary [Curzon] on British Intervention between Greece and Turkey" in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> In order to see such memoranda, see the compilation dated 10 November 1921, in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchillarchive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>54</sup> "Letter from Edwin Montagu to Winston Churchill, dated 11 November 1921," in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> "Turkish Peace, Memorandum of Secretary of State for India," in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

warmongering state. Britain was alone among the Allies specifically after the Treaty of Ankara was signed, making the anti-Turkish decisions particularly British.

After the French crisis, Montagu frankly offered extensive revisions to the Turkish settlement, suggesting the restoration of all of the pre-war Turkish territories in Thrace to Turkey.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, he adopted a harsher tone in his criticisms towards the cabinet. According to him, giving the Greeks more territory than they were capable of ruling had never been a friendly idea, since it was obvious that this would bring chaos to Greece one way or another.<sup>59</sup> From the perspective of Indian politics, the British policy with regard to the Near East was not serving the interests of the British at all:

If only we could take the lead in genuinely rehabilitating Turkey, if only we could take the lead in winning the good will of the Turks instead of allowing ourselves to be dragged at the heels of France, in forcing Turkey to a reluctant peace, I believe you would be startled by the improvement in the Indian situation. Now the French crisis has delayed any near possibility of this taking place, and I have grave doubts whether with the present Prime Minister and the present Foreign Secretary anything could achieve it.<sup>60</sup>

As Montagu assumed, Lloyd George and Curzon's policies did not bring an important revision to the Turkish settlement that could satisfy Ankara, which, as a result, started to prepare for an offensive that would bring an end to the war in the summer of 1922. In the meantime, the critical stance of Montagu brought an end to his term as the Secretary of State for India in March 1922. His forced resignation was about the publication of a statement without consulting the cabinet in order to deny the accusations of the Khilafat claiming another round of British military aid to the Greek army.<sup>61</sup> As can be anticipated, it was just the last straw to the already broken relationship between Montagu, Lloyd George, and Curzon.

## Conclusion

Throughout the period that this article dealt with, Montagu frequently tried to define himself as the supporter of the British interests.<sup>62</sup> What connected the British interests to an impartial Turkish settlement for him was unquestionably related to the politics in India. In this respect, several aspects seem significant around the story of Edwin Montagu that this article tried to narrate. First, it was seen that Montagu preferred a "softer" peace settlement with the Turks, as a result of the transnational setting on which he acted. On the one hand, he had to deal with the Indian Muslims who had gathered around the Khilafat movement and who had been determined to support the Caliph - and later on - the Kemalists. On the other hand, he had to prevent a possible union between the Hindus and the Muslims, who were becoming more and more anti-colonial, interconnectedly with the other parts of the world, particularly the Near East. Second, this narrative indicated that the Turkish settlement in the post-war period and accordingly the Turkish War of Independence cannot be evaluated within the confines of Turkey. Rather, it transcends the Turkish boundaries; both affecting and being affected by the

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> "Letter from Edwin Montagu (India Office) to WSC defending his policy in" The Churchill Papers (CHAR 2/120/54-56), Churchill Archives Centre (Cambridge), Churchill Archive, <http://www.churchillarchive.com/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+2%2F120%2F54-56> (accessed 20 May 2020).

<sup>61</sup> Bennett, p. 84.

<sup>62</sup> He frequently reiterated: "I am not pro-Turkish." "Turkish Peace, Memorandum of Secretary of State for India," in *Official: Cabinet: Papers, Correspondence and Notes 5 August 1921-31 December 1921*. The Churchill Papers (CHAR 22/7). Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge. Churchill Archive. <http://localhost:8080/churchill-archive/explore/page?id=CHAR+22%2F7> (accessed 1 Jun 2020).

different parts of the world. This understanding, from a historiographical point of view, has a potential to yield fruitful accounts on the post-war Turkish history. Last but not least, the story of Edwin Montagu, as the main actor of this study, showed that the different institutions of the British state, including the War and Colonial Offices, had opposing ideas about the Turkish settlement. Montagu did not have the power to shape the ultimate decisions regarding Turkey. Instead, British foreign policy remained to be dominated by pro-Greek Lloyd George and George Curzon until its eventual collapse in 1922. Despite this fact, however, the position of Montagu is a good example of the existence of dissenting views, creating serious tension inside the British government.

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## **The Kurdish Uprisings in the Middle East: A Survey**

(1831-1979)

**Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

The period (1831-1979) witnessed the origins of Kurdish nationalist sentiments through a series of separate, smaller rebellions in the 19th century, through to a larger, more cohesive and discernible movement launched following the World War I. The Kurdish "problem", as it has often been called, has been a historiographical issue. Pressures of regional states meant that the research into the issue has been limited. However, that is fast changing. Rather than a legal or political entity, the term "Kurdistan" generally refers to an agreed geographical area. Kurdish populations are concentrated in Iran to the east of the region, Turkey to the north, Iraq to the south and west, and Syria to the northwest. Territory populated by the Kurds evolved over the previous two centuries, with some regions becoming consolidated, while others were subject to constant change. Although continuing international debate regarding the future of "Kurdistan" can be said to date from around 1918-20, the British archives hold significant material dating from the early 19th century. Identifying and presenting all available documents helps to shed a light on aspects of Kurdish nationalism and territoriality as they were perceived by contemporary observers. Being conducted within the larger context of diplomatic relations with Iran, Russia and Turkey, British observations are a useful source for three reasons: first, they monitor international boundary disputes and frontier issues; second, they present assessments of strategic defence issues against any possible incursion towards the British Indian Empire; and third, on a commercial level, provide a view to establishing channels for local trade. The object of this work is to present the geo-political context of the Kurdish "Problem" as reflected in the British archival documents.

**Key Words:** Kurds, Middle East, Turkey, Iraq, Iran.

## **Ortadoğu'da Kürt İsyamları: Genel Bir Bakış**

(1831-1979)

### **Özet**

19. yüzyıl bir dizi ayrı, daha küçük isyanlar yoluyla Kürt milliyetçi duyguların kökenine tanık oldu. I. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından başlatılan daha büyük, daha uyumlu ve fark edilebilir bir harekete dönüştü. Bugün "Kürt sorunu", sık sık ifade edildiği gibi, tarih yazımıyla ilgili bir konu olmuştur. Bölgesel devletlerin baskısı, konuyla ilgili araştırmaların sınırlı olduğu anlamına geliyordu. Ancak, bu durum hızla değişiyor. Tüzel veya siyasi bir varlıktan ziyade, "Kürdistan" terimi genel olarak kararlaştırılan bir coğrafi bölgeyi ifade eder. Kürt nüfusu, İran'ın batısında, Türkiye'nin güneyinde, Irak'ın kuzeyinde ve Suriye'nin kuzey ve kuzeydoğusunda yoğunlaşmıştır. Kürtlerin yaşadığı bazı bölgeler konsolide olurken bazı bölgeler ise son iki yüzyıl boyunca sürekli değişime uğradı. "Kürdistan"ın geleceğine dair devam eden uluslararası tartışmaların daha çok 1918-20 yılları arasında yoğunlaştığı söylenebilir de, İngiliz arşivleri 19. yüzyılın başlarından kalma önemli materyallere sahiptir. Mevcut tüm belgelerin tanımlanması ve sunulması, Kürt milliyetçiliğinin, çağdaş gözlemciler tarafından algılanmasına ışık tutmaya yardımcı olacaktır. İran, Rusya ve Türkiye ile olan diplomatik ilişkiler bağlamında yürütülen İngiliz gözlemleri, belgeleri üç nedenden dolayı yararlı bir kaynaktır: Birincisi, uluslararası sınır anlaşmazlıkları ve sınır konularını izler; ikincisi, Britanya Hindistan İmparatorluğu'na yönelik olası herhangi bir saldırıya karşı stratejik savunma konularının değerlendirmelerini sunar; üçüncüsü, ticari düzeyde, yerel ticaret için kanallar oluşturmak için bir görünüm sağlar. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Kürt "Sorununun" jeopolitik içeriğini İngiliz arşiv belgelerinde yansıtıldığı şekilde sunmaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kürtler, Ortadoğu, Türkiye, Irak, İran.

### **Introduction**

This paper does not deal with the details of the Kurdish Question but with the influence of the Kurdish question on the balance of political forces in the Middle Eastern region generally. It represents the reactions to the impact of the Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds, more or less continuously as a homogeneous community, inhabited astride the frontier of Turkey, Iran and

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Iraq with small overlaps into Syria and Armenia. It is for the most part a land of mountains, but on the southwest, it extends well into the Mesopotamia plain. In addition, there are isolated islands of Kurds far removed from this main body. The Kurds of Iraq can be reliably estimated at about 1.5 million, one-fifth of the total population. Reasonable guesses would be about the same for Iran and 2.5 million for Turkey, making with Syria and Armenia a grand total of about 5.5 millions in 1950s.<sup>2</sup>

The religion of the great majority is Sunni Muslim; the dervish orders have adherents in all parts of Kurdistan. The economy of Kurdistan is still primarily agricultural and pastoral. Until now, rural society has been essentially tribal, with groups of villages owning a sort of feudal allegiance to tribal chiefs (Beg, Agha) or dervish Shaikhs. Where there is no blood relationship with the villagers, such rule has been in places very vexatious. Owing to the spread of education and the consolidation governmental authority, this system has been breaking down. So far, there has been little industrialization; but the Kerkuk oil field lies on the edge of all Kurdish area, and employment here and on the great dams and other major development projects in Iraq must be creating a labour force very different from the simple peasantry of former times.<sup>3</sup>

Kurdish nationalism dates back to days of the semi-independent principalities which survived both in the Ottoman Empire (in parts now in Turkey, Iraq and Syria) and in Iran until the Middle of the 19th century. In its modern form, it developed on parallel lines with the similar Arab and Armenian movements. The first Kurdish newspaper appeared in 1897 and was published at intervals in Cairo, Geneva, London and Folkestone until 1902. It was revived in 1908 (after the Young-Turk Revolution) in Istanbul, and appeared again during the First World War in Cairo. The first Kurdish political club with an affiliated cultural society was founded at Istanbul also in 1908.<sup>4</sup>

The aspirations of the minorities were encouraged by the military defeat of Ottoman Empire in 1918, by Point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson's "programme of the world's peace", (concerning the autonomous development of the non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire) and by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Kurdish delegates attended the Peace Conference. On 10 August 1920, the Treaty of Sévres provided for the recognition or creation not only of the Arab States of Hejaz, Syria and Iraq, but also of an Armenia and a Kurdistan.<sup>5</sup>

However, the Treaty of Sévres was never ratified, owing to the military revival of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal. It was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which confirmed the provision for Arab States south of the armistice line of 1918, but made no mention of an

<sup>2</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10. Today, the total population of the Kurds in the Middle East can be reliably estimated at about 25 million; about 5 million in Iran, 5 million in Iraq, 10 million in Turkey and 5 million in Syria and Armenia.

<sup>3</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>4</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>5</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

Armenia or a Kurdistan. The Mosul Vilayet was excluded from the Lausanne settlement, and the question of its future was referred to the League of Nations. Turkey at first refused to accept the League's award in favour of Iraq in 1925, but finally renounced her sovereignty in the Treaty of Ankara between Turkey, Iraq and Britain signed in 1926.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, this dream of an independent Kurdistan remained on record in an international document and was not forgotten. Though not applicable to them, the Treaty stimulated the hopes of the Kurds in Iran for independence in a united Kurdish States. After 1920, armed nationalistic risings occurred in all three countries. The Kurds in Iraq under Shaikh Mahmud resisted incorporation in Iraq for some years. In Turkey, the most formidable revolt was that of Shaikh Said of the Kharput region in 1925, and there were others at Siirt, Ağrı and elsewhere. In Iran, in 1922, Saiyid Taha and Ismail Agha Shikak, achieved widespread successes for a time; and in 1945-46, the Kurds in Iran set up the "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad."<sup>7</sup>

As elsewhere, language has served as the handmaid of nationalism. Up to 1918, except for the limited journalistic activity already mentioned, very little Kurdish had been printed. In 1918, Kurdish was introduced by the British military administration as the official language in Iraq. Since then there has been in Iraq a regular if not very prolific output of periodicals, anthologies and new works of all kinds, and the language is now generally used for private correspondence; Baghdad radio had a Kurdish service for some years. There was some journalistic activity at Mahabad in Iran at the time of Republic. For some years, a cultural Centre at Damascus published a magazine and a few books in Roman script, but this was rather an academic exercise for a group of intellectuals. In Soviet-Armenia, some Kurdish verse was published in the Cyrillic alphabet.<sup>8</sup>

## **2. The Period of 1831-1855**

There were at least two major Kurdish revolts during this period, chiefly as a direct result of the Perso-Turkish War of 1828-29. By 1838, British officials had begun referring to a "the Kurdish question" particularly in regards to free migration. Further revolts occurred at Van, led by Bedr (or Pedr) Khan in 1846-47, leading to reprisals, including the arrest of numerous Beys over 1849-52. There was also a revolt in Jezirah in 1854.<sup>9</sup>

## **3. The Period of 1856-1878**

Traces the impact of administrative changes set out by the Ottoman government and an increased international interest, which followed the Treaty of Paris 1856, in the Kurds and "Kurdistan". An increase in Kurdish activism with a significant revolt-taking place in Van in 1856, with another being led by Bedr Khan in 1858-59. Unrest accelerated from 1876, initially over the Kurdish resistance to conscription into the Ottoman army, and by 1878 parts of the

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<sup>6</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>7</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>8</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>9</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

region, notably around Kharput, were said to be verging on the state of anarchy. Dersim Rebellion 1878-79.<sup>10</sup>

#### **4. The Period of 1879-1899**

A state of chaos prevailed in the province of Van at the start of 1879. By August, the Kurds of Hakkari were in a state of open revolt with Shaikh Abeydullah as their leader. While increased military activity and tensions on the Perso-Turkish border in 1881 caused hardship for and resentment among Kurds trying to cross the frontier, 100,000 Kurdish families nonetheless reportedly fled Iran to Turkish territory. A state of turbulence continued from 1883-1887, leading to virtual autonomy in some regions, including Hakkari. This was ended by an Ottoman expedition in 1890 with the specific aim of repressing the Kurds. Intra-Kurdish quarrels broke out in 1894.<sup>11</sup>

In 1888, after witnessing a Kurdish revolt, W. G. Abbott, the British Consul of Tabriz, Iran, wrote to his superiors in London; "*Still, I am far from thinking that Europe has heard the last of this Kurdish question. It will probably be asked hereafter, what is to be done with Kurdistan?*"<sup>12</sup> At the time of the report, Britain had already been involved in the affairs of Kurdistan for half a century with British technical and diplomatic teams working alongside their Russian counterparts to formalize the division of Kurdish-populated regions between the Ottoman Empire and Iran (1843-1914).<sup>13</sup>

#### **5. The Period of 1900-1914**

August 1905 Kurdish forces under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha were at the gates of Diyarbekir. January 1905 they sent a petition appealing to the British Government to be placed directly under British protection. Revolts at Moush in 1910, Khuyt in 1911, and under the leader Simko (who became active from 1913), all with the goal of seeking Kurdish autonomy from the Committee of Union and Progress.<sup>14</sup>

#### **6. The Period of 1914-1920**

A special mission under Major E. Noel was sent to approach Shaikh Mahmoud to represent British interests in Suleimaniya. Shaikh Mahmoud was initially made governor, albeit with limited powers, but by 1919 had turned on the British and had become the leader of a series of revolts. The Cabinet in November 1919 cited policy as being aimed at "setting up a ring of autonomous Kurdish states around the border of the Arab vilayet of Mosul". In stark contrast to this, a policy was then adopted in January 1920 to not file a mandate for Kurdistan, while also not permitting its restoration to Turkey, nor supporting its partition. In addition, Lord

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<sup>10</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

<sup>11</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

<sup>12</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. Today, the Kurds in Iraq are understood to constitute between 15 and 20 per cent of the total population (26 million in the 2003 census). Avshalom H. Rubin, "Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization, Resistance and Revolt, 1958-1963", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume: 43, Number: 3 (May 2007), pp. 353-382.

<sup>13</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

<sup>14</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

Curzon at the San Remo conference of April 1920 had begun expressing doubts about the direction for "Kurdistan".<sup>15</sup>

In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain's influence over "Kurdistan" intensified. With the Ottoman Empire defeated and Iran in a state of collapse, the officers of the Foreign and India Offices, together with their counterparts in *Quai d'Orsay*, assumed responsibility for much of the Middle East. While the idea of creating a Kurdish homeland on former Ottoman lands attracted some support, ultimately the Middle East's new European masters chose to divide "Kurdistan" among the newly formed states of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Kurdish protests, petitions, and resistance were ignored.<sup>16</sup>

### **7. The Period of 1921-1926**

The diplomatic failure of the Allies to sufficiently advance the provision for a Kurdish state set off a chain of revolts in areas of the former *vilayet* of Kurdistan beginning with Simko's campaign. Allied reversal of the agreement of 1923, reached at the Lausanne Conference, dashes the diplomatic creation of a Kurdish respecting the Kemalist government. Major revolts continued to erupt, notably in 1925 in the form of the Shaikh Said rebellion, and again with the Dersim revolt in Turkey in 1937-38, which led to martial law being declared. Retreat and exile of Simko to Iraq in late 1926.<sup>17</sup>

### **8. The Period of 1926-1929**

By June 1927, one official was expressing the view that the Kurdish nationalist movement had reached a hiatus. The attitude and policy of the Kemalist government was now affecting the Kurds, the policy involved plans for mass deportations along with a campaign of repression of nationalist activities from July-December 1927. Kurdish declaration of independence and establishing of the Republic of Ararat in 1927. Evaluation undertaken of the consequences of the defeat in June 1929 of Iranian Kurds in the attempted Mangur Revolt.<sup>18</sup>

### **9. The Period of 1930-1939**

A significant British review of policy and promises made to Kurds, which were undertaken in the context of Anglo-Iraqi cooperation in August 1930. Mass meetings of Kurds

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<sup>15</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1957), pp. 52-62.

The Treaty of Sevres (1920) envisaged the setting up of an autonomous Kurdistan, but was never ratified because of Turkish opposition. Instead, the Kurds found themselves divided by the international frontiers of Turkey, Iraq and Syria where under the Ottoman Empire only provincial boundaries had existed. However, the establishment of an independent Kurdistan uniting all the Kurds divided by international frontiers was not an immediate aim, though it has long been the dream of almost every Kurd. The 1966 Programme of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) stated that the Kurds were fighting "for liberation and the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan within the framework of the Iraq Republic." See FCO51/191/RR6/10, "The Kurdish Problem in Iraq, 1963-1971", 6 December 1971. FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959.

<sup>16</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

<sup>17</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

C. J. Edmonds was formerly in the British Foreign Service. In 1922, he was seconded for service under the Iraqi Government and from 1935 to 1945 was Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior. He was lecturer in Kurdish at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.

<sup>18</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

and plans for a major anti-Arab revolt in Iraq, 1931. The Khoybun Revolt took place over the period 1929-31, leading to attempts to define the boundaries of Kurdistan in 1931-32. The Kurds were forced migration during the period 1939-1945, in which one-estimate claims 700,000 Kurds died.<sup>19</sup>

#### **10. The Period of 1940-1944**

During the World War II in which both Iran and Iraq were effectively under Allied occupation. A Kurdish revolt occurred in Persia in December 1941, supported by Assyrian and Chaldean factions, leading to full military engagement with Iranian forces, and ultimately a Kurdish defeat in January 1942. Continued disturbances in western Iran January 1942, notably the Kurdish advanced on Rezaieh in western Azerbaijan. Unrest among Kurds in the autumn of 1942 led to Iranian military operations and surveillance in northern "Kurdistan". Various incidents involving Kurds, such as an attack on Mazlu village, suggested they would not undertake attacks if Russians offered any resistance. The frontier situation from August 1943 points to a lack of control, allowing for subsequent incursions and cross-border raids by Kurds.<sup>20</sup>

#### **11. The Period of 1945-1950**

Since 1945, there had been little manifestation of Kurdish political nationalism in any of the three countries (Turkey, Iran and Iraq). The intellectual leaders seemed to have been persuaded that for the time being, in the face of the opposition of the three governments, nothing could be done to forward their aspirations for an independent united Kurdistan; they could only wait in the hope that some future international upheaval would give them, or their sons, an opportunity of renewing their movement with some chance of success.<sup>21</sup>

From 1945, the Iraqi Kurdish situation had become focused on the activities of Mullah Mustapha. A report from Capt. Stokes, the Political Adviser at Erbil, referred to "the confederacy of Barzan" as an "autonomous Kurdistan" established by Mullah Mustafa. Tours of the region by British officials in late 1945, aimed at assess the interaction between local officials and Mullah Mustafa. This period also saw the formation of political protest parties, the "Kurdish Democratic Party" dates from 1946 for example. Temporary creation of "The autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan" in the western Azerbaijan area of Mahabad, 1946. Mahabad continued to be a focal point the nationalist movement, at least until 1949.<sup>22</sup>

#### **12. The Period of 1951-1965**

Barzan revolt of 1954. The Shah launches an attack against the Juamri Kurds 1956. Decision was made by many Iraqi Kurds in February 1963 start a revolt under leadership of

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<sup>19</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147.

<sup>20</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. Ofra Bengio, "Iraqi Kurds: Hour of Power?", *Middle East Quarterly*, (Summer 2003).

<sup>21</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959.

<sup>22</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim. Also, see* FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. Michael M. Gunter, **The Kurds of Iraq**, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Mullah Barzani. Iranian assistance was offered to Iraqi Kurds in 1963. Negotiations in 1964 for a ceasefire among the Iraqi Kurds proved unfruitful and gave way to renewed fighting in 1965.<sup>23</sup>

Resentment against the ruling majority was perhaps less in Iraq than in the other two countries, because it was here that the Kurds had had the fairest deal: only in Iraq were they legally recognised as a minority having certain rights of their own *qua* Kurds, or was their language used for elementary education, local administration and legal proceedings, or was there any lively cultural and journalistic activity. This was due to: (a) the obligation on the Mandatory Power to keep open until 1923 (Treaty of Lausanne) the possibility of their adhering to a Kurdish State; (b) the conditions under which the League of Nations had awarded the Mosul Vilayet to Iraq in 1925; and (c) the guarantees demanded by and given to the League when Iraq was admitted to membership in 1932. One or two Kurdish Ministers were normally included in every Cabinet.<sup>24</sup>

It was not surprising, therefore, that the news of the revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958, followed as it was by the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan and the sabre-rattling of the Soviet Union, should have suggested to Kurdish nationalist in three countries (Turkey, Iran and Iraq), that this might be the international upheaval for which they had been waiting and that they should have put in hand the preparation of a memorandum on the Kurdish Question for the Summit Conference as first demanded by Nikita Khrushchev, who was the leader of the Soviet Union from 1955 until 1964, succeeding Stalin.<sup>25</sup>

An event which particularly struck the popular imagination was the return to Iraq at the beginning of October 1958 of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the rebel tribesman from Iraq, who was driven over the frontier in 1945, took service with the "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" and on its collapse escaped to Soviet-Armenia, where he was given high military rank and encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erevan. Mulla Mustafa's welcome by Arabs and Kurds alike was on a royal scale, and he was hailed not only as a Kurdish "leader" but as a champion of the general struggle against the "reactionary and colonialist monarchy". After twelve years at Mahabad and as an honoured guest of the Soviets, the General Mustafa of to-day must be a very different person from the comparatively unsophisticated tribesman of 1945; but it is difficult to explain this rapid build-up into a national all-Iraqi figure otherwise than as the work of a well-organised chain of Communist propagandists, long or quickly established in all parts of Iraq.<sup>26</sup>

### 13. The Period of 1966-1979

The period begins with a strategic conference in Iraq, which planned to remove Kurds from all oil-bearing areas in 1966; this was at a time when the British Government had effectively declared neutrality on the (Iraq) Kurdish question. Mustafa al Barzani delivered a

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<sup>23</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. Avshalom H. Rubin, "Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization, Resistance and Revolt, 1958-63", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May 2007), pp. 353-382.

<sup>24</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>25</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

<sup>26</sup> FO371/140682/E1821/9/59, The Kurds by C. J. Edmonds, 13 February 1959. FO371/140682/E1821/20, The Kurds and the Baghdad Pact Powers, 29 April 1959. C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Volume: 13, Number: 1, (Winter 1959), pp. 1-10.

list of demands to the Iraq government in April 1966. Over 400,000 Kurds were expelled by the government of Iraq over 1970-76, despite the terms of the 1970 "settlement" negotiated with the Government and accepted by Mullah Mustapha. Growing tensions between Kurds and government of Iraq were evident in 1973, and an ultimatum was given to the KDP by Saddam Hussein in March 1974. Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Iran and their forcible re-settlement from 1976-1977 affected wider relations between Britain, Iran and Iraq. The Pahlevi regime in February 1979, labelled the KDP as "counter-revolutionary" following the setting up of KDP HQ at Mahabad-their first revolt since 1949.<sup>27</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The Turkish and Iranian Governments were following developments in Iraq very closely and perhaps anxiously. They were also probably considering a number of proposals for improving communications, initiating development projects, and extending material benefits such as social services in their Kurdish provinces, in order to conciliate with public feelings. It was, however, in the field of education and cultural activity that the most difficult decisions were to be made.

The first alternative was to continue in the policy that had been pursued up until that point, namely of denying Kurdish racial sentiment, and discouraging or, in some cases, forbidding all Kurdish cultural and literary activity, particularly journalism. Such an alternative would rely on an extension of the educational system of that time with the Turkish (or Iranian) language as the medium of instruction, and the complete denial of the existence of a Kurdish language. The hope was to be that future generations would forget about the origins of a Kurdish race or language, and thus grow up as Turks or Iranians loyal to their nations and ready to defend their integrity. However, such a policy had not been successful so far, and it was doubtful that it could be maintained for long without an opposing policy across the borders being actively pursued.

The second alternative was to follow the approach Iraq had adopted; specifically, to accept the existence of a Kurdish identity. This policy, imposed first by the Mandatory Power and then by the League of Nations, was at first disapproved of by the Arab rulers; but later it was not only endorsed, it in fact became extended. Possible objections were expected to be along the line that such a policy would promote a stronger feeling of solidarity among the Kurds of the three states, which would inevitably and rapidly lead to demands for separation. There were a number of arguments refuting these objections. First, the impetus of Kurdish nationalism could not be dampened; second, should Turkey, as the nation with the largest Kurdish population, take the lead in winning Kurdish support, the abnormal situation in which Iraq, which had the smallest Kurdish population of the three, was the attractor would be reversed; and finally that, with satisfied Kurdish populations in each of the three countries together with an unfavourable geography for the formation of a separate Kurdish state, it might be possible for the three governments to come to arrangement based on liberal toleration. However, Turkish and Iranian statesmen had preferred the first alternative.

Soviet support of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, Turkey and Iran was common knowledge. Together with Kurdish resurgence due to the Iraqi Revolution and the discontent of the Kurdish minorities in Iran and Turkey, this situation was clearly in the Soviets' favour. However, the objectives of Kurdish and Arab nationalism were inevitably irreconcilable. Therefore, although

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<sup>27</sup> Burdett (ed.), *Passim*. Also, see FO371/140682; FO371/52369; FO371/2718; FCO8/3243; FCO8/3244; FCO2335; FCO8/2308; FCO51/147. F. Michael Wuthrich, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey, Iraq and Beyond", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2, (March 2012), pp. 303-310.



the resurgence of the Kurdish question in Iraq clearly posed a difficult problem to Iran and Turkey, it was certainly a puzzling issue for the other countries, both inside and outside the region. It was a powerful additional force which underlined the historical divisions in the Arab world between Baghdad on the one hand, and Damascus and Cairo on the other.

By reversing the cautious policies of Nuri Said, the new Iraqi government was in effect proclaiming an Arab-Kurdish common front disguised as an "anti-imperialist" brotherhood. It was also true that Kurds who were influenced by the Soviets, such as Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Barzan family, were being used as figure-heads in these events. To see events in perspective, however, it is necessary to view them in relation to the trend towards Arab unity embodied in Nasser's United Arab Republic.

Clearly, the Iraqi Revolution had set in motion two opposing trends of political thought: one advocating Arab unity; and the other supporting Iraqi separatism beyond Arabism, underlining that Iraq was far from a wholly Arab country. The first trend was represented by Rashid Ali and Arif, the second by the Premier Qasim. The leaders of the movement towards unity with Egypt and Syria were suppressed and brought to trial with the death penalty foreseen. The rift was so clear that not even a counter revolution would heal it. Popular opinion put the blame on Soviet influence, with Qasim choosing Moscow over Cairo. However, there was no clear evidence to indicate this, and it overlooked the Soviet interest in remaining on good terms with Cairo. The more plausible explanation was that Qasim's choice was influenced by Kurdish nationalism, especially given that this movement emphasised the historical antipathy of Baghdad for Levantine Arabism. For the time being it seemed more attractive for the revolutionary Arabism of Baghdad to share a common cause with a Kurdish movement which its leaders knew as embarrassing to their close neighbours in Turkey and Iran, than to flirt with what was to them the vague emotionalism of Arab unity. At this point it should be mentioned that critics of the alleged "divide and rule" British policy at that time appeared to have no knowledge of the real forces at work. Divisive forces have historical roots, going back further than British influence.

The Kurds of Iraq were always wary of any trend towards Arab unity. Their dislike of the abortive Iraq-Jordan Federation can be given as an example. All their influence was likely to be used against Iraq's joining the UAR. Any Iraqi government which followed such a cause would lose their support. The reality of events following the Iraqi revolution demonstrated that the Iraqi Arab leaders had been willing to pay a high price for that support. Indeed, Kurdish ambitions were to an important degree the key to events in Baghdad at that time.

However, the picture must also be viewed from a wider perspective. The Iraqi Kurds constituted only about one-quarter of the Kurdish ethnic group, one-half being in Turkey, and the remaining quarter in Iran. If any foreign power, whether the USSR, the USA, the UK, or even Iraq itself, were actively to support the consolidation of the Kurds either to form a new Kurdish State (as contemplated in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of 1920), or to join with the Kurds of Iraq, the Arabism of Baghdad would be under serious threat. There was probably a total of more than 5 million Kurds, and about 4 million Arabs in Iraq. This suggests that, however emotionally the Arab-Kurdish front in Baghdad may have been proclaimed at that time, no Baghdad government was likely going to support Kurdish nationalism without reservations.

The Soviets had a number of Kurds living in the Armenian USSR. They had been using them as an "anti-imperialist" voice since 1946, and they know far more about them than the Western powers. They were well aware of the dilemma that support of Kurdish nationalism

after a certain point was incompatible with Arab unity. Even limited support had already had the result of further alienating the new Arab idea in Baghdad from Mediterranean Arabism. For these reasons, it was unlikely that Moscow would support the Kurds, or the Communist Party of Baghdad, in all-out opposition to the UAR. It would be against Soviet interests deliberately to agitate the friction developing between Iraq and Egypt.

For the West the problem was rather different. Britain had always supported a fair deal for the Kurds; in fact, it was only British insistence that gave them better treatment in Iraq (e.g., their own schools, use of their own language, their own local officials) than in Iran or Turkey. However, even in the days of the Mandate the British Government did not, following the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), envisage Kurdish separatism, and were prevented from doing so in Turkey and Iran. Indeed, to support an independent Kurdish State would be impossible for a member of the Baghdad Pact, and would inevitably alienate both Turkey and Iran. The British Government could no more do so than support the formation of a Pathan State out of Pakistan. However, it would still be advisable for Britain or the US to check the atmosphere Turkey and Iran to see if they would alleviate Kurdish separatism by more generous treatment of the Kurdish minorities within their boundaries.

To conclude, Soviet desires to keep good relations with the Arab world should have made it against their interest to use Kurdish nationalism beyond a certain point as a means of entry to the heart of the Middle East. However, the events of 1946 showed how badly the Soviets had failed to appreciate the real balance of forces, or the internal situation, in this region at that time. They could make a similar mistake again. The visions of the disruption of Turkey or Iran or both would likely prove too much for the Kremlin. The best way to make sure that this did not happen was for the West to understand the forces that operated, to publicize the dangers widely and show that they were prepared.

The division of the Ottoman Kurdish populations amongst three inhospitable countries proved to be a costly solution. Turkey, for example, has witnessed almost thirty Kurdish rebellions. Iraq, too, fought a series of unforgiving wars against the Barzani-led Kurdish rebels from the time of its foundation until the present day. In Syria, the Kurds have been the subjects of a system that has, for many years, deprived them of their right to citizenship. Paradoxically, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 has acted to empower the Syrian Kurds. However, the threat presented by Islamist militants, the antipathy of the Syrian opposition, and the continuing power of the Ba'athist regime, mean that their future remains uncertain. The history of Iran and its Kurdish population has been far from stable. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed numerous examples of persecution and repression directed towards Iran's Kurds as well as examples of rebellion and resistance.

Part of the reason why Kurdish history has often been defined by conflict and violence can be attributed to the ways regional actors have viewed the Kurdish "question". More precisely, the political establishments in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, have regarded the issue as one of vital national security and, more broadly, regional stability. Indeed, it could be argued that these states have benefited from the Kurdish presence, since the possibility of a Kurdish nation has constituted one of the very few areas of geopolitical common ground in a region often divided against itself. There have, of course, been exceptions. Iran has, at times, offered support to Iraqi Kurdish rebels, largely in order to gain advantage over Baghdad. Similarly, during the 1980s and 1990s Syria provided political and logistical support to the PKK as it waged war on Ankara. Nevertheless, for much of the last century the common agenda aimed at suppressing Kurdish demands allowed these states to maintain an uneasy coexistence.

Today, the world's approximately 30 million Kurds are often described as the biggest ethnic group without a nation-state. Still, the question of how this state of affairs came to pass and the processes nurturing that predicament have yet to be thoroughly studied. Indeed, the policies of regional states have often made it difficult to study any aspect of the Kurdish people. The Kurdish "problem" has thus become a historiographical issue as well. That, however, is changing quickly as new generations of young academics and intellectuals are laying the foundations of the field of Kurdish studies.

This paper will no doubt lead to new insights and greater understanding of evolution of the Kurds and "Kurdistan". Perhaps not so coincidentally, while referring to the cross-border movement of tribes, one of the first documents refers to the "Kurdish Question," while one of the last, dated 1979, is entitled "The Kurdish Problem". In the hundred and fifty years covered by the paper, the Kurds went from being a "question" needing an answer to a "problem" urgently demanding a solution. Thus, considering the fact that the "Kurdish question" has yet to find a solution, it seems that reassessing the *longue durée* development of the issue should constitute one of the most important tasks for scholars and academics with an interest in the region. In this regards, the documents to be found within the archives will be of great importance.

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
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**Appendix-I: Distribution of Kurds in the Middle East. Source: The National Archives, UK. FO370/2718.**



## British Ambassador Noel Charles and Turkey's Agenda (1949-1951)

Betül Batır<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Noel Charles' three-year service in Turkey as the British ambassador in the time period between 1949 and 1951, when Turkey's domestic and foreign policy were active and changeable, is discussed within the scope of Turkey's agenda at that time. The events in which Noel Charles took part and became actively involved have been determined in the light of Turkey's political-military, cultural-social and commercial agenda based on the press and archival resources of the period. On the basis of the foreign relations, Turkey's campaign for NATO membership and British government's desire to maintain its existence in the Middle East as a powerful state prompted the rapprochement between Britain and Turkey in this period. The fact that that Soviet Russia was a common enemy and the United States was a common ally can be considered as one of the main factors in this rapprochement. In our study, the amicable relations established between Britain and Turkey in the time period between 1949 and 1951 are addressed, and it is aimed to present Noel Charles' perspective of Turkey, his special travels in Turkey, personal point of view and feelings through the available data. The relations between Turkey and Britain during a three-year working period of an ambassador have been reviewed within a limited frame.

**Key Words:** Noel Charles, Turkey, Britain, the Middle East, NATO

## İngiltere Büyükelçisi Noel Charles ve Türkiye'nin Gündemi (1949-1951)

### Özet

Türkiye'nin iç ve dış politikada etkin ve değişken olduğu 1949-1951 yılları arasında Türkiye'de İngiltere Büyükelçisi olarak görev yapmış olan Noel Charles'in üç yıllık faaliyetleri Türkiye gündemi ile birlikte ele alınmıştır. Türkiye'nin siyasi-askeri, kültürel-sosyal ve ticari gündemi ışığında Noel Charles'in katıldığı ve etkin olduğu faaliyetler dönemin basın ve arşiv kaynakları esas alınarak belirlenmiştir. Dış ilişkiler bazında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya katılma çabaları, İngiltere'nin Ortadoğu'da güçlü devlet olarak kalma istekleri bu dönemde İngiltere ile Türkiye arasındaki yakınlaşmayı sağlamıştır. Bu yakınlaşmada Sovyet Rusya'nın ortak düşman ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin ortak müttefik olması temel etkenlerden sayılabilir. Çalışmamızda 1949-1951 yılları arasında İngiltere ile Türkiye arasında gelişen dostane ilişkiler Noel Charles temelinde ele alınırken, Noel Charles'in Türkiye'ye bakışı, Türkiye'deki özel seyahatleri, şahsi görüş ve duygularına da veriler ölçüsünde yer vermeye çalışılmıştır. Bir Büyükelçinin üç yıllık yaşamında Türkiye-İngiliz ilişkileri sınırlı bir çerçeve ile yeniden gözden geçirilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Noel Charles, Türkiye, İngiltere, Ortadoğu, NATO.

### Introduction

The period between 1949 and 1951, when Turkey's domestic and foreign policy agenda was busy, was also the time when the impacts of the Second World War was felt in different ways. The issues that existed before and that appeared after the war were in the centre of the attention for the world countries<sup>2</sup>. The emergence of various disputes and the changing world order also required a revision of the policies and international relations.

After the Second World War, an atmosphere of peace could not be achieved immediately. As Armaoğlu stated, the world had to spend an eventful fifteen-year in a "cold war" atmosphere<sup>3</sup>. In this context, for Turkey, the most remarkable country in this changing relations and policies was Britain. Britain's desire to maintain its forces in the British colonies and the emergence of the Soviet Russia, disturbing the balance after the war, caused Britain to change its direction. Upon reviewing its relationship with Turkey, Britain launched a new policy towards Turkey including amity and closeness. Especially in order to maintain its existence as

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<sup>2</sup> For detailed information about the period See *Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1995) [20th Century Political History (1914-1995)]*, 11. Baskı, Ankara: Alkım Yayınevi, p. 419vd.

<sup>3</sup> Armaoğlu, Op. Cit., p. 419.

a powerful state in the Middle East, Britain intended to conciliate Turkey<sup>4</sup>. In this policy, the fact that both countries were on the side of the United States against Soviet Russia was effective. Turkey also favoured the policy of rapprochement with Britain<sup>5</sup>.

The only way to ensure security for Turkey was to take part in the unities formed by the powerful states and so it was of primary policy to be one of the member states in these unities. The unity that would provide security in this period was North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Turkey had to be a partner of this association for its military and political survival. Therefore, Turkey strived to join NATO as a member country within the framework of its foreign policy between 1949 and 1951<sup>6</sup>.

Meanwhile, within the framework of the domestic policies in Turkey, efforts were accelerated for the transition to pluralistic system. The President İsmet İnönü was in favour of the transition to pluralist democracy, which had been started in the time period of Atatürk but could not be implemented, and he was waiting for the end of the war. For this reason, after the war, the pluralistic system that had been longed for years in Turkey was achieved in 1946 with the establishment of the Justice Party and its participation in the local elections. The power groups and policies changing with 1950 elections in Turkey gave rise to new arrangements in Turkey<sup>7</sup>. In brief, Turkey witnessed highly intensive changes in the domestic and foreign policies between 1949 and 1951<sup>8</sup>.

Noel Charles, one of the prominent figures in Turkish-British rapprochement, who worked in Turkey in these circumstances of changes, had been to Turkey for around three years as the British ambassador. During this period, he witnessed political, military, social, cultural and commercial developments and had an opportunity to get to know Turkey better. He kept records of the period when he was in Turkey and also officially sent information to Britain. Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa evaluated these reports by Noel Charles in his various works comprehensively<sup>9</sup>. As can be understood from his reports and Turkish press as well, it is

<sup>4</sup> Armaoğlu, Op. Cit., p. 518.

<sup>5</sup> Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası (1950-1960) [Turkey's Middle Eastern Policy during the Democrat Party Era (1950-1960)]", *History Studies*, 2010, Volume: 2, Issue: Special Issue, p. 68; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "The Straits Questions According to British Documents (1774-1953)", *International Symposium on Karamürsel Alp & History of Kocaeli-II*, Volume: 1, Kocaeli 2016, p. 1633.

<sup>6</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, Op. Cit., p. 517-521.

<sup>7</sup> Sina Akşin, *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi [Brief History of Turkey]*, 9. Baskı, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2009, pp. 239-248.

<sup>8</sup> After the transition to pluralist democracy and handover of the ruling power, it is also mentioned that there was an uneasiness and pettishness felt by Bayar and Menderes, which started especially in the last year when Noel Charles was in Turkey and continued until 1954 elections. They are considered to have been in that mood for the fear of losing power. Even, some authors argued that Menderes and Bayar had a kind of "İnönü Phobia". See Sina Akşin, Op. Cit., p. 250. On a dining event hosted by Noel Charles in the embassy, during the conversations with the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes a similar situation occurred as follows: While chatting with Adnan Menderes after dinner, Noel Charles spoke highly of Turkey's advancement in democracy and started talking about İsmet İnönü and posed critical comments. Highly irritated with the situation, Adnan Menderes tried to keep calm for the sake of the intimate friendship representations by Noel Charles on behalf of Britain, and he didn't reply harshly but changed the topic by not responding back to the criticism. He ended the night after his speech emphasizing democracy and Britain-Turkey fellowship. See Nadir Nadi, "*Perde Aralığından-Demokrasiyi soysuzlaştıran Sen-Ben Kavgarları [Power Struggles that Degenerate Democracy-Behind the Counter]*", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 September 1964, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> See. Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası (1950-1960)", p.68; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Economic Developments in Turkey During The Democrat Party Era (1950-1960)", *Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi -Journal of Social Science*, Volume:2005-1, Issue:10, p.207-239; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "The Straits Questions According to British

obvious that Noel Charles served as a bridge in the development of foreign policy between Britain and Turkey, in accordance with his duty. During the period he was in charge, Noel Charles knew that the Turkish Government's primary concern was the issue of security and that Turkey was highly determined and persistent to join NATO to ensure this security<sup>10</sup>.

The study aims to handle the events, in which Noel Charles was involved and became influential, within the agenda of Turkey during the period when Noel Charles was in Turkey. Also, Noel Charles' views and feelings were given place based on the speeches made by him for the press.

### **1. The Life of Noel Charles (according to the agrément<sup>11</sup> dated 1949)**

In the agrément letter sent to Britain by the Republic of Turkey on February 9, 1949 requested for the new British Ambassador to be appointed, the appointment of Ambassador Noel Charles, who served as Deputy Undersecretary at the British Foreign Office, was deemed appropriate<sup>12</sup>.

The short résumé of Noel Charles until the year 1949 was included in the agrément letter of February 10, 1949 sent from the Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak to the Presidency<sup>13</sup>. According to this; Noel Charles was born in 1891, studied at Rugby College and Oxford University, participated in the First World War from 1914 to 1918 and had Iron Cross Medal.

He was appointed as the Brussels Embassy clerk in 1919, the Foreign Clerk in 1921 and the Embassy clerk in Bucharest in 1923. In 1925, he was promoted to the first secretary, then appointed to the Embassies of Tokyo, Stockholm and Moscow respectively.

In 1936, he was assigned as the undersecretary of the Embassy of Brussels and a year later he was appointed to Rome. He was promoted to the Legation in 1939 and brought to the Legation in Lisbon in 1940 after declaring war with Italy. He was appointed as the Ambassador to Rio de Janeiro in 1941<sup>14</sup>. In 1944, he was appointed to the Supreme Commissioner of Britain in Rome, and after the peace agreement with Italy, he served in Rome as a representative in the position of ambassador<sup>15</sup>. Later, Noel Charles was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appointed to the British Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers authorized to negotiate the fate of the Italian colonies. Before he was appointed to the Embassy in Turkey, his post was the Undersecretary of State of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>16</sup>.

His résumé in Cumhuriyet newspaper began with the phrase "Baronet Sir Noel Charles was 58 years old and educated in Rugby and Oxford". Here, the nobility of Noel Charles stands out. Noel Charles was called Baronet because of his father, Richard Charles, a leading member of the Indian service, had the title of Baronage, and he also had the title of Sir given by the UK<sup>17</sup>.

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Documents (1774-1953)", p. 1621-1635; Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'nin Dış İlişkilerine Genel Bir Bakış (1950-1960) [An Overview of Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Democratic Party Era (1950-1960)]", *Alternative Politics*, Volume:1, Issue:2, September 2009, pp.142-193.

<sup>10</sup> Behçet Yeşilbursa, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası (1950-1960)", p.68.

<sup>11</sup> Agrément: The origin of the word "agrement"; French agrément. Certificate of Eligibility.

<sup>12</sup> Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA) [The Prime Ministry Republic Archives], nr. 30.10.00.131.941.16.

<sup>13</sup> BCA, nr. 30.10.00.131.941.16.

<sup>14</sup> *The London Gazette*, June 24, 1941, No:35199, p.3599.

<sup>15</sup> During his duty, on October 31, 1946, the house he resided in Rome was damaged by the bombing of the Irgun terrorist group's events in Rome. See; *The Courier-Mail*, November 1, 1946, No:3102, p.1; *The Canberra Times*, December 25, 1946, No:6151, Vol:21, p.1.

<sup>16</sup> BCA, nr. 30.10.00.131.941.16.

<sup>17</sup> "Yeni İngiliz Elçisi Perşembe günü geliyor [The New British Ambassador is coming on Thursday]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 10, 1949, p.1.4.



## 2. Noel Charles's Arrival to Turkey

British Ambassador David Kelly and his wife, who were in charge before Noel Charles, left Turkey on May 2, 1949. David Kelly was appointed to Moscow. He and his wife went to Yeşilköy on May 2, 1949, to travel to London on a British plane. The Ambassador was sent off in Yeşilköy by the American Ambassador Mr. George Wadsworth, who had come there on a private plane from Ankara, the Greek Ambassador Pericles Skeferis, the Indian Ambassador Diwan Chamau Lall, Hayriye Kırdar, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the American Consul General Mr. Mac Donald, the British and American Embassy members and reporters. Looking very excited, David Kelly told the reporters at the airport: *"I spoke enough in Ankara. What should I tell; I'm leaving your beautiful land unfortunately and I'm very sorry, I hope to see you again"*<sup>18</sup>.

David Kelly's wife wiped her eyes with her handkerchief while saying goodbye to her friends who came to see her off. Her sadness and tears were getting increased as they went on the plane, and after looking at the Turkish flag flying over the plane, to a journalist who *said*, *"Would you like to say something?"*, she said: *"What can I do? I have to go"*.<sup>19</sup>

The reason why Lady Kelly had such a grief was an incident that had happened the day before their journey. It was a bouquet of flowers sent to their home by a sign officer who gave way to the Ambassador's car in front of the Embassy. Ms. Kelly took the bouquet and said to those around her in tears, *"Here are the Turks!"*<sup>20</sup>.

Britain's new Ambassador to Ankara Noel Charles said in a statement to Nafen agency: *"On my way to my mission in Ankara, I am deeply pleased"*<sup>21</sup>.

Noel Charles attributed his arrival in Turkey with a deep sense of friendship and without feeling like an outsider to his visit to Turkey in 1925 and uttered the following words;

*"In 1925, when I served at the British Embassy in Bucharest, I came to Turkey for the first time for a diplomatic mission. I also had the opportunity to visit Turkey in 1931. In this way, I have been pleased to observe Turkey's resurgence with the indoctrinations of the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal in the very beginning days. Today, I welcome a longer residence in Turkey and I hope that I can see the mature results of Atatürk's achievements closely"*<sup>22</sup>.

Noel Charles, who would represent the Great Britain in Ankara, stated that he was in constant contact with Percy Lorraine, one of Britain's former Ambassadors to Ankara, and thus knowledgeable about Turkey, adding that *"Anyone who has worked with Sir Lorraine can't stop sharing the Ambassador's great reverence in Turkey's past and his great faith in its future"*<sup>23</sup>.

Noel Charles, who noted the robustness of Turkey's political views and national body in his remarks, expressed great respect and reliance for this. Noel Charles expressed his deep satisfaction that he would find himself in the front of a nationalist Turkish press that is active and speaks openly<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci [The statement of the new British Ambassador]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3 1949, p.1,4.

<sup>19</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

<sup>20</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

<sup>21</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.1.

<sup>22</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

<sup>23</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

<sup>24</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

Noel Charles, who gladly said he would go to Turkey on a Turkish ferry, said, "*I am very pleased to go to Turkey on a Turkish ship. All I wish is that during my journey, I can travel in a calm and clean weather like Turkish and British relations*"<sup>25</sup>.

British Ambassador to Ankara Baronet Noel Charles and his wife Lady Charles arrived in Turkey by the Istanbul ferry on Thursday, May 12, 1949<sup>26</sup>.

He was welcomed by the British Consul General, his wife, consular officer and members of the press at the dock. Ambassador Noel Charles had expressed his feelings to the reporters in the following sentences: "*I am very pleased to have come to the friendly nation Turkey. I'm having the happiest moments of my life right now. The Turkish and British nations understood each other closely and appreciated that they were needed. In the face of today's situation, I am aware of the importance and seriousness of my duty. Turkish-British relations are evolving by the day. My journey was very comfortable. I admire the interest and intimacy I have experienced on the Turkish ship*"<sup>27</sup>. On the evening of the same day, the Ambassador moved to Ankara.

Noel Charles remained in Turkey until November 1951, the date his duty ended. However, in May 1950, he went to London on leave<sup>28</sup> and returned to Turkey a few months later. During his duty, Noel Charles went to London for a variety of reasons at certain time intervals and resumed his duties when he came back to Turkey.

He had an illness during his time period in Turkey and it was stated in the press that his illness worsened in April 1951<sup>29</sup>. Noel Charles was not in Turkey until June 27, 1951 after his illness. Noel Charles, who returned to Turkey on June 27, 1951, told *Milliyet* newspaper:

"*I haven't been in Turkey for a long time. I'm very pleased to be back. I will meet with your Foreign Secretary within the next week and inform your government of what I have been asked by the British Foreign Secretary. There is great sympathy for Turkey in Britain. Recent incidents have been misunderstood. The bonds between Turkey and Britain have reached the strongest state at the moment. That's why, there is no way to have a disagreement between the two friendly states*"<sup>30</sup>.

### **3. Noel Charles in Turkey's 1949-1951 Agenda**

Turkey's agenda between 1949 and 1951 was intense. The agenda was very intense not only in foreign affairs issues, but also in internal affairs. While Turkey, which switched to pluralist democracy, experienced some changes in its internal policy, it was considered vital to have a wise plan for the determination of the allied states in order to maintain security together with changes in the world policy and to be able to take part in the interstate relations. For this reason, the agenda of this process was very active from military-political, cultural-social and commercial aspects. In particular, Britain, which established friendly relations, was included in this active agenda through Ambassador Noel Charles.

#### **3.1. Military - Political Agenda and Noel Charles**

Between 1949 and 1951, Turkey's political and military agenda continued in relation to each other. Political decisions were also reinforced in the military field. When this situation is taken into account in the context of Noel Charles, who ensured the relations with Britain and

<sup>25</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p.4.

<sup>26</sup> "Yeni İngiliz Elçisi Perşembe günü geliyor [The New British Ambassador arrives on Thursday]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 10, 1949, p.1.4; "İngiltere'nin yeni Ankara Büyük Elçisi geldi [Britain's new Ambassador to Ankara has arrived]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1949, p.1.3.

<sup>27</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni Ankara Büyük Elçisi geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1949, p.1.3.

<sup>28</sup> "İngiltere elçisi dün sabah Londra'ya gitti [The British Ambassador went to London yesterday morning]", *Milliyet*, May 30, 1950, p.2.

<sup>29</sup> "İngiliz Sefirinin Hastalığı [The Illness of the British Ambassador]", *Milliyet*, April 8, 1951, p.1.

<sup>30</sup> "İngiltere elçisi dün gece geldi [The British Ambassador came last night]", *Milliyet*, June 28, 1951, p.1.

the Turkey-Britain relationship, it is seen that there were military and political visits to Turkey in this period. These visits were sometimes for military purposes and could turn into visits where political issues were discussed. The topics discussed during the visits were mainly about the Britain-Turkey friendship, trade relations, the Middle East issue and Turkey's accession to NATO.

### **3.1.1. Military-Political Visits and Noel Charles**

Visitors from Britain to Turkey were usually political or military officials. Guests from Britain were greeted by Ambassador Noel Charles. Therefore, Noel Charles was also present while the guests were being welcomed in Turkey by the relevant authorities.

Sailor visitors from the British naval base in Cyprus stopped by Turkey and made various visits. For Britain, Cyprus had an important position in the 1950s. It was the concern about the Middle East issues that made this importance and the concern to maintain the place among the powerful states in the Mediterranean. One of the reasons why Britain later supported Greece and Turkey to join NATO was because it was trying to maintain its dominance in Cyprus<sup>31</sup>.

The first guests of the period were the British sailors. Due to the Mediterranean fleet, the passage of British sailors from Istanbul was intense during this period. On September 2, 1949, the officers and privates of British ships as guests in Istanbul Harbour visited the city's sights. Also, on the evening of the same day, a dinner was given by British Ambassador Noel Charles in honour of the visiting sailors. Mediterranean fleet Admiral Arthur Power was accepted by İnönü at Dolmabahçe Palace on September 3, 1949<sup>32</sup>.

The Commander of the British Middle East Air Force visited Turkey on September 24, 1949. The reason for the visit was the delivery of the British jet plane fleet. Twelve of the British jet "Vampire" planes, located in Cyprus, were brought from Eskişehir to Yeşilköy on the morning of September 23. With his fleet, The Commander of the Cyprus Air Force, Brigadier General BHC. Russell also came to Istanbul. The fleet was welcomed with a military ceremony<sup>33</sup>.

Brigadier General Hamdullah Göker, Commander of the Turkish Air Force, welcomed the British General and said "welcome" in Yeşilköy military area. General Russell reviewed the reverence troop, first the British and then the Turkish national anthems were played. Istanbul Air Commander Colonel Naim Bürküt also reviewed British aviators, shook their hands and said "welcome"<sup>34</sup>.

British Air General Russell told reporters that his trip was fine and that the kind acceptance in Eskişehir was very special for him. In honour of the guests, a lunch feast was given by the Air Command at the Florya casino<sup>35</sup>.

After this feast, British Ambassador Sir Noel Charles also came to Yeşilköy and met with General Russell. Three Vampire planes took off for demonstrations at 3:30 p.m. Meanwhile, a curious public crowd filled Yeşilköy square and its surroundings. The public appreciated the planes' flights from a very low altitude. The British Ambassador congratulated the pilots after the demonstration flights. In honour of the guests, a feast was given at Taksim Casino in the evening<sup>36</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Soyalp Tamçelik, "Kıbrıs'taki İngiliz üslerinin stratejik önemi [Strategic importance of British bases in Cyprus]", *International Journal of Human Sciences*, Volume:8, Issue:1, Year:2011, p. 1516.

<sup>32</sup> "Misafir İngiliz Denizcileri [Guest British Sailors]", *Cumhuriyet*, September 3, 1949, p.2.

<sup>33</sup> "İngiliz tepkili uçak filosu dün geldi [The Fleet of British jet planes arrived yesterday]", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1949, p.1,3.

<sup>34</sup> "İngiliz tepkili uçak filosu dün geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1949, p.1,3.

<sup>35</sup> "İngiliz tepkili uçak filosu dün geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1949, p.1,3.

<sup>36</sup> "İngiliz tepkili uçak filosu dün geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1949, p.1,3.

On those days again, Middle East Air Force Commander-in-Chief Marshal William F. Dicson came to Istanbul and visited the Governor of Istanbul. Marshal William Dicson was later accepted by President İnönü<sup>37</sup>.

The 1950s, when Middle Eastern issues were heated, were also important for Britain and Turkey. Visits on these issues increased. General John T. Crocker, commander of the Middle East Army of Great Britain, along with Chief of Staff General Miller, Crocker's wife and entourage, arrived at Etimesgut military airport with a private plane on April 26, 1950 at 12:00 a.m. General John T. Crocker was welcomed at the airport by General İzzet Aksalur, the second Chairman of the General Staff, Noel Charles, Ambassador of Great Britain, military men, British land and air attachés. When General Crocker got off the plane, General İzzet Aksalur greeted and welcomed him and introduced him to those who were with him. Meanwhile, Mrs. Crocker was given a bouquet by Mrs. Aksalur. After that, the British and Turkish national anthems, played by the band, were listened, and subsequently, the General Crocker reviewed the reverence troop<sup>38</sup>.

Having been asked about his impressions of his arrival in Turkey, General John T. Crocker told the reporters:

*"I am in Turkey for the first time. When I was in the Middle East, I always wanted to come to Turkey. I am very fortunate to have the opportunity to come to Turkey when I leave this region. I am very pleased to contact the Turkish authorities, Turkish commanders and Turkish military units here. I am also pleased because I will be accepted by the President"*<sup>39</sup>.

He visited the Foreign Secretary, then the Minister of National Defence and the Commander of the Land Forces and the second Chairman of the General Staff with the British Ambassador to Ankara, Noel Charles. General Crocker was accepted by the President at Çankaya mansion, and the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador of Great Britain were also present. The British Ambassador Noel Charles hosted a dinner at his private residence in honour of the Commander of the Great Britain Middle East Land Forces General John T. Crocker, who was a guest in Ankara<sup>40</sup>.

In Ankara, General John T. Crocker visited the Tank school together with Chief of General Staff Operations Division Lieutenant General Yümnü Üresin, Land Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Şahap Gürler and General Miller.

When General John T. Crocker came to school, he was greeted by a troop of soldiers, and he was briefed by the school commander in the school command room afterwards. Later, he attended the biology, radio and artillery classrooms, the artillery class in the number 6 classroom, the engine classrooms, the chassis class in the number 2 classroom, the radio pavilion and the radio class in the number 11 classroom, the shooting with room ammunition in the polygon, the motor course in the number 3 pavilion, and saw the artillery and radio practice in front of the school. General John T. Crocker expressed his satisfaction with what he saw when leaving school and thanked the school commanders and officers<sup>41</sup>.

Minister of National Defence Hüsnü Çakır hosted a lunch at Ankara Palas in honour of General John T. Crocker in Ankara. The British Ambassador Noel Charles, Deputy Chairman of the General Staff General İzzet Aksalur, Land Forces Commander General Nuri Yamut,

<sup>37</sup> "İngiliz tepkili uçak filosu dün geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1949, p.3.

<sup>38</sup> "İngiltere'nin Ortaşark Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Geldi [Britain's Middle East Land Forces Commander Arrives]" *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 1950, p. 1,3.

<sup>39</sup> "İngiltere'nin Ortaşark Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Geldi" *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 1950, p. 1,3.

<sup>40</sup> "İngiltere'nin Ortaşark Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Geldi" *Cumhuriyet*, April 26, 1950, p.1,3.

<sup>41</sup> "İngiliz generalin dün yaptığı ziyaretler [Visits made by the British general yesterday]," *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 1950, p.1,3.

Foreign Ministry General Undersecretary Ambassador Faik Zihni Akdur, land, sea, air force chief of staffs, Chief of staff operations division chief, garrison commander, British Embassy land and air attachés and embassy staffs were present<sup>42</sup>.

After a two-day visit to Ankara, General John J. Crocker, along with Chief of Staff General Miller, Crocker's wife and entourage, departed in the direction of Egypt on his private plane at 9:30 a.m. General John Crocker was greeted by a reverence troop, led by a band, at Etimesgut military airport and was sent off by Deputy Chief of General Staff General İzzet Aksalur, Chief of General Staff Operations Division Lieutenant General Yünnü Üresin, chiefs of land, naval and air force staff and British Ambassador Noel Charles<sup>43</sup>.

Turkish and British fleets gathered in Marmaris between 8 and 13 July 1950. During this visit, the British Mediterranean fleet celebrated annual sea festivities, and races were held between the lifeboats representing the two fleets on Wednesday, July 12<sup>44</sup>.

British Ambassador Noel Charles, along with the sea attaché Colonel J.R. Brown, was on their way to attend the British Mediterranean fleet sea festivities in Marmaris on July 9, 1950. They would be the guests of the new Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Navy John Edelston K.C.B., who was on the H.M.S. "Suprise" flagship in Marmaris, British navy troops in Marmaris, which included the aircraft carrier H.M.S. "Glory", two cruisers, six destroyers, seven frigates, several submarines, mine scanner and auxiliary ships, announced that they would organize magnificent naval festivities<sup>45</sup>.

On July 13, both fleets left Marmaris to perform their manoeuvres. The Turkish fleet departed in the direction of Istanbul and the British fleet of Cyprus. British naval aircraft played an important role in the manoeuvres made while leaving Marmaris. Relations between the two fleets and especially the bilateral relations between Admiral Rıdvan Koral and Admiral John Edelsten were very sincere and close<sup>46</sup>. British Ambassador Noel Charles was present during the entire visit. President Celâl Bayar also went from Izmir to Istanbul with the navy returning from the Mediterranean.

The son-in-law of the King of England and the husband of the British crown princess Elizabeth, and the commander of the "Magpic" destroyer of Britain's Mediterranean navy, Altes Philippe Mountbatten, Duke of Edinburgh, came to Yalova on a special R.A.F. airplane. The Duke had arrived in Izmir two days earlier with a frigate and had trips to Bursa, Yalova and Istanbul and returned back to Izmir. He was welcomed by the British Ambassador Noel Charles, Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, Admiral Nuri Günege in Yalova. The Duke later took a rest at Termal Otel. After a half-hour rest, he went to the Mansion and met with President Celâl Bayar. Duke also attracted the attention of Yalova people. After the meeting and dinner at the Mansion, he set off for Istanbul with the Acar ship<sup>47</sup>. In Dolmabahçe, Istanbul, he was greeted by the Governor and Mayor Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay and Istanbul land and sea commanders<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> "İngiliz generalin dün yaptığı ziyaretler," *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 1950, p.1.3.

<sup>43</sup> "Orgeneral Sir John Crocker Mısır'a gitti [General Sir John Crocker went to Egypt]", *Cumhuriyet*, April 28, 1950, p.5.

<sup>44</sup> "Türk ve İngiliz filoları [Turkish and British fleets]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 14, 1950, p.1.

<sup>45</sup> "İngiliz Filosunun Marmaris'te yapacağı şenlikler [British Fleet's festivities in Marmaris]", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1950, p.3; "Celâl Bayar İzmir'e gidiyor [Celâl Bayar is going to Izmir]", *Milliyet*, July 9, 1950, p.7.

<sup>46</sup> "Türk ve İngiliz filoları [Turkish and British fleets]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 14, 1950, p.1.

<sup>47</sup> "Edinburgh Dükü Bayar'la konuştu [The Duke of Edinburgh spoke to Bayar]", *Milliyet*, September 15, 1950, p.1.5

<sup>48</sup> "Edinburgh Dükü Bayar'la konuştu", *Milliyet*, September 15, 1950, p.1.5

The Duke of Edinburgh visited Hagia Sophia and historical sites in Istanbul with the British Ambassador Noel Charles in the morning hours of September 15, 1950. After the Duke had lunch at the Embassy, he had a stroll through the Bosphorus with the Embassy ship. In the afternoon, he attended the cocktail given by the British Ambassador to introduce the British citizens there and subsequently to the dinner of the Governor. The Duke of Edinburgh then left Istanbul for Izmir<sup>49</sup>.

On February 23, 1951, President Celâl Bayar accepted General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander-in-chief of the British Middle East Army, accompanied by the British Ambassador Noel Charles. The Minister of National Defence Refik Şevket İnce, Chief of General Staff General Nuri Yamut were also present in this reception<sup>50</sup>.

### 3.1.2. Noel Charles on Turkey's Entry to NATO Days

In Turkey's process of entering NATO, Britain initially took a negative stance and did not support it. But then, the emerging events and the shift in strategic balance swayed Britain to change direction. Turkey could be the basis for British policy both in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean.

The years when Noel Charles was in charge were the years when Britain pursued a policy of rapprochement and friendship with Turkey. For this reason, the Ambassador made statements and performed acts that reflected this friendship between the two states.

It was vital for Turkey to be sure about the states that would help Turkey in case of any attacks, and therefore to be included in the Atlantic Treaty.<sup>51</sup> For that purpose, in September 1950, Turkey sent troops to Korea and once again showed his alliance with United States.

Turkey's sending troops to Korea, in its struggle to join NATO, contributed positively. On the other hand, the events in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean delayed the Britain's exact response to Turkey's admission to NATO, and Britain maintained its negative stance<sup>52</sup>.

Noel Charles left Turkey for a while and came back to Ankara in June 1951. During this time, he was sent by Britain on a special mission. Noel Charles said that he had been assigned by British Foreign Secretary Morrison to meet Fuad Köprülü. When the Ambassador arrived in Ankara from Istanbul, he made the following statement to the Anadolu agency reporter at the railway station:

*"I am very pleased to return to your land to continue my mission. I'm not going to say much until I meet with your government, which I'm accredited with. However, I would like to point out that Britain is never against Turkey to enter the Atlantic Treaty. Britain understands this need. In fact, Mr Morrison, our Foreign Secretary, wished Turkey would also be in the ranks of the Atlantic Treaty in the House of Commons"*<sup>53</sup>.

When asked if he had received a message from London, the Ambassador replied:

*"Our Foreign Minister, Mr. Morrison, has assigned me to speak to Prof. Fuad Köprülü. When I am accepted by Prof Fuad Köprülü, I will fulfil this task"*<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> "Edinburgh Dükü bugün İzmir'e gidecek [The Duke of Edinburgh is going to Izmir today]", *Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1950, p.1,3.

<sup>50</sup> "Robertson'u kabul etti [He accepted Robertson]", *Milliyet*, February 24, 1951, p.1.5.

<sup>51</sup> Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası (1950-1960)", p. 70; FO371/95267/RK1011/1, Turkey: Annual Review for 1950 (Turkey: 1950 Annual Review), From Noel Charles to Bevin, January 13, 1951.

<sup>52</sup> For details of developments, see Armaoğlu, Op. Cit., p. 483-491; 517-524.

<sup>53</sup> "İngiliz Büyükelçisi Ankara'da [British Ambassador in Ankara]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1951, 1.4.

<sup>54</sup> "İngiliz Büyükelçisi Ankara'da", *Cumhuriyet*, July 1, 1951, 1.4.

British Ambassador Noel Charles went to the Foreign Ministry on July 2, 1951 and met with Prof. Fuad Köprülü. The meeting between the Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador lasted about an hour. The interview was particularly about the Atlantic Treaty. Noel Charles had given information related to his meeting with Mr Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, and expressed his opinion that the British Foreign Ministry supported Turkey's accession to the Atlantic Treaty. During this meeting, he presented the memorandum he brought with him to Köprülü<sup>55</sup>.

Foreign Minister Prof. Fuad Köprülü presented statements about Morrison's declaration about Turkey's accession to the Atlantic Treaty in response to oral questions from Izmir Deputy Osman Kapani and Kocaeli Deputy Edhem Vassaf Akan in the Parliament on July 20. The Minister's statement, particularly his words mentioning The USA, which was described as a friend, appreciated Turkey's security sensitivity, were strongly applauded.

The President Celâl Bayar followed this statement with the Chief of General Staff General Nuri Yamut from his lodge.

The British Ambassador Noel Charles and Canadian Ambassador General Odlum were also at corps diplomatique lodge<sup>56</sup>.

Prof. Fuad Köprülü said:

*"I am grateful to our friend Kocaeli Deputy Ethem Vassaf Akan for giving me the opportunity to make explanations to the high council on this issue with the occasion of the verbal question by him on the basis of friendly and allied British Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Morrison's verbal statement on our accession to the Atlantic Treaty in the House of Commons.*

*As you know, as soon as our government came to power, it became our primary goal to establish the world's current security on solid foundations and centred its action in this direction. The government of the Republic, which believes that the ensuring general security is a must that does not accept division and needs to be established on European basis, has concluded that our own safety and therefore the issue of world peace and stability can be ensured in the most effective way with our accession to this treaty. That's why we've never had a moment of desistance in the presence of our allies and friends to achieve this goal.*

*I am pleased to present you now that our rightful cause has been embraced by our ally, Britain, with great understanding. In fact, as you have seen in our press, Mr. Morrison briefly pointed out in this statement that after reconsidering the issue of admission of Greece and Turkey to the Atlantic Treaty from every aspect, the British government regards the best solution for the issue as the acceptance of these two countries to the treaty. On the other hand, it was also stated that The British government wanted Turkey very much to play its role in defending the Middle East and it was necessary to consider the views of the Contracting States about the accession to the treaty and the Kingdom government would try to reach an agreement in this context.*

*I would also like to point out that we believe the Middle East defence is essential for the protection of Europe, both strategically and economically. In this respect, when Turkey enters the Atlantic Treaty, our role in the Middle East will be to engage in immediate negotiations with those concerned to fulfil our responsibility and take the necessary measures cooperatively.*

*At a time when the danger rests on the door of the free world, I would like to state once again that our security cause, which will be an important agent in the strengthening of the*

<sup>55</sup> "Türkiye ve Atlantik Paktı [Turkey and Atlantic Treaty]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 3, 1951, p.1.

<sup>56</sup> "F. Köprülü'nün Atlantik Paktına dair demeci [F. Köprülü's statement on the Atlantic Treaty]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1951, p.1

*resistance against the attack, is to work in full confidence in the defence of the ideals we are connected with the Western community*"<sup>57</sup>.

The President Celâl Bayar went to his private office after the announcement and accepted the Ambassadors of the Great Britain and Canada. The Foreign Minister Prof. Dr. Fuad Köprülü was also present at this reception. The meeting continued for a long time. The foreign media supporting the acceptance of Turkey and Greece to the North Atlantic Treaty organization, like American newspapers including the New-York Times and the Herald Tribune, reported news in this direction<sup>58</sup>.

The Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü departed to Paris on July 30, 1951, with The Principal Clerk Sadi Eldem with an Air France flight to be present at the Council of Europe to be held in Strasbourg on August 2, 1951. They were sent off by the Governor of Istanbul and Mayor Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay and British Ambassador Noel Charles at Yeşilköy Airport<sup>59</sup>.

Comments continued both internally and externally about Turkey's acceptance to the Atlantic Treaty as a member state with equal rights. As of the date of September 23, 1951, the first political speeches began on the issue of the treaty acceptance, which was regarded as a definitive result of the tenacious and peaceful politics of the Turkish government. Although it was Sunday, The British Ambassador Noel Charles and The Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü had a long meeting<sup>60</sup>.

At the meeting, Turkey's view was presented about the actual place of its honourable duty in the treaty community, and Britain's satisfaction for Turkey's collaborative participation in the protection of the security of the democratic realm was expressed by the British Ambassador<sup>61</sup>.

The Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü said the following about the Atlantic Treaty:

*"Our acceptance to the Atlantic Treaty is as much a gain for the world's peace as Turkey and perhaps more than that. This treaty will maintain the security of the whole world together with Turkey"*<sup>62</sup>.

The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had a meeting with the Ambassadors of the three major states at 16.00 on October 6, 1951. The US Ambassador Mr. George Wadsworth, The British Ambassador Sir Noel Charles and The French Ambassador Jean Lesevyer were accepted all together. For the first time after Turkey's acceptance to the Atlantic Treaty was deemed appropriate, he accepted the Ambassadors of the three major states and reviewed the political and military issues that were considered important on the agenda<sup>63</sup>.

Together with Turkey's acceptance to the Atlantic Treaty and also to reconsider the Middle East security issue, three meetings were held at the Prime Ministry on October 13-14<sup>th</sup> under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes with the participation of The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Omar Bradley, who arrived in Ankara on Friday October 12, The British Imperial Chief of Staff William Slim, The Chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of France Charles Lecheres, The Foreign Minister Prof. Fuad Köprülü, The US Ambassador Mr. George Wadsworth, The French Ambassador M. Jean

<sup>57</sup> "F. Köprülü'nün Atlantik Paktına dair demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1951, p.1

<sup>58</sup> "F. Köprülü'nün Atlantik Paktına dair demeci [F. Köprülü's statement on the Atlantic Treaty]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1951, p.1

<sup>59</sup> "Fuad Köprülü dün Paris'e hareket etti [Fuad Köprülü departed to Paris yesterday]", *Milliyet*, July 31, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> "Pakta dair Fuad Köprülü'nün demeci [Statement of Fuad Köprülü about the Treaty]", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1951, p.1.

<sup>61</sup> "Pakta dair Fuad Köprülü'nün demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1951, p.1.

<sup>62</sup> "Pakta dair Fuad Köprülü'nün demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1951, p.1.

<sup>63</sup> "Bakanlıktaki mühim içtima [Important meeting in the Ministry]", *Milliyet*, October 7, 1951, p.1.7.



Lescuyer, The British Ambassador Noel Charles, The Minister of National Defence Hulusi Köymen, The Chief of General Staff General Yamut and their deputies. The negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of sincerity and frankness that reflected the robust friendship among the four states. The structure and functioning style of the Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's role within this structure and to which command Turkey would belong to were discussed. In the decisions taken here, it was emphasized that Greece and Turkey were important states that should be involved in the Atlantic Treaty; a Turkish general who should be sent to Washington as a permanent member of the Treaty's military representative committee by contacting the Atlantic Standing Group immediately after Turkey officially joined Treaty; the Middle East Command needed to be established as soon as possible to eliminate a invasive movement targeting the Middle East and to ensure the peace and security of this region. Turkey had been advocating the idea of establishing a command especially in the Middle East for a long time<sup>64</sup>.

These contacts were also particularly useful as they enabled meeting with the military and political representatives of the friend and ally states that would cooperate with Turkey in the Atlantic community, and Turkey closely involved in the issues in the accession stage to the Atlantic Treaty<sup>65</sup>.

After the meeting, the delegations went to Ankara Palas and attended the dining event held for them. The Ambassadors of the twelve Treaty states, along with the Ambassadors attending the conference, were invited as well as the Greek Ambassador, the American Aid delegation officials, and the military attachés of the Treaty states<sup>66</sup>.

### **3.2. Cultural and Social Agenda**

Some changes in cultural and social life were also observed in Turkey between 1949 and 1951, albeit not too many. There were a number of activities related to the British state, and activities Noel Charles was actively involved in. Noel Charles also established the connection between the British citizens living in Turkey and Britain.

Noel Charles presented a medal to one of these families, the Tucker family. The British Ambassador Noel Charles presented the award to a British family member who had been living in Istanbul for a long time. Noel Charles, at the British Embassy halls in Galatasaray, gave the press member T. Tucker the "British Empire Redeem" medal that was deemed worthy by the King of England. On that occasion, the Ambassador gave a short speech and praised the efforts of Tucker, who had been in constant contact with the Turkish press. Mr. Tucker was the son of the deceased Thomas Tucker, who gained a good reputation and was highly loved among Istanbul's trade and economics groups, and he was a member of the oldest British families to have settled in Turkey for centuries<sup>67</sup>.

A sad accident happened in the time while Noel Charles was in charge in Turkey. There were British military officers among those killed in an accident at Etimesgut Airport in Ankara in August, 1949. The funerals of British army members; air attaché Brigadier General Bartholonen, his deputies Colonel Simon Maud and lieutenant colonel L. Burmand and

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<sup>64</sup> "Resmi Tebliğ [Official Communiqué]", *Cumhuriyet*, October 15, 1951, p. 1, 3; Mekki Said ESEN, "Dünkü Ankara müzakereleri [Ankara Negotiations of Yesterday]", *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>65</sup> Mekki Said ESEN, "Dünkü Ankara müzakereleri", *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1951, p.1; "Resmi Tebliğ", *Cumhuriyet*, October 15, 1951, p.1,3.

<sup>66</sup> Mekki Said ESEN, "Dünkü Ankara müzakereleri", *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> "İngiliz Büyük Elçisinin verdiği nişan [The award given by the British Ambassador]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1949, p. 2.

Sergeant Withworth were held in Ankara with a sad ceremony on August 17, 1949. The Chief of Staff and high state officials also attended to the ceremony<sup>68</sup>.

The funeral procession departed from the garden of the British Embassy at 10.30 am. The coffins of the victims of the disaster, wrapped in British flags, were on four cannons. In front of the procession were a police cavalry troop and a police detachment and a military police troop. Behind them was a military band, followed by wreaths carried by Turkish and British officers and soldiers. The wreaths of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of National Defence were on the cannons<sup>69</sup>.

After the coffins, the members of the Embassy, especially the British Ambassador Noel Charles, and then the Principal Clerk Adil Derinsu on behalf of the Prime Minister, The Adjutant Major Abdullah Önhan and The Foreign Ministry Protocol General Director Kadri Rezan were advancing. They were followed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Commanders of the Army, generals and high-ranking officers from the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff led by Chief of the General Staff Nafiz Gürman, and the military attachés, the heads of the American military assistance committee and the members of the corps diplomatiques were coming after them. The final phase of the ceremonial procession was a police and military police detachment as well as a Turkish reverence troop<sup>70</sup>.

In the church where the religious ritual was held, the Minister of State and Deputy Foreign Minister Cemil Said Barlas, and the Public Clerk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Faik Zihni Akdur were also present. Coffins taken from the church after the religious ceremony were transported to the airport in private trucks. The funerals had been temporarily buried in the British cemetery in Istanbul<sup>71</sup>.

The Chief of Staff General Abdurrahman Nafiz Gürman went to the British Embassy and offered condolences for the victims of the accident and told the Ambassador of Great Britain Noel Charles:

*"I am sharing the grief of the British nation and would like to offer the deepest condolences of the Turkish Armed Forces to the British Royal Air Force"*<sup>72</sup>.

The Ambassador also told the General:

*"I appreciate your condolences for our air attaché passing away as a result of an accident and I would like to thank the Turkish Armed Forces for this fine interest and I will inform my government and nation, and the British Air Force. I would also like to express my gratitude to you for the attendance of the generals and officers of the armed forces to the funeral"*<sup>73</sup>.

Another sad event was the flood disaster that happened in Turkey. A flood occurred on March 5, 1950 due to the overflow of Porsuk River in Eskişehir. Fifty thousand people were left homeless, 2,500 homes were destroyed and six people drowned<sup>74</sup>. The disaster victims were helped by Marshall Plan.

The General Aid Committee Chairman and also The Head of Religious Affairs Ahmet Hamdi Akseki issued a declaration for Eskişehir disaster victims, stating that more than 25 thousand citizens were left homeless, there were huge needs to be met especially the need for

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<sup>68</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı [Funeral of British aviators has been held]", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p. 1,3.

<sup>69</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p.1.

<sup>70</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p.1,3.

<sup>71</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p.1,3.

<sup>72</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p.3.

<sup>73</sup> "İngiliz havacılarının cenazeleri kaldırıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, August 17, 1949, p.3.

<sup>74</sup> "Eskişehir'de Sel Felaketi [Flood disaster in Eskişehir]", *Zafer*, March 8, 1950.

clothing, it was necessary to build 2,500 houses and wanted the citizens to rush to help Eskişehir<sup>75</sup>.

Due to the flood in Eskişehir, the British Ambassador Noel Charles sent a letter to the Foreign Ministry, highlighting that both the British government and he himself offered deep condolences about the disaster. The Norwegian Ambassador M. Krogh Hansen also reported the grief of his government and himself to the Foreign Ministry<sup>76</sup>.

Noel Charles was on the top of the list of guests invited to the ceremonies organized by the existing English schools in Turkey. To mark the centenary of the British Girls High School, a ceremony was held at the school on November 14, 1950. The ceremony, where the Governor and Mayor, British Ambassador, Technical University Rector, parents and students were present, started with the National Anthem, and then the Chairman of the School Board made a speech, followed by the speech of the Governor and the Mayor. Istanbul Governor and Mayor Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay praised Anglo-Saxon education and mentioned the role played by such schools in terms of the development of Turkish-British relations.

After the presentation of the activity report by the Headmaster, The British Ambassador Noel Charles gave his reward to those who finished the school with a good degree. After a play by Reşat Nuri was performed and scenes from Shakespeare were shown, the ceremony came to an end<sup>77</sup>.

Noel Charles stated that he had followed developments in Turkey from afar, but that he would gladly witness these developments closely with his mission when he came to Turkey<sup>78</sup>. One of these developments was the opening of the fourth radio station. The fourth radio station, which was installed on the Çakıllar farm near Etimesgut, Turkey, opened on December 3, 1950. At the ceremony held at 17 o'clock, The Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, some deputies, The Ambassadors of The USA, Britain, Canada and Embassy officials, The State Department General Clerk, Governor of Ankara, Mayor of Ankara, The Press-Broadcast General Director and members of the press were present<sup>79</sup>.

The Press-Broadcasting and Tourism Director Halim Alyot spoke publicly about the services of the radio and said:

*"While our heroes will fight for the ideal of the United Nations in Korea, we will announce the peaceful voice of Turkey to every corner of the world for the same purpose through our transmitter radio"*<sup>80</sup>.

After that, The Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü made this statement:

*"We are currently at the opening ceremony of a new radio station in Turkey. I am fortunate to address the people of these friendly countries from this radio station, which will*

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<sup>75</sup> "Eskişehirliilere yapılan yardımlar [Aid to Eskişehir residents]", *Cumhuriyet*, March 15, 1950, p.1,3. One of the aids was provided by a concert organized by Eminönü People's Houses (Halkevi). Jose Iturbi, who promised to give a concert to help the survivors at Eminönü People's Houses i after the Eskişehir disaster, gave this concert on March 14, 1950 at 21.00 in front of a large public audience. The governor and his wife were present at the concert. J. Iturbi also helped the survivors by buying two tickets by giving a thousand liras for each. See; "Eskişehirliilere yapılan yardımlar", *Cumhuriyet*, March 15, 1950, p. 3.

<sup>76</sup> "Eskişehirliilere yapılan yardımlar", *Cumhuriyet*, March 15, 1950, p. 1,3.

<sup>77</sup> "High School'un yüzüncü yılı kutlandı [The centenary of the «High School» was celebrated]", *Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 1950, p.2.

<sup>78</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci [The statement of the new Ambassador of Britain]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p. 4.

<sup>79</sup> "Dördüncü radyo istasyonumuz dün açıldı [Our fourth radio station opened yesterday]", *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1950, p.1.

<sup>80</sup> "Dördüncü radyo istasyonumuz dün açıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1950, p. 1.

*deliver the voice of Turkey to the British community and its countries, Canada and America, and to present you the greetings and affection of the Turkish nation*"<sup>81</sup>.

The Canadian Ambassador said in a brief address that "*I wish this station, which I hope will bring our countries closer together, be good*". The British Ambassador Noel Charles also expressed his pleasure of being present in this opening ceremony<sup>82</sup>.

### **3.3. Commercial Agenda**

Trade relations between Turkey and Britain, started during the Ottoman period, continued during the Republic. Despite the world economic crisis and the negative effects of World War II on trade, commercial exchanges between Britain and Turkey continued, albeit limited.

When Noel Charles was appointed as an Ambassador to Turkey, he believed that trade relations between Britain and Turkey would continue to increase. Noel Charles told the Nafen Post in London in 1949 that he was hopeful about the development of Turkish-British trade. He stated about the issue:

*"Our trade by its nature must and will surely develop. It would really be surprising if we couldn't connect our trade relations with more stringent ties in a gradual manner as a result of our collective interests. Turkey's prosperous situation plays an important role in the future of the world of democracy. My admiration for Turkey, walking resolutely on this road, is obvious"*<sup>83</sup>.

On September 7, 1950, the British Chamber of Commerce<sup>84</sup> hosted a lunch in honour of the Trade Minister Zühtü Hilmi Velibeşe and the British Ambassador Noel Charles. About 200 well-known merchants and members of the British trade attachés and the press attaché were present at the banquet at the Park Hotel<sup>85</sup>.

At the end of the banquet, the President of the British Chamber of Commerce of Turkey underlined the importance of the chamber and the services it had made in terms of bringing the two countries closer. After the President John's remarks, the Minister of Commerce and Economy Zühtü Hilmi Velibeşe said: "*In the good and bad days of a long history that transcends centuries, we have been bound by the bonds of deep links as a requirement of realities. Our admiration for the British nation is without end. The friendship of Turkish-British nations is deeper than ever these days, when we cooperate with our great American friends. Turkey and Britain are two nations that show deep friendship in the economic field. Turkey demands products with British capital*"<sup>86</sup>.

After the Minister Velibeşe, the British Ambassador said briefly:

*"By taking advantage of the Marshall plan, economic progress has accelerated. I must say that Britain, with the active and generous guidance of the United States, has been successful about providing great assistance to Turkey under the scope of this plan. Over the past two years under the terms of the right to circulation, it has provided assistance more than any other country, apart from the United States. Furthermore, I would like to remind you that since 1938, Britain has granted a loan of about £50m to Turkey, an estimated half of which has been used to help the Turkish national defence and the other half in the name of British-Turkish trade.*

<sup>81</sup> "Dördüncü radyo istasyonumuz dün açıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1950, p. 1.

<sup>82</sup> "Dördüncü radyo istasyonumuz dün açıldı", *Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1950, p.1.

<sup>83</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci [The statement of the new British Ambassador]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p. 4.

<sup>84</sup> The British Chamber of Commerce of Turkey (BCCT) was established in 1887 by a group of British Businessmen. BCCT is the second oldest British Chamber of Commerce outside the UK. It has played a long and distinguished role in developing trade and investment relations between Turkey and the UK. BCCT is a member of Council of British Chamber of Commerce in Continental Europe (COBCOE). See; [https://www.tobb.org.tr/UlkeRehberi/Documents/Ulkeler/ingiltere/bcc\\_of\\_TR.pdf](https://www.tobb.org.tr/UlkeRehberi/Documents/Ulkeler/ingiltere/bcc_of_TR.pdf)

<sup>85</sup> "Türk İngiliz ticareti [Turkish-British trade]", *Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1950, p. 1,4.

<sup>86</sup> "Türk İngiliz ticareti", *Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1950, p. 4.

*These financial conveniences have not satisfied this country's demand for British goods. In fact, our industry, which has started to recover for the last three years, has started to export widely, and Turkey has consumed its pounds quickly in this direction. This means that Turkey's imports from the pound field are offset by the incompetence of sterling or, in other words, we are unable to make maximum purchases with the Turks.*

*It is true that imports from the United Kingdom do not increase year by year as the traders' desire. The amount of this is £16.6m. This has resulted, as a result of the expulsion of the grain export, with the increase of sterling in favour of Turkey in an exceptional way. Their value was £13.5m in 1949 and £3.76m in the first six months of 1950. Howbeit, the final figure may not be a mere evidence of the whole of this year's imports. In the last days of June, about £3m was out of accountability given by the United Kingdom about the circulation. Because the newly formed European Reimbursement Association has allowed us to buy Turkish crops so that Turkey can benefit more in sterling. Hereupon, there is no reason for us to be pessimistic about Turkish markets for our goods.*

*As for buying Turkish crops, I am pleased to see that the situation is better than last year. According to the British Trade Ministry, this is worth £6.85m in the first six months of this year, compared to £5.2m in the first six months of last year. I know that the Turkish government is closely involved in our purchasing from Turkey. I can assure that I am working with care and determination to increase this purchase. The measures we take on the freedom of our imports are satisfactory. In this way, I hope that Turkish exporters can easily have access to the British markets"<sup>87</sup>.*

Noel Charles interpreted Turkey's foreign exchange gap in December 1950 rising from 86 million TL to 173 million TL in December 1951 as a reflection of its efforts to finance its long-term investment program, although it was not satisfactory for Turkey's economic development in 1951<sup>88</sup>.

#### **4. Noel Charles's Travels in Turkey**

Noel Charles brought his private vehicle with him as he came to perform his mission in Turkey. During his time of working in Turkey, he used his personal vehicle to make private trips. Noel Charles told the Nafen Post reporter about this issue in London a few days before his trip to Turkey:

*"One of the things I want is to travel extensively within Turkey to see the big moves and road projects it has made in the industrial area of the country. I am particularly interested in the efforts made for road construction and road repairs, which will surely play a major role in the progress of Turkey's economic and social developments. In order to reach this goal, I am taking my personal jeep car with me and I hope to travel within Turkey with this car"<sup>89</sup>.*

Noel Charles had made various trips in the country during his time when he was in charge in Turkey. He paid a visit to Konya province, close to Ankara, on June 22, 1949. The British Ambassador, along with the Embassy air attaché, went to Konya from Ankara in the evening with the undersecretary of commerce. The Embassy press attaché and two members of press attaché arrived in Konya by plane on June 23, 1949 and joined the Ambassador. Noel Charles said his trip was special. Visiting the Governor and the Commander in their offices, the Ambassador visited the city's sights<sup>90</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> "Türk İngiliz ticareti", *Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1950, p. 4.

<sup>88</sup> Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, "Economic Developments in Turkey During the Democrat Party Era (1950-1960)", p. 215.

<sup>89</sup> "İngiltere'nin yeni elçisinin demeci [The statement of the new British Ambassador]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 3, 1949, p. 4.

<sup>90</sup> "İngiliz Büyükelçisi Konya'da [British Ambassador is in Konya]", *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1949, p.3.

In the letter sent from the Embassy to the Council of Ministers to visit British military cemeteries in Gallipoli on September 5, 1949, there was a request for special permission for the banned area. The request for permission by British Ambassador Noel Charles and the British Mediterranean fleet's Commander-in-Chief Admiral Power and General Staff to allow the second restricted zone at Gallipoli was deemed appropriate with the decision of the Council of Ministers on September 1, 1949<sup>91</sup>.

The British Ambassador Noel Charles went to Bursa by plane in the morning to be present at the opening ceremony of the "Today's Britain Exhibition", which would be opened in the People's House halls in Bursa in the evening hours on July 23, 1949. The Ambassador was accompanied by Mr. Allen, Undersecretary of the Press, and the Director of the Embassy Exhibitions Branch. After visiting the governor, the ambassador visited Bursa's art and historical monuments. The Ambassador Noel Charles also had a stroll in Uludağ<sup>92</sup>.

The President Celâl Bayar invited Noel Charles on his trip to Karacabey in the fall of 1950. The three-day trip together delighted Noel Charles. In a letter, which was sent to the Presidential General Clerk, on November 24, 1950, signed by Noel Charles, he thanked the President Celâl Bayar for his invitation and their trip to Karacabey for three days<sup>93</sup>.

Charles, who expressed his happiness for President Celâl Bayar's special care in the selection of three horses for the horse race (polo game) he gifted him on behalf of England, added to his letter of thanks that he would be pleased to report the situation to the Duke of Edinburgh and that it would make His Highness happy<sup>94</sup>.

Noel Charles met with various government officials in Bursa and Karacabey, where he went as the guest of the President Celâl Bayar, and visited Çifteler and Hamidiye schools and had the opportunity to meet with the principals and teachers<sup>95</sup>.

##### **5. Noel Charles's Departure from Turkey**

Noel Charles, who served as an ambassador in Turkey for approximately three years, completed his duty. British Ambassador Noel Charles, who left Turkey at the end of November, said in a statement:

*"We had a year that was very active for both Turkey and the whole world. Peace is not lost after all. The Western world is particularly committed to maintaining peace in order to be strong, thanks to the initiative and effort of our American friends. Turkey will soon become a member of the Atlantic Treaty and will play an important role both in the works within the Treaty and in the preservation of our common interests and ideals. I don't know a nation that is braver and more determined than the Turks. We will embrace the Turks and our old friend Greeks with joy."*<sup>96</sup>

Noel Charles, the British Ambassador to Ankara, arrived in Istanbul on November 26, 1951. He was welcomed by the Governor and Mayor of Istanbul Prof. Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, Embassy members and friends at Haydarpaşa Railway Station<sup>97</sup>. Four days later, on November 30, 1951, at 10:00, he left Istanbul by Barletta ferry<sup>98</sup>.

<sup>91</sup> BCA, nr. 30.18.01.02.120.66.13.

<sup>92</sup> "İngiliz Büyük Elçisi Bursa'da [British Ambassador is in Bursa]", *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1949, p.3.

<sup>93</sup> BCA, nr. 30.10.00.41.242.24.

<sup>94</sup> BCA, nr. 30.10.00.41.242.24.

<sup>95</sup> BCA, nr. 30.10.00.41.242.24.

<sup>96</sup> "İngiliz elçisinin veda demeci [British Ambassador's farewell statement]", *Cumhuriyet*, November 14, 1951, p. 3.

<sup>97</sup> "Sir Noel Charles dün Ankara'dan şehrimize geldi [Sir Noel Charles came to our city from Ankara yesterday]", *Milliyet*, November 27, 1951, p. 2.

<sup>98</sup> "İngiltere Büyükelçisi Yurdumuzdan Ayrıldı [British Ambassador Has Left Our Homeland]", *Milliyet*, December 1, 1951, p.1.

The Ambassador, who was sent off by the Governor and Mayor of Istanbul Prof Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, his friends and members of the press from Galata Dock, told reporters:

*"We are really sorry that we are leaving Turkey. Even though our mission is over, our friendship is eternal. If I could strengthen the friendship between Turkey and Britain during my mission, I would call myself as very fortunate. I am leaving your beautiful country and your noble nation with the best impressions. I'm going to transfer these impressions to all over England"*<sup>99</sup>.

The former Ambassador was presented with a bouquet on behalf of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the city by the Governor, and Noel Charles thanked for this kindly farewell and presented his deep respect to the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes<sup>100</sup>.

Returning home, the Ambassador Noel Charles and his wife Lady Charted donated 2,000 TL to the Turkish Animal Protection Society. He promised to co-operate with the community from England<sup>101</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

Turkey's intensive shift in the foreign policy between 1949 and 1951 was an indication of being positively affected by the uncertainty and variability of situations after the World War II and maintaining international peace with smart policies as much as possible.

Being effective in the Middle Eastern politics and being able to stand up to the wishes of Soviet Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean pushed Turkey to the American side. Britain was also on the same side in order to maintain its former power in Middle East and Mediterranean politics. These were the main factors that led the two states to be friends.

Britain appreciated Turkey, which demonstrated its attempt to use democracy with its original nature and switched to pluralist democracy, and, among other main factors, made this issue more visible. The British Ambassador always added Turkey's move for democracy in his words with appreciation.

Traces of British-Turkish rapprochement can be seen in political-military, cultural-social and commercial developments between 1949 and 1951 of Turkey. Noel Charles, who was in Turkey as a British official, drew attention to this delicate line between Britain and Turkey. They favoured Turkey in the Middle East politics and in Turkey's accession to NATO. In fact, during this period, the majority of military-political visitors from Britain discussed these evolving relationships.

Noel Charles also made domestic trips to get to know Turkey and follow developments during his time in Turkey. Although most of these trips were for official purposes, he also had personal trips. The President Celâl Bayar's invitation to Noel Charles on his private trip to Karacabey for three days and their visit of various institutions here, schools in particular, reflect the importance given to the British State. Generally speaking, Noel Charles gave importance to establishing friendly attitudes in relationships in accordance with the friendly politics of the British State. He used the gains of his professional experience in his mission in Turkey.

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<sup>100</sup> "İngiltere Büyükelçisi Yurdumuzdan Ayrıldı", *Milliyet*, December 1, 1951, p.1.

<sup>101</sup> "Sir Noel Charles'in eşinin bir teberrüü [The Donation of Sir Noel Charles's wife]", *Milliyet*, December 5, 1951, p. 2.

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(Erişim Tarihi: 20 Nisan 2020)





**Figure.1:** Noel Charles and his wife in Turkey. Source: "İngiltere'nin yeni Ankara Büyük Elçisi geldi [Britain's new Ambassador to Ankara has arrived]", *Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1949, p. 1.



**Figure.2:** General John T. Crocker in Çankaya. Source: "İngiliz generalin dün yaptığı ziyaretler [Visits made by the British general yesterday]", *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 1950, p.3.



**Figure.3:** Noel Charles and Fuad Köprülü. Source: "Fuad Köprülü dün Paris'e hareket etti [Fuad Köprülü departed to Paris yesterday]", *Milliyet*, July 31, 1951, p.1.



**Figure.4:** Noel Charles and his wife leaving Istanbul. Source: "İngiltere Büyükelçisi Yurdumuzdan Ayrıldı [British Ambassador Has Left Our Homeland]", *Milliyet*, December 1, 1951, p. 1.

## İngiliz Amiral Charles Napier’in 1840 Mısır Krizindeki Tutumu ve Osmanlı Devleti Hakkındaki Görüşleri

Bekir Sadık Topaloğlu<sup>1</sup>  
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### Özet

Avrupalı devletler 1815 Viyana Kongresi’nde aralarındaki savaşları sonlandırma ve denge politikasına dayanan bir uyum süreci başlatma kararı almışlardır. Bu prensiplerden yola çıkan İngiltere, Osmanlı Devleti’nin desteği ve Avusturya’nın da katılımıyla 1840 yılında Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın birliklerine karşı Suriye’de askeri bir harekât düzenlemiştir. Fransa bu gelişmeyi olumlu karşılamamış olsa da süreç boyunca arabuluculuk konumunda kalmayı tercih etmiştir.

Tuğamiral Charles Napier hem askeri başarıları ile hem de İngiliz hükümetinin genel siyasetinin dışına çıkan hamleleri ile söz konusu bu harekâtın en önemli aktörü olmuştur. Suriye’de kısa sürede Mısırlı birliklere karşı zafer kazanan Napier İngiliz hükümetinin onayı olmadan İskenderiye’de gizlice Mehmet Ali Paşa ile görüşmüş ve Mısır’daki valiliğinin veraset usulüne göre devam etmesine dayanan bir anlaşma teklifinde bulunmuştur. Başta İngiliz hükümeti, Osmanlı Devleti ve Avrupalı devletler bu gizli görüşmeye tepki göstermişlerdir. Ancak Sultan Abdülmecid’in 13 Şubat 1841 tarihli fermanı ile Mısır’daki valilik makamının veraset yoluyla devam etmesine karar verilmiş ve sonuç olarak Napier’in Mısır Krizi’ni taşıdığı durum resmîyet kazanmıştır.

Bu çalışma Napier’in kriz esnasında bölgede yürüttüğü askeri faaliyetler ve diplomatik girişimlerin üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktadır. Ayrıca Napier’in Mısır krizi, Osmanlı Devleti’nin genel durumu ve Suriye toplumu üzerindeki görüşlerine de yer verilmiştir. Napier’in biyografisi ve kriz ile ilgili eserinin yanında döneme ait arşiv belgeleri, yazışmalar, gazeteler ve kitaplar bu çalışmanın birincil kaynaklarını oluşturmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Sir Charles Napier, Mehmet Ali Paşa, Mısır Krizi, Suriye, Askeri Harekât.

## British Admiral Charles Napier’s Activities in Egyptian Crisis of 1840 and his Views on Ottoman Empire

### Abstract

The European Powers decided to halt the intra-European wars and initiate a harmony process based on the policy of balance in 1815 Vienna Congress. Britain, relying on these principles, commenced a military campaign against the troops of Mehmet Ali Pasha in Syria with the support of Ottoman and Austrian troops in 1840. France, despite reserving strong objections, opted to act as a negotiator during the crisis.

Commodore Charles Napier became one of the most prominent actors of this crisis through his military accomplishments and his acts contradicting and sometimes even defying British official policy. After a rapid victory over the Egyptian forces in Syria, Napier conducted a secret convention with Mehmet Ali Pasha in Alexandria without informing the British government and reached an agreement with the latter on the hereditary governance of Egyptian territory. At first, his move was protested by the British, Ottoman and European governments. However, with the *firman* of Sultan Abdülmecid on 13 February 1841, the hereditary governance of Egypt was officialised. Hence, Napier, through his secret meeting, provided the layout for peace terms and significantly contributed to the termination of Egyptian Crisis of 1840.

This paper focuses on Napier’s military operations in the region and diplomatic engagements during the crisis. Furthermore, Napier’s expressions on the Egyptian crisis, general position of the Ottoman Empire and the peoples of Syria are evaluated. Besides Napier’s biography and account on the crisis, the archival documents, communiqués, journals and books of the time constitute the primary sources of this study.

**Key Words:** Sir Charles Napier, Mehmet Ali Pasha, Egyptian Crisis, Syria, Military Operations.

### Giriş

On dokuzuncu yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti’nde değişim ve dönüşümün en hızlı yaşandığı dönemlerin başında gelmektedir. Osmanlı yöneticileri reform yoluyla ülkeyi koruma ve modernleştirme yönünde adımlar atarken dış baskıların da derinleştiği çok sayıda kriz ve savaşla da mücadele etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Mısır Valisi Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın sebep olduğu Mısır Krizi on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Osmanlı idaresini sınavan en önemli olaylardan biri olmuştur. Osmanlı saltanatını tehdit eden bir pozisyona ulaşan Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı bölgede

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dengeleri değiştiren bir hüviyete bürünmesi sebebiyle Avrupa ülkelerinin de müdahalesiyle uluslararası bir boyut kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma da Mehmet Ali Paşa Krizi’nin son safhasında Osmanlı Devleti ile Avrupalı devletlerin Mehmet Ali Paşa’ya karşı oluşturduğu askeri koalisyonun bir komutanı olarak bölgeye gelen İngiliz amiral Charles Napier’in krizin seyrine olan etkisi ve Osmanlı Devleti ve toplumlarına olan bakış açısını ele almaktadır.

Uzun ve yorucu Napolyon Savaşları’nın ardından 1815 yılında düzenlenen Viyana Kongresi’nde Avrupalı büyük devletler birbirleri arasında savaşmaktan kaçınmaya karar vererek ilgilerini “hasta adam” olarak tarif ettikleri Osmanlı Devleti’ne yönlendirmişlerdir. Bu yüzden, Osmanlı coğrafyasında beliren problemlere Batılı devletler hemen müdahil olma gayretinde olmuşlardır.<sup>3</sup> Genel anlamda “Doğu Sorunu” olarak adlandırılan bu müdahaleci politikanın en önemli unsurlarından biri de Osmanlı Devleti ve toprakları üzerinde tek bir gücün etkin olmasına engel olmaktır.<sup>4</sup> Böylece hem birbirlerini dengelemiş hem de Osmanlı Devleti’ni kontrol altında tutmuş oluyordular.

“Avrupa Uyumu” olarak bilinen bu dönemde Osmanlı Devleti de reform ve ıslah çalışmalarına girerek içinde bulunduğu kötü gidişatı düzeltme gayretinde olmuştur. Üçüncü Selim ile başlayan bu reform süreci 1839 yılında Sultan Abdülmecid’in tahta çıkması ve Tanzimat Fermanı’nın ilanı ile birlikte devlet kurumları ve topluma her yönüyle etki etmeye başlamıştır.<sup>5</sup> Abdülmecid’in tahta çıktığı ve Ferman’ın ilan edildiği esnada Mehmet Ali Paşa Meselesi Osmanlı Devleti’ni ciddi bir şekilde zorlamaktaydı. Saltanatı tehlikede gören Sultan Abdülmecid çare olarak Avrupalı devletlerden destek istemiş ve Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın güçlenmesinden aşırı endişe duyan Avrupa devletlerinin Osmanlı Devleti ile birlikte gerçekleştirdiği ortak müdahale sonucunda kriz dönemi kapanmıştır.<sup>6</sup>

1839-1841 yılları arasını kapsayan Mehmet Ali Paşa Krizi’nin ikinci ayağının 1840 yılında vuku bulan askeri safhasının en önemli figürlerinden biri İngiliz komutan Charles Napier’dır. Napier<sup>7</sup> İngiliz hükümetinin görevlendirmesi üzerine Tuğamiral (*Commodore*) rütbesiyle Doğu Akdeniz’de askeri faaliyetlerde bulunmuştur. Kendisi o dönem Suriye’de bulunan Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın oğlu İbrahim Paşa’nın kuvvetlerine karşı giriştiği başarılı saldırıların yanında yetkisini aşan bir şekilde Mehmet Ali Paşa ile yaptığı diplomatik görüşmelerle de krizin gelişimi ve sonlanmasında dikkate ve incelemeye değer bir yer edinmiştir. Napier ayrıca kendisinin de aktif olarak katılıp gözlemlene şansı bulduğu Mısır krizini ele alan bir kitap yazmış ve bu kitapta Osmanlı Devleti, yöneticileri ve toplumları hakkında kendi görüş ve gözlemlerine yer vermiştir.<sup>8</sup> Doğrudan kendi gözlemlerine dayanarak yazılan bu eser Mısır Krizi ve dönemin diplomasisi gibi konularda önemli bilgiler ve görüşler sunmasının yanında Napier’in kendi hükümetinin politikasıyla yer yer çelişen fikirleri ve çok yönlü kişiliğini de gözler önüne sunması açısından önemlidir.

### **Mehmet Ali Paşa Krizi**

Mehmet Ali Paşa ilk kez 1831 yılında Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı ayaklanmıştır. Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın Kütahya’da Osmanlı ordularını yenmesi üzerine büyük güçlerin müdahalesi ile

<sup>3</sup> M. E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923*, (New York: Longman, 1987), s. 92-96.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Erskine Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question: a Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1885), s. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı*, Türkler, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), s. 562-563.

<sup>6</sup> Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society; Lebanon, 1711-1845*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), s. 35.

<sup>7</sup> Çok sayıda askeri harekâta katılan ve aynı zamanda siyasete de atılan Charles Napier’in (1786-1860) detaylı biyografisi için bkz: Elers Napier, *The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.*, (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1862), v.1& v.2.

<sup>8</sup> Kitap için bkz: Charles Napier, *The War in Syria*, (London: J. W. Parker, 1842), v.1 & v.2.

1833 yılında bir anlaşma sağlanmış ve Mehmet Ali Paşa ve oğlu İbrahim Paşa’ya Mısır’ın yönetiminin yanında Suriye’nin de dâhil olduğu geniş bir bölgeyi yönetme yetkisi verilmiştir.<sup>9</sup> 1839 yılında Osmanlı ordusu ile Mehmet Ali Paşa ve İbrahim Paşa’nın birlikleri Nizip’te karşı karşıya gelmiş ve Osmanlı ordusu yine mağlup olmuş ve saltanat tehlike altına girmiştir. Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın bu derece güçlenmesinden endişe duyan Batılı devletler uzun bir diplomasi trafiğinin ardından 15 Temmuz 1840’da Londra Konferansı’nda aldıkları karar ile Mehmet Ali Paşa’ya konferansta belirledikleri barış şartlarına uyma çağrısında bulunmuşlardır.<sup>10</sup>

Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın barış şartlarını reddetmesi üzerine Osmanlı Devleti İngiltere ve Avusturya ile Mehmet Ali Paşa’ya karşı ortak bir harekâta girişmiştir.<sup>11</sup> Mehmet Ali Paşa ile olan yakın ilişkilerine rağmen Fransa oluşturulan bu ittifakın doğrudan karşısında yer almaktan çekindiği için karşı gelmek yerine arabuluculuk yapmaya çalışmayı tercih etmiştir.<sup>12</sup> Aslında Fransa, İngiltere’nin önderliğinde oluşturulan ittifak güçlerinin Suriye’ye bir askeri çıkartma düzenlemesini her fırsatta eleştirmiştir. Söz konusu bu harekâtın olası olumsuz sonuçlarına dair yazılara Fransız basınında geniş yer ayrılmış, Fransız kamuoyunun bir anlamda bu fikri benimsemesine gayret edilmiştir. İngiltere’nin “Doğu Sorunu” konusunda hatalı bir politika izlediği, Akdeniz’de bir savaş başlatmak üzere olduğu ve Suriye’de Mısır güçlerine karşı yapılan askeri çıkartmanın esas amacının barışı tesis etmek olmadığı, İngiltere’nin bu konuda kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket ettiği fikirlerine dönemin Fransız basınında sıklıkla rastlamak mümkündür.<sup>13</sup>

İngiltere’ye yönelik eleştirel yazıların yanı sıra Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın Avrupalı devletlerin kendi aralarındaki denge açısından önemi, Suriye’de yaptırdığı yollar sonucu ticaretin gelişimi için uygun bir ortam sağladığı ve Suriye’nin geleceği için planladıkları konu edilerek İngiltere’nin yanlış bir hamle yapmakta olduğunun altı çizilmiştir.<sup>14</sup> Avrupa ticareti ağı açısından stratejik öneme sahip bir şehrin tamamen yakılıp yıkıldığı ve sivil halkın hedef alındığı ya da bombardıman sırasında hedef olmamak için siyah bayrak asan bir hastanenin Avusturyalı askerler tarafından bombalanarak yerle bir edildiği gibi olaylar da ön plana çıkartılmıştır. Bu şekilde kamuoyu nezdinde İngiltere ve Avusturya’nın yapmakta olduğu çıkartmanın imajının sarsılması amaçlanmıştır.<sup>15</sup>

İngiltere öncülüğündeki ittifak güçleri harekâtın yoğunlaştığı nokta olan İbrahim Paşa komutasındaki Suriye’de Beyrut ve Sayda gibi şehirleri denizden bombalayarak ele geçirmiş ve Mısır kuvvetlerini zor duruma sokmuştur.<sup>16</sup> Çatışmaların şiddetinden bölgede yaşayan yabancılar da etkilenmiştir. Örneğin Beyrut’taki Amerikalı misyonerler faaliyetlerine ara

<sup>9</sup> Süleyman Kızıltoprak, *Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali Osmanlı’nın Diplomasi Savaşı (1882-1887)*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010), s. 10.

<sup>10</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi: 1789-1914*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), s. 211-214.

<sup>11</sup> Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), s. 51. Hatta dönemin İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Palmerston Mısır kuvvetlerini zor durumda bırakmak adına Osmanlı kuvvetlerinin bir an önce Doğu Akdeniz’e yönelmesi konusunda Osmanlı yönetimini acele ettirmiştir. Bkz: BOA, İ.HR, 312, 20 Receb 1256 (28 Ekim 1840).

<sup>12</sup> A.J. Abraham, *Lebanon in Modern Times*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), s. 38.

<sup>13</sup> Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, 8 Eylül 1840, 11 Eylül 1840.

<sup>14</sup> Courier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire, 18 Eylül 1840; Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, 3 Ekim 1840; Courier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire, 20 Ekim 1840.

<sup>15</sup> Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, 6 Ekim 1840. Süleyman Paşa’nın askeri harekâtı düzenleyen amirallere yazdığı mektup için bkz: Courier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire, 11 Eylül 1840.

<sup>16</sup> Caesar E. Farah, *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861*, (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000), s.37.

vererek geçici bir süreliğine dağlardaki güvenli bölgelere göç etmek zorunda kalmış ve ancak kriz sona erdikten sonra dönebilmiştir.<sup>17</sup>

### **Napier ve Savaş**

Suriye kıyılarında meydana gelen bu çatışmaların en önemli aktörlerinden biri de şüphesiz Tuğamiral Charles Napier’dır. 1840 yılının Haziran ayında askeri harekât için Doğu Akdeniz’e görevlendirilen Napier İngiliz hükümetinin isteği üzerine 11 Ağustos’ta Beyrut’a ulaşmış ve burada Mısır yönetimine bölgeyi kendi güçlerine teslim etme çağrısında bulunmuştur. Bunun yanında, 15 Ağustos’ta Beyrut’ta Suriye halkına harekâtın gerekliliğini ve bölge halkı için faydasını anlatan bir bildiri yayınlamış ve kendilerinden harekâta destek vermelerini istemiştir.<sup>18</sup>

Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın ve İbrahim Paşa’nın teslim olma ve Londra Konferansı’nda alınan kararları kabul etme yönündeki çağrılara uymaması üzerine Eylül ayı ile birlikte İngiliz, Avusturya ve Osmanlı birlikleri Koramiral Robert Stopford ve Napier öncülüğünde Suriye kıyılarını denizden bombalamaya ve kıyıları çıkartma yapmaya başlamıştır. Napier çıkartma öncesi Suriye kıyılarını detaylı bir şekilde incelemiş ve askeri bir çıkartma yapılabilmesi için en avantajlı konumları belirlemiştir. *Revenge* adlı gemiyi kıyı boyunca Beyrut’tan gelen yolu koruması amacıyla stratejik bir noktaya konuşlandırmış, *Wasp* ve *Phénix* adlı gemileri ise Trablus yolunu korumak üzere görevlendirmiştir. İki Türk gemisi ise Baalbek’ten Ayn Dara’ya giden iki yolu koruma altına almıştır. Mısırlı kuvvetleri oyalamak amacıyla bir müddet Beyrut önlerinde oyalanan Napier güçlü bir direnişle karşılaşmadan çıkartmaya başlamıştır.<sup>19</sup>

İbrahim Paşa’nın ilk birlikleri tamamen yok edilmiş, yaklaşık iki yüz askeri ile iki subayı dağlarda öldürülmüştür. Napier *Powerful* gemisi ve beraberinde *Gorgon* ve *Cyclope* gemileri ile Trablus’a doğru bu şehri bombalamak üzere yola çıkmıştır.<sup>20</sup> Bu esnada İbrahim Paşa ise komutasında bulunan yaklaşık üç bin askeri ile Beyrut’a yakın bir noktada konumlanmıştır. Tam bu sırada Sir Charles Smith Cüniye kampına komutayı devralmak üzere gelmiştir. Sir Robert Stopford Napier’a geri çekilmesini emretmiş ancak bu emri vermek için geç kalmıştır.<sup>21</sup> Napier düşman saflarına toparlanma fırsatı bırakmadan hızlı bir şekilde saldırıyı gerçekleştirmiştir. Bin civarında Mısırlı asker tutsak edilmiş, İbrahim Paşa ve Süleyman Paşa da kaçmışlardır. Bunun üzerine Mısırlı askerlerin morali tamamen çökmüş, kalanların bir kısmı öldürülmüş, bir kısmı da kaçmıştır.<sup>22</sup>

Beyrut ve Sayda’yı da kısa sürede ele geçiren ittifak güçleri Suriye bölgesinde Mısır ordusunun elinde kalan son kıyı şehri olan Akka’yı da 3 Kasım itibariyle zapt etmiştir. Akka kuşatması esnasında Napier Akka kalesinde çok şiddetli bir patlama çıkararak Mısır kuvvetlerinin kısa sürede kaçmasını sağlamış ve ittifak güçlerinin kısa sürede zafere ulaşmasında çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır. İbrahim Paşa ise kuvvetleriyle birlikte Suriye’yi

<sup>17</sup> *Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, (Boston: The Board, 1841), s. 107-110.

<sup>18</sup> William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913*, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1913), s. 150. Bildiri için bkz: I. de Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissance étrangères, depuis le Premier Traité Conclu en 1536 entre Suléyman I et François I jusqu’à nos Jours*, (Paris: Amyot Editeur, 1864), v. 10, s.10-11; Charon Cyrille, *La Syrie de 1516 à 1855*, *Echos d’Orient*, (1905), v. 8, No: 54, s. 281- 286; *Courrier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire*, 8 Eylül 1840.

<sup>19</sup> 16 Eylül 1840’da Napier’ın Amiral Stopford’a yazdığı mektup, Amiral Stopford’un 20 Eylül 1840 tarihli mektubu için bkz: *Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires*, 13 Ekim 1840.

<sup>20</sup> *Courrier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire*, 5 Kasım 1840.

<sup>21</sup> M.Henri Guys, *Relation d’Un Séjour de Plusieurs Années à Beyrouth et Dans Le Liban*, (Paris, Librairie Française et Etrangère, Place de la Madeleine, 24, 1847), v. 1, s. 281.

<sup>22</sup> *Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires*, 7 Kasım 1840.

birakıp Mısır’a doğru harekete başlamıştır.<sup>23</sup> Son dönem Osmanlı sadrazamlarından Kıbrıslı Mehmet Kamil Paşa kaleme aldığı Osmanlı Tarihi kitabında Napier’in Suriye kıyılarında Mısır ordularına karşı yürüttüğü savaştan övgüyle bahsetmiştir.<sup>24</sup>

### **Napier ve Diploması**

Mısır ordularının Suriye’de mağlup edilmesinin ardından Napier İskenderiye’ye Mısır’daki İngiliz filosunun başına görevlendirilmiştir. Suriye’de aldığı inisiyatifler ve elde ettiği başarılarından cesaret alan Napier Mısır’da da farklılığını göstermiş ve merkezi hükümetten ve üstlerinden yetki almadan Mısır yönetimiyle temasa geçmiştir. Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın yardımcısı Boğos Bey ile temasa geçerek Paşa ile bir görüşme ayarlamıştır. 27 Kasım 1840’ta İskenderiye’de gerçekleşen bu görüşmede Napier İbrahim Paşa’nın Suriye idaresinden çekilmesi ve Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın Mısır’daki valiliğinin veraset usulüne göre devam etmesi gibi çok önemli hususları içeren bir anlaşma şartlarını Mehmet Ali Paşa’ya kabul ettirmiştir.<sup>25</sup>

Napier’in Mehmet Ali Paşa ile yaptığı görüşme ve vardığı anlaşma kısa sürede büyük yankı uyandırmıştır. Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın kesin bir yenilgiye uğratılmasını bekleyen Osmanlı hükümeti Napier’in bu kapsamda gizli bir görüşme yapma yetkisinin olmadığını belirterek durumu protesto etmiştir.<sup>26</sup> Sadrazam Mustafa Reşit Paşa İngiltere’nin İstanbul Büyükelçisi John Ponsonby’ye bir protesto notası göndererek anlaşmanın geçersiz olduğunu belirtmiştir.<sup>27</sup>

İngiliz hükümet yetkilileri de Napier ile iletişime geçerek bu anlaşmanın kendisinin yetkisi dışında olduğunu belirterek tepki göstermiş ve bu sebepten dolayı Osmanlı ve Avrupa hükümetlerinin bu durumu protesto ettiğini açıklamıştır. Napier yetkisini aştığını kabul ederek bunu krizi daha çabuk bir şekilde sonlandırmak adına yaptığını beyan etmiştir.<sup>28</sup> Napier’in yetki alanı dışında izinsiz bir şekilde siyasi hamleler yapmasını on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında İngiliz dış politikasının geçirdiği dönüşüm süreci içerisinde yorumlamak bu olayın sebep ve sonuçlarını doğru analiz etmek açısından faydalıdır. Bu dönemde İngiltere uzak toprakların yarattığı sorunlar ile iç politikanın arasındaki dengeyi korumakta zorluk çekmeye başlamış ve Londra hükümetinin etkisi giderek zayıflamıştır.<sup>29</sup>

Her ne kadar Napier’in bu cesur hamlesi çok tepki çekmiş olsa da diplomatik açıdan bakıldığında bu hamlenin gerçekten de krizin büyümeden sonlanması yönünde önemli bir adım olduğu iddia edilebilir. Suriye’de yenilmiş bile olsa hala Fransa’nın desteğini uman Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın kendisine sunulan şartları çok fazla müzakere etmeden kabul etmesi daha büyük askeri yüzleşmelerin önüne geçmiştir. Hatta Napier’in İskenderiye’deki görüşme esnasında Mehmet Ali Paşa’yı şartlara zorlamak adına bombardıman ile tehdit ettiği ve Paşa’nın bunun üzerine şartları kabul ettiği iddia edilmiştir.<sup>30</sup> Elbette bu iddia sadece inanılması güç bir söylentiden ibarettir ve doğrulanmamıştır. Napier kendi eserinde Mehmet Ali Paşa ile olan

<sup>23</sup> Donald Andreas Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, or, Mehemet Ali and his Successors until the British Occupation in 1882*, (London: Smith, Elder&co., 1898), s. 188-191.

<sup>24</sup> Bkz: Kamil Paşa, *Tarih-i Siyasi-yi Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye: Teessüs-i Devlet-i Âliyeden Cennet-Mekân Sultan Abdülmecit Han’ın Evahir-i Saltanatına kadar Güzeran Eden Zamana Aittir*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmed İhsan,1909), c. 3, s.205-209.

<sup>25</sup> Elers Napier, *The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.*, v.2, s. 104-111. Süreçte rol alan önemli aktörlerin yazışmaları için bkz: Paul Mouriez, *Histoire de Méhémet-Ali Vice-Roid’Egypte*, (Paris: L. Chappe, 1857), s. 125.

<sup>26</sup> M. Henri Guys, *age*, s. 284.

<sup>27</sup> I. de Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissance étrangères*, v. 10, s. 101-102.

<sup>28</sup> Charles Napier, *The War in Syria*, v. 2, s. 3-14.

<sup>29</sup> Claude Markovits, *İnceleme: Strategies of British India, Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798- 1850*. M.E. Yapp. *Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre Mer*, (1980), v. 67, No: 248-249, s. 396-398.

<sup>30</sup> İddia için bkz: Cameron, *Egypt in the Nineteenth Century*, s.194.

görüşmesini anlatırken böyle bir konuşmanın varlığından bahsetmemiştir ve böyle bir bilgiye biyografisinde de rastlanmamıştır.

İngiliz hükümeti Napier’ın Mehmet Ali Paşa ile yaptığı gizli anlaşmanın 15 Temmuz Londra Anlaşması’na ek bir belge statüsü kazandırılarak anlaşmanın imzacı devletler tarafından kabulü formülünü benimsemiştir.<sup>31</sup> Dolayısıyla İngiliz hükümetinin ilk başta Napier’ın Mehmet Ali Paşa ile anlaşmasına tepki gösterse de neticede bu hamleyi olumlu karşıladığı söylenebilir. Dışişleri Bakanı Palmerston Napier’ın büyük bir iş çıkararak Mısır’ın Suriye’den çekilmeyi kabul etmesini sağladığını söyleyerek kendisine destek çıkmıştır.<sup>32</sup>

İngiliz hükümetine bundan sonrası için sadece Sultan Abdülmecid’i Mısır’ın idaresinin veraset yoluyla devamı konusunda ikna etmek görevi kalmıştır. Nitekim yapılan müzakereler sonucunda varılan uzlaşma Napier’ın Mehmet Ali Paşa’ya kabul ettirdiği şartlardan çok farklı olmamıştır.<sup>33</sup> Sultan Abdülmecid’in 13 Şubat 1841 tarihli fermanı ile Mısır’daki valilik makamının veraset yoluyla devam edeceğini açıklamasıyla birlikte kriz nihayete ermiştir.<sup>34</sup> Böylelikle, Fransa’nın dış politikada hareket alanını kısıtlama prensibi üzerinden hareket eden Napier, bir bakıma Fransa’nın Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın yenilgisini kullanarak bölgeye müdahale etme olasılığının da önüne geçmiştir.<sup>35</sup>

Görüldüğü üzere, Tuğamiral Charles Napier askeri faaliyet ve başarılarının yanında yürüttüğü cesur ve sansasyonel diplomasi ile de 1840 Mısır Krizi’nin en önemli ve belirleyici aktörlerinden birisi olmuştur. Napier’ın askeri başarıları, üstleriyle girdiği yetki mücadeleleri ya da kritik meselelerde İngiliz Hükümeti’nin resmi dış politikasına aykırı kararlar alıp uygulayabilme becerisi sadece kendi ülkesi tarafından değil, Fransa tarafından da yakından takip edilmiştir. Belirli açılardan tutarsızlık olarak nitelendirilebilecek söz konusu bu tavırlardan dönemin Fransız basınında sıklıkla bahsedilmiş, Fransız gazetelerinde Napier hakkında yazılmış geniş yazılara yer verilmiştir.<sup>36</sup>

### **Napier’in Osmanlı Devleti ve Toplumları Hakkındaki Görüşleri**

Hayatı boyunca çeşitli savaşlarda yer almasının yanında gemicilikte önemli bir şöhrete ulaşan ve siyasete de atılan Napier tecrübe ve gözlemlerini kitaplaştırmayı ihmal etmemiştir.<sup>37</sup> Mısır Krizi’nin ardından 1842 yılında yayınladığı ve iki ciltten oluşan *The War in Syria* kitabında çatışmaların ve diplomasi sürecinin gelişimi yanında bölgedeki gözlemleri ve dönemin siyaseti hakkındaki fikirlerini de belirtmekten kaçınmamıştır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında bu kaynak belli ölçüde bir seyahat yazısı niteliği de taşımaktadır. Napier’ın Osmanlı idaresi ve Doğu Akdeniz’de yaşayan halklar hakkındaki çeşitli gözlem ve tespitleri bu kitapta mevcuttur.

Napier’ın Doğu Akdeniz’de görev yapıp eserini kaleme aldığı dönemde İngiliz diplomasisinde ve kamuoyunda Osmanlı imajının pozitif yönde olduğu iddia edilebilir. Özellikle 1830’da göreve gelen Dışişleri Bakanı Palmerston Osmanlı Devleti’nin Rusya tehdidi ve Fransa yayılcılığına karşı bütünlüğünün İngiliz çıkarları için gerekli olduğunu düşünmüş

<sup>31</sup> Courrier du Gard: Journal Politique, Administratif et Judiciaire, 1 Ocak 1841.

<sup>32</sup> M. Henri Guys, *age*, s. 285.

<sup>33</sup> William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire*, s.151.

<sup>34</sup> Evelyn Baring (Earl of Cromer), *Modern Egypt*, (London: MacMillan&Co. Ltd., 1908), v. 1, s. 16. Ferman metni için bkz: Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d’actes Internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman*, (Paris: F. Pichon, 1897), v. 2, s. 320-323.

<sup>35</sup> Le Constitutionnel, 16 Aralık 1852.

<sup>36</sup> Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, 2 Ekim 1840.

<sup>37</sup> Napier Mısır Krizi ile ilgili kitabının yanında Portekiz’de ve Baltık Denizi’nde katıldığı savaşlar ve İngiliz denizcilik tarihi ile ilgili de kitaplar yazmıştır. Bu kitaplar için bkz: Charles Napier, *An Account of the War in Portugal between Don Pedro and Don Miguel*, (London: T. & W. Boone, 1836); Charles Napier, *The Navy, Its Past and Present State*, (London: John & Daniel A. Darling, 1851); Charles Napier, *The History of the Baltic Campaign of 1854*, (London: R. Bentley, 1857).



ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin reform programını destekleyerek Osmanlı yönetimi üzerinde siyasi ve ticari bir nüfuz alanı oluşturmak istemiştir. Yine önceki dönemlerin aksine 1830 ve 1840’lı yıllarda Osmanlı coğrafyasını ziyaret eden seyyahlar da çoğunlukla Osmanlı toplulukları ve bireylerinden olumlu anlamda bahsederek İngiliz toplumunda yaygın olan Osmanlı karşıtlığının azalmasına katkıda bulunmuşlardır.<sup>38</sup> Suriye bölgesi için bakıldığında ise İngiliz ilgi ve sempatisi Fransa’nın Marunîler başta olmak üzere bölge Hristiyanları ile olan yakın ilişkilerini dengelemek adına eski dönemlerden beri Dürzîlerden yana olmuştur.<sup>39</sup>

Dönemin ve Suriye bölgesinin şartları dikkate alındığında Napier’in çağdaşlarıyla örtüşen görüşlerinin yanında ayrılan görüşleri de olduğu göze çarpmaktadır. Napier her ne kadar harekâta Osmanlı kuvvetleri ile birlikte aynı ülkü doğrultusunda ve Osmanlı bütünlüğü lehine savaşmış olsa da eserinde Osmanlı idaresine karşı mesafeli görüşler belirtmiştir. Suriye’ye Osmanlı kuvvetleri ile birlikte askeri çıkartma yapan Napier Osmanlı asker ve idarecilerinin bölge halkına kötü davrandığını<sup>40</sup>, çatışmadan dolayı yaralan ve zarar gören halkla ilgilenmediğini<sup>41</sup> ve bölgeye atanan idarecilerin art niyetli olduğunu belirtmiştir.<sup>42</sup> Bölge halkına yaklaşım olarak kıyaslandığında Osmanlı yetkililerinin Mısırlı meslektaşlarından çok farklı olmadığını da eklemiştir.<sup>43</sup> Napier Osmanlı Devleti’nin genel durumundan bahsetmeyi de ihmal etmemiştir. Ona göre, Osmanlı Devleti denizcilik ve donanma konularında çok zayıftır<sup>44</sup> ve elindeki uzak bölgeleri kontrol edebilecek güçte değildir.<sup>45</sup>

Napier ayrıca Suriye kıyısında yaşayan toplumları da gözlemlemiş ve bölge halkları hakkında çoğu İngiliz meslektaşından ve İngiliz resmi politikasından ayrılan görüşler ortaya koymuştur. Napier çoğu İngiliz’in sadece Dürzî toplumuna olan sempatisinin aksine Suriye ve Cebel-i Lübnan bölgesinin Fransa’nın desteklediği Marunîler dâhil bütün gruplarına sempatiyle yaklaşmaktadır. Mısırlılar bölgeden çekildikten sonra bölge halkına verilen siyasi imtiyaz ve zarar tazmini sözlerinin tutulmadığını belirten Napier<sup>46</sup> İngiliz hükümetini de Osmanlı Devleti’nin bölge halkına verdiği sözleri tutmamasına ve Osmanlı idarecilerinin bölgedeki keyfi davranışlarına kayıtsız kalmakla suçlamıştır. Osmanlı Devleti’nin bu kötü niyetli tutumunun bölge halkları nezdinde bir nefret oluşturduğu ve artan bu nefretle birlikte bölgedeki mezhep gruplarının birleşerek Osmanlı Devleti’ni bölgeden çıkaracağına inandığını belirtmiştir.<sup>47</sup>

Napier her ne kadar belli konularda Osmanlı Devleti’ne ciddi eleştiriler yöneltmiş olsa da bu eleştirilerde diplomatik sınırları aşmamıştır. Aslında Napier’in eserinin en çarpıcı özelliklerinden birisi de eserinde fanatizme ve propagandacı bir üsluba yönelmiş olmamasıdır. Osmanlı hükümetini eleştirdiği gibi memuru olduğu İngiliz hükümetini de eleştirmekten çekinmemiş, Suriye halkları hakkındaki görüşlerinde de aşırıya kaçmamıştır. Bölgedeki sorunlara dikkat çekmiş ve çözüm olarak alternatif fikirler sunmaya çalışmıştır.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Ayşen Müderrisoğlu Esiner, “Doğu Sorunu” Çerçevesinde İngiliz-Rus İlişkileri ve 1844 Tarihli Gizli Sözleşme, Bozkırın Oğlu Ahmet Taşağıl’a Armağan, ed. Tuğba Eray Biber, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2019), s. 501-504.

<sup>39</sup> J. Hajjar, *L’Europe et les Destinées du Proche-Orient: (1815-1848)*, (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1970), s. 18.

<sup>40</sup> Charles Napier, *The War in Syria*, v. 1, s. 182.

<sup>41</sup> *Age*, s. 211.

<sup>42</sup> *Age*, s. 241-245.

<sup>43</sup> *Age*, s. 237.

<sup>44</sup> *Age*, v. 2, s. 290.

<sup>45</sup> *Age*, s. 277.

<sup>46</sup> *Age*, s. 291.

<sup>47</sup> *Age*, s. 296.

<sup>48</sup> Mesela Osmanlı Devleti’nin Suriye’deki hâkimiyetini uzun tutması ve yerli halkın gönlünü kazanması için askerlerini bölgeden çekmesi ve bölgedeki imtiyazları arttırması gerektiğini savunmuştur, bkz: *age*, s. 296.

Mısır Krizi ve Suriye Sorunu gibi konularla ilgilenen ve Doğu Akdeniz’i iyi tanıyan dönemin İngiliz yetkilileri arasında da fanatizm ve Osmanlı karşıtlığının yaygın olmadığı söylenebilir. İngiltere’nin İstanbul Büyükelçiliği’nde görev yapan ve Cebel-i Lübnan’a uzun süreli bir gezi gerçekleştiren David Urquhart da Napier gibi gözlemleri üzerinden tespitlerde bulunmuş ve Suriye’deki mezhep gruplarını değerlendirirken ayrımcı ve dışlayıcı bir tutum takınmamıştır.<sup>49</sup> Osmanlı Devleti hakkında aşırı olumsuz görüş belirtmeyen Gregory Wortabet<sup>50</sup> ve George Washington Chasseaud<sup>51</sup> gibi İngiliz hükümetine yakın olan misyonerler Napier ve Urquhart’ın aksine Dürzî taraftarlığına daha çok ağırlık vermiş ve Marunî toplumuna karşı daha mesafeli durmuşlardır. Din adamlarının rakip olarak gördükleri Katolik inancına sahip Marunîlerden ziyade Müslüman olarak kabul gören ve İngiltere ile iyi ilişkileri olan Dürzîlere daha yakın durmaları dönemin şartlarında gayet anlaşılır bir durumdur.

Suriye’deki Mısır işgalinden övgüyle bahseden ve İngiltere’nin genel anlamda Doğu Akdeniz’de yürüttüğü politikayı eleştiren İngiliz asker ve diplomat Charles Henry Churchill ise Napier’dan her yönüyle çok farklı bir profil çizmektedir. Churchill eserinde Türk ırkına ve Dürzî toplumuna hakaret edecek kadar ileri bir fanatizm örneği göstermiştir. Eserinde sunduğu veriler ırkçılık ve propaganda içeren görüşlerinin gölgesinde kalmıştır.<sup>52</sup> Churchill’in kitabı Napier’ın eseri ile karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde ele alındığında Napier’ın yapıcı üslubunun değeri çok daha iyi anlaşılacaktır.

### **Sonuç**

1815 Viyana Kongresi ile temelleri atılan “Avrupa Uyumu” sürecinin esas amacı Avrupa devletleri arasında çıkabilecek çatışmaları engellemek ve bir denge düzeni kurmaktır. Dolayısıyla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun herhangi bir büyük gücün tahakkümü altına girmemesi Avrupa’nın inşa etmeye çalıştığı denge sistemi için kilit bir öneme sahipti. Esas amacının bu prensiplerin uygulanması olduğunu belirten İngiltere, 1840’ta Avusturya’nın desteği ve Osmanlı askerlerinin de katılımıyla Suriye’de bulunan Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın himayesi altındaki Mısırlı birliklere karşı bir harekât düzenleyerek Fransa’nın tepkisini çekmiştir. Fransız kamuoyunda İngiltere’nin Suriye topraklarında Fransa’ya karşı avantajlı bir konuma geçmek amacıyla bu harekâtı yaptığı görüşü hâkimdi. İngiltere’nin hatalı bir hamle yaptığı, Mehmet Ali Paşa’nın Suriye’de etkin bir pozisyonda olmasının Fransa’nın çıkarları açısından daha avantajlı olduğu Fransız basınında yoğun bir şekilde vurgulanıyordu. Öte yandan bu harekâtı yöneten komutanlar arasında ön plana çıkan ve bir anlamda olayların seyrini değiştiren Napier’ın askeri başarıları ve İngiltere’nin genel siyasetine aykırı düşen yetkisi dışında kararlar alıp uygulaması da Fransa tarafından dikkatle takip edilmiştir.

Suriye’de yönettiği askeri çıkartmalarda kısa sürede başarı elde eden Napier’ın İskenderiye’de Mehmet Ali Paşa ile gizli bir görüşme yapması ve Mısır’ın verasetini teklif ettiği bir anlaşmanın gündeme gelmesi hem İngiliz hükümeti, hem Avrupalı devletler hem de Osmanlı Devleti için beklenmedik bir hamleydi. Napier, Avrupalı devletlerin çıkar çatışmalarını, siyasi ve ekonomik amaçlarını, Doğu’daki mücadele alanlarını iyi bilen deneyimli bir asker ve aynı zamanda bir siyasetçiydi. Batılı devletlerin özellikle Suriye üzerindeki planlarını, Suriye’nin iç dinamiklerini yakından incelemiş ve dönemin şartlarına

<sup>49</sup> Urquhart’ın Suriye hakkındaki eseri için bkz: David Urquhart, *The Lebanon (Mount Souria)*, (London: T. C. Newby, 1860), v. 1 & v. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Bkz: Gregory Wortabet, *Syria and the Syrians; or, Turkey in the Dependencies*, (London: J. Madden, 1856).

<sup>51</sup> Bkz: George Washington Chasseaud, *The Druses of the Lebanon: Their Manners, Customs, and History*, (London: R. Bentley, 1855).

<sup>52</sup> Eser için bkz: Charles Henry Churchill, *The Druses and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860*, (London: B. Quaritch, 1862).

kıyasla olabildiğince tarafsız değerlendirmeler ortaya koymuştur. Dolayısıyla Napier’in attığı siyasi adımları incelerken birçok etkeni göz önünde bulundurmakta fayda vardır. İngiliz hükümetinin onayı ve bilgisi olmadan yapılan bu görüşme daha sonra İngiliz hükümeti ile diğer Avrupa devletleri tarafından kabul gören bir anlaşmaya dönüşmüştür ve Mısır Krizi olarak adlandırılabilir. Olayları bir anlamda sonuca taşımıştır.

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**Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic Relations:**

**An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland<sup>1</sup>**

**Çiğdem Balım<sup>2</sup>**

**Q-1: What would you like to tell our readers about yourself, your mission, and the activities of the Embassy?**

I Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1989. I served in the office of the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam and in the Turkish Embassies in Baghdad and Moscow. I was Consul General at the Turkish Consulate General in Plovdiv and Dubai and served as the Ambassador of Turkey to Kuwait. While stationed in Ankara, I worked mostly on issues concerning the Middle East. Between October 2016 and August 2018, I served as the Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 1 October 2018, I was appointed as the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

We have historical ties with the United Kingdom. Hence, our relations continue in many dimensions on a wide scale with the accumulated wisdom of many centuries. As the Embassy, we are working to deepen our bilateral relations and cooperation even more in every area starting with economy, trade, tourism, education and security. Our bilateral political relations are on a positive route. Having left Brexit behind, we are predicting an increase in reciprocal visits this year. Last year, although the agendas of both Turkey and the UK were fully booked, several visits at ministerial and upper level bureaucratic levels were realized. We ended the year with the visit of the Turkish President to London during the NATO Leaders' Summit. During his visit, the President opened the Cambridge Central Mosque.

Other departments under the Embassy also give valuable support to deepening our relations. For example, our Office of the Commercial Counsellor lends it support to businesspeople who do or who want to do business in UK; it carries out activities to encourage the UK firms to invest in Turkey. Our Office of the Culture and Tourism Counsellor, makes important contributions in UK to the promotion of our country, our historical and cultural heritage and our shores.

Moreover, as the Turkish Embassy, we try to provide the needed support to many Turks who live in the United Kingdom and make significant contributions to the economic, political

<sup>1</sup> The interview took place at the Turkish Embassy in London on 20 February 2020.

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Balım, Çiğdem. "Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic Relations: An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (June 2020), pp. 87-91.

and cultural life here. The Office of the Consulate General, which is in a separate building, provides civil registry and citizenship services.

**Q-2: What are your views about the diplomatic relations between the two countries over history?**

Our diplomatic relations with the UK has a long history. British Empire is one of the first countries which sent an Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. William Harborne, in 1583, was sent as an Ambassador to the court of Murad the Third. Yusuf Agah Effendi, who was one of the first Ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire, started to serve during George the Third in 1793.

Despite the fact that historically Turkey and the United Kingdom fought against each other sometimes, bilateral relations cooperation in the face of joint interests has always been in the forefront. And today we work in close cooperation with the United Kingdom for the aim of spreading economic prosperity, stability, peace and security in different parts of the world. As members of NATO, we act together against many common issues from terrorist attacks to illegal immigration. During the time she was a member of the EU, the United Kingdom was a prominent supporter of our application to EU membership. With Middle East, North Africa and Cyprus in the first place, developments in our region, issues of global security, and the development of economic and trade cooperation both bilaterally and with the third parties are the main items on our common agenda. Our bilateral relations have gained a new momentum in all areas with the establishment of strategic partnership set up in 2007.

**Q-3: Can you expand on the economic and trade relations between the two countries- past and future?**

Our economic and trade relations go back a long time in history as I said before. Before the establishment of reciprocal continuous diplomatic representation, the British merchants used to travel to Istanbul, a major world city then as well. In fact, the first British Ambassador to Istanbul, William Hargrave, was a merchant and knew Istanbul from his earlier trips to the city.

Today also, economy and trade continue to be an important driving force of our relations. United Kingdom is the second largest export market of Turkey with our bilateral trade volume of 16,5 billion dollars by the end of 2019. In 2019, our export was nearly 11 billion dollars, our import was close to 5,5 billion dollars. Major groups of our exports to United Kingdom are the products of automotive industry and automotive supplies, textiles, electric and non-electric machinery and utensils, iron and steel. During the past 15 years, the United Kingdom with an investment over 10 billion dollars, is the fifth in line among the countries which have invested in Turkey the most.

Our tourism relations continue to develop as well. In 2018, 2.2 million British tourists visited Turkey. That number was up to 2.5 million in 2019. On March 2, 2020 Turkish visa requirement has been abolished for the UK citizens, which will help to increase this number even higher.

The efforts to increase cooperation between the two countries in the areas of innovation, health, education, renewable energy is continuing. In international health services, to promote the services offered by Turkey and to support the state and private sector activities in health tourism, in February 2019 USHAŞ (Uluslararası Sağlık Hizmetleri/ International Health Services) was set up within the Ministry of Health, and it is working to increase cooperation with UK.

Balımlı, Çiğdem. "Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic Relations: An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (June 2020), pp. 87-91.

To strengthen the cooperation between the UK and Turkey in science and innovation, there are foundations like Newton - Katip Çelebi Fund Bilateral Cooperation Program. In Defence industry we have cooperation and projects for joint production. Turkish and British economies are not in competition. Just the opposite, they complement each other. There is potential for cooperation in many areas in this context.

#### **Q-4: How about cultural relations?**

During the recent years, with the deepening of trade, economic and political relations, we are observing a dynamic development in our relations in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, and it makes us very happy.

In the UK we carry out our cultural and promotional activities through the coordinated efforts of the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) and the Office of the Culture and Information Counsellor in the Embassy. In this context many diverse activities such as meetings with authors, lectures on culture and art, screening of films, book launches, activities on gastronomy, presentations on archaeology and design, exhibitions and concerts are realized. Moreover, YEE organizes courses and workshops on many areas. We continue to support the cultural and art activities organized by the non-governmental organizations set up by the members of our community. We continue to take part in and support the cultural activities in London by our performers and artists, or with their contribution, such as concerts, exhibitions, activities for charities. Pretty soon there are going to be many activities. For example, in the London Book Exhibition between March 10-12, we will have a Turkish National Stand. Moreover, on the evening of April 1<sup>st</sup>, "Turkish Waltzes Project" will take place in the Cardogan Hall, which will bring together the unforgettable works of the Turkish composers of the Ottoman and Republican period.

In Tourism, Turkey is among the most preferred destinations of the British tourists. The fact that the number of British tourists who came to Turkey during 2019 is over 2,5 million, enables our historical and cultural wealth to be better known by the British. It increases our human communication.

Our cooperation in higher education with the UK has gathered momentum during the past few years. Moreover, within the framework of cooperation in science and innovation, from our country support is given to many innovative projects and initiatives in areas of health, agriculture, food security, management of natural disasters and risk, energy and climate change.

#### **Q-5: What do you think about the relations between the two countries following BREXIT?**

The United Kingdom is an important partner and ally for us. Before BREXIT, she has been among the countries which supported our membership to EU most. However, people of the UK have made a decision and the Government has taken steps suitable with that decision.

We have to look forward and not back from the point we are now. And that is what we are doing. We are striving that our bilateral trade and our citizens settled here are not affected. Within the context of various meeting mechanisms, we have set up with the UK, we get together regularly. We discuss these issues in detail. Our labour has started to bear fruit. The authorities of both countries will carry out talks to sign an STA between Turkey and the United Kingdom at the same time as with EU.

Balımlı, Çiğdem. “Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic Relations: An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (June 2020), pp. 87-91.

The United Kingdom aims to limit the side effects of Brexit and become a stronger global actor. And within the context of this aim, new trade strategies are being structured. For example, starting on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February the UK has started the “Ready to Trade” campaign in 13 countries and 18 cities, directed to future global partners. Turkey and Istanbul are among these cities and countries.

Finally, when we look at the future, we see that both parties are determined to deepen the relations after the period following Brexit. The UK, leaving behind the restrictions brought on by EU, will reach a wider area of movement. We want to make use of this new area in the best way possible.

**Q-6: How about the contributions of the Turkish community in the UK?**

*Signed in 1963 and known as the Ankara Agreement*, The Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community, provides the framework for co-operation between Turkey and the European Union. It created the basis especially after the 2000s, for our countrymen to come to the UK to settle. This is actually an agreement which creates the legal basis for relations between Turkey and the European Union. It was not only for the UK but for the other EU countries as well. However, it will lose its validity for the UK after 31 December 2020. We are following up on new regulations which will be put in action.

Turkish community here take part in almost all areas of life including economy, finance, trade, culture, sports, arts, politics and science, and they make important contributions to the community they live in. They have a reputation of being hard working, practical, skilful, hospitable and communicative people. We have over 5000 students in universities the UK.



Balı, Çiğdem. “Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic Relations: An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (June 2020), pp. 87-91.



### **Ambassador Ümit Yalçın**

Ambassador Ümit Yalçın was born in Ankara in 1967. He graduated from Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations in 1989.


Ambassador Yalçın joined the foreign service in 1989. He served in the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam and in the Turkish Embassies in Baghdad and Moscow. He was Consul General at the Turkish Consulate General in Plovdiv from 2005 to 2009 and Consul General at the Turkish Consulate General in Dubai from 2009 to 2012. He also served in different political departments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 2012 and served as Ambassador of Turkey to Kuwait.

Ambassador Yalçın held the positions of Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs and Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His portfolio covered North Africa & Middle East and Asia-Pacific. He was appointed as Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2016. He held this role until August 2018. Since 1 October 2018, he has been serving as the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Ambassador Ümit Yalçın is married to Mrs. Gül Yalçın. They have one son.

## Book Review

Aynur Onur Çiftçi, *Ben Türk: Kore Savaşı'nda Türk Esirler*, (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2020). ISBN 978-605-08-3055-2



Çiğdem Balım<sup>1</sup>

*Amerikalı Teğmen Charlie Heath, Kunuri muharebeleri esnasında Amerikan birliklerinin çatışma sırasında yol üstüne terk ettikleri tank ve M39 zırhlı aracı kendi tankı ile itmek istedi. M39'un frenlerini kontrol ederken kenarda ağır yaralı bir askerin inlemesini duydu. Asker elinde tuttuğu boş su matarası ile yalvarıyordu: "Ben Türk... Ben Türk!". Ne teğmende ne de yanındakilerin matalarında su kalmamıştı, karnındaki ve omuzundaki yaralardan akan kanların içinde yatan askeri olduğu yerde bıraktılar.(76)*

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında 38. paralel sınır kabul edilerek Kore bölünmüş ve iki devlet ortaya çıkmıştı- Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti (Kuzey Kore), ve Kore Cumhuriyeti (Güney Kore). Kuzey Kore, Kim Il Sung yönetiminde Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB) ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti tarafından destekleniyordu. Güney Kore ise Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından himaye ediliyordu. İki devletin arasındaki gerilim 25 Haziran

1950'de kuzeydeki Kore Halk Ordusu'nun güneydeki Kore Cumhuriyetini işgal etmek için 38. paraleli ihlal etmesiyle savaşa döndü. 27 Haziran 1950'de BM Güvenlik Konseyi, üyelerine ABD Başkanı Truman'ın uluslararası barışı koruma amacıyla başlattığı "asayiş harekâtına" (police action) katılma çağrısında bulundu.

BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin çağrısı karşısında 16 devlet (ABD, Avustralya, Belçika, Filipinler, Etiyopya, Hollanda, İngiltere, Kanada, Kolombiya, Lüksemburg, Porto Riko, Tayland, Türkiye, Yeni Zelanda ve Yunanistan) Kore Cumhuriyetini desteklemek için bölgeye askeri kıta, hastahane gemisi ve sağlık ekibi gönderdi. 29 Haziran 1950'de Türkiye, ABD'den sonra Kore'ye asker göndereceğini deklare eden ikinci ülke oldu. Devrin Başbakanı Menderes de tıpkı Başkan Truman gibi davranarak bu konuyu meclise getirmede. 25 Temmuz 1950'de yapılan Bakanlar Kurulu toplantısında Türkiye'den tugay boyutunda bir birliğin Birleşmiş Milletler Uzak Doğu Komutanlığı emrine gönderilmesine karar verildi ve Kore'ye gitmek üzere 5090 personelden oluşan bir tugay oluşturuldu. Genel Kurmay arşivlerindeki belgeler, Türk askerlerinin 1 aylık hızlandırılmış eğitimle savaşa gönderildiğini hatta savaşta kullanacakları silahlarla gemide tanıştıklarını gösteriyor. 27 Temmuz 1953'de imzalanan ateşkes ile savaş bittiğinde üç farklı tugay Kore'de görev yapmıştı. Tugaylar subay, astsubay ve çoğunluğu askerliğini yapan eratlardan oluşuyordu. Resmi verilere göre Türk tugaylarının kaybı 725 şehit, 2180 yaralı, 168 kayıp ve 244 esirdi.

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**Ben Türk** kitabında antropolog Dr. Aynur Onur Çiftçi, esir düşen 244 Türk askerinin kim olduklarını ve başlarından geçenleri Türk, Amerikan ve İngiliz arşivlerinden elde ettiği askerî belgelere dayanarak anlatıyor. Yazar neden böyle bir çalışmaya başladığını kitabın Önsöz'ünde açıklıyor. 2017 yılında yazar ve eşi Indiana Üniversitesindeki çalışmalarına ara verip Maryland'deki Millî Arşiv ve Kayıtlar İdaresini (*National Archives and Records Administration - NARA*) ziyaret ederler:

“Erhan ne aradığımı biliyor, odaklanmış bir biçimde ve hızla çalışıyordu. Ben ise katlar arasında geziyor, ilgimi çeken dosyaları aç gözlülükle kurcalıyor, güler yüzlü ve yardımsever arşiv uzmanlarına ilgilendiğim konular hakkında sorular soruyordum. İşte ilgimi çeken o dosyalardan biri bu kitaba hayat verdi. Bulduğum dosya, Kore Savaşında komünist kuvvetlere esir olan Türk askerlerinin esaret hayatlarını inceleyen 18 sayfalık bir rapordur. Rapor, Amerikan Kara Kuvvetlerinin (Amerikan KK'nın) George Washington Üniversitesi'nde kurduğu İnsan Kaynakları Araştırma Ofisi (*Human Resources Research Office - HumRRO*) tarafından hazırlanmıştı. Bu çalışma, HumRRO'nun Kore'den dönen Amerikan KK esirlerinin esaret davranışları üzerine yaptığı araştırma kapsamında gerçekleştirilmişti. HumRRO'nun bulguları Kore Savaşı'nda esir düşen Amerikan KK esirlerinin yaklaşık olarak yarısının esir kamplarında hayatlarını kaybettiğini ve %15'nin düşman ile iş birliği yaptığını gösteriyordu. Öte yandan, Kore'den dönen Amerikalı esirler ve gaziler arasındaki yaygın inanışa göre, aynı esir kamplarında ve aynı koşullarda yaşayan Türk esirler tek bir kayıp dahi vermemişlerdi ve bir iki istisna dışında düşmanla iş birliği yapan olmamıştı. Bu nedenle, Amerikan KK HumRRO'dan Türk esirlerin esaret davranışlarını yakından incelemesini istemişti.”(11)

Yazar daha sonra HumRRO'nun Amerikan esirleri ve Türk esirler hakkında yaptığı bu çalışmaların 1955'te yayınlanan ve ABD Ordusunun bugün halen kullandığı ABD Muharip Kuvvetleri İçin Davranış İlkeleri Rehberi'nin (*The Code of the U.S. Fighting Force*) şekillenmesinde ve sonraki yıllarda Hayatı İdame, Sorguya Mukavemet, Kaçma ve Kurtulma (*SERE, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape*) eğitiminin oluşturulmasında rol oynadığını öğrenir.

“Kore'de esir düşen Türk askerleri Türkiye'ye iade edilmeden önce ABD Ordusu tarafından sorgulanmışlardı. Bu tutanakların bir kısmı NARA'da bulunuyordu. Bu kitap için yaptığım 2 yılı aşkın araştırma ve ön hazırlığın en heyecanlı kısmı Türk esirlerin dosyalarını tek tek alıp açmak oldu. Artık HumRRO raporunun bahsettiği Kore'deki Türk esirler isimsiz askerler değillerdi; ete kemiğe bürünmüşlerdi.”(12)

**Ben Türk** te Türk, Amerikan ve İngiliz arşivlerinden edinilen belge ve kaynaklar mukayeseli olarak ele alınıyor. Yazarın Londra'daki İngiliz Ulusal Arşivi'nden (*The National Archives - TNA*) temin ettiği İngiliz esirlerin dosyaları ve diğer askerî belgeler, aynı kamplarda ve aynı koşullarda yaşayan İngiliz esirlerin bu iki grup hakkında verdikleri bilgileri içeriyor. Bu anlamda, kitapta Türk, Amerikalı ve İngiliz esirlerin sorgu tutanakları çapraz okunmuş ve kesişme noktalarına odaklanılmış. Eser ayrıca bölgenin politik ve sosyal tarihi hakkında birçok ipucu içeriyor, örneğin Kuzey Koreli çiftçiler o kadar fakirlerdir ki esirlerden yiyecek dilenirler. Değişik ülkelerden gelen esirlerin diğerleri hakkında ne düşündükleri de ilginçtir, örneğin Türk ve İngiliz esirlerin birbirlerinin askeri disiplinlerini takdir ettiklerini ve karşılıklı saygı duyduklarını görüyoruz. Kitapta belgeler, resimler ve Kore savaşı hakkında bilgiler de mevcut.

Dr. Çiftçi'nin bu çalışması bir ilk, çünkü daha önce Türk şehit ve gazileri üzerine detaylı bir çalışma mevcut değil. ABD ordusunun kayıtları olmasa Türk esirler hakkında Genelkurmay arşivinde belli ki hemen hiçbir şey yok. **Ben Türk** kitabı kendi kaderlerine terk edilmiş, mektupları bile esir kamplarına gönderilmemiş, esaretten sonra değil tazminat, yolluklarını bile devletten alamamış insanlarımızın inanılmaz cesaret, disiplin ve dayanıklılık hikâyesi.

## Book Review

Nazan Aksoy, *Rönesans İngiltere'sinde Türkler*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004). ISBN 975-6857-82

Özlem Baykal<sup>1</sup>



Nazan Aksoy'un "*Rönesans İngiltere'sinde Türkler*" adlı eseri, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayınları tarafından 2004 yılında yayınlanmıştır. 131 sayfalık kitabın kapağında, *Pieter Coecke Van Aelst*'ın 1553 yılına ait *Haliç Gravürü*'nden bir ayrıntı bulunmaktadır. Bu eser genellikle, İngilizce ve Türkçe kaynaklar kullanılarak yazıldı. Altı bölümden oluşan, her bölümünde 16. yüzyıla ait resimlerin ve gravürlerin yer aldığı bu kitabın son sayfaları, kaynakçaya ve genel bir dizine ayrılmıştır.

Nazan Aksoy, 1950 yılında İstanbul'da doğmuştur. 1974'te İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü'nde lisans, 1982 yılında aynı bölümde doktora eğitimini tamamladı. 1984-2001 yılları arasında Marmara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi'nde görev yapan Aksoy, 2001'den bu yana İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat ve İngilizce Öğretmenliği bölümlerinde öğretim üyesi olarak çalışmaktadır. Yazarın çok sayıda ulusal ve uluslararası yayınlanan makalesi, kitap bölümleri ve çevirilerinin yanı sıra *Iris Murdoch: Sanatı ve Felsefesi* (1989), *Batı ve Başkaları*

(1996), *Kurgulanmış Benlikler: Otobiyografi, Kadın, Cumhuriyet* (2009) adlı eserleri de mevcuttur.

Kitabın giriş kısmında 16. yüzyıl, İngiltere'nin dış dünyaya açıldığı, İngilizlerin Türklerle münasebetinin başladığı dönem olarak ele alınmıştır. Kraliçe Elizabeth'in iktidarı sırasında Türk imgesinin ön plana alınmasıyla yazılan oyunlar ve edebi eserler incelenirken, özellikle oyunların içeriği ve taşıdığı anlam tarihsel bir çerçevede eleştirilir.

Birinci bölümde, 14. yüzyıldan itibaren Doğu dünyasında nüfuzlu bir devlet olarak varlık gösteren Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun *I. Murat* zamanında Balkanlar'da hâkimiyet kurması Avrupa için dikkat çekici bir gelişme şeklinde lanse edilir. Bununla birlikte 1453 yılında *Fatih Sultan Mehmet*'in İstanbul'u fethetmesi ve 16. yüzyılda *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman*'ın Avrupa'ya ilerleyişi, Batı nezdinde Osmanlı Devleti'nin İslam dünyasının temsilcisi olması incelenmektedir. Öte yandan Ortaçağ'dan Yeniçağ'a doğru Müslümanlara karşı yaklaşımların hangi açıdan değişime uğradığına yer verilirken, Müslümanların eleştirilerek daha çok Hristiyanlık zeminin güçlendirilmesi söz konusudur. 16. yüzyılda Avrupa, ekonomik ve askeri alanda zayıf bir durumdayken, Osmanlı Devleti toprak ve ordu sistemi açısından güçlü bir konumdadır. Dolayısıyla imparatorluğun fetihlerle hâkimiyet alanını genişlettiği, farklı etnik

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toplulukları da bünyesi altında barındırmaya başladığı, böylece bu gelişmelerin devleti hem Avrupa'dan hem de Arap ülkelerinden ayırdığı vurgulanır.

Kitabın ikinci bölümünde Osmanlı Devleti ile İngiltere arasındaki ilişkinin coğrafi mesafeden ötürü 16. yüzyıla kadar gelişme göstermediği, dolayısıyla bu durumun İngiltere'nin Avrupa'daki siyasi gelişmelerden de uzak kalmasına neden olduğuna vurgu yapılmıştır. Kraliçe I. Elizabeth dönemine kadar İngiltere'nin Akdeniz ticaretine kesin olarak giremeyişi, bu gecikmenin temel nedenleri arasında gösterilir. Nitekim Akdeniz limanlarının hâkimiyetini ele geçiren Osmanlı Devleti, İngiltere'deki mevcut ekonomik ve politik dengede birtakım değişiklikler yaratmıştır. Kraliçe döneminde söz konusu limanlarda ticarete başlayan İngiltere'nin Osmanlı Devleti ile kültürel, siyasi ve iktisadi anlamda yakınlaşması değerlendirilmiştir. Özellikle bu ilişkilerin III. Mehmet döneminde, 1601 yılında İngiltere'ye verilen *ahitnamenin* yenilenmesiyle süreklilik kazandı. Ayrıca İngiltere'de Protestanlığın yaygınlaşması ve bunun ticari ilişkilere ne şekilde tesir ettiği ele alınmaktadır.

Eserin üçüncü bölümünde, 16. yüzyılda İngiltere'de Türklerin konu edildiği tarih kitapları incelenir. Bu eserlerden yola çıkarak, I. Elizabeth döneminde İngiltere'de Türklere olan ilginin yüksek bir derecede varlık gösterdiğine işaret edilmiştir. Söz konusu eserlerde Osmanlı Devleti'nin ordusu, siyaseti, ekonomisi, yaşam tarzı ve toplumsal yapısının ele alındığı belirtilmektedir. Aksoy bu eserler arasında karşılaştırmalar yaparak, kaynakların nitelikleri ve içerikleri hakkında detaylı bilgilere ulaşılmasına olanak sağlar.

Dördüncü bölümde ise 16. yüzyılda Türkler hakkında bilgilerin geçtiği, seyahatnameler ele alınmıştır. Söz konusu döneme ait seyahatnameler, kısmen dini kısmen ise edebi özellik taşır. Osmanlı Devleti'ni ziyaret eden elçiler tarafından, Avrupa'ya resmi ve ticari raporların yanı sıra devletin sosyal yaşantısı ve dini yapısı hakkında kapsamlı bilgiler servis edildi. Bu yüzyılda gezginler, tarihçiler ve edebiyatçılar benzer konulara eğilim göstermişlerdir. Söz konusu zümreler, Osmanlı Devleti'nin ordu sistemi üzerinde yoğunlaşmanın yanı sıra hukuk, inanç ve toplum düzenini de incelediler. Öte yandan I. Elizabeth'in Padişah III. Mehmet'e *Thomas Dallam* tarafından yapılan orgu armağan etmesine, dolayısıyla Hristiyan bir kraliçenin Müslüman bir hükümdara jestte bulunmasına dikkat çekilmektedir.

Kitabın beşinci bölümünde, 16. yüzyıl İngiliz Edebiyatında yer bulan Türklerle ilgili oyunlara değinilmiştir. Kraliçe Elizabeth döneminde Christopher Marlow'un Türkler hakkında yazılmış en önemli oyunu *Tamburlaine*, detaylı bir biçimde incelenmektedir. Özellikle tarih kitaplarından yararlanılarak yazılan beş perdelik bu oyunun başkahramanları olan *Tamburlaine Timurlenk*, *Bajazeth* ise *Yıldırım Bayezid* ile özdeşleştirilir. *Tamburlaine*, Türkleri savaşlarda yenilgiye uğratan ve Hristiyanların gerçek dostu olarak lanse edilir. Aksoy, söz konusu oyunda 1402'de gerçekleşen Ankara Savaşı'nı 16. yüzyılda yaşanmış gibi canlandırıldığına dikkat çekerek, eserin anakronik bir özellik taşıdığını vurgulamaktadır. Öte yandan ele alınan bir diğer konu ise Christopher Marlow'un *The Jew of Malta* isimli oyunudur. Bu oyunda Hristiyanlar tarafından tutsak edilen *Selim Calymath*'in ana kahraman şeklinde sahnelendiği ve Türk kimliğinin dolaylı olarak Makyavelizm ile bütünleştirildiği belirtilmektedir. Ayrıca *Robert Greene*'in *The Tragical Reign of Selimus* adlı oyununda *Bajazeth* yani *II. Yıldırım Bayezid*'in yerine tahta geçmek için mücadele eden *Yavuz Sultan Selim*'in yani *Selimus*'un zorba ve inançsız olarak tanımlanmasının analizi yapılır. Aksoy, *Thomas Kyd* tarafından yazılan *Soliman and Perseda* isimli oyunda ise *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman* döneminde gerçekleşen olayların kronolojinin göz ardı edilerek, Ortaçağ esintileri çerçevesinde anakronik bir biçimde sahnelendiğini ifade etmektedir. *Robert Greene* tarafından tek bölüm halinde yazılan, *The Comicall Historie of Alphonsus, King of Argon*'u adlı eserde ise Türk saltanatını ele geçiren, sultanı ve haremını tutsak eden bir karakter varlık gösterir. Oyunun içeriği, *Tamburlaine*'dan

taklit edilerek hazırlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda Tamburlaine tarafından yenilgiye uğratılan Türk karakteri, neredeyse dönemin her oyununda varlık gösterir.

Eserin altıncı bölümünde ise Ortaçağ'dan Rönesans'a doğru değişen Türk imgesi analiz edilmektedir. Önceki yüzyıllara göre 16. yüzyılda Türklere karşı tek tip bir yaklaşım sergilenmediği, bu algının aynı zamanda İngiliz edebiyatına da yansıdığı vurgulanır. Aksoy, Rönesans dönemine ait tiyatro oyunlarında Türk karakterinin hem olumlu hem de olumsuz yönleriyle sahnelendiğini, dolayısıyla bu oyunlarda Türklerin *iyi/olumlu* veya *kötü/olumsuz* kavramlarıyla tanıtıldığını ifade eder. 16. yüzyılda Türk kimliğinin ve varlığının Avrupa kıtası ve İngiltere için tehlike arz ettiği belirtilir. Zira dönemin tarihçileri ve seyyahları tarafından hazırlanan birçok eserde, Türklerin olumsuz nitelikleri üzerinde yoğunlaşmaları ele alınmıştır. Aksoy, söz konusu reaksiyonun görülmesini Osmanlı Devleti'nin savaşlarda galip bir pozisyonda olmasına bağlamaktadır. Nitekim edebi eserlerde ve oyunlarda tek tip bir Türk imajından ziyade değişkenlik gösteren, imgeler yoluyla yansıtılan bir karakter anlatılır.

16. yüzyıl İngiltere'sinde Türklere karşı değişen algı siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal alanlara da yansımıştır. Diğer yandan Kraliçe Elizabeth'in sanata verdiği önemin izlenimlerine bu kitapta sıkça rastlanmaktadır. Elizabeth çağında yazılan eserlerde ve oyunlarda dikkat çeken nokta, Türk stereotipine genişçe yer verilmesi ve Türklük imgesinin yoğun bir şekilde işlenmesidir. Bu oyunlarda sıkça vurgulanan parola, Nazan Aksoy'un da altını çizdiği üzere Türklüğün İslamiyet ile özdeşleştirilmesidir. Nitekim Avrupalı-Türk kimliği, Hristiyanlık-İslamiyet inancı doğrultusunda ön plana çıkarılmıştır. Dönemin konjonktürüne bağlı olarak, Osmanlı Devleti'nin yükseliş çağını yaşaması ve İngiltere ile Akdeniz liman ticareti sayesinde başlayan etkileşimi, diplomatik ilişkilerle devam etmiştir. Dolayısıyla bu dönemde Türk dünyasında vücut bulan her reaksiyonun özellikle İngiliz edebiyatına ve tiyatro oyunlarına yansıtılması, sanatın diplomatik süreçlerden ne kadar etkilendiğini bir kez daha kanıtlar niteliktedir. Bu bağlamda 16. yüzyılda Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerinin boyutu ve İngiliz dünyasında Türk imajının nasıl yorumlandığı sorusuna cevap veren bu eser, hem edebiyat hem de tarih disiplinleri için önemli bir başvuru kaynağıdır.



*Elizabeth Tudor (I. Elizabeth)*, 1533'te İngiltere Kralı VIII. Henry ve ikinci eşi Anne Boleyn'in kızları olarak dünyaya geldi. Gerilimlerle dolu bir çocukluk geçirdikten sonra, 17 Kasım 1558'de İngiltere Kraliçesi olarak taç giymiştir. Elizabeth hükümdarlığı sırasında, İngiltere'de mezhep çatışmalarına ılımlı bir yaklaşım göstererek, Protestanlığın yaygınlaşması konusunda taraftar bir duruş sergiledi. Öte taraftan Kraliçe, Latince, Yunanca, Fransızca ve İtalyanca konuşabilmenin yanı sıra, oldukça entelektüel bir kişiliğe de sahiptir. Genellikle barışı korumakla ön plana çıkan I. Elizabeth, ülkesinde güzel sanatların geliştiği bir ortam yarattı. İngiltere'de bu refah yılları, *Altın Çağ* olarak anılmıştır. Müziğe ve ud çalmaya olan ilgisinin yanında, dans etmeyi ve tiyatro izlemeyi seven Kraliçe, saltanatı boyunca *William Shakespeare* ve *Christopher Marlowe* gibi sanatçıların üretkenliğini destekledi. Diğer yandan portre çizim sanatının 16. yüzyılda yaygınlaşmasıyla birlikte birçok ressam sanatı önemseyen Kraliçe'nin portresini çizerek, onu onurlandırmak istemiştir.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bu eserlerden yola çıkarak, Kraliçe Elizabeth'in birçok yönden çağın ilk modacıları olduğunu belirtmek mümkündür. Aksesuarlara ve kıyafetlere yoğun bir ilgi gösteren I. Elizabeth'in giysileri, genellikle altından ve gümüşten yapılmıştır. <https://www.biography.com/royalty/queen-elizabeth-i> Erişim Tarihi 27/04/2020.

Diğer taraftan Kraliçe Elizabeth'in saltanatının son yıllarına, kıtlık, işsizlik ve enflasyon gibi iç sorunlar damgasını vurdu. Dolayısıyla söz konusu sorunlar, ülkede bazı isyanların görülmesine zemin hazırladı. Yaşanılan ekonomik ve siyasi problemlere rağmen I. Elizabeth, büyük ölçüde halkını destekleyen bir Kraliçe olarak hatırlanmaktadır. Diplomatik bir zekâyâ sahip olması, onun politik, dini ve sosyal alanlarda var olan kriz anlarını yönetmesine imkân tanımıştır. Bütün zamanını ülkesini yönetmeye adayın Kraliçe'nin halkıyla evli bir yönetici imajı sergilemesi, günümüze kadar "*Bakire Kraliçe*" olarak anılmasına etki eder. İngiliz tahtında 44 yıl boyunca hüküm süren I. Elizabeth, 24 Mart 1603'te Surrey'deki *Richmond Sarayı*'nda hayatını kaybetti.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> I. Elizabeth'in yönetimi sırasında İskoç Kraliçesi Mary, İngiliz tacına hak iddia etmiştir. Kraliçe Mary eşinin ölümünden sonra, 1561'de İskoçya'ya döndü. Kraliçe Elizabeth, kuzenini çeşitli suikast girişimleri nedeniyle suçlayarak, 1567'de hapsedirmiştir. Kraliçe Mary'nin yirmi yıl süren hapis cezası, 1587'de idam edilmesiyle sonuçlandı. Claire Price-Groff, *Queen Elizabeth I*, (San Diego: Lucent Books, 2001), pp. 80-100; <https://www.biography.com/royalty/queen-elizabeth-i> Erişim Tarihi 27/04/2020.