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Dear Readers,

In Volume 2 Issue 2 of the Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations, we have seven research articles, two evaluations, two interviews, and two books reviews.

In the first article, Nur Bilge CRISS analyses Anglo-Turkish relations during the period of 1914-1939 in the context of the politics of war, its aftermath, peace-making, and peacebuilding through portraits of public influencers, decision makers and diplomats. She concludes that, as with the Eastern Question in the past, identity politics of the present are unlikely to be of any benefit to security issues.

Brexit and its effect on Anglo-Turkish relations are the focus of the second article, by Görkem ALTINÖRS and Yaprak GÜRSOY. The authors evaluate elements of continuity and possibilities for change and suggest there is potential to strengthen these relations. However, both sides need to be willing to engage with Europe and each other as they develop realistic expectations of their future relations.

In the third article, Nihan AKINCILAR KÖSEOĞLU adopts a constructivist approach to analyse the identity formation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot diasporas living in the UK. She asks whether or not the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities could be defined as a single Cypriot community; and, if so, whether such a definiton could bring about a change in the attitude toward unification in Cyprus.

Emine Tutku VARDAĞLI analyses the impact of the Lausanne Treaty on British colonial rule in the the fourth article. She argues that the Lausanne Treaty constitutes an early and critical stage in the move towards decolonization, which is generally regarded as a post-Second World War phenomenon.

In the fifth article, Harumi ARAI discusses the continuous and changing aspects of Turkish foreign policy, state identity and the ruling elite. She suggests that the change in the identity of Turkey's ruling elite and its effect on the foreign policy of the country could lead to a change in the identity of the state itself.

The sixth article, by Mehmet TUNCER, presents a unique aspect of the connections between UK and Turkey. He argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has forced us to reconsider the characteristics of urban life. As a possible solution, he suggests that the 19th-century British "Garden City" concept could provide a model for future urban planning, using Ankara as a specific context.

Last, but most certainly not least, in the seventh article, Ulvi KESER discusses the radio broadcasting activities on Cyprus between 1939 and 1963, based in interviews with the women who constituted a significant ratio of the broadcasting personnel.

We hope you enjoy this collection of works that we have brought together in this issue, and we look forward to meeting you again with the next issue.

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20 June 2021
JATR Editorial Team

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Portraits from War to Peace: Britain and Turkey (1914-1939)

Nur Bilge Criss[1]

Abstract

The purpose of this article is threefold. One is to address an age-old foreign policy framework that shaped Anglo-Turkish relations prior to and in the aftermath of World War I (WWI). Namely, how the Eastern Question came to bear on the ideational level and in practice in Anglo-Ottoman/Turkish relations. Secondly, punitive peace conditions were imposed on the Central Powers under the unprecedented demand for unconditional surrender. Victors did not take into consideration the possibility of resistance, let alone armed resistance from the defunct Ottoman Empire whose core territories, including its capital were under Allied occupation. A state of war continued until a negotiated peace was concluded in 1924. Peace-making was formalized in 1920, but mainly in terms dictated by the Allies. Hence, a state of war continued until resistance prevailed in 1924. The third aspect of the saga was peacebuilding. European conjuncture of the 1930s forced London and Ankara, by then the capital of the Republic of Turkey, to mend fences albeit reluctantly for the former, but facilitated by diplomats. Consequently, inspired by the English poet Alexander Pope that "the proper study of mankind is man,"[2] this article analyses the politics of war, its aftermath, peace-making, and peacebuilding through portraits of public influencers, decision makers and diplomats who were practitioners of policy. Inherent during this timeframe is how assumptions about their political future resonated on their Turkish interlocutors.

Key Words: Edwin Pears, Nathaniel Curzon, Percy Loraine, peace-making, peacebuilding

Introduction

This article begins with exploring concepts embedded in imperialism and how they became instrumental in political/diplomatic platforms. Form a broad perspective; by 1870 two major national unifications were completed, of Germany and Italy as late comers into the world order. Great power competition became sharper on the world scale with rapid industrialization, urbanization, financial controls, and militarization.

At the same time, general staffs were established whose major function was to prepare war plans on geopolitical assumptions. Strategic interests based on geopolitics were professionalized. Colonialism had been a major aspect of building empires in the case of Britain and France. Colonies also enhanced the economic/financial status of kingdoms such as Belgium and Italy. Contiguous empires of the Habsburgs, Ottomans, and Romanovs on the other hand, represented ancient régimes with the oldest dynastic lines in Europe and the Near East even when they transformed into constitutional monarchies. The major reason for this is because all three

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[2] Alexander Pope (1688-1744) "An Essay on Man: Epistles I-VI", Retrieved from http://www.poetryfoundation.org, May 15, 2021.

remained autocratic, although domestically the dose of authoritarian impositions differed both spatially and temporally.

The concept that lurked behind the initial western approach to the Ottoman Empire was the Eastern Question. In the first place, the article discusses this concept and its development first into interference, then to clash. Secondly, it analyses the Great War and its immediate aftermath through peace-making. Thirdly, it discusses peacebuilding in the 1930s culminating in the 1939 Mutual Military Assistance Agreement between Britain, France, and Turkey. In Brock Millman's words, it was an ill-made alliance.[3] The Conclusion points to how arduous a relationship the Anglo-Turkish encounters had been, given systemic changes in international relations and actors. Salient changes had been established with the 1648 Westphalia Agreements, then the Concert of Europe system in the post-Napoleonic age until the 1848 revolutions. With the new generation of actors, a different leadership profile emerged. Leaders now overtly projected imperial nationalisms in contrast to collective security. Rivalries toward becoming a "great nation" paved the road to total war. By the early 20th century, balance of power, the principle once dear to the Concert was abandoned and Europe succumbed to prolonged violence.

In the aftermath of war, the only policy tool left over from the old system was to partition territories of adversaries. All belligerents had expected the war to be of short duration, but not only did it last for four years. It played havoc on demography with unnecessary slaughter in trench warfare and British blockade of non-contraband (especially foodstuffs) which affected civilian populations. Civil wars and ethnic cleaning ensued as empires "shattered"[4] maps were re-drawn. And lastly, war did not end with the Armistice in November of 1918 for Eastern Europe, Russia, China, or the Ottomans, while socialist revolutionary attempts flourished in Germany and Italy. What followed was hardly a new world system, but a fragile truce until the next world war, perhaps because the League of Nations (LN) which was established to become an international body symbolizing supra governance, turned into the guardian of the old system of colonization, now politely termed "mandates". However, LN served as a platform where member states could at least seek and sometimes find solutions to ill-founded circumstances which were spill over effects of WWI.[5]

The Eastern Question, La Question D'Orient, La Questione Turca

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[3] Brock Millman, *The Ill-Made Alliance, Anglo-Turkish Relations 1939-1940,* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).

[4] Michael A. Reynolds, *The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[5] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians, The League of Nations, and the Crisis of Empire,* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

By the 19th century, the axis of the Eastern question shifted from how it was problematized in the previous century. Initially, French political writers had defined the problem case as Poland. Accordingly, two major threats emanated from Poland. One was indefensible borders, and the other was Prussia, Austria, and Russia's potential to resort to war with one another over Polish territory which would upset the balance of power in Europe, a major concept introduced by the Westphalian system. The solution to the problem came by partitioning Poland starting in 1792 between those three states whereby peace in Europe was maintained.

Although the system was flexible and at times inclusive of those who were not legally part of European public law as was the case with the Ottoman Empire. The Porte was included in alliances during the Napoleonic Wars, British concern for Ottoman security vis-à-vis Russia, as in the case of the Crimean War (1853-1856). Ottoman diplomats were constantly perturbed that their realm might be next in line for partition by the Great Powers and all efforts were directed towards preventing such outcome. They were not mistaken, because by mid-19th century political literature in Britain and France specifically began to discuss the Eastern Question with a focus on the Ottoman Empire.[6]

However late in coming, the Ottomans were legally admitted into the system to partake in European public law with the 1856 Paris Peace Agreement. "…Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Sardinia, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, on the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians on the other part, as well as between their heirs and successors…"[7] sealed the agreement for peace and friendship as well as guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. There was a note added under the title of the treaty that stated, "treaty of peace unilaterally abrogated by the Sublime Porte, 13 November 1916." While this was a note for the record, the Paris Treaty had been rendered null and void with the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War. The times had changed and all the signatories to the Paris Peace Treaty watched while Russian armies decimated the Turks on the Balkan and Caucasian fronts. The toll was heavy not only because of territorial and human losses (Balkan provinces were lost in entirety save for Macedonia). It was also heavy in economic terms,

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[6] A. L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923,* (London and New York: Longman Ltd. [1989], 1996): 1-4; Edouard Drialut, *La Question D'Orient: Depuis Ses Origines Jusq'a Nos Jours,* (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Bailliere, 1898).

[7] J.C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and Africa in World Politics, 1535-1914, A Documentary Record,* Vol. I (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975): 319-322.

pushing the Empire to bankruptcy and foreign financial control by 1881.[8] The burden of economic and judiciary capitulations was doubled with the establishment of Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye).

When the Eastern Question is divided into its constituent parts in ideational and operational terms, the outcome is apparent even with a rudimentary glance at war aims and matching changes in areas of occupation and re-drawn maps. In WWI, articulations by writers and statesmen were operationalized by practitioners. Issues in question involved partition of the Ottoman Empire, control of the Turkish Straits, the future of Constantinople,[9] recovery of the Holy Lands and colonize the Near East between the Allies.

Sir Edwin Pears (1835-1919) was a lawyer and man of letters who had settled in Istanbul in 1873. He practiced in consular courts, was judge of the Admiralty and President of the European bar there as well as being a correspondent to The Daily News. His articles appeared in journals of high circulation such as The Contemporary Review. Pears authored several historical books about Turkey, the most renowned among which are Forty Years in Constantinople: The Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, published in 1906 and Turkey and Its People, published in 1911. It is significant that these books are still available reproduced in digital format. Hence, his observations and political interpretations were highly relevant to war aims from the British perspective.

Pears initially had a favourable impression about the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) government, especially about Talât Bey, Minister of the Interior (1874-1921). In an article entitled "Turkey and the War" he traces swings from neutrality to pro-war groups in the government during the fateful months from August to October 1914 and rushed to highlight a sharp division between the civilian and military sectors. Yet, he also discussed the growing number of German military and civilian (engineers and technicians) personnel. In reference to the German instigated jihad,[10] followed by the German Embassy propaganda that all Muslims would follow the lead and rise against England, Pears wrote, "But the final blow came when the

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[8] Jeremy Salt, *The Last Ottoman Wars, the Human Cost, 1877-1923,* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2019): 20-21.

[9] "Constantinople" and "Istanbul" are used interchangeably in this article for the sake of convenience although the city was not formally named Istanbul until 1934. While the Ottoman statesmen also used the Turkified version of Constantinople, Konstantinniye, the Muslim populace frequently referred to the city as Der-i Saadet (Abode of Happiness), Dâr-ı Devlet (the Gate of State), Âsitane (the Treshold) or Dârü'l Islam (the Abode of Islam) among other endearments.

[10] Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express, The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power,* (London: Penguin Books, 2010): 85-99.

Committee of the Islamic League of All India urged all Moslem States not to be caught up in the whirlwind of the great war, and counselled Turkey to remain neutral."[11]

Pears`s hopes were dashed by the end of October when the Ottoman fleet, led by two German dreadnaughts Goeben and Breslau under Admiral Wilhelm Souchon's orders, bombarded Russian port cities and Turkey was at war. All the pressure that the British Ambassador Sir Louis Mallet (1864-1936) exerted upon the CUP government to remain neutral was for naught.[12] Mallet was given credit for having gained time for the Allies to transport forces to Egypt's borders and reinforce the division of Iran between England and Russia. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention not only had ended rivalry between the two in Central Asia. It also facilitated to outflank Germans who concentrated on building the Berlin-Baghdad railway which strategically aligned the Ottoman Empire with Germany, not to mention that Berlin had gained an upper hand on trade with the former as opposed to England. Moreover, Kaiser Wilhelm II's (r. 1888-1918) policy of "peaceful penetration" was welcomed by Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) because Istanbul was isolated diplomatically as well as militarily by the European Great Powers, who made inroads to Ottoman territories by military force (Egypt) and/or gave overt support to seceding Balkan nationalities. Consequently, Abdülhamid's nemesis, the CUP governments realized that they had little choice other than to follow in his footsteps.[13]

In December 1914, Emile Joseph Dillon (1854-1933), journalist, author, and linguist, was to write a scathing article which criticized Pears's overly optimistic views expressed previously.[14] Dillon blamed German intrigues and specifically Enver Pasha (1881-1922), the Minister of War, who accordingly was a person of "Polish extract" and a "puppet of Germans" for the Ottoman entry to war. He stated, "Only a miracle could save it now, and neither God nor Devil has any motive to work one for the Young Turks, whose main characteristics is invincible stupidity… The Young Turks have achieved an immortality of opprobrium and will be pilloried in history for all time."[15] Dillon was convinced that the CUP had betrayed its friends without taking into consideration Russian policies towards taking over Constantinople for total control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. In essence, it seemed that the Ottoman capital was no longer defensible from land and sea and as war progressed, it also became vulnerable to fledgling air

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[11] Edwin Pears, "Turkey and the War", *The Contemporary Review,* No. 587 (November 1914): 584-597, 590.

[12] Joseph Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War," *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (1976): 3-44.

[13] İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu,* (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018).

[14] E. J. Dillon, "Turkish Neutrality": Credo Quia. Impossible", *The Contemporary Review,* No. 588 (December 1914): 48-66.

[15] Dillon, "Turkish Neutrality", 52.

power.[16] Towards the end of the 19th century, the Eastern Question specifically targeted Istanbul, and the threat it posed to European peace so long as it remained in Turkey's hands. The ideas put forth, by now in obscure journals and were almost realized on Istanbul's fate as well as the Russian factor in drawing the CUP into WWI have been side-lined perhaps because access to most archives was not possible until later in the 20th century. Yet, approaches towards foreign management of the imperial capital, by Russia alone signalled the end of empire which the Turks did not take lightly. In fact, the response was serious enough to participate in WWI. Another reason to do so and just as significant as the Russian threat was to abrogate the judicial and financial capitulations on the eve of war, albeit unilaterally. Payments on Ottoman debt to European powers were put under moratorium.

Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924[17]

The seat of the Greek Orthodox Church and Islam by virtue of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, protector, and servant of the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina, cosmopolitan and imperial by heritage at the same time, yet strategically inviting Great Power rivalries over itself, Mansel's book title is an apt depiction of the city. If only one looks at a timeline map of Ottoman Turkey and its capital, it can be observed that while the imperial capital was positioned in the middle of the Ottoman realm at the height of its power in the 16th century, the borders gradually receded in the following centuries. By the end of the 19th century, this recession came dangerously close to the borders of the city. So much so that in the Balkan Wars of 1912, Bulgarian army reached the suburbs of Istanbul, only to halt because of cholera and typhus which rendered its ranks immovable. Otherwise, the Bulgarians were ready to take the city which they called Tsargrad by storm.

The disastrous Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 and ensuing Berlin Peace Treaty had already torn large tracts from the Ottoman Balkans. During the war, the Porte considered to move the capital to inner Anatolia as a transitory precaution. However, the idea of moving the capital also got hold of some political actors. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843-1916) who was employed by the Ottomans to reorganize and train the army between 1883 and 1895 was one of them. He was recalled from retirement in 1914 and in 1915 returned to Turkey as military aide to Sultan Mehmed Reşad (r. 1909-1918). But just like he had suggested in 1897 that the Ottoman capital should be moved to Konya or Kayseri in inner Anatolia, after the Balkan Wars he wrote

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[16] Emin Kurt ve Mesut Güvenbaş, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul'a Yapılan Hava Saldırıları,* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018).

[17] Philip Mansel, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924,* (London: St. Martin's Press [1995] 1997).

that the capital should be moved to Aleppo or Damascus. Having lost most of its territories in the Balkans, Goltz projected that the Ottoman Empire would become a Turkish-Arab Empire just like the Habsburg Empire which had become the Austria-Hungarian Empire in 1864.[18] Strategically and culturally this arrangement was the most expedient solution. Goltz Pasha was discreet enough not to suggest who he had in mind to control Istanbul, hence the Straits.

To curb Russian influence among the Balkan peoples, European Great Powers had internationalized the Macedonian uprisings and endless internecine warfare through interference and imposition of reforms under their supervision and inspector/administrators as of 1902. The British Ambassador Nicholas O'Connor and Austrian Ambassador Baron Heinrich von Calice drew a working program that would make these provinces almost autonomous. Consequently, the six provinces (Vilâyât-ı Selâse), namely Edirne (Adrianopolis), Yanya (Jannina), İşkodra (Scutari), Selânik (Salonica), Manastır (Monastir), and Kosova (Kosovo) were to be practically administered by Europeans while their salaries were to be paid by the Ottomans. The First Balkan War in 1912 severed all these territories from the Ottoman Empire.[19] Edirne, the first Ottoman capital, was recovered during the Second Balkan War (1913) when the belligerents went to war with one another for the spoils, but its status was once again in question until after the Greco-Turkish proxy war of 1920-1922.

The Russian factor, though lurked behind, carried the old Eastern Question diplomatically to the north and practically to the east of Istanbul until WWI. In 1915-1916 Sir Edwin Pears was to put forward his final suggestions about applying law and order in European Turkey and the capital city. But before that, a discussion may be in order as to why the CUP government joined the belligerents by attacking Russian Black Sea ports as well as engaged Russians in the Caucasian front (Sarıkamış campaign) in winter conditions. Hence, although historiography both in England and Turkey emphasized, judged, and accused the CUP government in general, and Enver Pasha and Talât Pasha in particular, for blindly following German war policies, little attention was given to reasons of their own (raison d'etat) to resort to war. That is, until a new generation of scholars began to reveal what the Young Turk war aims were, when

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[18] Bilâl N. Şimşir, "Ankara'nın Başkent Oluşu", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi,* Vol. 7, 20, (1991): 189-222.

[19] For a comprehensive background study of Macedonian issues, see İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Russian/Ottoman archives became available.[20] Was there any public support? An incisive article by Mustafa Aksakal, "Not 'by those old books of international law, but only by war': Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War"[21] shows that there was also support from the civilian side. In 1914, an American missionary reported that the Turks were discussing whether to join the war now would not be a good opportunity to end foreign controls.[22]

The first step was unilateral abrogation of the capitulations in September which Talât Pasha announced to all foreign ambassadors after it was obvious from previous discussions that the powers would not negotiate on this matter. The second step would be to deal with the Russian threat through war. Sean McMeekin wrote that Russian concern for the Serbs against Austria was deceptive, plausibly to hide their major war aim, possession of Constantinople and expansion to the Near East. In October 1914, Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, Mikhail Nikolayevich Giers (Girs) wrote to Count Trubetskoi, Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Near Eastern Affairs Department, "We need a strong boss ruling over Constantinople, and since we cannot let any other power to assume this role, we must take her for ourselves. For us to do this without waging war on Turkey would, of course, be impossible."[23] Three months prior to this correspondence, Russian Chief of the General Staff (CGS) General Nikolai Nikolaevich Yanushkevich (1868-1918) had mobilized troops on the Caucasian borders with Turkey in July 1914. On the diplomatic front, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov (1860-1927) had already made demands of allies on Constantinople.[24] It was surprising that his British and French counterparts were surprised. The CUP government was probably informed of Russian troop movements on the Caucasian border since that is where the Ottoman army attacked next to meet the Russian challenge.

It is remarkable in his consistency that as wars were raging in multiple fronts by 1916 that Sir Edwin Pears was still doggedly making plans for the future of Constantinople and sharing them with the public. While the Gallipoli Wars were ongoing between the Allies and Turks (March 18, 1915-January 9, 1916); while trench warfare was claiming extremely high numbers of German and French youth; and while civil unrest had begun in Russia because of insistence upon

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[20] Mehmet Emin Elmacı, *İttihat Terakki ve Kapitülasyonlar,* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2005); Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press/Belknap, 2011): 98-140.

[21] Mustafa Aksakal, *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004): 507-544.

[22] George F. Herrick, "The Turkish Crisis and American Interests", *American Review of Reviews,* 50 (October 1914): 475-476, quoted in Nur Bilge Criss, "İstanbul'da İşgal Günleri" in *100. Yılında İstanbul'un İşgal Günleri,* ed. Bülent Ulus, (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür AŞ, 2020): 19-101, 54.

[23] Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins*, 98.

[24] McMeekin, *The Russian Origins,* 101.

continuing the war despite tremendous losses to Germany in terms of manpower and famine at home; while British blockade of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, and eastern Mediterranean was playing havoc on civilian populations; and lastly, as the secret Sazonov-Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916 partitioned Anatolia and the rest of the Near East, Pears gave an interview to New York Times on December 17, 1916. The newspaper headline read, "A Russian Constantinople will Mean More War." Given the chronology, Pears might have had an inkling about the secret Constantinople Agreement (1915) and if this were the case, both Pears and London might have had second thoughts about the promise of Constantinople to Tsar Nicholas II just to keep him at war with Germany despite horrific loss. Or Pears, a master of English understatement, used such rhetoric to promote the idea of neutralized Constantinople for the sake of peace then and the future as he saw fit.

Accordingly, Pears drew four scenarios for Istanbul's future. One, it may be left to the Turks under the strict control of Germans. Secondly, it may be occupied by Russia. Thirdly, it could become the capital of a small but internationalized state surrounding the Marmara Sea, Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits. Lastly, it may be left to the Turks as now. The crux of the issue, however, as Pears asked was whether Turks will be allowed to retain Constantinople. The longer version of this interview which appeared in Contemporary Review emphasized neutralization as the solution and recommended that Russia and Bulgaria should be convinced to keep their "hands off" Constantinople. The "peace loving" Tsar Nicholas II would surely acquiesce to governance of Constantinople and its environs by a European Commission.[25] He also advised Russians to channel their energies towards Central Asia and work on "civilizing those savages" instead of concentrating on the Balkans and Near East. Pears passed in 1919, but his idea, Istanbul neutralized, Istanbul a free state, Istanbul governed by commission plausibly had some impact on British Foreign Secretary Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925) who served between 1919 and 1924 in that capacity.[26] Although Curzon had no problems about detaching Istanbul from Turkey, he did not accede to the idea of landing a Greek army in Smyrna (İzmir). Istanbul was another matter, but letting Greeks loose on the Anatolian heartlands would certainly bring about serious resistance on the part of the Turks and make peace impossible. Besides, the Greeks were too weak to control Asian Turkey. Partitioning the Ottoman Empire was a foregone conclusion. But partitioning Turkey's heartland was not sustainable policy. However, Curzon

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[25] Edwin Pears, "The Future of Constantinople", *Contemporary Review,* Vol. XCI (1916): 374-379.
[26] David Gilmour, *Curzon, Imperial Statesman 1859-1925,* (London: John Murray, 1994).

was not able to override Prime Minister Lloyd George (PM 1916-1922) who intensely disliked the Turks.[27]

Armistice and Peace Making: On Whose Terms? (1918-1923)

"The Great War" said Margaret MacMillan, "was nobody's fault or everybody's."[28] While it seemed too easy to go to war, and all belligerents had legitimate reasons one way or the other, the victors to be believed justified in rejecting US President Woodrow Wilson's mediation efforts in 1917 to secure an armistice. Too much blood had been spilled to bring an end through mediation. Consequently, historiography of the war abounded with pointing fingers at the "guilty" parties until well into the 1960s until historians began to look at the catastrophe critically from the inside out instead of the outside in. Since then, this became a strong trend toward and during the war's centenary.[29]

Peace-making and peacebuilding at the end of WWI, however, had different connotations for the United Nations that was organized after WWII where peacekeeping and later conflict resolution were introduced as peace issues became a serious academic line of scholarship.[30] That said, during the timeframe under this study, peace-making meant direct peace enforcement and peacebuilding meant enhancing a culture of peace, left to preventive diplomacy. Though the latter approach remains with the UN, an added aspect to the terminology is that disagreements and tensions be resolved without resorting to pre-UN style violence – theoretically, but only manageable if there is political will.[31]

Be that as it may, peace enforcement came upon the Ottomans with the Mudros Armistice of October 31, 1918, when they sued for peace after the Bulgarians (the archenemy of Ottomans during the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria had become an ally in WWI) capitulated to the Allies.

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[27] David Gilmour, *Curzon, Imperial Statesman,* 528-548.

[28] Margaret MacMillan, *The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1919,* (New York: Random House, 2013): xxxv.

[29] Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August,* (New York and Ontario: The Macmillan Press, 1962); David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace,* (New York: Henry Holt, 1989); Margaret MacMillan, *Six Months that Changed the World: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War,* (London: John Murray, 2001); Jeremy Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands,* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2009); Adam Hochschild, *To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011); Laila Tarazi Fawaz, *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East,* (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

[30] Nimet Beriker and D. Drucker, "Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining", *Simulation and Gaming,* Vol. 27, No. 2, (1996): 162-183.

[31] See UN website on Peace and Security, https://www. un.org.

Hostilities were supposedly to end as of that date and all military action was to stop. But it did not. The British and French contingents proceeded to occupy key cities in south-eastern Anatolia such as Antep and Maraş as well as Cilicia[32] where they faced armed resistance from local militia. Second, but just as significant were terms of unconditional surrender, so much so that although it is difficult to determine precisely when empires fall, many scholars in Turkey point to the date Armistice was signed. Unconditional surrender is described as "a surrender in which no guarantees are given to the surrendering party…Announcing that only unconditional surrender is acceptable puts psychological pressure on a weaker adversary but may also prolong hostilities."[33] The Ottoman Empire legally survived on paper until November 1, 1922, when the sultanate was abrogated by the National Assembly of Ankara.

Either way, the state of war continued until a peace agreement was signed, but the state of war continued although the dictated, non-negotiated Treaty of Sèvres was signed in 1920. I have written elsewhere why the state of war continued due to occupations, national resistance, and the proxy Greco-Turkish war (1920-1922). I also wrote about the subject from various perspectives previously.[34] An additional factor, however, should perhaps be taken into consideration. That is, a particular sabotage in Istanbul which may have served as a turning point in the tide of war between the British and Ottomans. In 1917, tons of ammunition, artillery, fresh troops, and train wagons to be sent to the Palestinian front were blown up while loading in Haydarpaşa train station. Whether it would have made a difference in the outcome of war if this force had reached Mesopotamia or not remains a matter of speculation. However, since war in the southern front has been clouded by the Lawrence of Arabia myth for so long that it may be high time to put issues in perspective.[35] No matter how destructive Lawrence's recruited Arab tribesmen and his own skill at detonation of dynamite on railroads and bridges, including attacking hospital trains that carried convalescent Turkish soldiers home, this was not policy, but a demonstration of sheer sadism as he gleefully describes his feats/services rendered and made public many years later. He certainly did legwork, but there is no indication that he was taken seriously or respected by British authorities in the Middle East because he was unruly and undependable.

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[32] Yücel Güçlü, "The Struggle for Mastery in Cilicia: Turkey, France, and the Ankara Agreement of 1921" *The International History Review,* Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 2001): 580-603.

[33] "Unconditional Surrender" https://www.en.wikipedia.org.

[34] Nur Bilge Criss, *Istanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923*, (Brill: Leiden, 1999); Criss, *100. Yılında İstanbul'un İşgal Günleri.*

[35] For a recent account on Lawrence, see Scott Anderson, *Lawrence In Arabia, War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East,* (New York: Doubleday, 2013).

Truer to life was the successful disruption by the British Military Intelligence, specifically the Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau, of German-Ottoman arms and men from reaching Mesopotamia in time to make any difference in that war theatre. Yigel Sheffy informs that "In September 1917 according to an account by the commander of the Royal Navy Aegean Squadron, a British controlled agent or agents, possibly from an EMSIB station in the Aegean, set fire to the central railway station at Haydar Pasha near Istanbul, destroying a major ammunition dump designed for Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) troops assembling in the Aleppo area in Syria for the counteroffensive in Mesopotamia."[36] On September 10, 1917 Jerusalem was handed over to General Allenby to prevent a potential destruction of the city. Holy Land to all belligerents, the fall of Jerusalem was celebrated in Vienna, church bells rang, members of the Parliament and ordinary people recited prayers of gratitude now that the city was taken from the Muslims.[37] Religious devotion and Christianity against Islam weighed stronger than the Habsburg alliance with the Ottomans. This was yet another dimension of the Eastern Question which had been articulated by Edouard Drialut in 1898 where La Question d'Orient was defined as the struggle between the Cross and Crescent.

Following the Allied occupation of the Capital city, the religious dimension once again became an issue when the future of Constantinople was in question. Philip Mansel, in the chapter entitled "Death of a Capital City"[38] referred to the British Foreign Secretary Curzon who said in a speech at the Paris Peace Conference that the Turks deserved a worse punishment than Germans. Referring to the Turks as the "plague" of Europe, the Foreign Secretary argued that, lest the sins of the East prove contagious, the Turks should not be allowed to rule Istanbul. He proposed an outmoded solution, that of a free city-state whereby the sultan/caliph would be moved to Konya or Bursa. The city would be run by an International Commission. The "plague" metaphor, according to Mansel, had directed Curzon to militant Christianity. During a speech he gave on behalf of Hellenism and Christianity, he stated that the 900 years-old church, St. Sophia should revert from a mosque to its origins. Greeks were jubilant. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Phanar stated that the Eastern Question would never be solved unless Constantinople became Greek. But then the Italians, part of Allied occupiers, argued that since St. Sophia had been built by a Roman Emperor, the church should become Catholic. Curzon did not resort to religiously

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[36] Yigel Sheffy, *British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918,* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998): 155-156.

[37] Emre Saral and İsmail Tosun Saral, *Türklerle Beraber, Osmanlı Cephelerindeki Avusturya-Macaristan Askeri Birlikleri, 1914-1918,* (İstanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2020): 31-32.

[38] Philip Mansel, *Constantinople, City of the World's Desire,* 380-384, Quoted in Nur Bilge Criss, *Constantinople 1918 Konstantiniyye*, ed. Ali Serim (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2015) English Preface, np.

coloured parlance again. He wanted to dismantle the city's image as the seat of Islam, but arguments from Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India (1917-1922), lest this policy should jeopardize British security in India due the Khilafat movement became a factor in Curzon's plans to tread cautiously.[39]

In the end, peace-making would ironically be imposed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1881-1938) and the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1923, in the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish wars. The 1923-1924 Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, alias the Lausanne Conference called by Curzon led to a negotiated peace. This situation was "extraordinary" even for the Foreign Secretary who supported peace, but a dictated one not a negotiated peace. Upholding British prestige to the extreme was no longer possible given that France and Italy had already abandoned the alliance, and their "associated ally" the USA's main concern was normalization so that trade could be resuscitated in accordance with Open Door policy.

Peace-making had proven as arduous as military confrontations, but peacebuilding would not be easy either. A sovereign and independent Republic of Turkey was recognized by the signatories, Great Powers of years past. However, reciprocity in diplomatic relations came slowly and reluctantly as it also involved moving embassies to the new capital Ankara. Mending fences politically became of utmost importance by the 1930s with radically changing conditions in Europe.

Peacebuilding between Britain and Turkey (1924-1939)

Perhaps the most important component of British representation in the Near East (in the Far East as well) next to military and civilian High Commissioners had been that of Dragomans. Fluent in foreign languages, dragomans managed affairs of the British communities in line with both judicial and financial capitulatory rights. A dragoman was also a highly skilled translator as well as provider of intelligence of relevance who counselled diplomats. Now that the capitulations were formally abrogated with the Lausanne Treaty, that office had to be closed.[40] The second matter of significance was the status of the representative of His Majesty's Government and abode.

"It had also long been assumed by some in London that the lower-ranking legation, headed by a mere minister, would be the proper vehicle for British representation in the shrunken and

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[39] Hazal Papuççular, "For the Defense of the British Empire: Edwin Montagu and the Turkish Peace Settlement in a Transnational Context", *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations,* Vol. 1 No. 2 (June 2020): 30-42.

[40] Andrew Ryan, *The Last of the Dragomans*, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951).

hostile Turkey which had emerged from the war."[41] However, in 1925 when the French and Italians announced that they were going to appoint ambassadors to Turkey, London joined them with the caveat that ambassadors reside in Constantinople. Barring physical inconveniences, Russia, Poland, and Afghanistan had already set up embassies in Ankara. And, although some Allies thought that the caveat might compel the Turkish Government to move back to Istanbul, this was not going to happen. It was the Mosul issue which had to be negotiated directly with the Ankara Government and not through representatives that Ankara sent to Istanbul in the process, is when the first British Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey, Ronald Lindsay (1925-1926) decided to take up a part-time resident embassy in Ankara.[42] In 1926, the League of Nations decided that the previous Ottoman province of Mosul remain as part of Iraq-under-British mandate. Turkey complied in return for a sum to be received from the petroleum income.[43] In short, the next to the last territorial dispute between London and Ankara was resolved peacefully. The last one, disarmament and control of the Straits by an international commission (albeit with a Turkish Director) was to be solved in 1936 with the Montreux Convention.

Nevertheless, a double centred British embassy continued, but with the next two Ambassadors George Clerk (1929-1934) and Percy Loraine (1934-1939) spending more time in Ankara with an increasing charm offensive, especially from Loraine towards President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Building peace had to be accelerated through cultivating warm personal relations. At first, Percy Loraine had accepted his new appointment to Turkey with sheer disappointment and reluctance. He felt that he was practically removed from Cairo, was not even consulted by the Foreign Ministry about his next destination (he would have preferred Paris or Rome). He wrote in his diary "In fact, it just broke my official heart…Transfer-before my time was up: unconsulted!"[44]

By the time Loraine came to Turkey in 1934, it was becoming obvious (at least to Atatürk) that yet another European war threatened. Almost all eastern European and Balkan countries, not to mention Stalin's Soviet Union, had civilian, military, or monarchial dictators as leaders. Direct threats to Turkey emanated from fascist Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. In 1933, Mustafa Kemal shared his concerns about security with visiting American General Douglas MacArthur;

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[41] Geoffrey R. Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: A study in the evolution of the resident embassy,* (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009): 142-144.

[42] Geoffrey Berride, *British Diplomacy in Turkey,* 146-151.

[43] Hikmet Uluğbay, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik,* (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Yayınları, 1995).

[44] Gordon Waterfield, *Professional Diplomat, Sir Percy Loraine, 1880-1961,* (London: John Murray, 1973): 201.

he told the general that Germany would no longer remain confined by the Treaty of Versailles, Berlin would start another war and plausibly draw in the Soviets and the United States. Atatürk was the only leader who had read Hitler's infamous book Mein Kampf and understood the potential danger seriously. Mussolini's fiery oration about Italy's historic rights to lands of the Roman Empire covered most of Turkey's land mass as well as the Mediterranean Sea, "mare nostrum" in Mussolini's parlance.[45]

Last, but note least Stalin made a démarche which breached hitherto cordial relations with Turkey. In 1932, Falih Rıfkı (Atay, 1894-1971) a journalist and man of letters was attending a Writers' Conference in Moscow when three of Stalin's agents visited him in his hotel room. Falih Rıfkı was a confidante of President Atatürk and Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü, 1884-1973). The agents who spoke fluent Turkish said that Stalin was concerned that Turkey may become a springboard for other parties who might attack the Soviet Union. He asked for a regime change which only then would prove Ankara's loyalty. The message was intended to find its way to Turkey's top leaders. It did, but the leaders advised the journalist to keep on writing complimentary editorials about the Soviets.[46] Ankara's witch hunt among Turkey's leftist literati accelerated, while the following year Stalin sent a large delegation led by his Politburo confidante Kliment Voroshilov (later Marshal and Soviet President, 1881-1969) to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Turkey's republic.

In the course of peacebuilding, Ambassador Loraine established a warm relationship with Atatürk; since he held his drink well, Loraine frequently wined and dined, played poker through the night with the President; mutual love for horses and horse races had Loraine, a horse breeder in his English estate, bring over a thoroughbred stallion and mare as a contribution to the Ankara Riding Club. Behind these niceties, however, lay serious concerns about security and defense. Loraine was also active in forging ties between Ankara and London by facilitating an informal visit to Atatürk by King Edward VIII who was vacationing on Greek islands with his friend Wallis Simpson. Mustafa Kemal enjoyed the visit not only because the King came but took an instant liking to him because Edward was an unconventional person, challenging the British dynasty with his intention to marry a twice divorced American woman. Loraine also encouraged some English businesses to trade with Turkey. Yet his most notable and lasting contribution to

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[45] Brock Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy, 1934-1942", *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol 31, No. 3 (1995): 483-508; Nur Bilge Criss, "Turkey's Foreign Policies During the Interwar Years (1923-1939)" in *Turkish Foreign Policy, International Relations, Legality and Global Reach,* ed. Pınar Gözen Ercan (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017): 17-38; Criss, "Shades of Diplomatic Recognition: American Encounters with Turkey, 1923-1937" in *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey,* eds. George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss (Leiden: Brill, 2009): 97-144, 131.

[46] Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya,* (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1969): 578.

Turkey was the role he played in convening a conference with all signatories to the Straits Convention (annexed to the Lausanne Treaty) of 1924. It was imminent; Turkey argued on all platforms, that Ankara should re-militarize the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and assume full control of ingress, egress, and regress to the Black Sea in times of war and peace. Loraine managed to convince London that regulations, satisfactory to all concerned would also ensure the security of all riparian states and beyond.[47] The result was the 1936 Montreux Convention, still in force to this day.

Loraine's last gesture in building good will was to organize British presence in Atatürk's funeral who passed on November 10, 1938. A 200 men contingency, the largest among all other state representatives, attended in full uniform as well as with the presence, in full regalia of retired Major General Sir Edmund Guy Tulloch Brainbridge (1867-1943) who had fought in the Gallipoli wars. Loraine left Turkey in 1939, but also left behind many positive memories. That same year, Turkey, the United Kingdom and France signed a Mutual Military Assistance Agreement. Ankara was still neighbours with both in Iraq and Syria, respectively. Once again, under conditions of WWII and the early surrender of France to Germany in 1940, exhaustive and exhausting negotiations began between London and Ankara for military assistance under dire financial circumstances. This topic alone merited a 500+ pages long book by Brock Millman (fn. 3). In the end, Turkey managed to remain outside the war which was one of Europe's own making but contributed to its allies' struggle by other means than war.

Conclusions

Arduous relations between Britain and the last Ottomans as well as the new Turkey ended with a negotiated peace. There were certainly other states involved at Lausanne, but definitive loss of war was determined by British arms. Consequently, Britain's representatives took the lead and primacy during the Armistice period. However, London received half of its desiderata in establishing the international commission in controlling the Turkish Straits between 1924 and 1936. Istanbul returned to Turkish rule as a legacy of empires past.

Secondly, the Nationalists prevented partition of the Anatolian heartland. As a result, the antiquated Eastern Question was expelled beyond its borders. Third, capitulations were formally abrogated. Its judicial component, the right of foreign peoples to be subject to the laws of their home countries when living and working in a majority Muslim country ended with secularization and adaptation of European laws in Turkey. Since religious law was no longer valid, political Islamists see this as a matter of rejecting religion, but never consider the salient tie between

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[47] Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim*, (İstanbul: Semih Lütfi Kitabevi, n.d): 121-127.

secularization and independence. Besides, Islamic jurisprudence varies on a sectarian basis, the only common denominator being its patriarchal and misogynistic applications. Western democracies have yet to be convinced that this has nothing to do with "religious freedom" because it is difficult enough to struggle against this frame of mind domestically. Secularization is in essence about human security. Politicization of the Eastern Question did not yield any benefit to anyone in the past, and identity politics, currently in vogue between hegemony and resistance do not look promising for the future either.

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Business as Usual?

The Present and Future Impact of Brexit on Anglo-Turkish Relations

Görkem Altınörs[1] and Yaprak Gürsoy[2]

Abstract

This study aims to analyse how Brexit has affected Anglo-Turkish relations. It evaluates elements of continuity and possibilities of change in bilateral relations. In the first two sections, the article offers background information on the Brexit referendum and the history of Anglo-Turkish relations. It then discusses the potential risks and opportunities for foreign policies of both countries with regards to their relations with each other. In the final section, it analyses the significance of Anglo-Turkish commercial ties and areas of further economic cooperation. The article concludes that despite the obstacles that were posed by Brexit, Anglo-Turkish relations have continued as usual. There is potential for the deepening of relations in economy, trade and security. However, the future of bilateral relations will also depend on the willingness of both sides to engage with each other and Europe while also developing realistic expectations from one another in an era of global uncertainty.

Keywords: Britain, European Union, Turkey, Brexit, Foreign Policy, Trade.

Introduction

Global politics and the economy have undergone major crises in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crash. As populism and economic nationalism escalated in many countries, Brexit became one of the flagrant examples of epoch-shifting global turmoil. This study aims to analyse how Brexit has affected Anglo-Turkish relations in this era of global uncertainty. It evaluates elements of continuity, as well as possibilities of change in Anglo-Turkish relations and the foreign policies of both countries.

Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies on Brexit, as well as its consequences for the international world order, politics of the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom's (UK) relations with other countries.[3] However, there is limited research examining the specific impact of Brexit on Turkish-UK relations. Aiming to fill this gap in the literature, this article provides an outline of the past, present and future of political and economic relations.

In order to analyse elements of continuity and change post-Brexit, the article first offers background information on the Brexit referendum and the history of Anglo-Turkish relations. It then discusses the potential risks and opportunities for foreign policy, before analysing the significance of Anglo-Turkish trade relations and areas of further economic cooperation.

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[3] See, for example, Tim Oliver, "European and International Views of Brexit," *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 9, 2016: pp. 1–8.

The Road to Brexit: EU-UK Relations and the Referendum Campaign

The results of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 revealed that 52% of the voters were in favour of leaving the EU. The outcome was narrow and gave the impression to those who favoured staying in the Union that with a better campaign and more suitable political atmosphere, the results could have favoured remaining in the EU.[4] In reality, the results were influenced by contingent factors leading up to the vote as well as long-term uneasiness between the EU and the UK. Therefore, explaining the reasons behind Brexit requires an analysis of both the background of EU-UK relations and the referendum campaign itself.

Background of EU-UK Relations

When the UK first joined the European Community in 1973, it already had an exceptional relationship with it, due to its decision not to be a founding member of the communities in 1957. This hesitation was a result of the self-perception that Britain could be detached from European affairs and continue to be a global and transatlantic power. While this self-perception delayed British membership, it also determined its subsequent relations with the EU.[5] Once in the EU, the UK preferred a wider Union with more members, which cooperated with each other economically while also safeguarding their security interests. This position at times put the UK at odds with the increasingly deepening supranational project of European integration.

While the UK approached political integration with caution, it also established limits to economic deepening. On at least two occasions, the reluctance in economic integration resulted in exceptions. First, reminiscent of its membership decision, the UK initially did not participate in the European Monetary System (EMS), which took effect in 1979. When it did so 11 years later, the experience was short-lived, and the UK withdrew from the EMS after currency fluctuations in 1992. Subsequently, the UK opted out of the single currency agreed by the EU in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Second, due to disputes about the contributions of the UK to the EC budget, Britain negotiated a rebate, whereby its payments were reduced to better reflect its revenues from the EU.[6] Despite the rebate, the controversy over how much Britain contributed to the EU budget continued, flaring up once again during the Brexit referendum campaign.

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[4] Henry Mance and Jim Pickard, "How David Cameron could have avoided an EU leave vote," *Financial Times*, 25 June 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/4f8634c6-3873-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7.

[5] Daniel Kenealy, "How did we get here? A brief history of Britain's membership of the EU," *European Futures*, 24 May 2016, https://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/how-did-we-get-here-a-brief-history-of-britains-membership-of-the-eu/.

[6] Gianluigi Vernasca, "The UK's EU rebate – explained," *The Conversation*, 6 June 2016, https://theconversation.com/the-uks-eu-rebate-explained-58019.

For the majority of the British public and the governing elite, the EU was a limited economic project. As a result, when the 2007/2008 financial crisis triggered a Eurozone crunch in 2009, it also precipitated heightened scepticism toward the EU.[7] This cynicism toward the Union was not unique to the UK; however, given the background of already existing suspicions, it set Britain on a unique path of holding a referendum on the matter.

The Brexit Referendum

The Conservative Party decision to hold the Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016 was in part due to a sense of general political crisis.[8] Prior to the 2015 general elections, Britain's two-party system seemed to be on shaky ground. In the last decade, the combined votes of the Conservative and Labour Parties had declined. In the aftermath of the 2010 general elections, for the first time since the Second World War, a coalition government was formed between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Fearing the possibility of defeat or another coalition government, the Conservative leadership pledged in 2013 to hold a referendum on leaving the EU if it was re-elected to power.

Along with the decline of the two-party system, Euroscepticism after the 2009 financial crisis resulted in the rise of the radical right "challenger" UK Independence Party (UKIP). The party's vote share increased from 3% in 2010 to 13% in 2015. The growing success of UKIP in polls was also evident from its 27% vote share in the European parliamentary elections.[9] For the Conservative leadership that also included Eurosceptics, UKIP was a threat to its parliamentary majority in the 2015 elections. Thus, the promise of a referendum on Britain's membership in the EU was an attempt to stop the decline of the two-party system and curb the increasing popularity of Eurosceptic political groups.

While the background conditions and the contingent political factors paved the way for the ballot, the Brexit referendum campaign impacted the results. The Remain campaign focused on the economic risks of Brexit, trying to tap into the public sentiment that perceived the EU as a limited economic project.[10] In contrast, the Leave campaign adopted a populist stance[11] and stressed the possible benefits of leaving the EU, such as a reduction in the number of immigrants, more employment, taking back control of the borders, and transferring the funds saved from the EU budget to the National Health Service (NHS).

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[7] Sofia Vasilopoulou, "UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit referendum," *The Political Quarterly* 87, no. 2, April–June 2016, pp. 219-227.

[8] Will Jennings and Martin Lodge, "Brexit, the tides and Canute: the fracturing politics of the British state," *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 5, 2019, pp. 772-789.

[9] Geoffrey Evans and Jonathan Mellon, "Immigration, Euroscepticism, and the rise and fall of UKIP," *Party Politics* 25, no. 1, 2019, pp. 76-87.

[10] Andrew Glencross, *Why the UK Voted for Brexit: David Cameron's Great Miscalculation*, London: Palgrave Pivot (2016), pp. 35-46.

[11] Michael Freeden, "After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-11.

Despite these assurances, the immediate aftermath of the referendum proved unexpectedly difficult to handle. As the first country disintegrating from the EU, negotiating the terms of the withdrawal took four and a half years to complete. Within the UK political system, Brexit negotiations consumed three prime ministers. David Cameron had to resign after his defeat in the poll. His successor, the pro-Remain politician, Theresa May, struggled to receive parliamentary approval for her terms of withdrawal from the EU and was replaced by Boris Johnson. It was Johnson, one of the prominent names of the Leave campaign, who oversaw the official separation from the EU on 31 January 2020.

One of the major points of tension between the UK and the EU was the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. This border had been frictionless since the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. The EU had facilitated the necessary conditions of the agreement through the single market which guaranteed the free movement of people and goods across the Irish border.[12] With Brexit, one of the most pressing issues became the future of the Belfast Agreement as the UK re-established its borders. The matter was tentatively resolved with a protocol that ensured that Northern Ireland would remain integrated into the EU in some areas of trade.[13]

In December 2020, just days before the end of the transition period and the UK's complete withdrawal from the EU, the two entities signed a free trade and cooperation agreement.[14] For the time being, in 2021, this agreement regulates post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU. However, the terms of this agreement and relations are subject to reviews and evaluation in the future.[15] The UK's relations with the EU will continue to evolve in response to bilateral dynamics and domestic political change. Like in the past, the UK's future relations with the EU will continue to be exceptional.

A Brief History of Anglo-Turkish Relations

Similar to the UK's relations with the EU, Anglo-Turkish relations have been unique as well. The two countries have had historical ties and experiences, which saw wars, conflict and close cooperation. Despite episodes of tension, however, over the centuries, relations were mostly friendly because, as the British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Dominick Chilcott nicely summarised, the two countries' "interests haven't clashed generally. But [they have] both had

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[12] Katy Hayward, "The pivotal position of the Irish border in the UK's withdrawal from the European Union," *Space and Polity* 22, no. 2, 2018, pp. 238-254.

[13] Tom Edgington and Chris Morris, "Brexit: What is the Northern Ireland Protocol and why are there checks?," *BBC News*, 15 March 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-53724381.

[14] Anna Isaac, "10 key details in the UK-EU trade deal", *Politico*, 27 December 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/10-key-details-uk-eu-brexit-trade-deal/.

[15] Sam Lowe, "Brexit trade deal means 'freedom', but at a cost: the arguments will be far from over," *The Guardian*, 27 December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/commentisfree/2020/dec/27/britain-trade-deal-eu-arguments-brexit-renegotiation.

the common interest of preventing any one power on the European continent becoming so dominant that it threatens … both [of them].”[16]

Affirming their understanding of each other's significance, formal commercial and diplomatic relations were established four centuries ago when Queen Elizabeth I was granted a treaty of peace and friendship by Sultan Murad III in 1583.[17] Commercially as well, relations were institutionalised early on, for example, through the foundation of the British Chamber of Commerce in Turkey (BCCT) established in 1887 as the second oldest British Chamber abroad in the world.[18]

Bilateral Relations in the Twentieth Century

However, bilateral relations started off on the wrong foot at the start of the twentieth century. Britain and Turkey were on opposite sides of World War I and Anglo-Turkish antagonism had intensified throughout the second decade of the century. Köymen argues that there are three reasons that could be pointed out for this hostility. First, the Turks blamed Britain for the atrocities caused by the Greek troops in Anatolia during and in the aftermath of WWI. Second, the Turkish nationalists believed that the riots that erupted simultaneously with the Greco-Turkish War were caused by Britain. Third, although occasionally it was disowned by the Foreign Office, British Prime Minister Lloyd George's personal dislike of the Turk that was derived from Venizelos' direct influence on him, led to decisions made by his extremely negative emotional attitudes, which in return escalated the mutual resentments.[19]

Although they fought against each other in World War I, the UK and Turkey have maintained good bilateral relations since then. One of the most crucial challenges of the bilateral relationship was the demilitarisation of the Straits in the 1930s. However, as Barlas and Yilmaz argue, “the British Chiefs of Staff believed that the importance of Turkish friendship with Britain outweighed the disadvantages of complete remilitarization of the Straits.” As a result, “the British did not object and in July 1936 at Montreux accepted the new status of the Straits” which then “was the turning point in Turkish-British

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[16] Amanda Jane Yeşilbursa, “Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations: An interview with Sir Dominick Chilcott (KCMG), British Ambassador to Turkey”, *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations* 1, no. 1, January 2020, pp. 97-107 (p. 97).

[17] Çiğdem Balım, “Perspectives on Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations: An interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations* 1, no. 2, June 2020, pp. 87-91 (p. 88). See also Arthur Leon Horniker, “William Harborne and the beginning of Anglo-Turkish diplomatic and commercial Relations,” *The Journal of Modern History* 14, no. 3, 1942, pp. 289-316.

[18] BCCT, “About us”, https://www.bcct.org.tr/about-us/the-british-chamber-of-commerce-in-turkey.

[19] Oya B. Köymen, “Anglo-Turkish relations: 1919-1922”, *The Turkish Yearbook 8*, 1967, pp. 14-28 (p. 27-8).

rapprochement."[20] Indeed, in the aftermath of World War II, the UK and Turkey became allies as both countries joined NATO and the Council of Europe. The foundation of CENTO was also an important aspect of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in the 1960s.[21]

The Cyprus issue has also been an important part of Anglo-Turkish relations as both Britain and Turkey (together with Greece) are signatories of the Treaty of Guarantee on the protection of the independence of Cyprus which was promulgated in 1960. Today, there is also a significant number of Cypriot Turks living in London. According to Home Office estimates in 2001, the number of Cypriot Turks living in the city is around 300,000 –twice the number of those in Cyprus.[22] The escalated political violence towards Kurds, Alevis, and the leftists in the 1970s and 1980s in Turkey also made the UK a destination of asylum for the Turkish dissent and minority groups. Today, approximately 150,000 Turks live across the UK, though mainly concentrated in London.[23]

Bilateral Relations in the Twenty-First Century

Up until Brexit, Anglo-Turkish relations were most crucially shaped by the EU. Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the EEC in 1963, which formulated Anglo-Turkish relations on a number of areas, including migration. Furthermore, the UK, as a full member between 1973 and 2020, has been one of the strongest supporters of Turkey's EU membership. Both Labour and Tory governments supported Turkey's accession to the Union along with an understanding of its strategic importance. For example, both David Miliband,[24] the Foreign Secretary of the Labour government under Gordon Brown's premiership, and David Cameron,[25] the Prime Minister of several Conservative governments, showed their support on multiple occasions.

Despite the supportive relations at official levels, other political parties and the public approached Turkish membership of the EU with scepticism. Turkey's candidate status became a contentious subject during the Brexit referendum campaign as pro-Leave campaigners argued that Turkey's accession to the EU would cause an influx of migrants

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[20] Dilek Barlas and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Managing the Transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana: Turkey's Relations with Britain and the US in a Turbulent Era (1929–47)", *Turkish Studies* 17, no. 3, 2016, pp. 449–73, (p. 456-57).

[21] Cihat Göktepe, "The 'forgotten alliance'? Anglo-Turkish relations and CENTO, 1959–65", *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4, 2006, pp. 103–29.

[22] House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, "Implications for the Justice and Home Affairs Area of the Accession of Turkey to the European Union," *Tenth Report of Session 2010–12*, 2011.

[23] Ibrahim Sirkeci, Tuncay Bilecen, Yakup Çoştu, Saniye Dedeoğlu, M. Rauf Kesici, B. Dilara Şeker, Fethiye Tilbe, and K. Onur Unutulmaz, *Little Turkey in Great Britain*, London: The Transnational Press London, 2016.

[24] Euractiv, "Miliband: Turning Turkey away from EU 'unconscionable'," 27 Oct 2009, https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/miliband-turning-turkey-away-from-eu-unconscionable/.

[25] BBC, "Cameron 'anger' at slow pace of Turkish EU negotiations," 27 July 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10767768.

towards the UK. The campaign suggested that leaving the EU would be the only solution to prevent this undesirable outcome.

Ironically, the number of applicants from Turkey for residence/work permits in the UK via the Ankara Agreement, which stopped at the beginning of 2021, increased sixty times (6000%) in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.[26] This was mostly due to Turkey's own political turbulence after the 2016 coup attempt. Shortly after the Brexit poll, Gülenist-linked army officers in Turkey unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the Erdoğan government. In response to the putsch, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency, which was extended eight times between 2016 and 2018. The purges by the Decree-Law continued to go beyond the Gülenists, including many left groups.

Immediately after the coup attempt in Turkey on 15th July 2016, the UK Government gathered the Cabinet Office Briefing Room and discussed emergency decisions on security and counter-terrorism in close cooperation with Turkey. Only three days after the coup attempt, Sir Alan Duncan, the State Minister Responsible for Europe and the US at the Foreign Office, visited Turkey to deliver a special message of solidarity. This was the first official visit after the coup attempt at the ministerial level from Europe to Turkey. Thereupon, Prime Minister Yıldırım thanked Prime Minister May in his interview with The Guardian on 27 July 2016.[27] He highlighted that May sent one of her ministers specifically to show solidarity with Turkey. Yıldırım also criticised other Western countries for not showing enough and genuine support to Turkey in the aftermath of the coup attempt.

In the decade before the coup attempt and despite concerns over rising authoritarianism in Turkey, the UK governments have approached Turkey for more advanced trade and security cooperation. A Strategic Partnership Document was signed by the countries in 2007 and it was renewed in 2010. The Document listed the relationship under these titles:[28]

- Bilateral Relations,
- Bilateral Trade and Investment,
- Turkey's EU Membership,
- Regional Stability and Peace,
- Cyprus,

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[26] Euronews, "Ankara Anlaşması'na başvuruda yüzde 6 bin artış," 27 January 2021, https://tr.euronews.com/2018/03/23/turkiye-den-ankara-anlasmas-na-basvuruda-yuzde-6-bin-art-s.

[27] Başbakanlık Basın Merkezi, "Başbakan Yıldırım'ın The Guardian'a verdiği mülakat," 27 July 2016, http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/pgNewsDetail.aspx?Type=5&Id=18179.

[28] Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey and the United Kingdom," 2011, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-united-kingdom.en.mfa.

- Defence,

- Global Security,

- The Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons,

- Combating Illegal Migration,

- Energy Security and Low-Carbon Fuel Future,

- Intercultural Dialogue

- Education and Culture.

Whilst signing the renewal of the Document with the then Prime Minister of Turkey Erdoğan, David Cameron described Turkey as the "BRICS of Europe" and he wished to double the bilateral trade volume in the next five years.[29] Subsequently, Turkey and the UK have increased their trade volume (see below) with repeated pledges to work on intensifying relations. For example, Cameron and Erdoğan agreed to advance the commercial relationship between the UK and Turkey in the post-Brexit era when they met during the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016.[30]

Thus, bilateral relations between the UK and Turkey have remained stable in the twenty-first century despite Brexit and the intensified democratic backsliding in Turkey.[31] This rapprochement is increasingly significant not only for the augmentation of Britain's soft power in the post-Brexit era,[32] but also for the future of a sustainable and stable Turkish foreign policy in the age of global challenges.

The Political Impact of Brexit on Foreign Relations

While Brexit has no immediate and direct impact on Turkey, as a candidate country of the EU and a European neighbour, Ankara's relations with both London and Brussels will change after Brexit, with possible consequences for its foreign relations with the EU and beyond. The negative and positive impacts of Brexit on Turkey would reflect the long-term alliance and cooperation between Ankara and London in foreign and security policy. Although it is hard to predict the future, potential risks and opportunities for Turkey exist in terms of its relations with the rest of the Western alliance.

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[29] Gov.uk, "Strengthening UK-Turkey relations," 09.02.2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/strengthening-uk-turkey-relations.

[30] Gov.uk, "PM meeting with President Erdogan of Turkey," 09 July 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-meeting-with-president-erdogan-of-turkey-9-july-2016.

[31] Görkem Altınörs, "Devamlılık mı Kırılma mı? Brexit Sonrası Dönemde Birleşik Krallık-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Karşılaştırmalı Dış Politika Analizi," *Pamukkale University Journal of Social Sciences Institute* 40, 2020.

[32] Yaprak Gürsoy, "Reconsidering Britain's Soft Power: Lessons from the Perceptions of the Turkish Political Elite," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2020.

Risks for Turkey's Membership of the EU

The most important risk facing Turkey is the loss of a like-minded power as an ally within the EU. As explained above, the UK had preferred a relatively loosely integrated intergovernmental EU with strong security ties to the US. Partly as a result of this preference, and despite more sceptical public opinion, Britain had been one of the chief champions of Turkey's membership in the EU.[33]

With Brexit, Turkey had lost an important advocate of its bid at a time when prospects of membership already declined. Since 2006, Turkey-EU relations faced three main obstacles, which appear to be irreconcilable for the time being. First, the EU has raised concerns over Turkey's democracy and human rights. While these issues are related to general humanitarian concerns, they also have a concrete bearing on membership since it is enshrined in the EU through the Copenhagen criteria that candidates cannot accede unless they are full democracies and until they share the same political liberal values with the rest of the members.[34]

Second, Turkey's assertive foreign policy in its neighbourhood and Syria have raised concerns in the EU over the mutual defence and security goals. On the one hand, accusations that Turkey supports Islamic groups against Damascus led to questions on whether there are any shared foreign policy interests and values between the EU and Turkey. On the other hand, the influx of refugees from Syria and the wider Middle East, necessitated the EU to cooperate with Turkey from a transactional point of view. The two entities signed a migration agreement in 2016, which ensured that relations continued despite problems in the accession negotiations.[35]

Finally, as a result of the membership of Cyprus in 2004, Turkish negotiations with the EU came to a halt. Turkey has refrained from extending the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. Practically, the resolution of the conflict on the island became one of the primary conditions for Turkey's possible accession to the EU in the future. From a broader perspective, the ongoing dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean

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[33] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate", *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 4, 2008, pp. 35-50 (p.44); Sevilay Z. Aksoy, "The prospect of Turkey's EU membership as represented in the British newspapers The Times and The Guardian, 2002–2005," *Journal of European Studies* 39, no. 4, 2009, pp. 469-506.

[34] Natalie Martin, "From Containment to Realpolitik and Back Again: A Realist Constructivist Analysis of Turkey–EU Relations and the Migration Issue," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 57, no. 6, 2019, pp. 1349-1365.

[35] Kemal Kirişçi, "Order from Chaos," *Brookings*, 17 March 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/17/as-eu-turkey-migration-agreement-reaches-the-five-year-mark-add-a-job-creation-element/.

between Turkey and EU member states, including Cyprus, Greece and France, put further strains on Turkey's accession negotiations.[36]

In such areas of dispute, as a member of the EU, the UK could have played an important mediating role between Brussels and Ankara. Because of the legacy of its colonial rule, as well as its status as one of the guarantor powers, the UK has historical ties with both the Greek and Turkish communities of the island. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Cypriot accession, the UK made "attempts to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots."[37] As a result, the UK is relatively equidistant from both sides, allowing it to be well placed in taking up a balancing role in resolving the dispute. Therefore, from Ankara's perspective, Brexit complicates EU's involvement in the Cypriot dispute since no EU member is seen impartial anymore. Thus, Brexit has negative consequences for Turkey's accession beyond the mere loss of an advocate in the EU. Since membership is directly linked to the resolution of the de facto separation of island of Cyprus, Brexit has the potential to further complicate relations between the EU, Turkey and Cyprus.

Opportunities for the UK and Turkey within and beyond NATO

While Turkey's relations with the EU have deteriorated in recent years, similar tensions also occurred within NATO and with the US. Turkey's position in the Western alliance has been questioned since 2011, due to Ankara's foreign policy changes after the Arab Spring, the 2016 coup attempt and its cooperation with Russia. Turkey's position against the Egyptian government following the 2013 coup in the country and against Kurdish forces in Syria clearly indicated different national interests and ideological predispositions between Ankara and Washington. The purges and domestic security practices of the government after the 2016 failed coup further put in doubt Turkey's adherence to common Western values of democracy and human rights in similar ways to the reactions of EU members. As Ankara sought new allies, including the purchase of the S-400 defence system from Moscow, relations significantly worsened with a long list of grievances on both sides, getting harder to detangle and reverse.[38]

In this context of Turkey's foreign and security relations, there is an opportunity for the UK to play a more active role in balancing Turkey's relations with the EU and NATO allies.

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[36] Thanos Dokos, Nathalie Tocci, Anja Palm and Can Kasapoğlu, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus dispute: impact on Turkey-EU scenarios," *FEUTURE Online Paper*, December 2018, https://feuture.uni-koeln.de/sites/feuture/user_upload/Online_Paper_No_27.pdf.

[37] James Ker-Lindsay, "A Difficult Transition to a New Relationship: Britain and Cyprus in the European Union", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 15, no. 2, 2007, pp. 185-200 (p. 191).

[38] Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür, "Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent alliance with Western institutions," *Analyses of the Elcano Royal Institute (ARI)*, 11 June 2018, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ARI73-2018-Gursoy-Toygur-Turkey-in-out-NATO-turbulent-alliance-Western-institutions.

The extent to which the UK would be willing to play such a role would depend on its own interests and goals in becoming a global power. Since the Brexit referendum, foreign policymakers in the UK have focused on enhancing Britain's soft power with the intention of embracing the chance of formulating foreign and security policy independently of the EU. For instance, the 2018 National Security Capability Review outlines Global Britain as the "vision … for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence."[39] Similarly, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence Development and Foreign Policy published in March 2021 describes UK's vision for 2030 in following terms: "departure from the European Union (EU) provides a unique opportunity to … exploit the freedom that comes with increased independence, such as the ability to forge new free trade deals."[40]

In this new vision of Global Britain, the significance of the UK's ties with the US and Europe are stressed as unchanging elements of foreign and defence policy. It is further highlighted that "the UK has a seat in every major multilateral organisation"[41] including NATO, the UN Security Council, and the Commonwealth. Through the Global Britain vision, the UK intends to strengthen its relations with non-EU countries while also utilising its position and relations within international organisations and European partners. The priority nations listed are, first, the US, and then, European neighbours and allies, including Turkey. Thus, the Global Britain vision would make it possible for the UK to play a more positive role between Turkey – a country it considers as a strategic partner — and the EU and NATO. London's historical connections and common foreign policy goals with Washington would also place it in a distinctive position to mediate between Turkey and the USA. In addition to positive prospects in Western security cooperation for Turkey, there is also a chance to strengthen bilateral ties between London and Ankara through defence deals, such as Turkey's purchase of TF-X fighter jet engines from the UK.[42]

Despite these optimistic scenarios, however, Ankara needs to be cautious in its expectations. Although London appears to have stronger connections to Ankara than other Western capitals, for the time being, the chances for Britain to oppose its European and American allies are weak. In case of a dispute, the UK is more likely to maintain its

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[39] HM Government, "National Security Capability Review," March 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf, p. 7.

[40] HM Government, "Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy," March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf p. 11.

[41] Ibid, p. 8.

[42] Patrick Wintour, "Turkey plans to speed up fighter jet project with Britain," *The Guardian*, 11 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/11/turkey-fighter-jet-project-britain.

equidistance while supporting a multilateral approach in line with NATO and the UN. Thus, the UK may not be as proactive and as willing to throw its weight behind Ankara as expected.

Nevertheless, Brexit may still provide political openings for Turkey through passive means and by setting positive examples. First, the nature of Turkey-EU relations is in flux because of the freezing of Turkey's accession process and the development of a new transactional approach. Moreover, the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU is being reconsidered because of its restrictive elements. Turkey and the EU are in search of a new and accommodating relationship taking into account their historical trade relations and Turkey's decades-long candidacy.[43] Although the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed between the UK and the EU in December 2020 established in some respects a less integrated association than that of Turkey's relationship with the EU, London and Brussels will continue to evaluate and negotiate elements of the agreement. Thus, in the long run, the UK's arrangement with the EU has the potential to stimulate similar accords between Turkey and the EU. In the immediate aftermath of the referendum and the subsequent period, officials from both sides have expressed their willingness to take Brexit as an example for the future of Turkish-EU relations, suggesting that such modelling might be possible and desirable in the future.[44]

Second, as Turkey seems to be further detached from liberal democratic nations of the West, maintaining political and economic ties with a European democracy would have implications beneath the surface. Continued bilateral visits and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Ankara and London (see below) were criticized by opposition groups in both countries because they neglected concerns over Turkey's democracy and human rights conditions. In its memorandum to the Parliament explaining the FTA, the UK Department of International Trade addressed these concerns by stating that "we regularly raise human rights issues with Turkey at all levels."[45] Regardless of the probable impact of raising such problems behind closed doors, previous research has shown that among Turkish politicians, Britain is considered as an important role model with its political system and democracy.[46] Thus, a continued partnership between the two countries would potentially

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[43] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Remolding the Turkey-EU Relationship," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (2018): 119-128.

[44] See for examples, Burcu Arık, "Erdogan: Turkey may have Brexit-like referendum on EU," *Anadolu Agency*, 26 March 2017, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/archive/erdogan-turkey-may-have-brexit-like-referendum-on-eu/3085 and Duvar English, "Germany's CDU leadership hopeful suggests UK model for Turkey-EU partnership," 4 January 2021, https://www.duvarenglish.com/germanys-cdu-leadership-hopeful-friedrich-merz-suggests-uk-model-for-turkey-eu-partnership-news-55733.

[45] Gov.uk, "Explanatory memorandum: UK/Turkey: Free Trade Agreement," *International Treaty UK/Turkey: Free Trade Agreement [CS Turkey no.1/2021]* https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukturkey-free-trade-agreement-cs-turkey-no12021, p. 6.

[46] Yaprak Gürsoy, "Reconsidering Britain's Soft Power."

safeguard the diffusion of liberal values from the UK through subtle persuasion and by setting up a positive example at a time when such flows from the EU have deteriorated.

Finally, and beyond the mediator role, the advantage of having another non-EU ally in NATO may strengthen Turkey's position in strategic partnerships. Further cooperation between the EU and NATO has created problems for Turkey as a non-EU NATO member.[47] In particular, the accession of Cyprus to the EU has led Ankara to block Nicosia's participation in the Partnership for Peace programme aiming to build cooperation between NATO and Euro-Asian countries. In response, Cyprus blocked Turkey's inclusion in the European Defence Agency and the sharing of classified information between the EU and Turkey. This resulted in a stalemate between the EU and NATO in furthering defence cooperation. Brexit now has the potential to break these types of deadlock, in especially schemes such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), where Britain and Turkey will both share the same status as a third party possibly collaborating with the EU.[48] Britain's future position in EU-NATO cooperation can provide a positive model for Turkey's status as well.

To conclude this section, the direct impact of Brexit on Turkish politics is mostly associated with Ankara losing an important ally in the EU when such a partner was perhaps needed the most. However, Brexit may also lead to new and unexpected opportunities due to the ability of the UK to act more independently of the EU and becoming a model for the future of EU-Turkey relations and domestic politics. It should be kept in mind, however, that the ability to reap the benefits of Brexit would depend on the continuation of good relations between London and Ankara, as well as the UK's ability and willingness to engage with Europe and Turkey, not only in trade but also in foreign and security policy.

Economic Relations post-Brexit

In Anglo-Turkish relations, bilateral trade and the economic interactions have marked one of the most concrete aspects of high degrees of cooperation between the two nations. For both countries, economic partnership is significant for various domestic and foreign reasons. Although Brexit threatened this partnership, the worst-case scenario was avoided by the signing of the FTA in December 2020.[49] The future of bilateral trade would depend on the renewal and expansion of the FTA with the likelihood of spilling over to other areas of cooperation in politics.

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[47] Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management: No Turkish delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 1, 2002, pp. 9-26.

[48] Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Alessandro Marrone, "PESCO and security cooperation between the EU and Turkey", *Global Turkey in Europe Working Paper 19*, September 2018, http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/38203/1/PESCO_and_Security_Cooperation.pdf.

[49] Bethan McKernan, "UK signs free trade agreement with Turkey," *The Guardian*, 29 December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/29/uk-signs-free-trade-agreement-with-turkey.

The Significance of Bilateral Trade for the UK and Turkey

Trade volume between Turkey and the UK has been on a rising trend. According to the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce data, the trade volume between Turkey and the UK was £9.4 billion at the end of 2009.[50] After mutual declarations of increasing cooperation, the trade volume increased to £16.1 billion in 2016 and further to £18.6 billion in 2019, according to the data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[51] Today, more than 2,900 British companies are operating in Turkey which makes the UK one of the largest investor countries and "the fifth in line among the countries which have invested in Turkey the most."[52]

Bilateral trade with the UK is particularly significant for Turkey due to two factors. First, Britain is the sixth biggest trade partner and the second (after Germany) biggest exporting market, according to the figures in 2019.[53] As it can be seen in the below figure, Turkey has a significant foreign trade surplus with the UK.

Figure: Turkey's foreign economic relations with the UK (Data collated from https://data.tuik.gov.tr/ in May 2021).

Furthermore, trade with the UK covers a wide range of Turkish goods. In 2018, the top three items Turkey exported to the UK consisted of land vehicles (24.13%), garments and

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[50] İTO, *Birleşik Krallık Ülke Etüdü*, 2011, İTO, İstanbul.

[51] Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey and the United Kingdom".

[52] Balım, "An Interview with His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın," p. 88.

[53] Eralp Yarar, "Post-Brexit Turkey-UK ties show signs of new strategic partnership," *Daily Sabah*, 21 Feb 2021, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/news-analysis/post-brexit-turkey-uk-ties-show-signs-of-new-strategic-partnership.

textiles (22.19%) and electronic devices and machinery (12.08%) whereas the top three items imported included power generating machines and devices (20.38%), non-monetary gold (19.84%) and metal scraps (12.72). Given these figures, the UK is an important trading partner for Turkish businesses and industrialists based on purely economic interests.

The second reason why the UK is an important trading partner for Turkey is more political in nature. Since Turkey opted for a new presidential system in 2018 and severed its ties with the US and the EU, it has suffered from a currency and debt crisis predominantly caused by a notoriously acute high current account deficit. Currently, Turkey is suffering from an economic downturn characterised by high inflation, devaluation of the Turkish Lira and loan defaults.[54] This has increased tendencies towards economic nationalism in some sectors, further intensifying due to the Covid-19 pandemic since 2020. In this setting, transnational capitalist groups in Turkey still desire to be part of the US-led liberal international order, including the Customs Union. This is counteracted by emerging capital groups that desire to expand their businesses further domestically and beyond the Customs Union internationally, including the Middle East. Ironically, however, both groups view a post-Brexit FTA with the UK as a viable option. For the first group, cooperation with the UK still implies ties with the international liberal trade order whereas for the second group, it suggests an opportunity beyond the Customs Union they can benefit from. Thus, there is an economic and political convergence among government and business circles on the importance of developing commercial ties with the UK.

Especially after the Brexit referendum, the significance of bilateral trade has been emphasised from both sides and at every level of diplomacy. For example, Turkey's Ambassador to London made a speech at the Turkey-UK Science and Innovation Platform on 21 November 2016. In his speech, Ambassador Abdurrahman Bilgiç highlighted the importance of the growth in the UK's trade with Turkey after Brexit.[55] The Ambassador also spoke at the opening of Beko's new Research and Development Centre in the UK and he underlined that the UK is the second-largest market for Turkish exports and that this situation strengthens despite the fluctuations in the global market. He also described the UK as one of the few developed countries with which Turkey has a foreign trade surplus in foreign economic relations.[56]

Similar sentiments were voiced from the British side as well. After the Brexit referendum and the coup attempt in Turkey, in September 2016, Boris Johnson visited Turkey

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[54] Özgür Orhangazi and A. Erinç Yeldan, "The Re-making of the Turkish Crisis," *Development and Change*, 2021.

[55] Londra Büyükelçiliği, "Ambassador's Statement at 'Turkey-UK Science and Innovation Platform'", 21.11.2016, http://londra.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowSpeech.aspx?ID=12070.

[56] Londra Büyükelçiliği, "Ambassador's Statement at the opening of BEKO's Research and Development Centre", 14.12.2016, http://londra.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowSpeech.aspx?ID=12077.

as the UK Foreign Minister. Besides the symbolism of solidarity with Turkey, the talks covered security and counter-terrorism, including fighting against ISIS, the Syrian civil war, and the migrant crisis. The visit also highlighted the importance of developing better and advanced mutual commercial and economic relations. For example, Johnson mentioned that his washing machine at home was a Turkish brand (Beko) and he wished to sign a "jumbo" FTA with Turkey to continue developing commercial relations after Brexit.[57] Johnson then met with the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to discuss economic relations. Following the meeting, Johnson said:

> [a]nd of course we talked about all the optimistic things that we could do together and above all the economic inter-penetration between Britain and Turkey which is growing the whole time. I mean, it is not just the 2.5 million Brits we send here every year. I think our trade has been increasing 70% in the last 5 years and that is something that we need now to expand.[58]

A few months after Boris Johnson's contacts in Ankara, Prime Minister Theresa May visited Turkey. Similar to the previous high-profile encounter, trade and counter-terrorism were the most important issues. Again, the official trip was symbolic, as *The Independent* argued; May was the first foreign leader who travelled to Ankara in the aftermath of the coup attempt and the consecutive purges.[59] However, the visit also had a concrete trade agenda. May expected to open new business channels and trade opportunities worth billions of pounds. This is when the deal to produce fighter jets in Turkey, worth £100 million, was signed. After meeting with President Erdoğan, May also announced that a joint working group would be established in order to discuss and negotiate the post-Brexit FTA between Turkey and the UK.[60]

The goodwill of deepening trade was not exclusive to the British cabinet. In 2017, the UK House of Commons published a document entitled "UK's Relations with Turkey" which emphasised the importance of growing trade relations with Turkey in the post-Brexit era. The document stated that "[d]espite the damage caused by the coup attempt and government's response, Turkey represents an economy that the UK will find difficult to ignore."[61] A special emphasis was made on the £100 million worth fighter jet deal in terms of deepening the "strategic" partnership.

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[57] Gov.uk, "UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson's visit to Turkey," 29.09.2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-foreign-secretary-boris-johnsons-visit-to-turkey.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Independent, "Theresa May approves £100m fighter jet deal with Erdogan despite human rights abuses," 28 Jan 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/theresa-may-agrees-100m-fighter-jet-dealwith-turkeys-erdogan-despite-human-rights-concerns-a7551006.html.

[60] BBC, "İngiltere ve Türkiye arasında 125 milyon dolarlık savunma anlaşması," 28 Feb 2017, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-38772811.

[61] Parliament.uk, "A 'strategic 'relationship, and its implications for Turkey and the UK," 23.03.2017, https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/615/61506.htm#_idTextAnchor031.

It is clear from the bilateral visits, speeches of government officials and published cabinet statements, that for the UK, Turkey constitutes an important trading partner. This is in part due to the Global Britain vision of the UK which emphasises increasing trade relations with non-EU countries. With its geographical proximity, high degrees of people-to-people interaction and strong historical relations, Turkey is an ideal country to forge deeper economic ties with. Through foreign direct investment and joint ventures, Turkey also provides the potential to expand further towards North Africa and the Middle East –regions where Turkish businesses have already initiated and completed valuable projects and commercial links.

Post-Brexit Risks Avoided: The Future of Bilateral Trade

One of the reasons for the high volume of trade between the UK and Turkey was the Customs Union, which allowed for unrestricted trade of goods. Brexit brought about three risks because the UK would leave the Customs Union. First, Turkey could have lost its competitive edge in its trade with the UK, which would now also trade with non-EU countries, such as in Asia, in equal terms. Second and relatedly, Turkey did not have the capacity to sign a separate FTA with the UK because of the conditions of the Customs Union agreement, which restricted Ankara's signing of FTAs unless the EU also had similar deals. Third, Turkey could have lost some of its foreign trade advantage with the third countries because of the disruption in the supply chains caused by Brexit.[62]

This worst-case scenario was avoided thanks to the preparation of an FTA, which was ready to be signed as soon as the UK agreed its own divorce deal and trade agreement with the EU. Through this foresightedness and mutual work conducted after the referendum, the two countries signed an agreement quickly before the end of 2020. Although the deal was criticised by some in the UK for ignoring rising authoritarianism in Turkey,[63] it was mostly hailed by both sides as a great achievement. For example, President Erdoğan announced it as the second most important free trade agreement in Turkish history after the Customs Union with the EU.[64] It was also welcomed by manufacturers, such as Stuart Rowley, the president of Ford of Europe who declared that:

> Ford welcomes the announcement today of a trade agreement between the UK and Turkey, and the speed with which it has been concluded underscores its importance to the economic prosperity of both countries. As Europe's leading commercial vehicle brand, Ford's Dagenham engine

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[62] Yaprak Gürsoy, *Brexit: Türkiye-Birleşik Krallık-AB İlişkilerinde Siyasi ve Ekonomik Riskler ve Fırsatlar*, İstanbul, DEİK, 2019.

[63] Simon Tisdall, "'Global Britain' is willing to trade away everything. Including scruples," *The Guardian*, 3 Jan 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/03/global-britain-is-willing-to-trade-away-everything-including-scruples.

[64] Bloomberg HT, "Erdoğan: İngiltere ile serbest ticaret anlaşması imzalıyoruz," 28 Dec 2020, https://www.bloomberght.com/erdogan-yarin-ingiltere-ile-serbest-ticaret-anlasmasi-imzaliyoruz-2271567.

manufacturing facility in east London exports much of its diesel engine production to our Ford Otosan joint venture in Turkey where the engines are fitted into Ford Transit vehicles, many of which are then exported from Turkey to the UK. Given that Ford and Ford Otosan business constitutes more than 10 per cent of the total trade volume between the UK and Turkey, this trade agreement is extremely significant for us and will help to secure jobs in both countries.[65]

Despite these positive sentiments, the current FTA's main purpose is to preserve the existing bilateral trade and to help manufacturers avoid any potential losses caused by Brexit. The ultimate goal is to prepare bilateral trade for a more comprehensive phase-2 FTA which would go beyond economic relations and enhance the strategic partnership. Now that economic ties are freed from the restrictions of the Customs Union, there are opportunities, including advanced trade in services and agriculture and an increase in foreign direct investment. There are already signs that relations can move in this direction. For example, according to British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Dominick Chilcott, a new FTA would also cover "trade in agricultural goods, trade in services, investment and the digital economy."[66]

In a few years, it is expected that bilateral trade would reach over £21 billion as announced by the ministers of trade, who also declared their will for a more comprehensive and ambitious FTA in the future.[67] Speaking about the FTA, British Trade Secretary Liz Truss argued that:

> [t]oday's deal covers trade worth more than £18 billion, delivers vital certainty for business and supports thousands of jobs across the UK in the manufacturing, automotive and steel industries. It paves the way for a more new, more ambitious deal with Turkey in the near future, and is part of our plan to put the UK at the centre of a network of modern agreements with dynamic economies.[68]

Given the evidence, as far as bilateral trade is concerned, in the post-Brexit era, there is a strengthening continuity in Anglo-Turkish relations.

Conclusion

The global political economy and international affairs have faced unparalleled challenges since the financial crash in 2007/2008. Undoubtedly, Brexit was one of them. The impact of Brexit on Britain's relations with the EU and beyond is still a curious case for academics and policymakers. The multilateralism of post-Brexit affairs will remain salient for years to come. The purpose of this study was to analyse how Brexit has affected Anglo-Turkish relations. We assessed the elements of continuity and possibilities of change in

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[65] BCCT, "UK and Turkey Sign Trade Deal," 2021, https://www.bcct.org.tr/news/uk-and-turkey-sign-trade-deal/70799.

[66] Serkan Demirtaş, "Trade deal to boost Turkey-UK strategic partnership: British envoy", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 Jan 2021, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/trade-deal-to-boost-turkey-uk-strategic-partnership-british-envoy-161524.

[67] Ibid.

[68] BCCT, "UK and Turkey Sign Trade Deal".

bilateral relations and the foreign policies of both countries. We first offered background information on Brexit as well as a concise history of Anglo-Turkish relations. Against the backdrop of Brexit and global uncertainties, we then examined the potential risks and opportunities for the foreign policies of both countries and with regards to their relations with each other. Finally, we analysed the significance of Anglo-Turkish trade relations and areas of further economic cooperation.

We contended that despite the difficulties that were posed by post-Brexit uncertainties, Anglo-Turkish relations have continued as usual. It is safe to argue that there is potential for deeper relations in the areas of economy, trade and security. As we maintained above, the EU and Turkey's candidacy for membership is one of the main aspects of Anglo-Turkish relations. In terms of the political impact of Brexit on foreign relations, the close cooperation between the UK and Turkey has continued as usual, although there are risks imposed by Brexit too. Turkey's relations with the Western world have seen challenges. Negotiations with the EU have stalled recently because of the Cyprus issue and Turkey's assertive foreign policy in its neighbourhood, democratic backsliding and human rights problems. As a strong supporter of Turkey's membership bid, the UK could have played a significant role within the EU. However, for the same reason that Turkey and the UK are close partners, the UK leaving the EU can bring opportunities as well. As a non-EU country, the UK can play a more active role in mediating between Turkey and the EU, US, and NATO. This becomes even more important for Ankara at a time when it further detaches from the liberal democracies of the Western world. Finally, as a non-EU NATO member, Britain may play a more proactive role in Cyprus. Although it is worth mentioning that the more Turkey moves away from democratic values and the Western world in general, the less the UK can do as a proactive mediator. Similarly, the post-Brexit UK's ability to act as a global actor depends on its adherence to the Global Britain vision which is closely linked to its good relations with the EU. The possibilities of Britain being a mediator between Turkey and the EU are weaker where the UK's own relationship with the EU is confrontational.

In terms of bilateral foreign economic relations between the UK and Turkey, there is continuity too. Turkey's foreign economic relations with the UK has witnessed a growing trend in the last decade. We argued above that this is significant for two reasons. First, Turkey has a trade surplus with the UK. Second, in times of economic downturn, close cooperation with the UK is still a viable option for the major capital groups in Turkey. It is also plausible to argue that there was a similar sentiment of willingness from the British side, although close economic relations with Turkey at a time when it slid into authoritarianism was criticised by some. Nonetheless, the signing of a post-Brexit FTA was welcomed from both sides. The FTA was not only to avoid the economic risks that were posed by Brexit, but it was also to prepare the countries for a phase-2 FTA in the near future with the purposes of developing

further and deeper economic relations. However, like political cooperation, the future of bilateral commercial relations will also depend on the willingness of both sides to engage with each other and Europe in a multilateral and liberal trading order. They also need to carefully develop realistic expectations from one another whilst closely working with the EU and NATO in the era of post-pandemic recovery.

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Constructivism and Diaspora: Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the United Kingdom[1]

Nihan Akıncılar Köseoğlu[2]

Abstract

This paper aims to examine the effect of Diasporas in host lands on the formation of national identity in homelands. By applying a constructivist approach, this paper seeks to explain how national identity is socially constructed and/or strengthened in Cyprus with the help of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diasporas in the United Kingdom (UK). To this end, Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the UK were investigated through their NGOs, print media and radio stations and, primarily, through a detailed examination of the Cypriot Diaspora Project. The paper attempts to answer two main questions. Firstly, can Turkish and Greek Cypriots be defined as a single Cypriot community in the UK when they have always sought to separate themselves from each other in Cyprus? Secondly, if they are regarded as a single community, can we expect that the change of attitude within the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diasporas may lead to a change of attitude towards unification in Cyprus under the influence of constructivist theory?

Keywords: Diaspora, Social Constructivism, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, United Kingdom

Sosyal İnşaacılık ve Diaspora: İngiltere'deki Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Rumlar

Özet

Yunanca'da 'tohumların saçılması' anlamına gelen diaspora, bir etnik-milli topluluğun anavatanından çıkarak başka ülkelere dağılması demektir. Diasporaların temel özelliği ise anavatanla ilişkisini koparmadan yaşamını anavatan dışında sürdürmesidir. Bu tanımdan yola çıkarak, 1920'lerden başlayarak Kıbrıs adasındaki ekonomik ve politik sorunlardan kaçan Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlar Amerika, Avustralya, Güney Afrika ve özellikle de İngiltere'ye göç etmişlerdir. O yıllarda İngiltere kolonisi olan adanın Türk ve Rum sakinleri, iş bulmak için İngiltere'yi seçmiş, bu yüzden göç dalgaları 1970'lerin sonuna kadar sürmüştür. Ve orada bir/er diaspora oluşturmuşlardır.

Kıbrıs adasında, Türkler ve Rumlar kendilerini daha çok dinleriyle tanımlarken, İngiltere'deki diasporalarında Kıbrıslı olmaları ön plana çıkar. Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi'nin 2004'te Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmasıyla birlikte, İngiltere'deki diasporalarında Avrupalı kimliği de vurgulanır. Diğer yandan, 1983'te bağımsızlığını ilan eden Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin İngiltere'deki diasporası ise kendisini sadece Türkiye'nin tanıması nedeniyle çeşitli zorluklar yaşamaktadırlar.

Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rum toplulukları, çoğunlukla Londra'nın kuzeyindeki Wood Green'de 1984'te kurulan Haringey Kıbrıs Toplumu Merkezi'nde bir araya gelmektedir. Ayrı ayrı kurdukları çeşitli görüşlerden kurumlarıyla, İngiliz hükümetinin de desteğini alarak politik ve sosyal alanlarda çeşitli faaliyetlerde bulunmaktadırlar. Bunun yanı sıra, kendi toplulukları için önemli olan günlerde Trafalgar Meydanı'na yürüyerek çeşitli eylemler yapmaktadırlar. Haftalık gazeteler, radyo istasyonları ve internet aracılığıyla da iki toplum arasındaki ve anavatanlarıyla aralarındaki ilişki devam etmektedir. Sonuç olarak, 23 Nisan 2003'te kişilerin ve

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[1] This paper was presented on 14 November 2009 as "Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diaspora(s) in the United Kingdom" in the Turkish Political Science Association 7th Graduate Conference organized by Istanbul Bilgi University – Istanbul/Turkey.

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malların Yeşil Hat üzerinden geçişleri başlamadan önce de İngiltere'deki diasporalarında iki toplum bir arada yaşayabilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Diaspora, Sosyal İnşaacılık, Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Rumlar, İngiltere

Introduction

This paper will look at the current international relations theory of constructivism in conjunction with the phenomenon of the diaspora. Turkish and Greek Cypriot diasporic populations who have emigrated from Cyprus – constituting the fifth-largest minority group in the United Kingdom – will be examined in the light of several constructivist principles.

First of all, this paper will summarise definitions of the term 'diaspora'. Then, after presenting the major actors in the host land, the place of the diaspora in International Relations (IR) theory will be examined. Constructivism in terms of national identity formation – particularly in London – will be addressed in detail, including when and why the migrants left Cyprus, together with their organisations, newspapers, radio stations and television channels, which affect both the formation of Cypriot identity in the host land and foreign policy in the homeland.

The Definition of Diaspora

According to Shain and Barth (2003), the term 'diaspora' originates from the Greek *dia spora* – 'splitting the seed' – and refers to 'a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland - whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control'.[3] While this has become a common definition of a diaspora, other scholars believe that every migrant or refugee wave constitutes a later diasporic group in the host land. Van Hear (1998) identifies three essential features of a diaspora, 'first, a diasporic population must be dispersed from a homeland to two or more host lands; next, such a presence abroad must be enduring (although not necessarily permanent); and most crucially, exchange and communication must happen between parts of the diaspora itself'.[4]

From these academic definitions, it can be understood that a diasporic population should reside outside its motherland as a minority in host countries while bound by strong economic, political and social ties to the home country. Hence, the ethnic or religious identity of this population abroad can be seen as dedicated to the homeland.

In reality, members of diasporic groups are expected to influence the foreign policies of both their homeland and host land. That is to say, diasporic groups abroad should establish a powerful political lobby for their homeland, attracting the attention of their host land's

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[3] Y. Shain and A. Barth, (2003), "Diasporas and International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, Vol. 57, p. 452.

[4] C. Ogden, (2008), "Diaspora meets IR's Constructivism: An Appraisal", *Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 2.

politicians as a direct means of improving relations between host and home countries. However, some diasporic groups are passive and do not become involved in this process, attempting rather to be assimilated into the host land's identity. In contrast, other members of the diasporic groups are active in seeking to affect the foreign policy of either their host land or their homeland, to preserve their national identity for themselves and the next generation.

In summary, 'diasporas are increasingly able to promote transnational ties, to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy as well as the "entrepreneurial spirit and skills that their home countries so sorely lack"'[5]. Thus, diasporic groups are generally able to democratise their home countries through the transmission of their experience in their host countries.

Diaspora and IR Theory

In the past, the phenomenon of the diaspora was not sufficiently attractive to scholars to prompt an examination using IR theory. However, with the growth of sociological research, diasporic groups are now being defined within the boundaries of IR with a particular emphasis on their importance and power over both home and host countries.

Recent examination of the place of the diaspora in IR theory has found that constructivist and liberal approaches complement one another: on the one hand, constructivism emphasises the impetus that diasporas give to the formation of national identity and the constitution of interests, preferences and practices. On the other hand, liberalism focuses on the domestic politics of a homeland influenced by the already established interests and preferences of the diaspora. As Shain and Barth (2003) note, 'To varying degrees, both constructivism and liberalism acknowledge the impact of both identity and domestic interaction on international behaviour'.[6]

Thus, both IR approaches claim that diasporas are motivated, in particular, by their national identities; their interests are formed by social interaction with each other and their homelands. Furthermore, these diasporas affect their homelands' foreign policies through domestic actors.

We turn now to an in-depth analysis of the constructivist approach towards diasporas since the purpose of this paper is to incorporate the theory of constructivism in the phenomenon of the diaspora. First of all, constructivism and its major principles in IR theory will be summarised and then, the term 'diaspora' will be addressed through a constructivist perspective.

Constructivism in IR Theory

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[5] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 450.
[6] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 451.

According to Wendt (1999), constructivism arose, and is shaped within the IR theory, from a belief that the international arena is socially constructed. Constructivism, while combining doctrines from several social theories, including critical theory, postmodernism and new institutionalism, is defined by Wendt as based on two main principles, '(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.'[7]

For Wendt, constructivism is not a theory of international politics; however, it can be utilised and adapted in every political system in which the main actor is the state itself. Wendt uses the term 'state' to encompass any organisation which cannot exist without its relationship to society. In constructivist theory, society is composed of the shared ideas of its members; these shared ideas shape the national identity and national interests of the population both within the motherland and in the diaspora.

Diaspora and Constructivism

Since constructivism accepts that shared ideas shape national identities at home and abroad, it is, as noted by Ogden (2008) a natural starting point in IR for the analysis of the notion of the diaspora.[8] The appropriateness of constructivism in this regard is due also to the multiple identities encompassed within the diaspora, crossing national boundaries and concerned both with domestic politics and transnational relations (Ogden, 2008).[9]

Constructivism's main argument regarding the diaspora is its ability to form a national identity. Thus, the diasporic group's interests and preferences will be shaped according to its identity. However, 'identity does not always determine interests, as constructivism posits; sometimes identity is the interest'.[10] Shain and Barth (2003) concur that national identity is, for some, not merely a means of influencing policy but the end in itself, 'For some diasporas, the people's identity is not the starting point to be captured in order to influence interests, practices, and policies; identity is both the starting and the end point.'[11]

According to constructivists, a population living in its homeland can enjoy its identity in its daily life. However, the diasporic population of this nation in the host land has sufficient encouragement to work hard in order to form and preserve their national identity through which they will gain the right to experience their national interests.

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[7] A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1.

[8] Ogden, (2008), p. 1.

[9] Ogden, (2008), p. 1.

[10] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 455.

[11] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 455.

Moreover, homelands, broadly speaking, are in favour of active diasporas abroad: if the diaspora is politically and economically powerful in the host land, it can invest in its homeland, bringing financial support and influence in the foreign policies of its host land through the mobilisation of diaspora members, campaigns, demonstrations and lobbies.

Nevertheless, in order to create such an active and engaged diasporic group, there must be motivation and capacity to do so. That is to say, the more democratic the host land, the more motivation and capacity for the diasporic influence exist. Conversely, the weaker the homeland, both economically and in terms of social structures, and the more cohesive the diaspora, in terms of determination to influence policy through a unified voice, the greater the influence the community will exert on its homeland.[12]

In summary, according to constructivism, a diasporic population comprises both active and passive members. In the optimal version of a diaspora, the diasporic group is active in social and political relations, shaping its national identity through its shared ideas. A powerful and successful diasporic population can influence the economics, politics and society of both the home and host countries. Conversely, in the worst version of the diaspora, the diasporic organisation in the host land is passive, including in its political and economic relations with the homeland. This kind of diasporic group wishes to integrate and assimilate into the host country.

The Division of Cyprus

The division of Cyprus into the Turkish north and the Greek south originated in 1964 when the Turkish Cypriot minority was displaced and attacked by the Greek Cypriots and the British commander, Major General Peter Young, first conceived of the ceasefire zone and drew a line – allegedly with a green crayon – across a map of Cyprus, dividing the country into two parts.[13] The process can, however, be traced back to 1960, when the new constitution of the independent country separated the population into two ethnic identities. A further decisive step was taken in 1963, when Makarios proposed to annul the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The struggle between the Greek EOKA, which wanted *enosis* (unity with Greece), and the Turkish Cypriots who wanted *taksim* (partition) grew. Moreover, according to Innes (2017), the British supported 'Turkish Cypriot police forces to combat growing EOKA militarization, …[and] fostered discord between the two groups'.[14] It may be said that this process was completed de facto in 1974 after Turkey's intervention in response to Makarios's coup.

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[12] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 466.

[13] A. J. Innes, "Mobile diasporas, postcolonial identities: the Green Line in Cyprus", *Postcolonial Studies*, (2017), p. 2.

[14] Innes, (2017), p. 2.

Cypriot Migration to the United Kingdom

The agricultural state of Cyprus and the exploitation of its natural resources by the colonialists forced many Cypriots to seek their fortune in industrially advanced countries,[15] including the USA, Australia, South Africa and, especially, the United Kingdom (UK). The reason for the vast migration to the UK stems from the fact that, when the UK annexed Cyprus in 1914, residents of Cyprus acquired 'a new status as subjects of the British Crown'.[16] From the 1920s, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots left the island for both economic and political reasons. In economic terms, Cyprus was poor, and opportunities for rural Cypriots to find work were rare since unemployment was high at the time. In political terms, the clash between Turkish and Greek nationalists was ongoing, since the Greek part of the island wanted to unite with Greece while the Turkish part desired the partition of the island, with its part uniting with Turkey. The conflict gained another dimension with the British involvement.

In the first wave of migration in the 1920s, the island was under British colonial rule and Cypriots, therefore, migrated to the UK to find work. During the 1930s and 1940s, the UK started to employ Cypriot workers, and approximately 1,000 Cypriots emigrated from the island each year and settled in Britain.

The second wave of Cypriot migration occurred in the 1950s with the escalation of the conflict in the island between the two communities, exacerbated by the events of 6–7 September 1955 in Turkey, mainly in İstanbul and in İzmir, in the form of a pogrom, planned and supported by the Turkish government against non-Muslim minorities and, in particular, the Rum Orthodox minority, attacking them and plundering their properties to seize their wealth and position. These events were reflected in Cyprus and, as a result, Greek Cypriots left the island in increasing numbers, with approximately 3,800 migrants leaving the island each year to settle in the UK.

In 1959, the Zurich and London agreements were signed between Britain, Greece and Turkey, the three 'Guarantor Powers' of Cyprus, the population of which comprises Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Maronite and Latin Cypriots. In reality, Turkish and Greek Cypriots constitute a bi-communal majority, while the other Catholic populations form a minority on the island.

Most importantly, with the support of these three Guarantor Powers, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as a unified entity under equal Greek and Turkish administration, resulting in civil war at that time. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 was

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[15] V. Coombe and A. Little, *Race & Social Work*, (London: Tavistock Publication, 1986), p. 80.

[16] T. Küçükcan, "The making of Turkish-Muslim diaspora in Britain: religious collective identity in a multicultural public sphere", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2004), p. 246.

accepted to prevent an influx of migration from Cyprus, Cypriots continued to leave the island for Britain, and the estimated number of Cypriots in Britain had reached approximately 80,000 by 1964.[17]

The third migration wave came after 1964, with civil war in Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations, because of conflict between the hyper-nationalist organisations of the two populations, that is, EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) and TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation).

The most recent migration wave occurred after the turning point of 1974, when Turkey intervened following an attempted coup d'etat by the Greek junta. Thereafter, the island was separated into two countries: approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to leave the North and settle in the South, while around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were relocated from the South to the North. Because of this chaotic atmosphere, approximately 15,000 Turkish Cypriots and 15,000 Greek Cypriots emigrated from the country and resettled in the UK, and especially in London. By the 1980s, the number of the Cypriot diaspora in the UK was estimated at around 160,000, of which 20–25% were thought to be Turkish-Cypriots.[18] Coombe and Little (1986) reported similar figures.[19] Those Cypriot migrants who later constituted the Cypriot diaspora in the UK emigrated from the island only as married couples. Once in Britain, they sought refuge from friends or relatives, who could also help them find accommodation and employment.[20] By the 1990s, it is estimated that the Greek Cypriots in London numbered around 180,000–200,000 (Christodoulou-Pipis, 1991), while the population of Nicosia was 200,000–250,000 (Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, Cyprus).[21] Thus, in the 1980s, the Greek communities in the UK and Cyprus were numerically comparable; this started to change in the 2000s.

Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diaspora(s) in the United Kingdom: Bi-communal or one Community?

In the homeland of Cyprus, 77% of the population are Greek Cypriots, with 18% Turkish Cypriots and the remaining 5% a combination of Armenian, Maronite and Latin Christian minorities. According to the 2011 population censuses held in the Turkish Republic

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[17] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 247.

[18] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 247.

[19] Coombe & Little, (1986), p. 81.

[20] Coombe & Little, (1986), p. 81.

[21] P. Gardner-Chloros, L. McEntee-Atalianis and K. Finnis, Language Attitudes and Use in a Transplanted Setting: Greek Cypriots in London", *International Journal of Multilingualism*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2005), p. 55.

of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and in Greek Cyprus, 667,398[22] Greek Cypriots and 286,257[23] Turkish Cypriots live on the island.

According to the UK's 2011 population census,[24] the Cypriot diasporas are composed of around 300,000 Turkish and Greek Cypriots, including 60,000 Cypriot-born immigrants; the majority live in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff, Nottingham and Bristol.[25] Approximately one-third of the total Cypriot diaspora in the UK is Turkish Cypriot, with about two-thirds Greek Cypriots, 70% of whom live in London alone.

These data show that nearly one-third of the Cypriot population lives outside Cyprus, and, for this reason, the Cypriot diaspora is an important force for the motherland, both for the TRNC and Greek Cyprus. For the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the UK is crucial in terms of the economy, due to the financial problems it encounters because of its lack of international recognition. In contrast, for Greek Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot diaspora plays a major role in terms of political preferences. Due to long-standing British involvement in Cyprus, the two diasporic populations in the UK have both gained importance for their home countries.

In Cyprus, no sole Cypriot identity has emerged among Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Therefore, Greek Cypriots in the UK define themselves predominantly as Orthodox Christians speaking Greek, while Turkish Cypriots in the UK define themselves as Turkish-speaking Muslims, but a majority also emphasise their Turkishness.

Although both Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the UK had felt a historical link with the UK before immigration, after settlement they became an 'invisible population'.[26] Traditionally, neither population shared a feeling of being Cypriot; rather, they separately reconciled themselves to their Greekness and Turkishness.

Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot diaspora in the UK started to define themselves predominantly with their Cypriot and European identities, especially after Greek Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004. In contrast, some hyper-nationalist groups within the Greek Cypriot diaspora define themselves as Greeks and participate in Greek diasporic organisations. Nevertheless, due to the high numbers in the Greek Cypriot diaspora and the

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[22] Population Census 2011 in Cyprus, Statistical Service of Cyprus (CYSTAT), https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_22main_en/populationcondition_22main_en?OpenForm&sub=2&sel=2

[23] 2011 Nüfus Sayımı, KKTC İstatistik Kurumu, http://www.stat.gov.ct.tr/nufus2011.aspx

[24] Office for National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets

[25] https://cypriotfederation.org.uk/ukcypriots/

[26] K. Robins and A. Aksoy, "From spaces of identity to mental spaces: Lessons from Turkish-Cypriot cultural experience in Britain", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2001), p. 685.

democratic and open-minded nature of Britain, they have established a powerful diasporic group that emphasises first their Cypriot, and then their European, identity.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora is less powerful and effective than its Greek counterpart. In 1983, the TRNC was declared an independent country but only Turkey has recognised its independence to date; as a result, Turkish Cypriots abroad have faced a conflict about their identity. The majority emphasise their Cypriotness, but also define themselves as Turks. As Robins and Aksoy (2001) observe, 'Whilst they clearly have a sense of a culture in common, they have never had an achieved sense of national identity.'[27]

As a result, although both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have respectively attempted to preserve their cultural identities, they can live together in a close environment as if they constitute one single Cypriot diaspora in the UK.

Cypriot Organisations in Britain

The Greek Cypriot case

The earliest established Greek Cypriot diasporic organisations are EKEKA (the Federation of Cypriot Refugees, established in 1974), POMAK (the World Federation of Overseas Cypriots) and PSEKA (the Global Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) which are all members of the Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE) and are nationalist associations maintaining no communication with the Turkish Cypriots. These organisations lobby the host countries' governments 'in a classic way, by letters, street demonstrations, picketing and events like fund-raising, public meetings, etc. during electoral campaigns'.[28] They are closely involved with the political situation in Cyprus and emphasise international law and human rights' issues in their discourse, including the Greek Cypriot civilians and soldiers missing since the Turkish intervention in 1974 and the Turkish occupation of Cyprus.[29]

In 1974, a non-political organisation – the Christian-only National Federation of Cypriots in Great Britain (NFCGB) – was established, aimed at communication and cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot organisations. Except for the Lobby for Cyprus, almost all the Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK belong to the NFCGB.[30] Lobby for Cyprus was established in 1993 and was highly effective in the New Labour election campaign in 1997. Moreover, AKEL as the communist party of Greek Cypriots has opened a branch in the UK which has been powerful in influencing the policies of the host land.

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[27] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), pp. 685–686.
[28] G. Bertrand, "Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) Committed to Peace?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (2004), p. 101.
[29] Bertrand, (2004), p. 101.
[30] Bertrand, (2004), p. 108.

Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992) introduced the notion of a Community of Practice with reference to British-born Greek Cypriots. According to their definition, a Community of Practice is 'an aggregate of people who, united by a common enterprise, develop and share ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs and values—in short, practices' (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1999, p.186).[31] Within this Community of Practice, Greek Cypriots can develop a shared identity in the UK through 'shared stories, insider jokes, knowing laughter, styles recognised as displaying membership, and a shared discourse that reflects a common outlook' as Wenger (1998) argues.[32] Although the second and third generations of British-born Greek Cypriots are criticised for their loss of Cypriot identity and their assimilation into British culture,[33] they have strong ties with relatives in the UK and 'live in a close-knit environment'.[34] In fact, the Greek Cypriots both in Cyprus and the UK have striven to protect their culture and language, faced with mutual political, economic and social concerns.[35] Greek Cypriots in the UK speak three languages: Cypriot Greek, Modern Greek and English.[36]

The Turkish Cypriot case

Like the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots in the UK also have a tripartite cultural reference point in developing their identity: the Cypriot culture, the culture of 'mainland' Turkey and the culture of Britain.[37] Largely due to the non-recognition of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the UK has worked hard to integrate into British culture and was, thus, more open to assimilation than the Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora has been called a 'silent or silenced minority' or a 'lost community with a lost identity' (Aydın Mehmet Ali, 1985, 1990).[38]

However, almost all the Turkish Cypriot organisations focus on the Turkish language because 'assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity'.[39] The Turkish Cypriot identity, thus, comprises language, ethnicity and Islam, which are transmitted to the younger generations in the UK.

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[31] K. A. Finnis, "Variation within a Greek-Cypriot community of practice in London: Code-switching, gender, and identity", *Language in Society*, Vol. 43, (2014), p. 289.

[32] Finnis, (2004), p. 290.

[33] A. Papapavlou and P. Pavlou, "The interplay of language use and language maintenance and the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots in the UK", *International Journal of Applied Linguistics,* Vol. 11, No. 1, (2001), p. 105.

[34] Papapavlou & Pavlou, (2001), p. 104.

[35] Gardner-Chloros, McEntee-Atalianis & Finnis, (2005), p. 57.

[36] P. Karatsareas, "Attitudes towards Cypriot Greek and Standard Modern Greek in London's Greek Cypriot community", *International Journal of Bilingualism*, (2018), p. 5.

[37] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), p. 686.

[38] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), pp. 690–692.

[39] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 252.

Just after the partition of Cyprus, the hyper-nationalist organisations 'Relatives of the massacred Turkish Cypriots' and 'Cyprus Before 1974' were founded in the UK. Later, the Council of Turkish Cypriot Organisations (Konsey) was established by pro-Denktaş – pro-TRNC – Cypriots. Almost all the Turkish Cypriot organisations are members of the Konsey, which has been active, industrious and successful in affecting, to some extent, the host land's policies and practices. In order not to become a 'silent community', some of the Turkish Cypriot organisations in the UK prefer to keep the Cyprus issue alive to help revive a collective identity.[40]

In addition, the UBP (the National Unity Party), with about 50,000 supporters in the UK; the Solidarity Association (CTPDD), a relatively passive organisation; the CTP (Republican Turkish Party) and the United Patriotic Movement Solidarity Association (YHBDD) act as the main representatives of the Turkish Cypriots, the latter two constituting the Cyprus Turkish Democratic Association (CTDA). The CTDA has been a conciliatory association between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities and is even in favour of the unification of the two communities on the island. Furthermore, the CTDA has good relations with the AKEL and NFCGB in the UK: the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organisations communicate and share news and developments from Cyprus with each other. As Bertrand (2004) notes, 'In this sense, Cypriot diasporic organizations by-passed the 'Green Line' which almost totally separated Christian (Greek and minorities) and Turkish Cypriots, until its opening on April 23, 2003.'[41]

YHBDD performs well in terms of being active in Britain but is unable to influence either the host or the home country. The CTPDD, YHBDD and CTDA all advocate that British-born Turkish Cypriots integrate into British society while, at the same time, trying to mobilise them.[42]

The Turkish Cypriot Network (TCN) is a hyper-nationalist, anti-Greek association and supports the conservative government in Turkey. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) notes succinctly that 'TCN calls itself "the voice of Turkish Cypriots" while the Turkish Cypriot Democratic Association calls itself "the voice of the peace-loving Turkish Cypriot Community in Europe."'[43]

In the 2000s, with the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and Cyprus joining the EU in 2004, relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK have also

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[40] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 253.
[41] Bertrand, (2004), p. 107.
[42] Bertrand, (2004), p. 107.
[43] E. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of Diaspora Politics: Turkish Cypriots in Britain and the Cyprus Issue", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2003), p. 691.

developed. Several Turkish Cypriot organisations established the 'Peace for Cyprus' platform at the beginning of 2003, in cooperation with their Greek Cypriot counterparts.

Moreover, the Annan Plan, prepared by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the re-unification of the island, was supported by the majority of Turkish Cypriot organisations in the UK, except for the hyper-nationalists. A referendum for the Annan Plan was held on 24 April 2004, in which 64.9% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour, while 75.8% of Greek Cypriots voted against. Despite the Turkish Cypriot diaspora launching a 'policy of lobbying EU states to put pressure on Greek-Cypriots as a sign of the Turks' desire to be a part of Europe', Cyprus joined the EU, leaving the Turkish side behind.[44] In this regard, it is hard to say whether the good relations between the two communities in Britain affected the homeland's policies or vice versa.

The British case

Apart from the above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, three British-supported associations for the Cypriots are also important.

The first is the 'Friends of Cyprus' association which was established in 1974 in London. It includes Cypriot members from both Turkish and Greek sides, but the leading roles are played by British MPs (Members of Parliament) and MEPs (Members of the European Parliament).

Secondly, the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Cypriot Affairs (ACGTA) was formed in 1992 in the UK by students and scholars as an academic organisation. It is a powerful organisation with the capacity to bring British and both Turkish and Greek Cypriot academics together to share ideas for future solutions.

Thirdly, the Forum for Friendship and Cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was established in 1997 in London, also by students and scholars, as another academic organisation.

In summary, while Turkish and Greek Cypriots have formed their own ethnic organisations in the UK in order to play a role in the Cyprus issue, the UK as a former guarantor power, has also established locations to allow interaction between the two communities. Whereas the TRNC and Greek Cypriot governments have been satisfied with the active roles of their diasporas in the UK, British politicians have also used these diasporic groups to gain votes during election campaigns.

Living Centres Established by the Cypriot Diasporas

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[44] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 253.

There are two main centres for the two Cypriot communities settled in London. First, in 1984, the major Cypriot community centre was formed in Wood Green, North London, also known as the Haringey Cypriot Community Centre (HCCC). This is more active than the second community centre established in Southwark in 1989 to provide social services for older members of the two Cypriot communities. The administration of these centres has been organised so that the chairperson is elected, by the members of the centres, from either the Turkish or Greek Cypriot community, while the manager is elected from the other community.

The HCCC has played a leading role for many years, organising breakfasts, lunches, dinners, as well as marriages, circumcisions and other social occasions for Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Moreover, in order to integrate British-born children into the Cypriot community, the HCCC arranges Turkish and Greek language classes.

The two communities share the same political activities in London: every year, on 9 July, Greek Cypriots celebrate the anniversary of the 1821 uprising in Cyprus. This celebration should be regarded as a protest the current situation on the island. As Bertrand (2004) notes, 'The Turkish Cypriots might have agreed to protest with the Greek Cypriots about the current situation, but July 9 is a dividing event because it is a purely Greek nationalist event.'[45]

Likewise, every year on 21 July, Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations arrange marches to Trafalgar Square. First, the Turkish Cypriots celebrate the anniversary of the Turkish 'intervention' in Cyprus in 1974; then, some hours later, the Greek Cypriot community marches to the same place to protest Turkey's 'invasion'. Nevertheless, in both demonstrations, Turkish and Greek Cypriot demonstrators can be observed hand-in-hand.

Moreover, both communities share time in social activities: they watch television at the HCCC together, talk to each other about daily issues or news from Cyprus, discuss the politics of the home and host countries, visit each other in their homes, cooperate at work, businesses and in schools. They even marry members of the other community: the marriage of Turkay Hadji-Philippou, the chair of the Turkish Cypriot Community Association (which owns Londra Toplum Postası) to a highly active Greek Cypriot woman attracted attention from both the Cypriot diasporas in the UK.[46]

Weekly newspapers, radio stations and the internet are also crucial and beneficial means for the formation of an ethnic identity among Turkish and Greek Cypriot community members.

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[45] Bertrand, (2004), p. 102.
[46] Bertrand, (2004), p. 104.

Four weekly Turkish newspapers are in circulation in London: *Londra Toplum Postası*, *Londra Gazete*, *Avrupa* and *Olay*. While *Londra Toplum Postası* is run by Turkish Cypriots to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, *Londra Gazete* is published by both Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the two aforementioned newspapers are left-wing, *Avrupa* and *Olay* are Turkish-owned, nationalist, pro-Turkish government publications. In addition, there is a radio station run by Turkish Cypriots – *London Turkish Radio* – who define themselves as Turks.

For the Greeks, *Parikiaki*, the Greek Cypriot weekly newspaper, is dominant in spreading and influencing news and attitudes about Cyprus in London. There has for many years been one radio station for Greek Cypriots, named London Greek Radio. However, in the HCCC, watching television is a popular pastime in both communities, with the Cyprus channel (CBC-SAT), Greek channel (ERT-SAT) and the local Hellenic TV the major channels available throughout the day.

Moreover, currently, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot home pages on the internet are commonly used by both Cypriot communities, especially by the younger generations. The best-known is the 'HADE Bi-communal Magazine of Cyprus' which has managed to bring Turkish and Greek Cypriot youth together through its forums.

Indeed, this Cypriot Community Centre has been a major hub in forming a Cypriot identity among the diasporic populations. Both Turkish and Greek Cypriots use the media in the HCCC extensively and can communicate and interact with each other easily. It is worth emphasising that Greek and Turkish Cypriots share the same space at the HCCC in a way that has not been common in Cyprus for almost half a century.[47]

Questioning the Cypriot Diasporas in the UK: Can Turkish and Greek Cypriots Affect Their Homelands' Foreign Policies?

It should be noted that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have managed to live together in the two above-mentioned Cypriot centres. This co-existence is considerably more successful than the conditions on the island of Cyprus. However, in order not to lose their historical ties with Cyprus, and their respective cultural identities, both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities try to pass on features of their respective languages, religions and ethnicities to the younger generations.

When we examine separately the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their IGOs and/or NGOs, mass media and political activities, it is clear that the Greek Cypriot community is far more powerful and successful than the Turkish Cypriot diasporic group. Since the ethnic identity of Greek Cypriots has gained far wider acceptance in the

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[47] M. Georgiou, "Crossing the Boundaries of the Ethnic Home: Media Consumption and Ethnic Identity Construction in the Public Space: The Case of the Cypriot Community Centre in North London", *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 63, No. 4, (2001), p. 326.

international arena than the Turkish Cypriot identity, which is recognised only by Turkey, Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK have a more powerful voice in influencing UK foreign policy concerning Cyprus in favour of themselves.

As Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) argues, the Greek Cypriot community's lobby is 'one of the few successful diaspora political lobbies in Western Europe and has strong ties with the Labour Party'.[48] It should be noted that, because the number of registered Greek Cypriot voters exceeds that of Turkish Cypriot voters in the UK, political parties tend to establish stronger relations with the Greek Cypriot diasporic group during election campaigns. Consequently, Turkish Cypriot associations are relatively passive compared to their Greek Cypriot counterparts. This passivity may also stem from the positive or negative attitudes of British politicians regarding the TRNC government. In addition, after the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and Cyprus' EU membership in 2004, Greek Cypriots increased their active role in British politics. The effect was, however, to some extent balanced if a unionist and less nationalist president was elected in the TRNC. Moreover, with the increased number of registered Turkish Cypriot voters in the UK, the Turkish Cypriot lobby has recently started to be used during election campaigns. As Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) notes, 'The TRNC political actors, like political actors in most sending countries, are interested in supportive lobby groups abroad – in particular when they reside in countries like Britain which is relatively influential in international politics in general and in the Cyprus issue in particular.'[49] That is to say, as a former guarantor country, the UK has been a powerful actor in the Cyprus issue in the international arena, and the TRNC government, therefore, would like the Turkish Cypriot diasporic population in the UK to influence the host land's policies and practices in favour of the TRNC.

Conclusion

Currently, debate continues among sociologists and political scientists regarding the meaning of the phenomenon of the diaspora. While some see every migration event as creating a diaspora, the definition produced by Shain and Barth (2003) is the most complex and fully-fledged. Since constructivism and liberalism are both appropriate approaches for the study of the phenomenon, these two IR theories are applied. Constructivism argues that the world is socially constructed. In the international arena, a state should have good relations with society, which is shaped by the shared ideas of its members, leading to the formation of a national identity and national interests at home or abroad.

After the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the island was separated into two communities which later formed Greek Cyprus in the South and the TRNC in the North.

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[48] Ostergaard-Nielsen, (2003), p. 694.
[49] Ostergaard-Nielsen, (2003), p. 697.

While these two communities live separately in Cyprus, Cypriot immigrants in the UK, specifically in London, have collectively formed a single community centre. This Cypriot diaspora constitutes the fifth-largest minority in the UK. Although these two communities have to face the ongoing problem in Cyprus, Turkish and Greek Cypriots have succeeded in sharing the same social space, schools, work and businesses.

In order to establish a Cypriot identity in the two communities in the UK, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots founded major intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations to help exert influence on their homelands' politics. Since the Greek Cypriot identity is far more powerful and widely approved by international actors than the Turkish Cypriot identity, due to the widespread non-recognition of the TRNC, the Greek Cypriot diaspora has become better-known and more successful in terms of lobbying for Cyprus in its host land.

Indeed, these Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations cooperate with each other in political and social events in daily life. Although the unification of the two countries within the island of Cyprus remains a well-known and unresolved issue between the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot governments, the problem has already been overcome within the Cypriot diaspora(s) in London, the majority of whom are in favour of the unification. Those who support the unification of the island call themselves Turkish-speaking or Greek-speaking Cypriots, while those members of the Cypriot diaspora in favour of the status quo define themselves as Turkish or Greek Cypriots, or even as Turks or Greeks.

In terms of the diaspora's effect on homeland policies, it cannot easily be claimed that the Cypriot diasporas in the UK influence domestic politics. In the unification referendum of Cyprus in 2004, the shared ideas of the Cypriot diasporas in London had little effect on the views of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations on the island. Therefore, the percentage of negative votes outweighed the affirmative ones and the separation of the island continued. In the end, the successful lobbying of hardworking Turkish and Greek Cypriot diasporic organisations in the UK was not able to change attitudes on the island. Could this, however, change in the future?

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The Impacts of Lausanne Treaty on British Colonialism

Emine Tutku Vardağlı[1]

Abstract

This study analyses the impacts of the Lausanne Treaty upon the British colonial rule. So far, much has been discussed about how the Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922 and the conclusion of Lausanne Treaty in 1923 influenced anti-imperialist or anti-colonial movements on the Middle East. That means the issue was usually studied from the perspective of the colonized. However, the colonizer side of the issue is often neglected. Whereas the British Parliamentary discussions during the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty expose that this Treaty posed serious questions for the British colonial administration. Specifically, Canada's challenge to the British colonial rule concerning the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty provoked heated debates in the British Parliament. British colonies' contribution to the imperial military campaigns and their role in the peace settlements were open to debate. Besides, the administrative approach to the colonies created a dispute in the British domestic politics between the liberals and the conservatives. Thus, it is argued that the Lausanne Treaty generated an immediate impact on the colonial administration and the domestic politics of the British Empire as well. From this point of view, the Lausanne Treaty as a special post-First World War (WWI) agreement is formulated here as a critical stage in the de-colonization movement, which is usually taken as a post-Second World War phenomenon.

Key words: Lausanne Treaty, British Colonialism, British Parliament, First World War, Decolonization

Introduction

British imperial rule was preoccupied with so many questions concerning the dominions and colonies at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, managing these entities at the brink of a world war and mobilizing them for a common imperial cause was not an easy task at that period. In addition, the British imperial rule was still striving to capture new colonies to advance, or at least to sustain, its position against the other Great Powers in the international order. At the end of the First World War, the British Army was evacuating from the Caucasus, however it got its share from the falling Ottoman Empire under the League of Nations' Mandate System and extended its imperial rule. Territorial expansion of the Empire and the post-war difficulties levied an extra burden on the British colonial rule and gave way to critics not only in the dominions but also in the domestic politics.

The economic and human resources of the British colonies were exploited during the WWI and these exploitations gave way to discontents in the colonies.[2] The British dominions and colonies demonstrated their discontent in diverse ways in the postwar period. Over 2.5 million

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[2] Christian Koller, "The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War", *Immigrants & Minorities* 26, no. 1-2 (2008), p. 3.

men had served in the armies of the Dominions, as well as many thousands of volunteers from the Crown colonies.[3] It is understood from the British Parliamentary debates that drafting these colonies into a peace agreement was more problematic than mobilizing them for the imperial war effort. The colonies supporting the imperial war effort enthusiastically at the beginning of the war changed their minds during the war because of the calamities they experienced on several fronts. Their enthusiasm at the beginning of the war was replaced by a more sober attitude against the British imperial rule. Although the colonies were contended with the conclusion of the WWI, the bitter war memories,[4] isolation from the peace settlement arrangements and frustrating postwar migrations to England, the heart of the Empire,[5] led them to question their role in the British Empire. After the WWI, the dominions and colonies[6] asked greater autonomy and real authority in the war and peace decisions beyond formality. Relying on the Parliamentary debates, this study proposes the period following the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty as an antecedent of the decolonization movement for the British Empire. Although the WWII is usually taken as the key turning point for the decolonization movement,[7] the immediate aftermath of the WWI is suggested in this study as one of the initial stages of decolonization.

The challenges from the colonies were debated in the British Parliament during the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. Specifically, Canada's rejection to sign the treaty compelled the British government to revise its colonial administration approach and policy-making methods especially regarding the war and peace decisions.[8] Lausanne Treaty as the last one of the series of treaties concluding the WWI generated a formal ground where the critics of the colonies were crystallized.

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3 Peter J. Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 151.

4 Santanu Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 127-142.

5 Jacqueline Jenkinson, "All in the Same Uniform? The Participation of Black Colonial Residents in the British Armed Forces in the First World War", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 2 (2012), pp. 207-230.

6 Dominions refer to the privileged colonies of the British Empire having greater autonomy in comparison to the dominions. This status was formally accorded to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. For further information, see S. H. Steinberg, "The British Commonwealth and Empire" in The *Statesman's Year-Book,* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1948), pp. 54-71.

7 Robert Pearce, "The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa", *African Affairs* 83, no. 330 (1984), pp.77-93; Antony G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization", *Past & Present* 200, no. 1 (2008), pp. 211-247.

8 George M. Wrong, "Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet", *Canadian Historical Review* 1, no. 1 (1920): 3-25.

In this article, the British Parliamentary minutes are taken as the key source to analyse the position of the colonies and the British rule regarding the ratification of this treaty. The Parliamentary debates were centred on the ratification procedures. These procedures revealed the question of the isolation of colonies from the most critical decisions of the British Empire. For this reason, these procedures were deemed more essential than the provisions of the treaty.

After the WWI experience, the fundamental question was to what extend the colonies should have a say in the most critical decisions of the British Empire. The below sections analyse this key question from the point of the colonies and the British colonial administration. To start with the position of the colonies, it is observed that not only the greater dominions like India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, but also the newly obtained smaller colonies of the Empire were challenging to the British rule in their own ways. Therefore, a general overview of the state of the British colonial administration at the end of the WWI helps to see the whole picture. Given the integrity and interdependence of the British imperial rule, as was underlined by the British colonial administration on many occasions, a challenge by a colonial entity can only be comprehended regarding the state of the colonial rule in general.

The State of British Colonial Rule at the end of the First World War

Although the decolonization notion entered to the lexicon in the 1930s and became popular after the WWII,[9] the WWI experiences laid the ground. The WWI had done much to alter the tone of colonialism.[10] While the war mobilization efforts at the beginning of the war, especially the soldier recruitments, might have generated a consolidating effect on the colonial empires by extending a common sentiment of belonging to the same polity, the later stages of the war unravelled the dissociating forces. Especially the battles in which the soldiers from the colonies were killed in large numbers forged the bitter war memories and prompted the colonies to revise their role and significance for the empire. For example, the losses of Australian and New Zealand troops, namely the ANZAC forces, during the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign against the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact on the national consciousness at home, and marked a watershed in the transition of Australia and New Zealand from colonies to independent nations. The Battle of Vimy Ridge, where the losses of the Canadian troops were innumerable, made a similar impact upon the Canadian national consciousness.[11] Therefore, especially the dominions like Canada, Australia and New Zealand started to develop a more reserved attitude against the British rule after the WWI experiences. Moreover, not only the human resources but also the economic

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[9] Raymond F. Betts, *Decolonization*, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 1.
[10] Prasenjit Duara, *Decolonization Perspectives, Now and Then*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 98.
[11] Trevor O. Lloyd, *The British Empire 1558–1995, (*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 277.

resources of the colonies were exhausted during the war, which was another source of discontent in the colonies. In addition, the critical circles at home were complaining about financing the war spending of the colonies and meeting their economic restoration costs in the aftermath of the war. In short, the dissociating factors came to the surface in the immediate aftermath of the Great War.[12]

The ill effects of the war were further deteriorated by the ongoing challenges from the colonies. Ireland and India questions were already occupying the agenda of the British colonial administration even before the war. According to Thurlow, the colonial matters of the Empire always had a certain influence on the domestic politics of Britain. The British Home Office was at odds with the Colonial Office for this reason. The Home Office complained many times about the Colonial Office for occupying the domestic agenda. However, the long-established determination of the British Home Office that the questions of Colonial Office should not influence the way how Britain was governed, did not practically make sense in the post-war period. Parallel to the raising challenges from the colonies in the post-war period, the colonial questions went beyond the domain of the Colonial Office and turned to a critical issue of domestic party politics between the liberals and the conservatives. Consequently, the British governments had to develop a more consensual approach to the colonies in the post-WWI period.[13] Although some of them were just on paper, the British administration had to assign self-governing status for some dominions and the colonies in the aftermath of the Great War, as part of an appeasement policy.

Declaration of Irish Independence in 1919 and the following guerilla war frustrated the British administration.[14] A similar struggle started in India when the Government of India Act (1919) failed to satisfy the demand for independence.[15] The India Office demanded autonomous enclaves or statelets under the British rule. Moreover, the British-Turkish relations found direct resonances in India. Especially, the Muslim population of India was very closely watching the Turkish Struggle against the Great Powers.[16]

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[12] Chris Wrigley (ed.), *British Industrial Relations*, (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 1996), pp. 28, 40.

[13] Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Wiley, 1994), p. 75.

14 Judith Brown, *The Twentieth Century, The Oxford History of the British Empire,* Volume IV, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 127-135.

[15] See Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power,* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

[16] Alp Yenen, "The Other Jihad: Enver Pasha, Bolsheviks, and Politics of Anticolonial Muslim Nationalism during the Baku Congress 1920" in *The First World War and Its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Middle East*, edited by Fraser T. G., (London: Gingko, 2015), pp. 275-276.

Not only the British dominions, but also the A category mandates under the League of Nations' mandate system like Iraq and Palestine posed challenges to the British government in the same period. In Palestine, Britain had a problem of maintaining the balances between the Arabs and Jews. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, started a century-long Arab-Israeli conflict.[17] On the other side, the treaty signed between Britain and Iraq in 1922 was challenged soon both in Iraq and in Britain. The Iraq administration realized that this treaty envisaged the reproduction of the mandate rule, and it was far from achieving the independence of the country. Therefore, the Iraq Parliament refused to ratify this treaty. On the other side, the British public was not satisfied with this treaty either. A press campaign was organized against the British expenditures in Iraq. This campaign made an impact on the British general elections in 1922.[18] In 1922, British administration granted another unsatisfying formal independence for Egypt this time.[19]

The British colonies in Africa were also frustrated. Black colonial people volunteered for the British Army and the Royal Navy during the WWI, because they regarded themselves as part of the British Empire. Nevertheless, their enthusiasm for the British Empire was replaced by frustration at the end of the war. On their return from the war front, demobilized African navy personnel intended to settle in Britain. However, the white crowds that attacked black colonial war veterans during the Seaport riots of 1919 manifested that they were not regarded as Briton as they assumed by some white Britons. These Black veterans were repatriated to their home after the war to give the message to the potential emigrants from the African colonies that they would not be welcomed by London.[20]

All these postwar developments in the colonies indicate that the British administration was having difficulties in meeting the demands of the colonies in the post-war period. Some colonies believed that they deserved a greater autonomy or independence; some others asked better life standards in Britain in return for their war services. On the face of these post-war demands from the colonies, it is observed that the British administration had to follow an appeasement policy to maintain its power.

Although the British administration still stood as a powerful force over the colonies, it had to give some concessions to be able to maintain its power. The admission of formal self-

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17 W. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization, (*London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 73-75.

18 https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/British-occupation-and-the-mandatory-regime, retrieved on 14.3.2021.

19 Simon Smith, *British Imperialism 1750–1970,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 86.

20 Jenkinson, pp. 207-230. See also, Michèle Barrett, "Subalterns at War: First World War Colonial Forces and the Politics of the Imperial War Graves Commission", *interventions* 9, no. 3 (2007): 451-474.

governing status was not the only concession given by the British colonial rule; some economic concessions were also offered in the aftermath of the war. For example, the British administration had a little desire to establish arbitration services in the dominions, but it had to do so after the war.[21] In addition, India and the other dominions got tariff autonomy in 1919.[22] However, this appeasement policy of the British colonial administration helped to save the day until the WWII.

On the other side, the forces of Turkish nationalism posed a different kind of challenge to the British colonial rule. The Turkish War of Independence fought between 1919 and 1922 instilled hope and constituted an ideal model for the nationalists of the colonized world.[23] This enthusiasm was explained concisely by Sonyel:

> "The repercussions of this Turkish victory found an echo outside the boundaries of Turkey, throughout the dependent and oppressed countries, which now looked to Mustafa Kemal for liberation. Muslims all over the world hailed this Turkish success as the greatest victory of Islam over Christendom, of the East over the West, of Asia over Europe, and of Nationalist Turkey over Imperialist Britain."[24]

Nevertheless, the Turkish military success over the Greek army in Anatolia was viewed differently in Britain. Some authors like Davison regarded the victory of Turkish nationalism as comparable to the similar developments in the other countries of the region like Iran and Afghanistan.[25] According to this view, Turkey was not the only country waging a national war in the post-WWI period. Afghan national forces also had got their independence in 1919 by the Anglo-Afghan Rawalpindi Treaty.[26] Although, the international resonances of the Lausanne Treaty concluding the Turkish War of Independence were more extensive and influential in the larger framework of the Great Power politics, the British administration undermined this fact. The British Delegation in Lausanne followed the same unrecognition strategy. Nevertheless, the British imperial administration could hardly evade from the consequences of the Lausanne Conference upon its colonial rule. The developments leading to the convention of Lausanne Conference, especially the Chanak Affair, and the strategy of the British Delegation in the

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[21] Thurlow, p. 36.

[22] John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World*, (London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 1988), p. 9.

[23] George W. Gawrych, "Kemal Atatürk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–1922: from Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 11, no. 3 (1988), p. 318.

[24] Salahi Sonyel, "The Anglo-Turkish Conflict Fifty Years Ago", *Belleten* XXXVII, no. 8, (1972), p. 116.

[25] Roderic Davison, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After", *Middle East Journal* .7, no. 3 (1953), p. 325.

[26] Gregory Fermont-Barnes, *The Anglo Afghan Wars, 1839-1919,* (Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 198.

Conference should be explained at first to understand how the dominions came at loggerheads with the British administration at the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference.

The Chanak Affair and the British Strategy in the Lausanne Conference

Turkey was a significant gateway for the maintenance of the British colonial empire and the British strategy against Turkey was largely shaped by this geostrategic concern during the WWI. The British strategy at the end of the war was summarized in a memorandum by Harold Nicolson, an official at the Foreign Office's Eastern department, well-acquainted with Greek affairs as well. He said: "The idea which prompted our support of Greece was no emotional impulse but the natural expression of our historical policy — the protection of India and the Suez Canal."[27]

The key concern of British administration was territorial, since Britain's economic stake in Turkey was relatively small in comparison to France and Italy.[28] The caliphate status of the Ottoman Sultan in İstanbul was another concern for the British administration. As was emphasized by the State Secretary for India, Edwin Montagu, a humiliating peace treaty imposed upon the Caliphate as the highest-ranking Islamic leader might have made things harder for the British administration in India and other Muslim populated colonies.[29] That means the British strategy upon Turkey during the WWI was largely determined by the maintenance of the colonial rule, both territorially and socio-politically. Therefore, it can be expected that the peace conference strategy would be based on the same determinant.

Lord Curzon was holding the Foreign Secretary post during the Lausanne Conference and acted as a remarkably determinant actor of the British policy during this peace settlement process. The State Secretary for the Dominions, Sir Winston Churchill, was another influential figure. Both figures were trying to mobilize the British dominions to wage another war against the Turks for the maintenance of the Straits. After the takeover of Smyrna by the Turkish forces, the British Cabinet was alarmed for the safety of the Straits. Then Curzon took initiatives to give an end to this prolonged chapter of the WWI on Anatolia by a final strike on the Straits. He threatened the victorious troops of Mustafa Kemal not to advance to the neutral zones on the Straits. Although Curzon found it as "a gross and ridiculous exaggeration to suppose that Mustafa Kemal would

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[27] Theo Karvounarakis, "End of an Empire: Great Britain, Turkey and Greece from the Treaty of Sèvres to the Treaty of Lausanne", *Balkan Studies* 41, no. 1 (2000), p. 173.

[28] Michael Dockrill, "Britain and the Lausanne Conference: 1922-1923", *The Turkish Yearbook*, XXIII, (1993), p. 4.

[29] Hazal Papuççular, "For the Defence of the British Empire: Edwin Montagu and the Turkish Peace Settlement in a Transnational Context", *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations* 1, no. 2, (2020), pp. 30-42.

dare fire a single shot at the allied detachments"[30] on the neutral zone protecting the Straits, the French Prime Minister Poincare reminded him about the consequences of such an adventure. Curzon argued that "a triumph over the Greeks is not necessarily a triumph over the Allies."[31] Both Curzon and Churchill would not concede before taking the control over the Straits. So that, they forged ahead for a military operation for this purpose. However, they did not directly target the Bosporus but preferred Dardanelles Strait to relieve the national memory from the burden of the defeat at Gallipoli in 1915. Left alone by the French and Italian forces, the British army came at the brink of war with the Turkish forces for the Dardanelles shortly before the Mudania Ceasefire, which was known as the Chanak Affair. Despite the incessant calls of its allies, the British administration did not approach to the diplomacy table before a last military attempt to change the course of the war for the safety and prestige of its imperial rule. For the Chanak operation, Churchill made a call to the dominions to recruit soldiers. He appealed to the dominions saying that:

> "…the foundation of British policy in that region, was the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. It was of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively for this. Apart from its military importance, Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance to the prestige of the Empire… we cannot forget that there are 20.000 British and Anzac graves in the Gallipoli Peninsula and that it would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire if these were to fall into the ruthless hands of the Kemalists."[32]

The responses of the dominions to this call were frustrating for the British Cabinet. New Zealand alone replied with an immediate declaration of support and the offer of a detachment. Canada and Australia took a reserved stand replying that they could offer their support under certain circumstances. General Smuts of South Africa did not reply at all.[33] Consequently, the British administration had to accept the diplomacy table at Lausanne after a military show off at Chanak to save the face. The Chanak affair indicated that the British cabinet and the dominions were not on the same page. The gap would be broadened after the Lausanne Conference.

The British Delegation at Lausanne headed by Curzon approached the Turkish delegate by a denial strategy. The betrayal of the French and Italian administrations was underlined to undermine the military success of the Ankara government.[34] However, the Turkish case was unique in the sense that a national war was fought to challenge the Sèvres Treaty concluding the

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[30] A. L. Macfie, "The Chanak Affair, September-October 1922", *Balkan Studies* 2, (1979), p. 310.
[31] Ibid., p. 312.
[32] Ibid., p. 323.
[33] Ibid., p. 318.
[34] Dockrill, p. 8

WWI. Among the treaties concluding the WWI, only the Sèvres Treaty was replaced by a new one upon a national war fought against the Allies. However, the Lausanne Conference was commenced by a view denying the Anatolian chapter of the WWI. The British policy was reluctant to accept this last battle changing the course of the war to the detriment of Britain and the Allies. From the British point of view, Turkey was a defeated enemy. For this reason, at the beginning of the Lausanne Conference, the British policy turned a blind eye to the most recent facts about the war and tried to adopt the 1919 Paris Peace Conference spirit to Lausanne. As Hayes put it, the British policy during the Conference was pragmatic in concept if unrealistic in execution, being an attempt to match the commitments of 1919 to the facts of 1922.[35]

The British administration might have expected a diplomatic advantage over this denial or unrecognition of the factual situation in an authoritative peace conference setting. As Zvi suggests, Turkish delegation in the Lausanne Conference was confronted with a powerful, coercive coalition comprising all or most of the Great Powers.[36] The diplomatic disparity between the negotiating parties was observable in almost all of the stages of the Conference starting from the commencement ceremony.[37] The American journalist following the Conference, Joseph Grew, reported İsmet Pasha's unsolicited inauguration speech as a "tactless attitude ridiculing the Turkish delegation at Lausanne."[38] Grew's observation as a diplomat attending the Conference as the USA delegate directly reflected the general sentiment dominating diplomatic atmosphere in Lausanne. The underlying fact was that the Great Powers were unwilling to negotiate with the newly established Ankara government on equal terms. As Bush notes, the Lausanne Conference was the only post-war conference in which the Allies met the defeated enemy on anything like equal terms.[39] On the face of this fact, it seems that the Allies resorted to an undermining and unrecognition approach in Lausanne.

The challenges from the British colonies at the end of the Lausanne Conference imply that not only the military success of the Ankara government, but the negotiation capacities of the colonies were also denied. The greatest dominions of the British Empire reacted to this isolation from the peace settlement during the ratification process of the Lausanne Treaty. The ratification

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[35] Paul M. Hayes, *The Twentieth Century 1880-1939*, (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1978), p. 212

[36] Abraham Ben-Zvi, *Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,* (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 6-7.

[37] Nimet Beriker and Daniel Druckman, "Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining", *Simulation & Gaming* 27, no. 2 (1996), pp. 162-183.

[38] Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era; A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945,* Vol. 2, (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 489-490.

[39] Briton C. Bush, *Mudros to Lausanne,* (Albany: Suny Press, 1976), p. 365.

discussions in the British Parliament after the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty unravels this legitimacy question in detail.

Ratification of Lausanne Treaty in Britain and the Discussions over the Imperial Governance

Much has been written about the negotiations and provisions of the Lausanne Treaty so far. As Toynbee noted after the conclusion of the Treaty as a contemporary observer, "The Treaty of Lausanne will be judged in history by its effect upon the internal development and the mutual relations of the nations between whom it has been made."[40] It is a fact that the domestic impacts of this treaty upon the signatory states have not been thoroughly discussed, although its bilateral consequences were debated so much in the literature. Since the fate of the newly established regime in Turkey was largely dependent on the durability of this treaty, domestic repercussions of this treaty were usually examined in reference to the Turkish politics. However, it is argued here that the impacts of this treaty upon the British politics was not negligible at all, especially concerning the colonial administration. The below section concentrates on the British Parliamentary discussions on the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty and its relevance for the British colonial administration.

As a general principle of international law, the treaties should be put to the vote of the legislative bodies of the signatory countries for assent. Only after this assent procedure, which is called ratification, the treaties can be put into force.[41] Comparably, a more complex assent procedure was in operation in the British Parliament due to the colonial rule. Since the British colonies were mobilized for the Great War, it became an ethical burden for the British Cabinet to involve the colonies somehow into the peace settlement as well. The way the British colonies were represented in the Lausanne Conference and the role of the colonies in war and peace decisions of the Empire were discussed in the British Parliament following the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference. The debate triggered by Canada Prime Minister Mackenzie King's rejection to sign the treaty. King declared that Canada cannot undertake all the obligations deriving from the Treaty. The Prime Minister was anxious since these obligations deriving from the guarantor status of Britain on the Straits, might have given way to another war mobilization for Canada. This challenge by Canada generated hot discussions in the British Parliament. The liberals and conservatives criticized one another's approach to the colonies and tried to find a way out of this deadlocking situation because it was necessary to ratify the treaty properly with the signatures of all the dominions.

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[40] Arnold Toynbee, "The East After Lausanne", *Foreign Affairs,* 2, no. 1(1923), p. 84.
[41] See also, Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, "Do Treaties Need Ratification", *Brit. YB Int'l L.* 15 (1934), p. 113.

The ratification of the Lausanne Treaty came onto the agenda of the House of Commons on 6th June 1924. One of the Liberal Party members, who was also a private secretary to the Prime Minister Lloyd George, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Edward Grigg[42] raised the point for the first time saying that they assumed that the Treaty of Lausanne had been accepted and welcomed by the whole Empire until the challenges from the Canada Prime Minister. Grigg claimed that from the very outset Canada called attention to changing procedures. He followed that the constitutional procedures applied in the Treaty of Versailles and all the other Peace treaties were not followed for the Lausanne Treaty. In sum, as a liberal MP Grigg questioned the role of the colonies in the treaty negotiation and signature procedures. He considered the absence of the plenipotentiaries from the colonies in the Lausanne conference as a fatal initial error. He noted that the dominions were informed that the British government reached an agreement with the French and Italian governments that each Power would be represented by two plenipotentiaries. He emphasized that the opinions of the dominions were not asked, but they were merely informed about the decision of the British Cabinet. He argued that the British Cabinet sacrificed its own dominions for the sake of the French empire. He claimed that the French government suggested disregarding the colonial delegates in Lausanne because they would have to invite the Sultan of Morocco as well. The presence of a Muslim ruler would not strengthen their hand in Lausanne, but quite the contrary. Nevertheless, he argued that the British administration's relations with its own dominions were strained because of the French position. He made the point that "If Canadian lives, Australian lives and the blood and treasure of all the other Dominions are to be sacrificed, that can be done only by the decision of their own elected representatives sitting in their own parliaments, and not by the representatives of the British Isles in this Parliament.[43]

Then, Mr. Ronald McNeill from the Conservative Party replied Grigg pointing out that the Lausanne Treaty was a modification of the Sévres Treaty that the dominion representatives already signed as a matter of formality without complaining. Upon this reply Grigg directed a critical question; "how it comes about that the Dominions quite willingly signed the Treaty of Sèvres, and refused to sign the Treaty of Lausanne?"[44]

Although, the British Cabinet might have undermined what happened between the Sèvres Treaty and the Lausanne Conference, the dominions who actively participated to the war were very well aware of the fact that they lost the Anatolian section of the WWI despite all their efforts

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[42] Kenneth Rose, "Grigg, Edward William Macleay, First Baron Altrincham" in *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 1.

[43] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521617

[44] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521617

and losses. While the British Cabinet was striving to change the course of the war by a final attack to Chanak, the British dominions had already concluded that the war was over. However, the British Cabinet and the British delegation in Lausanne denied this fact.

This ratification challenge by the dominions was brought onto the agenda by the Liberals in the Parliament as a critique against the Conservative Party in power at that time. However, the liberals, especially Lloyd George leading the coalition government until the 15th of November elections, shortly before the commencement of the Lausanne Conference, was also questioned in the Parliament. In so far as they had started to search a political faction to blame for this colonial crisis, the issue turned to a domestic party politics debate. The problematic side of the issue is that all these questionable communication with the dominions took place during the transfer of the Liberal-Conservative coalition government led by Lloyd George to Bonar Law of the Conservative Party. Lloyd George explained in detail how his cabinet approached to the dominions on the Lausanne conference issue. He underlined that their Cabinet sent a telegram to the dominions to inform them that about the Lausanne Conference procedures not to ask their opinions. Then he added that "if another Die-Hard Conservative Government comes into power, they will do exactly the same thing again." Nevertheless, he rejected the claims that the dominions were not consulted at all. He said:

> "I will give you an account of how the Turkish Treaty was negotiated…The main principles of that Treaty were discussed in Paris by the British Empire Delegation…I say that the main principles were discussed during that British Empire Delegation, where the Prime Ministers of the Dominions were present….Mesopotamia was discussed, Palestine was discussed, Armenia was discussed, Cilicia was discussed, Smyrna was discussed, and Thrace was discussed. The Dardanelles were also discussed. All these vital questions were discussed at Paris, at the meetings of the British Empire Delegation…What is the good of saying that the Dominions were not consulted?"[45]

From Lloyd George's point of view, the large gap between what they had decided in Paris and how the Treaty was concluded in Lausanne was more upsetting than the challenges by the colonies. He emphasized that the treaty terms that the new Conservative government accepted in Lausanne was a complete reversal of the decisions taken in Paris. He listed his objections to the concluded treaty saying that:

> "Does he realise that in three important parts it is a complete departure from the decisions taken in Paris? What were they? First of all, with regard to Smyrna and South Eastern Anatolia, that was a reversal. The Straits is another. You had a decision there, and you had a demilitarised zone, to be occupied and garrisoned by the Allies. Now, you have a demilitarised zone depending entirely upon Turkish Declarations. What were their declarations worth in the late war? Then there is a guarantee of

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[45] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521632

Turkish neutrality by the British Empire. Surely that is a vital distinction. If there is any attack upon their zone, upon Constantinople, upon the Straits, the British Empire by this Treaty is bound to come in—horse, foot and artillery, with all its resources — to defend them from whatever quarter the attack comes. Is not that a vital difference? What is the third departure? The surrender of the capitulations. You surrendered there, British rights which had been enjoyed by the traders of this country for centuries. That was not in the Paris arrangement. That was not in the Treaty of Sèvres."[46]

Lloyd George's challenges to the Lausanne Treaty were taken by the conservatives as a partisan score against his former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, who was a conservative. A Conservative MP Mr. Ormsby Gore criticized George with threatening the peace. He also added that the dominions turned away from the British Cabinet in the Chanak affair because of this fanatical approach of George threatening the peace.[47] Concerning the colonial question, he emphasized the integrity of the British Empire, noting that it was not just a matter between the British Cabinet and Canada but concerned the Empire as a whole. He said:

"I believe that, with the possible exception of Canada, at this moment the majority of the Dominions are anxious that the Treaty of Lausanne should be ratified at the earliest possible moment. It is of enormous importance to the Empire and to the Dominions. I believe it is quite as important to Canada as to Australia and New Zealand… Canada will inevitably realise that in the event of the British Empire being involved in difficulties in the Near East, she will be involved as an Empire."[48]

Then, the Prime Minister Bonar Law came onto the stage and involved in the debate. He started his speech by acknowledging that it was the time to consider what machinery was to be created for the conduct of a unified imperial policy. He suggested sending weekly telegrams to the dominions on the foreign policy matters so that they would be able to express their opinions. He also related this challenge by the dominions to the Chanak affair saying that: "The whole question is now, after the War, there has been a tremendous change in the minds of the Dominions, made by what is known as the Chanak telegram."[49] Finally, he announced to the Parliament that Canada accepted to sign the treaty and pointed out that they had to return immediately to the Irish question.[50]

This issue was closed in the Parliament by the final remarks of radical liberal Captain Benn, who joined the Labour Party later on.[51] Supporting the Canadian Prime Minister's objection, he

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[46] House of Commons Hansard Archives (HC)
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521635, (accessed, 9 January 2021).
[47] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521644
[48] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521647
[49] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521649-1650
[50] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521651
[51] Percy Harris, *Forty Years in and out of Parliament*, (London: Read Books, 2006).

said; "After all, the important thing in this Debate is not our view of what Mr. King should think, but what Mr. King does think."[52] He criticized the conservative approach to the dominions that opposed granting Constitution to South Africa. He also criticized using force against Ireland. Concerning the Lausanne Treaty, he said: "It is too late now to destroy the Treaty of Lausanne. It is the presentation of the two conceptions of Empire. If right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite suggest that the Empire is to be founded upon tariff, we reply that the true foundation of Empire is liberty."[53]

Above Parliamentary debates manifest that the colonial administration approach of the British Empire came under question due to the procedures at Lausanne. Content of the treaty were overshadowed by the colonial problems of the British Empire. In a sense, the Lausanne Treaty constituted a ground for the British Cabinet and the dominions to renegotiate their roles and expectations from one another.

The Consequences of the British Colonial Crisis

The important contribution of the Dominions to the war effort was recognized in 1917 by the British Prime Minister Lloyd George when he invited each of the Dominion Prime Ministers to join an Imperial War Cabinet to co-ordinate imperial policy.[54] However, the later stages of the war proved that the role of the dominions was diminished in time. Finally, the Lausanne Treaty setting exposed that they were isolated from the decision-making venues when it comes to the peace settlement. Their role was reduced to a commanded signatory who signed a treaty merely as a formality. Such an approach dragged the British administration into a legitimacy crisis.

Australia and Canada were the most developed British colonies, which were called as the dominions.[55] The dominions had more say in the imperial politics in comparison to the colonies. In return, they were usually placed on the fore fronts in a war situation. Britain did not deploy any African troops on European battlefields at first in the WWI. Then, some politicians like Churchill deemed the mobilization of all the dominions and colonies into the imperial war effort as being necessary for the integrity of the Empire. Churchill claimed in a House of Commons speech in May 1916 that not only ten to twelve Indian divisions, but also African units should be

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[52] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521652
[53] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521652
[54] Lloyd, p. 277.
[55] Matthew Lange, *Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 3.

trained for deployment in Europe.[56] As a result, as was mentioned above in reference to Jenkinson's work, the African volunteers joined the navy during the WWI. Contributions of all the colonies were crucial for the maintenance of the imperial rule. By the same token, objection by any colonial entity was taken as a threat to the unity of the empire. Then, one can ask why Canada was the forerunner of the challenges to the British administration. As a prompt reply, it can be suggested that the public opinion factor might have been influential in Canada to develop such a resentment against the British administration. The famous novelist Ernest Hemingway's role was important in the development of this public opinion in Canada.

It was not until May 1917 that the journalists and reporters were able to move close to the war fronts, in an attempt to deflect mounting criticism of the casualty lists.[57] As a young reporter, Hemingway visited Istanbul and the Thracian part of Turkey between 29 September and 18 October 1922. During his stay, he closely followed the military and political consequences of the Turkish Great Offensive, which was a major stage in the Turkish War of Independence and witnessed at first hand the Greek evacuation of eastern Thrace.[58] His impressions of Istanbul under occupation and his observations of the events and developments at the time were published in a popular magazine in Canada called Star. His novel, *A Farewell to Arms* published in 1929 denounced the war. This piece relying on the direct observations can be regarded as a manifestation of the growing anti-war sentiment since the later stages of the WWI.[59]

Both the Chanak Affair and the ratification crisis revealed that the British colonial administration was undergoing a management crisis in the immediate aftermath of the WWI. The challenges to the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty unravelled a legitimacy crisis concerning the British colonial administration. A year after these Parliamentary debates, a separate Dominions Office was established in 1925 to handle relations with Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State.[60] The establishment of this special office can be evaluated as a concrete outcome of these negotiations between the dominions and the British administration. However, the effectiveness of this new office is questionable. It should have been still unsatisfying for the Canada Parliament. In 1936, Canada Premier Mackenzie King stressed

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[56] Christian Koller, "The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the First World War", *Immigrants & Minorities* 26, no. 1-2 (2008), pp. 111-133.

[57] David Reynolds, "Britain, the Two World Wars, and the Problem of Narrative", *The Historical Journal* 60, no. 1 (2017), p. 199

[58] Himmet Umunç, "Hemingway in Turkey: Historical Contexts and Cultural Intertexts", *Belleten* 69, no. 255 (2005), pp. 229-242.

[59] Linda Wagner-Martin, *A Historical Guide to Ernest Hemingway,* (Oxford, New York: 2000), p. 24, 31.

[60] David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century,* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 43

that only the Canadian Parliament could decide, "To what extent, if at all Canada would participate in conflicts involving other Commonwealth countries."[61] The sequence of these challenges exposes that these post-WWI discontents can be evaluated as an antecedent of the post-WWII decolonization movement. In this continuous process of decolonization since the WWI, the Turkish War of Independence and the Lausanne Treaty concluding the last chapter of the WWI war in an unusual way constitutes a critical turning point for the British colonial administration.

Lausanne Conference constituted a break also in the diplomatic representation customs and privileges of the British Empire. The British Empire was the only League of Nations member that was officially represented together with its dominions. The glorious British Delegation attended by the representatives of the dominions was dissolved for the first time in the Lausanne Conference. As was criticized by the liberal MP Mr. Grigg in the Parliament, the isolation of the dominions from the British delegation in Lausanne was considered as a concession from the imperial prestige of the Empire on the international arena.[62] According to the liberal opposition in the Parliament, not only the imperial prestige but also the democratic legitimacy of the British rule was eroded in the Lausanne peace process. The British rule had a claim to generate a microcosm of the League of Nations with its dominions and colonies. Since the British administration presented itself as an ideal form of a League of Nations acting in harmony with the territories and people that it governed by liberal principles, the objections from the dominions eroded the legitimacy of its power. Grigg expressed this view of the British Empire saying that: "Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions at this moment constitute an actual League of Nations acting together on the very principles to which the wider League of Nations aspires. It is a family of free nations."[63]

Grigg pointed out to another important consequence of this colonial crisis, which was the loss of prestige against other Great Powers. The dissolution of the British Delegation for the first time in Lausanne was regarded as a loss of status against the French Empire. Although the British Empire was given the right to be represented as an Empire with its dominions according to the League of Nations Covenant, French Empire was deprived of such an imperial representation in the League. Therefore, reaching an agreement with France for the exclusion of the dominions

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[61] Reynolds, p. 123.
[62] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521619
[63] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521621

from the Lausanne Conference practically meant to surrender of this privileged imperial status of Britain.[64]

Concluding Remarks

This study revealed that the Lausanne Treaty between the Ankara government and the Allies generated significant impacts on the British colonial administration in the post-WWI period and constituted an antecedent stage of the decolonization movement. Britain was not only one of the signatories to this Treaty but also the key influential actor of the peace conference. The British delegation in Lausanne approached the Turkish delegation by a strategy denying the diplomatic consequences of the military success of the Turkish army in Anatolia. Not only the Ankara government, but also the British dominions were undermined during the Lausanne peace settlement process. The peace settlement procedures that the British administration agreed upon to follow with other Great Powers resulted in the discontent of its colonies. The British delegation made up of the representatives of the dominions together with the British cabinet was dissolved for the first time in the Lausanne Peace Conference. This change in the peace-decision procedures were criticized by the British dominions and the issue was taken to the British Parliament.

In a sense, the Lausanne Treaty constituted a ground for the British Cabinet and the dominions to renegotiate their roles and expectations from one another. Long undermined colonial questions reached its climax when the Lausanne Treaty was presented to the dominions for signature. The accounts of the Lloyd George government suggest that the starting point of this climax was the Gallipoli battle, where so many dominion soldiers lost their lives. Then, the discontent between the dominions and the British Cabinet became explicitly visible during the Chanak affair, when the dominions were called to wage another war in Anatolia to conclude the war with British victory against the Turkish troops on the Straits. Contrary to the expectations of the British government, all the dominions except New Zealand rejected to wage another war in Anatolia. Discontent of the dominions lasted during the Lausanne peace conference as well. Even though the dominions did not hesitate to make their utmost efforts during the war, they were isolated from the peace settlement. Then, they criticized the British administration at the ratification stage of the Lausanne Treaty in the British Parliament.

Canada as one of the greatest dominions took the lead to challenge the British Cabinet by rejecting to sign the Lausanne Treaty not to come under any military obligation especially for the defense of the Straits as Lloyd George aspired. Thanks to the Conservative government that

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[64] HC Deb 06 June 1924 Vol 174 cc1617-521619

replaced Lloyd George government, so that the dominions were relieved from another war threat. However, conservative and liberal approaches to the colonies were principally the same. As was clearly expressed by George, there was no difference between the liberal and even die-hard conservative governments in their approach to the colonies. Only the radicals within the Liberal Party, who would later establish the Labour Party, took side with the dominions, and supported greater autonomy for the dominions.

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Turkish Foreign Policy, State Identity and Elites, Continuity and Transformation

Harumi Arai[1]

Abstract

Turkey is an important player in international politics due to their military power, geo-political situation, historical background, and many other factors. There is a need to analyse the consistency and changing aspects of Turkish foreign policy. There are many studies that examine its foreign policy, not a many that focus on the issue of identity. Identity is critical factor to decide foreign policy. Especially for Turkey, foreign policy is as same as seeking the state identity which would be accepted by other countries. There are not so many studies to analyse who choice one identity which influence foreign policy from a various kind of identity, and how the identity influences the foreign policy. This article mentions, first, Turkish state identity consists of three aspects. Sometimes they are impossible to exist together at the same time. Second, while reviewing foreign policies follow the change of foreign policy. Sometimes Turkey is not worth of, however they do not change foreign policy because of identity. Third, how elites' consciousness decided and influenced foreign policy, their identity reflected foreign policy. Fourth, how identity is kept and change in Turkey. Traditional elites gradually lost their power foreign policy transformed. Therefore, relation state identity and foreign policy and the role of elites would be cleared to understand Turkish foreign policy easily.

Key words: Turkey, identity, foreign policy, elite, westernization

1. Turkish States Identity

1.1. Importance of identity

Turkish state identity is diversity. Turkey is always asked whether it belongs to the West or the East, whether it is European or Asian, the Middle Eastern, whether it is Islamic or secular. The answer is that no one of those options alone is correct, and yet people insist still that just one is chosen. How does Turkey answer the question? As for the issue of identity itself, there have been many different attempts to define what it means within certain parameters. Alexander Wendt says it shows who she/he is and what she/he is.[2] Henry Nau defines identity as self-image.[3] Peter Katzenstain says identity is a subjective fundamental attribute of the state[4], and Shinya Baba emphasizes the magnitude of identity and indicates that power, influence, and interest are only part of identity.[5] Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu mentions

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[2] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What Stats Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization,* 46(2), 1992, p. 398.

[3] Henry R. Nau (Japanese translated by Koji Murata), *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy,* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 2005), pp. 26-31.

[4] Peter Katzenstein (edit.,), *The Culture of National Security,* (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 52-53.

[5] Shinya Baba, *Identity no Kokusai Seiji (International Politics of Identity),* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1980), pp. 12-13.

that "when states construct their identities, they formulate at the both domestic and international levels."[6]

According to constructivists, an agent is not a rational actor who pursues profit after constantly calculates profit and loss, but acts after judge who he/she is (identity) and what he/she wants (interest). Identity and interest are not given, but are the sources of action and constructed socially in relation with others. If others do not agree with a person's self-consciousness, a person attempts to correct this discrepancy. In the case of the state, the mechanism for effecting this amendment is diplomacy. Just as individuals, when they live their social lives, essentially seek to be recognized by others for who they are, what they belong to, and the kind of person they are, so too do states also seek a similar kind of recognition by others.[7]

The reason interaction between identity and foreign policy is important is that a sense of identity distinguishes "we (us)" from "they (other)" [8] an enemy and an ally and, in so doing, strengthens the "we"-notification. Regional integration like EU (Europe Union) is led by we notification. Besides that, it also embodies that which states seek to be, and states act to establish identity because it requires authentication from others. When such an identity is indeed accepted by others, it means that foreign policy based on identity is a success. As such, in order to be able to better understand and predict a state's behaviour it is useful to understand how identity affects foreign policy.

A state's identity consists of several different elements. These could be historical, cultural, or religious; they could be the personal characteristics of political leaders; they could also be ideas reflecting their role and goals in the international community. As such, it is therefore proposed that state identity can be classified into the following three forms: indigenous identity; official identity; exogenous identity.

1.2. Indigenous Identity

An indigenous identity is inherited in a group of elements such as tribe, language, geography, culture, history, religion, and ethnicity. These indicate the sense of belonging of the people. These elements pull people together even when they are not particularly aware of it. Having languages, customs and lifestyles in common gives rise to an increased sense of intimacy among people and can then in turn trigger group formation. Groups based on kinship or territorial relationships cohere strongly and maintain tight bonds: once a group is formed,

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[6] Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, "Modernity, Identity and Turkeys Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10/ No.1/ 2008, p. 72.

[7] Baba, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 13-14. For individuals, Erik H. Ericsson (Japanese translated by Nao Nishihira and Yue Nakajima), *Identity and Life Cycle,* (Tokyo: Seima Shobo, 2011).

[8] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

its members instinctively protect it. Within a group, a sense of companionship and consciousness is shared and comes to be further formed and constructed as an identity. The consciousness once formed and built they are inherited from generation to generation. Indigenous identities have been accumulated and formed over an extended period.

The indigenous identities of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the de facto Turkish Republic, were Islamic state and there was self-conscious of a Muslim. It was true that there were Christians, Jews, and others in the Ottoman Empire, but the majority of its inhabitants were, however, Muslims and state governed by Islamic law.

After the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, Islam was placed under state control. Despite that, though, the practice, in the personal arena, of Islam was not prohibited by the Republic, meaning that its status as one of the numerous indigenous identities was neither denied nor deleted. As individuals, many Turkish citizens are proud to be good Muslims,[9] celebrating Islamic festivals and following religious customs in their daily lives. People identify their Muslim identity.

At the state level, instead of Islam new identity was introduced by the western orient government. Republic leaders aimed at establishing modern state which was different from old Ottoman Empire. They needed an official identity.

1.3. Official Identity

Official identities are defined by policy makers for the state management and show states' goals or policies. It is a centripetal concept that has a political character and is used to make a group state. Because state is political system and sometimes lack of indigenous elements, so official identity is needed to make state.

Under European imperialism, borders were drawn in colonial Asia or Africa that failed to consider the sense of belonging felt by the native populations of those regions. Often, people who did not share a common identity were contained together within the same national border. When such counties become independent, official identity is needed in order for people to be able to come together. When the identities present amongst member of the population are diverse and inconsistent, conflicts are likely to occur; in order to overcome such difficulties and promote unity within the group, it is necessary to then create a new identity and encourage its permeation throughout society.

Domestically, official identity is used as the basis for asserting the legitimacy of control and is the "identity confirmed by order."[10] Until the unified official identity has successfully

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[9] Author interviewed a female graduate student and a woman in May 2010 in Ankara.

[10] Willian E. Conoly (Japanese translated by Atsushi Sugita), *Identity / Difference,* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten), p. 45.

permeated society, a heterogeneous group of people will not become an established state and the legitimacy of the leaders remains unproved. When the regime changes to new one, it denies and cut off the old one. New regime needs new identity suitable for new regime. The new identity makes the new system. Leaders use politics, education, propaganda, and sometimes pressure to disseminate the new identity all over the country.

In Turkey, some political leaders say that the country is a secular, democratic and Western, others say Muslim in Europe, and others say bridge, centre country. These statements are subject to variation and affect foreign policy over time.

Turkey's predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, played a role of balancer but also a member of the European balance system.[11] It can be said that the Ottoman elites were conscious that and they were a part of the Europe. In other words, the perception of being a member of the European system was inherited to the elites of the Turkish Republic in the 20th century. At the end of the Empire, Western-style education in medical schools or military academies was used as tool in modernization reforms; as a result of that, West-oriented elites were created and these, in turn, went on to forge a new Turkey. They recognized Turkey as a "civilized country of Europe", to maintain its Western identity.

Bozdağlıoğlu says that Turkey's official Western identity was created as a result of the country's modernization project in their years of following Kurtuluş Savaşı.[12] In the Republic, six principles were proposed by Kemal Atatürk, which form the foundations of what was later called Kemalism. They are as follows: Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), Populism (Halkçılık), Nationalism (Millyetçilik), Secularism (Laiklik), Reformism (İnkılapçılık), and Statism (Devletçilik). It is generally understood that secularism is the core and most important of those principles; the introduction of secularism marked a clear break up with the past and transition to the West.

Turkey set a goal to become a civilized and advanced nation. Being recognized as a member of the West is as same as being a modern, civilized and progressive nation. It is pointed out that European identity remained strongly conscious as a political elites' goal to carry on the Atatürk tradition.[13]

As a result of that leaders struggle in diplomacy, Turkey became a member of the Western camp during the Cold War. It is said that Turkey joined the Western alliance against

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[11] William Beik (edit.,) "The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe", *New Approaches to European History Series,*
http://archive.org/stream/The.Ottoman.Empire.and.Early.Modern.Europe/The.Ottoman.Empire.and.Early.Modern.Europe_djvu.txt

[12] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Op. Cit.,* p. 72.

[13] Pia Christina Wood, "Europe and Turkey: A Relationship under the Fire", *Mediterranean Quarterly,* (Winter 1999), pp. 95-115.

USSR's threat. It is too simple. The consciousness that the Russians were others made Europe and Turkey alliance (we).

When the Cold War ended the international order changed: Turkey insisted on being a "bridge", and in the twenty-first century it transformed into recognition of a "central state (merkez ülke)".

1.4. Exogenous Identity

Indigenous identity has accumulated and formed within the nation whereas exogenous identity is often formed by external stimuli.

Exogenous identity is also an image that can be seen in other countries. For instance, the role of balancer that regulates order in the international power balance and of negotiator when conflict occur, are ones that are created from external factors. When the assumption of such a role or position is the goal of the state, that is, exogenous identity overlaps with the official identity, and then there are no problems. If not overlapping, identity crisis occurs.

From a European perspective, Turkey is in most cases seen as being an Islamic, Middle Eastern country. Europe was formed as an entity in distinction from those other nations further east, termed "the Orient," and it has repeatedly redrawn its boundaries even as it maintains them.[14] It is said that Europe was born and integrated with "our" consciousness because there was a different existence such as the Ottoman Empire and Russia as the east.[15]

While Turkey claims to be a member of the West, Europe does not necessarily agree with that assessment; this discordance in recognition has proved to be a remarkable and major issue in Turkey's experience with the EU's admissions process. In 1963, the Ankara Convention was held to dealt with the joining the EEC (European Economic Community). Then the chair Hallstein said that Turkey was part of Europe.[16] In some areas integration with Europe has seen progress, for instance Turkish football teams belong to European leagues and Turkish singers have won European music contests, whilst Turkey's largest city Istanbul was even designated the European City of Culture in 2010.[17] Turkey also joined Custom Union in 1995. No further progress beyond that can be seen though.

Since 2002, when the AKP regime first assumed power, Turkey's integration into Europe has stalled more markedly. Some European leaders have started to repeatedly state

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[14] Burak Akçapar, *Turkey's New Europe Era,* (Maryland: Rowman &Little Field Publishers, 2007), pp. 41-45.

[15] Iver Neuman, *Uses of the Other,* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1999), p. 3.

[16] Address by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein President of the Commission of the European Economic Community on the occasion of the signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey, 1963, *Archive of European Integration,* University of Pittsburgh Library System, http://aei.pitt.edu/14311/

[17] Akçapar, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 34-37.

that Turkey is not European[18] and one veteran French politician said Turkish membership of the EU would spell the "end of the European Union."[19] Ultimately, Turkey's application for EU membership has remained stagnant for nearly fifty years.

Turkish state identity contains components that struggle to coexist, such as Islam (indigenous identity) and secular, western (official identity), and often only one identity can be chosen.

Indigenous, official and exogenous identities are not completely separated; they may be matched or are related in a variety of ways. Sometimes they complement one another but, equally, at other times they find themselves in competition.

2. Development of Foreign Policy

State identity is reflected in the various foreign policy decisions made by elites in the state. The identity of elites' or policymakers' manifests itself in the policies they develop and support, and the nature of their diplomatic efforts; approval of those things is then necessarily also a form of approval of the agents' identity. If diplomatic moves are successful then the policymakers' choices are shown to have been successful, and that also in turn ensures that the legitimacy of their rule remains secure. As that process is repeated, a form of absolute identity will gradually emerge, and the existence of agents with that identity will also be absolutized.

Turkish foreign policy can be characterized and categorized as belonging to one of the following three historical periods.

2.1. 1923-1970s

From the establishment the republic in 1923 to the 1970s was one during which foreign policy was decided by elites who possessed Western identity. Construction and modification of official identity was the goal of policy.

After practicing good neighbour diplomacy in the early days of the foundation of the Republic and adopting "aggressive neutrality" during World War II, during the Cold War period Turkey steered toward the Western side, adopting an anti-communist position in a liberal economy and democratic system led by the United States. The reason for Turkey's participation with the West in this regard was not only to counter a military threat posed by the U.S.S.R., demand to cede territory and management of the Turkish straits, or to receive economic and military assistance, but also because it judged the Soviet Union as being a

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[18] Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and others. http://www.afpbb.com/article/politics/2590017/4000444

[19] Bordering on the ridiculous: why Turkey is not a European country, https://www.politico.eu/article/bordering-on-the-ridiculous-why-turkey-is-not-a-european-country/

threatening "Other". Turkey notified that the Soviet Union was a "communist state", "east side" and thus different from Turkey, which was a Western and democratic state.

Turkey's accession to NATO (1952) was understood to be recognized as a member of west which shares the common values of freedom, democracy, and equality[20]. Despite that, the reason that the other NATO members approved Turkey's accession was primarily strategic rather than acknowledgement of a common identity. Matsutani pointed that the reasons why NATO members disagree Turkey and Greece accession, first enlargement of NATO was too fast, secondly, they were afraid that aid from US would decrease, third especially Turkey was different from NATO members in culture, customs.[21] There was, then, a degree of discordance in the nature and terms of mutual recognition. As such, even after joining NATO, Turkey's security was not guaranteed. Whilst American missiles were deployed at an airbase in Turkey, Turkey could neither participate in US-USSR negotiations and it did not join the circle of Western leaders during Cuban missile crisis (1953). Also, when it came to the issue of Cyprus, Turkey did not gain support from Western countries: the U.S. banned arms exports to Turkey (1975-1978). Strategically, then, NATO was not always profitable for Turkey. Despite such a divide between itself and Western countries, however, Turkey did not choose to leave the Western camp. Throughout the Cold War NATO was represented as the bastion of Western identity. [22]Only was NATO a proof that Turkey was European country.

During this period foreign policy was being decided by elites who kept Western (European) identity as an official identity which was always placed first. At the same time, those elites also made indigenous identity subordinate to official identity. Foreign policy was able to continue so long as policy-making powers were shifted among agents with the same identity.

2.2. The 1980s

This was a decade during in which various domestic phenomena led to the diversification of both identity and foreign policy. In the 1980s, the military seized power through a coup d'etat and with the aim of regaining stability and re-integrating the society after domestic unrest. The military regime insisted on the implementation of TİS (Turkish-Islamic Integration theory, Türk-İslam Sentezi). The military government focused on two

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[20] North Atlantic Treaty, "The Parties to this Treaty are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

[21] Hironao Matsutani, *Gendai Toruko no Seiji to Gaikou, (Modern Turkish politics and diplomacy),* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1987), p. 222.

[22] Pınar Bilgin, "The Peculiarity of Turkey's position on EU-NATO Military/Security Cooperation: A Rejoinder to Missilori", *Security Dialogue,* Volume: 34 Issue: 3, 2003, p. 345.

indigenous identities, Turk and Islam; Islam sought to as a tool to protect Turk portray in the regime. The military itself has publicly embarked on state management using Islam.[23]

This transformation of identity structures through TİS concept, led by elites, led to the claim of being "Muslim country in Europe" in Özal's government. Tugrut Özal (Prime Minister 1983-1989, President 1989-1993) worked in government offices, in private companies, and in the World Bank after graduating from Istanbul Technical University. He was a member of the Aydınlar Ocağı, and had a relation with Islamic group. Under his administration, religious subjects were added to school education syllabuses and the ban on headscarves in public schools was relaxed.

As to his foreign policy, while maintaining the previous official identity of being a member of Europe, Özal recognized the indigenous identity of Islam and this was reflected in foreign policy decisions that were made.

Under Özal's leadership, Turkey also intensified its relations with EC, and he transformed the country's identity, both culturally and politically, from that of a "fully secular and westernized" regime to that of a "technologically Western, but culturally Easterner" state.[24]

His goal in doing so was Turkey's accession to the EC; this was an objective that he also shared with the secular elite.[25] As Özal pointed out, "the EC was the only way to ensure Turkey's European identity for Turkey's political leaders, despite the serious challenges in its relationship with the EC."[26] Özal argued that the Turks were European Muslims, which meant that Turks did not have to change their mentality or cultural style in order to become Europeans, and that other Europeans consequently had to accept them as they were.

Özal thought that there were three requirements for accession to the EC: being European, having an established democracy, and having a free economy, and he believed Turkey met all requirements.

The issue of EC accession is a difficult one not only for Turkey but also for Europe, as it has the potential to shake the foundation of European as well as Turkish identity.[27] Islam is

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[23] Fumiko Sawae, Sezoku Shugi Taisei no Naka no Islam Seitou Toruko no Jirei, "Islamic Political Parti in Secular Regime the case of Turkey", *Asia Africa Area Studies,* (2001), 1: p. 261 https://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/79970/1/aaas_1_251.pdf

[24] Muhittin Ataman, "Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış", https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/301101

[25] Akan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy,* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 150.

[26] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Op. Cit.,* p. 104.

[27] USAK, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Policy: Özalism", *Turkish Weekly,* March, 2009.

not an indigenous element of Europe; rather, it is a conflicting factor. Turkey is asked if it is Europe or Islam (not Europe) to join EU.

2.3. Post-Cold War Period

When communist bock collapsed and end of the Cold War, a new issue how to make Eastern European countries integrate with Europe emerged. EC's intention to integrate Eastern European countries has added a "cultural aspect" that was previously lacking in EC policy as well as economic, democracy level and law system, human rights.[28] Even though Eastern European countries were economically weaker, law system was substandard performance, they were nonetheless still considered to be more culturally European.

The changes of world order have similarly led Turkey to seek a new identity. The threat of Russia was perceived to have disappeared and so, shifting from seeing itself as "the bulwark of the Western camp" or "fort against the communist bloc".

The disappearance of Russia had the same meaning as the disappearance of other, which was common to Turkey and Europe. Turkey created a new identity to function as its raison d'etat. This new identity was as the bridge connecting East and West, developed and developing countries, the continents of Europe and Asia. Contrary to Turkey's speculation, however, this new position only served to strengthen the international perception of it as being a "torn country" that does not clearly belong to any one particular world.

Turkey tried to bring to the fore it is ethnic (indigenous) identity when making diplomatic overtures and moves toward the newly established and independent countries in central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan)[29] that coalesced following the disruption of the Soviet Union. Despite its attempts to capitalize on such cultural similarities, however, Central Asian countries largely failed to recognize Turkey as being a Big Brother, because it lacked the monetary resources required to assist those countries at the time. "Nothing can be achieved with the vain words spent on historical and cultural unity".[30] Under the USSR, indigenous identity was sealed in Central Asia for a long time, it took a time they rediscover their indigenous identity.

In Turkey, Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan (PM 1996-1997) formed a cabinet in 1996. The reason FP emerged was as follows. At those days, people found that western

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[28] Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1612/

[29] Turkey led Head of State Summit of Turkic speaking Countries in 1992 (Turkic Council, The Cooperation of Turkic Speaking States since 2009). Members are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Hungary (observer).

[30] Saadettin Gömeç, "Türkiye-Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkileri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme", *Journal of International Social Research,* Volume: 1, Issue: 1, (November 2007), p. 114. https://www.sosyalarastirmalar.com/cilt1/sayi1/sayi1pdf/gomec_sadettin.pdf

system did not give all the people economical wealth, drug abuse or crimes increased. These were negative side of westernization. Existing political parties could not dissolve social problems. FP showed Islamic value, virtue and provides people whose identity was instable with the destination of identity.[31]

Due to Erbakan's Islamic background, Milli Görüşü, his government thought highly of Islamic and developing countries. They made Developing-8 also known as D-8, Organization for Economic Cooperation in 1997 with the participation of Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria which, together with Turkey, represented eight prominent Muslim countries.[32] This was dramatic change of foreign policy.

Military was apprehensive of Islamization which FP promoted inside Turkey. Soon they intervened to exclude FP. (Post Modern Coup, 1997) in order to maintain secularism, that is, a more Western identity. But Europe criticized this intervention as being undemocratic and rejected Turkey's request for EU membership. Ironically, the military, which tried to maintain its western identity, was criticized and marginalized by Europe. This represented an identity crisis for Turkey.

2.4. Under AKP Regime

In the November 2002 elections, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) won 34% of the vote and in 2007 they increased this to 47%. CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) got 21%. This meant that, as Rabasa said, "a form of political Islam has moved out of the political shadows to become a major actor in Turkish politics."[33] AKP is the successor of the Islamic movement "Milli Görüşü". AKP refers to itself as a moderate conservative party rather than as Islamic one, and its leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül have different from previous generations by neither loudly advocating Islam nor denying secularism.

The rise of the Islamic elite seems to mark an attempt at creating a new identity. At the beginning AKP did not deny secularism, but gradually changed their position. They insist that some use secularism as a tool of control of religious. That is not correct. AKP said all religious must be respected and need to liberate Islam from states' control. They try to liberate Islam under state control and eventually positioning it as official identity.

"Leaders' perception of the role that their states should have in international system, that is their role conceptions, depends on those leader's backgrounds.[34] Their tendency to Islam was expressed their wives wearing head scarf in public spaces. The ban on wearing

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[31] Masami Arai, *Toruko Kingendaishi, (Turkish modern history),* (Tokyo: Misuzu shobo, 2001), p. 295.

[32] Berdal Aral, "An Inquiry into the D-8 Experiment: An Incipient Model of an Islamic Common Market?", *Alternatives,* 4(1-2), (July 2005), pp. 1-15.

[33] Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey,* (RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 31.

[34] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Op. Cit.,* p. 69.

such items has itself been gradually lifted, the government stating that wearing a headscarf is a human right or freedom. Similarly, AKP built many religious schools (imam hatip) so as to rise "pious generation".

New foreign policy was started by AKP. Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted Strategic Depth policy. [35] Davutoglu Doctrine consists of zero problems with neighbours, proactive diplomacy, rhythmic diplomacy, and pivotal country. Turkey has also positioned itself as a central state and plays a role as a negotiator or intermediary. By using its geopolitical and geostrategic position, Turkey can become a regional as well as a global actor[36].

Strategic Depth shows historical and cultural common with surrounding countries which depends on indigenous identity. Turkey tried to succeed in improving relations with neighbouring Islamic Arab countries, and this more aggressive diplomatic stance had not been seen before the formation of the AKP government.

AKP play various identity cards. They keep relation with Europe through the EU accession process, at the same time involved in Middle Eastern countries, Central Asia and Africa continent. The AKP help Palestine and maintain good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a pro-Islam, pro-Arab attitude led to deterioration in Turkey's relations with Israel. The Mavi Marmara incident occurred in 2010,[37] exports of military equipment from Israel to Turkey ended. These were negative impacts in terms of security and diplomacy.

The news that large numbers of the Uygur population of Xinjian in the People's Republic of China were being detained in camps by the communist government stimulated indigenous identity in Turkish citizen. There are linguistic, ethnic, and religious similarities between Turks and Uygur, and anti-PRC demonstrations happened in many cities across Turkey.[38]

Besides, Erdogan insists "the world is bigger than 5". He criticized that there are many countries in the world, only five countries which is permanent members of U.N. Security Council, determine the world issue. He disagrees with the current international order, UN

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[35] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı", Radikal, 26.02.2004, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye-merkez-ulke-olmali-702116/, Ahmet Davutoğlu, (Japanese translated by Ko Nakata), *Stratejik Derinlik,* (Tokyo: Shoshi-Shinsui, 2020).

[36] Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, "Davutoglu Promoting "Strategic Depth" in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Eurasia Daily Monitor,* Volume: 6, Issue: 89, (May 8, 2009), https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglu-promoting-strategic-depth-in-turkish-foreign-policy/

[37] The Mavi Marmara with Turkish citizens and activists carrying relief supplies to Palestine was attacked by Israel coast guard. Nine activists were killed and Israel soldiers were injured. Turkish government asked for apology and two countries relations definitely worsened.

[38] Turkey has accepted Uygur refugees from Xinjian for a long time. AKP government criticized PRC communist government using word "genocide" and called boycott. But around 2020 they stopped criticize PRC, even though western countries started to criticize PRC for human rights abuse. AKP prioritizes Chinese economic power.

structure and decision-making process. Islamic value is one of the reasons Erdogan's protesting against status quo. "The AK Party has all along emphasized religious (Islamic) and cultural values and traditions as Turkey's invaluable cultural assets worthy of conservation. The AK Party's political orientation is strongly aligned with the principle of justice. The Quran contains strong references to justice."[39]

3. The Role of Elites

Identity is a crucial factor of foreign policy, although, just concept and it does not do anything itself. Identity influences behaviour of the person who possesses that. Therefore, when analysing a state behaviour, the kind of identity the policymakers have can be seen to be of importance. Usually, political decisions are made by elites who have greater power than the general public, so it is necessary to pay attention to the identity held by the elite.

Identity is constructed when the state encounters other nations, international organizations, communities, societies, and/or by other external factors. While interacting with other countries and a wide variety of actors in international society, a state's elites will come to learn with values and norms with which they were not previous familiar, and they bring these back with them. These new values and norms gradually establish themselves and percolate throughout the entire country; they help to form a new identity, sometimes excluding previous ones as they do so.

The role of elite in Turkey can be categorized as being typical of one or other of the following periods: founding to the 1950s; the 1960-1980s, the 1980s-1990s and 2000-.[40] During the period from the founding of republic to the 1950s there was a single leader. At first Atatürk and a little people, founding fathers, participated in a policy decision. Later members in the political power centre changed, most of them including bureaucracy, judicial, academic circle were pro-western position. This was a time in which policy decisions were being made among players with a western identity, and there the period also saw foreign policy followed a consistently pro-western course.

Due to the progress of democratization from the 1960s to the 1980s, policy makers who had a western identity still kept power, various new actors appeared. Political Islam movement emerged. It was a time that oversaw a diversification of identities, interaction with domestic factors and of foreign policy. As consequence of security issues that developed during the 1980s and 1990s, the military that resurfaced, and this was the period when Turkey needed to seek a new identity following end of the Cold War and the attendant changes in the

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[39] *Insight Turkey*, winter 2019 / Volume 21 Number 4.
https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/the-world-is-bigger-than-five-a-salutary-manifesto-of-turkeys-new-international-outlook

[40] Baskın Oran (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents,* English version, (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2011), pp. 35-49.

international community. Official identity (=western identity) was held by elite in military, especially those in the National Security Council where military guided on policy. They had power and rights sometimes used them to maintain their identity. On the other hand, the indigenous Islamic identity survived in the private domain.

The point to be noticed is new pro-Islam elites of AKP accept western values and systems. They seemed to have placed indigenous and official identity in the same priority. However, they gradually emphasized Islam and began to eliminate other identities. Foreign policy changed dramatically that Turkey began the behaviour which represents Islam world. Gradually, Turkey and its Western allies increasingly found themselves conflicting over various issues. Turkish intervened in the conflicts in Middle East and Northern Africa then diplomatic frictions with the West are getting bigger. Some Western observers say that Turkey should be removed from NATO despite the threat that Russia still poses to that alliance.[41]

There has been a conspicuous decline in the number of West-oriented elites, mainly in the military. They were excluded from policy decision process under the name of democratization. As a result, it became difficult for the military to keep their identity and led the change of pro-western foreign policy.

The self-conscious of Turkey is a democratic state permeated among people. Because democracy is the condition to be cleared for EU membership, Turkey continued democratic reform for a long time. It is AKP government that carried out reforms mostly to achieve EU membership standards. Through such a reform and contacts with other countries people came to dislike military's political intervention, which was against democracy. Such transformation led state identity change.

Under AKP regime, another new actor which holds Islamic identity appeared at forefront of politics. The Gülen group which established by Fethullah Gülen who is a famous Islamic scholar who argues for the importance of education, the denial of violence, the adoption of a positive stance toward secularism and the need to keep a distance from political Islam. The AKP and Fethullah Gülen had very close relationship and Gülen's Hizmet Movement has extended not only inside Turkey but also foreign countries. The number of believers increased the schools, cultural events, media outlets, business networks and NGOs managed by the Gülen group. Under the AKP government Gülen's followers started to enter the centre of the administration instead of traditional elites. AKP and Gülen shared a common consciousness in considering the traditional elite as an enemy.

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[41] "It's time to expel Turkey from NATO", *The Spectator,* https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/it-s-time-to-expel-turkey-from-nato, 30 October 2020.

After the attempted coup of July 15, 2016, Gülen believers in many organizations – such as the military, police, legal circle, civil service, and educational institutes – were purged by the government. Gülen himself and his followers seemed to be the perpetrators of the coup.

4. Structure of Turkish State Identity

A characteristic of the structure of Turkish state identity is as already mentioned, consisted of various elements, elites decide which element should be the highest priority. Then elites promote foreign policy depend on their identity. Even though a decided foreign policy is not worth the cost, it is not always changed. Because identity distinguishes, we (friend, alliance) and they (other, enemy) and this distinguish holds a key of diplomacy. It is safe for nations to keep relation with friends, alliance, which share "we," consciousness.

Turkish foreign policy had been firmly anchored on varieties of Kemalism for 70 years.[42] From 1923, when the Republic was founded, to the 1970s, official identity, namely western identity was put highest priority. Pro-west foreign policy was promoted. As long as priority of state identity is consistent, foreign policy also consistent. For Turkey to construct and be approved western identity by others are main issue in its foreign policy. This period official identity - western elite's identity- was the most important if western elite keep the power foreign policy did not change.

Even though Western identity was denied in the diplomatic field repeatedly, Cuban missile crisis or Cyprus issue, it continued to maintain policies centred on Western identity unchanged.

From Turkey's point of view, NATO is a military organization aimed at protecting values such as the free economy and democratic system. It is a proof of the Western camp. This is because elites kept decision making process and the rank of identities did not change.

Though western elite denied Muslim identity especially in diplomatic arena, Muslim identity was revived repeatedly. There may be conflicts between indigenous and official identities. Even one identity is lost or thought lightly, it does not disappear completely. When the identity with power becomes fragile, other identities reappear.[43]

But leaders put official and indigenous identities in equal positions because of political reasons. For example, Turkey's self-awareness of being a "Muslim in Europe" seen in the

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[42] Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 6, November 2006, p. 945.

[43] Richard Mansgach, Edward Rhodes, "The National State and Identity Politics: State Institutionalism and "Markers" of National Identity", *Geopolitics,* 12:2007, pp. 426-458.

1980s insisted on the fusion of identities.[44] Turkey is not only Muslim but also European, and those two identities are not fundamentally incompatible.

As another feature, identity is neither given nor ever completed. It is constructed through contact with others. As such, it is natural for identity to change; however, it means that the priorities are changed. Changes in the international society or order not only prompt changes in a state's role or/and position, but can also stimulate change in a state identity.

During cold war era, Turkey played a role of the bridge against the communist block for a long time. When U.S.S.R. collapsed and their threat disappeared, the role of bloc was not needed. They become bridge using some of indigenous identity. Turkey had sought new role and identity.

Domestic change also leads transformation of state identity and foreign policy. Voting behaviour of the people may change as the people encounter information due to technological advances. This situation will eventually encourage a change of leaders. Bringing changes in people's thoughts and self-awareness. When the leader changes, so does the official identity.

The change in demographic composition also influence state identity and/or foreign policy. The educational content varies from generation to generation; identities are not same among people. Differences in education lead to differences in identity, as the concept of who I am is established through education. Western secular education system has largely continued in place, but recently AKP has promoted religious education. It is hard to say that pious education has taken root now, though, there may be some impact in the future.

Globalization promotes movement of people across the border. When people meet foreign people who speak unfamiliar languages, and have a different common knowledge, they strengthen "we" and "they" consciousness.

Conclusion

The importance of identity is that it is the root of a state behaviour. States act to construct their identities by implementing foreign policy, like individuals do through social interaction. Identity also distinguishes "us" and "them", enemies and allies, in international society. This distinction is a major factor in diplomacy. Occasionally, policies that are not worth the cost and friction with other countries are also due to identity. As already mentioned, state identity consists of three aspects, indigenous, official and exogenous. They are sometimes overlapped and other times opposed each other.

Regarding Turkey, long lasted pro-western foreign policy was due to elites having western style education, accepted western value decided policies. They prioritized western

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[44] Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Ozalism", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly,* 9 March 2009.

identity as official one and excluded indigenous one. On the other hand, indigenous identity does not disappear, and when the Muslim elite emerged like FP in the1980s, Military needed domestic stability; it appeared on the front stage.

In the 21st century, AKP took power instead of western elites, they develop foreign policy depends on their Muslim identity which also changes image other countries have toward Turkey. Besides, changes in the international order urge Turkey to change its role. Transformation both inside and outside Turkey, it can be said Turkey's state identity may change.

Can the British Garden City Model be a Solution for Ankara after the Pandemic?

Mehmet Tunçer[1]

Abstract

The spread of COVID-19 and its becoming an pandemic is also an urbanization problem and therefore the characteristics of cities, their future, should be discussed in relation to new life styles and planning in cities. It is a tiny virus that affects everyone, the whole world, and all economic systems, socio-political systems, urbanization systems, and causes us to rethink the past and the future.

Ebenezer Howard, one of the most influential names in the field of urban planning in the 19th century, introduced the concept of Garden City to be built around London, England, and this concept has been one of the most influential design ideas in City Planning and New City Designs until today. Howard introduced the "social city" design that attempted to bridge the gap between the individualist (capitalist) system of his time, trade unions, cooperatives, nature, quality life and common ideas.

The purpose of this article is; to describe the British "Garden City Model" as the rest of the world since the end of 2019 in Europe, the UK and Turkey also great pandemic (massive outbreak) that leads Covid-19 (Crona) to be taken in the near future and be ahead against infectious diseases and to discuss their possible spatial decision. In a way that I wanted to discuss the subject by associating with the idea of the Renaissance and Modern era "Ideal City" and focused on Ankara.

Based on Howard's Garden City Model, Prof. Hermann Jansen's Ankara Plans and plan principles, prepared after the international competition at in 1930s, will be briefly mentioned and my thoughts on macro planning decisions that can be taken today will be explained.

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What kind of "City Model" and what kind of "Strategies" should we have against the epidemic and what are we able to do? All of these require a planning-project, and scientific experience on this subject and interdisciplinary studies. Especially social, economic, political issues are already brought to the agenda and made by governments and municipalities, while some issues are currently being implemented. There are a number of measures to prevent contamination. Public health experts say these and every city is reorganized from time to time, leaving a distance called "social distance" to prevent the contamination, in order to create healthier urban spaces, business centres, residential areas, industrial areas.

Keywords: Ankara, Urbanization, Howard, Garden City, Covid-19 Pandemic, Planning solutions.

Definitions of the City and Capital Ankara

Prof. Ruşen Keleş describes the social life in cities as*; "the city in socio-economic and cultural terms; social life is organized according to professions, division of labour, different cultural groups, institutionalization intensifies, complex human relations affect the whole daily life".* Cities are shaped according to people's own lifestyles and contain many social and economic elements, especially culture and architecture (Keleş, 1998).

According to Prof. İlber Ortaylı; the city is expressed as *"the settlement unit that controls the economic activities of the surrounding settlements, specializes accordingly, realizes the production, and as a result assumes a supervisory role over its surroundings in social and administrative terms"* (Ortaylı, 1979).

First of all, we build cities that are difficult to live in; and our cities are really high in density and very unhealthy in many respects. This is actually an urbanization problem, and as these densities of population and building densities increase, epidemics, psychological problems, infrastructure problems and environmental problems increase. This is a general subject that is repeatedly said by specialists. Therefore, these planning issues should be reconsidered. We see that green areas, historical textures fabrics and natural areas in cities have gradually disappeared, turning into concrete; they have been largely destroyed in recent years, especially since the early 1980s. This may have increased in recent years, being perhaps the biggest problem of Turkey's cities. Green areas first become slums or squatter areas and then transform into high density neighbourhoods. We either rehabilitate it or call it zoning (imar) peace; we concentrate here again in multi-storey form.

For example, in Ankara, Çayyolu Region, we have been living there for 15 years; unfortunately, there is neither traffic nor the environment left from the very high blocks, without condensation. The traffic problem has increased tremendously. The noise got too much. In other words, although we went out of Ankara for 25 kilometres and unfortunately, there was not a calm life and a life in harmony with nature.

In fact, the concepts of a *"livable and beautiful green settlement"* is tried to be achieved in the background by using standards (green space, equipment, infrastructure, transportation, etc.) in all city planning, landscape projects, infrastructure, etc. However, as described in the

concept of "*The Spirit of the Place (Genius Loci)*", a city lives with a historical center and its immediate surroundings that have been formed in hundreds of years beyond standards, and if its reputation exceeds the borders of the country and tourism becomes a pioneering city, it will become a *"Beautiful City" (Tuncer, 2021).*

What has been done for Healthy Cities in the 19th Century New City Models?

The new city designs for urban settlements, which are described as "utopia", were made by thinkers and action figures such as Henry George, Sir Raymond Udwin and Ebenezer Howard.

One of the self-sufficient small settlement models developed by utopian socialists is Ebenezer Howard's proposal for the "Garden City" model, which aims to "marry the village with the city" and to combine the superior aspects and characteristics of both types of settlements.

It was quickly understood that The ideas developed in Ebenezer Howard's book "Garden Cities of Tomorrow", first published in 1898, are not a *"product of imagination"* or a *"utopian quest"*, and they are have a universal contribution value that maintains its current and validity even today turned out to be carrying " (Howard, 2019). Keleş, states that his teacher Lewis Mumford from MIT wrote for this work, *"There is no other book that influences the contemporary urban planning movement as much as this work and changes its aims".* (Keleş, 2019).

The concept of Garden City, which was put forward in order to eliminate the economic and social drawbacks of over-urbanization and to provide a more balanced distribution of the population at the country level, aimed to create settlements that have both the ideal living environment characteristics that do not exist in cities or rural areas (Keleş, 2019).

Epidemics are not just the subject of today, as you know, the Spanish Flu epidemic between 1915 and 18 cost the lives of several ten millions people, precisely during the First World War. Before that, many cities in Europe were actually broken by plague epidemics, cholera epidemics, typhoid and typhus epidemics (Tunçer, A., 1982).

This is a subject that destroyed cities, European cities and caused rethinking of cities for hundreds of years, especially in the Middle Ages, and was one of the foundations of the birth of the Renaissance Period. The issue of Public Health, city health and the environmentally friendly redesign of the city, and here the Garden City models emerged during these periods.

In the 1800s, contagious diseases increased and became a threat in cities with industrialization, and in 1854, it was determined that solid wastes pollute clean water resources by mapping where these diseases were common by first mapping by John Snow. This situation then laid the groundwork for the institutionalization of disciplines that directly affect city administration, such as public health and urban planning.

1898 Ebenezer Howard Garden City Model (Garden City)

The utopian urban module that Ebenezer Howard defined as Garden City in 1898; they were self-sufficient settlements surrounded by green belts, including residential, industrial and agricultural areas. Ideally, the "Garden City" would host 32,000 people on a 6,000-acre site planned concentrically with public spaces, parks and six radial boulevards. When the garden city reached full population, another garden city would be developed nearby. Howard's concept of the garden city, linked by road and rail, combined town and city.

He was leading the "Garden City Movement" with the establishment of the Garden City Association in 1899 (it would become a city after 42 years). The construction of *Letchworth* in 1903 and *Welwyn* in 1919 would serve as more catalysts for change.

Ebenezer Howard's idea for Garden City combined a landscape architecture concept with social, economic and regional planning concepts. This concept of landscape architecture

is based on the dominant nineteenth century landscape and garden design principle as shown above.

It is important to understand the context in which Howard's work was a reaction. In the 19th century, London (and other cities) was in the process of industrialization and the cities were exerting great power over the labour markets of the time. There was intense migration from rural areas to the big cities, and the urbanization problems it brought with it were growing like a tumour over the big cities. The politicians of the period asked the question of what kind of antidote they could produce against "the greatest danger of modern existence" (İkiz, S., U., 2018).

For Howard, the treatment was simple, reintegrating people into rural areas. He believed that "man should enjoy the beauty of society and nature together". Central to Howard's argument was that Garden-City could function economically and allow the community to own the land.

Starting from a beautiful foreground, Olmsted planned the green (park) systems and adapted this concept to urban design, while Howard adapted it to the Garden Cities concept. It can be understood as a concept of Landscape Cities and can be seen as the precursor to what is now called Landscape Urbanism. Ebenezer Howard's three magnets diagram which addressed the question "Where will the people go?", with the choices "Town", "Country" or "Town-Country".

The Three Magnet Diagram (below) points to three points:

(1) City life has good and bad features.

(2) There are good and bad features of rural life.

(3) Town-Country life can have all the good things about life in the towns and life in the countryside, without any of the bad things.

1898 Ebenezer Howard Garden City Model (Garden City)[2]

The main utopias such as Garden City, Beautiful City, "Le Corbusier's La Villette Ville Contemporaine" known in city planning and design literature, have always been defined in terms of health and urban and built environment. While these were being set up, urbanism and design principles such as keeping the building density at a certain level, designing large green and public spaces, easy accessibility to urban services, always prioritizing the public interest, and social equality came to the fore.

Ebenezer Howard's Garden City (Bahçeşehir) Idea[3]

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[2]https://www.gardenvisit.com/landscape_architecture/urban_design/garden_city_landscape_urbanism_ho ward, (Access: 07.03.2021).

[3]https://www.gardenvisit.com/landscape_architecture/urban_design/garden_city_landscape_urbanism_ho ward, (Access: 07.03.2021).

Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow could advantageously be called Landscape Cities of Tomorrow.

The basic ideas on which the Garden City Model is based:

a. A green belt devoted to agricultural activities will be an integral part of the city;

This green belt is constantly being brought to the agenda as "Blue-green Infrastructure" today. In the pandemic, the importance of open and green areas, green areas where people can freely walk, run, ride bicycles, and do recreational activities are much better understood.

b. This belt will be used to control the spreading of the city from the center to the periphery or the irregular developments taking place around the city;

c. All of the urban lands will be owned and controlled by the municipality and can only be transferred to private entrepreneurs through "lease";

d. It will be ensured that the population of the city does not exceed the initially planned size;

e. The "undeserved" gains created as a result of the growth of the city and the prosperity of the society will be attributed to the society;

f. Industrial organizations that provide the livelihood of the majority of the population will move to new cities (Keleş, 2019, p. 9).

Inspired by the utopian novel *Looking Backward* and Henry George's work *Progress and Poverty*, Howard published the book *To-morrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform* in 1898 (which was reissued in 1902 as *Garden Cities of To-morrow*). His idealised garden city would house 32,000 people on a site of 9,000 acres (3,600 ha), planned on a concentric pattern with open spaces, public parks and six radial boulevards, 120 ft. (37 m) wide, extending from the centre. The garden city would be self-sufficient and when it reached full population, another garden city would be developed nearby. Howard envisaged a cluster of several garden cities as satellites of a central city of 58,000 people, linked by road and rail.

Le Corbusier in the 1920s; rejecting low-density urban settlements, interpreting Howard's vision as a "Vertical Garden City".

Le Corbusier's excellent city contained high-density prefabricated skyscrapers spread over vast green areas. Le Corbusier proposed a new zoning case in "Radiant City", which he first presented in 1924, in which business, commerce, entertainment and life functions were separated. Business center (CBD); it was located in the center of the city and included monolithic mega skyscrapers and an extensive underground train system.

--"Ville Contemporaine" (1922) A Contemporary City for Three Million People

--"Ville Radieuse" (1930) The Radiant City

Layout of Le Corbusier in Ville Contemporaine

(http://thesis.arch.hku.hk/2015/2015/11/10/the-space-between-spaces-2/)

Topics such as reconsidering Paris, Haussmann Plans, destroying Paris and reconsidering the infrastructure of Rome and Istanbul in a way to improve it were discussed. Actually in the 1930s and in the 50s after World War II, *"New Livable City Models"* were established in European cities. Some of these models are multi-storey and some are in the form of the UK's "Garden City" model.

Ideal City

The "ideal" nature of such a city may encompass the moral, spiritual and juridical qualities of citizenship as well as the ways in which these are realised through urban structures including buildings, street layout, etc. The ground plans of ideal cities are often based on grids (in imitation of Roman town planning) or other geometrical patterns. The ideal city is often an attempt to deploy Utopian ideals at the local level of urban configuration and living space and amenity rather than at the culture- or civilisation-wide level of the classical Utopias such as St Thomas More's *Utopia*. The Ideal City has been a recurring theme throughout the history of architecture: the ideas of Plato and Aristotle are not only political, but also have references to the Hippodamus of Miletus.

While Plato defined the ideal city structure together with the state and democracy, Renaissance period painters emphasized the physical appearance of the city. The Urbino, Baltimore and Berlin perspective series, among the paintings of this period, reflect the development of the Ideal City Idea and the systematic transformation of the urban space.

The Ideal City also known as Panel Urbino, Berlin[4]

The vision of the city defined in the Urbino Panel is very modern for the 15th century and the architecture is much more uniform. The circular temple dominates the center of the symmetrical square. When we look at the Baltimore Panel, we see that the modern character of the city has disappeared and the ideal city is treated as theatrical.

The results of the Renaissance and the Concept of the Ideal City (La città ideal) in Renaissance art:

The age between the Middle Ages and the new age (until the 17th century) is the Renaissance "Rebirth". With the beginning of the new age, it is called the innovations are seen in the fields of literature, fine arts (painting, sculpture, architecture, city etc.) and science in Europe (Tuncer, M., 2010).

It is the era in which brand new thoughts and approaches, understandings and practices (on art, philosophy, religion issues) are put forward and a brand new human phenomenon appears on the stage of history.

Among the results of the Renaissance:

The destruction of the scholastic view (narrow vision of the church), dominance of positive (scientific) thinking instead, preparation of reform movements and acceleration of developments in science and technique, also the intellectual (bourgeois) class and the public

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[4] Atfedilen: Piero della Francesca, Luciano Laurana, Francesco di Giorgio Martini, o Melozzo da Forli, c. 1480-90. Fuente / Kaynak: Galleria Nazionale delle Marche, https://xxi.com.tr/i/ideal-kent, (Erişim: 02.03.2021).

class that enjoyed art in Europe has been formed. The authority of the clergy and the church over the people was shaken.

There was an opportunity to realize the promises of the Ideal City in Spanish colonialism of America (planned urbanism around the Plaza de Armas, Plaza Mayor or Plaza de Suburb of Castilian urbanism); grand perspectives were not realized in practice until Baroque urbanism.

For Leonardo da Vinci, the width of the street will be proportional to the height of the houses. Filarete designed the utopian city of Sforzinda in his Trattato di Architettura (1464) in honour of Francisco Sforza and it was never built. Its starry wall highlights the Italian sketch of the fortifications built across Europe and designed by Vauban for Louis XIV.

Ideal City called as "Baltimore", Attributed to Fra Carnevale

(C. 1480-1484 (Walters Art Museum, Baltimore)

Late nineteenth-century examples of the ideal city include the Garden city movement of Sir Ebenezer Howard, realised at Letchworth Garden City and Welwyn Garden City in England. Poundbury, Prince Charles' architectural vision established in Dorset, is among the most recent examples of ideal city planning.

Modern Ankara and Garden City Model

The cities of the Ottoman Period were among the most beautiful and magnificent cities of the period with the highest aesthetic value because of the kneading of architectural works with art. magnificent mosques, inns, baths, covered bazaars and complexes were built in cities such as Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa, Kayseri, Konya, as an indicator of development. These buildings, with the residential buildings around them, have formed livable, healthy and well-equipped cities, besides being beautiful cities. One of them is Ankara in Ottoman Period.

In today's world, where new values are formed and globalization is pushing all boundaries, the sustainability of cities is based on their "original geography" and "their

history, culture, tradition, etc." which makes them different from other cities (Gülhan, D., 2016). It depends on their ability to maintain their core values. Venice, Florence, Prague, Vienna like historical cities has historical identities and architectural characters are meticulously preserved and maintained similar to many European cities.

After 1923, "Atatürk's Revolutions" in Modern Turkey, attaching importance to "Science and Art" and "Contemporary Urbanization" relations are important. In the Early Republican Period, a new emphasis on westernization and the search for our own Anatolian civilisations origins in architecture, art, archaeology, science, language and all kinds of life culture came to the fore. The discovery of artifacts belonging to the Palaeolithic and Neolithic ages in the archaeological excavations carried out in and around Ankara by the order of Atatürk revealed that Ankara is a very old settlement.

Carl Christopher Lörcher's Plan for Ankara

With the expression of Ali Cengizkan;

"... .. The fact that he is a very important advocate of the Garden City understanding has led to the realization of one of the most important qualities of the Lörcher Plan. The "Garden City" may have been realized as a quality that Lörcher could attribute to Ebenezer Howard between the opportunities offered by the vineyards of Ankara and the current theoretical approach. Not only the villa neighbourhoods in Yenişehir, but also Kavaklı Dere, Koca Tepe, Çankaya, Dikmen, Küçük Esat, Ayrancı, Keçi Ören Etlik neighbourhoods were presented as storage areas for villa areas" (Cengizkan, A., 2004).

The Garden City approach, which is also repeated in the Jansen Plan, was developed in the 19th century. It is an approach that emerged against the environmental disasters in London caused by the extreme pollution due to industrial revolution, especially in England. However, it is known that the representatives of this approach, which continued in the 1920s, were not very effective in Ankara Planning, and almost all the ties in the periphery were destroyed with the phenomenon of rural-urban migration and slums that accelerated after the 1940-50s.

Ankara's first plan was a "Garden City" by Prof Hermann Jansen. The first development plan of the city of Ankara, which was obtained with the competition in 1929, was a pedestrian-based city model, in accordance with the Garden City Model where the protection of green areas and rivers were also aimed.

Approved in 1932 Jansen's City Master Plan of Ankara was as a "Garden City" Quality

In Jansen's Designs, The Bend Deresi is organized for recreation purposes.

The tanneries and water mills that existed on the shores of Bendderesi until the 1920s were destroyed, and there is no trace left from the Roman Bend, which first lost its originality with the changes and additions made in the early 1930s, and then completely collapsed. In Ankara, all these green areas, especially, streams have been destroyed, covered and turned into sewer pits.

> *"...... Starting from the Jansen Plan, especially starting from the 1950s, these were all turned into sewers by the State Hydraulic Works and municipal policy; roads were was passed over them. Ankara's streams flow under the roads right now. Here Bentderesi Street is a very good example, we can give. Now, of course, Ankara has rapid grown city several master plans were made. The 1957 Master Plan, the Yücel-Uybadin Plan, the 1960 Plan, the 1990 Master Plan (Metropolitan Area) and today we ended up with a city without plans. Because currently, Ankara does not have a Metropolitan Area Master Plan ..."* (Tunçer, M., 2020).

Today, Ankara is expanding in the shape of oil spot in every side

"... Of these plans; the plans for 2023 and 2038 were suspended, lawsuits are opened. Because Ankara has been planned in a huge area from one end to Polatlı, from one end to Ayaş, and these plans are indications that Ankara has a plan that will be enough for 19 million people. However, it may take 100 years to reach this 19 million. For metropolitan Ankara, there is a need for a master plan aiming at «zero carbon» and «green policy» in which forests, agricultural areas, rivers and valleys are protected and a green infrastructure is established." (Tunçer, M., 2020).

2038 Ankara Environmental Master Plan

Existing plans can be taken into account. Existing plans have invaluable research. These master plans and master plans should be reconsidered by bringing together climate change, global warming, epidemics, pandemic, resistant city models and smart city models.

For Ankara, it is necessary to develop strategies to combat climate change, global warming and to create a resilient city model. After the pandemic, it is necessary to prepare a master plan established in Ankara's Metropolitan Area Master Plan with zero carbon (Zero carbon), green policy, forest, agricultural areas, rivers and valleys.

Existing plans can be taken into account, as they have invaluable research. These master plans should be reconsidered by bringing together all precautions for climate change, global warming, epidemics, pandemic, resistant city models and smart city models. How today's Bahçekents will develop, is today's evolving into a new understanding that includes zero carbon city, etc.

Population and Building Densities should be reviewed

A directly proportional relationship is observed between the places with high population density and the spread of the virus. In Keçiören, Ankara Castle and its surroundings, Altındağ

and in the center, we see that it is especially crowd in Demetevler in the new settlements of Sincan, Batıkent and Eryaman. Therefore, this is an event related to population density and economic structure. In other words, it is necessary to improve the living conditions of people, to take measures to improve their economic power and to make environmentally sensitive planning.

The decreasing green / blue infrastructure systems in Ankara should be developed, a green belt should be established, Mogan-Eymir-Imrahor Valley Special Environmental Protection Area should be protected with its natural ecology. The gradually decreasing green-blue infrastructure systems Imrahor Valley and lakes, Mogan - Eymir Lakes and its continuation Imrahor Incesu Stream must be protected. Ecological planning; Considering zero carbon emissions, green buildings are issues that take green architecture into account, highlight the environment in environmental planning, and highlight green infrastructure. High carbon emission, energy-intensive, has coal and other fossil fuel-based economic growth in many environmental advice on the insistence of Turkey. This should be taken very seriously as soon as possible, especially these days. Maybe this Covid-19 will have an effect; Corona virus will have an effect. It should be emphasized that all living spaces in all areas of the city must be handled as spaces with aesthetic qualities with contemporary designs suitable for the nature, environmental beauty, biological diversity, historical and cultural structure of the city.

► Parks should be designed in a useful and aesthetic way; trees, plants, colours, lighting elements and material selection should be made accordingly. Open spaces should be considered in a way that provides maximum opportunities for the inhabitants to be active and creative, and should be suitable for rest. Sports fields should also be designed to include different sports branches, suitable for different ages and physical capacities. There should be adequate and qualified playgrounds for children.

► Agriculture and animal husbandry should be given importance. Urban agriculture and surrounding agricultural areas must be protected.

► Transportation systems should be reviewed, pedestrian + access roads should be increased. Since public transportation vehicles are seen as the most commonly infected vehicles, they have suddenly become the dirtiest looking vehicles. From now on, everyone will create their own solution and prefer not to use public transportation, to walk, or to choose individual transportation vehicles such as bicycles and electric scooters, which are recently supported by local governments. (Özuduru, B., 2020)

► Restriction of vehicle roads, narrowing of lines, pedestrian and bicycle prominence: When we look at Austria, Germany and the USA, the streets are closed to

traffic, leaving space for pedestrians and cyclists and the effort to protect social distance in this way came to the fore. In fact, we saw that the bicycle roads were widened by narrowing the vehicle roads in Berlin[5].

▶ "*Ankara Greater Municipality Mayor Mansur Yavaş, who introduced the 6-stage 53.6-kilometer bicycle path to be built in Başşehir, said," There are 65 thousand vehicles in total at a walking distance of 500 meters to the route. We need to ensure that these vehicles do not enter the city anymore,*" he said[6].

Ankara Bicycle Road Routes

The concept of public space will change and dense and congested spaces will be abandoned. In the first place, during this pandemic the workplaces were partially abandoned. Later, the most popular consumption places and "semi-public" areas of the last twenty years, Shopping Centres (Shopping Centres) were closed. Green areas such as parks, walking paths and natural areas followed. The only places that could not be closed were the streets, which were far from surveillance and were more public places.

"*The squares remained empty; the number of people on the sidewalks has decreased. In the past, uncared encounters while passing by, started to change the sidewalk. Since the cities do not have a socially tolerant city culture, in a short time, a culture that was rude to each other was formed*". (Özuduru, 2020).

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[5] Germany: Pop-up bike lanes give Berlin cyclists extra room amid COVID-19 outbreak: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zogGJVExQU

[6] https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/ankara/bisiklet-yolu-gelecek-65-bin-arac-gidecek-41383503

Aesthetic Criteria and Healthy Cities

Examination of cities in the historical process gives some clues about urban aesthetics. These are can be summarized as follows:

• The most important factor that creates urban aesthetics has been the natural environment. Vegetation, geomorphology and climate are elements that make up the natural environment. These elements play an important role both in the selection of the places where cities are established and in the formation of the cities. It must be emphasized that these elements should be compatible with each other in terms of urban aesthetics,

• The urban environment is the living environment where human life, private and social life passes after the transition to settled social order and the first settled urban fabrics are established. Urban environments can be classified as private, semi-public and public environments. In the cities, streets, squares, open and green areas, working spaces, social and cultural spaces, industrial and production spaces all together constitute the "Urban Environment" (Aytekin, O., 2020).

• The urban environment consists of buildings and outdoor spaces defined by them. The harmony and relationships between them determine the quality of urban aesthetics. The roads, which are described as positive elements, come together to form negative elements, namely outdoor spaces. Negative elements are defined as open spaces with circulation systems. Roads and squares are parts of the circulation system, breathing spaces of structures such as courtyards, front gardens and side gardens, and green areas are parts of open spaces.

• Lines forming the surfaces of negative and positive elements; texture, material, colour, that is, facades of buildings and pavements in outdoor spaces, are important elements of urban aesthetics. The exterior lines that make up the building facades, the proportions of doors and windows, horizontal and vertical lines, building material, colour and decoration elements. The aesthetic items found outdoors; floor coverings, natural landscape materials and urban outdoor items (furniture). All these elements come together to form a macro form and silhouette for the whole city. Landscape[7] planning practice is mainly focused on "cultural" landscape, where land use reflects a mix of environmental possibilities (such as slope, climate and soil fertility) and human effort.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is; taking the British "Garden City Model" against the Covid-19 (Crona) contagious disease, which has caused a pandemic (mass epidemic) all over the

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[7] Landscape as defined in the European Landscape Convention is defined as an area perceived by people whose 'understandable' character is the result of the action and the interaction of natural and / or human factors. Council of Europe (2000) 'The European Landscape Convention', Strasbourg.

world since the end of 2019, is to discuss the spatial decisions that may be taken in the near future and in the future. Covid-19 virus it is impossible to see it even with a microscope. It is possible to see it with electron microscopes, but I think we can say that this is a warning sent by nature.

In the search for what kind of "City Model" and what kind of "Strategies" should be brought against the epidemic and what we should be able to do the English "Garden City" can be reconsidered as a model.

Ebenezer Howard introduced the "social city" design that attempted to build a bridge between the individualist (capitalist) system of his time, unions, cooperatives, nature, quality life and common ideas. In this article, the importance of this model in terms of "environment" and "public health" (Tunçer, A., 1982) has been emphasized, and its position among the Ideal City models has been tried to be explained.

Based on Howard's Garden City Model, the principles of the Hermann Jansen Plan, which is the first holistic plan of Ankara obtained through competition in the 1930s, were briefly mentioned. Capital of the Republic of Turkey has also developed ideas for macro-planning decisions, which can be taken to Ankara today again.

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Kıbrıs'ta Radyoculuk ve Radyocu Kadınlar (1939-1963)

Ulvi Keser[1]

Özet

Kıbrıs'ta radyo yayıncılığı her ne kadar 1950'li yıllara kadar pek de sağlıklı yapılmasa da daha önceki süreçte başlayacak şekilde radyo yayınlarına ve radyo yayıncılığına ilgi olduğu da açıktır. Özellikle İngiltere'nin Ortadoğu coğrafyasındaki bazı askeri birliklerini geri çekmesi ve bunları Kıbrıs'ta konuşlandırmasının ardından önce askeri radyo olarak kısıtlı bir çevreye yayın yapmaya başlayan radyo daha sonraki süreçte BBC'nin de desteğiyle bütün Kıbrıs'a yayılacak hale gelecektir. 1930'lu yıllardan itibaren akülü radyolarla karşılaşmaya başlayan Kıbrıslı Türkler ise bu dönemde radyo istasyonlarında da görev almaya başlayacaktır ve şaşırtıcı bir şekilde İngiliz yönetimince işletilen adadaki radyo istasyonlarında görev yapanların büyük bir kısmı Kıbrıslı Türk kadınları olacaktır. 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde İngiltere, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'la Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Kıbrıslı Rumların imzaladığı antlaşmalar çerçevesinde kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin ardından buradaki radyo personeli de yavaş yavaş devletin radyo istasyonunda göreve başlar. Ne yazık ki bu süreç fazla devam etmeyecek ve 21 Aralık 1963 tarihinde başlayan ve tarihe Kanlı Noel olarak geçen Rum saldırılarının ardından Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti fiilen ortadan kalkarken devletin diğer kurum ve kuruluşlarında olduğu gibi radyoda çalışan Kıbrıslı Türk personel de işlerine gidemeyeceklerdir. Bu dönem Kıbrıslı Türklerin kendi radyolarını kurmak ve bütün dünyaya seslerini duyurmak için başlattıkları yeni bir sürecinde başlangıcı olur ve 28 Aralık 1963 günü Bayrak Radyosu ile zor ve kısıtlı şartlarda başlayan radyo yayınları diğer Kıbrıs Türk radyolarıyla da devam eder. Arşiv kaynakları yanında sözlü tarih çalışmalarıyla da desteklenen bu bilimsel çalışma özellikle 21 Aralık 1963 tarihine kadar Kıbrıs'ta radyoculuk ve Kıbrıslı Türk radyo personeli kadınları mercek altına alacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Radyo, BBC, CyBC, Bayrak, EOKA

Radio Broadcasting and Women in Radio in Cyprus (1939-1963)

Abstract

Although radio broadcasting in Cyprus was far from perfect up to the 1950's, it was clear that there was an interest in radio programs and broadcasting. After the British government had withdrawn British troops from the Middle East and relocated them in Cyprus, military radio broadcasting within a certain and restricted area, then enlarged the borders and started broadcasting the programmes for all the island with the support of the BBC. The Turkish Cypriots who had used battery-operated radios after 1930's started working in those above-mentioned radio stations in Cyprus. In fact, most of the Turkish Cypriot personnel there were Turkish Cypriot women. The Republic of Cyprus was founded on 16 August 1960 with the UK, Turkey, Greece as guarantors, and signed by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The Turkish radio personnel start working in the radio station of the newly established state. Unfortunately, the Republic of Cyprus did not last long. After the Greek Cypriot attacks against the Turkish Cypriots started on 21 December 1963 — known 'the Bloody Christmas' — like all other Turkish officials, the Turkish Cypriot personnel working in the state radio station left work, and never to go back due to security problems. This period also marked the starting point for them to establish their own radio stations and to broadcast their voices all over the world. Turkish-operated radio stations, including Bayrak Radio, made its first broadcast under difficult and restricted conditions on 28 December 1963. This study will focus on the radio broadcasting in Cyprus up to 21st December 1963, with a particular focus on the female Turkish Cypriot radio personnel.

Key words: Cyprus, Radio, BBC, CyBC, Bayrak Radio, EOKA

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Giriş

Kıbrıs'ta özellikle 1 Nisan 1955 sonrasında ortaya çıkan toplumsal çatışmalar ve ardından yaşanan gerginlikler 16 Ağustos 1960'da Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurulmasına rağmen son bulmayacaktır. Cumhuriyetin silahlı Rumların Aralık ayında başlattıkları saldırılarla yıkılmasının ardından devletin resmi radyo istasyonu olan Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation'da çalışan Kıbrıslı Türk radyocular da buradan ayrılmak ve adanın güvenli bölgelerine göç etmek zorunda kalırlar. 25 Aralık 1963 günü radyocuların ifadesiyle "havaya çıkan" Bayrak Radyosu da bu anlamda bir dönüm noktası oluşturur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde ilk defa gerçek anlamda radyoyla tanışan Kıbrıs'ta daha sonraki süreçte adada bulunan İngiliz askeri üsleri kanalıyla küçük çaplı da olsa radyo yayınları yapılmaya başlanır. 1950'li yıllara gelindiğinde bu radyo yayınları yerini İngilizlerin sivil radyo yayınlarına bırakacaktır. Bu bağlamda Kıbrıs'ta radyo tarihi aşağıdaki şekilde kronolojik bir liste halinde sunulabilir;

1- İkinci Dünya Savaşı süreci askeri radyo yayınları
2- 1950'li yıllarda başlayan İngilizlere ait "sivil" radyo yayınları
3- 16 Ağustos 1960 sonrasında Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti radyo yayınları
4- 25 Aralık 1963 sonrasında Kıbrıs Türk radyo istasyonları ve yayınları

Bütün bu süreçte Kıbrıslı Türk kadın çalışanları teknisyen, yayıncı, programcı, spiker, haber yorumcu vb. olarak görmek mümkündür. Bu araştırma kapsamında Kıbrıs adasında kısaca radyo tarihine değinildikten sonra İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından önce İngiliz askeri radyo istasyonlarında, sonra İngiliz yönetimi, ardından Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti sürecinde adadaki radyo yayıncılığına değinilecek ve 21 Aralık 1963 tarihinde tamamlanana kadar Kıbrıslı Türk kadın radyocuların bu radyo istasyonlarındaki safahatları da mercek altına alınacaktır.

Kıbrıs'ta İlk Radyo Yayınlarının Duyulması

1914-1918 sürecinde yaşanan Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında radyo yayınlarıyla tanışmaya başlayan insanlar arasına adada yaşayanlar ise ancak 1929 Ekonomik Krizi sonrasında dâhil olacaklardır. Bu süreçte Kıbrıs'ta sayılı radyo olmakla beraber Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Rumlara hizmet veren bir radyo istasyonu ise söz konusu değildir. Bu süreç yaklaşık 10 yıl daha devam edecek ve radyo gerçek anlamda 1930'lu yılların sonunda adada kendisini gösterecektir. Bununla birlikte 1926 senesinde Kıbrıs'ta Mehmet Nuri Özkan'ın Söz gazetesinde Kıbrıs'ta "Mösyö Lang" isimli bir elektrik mühendisinin radyo-telsiz telefonu yaptığı konusunda bir haber vardır.[2]

Kıbrıs'a henüz radyo gelmeden önce bir radyo istasyonunda çalışan Kıbrıslı Türkler de bulunmaktadır ve Dr. Fikret Rassim ise İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devam ettiği süreçte

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[2] Hamid Orundalı'nın 21 Mayıs 1927 tarihli *Söz* gazetesindeki yazısından aktaran Meral Demiryürek, *Larnaka Mektubu; Mütefekkir,* (İstanbul: Akademik Kitaplar Yay., 2010), s. 156.

Londra'da tıp eğitimi aldığı dönemde BBC'de görev yapmış ve radyo yayınına çıkmış ilk Kıbrıslı Türk olarak bilinmektedir.[3]

Özellikle 1930 sonrasında adada tek tük de olsa elektrikle çalışan radyoların bulunduğu bilinmektedir. Örneğin Serdarlı köyünde Ahmet Zaimoğlu 10 Kasım 1938 tarihinde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün ölümüyle ilgili haberleri radyodan dinlediklerini hatırladığını belirtmektedir.[4] Aynı günlerde İngiltere'nin Atina Büyükelçisi Sir Michael Palairet ise Almanların Rumca yaptıkları propaganda faaliyetleri karşısında özellikle Kıbrıslı Rumların ve Yunanların moral değerlerini ayakta tutmak ve müttefiklerle beraber savaşa girme konusunda cesaretlendirilmeleri amacıyla adanın Yunanistan'a verilmesini teklif eder; ancak bu teklif İngiltere hükümeti tarafından derhal reddedilir. 1939 yılından itibaren İngiltere BBC vasıtasıyla Yunanistan ve Kıbrıs'a yönelik Yunanca yayınlar yapmaya başlar. Böylece her iki bölgede İngiltere'ye yönelik sempatik bir yaklaşım sağlamaya çalışan ve savaşla ilgili propaganda çalışmalarına devam eden İngiltere karşısında Almanya da boş durmaz ve Polonya'da Breslau denilen yerden doğrudan Rumlara yönelik İngiltere karşıtı yayınlara başlar.[5]

BBC yayınlarının Kıbrıslı Rumlar üzerinde fazla bir etkisinin görülmemesi üzerine özellikle "yorgunluktan erken yatmak zorunda kalan köylülere"[6] yönelik olarak yayınların 20.10'da sunulacak olan Yunanca haberlere göre yeniden programlanması da düşünülür. Emir Ali Başar ise anılarında radyonun getirildiği ilk tarih olarak 1938'i işaret eder; ancak bu tarihin radyonun köye mi yoksa Kıbrıs adasına mı gelişiyle ilgili olduğu konusunda açıklama yapmaz.[7] Aynı sıkıntılı süreci yaşayanlardan birisi de halen Kıbrıs TMT Mücahitler Derneği Başkanlığı görevini yürüten 1936 Akıncılar doğumlu Yılmaz Bora olacaktır.[8]

Bu dönemde öncelikle fakir halk tabakasına, özellikle de köylüye, esnafa ve işçi sınıfına hitap etmek üzere kurulan Kıbrıs'taki radyo yayınlarının istenilen ölçüde etkili olabilmesi için insanların radyo cihazına sahip olmaları gerektiğinden İngilizler de bir dizi tedbir alma gereği duyarlar ve ilk etapta Gümrük Kanunu'nda değişiklik yaparak 6 Sterlin 'den aşağı değeri olan radyo cihazlarının adaya gümrük ödenmeden girmesi sağlanır.[9] Ayrıca radyo cihazı

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[3] Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Dr. Fikret Rassim (1910-1998),* (Lefkoşa: Lefkoşa Özel Türk Üniversitesi Yay., 1998), s. 29.

[4] Zeki Akçam, *Serdarlı, (Çatoz) Köyü Monografisi ve Ağzı,* (İstanbul: Hiperyayın Yay., 2017), s. 326.

[5] William Mallinson, *Cyprus; A Modern History,* (London: I. B. Tauris Publications, 2005), s. 212. Tabitha Morgan, *Sweet and Bitter Island: A History of the British in Cyprus,* (London: I. B. Tauris Publications, 2010), s. 150.

[6] Morgan, *a.g.e.,* s. 151.

[7] Emir Ali Başar, *Anılarım,* (Lefkoşa: Ateş Matbaacılık, 2017), s. 19.

[8] Yılmaz Bora'dan aktaran Mustafa Yeniasır, Kenan Kalay ve Emir H. Yemenicioğlu, *Lefkoşa Sancağı,* (Yayımlanmamış Askeri Günce), Lefkoşa, s. 131-134

[9] Özen Çatal, *Canbulat Radio as an Alternative Radio Station,* DAÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Gazi Mağusa, 2003, s. 86.

ithalatçılarıyla yapılan görüşmelerde adaya getirilmesi planlanan ve değeri 6-10 sterlin arasında olması düşünülen cihazlarla ilgili olarak kar oranlarının olabildiğince alt dilimde tutulması yönünde mutabakat sağlanır. Bu durum radyo cihazı sayısına da doğrudan yansır ve 1951-1952 döneminde radyo ruhsatı sayısında %33 gibi radikal bir artış söz konusu olur. Bu ilk radyo yayınları kısıtlı da olsa Kıbrıs Türkleri tarafından da ilgiyle takip edilmektedir.[10]

Öte yandan dünyayı yakıp yıkan İkinci Dünya Savaşı döneminde de Kıbrıs savaşın kaçınılmaz sonucu olarak savaş ekonomisi, enflasyon, karaborsa, yokluklar, karne uygulamaları, işsizlik ve pahalılık gibi sorunlarla boğuşmaktadır. Bu süreç insanların kaçınılmaz olarak askere yazılmaları ve İngiltere adına dünyanın farklı cephelerinde savaşmaları ya da esir düşmeleri anlamına gelmektedir.[11]

İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Kıbrıs'ta Radyo

Okuluyla gittiği İngiltere'deki günlerini tamamlayarak Kıbrıs'a dönen Rauf R. Denktaş da 1939 yılıyla birlikte savaşın acı yüzünü ve etkilerini hissedenler arasındadır.[12] Savaşın askerî olmasa da sosyal boyutu esasında adada yaşayan herkes açısından son derece olumlu bir görüntü çizmeye başlar. Özellikle 1931 Rum isyanı sonrasında iyiden iyiye gerilmeye başlayan Kıbrıslı Türklerle Rumlar arasındaki ilişkiler Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki dostluk ilişkileri çerçevesinde yerini yumuşamaya bırakır. Bu durumdan karlı çıkan ve istifade eden ise yine İngiltere olur. Böylece adada askere alımların başlatılması için de düğmeye basılır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın başlamasıyla beraber acilen asker ihtiyacıyla karşılaşan İngiltere bu açığını kapatabilmek için Kıbrıs'ta da asker almaya hız verir.[13]

Özellikle 1939 yılında Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan insanların genellikle tarıma dayalı bir ekonomik güce bağlı kaldıkları, tarım alanında ön plana çıkan ürünlerin ise bağcılık ve buna bağlı olarak üzümcülük ve şarapçılık olduğu, ayrıca zeytincilik yapıldığı da görülür. Bu dönemde Kıbrıs'ta sanayi bağlamında neredeyse hiçbir ciddi yatırım söz konusu değildir. Buna karşılık karşılaşılan görüntü yokluk, hayat pahalılığı, karaborsa, işsizlik ve karamsarlıktır.[14] İnsanlar karaborsadan bıkıp usanmış durumdadır; ancak adada faaliyet gösteren İngiliz gizli ajanlarına göre karaborsayı normal ve düzenli iş olarak görenlerin sayısı da bir hayli fazladır.[15] İngiliz yönetimi ise savaş nedeniyle ortaya çıkan ekonomideki olumsuz tablo, hayat pahalılığı ve karaborsa nedeniyle memurlara yönelik bir iyileştirme programını yürürlüğe koyar. Buna göre senelik 30 liraya kadar maaş alan memurlara 12 lira, 30 liradan

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[10] Çatal, *a.g.t,* s. 86.

[11] Arslan Mengüç, *Ben Tiremeşeli Mehmet Ali,* (Lefkoşa, 2013), s. 9.

[12] Rauf R. Denktaş, *Karkot Deresi,* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005), s. 28-30.

[13] Bilal Halil Denizal'dan aktaran Fikret Demirağ, *Şu Müthiş Savaş Yılları,* (Lefkoşa: Kültür Yay., 1999), s. 9.

[14] *Halkın Sesi,* 31 Mart 1942.

[15] Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "The Special Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War", *Middle Eastern Studies,* Volume 45, No 2, (Mart 2009), s. 318.

yukarı ve 60 liraya kadar maaş alanlara 18 lira, 60 liradan yukarı ve 180 liraya kadar maaş alanlara 24 lira, 180 liradan 204 liraya kadar maaş alanlara da maaşlarını 204 liraya tamamlayacak oranda ikramiye verilecektir.[16]

Adaya 1957 yılında da Kıbrıs Valisi olarak gelen ve daha önce de İkinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde aynı şekilde adada görev yapan Sir Hugh Foot ise özellikle 1943-1945 döneminde adanın durumunu "...Yunanistan hala Alman işgalinde ve Türkiye de tarafsız pozisyonunu korurken Kıbrıs'taki Türklerle Rumlar nefes alabilecek bir durumdaydılar. Bizimle çalışmaktan ve savaşın neden olduğu yokluklara karşı birlikte mücadele etmekten ve günlük koşuşturmaların içinde pratik tedbirler almaktan memnundular..."[17] diyerek ifade eder. İngiliz ordusunda katırcı olarak görev yapan Kıbrıslı Türkler arasında Bayrak Radyosu'na ve Anamur'da tesis edilen Kıbrıs'ın Sesi Radyosu'na da uzun yıllar hizmet edecek olan merhum Hasan Fehmi yanında merhum Hüseyin Hes[18] de vardır.[19]

BBC'nin Strand'da bulunan Bush House'dan yapılan Yunanca yayınları ve özellikle Kıbrıslı Rumlara yönelik faaliyetleri burada çalışan ve kendilerini "ince zevkli ve kaliteli Atinalılar"[20] olarak nitelendiren Yunanlar tarafından yapılmaktadır ve onların derdi "Yunan köylüler" veya "basit, sıradan insanlar" olarak değerlendirdikleri Kıbrıslı Rumlar değildir. Tam da savaşın ortasında böyle bir durumla karşılaşılması ve radyoda çalışanların kendilerini adeta üstün ırk gibi görmeleri ise İngilizler tarafından kabul edilebilecek bir durum değildir. Bu arada İngiltere-Kıbrıs arasında posta haberleşmesinin neredeyse durma noktasına gelmesi ise insanların haber alabilecekleri tek kaynak olarak radyoya bağlanmalarına da neden olacaktır. Gazeteler de haber kaynağı olarak radyoyu kullanmaktadır ve bu durum Kıbrıs'ta insanlara "Herkese kendisini dinleterek günün saatlerini harcatan radyo çok can sıkıcı."[21] dedirtir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı süreci adada yokluk, karaborsa, ekonomik çöküş, katırcı olarak İngiliz ordusuna kaydolan ve neredeyse dünyanın dört bir yanındaki cephelerde savaşa giden insanların memleket hasretiyle ve fakirlikle yoğrulacaktır. Ocak-Şubat 1940 sürecinde kısa dalgadan Yunanca yayın yapan Nazi Propaganda Radyosu ise İngiltere'nin bu yaklaşımını yumuşak karın olarak nitelendirir ve Kıbrıslı Türklerle Kıbrıslı Rumların bu şekilde askere

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[16] *Halkın Sesi,* 25 Mart 1942.

[17] Hugh Foot, *A Start in Freedom,* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), s. 143-144.

[18] Hüseyin Hes, 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan'ın üçlü garantörlüğünde kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ni yıkmaya yönelik olarak harekete geçen ve Enosis rüyasına gerçekleştirerek Megali İdea doğrultusunda adayı Yunanistan'a ilhak etmek isteyen Rumların Türklere karşı baskı, yıldırma ve tedhiş hareketlerine başlaması sonrasında Türkiye'nin en güney noktası olan Anamur'da kurulan ve Anamurlular tarafından Anamur'un Sesi Radyosu olarak bilinen Mücahit Radyosu'nda da uzun yıllar görev alır.

[19] CY/23045 sicil numaralı Hasan Fehmi'den aktaran Mehmet Ali İzmen, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Kıbrıslıların Katkısı,* (Ankara, 2005), s. 72.

[20] Mallinson, *a.g.e.,* s. 214.

[21] Mallinson, *a.g.e.,* s. 217.

alınmalarını "ancak katırcı ve köle olmaya uygun" şeklinde değerlendirir ve bunu kaşımaya devam eder.[22]

Abdullah Acar da iletişim ve radyoculuk konusunda daha çocukluğundan itibaren çalışmaya başlayanlar arasındadır.[23] Lefke Sancak Radyosu ile Bayrak Radyosu'na uzun yıllar hizmet eden merhum Hüseyin Kanatlı da adadaki karartma gecelerini ve radyoyu anılarında yaşatanlar arasındadır. Evlerde ve işyerlerinde uygulanan karartma tedbirlerine ilaveten ayrıca pencerelere ışık sızmasını engellemeye yönelik olarak siyah perdeler takılır.[24] İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devam ettiği günlerde radyo başına toplananlar arasında Poli'de o günleri yaşayan Arif Feridun da vardır.[25] İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devam ettiği günler Kıbrıs adasını savaş ekonomisi bağlamında ciddi sıkıntılara sokarken radyo yayıncılığı da yavaş yavaş hayatın içinde kendine yer bulmaya başlamıştır.[26] Bütün bunlara ilaveten hemen bütün devlet dairelerinde sığınaklar tesis edilerek siren sistemleri ve sivil savunma ekipleri devreye sokulur.[27] Savaşın ağır hasarının tam anlamıyla hayatın her alanında gösterdiği bu dönemde Kıbrıs'ta sosyal hayat ise düşünüldüğünden çok daha basittir.[28]

Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Kıbrıs ve Radyo

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında bütün dünyada olduğu üzere Kıbrıs'ta da radyoculuk ve radyo haberlerinin ilgiyle takip edilmesi söz konusudur. Ancak adadaki radyoların neredeyse tamamı ada dışından gelen radyo yayınlarını takip etmeye yönelik olduğundan, ayrıca arz-talep dengesi içinde radyo cihazı hala son derece popüler ve pahalı bir cihaz pozisyonunda bulunduğundan özellikle fakir ve orta halli ailelerin evlerinde bulunması söz konusu değildir. Sadece varlıklı aileler ve sonraki süreçte de bazı köylerde köylülerin ortak kullandıkları köy odası veya köy kahvesi gibi yerlerde radyo cihazı bulunmaktadır.[29]

Kıbrıs adasında İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından 1950'li yıllara kadar henüz neredeyse hiç radyonun olmadığı pek çok köy de söz konusudur.[30] İletişim konusunda atılımlar yaşanmasına rağmen henüz insanların evlerinde yaygın bir şekilde radyo bulunması söz konusu değildir. Bu dönemde radyo sahibi şanslı ailelerden birisi de şair Özden Nazım

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[22] TNA CO 323/1787'den aktaran Morgan, *a.g.e.,* s. 146.

[23] Abdullah Acar'la 8 Nisan 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[24] Hüseyin Kanatlı, *a.g.e.,* s. 52-53.

[25] Arif Feridun, *Unutulmasın Diye,* (Lefkoşa: Kitap Matbaacılık, 2011), s. 39, 90.

[26] Nevzat Yalçın, "Köyde İlk Radyolar", *Modern Kıbrıslı Türk Edebiyatından Anı ve Gezi Yazıları,* Editör Mehmet Yaşın, (Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs Türk Eğitim Vakfı Yay., 2007), s. 55-56.

[27] Hüseyin Özdemir, *Kıbrıs'ta 60 Yıl,* (İzmir: Volkan Yay., 1997), s. 39.

[28] Okan Dağlı, *Medeniyetlerin Kesiştiği Kent Mağusa,* (Lefkoşa: Havadis Yay., 2015), s. 79-80

[29] TMT Limasol Sancaktarı ve Limasol Hastanesi Başhekimi Dr. Ayten Berkalp ile 12 Kasım 2013 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

[30] İsmail Bozkurt, *Beştulum'dan Zirköy'e; Bir Kıbrıs Çocukluğu ve İlkgençliği 1940-1963,* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yay., 2018), s. 231-232.

Osmancık Selenge'nin ailesidir.[31] Özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Kıbrıs adası savaş ekonomisinin yarattığı yıkımla da uğraşmaktadır ve insanların radyo sahibi olabilmeleri parmakla gösterilmelerine neden olacak türden bir ayrıcalıktır.[32]

Savaşın bitmesinin ardından Kıbrıs'ta sadece 18 radyo tamircisi vardır. İşsizlik, hayat pahalılığı, ekonomik kriz ve yokluklarla boğuşan halk tabakalarının bir ölçüde de olsa radyo yayınlarıyla alakadar olması ve asıl sıkıntılardan uzaklaşabilmesi maksadıyla adada yaşayanların radyo alabilmeleri teşvik edilir ve yapılan hukuki düzenlemelerin ardından fiyatı 6 İngiliz Lirası'ndan daha düşük olan radyoların Kıbrıs'a gümrük ödemeden getirilmesinin de önü açılmış olur. Bunun dışında Kıbrıs'ta radyo cihazı satmakta olan firmalarla da görüşülerek daha yüksek maliyetli radyo cihazlarında fiyatlara uygulanan kar marjlarının mümkün olduğunca düşük tutulması ve herkesin istediği radyoyu alabilmesi için de ithalatçılarla bir anlaşmaya da gidilir. Durum böyle olunca alınan tedbirler kendisini hemen gösterir ve 1951-1952 sürecinde iletişim dairesinden alınan radyo ruhsatı sayısı %33 artar. Bugünkü teknolojiyle hiçbir şekilde mukayese edilemeyecek olsa da radyo almak için çabalayanlar arasında kaçınılmaz olarak Kıbrıslı Türkler de vardır. Savaşın ağır hasarının tam anlamıyla hayatın her alanında gösterdiği bu dönemde Kıbrıs'ta sosyal hayat ise elektrik, radyo, televizyon yayınlarının olmaması nedeniyle düşünüldüğünden çok daha basittir.[33]

FBS ve CBS Yayınlarının Başlaması

Adada resmi kayıtlara geçmiş ilk radyo savaşın hemen ardından Filistin cephesinden getirilerek Kıbrıs'ta bugün Agrotur ve Dikelya Özerk Askeri Üsleri olarak bilinen İngiltere'ye ait askeri bölgelerde öncelikle İngiliz askeri personeli için tesis edilen ve kısaca CFBS (Cyprus Forces Broadcasting Service/Kıbrıs Askeri Radyo Servisi) olarak bilinen ve daha sonraki süreçte de FBS (Forces Broadcasting Service) şeklinde anılan radyo istasyonudur.

Bu radyo istasyonu daha sonra ve özellikle Ekim 1948 tarihinden itibaren artık İsrail olarak bilinen topraklardaki bütün İngiliz askeri gücünün Kıbrıs'a nakledilmesinin ardından[34] Lefkoşa'nın Lakadamya köyünde yayınlara başlar. Radyo doğrudan askeri personele yönelik olarak çalışmaya başlamış ve şüphesiz çalışma ilkesi olarak da BBC'nin faaliyetleri esas alınmıştır. İlk etapta İngiliz askeri personeline yönelik programlara yapmaya başlayan radyo istasyonu daha sonra Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Kıbrıslı Rumlara yönelik de İngilizce programlar

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[31] Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının Eğitim Aracılığı sayesinde Dinsel Mutaassıplıktan Sıyrılıp Çağdaş Hak ve Özgürlük Kurallarını Kabullenişi,* Cilt III, (Lefkoşa: Lefkoşa Özel Türk Üniversitesi Yay., 2010), s. 74-75.

[32] Ayla Haşmet, "Üner Ulutuğ'un Kıbrıs Türk Tiyatrosuna Katkıları", (Editör Prof. Dr. Naciye Doratlı), *VII. İz Bırakmış Kıbrıslı Türkler Sempozyumu,* Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi, Gazi Mağusa, KKTC, s. 69.

[33] Dağlı, *a.g.e.,* s. 79-80

[34] 17 Eylül 1964 tarihinden itibaren Forces Broadcasting Service (FBS) yeniden yapılanmaya giderek BFBS haline gelir ve Larnaka'daki Dikelya İngiliz üslerinden havaya çıkmaya başlar. http://www.overlandstorage.com/pdfs/bfbs.pdf

yapar. 1949 yılına gelindiğinde radyo haftada iki sefer ve sadece 30 dakikalık Türkçe ve Rumca programlar da yapmaya başlamıştır. Bu programların ana hedefi ise özellikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde İngiliz ordusunda görev yapan ve cephe gerisinde katırlarla lojistik malzeme taşıyan, şoförlük, terzilik, aşçılık ya da telefon operatörlüğü gibi görevlerde bulunan ve kısaca "Katırcılar" şeklinde isimlendirilen insanlar ve aileleri olmuştur.[35]

Radyo istasyonu bu yayınların dışında "Cyprus Forces Radio Times" isimli ağırlıklı olarak radyo programlarının yayımlandığı, ayrıca çeşitli spor, eğlence, alışveriş, müzik, kültür ve magazin haberlerinin de bulunduğu dergi/bülten çıkartır. Söz konusu dergi/bülten daha sonraki süreçte ve 1 Ocak 1956 tarihinden itibaren haftalık olarak "Radio Cyprus; Organ of the Cyprus Broadcasting Service" adıyla İngilizce-Türkçe ve Rumca olmak üzere üç dilli olarak yayımlanmaya devam edecektir.[36]

Böylece bu askeri radyo kanalı adadaki İngiliz askeri personeli yanında 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin de eşit iki ortağı olan Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Kıbrıslı Rumlara da kısıtlı da olsa yayınlarıyla destek olmaktadır. 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihine gelindiğinde bu askeri radyo istasyonu bir kere daha nakledilir ve Lakadamya'dan Dikelya'daki İngiliz askeri bölgesine taşınır. Bu radyo istasyonu kısıtlı da olsa Türkler ve Rumların da gönlünü hoş etmek maksadıyla yayınlar yapmaktadır; ancak asıl gaye İngiltere'nin bölgedeki psikolojik algı operasyonları ve çeşitli propaganda faaliyetlerine yönelik olarak Basın Bilgi Bürosu (Press Information Office) yanında intelijans unsurları tarafından hazırlanan programları da servis etmektir. Söz konusu bu servis yayınlarına 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihine kadar devam etmekle birlikte bu tarihten sonra farklı kimliklerle de aynı şekilde faaliyetlerine devam etmişlerdir.[37]

Kıbrıs'ta Radyo Yayınları ve Şule Örfi

Bu süreçte karşımıza çıkan önemli isimlerden birisi de Şule Süha Örfi olacaktır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından ve tamamen İngiliz resmi radyo kanalı BBC örnek alınarak kurulan ve Cyprus Broadcasting Service (CBS) olarak adlandırılan radyoda spiker olarak görevlendirilecek olanlar ciddi anlamda bir eleme ve tecrübe sürecinin ardından mikrofon başına alınmaktadır. Bu radyoda ilk göreve başlayan Kıbrıslı Türkler arasında Şule Örfi (Süha) de bulunmaktadır.[38]

Daha sonraki süreçte Şule Örfi'yle hayatını birleştirecek olan 1925 Lefkoşa doğumlu Hakkı Süha Bey, Lefkoşa Türk Lisesi mezunudur. 1942-1950 sürecinde Halkın Sesi gazetesinde muhabir, yazar ve tercüman olarak görev yaptıktan sonra 1950 yılında burslu

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[35] Ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz. Ulvi Keser, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve İngiliz Ordusunda Katırcılar,* (İstanbul: IQ Yay., 2007).

[36] Söz konusu dergilerin örnekleri KTMA'da görülebilir.

[37] Ahmet Tolgay, *Naftalin Kokulu Kıbrıs,* (Lefkoşa: Cypri-Cola Evsu Yay., 2011), s. 143-145.

[38] Sanem Koç, a.g.m., s.10. Şule Örfi 11 Kasım 2020 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da vefat etmiştir.

olarak gazetecilik eğitimi almak üzere İngiltere'ye gider. 1952 yılından itibaren Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu'nda görev yapmaya başlayan Süha 1954 yılında radyonun haberler bölümünde editör olarak göreve başlar. Daha sonra haberler bölümü amirliğine getirilen Süha burada 21 Aralık 1963 tarihine kadar çalışır. 25 Aralık 1963 tarihinden itibaren bu görevine Bayrak Radyosu'nda devam eden Hakkı Süha 25 Şubat 1965 tarihinde de Bayrak Radyosu müdürlüğüne getirilir.[39]

Bu süreçte İngiltere tarafından Lakadamya'da faaliyete başlayan ve 1950'de bir yangın sonrasında hizmet veremez hale geldiğinden Lefkoşa'ya taşınıp Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sarayı civarında tekrar faaliyete geçen istasyonda görev yapan Kıbrıslı Türkler arasında Akile Işın da vardır. 4 Kasım 1925 tarihinde Pınarbaşı'da doğan Akile Işın'ın babası köyün varlıklı insanlarından Nihat Menteş, annesi de Nazif Hanım'dır. Annesi 2,5 yaşındayken vefat ettiğinden babaannesi tarafından yetiştirilen Akile Işın babaannesini de bir kaza sonrasında kaybedince amcasının yanına gelir. İngiltere'de Cambridge'de burslu devam ettiği eğitim hayatının ardından Kıbrıs'a dönen Akile Işın adadaki ilk Türk Kız Koleji'ni de kurar. İngilizlere ait bu radyoda çeşitli hizmetler veren söz konusu Kıbrıslı Türk radyocu kadın 25 Aralık 1963 tarihinde Bayrak Radyosu'nun ilk yayınına başlamasının ardından Lefkoşa'da söz konusu Türk radyosunda da çalışmaya başlayacaktır.[40]

1956 yılında Diş Hekimi Osman Işın'la evlenir. Kıbrıs'taki olaylardan sonra Londra'ya yerleşirler. Kıbrıs Türk Dernekleri Konseyi ve İngiltere Türk Kadınları Yardım Derneğinin kuruluşunda da görev alan Akile Işın 2015 yılında 90. yaşını kutlar; ancak Akile Işın maalesef 27 Ocak 2021 günü Londra'da hayatını kaybedecektir. Bu askeri radyoda görev alanlar arasında Lefkoşa'da "Terzi Hoca" adıyla anılan ve tiyatro konusunda ciddi yetenekleri olduğu ileri sürülen Mustafa Naim Aytaçoğlu da bulunmaktadır.[41]

Bu radyoda görev yapanlardan birisi de bulunan Reşad Kâzım (Işınay)'dır. Lefkoşa, 1919 doğumlu olan Reşad Kazım kaleme aldığı edebi yazılarda genellikle Ferhad Can mahlasını kullanmayı tercih etmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında hem ilkokul öğretmeni olarak hem de 1952 senesinde Kıbrıs'ta İngilizler tarafından bir radyo istasyonunun kurulmasından sonra Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu'nda çalışırken Kıbrıs Türk toplumunun haklarını savunmak için çaba harcamış, bu çizgide yazılar kaleme almış, İngiliz baskı ve sansüründen kurtulabilmek için farklı isimler kullanmıştır. 1979 yılında Bayrak Radyosu'ndan emekli olan Reşad Kazım aynı dönemde Halkın Sesi gazetesinde de pek çok makaleye imza atmış edebi bir kişiliktir.[42]

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[39] Sanem Koç, a.g.m., s.10.
[40] *Star Kıbrıs,* 9 Kasım 2015.
[41] Turhan Korun'dan aktaran *Poli,* 21 Ekim 2012, s. 8
[42] Reşad Kazım, "Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Kıbrıslılar", Kıbrıs Bülteni, Sayı 6, Cilt 4, Haziran 1981, İstanbul, s.6.

Öte yandan 1950 yılında her 37 kişiye bir radyo düşerken 1952'de bu sayı 27 kişi olmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında 1946 yılında hazırlanan 10 Yıllık Kalkınma Planı doğrultusunda adada bir radyo-televizyon istasyonu kurulması her ne kadar düşünülmüş olsa da gerek savaş sonrası hayat pahalılığı ve yüksek enflasyon ve gerekse savaşın ağır tahribatı nedeniyle bunun gerçekleşme ihtimali neredeyse hiç olmayacakmış gibi görünmektedir.[43]

Kıbrıs'ta böylece ilk radyo istasyonu askeri amaçlara yönelik olarak 1948 senesinde tesis edilirken hemen iki yıl sonrasında daha da gelişmiş, askeri amaçların dışında da hizmet verebilecek türden bir radyo istasyonu kurulması yönünde çalışmalara hız verilir ve altyapının düzenlenmesi kararlaştırılır. İlginçtir ki bunca hazırlıklar yapılmasına rağmen adadaki İngiliz yönetimi bütün bu hazırlıkları ve yapılan onca düzenlemeleri dikkate almaz ve 1951 yılında gündeme getirilen on yıllık kalkınma planının içerisine bunları dâhil etmez. Adadaki kamuoyunun çok sert tepki gösterdiği bu durumun ardından İngiltere bir kere daha kolları sıvar ve ilk etapta 193.000 İngiliz Lirası civarında bir tahsisat hazırlar ve bunun 85.000 liralık kısmını da sadece radyo altyapısı için harcar.[44]

1951 senesinden itibaren hızını arttıran İngiliz yönetimi radyo istasyonuyla ilgili teknik altyapı ve buralarda görev yapacak teknik elemanın yetiştirilmesi konusunda da çalışmalar başlatır.[45] İngilizlerin özellikle Kıbrıs'ta görev yapan memurları ve askeri personeli için yayın hayatına geçirdiği bu radyo istasyonu EOKA'nın faaliyete geçtiği 1955 yılında ise Rumca ve Türkçe yayınlara ağırlık verirken İngilizce yayın saatlerinin artırılması yönünde bir çabanın içine girmez.[46] Bunda şüphesiz İngilizce yayınların herkese hitap etmesi ve yayın saatlerinin de yeterli olması büyük etkendir.

Fevziye Hulusi ve Radyoculuk

Bu radyoda görev yapan, çeşitli temsiller gerçekleştiren, dinleyicilere masallar okuyup şiirler dinleten Fevziye Hulusi de radyoculuğu "…Radyoculuk çok heyecan verici. İnsanları masallarla uyuturduk, çocuklara eğitici programlar yapardık. Televizyonculuktan daha zevkli ve daha zor. Yaratıcılık gerektirir. Bugün niye televizyon tercih ediliyor hayret ediyorum…"[47] diyerek ifade eder. 21 Aralık 1963 sonrasında Dr. Fazıl Küçük'ün garajında deneme yayınlarına başlayan Bayrak Radyosu'nda Üner Ulutuğ'la birlikte halkın moral ve motivasyon seviyesini yüksek tutacak şiirler okuyan ve Bayrak Radyosu Müdürü Hakkı Süha'nın davetiyle 1968 yılında tekrar radyoculuğa başlayan Fevziye Hulusi'nin radyodaki en acı hatırası ise 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı sırasında ortaya çıkmıştır. Hulusi o anı "…1974

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[43] Ahmet Tolgay'dan aktaran *Bayrak Özel Sayısı,* BRTK, Aralık 2013, s. 28-29.
[44] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının Eğitim Aracılığı sayesinde Dinsel Mutaassıplıktan Sıyrılıp Çağdaş Hak ve Özgürlük Kurallarını Kabullenişi,* Cilt III, (Lefkoşa: Lefkoşa Özel Türk Üniversitesi Yay., 2010), s. 46.
[45] Ahmet Sanver, Eski Lefkoşa, Eski Lefkoşa Anılarım-4, Ateş Matbaacılık, Lefkoşa, 2016, s. 62
[46] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının*, s. 46.
[47] Nezire Gürkan, *Hayata İzler; Söyleşiler,* (Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi Yay., 2010), s. 182-183.

savaşında radyoda görev başındaydım. Canlı programlar yapıyorduk. Moral olsun diye müzik çalıyorum. Gelip uyardılar 'Şehitler gömülüyor, müzikleri biraz ağırlaştır.' dediler ve o şehitler arasında benim oğlumun (Ongun Hulusi) da olduğunu sonradan öğrendim…"[48] sözleriyle ifade eder. [49]

Bu dönemde radyoya en büyük katkıyı verenlerden birisi de KKTC'de Türkan Aziz gibi özellikle 1963-1974 sürecinde Kıbrıs Türk toplumuna büyük hizmetleri geçen başhemşire ve sağlık görevlisi Baber (Babür) Aziz gibi evlatlar kazandıran; ancak bugün maalesef Kıbrıs'ta onu Sinekçi Aziz olarak bilip tanıyan eski kuşak haricinde kimsenin bilmediği ve unuttuğu bir kişilik olan Mehmet Aziz Bey'in kızı 1950'li yıllardan 1963 yılı Aralık ayına kadar Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu'nda hizmet veren ve 7 Mart 2017 tarihinde hayata gözlerini yuman sanatçı Kamran Aziz olacaktır.[50]

Kamran Aziz öncelikle Jale Derviş, Vecihi Turgay, Ahmet Alar ve Fikret Özgün gibi hafif batı müziği çalışmaları yapan sanatçılarla ilk etapta "Kamran Aziz ve Arkadaşları" ismiyle 1950-1963 sürecinde radyo ve televizyon programlarıyla fırtına gibi eser ve Kıbrıs sanat ve müzik anlayışına farklı bir ses getirir. Daha sonraki süreçte radyoda program yapan bu sanatçılara Ferahzat Gürsoy, Salih Biray, Erer Selçuk, Türker Mirata ve Salih Mirata da dâhil olurlar. Söz konusu grubun solistliğini ise Ayer Kâşif ve Faiz Raif üstlenmiş durumdadır. Aynı dönemde radyo yayınlarını yakalayan ve sonraki süreçte gerek Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu ve gerekse Bayrak Radyosu'na da büyük emek veren bir kişi de Hilmi Özen olacaktır.[51]

Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu Dönemi

1952 Eylül ayından itibaren radyonun ilk deneme yayınları başlatılırken aynı yılsonunda ise radyo istasyonuyla ilgili binalar da tamamlanır. Çalışmalar devam ederken bir yandan da kamuoyu yoklamaları ve neredeyse adanın dört bir yanında halkın nabzını tutan araştırmalar yapan İngilizler radyo yayınlarının hangi bölgelerde rahatlıkla takip edilebildiği veya edilemediği konusunda da bilgi toplayarak bu noktalara anında müdahale etme imkânı bulurlar. Trodos Dağlarının fiziki özellikleri gereği hemen ardında kalan Baf bölgesinde ve Limasol civarında yayınların sıkıntılı olduğu, ayrıca özellikle Ortadoğu merkezli olarak yapılan başka yayınlar nedeniyle İngilizlerin yayınlarının ya hiç duyulmadığı ya da parazitlenerek hiç anlaşılmadığı da ortaya çıkar. Bu noktada ada dışından gelen sinyallerle başa çıkmakta güçlük çeken yetkililer Lefkoşa'nın halen Rum tarafında kalan Eylence

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[48] Meral Ertürk ile 15 Temmuz 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[49] http://www.erguclu.eu/yasamin%20mutfagi/feyziye.htm

[50] Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının Eğitim Aracılığı Sayesinde Dinsel Taassuptan Sıyrılıp Çağdaş Hak ve Özgürlük Kurallarını Kabullenişi,* Cilt II, (Lefkoşa, 2009), s. 301-302.

[51] Bayrak Radyosu çalışanı ve tiyatro sanatçısı Hilmi Özen'le 30 Mart 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

köyünde diktikleri 100 metrelik anten direği üzerindeki 10 kw gücünde vericiyle yayınları daha sağlıklı iletmenin çarelerini aramaya başlar.[52]

1952 yılında radyonun isim değişikliğine gitmesi, isminin Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu (İngilizce Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation ve Rumca Ραδιοφωνικό Ίδρυμα Κύπρου) olması, ardından "300 A sayılı Kıbrıs Yayıncılık Yasası (Cyprus Broadcasting Law Cap, 300 A)[53] gereği 4 Ekim 1953 günü saat 17.00'den itibaren 434 ve 495 metre Orta Dalga üzerinden Türkçe, Rumca ve İngilizce deneme yayınlarına başlaması ve hemen ardından adada yaşayan Kıbrıslı Türklere de doğrudan hizmet etmek gayesiyle Türkçe Bölümü de oluşturmasının ardından burada görev yapmak üzere yetenekli Kıbrıslı Türk kızları da yapılan çeşitli sınavların ardından burada görev yapmaya başlarlar.[54] Radyonun ilk Kıbrıslı Türk çalışanları arasında daha sonraki süreçte Bayrak Radyosu'nda da göreve devam edecek olan ve radyoya 1954 senesinde önce teknik operatör olarak giren Güzide Tunç da vardır.[55]

Güzide Tunç kaderin bir cilvesi olarak Bayrak Radyosu'nun son derece kısıtlı imkânlarla ve ilk etapta sadece 5 dakikalığına ve ancak 50 metre mesafeye yayın yaptığı 25 Aralık 1963 tarihli ilk yayında *"Bayrak Bayrak Bayrak. Burası Kıbrıs Türk Mücahidinin Sesi"* anonsunu yapan Kemal Tunç'un da hayat arkadaşı olacaktır. Bayrak Radyosu'nun da ilk spikerleri arasında yer alan Güzide Tunç ise Lefkoşa'da doğmuştur. Özellikle annesinin eğitim ve hayatında çok büyük destek ve teşvikini gören Güzide Tunç'un ilkokul hayatı Baf'ta başlamış, ardından Lefkoşa'da Selimiye İlkokulu'nda devam etmiştir. St. Joseph Lisesi'nde başladığı lise hayatı ise Amerikan Akademi'de tamamlanmıştır. St. Joseph Lisesi'ne devam ettiği sürede ablasından maddi destek almış, daha sonraki süreçte gelecek kaygısıyla Amerikan Akademi'de okumaya başlamıştır. Bu dönemde radyoda program yapanlar arasında Kıbrıslı Türk ses ve saz sanatçıları da bulunmaktadır.[56] 1951'de kurulan Kıbrıs Radyosu'nun Türkçe program saatlerinde düzenlenen Türk müziği programında Mustafa Kenan keman, Adnan Hakkı ud, Zeki Taner klarnet, Keyam Celalyan kanun çalardı. Ses sanatkârları arasında Cevat Şekeroğlu, Yıltan Şenol, Mualla Şevki gibi tanınmış solistler de vardı.

Kuruluş amacına uygun olarak öncelikle adada bulunan askeri personele ve İngiliz memurlarına yönelik yayınlar yapan FBS hazırladığı yerel programlar ve doğrudan üsler bölgesine özel programlar yayında bu dönemde BBC'nin World Service yayınları

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[52] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının,* s. 46.

[53] Kevork K. Keshian, *Nicosia; Capital of Cyprus Then and Now,* (Lefkoşa: The Moufflon Book and Art Center, 1990), s. 297.

[54] Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının Eğitim Aracılığı Sayesinde Dinsel Taassuptan Sıyrılıp Çağdaş Hak ve Özgürlük Kurallarını Kabullenişi,* Cilt III, (Lefkoşa, 2010), s. 293-294.

[55] Güzide Tunç ile 16 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[56] 1946 doğumlu piyano sanatçısı ve müzik öğretmeni Gaye Kenan Çağlar'dan aktaran Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının Eğitim Aracılığı Sayesinde Dinsel Mutaassıplıktan Sıyrılıp Çağdaş Hak ve Özgürlük Kurallarını Kabullenişi* Cilt II, (Lefkoşa: Lefkoşa Özel Türk Üniversitesi Yay., 2009), s. 316-317.

çerçevesinde farklı programları da dinleyicileriyle buluşturmaktadır.[57] Sabah 05.45-08.15, öğlen 12.30-23.00 ile Pazar günleri 07.00-23.00 arasında yayın yapan radyo Cumartesi günleri programını ise 24.00'e kadar uzatmakta, haftalık yayın programını ise Radio Times isimli haftalık dergi ve günlük Cyprus Mail gazetesi vasıtasıyla dinleyicilerine sunmaktadır.[58] FBS'nin radyo frekansları ise Orta Dalga 1439 k/cs. (kilocycles) 208 metre, 890 k/cs. (kilocycles) 337 metre ile VHF Bandı II 99.6 m/cs ve 92.1 m/cs olarak belirlenmiştir. 692 kilocycle frekans ile 2 kilowatt verici gücü ile çalışan radyo istasyonuna daha sonra 1484 kilocycle üzerinden yeni bir yayın yapma müsaadesi verilince bu hat üzerinden de deneme yayınları başlatılır. 1952 yılında fiilen çalışmalarına başlayan ve bütün inşaat çalışmaları da bitmiş durumdaki CBS yayınlarını iki ana bina üzerinden yapmaktadır. İlk binada 4 stüdyo, teknik personelin çalışma odaları ve verici, ayrıca haber programları il diğer programları yapan haber bürosu personeli, program yapımcıları ve diğer hizmetlilerin çalışma odaları ve ofisleri bulunmaktadır. Bu binadaki stüdyolar ise aşağıdaki amaçlara hizmet edecek şekilde tasarlanmıştır.[59] CBS'nin 1952 yılında inşaatını tamamladığı ikinci binasında da farklı amaçlara hizmet edecek şekilde tasarlanmış 5 stüdyo bulunmaktadır. [60]

Her iki radyo binasında bulunan toplam 9 stüdyoda dönemin teknolojisine uygun akustik ve teknik altyapı yanında radyo yayınlarının olmazsa olmaz gereklerinden soğutma sistemleri de bulunmaktadır. Manyetik teyp kayıt sistemlerinden büyük ölçüde istifade eden radyo istasyonunda statik kayıt yapmak ve çoğaltmak için iki cihaz, seyyar kayıtlarla ilgili olarak dört portatif makine bulunmaktadır. Radyonun müzik arşivi de son derece zengindir ve 1952 yılı itibarıyla 10.000 plaklık bir arşiv söz konusudur. İngilizler tarafından adada yaşayan herkese yönelik radyo yayını yapmak üzere oturttuğu bu radyonun yayınları vasıtasıyla özellikle 1952 yılından itibaren yerel halkın ilgisini çekecek programlar hazırlanmaya özen gösterilir; ancak bu noktada da "Platres Festivali, Limasol karnaval gösterileri, Atalasa uluslararası izci kamp ateşi gösterileri, Larnaka Kataklizmoz Panayırı, ada otellerindeki dans ve müzik gösterileri ve kilise ayinleri"[61] gibi çeşitli programlardan da görüleceği üzere Kıbrıslı Türklerin ilgisini çekecek veya onların sorunlarına eğilecek bir yayın maalesef söz konusu değildir. Radyo yayınları arasında özellikle Rumların ilgiyle ve beğenerek takip ettiği programlar arasında aşağıda sıralanan yayınlar ilk sıradadır. Kıbrıs'ta "bir Babil Kulesi"

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[57] Güzide Tunç'tan aktaran Emine Hoca, "Bir Dönem, Üç Kadın", *Medya, Kıbrıs Türk Gazeteciler Birliği,* Sayı: 9, (Temmuz 2014), s. 49

[58] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının, C. III*, s. 46.

[59] Servet Sami Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon veya Yazılı ve Sözlü Basın,* Cilt I, (Lefkoşa: Lefkoşa Özel Türk Üniversitesi Yay., 1988), s. 47.

[60] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 47.

[61] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 48.

olarak da adlandırılan CBS yayınları adanın bütün toplumlarına hizmet eden yayınlar yapmaya çalışmaktadır. [62]

Kıbrıs Radyosu Süreci

1952 yılından itibaren Kıbrıs Radyosu Türkçe Bölümü tarafından hazırlanan çeşitli çocuk programlarında, temsil ve skeçlerle dramalarda görev alanlardan birisi de tiyatro sanatçısı ve "Bayrak Radyosu'nun en tatlı sesi"[63] Hatice Söğüt olacaktır ve o günlerde Viktorya Ortaokulu'nda okuyan 13 yaşında bir öğrencidir.[64] Hatice Söğüt daha sonraki süreçte de radyo programları dışında televizyon yayınlarıyla da seyircilerin karşısına çıkacak, radyoda program sunuculuğu yanında çeşitli plak derlemeleriyle şarkılar ve müzikalleri seyirci ve dinleyiciyle buluşturacaktır.[65]

21 Aralık 1963 tarihinde başlayan Rum saldırılarının ardından bu radyo istasyonundaki programlarına ara vermek zorunda kalan ve radyoda görevli bütün Kıbrıslı Türk personelle birlikte bir daha geri dönmemek üzere radyodan ayrılan Hatice Söğüt hemen ardından Lefkoşa'da kurulan Bayrak Radyosu'nda program yapımcılığı, tiyatro oyunculuğu, ses sanatkârlığı ve haber sunuculuğu gibi farklı alanlarda çalışmaya başlar ve Temmuz 1985 tarihinde emekli oluncaya kadar da buradaki görevine devam eder. Hatice Söğüt Şubat 1964 tarihinden itibaren Üner Ulutuğ, Kemal Tunç, Ayla Haşmet, Yücel Köseoğlu, Biler Demircioğlu gibi tiyatro sanatçılarının kurdukları İlk Sahne isimli tiyatro derneği vasıtasıyla da Vedat Nedim Tör'ün Kör adlı oyunuyla tiyatro çalışmalarına yeni bir yön verir. Aynı günlerde Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation'da çalışmaya başlayanlardan birisi de ilkokul sıralarındayken radyo için okuduğu bir şiirin ardından radyo macerası başlayan, ardından ortaokul yıllarında da Çocuk saati gibi programlarda yer alan ve 21 Aralık 1963'ün ardından devletin ortak radyo istasyonundaki görevlerine gitmeleri can güvenliği açısından son derece tehlikeli olduğundan Bayrak Radyosu'nda meslek hayatına devam eden Sevil Emirzade olacaktır.[66]

CBC'de görev yapmaya başlayacak olanlar arasında Sevilay Direkoğlu da bulunmaktadır ve onun 6 aylık kısa bir eğitim sürecinin ardından yeni görevine başlaması tam anlamıyla bir tesadüf sonucudur.[67] 1937 Lefkoşa doğumlu olan Sevilay Direkoğlu, ilk, orta ve lise eğitimini Lefkoşa'da tamamladıktan sonra 1957 yılında Kıbrıs Radyo-Yayın Korporasyonu'nda Türkçe Servisi'nde yayın spikeri olarak çalışmaya başlar. 21 Aralık 1963 tarihinde diğer bütün Kıbrıslı Türk radyo personeli gibi onun da buradaki radyoculuk hayatı

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[62] Hüseyin Kanatlı, "Antendeki Bayrak", *Kıbrıs Türk Gazeteciler Birliği,* Sayı: 3, (Temmuz 2011), s. 14-15

[63] Osman Balıkçıoğlu, *Bizim İnsanımız Bizim Lefkoşa'mız,* (Lefkoşa, 2000), s. 172-174.

[64] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının, Cilt III,* s. 153.

[65] http://ktdt.blogspot.com.cy/2007/08/ktdt-kisa-tarihe.html

[66] Sevil Emirzade ile 14 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[67] Emine Hoca, a.g.m., s. 52.

sona erer ve ardından Bayrak Radyosu'nda çalışmaya başlar. Bu arada 1957 yılında CBC'nin TV yayını konusunda da altyapı hazırlıklarına başlaması üzerine ekranlarda program sunmak üzere düşünülen isimler arasında Sevilay Direkoğlu da vardır ve TV için uygun bulunmasının ardından Londra'ya nişanlısının yanına giden ve ona "Seni çok sevdiğin işinden kopardım." diyen Fikri Direkoğlu'yla evlenip adaya döner ve CBC TV kanalında program yapmaya başlar. Bu TV programları konusunda da Sevilay Direkoğlu "...Salı günleri Rumların, Cuma günleri de Türklerin programları vardı. Yayınlanacak programların takdimini yapardım. Bilgi verirdim. O yıllarda yayınlar (evlerde) vitrinlerdeki televizyonlardan izlenirdi. Özellikle de (Lefkoşa'da) Uzunyol'daki dükkân önlerinde (izlenirdi.)" der. Peyker Tevfik de aynı şekilde Sevil Emirzade ve Hatice Söğüt gibi radyo hayatına Kıbrıs Radyosu'nda başlayanlardandır ve buradaki Türkçe programlarda masallar okumaktadır.[68]

Çeşitli temsiller, okul programları, masallar anlatılan çocuk programları, Fatih Sultan Mehmet gibi Osmanlı Padişahlarının anlatıldığı programların ardından Mevhibe Şefik ve Orhan Avkıran gibi ustalarla çalışmak ve 1963 Aralık ayında gerilim iyiden iyiye artmasına rağmen programlara devam etme arzusu olan radyocu Kıbrıslı Türk Peyker Tevfik radyo programlarına nasıl başladığını da çeşitli tiyatro oyunlarına bağlar ve kendisini ilk defa ortaya çıkartanın da "entelektüel ve kültürlü bir öğretmen olan ve 1976'dan itibaren BRT'nin ilk müdürlüğünü de yapan"[69] Suphi Rıza olduğunu belirtir.[70]

Öte yandan 9 Nisan 1923 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da Nuri Efendi Sokağı'nda doğan ve o dönemde Mevhibe Hüseyin olarak bilinen Mevhibe Şefik o dönemde Lefkoşa'da faaliyet göstermekte olan Viktorya Kız Mektebi'nin ilk kadın resim öğretmenidir. 1957 yılında müdürlüğünü Suphi Rıza Bey'in yaptığı radyo istasyonuna müracaat eden Mevhibe Şefik radyo temsillerinde görev yapmaya başlar ve bu işi 1963 Aralık ayına kadar büyük bir keyifle yapar. Çatışmaların başlamasının ardından artık radyodaki görevine gidemeyen Mevhibe Hanım bütün yoğunluğunu Rum saldırılarından kaçarak daha güvenli bölgelere sığınmaya çalışan göçmenlere verir. Kız Lisesi'nde resim çalışmalarına daha yoğun zaman ayıran ve Gülten Can, Yalkın Muhtaroğlu, Özden Selenge, Göral Özkan, Gülşen Mustafa ve Aylin Örek başta olmak üzere pek çok sanatçıya da hocalık yapıp ilham kaynağı olan Mevhibe Şefik Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Merkezi Müdürü Prof. Dr. Naciye Doratlı'nın da annesidir.

Eski başbakanlardan Hakkı Atun da Suphi Rıza'nın 1947-1950 sürecinde Mağusa Ortaokulu'na başladığı dönemde okul müdürü olarak görev yaptığını, ayrıca köyde de ikinci sınıfta kendisini okuttuğundan bahseder. Radyonun 1954 senesinde yaptığı programlarda ağırlıklı olarak müzik söz konusudur ve mahalli sanatçıların bu programlarda yer alabilmesi

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[68] *Ortam*, 18 Mart 1992.

[69] Hakkı Atun, *Bir Öz Yaşam Öyküsü; Hakkı Atun'un Anıları,* (Lefkoşa: Ateş Matbaacılık, 2016), s. 56.

[70] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıslı Türk Kadınının,* s. 225.

için de bir uğraş söz konusudur. Eldeki imkânların son derece mahdut olması, ada dışından istenildiği vakit istenilen şeyin getirilmesinin mümkün olmaması gibi şartlar nedeniyle elde olanlarla yetinmek ve bunları en üst düzeyde değerlendirmek ana prensip haline gelmiş durumdadır.[71]

Radyonun 1954 yılı yayınlarında müzik programları önemli bir yer tutmaktadır ve özellikle yerel sanatçıların radyo programlarına çıkartılması yönünde gözle görülür bir gayret vardır. Bunda şüphesiz Kıbrıs gibi bir adada son derece kısıtlı imkânlarla ve küçük bir nüfus içerisinde faaliyetlerin elde mevcutlar arasından değerlendirilmesi mecburiyeti de vardır. Bununla beraber aynı yıl içerisinde 30 mahalli sanatçıyla çoğunluğu okul koroları olmak üzere 15 müzik korosu radyoda yayın yapma imkânı bulur. Küçük esnaf, tarımla uğraşan insanlar, hayvancılık, ticaret gibi farklı alanlarda da yayınlar yapılmaya çalışılsa da yayınların ağırlıklı bir bölümü klasik müzikten yerel ada müziğine kadar hep müzik oluşturmaktadır. Bunda en büyük etken ise özellikle haber bürosuyla ilgili kalifiye eleman bulunamaması olmuştur. Müzik ve çeşitli mesleklere yönelik programlar yanında radyoda ayrıca çeşitli yerel sanatçıların konserleri de yer almaktadır. Bütün bu programların dışında radyo yetkilileri eldeki imkânları ince bir stratejiyle birleştirerek adanın farklı noktalarındaki herkesi kapsayacak şekilde programlar yapmaya da özen gösterir ve başta çarşı esnafının sorunları olmak üzere tarım ve ziraatla köylülere de hitap edecek programlar ortaya koymaya başlar. Durum böyle olunca da 1952 yılında yayınlarına başlayan radyo ancak 4 Ekim 1953 tarihinde dönemin Kıbrıs Valisi tarafından yapılan açılışla birlikte haber bürosuna ve haber programlarına kavuşacaktır.[72]

1951-1955 sürecinde Kıbrıs Radyosu'nun yayınları bütün imkânlar kullanılmasına rağmen adanın %85'lik kısmına hitap edebilmektedir. Bu dönemde radyo daha yeni yeni insanların hayatına girmeye başlamış durumdadır.[73] Özellikle Baf ve Limasol gibi Trodos Dağları tarafından nispeten engellenen bazı bölgelerde yayın kalitesi ise son derece düşüktür. Bu yayınlar EOKA'nın 1 Nisan 1955 günü ada sathında başlattığı bombalı saldırıların ardından radyo istasyonunda da hasara neden olunca vericilerin istenilen düzeyde çalışamaması nedeniyle yayınlar daha da etkisiz bir şekilde yapılmaya başlanır.[74] Öte yandan 1954 yılına gelindiğinde programda Kıbrıslı Türkler lehine olmak üzere küçük bir değişikliğe gidilir ve Pazar günkü radyo yayın programına Türkçe de eklenir.

1955 yılına gelindiğinde 1. Kanal 692 kilosaykıl üzerinden Rumca, 2. Kanal 606 kilosaykıl üzerinden İngilizce, Türkçe ve bazı Rumca yayınların yapılması, ayrıca Rumca ve Türkçe yayın saatlerinin artırılması yanında İngilizce yayın saatlerinde herhangi bir

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[71] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 49.
[72] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 49.
[73] 1940 Baf/Fasulla doğumlu Emin Sensay'ın anılarından aktaran torunu Fatma Türkoğlu, https://plus.google.com/110216130259195995205/posts
[74] Emine Solyalı ile 16 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

değişikliğe gidilmemesi yönünde bir karar alınmış olmasına rağmen Atina'da Yunanistan destekli olarak emekli bir Yunan subayı olan Trikomo (İskele) doğumlu Georges Grivas ile Makarios III olarak daha çok ve yaygın tanınacak olan Michael Mouskos'un da aralarında bulunduğu asker, devlet adamı ve din adamlarının kurduğu EOKA tedhiş ve terör örgütünün 1 Nisan 1955 günü adanın dört bir yanında faaliyete geçmesi ve radyo istasyonunun 20 ve 2.5 kilovat gücündeki vericilerini 3 saatli bombayla tahrip etmesi sonucu bütün planlar altüst olur. Bu arada plakların ve gramofon arşivinin bulunduğu bölüme atılan bir bomba ise yaklaşık 2.000 plağın kullanılamaz hale gelmesine neden olmuştur.[75] Aynı şekilde kütüphane de uzun bir süre hizmet veremeyecek hale gelmiş durumdadır. Bina içerisinde yapılan yeniden düzenlemeyle kütüphaneye geçici bir yer bulunmaya çalışılırken eldeki plak arşiviyle yayınlar yine de devam ettirilmeye çalışılır. Kütüphane ve gramofon arşiviyle radyo binasına yapılan bu saldırılarla ilgili hasar tespiti, yeniden düzenleme, bakım ve onarım çalışmaları 1956 yılına kadar devam eder.

EOKA Terörü ve Radyo Yayınları

Grivas'ın Makarios'la 25 Mart[76] akşamı mı yoksa 1 Nisan akşamı mı olsun tartışmalarından sonra o gece Kıbrıs'ta yer yerinden oynar. Gece 03.00'de elektrikler kesilir, daha sonra da bombalar patlar, makineli tüfekler rastgele ölüm saçar, çeşitli işyerleri, İngiliz bankaları havaya uçurulur. Genel Valilik, Müsteşarlık Dairesi, Wolseley Kışlası'nda bulunan Ortadoğu İngiliz Kara Kuvvetleri Genel Karargâhı ve radyo istasyonu da patlamalardan nasibini alır.[77] Markos Dragos ve dört adamı radyo istasyonunu basıp içeride bulunanları etkisiz hale getirirler ve binayı havaya uçururlar.

1 Nisan 1955 tarihinde Atalasa'daki radyo istasyonuna patlayıcı yerleştiren ekibin içerisinde EOKA'nın en eli kanlı üyelerinden birisi olan Afksentiou da bulunmaktadır ve bu operasyon sırasında bölgede pasaportunu ve kimliğini düşürdüğünden deşifre de olmuştur.[78] "Kıbrıslı Türklerin ve solcu Rum örgütlerin tepki gösterdikleri, fakat Rumların destekledikleri ve her türlü destek ve yardımı verdikleri"[79] EOKA eylemleri konusunda Limasol'da ve Mağusa'da da aynı şekilde patlamalar olur.[80] Grivas ise bütün bu olup biteni Lefkoşa'da

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[75] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 50.

[76] *Halkın Sesi,* 28 Ağustos 1956. Ayrıca Bkz. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, a.g.m., s. 382-383.

[77] 1935 Kilitkaya doğumlu M. D.'den aktaran Halil Erdim, *Tahtagala-Çağlayan 1963-1974,* Lefkoşa, 2009, s. 54.

[78] Arslan Mengüç, *Ben Tiremeşeli Mehmet Ali,* Lefkoşa, 2013, s. 60. Makarios Druşotis, *Karanlık Yön EOKA,* (Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yay., 2005), s.131. Byford Jones, *Grivas and The Story of EOKA,* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1959), s. 69. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* Vol. 21, No. 2, (2008), s. 385. TMT Lefkoşa Sancağı üyesi 1941 Lefkoşa doğumlu Metin Aybars ile 23 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[79] Varnavas, *a.g.e.,* s. 53.

[80] Durrel, *a.g.e.,* s. 202.

gizlendiği evde koruması Gregoris Louka ile takip eder.[81] 1 Nisan 1955 sonrası artık hiçbir şey eskisi gibi olmayacaktır ve insanların aklına güvensizlikle beraber tereddütler de girmiştir.[82]

Bütün bu olup bitenleri ilk olarak duyuran ve daha sonra Kıbrıs propagandası konusunda neredeyse işi çığırından çıkaran Atina Radyosu'nun yayınları ise Grivas'ın pek hoşuna gitmez.[83] Atina Radyosu ise "Özgürlük ancak kan ile alınır." çığırtkanlığıyla olanları körüklemeye devam eder ve Kıbrıs Radyosu adını kullanır.[84] Atina Radyosu'nda görevli hemen bütün spikerler ellerinden gelen tüm çabayı göstererek gün boyu EOKA'ya bağlı direniş gruplarını kışkırtmaya yönelik konuşmalar yaparlar. Böylece Kıbrıs'ta yeni bir dönem de başlayacaktır.[85]

Aynı şekilde Kıbrıslı Türkler adada Rumlarla beraber yaşamalarına rağmen bir şeylerin ters gitmekte olduğunun farkındadırlar çünkü Rumların bir takım gizli faaliyetlere giriştikleri konusunda kendilerine bilgiler ulaşmaktadır. Bu tarihten itibaren daha çok mahalli halkın ilgisini çekecek programlar yapma stratejisi takip etmeye başlayan yetkililer adanın dört bir köşesinde açtıkları haber büroları vasıtasıyla herkesi kucaklayacak ve herkesin ilgisini çekecek haber programları yapmaya başlar ve böylece aynı yıl içerisinde radyoda sunulan haberlerin %45'lik kısmı doğrudan Kıbrıs'ı ilgilendiren türden haberler olur. 24 Nisan 1955 günü ise beklenmedik bir gelişme yaşanır ve o güne kadar kimliği tespit edilemeyen EOKA lideri Dighenis'in kim olduğu Özgür Yunanistan (Free Greece) Radyosu'nda programa çıkan Yunanistan Komünist Partisi Genel Sekreteri Nikos Zachariades tarafından deşifre edilir.[86] Söz konusu radyo yayınlarında özellikle Makarios ve Grivas'ı hedef alarak onları hain olarak nitelendirir ve maskelerinin çıkarılma vaktinin geldiğini öne sürer.[87]

Bu arada radyonun yeniden ve yenilenmiş haliyle devreye girmesinin ardından 1956 yılında EOKA tarafından iki bombalı saldırı daha söz konusu olur.[88] EOKA'nın özellikle iletişim ağlarına yönelik saldırıları ve radyo istasyonunu hedef seçmesi çalışanlar arasında da tedirginlik yaratmıştır.[89]

Bu arada EOKA teşkilatının kurulduğu ilk günden itibaren Grivas'ın üzerinde durduğu en önemli konulardan birisi propaganda ve basın-yayın kuruluşlarıyla ilişki olduğundan

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[81] Charles Foley, *a.g.e.,* s. 33.
[82] Güzide Tunç ile 16 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[83] *Halkın Sesi,* 28 Ağustos 1956.
[84] Durrel, *a.g.e.,* s. 205.
[85] Aydın Samioğlu ile 29 Kasım 2004 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[86] Varnavas, *a.g.e.,* s. 75.
[87] Varnavas, *a.g.e.,* s. 75.
[88] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 50.
[89] Güzide Tunç'tan aktaran Emine Hoca, a.g.m., s. 50

EOKA'cılar her fırsatta bundan azami çıkar sağlamaya yönelik girişimlere devam ederler.[90] Adada oraya çıkan bu yeni kargaşa ortamı İngiliz yönetiminin radyo istasyonunun idari mekanizması ve yönetim şekliyle ilgili bir dizi değişikliğe gitmesine de neden olur. Daha önce İstihbarat Dairesi'ne bağlı olarak çalışan radyo 1 Nisan 1955 sonrasında İstihbarat Dairesi'nin Kıbrıs Radyo İstasyonu Müdürlüğü ve Halkla İlişkiler Müdürlüğü olarak yeni bir yapılanmaya gitmesinin ardından Kıbrıs Radyo İstasyonu Müdürlüğü çatısı altında faaliyetine devam eder. Bütün bu faaliyetlerin tamamını tek bir çatı altında kontrol edebilmek amacıyla da 22 Kasım 1955 tarihinde İstihbarat Servisleri Genel Müdürlüğü ihdas edilir.[91] Bu dönem radyo ile ilgili ortaya çıkan yeniden yapılanma konusu Kıbrıslı Türklerin haklarının görmezden gelinmesi veya Rumlar lehine bir tutum sergilenmesi gibi sonuçlar da doğurduğundan Kıbrıs Türk toplumu tarafından da tepkiyle karşılanır. Bu tepkiyi ortaya koyanların başında ise Kıbrıs Türk toplum lideri Dr. Fazıl Küçük gelmektedir.[92]

Kıbrıs Radyo Yayın Korporasyonu ve Radyo Yayınları

Öte yandan bu yeni düzen EOKA saldırıları karşısında çok da etkili olmayacak ve özellikle Kıbrıslı Rumların radyoyla ilgi ve irtibatlarını kesmeyi amaçlayan EOKA karşısında Kıbrıslı Rumlar korku ve çaresizlik içerisinde sinip kaderlerine razı bir görüntü çizmeye başlarken 1 Ocak 1959 tarihinde Kıbrıs Radyo-Televizyon Korporasyonu (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) özerk bir yapıya kavuşturulur. Bunun hemen ardından 26 Nisan 1959 tarihi itibarıyla radyodan ticari reklamların yapılabilmesinin de önü açılmış olur.[93] Bu tarihten itibaren ve özellikle de Londra ve Zürih Antlaşması'nın imzalanmasının ardından çeşitli dış kaynaklı yayınlar, çeşitli siyasi ve sosyal konularda açık oturumlar ve tartışma programları da kamuoyuna sunulmaya başlanır. Bu patlamaların ardından ilk şoku atlatan İngiliz yetkililer ilk etapta 2.5 kilovat gücündeki vericinin yerine Messrs. Marconi Şirketi vasıtasıyla 2 kilovat gücünde yeni bir vericiyi 5 gün gibi kısa bir sürede uçakla adaya getirtirler ve yayınlara tekrar başlarlar. Bu gelişmelerin ardından radyo yayınlarının uzatılması ve daha geniş kitlelere ulaştırılması yönündeki planlar da bir kere daha devreye girer.[94]

Bu verici yayın kalitesini arzu edildiği oranda artıramayınca yerine yeni bir verici bulma çalışmaları başlatılır ve 2 kilovat gücündeki verici de Limasol'un güney batısındaki rele istasyonuna nakledilir. Bunu 2 kilovat gücündeki diğer vericinin de Baf'ın güney batısındaki rele istasyonuna nakledilmesi takip eder. Limasol ve Baf'taki bu takviyelerle radyo yayınları daha kaliteli olarak daha geniş bir alanda duyulmaya başlanır. Haziran 1955 içerisinde getirilen yeni bir vericinin de devreye girmesiyle haftalık 42 saat olan yayın süresi de bir anda

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[90] KTMA, EOKA Bildirileri Dosyası No. 1318 ve 1319.

[91] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 53.

[92] *Halkın Sesi,* 6 Temmuz 1957'den aktaran Osman Yıldız ve Güven Arıklı, *Dr. Fazıl Küçük Makaleler (1942-1981),* 4. Cilt, Dr. Fazıl Küçük Vakfı Yay., (Basım tarihi belli değildir.), Lefkoşa, s. 527-529

[93] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 53.

[94] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 50.

100 saate kadar yükselir. Alınan Marconi 20 kilovat vericilerden biri tamamıyla Rumca yayın yapan 1. Kanal, diğeri de her üç dilde yayın yapan 2. Kanal için kullanılır.[95]

Böylece 1 Nisan 1955 günü saat 12.30-14.30 arasında başlatılan yayınlar 46 saat Rumca, 23 saat Türkçe, 17 saat İngilizce ve 15 saat de çeşitli yayınlar şeklinde ve toplam 101 saat üzerinden devam etmektedir. Bu yayınlarda öğle programlarıyla resmi bildirilerin nakledilmesi Rumca ve Türkçe olarak yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca İngilizce haberler ile İngilizce bazı programlar da öğle ve akşam kuşağında dinleyicilerle buluşmaktadır.1. Kanal 692 kilocycle üzerinden özellikle geceleri sürekli olarak Rumca yayın yaparken 2. Kanal 606 kilocycle üzerinden Türkçe, İngilizce ve Rumca yanında Ermenice de yayın yapmaktadır. Eylül 1956 itibarıyla Türkçe ve Rumca yayınlar da artırılırken sabahları 06.30-08.00 arasında Türkçe, İngilizce ve Rumca yayınlar yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca aynı yıl radyo yayınları 10.30-13.00, 16.30-17.00 ve 21.30-22.30 arasında İngilizce olarak devam ettirilmektedir. Bu arada Süveyş Kanalı'nda başlatılan askeri operasyon ve askeri hareketlilikle ilgili olarak yayınlar 18 Kasım 1956 gününe kadar 06.30-23.00 arasında kesintisiz devam ettirilmektedir.[96]

Bu noktada belirtilmesi gereken farklı bir husus ise aynı dönemde Kıbrıs'a getirilen Fransız askeri gücüyle ilgili olarak radyodan Fransızca yayınların da başlatılmasıdır. Böylece 2. Kanal üzerinden her gün saat 12.30-13.00 ve 19.15-19.30 devresindeki İngilizce haberler yerine Fransız askerlerine yönelik olarak Fransızca haberler ve müzikler sunulmaya başlanır.[97]

Kıbrıs Radyo Yayın Korporasyonu ve Anılar

Aynı dönemin içerisinde CYTA bünyesinde de bazı teknik gelişmeler söz konusudur ve burada görev yapan Kıbrıslı Türk personel de vardır.[98] CYTA'da göreve başlayan ve daha sonraki süreçte Bayrak Radyosu'nun da nüvesini oluşturanlar arasında bulunan Cafer Elgin de bulunmaktadır.[99] Bu dönemde söz konusu radyo istasyonunda göreve başlayanlardan birisi de daha sonraki süreçte de Bayrak Radyosu'nda uzun yıllar hizmet verecek olan Kıbrıs Türk radyoculuğunun önemli isimlerinden Sevilay Direkoğlu olacaktır.[100]

1957 yılına gelindiğinde Kıbrıs Radyosu ada sınırları dışına da çıkar ve özellikle İngiltere'de yaşayan Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlara yönelik farklı programlar yapabilmek amacıyla Londra'da bir stüdyoyla birlikte bir de ofis açar. Özellikle İngiltere'de yaşayan Kıbrıslı Rumların ve Türklerin gönderdikleri mesajları kayıt altına alan ve bunları her hafta düzenli olarak Kıbrıs'a gönderen bu bürodaki stüdyoda ayrıca bir dış yayın ünitesi, bir radyo-

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[95] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 50.
[96] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 50.
[97] Güzide Tunç ile 16 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[98] Yusuf Osman Gazi ile 3 Nisan 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[99] Dr. Ahmet Cafer Elgin'le 18 Nisan 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[100] Sevilay Direkoğlu ile 3 Mayıs 2015 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

televizyon bölümü, ayrıca kayıt yapmak amacıyla çeşitli donanım bulunmaktadır. Londra'daki bu büroda ayrıca "Bilimsel Haberler" isimli bir program, çeşitli sinema sanatçıları ve şarkıcılar yanında orkestra sanatçıları ile ilgili bilgilerin de verildiği İngiliz-Amerikan yıldızlarıyla ilgili programlar, klasik müziklerin dinleyicilerle buluşturulduğu bir program, vizyona giren sinema filmlerinin radyo skeçleri şeklinde sunulması ve kamuoyuyla paylaşılması için hazırlanan programlar, başta moda ve yemek ile genel kültür içeren kadın sohbet programları, Londra'daki magazin haberleriyle ilgili olarak "Londra Magazin" isimli program, ayrıca Londra'da düzenlenen "Ideal Home Exhibition" isimli sergiyle ilgili bir program, Londra'da açılan Kıbrıs'la ilgili şarap festivali, Kraliyet Turnuvası, İngiltere'de yükseköğretimlerine devam eden Kıbrıslı Türk ve Kıbrıslı Rum öğrencilerin bu ülkedeki sosyal hayatları, eğitim dünyaları ve sorunlarıyla ilgili bir program ile İngiltere'deki bütün Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumların sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel hayatlarıyla gelecek beklentileri konusunda hazırlanan bir program da dinleyicilerle buluşmaktadır.[101]

Bu ofis vasıtasıyla özellikle Londra'da yaşayanların da nabzını tutmayı amaçlayan İngiliz yönetimi ayrıca Kıbrıs Radyosu'nda görevli olan radyo personelinin başta BBC ve ITV olmak üzere çeşitli radyo ve televizyon kanallarında katılacakları her türlü eğitim, kurs, seminer, toplantıyla ilgili olarak da yardımcı olmakta, Kıbrıs'taki plak koleksiyonu ve arşivin zenginleşmesi için de her türlü desteği vermektedir. Daha sonraki süreçte Kıbrıs'ta bir televizyon kanalının açılmasıyla birlikte Londra'daki bu büro televizyon için de çeşitli müzik yayınları, plaklar ve kayıtlar almaya devam etmiştir. 1960 yılına gelindiğinde Atalasa'da iki verici istasyonu bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca Limasol ve Baf'taki 2 kilovat kuvvetindeki vericiler yanında Trodos bölgesindeki Olimpos Dağı'nda da VHF link vasıtasıyla yayınlar bütün ada sathına yayılmış durumdadır. Aynı dönemin içinde radyoda ufak görevlerle işe başlayanlardan birisi de Sevil Emirzade olacaktır.[102]

1 Nisan 1955 tarihinde başlayan Yunanistan destekli EOKA tedhiş örgütünün kan gölüne çevirdiği Kıbrıs adasında Türkiye, Yunanistan ve İngiltere'nin garantörlüğünde 1960 yılında Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurulur ve söz konusu bu radyo istasyonu da yeni kurulan devletin Kıbrıs Yayın Korporasyonu[103] (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) ya da kısa şekliyle CYBC olarak hizmet vermeye başlar.

CBC ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne Doğru Radyoculuk

Bu dönemde Kıbrıs adasında TV yayıncılığı söz konusu değildir ve sadece radyo ile sesli yayın yapılabilmektedir. Askeri amaçlı kurulan bu radyo istasyonu dışında adada ayrıca Türkiye'den Ankara Radyosu, Sovyetler Birliği'nden Moskova Radyosu ve İngiltere'den de

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[101] Dedeçay, *Kıbrıs'ta Enformasyon,* s. 51.

[102] Sevil Emirzade ile 14 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[103] Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, Chapter 300 A of the Laws;1959 Ed., Government of Cyprus, Londra, 1959.

BBC yayınları dinlenebilmektedir.[104] Kıbrıs Valisi Sir Hugh Foot'un Londra'yı ziyaret ettiği saatlerde Kıbrıs Türk'tür Partisi Genel Başkanı Dr. Fazıl Küçük de Kıbrıs Başkonsolosu Burhan Işın'la beraber Ankara'ya gelerek Dışişleri Bakanlığı yetkilileri, Başbakan ve Cumhurbaşkanı ile Kıbrıs konusunda görüşmelerde de bulunur.[105] Kıbrıs Valisi Sir Hugh Foot, Kıbrıs'ın mukadderatı konusunda Türklerle Rumların dostluğundan bahsederken Kıbrıs Radyosu da yaptığı yayınlarla bu dostluğu pekiştirecek adımlar atıldığını, bunun en son örneğinin ise Lakadamya köyünde yaşayan Türklerle Rumlar arasında gerçekleştirildiğini duyurur; ancak bu haberler Kıbrıs Türk toplumundan çok sert bir tepki görür.[106] Kıbrıs Radyosu'nun Türklerle Rumların dostluğunu göstermek için duyurduğu olay ise yılbaşı akşamı gerçekleşmiştir.[107]

Öte yandan 27 Ocak 1958 tarihinde Lefkoşa Sarayönü Meydanı'nda meydana gelen olaylarda insanların hayatını kaybetmesi üzerine "Kıbrıs Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı"[108] bir bildiri yayımlayarak Kıbrıs Türklerini İngilizlere karşı pasif direnişe davet eder ve 'Yunan menfaatlerine hizmet ettiği için'[109] hükümet kontrolündeki Kıbrıs radyosunun Türkler tarafından da dinlenmemesi istenir.[110] Bu tarihten sonra ise söz konusu radyo istasyonu Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin resmi yayın organı olarak CYBC olarak bilinen Kıbrıs Yayın Korporasyonu[111] (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) ve bütün Kıbrıs adasının sesi bağlamında hayli iddialı bir başlangıçla yayın hayatına devam eder; ancak 16 Ağustos 1960- 21 Aralık 1963 döneminde Kıbrıslı Türkler yanında Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve bazı Ermeni ve İngiliz radyo personelinin de görev yaptığı bu radyo istasyonunun ömrü çok uzun süreli olmayacak ve kuruluşundan sadece 3 yıl, 4 ay, 5 gün sonra fiilen ortadan kalkacaktır. Esasında kurulan çiçeği burnunda Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti açısından Kıbrıslı Türklerle Rumların birlikte görev alacakları ve işbirliği içerisinde olumlu işlere imza atacakları radyo istasyonu ilk bakışta son derece olumlu bir intiba bırakmakta ve geleceğe yönelik bir umut ışığı da yakmaktadır; ancak durum hiç de beklendiği gibi olmayacaktır. Her ne kadar aynı isimle radyo yayınlarına devam ediyor gibi görünse de artık radyoda Kıbrıslı Türk personel bulunmamaktadır ve onların yerine bilgi kirliliği, propaganda ve lobicilik faaliyetlerinde bulunan ve doğru Türkçeyi de

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[104] Tansu Yeşilada'dan aktaran Osman Güvenir, *Bestekâr ve Müzik Adamı*; Ekrem Yeşilada, Okman Printing, Lefkoşa, s. 167. Şeniz Coşkun, *Televizyon Haberciliğinde Etik; KKTC'de Televizyon Haberciliğinin Etik Anlayışı Üzerine Bir İnceleme,* Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Lefkoşa, 2011, s. 20.

[105] *Dünya,* 1 Ocak 1958.

[106] *Halkın Sesi,* 4 Ocak 1958.

[107] *Halkın Sesi,* 4 Ocak 1958.

[108] Araştırmacının Notu; 27-28 Ocak 1958 itibarıyla TMT Kıbrıs'ta kuruluşunu tamamlamış olmasına rağmen o dönemin Türk gazetelerinde bu teşkilattan Kıbrıs TMT Volkan olarak bahsedilmektedir.

[109] *Dünya,* 2 Şubat 1958.

[110] *Dünya,* 2 Şubat 1958.

[111] Konuyla ilgili yönerge için bkz. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, Chapter 300 A of the Laws;1959 Edition, Government of Cyprus, Londra, 1959.

bilmeyen Rum radyocuların bütün gün devam eden beyin yıkama faaliyetleri söz konusu olacaktır.[112]

CBC, 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan'ın garantörlüğü altında kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluş antlaşmaları gereği bünyesinde %70 Rum ve % 30 da Türk personel bulundurmak zorundadır. Öte yandan Kıbrıslı Rumların devletin işleyişiyle ilgili anayasal ve antlaşmalarla garanti altına alınmış pek çok hususa riayet etmemeleri gibi personel sayısıyla ilgili konu da neredeyse bütün kamuda hiçbir şekilde uygulanamamıştır.[113] 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan'ın garantörlüğü altında kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti anayasasının ilgili 171. maddesi yeni kurulan devletin yayın stratejisini ortaya koymaktadır.[114]

Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti kurulduktan sonra da daha önce olduğu üzere Rauf R. Denktaş'ın büyük bir stratejik öngörüyle sadece Kıbrıslı Türklere özel bir radyo istasyonu kurulması yönündeki düşüncesi bir kere daha gündeme gelir.[115] Bununla birlikte esasında 1957 yılında Kıbrıs Türkleri tarafından bir radyo kurma çalışması daha söz konusudur ve pek bilinen bir durum da değildir. 1957 yılında Limasol'da 19 Mayıs Lisesi'nde Fizik dersi bağlamında bir ev ödeviyle başlayan bu çalışma Kıbrıs Türklerinin ilk radyo denemesi olarak da değerlendirilebilir.[116] Kıbrıs Radyo Yayın Korporasyonu biraz sıkıntılı dinlense de Ankara Radyosu dışında Kıbrıslı Türklerin Türkiye ve Türk müziğiyle olan tek bağlantısıdır o dönemde.[117] EOKA teşkilatının kurulduğu ilk günden itibaren Grivas'ın üzerinde durduğu en önemli konulardan birisi propaganda ve basın-yayın kuruluşlarıyla ilişki olduğundan EOKA'cılar her fırsatta bundan azami çıkar sağlamaya yönelik girişimlere devam ederler.[118]

Radyo Yayınları ve İç Huzursuzluklar

İngilizlerin adada kurdukları bu radyo istasyonunda görev yapanlar arasında bulunan Hüseyin Kanatlı da bu radyo istasyonuyla ilgili olarak "…Türklerin ayrı, Rumların ayrı bölümleri ve bu bölümlerin başında da Türkçe ve Rumca Neşriyat Müdürlüğü bulunmaktaydı. Radyocuların yayınlarını kendi müdürleri denetlemekteydi. Dönemin Türkçe Neşriyat Müdürü ise Suphi Rıza Bey'di… Biz esas radyoculuğu orada öğrendik. Büyük bir titizlik söz konusuydu…"[119]. Hüseyin Kanatlı'nın bu radyo istasyonunda çalışmaya başlaması ise kendi

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[112] Hüseyin Kanatlı ile 12 Nisan 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[113] Bayrak Radyosu çalışanı ve tiyatro sanatçısı Hilmi Özen'le 30 Mart 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[114] Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Madde 171, Kıbrıs Hükümet Matbaası, Lefkoşa, 1960, s. 55.

[115] Rauf R. Denktaş, *a.g.e.,* s. 346-347.

[116] Metin Turan, "TMT Yıllarından Onurlu Sesler; Sancak Radyoları", *Kıbrıs Türk Milli Mücadelesi ve Bu Mücadelede TMT'nin Yeri II. Uluslararası Sempozyumu,* Cilt II, 31 Ekim-5 Kasım 2011, Kıbrıs TMT Mücahitler Derneği, Lefkoşa, s. 32-33

[117] Ahmet Tolgay'dan aktaran Bayrak Özel Sayısı, BRTK, Aralık 2013, s. 28-29.

[118] KTMA, EOKA Bildirileri Dosyası No. 1318 ve 1319.

[119] Hüseyin Kanatlı ile 17 Mayıs 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

ifadesiyle önce bir hayal kırıklığı, ardından bir yıkımla gerçekleşecektir. Limasol'da Talat Yurdakul'un okul müdürlüğü yaptığı günlerde bu okulda son dönemini geçirdiğini düşünmektedir ve sene sonu müsameresinde son derece ağır bir program hazırlayarak Osmanlı Tarihi'ni gözler önüne sermeye çabalar. Seyirciler arasında Kıbrıs Radyo Korporasyonu'ndan Türkçe Neşriyat Müdürü Suphi Rıza Bey ile yardımcısı Özkan Uygur Bey de bulunmaktadır. Program tamamlanır; ancak Hüseyin Kanatlı'nın Lefkoşa'daki Teknik Okul'a atanma düşüncesi başka iki öğretmen tercih edilmesi nedeniyle gerçekleşmez.

O arada Müfettiş Özdemir Bey'in kendisine gelerek bir münhal bulunduğunu belirtmesi ve ardından "Bu meslek tam sana göre. Kalemin güçlü, hayal gücün de öyle. Türkçe, İngilizce, edebiyat ve sanat dallarında da yeteneğin çok yüksek. Üstelik müzik eğitimin, müzik hocalığın da var. Bu iş için biçilmiş kaftansın. Gerçi öğretmenlikte müzik ağırlıklı bir programın var; ancak sevmediğin başka konularda da ders vermek zorundasın. Oysa radyoda kendi çizginde ve zevkine uygun programlara kendini verebilirsin. Eğitiminin ve öğretmenlik deneyiminin de bu çalışmalarında daha da başarılı olmanı sağlayacak ve daha da önemlisi içinde bulunduğun hayal kırıklığı yerini daha aydın bir geleceğe bırakacak..."[120] demesiyle radyoda "Program Danışmanı" görevi için müracaat etmekte gecikmez.[121] Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasının ardından radyoda ufak çaplı da olsa huzursuzluklar kendini göstermeye başlamıştır.[122]

16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinden itibaren yayın yapan Kıbrıs Radyosu böylece "tahrik kumkuması, Türklük düşmanı, öfke makinesi"[123] olarak faaliyette bulunmakta ve Kıbrıslı Türklerin tepkisini çekmektedir. Türklere verilen hakların ortadan kaldırılması ve bu hakların Rumlara verilmesi veya Rumlar lehine değiştirilmesi Türk toplumunu adada azınlık haline getireceğinden Makarios, İngilizlerden aldığı olumlu sinyallerle planını uygulamaya koyar. Bu konuda faaliyette bulunan sadece Makarios da değildir. Rum tarafının bütün ileri gelenleri ellerine geçen her fırsatta tahrik edici davranışlar ve konuşmalarla Enosis fikrini sıcak tutma gayreti içine girer. Ayrıca İngiltere'nin adada Akrotiri ve Dikelia askerî üslerini açmasını müteakip Yunanistan, Türkiye ve İngiltere'nin garantör ülke olarak geri planda kalmaları, kâğıt üzerinde nüfus olarak Türklerden daha olan Rumların Türkleri nasıl olsa kolayca alt edebiliriz düşüncesine kapılmalarına sebep olur ve Makarios, Yunanistan ve Kıbrıslı Rumların Enosis hayalleri bir kere daha kabarır.[124]

Londra ve Zürih antlaşmalarının ardından 16 Ağustos 1960 tarihinde Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasıyla birlikte bu radyo istasyonu da yeniden düzenlemeye gider ve 1

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[120] Hüseyin Kanatlı, *Uçan Yıllar 1931-1959,* Cilt I, Lefkoşa, Haziran 2014, 251-252.

[121] Kanatlı, *a.g.e.,* s. 253-254.

[122] Hüseyin Kanatlı ile 12 Nisan 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[123] *Nacak,* 14 Haziran 1961.

[124] Fahir Armaoğlu, "Crisis The Cyprus Question Initiated In Turco-Greek Relations", *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire,* Ankara, 1988, s. 228.

Nisan 1955 tarihinden itibaren adayı kan gölüne çeviren EOKA tedhiş örgütünün saldırılarının ardından kurulan bu ortak radyoda radyonun müdürlüğünü %70-%30 oranlarına göre Kıbrıslı bir Rum yaparken müdür yardımcılığı görevine ise Suphi Rıza Bey getirilmiş durumdadır.[125]

Hazırlanan yönergeyle ortak bir radyo istasyonu kurulması ve bu istasyon vasıtasıyla başta radyo, televizyon olmak üzere ilgili alanlarda sesli ve görüntülü yayın yapılması kabul edilir. Böylece bu radyo istasyonu vasıtasıyla ve tıpkı Londra-Zürih antlaşmalarına uygun bir şekilde garantör devletler olarak bu antlaşmalara imza atan İngiltere, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın talepleri doğrultusunda Türk ve Rum personel istihdam edilmeye başlanır. Bu oran devletin diğer bütün kurum ve kuruluşlarında olduğu üzere %70 Rum ve %30 Kıbrıslı Türk olarak belirlenmiştir; ancak Rumlar bu kurala hiçbir şekilde riayet etmemişlerdir. Kıbrıslı Türklerin esaret ve mücadele döneminde açmaya çalıştıkları Bayrak Radyosu öncesinde ise Kıbrıslı Rumların radyo yayınları söz konusudur ve 1960 yılından çok daha önce başlamıştır. 4 Ekim 1953 Pazar günü İngiliz yönetimi tarafından altyapısı hazırlanıp yayın hayatına başlayan, 1960 yılında Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne devredilen ve 1963 sonrasında tamamen eski EOKA'cı İçişleri Bakanı Polikarpos Yorgacis idaresinde Rumlara bırakılan bu radyo istasyonunun ardından 4 yıl sonra ve 1 Ekim 1957 tarihinden itibaren de ilk televizyon yayını söz konusu olacaktır.[126]

Öte yandan 1960'lı yıllardan itibaren faaliyete geçen RIK (PIK) TV kanalı özellikle Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasının ardından Kıbrıslı Türklerle Kıbrıslı Rumların müşterek hizmet verdikleri ve yayınlar gerçekleştirdikleri bir TV kanalı haline gelmesine rağmen 21 Aralık 1963 günü başlayan Rum saldırılarının ardından Türklerin buradaki hizmetleri de sona ermiş ve TV kanalı sadece Rumlara hizmet eder hale gelmiştir.

İlk yayına başladığında Cyprus Broadcasting Service/Kıbrıs Radyo Yayın Kurumu adıyla yayına başlayan ve kısaca "CYBS" olarak adlandırılan radyo istasyonu 1 Ocak 1959 tarihinden itibaren resmen devlete ait bir radyo istasyonu haline gelir ve ismi de "Kıbrıs Radyo Yayın Korporasyonu Kanunu Madde 300 A" çerçevesinde Kıbrıs Yayın Korporasyonu (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) olur.[127]

Radyo istasyonu ilk yayına başladığı dönemde haftada sadece 5 gün ve günde sadece 3 saat radyo yayını yapabilecek bir kapasiteye sahiptir ve bu yayınlar Lefkoşa civarında

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[125] Hikmet Afif Mapolar'ın Suphi Rıza Bey hakkında bu kadar sert, suçlayıcı ve acımasız eleştirilerde bulunmasının muhtemelen farklı sebepleri olabilir. Suphi Rıza Bey'in bürokrat ve bir kamu görevlisi olarak ciddiyeti, iş disiplini ve görev yaptığı kurumlara verdiği destek ve katkı ise zaten gözler önündedir. Hikmet Afif Mapolar, a.g.e., s. 230-231.

[126] Şeniz Coşkun, a.g.e., s. 21.

[127] Nikolaos Stelya, "The Short-Lived Bicommunal Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation", *Media History,* 22:2, s. 218.

yaklaşık 24 kilometrelik bir alanda etkili olacak şekilde yapılabilmektedir.[128] Bu araştırmanın farklı bölümlerinde de ayrıntılı bir şekilde değinildiği üzere radyo istasyonunun ve 4 yıl sonra da TV kanalının hizmete girmesi adadaki İngiliz yönetiminin 1878'den itibaren devam eden hükümranlığının belki de en karmaşık, en zorlu ve en sıkıntılı sürecine denk gelir. Bu kadar zorlu bir dönemde ve daha önce bu konuda hiçbir ciddi adım atılmamasına rağmen adadaki İngiliz yönetiminin adada egemenlik haklarını Kıbrıslı Türklere ve Rumlara bırakma arifesinde böyle bir adım atması da ayrı bir tartışma ve araştırma konusudur. Söz konusu radyoda çalışanlardan birisi de yılların radyo ve televizyonculuğa büyük emek vermiş 1932 Kıbrıs doğumlu Mustafa Sami Akalın'dır.[129]

Öte yandan başta Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı ve Başpiskopos Makarios ve dönemin İçişleri Bakanı Polikarpos Yorgacis'in kurulan yeni devleti Yunanistan'la birleşmek ve Enosis hayallerini gerçekleştirmek amacıyla bir atlama tahtası olarak görmeleri nedeniyle bu radyo da uzun soluklu olmaz ve Kanlı Noel olarak Kıbrıs tarihine geçen Rum saldırılarının ardından 21 Aralık 1963 gününden itibaren Kıbrıslı Türk personelin görev yapamadığı, işe gidemediği ve can güvenliğinin olmadığı bir ortam oluşur ve Rumların işgaline giren radyo istasyonu da doğrudan Rum propagandası yapan bir istasyon haline gelir. Radyoda bozuk Türkçeleriyle kara propaganda yapan Rumlar ise Kıbrıslı Türk çalışanların mazeretsiz işe gelmedikleri, silahlı Türklerin Rumlara saldırdıkları ve devleti yıkmaya çalıştıkları yönünde inandırıcılıktan uzak kara propaganda çalışmalarına devam ederler. 21 Aralık 1963 tarihine kadar devletin bu radyo istasyonunda çalışan Kıbrıslı Türk radyocular arasında istihbarat görevi de üstlenmiş olan Meral Ertürk de vardır.[130] Söz konusu bu radyoda meslek hayatına başlayanlardan birisi de sonraki süreçte Kıbrıs Türk sahnelerinin önemli simalarından birisi olacak Ahmet Belevi olur.[131]

Radyo yayıncılığına oranla TV yayınları ise son derece kısıtlıdır ve televizyon sahipleri de adada neredeyse parmakla gösterilecek kadar azdır. Dönemin şartları gereği insanlar televizyon sahibi tanıdıklarına sanki sinemaya gider gibi gitmeye başlamışlardır ve bundan en çok şikâyet edenler de şüphesiz ev sahipleri olmaktadır.[132]

21 Aralık 1963 Kanlı Noel Süreci ve Radyolar

Garantörlük Antlaşması'na uygun olarak Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti çerçevesinde devlet memurluğu kadrolarında %70 Rum ve %30 Kıbrıslı Türk çalıştırılması konusu ise Rumların farklı dönemlerde yaptıkları çeşitli baskılar sonucunda hiçbir zaman hayata geçirilemez ve özellikle Başpiskopos ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Makarios'un 1962 yılından

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[128] Stelya, a.g.m., s. 218.
[129] Bertuğ Topal ve Didem Menteş'ten aktaran *Yenidüzen,* 15 Şubat 2010.
[130] Meral Ertürk ile 15 Temmuz 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[131] Ahmet Belevi ile 15 Mayıs 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.
[132] Özker Yaşın, *Nevzat ve Ben,* Cilt III, İstanbul, 1997, s. 15.

itibaren Anayasa üzerinde Kıbrıs Türklerinin haklarını gasp etmeye yönelik 13 değişiklik yapma düşüncesi adayı kaosa sürükler ve 21 Aralık 1963 günü başlayan Rum saldırılarıyla Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti fiilen ortadan kalkar.[133] 21 Aralık 1963 günü başlayan saldırıların ardından Kıbrıslı Türk radyo personeli radyo istasyonundaki görevlerine artık bir daha gidemezler.[134]

Yunanistan'ın Megali İdea ve Rumların Enosis hayalleri nedeniyle ömrü maalesef kısa süreli olan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti böylece fiilen 21 Aralık 1963 gecesi başlayan Rum saldırılarıyla tarihe karışır ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin bütün resmi kurum ve kuruluşlarında görev yapan öğretmenden tapu memuruna, ormancıdan hemşireye kadar hiçbir Kıbrıslı Türk artık mesailerine devam edemezler. Bu kaosu yaşayanlar arasında şüphesiz Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin müşterek radyo istasyonu olan CBC'de görev yapmakta olan Kıbrıslı Türk radyo elemanları için de geçerlidir ve böylece radyo istasyonu doğrudan bir Rum radyosu haline gelirken[135] Lefkoşa yakınlarındaki Atalasa'da bulunan radyoya artık gidemeyen Türk personel ise Lefkoşa'nın güvenli bölgelerine kaçmış ve Bayrak Radyosu'nun kuruluş sürecine destek vermeye başlamıştır.[136]

Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti devletinin fiilen ortadan kalkması, CBC'de görev yapan Türk personelin artık görevlerine devam edememeleri ve Kıbrıs Türklerinin radyo yayınları vasıtasıyla temsiliyet haklarının ellerinden alınması 24 Aralık 1963 tarihinde verilen "Kahraman mücahitlerimizin sesini doğru olarak yansıtacak bir radyoya ihtiyaç vardır." direktifinin alınmasından hemen sonra çalışmalara başlanılır. O günlerde Kıbrıs Telekomünikasyon İdare Meclisi asbaşkanı konumunda olan Ali Gürsoy'un[137] da büyük destek verdiği bu çalışma sonrasında Lefkoşa'da Viktorya Caddesi'nde bulunan Ergün Orhan Şevket'in deposundaki hurda malzemelerden radyo istasyonu kurma projesi de hayata böylece geçirilir.[138]

Bu dönemde perde arkasında Seferberlik Tetkik Kurulu ya da daha sonraki adıyla Özel Harp Dairesi bulunmaktadır ve Bayrak Radyosu'nun elektronik konusunda uzman personeli de bu daire tarafından takip edilmektedir. Bu konuda görev alanlardan birisi de Derviş Özer Berkem olacaktır.[139] Dr. Fazıl Küçük'ün garajında halktan toplanan 100 araba aküsüyle derme

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[133] Caner Akova ile 4 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

[134] Hüseyin Kanatlı ile 12 Nisan 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme. Sevilay Direkoğlu ile 3 Mayıs 2015 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

[135] Kıbrıs Türk Basın Konseyi ve Kıbrıs Türk Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yönetim Kurulu üyeliği yapan Meral Ertürk ile 15 Temmuz 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[136] Sevil Emirzade ile 14 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[137] Ali Gürsoy aynı zamanda Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Sağlık Bakanı Dr. Niyazi Manyera'nın damadıdır.

[138] Bayrak Radyosu çalışanı ve tiyatro sanatçısı Hilmi Özen'le 30 Mart 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[139] Derviş Özer Berkem ile 8 Şubat 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

çatma bir istasyon kurulur ve 25 Aralık 1963 günü Lefkoşa'da "Bayrak Bayrak Bayrak. Burası Kıbrıs Türk Mücahidinin Sesi"[140] anonsu duyulur.[141]

21 Aralık 1963 tarihinde başlayan ve Kıbrıs tarihine Kanlı Noel olarak geçen sürecin ardından ada sathında 103 köyün boşaltılması, nüfusun neredeyse yarıya yakınının daha güvenli bölgelere göç etmeye başlaması ve iletişim bağlamında Kıbrıs Türklerinin sesini duyuracak bir radyoya ihtiyaç duyulmasının ardından başlayan faaliyetler Kıbrıslı Türkler için muazzam bir moral ve motivasyon kaynağı da olacaktır.[142]

Bu arada Rumların yukarıda belirtilen "Bekledim de gelmedin" şarkısıyla yaratmaya çalıştığı psikolojik algı operasyonu 20 Temmuz 1974 tarihindeki Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı'na kadar devam edecektir.[143] Bayrak Radyosu, Kıbrıs Türk toplumunun en büyük moral kaynağı olmuş, çarpışmalar ve katliamlar sonucunda birbirlerinden ayrı düşen ve haberleşemeyen ailelerin iyilik ve sağlık haberlerini yayımlayarak millî marşlar, kahramanlık türküleri ve şiirler okuyarak toplumun moral seviyesini hep yüksek tutmuş ve millî duyguları kamçılamıştır.

Bu süreçte İngiliz döneminden başlayarak Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti radyo istasyonunda görev yapan ve 21 Aralık 1963 sonrasında bu görevlerine devam edemeyen ve Bayrak Radyosu'nun ortaya çıkmasında isimleri geçen ve tespit edilebilen spiker, programcı, yönetmen ve idareci Kıbrıslı kadınlar Meral Ertürk, Güzide Tunç, Muazzez Yalın, Sevilay Direkoğlu, radyo teknik operatörü Ayten Kılıç, CBC'de TV görevlisi Olcay Okur, CBC'de radyo teknik operatörü Aysel Suphi Tilki, CBC'de radyo teknik operatörü Ayten Kamuran, Hatice Söğüt ve sözlü yayınlarda program yapımcısı ve sunucu olan Ayşe Başar olur.

Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne ait radyo istasyonuna can güvenliği kalmadığı için gidemeyen ve Bayrak Radyosu'nda göreve başlayan personel arasında eşi Kemal Tunç'la birlikte görev yapan "radyolu günlerimizde nice sözel programı, radyofonik skeci, reklâmı renklendiren ve unutulmaz semboller arasına giren bir ses"[144] olan Güzide Tunç, kendisini "Ben Bayrak Radyosu'nu çocuğum gibi görürüm."[145] şeklinde ifade eden diyen Sevilay Direkoğlu[146], Hatice Söğüt ve Ayşe Başar yanında Feyziye Hulusi olacaktır.[147] Güzide Tunç inanılmaz fedakârlıklar, cansiperane çabalar sonrasında tesis edilen Bayrak Radyosu'ndaki hizmetleri konusunda "Zaman mevhumu gözetmeksizin bize verilen görevleri yapmaya çalışıyorduk.

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[140] Ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz. *BRTK Yıllığı,* 1985, s. 34.

[141] *Halkın Sesi,* 29 Aralık 1963.

[142] Birsen Şemsettin ile 4 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[143] KKTC Kurucu Cumhurbaşkanı merhum Rauf R. Denktaş ile 8 Temmuz 2003 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[144] Ahmet Tolgay'dan aktaran *Kıbrıs,* 10 Temmuz 2007.

[145] Emine Hoca, a.g.m., s. 52.

[146] Yakup Adadağ ile 19 Haziran 2017 tarihinde Girne Karaoğlanoğlu'da yapılan görüşme. İnci Çelik ile 10 Nisan 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

[147] Gürkan, *a.g.e.,* s. 177-184.

Örneğin fazla mesai ödenmesi gibi bir şey söz konusu değildi. Herkes işini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışırdı. Disiplin ve saygı vardı ama en önemlisi personelin onore edilmesine verilen önemdi...”[148] der.

Sonuç

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde Kıbrıs adasında ilk defa radyoyla ve radyo yayınlarıyla karşılaşan Kıbrıslı Türklerin radyo macerası zorlu ve bir o kadar da kısıtlamalarla doludur. Bununla birlikte İngiltere'nin özellikle Ortadoğu coğrafyasında İsrail devletinin kurulmasının akabinde bu bölgeden bazı askeri birliklerini Kıbrıs adasına nakletmesi ve Kıbrıs adasının askeri stratejik bağlamda taşıdığı göz önüne alınarak burada yaptığı yeniden yapılanma girişimleri iletişim alanında da kendisini gösterir. Önceleri sadece İngiliz Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı askeri personeline yönelik kısıtlı yayınlar yapmakta olan radyo istasyonunun Lefkoşa Lakadamya'da bulunan merkezden başlayan serüveni daha sonra Agrotur ve Dikelya özerk askeri üsleriyle devam edecektir. Bu süreç İngiliz resmi radyo yayın korporasyonu olan BBC'nin de Kıbrıs'a büyük önem ve destek verdiği bir süreçtir.

İlginç ve şaşırtıcı olan nokta ise söz konusu İngiliz radyo istasyonlarında çalışan Kıbrıslı Türk personelin büyük bir kısmının kadınlar olmasıdır ve söz konusu kadınlar önce 1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti sürecinde devlete ait radyo istasyonunda çalışmaya başlayacaklar, ardından Aralık 1963 itibarıyla Kıbrıslı Türklerin dünyaya seslerini duyurabilmek amacıyla zor şartlar altında tesis ettikleri Bayrak Radyosu'nun da temelini oluşturacaklardır.

Daha sonraki süreçte ise Lefkoşa'da Orhan Şevket'in hurda deposundan cansiperane ve Rum ateşi altında temin edilen birkaç alet, yaklaşık 100 arabanın sökülen aküleri, evlerden bulunan kablolar, telefon ahizeleri vb. yardımıyla önce 5 dakika ve sadece 50 metreye, süreç içerisinde de Mağusa Canbulat, Larnaka Doğanın Sesi, Limasol Sancak, Gazi Baf, Lefke Sancak Radyosu gibi diğer sancak radyolarıyla dış dünyaya seslerini duyurma çabalarıdır. Bu bağlamda Kıbrıslı Türklerin Bayrak Radyosu ile başlayan ve son olarak Anamur'da açtıkları son derece gizli ve uzun süre nerede olduğu anlaşılamayan Anamur Radyosu'na kadar geçen süreçte Kıbrıslı Türk kadınlar spiker, haberci, yorumcu, telsiz verici imalatçısı, bu malzemelerin güvenli bölgelere taşınması ya da arıza yapan cihazların tamirinde çeşitli görevler üstlenerek kelle koltukta adanın dört bir yanında EOKA'nın, silahlı Rumların ve askeri sansür ve sıkıyönetimin ağır baskıları altında cansiperane görev yapmışlardır.

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[148] Emine Hoca, a.g.m., s. 48

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Medya

Middle Eastern Studies

Nacak

Ortam

Poli

Star Kıbrıs

Yenidüzen

D. Sözlü Tarih Çalışması

Bayrak Radyosu çalışanı İnci Çelik ile 10 Nisan 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Bayrak Radyosu çalışanı ve tiyatro sanatçısı Hilmi Özen'le 30 Mart 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Birsen Şemsettin ile 4 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Caner Akova ile 4 Şubat 2017 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

Derviş Özer Berkem ile 8 Şubat 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

Güzide Tunç ile 16 Kasım 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

Hüseyin Kanatlı ile 12 Nisan 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

KKTC Kurucu Cumhurbaşkanı merhum Rauf R. Denktaş ile 8 Temmuz 2003 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme

Meral Ertürk ile 15 Temmuz 2015 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Özcan Atamert ile 16 Ağustos 2017 tarihinde Datça'da yapılan görüşme.

Sevil Emirzade ile 14 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Sevilay Direkoğlu ile 3 Mayıs 2015 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

Şirin Süha ile 15 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

Şule Örfi (Süha) ile 15 Nisan 2016 tarihinde Lefkoşa'da yapılan görüşme.

TMT Limasol Sancağı mensubu Aydın Aygın ile 20 Ağustos 2004 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

TMT Limasol Sancaktarı ve Limasol Hastanesi Başhekimi Dr. Ayten Berkalp ile 12 Kasım 2013 tarihinde Girne'de yapılan görüşme.

Yakup Adadağ ile 19 Haziran 2017 tarihinde Girne Karaoğlanoğlu'da yapılan görüşme.

E. Elektronik Kaynaklar

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Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Yeni Fikirler

Sibel Siber[1]

"Sözcük oyunu oynuyorum küçük yeğenimle. "Bu söz sana ne anımsatıyor?" diye soruyorum ve sözcükleri ardı ardına sıralıyorum… "Kalem" diyorum, "kâğıt" diyor, "deniz" diyorum "mavi" diyor; "Kıbrıs" deyince, "sorun" diyor hemen. Anlamamış gibi bir kez daha tekrarlıyorum sorumu. "Ne yani, anlamayacak ne var," dercesine, bu kez daha yüksek sesle "Kıbrıs Sorunu!.." diyor. Ben yüzümde acı bir gülümseme, bu küçük masum gözlere bakıyorum."

Kıbrıs'ın sorunla özdeşleştiği gerçeğini vurgulayan, 2010 yılında yazmış olduğum bir yazıdan alıntı yaparak giriş yapmak istedim yazıma. Maalesef 'Kıbrıs' denince akla ilk gelen sözcük, 'sorun'. Tedavisi mümkün olmayan kronik bir hastalık gibi… İyileşmesini istersiniz, ama pek de umudunuz kalmadığından onunla yaşamayı öğrenirsiniz. Kıbrıslı Türklerin birlikte doğup büyüdüğü, birlikte yaşlandığı Kıbrıs sorunu ile ilgili ruh halini, hekim kimliğimle böyle izah edebilirim ancak.

Kıbrıs'ta toplumlararası müzakerelerin başlangıç yılı 1968. Beyrut'ta bir otelde başlamış müzakereler. Kıbrıs Türk toplumunu temsilen Rauf Raif Denktaş, Kıbrıs Rum toplumunu temsilen ise Glafkos Kleridis, ilk kez sıcak bir Haziran ayında bir araya gelmişler. O zamandan beri gazete sütunlarında; "Kıbrıs Sorunu'na çözüm bulmak amacıyla iki lider…" diye başlayan sayısız habere konu oldu müzakereler.

Kıbrıs Sorunu'nu konu alan "Aynı Masada Yarım Asır" isimli kitabımın son sözün-de sonuçlanmayan müzakerelerle ilgili şu ironiyi yapmıştım:

"Ve 50 yıldır değişmeyen durumun bir özeti:

* Kıbrıs'ın Sıcağı...

* Kıbrıs'ın Sorunu...

* Kıbrıs Müzakereleri...

* Kıbrıs Müzakere Masası…

* İkili, Üçlü, Beşli Görüşmeler...

* Siyasi Eşitlik Zemininde Ortaklık Arayışı…

* BM'nin Kıbrıs'taki Görevi…

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[1] Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC) Cumhuriyet Meclisi Eski Başkanı.

* BM Genel Sekreteri Kıbrıs Raporları…

* "Her şeyde anlaşmadan hiçbir şeyde anlaşmış sayılmayız" prensibi…

Dünyanın en uzun uzlaşmazlığı diye nitelendirilen Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun tarihçesine baktığımızda, sorunun temelinde 1960 yılında kurulan ortaklığa dayalı Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Anlaşması'nın gerçekte bir uzlaşı anlaşması olmamasının büyük rol oynadığı görülür. Londra ve Zürih Anlaşmaları ile kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin ömrünün uzun olamayacağı daha imzaların atıldığı ilk günden belliydi. Anlaşmaya imza koyan taraflardan biri olan Rum lider Makarios, kendi toplumu tarafından Enosis'in önünü kapamakla suçlanmıştı.

Glafkos Kleridis, anılarını kaleme aldığı "My Deposition" (İfadem), isimli kitabında şöyle demektedir[2]: "Makarios; 1959 Zurih ve Londra Anlaşmalarını kabul etmekle, yeminine ihanet ederek Enosis'in önünü kapamakla suçlanıyordu."

Toplumlararası uyuşmazlık çözümle sonuçlandığında, "Barış anlaşması" imzalandı, denir; aslında bunun adı "Çözüm Anlaşması" olmalıdır. Barış, çok daha farklı bir anlam ifade eder. Çözüm masada yapılır; ama barışın imzası yoktur. Çözüm ve barış arasındaki farkı anlatmak için şu sözleri çok sıklıkla kullanmaktayım:

"Çözümü liderler, barışı halklar yapar."

"Çözüm kâğıt üzerinde, barış ise gönüllerdedir."

Anlaşmaya imza koyan taraflar veya taraflardan biri, anlaşma için heyecan duymaz ve benimsemezse bu anlaşma sadece kâğıt üzerinde kalır. 1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Anlaşması da işte böyleydi; o nedenle ömrü kısa sürdü.

Anlaşma'nın üzerinden henüz daha 3 yıl bile geçmemişken, Makarios, Anayasa değişiklik önerileri sundu. Bu öneriler, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ni Ortaklık Cumhuriyeti'nden çıkarıp, Üniter Rum Devleti'ne dönüştürme önerileriydi. Önerilen13 Anayasa değişikliğinin temelinde ise Kıbrıslı Türklere azınlık hakları verilmesi yatıyordu.

Kıbrıslı Türklerin ortaklıktan azınlığa geçmeyi kabul etmemesi ile birlikte Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun temelleri atılmış oldu. Kıbrıslı Türkler gettolarda yaşamaya mahkûm edildi, kendi yurdunda göçmen oldu; ekonomik zorluklar, can ve mal kayıplarının yaşandığı o zor mücadele yılları başladı.

1963-68 yılları, Kıbrıs Türk toplumunun kendi yurdunda verdiği var olma mücadelesinin destansı öyküsüdür. 1968 yılında ise Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) arabuluculuğunda ilk kez iki toplum arasında müzakerelerin başlaması, özellikle çok zor koşullarda yaşam süren Kıbrıslı Türkler için bir umut oldu.

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[2] Glafkos Kleridis, *Cyprus: My Depositon, Cilt 3,* s. 213.

1968-1974 yılları arasında, 6 yıl devam eden toplumlararası görüşmelerle ilgili Meclis kapalı oturum tutanakları, ilk kez Ocak 2017 tarihinde açıldı. Meclis Başkanı olduğum dönemde, Meclis Divanı kararıyla açılan bu tutanaklar, bugüne kadar neden bir çözüme ulaşılamadığı konusuna ışık tutacak nitelikte.

Günümüz müzakereleri ile o dönemin müzakereleri arasındaki en önemli ortak nokta, Rum tarafının hiçbir zaman siyasi eşitlik temelinde bir çözüme razı olmamasıdır. Buna, Rum tarafının kırmızıçizgisi de denebilir.

1960 yılında kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, iki toplumun siyasi eşitliğine dayalı fonksiyonel bir federasyondu. Bu anlaşmaya istekli olmadan imza koyan Makarios, kısa bir süre sonra "%18 nüfusa sahip toplum bize hükmedemez!" diyerek, Anayasa'yı değiştirmek istemişti. Şimdi, tam yarım asır sonra, bu kez Rum lider Anastasiadis; Kıbrıslı Türklerin %20 nüfus oranına vurgu yaparak ''Azınlık, çoğunluğa hükmedemez!'' demekte ve Kıbrıslı Türklerle siyasi eşit ortak olmayı reddetmektedir.

Makarios'un "%18 nüfus oranına sahip Kıbrıslı Türklere bu kadar hak verilemez" sözleri, yani 1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ni yıkan düşüncesi ile günümüzde, Anastasidis'in siyasi eşitliği Kıbrıslı Türklerle paylaşmama düşüncesi tamamen örtüşüyor.

Toplumlararası bir uyuşmazlığın çözümünde değişmez kural, tarafların bu uyuşmazlığın çözümü için samimi istek duymalarıdır. Bu değerlendirme için uzman olmaya gerek yok. İkili ilişkilerde de bu böyledir. Kişiler, aralarındaki küskünlüğü sona erdirmeyi samimiyetle istiyorlarsa uzlaşmayı başarabilirler. Birinci şart, tarafların uzlaşı konusunda eşit istek duymaları, ikincisi ise aralarındaki sorunu çözdükleri takdirde kazançlı çıkacaklarına inanmaları (kazan-kazan prensibi) ve bunun için de karşılıklı bazı fedakârlıklarda bulunmaları gerektiğinin bilincinde olmalarıdır. Her iki taraf da karşılıklı haklara saygı temelinde samimi çaba ortaya koyarlarsa mutlaka uzlaşıya ulaşılır.

Yıllardır, BM Parametresi temelinde 'iki toplumlu, iki bölgeli, siyasi eşitliğe dayalı federasyon' görüşülmesine rağmen bir sonuca ulaşılamamıştır. Örneğin; Rum lider kendi halkına hitaben yaptığı konuşmalarda, BM parametrelerinden biri olan 'siyasi eşitliğe dayalı federasyon' tanımını kullanmamaya özen göstermektedir.

BM parametreleri çerçevesinde bir çözüm için masada olduğunu iddia eden Rum tarafının, aslında çoğunluk iradesine dayalı bir çözümü hedeflediği açıktır. Bu hedefine ulaşıncaya kadar da müzakereleri sürdürme arzusundadır. Hâlihazırda uluslararası alanda tanınmış bir üniter devlete sahip olduğu için acelesi de yoktur.

Empati yaptığınızda federal bir çözümle birlikte Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Üniter Rum devletini Kıbrıslı Türklerle siyasi eşitlik temelinde bölüşmek zorunda kalacaktır. Böyle bir anlaşmaya

imza atabilecek Rum lider olduğunu sanmıyorum. O nedenle de bir demecimde, "Rum tarafında çözüm arzusu değil, müzakere arzusu var," demiştim.

Bu geçen uzun süreçte; farklı zaman dilimlerinde farklı ideolojilere sahip KKTC Cumhurbaşkanları, ideolojisi farklı Rum liderlerle sonuçsuz müzakereler yapmıştır. Bu süreçlerin sonunda Kıbrıslı Türkler adına müzakereleri yürüten 4 cumhurbaşkanının da kendi dönemlerinde müzakerelerle ilgili verdikleri demeçlerinin ortak noktası, siyasi eşitlik konusunda Rum tarafının gösterdiği olumsuz tavırdır.

Örneğin; 1968'den günümüze uzanan müzakereler her çıkmaza girdiğinde, Cumhurbaşkanlarımız tarafından yapılan ve basında yer alan açıklamaların hemen tümünde benzer ifadelerin olduğu görülür.[3]

"Rumlar bizimle ortak olmak niyetinde değiller. Bizi, azınlık olarak görmek istiyorlar!" (Rauf Denktaş, Kurucu Cumhurbaşkanı, 1 Mart 2004).

"Rum tarafı üniter devlet yanlısıdır." (Mehmet Ali Talat, 2'nci Cumhurbaşkanı, 25 Aralık 2009).

"Rumlar 50 yıldır zamana oynuyor." (Derviş Eroğlu, 3'üncü Cumhurbaşkanı, 8 Ekim 2014).

"Rum tarafı bizi siyasi eşit olarak görmek istemiyor!" (Mustafa Akıncı, 4'üncü Cumhurbaşkanı, 9 Nisan 2019).

Buna karşılık, Rum tarafından yapılan açıklamalarda da yine geçen bunca yılda değişen bir şeyin olmadığını görürsünüz.

"Nüfusun %18'i yönetimde eşit ortak olamaz. Azınlık, çoğunluğun iradesine hükmedemez!" (Rum lider Makarios,1963).

"Çoğunluk yönetiminde bir devlet yapısı için müzakere ediyoruz!" (Rum lider Nikos Anastasiadis, 2017).

"Kıbrıslı Türklerin her karara etkin katılımı kabul edilemez!" (Rum lider Nikos Anastasiadis, 2019).

Rauf DENKTAŞ; 12 Ekim 1973 tarihli Türk Yönetimi Meclisi tutanağında, müzakerelerle ilgili olarak yapılan gizli oturumda milletvekillerine gidişatla ilgili şu bilgiyi veriyordu:

"1968'de başlayan görüşmeler 1973''ün son aylarına kadar geldi. Hâlâ yüzde seksen olduklarına dayanarak Kıbrıs'ın mutlak hâkimi imişler gibi bize neyi kabul edebileceklerini söylemektedirler."

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[3] Sibel Siber, *Aynı Masada Yarım Asır-Tutanaklar ve Tanıklık*,

Masadaki BM parametrelerini reddeden Rum tarafıdır. 2004 Annan Referandumu'nda, Kıbrıs Rum toplumunun federasyona "hayır" demesinin üzerinden tam 17yıl geçmiştir. O günden bugüne, yapılan çeşitli kamuoyu yoklamaları, Rum halkının federasyona "hayır" iradesinin değişmediğini göstermektedir. Bunu bilgi ve belgelere dayanarak uluslararası topluma anlatmak önemlidir.

Burada tartışılması gereken federasyonun iyi bir çözüm modeli olup olmadığı değil, Kıbrıs'ta yaşayabilir bir çözüm bulunması için ne yapılması gerektiğidir. Federasyonun temel ilkesi siyasi eşitlik olduğuna göre ve Rum tarafı siyasi eşitliği reddettiğine göre, gerçek anlamda federal bir çözüme ulaşma çabası bir hayaldir. Uluslararası baskıyla, halkların benimsemediği çözümler ise barış yerine çatışma, acı, gözyaşı getirir. Nitekim yakın tarihimizde bunu yaşadık.

O nedenle, eğer yaşayabilir bir çözüm arzu ediliyorsa, yani sonuç odaklı müzakere hedefleniyorsa, BM Genel Sekreteri Antonio Guterres'in 16 Ekim 2018'de Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'ne sunduğu Kıbrıs Raporu'nda da vurguladığı gibi 'yeni fikirlere' ihtiyaç vardır. Bunca yıldır masada olan federal çözüm formülü, sorunu çözememiştir. Tıp'ta bize öğretilen bir prensip vardır: Aynı hastalığı taşıyan her hastayı aynı reçeteyle iyileştirmezsiniz; yani "hastalık yoktur, hasta vardır."

Bu aşamada, iki toplumun karar mekanizmalarının ortak olmayacağı yeni formüller masaya yatırılmalıdır. Bu yeni formülün adına ister konfederasyon ister iki devletli çözüm deyin. Adının ne olacağından ziyade, geçmişin ve bunca yıllık müzakerelerin tecrübelerinden yola çıkarak, Kıbrıs'taki gerçekler de göz önünde bulundurularak, çözümle sonuçlanma ihtimali daha yüksek yeni bir yola giril-mesinin zamanı artık gelmiştir.

Britanya Monarşisi Mektup Geleneği ve Toplum İlişkileri

Batuhan Ulukütük[1]

Birleşik Krallık denince akla gelen ilk kavramlardan olan monarşi sistemi, geçmişten günümüze hayatta kalmak için zamanın gerektirdiği koşullara göre kendini hep yeniledi. Böylesine kadim bir kurumun elbette zamana ayak uydururken kendi otantik duruşundan taviz vermesi söz konusu değildir. Bahsettiğim bu durumu daha somut bir şekilde anlayabilmek için Kraliyet Ailesi'nin mektup geleneğini ve toplumla ilişkisini ele alabiliriz.

Geçmişten günümüze yönetimlerin otoritelerinin yumuşadığını ve sorumlu oldukları toplumlara karşı daha yakın ve sıkı ilişkilerle yaklaştığını söylemek mümkün. Özellikle savaş, afet gibi zor zamanlarda veya bayram ve özel günler gibi ortak paydada buluşulan zamanlarda toplumun nabzını yoklamak ve ilişkileri kuvvetlendirmek için iletişim araçları pek çok kurum tarafından sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır. Britanya'da da bu yöntemin yaygınlaşması I. Dünya Savaşı esnasında tahtta bulunan Majesteleri Kral V. George döneminde olmuştur. Bugünkü koleksiyonları incelediğimizde sivil halk ile saray arasındaki mektup trafiği ilk kez bu dönemde göze çarpmaya başlamaktadır. Savaşta akrabalarını kaybeden ailelere, çalışanlarını kaybeden kurumlara saraydan taziye mektupları gönderilerek zor durumda olan Britanya halkına hükümdarlarının desteği hatırlatılmıştır. Keza benzeri mektuplar cephedeki askeri birliklere de gönderilmiştir. Sarayın bu jesti halk tarafından olumlu karşılanmış olacak ki bu dönemden sonra ekseriyetle Noel zamanlarında olmak üzere halktan saraya Kraliyet Ailesi için önem arz eden günlerde mektuplar gitmeye başlamıştır.

Elbette her zaman tebrik niteliğinde kart ve mektuplar gönderilmedi. Sivil halkın saraya taleplerini ve yaşamlarından paylaşmak istediklerini de iletmesine aracı olan mektuplaşma geleneği, çokça kimsenin sorunlarına kraliyet eliyle çözüm bulmasını sağlamıştır. Majesteleri Kraliçe II. Elizabeth, 1990'lardaki bir belgeselde kendisine hitaben yazılan mektupların bazılarını bizzat açıp okuduğunu, bu sayede halkın kendisinden beklentilerini, duygu ve düşüncelerini öğrendiğini söylemiş ve yardımcı olabileceği konularda kişilerin taleplerini doğru makamlara ilettiğini aktarmıştı. Bu bağlamda kraliyetin halkın yanında ve ihtiyaçlarına cevap veriyor oluşunun altı çiziliyor ve güçlü bir imaj ortaya konuyor.

Yalnızca Birleşik Krallık'ta yaşayanlara değil, dünyanın neresinde olursa olsun saraya mektup yazan herkese sarayın iletişim ofisi tarafından geri dönüş yapılıyor. Bugün halen gazetelerde saraydan mektup alan kişilerin deneyimlerine dair haberlere rastlanabilir. Ben de bu heyecan verici mektup serüvenlerime başladığım ilk günden beri aynı heyecanı içimde

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taşıyorum. Tarihe damgasını vurmuş ve dünyaya yön vermiş bu kurumdan karşılık alabilmek elbette benim için de harika bir duygu. Hem manevi yönü hem de koleksiyon değeriyle öne çıkan bu uğraş kesinlikle çok keyifli. Ayrıca belirttiğiniz takdirde saray çeşitli kaynaklar göndererek sizlere kurumu tanıtıcı doküman da sağlıyor. Yazdığınız mektuba gelecek yanıtı beklemenin heyecanı ve ummadığınız bir anda işten veya okuldan eve dönüp sarayın armasıyla bezenmiş bir zarfla karşılaşmanın mutluluğu kesinlikle çok özel bir his. Bu temaslar sistemli bir uğraş ve bolca sabır gerektiriyor. Fakat bu arşivinizin gelecek nesillere, ait oldukları zamanı temsil eden birer elçi olacağını düşünmek bile tüm bu çabaya değdiğinin bir göstergesi.

Günümüzde elektronik posta ile çok daha kolay ve hızlı cevap alınabilmesine karşın ben de dâhil insanların mektup yazmayı tercih etmesi, o dokunun kendine has özelliğini sevmemizden kaynaklanıyor aslında. Ellerinizle üstüne eğilerek yazdığınız bir mektubun, çağlar boyu tarihte yer almış bu kurumun bir temsilcisi tarafından aynı özenle size cevaben geri gönderilmesi, dijital dönemde bile insanların bu geleneği usulüne uygun gerçekleştirme arzusunu gösteriyor. Dil özelliklerine de dikkat edildiği için dillerin yaşatılması açısından da yazılı birer kaynak teşkil etmesi bir başka faydası olarak önümüze çıkıyor.

Sonuç olarak Britanya'da monarşinin kendini zamana uygun yenileyerek kolayca erişilebilen bir yapıya bürünmesi ve bunu mektup iletişimi haricinde de etraflı programlarla pekiştirmesi kesinlikle büyük bir başarı örneği. Günümüzde şirketlerden devlet kurumlarına kadar tüm dünyada güdülen "kolay erişim" politikasının temellerini aslında bu gelenekten aldığı bile düşünülebilir. Kurumların şeffaflık ilkesini doğrudan doğruya halka ispat ettiği bu gibi iletişim metotlarının etkili olduğu açıkça ortada.

Interview with the cinema and theatre actress, Suna Yıldızoğlu[1] (Istanbul, 9 June 2021)

Amanda Yeşilbursa[2]

Amanda Yeşilbursa: As far as I know, you come from a very large family. What would you like to tell us about them?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: In fact, they're a bit crazy, they're completely crazy. Genetically, I can't think of one of them, that is, you know, "in the box", okay, that's neither the men or the women. Though the women are more intelligent, you know, and they have been, obviously, I've been going to the National Archives in London. Looking at my family, and now women have, you know, because the woman comes first. And sometimes the father is not even around his children. I don't know where he goes. And then I looked at my father's side as well. And it's the same, women in charge.

So women, to women have a particular thing about independence, they always have been very independent. That's me. I had to think about this example. I was brought up without realizing, as a feminist, standing up for myself, and trying to protect my rights and others. But now it's got to the stage where I mean, I'm not sure I can be standing open. It's become something different. I also believe we need each other. I think life's too short.

Amanda Yeşilbursa: What about your childhood? School?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: I was born in a village of one house. In the middle of the fields, it was my grandmother's house. And her cottage was supposed to be knocked down, but we had nowhere to go. So much time. So I spent most of my time outside until I was called in. It was really fun. So I spent most of my time up trees in fields in rivers, which was incredible. I am

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[1] Suna Yıldızoğlu (born in Bournemouth, UK, as Sonja Eady) is a British-Turkish actress based in Istanbul. She came to Turkey in 1974, and married Kayhan Yıldızoğlu, upon which she took on Turkish citizenship and the name, Suna. She played alongside Cüneyt Arkın in the film "Yıkılmayan Adam", with Zeki Alasya and Metin Akpınar in "Petrol Kralları", Kemal Sunal in "Gol Kralı", and Metin Belgin in "Sokaktaki Adam", among many others. In 1981, she won competed in the 17th Golden Orpheus Acting Contest and won the Özel Burgaz Award and the Journalists Award. In 1996, she won the award for Best Female Actor at the 18th SİYAD Turkish Cinema Awards for her role in "Sokaktaki Adam". Between 1978 and 2000, she took on roles in films, TV series, advertisements, as well as doing photo modelling and singing. In 2000, she left the stage and cinema to move to Australia for her children's education. Here, she set up a small business, "Alaturka", which was a success in promoting Turkey on a small-scale. Seven years later, she returned to Turkey, which she has called her "second homeland". She still resides in Istanbul.

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so glad that I had that upbringing. Nobody, particularly until I started school. Nobody really had much influence over me. There were no men around. Mum was very busy. She was incredibly disciplined. And everything that, things like that, huge punishments and then one day in May, I remember that day really well, she took me to write me, sign up for school. So yeah, I must have been about just four, so she was writing strongly up to the next week we went into the headmistress's office. I'd never seen anything like it. There were pictures and a piano. I was running, touching everything. I know, I was touching. I know that feeling even now, that was amazing. I was so shocked. And then apparently what happened was the teacher said I should start right now. She's just so curious. There's no need to waste time. Get her started right now. I started right then.

I loved until I was 11 years old. And then something went wrong. I've no idea to this day. I passed my 11-plus, and I went to grammar school in Brighton. And I was always top of the class. I was always top of the screen once you screen when I was in primary school and I went down to seventh. Yeah. So I had to climb up.

So that's, that's how, how I was brought up. So I was affected. And I wasn't, I wasn't afraid of people, it's just I didn't know how to be afraid. And then I started going to school. Living out in the country, you learn that there are dangerous people out there. So you have to be careful. And then when I knew I wasn't going to stay, because I used to sit in the trees and watch the planes from Hurn Airport. Hurn Airport had planes going to Guernsey and Jersey. But it was actually training pilots and testing shows with planes, new planes. So I saw, the things I witnessed were incredible. My mum, she used to work at the airport, and she, she had a lot of friends from different countries. So, I got more and more interested. And then my uncle married a Chinese woman. He was working for Readers Digest in Hong Kong. And he moved to China. So we have a Chinese woman in the family. And they brought us a present, a lamp, and it had Chinese writing on, and they told me what that meant. And I learned by heart, and I knew I knew …this is what I'm trying to say. I'm writing on windows, writing these signs on windows. And they said what are you doing? I said writing Chinese, and they said do you know Chinese? I said of course I know Chinese? And it was from then on that I was really interested in, getting more and more interested in different languages nothing I did was, I was all into it. *I'm* going to do this, *I love* dancing music. Yeah, so they kicked me out of ballet when I was 12 because I was too well-formed. I think what happens is sometimes you shouldn't try to do something. If the door closes, the door's closed. Let's find another door. You know, I'm not like that kind

of person who bangs on. Why should I waste time banging on the door? There's another…So Turkey was kind of like that?

Because I was, I'm outspoken, I'm, I don't know I, I was always told that you don't speak until spoken to, right? Yes. Children should be seen... And even if you try to explain a problem in a polite way with the school, for example, in the polite way… school, dinners, I couldn't eat pineapple, for example., So I went up to the chef and I said very kindly, I think, you know, my mum pays for these meals, so I think we can decide…I had to go and serve the younger children. For the rest of the time I was at that school, I had to sit there. For quite a while. When I came to, Turkey, it was a completely different thing. We went to weddings, danced as much as we like. Nobody said sit down. So I found a place to express myself. I did in, in Spain too, I spent a lot of time with gypsies, working the hotel, they used to go down to the beach in the evening, and they can tell us and we used to dance. It was incredible.

Actually, no, it was, there were two playgrounds one was for the boys so they could play football and cricket, and us girls with the young children so you couldn't run around. And I used to sneak into the boys' playground to play football and cricket and whatever. And they'd come out and send you back each time, and then we've got the other girls starting to come. So that was good. I think I have to change the world. So, I can change things at primary school, I can change the world!

Amanda Yeşilbursa: Would you say that it's easy to leave somewhere and it make a go in a new place, in a way, when you're outgoing? Why Turkey?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: Yeah, …because I fell in love with the Istanbul that I saw back then. It was incredible to me. I mean, I love history, and culture and this culture. We turned the radio on, there were French, English, Turkish, Italian, Spanish songs. We had to listen to pirate radios in my age if we wanted to listen to French songs. Radio Caroline, on the ships, Radio Luxembourg. Here? People spoke different languages. Everybody. I'm not talking about high society. Ordinary families. Then there was the *Kapalı Çarşı*, it was incredible. I loved going there.

And then when you go to the villages, when I started working, and we started hanging out in the villages. That was so different. But that culture was something you learn from, they use completely different things. And I didn't like the gap between the city, or what we say, the city-culture person — villager, I didn't like that gap because I thought that was rather ridiculous. Because the knowledge that a farmer or a villager has is so completely different

from ours. And it should be *added* to our knowledge. You can't just say oh, we know this. So you'd get lost. If you only had the city culture, you'd get lost. I was lucky I had both.

Amanda Yeşilbursa: Would you see yourself as a cultural ambassador in a way?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: Because I do have ridiculous amounts of information outside of Turkey. And sometimes, I think it's really a relief for Turkish people to know that they're not the only ones. Right? It's not just them…Yes, yeah. doing different, you know, showing people different views of the world different alternative viewpoints. I mean, what's the word? *Kışkırtıcı*? Protagonist? Oh, yeah, I am attacking this. But I like to think that I'm a protagonist in a positive way. Yes. I don't go out on the street, screaming, whatever, whatever. But I like to make brains, people's brains work in different ways. *Seviyorum işte!* You asked about my children? I have very difficult children! So, my fault I know isn't my fault. Because I'm, I made them think more. And we went live in Australia, right? Yeah. In 2000, I was so sick and tired. I just wanted to be *me* now.

When you're well known, I guess. You never know. When anybody wants to be friends with you. I mean, I went to Australia and I met this neighbour, a woman, we met in Sydney. Okay? She was trying to sell me….She was just being friendly, because that's what your friendship is. Yeah. So when you're well known, you don't know what people want. And I noticed that a lot of people wanted so much in every way, and I was so tired of giving…. And life doesn't work that way, it doesn't exist on a plan — Put your mask on and then first, before you put on… what I call it the cost to myself.

In terms of cultural relationships, because I thought when I was younger, I just could not understand from one minute why I'm, you know, doing things in the 80s. Okay, I was way out. Because I was singing as well. I couldn't understand for one minute why the government didn't want to use me for tourism. I mean, I spoke to now cities back then, because I had an opportunity. I've got a private company in England, we're doing a thing on my life, documentary. And I said, why don't I arranged for you guys to come to Turkey, we'll do a tour of Turkey. I'll sing. And I spoke to the Minister of Tourism and Culture, he was going to London for the Ottoman exhibition. So we met up with the guy there. And they agreed. So they said that they arranged the hotels, and for some reason, when asked, it was it just, you know, I don't know what happened. I have no idea.

Amanda Yeşilbursa: In one interview you said you were curious, like a permanent student. What would you like to say about that?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: I just love curiosity, oh, going there, go in there, do that, sure, that that's what it is. It's always curiosity. How does it work? How is it done? It's like, I painted, and I realized that I really didn't get much enjoyment out of painting pictures because they

weren't functional. So I started painting the house! You see knitting is functional, it's …a blanket.

Amanda Yeşilbursa: You've got cats as well.

Suna Yıldızoğlu: I love cats walking dogs I find very boring, because it's something I have to do. Cats are free … I've got three now. Fluff, my love. I love him. You know I've loved every single animal. Of course. I do. I do. This, this cat. Here he was. He's just; he comes to me in the morning. In the very beginning, it was a nice time to wake up at five in the morning. So not really. You know, I put the wall up again, I go back to sleep. But that's not the stage where I couldn't sleep. And I was going to bed about three o'clock in the morning. So an hour later I wasn't waking up. Then it was like a slap. And then a bite. So what I did was I said — Look, if you were a man, you'd be gone by now!

Amanda Yeşilbursa: You once said that it would be *ihanet*, betrayal, to leave Turkey.

Suna Yıldızoğlu: Yeah, in spite of everything, isn't it? And people. I mean, a lot of people didn't understand that. Because the difference between Turkish people, I find, is that when they go abroad, they dream of Turkey. I know. Not not because they don't like England. And I'm very lucky that I had my education there. I'm I feel very lucky for everything I have done. But I don't dream of England!. I mean, at the moment, I'm dreaming of South America! But I can't. I left in 2000. That's fine. That was my own decision. I wanted to take, bring my children up in a different way, et cetera, et cetera. But now, it's like, come on, you know, you're there for so many years. You've had good times, really good time. You've got loads of good friends. Really nice friends I would never want to leave, you know. And how can I get on a plane and go sit somewhere nice and say..? No, you can't do that. No, you can't. It's well…Yeah, it's just I mean, obviously, Turkish people dream, going to America, someone to leave that view is quite difficult to understand, in a way. But… I wouldn't dream. I think I see what you mean.

I never thought, I was I was never taught to think I was anything special. When I started, as soon as you're in the cinema, and people were saying, oh, you're so beautiful. I never thought about beauty being something special. And this age. I treat this age unlike myself. When you know, it's a good thing. But I wasn't aware that I still believe that we were absolutely irrelevant. Each individual is actually irrelevant, but at the same time, so, so relevant. And life is just one paradox. I don't know where we are, you still have a human being under those electron microscopes, and it's a village. This is a city. This is a city, then you look up. What do you think … maybe I'm just a cell of something? Not me personally, but the world. There might be a gallstone in some other huge entity, right? And again, it's very disturbing. The gallstone is causing problems, you know? Got to have this out! So it's, I think it's absolutely ridiculous to think that you're anything special. You're special to people

close to you, especially to the people you connect with. When I go, my kids are going to be sad for a while. But that's going to pass. Is it so important? I mean, if you're going to be like Hitler! I'd rather not being in history books. A lot of the people in history books… and again, it doesn't matter what you write about. Here, to be a hero, you have to be a mean boss, if you can't, you can't be nice. So I think that's what Atatürk did, he created the balance.

Amanda Yeşilbursa: You have said before that Atatürk was a true leader. What would you like to say about that?

Suna Yıldızoğlu: He had to do things that I'm sure that he didn't want to do. And I'm sure that making those decisions must have been hard, yet necessary. I watched the film *Mustafa*? Did you like *Mustafa*? I loved it. I cried. And then I come here. What do you when you make a film like that kind I said, What's the matter? It was a brilliant film. I said I cannot crime is showing Ataturk in that way. What way? I said he was a human being that makes him greater. Well, he did because he wasn't a god. He wasn't a prophet. He was a human being with human feelings, that what, that is why it makes it incredible. Incredible. People don't understand that the more you make somebody's superhero, a superhero; you take away their powers, if you understand that it's just a human being who has to make awful decisions for which people are going to die for. That's terrible. But if you know, he just had such an incredible idea of the future, and foresight, science, he had incredible foresight. He knew the people so well; he knew what was going to happen. It happened. It happened. You look at history. I mean, way back like 2000 years ago, they would have made him a prophet! Because the things he said came true. But it's not prophecy. He was. Have you if you haven't infamous, your fate information all the time. You're not aware of this is what I find really exciting is the fact that there's a library in my head. And sometimes it comes up with some incredible things. But I believe that he was one of those men, when he, he had all this information, and he was aware of it and knew how to use it. This is really important. This is not prophecies. It's just logic. But this is what happens in this situation. This is what happened. It's intelligence and logic, both so important in life. Feelings are also important. So, they definitely like a leader. Even though, he didn't want to be one. He didn't want statues; he just wanted to do his job. I understand. I just want to do my job. I don't want to be famous. I don't want this. I don't want that. I don't want special attention. I want to be me. He was, he wasn't a kind of God, as far as I've read. And I've read so much. I really don't get, he just wanted to be himself. And he wanted to do, I mean, if you look at his life, he's legendary. Incredible and he wouldn't have had time for women. He had to get married because he's supposed to get married. You know, they want him to marry. But there's no time for marriage. There's not that's like me now. There's a tiny relationship. Too much to do. I want to read. I want to think I don't. I mean, I get annoyed when I'm in the kitchen now. And I said to my son the other day, he doesn't ask me to do anything. But this is thing I'm like, I'm not

Italian Mother, you gotta cook for your baby. And what am I doing? I don't want to do. I don't want to cook. I just want to think I want to share. That's why, I thought, think he had success. He wanted to love. I believe he wanted to know, I mean, there was that romantic side of his letters. But he put his country, his aim before everything. Thank God! Well, I think, I mean… Turkey. So who would it be? The British, the Italians, the Greeks. They'd have a bit of *İç Anadolu* ….I mean I love the Aegean! If I was Turkish, I'd be Aegean! I love the East. They're so nice, so polite. I mean I don't know what they're like in their houses. That's not my business. And so helpful. And so kind. I felt I've never felt anything *yargılayacı*… judge - judgmental in the East.

    Amanda Yeşilbursa: Thank you very much for your time.

    Suna Yıldızoğlu: Thank you.

Interview with Fethiye International Group (FIG)[1]

Gülşen YEĞEN[2]

Gülşen YEĞEN: Could you introduce yourself, please?

Ann-Marie CLARK: My name is Anne Marie. I'm from Edinburgh, Scotland. I've lived in Turkey for nearly six years. And I live here, okay. I previously worked in finance, and I worked in banking. And I decided with my husband to retire early. So we left Scotland in October 2015 to move to Fethiye. And shortly after that became involved in the charity, and we've met lots of friends, and we now run the charity with our friends. And we work in the shop, we do coffee mornings and we raise money to help Turkish children.

Gülşen YEĞEN: When and how was FIG founded?

Ann-Marie CLARK: FIG was founded many years ago, I think nearly 20 years ago by an English lady. We first became aware of FIG when my husband, Norman, had had a photograph in a calendar competition for FIG and he won. So, we, that's how we found out about FIG. And initially we just worked in the shop as volunteers. I am, but no, like I said, we run the charity with our friends.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What is the purpose of FIG?

Ann-Marie CLARK: The purpose of FIG is to raise money by selling second hand clothing and household items. And we use that money in conjunction with the setup who govern the charity, and to help local schools and where they have needs that their budget can't meet. We like to raise money to help specifically with educational needs, but we also sometimes help

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[1] Fethiye International Group or FIG is a group of volunteers that run a charity that raises money for the benefit of local children. In 2003, a group of people who had adopted Fethiye as their home wanted to give something back to the community within which they now lived. A mix of foreign and Turkish residents met to discuss the possibilities and decided to do something to help the local children. In January 2004 FIG was born. Over the years FIG has grown from a weekly book swap to an active part of the community. Today's FIG includes a Charity shop, weekly coffee mornings, regular craft fairs, other fundraising events and much more. FIG operates legally under the banner of FETAV (Fethiye Tourism, Promotion, Education, Culture and Environment Foundation). Contact details:
http://www.figfethiye.com/, https://www.facebook.com/figfethiye/, figfethiye@gmail.com,
Photograph: The Management Team of Fethiye International Group (FIG). The names from left to right are Norman Clark, Aimee Lonsdale, Linda Jones and Ann-Marie Clark.
[2] Emerita, Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal University. Director of Fethiye Tazelenme University. E-mail: gulyegen@gmail.com

children with some medical problems. And but the sole purpose is to raise money to help underprivileged children. Yes.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What are the activities of FIG?

Ann-Marie CLARK: The activities of FIG are the shop. We have the shop open at the moment, three days per week due to the pandemic. We've been very careful. We also try to have coffee mornings once a month. Again, that's been impacted by the pandemic. And we're hoping to have one in July. We also, in the past, have had craft fairs where local Turkish crafters and all other nationalities can hire a table to sell their handcrafted goods. And we get the money from the sale of the tables to help FIG, yes.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What is FIG's vision?

Ann-Marie CLARK: FIG's vision? Yeah, I would say is to continue to operate the shop to try to help as many children as possible. And we pay for some school bus fares. We also do some bursaries. We would like to take on, maybe next year, another school project. And in the past, we've done a chess room. We've done security safety railings in a school. So we would just like to continue to be able to help with some larger projects. Once, the pandemic makes it possible.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What does FIG think about the future?

Ann-Marie CLARK: At the moment we have no big projects planned. We really just want to try to protect the shop. So, if we don't make enough money to pay the rent, we would have to close the charity. So that, at the moment, is our main focus. To just keep going and hope that in the future, things in general will improve and we can go back into projects again.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What does FIG think about the relations between Turkey and England?

Ann-Marie CLARK: I think personally, and as a charity, we have, we have very good relationships between our British volunteers and Turkish volunteers. And we, we are recognized in the community as doing something valuable and important for Turkish children. So, I think we have good relationships.

Aimee LONSDALE: My name is Amy Lonsdale. And I've lived in Turkey now for seven years. Previously to that when I worked in the UK, I managed a sales office. So I've worked in sales for quite a long time.

Gülşen YEĞEN: What do you think about the relations between Turkey and England?

Aimee LONSDALE: I think they're very good. We have a lot of different people, which you mean, as supporting the charity? Yeah, we have a lot of people that come in from many different national… nationalities. And yeah, I think it's okay.

Gülşen YEĞEN: Thank you very much for your time.

Ann-Marie CLARK: Thank you.

Winrow, Gareth.[1] Whispers across Continents: In Search of the Robinsons, (Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing, 2019). 288pp. ISBN-13: 978-1445691398.

Çiğdem Balım[2]

Whispers across Continents is the story of a family spread over England, India, Ottoman Empire, Germany and the United States, and the period covered is from the 19th century to early 20th. It starts with Spencer Robinson (1838-1889), who was a tenant farmer from East Keal in Lincolnshire. He migrated to India to become a tea farmer and also worked on the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway. After the death of his first wife, in 1880 he married Hannah Rodda (1854-1948), who was raised in the slums of London's East End. Their son Ahmet (Peel Harold) Robinson (1889-1965) or Ahmet 'Robenson' was born in Bengal, lived in the Ottoman Empire and died in New York. He was one of the first goalkeepers for the Galatasaray football team, and he is also known as the person who introduced scouting and basketball to the Ottoman Empire. The German connection of the story is through Gertrude Eisenman, an 'illegitimate 'daughter of Hannah before she met Spencer. Later Gertrude became a cult figure in Germany as a racing motor-cyclist and a car rally driver in late Wilhelmine Germany.

Hannah plays the central role in the family history. Apparently very little was known about her real life, and what was known was misrepresented or distorted. For example, her son Ahmed claimed that she had some aristocratic connection, which could not be further from the truth. In fact, the real life of Hannah is much more interesting and adventurous than having royal blood. After her husband's death in 1889, she returned to England from India to run a superior boarding house on Regency Square in Brighton. In 1891, she converted to Islam, adopted the name Fatima and married a supposed Afghan warlord named Dr Gholab Shah at Quilliam's mosque in Liverpool, and migrated to Constantinople with her new husband and children. Unfortunately, her husband was actually a charlatan Indian oculist (known as Eliahie Bosche), who used all her savings and threaten to use violence against her. Trapped in a foreign land, Hannah put to use her relationship with Abdullah Quilliam, who had overseen her conversion to Islam. In 1892, she wrote a letter to the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Ahmed Cevat Pasha, mentioning Quilliam, who at the time was trying to establish a close relationship with the sultan. She also wrote to the Office of the Prime minister in London. She was able to secure a divorce from Bosche and gain financial support from the Sultan Abdulhamid II. After all she was a destitute foreign Muslim woman with four small

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[1] Professor Gareth Winrow worked for twenty years in Istanbul teaching international relations. He is a now a part-time tutor at Oxford University and an independent researcher.

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children- a daughter Adile (Maud), sons Yakup (Spencer Bernard), Abdurrahman (Eugene B.) and Ahmet (Peel Harold), and had to be saved. Hannah's daughter was placed in the household of Mustafa Zeki Pasha, the Field Marshal of the Imperial Arsenal of Ordnance and Artillery, who was also in charge of the military schools in the Empire[3]. Three of Hannah's sons, including Ahmed, would receive free education at the Kuleli military college. But she was unhappy to have sons in the military and later, the boys were transferred to the Galatasaray High School. In 1894, Hannah married Ahmed Bahri, one of the sultan's young military officers who would shortly distinguish himself in the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897, and had a son by him (Fevzi). But I must stop summarising the book and not spoil it for the readers, for at times it reads like an exciting adventure/mystery fiction.

What is just as fascinating as the history of the family is the socio-economic history that Winrow provides to enable the reader to place the characters in time and place. The reader learns of rural England in the mid-nineteenth century in some detail, as well as the colonial history of tea plantations in the Darjeeling hill stations, the birth of the Darjeeling Himalayan Railway, and about the lives of the British in India. We also learn about the Ottoman Empire and society before and after the WWI. We read about the first matches of the Galatasaray football club, introduction of scouting and basketball in Turkey (and even efforts to bring YMCA to Turkey), and the introduction of female motorbike and car racing in Europe. The book is the result of meticulous research. Winrow has used official documents, met surviving family members, and travelled to the countries/places where the different members of the family lived. In an impartial tone, he gives us the results of his findings, weaving a fascinating story. The family trees and photographs in the book help to bring the characters to life.

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[3] "Sabiha, a daughter of Mustafa Zeki Pasha born in 1895, would later marry Ali Kemal, the great-grandfather" of the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. (121).

Bein, Amit. Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020). 295pp. ISBN-13: 978-1316647981.

Çiğdem Balım[1]

Almost every student of the history of the Middle East has read David Fromkin's 1989 book A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. Fromkin's view about the new Republic of Turkey at the end of WWI reflects the common thinking among many historians and political scientists: with the declaration of the Republic (1923) and the drawing of the new borders, Turkey distanced itself from the Middle East and moved to a Western-oriented and passive foreign policy stand. Amit Bein sets out to prove that on the contrary the new Republic was very much involved in Middle East politics and in the reshaping of the post-Ottoman borders. Using primary sources, including archives and newspapers in Turkish, Arabic, English and other languages, with maps and photographs, Bein gives the readers an almost day-to-day account of the Turkish foreign policy between two wars. However, the book is not only about post-Ottoman Turkey and its efforts to survive, to gain respect and independence, but it is also about the policies of the colonial powers and how deeply they were always involved in the Middle East even after WWII, and the fate of the minorities-the Kurds, the Armenians and the Assyrians.

The book has seven chapters. Chapter 1 ("Not-So-Distant Neighbor") gives the book's main argument that the interactions between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours throughout the interwar period were interest-driven. They were carefully planned and structured. In Chapter 2 ("Degrees of Separation") Bein illustrates that an active revisionist interest in northern Syrian and Mesopotamian territories was inherent in the founding charter of the Turkish state - the National Pact, and it was the motivation behind the Republic's seeking of territorial gains in northern Syria and Iraq. Throughout the interwar period Turkey tried to modify its borders and this was a part of a well-thought out plan. The new Republic did make its Arab neighbours and the colonial powers anxious especially after it was able to manipulate the Alexandretta (Hatay) crisis in the late 1930s to its advantage and annexed the province. In Chapter 3 ("Ties That Bind"), Bein gives a detailed account of Turkey's diplomatic contacts with its Middle Eastern neighbours in the interwar period. Among these are the visits to Turkey of the Hashemite brothers (King Faysal of Iraq (1931) and Amir

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Abdullah of Transjordan (1937), both of whom sought the blessings of Atatürk in pursuing their conflicting political ambitions), and of Reza Shah of Iran in 1934. There are stories tied to each one of these visits but the one about the route of Reza Shah's journey is especially interesting, and illustrates how planned the movements of Turkish leaders were. Atatürk insisted that the Shah enter Turkey in a motorcade on a bumpy road across the common border, rather than the usual route of traveling via Iraq. In later chapters we learn that Atatürk's insistence on this route was in preparation for a trade route to Trabzon that he had in mind. In the same chapter, after much negotiating with the Middle Eastern neighbours and the colonising powers (France and Britain), in 1937, a multilateral treaty between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan is signed. Bein also explains why Egypt opted out of the treaty. Chapter 4 ("Great Expectations") is about the promotion of economic relations between the Middle Eastern neighbours, which include transportation projects like the Tabriz-Trabzon road and railway links to Iraq and Iran to facilitate the movement of merchants and goods as well as tourists. Chapter 5 ("The Turkish Model") is devoted to how in a planned and deliberate fashion; the Turkish leaders presented their country as a model to the rest of the Middle East. For example Miss Turkey (later Miss Universe Keriman Halis) was sent as an emissary to Egypt, as a symbol of Turkish modernity, and was hailed by Egyptian feminists as embodying the emancipation of Muslim women. The chapter contains interesting details about the Kemalist reforms including education, women's rights and legal reforms, but more importantly about how these were promoted internationally in a planned, structured and step by step fashion using the media among other means. Chapter 6 ("Strolling Through Istanbul") describes the efforts to establish Turkey as a major transit route between Asia and Europe, visits by friendship delegations and tourists. Unfortunately all take place under the shadow of the beginnings of WWII and are cut short with its start. The last chapter ("A Distant Neighbour") examines the regional and global conjuncture Turkey found itself in after World War II. This was a time when Turkey was worried about its existing borders and had to struggle to keep out of the War.

Bein concludes that Turkey's recent moves in the Middle East are not "neo-Ottomanist" as sold to the masses in a populist move, but the continuation of a century-long foreign policy, with the difference that the former was self-restrained and cautious, and not ideologically driven. Bein's extensive and insightful research, written in a vivid and enticing style is a 'must read' for everyone interested in the Middle East, Turkey and the role of the colonial powers, especially Britain, in the area.