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## İKTİSADİ VE İDARİ BİLİMLER FAKÜLTESİ DERGİSİ

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## TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN

Sündüs Adaş<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

The history of democracy in Spain includes bloody wars and great struggles. The traditionalist forces that emerged victorious from the Spanish Civil War established a dictatorship that would last almost four decades under the leadership of General Francisco Franco. With the death of the dictator Franco, the transition to democracy was experienced. While analysing this process, it is seen that many theoretical approaches have been developed. This study was based on the approach of Nicos Poulantzas, who undertook his theory in his book, *The Crisis of Dictatorships*, published in the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, this study was not limited to Poulantzas's approach. In this study, the events during the transition to democracy were evaluated. In addition, the democratisation process was also examined in the context of institutions that had important effects and reflections on Spanish politics.

**Keywords:** Spain, democratisation, transition to democracy, dictatorship, Franco regime

### INTRODUCTION

Spain is one of the most cited examples of transition to democracy in the recent history of Western Europe. This paper aims at providing an explanation of the Spanish transition to democracy after the death of Dictator Franco. In the first part, there is an exploration of the theoretical framework in relation to regime change. In the second part, we touch upon the significant events that occurred after the transition. The third part looks at the transition from the perspective provided by major Spanish institutions. It should be necessary to indicate the fact that the significant motive during the preparation of this paper was to understand rather than to describe. In this sense, we tried to account for what we understood. Trying to look from different angles and different theoretical outlooks provided us with a broad perspective concerning transition.

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSITION

The transition to democracy in Spain has been a very crucial case concerning the subject matter of comparative politics. There are various and fruitful theoretical frameworks in the analysis of this transition. We prefer to follow up with Nicos Poulantzas, who undertook his theory in his book, *The Crisis of Dictatorships*, published in the mid-1970s. However, we are aware of the fact that there are some deficiencies and failures in his theory. Thus, we try to analyse his approach without getting stuck in it.

Before elaborating on Poulantzas's theory in detail, to make the picture seem more encompassing, introducing three major approaches summed up by José Casanova (1983, p. 941) would be helpful: The Marxist structuralist analysis, the rational choice explanations, and the leadership explanations.

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The basic argument of the Marxist structuralist analysis is that the officeholders are “servants of the ruling class.” In this highly reductionist and instrumentalist assertion, “transition is usually analysed in terms of the composition or decomposition of a dominant faction or class coalition within the hegemonic bloc” (Casanova, 1983, p. 941). For Casanova, there are two mutually exclusive versions of this analysis: That of Poulantzas and Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla. Leaving aside Poulantzas’s argument aside, for now, Giner and Sevilla see Francoism as “reactionary despotism –a mode of class domination brought by a reactionary coalition” (Casanova, 1983, p. 942). If the regime enters its final crisis, the liberal factions within the bourgeoisie choose to abandon the regime and give way to political liberalisation. Casanova (1983, p. 943) criticises the Marxist structuralist analysis in a way that:

This theory is unable to offer a valid interpretation of Francoism as a system of class rule. This theory also offers no evidence in support of the contention that the bourgeoisie, either as a class or as a dominant faction within it, played a leading role in the transition. At most, one could argue that it played a “permissive” role. An analysis of the Spanish transition and of the resulting party system can hardly be used to prove the political power of the Spanish bourgeoisie. On the contrary, what it shows is its chronic political weakness and its inability to organise itself politically as a national class.

The second analysis to be mentioned is the rational choice. According to this explanation, the officeholders chose what they did “rationally” to maintain their office or to prevent civil war. However, for Casanova (1983, p. 944), this “presupposes a completely unrealistic scenario.” He (1983, p. 945) also claims that what seems rational to a person may be illogical to others. Thus, there has to be “a concrete historical, phenomenological analysis to explain social action.”

Thirdly, Rustow’s leadership theory is based on the evaluation of the leaders’ role in transitions. Following this line of analysis, the role played by Suarez and King Juan Carlos. Also, the leaders of the opposition were crucial. Casanova illustrates this point by referring to Navarro’s inability to transform the regime while Suarez could successfully do so. However, this approach is inadequate in considering the social-economic climate in which the transition takes place.

### **Poulantzas’s Typology**

Turning back to the Marxist structuralist analysis of Poulantzas, we have to focus on his typology of state. This typology indicates three levels: the type of state, form of state and form of regime. In his theory, he perceives the state as a form of social relations of production. In this sense, there can be several forms of production, but the dominant one determines the type of state. Thus, if the capitalist mode of production is the dominant one, then the type of state is conceptualised by Poulantzas as “the capitalist state”. According to him, there cannot be one encompassing theory of the state. That is why he develops the theory of the capitalist state as a distinct one.

“Form of state” has two dimensions: state/economy relations and state/society relations. Concerning state/economy relations, there are two kinds of forms: “liberal” and “interventionist”. The liberal state promotes a free-market economy while the interventionist state strictly regulates economic activity. State/society relations put forth “normal” and “exceptional” forms of state. A normal state is identified with liberal democracy. On the other hand, the exceptional state may have different kinds, namely, “Bonapartist states”,<sup>i</sup> “military dictatorships”, and “fascist states”.

### **Analysing the Francoist State**

At this point, it is necessary to indicate that this paper attempts to test how much Poulantzas's argument fits into Spain. This attempt accounts for the transition; it is relevant to account for the social-economic-political base within which this transition took place. In this sense, analysis of the Francoist state is crucial.

It is evident that by following Poulantzas's categorisation, we can easily insert the Francoist state into the picture as an exceptional state. However, such insertion in social sciences is not the appropriate way always. For example, Poulantzas (2004, p. 414) also admits the picture's complexity, and he says that despite the more affinity to the military dictatorship, the Francoist state is somewhere in-between the fascist state and military dictatorship. Casanova's analysis illustrates the ambiguity clearly.


Casanova (1983, p. 947) refers to Philip Schmitter's perception that "the sources of contradiction necessary if not sufficient for the overthrow of authoritarian rule, lie within the regime itself, within the apparatus of the state, not outside it in its relation with civil society." Hence, analysing the nature of Francoism and "the inner contradictions which make possible its self-transformation" should be understood. In doing so, Casanova puts forward three theories: fascism, authoritarian regime and system of dictatorial class rule.

In the case of fascism, he points out that while there were many similar ideological components of fascism in Francoism, the essential structural characteristics, such as lack of mass party or movement before the military uprising, were missing. After the victory of the military, the one-party system was established by a decree. Nevertheless, there was no control of the party over the repressive or ideological apparatus of the state. On the other hand, the Church was the prominent ideological supporter of the regime. When the social base of Francoism is compared with that of fascism, the similarity stands out: "the agrarian land owning and traditionalist peasant interests predominated over the urban-industrial bourgeois or petit-bourgeois interests, all mediated by traditional financial oligarchy" (Casanova, 1983, p. 949). Also, the corporatism of Francoism has some similarities with that of fascism, while the Spanish case is predominated by "Catholic traditionalist elements" (Casanova, 1983, p. 950). He (1983, p. 950) concludes that "... though it had some fascist properties, Francoism can hardly be called a fascist regime, nor was the Francoist state or the party "totalitarian" in any meaningful sense of the term."

Casanova (1983, p. 950) notes that Linz's "ideal-type" of authoritarian regimes derived from an empirical analysis of Francoism. The characteristics of these regimes are limited pluralism, the absence of a systematised ideology, and depoliticisation and demobilisation of the population. Casanova (1983, p. 951) rightfully counts the shortcomings of this model: Firstly, it has a purely political character and, thus, does not explain the socioeconomic base of the regime. Secondly, it is a purely static model since it stresses the regime's permanent and "stable character rather than its tensions, problems or crisis." Unless it incorporates into the analysis the possible internal contradictions within the political structure and the possible tensions and contradictions between the political and the social and economic structures, the model cannot explain the transformations of authoritarian regimes (Casanova, 1983, p. 952).

The third theory to be explained perceives Francoism as a system of class domination. While Linz's theory is regarded as purely political, this third theory suffers from an opposite drawback: an analysis of "the state and political structure solely as reflections or instruments or the socioeconomic structure" (Casanova, 1983, p. 952). In this kind of analysis, the internal changes of the regime are seen as a "reflection of changes in the relations of production within

the hegemonic bloc” (Casanova, 1983, p. 952). Recalling Poulantzas, the theoretical framework he draws is about the conflict within the “power bloc”.<sup>ii</sup> Figure 1 shows how Poulantzas view the power bloc under the Francoist state.




**Figure 1.** The Poulantzian schematisation of the power bloc in the Francoist state (Lopez III, 1990, p. 19).

According to the argument raised by Poulantzas (1976, p. 10), the industrialisation of Spain is characterised as “dependent industrialisation.” The dependence results from the primitive accumulation of capital deriving from the exploitation of colonies and uneven and late industrialisation. In this context, there is a dependence on foreign capital and exogenous sources of capital accumulation. For Poulantzas, the comprador-agrarian bloc (oligarchy), the interest of which is represented by Francoism, benefited from this situation (Lopez III, 1990, p. 20).

On the other side, the “domestic bourgeoisie” believed that the Francoist state, together with the comprador bourgeoisie, was causing the exploitation of the country at a high level. Thus, for it, transition to democracy, its interests would be represented more easily. It had a certain degree of autonomy from foreign capital but not in a total sense. That is why it was not strong enough to have an anti-imperialist struggle.

As a result, the domestic bourgeoisie opted for a strategy of shifting the weight of dependence toward the European Economic Community (EEC) to readjust the balance of forces to their advantage. Part of this strategy included a new partial alliance with the subordinated classes. Poulantzas noted that the general policy of the Spanish domestic bourgeoisie toward the popular masses, and the working class, in particular, evolved into a more open and conciliatory position with regard to their demands. In Spain, this took the form of acceptance of trade unionism as a necessary evil by the domestic bourgeoisie, precisely recognition of two institutions: show steward committees and a system of collective bargaining (Lopez III, p. 23).

In this sense, for Poulantzas, the domestic bourgeoisie triggered the struggle for democratisation through the support of the popular masses and the EEC. Figure 2 schematises the strategy of the domestic bourgeoisie.



**Figure 2.** The schematisation of the bourgeoisie's strategy (Lopez III, 1990, p. 25).

Regarding the shift in the source or origin of foreign capital, the statistical information that Poulantzas lies on is striking. To show the shift from the USA capital to EEC capital, while the percentage of US capital between 1961 and 1965 had risen from 27.8 to 48.3, in 1970, with the effect of EEC capital, this percentage had fallen back to 29.2. For Poulantzas, this indicates the contradiction between the two sets of foreign capital and led to a polarisation within ruling classes; thus, the situation of destabilised hegemony and the crisis of the dictatorship within the power bloc (Lopez III, 1990, p. 20). In this sense, for Poulantzas, the distortion of the Francoist state is all about the redistribution of class forces.

However, there are bouncing criticisms raised upon this highly schematic and mechanical interpretation of Poulantzas. For Maravall (1982, pp. 7-8), the division between comprador and domestic bourgeoisie does not fit into Spain. He denies that the economic development of Spain after 1957 was a result of the promotion of foreign capital. On the contrary, the growth was due to an alliance of financial aristocracy and the state benefiting from the weakness of the bourgeoisie (Maravall, 1982, p. 7). Lopez III (1990, p. 27) argues that “denials of the existence of a dichotomous comprador and domestic bourgeoisie and Maraval's assertion that a financial oligarchy wields economic power in Spain were supported by many facts that Poulantzas seems to have overlooked.”

Moreover, Giner and Salcedo (1976, p. 362) argue that the duality of comprador and domestic bourgeoisie may be applicable to Greece and Portugal, but not Spain. They suggest that the comprador bourgeoisie was actually “internal” (oriented toward internal development) and the “internal” or domestic bourgeoisie was actually external (oriented toward external demand), and Spain then finally possessed a single and unified upper class, in contrast with its structures of pluralism in other respects.

Aramberri, too, calls into question Poulantzas' distinction between comprador and domestic bourgeoisie as being artificial and not corresponding to the reality by asking the question that

Poulantzas (1979, p. 175) does not explain why banking capital supported Suarez, but not right-wing *Alianza Popular*.

Casanova rejects the class-reductionist approach that interprets the rising power of technocrats in terms of the rising power of the comprador bourgeoisie raised by Poulantzas. For Casanova, technocrats were not representatives of comprador bourgeoisie. They only wanted capitalist rationalisation through integrating Spain into the world economy (p. 956).<sup>iii</sup> He (1983, p. 957) puts forward the argument that “technocratic rationalisation and the transformation of Francoist state it entailed may have created some of the conditions of possibility or, at least, facilitated the later democratisation of the state.”

## EVENTS AFTER THE TRANSITION

It would not be a mistake to assert that the indications of transition were seen in Franco’s term. For example, there were attempts of liberalisation, King Juan Carlos was called back. Moreover, attempts to open the way to the external world made it possible for internal and external dynamics to come together to make up the base for transition. To illustrate, Magone states that due to the relations of Spanish originated European workers with their home country, partial liberalisation of the press, industrialisation and modernisation of the social structure and formation on which Francoism relied had been transformed. Thus, with tourism, immigration, the rise of living standards, the social support of the regime had been eroded (Magone, 2006, p. 15).

In other words, economic and social transformation necessitated political transformation as well (Magone, 2006, p. 16). The oil crisis in 1973, the rise in the number of political demonstrations led by workers and students in the last years of Franco strengthened regional movements after Franco in Basque and Catalonia invited political instability (Magone, 2006, p. 16). With the dictator’s death in November 1975, the transition to democracy became inevitable, as in Greece and Portugal. For Magone, the transition process was affected by Portugal since the Spanish political elite observed the turbulence in Portugal and opted for an evolutionary process of cooperation.

During the first year after Franco, there was an ambiguity about initiating a successful transition to democracy. There was not an agreement whether to realise an evolutionary “reforma” or revolutionary “rupture”.

On the one side, there was a possibility of polarisation of society as the sudden-revolutionary break in Portugal. On the other side, there was a peaceful, evolutionary transformation of the Francoist state by supporting a moderate democratisation policy (Gunther, 1988, p. 34). With demands like “rupture”, general amnesty, legalisation of all political parties, radicals initiated demonstrations and strikes. The choice in this process would determine the political plane of Spain from then on. In July 1976, the Navarro government was replaced by the Adolfo Suarez government, and the reform process accelerated. With this choice, “reforma” became the only prevailing way to democracy. Suarez was “Movimiento”, originated general director and minister.<sup>iv</sup> He was not a much-known figure of the Francoist regime. His cooperation with the King and speaker of the Cortes made him a successful reformer.<sup>v</sup> With the approval of the October 1976 Reform Bill, his persuasion of Cortes to suicide is the indicator of this. This bill introduced first, a way for a new and democratically elected constituent assembly to shape new political reforms and second, new Cortes is designed as a bicameral assembly. The people ratified this bill in December 1976 with 94 %. These followed this bill: hundreds of convicts gained their freedom, Movimiento was dissolved, vertical syndicalism was replaced with free

trade unions, negotiation of new electoral law with the opposition, legalisation of Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in April 1977 despite the strong opposition of the military. With the success of “reforma”, the new regime was legitimised before the Francoistas and opposition of the Francoist state.

Suarez’s Union of Democratic Centre (UCD) won the 15 June 1977 elections for the constituent assembly with 40%. Socialists (PSOE) got 29%, and the most substantial organisation –PCE– could only get 9%. AP (Popular Alliance), which is more conservative than UCD, was able to get 8%. Besides these parties, regional parties were able to be represented. These results show that moderate parties were favoured.

Contrary to the past, “consensualism” and harmony prevailed during the preparation of the new constitution. Thus, harmony became one of the primary motives of the new political culture in Spain. There were two critical issues to be solved in the new constitution: the country’s form of regime and organisation.

The form of the regime was identified as “republican monarchy”, with which legitimacy was transferred to the Cortes and thus sovereignty based totally on the people. Decentralisation became the most important principle concerning the organisation of the country. As a result, the “state of autonomies” (*estado autonomias*) was established.

With the economic policy of the Suarez government, the rise of workers’ wages was delimited, the growth rate decreased from 3% to 1.5%, unemployment rose. Despite this economic picture, Suarez could get 35% of the votes while PSOE remained 30. However, economic problems intensified. Unemployment rose although trade unions –UGT and CCOO– accepted a rise in wages under inflation. Moreover, Basque terrorism increased. The most reactive and anti-democratic element of repressive state apparatus, civil guard, took advantage of the instability and broke into the Cortes in Tajero’s leadership.<sup>vi</sup> This coup attempt was suppressed successfully.

Some within the party harmed Suárez’s authority and his role as leader. The tension exploded in 1981: Suárez resigned as the head of government, and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was appointed to lead the new cabinet and the UCD. Sotelo dissolved parliament and called elections for October 1982. In the 1979 election, the UCD had achieved a majority, but in 1982 they suffered a spectacular defeat. The elections gave an absolute majority to the PSOE.

In the 28<sup>th</sup> Congress of the PSOE (May 1979), Felipe González, the party’s secretary general, resigned rather than ally with the radicals in the party. In the Congress held in September 1979, there was the realignment in the party along more moderate lines allowing González to take charge once more. He entered the elections with the political program called “el cambio” (the change). Winning an absolute majority in parliament in two consecutive elections (1982 and 1986) and exactly half the seats in 1989 allowed the PSOE to legislate and govern without establishing pacts with the other parliamentary political forces.

With Gonzalez, the PSOE abandoned dogmatic Marxism and reached the middle class. During the 80s, they continued their reforms. Their strategy was to open the Spanish market to competition and to restructure some sectors. They took into account the rising importance of neo-liberalism and left Franco’s protectionism. The membership in the EEC motivated their reforms as well. However, unemployment remained very high between 17 to 23%. Reform of higher education, expansion of health system and some regulations regarding improvement of

the position of women furthered democratisation. On 12 June 1985, Spain became a member of the EEC.

Despite its anti-NATO attitude during the 1986 election campaigns, the PSOE took the issue to the referendum, and the people favoured membership. In the election, while AP/CD could get 26 %, they won 44 %. In 1989, PSOE degraded to 40 %, while PP got 26 %. Between 1989 and 1996, PSOE could no more get the absolute majority in the Cortes. With José Maria Aznar's presidency in PP, the party increased its votes significantly, and in 1996, it exceeded PSOE's votes by 1%.

The reasons for the decline of PSOE are multifaceted. In its long government years, the party was remembered for the exploitation of office, corruption, clientelism and scandals. Some political scientists entitled these years "patrimonial socialism" since socialists opted to develop close relations with financial oligarchy rather than improve the social conditions of the masses (Magone, 2006 p. 20). Due to their obsession with holding power, they fell into scandals. Moreover, the fundamental problem of Spain, that is, unemployment, could not be solved, and this intensified the loss of prestige.

With the end of support provided by the regional party of Catalonia (CiU), Gonzalez was forced to hand over the office to Aznar. Aznar, too, formed the government with the support of some regional parties. Due to the demands of delegation of authority coming from regional parties, "decentralisation" increased in Aznar's term of office. With him, liberalisation of the economy furthered, and there were some positive indicators in the economy. Thanks to the positive results of his first term, Aznar could win the absolute majority with 2000 elections. With the support of Zapatero, the leader of PSOE, he attempted a struggle with the terrorist organisation ETA. However, providing support for the USA in Iraq caused a reaction of Spanish people, and in March 2004 Elections, the PSOE came to power.

## **TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

The *Cortes Generales* approved the constitution on 31 October 1978, and by the Spanish people in a referendum on 6 December 1978, before being promulgated by King Juan Carlos on 27 December. It came into effect on 29 December, the day it was published in the *Official Gazette*. The constitution, which established a democratic constitutional monarchy, was the first Spanish constitution that was not imposed by a party but represented a negotiated compromise among all the major parties (Carr, p. 177).

At this point, explaining the roles of the primary Spanish institutions, namely the Church, Military, the Crown, and executive-legislative bodies, and the constitution would help clarify the scene in which transition to democracy took place. Afterwards, we will mention the importance of NATO and the European Union membership for the democratic transition. Finally, we will focus on the change in the regional policy with democratic transition

### **Basic Institutions of Spain**

#### ***Church***

As the principal legitimiser of the Francoist state, eliminating the Church's power was crucial for the settlement of democracy. 1978 Constitution changed the state-church relations ultimately, such that the Constitution draft did not even mention the Church. If we look back at the Church during the Francoist state, we would see a moral and cultural mesogovernment in

the hands of the Church, which would share in the decision making and execution of policies on moral education, backed up by an explicit legal framework (Pérez-Díaz, p.133). At that time, the state also contributed all sorts of material resources to the Church.

However, a rupture from the Francoist regime was carried out despite the resistance from the conservative sectors of the Church. It is also remarkable that, in the final analysis, the Catholic Church is mentioned in the constitution (Article 16), which led to a contradiction in the constitution that a Spanish state claimed to have no official religion with freedom of ideology and religion but mentions about Catholic Church in its constitution.

According to some, this change in the state-church relations took place smoothly mostly because of the internal conflicts of the Church. For example, Pérez-Díaz (1993, p.172) puts it like that “During the 1960s and 1970s the church had used up all its energies absorbing internal conflicts and ensuring for itself a dignified way out of Francoism”. On the other hand, according to some scholars like McDonough, Shin, Moisés (1998, p. 929), the cracking the direct influence of the Church from the politics also stemmed from the consent of the Church for integration to the new system because even after the transition to democracy religious affiliation was closely related to political participation. Therefore, either with the consent of the Church or with the pressure inside or outside of the Church, with the transition to democracy, the Spanish Church lost most of its direct and formal power on politics and civil life.

However, it would be too naïve to think that Church does no longer have any influence on politics. As put by Anderson (2003, p. 142), “whilst abstaining from overt political involvement, the Church had no intention of keeping silence on issues relating to core values or institutional interests.” Therefore, despite its formal status, the Catholic Church still exerted so much influence on Spanish political and civil life by indirect means.

### *Military*

One of the most important elements of the transition to the democratic state is the construction of a civilian government without any links to the military. As mentioned in the 8<sup>th</sup> article of the Spanish Constitution, the responsibility of the military is confined to the guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of Spain, the defence of its territorial integrity and constitutional order. Its mission as a guardian against internal threats had changed to one as a protector against external threats. Besides, further articles in the constitution guaranteed the removal of the military from politics. For example, according to the 97<sup>th</sup> article, “government” directs the defence policy and military administration. Therefore, even in the defence policy military is not a policymaker but a tool of state for its implementation.

Moreover, Spain’s military regions were re-drawn and reduced from nine on the mainland to six, plus the Balearic and Canary Islands (Heywood, 1995, p. 63). Besides, further attempts were made for professionalism. Resources have been shifted from ground to air and the naval. During this period, although the military expenditure grew in real terms, it declined as a proportion of the state’s central budget (Heywood, 1995, p. 63)

### *The Crown*

The formal position of the Crown is set out in Articles 56-65 of the constitution. The monarch is the head of the state but remains at the margins politically. The constitution outlines a series of functions, as opposed to powers; the head of state sanctions and promulgates laws, issues decrees approved by the Council of Ministers, is supreme Commander of the armed forces, represents Spain in its relations with other states.



If we look carefully, these are all duty acts in the sense that they are constitutionally required of the monarch, who has left no discretion over their fulfilment (Carr, 2002). Therefore, the Crown is also bound to the constitution by fulfilling the required tasks.

### ***Executive-Legislative Relations***

In constitutional terms, there is no “Prime Minister” post that exists in Spain but rather “President of the Government” and the “President of the Council of Minister” is referred to. Actually, this amendment in the name of this post also serves the purpose of protecting democracy and preventing authoritarian regimes. As Heywood (1995, p.88) states, the country’s long tradition of authoritarian intervention has been reflected in the dominance of heads of state vis-à-vis heads of government. Therefore, the creation of a more assertive executive and the head of government was the objective. Moreover, the legislative is set in a position subordinate to the executive. Furthermore, as articulated in the constitution (Art 87, 109-11), there is no clear separation of powers. Instead, there exists a deliberate integration of executive and legislative via government.

The creation of a strong executive is also reflected in the powers granted to the president of the government such that he has a virtually free hand over the structure of and appointments to Cabinet members, the number of vice-presidents, and so forth. Cabinet members do not have to be either deputies or members of the party in power.

The reason for the creation of a strong executive was for the protection of democracy. However, the relative decreased role of the legislative undermined democracy. Parliamentary rules also encouraged a “pactist” style of decision making: the minimum size of parliamentary groups was set at 15, only parliamentary groups were allowed to introduce legislation. Consequently, all these regulations resulted in creating a weak parliament and the domination of the policymaking process by the government.

This is clearly indicated by the statistics carried out between 1977-2004 (Field, 2005, p. 1084). According to those statistics, 86% of laws began as government bills, and only 20% of these government bills did not become law. However, when we look at the reasons behind this 20% of rejection, we could see that the parliament is not very powerful even in the decline of these governmental bills because in 90% of these bills expired when the parliamentary elections were called, and 8% is withdrawn, and just 2% is rejected.

Therefore, parliament does not have enough tools to check and control the government. Actually, these regulations are pretty similar to the ones that are implemented in Turkey with the 1982 Constitution. Just like Spain, in Turkey, all parliamentary rules and regulations served to eliminate political cleavages. The closed-list system for elections in Spain was also intended to diminish traditional ideological conflicts as well as centre-periphery tensions.

### ***NATO Membership***

The PSOE owes its victory in the 1982 elections primarily to its anti-NATO stance such that its slogan was “OTAN, de entrada, no”. However, soon after the elections, the PSOE changed its attitude towards NATO. Under considerable international pressure and with the NATO issue increasingly linked to Spain’s application for EC membership, the Socialists, once in government, shifted positions and then had to convince the public, which (according to public opinion polls) was opposed to the membership to the NATO (Maxwell, 1991, p. 40). There are several reasons behind this change; however, after all, the NATO membership had a fundamental importance for Spain during the transition period to democracy.

As we have already mentioned, there was a shift in the mission of the military. Contrary to the Francoist state where the military had a paramount value, in democratic Spain, this military ended up with an ambiguous role such that the military was neither granted so much power nor needed as before. Hence, to avoid this potential idle military and locate it to a beneficial function, the NATO membership was priceless such that it could guarantee the rule of the civilian government. In this way, the military would have given a new role as the guardian against external threats rather than the internal ones.

On the other hand, another view from within the military was that if Spain becomes a member of NATO, that will provide Spain with a fully equipped and professional army, which is essential for protecting democratic Spain against internal threats (Heywood, 1995, p. 265). Therefore, the NATO membership served well to Spain in many ways during its transition to democracy.

### ***European Union***

In 1986, Spain joined the European Community (EC). According to the political leaders, the European engagement was essential to ensure the successful consolidation of a European-style democracy, an essential concern after the failed coup of 1981 (Maxwell, 1991, p. 37). The prospect of joining the European Union played an essential role in the consolidation of democracy. Spain's first formal application for membership to the EC was made in February 1962. According to *Birkelbach Report* (Thomas, 2006, p. 1198) promulgated in 1962, "States whose governments do not have democratic legitimacy and whose people do not participate in the decisions of the government, neither directly nor indirectly by freely-elected representatives, cannot expect to be admitted in the circle of peoples who form the European Communities." Moreover, according to the report, "this involves above all recognition of the principles of the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms." Therefore, to adjust those political criteria, Spain has taken significant steps towards the consolidation of its democracy. As Conversi (2002, p. 231) puts it, "this worked as a lever for increasing Madrid's commitment to the protection of human rights in all their aspects."

In the second application, in 1977, this time economic rather than political issues were concerned. For ten years period, Spain undertook significant economic reforms for its integration with the European Union. Finally, the accession treaty was signed in Madrid on 12 March 1985, and Spain formally became a member of the EC on 1 January 1986.

### ***Regional Policy***

Regionalised state model introduced by the new constitution is a unique way that contributed to the democratisation process of Spain (Konuralp, 2019). Nearly one-tenth of the constitution was devoted to regional matters. However, there is considerable ambiguity in the constitution regarding the territorial organisation. For example, Article 2, which is on national unity and regional autonomy, writes: "The constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, *and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.*"

This article both rule out the regional autonomy, as indicated in the first part and specifically rule it in, as suggested by the italicised section. However, this ambiguity was a planned one such that the sensitive issues like regional autonomy are left aside to be solved later. Therefore, in order to reconcile both centralists and regional autonomy seekers, vague language is used in the constitution. However, as compared to the past, the 1978 constitution, emphasising

subsidiarity and decentralisation, gave local governments much more responsibilities and authority. Hence, the governance became more democratic.

The constitution established three levels for 17 autonomous communities shown in Figure 3:

- (1) Privileged regions: These are historic regions-Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia-which had been granted the right to autonomous government during the II Republic. They do not need any formal application to the state regarding their status. They would enjoy full autonomous powers, entailing a high level of responsibilities.
- (2) Grade 1 regions (Article 151): Any region could apply to receive the same high level of autonomy as the privileged regions, provided that a series of conditions were first satisfied, and the draft autonomy statute was endorsed in a referendum.
- (3) Grade 2 regions (Article 143): required regions to follow a lengthy consultation process before making a formal application for autonomy. Once granted, their autonomous status will be low and subject to five years prior to their being granted similar autonomy as privileged regions.



**Figure 3.** Political Map of Spain (Maps of World, 2014).

All 17 communities have a president, an executive, a unicameral parliament, together with their administrative organs and the High Court of Justice. While ordinary laws passed at the central and regional level have equal standing, the central government sets primary legislation which ranks above regional law in such areas as education, health, law and order and civil service. Several areas, such as defence, foreign affairs, economic stabilisation, pensions and unemployment legislation, remain the exclusive preserve of central government (Articles, 149-150).

### *Financial Structure of the Regions*

In terms of control over expenditure, seven autonomous communities were granted a high level of responsibility. The only taxes allocated explicitly to the central government are the customs duties. All remaining tax fields can be assigned to any level of government. However, regional and local powers cannot levy a particular tax without the transfer by the central government; tax assignments depend on Madrid's decisions.

### *Provincial and Municipal Government*

Spain's 17 autonomous communities were further divided into 50 separate provinces and over 8,000 municipalities. As the Spanish state was being decentralised through the establishment of autonomous communities, local government was firmly being re-centralised. Control over municipalities was passed mainly to regional governments, which are reluctant to cede the power to the local level.

Whereas in the early 1980s, many Basque and Catalan nationalists declared outright independence to be their ultimate aim, in the 1990s, they tended to adopt a somewhat vaguer attitude. As in "Europe of the regions", the role of national states would become secondary, and as decision making power moved both upwards to the supra-national level and downwards to the regional level, independence claims of the communities no longer constitutes their ultimate aim.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Poulantzian framework provides that the type of state need not be changed with the change in the form of state. In Spain, this is the case too. After the transition, the type of state continued to be a capitalist one while the form of state moved from exceptional to normal (democratic). The form of the regime after the transition became a republican monarchy. However, such a schematisation may not always be valid in studying social phenomena. In this sense, the uniqueness of the Spanish case has its merits too. This paper showed such an attitude.

Concerning Spanish institutions, there is a significant transformation in all of the primary institutions of Spain with the transition to democracy. However, there is still ambiguity in the new role of these institutions. First, with the transition to democracy, while the Catholic Church had been deprived of most of its privileges formally, the Catholic Church kept exerting great influence on politics and civil life informally.

Secondly, the role of the military in democratic Spain also created big debates. Nonetheless, the military proved its commitment to the civil government and targeted external threats as a professional defence organ. Except for the attempted military coup of 1981, the military internalised its new role and operated accordingly.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 also dealt with legislative-executive relations. However, to protect democracy, the constitution created such a powerful executive that one could hardly claim that there is a democratic decision-making process in the parliament. As a consequence of the dominant executive, the role of the legislative turned out to be a symbolic one. There have also been two critical international dimensions of Spain's transition to democracy; NATO and EU membership. NATO membership played an essential role in creating a new function to the military, consequently securing the civilian government. On the other hand, to adapt the criteria set by the EC, Spain took significant steps towards democracy.

The last issue that we dealt with was the regional policy. The regional policy had always been a controversial issue in Spain, and such a contentious issue was left to be solved later. Therefore, as we have shown, there are ambiguities in the constitution regarding regional autonomy and sovereignty. However, despite these uncertainties in the constitution, the regions had been given much more powers and responsibilities, so the decision-making process attempted to be made more democratic.

However, this time another obstacle occurred in front of the democratic decision making. As the control over municipalities was primarily passed to regional governments, regional governments were reluctant to give the power to the local level. With the membership to the EU, the regional governments also become more satisfied as living in the “Europe of the regions”, consequently forsaking the desires for independence.

<sup>i</sup> “Bonapartist state” is derived from Marx’s works. The argument is as follows: While Marx saw the state as largely derivative of the economic forces and class interests, he did at times allow it a substantial degree of political autonomy. His work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) describes a *coup d’état* in France in 1851, in which state forces led by Louis Bonaparte seized absolute power, achieving not only a considerable degree of independence from the bourgeoisie, but often acting directly against its immediate interests. According to Marx, however, the Bonapartist state still served the long-term interests of the capitalist system, even if it often acted against the immediate interests and will of the bourgeoisie: that the individual bourgeois can continue to exploit other classes and to enjoy undisputed property, family, religion and order that their class be condemned along with other classes to similar political nullity; that, in order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown.

<sup>ii</sup> “Power bloc” is defined by Poulantzas as a “contradictory unity” of classes and class fractions organised around the hegemonic class or class fraction. This does not mean a homogeneous composition, but an alliance structure that is fractured and full of contradictions. It is marked by permanent competition between the sectors of internationally oriented capital.

<sup>iii</sup> Technocrats came to power in 1957, known as Opus Dei technocrats.

<sup>iv</sup> Movimeto: the sole fascist political party permitted under the dictatorship.

<sup>v</sup> Cortes: The Cortes Generales (Spanish for General Courts) is the legislature of Spain.

<sup>vi</sup> Antonio Tejero, breaking into the Congress of Deputies February 23, 1981, attempting a coup.

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# PARTICIPATION AND THE ESSENCE OF ORGANISATION THEORY

Selçuk Gürçam<sup>i</sup>

## ABSTRACT

This article departed from the fact that participation is one of the most critical parameters in organisation theory. This article evaluated the issue of participation in the context of organisation theory. It analysed this term concerning modern theories of organisation, post-modernism discussion, and changing nature of reality. In the search for such analysis, the central argument was to test whether “participation” matters in changing the essence of modernist reality. In doing so, the article referred to the discussion on post-modernity, the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, globalisation, governance, ethical concerns. After mentioning such issues, the analysis included types of participation in administration in organisational life in the last part. Thus, the argument gained a more concrete basis. The article argued that despite the broadness of discussion, participation proved to be fruitful in the context of organisation theory. The article concluded with the suggestion that to construct a theory of participation, complete emancipation of paradigms and approaches from their inherent modernist capabilities, which result in the transfer of the same essence to every theorisation, is necessary.

**Keywords:** participation, organisation theory, psychic prison, classical organisation theory, neoclassical organisation theory

## INTRODUCTION

Participation is one of the most critical parameters in organisation theory. In this paper, we will evaluate participation in the context of organisation theory. We will analyse this term concerning modern theories of organisation, post-modernism discussion, and changing nature of reality. In the search for such analysis, our central argument is to test whether “participation” matters in changing the essence of modernist reality. In doing so, we will refer to the discussion on post-modernity, the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, globalisation, governance, ethical concerns. After mentioning such issues, the analysis will include types of participation in administration in organisational life in the last part. Thus, the argument would gain a more concrete basis.

## PARTICIPATION IN A “PSYCHIC PRISON”

It would make sense to start with the “emancipatory” aspect of participation in organisational life. Psychology-centred outlooks are gaining interest in this respect. Gareth Morgan (1980, p. 617) points out that the radical humanist paradigm focuses on the alienating nature of organisations, and he refers to the metaphor of “psychic prison”, “an image which focuses upon the way human beings may be led to enact organisational realities experienced as confining and dominating.” Like many approaches in social thought, the critical theory developed from Marx (1844) and Lucas’s (1971) works emphasises “the process of reification through which

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individuals over-concretise their world, perceiving it as objective and real, something independent of their own will and action” (Morgan, 1980, 617).

Thus, to get rid of the gratings of the psychic prison, participation has roles to play. In this sense, it might be praised as an instrument to curtail alienating nature of modern organisations in which alternative realities are dismissed, and an over-concretised organisational life dominates the will of individuals. For example, Chell (1985, p. xii) focuses on the issue with a psychology-centred approach in her book, namely *Participation and Organization*, by using a broader definition of participation as such: “interaction between people to achieve specific goals or outcomes.” Reference to the achievement of goals will be discussed in the following sections in relation to the changing reality of organisational life, but seeing participation as “fundamental to social life and *mutatis mutandis* to organisational behaviour” has a special meaning in this context (Chell, 1985, p. xii). Thus, participation implying “interaction between people” has an integrative role in coping with organisational domination in modern theories of organisation.

### **“MONIST” PARADIGM AND PARTICIPATION**

At his point, referring to the modern organisation theory makes sense to address the inherent participation problem. The practice and theory of democratic participation and an organisational perspective based on a “monist” philosophy contradict (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 307). Modern organisation theory does not abandon the adherence to centralisation and direction of power by the administration. Thus, modern organisation theory and practice exhibit the problematic aspect of participation since it could not free itself from the monist paradigm. Üstüner and Keyman (2003) refer to two basic approaches to illustrate this concern. The first is Taylorism, based on F. W. Taylor’s book published in 1911, namely *Principles of Scientific Management*. The second one is the theory of bureaucracy constructed by Max Weber (1921 [2015]).

In Taylorism, participatory management or participation of members of an organisation whose principal task is not management was rejected due to being contrary to “scientific” principles. Reference to “science” has a special meaning in this context since it is an ideological shield. In a way, ordinary people are excluded from administration as they lack education in scientific principles of management (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 308). Thus, management is perceived as a technical issue. Moreover, some assumptions of Taylorist scientific management about human nature obstruct participation. For example, Taylor assumed that when workers (or members of an organisation) come together, the risk of “soldiering” increases. Thus, it is believed that in order to get rid of such a risk, workers should be isolated as much as possible. Concerning the Weberian approach, it is evident that Weber focused on the legitimation of power on the grounds of “rationality”. Following the same line of analysis, both approaches are a reflection of the monist paradigm, and they see the organisation as an instrument of social control while the former realises it with the claim of being “scientific”, the latter does it with reference to “rationality” (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 310). Then it becomes natural that participation is a problematic aspect of such theorisations when power is perceived as central.

### **FOLLETT: PARTICIPATION AND INTEGRATION**

After mentioning Taylorism, which is in the classical period of organisation theory, it would be helpful to point out the contributions of Mary Parker Follett, who represents a transitional vein between classical and neo-classical schools. She emerged as a critique of neo-classic school by grounding her criticisms on humanistic arguments. She departs from Taylorism as she focuses on authority, power and cooperation. She also sees power as a collective thing. Thus it cannot

be delegated from top to down (Follet, 1996, p. 161). In her conceptualisation, there is a distinction between “power-over” and “power-with”. Power-over aims at dominating and oppressing the one with coercive means, while power-with concentrates on cooperation and consent between workers and managers. In other words, power-with should only be constructed if, at the same time, the worker can have an influence on the manager (194?, p. 105). Feldheim (2005, p. 411) states that “Follett advocated an integrative unity of organisations or the state where members work together to get the facts and consider the situation and in which where there is collective responsibility for decisions.” She recognises differences within an organisation and searches for integration of these differences since they are helpful for the well-being of an organisation. With reference to “creative experience”, she argues that every individual makes the organisation richer since everyone is different. For example, in her book *Creative Experience*, she writes that

What people often mean by getting rid of conflict is getting rid of diversity, and it is of the utmost importance that these should not be considered the same. We may wish to abolish conflict but we cannot get rid of diversity. We must face life as it is and understand that diversity is the most essential feature... We seek a richly diversified experience where every difference strengthens and reinforces the other. (Follet, 1951, pp. 301-302)

The participation of individuals can realise the integration of diversity. Thus, “it is this creative integration which lies at the heart of what Follett calls true democracy” (Morse, 2006, p. 8). However, the neo-classical school could not be evaluated much more progressive than Follett concerning the participation of organisation members since “it is for a limited participation of members only in maximisation of outputs” (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 311). The human-centred theories of Mayo, Maslow and McGregor are examples of such an approach. While Mayo emphasised group dynamics, Maslow focused on the pyramid of needs, and McGregor conceptualised the human side of organisations to increase labour productivity (Şener, 2005, p. 5).

## **A CHANGING REALITY?**

With the 1970s, there are increasing numbers of examples within the discipline of public administration, which attaches importance to the concept of participation. Marini’s (1971) new public administration; Vincent Ostrom’s (1973) critique of the classical school; George Frederickson’s (1982) emphasis on civism; and Blacksburg Manifesto (Marshall and White, 1990) are inline with this trend. Nevertheless, as Üstüner and Keyman (2003, p. 313) note, all of these examples are incapable of developing new alternatives to the monistic structure of organisations. Consequently, the idea of reforming modern organisation theory was revived.

It is argued that the 1970s and 1990s represent distinct contours of participation. Therefore, while in pre-1970 theories, participation was seen as a means to reach efficiency, after the 1970s, participation became a means of legitimation not only at the level of organisations but also at the societal level. After the 1990s, participation and pluralism seem to end on their own (Şener, 2005, p. 2). In other words, with the influence of post-modernism, it is claimed that efficiency started to be rejected, and participation appeared to be a value on its own (Şener, p. 15). Kenneth Gergen (1992, p. 213-215) asserts that post-modernism draws upon three interrelated propositions about the nature of knowledge: (1) the replacement of the real with the representational; (2) the understanding of representational as a communal artefact; (3) the need for the ironic self-reflection. In post-modern thinking and theories asserting to be post-modern, reality gives way to temporary truths or temporary communicational truths constructed by discourses. In this way, rejection of the monist paradigm or modernist pretensions of being “scientific” or “objective” gains an epistemological ground, contributing to the development of

alternative theories based on participation. In other words, post-modern thinking gave way to new understandings of organisations by emancipating organisation theory from rigid ontological demarcations of modernism. However, it would be inappropriate to argue for a united post-modern theory of organisation (Hancock and Tyler, 2001, p. 64).

Fox and Miller, and Farmer's theories illustrate this break-off. Fox and Miller's (1995, p. 12) discourse theory is built on two categories: The first one is "few-talk" dominated by elites in which no other one can get to talk. The second one is "many-talk", in which everyone can talk without any limitations. Nevertheless, their proposal is "some-talk" in which not only elites or everyone can talk, but the ones who want to talk can talk. They argue that the self-governing of the people is no more meaningful, and thus, election polls are not the appropriate means to realise democracy (Fox and Miller, 1995, p. 39). In this sense, the prevention of manipulation in discussions is good for participatory mechanisms. As for Farmer's (1997, p. 17) theory, we can argue that "anti-administration" is a motto aiming at denying administrative-bureaucratic power and rational-hierarchical Weberian appearance. It suggests confrontation of opposing discourses (administration and anti-administration).

## **GLOBALISATION, POST-FORDISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY**

Üstüner and Keyman (2003) have a different attitude towards the discussion of post-modernism in the context of organisation theory. Their argument takes form with the inclusion of globalisation and liberal democracy. According to them, the assumption that today both at national and international levels, there are deep-rooted changes, and these changes constitute a rupture in our manners of analysing relations of domestic/international, inside/outside, identity/difference, at the same time make up the ground for broadening the scope of liberal democracy (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 301). Nevertheless, this does not mean that these deep-rooted changes represent a shift from modernity to post-modernity. Thought of post-modernity becomes meaningful when it symbolises a style of criticism to modernity, which needs broadening of its internal scope. It is on the agenda that the liberal democracy model, which could not accord with globalisation and pluralistic social structure, should be restructured. This restructuring process gains a post-modern quality as long as it represents an internal critique of modernity and broadens its internal scope (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 302).

Moreover, economic relations undergo deep-rooted changes in this restructuring process (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 304). This is a shift from Fordism to post-Fordism or flexible model of production. This post-Fordist restructuring has a global characteristic, and thus, economic models within national boundaries come out to be in crisis. Therefore, the global/national/local interaction undermines the legitimacy of thoughts that claim the integrity of society realised by the nation-state (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 305). This interaction has two crucial influences on liberal democracy. Firstly, the concept of citizenship is broadened to accommodate differences. Secondly, with the problem of the representation of this category of citizens, representative democracy is in crisis (Üstüner and Keyman, 2003, p. 306).

Üstüner and Keyman (2003, p. 306) argue that the area of the question of democracy shifts to civil society, and civil society organisations become subjects of representative democracy more. This shift represents a shift from representative democracy to participatory democracy. In this context, the concept of participation seems to exhibit a much broader meaning. In other words, its scope shifts from organisational to social and political levels.

## GOVERNANCE AND RESTRUCTURING PROCESS

However, in this study, we are critical to the claimed global/national/local interaction since this interaction does not broaden the scope and essence of participation. To put it in another way, nothing becomes more participatory in essence during the restructuring process. Moving to the discussion on “governance” is helpful to assert this claim. “Governance” became a key concept as a reflection of the restructuring process. For Gerry Stoker (2000, p. 3), this term implies “a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state.” This definition gives us the idea that, firstly, governance is highly related to governing, but not using the state authority; and secondly, it is a way of collective action. Stoker (2000, p. 3) writes,

Governance involves working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors. It focuses attention on a set of actors that are drawn from but also beyond the formal institutions of government. A key concern is processes of networking and partnership. Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. Governing becomes an interactive process because no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally.

The passage above involves most of the terms that are key to governance. These are “public-private-voluntary sectors, networking, partnership, interaction.” These terms have much to do with the trend that the discipline of public administration faces from the 1970s. The combination of these terms resulted in a shift from governing to governance. For Tarık Şengül (2001), the welfare state practices in the West regressed, and in place of this, there emerged some market mechanisms with the rise of the new right. Then, the nation-states started to be abraded with the search for increasing the mobility of capital on a global scale. The privatisation process could be accounted for the very same logic. The areas that were abandoned by the state started to be filled by the private sector. However, state-market distinction proved insufficient, and a third sector was transformed in local administrations. In this framework, a tripartite model came to the fore with the combination of local state, local capital and civil societal institutions. Since the local government could not embrace such a formation, this new genesis was entitled “governance” (Şengül, 2001, p. 52).

One could easily argue that there was no need to make a new conceptualisation to explain the new contours of local government if the essence had not changed. Since the market and civil society were not novel to governing process, the shift in emphasis did not eradicate the essence of governing.

Like Tarık Şengül, Bob Jessop (2000) argues for the failure of state-market separation, and he defines the process as “market failure”. Hence, governance was a response to this failure in the form of public-private partnerships. Bob Jessop (2000, p. 11) points out that

The 1970s saw growing assertions that state intervention was failing and that the state itself was in crisis. In the 1980s, the dominant neo-liberal response in Britain to this alleged crisis largely involved turning to the market and, to a lesser extent, community or family self-help. Successive Thatcher and Major governments promoted privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, the use of market proxies in the residual state sector, cuts in direct taxes to enhance consumer choice, and internationalisation to promote capital mobility and the transfer of technology and “know-how”. They also advocated an enterprise culture and popular capitalism to make civil society more market-friendly.

## THE RATIONALITY OF GOVERNANCE AND POST-FORDISM

Regarding the rationality of governance, Jessop (2000, p. 16) identifies that “the rationality of governance is dialogic rather than monologic, pluralistic rather than monolithic, heterarchic rather than either hierarchic or anarchic.” Goodwin and Painter (2000) raise another approach to the shift to “governance”. While scholars such as Jessop and Şengül put the emphasis on “marketisation”, Goodwin and Painter make use of the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism as an analytical tool. They write that

Under Fordism, for a period, the provision of social welfare was functional for economic growth and development, and also brought a degree of social cohesion and stability. Under post-Fordism, international economic competitiveness would be paramount, and social policy would be subordinated to supply-side requirements, particularly the need to provide a flexible labour force with training matched to the requirements of private investors. In consequence, new forms of coordination between the public and private sectors (governance) would be required both to maintain the subordination of social need to economic competitiveness politically, and to ensure that supply-side provision was indeed tailored to the needs of the private sector. Welfare policy becomes decoupled from economic development and increasingly a mechanism for mitigating the social consequences of the restless search for competitive advantage. As it is no longer central to the mode of growth, welfare need no longer be provided or underwritten by the state, and new forms of coordination (‘governance’ again) can be introduced here too. (Goodwin and Painter, 2000, p. 42)

The reason for referring to the discussion of governance is to clarify how the restructuring process accommodates the essence of the previous structure within itself. In other words, the restructuring process does not make the essence more participatory. In order to conceal the failure of the new model proposed by neoliberalism, governance became an enforced theory to make things appear more “participation-friendly”. Ascribing increasing roles to civil society organisations seems more participatory, but it has no meaning when considering current NGOs’ professionalised, market-oriented, undemocratic and exclusionary nature. The discourses of flexibility, interaction, dialogue through civil society are all in line with this new enforced theory. However, the changing position of the masses within the new framework needs to be discussed since new forms of oppression and exploitation gained an appearance of participation. To put it in another way, this is an illusion of liberal democracy as it becomes inefficient in the context of post-modern thinking. Organisation theory should reflect such an approach more explicitly and assertively with the contribution of post-modern thinking.

## PARTICIPATION WITH ETHICAL CONCERN

Denis Collins’s (1997) approach is an example of how participation is used as a means to sustain efficient management. Collins (1997, p. 490) argues for the analogy between political/economic systems and organisational systems. For example, Collins (1997, p. 490) identifies authoritarianism with traditional management, communitarianism with participatory management and libertarianism with self-management. However, this theorisation is somewhat contradictory. He argues for the superiority of ethical arguments over economic arguments, and he is for participation due to the superiority of ethical concerns (Collins, 1997, p. 493).

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, participation helps economic goals, and this shows their primacy. Moreover, Stephan Cludts (1999) focuses on participation and organisation theory with ethical claims. However, the ethical aspect is only for justification of participation, and productivity is a major motivation. He writes that “the functionality of participation can be enhanced by extending participation to value-setting. In addition, we claim that such an extension can be justified, and is even desirable on moral grounds” (Cludts, 1999, p. 157).

## **PARTICIPATION AND SOME MODELS**

At this point, we will elaborate on participation in administration with reference to some models. It is argued that the 1980s and 1990s accommodated two adversary trends. The first trend is more effective and flexible relations of work, and the second one is more participatory and based on cooperation in administrative affairs (Murat, 2001, p. 257). However, in our opinion, these two trends cannot be regarded as the adversary. Participation, cooperation, effectiveness and flexibility are the terms that are widely used in recent theories of organisation. In other words, an organisation could be participatory and flexible at the same time without any theoretical contradiction.

Participation in administration is a form of industrial democracy and indicates that workers can affect decision-making processes at various levels. For Eren (2000, p. 381), this requires three essential components. The first one implies the participation of workers in the decision-making processes of the organisation. Secondly, fulfilment of the psychological ego of workers with a democratic environment is essential. The third one is reaching administrative effectiveness and efficiency with the help of dialogue and cooperation between workers and administration.

The models are evaluated as successful if they reflect these components. These components show that the essence of modern theory dominates the literature on participation as well. The models are consultative model, participatory model and model of worker's control (Murat, 2001, p. 260). With the first model, the number of workers resisting the decisions diminishes. The second model provides an opportunity for workers and administration to act together. In the third model, not the participation of workers in the administration but their self-administration is perceived.

## **TYPES OF PARTICIPATION**

The types of participation in administration are divided into two: indirect and direct. Types of indirect participation could be exemplified as workplace representative, trade union representative, and works councils-workplace committees. Quality circles, total quality management, and teamwork practices are examples of direct participation (Murat, 2001, pp. 262-263). According to Rees and Porter (1998, p. 169), "formal schemes of employee participation, whether indirect or direct, critically dependent on the enthusiasm and ability of line management." In our opinion, the reason for that is that all types of formal participation workers are subordinate in these processes.

For Murat (2001, p. 263), indirect participation is the most common type of participation due to the impossibility of participation of all members in the decision-making process in a large-scale organisation, and thus, participation is realised by the representatives of sub-levels. Worker representatives deliver the suggestions, requests and ideas of workers to the administration. However, this may result in disregarding the common interests of workers in the workplace (Murat, 2001, p. 263). Trade union representatives seem to be more effective for workers since they are more potent in bargains and prevent bifurcation among workers and their division of power (Murat, 2001, p. 264). On the other hand, employers accuse the participation of trade unions in the decision-making process and of having desires for extensive bureaucratisation (Murat, 2001, p. 265). In addition to workers and trade union representatives, works councils have the basic function of cooperation, and in almost all continental European countries except for Sweden and Finland, this institution works (Murat, 2001, p. 266).

Direct participation is thought to be an alternative to indirect participation aiming to establish common and mutual responsibility understanding and culture through dialogue and

reconciliation for efficiency, quality customer satisfaction (Murat, p. 2001, 268). For example, quality circles maintain the active participation of members with increasing commitment to the organisation (Scott-Ladd and Marshall, 2004, p. 646). Moreover, teamwork increases efficiency and flexibility by making it easier to accord with environmental pressures such as market, government policies and consumer demands.

## CONCLUSION

The models and types of participation mentioned here project the essence that we have been repeating, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness. Arguments for job satisfaction, organisational commitment, flexibility, improving performance, ethical concerns, recognising diversity or opening doors for alternatives all have the basic motivations behind or inherent in themselves. This basic motivation does not change even when the context changes with post-modernity or any other contextual shift. From Follett to Gergen, Taylor to Fredrickson, Fordism to post-Fordism, etc., this does not change in fact.

In this paper, we mentioned the psychology-centred approach to participation to get rid of the psychic prison of organisations. Then, we moved on to an evaluation concerning the contradictory relationship between the monist paradigm and participation. Reference to concepts of Follett such as integrative unity, “power-with”, and “creative experience” provided a ground to shift from monist paradigm to changing realities in the 1970s and 1990s. Thus, with the 1990s, post-modern thinking, globalisation and the global/national/local interaction resulted in a discussion on governance, which broadened the scale of participation in this paper. The rationality of governance and post-Fordism was touched upon in a critical manner. Then we looked at the soundness of ethical grounds of participation. In the last section, referring to the types of participation helped us to concretise the argument. Despite the broadness of discussion, participation proved to be fruitful in the context of organisation theory. We want to finish with a suggestion: To construct a theory of participation, there must be a full emancipation of paradigms and approaches from their inherent modernist incabilities, which result in the transfer of the same essence to every theorisation.

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# BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE NEW LABOUR ERA

Abduladem Esmayl M Lazrg<sup>i</sup>

## ABSTRACT

After the election victory of the new Labour Party led by Tony Blair in 1997, the process of establishing a new system based on the devolution of authority started in the United Kingdom. Along with this process, a sui generis system, which can be called the regionalised state model, has developed in the United Kingdom. This system envisages regional governments as a new level between the central state and local governments. However, local governments constitute the most fundamental level of local democracy and decentralisation. This study focused on how a transformation was initiated with the New Labour governments as well as an overall assessment of the British local government system. In this respect, the historical background of local governments in Britain was touched on to place the argument in a historical context. Then, the structure was elaborated on without falling into the “trap” of structure/agency problem since this kind of presumptions usually limits the comprehensiveness and peculiarity of the research in question. Finally, the New Labour Party’s local election 2006 manifesto was evaluated.

**Keywords:** local government, Britain, New Labour, local democracy, governance

## INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom developed a unique system of government having more or less similar underpinnings with Spain and Italy. This system can be conceptualised as a regionalised state mode (Konuralp, 2019). This model organises the state together with the devolution of authority to the regional administrations. In other words, there emerges a new layer between local governments and regional administrations. This new model draws on decentralisation. However, another vital aspect of decentralisation is associated with the level of local governments.

This study tries to re-discover the local government system of Britain with the point views of a foreigner. Hence, the central assertion here is the objectivity of this paper. Moreover, all of the ideas and outlooks are developed during the research stage, and in this sense, there are no biases and presumptions to direct this study. The inquiry starts with an attempt to understand what its object is. The historical background of local governments in Britain is touched on to place the argument in a historical context. Then, the structure is elaborated on without falling into the “trap” of structure/agency problem since this kind of presumptions usually limits the comprehensiveness and peculiarity of the research in question. The New Labour Party’s local election 2006 manifesto is evaluated in the last part while referring to the arguments raised in the preceding part concerning third-way politics.

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## OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY

In the mid-eighteenth century, the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom (UK) gave pace to meet the needs of people at the local level, and this attempt initiated the rise of local governments (Stoker, 1991, p. 1). Also, as Wilson and Game (1998, p. 42) state, “It is an irony in the history of British local government that the term ‘local government’ itself was coined only in the nineteenth century –at the very time when it was becoming larger and less local ever before.” The county councils and boroughs were formed through the “Local Government Act 1888” (History, 2006). The system established by this act existed till 1965 reform, namely, London Government Act. Local Government Act of 1972 introduced new changes such as creating a uniform two-tier system everywhere, abolishing county boroughs and reducing the number of counties. In the 1990s, John Major’s Conservative government introduced new reforms to the local government system. While forming a unitary model in various parts of the United Kingdom, at the same time, some other parts remained in the confines of the two-tier system, which was similar to the situation that existed between 1890 and 1972. The Conservative period in the 1990s ended with New Labour’s coming to power. The change process gains momentum in Tony Blair’s New Labour era. The unitarist form of local government structures was put into practice in this era. The argument about the New Labour’s local government policy was that “unitary local government was inserted as a precondition for the introduction of any elected Regional Assemblies under the Blair-Labour government’s former plans to introduce such bodies prior to the rejection by referendum in North East in November 2004” (Recent History, 2006). However, the local government system in the UK continues to be complicated.

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

As Keating (1991, pp. 26-27) puts forward, “Local government structures reflect national traditions as well as social and political interests.” These structures of modern times in the UK carry the intentions of the central bureaucratic and political elite to a large extent. Keating (1991, p. 27) explains the subordination of localities as such:

By the 1920s, the principle was established that the wishes of the inhabitants should be a subordinate consideration. Convenience, partisan advantage and technical efficiency have been the motives for change which has been imposed from the top rather than emerging from the localities. The structure has been dominated by large units with uniform powers for each category of local government and little fragmentation of major cities. Local interests have been important only at the margin, influencing boundaries to ensure local partisan advantage or the defence of social interests.

Leaving aside the discussion of the extent to which the British case is centralist, focusing on current structures will provide a ground to analyse the new phases of these structures in light of the change process. Hence, the centralism indigenous to the British case becomes evident in a historical context. At this point, it would be appropriate to clarify British local governments’ external and internal structures.

### External Structures

In the UK, as mentioned above, there is no uniform structure of local government. In this sense, every part of the country has its own local government structure. Since “... local government in Northern Ireland will remain something of a pale imitation of that elsewhere in the UK” (Wilson and Game, 1998, p. 67), this paper is concerned only with the mainland.

The yellow areas have two-tier authorities: Ceremonial and administrative county in England, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, in England, there are:

- 39 Traditional Counties of immemorial antiquity. These no longer have any legal standing but still represent what many people continue to think of as “counties”, such as “Middlesex”, “Sussex” and “Yorkshire”.
- 33 Non-metropolitan Counties - areas covered by county councils, 6 of which (Isle of Wight, Cornwall, County Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire and Wiltshire) have become unitary authorities absorbing the functions of former districts now abolished.
  - o Rutland and Herefordshire councils are not county councils (they are unitary district councils) despite sticking the word “County” into their corporate names. It is not clear that this distinction has any practical consequence other than determining the years in which they hold their all-out elections (2013 + 4n for counties, 2015 + 4n for districts).
  - o In most cases, the area a new unitary authority created from 1995 onwards has been defined as a separate “county”. (The districts in Berkshire and Cleveland seem to have missed out on this.) Except for the 6 mentioned above, the statutory instruments creating them have exempted them from the provision of the 1972 Act that “every county shall have a (county) council”.
- 48 Ceremonial Counties (areas for which a Lord Lieutenant acts as the Queen’s deputy). Every County Council area has a Ceremonial County of the same name, but the Ceremonial County is in many cases larger as it takes in areas served by Unitary Authorities. The other 15 Ceremonial Counties do not have a County Council of the same name. Insofar as there is an official definition of “Geographical” county I believe this is it. Everywhere in England falls within one (and only one) Ceremonial County. The term “Lieutenancy” is also sometimes used for these areas. (The City of London is a separate Ceremonial County from Greater London - it is too small to show on the adjoining map).

In Scotland, 31 lieutenancies were established in 1975 and revised in 1996, bearing some resemblance to the counties existing pre-1973. There are also 4 cities which have been “Counties of Cities” for centuries, where the Lord Provost is the Lord Lieutenant ex officio. In Wales, for Ceremonial purposes there are eight “preserved counties” which have the same names as the 1974-1996 Administrative Counties, but have had their boundaries shifted to align more closely to the unitary councils. In Northern Ireland, the traditional six counties and two cities remain as they were before 1973. Lord Lieutenants and High Sherriffs are appointed for each county. (Edkins, 2011)



**Figure 1.** Counties in England (Edkins, 2011).

### **Internal Structures**

The components of the internal structure of British Local Governments are local authorities, councils, councillors, elected members, committees, departments, officers (Wilson and Game, 1998, p. 70).

Local authorities (...) are semi-independent, politically decentralised, multi-functional bodies, created by and exercising responsibilities conferred by Parliament. The term is often used –and has already been used by us- interchangeably with councils. Strictly speaking, though, the council is the legal embodiment of the local authority: the body of elected councillors who collectively determine and are ultimately responsible for the policy and actions of the authority. In recognition of this legal responsibility, councillors are often referred to as the elected members of the authority, which distinguishes them from its paid employees, the officers and other staff.

(...) British local authorities are mostly very large organisations and, with the spread of unitary authorities, getting larger still: 467 from 1998 for the whole of the UK, or one council for every 125.000 of us. Several have more than 100 councillors and tens of thousands of full time and part-time employees. In most authorities it would be impossible for councillors to take all necessary policy decisions in full council meetings, or for officers to ménage or deliver the multitude of the local government services, without some kind of internal structural divisions. The way in which local authorities in this country have traditionally organised themselves is through committees and councillors and professionally-based departments. (Wilson and Game, 1998, pp. 70-71)


In these structural components, committees and departments need to be analysed in detail. For this reason, the table below gives us characteristic features of them.

**Table 1.** Internal Management Structures (Wilson and Game, 1998, p. 77).

Committees	Local authorities are governed by councillors or elected members, who meet regularly and publicly to take authoritative decisions for their local area. Most councils delegate much of their work to committees and sub-committees of councillors that concentrate on a particular area of the council’s work and are responsible for determining the council’s policy in that area. Each committee will have a chair, who chairs its meetings, speaks and acts on its behalf, and liaises with relevant officers. Council meetings are presided over by the mayor or chair of the council, elected annually by and from all members of the council. The leader of the council, its key political figure, is generally the elected leader of the majority or largest party group on the council. Most authorities have a coordinating policy (and resources) committee of mainly senior councillors, usually chaired by the leader.
Departments	Local authorities are organised into departments. These departments are staffed by appointed officers and other employees -administrative, professional, technical and clerical staff, manual workers- who legally are the paid servants of the elected council. These officers and staff implement council policy as determined by its councillors and run the authority on a day-to-day basis. Departments can be divided into service departments, providing a service directly to the public, and central or coordinating departments, providing a service for the authority as a whole. Each department has a chief officer, usually a professional specialist in the department’s work and is responsible for it to a committee and its chair. Most authorities have a chief executive, the head of the council’s paid service, responsible for coordinating the operation and policy of the council, usually through a Chief Officers’ Management Team.

A council makes a policy through the interaction of elected councillors and their appointed officers both formally and informally. Also, they have substantial discretion over their internal organisation. For this reason, we cannot see the same internal structures in the British local governments.

Elaboration on the structural relationship between councils and their committees would provide us with an outlook concerning the complexity of the system’s functioning. This is generally the main criticism directed to the council system (Wilson and Game, 1998, p. 74). Because the huge number of committees and their sub-committees either make the decision-making process difficult or delay the implementation of the decisions. Figure 2 shows how complicated a county council is in, for example, Leicestershire.



**Figure 2.** The organisation of the Leicestershire County Council.

## THE ERA OF NEW LABOUR: THE FOCAL POINT

With Tony Blair's coming to power, Britain faced an era of change through the catchword of regeneration: the third way. As Giddens (2000a, p. 29) puts it, third-way politics "offers the means of reconstructing and renewing public institutions." More responsive and more open political institutions are at the heart of the reform agenda. For Giddens (1998, p. 1), this can be realised through "democratising democracy". In Blair's rhetoric, the ideological standpoints behind this new left-of-centre politics were democratic socialism and liberalism. However, the former president of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, Oscar Lafontaine argues, Tony Blair was far from presenting a political concept, and he was only successful at offering a "marketing" concept (2000, p. 116).

Moreover, says Lafontaine (2000, p. 118), whatever Blair did was labelled as "new" and "modern", although he was only hoodwinking. Also, for Nirmala Rao (2000, p. 191), the third way could be questioned in terms of lacking substance "as an amorphous political project." While the people demanded a freer and more democratic atmosphere, the New Labour appealed to the masses as representing these new ideals. Nevertheless, as some thinkers argue, the New Labour is reducing the individual to a market object. In this sense, Lafontaine (2000, p. 152) describes the third way as "out-of-the-way."

On the other hand, Blair (1998, p. 16) explains the new process as such: "New democratic experiments from elected mayors to citizens' juries were hailed as important pointers to the future. Making government more responsive would enable local government to be open and vibrant, for diverse democratic debate is a laboratory for ideas about how we should meet social needs."

Nirmala Rao (2000, p.120) argues that the regeneration process of New Labour reflected concepts of partnership, local involvement and decentralisation. For the time in which Labour came to power, there was a global demand for accountability, transparency and responsiveness. Thus, the change process in Britain under the Labour government reflected these new demands.

In this sense, local democracy in Britain recognised effective participation resting on well-informed citizens, and New Labour was trying to promote communication and openness and enhance accountability through broader participation (Rao, 2000, p. 124). Within this context, it is clear that the term “governance” becomes a respected contour of the “new” political agenda.

For Gerry Stoker (2000, p. 3), this term implies “a concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the authority of the state”. This definition gives us the idea that, firstly, governance is highly related to governing, but not using the state authority; and secondly, it is a way of collective action. Before focusing on its reflection on actual life, it would be appropriate to continue with Stoker’s (2000, p. 3) vision:

Governance involves working across boundaries within the public sector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors. It focuses attention on a set of actors that are drawn from but also beyond the formal institutions of government. A key concern is processes of networking and partnership. Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. Governing becomes an interactive process because no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally.

The passage above involves most of the terms that are key to governance. These are “public-private-voluntary sectors, networking, partnership, interaction”. These terms have much to do with the trend that the discipline of public administration faces from the 1970s. Public-private partnerships could be seen as a new phase of changing strategies of development. Despite the striking slogan of the new-right that non-intervening, minimal, “night watchman” state, the line of demarcation between market and state has been disappearing through partnerships at whether local or national level. Recalling the very known motto of “steering, not rowing”, one may say that local governments are both steering and rowing in this new age of local governance.

“Bringing Britain together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal”, the report of the Social Exclusion Unit established by New Labour, was critical of both central and local government for its past failures in relation to urban policy (Rao, 2000, p. 126). Calling on public, private and voluntary bodies to work together was seen as a solution. Hence, maybe the most crucial concept of this regeneration led by New Labour was “partnerships”, implying this coming togetherness. Within this context of partnership, local authorities were to discharge their new duty: to promote economic, social and environmental well-being in their areas.

“Best value” and partnership are two concepts combined. New Labour attempted to introduce a new context in which partnerships produce the best value. There was a rewards-incentives system, and the best-performing authorities were rewarded. Beacon councils are examples of this new context. As their performance increase, so the discretionary power of these councils. In Beacon status, for “the very best performing councils either for an individual service or for the council as a whole. Beacon Councils will have to have modern management structures, effective community involvement and a successful Best Value programme. Councils with Beacon Status have additional powers and freedoms” (DETR, 1998).

The assertion of governance is to bring together various actors to form a social coalition in reaching relevant solutions to socio-economic problems and provide a sustainable ground for development. It is not an uncomplicated and smooth process; on the contrary, forming a fertile base for cooperation requires effort and skills of coordination. Otherwise, there emerges chaos which may result in the intensification of problems. Similarly, Peter John and Alistair Cole (2000, p. 86) underline the exigency of “political leadership”. They acknowledge that “whereas local government leadership was always difficult, local governance leadership requires almost

super-human skills” (John and Cole, 2000, p. 86). In this sense, another fundamental concept raised by New Labour is community leadership. The “community leadership” concept, which developed during Labour’s years of opposition, came into its own after May 1997 and informed the entire gamut of New Labour’s programme for local government: “Community leadership is at the heart of the role of modern local government. Councils are the organisations best placed to take a comprehensive overview of the needs and priorities of their local areas and communities and lead the work to meet those needs and priorities in the round” (DETR, 1998, p. 79). As Rao (2000, p. 131) puts it,

Clearly, New Labour has given local government central place in its agenda to modernise British institutions, but the key question is whether or not the package is likely to work. It is not hard to see that Best Value offers greater flexibility and brings in wider considerations of service and the beacon council scheme makes sense as a model for diffusing and encouraging innovation. It is also hard to disagree with the proposition that the new ethical framework has a wider compass and greater sensitivity than the old blunt instrument of surcharge. What is less clear is whether the underlying problems of public disaffection and distrust, sporadic electoral participation and general indifference to local democracy can be reversed. To make that judgment, it is necessary to look more closely at what is proposed by the new legislation - first, for directly enhancing participation and, second, for attracting greater interest through new models of political leadership.

In July 1998, The New Labour government published the “White Paper Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People” The aim was the renewal of local democracy with a slogan of “a better deal; a bigger say for local people”. This modernisation program implies the relationship between the council and its community with two primary grounds: first, listening to and involving people; second, readdressing the problem of non-voting. On the first ground, there were some ways of realising this: (1) consensus conferencing (small number of local people); (2) local referendums; (3) citizens’ jury (selection of a representative group of residents); (4) deliberative opinion polls; (5) standing citizens’ panels and research panels. For increasing voting turnout, the New Labour government aimed at simplifying the electoral system. Also, local authorities were permitted to experiment in electoral practice such as (1) electronic voting, (2) mobile polling stations, (3) voting in different hours, (4) voting on different days, (5) voting over a number of days holding elections entirely by postal vote. To sum up, New Labour triggered the change process and combined the new reform agenda with its experiences in local governments.

## **NEW LABOUR PARTY AND 2006 LOCAL ELECTIONS**

New Labour Party’s 2006 local election motto was “Securing Britain’s Future” (Labour Party, 2006, p. 1). Thus, the primary source used in this discussion is the official manifesto of the Labour Party. In the local government agenda of the party, there are five main topics that the party was making promises to the citizens of the UK. In this part of the paper, these topics will be elaborated on: (1) Investing in each and every child; (2) Securing Local Communities; (3) Stronger cities and Towns; (4) Labour’s councils cost less and deliver more; (5) Working for cleaner, greener, safer communities.

In the “Investing in each and every child” section of the manifesto, the Labour Party (2006, p. 6) says:

Every young person deserves the best possible start in life with every opportunity to achieve their full potential. That is why education is Labour’s top priority. As a result of Labour’s record investment and programme of reform in our schools, standards are up. The next stage of our economic development depends on the highest standards of education, which is why Labour is now intensifying the pace of school reform.



The Labour Party aims to increase the local authorities' power to raise the standards of schools. In this respect, the party believed that the powers of local governments are "strategic" (Labour Party, 2006, p.7). However, being strategic was not defined, or the tasks of local authorities were not determined clearly. What makes the powers of local authorities strategic and different from the previous situation remained untouched.

At that point, the "Sure Start Program" is a clear indicator of how the New Labour attached importance to education via local governments. Since their target was to enhance these centres through conveying it to every community, these centres provide the best start in life for every child and help families.

Another important point is the "Securing Local Communities" that Labour Party gave a great deal of effort. Labour (2006, p. 8) says that "With Labour, every community will have a local neighbourhood policing team, which is accountable to the community it serves." In this way, the community elects the ones who will govern and is involved in controlling the services. The involvement of the community in the processes reveals how the term of governance is reflected in actual life practice.

Labour Party (2006, p. 10) promised "Stronger Cities and Towns" by trying to increase the efficiency of cities in terms of their economic opportunities. On the other hand, any program neglecting the social aspects has no chance to be successful in the total sense. In addition, while adhering to democratic socialist ideals to a certain extent, New Labour seems to be sunk into mistaken considerations of market discourse, such as attempting to account for most of the issues with market rationale. The cultural, social, economic and also political development of a city or a community is a composite whole. There is no point in separating these dimensions because development is integral with its all components.

New Labour's (2006, p. 12) frequently used catchword "labour's councils cost less and deliver more" indicates its approach towards public service provisions. It claimed that "Labour councils have led the way by delivering both the lowest increases and the lowest average council tax" (Labour Party, 2006, p. 12). For instance, Table 2 shows the relative cheapness of Labour councils. Here is again a confrontation with Labour's market-oriented evaluation of every issue. Rather than presenting how many people benefited from services provided by these councils, Labour seems to be content with its councils' economic advantage compared to liberal democrats and conservatives.

**Table 2.** Average Council Tax in 2006 (Labour Party, 2006, p. 12).

<b>Average council tax in 2006/07</b>		
Labour	Liberal Democrats	Conservatives
£957	£1053	£1147

The last section of the Labour (2006, p. 14) manifesto is about environmental concerns under the topic of "working cleaner, greener, safer communities." To realise this, it dumps the responsibility on local governments. It says: "Labour has given local authorities new powers to tackle graffiti, abandoned cars, fly-tipping, noise pollution and other environmental concerns. These new powers will help local authorities deliver real improvements to the environmental quality of our neighbourhoods."

Giddens (2000b, p. 74) argues that a risk plait is composed of positive and negative sides: opportunity, security, responsibility, and innovation. Even environmental issues are approached in terms of this plait which smells market rationality to a large extent. It is evident that the

central notion is winners and losers in the market and survival of the fittest. However, for example, in environmental issues, who will be the loser, nature or humanity?

## CONCLUSION

There are clear indicators of how the term “governance” is reflected in the local government practice in the British case. However, one should not disregard that during the transition from the “old” style of local government to “local governance”, it is normal to see some deviations and consistencies. A clear example of this could be seen in Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). Over the UDCs, the councillors have no power and appointees of central government run these corporations. This results in social exclusion, especially of ethnic minorities (Brownvill, Razzaque, Stirling, Thomas; 2000, p. 239). Local democracy is eroded while opening the way to the influence of local business people; the elected bodies are drowned out of the picture (Brownvill, Razzaque, Stirling, Thomas; 2000, p. 238). In order to broaden the borders of local democracy, exclusionary forms of governing need to be transformed. Otherwise, neither local governance nor accountability would be realised.

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# TÜKETİM VE KİMLİK İNŞASI ÜZERİNE

Çiğdem Güneş<sup>i</sup>

## ÖZ

Tüketim basit anlamda birşeyleri kullanarak bitirmek anlamına gelmektedir. İnsanın birçok ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır ve bu ihtiyaçların giderilmesi için yapılan tüm harcamalar tüketim olarak ifade edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, tüketimin insan yaşamı için önemi ve kimlik üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. İlk başlarda temel ihtiyaçlarımıza göre şekil alan tüketim tarzımızın zamanla ihtiyaçtan isteğe yönelmesi ile birlikte daha hazcı bir duruma evrildiği ve kişilerin kimliklerini oluşturmada, toplumda statü sağlamada popüler kültür ve medyanın da kayıtsız kalmaması bir katkısıyla kritik bir araç haline dönüştüğü üzerinde durulmuştur. Bireylerin sosyal medya aracılığıyla satın aldıkları ürünleri teşhir ederek başkalarını aynı tüketim kalıplarına yönlendirmesinin tüketimle birlikte gelen yeni kimlik arayışlarını ve davranış biçimlerini etkilediği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** tüketim, kimlik, popüler kültür, sosyal medya

## ON CONSUMPTION AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

### ABSTRACT

Consumption simply means to finish using something. Humans have many needs, and all expenditures made to meet these needs are expressed as consumption. In this study, the importance of consumption for human life and its effects on identity were examined. It has been emphasized that our consumption style, which was shaped according to our basic needs at first, has evolved into a more hedonistic situation with time turning from need to demand and has turned into a critical tool in creating the identities of individuals and providing status in the society, with the indifferent contribution of popular culture and media. It has been concluded that individuals' displaying the products they buy through social media and directing others to the same consumption patterns affects their search for new identity and behaviour patterns that come with consumption.

**Keywords:** consumption, popular culture, social media

## GİRİŞ

Tüketim günümüzde kişilerin kimlik kaynaklarının araştırılmasında önemli bir yer etmiştir. Tüketim kavramının anlamı zaman içerisinde değişmiş ve hala da değişmeye devam etmektedir. Tüketim ile birlikte var edilmeye çalışılan kimliklerin oluşmasında medyanın ve özellikle sosyal medyanın yeri giderek önem kazanmaktadır.

Sosyal medyanın her kesimden insan tarafından kullanılması ve her anın herkesle hızlı bir şekilde paylaşılması, geri bildirim alınıp verilmesi sosyal medyayı tüketim ve kimlik inşası üzerinde daha da önemli bir noktaya getirmiştir.

Tüketimin ve tüketim kültürünün anlaşılması aynı zamanda içinde yaşanılan toplumun anlaşılması açısından da önem arz etmektedir.

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## TÜKETİM KAVRAMI

Tüketim basit anlamda birşeyleri kullanarak bitirmek anlamına gelmektedir. İnsanın birçok ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır ve bu ihtiyaçların giderilmesi için yapılan tüm harcamalar tüketim olarak ifade edilmektedir (Torlak, 2000, s. 17).

Tüketim kavramı farklı şekillerde ortaya konulsa da üzerinde hemfikir olunan bir kavram değildir. Farklı kuramcılara göre farklı şekillerde ele alınmakta ve bu ele alış biçimi değer yargıları ile birlikte şekillenmektedir. Örneğin serbest piyasa anlayışında olumlu bir şekilde algılanan tüketim kavramı, farklı mal ve hizmetlerin özgür ve rasyonel hareket eden bireylere sunulduğu iddiası ile ortaya konulmakta iken; materyalizm, hedonizm, bencillik ve bireysellik gibi tüketim ile birlikte ele alınan kavramlar tüketimi olumsuz bir şekilde ele almaktadır (Yanıklar, 2006, s. 22).

İnsanlık kadar eski olan tüketim kavramı insanlık kavramının değişimi ve dönüşümü ile gelişmiş ve günümüzün ortamına ayak uydurmuştur. Değişen sadece tüketim olmamış tüketimle birlikte tüketim araçları da değişmiştir. Eskiden yüz yüze yapılan tüketim şimdilerde teknolojinin gelişimiyle birlikte internet alışverişi üzerinden gerçekleştirilmektedir. Tüketimde internet önemli bir araç olarak yerini alırken medya ve sosyal medya da tüketimin itici gücünü oluşturmuştur. Bu durumda tüketicilerin sosyal medya da geçirdikleri zaman diliminin de önemli bir etkisi vardır.

Tüketimin insanlığın var olmasıyla ortaya çıkmasından günümüze kadar gelen süreçte yaşadığı anlam değişimi insanların sadece ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için tüketmelerinden sosyal statülerini belirlemede belirleyici olan bir unsur olarak karşımıza çıkmakta ve hatta kimliklerinin de tanımlanmasına sebep olan semboller ve yaşam tarzları gibi öğeleri de içinde barındıran kültürel bir bakış açısına gidilmesine sebebiyet vermiştir (Halis, 2012, s. 151).

Tüketimi sosyal bilimler açısından önemli bir konu haline getiren süreç kapitalizm ile başlar ki, bu durum kapitalizmin kar anlayışının tüketimin odak noktası olması ile yakından ilişkilidir. Kapitalizm ile gelen üretimin devasa boyutlara ulaşması tüketimi önemli bir noktaya ulaştırmıştır (Coşkun, 2007, ss. 10-17). Nitekim üretimin devamı için tüketimin hız kesmeden ve ihtiyaç olup olmadığı gözetilmeden devam etmesi gerekmektedir.

## TÜKETİCİ DAVRANIŞINI ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER

Tüketim yaparken bu eylemimizi etkileyen belli başlı faktörler vardır. Bunlar; kültürel, kişisel, psikolojik ve sosyal etkenler olarak sınıflandırılabilir. Bu değişkenlerin hepsi tüketim kararımızı etkilemektedir.

Kültür, toplumda yaşayan insanların yaşam biçimini şekillendirir. Kültürel değerler tüketimi ve tüketim şeklimizi etkilemektedir. Kişinin davranış ve arzularının temel belirleyicisi kültürdür. Büyümekte olan bir çocuk içinde yaşadığı sosyal çevre ile aile ve diğer kurumlar aracılığıyla tercihlerini ve tüketim alışkanlıklarını belirler. Ayrıca her kültür, o kültüre ait kişilerin daha spesifik olarak ifade edildiği alt kültürlerden oluşur. Bunlar; dinler, ırklar, coğrafi bölgeler gibi ortak özellikleri olan alt kültürleri oluşturur (Kotler, 2000, s. 161).

Kimliğe ilişkin sosyolojik bir perspektifle değerlendirme yapacak olursak, kimliğin birçok sosyal bilim disiplinin ortak inceleme nesnesi olduğunu ve kimliğin bilimsel çözümlemesinde birçok farklı yaklaşımın kullanıldığı görülmektedir (Konuralp, 2018). Konuralp (2017, ss. 14-15), bu farklı yaklaşımların çeşitli öğelerin birbiriyle etkileşimi sonucu ortaya çıktığını belirterek şöyle der:

Kimliği meydana getiren temel altı veçhe din, milliyet, ırk, dil, sınıf ve toplumsal cinsiyet olarak sıralanabilir. Bu veçheler, bir etnik kimliği oluştururken genellikle iç içe geçer ve tikel bir etnik kimliğin tarihsel biçimleniş koşulları dolayısıyla hangi unsur ve unsurların diğerlerine göre daha baskın geldiği değişkenlik gösterir. Dolayısıyla, bu veçheler her bir kimliğin özgüllüğünde tek tek ele alınmalıdır. Ayrıca din, milliyet, dil, sınıf gibi etnik kimlik öğeleri ırk ve toplumsal cinsiyet gibi öğelere nazaran koşullar ve bireylerin tercih, seçim, öncelikleri ile biçimlenebilirken, biyolojik/doğal unsurların görece sabitliği kimlik sorunsalını giriftleştirmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, kimlik verili ve durağan bir kişisel özellik midir, yoksa değiştirilebilir bir tercih midir sorusu birçok kimlik tartışmasının nirengi noktasıdır.

Dolayısıyla, sürekli değişkenlik gösterdiği söylenebilecek olan kimlik çerçevesinde tüketim davranışı da belirlenir. Tüketim davranışını gerçekleştiren etkilendiğimiz kültürel etkenlerden bir diğeri ise kişilerin içinde yer aldığı sosyal sınıftır. Sosyal sınıflar bir alt kültür olarak ele alınabilir ve bu anlamda sosyal sınıflar arasında tüketim, tüketilen malların alındıkları yerler ve tercih edilen markalar arasında bir ayırım vardır. Aynı zamanda sosyal sınıflar arasında psikolojik anlamda da büyük farklılıklar vardır. Satılan malları algılama şekilleri ve pazarlama teknikleri ile ilgili algılayışları farklıdır (Köseoğlu, 2002, s. 107).

Sosyal faktörleri; referans (danışma), aile, roller ve statüler olarak sınıflandırabiliriz. Referans grupları kişilerin davranışlarını ve tüketim kararlarını etkileyen faktörlerden biridir. Ve kişiler yaşadıkları toplumun, ailenin etkisi altında tüketimlerini gerçekleştirirler. Bir ürün satın alınırken içinde bulunulan grubun sosyal ve kültürel özellikleri grubun ürüne olan uzaklık veya yakınlığı grubun tepkisi satın alınacak şeyin gerçekleşmesine ya da sonlanmasına neden olur (Zastrow, 2009, s. 22). Tutum ve davranış için kullanılan referans grupları kıyaslamalı referans grupları olarak tanımlanır. Bu gruplar yaşantıları, ev ve otomobil tercihleri hayranlığa neden olan ve taklit edilmeye değer görülen kişiler olabilir (Kavas vd, 1995, s. 168). Sosyal faktörler içinde yer alan aile için tüketim evlilik öncesi ve evlilik sonrası süreç içerisinde ayrılmaktadır. Evlilik öncesi yapılan tüketim harcamalarının daha çok sosyalleşmek ve kişisel ihtiyaçlar çerçevesinde şekillenirken örneğin giyim, sanatsal aktiviteler, gezi, aksesuar, makyaj malzemeleri gibi evlenmek üzere olan kişiler için tüketim amaca yönelik olarak daha çok mobilya, beyaz eşya gibi harcamalara kaymaktadır. Bu süreç bireylerin çocuk sahibi olmasıyla birlikte çocuğun kişisel ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda tüketim eğilimlerini tekrar değişime uğratmaktadır (Assael, 1992, s. 477).

Roller ve statüler bakımından analiz edildiğinde kültür ile cinsiyet rolü arasındaki uyum, aile açısından tüketim alışkanlıklarında belirleyici rol oynar. Geleneksel ailelerde kadın ve erkeğe biçilen rol ve kadın ile erkek ihtiyaçlarının farklılığı tüketimi farklılaştırır. Yaşanılan toplumda ailenin nasıl anlamlandırıldığı babanın veya annenin ailenin reisi olarak görülmesi ailenin tüketim alışkanlığı edinmesinde önemli bir rol oynar. Tüketim kararını verirken anne ya da babanın hangisinin daha etkin olduğu düşük ve yüksek gelirli ailelerde daha belirgin iken orta gelir düzeyine sahip ailelerde bu kadar belirgin değildir (Green ve Cunningham, 1975, s. 326).

Tüketici davranışlarını etkileyen kişisel faktörleri yaş, meslek, ekonomik durum, yaşam tarzı, kişilik ve benlik olarak sıralayabiliriz. Aynı yaş grubunda olan tüketicilerin ortak belleği paylaşımları ve benzer zevklere sahip olmaları benzer istek ve ihtiyaçları da beraberinde getirir (Orhan, 2002, s. 5).

Kişisel faktörlerden yaşam tarzı, kişilerin aynı sosyal sınıfa veya meslek grubuna mensup oldukları durumda dahi oldukça farklı yaşam tarzlarına sahip olabileceği ve bu durumda da farklı tüketim tercihlerine sahip olacağı anlamına gelmektedir. Bir kişinin yaşam tarzı onun yaşama olan bakış açısını, ilgilerini, fikirlerini ve hayattan beklentilerini ortaya koyar. Kişilik

ise, insanın kendine özgü biyolojik ve psikolojik özelliklerinin tamamıdır. Kişilik kişinin satın alma davranışlarını etkilese de bu etkinin niteliği net değildir (Saticı, 1998, s. 9).

Psikolojik faktörler; güdülenme, algılama, öğrenme, tutum ve inançlar olarak ifade edilebilir. Güdüler kişilerin tüketim davranışlarının ortaya çıkmasını tetikleyen kişileri ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda harekete geçiren güçlerdir. İhtiyaç herhangi bir şeyin yokluğunun sebep olduğu gerilimi ifade ederken, güdüler gerilimi azaltır veya gerilim durumuna sebep olur (Mucuk, 2009, s. 74). Algılama ile ise tüketiciler çevrelerindeki uyarıcıları anlamlandırmaktadır. Örneğin markalar, mağaza dekorasyonu, ambalajlar uyarıcı olarak işlev görmektedir. Uyarıcılar çevreden kaynaklı fiziksel uyarıcılar ve tüketicilerin kendi algılarından kaynaklı olmak üzere ikiye ayrılır. Fiziksel uyarıcılara renkli ambalajların renkli olmayanlara göre daha fazla dikkat çekmesi örnek gösterilebilir. Tüketicilerin kendilerinden kaynaklanan uyarıcılar içinse ilgi, ihtiyaç, dikkat, hafıza, deneyim gibi faktörlerdir (Deniz, 2011, s. 255).

## TÜKETİM VE KİMLİK

Tüketim insana özgü ve varlığının devamı için gerekli en temel ihtiyaçtır. Hayat neredeyse tüketim üzerine inşa edilmektedir ve insan var olduğu günden beri tüketmiş ve tüketmeye de devam edecektir. Tüketim, günümüzde daha önceki dönemlere kıyasla kimlikle ciddi anlamda bir bütünleşme yaşamaktadır (Ongur, 2011, s. 34).

Klasik iktisat teorisinde yer alan sınırsız ihtiyaçların karşılanması olgusu karşısında bireye mutluluk veren tüketim bireysel kimliğin oluşmasında da önemli bir potansiyele sahiptir (Kaymas, 2001, s.115).

Tüketim çalışmalarında egemen olan ve birbiri ile çatışmacı bir nitelik sergileyen iki yaklaşım vardır: Bağımsız yaklaşım ve Etkileşimci yaklaşım. Bu yaklaşıma göre tüketici ve pazar birbirinden bağımsızdır. Yaklaşıma göre şirketler tüketicileri tanımadan pazara ürünü sunarlar ve rasyonel davranan bireyde bu ürünleri tüketir (Kaymas, 2001, s.115). Bağımsız yaklaşım baz alınarak yapılan bir çalışma 1994 yılında Japonya'daki bilinen örneği Hakuodo Enstitüsü'nün gerçekleştirdiği çalışmadır. Bu çalışmada tüketicilerin tüketim kararı verirken malın fiyatını ve kalitesini değerlendirdikten sonra bir tüketim kararı verdikleri ispatlanmaktadır (Hakuodo 1994, s. 144.).

Bu çalışmada kişilerin tüketim kararı alırken tüketimden aldıkları hazzın yanı sıra bu tüketimin bir kimlik arayışının da sonucu olduğu öne çıkmıştır. Araştırmanın sonuçlarına göre Japon erkeklerin yüzde 36'si telefon seçimlerini, kadınların yüzde 63'ü saç modellerini, giysi seçimlerini ve müzik beğenilerini kimlik temsillerinin bir göstergesi olarak ifade etmişlerdir.

Etkileşimci anlayış ise pazar ve tüketici arasında belirli bir etkileşimin gerçekleştiği ve tüketici kimliğinin pazar ve tüketici arasındaki bu etkileşim aracılığıyla gerçekleştiğini belirtir (Kaymas, 2001, s. 116).

Bireyin kendini ifade etme çabası tüketim tercihleriyle kendini gösterir. Kişinin kendini ifade ederken ortaya çıkan güdüsü gerçekle çelişkili bir hal alabilir. Bu durumda birey olmak istediğini ifade ederken tüketimi kullanır. Zengin görünmek, çevreci görünmek veya entellektüel görünmek gibi bir tarzın yaşam biçimini oluşturmak ister. Bu nokta da istenilen durumdan bağımsız olarak kişi kendini ifade etme yolunu tüketim tercihleriyle şekillendirir (Kadıoğlu, 2013, s. 106).

2016 yılında, Kahraman'nın yaptığı çalışmada tüketim ve kimlik inşası üzerinden Starbucks örneği ele alınarak kişilerin tüketim tercihlerinin nedenleri araştırılmıştır. Bu araştırma

sonucunda Starbucks'ın kişilerin yaşam tarzlarında bir değişime neden olduğu ve markanın prestijini kendi yaşamlarına katmalarına yol açtığı ve tüketicilere belli bir sınıfa ait oldukları hissine kapılmalarına neden olmuştur ve yapılan çalışmada görüşülen kişilerin büyük bir çoğunluğu Starbucks'tayken sosyal paylaşım sitelerinden bunu paylaştıklarını ifade etmişlerdir. Bu durum tüketim mallarının sergilenmesinin teknoloji ile farklılık gösterdiğini artık kişilerin buldukları yeri yanlarında bulunmayan kişilere de sosyal medya üzerinden göstermek istediklerini ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca katılımcıların yarıya yakını bu mekânı tercih etme sebepleri olarak mekâna prestijli insanların geldiğini düşünmeleri ve mekâna gelmelerinin sosyal çevrelerini etkileyeceği şeklinde ifade etmişlerdir (Kahraman, 2016, ss. 626-627).

Sosyal medya, sosyal etkileşim ve paylaşım alanlarıdır ve ulaşılabilir, ölçeklenebilir iletişim araçları aracılığıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Yani kişilerin duygularını, düşüncelerini, deneyimlerini, tecrübelerini iletmek ve birbirleriyle iletişimde bulunmak için kullandıkları çevrimiçi alanlar olarak ifade etmek mümkündür (Aydoğan ve Kırık, 2012, s. 58).

Sosyal medya kullanılarak yapılan tüketimin temel dayanak noktası teşhirdir. Kişiler tükettikleri markaları ve yaşam biçimlerini sürekli kendi istekleri ile sosyal medyada sergilemektedirler. Faik Uyanık'ın (2013) *Sosyal Medya: Kurgusalılık ve Mahremiyet* adlı çalışmasında sosyal bilimci Kevin Robins ile gerçekleştirdiği röportajında sosyal medya ortamında açık bir şekilde kişilerin kendilerine hayran olduğu, kendilerini birey olarak sergilemek ve bunu yanlarında bulunmayan kişilere de göstererek bir teşhir dünyası oluşturdukları vurgulanmaktadır ve bu durumun temel nedeninin de beğenilmek, takdir görmek, dikkate alınmak olduğu belirtilmektedir (Uyanık, 2013, ss. 1-3).

Sosyal medya ve tüketim üzerine bir araştırma yapan Amonrat Thourunroje (2014) ise sosyal medya kullananların örnek aldıkları yani sosyal medya fenomeni olarak adlandırdıkları kişilerin tüketim davranışlarını örnek alarak bu kişilerin sayfalarında paylaştıkları ürünleri satın alma isteklerinin artırdığı sonucuna varmıştır (Thourunroje, 2014, s. 13).

## SONUÇ VE DEĞERLENDİRME

Günümüzde insanlar tüketimi ihtiyaçtan çok statü ve kimlik inşası üzerinden gerçekleştirmektedirler. Bu durum popüler kültür anlayışı ile hız kazanmış ve geleneksel olarak tüketim anlayışımızın farklılaşmasına neden olmuştur. Bu durum markalarla daha da ön plana çıkmakta ve kişiler kullandıkları markalarla kişiliklerini özdeşleştirip kendini bir sınıfa ait hissetmektedir ve bu noktada kimlik soyut değerlerden ziyade markalara, imajlara dayalı olarak inşa edilmekte ve pazarlanmaktadır. Bu duruma sosyal medyanın da küçümsenemez bir etkisi vardır. Bireyler sosyal medya aracılığıyla satın aldıkları ürünleri teşhir etmekte ve bu yolla da diğer tüketicileri bu yönde bir teşvikle güdülemektedir ve böylece tüketimle birlikte gelen yeni kimlik arayışları da kişilerde sosyal, psikolojik etkiler yaratmakta ve yeni davranışlar ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

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
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## BOOK REVIEW

Mehmet Emre Zarifoğlu<sup>i</sup>



**Book Title:** *Türkiye'de Devlet Geleneği (The State Tradition in Turkey)*

**Author:** Metin Heper

**Year of Publication:** 2006

**City of Publication:** Ankara

**Publisher:** Doğu Batı Yayınları

**ISBN:** 975-8717-21-9

Metin Heper's book, *Türkiye'de Devlet Geleneği* was initially published in English with the title, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, in 1985 by Eothen Press. As Emrah Konuralp (2016) puts it, this book is an effort of finding answers about how the characteristics of the state are affected by and how the state influences political life, how the state was structured by which person and/or institutions in different time intervals in Ottoman-Turkish politics. His book is an example of centre-periphery relations, an approach developed by Şerih Mardin (1973) to analyze Turkish politics. As the name suggests, its primary focus is the state. In other words, there is a state-centred analysis of Turkish politics and state-society relations in Turkey.

Heper's main concern is the formation of an independent civil society depending on economic rationality, which is prevented by the political centre or, in Heper's terms, a strong state/high stateness. The Weberian notion of "stateness" depends upon the extent to which the significant goals for society are designated and safeguarded by those who represent the state, independent of civil society. He underlines the need for taking the state as the object of inquiry and looking at Turkey's state tradition to understand Turkish politics. This is the primary motive of his introduction of the state tradition thesis.

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However, I should note that this work lacks a substantive theory of the state. Therefore, it is vulnerable in terms of theoretical consistency. The only reference in one paragraph to his understanding of state is in the preface to the Turkish edition of the book written in 2006. In the original text written in 1985, there is not such a reference. In his mini explanation, he states that the state phenomenon in the book is not taken into account in a normative or deterministic manner.

Neither Marxist conception of the state as an instrument of dominating classes nor Hegelian emphasis on the state as representing ultimate rationality is determined. Heper argues that the state in his work is regarded as an empiric phenomenon in which, in different places and times, a state phenomenon, i.e. state elites, could emerge. These could take political elites under control in various forms and ratios. Therefore, it is assumed that they could have a great influence on political life.

I find it very important that referring to the contractarian tradition in Western Europe and claiming that the ability to create consensus after multiple confrontations and conflicts determines the extent to which a state is sovereign and autonomous vis-à-vis civil society, Heper states that there emerged variations in the early forms of Western European states. Variations in state formations led to the emergence of different political cultures. In that sense, the phenomenon of the state gives birth to a particular political culture. Concerning the case of Turkey, Heper locates this country in the developed-Western category rather than in the developing world.

He uses some conceptualization, such as transcendentalism and instrumentalism, and their extreme and moderate forms. Transcendentalism means the priority of the community, connoting concepts such as duty, service, leadership. And instrumentalism implies the priority of the individual and connoting concepts such as freedom, diversity and plurality. These are used to define forms of politics. Extreme and moderate forms of these orientations exist in different societies. In moderate transcendentalism, it can be claimed that a consensus is created by the imposition of the state norms on civil society. Whereas a degree of institutionalization is seen in the moderate form of transcendentalism, the personal rule becomes the tenet of extreme transcendentalism. While goals for society were designated by civil society and no sovereign state vis-à-vis civil society is seen in moderate instrumentalism, the extreme form is conceptualized by the efforts to gain the active support of the ruled.

According to Heper, the dominant paradigm in the study of Turkish politics lacks systematic attention to the political structure and culture of the phenomenon of the Turkish state. Thus, some aspects of Turkish politics remain a puzzle for many. However, the “contradictions” that appear in Turkish politics can be fully explained if the state is put into its proper place in the analysis. Only from this vantage point, Heper claims that Ottoman political culture was characterized by a tension derived from the bureaucratic centre’s nervousness toward the periphery and the periphery’s effort to circumvent the centre whenever it could.

It is worth mentioning that he criticizes some theses that are far from catching the main philosophy of “Ataturkism”. For him, the essential motivation of Kemal Atatürk was to form a temporary transcendental state. However, some scholars could not discern his primary strategy from his temporary tactics. In this sense, even Atatürk’s ardent opponents used his tactical statements to prove how “genuine Atatürkists” they were. Heper also criticizes the bureaucracy for not keeping Atatürk’s real path and developing a bureaucratic and authoritarian interpretation of Ataturkism.

Heper emphasizes the lack of control of the centre by peripheral forces in Ottoman society and defines Ottoman rule as patrimonial. The Turkish Republic seems to have inherited a strong state and a weak civil society from the Ottoman Empire. The duality between the strong state and weak civil society lies behind the tribulations of Turkish politics, crises of legitimacy and integration. In other words, the asymmetric relationship between the strong centre and the weak periphery paves the ground for the emergence of a state autonomous vis-à-vis civil society in designating goals for it.

Heper claims that the dichotomy between state and civil society continues to be a fundamental problem about the nature of Turkish politics. The new Turkish state inherited the Ottoman legacy. In his efforts to found a moderately transcendental state, Mustafa Kemal attempted to plant the seeds of liberal democracy in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension is related to participation mechanisms, whereas the vertical dimension is related to leadership and responsibility.

The importance of state tradition in the foundation of the Turkish state is that a state-dominant political system was to be established. Since the basic cleavage was the one between a dominant centre and a fragmented periphery, Turkish politics lacked a tradition of multiple confrontations as a way of resolving conflicts. A tradition of “politics” is lacking in that sense, and the political parties in Turkey have been nothing more than a means of elite conflict.

The contrast between state and civil society leads to an approach to politics as an elite confrontation. For him, bureaucratic elites, representing the state tradition against political elites, which emerged with the establishment of multi-party democracy, is the main theme of Turkish political history that merely reflects cultural cleavages because functional cleavages cannot be developed. Also, the group of economic elites, or the bourgeoisie, was not formed independently from the state, nor could it formulate economic policies despite the state. This “high stateness” results in the obstruction of economic rationality and civil society's development.

The post-1973 era up to the early 1980s can be summed up as such: the strong state tradition, having its roots in the absence of moderating structures in the Ottoman Turkish polity, results in an easy-shifting of the political regime between extreme transcendentalism and extreme instrumentalism. The incapacity of the political elites to create a dynamic consensus due to the lack of links within the civil society forced the military to attempt to re-equilibrate democracy. The coup d'état of 1980, in that sense, can be taken as a “transient transcendental state” to reach moderate instrumentalism in which the fertile ground for the enhancement of liberal democracy was created. Interestingly, the developments after the coup presented as “hopeful” signs for institutionalizing moderate instrumentalism in Turkey.

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