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Editörden...

Kültür ve İletişim özel bir sayı ile yeniden karşınızda. Bu sayıda 10-12 Nisan 2001 tarihleri arasında Ankara Üniversitesi, İletişim Fakültesi ile Avustralya'dan Canberra Üniversitesi, İletişim ve Eğitim Bölümü ortak girişimi ile Ankara'da düzenlenen konferansın bildirimlerini bulacaksınız.

Bülent Çaplı
Editör

Medya çalışmalarının Batı odaklı literatürü özellikle 90'lardan bu yana hızla kırılmaya başladı. Medya iletilerini, bu iletileri üreten kurumsal yapıları ve yine bu iletilerin tüketildiği sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel bağlamları sorgularken araştırmacıların kullandığı Batı merkezli kuramsal çerçeveler artık medyaya ilişkin birçok olgunun açıklanmasında yetersiz kalıyor. Küreselleşmeye ilişkin tartışmalar ve dolayısıyla bu alandaki araştırmalar, küresel olan karşısında yerel olanın dinamiklerinin de kendi özgün yapısı içerisinde sorgulanması gerektiğini önemle vurguluyor. Sosyal bilimlerin sorgulanmasına ve "açılma"sına yönelik 60'lardan bu yana kurulan yaklaşımlar bugün kendi özgün literatürünü de oluşturmuş durumda. Artık Batı odaklı kuramlar içerdiklerinden çok içermedikleri, dışladıkları üzerinden sorgulanıyor.

Medya çalışmaları da bu etki alanı içerisinde yeni bir döneme girdi. Medyayı sorgulama biçimimiz artık küresel olan ile yerel olan arasındaki mücadeleyi kavramsallaştırabilme ve tartışabilme becerilerimiz ve olanaklarımızla yakından ilişkili hale geldi.

Bu eğilim medyanın ekonomi politiği çalışmalarından, izler kitle araştırmalarına kadar geniş bir yelpaze içerisinde etkisini gösteriyor. Bu noktada özellikle karşılaştırmalı çalışmaların önem kazandığını görüyoruz; çünkü, bir coğrafyada olup bitenin kendine özgü yapısı ancak bir "öteki"sinin yanında durabilme ya da onunla hiçbir şekilde örtüşmeme durumunda görünürlük kazanıyor. Ancak karşılaştırmalı araştırmaların verileri her zaman bu kadar net de olmayabiliyor. Benzerlikler arasındaki kırılmalar, farklılıklar arasındaki ortaklıklar araştırmaları daha da verimli kılıyor ve sorgulanması gereken bir başka boyutu ya da boyutları netleştiriyor.

Avustralya coğrafi anlamında bize oldukça uzak; ama belleğimizin coğrafyasında bir o kadar da yakın bir ülke. Avustralya'yı dünya haritasındaki yeri bakımından ilginç kılan, Batılı bir köke sahip olmayla, 'resmi' haritanın en doğusunda yer alma arasındaki sürekli bir mücadele durumudur. Avustralya'da gerçekleştirilen son dönem akademik çalışmaların önemli bir bölümü tam da bu mücadele alanının içerisinde olguları araştırıyor. Artık sömürgeci tarihin de farklı okunuyor olması, kıtanın kendi tarihi ile resmi tarihi arasındaki sınırların sürekli olarak yeniden yorumlanması, Avustralya'daki son dönem akademik çalışmalarda eleştirel geleneklerin ne denli önemli olduğunu vurguluyor. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Avustralya özellikle eleştirel kültürel çalışmalar alanında her geçen gün daha da ön plana çıkıyor.

Bizim kültürel belleğimizde ise bir yandan Gelibolu'da Türkler ile Anzaklar arasında savaş ortamında yaşanan dostlukların hikayeleri, öte yandan da Avustralya'ya da yönelmiş olan Türk işçi göçü gibi etmenler iki coğrafya arasındaki bağın devamlılığı açısından temel niteliğini sürdürüyor. Ancak, iki ülke arasındaki bu ilginç akademik anlamda da var olduğunu söylemek oldukça güç. Düzenlenen ortak konferans tam da bu eksikliğin farkındalığından yola çıkılarak tasarlanan bir oluşum. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye'de ender görüldüğü biçimiyle iki üniversite, belirli bir akademik alanın karşılaştırma yoluyla sorgulanması amacıyla bir araya geldi. Tüm bu cazibesine karşın, konferansa gösterilen ilginin az olduğunu da belirtmek gerekiyor. Konferansın tanıtılması ve duyuru-

lması açısından yaşanan eksiklikler, kişiler düzeyinde yaşamın o anki başka yöndeki gereklilikleri gibi nedenler ilginin azlığını bir ölçüde açıklayabilir. Ancak, "Bu konferans Avustralya'dan değil de Amerika ya da İngiltere'den bir üniversite ile ortak düzenlenseydi değişen ne olurdu?" sorusunu da yanıtlamamız gerekiyor. Böylesi bir oluşumda katılımın daha çok olacağına dair bir inanç, akademik çalışmalarımızda yüzümüzün hangi coğrafyaya daha çok yöneldiğinin açık göstergesi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak, bu sorunun yanıtını "hiç bir şey değişmezdi" olarak vereceksek, o zaman akademiye ilişkin daha yapısal sorunları da tartışmaya açmamız gerekiyor. Karşılaştırmalı bir değerlendirme sürecine bir de bu açıdan başlamak hepimiz için önemli gibi gözüküyor...

"Australia and Turkish Media in Question" başlığı altında düzenlenen konferansta toplam 15 bildiri sunuldu. *Kültür ve İletişim*'in bu özel sayısında bu bildirilerin 13'ünü bulacaksınız. Bu bildirilerden dokuzu Ankara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi, altısı ise Canberra Üniversitesi İletişim ve Eğitim Bölümü öğretim elemanlarına ait. Konferans her biri günümüz medya ve iletişim çalışmalarının temel konu başlıklarına denk düşecek bir biçimde dört oturumdan oluşuyordu ve kapanışta da bir interaktif multi-medya projesi ile öğrenci filmlerinin gösterimi yer aldı. Oturum başlıkları sırasıyla şöyleydi: "Karşılaştırmalı Medya Politikaları", "Kimlik ve Temsil", "Medya: Kurumlar ve Uygulamalar" ve son olarak "Kultur ve Metodoloji".

Konferansın açılışı Avustralya'nın ulusal medya sisteminin özellikleri ile bu sistemin düzenlenmesini genel hatlarıyla aktaran bir videonun sunumu ile gerçekleşti. Bu sayıda ilk sırayı alan Peter Putnis, John Penhallurick ve Michael Bourk ortak çalışması, Avustralya medyasının genel özelliklerinin yanı sıra ülkenin iki büyük gazetesinde yer alan dış haberlerin analizini konuları alıyor. Bu çalışmada, Avustralya basınında yer alan dış haberlerin oluşumuna kaynaklık eden faktörler ve haberlerin profili çiziliyor.

"Medya Politikaları" başlığı altında yapılan sunumlar 80 sonrası Avustralya ve Türkiye'de yaşanan medya politikaları alanındaki değişimleri, yayıncılık alanında teknelci ve çoğulcu

yaklaşımlar arasındaki gerilim, medya sektörünün yapısal olarak düzenlenmesi, kuralların çözülmesi (deregülasyon) süreci ve tüm bu politikaların ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan siyasal, kültürel ve ekonomik bağlamlarla ilişkisi çerçevesindeki tartışmalara odaklandı. Bu başlık altında Bülent Çaplı, TRT tekelinin kırılması ile özel radyo televizyon yayıncılığının ortaya çıktığı 90 sonrası medya ortamını ele aldığı yazısında, Türkiye'de medya politikaları alanında politikasızlığın nasıl bir politika halini aldığını ve bu durumun çoğunlukla gündelik siyasete nasıl bağımlı olarak şekillendiğini tartışıyor. Beybin Kejanlıoğlu ise Türkiye'de medya politikalarına tarihsel bir perspektif içerisinden bakarak, politika üretme sürecindeki devamlılıkları ve kırılmaları ortaya koyuyor. Bu bağlamda Kejanlıoğlu, devlet tekelciliğinden özel yayıncılığa geçiş sürecinde politika üretimine dahil olan kurum ve aktörlerin aynı kaldıklarını, çoğulculuğu sağlayacak yeni aktörler ile faktörlerin medya politikalarına dahil olmadıklarının altını çiziyor. Rob Schaap ise, son 30 yıldır medya politikalarına etkide bulunan teknolojik ve ekonomik belirlemcilik, postmodernizm, politik ve ekonomik küreselleşme ve bilgi devrimi tartışmalarının Avustralya yayıncılığı özelindeki yansımalarını ele alıyor.

"Kimlik ve Temsil" başlığı altında ilk olarak Elaine Chanter, özellikle 2000 Sidney Olimpiyatları'ndan yola çıkarak Aborigin'lerin Avustralya medyasındaki temsili üzerinde odaklanıyor. Chanter, hükümetin ve medyanın Aborigin kültürel tarihini (history) şenlikli bir öyküye (hi/story) dönüştürdüğünü aktarıyor. Bu bölümde yer alan ikinci yazıda Mine Gencel Bek, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği adaylığının yazılı basında temsil edilme biçimlerini sorguluyor. Gencel-Bek, adaylık konusunun basına yansımalarının temel-hedef gösterilen 'batılılaşma' tartışmaları içerisinde şekillendiğini dile getirerek, tirajı en yüksek olan üç gazeteyi Avrupa ve Avrupa Birliği'nin tanımı, Avrupa Birliği'nden beklentiler ve Türkiye'den talep edilen ekonomik ve politik koşullar açısından değerlendiriyor.

"Kurumlar ve Uygulamalar" başlığındaki üçüncü bölümde, ilk olarak Joelle van der Mensbrugge sadece Avustralya'da değil İngiltere, Fransa ve Belçika'dan seçtiği yazılı basın örneklerinde, çevre sorunları ile işsizlik konularının ele alınma biçimlerini karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendiriyor. Bu karşılaştırma aracılığıyla, gazetelerin liberal ve/veya muhafazakar olarak tanımlanabilecek kültürel kimliklerinin haber aktarma biçimlerinde belirleyici olduğunu vurguluyor. Türkiye'deki yeni enformasyon teknolojilerini konu alan yazısında Halil Nalçaoğlu ise cep telefonu ve internet benzeri teknolojilerin kültürel açıdan kullanımı ve yaygınlığı üzerinde durarak, bu teknolojilere ilişkin beklenti ve taleplerin eleştirisini sunuyor. Bu bölümün son yazısında Sevilay Çelenk, özellikle yerli televizyon dizilerine odaklanarak, Avrupa ülkelerinden farklı olarak Türkiye'deki yerli yapımların yabancı yapımlara oranla daha çok izleyici bulduğunu dile getiriyor. Çelenk, Türkiye'deki bu özgün durumun, program içeriklerinin ya da yaratıcı endüstrinin çeşitliliğinin varlığı anlamına gelmediğini vurguluyor.

"Kuram ve Metodoloji" başlığı altındaki yazılar sadece iletişim ve medya alanına ilişkin değil, genel olarak tüm sosyal bilimlerin yaşadığı kuramsal ve metodolojik sorunlara odaklanıyor. Bu bölümün ilk yazısında İrfan Erdoğan, Türkiye'de yayınlanan ampirik araştırmaların temel eksikliklerini ve yanlışlarını; problem formülasyonu, kuramsal çerçeve, varsayım oluşturma, yöntem ve son olarak bulgular-tartışmalar-sonuçlar başlıkları altında değerlendiriyor. Nur Betül Çelik ise yazısında sosyal bilimlerde ideolojinin neden hala önemli olduğu sorusunun yanıtını arıyor. Çelik, ideoloji kavramının bir araştırma nesnesi olarak hala geçerliliğini koruduğunu ancak ideolojinin farklı hegomonik yapılar içerisinde sürekli olarak yeniden tanımlanması gerektiğini altını çiziyor. Bu bölümdeki son yazıda Bora Kanra, Habermas'ın kamusal ve özel özerkliğin oluşumu ve karşılıklı ilişkileri konusundaki düşüncelerine eleştirel bir bakış getiriyor. Kanra, insan haklarının ulusal düzeyde değil, kozmopolitik kurum ve yapılar içerisinde

de yeniden tanımlanması gerekliliğini Habermas üzerinden yeniden tartışıyor.

Kültür ve İletişim'in bu özel sayısında son olarak Brogan Bunt bilgisayar teknolojilerinin belgesel formatı ile nasıl ilişkilendirilebileceğini, Türkiye'de Bora Kanra ile birlikte gerçekleştirdiği deneysel "Halfeti Projesi" özelinde tartışıyor. Bunt, interaktif tasarımların, bilgisayar ortamında belgesel anlatısı ile harmanlanmasının belgesel türünde yeni olanaklar sunabilme potansiyeline dikkat çekiyor.

Kültür ve İletişim dördüncü yılının sonunda özel bir sayı ile karşınıza çıktı. Bu sayı, düzenlenen konferansta sunulan bildirilerin daha çok sayıda insana ulaşmasına aracılık etme amacını taşıyor. *Kültür ve İletişim*, gelecek sayıdan itibaren yine iletişim, kültür eleştirisi ve toplumsal düşünce alanlarındaki özgün makalelere yer vermeye devam edecek. Her zaman olduğu gibi bu alandaki çalışmalarını desteklemeye devam ediyor ve yazılarınızı bekliyoruz.

Editor's Note

Culture&Communication is printed again with a special issue. In this issue you will find papers, presented in a joint conference, which was held with the common initiative of Ankara University Faculty of Communication and Canberra University Division of Communication and Education in Australia in April 10-12, 2001.

Bülent Çaplı
Editor

The Western-dominated literature of media studies has been continuously challenged since early 90s. The Western oriented theoretical frameworks those have been used by social researches are no more capable enough to question and understand media messages, the institutional structures in which these messages are produced and the social, economic and cultural contexts in which they are consumed. The debates centering on globalization and consequently researches on the issue, underline the necessity of questioning not only the dynamics of the global but also the local within its specific structure and context. The critical approaches that started to emerge in early 60's with a demand for broadening the context of social sciences and moreover with a call to criticize the formation of social science itself have already established a wide literature of its own. Today Western-oriented studies are questioned not by focusing on what they include but by focusing on what they particularly exclude.

Under this impact, media studies have also shifted to a new era. The ways in which we question media can only be more purposeful and suggestive in linkage with our capabilities to conceptualize and debate the struggle between the global and local. This tendency has affected a wide variety of research field, changing from studies on the political economy of media to the studies on audience analysis. At this point, we see that comparative studies are much more valued since the specific features and insights of the phenomenons occurring in any part of the world can be much more explicit when evaluated in relation with the ways in which they are similar or different than the "other"(s). However, the outcomes of the comparative researches may not be clear-cut for every case. The fragments between the similarities as well as the differences between the commonalities make the researches more suggestive and moreover open up new ways for follow-up researches of an aspect or aspects that should be further questioned.

Australia is a country that is quite far away from us in geographic terms; however it is also that much close to us in our cultural memory. What makes Australia intriguing on the world-map the continuous existence of the realm of struggle between having strong roots in Western culture and at the same time being situated in the very far east of the 'official' world-map. Most of the recent academic studies in Australia directly question the world within and through this realm of struggle. The re-conceptualization of the colonial history, the continuous re-interpretation of the between the lines of the "official" history and the history of the continent, make us see how much the critical traditions are valued in recent academic studies. When it is regarded in this context, we see that Australia has come to foreground particularly with its research tradition centering on critical cultural studies.

In our cultural memory, our hearings of the friendship stories among Turks and Anzacs in Gallipoli war and the labor migration from Turkey to Australia still provide important

common grounds for the maintenance of the bond between the two cultures. However, it is hard to say that the same interest exists in academic terms between the two. The idea of this joint conference was directly the outcome of the awareness of this issue. In this context, as it is rarely seen in Turkey, two universities from two different countries came together with the objective of questioning a specific field. However, it must also be noted that, the interest in the conference was not as much as it was expected. This lack of interest can be explained to a certain extent with the deficiencies that occurred in the announcement process or with the routine practicalities of life in the individual level. However, the question "what would have changed if this conference was held in co-operation with an American or British University rather than with a one from Australia?" needs to be answered. If there is a belief that the attendance would have been more in that case, then such an answer can be an indicator to reveal the direction of our stands in academic practice. On the contrary if the answer to this question will be "nothing would have changed" than we should open up a new discussion on different problems and dilemmas in the academia. It seems important for all of us to start another comparative questioning within this framework.

In the conference that was held under the heading "Australia and Turkish Media in Question", 15 papers were presented. In this special issue of *Culture&Communication* you will find 13 of them. The nine of these papers are owned by the academic members of Ankara University Faculty of Communication and the other six are by the academic members of Canberra University Division of Communication & Education. The conference consisted of four sessions, in which each of them issued a different aspect of recent media and communication studies. At the final session of the conference the interactive multi-media project and student's short films were presented. The titles of the sessions were as follows: "Comparative Media Policy", "Identity and Representation", "Media: Institutions and Practices" and "Issues in Theory and Methodology".

The opening session was held with the presentation of a video focusing on the features of the Australian media and how they are regulated. The first paper of this issue is a study done by Peter Putnis, John Penhallurick and Michael Bourk and focuses on the general framework of Australian media and moreover it issues the analysis of the international news that are published in two main newspapers in Australia. By doing so, they picture out the factors, which are the sources for the mentioned news stories and explore the profile of the news.

The presentations under the heading "Comparative Media Policy" basically focus on the issues such as shifts within media policy both in Australia and Turkey, the tension between the monopolist and pluralist approaches to broadcasting, the structural regulation of media sector hand in hand with the deregulation policies of the period and the underpinning aspects of the political, cultural and economic contexts in which these policies are emerged. With his paper under this heading, Bülent Çaplı highlights the framework of the media sector of 90's with its newcomer private radio and television broadcasters; that emerged after the end of the monopoly of TRT. He discusses how "the policy of having no-policy" becomes dominant in media policy-making circles and shows how this preference of policy-making is related with daily political concerns. Beybin Kejanlıoğlu, on the other hand, by evaluating media policies in Turkey from a historical perspective, explores the continuities and discontinuities within the policy-making process. In this context Kejanlıoğlu, underlines the fact that both actors and factors were always the same and no newcomers were included to the process of shifting from state monopoly to private broadcasting which would have provided plurality. In last paper of this heading Rob Schaap, evaluates the reflections of the debates centered around issues such as technologic and economic determinism, postmodernism, political and economical globalization, information revolution, which had influence on media policies of the last three decades worldwide, in Australian media context.

Under the heading "Identity and Representation" Alaine Chanter, issues the representations of Aborigines in Australian media by particularly focusing on 2000 Sydney Olympics. Chanter states that both the government and the media have displaced cultural history of Aborigines to a kind of hi/story. In the second paper of this part, Mine Gencil Bek questions the ways in which Turkey's European Union candidacy process is reflected in the press. Gencil-Bek analysis the three main national newspapers in terms of the identification of Europe and European Union, and the expectations from European Union. Gencil-Bek states that candidacy issue is shaped in the press within the debated of "Westernization" that has been determined as a target in the public eye.

Under the third heading that is "Media: Institutions and Practices", Joelle van der Mensbrugghe makes a comparative analysis of the ways in which environmental and unemployment issues are taken into consideration by focusing on different examples not only from the Australian press but also from French, Belgium and United Kingdom. By this comparison van der Mensbrugghe states that the cultural identities of the newspapers which can be defined as liberal or conservative, determine the ways in which news stories are formulated. In his paper, which focuses on the new information technologies, Halil Nalçaoğlu debates the usage of technologies such as mobile phone and internet by centering on cultural aspects and diffusion and he presents a critique of the expectations and demands for such technologies. In the last paper of this part, Sevilya Çelenk focuses mainly on national television dramas and argues that differing from the European countries, the national productions rather than the imported ones are preference of the Turkish audience. Çelenk, points out the fact that, this original phenomenon does not mean the existence of diversity neither in the content of the programs nor in the creative industry.

Papers under the heading "Issues in Theory and Methodology" focus not only in the fields of media and

communication but they also question the theoretical and methodological problems that occur in social sciences in general. In the first paper of the part İrfan Erdoğan evaluates the problems of the empiric researches published in Turkey by focusing on different aspects such as problem formulation, theoretical framework, derivation and statement of hypothesis or research questions, method, and findings-discussions- conclusions. In the following paper, Nur Betül Çelik underlines the fact that 'ideology' is still a valid concept within social studies and she states that it must be continuously re-conceptualized within different hegemonic structures. In the last paper of this part Bora Kanra argues the thoughts of Habermas regarding the formation of private and public autonomy and their mutual relations from a critical perspective. Kanra, by following Habermas states that human rights should be re-defined not in the national level but rather in cosmopolite institutions and structures.

In the last paper of the special issue of *Culture&Communication*, Brogan Bunt debates the ways in which web design technologies can be juxtaposed with the features of the documentary genre by focusing on his own experimental "Halfeti" project, which he also worked together with Bora Kanra in the pre-production phase.

The last but not the least, here is the special issue of *Culture&Communication* at the end of its fourth publishing year. This issue has the objective to make many others reach the papers which were presented in the joint conference of Ankara University Faculty of Communication and Canberra University Division of Communication and Education. *Culture&Communication* will present original papers in communication, cultural criticism and social thought in its next issue, as usual. As we always did, we continue to support related studies in the field and make a call for your papers.

The Australian Media and International News

Abstract

This paper analyses Australia's media system and the factors that have influenced its development including the impact of overseas models and of Government regulation. It then focuses on international news and addresses the question of what factors determine the pattern of international news coverage in the Australian media? It reports on a research project which analyses the relative prominence of various countries and regions in Australian international news as well as the differing 'topic profiles' of news from different regions. Comparisons are made with British data and earlier Australian studies.

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The Australian Media and International News¹

¹ This paper is a revised and expanded version of Putnis, P., Penhallurick, J. and Bourk, M. (2000). "The Pattern of International News in Australia's Mainstream Media." *Australian Journalism Review* 22(1): 1-19.

² Sources for this and the following section are: McLennan, W. (1999). 1999 *Year Book Australia*. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Morris, P. (1996). "Newspapers and the New Information Media." *Media International Australia* 79: 10-21; Bureau of Transport and Communication Economics (1996). *Australian Commercial Television 1986-1995*. Canberra: ACPIS; Gross, L. S. (ed.) (1995). *The International World of Electronic Media*. New York: McGraw Hill; Cunningham, S. & Turner, G. (eds.) (1997). *The Media in Australia: Industries, Texts, Audiences*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin; Ri sh, N. (1999). *Margaret Gee's Australian Media Guide*. Melbourne: Margaret Gee Media.

Australia's National Media System

Australia's 19 million people are, by world standards, eager media consumers who live in a rich and relatively free communication environment and who are quick to take up new technologies. While the relative position of newspapers in the media environment has declined markedly, with per capita circulation halving between 1950 and 1990, they are still a significant force. A 1995 survey indicated that 87.9% of males and 82.4% of females aged 18 years and over had read a newspaper in the previous week while a 1996 survey found that 63.8% of people read newspapers or magazines daily.² Australians on average watch free-to-air television for about 22 hours per week with news and current affairs programs rating particularly highly. This free-to-air television audience is, however, also slowing declining in response to greater media diversity, particularly in the youth market where the uptake of new technologies is very strong. In 1998, 42% of Australian households had computers and 36% of them used a computer once a week or more, up from 30% two years earlier; 14% of Australians had Internet access from home while 25% of the population 18 years and over had access to the Internet from any site; the highest rate of Internet use was in the 18-24 age group. Historical and contemporary factors which help account for the shape of Australia's media system include:

- the size of the country and the long distances between major cities;

- a comparatively small market where the search for economies of scale tends to concentration of ownership and the formation of global alliances;

- a relatively high degree of government involvement in media industries albeit within a free press framework;

- the influence of British models, particularly in broadcasting;

- the cultural diversity of the Australian population largely due to post World War immigration patterns; and

- relative affluence which has enabled the maintenance of high standards of media technology.

The current distribution of newspapers continues to reflect, to a significant degree, 19th century settlement patterns. While there are two national newspapers, *The Australian* and *The Australian Financial Review*, the press is essentially locally oriented. Major newspapers centered in the State capitals are complemented by a vast number of regional and small-town papers. Recent decades have seen the rapid growth of suburban newspapers coupled with a gradual decline in the rural press (which nevertheless has proved remarkably resilient) and a reduction in capital city titles particularly amongst tabloids serving the popular market. Today, all but two capital cities, Sydney and Melbourne, are monopoly markets for mainstream dailies.

In 1999, 759 newspapers were listed in Margaret Gee's *Australian Media Guide*. Of these two are major national, and nine major metropolitan dailies. In this group there are two papers which have daily average circulations in excess of 400,000, five with circulations above 200,000, and four below 200,000. There are 437 regional and country newspapers listed, 170 suburbans and 127 ethnic newspapers.

In terms of circulation, major titles, and newsprint production the Australian newspaper industry is dominated by one company, Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. News Corporation, which had its origins in Murdoch's ownership of one Adelaide afternoon newspaper, now owns the highest circulation newspaper in each of Sydney and Melbourne, and the monopoly daily papers in Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart as well as the major national newspaper, *The Australian*. Murdoch papers account for over 60% of the total circulation of major papers in Australia. The other major players are John Fairfax Limited, owners of the second national newspaper and a major daily in each of Sydney (*The Sydney Morning Herald*) and Melbourne (*The Age*), with 25% of the Australian circulation and WA Newspapers, owners of the monopoly daily in Perth, with 13% of national circulation. The fourth significant player, Rural Press Limited, owns the national capital's *The Canberra Times* and over 150 regional and country newspapers.

Australia has a dual system of radio and television broadcasting with two state-owned networks, funded by the Federal Government, operating side-by-side with government-licensed commercial operators. The government-funded but editorially independent Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), established in 1932 on the BBC model, operates a national television service carried on about 600 transmitters and reaching almost 100% of the population. It also operates six distinctly targeted radio networks across Australia on over 6,000 transmitters. ABC radio has a strong news and current affairs orientation. The Special Broadcasting Service (SBS),

established by the Government in 1978, provides multilingual television and radio services designed to reflect Australia's multicultural society and broadcasts to all major population centers. In addition, in 1997 there were 261 private radio broadcasters in Australia comprising 103 commercial stations and 158 non-profit community and specialist broadcasters.

Australia's 34 commercial free-to-air television broadcasters command about 80% of the total viewing audience. The commercial television system initially comprised relatively autonomous metropolitan and regional broadcasters. Broadcasters were, before 1987, restricted to owning a maximum of two stations nationally. However, the development of a domestic satellite system from 1985 and a liberalisation of ownership rules encouraged networking and affiliation agreements. The system is now dominated by three networks, Channels Seven, Nine, and Ten, which own or control most of the capital city stations and which, in their own right and through affiliations with regional stations, reach about 90% of the market. This has led to an increased uniformity of free-to-air programming across Australia. Subscription television, which includes access to international news channels such as CNN and BBC World, was introduced to Australia in 1995 utilising both cable and satellite delivery systems. Uptake has been relatively slow with around 14% of homes connected by the year 2000.

Media Regulation

The Australian Constitution gives the Federal Government responsibility for the regulation of 'postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services'. As indicated earlier, the Government established public broadcasters which, while governed by independent boards, ultimately report to the Federal Parliament. Commercial broadcasters are regulated via a licensing system administered by the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA). The principle underpinning regulation has been that spectrum allocation involves leasing a scarce and

powerful resource to private interests and that therefore it is appropriate to attach conditions to licenses which reflect the public interest. These conditions cover programming (e.g. requirements for Australian content, for news services, and for children's programs), codes of practice, and compliance with the ownership and control provisions of the Broadcasting Act.

Ownership regulations are a major determinant of the structure of media industries. Foreign ownership of commercial television stations is limited to 20%. Only three commercial free-to-air television licenses are issued for each of the main markets and ownership is restricted to one license in each market. While a single owner can operate television stations across Australia's various major markets, thus facilitating networking, there are quite stringent controls designed to prevent any one owner dominating the various media – print, radio, and television – in any single market. These 'cross media ownership' rules, established in 1987, prevent a major player in one medium also holding major interests in a second medium in the same city.

In 1999 the Government announced a review of its 1992 Broadcasting Act. The convergence of technologies and the associated blurring of distinctions between different means of communication have led to a questioning of regulations based on the 'cross media' concept. The globalisation of media industries has also led to a questioning of foreign ownership restrictions. Furthermore, current government policies tend to favour deregulation. Hence, it is likely that there will be significant changes to media regulation in the next few years.

The Federal Government's power over the press is limited to its corporate affairs responsibilities and foreign investment policies. It has used these to limit foreign ownership of major newspapers to 25% for an individual and 30% in total. However, its influence extends beyond this. As is evident from the above discussion, the Government's broadcasting powers, from which the cross-media ownership rules derive, have a major impact on the pattern of print ownership.

International News in Australia

In the 19th century Australians keenly felt their isolation from major world centers, particularly Britain. The establishment of the telegraph link to Britain in 1872 was celebrated in Australia, by newspapers in particular, as a great event. As one newspaper noted, because of the telegraph, 'we are able to feel in a sense that we have never felt it before that Australia holds a place in the commonwealth of nations'. Australia's communication links and its flow of international news initially developed within the framework of the British Empire. When the three world news agencies of the era, Agence Havas, Wolff, and Reuters, carved up the world into three spheres of influence in 1870 it was in large part along imperial lines. For Australia, even more so than the rest of the world, London was the international news hub from which global communication, including information originally sourced in the Asia-Pacific region, radiated. After 1872, Reuters consolidated its position in Australia as part of its policy of 'following the cable'. For the next century it was the dominant supplier of international news though it largely operated through partnerships with domestic newspaper associations rather than in its own right (Putnis, 1999).

Current structures for the supply of international news can be traced to the establishment in 1935 of Australian Associated Press (AAP) by the 14 major metropolitan newspapers of the day. Designed to provide members with a comprehensive and cost-effective world news service, AAP established offices in London, where it bought the Reuters service, and New York, where it subscribed to AP and UP services. Rights were also obtained to the news file of *The Times* of London and *The New York Times* and other newspapers. AAP's international role was enhanced in 1946 when an agreement was reached with Reuters whereby AAP became a partner of Reuters and a member of the Reuters Trust and took responsibility for supplying news from the Far East and the Pacific to Reuters' global service through

'AAP-Reuter' correspondents in major Asian centers including Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Beijing and Tokyo (UNESCO, 1953). The agreement with Reuters also gave AAP exclusive rights to Reuters material in Australia, an arrangement which continued until 1995.

AAP continues to be the major vehicle for the flow of international news to Australian newspapers. It maintains editorial staff in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Jakarta and London. However it functions less as a source than as a distributor of international news services including those of Associated Press, Reuters, the Press Association of the United Kingdom, Knight Ridder, the New Zealand Press Association, Agence France-Presse, the Press Trust of India and the Asian news agencies Kyodo, Xinhua, Antara and Yonhap. Its ownership structure reflects that of the major metropolitan newspapers with the News Limited Group owning 43%, the Fairfax Group 43% and Western Australian Newspapers 8%.

Major newspapers complement wire service materials with news from their own correspondents and other international syndication arrangements. For example, *The Sydney Morning Herald* has correspondents in Beijing, London, Tokyo, Washington and New York while *The Australian* has correspondents in Bangkok, Beijing, Honiara, Jakarta, London, Los Angeles, New York, New Zealand, Tokyo and Washington. *The Australian* also uses material syndicated from other Murdoch newspapers such as London's *The Times* and *The Sunday Times*.

The charter of the publicly funded Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) requires it to provide an independent news service to which end it operates fifteen news bureaux throughout the world serving both radio and television. Commercial television stations typically operate one or two bureaux in, say, London or Los Angeles. The commercials are almost entirely dependent on whole-sale news suppliers. The ABC also utilises them extensively for routine news and to complement the work of its overseas reporters.

The first regular television news satellite feed to Australia was established by Visnews (now Reuters Television) in May 1975. This, the world's first satellite-based daily international news feed, consisted of a ten minute selection of world stories packaged in London and transmitted to Australia via the Intelsat IV Indian Ocean satellite. Subsequently, the range of suppliers grew to include NBC, CNN, BBC, WTN and APTV as well as Reuters Television. This range of suppliers suggests a great diversity of news but, in fact, such is the concentration on 'headline items' and the pattern of interdependency amongst these suppliers that their offerings constitute quite a limited news menu despite the vast quantity of material that is delivered (Putnis, 1997). A greater variety of international news is available to multilingual Australians via SBS television which broadcasts a daily, six hour, satellite-delivered *World Watch* program each morning comprising news and current affairs bulletins from around the world presented unedited in the original languages. Regular bulletins include *Japanese News*, *Mandarin News* from China, *Cantonese News* from Hong Kong, *Telegiornale* from Italy, *Das Journal* from Germany, *Ta Nea Ton Ennea* from Greece, *Le Journal* from France, *Sevodnia* from Russia, *Telediario* from Spain, *Siaran Berita* from Indonesia, and *Oto Polska* from Poland.

Australia's International News Map: A Case Study

Some time ago a team at the University of Canberra analysed international news coverage for two one-week periods (3rd-9th September 1995 and 17th-23rd September 1995) in *The Australian*, *The Sydney Morning Herald* and the Sydney edition of the ABC's 7 p.m. bulletin. The resultant data set of 1947 international stories, each coded in terms of twenty-six variables, was our contribution to the international study *Foreign News and Global News Flows in the 1990s* involving 45 countries, each of which had research teams coding international stories for these same two weeks (Sreberny & Stevenson, 1999).

The primary rationale for the Australian data-collecting exercise lay in the contribution it would make to the international study's goal of constructing a new 'global snapshot' of international news coverage. The new 'snapshot' could be compared with earlier studies, in particular, the Unesco commissioned research conducted in 29 countries, including Australia, in 1979 (Sreberny-Mohammadi et. al., 1985). The new study, like previous ones, was motivated by concerns, voiced most strongly in the 1970s and 1980s via the call for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), about Western domination of international news. It also sought to assess the impact of the major geopolitical changes, economic shifts and technological developments of the late 1980s and the 1990s on 'global news geography' (Sreberny & Stevenson, 1999: 66).

It is clear that the value of the Australian data is primarily as a contribution to the global data set. Nevertheless it carries significant interest as a 'snapshot' in its own right. Its value as a benchmark is somewhat limited by the sampling method set down for the international study - specific weeks rather than constructed ones - which fails to minimise the impact of individual major events. However, such is the detailed coding for each story, that the effect of particular events and their relation to the overall pattern of coverage can be discerned.

Here we present an overview of the Australian data. We discuss the portrayal of major news events in the sample period and analyse the data set as a whole. We do not purport to present a full descriptive analysis of the data set. There are, of course, very many ways of 'mining' the database created out of the quite massive coding task involved in this project. This representation of the data considers the Australian data set as a whole and focuses on two sets of variables - those relating to countries prominent in each story and in the set as a whole and those relating to the topic/s of each story and the distribution patterns with respect to these topics amongst countries and global regions. The analysis is designed to elicit answers to the following two questions:

- To what extent were various countries and regions represented in Australia's international news map and how did the quantity and prominence of representation vary from country to country and region to region?

- What range of topics was dealt with in the stories relating to particular countries and regions and were there significant differences in the 'topic profile' of stories amongst regions?

In addition, comparisons are made with respect to prominence of countries and regions between the Australian data and the British data. Some further comparisons are also made between the 1995 Australian data and that gathered in Australia as part of the 1979 UNESCO study (Noble & Noble, 1980-81).

The 1995 Australian Sample

The Australian sample comprised Monday to Saturday editions of two newspapers and one television news bulletin for the designated two-week sample period. *The Australian*, owned by News Limited, is the major national daily newspaper and, at the time of the study, had a week-day circulation of about 125,000 and a Saturday circulation of about 310,000. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, owned by John Fairfax Limited, is the most important daily of Australia's largest city and had a week-day circulation of about 230,000 and a Saturday circulation of about 400,000. The ABC's 7 p.m. thirty minute national news bulletin is the most authoritative bulletin in Australia and was viewed, in the sample period, by about 16% of the 7 p.m. television audience.

The three media chosen, while clearly mainstream media with large audiences, cannot be taken as representative of the total news media output presented in Australia in the period. Both newspapers are elite rather than tabloid products; the government-funded ABC takes a rather more serious interest in political and world affairs than commercial news organisations. Taken together, however, the three media do constitute a fair representation of the more serious (and more internationally oriented) Australian media and provide a reasonable indication

3

This represents a recent reduction in ABC international news bureaux. In 1995 the ABC maintained 19 overseas news bureaux in the following locations: Amman, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New Delhi, New York, Port Moresby, Santiago, Singapore, Tokyo and Washington. It also subscribed to Reuters Television through which it received a package of feeds including BBC, NBC and Reuters' own feeds. It also subscribed to CNN. Subsequently, the ABC's configuration of both international bureaux and international feeds has changed somewhat. A number of international bureaux have closed and APTV has become a major supplier of television news feeds.

4

The project *Foreign News and Global News Flow in the 1990s* is co-ordinated by Professor Robert Stevenson of the University of North Carolina and Professor Annabelle Sreberny of the University of Leicester. A description of the project, its methodology and a full list of participants is available from the project web site: <http://sunsite.unc.edu/newsflow/>

of what was presented in the period by way of international news to a very large group of generally better educated Australians.

The ABC and these two newspapers are each committed to substantial and original international news coverage as evidenced by their international news bureaux.³ ABC bulletins work within a broad editorial framework of 1/3 international news, 1/3 national news and 1/3 local and State news. Both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* have specific international news sections as well as substantial international coverage in other sections such as business and sport. These three media were also chosen because they figure in the Australian sample for the 1979 UNESCO sponsored study (Noble & Noble, 1980-1981; Sreberny-Mohammadi et. al., 1985). While the 1979 and 1995 samples are not strictly commensurate because of significant differences between the methodology of the earlier study and the current one (most importantly, the earlier study used one chronological week and one composite week and sampled general news pages only), some comparative observations are nevertheless possible.

The 1947 stories in the sample were selected and analysed using the procedures set down for the international study.⁴ All items judged to have a clear foreign or international element which appeared in each newspaper issue or television news edition were included. This comprehensive approach meant that items of all sizes, including brief one paragraph stories, were included as were items on all topics (including, notably, sport which had been excluded from some major previous similar studies). The selected stories were each coded in terms of twenty-six variables including prominence (with each story classified as being either major, medium or minor), source (up to two sources per story), gender of correspondent, countries prominent in the story (with the possibility of indicating up to three countries per story scaled as 'most important country', 'second country' and 'third country'), topic (up to three topic

areas per story scaled as 'main topic', 'secondary topic no 1' and 'secondary topic no 2' selected from twenty-four topic areas) and variables relating to the status and gender of the main actors in each story.

Major Stories

The three major international news stories in the sample period were, in order of prominence, the French nuclear test at Mururoa Atoll, the war in the Balkans, in particular, NATO's bombing campaign against Bosnian Serbs, and the UN Conference on Women in Beijing.

The French nuclear testing in the Pacific caused outrage in Australia and accounted for 161 (8.3%) of the 1947 stories in the total data set of international news. The event was more than twice as prominent in the Australian media than in the British media in the same period, a finding consistent with expectations regarding regional bias in international news priorities (Putnis, 1998). The most newsworthy events occurred in the first sample week (4-9 September) and included the French seizure of a Greenpeace ship which had been heading towards Mururoa, the explosion itself, and demonstrations and riots in Tahiti which followed the test. However, only about 20% of the stories were 'event focused' in the sense that they were primarily concerned with describing an occurrence. The other 80% were concerned with interpretation, commentary and opinion. The vast majority of stories were written by the Australian media's own correspondents either stationed in the South Pacific or in Australia. 'Own correspondent' figured 87 times as either the first or second credited source while wire services figured 29 times. The perspective of a very large majority of stories was 'anti-test', reflecting the community outcry against them within Australia. French perspectives did nevertheless manage to get through quite strongly particularly in European correspondent and agency reports. The use of global news sources ensured the presence of French perspectives beyond those presented by French government representatives in Australia (Putnis, 1988).

The war in Bosnia produced 74 or 3.8% of international news stories. These were largely relegated in the newspapers to foreign sections though NATO's resumption of bombing raids was the major front page story in *The Australian* on 6/9/95. There was little in the coverage that was specifically Australian in orientation. NATO perspectives predominated and much of the coverage was supplied by wire services. Wire services figured 51 times as either first or second credited source while 'own correspondent' figured 35 times.

The UN Conference on Women in Beijing accounted for 65 stories or 3.3% of the sample. All three media had their own correspondents in Beijing who provided a distinct Australian focus via interviews with Australian delegates, supplemented by reports of reactions to the Conference in Australia itself. 'Own correspondent' figured 46 times as either first or second source while wire services figured only 10 times. The Australian media viewed the Conference as a major story with both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* publishing large features as well as daily news reports. In the first sample week, which directly overlapped with the Conference, five of the six editions of *The Sydney Morning Herald* and three of the six editions of *The Australian* featured the story on the front page. Reports emphasised the alleged harassment of delegates and linked this to human rights abuses in China. Hillary Clinton's comments on human rights in China made front page news in both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* with both papers featuring the same Reuters-sourced picture of Mrs. Clinton speaking at the Conference.

Australia's 'nternational News Map: Prominence of Countries

The data set was analysed to determine the frequency of representation of various countries in Australia's coverage of international news. In the first instance the data was analysed in terms of a ranking of country frequencies by Most Important Country. Table 1 shows the first 30 countries by this criterion.

Table 1 : Number of Stories by Most Important Country

Australian Data			
Rank		No of Stories	% of Total n = 1930
1	Australia	495	25.4
2	United States	319	16.4
3	United Kingdom	160	8.2
4	France	114	5.8
5	China	73	3.7
6	Japan	61	3.2
7	Bosnia/Herzegovina	53	2.7
8	India	36	1.8
8	South Pacific	36	1.8
10	New Zealand	32	1.6
11	Indonesia	31	1.6
12	Russia	26	1.3
12	Hong Kong	26	1.3
14	Israel	24	1.2
15	Papua New Guinea	21	1.1
16	South Africa	19	.98
17	Germany	17	.87
18	Canada	15	.77
19	Sri Lanka	14	.72
19	Vietnam	14	.72
21	Malaysia	13	.62
22	Spain	12	.62
22	Italy	12	.62
22	Philippines	12	.62
25	Europe	11	.56
26	United Nations	10	.51
26	Argentina	10	.51
26	Somalia	10	.51
26	Thailand	10	.51
30	Algeria	9	.51

Relatively few countries dominate the 'Most Important Country' ranking in this set of international news stories. Four countries - Australia, United States, United Kingdom and France - account for 55.8% of stories. If we exclude stories where

Australia was the most important country the pattern of news dominance by few countries remains apparent. Three countries (the United States with 22%, the United Kingdom with 11% and France with 8%) account for 41% of all stories. It is also noteworthy, however, that 10 of the top 30 countries are Asian, a matter that will be considered further later in this paper.

A large range of factors appear to have been at play in generating this pattern of prominence, some relatively constant, others peculiar to the sample period. Though it is not possible to attach relative weights to these factors, they include:

- a 'home country effect' – not surprisingly, international stories involving the home country rate highly. A flow-on effect of this is that countries with whom Australia has newsworthy relationships (i.e. ones which generate stories where both countries are important) also rate relatively highly.
- traditional cultural ties, in Australia's case particularly with the United Kingdom.
- economic, military and cultural power of nations (so called 'elite nations') most obviously reflected in the prominence of the US.
- effect of regional proximity – as will be shown later Asian nations are more prominent in the news map of Australia than in that of the UK.
- effect of specific events – the count for France was inflated by the French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, which is also the main source of the fairly high count for the South Pacific itself. The China count is inflated by the Beijing Women's Conference.
- nature and distribution of international news gathering resources of the three media (see Note 2).

In order to gain a more complete measure of the prominence of various countries and, in particular, to be able to take into account the three levels of importance allowed for

in the coding scheme a prominence measure was created whereby three points were awarded if a country was rated as the Most Important Country in a story, two points if it was the Second Most Important Country mentioned and one point if it was the Third Most Important Country. This measure was applied to both the Australian and British data. The British data set used for this purpose comprised 3855 international stories in the two sample weeks appearing in four daily newspapers – *The Express*, *The Guardian*, *The Telegraph* and *The Daily Mail* and in two evening television bulletins – the BBC nine o'clock news and ITN news at ten.

Prominence scores achieved by countries were aggregated for the Australian data set and the British data set. The country scores in the two sets were then aligned by adjusting the British totals down to take into account the overall greater size of the British data set as against the Australian one – 3855 stories as against 1947. This yielded Table 2.

As indicated earlier, in the preparation of Table 2 the raw prominence scores in the British data set were adjusted to the size of the Australian set. Hence, while the numbers given against individual countries in Table 2 are in themselves a somewhat arbitrary construct, they provide a sound basis for comparing relative prominence of countries in the two sets of data.

A comparison of Table 1 and the Australian data in Table 2 reveals relatively little difference in the rankings of countries. However it is noticeable that there is a marked rise in the prominence of international organisations: the UN jumps from 26th in Table 1 to 11th in Table 2, the category 'World community of nations' and NATO appear in Table 2 but not in Table 1. It is clear that the significance of international organisations in news is more fully represented by the measure used in Table 2 than that used in Table 1.

Table 2 : Country Prominence Measure: Top 30 Countries

AUSTRALIAN DATA		BRITISH DATA	
Country Name	Total Score	Country Name	Total Score
Australia	2047	United Kingdom	2594
United States	1478	United States	1525
United Kingdom	776	France	628
France	550	Germany	340
China	357	Europe	332
Japan	285	Ireland	206
South Pacific	231	Bosnia-Herzegovina	199
Bosnia-Herzegovina	194	Australia	187
New Zealand	182	Italy	173
India	140	South Africa	160
United Nations	123	China	160
Indonesia	118	Russia	159
Russia	113	Spain	155
World Community/nations	109	EU	150
Hong Kong	108	United Nations	148
Papua New Guinea	106	India	127
Germany	101	Japan	127
Israel	93	NATO	92
South Africa	83	New Zealand	82
Canada	79	Belgium	69
Asia, in general	77	Sweden	64
Italy	74	Pakistan	60
Europe	64	Israel	57
NATO	57	Hong Kong	54
Croatia	55	Canada	50
Sri Lanka	55	Switzerland	50
Vietnam	53	Serbia	40
Malaysia	52	South pacific	38
Pakistan	47	Croatia	34
Ireland	46	Sri Lanka	34

A comparison of the Australian and British data in Table 2 sheds significant further light on the factors determining Australia's international news map. Both the similarities and differences between the two sets are noteworthy. The broad 'prominence pattern' in the two sets is strikingly similar, suggesting a similar

general distribution of international news in which a relatively few countries (including the home country) dominate and in which, after the top twenty or so countries, prominence falls away rapidly. The United States scores a similarly high rating in both Australia and Britain as does France. However, though France ranked highly for both British and Australian news stories, a more detailed analysis of story topics has demonstrated that they were covered in very different terms. While the Mururoa nuclear test dominated Australian coverage of stories in which France was prominent, the British coverage included a much greater percentage of routine stories on topics like sport (Sreberny et. al., 1998). Table 2 also indicates that the United Kingdom is much more prominent in the Australian media than Australia is in the United Kingdom's.

Table 2 also shows that regional proximity affects patterns of news coverage. In the United Kingdom sample, nine Asian/South Pacific countries or regions rank in the top 30 while in the Australian sample 14 Asian/South Pacific countries or regions figure. Utilising the relative weightings given to countries in Table 2, Germany is 3.37 times more prominent in Britain than in Australia, Europe is 5.19 times more prominent, Ireland is 4.5 times more prominent, and Italy is 2.3 times more prominent. On the other side of the ledger Japan is 2.2 times more prominent in Australia than in Britain, China is 2.2 times more prominent and Indonesia (not in the British top 30) is some 7.4 times more prominent. Interestingly the prominence of India is similar in the U.K. and Australia suggesting perhaps an 'equalising' effect, which cuts across region as a determinant of prominence, in the case of major Commonwealth countries.

Prominence of Regions

The Australian data set was also analysed by region using the country groupings constructed in the design of the international study. This analysis is regarded as particularly important given the potential use of the international news map as a gauge of Australia's position in the world given its cultural ties to Europe and its geographical proximity to Asia.

Table 3 indicates the prominence of regions as measured by the number of stories for which countries from the particular region were judged as most important.

Table 3 : Prominence of Regions

Region	Australian Data	
	No of Stories	Percentage n = 1930
Western Europe	359	18.6
North America	338	17.5
Latin America/South America/ Central America/Caribbean	45	2.3
Central/Eastern Europe	107	5.5
Africa	62	3.2
Middle East	44	2.3
Asia/Pacific (inc Australia)	937	48.5
Other	38	2.0
Total	1930	100

In Table 3 the Asia/Pacific region accounts for 48.5% of stories thus highlighting the privileged position given to one's own region in international news representation. This is in part a 'home country effect' since in Table 3 Australia is included in the Asia/Pacific region. However, the importance of the region is still evident if Australia is removed from the data set. Table 4 shows the prominence of regions disregarding those stories where Australia is most prominent.

Table 4 : Prominence of Regions excluding Australia

Region	No of Stories	Percentage
Western Europe	359	26.6%
North America	338	25.0%
Latin America/South America	45	3.3%
Central America/Caribbean	107	7.9%
Africa	62	4.6%
Middle East	44	3.3%
Asia/Pacific (exc Aust)	442	32.7%
Total	1352	100

Table 4 indicates that North America, Western Europe and the Asia/Pacific regions loom large in Australia's international news map each with 25% or more of stories while Latin America and Africa are of peripheral interest each having less than 5%.

This pattern of regional prominence is similar to that identified by Noble and Noble in the 1979 study which used very similarly constructed regions. Their findings, summarised in Table 5, are most properly compared with the results in Table 3 since in both these tables Asia includes Australia.

Table 5 : Prominence of Regions – 1979 Study

Region	No of Stories	Percentage
Western Europe	226	21.9%
North America	201	19.5%
South America	21	2.0%
Eastern Europe	40	3.9%
Africa	101	9.8%
Middle East	92	8.9%
Asia (inc Aust)	333	32.3%
Other	18	1.7%
Total	1032	100

Source: Noble & Noble, 1980:81

The high relative prominence of Western Europe and North America in Australia's 1979 news map is very similar to that in 1995. The very low score for South America is also common to both. Africa scored more highly in 1979 than in 1995 (9.8% as against 3.2%) largely because the 1979 sample period included elections in what was then Rhodesia and fears of African political instability, which were prominently reported in Australia (Sreberny-Mohammadi et. al., 1985). The increase in stories from the Asia/Pacific region (32.3% in 1979 and 48.5% in 1995) is to some extent accounted for by the prominence of the South Pacific in 1995 due to the Mururoa tests. However, it also reflects a strengthening of links between Australia and its Asian neighbours between 1979 and 1995.

It was noted earlier that the 1979 and 1995 samples are not strictly commensurate. As well as the differences in sampling methodology already noted, the 1979 study surveyed a greater range of media than the 1995 one, including radio news. Noble and Noble note, however, that while there are some variations in emphasis amongst the different media there is in general a pattern of conformity with respect to regional prominence. This suggests that the comparison of 1979 and 1995 results has acceptable validity despite the sampling differences.

As well as identifying the relative prominence of different regions in Australia's news, Noble and Noble also investigated the 'images' of the regions as reflected in the topic areas of news from the region. They noted that in the Australian media 'North America's image is one of science, followed in turn by crime, international politics, economics and diplomatic activity with personalities and human interest stories bringing up the rear. The image of South America, given the fact that it is largely invisible, is one primarily of military and defence and of natural disasters', (Noble & Noble, 1980-81: 55). They also note that while news from Western Europe and Asia is diversified, reflecting the whole spectrum of news events, that from the Middle East and Africa is highly selective reflecting political and military crises. The 1995 data yields similar results overall but with an important variation with respect to Asia. In the current analysis a 'topic profile' was constructed for the stories from each region which was then assessed against the 'topic profile' of the total international data set, excluding stories where Australia was most prominent. The total international data set, excluding Australia, was seen as the most appropriate standard of comparison for study of biases in the representation of regions (see Putnis et. al., 1997 for a more detailed statistically-based account of this analysis). This analysis revealed North America as significantly higher than average for domestic politics, domestic economics, sports and entertainment/human interest categories while low for international conflict, domestic conflict and natural disaster categories. Western Europe and

Central/Eastern Europe were high for international conflict due to involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, while Central and Eastern Europe figured low in 'non-conflict' categories, Western Europe was higher than average in culture, entertainment, human interest and sports categories. Latin/South American scores were too low on most topics to be able to confidently suggest a pattern other than one of relative absence of news, though the highest number of stories, nine each, were for sports and natural disasters/accidents/weather. The numbers for Africa are also very small, though the highest number of stories, eleven, was in the civil wars/political violence category.

These patterns of representation are similar to those identified by Noble and Noble. There is a diversity of reporting of North America and Western Europe not evident in the reporting of Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and South America. The Asia/Pacific region, as noted earlier, is also prominently reported. However, the pattern of reporting from Asia that emerges in the 1995 study is somewhat less diversified, in the sense of reflecting the whole spectrum of news events, than Noble and Noble found. In the 1979 study stories where Australia is most prominent were included in the topic analysis and this is likely to have been the source for a considerable component of the perceived diversity. For the analysis of the 1995 data it was decided to exclude stories where Australia was not prominent so as to be able to focus specifically on the portrayal of Asia in Australia. For this purpose it was also useful to exclude stories from the South Pacific region since the count for the Pacific largely arose from the Mururoa nuclear tests and hence did not reflect more usual patterns of representation.

This Asian data set, while still reflecting considerable diversity, is heavily weighted to economic topics. It shows notably higher scores than the all-nation average for international economics/globalisation categories (16.21% versus 8.97%); domestic economics (13.46% versus 7.88%); and social

issues categories (13.76% versus 7.22%) – though this last statistic is largely an artefact of the Beijing Women's Conference. Asia's percentage scores are noticeably below the average for all nations in relation to sports (6.12% versus 15.03%); entertainment/human interest categories (2.75% versus 7.29%); science related categories (1.83% versus 5.25%); and culture/history categories (5.50% versus 8.17%). Overall, this analysis suggests that Australia, and the Australian media, view Asia as very important and that there has been an increase in this perception since 1979. However, in the media view of Asia, economic and business issues rate relatively more highly than broadly cultural ones.

Discussion

We can no longer speak sensibly of any single or even representative Australian 'international news map' no matter how extensive the data collection or careful the sampling technique. Perhaps we never could. But certainly we were more likely to be able to do so when international news was a scarce commodity, when the 'tyranny of distance' still reigned, and available distribution technologies determined (and restricted) access. In 1908-09, 2,457 press cable messages, comprising 211,263 words, were cabled from Britain to Australia (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1909: 389). At the time all world news cabled to Australia came via London and cable technology was the only way of transmitting up-to-date news internationally. One could fairly say that these 211,263 words largely comprised the international news menu for Australians of the day. We can contrast this with the contemporary situation where any thing like a total word count is untenable and where end user initiated Internet access to global information tends to undermine the very idea of an 'international news menu'.

Yet international news flow studies and the national 'news maps' they generate remain important if only because there still

is, despite the Internet, a mainstream media with very large audiences and hence great capacity to inform and influence.

The Australian international news map described in this paper is significant in a number of respects. Firstly, while admittedly representing just a fleeting glimpse of international news (and a somewhat arbitrarily framed one at that), it does represent a point (just as Noble and Noble's 1979 study did) in the evolving narrative of Australia's engagement with the rest of the world, a narrative in which the media both reflect and construct relationships.

Australia's communication links to the outside world developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries within the framework of the British links of the majority of its people and of Australia's position as a part of the British Empire. It was London, not the world, with which Australians then wanted to communicate. The agencies which developed for the gathering and distribution of world news reflected the structures of Empire. Even by the 1930s the vast majority of news coming into Australia came from London (Ball, 1938). In the 1930s Melbourne political scientist William McMahon Ball argued that Australian coverage of international events was marred by a lack of news from the Pacific region, including Asia and the USA, and was dominated by British perspectives (Osborne, 1997). Of course since world War II there has been a 'turn to Asia', though in the media, as well as in other circles, there has been a tension between the need for greater links (including media links) with the region and the traditional pull of old cultural ties. Writing in the early 1960s researcher Sprague Holden commented that "Among top-echelon editors ... I observed a general dissatisfaction with Australia's coverage of Pacific news" and that "it would appear imperative for Australians ... to be up-to-the minute on Asian politics." However the reality was that "The pull is towards London. Peiping [Beijing] gets noticed, but a cold in a royal head at Buckingham Palace may get more news play than a démarche by the People's Republic of China" (Holden,

⁵ It is relevant to note that Australia's 1992 Broadcasting Act saw the removal of the long-standing requirement of television licensees to provide an 'adequate and comprehensive' service in their own right. The 1992 Act merely requires them to contribute to the overall range of services in the license area. The old provisions were interpreted by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) as requiring commercial television licensees to provide their communities adequate news services. Licensees were subject to periodic performance appraisal and were required to provide the ABT with monthly breakdowns of their bulletins by local, national and international stories. The Tribunal noted: 'In assessing whether a news service being provided to a particular community is of adequate quality, the tribunal will look at the sources of news, the range of issues presented, and the overall division between local, national and international coverage' (*Australian Broadcasting Tribunal*, 1992: 84-85). By contrast, under the new Broadcasting Act, the scope of bulletins and, indeed, the decision whether to have them at all, is largely a matter for the licensees themselves. (Putnis, 1996)

1961: 131-132). The 1995 international news map described in this paper suggests that the 'turn to Asia' has progressed significantly since then, albeit in a way weighted towards economic rather than more broadly cultural frames.

Secondly, the international news map is significant as a 'stocktake' which can contribute to the ongoing important debate about media coverage of Third World countries and events. The global structure of news gathering and dissemination continues to follow the global flow of economic and political power, selectively producing news visibility and invisibility and creating imbalances in news flow.

Continuing coverage of the global centers of the industrial world can be contrasted with intermittent images from a Third World characteristically presented as being in crisis (Sreberny & Stevenson, 1999: 60). Consideration of these global issues position the news maps of individual countries within a normative framework. While there can be no objective yardstick of newsworthy events or, indeed 'ideal coverage' against which to measure any particular map of international news it is nevertheless an important task of criticism to assess international coverage against values such as 'balance', 'diversity', 'comprehensiveness' and 'fairness'. These can be applied to the global system as a whole, to national systems, to particular sectors (e.g. television) or to particular publications, though in an increasingly fragmented media marketplace issues of comprehensiveness become even more problematic with respect to whole sectors let alone individual publications.⁵

Most studies of overseas news in Australia have taken this approach. Henningham's (1988) description of Australian television news coverage of different regions of the world appears to be informed by a notion of imbalance. He comments, "There is great disparity in the attention given to different parts of the world" (160) and, later, "whole regions of the world are invisible on some channels" (161). Overton's (1989) analysis of Australian television news argues that Australian media have

failed to provide comprehensive and balanced coverage of world affairs despite the vast amount of international news available via satellite. Lindley (1993) suggests that there is 'spatial bias' in Australian newspaper coverage of natural disasters. Gerdes and Charlier (1985) suggest that financial considerations have led to an over-dependency by Australian television stations on US-produced news: "what is true of television drama may also be true of television news: the production cost to the Americans is offset by sales to other countries where it is cheaper to buy American reports than produce at home or send correspondents all over the world" (20). The present study confirms the prominence of US stories and the relative lack of attention given to news from Africa and South America in Australian coverage. The numbers of stories from the Latin American/South American and African regions in the data set, 45 and 62 respectively, were too small to formally calculate the significance of the variation between their 'topic profiles' and the all-nation average but the available data tended to confirm a pattern of intermittent crisis-oriented coverage.

Thirdly, the international news map is significant as a demonstration of particular patterns of representation, which pose a challenge to our understanding of the determinants of 'news geography'. How can we account for this map? In part, of course, it is a function of the particular sample both with respect to the time period selected (the influence of specific news events) and the media selected (the influence of, for example, a particular publication's editorial policies and international news gathering resources). Yet we can discern other more systemic factors at work as well, even if we cannot determine their relative weight. The comparison between the news maps of Australia and Britain suggests that there is a 'global news system' and that both countries are part of it. It is a system which reflects the structure of global economic and political power. At the same time there are differences in the news maps of the two countries which reflect regional and national priorities.

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Media Policies in Turkey Since 1990

Abstract

In Turkey, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was the one and only institution that has the broadcasting rights until 1990. However, the international impacts of policies regarding deregulation and privatization of media environment has begun to open up a new era in Turkey by the national policies of Motherland Party (ANAP) that started to be in power in early 1980s. Consequently, within this new era Turkish media scene is subjected to the polarization of new radio and television broadcasters those will be the dominant actors to shape the media sector in Turkey starting from 1990s upto now. This paper aims to trace back the early history of 'private' broadcasting in Turkey by giving particular attention to the dynamics of recently emerging media market. By doing so, the underpinning aspects of media industry of 2000s in Turkey can be better evaluated.

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Media Policies in Turkey Since 1990

Introduction

Until 1990, the word "television" was, in Turkey, immediately associated with TRT, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation. The constitution of the Republic of Turkey had awarded the sole broadcasting rights to the TRT.

Although the constitution specifically stated that all radio and television broadcasts would be conducted in conformity with the principles of impartiality, TRT had never been politically impartial - the status of the TRT was typical of government influence at the executive level. The director general and the members of the administrative council were appointed by the council of ministers. For this reason, TRT had always been responsive to the government's wishes. With some exceptions, the general directors had occupied their positions at the discretion of the government.

In mid 1990, however, with the receipt of the first signals of a privately owned television station, which started broadcasting to Turkey via satellite from Federal Germany, there began a new era in Turkey's television. Although perfectly aware of its obvious illegal position, the government did not hesitate to give the green light to Turkey's first private television channel Star 1, established by the young dashing business executive Cem Uzan and Ahmet Özal, who happened to be President Turgut Özal's son.

As the curtain of this new era went up, one by one a whole host of new, private radio and television channels began to reach the Turkish viewers.

At first, receivers and satellite dishes were needed to watch these broadcasts reaching Turkey via satellite. The private television companies started a campaign together with the dish-manufacturing firms to improve the sales of the new satellite dishes, or in other words, in order to extend the penetration of their own broadcasts. As it turned out, the privately owned channel, Star 1, would not have to wait for the results of the dish selling campaign in order to reach a far greater number of viewers. The mayors of several cities in various parts of Turkey, claiming that they had no other motive than that of opening up new horizons for the viewers, established "television stations" in their own regions. The basic feature of these stations was to turn the hitherto satellite broadcasts into terrestrial ones; that is, to receive the satellite broadcasts through satellite dishes and to emit them to the local receivers. In this way, a large number of viewers in several different regions of Turkey were suddenly presented with the opportunity of watching these new and "private" television channels without going to any extra trouble at all to receive them. In actual fact, these developments were the first signs of a great storm that was soon break in the sphere of television.

By the mid 1990, there were seven private channels broadcasting nationally in Turkey via satellite. When the five TRT

channels were added to these, a rather dramatic picture emerged. In fact, that was not the whole of the picture portraying the state of television in Turkey, as there were also hundreds of local television channels of varying sizes, especially in the big cities. The common feature of all these channels was their use of electromagnetic waves.

It was at this point that the first storm -"The Frequency Storm", as it may be called- broke. These television stations, which should have broadcast their programs at certain frequency intervals, started using the available electromagnetic spectrum irregularly, without a license to do so.

Thus, as an outcome, the totally unplanned usage of the already limited frequency capacity led to the introduction of the viewers to a brand new concept which they had never before met -"Electronic Pollution". The electronic pollution reached such heights that Turkish viewers almost came to the point where they wished for the old days when there was only one television channel to watch. This was due to the fact that there was no longer any guarantee that they could watch any broadcast with the same clarity or quality of picture and sound as they had received it even the evening before.

Moreover, the institution that was responsible for the planning and organization of all frequency usage and bore the obligation of preventing such chaos, the Wireless General Directorate (TGM), could do nothing but stand by helplessly in the face of these developments. In actual fact the TGM had accused the transmission stations of breaking the law and had managed to temporarily close down a number of them. However, the judges of the local courts where such cases were heard looked warmly upon the arrival of new channels.

Regulatory Structure - "The Battle for New Legislation"

The main problem was that there was neither a law to regulate newly emerged private radio and television stations

nor a regulatory body to assign frequencies to private operators and regulate channels.

By 1993, no concrete steps were taken to provide a new law to regulate electronic communications. The developments concerning the new legal arrangements were taking place at a snail's pace.

One of the reasons for the delay, was the vastness of the technical problems that had to be solved. In order for the radio frequencies to be assigned to private and public institutions, a highly detailed frequency plan of the whole country had to be made.

Another factor underlying the delay in change of the law pertaining to telecommunications was that a great many people are satisfied with the situation. The private television companies were also endeavoring to maintain good relations with the government because of their fears that the new law concerning telecommunications might eventually bring them more harms than good. Furthermore, the private television companies wanted the present incongruous situation to continue for as long as possible because they established a costly technical infrastructure and signed long-term contracts for the lease of their satellite channels. Even though these channels use the radio frequencies allocated to Turkey, they did not pay any license fee.

The end came rather unexpectedly for all private radio stations and local television channels. The Ministry of the Interior published a circular on January 1993 that led to even further turmoil. With this notice that was sent out to the governors of all the provinces in Turkey, the Ministry announced that all private radio and television stations in Turkey were illegal and ordered that the necessary steps be taken for them to be closed down. It later became clear that this notice was covertly aimed at the Islamic radio and television stations that had recently begun to flourish in many towns all

over Turkey. Apparently, the National Security Council had held a meeting on the issue of the closure of radio and television stations transmitting these kinds of Islamic broadcasts and had ordered that these stations be closely observed.

The efforts to close down these stations failed because the scope of the operation had been much too wide. Apart from a few exceptions, all the private radio and television stations thus continued to transmit their own broadcasts until March 1993.

This time, the Wireless General Directorate, ordered the governors of Turkey's 76 provinces to close down the radio and television stations. It was declared that the stations were illegal and operating without licenses, causing frequency interference with vital air traffic, naval, coast guard and police communications. The provincial authorities were ordered to confiscate all radio equipment and transmitters if the stations did not cease broadcasting. The government made it clear that the ban would not be applied to private television channels that beam broadcasts from outside the country via satellite. The Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel said that until Turkey's laws governing wireless communications were changed, the private radio and television would not be allowed to operate. Prime minister was adamant to go ahead to close private stations. As a result, altogether nearly 700 local radio and television stations were shut down. The survivals of this operation were the private television channels reaching Turkish audience via satellites. The government didn't even touch the transmitters of these channels. They freely continued operating as usual.

The staffers of the defunct radio and television stations and people in general started countrywide protest action. People attached black ribbons to their car antennas, gathered around buildings where their beloved radios used to be, and collected signatures in protest of the government.

Meantime, it became clear for the entrepreneurs that the stability of the market and its long-term profitability hinged on

the government's ability to expedite a sound broadcast law that would facilitate and encourage competition and expansion in a secure political and economic environment.

The most important single obstacle for the privately owned television companies to overcome was the article 133 of the constitution that stated that "Radio and television stations in Turkey may only be established by the state." Despite the fact that all the political parties represented in the Turkish parliament were unanimously agreed that this article should be changed, any change to the constitution was constantly being brought to a halt by discord on the provisions of the amendment.

Finally, the Parliament passed in August 1993 the proposal to amend the constitutional article 133, lifting the state monopoly on radio and television broadcasting.

Following the Constitutional change, long awaited Law came into effect in April 1994. Radio and Television Law was passed by parliament to regulate both private and public service broadcasting. The law envisioned the establishment of a Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), to regulate the activities of the public and private television stations. This Council was assigned the duty of allotting frequencies, channels and transmission licenses to all broadcasting stations. Having experienced the results of the previous body working with next to no powers of sanction, the government decided to endow this new organ with the right to confiscate station's broadcasting license whenever it sees fit. According to law, the new Council was to be made up of nine members appointed by the Turkish Parliament.

The enactment of the law did not solve all the problems as it had been expected to do. In fact, the law drew many criticisms from different actors of the broadcasting policy community. First criticism was about the way which the Supreme Council was formed. The Council was believed to be overtly political.

According to critics, this would damage the impartiality of the Council. Secondly, the range of sanctions was considered as strict controls over the broadcasting stations.

The Attempts to Allocate Frequencies

The Council's first job was to prepare a detailed frequency plan of Turkey's national electromagnetic spectrum. For this purpose, the Council assigned Bilkent University to make a comprehensive frequency plan. Then, the Council made an announcement to all private television and radio owners to apply for operation licences and for frequency allocation. The announcement concluded that stations having not applied to the Council would be banned from transmission. By the end of 1995, applications were already being filed and the frequency plan was completed. Then, applicants started a long wait for the Council's decision to finalise the applications. The applicants were anxious that some of them would be out of the race as a result of frequency scarcity which would not accommodate all of them.

The competitive tender for frequency and channel allocation, was finally made in 1997. This competitive tender which was the first of the series, was to award the licences for local television stations. The Council's original plan was to first start with the bidders for local television channels, then to award the licences for national channels. But the Council had never had a chance to go over to the second phase of the original plan. The Council's decision to award licences for local television channels had been discussed throughly by the National Security Board of Turkey; the result of this discussion, was to 'advise' the Supreme Council to cancel its decision on the awards. The main motive behind The National Security Board's decision was the fear that Islamic circles were to be awarded with the television licences. Then the Supreme Council started looking for alternative ways for preventing Islamic capital from

entering the electronic media sector. Finally, by 1998 the Council in conjunction with the The National Security Board's advise, issued a new procedure to be followed by the bidders for both local and national licences. The new procedure required owners and top managers of the bidding companies to obtain a national security clearance document from the Primeministry. It will only be those applicants who will satisfy these requirements whose cash bids will be considered. The primary purpose of this obligatory procedure was to impede the Islamic and separationist companies. The Council announced its intention to complete the issuing process of national security passes by the end of 1999. As of 2001, seven years after the enactment of the Law all private radio and television channels are still operating without a licence.

Conclusion

By and large, the actions of policy makers have been limited to reactive policies, "designed to cope with, or adopt to, the consequences of changes, rather than anticipating (and so influencing) the consequences. The policy makers have not been concerned with the complex problems associated with political, economic and cultural aspects.

The regulatory policy in media reflects the forces of 'demand-pull' as well as 'technology-push', making broadcasting less stable sector.

Can Media Policy do without “Culture“ and “Society“?

Abstract

The profound changes that have beset Australian communications policy over the course of the last thirty years are often thought to have had their genesis in the technological shake-up which became manifest in Australia in the mid-1980s, in primarily local developments, or in the apparently autonomous realms of 'discourse' (O'Regan, 1993; Cunningham & Turner, 1997; Spurgeon, 1997). I think such analyses constitute a focus on symptom rather than pathology, often imply a dangerously anti-humanist technological determinism, and distract us from a wider and more decisive context - that of the profound political economic changes which occurred in the United States in the 1970s. In fact it was there and then that the institutional power relations which were to mark the rest of the century, in America and Australia alike, were forged.

This paper is based on the suspicion that the twin ideologies of technological determinism and economism have so permeated the Australian debate that the policy community's many critics there effectively share the world view of the objects of their derision. In its postmodern turn, the left has constructed for itself a worldview thoroughly incapable of critiquing, never mind surmounting, the current orthodoxy. A consequence of this effective conflation of views is that categories like 'society' and 'culture', the ontological mainstays of the nation-building ethos that sustained Australian media policy before the mid-1970s, are being effaced by a new hegemonic structure. Since the mid-70s, 'Media policy' has been left with ever less rationale and coherence.

This transformation cannot adequately be explained without recourse to the US political economy of the early 1970s, as a general crisis of accumulation coincided with a need on the part of companies formerly committed to Department of Defence and NASA contracts to find civilian markets, and a correspondingly new hegemonic order became necessary.

I suggest that the international political economic context should remain an important platform for analysis and policy as we may be approaching a moment in which the new mode of accumulation and its attendant hegemony are confronting a conjuncture of crises. As such moments occasion new constraints on the thinkable and the doable, so do they create new opportunities for reappraisal and action.

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Can Media Policy do without “Culture“ and “Society“?

Introduction

It is, after all, only common sense to say that we exercise our freedom through co-operation with others. If you join a social group - let us say a dramatic club - you expect that it will increase your freedom, give your individual powers new stimulus and opportunity for expression. And why should not the same principle apply to society at large? It is through a social development that mankind has emerged from animal bondage into that organic freedom, wonderful though far from complete, that we now enjoy (Cooley, 1922: 50).

From Charles Cooley (1922) to Raymond Williams (1981), the idea persists that needless constraints on mutual access and democratic expression undermine society's 'organic' essence, and thus represent an assault on human freedom. Culture is effectively defined as a self-enabling, self-defining but typically unconscious collaboration in the face of life's material opportunities and constraints. On such an account, media have the capacity to promote this social dimension of the self and facilitate the cultural process. They also have the capacity to do the opposite.

'Society' is a notion which has been bundled into the dustbin of history by neo-classical zealot (witness Thatcher's proclamation that 'there is no such thing as society') and earnest postmodernist alike (for to appeal to such a notion threatens 'to do violence to the particular'), and whatever is meant by 'freedom' today, it can have little to do with social development.

This is because the last thirty years have seen a profound shift in the contradictory but mutually constitutive relationship that pertains between the state (primarily in its role as function and guarantor of constitutional democracy) and commercial industry (whose economic - negative - freedom begins to impinge on the political freedoms upon which constitutional democracy is based). As Hawkins (1991) reminds us: "[n]ot only is 'cultural policy' a continual process of producing meanings for 'culture' but these meanings also emerge in a network of power relations between government and those who are funded or regulated."

Statements uttered in such Foucauldian terms are rarely taken as invitations to the prosaic realms of political economy, but, if we are properly to appreciate the transformations which have beset the discourse of social, cultural and media policy in Australia over the last thirty years, it is to political economy we must turn:

Political Economy ... is concerned with the historically constituted frameworks or structures within which political and economic activity takes place. It stands back from the apparent fixity of the present to ask how the existing structures came into being and how they may be changing, or how they may be induced to change. In this sense, political economy is critical theory (Cox, 1995: 32).

Cox defines 'structure' as an institutionalised 'picture of reality' and it is within these that policy is inevitably made. Cox stresses that these structures change over time and that people

have a hand in changing them. Structures condition our view of the world, but we condition them, too - and political economists of a critical bent hold that we can do so consciously. As Gramsci once told us (1992), and as thirty years of Australian experience have shown us, hegemony is neither complete nor stable. Much of the structure we call Keynesianism is gone, and a hybrid economism, part neo-classical and part Austrian, has become the new lens through which our policy makers apprehend their world. One even hears, in the mix of trepidation and triumphalism that marks our millenarian moment, a few tendentiously selected phrases from the pen of Joseph Schumpeter (1942).

This observation presents the critical political economist with two tasks: the political economic component lies in explaining how and why this discursive transformation came about; and the critical component lies in identifying the inherent dangers and, perhaps, suggesting some potential solutions. What follows represents an attempt to make a start on these undertakings, with reference to Australian social, cultural and media policy, but in the hope that lessons of direct relevance to the Turkish context may be gleaned.

The Australian Historical Context

Throughout the century, communications policy in Australia has typically been informed by a fluctuating combination of two sensibilities: an awareness of the tyranny of distances, both from 'the old country' (Great Britain) and within the new; and an abiding faith in 'the good judgement of the British, where a public telecommunications carrier monopoly and Lord Reith's model of public service broadcasting had thrived in a political culture where even a Conservative Prime Minister had been known to assert that, "(m)ost of us recognize that the old system of free unplanned capitalism has passed away" (MacMillan, 1937: 1, quoted in Seaton, 1988: 123).

By the mid-1970s, it had long been a bipartisan article of faith in Australia that government should have a significant role in social and economic planning. Indeed, Butlin et al. identify centralisation at the level of public policy, corresponding concentration on the part of private organisations and increasing government regulation as the 'outstanding characteristics of allocative and regulatory intervention after 1945.'

The role of the Federal bureaucracy accentuated opportunities for autonomous action by government and focused private pressures at the Federal level ... (due in part to) ... strong elements of constraint on private decision-making for aggregate economic purposes rather than for purposes of particular markets (108-9).

In short, this tradition of *colonial socialism* (as Butlin termed it) had helped produce a centralised bureaucracy, committed to the promotion of articulated national goals, and strong enough to do this at the expense of substantial private interests.

Impassioned public debate about the socio-cultural functions of media persisted well into the 1970s. Medium theorists like Fred and Marilyn Emery with *A Choice of Futures* (1975) and class theorists like Humprey McQueen with *A New Britannia* (1970) and Bob Connell with *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture* (1977) warned us against the hypnotic medium of television and its capacity to perpetuate and normalise the pastimes, prejudices and world views of the bourgeoisie, both in its British and local guises.

Oft-criticised these days is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) proposition that the media were a channel (whether it be framed as technology or ideologically-bound institution) by or through which the passive audience was brought to heel. 'Culture', then, was something imposed from above rather than deployed from below. It followed then, for conservative and social democrat alike, that the logical, rightful and ultimate promoter and protector of 'culture' was the state. For the former,

only the state could ensure that the commercial broadcasters' populist 'lowest common denominator' fare would be balanced by healthier offerings; for the latter, the state was the rightful custodian of an agent so potent in the making of public opinion, so open to abuse, and in a market where sparse population and spectrum scarcity combined to limit viable alternatives (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, 1984).

Contradicting such theoretical suppositions, but buttressing their effective appeal to the primacy of cultural policy and government intervention, was the cultural theory gaining prominence in Britain at the time. For thinkers of the British 'New Left', culture was most definitely a lot more than the unidirectional imposition of anything, whether it be 'correct values' or the evils of cultural catalepsy and political hegemony. Neatly summing up the New Left's general attitude to culture, Raymond Williams was to write:

To say that all culture is 'ideological' need mean no more than that (as in some other current uses) all practice is signifying. For all the difficulties of overlap with other more common uses, this sense is acceptable. But it is very different from describing all cultural production as 'ideology,' or as 'directed by ideology,' because what is then omitted, as in the idealist uses of 'culture,' is the set of complex real processes by which a 'culture' or an 'ideology' is itself produced. And it is with these productive processes that a full sociology of culture is necessarily concerned (1981: 28-9).

This insistence, that 'culture' is 'ordinary' in the sense that it comes from lived experience in real social settings, whose constitutive relations are themselves dialectically intertwined with the forces of production, rendered culture, by intention and in effect, a very political act, for it rendered 'culture' political by definition:

It was ... perfectly clear that the majority of the people, while living as people, creating their own values, were both shut out by the nature of the educational system from access to the full range of meanings of their predecessors in that place, and excluded by the whole structure of communications - the

character of its material ownership, its limiting social assumptions from any adequate participation in the process of changing and developing meanings which was in any case going on (1967: 29).

This association of culture with a democratic communications system is evident in both the policy and the rhetoric of the government of the day. Whitlam's social democrats forced through licences for new public radio stations, increased funding to the performing arts, introduced quasi-national multicultural radio and television stations, and introduced publicly-funded film finance authorities. In announcing the introduction of FM radio in 1974, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam declared:

FM radio will bring new clarity of reception and make possible a new range of stations. It will enable greater participation by the community in media services, in entertainment, news, comment and discussion. It will enable proper recognition to be given to the needs of cultural and social minorities.

Whitlam's sentiments were echoed in the media, and by technocrat and bureaucrat alike:

The Radio Times opined in late 1975 that, "[t]here are numerous local pressure groups in the community who receive very little coverage in the media, and that which is given trivialises the issues and distorts their position in the political spectrum. The mass media thrives [sic] on the perpetuation of myths (4).

The authors of Telecom Australia's strategic directions report, *Telecom 2000* wrote in that same year (1975) that: "a suitable balance between business performance and the social implications of future decisions requires that the commission be fully aware of community needs and attitudes which may not necessarily be reflected in the market place" (quoted in Reinecke, 1984: 30).

A member of staff on the *Coombs Inquiry* summarised public sentiment concerning the Australian bureaucracy at the

time (1975: 22, at 2.4.3) as follows: "(T)he administration is, consciously or unconsciously, the instrument of dominant social groups and the values which they espouse: that its composition reflects this domination" (Hawker, 1977: 158).

Yet, however strident and popular these effective identifications of culture, democracy and society with media and the *raison d'être* of media policy appeared to be, the radical-democratic moment was soon to pass, and Australian social, cultural and media policy was quick to reflect this.

In late 1975, Whitlam's social democrats were removed from office, and by 1977, media magnate Kerry Packer was gaining government sympathy for a publicly financed satellite to relay metropolitan commercial television throughout regional Australia. This not only constituted a socialisation of the cost of augmenting private profit, it also heralded the introduction of a domestic satellite system which offered no practical advances to the Australian telecommunications system other than a potentially autonomous end-to-end alternative to it (Reinecke). *The Green Report* (Australian Parliament 1976) had recommended the public service broadcaster (Australian Broadcasting Commission) not be funded to compete with commercial broadcasters in the offering of popular genres, effectively recommending the marginalisation of the only medium to address Australians as citizens rather than commodities. The ABC has undergone a series of cuts in its appropriations ever since. For their part, the newly autonomous Telecom Australia (one of Whitlam's last acts had been to split Telecom off from the Australian Post Office and remove it from Public Service Board oversight) had adopted a corporate plan which effectively effaced the notions of 'community' and market-skepticism to which they'd committed themselves only months earlier (Moyal, 1983: 306; Chanter, 1989: 192). Even the *Coombs Inquiry* had effectively enhanced the power of departmental heads without enhancing the mechanisms and procedures which they might be held accountable (Troy, 1977: 94).

A New Consensus?

The tide was turning in the Anglo-Saxon academy, too. Courses in political economy had begun to disappear from Australia's economics faculties, often amidst vicious infighting and rancour. In a foreword to a 1976 text on Australian political economy, for example, Simpson-Lee had this to say:

I should have liked to have been able to say in this Foreword that it is a matter of pride and propriety that this highly innovative and important book should have originated in the oldest, largest and most illustrious university in Australia, but that would be to mislead the reader into believing that things are as they should be in such an institution. In fact, this book is born of a long and bitter struggle involving staff and students in the Department of Economics for the right to try to come to a better and fuller understanding of how the economic system really works and how it can be made to serve the welfare of mankind (Wheelwright and Stilwell, 1976: v).

Communications departments were not to be spared. Adrian Mellor (1992: 664) and Jane Gaines (1991: 243) are two commentators to have remarked the pressures on 'Cultural Studies' to abandon its political *raison d'être* and blunt its edge. Whilst, as Graham Murdoch has observed, "the takeoff of cultural studies to growth is almost exactly coterminous with neoliberalism's dominating economic and social policy and with the gathering crisis in the traditional rhetorics and organizational forms of established politics, and more particularly of socialism" (91), it is also true that cultural studies has largely "decamped from the political project" (Leivesley, 1997: 6). In their campaign to dissolve certitude, debunk the metanarrative, and efface theoretical humanism, the post-Althusserian apostles charged appeals to 'society', 'the public sphere' and 'the critical ideal' with logocentrism (universalising discourse in a reality of incommensurable particularities). That the Anglo-Saxon cultural studies faculties so readily took these French theorists to their heart annoyed the likes of Jameson (1991), Eagleton (1995), and Agger (1992), who discerned in this 'postmodern' *ennui* a

blurring of the public and the private realms which betrayed the same antipathy towards the state and the public sector evident in neoclassical economics and its corollary in political science, public choice theory.

James Carey has made the McLuhanesque move of explaining such structural transformations in terms of technological developments, which had "... cultivated new structures in which thought occurred - national classes and professions - new things thought about - speed, space, movement, mobility - and new things to think with - increasingly abstract, analytic, and manipulative models" (84).

This, argues Carey, makes thinkable a centralised technocratic social management and a concomitant 'high communications policy'. Such notions had been mooted in JK Galbraith's famous *The New Industrial State* in 1967 and then again by Daniel Bell, in his even more influential *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (1973). In the latter, Bell envisages a new class of white-collar workers, which "functioned neither as catalyst nor as ruler of a debased and a dominated polity, but rather as the basis of a new social order, in which knowledge rather than market relations would be primary" (Schiller, 1996: 162).

Whilst leading Australian communications scholar Tom O'Regan at least allows for some influence on the part of economic transformations in the reputed ascendance of this 'high policy' sensibility (31), he does confine this to specifically Australian developments and to the specific decade in which technological and policy change was most apparent there, the 1980s.

It is precisely the position of this writer that, insofar as we may speak of 'high communications policy' at all, its heyday had in fact passed by the 1980s, and that the rationales upon which such a policy could sensibility rest had been under the concerted attack of primarily US vested interests since the early 1970s. The

age of a centralised and integrated nation-building public policy, informed at once by an egalitarian bow to cultural democracy and the guiding hand of the engineer, was actually giving way to an order totally uninterested in such policy imperatives. Whereas technological convergence was pointing in one direction [as Herbert Schiller argued, "the separation of culture, politics and economics is now absurd ... when culture is the economy" (77- 81)] academic, bureaucratic and legislative tendencies were clearly headed in the opposite direction.

Beyond the secured corridors of the US military industrial complex (for much of the new technology was still an official secret), only the union movement seemed aware of technological convergence and its implications for policy. The Union of Postal Clerks and Telegraphists provide us with the first utterance of the notion of technological convergence in the Australian policy process in 1974. The union submitted that 'the direction of technological change implied a greater unification of all forms of communication' in its argument against the separation of Telecom from the Australian Post Office. Yet the separation went ahead, and the newly autonomous Telecom promptly forgot the social-ontological premises of its *Telecom 2000* policy guide, opting instead for the pursuit of four corporate priorities: "service and its improvement to meet customer needs; efficiency in the organisational structure and work environment; staff relations and development, and technological improvement" (quoted in Moyal, 1984: 306).

This reduction of society to 'customers' implied a divorce between 'communications' and 'culture' insofar as a direct, exclusive and purely commercial relationship is presupposed between medium and user. Importantly, the definition of 'technological improvements' depends on the definition of one's constituency. Basic universal service (in which respect Telecom had been an unrivalled success, with well over 90% of a huge country's irregularly distributed population enjoying access to the network) is the priority where the citizenry and the cultural

process are the focus; 'value-added services', 'red-lining' metropolitan fibre-optics and resale access to satellite transponders are less so. Implicit in this economistic trend is the definition of communication as the transmission of 'information' (a move Claude Shannon himself had warned against, when his information theory was so uncritically applied to the social sciences). As Dan Schiller argues: "Those who trumpeted the news of post-industrial society's imminent arrival pivoted their theory on information's apparent inherent singularity. There is an uneasy but muted tension, with this antihistorical impulse" (161).

The economic analogue of this move lay in the new sub-discipline of 'information economics', in which 'information' becomes quantifiable (ie. is effectively reduced to 'data') and must thus lose its status as a process in which meaning is generated through the interaction of text, reader and historical context. As of this point, Raymond Williams has nothing to do with communications, and cultural studies nothing to do with communications policy: "In contrast to transportation models, which see media forms ... as vehicles for transmitting 'messages' to consumers, cultural studies approach them as mechanisms for ordering meaning in particular ways" (Golding & Murdock, 1992: 16).

To accept these scientific compartmentalisations, and to accept 'information' as the discreet commodity theorised by Bell and fellow travellers in economics departments (eg Kenneth Arrow), is, as Dan Schiller argues, to accommodate: "A pronounced tendency to economism: the assumption, so prevalent in contemporary public discourse, that something called 'the economy' could be diagnosed and prescribed for as if it existed in pristine separation from 'politics' or 'culture'. The absence of any clear-cut difference between the two formulations, 'the information society' and 'the information economy,' was symptomatic" (169).

It is hard to see the benefits of the sudden hegemonic abstractions that 'communications' and 'information' underwent

in the Australia of the 1970s. Certainly, the process may be read as a defining moment in terms of Weber's 'iron cage of bureaucratic rationality', Postman's notion of 'technopoly', and Habermas's complaint that the 'lifeworld' is being colonised by the 'system'. Of course, western society had spent centuries inserting a dividing line between its conception of itself as a thing of discreet parts and the complexity of itself as a self-reproducing whole, this does not explain why the particular discursive transformation that concerns us here came to take place when it did, where it did, and in the way it did. For that explanation, I submit we need to take a look through the eyes of a political economist; at the US political economy of the early 1970s, where two apparently unrelated developments were unfolding: a crisis of accumulation and a reappraisal of strategic priorities.

The Global Political Economic Context

US multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the mid-1970s were still decisively national in terms of their assets (of which around 78 per cent were based in the 'US'), their sales (67 per cent), and their work force (72 per cent) (Cohen, 1990: 14). The figures were even more pronounced in the case of Japanese MNEs, some of which were in the process of replacing US MNEs among the world's fifty largest industrial corporations. But the Japanese economy had become much the more export-oriented of the two, especially since the US had made itself an attractive focus by lowering its tariffs at the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1967. The US economy, for so long relatively closed to the world, was responding to the Cold War competition for allies, by opening its markets to promising candidates, and the proportion of international trade of US GNP had grown from 9.4 per cent in 1950 to 13.7 per cent in 1973 (Batra, 1992). Yet foreign affiliates of US MNEs were still contributing only 2.3 per cent to US business gross product in 1977 (Cohen, 1990: 15). The economic problem associated with Washington's Cold War strategy was that it was

opening the US economy just as its typically oligopolistic manufacturing sector was falling into relative decline, and, for the first time in decades, US consumers were buying more foreign product than foreigners were buying US product. On most indicators, the US economy peaked in early 1973; painful years of deindustrialisation, corresponding drops in the real wages of the middle class, increases in the poverty rate, and spiralling personal debt can all be traced to that year (Korten, 1993: 1-4). A sudden decline in the utilisation of US capacity, especially in the manufacturing sector, not only pointed to economic crisis (table 1), but also to a paucity of avenues for accumulation for capital.

Table 1: US Capacity Utilisation 1965 - 1975

	All	Manufacturing
1965		.89.5
1966		.91.1
1967	.87.0	.87.2
1968	.87.3	.87.1
1969	.87.3	.86.6
1970	.81.1	.79.4
1971	.79.4	.77.9
1972	.84.4	.83.4
1973	.88.4	.87.7
1974	.84.3	.83.4
1975	.74.6	.72.9

The Government faced structurally problematic current account deficits; a spiralling national debt (fast approaching one trillion dollars - see McWilliams & Piotrowski, 1993: 422-423), and continual demands from an insecure electorate for protectionist measures were increasing in number and desperation (Petitions to this effect submitted to the US International Trade Commission doubled between the mid-seventies and early eighties, according to Boltuck and Litan (1991) and *The Economist* (1984: 42)).

On some fronts, the US government was not the only one to give in to popular pressure. Whilst the GATT had been

successfully bringing down tariffs throughout the world, corresponding non-tariff barriers were being erected to alleviate political costs after 1973. Such barriers were difficult to stem, as the line between 'legitimate' social policies to do with safety, reliability and compatibility standards and 'illegitimate' protectionism were rarely well defined (Wiener, 1997). The transnationalist advocates of the G7 were clearly faced with significant institutional and popular protectionist sentiment.

Three conditions had to be met if the role of the state was to be successfully transformed in such contradictory times. Firstly, a substantial proportion of corporate interests would have to favour, rather than fear, the transnationalisation process. Secondly, a decisive consensus had to be built on Capitol Hill. Lastly, a concerned citizenry had to be convinced of the need for radical and discomfiting change.

With the end of the 'Space Race' and the Vietnam War had come an urgent need on the part of the high technology and communications sectors for civilian markets and an associated global protection regime for the intellectual property rights upon which their profitability would depend. It was in these areas that the US economy held a decisive advantage over its ever more efficient industrial rivals, and it was here that a harmony of interests, between powerful corporate interests and a legislature looking for a way out, could be exploited and developed. The USA was the world's largest exporter of services and France the second largest. In both cases, trade surpluses were already growing in services to offset the trade deficits they were enduring in their merchandise sectors. By 1981, the former was in surplus by \$38.9 billion in the USA, whilst merchandise was in deficit to the tune of \$27.8 billion (Wiener, 1997). This coincidence of a conjunctural economic crisis, hoarded capital looking for new modes and loci of accumulation, and an information technology sector striving for civilian markets to absorb the capacity left idle by the loss

of Defense Department and NASA accounts was to be singularly decisive in shaping the economic and communications policy environments around the world for at least a quarter of a century.

Milton Friedman's monetarist prescriptions were translated into policy in 1979, when Trilateral Commissioner and US President Jimmy Carter appointed Trilateral Commissioner and Chase Manhattan Banker Paul Volcker chair of the Federal Reserve. Volcker promptly attacked the inflation rate by tightening the money supply, and the Keynesian era would not return until the rehabilitation (in practice, if explicitly not by name) of the cold-war military Keynesianism instigated by Ronald Reagan two years later. Friedmanism had effectively exacerbated suspicion of government enterprise, heralded the destruction of the social ontology that characterised hegemonic Keynesianism (Pusey, 1985), and introduced narrow view of the economy such that institutionally sensitive policy criteria and imperatives were all but effaced. In this sense, Friedmanism had consequences for hegemony in general (best characterised as a selective reinforcement of entrenched cultural assumptions and values) and certain institutions in particular (in the case of, for instance, the Federal Communications Commission, the consequence was to be much more dramatic).

An economic theory of politics lay immanent in the 'new' economics, but it was a theory within which a political theory of the economic was quite unthinkable. The promised transnational harmony of the new world order had been driven by the needs of commerce, and, to the extent it was to come about, would be at the expense of the political. The public had, in effect, been trumped by the private. As Self notes: "[T]he market system must be seen not simply or primarily as a spontaneous system of voluntary exchanges governed by objective economic laws, but as itself a political system" (203).

The pristine isolation of 'the economic' from the muddy waters of 'the social' was, as Friedman noted, good for model-building. But it was also singularly good at projecting its econometric assumptions into the political culture in general, and the academy in particular, in the form of commonsensical premises. The Heritage Foundation (founded, like the Trilateral Commission, in 1973), the American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research and the Hoover Institute (which combined to fund annual lecture tours by Hayek from 1974), research centers for conservative intellectuals financed by generous amounts of hoarded, or uninvested, corporate money, were providing Capitol Hill with position papers and the media with press releases on a variety of subjects, all opposing established fiscal policy in favour of a new approach to monetary policy, and all calling for a narrower conception of the proper role of the State. Major contributor to this research and dissemination programme were the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Coalition of Service Industries (CSI), both vastly interlocked peak bodies representing European and US transnational finance (American Express and Citibank, for two), both pressure groups for the liberalisation of trade on both sides of the Atlantic (Wiener 1997), and both represented on the Trilateral Commission. As Friedman's famous 'Free To Choose' made clear, there is only one freedom and that is freedom of the individual from constraint (a negative freedom, in Berlin's terms). Elster explains how such a political philosophical individualism must produce an exclusive methodology in which, "[A]ll social phenomena - their structure and their change - are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals - their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions" (5).

It was at this historical juncture that the philosophically materialist and holistic conception of cultural studies advanced by the British New Left first found itself challenged by Foucault's attacks on enlightenment notions like

materialism and humanism (*The Order of Things* was translated into English in 1970 and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1972), Derrida's attacks on universalism and meaning (*Of Grammatology* was translated in 1976), and Lyotard's attacks on the rational and the whole (*The Postmodern Condition* was published in 1979). Joining the negatively free autonomous individuals beloved of the public choice theorists, were the dis-joined, de-centred, fragmented, incommensurabilities at the core of the postmodern anti-philosophy. The marriage has hitherto been a happy one.

Public Choice theory was left very much alone as it set about recasting the institutions of Keynesian public enterprise. If politicians and public sector workers were driven by selfish material goals, it followed that they should be constrained such that their rational pursuit of said goals not undermine the public good (ie. the aggregate of private goods). Furthermore, if the service or goods rendered by the public sector were offered freely, or even at subsidized prices, then the rational acquirers who constituted 'the public' would have reason to 'over demand' said service or good. This would, in turn, ensue in a motivation for politicians and public enterprises alike to call on more funds from the public purse. All would eventually be complicit in the economic destruction of the polity. As Self points out, systems attuned to obviating potential market failures were being transformed to avoid government failure (3). In appealing to the 'price mechanism' as that which would equilibrate supply and demand, public choice theorists effectively assumed a perfectly competitive market (in which case the issue of market failure could not arise). Furthermore, an economic definition of 'public goods' was posited: "A pure public good is a jointly supplied one from which individual consumers cannot be excluded" (Self, 1993: 36). Public Choice's attitude to public telecommunications companies was consequently definitively antagonistic. Channels of information, and the data thus transmitted, could be

confined to an individual consumer (albeit, at some cost), so telecommunications did not constitute a public good. Should access to those channels be free, the public purse would continually be charged with expanding the network's capacity. This development would suit the corporate interests of the telecommunications company (which would correspondingly grow in size, power and disposable funds) and, in the all-important short-term, the government generous enough to fund the supply of capacity.

'Keynesian' public enterprise telecommunications companies and public service broadcasters throughout the world would be assailed by these arguments from the mid-1970s, when new technology and new applications would be deployed, and new needs and wants created, to threaten governments with the prospect of huge infrastructure budgets and depleted rationales.

The Information Revolution in Context

Much of the development and diffusion of the computer and the satellite was undertaken within this context, and it this point most Australian commentators have ignored. Indeed, they represented important contributions to that context, as a new round of expensive fixed capital investment was born. The combination of this rise in the organic composition of capital (as the cost of fixed capital again represented an ever greater proportion relative to the cost of labour) with a secure and industrially assertive working class and thoroughly rejuvenated competitive economies in Western Europe and Japan, threatened US corporations with lower profits and higher inflation.

The corporate response was to fund a public relations campaign of unprecedented proportions, identifying 'free enterprise' with the myths upon which US identity had long depended. This contribution to the 'closing of the American

mind' needed to be extended beyond US shores, both at the level of popular ideology ('grassroots') and policy elites ('treetops'). In 1974, for instance, the United Kingdom, West Germany, The Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand and Israel all had distinctly left-of-center governments, and Portugal and Spain lay on the verge of sharp deviations to (respectively) socialist and left-liberal governments. Of this campaign in Australia, Carey wrote: "There should be no doubt that the objective of corporate grassroots and treetops propaganda is an expansion of neo-conservative doctrine" (105).

All this was making its mark within the context of the sudden need for new markets for technologies developed during the recently concluded race to the moon and the recently lost Vietnam War (Lyon, 1988: 26-35). The US response to Soviet nuclear capacity was to integrate its radar system, a computer 'net' to analyse the data, and the telecommunications network, to which was added digital processing equipment to render radar signals communicable. The Soviet 'Sputnik' launch, in 1959, moved President Kennedy to institute the 'space race', and it was the concomitant need for component miniaturisation which prompted a federal programme to seed and support research and development firms, some of which would base themselves on the relatively cheap real estate of Santa Clara County, in what was to become 'Silicon Valley'. A more succinct technological definition of the 'technological convergence' which has reputedly revolutionised our world can hardly be imagined, and its political economic roots are equally evident: Keynesian stimulus, enabled and constrained through Defence Department funding and coordination of research, development and production, within the context of a 'Cold' War.

Given the need for the capital hoarded immediately before and during the 1973-1976 crisis, the need to find new avenues of accumulation was intense if depression was to be avoided: "[T]he real challenge for individual firms and for capitalism as a

whole was to find new markets able to absorb a growing productive capacity of goods and services" (Castells, 1999: 80).

The US information technology sector had the wherewithal to provide this. To create the world system necessary for the valourisation of this capital, several conditions would need to met.

A transnational intellectual property regime would be essential to protect the US's singular advantage in the decisive sector. If information is not excludible and rivalrous it can not be a commodity (Delong & Froomkin, 1998).

The movement to deregulation of public telecommunications ... is partly the offspring of ideologically right-wing governments and monetarist economics. But it is also part of the process by which the United States seeks to establish its technological and economic leadership in the world trade of services ... The majority of records and data bases are centred in the United States, and global business demands the right of free passage of such information around the world (Hills, 1983: 2).

Secondly, an increase would be required in the categories of communication to be commodified. Public custodianship of the electromagnetic spectrum, public service broadcasters, sport, and public libraries all represented foregone opportunity from the point of view of capital. As the first industrial revolution had been generated by the enclosure of the commons, so would the third require its own round of enclosures.

And thirdly, it would be necessary to gain control over the carriage infrastructure, most of the world's telecommunications companies were publicly owned and controlled, and this state of affairs represented a danger to large corporations. To rely on the dissemination of information is to rely on communications channels, and the corporate response to resource dependence is to wrest control over the germaine resources. That this task was an urgent one was more apparent to corporate America than it

was to the governments of the world, few of which showed any understanding of the potential market power inherent in controlling digital networks (price structures become possible under a digital regime that reflect the 'user-pays' model much more accurately than those possible under an analogue system).

It is necessary to break the PTT monopolies before they are able to institute their plans for Integrated Services Digital Network ... under public control ... would not only make redundant the provision of private information networks, but would also introduce higher costs to multinational business ... ISDN would instigate a costing of transmission by the 'bits' of information passed. Costs would therefore escalate for the major users of the system - multinational and large business (Hills, 1983: 3).

The political implications of the satellite, too, were generally not grasped. Inevitably expensive and commercially non-viable satellite projects, such as IBM's SBS satellite of 1979, show that at least some corporations understood them rather better. AT&T's long history as monopoly carrier were numbered. And what could undo AT&T, could undo any monopoly carrier anywhere.

In Australia, these commercial imperatives and corporate strategies were to take a variety of forms, from the US-financed Business Telecommunications Services (BTS) public relations and lobbying organisation, to the gratuitous launch of effectively useless satellites to afford potential end-to-end autonomy from the Telecom network, to the slandering of the publicly owned Telecom by programmes on Packer's network (a founding member of BTS), and to the marginalisation of communication (as 'information'), culture (as 'audio-visual product'), society (as 'market'), and citizen (as 'consumer'). Shorn of control over the national telecommunications network, and bereft of categories which evince the links between society, polity, culture and communication, the Australian government had lost the capacity to formulate anything worthy of the tag 'media policy' by the late eighties.

The Australian government is an enthusiastic member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as it was a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it. The 'Uruguay Round' of GATT of 1994 was where what was left of 'culture' met the ideology of neo-liberalism head-on. Canada and France had angered transnational vendors of audio-visual product by claiming that their periodicals and audio-visual product constituted media of national culture and thus warranted exception from the list of categories of commodities freely to be traded between nations. The legal basis of their argument evinces conceptions of culture redolent of Raymond Williams and the radical democracy aspirations of yore. The Canadian and French delegates had cited the right of peoples and nations to maintain permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, as guaranteed by the United Nations Charter of Human Rights.

Sovereignty has historically referred to a nation's right to protect its borders from military invasion; to preserve natural resources, and to choose and protect political, social, economic and cultural systems without interference by another state (Frederick, 1992: 121).

It is tenable to read into this defence a dual conception of 'culture'. For the Canadians and the French, 'culture' was to be defined as both the medium through which political and social self-reflection and reproduction took place and those artefacts taken to be representative of that process.

The US delegates, responding to complaints from the likes of Time Warner that such claims constituted a 'ploy', to disguise simple economic protectionism. For them, even if 'culture' did manifest in an artefact, that artefact's status as a commodity was not compromised by the relation. Polanyi's old argument that the market should be embedded in society, rather than society in the market was formally forgotten and his exhortation that,

[t]he human economy ... is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of

the noneconomic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines that lighten the toil of labour (Polanyi, 1957: 34),

was taken to mean that 'business certainty' required the subsumption of these otherwise problematic institutions by 'the market'. Like public telecommunications monopolies, public service broadcasters and publicly subsidised film-finance authorities would be marked for death on the grounds they represented distortions of a free international market place. As Karl Marx noted over 130 years ago:

The separation of public works from the state, and their migration into the domain of the works undertaken by capital itself, indicates the degree to which the real community has constituted itself in the form of capital (Marx, 1857, notebook V, in Tucker, 1978).

Whilst roughly the first 75 years of Australia's communications policy seemed to contradict this prognosis, it seems the normal course of capitalist development has been resumed. The Australian state's capacity to promote the constitutional democracy, without which it has no formal legitimacy, has been so weakened, and it has been so complicit in that abrogation, that we now face a future in which governments do not oppose transnational conglomeration (as once they did, albeit arguably on domestic capital's behalf as much as out of nationalist principles) but facilitate it, as bouts of mergers produced a decisively powerful finance sector, the ascendance of neo-liberal economics to make sense of the new order, and state bureaucrats versed in that discipline:

The result is popular or democratic consensus in rule by the experts (usually bureaucrats) of the modern state whose structures are such that it is unreasonable to demand any alternative to expert rule. Indeed it is 'unreasonable' since the structures of the modern state provide the only conditions for 'truth statements' within it (Beilharz, 1992: 132).

Closing Comments

... the signified of 'free trade' is the self interest of the most powerful (Miller, 1993: 127).

The Keating Labor government's 1994 document, *Creative Nation*, showed that the retooling of 'culture' into a narrowly economic category was complete. Henceforth, 'culture' would be an industrial sector in which the government might invest with an eye to future profits rather than protect and promote as the process of national self-appraisal and development. Even left-leaning critic Jock Given has opposed the Australian government's current efforts to come to a bipartisan agreement with the United States on the issue of trade in 'audio-visual product' because the lack of rules governing such negotiations with the powerful threatens the industry (Usher, 2001). No longer, it seems, is a society's capacity to collaborate in its own reproduction of its own structures within its own material setting a sensible idea.

Horkheimer and Adorno's theory that the serialised standardisation of commodified culture would deprive society of avenues for critical self-reflection are to be tested in the Australia of today and, I dare suspect, the Turkey of tomorrow. As people come together at last to question the tendentious fait accompli of neo-liberal 'globalism', they might be well advised to look again at the institutionalist political economists of culture out there who call what they see. Marjorie Ferguson is one of them:

Protests about "competition" ring hollow from trade czars pushing for unrestricted access to smaller markets, with threats of tariffs or American market exclusion, when the U.S. itself imports less than 2% of its movies and television. For nations attempting domestic cultural protection against the forward march of Western popular culture and the icons of Disney and MTV, the "realist-mercantilist" odds are still skewed towards the audiovisual economy elephant rather than the culture-defensive mouse (Ferguson, 1995).

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Turkish Broadcasting Policy in a Historical Context: Continuities and Discontinuities in the 1990s

Abstract

This article addresses the question of whether a radical change in Turkish broadcasting scene in the 1990s implies a similar trend in broadcasting policy process. Broadcasting history in Turkey is analyzed in terms of legal-institutional arrangements in order to shed light on basic characteristics of the broadcasting arena and policy process, including the factors and actors involved within that process. The analysis reveals the fact that in spite of the impact of worldwide privatization/deregulation movement and the entrance of new players to the Turkish broadcasting scene, powerful old players still endure and main characteristics of the policy process has not changed much.

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Turkish Broadcasting Policy in a Historical Context: Continuities and Discontinuities in the 1990s¹

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² Most parts of the text below can be found in Turkish in B. Kejanlioğlu, "Türkiye'de Radyo TV Yayıncılığı Siyasası." *Bağımsız İletişim Ağı Yerel Medya Eğitim Projesi Seminer Notları*, 1997.

"Since the late 1980s Turkish broadcasting has undergone a rapid transformation." All the analyses of national media in the 1980s could begin with such a sentence because there is nothing specific to Turkey in terms of deregulation, liberalization, commercialization, privatization and internationalization processes. As a matter of fact, outlining some peculiar characteristics or different features of broadcasting policy in each country is not so much related to the question of *what* but *how*. In other words, what counts in such analyses is *not the product or outcome per se* but the *process* and the *factors and actors* involved within that process. Looking at the process can give us hints about politics and administration in that country, as well as broadcasting policy.

In this article I will tell you, first, the story of broadcasting policies in Turkey from their inception up until the early 1990s which, in turn, gives basic characteristics of the broadcasting arena and policy process. Most of these characteristics are still valid today, in spite of the fact that the broadcasting scene has changed dramatically. The 1990s broadcasting arena and the continuities and discontinuities in the broadcasting scene and policy will constitute the second part of this article.

A Story of Broadcasting in Turkey: The Scene and Its Evaluation

Broadcasting in Turkey until the early 1990s can be divided into three broad phases in terms of legal-institutional arrangements²:

1. *Commercial radio (1926-1936)*
2. *State monopoly (1936-1964)*
3. *TRT's (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) monopoly (1964-early 1990s)*

Commercial Radio

A private company, *Türk Telsiz Telefon AŞ*, was granted a ten-year radio broadcasting monopoly license in 1926 and started regular broadcasts in May 1927, first in İstanbul, and then in Ankara. The company built two small radio studios (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 9-13; Gülizar, 1985: 2732) and used the PTT technical infrastructure, which had been installed by a French company, *Telephonie Sans Fil*. The first three years of radio broadcasting corresponded with "the period of reconstruction under the conditions of open economy." In those years, the state created and supported the national bourgeoisie and transferred the operation of public economic enterprises to private companies that included some politicians (MPs) as shareholders or as members of administrative boards. Thus, shareholders of *Türk Telsiz Telefon AŞ* were the Bank of Affairs, the Anatolian News Agency, two politicians and a merchant. However, in the 1930s, Turkey closed its doors to foreign capital and began a policy of industrialisation under statist policies (Boratav, 1988: 45). It is in this context that the state became more interventionist in broadcasting in the early 1930s and took radio under its direct control in 1936.

In cultural terms, "wireless telephony" or radio was initially regarded as "a kind of international hobby like dance and sports", or as a form of "civil and modern entertainment" (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 74). These terms, "civil" and "modern" meant "Western". By turning its face to the West, the Republic of Turkey has, from its very inception, been involved in cultivating a "new", "modern" culture. From the 1930s onwards, radio acquired an educational role. But in practice it continued primarily as a medium of entertainment and music. In an attempt to spread Western classical music through establishing music schools and organisations such as the Presidency's Philharmonic Band, the state also intervened in radio, which was mostly dependent upon disseminating music. In 1934, broadcasting Turkish music was even banned for a period (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980; Kocabaşoğlu, 1985: 2733).

The emphasis in the 1930s on entertainment and education is comprehensible in the context of the Turkish State's cultural policy of "Westernization". Such a holistic attempt to educate from above people of different backgrounds, or to cultivate a somewhat Westernized culture, required that the means of communication be under the direct and strict control of the state. This was realized in 1936.

State Monopoly

The second phase (between 1936 and 1964) is usually referred to as the "period of state monopoly" in broadcasting. Radio was under the control of the PTT from 1936 to 1940. This period is considered a "transitional phase"; ie. the transition from a commercial to a state monopoly.

From 1940 onwards, the Press Department became responsible for radio broadcasting. Radio underwent institutional and administrative improvements during the Second World War: considerable funds from the state budget were devoted to radio's development; radio broadcasts started addressing different audiences; and radio became one of the main sources of information about the war.

Consequently, demand for radio sets and the number of radio listeners increased. However, despite all these developments, radio was still a part of the bureaucratic machine and was even labelled "the mouthpiece of the government/state and the ear of the nation" (Kocabaşoğlu, 1985: 2735).

During the Second World War, American correspondents and members of the British Council in Turkey used Radio Ankara. In 1944, there was a radio program exchange with the US. Moreover, US radio stations and the BBC inspired program production in Turkey. Radio program personnel were educated by Marshall Plan experts and a program on the Plan was broadcast, as was another entitled "NATO Hour".

In 1946, Turkey witnessed the first multi-party elections after 23 years of one party (Republican Peoples Party) rule. The opposition party, the Democrat Party (DP), won the next three successive general elections (1950, 1954 and 1957) and governed the country throughout the entire 1950s. What made radio a crucial subject in that decade was the ban on broadcasts by the opposition and its extensive use as a propaganda medium by the government. These years in broadcasting history in Turkey are called the period of 'partisan radio' (Aksoy, 1960). Leading DP figures were severely punished by the military regime after 1960 because of their use of the state radio along with other crimes (Şahin, 1974: 104-105). According to some scholars and professionals who worked at radio in those years (e.g., Aksoy, 1960; Gülizar, 1994: 69-79; Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 345-353), the economic crisis and criticisms by the opposition party and by the press had an important role in the DP's partisan use of radio.

Moreover, the DP's populist rhetoric, which included Islamist components, against the strict secularism of the Republican People's Party was directly reflected in the introduction of religious programs to radio. Immediately after winning the 1950 general elections, the DP allowed the calling for prayer in Arabic and introduced religious programs on

radio. From the mid-1950s onwards, religious broadcasts increased (Gülizar, 1994: 65-68; Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 316-317).

However, these developments did not mean that Turkey had turned its back on the West; instead, while a populist party program was being pursued, there was no break in relations with the US. Radio İzmir (1951) started operating in these years as a result of technical aid from the American News Center. In addition to technical aid, the American Embassy in Ankara, the USIS and the VOA produced programs for Turkish radio (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 356; Kocabaşoğlu, 1985: 2734-2735). In 1954, military agreements between the US and Turkey led to the broadcast of American radio stations for the personnel of military bases in Turkey. Also, Turkish people who liked listening to Western music became fans of those stations' broadcasts (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 363). (Even after the 1960 military intervention, listeners could tune in to the VOA-originated "anti-Communist" bands on several programs and state-funded public spots (Kocabaşoğlu, 1980: 417-419).

TRT's Monopoly - Three Military Interventions and Successive Changes in the Legal Framework of Broadcasting

After the military intervention of 1960, radio remained under the control of the Press (and Information) Department for a few more years. In the meantime, the 1961 Constitution was prepared and passed. That Constitution is generally regarded as Turkey's most democratic Constitution, yet the lack of democratic consensus and popular support in preparing it resulted in it being severely criticised throughout the 1960s. A new broadcasting law was passed in 1963—one of the last laws to be issued for two years in accordance with the Constitution (Şahin, 1974: 119-120). This law considered establishing an independent public corporation, resulting in the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) being created in May 1964 as an autonomous public body. Thus, the third phase in Turkey's broadcasting history is characterised

by TRT's monopoly, which came to a de facto end in the late 1980s, and legally in the early 1990s.

After TRT started operating, there was a large increase in technical, administrative and program personnel; the corporation gained financial power; program making was improved; and broadcasting hours increased. All this occurred in a relatively short time span. However, TRT had intra-organizational problems such as an excess in personnel, a lack of co-ordination among staff, and a strict hierarchical structure (Öngören, 1985: 2748-2750). The introduction of television within this structure made the organizational operations worse.

In the context of a transition to a planned economy and the establishment of the State Planning Organization, television was considered to require extensive investment, which was not forthcoming in the 2nd development plan. However in 1968, television was introduced in Turkey with technical aid from Germany and professional training mainly from Germany and Britain. These countries also supplied programs.

Constitutional and legal guarantees were not sufficient to ensure TRT's autonomy, and the Corporation was subject to partisan use (Şahin, 1974). Formal rules applied in indirect ways and unwritten rules of power politics were used to intervene into its operation. The political pressures in the period 1964-1971 included the following: TRT was not allowed to develop relations with other institutions; TRT's accounts were controlled illegally; the Ministry of Finance attempted to keep revenue from license fees for itself; state funding was tardy or was not given; and staff appointments were delayed (Şahin, 1974; Topuz et.al., 1990: 95-98). From 1965, successive governments announced that there would be changes to TRT's legislation and an amendment was on Parliament's agenda when the military intervention of 1971 occurred.

Although radio broadcasting was under a TRT monopoly with TRT broadcasting one nation-wide channel, more than 70 radio stations existed in 1971 servicing some schools and institutions. Among these were a 'police radio' and a 'meteorology radio' that had relatively large audiences. Moreover, as stated earlier, there were American radio stations servicing military personnel at the American (NATO) bases in Turkey. (Aziz, 1981; Kocabaşoğlu, 1985: 2736-2737).

After the military intervention of 1971, a new Director-General, who had a military background, was appointed illegally to TRT. He tried to strengthen regional radio programs to protect Turkey from what was argued were harmful foreign broadcasts (Gülizar, 1985). Later, the government's interference in TRT occurred in the legal realm as well. An amendment to the Constitution ending TRT's autonomy was followed by an amendment to TRT's legislation which increased the government's political and financial control over the corporation.

An amendment to article 121 of the Constitution not only abolished the autonomy of TRT but also set the corporation's program policy to be the furtherance of the educational and informative role of radio and television. Article 121 required TRT's "Commitment to the unity of the State; to the national democratic, secular and social Republic which is based on respect for human rights; to general moral values; and to accuracy in news provision."

In the 1970s, TRT's programming often changed, usually following a change in the Director-General. For instance, İsmail Cem (who is now Minister of Foreign Affairs) initiated day-time broadcasts on TV; he supported the production of sports programs, documentaries, current affairs, new TV dramas and encouraged live broadcasts on radio (Dedeoğlu, 1991: 25-26; Gülizar, 1995: 78). However, when a conservative Director-General was in office (Nevzat Yalçıntaş, but mainly Şaban Karataş -interestingly, their surnames end with "taş", which

means "stone", and TRT was considered to be passing through the "Stone Age" under their directorate), both programming policy and program content changed dramatically toward a "Turkish-Islam synthesis". *The Koran Reading Contest*, *The Great Turks*, and *Conquest* are among the program titles produced in this period, and the use of some words and names in programs was forbidden (Gülizar, 1995: 141-143).

In the 1970s, 25-34 percent of radio programs were comprised of educational/cultural and news content; advertisements comprised 4-5 per cent and the remainder was filled with Turkish and foreign classical and pop music (Kocabaşoğlu, 1985). Until the mid-80s, there was only one black and white television channel, and foreign programs constituted 32-33 percent of total programming in the 1970s (Cankaya, 1990).

The 1980 military intervention differed from that of 1971 in clamping down completely on political activity rather than merely curtailing its parameters. Following this intervention, the National Security Council issued a new broadcasting law in November 1983, which was based on an article of the 1982 Constitution and introduced after the general elections that had brought the Motherland Party (ANAP) to power. That law was in force until the amendment of article 133 of the Constitution in 1993 and the passing of a new law in 1994.

The military rulers' strategy regarding broadcasting was to keep radio and television under military control for some time after 1983. To this end, the regulatory authority RTYK (*Radio Televizyon Yüksek Kurulu*) was established with a board of directors, most of whom were to be appointed by the president, Kenan Evren. Apart from the establishment of this agency, the structure of broadcasting remained more or less the same and TRT held its monopoly status (Kejanhoğlu, 1998).

There were strict rules on content concerning "national economic interests", "national security policy" and the unity of

the state, though most problematic of all in the 1980s was article 19, which allowed the government to produce a 30 minute program without using TRT's facilities, and requiring that it be broadcast monthly on TRT channels. This development relates to both the arguments concerning the growth of independent/private production companies and to those regarding the partisan use of radio and TV (Çelenk, 1998; Kejanlıođlu, 1998).

The main indicators of a movement towards commercial broadcasting, or the change in the 1980s from a system of state monopoly to a dual broadcasting system were: (a) the airing of independent productions by TRT from 1985 onwards, (b) the launch by the PTT of cable television in 1988, and (c) the transfer of the control of transmitters from TRT to the PTT in 1989. These developments did not seem to directly influence the state monopoly in broadcasting but did actually have a crucial impact on the transformation process, when interpreted in the light of worldwide deregulation and privatization policies, a restructuring of world markets, and technological convergence. In fact, Prime Minister Turgut Özal announced in March 1989 that he would increase the number of television channels, including channels funded by foreign capital, to 15-16. He added that because of the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications, broadcasting would be taken under the control of the PTT (Kejanlıođlu, 1998).

Characteristics of Policy: An Evaluation

This story of broadcasting brings some significant actors and factors to the fore and gives the basic characteristics of broadcasting policy and the policy process in Turkey.

The main actors and factors:

1. In Turkish broadcasting, the state has always been the main, active agent. The authoritarian understanding of the

state and its control over broadcasting was evident even when a private company ran radio in its first years. When I say the state, I refer particularly to the military branch of the state—the Constitutions and most important laws have been put into force directly or indirectly by the military: for instance, the 1961 Constitution, the 1963 Broadcasting Law, the 1971 and 1972 amendments to the Constitution and the law, the 1982 Constitution, and the 1983 Broadcasting law. The military also established or strengthened radio stations close to national borders.

2. Despite the military's dominant role, there has also been civil government influence in broadcasting. This can be seen in the Democrat Party's use of radio in the 1950s which, although severely punished by the military, established the principle of the partisan use of radio and television. It also demonstrates that the media was perceived as an instrument of manipulation and propaganda. Within the limits drawn by the military ("national security"), governments have always found a way to intervene into the operation of radio and TV, even when TRT was an autonomous public corporation.

3. Whether the military was in power or not, all governments have had one common tendency—Westernization, and particularly Americanization after the Second World War. Contrary to recent arguments, I believe we can argue that a situation of "dependency" existed in those days in relation to technical infrastructures, training, and programming. The wireless technical infrastructure was installed by a French company and the television one through financial aid from Germany. Radio İzmir was built with aid from the US, and as late as 1985, the US Armed Forces provided new technology and capacity for television. In addition, German and British experts trained Turkish broadcasting personnel. Even Ankara University's Communication Faculty was established with UNESCO aid to educate students in the media professions.

Basic characteristics of broadcasting policies and the policy process:

1. Broadcasting policies have not been subject to long-term or even short-term planning. The only exception was the Broadcasting Law of 1963 and related reports by TRT and the State Planning Organization on the role of radio as a tool of cultural promotion and education. The fact that TRT was given this role after radio had been well established as a propaganda medium suggests that it was, in a sense, a reactive policy and its implementation failed. Inadequate technical resources made the attainment of this goal difficult, along with an elitist and didactic understanding of education. The policy therefore did not result in concrete reforms or any improvement in people's daily lives (Oskay, 1978).

2. Even when broadcasting was subject to planning, the plans were not carried out. For instance, although the State Planning Organization knew that television required expensive investment and did not include provision for such investment in its development plan, Turkey nonetheless witnessed the introduction of television broadcasting. Similarly, from a legal perspective, broadcasting was always among the last areas to be considered. From the mid-1960s to 1971, successive governments announced that there would be changes in broadcasting law, but an amendment was made only after the military intervention. However, the regulation of broadcasting did not have a priority status for the military either: the 1963 and 1983 broadcasting laws were among the last to be passed at the time.

3. Broadcasting policy usually occurred after the fact—several changes and innovations having been introduced *de facto*. Examples include the introduction of radio advertisements in 1950, the broadcasting of several radio stations in 1971, the PTT's introduction of cable TV in 1988 against the constitutional mandate of TRT's monopoly, and the existence of two Director-Generals for TRT in 1975-8.

4. Broadcasting policies were usually made by the military as reactions to the perceived threat to national security, or, in case of TRT's policies, as an attempt at manipulation. What was missing in these policy processes was the *audience* or *public*. The "public" as a body of "citizens" and as a part of the policy-making process is nonexistent, its representatives serving to only 'legitimate the ruling group' (Habermas, 1973: 67).

The Dual Broadcasting System: TRT and Commercial Radio and TV Stations in the 1990s³

Broadcasting in the Early 1990s

Turkish broadcasting once again underwent *de facto* changes in 1990. In January of that year, President Turgut Özal announced that "there is no rule to prevent broadcasting in Turkish from other countries... If a person leases a channel, he can broadcast programs to Turkey via satellite". Following this announcement it was reported that the Rumeli Holding's company Magic Box Incorporated (MBI), which had been established in Liechtenstein, had leased a transponder in Germany in order to launch a Turkish television channel. Consequently, *Star 1* began broadcasting on 1 March 1990 and it later became public that President Turgut Özal's son, Ahmet Özal, was one of the part owners of MBI (Çaplı, 1994: 136).

Star 1 initially began with a campaign to sell satellite dishes to extend its penetration. However, this marketing strategy ceased to be successful because of the attempt by several municipal governments to build receivers and transmitters in their own regions. Although dish manufacturing was reduced, *Star 1* nonetheless reached its target audience through municipalities, most of which were ruled by the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Populist Party. In addition, despite the fact that the transfer of transmitters from TRT to the PTT was against the

³ Some parts of the text below are taken from D. B. Kejanlıoğlu, "Broadcasting Policy in Turkey since 1980," *Boğaziçi Journal*, Summer 2001, where a more detailed analysis of Turkish broadcasting policy in the 1990s can be found.

Constitution, no new law was prepared and the PTT also mobilized its facilities in the service of *Star 1* (Kejanlıoğlu, 2001).

Although the Social Democratic Populist Party claimed the 'illegality' of the private channel and was against the PTT's extended role in broadcasting, it also tried to launch a private channel, *Mega-10*, and to use PTT services just before the 1991 general elections. However, the life of the channel corresponded only with that of the election campaign period.

In 1992 and 1993 several commercial television channels started broadcasting. At first, *Star 1* had to change its name to *Interstar* because of the dispute between the company's owners, Ahmet Özal and the Uzan family. The Uzan family added a sister channel, *Teleon*, to its capacity, and Ahmet Özal started the channel *Kanal 6* in 1992. Four more television channels became available in 1992: *ShowTV*, *FlashTV*, *HBB*, and *Kanal E*. The following year saw the entrance of major national newspapers into the broadcasting arena with *Türkiye's TGRT*, *Milliyet's* (and then *Hürriyet's*) *Kanal D*, *Sabah's ATV*, and *Zaman's STV*. Moreover, the first Turkish pay TV service, *Cine5*, started broadcasting in March 1993 (Kejanlıoğlu, 1998: 256-7; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001). Each year a new genre has acquired popularity in the content of the major national channels: for example, the predominance one year of talk shows is followed the next by game shows and then reality television etc.

Commercial radio stations proliferated even faster from the mid-1992 onwards. From June to October 1992, nine stations went on air and in March 1993 the number of radio stations was estimated to be between 400 and 700 (Kejanlıoğlu, 1998: 257-260; Kejanlıoğlu, 2001). These stations were and continue to be mostly reliant on popular music and call-ins.

The city governors who had received in January and March 1993 directives from the ministries of Internal Affairs and Transportation to close private radio stations and some television channels that were not beaming broadcasts outside Turkey via satellite, banned their broadcasts on 30th March 1993. The official

reason for this ban was technical; this being that the proliferation of stations was resulting in a polluting of the frequency spectrum. Another official reason was to convince the opposition to work on a Constitutional amendment relating to broadcasting (Art. 133). Other plausible reasons revealed by the press included the taking of measures against the dissemination of Islamic radios (Çaplı, 1994: 139) and a plan by the Government to direct attention away from its unfulfilled promises (Kejanlıoğlu, 1998: 260-3). There were also claims that the decision was related to the lobbying activities of the music industry looking for copyright revenues (Aksoy & Robins, 1993).

The Process Leading to the Broadcasting Bill, the New Law and its Implementation

The coalition agreement between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) included as a priority the provision of a legal environment for private television and radio stations (*Cumhuriyet*, 21.11.1991). However, it took more than one and a half years to make an amendment in the Constitution. The National Assembly passed the amendment of article 133 of the Constitution on 8th July 1993. This new article abolished the state monopoly in broadcasting and was only realized by silencing the radio stations in order to endorse the necessity to make a change. The attempt in 1992 by the Minister of State responsible for broadcasting, Gökberk Ergenekon, to prepare a consensual draft bill was simply set aside, despite the fact that he had asked 180 public and private institutions to submit their proposals for the new broadcasting law and had collected views and advice from 83 (*Özel Radyo-Televizyon Kanunu Konusundaki Görüş ve Düşünceler*, 1992).

Although the Head of the National Assembly and the representatives of the True Path Party, the Social Democratic Populist Party, and the Motherland Party had signed an agreement relating to the then forthcoming broadcasting law, large media interests tried to influence the members of the True Path Party and continued lobbying while the bill was on the agenda of the

⁴ According to the article 29, private radio and television broadcasters can only be established as incorporated, Inc., companies. A company can own only one radio station and one television channel. A shareholder can only hold a maximum 20% share of a company or of different companies. Foreign capital's and Turkish newspaper owners' share in a company cannot exceed 20%. Foreign shareholdership is limited to only one private radio and television company. People or institutions that hold more than a 10% share of a particular radio and television company cannot have undertakings from the State or public institutions. The terms of administrative, financial and technical conditions would be set by RTÜK (Article 30) and all the private stations should obey program quotas (Article 31).

National Assembly. The Assembly passed only the first 24 articles of the bill in November. MPs could not reach an agreement on the remaining articles, especially the 29th which regulates ownership,⁴ and the bill languished for five months. It returned to the Assembly's agenda after some provocative reporting by private television channels on the Serbian action in Bosnia and the live broadcasting of the related demonstrations, later labeled as the "sheria demonstrations". The National Assembly passed the bill in a single day on 13th April 1994 (Kejanlioğlu, 2001).

The articles relating to the RTÜK (*Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu* -Radio and Television Supreme Board)—nos. 5 to 15—are the most important because they establish this Board as the supreme regulatory agency responsible for the application of all the rules (or almost all the other articles of the law). The RTÜK consists of nine members nominated for a period of six years by the National Assembly—five nominated by the party/parties in power and four by opposition parties. Three new members are appointed every two years. The RTÜK is supposed to make organizational interventions into the broadcasting arena (e.g., allocating frequencies), to set rules and regulations related to broadcasting, and to monitor programs and impose appropriate sanctions in the case of violations of rules and regulations.

In its seven-year history, the RTÜK has issued some regulations and taken mostly punitive action against broadcasters (Kejanlioğlu, et.al., 2001). The suspension of broadcasts has become a common response of the Board and has led to severe criticism against it and the claim that it acts as a "Censure Board". Even though the RTÜK has been able to fulfill its requirements in the areas of regulation, monitoring and punishment, it was stopped from auctioning frequencies, which it was mandated and intended to do in the last quarter of 1997, by the National Security Board, more than half of whose members are military commanders.

Today, there are 16 registered national television channels on air. When we include all terrestrial, cable and satellite channels except digital packages, the number rises to 55, and if all local and regional channels are included, this number quintuples (*MediaScape Raporları: Türkiye'de Medya 2000*: 31). The total number of radio stations, most of which are local, is more than 1200. All of these channels and stations are operating without licenses and are thus still not legal!

Conclusions: Discontinuities and Continuities in Broadcasting Policy

The first sentence of the conclusion is the first sentence of this piece: "Since the late 1980s Turkish broadcasting has undergone a rapid transformation." Today, we have hundreds of television channels and more than a thousand radio stations. All of them are commercial except those of TRT. This rapid proliferation of channels demonstrates that new actors have entered into the broadcasting arena. Although most of them—especially local and regional broadcasters—do not seem powerful, big businesses have always found loopholes in regulations which have enabled them to pursue their goals. Media moguls have come and gone. Now, all have investments in other sectors of the economy, especially in banking, and two of them have the global giants CNN and CNBC as shareholders.

Another new actor is the regulatory authority, the RTÜK. It seems very powerful on paper and its punitive actions, which are heavily publicized by the major media, reinforce such an image. However, the RTÜK has largely ignored regulations about advertisements and has published new ones in contradiction to the European Convention (Pekman, 2001). Therefore, both the RTÜK and the major media can easily infringe the rules and regulations on advertising in order to enhance their major source of revenue—advertising! In fact, not only does the RTÜK seem to be financially vulnerable⁵ but advertising has become a very important sector as well.

⁵ Moreover, as RTÜK could not allocate frequencies and issue licenses after the National Security Board's intervention in 1997, it is, not as administratively (and thinking of revenues from licenses, again financially) powerful as it seems to be.

Partisan use of state radio and TRT until the 1980s has carried over to private channels, each of which takes sides with a particular political party in order to enhance potential investments in different sectors. In other words, business ventures today are also political ventures, and the unwritten rules of power politics still dominate the scene.

In addition, old players in the broadcasting scene still endure. In the 1990s, we still witnessed the military's active role in broadcasting. The ban on broadcasts in 1993, the issuing of the 1994 broadcasting law, and the cancellation of the frequency allocation in 1997, were all related to the military's pursuit of 'national security'. Moreover, the military has always been the main agent in the development, importation and dissemination of technology. In an age of "convergence", it thinks that it holds the right to intervene for technical reasons into every area of life.

As mentioned above, in the 1980s, broadcasting policies in Turkey were not at all the product of rational models of policy-making, and nothing much has changed. Although anticipated, no policy formulation or planning had taken place when the first commercial TV channel was launched in 1990. Both the amendment to the Constitution and the new broadcasting bill occurred as a result of particular events—the ban on broadcasts of Islamic radio and television stations, and the private channels' broadcasting of the "sharia demonstrations"—that were considered to threaten "national security"

Such an attitude towards broadcasting implies a bureaucratic (and technocratic) view of policy in which the professional becomes the mere agent. Even when politicians decide, as in the case of Turgut Özal's decisions, it is like a one-man show where decisions are made out of sight and the public/s experience policy as a *fait accompli* (Kaya, 1994).

As Habermas argues, "the specialization of large-scale research and a bureaucratized apparatus of power reinforce each other only too well while the public is excluded as a political

force" (79). So long as public deliberation is excluded from the policy process, and so long as broadcasting policies and laws carry the burden of illegitimate acts, the audience/s will go on consuming as "consumers" and experiencing *déjà vu* as "spectators."

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Olympic Dreams: Representations of Aborigines in the Australian Media

Abstract

The paper discusses the manner in which indigenous Australians are represented in the Australian media. It queries whether the seemingly positive representations in the Opening Ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics are representative of more general media representations of Australia's indigenous peoples. It reads the indigenous presence in the Opening Ceremony as an engagement with politically charged debates in Australia on whether and how to promote reconciliation between indigenous and settler communities. It concludes by arguing that, while the Opening Ceremony can be read as a significant improvement on mainstream media representations, it fell significantly short of constituting a progressive rearticulation of the central place of Aborigines in Australia's colonial history and contemporary society.

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Olympic Dreams: Representations of Aborigines in the Australian Media

If you watched the Opening Ceremony of the Sydney Olympic Games, you would be excused for thinking that Australians are well reconciled to their Aboriginal heritage. Here was a performance that aimed to depict Australian history—a hi/story in which Aboriginal people feature prominently. It goes something like this...

Once upon a time there were rich and vibrant Aboriginal cultures whose dreamings emerged from the vastness of the landscape and the mysteries of the seas. To this came settlers who brought new dreamings of new beginnings, achieved through toil and ingenuity. Migrants too brought their labour, but also their cultures, resulting in an explosion of cultural diversity and the creation of a richly cosmopolitan society that nonetheless remained inflected by its relationship with the environment, particularly the vast, hot centre and its encircling seas.

Our Aboriginal peoples, the story goes, have travelled the path with us. Their on-going presence continues to enrich our lives. They give meaning to our existence in this land through their culture and the welcome that they bestow upon us. Without them non-Aboriginal Australia would not be what it is today.

They are themselves a diverse people. Some are traditional and some are contemporary; the latter personified in Cathy Freeman, Australia's gold winning 400-metre sprinter. Cathy

Freeman is here the exemplar of Aboriginal achievement and her pivotal ceremonial role of torch lighter the indication of how central Aboriginality is to Australian identity.

This was the hi/story of our history that the Olympic Opening Ceremony committee wished to present. A nation 'reborn in unity so that we can all be as one mob', a nation where 'acceptance without questioning' prevails, where judgement is reserved (TWI Production 2000, Ernie Dingo commentary). These characteristics are enabled by the Aboriginal songmen who, through their traditional smoking ceremony, call us into unity and rid us all of our demons. Thus it is, according to this hi/story, that core aspects of the Australian national character are linked symbolically to Aboriginal tradition.

Those watching the Ceremony may have been confused by the extent to which these representations contradict so much of what is heard in the international media of indigenous and non-indigenous relations in Australia. One has only to depart Australian shores to be reminded of our poor reputation in this regard. Was the situation changing, or was the Olympic Opening Ceremony simply an obscenely indulgent exercise in global PR? I argue that, while both readings are at some level incontrovertible, neither is sufficiently nuanced to fully ascertain the hi/story's ideological effects.

The Context

The Olympics took place at a very difficult moment in indigenous politics in Australia. The conservative-led Federal Government had repeatedly made known its reluctance and resistance towards attempts to improve relations between non-indigenous and indigenous Australians. Most of these attempts occurred under the banner of 'reconciliation'. In 1991, the previous Prime Minister Paul Keating had instigated official attempts to promote reconciliation through the creation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. The Council's mandate was not only to promote reconciliation in the community, but also to ascertain whether the community would support a formal commitment of Commonwealth and State Governments to the reconciliation process (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000b: viii). By 1997, the Council had determined that this formal commitment would take the form of a Document of reconciliation (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000b: 72-76). The Document would commit governments to strategies aimed at substantially improving the circumstances and life chances of indigenous people. The Council was required by legislation to present the Document (what later became Documents) of Reconciliation to the Government by May 2000.

The conservative Government led by Prime Minister John Howard was therefore presented with Documents of Reconciliation that it had not commissioned and was not at all inclined to support. The central document is called the Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000a). This one-page Declaration touches on highly sensitive issues that have been central to Aboriginal political demands since the beginning of colonialism—the moment they call invasion: An acknowledgement of prior Aboriginal ownership of the land; an acknowledgement that the land was taken from the Aboriginal people without consent; and an acknowledgement of the spiritual relationship between the Aboriginal peoples and their land. The Declaration concludes

with the pledge 'to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and respect that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right to self-determination within the life of the nation'. Its 'hope is for a united Australia that respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for all'.¹

Throughout its period in office, the Government had felt buoyed in its uncompromisingly tough stance on reconciliation by the rising level of support for ultra-conservative political parties—some might say neo-fascist—that shunned reconciliation. Foremost among these was the One Nation Party led by Pauline Hanson whose highly racist statements, not only regarding Aborigines, received considerable media coverage and apparently resonated with a sizeable section of the electorate. A central argument put forward by Pauline Hanson and others was that Aboriginal people were not at all discriminated against; rather they were relatively privileged when compared to white Australia because they received special benefits on the grounds of their race. This theme was raised in her first speech in Parliament which received blanket media coverage:

We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to mainstream Australians by those who promote political correctness and those who control the various taxpayer funded 'industries' that flourish in our society servicing Aborigines, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups' (Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, 10 September 1996).

This discourse of privilege took on another inflection when articulated by Prime Minister John Howard. For Howard, the aim of Government policy was equality—ensuring that each person in Australia had equal rights and opportunities. The corollary of this notion of equality was that no group should get 'special treatment'.

Howard's idea of equality is one that shuns the notion of difference. It is an equality of process—equality before the law, employment equality, equality of access to Government

¹ Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation: We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment to go on together in a spirit of reconciliation. We value the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the original owners and custodians of lands and waters. We recognise this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or consent. Reaffirming the human rights of all Australians, we respect and recognise continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions. Through understanding the spiritual relationship between the land and its first peoples, we share our future and live in harmony. Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves. Reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians. Many steps have been taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories. As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies and forgives. We desire a future where all Australians enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential. And so, we pledge ourselves to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and respect that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right to self-determination within the life of the nation.

Our hope is for a united Australia that respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for all.

services. The argument goes that if these procedural aspects of equality are in place and equality is not the outcome, then the blame falls on the individuals who fail to take advantage of these opportunities. The idea that people do not start with the same power to access these opportunities is outside this discursive frame of reference. In particular, the idea that people's difference results in their being subjected to stigmatising practices that impair their ability to exploit opportunities is not acknowledged. Aboriginal people in Australia have been worn down by over two centuries of ethnocide, dispossession, chronic subordination and manifest disadvantage. A popular song written and sung by the Australian musician Paul Kelly plays on this idea that Aboriginal people today receive 'special treatment', saying that such destructive practices towards Aborigines are indeed special in the sense that no other ethnic group in Australia's colonial history has been subjected to them (Kelly, 1999: 66-67).

Howard's argument on equality evokes the assimilationist policies that officially guided Government practices towards Aborigines from the 1930s to the 1960s. As Meaghan Morris argues, assimilation may have been a generic colonial policy across various societies during this period, but it was more than a mere generalised ideology: It was enacted in very specific ways through plans put in place by the Australian Government, each of which could have been formulated and enacted otherwise. They were, in other words, specific to Australian colonialism and had dire practical consequences for their recipients that were also specific to the Australian circumstance. The most chilling practice was that of taking away Aboriginal babies and children from their mothers in an attempt to force an extermination of Aboriginality. This practice has received considerable notoriety in recent years as a result of a 1997 inquiry into the practice by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission which described those removed from their families as 'the stolen generations'. As a result of

this inquiry, as Morris writes, "We cannot not know now that the extermination of Aboriginality-culture, identity, kinship-was the aim of assimilation. 'Assimilation' in this context was understood in the bodily sense of the term: It did not mean (as it could have) working for social and economic equality and mutual enrichment between Aboriginal and European peoples, but the swallowing up, the absorption, of the former by the latter" (13).

This political context, in particular the hostility of the Government towards progressing Aboriginal rights, helps explain how the Opening Ceremony could be interpreted as a progressive rendition of Australian history. The mere fact that Aboriginal people were made to be such a prominent part of the hi/story was itself subversive in the context. Moreover, the Ceremony picked up on key themes in the Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation, in particular the idea that black and white Australians should symbolically walk hand in hand towards the future. The symbiosis was affirmed by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation when it used an image from the Opening Ceremony of the Aboriginal songman and the young white girl walking hand in hand to adorn the cover of its final report to Government (December 2000). Indeed, in the report, the Chairman of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Geoff Clarke described the 2000 Olympics as "A powerful healing statement for Aboriginal Australia" adding: "This was evident from the very beginning. The recognition of our culture in the creation scenes at the opening ceremony, the smoking ceremony, acknowledgement of our flag and symbols demonstrated true and proper respect for our people. It was a celebration of our survival. I am sure many will see the ceremony as a unifying point in our history, a milestone on the road to reconciliation from which there should be no turning back" (Geoff Clark, 2000).

Clark's comment suggests the extent to which the Opening Ceremony departed from the ways that Aboriginal people have

been represented in public discourse. While the Opening Ceremony's representations were, as I will argue, not representative, they did tap into the desires of an increasing number of Australians to support the reconciliation process. On the weekend when the Documents of Reconciliation were presented to the Federal Government at a ceremony at the Sydney Opera House, over 250,000 people walked across the Sydney Harbour Bridge in support of reconciliation. Other marches took place in other capital cities and were well attended. It is tempting to think that the euphoric faces of the spectators at the Olympic Opening Ceremony in part derived from this emerging spirit. We can only hope.

Media Representations Otherwise

Media reporting of Aboriginal issues has been considered by several Government agencies and is discussed in an emerging body of academic research. Aboriginal groups have long registered complaints with Government bodies concerning racist media coverage. The Australian Community Relations Office which was in existence from 1975-1981 received around 4,000 complaints of racial discrimination, a significant proportion of which were against the media (Meadows, 2001: 42). Meadows writes that the Community Relations Commissioner Al Grasby commented at the end of his tenure that the media's function appeared to be "chiefly that of defending the invasion and subsequent dispossession" (42). In 1991, two reports by Government agencies-The Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and the Human Rights Commission National Inquiry into Racist Violence-commented in some detail on the nature of media representations of Aborigines. In particular, the report on Aboriginal deaths in custody found that the media tended to exhibit 'a number of habitual and widespread detrimental practices' that resulted in persistent negative stereotyping (Mickler, 1998: 58). These stereotypes fall mainly into two

categories (Hartley, 1996). One is mobilised through a discourse of protection. This discourse contends that real, authentic Aborigines-the image here is of full-blooded Aborigines that live in remote areas and are relatively untouched by Western influence-need protection from the state to guard them from modernising forces that they are culturally and intellectually ill equipped to negotiate. This is, in effect, a discourse of infantilisation. The second is a discourse of correction-the idea of Aboriginal people, particularly youth, as deviant and a threat to white society resulting in their being a legitimate target of control and correction. According to Stephen Mickler in his analysis of media reporting in Western Australia, the discourse of correction acquired considerable prominence in the media in the early 1970s and has since become almost routine. Indeed, he writes, "there has been a particularly virulent news discourse about Aboriginal youth in the press and electronic media in Perth since 1990, a dramatically increased visualisation of them as criminals, as major instigators of disorder" (19).

The media's ready lapse into a discourse of deviancy when discussing Aboriginal issues is one of the 'detrimental practices' referred to in the 1991 report. The Report noted that this emphasis was often the practical consequence of journalists basing their stories on police briefings. To illustrate this point it discussed a 60 Minutes story about Aboriginal people living in a Sydney inner-city suburb that was considered particularly offensive by Aboriginal witnesses who appeared before the Inquiry. It was not so much a matter of overtly racist comments from the journalist but rather the fact that the story was filmed while on tour with the police and that the journalist was clearly in sympathy with the views being expressed by the police (Mickler, 1998: 58-59). The tendency to accept and promote police interpretations of events involving Aborigines is a feature of a great deal of past and present reporting. Stories on Aboriginal drunkenness in rural towns have become almost emblematic, particularly on commercial television, and often focus on police attempts to remove drunks from the town

streets. In such news stories, another of the 'detrimental practices' is apparent—that of an inadequate socio-political contextualisation of the events reported on. Generally little attempt is made to consider why substance abuse is such a problem in certain Aboriginal communities. Such consideration would surely necessitate a discussion of the effects over several generations of dislocation, subordination and denial of identity and culture. This contextualisation would challenge the triumphalist colonial mythology that still frames indigenous and non-indigenous race relations in Australia. The fact that it so rarely happens must surely support Grasby's observation on the media's role in legitimising colonialism.

However it is not always possible for the media to mobilise a discourse of deviancy. During the 1990s, some of Australia's most exalted public institutions lent their weight to Aboriginal political demands, among them Australia's supreme legal authority The High Court. In the Court's 1992 Mabo decision (Mabo v State of Queensland 2, 1992), and later in its 1996 Wik decision (Wik Peoples and Thayorre People v Queensland 1996), prior Aboriginal ownership of the land was recognised for the first time resulting in Aboriginal communities being accorded the right to access and use their traditional lands. These decisions generated enormous political controversy, spurred on by conservative politics and farming and mining lobby groups that opposed native title to land. Their rhetorical catch cry was that these decisions created uncertainty for regional land owners; that the pendulum had swung too far in favour of Aboriginal political demands and that a political counter-response was required (John Howard, 7:30 Report, Australian Broadcasting Commission, September 4 1997). In April 1997, this response came in the form of the Howard Government's 10 Point Plan (Commonwealth Government, Native Title Amendment Bill, 1997). The 10 Point Plan was the Government's proposal to curtail the impact of the High Court's decisions by legislative means. Indeed, in some senses it denied Aborigines rights that they had held even prior to the landmark

High Court rulings. It generated considerable public controversy with pastoralists and the mining industry joining once again with the Government in supporting the proposed legislation. The argument that was pushed was that the land of every Australian was under threat of claim, even private backyards. Even though this argument was demonstrably false (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1997), it received considerable prominence in the commercial media. Michael Meadows writes of a large front page photo in a Queensland newspaper of Aboriginal writer and filmmaker Sam Watson with the Brisbane cityscape behind him and the headline 'City Ours, Mall, Bridge and All-Black Leader' (Courier Mail, 13 December 1992, cited in Meadows, 2001: 123). Meadows writes that the prominence given this photo was highly questionable, particularly considering that an adjacent but much less prominent article quoted a High Court judge saying that this was not legally possible. Meadows questions why the paper gave the Aboriginal elder's clearly ambit claim such prominence, if it wasn't to stir up non-indigenous passions (124)?

In another analysis of the media reporting at the time in two major and respected newspapers, *The Sydney Morning Herald* and the national newspaper *The Australian*, Kim Bullimore (1999) discusses the relative paucity of Aboriginal voices in these papers and how Eurocentric notions of Aboriginality appeared to determine which Aboriginal voices did appear. She found that every article concerning native title that contained an Aboriginal voice was counterbalanced by two to three that contained no Aboriginal voices. Where Aboriginal comment did appear, it was most frequently accompanied by three to five non-Aboriginal commentators who either refuted Aboriginal claims or spoke on behalf of Aboriginal demands. Moreover, those Aboriginal representatives that did appear in the media were those that were 'culturally approved' within a dominant Eurocentric discourse of Aboriginality. Bullimore argues that cultural approval requires that the Aboriginal

person look Aboriginal and have demonstrable contact with traditional Aboriginal people, these being the dominant signifiers of 'real' Aborigines within this discourse. Moreover, it is precisely these signifiers that imprison 'acceptable' Aboriginal representatives in the trope of the 'noble savage'. Moderation is a key to this possibility, and it is these moderate Aboriginal leaders that the media called on in the debate over the 10 Point Plan. Bullimore concludes that while representations of Aborigines may appear more positive than they did 10 or 20 years ago, 'their portrayal is still determined by the dominant elite's concept of Aboriginality. This concept fails to portray Aborigines in a manner that reflects the kaleidoscope of Aboriginal identity'. Thus, Eurocentric notions of Aboriginality preclude as legitimate, media representation of Aborigines who do not comply with non-indigenous standards of authenticity (79).

The notion that only a circumscribed group of Aborigines can be accorded the status of authenticity relates strongly to the emergence of the discourse of Aboriginal privilege. In his book, *The Myth of Privilege*, Stephen Mickler analyses media reporting from the 1930s onwards to uncover a genealogy of the discourse. His aim is to uncover how it is that in contemporary discourse, Aboriginal people "can be spoken of as a desperate social underclass in one breath, and akin to a neo-aristocracy in the next?" (13).

Mickler notes how the segregation and incarceration of Aborigines on reserves in the early part of the twentieth century resulted in a limited contact with non-indigenous populations. This context was reflected in the tendency of newspapers to rely on official voices-administrators, politicians, missionaries, social welfare authorities-to comment on Aboriginal issues. With the abolition of the reserves and the official introduction of assimilation policy, Aboriginal people were more prevalent in rural towns and communities. Newspapers began to incorporate the opinion of so-called 'ordinary Australians'

whose prognostications on the failure of assimilation policy increasingly blamed the Government for an inadequate provision of services to Aborigines. Mickler writes that:

...it is really at this point that we can speak of a distinct change in the way relations between the state, the public and Aborigines were configured in news reporting ... 'the problem', and Aboriginality itself, was no longer strictly the province of native administrators, missionaries and other experts. This expert knowledge was now seen to be challenged by local experience, commonsense and practical wisdom of good down-on-the-farm Australians. The state had lost its monopoly over the production of public meaning about Aboriginal affairs and in the process of this loss can be seen the re-emergence of a body of public opinion that is sceptical, incredulous and hostile to state Aboriginal policy. None of this would have been possible, of course, for metropolitan readerships at least [who had little contact with Aborigines], without news visualising Aboriginal affairs (120).

Once this new space for popular sentiment was opened up, it was a matter of inflection rather than redefinition to argue that the state was doing too much for Aborigines rather than not enough. Those for whom too much was being done were the more visible residents of rural communities or cities, as opposed to the 'real' traditional Aborigines who remained out of sight. In this manner, the discourse of Aboriginal privilege intersected with that of Aboriginal authenticity, placing a double burden of illegitimacy on rural and urban Aboriginies. By the 1970s, the inflection was manifest in the argument of conservative West Australian politician Reg Withers "that the Commonwealth is discriminating against whites with grants and subsidies it pays for the secondary education of children of Aboriginal descent" (West Australian, May 1972 cited in Mickler, 1998: 10). Thus, the idea and myth of Aboriginal privilege is born, to be subsequently nurtured by conservatives and influential media commentators, notably the talkback radio 'shock jocks' discussed by Mickler (1998)² The media's frequent articulation of this discourse of privilege meant that, by 1995, Pauline Hanson's views on Aborigines could be considered 'populist'.

² We're also sick to death of the privileges available to Aborigines that aren't available to other Australians'. Caller to The Sattler File, Perth talkback radio show, August 1991) (Mickler, 1998: 10).

Olympic Dreams - Who's Dreaming Now?

The earlier discussion on the manner in which indigenous politics is bound up with contestation over representations of Aboriginality is, of course, pertinent to the Opening Ceremony's reconciliatory dreaming. Cathy Freeman who, the suggestion is, personifies contemporary Aboriginality, lit the torch. In keeping with the reading of the Ceremony as politically subversive, it was an apt choice. On several occasions, Cathy Freeman had made known her support for Aboriginal self-determination and her abhorrence of the Howard Government's policies. Preceding Cathy Freeman were the indigenous singers and dancers who wore traditional adornment and enacted several traditional acts of welcome. In the colonial space between these two symbols of Aboriginality there was silence concerning Australia's indigenous peoples. Captain Cook arrived, the Australian bush ranger Ned Kelly burst on the scene, and the boot-scootin, toe-tappin', thigh-slappin' future of Australia began. From then on, we could have been almost anywhere in the Anglo-Celtic world, except for the display of popular national iconography, such as the Australian clothes line and the corrugated iron. Following the arrival of Captain Cook, there was one ambiguous moment that might have explained the silence of Aboriginal colonial history. Unexplained gun shots rang out over the stadium, but rather than signifying the Aboriginal experience of dispossession they instead symbolised the subversive activities of nineteenth century bush rangers.

Without the truth of Aboriginal dispossession, this was indeed a sanitised version of Australian history. The refusal to link together the Aboriginal past with its present and future left the spectators and viewers with only two representations of Aboriginal identity-Aboriginality as tradition and Aboriginality as assimilation. The emphasis on tradition reproduces the infantilising trope of the primitive, giving weight to what Robert Ariss describes as, "popular European folk models which cling to more conservative constructions-the corroborree,

the boomerang, the naked savage eking out an existence in the harsh desert environment" (1988: 133, cited in Jennings, 1993: 13). This symbolic conservatism undermines the notion of contemporary Aboriginality as diverse and creative. On the other hand, Cathy Freeman as representative of contemporary, urban Aboriginality, attests to the on-going possibility of the successful fruition of assimilation. In this highly individualistic sport, she has well and truly made it in a white man's world. Cathy Freeman as symbol is thus antithetical to the more radical articulation of contemporary Aboriginality as difference.

My argument therefore is that the indigenous presence at the Opening Ceremony enabled simultaneously both progressive and regressive readings of the Aboriginal place in Australian history. The progressive element was the audacity of intertwining Aboriginal symbolism so intimately with Australian history, particularly in the current political context. However, to do so with such reified notions of identity only gives substance to regressive readings of contemporary Aboriginality. Safe Aboriginality, for white Australia it seems, is the distant past of Aboriginal tradition and the present of individualistic sporting prowess. Could the emphasis on the traditional in the Opening Ceremony be an instance of what Marcia Langton describes as the increasing desire of non-Aboriginal people "to make personal rehabilitative statements about the Aboriginal 'problem' and to consume and reconsume the 'primitive'" (10)? Could the Ceremony be read as a grandiose exercise in public rehabilitation; something orchestrated to make we colonisers feel safe and better about our place in the world? To ask this question evokes one of the constant criticisms of the reconciliation movement by more radical Aborigines, this being that it is an exercise in non-indigenous self-righteousness, not in justice. The Opening Ceremony might well have made many non-indigenous Australians feel better, but what did it do for those Aboriginal people who have long sought recognition of gross injustice and some meagre form of compensation? Not much, I expect.

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Media and the Representation of the European Union

An Analysis of Press Coverage of Turkey's European Union Candidacy

Abstract

This article aims to analyse how the mainstream Turkish press constructed European identity and the meaning of being a part of Europe in the news during the period in which Turkey's candidacy was accepted at the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The article begins by summarising the history of Turkey-EU relations. The findings of a qualitative analysis of the news in three dailies is then discussed by focusing on the actors, their dispositions, the themes-which are discussed under the headings: the meaning of Europe and the EU, expectations from the EU; economic elements, conditions of and obstacles to the EU; political elements-and the ways these themes are expressed. Finally, the article argues that the newspapers analysed make up sensationalist news when rendering the EU newsworthy. Furthermore, headlines of the stories analysed and some extracts from these stories are provided in the article.

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Media and the Representation of the European Union An Analysis of Press Coverage of Turkey's European Union Candidacy¹

¹
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The objective of the Republic of Turkey since its establishment in 1923 has been determined by the prevailing political philosophy of Kemalism, and has essentially involved Westernisation. The background to the founding of the Turkish Republic was the war of independence against "Western imperialism", and the Kemalists set as a major goal their anti-imperialist preference that Turkey cease to be a colony of the West. At the same time, however, Turkey accepted Westernisation as the main target (Ahmad, 1981; Keyman, 1995) in order, as Atatürk's own words indicate, 'to reach a contemporary level of civilisation'. It is impossible to separate Westernisation and development in Turkey because

[...] for nearly a century, 'Western-ness' has served both as a frame of reference and also as an image of the future for generations of Turkish elite, coupled and identified with progress and development (Öncü, 1993).

The secularism principle of Kemalism, more obviously than the other five principles, was designed as a constitutive part of the modernisation and Westernisation process. In accordance with this principle, in addition to the introduction of the new alphabet, the legal system was changed, the Swiss civil code was adopted, the political rights of women were recognised the caliphate and Islamic law and courts were abolished, religious shrines, convents and religious education centres were closed, the official weekend holiday was changed from Friday to Sunday, and the calendar and measurement units were adapted to the Western model (Toprak, 1992; Akural, 1984).

Since the 1950s, Turkey has further linked itself with the Western world, especially the USA, through economic and military alliances. In addition, Turkey has worked towards integration with Europe and sought to become a full member of the European Union. Many agreements and protocols with the European Community have been established since 1960. In 1963, an Association Agreement was signed which established a relationship with Europe. Following Turkey's membership application, which was lodged on 14 May 1987, a decision was taken to postpone the review of Turkey's membership until at least 1993 (Kushner, 1994). In November 1992, Turkey joined the European Union as an associate member. In 1996, the Customs Union Agreement was realised. Turkey was excluded from the agenda of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit of the EU. Following the Cardiff, Vienna and Köln summits, the EU declared in 1999 that Turkey's candidacy would be on the agenda. Finally, Turkey's candidacy was approved in December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit.

According to international relations expert Hatipoğlu (1999), a series of political factors has contributed to this positive change including the coming to power in Germany of a new coalition government, Western worries about Kurdish demonstrations in European countries following the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's imprisonment in Turkey, the establishment of the nationalist party as a coalition partner in Turkey following the 1999 general elections, Turkey's increasing geo-political importance, and the earthquake catastrophe of 1999.

It has been argued that Turkish membership of the EU would result in an economic advantage for the other EU countries. It would mean that foreign investment could expand without restriction and capture a larger share of the local market (Berberoğlu, 1981). The geographically strategic place of Turkey between Europe and Asia (Spencer, 1993) is also considered a factor in increasing Turkey's importance to the EU. According to Cremasco (1990), in a geographical sense, Turkey performs a 'barrier function' between Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As he argues, "European security requirements cannot, in fact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's participation and contribution".

Despite the advantages the EU could accrue, it is also argued that Turkey's membership of the EU is rather difficult because of macroeconomic factors such as Turkey's low GDP per capita, unemployment, and a rapidly increasing population (Denton, 1990). There are also differences between levels of industrialisation, economic development, and inflation (Öniş, 1995). In addition, the free movement of Turkish workers is viewed as a problem.

In the political sphere, human rights violations are seen as another stumbling block to Turkey's full membership (Balkir and Williams, 1993). Some in Turkey argue that the issue of human rights is an excuse by the Christian EU to stop entry to a Muslim country. Although defenders of the status quo in Turkey also use this as an excuse for not implementing democratic changes, it is undeniable that their cause is strengthened by this European double standard. In general, the EU tends to emphasise the cultural unity of Europe in order to compensate for the lack of a political unity, since the EU has not developed a common basis for a European political culture or a European citizenship up until now (Morley and Robins, 1997). The emphasis on the religious aspect of culture leads to exclusion in Turkey's case. When Europeans argue that Turks would not fit into the EU because of their cultural difference (Evin, 1990), the sub-text is always

religion, and Islam specifically. Robins describes Europe's relationship with Turkey as 'the closure of European culture' and argues that Europe can only see the Turks in terms of 'negative identity'.² Robins (1996) goes on to argue that European acceptance of Turkey offers the possibility for Europeans to revitalise and remoralise their culture which, as Morley and Robins argue does not at present reflect the diversity of religion, geography and ethnicity. (45)

In challenging the idea of a shared European heritage and culture, scholars (Yurdusev, 1997; Wintle, 1996) note that none of the elements attributed to the 'common European experience', such as Christianity, the Enlightenment, language and geography, were or are exclusively European. Instead of a singular European identity, there is a plurality of European identities in EU countries. The difference is not only between member and non-member countries, but also between Europeans themselves in relation to language, territory, law, religion, economic and political systems, as well as ethnicity and culture (Smith, 1999; Neumann, 1999). The issue of the extent to which European people themselves identify with the EU is debatable. A common European identity has not yet emerged, although the EU has made some attempt to create a common identity through a common currency, the European passport, the EU flag, youth programmes and many other proposals such as the establishment of a European Academy, a lottery, voluntary work camps and a Europe day (Spiering, 1999). The results of the 1991 Eurobarometer indicate that more citizens living outside EU countries can identify as European than those within the Community. For example, in Romania the percentage of the people who never felt European was only 18% compared with a rate of 69% in the UK (Hedetoft, 1997). In the 1997 Eurobarometer poll, people were asked whether, in the near future, they would see themselves in terms of 'nationality only', 'nationality and European', 'European and nationality' or 'European'. The results indicate that people felt more attachment to their nationality and less to Europe than they had in earlier polls. People who felt European were a minority (ranging from 5 percent in Greece to 27

² For a study which traces 'the other' of Europe, 'the Turk', in the Ottoman Empire period, see Iver B. Neumann, Jennifer M. Welsh (1991). "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society." *Review of International Studies* 17 (4): 327-348.

3 For a study that examines the attitudes of 'Turkish press elite', namely editors and columnists, towards West and liberal democracy, see Şahin, Alp (1993). "Journalists: Cautious Democrats." In *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*. Metin Heper et. al. (eds.) London: I.B. Tavis & Co. 69-92.

4 *Hürriyet* was founded by Sedat Semavi in 1948, and after his death in 1953, it was continued by Haldun Simavi. In 1968 he sold his shares to his brother and left because of a disagreement. His brother Erol Simavi sold *Hürriyet* to the Doğan group in 1994. It was the most selling newspaper in 1999 with its circulation more than 500.000.

5 *Sabah* was established by Dinç Bilgin in 1985. Its circulation was around 450.000 in 1999. Turkish media industry is changing rapidly in the recent years. One of the example to that is the newspaper, *Sabah* and the other media Bilgin group owned. After this research had been completed, the ownership structure of *Sabah* changed dramatically (at the end of the year, 2000): Following the bankruptcy of their bank called Etibank, 61% of Bilgin group's media, including *Sabah*, was purchased by the company called MTM that is owned by Mehmet Emin Karamehmet (who is the owner of Çukurova group, the second biggest media group of Turkey after Doğan group), Turgay Ciner and Murat Vargı.

percent in Luxembourg) (Burgoyne and Routh, 1999). When the results of polls in 1973 and 1998 are compared, the percentage of people in the EU who believed that the EC/EU is a good thing decreased on average 2 percent. While there was an increase in Holland, Denmark and the UK, there were larger decreases in Italy and France (Moisi, 1999).

Construction of the EU in the Turkish Press

As Hall (1996) argues, identities are constituted within representation and constructed within discourse. They are produced in 'specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices'. Therefore, there is no single definition of Turkishness and Europeaness, but multiple forms of those identities and their positionings according to the changing context. Turkey's membership of the EU is a particularly good example in this respect since the Turkish media provided negative coverage of the EU summit in Luxembourg, where Turkey's candidacy was rejected, whereas the coverage was more positive when the candidacy was approved in Helsinki.

In this research, news³ about the EU in three Turkish dailies was analysed in the period 9-15 December 1999. The EU summit started on the 10 December. The researcher chose to sample one day earlier in order to investigate how the news approached the EU before the decision was taken. One calendar week gave sufficient news to analyse, there being 141 stories in the three newspapers chosen. *Hürriyet* had 66, *Sabah* 62 and *Star* the least with 13. These are the highest circulation newspapers in Turkey. All are products of media conglomerates that expand to different sections of the media industry including newspapers, television, publishing, news agencies, distribution and marketing. These media conglomerates are also strong outside the media sector with their holdings in large financial institutions and banks. *Hürriyet*⁴ belongs to the Doğan media group, *Sabah*⁵ to the Bilgin group and *Star*⁶ to the Uzan group. Even though almost every newspaper in

Turkey in the last two decades has undergone a tendency towards tabloidisation following the rise of commercial TV channels, *Star* still differs from the others in being a tabloid newspaper in the real sense. The newspaper has less pages than the other two, its pages feature very large headlines and photographs, and it has the least amount of news.

The analysis employs the concepts of critical discourse theorists (van Dijk, 1995; Fairclough, 1995; Bell, 1994; Bell, 1998), focusing on 'who speaks?' and 'how?' (lexical choice, foregrounding and coherence) in the news. These formal characteristics in the news are considered very important in the production of meanings.

The Helsinki Summit received broad coverage in the Turkish press as a result of Turkey's candidacy being on the agenda of the Summit. The Summit was the prominent issue in the press during the week analysed. The striking thing in the newspapers was that while they attributed great importance to Turkey's candidacy, they almost completely ignored the other issues at the Summit. That Turkey's candidacy constituted the overwhelming emphasis while other issues were being ignored, suggests the extent of the press' nationalism⁷ which limits the information on the EU and therefore makes readers' access to information on other issues⁸ difficult.

Actors and Positions in the News

Foregrounding positive remarks, and discrediting others

The actors in the stories were generally Turkish politicians, EU bureaucrats, foreign politicians and business people. When the stories are analysed, it is apparent that most stories concern positive remarks⁹ on Turkey's candidacy, made mostly by EU leaders, European politicians and European and world media.¹⁰ Headlines concentrated on these actors and their remarks.¹¹ The positive remarks of Turkish politicians and business people were also evident in the headlines and/or lead.¹²

6 *Star* is the newspaper of Uzan holding which entered the media sector with *Star* TV in 1990. *Star* has been published since March 1999, but has become one of the most selling newspaper at the end of the year (it's monthly circulation in 1999 is around 300.000) partly because of its cheap price. It should be noted that the overall circulation in Turkey, where the population is more than 60 million, is around 4 million. For the details about the newspapers and the media industry, see Mine Gencel Bek (ed.) (2001) *MediaScape Raporları, Türkiye'de Medya 2000*. Ankara: BYAUM, Ankara Üniversitesi Basın Yayın Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi

7 As Billig argues in his 'banal nationalism' thesis, the media reminds nationhood by reproducing the world of nations routinely as the national environment; 'flagging the homeland daily', Michael Billig (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

8 There is only one exceptional news (H1), in which information on the other issues (like European Army, tax harmonization, intervention to Chechnia) of the EU summit takes place besides Turkey. However, even this particular news foregrounds Turkey with the headline as 'Europe's Agenda Turkey' and with prioritizing descriptions on Turkey such as 'the burning issue'.

9 See the tables 1, 2 and 3 on the headlines of the news at Appendices.

10

H16, H33, S3, S12, S33, S44, Star 1. It should be mentioned here that the most important/prestigious one is considered as the American media in the Turkish press.

11

H2, H3, H4, H6, H12, H42, H46, S1, S7, S8, S34, S47.

12

H25, H26, H27, H31, H35, H39, H40, S13, S20.

13

See the tables 1, 2 and 3 at Appendices.

14

This is an example of 'closure of European culture' in Robins's terms. The desire of knowing where Europe starts and ends completely, according to Morley and Robins, means a construction of a symbolic geography which will divide insiders from outsiders, the Others. The new Iron Curtain, therefore, is required to defend Europe against the Islamic Other (Morley and Robins, 1997: 44).

Some of the positive remarks were presented in headlines without quotation marks¹³, suggesting that these statements were internalised by the journalists and editors, and expressed as if they were journalists' own comments. While positive commentary is given prominence and fore-grounded in the news' headlines and via lexical choices attributing more importance to the information favourable to 'us', the opinion of the other is discredited through deployment of the word 'claim' and the use of quotation marks. For example, in the news in *Hürriyet*, (H2), Romano Prodi's (Head of the European Commission) explanation that there would not be any obstacle to Turkey gaining an official candidacy statute is given in the headline and summarised with the words 'Prodi said'. On the other hand, 'claimed' is used to refer to Günther Verheugen's (member responsible for enlargement in the EU Commission) statements (taken from the interview printed in *Die Zeit*) that Turkey will not enter the EU in the near future because Turkey is not ready for membership. His expression 'is not ready' is given in quotation marks in the story. Moreover, the coherence of stories is lost for the sake of attractive, positive headlines. For example, in S7, the Greek Prime Minister Papandreu is reported in the news as stating that 'the balance favours Turkey'. However, the headline of the news item is 'Said "yes"', even though this was not the case. Over-generalisation is also apparent in the stories that foreground positive remarks, as seen in S12 with the sentence: 'The whole world press said Welcome'. Such over-generalisation can also destroy the coherence of the news story.

The story in *Star* (Star 3) similarly uses the headline 'All happy'. However, while there are supportive statements from several leaders (Lipponen, Clinton, Chirac and Papandreu), there is one that is not supportive: Fontaine, the head of the European Parliament asks:

What about adaptation? If Turkey is accepted to the club, can it adapt culturally? Furthermore, if we accept Turkey, Northern African countries will also apply for membership. There is confusion in concepts about where the boundaries of Europe start and end.¹⁴ Suppose Turkey complied with the economic and political conditions.

What about cultural adaptation? I can say the 626 members of the European Parliament are divided about Turkey's candidacy.

As is seen from the statement of Fontaine, not everyone is happy with the candidacy despite the headline, which gives the story negligible coherence.

Star's Nationalist and Ambiguous Position

There are only a few stories in *Hürriyet* in which critical views on the EU membership appear, but even those are not against EU membership. Instead, they express the views of actors who foreground national interests and warn against giving concessions to the EU.¹⁵ The tabloid newspaper *Star* on the other hand, does not present the views of actors who are critical of the EU candidacy but instead presents stories that are sceptical of or against the EU candidacy by arguing that serious concessions were given to the EU, and opposing the abolition of capital punishment that would be required for EU membership. Even though *Star* does not explicitly object to Turkey's EU membership, *Star's* nationalism does not allow EU news to be covered positively. Thus, as the three extracts below show, what is at stake here is a strong nationalism, the scope of which creates the fear of giving concessions to the EU and of being 'behind' compared to the other countries. The headline of the first story illustrates the point amply: 'Nobody could be glad because of the severe conditions'¹⁶ (Star 2). The second story, 'This Europe is Real Europe', (Star 7) criticises Turkey's EU candidacy which, according to *Star*, is not deserved and may not be realised. As is frequently the case for this newspaper, football is used as the main issue in the story and is used in the European context:

Turkey may enter the EU in 2020. The Turkish national team, on the other hand, will compete with Belgium, Sweden and Italy in the 2000 European Football Championship. The team entered the door of that championship with wrist.

The news uses the word of 'wrist' to imply that it is a game entered with the power they have; that is, it is deserved. The story continues:

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For example, in H36, coalition partner nationalist MHP (National Movement Party) states that they are against the abolition of capital punishment for the EU. In H38, Islamic oriented FP thinks that 'serious concessions were given on Cyprus and Aegean issues'. Similarly, in the news, H59, the FP leader Kutun states that unless it contradicts with national interest, they support the EU membership.

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These severe conditions are listed as 'Aegean, Cyprus and Apo issues' in the news.

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When it is directly translated, it means the central pole of the nomad's tent. The founder of the ANAP (Motherland Party) and the Prime Minister between 1983-1999, the President from 1989 until his death in 1993, Turgut Özal created this term to address the people by unifying them and dissolving their differences. It came to a point that both a worker and a boss defined themselves as *ortadirek* (for the detailed analysis of the term, see Tünay, 1993; Mutlu, 1995). However, after Özal failed to receive popular support of his Thatcherite policies, *ortadirek* has been started to be used to describe the people at the bottom and survivals. In the news, the meaning of being at the bottom is used.

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The comparison of Turkey with the 'ex-socialist' countries in the Turkish press has been found in the earlier research (Mine Cencil Bek, *Communicating Capitalism: A Study of the Contemporary Turkish Press*, Ph.D thesis, Loughborough University, 1999) on the representation of privatization and Customs Union as well. Especially when the issue is economic liberalization, the ex-socialist countries are referred by the Turkish press with the argument of 'even they started that, even they managed that' or 'they have even gone further'. While that Turkish press not tending to compare Turkey to the other countries in terms of political rights is striking, this comparison with the ex-socialist countries in terms of economy is also an extension of a change in the world geopolitics.

The real victory for Turkey came yesterday. Lots were drawn for the 2000 European Football Championship in Brussels. Turkey is in the same group as the countries that Turkey could approach only to take photographs with.

Here, Turkey's presence in the EU family photograph is implied: "Rivals are strong but this time Turkey is strong too. The most important thing is we did not give concessions to anyone to achieve this success."

The idea of Turkey's not being as developed as the EU member states, and the importance of this idea for the newspaper, can be seen more clearly in the third story: 'Turkey to be Europe's *ortadirek*'¹⁷ (Star 8). In it the newspaper argues that Turkey is a country with problems in relation to its 'civilization indicators', with the result that it is a 'candidate to be the *ortadirek* of Europe':

Too backward in economic and social aspects in comparison with Europe and its 'rivals', not even in a situation to compete with most of the 11 candidate countries...even Eastern block countries, which are called Iron Curtain countries, are almost in a better condition in terms of inflation.

The newspaper distinguishes Turkey from these countries and over-states their socialist past while ignoring the fact that these countries are no longer socialist.¹⁸ The other candidates for the EU are seen as rivals.

In contrast to these stories, the other stories in *Star* that celebrate the 'world praising Turkey', show that this sensationalist nationalist tabloid admires the West at the same time:

The 'Turkey best amongst candidate countries' (Star 9) headline announces the statement made by 'the most respectable magazine in the world', 'the most influential magazine in the USA, *Time*' without quotation marks.

The Meaning of Europe and the European Union¹⁹

It should be emphasised firstly that the stories analysed consider the EU as a homogeneous entity.²⁰ This is important

because ignoring the differences in the EU can be dangerous and can be used to further a nationalist 'us versus them'. The stories do not tend to include historical background on the Turkey-European Union relationship. Although the press had been full of negative comments on earlier EU summits decisions, these do not find place in these stories.²¹

The EU acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit is given great importance by the newspapers. The waiting period before the decision was announced is described as:

- 'Uncertainty Still Continues. We Continue Our Travel In The Horror Tunnel'(S17)
- 'Exciting Moments', 'A Real Horror Film'(S16)
- 'Europe Adventure'(Star 2)
- 'Operation Centre at Foreign Ministry' (S19)
- 'The Result Of the Helsinki Summit Which All of Turkey is Breathlessly Waiting For' (S25)

The word 'historical' is used in some stories in the sense of 'historical day' (H13), 'historical decision' (H11, S12, S20), and 'historical opportunity' (by President Demirel, H25). Metaphors of the road (H21, H50) and gate are frequently used, as in '...has been waiting in front of the gate of the EU' (H15), 'gate opened' (by Ecevit, H16, S26, S53). The word 'dream' is also used, as in: '100-years old Europe dream' (Star 1), (S27), 'We are welcomed'....'We had our heart in our mouth, but it ended well. Let's hope for the best. We are European from now on. 160-year old dream.... happy end'...(S 12). After the candidacy was granted, Turkish leaders attending the EU meeting were included in the 'historical' European family photograph finally taken 'after 36 years'. The photo is given prominence in *Hürriyet* and *Sabah*. Salona's visit to Turkey is commented on as the indication of the importance attributed to Turkey (H17). 'Possibly no candidate country in EU history was shown such great attention', states the news in *Sabah*

As Morley and Robins state (1997: 141), during the cold war period, everything which was not communist was western, or European. In this context, many Turks were thinking that being in the NATO was an evidence of being Western. After the Soviet Block collapsed, however, these have been started to be questioned. In the period in which the borders of Europe are redefined, Eastern and Central European countries are emphasising their Christian identity. Therefore, Turkey suddenly has found itself in a different context in which it is losing its European characteristics with the Muslim identity. This might be a reason of Turkish press often referring to its longer capitalist past and comparing itself with the ex-socialist countries.

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Unless actors mentioned, the definitions belong to the newspapers.

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'Cyprus dispute in EU' headlined news covers the debates between EU members on Cyprus (H44). Another news 'Turkey dispute in EP' (European Parliament) (H61) explains the different approaches towards Turkey as Christian Democrats, Greens, Liberals and Socialist.

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There is only one exception: The news in *Hürriyet* (H21) is the only news which mentions Luxembourg summit (December 1997) as 'Shocking decision of Europe' and Cardiff summit (June 1998) 'backward step from the Union'.

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This news is a summary of the column by Güngör Mengi. Thus, the news is a mixture of 'facts' and 'opinions' not only in the tabloid newspaper *Star* as seen above, but also in *Sabah* as well. *Sabah* often carries the ideas in editorials and columns to the front page news. The news in general in everywhere claims giving only facts, but contains opinion and ideology. However, this is even different from that, more overtly representation of comments in the news.

(S33). It is emphasised that European leaders in Helsinki 'queued to congratulate Ecevit' (H30, S33).

The sentiments expressed about Europe and the EU were more dramatic following the candidacy decision. Füsün Mutlu writes in her special report (S15): "...In Helsinki, I am witnessing a submission of European identity for which we struggled for many years. I am happy. All Turkish journalists here congratulate each other."

For her, this is the indication of 'Turkey being in the world's first league' (S11).

An emphasis on newness and change is another pattern in some stories: 'Our Life Will Change'... 'A New Period Is Starting From Now On' (S18). 'A New Period In Europe', 'The EU Adventure', 'Landmark In The EU Road' (S24). Stories²² from *Sabah* announce (S27) that Turkey will be integrated with the 'biggest political and economic union of the world':

Respectable, wealthy and contemporary Turkey, who's political and economic future is under insurance, is not a dream anymore... yesterday's Helsinki declaration includes Turkey in the contemporary family of civilisation.

As is evident from these extracts, approval of Turkey's candidacy in the summit is considered a very important historical decision in the Turkish press, especially *Hürriyet* and *Sabah*, and suggest the promise of change.

Expectations: Economic Gains from EU; Conditions: Political Obligations to the EU

The expectations from EU membership are presented in the stories as mostly economic, in the form of economic help or support. Specifically, they relate to Turkey joining commissions in the Customs Union, including agriculture and the services sector, trade agreements, starting negotiations to increase the competitive power of agricultural products, financial help, credits, foreign capital investments, development of the tourism sector,

banking...etc.²³ In the stories emphasising the economic dimension, Turkey is compared with the other candidates. Stories in *Hürriyet* (H23) attribute superior characteristics to Turkey compared with the other 'competing' candidates. Their comparison is therefore positive compared with that of *Star* (Star 8) which presents Turkey as being behind the socialist countries. The fact that Turkey adopted capitalism before these countries is shown as a reason for Turkey being considered more 'powerful'. The story with the headline 'If inflation goes down, we are more powerful than competitors' speaks in the name of Turkey and makes economic comparisons with the other candidates as if it were a sports game or competition. This is seen in another story that includes the claim that Turkey is taking its place 'in the premiere league compared with the 12 waiting members' (H22). A story in *Sabah*, which speaks in the name of Turkey, comments: 'If the programme succeeds, we will overtake all' (S53). This again talks about Turkey leaving the other candidate countries behind. According to the story:

After the EU candidacy, programmes to reduce inflation gained more importance. If success is achieved, the adaptation process to the EU will be shorter...Turkey's target for the three-year programme is reducing inflation. It will also open the EU gate to Turkey...It will make Turkey a world state. If we succeed with this programme and comply with the EU countries' criteria, with the dynamism and power of our economy, Turkey will overtake the other 13 candidate countries easily.

The 'Everything is for the EU' sub-heading is a summary of *Sabah's* policy, and so is 'Economic adaptation'. While the government's fiscal tightening programme against inflation receives great support from the media, the media coverage of workers and state officials' mass demonstrations finds less space in the newspapers. The Turkish media continues to give support to the market and economic liberalisation while failing to demonstrate significant improvement in defending the political rights of citizens with multiple identities.²⁴ When the issue of what is to be gained from the EU is considered, economic opportunities are mostly discussed, and the suggestion is that there is a

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For example, H15, 19, 22, 23, 27, S36, S58 and Star 6.

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Alankuş (1995) makes a discourse analysis of the representation of the religious and ethnic identities in TV fictions while emphasising theoretically that the media messages are open to be decoded differently by TV audience. Differently from the debate here, she shows the examples to argue for the tendency of the dominant discourse to include and tolerate the other identities; namely pluralisation of identities. However, even Alankuş recognizes that this does not mean a genuine pluralist democracy nor this tendency becomes dominant.

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H14, H15, H18.

26
Star 4, Star 13, S2, S25, S36.

competition to reach these opportunities through a prioritising of economic programmes. Political development and human rights issues, on the other hand, are mostly framed as the 'condition' or obligation of the EU. For example, a story in *Sabah* states that 'the Copenhagen criteria will make the membership road "long and with ups and downs"' (S5). According to one story (H22), adaptation to Copenhagen will constrain Turkey. Such references to the Copenhagen criteria also occur in other stories.²⁵

The overwhelming political issue for the press in relation to the Copenhagen criteria is the Kurdish issue. It is framed by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's prospective execution.²⁶ *Star* frames the Kurdish issue in terms of Öcalan's (nickname 'Apo' is used) execution in a sensationalist nationalist way and expresses worries on abolishing the death penalty and, as previously mentioned, giving concessions on Cyprus.

...From now on, Europe will have a say in every law to be enacted in the parliament. The first condition of being an EU member is abolishing capital punishment. The first issue is not to hang Apo. Those who are most pleased by Turkey's candidacy is the PKK (Star 4)

Besides expressing these worries in a form that appears like a column, *Star* also gives place to the ideas of extreme nationalists. The headline 'Do not say I do not warn you' from Gül, who is a Member of Parliament from the MHP (National Movement Party), is presented without quotation marks. Later he states that any person who does not raise a hand for executing Apo in the parliament deserves to be beaten and adds: 'Lets hang him first and discuss later'. The abolition of capital punishment after Apo's execution is also proposed by other MHP members.

Stories in *Sabah* also focus on whether Abdullah Öcalan will be hanged. One story comments that the Helsinki summit 'affects Apo's fate closely' and that if membership is realised he will not be executed (S2). In another it is declared that the result of the Helsinki decision has importance for Öcalan 'who ties all his hope to delivery from execution' (S25). The 'Apo will not be hanged'

headline again expresses the issue in terms of corporal punishment, which is one of the main focuses on discussion of politics and the Kurdish issue. As these examples indicate, democracy is seen, in general, as a condition or requirement of the EU. The 'Coups era finishes' headline in *Sabah* (S28) mentions democracy as an outcome of the EU candidacy for the first time. According to the news, 'Turkey being an official EU candidate abolishes the possibility of military coup'. In this story, unusually, 'the first condition' of the EU membership is presented as 'full democracy'-a positive and desirable thing. However, this understanding of democracy is a lack of military rule; it does not question the effects of the military on the civilian rule in 'normal' times.²⁷ The military in Turkey is not seen as an obstacle to EU membership by either the newspapers' voice or the actors-politicians in the news. In H10, veteran generals' and MGK (National Security Council) members' idea that the MGK is not an obstacle to EU membership is presented as a headline without quotation marks. Actors in other stories also mention that there is no need to make changes in the MGK.²⁸

While the press covers the news on political changes and EU membership, it trivialises and personalises the issues. In its discussion of Islam, the mainstream Turkish press foregrounds Merve Kavakçı, a Merit Party (Fazilet Partisi) MP. The issue discussed by the press is whether she should be allowed to enter parliament wearing her headscarf. This, in effect, personalises/limits discussion of Islam, in a manner similar to the use of 'Apo' in relation to the Kurdish issue. One headline reads 'Will Merve be allowed to enter the Parliament?' (S29). Her withdrawal of Turkish citizenship because she had concealed her American citizenship is the background to the story.

The position of the mainstream press towards Islam can also be seen in *Hürriyet* (H41). Although the stories are not directly related to EU membership, their whole context is the EU. Two events, a peaceful political demonstration aimed at abolishing the *türban* ban, later, selling dates are both framed negatively, mainly because of participants / people wearing 'unsuitable' dresses.

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Turkish history witnessed military coups three times: May 27, 1960, March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980. It is not only in these extraordinary conditions that the military in Turkey has an important role; this role exists even during the civilian periods with the continuing impact of the military on political and economic life. Since the Constitution changed following each of the military coups, military power has been of influence during the civilian periods as well. There are two key mechanisms which are created by the military following the coups, which were incorporated in the Constitution. These mechanisms produce a 'double-headed political system' in Turkey as Sakallıoğlu (1997) argues: The first one is the creation of the state security courts which led to the operation of military justice alongside the civilian justice system. The second mechanism is the National Security Council which made it possible for the military to participate in the decision-making process of the civilian authorities. Having been introduced as a 'platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security' by the 1961 Constitution, it was extended with the 1973 amendments, which included making recommendations to the government and further empowered with the 1982 Constitution with the statement that the military's 'recommendations would be given priority consideration by the council of ministers'.

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Demirel: 'No need to make changes in MGK' (H57); Cem: 'The issue of MGK is exaggerated. I am sometimes conservative myself compared to soldiers' (S54).

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The news uses the word *tezgahtar* for salesman by putting quotation mark to the word of *tezgah* (as *tezgahlar*) *Tezgahtar* means salesman in Turkish, but there are other words such as *sahici* to be used instead of *tezgahtar*. The reason of the preference of this word is related with the multiple meanings of the word of *tezgah*: *Tezgaht* means both loom and also contriving a scheme or trick.

Hand to hand human chain' action arranged for türban became a scenery for views that do not befit Turkey which struggles to be part of modern Europe. Kara çarşafılilar (black veileds) who created Saudi Arabian views could not succeed in their actions due to low participation.

According to the news, 'While Turkey makes a great effort to enter the EU, these 'outdated views' of 'black action' become an obstacle for Turkey. The eclectic news continues with another event:

3 days after Helsinki...While Turkey winds blows in Europe, Arabian views from the middle of Istanbul...They are in Arabian dress in order to sell 2-3 dates more. Keyfiye on their head and in long white dresses, two tezgahtar²⁹ in Medine Market opposite of Eyüp Sultan Mosque. They say that they dress as Arab in order to reminds citizens date and so sell more. Thus, religion trade, is brought down to the date loom by religion merchants.

The stories can be understood in the context of Kemalism and the Turkish modernisation project, and the role of the media in these processes. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Kemalist elites used the media when establishing the Republic of Turkey. After its establishment, the media promoted modernisation by disseminating Western values and ways of life and the Kemalist ideology (Karpas, 1964; Oktay, 1987; Heper ve Demirel, 1996). Kemalism is not only an ideology of national independence and sovereignty but also the backbone of social change directed by an Enlightenment, modernised and Westernising vision. The principles of Atatürk and the Republican People's Party (RPP) (republicanism, revolutionism, nationalism, secularism, statism and populism) still maintain their importance (with the exception of statism in the current economy), not only in the Turkish state's concept of ideal economic and political relations but also in the mainstream media's understanding of the notion of an ideal state and society. These principles, especially nationalism and secularism are the sources of bias in the representation of Kurdish issue and Islam in the media. The principle of nationalism replaces religion and recognises Turkishness over difference between ethnic groups in the society. The principle of secularism, like that

of nationalism, aims to cut the ties of the new Turkish Republic with the Ottoman past by ending religion as a basis for society. What has been observed over the years about this principle is that it is not being used simply 'to separate ideas of religion from politics and from the affairs of the world and of the State' (Landen, 1970), as is included in the RPP Programme and as is generally claimed. Religion is not removed from public life; on the contrary, it is used by politicians and the military (especially after the 1980 military coup as an antidote to the left). As Tunçay states, secularism in Turkey in reality means the organisation of religion by the state. More specifically, it means

the state's control of religious practices, restricting the activities of Islamic ruhban (clergy) by including them in the state, and some of the religious principles directing public life according to the needs of the state's political legitimacy (quoted in Insel, 1995).

Making up the News, Sensationalisation and Tabloidization of the Press

While the press conceives of the Kurdish issue and Islam as obstacles or concession, different sexual choices/identities are framed in a more sensationalist and sarcastic way, especially in *Sabah*. For example, the headline 'Equal rights to homosexuals' (S30) exudes sarcasm:

With Turkey's EU candidacy, homosexuals became European as well... Turkey, which will require a change in thousands of pages of regulations in the process of full membership to the EU, will experience the main difficulty in accepting the 'freedom for different sexual choices' which a criterion of basic human rights in Europe requires.

The story puts quotation marks around 'freedom for different sexual choices'. Since the newspapers analysed often fail to use quotation marks even when warranted, their use in this instance may suggest that the paper is attempting to distance itself from the statement. Also, the lexical choice of 'main difficulty' is striking. The story assumes that accepting freedom for different sexual

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Homosexuals ready for the EU' (S61) again foregrounds homosexuals in the headline as a sensational way. The news is about Police organization's regulation change in order to be adapted to the EU. 'We are ready' (subheadline) is used after headline and it sounds as if homosexuals said they are ready for the EU. In fact, this is a statement made by the Interior Minister Tantan as a reply of a question 'Is the police organization ready to the EU?' Tantan replies 'We have already done the necessary preparations'. Thus, that is police who is ready for the EU when the body of the news is read. There are some items regarding homosexuals in the regulation change, and the newspaper carries this to the headline in a sensational way. 'Judge decision is condition for virginity test' headlined news (S48) states that 'EU membership fastened work on judiciary reform'. The items in the bill is varied from capital punishment... to torture, children courts, changes in the Marital Law - ending family head, women's freedom to choose profession, property gained in marriage- From all these items, *Sabah's* foregrounding virginity control is related with its tendency of making sensational news.

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In his book on TV news, Ergül (2000) states that *magazin* news (that is news about celebrities, models... etc), constitute 40% of the main TV news. At the same time, the news on serious events have entertaining content ('info-tainment') increasingly more as a result of the consolidation of big media groups.

choices is difficult for Turkey by speaking in the name of Turkey again.³⁰

The tabloidisation of the news is not only an issue for the tabloid newspaper *Star*, or for *Sabah*, but for the other newspapers as well. This has been a general tendency of the Turkish press in the past decade, especially since the advent of commercial TV channels.³¹ The Turkish press seems to be more akin to American newspapers (rather than European ones), as 'making a story' and providing 'synthetic happenings' such as 'pseudo events' are also evident in the history of American newspapers (Boorstin, 1992).

Only a few days after the candidacy declaration, the news became more sensationalised and fictional. The topics started to shift from serious political and economic issues towards more sensational ones, as seen in *Star's* announcement that not only will 'Inflation or torture', but 'even tripe consumption will be changed' (Star 4). *Sabah* also declares (S 62) that: 'one of the most interesting problems is whether *kokoreç* and *döner* is going to be banned'. *Hürriyet* addresses the readers with the news (H56) that 'tripe is allowed in the EU'. The story presumes that the public is worried about this issue and reassures it by stating that 'the worry [that] started in public opinion after the declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy that "we will not be able to eat offal products" is needless'. The news announces that the EU Commission had abolished the limitations on offal products, which were brought in because of mad cow disease, 'so that the tripe and tripe soup could obtain EU visas': In *Hürriyet*, (H66) the news mentions that the tripe can be eaten, but with the EU, it will be impossible to sacrifice an animal.

The words 'the EU', even 'Finland', gains newsworthy after the EU summit. For example, under the headline 'Helsinki brings luck' (H47) the story states that 'the consecutive events that took place in Helsinki showed that this city brings luck to Turkey'. The events listed include sport victories-the Turkish National Team beat Finland last year 2 to 1 and the Women's Volleyball National Team again won in the same week-a Turkish professor was given

'the best geophysicist prize' in a conference that took place in Helsinki; another professor living in Finland was commended for his discovery of a microbe causing kidney disease, and Helsinki University decided to open a Turkology department.

A general pattern is established in a series of stories published in *Sabah*, which presents the illusion that everything in Turkey started to change with the EU candidacy. For example, 'First traffic control in European standards' (S40) tells that the traffic police's work of the previous night had been realised with modern tools. The story continues: 'Hidden cameras found drivers exceeding the speed limit' as if this technology came to Turkey after the EU candidacy, and did not exist before then. There is no indication in the news that the tools used were European or brought as a condition of the EU. The story continues with discussion of traffic fines, but again the relation with the EU is not at all clear.³²

These kinds of stories are not limited to news relating to the European Union. They are rather a result of the rise of tabloid journalism at the expense of serious, political journalism in the age of media conglomerates. What is new is that the EU has become newsworthy and a context for these fictional stories.

Conclusion

This study has analysed the Turkish news coverage of the European Union as a supranational/regional formation. It also provides clues as to how national and sub-national identities are constructed in the Turkish press.

In the detailed analysis of the news in the three dailies, the research first investigated who the actors were in order to discover who's ideas and who's versions of the world are represented in the news. These are mostly those of Turkish and European/EU bureaucrats, politicians and Turkish businessmen. Thus, the issue of what these stories are saying has already been predetermined by the identity of the actors. The themes of the stories are also very closely related to the ways in which the stories are composed with

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There are other examples to this kind of news: *Hamsi* (anchovy in Turkish) enters first is another example (S41) of such made-up news: 'From the day we became candidate for the EU, even *hamsi* adapted to the new conditions. After *hamsi* rice, desert and burger, now *hamsi* pizza on the market (an advertisement-like news about a new pizza-cafe in Trabzon). There is no relation with the EU at all, unlike the headline. 'Internet course for Parliament members' (S49) is similar to the news on traffic control. Here again there is no evidence that these changes are taking place as a result of the EU candidacy. The news declares that the parliament will also be European in terms of 'physical conditions' and explains that members of the parliament will have computers and courses. 'Fines on environment increase' (S51), a similar kind of news, this time in the context of environment, states that 'Turkey which is a candidate of the EU, is going through a series of arrangements on environment before the membership'. However there is no evidence, no detailed information whether the change is related with the EU. The 'really bad' news on these kind of made-up news has the headline 'Big change in Gürel': 'State Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel also has a change in the process of the EU'. The news takes readers' attention to Gürel's using Laguna car and coming to a meeting with his new car instead of his earlier Frontera. Other news again in *Sabah* (S55) announces that 'EU wind affected

Turkish and Greek pilots as well. The news informs that both countries' pilots gave up battling in the Aegean' by emphasising that the 'rate' of battling decreased 'to a great extent in the last days'. The body of the news is exactly opposite of the headline and comment of the news. In fact, the news actor, the general in chief Air Forces, replies completely differently and states clearly that 'it has nothing to do with the EU'.

their lexical and headline choices and the issues that they foreground. In general, the stories analysed project the voices of those actors who support Turkey's EU candidacy and the EU. Besides choosing these actors, the newspapers, especially *Sabah* and *Hürriyet*, also carry headlines that celebrate the EU candidacy as a historical dream. The stories foreground the ideas of the actors who are pro-Turkish and pro-EU candidacy (for example by writing without quotation marks in the headlines) whereas the opposite happens for the few actors who think differently (as seen by the use of the word 'claimed' instead of 'said' or 'stated'), even sometimes at the expense of the story's coherence.

Despite the claims of journalists, we are seeing a blurring of the distinction between news and opinion in the Turkish press, and not only in *Star*. It is increasingly difficult to make a distinction between tabloid and quality newspapers in the Turkish press. Newspapers are increasingly dealing with the national culture in a sensationalist way (as seen in the stories on tripe or *döner*...etc), or manufacturing news stories. This is not merely an ethical violation by individual journalists, but is also a product of the media industry's current situation. The main solution to these developments is to change the current commercial, profit-driven and conglomerated media structure. In the short term, however, there is a need for some regulation which does not limit political discourse but requires that journalistic codes be followed in order to prevent sensationalism and fake news.

The economic and political dimensions of Turkey's EU candidacy are emphasised in the news more than cultural/identity issues which are mostly sensationalised. The economy is seen mostly in relation to national development and economic aid from the EU, rather than labour related issues, such as unions, unemployment insurance...etc. Speaking in the name of Turkey rather than the Turkish people with all their differences becomes more obvious in the stories on political issues. Not only in *Star*, but also in the other two newspapers, 'we' is used to represent Turkey in the news, and 'giving concessions to the EU' becomes one of the

main worries about the candidacy. The military, on the other hand, is not considered an obstacle and is not at all criticised in the news. The liberal media in an economic sense is statist in politics and considers the 'other' as a threats. The media adopts the official definition of Turkish identity rather than acknowledge multiple identities. For example, the Kurdish issue is personalised with Abdullah Öcalan while the same is done with Merve Kavakçı in discussion of Islam. Although Europeans are criticised for having double standards against Islam, the Turkish press does the same with regard to 'Eurocentrism'.

This time, again, the Turkish media is willing to take another step in promoting integration with global capital via the EU membership, while at the same time being on the side of the nation-state in politics. It is hard to say that the human rights issue is seen as a desirable thing for the Turkish press which frames the Copenhagen political criteria as a constraint and imposition of the EU. Since democratic civil institutions, organisations or unions are not represented in the news, either as actors or sources, the democratic demands of the Turkish people do not appear in the stories analysed here. If the large spectrum of democracy demands of Turkish citizens were represented, the awkwardness of the question, 'are we going to democratise just because the EU asks for it?' would be revealed. The media's viewing of political improvements as requirements or conditions, and economic changes as gains, is dangerous for democracy in Turkey, since the media does not only represent and is not only affected by, but also constitutes and affects the social reality.

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I would like to thank to
Feyza Okan for checking my
translation of the headlines.

APPENDIX³

Table 1 : Headlines of the news in Hürriyet
(December 9, 1999- December 15, 1999)

Number-Date	Headline
H1-9 Dec.	Turkey on the European Agenda
H2-9 Dec.	Prodi: I am hopeful of candidacy
H3-9 Dec.	France: One meter left to membership
H4-9 Dec.	England: We support Turkey
H5-9 Dec.	Apo to Athens: Do not veto
H6-9 Dec.	Denmark: We already back you
H7-9 Dec.	Ankara: Agreement is condition
H8-9 Dec.	Cem's assurance softens Athens
H9-9 Dec.	Antagonism in Aegean to increase
H10-9 Dec.	National Security Council not obstacle to EU
H11-10 Dec.	Last minute in backstage
H12-10 Dec.	Earthquake warning in Helsinki
H13-10 Dec.	Historical day
H14-10 Dec.	Who wants what in summit?
H15-11 Dec.	First Muslim Candidate
H16-11 Dec.	Ecevit: Great Success
H17-11 Dec.	Exciting Friday in Ankara
H18-11 Dec.	EU: Comply with these
H19-11 Dec.	Turkey: Provide these
H20-11 Dec.	Candidacy bid hour to hour
H21-11 Dec.	Turkey passes through long thin road
H22-11 Dec.	Economy after Helsinki
H23-11 Dec.	If inflation goes down, we are more powerful
H24-11 Dec.	Become giant in 45 years
H25-11 Dec.	Demirel: Do not miss opportunity
H26-11 Dec.	Cem Duna: Turkey can be member before other candidates
H27-11 Dec.	Tourism sector happy
H28-11 Dec.	Support rally from PKK
H29-11 Dec.	Five records in stockmarket
H30-12 Dec.	Turkey wind
H31-12 Dec.	Bülent Ecevit mark in Summit
H32-12 Dec.	Denktas upset
H33-12 Dec.	What leaders say?
H34-12 Dec.	Historical statements from Papandreu: I took big risk
H35-12 Dec.	Economy world pleased
H36-12 Dec.	Helsinki dispute of government
H37-12 Dec.	Thanks to Simitis, Attila entered Europe
H38-12 Dec.	FP: Greeks are happy, so we are cheated
H39-12 Dec.	Çiller: All contributors should be congratulated
H40-12 Dec.	Anap: Özal was right
H41-13 Dec.	Not befit you
H42-13 Dec.	Turkey most attractive candidate
H43-13 Dec.	Ministry for EU establishing
H44-13 Dec.	Cyprus dispute in EU
H45-13 Dec.	Historical era in relations with Athens
H46-13 Dec.	Congratulation letter from Clinton
H47-13 Dec.	Helsinki brings luck
H48-13 Dec.	D'alema: Apo's life saved

H49-14 Dec.	Kurdish TV surprise
H50-14 Dec.	Full membership road
H51-14 Dec.	Papandreu to come in January
H52-14 Dec.	Chirac to Süleyman Demirel: We bolster you on torny road
H53-14 Dec.	Prime Minister Ecevit's Assurance to Denktas
H54-14 Dec.	Cyprus meetings end without conclusion
H55-14 Dec.	TUSIAD: Private sector support is a pre-requisite
H56-14 Dec.	EU okeys tripe
H57-14 Dec.	Demirel: No need to make changes in National Security Council
H58-14 Dec.	Altan Öymen: EU candidacy is not a victory
H59-14 Dec.	EU Commission in Virtue Party
H60-15 Dec.	France determines candidacy
H61-15 Dec.	Turkey dispute in European Parliament
H62-15 Dec.	Demirel: Fundamentalism is unacceptable for full membership
H63-15 Dec.	Full membership is not favour but Turkey's right
H64-15 Dec.	Membership and capital punishment not advocated together
H65-15 Dec.	Long struggle to start with status quo defenders
H66-15 Dec.	Eat stripe but forget animal sacrificing

APPENDIX-B

Table 2 : Headlines of the news in Sabah
(December 9, 1999-December 15, 1999)

Number-Date	Headline
S1-9 Dec.	Last minute support
S2-9 Dec.	Apo eyesdrop on radio S3-9 Dec. Edge of 'Yes'
S4-9 Dec.	'They cannot give us up'
S5-9 Dec.	Membership in 2020
S6-9 Dec.	Speedy diplomacy traffic
S7-10 Dec.	Acceptance at 8 thousand meters
S8-10 Dec.	Turkey's dismissal a historical mistake
S9-10 Dec.	Nerves war at table
S10-10 Dec.	'Turkey should not see every step as concession'
S11-10 Dec.	USA-Europe crisis in horizon
S12-11 Dec.	We welcomed
S13-11 Dec.	Developments in Helsinki in hours
S14-11 Dec.	Helsinki may be new Luxembourg
S15-11 Dec.	A minutes escape of clash
S16-11 Dec.	Athens: We want to say welcome
S17-11 Dec.	Moments of the crisis
S18-11 Dec.	Simitis: We achieved our target
S19-11 Dec.	Operation Centre: Foreign Ministry
S20-11 Dec.	Story of crisis night
S21-11 Dec.	Irtemçelik: We challenge EU
S22-11 Dec.	Calm comment from father
S23-11 Dec.	Özal applies first full membership
S24-11 Dec.	Vouchsafes this team
S25-11 Dec.	A relief for Apo
S26-11 Dec.	EU from artist's brush
S27-12 Dec.	Picture of acceptance to Europe
S28-12 Dec.	Coups era finishes
S29-12 Dec.	Assembly entrance at limbo for Merve
S30-12 Dec.	Equal rights to homosexuals

S31-12 Dec.	Parliament becomes European
S32-12 Dec.	Secret heroes
S33-12 Dec.	Thus we find our place
S34-12 Dec.	Turkey, Welcome in Family
S35-12 Dec.	Apo not to be executed
S36-12 Dec.	Who wins what?
S37-12 Dec.	Elections player Simitis won
S38-12 Dec.	Things settle down
S39-12 Dec.	Europe gets most
S40-13 Dec.	First traffic control in European standards
S41-13 Dec.	Anchovy enters before
S42-13 Dec.	EU standard in Turkish Armed Forces
S43-13 Dec.	'We have to take some steps'
S44-13 Dec.	Target 2004
S45-13 Dec.	Revolution for democracy in Turkey
S46-13 Dec.	Shines as star
S47-13 Dec.	Support Turkey with newspaper announcement
S48-14 Dec.	Court order is prerequisite for virginity test
S49-14 Dec.	Internet course for Parliament members
S50-14 Dec.	Kutan calls collectivism for applying criterion
S51-14 Dec.	Fines on environment increase
S52-14 Dec.	Big change in Gürel
S53-14 Dec.	If programme succeeds, we overtake all
S54-14 Dec.	Cem explains conditions
S55-14 Dec.	Dogs fight ends
S56-15 Dec.	EU negotiations next year
S57-15 Dec.	Simitis: We are not two rival countries anymore
S58-15 Dec.	A 2.5 trillioned dollar fortune
S59-15 Dec.	'Let's improve our record'
S60-15 Dec.	'We should leave capital punishment'
S61-15 Dec.	Homosexuals ready for EU
S62-15 Dec.	Duel for Europe

APPENDIX-C

Table 3. Headlines of the news in Star
(December 9, 1999-December 15, 1999)

Number-Date	Headline
Star1-9 Dec.	Decision day for Europe dream
Star2-11 Dec.	Let's hope for best
Star3-11 Dec.	All happy
Star4-12 Dec.	May it be easy
Star5-12 Dec.	Turks European for 600 years
Star6-12 Dec.	Candidacy OK, hope continues
Star7-13 Dec.	This Europe real Europe
Star8-13 Dec.	Turkey to become Europe's most
Star9-13 Dec.	Turkey best amongst candidate countries
Star10-13 Dec.	Musa asks people European candidacy
Star11-14 Dec.	CNN Kurd
Star12-15 Dec.	Denktas offended Ecevit
Star13-15 Dec.	Don't say I do not warn you

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How the Quality Press Defines the World for Us: A Comparative Study of News Reporting on the Environment and Unemployment.

Abstract

To keep informed about political, economic or social events people will, in Western countries, turn to quality papers. The role played by those papers and mass media in general is crucial in the process of transmission of knowledge about the world. Particularly in a context marked by increasing uncertainty. Conditions of employment, the way we look at the environment has completely changed over the last decades creating a certain vagueness as to how to treat those issues. Media in such a context has the power to cut through uncertainties by setting up terms of the possible. But possibilities as expressed by the quality press are very much a function of values held by newspapers themselves. When newspapers belong to large media corporations those values are marked by priorities held by a corporate world, which are then presented as the only rational options possible.

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How the Quality Press Defines the World for Us: A Comparative Study of News Reporting on the Environment and Unemployment.

Introduction

This paper presents the result of a study of the reporting on the environment and unemployment in 8 quality papers published in Australia, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. The significance of this study lies in the important role attributed to mass media in Western democracies. It is via mass media that people learn what is happening in their own country and in rest of the world. This is a crucial knowledge when it comes to participating in society and take on the political responsibilities inherent to living in a democracy. Media are also part of the field in which any public debate, not only will be held, but also its terms defined.

Why choose unemployment and the environment as an object of study? This choice is determined by a variety of reasons. First these issues have been named as major issues in election polls held in Europe as well as in Australia. Unemployment and the environment are also issues implying a choice about the type of society we want to live in. The increasing uncertainty surrounding issues such as the environment or unemployment makes them particularly important to study. In such periods of uncertainty, when elements are being redefined, the media play a crucial role by cutting through uncertainties (Murdoch and Golding, 1989)

This uncertainty followed a sudden decrease in economic growth in the seventies and the significant increase of

unemployment in all Western countries. This brought forward a rethinking about conditions of employment. It is also in those years of economic uncertainty that the environment became a major issue.

This paper examines what, within this context of uncertainty, are the options proposed by the quality press. Quality papers were chosen as object of analysis, because they are par excellence the papers seen as providing a service indispensable in a democracy, by supplying informed discussion. They also "attract journalists of high skill and intellectual integrity" (Hirsch and Gordon, 1975: 15). People who want to read about one country's overall political, social and economic issues turn to quality papers. *The Australian* and *The Age* from Australia, *Le Soir* and *De Standaard* from Belgium, *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* from France, *The Times* and *The Guardian* from England were chosen as objects of analysis. Those papers are considered as national quality papers, or major quality dailies in their respective countries.

The choice of countries made is justified by the fact that each of those countries has very specific press traditions. In Australia the press is concentrated in only a few hands. Belgium and France still recognise and publicly support (through a system of subsidies) a model of opinion press. The English press tradition served as a model for the press in Anglo Saxon countries and is still held somehow as THE model in democratic

countries. It is based on an intimate relationship between the media and economic powers and a continuous tension with the state (Charon, 1991). The notion of fourth estate fits into this model according to which the media has the power to control and limit excesses of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. By the same token the power obtained by some large media corporation is not really seen as menacing. In countries like France and Belgium, the role played by the press as fourth estate does not go unrecognised, but the state is also attributed a role in the development and the constitution of media. Not just because of the political role they play, but also because they are considered as cultural assets worth protecting (Murschetz, 1998). The usefulness of state aid to counter anti-democratic market tendencies is deeply entrenched in the continental European press. The subsidy system in place in Belgium and France thus aims to maintain press diversity, in an attempt to counteract the constant reduction of media outlets in a competitive market environment. The market environment has brought forth contradictions between the principle of freedom of the press and the realities of a difficult access to media. But despite this, the concept of freedom of the press is still the argument used by big media corporations to avoid interference in media issues.

Methodology

The findings of this research are based on a sample of two constructed weeks, in 1998, of news published in 8 quality papers (*The Age, The Australian, De Standard, Le Soir, Le Figaro, Le Monde, The Guardian, and The Times*), from 4 different countries (respectively Australia, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom). From this two-week sample, two sub-samples containing all articles on unemployment and on the environment were constituted. For this purpose, articles on unemployment were defined as all articles containing at least a couple of sentences on the idea of unemployment or on employment when reported as a movement (people becoming unemployed or employed). Articles on the environment were defined as articles relating to the natural

environment - as having as main subjects, the air, the soil, the water, wildlife or vegetation.

The samples thus obtained were submitted to a framing analysis. Basically, the facts on which the news is based have no intrinsic meaning, but only take on meaning by being embedded in a frame that organises them and gives them coherence, selecting certain interpretations to emphasise while ignoring others. The process of framing involves the selection of "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman, 1993: 60). Because presented frames largely depend on the source of news or sponsors of frames (Entman, 1991: 7), this paper looks at sources of information, who they are, how they are used by newspapers, how specific sources of information lead to specific ways of framing of information? Together with the journalist who wrote the story, the sources of news used for the story can indeed be regarded as sponsors of particular frames (Gamson, 1989).

Findings

The findings presented here are a summarised version of a thesis. More explanations on where the findings have been derived from can always be obtained from the author. This paper limits itself to setting out briefly a few of the more important findings. They involve the overwhelmingly economic framing of news, the dominance of a few themes and an analysis on how the 'culture' of each newspaper and the sources of information used contribute to the framing of news.

Unemployment and the Environment Presented Through an Economic Frame

Newspapers all have their own priorities and this research has clearly emphasised that. Those priorities are clearly spelt out

in the case of opinion papers. *Le Figaro* is openly conservative, *Le Monde* advocates sympathies for social ideas, *De Standaard* is a pro-Flemish Christian and conservative newspaper, *The Guardian* advocates a more progressive liberal position. *The Age*, *The Australian*, *The Times* and *Le Soir* call themselves 'neutral'. But as this research shows clearly there is no such thing as a neutral newspaper. And what's more, despite the possibility for diversity that those different newspapers might offer, in reality the news presented is confined to a few dominating interpretations.

Reporting on unemployment, as well as on the environment is based on the assumption that economics rule the world. While unemployment can be covered as a social, a political or an economic issue, our research shows that newspapers all clearly present unemployment as an economic issue. Unemployment is thus mainly reflected on as if it were an important economic variable, an economic measure. Reporting about unemployment is largely based on statistics, business reports, national or regional budgets. In this type of reporting the unemployed become abstract numbers, which overlook the existence of real individuals.

Solutions to unemployment proposed are also economic. They all rest on one basic assumption: that economic growth is essential to reduce unemployment, and poses that there are two ways of doing things: an old way, which goes with state intervention and job security, but cannot be afforded any more; and a new more flexible and more competitive way, which allows business create wealth (and thereby jobs). Following this way of thinking unemployment becomes a problem of maladjustment, of not having been able to keep in pace with changing times. It is based on the idea propagated by the press that the world is rapidly changing and that countries which are not able to participate in those changes will be left out.

To what extent the state should intervene to promote or sometimes to complement economic growth forms the basis of

discussions. It rests on the assumption that any state organisation can by definition not be effective. Unemployment articles are also framed as political issues, when the government (or the opposition) releases (or proposes) new unemployment policies, or makes public how much will be spent to fight unemployment. Those political articles are framed as "unemployment can be solved by political intervention", which coexists with the frame "the government cannot do anything good when it comes to unemployment". Depending on the priorities held by each newspaper, they support or condemn governments as possible managers of unemployment. Conservative newspapers reject the possibility for government to play any other role than supporting business to allow it to be competitive (presented as the key to participate in the changing world) and let the market rule solve unemployment. Managing unemployment is by all papers presented as part of a more general economic management.

Environment is similarly largely viewed in economic terms. The idea that taking care of the environment is part of ensuring a better life quality is almost inexistent, unless life quality is viewed in economic terms. For other papers the environment is seen in economic terms: the financial cost of taking care of the environment has to be carefully considered. Not putting the economic priorities first is presented as irrational. The environment is on very few occasions presented as a political issue. This is reflective of the influence of political agendas on media reporting. Reporting indeed shows that taking care of the environment only becomes a political issue when green politicians are in government, and providing that newspapers are willing to use them as sources of information. In France, green politicians are in government, but while *Le Monde* uses them as sources of information, *Le Figaro* never does.

This summary represents the overwhelmingly dominating view presented by all newspapers. Only a few newspapers in

our sample also offer contradictory information, introducing some form of conflicting frames. While media have been presented as "battleground for contesting forces" (Curran, 1991, 29), our research shows that within the quality press there is very little scope for a real battleground. Only the more independent (in the sense that they do not belong to a major press group) *Le Monde* and *The Guardian* introduce the idea that taking care of the environment is making a choice for a more harmonious way of life, and that unemployment also has social implications. Similarly *The Age* and *Le Soir*, which are two more local newspapers also offer interpretations which take on board the social aspect of unemployment. This can be explained by the closer links those newspapers have developed with local organisations. The fact that those two newspapers use those local organisations as sources of information, allows for information with a different emphasis to enter the news.

Recurrent Themes

There are also a few themes that dominate the reporting on unemployment and the environment. Simplified and entertaining news for instance dominates news on the environment. Environmental issues as well as unemployment are also presented as depending on the responsibility of individuals. But by the same token, the unemployed themselves rarely make it in the news, whether as source of news or as news actor. There is also the strong idea, that the world is a rapidly changing place. Within this context unemployment is presented as a problem of maladjustment to those changes. Another recurrent theme is the idea that business exists almost only to provide employment.

- Articles on the environment are marked by the existence of a very large amount of articles on animals, plants and the countryside. The information provided is non controversial and carries little risk in terms of alienating any sympathies. The entertaining rather than the informative, investigative factor is emphasised. There is also a large amount of articles covering

exceptional weather conditions. They are generally just entertaining or catastrophic (which is another way to be entertaining) and not placed in any broader background questioning the management of the environment.

- Unemployment is framed as a problem of adaptation, of maladjustment to a modern way of living, whether individually or globally. This follows the idea that we live in a world changing rapidly and to which we have to adapt, if we do not want to be left out. What we could be left out of is never clearly spelt out.

- The unemployed simply rarely make it into the news. Most of the time they are abstractions, numbers. News about unemployment does not tell stories about the unemployed, but success stories, positive examples, stories about those employed who used to be unemployed. They are stories of people who made it despite adversity. Thus the unemployed become news, when they are employed against all odds, when they managed the adaptation process and individually transform adversity into success. This type of stories emphasises the importance of taking individual responsibility and by the same token promote a new attitude to employment, which is based on more flexibility.

The notion of individual responsibility can also be found in the reporting on the environment, in which private citizens are portrayed as main responsible for pollution. The main pollution thus reported by newspapers is city pollution. There are only few accounts of industrial pollution and when such accounts are given, articles tend to reassure citizen. Industrial pollution will come in the news, when there has been some major environmental accident, or when the news is consonant with a previously occurred big accident. This is the case of nuclear accidents in Europe. But when nuclear mishaps are reported, newspapers try to reassure citizens. This is certainly the case of *The Figaro*, *De Standaard*, *The Times*, which are clearly very supportive of nuclear energy. Only *Le Monde* and *The Guardian*

question the use of nuclear energy, thereby introducing some form of debate.

- The industry, business is pictured in the news as if their main task was to create employment. That businesses are generally created for profit making purposes is often whisked away. It is therefore not surprising that support for the development of industry is presented as a major component in the creation of jobs. The state is often accused of preventing business to do its job, as preventing competitiveness and therefore of being a main cause of unemployment.

This theme also has its equivalent in environment reporting, where business is presented as doing its best for the environment, by making environmentally friendly innovations and using environmentally friendly techniques. According to the press they do this within the limits of rationality - rationality which consists of not putting in jeopardy the competitiveness of enterprises. Indeed competitiveness is seen as the main weapon through which a business and countries will not be left out of a rapidly changing world.

Newspaper "Cultures" and Framing Mechanisms

While there is a dominating frame according to which news is framed in economic terms, while there are recurrent themes, the emphasis put by each newspaper on a particular interpretation clearly depends from each newspaper's own individual 'culture'.

Priorities held by each newspaper are made clear when one compares the reporting in newspapers from a same country. Considering the existence of general news values, one might assume that, in a same country, the same events would be chosen as news. But this is far from true. From one newspaper to another, the reporting is quite different. And the differences reflect the priorities and values defended by each newspaper. Thus, *Le Figaro*'s news supports a conservative and no state intervention policy. *Le Monde* acknowledges global economic

structures, but also the need for social solidarity. Similar differences exist between *The Times* and *The Guardian*. The first one supports conservative policies, while *The Guardian* has a more social focus.

Differences also exist between *The Australian* and *The Age*, but in this case a lot of it is due to the fact that *The Age* is a more local paper, while *The Australian* has more of a national focus. Similarly *Le Soir* and *De Standaard* cover different local, and also cultural areas.

Different mechanisms contribute to the framing of news. First there is the choice of what to report, the selection of specific items of an event also contributes to the framing, then there is also the use of particular sources of information rather than others, finally the frames put in place are reinforced in opinion articles.

The larger journalistic features, and the way in which each of them has been analysed, easily reveal newspapers' priorities. The features in *The Age* clearly promote the importance of taking on new, faster, innovative more flexible ways of doing things, underlining the vulnerability of those industries which cannot keep in pace with changing times. The changing world forms the basic theme of the reports published in *The Australian*. Journalistic reports in *Le Figaro* set the example by presenting initiatives of countries promoting low business taxes, a lowering of social welfare, the importance of a flexible workforce. This is according to *Le Figaro*, the way to solve unemployment. Those same priorities are defended by *The Times* in its journalistic features.

Selecting specific elements of information also contributes to framing. Newspapers, even when reporting the same story, each have their own way of reporting events. *The Guardian* for instance puts the accent on how new measures might benefit the poor, while *The Times* accents that enterprises will be rewarded while many people will leave the welfare system. When new

unemployment figures are published, *The Times* accents that business circles react positively to the figures while *The Guardian* stipulates that jobs are still a problem.

Not only the choice of events as news participates in the framing of news, but also who is chosen to comment on a particular information. The use of one particular frame instead of another is very dependent on the use of sources of information, which can be regarded as sponsors of particular frames (Gamson, 1989, 158). The excessive use of government sources, business sources or economic experts compared to other sources is capital to the domination of the frames 'let the market sort it out' and 'we have to adapt to a new, more flexible, more competitive way of life'. Community organisations do not promote those frames, but they very rarely appear in the news as sources of information. Judging by the media coverage on unemployment, there are also few, if no, organisations specifically defending the unemployed.

The preference given to certain news sources is partly due to news practices. But there is also a clear tendency, particularly in the European newspapers, to go out and interview sources with which the newspaper has build up a closer relationship, because of a similarity in viewpoints. *Le Monde* favours political sources coming from the socialist party, while *Le Figaro* favours conservative political sources. *De Standaard* tends to favour political sources linked with catholic political sources. It has to be underlined here the Belgian parliamentary system is one of proportional representation, which allows for the existence in parliament of a wider variety of parties. As a result of this, more political parties get to be used as sources of news. *Le Soir* publishes a variety of government/politicians initiatives. No political party seems to be getting specific attention in *Le Soir*, but the paper does include local politicians as sources, which other newspapers do not do. This clearly follows the more local focus of the newspaper.

When it comes to environmental news, *The Age* and *Le Soir* stand out for the quantity of information coming from local city councils. They are often presented as in opposition with national governments and this therefore provides for conflicting interpretations.

After government and other political sources, the business world is the most important source of news in news on unemployment - and an important source of news in news on the environment. The sort of news coming from business sources is quite different to that coming from political sources. The majority of it is made up of articles in which businesses announce job cuts or the creation of new jobs. Information on companies laying off or taking on more staff is important for the business world. This type of information functions as a barometer of how well companies are doing, how they are dealing with market challenges, which is important for how they are perceived on the stock market. As Halimi (1997: 54) underlined, prices on the stock market tend to go up when a company announces plans to lay off people. It is seen as a sign of effective management. In the same way, the fact that companies are doing well and taking on more staff, also influences the stock market positively. The environment also becomes part of larger financial or business issue. The cost of protecting the environment is always underlined, as is willingness of companies to cover those costs. Mishaps can be fixed with money. All newspapers frequently report environmental friendly inventions made by companies.

But there are differences between newspapers. Clear differences can be seen in the way *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* treat business. *Le Monde* is much more critical of the business sector than *Le Figaro*. *Le Monde* also publishes quite a few articles on the necessity for business to take on social responsibilities. At the same time, *Le Monde* does develop the idea that the state has a role to play in providing the necessary structures to encourage business. Those articles again coexist with other articles in

which the state is seen as preventing economic development and thereby contributing to unemployment. These are all very contradicting ideas and it is mainly the use of a variety of news sources, which account for those different ideas. Nor are they in *The Times*, which also pushes for less state intervention as in the article "Blair's soundbite strategy keeps us on the sidelines" (5/1/98, 46) which states that "People in Western Europe would like more jobs, higher wages, more holidays and lower taxes. What they are being offered instead is more government, more laws, few jobs and higher taxes", wondering why Blair signed the Social chapter "if he really wants more flexible labour markets". A call for more social responsibilities from the business sector is made in *The Guardian*. The same happens in the coverage of environmental issues. *Le Monde* and *The Guardian* take a much tougher stand on business than the other papers.

Private citizen rarely make it into the news. In general news articles, private citizen used as emotional props to illustrate news provided. They are quoted for their emotive reactions, but not conferred the legitimacy to participate in any debate in another way. In the Anglo-Saxon press, 'letters to the editor' columns allow them to have a word. But in practice, those letters tend to be rather entertaining. The more serious letters come from organisations and not individual people. This underlines the importance of lobby groups, which are given more credibility than individual people. When the unemployed are sources of news, their messages are emotional rather than political, economic or social. The legitimacy to comment on a situation they live in every day is not conferred upon them. There are also no lobby groups to defend the interests of the unemployed. Individually, they sometimes appear in the news via the "letters to the editor" page. Only in France, when the unemployed organised large protest marches and occupations did they become major actors and even sources of news. In his speech to the unemployed Bourdieu (1998: 102) qualified the movement as a social miracle, a unique opportunity fought for by individuals and associations to pull the unemployed out of

oblivion. But despite this, the coverage of the protest, in our sample, largely minimises the movement.

When it comes to the environment, there are many lobby groups. Environmental organisations are prominent news sources. An analysis of those environmental sources uses, shows that only those defending non-controversial issues are portrayed as legitimate sources of information. Organisations going against business interests are rarely used as main source of information and often portrayed negatively, particularly in papers such as *Le Figaro*, *De Standaard*, *The Australian*.

The use of specific vocabulary also participates in the framing of news and can be directly linked back to particular news sources. Thus 'flexibility in the work place' is also called 'lack of job security', 'excessive work flexibility' or 'job precariousness' in *Le Monde*, *Le Soir* and *The Guardian*. Unions, community sources, politicians from left parties talk about 'precariousness' and 'lack of job security', other sources promote the notion of 'flexibility' and propose short time employment as a good dynamic solution. 'Flexibility' is readily used by employers. Clearly having a workforce at hand, which can be used at will is in their advantage.

Opinion articles also certainly play a big role in the construction of news frames, particularly in those officially 'neutral' newspapers, such as *The Age*, *The Australian* and *The Times*. Together with the letters published, opinion articles are the place in which comments are made openly.

Editorials in *The Australian* newspapers are all very critical of government and political action. This reinforces the positions made in general articles. Government and politicians generally are presented as self interested, uncaring and not capable of handling issues such as unemployment. The European newspapers analysed do not have the same quality of criticism in their opinion articles. They do not necessarily comment on government action, but tend to offer broader reflections on

society, on the economy. When they do comment on government action, they are able to welcome what they think the government has done well. The degree to which they do so is clearly dependent on how much each newspaper's own ideological attitude matches that of the government and its initiatives. The level of criticism in the English newspapers thus seems to reflect the attitude of each newspaper towards policies of state intervention as opposed to letting the market rule.

Conclusions

This study has pointed at the existence of different newspaper 'cultures'. They can be traced back to openly declared opinions or priorities held by individual newspapers. Commercial newspapers do not define themselves as opinion papers and, while when it comes to politics, they adhere to the concept of balancing sources, in reality they come up with very clear positions. *The Times* and *The Australian* are just as conservative as the openly conservative *Le Figaro*. Those newspapers, which all belong to big media corporations, defend the interests of corporations generally. In this sense the commercialisation of newspapers, which eliminates any opposing view on the world, is clearly a worrying trend

The existence of newspaper 'cultures' thus does not imply diversity of news. Differences are clearly within boundaries. There are clearly dominating frames. Within newspapers themselves there is very little discursive struggle. The only papers that allow for competing information are *Le Monde*, *The Guardian*, *The Age* and *Le Soir*. All those papers carry the most social information, presenting unemployment as also a social problem. In *Le Monde* and *The Guardian* this is due to the more social orientation of the paper. When it comes to *Le Soir* and *The Age*, one might wonder to what extent the more local focus of both newspapers does contribute to the social input. The study on environment in the press also showed that *The Age* and *Le Soir* displayed more interest for local environmental issues than the other papers analysed.

There is a difference in attitudes adopted by the press towards government. The Australian press distinguishes itself from the European press by its very cynical attitude towards politicians generally. While there is hardly any criticism of business, government is dismissed as an instrument capable of dealing with unemployment, managing the environment. The strong 'let the market sort it out' view held by these newspapers further points towards a dismissal of the state apparatus. But when it comes to issues like unemployment who else than the state has the capacity (providing of course there is a political will) to issues policies that might benefit whole of the population in the long term. Dismissing government like this is playing in the hands of big corporations. Solutions to debate are left in hands of big corporations. Particularly if unemployed are left out of debate and disfavoured cannot even have government to represent their interests.

Private citizen have no voice in the quality press. Any debate held is almost exclusively held by business (as business or newspapers themselves) and politicians. By the same token, responsibility for unemployment, for the environment is largely conferred to each individual. Private citizen are held responsible, but not given a chance to participate in any form of debate.

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New Information Technologies as "Innovations": The Case of Turkey

Abstract

This paper is organized around the critique of "expectations" and "indications" associated with new information and communication technologies (ICTs). The notions of "expectation" and "indication" reflect a divided attitude endemic in the theory and research on ICTs. The social impact (of ICTs) research focuses on new technologies as entities inherent in the structural properties of social systems while the so-called intercultural research locate ICTs as elements external to the social systems. The former approach loads the signifier of ICTs with expectations while the latter registers them as mere indicators of modernity. Through this division, communication theory fails to see the content of communication that the new technologies enable subjects of the non-Western countries. With reference to C. Wright Mills' "controversial" argument regarding the use of history, the paper concludes with the proposition that there is nothing "new" about the new technologies for countries like Turkey as they might very well be considered "novelties" for the advanced capitalist countries.

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New Information Technologies as "Innovations": The Case of Turkey

As the official rhetoric positions Turkey's future in the "information society," there are jokes about the fact that "we have actually passed it," with the resulting problem that "we don't really know where we are!" It is always hard to define *from the inside* where one actually is, that is, from within the given time/space intersection. One's perspective is always blurred by media representations and politicians' projections brazenly peppered with promises. Another contribution to this "blurring" is the models of theorists. In the sub-field of communication studies known as "new technologies," even the adjective "new" is prone to a basic logical challenge, for technology is, by definition, changing moment by moment. From a theoretical perspective, what remains unchanged is the ideological attributes given to "new technologies," which are defined by extra-technological parameters. For instance, a technology may be presented as the yardstick for modernization or the agent responsible for the advancement of democracy in an "already modernized" geography. The Internet may be conceived of as an indicator of development as well as a novelty loaded with expectations.

This paper is organized around the critique of *expectations* and *indications* associated with new information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as mobile phones and the Internet. Like many other intercultural phenomena, the diffusion and adoption of ICTs attracts the attention of a particular kind of scholar-in this case scholars of "intercultural communication" and "diffusion," who develop theories

accounting for the presence of objects and practices otherwise alien to a particular culture. Aside from the implications of being an intercultural phenomenon, the development of ICTs always induces fierce debates. The diffusion of ICTs in any given culture is regarded as a force capable of producing a "restructuring of the inherited social structure" (Shields and Samarajiva, 1993: 374). When discussed in these terms, ICTs are presented as elements external to the structural properties of social systems, in particular, of capitalism, and the analysis is usually inspired by a domination-emancipation matrix. That is to say, theoretical debates around the impact of new ICTs are articulated within an existing paradigm of social and economic domination-the questions asked are mostly nothing new to the critical scholar who focusses his or her intellectual energy on the emancipatory potential of social scientific knowledge. In this respect, debates around the social impact of ICTs raise issues relating to "institutional clusters of capitalism," "forces of distribution," "forces of consumption," and "forces of domination" (Shields and Samarajiva, 1993).

However, when it comes to the so-called "intercultural" impact of the ICTs, the discourse shifts from structural issues and the possibilities of human agency in the context of constrictions inherent in the social system, to the issues of development and modernization. "Expectations" and "indicators" enter here. My aim in this rather brief exploratory analysis is to compare and contrast the expectations symptomatic of these two different

research programs, and to offer a critique of the notion of "indication" endemic in the diffusion of innovations paradigm. This paradigm must be considered from a perspective inclusive of but not limited to that of Everett Rogers, its original advocate.

Without a doubt, most new technologies originate from advanced industrial countries and then "diffuse" into the rest of the world. In this regard, the issue is not the path or direction of the new technologies (ICTs), but the way in which their diffusion is theorized and the metatheoretical considerations acting as the basis for this theorization. The problem of the place and impact of ICTs in society, especially computers and computer-supported networks, has given rise to a specific field of study known as "social informatics." The Center for Social Informatics at Indiana University (Bloomington, Indiana) is one among a few formal institutions whose work is solely devoted to the study of information technologies and social change. The main page of the Center's website "<http://www-slis.lib.indiana.edu/CSI/>" addresses the viewer with a quote from Rob Kling, the founder of the Center:

I hope that important technologies such as computing can be sufficiently well understood by many social groups early on, so that important decisions about whether, when, and how to utilize computer-based systems will be more socially benign than would otherwise be the case.

In the Center's mission statement, social informatics (SI) is defined as

...the body of research and study that examines social aspects of computerization-including the roles of information technology in social and organizational change, the uses of information technologies in social contexts, and the ways that the social organization of information technologies is influenced by social forces and social practices.

It is clear from this definition that the emerging field of SI does not feel responsible for producing the knowledge of the circulation of these technologies and related practices, despite the much emphasized "barrier-free" nature of the new ICTs. Even a cursory glance at the working papers made available in the


aforementioned website seems to support this judgement. The following table shows the distribution of the topics of these working papers:

Topic	Number
Distance education/reflective learning	4
Information inequality	2
Visual representation	1
Library and ICTs	4
Liberty/emancipation	2
Scientific/organizational use of ICTs	7
Community networks and digital communities	4
Technology-specific issues	1
Total	25

As seen in the table, there is not a single item devoted to the intercultural aspect of the new ICTs. However, given the Center for Social Informatics' mission and goals, it would be a misjudgement to evaluate this distribution as a shortcoming on their part. The concern is a paradigmatic rather than an institutional one; we should concentrate on the shift that takes place in the concept of "social impact" when the social scientist defines his or her area of interest and the cultural milieu in which the knowledge of new ICTs is being produced. An example of how a different cultural setting produces a difference in questions relating to 'social impact' can be found in the book *Communication and Imperialism: The Political Economy of Telecommunications in Turkey* (Başaran, 2000).

The title and cover design of the book is suggestive of this difference. On the cover, the publisher has picked a Picasso painting, *Massacre in Korea* (1951) which depicts a group of women and children facing a firing squad in a composition based on Goya's "May 3 1808." Without overemphasising the importance of the cover design, it can still be argued that the choice of a painting reflecting an artist's response to an imperialistic war might at least provide us with a clue regarding the perception of the diffusion of ICTs in non-Western contexts. Başaran aptly formulates the

matter by looking into developmental communication literature at the very beginning of her research. As a result, two significant conclusions emerge from her analysis: First of all, new ICTs, especially technologies of telecommunications, are seen as "indicators" of development without much attention given to the content of the communication they enable. Secondly, the literature reflects an individualistic stance which is well aligned with the instrumental philosophy of West-oriented developmental communication research (Başaran, 2000: 25-34).



Pablo Picasso, Massacre in Korea (1951)

The omission of the content of telecommunications is extremely significant in the context of this critique. In many instances, the issues of development, modernization and Westernization are marked by reductionism and ethnocentrism. Let's call this defect the "Bureau of Applied Social Research Syndrome." As is well known, in the 1950s, Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research and MIT launched a joint research project on communication and development in the Middle East. The most well known product of this research is Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (1958). Mattelart and Mattelart's assesment that the model of development advocated in this work is by no means "innocent," concurs with the critique regarding the fissure between developmental/intercultural communication research

and what is generally called SI research on ICTs (39). A second very influential work in this vein is Everett Rogers' *Diffusion of Innovations*. This work defines "modernization" in terms of "new ideas" integrated into the existing social system through more modern production techniques and a sophisticated social organization. Criticisms of this approach have raised the issue of the power relations specific to the local cultures. Rogers' early work remains vulnerable to the accusation that it does not take into account (actually has no way of knowing) the local power networks which inevitably affect the integration of new ideas (see, for example, Beltran, 1976).

C. Wright Mills asserts that there cannot be trans-historical laws of social change. Generalizations that do not refer to a definite time and space intersection are nothing but nonsensical abstractions and confusing tautologies. In short, for Mills, there are as many principles of change as there are different types of social structures (166). Lerner's assertion that "no modern society functions efficiently without a system of mass media" (55), falls into this category of nonsensical abstraction and confusing tautology. "Efficient functioning" is a term defined within the context of "modern society" based on the Western model of modernity and the modern ideal of progress. It is possible to observe the same fallacy in the three generations of development and communication studies defined by Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979). The first generation of research includes Lerner (1958), Rogers (1962), Lucien Pye (1963), Wilbur Schramm (1964) and Lerner and Schramm (1967). These works all suffer from Mills' aforementioned criticism of the bias regarding development as an ahistorical category. When we look at the second generation of research, we basically see the same figures revising their perspectives. Rogers' *Communication and Development* (1976) and Lerner and Schramm's *Communication and Change* (1976) are two such examples. This group of works demonstrates at least some acknowledgement of ethnocentric bias in the earlier works. This group posits an opposition between national and Western cultures and put the emphasis on domination created by Western

cultural codes. The third generation is defined by Nordenstreng and Schiller as "radical economists" who can be located within the "world system" paradigm developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Neither Marxist arguments nor the point of view of the first two generations of scholars gives sufficient equivalence to non-Western knowledge or theory. It is my contention that the same judgement holds true when we consider ICT-related research and the split, which I will go on to discuss, between "expectations" and "indications."

In the above argument, the choice of C. W. Mills, who wrote of "confusing tautologies" and "nonsensical abstractions" in 1959, is not a coincidence. Mills' voice resonates today as an archaic warning from a time when globalization was only in few people's imagination. Three decades after the Second World War have been the years when "academic craftsmanship"-to use Mills' phrase-was a secure business under the auspices of modernization theory. In Appadurai's terms, "that was a period when there was a more secure sense of the social in the relationship between theory, method and scholarly location. Theory and method were seen as naturally metropolitan, modern, and Western." Within the confines of modernization theory, the ground breaking Marxist work on the world system, which inspired the third generation of international communication studies, "had no special interest in problems of voice, perspective or location in the study of global capitalism." (Appadurai, 2000: 4).

Perhaps it is time to test one of Mills' arguments on the uses of history, which, in his words, is "more controversial" than others, "but if it is true, it is of considerable importance" (172). To my knowledge, the "controversial" argument summarized in the following quote has not been seriously challenged yet:

the relevance of history ... is itself subject to the principle of historical specificity ... Sometimes there are quite new things in the world, which is to say that 'history' does and 'history' does not 'repeat itself'; it depends upon the social structure and upon the period with whose history we are concerned. (173)

If this argument is true, then we are expected to employ different historiographies (different conceptions of temporality and different conceptions regarding a society's response to novelties) in the analysis of different societies, even if they were inextricably linked up by the single grip of the world system or "globalization." To be more concrete, history might mean one thing for Turkey and another for the United States or Australia. Is this not to say the same thing as Appadurai when he asserts that "globalization ... produces problems that manifest themselves in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local"? (6) Paradoxically enough, such an argument may very well push us to consider mobile phones or the Internet as local and historical phenomena while they certainly are 'novelties' or 'innovations' for the cultures who actually invent, produce, and distribute them. The path that takes us to the modern is by no means the historical succession of events that has shaped the contemporary Western metropolis; yet this old story still seems to shape the unconscious of scholars who did not grow up in North America or Western Europe. The imagination that calls us to arms today requires historicization of innovations or novelties in regional/local contexts. Only then can we assign meaning to statistics on the uses of ICTs in different cultural contexts which, do not seem to make sense on their own. It should always be remembered that the new ICTs move along the corridors of the global state-capital nexus but are consumed and, more importantly, used in the streets, homes, and offices of the local subjects. In this respect, figures describing the frequency of use of the so-called "innovations", such as the Internet or mobile phones, would bear an alternative significance in different pictures or imaginations of the globalized world. The new picture of the globalized world, of course, is yet to be created by those who believe that there can be, and actually are, global flows other than the ones contrived by the state-capital nexus.

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Turkish Televisual Landscape and Domestic TV Fiction

Abstract

In the new multi-channel television environment which still appears as an unsettled landscape, issues of increasing domestic contents always became a crucial consideration. In Turkey, beginning with the first quarter of the 1990's, commercial television has drastically increased the need for television programs like else where in Europe. During the years, what comes out clearly, however, is Turkish television is able to offer a large number of domestic television programs, especially domestic television fiction. Today, in contrast to the case with many European countries, television fiction is overwhelmingly Turkish in Turkey. In fact, foreign penetration had never been a serious threat for the Turkish television market. However, it must be added that a large offer of domestic programme neither always indicates a diversity of content nor a creative industry. In this context, this paper will summarise the findings of a research that focuses on productive activity and capacity of Turkish broadcasters regarding domestic television fiction. The study also seeks to come to a general understanding of recent developments and new trends in Turkish televisual landscape.

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The Turkish mediascape has experienced unexpected and rapid changes in the last decade. The roots of these developments can be traced back to the mid-1980s, a time when European audio-visual policies were transformed as a result of trends towards deregulation. Deregulation processes in Europe have considerably affected the television industry in Turkey and encouraged commercial television channels.

Until 1990, there were only four state-controlled channels of TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation). *Interstar* TV, the first privately owned channel in Turkey, ended TRT's monopoly by attempting satellite broadcasting in May 1990. One consequence of this audacious act was the subsequent establishment of 15 commercial TV channels. Within a decade, two international and four national TRT channels, as well as 15 private channels, had started broadcasting. Broadcasting Act No. 3984 was the unavoidable response to these developments, and it finally allowed commercial channels in 1993.

Today in Turkey, the 15 commercial channels and TRT1 broadcast approximately 140,000 hours per year. It is a remarkable fact that in spite of this high volume nearly all television programs in prime time are domestic productions. Imported programs like cartoons or serials, for which the target audiences are mostly children and housewives, are broadcast only in the daytime or the very early morning.

The Origin of Fiction Programs

The new multi-channel television industry has drastically increased the need for television programs. When deregulation began, a large amount of imported programs, such as serials, films and documentaries, filled commercial television schedules. At that time, the TV fiction on offer was inevitably of foreign origin, coming mostly from the United States, Brazil, or Mexico.

As time passed, the commercial channels became established institutions and their volume of Turkish programs increased. Research on viewing preferences had shown that Turkish audiences were far more interested in domestic productions -such as domestic TV fiction, entertainment programs, and studio discussions- than in imports. In fact, this observation wasn't at all new.

In the days of TRT's monopoly, television fiction became one of the most favourite offerings on Turkish television. While in the late seventies and the first half of the eighties, TRT programmed in prime time several high-profile fiction imports, such as *Dallas*, *Space 1999* and *Dynasty*, this policy changed after 1985. Increasing the share of domestic TV fiction in its schedule became a basic objective of TRT. Since the late eighties, TRT has both increased the in-house production of TV fiction and has encouraged independent companies to produce fiction. Although most of these fiction programs were at first inspired

by, or adopted from, great examples of Turkish literature, original TV fiction soon started to emerge. The popularity of domestic TV fiction meant that these programs were always given priority, especially in prime time.

Learning from TRT's experience, the commercial channels realised the importance of domestic TV fiction even before they started broadcasting, and tried to increase the time allocated to it from the outset, mostly commissioning their programs from independent production companies. The newly established TV channels have shown a general tendency to leave program development to independent production companies and act only as publisher-broadcasters because of their inexperience in various aspects of television programming. In the first years at least, their competence was mainly limited to the technical side of broadcasting. Buying independent products has also given them an opportunity to decrease production costs and increase their program choices. As a result, the number of independent production companies in Turkey has increased annually, and they have gained considerable experience. These companies produce game shows, musical entertainment programming, talk shows, and studio discussion programs. By the end of 1999, there were around 50 drama production companies in Istanbul alone.

Domestic TV fiction has strongly caught the viewers' attention and has played an important role in meeting the program requirements of major broadcasters. In 1998, the major commercial TV stations broadcast 30-35 different first-run domestic TV fiction programs every week, almost all of which were made by independent production companies. Today, in addition to TRT1, five out of the 15 commercial channels (ATV, Star TV, Kanal D, Show TV, and TGRT) regularly broadcast TV fiction. According to figures derived from the reports of AGB-Istanbul, these channels broadcast 4,655 hours of domestic and foreign TV fiction in 1996, 4,090 hours in 1997, and approximately 4,000 hours in 1998. A closer look at the

schedules shows that, each year, nearly 45% of this total has been allocated to domestic TV fiction. Moreover, almost all TV fiction broadcast in prime time is domestic. TV fiction imported from foreign countries is broadcast during the day, and today it mostly comes from the United States.

Domestic TV Fiction

In comparison with many other European countries, Turkish TV fiction has succeeded in shielding Turkish screens from the hegemony of both US programs and Latin American telenovelas, especially in prime time. In effect, foreign penetration had never been a serious threat for the Turkish television market. Even though imported fiction programs have always been cheaper than domestic ones, commercial channels have responded to consumer preferences and tried to help develop a domestic fiction industry.

Nevertheless, in the fourth quarter of 1998, the first signs of a crisis in TV fiction emerged, and this became a real crisis in 1999. Beginning in the last months of 1998, top-rated first-run fiction programs started to be affected by a general economic crisis. As the crisis deepened, network advertising revenues decreased due to companies in several sectors slashing their advertising budgets. As a result, networks could no longer afford the high costs demanded by the independent companies for first-run TV programs, especially fiction. As a consequence of giving priority to popular and high-priced TV stars in leading roles, fiction programs had become the most expensive programming option. Negotiations among major networks resulted in a kind of gentlemen's agreement: The networks' marketing companies -*Prime Media*, *Bimaş*, *Mepaş* and *Medpa*- agreed to apply a single tariff scale for their commercial slots which up until then had been priced individually. The agreement also meant that they would be able to act as a single and powerful body against independent production companies

and pay more or less equal, and lowered, prices for programs. A second decision was of prime importance for the future of domestic fiction. The networks started to substitute this expensive genre, especially in prime time, with relatively cheaper productions such as game and celebrity shows. As a result, even some of the most popular fiction programs, such as *İkinci Bahar*, disappeared at the end of the first quarter of 1999.

Of the four major commercial networks, *ATV* has had a more or less stable prime-time schedule because it has generally given preference to quality serials featuring stage actors rather than TV or movie stars who are paid astronomical sums. Additionally, as the owner of one of the biggest private production companies in the Turkish television industry (*Ulusal TV*), *ATV* was able to keep the costs of fiction production at a lower level. However, *İkinci Bahar*, starring famous movie stars *Türkan Şoray* and *Şener Şen*, is an exception to *ATV*'s fiction policy.

Star TV substituted first-run fiction in prime-time slots with re-runs of domestic fiction programs, and *Show TV* allocated most of its airtime to repeats of old Turkish comedies and celebrity shows. *Kanal D* started to substitute a high-rated prime-time game show called *fiuse* studio productions or program re-runs. Not surprisingly, the independent production companies have had severe problems adapting to this new situation.

This chaotic situation continued until September 1999. During this period, even the prime-time line-up of the major networks mainly consisted of fiction re-runs and variety and game shows. However, no significant change took place in daytime and late-night programming, which continued to consist basically of a range of shows for women, cartoons, and topical studio discussions. First-run domestic fiction only reappeared in the last months of 1999. These problems may appear as an inevitable result of an immature industry's fluctuations, but the companies producing fiction had been

managed fairly competently and professionally. Rather, the problems experienced by the television industry were caused by the upswing in inflation and the deepening economic crisis, not inefficiencies in the industry per se.

Successes and Failures

If we exclude the financial problems experienced by the industry in the last months of 1998, it is evident that Turkish television is able to offer a large number of domestic TV fiction programs. Compared to many other European countries, domestic fiction programs play a crucial role in Turkey. This can be seen from the Turkish top 100 list of the most watched programs. In the first quarter of 1998, four out of the first 10 programs and 28 of the top 100 were domestic fiction broadcasts. Foreign series were nearly absent from this list: The two that were on the list were in very low positions-*Police Academy* at number 86 and *Sinbad* at 91. The other leading programs were game and variety shows, and sports events like football championships and world cups.

Interestingly, the most popular movies on Turkish television are also domestic productions. Only five foreign movies, including Hollywood productions, are among the top 50 TV programs, and 12 more are even lower ranked. Even re-runs of old works of Turkish cinema seem to attract larger audiences than Hollywood movies-in all, 30 Turkish movies were among this top 100 list of the first quarter of 1998. Turkish television screens seem to be more in need of rescue from the hegemony of Turkish TV fiction and movies than of foreign imports.

However, it must be borne in mind that success in quantitative terms is not necessarily linked to qualitative aspects. A large offering of domestic TV fiction as such indicates neither a diversity of content nor a creative industry. In Turkey, it is more the result of product diversification and the production of re-combinations of highly successful fiction programs, driven by commercial imperatives.

Fiction Program Content

The stories told in domestic TV fictions essentially employ three models of relations among leading characters and lifestyles:

Lower or middle class communities acting in solidarity with their neighbourhood. This type of domestic fiction includes family comedies as well as open-ended serials.

Conflicting relations of people who, economically, belong to upper classes. It is quite common for people of upper classes to be represented as being involved in various struggles concerning power, money, love affairs etc.

Famous characters who are mostly popular stars, business people or important politicians involved in drug trafficking, mafia relations, corruption and cheating. These topics are a speciality of crime and action series.

Some fiction programs that feature a famous singer in the leading role can be considered a subgroup of domestic TV fiction. They are generally closed series that last one broadcast season, and are usually inspired by a popular song that is developed into a series resembling a long music video; e.g. *Yıkılmadım*.

In general, it is quite obvious that the social relations of traditional communities are prominent in the narratives of Turkish TV fiction. However, the priority given to the representation of these relations does not mean that these stories are preferred by TV programmers because they reflect a culture closer to a Turkish way of life. Rather, they are preferred because they represent diverse identities that enable a fiction program to draw a larger audience. Different occupations are likely to be represented in the depiction of a community; for example, teacher, postman, housekeeper, grocer, repairman, and so on, as are people at different educational levels or in different age groups. In short, this tendency has economic roots- by accumulating audiences, the television companies can raise

their profits. One limitation to this, however, is that almost all domestic fiction represents an İstanbul-based lifestyle. If we take into account that the fiction production industry is based in İstanbul, this is hardly surprising.

In contrast to television, cinematic filmmaking in Turkey is completely overshadowed by American movies. The biggest part of the problem is distribution and exhibition: Turkish movies have difficulty finding a movie theatre for their screening. However, it cannot be argued that this American hegemony in the cinema counter-balances the hegemony of Turkish fiction on TV. Rather, both areas address a completely different audience and must therefore be seen as totally independent of the other. While the audience of TV fiction mostly consists of housewives and middle-aged people, cinematic audiences in Turkey are primarily from younger age groups. Nonetheless, television does have the general effect of decreasing the number of moviegoers. Already in the 1970s, the disappearance of family theatres, as well as down-town cinemas, was attributed to television.

The Future of the Television Industry

Commercial television in Turkey is a young but fast developing industry, notably changing from one year to another. However, it is obvious that the concepts of "free competition" and "private enterprise" in television have not led automatically to product diversity in television programming in the manner claimed by the owners of private channels. This is particularly evident in the similarities in the content of television fiction. Even though TV fiction has done much more than simply survive in this very open television environment, its future is still unpredictable.

Among the new trends in domestic TV fiction, "sponsorship" is emerging as a new method of financing, particularly following the industry's economic crisis. New

developments such as the previously mentioned gentlemen's agreement forced the independent production companies to cover their expenditures with sponsorship instead of being paid in advance by broadcasters. Currently, most domestic TV fiction is being produced with the support of sponsor companies from sectors such as textiles, automobiles, banking and food. Nearly all fiction programs have sponsors whose number can range from 10 to 40 for each episode. As a consequence, TV channels are no longer expected to pay for fiction. Unless there is an awareness of the importance of further diversification regarding both the stories and target audiences of fiction programs, there is no guarantee that the savings made by Turkish broadcasters will be utilised to promote a higher quality in fiction production.

Methodology Issues: Problems in Published Empirical Research in Turkey

Abstract

This article, mainly using the positivist-empiricist theoretical framework, is an assessment of the present state of empirical research design and statistical analysis in Turkey. The main objective of the study is to illuminate the problem areas in applied and/or administrative social research and prompt concerned parties to design research in order to determine the extent of the problem and provide proper suggestions for plausible solutions. Examination of published empirical research indicates that there are widespread design and statistical usage problems, stemming from the lack of knowledge, expertise, ethic and rigor (from the standpoint of the mainstream theory), and rooted in dominant mode and relations of academic life (from the perspective of Marxist oriented critical schools in general).

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Methodology Issues: Problems in Published Empirical Research in Turkey

¹ The article has some critical evaluations based on Marxist approach throughout and especially at the end of the article. Otherwise, the main theoretical framework of the article is based on the mainstream empirical approach.

Introduction

Academic life, including production mode and relations of academic and social life in Turkey are full of problems waiting for pertinent solutions. Academicians in their studies, master and doctorate students in their theses, and private research firms doing public opinion and/or marketing research for their clients in Turkey increasingly use empirical research methods and statistics. This article focuses on grave errors made in empirical research designs and statistical analyses in Turkey. The objective is to explore the problem areas in applied and/or administrative social research and hopefully motivate concerned parties to design research in order to determine the extent of the problem and put forward necessary suggestions for the corrective measures. The article uses positivist-empiricist theoretical framework,¹ thus doesn't critically evaluate the epistemological foundations of positivist-empiricism, rather concentrate on the problems of the design and usage.

I didn't turn to any popular authority (neither god nor any famous professional academician) in order to seek support for my evaluation, because I have no identity problem; I am not in need of proving my academic knowledge and intellectual ability via doings and sayings of "advanced and better others." That's why the quality, validity and worth of this article shouldn't be judged according to how extensively words of acknowledged authorities are used in the article. It is time to

recognize our own worth and stop searching for our own selves in somewhere else (being deprived of own history), in those who control our material and intellectual resources (being deprived of self determination).²

Published research including books, journals, dissertations and reports are used for the evaluation. This article can be considered as a pilot or opening study urging concerned academicians to design and conduct specifically pointed and detailed ones.³

The order of presentation pursued the general steps of survey research design: Problems with problem formulation were analyzed, followed by theoretical framework, related studies, research questions and/or hypotheses, research method and findings. Each stage of design was analyzed for errors, inconsistencies and misuses.

Problem Formulation

Scientific investigation begins with asking questions leading to learn, explain, predict, experiment, observe and consequently advance the limits of the accumulated knowledge up to date. The selection and the formulation of research problem effect all subsequent research activities, because it is the starting point of a specific inquiry. A scientific research begins with an introduction that principally includes problem

² Herein I am not refusing the necessity of knowing of others and of accumulated knowledge; I am refusing slavish dependency on the authority for a presentation. It is worst when it reflects the fallacy of research or part of intellectual fallacy. When intersubjectivity reigns, the science suffers.

³ I am not revealing the sources of articles analyzed and examples taken from, since I don't believe that the prime responsible party is the individual per se, but educational and editorship and referee systems.

4
Problem formulation means also selecting an issue to study. Namely it is not limited with only a problem.

5
To make money, to collect points for academic advancement or to solve corporate problem are not valid goals for scientific research.

formulation, statement of objective and importance of the research. Problem formulation is supposed to provide empirically testable and feasible questions. Followings are main problems found in problem formulation:⁴

a. It is hard to find proper problem formulations in any research. There are only statements of some ideas and facts, but no conclusive arguments leading to problem (or issue) identification and setting up goals and importance of the research.

b. A properly titled research is extremely hard to find. The most titles are like book titles. For instance, titles like sustainable Tourism and Turkey; Democracy and Media; Sport and Media; Internet and Democracy; Olympics and Tourism; What is Rural Tourism?; Terrorism and Tourism are like book titles. Some articles don't provide the basic information about the research. Some others don't reflect the right content of the article.

c. One can't use concepts like Turkey, Turkish people, Turkish corporations, British tourists, Hotels in Turkey and Turkish media in a title, unless it is a parametric study covering Turkey, Turkish people, Turkish corporations, British tourists, Turkish hotels and Turkish media. If the title has the word "Media" and radio is not included in the content, then there should be a convincing rationale for omitting the radio.

d. Objectives of the research are mostly misstated or confused with research procedures. In some studies, there is no relation between the presented objective and the content of the research. Researchers should understand that statements of "what to do" don't constitute the objective of the research. The objective requires a convincing answer to the following question: Why do you do?, What do you want to?⁵ For instance, stating that "the objective of this report is to device a comprehensive and detailed map of media in Turkey" indicates only what is going to be done, doesn't show the objective of the

research. The objective is to state why you want to device the map.

e. Some stated objectives represent deliberate lies or unconscious falsehoods. Most public opinion research purportedly tied with public policies done by public authority or private interest state unrealizable false objectives with ulterior motives. For instance, a statement like "the goal of the research is that findings will be used for the determination of policies in information technologies in Turkey" is surreptitious, if not, unsubstantiated assertion. Because public opinion research findings on technology is hardly ever used for the determination of public policy, instead used for policy justification. *Committee on Atomic and Nuclear Energy*, hiding its identity, designs a survey research with leading and ideologically loaded questions aiming at mind management through questions with pseudo-informative explanations in the questionnaire. It states its objective as learning from concerned people and in return arming them with right information on nuclear energy. This is outright and inconspicuous chicanery. In short, such survey research serves as mind management tool for the interest of industrial and state structures.

f. Importance of the research is very rarely stated in studies. If stated, it is misdirected and tied with the success of, for instance, tourism industry, a firm, an institution or an organization; thus, academic importance is ignored, brushed aside or misunderstood. It is misunderstood in the sense that the so-called academic article has specific importance and serves a well-known purpose: it is a tool for bureaucratic advancement, because writer collects point for promotion, for instance, from assistant Professor to associate professor position. This is the dominant importance and unstated goal of article. There are very few empirical articles written by full professors in academic journals in Turkey. The basic reason is obvious: They are at the top of the bureaucratic ladder and nobody asks them to produce anything academically.

g. Statement of importance of a study is very important because the ultimate objective of the problem formulation is to explain and predict social phenomena not simply for pure academic activity, but for understanding the social issues in order to contribute to the solution. Namely, research problems should have social (economic, political, and cultural) relevance. It seems that researchers either have no idea about the social (and ideological) relevance of their study or perfectly aware of the relevance that is to serve the interest of a firm, a specific group or an institution.

h. Derivation of the research problems, which is one of the most necessary requirements of scientific inquiry, is simply nonexistent. Thus, such research seriously lacks academic rigor and scientific character.

i. It is unlikely to find any research that integrates the materials used and opinions presented in the introduction and, consequently, formulates the problems to be studied appropriately.

j. Related studies are integral part of a scientific research, however either not used or erroneously used. The related studies are supposed to function as means of problem formulation, objective setting and statement of the importance. A research using related studies in an appropriate and correct way is simply nonexistent. Related studies, if used, like in master and doctorate theses, wrongly used, because it means nothing merely to line up series of studies, their findings and/or theoretical statements in the area of interest.

k. Descriptive presentation (or promotion) of a measurement or data collecting tool or procedure (e.g., ISO 9000, GIS, Communications Auditing, Critical Incidents Technique) disguised as research article can not have a scientific value. Designing a study in order to demonstrate "critical incident technique" or to show how to conduct "a communication auditing in an organization" is not scientific endeavor at all.

l. Model building is a serious undertaking that requires deep knowledge on theory and research. One can't build a model by simply drawing a flow-chart and explaining the components of it.

m. Use of a model in a scientific research ultimately means test of the model, not sale-promotion of it via description and qualitative evaluation. For instance, a study "increasing the service quality by using work character model" should focus on not the conceptual definitions and descriptions, but on testing the model via experimental design or longitudinal observations.

n. One of the gravest design problems is to prepare some questions, collect the data and do some correlations, then try to come up with some findings. Trying to make sense out of some primary and secondary data is not the proper way of scientific design and inquiry.

Theoretical Framework

A research issue or problem in a scientific investigation should have theoretical significance. It should be connected to a set of interrelated empirical generalizations (a theory); otherwise it is not theoretically significant and becomes atheoretical and scientifically insignificant.

A statement of theoretical framework is customarily not expected when an administrative or applied social research is designed. However it is necessary to provide a theoretical rationale when doing an empirical research for academic purpose. Basic problems with theoretical framework are as follows:

a. Theoretical framework is missing in almost every study, with the exception of some academic studies and theses.

b. Theoretical framework in empirical academic studies and theses is confused with conceptual definition. A concept is placed within a theoretical framework when it is conceptually

defined in a specific way. Conceptual definition is required in order to provide a theoretical framework of a concept so that an operational definition can be formulated for observation. Namely, a concept should be first theoretically, then operationally defined. A concept should be transformed into a measurable variable by operational definition. Otherwise, a measurement (observation) is not possible; thus an empirical testing or observation can not be validly and reliably realized. Theoretical framework and operational definition require adequate knowledge and expertise that can hardly ever be found in applied and scientific research in Turkey.

c. Unfortunately most researchers have no or little idea about the theoretical structure of a research. For instance, it is wrong to state that "theoretical framework of the study is determined through the gathered information and findings. Then, a field research based on this theoretical framework was devised."

d. Statement of any theoretical rationale seems unnecessary in marketing oriented public opinion studies, because of the nature and objective of the research. However researcher is supposed to be aware of the importance of a theoretical basis, even if it looks completely needless or dispensable.

e. Integration of theoretical framework with the extraction of research questions and with the evaluation of findings can't be found in any research at all.

Derivation and Statement of Hypothesis or Research Questions

A research question or a hypothesis doesn't come out of thin air. It can not be simply stated and ready to investigate. There should be a rationale for each research question or hypothesis. A researcher should know that hypotheses or research questions are testable statements derived from a theoretical reasoning. Primary problems in research in this respect include followings:

a. Some studies have no research questions or hypothesis what so ever. Some just state the research questions or hypotheses without any rationale. Some others state them in method or findings section of the study. There can be found no derivation of and no discussion leading to a hypothesis or research question in any study at all.

b. Multi factor relations is presented in some studies, but bivariate analysis is done. Besides, number of variables/factors doesn't make a study multivariate design, but nature of the design and statistical analysis.

c. Wrong or baseless causal relationships are established in some designs, because of the lack of theoretical reasoning. For example, it takes an urban prejudice mind to establish causality between environmental sensitivity and readership of environmental magazine by rural and urban dwellers, because the result is obvious (urban people will be more environmentally sensitive because they read the magazine). One can not infer environmental sensitivity via readership of a magazine, because people can be environmentally sensitive, but can not have any access to the magazine, can not afford it, can not have time for it, can not see it as necessary to read in rural areas. Namely, the readership of environmental magazine doesn't make a group environmentalist. Similarly, it is ridiculous to assume causality between existence of marketing department in a firm and selection of marketing channel, and between owning or renting a business building and selection of marketing channels. Likewise, it needs a convincing rationale in order to hypothesize that there is a positive causal relationship between work performance (as independent variable) and work attachment (as dependent variable).

Method

Method section of empirical research supposed to provide detailed information on modus operandi of a study. This is the

section wherein the researcher explains how to do the research in order to collect reliable and valid data for hypotheses or research questions. Main problems are as follows:

a. Method section of some studies includes unnecessary conceptual definitions. Some of such definitions, using different theoretical approaches, provide detailed and conflicting accounts of the concept, but never reaching to a synthesis.

b. Definition of a concept requires a proper statement of defining characteristics of the word. Concepts are defined at two levels of abstraction: theoretical and observational. Definitions at the theoretical level are named conceptual definitions that define concepts by means of other abstract concepts. Definitions at the observational level are operational definitions that make a theoretical concept observable. A concept can not be measured unless it is operationally defined. Unfortunately it is hard to find any study with proper theoretical and operational definitions. Some uses are wrong because of the lack of theoretical definition of a term. For instance, a study finds an increase in the number of the newspapers in Turkey, relates the reason of the increase with the fact that newspapers engage in consumer goods promotion and sale by using coupons. Then, it concludes that newspapers are transformed into tools for consumption of various consumer products. There are at least two interrelated mistakes: (1) Underlying concept of communication via newspapers is wrong, because newspaper communication is not limited with the symbolic interaction through the written words (news, sport, editorial etc.). It also includes interaction through the written words orienting readers to commodity, setting the conditions of, starting and completing exchange of goods. (2) The conclusion is wrong because the causal relationship established between commodity promotion and "transformation to the tools of consumption" is not correct. Commodity sale or promotion doesn't make newspapers tools

of consumption, but a commercial enterprise selling and promoting symbolic and material forms that leads to consumption. It means newspapers are still tools of communication, because communication is necessary condition of social interaction of any kind.⁶

c. Concepts are carelessly and wrongly used, thus factors and items are not understood right. For instance "physical and cultural travel motivations of tourists" are equated with various reasons for travel. This is wrong because motivations are not reasons of travel, but psychological drives underlying those reasons. Another study indicates that there are 10 thousand radio receivers in Turkey as compared to 20.5 thousand TV receivers. Based on this finding, it is concluded that radio is not a widespread communication tool as much as television. The statistics and, thus conclusion is wrong, basically because "the radio receivers" is not operationally defined right. People don't listen to the radio only at home, but at work, outside, on the street, on the way to and from work, especially in their cars. It means there radio sets ownership outside the home. Thus it is wrong to limit the radio receivers with the ones at home. Furthermore, there is another mistake made by equating media use with the ownership of a medium. Ownership should not be confused with the extent of use. In another study, property relations are confused with the ownership. The study orients the reader to a table indicating that it is a map of property relations. Table shows the distribution of ownership of firms by corporations (who own what). Property relations include pattern and structure of ownership, but are not merely ownership. The mistake made is because of the lack of theoretical knowledge or rigor.

d. Unit terms, character terms, relational terms and constructs should be operationally defined. Almost none of the studies provide operational definitions for the variables to be measured. That's why there are a lot of mismatches, problems of scaling and measurement errors. For instance, "media access"

⁶ Newspaper is also means of consumption in the sense that it is a commodity sold and bought for use. It has a use and exchange value.

is not defined, but reader sees that it refers to number of the radio and TV receivers. Then media access is correlated (without any statistical test) with "information rich" and information poor". Herein, there is no theoretical framework, no proper theoretical definition of media access and audience (Information rich and information poor), no operational definition and no statistical test. One cannot become information rich or information poor because of the extent of media access defined as use of the finished media product. Quantitative abundance of media products may indeed mean profusion of junk, thus "information poor" may indeed mean "junk poor." That's why, access should be tied with the means and modes of media production. In another study, two subtitles (access and use) are given, but both are defined as the number of users: Access is equated with the frequency distribution of Internet use in six geographical regions in the globe. Researchers should know that access and use are interrelated but separate terms.

e. A concept is not a variable. A variable is not necessarily "something that changes."

f. There should be only one operational definition for a variable. For instance, in one study, two criteria for operational definition of a variable are given as instruction to the interviewer: Occupation is defined as field of education and personal ability. This is a grave mistake, because two different definition of a variable, even if correct, requires two different measurement and evaluation. Besides a concept is not supposed to be operationally defined for the interviewer and the stage of conducting a survey.

g. Two or more concepts cannot be combined into one variable and operationally defined. For instance, "physical and mental relaxation" can not be measured as one single variable, because a single operational definition can not be provided. It can be defined either as relaxation and relaxation is grouped under physical and mental etc. or it is treated as two variables and defined and measured separately.

h. Another measurement problem is that some researchers have no, little or wrong idea about levels of measurement. That's why measurement design lacks consistency, reliability and validity.

i. Type of research is generally not stated, misstated or stated with no explanation. It is not enough to write down that, for example, it is a field research. Type of research should be stated and a brief discussion should be given explaining why this type of research is preferred among others.

j. Difference between and importance of parametric and non-parametric study and relation among population, sampling frame and sample are not clearly known. Knowledge about sample size is inadequate and generally wrong. For instance, a study indicates that there are 92 five star hotels and % 84.7 questionnaire sent to them is filled and returned. The researcher is concerned with the problem of representativeness, because of the % 84.7 return. He/she is not supposed to be concerned, because he/she is not using sampling, he/she is using the population.

k. Studies talk about "universe" and indicate that they extracted sample from this universe. Concept of universe is misunderstood. You can't extract your research sample from the universe and can't make generalizations to an undefined and unidentified universe. Population is theoretical definition of a universe. Generalizations of findings are only made for this defined population in a parametric study, because sample is extracted from a sample frame that is the accessible population tied with the theoretical one.

l. Sometimes type of study is named, but there is no such research type in the literature. For instance, "collecting data via questionnaire" is stated as research type. Some researchers invent a research type called "conceptual study." In fact, their study is a kind of extremely primitive theoretical research. Furthermore, the study is not the type that is stated, but

something else. For instance, a study titled "a conceptual study on increase in service quality" implies that some kind of conceptual, thus theoretical discussion will be provided concerning the service quality. However this study is nothing more than a descriptive publicity promotion of a model for effective management.

m. Another problem of measurement is designing a question that doesn't measure what it is supposed to measure: e.g., "How well do you know a foreign language?" How can you distinguish one person's language level from the other by basing your judgement on such self-reported value question? Or how can you measure level of proficiency in English by asking people to rate themselves on an ordinal scale? It is wrong to ask students to evaluate the advancement opportunities or salaries in a sector or evaluate the curriculum in a school, because the students are not the right source of information.

n. Data collection procedures are generally stated, but either simply named or full of mistakes. It is not enough to state that it is a content analysis or discourse analysis. Some studies indicate the method of data collection method, but they completely lack a systematic analysis, because method is merely mentioned but not properly and expertly used.

o. Generally wrong sources for data collection are identified and used. For instance, the objective of study is stated as "to find number and extent of cellular phones used", and sample of phone users are used for the collection of data. In another study, objective was to determine the number of cars in use in İstanbul and data source was sample of population of some 2000 people. You can't make right estimation by using sample of phone users or İstanbul dwellers, because right source of data is somewhere else. It is preposterous, if not intentionally done, to ask municipal administrators if their solid waste landfill causes foul smell and annoys surrounding communities. Asking wrong people right question provides us only with invalid data: Does asking British tour operators "Why

do British tourists prefer Turkey?" give us a reliable and valid data? Absolutely not, unless we want to know projections of tour operators for some reason.

p. Problems with questionnaire design are multifold. The most grave one is to translate the survey research questions and scales developed in the United States or elsewhere and use them. Currently the most popular one is the value analysis.

q. Questionnaire development is not done properly. One can't simply prepare some questions and conduct a survey. But you can in Turkey.

r. Questionnaire design is packed with double, even triple barreled questions. Some examples: Did your child attend primary, secondary or high school in private school? Yes or No. Did you plan and/or implement a study that requires funding? Yes or No. "Physical and mental relaxation", "interest in art-music-architecture and folklore" and "entertainment-excitement," are treated as three variables measured with a likert type ordinal scale. In fact, these are double and triple barreled questions, thus completely wrong.

s. Rules of nominal and ordinal category formation are broken in questionnaire design:

1. Mutually exclusiveness rule is not complied with. For example, categories of a close-ended question include "social scientist, faculty teaching staff and architect". My wife is natural scientist, social scientist, architect and at the same time faculty teaching staff. Forced choices in another study include 1. At home, 2. Out side, 3. Restaurant, Another one: 100 – 150, 150 – 200, 200 – 250 etc. These are all wrong.

2. Exhaustiveness rule necessary for collecting reliable and valid information is generally not followed. Instead predetermined categories or choices that fit the objective of the researcher are stated. This is common problem in questions forcing respondents to choose among given

selections. Adding "other" choice is not always a proper solution, since the given choices influence people.

3. Inconsistent, irrational and/or unrelated categorization is provided: For instance, "What kind of work do you do at present?" (Work is defined as activity that brings income). Some of the forced selections are student, housewife, retired and unemployed.

4. Too many categories are provided. For instance, 22 categories of occupation and 21 categories of income are too many to handle. How can you do a univariate and bivariate analysis using too many categories? You technically can, but can not do meaningful evaluation.

5. Unnecessary and/or groundless categorization of interval measurement are provided. For instance, age is grouped under 5 category: 25 and less, 26-30, 31-35 etc. Questions like "What makes the difference between 30 and 31 years old? Why five category but not six?" can not be answered in such categorization. There must be a convincing rationale for the group intervals.

6. Some categories in some studies are ideologically loaded or deliberately designed, thus subjective and leading.

7. Some studies use wrong criteria for grouping: Small size business (grocery owner) medium sized businessmen (max 10 workers); large sized business (more than 10). My brother in law employs 13 workers in his sweatshop and KOÇ Holding employs tens of thousands of people. Are they both large sized businesses? Can you put them under same group?

8. Ordinal scales are not properly designed or balanced: For example, 1. Good, 2. Medium, 3. Bad, 4. Very Bad; 1. Not satisfied at all, 2. Not satisfied much, 3. Partly satisfied 4. Satisfied very much; 1. Not agree 2. Generally agree, 3. Totally agree. None of the scales above is right.

9. Inconsistency between question and categories are abundant in studies. For example, "Do you watch TV everyday of the week? 1. Every day; 2. 5-6 nights; 3. 3-4 nights, 4. 1-2 nights; 5. seldom; 6. Other. The researcher is not aware of the fact that the measurement unit is "days of the week". Thus, "seldom" is not appropriate. "Other" can not be used, because there is no other probability left. Besides, the question is not properly designed.

t. Some studies have ideological overloaded questions. For example, "do your students gain sufficient practical skills when graduated? Yes/No. (School provides liberal art education; it is not a job training school or a community college)

u. Statements about statistical analysis in some studies are either nonexistent or lack proper explanation. Furthermore, it is not enough to state that SPSS is used for data analysis. SPSS is only a tool, a package program for statistical analysis; it doesn't analyze the data for us.

v. Scope of research and limitations of research are not understood right. The scope or delimitation is not the methodological or any other limitations of a study.

w. Some researchers use formulas to explain the test they use (e.g., anova). Some others explain how to read a factor analysis table. This is done either because the researcher doesn't know that there is no need for such explanation or because he/she wants to impress the reader.

x. Statistical analyses in some studies are used wrong or interpreted wrong. For instance, the researcher studying the difference between males and females indicates that "According to the Levene test results, $F=0.835$ and $p=0.364$ are found. Thus, there is no difference between the groups." This is a wrong interpretation, because Levene test is to determine if the group variances are significantly different (or same). It is necessary to use the test since t-test has assumption of equal variance. Groups can have variance that doesn't significantly

differ, but they may still have different central tendency. Another researcher uses Mann-Whitney U test to compare two groups of nominal measures. This is wrong test for nominal measurement, because Mann-Whitney U requires ordinal level measurement. Thus, all findings and interpretations are invalid.

Findings/Discussions/Conclusions

The basic rule in reporting of the results is that finding and evaluations should be either separately presented or distinguishable.

a. One of the most common problems is that unnecessary statistical correlation is made for no stated reason. Correlation for the sake of correlation is not a proper way of doing research. Correlation of every variable with the other is meaningless unless it is the part of the design.

b. Studies are full of misstatement and misevaluation of the statistical results. Some studies don't even provide p value for determination. For instance, researcher has no hypothesis, but uses anova in order to compare income group with "interest to art-music" measured with Likert type ordinal scale; then, states that as income increases, interest to art-music increases. Anova is a central tendency test and used to find if the groups differ in central tendency. If we assume that as one variable changes, the other one changes too, then, we have to have interval or ratio level measurement. Central tendency tests don't tell us about any positive causal relationship. Similarly, a hypothesis stating that "as age increases, frequency of travel decreases" can not be tested using chi-square test. Chi-square distribution shows us relationship between two grouped variables. Furthermore, we can not infer linear relationship by looking at anova or chi-square test results.

c. Univariate analysis of ordinal scales are mostly wrong, because of the use of the mean and standard deviation, instead of

frequency distribution for a closed-end questions with three or five choices.

d. Univariate analysis of nominal data are stated right, but misinterpreted. Most of the time no test is used in the studies, while Z test is required to determine if there is statistically significant difference in distribution.

e. Univariate analysis of data is generally correct. Some interpretations are wrong. For instance, distribution of internet access in global regions of the world (wrongly defined as number of users) is given and then concluded that there is imbalanced distribution. You can't come to this conclusion unless there is a distribution of population in accord with it. For instance, if half of the world population lives in the North America and half of the internet users are from there, then you can't drive the conclusion of imbalance.

f. Bivariate statistical tests are improperly used: For example, two groups or two nominal variables are compared with ordinal variables of motivation, attitudes, job satisfaction) using T-test or anova. Some studies use Pearson product moment correlation with two nominal measurements or one nominal one ordinal scale. These are completely wrong uses.

g. Two or more statistical tests are used for a single bivariate analysis. Then, the one that serves the researcher's purpose is selected and an invalid discussion is provided negating the results of other test(s): For example, the researcher indicates that the test result ($r = 0.95$) shows strong relationship, however the t-test value (-1.55) shows that this difference is not significant. There are few fundamental mistakes here: There is a significant relationship according to the Pearson product moment correlation and it is very strong. One can't negate this and provide a contrary interpretation. T-test is used to find if there is significant difference between groups, while the Pearson test is the test of probable relationship. They are different tests for different purposes. Furthermore, one can't determine the group

difference by looking at the T-test value unless the p value is checked.

h. Causal relations are inferred from the correlation analysis in some studies. This is a grave mistake, because correlation and causality are not the same. Causality is not inferred from the statistical results, but theoretically construed and tested. Correlation provides information on the significance, direction, strength of the relationship, nothing else.

i. Correlation and causality is construed by merely looking at the univariate frequency distribution or central tendency measures. This is wrong because a proper test of significance should be used. Furthermore, sometime grave mistakes are made. For instance, it is stated in a study that "mean income level of cities in Turkey show normal distribution." Here we have Turkish cities, level of income for each city, and normal distribution of income among cities. What is the theoretical assumption of the normal distribution of income? It is not stated. Does normal distribution of income mean income is distributed evenly among cities? That's what it means, since we have a distribution on nominal scale (cities). This normality statement lacks relevance and factual meaning. The same study states that "in regard to population, normality disappear." What do we suppose to expect: equal population for each city? This disappearance statement also is meaningless and invalid.

j. Factor analysis is defined and used wrong in some studies.

k. Tables and figures generally are not named and designed properly.

l. A scientific research has to establish ties between the theory, hypothesis and findings, and reach conclusions by integrating and synthesis. It is extremely hard to find any research doing such integrating.

m. Furthermore, no integration of findings with theoretical reasoning and related studies is found in the studies.

n. Conclusions in some studies have nothing to do with statistical results and findings. Findings that don't support researcher's expectations are generally ignored or misinterpreted.

o. Another grave mistake is that generalizations beyond the research populations are made in some studies.

It is rarely seen any thesis, any report, any book or any article in various journals in Turkey that has correctly designed an empirical research, properly used statistics, appropriately presented and systematically analyzed findings by integrating theoretical rationale, related studies, research questions and hypotheses and data. This article is only to indicate that there are grave errors in design and misuses of the methodology and statistics in published studies in Turkey. It is extremely important to go beyond this presentation and conduct research in order to find the extent of problems in each of the problem areas stated in this article and formulate viable solutions, especially for the academia. Unfortunately probability of such research initiative is extremely low, because very few in academia can take the heat. It is easy, beneficial and rather fulfilling to go along the dominant flow. Only a professor can dare to do such research, only if he/she is not planning for high administrative position in the university or public institutions in the future (before or after retirement). Dependence and inter-dependence nurture inter-subjectivity framed as objectivity in social sciences. That's why nothing (or close to nothing) is done against the dominant work culture within the knit academic community. It is a kind of work culture that reproduces laziness in people and animosity against those few who work hard. There are people in academia, including research assistants, who haven't read any book or article in years. Hence, mistakes, misuses, abuses are maintained and perpetuated. One of the best (surely worst) examples to such perpetuation is the student guidebooks or student handbooks for the master and doctorate theses in the universities. These

guidebooks (e.g., Ankara University, Trabzon Technical University, Gazi University and Hacettepe University) are outdated, methodologically flawed and full of grave mistakes. The perpetuation remains not only because of the interdependence of interests and dependence, but also because of lack of concern and involvement that is reproduced by the oppressive mode of production and production relations in academia. Such reproduction inevitably nourishes a functionary bureaucrat masquerading, posing and passing as academician, lackeying, fawning, fakery, hypocrisy, further dependence, fixation, mindless and unquestioned dedication, forgery, recurring mistakes and unproductive stability. It is not merely because of the individual academician's fault, incompetence or inability, if there are gross mistakes in research design, application and evaluation. Individual academician makes himself/herself under ruling organized social conditions, that's why problem is not solely with the individual or specific mode of thinking, but with the prevailing conditions of daily academic and wider social production and production relations in a society and among societies.

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Why Does Ideology Still Matter in Social Studies?

Abstract

This study tries to ask some questions and to underline some points with respect to the study of ideology. Its main objective is firstly to show that the concept of ideology is still a plausible concept, and that an approach to ideology, irrespective of the discipline in which it is developed, entails an understanding that the meaning of the concept of ideology is embedded in language games in which it is utilized, and is partially fixed through an hegemonic operation. Secondly, it is to show that an understanding of ideology in itself needs to reconsider certain philosophical categories such as truth, subject, consciousness, and the misrecognition/distortion of reality, which have traditionally been central to the theories of the formation and nature of ideology itself and have created a conceptual puzzlement. It argues that despite all the difficulties and ideological problems that the concept of ideology causes, it is not justifiable to discard the notion altogether. It suggests that transcending the conceptual blindspot in the theories of ideology doesn't necessarily mean a total abandonment of those traditional philosophical categories either. The third point this paper emphasises is the political character of ideology. Put it differently, its aim is to underline that an approach to ideology entails an understanding of the formation and nature of the political and vice versa.

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Why Does Ideology Still Matter in Social Studies?

Any attempt to develop an understanding of the notion of ideology has to deal with various difficulties emerging out of historical, theoretical and ideological reasons. All who have grappled with the notion of ideology are aware that it is problematic to develop an approach to the notion of ideology, which has, in its long history, gained different, mostly contradictory and confusing, connotations. In its long history, the concept of ideology has remained undecidable between life and death, positivity and negativity: Some scholars proclaim that we no longer live in an age of ideology, so ideology is dead and this is a post-ideological era, while some others suggest that ideology never dies.

Given all these, this paper does not offer a fully elaborated answer to the question why the concept of ideology matters for social inquiry in general and for media studies in particular. Nor will I offer a fully developed approach to the analysis of ideology, or try to relocate the concept in media studies, which could only be a vain repetition of Hall's attempt to sketch out the main contours of 'the rediscovery of ideology' in the 1980s. Rather, I will try to ask some questions and to underline some points that I think crucial for an approach to the notion of ideology. My main objective here is firstly to show that the concept of ideology is still a plausible concept, and that an approach to ideology, irrespective of the discipline in which it is developed, entails an understanding that the meaning of the concept of ideology is embedded in language games in which it

is utilized, and is partially fixed through an hegemonic operation. Secondly, it is to show that an understanding of ideology in itself needs to reconsider certain philosophical categories such as truth, subject, consciousness, and the misrecognition/distortion of reality, which have traditionally been central to the theories of the formation and nature of ideology itself and have created a conceptual puzzlement. Underlying all the theoretical problems concerning this puzzlement, the proclamations of the decay of the concept of ideology and of "the end of ideology" (a formula which was immensely used at the beginning of the sixties and which has recently been revived) suggest that the concept no longer makes sense, and can be eliminated. I want to argue following Laclau and Giddens that despite all the difficulties and ideological problems that the concept of ideology causes, it is not justifiable to discard the notion altogether. Instead, we should maintain the concept of ideology by breaking up with its traditional content and develop a new theory of ideology that goes beyond such a conceptual puzzlement. I also suggest that breaking with the conceptual blindspot in the theories of ideology doesn't necessarily lead to a total abandonment of those traditional philosophical categories either. Instead, they must be revisited and revised. Thirdly, I want to emphasise that in a new theory of ideology the concept of ideology must be considered in its relation with power, and therefore, with central political structures. I suggest that an approach to ideology entails an

understanding of the formation and nature of the political and vice versa. Finally I must warn the reader that what he/she will encounter in this paper is a rather preliminary and humble way of re-thinking certain problems and questions concerning the theory of ideology, not a fully developed answer to all questions that are posed here in the length of this paper.

In the paper, I will first of all dwell upon the kind of "ideological blindspot" or "conceptual puzzlement" as appeared in the attempts to clarify the meaning of the concept of ideology. Following Wittgenstein's arguments, I will try to show that the polysemic character of the concept of ideology does not necessarily lead us to abandon it altogether; for the concept of ideology, like all other concepts in our language, gains its meaning in its both everyday and scholarly usages which are plural, inconsistent and ambiguous. Secondly, I will focus on the dichotomy of science and ideology, a dominant way of conceptualization of ideology. Following from the second one my third focus will be on another crucial dichotomy, that is, the dichotomy of true and false consciousness. Here I will try to discuss whether or not distortion is still plausible for a new theory of ideology and if it is so, then, where we should locate it. Finally, in an attempt to correct a tautology I will try to show that ideology has an inherently political character.

Conceptual Puzzlement

"If there are such things as contested concepts," says Giddens, and "if there were a prize for the most contested concept, the concept of ideology would very nearly rank first. Nobody can even decide how to pronounce it!" (21) In fact, the long history of the concept of ideology is marked with a disarray and confusion around the meaning of the concept. Despite all vigorous attempts to clarify its meaning and to draw a clear-cut boundary between the concept of ideology and its confusing uses, it ironically remained ambiguous and

undecidable. Thus, the word of "ideology" still connotes more than one concept, bound in various ways to different disciplines.

The study of ideology stands at the crossroad of many disciplines from sociology to politics, from anthropology to psychology. Various disciplines develop various approaches to the concept of ideology. The interdisciplinary character of the study of ideology multiplies the problems of definition, and deepens the confusion and disarray around the concept of ideology.

However, what is at stake here is not only a problem of definition as a result of contradictory or inconsistent usages of the concept of ideology, but also "a blindspot" that is embedded in the ways in which the concept of ideology is used by both scholars and non-scholars. In Freedman's words, "Both scholars and non-scholars have invested in it not only purposive, reflective, and critical thought but strong emotions. Yet it is also the case that the very existence of the facts to which ideology purportedly refers has frequently been denied" (13). In other words, most traditional treatments of ideology render the concept totally blind to itself by reducing it to shared beliefs, "to a corpus of arguments, to the apparatus of beliefs which provides the visible framework of a collective practice" (Lefort, 1991: 47). Similarly, the dominant ideology theses within social sciences also produce a blindspot in the study of ideology by overemphasizing the ideological homogeneity of a certain social class both in capitalist and pre-capitalist societies.

This is, for Claude Lefort, a "misappreciation of the problem of ideology". Lefort points that this misappreciation is embedded in the ways in which the concept of ideology is "employed by sociologists or historians invoking scientific authority, as well as by revolutionary militants" (46-7). Lefort thinks that in different conceptualizations of the concept of ideology "the split between an order of practice and one of representation ... is ignored". For him, this not a question of the

distortion of a concept, but that of the concealment of a fundamental split which must be the focus of the study of ideology. Lefort says, this is as such "an ideological blindspot" which shows itself in a misappreciation of the problem of ideology (47).

From all said so far we could draw the conclusion that the concept of ideology is hopelessly flawed by ambiguity, and that it is a vain attempt to develop a clear understanding of what ideology is; therefore, the concept of ideology should be abandoned. The abandonment of the concept seems inevitable when one starts to reflect on the concept through a set of related concepts like "subject," "consciousness," "knowledge," and "reality." All these related concepts, like many others, suffer from a similar ambiguity. However, it is not easy to abandon a concept, as Kuhn emphasizes, since "we are unable to do so in the absence of a developed alternative" (Pitkin, 1993:113). In other words, we cannot abandon the concept of ideology unless we have a new and better, but necessarily *developed* conceptualisation. Moreover, we cannot develop an alternative *concept* without a *concept* since we always need to have a *concept* to know what we refer to and what we conceptualise of. Thus, Kuhn's paradox becomes ours: the more we try to relinquish the conventional ways of conceptualisation of ideology, the more we find ourselves, as Kuhn did, hopelessly dependent on and surrounded by these kinds of conceptualisations:

But is sensory experience fixed and neutral? Are theories simply man-made interpretations of given data? The epistemological viewpoint that has most often guided Western philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate and unequivocal, Yes! In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible to relinquish entirely that viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and the attempts to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of observations now seem to me hopeless (Kuhn, 1970: 126).

So one can interpret the meaning of what Kuhn discovers in his attempt to relinquish the conventional views on the

concept of "world" in the following way: We cannot discuss a *problem* or a *concept* without encountering such ambiguities and inconsistencies. "What we say or think about discursively about" a *concept* "must be said or thought in language. And that means that in saying it, we must introduce the assumptions and implications built into our language," and "as soon as we try to say what it is we invoke a conceptual system with all that implies" (Pitkin, 1993: 113-114). Moreover, "a new concept free of these ambiguities will not be a concept" of ideology at all, "will not satisfy what troubles us" (Pitkin, 1993: 113).

What we have at hand here is a "conceptual puzzlement" or a "conceptual paradox" in Wittgensteinian sense, as a result of the ambiguous, inconsistent and diverse uses of the concept of ideology, and of the plurality of its meaning. Wittgenstein teaches us that when we have a conceptual puzzlement "we consider the concept in general, in the abstract" by dismissing the concrete cases as irrelevant (Pitkin, 1993: 92). He suggests, "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (quoted in Pitkin, 1993: 92). Wittgenstein invites us to have an awareness of concepts, and sensitivity to the plurality and ambiguity of their uses in a theorist's language. He also invites us to acknowledge as constitutive qualities of language such plurality, ambiguity and inconsistency. Following his line of argument, I suggest that the study of ideology, in its quest for clarity, must cease to search a new and a better conceptualisation. Rather, it must develop awareness to itself, to its inevitably plural and ambiguous concepts. I also suggest that an understanding of the theories of ideology entails an analysis of continuing theoretical controversies on the concept of ideology with a complete awareness of the significance of conceptual plurality and inconsistency. So, the task is not to refuse a concept, but to understand the ways in which it is used, to understand what kind of language games are played with this concept. This entails an enterprise that is of course beyond the scope of this paper. So, in the rest of the paper I only follow certain paths that

can take us in the depths of the theories of ideology. I will try to underline the questions, controversies, and concepts that a theory of ideology must be aware of and sensitive to.

Science/Ideology Dichotomy

Giddens tells us that it is not justifiable to abandon the concept of ideology. However, this does not mean that we should stop searching a better conceptualisation. He insists that we should keep the concept of ideology by breaking up with its traditional conceptualisations. He develops his four theses on ideology on the basis of this attempt to break up with the conventional and dominant ways of understanding what ideology is. His criticism firstly attacks on the dominant science/ideology dichotomy. He says, "The notion of ideology has to be disconnected from the philosophy of science, with which in the past it has almost inevitably bound up." (21)

Firstly, the French rationalist tradition of de Tracy made a connection between science and ideology, giving ideology the meaning of the science of ideas that would be capable of demystifying society. The kind of knowledge that formed the content of ideology would rid society of prejudices. As is well-known Napoleon reversed this perspective, and ideology became understood as "that which lies beyond the margins of science" – as the very repository of prejudice and obfuscation" (Giddens, 1991: 21). The same science/ideology dichotomy is present in the empiricist-positivist tradition as well as in the Marxist tradition. The difference between these two traditions "lies in their opposing conceptions of what constitutes the science that excludes ideology: In the work of Althusser, for example, it is Marxism itself (and possibly psychoanalysis) which is that science. For Popper, on the other hand, both are the supreme examples of pseudo-sciences" (Giddens, 1991: 22). For Giddens this is rather a "comic opposition to be based upon a false starting point" that "ideology can be defined in reference

to truth claims" (22). In other words, while science is identified with the Truth, ideology represents the falsity.

Obviously, science/ideology dichotomy, as Giddens and most others emphasize, has been a controversial issue for theorists of ideology. It is of course problematic to take ideology as a margin concept whose function is limited to define what science *is*, or what science *is not*. However, I also believe that we cannot simply ignore or reject what have been said on the issue, and carry on towards a new concept that has no trace of all that have been said in the history of philosophy or social theory. Rather, I suggest that despite all contradictions, inconsistencies and even absurdities we find in conventional theories of ideology, we must focus on what have been said, how they are said, and why they are said. The enterprise, then, is not to reject or abandon a concept or its certain uses, but to locate it in its context. That is necessary, I believe, not only to understand the theories of ideology, but also to understand the problems of contemporary human condition, and also to make a revolutionary departure from traditional ways of conceptualizing ideology.

True/False Consciousness Dichotomy

Under this heading we have to deal with another dichotomy: The dichotomy of true/false consciousness, through which misrecognition of reality or an illusion is located in knowledge. In relation to this dichotomy two questions seem crucial: How can we assert falsehood to the consciousness of the subject? And, if by maintaining the concept of ideology we also keep the notion of misrecognition or distortion of the social reality, yet we still insist that ideology cannot be understood as false consciousness, then where is this misrecognition/distortion to be located? The Marxian formula well defines the illusion: 'They do not know what they are doing, but they are still doing it.' The notion of ideology as false consciousness,

which is based on this formula, implies that the ontological consistency of the social reality is possible only on condition that its participants are *not* aware of its proper logic. This classic approach to ideology has been contested by a number of theorists like Giddens, Laclau, Lefort, Freedman, Sloterdijk and Žižek. Giddens rejects any idea that links ideology with truth claims. He also rejects to think ideology through a given content. He suggests that the concept is an empty one, which allows it to incorporate the forms of significations within systems of domination in its own formation and to represent particular forms of signification as universal ones (22).

Laclau claims, "the theoretical ground that made sense of the concept of 'false consciousness' has evidently dissolved" (1991: 26). His argument is based on the idea that the identity of social agent can no longer be fixed at the basis of objective class interests. It is only when the identity of the agent is recognized as positive and non-contradictory, it becomes possible to attribute falsehood to the consciousness of the subject. However, since "any social subject is essentially decentred" and since "her identity is nothing but the unstable articulation of constantly changing positionalities" we cannot assert that her consciousness is 'false' (Laclau, 1991: 26).

Sloterdijk is another writer who attempts to reverse the classic Marxian formula of 'false consciousness'. For him in today's society the actual problem is not 'false consciousness', but 'enlightened false consciousness'. The formula is no longer read as "they do not know what they are doing, but they are still doing it". It has now become "they know what they are doing, but they are still doing it". This new formula implies that we are living in a post-ideological society: We keep a cynical distance between the ideological truth and ourselves. We no longer believe in ideological truth; we do not take ideological propositions seriously, but what we have is only an enlightened false consciousness since we are still doing things in which we no longer believe (Sloterdijk, 1987).

Sloterdijk's cynical reason cannot represent a total break with the traditional understandings of ideology, from whose perspectives too today's society appears post-ideological. The illusion remains located in the side of knowledge. The prevailing ideology, as Žižek suggests, is that of cynicism:

Even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them. (...) For example, they know that their idea of Freedom is making a particular form of exploitation, but they still continue to follow this idea of Freedom (33).

The question to ask again is: If it is not on the side of knowledge where is the illusion? The answer is obvious: The illusion is not on the side of *knowledge*, but on the side of what people are *doing*. Another question follows up the first one: How should the illusion be understood? Both Žižek and Laclau give similar answers to these questions. Žižek directly asks the same questions and answers them by identifying ideology (the ideological) with the individual's social reality. He emphasizes that the illusion guides and structures the individual's relationship to reality, or in other words the individual's action:

What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy (32-33).

Similarly Laclau points to the constitutive role of the ideological. The illusion is not the misrecognition of a positive identity of the social, but that of the impossibility of the society. The ideological can be understood as the will to totality, in the sense that it is constitutive of the social because "the social only exists as the vain attempt to institute that impossible object: society" (Laclau: 1991: 27).

Laclau, together with Žižek, offers a way of understanding the ontological dimension of ideology. They conceive ideology not as the distortion of reality, but as the construction of reality through distortion. The distortion (the illusion) they are discussing is "not the distortion of a pre-constituted identity, but rather a discursive operation that constructs a constitutive closure of social and political identities" (Torfing, 1999: 216). Distortion conceals the dislocation and undecidability of any identity. This point is emphasized even more strongly in Laclau's later article "The Death and Resurrection of Ideology": "The notion of distortion involves something more than mere dislocation: Namely, that a concealment of some sort takes place in it. Now, ... what is concealed is the ultimate dislocation of what presents itself as a close identity, and the act of concealment consists in projecting on to that identity the dimension of closure that it ultimately lacks" (1996: 4).

I want to conclude this part of the paper by suggesting that it is important for the social theory to recognise that there is no extra-ideological reality, and that "ideology is a dimension which belongs to the structure of all possible experience" (Laclau, 1996: 9).

A Tautology: Political Ideology

In this part of the paper, my main objective is to correct a tautology: It seems quite common to use the adjective 'political' before the word 'ideology' to specify certain forms of political thought and separate them out from 'philosophical' ones. This distinction between philosophical and ideological implies the science/ideology dichotomy once again, and overlooks the political character of ideology and the ideological character of philosophy. I will dwell upon the political character of ideology. There are three reasons for this: First, ideology is a political practice because it is constitutive of the social. Secondly, ideology articulates some discursive forms (social identities) in

its totality by hegemonizing the social, which means acting over the social in order to limit the infinite play of differences that characterise it. One of Laclau's central assertions can be repeated here: "The constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that identity as such is power" (1990: 33). Thirdly, the uses of ideology in various disciplines including media studies are associated with the sphere of politics and those uses specify power relations as central to the concept of ideology. As Fairclough reminds us, "ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on power relations which underlie the conventions" (2). An understanding of the relations of power in modern society entails awareness to its ideological nature, or vice versa.

I want to emphasize that neglecting the political character of ideology is itself an ideological enterprise, which can be taken as one of the versions of 'the end of ideology' theses. It is ideological, like different versions of mentioned theses, in the sense that it associates itself with the impossible "ideal of pure, non-political, administrative practices" (Laclau, 1996: 15).

Conclusion

To conclude this paper I will content with repeating my initial position: We should retain the concept of ideology. The constitutive role of the ideological can justify my position not to discard the notion of ideology and not to consider today's society as a post-ideological society: Because ideology is a permanent and structuring phenomenon, the end of ideology would signal the end of social reality itself; and the abandonment of the concept of ideology would leave us in an abyss.

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How To Straighten a Crooked Timber

Abstract

The dream of a peaceful world order has occupied minds of many great thinkers. Recently, Jurgen Habermas has offered a new version of it. This paper will attempt to investigate what Habermas has been elaborating on the relevant features of deliberative democracy since the publication of his *Between Facts and Norms*. The analysis will specifically focus on his formulation of mutual relationship between public and private autonomy as the fundamental base for his cosmopolitan scheme. This will be tied to his new concept: Constitutional patriotism arguing for the necessity of a shift from national to a cosmopolitan constitutional order based on institutionalisation of human rights on a global scale.

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How To Straighten a Crooked Timber

Almost two hundred years ago, at the birth of the modern era, Kant formulated one of the earliest and a very systematically constructed version of a peaceful world order. In *Perpetual Peace* (in Reiss, 1991: 93-130), he proposed a cosmopolitan rule of law under which a federal union of different nations would gather until it included all the peoples of the earth and became a world republic. Even though he was sceptical enough for the capacity of men to realise this dream and he famously confessed that "nothing straight can be constructed from such crooked timber as that which man is made of" (in Reiss, 1991: 46) he was hoping that by the rule of this cosmopolitan legal order natural rivalries and antagonisms would be constrained, and in time men would move towards greater agreement over the principles of justice.

Two hundred years later, Habermas revived this Kantian dream. He believed that Kant's idea has managed to survive and must be reformulated in the light of the contemporary global situation (1998: 165). However, Habermas' criticised two main aspects of Kant's model. Kant's federation proposed only a voluntary association of the states without any legal binding so that their sovereignty were not threatened. Kant also was not concerned too much about how democratic the states' regimes were. He accepted that the states could become members of the federation as long as they were republics without being democratic or egalitarian. Habermas cautioned that Kant's idea was inconsistent since preserving the sovereignty of the states within the federation would be in conflict with maintaining

peace in the long run. If peace is to be promoted states should be under obligation to abide a system of rights based on the implementation of human rights on a global scale. He also emphasised that it is not enough simply to converge different republican traditions to achieve a worldwide peace for it requires a similar system of rights in every member state (1998: 165-170).

In his reformulation, Habermas advocates a model of cosmopolitan legal order which privileges individuals as the bearers of rights and does not allow the autonomy of citizens to be pre-empted by the sovereignty of states, thus the nation states under his scheme are expected to subordinate their sovereignty to the common political principles of the cosmopolitan order up to a degree that citizens of any nation state would be able to appeal to any coercive legal authority even if it is their own government. To ensure the implementation of this order, Habermas even goes on to propose the creation of supranational political institutions with greater executive and judicial powers. In a sense, Habermas' scheme starts where Kant's stops, that is, Habermas, as oppose to Kant, perceives the unquestionable sovereignty of nation states as the real burden in the creation of a peaceful world order. Thus, his cosmopolitan scheme is fundamentally more ambitious and demanding than Kant's proposal, but also equally controversial. It is therefore important to see how Habermas structures and justifies his argument.

To my reading, the most crucial step Habermas takes in developing this framework is to establish an internal relation between private and public autonomy. This link assumes a mutual relationship, which does not allow subordination of one to each other. While private autonomy provides the essential rights to act, public autonomy delivers the power and the space to participate into the process of deliberation. They are mutually interdependent because against a purely liberal-individualist conception of equal rights, Habermas argues that individual liberties can not become real without the power of being able to deliberate in the process of political will formation. This is what Habermas calls the co-originality of the rule of law and popular sovereignty, namely the internal connection between individual rights and democratic politics. However, I should note that within the trajectory of his theory Habermas has increasingly paid more attention to private autonomy. Indeed, for the establishment of his cosmopolitan order, based on individual rights, private autonomy has almost become a precondition. The application of individual rights at the level of constitutional states is the first and the most important step Habermas demands for being able to implement justice beyond the boundaries of nation states.

Within this framework, the establishment of the co-originality of the rule of law and popular sovereignty follows three major steps: The first is a vibrant political public sphere in which citizens as equal and free agents communicate to reach a common agreement on public issues. The second is a legal order which formally secures a democratic structure for the political public sphere and ensures that the process of deliberation have a formal impact on the final decision making bodies, and the last one is the constitutional state as a centralised power with the capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions.

In *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas gives a detailed account of how he envisages the functioning of political public sphere in modern societies. It is important to note that in his

account he also rectifies some shortcomings of his early analysis appeared in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Habermas later conceded that his early analysis was speaking more of one single public without acknowledging the internal differences, therefore consequently leading to an unjustified idealisation. He concluded that a more detailed oriented focus reflecting a greater internal differentiation should be accommodated into his study (in Calhoun, 1992).

Habermas takes these steps in *Between Facts and Norms*. Firstly, he acknowledges that the complexity of modern societies and their systemic divisions resulted in the formation of a decentered public sphere in which the self-understanding of different groups relies on a different set of value systems. The decentered characteristic of the modern public sphere has major consequences for a theory of democracy in that reaching agreement between those different value systems, and consequently the social coordination of them, becomes increasingly problematic.

Along with his new emphasis on the decentered nature of the public sphere, Habermas suggests a two-track model of public sphere in which he identifies a division of labour between weak and strong publics. Weak publics refer to the informal circles of political communication functioning at the level of civil society such as public agencies, private organisations, business associations, labour unions, interest groups, mass media and so on. Strong public is the formally organised bodies of political institutions, including the parliament and administrative system. Habermas also suggests that strong and weak publics function along a centre-periphery axis. Centre, with its virtue of formal decision-making power, plays a key role in synthesising public opinion and putting them into a binding context. However, the periphery, or weak publics, assumes a more central role for identifying and interpreting social problems. With its informal, highly differentiated and cross-linked channels the networks of weak

publics act like a warning system to alert civil society to the likely breaches of legal rights. So, in this sense the public sphere "can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes). Like the life-world as a whole, so, too, the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action" (1996: 360).

Habermas' division of work between weak and strong publics is an important attempt to overcome the difficulties his early analysis faced. With this division, apart from acknowledging a pluralistic public sphere as a network of public spheres functioning at different levels in civil society, Habermas also makes room for the legitimate applications of strategic action in the forms of bargaining and compromise. He suggests that in real life situations, where it is often difficult to apply the ideal procedures, bargaining can be brought into action if it is regulated by the discourse principle from the standpoint of fairness, that is, if an equal opportunity is created "to influence one another during the actual bargaining, so that all the affected interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing" (1996: 167), then a negotiated agreement can be considered as fair. He concludes, "fair bargaining, then, does not destroy the discourse principle but rather indirectly presupposes it" (1996: 167).

What is crucial here for Habermas is that once a communicatively functioning public sphere is established then the formally organised political system would be increasingly open to the influences stemming from the deliberation process within weak publics. This is important for Habermas not only to establish communicative freedom as a fundamental right but also to emphasise its motivating force in generating power to reinforce change. It is the motivating force of communicative action that plays a central role when he explains how a decentred public sphere can function as a binding force and can expand the horizons of a community. He believes that

mobilising citizens' communicative freedom builds up into a potential that holders of administrative power cannot ignore. Thus, a healthy public sphere is the one that transforms the communicative power of citizens into administrative power. And this exactly where law plays its essential part in deliberative politics.

Habermas is cautious about the capacity of communicative action alone in dealing with conflict resolution. Under the complex conditions of modern societies, he maintains, "unfettered communicative action can neither unload nor seriously bear the burden of social integration falling to it" (1996: 37). Then, the power of communicative action needs to be backed up by the institutional power of law in order to guarantee that the power created by the communicative action of citizens is transformed to the formal administrative bodies of the political spectrum. Thus, through law, Habermas seeks to establish a stable social environment in which members of different traditions can perform their participatory role in democratic decision-making process. However, Habermas also offers a different conceptual arrangement for law. Following the principles of discourse ethics he proposes a procedural model of law in which the addressee of a legal order is neither an individual protected by the liberal law, nor the clients of a welfare state protected by the paternalistic measures of welfare state bureaucracies, but a public of citizens actively participating in political decision making processes and articulating their needs and wants, and more importantly formulating the criteria according to which equals are treated equally and unequals are unequally. Habermas simply wants citizens to be author of their legal system.

Individual liberties must be discussed in the political sphere in order to reach a consensus about their appropriateness. Therefore he argues that private persons should not only be equal under the law, they should also be able to understand themselves as the authors of the laws. His conclusion is that:

a legal order is legitimate when it safeguards the autonomy of all citizens to an equal degree. The citizens are autonomous, only if the addressees of the law can also see themselves as its authors. And its authors are free only as participants in legislative processes that are regulated in a way that deserve general and rationally motivated agreement (in Gutmann, 1994: 122).

Thus, in this sense law owes its validity to the approval of its subjects. His main principle of discourse ethics, that is, "just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses" (1996: 107) becomes the main criteria to test the legitimacy of law. And in return, law guarantees that the norms, regulating the democratic deliberation of citizens, are formally acknowledged by the political system.

However, to be able to socially effective at this level law needs to have a centralised power with the capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions, which brings us to the notion of constitutional state. Within this framework the constitutional state takes up the role to be the institutional guarantor of the dissemination of communicative power derived from citizens' deliberation. What makes this definition of the constitutional state different from its liberal or republican models is where Habermas assigns the task of sovereignty. Again in line with his theory of communicative action and discourse theory of democracy the sovereignty here appears in the subjectless forms of communication rather than in the form of a concrete subject such as the people as in the republican tradition, or some anonymous agencies representing the constitutional rights but detached from the subjects of these rights as in the case of liberal tradition. In Habermas words:

We can then interpret the idea of constitutional state in general as the requirement that the administrative system, which is steered through the power code, be tied to the lawmaking communicative power and kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power (i.e., of the actual strength of privileged interests

to asserts themselves). Administrative power should not reproduce itself on its own terms but should only be permitted to regenerate from the conversion of communication power (1996: 150).

Once the administration is linked to the process of democratic will-opinion formation its power takes a more accountable shape in the service of citizens. In return the constitutional state demands from its citizens a loyalty to the norms that it promotes. Habermas calls this bond constitutional patriotism advocating devotion to a shared political culture in which different cultural, ethnic and religious forms of life coexist and interact on equal terms (1998: 118). This shared political culture does not refer to a shared ethos or to the idea that citizens are part of the same language, culture or ethnic origins, rather it ensures that an awareness of diverse life styles and acknowledgment of their integrity is embedded within the shared political culture. Thus, a shared, common political culture acts like a common denominator around which citizens gather patriotically. It resists to the integration of sub cultural entities into mainstream culture.

However, the most striking feature of this common political culture appears to be a search for the establishment of a base broader than nation-state. Habermas defines the project of constitutional state is an ongoing, unfinished project which does not have a fixed essence. It can broaden its base easily particularly within the framework of rapidly developing intimate relations between different nation-states, thus enabling to ground democracy also at supranational levels. At this stage Habermas' theory reaches its most ambitious level. He proposes a cosmopolitan order seeking the establishment of an international legal order to guarantee the loyalty of individual nation states to the basic rights of citizens. For this reason he supports supranational institutions with greater executive and judicial powers. The aim of these institutions is to constitute an international order to force individual governments to respect

the basic rights of their citizens, if necessary through the threat or the implementation of sanctions. A cosmopolitan law in this sense, privileges individuals as the bearers of rights and gives them "unmediated membership in the association of free and equal world citizens" (1998: 181). The establishment of cosmopolitan law should not allow the autonomy of citizens to be pre-empted even by the sovereignty of their states. The principles of constitutional patriotism remains same here with the exception that it operates now at a supranational level where individual states subordinates their inherited regional royalties to the common political principles of the new cosmopolitan order. In other words, the form of social integration created by constitutional patriotism first at national level transcends itself over the borders of nation state, but still remain loyal to the main principles of a constitutional order. Surely there are a lot of issues at stake here in regard to the sovereignty of states, but for Habermas without this obligation the creation of a peaceful world order is a very remote possibility.

So, how realisable is Habermas' dream in the context of real life situations where sharp value conflicts divide members of different groups? Habermas' general answer to this question lies in the fact that any formal process of legitimation requires the expansion of common horizon against the horizon of individual perspectives and worldviews. This means that under the conditions of pluralist complex modern societies the different parties should refer to a shared understanding of justice, or moral issues, and in order to do that they are required to decenter their different perspectives. The difficulty here stems from the fact that practicality is always a distant issue for a normative theory which can never be totally reflected in the empirical world. Habermas explicitly says that his theory does not provide answers to substantive questions. He refuses to offer an a priori answer to real life problems. His contribution remains at the level of the rules of procedure providing the framework for a legitimate decision making process. Finding

answers to substantive issues is left to participants within this framework. However, in relation to the operational functioning of the deliberation process there are still some problems that are not clearly answered by Habermas. For instance, it is not clear what specific proposals would follow from his model in regard to the rules of interaction between weak and strong publics. This question demands serious consideration about how to mediate communicative and administrative powers. Another problem surfaces at the level of communicative action, that is, how much can we realistically expect all participants to reach agreement even if they agree to listen to each other. Is consensus possible at all? If we accept the fact that the process of deliberation can not completely be immune from the symptoms of social inequalities endemic to contemporary societies.

Then how can these inequalities be neutralised? Surely, the asymmetrical power relations among participants plays a very critical role in decision making process. Habermas himself acknowledges that nation states are becoming increasingly helpless to overcome the problems created by the current global economic regime under which not only individual states loose control over their own economies, but also their resources to deal with the risks of globalisation such as ecological problems, economic inequalities, international crime and arm trade are already running scarce (1998). All this will ultimately form underclasses in even developed countries and the attempt to contain the anomic effects of underclass groups would result in recourse to repressive politics and the decay and finally the collapse of political legitimacy. Habermas' sole answer to modify these inequities and minimise outside effects relies on the rules of the deliberation process and the power that communicative action creates. This seems quite a fragile ground to build a democratic process since both solutions demands a high level of reliance on individual's rational thinking capacity. I accept that once the power of communicative action is institutionalised, that is, the foundation of a democratic deliberation process is established, then it is easier to protect

this existing structure, however the real question appears to be how to establish it in the first instance. Thus, a more thorough investigation of the current structural deficiencies of political public spheres is essential in order to make Habermas' normative theory a viable alternative.

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Imagining Interactive Documentary - the Halfeti Project

Abstract

What potential does interactive multimedia have as a documentary medium? We know it can serve as a convenient means of linking together a diverse set of documentary materials, but are there interactive paradigms available to enable a more sophisticated work of interpretation? This paper considers this question both at a general theoretical level and in terms of the issues raised by a recent Turkish/Australian interactive documentary project.

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Imagining Interactive Documentary - the Halfeti Project

Introduction

There is really no such thing as interactive documentary, certainly not as a clearly delineated genre. There are only experiments - diverse attempts to chart a relation between traditional notions of documentary and the possibilities associated with digital media. This article begins by trying to clarify some of the theoretical issues involved in envisaging interactive documentary. It then moves on to consider aesthetic issues arising from the production of a recent experimental work - *Halfeti*, a CD-Rom that enables the user to explore a small south-eastern Turkish town on the eve of its partial submersion beneath the waters of a large hydro-electric project.

Theorising Interactive Documentary

The following constitutes a kind of urban myth of interactive multimedia: An author discovers a box that belonged to her late grandmother in the garage. It is full of photographs, letters, official documents, knick-knacks - all the small stuff that sums up a life and that nobody quite has the heart to discard. The author sifts through it and recognizes the potential for a book, a film, or perhaps a CD-Rom. It is the latter that seems to offer the greatest potential, providing a means of viewing and tying together all the contents of the

box, as well as the utopic hope of creating a work that embodies the associative logic of subjective experience and memory.

It's not so much the narrative of the myth that interests me (the conceit of discovery), nor the specifics of what the box may contain, as the notion that multimedia offers a particularly effective vehicle for conveying aspects of the grandmother's life. What are the differences between imagining this intimate documentary as a book, or as a film, or as a piece of multimedia? What are the different aesthetic horizons that these media open up and why the preference for interactive multimedia?

I should stress that this preference is not universal, and indeed is probably a minority view these days. There has been a critical backlash against the utopic view of interactive multimedia for at least the past five years or so (Kahn, 1996). There is a widespread perception that interactive multimedia has failed to live up to its over-hyped aesthetic promise, yet digital convergence constantly throws up new interactive technologies and creative experimentation continues. What I have posited above then is a kind of naive myth, intended to open up and clarify the issue of how an interactive documentary might differ from other forms of documentary.

At first glance, one of the obvious advantages of multimedia is that it provides a means of assembling all or most of the contents of our imaginary box into a single accessible

form. Multimedia enables the easy combination of still image, text, audio, and video. A book could not easily incorporate all of these different media. A film could manage it but would need to be very selective due to time constraints. This points to the archival value of multimedia – a great deal of information in all sorts of forms can be assembled in the one work. Here the documentary potential of multimedia is linked to the root sense of the term "documentary" – the capacity to document and record.

Yet without wishing to denigrate the importance of primary historical evidence, a documentary is much more than merely a collection of records. We expect documentaries to make arguments and tell stories, to select, combine, and interpret whatever may be found in the box. There are all sorts of traditions within film documentary for accomplishing this task, from explicitly interpretive voice-over narration to the subtleties of cinema-verite mise en scene and editing. Most of these traditions depend upon the temporal language of narrative or sequential argument. Interactive multimedia can draw on these traditions but there is a sense that they are not strictly native. The emerging language of digital interactivity has its basis in the trajectory of the user rather than the linear artistry of the traditional author. The interactive author builds structures of interaction rather than finished compositions.

This opens up a key question. What kinds of structures of interaction can be developed to lend interactive documentary a properly documentary character rather than simply a glorified archival one? Is there some interactive alternative (or slight twist) to the existing traditions of documentary storytelling and argumentation? I realise I am posing these questions in an oversimplified, either/or fashion. My aim is not to deny multimedia access to processes of linear composition, but to pinpoint the distinctive potential of interactivity.

Let's consider some interactive paradigms, some ways in which the contents of the box may be approached, or articulated, in interactive terms.

• **The Hierarchical Tree Paradigm.** A main page introduces the grandmother and provides a menu of links to subsidiary sections that represent particular periods in the grandmother's life. These in turn link to further subsections that provide relevant materials from the box. Here the emphasis is upon facilitating access to information through the construction of a logical hierarchy. It is the structure typically adopted by the corporate website. This structure can often prove useful, but can hardly be said to engage with, or develop, the discursive aesthetics of documentary. If there is a creative documentary element here it is likely to be in the composition of particular pages. Especially promising in this respect is the emerging dialogue between graphic design and documentary traditions. The interplay and juxtaposition of elements on a page – text and image, foreground and background, interface and content – offer all sorts of possibilities for documentary experimentation.

• **The Associative Network Paradigm.** A main page sends us randomly to one of many pages that represent particular moments in the grandmother's life. One page shows an immigration document and lists her parent's names. Click on the names to jump to pages on her childhood, or perhaps pictures of her parents, or a diary entry concerning her earliest memories. There is no menu to guide the user, only a selection of links embedded in images or text. This paradigm sets up an associative (often playful) relation between a set of pages (or media). Rather than an hierarchical tree there is the sense of a network of interconnecting nodes. This is the model that literary hypertext adopts. It can also be regarded as a web paradigm, if stress is placed on the macro structure (or experience) of the web rather than the typically hierarchical structure of particular sites. Multiple logics may guide the pattern of associative links – time, cause and effect, resemblance, difference, etc. The notion of a non-hierarchical associative network offers considerable potential as a novel means of approaching documentary topics, especially when the user can engage closely with the associative logic of the piece. This is especially so when there is little need

to tell a specific story or make a particular argument. An observational style documentary in which the user develops an overall picture of a topic by selecting from a range of 'views' would seem to lend itself well to this approach. The major challenge for this paradigm lies in finding means to motivate the user's choices and to establish a balance between the content of any particular page and the aesthetic imperative to interact. A kind of idle (fetishistic) clicking can easily supplant more focused interaction.

• **The Simulatory Matrix Paradigm.** An exterior view of the grandmother's old house. Click on the front door to enter. A view of a hallway with an open door to the left. Click to enter a living room. The sound of an old record starting up. Click on an album of photographs on the coffee table. Turn through the pages of photographs of the grandmother's life. Here interaction is structured via a spatial-experiential metaphor. The emphasis is less on logical association (jumps, juxtapositions, correspondences) than on experiential contiguity between one node and the next. There is the sense of moving through a defined matrix rather than a loose associative network. While convincing simulation may not be a high priority, the interactive structure is simulatory in that it draws upon experiential metaphors rather than more abstract logical schemas. This paradigm gains its clearest realisation in the structure of first-person, real-time, 3D computer games. The artificial, agonistic, and viscerally immersive character of these games may seem very distant from the realism and critically-reflective stance of mainstream documentary traditions, but there are undoubtedly creative possibilities here. A documentary on ancient Rome could, for instance, enable the user to wander the streets of ancient Rome - interacting with the people, performing various set tasks, solving puzzles, etc. This is to move away from the traditional conception of documentary as a mode of representation intimately linked to the authentic texture of reality - opening up the possibility that it might also serve as a mode of simulatory exploration and insight.

• **The Games Paradigm.** A jumble of jigsaw pieces, each depicting a portion of an image of the grandmother. Beside them an empty frame. The user must drag the pieces into their appropriate place within the frame. When they are correctly placed then a section of the grandmother's story plays. Here the documentary takes shape as a jigsaw puzzle. It is structured as a game. Games have a linear character in that they point to a particular goal, but they differ from narratives and arguments in that they place crucial stress on user interaction. Games can take many different forms. They need not employ experiential metaphors, although typically strategic puzzle-solving and spatial exploration are linked. The possibility of linking games-play to documentary representation deserves experimentation. There is a fairly obvious satirical potential but perhaps it could also serve more serious illustrative or argumentative purposes. The problem is once again in making the shift from a representational to an interactive mode, or, more precisely, in finding a satisfactory means of enabling both modes. A naïve view imagines documentary 'shows us reality'. The viewer is positioned at a respectful distance - seeing and listening, but certainly not literally interacting. How can the viewer ever literally interact with an 'authentic record'? And then to interact in terms of a game? There are crucial theoretical and ethical issues to wrestle with here.

• **The Participatory Paradigm.** A web page poses the question: what do you know of your grandmother? Is there any single memory or object that best defines your relationship to her? If so then create a web page that deals with this topic, send us the link and we'll establish an on-line database-documentary of grandmother memories. Here the user is not simply interacting with a pre-constructed piece of documentary multimedia, but is instead called upon to collaborate in the work of documentary creation. This paradigm draws upon the potential of networked multimedia systems to enable literal social interaction/participation. This need not take the form of producing collaborative works. It could also open up

documentary as a field of dialogic exchange – an open forum in which the traditional documentary subject (the people represented) and the wider public (the viewing audience) address social issues via interactive multimedia. Discursive novelty is established here less in terms of the actual content of any particular contribution than in terms of the broadly participatory framework. This need not imply a naïve and utopic vision of public communication. The web is full of examples of focused public interaction, from the websites associated with commercial reality television shows (with their on-line voting, discussion forums, and chat rooms) to the many low-tech lists devoted to specialised (potentially documentary relevant) topics.

It should be stressed that these paradigms are not mutually exclusive. It would be possible to imagine all kinds of combinations of the above. My aim in describing them separately has been to clarify the possibilities, not to envisage five discrete interactive genres.

The Halfeti Project

Halfeti is (or was) a small town on the banks of the Euphrates in southern Turkey. In the middle of last year (2000) it was partially submerged beneath the waters of the Birecik dam – a large new hydro-electric project some 100km north of the Syrian border. I travelled there in early 2000 to document aspects of the town prior to its flooding. My primary focus was on preserving a navigable photographic record of the physical space. I'd been working on programming constructs to enable virtual exploration of imaginary spaces – haunted houses and the like, and the opportunity to apply these constructs to a complex real space was tempting. Another aim, probably less clearly conceived, was to document the responses of the Halfeti people to the prospect of having to abandon their stone homes, cobbled

lanes, and alluvial orchards for a new housing development on the rocky escarpment.

I have no wish to position this project as some kind of realisation of the potential of interactive documentary. Indeed for much of the production phase, I scarcely even considered these larger aesthetic issues. I was mainly concerned with the various technical challenges involved in facilitating a sophisticated level of spatial navigation. I had a very humble sense of the scope of the project at a documentary level. It was the record of a town on the eve of its disappearance.

I had taken over 3000 digital photographs of the town and my associate, Bora Kanra, had recorded some 6 hours of audio and video. This material had to be edited and optimised to fit on a single CD-Rom. The main challenge was in developing an efficient way to piece all this material together into a responsive and spatially cogent interactive experience. After a number of aborted efforts, I was forced to develop specialised authoring software for the creation of multimedia 'virtual tours'. This took considerable time, but made the final work of putting everything together much simpler.

The aim was to employ an experiential paradigm. The user 'wanders' the streets of Halfeti – moving forward and back, turning left and right, looking up and down, etc. Each move represents a jump from one photographic image to another. Choosing a direction to proceed involves clicking on relevant parts of the screen – to turn left, the user clicks at the left of the screen, and so on. Atmosphere sound supports the sense of first-person exploration. Screen hotspots enable access to additional media, so that clicking on the image of a person may, for instance, display interview-based video material.

The lack of grand documentary ambition proved advantageous in ways. There was an emphasis on directly and straightforwardly showing the town. The photographic style is

very frontal. Each photograph represents a view – north, south, east, or west. The images were building blocks, compositionally bound by the requirements of the larger tour. In a similar way, the exploratory interface is deliberately low key, placing the stress on images and sounds of the town rather than ostensible interpretation. Of course none of this is stylistically or interpretively innocent. The avoidance of obvious interpretation is the classic trope of the cinema verite documentary tradition. My point here is that this approach arose from and meshed nicely with the focus on technical implementation. That it also worked aesthetically (and perhaps even interpretively) was a bonus.

As I say, it was only late in the production phase (once most of the technical problems had been solved) that aesthetic/interpretive issues returned - more or less unexpected - to the fore. These issues of selection and combination, and of discursive positioning, suggested that there was something more at stake here than just producing an historical record. These issues harked back to the concerns of traditional documentary, but were also suggestive of another space of aesthetic possibility. They arose from very specific creative issues, so I'll deal with them in those terms.

- **Snow to the East.** Each positional node tended to involve at least four images, one for north, east, south, and western views, so that when you click to the left or the right the view switches ninety degrees in the relevant direction. From a technical perspective, I should have taken more images at each position, but this would have complicated the programming task (I'd been thinking in terms of a vast chessboard-like matrix), push up the file size of the overall work, and take that much longer to photograph. The problem with my approach was that there were no areas of overlap between one compass view and the next. There was overlap if the user moved forward or back, but not if they turned on the spot. Older style, still image based, spatial-exploratory computer games typically employ an hexagonal style matrix that enables six views from any particular position. This

creates a minimal level of visual overlap, ensuring continuity between one turning view and the next. These days, of course, the typical user expects much more than static views. They are accustomed to the seamless panoramas of Quicktime VR and the immersive experience of real-time rendered 3D. In these terms, the approach I adopted in Halfeti is likely to seem anachronistic and experientially weak. Yet apart from technical exigencies, there was another rationale for my approach. I was never going to produce an experience that was equivalent or adequate to the experience of actually exploring Halfeti. I was producing an imperfect record – a very ostensibly stitched together one. The distance between clicking through the streets and walking through them was something vital to the project. There was a need for a mode of simulation that would provide access - but not glib access – to the alterity of another space (and another time). The ambivalent, never quite adequate, sense of spatial continuity also had a creative dimension. I realised this very clearly while piecing together the images of the central town area. It turned out that I had taken images of the area on a number of different days in very different weather conditions. At first I thought that I'd better strive for visual consistency, but it ended up working better to allow sudden shifts from sunshine to snow, daylight to darkness. The same view might even have two potential states - differing depending upon the direction the user approaches it from. It became possible to open up secret corridors of darkness or snow through what was ordinarily a sunny space. This worked to emphasise the constructed (discontinuous) nature of my simulation, but also to enable (and plainly manifest) a creative work of spatial collage.

- **The Sound of Card Playing.** I'd spent most of the time labouring with images – adjusting, organising, and choreographing them. I'd always intended to add atmosphere sound, but the sound was a problem. I really only had what was on the videotape, and most of that was interview-based stuff. It was a matter of searching for all the in-between bits on the videotape, all the moments when nothing was being said and

perhaps some slight bit of atmosphere sound could be extracted. Note to self; in future always bring along a dedicated sound recordist. The sound from videotape is not ideal – all sorts of strange clicks and camera operator grunts make it very difficult to cull out anything very useful. Despite the poor quality of the sound it ended up being crucial to the final project. It made the whole exploratory experience much more compelling. All it took to make navigation through a room of card players come alive was to add a single, twenty-five second sound loop. I'd discovered the obvious truth that sound, even more than vision, is vital to our sense of space. But sound did more than just lift and support the images (lending them greater continuity). It also opened up a kind of dialogue with the static space of the photographs. It introduced a temporal element, but in complex ways – at once reaching out and summoning the other (past) time of Halfeti and yet also constituting a very present-focused musical play. The atmosphere loops are all obviously loops and their loose association with particular images means that moving about becomes more than just spatio-temporal simulation. Navigation becomes a playing with sound and with image sound relations. The pace at which the user moves has a crucial effect on which sounds play. In this way, the experience of sound becomes different for each user. Sound then has an ambivalent status – working both to heighten realism and to open up another terrain of (interactively grounded) distanciation.

• **How to Cross the Euphrates.** Abdullah ran the ferry service across the Euphrates. He rowed back and forth throughout the day – huffing and puffing at the oars, negotiating the difficult currents, and abusing those who annoyed him. It was generally agreed that once the town was flooded the need for his ferry service would disappear and he'd be forced to find work elsewhere. Abdullah emerged as a crucial emblematic figure. Adopting the perspective of an imaginary ferry customer, I photographed him rowing back and forth across the river. Ultimately this provides the basis for the user

to approach the river, climb into the ferry, experience the sights and sounds of the crossing, and then disembark on the opposite side. The interesting point is that crossing the river becomes more than just a spatial transition. It becomes a temporal sequence – a process. This made me aware of the potential to create more than just a static record of a place. It was possible to create navigable sequences that both made spatial sense and also told stories. So, for instance, in one of the crossings the user must click back and forth on the screen to observe donkeys being led down the bank and then placed on the barge. The photographs follow a shot-reverse shot logic. Without disrupting the sense of spatial navigation, they open up a narrative dimension. It gradually dawned on me that there were all sorts of opportunities for subtle interplays of space and time. If I'd realised this earlier, I might have devoted more time to following the trajectories of particular people (characters) rather than concentrating so exclusively on spatial paths. I can now imagine an interactive documentary mode that discovers in space stories and in stories space.

• **The Hidden Phrasebook.** I had played with the idea of introducing game-style interactivity – setting tasks for the user as they roamed about. Perhaps they would need to find a hidden Turkish phrasebook in order to get an English translation of what people were saying. In the end, however, I decided to avoid game elements. They were tempting because they provided an obvious means of motivating the user's exploration, but they also threatened to render Halfeti a mere picturesque tableaux for game-based activity. The exploration that I was trying to encourage was different. It wasn't about solving logical puzzles. It was about engaging – in a limited but audio-visually compelling manner – with the alterity of another place and another time. Perhaps this would provide the basis for increased understanding, but even more importantly I wanted to encourage an emotional response. This response would emerge from the gap between simulation and reality. It was about making loss tangible, or almost so.

Conclusion

This paper has been an attempt to clarify what is at stake in imagining interactive documentary. At a general conceptual level, it specified five different paradigms of interactivity: the hierarchical tree; the associative network; experiential simulation; game play; and networked participation. It then moved on to consider a specific experiment in documentary multimedia production. The creative and theoretical issues that the Halfeti CD-Rom raise indicate that traditional questions of documentary interpretation remain relevant to the interactive terrain. Even an ostensibly non-interpretive, archival piece has all sorts of scope to creatively articulate aspects of space, time and interaction.

In terms of the prospects for developing an interactive documentary genre, theoretical projection is clearly vital, but so too are the realisations that emerge more or less unexpected in the midst of creative practice. We can only imagine so far, then there is the need to get started and see what happens. This should not imply the need to abandon documentary's 'linear' past. On the contrary, it is most likely in the friction between tradition and an as yet unclear future that something new will begin to take shape.

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Ali Karadoğan

Gelişimi, kullanılması ve yaygınlaşması düşünüldüğünde dünyadaki her hangi bir araçtan, düşünmeden, teoriden ya da yaşam tarzından çok daha hızlı yaygınlaştığı kuşku götürmez bir gerçek olan yeni iletişim teknolojilerinin artık insan hayatının pek çok alanını belirleme, yönlendirme ve düzenleme gücüne sahip olduğu yaygın olarak kabul gören bir düşüncedir. Sadece maddi günlük hayatımızın bir parçası olarak kalmakla yetinmeyen, aynı zamanda nesnelere dünyamıza yeni anlamlar katarak biçimlendiren, onu yeni gelişmeler ışığında değiştiren yeni iletişim teknolojileri bir yandan da insani varoluşu kendi varoluşunun kaçınılmaz sonucu haline getirmektedir. Belki biraz ileri giderek Pierre Bourdieu'nun televizyona yönelik, "kültürel üretimin farklı kürelerini, sanatı, edebiyatı, bilimi, felsefeyi, hukuku, çok büyük bir tehlikeyle karşı karşıya bıraktığı" (13) yönündeki eleştirisini bütün medya alanını kapsayacak biçimde genişletmek mümkün. Böyle biraz da "karamsar" bir bakış açısından yola çıkmak daha başlangıçta yazının gideceği yönü de belirle-

mek anlamına geliyor elbette ki; ancak bu bir önyargıdan çok medyanın günümüzde gerek endüstri olarak yapılanması –Ramonet'in deyimiyle "yeni teknolojik ütopya ile tetiklenen tutku fırtınası"– gerek haber üretim süreci ve ilettiği haber içerikleri, gerekse de alan içerisinde faaliyet gösteren profesyonellerin ideolojileri ve bu ideolojilerin haber metinlerinde ifadesini bulmasında yaşadığı değişimden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu değişim örgütsel anlamda medya kurumlarının geçirdiği değişimden farklı olarak hem gazeteciliğin, hem televizyonculuğun hem de her iki alanda –internetin, kablolu interaktif sistemlerin vb diğer yeni iletişim teknolojilerinin devreye girmesiyle– haberin tanımının ve "değeri"nin yeni bir evreye girmiş olmasından dolayı da bir değişim yaşamaktadır. Haberin geleneksel tanımını medya alanındaki "geleneksel" diyebileceğimiz ekonomik, kültürel ve toplumsal yapının değişmeye –ulus devletlerin hakim olduğu bir dünyadan uluslararası şirketlerin uluslararası davrandıkları bir dünyaya geçiş, uluslararası medya gruplarının ortaya çıkması, sayısal sistemlerin hakim olduğu yeni bir teknolojik devrimin teknolojik alt yapıyı değiştirmiş olması, bunların sonucunda serbestleşme (deregülasyon) tartışmalarıyla kamu yayıncılığı düşüncesinin aşınması vb gibi-

başlamasıyla değişikliğe uğramıştır. Ekonominin ve kültürün küresel olarak yayıldığı, "tek uygarlığın" dünya ölçeğinde genişlediği ve "küresel bilgi toplumu" diye adlandırılan, bilişim ve iletişim teknolojileriyle at başı gelişim gösteren yeni oluşum dünyaya da yeni bir çehre kazandırmaktadır. Dünyayı bir örümcek ağı gibi saran bu yeni oluşumun yarattığı "küresel bilgi altyapısı" yeryüzünde yaşayanların zihinlerini ve psikolojilerini de sarmalamaktadır. Ramonet, Armand Mattelard'dan aktararak "bu sözü edilen altyapının insanlara yararlı olması için, iletişimin dünya üzerinde herhangi bir kısıtlama olmaksızın dolaşabilmesi gerektiğini" belirtir (149). Ramonet bu nedenle ABD'nin ekonominin küreselleşmesi adına tüm ağırlığını, aykırı yönetmeliklerin kaldırılmasından yana koyduğunu dile getirir; çünkü mümkün olan en çok sayıda ülkenin sınırlarını bu serbest bilgi akışına açmakla Amerikan iletişim ve eğlence endüstrisi devlerinin ekmeğine yağ sürülmüş olacaktır.

Geleneksel olarak "bir haberi iletme, bir bakıma, bir olguyu ya da olayı yalnızca kesin biçimiyle betimlemek değil, okurun bu olayın derin anlamını kavramasını sağlayacak bir dizi bağlamsal parametreleri de tanımlamak anlamına geliyordu. Buysa gazeteciliğin temel sorularının cevabını vermek demektir: Olayı, kim, ne zaman, nerede, nasıl, neden, hangi araçlarla, hangi koşullarda gerçekleştirdi? ve bütün bunlar hangi sonuçları doğurdu?

Bu geleneksel tanım içerisinde haberin "nesnel", "tarafsız" ve "dengeli" olabileceğine dair de güçlü bir inanç vardır. Bu kavramlar habere farklı yaklaşan pek çok araştırmacı için kuşkulu da olsa haber değeri tartışmalarında öne çıkan kavramlardır. Bu bakış açısı içerisinde "bireyin toplumsal olgular karşısında değer yargularından arınarak, toplumsal gerçekliğin "nesnel" bilgisine ulaşabileceği inancı egemendir" (İnal, 1994: 165). Burada medyanın insanları aydınlatabileceğine dair bir

inanç vardır; çünkü hala kamu yararı düşüncesi haber üretim sürecinde etkili faktörlerden biridir. Yanlılık ve nesnellik pek çok kişi tarafından haber medyasının siyasal ve ideolojik rolü ile ilişkilendirilmiştir (Hackett, 1998: 31). Bu nedenle bu kavramlar politikacıların olduğu kadar akademisyenlerin de ilgisini çekmiştir. Bazı araştırmacılar (Brood, 1955) dayatılan yanlı yayın politikaları ile gazeteciliğin nesnellik ideali arasındaki ayrımı verili kabul etmişlerdir. Ancak medyanın ideolojik işleyişinin açıklamaya yönelik analizlerde "yanlılık" ve "nesnellik" kavramlarının işe yararlılığı git-tikçe sorgulanır hale gelmiştir. Hatta Stuart Hall gibi araştırmacılar yanlılık kavramsallaştırmasının bütünüyle yetersiz olduğunu bile iddia etmişlerdir. Peki medya araştırmalarında "yanlılık" ve "nesnellik" kavramlarından ne anlaşılmalıdır? Genellikle yanlılık haberde "olguların" aktarımına "yorumların" sızması olarak görülür. Bu çalışmalarda yanlılık birbiriyle tam tutarlı olmayan iki momentten oluşur. Bunlardan birincisi, ifade edilen görüşler arasında "dengeliğin" olmadığı; ikincisi de "gerçekliğin" taraf tutularak çarpıtıldığıdır (Hackett, 1998: 33). Bu bakış açısının altında yatan, medyanın gerçek dünyayı doğru ve dengeli bir biçimde yansıtılabileceği düşüncesi ve doğru, dengeli bir haberciliğin önündeki en büyük engelin değerlerin habere girmesine izin veren siyasal önyargı ve tutumlar olduğu düşüncesidir.

Bu yaklaşımın karşısında ise haber üretimini günlük pratiklerden yola çıkarak anlamaya çalışan, haberi gerçekliğin bir tür "inşası" olarak ele alan fenomenolojist çalışmalar yer alır (Tuchman, 1978; Fishman, 1990). Bu yaklaşımlar içerisindeki vurgu zaman zaman örgütler, gazetecilik pratikleri, profesyonellerin ideolojileri üzerine kaysa da temel olarak haberin ne olduğu sorusu araştırmaların merkezinde yer alır. Bunun nedeni ise haberin dinamik doğasının anlaşılmasının aslında içinde var olduğu toplumsal-kültürel-ekonomik-

politik sistemin de işleyiş ve var oluş mantığını deşifre edebilme gücü taşımaktadır; bu güç bir yandan sistemin zayıf yanlarını ortaya koyabilme gücüne sahipken ve onu tehdit etme potansiyeli taşıırken, bir yandan da sistemin yürütücüleri tarafından hakimiyet altında tutularak "vatandaş"lar üzerinde bir egemenlik sağlama aracı olarak da kullanılmaktadır. Bourdieu, televizyon'un "nüfusun çok büyük bir bölümünün beyinlerinin oluşturulmasında bir tür fiili tekele sahip" olduğunu söylemektedir (22). Haberin -görüntünün- denetim altında tutularak, bilgi akışı kontrol edilerek bir savaşın nasıl "kazanıldığını" Körfez Savaşı'nda bütün dünya çok yakından anladı. Bu nedenle günümüzde haber üzerinde girişilen mücadele bir yanıyla politik bir mücadelenin parçası olup, bu mücadele içinde yer alan aktörlerin söylemleri arasındaki etkileşimle ilgilenmesi gerektiği kadar bu söylemlerin içinde hareket ettiği uluslararası endüstriyel yapıyla da ilgilenmek zorunda olan siyasal iletişimin de odağında yer alır. Bu anlamda "haberin politikası"nu saptamak kamusal alanda çarpışan farklı söylemleri ve girişilen mücadeleleri anlamayı da kolaylaştırır.

Haberin "dengeliği" ve "çarpıtılması" arasındaki gerilim epistemolojik anlamda da varlığını sürdürür. Örneğin "rölativist bir epistemoloji yanlılıktan birbirleriyle yarışan ve uzlaşmayan, her biri kendi içinde geçerli dünya görüşüne dengeli biçimde yer vererek kaçınılabileceğinin altına çizer" (Hackett, 1998: 38). Ancak pozitivist bir epistemolojiden yola çıkan yaklaşım, "yanlı davranan bir gazetecinin geçici de olsa görünürlüğünü dengelediği 'olguların' son kertede bilinebileceğinin kabulü üzerine kuruludur" (Hackett, 1998: 38). Bu bakış açıları temelde toplumsal gerçeği, üzerine gözlem yapıp haber yazdıkları olaylardan ayrı olarak değerlendirirler, ancak bu bakış açısına "toplumsal ve siyasal dünyanın önceden verili olmadığı ve medyanın yansıtacağı 'sağlam' bir gerçeklik olmadığı" öne sürülerek

karşı çıkmıştır (Hall, 1994); çünkü anlamların hepsi toplumsal süreçler içerisinde inşa edilmekte ve medya da bu inşa sürecinde bağımsız bir gözlemci olmak yerine aktif bir katılımcı haline gelmiştir.

Bu bakış açısı içerisinde "medya 'orada duran' ve dünyaya ilişkin 'önemli' olaylardan oluşan nesnel gerçekliğin bir yazıcısı-yansıtıcısı-göstergesi" (Molotch ve Lester'den aktaran Hackett, 1998: 41) olarak görülmez. Çünkü Hall'ün belirttiği gibi "gerçek, gerçekliğin belirli bir tarzda kurulmasıydı. Medya 'gerçekliği' yalnızca yeniden üretmiyor, tanımlıyordu. Gerçeklik, tanımları, tüm bir dilsel pratikler yoluyla desteklenip üretiliyordu ve bu dilsel pratikler aracılığıyla 'gerçek'in seçilmiş tanımları temsil ediliyordu" (67).

Gerçeğin dilin dolayımlayıcı yapısından geçerek deneyimlendiği ve dolayımının bir çarpıtma veya gerçeğin yansıtılması değil, gerçeğin kurulduğu etken bir toplumsal süreç olduğu düşüncesi haberin ve medyanın anlaşılma biçimini etkilemiştir. Medyayı böyle bir perspektiften ele alan *Medya'nın Zorbalığı* kitabında Ignacio Ramonet, medyanın dünyanın yaşadığı toplumsal, ekonomik, kültürel ve siyasi yeniden yapılanma içerisinde bulunduğu yeni biçimi, değişen yapıda haberin ve gazeteciliğin geleneksel biçiminin nasıl değiştiğini analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Göstergibilim, medya, jeopolitik ve kültür tarihi konularında çalışan, Paris Denis Dederot Üniversitesi'nde iletişim kuramı profesörlüğü ile Madrid Carlos III ve Saint Petersburg Üniversitesinde öğretim üyeliği yapan Ramonet, *Le Monde Diplomatique*'in ve *Manière de voir*'in yayın yönetmenidir. Çalışmaları arasında yer alan *Le chewing-gum des yeux* (Gözlerin Çiklet, 1981), *La communication vitime des marchands* (Tüccarların Kurbanı İletişim, 1989), *Nouveaux Pouvoirs, nouveaux maîtres du monde* (Yeni İktidarlar, Dünyanın Yeni Efendileri, 1996), *Geopolitique du chaos* (Kaosun Jeopolitiği, 1997) gibi kitap-

ları saymak aslından onun medya konusuna nasıl baktığını da tanımlamamıza yardımcı olur. Noam Chomsky'yle birlikte (*Cómo nos venden la moto*, 1995) de bir kitap yazar Ramonet 1997'de *Le Monde Diplomatique*'te demokratik kontrolden muaf finans pazarlarına ve dev şirketlere bayrak açan bir makale yazıp *Attack* adıyla anılan *Vatandaşlara Yardım İçin Mali İşlemlerin Vergilendirilmesi Birliği*'ni kurdu. Ramonet *Medyanın Zorbalığı* adlı kitabında (kitabın asıl adı *La Tyrannie de la communication-Medyanın Tiranlığı'dır*) medyanın değişen ekonomik yapı içerisinde aldığı yeni biçim üzerinde durmakta ve bu ulusötesi şirketler zamanında uluslararası ekonomik aktörler haline gelen medya şirketlerinin yarattığı değişimleri ele almaktadır.

Temelde basının içinde bulunduğu bunaldıktan yola çıkan Ramonet'nin kitabı pek çok alt başlık barındıran on bölümden oluşmaktadır. Bourdieu'nun "iletişimin en korkunç yanı iletişimin bilinçaltıdır" sözüyle başlayan birinci bölüm "Medyatik Mesihçilik" başlığını taşımaktadır. "Telefonun, televizyonun, bilgisayarın birbirine eklenmesi, sayısal işlem sisteminin hünerlerini temel alan, interaktif yeni bir iletişim aracının doğmasına yol açıyor" (7) diyen Ramonet, dünyanın ekonomik devlerinin; telefon, sine, televizyon, reklamcılık, video, kablolu yayın ve bilişim alanlarının devleri arasında gerçekleşen gruplaşmalar ve bunun sağladığı ekonomik güçle oluşturulan, elektronik ve uydularla entegre olmuş, sınırsız, anında ve sürekli çalışan kusursuz bir bilgi ve iletişim pazarının düşünüyü kurduğunu belirterek, bu ekonomik devlerin bu yapıyı sermaye piyasası ve kesintisiz finans akışı modeli üzerine kurmayı istediğini belirtmektedir (8). İnternetin ve uydularının genişlemesiyle basının bu "yeni teknolojik ütopya ile tetiklenen tutku fırtınasına" karşı duramayacağını altını çizen Ramonet, tekellerin yeniden ortaya

çıkmasının yeni bir "düşünce polisi" şüphesini doğurduğunu vurgulamaktadır.

Eğlence endüstrisinin kafasındaki büyük endüstriyel şemada, bilginin (haber) her şeyden önce mal olarak ele alındığını, bu nedenle de, medyanın "insanları aydınlatıp demokratik tartışmaya zenginlik kazandırmak olan temel misyonunun" bozulmaya başladığını belirtmektedir (9). Ramonet, yakın geçmişte yaşanan Lady Diana ve Clinton-Lewinsky olaylarının bu eğilimi çok açık bir biçimde ortaya çıkardığını söylemektedir. Bu iki olay sırasında medyanın yarattığı "aşırı medyalasma"nın her zaman doğru bilgilendirme anlamına gelmediğini vurgulayan Ramonet, Lady Diana olayının "dünya ölçeğinde ayın"e, "dünya ölçeğinde psikolojik darama"ya "bütünsel bir medyatik şoka", "duygusal bir küreselleşmeye" (10) dönüştüğünü bunun da medyadaki bir "kısa devre"den kaynaklandığını söylemektedir. Ramonet, "Diana uğradığı, ölümle sonuçlanan kazadan sonra medyada bir tür kısa devre oluştu, yani halkın benimsediği bir dizi roman, bir telenovela kahramanı birden ciddi, örnek basın ilgilendiği bir kişilik statüsü kazandı. Diana magazincilerin dar ve folklorik dünyasının sınırlarını aşarak, politik basının düzeyli, önemli konuların ele alındığı sütunlarına doğru giriverdi" diyerek bu kısa devreyi açıklar (14).

Televizyonun Körfez Savaşı'yla birlikte kazandığı görüntüye dayalı haber anlayışının haberciliğin doruğuna çıkıp zaferini ilan etmesi, basının kendisini görüntülü haber kaynakları karşısında yenik hissetmesine yol açtığını belirten Ramonet, basının bu durumu yeni haber alanları keşfederek değiştirdiğini söylemektedir. Ramonet'ye göre bu yeni haber alanları "tanınmış kişilerin özel yaşamları ile kokuşmuşluğun ve çıkarıcılığın yol açtığı rezaletlerdi." Bu ise (araştırmacı gazeteciliğe karşı olarak) "ifşa gazeteciliği" olarak adlandırılan şeydi (18). Bu tür olayları ortaya çı-

karmak için belirleyici olan kişinin saygınlığına gölge düşürecek belgeler bulup yayınlamaktır. Bir gazetenin ya da televizyonun bulup ortaya çıkardığı belgelerden sonra diğer gazete ve televizyonlar olayı atlamamak için "mutlak acelecilik içinde" olayın üstüne gitmeye başladıklarını belirten Ramonet, bu "taklitçiliğin" "kartopu etkisi yaparak bir tür kendi kendisini zehirleme olarak" çalıştığını vurgular. "Medya bir konudan ne kadar çok söz ederse, kolektif olarak, o konunun o ölçüde kaçınılmaz, önemli, yaşamsal olduğunu, o olaya daha çok zaman, daha çok olanak, daha çok muhabir ayırmak gerektiğini düşünmeye başlar" (23) demektir. Ramonet, bu durumun internet ile daha da ciddi bir hal aldığı belirtmekte; internetin -Daniel Bounoux'dan aktararak- medyanın elinde bulundurduğu bir güç olmadığını, taklitçiliği buluşturmaya yarayan bir araç ve hepimizin kattığını söz konusu "görsel-işitsel cinayet girişimi"nde (23) pek çok kişinin linç edildiğini belirtir.

Ramonet, televizyon haber programlarının, "olayı görüntüsüyle verme" olgusunun yarattığı büyü sayesinde, haber kavramının içini boşaltarak onu yavaş yavaş heyecan yaratma bataklığının içine gömdüğünü belirterek, aşırı heyecan yaratmanın aşırı bilgilendirmenin karakteristik bir yönü haline geldiğini vurgular. Bu gelişme sonucunda şöyle formüle edilebilecek yeni bir haber denklemi ortaya çıkmıştır: "haber programı izlerken duyumsadığınız heyecan gerçekse, haberin kendisi de gerçektir" (24). Ramonete göre, bu da haberin her zaman basitçe kitlelerin izleyebileceği görüntülere dönüştürülebilir ve belirli sayıda "heyecan parçacığına" ayrıştırılabilecek bir şey olduğu düşüncesini doğurmuştur.

Ramonet, "medyatik taklitçiliğin" ve olayın üzerine aşırı heyecanla gidilmesinin en önemli sonucunun, dünyada bundan böyle bir "medyatik mesih" in ortaya çıkması bekleni-

yormuş izleniminin doğmasına yol açması olduğunu söylemektedir. Ramonet'ye göre "medya düzeni, yalnızca teknolojik olarak değil, psikolojik olarak da buna hazır görünüyordu." Bu medyatik mesih, "politikayı 'televizyon dinciliğine' dönüştüren, dünyayı hiçbir eyleme girişmeden değiştirmeyi düşleyen, devrimsiz bir kökten evrimi gerçekleştirmek gibi meleklere özgü bir savla ortaya çıkacak biri olacak"tı (26).

Ramonet'nin insanların medyaya bakışlarını tanımlamak için kullandığı *Kuşku Çağı* kitabının ikinci bölümünün de adı. Temel olarak 60'lı ve 70'li yıllarda basına duyulan güvenin -özellikle Watergate ve Vietnam Savaşı dolayısıyla- bugün için, kuşkuya, güvensizliğe ve zor inanılığa dönüşmesinin nedenleri üzerinde duran Ramonet, bunun nedenleri arasında ilk olarak "haber değerlerinin" geçirdiği değişimi göstermektedir. Haber değerinin "doğruluk"tan, "ilginç"liğe doğru kaymasının temel bir değişim olduğunu belirten Ramonet, televizyonun körfez savaşından bu yana medya arasındaki iktidarı ele geçirdiğini söylemektedir. Ona göre, "televizyon, medya hiyerarsisinde baş köşeye otururken, öteki iletişim araçlarına kendi olumsuz yanlarını dayatıyor ve bunu öncelikle, görüntü karşısında beslediği büyütlenmeyi onlara dayatarak yapıyor. Dayandığı temel düşünce şu: Yalnızca görülebilir olanın haber niteliği vardır; görülebilir olmayan, görüntüsü olmayan, televizyonda kullanılamaz, dolayısıyla medyatik olarak varlığı söz konusu değildir" (30). Görüntünün kral olduğu, gerçeğin ancak görüntü var olduğu zaman gerçek olarak kabul edildiği bir düzende gerçekleri görünmez kılmanın en iyi yolunun görüntü alınmasını engellemek olduğunu vurgulayan Ramonet, bu uygulamanın sansürün "demokratik biçimi"ni yarattığını belirtmektedir. Sansürün bu biçiminde otokratik sansürün tersisine haberin birikmesi, doyum noktasına ulaşması, aşırılılaşması, bollaşması hedefleniyordu (32). Bu sansür bileşenle-

rinden biri de "paravana etkisi" olarak adlandırılan şeydir. Ramonet'ye göre bazı olaylar "güncel alının ritmini öylesine abartıyordu ki, geriye kalan haberler silikleşiyor, boğuklaşıyor, dağlıyordu. Öyle ki, önemli olaylar medyanın paranasının ardında görünmez hale gelip dünyanın dikkatinden kaçabiliyordu (35). Buna örnek olarak ABD'nin Aralık 1989'daki Rumen "devrimi"nden yararlanıp aynı tarihlerde Panama'yı işgal etmesi verilebilir.

Ramonet bu bölümde "canlı yayın ideolojisi" nedeniyle televizyon haberlerinin sunuluş modelinin değiştiğini belirtmektedir. İzleyiciye bir Hollywood filmi gibi sunulan ve kurgusal yapıya sahip bir gösteri niteliğinde olan haber bölümlerinin yerini "spor gazeteciliği modeli"nin aldığını belirtmektedir. Bu yeni modelde yaşamın bir spor karşılaşması olarak ele alındığını, önemli olanın yalnızca olayın görüntüleri olduğunu vurgulayan Ramonet, burada yorumun en alt düzeye indirildiğini belirtir. Haber vermenin, bilgilendirmenin maç yorumlamakla aynı şey olduğunun kabul edilmesinin en önemli sonucunun "herkesin gazeteci olabileceği" düşüncesinin ortaya çıkması olduğunu belirten Ramonet'ye göre artık önemli olan kurulan bağlantı ve bu bağlantının "gerçeklik etkisi"ydi (39). Kişi olay yerindeyse bu anlattıklarının doğru olduğunun göstergesiydi. Bu canlı yayın ideolojisinde "tanuk" mutlak değere dönüşmüştü ve gazetecilere de "tanuk" olmaları dayatılıyordu (39).

Ramonet buradaki temel değişikliğin televizyon haber sisteminin inandırıcılık değerinde gerçekleştiğini vurgular. Görsel-ışitsel haberleşme tarihinde şimdiye kadar iki tür inandırıcılık modelinin var olduğunu belirten Ramonet, inandırıcılığın sıfır yorum üzerine kurulu olduğu ilk modelden sonra, 70'lerde CBS kanalının sunucusu Walter Cronkite ile kendini kabul ettiren ikinci tür bir modelin ortaya çıktığını belirtir; bu model "önceki modeli

oluşturan öğelerin tam tersini içeriyordu. Konuşan ses artık anonim değildi, bir yüzü ve bir adı vardı; kimliği açık olarak belliydi; bu ses televizyon izleyicisine, gözünün içine bakarak seslenen sunucunun sesiydi" (40). Üçüncü inandırıcılık modelini oluşturan bugünkü düzendeyse sunucunun yüzü silikleşmektedir. Bunun nedeni öncelikle yirmi dört saat sürekli, "canlı ve anında" haber sunan kanalların tek bir sunucuyla yürütülmesinin olanaksızlığıdır; böyle yapılırsa sunucu tükenir. Bu nedenle bundan sonra sistemin temelini oluşturacak olan sürekli olarak kesintiye uğrayan hareketler (41).

"Televizyon haber üreten bir aygıt değil, olayları yeniden üreten bir aygıttır" (42) diyen Ramonet, *Basın, İktidarlar ve Demokrasi* başlıklı üçüncü bölümde basınla iktidarlar arasındaki çelişkinin hala varlığını sürdürdüğünü belirtmektedir. Ramonet'ye göre bu durum iktidarın artık yalnızca politik iktidarla özdeşleştirilmemesi ve dikey, hiyerarşik ve otoriter bir iktidardan, yatay, ağ oluşturan ve uzlaşımçı bir iktidara geçilmiş olmasından dolayı daha karmaşık bir hal almıştır (46-47). Ramonet burada yıllarca "olumlu kahraman" olarak sunulan, 70'li yıllarda modern toplumun kahramanı sayılan gazetecinin günümüzde neden "bekçi köpeğine" dönüşüp, utanç sınıflamasında başı çeker hale geldiğini sorgular.

Günümüzde Gazeteci Olmak başlıklı bölümde Ramonet, bugünkü koşullarda gazeteciliğin mümkün olup olmadığını tartışır. Sistemin artık gazeteciler olmadan da işleyebileceğini belirten Ramonet, gazetecilik mesleğinin bir "Taylorizm" uygulamasıyla karşı karşıya olduğunu vurgular; çünkü haber artık tam anlamıyla bir metaya dönüşmüş durumdadır: "Gerçeğe ya da vatandaşlık bağlamındaki etkinliğe bağlı özgün bir değeri yoktur" (69). Bu değişim haberin olay-gazeteci-vatandaş şeması içindeki işleyişini de değiştirmiştir. Olay ile vatandaş arasında "dolayımlayıcı" rolü oynayan

gazeteci artık bu rolü yerine getirememektedir; çünkü, medya kendisini "arında haber ideolojisi"ne kaptırdığından olaylar üzerine düşünme zamanı ksalmıştır.

Televizyon Haber Programlarının Sonu mu Geliyor? başlıklı bölümde Ramonet, bu soruya "kuşkusuz öyle" diye yanıt verir. Bunun nedenlerini "haber sahneleme olgusunun gerçekliğe ağır bastığı, programların haber-gösteri niteliğine büründüğü televizyon sisteminin kendisinde aramak" (93) gerektiğini belirten Ramonet, tv programlarının "kitlelerle iletişim kurmada kabalığı ve bayağılığı temel alan" (94), "insan yaşamının tv gösterisinin ham maddesi olmaktan öte bir şey olmadığı" (96) "tele-çöplük" programları haline geldiğini söyler. Tv programlarındaki bu değişim üzerine yaptığı vurgu Ramonet'yi televizyonun savaşlar konusundaki tavrını da sorgulamaya götürür. 1982'deki Falkland Adaları Savaşı, ABD'nin 1983'de Granada'yı işgal etmesi, Fransızların 1988'de Cad'la girdiği savaş, 1991 yılındaki Körfez Savaşı "aşırı medyatikleşmiş bu dünyada halkla ilişkilerin dayattığı buyruklar dikkate alınmaksızın yürütülemeyen büyük politik promosyon işlemlerine dönüştüğü"nü (105) belirtir. Görüntünün anlamı belirlediği, anlamın ise artık görülerek dolaşıma girdiği bir dünyada savaşların sonucunu belirlemek için görüntü üzerinde hakimiyet kurmak savaş başlanmadan kazanmak demektir.

Televizyonun Ceset Severliği başlıklı bölüm temelde medyadaki aşırılıkların ele alındığı ve incelendiği bir bölüm. Özellikle Rumen "devrimi" sırasında medyanın oynadığı rol üzerinde duran Ramonet medyanın bu konuda haberleri nasıl "yarattığı", "inşa ettiği"ni medyanın Romanya konusunu işlerken ele aldığı benzerlik ve mitleri açıklayarak sorgular. Ne pahasına olursa olsun "heyecan yaratmayı amaçlayan medya" bu konuda "komplo" ve bir "benzerlik"ten; komünizm ile Nazizm arasında kurduğu benzerlikten yararlanır. Bu iki miti ta-

mamlayan bir diğer figür ise, Dracula'nun ülkesinde etki uyandırması hiç de zor olmayan "canavar" figürüydü.

Medyanın mit yaratma sürecini tekeline aldığı bir başka savaş ise Körfez Savaşı'dır. *Medyaya Özgü Üç Mit* başlıklı bölümde medyanın Körfez Savaşı sırasında nasıl mitler yaratarak zihnimize ve algılarımıza yön verdiğini, Körfez Savaşı'nda "canlı tarihe" dayanarak ortaya konan üç miti tanımlayarak açıklar. Savaşla birlikte medyanın günlük hayatımıza soktuğu -temel özellikleri hayatta kalma savaşını vermek olan- üç nesne; *gaz maskesi*, *Hayalet* adı verilen radara yakalanmayan Amerikan bombardıman uçağı F 117 Stealth ve Füzesavar bir füze olan *Patriot* (Vatansever) mit-sel bir değer kazanmıştır.

Yeni İmparatorluklar bölümünde ise, dünyada hakim hale gelen yeni küresel altyapı ve bunun etrafından oluşan yeni gruplaşmalar ve ekonomik rekabet konusu tartışılmaktadır. Bu bölümde yeni tutkusu "iletişim zincirini bütünüyle hakimiyet altına almak" (152) olan yeni bir ekonomik düzenin ekonomik alandaki faaliyetlerini tanımlamaya çalışan Ramonet, "Küresel kültürün", "küresel bilgi toplumu" dayandığı ekonomik temelleri sorgulamaya çalışır.

Son bölümde ise gazeteciliğin uğradığı prestij kaybının temel nedenlerinin aslında ekonomik bağlamda yaşadığı etkilenmeden bağımsız olarak gazeteciliğin bazı temel kavramlarının uğradığı değişimde yattığı vurgulanmaktadır. Bu değişimin başında ise haberin kavram olarak geçirdiği değişim gelmektedir. Yakın zamana kadar haberin "bir haberi iletmek, bir bakıma, bir olguyu ya da olayı yalnızca kesin biçimiyle betimlemek değil, okurun bu olayın derin anlamını kavramasını sağlayacak bir dizi bağlamsal parametreleri de tanımlamak anlamına geliyordu" (157) diyen Ramonet, yeni koşullar altında "medya hiyerarşisinde egemen bir yeri olan ve kendi

modelini giderek yaygınlaştıran televizyonun etkisiyle, bu durum değişikliğe uğradığını belirtir (157). Özellikle "canlı ve anında yayın ideolojisi" nedeniyle yeni bir haber kavramının bütün öteki medyaya dayatıldığını vurgulayan Ramonet, haberi iletmenin bundan sonra "olayın öyküsünü oluşum halinde göstermek, başka deyişle izleyicilerin olaylara 'tanık' olmasını sağlamak anlamına geldiğini" (157) belirtir. Ramonet'e göre ikinci değişim güncellik kavramında ortaya çıktı. Güncel olanın artık egemen medyanın ekranlara taşıdığı şey haline geldiğini vurgulayan Ramonet, bunun da "görmek=anlamak" denkleminin hakim hale gelmesine neden olduğunu belirtir. Ramonet'e göre artık medyada haber yapmak "gerçeği senaryolaştırmak", "haberi sahneye koymak", "haberi tasarlanan senaryoya uydurma eğilimi" (75) anlamına gelmektedir. Bütün bunlar altında yatan ise, farklı (yazı, ses, görüntü) gösterge sistemlerinin tek bir sistem altında birleştiren "sayısal devrim" dir.

Değişime uğrayan üçüncü kavram ise haber zamanı kavramıdır. İnternetin haber çevrimini süre olarak kısaltması, medyanın olayları vurgulama süresinin anında, canlı olarak ortaya çıkmasını neden olmaktadır. Bu duruma sadece radyo ve televizyonun uyum sağlatabilmesi medya arasında hakimiyetin bu araçlar yönünde, özellikle televizyon yönünde, kurulmasına neden olmaktadır. Bu koşullar altında değişen bir diğer kavram ise haberin doğruluğu kavramıdır. Ramonet, yeni gelişmeler ışığında bir haberin doğruluğunun "nesnel, kesin ölçütlere uygunluğu ve kaynağından aktarılmasıyla değil, öteki medyanın da aynı bilgileri tekrarlayıp 'doğrulamalarıyla' doğruluk kazandığını vurgulayarak, tekrarlanan kanıtlanmanın yerini aldığını" belirtmektedir (159).

Ramonet bütün bunlar sonucunda hala temel bir yanlışın devam ettiğini belirtmektedir; "salondaki koltuğuna rahat biçimde yerle-

şip, ekranda kendisine sunulan...imgelerden oluşan olaylar çağlayanını izleyen vatandaşların çoğunun dünyada olup bitenlerin kendisine ciddi biçimde aktarıldığını düşünüyor" (162). Bu "bütünüyle yanlış" diyen Ramonet bu yanlışın üç nedeni olduğunu belirtmektedir: Bunlardan ilki, "bir kurgu olarak hazırlanan haber programlarının insanlara haber sunmak için değil, onlara eğlendirmek için yapılmış" olması. İkincisi "kısa ve parçalar halinde sunulan haberlerin birbiri ardından hızla geçişinin, iki yönlü olarak işlev görmesi, yani bir yandan aşırı ölçüde bilgilendirirken bir yandan da insanı bilgiden yoksun kılan olumsuz etki yaratması". Üçüncü olarak da, "hiçbir çaba harcamadan bilgi edinmeyi düşünmenin, uygarlık yolunda seferber olmaktan çok, basının yarattığı mitten kaynaklanan bir yanlış olması" (162). Ramonet bundan böyle haberin üç temel niteliğe sahip olması gerektiğini belirtmektedir: Kolay anlaşılabilirlik, sürat, eğlendiricilik (163).

Genel bir değerlendirme yapmak gerekirse aslında Ramonet'nin de Jean Baudrillard'a uyararak haber denilen şeyin "ne bir iletişim ne de bir anlam biçimi" (Baudrillard, 1991:21) olduğu düşüncesini paylaştığını söylemek mümkün. Kimilerince "üçüncü endüstriyel devrim" olarak adlandırılan bugünün iletişim destekli ekonomileri, her zamankinden daha fazla gazetecilere, iletişimcilere boyun eğdiren bir yapıya bürünmeye başlamıştır. Bu gücünü önce işin profesyonelleri üzerinde uygulayan daha sonra da kısmen onlar aracılığıyla kültürel üretimin farklı alanları -edebiyat, sanat, bilim vb gibi- üzerinde hakim kılmaya çalışan bu iletişim destekli ekonomiler habercilik alanının tümüyle kendine özgü yeni bir kültürel mantık edinmesine yol açmaktadır. Bu da kendisiyle birlikte izleyici kitesinin de değişikliğe uğraması sonucunu getirmektedir. Ramonet bütün bu gelişmelerin altında ABD'nin öncülük ettiği küreselleşme mantığının yattığını vurgulamasına karşın bu mantı-

ğın ideolojik alanda karşılığını bulan ekonomik öncüllerini tartışmadan doğrudan habercilik alanına yansıyan yönleri üzerinde durması kitabın söylemek istediklerinin biraz muğlak kalmasına neden olsa da bu durum kitabın günümüz dünyasının içinde bulunduğu durumda iletişimi nasıl kullandığını anlamak konusunda gerekli bilgi ve bakış açısını bize sunduğu rahatlıkla görülebilir.

Kaynakça

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Kültürel Bellek

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Aytaç Yıldız

George Gerbner'in "ekme tezi" kadar, bu tezinin temellerini oluşturan "bildiğimiz şeylerin çoğunu hiçbir zaman kişisel olarak deneyimleyemeyiz...bize aslında sürekli olarak öyküler anlatılır" (17) sözleri de yaygın olarak bilinir. Gerbner'a bunları söyleten, bir öykü anlatıcısı olarak gördüğü "televizyon" üzerine yaptığı çalışmaları kuşkusuz. Yalnızca Gerbner değil, birçok medya kuramcısı ve sosyolog da (Hall, Baudrillard, Schiller, Murdock, Williams) öykü, gerçek ve televizyon üçgenindeki yoğun ve karmaşık tartışmalara değinerek kendilerine katkıda bulunmuşlardır ve bu durum günümüzde de devam etmektedir. Biraz daha geniş bir bakış açısından, tartışılan konunun aslında birbirini tamamlayan iki bölümü olduğunu görürüz. Bunlardan ilki, matbaanın yaygınlaşması ve Endüstri Devrimi'ne kadar olan kısım, diğeri ise "kitle kültürü" kavramının ortaya çıktığı ve televizyonun başat rol oynamaya başladığı dönemdir. Bu iki dönem arasındaki en belirgin fark, anlatılan öykünün niteliğinin ve öykü anlatıcısının değişmiş olmasıdır. Her ne kadar Gerbner'ı takip ederek, ikinci dönemin öykü yapıcısı ve anlatıcısı olarak "televizyon"u gösterebilsek de tüm bu tartışmaları yaratan ve bunlara temel sağlayan ilk dönemi bilmenin ve anlamının gerekliliği açıkça ortadadır.

Peki neydi bize anlatılan öyküler? İnsanlık tarihi boyunca efsaneler, mitler, dinler ve bunların görsel yansıması olan ritüeller, kuşaktan kuşağa nasıl taşındı? Bunların karakteristik özellikleri nelerdi, toplumsal bellekte nasıl bir yer edinmişlerdi? Bütün bu tarihsel akış içinde yazının bulunuşu, fonetik alfabe ve belki de en önemlisi matbaa bu süreci ne derece etkileyip dönüşüme uğrattı? İşte tüm

bu sorulara yanıt bulmaya yardımcı olacak önemli bir eser, Jan Assmann'ın *Kültürel Bellek*'i kısa bir süre önce Türkçe'ye çevrildi.

Kültürel Bellek iki ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. "Teorik Temeller" başlığını taşıyan birinci bölüm kuramsal tartışmaları ve tanımlamaları içeriyor. Yazar bu bölümde toplumsal hatırlamanın biçimleri ve ritüel-metinsel bağdaşıklık, gelenek, bellek ve kanon gibi önemli kavramları sunuyor ve bu kavramlarla birlikte kültürel belleği, tartışarak açıklamaya çalışıyor. Yine aynı bölümde Assmann çok önemli bir konuyu, anlatılan öyküler ve mitlerin niteliği ve işlevlerini gözler önüne seriyor ve bunların tarihsel süreçte toplumsal ve kültürel belleğin inşasındaki yerlerine değiniyor. "Teorik Temeller" in son kısmıysa kimlik ve kültür ilişkisine ayrılmış. Bireysel ve toplumsal kimlik ile kültür arasındaki etkileşimi anlatan yazar, bu kavramların politik imgeleme ilişkisi üzerinde durarak, "kimlik" in, kültürel bellek tarafından ve onun aracılığıyla nasıl yeniden üretildiğine yer veriyor.

İkinci bölüm ise "Örnek İncelemeler" adını taşıyor ve bir anlamda yukarıda anlatılan kuramsal tartışmaları hem daha genişletmek hem de örneklerle somut kılmak amacıyla taşıyor. Yazar bu bölümde, Mısır, İsrail ve Yunan uygarlıklarını ayrı ayrı ele alarak, her uygarlığın bilinen en belirgin yapıtaşını ortaya koyup tarihsel süreçteki oluşumlarının geçmişten günümüze taşıdığı değere değiniyor. Mısır: yazı kültürünün önemi, İsrail: bir direniş yaratıcısı ve toplumsal hatırlamanın aracı olarak Yahudilik, Yunanistan: düşüncenin disipline edilmesi ve yazı kültürünün sonuçları.

Önsöze "birkaç yıldan beri bellek ve hatırlama furyası yaşıyoruz" diye başlayan yazar, çalışmasının amacını çarpıcı bir biçimde ortaya koyuyor: "Bu konu yaklaşık 10 yıl önce Doğu'da ve Batı'da düşünürleri meşgul etmeye başladı. Konunun çekiciliğini etkileyen en az 3 faktörü içeren bir dönemin eşliğinde olduğu-

muza inanıyorum. Birincisi, yeni elektronik medya ile bellek dışı kaydın (dolayısıyla da yapay belleğin) mümkün olduğu bir çağın içindeyiz; böyle bir gelişim, matbaanın ve ondan önce yazının keşfine eş değerde bir kültürel devrim anlamına geliyor. İkincisi, birinci gelişmeye bağlı olarak, bugünün kültürünü geçmişin 'ardıl kültürü' olarak kavrayan tutum, yani 'devrini tamamlamış birşey' olarak tanımlayıp, geçmiş kültürü bir hatırlama ve ve geçmişi anlama çabasını konu eden bir tutum yaygınlaşıyor. Üçüncüsü belki de en belirgin etkense, bizi çok daha kişisel ve yaşamsal düzeyde etkileyen birşeyin sonuna gelmiş olmamız. Yazılı insanlık tarihinin kaydettiği, en ağır felaketlerin ve insanlık suçlarının işlendiği dönemin görgü tanıklığını yapmış bir kuşak artık yaşama veda ediyor: "Faşizmden 40 yıl sonra, yaşayan bellek yok olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıyaysa ve kültürel hatırlama biçimleri sorun yaratmaktaysa, toplumsal bellek bir dönem değişiminin eşliğinde demektir" (17).

"Teorik Temeller" başlıklı ilk ana bölümde yazar, önce, hatırlama kültürünün üç temel karşılaştırmasını yapıyor; ki bu, bellek teriminin anlaşılması için önem taşıyor: (1) *Hatırlama kültürü/Bellek kültürü*: Bellek sanatı bireyleri ilgilendiriyor ve onlara belleğini geliştirme imkanı veriyor. Sözkonusu olan bireyin kapasitesinin geliştirilmesidir. Hatırlama kültürüyse siyasal sorumluluğun devamını amaçlıyor ve bir gruba dayanıyor. Yazara göre burada söz konusu olan "neyi unutmamamız gerekir sorusu" dur. (2) *Bireysel bellek/Toplumsal bellek*: Birey açısından bellek, kişinin çeşitli grup belleklerine katılımı sonucu oluşan, çok katmanlı bir yığılımdır. Grup açısından ise bir dağılım sorunudur, içinde yani üyeleri arasında dağıttığı bir bilgidir. Assmann bu ayrımı, Fransız sosyolog Maurice Halbwachs'a dayandırıyor. Çünkü Halbwachs'a göre mutlak yalnızlık içinde büyüyen bir bireyin belleği olmaz, toplumlara "ait" bir bellek yoktur ama toplumlar üyelerinin belleğini belirler. (3) *İletişimsel bel-*

lek/Kültürel bellek: İletişimsel bellek yakın geçmişe ilişkin anıları kapsar; ki bunlar kişinin çağdaşlarıyla paylaştığı anılardır. Bunun en tipik örneği kuşağa özgü bellektir ve bu bellek taşıyıcısıyla sınırlıdır. Kültürel bellekse geçmişin belli noktalarına yönelir. Geçmiş onda olduğu gibi kalmaz daha çok, anının bağlandığı sembolik figürlerde yoğunlaşır (Bunlar tam da öykünün yapısını oluşturan hatırlama figürleri ve anlatılardır). Sözelimi İsrailoğulları'nın Mısır'dan çıkışı, çölün aşılması, bayram ve törenlerde ritüel olarak anılan figürler. Assmann'a göre efsaneler de bir hatırlama figürüdür. "Ancak burada efsane ile tarih arasındaki fark gözönünde tutulmalıdır. Çünkü kültürel bellek için gerçek değil, hatırlanan tarih önemlidir" (55).

Jan Assmann'a göre kültürel belleğin tarih boyunca hep özel taşıyıcıları olmuştur. "Şamanlar, kent ozanları, rahipler, öğretmenler, yazarlar, filozoflar ve adları ne olursa olsun kendilerine bilgiyi taşıma yetkisi tanınmış olanların tümü buna dahildir. Yazı kültürüne sahip olmayan toplumlarda bellek aktarıcılarının uzmanlaşması, bu belleğe yüklenen sorumlulukların gereğidir. En önemli ve en zor sorumluluk, anlatının kelimesi kelimesine aktarımının üstlenilmesi ve başarımasıdır" (57). Yazar daha sonra da mit ve öykü ilişkisi çerçevesinde "hatırlama kültürü" üzerinde duruyor; ki bu, özellikle dikkate değerdir. "Kökene ait öykülere 'mit' adını veriyoruz" diyen Assmann'a göre içselleştirilmiş geçmiş (yani tarihin içselleştirilmesi hiçbir zaman sözkonusu olmadığına göre, tarihsel değil mitsel olarak hatırlanan geçmiş) öykü biçiminde ortaya çıkar. Bu öykünün de bir işlevi vardır: ya gelişmenin motorudur ya da sürekliliğinin temelini oluşturur. Her halükarda 'sırf geçmiş olduğu için' hatırlanmaz. Öyküler, insanın kendini ve dünyayı tanımak için anlattıklarıdır; bizi kendine bağlayan, kuralcı talepleri olan ve biçim verici bir gücün temsil ettiği bir gerçekler toplamıdır. "Sözkonusu olan, geçmişin kökensel

tarihe, yani efsaneye dönüştürülmesidir. Bu nitelendirme, hiçbir şekilde olayların gerçekliğini yadsımamakta aksine onların geleceğe dayalı bağlılığının, hiçbir zaman unutulmaması gereken birşey olarak öne çıkarmaktadır (79). İşte bu öne çıkarma bir anlamda totaliter toplumlarda ve baskı koşullarında devrimci bir nitelikte olabilir.

Assmann'ın bu tespiti önemlidir çünkü, bu gibi durumlarda anlatılar varolanı onaylamaz, aksine onu sorgular değiştirilmesi, devrilmesi çağsında bulunur. Konuyu biraz daha anlaşılır kılmak için Frankfurt Okulu'nun yardımına ihtiyacımız olacak. Horkeimer ve Adorno'ya göre "tahakkümü alt edebilecek olan doğanın bizzat kendisi değil, doğasının canlı tutan bellektir" (Jay, 1989: 386). Yine Marcuse'a göre "...yerleşmiş toplum, belleğin yıkıcı içeriklerinden korkmaktadır. Hatırlama, bir anlamda, varolan gerçeklerden uzaklaştran, bu gerçeklerin iktidarını kısa bir süre için de olsa kıran bir 'aracılık' biçimidir. Bellek, geçmiş korkular gibi geçmiş umutların da yeniden hatırlanmasını sağlar" (125).

Birinci bölümün ilerleyen bölümlerinde yazar, kültürel bellek sürecinin önemli öğelerinden bağdaşıklık ve kanon üzerinde duruyor. Kimliğin bir bellek ve hatırlama sorunu olduğunu vurgulayan Assmann'a göre, nasıl ki bir birey kendi kimliğini sadece belleği sayesinde oluşturabiliyorsa, bir grup da grupsal kimliğini ancak bellek sayesinde yeniden kurabilir. Bir diğer kavram olan "kanon" Assmann'ın en çok üzerinde durduğu kavramlardan biri. Çünkü "kanon" geçmişte olduğu gibi günümüzde de toplumun kültürel belleğinin en önemli unsuru olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Toplumsal anlamda önemi ise kanonun tam da "neye göre hareket etmeliyiz?" sorusuna cevap veren bir yapı olmasında yatar. Örneğin Ortaçağ'ın kanonu kilisedir. (Acaba tam da bu anlamda televizyon da günümüzün "kanon" u mu?- A.Y.).

"Teorik Temeller"ın son bölümünde Jan Assmann kültürel kimlik ve imgelem üzerinde duruyor. Yazara göre "ortak kimlik" ya da "biz kimliği" dediğimiz zaman bir grubun yarattığı ve üyelerinin özdeşleştiği imgeyi anlarız. Kendi başına ortak bir kimlikten söz edilemez. Bu, ancak kendini bu kimlikte tanımlayan bireylerin varlığı ölçüsünde varolur. "Kendimize ilişkin deneyimlerimiz her zaman dolaylıdır, dolaysız olan sadece diğerlerine ilişkin deneyimlerimizdir. Yüzümüz gibi öz benliğimizi de ayna olmadan görme olanağımız yoktur. Çünkü kişisel kimlik ancak, etkileşim ve eylemlilik içinde ortaya çıkar" (135). Mitler ve efsaneler kimlikle ilgilidir, "biz" kimiz, nereden geliyor ve "bizim" evrendeki yerimiz neresi sorularına cevap verirler. Assmann'ın deyimiyle "...bilgelik yaşam biçimlerini /gelenek ve görenekleri) yaratır ve temellendirirken, mit, yaşamın anlamlarını verir. Düzen, kendiliğinden oluşmaz: mitler düzeni anlatır, ritüeller kuruluşunu sağlarlar (143).

"Örnek İncelemeler" başlıklı ikinci ana bölüm Mısır'la başlıyor. Yazar eski Mısır'la ilgili iki belirleyici örnek üzerinde duruyor. Bunlardan biri yazı. Assmann'a göre Mezopotamya'nın aksine Mısır'da yazı ekonomik değil, politik örgütlenme ve temsil mekanizmasına bağlı olarak gelişir. "Burada ekonomik değil, dikkat çekici politik eylemlerin kayda geçirilmesi amacıyla 'politik' iletişim söz konusudur. İlk yazı anıtları, oluşmakta olan devletin hizmetindeki politik manifestolardır...Öte yandan yazı sadece anıtsal işleviyle sınırlı kalmaz; hiyeroglif özelliğini, yani resimsi karakterini kaybederek gerçek anlamda bir digrafi (ikili yazı) durumu ortaya çıkar. Yazı, anıtsal işlevi anlamında Mısır kültürünün sonuna kadar, kökenindeki resimselliği korur. Bunun dışında asıl resimlerin tanınamayacak kadar basitleştirildiği ve bu yolla yazı birim-

lerinin işlev kazandığı bitişik bir yazı ortaya çıkar. Böylece iki ayrı yazı türü aynı anda varolur: hiyeroglif yazıt yazısı ve bitişik el yazısı (171). Yazar'a göre eski Mısır kültüründe ikinci dikkat çekici şey son dönem Mısır tapınağıydı. "Diğer medeniyetleri incelediğimizde kültürel anlamın sabitleştirilmesi için dil merkezli bir kanalın izlenmesi, yani söz, metin, yazı ve kitap kültürünün gerekliliği ortaya çıkıyor. Artık 'kültürel belleği', dile dayalı aktarımlardan başka bir şeyin oluşturabileceğini düşünmek mümkün değildir. Ancak burada eski Mısır, aksi yönde en etkileyici örnek olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Anlamın sabitleştirilmesi ve kültürel belleğin buna uygun örgütlenme biçimlerini araştırdığımızda karşımıza özel bir olgu, son dönem Mısır tapınağı çıkıyor" (166).

İkinci örnek olan İsrail kültürünü ele alan yazar özellikle bir din olarak "Yahudilik"ın bu ulusun yarattığı kültürel ve politik imgelemdeki yerini inceliyor. Dünyanın her yerinde doğal ve kaçınılmaz olarak varolan dinler, normalde bir kültürün parçası olarak ortaya çıkar ve kaybolur diyen Assmann'a göre "İsrail'de din yeni ve etkileyici bir biçimde yeniden yaratıldı, bu şekliyle genel kültürden bağımsızlaştı ve tüm kültürel değişimler ve asimilasyonlara karşı varlığını sürdürdü" (195).

Son örnek inceleme olan eski Yunan kültürü, bu yazının giriş kısmında belirtilen çerçevede, oldukça önemli bir yere sahip. Batı'nın geleneğinin ve kendine özgü düşünce evriminin, birkaç yüzyıl içinde yazı kültürüne ve özellikle Yunan yazı kültürüne bağlı olarak geliştiği konusunda, herkesin hem fikir olduğunu söyleyen Jan Assmann buradan hareketle, yazının yarattığı devrimi inceliyor. Yazar bu sürecin anlaşılması için kilit bir kavram atıyor ortaya: hipoleptik ufuk. Bir önceki konuşmacının söylediğiyle ilişki kurarak devam etmeye, eski Yunan'da

"hipoleptik" denir. Bu, bağımsız değil, daha önce olanla ilişki içinde, bir başlangıca ve süregiden iletişim durumuna dahil olmayı ifade eder. Bu iletişim olayını yazar "hipoleptik ufuk" olarak adlandırıyor ve yaşanan dönüşümü gösterebilmek için bu kavramı üç olguyla, yazı, çerçeve ve bilgi ile ilişkilendiriyor.

Yazının önemi, etkileşimsiz iletişimi mümkün hale getirmiş olmasıdır. Yani bir önceki anlatıcının bıraktığı yerden, artık konuşmacının olmadığı bir sonraki aşama için bağlantının kurulması; ki bu ancak yazı ile mümkündür. Neil Postman da benzer şekilde yazının önemine değinir: "Platon, yazının algıda bir devrim yaratacağını biliyordu. Bu algı devrimi, dilden yararlanma organı olarak, kulaktan göze doğru bir kaymayı temsil ediyordu...yazı sözü dondurur; böylece neyin kastedildiğini, nerede hata yapıldığını, nereye doğru gidildiğini anlayabilmek için dili önlerinde tutmaları gereken kişileri (retorikçi, gramer uzmanı, tarihçi) yaratır" (21).

Çerçeve, iletişimin, o anda hazır bulunanları aşım aşımamasıyla ilgilidir. Çünkü çerçeve dışına çıkıldığında anlatımın anlam değiştirme tehlikesi başgösterir, metin, her tür yanlış anlama ve reddetme açık hale gelir. Assmann "çerçeve" ile ilgili Luhmann'dan ilginç bir de dipnot düşüyor: "Alfabe yazısının (fonetik alfabe) iletişime katılanların zamansal ve mekansal olarak kısıtlı çerçevesinin dışına çıkarma şansını vermesiyle birlikte, sadece sözlü konuşma biçimlerinin etkili gücüne dayanılmak zorunluluğu kalmamıştır. Artık metne dayanarak tartışma yapılabilir; ki felsefenin ilk kaynağını bu olanaktan aldığı görülüyor" (277).

Bilgi ise iletişimin en önemli unsurudur. Çünkü iletişim, bilgi ve haber arasında ayırım yapma deneyimi gerektirir. Yazara göre, yazı

ve özellikle matbaa sayesinde, bilgi ve haberin aynılığına değil, farklılığına tepki veren iletişim süreçleri mümkün olmuştur: gerçeğin kontrol edilmesi ve kuşkunun dile getirilmesi süreçleri.

Gerçekten de matbaanın gerek süregelen öykü anlatımı, gerekse iletişim biçimleri üzerinde çok önemli bir dönüşüm yarattığı konusunda yaygın bir görüş birliği vardır. *Alman İdeolojisi*'nde Marx "Matbaanın hatta baskı makinelerinin olduğu bir çağda İlyada mümkün müdür? Matbaanın doğuşuyla birlikte, şarkı söylemenin, öykü anlatmanın hatta derin derin düşünmenin geçerliliğini yitirmesi kaçınılmaz değil midir?" (54) diye sorarken, Walter J. Ong "Matbaa, zamanla düşünme ve anlatım biçimine hükmetmekten bir türlü vazgeçemeyen işitsel üstünlüğün yerine; yazının başlattığı ama tek başına yeterince destekleyemediği görsel üstünlüğü geçirmiştir...yazı sözcükleri ses dünyasından görsel mekana taşır, matbaaysa bu mekandaki yerlerine hapseder onları" (144) der. Walter Benjamin ise matbaanın yarattığı en büyük sonuçlardan birine, "enformasyon"a yöneltir dikkatleri: "...burjuvazinin gelişmiş kapitalizmde matbaayı en önemli araçlarından biri kılarak egemenliğini tam olarak kurmasıyla birlikte, kökeni ne kadar eskiye uzanırsa uzansın, yeni bir iletişim biçimi ortaya çıktı. Öykü anlatıcılığına en az roman kadar yabancı, ama ondan çok daha tehditkar, aynı zamanda romanı da krize sokan bu yeni iletişim biçimi enformasyondur. Enformasyon yalnızca yeni olduğu an değer taşır, yalnızca o an yaşar. Kendini tümüyle o ana teslim etmeli, zaman kaybetmeden kendini ona açıklamalıdır. Oysa öykü farklıdır, kendini tüketmez, gücünü toplar ve korur ve yıllarca sonra bile harekete geçirebilir" (82).

Jan Assmann'ın *Kültürel Bellek*'inin, gerek toplumların geçirdiği tarihsel evrimi gerekse

bu süreçte, her toplumda ve her uygarlıkta ayrı ayrı varolan "kültürel yapının temel dinamiklerini" anlamak açısından gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tarihsel bir durum olarak günümüz toplumu ve insan ilişkileri üzerine yapılacak herhangi bir çalışma ve araştırmada, Asmann'ın kitabının önemli bir boşluğu dolduracağına inanıyorum

Kaynakça

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Yazı Teslim Kuralları

Gönderilen yazıların, başka bir yerde yayınlanmamış olması ya da yayın için değerlendirme aşamasında bulunmaması gerekir. Yayınlanan yazıların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar(lar)ına aittir. Yayınlanmayan yazılar iade edilmez. Yayın için kabul edilen yazıların yayın hakkı, yayınlanan yazıların da her türlü telif hakları dergiye aittir.

Makaleler 8000 kelimeyi geçmemelidir. 6000-7000 kelimelik bir makale (notlar ve referanslar dahil) iyi bir hedeftir. 2000-3000 kelimelik daha kısa yorum yazıları da kabul edilmektedir. Yazılar, varsa tablo, şekil ve illüstrasyonları da içeren dört eş nüsha olarak teslim edilmelidir. Yazının bir nüshası da diskette gönderilirse (Word for Macintosh ya da Windows), yazıyla ilgili işlemler daha hızlı yürütülebilir.

Yazarlar, gönderdikleri yazının eş bir nüshasını kendilerinde bulundurmamalıdır. 100-150 kelimelik İngilizce ve Türkçe birer özet de yazılarla beraber gönderilmelidir. Yazılar, bir toplantıda tebliğ edilmiş ise, toplantının adı, tarihi ve yeri belirtilmelidir.

Yazıların ve özetlerin üzerinde, sadece yazının başlığı bulunmalıdır. Aynı bir kapak sayfasında yazarlar, isimlerini, tam ve açık kurum posta adreslerini, telefon ve fax numaralarını ve varsa elektronik posta adreslerini bildirmelidirler. Bu bilgiler, hakemlere gönderilmeyecektir.

Tüm metin, girintili (indent) paragraflar, notlar ve referanslar dahil, A4 boyutunda kağıda çift aralıklı olarak ve kağıdın sadece bir yüzüne yazılmalıdır. Başlıklar ve arabaşlıklar kısa ve belirgin olmalıdır. ABD, TRT gibi kısaltmalarda nokta kullanılmamalıdır.

Dergiye gelen yazıların yayınlanması hakemlerden alınacak değerlendirmelere bağlıdır. Dergiye ulaşan yazılar en kısa süre içinde hakemlere gönderilir.

Hakem değerlendirmelerinin normal şartlarda 2-3 ay sürmesi beklenmelidir. Yazarlardan, hakemlerin görüşleri uyarınca yazılarını geliştirmeleri veya gözden geçirmeleri istenebilir. Yayın konusunda son karar Yayın Kurulu'na aittir. Yazıların kabul edilip edilmediğine dair bir mektup, hakem raporlarının fotokopileriyle birlikte, yazarlara gönderilir.

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Metin içinde kaynak belirtme

Tüm referanslar, ana metinde uygun yerlerde ve parantez içinde, yazarın adı, basım yılı ve gerekiyorsa sayfa numaraları ile belirtilir. "Ibid", "op.cit.", "a.g.e." vs. kısaltmalar kullanılmaz. Notlar ve referanslar ayrılmalıdır. Notlar, metnin içinde numaralandırılıp, metnin sonunda numara sırasına göre ve referanslardan önce yerleştirilmelidir. Notların içinde yer alan referanslar da metin için geçerli olan kurallara göre belirtilir.

- Yazarın adı metinde geçmiyorsa ve kitaba referans veriliyorsa, (Williams, 1988)
- Yazarın adı metinde geçmiyorsa ve belli bir sayfa söz konusuysa, (Williams, 1988: 26)
- Yazarın adı metinde geçiyorsa ve kaynakçada birden fazla eseri varsa (1988: 26)
- Birbirini takip etmeyen belli sayfalar söz konusuysa, (Williams, 1988: 22-6, 45-8)
- Yazarın adı metinde geçiyorsa ve kaynakçada bu yazarın yalnızca bir eseri mevcutsa sadece sayfa numarası verilir. Hawkes'a göre dil ve antropoloji ... (32)
- İki yazar varsa, (Lash ve Urry, 1988)
- İki kiden fazla yazar varsa, (Bennett vd., 1986)
- Aynı yazarın aynı yıl içinde yayınlanmış birden fazla eserine referans varsa, basım yılına a, b, c, gibi harfler eklenerek birbirinden ayrılır. (Foucault, 1979a)
- Aynı bahiste birden fazla kaynağa referans varsa, bunlar aynı parantezde noktalı virgülle ayrılarak belirtilmelidir, (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 1987; Lamont, 1988)
- Metnin içindeki alıntılar için çift tırnak, alıntının içindeki alıntılar için tek tırnak kullanılmalıdır. 40 kelimedden uzun alıntılar, tırnak kullanmadan girintili paragrafla verilmelidir.

Dergiden makale

Lawrence, Grossberg (1995). "Cultural Studies vs. Political Economy: Is Anybody Else Bored with this Debate." *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 1(12): 72-81.

Editörlü bir kitaptan makale

Turow, Joseph (1991). "A Mass Communication Perspective on Entertainment Industries." *Mass Media and Society*. James Curan ve Michael Gurevitch (der.) içinde. London: Edward Arnold. 160-167.

Bir yazarın seçilmiş yazılarından derlenmiş kitabından makale

Thomas, Lewis (1974). "The Long Habit." *Lives of a Cell: Notes of Biology Watcher* içinde. New York: Viking. 47-52.

Kitap

Lewis, Justin (1991). *The Ideological Octopus: An Exploration of Television and Its Audience*. London ve New York: Routledge.

Çeviri kitap

Larrain, Jorge (1993). *İdeoloji ve Kültürel Kimlik*. Çev., Neşe Nur Domaniç. İstanbul: Sarmal.

Derleme kitap

Balio, Tino (der.) (1990). *Hollywood in the Age of Television*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

İki yazarlı kitap

Gessell, Arnold ve Francis L. Ilg (1949). *Child Development: An Introduction to the Study of Human Growth*. New York: Harper and Row.

Üç ya da daha fazla yazarlı kitap

Spiller, Robert, vd. (1960). *Literary History of the United States*. New York: MacMillan.

Yazar olarak kurum adı

Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı (1996). *Kafkasya ve Orta Asya: Bağımsızlıktan Sonra Geçmiş ve Gelecek*. Ankara: Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı Yayınları.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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