

A PANEL COINTEGRATION APPROACH TO MODELLING THE SHARE PRICES OF FOOTBALL CLUBS¹

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Abstract

Although equity valuation has been widely studied in the finance literature, very few studies have analysed the valuation of football club companies, which (due to their non-profit nature) significantly differs from the valuation of other institutions and thus requires different analytical techniques. This study contributes to the equity valuation literature on football clubs by proposing a valuation model based on the net market value of assets. Besides the market value of assets and liabilities, a number of proxy variables representing brand value, economic-wise management factors, investment sentiment in the market and a factor representing the value derived from the league in which the club participates are included in the model. The proposed model is tested with quarterly data from the 2011/12 season to the 2016/17 season on four publicly traded football club companies competing in the Turkish Super League, with panel cointegration regression tests revealing the statistical significance of the variables included.

Keywords: Equity Valuation, Share Value, Football Clubs, Sports Finance, Valuation Factors

FUTBOL KULÜPLERİNİN HİSSE FİYATLARININ DEĞERLEMESİNE PANEL EŞBÜTÜNLEŞME YAKLAŞIMI

Özet

Hisse senedi değerlemesi finans literatüründe geniş çapta incelenmesine rağmen futbol kulübü şirketlerinin değerlemesini çok az sayıda çalışma analiz etmiştir. Futbol kulübü şirketleri kar amacı gütmeyen yapıları nedeniyle diğer kurumların değerlemesinden önemli ölçüde farklılık göstermektedir ve bu nedenle farklı analitik teknikler gerektirir. Bu çalışma, varlıkların net piyasa değerine dayalı bir değerlendirme modeli önererek futbol kulüplerine ilişkin hisse senedi değerlendirme literatürüne katkıda bulunmaktadır. Modele, varlık ve yükümlülüklerin piyasa değerinin yanı sıra marka değerini, ekonomik yönden anlamlı yönetim faktörlerini, piyasadaki yatırım iştahını ve kulübün katıldığı ligden elde edilen değeri temsil eden bir dizi temsili değişken dahil edilmiştir. Önerilen model, 2011/12 sezonundan 2016/17 sezonuna kadar Türkiye Süper Liginde yarışan halka açık dört futbol kulübü şirketinin çeyreklik verileri ile test edilmiş, panel eşbütünlük regresyon testleri dahil edilen değişkenlerin istatistiksel önemini ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özkaynak Değerleme, Hisse Değerleme, Futbol Kulüpleri, Spor Finansı, Değerleme Faktörleri

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1. Introduction

Despite football news attracting considerable attention in written and visual media, studies on the valuation of football club companies (which require a specific approach due to their unique characteristics) are relatively limited in the academic literature. The main distinguishing characteristic of football club companies is their long debated objective whether it is profit maximisation or win maximisation. Fort (2015) states that estimating the potential trade-off between win and profit maximization is an important avenue for sports economics. The discussion about the aims of professional clubs is crucial to the valuation of football clubs that are structured as companies, since financially sound valuation is based on reasonably expected future cash flows to the equity holders. This study examines the valuation issue especially from the point of European clubs where profit maximization target is in the latter row. (see Sloane (2006) for a brief discussion about distinctions between the North American and European models of team sports.)

Sloane (1971) argued that the assumption of profit maximisation was inappropriate for the football industry, rather, a utility maximisation model seemed to fit the facts better. In line with this argument, European football reported a declining financial performance and position despite rising revenues in the first decade of the 2000s (Morrow, 2014) (Storm and Nielsen, 2012). Terrien et al. (2017) stated that “the utility function may be interpreted as the pursuit of sporting success subject to an acceptable level of financial losses.” Nevertheless, as a result of excessive spending and increasing borrowing that threatening the viability of clubs, UEFA had to introduce Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules in order to maintain the financial soundness of football clubs and the system in 2009. (UEFA, 2019)

Leach and Zymanski (2015) analysed whether being public has an impact on profitability of English football clubs. Their study showed that being listed on the stock exchange did not result a move towards profit maximising behaviour and thus it does not have a long-term effect on their profitability performances. Considering the increased losses during the study period, the same observation results are seem valid for the exchange listed Turkish football clubs subject to this study.

The FFP rules, aiming to limit the spending of clubs in their budget, have successfully reduced losses over the last decade (UEFA, 2019). However, these rules can only help to cure the loss-making nature of clubs and do not make them financially sensible investments unless their management strategy is oriented towards profit rather than sporting success. When it comes to profit-making football club companies (of which there are very few) they tend to retain these earnings, either to lower their high debt finances or to finance their new player transfers, rather than pay dividends. This renders both absolute valuation models based on discounting cash flows and many of the relative valuation models, including price-to-earnings and price-to-sales ratios, inadequate for the valuation of football club shares. Even the price-to-book value ratio is unsuitable because many clubs have negative book values on their balance sheet.

Although the amount and the consistency of profits far from justify the equity values of publicly traded clubs that do not provide any financial return to equity holders, still there exists a significant interest in the ownership of these clubs, especially those with a strong brand name, wide supporter base and a

history of sporting success. As a result, the source of value for football clubs is assumed to be determined not by future cash flows but by undisclosed intangible assets.

One of the undisclosed intangible assets for a football club is the value of its potential outgoing transfer revenues, which are not presented on its balance sheet. However, what is disclosed as an intangible asset (assuming it is composed of player transfer costs only) on a club balance sheet is the remaining balance from the amortisation of historic player transfer costs. The magnitude of the difference between the potential outgoing transfer revenues and the reported intangible assets figure is an important hidden value that is estimated to be a crucial determinant of share value.

Another feature contributing to the value of football clubs is their brand value, which (in line with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) is not disclosed on balance sheets unless purchased from a third party (IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, 2018). Since football fans stick to their brands and hardly change their clubs, brand loyalty is stronger for football clubs when compared to other industries, and this makes club brands highly valuable. Hence, their brand is thought to be an important value contributor for football club companies.

Given the inapplicability of absolute and relative valuation techniques due to the lack of positive cash flows, an asset-based valuation model that aims to mark to market all the assets, including the undisclosed intangibles, emerges as a suitable tool to estimate football club equity values. Hence, the aim of this study is to develop an asset-based relative valuation model for football club companies by proposing measurement criteria for undisclosed intangibles and mark-to-market criteria for all disclosed assets. While the model includes some independent variables that were introduced in previous studies, it proposes new variables as well, which increases significantly the model's predictive power.

The study contributes to the existing literature by proposing an alternative tool for determining the equity value of football clubs. The model is tested by employing a co-integrating regression approach using a fully modified least squares method on the panel data, and all variables were found to be significant predictors of football clubs' equity value. Although the model is not definitive and has limitations, it is thought to be useful given the paucity of valuation tools applicable to football clubs.

2. Theoretical Background

Studies on football club valuation are very limited in the finance literature. Early attempts aimed to uncover the factors that affect the price and trading volume of publicly traded sports companies. Brown (2001) studied the data for the Boston Celtics, the first publicly traded American sports team, and found that game results have a significant impact on returns, trading volume and volatility and showed that unexpected game results created abnormal returns. Vine (2004) also studied the factors that affect the share value of clubs competing in American football, basketball, baseball and hockey leagues and found that revenue is the key driver behind the valuation of sports franchises. Zuber et al. (2005) examined the game-related performance of 10 publicly traded English Premier League teams and concluded that the market is insensitive to game results in terms of both price movements and trading volume, and the football club share investors appear to derive value from merely holding the shares. Scelles et al. (2014) aimed to estimate the determinants of firm values of European football clubs for eight years between 2005 and 2013 and concluded that the value of players, operating income of sports club companies,

new ownership, clubs' assets (including stadium age, club ownership type, number and income of supporters) and past sport performance are significant factors in determining the value of sports clubs. The authors propose that revenues are a better basis upon which to calculate value than profits since revenues are a good indicator of a club's cash-generation capacity.

Regarding the techniques behind the valuation of sports companies, Thornton and Matyszczyk (2010) stated that present absolute valuation techniques should be used by adding some adjustments to reflect specific features of the clubs being valued. Similarly, Kızıltepe (2012) examined the valuation of four publicly traded Turkish football clubs and concluded that a discounted cash flow approach and other income-based approaches are appropriate for the valuation of sports clubs.

Opposition to these statements came from Markham and Solntsev. Markham (2013) analysed English Premier League clubs and stated that neither discounted cash flow techniques nor revenue multiples are appropriate for valuation as clubs in the United Kingdom are perpetually loss-making entities and therefore do not have any positive cash flow to equity to discount. The author suggested an alternative model where the value is determined by revenue, net profit, net assets, stadium attendance and wages-to-turnover ratio. The suggested factors were tested on the actual transaction values of clubs that faced an ownership change between the 2003-2004 and 2011-2012 seasons, and all were found to be statistically significant.

Similarly, Solntsev (2014) argued that most football clubs have historically been unprofitable and financed by private investors or municipal authorities. As their financial performance is highly volatile and unpredictable due to their dependence on sporting results, using a discounted cash flow technique is inadequate for their valuation, and a club's net assets figure could be considered as representing fair company value.

After summarizing the meager financial returns in the Premier League, Yueh (2014) reasoned why people buy football clubs and stated that it has nothing to do with money and simply because they are fans of the clubs they own or have strong ties with the local community. Also, for some countries with global ambitions, football is seen as an important way of expanding their brands, with many of these investments ultimately government backed through sovereign wealth funds.

KPMG (2016), an internationally recognised auditing and consultancy firm, issued a report on the valuation of football clubs in 2016 and reported that football clubs aim to maximise utility rather than profits and that the correlation between direct investments and sporting success is very low. Because of these peculiarities, KPMG suggested using the "enterprise value" technique for the sports clubs' rankings, where enterprise value is calculated based on five metrics: profitability, popularity, sporting potential, broadcasting rights and stadium ownership.

More recently, Prigge et al. (2019) studied whether stocks in football clubs are valued in line with the valuation of other capital assets in the capital market by analysing the share prices of 19 listed European football clubs from January 2010 to December 2016. Findings indicate that the majority of the football clubs in the sample are overvalued. They argued that this might be related to the motives of investors who are not purely financial investors and do expect extra benefits from investing in club shares. This

study once again indicates that the known financial valuation methods are not suitable for application to football clubs.

3. The Model

A number of previous studies on football club valuation have concluded that the equity valuation methods developed for profit-maximising entities are not suitable for football clubs due to their not-for-profit nature. Hence, the aim of this study is to develop an asset-based valuation method that would shed light on the club valuation issue. Since the main goal of football club firms is not profit maximisation, valuation of these entities should be similar to that of non-operating firms. However, unlike firms that have ceased operations, sports clubs have considerable undisclosed intangible assets due to their ongoing activities. Thus, an asset-based valuation model that marks to market all the assets, including the undisclosed intangibles a club possesses, would be a suitable tool to estimate sports clubs' equity value.

The asset-based valuation of equity simply takes into account the fair market value of all assets and deducts all liabilities of the entity. The least problematic part of this calculation is adjusting the book values of debts to the mark-to-market values. Since the IFRS 9 requires adjusting debt accounts to reporting date values, the book value of the total debt figure is assumed to be the mark-to-market value of total debts (IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, 2018).

Adjusting the book value of assets to mark-to-market values is a little troublesome for football clubs. The most important asset class on a club's balance sheet is fixed intangibles. The fixed intangibles of clubs consist of player transfer fees and are of particular importance. In most cases, this is the account in which the clubs make the most investment they can possibly afford. This is unsurprising given the clubs are sporting organisations and their management success is evaluated in parallel to their sporting success. On the other hand, this is the account that usually differs most from the market value because what they have spent for an incoming player transfer rarely mirrors what they may expect to receive for the same player should the player be subject to an outgoing transfer. Moreover, these transfer costs are subject to amortisation for the length of the player's contract with the club. Thus, the book value of fixed intangibles represents only the unamortised part of player transfer costs. Even more noteworthy, the expected transfer revenue from a home-grown player is not included in the accounts. Therefore, the fixed intangible account on a club's balance sheet far from represents the sum of the club's possible revenues in the event of player transfer. For this reason, instead of considering the remaining balance of player transfer costs, that is, the intangible fixed assets, the possible outgoing transfer value of players should be taken into account to better reflect the team's value.

Different from manufacturing or trading entities, football clubs operate in the leisure industry and do not have other sizeable assets compared to the value of their players (fixed intangibles). At least, this is the case for the clubs examined in this study. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the book values for all other assets are a good proxy for their market values. Nevertheless, for an asset with considerable size, if it is known that its book value substantially differs from the market value, then it

should definitely be treated individually and marked to market. By adding up the mark-to-market values of all assets, we calculate the total market value of all assets on the balance sheet of a club.

Unlike non-operating companies (for which an asset-based valuation is suitable), clubs have another very important asset not found on their balance sheet: the value of the brand upon which all their activities are built. A non-operating company may have no or a considerably small brand value. But a football club builds its brand through sporting success, adopting and uplifting values and managing its relationship with fans, no matter whether these efforts overall result in a profit or not. Therefore, this study argues that the suggested model should include brand value as an important constituent of club equity value.

Brand Finance, an international consulting and research group, has been publishing a report each year for the 50 most valuable football club brands for more than ten years. The report discloses the brand values for the top 10 and only the ranking order for the rest. Their methodology involves “estimating the likely future revenues that are attributable to a brand by calculating a royalty rate that would be charged for its use, to arrive at a ‘brand value’ understood as a net economic benefit that a licensor would achieve by licensing the brand in the open market” (Brand Finance, 2021). The steps in the process briefly include the application of the royalty rate on football specific revenues and then calculating the post-tax present value of the brand revenues today. Since the reports do not cover all clubs included in the study and the data frequency is once a year, this source is not referred for brand value data. However, Brand Finance's methodology shows that brand value is highly correlated with revenue.

In this study, it is assumed that total revenues of a club is a good proxy for its brand value because the higher the brand value, the higher the number of fans, and the wider the club is known and supported. Consequently, it means more spectators and higher match day revenues and merchandise sales. Similarly, the higher the value of a club's brand, the higher the licensing fees, advertisement revenues and sponsorship income, since other brands will be more willing to be associated with the club. Accordingly, we consider revenue as a proxy for brand value, which should be a factor in the model.

Although profit is not the ultimate target for clubs, the importance of economic-wise management cannot be ignored for clubs either. It is assumed that management running the club with financially sound policies should contribute to the value of the club. For companies with a profit-maximising objective, the earnings figure (supported by cash flows from operations) that is taken into account for valuation purposes already contains this element. For football clubs, however, another measurement is needed to proxy the quality of economic-wise management. It is assumed that a cash flow item could be a proxy for the contribution of economic-wise management to the value of a club.

Apart from the factors specific to clubs, there are also some macro factors affecting the prices of assets in an economy. Investment appetite and/or market sentiment are common terms used to describe the overall investment tendency in securities markets. Accordingly, it is assumed that this investment sentiment has an effect on club shares as well, as it would for any other type of share. In organised markets, the general price levels are measured by indexes composed of prices of the securities traded in that market. Thus, a stock market index in which the shares subject to study are being traded should

be added to the model. Accordingly, the “Borsa Istanbul XU100 Price Index” is applied as a proxy for market sentiment in the model since all the shares included in the study are traded on Borsa Istanbul.

Another factor considered important is the one affecting the value of clubs following a relegation to a lower league or promotion to a higher one. In other words, club values do change depending on the popularity and revenue potential of the league in which the clubs compete. This factor is expected to be the same for all clubs participating in the same league. Thus, this factor should be included in the model with a constant term. This constant value is derived after running the statistical software to find the best-fitting coefficients of factors affecting the club value.

In addition to the constant term derived from the league, a persistence coefficient that is less than 1 may be applied on the constant term for those clubs likely to be relegated. In this case, the value derived from the league in which the club competes would not be fully reflected in the equity value of the club, while a persistence coefficient of 1 would mean that the club’s equity fully contains the value arising from the league constant.

Having explained the factors that are assumed to be effective in determining the equity value of clubs, the following valuation model is suggested:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Equity Value of Club} &= \text{Persistence Coe.} \times \text{League Constant} \\ &+ \beta_1 \times \text{Brand Value} + \beta_2 \times \text{Team Value} + \beta_3 \times \text{Other Assets Value} \\ &+ \beta_4 \times \text{Economic-wise Management} + \beta_5 \times \text{Total Debt} \\ &+ \beta_6 \times \text{Market Sentiment} + e \end{aligned}$$

where $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_6$ are factor coefficients.

4. Data & Methodology

The proposed model is tested on four Turkish football clubs—namely, Besiktas (BJKAS), Fenerbahce FENER), Galatasaray (GSRAY) and Trabzonspor (TSPOR) with shares that are traded on Borsa Istanbul. These four clubs have the most fans in Turkey and the most championships in the Turkish Super League. The dataset is limited to four clubs because no other Turkish football club companies are listed on the stock exchange and hence do not disclose their financial statements. All four football club companies included in the study have similar organisational structures and operations as they engage solely in football activities. Since the shares are traded on the same market, the clubs are subject to the same regulations and apply the same financial reporting standards.

To maintain the homogeneity of other factors that could affect club values, clubs from other countries and / or exchanges were specifically excluded from the study. Thus, the formation of the Club value were tried to be explained only with the variables suggested in the model. If the model to be obtained in this way can predict the dependent variable powerfully, it is suggested that the model can be used as a relative valuation tool for new public offerings to be made in the same stock exchange or when comparing existing stocks for arbitrage opportunities.

The data cover the 2011/12 season to the 2016/17 season inclusive (four quarters for each season), amounting to 24 observations for each club and 96 observations in total. Each observation includes six independent variables that are assumed to be significant in determining the value of clubs and the

observed club value, which is the dependent variable. The independent variables are: Revenues for the last four quarters (trailing 4 quarters revenues); Team Value, which consists of the potential transfer value of players; Assets other than Fixed Intangibles (that is, Total Assets minus the book value of players), Total Debt and Free Cash Flow to Firm for the last 12 months.

The data are gathered from three different sources. All financial reports are obtained from Borsa Istanbul, Public Dissemination Platform (KAP Kamuyu Aydınlatma Platformu, 2018). Borsa Istanbul 100 Index values are taken from the bulletin data on the Borsa Istanbul website (Bulletin Data, 2018). Finally, Team Value figures are taken from Transfermarkt (2018).

All the clubs subject to this study have financial years starting on 1 June and ending on 31 May. Although these clubs' shares were offered to the public and began to be traded between 2002 and 2005, the structures of the companies differed from those of a football club and were not comparable to one another before the 2011/12 season. In the early 2000s, considering that a high valuation would not be possible with the net income of football branches, the parent associations of these clubs (except Beşiktaş) established companies such as a revenue sharing structure to attract investors, and offered to public. However, realizing that it was not possible to continue their football activities, whose expenses were already higher than their revenues, they transferred their football activities to their publicly traded companies until the end of the 2011/12 season. In this way, the public offered companies of these associations became football branches (or clubs) of them with very similar structures. Therefore, the earliest data were taken from the first quarter of the 2011/12 financial year.

Team Value figures are taken from Transfermarkt (2018). The website is a popular source in the football sector for viewing the likely transfer prices of players as well as the values of teams based on the total transfer value of players. The website revises team values twice a month. For each observation in the study, the most recent available team value is taken as an explanatory independent variable for the closing share price at the end of the day following the day on which the financial statements are disseminated.

For the remaining assets, book value is assumed to be a close proxy for the market value. Therefore, the book value of intangible fixed assets is deducted from the total assets of clubs to calculate the Assets other than Fixed Intangibles.

Another balance sheet item used as an independent variable in the model is the club's Total Debt. According to the IFRS, debt figures must be adjusted to reflect real values on the date of reporting (IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, 2018). Consequently, the book value of total debt is considered to be a good approximation of market value on the date of the balance sheet.

The dependent variable is the market value of the club's equity based on the closing share price on the day following the dissemination of its financial statements. It is assumed that the market is efficient and all the information is reflected in the prices by the end of the next trading day at the latest, following the dissemination of financials.

A cointegration regression model with a constant was examined over the data set. The constant value is interpreted as the value originating from the league in which the clubs are participated. However, this

value is not expected to be reflected in all companies in the league in the same way. The four clubs examined in the study are longstanding and the most competitive participants in the Turkish Super League. Therefore, it is assumed that their values fully reflect the value arising from the league, and their persistence coefficients for League Constant are assumed to be 1. For teams that are likely to be relegated, it would be necessary to determine a persistence coefficient between 0 and 1, so that the value from the league is partially reflected. (For clubs that are sure to be relegated from the league, persistence coefficient = 0)

In the study, quarterly cross-sectional units were examined between the 2011/12 and 2016/17 seasons, inclusively. Since the number of observations for each variable is the same and the number of time periods is larger than the number of cross-sectional units, the approach is a long balanced panel. The study employs a cointegration regression approach in testing the model for the equity values of clubs.

The independent factors are either static figures (figures for a certain instant) or flow figures of the trailing 12 months. Therefore, seasonality is not a concern because the flow items (Revenues and Cash Flow figures) cover an entire season.

In order to balance the extreme fluctuations to a certain extent, log transformation for dependent variables is done. To ensure the stationarity of the variables, first differences are taken. Then, the panel cointegration tests concluded that cointegration exists (meaning there is a long-term relationship) among all the variables.

The abbreviation of variables used in the model are presented in **Table 1**.

Table 1. The Variables Used in the Model

Variable	Description
y	i th club market value at t th time
x _R	i th club revenues at t th time
x _T	i th team value at t th time
x _O	i th club assets other than fixed intangible at t th time
x _D	i th club total debt at t th time
x _F	i th club economic-wise management contribution at t th time
x _C	Common (Price Index) variable at t th time

Table 2 represents a sample of data employed to test the model. The table includes 2 quarters data for the 1st season out of 4 quarters for 6 seasons observed.

Table 2. Sample Data Set (Figures 1.000 TL except X_c)

Club	Term	Y	X _R	X _T	X _O	X _D	X _F	X _C
B	1Q1	328.800	116.118	309.954	111.751	417.595	-73.298	59.300
F	1Q1	1.162.500	130.628	297.708	55.456	63.339	55.683	59.300
G	1Q1	674.716	129.927	292.048	114.097	426.323	-30.464	59.300
T	1Q1	498.750	90.725	201.932	146.548	170.077	9.416	59.300
B	1Q2	262.400	150.103	272.774	127.386	452.058	-57.256	57.357
F	1Q2	950.000	186.492	271.645	90.915	63.110	-15.130	57.357
G	1Q2	490.703	144.418	279.651	75.242	415.809	-23.424	57.357
T	1Q2	317.500	129.382	189.832	165.515	169.527	-1.476	57.357

Notes: B, F, G & T represent BJKAS, FENER, GSRAY & TSPOR.
 1Q1 and 1Q2 represent 1st season, quarter 1 and 2.

Table 3 is the results of cointegrating regression model derived by using the panel fully modified least squares (FMOLS) estimation method on the panel data. Although the technique is relatively new, it is commonly used by economists to avoid spurious regression. The assumptions of the model are also examined, confirming the validity of the model. The estimated parameters of the independent variables used in the model are given under the heading "Coefficient".

Table 3. Cointegrating Regression Results

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
X _R	1.97E-09	5.18E-10	3.7999	0.0003
X _T	1.78E-09	6.99E-10	2.5441	0.0128
X _O	-8.06E-10	3.60E-10	-2.2357	0.0281
X _D	-6.19E-10	2.71E-10	-2.2832	0.0250
X _F	1.30E-09	5.64E-10	2.3014	0.0239
X _C	1.02E-05	4.91E-06	2.0717	0.0414
R-squared	0.76	Mean dependent var		19.97
Adjusted R-squared	0.73	S.D. dependent var		0.71
S.E. of regression	0.37	Sum squared resid		11.09

Taking into consideration the probability values for the independent variables, all the probability values are smaller than the $\alpha = 0.05$ significance level. Therefore, it can be stated that all independent variables in the model are significant and thus make a meaningful contribution to explaining the dependent variable.

Tests for residuals showed that residuals are stationary and come from normal distribution. There is also no multicollinearity to affect the results of the model adversely.

There are some strong positive relationships between some variables (Table 3). However, when the independent variables are evaluated fundamentally, there is no causal relation affecting each other. For instance, the revenue of a company does not increase necessarily due to an increase in debt or vice versa. As a result, the correlations observed between limited variables are ignored.

Table 4. Correlations Between Variables

Correlation Probability	X _R	X _T	X _O	X _D	X _F	X _C
X _R	1.0000					
X _T	0.5687	1.0000				
X _O	0.7557	0.4074	1.0000			
X _D	0.8446	0.6835	0.7672	1.0000		
X _F	0.0894	-0.0333	-0.1847	-0.0136	1.0000	
X _C	0.3913	0.2225	0.3247	0.5333	-0.0912	1.0000

0.0001 0.0294 0.0012 0.0000 0.3770

In order for the obtained model to operate more consistently, it is important that the sample data are derived from similar entities. Among the four clubs studied, Besiktas, Fenerbahce and Galatasaray are most similar one-another and usually referred to as the “The Three Bigs”. Therefore, another model is derived using data that excludes the Trabzonspor observations. The results show that all the conclusions remain the same while the significance of the variables substantially improves, where all probabilities have fallen below 1% (**Table 5**). Therefore, using a model derived from similar clubs would work much better in predictions.

Table 5. Cointegrating Regression Results (without TSPOR)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
X _R	1.48E-09	3.98E-10	3.7034	0.0005
X _T	3.06E-09	5.05E-10	6.0567	0.0000
X _O	-1.02E-09	2.75E-10	-3.7222	0.0004
X _D	-8.96E-10	2.05E-10	-4.3727	0.0000
X _F	2.02E-09	3.90E-10	5.1744	0.0000
X _C	1.87E-05	3.43E-06	5.4491	0.0000
R-squared	0.63	Mean dependent var		20.27
Adjusted R-squared	0.58	S.D. dependent var		0.50
S.E. of regression	0.33	Sum squared resid		6.42

5. Findings

Confirming the general view that revenue is the most important factor in determining the equity value of clubs, the Revenue variable in the model is found to be the most significant one with a probability value of 0.0003. In fact, many analysts and researchers consider brand value as the main determinant of football clubs that report a net loss. Revenue is taken as a proxy for brand value since a stronger brand relates to a wider fan base in most cases, which directly affects the revenues. If a club has a wider fan base, it can generate higher revenues through broadcast rights, match day revenues, advertising and sponsorship income, etc.

The second most important factor is Team Value, with a probability value of 0.0128, making it almost significant at the level of 0.01. It appears that investment in talent to increase the likelihood of sporting success is an important value driver for investors. Higher team value also seems to be related to higher revenues to a certain extent. Table 3 represents correlations between variables and shows that the correlation between the Revenue and Team Value variables is 0.57, with a probability of less than 1%. Although the correlation between the variables may be viewed as problematic, it is ignored here considering its lack of direct causality. The brand and team values may be seen as complementing each other to build the club's reputation with some interaction in between.

The Economic-wise Management factor measures the contribution of the management through its practices and policies while running the club in a balance between sporting competitiveness and financial sustainability. To measure the success of the management in this sense, Net Profit/Loss,

Operating Profit/Loss and Free Cash Flow figures were tried as a proxy. The Free Cash Flow is the total of "Cash Flow from Operations" and "Cash Flow from Investments" derived from the cash flow tables. The trials revealed that only Free Cash Flow results in a meaningful relation with the dependent variable with a probability of 0.0239. That means that investors see the club's management as adding value to the club to the extent that the company leaves cash available to all capital providers (including debt providers) after all operating expenses have been paid and necessary capital investments have been made. Confirming the fact that clubs are not profit-oriented organisations, the Profit/Loss figures did not result in meaningful and significant coefficients in the trials.

The Borsa Istanbul XU100 Price Index was chosen as a proxy to reflect the general investment appetite of the investors in the market. Since this variable was the same for all clubs' observations at time t , it is named the common variable. The model confirms that the general investment atmosphere is effective in determining the equity values as predicted with a significance level below 5% (that is, 0.0414).

The financial leverage of the company is an important factor in valuing equity. In relation to this, while previous studies have used leverage ratios, the total debt and financial debt values are tested as proxies for leverage in this study. The trials revealed that the Total Debt figure was a better proxy for leverage and had a negative coefficient as expected, with a probability value of 0.0250.

One of the most interesting results of the study is related to the Other Assets in the model representing the book value of assets of the clubs except the intangible fixed assets (the unamortised part of player costs). This variable aims to reveal the effect of the investments that the club makes in assets other than acquiring players on the equity value of the club. Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative and meaningful at the 5% significance level. This result indicates that club investors adversely value the investments made in areas other than in the team. It seems that investors would be happier if clubs had a higher valued team rather than owning assets like a stadium, land, training facilities, etc.

The average league constant value for the trial with four clubs is 161 million TL, while the trial with the Three Bigs resulted in a value of 105 million TL. Considering that the trial with the three more similar clubs improved the significance of the variables substantially, it may be inferred that being a participant in the Turkish Super League would add roughly 105 million TL to the value of a club, provided that it is not likely to be relegated from the league in the foreseeable future.

6. Conclusion

The present study aims to propose a new model for the equity valuation of football club companies. The model is based on asset valuation and takes into account the mark-to-market values of disclosed and undisclosed intangible assets, namely team value, brand value and the contribution of economic-wise quality management. While the study uses some independent variables that were also used in previous studies, some new variables such as Assets Other Than Fixed Intangibles, Total Debt (previous studies used leverage ratios), Free Cash Flow and Stock Exchange Price Index were also introduced. The model is tested by employing a cointegrating regression approach using a fully modified least squares method on the panel data, and all variables were found to be significant predictors of football clubs' equity value. As a test of robustness, considering that the top three clubs are more likely to be

comparable to one another, an alternative model test is done by excluding TSPOR data. The results show an increase in the significance level of the independent variables, as expected.

The study makes several important contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides investors with an alternative tool with which to judge the comparative fairness of the value of football club shares and hence has important policy implications. An interesting finding is that investors penalise clubs for investing in assets other than the team by affecting the share prices adversely. The implication of this finding is that to increase the value of shares, managers should minimise the investments made in assets other than the team. It appears that investors are happier if a club directs most of its resources to strengthen its team, since it is the main asset of a club that is assumed to reflect its sporting competitiveness. This finding also explains why clubs struggle to invest in infrastructure and the need for government incentives to make these investments.

Club managers should also direct the club so that its operational and investment activities together result in a positive cash flow. The model predicts that a free cash flow derived from operational and investment activities is positively reflected in club values, whereas tests with profit (loss) figures showed no significant relation. This result is consistent with the not-for-profit nature of football clubs.

Another implication of the study is the necessity to limit club borrowing. Since football clubs are not-for-profit entities, there is no Return on Equity concept for sporting entities. Therefore, from the perspective of clubs, borrowing is actually spending their future income with a discount today. In practice, clubs tend to overspend and turn to borrowing in order to achieve less-certain sporting success in the current season, leaving the burden to repay to the future (and to future managers). Accordingly, the total debt factor in the proposed model negatively reflects club share value. It clearly shows that debt is a value depreciating factor and should be limited, particularly for those clubs that is set up as an association where directors come and go with general meeting decisions and bear no responsibility for the debt they incur and leave to their successors. For a non-profit entity, overspending by borrowing, that is spending discounted future income, can only be justified if it is related to a project that will result in a positive net present value with the proceeds the project generates.

This study proposes investors an alternative tool with which to judge the comparative fairness of the value of football club shares. However, it is not a definitive and has limitations. Performing the study with a larger data set would benefit to the reliability of the model and tests using sports clubs from different leagues (but clubs from same league each time to control other factors) would enable to confirm or not the findings of this paper and assess whether they can be generalised or not. Moreover, the data used in testing should be updated continuously to reflect the current market dynamics. Nevertheless, considering the current paucity of methods available for valuing club shares, the model is thought to be a worthy one.

The frequency of the data used in the study was four times in a year. The limiting factor here with the least frequency was the financial data which is disseminated quarterly. Data for other variables could be obtained more often; for example, team values are updated twice a month on the Transfermarkt website. Therefore, a future study could use observations that are updated more often but are also unbalanced variables.

Finally, although the study focuses on football clubs due to their popularity, the concepts mentioned here may be applied to all other sporting entities that care sporting success over financial return and sustainability.

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ENTREPRENEURSHIP ECOSYSTEM IN TURKEY: ACCELERATORS & INCUBATION CENTERS

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Abstract

The main aim of this research is to examine the entrepreneurship ecosystem in Turkey and to make recommendations about needed training to develop innovative entrepreneurship.

The research method is based on qualitative analysis which in-depth interviews were made with 13 entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs were asked a total of 7 questions about their demographic structure, socio-cultural experiences, and start-ups.

As a result of the study, an evaluation was made about the entrepreneurship training needed to increase innovative entrepreneurship. The most challenging stages are networking, finding customer, introducing product/service, testing product, and creating a team. The centers need to provide support focused on entrepreneurial needs to increase the start-up survival rate. The centers are concentrated in 3 provinces in Turkey. Considering each young people in all provinces has the potential for being an entrepreneur, it will be beneficial to provide remote education in these centers.

Entrepreneurship is an important factor for economic development in developing countries. Entrepreneurship should proceed parallel with innovation to a gain competitive advantage. For this reason, it is important that entrepreneurship centers spread across country provide support by targeting the areas where start-ups that will create innovation have difficulty. This paper aims to enrich the supports of accelerator and incubation centers by presenting in depth-understanding the needs of entrepreneurs in Turkey.

Keywords Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Incubation Centers, Accelerators, Education

TÜRKİYE'DE GİRİŞİMCİLİK EKOSİSTEMİ: HIZLANDIRICILAR VE KULUÇKA MERKEZLERİ

Özet

Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, Türkiye'deki girişimcilik ekosistemini incelemek ve yenilikçi girişimciliği geliştirmek için ihtiyaç duyulan eğitimler konusunda önerilerde bulunmaktır.

Araştırma yöntemi, 13 girişimci ile derinlemesine görüşmelerin yapıldığı nitel analize dayanmaktadır. Girişimcilere demografik yapıları, sosyo-kültürel deneyimleri ve start-up'ları hakkında toplam 7 soru sorulmuştur.

Çalışma sonucunda yenilikçi girişimciliği artırmak için ihtiyaç duyulan girişimcilik eğitimine ilişkin bir değerlendirme yapılmıştır. En zorlanılan aşamalar; ağ oluşturma, müşteri bulma, ürün / hizmet sunma, ürünü test etme ve ekip oluşturmaktır. Girişimcilik merkezlerinin, start-up'ların hayatta kalma oranını artırmak için onların ihtiyaçlarına odaklanarak destek sağlaması gerekir. Merkezler Türkiye'de 3 ilde

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yoğunlaşmıştır. Tüm illerdeki her gencin girişimci olma potansiyeline sahip olduğu düşünüldüğünde, bu merkezlerde uzaktan eğitim verilmesi faydalı olacaktır.

Girişimcilik, gelişmekte olan ülkelerde ekonomik kalkınma için önemli bir faktördür. Rekabet avantajı elde etmek için girişimcilik inovasyonla paralel ilerlemelidir. Bu nedenle ülke geneline yayılmış girişimcilik merkezlerinin inovasyon yaratacak start-up'ların zorlandığı alanları hedefleyerek destek sağlaması önemlidir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye'deki girişimcilerin ihtiyaçlarını derinlemesine anlayarak hızlandırıcı ve kuluçka merkezlerinin desteklerini zenginleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Girişimcilik, İnovasyon, Kuluçka Merkezleri, Hızlandırıcılar

1. Introduction

Entrepreneurship has existed since people started living as a community. In today's perspective, entrepreneurship is unlike trade as it contains innovation. However, the point to be considered that everything new does not constitute the fundamental dynamics of innovation. It creates innovations that turn into or transform into an economic and social added value (Uzkurt, 2010). Innovative entrepreneurship plays an important role in the development of the country to gain competitive advantage with gaining value in the global market.

Since entrepreneurship is one of the driving forces of economic growth, various studies are being carried out to develop entrepreneurship around the world. The entrepreneurship ecosystem is generally supported by education and economic policies.

Literature research demonstrated that entrepreneurship has a positive effect on economic growth and employment. However, the degree of this impact varies according to the socio-economic levels of the countries. Entrepreneurship contributes by creating innovation, creating difference, and creating competition for economic performance (Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). Socio-economic levels are measured into three levels: high, middle, and low. Socioeconomic levels are determined by people's socioeconomic status in a country based on income, education, and occupation.

Numerous researchs was found about entrepreneurship tendency in literature research. The most commonly purpose of these research is why some individuals are entrepreneurs while others are not an entrepreneur. The main reason of this question is individual differences. Even though individual characteristics are significate factors, individuals' behaviors also effect entrepreneurship. Unlike characteristic features, behavior can be learnt through formal and informal processes (Paço, 2015). According to Drucker (1993), entrepreneurship is a discipline, entrepreneurship can be evaluated as a learnable fact.

This study offers contributions that understand entrepreneurs' need and make advice entrepreneurial centers supports. Within the scope of this study, the ecosystem of entrepreneurship in Turkey will be analyzed to make suggestions to improve innovative entrepreneurship. In this study, in-depth interviews were made with innovative entrepreneurs to understand their needs. The entrepreneurs were selected according to the following criterias; having innovative product/service, offering a product or service that

is the first in Turkey or in the World, achieving the planned success, receiving award or investment, having multidisciplinary team. All entrepreneurs participating in the interview have at least one of these criteria. In interviews with entrepreneurs, questions regarding their demographic and socio-cultural structure and start-ups were asked. In this study, it is aimed to make suggestions about the supports that can be added to the entrepreneurship centers in Turkey that form the infrastructure of the entrepreneurship ecosystem.

2.Theoretical Background and Related Research

2.1. Entrepreneurial Tendency

Awareness of entrepreneurship and innovation in accordance with the general trend in public institutions in Turkey has increased considerably. Then, the factors affecting entrepreneurship started to be examined.

According to pre-Gartner researchers, entrepreneurial tendency based on theory of features, individuals with personality traits. With this approach, a person is born as entrepreneur or not because it is an innate characteristic (Gartner, 1989). In other words, it was argued that there is a relationship between personality and business building skills. Koppl and Minniti (2003) defined entrepreneurship as a dynamic process of change in which individuals, having in unusual degree certain personal or psychological characteristics, undertake innovative activities while Shane and Eckhardt (2003) defined as it is the sequential process of discovery, evaluation and exploitation of future goods and services.

According to Entrepreneurial personality traits, unlike the field approach, entrepreneurship is taken as a process (Kibuka, 2011). It is advocated by many studies that experiences gained in age, gender, family, and social environment effect entrepreneurial behavior.

In the year of 1996, Morris defined the entrepreneurship as the relationship between entrepreneurs and their surroundings and the role government plays in creating the economic, political, legal, financial, and social structures that characterize a society and give shape the environment for entrepreneurs (Morris and Sexton, 1996).

With the awareness of society against entrepreneurship, not only people with certain personality traits but those who want to learn this behavior can get involved in the entrepreneurship ecosystem through education and support.

People who have work experience may be more likely to adapt easily to the ecosystem. Having networking and working discipline increases the self-confidence of people. The Örenc (2019) study investigates the effect of applied entrepreneurship training on entrepreneurship tendency. Within the scope of the research, 15 people among the entrepreneurs who participated ISKUR entrepreneurship training in Çanakkale, been successful and established their business by using KOSGEB support were selected. Data were collected and analyzed by qualitative research technique. In-depth interviews were made with 15 entrepreneurs. 11 out of 15 people who participated in the research stated that the information they obtained in the entrepreneurship course was useful while developing their businesses. Most of the participants who previously worked in the private sector stated that they worked to save some money and provide the necessary infrastructure for their businesses.

In the study of Ayar (2019), the effects of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurship tendency were also examined in terms of demographics features and which factors had more effect. After examination of age range, it was seen that the age ranges of 21-30 and 31-40, which are the most productive periods, corresponding to 72.6 percent in total. 63.1 percent of the participants are higher education graduates. Among the reasons for the participants to start their own business; the dreams that are desired to be realized, being the boss of his own business and creating innovation come to the fore. Even though the participants choose to receive grants and credit support in the first place, they preferred to develop themselves in the sense of entrepreneurship at a very close rate.

2.2. Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Even though entrepreneurship has existed in several ways since people began to live as a community, there is not a generally accepted definition for 'Entrepreneurship'. The scope of entrepreneurship has also changed over the years with the effect of technology and globalization. Entrepreneurship is now associated with innovation today.

According to Draheim (1972), Entrepreneurship is the act of founding a new company where none existed before. Churchill (1992) defined the entrepreneurship as 'uncovering and developing an opportunity to create value through innovation and seizing that opportunity without regard to either resources such as human and capital or the location of the entrepreneur – in a new or existing company'.

Drucker considered entrepreneurship as a managerial process and handles innovation in the form of managing information. In addition, he stated that if there is no such culture, the management should create it. Otherwise, it would not be called systematic innovation in a place without entrepreneurship (Drucker, 1993). According to Schumpeter, there are five types of innovation consist of new product, new method of production, new sources of supply, exploitation of new markets, and new ways to recognize a business.

Entrepreneurship is enabled by innovation; entrepreneurship is guided by innovation for competitive advantage and develop the countries. European Cooperation in Education and Training has four strategic objectives which approved by the Council of the European Union in 2009; one of the strategic is enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training (Entrepreneurship in the EU, 2009).

When look at the examples from the World, the entrepreneurship education and culture existing in the United States have formed the basis of the strong infrastructure needed for the creation of worldwide organizations such as Microsoft, Oracle, Dell and Wal-Mart. On the other hand, the national welfare is increased such successful enterprises have created innovative products and services and strengthened the competitive advantage of the United States (Lee, 2005).

Turkey has studies to develop entrepreneurship according to the 10th Development plan. These studies are entrepreneurship training in university, high school, primary and secondary schools to the establishment of entrepreneurship discipline on young people. On the other hand, establishing

incubation centers, accelerator centers, generalizing entrepreneurship training via KOSGEB, ISKUR etc.

2.3. Factors that Affect the Innovative Entrepreneurship

According to the study of the World Entrepreneurship Platform by Babson College and London School of Economics, the factors affecting entrepreneurship are gathered in two main dimensions as country infrastructure and entrepreneurship infrastructure. Country infrastructure consists of economy outward openness, the role of the state, efficiency of the financial sector, technology density, physical infrastructure, management skills, flexible labor market, legal institutions, economic growth, and social, political, cultural environment. Infrastructure of entrepreneurship consists of finance, government policies, government programs, education, R&D transfer, commercial infrastructure, openness of the domestic market, physical infrastructure, and cultural norms to be effective in a country (Börü, 2006).

In the year of 1996, Morris defined the entrepreneurship as the relationship between entrepreneurs and their surroundings and the role government plays in creating the economic, political, legal, financial, and social structures that characterize a society and give shape the environment for entrepreneurs (Morris & Sexton, 1996).

In the GEM study made in 2016, 65 economies are classified according to WEF. According to this classification, Turkey is one of the efficient-driven economy. Efficiency-driven economies known as an economy have become more competitive with efficient production processes and increased product quality. The developed countries are in innovation-driven phase; businesses are more knowledge-intensive and the service sector expands.

The study of Turgut (2016) investigated the relationship between innovation and internationalization in Turkish young entrepreneurial firms based on data from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor for Turkey during the period of 2013-2014. According to the result of the study, demographic factors such as age, education and gender are also important as innovation for the internationalization process of firms. According to the results, %57 of entrepreneurs who have process innovation are more likely to be internationalized.

Aldrich and Wiedenmayer (1993) examined the socio-political environment may have positive or negative effects on entrepreneurship. External effects can determine the relationship between entrepreneurial behavior and performance. The supportive environment increases motivation to establish and growth an enterprise such as reducing legislation for the establishment of enterprises, providing training and mentoring, financial resources, supporting to prototype and the impact of entrepreneurship education in the region.

The Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan of the European Commission states that the return on investment in entrepreneurship education will be high. It has been demonstrated that middle school students included in the small company program in Europe may start their own businesses at a rate of 15 to 20 percent. Entrepreneurial courses provide to young people to develop entrepreneurship skills and behaviors, including business knowledge, creativity, taking initiative, perseverance, teamwork, risk

understanding and responsibility. This is a situation that enables ideas to turn into action and increases the employability of individuals.

Universities can play an important role in training the next generation of skilled workers who can create working areas in the future. On the other hand, universities prepare students to the global market with improving their skills through new technologies. Nowadays, with the incentives for the creation of 3rd generation universities or entrepreneurial universities, the training is given at universities have started to be sector oriented. In this way, the innovation creation in universities is supported to be implemented through entrepreneurship. The aim of entrepreneurship and innovation policies are to produce and implement new ideas, to provide the necessary incentives to facilitate its dissemination, commercialization and a favorable eco-system that should be created (Keskin, 2018).

As the universities' role is increasing in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, universities need to develop business and entrepreneurship as strategic goals. Universities that understand their role in entrepreneurship named as third-generation universities or entrepreneurial universities have started to establish resources, such as technology transfer offices (TTOs), pre-incubation and incubation centers, and technoparks.

The report that is 'Effects and Impact of Entrepreneurship Programs in Higher Education' published by the European Commission states that entrepreneurship education in higher education improves students' basic competence in entrepreneurship, reinforces students' entrepreneurial intentions, and increases the employability. Additionally, it is mentioned on the report that entrepreneurship education is disseminated to all disciplines and delivered through compulsory courses in universities, emphasizes that the post-education monitoring activities should be performed repetitively (European Commission, 2013).

It is emphasized on European Commission's Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan that entrepreneurial education and training to support growth and business creation. Investment in entrepreneurship education is evaluated as the highest yield return for Europe. Thanks to entrepreneurship education, whether students establish an enterprise or not, they can improve their business knowledge and basic attitudes and skills that include creativity, initiative-taking, decidedness, teamwork, risk taking, and sense of responsibility (European Commission, 2013).

The World Economic Forum published the report named as 'Education the Next Wave of Entrepreneurs, Unlocking Entrepreneurial Capabilities to Meet the Global Challenges of the 21st Century', it was focused on entrepreneurship education, states that there are a number of approaches which are being effectively utilized and which support the call to action to 'mainstream' entrepreneurship education. These approaches were listed as developing leadership and life skills, embedding entrepreneurship in education, taking a cross-disciplinary approach, utilizing interactive pedagogy, and leveraging technology. The basic factors of success in entrepreneurship education were considered as the entrepreneurial ecosystem, developing effective educators, curriculum development, engagement of business, advancing innovation, and sustainable funding (WEF, 2009).

2.4. University Incubation Centers

Entrepreneurship at the university level in terms of commercialization of information, collaborations with industry by transforming information into product, processes, and companies each acts as a mechanism of information flow (Mueller, 2006). Since, there are universities in every province in Turkey, the commercialization potential of information is high. According to Fritsch and Aamoucke (2013), the mere presence and size of local universities, regardless of their quality, has a positive effect on the creation of new innovative businesses.

Incubation centers may have different programs such as incubation programs focus on already established firms, including start-up and senior firms; pre-incubation programs concentrate on the ideas of potential entrepreneurs.

Universities have an important role in the economic team to win the match of growth through their effective participation in managing incubators, research and development, innovation, commercialization and formation of entrepreneurs in both developed and developing countries (Miner, 2001).

According to Chandra et al. (2012), university incubation centers have strong historical perspective with the provision of location, human expertise, funding source, fostering innovation and commercialization while the involvement of industry incubators is deficient. It is commonly accepted that university incubation centers are established to guide and support students who tend to be an entrepreneur. The success rate of an incubation center is measured by the opportunities provided by the university; these factors are mainly infrastructure, networking, human and technical support, faculty and staff and institutional reputation.

The first incubation center in the world is known as Batavia Industrial Center, New York at USA started operation in 1959 (Ryzhonkov, 2013).

USA is the first state to change its mission and become an information society from an industrial society. The USA has become a technology center with the world's leading incubation center with the positive results of the science and technology policies. Within the scope of National Business Incubation Association data in the USA, as of 1997, there were 550 company incubators, while in 2003 this figure increased to 950. Since 2003, the number of incubations worldwide will be in 4000 (Lalkaka, 2003). Today, there are approximately 1400 incubation centers in the USA as of April 2019 (inbia.org, 2019).

Japan is one of the top countries in terms of technology and development. With Japan's transition to the information society, its economy and industry grew rapidly and became an important producer in terms of information technologies. In the research, while the success level of innovative companies in Japan is around %20, it is determined that it increases to 50% if university support is provided (Ari, 2019).

The world of incubation centers are periodically monitored by UBI Global, Stockholm-based data and advisory firm. According to World Ranking Report 19/20 of UBI Global, İTÜ Çekirdek has been placed among the top 5 in the entrepreneurship incubation centers ranking around the 82 countries. İTÜ Çekirdek is an early-stage incubation center has supported 2424 start-ups and 5432 entrepreneurs since 2012 (itucekirdek.com, 2020).

Pre-incubation programs are mainly pay attention on training and educational workshops or seminars with also supporting entrepreneurs with writing a project, reaching technical equipment, mentoring, networking, access to knowledge and financial capital. The first pre-incubation center in Turkey was established in 2004; the impact of these centers is getting important from day to day. Today, there are almost 30 pre-incubation centers. Since the pre-incubation centers provide support at the idea stage, it provides efficient benefits for university students who have not had any previous work experience and have not made any attempt. According to Kirby (2006) definition of pre-incubation, it is a kind of facility for a very early stage of a start-up that has yet to formulate its business plans, develop a prototype, or establish an entrepreneurial team; the pre-incubator leads the embryonic business to an investment or market ready stage (Kepenek, 2016). In this way, students with entrepreneurial potential can adapt their ideas to the market without losing time and investment thanks to the right direction when they are still in the idea phase. From this perspective, pre-incubation centers are valuable in terms of including potential entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurship ecosystem without disappointment.

Evolved universities perform the functions of R&D; R&D culture is the essence of higher education to get the benefits of economic and social environment. Although developed countries are the main beneficiaries of R&D activities, developing countries are also give importance (Jamil, 2015). Patents and licenses are determined as the criterion of entrepreneurial activities.

The most difficult periods of start-ups are the foundation years. Because of that early stage incubation centers are important for entrepreneurs for various reasons. Although the product or service is innovative and technological, it may not survive. As can be seen from Eser and Kepenek (2016)'s research, the most prominent reason for entrepreneurs' failures is lack of harmony among group members by the percentage of 17. The second reason is unable to find financial resources, the third one is unable to focus on the market. These results show that, while preparing for the market, it will be advantageous to create a versatile team in addition to active training in the pre-incubation center.

Pointing out that the pedagogy in entrepreneurship education has changed in line with the expectations and demands of the market, Solomon (2002) states that interdisciplinary programs are a serious trend towards designing private courses related to entrepreneurship, especially considering students in the fields of arts, engineering, and science.

Until the early 2000s, innovation was the pattern adopted by companies in which their R&D centers were conducted solely in their own laboratories, using qualified professionals and significant resources. In the last decade, innovation openly emerged as a new model in which companies take advantage of the creativity of customers, suppliers, research institutes or independent inventors, especially universities. This allowed companies to offer more innovation more efficiently, more consistently and customer-oriented (Chesbrough, 2008). In this open model, companies need universities due to the high level of creativity and academic infrastructure.

2.5. Private Supported Organizations

As entrepreneurship gains importance, organizations supporting entrepreneurship have also been expanded. Acceleration centers, incubation centers are at the head of these types of organizations.

Private institutions that give entrepreneurs the opportunity to rent offices, mentoring, and education have also become widespread.

Co-working is also becoming widespread which means working in collaboration. This working model is also called 'independent but together'. The aim of this model is to create synergies for people with innovative thinking from different sectors, working together in independent working environments and shared common spaces. In this way, individuals or companies from different disciplines can work under the same roof in a more economic and social environment.

The services commonly provided in entrepreneurship support centers are as follows; membership to use offices, product & business development consultancy, technologic infrastructure support, mentor support, angel investor networks, networking, events, and trainings. Some additional supports vary from institution to institution. Distribution in Turkey of these centers is respectively as follows, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other provinces.

3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The research method is based on qualitative analysis. In the first stage, qualitative analysis was used to get the factors for having entrepreneurial tendencies and needed supports in process of entrepreneurship by in-depth interviews with innovative entrepreneurs. In the interviews, the entrepreneurs were asked questions about their demographic features, educational status, start-up teams, and their opinions about innovation. As a result of the interviews with the entrepreneurs, the factors that affect their entrepreneurship intentions and which decisions play a role in their success are examined.

All individuals with the potential to be an entrepreneur and entrepreneur in Turkey are research universe. The universe of research has been limited by groups that could represent the universe were chosen following the purpose of the research.

The research questions are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Research Questions

1	In what area does your organization operate? Why did you want to enter this sector?
2	The foundation year of your organization?
3	How many people was it established with? What is the educational status of the team members?
4	Have you received 'Entrepreneurship' courses during your university education? (If so, how much do you think it has an impact on actualizing your initiative today?)
5	Have you received 'Entrepreneurship' courses from outside the university? (If so, how much do you think it has an impact on actualizing your initiative today?)

6	Have you received financial support for your initiative? Where from?
7	What was the most challenging stage?

4. Data Analysis

Innovative entrepreneurs were selected for the research. Although sectors differ, many entrepreneurs concentrate on technological products. The product/services in which entrepreneurs operate and their innovative aspects are given in Table 2.

Table 2. Innovative aspects and foundation years of venture initiative

Code	Product / Service	Innovative Aspects	Foundation Year
E1	Personal Defense Device	“The device can take a picture, take the location of the scene, and sending emergency notification.”	2015
E2	Sustainable Digital Marketing Services	“Companies can start their marketing processes by choosing the most suitable road maps for them. People working freelance earn money by having the opportunity to learn and practice for themselves along with application-based online training.”	2019
E3	Digital Consultation	“Supplying connection with foreign relations in a short while.”	2007
E4	E-commerce	“Removing barriers in fields of software, bank, cargo in front of people or institutions who want to e-commerce.”	2015

E5	E-commerce	“Having first woman illustration used in the packaging of coffee in Turkey.”	2015
E6	Digital Platform	“Verifying technical abilities according to candidate’s data on social platforms, at the same time measuring their soft skills and matching them with the appropriate technology company.”	2018
E7	Blockchain	“Adapting blockchain to daily life.”	2018
E8	Medical Technologies	“Sending a photo to the dentist consultant through the application. Adding image processing technology on the application.”	2019
E9	Biotechnology	“Working in accordance with land and climate and make proven products.”	2019
E10	Sun Protection	“Production of sun protection cream with green tea.”	2019
E11	Hospital-type Sperm Software	“Doing a private test at home. And adapting image processing”	2017
E12	Heating Fabrics	“Developing smart textiles that emit heat and transforming them into products that can be	2016

		used in different applications that need heating.”	
E13	Education Management	“Providing regular reports to HR, managers, and employees about employees’ language developments.”	2019

In the entrepreneurship ecosystem, the founder must have competence in many areas such as marketing, designing, finance, etc. Although all these competencies are not possible by a single person, it is advantageous to have experts in the field. In this study, it is argued that having team members from different disciplines is one of the success factors. For this purpose, entrepreneurs were asked about the academic backgrounds of the team members in many areas such as marketing and designing the product or service offered by the founder in the entrepreneurship ecosystem. Detailed information about the team members’ academic background of the start-ups has given in Table 3.

Table 3. Team members’ academic background of the start-ups

Code	Founders’ Academic Background	Team Members’ Academic Background
E1	Information Systems, Bachelor Degree	Computer Engineers, Designers, Electrical and Electronic Engineer, Software Engineer, Industrial Designer.
E2	Electronics and Communication Engineering, Bachelor Degree / MBA, Master Degree	Electronic Engineer, Advertising and Public Relations, Marketing, Sociology, Business Administration. And, there are over 120 team members as freelance having different backgrounds.
E3	Food Engineer, Bachelor Degree	The entrepreneur works alone. She has different teams to support. Disciplines vary in these teams.
E4	Computer Engineer, Bachelor Degree	Management Information Systems, Economics.

E5	Public Relations, Bachelor's Degree / E-commerce, Master's Degree	The entrepreneur works alone. There are 2 worker as freelance.
E6	Advertising Design and Communication, Bachelor's Degree	Mechanical Engineer, Computer Engineer.
E7	Financial Engineering, Master's Degree / Information Technology, Master's Degree	Computer Engineer, Business Analyst. But now the founder is working alone.
E8	Dentist, PhD Student	Mechatronics, Computer Engineering, Bio-medical.
E9	Business, Bachelor's Degree / Biotechnology, Master's Degree	Agricultural Technology and Microbial Fertilizers.
E10	Pharmacy, Doctorate Degree	Molecular biology, Genetics and Pharmacy.
E11	Biomedical Engineer, Master's Degree	Bio-medical Engineers. They received help from students as trainee from many different disciplines working in the background.
E12	Public Administration, Bachelor's Degree	Metallurgical and Materials Engineering
E13	Advertising, Bachelor's Degree	Management Information Systems, Business Administration.

The entrepreneur coded as E8 stated that they received short training about each other's fields to speak the same with team members. In addition, the entrepreneur coded as E11 stated that the founding team from the same discipline is effective in speaking the same language and work practical. E11 also stated that this was not enough and that the support given by students according to their interests was very effective.

Among the 13 entrepreneurs, 10 entrepreneurs have multidisciplinary team. As a result of the interviews, if there are no employees from different disciplines in the core team, they need human resources with options such as freelance, part-time, and interns. In addition, most of the entrepreneurs talked about the difficulties of managing the marketing and customer relations side while the company was in the growth phase. And in an ecosystem where a person is involved in many areas, the presence of people who are specialized in different disciplines is a factor that may affect their success. As a result of these findings, having a multidisciplinary team has an impact on start-up success.

Many of the entrepreneurs received grants from the TUBITAK 1512 program. Since this program is prepared for entrepreneurs to develop prototypes, it is not sufficient at the stage of establishment. Some entrepreneurs are preparing to apply for the ongoing programs of this program.

Table 4. Financial Support

CODE	FINANCIAL SUPPORT
E2	BTM
E4	Tübitak 1512
E5	KOSGEB
E7	Tübitak 1512
E9	Tübitak 1512
E11	Tübitak 1512
E12	Tübitak 1512

In addition, entrepreneurs who do not receive support explain the reason as follows; “supports arrive late than planned and they request a detailed report.”. Entrepreneurs state that these reports take a lot of time, and because there is no person to devote time to this, they are pushing them very much in the development process.

Whether entrepreneurs take entrepreneurship courses during their university education is examined in this section. They were also asked if they had received any training when they decided to become entrepreneurs. Table 5 has been prepared according to the responses received from the entrepreneurs.

Table 5. Entrepreneurship Courses

Code	Entrepreneurship Training in University	Entrepreneurship Training from Outside
E1	X	X
E2	X	X
E3	X	✓
E4	X	X

E5	✓	✓
E6	X	✓
E7	X	X
E8	X	X
E9	✓	X
E10	X	X
E11	X	✓
E12	X	✓
E13	X	X

As entrepreneurship started to become widespread in Turkey, entrepreneurial universities started to be created and special education programs were prepared. When Table 5 is analyzed, only two entrepreneurs seem to have received entrepreneurship training at the university.

When the responses of entrepreneurs are analyzed, it is observed that entrepreneurs have difficulties in finding customers in the market. In addition, it has been observed that new companies in the market have difficulties in explaining their products or services to customers. And, it has been observed that entrepreneurs receive negative reactions from their social environment. It has been observed that their social environments are worried because entrepreneurship is an uncertain way, riskier than a regular job.

Table 6. Challenges that entrepreneurs face

CODE	CHALLENGES
E2	Lack of training and mentoring
E3	Being a woman and finding customer
E4	To promote the service
E5	Time management
E6	Legislative problems
E7	Finding the customers and market

E8	To be able to speak the same language with the teammates and the reactions from social environment
E9	To convince people to sell
E11	Networking and legislative problems
E12	Testing the product
E13	Finding a good team

5. Discussion and Conclusion

5.1. Key findings

Incubation centers and acceleration program in Turkey were examined according to the challenges faced by entrepreneurs such as networking, finding customers, testing products, etc. In Table 7, the opportunities provided to entrepreneurs by private incubation centers and acceleration programs are examined. While conducting this research, information was obtained by asking questions via the website and e-mail of the centers. Since some centers are not responsive to the questions, the relevant fields are left blank.

Entrepreneurs also stated that they had difficulty in forming their teams at the idea stage. Accordingly, it has been investigated whether the centers must form a team for the application. Some centers accepting individual applications, they stated that they were able to establish their teams during the training thanks to the networking among entrepreneurs.

In Turkey, entrepreneurship centers mainly located in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. This situation reduces the entrepreneurship rate in other cities. The cities of the entrepreneurship centers are in Table 7. It has been investigated whether these centers provide accommodation support or remote education. Table 7 was prepared by examining the active private centers in 2020. Supports without clear information are not marked. It was determined because of the research that the supports given by some centers changed periodically and the targeted sectors changed according to the agenda. Consequently, support types and target sectors may change periodically.

Table 7. Private supported accelerator and incubation Centers

Name	Focus Sector	Location	Accomadation Support / Remote Education	Type	Require MVP/Prototype	Require to be a Team	Support for Validasyon / PoC	Pre-Grat
Workup Entrepreneurship Program		Istanbul		Accelerator	√	√		

Türk Telekom PILOT		Istanbul	√ + Accomadation Support	Accelerator	√	√		
QNBeyond		Istanbul		Accelerator			√	√
T3 Entrepreneurship Center		Istanbul		Accelerator		√		
Albaraka Garage	Financial Technology	Istanbul		Accelerator				
İSO Koza	IoT, Health Technologies, Enerji, Savunma Sanayii	Istanbul		Accelerator	√			
Lonca Entrepreneurship Center	Changing Periodically	Any Branch of Workinton		Accelerator			√	√
Zemin İstanbul		Istanbul		Accelerator	√	√		
BTM		Istanbul		Camp			√	
		Istanbul		Pre- incubation			√	
		Istanbul		Incubation	√ Company must be established	√	√	
Cube Incubation		Istanbul		Pre- incubation				
TechUP		Bursa / Eskisehir		Accelerator	√ Company must be established	√		

Garanti Partners		Istanbul		Accelerator	√			
Kapadokya Incubation Center		Istanbul		Pre-incubation / Incubation				
TEB Entrepreneurship		Istanbul / İzmir / Gaziantep / Denizli / Bursa / Mersin / Konya / Edirne / Konya / Edirne / Trabzon / Erzurum		Accelerator / Incubation				
Founder Institute		Istanbul						
Viveka		Ankara/ Istanbul/ Izmir/ Talinn		Pre-incubation / Incubation / Accelerator				

Sera Kuluçka Merkezi	Smart Life, Smart Urbanism, Mobile Applications, Robotics, Wireless Communication, Wearable Technologies, Health, Biotechnology, Biomedical, Intelligent Education, Renewable Energy Systems, Information Technologies and Software, Food Technologies	Kayseri		Pre-incubation / Incubation / Post-incubation / Accelerator			√	√
Classboom		İzmir		Pre-incubation / Incubation				
Plusa Ön kuluçka		Malatya		Pre-incubation				

Many of the incubation centers of universities provide the same supports. However, the supports provided vary depending on the possibilities of the university such as workshops, laboratories, etc. On the other hand, some universities have concentrated on specific sectors. Accordingly, the distribution of incubation centers according to cities and sectors was given in Table 8. Meanwhile, there are not any remote incubation centers in universities in Turkey.

Table 8. University Incubation Centers in Turkey

University	Name	Focus Sector	Location
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Sabancı Uni	SUCOOL		Istanbul
Koç Uni	Kworks		Istanbul
ODTU	YFYİ		Ankara
ODTU	Atom	Game and animation technology	Ankara
Yıldız Technical Uni	Yıldız Kuluçka	Technology-oriented	Istanbul
İTÜ	İTÜ Çekirdek	Technology-oriented	Istanbul
Kadir Has Uni	INEO	Technology-oriented	Istanbul
Ege Uni	NüvEGE		Izmir
Aydın Uni	Incubation		Istanbul
Şehir Uni	incuba.city		Istanbul
Bilgi	Sosyal Kuluçka	Civil initiatives	Istanbul
Acıbadem	Kuluçka merkezi	Health	Istanbul
Yaşar Uni	Minerva Kuluçka Merkezi		Izmir
Nişantaşı Uni	NishNova		Istanbul
Dokuz Eylül Uni	Bambu		Izmir
İzmir Economics Uni	Embryonix	Technology-oriented	Izmir
Anadolu Uni	Anaç Kuluçka Merkezi		Eskişehir
Bahçeşehir Uni	BAUICE		Istanbul
Boğaziçi Uni	DreamBU	Technology-oriented	Istanbul
Boğaziçi Uni	BUBA Campus	Health, Agriculture, Fintech, Insurance, Maritime, Aviation, Transportation	Istanbul

Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakfı Uni	Conqueror Kuluçka ve Girişim Hızlandırma Merkezi		Istanbul
Erzurum Teknik Üniv	ETÜ Kristal	Technology-oriented	Erzurum
Harran Uni	Tohum Harran	Technology-oriented	Şanlıurfa
ODTU	Growth Circuit		Istanbul / Ankara
Özyeğin Uni	Girişim Fabrikası	Technology-oriented	Istanbul

Entrepreneurship centers in the university can be more advantageous than other centers since they provide the opportunity to benefit from facilities such as laboratories, workshops, and academic support.

In the Table 9, there are grant support programs given by KOSGEB and TÜBİTAK. Programs are considered as early stage, advanced stage. It refers to attempts to develop an early-stage prototype. The advanced stage refers to the established start-ups and companies. Entrepreneurs can apply to all TÜBİTAK projects through implementing organizations. However, after training for KOSGEB supports, they can apply directly on behalf of their company. Implementing agencies may change in every call, and some organizations may be implementing organizations every year. At the same time, implementing agencies can choose a certain sector, only accept applications that develop products / services to this sector.

Table 9. Grant support programs given by KOSGEB and TÜBİTAK

Stage	Grant Programs	Sector	Support Type / Amount
Later Stage	KOSGEB - Advanced Entrepreneurship Program		Foundation Support: 5,000 - 10,000 TRY Performance Support: 5,000 - 20,000 TRY Certificate Support: 5,000 TRY

Later Stage	KOSGEB - Business Plan Award	Mining and Quarrying; Production; Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Production and Distribution; Water supply; Sewerage, Waste Management and Improvement Activities; Build; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Transportation and Storage; Accommodation and Food Service Activities; Information and Communication; Finance and Insurance Activities; Professional, Scientific and	<p>Realized with higher education institutions: 15.000 - 25.000 TRY</p> <p>Performed within the scope of competitions organized by domestic / international institutions / organizations: 100.000 TRY</p> <p>Organized within the scope of award-winning / non-award winning national / international competitions for the business ideas of overseas enterprises: 100.000 TRY</p> <p>Business plan award organized by KOSGEB 100.000 TRY</p>
Early Stage	KOSGEB - Traditional Entrepreneur Support	Technical Activities; Administrative and Support Service Activities; Culture, Art, Entertainment, Recreation and Sports	<p>Foundation Support: 5.000 - 10.000 TRY</p> <p>Machinery, Equipment and Software Support: 100.000 - 300.000 TRY</p> <p>Mentoring Consultancy Support: 10.000 TRY</p> <p>Performance Support: 5.000 - 20.000 TRY</p> <p>Certificate Support: 5.000 TRY</p>
Later Stage	1507 – SME, R&D Start Support Program	Information and Communication Technologies; Agriculture and Food; Automotive; Social and Humanities; Energy; Machine Manufacturing; Health; Mining; Advanced Materials Technologies; Chemistry	Upper Limit 600.000 TRY

Later Stage	1501 – Industry R&D Support Program	Information and Communication Technologies; Agriculture and Food; Automotive; Social and Humanities; Energy; Machine Manufacturing; Health; Mining; Advanced Materials Technologies; Chemistry	<p>Each of the transfer payments to be made within the scope of the project.</p> <p>the support of the total project budget included in the scope of support, and of each partner in projects with partners.</p> <p>Twenty-five percent (25%) of the project budget covered and periodically by establishment.</p> <p>It cannot exceed 2.000.000 TRY. However, the total covered by the support</p> <p>For projects with a project budget of 100,000,000 TRY) and above, 2,000,000.- TRY upper limit does not apply.</p>
Later Stage	1601 – Increase Capacity in Innovation and Entrepreneurship Areas Support Program (BIGG+)	<p>Smart Transportation</p> <p>Energy and Clean Technologies</p> <p>Intelligent Production Systems (Digital Transformation in Industry)</p>	<p>The upper limit of the project budget that is supported by this program is 750.000 TRY</p> <p>This budget covers personnel expenses, service purchases and other expenses that is up to 15% of the periodic support amount.</p>
Early Stage	1512- Tecno-Entreprise Capital Support Program (BIGG)	<p>Communication and Digital Transformation</p> <p>Health and Good Life</p> <p>Sustainable Agriculture and Nutrition</p>	<p>Upper Limit 200.000 TRY</p>

Entrepreneurship centers in Turkey are given in Table XI as acceleration and incubation centers. The centers are classified as idea stage, early stage and advanced stage. The idea stage refers to projects that have not been developed as prototypes and not written projects. Early stage refers to projects that have developed MVP / Prototype. The advanced stage refers to the established start-ups. The sectors that the centers focus on change periodically. The sectoral distribution in the table was prepared by obtaining information from the current websites of 2020.

Table 10. Acceleration and Incubation Centers

Sectors	Stages	Centers
Technology-oriented without sector restriction	Idea Stage	Lonca Entrepreneurship Center
		Sera Kulua Merkezi
		SUCOOL
		Yıldız Kulua
		İTÜ ekirdek
		INEO
		NüvEGE
		DreamBU
		Tohum Harran
	Early Stage	T3 Entrepreneurship Center
		İSO Koza
		Lonca Entrepreneurship Center
		Sera Kulua Merkezi
		SUCOOL
		Yıldız Kulua
		İTÜ ekirdek
		INEO
		DreamBU
		Tohum Harran
		Later Stage
	Sera Kulua Merkezi	
	İTÜ ekirdek	

		DreamBU
Civil Initiatives	Idea Stage	Sosyal Kuluka
	Early Stage	Sosyal Kuluka
Defense Industry	Idea Stage	
	Early Stage	İSO Koza
	Later Stage	İSO Koza
Finance	Idea Stage	
	Early Stage	Albaraka Garage
	Later Stage	
Game and Animation	Idea Stage	Atom
	Early Stage	Atom
Health	Idea Stage	Kuluka merkezi
	Early Stage	İSO Koza
		Kuluka merkezi
	Later Stage	İSO Koza
		Kuluka merkezi
Centers that do not focus on a particular sector	Idea Stage	Türk Telekom PILOT
		QNBAYOND
		BTM
		Cube Incubation
		Kapadokya Incubation Center
		TEB Entrepreneurship
		Viveka

		Classboom
		Pusula
		Kworks
		YFYİ
		Incubation
		incuba.city
		Minerva Kuluçka Merkezi
		NishNova
		Bambu
		Embryonix
		Anaç Kuluçka Merkezi
		BAUICE
		BUBA Campus
		Conqueror Kuluçka ve Girişim Hızlandırma Merkezi
		ETÜ Kristal
		Girişim Fabrikası
Early Stage	Workup Entrepreneurship Program	
	Türk Telekom PILOT	
	QNBAYOND	
	Zemin İstanbul	
	BTM	
	Cube Incubation	

		Garanti Partners
		Kapadokya Incubation Center
		TEB Entrepreneurship
		Founder Institute
		Viveka
		Classboom
		Pusula
		Kworks
		YFYİ
		Incubation
		incuba.city
		NishNova
		Embryonix
		Anaç Kuluçka Merkezi
		BAUICE
		BUBA Campus
	ETÜ Kristal	
	Later Stage	Workup Entrepreneurship Program
		Türk Telekom PILOT
		QNBeyond
	BTM	
	Cube Incubation	
	TechUP	

		Viveka
		Classroom
		Growth Circuit

5.2. Practical Implications

Entrepreneurship has gain momentum within recent years by the effect of globalization and technological developments. The concept of entrepreneurship has existed since people started living together, but its scope has improved over the years. Entrepreneurship has become more than just evaluating opportunities, it means creating opportunities and creating demands. Due to the potential of entrepreneurship such as developing new products / services, creating a new area in the market, gaining a competitive advantage in the global market, incentives have been rapidly created by countries. Entrepreneurship has advantages for especially developing countries such as creating scalable business areas and creating employment; countries have rapidly included entrepreneurship in their strategic and development plans. Considering the benefits it can provide to the country's economy, countries increase entrepreneurship by creating incentives through various institutions. Universities, private and public institutions have encouraged to increase the number of entrepreneurs.

Considering that innovative entrepreneurship will bring competitiveness in the global market, it is inevitable for young people to be more encouraged to entrepreneurship. Innovation and entrepreneurship are two elements that must proceed in parallel to create competitive advantage. This study aimed to make suggestions about the supports that can be given to developing innovative entrepreneurship.

When startup teams are examined, if it is observed that they do not have multidisciplinary teammates in the core, they need to get support from outside. All entrepreneurs agree that the multidisciplinary team is advantageous in this regard. Many entrepreneurs received financial support during the prototype and establishment phase. Entrepreneurs who did not receive support acted with their own capital accumulation. When the educational status of entrepreneurs is examined, they all have at least a bachelor's degree and received formal education. Only two of the entrepreneurs received entrepreneurship education at the university, entrepreneurship education has started to be given widely in recent years, and not being given in every department causes fewer students to take this education. Some of the entrepreneurs who decided to become entrepreneurs received training on their own from other organizations.

The areas where entrepreneurs think most challenging are as follows; networking, finding customers, introducing products, testing the products, and creating a team. According to the challenges faced by entrepreneurs, private entrepreneurial centers in Turkey were examined. Some centers require that a team must be established at the application stage. Entrepreneurship centers, which have not required a team as a condition, they also state that the presence of the team provides an advantage when choosing between candidates. All centers provide networking support and access to investor networks

after the product/service is ready for the market. There are few entrepreneurship centers that provide support to find customers and test products. All centers accept entrepreneurs at the early stage. Facilitating processes such as providing more support to entrepreneurs at the early stage, promoting the product, and testing the product through these centers will give entrepreneurs an advantage. In this regard, the centers need to provide more support to entrepreneurs. Especially at the stage where the prototype is developed, it is difficult for entrepreneurs to access facilities such as laboratories and workshops. Support is also required at these stages.

Training of entrepreneurs for marketing is another important issue. Interviews have shown that marketing is one of the most challenging areas for entrepreneurs. It is necessary to reach the right customer with the right channel, to offer the right product to the right market, and to do them with the right timing. It was observed during the interviews that there was a close relationship between innovative entrepreneurship and marketing. In cases where the correct marketing strategies of innovative products are not determined, the customer is not ready for the product or service, and the use of the product or service cannot be described correctly, innovative studies cannot find a place in the market. It is anticipated that intensive training to be given on this issue will positively affect the start-up successes.

On the other hand, entrepreneurship centers in Turkey are concentrated in Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara. There are fewer active centers in other provinces. Considering each young people in all provinces has the potential for being an entrepreneur, it will be beneficial to provide remote education in these centers. Remote incubation centers with the creation of access to potential entrepreneurs in different regions of Turkey, the number of innovative entrepreneurship can be increased. Entrepreneurs should be provided with the laboratory and workshop facilities where they can develop prototypes. Supports from the idea to the product stage will help bring more ideas to life. The chances of creating innovative products are also high in the university period when people's creativity is high. However, not every innovation can be transformed into a commercial product, so marketing education should be emphasized more while giving entrepreneurship training to students in different departments.

5.3. Limitations and Further Research

Entrepreneurship has been included in the education system in our country in recent years, so entrepreneurship education is not provided in all faculties. However, individuals who are not trained in entrepreneurship are aware of entrepreneurship incentives through various media channels. With the increase of awareness, the number of people who want to become entrepreneurs also increase. This study has a few limitations. Clear information could not be obtained from some entrepreneurship centers. Centers that do not have clear information are excluded, not included. In future research, more effective information can be collected through one-on-one interviews with center officials over a wider period. Secondly, the capacities of centers can be examined in future studies. It can be researched how many entrepreneurs can accept in which period intervals.

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SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: A CASE STUDY FROM BOĞATEPE VILLAGE

Çiğdem Boz¹

Abstract

Solidarity economy leads us to think about alternative types of economy in which productive activities meets social needs rather than profitability of the capital. In other words, it can be seen as an utopia against the capitalism and this utopia shows that production and consumption relations could be arranged in different ways. Being based on mutual willingness, beside it enlarges the scope of economic relations, it also allows the contribution of the citizens. Since activities of solidarity are carried out in physical territories, they establish commercial relations in large scale which attributes permanent development of that territory. By providing goods and service production which is based on the contribution of men and women both, populations could participate in their own development. Thus, they can define for themselves the economic programmes that are best suited to their needs and the territories they occupy. Moreover solidarity economy comprises public debate about the mode for economic regulation of a community. So, it builds local, national and international social networks based on consensus and cooperation. As a humanist and democratic economy, solidarity economy could renew our approach to sustainable development.

The case study which focuses on the effects of solidaristic tourism on Boğatepe village located in Northeast Turkey, uses interviews with local people to understand the these development effects. The findings imply that economic relations based on solidaristic perspective has provided significant benefits to the community.

Keywords: solidarity, eco-museum, Boğatepe village

DAYANIŞMA EKONOMİSİ: BOĞATEPE KÖYÜ ÖRNEĞİ

Özet

Dayanışma ekonomisi bizi, kar odaklı üretim yerine toplumsal ihtiyaçları gideren üretim aktivitelerinin olduğu alternatif ekonomileri düşünmeye yönlendirir. Başka bir deyişle, kapitalizm karşısında bir ütopya olarak görülebilecek bu anlayışta üretim ve tüketim ilişkilerinin farklı şekilde de düzenlenebileceği gösterilir. Dayanışma ekonomileri, karşılıklı gönüllülük üzerine kurulu olduğundan, iktisadi ilişkilerin alanını genişletmesinin yanında yurttaşların katılımına da olanak sağlar. Dayanışma etkinlikleri fiziki alanlarda gerçekleştirildiği için geniş ölçekli ticari ilişkiler kurmak suretiyle bölgenin kalıcı kalkınmasına da katkı yapar. Mal ve hizmet üretimi kadınlar ve erkekler tarafından birlikte yapıldığından, yurttaşlar kendi kalkınmalarının da rol sahibi olmuş olurlar. Böylece, yaşadıkları bölgenin ihtiyaçlarına uygun bir ekonomik program inşa etmiş olurlar. Dahası, dayanışma ekonomisi topluluğun ekonomik

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regülasyonuna dair bir kamusal tartışmayı da içerir. Böylece, uzlaşa ve işbirliğine dayalı yerel, ulusal ve uluslar arası sosyal ağlar ortaya çıkar.

Bu çalışmada, dayanışma ekonomisine bir örnek olarak Boğatepe köyü örneği analiz edilmiştir. Türkiye'nin Kuzeydoğusunda bulunan bu köyde dayanışmacı turizmin kalkınmaya olan etkilerini anlayabilmek için, yerel halkla yapılan mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Dayanışma perspektifine dayalı iktisadi ilişkilerin köy halkına önemli faydaları olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dayanışma, Ekoloji Müzesi, Boğatepe Köyü

1. Introduction

Immanuel Wallerstein discusses capitalism as a historical system and claims that, just like every historical system, capitalism will exist for a while and will eventually find its end because of a structural crisis caused by internal strife (Wallerstein, 1983, pp.77-78). Wallerstein claims that it is no longer possible to accumulate capital with market processes because the world has been in a systematic-structural crisis for the past 50 years, he also emphasizes that what needs to be done now cannot be presented in the form of "revolution or reform?" (Wallerstein, 2003, p.12). Wallerstein asserts that we can be sure of only one thing after 2050 or 2075 which is that we will no longer be living in a capitalist global economy (2000, p.51), alleges that there are two alternatives regarding what kind of system will take the place of the global capitalist order upon its collapse, and named "those who see the dream of hierarchy and privilege and the dreamers of democratic equality" the spirit of Davos or Porto Alegre, respectively.

The struggle between these two spirits, according to him, started with the global revolution in 1968 and is something that can't be resolved until the 2050s. What he referred to as the spirit of Davos are the neoliberal policies that have maintained their dominance since the 1980s. Porto Alegre, however, indicates a paradigm of more egalitarianism, protection for minority, and concern for ecological balance. The World Social Forum, which is known to have been held since 2001, is the annual meeting that parties to the alternative globalization movement organize to arrange campaigns to be conducted around the world, determine strategies, and inform individuals about movements around the world, and it was first held in Porto Alegre. No matter Wallerstein does not use the concept of solidarity economy, what he wants to explain with the spirit of Porto Alegre is a more egalitarian, more environmentally friendly, and more solidarist world.

Multiple global crises and heightened concerns about the social and environmental consequences of economic growth and liberalization have increased interest in alternative production and consumption patterns and ways of organizing enterprise activities. In recent years, considerable attention has focused on Social and Solidarity Economy. The term is increasingly used to refer to organizations and enterprises engaged in the production and exchange of goods and services, which are autonomous from the state and are guided by objectives and norms that prioritize social well-being, cooperation and solidarity. They include for example cooperatives and other social enterprises, mutual associations,

women's self-help groups, unions of informal economy workers, fair trade networks and solidarity finance schemes.(Utting, et al., 2014, p.v)

The most important constraint of the capitalist approach is that top-down decisions are made without getting the opinions of local communities and that growth based on industry is seen as the motor for development. It can be seen that as the malfunctions in the capitalist economy become more frequent, interest in local organizations and what is societal becomes more intense. Santos (2006) defines the solidarity economy as an alternative to the dominant understanding of development in the capitalist global economy. Alternative development is based on local, ecological, and democratic principles.

Increasing alternative models of organization reflect a tendency of change on a global scale, although scattered and limited. This situation doesn't mean that the capitalist state will be removed through revolution or that a new structure will replace it. It offers an option to those aspiring to leave a system to which they are dependent (Aykaç, 2018).

The solidarity alternative doesn't emerge as belonging to a single format, a single corporate structure, or a typical economic space. It develops using local human and natural resources in different ways. It is incredibly unique in the solutions that it produces for social and economic issues of the local from which it emerges. We can assert that a revolution that is loose, not structural, and even fluid in this context advances towards the foundations for the current structures. This is a process that is geographically scattered and whose speeds of development are determined based on different local contexts. The fundamental characteristic of these is that they are a non-state and non-market model of societal organization that holds societal welfare before material welfare.

According to Qijano (2006), solidarity economies offer structural innovations in three basic areas:

- It offers alternatives to capitalist means of production beyond seizing value, unequal exchange, and the infinite accumulation of capital.
- It stands against the state that exists within the capitalist system.
- It emerges against the relationships between private property, domination, and subjugation.

The most general and descriptive characteristics of the options that emerge after globalization are that exit points are local and organized using local practices, resources, and relationships. This exit point rejects the imposition of any top-down model and gets its strength from global movements coming from the foundation.

Solidarity economies recommend ways of direct intervention for spontaneous economic problems rather than removing capitalism. Consequently, it is more transformative than being revolutionary; it develops based on the collaboration between different societal movements and requests instead of organizing the interest of unified masses.

We can compare the key concepts of global capitalist framework and solidaristic one as follows;

Mainstream (Capitalist) view	Solidarity economy view
Globalization	locality
Profit maximization	social well-being
Individual action	Collective action
Natural destruction	Nature friendly
Inequality	equality
Efficiency	Ethic and morality
Representative democracy	participatory democracy
State or market owned	non-state and non-market
Unlimited consumption	responsible consumption
Market actor	agency
Competition	collobaration

As in most developing countries, the neoliberal policies implemented under the discourse of “globalization” after 1980 in Turkey brought along greater dependency on and borrowing from developed countries. These policies also led to greater economic and social degradation. Like Turkey, the rural segment received the harshest damage in developing countries that opened to the global economy rapidly and without preparation as of the 1980s.

It is clear that there is a need for alternative organization for animal husbandry and agriculture to rise again. It is possible to encounter sample initiatives in our country in terms of vitalizing rural segments through solidarity economies and of making local production attractive. I want to open the discussion of the opportunities and gains that this initiative presents for the local community and to tell the store of the Boğatepe village as an example for a local solidarity initiative in this study. The study presented here adopts two methods for collecting qualitative data: in-depth interviews and observations.

2. Agricultural Cooperatives and Rural Development in Turkey

Neoliberal policies led to the single typification of agricultural production by increasing external dependency in the agricultural sector, just as in every sector. While the prices of agricultural inputs change based on currency exchange rates and increase farmers’ costs, the farmer can sell a product at a low cost because of the profit margins of the intermediary merchants. This situation gradually lost the charm of agricultural production because it led to production to the harm of farmers, and it spread to

populous cities that unloaded their land. That is why we propose and support the cooperatives for solution.

When examining the strengths and weaknesses of agricultural cooperatives, Muradian (forthcoming) noted that collective action can be a key mechanism for overcoming the high level of transaction costs typically experienced by small-scale agricultural producers, often operating in highly unfavourable conditions in terms of the size of holdings, location and infrastructure. Referring to Colombia, Bateman (forthcoming) pointed out that the key issue is not only better prices for farmers, but also the possibility of restructuring value chains by linking producers and consumers more directly and by-passing intermediaries or connecting producers with firms and consumers that adhere more explicitly to ethical or fair trade principles. In other words they restructure the exchange relations. (Utting et al., 2014)

The goal of cooperatives is not just to improve the individual lives of workers but also to minimize dependency on the capitalist economy as a collective economic initiative. For the modern system cooperatives, this includes getting products from local producers, financing through cooperatives, and keeping cooperative networks within their own networks as much as the capital will allow. (Doğan et al., 2016, p.68)

These principles may exhibit some differences in practice based on the worldview and ideologies of various cooperatives and can generally fit into this frame. Cooperatives that differentiate with the modernization over time of production and the market are representatives in the economic field for the third sector that generally assimilates into civil society organizations today (p.68).

The cooperative movement, which laborers fighting with different challenges including the unsecuritization of the labor market in the 1980s, is developing many different experiences and reflexes at the turn of the century. Cooperatives are the foundation of the solidarity economy thanks to the organic fields they established with different societal movements of the era (Doğan et al., 2016, p.70).

The agricultural production and consumption cooperatives of which various examples exist in Turkey are primarily trying to establish a different relationship with food. They constitute an alternative to the use of seeds imposed by global corporations and chemicals like insecticides/herbicides, to monocultural agriculture that destroys the structure of the soil and degrades its fertility, and the need to consume the products that confront us without having any idea about their processes of production (Ertör and Akyazı, 2015; Kocagöz, 2015).

But unfortunately, many positive aspects of agricultural cooperatives and producer unions have been liquidated pertaining to solidarity and cooperatives within the past 20 years in Turkey. These institutions assumed the roles of life preservers to balance the market in periods of crisis and need. On the other hand, one of the important halos of the food supply chain, the process of the privatization of instances of municipal supervision, are ongoing. However, we don't require a food system under the control of corporations or the incorrect practices that use public infrastructure that is rotten or that assumes a role of life preserver. We must find an alternative way for a food system that is public, participatory, and democratic, that is based on solidarity against competition, in which the subjects of planning are the residents of cities and rural areas, and that is based on living together with nature.

The food initiatives that citizens from different segments created with their own initiative are in an effort to define such a need and to take concrete steps towards this need. The food movement in Turkey focuses on topics like becoming a cooperative, establishing communities, developing models of working collectively and in solidarity, unmediated product supply, ecological agriculture, planned and sustainable use of resources, local seeds, and healthy food. From this perspective, it produced a series of discourse aimed at overcoming these problems and indicating the current problems of the agriculture-food system. This discourse has effects in various segments of society as well. The various actors of the food movement have perpetuated and popularized this effect within the framework of their own limits and feasibilities.

We can say that different segments suffering from food problems constructed their own independent, democratic, and participatory organizations by coming together. At the same time, we can add that another food system is being constructed with its own network of logistic mechanisms, farmers, and distribution that is limited and humble to the segment that it covers today against the present *incorporated system of food*. In this sense, the food movement that exists over initiatives based mostly on volunteerism have an alternative model recommendation for the socialized food crisis.

It's possible to list the results of the neoliberal policies implemented in Turkey after 1980 on the agricultural sector as follows:

- 1- The privatization of agricultural state-owned enterprises
- 2- The defunctionalization of agricultural sales cooperative unions
- 3- The dominance of multinational corporations in seed markets
- 4- The sovereignty of the importation lobby in the chemical fertilizer market
- 5- The increase of the foreign share in agricultural financing

Within the framework of the commitments made to the IMF and World Bank, a period occurred in which the attack of privatization towards agriculture accelerated after 2000. Privatization in agriculture brought forth results to the detriment of both producers and consumers. The areas that agricultural state-owned enterprises empty out are filled up by local and foreign monopolies; the farmer can't even sell the product at its cost while consumers are forced to pay higher prices for the food.

These results left small producers entirely defenseless. Small producer expresses the social category that is either under a variety of union (cooperative, labor union, chamber) or is independent and solitary, that has its own means of production, that has been situated outside of a relationship of income, and that mostly works in its own means of production. In this regard, the small producer is different than the laborer, merchant, landlord, and corporation in terms of them possessing their own means of production and their own labor forces. Farmers, boss-less factories, cooperatives, collectively working workshops, and boutique producers can be thought of in these categories.

Small producers can collaborate with different producers to develop their production capabilities and strengths. They can even develop mechanisms with which they can manage their production terms and relationships in their own scale in the instance of large cooperatives. In many situations, they are open

to the challenge and intervention of societal relationships and market relationships, and they face their impositions and terms. Despite this, they have the possibility of creating and developing their own distribution-consumption networks because they have their own means of production. When this probability is considered as a possibility, the direct relationship between the producers and the people who will use the products can be considered as the fundamental procurement of another type of relationship.

A consumption cooperative that works directly with a small producer primarily works with the principle of supporting small producers. Supporting small producers means supporting the conditions of being able to continue possessing the means of production by people who possess their own means of production. At first glance, this “support” activity can be viewed as a sort of “defense”. Small producers are constantly liquidated in societies based on the capitalist style of production, and a vast majority of the population is “laborized”; the terms of sovereignty for their own labor disappears. The company hegemony that replaces small producers determines what will be produced, how it will be produced, and how it will be consumed as we expressed above. In other words, the incorporation of the society or the spread of company logic in society means the determination of how large companies, the company mentality, and people will live. “Supporting” small producers opens opportunities to resist the sovereignty of corporations in this sense.

For example, supporting farmers against the incorporation of food and company sovereignty in the field of food means defending the terms of production for cheap and healthy food. The farmers can maintain their status of maintaining wise village agriculture, using local and ecological seeds, and producing based on soil fertility and their needs as long as they have the opportunity to produce outside of the sovereignty of companies and the market. This situation can be thought of as a condition for confronting the statuses of farmers making production for borrowing and corporate interests and also for people who are not food producers procuring needs for healthy and cheap food.

It can be predicted that the development and popularization of food initiatives against the deepening of the current crisis will create a serious opportunity about finding effective and permanent solutions. For this purpose, it is necessary to support the different segments of society to develop their own opportunities and capacities and to encourage and strengthen the new practices of organization. It has become clearer today that the food movement must grow and be strengthened to reinforce a model in which the public is not obliged to an incorporated food system and manages its own resources.

The rural-urban migration problem that Turkey faces doesn't just reduce the quality of life in cities but creates a serious food-supply problem because of people who work in agriculture distancing themselves from the villages. Therefore, initiatives that vitalize local economies must be valued and supported. The Kars Boğatepe Village and the local economic organizations that form in its framework in this context are a small opening model. The solidarity initiative that the village public initiated is more valuable than a more participatory, fairer, and more environmentalist producer shows is possible beyond the state and market.

3. Boğatepe Village

Boğatepe is a village in Turkey, 45 kilometers from the city of Kars near the Armenian border, and sits at an altitude of 2,300 meters. The cheese culture of the village was shaped by immigrants from Caucasia who were Molokans as well as Austrian and Swiss that came at the end of the nineteenth century when the area became part of the Russian Empire (Torun, 2014). Kars remained under Russian sovereignty for approximately 30 years and during this time families introduced a variety of cheese making to the city and its environs. While the surrounding villagers became engaged in animal husbandry and handicrafts, the families in Boğatepe concentrated on milk and dairy products and in the early years of the Turkish Republic, the village pioneered the development of cheese-making in the region (Doğan 2015). Most notably, a Swiss family established a cheese production company called “zavot” in Russian, known as gravy, which became famous over time (Doğan, 2019, p. 541).

The history of cheese-making in Boğatepe began with a Swiss cheese producer establishing a cooperative in the village in 1880. (When Kars passed into the hands of the Russians, Swiss, German, and Russian business men came to Kars to produce cheese; the first person who came from Switzerland to establish the first dairy farm and who planted the seeds for today's gruyere was the Swiss David Moser). Cheese-making continued with the Malakan community coming from Russia. The Malakans, known for their adversity to the war at the time in Russia, migrated to Kars because they didn't want to be called to arms by the Czarist state.

The new community of the Boğatepe Village took the Karapapakhs (Terekemes) who lived in the Tbilisi Borchali Region with the passage of the Malakans, who made the decision to return to Russia after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, replacing Turkish sovereignty in Kars. The Karapapakhs took over cheese-making in the 1920s and started making cheese by establishing four cooperatives. These were also the first cooperatives in the Republic of Turkey.

The first sales of these cheeses were made to Russia until 1928, while agricultural machines were purchased in exchange. A type of exchange, that is. After 1938, the cheeses were sent to Istanbul because Russia cut off goods acquisitions. Acceleration dropped because of shipment challenges, and train shipment began after World War II. The 1960s can be described as the golden age, like all over the world. They are experiencing challenges in the 1980s, which is the symbol of the transition to a free market economy. There were more than 10 dairy farms in the village at the start of the 1980s, while this number dropped to 2 in the 2000s. The most important reason for this is that people who were aware of the cooperatives together were removed from the village with the 1980 coup. After the 1980 coup, cooperative operations were halted with the excuse of “There is significant opposition in the villages”, and a mosque was constructed in place of the cooperative building.

İlhan Koçulu, who sought out remedy to rejuvenate the local economy and traditional culture, is an activist who constantly produces projects, and whom we can call the head actor in the Boğatepe development initiative, made the decision to return to the village in the 2000s and opened a dairy farm in 2004. He proposed partnerships to the people of village at the rate of milk they provided to the raw milk producers. On the one hand, rural production organized while on the other hand urban consumption also organized. It is necessary to note that İlhan Koçulu is the founder of many of the consumption cooperatives in the cities. The number of business centers in the village dropped in the 2000s to 40, and 500 animals and 1 dairy farm remained. Everyone living in the village intended to migrate to large

cities. Education, subsistence problems, and socialization, as can be guessed, were the primary problems of village life. Koçulu was aware that the solution for these problems passed through rejuvenating production and started a local economic initiative that covered 10 villages. In this local economy, which comprises 2 villages with an altitude of greater than 2000 meters and 8 villages with an altitude of less than 2000 meters, the high-altitude villages start to work with cattle while the other 8 villages cultivate feed for cattle. Mountain villages took their feed from the lower villages. Beside these shared equipment usage began to vitalize agriculture. Namely, these villages jointly bought agricultural machinery and started using them in order. In this regard, it became easier to purchase new equipment by increasing efficiency by 30% in local seeds.

The university-supported botanic and ethnobotanic education provided in the village start to distribute remedy to the surrounding villages by gaining a social status for women thanks to these herbs as well as solving the health problems of women. The village women began to earn money with the varieties of herbs they made themselves and turned into a social asset by producing. Thirty varieties of cheese were identified in a project conducted together with Ardahan University. A portion of the cheeses produced in the village are sent to larger markets in Istanbul, while a portion is given to consumption cooperatives. The remainder is sold at the Women's Market established in the village.

Then, the Boğatepe Environment and Life Association (BELA), was founded in 2007 under the leadership of İlhan Koçulu and grew with the support of the village women. As a result of this initiative there appears to have been no migration to or from the village in the last decade. The association's work became an example in rural development. It created a huge difference in both the rebirth of the village and in the lives of the village women. The main goals of this association can be summarized as; protect the local seeds, improve the organic agriculture, training of farmers, finding out and introducing the cultural heritage of the region and increase the quality of life.

The Boğatepe cheese museum initiative and its focus on local specialist cheeses from the village was started in 2010 by BELA and residents. The eco-museums found by civic initiatives in order to protect local values have been debated since 1960s in France.

It opened in 2012 and all its activities came under the umbrella of the Boğatepe-Zavot Ecomuseum. These activities not only related to cheese production and did not just cover the village but also the surrounding area. Previously since 2008, tourism related projects had been carried out with the TAMADI Association of France, a nongovernmental organization that helps to develop tourism in rural areas in France and Belgium (<http://www.tamadi.org/>). Now the TAMADI and BELA associations organize all the tourism plans and tours with the profits being shared with residents (Doğan, 2015) (Doğan, 2019, p.542).

Cheese Museum was established to rescue types of cheese that are starting to be lost, to preserve production processes, to find what kind of flavor it gives to food in this process, to tell the story of cheese in the Kars region, and to introduce products to the world; and that in this regard the number of tourists visiting the village has exceeded 1,000 a year.

4. Local economy and Solidarity Outputs for Boğatepe Village

Solidarity economy is a set of practices and theories promoting democratic, just and sustainable development to address persistent poverty, social inequalities, environmental ills related with capitalist

relations of production and exchange. So, solidarity economy is consistent with democratic and transformative approaches to community development. The village of Boğatepe, as an example of solidarity economy, provides positive outputs.

As a result of depth interviews consisted of villagers who had hosted foreign and local tourists in the own homes and made in May 2019, the outputs summarized below.

In addition to the direct income obtained from these activities (accommodation, food, and other services), the villagers also have other revenues earned from selling cheese, medicinal herbs and herbal creams which they produce. These developments not only improve the local economy but also create a new valuable income resource in the village.

One of the important effects of tourism on social life is experienced through the mutual recognition of different cultures and the learning, interaction and communication processes involved. Notably, the positive effects of foreign guests in this respect are observed to be high.

The dependency of women on their husbands decreased and their participation in the social life of the village and their social visibility markedly increased. This process helped them to gain a more confident and self-sufficient attitude.

The social life that has changed by tourism leads to a diversification and improvement (socially and economically) in the lives of people in this rural area and can be seen as a major motivating factor in the villagers continuing to welcome tourists. The villagers are particularly pleased to host foreign tourists. In fact, they say they like foreign visitors more than local ones and despite the language problems get along better with them.

The familial relations of women have experienced many changes and transformations as a result of tourism, in particular the relation between their husbands and children. Women have become more independent, more enterprising and there is a greater equality between women and men in the family (Doğan, 2019, pp. 544-546).

While the villagers had intention to migrate before BELA, in 2000s the village started to become more crowded because of the increase in quality of life. They could earn more, be more healthy and social by staying in their region.

Doğan (2019, p. 547) summarizes the core components of this solidaristic tourism as encountered in Boğatepe as follows:

- The majority of the local income is shared fairly among the villagers who join in the BELA activities.
- Tourism supports the local economy directly and indirectly and contributes an unexpected revenue for the villagers who engage in the tourist activities.
- Only the Association is allowed to organize tourism.
- Tourism is well controlled and planned by the Association. The decision-making process is clear and decisions are based on as much participation of the members as possible.
- Mass tourism and the uncontrolled movement of tourism is not permitted, allowing the villagers to maintain their usual daily life.
- The package tours focus on the sharing in and learning about the local heritage.

- The social dialog, interaction and solidarity between tourist and residents is high.
- Tourist and residents mutually share knowledge about their lifestyles and culture.
- Tourism has influenced the socioeconomic structure positively and transformed some traditional relations. In particular it has provided some special benefits to the women who have taken part in providing tourism services.

5. Conclusion

Since the global financial crisis, in particular, there has been increasing calls for a profound shift in development strategy. Such a shift recognizes the social, environmental and developmental failures of market-centred approaches that have promoted economic liberalization, financialization, privatization, commodification, corporate control of global value chains and business models that externalize environmental costs. This market-centred or neoliberal approach is seen by many to lie at the root of four today's major development problems. The first is the inability of the conventional formal sector of the economy to generate more and better work. Second, inequalities of income, wealth and location within countries have risen significantly. Third, recurring and multiple crises linked to finance, food and fuel have heightened levels of human insecurity. Fourth, industrialization and consumerism have resulted in patterns of environmental degradation and climate change that enhance shocks and vulnerability (Utting et al., 2014, pp.5-6).

Agricultural programs implemented on a global scale today liquidate small- and medium-scale businesses and prioritize industrial agricultural and contract models of production that are imposed by multinational agriculture-food corporations in their place. Thus, both a market is created for agricultural inputs like seeds, medicines, and fertilizer that are produced/marketed by multinational corporations and the dominance of monopolies in agriculture is strengthened. After the 1980s, a series of changing and transformative process occurred with the implementation of neoliberal policies in agriculture. The attitudes of states that support agriculture between 1950-1980 changed, and the role that comprised supporting acquisitions, inputs, and credit subsidies shrank

Considering all these, the recent course of food inflation in Turkey is not surprising at all. It is necessary to underline that the crisis into which we are slowly falling is not natural or cyclical but formed as the result of concrete political and economic choices and practices. That's why it should be our priority to organize solidarity and community economies that are not capitalist instead of a program that promises to fix the malfunctions of capitalism in the face of crisis. In other words, it is necessary to make green and increase alternatives to capitalism and to the ways of life established over interests for economic benefit and harm calculations that capitalism imposes. The solidarity option means a system of production that is focused on needs, based on solidarity, environmentally sensitive, and fair against capitalist market rules (supply, demand, full competition, etc.) because it is a new way of thinking that focuses on a policy and economic organization that prioritizes societal issues (Madra, 2019).

The most general and descriptive characteristics of the options that emerge after globalization are that exit points are local and organized using local practices, resources, and relationships. This exit point rejects the imposition of any top-down model and gets its strength from global movements coming from

the foundation. These local options might not have as strong a discourse as a global revolution, and they might not unify within a single model of development, but they follow their own roads and determine their own speeds of development. It might not have universal representations or always be unifying, but it can create a revolutionary spark by setting out from their own singular individualities.

As a post-capitalist project, solidarity economy emphasises on agency and democracy, sustaining people and planet. Therefore it necessary develops in real places with real people, collectively negotiating and enacting values and aspirations. It is also an effort of integrating productivity with morality.

In addition to socioeconomic and environmental advantages, SSE also has significant emancipatory potential, given its association with political empowerment and identity politics via contestation, active citizenship (Utting et al., 2014, p.6). Various forms of SSE, notably those associated with solidarity economy relate more explicitly to emancipatory dimensions such as ethnic and gender equality. The advantages of collective action or group behaviour relate to economic empowerment, social capital, political empowerment, participatory governance, solidarity and ethicality. Organized groups of workers or farmers often have easier access to consultative and decision making processes at local, national and other levels, can makes their voice heard through various forms of contestation, dialogue and bargaining (Utting et al., 2014, p.8).

Boğatepe case provides a proof for a model of transformative change that is rooted in real world practices and possibilities rather than utopian idealism or blueprints. It is an excellent model of local and solidarity economy. While it began with a volunteer movement, it includes all aspects such as the organization of the local community, the formation of civil initiatives, joint decision-making processes and the existence of participation and consensus.

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE EU'S REACTIONS TO MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE

Nihan Akıncılar Köseoğlu¹

Abstract²

During the last century, several military interventions occurred in Turkey and Greece. These military interventions into politics were tolerable until the end of the Second World War, as the world had been facing ongoing warfare since the early 20th century. However, in the early Cold War era, major international institutions were established to prevent war by forming alliances between countries. In this context, Turkey and Greece applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 in order to improve their economies through financial aids and their political systems by integrating into Europe. However, the EEC did not approve of the coups d'état of the Turkish and Greek military and objected to the military regimes which were founded subsequently. Arguing that the military interventions disrupted Turkish and Greek democracies, the Community insisted on the replacement of military rule with civilian politicians. In the light of this demand, this article compares the reactions of the EEC to the Turkish and Greek coups d'état in 1960 and in 1967 respectively. And it argues that the EEC showed stronger reaction to the Greek coup than to the Turkish coup. Even though the EEC was then just an economic organization, its responses to the coups show the sign of its future transformation into a multidimensional organization.

Keywords: EU, Military Interventions, Civil-Military Relations, Democratization, Turkish-Greek Relations.

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN TÜRKİYE VE YUNANİSTAN'DAKİ ASKERİ MÜDAHALELERE TEPKİSİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

Özet

Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da birçok askeri müdahale yaşanmıştır. 20. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren, dünya sürekli bir savaşa sahne olduğu için de bu askeri müdahalelere, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar müsamaha gösterilmiştir. Fakat Soğuk Savaş'ın başladığı yıllarda, ileride meydana gelebilecek olası savaşları engellemek için uluslararası organizasyonlar kurulmuş, ülkeler bu organizasyonların çatısı altında bir araya getirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan, aynı zamanda Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) üyeliğine başvurmuştur. İki ülkenin de bu üyelikten beklentisi, AET'den gelecek mali yardımla ekonomilerini düzeltmek ve bir Avrupa ülkesi olarak güçlü bir siyasete sahip olmaktı. Ancak, AET, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da gerçekleşen darbeleri hoş karşılamamış, darbe sonrası kurulan askeri yönetimlere de karşı çıkmıştır. Askeri müdahalelerin,

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Türk ve Yunan demokrasilerine ara verdirdiğini ileri sürerek, ısrarla askeri yönetimlerin son bulmasını ve seçilmiş sivil politikacıların yönetime geçmesini talep etmiştir. Bu istekten yola çıkarak, bu makale AET'nin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki sırasıyla 1960 ve 1967 yıllarındaki darbelere vermiş olduğu tepkileri karşılaştırmaktadır. AET'nin Yunanistan'daki darbeye daha sert tepki verdiğini iddia eden bu makale, aynı zamanda AET'nin o dönemde ekonomik bir topluluk olmasına rağmen Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki darbelere verdiği tepkilerle gelecekteki çok boyutlu bir örgüte dönüşmesinin sinyalini verdiğini söylemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Askeri Müdahaleler, Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri, Demokratikleşme, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri.

1. Introduction

With Greece under Ottoman rule between the 15th and 19th centuries, Turkey and Greece developed, starting from the Tourkokratia period, a dominant role of the military in politics due to the Ottoman tradition. After the Ottoman Greeks declared independence in 1821, both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom adopted a 'Westernization' policy. In order to westernize their countries, both countries first aimed at the modernization of their armies. They followed the slogan: "the more powerful the army is, the more powerful is the country". Seeing each other as the greatest enemies, the two countries had fought each other for a century (between 1821 and 1923) without cease.

In May 1919, Mustafa Kemal initiated the Turkish War of Independence. In October 1923, he founded the Turkish Republic. Due to the fact that army officers had founded Turkey and Greece after their respective wars of independence, the military was regarded as the top authority. Thus, given also the historical legacy of military dominance stemming from Ottoman rule, democracy was interrupted several times in Turkey and Greece by military interventions.

In line with their Westernization policies, Turkey and Greece aimed at their integration into Europe through membership in several international institutions since the end of the Second World War. Membership in the European Economic Community seemed sensible to them as a means to improve their poor economies. However, the EEC set conditions for membership, among which the most important one was the Communities' importance given to democracy. Therefore, the EEC reacted to the frequency of military interventions in Turkey and Greece and declared that the two countries could not become members of the Community as long as the military's dominance in the political sphere lasted. This article focuses on the military interventions in 1960 in Turkey and in 1967 in Greece. The main question of this article concerns the EEC's respective reactions to Turkey and Greece. Comparing these reactions, which country was tolerated more by the EEC? And why?

2. Westernization / Europeanization of Turkey and Greece

2.1 Turkey

The Turkish War of Independence ended with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Blaming Islamic religion for the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the leaders of the newly founded Turkish

Republic adopted the policy of Westernization for the progress and development of the country (Mahçupyan, 2000, p. 19). The new ruling elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk implemented a series of secularist reforms, trying to separate religion from state affairs. In line with Atatürk's Westernization policy, the caliphate was abolished in 1924, the new Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, and religious schools and religious courts were closed down. Instead, a Westernized educational system was established with many of the teachers imported from Europe (Rustow, 1987, p. 16). Moreover, religious law, the Sharia, was eliminated and replaced with the secular Swiss code.

During the inter-war period, Turkey tried to integrate into Europe by placing emphasis on its European identity. Therefore, the new Republican elite rejected the linkage with the Ottoman past. For instance, only five years after the establishment of the Republic, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs "Tevfik Rustu (Aras) defined his country's new orientation and identity as that of a Western power to which 'the death of a peasant in the Balkans is of more importance than the death of a king in Afghanistan'" (quoted in Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 425).

In the 1920s and 1930s, there appeared two main initiatives for a united Europe: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe movement and Aristide Briand's European Union proposal at the League of Nations (LoN). Because the LoN had not been able to prevent the First World War, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposed the vision of a politically united Europe in his book 'Paneuropa' (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926). In turn, French Foreign Minister Briand proposed a European Union at a conference of the LoN after the Great Depression of 1929, placing emphasis on its economic features more than peace and security.

The two abovementioned proposals for a united Europe "came at a time when Turkey was trying to break its international isolation and end its status as an outcast in European politics" (Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 431). When Coudenhove-Kalergi published his book in 1923, Turkey was a newly-established, fragile country. Thus, he did not want to incorporate Turkey into his Pan-Europe project. "Briand also excluded Turkey from his European Union proposal for two reasons: first, Turkey was not a member of the LoN; second, it was not a part of geographical Europe" (Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 431).

Although Turkey was excluded from a united Europe in these proposals, the newly established Republic was to be Europeanized through Atatürk's Westernization reforms. That is to say, the Turks had struggled with the West to become a Western country (Tunaya, 1960, p. 103).

After the Turkish political system was transformed into a multi-party system in 1950, the importance of membership in European institutions for the integration with the West was realized. Therefore, Turkey became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, at the time of its establishment. The OEEC aimed at the distribution of financial aid stemming from the Truman Doctrine. In 1949, the Council of Europe (CoE) was established in order to defend human rights and freedoms in the European continent after the human rights violations during the Second World War. Turkey became a member of the CoE in 1949 and signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. The Convention founded the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as an international judicial body to which both states and individuals can

apply. When the treaties of the European Economic Community were signed in 1957, the European institution most attractive for Turkey was formed. Thus, Turkey applied for membership in the EEC in 1959, just after Greece. With this, the European adventure began for the country.

According to Öncü (1993, p. 258), “the Turkish elite have been the articulators of a grand political project – Westernization – which has indelibly marked the path of modern Turkish history”. During more than a century, “‘Western-ness’ was coupled and identified with progress and development” (Öncü, 1993, p. 258) for the ruling elite and has served as a reference for the future Turkish political leaders.

2.2 Greece

Greek merchants as well as other non-Muslim tradesmen constituted an economic bourgeoisie within the Ottoman Empire. They had close ties with the West through import and export and their knowledge of one, (or more), foreign language(s). As soon as the libertarian ideas spread among the Greeks, they planned and organized for a revolt against Ottoman rule. The Empire’s efforts of the Tanzimat reforms could not prevent this.

After the secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, “the newly independent Greeks embarked on the task of building a nation- state out of a former province” (Frangoudaki & Keyder, 2007, p. 1). The independence of the Greek Kingdom was recognized at the end of the London Conference in 1832. “The ancient Greeks invented democracy, but their linguistic descendants in modern times had to import representative government, a modern version of a democratic polity, from the West” (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002, p. 44). However, “Greeks were afraid of losing their Hellenic identity while catching up with the West” (Exertzoglou, 2007, p. 52).

Just as modern Turkey blamed the Ottoman Empire for inherited backwardness, Greece chose both the Ottomans and the Byzantine Empire as its sources of backwardness. Thus, “intellectuals and the emerging middle class of the Neohellenic Enlightenment movement championed a radical break with Ottoman traditions and the legacy of Byzantium which was thought to represent a period of decadence, decay, and superstition” (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008, p. 23) in the Greek history. Then, the country had to catch up with its European counterparts by modernizing its economy, politics, technology as well as culture.

In the first decades of the Kingdom, Greece paid attention to its military due to ongoing warfare. Thus, the country started its modernization attempts within the army. When Venizelos came to the Greek political scene in 1909, he had a revisionist policy in mind. He could easily expound his Westernized thoughts to the public through the daily press. Moreover, Venizelos gave importance to urbanization, which was a widespread tendency throughout Europe.

Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Greek politics had faced instability. On the one hand, Venizelist governments were interrupted by frequent military interventions. On the other hand, Greece fought continuously in the Balkans, in the First World War, and with the Turks in the Aegean until 1922. Thus, Westernization attempts stopped during this period. After the declaration of an independent Turkish Republic, the Republican movement gained popular support throughout Greece.

The Second Hellenic Republic was established in 1924.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Greece became a part of the two main initiatives for a united Europe mentioned above: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe movement and Aristide Briand's European Union proposal at the LoN. Because of its geographical position, the country was included in these projects. However, they did not last long due to both imperfections of these early initiatives and the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, since military interventions continued to be frequent and led to a four-year long Metaxist dictatorship in the second half of the 1930s, the Greek political system gradually became authoritarian - as was a more general trend in the Europe of the inter-war period. By the same token, the Westernization policy of the Republican rulers was interrupted until the early Cold War era.

At the end of the Second World War, Greece became an "association maniac" (quoted in Tassopoulos, 2007, p. 14) like many other European countries. "Associations were of every kind: political, educational, charitable, cultural, etc." (Tassopoulos, 2007, p. 14). Consequently, Greece became a member of the OEEC in 1948 at the same time as Turkey. Membership in this economic association guaranteed the country its economic development. Greece further applied for membership in the CoE in 1949 in order to reinforce democracy, human rights, and freedoms throughout the country. Finally, after the establishment of the EEC, Greece applied for associate membership in 1959. Membership was seen as guaranteeing a number of advantages, "such as maintaining and consolidating existing links with the West, going beyond historical dilemmas of the past between West and East, strengthening Greece's international bargaining power, preventing foreign interference in internal and domestic affairs" (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005, p. 225), and securing its position against Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus. Although Featherstone and Kazamias (2001, pp. 4-5) argue that "Europeanization is more than just 'integration'" into Europe, Greece, since the end of the Second World War, aimed at the recovery of its economy by integrating into an economic alliance (Stavridis, 2003, p. 4).

3. Association Agreements with the European Economic Community

3.1 Greece's Association with the EEC

After the Greek application for association with the EEC on June 8, 1959, negotiations for the accession of Greece to the Community began on September 10, 1959. The Association Agreement, called Athens Agreement, was signed on July 9, 1961. It entered into force one year later on November 1, 1962 and "made Greece a privileged associate member of the EEC under the provisions of Article 238 of the Rome Treaty" (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 141). According to the agreement, the EEC aimed at developing the Greek economy by preparing short- and long-term development plans and even giving financial aids in order to have the country enter into a Customs Union. If everything went well, Greece would become a full member of the Community in 22 years.

Before the Greek association with the EEC, the country demanded to join any of the existing regional alliances to secure its economic and military growth. In this context, before the application to the EEC, Greece "took part in the lengthy negotiations (1957-8) of the Organization for European

Economic Cooperation, which at that time considered a British proposal for a European free-trade area embracing all Western European countries – an alternative to the Common Market” (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 150). At the end of these negotiations, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was formed under the leadership of Britain. Even though Greece was also invited for membership, it refused this proposal. After some time, however, Greece regretted its rejection, as it felt isolated in the region. It thus started to seek for ways to associate with the EEC. According to the Greek administration, an association with the EEC would develop the Greek economy on the basis of trade with other EEC countries and strengthen Greek politics in regional conflicts. During the negotiations with the EEC, Greece chose an associate membership, although it could have applied for full membership. According to Kalamotousakis (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 151), this was a good choice because

if Greece had opted for full membership, it would have been risking catastrophic consequences because (a) direct and unconditional membership would have meant acceptance of the accelerated time-table among the Six for the complete abolition of all tariffs and quantitative import controls, and (b) the geographic orientation and composition of Greek exports, consisting largely of few agricultural products having a low price and income elasticity of demand and a high elasticity of substitution, were substantially tied to the EEC countries.

When the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis signed the Association agreement with the EEC on July 9, he gave a speech which showed that Greece aimed at both economic and political improvements through EEC membership given its weak economy and instable politics during the post- Second World War era. Karamanlis aimed at being close to Western countries, thus gaining a European identity like other member states. However, the EEC seemed to have only economic aims concerning the country. Nevertheless, this was a relevant decision of Greece: if the country had not joined the EEC, it would have been isolated politically and economically in the European continent.

Why the Community offered a preferential status for Greece is another issue. The EEC aimed at the harmonization of Greek agricultural and financial policies in order to develop its economy throughout the 22 years leading up to membership and tried to assume the protector role of the United States and Britain.

After the Athens Agreement entered into force in November 1962, the relationship between Greece and the Community stayed problem-free for only five years - until Greek Colonels staged a coup d'état in April 1967. During these five years, Greek exports to EEC countries increased significantly. “Western governments were encouraged to establish industries in Greece which accelerated the revival of the economic activity since the U.S. civil aid came to an end during 1962” (Woodhouse, 1991, p. 282). Because Greek Colonels had rapidly transformed the military government into a military dictatorship, the dialogue between Greece and the EEC stalled. The relations were resumed when Greece applied for full membership in 1975, one year after the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship. Negotiations lasted from 1976 to 1979. On January 1, 1981 Greece became formally a member of the EC (Pagoulatos, 2002, p. 3).

3.2 Turkey's Association with the EEC

After having become members of the NATO in 1952, Turkey and Greece turned to another powerful Western Cold War institution, the European Economic Community. When Greece applied for membership in the EEC in June 1959, Turkey also initiated a contractual association one month later on July 31, 1959 due to political and economic reasons (Saraçoğlu, 1992, p. 8). The EEC approved the Turkish application on September 11, 1959 and decided to start the negotiations (Saraçoğlu, 1992, p. 9). However, because Turkish democracy was interrupted by a coup d'état on May 27, 1960 and one year later three politicians were hanged, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen. In contrast, Greece succeeded in signing the Athens Agreement on July 9, 1961. Then, "[t]hrough there was a domestically troubled situation after the coup and the Turco – EEC relations were quite tensed after the Athens Agreement, in July 1962 the talks between Turkey and the EEC were resumed" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6). Finally, the EEC accepted to sign the Association Agreement, called Ankara Agreement, on September 12, 1963 in Brussels.

In the evening of the same day, Prime Minister İnönü interpreted this association as follows:

In my opinion, throughout the history of mankind, the most daring works of the human mind are brought into the body, the European Economic Community. With this Agreement, Turkey will be forever connected to Europe (Cumhuriyet, 1963).

When the Association Agreement came into force on December 1, 1964, the relationship between Turkey and the EEC officially commenced. The agreement divided the membership period of Turkey into three parts: the preparatory, transitional, and final stages.

After the signing of the Association Agreement, the Second and Third Financial Protocols were accepted in 1970 and 1977. On November 23, 1970, an Additional Protocol was signed which aimed at the completion of a Customs Union between the two sides within 22 years. However, these protocols were cancelled when the Turkish government decided to freeze the relations with the EEC in 1978, "referring to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the Self-Protection clause" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6). After the military coup of 1980, the dialogue between Turkey and the EEC was severed and the Ankara Agreement was suspended in 1982 for five years.

Ironically, although Turkey signed an agreement "the content of which was purely economic, the main driving force behind the Turkish application for the Associate Membership was mostly political rather than economic" (Sözen, 2005, pp. 3-4). The reasons, according to Hale, were "to gain easier market access to the EEC, to avoid being outflanked by Greece, and to be internationally recognized as a member of the Western Community of nations which had been an objective of Turkish leaders" (2000, p. 175) since the early days of the Tanzimat period. In turn, the Community had also fulfilled its objective by "bringing one of the strategically most important states in the boat" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6).

4. The First Military Intervention in Turkey on May 27, 1960

From the foundation of Turkey in 1923 until 1946, the country was governed by a single party, the Republican People's Party. On January 7, 1946, a powerful oppositional party, the Democrat Party, was constituted by four former MPs of the RPP: Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü. Gradually, this party came to represent all the opposition and popular discontent among

the public which had been cumulating until then. Therefore, the DP gained popular support and won the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections. As a result, the party governed the country for a decade, from 1950 to 1960.

Like the earlier opposition parties, the DP was established as an anti-RPP party. Because it was founded with the aim of securing fundamental rights and freedoms of the nation, the party adopted some liberal policies. It was a supporter of a laissez-faire economy and tried to bolster both national and foreign private sectors (Eroğul, 2003; Kasaba, 1993).

After the DP came to power in 1950, the members of the party elected Celal Bayar as the new president. He further was elected chairman of this new party. Thus, for the first time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a civilian president came to power. This showed that the DP had the potential to make important changes in the current system of the country. Every time Bayar was asked about the difference between the RPP and his party, he answered that they were like cooks preparing Turkish sweet 'helva' with different recipes (Ahmad, 1994, p. 156). While both Democrats and Republicans aimed at creating a 'small America' with one millionaire in each neighborhood, their methods for reaching this goal differed (Ahmad, 1994, p. 156).

As Zürcher notes, "under the RPP the state apparatus and the party machine had been merged (even officially) to the extent that one could say that the party was just one of the instruments through which the state controlled and steered society" (2004, p. 221). Likewise, in the first years of the DP government, the party abandoned its libertarian policies and began to put pressure on leftist ideas, just as the RPP had done with the right-wing, which had been heavily criticized by the DP MPs. As the DP governed the country as a single-party during a decade, the tradition of the RPP continued, and the Democrat Party rule became a state-party-government.

At the same time, the country faced growing economic problems. Since the Truman Doctrine was implemented in Turkey in 1947, a liberal economy had been slowly introduced to the country. In spite of the RPP's insistence on statism, the Democrats supported a free market economy for Turkey. Thus, after the DP came to power in 1950, it rapidly implemented liberalization policies. In the first years, these liberal policies combined with U.S. financial aid had positive effects in terms of a growing national economy. However, when American aid ceased, the DP's heyday ended. Because they did not have any development plan for solving Turkey's financial problems, the new Turkish liberal economy began to collapse. This meant that Turkish people began to get poorer, just as in RPP times. In July 1958, Menderes personally visited the U.S. and German Presidents concerning recovery programs. The two countries accepted to give financial assistance to Turkey in return for the devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Menderes did not accept but turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Despite its success in the 1957 elections, as people voted for Menderes rather than for the party, the DP started to lose power and popular support - it had become too authoritarian, too much like the RPP during the single-party period. In fact, "the Democrats' basic problem, pointed out by many foreign observers at the time, was that they tried to do too much too quickly and with insufficient means at their disposal" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 228). Because the DP had gained the majority of votes in the 1954 and 1957 elections, it thought that it was justified in acting in an authoritarian manner.

However, the authoritarian activities of the DP had sparked discontent among some parts of society. First of all, peasants were affected negatively by the DP's support for the mechanization of agriculture between 1950 and 1960. When the number of tractors and harvesters sharply increased, the peasants got poorer. This initiated the process of migration to big cities and the building of shanty towns (see Karpas, 1976). Moreover, since the DP wanted to control the bureaucracy, military, and academia, it reduced the salaries of these professions more than others. Their annoyance increased in the late 1950s when the DP attempted to seize RPP property, to punish newspapers which did not support the government, and to penalize academics and judges who were not pro-government.

As last authoritarian attempt of the party, Democrats established a Commission of Inquiry in April 1960 in order to investigate the RPP's plans, contrary to the Constitution. The Commission of Inquiry tried to reveal whether or not there was a plan for a coup d'état being made. In response, students and university academics began to demonstrate on the streets of Ankara. The DP government responded with martial law but could not end the expression of popular discontent. Its announcement of the abolition of the Commission on May 24 came too late. The foundation of the Commission had emphasized the DP's authoritarianism, which brought about the first coup of the country.

On May 27, 1960 Turkish army officers staged a coup d'état, arguing that the Democrat Party had acted against the Turkish Constitution. This coup was made by ratings and thus differed from the 1971 and 1980 coups that had been staged by high-ranking military officers. At three o'clock in the morning, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş read a declaration on the radio in which the Turkish military explained the reasons for the coup. "The statement announced that the Turkish armed forces had taken over the administration of the country 'to prevent fratricide' and to 'extricate the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen'" (quoted in Zürcher, 2004, p. 241).

After the coup, the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi/ NUC), headed by General Cemal Gürsel and composed of 38 members, took over and formed the government. General Gürsel immediately closed down the Democrat Party and banned it from politics. He then arrested the leading members of the party, including President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes. General Gürsel rapidly obtained all authority and governed the country until 1961 when he transferred the government to civilians.

For the trial of arrested DP politicians, a special court was founded in Yassıada, an island in the Sea of Marmara. In the end, "123 people were acquitted, 31 were sentenced to life imprisonment and 418 to lesser terms, while 15 were sentenced to death" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 248). The NUC mitigated the death penalty of eleven people, but not of President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan. Thus, the NUC rapidly passed a law which suspended the execution of the death penalty for those above 65 years of age. This law was adopted for the former President of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar. Hence, the death penalty of Bayar was annulled and he was deported from the island. Zorlu and Polatkan were executed on September 16, 1961 and Menderes the next day. After these executions, Menderes became a martyr in the eyes of the majority of society and his memoir was used by DP's successor politicians (Ahmad, 1994, p. 192).

5. The EEC's Reaction to the May 27, 1960 Coup d'État

After the Turkish application for the associate membership in the EEC in July 1959, the Community decided to start negotiations in September 1959. Even though negotiations between Turkey and the EEC continued for several months, with the May 27, 1960 coup d'état the relations were strained. When the three DP politicians were executed in September 1961, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen.

The then President of France, General de Gaulle, strongly opposed to these executions. Because the three politicians were hanged despite his reaction, the Turkish association with the EEC was delayed for two years (Özer, 2009, p. 91). Although the relations between Turkey and the EEC worsened after Greece signed its association agreement in July 1961, the dialogue between Turkey and the Community was resumed in July 1962 with the special effort of Tevfik Saraçoğlu, the Turkey's permanent representative in the EEC. Thus, negotiation talks were re-started for the Turkish association with the EEC. Finally, Ankara Agreement was signed in September 1963 and Turkey became an associate state of the Community.

It seems that the EEC's reaction to the 1960 coup of Turkish colonels was not severe. While England, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied for the membership in the EEC in 1961, negotiations with these countries were stalled in January 1963 due to General de Gaulle's veto (Özer, 2009, p. 92). Despite this, the EEC signed the association agreement with Turkey in September 1963. Thus, it can be said that Turkey was not reacted severely by the EEC compared to the frozen relations between the major Western European countries and the Community until 1967.

6. The Colonels' Dictatorship in Greece (1967 – 1974)

The civil war in Greece ended in 1949, while martial law was lifted and new elections were held in 1950. After a short-lived government, another election was held in 1951, but the result was again a short-lived government. Marshal Alexandros Papagos, who was a resigned Commander-in-Chief and the leader of a right-wing party, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos / GR), emerged as the winner of the new elections held in 1952. "Now a period of right-wing rule began that maintained until 1963" (Clogg, 1992, p. 147).

Papagos continued to govern the country until his death in 1955. Konstantinos Karamanlis succeeded him and renamed the party the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis / NRU) in February 1956.

Because Karamanlis' NRU was successful in the 1958 elections, he called for an early election in 1961 in order to guarantee his rule for the next four-year term. However, the result fell short of his expectations because a high percentage of votes were given to a new party, the Centre Union (Enosi Kentrou / CU). The CU was constituted by Georgios Papandreou, who combined all of the center parties. Although Papandreou's CU gained popular support in the elections, Karamanlis' NRU was announced as the winning party. Thus, Karamanlis established a government which lasted until 1963. However, the two opposition parties, Centre Union and United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera / UDL), declared the 1961 elections null and void, accusing the NRU of fraudulence. In fact,

they suspected that an external power had intervened in Greek domestic politics. That is, “the opposition parties claimed that the army had implemented a NATO-plan, code-named Pericles and designed to deal with threats to internal security, to preserve the right’s hold on power” (Clogg, 1992, p. 155).

After elections, Karamanlis’ NRU started to lose popular support. Discontent among the public had increased due to his personal conflicts with the royalty, especially with Queen Frederica, and the assassination of an MP of the United Democratic Left. The Greek economy gradually deteriorated and unemployment and under-employment increased. Thus, strikes by workers, public servants, and teachers became frequent, which often led to clashes with the state’s security forces (Gallant, 2001, p. 195; Woodhouse, 1991, p. 283). Then, “huge protests by supporters of Papandreou’s Centre Union party shook Athens and other cities, forcing new elections in 1963” (Tsarouhas, 2005, p. 9). Consequently, Karamanlis had to resign and the Centre Union won the 1963 elections under the leadership of Papandreou.

Moreover, Georgios Papandreou’s son, Andreas Papandreou, became an MP during his father’s government. He was accused by the right-wing parties of being the leader of ASPIDA (Shield), a left-wing assassination group of the army. “The word means ‘shield’, but it was also an acronym standing for ‘Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy” (Woodhouse, 1985, p. 5). This led Papandreou to lose further power when young Constantine II was to succeed his father King Paul in 1964. In May 1965, Papandreou dismissed his Minister of Defence and demanded to be his replacement. King Constantine II, who only had the right to appoint the Minister of Defence, did not accept. From then on, an enduring conflict between the King and Papandreou senior developed in which the former aimed at the latter’s resignation and the splitting of his party. In July 1965, King Constantine II succeeded in forcing Papandreou’s resignation despite widespread demonstrations by the supporters of the CU. They later called this royal intervention into politics *Apostasia* (renegade). They also named the CU politicians who replaced Papandreou by appointment of the King renegades. The dissatisfaction of the military was apparent at the time. Therefore, Papandreou tried to get the army officers on his side before his resignation. “He tried to reorganize the armed forces along lines more sympathetic to his government and to encourage the promotion of low-rank officers that were disadvantaged by the political environment after 1949” (Tsarouhas, 2005, p. 9). Nevertheless, high-ranking military officers were not pleased with this effort and opposed Papandreou.

Both the American and British administrations were aware of a coup plan in Greece, because the King had visited them to obtain their advice. General Kardamakis, the Chief of the Greek National Defence General Staff, confirmed to the Americans that “the decision for a coup d’état has already been taken, that it is no longer a question of whether, but when” (quoted in Maragkou, 2006, p. 430). However, the British and Americans later realized that they were informed about a different coup plan.

Subsequently, the leaders of the Centre Union and of the National Radical Union called for early elections to be held in May 1967. However, two colonels and a brigadier - Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikoalos Makarezos, and Stylianos Pattakos - staged a coup d’état on April 21, 1967 just before the elections would have been held. They aimed to end the political instability in the country that

predominated during the post-Second World War period. In addition, they honored their intervention as 'revolution'.

The Colonels' coup d'état on April 21, 1967 led "an authoritarian no-party system of government in Greece which resisted internal and external pressures for a change toward a multiparty system" (Xydis, 1974, p. 507). After the intervention, "Papadopoulos pronounced the Greek nation 'diseased' and in need of a 'plaster cast'" (Pedaliu, 2007, p. 188).

A Greece 'in plaster-cast' meant that Greeks had to live under a regime that derived its power from naked repression and those who resisted or were suspected of resistance to the "revolution", or even gathered together in numbers exceeding five persons, or grew their hair long or listened to proscribed music, or ate Russian caviar or even read Aeschylus, Sophocles, Mark Twain or Shakespeare, were subjected to show trials, incarceration, widespread torture and banishment to concentration camps in arid and scorpion infested islands (Pedaliu, 2007, p. 188).

The Colonels' dictatorship was led by a rightist secret organization, EENA (National Union of Young Officers), under the leadership of Papadopoulos who was in cooperation with KYP (Greek Central Intelligence Agency), composed of rightist army officers (Coulombis, 2004, p. 308). Under the leadership of Papadopoulos, this military coup d'état was transformed into a military dictatorship which was established against all political parties from right to left. The symbol of his dictatorship was a phoenix with a soldier's shadow in front of it. "Including Papadopoulos, the leading members of the junta were mostly officers from lower-class backgrounds who had achieved career advancement through the armed forces" (Gallant, 2001, p. 197). The difference of the 1967 junta regime from Pangalos' and Metaxas' dictatorships was that this coup was staged by ratings, while the latter had been staged by high-ranking military officers. Thus, in the first years of the junta, ratings pushed the high-ranking military officers to retire. As a result, "over 2,700 army officers were retired by April 1972" (Close, 2002, p. 115).

Because King Constantine II attempted a counter-coup against the Colonels' dictatorship in December 1967, he was sent into exile. At the time, Papadopoulos had extended his power by simultaneously becoming the King, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Government Policy. The Junta took "the armed forces, police, civil service, judiciary, universities, schools, the Church, as well as local authorities, the trade unions and agricultural cooperatives" (Close, 2002, p. 115) under direct or indirect control. Moreover, Papadopoulos introduced martial law, banned and suspended political parties, trade unions, newspapers and ancient works, arrested all communists, "condemned long hair on boys and mini-skirts on girls" (Woodhouse, 1991, p. 290), ordered "church parades on Sundays and flag- raising ceremonies each morning; while forbidding mixed-sex social events" (Close, 2002, p. 117). Thus, the junta regime and Papadopoulos personally became all-powerful. "Owing to the fact that the society was put under restraint by the Junta, political discussions in public – or for that matter over the phone or by mail – were generally regarded as risky" (Close, 2002, p. 115). However, "[t]he extent of opposition to the regime was firstly manifested by the attendance of several hundred thousand people at Georgios Papandreou's funeral in November 1968" (Close, 2002, p. 119), which was transformed into a demonstration for democracy.

Like in other countries of the world, mass student demonstrations emerged in the end of the 1960s as a resistance to the Junta. "In September 1969 one student [K]osta[s] Yorgakis, committed suicide in public in Genoa by setting fire to himself" (Close, 2002, p. 122). Because this irritated the Colonels, they started to toughen restrictions. In response, students occupied the Law Faculty of the University of Athens in March 1973. "They held protests, boycotted classes and in other ways disrupted the higher education system" (Gallant, 2001, p. 202). Papadopoulos therefore declared the 'coup from above' on June 1, which gave the signal to a presidential parliamentary republic of Greece whose symbol became only the phoenix (Xydis, 1974, p. 509). Moreover, on July 29 a new constitution was accepted by another plebiscite and a puppet civilian cabinet was set up on October 29 by Spyros Markezinis until the elections were held one year later. However, it did not last long because students revolted and organized a sit-in at the Athens Polytechnic in November. In response, Brigadier-General Dimitris Ioannidis, the head of the Military Security Police (ESA), made a coup d'état on November 25, 1973, which led to an armed conflict between students and police troops. The result was thousands of arrested, wounded and even dead people. "Now, President Papadopoulos was replaced by another military man, enjoying more limited powers" (Xydis, 1974, p. 509). This time the shadow of a soldier was reinstated in the front of the phoenix as the symbol of the Greek military junta. However, it was not difficult to predict at the time that the end of the dictatorship came closer.

In the international arena, Greece had been gradually weakened during the post-Second World War era. After the Great Depression in 1929, the world went into a huge crisis in October 1973 when OPEC announced an increase in the oil price because the USA gave military support to Israel during the Yom Kippur war between the Israeli and Arab people. All NATO members were first affected by this oil crisis and their economies deteriorated. Greece, a NATO member since 1952, was also affected by this worldwide economic crisis. Coupled with high inflation in the country, the Greek economy came to the brink of demise. Moreover, the Junta spent most state money on the construction sector, which led to foreign debt. Since the EEC suspended development loans due to the dictatorship, Greece started to suffer from money shortage.

The ongoing conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots furthermore reached its peak in 1974. Therefore, Brigadier Ioannidis sent Greek army to Cyprus in order to provide stability, despite the reluctance of Greek Cypriot President Makarios. Then, Makarios wanted Brigadier Ioannidis to remove the Greek army officers from Cyprus and "protested that the junta was trying to destroy the state of Cyprus, [but] Brigadier Ioannidis' mindless response was to launch a coup against the president, who was forced to flee the island" (Clogg, 1992, p. 168). In response to the Greek coup, Turkey intervened in Cyprus on July 20, 1974 for three days and the two countries came to the brink of war. However, this catastrophic event caused the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship which also ended the Kingdom of Greece. Then, Turkey intervened in the island on August 14 for the second time and seized 40 percent of the island.

On July 24, 1974, the day after the end of Turkish intervention, the military government was abolished in Greece. Konstantinos Karamanlis was invited from his exile in Paris to be the head of the civilian coalition government of the Third Hellenic Republic (Woodhouse, 1985, pp. 157-166).

7. The EEC's Reaction to the Greek Dictatorship

The associate relationship between Greece and the European Economic Community started with the signature of the Athens Agreement. However, it did not last long. On April 21, 1967, six years after the Agreement had come into effect, three colonels made a coup d'état and briefly established a dictatorship. This interruption of democracy suspended the ongoing relationship. The EEC pressured Greece to restore democracy or it would limit the tariff reductions that were promised in the Association Agreement.

During the military dictatorship in Greece, the relations between the country and the EEC were frozen. The EEC indeed limited the tariff reductions and financial aid until the junta government ceased to exist.

The Greek Colonels' coup changed the attitudes of the EEC member countries which had seen ancient Greece as the cradle of democracy. At the time, the Community had only six members - West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) countries - which cooperated in the non-recognition of the Greek Colonels' junta regime. On May 8, 1967, the European Parliament initiated a debate to evaluate the military intervention in Greek politics. Three days later, the Parliament arrived at a decision about the situation in Greece (JOCE, 1967):

The Parliament expressed its concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece; declared its solidarity with the Greek people; stated that the association could not be applied in its various facets unless the democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored in Greece; considered that the suppression of the Greek Parliament made impossible the functioning of the mixed Parliamentary Association Commission and estimated that until this Commission could function again the practical application of the association agreement would be delayed; expressed hope that Greece would soon return to normal democratic life; underlined the prime need that Greece respect the European Covenant of Human Rights; demanded that the civil rights of political prisoners be restored, and charged the appropriate organs of the EEC to follow all developments in Greece and inform the Parliament of all developments (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 117).

According to this early decision of the European Parliament, the EEC was against the junta in Greece early on. One year later, West Germany's Bundestag decided on April 2, 1968 "to grant no further governmental credits to Greece until parliamentary democracy had been restored" (Xydis, 1974, p. 517).

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on May 7, 1969, in which it "reserved its right to have the association agreement revised or suspended" (Xydis, 1974, p. 519). Furthermore, at the time of the second anniversary of the Colonels' coup, the EEC condemned on May 28, 1969 with another resolution the interruption of Greek democracy and the martial law in force. The second article of the resolution stated that unless democratic and parliamentary structures were established, the Association Agreement would not be implemented, and that under these circumstances, future membership would become unrealizable (JOCE, 1969, p. 16). Thus, the EEC froze the association relations with Greece.

In fact, the EEC had not established written rules for freezing the association with a country. Because

the Community experienced a military intervention in politics of one of its associate states for the first time since its foundation, it used Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, the Birkelbach report, and the Italian memorandum (Coufoudakis, 1977, pp. 120-121). According to these documents, associate countries also had to fulfill the political criterion of the Community, namely adherence to parliamentary democracy. That is to say, if a country did not have a democratically elected parliament, it could not be an associate or a member state. Thus, the European Parliament of the EEC decided to suspend the Athens Agreement. The EEC stated that the EEC-Greece Joint Parliamentary Committee could no longer work with members of the junta for further development. Consequently, the Community stopped giving financial aid to Greece and discussing agricultural policies of the country.

After the freezing of the relations with the EEC, the Greek junta rapidly felt isolated in the international arena. Greek Colonels reacted to the decision of the EEC by claiming that the Community tried to stop financial assistance to Greece, which was only beneficial for the country but not for the Community, during the five-year association period. After a while, "Greek officials admitted that Greece could not win such a challenge, while the domestic political consequences of such an action could potentially be serious" (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 126). Despite the fact that the Greek Colonels decided to withdraw from membership in the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969, just before the eleven members of the CoE suggested excluding Greece from membership due to human rights violations, they insisted on maintaining the associate membership in the EEC.

The combined pressure of the EEC, the Council of Europe, the ILO (International Labour Organization), and to a lesser extent of the NATO and the UN, as well as "the complete diplomatic isolation from individual Western democratic European states, reinforced the Greek public's passive resistance to the junta" (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 131). The Colonels' junta regime in Greece ended in July 1974 after the crisis in Cyprus. Elections were held and a government was established by elected civilian politicians. Karamanlis became the new Prime Minister of the Third Hellenic Republic and re-applied for EEC membership in 1975. At the time, the relationship between the EEC and Greece had been reconstituted, which resulted in EEC membership of the country on the first day of 1981.

8. Comparison of the European Communities' Reactions to Turkish and Greek Coups d'État

On May 27, 1960, Turkish colonels made a coup and ruled the country until 1961. This interruption of democracy led to a delay of the Turkish association with the EEC. Even though relations between the Community and Turkey were strained during the military government, the EEC entered into the relationship with Turkey by signing the Ankara Agreement in 1963 after the government was left to civilians. Moreover, Turkey signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 with the Community. Although another coup d'état was made on March 12, 1971 by Turkish generals who continued to govern the country until 1973, the EEC did not suspend the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

In turn, Greece had initiated a relationship with the EEC by signing the Athens Agreement in 1961. However, the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967 and constituted a dictatorship. At first, just as in the Turkish case, the EEC applied a wait-and-see policy. However, at the time of the second anniversary of the Greek military junta, the EEC declared the freezing of relations with Greece

and suspended the implementation of the Association Agreement. Moreover, it stopped giving financial assistance and limited tariffs due to the continuation of the dictatorship. Consequently, the country had to make efforts to re-constitute the relationship with the Community after the end of the junta regime in 1974.

Besides, Turkey and Greece had become members of the CoE in 1949. The Council was founded in order to safeguard human rights and freedoms on the European continent. Hence, the European Convention on Human Rights was formed within the CoE in 1950 and Turkey and Greece became parties of it. While in the Turkish case, the CoE did not react strongly to the 1960 coup, it suspended the membership of Greece after the 1967 coup and condemned human rights violations in the country.

To sum up, the EEC and the CoE responded more severely to the Greek military dictatorship than to the Turkish coup in 1960. In my opinion, the EEC and the CoE did not suspend the relationship with Turkey because of the short-lived quality of the military governments in contrast to the seven- years- long junta of the Greek Colonels. Both European institutions froze their relations with Greece until the long-lived junta regime was replaced by a civilian government.

9. Conclusion

Because of the historical legacy of military dominance in politics stemming from Ottoman rule, the Turkish and Greek nation-states were established by the generals of their armies.

In the Turkish case, after every coup d'état, new constitutions reinforced the power of the Turkish military. Thus, the dominant role of the military in politics gradually increased. Ironically, the modernization movement in the Ottoman Empire had started with modernizing the army. However, the powerful military under the leadership of the NSC, strengthened after every military intervention, gradually became the cause for breaks to democracy. This led to reactions of the EEC/EU, to which the military replied with an anti-EU attitude.

As a result, the military, which was seen as a modernization instrument that aimed at greater closeness to the West during Ottoman times and early years of the Turkish Republic, now distances the country from the West. Unless its powerful role in politics is overcome, the West seems unlikely to include Turkey into the European Union.

In the Greek case, when the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967, their leader Papadopoulos did not intend to leave the government for a long time. Thus, he established his military junta, which continued for seven years. This Colonels' dictatorship caused the suspension of the relations with the EEC. The Community withheld the implementation of the Association Agreement and stopped giving financial aid to the country. The CoE also suspended the membership of Greece because of human rights violations occurring under the Colonels' dictatorship.

A turning point in Greek history occurred when the Greek junta made a coup d'état against the Greek Cypriot government. The Turkish government responded to this intervention with a military operation in July 1974. After the Greek defeat in Cyprus, the dictatorship in Greece ended. The Third Hellenic Republic was established with the aim of consolidating democracy. The first task of the civilian

government was to eliminate the military from politics in order to establish a strong democracy and to become a member of the EEC. After several amendments to the laws on the role of army officers, Greece applied for membership in the EEC in 1975. Then, the relationship between the country and the EEC was reconstituted. After a period of negotiations, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC on January 1, 1981. From then on, Greece has been benefiting from its EEC/EU membership in terms of financial assistance, while the country in turn has improved its political system.

After analysing the military interventions in Turkey and Greece and the EEC/EU's reactions to them, it seems that the Community reacted to the Turkish coup of 1960 more positively than to the Greek military dictatorship of 1967. Because Greek membership in 1981 coincided with the Turkish coup of 1980, the strained relations between Turkey and Greece led to more difficult relations between Turkey and the EEC: Greece used its veto power several times against the candidacy of Turkey. Even though Turkey-EU relations have been improving since 1999, Turkey should still fulfill the requirements for EU membership.

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DİŐ POLİTİKA OLUŐUM SÜRECİNDE SİVİL TOPLUMUN ROLÜNE TEORİK BİR BAKIŐ

Can Uyar²

Özet

Bu alıőmada dıő politika oluőum sürecinin nasıl ilerlediđi ve hangi aktörlerin bu süreçte ne kadar etkin olduđu uluslararası iliőkiler teorileri kapsamında deđerlendirilmiőtir. Dıő politika oluőum sürecinde bir aktör olduđu iddia edilen sivil toplum tanımı yapılmıőtır. Ulus-devletin egemenliđinin dönüőümü, sivil toplumla iliőkili olarak, uluslararası iliőkiler literatüründeki ortaya ıkan tartıőmalar karőılaőtırılarak incelenmiőtir. Uluslararası iliőkiler teorilerinin dıő politika analizinde ve karar oluőum sürecinde aktör kavramına bakıőları ve inőacı (konstrüktivist) teorinin özne-yapı-kimlik konuları uluslararası iliőkilerde sivil toplumla iliőkili olarak ele alınmıőtır. Dıő politikada yeni aktörlerin yer aldıđı iddiasının sebepleri deđerlendirilmiőt, özel olarak küreselleőme, neo-liberal politikalar, ulus-devletin egemenliđi ve bunun güç kaybetmesi ve kazanması, bir uluslararası aktör olarak Avrupa Birliđi gibi bir kurumun etkisi örneđi üzerinden açıklıđa kavuőturulmuőtur. alıőmada özellikle 1990'lı yıllardan sonra artan küreselleőmenin de etkisiyle dıő politika oluőum sürecinde devlet yerini ve önemini korusa da ulusal ve uluslararası sivil toplum örgütleri etkisini arttırdıđı/arttırmakta olduđu vurgusu yapılmıőtır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Dıő politika, sivil toplum, küreselleőme, ulus devlet, egemenlik

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Abstract

In this study, how the foreign policy formation process progresses, and which actors are effective in this process are evaluated within the scope of international relations theories. Civil society, which is claimed to be an actor in the foreign policy formation process, has been defined. The transformation of the sovereignty of the nation-state, in relation to civil society, is examined by comparing the emerging debates in the international relations literature. The perspectives of international relations theories on the concept of actor in the foreign policy analysis and decision-making process and the subject-structure-identity issues of the constructivist theory are discussed in relation to civil society in international relations. The reasons for the claim that new actors are involved in foreign policy, specifically globalization, neo-liberal policies, the sovereignty of the nation-state and its loss and gaining power, are evaluated, and related issues are explained through the example of the impact of an institution such as the European Union as an international actor. This article emphasizes that although the state maintains its place and importance in the foreign policy formation process, especially with the

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effect of increasing globalization after the 1990s, national and international non-governmental organizations have increased their influence.

Keywords: Foreign policy, civil society, globalization, nation state, sovereignty

1. Giriş

İnsanlık günümüze kadar farklı siyasi ve düşünsel iklimlerin hâkim olduğu dönemlerden geçmiştir. Bu dönemlerin bazıları hem dünyayı hem de insanlığı oldukça etkilemişlerdir. Bu çalışma, 1980'li yıllardan 2010'lu yılların başına kadar olan sürecini incelemektedir. Bahsi geçen dönemde siyasetten ekonomiye, insan hakları hukukundan çevre hukukuna, yaşam tarzlarına, tarihe ve topluma ilişkin birçok konuda değişim yaşanmaktadır. Bütüncül olarak yaşanan bu değişim genel olarak küreselleşme olgusuyla incelenmektedir. Yaşadığımız dönem ise post-modern dönem olarak değerlendirilmekte ve bu dönemde modern döneme oldukça yoğun eleştiriler yapılmaktadır.

Eleştiriler modern dönemin yaşam tarzından düşünüş şekline, bilimine, insan haklarına ve genel olarak her şeyinedir. Tabii ki hem bir bilim dalı olarak uluslararası ilişkiler hem de konu edindiği devlet ve dış politika oluşum süreci de bu değişimden etkilenmiş ve eleştirilere uğramıştır. Sistemin birincil aktörü olduğu kabul edilen devletin egemenliği artık daha çok tartışılmaktadır. Bunun yanında özellikle dış politika ve uluslararası ilişkilerde istisnalar hariç dikkate alınmayan sivil toplum ön plana çıkmaktadır. Belirtilen değişim ve dönüşüm cevaplanmayı bekleyen sorular da ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Dış politika oluşum sürecinde sivil toplum örgütlerinin etkisine odaklanan bu çalışma; konuyla ilgili teorileri karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemektedir.

2. Dış Politika Yapım Süreci, Sivil Toplum ve Aktörler

Dış politika yapım sürecinde; buna katılan aktörler ve bu aktörlerin son yıllarda nasıl değiştiği, bu aktörlere yenilerinin katılıp katılmadığı, birincil ve en etkili aktör olarak görülen devletin dış politika oluşum sürecindeki rolü hem ulusal hem de küresel düzeyde etkili olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda inşacı (konstrüktivizm) teorisinin sosyal yapı, özne ve kimlik eksenli dış politika bakışında sivil toplum kavramı ve sivil toplumun dış politikayla ilişkisi de öne çıkmaktadır. Çalışmada incelendiği gibi inşacı teoriler gibi postmodern uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri dış politika analizlerinde sivil toplum gibi aktörleri de incelemektedir.

Dış politika, devletlerin uluslararası sistem içerisinde yetkili organ ve temsilcileri aracılığıyla esasen diğer devletlere yönelik olarak izledikleri siyaset ve davranışların tümü olarak tanımlanabilir (Tayfur, 2010, s. 73). Bu şekilde tanımlamakla birlikte, devletin esas karar verici mi yoksa uygulayıcı mı olduğu noktasındaki önemli tartışmalar devam etmektedir. Özellikle 20. yüzyılın sonlarında devletin egemenliği oldukça sorgulanır hale gelmiştir. Diğer taraftan, ulusal devletin birincil aktör olduğuna dair görüşler literatürdeki başatlığını korumaya devam etmektedir. "Devletin büyük oranda otonom davranarak, belirli politika ve yaklaşımları üstten empoze ettiği eski sistem çöktü. Çıkar grupları ve siyasi çoğulculuğun gelişimi dış politikayı şekillendiren ve etkileyen farklı güçlerin ortaya çıkması anlamını taşıyordu" (Rubin & Kirişçi, 2002, s. 378) gibi iddiaların arttığı da bir gerçektir. Ancak "dış politika araştırma alanında yapılan katkılarının giderek derinlik kaybetmesi ve kendisini yinelemesinin önüne geçememesi" (Özcan, 2006, s. 9) bu durumu ortaya çıkaran sebeplerden biridir.

Ulus-devlet hem ulusal hem de uluslararası alandan egemenliğini zayıflatıcı müdahalelere uğramış ve uğramaya da devam etmektedir. Uluslararası ilişkiler alanında, devleti ön planda tutan ve tek aktör olarak vurgulayan realist kurama çok önemli eleştiriler yapılmış ve bu durum önemli bir tartışma alanının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu bağlamda 'günümüz toplumlarının ulaştığı sosyal farklılaşma ve örgütlenme zenginliği' uluslararası ilişkiler alanı içinde temel aktör ve inceleme alanı konusunda meydana gelen değişiklikleri yansıtmaktadır (Sönmezoğlu, 2005, s. 18).

Ayrıca Rosenau'nun uluslararası ilişkiler alanındaki aktör tartışmalarına getirdiği bakış açısı oldukça açıklayıcıdır. Rosenau, devlet merkezli (state centric) ve çok-merkezli (multi-centric) (Rosenau, 1989, s. 8) olmak üzere iki ana yapıda bu tartışmaları sınıflandırır. Sönmezoğlu'nun, William D. Coplin'in kullandığı ve kendisinin kitabında açıklayarak yer verdiği aktörler sınıflandırması dış politika düzeyinde değerlendirme noktasında önemlidir; buna göre aktörler dört gruba ayrılır: a) hükümetleri temsil eden ulusal nitelikli aktörler, b) hükümetleri temsil etmeyen ulusal nitelikli aktörler, c) hükümetlerin temsil edilmediği (non-governmental organization) uluslararası nitelikli aktörler (NGO), d) hükümetlerin temsil edildiği uluslararası aktörler (IGO) (Sönmezoğlu, 2005, s. 37). Bu dört ana grubun altına bireyler, sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK), uluslararası örgütler, çok uluslu şirketler gibi, bazısı yeni bazıları ise gücünü yeni arttıran aktörler eklenebilir. Bu noktada "uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe yer alan çalışmalarda bu gibi aktörler ne kadar yoğun bir biçimde dikkate alınırsa, egemen devletin birincil aktör olma konumu o derece sarsılmış olmaktadır" (Sönmezoğlu, 2006, s. 465). The Yearbook of International Organization'a göre günümüzde 74.000'in üzerinde (42.000 aktif) hükümetlerarası organizasyon ve uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşu var olup, her yıl ortalama 1.200 yeni örgüt bu sayıya eklenmektedir (Union of International Associations, 2021). Bu veriler, uluslararası düzeyde, sivil toplum örgütleri olan aktörlerin etkisinin artmasının görülmesi açısından önemlidir.

Dış politika yapım sürecini, bir karar alma süreci olarak incelemek de mümkündür. Karar vericilerin kim olduğu, nasıl karar verdikleri ve hangi şartlarda karar verdikleri bu noktada ön plana çıkmaktadır. Çok uzun yıllar kabul edildiği gibi, sadece egemen ulus-devlet tek başına karar verici olarak kalmamıştır. Dış politika oluşum sürecinde, yerel politikaların ve yerel karar vericilerin etkili olduğu bir gerçektir. Birçok uluslararası sorunda, uluslararası kamuoyu etkin olabilmektedir. Çevre sorunları çerçevesinde yapılan protestolar veya Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) 2003 yılı Irak işgali sırasında Türkiye'nin işgale katılmaması için yapılan protestolar, buna örnek olabilir. Bu kapsamda, yerel politikalar da dış siyaseti etkileyebilmektedir (Mintz & Derouen, 2010, s. 6).

Devletlerin dış politika yapım sürecinde yeri ne kadar olumsuz etkilense de; "dış politikanın konusu ve odağı, uluslararası sistemin temel aktörleri olan devletlerdir" (Tayfur, 2010, s. 74) görüşü hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Ancak devletler siyasa oluşturma sürecinde bu alanı etkileyecek; açık veya gizli hükümetler arası görüşmeler müzakereler, diplomatlar, askerler vb. kurumlarla başka bir devletin müdahalesine maruz kalabilmektedirler.

Bu resmi müdahalelerinin yanında gayri resmî nüfuz etme durumu da önemli bir müdahale şeklini oluşturmaktadır (Sönmezoğlu, 2006, s. 34). Özellikle 1990'lı yıllardan sonra artan şekilde sivil toplumdan gayri resmî şekilde önemli müdahaleler hem ulusal hem de uluslararası anlamda önemli ölçüde

gelmektedir. Bu noktada görülmektedir ki hem iç politika yapım süreci hem de dış politika yapım süreci, sadece siyasi partiler çerçevesinde ve ulusal boyutta düşünülmemelidir (Keyman, 2005, s. 7).

Dış politika, realizm ve tam olmasa da idealizmin (devleti tek aktör olarak görmese de önemli bir aktör olarak görmektedir) yaptığı gibi bir yüksek siyaset (high politics) olarak ele alınması sivil toplum ile beraber düşünüldüğünde pek mümkün olmamaktadır (Tayfur, 2010, s. 75).

Post-modern teorilerde oldukça önemli tartışma konusu olan, küreselleşmenin de etkisiyle kimlik, özne ve yapı gibi konular farklı açılardan incelenmeye başlanmıştır. İnşacı teorinin dış politika analizi özellikle aktör ve yapı arası ilişkide, neo-realist ve neo-liberal teorilere eleştiriyile oluşmaktadır. Özne, yapı ve kimliğin çıkar ilişkisini farklı olarak değerlendiren Wendt, kimlik ve sosyal yapının çıkarın oluşmasında ön planda olduğunu ve hem yapının bireyi hem de bireyin yapıyı etkilediğini vurgulamaktadır (Wendt, 2016). Bu durumda STK'ların politika oluşum sürecinde kendilerine nasıl bir kimlik ve rol atfettikleri ve devlete bunu nasıl yansıttıkları önemli hale gelmektedir. Yani dış politikanın inşası sürecinde, bir politik aktör olarak, sivil toplum örgütleri de etkili olmaktadır. İnşacı teori açısından mesele bir devletin kendini nasıl tanımladığı ve bu kimlik ekseninde politikasını nasıl oluşturulduğıyla alakalı olması da bunu gösteren önemli noktalardandır. Dış politika sürecinin, aktörlerinin ve analiz düzeyinin değişimi ile yeni inceleme boyutlarına başvurulmaktadır. Aktörlerin çoğalmasıyla yapılan çalışmalar ve karar alma süreçlerinin daha karmaşık bir yapıya büründüğü görülmektedir. "Dış politika kavramı her anlamdaki küreselleşmenin etkisiyle değişikliğe uğramaktadır" (Ersanlı, 2006, s. 25).

Bunlarla birlikte dünya genelinde artan demokrasi vurgusunun etkisi de değerlendirilmeye alınmalıdır. Demokrasinin genel geçer, sivil toplum, aktörler ve dış politika oluşum süreçleri açısından da önemli olan özellikleri vardır: Siyasi eşitlik, çoğulculuk, katılım, oy hakkı gibi. Demokrasiye yüklenen özellikler günümüzde çoğaltılmaktadır; pozitif ayrımcılığın var olması, halkın kendini doğrudan ve sürekli bir biçimde yönetebilmesi, eşit fırsatlar ve bireysel liyakat, rekabetçi seçimler ve halkın menfaatlerinin korunması gibi (Heywood, 2011, s. 101). Güçlü bir sivil toplumun oluşabilmesi için demokrasinin kurallarının en iyi şekilde uygulanması gerekir. Farklılıklar düzeylerde olsa da ülkelerde sivil toplumun etkisi artmaktadır.

Günümüzde devletin, dış politika oluşum sürecinden daha etkilenebilir bir yapıda olduğu da bir geçektir. Özellikle 1980'lerden sonra uluslararası sistem daha görünür ve daha çeşitli aktörlerle karşılaşmaya başlamıştır (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2002, s. 1). Bunlardan biri de çok uluslu şirketlerdir. Örneğin devletler politika uygulama noktasında, birçok uluslu şirketin baskısına maruz kalabilmektedirler.

Dış politika analizi alanı, alt-yerel-ulusal gruplardan da gelen, dış politikanın daha demokratik bir düzeyde oluşturulması istekleriyle de ilgilenmeye başlamıştır (Tayfur, 2010, s. 102). Genel bir artış seyri gösteren demokratikleşme talepleri, farklı temellere sahip ve farklı istekleri olan grupların dış politika sürecini de etkilemeye çalışmasını da ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Özellikle uluslararası örgütlere katılım ve bu düzeyde yeni örgütlerin ortaya çıkması, devletler üzerinde denetimi arttırmıştır.

Dış politika karar alma sürecinde gidilen önemli değişiklikler bir anlamda karar alma ve politika oluşum sürecinin daha fazla demokratikleşmesidir. Burada sivil toplumun daha aktif bir şekilde sürece müdahil olmasının gerekliliği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Daha demokratik bir politika oluşum süreci için sivil toplumun

etkin olması bir ön şarttır (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011, s. 2). Sivil toplumun etkisinin her alanda artmasıyla beraber devlet merkezli sistemin daha geçirgen bir yapıya dönüşmeye başladığı görülmektedir (Özcan, 2006, s. 11). Yönetişim kavramı ile şeffaflığın artmasının ne kadar çok uygulanmaya çalışıldığı dikkate alındığında, bu durum oldukça önemli bir ilerlemedir.

Dış politika oluşum sürecini etkileyen faktör ve aktörlerin arttığı bir gerçektir. Dış politika oluşum sürecini açıklamaya çalışan bütün teori ve girişimler bunları hesaba katmaktadır. Örneğin, uluslararası ortam, yerel etkileyiciler, karar alıcıların durumu, bilginin yeterli olup olmaması, var olan olayın durumu, ulusal çıkar gibi. Bunların dikkate alınmasındaki amaç; sübjektif dış politika karar alma sürecinde bir anlamda daha fazla objektif bir yapının oluşturulmaya çalışılmasıdır. Bunlara ek olarak 1980'lerde daha çok duyulan kamuoyu etkisi de eklenebilir. Bu olgu, günümüzde daha çok sivil toplum kavramı ile de açıklanmaktadır.

3. Dış Politika Analizinde Sivil Toplum Kavramı

Burada sivil toplum kâr amacı gütmeyen sektör geniş yelpazesini içerecek şekilde kullanılmıştır (Salamon & Anheier, 1992). Sivil toplum, toplumsal ve siyasi aktörlerin bir arada yaşamak için bir araya geldiği, birbirini etkilediği ve tartıştığı buluşma yeridir (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011, s. 2). Sivil toplum ve mobilizasyon süreci de birbirinin önemli tamamlayıcısıdır. Mobilizasyon sürecinde çıkar ve sivil toplum grupları ilişkili halinde olup, her biri birbirini etkiler ve birbirlerinden etkilenirler (Mayer & Imig, 1993, s. 254). Sivil toplumun hareketli ve başarılı olması, demokrasinin ilerlemesi ve faaliyet alanını artırması noktasında çok önemli bir yere sahiptir (Öniş & Türem, 2009, s. 95). Katılımcılık, sadece iç politikaya yönelik değil dış politikaya yönelik bir durumu da kapsamaktadır. Bu paralelde dış politikanın demokratikleşmesinde sivil toplum örgütlerinin çok önemli bir yeri vardır. Bu noktada uluslararası ilişkiler alanında özellikle dış politika analizinde bu kavramın değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Sivil toplum, hükümetlerin temsil edilmediği (non-governmental organization) aktörler, hükümet dışı aktörler (NGO) olarak düşünüldüğünde, bunların egemen devletin politika oluşturma sürecinde son yıllarda, bu aktörlerde hem niteliksel hem de niceliksel olarak yaşanan değişikliklerle, daha etkin hale gelmişlerdir. Bireyin toplumsallaşması daha katılımcı bir toplum için oldukça önemlidir. Yerel yönetimde boşluğun olması halinde, bu boşluk merkezi hükümet tarafından doldurulabilmektedir (Ketola, 2011, s. 789). Merkezin gücünün azalması, bireyin etkisini arttırmasına bağlıdır. Putnam'a göre de ilişkisel sosyal ağlar doğrudan hükümetin performansına etki eder (Ketola, 2011, s. 789). Daha demokratik bir yapı için sivil toplum olmazsa olmaz şartlardan biridir.

Sivil toplum, uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri açısından farklı şekillerde değerlendirilmiştir. Realist kuram devletleri aktör olarak incelemektedir. Realizm ve neo-realizme göre temel olarak sistem, devlet denilen tek bir aktörün uyguladığı kararlar etrafında şekillenmektedir. Realizme göre, devlet hâlihazırda rasyonel kararlar alır. Dış politika konusunda da bahsedildiği gibi, yüksek politika alanı önceliklidir. Bu noktada ulusal çıkar ve devlet çıkarı ön plandadır. Ancak sivil toplum, sadece devlet çıkarını dikkate alan bir yapı olarak düşünülmemelidir. Uluslararası bağlantıları olan ve kendi devletinin aleyhine çalışan baskı grupları da vardır.

Liberalizm özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle beraber, devlet yanında yeni aktörlerin de ortaya çıktığını göz önüne almıştır. Özellikle neo-liberalizm sivil toplum üzerinde durmaktadır. Uluslararası sistem ve devlet yanında/ötesinde uluslararası örgütler ve sivil toplum kuruluşları da inceleme alanı haline getirilmiştir (Doğan, Türk Dış Politikası ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, 2012, s. 56). Uluslararası ilişkilere feminist teorinin uygulanması bunun en iyi örneklerindedir. Bu uygulamada doğrudan kadınların uluslararası sistemde nerede yer aldıkları durumu tartışılmaktadır. Bunun, 1990'lardan sonra artan kadın hareketleri doğrultusunda geliştiği dikkate alınmalıdır. Kimlik ve yapı eksenli, sosyal alana daha fazla vurgu yapan uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri, yeni yaklaşımlar adı altında oluşmaya devam etmektedir.

Sivil toplumun oluşması için ön gereklilik biri de pazar ekonomisinin olmasıdır (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011, s. 5). Kâr amacı gütmeyen STK'lar olmakla beraber, ticaret odaklı kesimlerin kurduğu STK'lar, son kerte sivil toplumun ve liberal değerlerin gelişmesiyle beraber, pazarın gelişeceği de belirtilmelidir. Önemli bir konu da sivil toplum grupları arasındaki etki dereceleridir. Bu noktada ticari odaklı gruplar daha etkin rol oynamaktadır. Küreselleşme ve liberalleşmeyle artan oranda ekonomik çıkar grubu oluşmaya başlamış ve bunlar devletin hem iç hem de dış politikada refahı sağlamak için yardımcı olmak adına söz sahibi olmuşlardır (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2002, s. 15). STK'lar her zaman devlet ile karşı karşıya olmayabilir, bazen onlarla iş birliği halinde de olabilmektedirler (Özcan, 2006, s. 15). Sivil toplumun oluşması için diğer önkoşullar ise okuma-yazma oranının yüksek olması-yaygın yayın kültürü, toplum içinde yatay bağlar, grup içi ve grup dışı uyumdur (Heper & Yıldırım, 2011, s. 4). Daha katılımcı bir sivil toplum için iyi eğitim ve öğretim almış bireyler gerekmektedir.

Dış politikanın daha fazla gündemde olması ve dış politika alanıyla daha çok ilgilenen STK'ların artması ve bunların etkin hale gelmesi (Doğan & Mazlum, 2006, s. 11) dış politika analizinde daha mikro düzeyde çalışmalar yapılmaya başlamasına neden olmakta ve daha yerel düzeyde aktörlerin dış politika yapım sürecinde yerini almasını sağlamaktadır. Mikro düzeydeki çalışmalar ve kimlik çalışmaları hem uluslararası ilişkiler hem de dış politika düzeyinde önemli düşünsel değişimlere sebep olmaktadır. Post-modernizm ve konstrüktivizm, özneye oldukça önem verirler. Bu özne; birey ve onun oluşturduğu sosyal yapı olarak düşünülmektedir. Bu noktada sivil toplumun siyasa oluşturma ve karar alma sürecinde etkisi artarak belirmeye başlamaktadır.

Sivil toplumun etkin bir güç olmasının diğer bir yönü ise "uluslararasılaşma" (Özcan, 2006, s. 14) kavramının önem kazandığı 'Zeitgeist'in ortaya çıkmasıdır. Bireyler de sorunları uluslararası platformlara taşıyabilmektedir. Bunun en önemli örnekleri, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi ve son yıllarda yerleşik bir uluslararası ceza mahkemesi gibi uluslararası mahkemelerin varlığıdır. Bunun yanında gelişen bir sivil toplum ile bu sorunlar daha rahat gündeme getirilebilmekte ve iç politikanın konusu olabilecek bir durum dış politika konusu haline gelebilmektedir. Ancak sivil toplum yekpare bir yapı olmadığı gibi farklı güçte ve siyasi görüşlere sahip gruplar tarafından da oluşturulabilmektedir (Şimşek, 2004, s. 47). Sürece daha fazla ve farklı görüşleri barındıran aktörlerin katılması, politika oluşturma sürecinde devlete daha fazla baskı oluşturma gücü sağlamaktadır. Burada vurgulamaya çalışılan, politika oluşum sürecinin hem ulusal hem de uluslararası alandaki STK'lar tarafından etkilenir hale gelmesidir. Örneğin, AB her yıl yayımladığı ilerleme/ülke raporları ile Türkiye'ye eleştiriler getirip

gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasını sağlamada etki oluşturmakta ve sivil topluma daha fazla dikkat çekilmektedir.

Bunlara ek olarak Küresel sivil toplum (global civil society) kavramı oldukça yaygın kullanılmaya başlamıştır. Perret, üç ana gövdede bu konuyu incelemekte ve neo-liberal bakışta- küresel yönetim, Marksist bakış açısında daha neo-Gramşçıyan bir yol ve Kantçı bakış açısından da global-küresel sivil toplum yönüyle bahsetmektedir (Virgile, 2006).

Her yerde sivil toplum ile demokrasi arasındaki korelasyon aynı değildir (Şimşek, 2004, s. 46). Sivil toplumun bireyselliği içinde eritmiş olması gerekir. "İdeal anlamda sivil toplum aktif ve dönüştürücü bireyselliğin kolektif biçimidir" (Keyman, 2005, s. 168). Bireyselliğin içinde eridiği fakat farklılıkların da önemsendiği bir durum olmalıdır.

Yerel STK'lar artık uluslararası bağlantılara sahiptirler. Bu yolla yerel çaptakiler önemli derecede bir tecrübe, know-how ve fon sağlamaktadırlar (Ergun, 2010, s. 511). Örneğin AB, Türkiye'de STK'lara önemli finansal kaynaklar ve çok önemli tecrübe aktarımında bulunmaktadır.

Demokratik toplumun iki önemli yapı taşı sivil toplum ve partilerdir. Partiler dünyanın birçok ülkesinde politika oluşum sürecinin ana aktörü olarak daha şeffaf ve katılımcı bir politika oluşturmada yer almaktadırlar. Partiler, STK'ların isteklerini politika oluşturma alanına taşımaları ve bu örgütlerin gelişimini sağlamalıdır (Keyman, 2005, s. 169). Siyasal sistemde geri besleme (feed back), yeni politikalar oluşması için oldukça önemlidir. STK'ların finansal kaynak yaratmak, kapasite sorunlarına odaklanmak ve örgütsel büyümeye daha fazla değer veren bir yapıya sahip olmak için çalışmaları, asıl görevleri olan; toplumsal sorunların tartışma alanına girmesini ve politik sürece daha etkin girilmesi işlevini aksatmaktadır (Keyman, 2005, s. 204). Yani sivil toplumun demokratik sürece daha etkili katılımı gerekmektedir.

Dış politika açısından değerlendirildiğinde yapılacak bir anlaşma içeriği ve ayrıntılarından, kamuoyunu haberdar edecek yapı olarak sivil toplumun örgütlü olması gereklidir. Sivil toplum isteklerini siyasa oluşum sürecine sokabilmeli ve siyasi mekanizmada etkin olabilmelidir.

Sivil toplumun gelişmesi devletin elinde bulundurduğu gücü kötüye kullanmasını da engelleyebilmektedir (Ketola, 2011, s. 789). Diğer yönüyle düşünüldüğünde daha katılımcı ve demokratik bir yapı politika yapım sürecinde sivil toplumun etkili olmasını sağlayabilmektedir. Demokratikleşme ve siyasa yapım süreci bu durumda görüleceği üzere oldukça etkileşim içindedir. Karar alma sürecinde sivil toplumun etkili olabilmesi ülkenin rejiminin, siyasi kültürünün ve demokrasi niteliğinin yüksekliğiyle de alakalıdır. Ülkedeki STK'ların becerileri, etkili ve verimli çalışmaları da dış politika oluşum sürecinde etkili olmalarını belirleyebilmektedir (Doğan, 2012, s. 60).

4. Küreselleşme ve Neo-liberal Politikaların Dış Politika Analizinde Etkileri

Dünyada birçok alanda ekonomiden kültüre, teknolojiden iletişime gelişmeler ve değişimler olmuştur. Yeni grupların temsili, ekonomik liberalizasyon, nüfus alanlarındaki değişimler, yönetim kavramı içerisinde toplumların farklı gruplarının temsil isteklerinin artması ve küreselleşme gibi olgular bu kapsamda sayılabilir (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasely, 2002, s. 1-2). Bunlar sivil toplumu etkiledikleri gibi doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak da dış politika oluşum sürecini etkilemektedirler.

Literatürde, küreselleşme tartışmaları ve etkilerini oldukça önemli ve etkileyici görenler olduğu gibi bunun etkilerinin çok da fazla olmadığını, bunun yanında küreselleşmenin özellikle 20. yüzyılda hız kazandığını fakat bunun daha öncesinde de var olduğunu, küreselleşmeden ziyade bir bölgeselleşme olduğunu savunanları da görmek mümkündür (Held & McGrew, 2008). Yine de küreselleşme olgusuyla topyekûn bir olaydan bahsedilmektedir. Bu olgu insanları, şehirleri, algıları, devletleri ve birçok şeyi etkilemektedir. “Karmaşık teknolojik, ekolojik ve kültürel yapılar ve süreçlerin etkileri gezegenin tümünde hissedilmekte ya da en azından devletlerin ülke sınırlarını aşan ya da yok sayan bir hareket” (Poggi, 2011, s. 241) ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Küreselleşme tarihsel süreç içerisinde özellikle 20. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde hız kazanan tarihsel bir dönüm noktası olarak da görülebilir. Küreselleşme, 1980’den sonra yeni sosyal hareketler teknolojik gelişmeler ve küresel iletişimin artması ile daha görünür hale gelmiştir (Şimşek, 2004, s. 111). Küreselleşme ile birlikte siyaset yapım zeminlerini dönüştürürken, aynı zamanda ulus-üstü aktörleri (AB, International Monetary Fund- IMF, Birleşmiş Milletler gibi) ve ulus-altı aktörleri siyasal alanın iç aktörlerine dönüştürmeye başlamıştır (Keyman, 2005, s. 8). Bu gibi örgütler ulusal düzeydeki STK’ları oldukça fazla etkileme ve finansa etme gücüne sahiptirler.

Küreselleşme, “uzak yerellikleri yerel olayların millerce ötedeki olaylar tarafından biçimlendirdiği bağlantılar kuran dünya çapında toplumsal ilişkilerin yoğunlaşması” (Giddens, 2008, s. 81) olarak da ele alınabilir. Uluslararası alanda önemli etkiler bu süreçte oluşmakta ve ulus-devletin geçirgenliği artmaktadır. Bazı sorunların –çevre sorunları, nükleer enerji kullanımı, su, açlık, yoksulluk, sömürü-sadece ortaya çıktığı bölgenin kendi sorunları olmadığı fikri oluşmakta; bu durum da politika oluşum süreçlerini etkilemektedir. Bu süreçlerde ulusal düzeyde bir STK, kendi paydaşı STK’larla daha yakın ve hızlı iletişim kurarak sorunların çözümünde kendi devletlerine baskı oluşturabilmekte ve uluslararası toplumun ilgisini çekebilmektedirler.

Bazı devletler, değişikliklerle mücadele ederken bazıları da bu değişikliklere uyum sağlamaya başlamışlardır (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2002, s. 2). Bununla beraber küreselleşmeden birden fazla tarihsel dünya toplumunun tek bir küresel sistem içinde bir araya getirilmesi süreci olarak da bahsedilebilir (Modelska, 2008, s. 75). Bazı devletler bu duruma daha çabuk uyum sağlarken bazıları da daha geç kalmakta; bu durum onların dış politika oluşum süreçlerini de etkilemektedir. Yönetişim, neoliberalizm ve küreselleşme uluslararası sistemde, demokraside, refah devletinde, modern siyasi kurumlarda değişiklik olmakta (Zürn, 2005, s. 1) ve bu devletlerin politikalarına doğrudan yansımaktadır.

Küreselleşmenin avantajları olduğu gibi dezavantajları vardır. Bazı gruplar bu süreçten hem rahatsız olmakta hem de olumsuz yönde etkilenmektedirler. Bu durum tersi tepkiler oluşturarak, mikro milliyetçilikleri ve aşırı sağın yükselmesini tetikleyebilmekte ya da daha küçük ve ulusal düzeyde kimliklere bağlı siyasaların oluşturulmasına sebep olmaktadır. Böylece oluşan gruplar devletlerin iç siyasetlerinde ve dış siyasetlerinde söz sahibi olabilmektedirler.

Konuya şu açıdan da bakılabilir. Keohane ve Nye küreselleşmeye daha çok ekonomik bağlamda karşılıklı bağımlılık çerçevesinde bakmaktadırlar (Keohane & Nye Jr., 2008, s. 97). Küreselleşmeyi farklı boyutlarla yine karşılıklı bağımlılık çerçevesinde şöyle sınıflandırırlar: ekonomik küreselcilik, askeri küreselcilik, çevresel küreselcilik, toplumsal ve kültürel küreselcilik (Keohane & Nye Jr., 2008, s. 98-99).

Karşılıklı bağımlılık noktasında düşünülürse; kapitalizmin yaşadığı nihai küreselleşme hamlesinin sadece ekonomik açıdan bağımlı üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin değil, bu ülkelere oranla bağımsızlığını koruyabilmiş olan lider devletlerin bile hareket alanını ve eylem kabiliyetini sınırlandırmaktadır (Habermas, 2008, s. 58-59). Sivil toplumun belirttiğimiz olgularla bağlantılı olarak devletlerin dış politika oluşturma süreçlerini farklı düzeylerde olsa da etkilediği bir gerçektir.

Küreselleşme sürecinde, insani düzeyde hem uluslararası örgütlerin strateji ve politika üretmeleri hem de ulus-devletin politika oluşum süreci daha katılımcı bir yapıya sahip olmaktadır (Keyman, Değişen Dünya, Değişen Türkiye, 2005, s. 27). Uluslararası kamuoyunun sağlaması oldukça önemlidir ve dünyanın farklı yerlerindeki STK'lar da birbirlerini daha rahat etkileyebilmektedirler. Böylece STK'lar daha güçlü birer politik aktör olarak görünür kılınırlar. Siyasa oluşum sürecini doğrudan etkileyen küreselleşme, dış politika oluşum sürecinin değişime uğramasının önemli bir nedenidir.

5. Politika Oluşturma Sürecinde Ulus Devletin Egemenliğinin Gerilemesi

Küreselleşme, daha fazla katılım ve sivil toplumun güçlenmesi noktasında, ulus-devletin sınırlarının sorgulanır hale gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu dış politika anlamında da tek karar alıcının; devletin kendisinin olmasından ziyade, yeni katılımcılarla hareket etmesi anlamına gelmektedir.

Ulus-devlet, özellikle dış politika konusunda önemli bir aktör olmaya devam etmektedir. Bunun sebebi en etkili dış politika oluşturucusu olması, güvenlik konusundaki konularda gücü elinde bulundurması ve sivil toplumun zayıf olduğu ülkelerde ulus-devlete bazen sivil toplumu güçlendirmesi noktasında da ihtiyaç olmasıdır.

Ulus-devletin egemenliğinin azaldığı, egemenlik şeklinin değişime uğradığı ve toplumların hayatlarına daha mikro düzeylerde nüfuz eder hale geldiği literatür açısından devam eden bir tartışmadır. Genel kabul hem iç hem de dış politika oluşum sürecinde ulus-devlet adına önemli değişimler olduğudur. Egemenlik, bir devletin uluslararası düzen içindeki yeri ve bağımsız ve otonom bir varlık olarak hareket edebilme yeteneği ile ilişkilidir. Etkenler ve değişimler, bu dış egemenliği olumlu ya da olumsuz etkilemektedir (Heywood, 2011, s. 189). Egemenlik özellikle dış politika konusunda en etkili olunan düzeydir ve sivil toplum burada yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi görünür hale gelmiştir/gelmektedir.

Ulus-devletin bazı özellikleri aşınmakta ve tarihsel süreç içerisinde yeni özellikler kazanmaktadır; bazen de bu sınırlar şekil değiştirmektedir. Poggi, *Devlet- Doğası, Gelişimi ve Geleceği* adlı kitabında, Carles Tilly'nin tanımını alıntılar; "belli sınırları olan bir bölgede yaşayan bir nüfusu idare eden bir organizasyon, aynı toprak sınırları içinde faaliyet gösteren diğer organizasyonlardan farklılaşmış, özerk; merkezileşmiş ve bölümleri birbiriyle resmi bir koordinasyon içinde çalışıyor ise, devlettir" (Tilly, 1975, s. 70) ve son iki yüzyılda bu tanıma yeni bazı özelliklerin katıldığını belirtir.

Küreselleşme ve bölgeselleşme gibi kavramlar gündemde daha fazla yer almaktadır. AB gibi ulus-üstü bir yapı, sınırların aşınması ve etkisiz hale gelmesine iyi bir örnek teşkil eder. Bunun yanında bu çalışmada incelediği gibi devletin gücünü arttıran gelişmeler de olmaktadır. Belli bir nüfusun var olma özelliğine gelecek olunursa, artık insanlık çok hareketli bir yapıya sahiptir. Ancak yine de bir devlete resmi bağlılık olmakla beraber, insanların bağlılık hisleri topraktan farklı olgulara kaymaya başlamıştır. Daha geniş düşünceler, örneğin dünya vatandaşlığı gibi, ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Diğer bir özellik

ise organizasyondur. Devletin yönetimi ve politika oluşturmasını sağlayan organizasyonuna, farklı aktörler de müdahale eder duruma gelmiştir. Sivil toplumun ve STK'ların son yıllarda artan etkisi bu bağlamda düşünülebilir. Fakat ulus-devlet varlığını korumaktadır.

Egemen hareket etme kabiliyetinde, devletin önemli derecede baskı altında olması durumu söz konusudur. Konu çerçevesinde bakıldığında, ulus-devletin egemen hareket etme kabiliyeti, hem içerden –STK'lar- hem de dışarıdan –AB ve BM gibi uluslararası örgütler ve uluslararası kamuoyundan- siyasa oluşturma sürecinde egemenlik noktasında olumsuz yönde etkilenmektedir.

Poggi, Tilly'nin belirttiği devletlerin özelliklerine ek olarak, ulus olma, demokratik meşruiyet, yurttaşlık, bürokrasi kavramlarını da sayar (Poggi, 2011, s. 38-42). Bu düşünceye tezat olarak meşruiyet, yurttaşlık, ulus olma tartışmaları son yıllarda oldukça artmıştır. Bunların kimlik tartışmalarıyla çok yakından ilişkisi vardır.

Ulus-devletin incelenmesinin ve sınırlarının ve yetkilerinin aşıldığı iddiasının bir başka sebebi de uluslararası ilişkiler alanında kurumsal yeni tartışmaların ortaya çıkmasıdır. "Son yıllarda devletin tarihsel ve toplumsal niteliğiyle ilgili tartışmalar, neo-realist uluslararası ilişkiler kuramı ile karşılaştırıldığında, devlet kavramına daha tarihsel ve sosyolojik bir anlam vermektedir" (Yalvaç, 2010, s. 15). Devlete bakış ve onun sınırlarına dair temel fikirler, devletin güçlendiği, ulusal çıkar bazında araştırmalar hariç oldukça değişmiştir. Bu durum sınırları belli, ancak daha geçirgen, politika yapım sürecinde daha etkilenen bir devletin oluşması noktasında önem kazanır. Devlet kavramının sosyolojik bir anlam kazanması da bu noktada düşünülmelidir.

Klasik uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinden realizm ve idealizm teorilerinde devletin toplumdan koparılması ve ayrı bir noktada tutulmasının eleştirilmesi de ulus-devletin incelenmesinde bir etken olmuştur (Yalvaç, 2010, s. 16). Eleştirel teoriler özellikle konstrüktivist teori ve Wendt'in sosyal inşacı anlayışı da bu noktada önemli bir çerçeve oluşturmaktadır. Özne olarak sosyal ilişkilerin daha ön plana çıkarılması, konumuz açısından doğrudan bağlantılıdır. Bu paralelde sosyal yapının oluşmasında en büyük aktörlerden biri sivil toplumdur.

Devletin bağımsız bir aktör olduğuna dair diğer bir tartışma da özellikle 1960 ve 1970'ler de uluslararası ilişkiler alanında ortaya çıkan plüralist (çoğulcu) yaklaşım çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan tartışmalardır. Plüralizm de politika oluşum sürecinde bağımsız bir devletin değil, aksine farklı çıkar gruplarından etkilenen bir aktör olarak devleti incelemektedir. Etkileyenlerden biri de sivil toplumdur. Sivil toplumun uluslararası ilişkiler alanında bir aktör olarak kabul edilmesi, sivil toplumun meşrulaştırması açısından önem arz etmektedir.

Ulus-devletin gücünün aşınmasını küreselleşmeyle beraber düşünme zorunluluğu vardır. Karar alıcıların artan etkisi nedeniyle egemen ulus-devlet iç ve dış politika da karar alırken daha çok aktör, küreselleşmeyle bu sürece dâhil olmaktadır. Ulusal çıkar devrede olsa da bu ulusal çıkarın korunması önemli etkenlere dayanmaktadır. Bu kapsamda su sorunu, nükleer enerji kullanım sorunu, küresel ısınma ve küresel teknoloji ve bilişimin artmasıyla siber saldırılar, salgınlar gibi konularda ulusal bir karar almak yeterli olmamaktadır. Bu gibi durumlar devletleri zorunlu olarak işbirliğine yöneltmektedir ve sivil

toplumun sürece dahil olmasının yolu açsa da devletler yine de kararları kendi alanları çerçevesinde ve güvenlik eksenli almaya devam etmektedirler.

Ekonomik boyut açısından ulus-devletin aşınması konusu literatürde çok önemli yer tutmaktadır. Hem iç hem de dış ekonomik süreçlerin değişikliğe uğraması ulus-devletin en büyük etkinlik alanlarından ekonomiyi oldukça etkilemektedir. Uluslararası kuruluşlar (IMF, Dünya Bankası vb.) ve bunun yanında ulusal düzeyde (Türkiye’de Merkez Bankası’nın daha özerk bir kurum haline getirilmeye çalışılması gibi) önemli değişimler olmaktadır. Bu değişimler ulus-devletin egemenliği üzerinde önemli aşındırmalara sahiptir; ancak Gilpin’in belirttiği gibi bu durumun fazla abartılmaması gerektiğini belirtmektedir; ulus-devletin egemen olduğu bir dünya devam etmektedir, demektir (Gilpin, 2008, s. 412). Benzeri gelişmeler devam etmekle beraber ulus-devletin ekonomi-politikteki düzenleyici rolü hâlâ güçlü bir şekilde ortadadır.

Uluslararası ekonomik bağımlılığı vurgulayan karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık (complex interdependence), küreselleşme ile örtüşen bir anlayışa sahiptir. Ancak küreselleşmenin de önemli etkisiyle karşılıklı bağımlılık ile ulus-devletin klasik özellikleri üzerinde bazı önemli değişiklikler meydana gelmiştir (Sönmezoğlu, 2005, s. 35). Bu olgu çerçevesinde, ulus-devlet başka bir devlete bağımlı hale gelerek politika oluşturma sürecinde, bu durumu dikkate almak zorunda kalmaktadır. Ortaya konulan etkenler çerçevesinde ulus-devletin sınırlarının aşınmaya başlaması tartışması literatürde devam etmektedir. Yegâne ve tek karar alıcı olarak ulus-devletin sınırları hem içten hem de dıştan aşındırılmaktadır. Böylece yeni aktörlerin ve özellikle de sivil toplum etkin bir şekilde ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir.

6. Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’de Sivil Toplumun Gelişimine Etkisi Örneği

Yukarıdaki teorik tartışmalara bir örnek olması açısından AB’nin etkisinin dolaylı ve doğrudan sivil toplum ve dış politika oluşum sürecini etkilemesi burada incelenmektedir. Türkiye’nin dış politikası açısından AB’ye olası üyeliğinin önemi, AB’nin politikalarının özellikle demokrasi ve sivil toplum gelişmesine etkisi Türkiye’de hem dış hem de iç politika sürecini etkilemiş ve etkilemeye devam etmektedir.

Avrupalılaşıma (Europeanization) dış politika süreci içinde; özellikle de hassas konular noktasında sivil toplum örgütlerinin hareket alanını arttırmıştır (Terzi, 2010, s. 67). Avrupalılaşıma ile beraber Türkiye’nin dış politikası daha demokratik hale gelmiştir. Zaten Avrupalılaşımanın amacı hem iç hem de dış politika yapım sürecinin daha demokratik bir şekilde işlemesidir. Türkiye, Avrupalılaşıma sürecinde ekonomik ve siyasal olduğu kadar güvenlik ve askeri konular noktasında da etkilenmektedir (Terzi, 2002, s. 44). Bu durumun da gösterdiği gibi, Avrupalılaşıma süreci oldukça geniş kapsamlıdır. Bu da sürecin aday ülkeler için önemini daha fazla arttırmaktadır.

Türkiye’de sivil toplumun bir dış politik aktör olmasında hem sivil toplumun güçlenmesi hem de demokratikleşmenin artması noktasında AB’ye giriş sürecinin etkili olduğu gözlemlenebilmektedir (Terzi, 2010, s. 47). AB’nin Türkiye üzerinde baskısı açıkça görülmektedir. Bu doğrultuda müktesebata uyum için önemli hukuksal değişiklikler yapılmaktadır.

Demokratikleşme dış politikayı da etkileyen bir süreçtir. Dış politika oluşum süreci de sadece devlet veya hükümet yetkililerinin ve yahut bir liderin vereceği karardan ziyade sivil toplumun da katılacağı bir

süreç olmalıdır. Bunun yanında sivil toplum dış politika oluşum sürecinde kendilerine danışılmasını bir hak olarak talep etmeye başlamıştır (Terzi, 2010, s. 67). Algı ve düşüncelerdeki değişim yeni hakların ele geçirilmesi için de önemli bir etken olmuştur.

Sivil toplumun politika oluşturma sürecinde etkili olabilmesinin bir sebebi de; yönetim olarak bilinen sürecin, neo-liberal politikalar suretiyle Türkiye'de de etkili olmasıdır. Yönetişimin son yıllarda oldukça kullanılan bir kavram olduğu ortadadır. Yönetişim, genel anlamda karar alma sürecine katılımı en üst düzeye çıkarmayı öngörür. Bu katılım birçok aktörün görüşlerini kapsayacak şekilde oluşur. Bu aktörler özellikle sivil toplum örgütleridir. İdeal anlamıyla kullanılması bu noktadadır, daha fazla katılımı öngörür. Bu durum AB'nin özellikle vurguladığı daha demokratik ve daha katılımcı tabloya uyar ve üyelik sürecinin de bir parçasıdır.

Türkiye'nin AB'ye giriş sürecinin merkezini, demokrasi ve temel haklar alanında yapılacak reformlar oluşturmaktadır (Terzi, 2010, s. 67). Bu noktada liberal perspektifin, demokrasi vurgusu Türkiye politikaları açısından oldukça önem kazanmaktadır. Bu hem demokrasi hem de temel haklar konusunda ehemmiyetli bir noktadadır ve Kopenhag kriterlerinin uygulanması sürecine işaret etmektedir. AB de bu noktada sivil topluma destek vererek, devletin daha fazla güçlenmesini engellemeye çalışan uluslararası bir destekleyici gibi davranmaktadır (Ketola, 2011, s. 789). Pazar kurallarının uygulanması tepkileri beraberinde getirirse de AB'ye desteğin en önemli sebeplerinden biri de ekonomik sebeplerdir (Keyman & Öniş, 2007, s. 218).

AB'nin bu sürece en önemli katkısı Kopenhag zirvesiyle uygulanması istenilen kriterlerin etkisidir. En önemli etkisi de Türkiye'de devlete karşı görevlerle tanımlanan vatandaşlık anlayışının ve uygulanmasının haklara dayalı vatandaşlık anlayışına dönüştürülmesidir (Keyman, 2005, s. 16). Artık bireysel anlamda hizmet alma gelişeceği gibi, bireylerin siyasi sürece tam manasıyla vatandaş olarak katılmasına katkı sağlayacağı düşünülmektedir.

AB ve sivil toplum, Türkiye açısından kritik bir noktadır. AB, sivil toplumu desteklerken, diğer taraftan Türkiye'de bazı sivil toplum kuruluşları (TÜSİAD gibi) AB'ye giriş için çalışmaktadır. Türkiye'nin AB'ye girme sürecinde yapılan demokratikleşme ve temel haklar açısından yapılan reformlar bu sürecin merkezini oluşturmaktadır (Ketola, 2011, s. 787). Sonuç olarak AB sivil toplumun, Türkiye'de politika oluşum sürecinde etkili olmasına etki yapmaktadır.

7. Sonuç

Sivil toplum yukarıda belirtilen olgularla bağlantılı olarak devletlerin dış politika oluşturma süreçlerini farklı düzeylerde etkilemektedir. Bu dış politika analizinde kabul edilen bir durum haline gelmiştir. Bu noktada devletin egemenliği daha çok tartışılır hale gelmektedir. Egemenlik özellikle dış politikalarında en etkili olunan düzeydir ve sivil toplum görünür hale gelmiştir/gelmektedir. Tabii egemenliğin aşınması ya da tam tersi güçlenmesi devletlerin yapısı, yönetim şekilleriyle de doğrudan alakalıdır. Ancak bu çalışmada da iddia edildiği gibi devlet küreselleşmenin etkisiyle bazı alanlarda etkisini ve gücünü artırırken artık karar alma süreçlerinde önemli bir ortağa sahiptir; ulusal ve uluslararası sivil topluma. Bu Janus madalyonu gibi iki tarafın belirli düzeylerde olumlu bazı düzeylerde olumsuz olarak etkilendiği ancak ulus-devletin yerini koruduğu bir durumdur. Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Europeanization sürecini

özellikle sivil toplum ve dış politika bağlamında 2010'lu yıllara kadar incelemektedir. Ancak belirtilmelidir ki literatürde özellikle 2010'lu yıllardan sonra Türkiye için de-Europeanization süreci, Europeanization sürecinden daha çok öne çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda da Türkiye'de sivil toplumun dış politika süreci yeni çalışmalarda değişen politika perspektiften incelenmelidir.

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