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Tuğrul Keskin*

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Giriş

Takdim

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Tüm dünyada hızla yayılan Covid-19 salgını, 2019 yılı sonundan itibaren akademik çalışmaları ve yayıncılık faaliyetlerini etkisi altına aldı. Bölge Çalışmaları alanında sık kullanılan yöntemler olan saha araştırması, çoğu zaman yüz yüze görüşmeyi gerektiren derinlemesine mülakat gibi yöntemler bu dönemde daha az kullanılabilir hale geldi. Akademik çalışmalar, toplantılar ve yayınlar süratle dijital ortama çekildi, internet üzerinden yürütülen akademik çalışma ve yayınlar arttı. Diğer taraftan salgın sürecinde birçok yayıncı dijital arşivlerini ve veri tabanlarını ücretsiz olarak araştırmacıların kullanımına açtı. Bu sayede daha önce ulaşılmaması zahmetli ve maliyetli olan birçok arşiv belgesi, kitap ve makale erişilebilir oldu. İnternet, birçok açıdan yayıncıların ve akademisyenlerin kurtarıcısı haline geldi.

Bölge çalışmalarına yeni, eleştirel ve orijinal bir bakış açısı getirmeyi hedefleyen dergimiz, dijital imkanlardan da faydalanarak akademik kalite, bilimsel yayın etiği ve çağın gerektirdiği yüksek standartlar çerçevesinde tüm içeriğini online ortamda açık erişimde akademik camiaya ulaştırmaktadır. Küresel salgın dolayısıyla önemi ve etkisi hızla artan dijital yayıncılık ve açık erişim faaliyetleri yayın kurulumuzun öncelikleri arasındadır.

CJAS'ta yayımlanan tüm materyal, Kapadokya Üniversitesinin kurumsal akademik arşivinde tutulmakta, çeşitli tanımlayıcıların yardımıyla tüm içeriğin internet üzerinde erişilebilir ve görünür olması sağlanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede ilk sayıdan itibaren birçok endekste taranma süreci başlamıştır. Yüksek kaliteli akademik yayın standartlarının sürdürülmesi ile *CJAS*'ın içeriğinin akademik etkisi ve eriştiği kitle artacaktır.

Bu sayımızda

CJAS'ın 2020 yılındaki bu ilk sayısı, tarihi konulara ağırlık veriyor ve dünyanın farklı bölgelerinden siyasi ve kültürel meseleleri gündeme taşıyor. Michael M. Gunter'in makalesi, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin (ÇHC) ilk kurulduğu yıllarda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Çin arasında yaşanan gergin dönemi inceliyor ve ABD'nin ÇHC'yi 1979 yılında resmen tanımaya kadar geçen süreci değerlendiriyor. Nükhet Okutan Davletov, Hakasya'da keşfedilen ve Taştık kültürüne ait ölüm maskelerini araştırdığı makalesinde bu maskeleri yeniden yorumlayarak Türkoloji literatürünün gündemine taşıyor. Melih Demirtaş'ın Sovyet sonrası dönemde Başkurdistan Cumhuriyeti'ni incelediği makalesi, bu ülkede Rusya tarafından yürütülen siyasi elit yönetim sürecini yorumlayarak "Rus Oryantalizmi"nin ötekileştirme çabalarını okuyucuların dikkatine sunuyor. Tang Shan ve Jia Haitao'nun kaleme aldığı makale, Britanya İmparatorluğu'nun sömürgeci yayılım sürecinde Hindistan'ın yerini ve Hindistan tarafından sağlanan insan kaynağının önemini inceliyor.

Bu sayımızda araştırma makalelerinin yanında görüş yazıları ve yayın değerlendirmelerine de yer veriyoruz. Andrew Alexander'in Bölge Çalışmaları alanına getirdiği eleştirel yaklaşımın yanı sıra, son iki yılda Afrika, Merkezî Asya ve Ortadoğu üzerine yayımlanmış veya Türkçe'ye çevrilmiş bulunan önemli kitaplar, Ayşe Yılmaz, Sümeyra Demiralp ve Aykut Turan tarafından kapsamlı bir incelemeye ve değerlendirmeye tabi tutuluyor.

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Research Article

US Refusal to Recognize China (1949–1979)

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Abstract: This paper scrutinizes why the United States (US) refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for three decades after its foundation by Mao Zedong in 1949. The traditional national character influenced the position of the US toward the PRC, especially in light of its abhorrence of communism and its doctrine to contain its spread. For both domestic and foreign reasons, the US argued that China was not a responsible member of the world community, and thus deserved no recognition. For more than two decades, the US applied political, economic and diplomatic pressure on the United Nations to refuse the PRC the right to represent China. The situation only began to change when the Nixon administration realized how its non-recognition policy was becoming increasingly outdated and self-defeating, given China’s growing importance in international affairs. This paper will use a variety of primary and secondary sources to analyze the US policy of non-recognition of the PRC, providing the background for a better comprehension of contemporary Sino-American relations.

Keywords: People’s Republic of China, US foreign policy, US-China relations, Cold War politics

ABD'nin Çin'i tanımayı reddetmesi (1949-1979)

Öz: Bu çalışma Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'ni (ÇHC) Mao Zedong tarafından 1949 yılında kuruluşunu takip eden otuz yıl boyunca tanımayı neden reddettiğini incelemektedir. ABD'nin geleneksel milli karakteri, bu ülkenin ÇHC'ye karşı olan tutumunu etkilemiştir. ABD, Çin'in dünya toplumunun sorumlu bir ferdi olmadığını, bu nedenle tanınmayı hak etmediğini iddia etmiştir. Yirmi yıldan daha uzun bir süre boyunca ABD Birleşmiş Milletler nezdinde ÇHC'nin Çin'i temsil etmemesini amaçlayarak üye ülkeler üzerinde siyasi, iktisadi ve diplomatik baskı oluşturmuştur. Bu durum Nixon iktidarı zamanında Çin'in dünya siyasetindeki artan önemin paralel olarak "tanımama" politikasının miadını doldurduğunun ve ABD'ye zarar verdiğinin anlaşılmasıyla değişmeye başlamıştır. Bu çalışma, birincil ve ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden ABD'nin ÇHC'yi tanımama politikasını analiz ederek günümüzde ABD-Çin ilişkilerinin daha iyi kavranmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti, ABD dış politikası, ABD-Çin ilişkileri, Soğuk Savaş siyaseti

Introduction

Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. To fully understand why the United States refused to recognize the PRC for almost three decades, it would be useful to first clarify the background role of the US national style (national character) (Hook and Spanier 2019; Hofstadter 1965; Dallek 1983) and its Open Door Policy toward China, which the US considered a specific extension of its general moralistic national style. For most of its history, the US national style was characterized by isolationism in terms of its political entanglements in foreign policy, along with a self-righteous, almost missionary emphasis on its own exceptionalism, and an aversion to power politics (Fairbank and Goldman 2006; Spence 1990). War, of course, constituted a necessary exception to such isolation, but as soon as peace returned, the national style demanded a return to the traditional stance of political detachment toward the rest of the world. Only the changed international balance of power after World War II would bring an end to this traditional state of affairs and force the US into a more normal involvement in world affairs.

Nevertheless, its traditional national style long continued to influence its foreign policy positions, and compelled the US to take what it considered to be a morally appropriate position toward the PRC, especially in light of its abhorrence of communism and its recently declared Doctrine aimed at containing its spread (Kennan 1951). More particularly, its Open Door Policy toward China declared by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, stressed that other states should guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and that no state should have exclusive trading rights in any part of China (Bemis 1965, 484–485). Thus, the US believed that it brought a particularly moralistic understanding of foreign policy in general, while its Open Door Policy in particular stamped it as a special friend of China, unlike the other foreign powers that strove to profit at the expense of China.

Given the shock of the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 after having long recognized the Nationalists (Kuomintang/KMT) as the official government of China, and its fear of world Communist expansion after World War II, the US hesitated in recognizing the new PRC. The success of the domestic political efforts in the US of the so-called “China Lobby” to denounce the US Truman administration for supposedly selling Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) “down the river” to the Communists and the lobby’s demands that the US continue to recognize the now exiled Nationalist government in Taiwan also played a significant role. This initial US policy decision became locked into position given the bitter US experience with China during the Korean War (1950–1953). Thus, for both domestic and foreign reasons, the US argued that “Red China” or “The Peiping Regime” was not a responsible member of the World community and so did not deserve recognition – a policy that the US had used for more than 20 years to block the PRC representing China in the UN. This policy only began to change when the Nixon administration realized how its non-recognition policy was becoming increasingly outdated and self-defeating, given China’s growing importance in international affairs. The US finally recognized the PRC in 1979.

Interestingly, the US had earlier followed a somewhat analogous path towards the eventual recognition the Soviet Union. Due to the so-called “Red Scare” after World War I and the very conservative 1920s – somewhat similar to the 1950s – recognition of the Soviet Union became a very controversial issue and did not occur until 1933 (Bemis 1965). This paper will use a variety of primary and secondary sources to analyse the US policy of non-recognition of the PRC, which can be considered important in providing a background for a better comprehension of contemporary Sino-American relations.

Recognition in international law

Recognition, in political terms, means simply the willingness to deal with another state (Malanczuk 1997). However, it can be one of the most difficult areas in international law due to its many confusing political and legal aspects. Often, it is political rather than legal factors that influence the process. Adding additional complexity to the mixture, a distinction must be made between the recognition of a state and the recognition of a government. Recognizing a state means that the entity in question is deemed to possess the criteria of statehood, namely possessing a population, territory and the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states. On the other hand, the recognition of a government requires it to be seen as in effective control of the state. The US never questioned the existence of China as a state, and indeed has always recognized China as a state. What the US questioned was who was governing China.

The US has often used the recognition of governments as a sign of approval rather than as a mere statement of fact. Thus, for example, the US often declined to recognize Latin American governments it did not approve of, as is still the case today with the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. As in the case of the PRC, US policy towards the recognition of governments tends to be in diametric contrast to its long-time ally, Britain, which will usually recognize any government that is in actual control of a state's territory, whether or not it approves of that government. Thus, Britain recognized the PRC as the government of China almost immediately on January 6, 1950, while the US continued to recognize the Nationalists based in Taiwan as the government of China, right up until January 1, 1979. Although the US position was purely a political, and seemed to contradict the legal facts, there is no rule in international law that mandated the British position or prohibited that of the US.

Immediate origins

The US became involved in World War II to a significant degree due to its support of the Republic of (Nationalist) China against Japanese aggression. While this narrative lies clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it serves to explain why the US was so shocked, and even felt somehow betrayed, when the Communists took control of China a few years after the successful conclusion of the war.

Although the US recognized Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists as the legal government of China during the war, some US officials felt that the Nationalists lacked the necessary competence and were too corrupt to put up an effective fight against the Japanese (Schaller 2002; Dallek 1979; Feis 1953; Tuchman 1971). US General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, for example, maintained that it was in the

interest of the US to establish relations with the Communists to combat the Japanese enemy more effectively. The Dixie Mission to Yen-an in 1944 was the first official US contact with the Communists, comprising such Foreign Service officials as John S. Service, military personnel, weather specialists and translators, who engaged in successfully interactions with the highest level Communist leaders. Mao, for example, quizzed the Service closely about the position of the US toward his movement, and even declared that, “even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our program to object to” (Schaller 2002, 92).

However, other US officials, such as Generals Claire Lee Chennault and Albert Coady Wedemeyer, as well as Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, strongly opposed cooperation with the Communists, and their position prevailed. For example, Ambassador Hurley pressed the Communists to disarm and accept a subordinate role to the Nationalists, being either ignorant of Chiang’s bloody purge of the Communists during their supposed coalition in 1927, or confident that Mao would somehow willingly be led to the slaughter. Privately, Hurley insultingly referred to Mao as “Moose Dung” and Zhou Enlai as “Joe N. Lie.” (Schaller 2002, 94). During an impromptu visit to Yen-an in November 1944, Hurley astonished his Chinese hosts by shouting out an American Indian war cry while alighting from his plane, and other weird outbursts followed. The Communists began to refer to the US ambassador as “the clown”, and Hurley would eventually resign in November 1945. In a precursor to the conspiracy theories of the so-called China Lobby discussed below, the US ambassador ludicrously denounced the “Hydra-headed direction” of US China policy directed by the State Department officials who “sided with the Communist armed party ... against American policy” (Schaller 2002, 103).

In December 1945, US president Harry S. Truman sent a new representative to China to mediate between the contending sides – the most respected General George C. Marshall. Given the enormity of the problems, the growing strength of the Communists and the obvious US preference for the Nationalists, Marshall’s mediation attempt failed (Kurtz-Phelan 2018; Baijia 1998; Zhongyun 2003). The renewed struggle between the Communists and Nationalists soon resumed, but by 1949, the Communists’ will had prevailed, while the Nationalists fled into exile to Taiwan. The US was now faced with a completely new conundrum – who would they now recognize as the government of China.

US White Paper

To attempt to explain US policy and to respond to the domestic claims against the Truman administration that it had lost China, or worse, Secretary of State

Dean Acheson oversaw the publication of the China White Paper (Acheson 1969, 302–307). In this important document of more than 1,000 pages, Acheson attempted to explain that the Communists had won the civil war due to their superior abilities, power and morale, and not through perfidious US support: “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States” (Acheson 1969, 303). However, the Secretary of State added sarcastically that this obvious conclusion “was unpalatable to believers in American omnipotence, to whom every goal unattained is explicable only by incompetence or treason” (Acheson 1969).

Acheson also advised that the US should wait “until the dust settles” (Acheson 1969, 306) before recognizing the new government. Interestingly, Dean Rusk, the next secretary of state, under a Democratic president following the Eisenhower years (1953–1961), agreed with Acheson: “After Mao succeeded on the mainland, we flirted with the idea of recognizing Communist China ... But our prevailing attitude was, Let’s wait and see how the new Chinese Communist government acts before we grant recognition” (Rusk 1990, 158). Unfortunately, as the civil war was drawing to its Communist victory, Mao began to speak and write more negatively about the US (Schaller 2002, 117), accusing the few US diplomats remaining in China of organizing an “imperialist conspiracy” to foment opposition toward his new government. Apparently, the Chinese officials felt “that the continued presence of US diplomats, businessmen and missionaries in Chinese cities encouraged counterrevolutionaries.” In his memoirs, Acheson declared that, “the treatment of Angus Ward, our Consul General in Mukden, by the Chinese Communists and their attitude toward our rights and Chinese obligations were precluding recognition” (Acheson 1969, 340). The Chinese charged the US consular staff with espionage, holding him and his staff under house arrest for several months, or according to Acheson, “for over a year” (Acheson 1969, 344). However, in a road not taken, a few months later in May 1949 some close aides of Mao invited US Ambassador John Leighton Stewart, who had remained in Nanjing despite its capture by the Communists, to Beijing for talks. Although the ambassador wanted to go, President Truman, fearing damaging domestic Republican criticism, and citing the ill treatment of US consul Angus Ward in Mukden, ordered that “under no circumstances” (Schaller 2002, 117) should the ambassador accept the invitation.

Shortly afterwards, Mao declared that, henceforth, the new China would lean to one side in foreign affairs, that is, toward the Soviet Union. At the end of 1949 he journeyed outside of China for the first time in his life to visit Moscow where he entered into painstaking negotiations with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet

leader. The two communist leaders finally signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship on February 14, 1950, which, of course, in US eyes was a further reason not to immediately recognize the new regime. In January 1950, the new Chinese government announced that it would seize the consular property of foreign governments that had not yet recognized it. In a tit-for-tat move, the US froze all Chinese assets in the United States following its entry into the Korean War in November 1950, while a month later the PRC seized all US assets in China totalling, \$196.8 million (Redick 1973, 728).

The Korean War¹

By the beginning of 1950, Truman seemed to be divesting the US of any further interest in defending Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, announcing that the US would not intervene in the event of any expected PRC attack against Taiwan. However, Truman quickly reversed this decision when communist North Korea suddenly attacked non-communist South Korea on June 25, 1950. As already mentioned, the resulting, bitterly fought Korean War (1950–1953) turned what might have been a much shorter period of diplomatic estrangement into a permanently locked US policy of non-recognition that would last for almost 30 years.

The US immediately saw this invasion as an example of the Munich analogy when the West had appeased Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia only to whet the aggressor's appetite for more. Not responding to the Korean attack would lead to larger wars to the detriment of the West, and so Truman used the US influence in the UN to have it grant permission to respond. Within mere days, the US president committed his country to the defence of South Korea, to the protection of Taiwan, and to the increase in aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina. Mao believed that the US intended to surround and even overthrow the newly established PRC, and so as US-led UN forces approached the Chinese border, Chinese troops massively intervened, dealing the US its worse military defeat in history until the US troops managed to stabilize the situation at the original border. The bloody stalemate lasted until an Armistice Agreement was finally signed on July 27, 1953.

Both sides suffered considerable losses. The US lost more than 54,000 soldiers, while Chinese fatalities exceeded 180,000, including Mao's eldest son, Mao Anying. The two Koreas suffered even more, with a combined 352,000 deaths. The US had the UN pass a resolution condemning China as the aggressor in Korea, while the Chinese launched a mass anti-US propaganda "Resist

¹ For background, see Casey 2008; Merrill 1989.

America, Aid Korea” campaign among its civilians. Although details of the war fall beyond the scope of this article, the fallout from the Korean War for many years served to prevent the US’ recognition of the PRC. As Dean Rusk, Kennedy and Johnson’s secretary of state (1961–1969), wrote much later: “Many people, myself included, toyed with the idea of recognizing the People’s Republic of China in the late 1940s, but that idea died on November 26, 1950, when tens of thousands of Chinese ‘volunteers’ poured across the Yalu River to join battle with MacArthur’s Eighth Army ... The Korean War hardened American attitudes toward Peking” (Rusk 1990, 284).

The China lobby²

The China Lobby was a broadly based, well-financed network of domestic right-wing Republicans and private citizens, as well as Nationalist Chinese officials, who used demagogic tactics to influence the US political system’s support of Chiang Kai-shek’s recapture of China. In concert with the more widely based, character-slandering and red baiting anti-communism of US Republican senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Rovere 1959; Purifoy 1976), the China Lobby long enjoyed considerable success in influencing US foreign policy toward China, and preventing the US from recognizing its Communist government.

Through a multitude of activities, the China Lobby benefitted from the US’ fear of the spread of communism and the belief that it had been aided by inept or even treasonous elements within the US government. Indeed, many Americans had come to associate Chiang Kai-shek’s regime with efforts to establish democracy in China, and Chiang’s conversion to Christianity furthered this sympathy. Americans also viewed Chiang’s defeat as a victory for its arch Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union. Important right-wing elements in the Republican Party supported the China Lobby, largely as a political tactic against the Democratic Party of President Harry S. Truman and the members of his administration who had been associated with US China policy when the Communist had won. The China Lobby came to develop an extraordinary ability to discredit US State Department officials and others for their reputed betrayal and even treason regarding China.

The Korean War and Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur from his command in Korea after he advocated expanding the war to China, in going against Truman’s more limited policy, added to the Lobby’s influence. Indeed, MacArthur went so far as to argue that General George Marshall’s

² For background, see Koen 1974; Blackwell 2000.

mission to China in 1945–1946 had been “one of the greatest blunders in American history” (White 1951). According to this conspiratorial line of thinking, Marshall had attempted to force Chiang into a political alliance with the Communists in 1946, and later, as secretary of state, sabotaged US aid to Chiang, leading to the loss of China.

Alfred Kohlberg – a wealthy New York executive, fanatical anti-communist and pro-Chiang supporter – published over a dozen articles attacking the US’ failure to intervene in China in his pro-Chiang magazines *The China Monthly* and *Plain Talk*. Henry R. Luce and his wife Claire Booth Luce, publishers of the famous *Time* and *Life* magazines, were probably even more influential. The Luces placed Chiang’s photo on the front cover of *Time* a record 10 times over the years and made him the sympathetic featured cover story.

The China Lobby also laboured successfully to help discredit and have fired prominent US China academic experts like Owen Lattimore and John Paton Davies, Jr., among others. Davies was fired from his job in the State Department in the mid-1950s by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for his “lack of judgment” after suggesting that the likelihood of Chiang being victorious over the Communists on the mainland was doubtful. He went on to become a businessman engaged in furniture manufacture and design. (Davies 1964). A decade later, the author of this paper passed the difficult US State Department written exam, only to fail the final oral exam when he ventured the opinion in 1965 that the US should recognize the Communist government in China. The examiners told him that he was “naïve”, and he went on to become an academic.

Earlier, the notorious US senator Joseph McCarthy, while attempting to smear US Foreign Service officer John S. Service, questioned him about how curious it was that three China specialists (Service himself, John Paton Davies and John Carter Vincent) all had the same first name (Schaller 2002, 123–125), asking if it was a mere coincidence that “three Johns lost China?” Service replied that actually “four Johns lost China”. McCarthy, about whom one wit earlier quipped, “couldn’t find a communist in Red Square”, when demanding to know the identity of the fourth John, was told “John K. Shek”. Although the senate audience chuckled, Service lost his job, and eventually became a trap company employee and later a library curator.

For all these reasons, the China Lobby long enjoyed considerable success in the US. Although failing in its ultimate goal of returning Chiang Kai-shek to power in China, it did play a significant role in postponing the eventual US recognition of the new China for many years. It also managed to damage and even ruin the reputations of many scholars, journalists and politicians who did not agree with its positions. Although he had originally gained recognition as a

vociferous member of the Lobby, US president Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1971 ended most of the Lobby's influence, although even today, it still lobbies with some success in the US Congress on behalf of Taiwan.

Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson

The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidencies (1953–1969) proved to be largely fruitless in making any progress toward US recognition of the PRC, as both sides almost seemed to outdo each other in their mutual hostility. US secretary of state John Foster Dulles' refusal to shake Chinese premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai's proffered hand at the Geneva conference on Indochina (April 26–July 20, 1954) perhaps best symbolized the US' barren approach.³ Dulles, a dour moralist and Presbyterian Church lay activist described the PRC "as a godless, illegal regime that did not conform to the practices of civilized nations" (Schaller 2002, 142), and even hoped to restart the civil war in China and eliminate the PRC, albeit without US participation. The Eisenhower administration sanctioned China with strict trade controls, while also negotiating new or expanded security pacts with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan.⁴

Radical Chinese domestic policies, such as the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, served to isolate China, and did not help the situation. Neither did China's reference to the US as the most dangerous imperialist power and, paradoxically, a mere paper tiger. Indeed, on two separate occasions (1954 and again in 1958) they even approached "the brink" of war over the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. The long-lasting and complicated Vietnam War during the 1960s, in which the US and China supported opposing sides, added to the diplomatic impasse.

The US and China held 136 on-again, off-again ambassadorial level meetings, starting in 1955, first in Geneva and then from 1958–1970 in Warsaw, but they proved largely to be dialogues of the deaf (Goldstein 2002). Taiwan's status was the major obstacle preventing any real understanding, although the

³ For a discussion of this incident, see Suyin 1994, 233-236. However, Walter Bedell Smith, who took over the US delegation after Dulles left the conference early, gripped Zhou's left arm while holding a cup of tea in his right hand, and told the Chinese leader: "It's been an honor and pleasure to meet you here." Zhou replied: "The American and Chinese people will always keep a deep affection for each other." Unfortunately, these two gestures of respect, if they really did occur, proved to be a road not taken for many years.

⁴ The author of this paper remembers in his youth as a stamp collector how it technically was illegal in the US to acquire Chinese stamps, but how satisfying it was to get around the regulations while in Canada!

talks probably helped the two prevent their major difficulties from escalating into actual war until the eventual Nixon/Kissinger breakthrough in 1971.

Interestingly, one of Kennedy's close advisors claimed after his assassination in November 1963 that the US president had "felt dissatisfied with his administration's failure to break new ground in this area ... [and had] asked the State Department to consider possible new steps and did not regard as magical or permanent this country's long-standing policy of rigidity".⁵ However, the source claimed that "since the day of his inauguration the Red Chinese – unlike the Soviets – has spewed unremitting vituperation upon him." Thus, "even if Red China had not become an emotional and political issue in the United States, he [Kennedy] said, any American initiative now toward negotiations, diplomatic recognition or UN admission would be regarded as rewarding aggression". Accordingly, "he was prepared to use whatever means were available to prevent the seating of Red China in Nationalist China's seat at the UN".

This reference to the UN was an emotional and internationally important extension to the question of US recognition of the PRC (Bennett and Oliver 2002, 88–89). The UN question was a matter of mere recognition, not one of China's existence as a state. Indeed, the US always referred to China as an original member of the UN with a permanent seat on the Security Council. The question was who represented China – the old Nationalist government now exiled on Taiwan, or its successor, the PRC, which clearly controlled and represented mainland China. However, the whole issue of recognizing the PRC seat in the UN became wrapped up in the same imbroglio of the US recognizing the PRC itself. For example, Dean Rusk – Kennedy and Johnson's secretary of state – pointed out that "just before Dwight Eisenhower left office, he told Kennedy that although he would support him on foreign policy in general, he would strongly oppose any attempt by the new administration to recognize Peking and seat mainland China at the United Nations" (Rusk 1990, 283).

⁵ This and the following citations were taken from Sorensen 1965, 665.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., another close advisor to Kennedy and the author of an equally important biography published shortly after of the president's assassination, agreed with Sorensen when he wrote that Kennedy "considered the state of our relations with Communist China as irrational ... [and] did not exclude the possibility of doing something to change them in the course of his administration" (Schlesinger 1965, 479). Similarly, Dean Rusk, Kennedy's secretary of state, declared that "had Kennedy lived and been reelected in 1964 with a strong mandate, I am sure he would have eventually reopened the China question" (Rusk 1990, 284). However, earlier in 1949, "Kennedy was one of a handful of Democrats who accused President Truman and the State Department of deserting [Nationalist] China." (Schaller 2002, 153).

For more than two decades (1950–1971), the US applied political, economic and diplomatic pressure on the other UN members in an annual struggle to deny the PRC the right to represent China in the UN, even though the PRC controlled approximately 99 percent of China’s territory and population. From 1951 to 1960, the US used a procedural device to deny the PRC representation by keeping the issue itself off the General Assembly agenda by a mere majority vote. As this gradually became more difficult to achieve, the US switched to the tactic of having the issue treated as an important one requiring a two-thirds vote to seat the PRC (That said, important items requiring a two-thirds vote can be removed at any time from this category by a mere majority decision in the General Assembly, and this is exactly what finally occurred). Although a very impressive example of US influence, the entire exercise became increasingly difficult to pull off, given China’s growing influence in international relations. In addition, the UN recognition question became caught up in US president Nixon’s decision to seek rapprochement with, and clearly eventual US recognition of, the PRC. When the US finally switched its position in 1971 to recognize the PRC as China’s UN representative, while attempting to maintain at least a seat in the General Assembly for Taiwan – a two-China solution which the PRC would have none of – the UN General Assembly at last recognized the PRC as the sole representative of China, while the Nationalists were completely expelled. Indeed, the Shanghai communique signed by the US and China following Nixon’s visit to the country in 1971 both recognized the PRC as the sole representative of China and Taiwan as part of China, but insisted that the PRC would not use force to unify the two.

The Nixon/Kissinger breakthrough

The Sino-American rapprochement was one of the most stunning events in recent international political history. This was especially true, given Mao’s implacable anti-imperialist and anti-American standpoint, and Nixon’s virtual status as a card-carrying member of the China Lobby. The only similarly analogous earth-shaking event in recent history that this author can think of was the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact reached in August 1939. Fortunately, the results of the Nixon/Kissinger and Mao/Zhou breakthrough proved to be much more peaceful and successful!

Both foreign and domestic events made this sudden demarche possible. In 1967, the future American president published an article in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* in which he declared that in the long haul, the US “simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live

in angry isolation” (Nixon 1967, 121).⁶ A little more than a year later, the PRC reciprocated by publishing Nixon’s presidential inaugural address of January 20, 1969 in full in two major Chinese newspapers – an unprecedented act. Mao further signalled his wish for rapprochement by inviting American journalist Edgar Snow—the author of a classic book (Snow 1968) praising the Chinese communists – to stand beside him in Tiananmen Square for the annual National Day parade on October 1, 1970. The Chinese press then published a photo of the two together as a further signal to the US and the Chinese people. For the first time ever, Nixon, in a speech delivered in March 1971, referred to China by its formal name, the People’s Republic of China. Then in April 1971, ping-pong diplomacy between the two sides gave tangible international publicity to what was occurring. Indeed, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s erudite national security advisor and future secretary of state, had already made his first secret mission to Beijing where he had met Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, doing the groundwork for Nixon’s ground-breaking visit to China on February 21, 1972. Zhou and Kissinger expressed mutual respect and appreciation for each other, which was in stark contrast to Dulles’ refusal in 1954 even to shake Zhou’s hand at the Geneva conference. So, what led to this truly extraordinary turn of events?

Although a complete analysis of this is beyond the scope of this article, the mutually perceived Soviet threat was certainly one of the main factors behind this monumental breakthrough (Kissinger 2011, 202–235; Nixon 1978, 544–580; Kissinger 1979, 684–787). In March 1969, Soviet and Chinese troops had come close to war when they clashed on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River that formed their border in the north. Several months later in August, a large-scale Soviet attack killed hundreds more in the Xinjiang province on China’s far western border near the Chinese nuclear weapons test site. Looking back on these events, Kissinger would later write “having since seen many documents published by the main parties, I now lean toward the view that the Soviet Union was much closer to a pre-emptive attack than we realized and that uncertainty about American reactions proved to be a principal reason for postponing that project” (Kissinger 2011, 219). Both China and the US believed that their budding, tacit alliance would check the Soviet threat, while contributing usefully to their own domestic political and economic stability. Furthermore, domestically, Nixon felt that success with China would help him

⁶ *Foreign Affairs* was the very journal in which George F. Kennan had published his famous containment article 20 years earlier.

win re-election in 1972, as indeed it did, while Mao felt a need to calm the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution.

Ford/Carter: Final stages toward recognition

The Nixon/Kissinger breakthrough in relations with China did not lead to immediate US recognition of the PRC, due largely to the Taiwan issue. However, the Shanghai Communique did pledge that both states would work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. The US also agreed with the PRC position that there was only one China, and that Taiwan was part of that China. For its part, the PRC agreed that it would not employ force to unify with Taiwan. On other important matters, the US and the PRC agreed to take action against any state that would attempt to establish “hegemony” in the Asian-Pacific, in a clear reference to the Soviet Union.

To facilitate the final establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the two sides first opened reciprocal liaison offices in Beijing and Washington. From May 1973 to the end of 1978, David K.E. Bruce, George H.W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, Jr. and Leonard Woodcock – all distinguished officials – served as chiefs of the US liaison office in Beijing with the rank of ambassador. While visiting China in 1975, the new US president Gerald Ford (1974–1977) reaffirmed the US commitment to formally recognize the PRC, and his successor, Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), would repeat this determination.

However, quick recognition threatened to cause difficult domestic political problems for both Presidents Ford and Carter from long-time conservative supporters of Taiwan. Carter, for example, wrote how “the difficulty would lie in assuring China’s willingness to accommodate our requirements for unofficial relations with Taiwan and our permanent interest in its peaceful existence” (Carter 1982, 191). In his memoirs, Cyrus Vance, Carter’s secretary of state, specifically identified the problem of Taiwan as preventing earlier “normalization”: “We were determined not to jeopardize the security of Taiwan” (Vance 1983, 77). President Carter stressed that Vance also felt “it would be unwise to take on an issue as politically controversial as normalization with China until the Panama issue was out of the way” (Vance 1983, 79).⁷ At first, Ford and Carter were wary of establishing military relations with the PRC, as they

⁷ Vance was referring to the emotional status of the Panama Canal Treaties that would remove the US from controlling this important waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

might threaten US-Soviet relations, including the SALT II arms control negotiations.

However, finally, on December 15, 1978 the two sides reached an agreement to end almost three decades of diplomatic estrangement, and formally establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Vance referred this to be “one of the enduring achievements of the Carter years” (Vance 1983, 119). President Carter himself averred that, “my foreign policy team and I, very proud of our accomplishments, were in a happy and expansive mood” (Carter 1982, 200), and added, that “most countries recognized this development as a historic one, which would contribute to peace and would open China further to the outside world.”

Vice Premier and Paramount Leader, Deng Xiaoping’s well publicized visit to the US in January 1979 launched a series of very important political and economic exchanges in many different fields. Even Sino-US military cooperation was on the table, given the Soviet threats in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The US sold “non-lethal” arms to China, and in 1981 the two announced that a joint Sino-US listening post had been operating in Xinjiang near the Soviet border.

The long journey taken by China and the US culminated in the eventual US recognition of the PRC. Perhaps symbolizing this new era, Deng good-naturedly donned a ten-gallon, Texas-style cowboy hat during his visit to the US in January 1979. President Carter wrote enthusiastically that “The Deng Xiaoping visit was one of the delightful experiences of my Presidency. To me, everything went right” (Carter 1982, 202). *Time* magazine even named Deng its prestigious “Man of the Year” at the end of 1978, and his portrait appeared on the magazine’s front cover, a position that had in the past been reserved for Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.

Conclusions

Considerable time has elapsed since the US finally recognized the PRC in 1979, and to the astonishment of many who remember the old China, the PRC has become second only to the US as the most powerful economy in the world. China’s National Day celebrations in Beijing on October 1, 2019 demonstrated to all its military might. Many new crises have come and gone, the most recent being the 2019 so-called trade war between the two frenemies, which threatens not only their mutual prosperity, but also that of the world. Henry Kissinger, now 96, recently warned that the US and China are “in the foothills of a cold war” (Bloomberg 2019; Friedman 2019). Hopefully, their now 40-year-old diplomatic relationship will help them avoid the Thucydides Trap of devastating war caused by a new power challenging the old, established one.

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Araştırma Makalesi

Çin ile kültürel etkileşim sürecinde Hakas ölüm maskelerinin yeniden yorumlanması üzerine bir çalışma

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Öz: Farklı coğrafyalarda yaşayan halkların hemen hepsinin bir ritüel nesnesi olarak maske kullandıkları bilinmektedir. Bu çalışmada ise Hakasya'da keşfedilen ölüm maskeleri üzerinde durulmuştur. MÖ 2 - MS 5. yüzyıllara tarihlendirilen Taştık arkeolojik kültürüne ait bu maskeler, doğrudan ölünün yüzüne yapılmış olmaları sebebiyle 2000 yıl önce Güney Sibiry'a'da yaşamakta olan Türklerin fenotipik özellikleri hakkında bilgi sağlamaktadır. Tang yıllıklarında bahsi geçen Kırgız ölüm gelenekleri üzerinden kurulan kültürel bağlantılar sonucu bu maskelerin herhangi bir etkileşim sonucu ortaya çıkmadığı ve özgün olduğu görüşüne varılmıştır. Ayrıca Taştık mezarlarından elde edilen buluntular arasında söz konusu dönemde oldukça değerli kabul edilen Çin ipeğinin bulunması, Taştıkların Han dönemi Çin devleti ile ilişki kurduklarını düşündürmektedir. Günümüzde Rusya ve Hakasya'daki müzelerde muhafaza edilen özgün Taştık maskelerinin fotoğraflarını içeren bir fotoğraf sergisi ilk kez 2009 yılında Sergey Narylkov tarafından açılmıştır. Narylkov'un koleksiyonundaki fotoğraflardan esinlenerek ortaya konulan fotoğraf sergisi projesi için söz konusu maskeler sanatsal bir üslupla yeniden yorumlanmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: ölüm, maske, Çin, Hakas, Taştık

A study on the reinterpretation of Khakas death masks in the process of cultural interaction with China

Abstract: Masks are used by almost all people from around the world as an object of ceremony. In this study, it is focused on the death masks which have been found in Khakassia. These masks belong to the Tashtyk archaeological culture dating back to 2 BCE – 5 CE. Since these masks are made on the faces of dead people, they can provide answers to the question of how the physical appearance of the Turks was living in South Siberia 2000 years ago. By examining the death traditions of the Yenisei Kyrgyz in the annals of Tang dynasty, this paper argues that these masks are authentic. The discovery of Chinese silk fabrics among the burial sites of these people gives a very accurate picture of the interaction between Tashtyks and Han dynasty of China. A photo exhibition including the photos of the original Tashtyk masks that are in the museums of Russia and Khakassia was curated for the first time by Sergey Narylkov in 2009. The Khakas death masks have been reinterpreted with an artistic touch for the photo exhibition.

Keywords: death, mask, China, Khakas, Tashtyk

Giriş

Bu çalışmanın odak noktasını oluşturan maske kelimesinin doğduğu ve yayıldığı dillerde taşıdığı anlam anlaşıldıktan sonra bu derinlikli nesnenin örtük işlevlerinden bahsetmek yerinde olacaktır.

Arap dilinde “bir siperlikle gizleme” anlamına gelen *maskhar* fiili (Catafago 1873, 799) takip edildiğinde yine bu fiilden türeyen maskara kelimesi ile karşılaşmaktadır. Bu kelime ise hem “maske” hem de “maske takan kişi” anlamında kullanılmaktadır (Welsford 2015, 93). Yüzünün tamamını ya da bir kısmını maske ile gizlemiş olan bir kişinin ise geleneksel ortamda hemen her zaman bir çeşit ritüel ya da oyunda yer aldığını tahmin etmek zor olmayacaktır. Nitekim Arapça “gülünç kimse”, “soytarı” anlamına gelen *maskharah* kelimesinin Batı dillerinden İspanyolcaya *máscara*, İtalyancaya *maschera* ve İngilizceye de *masquerade* biçimlerinde ödünçlendiği ve maskeli balo, kılık değiştirme, taklit etme gibi anlamlar taşıdığı bilinmektedir (Lauand 2012, 87; Alabdullah 2014, 751).

Türk Dil Kurumu *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*'te yukarıda bahsi geçen kelimenin kökeninin Arapça olduğu belirtilmekle birlikte Arapçada olduğu haliyle

“maskara” şeklinde Türk diline geçtiği ve yine aynı şekilde hem “soytarı” hem de “karnaval maskesi” anlamları taşıdığı görülmektedir (*Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*, www.tdk.gov.tr). Ancak aynı kaynaktan “maske” ve “mask” kelimeleri aratıldığında köken bilgisi olarak Fransızca gösterilmekte ve tanınmamak, korunmak için kullanılan ve gerçek görünüşü olduğu gibi duyguları da gizleyebilen “yapma yüz” ile “ölünün yüzüne uygulanarak elde edilen yüz kalıbı” anlamları verilmektedir (*Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*, www.tdk.gov.tr). Görüldüğü gibi Türk dili, esasında aynı kökene sahip kelimeleri farklı dönemlerde farklı dillerden bünyesine almıştır. Hakas dilinde maske anlamına gelen “hubulcah”¹ (xyбyлчax) kelimesinin (Butanayev 1999, 193) kökünde de “değişmek” anlamına gelen “hubularğa” (xyбyлаpға) fiilinin (*Hakassko-Russkiy slovar* 2006, 856) bulunması, maskenin “dönüşülen kişiyi ya da yepyeni bir kimliği” temsil etme işlevi (Pollock 1995, 584) bakımından dikkat çekmektedir.

Taşlık maskelerinin bölgesel niteliği üzerine

Farklı coğrafyalarda yaşayan halkların hemen hepsinin bir ritüel nesnesi olarak maske kullanması ve bunu yapmaktaki amaçlarının da hep aynı şekilde görünüşü değiştirmek, gizlenmek, farklı bir kılığa girmek ya da olduğundan başka bir varlığı temsil etmek olması önemlidir. Ancak bu çalışmada çeşitli ayinlerde kullanılan ve amacı çoğunlukla görünüşü değiştirmek olan “ritüel maskeleri” (Bağcı 2018, 29) yerine, Asya kıtasının kalbinde, dünyanın en büyük dördüncü nehri olan Yenisey’in orta havzasında, Altay ve Sayan dağlarının arasındaki Hakas-Minusinsk vadisinde yer alan Hakasya’da keşfedilen ve yapılış amacı ilk gruptaki maskelerin aksine görünüşü değiştirmek değil, muhafaza etmek olan ölüm maskeleri üzerinde durulacaktır.

Güney Sibiry kurganlarından ele geçirilen ve adını bölgedeki Taştık nehri yakınlarında yapılan kazılardan alan Taştık maskeleri ile ilgili bilgileri ilk olarak II. Yekaterina tarafından St. Petersburg İmparatorluk Bilimler Akademisi’ne davet edilen Alman bilimci Peter Simon Pallas’ın 1771-1772 yıllarında Minusinsk steplerindeki araştırmalarını kaydettiği günlüklerden edinmekteyiz. Pallas, mezar soyguncuları tarafından anlatılan ve halk arasında da yayılmış olan “canlı yüzler” ile ilgili efsanelerden bahsetmiştir; bu anlatılanların gerçekliği ise ancak 100 yıl sonra ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk olarak Danişkin adlı bir köylünün, Abakan nehri sahilindeki bir kurganda bulduğu kilden yapılmış bir maskeyi Minusinsk müzesine getirmesi olayı bilinmektedir (Vadetskaya 1981, 92). Taştık dönemine

¹ Butanayev’in aksine Timur B. Davletov, 9 Mayıs 2017 tarihinde TÜRKSOY’da gerçekleşen “Yenisey Ölüm Maskeleri” fotoğraf sergisinin afiş ve davetiyesi için runik harflerle yazdığı Hakasça başlıkta maske kelimesinin karşılığı olarak *hubulğas* kelimesini tercih etmiştir.

(MÖ II – MS 5. yy.) ait bu maskelerin oldukça geç sayılabilecek bir dönemde keşfedilmesi ise Hakaslar arasında atalar kültürünün güçlü bir biçimde yaşatılması sebebiyle yerli halkın atalarının yattığı yerleri rahatsız etmek istememesinden kaynaklanmış olmalıdır. Nitekim kurganların çoğu Rusların bölgeye gelmelerinden sonra soyulmaya başlamıştır (Bağcı 2018, 43).

Bu konudaki en mühim keşiflerden biri 1883'te Rus arkeolog Aleksandr Adrianov'un, Tagar adasındaki bir mezar hücresi kazısında yirmiden fazla maske bulması olmuştur. Bu maskeler kafataslarının üzerinde, cesetlerden ayrı olarak ya da yakılmış insan kemiklerinin üzerinde durur halde ele geçirilmiştir. Adrianov'un anlattıklarına göre maskelerin bazıları oldukça sıra dışıdır. Üzerlerinde genellikle kızıl boyayla çizilmiş desenler bulunmaktadır. Hemen hemen aynı dönemlerde Fin ve Rus arkeologlar Aspelin ve Klements tarafından başka kurganlarda bu maskelerin daha basit yapılı olanları da gün yüzüne çıkarılmıştır. 1883'ten sonra Adrianov, 1895-1897 yılları arasında Abakan steplerindeki Kızılkul (Kızıl Göl) yakınlarında ikinci kez benzer maskeler bulmuştur. Ancak Tagar Adası'nda ilk bulunduğu maskeler doğrudan ölünün yüzüne uygulanmışken, Kızılkul'dan elde edilen maskeler kafatasına sıvanarak yapılmıştır. Bu sebeple Adrianov'un bulunduğu ilk maskelerde ölülerin boyun kıvrımlarının izi ya da saç teli kalıntıları mevcutken ikinci grupta böyle bir şey söz konusu değildir (Vadetskaya 1981, 93). Kızlasov'a göre ilk grupta bulunan maskeler erken Taştık dönemine aittir ve bu dönemdeki tüm kurganlarda delinmiş kafatasları, maske uygulanmış yüzler ve mumyalanmış bedenlerle karşılaşmaktadır. Bu buluntularda maskeler doğrudan olarak ölünün yüzüne uygulandığı için maskelerin iç tarafında yumuşak cilt dokusu, ağız, bazen bıyık, burun, göz çukurları, boyun derisindeki kırışıklıklar, kulakların şekli ve hatta sıklıkla kızıl olmak üzere saç teli kalıntıları korunmuştur. Bu maskelerin mekanik bir şekilde, kalıpla alınmadığı da tartışmasız şekilde ortadadır. Yaratıcılık söz konusu olduğu için bunların her birinin birer sanat eseri olduğunu söylemek de yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu cenaze maskeleri yalnızca plastik sanatlar ürünü değil, aynı zamanda resim sanatı ürünü olarak da kabul edilebilir niteliktedir; çünkü Taştık mezarlarından çıkan bu maskeler, çeşitli renklerde boyalarla süslenmiş durumdadır (Kızlasov 1960, 148). Kızlasov bu ikinci gruba ait maskeleri taşıyan cesetlerle ilgili olarak ise ölüm vakti ve ölünün mezara yerleştirilmesi arasında ciddi bir zaman farkı olduğunu belirtmiştir. Zaman farkının fazla olduğu bu gibi durumlarda öncelikle vücut iskelete dönüştürülmekte, ardından trepanasyon² ile beyin çıkarılmaktadır. Daha sonra kafatası kil ile sıvanıp burun boşluğu, kafatasının içi ve göz çukurları kille doldurulmaktadır (Kızlasov 1960, 148).

² Delgi, kemiklerin medikal ya da ritüel amaçlı delinmesi işlemi.

Bu keşiflerin ardından Güney Sibirya'daki Taştıkların ölülerinin yüzlerini maskelerle örtmelerinin bölgesel bir uygulama olup olmadığı sorgulanmaya başlamıştır. Daha önceleri antik Mısır ve Yunan medeniyetlerinde ölüm maskelerinin kullanılıyor olması bilgisinin dışında neolitik dönemde Yakın Doğu coğrafyasında kafatasının alçı ya da kil ile sıvanması uygulamasının mevcut olduğu da bilinmektedir. Yumuşak dokulardan arınmış ve iskelet haline dönüşmüş olan kafatasının, alt çene ile ya da alt çenesiz şekillerde bazen alçı, bazen de kil ile yüz özellikleri verilmeye çalışılarak sıvanması uygulamasının örnekleri, Suriye, İsrail, Ürdün ve Anadolu'da toplam 12 neolitik çağ köy yerleşmesinde gün ışığına çıkarılmıştır (Özbek 2005, 128). Kafatasının sıvanması dışında Jericho, Ain Ghazal ve Nahal Hemar mağaralarında kil büstler de bulunmuştur. Buluntuların kafatasları sıvanmış, boyanmış ve ziftle kaplanmıştır. (Arensburg ve Hershkovitz 1989, 127). Özellikle İsrail'in Yiftahel bölgesinde bulunan kil sıvalı başlarda ise yüzdeki özelliklere özen gösterildiği kaydedilmiştir. Örneğin burun için çakıl, kireç taşı ve gözler için beyaz deniz kabukları kullanılmıştır (Milevski vd. 2008, 40). Bu ritüellerin Taştık dönemindekilerden farkı ise kremasyon ile ilgilidir. İsrail'de bulunan bazı kafataslarının ağır biçimde yanmış olduğu görülmektedir; ancak bunun eriyik haldeki ziftin kafatasına uygulanmasından kaynaklandığı düşünülmektedir. Ortadoğu'daki neolitik sitlerde insan kalıntılarının kasıtlı kremasyonuna dair herhangi bir rapor bulunmamaktadır (Arensburg ve Hershkovitz 1989, 122). Bunun aksine mezar odalarının ateşe verilmesi sebebiyle deforme olan Taştık maskeleri ve insan küllerinin bulunduğu kurganlar kremasyona işaret etmektedir.

Bu örnekler dışında Asya'daki diğer örneklere de bakmak yerinde olacaktır. Shuyun Guo, Çin'de aynı derin tarihsel ve kültürel kökleri paylaşan Altay dil ailesine ve Sibirya koluna mensup çok sayıda halkın, benzersiz bir maske kültürü yarattığını ve başlangıçta bu maskelerin kesinlikle Şamanik ideolojinin bir ürünü olduğunu ifade etmektedir (2003, 163). Ancak söz konusu ölüm maskeleri olduğunda günümüz kaynakları yeterli örnek sunmamaktadır. Stoclet koleksiyonunda H. F. E. Visser tarafından Tang dönemine ait bir ölüm maskesi olduğu ileri sürülen bronz bir maskenin varlığı bilinmektedir. Ancak Çin'de bu tarz maskelerin oldukça nadir olması ve cesedin yüzünde maske bulunan gömülere dair kanıtların da eksikliği sebebiyle söz konusu bronz maskenin işlevi sorgulanmaktadır (Seligman 1952, 16).

Sonuç olarak bu maskeler İskit eseri olarak kabul edilecek olursa Sibirya'da farklı bölgelerin dışında Karadeniz'in kuzeyini de kapsayan daha geniş bir coğrafyada maskelerin benzerlerinin bulunmuş olması gerekirdi. Yenisey kıyısında bulunan maskelerin başka kültürler ile bir etkileşim sonucu geliştiği

ileri sürülecek olursa, bu kez de üslup ve maskelere eşlik eden ritüellerde ortaklıklar bulunabiliyor olması şartı aranırdı. Bu sebeple söz konusu ölüm maskelerinin yalnızca Sibirya'nın arkeolojik Mekke'si olarak kabul gören Hakas topraklarında bulunmuş olması dikkat çekicidir.

Taşlık maskelerinin yapılış amaçları

Taşlık maskelerinin orijinallikleri kadar yapılış amaçları da sorgulanmıştır ve bu sorgulama günümüzde hala devam etmektedir. En yaygın kanı ölümden sonraki hayatta ruhun garantiye alınması ihtiyacı ile ilgilidir (Baumer 2012, 171). Kiselyov da ölen kişinin yüzünü ve dış görünüşünü koruma davranışını ölümden sonraki hayata dair bir inanışın varlığına yormaktadır (1951, 394). Arkeolog ve etnograf Albert Nikolayeviç Lipskiy ise Hakaslar gibi Sibirya halklarının geleneklerini inceleyerek maskelere bir açıklama getirmeye çalışmıştır. Bölge halklarının inanışlarına göre ölen kişinin ruhunun, ölümden hemen sonra ölümler ülkesine geçebilmesi olanaksızdır. Öncelikle ölenin bedeni iskelete dönüşmelidir ve pek tabii bunun için belirli bir süre gerekmektedir. Ancak geçmesi gereken bu uzun süre içinde yaşayanların arasında kalan ruh kaybolabilir. Bu ise istenmeyen bir şeydir; çünkü ölen kişinin ruhunun yeni doğan bir bebeğin bedeninde tekrar dünyaya gelmesi gerekmektedir ve eğer ruh kaybolursa doğum oranı da azalacaktır. Bu durumu engellemek için ölenin akrabaları, ölen kişiye benzeyen, onu tasvir eden kuklalar hazırlarlar ve ölenin ruhunu bu kuklanın içine yerleştirirler. Kuklaları beslerler, korurlar ve ona kurbanlar sunarlar. Kemiklerin ya da küllerin gömüleceği son gün, bu kukla da mezara yerleştirilmektedir (Vadetskaya 1981, 97). Kızlasov da bu görüşe katılmakta ve Çin'deki Tang hanedanlığı zamanından kalan yıllıklar olan *Tangshu'*dan örnek vermektedir. *Tangshu'*ya göre, Taşlıkların torunları olan Hakaslar yani Kırgızlar, bir kişi öldüğünde bedenini yakıyorlar, kemikleri ise bir yıl sonra gömüyorlardı. Aynı şekilde Taşlık döneminde de ölü yakma işlemi korunmuştur. Maskeler ise görünüşe göre bu süre boyunca ölen kişiye benzeyen portrelerin gerekli olduğu birtakım ritüeller için ölenin akrabalarının evinde muhafaza ediliyordu (Kızlasov 1960, 150).

Yukarıda bahsedilen ölü kuklaları ve bu kuklalar çevresinde gelişen ritüellerin yüzyıllar boyunca aynı biçimde uygulanmakta olduğu tarihi verilerle takip edilebilmektedir. Örneğin, Banzarov Moğol Şamanizmini incelediği çalışmasında bu imitasyon kuklalar ve onlara ibadet edilmesi ile ilgili olarak, Moğollar arasında ölmüş insanların ruhlarının, halkın korku ve saygısının nesnesi haline gelmiş olduğunu ve bu sebeple de sevilen bir kişi öldüğünde onun oğulları, kızları, küçük ve büyük erkek kardeşlerinin, ölen kişiye benzeyen bir figür / idol yaptıklarını belirtmektedir. Devamında ise bu imitasyon kuklayı

evlerinde saklayarak Ebulgazi'nin daha önceden aktardığı gibi, evdeki ilk yemeği her zaman ona sunduklarını ve onu öperek "bu bizim sevdiğimiz kişinin tasviridir," sözleriyle ona tapındıklarını söylemektedir (Banzarov 1891, 30-32).

Banzarov'dan çok daha önce Marco Polo da Türklerin evlerinde bulduklarını birtakım putları her gün öğle ve akşam yemeklerinde yağlı bir et parçası ile beslediklerini anlatmaktadır. Bu et parçası önce Polo'nun "Tanrı" olarak aktardığı tasvirin, ardından da evdeki kadın ve çocukların ağzına sürülmektedir (Roux 1999, 210). Aynı şekilde Polo'nun çağdaşı olan Wilhelm Rubruk da XIII. yüzyılda Moğolistan'daki Tatarların putlar (idoller) yaptıklarını ve benzer ritüeller gerçekleştirdiklerini ifade etmektedir (Banzarov 1891, 7). Ancak atalar kültürünün belki de en önemli göstergesi olarak kabul edilebilecek olan bu "kutsal putlar," (Tryjarski 2012, 392) ve onlara yüklenen anlamlar çok daha eskiye dayanıyor olmalıdır. Nitekim Butanayev bu tarz putların MÖ VII-I. yüzyıllar arasında Hakas topraklarında Tagar kültürüyle ortaya çıkmış olabileceğini ifade etmiştir (1996, 180). Vadetskaya ise Baykal bölgesindeki ve Krasnoyarsk'taki Afantova dağındaki Bronz Çağı mezarlarından da Altaylıların "ocağın koruyucusu" olarak gördükleri benzer kuklalar çıkarıldığını ifade ederek Butanayev'in öne sürdüğü tarihi daha da geriye çekmiştir (1981, 67-68). Söz konusu tasvir ve putların, Güney Sibirya Türkleri için onları atalarına götüren bir çeşit "cisimlendirilmiş zaman vektörü" (Lvova vd. 2013, 98) olduğu göz önünde bulundurulacak olursa, bu cenaze uygulamasının Sibirya coğrafyasında Taştık kültürünü de içine alan binlerce yıl boyunca hiçbir sekteye uğramadan varlığını koruduğu daha iyi anlaşılacaktır.

Baş ile ilgili uygulamalara dönülecek olursa, Kuznetsov bu durumu kafatası kültürüyle ilişkilendirmektedir. Ona göre maskeler, ruhun bulunduğu yerdir ve maskelerin ölen kişinin ruhuna diğer dünyaya ulaşması için yardım etmesi, yeni hayatında bedeniyle birleşebilmesi için onu bulmasını kolaylaştırması gerekmektedir. Dünya genelinde ve özellikle Sibirya'da da Taştıklardan önceki Okunevler ve Afanasyevler gibi pek çok insan topluluğunun, başı ruhun bulunduğu yer olarak kabul etmesi ve dolayısıyla başın vücuttaki en kutsal yer olarak görülmesi de göz önünde bulundurulduğunda bu açıklama mantıklıdır (Vadetskaya 1981, 94-95). Shuyun Guo da Şamanik maskelerin işlevlerini tanımlarken pek çok bilinen işlevin yanı sıra "ruhu koruyan bir zırh" işlevini de verir ve ölüm maskelerini bu kategoride ele alır (2003, 169). Kuzey gömülerinde ölüm maskelerinin bulunmasını Şamanik ruh kavramı ile değerlendiren Guo da Kuznetsov ve Lipskiy gibi ölümden sonra ruhun dönecek bir evi olması gerektiğini ve ölenin yüzüne bir maske yerleştirmekle kötü ruhların ölenin yüzünü tanınamaları ve bu sayede onlardan gelebilecek herhangi bir zarardan kaçınmanın amaçlandığını ileri sürmektedir. Maskeye tutunan ruh hızlıca öbür

dünyaya geçecek ve etrafta amaçsızca dolaşmadan evini bulabilecektir (Guo 2003, 170).

Kızlasov ölüler kültüyle alakalı olarak yaşayanların henüz gömülmemiş olan ve kötücül nitelikler taşıyabileceği için korkulan ölüyle aralarına bir sınır koyma arzusundan bahsetmektedir (1960, 148). Dolayısıyla bu maskelerin, canlılar ve ölüler arasında koruyucu bir perde işlevi gördüğü düşüncesi de söz konusudur. Yenisey ölüm maskeleri üzerine çok sayıda araştırması olan arkeolog Elga B. Vadetskaya ise ölüm maskelerinin, aynı mezara farklı zamanlarda ölen birkaç kişiyi koyma geleneği sebebiyle, ölümden birkaç yıl sonra defnedilirken kişiyi tanıyabilmek için ve eski insanların inançlarının sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını ve kesinlikle başka bir kültürden alınmadığını belirtmektedir (Vadetskaya 1981, 98-99). Aksine mezar odalarının ateşe verilmesi sebebiyle deforme olan Taştık maskeleri ve yakılmış cesetlerin küllerinin bulunduğu kurganlar, erken Taştık döneminden modern zamanlara dek ölülerini yakma geleneğine sahip olan Kırgızların varlığını pekiştirmektedir (Kızlasov ve Pankova 2004, 63).

Yenisey Kırgızlarının bu kültürdeki payları ile ilgili olarak maskelerin üzerindeki “büyülü motifler”den (Vadetskaya 2009, 134-135) bahsedilebilir. Modern Kırgız desenlerinin Taştık kültürünün taşıyıcıları olan Yenisey Kırgızlarıyla ilişkili olduğuna dair çalışmalar mevcuttur (Savinov 1984’ten aktaran Kasieva 2015, 642). Bunlar Kiselyov’un tabiri ile dövme çizgileri olmalıdır (Esin 2002, 737). Nitekim maskelerdeki spiraller ve diğer desenler daha sonraları eski Hakaslar tarafından kullanılan dövme motiflerine dönüşmüştür. Yine *Tangshu*’da Yenisey Kırgızları arasında cesur olanların kendilerine dövme yaptıkları, evlenecek olan kadınların da boyunlarına dövme yaptıkları anlatılmaktadır (Kızlasov 1960, 150).

Taştık kültürü ve Yenisey Kırgızları arasındaki bir diğer bağlantı da Useev tarafından ortaya koyulmuştur. Useev konuya yeni bir bakış açısı getirerek, söz konusu maske uygulamalarının yalnızca Taştık arkeolojik kültürü dönemi içinde görülmediğini, Yenisey Kırgızları tarafından Taştık döneminden sonra dahi uzun süre uygulanmaya devam ettiğini ileri sürmüştür. Yenisey bölgesinde bulunan E 62 ve E 9 numaralı yazıtlar ile de bu düşüncesini desteklemektedir. E 62 numaralı yazıtta geçen bir cümleyi “yüz y(a)p(ı)g k(a)η(ı)m” şeklinde okuyarak “yüzü kapalı babam” şeklinde tercüme eden Useev, yazıtı yazan kişinin alt dünyaya geçen babasının yüzünün ne ile örtüldüğünü anlamak için Yenisey Kırgızlarının ölüm geleneklerini gözden geçirmek gerektiğini ifade etmiştir (Useev 2018, 645).

Useev E 9 numaralı yazıttaki bir başka cümleyi ise yukarıdaki okuma denemesine kanıt olarak göstermektedir. Yazıtın üçüncü satırındaki “b(e)ñüsi

yok (e)rm(i)ş. Y(a)l(a)η yüzl(ü)g...” (*ebedî taşı yokmuş. Yalın yüzlü...*) ifadesini yazıttaki kişinin bengü yani ebedî taşı olmadığı ve yalın yüzlü gömüldüğü şeklinde açıkladıktan sonra bu cümledeki “y(a)l(a)η yüzl(ü)g (*yalın yüzlü*)” tabiri ile yüzü yalın, bir başka deyişle yüzüne maske konulmadan gömülen birisinden bahsedildiğini ifade etmiştir. Useev’e göre Kara-Sug (E 9) Yazıtı’ndaki “y(a)l(a)η yüzl(ü)g (*yalın yüzlü*)” tabiri ile Kanmıldıg-Hovu (E 62) Yazıtı’ndaki “yüz y(a)p(ı)g k(a)η(ı)m (*yüzü kapalı babam*)” ifadeleri birbirini destekler niteliktedir (Useev 2018, 646).

Useev’in bu görüşünün Kızlasov’un arkeolojik verilere dair yorumlarıyla aynı doğrultuda olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Kızlasov’a göre de bazı gömülerde maske bulunmaması ve maske bulunmayan bu mezarlardan çıkan eşyaların da çok daha basit ve fakir olması, toplumda önemli bir sosyal eşitsizliğin varlığına işaretler (1960, 150). Ancak belirtilmelidir ki, bu durum yaş ya da cinsiyet ayrımıyla alakalı değildir. Nitekim çeşitli mezarlarda erkek, kadın ve hatta çocuk maskeleri bulunmuştur. Trepanasyon uygulamasında da cinsiyet farkı görülmemesi sosyal statü farkını düşündürmektedir (Mednikova 2003, 169).

Bu statü meselesini destekleyen bir diğer buluntu da maske bulunan Taştık mezarlarında rastlanan ipek kumaştır. Ögel’in ifadesiyle Güney Sibirya’da Çin’den gelen kumaşlara ilk olarak bu mezarlarda rastlanmaktadır. Ögel, Minusinsk’in 60 km kuzeyinde ve Yenisey nehrinin sağ kenarında, bir köylü tarafından tesadüfen bulunduktan sonra meşhur arkeolog Adrianov tarafından kazısı yürütülen Oglahıtı adlı bölgedeki mezarlarda alçı maskelere ek olarak cesetlerin yüzlerinde ipek örtüler keşfedildiğini ifade etmektedir (Ögel 1991, 86-87). Bu gömütlerde yer alan cesetlerin kafatasları delinip, beyin ve yumuşak dokuları ayrıldıktan sonra yüzleri ipek bir kumaşla sarılmış ve Avrupoid olmaktan çok Mongoloid özellikler gösteren kil/alçı maskelerle kaplanmıştır (Baumer 2012, 171). Doğrudan ölünün yüzüne örtülen bu ipek kumaşlar, ölü kuklaları da diyebileceğimiz yukarıda bahsi geçen tasvirlerde de görülmektedir. Söz konusu kuklaların başının arka kısmı çok renkli, desenlerle süslenmiş kalın Çin ipeği ile kaplanırken, yüz bölümü daha ince ve sade, kırmızı bir ipek kumaşla kapatılmıştır. Bu kumaşların her ikisi ise kuklaların alın kısmından dikilerek tutturulmuştur (Vadetskaya 2009, 67). Ayrıca özellikle kadın kuklalarında bulunmuş olan ve saçın üst kısmına tutturulan, silindir biçimli huş ağacından saç tokası ya da süsünden de bahsetmek gerekmektedir. Bu aksesuarın üzeri de desenli Çin ipeği ile kaplanmıştır (Vadetskaya 2009, 68). Arkeolog Elga Vadetskaya’ya göre mezarlarda bulunan Çin ipeği, tarihlendirmeye de imkân sağlamaktadır (1999, 13).

Bu noktada akla Taştık döneminde Güney Sibirya’da yaşayan bu insanların ipek dokumacılığını bilip bilmedikleri ya da söz konusu kumaşların Çin’den

geldiği konusunda netliğin nasıl sağlandığı soruları gelmektedir. Elbette eski Kırgızlar ve Türkler ipeği biliyorlardı. Bunun için geçmişten günümüze ipek için kullanılan kelimelere bakmak yeterli olacaktır. Örneğin, Clauson eski Uygurca *torku* biçiminde bulunan bu sözcüğün Moğolcada *torğan* ya da *torkan* biçiminde kullanıldığını; ancak sözcüğün büyük ihtimalle erken Moğolcadan ödünçlendiğini ileri sürer (1972, 539). Ancak tıpkı kumaşın Çin'den geldiğinin düşünülmesi gibi kelimenin de esasında Moğolcadan Türkçeye değil; Çince den Moğol, Türk ve Tunguz dillerini kapsayan Altay dillerine geçmiş bir kelime olarak kabul edildiğini belirtmek gerekmektedir (Shimunek 2017, 144-145).

Yenisay Kırgızlarının kültürel mirasçıları olan Hakasların dilinde günümüzde hala *torğı* biçiminde kullanılmakta olan bu kelime dışında, Türkçe ipek kelimesinin doğrudan karşılığı olan *çibek*³ de Hakasçada mevcuttur. Ek olarak *çibek hurtı* "ipek kurdu/böceği" de bilinmektedir (*Hakassko-Russkiy Slovar* 2006, 656-974). Ancak bahsi geçen tarihte Türklerin ipek dokumacılığı ile uğraşmadıkları, bu kumaşları Çin'den temin ettikleri düşünülmektedir. Nitekim bu buluntuların üzerinde şüpheye yer bırakmayacak biçimde eski Çin hiyerogliflerinin yer aldığı göze çarpmaktadır. Kiselév'a göre özellikle Han dönemi (MÖ 206 – MS 220) hiyeroglifleriyle kaplı ipek kumaşların da yer aldığı çeşitli eşyalar, ilginçtir ki Güney Sibirya'daki Taştık dönemi mezarlarında ve Moğolistan Noin-ula'daki MÖ I. yüzyıla tarihlendirilen Hun kurganları için ortak buluntulardır (1951, 466).

Hunlardan itibaren çeşitli Türk halklarının Çin ile sürekli ilişkilere sahip olduğu bilinen bir meseledir. Türk tarihine ışık tutması bakımından hayati önem taşıyan Çin kaynakları sayesinde Hunların MÖ 318'de ilk kez tarihi kaynaklarda görülmeleri ve hatta MÖ 2146'da Türk kavimlerinin ataları olabilecek halkların ortaya çıkışları takip edilebilmektedir (Ekrem 1995, III). Bununla birlikte Türk-Çin ilişkileri söz konusu olduğunda sıklıkla en başta Köktürk Kağanlığı dönemi hatıra gelmektedir. Bu döneme ait Türkçe yazıtlarda düşman Çin devletine karşı sürekli uyarılan bir Türk toplumu görülür. Oysaki Kül Tigin yazıtının M. E. H. Parker tarafından İngilizceye çevrilmiş olan Çince yüzünde Tang hükümdarı, Bilge Kağan ve Kül Tigin'in kendileri için birer oğul olduklarından ve babanın oğullarına duyduğu sevgiden bahsetmektedir. Ayrıca Türklerin Tang hükümdarına sundukları bağlılık ve saygı sayesinde silahların kınlarında kaldığını ve barış sağlandığını da anlatır. Hükümdar son olarak söz konusu yazıtı da kendilerinin diktirdiğini söyler (Thomsen 2011, 212-216).

³ Kırgızcada *cibek*, Kazakçada da *jibek* şeklinde kullanılan bu kelime, Eski Türkçede *yipek* iken Türkiye Türkçesinde kelime başındaki -y sesinin düşmesiyle *ipek* şekline dönüşmüştür.

Bu ifadeler açıkça göstermektedir ki, sınır komşusu olan ve birbirine düşman oldukları kabul edilen her iki toplum da tarihe kendi açısından bir yön vermeye ve aynı zamanda da geleceği şekillendirmeye çalışmaktadır. Ancak sadece yazıtın tek dilli olmayışına ve Çince yüzündeki metnin bambaşka bir içeriğe sahip oluşuna bakılarak bile bu iki halk arasında esasında sürdürülmesi zorunlu olan bir iletişim ve bu iletişimden doğan kültürel etkileme ve etkilenme süreçlerinin söz konusu olduğu anlaşılabilir. Elbette tarih boyunca süregelen bu etkileşim sürecinde Türkler her zaman etkilenen değil, aynı şekilde etkileyen taraf da olmuşlardır. Özellikle dilbilimsel etkilerin detaylı analizi için Finlandiyalı Mongolist ve Türkolog G. J. Ramstedt'in Türk dillerinin eski Çin dili üzerindeki tesirini bilimsel olarak tespit ettiği çalışmasına bakılabilir (Togan 1981, 15).

Kızlasov da bu Çin-Türk etkileşimini desteklemektedir. Araştırmacı, Yenisey Kırgızlarının yemek, satış ve yarış için farklı özelliklerde çeşitli atlar yetiştirdiklerini söylemektedir. Çin kaynaklarına göre Kırgızların savaşlarda kullandıkları bu atlar baştan aşağı zırhlıydı. Boyutları ve hızları bakımından oldukça ünlü olan bu atlar sıklıkla Çin imparatorlarına hediye ediliyordu. Ayrıca bu özel hayvanların Çin'e para karşılığında satıldıkları da bilinmektedir (Kızlasov 1993, 76).

Bu noktada Tang ülkesine giden Kırgız heyetlerinden ve yanlarında götürdükleri hediyelerden bahsetmek yerinde olacaktır. Mart 843'te bir diplomatik heyet, Kırgız kağanı adına Çin'e gönderilmiş ve imparatora iki adet ünlü Kırgız atı hediye edilmiştir. Bu olayın ardından Çin'in de Kırgızlara aynı şekilde bir elçi heyeti gönderdiği bilinmektedir. Birkaç ay sonra Temmuz 843'te Çin'e bir Kırgız heyeti daha gitmiş ve yanlarında hediye olarak bu kez on çift atmaca ve yüz at götürmüşlerdir. Nisan 844'te görevlendirilen Kırgız elçisi ise imparatora Kırgız kağanı adına iki beyaz at hediye etmiştir. Bu tarihlerin ardından 860-873 yılları arasında Yenisey Kırgızlarına ait elçilik heyetleri Tang sarayına üç kez daha gitmişlerdir (Kızlasov 1993, 69-70).

Aynı şekilde Hakas topraklarında yine Tang dönemine tarihlendirilen 9 adet Çin aynası ve çok sayıda Çin parası başta olmak üzere pek çok değerli eşya bulunmuştur. Bu eşyaların Güney Sibirya'da Tang dönemi başkentinden oldukça uzak sayılabilecek topraklarda bulunmuş olması, tarihi ve kültürel bağların daha somut biçimde görülebilmesi için de anlamlıdır. Kırgızlar, bahsi geçen eşyaların yüzlerine Yenisey runik yazısı ile Türk dilinde metinler yazmışlardır (Rygdylon 1951, 113-114). Bu sebeple söz konusu aynalar Yenisey Yazıtları arasında kabul edilmekte ve numaralandırılmaktadırlar. Yalınkaya bu bronz aynaların eski Çin'de hem sarayda ve halk arasındaki hediyelerle kullanıldığını, hem de yabancı ülke elçilerine sunulduğunu ve ilişkileri

güçlendirmek için tercih edildiğini belirtmiştir (2005, 1431). Yalınkaya ayrıca bunların içinde günümüzde Martyanov Minusinsk Müzesi'nde bulunan E 77 numaralı aynanın ait olduğu dönem için özel tasarım bir ayna olduğunu belirtir (2005, 1429).

Görüldüğü üzere Köktürkler gibi Yenisey Kırgızları da Çin ile tarih boyunca oldukça yoğun bir ilişki içinde bulunmuşlardır. Dolayısıyla üzerinde Çin hiyerogliflerinin bulunduğu ipek kumaşlar gibi buluntular söz konusuysen bu ilişkilerin Taştık döneminde de mevcut olmadığını ileri sürmek için bir sebep yoktur. Üstelik Çin ipeği ile kaplanmış ağaç eşyalar ve ipek giysiler, Taştıkların Han döneminde (MÖ 206 – MS 220) dahi Çin ile olan ilişkilerini açıkça göstermektedir (Zhukov 1956, 719).

Söz konusu devirlerde Çin'den getirilen eşyaların son derece değerli olması ve bu sebeple de saygınlık nesnesi olarak kabul edilmesi sebebiyle Han dönemi ipek kumaşlarına özellikle ölüm maskesi bulunan mezarlarda rastlanması, Kızlasov ve Useev'in yukarıda bahsedilen ve yalnızca yüksek sosyal statü sahibi kişilerin ölüm maskesi ile gömüldüğüne dair ifadeleri ile örtüşmektedir.

Bu konuda dikkate değer olduğu düşünülen, Hakas tarihçi ve halkbilimci Viktor Butanayev'e ait olan aşağıdaki ifadeleri aktarmak yerinde olacaktır. Sputnik Kırgızistan radyosunda tarihçi ve arkeolog Yulii Hudyakov ile birlikte röportaj veren Butanayev, günümüzde Hakaslar ve Tıvaların gündelik giysilerini geleneksel olarak keten ya da diğer kumaşlardan diktiklerini; fakat bayramlık giysilerin yalnızca Çin ipeğinden dikildiğini belirtmiştir. Butanayev ayrıca İpek Yolu'nun bir kolunun da eski Kırgız ülkesinden geçmesi sebebiyle bu geleneğin Yenisey Kırgızlarından kalmış olduğunu ifade etmiştir. (Tolkanov 2017). Görüldüğü üzere Çin ipeği ile ilgili gelenekler ve bu kumaşa verilen değer, Taştıklardan günümüz Sibiry Türklerine dek yaşatılmıştır.

Taştık maskelerinin yeniden yorumlanması üzerine bir çalışma

Günümüzde Rusya ve Hakasya'nın çeşitli müzelerinde muhafaza edilen bu ölüm maskelerinin orijinal görüntülerini içeren bir fotoğraf sergisi projesi ilk kez fizik ve matematik bilimleri alanında doktorası bulunan Sergey G. Narylkov ve Abakanlı fotoğrafçı Boris Dolinin tarafından gerçekleştirilmiştir. İlk olarak "Eski Hakasya'nın Yüzleri" adıyla (*Liki Drevney Hakasii*) Novokuznetsk Sanat Müzesi'nde 2009 yılında sergilenen fotoğraflar, Hakasya için çok önemli bir bilim adamı olan Leonid Romanoviç Kızlasov'un 85. doğum yıl dönümüne denk getirilmiştir. Novokuznetsk sanat müzesinde çalışan ve serginin de küratörü olan Natalia Rozhdestvenskaya, bugün maskelerin çoğunun parçalanmış halde olduğunu belirterek şunları söylemiştir (Shipilova 2009, 8):

Bu maskelerin yapımında öyle yüksek bir yetenek vardır ki, tek bir alçı parçasından kişinin tüm yüzü yeniden yapılandırılabilir. [...] Bu yüzler arasında şaşırtıcı derecede sakin ve huzurlu bir bilgenin yüzünü, henüz yaşamın tadını çıkaramamış genç bir erkeğin portresini, bir savaşçının sert ve ateşli yüzünü, bir prensesin asaletini, bir liderin güç ile sarmalanmış mağrur yüz çizgilerini görebilirsiniz.

Bu fotoğraf sergisi daha sonra Rusya'nın çeşitli şehirlerinde, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Finlandiya, Macaristan ve hatta Hindistan'da da sergilenmiştir.

Unutulmamalıdır ki fenotipik özellikler açısından günümüz Şor ve Hakaslarına benzeyen bu maskeler, ölü yakma geleneği sebebiyle söz konusu dönemde Hakas-Minusinsk vadisindeki insanların fiziksel görünüşleri hakkında bir yargıya varabilmek için tek kaynaktır (Kızlasov 1960, 150-151). Tam olarak bu sebeple şimdiye dek yapılmamış bir çalışma meydana getirmemiz için de ilham kaynağı olmuştur. Narylkov'un orijinal maske fotoğraflarından esinlenerek ortaya konulan ve ilk olarak "Yenisey Ölüm Maskeleri" adıyla gösterilen fotoğraf sergisi projemiz için söz konusu maskeler sanatsal bir üslupla yeniden yorumlanmıştır. Ancak Orta Asyalı modellerin yüzlerine yeniden yapılan kil maskelerde, orijinal renkler ve motifler birebir kopyalanmamış, bunun yerine Taştık dönemindekilere benzer renkler ve desenler farklı bir üslupla yeniden ortaya konulmuştur. Ayrıca bölgedeki İskit kurganlarının altın eşyalar bakımından zengin oldukları bilinmektedir. Bu sebeple Taştık döneminde yaşamış olan Türkleri canlandıran modellerin vücutlarına da altın varak uygulaması yapılmıştır (Okutan 2017a, 2017b).

Bir ekip çalışmasının ürünü olan bu projenin fotoğraf çekimi Ankara Sinema Akademisi kurucusu Hakan Kılıç tarafından gerçekleştirilmiş, kil maskelerin üzerindeki motiflerin çizimleri ise İranlı sanatçılar Aydın Yousefi Najmi ve Dorna Pirşahvirdi tarafından yapılmıştır. Orijinal fikrin ortaya konulması, projenin yaratılması ve yürütülmesi, fotoğraf çekiminin yönlendirilmesi, kostüm ve saç tasarımı gibi tüm detaylar ise tarafıma aittir. Kurganlardan çıkarılan 2000 yıllık mumyalarda olduğu gibi canlı modellerin saçları için de örgü tercih edilmiştir. Kostümler de modernize edilerek deri, kürk ve kuş tüyü detaylar ile hazırlanmıştır. Bu fotoğraf projesi Şaman Türklerin ölüm maskelerinin söz konusu coğrafyadan gelen gerçek modellerin yüzleri vasıtasıyla dünyada ilk defa sanatsal bir üslup katılarak yeniden canlandırılması bakımından önemlidir. Sergi ayrıca fotoğrafçılık, resim ve seramik gibi sanatın değişik kolları birlikte hareket ettiği takdirde, esas olarak bilim çevrelerine hitap eden bir konunun daha geniş çevrelere duyurulmasının mümkün olduğunu da göstermiştir (Okutan 2017a, 2017b).

Sergi ilk olarak Hacettepe Üniversitesi ve H.Ü. Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü'nün iş birliği ve desteği ile 4 Ocak 2017'de, ikinci olarak 9 Mayıs

2017’de Timur B. Davletov’un sergi küratörlüğünde TÜRKSOY (Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı) çatısı altında, daha sonra da 14 Aralık 2017’de Kırklareli Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Çağdaş Türk Lehçeleri ve Edebiyatları Bölümü’nde akademisyenler, öğrenciler ve sanatseverlerle buluşmuştur. 2000 yıl önceki Şaman Türklerin ölüm maskelerini günümüze taşıyan bu sergi son olarak 1 Mart 2018’de İstanbul’da Marmara Üniversitesi’nde, 19 Nisan 2018’de Samsun’da 19 Mayıs Üniversitesi’nde, 1 Mart 2019’da Zonguldak Bülent Ecevit Üniversitesi’nde, 13 Mart 2019’da Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi’nde, 15 Nisan 2019’da İstanbul Arel Üniversitesi’nde, 29 Nisan 2019’da Erciyes Üniversitesi’nde ve son olarak 25 Ekim 2019’da Kapadokya Üniversitesi’nde gösterilmiştir.

Ancak konu Türkoloji camiasında hak ettiği ilgiyi görmekten henüz oldukça uzaktır. Narylkov’un orijinal maskelerin fotoğraflarından oluşan sergisi ve tarafımızdan gerçekleştirilen yeniden yorumlama çalışması dışında ne Türkiye’de ne Rusya’da bu tarz başka bir çalışma vardır. Bununla birlikte Yenisey sahillerinde bulunan ölüm maskelerinin fotoğraf dışında başka sanatları nadir de olsa etkilediği görülmektedir. Nitekim Birleşik Krallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ortak yapımı Tomb Raider (Uthaug 2018) filminde Hakas topraklarında bulunan ölüm maskelerinden etkilenildiği açıkça belirtilmemiş olsa dahi anlaşılmaktadır. Filmde Japonya’nın bilinen en eski hükümdarı olan “Şaman kraliçe Himiko’nun (Miller, 2014) yaşamından esinlenen ve bu tarihsel figür üzerinden kurgulanan olayların başlangıcı Himiko’nun lahdinin açılmasıyla başlamaktadır. Bilindiği kadarıyla bahsi geçen kültürde ve kraliçe ile ilgili mitlerde herhangi bir ölüm maskesinin varlığına dair bir kayıt bulunmamaktadır. Ancak filmde lahit açıldığında efsanevi kraliçenin yüzünde Güney Sibirya kurganlarında keşfedilen tipik maskelerden biri olduğu görülmektedir. Filmdeki kil maskenin tüm detaylarının net bir biçimde Taştık ölüm maskelerini çağrıştırması ilgi çekicidir. Türk kültürüne ait bunun gibi pek çok değerın derinlemesine araştırılması, dünyaya tanıtılması ve pek tabii her şeyden önce korunabilmesi için yukarıda bahsi geçen örneklerin ilham verici olacağı kanısındayız.

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Ekler

Şekil 1. Solda S. Narylkov'un koleksiyonundan M. S. 3-4. yüzyıllara tarihlendirilen alçı maske. Fotoğraf: İ. A. Sedenkov. Bulunduğu yer: Devlet Doğu Eserleri Müzesi, Moskova. Sağda Taştık dönemi kadın maskesi, kil röprodüksiyon. Proje sahibi: Nükhet Okutan Davletov. Fotoğraf: Hakan Kılıç.



Kaynak: Sergey Narylkov, Nükhet Okutan Davletov 2017.



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Research Article

Understanding impacts of “Russian Orientalism” on post-Soviet elite-management in the Republic of Bashkortostan

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Abstract: The “Russian Orient” has as emerged as a popular area of study for specialists and political analysts with a predominant interest in Russia and Eurasia-related affairs. My primary aim in this work will be specifically to look deeper into this concept of the “Orient” inside Russia’s vast geography. Simultaneously, I will place emphasis on the Russian “otherization” process within this huge spatial realm, drawing upon a remarkable case study on Bashkiria, or to use its current official name, the Republic of Bashkortostan, in the Russian Federation. I will pose one general question to garner information on the current situation in Bashkortostan, being “How can we understand the political elite management process in this Federative Republic as a successful part of a general Russian-led Orientalist project?” In trying to find an answer to this question throughout the work, like in the imperial era, and as observed in the Soviet centralized totalitarianism, the post-Soviet state understanding in Russia will be treated as a kind of a “success story” in terms of its incorporation of large and varied segments of its population into its “orbit”.

Keywords: Orientalism, Russian Orientalism, Bashkortostan, Bashkir identity, political elites, Khamitov

Sovyet sonrası Başkurdistan Cumhuriyeti elit yönetiminde “Rus Oryantalizmi”nin etkilerini anlamak

Öz: “Rusya’nın Doğusu” terimi, Rusya ve Avrasya ile ilgilenen alan çalışmaları uzmanlarının ve siyasi analistlerin popüler konularından biridir. Benzer şekilde, bu çalışmadaki temel amacım özellikle Rusya’nın geniş coğrafyasında söz konusu “Doğu” kavramının derinliklerine inmek olacaktır. Bu bağlamda, Rusya Federasyonu’nun devasa mekânsal alanında, şu anki resmi adı Başkurdistan Cumhuriyeti üzerine dikkat çekici olduğunu düşündüğüm bir vaka çalışması yardımıyla Rusya’nın “ötekileştirme” sürecine vurgu yapılacaktır. Başkurdistan’ın şu anki durumu hakkında şu genel soruyu soracağım: Anılan Federatif Cumhuriyetteki siyasi elit yönetim sürecini Rus liderliğindeki Oryantalist bir projenin başarılı bir parçası olarak nasıl anlayabiliriz? Bu soruya cevap bulmaya çalışırken post-Sovyet sonrası Rus devlet anlayışı, imparatorluk yıllarında başladığı ve Sovyet merkezileştirilmiş totaliterciliğinde devam ettiği gibi, nüfusunun büyük ve çeşitli kesimlerini “yörüngesine” dahil etmede bir tür “başarı öyküsü” olarak kabul edilecektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Oryantalizm, Rus Oryantalizmi, Başkurdistan, Başkurt kimliği, Siyasi Elitler, Hamitov

Great-Russian chauvinism appears in the form of a striving to liquidate the Bashkir republic, basing its argument on the fact that the Bashkirs do not represent the predominant nationality of the republic (Carr 1957, 234)

Introduction

In the long imperial history of Russia, one part of its “Orient” lay within the conquered territories in the Caucasus, Idel/Volga or Central Asia (Turkestan). If considered usable at different times in historical process, Russia did not hesitate to make skilful use of their “self-confident European” or “colonial” character against their “inferior” or “culturally backward” eastern or southern neighbours, like in the case of the Soviet Orient – the *narody sovestkogo Vostoka* under the “modernizing” Party (Cronin 2015, 647–662). Hence, mainly in the first half of the 19th century, at the time when the first Orientologists were starting to propound their ideas in the related faculties, we began to see that between the “West” and “East”, “Russia’s dual position – dominating and dominated,

orientalized and orientaling” – being regarded also as one of the main determinants behind the “conceptions of Russia’s mission” into its Eastern territories (Knight 2002, 300). This special Russian status will be evaluated in this work in connection with a civilizer, superior and/or “combiner” mission between “Orient-Occident”, backed strongly by all of the elements of politics, economics, literature, etc. over “others”, usually referring to some “backward” societies in the Russian Orient.

Despite the presence of the broad realm known as the “Russian Orient” (Tolz 2011), the primary emphasis in this study will be in line with the Russian “otherization” process, making use of a special case study of Bashkiria, or to use its current official name, the Republic of Bashkortostan. I will ask one general question to clarify the current situation, being “How can we understand the elite-management process in the Republic of Bashkortostan as a successful part of a general Russian-led Orientalist project?”

Like in the imperial years, and as observed in Soviet centralized totalitarianism, the post-Soviet state can be regarded as a gigantic body that “continues to ‘incorporate’ large segments of the citizenry into its orbit, provide it with important resources, and undermine the legitimacy of the social actors with the help of controlled instruments of public agenda setting” (Lankina 2002, 1050). Bashkortostan will therefore constitute a valuable case study subject, allowing the moves of a desperate constituent body inside a larger union to be understood. Bashkortostan (along with Tatarstan) has been always considered “as a model of winning multi-ethnic states, mainly for the ability to bring together Christians and Muslims to live peacefully” (D’Agostino 2016, 32–33). That said, when compared to its most similar neighbourly brother in the region, namely Tatarstan, Bashkortostan can be seen as a historical victim of its conciliatory policies.

“Having been ‘colonized’ by a Tatar bourgeoisie (and thus unable) to develop their own language”, the people of Bashkir are sometimes seen as “a perverted form of Tatar” (Carr 1957, 232). In fact, beginning with the Russian invasions of their region in the 16th century, and after their voluntary involvement in the Russian expansion, “Bashkirs were driven off far and wide into the forests and mountains while the settlers appropriated their lands and their animals”. In this way, “the competition for the land between advanced Russian and backward Bashkir peasants” continued (Carr 1957, 225, 231). Meanwhile, the main ideas and tendencies of the local people and the evolution of their warlike attitudes into “loyalty to the state” over time served to allow an understanding of the issues historically and politically.

Coming to today, the current Republic of Bashkortostan – a region bordering Siberia –has since the Soviet times had an economy that is based on oil (accounting today for around 45percent of its industrial product), with the chemical and energy sectors being added more recently. The population of Bashkortostan is currently 30 percent Bashkir, 36 percent Russian and 25 percent Tatar. *Bashneft* is still the region’s largest petroleum company, producing more than 15 million tons of oil per year, and one of the few oil companies in Russia that is expanding (D’Agostino 2016, 34). The former head of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Rustem Zakievič Khamitov – a 62-year-old engineer known for his technocratic and reformist line and his special interest in foreign investment – surprisingly resigned from his post on October 11, 2018, to be replaced by another technocrat, the 55-year-old Radiy Faritovich Khabirov, who was appointed as the Acting Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Khamitov declared that he demanded himself his resignation from Russian President Vladimir Putin, with his saying that:

[...] regional leaders of a mature age should make decisions on the termination of their activities in a timely manner, and should resign with dignity, not under pressure from the higher levels or from below, nor due to extraordinary circumstances, but after careful consideration and without conflict.¹

We do not know exactly whether any “extraordinary circumstances” had played a role in his decision, but in the latter days of his term in office, Khamitov started to be subjected to harsh protests from the public. In one such demonstration on July 2017, hundreds of people amassed in the capital Ufa to demand his resignation from the Kremlin, carrying placards that read “We’re fed up!” citing the “closure of schools, the high child mortality rate and poor health care.”² It would not take much of a stretch of imagination to believe that the Kremlin had made some pre-emptive moves before the demonstrations could harm the stability of one of the key Republics in the Russian Federation.

Unlike his predecessor Rakhimov, who had been elected to office, Khamitov was appointed to his position in 2010, and the Russian government changed the bestowed title from “President” to “Head” of the Republic in order to signify the diminishing autonomy of the regional republics. As would be expected, in the last Presidential Elections in the Russian Federation (RF) in 2012, general support

¹ See, “Official website of the Government of the Republic of Bashkortostan” in <https://www.pravitelstvorbu.ru>. (last accessed on February 10, 2020).

² From the article “Protesters Call for Resignation of Kremlin Appointed Head of Bashkortostan” in RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty in https://www.rferl.org/author/rfe-rls-tatar-bashkir-service/ykt_qp (last accessed on February 10, 2020).

for Putin was at 63.6 percent, whereas in the Autonomous Republic of Bashkortostan it was 80.13 percent.

In such an environment, Bashkortostan's situation is seen as "complicated by its ethnic make-up" by many experts in the field (Gorenburg 1999, 247). With its unsupportive demography, the desperate situation in the Republic has been perpetuated due even to such "brotherly neighbours" like Tatarstan that has seemed to maintain an effective role politically, economically and socially in the Bashkirian territories. Underlining some historical facts, Carr states that for most of the pre-Soviet years, "the Bashkir population was almost totally illiterate, that there was no Bashkir written language, and that, apart from a tiny handful of Bashkir intellectuals, anyone in the territory possessing even rudimentary education or administrative capacity was a Russian or a Tatar" (Carr 1957, 223). The Russian Orientalist ideology has been nurtured by such contentions in its "Orient" and by the traditional policies of "divide and rule", with the ultimate goal of maintaining and reinforcing the hegemonic superiority. Elite-management is therefore a key concept in the relations between Moscow and Ufa.

Thus, throughout the paper, in response to the main question posed above, we will seek to understand how the centralist exceptionalist power in Moscow, which had once allowed a nationalist leader in Bashkortostan (namely, first and only post-Soviet Bashkir President Rakhimov between 1993–2010), could so easily replace this elected figure as an expired President with an appointed technocrat (namely Khamitov, the Head – not President – since 2010 of Bashkortostan), and then with another (this time a younger) technocrat, Khabirov in 2018. Accordingly, we will analyse how these current policies are compatible with the traditional Russian Orientalist line applied to its subjects.

Methodological approach: Understanding the discourse of Orientalism and the constructed power of Russian exceptionalism

Orientalism, in its famous definition by Edward Said, is "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and most of the time 'the Occident'" (Said 2003, 3). Hence, as stated by Said and his followers, through "the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions (...) and so on", Orientalist discourse is accepted as a functional tool for understanding the general project of "domination and/or imperialism" (Said 2003, 2–3). In this case, Orientalism, may be analysed also "as a discourse wherein the orient is identified as the other" – being a discourse that is highly related with the concept of "power" or as a hegemonic view of the powerful over of the inferiority of the Other, usually of the "East" (Ramakrishnan 1999, 138). Said's critique can be

understood consequently as “a discourse of domination”, and “beyond identifying a body of literature as ‘Orientalist’, seeks to relate it to theories of discourse and power”, especially through work of Michel Foucault (Halliday 1993, 148–149; Foucault 1980).

It is well understood that Said’s Orientalism is mainly a “British and French cultural enterprise”, and that “he dealt with Germany only in passing and with Russia hardly at all” (Cronin 2015, 651). That said, the powerful discourse and dichotomies found within the approach make it an attractive variant that deserves particular attention in the special case of Russia for its entire history. Thus, from the imperial era up until the advent of the USSR, and then finally to the period of the current Federation in the post-Cold War years, relations between Moscow (in the imperial years, St. Petersburg) and some of its federative bodies served as good examples of the “Other” under the authority of a “Superior” centre (Khalid 2000, 694). From the Russian side, according to such key scholars as Prof. Vitaly Naumkin – an active Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), and the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in RAS who served as the Chair at the Faculty of World Politics, Moscow State University – “the Russian word for Orientalism – *vostokovedenie* – has always had only one meaning, and is never referred to anything but only to ‘Oriental studies’” (Naumkin 2004, vii-viii). For Bustanov, it should be kept in mind that “after 1917, Soviet Oriental studies emerged as a state-organized discipline with a clear political agenda” (Bustanov 2015, xi-xii).

In fact, the evolution of Russian self-esteem, the starting point of which may date back to the advent of imperial Russia under Peter the Great at the beginning of the 18th century, was also in line with the “us/them categorization” denoted in Said’s Orientalism which tells us about the West that

managed to establish authoritative and dominant knowledge about the Orient and its peoples, [and thus] to study the Orient was ultimately [based on] a political vision whose structure promoted a binary opposition between the familiar (the West/us) and the strange (the Orient/them) (Abrahamsen 2003, 200).

The main idea behind the Orient/Occident dichotomy to Russia, in which Russia was neither fully western nor eastern, but rather “inserted between the West and East”, has been a well-used pretext for Russian rulers and representatives of the Academia in the world-leading Institutes of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg, Kazan and Moscow. Knight argues, as one such scholar writing on Russian Orientalism, that “like its Western analogues, Russian discourse on Asia was predicated on an assumption of cultural superiority and interwoven with an array of tropes denoting the indolence, despotism,

deviousness, and depravity of the Asiatic ‘other’” (Knight 2000/Fall, 709–710). In Russia, the “others” were the “all around-in ethnic enclaves penetrating deep into the heartland of Russian settlement, in scattered settlements and in vast stretches of borderland in which ethnic groups met and interacted over the course of centuries” (Knight 2000/Spring, 99).

Indeed, from a methodological point of view, we can follow the path of critical discourse. For the case of the Russian Orientalist attitude, some connections may be found with some “speech acts routinely and unconsciously using homeland-making phrases; small unnoticed words such as ‘we’, ‘the’ people, ‘this’ country, ‘here’, ‘society’ and so on” (Haldrup, Koefoed and Simonsen 2006, 176–177). This underlines the significance of the discourse and considerable dichotomies, resulting in what it can be referred to as “practical Orientalism”, being “is the translation of hegemonic discourses into everyday practices so that they enter into the habitual spaces of ordinary experience” (Haldrup, Koefoed and Simonsen 2006, 183). In this way, the construction of Otherness may turn into an “embodied practice”. As Knight argues, “about Empires in general and the Russian Empire in particular”, they provided the “means for precisely such an intermingling, hybridization and assimilation” through such embodied practices, and via a practical kind of Orientalism (Knight 2002, 302–303).

Supposedly, Academia and the first Orientologists, since their emergence in the imperial years, actually backed the Russian hegemony in its constructed region with the “depiction of Europe as threat to Russia” and with its “eastward-facing” identity (Schimmelpenninck 2010). Russia was seen to continue to behave as a superpower-like statist leader that behaved with an understanding and appreciation of its “East”. Accordingly, we were to see also, socially via the territorial expansions and the new invaded lands, a natural amalgamation of Russian society with other communities, such as the Tatars, bringing added values to the national identity. So once the strong Russian nation state becomes the reality, it is accepted by everyone, with all of its nationalist features, its economic successes, and its social and political gains, and emerges as the main determinant also in the fluidity and sociality of the individuals within. This may also open the way easily for “Us” (Russians) to be considered different to “Them”, according to some political/social/economic agenda. In this way, sometimes a state on the European continent, or sometimes an ethnic identity on the Kazakh or Bashkir steppe, may transform into the “Other” in this way of thinking. However it should be kept in mind that despite Russia not being considered a full member of the so-called “Occidental world”, it nevertheless has

not hesitated to approach its Orient as a moderate “modernizing” or “civilizing” Leader.

Going Deeper into history for the Bashkir identity

The Bashkirs held their land under the Mongol Khanate of Kipchak from the 13th to the 15th centuries, until the area was invaded by the Russians in 1552, who then “founded Ufa in 1574 and thereafter began colonization of the area, dispossessing the Bashkirs.” This resulted in several Bashkir uprisings that were harshly repressed, and as early as 1629, some Bashkirs began to “enroll in Russian service.” Bashkirs as *inorodtsy* or “alien origin people” served long and successfully in the Russian army, especially up until the end of the 19th century (Baumann 1987, 489–491). Their successful warrior characteristic, loyal to the Russian rulers, was a distinctive feature of the Bashkirs, and led to additional linkages between Russians-Bashkirs whose related histories have been subjected to deep analysis by various leading scholars (Donnelly 1968; Akiner 1986; Togan 2003; and Schimmelpenninck 2010).

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the culturally, politically and economically developed neighboring Kazan province had a superior position compared to Bashkiria. Due to its complicated demography and administrative units, the region was known in different circles as the “Kazan Province”, “the Ufa governor generalship” or the “Orenburg Province”, until finally, after 1881, its central part started to be known as the “Ufa Province”, but regardless of the name, the Russian suzerainty remained unchanged in the rule of this structure.

The Bashkir lands were in fact the centre of the most important mining and smelting operations in Russia. The considerable mineral resources led Russian forces to exploit the land to the maximum level, and to force the Bashkir peasants to work the mines and factories as what would resemble “slave labour”. The Bashkirs came to object to the seizure of their land, and in the 18th century in particular there were several uprisings against Russian imperialism, such as the famous *Pugachev* rebellion of 1773 that was strongly supported by the Bashkirs, who fought under the leadership of their own Salavat Yulai (Yalçın 2005).

As Tepeyurt argues, “beginning with the enlightened policies of Peter the Great, the Russian authorities began to consider the natives as ‘others’ and increasingly took a condescending and often hostile attitude toward the indigenous people”. He continues:

The Russian government attempted to assimilate Bashkirs and other non-Russian peoples of the region, including measures to sedentarize the nomadic Bashkirs, and attempted to proselytize Orthodox Christianity among them. In the long term, such efforts had mixed

results. On the one hand, by the early nineteenth century most Bashkirs had shifted from pastoralism to agriculture, and became loyal Russian subjects, fighting in the Russian army against Napoleon. On the other hand, they became increasingly Islamicized. [...] The Russian policies of repression and the sedentarization of the Bashkirs inspired and enabled their full embrace of Islam [...] Their rebelliousness had been broken, but their resistance to Russian assimilation gained another dimension as a national group. Consequently the imperial policies of the Russian authorities had modernized a native group and connected them to the wider world (Tepeyurt 2001, ii-iii).

At the end of the day, it can be claimed that “imperial officials did not simply seek to govern the Bashkirs, but rather to transform and rationalize life in Bashkiria,” meaning that as a civilizer or superior ruler, the Russian state “quite explicitly believed they were extending the benefits of European – not specifically Russian – civilization to what they perceived as backward, Asiatic Russia” (Steinwedel 2016, 105–107). For some key rulers like Stalin, the notion that the “Muslim areas of the Russian Empire were inhabited by ‘culturally backward peoples’” must be helped in ensuring their survival “from medievalism and national oppression” (Khalid 2001, 153). This brought for the Bashkirs also a rapid “Russification” or sometimes “Tatarization” of their schools (Carr 1957, 228)

The beginning of the 20th century and the revolutionary years were critical also in Bashkirian history. Under the leadership of such young elites as Zeki Velidi Togan, known more commonly as Validov, “the idea that this land should be a national territory for Bashkirs” opened the path to the Bashkir Autonomous Republic in 1919, although it would be overthrown shortly after its formation by the Bolsheviks (Togan 1999). These national feelings of the Bashkirs in the early years of the 20th century were bound to certain factors by notable historian E.H. Carr. He argues that “the Bashkirs, unlike the Tatars, made good soldiers, and were under the Tsarist regime regularly enrolled for military service”, bringing them “special rights” and enabling “them to retain some sense of separate national identity” (Carr 1957, 219).

Secondly, “the beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a small group of educated Bashkir intelligentsia, which was connected with the class of well-to-do Bashkir landowners and that developed embryonic nationalist aspirations.” Finally, this intellectual rise was seen as compatible with the dreams of “future Bashkir autonomy within the Russian Empire that would lead to total emancipation from the Russian and Tatar languages and cultures, with the support of Bashkir nationalists who “seem to have consistently hated and feared the Tatars more than the Russians” (Carr 1957, 219).

The Bashkir Autonomous Republic in 1919 was among the first such republics in the Soviet Union. Famous historian Richard Pipes documented how the Bashkir people had been weakened continuously at the beginning of the 20th century, when under the effect of the revolutionary years, hopes were still fresh for an independent Bashkir state. For Pipes, the Bashkir lands were too economically valuable to leave in the hands of its people, as some famous Western Orientalists have argued for other Asian territories. Consequently, repressions and clashes began to escalate in 1918, such that by 1926, according to a census in the region, the Bashkir population had been reduced to 700,000, down from an estimated 2,000,000 prior to 1920 (Pipes 1950, 318). The following quote by Pipes summarizes the situation in the 1920s very well, and provides a background to the dilemmas of the Bashkirian elite today:

By means of the Party, the Russians deprived the Bashkirs systematically of control over their army, secret police, and government, until the Bashkirs were stripped of all authority over their homeland. Instead of the greater independence which they hoped to gain, they lost even that privilege of self-rule which they enjoyed in Tsarist Russia. In this contest, the Communist Party, which acted as the tool of the colonist against the poor Bashkir, played anything but the role of an impartial leader of the oppressed of all nationalities (Pipes 1950, 319).

This decline in population numbers and the *de facto* de-Bashkirization of Bashkiria seems to have left its mark on the structures of the present day, with ethnic Bashkirs accounting for only around 30 percent of the population of the Republic, “only three-quarters of whom speak Bashkir as their native language”, and where the Bashkir elites have been “especially cautious in promoting sovereignisation so as not to alienate the Russian and Tatar majority” (Gorenburg 1999, 263). In what remained of the Soviet era, attempts were made to compensate for all the “national inequalities and national animosities in the USSR” with “powerful instruments of centralization” and industrialization, and therefore with “*russification*, since Russian was the only conceivable common language and the only language possessing technical literature and a technical vocabulary” (Carr 1957, 231). Thus, the new Soviet society, in which the Bashkirs were also included, was a community “of the five-year plans to which all nationalities were admitted on equal terms, but which had nevertheless a distinctively Russian base” (Carr 1957, 232).

Bashkortostan's first decades in post-Soviet times: rising national awareness among the Bashkirian elite

After the collapse of the USSR, as expected, the former communist elite retained power in Bashkortostan. Murtaza Rakhimov, the director of an Ufa petrochemical plant, after the collapse of the communist party, quickly consolidated his authority through the removal of his rivals. He served as President between 1993 and 2010 – as highly controversial, highly ethnic and nationalist period, but mostly free from harsh Russian domination. Ontologically, the Bashkir political elite should be considered a fairly unified entity, centred on the executive branch (President), who appoints the heads of administrations of cities, *raiony* and districts within cities. As we will see throughout the following sections, the term “President” was changed to “Head” in 2010, although the Head is still considered the sole superior above all the other political elites. As mentioned in official sources,

the Head of the Bashkortostan Republic is the highest official in the Bashkortostan Republic, and chairs the Government of the Bashkortostan Republic. The term of office for the Head of the Bashkortostan Republic is five years. The authority of the Head of the Bashkortostan Republic is set by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, by federal laws, by the Constitution of the Bashkortostan Republic and by the laws of the Bashkortostan Republic.³

That said, the nomination for the Presidency-Head comes from the Russian President (Putin), who has the right to nominate candidates for regional leadership positions under a 2004 law that cancelled gubernatorial elections.

Gorenburg summarizes the first years of Bashkortostan well in his article, explaining different stages of Bashkirian post-Cold War policies in its transition into a successful autonomous body. Thus as he argues, in the first period, from 1991 to 1995, it can be observed that for the elites, as a result of the “demographic status” and because “ethnic Bashkirs were in too weak a position to publicly press claims determination because of their as only the third largest group in the republic” (Gorenburg 1999, 252), ethnic or nationalist matters were in the second place, while leaders chose to “fashion a campaign that emphasized economic sovereignty” (Gorenburg 1999, 253).

The “Bashkir World Congress” held in Ufa in June 1995 was seen as a turning point in the discourse of the elites regarding nationalist and/or ethnic feelings. President Rakhimov spoke at that Congress demanding the “expansion

³ From the official webpage of the Head of Bashkortostan at <http://glavarb.ru> (last accessed on February 10, 2020).

of native language education”, and the “rebuilding of threatened cultural traditions and a reversal of the assimilation of Bashkirs by more numerous ethnic groups” (Gorenburg 1999, 254). He also called on Russia to help Bashkirs everywhere in the Federation to “reverse the numerical decline of the Bashkir population”. In fact, as Gorenburg argues Bashkir “politicians who had for years side-stepped nationalist concerns in speeches came out sounding like moderate nationalists” (Gorenburg 1999, 254-255).

So “after a cautious start, Bashkir leaders have started to pursue an increasingly broad programme of Bashkir ethnic revival”, and with the election of Rakhimov and afterwards, for commentators like Gorenburg, the ethnicization (i.e. Bashkirization), daily politics was at one of its highest levels when compared to similar autonomous republics at that time (Gorenburg 1999, 265). Among the ethnic policies were those calling for “the replacement of many non-Bashkir officials with Bashkirs”, the expansion of “the socio-economic infrastructure in Bashkir-populated regions”, preferential treatment of Bashkirs in employment, “establishing quotas for Bashkirs applying to universities” and “establishing mandatory quotas for Bashkirs in all spheres of employment.” These were accompanied by calls for cultural policies through which the Bashkirian language would be attributed equal weight with the Russian and Tatar languages at both administrative and educational levels (Gorenburg 1999, 265).

Firdaus Khisamitdinova, Bashkortostan's Minister of Education at the time, who “made the provision of Bashkortostan-produced textbooks a major priority in her administration,” had the following to say in an interview in the summer of 1997:

Before, we didn't even know our own mushrooms – we learned everything only from Moscow. We want to teach children to love their own Bashkortostan! In geography, for example, before we learned about the whole world and all of Russia, but not about our own homeland of Bashkortostan. People living in Ufa were unable to learn anything about the rest of Bashkortostan (Graney 1999, 615).

It can also be said that as the “titular ethnic group did not comprise the dominant majority of the population,” being strong only at a governing elite level, the leadership did not completely abandon their “cautious” positions (Gorenburg 1999, 270). Subsequently, the formal ethno-federalism of the Soviet times was perpetuated as the “autonomy of the local elites” after 1991, and this served firstly the interests and autonomy of the governor. On the other hand, despite these cautious moves, what seems to be being consolidated in these republics like Bashkortostan, then, is “not democracy, but an ethnically exclusive autocratic system of machine politics that political opponents have dubbed

ethnocracy, or a kind of regionalization of autocracy” (Hale 1998, 3–4). Behind the democratic façade, no opponent stands a chance, and sometimes the “ethno-centric autocracy” that has undermined even the internal Russian elements has become a reality.

Can these first nationalist sentiments in Bashkortostan be regarded as an antidote to Russian Orientalism? This may be another point for discussion, but what can be said at the outset is that there is no pretext for anti-democratic tendencies in the name of protecting a special group from the “others”. It is evident that in an oil- and industry-rich strategic region like Bashkortostan, before democratic preconditions, economic potential may sometimes come first and for the sake of stability, Moscow would seem to prefer also “tacit approval” for such autocratic rule for a while (Gravinghot 2002, 190).

On the other hand, in response to the question of “why the Russian central administration chose to give such tacit – but also risky – approval to these brave ethnic moves by Bashkortostan” (aside from the fact that the start of the post-Soviet era the Russian central authority lacked the necessary strength to enter into arguments with the regional elites), Yalçın comes up with a satisfactory explanation: “Moscow, fearing that Tatarstan might emerge as the hegemonic power in the Middle Volga, sought to strengthen the position of Bashkortostan against Tatarstan. This ‘divide and rule’ tactic characterized Moscow’s negotiations with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the post-Soviet era” (Yalçın 1999, 3). Such an attitude may also be in harmony with the imperial logic of rational Russian rulers, especially in their relatively weaker state in the 1990s and the first years of the 2000s.

Russian Orientalism revealed – Bashkortostan under its new “Head” Khamitov

As many commentators share, the Putin era saw the return of a strong Russian state that put Russia and Russians first, as had been the case in the imperial and most of the Soviet eras. When compared to the Yeltsin era, and such famous advice as “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” during a trip to Kazan and Ufa, Putin’s centralized system is definitely closer to the traditional Russian hegemonic ideal that goes hand-in-hand with a possible Orientalist agenda. We will see that for this reason, in the name of maximizing the power of the central government vis-à-vis the regions, the outcome of Putin’s federal reforms aimed to diminish or completely obliterate the personal power of the regional leaders who had rapidly switched to following their own agenda during the Yeltsin administration (Yalçın 1999, 50). As a result, the “unbalanced system in which regional governments were given vast amounts of autonomy in return for their

support of and unity with Yeltsin's national government" came to an end with Putin's 'vertical power' that "transferred regional power back to the center" (Shah, 2).

In July 2010, following a three-hour closed-door meeting with Putin, longtime Bashkir President Rakhimov resigned, only months after the long-serving President of Tatarstan, Shaimiyev had left office in April 2010. The suggestion that "their departures provided an opportunity for Moscow to reconsolidate control over the two regions and integrate their substantial energy resources into the larger state-owned firms like Gazprom and Rosneft, and pointing to increased confidence on the part of the Kremlin to contain any potential outbreak of violence in the country's restive Muslim region"⁴ can be considered accurate.

Rustem Khamitov, the new Head "appointed" to Bashkortostan, states in his personal biography:

I came upon politics on the wave of perestroika at the end of the 80s and was elected to the Supreme Council of the Republic. I was very active, offered many ideas and once I was noticed, people started to promote me. I never was an office seeker, I never carried out the intrigue against anybody; I just did my job and was always either invited or directed to a new position: this is what happened with the Emergencies Ministry, and with the tax and water resources agencies, and this is what happened now.⁵

One of the first acts of this "invited and directed" figure in 2011 was, not surprisingly, to abolish the compulsory Bashkir language courses, which led to some political protests and demonstrations (Mihailov 2016, 75), and protests by Bashkir activists in front of the FSB building in Ufa. "Activists from the Bashkir Youth Union (BYI) launched a hunger strike on March 3 to protest the alleged 'police pressure' against Bashkir nationalists, and to demand the release of former BYI leader Artur Idelbayev and Bashkir activist Ayrat Dilmukhametov" (Coalson 2011). Direct interventions by Khamitov brought an end to the protests, including around 150 hunger strikes.

Vladimir Ryzhkov, an opposition politician, in an analysis of the period, stated that

⁴ See the Stratfor Analysis entitled "The End of Bashkir and Tatar Independence" in <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-end-bashkir-and-tatar-independence> (last accessed February 10, 2020).

⁵ From the personal webpage of the new/current Bashkir President Khamitov in <http://glavarb.ru/eng/hamitov/osebe/> (last accessed February 10, 2020).

the very ideology that Putin is imperial [...], *de facto* he is building a new Russia on this bureaucratic-police vertical as an empire, [...] installing in [places like to Bashkortostan] *de facto* appointed governors, removing any influence of local societies over the power structures [...] all controlled from Moscow" (Coalson 2011).

It is no secret that Moscow, under Putin, does not hesitate to make use of religious or spiritual relations, given the importance of Islam in the modern form of the Bashkir identity. It is also true that Catherine II the Great, as another key figure, was fully aware of this value, and that's why "the Empress of All the Russias permitted the establishment of a *Muftī*, and revoked the prohibition on the building of mosques." Today, Putin similarly organizes regular meetings with religious figures and the heads of the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Ufa (D'Agostino 2016, 32). Thanks to Talgat Tadzhuiddin, the Grand *Muftī* of Russia (but for most commentators, no more than an *apparatchik* of Moscow), Putin's endeavours to stabilize the Russian hegemony within Russian Islam has become easier. This goes some way to explaining some of the regularly more interesting statements from Tadzhuiddin, such as his comment during the IV Bashkirs' *Qoroltai* soon after the Russian military intervention in Syria. He reported there "what he said to President Putin a few days before: 'Vladimir Vladimirovič, perhaps we should do to Syria and Israel what we have done to Crimea? [...] We ought to take [them]. May Russia extend to Mecca'" (D'Agostino 2016, 32–33).

The end of the Khamitov period, however, was as sudden as its beginning. Towards the end of his term in 2017, and also into 2018, protests calling for his removal on the streets of Ufa and in other Bashkortostan's cities escalated. Khamitov declared that based on his own choice (not as a result of some "extraordinary events", but mainly due to his old age), he had tendered his resignation to the Kremlin, which was accepted on October 11, 2018. Another term under another (this time younger) technocrat began, and there are many scholars and area specialists who are keeping a close eye on how Acting Head Khabirov can contribute to the perpetuation of Bashkir history.

Conclusion

Khamitov, speaking at a Conference, said that "over the past 450 years since the voluntary joining of our region with Russia, Bashkortostan has accumulated many centuries of valuable experience in the cohabitation of peoples." ⁶ Evidently, this voluntary engagement with Russia was achieved on the condition

⁶ From the speech by R.Z.Hamitov, the President of the Republic of Bashkortostan, at the "IX Congress of Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia", see, <http://www.cdum.ru/en/news/60/2989/> (last accessed 10 February 2020).

that Bashkortostan would be allowed to maintain its territorial integrity and Islamic faith; and still these preconditions are on the table in Bashkir-Russian relations. On the other hand, Steinwedel touches on a significant dimension, suggesting that throughout this journey of the Bashkirian elites alongside Russia, “efforts to restructure and rationalize Bashkir life have intruded deeply into Bashkirs’ lives. For a century, imperial officials had discussed forcing Bashkirs to give up their semi-nomadic pastoralism in favor of settled agriculture in order to make them more governable and productive”, although “the combination of service, status and education in Bashkiria, however, allowed a non-Russian elite to live relatively well” (Steinwedel 2016, 105–107).

For the post-Soviet situation of Bashkirian elites, it would be fair to say that as the first and only elected President of Bashkortostan, “Rakhimov tried to resist by playing the nationalist card” (Petrov, 2010), but his anti-democratic inclinations and solely ethnic-based moves had provided legitimate ground for the traditional Orientalist rulers of Moscow to reform and suppress the “radical other”. This radical “other” (Rakhimov, in this case) was replaced with a new name – Khamitov – (and currently, by the younger Khabirov) who was seen actually as an “agent” or “Kremlin insider” of Moscow by many circles (Goble, 2016).

In fact, these regional experiences explained in this paper show us, Saidian and Foucauldian senses for the explanations of domination and power-relations have repeated as they did in the imperial Russia or in Soviet times. “The history of the Bashkirs” has been “one of conflict and integration” and “of constant, multipolar negotiations about the names and identity of the people, their status and their territory”, claims Steinwedel (Steinwedel 2016, 5). Accordingly, “Russia’s historical role in Eurasia as an oppressive hegemon or bringer of enlightenment” or, “depending on the angle of vision – both at the same time – has proved intellectually fruitful, as have discussions generated by Said and other models of imperial domination” (David-Fox 2006). In comprehending this, it may be useful and more helpful to go deeper into the understanding of the identification of “the other” in relation to some Foucauldian “power” discourse, which could be a source for any continuing theoretical researches in this area.

Hence, while understanding Orientalism in this paper together with the issue of “civilizing the Orient”, we must also emphasize that in the Russian case, throughout the historical periods in question, under the effect of the main wars and conflicts with their European counterparts, and also as a response to the continuing European Orientalism toward Russia in which it is actually treated as another “backward/inferior” or “Asian” society, a specific distance was maintained by Russian circles from the “West”, and the idea of a fundamental

difference between Russia and the West has been always observable also in an intellectual sense. In this regard, taking historical and geographical accounts as a starting point, it can be argued that in policy evaluations of the “Russian continuity”, starting with the Muscovite power of the Czars, and passing through the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia, up until the current final form of the Russian Federation (RF), Russia’s “exceptional position” must be always paid special attention.

In this regard, while Orientalism has long been linked with “Western” sources of power, the case of Russia and its hybrid status as a historical “dominant” state with a strong sense of nationalism and statism forces us to consider a “Russian kind of Orientalism” in its relations with “others”. In this kind of Orientalism, in contrast to the usually unfavourable results of the Orient/Occident dichotomy, “elite management” - as seen in the Bashkirian case - may lead to the relative success in transforming the sense of “otherness” into a feeling of “serving unity”. However it should be kept in mind that like a “Foucauldian Panopticon”, the big Brother (Russia) with his “exceptionalist” and “Orientalist” outlook has always continued to put an eye on their brothers/sisters and has not stopped to determine the main rules of the “unity” among them throughout the history.

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Research Article

British colonial expansion through the Indian diaspora: the pattern of Indian overseas migration

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Abstract: Historically, India played a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of the British Empire overseas. Through the conquest of India, the British not only acquired great material wealth and secured the accumulation of industrial capital, but also obtained a sizeable pool of skilled human resources to facilitate its colonial expansion. At present, the total number of overseas Indians has exceeded 30 million, making up the second largest Diaspora after that of China. This massive immigrant group and its overseas distribution were inseparable from the British conquest of India and its borrowing and export of human resources to India. Through conscription, the recruitment of service personnel, the exile of criminals and the utilization of indentured labour, the British colonial rulers transferred Indian manpower to other colonies to serve their colonialist interests. This expansion was also accompanied by the movement of a large number of Indian businessmen, and all these Indian immigrants would lay the basic foundation and structure of today's global Indian Diaspora.

Keywords: British Empire, Indian Diaspora, colonial expansion

Hint diasporası ile İngiliz sömürgeci yayılması: Hint denizaşırı göçü örneği

Öz: Tarihsel olarak Hindistan denizaşırı Britanya İmparatorluğu'nun kurulması ve sürdürülmesinde çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Hindistan'ın fethi aracılığıyla İngilizler sadece büyük maddi zenginlik elde etmek ve sanayi

sermayesi birikimini tamamlamakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda sömürgeci yayılmasını kolaylaştırmak için büyük bir yetenekli insan kaynağı havuzu da temin etmiştir. Günümüzde, Çin diasporasının ardından en büyük ikinci diasporayı oluşturan denizaşırı Hintlilerin toplam sayısı 30 milyonu aşmış durumdadır. Bu muazzam göçmen grubu ve denizaşırı dağılımı, İngilizlerin Hindistan'ı fethi ve insan kaynaklarının temini ile Hindistan'a ihracatından ayrılmazdı. İngiliz sömürge yöneticileri, askere alma, hizmet personelinin işe alımı, suçluların sürgün edilmesi ve senetli kölelik yoluyla, Hint insan gücünü sömürgeci çıkarlarına hizmet etmek için diğer kolonilere aktarmıştır. Bu yayılmaya çok sayıda Hintli iş adamı da eşlik etmiştir. Bütün bu Hintli göçmenler bugünkü Hint diasporasının temelini ve yapısını küresel ölçekte ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Britanya İmparatorluğu, Hint diasporası, sömürgeci yayılma

Introduction

According to the latest official statistics from the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Indian migrants number 30 million across 208 countries, making them the second largest group of immigrants in the world, second only to the Chinese (MEA). This large-scale immigration and its overseas settlement pattern is closely related to the British Empire's conquest of the Indian continent and its leverage of the nation's human resources. It should be noted that the massive Indian overseas emigration phenomenon from post-independent India is quite different from that of the colonial time. In the British colonial era, the Indian migration coincided with the expansion of British colonialism and the Empire's maintenance of order in the newly-acquired territories, which shaped the current population distribution of overseas Indians across the globe (except for the case in the United States). The British rulers deployed Indian manpower to other colonies through of conscription, as service personnel, as convicts and as indentured laborers to serve colonial interests. This was a large-scale organization, aside from being a colonial conquest. Of course, this expansion saw the movement of a large number of Indian businessmen. In short, the above-mentioned immigration groups laid the basic foundation and structure of today's global Indian Diaspora. In this regard, studying the phenomenon of overseas Indian immigrants from the perspective of British colonial rule and the utilization of manpower in India will both provide an understanding of the world of overseas Indian immigrants, and serve as a necessary research foundation. Based

on a discussion of British colonial conquest and overseas dominance, this paper introduces how the large-scale and organized Indian migration occurred, and then analyses the different immigration patterns and categories of overseas Indians respectively. Finally, the paper discusses the contemporary influence of these immigrant groups.

The status of India and its overseas immigrants in the British colonial system

To some extent, the history of mankind is also a history of migration. The global immigration has been a continuous phenomenon since ancient times, although it was the “Age of Discovery” that truly kicked off a cascading series of migration that linked the Old and New Worlds. There were two great waves of colonial expansion and exploitation initiated by the Europeans: the first lasted from the end of the 15th century to the end of the 18th century, and was driven primarily by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Italian, English and French; while the second wave was marked by the rise of Germany in 1870, and ended with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Global travel and migration developed at an astonishing pace during the period of European colonial expansion (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 103–105). Simultaneously, the Russian Empire was embarking on its own imperialistic conquest along the borders of the steppe that ran roughly from Eastern Europe, passing through Central Asia and continuing to Mongolia and China (including Russia’s invasion and annexation of more than 1.5 million square kilometres of land from China), as well as into Siberia, the Kamchatka peninsula, Sakhalin and the vast area of Alaska. The result was a vast empire that stretched from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east, and from the Arctic Ocean to the north to the Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Lake Baikal to the South. Countries such as Germany, Japan and the United States joined the club of imperialist powers, with Germany and Japan obtaining large areas of foreign territory through aggressive wars, while the United States expanded its territory in North America through constant invasions, acquiring certain colonies abroad (the largest of which was the Philippines, which was captured from Spain).

Over nearly four centuries of colonial expansion, aside from countries like China, Thailand (Siam), Japan, Turkey, and Persia (Iran), the continents of America, Africa, Asia and Oceania were almost completely colonized by Europeans. Although China, Turkey, Persia, and other countries were not completely colonized, they were carved up by foreign powers competing for “spheres of influence”, and therefore lost their independence and sovereign integrity. Japan has its own unique story, being transformed through the Meiji Restoration under the slogan “Fukoku Kyohei” (rich country; strong army), setting a course toward military might and conquest that eventually brought

Japan into the troubling arena of colonialism and imperialism by wreaking disaster on neighbouring countries. Through colonial expansion, the European colonialists and their descendants took control of the entire world, aside from the Japanese Empire. The colonies of the Americas gained independence in late 18th century and the early 19th century, although these new countries were controlled entirely by European immigrants and their descendants, rather than by the natives. Thus, the newly established American countries should actually be considered European settlements. Japan also emerged as a notorious imperialist country due to its immense greed and brutal, sadistic treatment of the indigenous peoples in its colonies. Considering the combination of Japanese colonies in the Asia-Pacific region with colonies founded by other imperialist countries, almost the entire world fell under the grip of colonial rulers or imperialist aggressors.

The end of World War I opened a door on new era, witnessing the gradual disintegration of the global colonial system and the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. The basic structure of the imperialist colonial system and its hegemonic system remained unchanged in the aftermath of the war, while the political landscape and power structure had been changed forever in Europe. During that time, several new independent countries were formed in Europe, while European colonial rule on other continents remained almost intact. The declaration of self-determination and independence seemed to apply only to Europe, while in the colonies of the Europeans, it was nothing but empty promises.

The dismantling of the colonial system actually began with the victory of the anti-fascist alliance in World War II. Although viewed as a negative concept, the Cold War era actually witnessed and contributed to the total collapse of the colonial structure. In the 1980s there were still individual movements against the colonial empire, and the white minority rule in South Africa was not completely overthrown until 1994. That said, one cannot claim that colonial rule did not end until the 1980s, as the demise of the apartheid system and its institutionalized racial segregation was rich only in symbolic meaning, as the white supremacist regime in South Africa had long abandoned the concept of "suzerain" (whether it be British or Dutch). Perhaps the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau by the People's Republic of China can also be held up as a symbol of the ultimate dissolution of overseas European empires. Of course, some European countries and the United States still possess enclaves and pocket colonies around the world (mainly islands in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans), although this situation is no longer comparable to that of colonial rule. In fact, European countries started to withdraw from their former colonies in the

1980s, and so most former colonies have achieved autonomy or outright independence from their colonial rulers.

Etymologically speaking, the word “colony” originated from Latin language, referring specifically to the ancient Roman overseas settlements within the conquered territories of the Empire (Srinivasan 2001, 52–67). In fact, the original expression “colonization” embraced the meaning of immigration. The process of colonial expansion was actually the same process in the intercontinental migrations of the European colonialists, and the European imperialists and colonialists were themselves immigrants. For Europeans, colonization and immigration were synonymous. Even the non-European immigration activities wholly served the colonial interests of the conquerors. During the process of European colonial conquest over more than 400 years, global migration was mainly initiated and dominated by Europeans. For example, millions of enslaved Africans were transported to the American colonies as a cheaper and more plentiful labour source; and later, as substitutes for slave labour, Europeans imported Asian indentured laborers (especially Chinese and Indians) under force or deception in the infamous “coolie trade” to colonies around the globe. Although these two kinds of migration activities were part of the global migration phenomenon of this period, they could not be compared with the other types of invasion and colonization carried out by European colonizers around the world. Both black African slaves and indentured laborers from China or India suffered physical and psychological torture and lived in misery due to the passive, organized and manipulated migration process controlled by the European colonial rulers. From the Age of Discovery to the end of the World War I, global migration flowed mainly from the European centre to other parts of the world, which led to a reshaping and expansion of geographic boundaries, and an increasing exploitation of human and natural resources by Europe. By the early 19th century, one-third of the world's lands were in the hands of Europeans, and by the end of the 19th century, this proportion had grown to two-thirds. At the outbreak of World War I, the ration had risen to a peak of four-fifths (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 104). Britain was definitely the most “successful” country in this regard, being the empire on which the sun never sets. By the early 19th century, Britain had captured one-fifth of the world's land and controlled a quarter of the global population (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 105).

The Age of Discovery and the prevalence of mercantilism thinking in the late 15th and early 16th centuries provided Britain with unprecedented opportunities, fuelling its overseas trade and colonial expansion. At that time, the overseas markets were highly attractive to British businessmen:

Europe was the traditional market for the UK's overseas trade of textiles in exports, re-exports and imports; while the American market represented huge potential, being able to provide Britain with sugar, cotton, tobacco and other goods that could not be produced in Europe, thus becoming an important raw material base for Britain. The development of the African market was closely related to the development of the American market. With the rise of the transatlantic slave trade, the triangular trade system carrying slaves, cash crops and manufactured goods between Europe, America and Africa was gradually established (Qineng 2007, 35).

The British development of overseas trade was accompanied by all forms of violence to exploit economic and labour resources of the indigenous people. The British colonialists then began to look to the East, launching the start of colonial expansion into Asia, with India becoming one of its most important destinations.

Portuguese explorer Vasco Da Gama rounded Africa's Cape of Good Hope and anchored off Calicut, India on May 20, 1498, becoming the first European colonizer to reach India by sea (Jian et al. 2004, 438). The Portuguese came first as explorers, but stayed as conquerors, gaining control of the sea lanes and setting up onshore assets along the coast of India, ultimately dominating colonial trade in the Indian Ocean. Then came the Dutch, the British and the French who fought for colonial hegemony in India, with Great Britain emerging as the biggest winner. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the French were once very powerful on the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent, with control of large colonies, but in the later phases of the struggle for domination and interests, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French were successively defeated. The Portuguese had been operating in India for almost a century before the arrival of the Dutch, British and French, but were constantly defeated by the Dutch and the Indians. By the 1640s, almost all of the former Portuguese colonies in India had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, with only three remaining pocket colonies on India's west coast (along the Arabian Sea), being Goa, Daman and Diu (Jian et al. 2004, 439). The British then drove out the Dutch who, after losing territory to the British, completely withdrew from the subcontinent in 1781 (Jian et al. 2004, 440). After being defeated and expelled by the British, the French gave up any further power struggles with the British on the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent but retained four small colonies in southern India: Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanam and Mahe. After Britain defeated France in South Asia, it later restored to the ownership of these four colonies to France in order to secure peace between the two nations in India under the terms of the Treaty of Paris signed in 1763 (Jian et al. 2004, 443). After India gained its independence, the Indian government recovered these pocket colonies from the French and the Portuguese in 1954 and 1961, respectively, either by diplomatic means or by force. Among them, Goa became a state (almost

the smallest) in its own right, while the four former French colonies, including Pondicherry, became a Union Territory called Pondicherry, while Daman and Diu became another Union Territory, separate from Pondicherry. Consequently, Britain no longer had any difficulty in consolidating and expanding its colonial rule in India (Shihai and Weijun 2003, 99).

The British did not colonize India from the very beginning, first establishing a foothold through trade and then building up their colonial empire by force. The East India Company, a British trading concern, was incorporated by Royal Charter in 1600, but changed gradually from a commercial trading enterprise into a mighty entity of commercial, political, military and judicial power, encroaching into the subcontinent and finally taking full control of India. As observed by renowned German historian and Indologist Hermann Kulke, "The acquisition of a vast empire by a trading company was certainly a rather strange phenomenon" (Kulke and Rothermund 2004, 244). The East India Company first established settlements in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, then then expanded its territory and gained control through limited wars, gradually subjugated the local governments and the Mughal Empire, thus becoming the ultimate political master on the subcontinent. Originally, the East India Company's goal was primarily profit rather than territory. Greedy in their nature, the British soon got involved in constant frictions with the local Indians that escalated into massive conflicts. In the end, military conquest became an inevitable option, and the acquisition and expansion of territory became an unlimited target (Peers 2016). From the Battle of Plassey in 1757 which marked as the beginning of British rule in India, to the British annexation of Punjab in 1849, it took the British colonialists nearly a century to complete the conquest of India and to form the vast British Raj. In the wake of the Revolt of 1857 (the mutiny of the sepoys in the Company's army), control of India was transferred from the EIC to the British Crown, ushering in a period of high imperialism in India, epitomized by the British Raj in India that endured until 1947.

The British colonialists accelerated the process of the Industrial Revolution and promoted the comprehensive development and upgrading of various industries, such as commerce, maritime trade, finance, etc. to the detriment of India through the draining of its wealth. At that time, India was Britain's largest overseas blood bank, serving to nourish the British economy. As Lin Chenjie summarizes:

During British colonization in India, India was firstly regarded as the ideal object of economic exploitation and a crucial source of the primitive accumulation of capital; and then as an object of Industrial capital exploitation, and a sales market and country of origin of raw

materials for Britain. Finally, it became the victim of capital export and monopoly for the Empire (Chengjie 1995, 113).

Historically speaking, India played a significant role in the maintenance of overseas colonial rule for the British Empire. As once pointed out by a renowned English writer Lawrence James, "reliance on India marked the innovation of British governance" (James 1997, 30). As a matter of fact, Britain's native industrial development and overseas colonial plundering, as well as the expansion of the colonial map, would not have succeeded without the support of India. The British conquest of India not only brought great material wealth (which was converted into important capital for the development of British industry), but also created a huge pool of human resources. Britain's dependence on India for financial capital, military resources, raw materials, and labour was enormous. As an early stage centre of British colonization, the Bengal region indeed abounded in natural resources of various kinds and fertile lands for cultivation, supporting a vast population of over 40 million people, roughly four times the size of that on the British mainland (James 1997, 30). The contribution of India in terms of natural and human resources was critical to the British conquest and dominion of the Indian sub-continent and its colonial expansion into other areas. In the Eastern Hemisphere, the British relied on India for its colonial expansion and annexation, and gradually established political dominance in Southeast Asia, Africa, Oceania, Central Asia and the Middle East, which helped create an advantageous position from which to threaten China. As Chinese scholars Liu Jian regularly points out:

After the conquest of India and the establishment of the vast British Raj, Britain regarded India as a stepping stone in the East for its colonial aggression. During the invasion of China, Southeast Asia, Iran and Afghanistan, the Indian colony played a highly supporting role in replenishing manpower and material resources. Even the notorious British opium trade, which poisoned and devastated the Chinese people, was based in India (Jian et al. 2004, 455).

The British utilized India as an important foundation from which to invade China, and India granted its master access to the infiltration, encroachment and invasion of China's Xizang (Tibet), Yunnan, Guizhou and other major cities, smuggling opium into China by sea routes, initiating two Opium Wars in Chinese coastal cities and taking subsequent control of China. It is safe to state that the contribution of India remained high for British colonial expansion in China and the neighbouring countries to India in terms of finance and manpower. A large number of Indian sepoys were recruited into the British colonial army, and the fidelity of the Indian troops was an important factor in the

establishment and consolidation of British rule in India, as well as its colonial dominance and expansion outside of it. It was the exploitation and utilization of Indian soldiers that kept the British Empire strong, and that allowed it to gain full control over India within a few decades. In particular, the fertile plains of the Punjab that had come under direct British rule had “become the granary of British India and the chief recruiting ground for the British Indian army” (Kulke and Rothermund 2004, 241). The British invasions of China, whether by land or by sea, were largely facilitated by Indian sepoys, who were the principal protagonists on several bloody battlefields, in the two Opium Wars, in the looting and burning of the original Summer Palace, and in the Eight-Power Allied Forces War of aggression against China. The Indians stood alongside the Imperial masters and committed atrocities against innocent Chinese people. As the famous scholar K. N. Vaid once wrote: “The hoisting of the Union Jackflag at possession point in Hong Kong on January 1841 was witnessed by 2,700 Indian troops and 4 Indian merchants” (Vaid 1972, 15).

Indians were fully engaged in the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars from the very outset. In addition to their high involvement in the opium trade and as soldiers fighting in wars, Indians would subsequently also be recruited as police officers, employees and businessmen involved in the trade of opium and cotton in the British-occupied territories, and in Concessions in Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. In the International Concessions in Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou, Indians were once ubiquitous, and became known among the local Chinese by their derogatory nickname of “Hong-Tou-A-san” (turbaned number three) (Saran and Ke 2018, 105). As once noted by Indian scholars Brij V. Lal et al., “by the early 1930s, the total number of Indians (in China) was estimated to be about 10,000, including 5,000 in Hong Kong, 3,000–4,000 in Shanghai and other cities in Eastern China, and 1,000 in Xinjiang” (Lal et al. 2007, 211). In this period, it was estimated that a number of Indians were also residing in Tibet, and especially Lhasa, although accurate figures in this regard are hard to obtain. Most foreigners (including Indians) left China in the years leading up to and following the Communist victory in 1949, but there still existed a long-standing Indian community in Hong Kong. At present, there are roughly around 50,000 Indians residing in Hong Kong.¹ This is a conservative estimate, but if you include the illegal overstayers and refugees, the total number may be much higher, being mainly a product of the immigration phenomenon brought

¹ According to the authors’ interviews with Sir Sita K Motwani, a Hong Kong industrialist, publisher and social worker, and Deepak Kaul, the former consul of Indian culture in Hong Kong, and the data collected by the Indian consulate in Hong Kong in 2011.

about by British colonial rule in Hong Kong. From the very beginning, Indian immigrants in Hong Kong were intertwined with the colonial interests of the British Empire. As political and military instruments of the British colonial rulers, they gradually accumulated huge social and economic resources and shared the vested interests of the colonialist. They were always the most loyal subjects and accomplices of the British Empire, and became defenders and beneficiaries of colonial interests.

The overseas expansion of the British Empire and Indian overseas immigration

The British Empire was involved in almost all major wars in modern times, in which the contributions and sacrifices of Indian soldiers and the Indian homeland were of great importance. The British exploitation of Indian manpower can be best exemplified by its utilization of Indian sepoys and the export of Indian labour abroad. Historically, India has provided the largest number of international indentured workers, who are also the most widely distributed around the world. It is safe to point out that the support provided to the British Empire by India's human resources was on par with its material and financial support. Influenced by the Portuguese, who sold Chinese indentured labour (commonly known as "piglets") to places like Cuba, the British quickly followed the example and began exporting Indians under contract to their colonies in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean islands in support of their plantation economy (Kadekar). However, the policies implemented by the British colonialists to strengthen their rule and exploitation further disrupted India's feudal natural economy, in which agriculture and handicrafts were closely integrated, crushing traditional handicrafts and manufacturing industries with a certain level of development, destroying the original productive forces and depriving countless handicraft workers of their means of livelihood. Coupled with the frequent famines, many people were dislocated and were unable to make a living, and so began to look overseas for alternative employment (Chengjie 2004, 11). This, along with other factors, compelled them to leave the subcontinent, thus launching a large-scale Indian overseas emigration. This was also the basis for the massive expropriation of indentured labour. Of course, joining the army and police of the British colonial institutions seemed like a better choice for most people. The above-mentioned immigration types will be further elaborated in the following sections.

Indian soldiers and policemen

From its very beginning, the East India Company employed indigenous Indians (including the armies of the princely states) to serve its colonial conquest, and “enslaved India with the army of its own people” (CTBCPC 1961, 246). The Indian armies of the princely states were, in effect, subordinated to the European officers and served British interests. The British marched along the Ganges and reached an unprecedented level of control over the subcontinent with the help of Indian sepoys, clearing the way in the process. Later, the British set up its own standing army, known officially as the British Indian army, which gradually expanded in scale and developed its own military police and administrative management systems. It was through this army that the British maintained their colonial rule in India for more than 200 years and fought in bloody battles elsewhere for colonial expansion. During this process, Indian immigrants successfully established a strong presence overseas as soldiers, policemen and lower-ranking clerks, along with their relatives.

Examples of the overseas conquests of the sepoys of the British East Indian Company are briefly enumerated here for reference: In 1795, it assisted Britain in monopolizing the lucrative spice trade and the occupation of Maluku Island, known as the Spice Islands; it played an important role in the British invasion of Egypt from 1800–1801; then, in 1810, with the help of thousands of sepoys, the British invaded and took possession of Mauritius, and then invaded Java in 1811 (Lal et al. 2007, 44). The British Indian Army was one of the largest armed forces involved in World War II, numbering 2.5 million. The Army fought the three major Axis powers (Japan, Italy and Germany) from Hong Kong in the east, to Italy in the west. It fought on varying terrains, from the swamps and jungles of Malaya and Burma to the rocky terrain of Eritrea; and from the sandy desert of North Africa, to the mountains of central Italy (Roy 2017). At the height of India's struggle for independence, these Indian soldiers fought for the British rulers and protected the interests of the Empire.

After experiencing the brutal wars in the British colonies in Asia and Africa, a number of the surviving soldiers chose to settle locally after the military forces had been disbanded or withdrawn. For instance, Dean Mohammed, born in the city of Patna, Bihar, emigrated to Ireland in the late 18th century after serving 15 years in the Bengal Army, being an Indian traveller, surgeon and entrepreneur who was one of the most notable early non-European immigrants to the Western World. Mohammed opened his first Indian restaurant in the UK, facilitating the promotion of curry-based Indian cuisine locally; and was also the first Indian to publish a travel book in English, entitled *The Travels of Dean Mahomet*.

Mohammed was also a practitioner in the introduction of the Indian medicated vapor bath, with royalty among his clients, including King George IV and King William IV (Lal et al. 2007, 57). He was thus regarded as a successful role model as a retired Indian soldier who migrated to Ireland and Britain.

Sikh policemen were an inseparable part of the landscape of Shanghai in the first few decades of the 20th century, as a largely forgotten chapter in the story of the ties between China and India. In a foreign concession like Shanghai, the police served as “the most visible public symbol of colonial rule, in daily interaction with the local population and enforcing the codes of law that maintain colonial authority” (Anderson and Killingray 1991, 1–2). The Sikhs, a deemed martial race by the British colonialists, were “recruited from Punjab in India as a part of Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) to patrol the traffic in the International Concessions under the supervision of the Shanghai Municipal Council, its governing body” (Vathyam 2016). By 1898, a mounted police detachment composed completely of Sikhs was established, and by 1900, the number of Sikh police in Shanghai had reached 159. This number continued to increase, and by the time of the Second Sino-Japanese War, there were a total of roughly 700 Sikh police in Shanghai, constituting the largest proportion of the foreign police in service within Shanghai’s International Concessions (Saran and Ke 2018, 101-102). In a negative portrayal of Sikhs, they were referred to as “Hongtou Asan”, describing their status in Chinese eyes as “vicious lackeys of their British masters” (Jackson 2012, 1675). Due to the differences in the language and culture from the local Chinese, the Sikhs in Shanghai remained a relatively closed community and established their own networks, gurdwaras, schools and entertainment clubs, while very few married local women. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, as the rising Japanese threat against the International Concessions intensified, an exodus of Sikhs occurred, most of whom headed to Punjab. By 1945, the Shanghai Municipal Police had been disbanded and the Shanghai Sikh police passed into history. While some Sikhs left Shanghai for Hong Kong after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, others chose to stay in Shanghai, even after the 1950s, with the last Sikhs leaving Shanghai in 1973 (Vathyam 2016).

Indian convicts

Another little-known element in the history of Indian immigration occurred in the late 18th to mid-20th centuries when British India began transferring convicts to its overseas colonies in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. As Anderson stated in her book:

The first convict settlements established overseas by the East India Company was located in Bengkulu, along the southwest coast of Sumatra (1787–1825); and the Andaman Islands (1793–1796, 1858–1945), Penang in the British Straights Settlements (1790–1860), Singapore and Malacca (1825–73), British Mauritius (1815–53), and parts of Myanmar and Tenasserim (1828–62) were later made penal colonies respectively (Anderson 2007, 200).

It is believed that as many as six ships set out from Madras, Bombay and Bengal each year carrying prisoners in numbers thought to range from 12 to 200 (Anderson 2005, 144). However, due to the lack of historical records, the total number of prisoners transported over the Indian Ocean is difficult to quantify. Based on the limited official statistics, a rough calculation can be made as follows:

Before 1825, the East India Company sent a minimum of 2,000 and perhaps as many as 4,000 to 6,000 to the province of Bengkulu; Between 1815 and 1837, another 1,500 or so convicts set off from the ports of the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies to Mauritius for the long voyage of exile; moreover, the Bengal and Madras authorities transported at least 5,000 and maybe as many as 7,000 convicts to Burma from 1828 to 1862 (Allen 2012a, 9).

The remote Andaman Islands was turned into a fully-fledged penal colony in the wake of the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and the transportation of Indian convicts continued until the Japanese occupation of the islands during World War II. Anderson estimated that between 1858 and 1939, British India transported around 83,000 prisoners to the penal settlement of the Andamans, making the Andamans the largest penal colony in the entire British Empire in terms of the total number of incarcerated convicts (Anderson 2018, 25–26).

Stephen Nicholas and Peter R. Shergold estimated that the Straits Settlements together received on an average of 200 arrivals per year from the three Presidencies in India, amounting to 15,000 convicts (Nicholas and Shergold 1988, 30–32). However, Anderson deemed this an underestimate, and cited a number for Singapore of 16,000 convicts by 1858 (Anderson 2005, 144–145). On the whole, the British authorities transported at least 74,800 and perhaps as many as 100,000 South Asian convicts overseas between 1787 and 1943 (Yang 2003, 180; Anderson 2007, 188; Rediker et al. 2007, 9).

It has been reported that almost all of the deported criminals were men who had been sentenced to life in prison for murder and robbery etc. Women, charged with murder or infanticide, made up less than 10 percent of the total. Indian sepoy or other political convicts who participated in the 1857 Mutiny were also jailed here, coming from different parts of India and from different

socioeconomic backgrounds, although most were poor Hindus from the Bengal area (Lal et al. 2007, 45).

In the eyes of most British colonial rulers, exile was a harsher punishment than the death penalty. Indian society in general was isolated from the outside world, and according to their beliefs and customs, crossing the Kalapani (the Black Water) to foreign lands was a major taboo, resulting in the loss of one's social respectability and even caste. Consequently, exile was seen by British as a powerful deterrent as a punishment for crime among Indian people. The benefits of transportation were two-fold: on the one hand, it solved the ongoing problem of prison overcrowding in British India due to the increasing crime rate, while on the other hand, it created a cheap and controllable workforce to counter the labour shortage in the development of the newly conquered territories. As such, the transported convicts were used by the British rulers to build new colonies and the associated infrastructure works. Furthermore, it was also economically sensible to engage convicts in tasks that ordinary workers refused to undertake. "Generally well behaved and hardworking, the convicts initially carried out such works as clearing land and rubbish, reclaiming swamps, laying the early public roads, and erecting buildings and bridges" (McNair 2013; Turnbull 1972, 50–51), and it has been suggested that it was convicts who built the early Singapore (McNair 2013, 11, 109–110), and many of their contributions are still in existence today, including the Church of St Andrew and the Presidential Palace.

However, after the Indian uprising of 1857, the practice became unpopular as convicts started to be considered a threat to security. Consequently, Singapore refused to accept any more mutineers. In response to the opening of new penal colonies in the Andaman Islands, the forced migration of Indian convicts to Southeast Asia came to an end. In March 1858, a group of 1,000 convicts were sent to the Andaman Islands, which "ushered a new chapter in the history of transportation in colonial South Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (Yang 2003, 207).

"Before 1859, while the time-expired convicts may have been released, no provision was made for their repatriate at government expense" (Turnbull 1970, 43), and they generally lacked the resources to return to India. Most chose to integrate into the local community, to marry local women and to settle permanently. For example, intermarriages with the Malay communities created the Jawi Peranakan, and some achieved prominence. For instance, "one Brahman convict was released in 1839 and later acted as a respected priest for the Singapore Hindu community for twenty five years; another former convict, who died in 1865, was reputed to have left 50,000 dollars" (Turnbull 1970, 43-44).

Nowadays, the Jawi Peranakan boast substantial wealth and social standing, and have a profound impact on local society.

Today, a large number of Indian convict descendants live in places like Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, Singapore and Mauritius, although they don't share a separated and unique memory. Marriage and family life were two approaches to redemption that realized the social rebirth of convicts and helped them merge into local societies, meaning that the identity of the convict descendants simply diminished. The situation in Andamans, however, is somewhat different, where indigenous islanders were not settled cultivators. Today the Islands are home to a self-acknowledged convict-descended community known as the "Pre-42s" or the "Local-born" (Vaidik 2010; Anderson 2011; Anderson 2015; Sen 2000).

Indentured labour

The largest group of Indian overseas immigrants resulted from the export of labour services, with indentured labour emerging as a leading example in this regard. The proliferation of the indentured system was driven mainly by two forces – first and foremost, in the face of strong condemnation on moral grounds from various parties, the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 brought about the abolition of the slave trade throughout the vast British Empire, with some exceptions (Blackburn 1988, 420), which resulted in a labour shortage in the plantation economy of the British overseas colonies. For instance, since the beginning of the 16th century, an era of imperialism brought about the successive annexation of many Southeast Asian countries by British colonialists. These early colonies were generally sparsely populated, leading the British to set their eyes on India – as a populous neighbouring country, where an abundant labour force with high skills and qualifications prevailed. Moreover, considering the British colonial hegemony in India at that time, it was easier to control and manipulate the Indian immigrants than Chinese or Japanese workers from other non-British colonies. Transporting labour from British India to the British settlements in Southeast Asia served two purposes, alleviating the population pressure, as well as the domestic class and ethnic conflict in India, and serving as a source of labour for the colonies in Southeast Asia. An apprenticeship system was adopted with the emancipation of slaves that required all enslaved persons to be transformed into "apprentices", and to continue labouring for their former masters for a period of four to six years in exchange for provisions. It was essentially slavery by another name (Burn 1937; Green 1976), although this new system came with some inherent flaws that led to its later abandonment. The former slaves had a stronger sense of legal and self-protection, and so refused to do their work, protesting the

system of gradual emancipation, and demanding immediate and full liberation. To fill the labour “vacuum”, Hugh Tinker noted,

The British Empire recruited nearly 15 million Indians from inland cities in northern India and the coastal cities of Eastern India and shipped them to the overseas British colonies as far away as Natal, Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Suriname and Fiji to replace the former slaves on the sugar plantations. Nearby were places like Malaysia and Sri Lanka in southeast Asia where Indians were forced to grow tea, pepper, coffee, rubber and palm oil, and to work in tin mining and logging for roads (Tinker 1974, 77).

In nature, they were indentured labour, known more commonly as Coolies or Piglets, and served as cheap labour, subject to the interests of the British colonialists, and with the typical characteristics of colonial subjects.

Concerning the source of indentured labour, the early immigrants were Tamils from the Madras region of India, or Eastern Indians from the present-day Bangladesh. In the later period, the majority of immigrants were farmers from the north, such as from the Gangetic plain in Uttar Pradesh. In other words, the indentured laborers came mainly from the coastal areas of south India from the very beginning but were later replaced by Indian laborers from the north. They were sent to the British colonies of South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica to ease the labour local crises. Large numbers of workers also travelled to Guadeloupe and the Martini Islands of the French colonies, and to Suriname in the Dutch colonies (Ramsaran 2018).

The indentured system was a large-scale labour practice with intrinsic defects, and which differed from all other forms of contractual labour in the 17th and 18th centuries. Initially, indentured labour was completely monopolized and regulated by the British Indian government:

Most applicants were young men aged 20 to 25, who then entered into an indentured contract for a minimum five-year period. The contract explicitly defined the general living conditions, such as base salary, working hours, compensation (laborers worked five and half days a week. Adult men earned 12 pence, compared to 9 pence earned by adult women), as well as the type of work, housing, hygiene and medical facilities. (Lal et al. 2007, 46).

The government reiterated that Indian workers were to enjoy the same rights as the local population, and that all colonies were required to submit annual reports to the British Indian government. When any unequal treatment of the laborers was exposed, the Indian side would directly intervene in mediation. In addition, the contract promised repatriation by providing free passage home

for Indian laborers who worked in the colonies for more than 10 years. Those who did not return, as a persuasive method, were given ownership of land once their term was over. Those who had worked for more than 5 years were permitted to return to India at their own expense. "In Fiji, nearly two-thirds chose to settle after completing their contracts in the hope of finding a new life and new opportunities" (Lal et al. 2007).

Another feature of the indenture system was that in order to prevent a perpetuated gender imbalance in society, the government of India applied no restrictions on the immigration of women and children in its foreign policy. After 1870, India fixed the ratio of men to women at 100 to 40 (Lal et al. 2007). Although the colonial authorities complained about the extra cost of the accompanying female labour, the British Indian government remained decisive. In fact, the influx of female laborers helped create a more culturally and ethnically stable Indian community in the British Empire's overseas colonies.

Despite the British Government's introduction of labour regulations to protect the Indian immigrants, the law was not always strictly enforced. As a result, the indentured system was in essence a "modern system of slavery" (Allen 2012b, 225) that incorporated many of the inhumane aspects of the old system of slave labour, and both the signing contracts and the provisions of rights and obligations were highly unreasonable and deceptive. Any breach of contract was regarded as a criminal offence rather than a civil matter. For example, laborers may be thrown in prison for making an impolite gesture or comment toward their master, forcing them subsequently into more laborious, but unpaid work. In any case, the advantage always lay with the employer in labour disputes. As such, the position of Indian laborers under the indentured system was miserable, being worked like machines. These Indians suffered from a variety of diseases on their journeys to the colonies, and while many people died *en route*, the survivors migrated in hope of a bright future, but were exploited to the extreme by the recruiting agent and the employer, forced to live in harsh conditions, with low wages and long working hours. Under British colonial rule, these indentured Indian laborers seemed unable to escape the cycle of destiny (Wong 2002, 78). In general, indentured workers were treated only slightly better than the trafficked African slaves. As victims of exploitation and oppression, it can be seen as one of the most infamous chapters in the history of Indian immigration. However, the descendants of the indentured laborers who chose to stay were fully integrated into local society, and their personal achievements and social status are quite different from those of their grandparents.

Free immigrants

Apart from indentured labour, there was also a group of free Indians who travelled to British settlements around the globe who hoped to improve their living and working conditions, being mostly small vendors, artisans, shop owners, clerks, merchants and other professionals whose immigration and social conditions were slightly better than those under the indentured system. As free immigrants, they came equipped with abundant information and sufficient start-up capital and utilized their social connections to take full advantage of market opportunities, gradually accumulating wealth and consolidating their own economic power.

Based in Hong Kong, Burma, East Africa, South Africa, Aden and the coastal areas of Western Asia, they established their own business network, carried out a variety of commercial activities, and expanded their business circle to many countries in Europe and the United States (Satyanarayana 2001).

Consequently, the overseas Indian immigrants in the colonial times not only greatly influenced the current global distribution pattern of Indian immigrants, but also formed a comprehensive global business network that would ultimately lay the necessary foundation for the strengthening of the economic power of today's overseas Indians.

According to the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), although overseas Indians can be found on all five continents, their distribution across them is uneven, with "Asia having the largest number of Indian immigrants" (Singh 2014). This is mainly due to the large number of indentured laborers transported to Southeast Asia during the colonial period and the massive labour migration from India to the Gulf countries, post-independence. For instance, China and India are linked by mountains and waters, have enjoyed an overwhelming volume of friendly cultural exchanges over 2,000 years. As early as the first century AD, Indian traders settled in the Yunnan province of Southern China. In the 1930s and 1940s, China was plagued by internal and external conflicts and wars, and almost all Indian immigrants left mainland China, while a large long-standing community of Indians remained in Hong Kong. In recent years, as the cultural and commercial exchanges between the two countries have deepened, a growing population of Indian students, tourists, traders, and employees have headed to Mainland China. That said, there has been no significant increase in the number of Indians settling down locally, and the few settlers are concentrated in such coastal cities as Guangzhou, while the number of Indians in Hong Kong keeps rising.

One of the most notable free-immigration groups were the Chettiars (money lenders) from Tamil Nadu, India, a well-known historical trading caste in south India who moved to Malaya, Burma, the British Straits Settlements, Siam, Java, Indo-China and northern Sumatra in their masses, starting from 1826 onward (Markovits 1999, 902). The Chettiars were financial intermediaries who developed an extensive financial network throughout Southeast Asia during the colonial era and played an active role in the provision of credits. In the early 19th century, before the advent of modern banks or rural cooperatives, only a few European Banks made selective business loans to ensure capital flow, which limited the development of some economic entities. Consequently, the Chettiars started lending money to small- and medium-sized businesses who had neither capital nor collateral, boasting particular expertise in agricultural credits.

The Chettiars credit network was heavily dependent on British-Indian banks; indeed it could be argued that the Chettiars, acting as intermediaries for Western capital in the expansion of commodity production, were essentially complementary to the interests of Western financial and commercial interests" (Brown 1993, 254).

At that time, agricultural development in the Irrawaddy Delta led to an expansion of the area given over to paddy fields in lower Burma, from 0.933 million acres in 1855 to 9.9 million acres in 1930 (Wang 2014, 37). Shrewd Chettiars obtained low-interest loans from British banks, and then made loans to Burmese farmers at exorbitant interest rates, being long vilified by Burmese nationalists and even Europeans as "rapacious and usurious moneylenders" (Schrader 1996). Over the decades, the loans made by Chettiars to all agriculturists in the main rice-producing districts amounted to 450–500 million rupees. As a result, the Chettiars seized the opportunity to monopolize the paddy fields in southern Burma, leaving them with well over one-quarter of the prime delta land by 1936 (Adas 1974, 391). With the rapid development and increasingly close interconnection of Southeast Asia's economy, the Chettiars also financed farmers in areas such as Burma, Malaya and Ceylon, etc., being involved mainly in the agriculture and commodity trade of rice and tea of Sikkim, under the jurisdiction of the Madras Presidency, thus quickly gaining a foothold in the emerging plantation economy. In the 1880s, the Chettiars leveraged their relationship with the European banks, the Chettiar-managed Indian imperial bank and the Indian overseas banks to finance land transactions in some Southeast Asian countries. Besides credits and loans, the Chettiars were also active in import and export trade on the Indian Ocean. For instance, the Chettiars in Burma were specialized in the trade of rice and timber (Shaofeng 1986, 99).

Over time, the extensive and complex financial and trading networks established by the Chettiars in Southeast Asia gradually matured.

The Muslim communities of Khojas and Bohras from Gujarat in India had wielded huge influence in the local economy of Southeast Asia in the textile, rice, diamond, and home appliance sectors, among others. Prior to the Great Depression of 1930, Bohras traders had secured a near-monopoly in raw sugar exports from Burma and Indonesia, while in Singapore, the Bohras mainly lived in the Arab areas. At first, they used Singapore only as a transit point for trade between Gujarat and Indo-China peninsula, trading soap, liquid butter, cotton, etc. from India for Chinese spices, gold, porcelain, silk, and so on. Over time, the Bohras merchants began to settle in Singapore to engage in the trade of textiles, jewellery, spices and other import and export goods (Kaur 2008, 28).

The Sindhis from India were another successful group of born businessmen and frequent world travellers. Only limited numbers of Sindhis had migrated by the end of the 19th century, but they gained momentum after the mid-20th century, with partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 serving as a direct driving force. They were actively involved in the competitive textile industry in Southeast Asia, being mainly responsible for the re-export of textiles from China, India and Japan to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Indochina (Markovits 1999, 891). They enjoyed an overall dominant status in the textile market in the key commercial centres of the region.

When compared to the previously mentioned indentured labour, these free immigrants of Indian origin were equipped with professional skills and ample capital, which paved the way for their overseas success. Having inherited their ancestors' business success, most of their descendants are capable of maintaining a stable and good-quality middle class life.

Of course, Indian immigrants were a heterogeneous group with astonishing internal diversity and differences. While economy remains as the main reason for migration, many elements need to be taken into consideration when choosing a destination country, including passage cost, likelihood of reemployment in one's previous career, distance from home, the caste and origin of the existing Indian immigrants, the amount of information of the destination country, etc. Globally speaking, most of the indentured laborers who migrated to the British Strait Settlements and South Africa were landless farmers from Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, respectively. Having been displaced from the land they had cultivated for generations, the farmers from the immediate vicinity of Nowsari and Gujarat settled in Fiji and New Zealand in the hope of regaining land ownership, while Punjabis, on the other hand, dispersed all over the world. Those with technical skills migrated to Southeast Asia, Central Africa and West Africa, and found

employment as craftsmen or artisans, while those without headed for the British Strait Settlements and the major treaty ports on China's coast to work as laborers or in other low-paid jobs, for example, as security guards. People from the fertile lands of Punjab moved to such economically developed countries as Canada and the United States, while the Chettiers focused their operations in Burma and Malaya. In addition, some landless farmers from the states of Orissa, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, etc. started to migrate to Burma, while other farmers worked on the local farms in such Caribbean island countries as Mauritius with government support. Last but not least, a trading group composed of Parsees, Ismaili Muslims and Sindhis, etc. who were well known to possess a good business acumen, also roamed far and wide under the cover of the Union flag in search of undiscovered business opportunities (Vaid 1972, 3; Singh and Singh 2003, 5; Sandhu and Mani 1993, 12).

One intriguing fact was that as British colonial subjects, Muslims made up a very high proportion of the migrating businessmen and technicians, as prior to the arrival of the British to India, it was the Muslims who ruled the country, and the Hindus were in awe of them. However, in a stroke of misfortune brought by the British colonizers after the demise of the Mughal Empire, the Muslims who had held high positions and who had accumulated considerable wealth were forced to abdicate their positions, and were gradually ousted from their lands and offices, while the Hindus rose under the Raj (Majumdar 2015, 295). The creation and perpetuation of Hindu-Muslim antagonism was the one of the most tragic legacies of British colonial rule.

Another issue worth mentioning is the age-old social stratification known as the caste system – a deeply-rooted practice in Indian society – in which those at the lowest level, known as the untouchables, led a miserable life of humiliation, discrimination, prejudice and violence at the hands of the cultural elite. The “untouchables” also joined the massive migration, escaping their humiliated identity overseas. After returning home, they expressed their abhorrence of the discredited caste system and played an important role in breaking the shackles of caste discrimination and torture in India. Colonial-era Indian officials have also admitted the positive impact of this type of immigration on the lower castes. After years of hard work overseas, the marginalized castes from India had not only accumulated a certain amount of wealth that facilitated property purchases in India, but had also cultivated their sense of equality and independence and greatly improved their self-esteem, all of which were beneficial in the destabilizing of caste restrictions in India. This valuable immigrant experience had equipped this group with industrialized work practices and vocational training, motivating their self-initiation and creativity. This gave rise to the

emergence of modern labour force that had contributed greatly to the development of industry and commerce in India since the end of the 19th century. Moreover, during the colonial period, Indian immigrants also served as promoters of Indian culture and defenders of Indian national interests. The former was embodied in the fact that as the number of Indian immigrants grew, so did their symbols of identity – their temples. Nowadays, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh temples can be found in many corners of the globe, standing for ritualistic worship and cultural incubation. Of these, the latter was due to the fact that before India's independence, overseas Indian immigrants once advocated for and became the backbone of the national liberation movement. Considering the case of South Africa, in 1893, Gandhi arrived in British former colony of South Africa and lived there for 21 years between 1893 and 1914, and this was where he developed his political views and philosophies.

It was in South Africa that Gandhi realized his vocation in life. It was there that he invented and practiced satyagraha, and where not only his philosophy of life, but also his attitude to the social problems of India crystallized (Reddy and Gandhi 1993, 3).

In South Africa, Gandhi ultimately became the man who inspired the non-violent resistance on the African continent and led India to its independence, initiating a global movement of decolonization. To some extent, the traditional friendship between India and South Africa has continued and strengthened over time, and this has become an important driving force in the development of bilateral relations between the two countries.

Conclusion

During British colonial rule, Indian manpower was deployed to every corner of the globe, resulting in mass Indian migration accompanying the expansion and conquests of the British Empire. This served as the basis of current population distribution of overseas Indians around the world. The major immigration types comprise four groups, being soldiers and policemen; convicts; indentured labour; and free immigrants, who together constitute the immigration groups both in the colonial period and in the present day. With India and Pakistan claiming independence, and the disintegration of the British colonial system, large numbers of Indians living abroad returned to their homeland to start a new life. Others, however, chose to remain abroad, relying on the legacy of British colonialism, and included the Indians in Hong Kong. The Indian Diaspora, as an independent presence, is growing in strength and is becoming a key factor in the wealth and resources of India today. As pointed by Ning Mingfeng: "The 30

million colonial-era immigrants have been distributed all over the world. This represents an unmeasurable overseas asset, both for the colonial authorities at that time, and for post-independence India" (Minfeng 2012, 53). In recent years, the number and influence of India's overseas immigrants have been increasing, and its economic power and international influence have become comparable to those of the overseas Chinese, and in some ways even surpassing them. India holds high expectations for its overseas immigrants in terms of capital, skills and talents, and has developed a reliance on them, and a number of new measures have been adopted by the Indian government to leverage the strength of the overseas Indians, alongside the new breakthroughs being made in policies and laws that are both powerful and effective. In the near future, the role of Indians abroad in determining India's development and global rise will become increasingly apparent.

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Review Article

A critical overview of the Area Studies model: A brief study of the current trends in Area Studies

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Abstract: Since its inception in the colonial era, Area Studies (AS) has evolved in accordance with policy-oriented demands. From the study of former colonial territories to strategic areas of the Cold War, and from September 11, 2001 through to the present day, this academic field has been entangled with government, with an impetus aimed at achieving policy goals. Using the seminal book *Middle East Studies after September 11: Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony and Academia* as its basis, we present here a critical examination of historical context of the evolution of Area Studies and the current trends in the field. Some of the notable current trends in the field include observable rotations in area focus that over the last decade have manifested in a geospatial shift of focus to East Asia by US-centric academia, and the adoption of AS as a model outside of the United States and Europe. Regarding the latter, this brief study investigates the adaptation of an AS model by China, noting the transference of the practical negative attributes of AS, and critically engages in the AS dialectic by asking the question of whether the colonial, imperialist and Orientalist history and attributes of AS are inherent to the field when adopted by actors from outside its traditional milieu.

Keywords: Area Studies, critical approach, US-centric approach, China, historical analysis

Bölge Çalışmaları modeline eleştirel bir bakış: Bölge Çalışmaları alanındaki güncel eğilimler üzerine kısa bir çalışma

Öz: Sömürgecilik yıllarında ortaya çıkışından itibaren Bölge Çalışmaları politika odaklı bir gelişim çizgisi izlemiştir. Eski sömürge topraklarının etüt edilmesinden Soğuk Savaş'ın stratejik bölgelerine, 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarından günümüze kadar, Bölge Çalışmaları disiplini hükûmetlerle birlikte politika hedeflerine ulaşma yönünde çaba sarf etmiştir. *Middle East Studies after September 11: Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony and Academia* kitabını temel alan bu çalışmada Bölge Çalışmaları'nın tarihsel gelişim çerçevesi ve alandaki güncel eğilimler eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla incelenmektedir. Alandaki dikkate değer eğilimler arasında, son on yılda ABD merkezli akademik çalışmaların odağını Doğu Asya'ya kaydırması ve ABD ve Avrupa merkezli olmayan Bölge Çalışmaları modelinin tercih edilmeye başlanmasıdır. İkinci eğilimle ilgili olarak bu kısa çalışma Çin tarafından bazı olumsuz özellikleri ile birlikte benimsenen Bölge Çalışmaları modelini incelemektedir. Çalışma Bölge Çalışmaları diyalektiğine eleştirel yaklaşarak geleneksel çevreler dışındaki aktörler tarafından benimsenmesi durumunda da sömürgeci, emperyalist ve Oryantalist özelliklerin Bölge Çalışmaları alanına intikal edip etmediğini sorgulamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bölge Çalışmaları, eleştirel yaklaşım, ABD-merkezli yaklaşım, Çin, tarihsel analiz

Introduction

This analysis of the contemporary evolution of Area Studies is based on the seminal book *Middle East Studies after September 11: Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony and Academia*, wherein area studies is subjected to a critical examination from the perspective of Edward Said's thesis of Orientalism. Focusing primarily on AS – as an interdisciplinary field – the book highlights how many fields of social sciences and humanities resulted from colonial endeavours to study subjugated populations for policy-oriented purposes. The book identifies the origins of AS as being rooted in Imperialism, but also notes, somewhat importantly, that neo-imperialist and neo-Orientalist currents continue in AS through the position afforded to "Western "academia by the

corresponding hegemony, as well as through the evolving methods used by the State to incentivize academia. Accordingly, this article questions the outcomes of AS as it has grown under the aforementioned conditions and used as a model by such emerging powers as China.

The article begins by providing an overview and brief history of the evolution of Area Studies (AS), providing the necessary context for a critical approach to contemporary AS throughout the subsequent sections. After detailing the progression of AS since its inception, the current trends in AS in policy and scholarly terms is examined. Finally, the focus of this brief study turns to an important emerging factor in AS, being the adoption of an Area Studies model by an emerging global power from outside the “Western” paradigm, namely China. The findings aim to contribute to a dialectic on critical approaches to AS, and to spark further debate on its continued evolution and the wide distribution of Area Studies as a model.

Evolution of Area Studies

While focusing primarily on the Middle East and the Orientalism of Area Studies, *Middle East Studies after September 11* draws on the intersectionality of the factors that necessarily coalesce behind AS. The histories of colonialism, contemporary imperialist action and sustained orientalist perspectives make up the framework of Area Studies, but beyond this scope, the book broadly analyses the structures of the self-aggrandizing academic elites and the business platform behind AS. It provides a detailed account of the history and evolution of AS and its imperialist impetus, born out of the colonial era.

The colonial era created bred ties between education and the state, from the creation of missionary schools in colonized spaces to the development of new academic fields. Here, Keskin highlights the establishment of such fields of social science as anthropology as state-funded endeavours to learn about colonized populations to support the further exploitation and quelling of anti-colonial movements (p. 06). The transfer of hegemony from Europe to the United States in the early post-colonial period opened the door on a new period in Area Studies, focused on two dimensions. First, the US focused attention on colonial spaces to guarantee the continuity of control, albeit under different circumstances, using different methods, as European powers were unable to maintain their authority over colonies following World War II. This led to a “transformation from British colonialism to American imperialism” (p. 07). The second dimension is based around the emergence of the Cold War and the areas corresponding to the so-called containment policy. Both dimensions demanded strategic considerations in US policy development, facilitating interdisciplinary

studies on the cultural, political, and linguistic characteristics of key geographical areas.

While the onset of the Cold War formed the basis for contemporary AS, the Reagan/Thatcher era spurred a further evolution in Area Studies coinciding with the evolution of US policy development. The 1980s solidified the transformation to neoliberal-based policies and the corresponding focus on AS. The events of 9/11 sparked an immense transformation of government policy, and consequently, the focus of Area Studies. This led to vigorous expansion of state-academic collaborations in Middle East studies, along with key language programs, producing a windfall of funding to universities and think tanks. The militarism and the neoliberalism of the preceding period were both augmented under the post-9/11 period, wherein AS became even more lucrative. Despite the increased state funding in AS-related centres and think tanks, neoliberal policy had a significant effect on academia, resulting in a general decrease in state funding, increased engagement with private enterprises and the increased adaptation of a business model. The influence of the government over academia resulted in it being “co-opted through the work of Middle East studies, African studies, Asian and Central Asian studies centres, the Fulbright and Boren fellowships, the FLAS (Foreign Language Area Studies) fellowship, the Peace Corps, and so on” (pp. 14–15).

Each period of AS transformation legitimized and increased the institutionalization of AS through the state and non-state apparatuses through which academic studies are funded and supported. Such state institutions include the Department of Education, the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Additionally, government affiliated programs such as the Peace Corps and Fulbright aid AS-related programs in Universities. Finally, AS related centres and departments, such as the Middle East, African and East Asian studies centres, have been established in universities in the United States and beyond. As policy continuously influences AS, studies are conducted through a prism that reflects policy interests. This has culminated in a cultural hegemony in which the perceptions of “areas”, or the concept of those areas, are shaped by the elite and the benefactors of State policy development. This cultural hegemony, or Orientalism, shapes narratives and perceptions internally, and externalizes cultural hegemony by exporting these narratives and perceptions of those within an “area” to those areas.

The evolution of AS throughout periods of change in policy development provides insights to current trends of AS in its traditional settings, as well as its application in new arenas. Developments in Area Studies have made vital contributions to academia, and its components have undoubtedly become

permanent fixtures in academic studies. That said, the colonial and imperialist history of AS, its contemporary neoliberal quality, the clear influence of state policy over academia and its sustained Orientalist outcomes are all important considerations when examining the current trends of AS and its adoption by the emerging powers.

Current trends

As highlighted in the previous section, the periods of pronounced change in policy approaches correspond to shifts in the territorial focus of AS. Furthermore, underlying developments, distinct from such specific territorial or regional focuses as neoliberal policy adaptation, have also transformed the nature of AS. Given its inextricable link to security and policy, as long as Area Studies exists in its current dynamic it may serve as a prescient factor in policy direction, if not in geopolitical forecasting. Just as historical trends are observable and briefly covered in the previous section, so too are the current trends in Area Studies. One palpable component of the current AS evolution is the noticeable rotation in regional focus based on policy orientation, and therefore, scholarship.

Perhaps a new peak in academia/state collaboration is an integration of Area Studies with the intelligence sector. Patton called for a new age of academic collaboration to create an intel field of "Sociocultural Intelligence" (2010), which indicates an effort to establish well informed actors on social, cultural and political norms within a specific geospatial boundary – essentially, a fusing of the aspects of Area Studies with intelligence operations. The concept of sociocultural intelligence studies has been further promoted in counter-insurgency operations by analysts "who are trained and educated to assess the behavioural characteristics of all elements of the local population", "local" being as ambiguous a term as "area" and pliable to policy demands (Connable 2012). The call for sociocultural intelligence studies is rooted in the abysmal failure of the United States to comprehend the social, cultural, and political dynamics of Afghanistan during its ongoing invasion and occupation in the post-9/11 period. This was despite the extensive time and capital poured into Afghanistan by US industrial, intelligence, military, aid, media, and academic apparatuses for almost half of the 20th century (Hanifi 2018). This speaks to the failure, or perhaps success of Area Studies. Despite the deep, decades-long focus on Afghanistan, it was unrecognizable to US consciousness in the post-9/11 invasion, and after 9/11, scholars have noted "very little academic or public time or space devoted to the substantive American cultural distortions of Afghanistan that have assumed a reality of their own, very much to the detriment of US foreign policy, and the tens of millions of ordinary innocent inhabitants of the country" (Ibid., p.56). Either

this stands as evidence of a failure of AS, or, as in many profitable industries, speaks to a planned obsolescence in Area Studies. The evolution of an area that was directly changed by Orientalist and imperialist attention in the case of Afghanistan underlines a need for renewed focus and funding, through shifting geography corresponding to policy priorities. The planned obsolescence of AS has implications for current and future trends in Area Studies, as foundational “areas” can be treated with renewed fervour.

Such a shift, or renewed focus, would appear to have been the case in East Asia studies over the last decade. As an economic and foreign policy platform under the Obama Administration, the Pivot to East Asia, sometimes called the Pivot to the Pacific, the Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, or simply the Pivot to Asia, signalled renewed focus on East Asia, and particularly China. The Obama-era policy was a discontinuous resumption of the policies of the Nixon and Clinton administrations toward East Asia and China (Hundley, Kenzer and Peterson 2015). A policy shift towards East Asia is being considered in such security think tanks as the Center for New American Security (CNAS). CNAS, founded in 2007, developed a formidable Asia-Pacific directive that focused heavily on China. As a think tank devoted to the security aspect of AS, CNAS represents a fusion of policy influence in research, and is heavily funded by defence and intelligence companies and the US government, in addition to the tech and energy sectors (CNAS). Analysing data from 2011, Hundley, Kenzer and Peterson note that scholars representing East Asian studies in IR believed their field to be of vital importance for policy, although according to data from 2011, East Asian studies scholars were not engaged in policy-based research (2015). Significantly, due either to a lack of policy-centric research or any substantial change from 2011, East Asian studies received considerable Title VI funding in subsequent years. According to a US Department of Education International and Foreign Language Education 2017 annual report, East Asia accounted for the largest number of AS applications (2019, p.13), and in the same four year grant period, East Asia was the largest recipient of Title VI language course funding (Ibid., p.17).

Regional attention, or the “areas” of AS, appear to not only fluctuate, but to rotate. East Asian studies, for example are re-emerging as a key regional focus for policy and AS in the United States, although the field of Area Studies itself is dynamic, and is diffusing throughout the global arena. China, for example, while the key focus of AS in the United States, has been developing its own Area Studies using its application within the traditional paradigm as a model.

The Area Studies model and China

China is notable as a leading global power outside the United States, and the historical colonial paradigm to adopt the AS model has been focusing on developing AS to counter what is seen as a deficit in strategic regional expertise. This raises many questions relating to the effects of an emerging East Asian super-power adopting a policy model directed by academia built on imperial and colonial foundations. Nevertheless, China is fervently seeking to assume an elevated position in AS expertise. According to Myers, Barrios and Cunhai, China has maintained its long established focus on Latin American studies, but as the nation has risen on the global stage, so too has its focus on establishing new areas of expertise and further developing its capabilities in existing arenas (2018). For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has a long standing Institute of Latin America studies; and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, which hosts numerous AS institutes, such as the Center for West Asian and African Studies, and the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, was established in 1960 (SIIS). Aside from the well-established think tanks, Myers et al. point out the increased role of Chinese universities in furthering the country's AS ambitions. Universities such as Peking, Nankai and Fudan all feature Latin American Studies, although new AS centres are emerging in Chinese universities focusing on such "areas" as Western Asia (Middle East). For example, Shanghai Jiao Tong University has a newly established Center for Middle East Peace Studies, while Peking University, in addition to its own Center for Middle East Studies, founded an Institute for Area Studies in 2018 (CMEPS; Ma 2018). Furthermore, Shanghai University's Institute for Global Studies hosts Centers for Turkish, East Asian, and African studies (IGS). The coordination of academic AS centres through universities and think tanks is increasingly directed by the State with the explicit purpose of fulfilling its policy objectives, following the US model of AS.

Myers et al. have shown how government policy in China has been directed at augmenting the country's AS capabilities, and the authors identify several policy applications aimed at accomplishing such a goal from 2011 through to 2017, including the Notice on Fostering Area Studies and International Education Centers, the Notice on Effectively Constructing Information for Area Studies Centers, Interim Measures for the Cultivation and Construction of Area Studies Centers, and the Notice on Effectively Constructing Work Related to Area Studies Centers for 2017, to name but a few (Ibid., pp. 3–5). The steady government promotion of AS in academia highlights the policy-centric nature of AS, being undisturbed in its adaptation.

The practical considerations of the limitations of AS, within and outside its “Western” matrix, are underscored in China’s pursuit of AS and area expertise as they are met with the same challenges. In addition to lack of first-hand experience in the target “areas” and the language barriers, in part due to the publications of Chinese scholars in Chinese, the “areas” of focus of academicians are highly influenced by state incentives, which are provided according to policy needs. The National Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences of China (NPOPSS) oversees social science research in the country and can influence the areas of focus of scholars. The NPOPSS offers an annual grant, which is a necessary prerequisite for professional advancement in academia (Jiang 2020). This is similar to the US model for AS, as described by Keskin, in which state funding heavily influences research centres and academic research, either through direct funding via the Department of Education Title VI, or through a myriad of government affiliated think tank grants directed at centres of Middle East studies (p.12).

The adoption of an AS model may be a response to having been the subject of “Western”-oriented AS. Becoming a focus of US policy focus warrants raised anxieties considering previous “areas” of focus, most notably the Middle East. However, the re-balance or pivot to Asia or East Asia is rather ambiguous. Afghanistan, for example, is often included in discussions of the “Middle East”, which is itself an ambiguous Orientalist term used to denote an approximation of Western Asia. This ambiguity in “area” is a practical concern also for the Chinese adoption of AS. Area Studies focus on rigid geographic boundaries that are based on perceived territories, seeking to draw sharp lines where only blurred ones exist. While one could hardly argue that capital, information, goods and people flow with the same ease across borders, the rigid view of territoriality in Area Studies does not reflect the global factors of “area” ambiguity and flux. Such critiques of AS parochialism are reasonable, as territorial rigidity is also met with ethnic rigidity, and as McConnell points out, a rigid correlation to established nation-states, which can leave peripheral actors with an ambivalent view of AS (Powell et al. 2017). Though not a Western perspective of area studies, parochialism is still a relevant critique in the Chinese adaptation of AS, and one that is to be confronted, irrespective of orientation.

The practical shortcomings of AS are an important consideration, given its adaptation as a model by state actors outside its traditional paradigm. Despite the glaring social, political and economic differences between the United States and China, China’s position as a rising global power and its robust state structure make it susceptible to similar critiques as US- or UK-based Area Studies. Aside from the practical pitfalls of AS, whether the adoption of AS outside its original

paradigm neutralizes its Orientalist, imperial and colonial features, or whether these characteristics are inextricable from AS and are inevitably adopted and diffused, remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Using the book *Middle East Studies after September 11* to highlight the historical developments of Area Studies from a critical perspective, the evolution of Area Studies and its ties to State policy are defined here throughout the key periods of policy and scholarly transformation. Colonialist, imperialist and Orientalist currents have been found to influence academia and AS studies throughout its development. Such an evolutionary progression of AS aids in an examination of current trends, noted here as continued state/academic integration and the possession of a quality that can be likened to planned obsolescence, whereby the focus of AS is dynamic and rotates geographically. AS in the US would appear to be refocused on East Asia, and particularly on China, and from here, the study shifts to the more significant trend of the adoption of the “Western” AS model by countries outside its historical colonial framework – again, using China as an example. These countries do not, for the most part, share the history of a colonial empire, imperialist state policy or the Orientalist academic culture. However, the adoption of a model for global perspectives, built upon these foundations and following policy-based state direction, may not be without its deleterious outcomes, warranting careful consideration. Aside from the practical pitfalls of AS, whether the adoption of AS outside its original paradigm neutralizes its Orientalist, imperial and colonial features, or whether these characteristics are inextricable from AS and are inevitably adopted and diffused, remains to be seen. Are these characteristics engrained in AS, or is the onus instrumental in the content of state policy that drives the study? If normative positions are to be taken, due diligence in the dialectic of colonially and policy driven academia is essential. Rather than attempting to answer these questions directly, this brief article establishes the colonial history and Orientalist and imperialist nature of AS as it existed within the so-called Western milieu, and in doing so, aims to incite debate surrounding the adoption of the area studies model by countries outside this paradigm.

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Yayın Değerlendirmesi

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Vasilij Vladimiroviç, Bartold. *Orta Asya Tarihi Üzerine Dört Çalışma* (Four Studies On the History of Central Asia). İngilizcesinden çeviren: İlhan Aslan, İstanbul, Post Yayınları, 2020.

[Vasilij Vladimiroviç, Bartold. *Four Studies On the History of Central Asia*. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1962.]

Vasilij Vladimiroviç Bartold, doğu tarihi alanında yaptığı çalışmaları doğu dillerini öğrenerek destekleyen ve literatüre birçok özgün çalışma ile katkı sağlayan önemli isimlerden biridir. Bartold, araştırmalarında Orta Asya'da belirlediği alanlar üzerinde derinlemesine incelemelerin bulunduğu monografi türünde yazdığı eserlerle farklı bir bakış açısı oluşturmuştur. Bartold'un bu kitabında ise monografi türündeki dört araştırması bir araya getirilmiştir. Kitabın orijinal metninde Türkistan'ın kısa bir tarihi, Yedisu tarihi ve Ulug Beg, Mir Ali Shir başlıkları adı altında dört konu ele alınmıştır. Bu inceleme içerisinde Türkistan'ın kısa tarihi ve Yedisu tarihi olmak üzere iki bölüm bulunmaktadır. Çeşitli sorunlardan ötürü eserin diğer başlıklarının henüz çevrilemediği belirtilmiştir (s. 7-9).

Kitabın temel ilgi alanı Türk tarihidir. Bu bağlamda Bartold'un birbirinden farklı zaman diliminde yazılmış yazılarında vurguladığı temel nokta ise dünyanın en eski kültür alışverişinin başladığı coğrafyanın Türkistan jeopolitiği olduğu yönündedir. Kitabın amacı sadece Türkistan ve Yedisu havzasını coğrafi olarak tanıtmak değil, bu havzada yaşayan uygarlıkların ansiklopedik gelişimini siyasî ve sosyal perspektiflerden de analiz etmektir. Yazar, Türkistan'ın kısa tarihi başlıklı ilk bölümde Karahanlılar, Gazneliler, Harezmsahlar, Özbekler gibi birçok Orta Asya devletinden/uygarlığından bahsetmiş ve Orta Asya tarihi açısından önemli olarak tanımladığı göçebe hareketleri, Arap fethi, Moğol fethi ve Ch'ang Ch'un'un gezisi gibi olayları değerlendirmiştir. Yedisu Tarihi başlıklı

ikinci bölümde bu alanda yazılmış eserlerin eksik ve parçalı bir yapıya sahip olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Bu monografinin Yedisu tarihi üzerine çalışmak isteyen araştırmacılara yardımcı olması için yapılan arkeolojik gezileri de içerdiğinden bahsetmiştir. Yedisu tarihi içerisinde Işık Göl ve Balkaş Gölü havzasında yer alan Wu-Sunlar, Türkler, Karluklar, Karahanlılar, Kara-Kıtaylar, Moğolistan ve Kalmuklara değinmiştir.

Kitabın içerik olarak kavramsal çerçeve sunma gibi bir iddiası olmamasına karşın göç ve yönetim olgularını dolaylı olarak ele aldığı söylenebilir. Göç ve yönetim arasındaki ilişkiden bahsedilirken karşılaştırmalı bir anlatım yapıldığı ve neden-sonuç ilişkilerinin kurulduğu görülmektedir. Bartold'a göre İranlı Soğdianların kültür seviyesinin yükselmesi "Çin Kapısı" olarak görülen Semerkant'ın doğu bölgesinde yaşanan ticarî faaliyetler nedeniyledir (s. 27). İlk bölümde ele alınan Arap Fethi ise Türkistan'ın Batıdan karşılaştığı ilk işgal olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ve Araplara göre Türkistan'ın, Çin İmparatorluğundan zorla alınmış bir vilayet olarak görüldüğünden bahsedilmiştir (s. 32). Yazarın, doğrudan ifade etmese de, genel siyasî ve kültürel vurgularında Türkistan'dan bahsederken Rus Türkistan'ı ve Çin Türkistan'ı şeklinde bir karşılaştırmalı anlatım yaptığı söylenebilir.

Peki Orta Asya tarihinde birçok topluluğa, devlete ev sahipliği yapmış bu coğrafyada yönetim nereye doğru evrilmiştir? Yönetim anlayışında askeri sınıf, din adamlarının ve dihan sınıfı olarak bahsedilen birinci sınıf soylular arasında bir geçişkenlik söz konusu mudur? İlk olarak yönetim anlayışının bir evrilme yaşadığı çıkarımına varılabilir. Bartold'a göre yönetim biçimleri; Arap fethi öncesi, Emeviler etkisi ve Gazneliler ile farklı bir yönetim anlayışı yansıtan Türk dünyasının devlet kavramı üzerinden bir değerlendirmeye tâbi tutulabilir. Arap fethi öncesi yönetimi şekillendirenlerin dihan sınıfı olduğu Emevilerin ise valilik sistemi ile toplumsal düzeni kurmaya ve bir yönetim anlayışı oluşturmaya çalıştığı sonrasında Abbasilerinde monarşi benimsedikleri söylenebilir (s. 91).

Orta Asya ve İran'da kurulmuş Samaniler yönetimi ele alındığında ise din adamlarının askeri aristokrasinin yanında olduğu ve dihanların bu yönetime direnç gösterdiği aktarılmıştır. Devlet kavramını Gaznelilerin, baskı oluşturan bir anlamda kullandığına dikkat çekilirken bu durumun Selçuklular sonrasında göçebe kültürün oluşturduğu boylar ile yönetimi zayıflattığına vurgu yapılmıştır. Türk dünyasında yönetim anlayışının; göçebe kültürün etkisi, askeri sınıf ve inanç sistemine bağlı olarak dönüşüm gösterdiğinden bahsedilse de ortak noktanın askeri sınıf ile din adamları arasında bir uyum olduğu ve bu uyumun Karahanlılar döneminde idam edilen din adamları ile bozulmaya başladığı vurgulanmıştır (s. 93).

Yazarın sorguladığı bir konu ise Çingizler Ögedey yönetiminde bulunan alanlarda Batı Avrupalı, Müslüman, Rus zanaatkarların yardımlaşması ile çeşitli saraylar inşa edilmiş ve bu alan birçok uygarlığa ait yapıları içerisinde buldurmasına rağmen Orta Asya kültür çalışmalarında beklentilere karşılık vermemiştir (s. 66). Bartold'a göre Orta Asya tarihinde 15. yüzyıl sonrasında Avrupalılar tarafından deniz rotalarının değişimi, ticarete kervan sisteminin çökmesi, belirli hanlıklarda yaşanan siyasî sorunlar 18. yüzyıla gelindiğinde ekonomik, siyasî ve kültürel bir gerileme dönemine neden olmuştur (s. 87). Yazarın Türkistan coğrafyasının geleceği için en önemli tavsiyelerinden biri dünya ticaretine katılımının aktif olarak sağlanması gerektiği ve Türkistan'ın bu aktifliğinin demiryolu ulaşımına bağlı olduğu yönündedir (s. 89).

Kitaba şu açıdan bir eleştiri getirmenin yerinde olduğu kanaatindeyim; incelenen her iki bölümde ayrıntılı coğrafi adlandırmalara, tarihsel kişiliklere fazlaca yer verilmesi, çalışmada asıl vurgulanmak istenen siyasî, sosyal yapıya gelene dek okuyucuyu ağır bir dil anlatımına maruz bırakmaktadır. Kitabın birçok monolog tarzı esere göre güçlü olan yönünün ise tarihsel anlatımı yaparken karşılaştırmalara yer vermesi ve herhangi bir analiz yapılamayan konularda belirli argümanlara dayanarak varsayımlar sunabilmesi olduğu söylenebilir. Kitabın içerik bakımından sadece ansiklopedik bir tarih anlatımına sahip olmaması ve coğrafi, siyasî, ekonomik, kültürel birçok açıdan Türk dünyası tarihini ayrıntılı olarak değerlendirmesi ve bilgilendirmeye ulaşamayan tarihi konularda argümanlar sunması ile literatüre katkı sağladığı aşikârdır. Kitap açıklamasında belirtildiği üzere "Orta Asya Tarihi Üzerine Dört Çalışma" başlıklı bu eser Rusça'dan V. Minorsky tarafından İngilizce'ye "Four Studies on the History of Central Asia" başlığıyla tercüme edilmiştir. Kitabın hazırlanışında İngilizce çevirisi olan Leiden/Brill baskısı esas alınmıştır. Bu bilgiler ışığında alanında yetkin bir yazar olan Bartold'un, söz konusu eserinin Türkçe literatüre kazandırılması önemli bir nokta olarak değerlendirilebilecekse de, orijinal dili Rusça'dan tercüme edilmesi durumunda olası bazı eksikliklerin en aza indirgenmesi sağlanabilecektir.



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Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında çalışan akademisyenler tarafından hazırlanan kitap, Ortadoğu'daki Arap Baharı ve sonrasında meydana gelen hareketli yapının daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi adına, mevcut çalışmalara katkı sunmak amacıyla hazırlanmıştır. Konusu itibariyle Suriye, Mısır ve Irak'ın bir oyun sahası olarak gösterildiği kitapta, ABD, Rusya, Çin ve AB uluslararası, Türkiye, İran, Suudi Arabistan ve İsrail bölgesel oyuncular olarak ele alınmıştır. Sahada yer alan oyuncuların dış siyaseti ve askerî politikaları değerlendirilirken, bölgeyle olan tarihsel bağları göz önünde bulundurulmuş, ayrıca uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin temsil ettiği modeller yazarların çalışmalarında kullanılmıştır.

Kitap Arap Baharı'nı milat kabul ederek günümüze kadar süregelen bölgesel hareketliliği tüm dinamikleriyle ortaya koyma gayesindedir. Arap Baharı ile ABD ve AB'nin bölgedeki etki alanının daraldığına dikkat çekilirken Rusya ve Çin'in bölgeye olan ilgisinin arttığına yer verilmiştir. Yaşanan bu süreçte bölgesel siyasetini ve güvenlik politikalarını ABD ekseninde şekillendiren İsrail ve Suudi Arabistan'ın memnuniyetsizliği dile getirilmiştir. Türkiye ve İran'ın Arap Baharı sonrasında bölge üzerinde geçmişe nazaran daha aktif ve cesur politikalar yürüttüğüne dikkat çekilmiştir. Kitap, benzer içerikle hazırlanan çalışmalardan farklı olarak Arap Baharı sonrası yaşanan bu dinamik süreci detaylı olarak değerlendirip, daha anlaşılır kılmıştır. Kitap içeriği itibariyle Arap Baharı ve Ortadoğu merkezli ilerleyerek konusu ve amacının dışına çıkmamıştır. Bu yönüyle bölümler arasında bağ kurulabilmiş, konu bütünlüğü sağlanmış ve kitap okuyucuya vaat ettiklerini temellendirebilmiştir.

Kitap giriş ve sonuç bölümü hariç dokuz makaleden oluşmuştur. Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu yazmış olduğu makalede, Ortadoğu’da değişen dinamikler üzerine kavramsal bir analiz yapmıştır (s. 7-26). Arap Baharı sonrası dengelerin değiştiği bölgede, İran’ın Şiilerin, Suudi Arabistan’ın ise Sünnilerin liderliğine soyunduğuna, Türkiye ve Katar’ın bu mezhepsel ayrıma katılmadığına, ABD’nin İran politikasının İsrail ve Suudi liderliğindeki Sünnileri birbirine yakınlaştırdığına yer vermiştir. ABD’nin tahtını sallamaya başlayan Çin’in diğer bir küresel güç olan Rusya ile kurduğu stratejik ortaklıkla beraber bölge ülkeleriyle pragmatizme dayalı ilişkilerini geliştirdiğine dikkat çekilerek, geçmişle güncel tarih karşılaştırılmış, bölgedeki rekabet ortamı ve kutuplaşmalar tartışılmıştır.

Doç. Dr. Behlül Özkan makalesinde, Bush ve Obama dönemlerindeki ABD’nin Ortadoğu politikasını ele almıştır (s. 27-53). Bush döneminde Irak’a yapılan askerî müdahale ile bölgede ABD karşıtı rejimleri domino etkisiyle yıkarak, ABD liderliğinde liberal rejimler hayata geçirilmek istendiğine yer vermiştir. Obama döneminde bölgedeki Amerikan askerî varlığının sona erdirilerek, bölgeyi dışarıdan yönetme adına “Geriden Liderlik” teriminin öne çıktığına ve Arap Baharı ile birlikte bölgeyi müttefikleri üzerinden şekillendirme çabasından bahsedilmiştir. Makalede Obama’nın hükümetlerin halkın iradesini yansıtması gerektiğini söylemesine rağmen, sadece ABD karşıtı ülkelerin iç işlerine müdahale edildiğine dikkat çekilmiştir.

Doç. Dr. Emre Erşen makalesinde Rusya’nın Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoğu politikasını değerlendirmiştir (s. 55-81). Makalede 2012 yılından sonra Rusya’nın bölgede daha aktif rol aldığından bahsedilmiştir. Suriye ile yapılan askerî iş birliğinin birkaç ay içinde sonlanacağı Rus yetkililer tarafından açıklansa da, aradan geçen üç yılın ardından Putin’in gerektiği kadar kalacağız sözü Rusya’nın bölgeye bir plan dâhilinde girmedini, bölge politikasını Batı ile ilişkilerine göre şekillendireceğini göstermiştir. Yazar Rusya ile İran’ın gelişen stratejik ortaklığı sebebiyle, ABD ve etkisindeki ülkeler ile bölgede varılması olası bir barış mutabakatının uzak olduğunu değerlendirmiştir.

Doç. Dr. Çağdaş Ünver’ in geleceğin küresel lideri olması muhtemel Çin’in bölgeye bakışını makalesinde değerlendirmiştir (s. 83-99). Makalede Çin’in diğer küresel güç olan ülkelere farklı olarak bölge ülkelerinin iç işlerine karışmadan, karşılıklı fayda içeren ilişkilere dayalı dış politika yürüttüğüne yer vermiştir. Çin’i ihtiyaç duyduğu enerji itibarıyla bölgenin en büyük ithalatçısı, ticaret ortağı ve yatırımcısı olarak tanımlamıştır. Kuşak ve yol girişimi hamlesiyle Çin’in dış siyasette ağırlığını batıya kaydıracağına Ortadoğu’nun içinde bulunduğu kaotik ortamın Çin-Orta Asya-Batı Asya ekonomik koridorunun gerçekleşmesinin önünde engel olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Çin’in hedeflerine ulaşmak adına

ülkelerin iç işlerine karışmama ilkesi ve askeri müdahaleye soğuk bakışının, gelecekte değişeceği yazar tarafından öngörülmüştür.

Doç. Dr. Sinem Koçamaz makalesinde AB'nin uluslararası bir aktör olarak bölgede inandırıcılığını kaybettiğine dikkat çekmiştir (s. 101-129). AB ülkelerinin içerisindeki görüş farklılığı, Filistin-İsrail sorunu, Arap Baharı ve sonrasında Mısır darbesinde sergilediği tutum ve davranışların, bölgede AB'yi ciddi bir güven ve itibar kaybına uğrattığına yer vermiştir. Yazar bölgede tekrar söz sahibi olmak isteyen AB'nin giriştiği finansal fonlar aracılığıyla bunu başarmasını mevcut ortamda çok da mümkün görmemektedir.

Doç. Dr. Barış Doster makalesinde Ortadoğu'da yaşanan gelişmeler ışığında Türkiye'nin bölgesel liderliğinin sınırlarını tartışmıştır (s. 131-148). Türkiye'nin bölgede istikrarlı bir siyasi, iktisadî ve askerî müttefikinin olmadığına vurgu yapmış, siyasetin doğası gereği iyi ilişkiler kurmadığı bir coğrafyaya liderlik yapamayacağına yer vermiştir. Türkiye'nin bölgesel aktör olabilmesi için etkili bir dış politikaya, güçlü bir ekonomiye ve tüm unsurlarıyla güçlü bir askeri yapıya ihtiyaç duyduğuna dikkat çekmiştir.

Dr. Bilgehan Alagöz makalesinde İran'ın kuşatılmışlık kaskacında Ortadoğu'daki liderlik arayışını değerlendirmiştir (s.149-173). İslâm devrimi ile önemli bir dış politika yürüten İran'ın 2003 Irak Savaşı'nı takip eden süreçte bölgesel aktör olmaya soyunduğuna yer vermiştir. Bu uğurda İran'ın sahip olduğu enerji kaynakları, askerî gücü, bölgesel nüfusu ve Rusya ve Çin ile derinleşen iş birliği avantajları, ABD baskısı, kırılğan ekonomisi, İsrail ve Suudi Arabistan ile olan ilişkileri ise dezavantajları olarak ortaya konulmuştur.

Öğr. Gör. Ceyhun Çiçekçi makalesinde İsrail' in Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoğu politikalarına tartışmıştır (s. 201-243). Arap Baharı ile bölgede yaşanan çatışma ortamının İsrail'in dış politikada elini güçlendirdiğine ve askeri hamlelerine meşruluk kazandırdığına dikkat çekip, Suriye ve Mısır'ın İsrail için tehdit olmaktan çıktığını değerlendirmiştir. Makalede İran'ın bölge siyaseti ve ABD'nin de yardımı ile İsrail'in kurulduğu günden itibaren sorun yaşadığı Sünni bölge ülkeleriyle İttifak ortamı yakaladığına ve hiç olmadığı kadar kendisine güvenli bir ortam yarattığına yer verilmiştir.

Kitapta Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoğu'da bölgesel ve küresel oyuncuların detaylı bir analizi yapılmıştır. Bu analizde bölgedeki ülkelerin birbirleriyle yakınlaşmaları, restleşmelerini ve kutuplaşmalarına yer verilirken Ortadoğu'ya stabil bir görünüm kazandırmaya çalışmıştır. Ancak bakıldığında bölgenin stabil bir yapıya kavuşması mevcut ortamda olası durmamaktadır. Bölgede orta veya uzun vadede istikrarlı bir barış sağlanması hayalperestlik olacağı görülmektedir. Bölgenin yapısı itibarıyla ülkelerin iç ve dış siyasetlerinde yaşanacak kaymalar sonucunda Ortadoğu'da saflar yeniden değişeceği benzetilmektedir. Kitapta

yapılan Türkiye değerlendirmesinde mevcut siyasî rejim üzerinden gidilmiş, Türkiye'nin millî güç unsurlarıyla bölgesel aktör olamayacağına yer verilmiştir. Akla gelen "Türkiye bölgesel aktör olma kabiliyetini sahipken bunu mevcut siyasî yapıyla mı kaybetmiştir?" sorusuna kitapta tatmin edici bir cevap bulunamamıştır.

Kitap Ortadoğu'nun Arap Baharı öncesi ve sonrasıyla bölge siyasetinde yer alan ülkelerin başarılı bir fotoğrafını çekmiştir. Tüm oyuncularını tek kitapta toplaması amacıyla literatüre katkı sağlayacaktır. Bölgeye ilgi duyan bilim adamı, kamuoyu ve politikacılar açısından kitabın önemli bir kaynak olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ancak bölgenin dinamik yapısı sebebiyle kitap uzun vadede güncelliğini koruyamayabilecektir.



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Wolfgang Bauer. *Çalınan Hayatlar: Boko Haram ve Afrika'nın Kalbindeki Terör*. (Die Geraubten Mädchen Boko Haram und der Terror im Herzen Afrikas), İngilizcesinden çeviren: Sergen Özhan, Kor Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2018.
[Wolfgang Bauer. *Stolen Girls: Survivors of Boko Haram Tell Their Story*. The New Press, New York, 2017.]

Kitap 1970 doğumlu, haftalık *Die Zeit* Dergisi için çalışan, yaptığı röportajlarla Katolik Medya Ödülü ve Savaş Muhabirleri Ödülü gibi ödüller almış Alman gazeteci ve muhabir Wolfgang Bauer tarafından kaleme alınmıştır.

Kitabın arka kapak metninde “Başkalarının acılarına gözlerimizi kapatarsak, yakında kendi acılarımıza ağlamamız içten bile değil,” diyen Alman gazeteci yazar Wolfgang Bauer, 2015’te, binlerce çocuk ve kadını elinde esir tutan, köle yapan, savaşçlarıyla zorla evlendiren ve hatta intihar eylemlerinde kullanan terör örgütü Boko Haram’ın elinden bin bir farklı şekillerle kaçmayı başarabilen kadın ve çocuklarla konuşmuş ve kitabını bu konuşulanlar ışığında oluşturmuştur. Tanıklıkların her biri terör örgütünün akıl almaz suçlarını belgelemekte ve örgütün iç yapısına dair kesitler sunmaktadır. Söz konusu, son yıllarda IŞİD’den bile fazla insanı katleden (Boko Haram) terör örgütüdür. Getirdiği ölümün çokluğuna karşın, hakkında bilinenler bir o kadar azdır. Nasıl yönetildiği, uzun vadeli amacının ne olduğu ve kimler tarafından finanse edildiği, hangi kararları neden verdiği tam olarak bilinmemektedir (s. 36). Kitapta konu edilen, yani kaçırılan kadınların tanıklıkları bu sorulara yanıt olmasa bile bu yanıtların bulunması noktasında katkı sağlamaktadır. Kitap ayrıca, terörle mücadele için, terör mağdurlarının seslerine kulak verilmesi gerektiğini, bu sayede terörle mücadelede başarılı olunabileceğinin de altını çizmektedir.

Nijerya'nın kuzeyinde son yıllarda giderek daha da radikalleşen gruplar ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Özellikle de dinî gruplar ortaya çıktıkları hızla yok olmakta iken, Boko Haram, bugüne kadar bu kaos ortamının yarattığı en yeni ve en korkunç figür olarak ifade edilmektedir. Burada Boko Haramın gücü, ona karşı mücadele eden devletin güçsüzlüğü ile doğru orantılı olmaktadır (devlet ne kadar güçsüzse, dini temelli tarikat bir o kadar güçlüdür) (s. 42). Küçük çaplı bir ibadet grubu olarak yola çıkan topluluk, günümüzde yaklaşık elli bin silahlı militanı ile savaş gücü yüksek bir ordu hâline gelmiştir. Yedi milyonu aşkın insan kaçış hâlindeyken binlerce insanın köleleştirildiği ifade edilmektedir. Nijerya hükümetinin verilerine göre yaklaşık yirmi bin insanın hayatını kaybettiği bu terör çatışmalarında birçok ölenin kaydının hiç tutulmadığı da bilinmektedir.

İlk ortaya çıktığı yıllarda 'Yusufçular' olarak bilinen Boko Haram, karizmatik bir vaiz olan Muhammed Yusuf etrafında toplanmış, katı inançları olan küçük ve radikal bir gruptur. Muhammed Yusuf, 2000 yılında açılımı 'Kâfirlîğe Son ve Sünniliğin İnşası Topluluğu' olan İzala Hareketi'nden ayrıldığı tahmin edilmektedir. İzala Hareketi, Nijerya'daki ilk İslâmî reform hareketi sayılmaktadır. Bu hareket, çok sayıdaki yerel gelenek göreneklere karşı mücadele etmiş ve yerine herkes için geçerli İslâm hukukunu, şeriatını tesis etmek istemiştir (s. 45).

Boko Haram'ın şiddet yoluyla kurmaya çalıştığı ve 'Halifelik' olarak adlandırdığı devlet düzeni çoğu zaman muğlâk kalmıştır. İktidarların başlangıcını neredeyse istisnasız olarak kanlı cinayetler oluşturmaktadır. Savaşçılar, onlar için tehlikeli olabilecek herkesi, devletin güvenlik güçleri adına çalışmış veya örgüte katılmayı reddeden genç erkekleri katletmekte, kendilerine has İslâm yorumuna karşı çıkan din adamlarını da aynı şekilde acımadan öldürmektedir. Boko Haram'ın imparatorluğunu üzerine inşâ etmeye çalıştığı temeli köleler oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda genç erkekleri silah altına almakta, genç kadınları (çoğu kez yaşları 9'a 10'a kadar inebilen, Kuran'ı doğru düzgün okuyana ödül olarak sunulan, örgüt üyeleriyle yapılacak şiddet de içeren bir evlilik) da evlendirmektedir. Yaşı ilerlemiş kadınlar ise köle statüsünde kullanılmaktadır. Kitlese tecavüzler için lojistiği Boko Haram, köylerde kurduğu toplama kampları açısından sağlamaktadır. Kamplar, kadınları ayırıştırılmaya, itaatkâr hâle getirmeye ve onlara İslâm eğitimi vermeye hizmet etmektedir. İntihar eylemleri gerçekleştirmeleri için seçilen kızlar için de ayrı eğitim merkezleri bulunmaktadır. Herhangi bir yenilgi durumunda Boko Haram kadınları savaş konvoyuna katarak ormana (Sambisa Ormanına) kaçırmaktadır. Kadınlar Boko Haram'ın gözünde, onların genlerini taşıyan birer kaptan ibarettir (s. 62). Bu kitapta isimleri güvenlikleri nedeniyle değiştirilerek değinilen

kadınların ve çocukların yaşadıkları günümüz modern dünyasının pek de ilgi alanına girmemiş konuyu bilmek dahi istememişlerdir; ta ki 2014 yılına kadar. 2014'te 14 Nisan'ı 15 Nisan'a bağlayan gece Nijerya'da küçük bir kent olan Chibok'taki bir yatılı okuldan 276 kız öğrenci, bir Boko Haram timi tarafından kaçırılmış, zorla kamyonu bindirilerek bugüne kadar kurtulamadıkları Sambisa Ormanı'na götürülmüşlerdir. Bu olay sonrasında Boko Haram'ın bu vahşeti tüm dünya manşetlerine konu olmuştur. Hatta dönemin ABD Başkanının eşi Michelle Obama '*Bring back our girls*' (kızlarımızı geri verin) talebiyle bir kampanya başlatmıştır. Chibok baskını, akıl almaz olanı ete kemiğe büründürmüştür. Artık binlerce kadın ve çocuğun Boko Haram'ın elinde esir olduğu, çoğunun da Sambisa Ormanı ve bataklıklarında tutulduğu düşünülmektedir.

Yazar, fotoğrafçı ve çevirmenden oluşan bir ekibin, Temmuz 2015'te ve daha sonra da Ocak 2016'da, Boko Haram'ın köle kamplarından kaçmayı başarmış kadın ve çocuklarla görüşmeleri sonrasında hazırlanan bu kitap, Nijerya hükümetinin yıllardır sömürü altında kaybolup giden ekonomisi, devlet yönetiminde ve siyasetinde yaşanan yolsuzlukları, dinî inançları sebebiyle zulme maruz kalan vatandaşları, Boko Haram'ın hâlâ devam eden vahşi terörü hakkında bilgi vermesi ve zulmü yaşayanların seslerini dünya kamuoyuna duyurması bakımından büyük önem taşımaktadır.



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