İlahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 3 Number 2 Summer / Fall 2012

Bursa İlahiyat Foundation

IS

ILAHIYAT STUDIES

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

www.ilahiyatstudies.org

Volume 3, Number 2, Summer / Fall 2012

Publisher : Bursa İlahiyat Foundation

Editors : Kemal Ataman, *Uludağ University*, Turkey
Turgay Gündüz, *Uludağ University*, Turkey

Associate Editors : Kasım Küçükalp, *Uludağ University*, Turkey
Ulvi Murat Kılavuz, *Uludağ University*, Turkey
İsmail Güler, *Uludağ University*, Turkey

Book Review Editor : Kadir Gömbeyaz, *Uludağ University*, Turkey

Assistant Editors : Seda Ensarioğlu, *Uludağ University*, Turkey
Büşra Kılıç, *Uludağ University*, Turkey

EDITORIAL BOARD

Ilahiyat Studies is published in print (ISSN: 1309-1786) and online (e-ISSN: 1309-1719) biannually by Bursa İlahiyat Foundation, Hacılar Mh. Eceler Sk. Sema Apt. No: 6/5, Osmangazi, Bursa-Turkey.

Aims and Scope: Ilahiyat Studies is an international, peer-reviewed multidisciplinary journal dedicated to publishing scholarly articles on all aspects of Islam and the Muslim peoples and on religious studies. Available in print and online, and published twice a year, the journal aims to become one of the leading platforms in the world for new findings and discussions of all fields of Islamic and religious studies.

Annual Subscription: Annual subscription for each volume of two issues (print edition) is 50TL, $50 (US), €35 (EUR) for institutions; 30TL, $30 (US), €20 (EUR) for individuals, and 20TL, $20 (US), €15 (EUR) for students. An institutional subscription to the print edition includes free access to the online for any number of concurrent users across a local area network.

Abstracting & Indexing: *Ilahiyat Studies* is currently indexed in *Index Islamicus*, and abstracted by *Religious and Theological Abstracts*.

Disclaimer: The publisher and Editors can not be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal; the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the editors and publisher.

ILAHIYAT STUDIES
Volume 3, Number 2, Summer/Fall 2012

CONTENTS

ARTICLES		
İsmail Cebeci	Change in the Modern Practice of *Ijtihād*: The Case of Islamic Finance	149
Veysel Kaya	An Example of the Mystical Avicennism in Ottoman Thought: Jamāl al-Khalwatī's Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's *Risāla ilā Abī Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr*	173
Abdurrezzak Tek	Mystical Interpretation of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā's Controversial Ideas	197
Hayati Hökelekli	Religion, Religiosity, and Research in Psychology of Religion in Turkey: An Assessment of Locality and Universality Problem	223
Ebrahim Khodadady & Atefeh Taheryan & Armin Tavakoli	Validating the Persian Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale within an Islamic Context	247
BOOK REVIEWS		
Peter Adamson	*Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of*	276

	Dimitri Gutas, edited by Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman	
Josef van Ess	*Gnostic Apocalypse and Islam: Qur'an, Exegesis, Messianism, and the Literary Origins of the Babi Religion*, by Todd Lawson	282
Hussam S. Timani	*The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Beliefs and Practices*, by Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi	285
Anna Ayşe Akasoy	*The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook*, edited by Asad Q. Ahmed, Behnam Sadeghi, and Michael Bonner	290
L. W. C. van Lit	*Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings*, by Reza Pourjavady	294

ARTICLES

Change in the Modern Practice of Ijtihād*: The Case of Islamic Finance*

İsmail Cebeci

An Example of the Mystical Avicennism in Ottoman Thought: Jamāl al-Khalwatī's Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's Risāla ilā Abī Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr

Veysel Kaya

Mystical Interpretation of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā's Controversial Ideas

Abdurrezzak Tek

Religion, Religiosity, and Research in Psychology of Religion in Turkey: An Assessment of Locality and Universality Problem

Hayati Hökelekli

Validating the Persian Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale within an Islamic Context

Ebrahim Khodadady & Atefeh Taheryan & Armin Tavakoli

CHANGE IN THE MODERN PRACTICE OF *IJTIHĀD*

The Case of Islamic Finance

İsmail Cebeci
Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford-UK

Abstract

In recent decades, crucial changes in the legal reasoning of Islamic *sharīʿa* resulting from the differing influences of changing social needs, economic factors, and political-legal circumstances have been observed. This paper argues that these changes are particularly visible in the manner in which the major sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh* are utilized, the meanings attached to them and the frequency with which they are utilized in solving distinctly modern problems in the Muslim world. The paper makes this argument in terms of the modern theoretical approaches in Islamic finance by focusing on how a number of classical legal institutions, such as the *ḍarūra*, *maṣlaḥa*, and other foundations of *ijtihād*, have been re-interpreted in a manner that reflects changing socio-economic conditions in the age of globalization. The paper also demonstrates how other classical institutions, such as *madhhab* and the use of classical sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, have been radically changed by the (new) theorists of Islamic economics because of changing social and legal circumstances. Thus, for instance, the paper discusses how the *ijtihād* in Islamic finance has been both greatly intensified and partly transformed into a collective enterprise rather than the individual act of a scholar because of increasing complexity in economics and the accompanying specialization and professionalization of *ʿulamāʾ*. The paper ends with a discussion of the possible implications of these changes for the contemporary practice of Islamic finance in the West, as well as in the Muslim world.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.57

Key Terms: Ijtihād, Islamic finance, *fiqh*, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *madhhab*, *ḍarūra*, *maṣlaḥa*

INTRODUCTION

Modernity has had an undeniable impact on Muslim societies. Major transformations have occurred in social, political, economic, and legal fields. Advancements in modern technology have also disrupted traditional ways of life. The classical study of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) has not been immune to these changes: it has faced new problems and issues. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the field of *ijtihād* (Islamic legal reasoning) has undergone equally profound transformations. In this paper, I will argue that these changes are particularly visible in methodologies of Islamic knowledge. I will demonstrate how the use of the major sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh* (the science of Islamic legal theory) and their meaning have changed in recent decades. I will illustrate this change by examining Islamic finance (IF) as a case largely influenced by recent socio-economic developments.

I will investigate the changes underway in two key areas. First, I will focus on the various features of the modern *ijtihād* practices in the case of IF. Second, I will elaborate on these features by analyzing at more specific concepts related to *ijtihād* and their practice. I will examine the essential concept of the *madhhab* (legal school), and such instruments as the *ḍarūra* (extreme necessity) and *maṣlaḥa* (public interest).[1] I will explain how these institutions have been reinterpreted in ways that reflect changing socio-economic conditions.

More particularly, I will demonstrate how the *ijtihād* has been both greatly intensified and partly transformed into a collective enterprise rather than the individual act of a scholar because of increasing complexity in economics and the accompanying specialization and professionalization of *ʿulamāʾ* (scholars). I will focus on the modern period, beginning with the emergence of IF institutions during the 1970s. I will explain the primary argument using specific ex-

[1] The concept of *maṣlaḥa* refers to both public and individual interest in the terminology of Islamic law. However, to avoid the confusion with the term "interest" in the sense of usuary (*ribā*) I prefer to translate *maṣlaḥa* as "public interest," which is also the common translation in the relevant literature.

amples, such as *waʿd* (promise),[2] *qabḍ* (possession),[3] and *wakāla* (agency),[4] which are related to most forms of Islamic financial contracts.

TRANSFORMATION OF *IJTIHĀD* IN ISLAMIC FINANCE

The modern *ijtihād* process diverges from past legal practices in several key ways:

Socio-economic changes have influenced the direction of *ijtihād*s in Islamic finance. Rapid urbanization, the emergence of the new fast-paced life style, and technological improvements in the 20th century have changed individual life styles and mass consumption habits. Furthermore, as a result of technological improvement and the expansion of international trade, product diversity has become widespread, which has transformed peoples' relationships with goods and property.[5] Consequently, *ijtihād*-related contractual models and

---

[2] The issue of a binding promise is a controversial one. Although it has been thoroughly discussed in the context of *murābaḥa,* the *waʿd* is a natural element of other multi-structured transactions (*al-ʿuqūd al-murakkaba*), such as diminishing *mushāraka* and *al-ijāra al-muntahiya bi-l-tamlīk*. At the onset of these contracts, one or two parties must accept and promise to fulfill some responsibilities within the framework of the contract. The primary issue related to *waʿd* is whether contracts are religiously or legally binding.

[3] *Qabḍ* literally means possession. The primary issue with multi-structured contracts is that of to whom the force of possession belongs – the seller or the buyer. This subject is also related to the selling of *maʿdūm* (non-present goods), risk, and official registration.

[4] Modern *wakāla* is used to shorten transactions and to minimize banks' expenses.

[5] Some IF scholars provide examples from former eras to indicate the relationship between changing conditions and changing *ḥukm*s. For example, al-Qaraḍāwī refers to differences between Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf regarding their treatment of *istiṣnāʿ* contracts. Although the former states that promises in *istiṣnāʿ* contracts are not binding on either party, the latter argues that promises are binding if they do not contradict the agreements between the parties (Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ kamā tujrīhi l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya: Dirāsa fī ḍawʾ al-nuṣūṣ wa-l-qawāʿid al-sharʿiyya* [Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1987], 80-81). In addition, al-Qaraḍāwī emphasizes that al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī holds two opinions in this regard – 'old' and 'new,' as usual – and argues that *Imāmayn* (Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī) issued different *fatwā*s than Abū Ḥanīfa for one third of his opinions. The point is that disagreements arise over time based on the context of time and place. Al-Qaraḍāwī further notes that

transactions have become necessary for meeting the requirements of modern society.[6] In this context, al-Zarqā rightly argues that changes made to former *ijtihād*s are the result of two primary societal forces: changes in social structures, life styles, and technology, as well as changes in ethics and manners (*akhlāq*).[7] From this perspective, on the one hand, life-style changes are a result of social and technological developments; on the other hand, issues of ethical significance have become increasingly important in the economy. These changes should be considered during *ijtihād* deliberations. All of these changes have influenced the concept and practice of *ijtihād* in multiple ways, as discussed below.

1. Modern *ijtihād* practice has been increasingly shaped by external factors, which have been framed in particular by Western institutions, life styles, and solutions, rather than the internal dynamics of the Muslim world. In the past, interactions among different societies were relatively less intense than they are today; accordingly, Muslims would look for solutions to the problems that arose primarily with regard to their internal conditions and the *ijtihād* process would be practiced within this framework. However, inter-societal interactions have become much more common in the contemporary world, and modern *ijtihād* practice has become increasingly preoccupied with the problems of the Muslim people and institutions that are affected in particular by Western life styles, on the one hand, and with producing alternatives to practical frameworks originally produced in the West, on the other hand. This process naturally involves both positive aspects (such as dynamism) and negative ones (such as precipitancy and lack of originality).

---

different opinions were formed by al-Imām Mālik and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal when handling identical cases. He then states that these examples reflect a healthy diversity and renewal of *ijtihād* (*Ibid.,* 20-21).

6 For example, financial transaction contracts during pre-modern times were primarily two-party agreements under practically non-existent institutional authority. However, current banking and financial institutions are much more complicated and exert a far greater impact on the formation of *ijtihād* both at individual and institutional levels. Therefore, a new *ijtihād* is required to address issues at the practical level, e.g., in the case of clients' ability to withdraw their capital from banks at any time.

7 Muṣṭafā Aḥmad al-Zarqā, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī thawbihi l-jadīd: al-Madkhal al-fiqhī al-ʿām* (9th edn., Dimashq: Dār al-Fikr, 1967), I, 101-102.

2. Despite the convenience provided by the permissibility (*ibāḥa*) principle, modern scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*) generally do not prefer to produce genuine contracts in IF; instead, they produce contracts based on the modification of old ones found in classical *fiqh*. There are several possible reasons for this preference. First, scholars have a concern for Islamic justification: it is easier for them to refer to existing, more established and famous scholars and to *al-ʿuqūd al-musammāt* (nominate contracts) to prove permissibility and justify rulings. Second, it is more practical to modify and reproduce an old contract because it has already been discussed in great detail in the past. It is also difficult to create and maintain the overall scope of a legal argument without simultaneously introducing competing and often contradictory arguments. Finally, this practice might also be an old habit: previously, Muslim jurists did not produce new contracts such as *bayʿ al-wafāʾ* (the debt guarantee sale), primarily because they did not need to because of relatively slow social change.[8] This practice might have created a path dependency that affects the mindset and practices of contemporary Islamic scholars as well.

3. A third remarkable aspect of contemporary *ijtihād* practices is that although the names of some legal terms and concepts in classical *fiqh*, such as the agency contract (*wakāla*), promise (*waʿd*), and possession *(qabḍ),* have remained the same, their context, function, and even problematic aspects have changed, as they are now part of larger and more complex contracts. Accordingly, scholars apply new arguments to attach new meanings to old matters. Although this practice is partly unavoidable, it also often leads to conceptual confusion and related problems among scholars.

4. An intense use of additional sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is one of the most important features of modern *ijtihād* deliberation. Contemporary jurists commonly and very frequently resort to additional sources, such as *maṣlaḥa*, to generate an *ijtihād* under new circumstances when evidence is not readily found in the four fundamental sources of *fiqh* – the *Qurʾān*, *Sunna, ijmāʿ*, and *qiyās*. Although these additional sources are among the classical sources, their utilization

[8] In fact, al-Qaraḍāwī observes that historically social change was much slower than in today's world where many issues dealt with by scholars have extra dimensions and larger volumes, which is also related to the changing conditions in contemporary societies (al-Qaraḍāwī, *Bayʿ*, 20-21, 34).

has become much more intense and frequent in contemporary practice.

5. The crossroads of *ijtihād* deliberations and disciplines other than *fiqh* (e.g., modern finance, business, and law) have also multiplied. This increase has occurred because contemporary jurists must have a high-level of familiarity with contemporary contractual and transactional business models in IF. For example, a jurist studying new transactional business models (such as *murābaḥa* or *mushāraka*) must consider *fiqh*-related matters such as *waʿd*, *qabḍ*, as well as be knowledgeable regarding contemporary law's stance regarding the matter at hand. The modern *ijtihād* mechanism has a distinct relationship with contemporary law,[9] as there are numerous rules and regulations for virtually everything. If necessary, one may consult a substantial body of jurisprudence regarding new *ḥukm*s and

[9] The following case of banks in the UK is a remarkable example of how to reconcile contradictions between *sharīʿa* and law. "Deposit-takers are regulated and the customer is assured of full repayment as long as the bank remains solvent. A savings account originally proposed by Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB) as a 'deposit' was a profit-and-loss sharing account, or *muḍāraba*, where *sharīʿa* law requires the customer to accept the risk of loss of original capital. This was not consistent with *The Financial Services Authority* (FSA)'s interpretation of the legal definition of a 'deposit,' which requires capital certainty. After extensive discussions, the solution IBB adopted was to say that, legally, its depositors are entitled to full repayment, thus ensuring compliance with FSA requirements. However, customers had the right to turn down deposit protection after the event on religious grounds, and choose instead to be repaid under the *sharīʿa*-compliant risk sharing and loss bearing formula." (Michael Ainley et al., *Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges* [London: The Financial Services Authority, 2007], 14).

Additionally, the following *fatwā* concerning *Recommendations and Resolutions of the First Conference of Islamic Banks* is very interesting in terms of the relationship between *fatwā* and law:

"This promise [*murābaḥa*], according to *fatwā*s of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence, is enforceable by law while other schools of *fiqh* see that it is *sharīʿa* binding. What is *sharīʿa* compatible can be enforced by law if it is necessary and if it is possible for the courts to intervene. The wording of contracts in such transactions need *sharīʿa* technical accuracy, and might need the issuance of law (Act) in Islamic countries, to make them enforceable through courts."

(http://www.albaraka.com/media/pdf/Research-Studies/RSMR-200706201-EN.pdf, p. 268, *fatwā* no. 8) (accessed 10 November 2011).

contracts that do not contradict prevailing laws. When these *ḥukm*s and contracts are incompatible with existing laws, it is important to apply *ḍarūra* to resolve any remaining contradictions.

6. A common assumption among IF scholars is that the field of *muʿāmalāt* falls within the realm of *ẓanniyyāt* (the rulings whose meanings are open to interpretation), which for the most part, consists of flexible *ḥukm*s (rulings),[10] with the exception of *ribā* and *zakāt*. That is to say, most issues of IF are addressed within the field of *ijtihād*. Because urgent solutions are often needed for practical problems in this field, previously less favorable (*shādhdh*) opinions are easily adopted with reference to broad notions such as justice but without regard to their specific contexts. It has thus become a common practice among modern scholars to selectively refer to classical *fiqh* to render new *ijtihād*s.[11] However, some scholars, such as al-Qaraḍāwī, remain critical of the practice of relying too heavily on old rulings to formulate new *ḥukm*s, as today's *ʿulamāʾ* are entitled to derive new *ijtihād*.[12]

7. As I have argued elsewhere,[13] although the debates on economic provisions in the classical *fiqh* literature primarily address relatively simple and monophasic transactions among actual persons in a Muslim society, today, these provisions are directly applied to large, impersonal institutions in predominantly non-Islamic institutional contexts. I often observe the deployment of a contract recognized by

---

[10] See Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ʿUmar, "al-Tafāṣīl al-ʿamaliyya li-ʿaqd al-murābaḥa fī l-niẓām al-maṣrafī al-Islāmī," in *Khuṭṭat al-istithmār fī l-bunūk al-Islāmiyya: al-Jawānib al-taṭbīqiyya wa-l-qaḍāyā wa-l-mushkilāt* (Amman: al-Majmaʿ al-Malikī li-Buḥūth al-Ḥaḍāra al-Islāmiyya, 1987), 178.

[11] This tendency is particularly visible in the production of modern contract models. For instance, the *murābaḥa* as applied in contemporary practice is mainly based on a case discussed in al-Shāfiʿī's *al-Umm*. (In fact, Miṣri has emphasized that the *murābaḥa* is an old contract type, rather than a brand new one. See Rafīq Yūnus al-Miṣrī, "Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* 5/2 (1988), 1142-1143. Likewise, such selective appropriation of classical elements is also evident in the fact that the modern leasing model is based on the *ijāra*, and partnership models on the *mushāraka* in the classical *fiqh*.

[12] For example, see al-Qaraḍāwī, *Bayʿ*, 21, 32.

[13] İsmail Cebeci, "Integrating Social *Maslahah* into Islamic Finance," *Accounting Research Journal* 25/3 (2012), 174.

Islamic *fiqh* as part of a modern transaction, with no attention to its legal and social context. For example, *wakāla*, which is recognized by *fiqh*, is frequently used in modern financial transactions so that one of the parties can avoid the risk engendered by the transaction. The logic behind this application of traditional transaction mechanisms to modern, capitalist markets is a superficial one that ignores the intellectual and historical backgrounds of both Islamic and modern-capitalist structures. In both theory and practice, such an endeavor has produced a synthetic amalgam of very different parts rather than a compact whole. This mixture of pre-capitalist and capitalist elements thus lacks cohesion and a social perspective because the elements of *fiqh* are sought primarily as a potential source of Islamic justification for modern financial mechanisms. In other words, the academic/scholarly endeavors that focus on Islamic finance invoke Islamic law only in so far as it provides modern mechanisms with strictly legal provisions by abstracting them from their social contexts.

8. It is remarkable that the form and content of the IF literature have become much closer to that of *fatwā* (legal opinion) texts than of *fiqh* texts because of a concern for practical reasons and a need for immediate solutions. The idea of consulting *jawāz* (permission) on matters related to IF and the legitimization of some modern finance solutions have become common practice in the field. Moreover, adoption of the dichotomous approach ("*ḥalāl-ḥarām*," "*jāʾiz*-not *jāʾiz*") of modern law ("do's and don'ts") and the use of technical and micro legal approaches have abandoned the consideration of valuable *ḥukm*s, such as *mandūb* (the recommended), *makrūḥ* (the repugnant), and ethical values, during the deliberative process.[14] In fact, it is now possible to discuss the "micro-*mujtahid*" as a professional technician. Such a purely technical approach and agent may lead scholars to ignore the social-moral aspects and long-term implications of their *fatwā*s.

9. *Ijtihād* deliberations have thus begun to be viewed as tools for developing Islamic counterparts of Western institutions and therefore taken on an ideological meaning as well. Muslim scholars have argued that *ijtihād* aids Muslims in providing solutions to modern

[14] For a parallel argument, see Kilian Bälz, *Sharia Risk? How Islamic Finance Has Transformed Islamic Contract Law* (Cambridge, MA: Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard Law School, 2008), 12-13.

problems within the boundaries of the religion. For example, before Islamic banking was launched, leading Islamic figures such as al-Mawdūdī and Ḥasan al-Bannā had written about Islamic economic institutions. However, they were concerned that any possible failure of such institutions would weaken the idea of the universality and viability of Islam itself.

10. Another remarkable feature of *ijtihād* in the field of IF is the frequent use of collective *ijtihād* (*ijtihād jamāʿī*) deliberations. This use occurs because of highly technical and complicated subject matter that usually requires an academic background. In addition to their Islamic dimension, most IF subjects address financial and legal disciplines as well. Moreover, problems related to IF constitute the majority of modern collective *ijtihād*.[15] This factor also facilitates the creation of multiple, hybrid backgrounds in terms of nationality and ethnicity, *madhhab,* academic discipline, and cultural influences for *fatwā*s. For the first time in Islamic history, scholars from disciplines other than *fiqh* also play significant roles in the *ijtihād* process. Consequently, the study of modern *ijtihād* with regard to IF has thus far been the most comprehensive, large-scale, and interdisciplinary study of *ijtihād*. Furthermore, *ijtihād* deliberation has become more frequent, with increasing numbers of *fatwā*s in the modern practice of *fiqh al-muʿāmalāt* (the Islamic jurisprudence of transactions), particularly in the field of IF, in comparison with pre-modern times due to much larger number of scholars and institutions involved in this practice as well as the increasing complexity of social and economic life, and more intense and faster nature of social change in modern times, as discussed above.

11. Finally, the composition and profile of *fatwā* authorities have undergone some changes as well. In this context, commercial institutions – in addition to the *muftī*s and official bodies – have become deeply intertwined with the *fatwā* mechanism for the first time.[16] For example, note the introduction ('production,' in a sense) of the new

---

[15] For example, The International Islamic Fiqh Academy made 174 resolutions between 1985-2007, 82 of which are directly related to Islamic economics and Islamic finance (http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa [accessed 22 December 2011]).

[16] Some of the committees of Islamic Banks currently work similarly to *fatwā* institutions: For example, Albaraka provides 140 *fatwā*s (512 pages) on the *murābaḥa* on its website only. See http://www.albaraka.com/media/pdf/Research-Studies/RSMR-200706201-EN.pdf (accessed 10 November 2011).

"*mujtahid* class" by the Sharīʿa Boards.[17] Moreover, the audience of the *fatwā* has expanded as well. In theory, the *fatwā* was considered to be a decision concerning the individual with regard to particular matters and to influence a relatively narrower circle, but today, every Muslim becomes subject to the implications of the *fatwā* immediately after it has been announced.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TRANSFORMATION OF *IJTIHĀD*

Recent socio-economic changes have also led to the transformation of more specific elements of the *ijtihād* process, such as the *madhhab* (legal school) and *ḍarūra*. Below, I will examine how general changes to this process are reflected at more specific levels as well. I argue that both the perception of *fiqh* concepts and their practice have rapidly changed in recent decades.

Changes in the Perception of the *Madhhab*

During the several centuries leading up to the modern period a person's *madhhab* identity (belonging to a *madhhab*) was very strong in the Muslim world.[18] Solutions to problems were generally

---

[17] For an analysis of *sharīʿa* scholars and related board positions, see Murat Ünal, *The Small World of Islamic Finance: Shariah Scholars and Governance – A Network Analytic Perspective v. 6.0*, http://www.funds-at-work.com/fileadmin/downloads/ShariaNetwork_by_Funds_at_Work_AG.pdf (accessed 20 December 2011). For Sharīʿa Boards, also see Walid Hegazy, "*Fatwa*s and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the Practice of *Fatwa* in Contemporary Islamic Financial Markets," in S. Nazim Ali (ed.), *Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], Islamic Finance Project, 2005), 133-149; Aly Khorshid, "Adding Social Responsibility and Accountability to the Mandate of Shariʿa Advisory Boards," in S. Nazim Ali (ed.), *Building Bridges Across Financial Communities: The Global Financial Crisis, Social Responsibility, and Faith-Based Finance* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], Islamic Finance Project, 2012), 83-101.

[18] It should be emphasized that the *madhhab* as an institution has not been perceived by Muslims as a uniform entity throughout the Islamic history as its understanding (and practice) has varied in different regions and time periods. For instance, while a more analytical view of the *madhhab* dominated in the early periods, loyalty to a single *madhhab* was more common among both scholars and the general public in the later periods. For an examination of the concept of

limited to one's *madhhab*[19] and to the hierarchy within each *madhhab*, particularly with regard to the transmission of narrations of legal opinions (*aqwāl*). *Fiqh* books were generally written in accordance with a specific *madhhab*.[20] Thus, references on a subject were attributed to the researcher's own *madhhab* sources and opinions. Referring to other *madhhab*s was rare and regarded as a last option.

This perception of *madhhab* has changed in the modern world,[21] the *madhhab* identity has been transformed into a flexible structure, particularly in the *muʿāmalāt*. New social conditions, interaction among people from several *madhhab*s, and difficult problems in complex modern life situations have played an important role in this change. Thus, the practices of addressing economic-financial issues in accordance with one specific *madhhab* and formulating *ḥukm*s with regard to it have almost disappeared.[22] Now, I find new *ḥukm*s based on a combination of opinions adopted from different *madhhab*s and independent opinions. The modern perception of *madhhab* does not imply a set of legal precepts and practices isolated from each other, but it offers a valuable source consisting of different

---

madhhab and its evolution in early Islamic legal history, see Eyyup Said Kaya, *Mezheblerin Teşekkülünden Sonra Fıkhî İstidlâl* [*Legal Reasoning after the Formation of Madhhabs*] (PhD dissertation; Istanbul: Marmara University, 2001), 19-29, 42-48, 56-64; see also idem., "Continuity and Change in Islamic Law: The Concept of Madhhab and the Dimensions of Legal Disagreement in Hanafi Scholarship of the Tenth Century," in Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters, and Frank E. Vogel (eds.), *The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], 2005), 26 ff.

19 For example, *Majallat al-aḥkām al-ʿadliyya* (1876) and the latest Ottoman *fatwā*s (see *Jarīda-i ʿIlmiyya* [1914-1922]) were based on *the Ḥanafī madhhab*. There were only a few *fatwā*s given on a *madhhab* other than Ḥanafī in the late Ottoman era. (See İsmail Cebeci, Ceride-i İlmiyye *Fetvaları* [*Fatwās of* Jarīda-i ʿIlmiyya] [Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009], 112 [*fatwā* 579; *Jarīda-i ʿIlmiyya* 5/48, 1478]).

20 For example, al-Marghīnānī's *al-Hidāya*, al-Nawawī's *Minhāj al-ṭālibīn*, *Mukhtaṣar* al-Khalīl, and *Mukhtaṣar* al-Khiraqī, which belong to four primary *madhhab*s, were taught in many old madrasas for centuries.

21 For al-Zarqā's explanation of modern evolution of *madhhab*s, see *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, I, 206-207, 209-210.

22 As an example, see *The International Islamic Fiqh Academy* resolutions (http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa (accessed 22 December 2011).

legal traditions. Contrary to traditional *fiqh*, modern scholars pay less attention to the hierarchical order of opinions within a certain *madhhab*. Preferring the opinion of an ordinary *mujtahid* [23] to that of a leading *imām* of the *madhhab* is more common among modern *fiqh* scholars. It is common for scholars who claim to belong to the same *madhhab* to have different opinions on certain issues.

Parallel to this development, the issue of *talfīq* (combining the opinions of two or more *mujtahid*s on a legal issue) has gained a more flexible meaning, particularly in the *muʿāmalāt*; although some researchers note that there is *talfīq* in some new *ḥukm*s, the majority opinion holds that if the new *ḥukm* is based on evidence and not the application of *taqlīd* (following the authoritative opinion), this kind of *talfīq* would be considered acceptable.[24] The issue of promise (*waʿd*) is an appropriate example for this discussion. Some scholars state that although the *murābaḥa* contract was built on al-Shāfiʿī's opinion, the binding promise was received from Mālik. Furthermore, the integration of the binding promise into other composite models, such as the *al-ijāra al-muntahiya bi-l-tamlīk*, could also be included in this category. For this model has been produced in its current form by adding new features and conditions to its classical form. A third example in this context is the hybrid *ṣukūk*: it, too, has been formed with the integration of different kinds of contracts derived from the classical *fiqh*. For instance, Hashim Kamali has pointed out that the investment *ṣukūk* in particular consists of the *murābaḥa* and the *istiṣnāʿ* as well as investment, all three of which in fact refer to separate contract models.[25] Finally, as Vogel has demonstrated, the fact

---

[23] For example, in the context of *waʿd*, modern scholars refer to such early *ʿulamāʾ* (*salaf*) as ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Ibn Shubruma, Isḥāq ibn Rāhūya, and some companions (*aṣḥāb*) and followers (*ṭābiʿūn*) (see ʿAṭiyya Fayyāḍ, *al-Taṭbīqāt al-maṣrafiyya li-bayʿ al-murābaḥa fī dawʾ al-fiqh al-Islāmī* [Cairo: Dār al-Nashr li-l-Jāmiʿāt, 1999], 73-74).

[24] See Fayyāḍ, *al-Taṭbīqāt*, 105; Aḥmad Sālim ʿAbd Allāh Mulḥim, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa wa-taṭbīqātuhā fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Amman: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 2005), 178, 196. As Kamali argues, *talfīq* "can be an innovative instrument, or one that can be squarely placed under rubric of imitation and *taqlīd*, depending on its component segments and its outcome." (see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, "A Shariʿah Analysis of Issues in Islamic Leasing," *Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics* 20/1 [2007], 19).

[25] Kamali, "A Shariʿah Analysis of Issues in Islamic Leasing," 18-19.

that the *istiṣnāʿ* contract, which is essentially a classical Ḥanafī model, is combined with the *ʿarbūn* (down payment) that is considered *jāʾiz* in the Ḥanbalī tradition, in contemporary practice is also an example of the application of *talfīq* in IF.

As a result, there are significant elements other than *madhhab*, such as the academic background of the scholar, social conditions, and political context and accordingly, the principles he prioritizes, such as *maṣlaḥa* or *ḍarūra*, have become important factors in the *ijtihād* process in IF. Trans-*madhhab* and inter-*madhhab* practices are more common in modern IF and in the field of *muʿāmalāt* in general. Although traditional *madhhab* sources are cited very often, I argue that *madhhab* is a very valuable resource but no longer the key to or determining factor in approaching legal issues and IF.

Changes in the Perception of the *Ḍarūra* (Extreme Necessity)

In classical *fiqh*, the *ḍarūra* was resorted to for specific subjects and in certain examples, such as eating pork or drinking wine in the case of starvation risk. However, in the modern period, it has become one of the primary principles used to introduce new *ḥukm*s in IF and has been granted high importance by modern scholars.[26] Thus, there is a close connection between changes in *ijtihād* and the use of *ḍarūra* in modern IF. For instance, Vogel and Hayes observe that

> Scholars in Islamic finance and banking … have issued fatwās (opinions) allowing Islamic banks to deposit funds in interest-bearing accounts, particularly in foreign countries, because these banks have no alternative investments at the necessary maturities. Typically, however, they place conditions on such fatwās, such as requiring that the unlawful be used for religiously meritorious purposes such as charity, training, or research.[27]

Ḍarūra is closely related to some specifically modern difficulties. The most significant factors of introducing *ḍarūra*-based *ijtihād* include the following:

---

[26] As an example, see the *fatwā* of the *European Council for Fatwa and Research* on mortgage: www.e-cfr.org/data/cat30072008114456.doc (accessed 06 August 2012) (*fatwā* 26).

[27] Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, *Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 38-39.

- Legal obstructions: in some countries, the legal framework regulating the activities of IF institutions entails obstructions (such as banking law and the double tax issue), which is one of the most important reasons for *ḍarūra*.[28]

- Market conditions, economic obligations,[29] and severe competition.

- Modern commercial custom (*ʿurf*): Particularly international commercial practice, which is difficult to change.

- Difficulties related to the structure of Islamic Banks (e.g., the quality and quantity of personnel).

- Difficulties arising from the banking system (e.g., clients might take their money at any time).

- Problems arising from clients (e.g., ethical problems).

In applying the principle of *ḍarūra*, modern scholars commonly refer to three legal maxims: *al-ḥāja tunazzalu manzilat al-ḍarūra khāṣṣatan kānat aw-ʿāmmatan* (Need, whether of a public or private nature, is treated as an extreme necessity – *Majalla,* article no. 32), *al-Ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt* (Necessity makes the unlawful lawful – *Majalla*, article no. 21), and *al-Mashaqqa tajlib al-taysīr* (Hardship begets facility – *Majalla,* article no. 17).

---

[28] For example, there is a double tax problem during sale transactions in many countries, such as Turkey. Also see Necdet Şensoy, "Müzâkere (Ahmet Tabakoğlu'nun "İslâm İktisadı Metodolojisi" Başlıklı Tebliği Üzerine) [Discussion (On the Paper "The Methodology of Islamic Economics" by Ahmet Tabakoğlu)]," in *İslâmî İlimlerde Metodoloji (Usûl) Mes'elesi 2* [*The Problem of Methodology (Uṣūl) in Islamic Sciences 2*] (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2005), 1254-1255; Jamāl ʿAṭiyya, "al-Jawānib al-qānūniyya li-taṭbīq ʿaqd al-murābaḥa," *Majallat Jāmiʿat al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz: al-Iqtiṣād al-Islāmī* 2/1 (1990), 136.

[29] For instance, Abū Sulaymān argues that the Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī's resolution on the binding promise in the *murābaḥa* (see *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* 5/2 [1988], 1599-1600) is based on the *ḍarūra* principle, as this is required for the safety and welfare of commercial and financial transactions, and that the resolution fits the legal maxim "Harm must be eliminated" (see ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān, *Fiqh al-ḍarūra wa-taṭbīqātuhā l-muʿāṣira: Āfāq wa-abʿād* [Jeddah: Al-Bank al-Islāmī li-l-Tanmiya, al-Maʿhad al-Islāmī li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Tadrīb, 2002], 141). A similar, *ḍarūra*-based viewpoint is often applied in rulings on modern financial transactions that involve possession (*qabḍ*)-related issues.

As a result of this application, some financial issues, which had not been considered *jāʾiz* earlier, began to be considered *jāʾiz*.[30] Likewise, there are other issues, on which no *ḥukm* had previously been given, which could easily be considered *jāʾiz* today. To be certain, these changes have been possible because of the use of *ḍarūra*. Additionally, the extent of *ḍarūra* is changeable and has been gradually expanding, which implies a further integration of IF into the capitalist market system.

Furthermore, that there is a goal of complying with religious precepts in financial transactions suggests the existence of what might be called an "intellectual *ḍarūra*": a general *ḍarūra* concept that applies to all modern problems dominates and frames the scholars' mindset to such a degree that in the modern *ijtihād* in IF, this *ḍarūra* perspective – openly or latently – occupies a central space in legal reasoning, as it is considered to characterize modern socio-economic conditions and to be applied to all matters rather than specific cases. Its necessity is often taken for granted without due consideration and is thus overused in IF matters.

Changes in the Perception of *Maṣlaḥa*

The idea of *maṣlaḥa* (public interest) has been an important element of the *ijtihād* process in modern IF.[31] Its centrality is clearly visible in some *ḥukm*s, such as those regarding binding promises[32] and nominal possession (*al-qabḍ al-ḥukmī*)[33] in IF. In particular, those who accept a binding promise emphasize that some contracts, such as *salam* (forward sale with immediate payment), *istiṣnāʿ* (manufac-

---

30 See Abū Sulaymān, *Fiqh al-ḍarūra,* 138.

31 For the frequent use of *maṣlaḥa* and *maqāṣid* in modern transactions, see, ʿAbd al-Nāṣir Mūsā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Abū l-Baṣal, "Manhaj al-fatwā fī aḥkām al-muʿāmalāt al-muʿāṣira," *Abḥāth al-Yarmūk* 18/2B (2002), 474-476.

32 For example, Sāmī Ḥammūd expresses that there is a relationship between the *maṣlaḥa* of people and the binding promise in *murābaḥa*. (Ḥammūd, "Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* 5/2 [1988], 1107). Additionally, a similar opinion was expressed at The Second Conference of Islamic Banks (Kuwait, 1983).

33 Ḥaṭṭāb argues that nominal possession *(al-qabḍ al-ḥukmī)* is more suitable for *maṣlaḥa* of the bank and the client. See Kamāl Tawfīq Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭṭāb, "al-Qabḍ wa-l-ilzām bi-l-waʿd fī ʿaqd al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī," *Muʾta li-l-buḥūth wa-l-dirāsāt* 15/1 (2000), 233-259.

turing contract), *muzāyada* (bidding), *jiʿāla* (reward), and *bayʿ al-wafāʾ* (debt guarantee sale), were accepted on the base of *maṣlaḥa* and *istiḥsān* (juristic preference).[34]

The possibility of an Islamic life for individuals and communities is associated with a sustainable model of the economy based on Islamic precepts. It is argued that such a system is possible with the help of the *maṣlaḥa* principle in *fiqh*. The researchers who prioritize *maṣlaḥa* primarily address the issues surrounding permissibility (*ibāḥa*), facilitation (*taysīr*), and the possibility of new *ijtihād*s. They also argue that rulings may change with time and changes in social necessity.

Scholars focusing on the practical aspects of IF, such as those serving on the *fatwā* committees of Islamic Banks, are more interested in the idea of *maṣlaḥa* because they need immediate solutions. Additionally, some scholars make note of the relationship between *maṣlaḥa* and *al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khamsa* (the five essentials).[35]

Use of Other *Ijtihād* Instruments

Other factors have influenced modern *ijtihād* practice in IF, particularly the use of *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ*, the Qurʾān and Sunna, *al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya*, and *ʿurf*. A number of Muslim scholars have emphasized the use of the principle of *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* (blocking the means to evil) in their rulings on transactions in modern IF.[36] Those who prioritize the *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* (which is based on *iḥtiyāṭ*/precaution) believe that the legal solutions based on *maṣlaḥa* – although they might be *jāʾiz* in themselves – operate on a danger-

---

[34] For example, for *jiʿāla*, see al-Qaraḍāwī, *Bayʿ*, 77.

[35] Mulḥim emphasizes the relationship between *maṣlaḥa* and *al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khamsa* and argues that if the promise is not legally binding for the client, the bank would face enormous harm and that a promise that is made legally binding is more appropriate because it is more suitable for *maṣlaḥa* and the stability of financial transactions. Such a promise is also more suitable for the protection of the *five essentials* (religion, life, intellect, lineage or honor, and property), which is the primary function of the *maṣlaḥa*. However, in the case of the non-binding promise, all or some of the *maṣāliḥ* might be lost, resulting in *mafsada* (harm) (See Mulḥim, *Bayʿ*, 552).

[36] See, e.g., al-Miṣrī, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1996); Muḥammad Sulaymān al-Ashqar, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa kamā tujrīhi l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Amman: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1983).

ous terrain, as they might be easily used for impermissible transactions. The basic concern of those who are motivated regarding the *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* is the transformation of transactions into paper work and the possibility of transforming IF into an interest rate mechanism. However, I observe that the principle of the *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* has been less popular than *maṣlaḥa*-based reasoning among IF scholars, as the former is stricter and therefore less practical for application in real economic life.

Second, it is remarkable that direct references to the Qurʾān and Sunna have been gradually diminished in legal reasoning in modern IF. The primary causes of this decrease include the absence of some new issues in these sources and the presence of multiple structures in new problems, which require more complex reasoning. Instead, modern scholars make many more references to the views of *madhhab*s and *mujtahid*s. In addition to whether the subject matter is directly covered by the fundamental texts, in particular, researchers who emphasize *maṣlaḥa* may prefer to review the original text of the *ḥadīth* (e.g., regarding the *qabḍ*) and highlight the various interpretations of it and may use it in complex transactions.[37]

---

[37] I can cite two examples to demonstrate that many rulings by modern scholars are built directly upon not Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions but on rational principles derived from them. First, there are three verses on the 'promise,' including the following:

"O you who have believed, why do you say what you do not do? Great is hatred in the sight of Allah that you say what you do not do."

(يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لِمَ تَقُولُونَ مَا لَا تَفْعَلُونَ , كَبُرَ مَقْتًا عِندَ اللَّهِ أَن تَقُولُوا مَا لَا تَفْعَلُونَ) (Q 61:2-3)

"O you who have believed, fulfill [all] contracts." (يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَوْفُوا بِالْعُقُودِ) (Q 5:1).

"And fulfill [every] commitment. Indeed, the commitment is ever [that about which one will be] questioned." (وَأَوْفُوا بِالْعَهْدِ إِنَّ الْعَهْدَ كَانَ مَسْؤُولاً) (Q 17:34).

Modern scholars often disagree regarding the interpretation of these promise-related verses, particularly concerning their relationship to legally binding transactions. Second, they disagree on the nature and scope of the ban on "possession" that is mentioned in a number of prophetic ḥadīths; e.g., "The Prophet (pbuh) stated the following: 'Whoever bought food, he should not sell it before possessing it.'"

(نهى رسول الله ان يبيع الرجل طعاما حتي يستوفيه) (al-Bukhārī, "al-Buyūʿ," 54, 55; Muslim, "al-Buyūʿ," 30, 35, 36; Abū Dāwūd, "al-Buyūʿ," 65). These disagreements are the

Third, although the *al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya* (the legal maxims) have not been used to a great extent in IF discussions, some researchers – from time to time – have applied them to support their views. The *qawāʿid* do not have precedence over other evidence, and they usually utilize general rules rather than specific rules (*ḍawābiṭ*). Naturally, the scholars who emphasize the *ḍarūra* and *maṣlaḥa* refer to legal maxims regarding permissibility, such as "The general rule in financial transactions is permissibility (*ibāḥa*)" and "Financial transactions are based on the seeking of reasons and *maṣāliḥ*." Conversely, those who resort to the *qawāʿid* do so to avoid doubtful situations referring to the following legal maxims such as "The best is to keep away from unlawful things" and "Whatever is conducive to the *ḥarām* is itself *ḥarām*."

Finally, new forms of *ʿurf* (custom) that are different from premodern ones have developed as a result of new economic transactions and commercial practices. For example, it is observed that a new *ʿurf* is associated with foreign trade mechanisms, and rights and responsibilities they entail. For example, Ḥammād states that complex contracts are more suitable for modern trade and banking customs.[38] Likewise, some of those who prefer the legally binding promise in IF argue that modern commercial customs, practices, and institutions do not allow for non-binding promises, and therefore, that the former is more suitable for existing laws, customs, and market conditions and does not violate the major Islamic principles.[39] However, despite all these considerations, *ʿurf* is not a primary source, but it is used instead as a piece of evidence supporting the primary argument in modern *ijtihād* practice.

CONCLUSION

Parallel to the expansion and increase in the volume of commercial and economic activities in contemporary societies, Islamic Finance (IF) has transformed into a significant and dynamic field for

principal factors influencing the utilization of Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions in modern IF.

[38] See Nazīh Ḥammād, *al-ʿUqūd al-murakkaba fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī: Dirāsa taʾṣīliyya li-l-manẓūmāt al-ʿaqdiyya al-mustaḥdatha* (Dimashq: Dār al-Qalam & Beirut: al-Dār al-Shāmiyya, 2005), 50.

[39] See Fayyāḍ, *al-Taṭbīqāt,* 69-70; ʿUmar, "al-Tafāṣīl al-ʿamaliyya …," 188-191.

intellectual and *ijtihād*-related activities. In this context, modern Islamic economics (IE) has emerged as an important area in which the rapid pace of contemporary social and economic changes can be observed, and scholarly efforts and methods of reasoning in the field of modern Islamic law can be examined. In particular, IF and IE are significant loci of modern scholarship that allow for the investigation of how *fiqh*-centered approaches and concepts such as the *ijtihād* have been changed in the contemporary world.

I have argued in this paper that the modern *ijtihād* process bears significant differences from the traditional patterns of *ijtihād,* and that modern IF is an area in which this difference is most evident. I have demonstrated that socio-economic developments play a very important role with regard to these differences, which involve fundamental changes in a number of central concepts of *fiqh*, such as the *madhhab*, *maṣlaḥa*, and *ḍarūra*. Moreover, the content and functions of these concepts have also undergone a process of change in the course of modern *ijtihād* practice. These elements have thus come to have different meanings in different contexts.

We observe that although such *ijtihād* methods as *ḍarūra*, *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ*, *ʿurf*, and *maṣlaḥa* were also resorted to in the classical *fiqh*, the practice of producing rulings based on these concepts have become much more frequent and intense in the contemporary world due to rapid changes in social life and technology. I have thus argued that though the above-mentioned methods are found in the classical literature on the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence, and formed the bases of many rulings particularly in the Ḥanafī school, today they have become the main basis of *ijtihād* practice, particularly in the case of IF.

I have also demonstrated that although scholars often emphasize the permissibility (*ibāḥa)* principle, new *ijtihād*s are generally based on a modification of classical sources and opinions rather than the generation of brand new opinions. This is despite the fact that many jurists, such as al-Qaraḍāwī, emphasize the widely accepted notion that the field of *muʿāmalāt* exists within the domain of *ẓanniyyāt,* which consists of flexible *ḥukms*. They therefore claim that this field should be open to new *ijtihād* activity, to which general *fiqh* rules should be applicable.

On the other hand, we also observe that whether IF scholars are interested in the practical aspects of a financial ruling (e.g., if they are

on an 'Islamic' bank's *Sharīʿa Board*) influences the production of *ḥukm*s in this field. For example, those close to the practice of IF tend to draw on such practical principles as the *ḍarūra* and *maṣlaḥa* because they are often in a position to develop particular solutions to practical problems. 'Theorists,' on the other hand, tend to generate sharper opinions, often in the form of either total rejection of a solution or the offer of alternative solutions, which are not always easily applicable in the real-life economy. The latter group can be said to be producing rulings according to their understanding of "ideal Islamic economics."[40] Although this group's *ijtihād* methods often take the form of movement from sources or evidence to cases, 'practitioners' tend to transition from practical cases to sources and evidence. Furthermore, these processes often involve an intertwining of the predominance of *maṣlaḥa* with a series of assumptions regarding transition periods, gradual adaptation, and a lack of experience in the modern economy.

In this context, I have examined a number of changes in the process of modern *ijtihād*, such as the increasing shaping of modern *ijtihād* practice by external factors, which are framed in particular by Western institutions; changes in the context and functions of legal terms and concepts in classical *fiqh*; an intense use of additional sources of *uṣūl al-fiqh*; increasing inter-disciplinarization of *ijtihād* deliberations, along with the integration of modern finance, business, and law into *fiqh*; the deployment of a contract recognized by Islamic *fiqh* as part of a modern transaction, characterized by a lack of attention to its legal and social context; the transformation of the form and content of the IF literature into a series of *fatwā* texts rather than *fiqh* texts; *ijtihād* deliberations' partial adoption of an ideological character; the frequent use of collective *ijtihād* (*ijtihād jamāʿī*) deliberations; and changes in the composition and profile of *fatwā* authorities. I have also observed a decline in the use of alternative *ijtihād* instruments, including the *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ*, *al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya*, and *ʿurf*, as well as the Qurʾān and Sunna.

With regard to the practice of *ijtihād* within the field of IF, these changes will most likely intensify. Therefore, because of changes in

[40] For these concepts, see Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *İslâm İktisadı: Toplu Makaleler II* [*Islamic Economics: A Collection of Articles II*] (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2005), 125.

social and economic conditions and technological developments that are already in full swing, further developments within this field should not be surprising.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Nurullah Ardıç of İstanbul Şehir University for his helpful comments on the earlier versions of the paper.

REFERENCES

Abū l-Baṣal, ʿAbd al-Nāṣir Mūsā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, "Manhaj al-fatwā fī aḥkām al-muʿāmalāt al-muʿāṣira," *Abḥāth al-Yarmūk* 18/2B (2002), 449-484.

Abū Sulaymān, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm, *Fiqh al-ḍarūra wa-taṭbīqātuhā l-muʿāṣira: Āfāq wa-abʿād* (Jeddah: Al-Bank al-Islāmī li-l-Tanmiya, al-Maʿhad al-Islāmī li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Tadrīb, 2002).

Ainley, Michael, et al., *Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges* (London: The Financial Services Authority, 2007).

al-Ashqar, Muḥammad Sulaymān, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa kamā tujrībi l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Amman: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1983).

ʿAṭiyya, Jamāl, "al-Jawānib al-qānūniyya li-taṭbīq ʿaqd al-murābaḥa," *Majallat Jāmiʿat al-Malik ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz: al-Iqtiṣād al-Islāmī* 2/1 (1990), 131-155.

Bälz, Kilian, *Sharia Risk? How Islamic Finance Has Transformed Islamic Contract Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], 2008).

Cebeci, İsmail, Ceride-i İlmiyye *Fetvaları* [*Fatwās of* Jarīda-i ʿIlmiyya] (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009).

_____ "Integrating Social *Maslahah* into Islamic Finance," *Accounting Research Journal* 25/3 (2012), 166-184, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/10309611211290158.

Fayyāḍ, ʿAṭiyya, *al-Taṭbīqāt al-maṣrafiyya li-bayʿ al-murābaḥa fī dawʾ al-fiqh al-Islāmī* (Cairo: Dār al-Nashr li-l-Jāmiʿāt, 1999).

Ḥammād, Nazīh, *al-ʿUqūd al-murakkaba fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī: Dirāsa taʾṣīliyya li-l-manẓūmāt al-ʿaqdiyya al-mustaḥdatha* (Dimashq: Dār al-Qalam & Beirut: al-Dār al-Shāmiyya, 2005).

Ḥammūd, Sāmī Ḥasan, "Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* 5/2 (1988), 1089-1113.

al-Ḥaṭṭāb, Kamāl Tawfīq Muḥammad, "al-Qabḍ wa-l-ilzām bi-l-waʿd fī ʿaqd al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī," *Muʾta li-l-buḥūth wa-l-dirāsāt* 15/1 (2000), 233-259.

Hegazy, Walid, "*Fatwa*s and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the Practice of *Fatwa* in Contemporary Islamic Financial Markets," in S. Nazim Ali (ed.), *Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], Islamic Finance Project, 2005), 133-149.

Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, "A Shariʿah Analysis of Issues in Islamic Leasing," *Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics* 20/1 (2007), 3-22, http://dx.doi.org/10.4197/islec.20-1.1.

Kaya, Eyyup Said, *Mezheblerin Teşekkülünden Sonra Fıkhî İstidlâl* [*Legal Reasoning after the Formation of Madhhabs*] (PhD dissertation; Istanbul: Marmara University, 2001).

_____ "Continuity and Change in Islamic Law: The Concept of Madhhab and the Dimensions of Legal Disagreement in Hanafi Scholarship of the Tenth Century," in Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters, Frank E. Vogel (ed.), *The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], 2005), 26-40.

Khorshid, Aly, "Adding Social Responsibility and Accountability to the Mandate of Shariʿa Advisory Boards," in S. Nazim Ali (ed.), *Building Bridges Across Financial Communities: The Global Financial Crisis, Social Responsibility, and Faith-Based Finance* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, Islamic Legal Studies Program [ILSP], Islamic Finance Project, 2012), 83-101.

al-Miṣrī, Rafīq Yūnus, "Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī* 5/2 (1988), 1127-1179.

_____ *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1996).

Mulḥim, Aḥmad Sālim ʿAbd Allāh, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa wa-taṭbīqātuhā fī l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya* (Amman: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 2005).

al-Qaraḍāwī, Yūsuf, *Bayʿ al-murābaḥa li-l-āmir bi-l-shirāʾ kamā tujrīhi l-maṣārif al-Islāmiyya: Dirāsa fī ḍawʾ al-nuṣūṣ wa-l-qawāʿid al-sharʿiyya* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1987).

Şensoy, Necdet, "Müzâkere (Ahmet Tabakoğlu'nun "İslâm İktisadı Metodolojisi" Başlıklı Tebliği Üzerine) [Discussion (On the Article "The Methodology of Islamic Economics" by Ahmet Tabakoğlu)]," in *İslâmî İlimlerde Metodoloji (Usûl) Mes'elesi 2* [*The Problem of Methodology (Uṣūl) in Islamic Sciences 2*] (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2005), 1254-1255.

Tabakoğlu, Ahmet, *İslâm İktisadı: Toplu Makaleler II* [*Islamic Economics: A Collection of Articles II*] (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2005).

ʿUmar, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, "al-Tafāṣīl al-ʿamaliyya li-ʿaqd al-murābaḥa fī l-niẓām al-maṣrafī al-Islāmī," in *Khuṭṭat al-istithmār fī l-bunūk al-Islāmiyya: al-Jawānib al-taṭbīqiyya wa-l-qaḍāyā wa-l-mushkilāt* (Amman: al-Majmaʿ al-Malikī li-Buḥūth al-Ḥaḍāra al-Islāmiyya, 1987), 175-228.

Ünal, Murat, *The Small World of Islamic Finance: Shariah Scholars and Governance – A Network Analytic Perspective v. 6.0*, http://www.funds-at-work.com/uploads/media/Sharia-Network_by_Funds_at_Work_AG.pdf (accessed 20 December 2011).

Vogel, Frank E. and Hayes, Samuel L., *Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).

al-Zarqā, Muṣṭafā Aḥmad, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī fī thawbih*^{i} *l-jadīd:* vol. I-II: *al-Madkhal al-fiqhī al-ʿām*; vol. III: *Madkhal ilā naẓariyyat al-iltizām fī l-fiqh al-Islāmī* (9th edn., Dimashq: Dār al-Fikr, 1967).

http://www.albaraka.com/media/pdf/Research-Studies/RSMR-200706201-EN.pdf (accessed 10 November 2011).

http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa (accessed 22 December 2011).

www.e-cfr.org/data/cat30072008114456.doc (accessed 22 August 2012).

AN EXAMPLE OF THE MYSTICAL AVICENNISM IN OTTOMAN THOUGHT
Jamāl al-Khalwatī's Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's *Risāla ilā Abī Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr*

Veysel Kaya
Uludağ University, Bursa-Turkey

Abstract

In the face of growing scholarship on the classical period of Islamic thought, it is becoming more apparent that Ibn Sīnā owes much to the philosophical and theological traditions that precede him in matters that were once regarded as original stances of *al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs*. Undoubtedly, Ibn Sīnā still deserves to be regarded as a key figure who potentiated one of the turning points in Islamic thought. His influence is demonstrated by the fact that a time came, especially for Muslim theologians who represented the main theological tendencies in Muslim society, when they could not ignore his writings anymore. Al-Ghazālī's well-known *Incoherence of Philosophers* was a result of this inevitable case. In this regard, Ibn Sīnā's influential writings led the way to different interpretations of his ideas being incorporated within different traditions of Islamic thought, such as *falsafa*, *kalām*, and *taṣawwuf*. This article addresses a particular case in which some of his ideas, or to put it more correctly, ideas attributed to him, were conveyed in the Ottoman mystical environs, a situation that leads us to explore the concept of "mystical Avicennism." Rather than constructing an overall theory on the influence of Ibn Sīnā in Ottoman thought, this article is a modest attempt to make sense of a text written by one of the mystical figures of Ottoman times, a sample that can be addressed in the context of the Avicennian corpus.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.58

Key Words: Ibn Sīnā, Ibn ʿArabī, Ottoman philosophy, *taṣawwuf*, attributes of God

I

The history of Ottoman thought is a history that portrays an eclectic and thus selective character in every aspect of its progress. The best known and the most available text on the genealogy of Ottoman scholars *al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya* by Ṭāshkuprīzāda (d. 968/1561) presents ten generations (*ṭabaqāt*) of the Ottoman *elite*, all of which are categorized according to the particular reign of the Ottoman Sultans they lived during. The tone of the political concerns in the book is so powerful and immanent that the author himself, early in the book, acknowledges that he is compiling a biographical work and taking into consideration the Ottoman lineage of sultanate, as it was completed in the shadow (*fī ẓilāl*) of a state upon which God bestowed forceful (*qāhira*) rulers;[1] even he is inevitably in a position to gladly express these feelings. To understand the general character of Ottoman thought from the beginning, it is necessary to note that the Ottoman cultural atmosphere was always immersed with mystical tendencies under different names. This, of course, may give us clues as to why "mystical Avicennism," as I call it, endured through the ages in the Ottoman lands, together with the other aspects of the philosophy of *al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs*, i.e., Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), and particularly in our example, in the form of the thought of another respected figure in the Ottoman times, i.e., Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240).

The first lineage of the Ottoman scholars represented in *al-Shaqāʾiq* are, reasonably, nothing more than "founding father" personalities who undoubtedly played roles in shaping the scientific atmosphere of a new-born state. It is not until the second generation that we find scholars whose scientific activities can be considered to be within the scope of the traditional Islamic curricula. Among these first three generations, there are two figures that interest us because of their scientific mission to determine the basic tendencies in the history of Ottoman thought. One of them, Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d.

[1] Abū l-Khayr ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkuprīzāda, *al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1975), 6.

751/1350), belongs to the second generation, i.e., from the time of Orkhān Ghāzī. The author of a commentary on Ibn ʿArabī's famous work, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī is known for being a loyal follower of Ibn ʿArabī's school of thought, especially after he personally met and spent time with ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 736/1335).[2] One generation after al-Qayṣarī, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqsarāyī (d. 791/1388?) arises as an eminent personality, as evidenced by his being subject to the direct interest of the Sultan after he (al-Aqsarāyī) was commissioned to compile a work on morality (*Akhlāq-i Jamālī*)[3] and after he supplied an "authoritative environment" to some prominent scholars who are not pleased with the status quo in some madrasas.[4] The authority of him undoubtedly comes from as well, his blood relation to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), a polymath who was respected as "the leader" (*al-imām*) in any scholarly circle of Ottoman thought, so much so that the general character of Ottoman religious thought is often defined as "the school of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī" (tr. "Fahreddîn Râzî Mektebi").[5]

A descendent of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqsarāyī, the subject of the article, Jamāl al-Khalwatī (d. 899/1494?), comes to the fore as a typical Ottoman scholar who is not only trained in the Ottoman madrasa system in the traditional way, like his other Ottoman colleagues, but also has a strong mystical orientation. He is the founder of one of the main branches in the Khalwatiyya order, Jamāliyya. According to sources, Jamāl al-Khalwatī's appetite for the Sufi society developed when he

---

2 Cağfer Karadaş, "Dâvûd-i Kayserî ve Genel Hatlarıyla Düşüncesi [Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī and His Thoughts with Broad Strokes]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] 25/2 (2006), 5 ff.

3 Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn* (eds. M. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge; vol. I, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1941), 36.

4 The first Ottoman Sheikh al-Islām Mullā Fanārī, during his education, took refuge in his circle, when he disliked ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Aswad, who held the official chair in the Madrasa of Iznik [Nicaea], see Ṭāshkuprīzāda, *al-Shaqāʾiq*, 9.

5 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı* [*Educational Organization of Ottoman State*] (3rd edn., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 75-77. Uzunçarşılı adds that in the scientific circles of the 13th century, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was being called *sheikh al-ʿulamāʾ* (the chief of the scholars) as well.

became bored studying the standard text of the madrasa curricula, *Mukhtaṣar al-Talkhīṣ*, a work written in the field of Arabic rhetoric as a commentary by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī on al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīs al-Miftāḥ*.[6] In the biographical sources, al-Khalwatī is generally portrayed as a Turkish Sufi poet; however, the fact that he chose to write many of his works in Arabic might be interpreted as a desire to be regarded as a contributor to the Akbarī (related to Ibn ʿArabī) literature. This attitude, as shown in the example of his commentary on Ibn Sīnā's letter, may be regarded as his personal contribution to influencing Avicennian thought in Ottoman times and promoting its "political survival" in the guise of Islamic mysticism, a situation that allegorically reminds us of Ibn Sīnā's setting for Iṣfahān when he had political troubles and disguised himself in Sufi dress.[7]

II

There have always been discussions among researchers as to whether Ibn Sīnā has mystical inclinations in his writings. Although some categorically deny any mental or physical engagement between him and *taṣawwuf* or Sufi circles, there still remains the basic fact that at least some of Ibn Sīnā's major writings, such as *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* (esp. the ninth *namaṭ* titled "Maqāmāt al-ʿārifīn"), have allusions to the Sufi vocabulary. Several manuscript collections of Ibn Sīnā we have today in different libraries, bear witness to correspondence between Ibn Sīnā and the contemporary Sufi, Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr (d. 440/1049) of Khurāsān. In this regard, it is not surprising to find some researchers who tend to label the correspondence as forgery,[8] as the correspondence would otherwise supply direct evi-

---

6 For details about the life of Jamāl al-Khalwatī, see Muharrem Çakmak, "Türk Mutasavvıf Şairi Aksaraylı Cemal Halvetî [A Turkish Sufi Poet Jamāl al-Khalwatī of Aksaray]," *EKEV Akademi Dergisi* [*EKEV Academy Journal*] 16/3 (2003), 181-196.

7 See William E. Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sīnā* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1974), 63.

8 See, especially, observations by David C. Reisman in his notable study on Avicenna research: David C. Reisman, "A New Standard for Avicenna Studies," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 122/3 (2002), 567 ff. At first instance, he states that the correspondence "consists of some *authentic* Avicennian letters to Bahmanyār and Ibn Zayla related in different ways to … *Mubāḥathāt* and outright *forgeries* that emerged from the hagiographical tradition connected to Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr begun in the seventh/thirteenth century…" (p. 567, the ital-

dence for Ibn Sīnā's actual contact with mystics. In this article, I am not in a position to delve into the authentication of this correspondence. Given that the title proposes nothing but a general concept called "Avicennism," the fact that it was taken as a work belonging to the Ibn Sīnā corpus by Ottomans and by others as well, is adequate for us to evaluate it in a context that aims at describing the impact of Ibn Sīnā's scholarly heritage.

The letters that i have selected as the subject of our article display an intriguing and brief correspondence (**Text I**). The first letter by Abū Saʿīd, which may not be regarded as a conventional letter because of its brevity, consists of a single appeal by Abū Saʿīd to Ibn Sīnā. In essence, it consists of the phrase *arshidnī* ("guide me!," in some MSs, "show me the evidence!"). Ibn Sīnā's answer to that appeal seemingly reveals tempting aspects of his overall theological stance, as even the message is not totally clear to readers like us who want to interfere in the correspondence between two great "mystics." As the overall meaning in the *Risāla* indicates, according to Ibn Sīnā, to enter the literal unbelief (*kufr*) and quit the figurative belief (*islām*), one must only look beyond "the three personalities" (i.e., *muslim* [*muʾmin*], *kāfir*, and *mushrik*). If someone is beyond (*warāʾ*) this, there is not any label such as "believer" or "unbeliever" therein; but if under (*taḥt*) this, then he/she is a polytheist (*mushrik*) and a believer at the same time. Aside from these two positions described as *beyond* and *under*, if someone is totally ignorant, then he/she has no way other than to be excluded from the two existences, and thus, be-

ics are ours), thus setting aside the question as to which of these letters should be avoided as forgeries and on what grounds. However, later he concludes that all correspondence can be regarded as forgeries, probably products of a later Sufi or Ishrāqī tradition, by stating that he has "good evidence for arguing against the authenticity…" (p. 568). Our main approach here is not to impose any essentialist understanding either to a polymathic figure like Ibn Sīnā or to Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr, whose personality is unfairly seen by Reisman as belonging to a "tradition that sought to make of Abū Saʿīd an intellectual that he most likely was not…" (p. 574). Cf. idem., *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's* al-Mubāḥaṯāt *(The Discussions)* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2002), 138 ff.

comes priceless.[9]

Now, if the whole Avicennian corpus is taken into consideration, it is very unusual to come across such vocabulary as "believer" and "unbeliever" in their religious sense in his writings. In a way, this can be explained by the fact that Ibn Sīnā avoided using terms that related to the juridical/theological area in the classical Islamic literature that was called "names and judgments" (*al-asmāʾ wa-l-aḥkām*). This area, which addresses what basic religious nominations such as *muslim, kāfir*, and *fāsiq* theologically and socially mean, is not a concern of a philosopher in its true meaning, namely, one who is after universal truth. This brings to the question whether Ibn Sīnā, as a *Muslim* philosopher, wrote any work on Muslim catechism (*ʿaqīda*), which might satisfy his contemporaries by defending his true religion, as expected from someone who adheres to Islam. The closest to that among his works is his *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya*,[10] a work written in

[9] For a translation and a different evaluation of the correspondence in comparison with al-Ghazālī's thoughts, see Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 84-85.

[10] Reisman, again, raises his doubt about the authenticity of *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* and comments that the *Risāla* should be added to the pseudo-Avicennian works; Reisman,"Stealing Avicenna's Books: A Study of the Historical Sources for the Life and Times of Avicenna," in Reisman and Ahmed H. Al-Rahim (eds.), *Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 125 (n. 102). However, I see no reason to exclude the *Risāla* from the Avicenna corpus since the ideas demonstrated therein perfectly coincide with the general philosophical attitudes of Ibn Sīnā in his other works. Furthermore, after some specific studies of the *Risāla* in the framework of my ongoing PhD thesis (*Ibn Sīnā's Influence on Islamic Theology*), my hunch is that the *Risāla* is suitable to be linked to the proper *kalāmic* background of Ibn Sīnā's established oppositions, as is seen in his other writings such as *al-Najāt* and *al-Shifāʾ*. Yet, I am totally aware that this cannot be established without elaborate examination of all items, a task that exceeds the limits of this article.

However, this does not mean that the printed editions of the *Risāla* do not have some serious problems. For instance, the printed versions attributed to him naming the Muʿtazila as *Ṣifātiyya*, although it is utterly strange and unusual to refer to Muʿtazila in this way (see Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā, *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* [ed. Ibrāhīm Hilāl; Cairo: Jāmiʿat al-Azhar, 1980], 23; idem., *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya fī tawḥīdihī taʿālā wa-ṣifātihī*, in *Majmūʿ rasāʾil al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs* [Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1354 H], 7). This would have only been interpreted by the grave ignorance of either the author (Ibn Sīnā) or the editors about the general history of Islamic theology. Thankfully, it is determined

accordance with one of his followers' wishes to learn the realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) of the science of God's unity (*ʿilm al-tawḥīd*).[11] Nevertheless, the overall methodological viewpoint drawn therein by Ibn Sīnā is but a perfect summary of his philosophical stance, which derives its framework from the dichotomy of necessary and possible beings and the distinction between existence and essence. Thus, the *ʿArshiyya* does not offer any criterion for judging what makes a believer or an unbeliever or for what final case awaits these two persons in the hereafter.

Be that as it may, in an epistle called *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād*, which intentionally uses the religious vocabulary, Ibn Sīnā more clearly emphasizes the belief matters (*al-umūr al-iʿtiqādiyya*) in the theological sense and asserts that, from the religious perspective (*sharʿ*), one must express (*iqrār*) that the creator is one and that far from any material attributes insofar as to fulfill the Islamic creed (*ʿaqīda*), God has no partners with Him.[12] Ibn Sīnā also reports that, according to some of those who believe in the hereafter, there are three types of people: (1) the good-doing believer, whose rewards will be endless, (2) the sinful believer, whose final fate is in the hands of God, and (3) the unbeliever, whose punishment is endless.[13] In general, Ibn Sīnā attributes only the conventional meanings of "believer," "unbeliever," etc., to religious nominations as they are fun-

---

that it is due to a misreading because there is no such word as *Ṣifātiyya* in the well-known MSs of the Ibn Sīnā's epistles. Cf. *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894), 446a; (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya, 4849), 35a.

[11] It must be noted here that Ibn Sīnā undeniably sees an essential overlap between the subject matters of metaphysics and theology. Accordingly, it is tempting to note that the major issues he enumerates as being dealt within the science of metaphysics, such as the demonstration of the existence of God, the unity of God, and the attributes of God, were also the preliminary topics the contemporary *kalām* aims at: idem., *Fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya*, in *Tisʿ rasāʾil fī l-ḥikma wa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt* (2nd ed., Cairo: Dār al-ʿArab, n.d.), 112-113. In doing so, Ibn Sīnā is following his predecessor al-Fārābī, as it can be seen in the latter's *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm* (see the section on "ʿIlm al-Kalām"). Therefore, later theologians' distinctive effort to equalize *kalām* and *falsafa* in terms of their scopes, has interestingly its roots in the works of these prominent Muslim philosophers.

[12] Ibn Sīnā, *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād* (ed. Ḥasan ʿĀṣī; Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-Jāmiʿiyya, 1987), 97-98.

[13] *Ibid*., 92.

damental to the Islamic disciplines. Furthermore, in another less-known epistle of Ibn Sīnā (**Text IV**), where interestingly, he searches for the answers to major philosophical questions such as "What is the reason of man's existence in this world?" Ibn Sīnā explains that this world, as it pertains to human beings, can be regarded as the place of deeds, while the hereafter is the place of God's judgment, thus making an ontological distinction between "this world (*hādhā l-ʿālam*)" and "that world (*dhālika l-ʿālam*)." Accordingly, the eschatological circle for a believer (*muʾmin*) operates as "Heaven-That World-This World-*Barzakh*-That World-Heaven," consequently, ending in the rewards of God, whereas the circle is inevitably broken for the unbelievers, thus they face the punishment of God. Referencing a saying attributed to the Prophet "the world life is jail for the believer," Ibn Sīnā strikingly summarizes his position that man was forcibly brought into the world, he is forcibly being kept in the world and he will forcibly be taken out of the world. Consequently, from that perspective, there is no other way to gain the eternal salvation – one must believe.

Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā himself sees no harm in occasionally applying the traditional Islamic names such as *muslim*, *kāfir*, etc. and relates them to the issue of the eternal salvation. With respect to this particular point, our epistle adds another aspect, because as understood from the text, it praises what it calls the literal unbelief (*al-kufr al-ḥaqīqī*) while criticizing what it calls the figurative belief (*al-islām al-majāzī*). In this case, the consequence may be that while Ibn Sīnā still adheres to the major tenet for accepting the eternal bliss of the believers, he takes the liberty to deviate from the "al-sawād al-aʿẓam"[14] and re-defines religious categories such as *muslim* and *kāfir*. Thus, it is highly conceivable that one may find some Ismāʿīlī/Bāṭinī roots, thus giving ground to Ibn Sīnā's stance. Regardless, what escapes doubt is that it is this Avicennian aspect that some commentators wanted to see, as in the example of the Ottoman scholars such as Jamāl al-Khalwatī.

III

Ibn ʿArabī is certainly one of the most exceptional figures the Islamic world has ever seen. The works he produced were so well-received by his followers that we come across some efforts which

[14] Ibn Sīnā himself uses this term to render the majority of believers. See *ibid*., 91.

strive to perceive Islamic heritage from the viewpoint that he adopted and the terminology that he introduced. Obvious enough to be dealt with in a specific study, the epitome of this situation is evidenced in Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Fīrūzābādī's (d. 817/1415) attempt to write a voluminous commentary on major religious sources such as *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī, which drew upon the many quotations from Ibn ʿArabī's *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*.[15] Hence, Jamāl al-Khalwatī's gloss on the correspondence evidently belongs to this genre, as it additionally proposes an amalgamation of the Avicennian influence into Ibn ʿArabī literature.

We know that in addition to al-Khalwatī, there are other attempts to solve the puzzle regarding the correspondence, one of which is from a certain Saʿd al-Dīn al-Kālūnī (?) (**Text III**). This particular interpretation is worth dealing with in a special study due to its interesting references, although it does not restrict its scope to an Ibn ʿArabian framework. Jamāl al-Khalwatī's short gloss has two direct references to Ibn ʿArabī's works[16] (one without mentioning the book), *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, a foremost text particularly in the Ottoman tradition.[17] The reader of this interpretation is not in a position to miss the vocabulary of Ibn ʿArabī, which is noticeably evident in the explanations of al-Khalwatī. These include very apparent terms such as *al-insāniyya*,[18] *tajallī l-dhāt*,[19] *ẓuhūr al-asmāʾ*,[20] *aḥadiyyat al-jamʿ*,[21] among others.

---

[15] Kātib Chalabī, *Kashf al-ẓunūn*, I, 550.

[16] For the first one "qāla l-Sheikh fī *l-Fuṣūṣ* al-ilāh al-muqayyad …" cf. Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1946), 226; for the second "qāla l-Sheikh inna Ṣāḥiba …" cf. *ibid*., 226.

[17] There is a tradition of writing commentaries on Ibn ʿArabī's *Fuṣūṣ*. This mainly starts with the first *mudarris* in the first official Ottoman university (the Madrasa of Iznik), Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī and intriguingly continues with some "enemy of the state" personalities such as Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā.

[18] This is a very common term which Ibn ʿArabī generally uses as an adjective. However, there are some occasions when he refers to it as an independent entity. See for example *Fuṣūṣ*, 97: "we know that Zayd is the same with ʿAmr in humanness (*al-insāniyya*) …".

[19] Ibn ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004), II, 667.

[20] *Ibid*., I, 125: "Man is … the place where the divine names occur." For the importance of divine names in the philosophy of Ibn ʿArabī, see a very helpful

According to al-Khalwatī's interpretation, Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr's request, "guide me!," is in fact an inquiry about the reality of the secret of humanness, a reality that, as he states, is the very reason for the purpose of the creation of the world. Thus, "entering the real unbelief" provides someone with the explanation of this reality. The terms "belief" and "unbelief" are no more than different manifestations (*tajallī*) of the divine attributes, in accordance with the mystic's personal states. Al-Khalwatī has two definitions for the term *kufr*; both of which have positive connotations in contradiction to the orthodox perception. Although the general character of the letter fully bears Ibn ʿArabī's tone, his interpretation regarding the key term of the letter, "three persons (*al-shukhūṣ al-thalātha*)," is hopefully one of the instances where he comes close to Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. In one alternative explanation, he holds that the three persons mentioned in the letter represent the three stages of God's unity: the unity in His actions, the unity in His attributes, and the unity in His essence.

At this particular point, it is appropriate to deal with al-Khalwatī's stance with respect to one of the most complex problems in classical Islamic theology, i.e., whether the attributes of God are identical to his Essence or different from his Essence, in a context that can be called "Avicennian." First, "the orthodox point of view" on God's unity, as represented in a standard text of the Ottoman madrasa curricula,[22] *Matn al-ʿaqāʾid* by ʿUmar al-Nasafī and its commentary by al-Taftāzānī is as follows: The attributes are neither identical to, nor different from Him (*lā huwa wa-lā ghayruh*[ū]).[23] According to the Sunnī perspective, because the Muʿtazilites hold that any identity besides God would lead to the multitude of eternal beings (*taʿaddud al-*

chapter in Ekrem Demirli, *İslam Metafiziğinde Tanrı ve İnsan: İbnü'l-Arabi ve Vahdet-i Vücud Geleneği* [*God and Man in Islamic Metaphysics: Ibn ʿArabī and the Waḥdat al-Wujūd Tradition*] (Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2009), 123 ff.

21 *Ibid*., III, 81: "the unity (*aḥadiyya)* of the imām is the unity of *jamʿ* …"

22 For the importance of the text in the Ottoman education system, see for example: Mefail Hızlı, "Osmanlı Medreselerinde Okutulan Dersler ve Eserler [Courses and Textbooks in Ottoman Madrasas]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] 17/1 (2008), 39. As stated in the article, along with al-Taftāzānī's work, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid* must surely be included in the standard texts of the Ottoman curricula.

23 Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī, *al-ʿAqāʾid* (with *Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid* by al-Taftāzānī) (Istanbul: Ḥājī Muḥarram Efendī Maṭbaʿasi, 1288 H), 149.

qudamāʾ) – a notion contrary to the Islamic creed of the unity of God – they are labeled as the deniers of God's attributes.[24] In fact, this placed them in a very dangerous position from a religious standpoint because in the classical *fatwā* collections, the verdict for those who hold that God is the knower without the attribute of knowledge, namely the position of Muʿtazila, is to strip them of the name of Muslim.[25]

It is tempting to argue that Ibn ʿArabian notion of God's attributes deviated from the orthodox theory, while such intense opposition from the Sunnī/Ḥanafī side still aroused hostility against any unorthodox ideas regarding the issue. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī's (d. 898/1492) *al-Durra al-fākhira*, a work that was written at the request of the Ottoman Emperor Meḥmed II, to contrast the tenets of the three major groups (philosophers, theologians, and mystics) with respect to the basic theological issues, Ibn ʿArabī, when defending his position on the attributes of God, goes so far as to argue that the idea that "God's attributes are different from his Essence" is tantamount to pure disbelief and polytheism.[26] Not surprisingly, Ibn ʿArabī's Ottoman followers preserved this general stance of their *al-Sheikh al-Akbar*, in spite of the fact that some nuances were likely to be found from one author to another.[27] In his commentary on Ibn

---

[24] Abū Muḥammad Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd ibn Abī Bakr al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāya fī uṣūl al-dīn* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Hüseyin Çelebi, 579), 20b.

[25] Aḥmad Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Gumushkhānawī, *Jāmiʿ al-mutūn* (Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1856), 32 (on the margin). According to an excerpt from the famous *fatwā* collection *Tātārkhāniyya* "those who say that God is knower without the attribute of knowledge, and they are Muʿtazilites and philosophers, since they hold that all attributes of God is identical to Him (*ʿayn dhātih*ī), must be denounced as unbelievers (*yuḥkam bi-kufrihim*)."

[26] Abū l-Barakāt Nūr al-Dīn Mullā ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad al-Jāmī, *al-Durra al-fākhira*, in Fakhr al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *Asās al-taqdīs* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1935), 208.

[27] One might argue that there is the issue of how one can make sense of the era (i.e., the Ottoman period) in which the legal Sunnī stances were strictly applied on the one hand, and the followers of mystic tendencies that departed from the Sunnī view accepted on official grounds on the other hand. Maybe, the fact that Ottoman atmosphere was a melting pot of different authoritative discourses based on the different religious fields in Islamic culture, mainly *fiqh*, *kalām*, and *taṣawwuf* can be taken as a starting point for an easy yet insufficient explanation.

ʿArabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī meticulously applies the terminology of the Ibn ʿArabī to the issue of attributes. There are two levels (*martaba*) with regard to the essence of God. At the level of *aḥadiyya*, there is but the essence and entity of God, without any attributes or names. The level of *wāḥidiyya* talks about the attributes and the names of God. However, there is one condition, which is that the distinction between *ṣifa* (attribute) and *mawṣūf* (attributed) only occurs in the human mind. In reality, there is nothing but One Existent. In this regard, *Amīr al-muʾminīn* ʿAlī said, "The perfect devotion to God is to negate all attributes attached to his Essence."[28]

Hence, the deviation of Ibn ʿArabī and his followers from the Sunnī understanding of attributes was to serve the ultimate goal of preserving the unity of God (*tawḥīd*, *waḥda*), a notion that fully coincides with Ibn Sīnā's ideas. While it surely has its background in the Sufi literature, al-Khalwatī's three-fold understanding of God's oneness, as mentioned herein, is also a philosophical stance that is adapted by Ibn Sīnā as well.[29] In another instance, al-Khalwatī comments on the Qurʾānic chapter *al-Ikhlāṣ* (**Text IV**) and once again mentions this three-fold unity in the identical terms, providing more clues about his understanding of God's attributes such that the attributes of God must be identical to His essence, not distinct from it (*ṣifāt al-dhāt ʿayn dhātihi laysat bi-zāʾida*); only in this way does He gains the true meaning of unity.

It is also of interest that al-Khalwatī's clear philosophical position particularly came under his commentary on *sūrat al-Ikhlās*, since, in his commentary on the chapter *al-Ikhlās,* Ibn Sīnā himself took the chance to stress his neo-Platonist idea of God's absolute unity in a tone that much resembles that of the Sufis. In the first place, a careful reader would not miss some of the central vocabulary that Ibn Sīnā used, especially *wāḥidiyya*[30] and *aḥadiyya*,[31] considering how much

---

[28] Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Qayṣarī, *Matlaʿ khuṣūṣ al-kalim fī maʿānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (revised by Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Sāʿidī; n.p.: Manshūrāt Anwār al-Hudā, 1416 H), I, 27-28.

[29] Ibn Sīnā's outline in his *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* relies on the unity of the essence, attributes, and actions of God. See especially (Ibrāhīm Hilāl's edition), 36.

[30] Ibn Sīnā, *Fī tafsīr al-ṣamadiyya*, in his *Jāmiʿ al-badāyiʿ* (ed. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1335 H), 19.

[31] *Ibid*., 23.

Ibn ʿArabī and his followers rely on these two terms when explaining the unity of God and His attributes.[32] It would be anachronistic to assume that Ibn Sīnā utilized these terms to render the same notions in the school of Ibn ʿArabī. However, there is no doubt that Ibn Sīnā's whole point in the commentary is the absolute unity of God's essence (*dhāt*) and that there is not any sign of plurality (*kathra*) in Him. With that in mind, there is no way to know his Essence except through negations (*sulūb*) and nominal additions (*iḍāfāt*).

IV

In what sense do we talk about Avicennism in Ottoman thought in general? There is no doubt that Ottoman scholars are well aware of the philosophy and the thought of Ibn Sīnā as they are loyal disciples of the school of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his followers, such as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī, Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī, Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, all of whom were "immersed" in the Avicennian corpus as adherents to a period called "the later *kalām*." It must be noted, however, that the early encounters of the Ottoman circles with Ibn Sīnā were mainly through the works of the followers of Ibn ʿArabī, not through works of the major theologians listed above. If we take the example of a monumental figure of the early Ottoman times, i.e., Mullā Fanārī, who was seen as a towering personality of his time for representing the "true" stance in religious sciences,[33] it can be observed that his "Avicennism" is coming from such Akbarian tendencies, mainly from Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 672/1273).[34] In the meantime, there is the thought-provoking fact that it is rare to come across any separate commentary on one of Ibn Sīnā's major works, such as *al-Shifāʾ*, *al-*

---

[32] To follow the two terms in Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā, see his *al-Wāridāt* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ulucami, 1698, dated 920 H), 18a.

[33] Ṭāshkuprīzāda, *Mawsūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm* (ed. ʿAlī Daḥrūj; Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 1998), 251 (article: "*al-ʿilm al-ilāhī*").

[34] See Janssens's relevant evaluations in terms of the theory of emanation: Jules Janssens, "Elements of Avicennian Influence in al-Fanārī's Theory of Emanation," in Tevfik Yücedoğru et al (eds.), *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu (4-6 Aralık 2009 Bursa) – Bildiriler – (International Symposium on Molla Fanārī [4-6 December 2009 Bursa] – Proceedings –)* (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2010), 315 ff.

Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt,[35] or *al-Najāt*. One can argue that this situation is meaningful, if we consider the fact that we are talking about a period in Islamic thought in which any philosophical or theological stance was being developed in the form of commentaries and glosses on some major works. However, Jamāl al-Khalwatī's commentary on Ibn Sīnā's letter can still be regarded as a rare example of commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's own works.

Notes on the Arabic Texts

Text I

As for the correspondence between Ibn Sīnā and Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr, I took the MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, 1460, 14b-15a (ب) as the base text, for it has the interpretation of al-Khalwatī as well. Other versions of the correspondence include: ʿAbd al-Amīr Shams al-Dīn, *al-Madhhab al-tarbawī ʿinda Ibn Sīnā min khilāl falsafatihī l-ʿilmiyya* (Beirut: al-Sharika al-ʿĀlamiyya li-l-Kitāb, 1988), 398 (ش); MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894, 247a, (under the heading "Kalām li-l-Sheikh Abī ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā ʿalā ṭarīqat al-taṣawwuf") (ن). The editing begins with Ibn Sīnā's response.

Text II

The interpretation of Jamāl al-Khalwatī on the correspondence: MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, 1460, 14b-15a.

Text III

The interpretation of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Kālūnī (?) on the correspondence: MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894, 247a.

Text IV

Jamāl al-Khalwatī's commentary on the "sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ," MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, 1460, 59b-60a.

---

[35] One exception is Kamālpashazāda's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*.

Text V

Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī l-mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894, 435b-436a (ن); MS Nevşehir, Hacıbektaş İlçe Halk Kütüphanesi, 236, 79a-79b (under the heading "Min kalām al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs Abī ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā") (و).

Text I

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم و به نستعين. و صلى الله على سيدنا محمد و آله أجمعين.

كتب الشيخ أبو سعيد بن أبي الخير قدس سره العزيز إلى الشيخ الرئيس أبي علي بن عبد الله بن سينا. فقال في كتابه إنه :"أرشدني".[36] فكتب الرئيس في جوابه: "الدخول في الكفر الحقيقي و الخروج عن الإسلام المجازي أن لا تلتفت إلا إلى[37]ما وراء[38] الشخوص الثلاثة حتى تكون[39] مسلما و[40] كافرا، و إن كنت وراء هذا فلست مؤمنا و لا كافرا، و إن كنت تحت هذا فأنت مشرك[41] و[42] مسلم،[43] وإن كنت جاهلا[44] فأنت[45] تعلم أنك[46] لا قيمة[47] لك و لا تعدّ[48] من جملة الوجودين".[49] فلما وصل جوابه إلى الشيخ أبي سعيد استحسنه حتى ذكر في كتابه المسمى *بالمصباح*[50]: "أوصلني هذه الكلمات إلى ما أوصله إليه[51] ألف سنة من العبادة".

Text II

قوله "أرشدني" طلب عن بيان حقيقة سر الإنسانية و هو مقصود أصلي من إيجاد العالم. قوله الرئيس "الدخول في الكفر الحقيقي و الخروج عن الإسلام المجازي" بيان عن هذه الحقيقة. و الكفر عبارة عن تجلي[52] الذات بطريق الصفات الجلالية، و هو إما على طريق النزول، و هو خفاء الذات بظهور الأسماء على مظاهرها بحسب استعداداتهم

---

36 ن: "دلني على الدليل"
37 ب، ش: – إلى
38 ب، ش: بما وراء
39 ب: يكون
40 ن: – و
41 ن: مسلم
42 ش، ن: – و
43 ن: مشرك
44 ن: + بجميع هذا
45 ن: فإنك
46 ش، ن: أن
47 ب: همة
48 ب: نقد + لك ن: + لك
49 ش: الموجودين
50 ن: المصابيح
51 ب: + ما
52 في الأصل: تجلية

و قابلياتهم. و إما على طريق العروج و هو ظهور الذات باستهلاك (ال)تعينات الكونية[53] و العلمية عن مظاهرها بحسب المراتب. و الإسلام هو التجلي الذاتي بصفته الجمالية، و هو إما بعد الجمع أو[54] قبل الجمع. و المراد بالدخول فى الكفر الحقيقي، أي الاتصاف بالكفر، و هو شهود سريان أحدية الذات إلى المظاهر مع استهلال النظر الى الغير.

و قوله "و الخروج عن الإسلام المجازي" أي تنزيه الذات عن التجليات الخاصة كما قال الشيخ فى *الفصوص* الإله المقيد المعتقدات تأخذ الحدود و هو الإله الذي وسعه قلب عبده. فإن الإله المطلق لا يسعه شيء.

و قوله "ان لا تلتفت" اي لا تصل إلى هذا السر إلا بالتجريد عن الشخوص الثلاثة اي توحيد الأفعال[55] و الصفات و الذات. و في هذه الجمعية كان الإنسان سر الله و بالماوراء الرد إلى الحضرة العبودية لأن الله تعالى سر للعبد فيه.

قوله "حتى تكون مسلما" اي (١٥أ) وافقا على سر التجليات و هي شهود أحدية الجمع بين الأسماء كلها.

قوله "و كافرا" اي لا ترى فى كل شيء غير الله.

قوله "و إن كنت وراء هذا" اي و إن كنت مستويا في هذا و لست مؤمنا و لا كافرا، لأن الاعتبارات مسقوطة فيه، كما قيل "إذا تم الفقر فهو الله".

قوله "و إن كنت تحت هذا" اي و إن كنت مقيدا فأنت مشرك، لأن عبد الله ليس بعبد الرحيم، كما قال الشيخ إن صاحب هذا المعبود الخاص جاهل بلا شك.

قوله "و إن كنت جاهلا الخ" اي و إن لم يكن استعدادك فى العلم لم يوجد فى الغير، و يجوز أن يراد بالشخوص، السير إلى الله من منازل النفس إلى نهاية مقام القلب، والسير مع الله بالاتصاف بصفاته و التحقق بأسمائه، و السير فى الله و هو عين الجمع و نهاية الولاية و بالماوراء السير بالله عن الله و هو مقام البقاء بعد الفناء و الله يقول الحق و هو يهدي السبيل. تم بعون الله الملك الجليل.

Text III

(٢٤٧أ) ... هذا و قد حل الإمام العلامة سعد الدين الكالوني كلمات الشيخ الرئيس فقال: و ما توفيقي إلا بالله، عليه توكلت و إليه أنيب. اعلم أيها الحائض في لجج هذه الحجج أنه لا يتيسر(؟) لك هذه الطريقة إلا بالدخول في الكفر الحقيقي المشار إليه بقوله

[53] في الأصل: الكونين
[54] في الأصل: و
[55] في الأصل: التوحيد الأفعال

"و لكن قولوا أسلمنا" (الحجرات١٤:٤٩) فمن يكفر بالطاغوت (البقرة ٢٥٦:٢)، و هو الإعراض عما سوى الله تعالى بالكلية، و الخروج عن الإسلام المجازي المشار إليه بقوله "و لكن قولوا أسلمنا". و يؤكد ما قلنا قول أبي المغيث الحسن بن منصور الحلاج: كفرت بدين الله و الكفر واجب لدي و عند المسلمين قبيح. و قصر الالتفات على ما وراء الشخوص الثلاثة أي أصحاب الجنة و أصحاب الأعراف و أصحاب النار حتى تصير بذلك من أهل الله و خاصته و يكون مسلما لله و كافرا بما سواه. ثم بعد الالتفات إن كنت وراء هذا مرتب من إطلاق اللفظين، و إن كنت تحت هذا أي في مراتب الشخوص الثلاثة فأنت مسلم باعتبار الانقياد مشرك باعتبار الالتفات إلى الغير. و إن كنت جاهلا من جميع هذا فاعلم أنه لا قيمة لك و لا تعدّ من جملة الوجودين[56] أي تفصيل النشأتين و تحصيل السعادتين. قال الله تعالى "أولئك الذين كفروا بآيات ربهم و لقائه فحبطت أعمالهم فلا نقيم لهم يوم القيامة وزنا" (الكهف ١٠٥:١٨). هذا ما حج له الوقت و حاد به الحال. و الله المستعان.

Text IV

(٥٩ب)... سورة الإخلاص بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. "قل هو الله أحد" قل أمر من عين الجمع وارد على مظهر التفاصيل عند أهل الله تعالى، هو عبارة عن الحقيقة الأحدية المحصنة أي الذات من حيث هي بلا اعتبار صفة لا يعرفها إلا هو. "الله" بدل منه و هو اسم الذات المستجمع بجميع الصفات و علم من كونه بدلا أن صفات الله عين ذاته ليست بزائدة بل هي عينه، لا فرق إلا بالاعتبار العقلي. و لهذا سميت سورة الإخلاص. لأن الإخلاص تمحيض الحقيقة الأحدية عن شائبة الكثرة، كما قال أمير المؤمنين علي رضي الله عنه: كمال الإخلاص نفي الصفات بشهادة كل صفة أنها غير موصوف بشهادة موصوف غير صفة. "أحد" خبر المبتدأ و الفرق بين الأحد و الواحد ظاهر. لأن الأحد هو الذات بلا اعتبار الصفات و الواحد هو الذات مع جميع الصفات و هي الحضرة الأسمائية. "الله الصمد" أي الملجأ المطلق لكل الأشياء لافتقارها في وجوداتها و ما يتعلق بها و ذات[57] الله تعالى غني عن العالمين "لم يلد" أي لا شريك له في ذاته "و لم يولد" أي لم يكن لصفاته احتياج إلى شيء في الوجود "و لم يكن له كفوا أحد" أي منزه عن النظير.

و يجوز أن يراد من قوله تعالى "قل هو" أنه رد لمن أنكر وجود الحق و قال إنه ليس بموجود و قوله تعالى "أحد" أنه رد لمن قال إن الخالق إثنان أي خالق النور غير خالق الظلمة، و قوله تعالى "الله الصمد" أنه رد لمن قال إنه يأكل و يشرب، و قوله "لم يلد و لم يولد" أنه رد لمن قال إن الملائكة بنات الله تعالى و عزير ابن الله، و قوله "و لم يكن له

[56] في الأصل: لا قيمة له و لا لك من جميع الوجودين

[57] في الأصل: ذوات

كفوا أحد" أنه رد لقول المشبهة و المجسمة سبحانه و تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا.

و يجوز أن يراد من قوله "قل هو الله أحد" التوحيد الذاتي و قوله (٦٠أ) "الله الصمد" التوحيد الصفاتي، و قوله "لم يلد و لم يولد و لم يكن له كفوا أحد" التوحيد الأفعالي.

و اعلم أن في قوله "هو" إشارة إلى أن أول الموجودات هو و آخرها هو، لأن الهاء من أقصى الخلق و منتهى المخارج فافهم.

و يؤيده أن وقوع لفظة الله تعالى بين الإسمين، لأن "هو" و "الأحد" يدلان على الجمال (الإجمال؟) و ما وقع بينهما يدل على التفصيل.

Text V

(٤٣٥ب)... *رسالة في المبدأ و المعاد* للشيخ الرئيس أبي علي بن سينا. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. الحمد لله حمد الشاكرين و صلواته على سيد الأولين و الآخرين محمد و آله الطيبين الطاهرين من كلام الشيخ رحمه الله.

المسألة الأولى: أنا من أيّ موضع جئنا إلى هذا العالم؟ الجواب: اعلم أنا من ذلك العالم جئنا إلى هذا العالم، و حد هذا العالم من فوق فلك البروج تحت الفلك المستقيم إلى هذه الأرض. و حد ذلك العالم[58] من فوق الفلك المستقيم إلى تحت مرتبة القلم الذي هو العقل الأول. و مجيئنا من ذلك العالم إنما هو من جنة الله تعالى هي خضرة القدس التي بها قدس المقدسون، و تلك هي فوق[59] ذلك العالم و هذا العالم. فأما هذا العالم فهو دار عمل[60] و ذلك العالم دار حساب[61] و الجنة هي[62] دار جزاء المحسنين. و إنا جئنا من الجنة إلى ذلك العالم و من ذلك العالم جئنا إلى هذا العالم، و من هذا العالم نذهب إلى البرزخ، و من البرزخ نرجع إلى ذلك العالم[63] الذي هو موضع الحساب، و من موضع الحساب يرجع من حسن عمله إلى جنة الله تعالى، و يبقى من ساء عمله تحت الطبع و الطبيعة في جهنم أبدا ما دامت السماوات و الأرض إلا ما شاء ربك إن ربك فعال لما يريد. و احتاجوا إلى العمل بغير إرادة منهم ليصلوا إلى الصور الموافقة

---

58 و: – و حد هذا العالم من فوق فلك البروج تحت الفلك المستقيم إلى هذه الأرض. و حد ذلك العالم

59 و: – هي فوق + من

60 و: العمل

61 و: الحساب

62 ن: – هي

63 و: – و من ذلك العالم جئنا إلى هذا العالم، و من هذا العالم نذهب إلى البرزخ، و من البرزخ نرجع إلى ذلك العالم

لأزواجهم من الجنة، و هم[64] ينالون من تلك الصور التى هي في الطعام و الشراب لذة، و يجدون سكونا إلى الدنيا تحت الطبع و الطبيعة و كذلك يكونون[65] في قيد الطبيعة يدخلون كارهين من غير إرادة تحت قيد العقل الذي يدره (؟) العمل العقلي الذي جاء به الرسل عليهم السلام مما يشهد به شرائعهم حتى تأنس النفس و تطمئن بتلك الصور العلمية و العقلية و يجد بها قرارا، لأن أصلها أيضا هو من جنة الله تعالى، و بتلك الاستفادة يضيء لها طريق الصراط وقت ذهابها إلى معادها و يخف حسابها و تثقل موازينها. فقد بين الآن أن البشر بتقدير الابتداء فوق العقل و الطبع لكنهم اليوم محبوسون تحت الطبع و مقيدون بالعقل، و خلاصهم يكون حين يطلقون من قيد العقل و ليس يطلقون من قيد العقل إلا حين يخرجون من سجن الطبع و الطبيعة. و هذه معان مغلقة[66] يفتحها الشرح للمستحقين إن شاء الله تعالى.

المسألة الثانية: لأي سبب جئنا إلى هذا العالم؟ الجواب: اعلم أن مجيئنا إلى هذا العالم لم يكن باختيارنا و إرادتنا لكن بالقهر جيء بنا و بالقهر نمسك و بالقهر نخرج، و إنما جيء بنا للتمحيص و التطهير "ليمحص الله الذين آمنوا و يمحق الكافرين" (آل عمران ١٤١:٣)، و طهارة النفس إنما تكون بالعمل الشرعي و العلم الإلهي و بهذين يتم الطهارة و التوجه إلى المعاد. و كما أن طهارة الجسد من أنجاسه إنما تكون بالماء أو بالتراب عند عدم الماء، كذلك طهارة النفس بالعلم الذي هو بمنزلة الماء أو بالتراب[67] الذي هو بمنزلة العمل فقد تبين أن كل من أتى بالعمل الشرعي حتى يصل به إلى العلم الإلهي، فيعلم حقيقته و يقينه[68] فإنه تخلص عند مفارقة هذه الدنيا التي هي سجن المؤمن، فاعرفه إن شاء الله.

المسألة الثالثة: أنا حين نخرج من هذا العالم إلى أين مرجعنا؟ الجواب: اعلم أن كل إنسان يخرج من هذا العالم تلقاء ملائكة (٤٣٦أ) الرحمة أو ملائكة العذاب فيحملونه[69] إلى البرزخ، و البرزخ هو قبر النفس[70] فإن كانت مؤمنة فتح لها باب من الجنة و إن كانت كافرة[71] فتح لها باب من النار إلى ذلك القبر الذي هي فيه، و حد سفل البرزخ علو هذا

---

64 و: – هم
65 و: يكون
66 و: – مغلقة
67 و: التراب
68 و: تعينه
69 ن: يحملونه
70 و: ٧٩ب
71 و: كافرا

العالم و حد سفل ذلك العالم علو[72] البرزخ، و قوة شرائع الأنبياء عليهم السلام هي أن يحمل الإنسان من دار العمل فتوصله إلى البرزخ و بالقوة السابعة يكون حركته في البرزخ، و بالقوة الثامنة يفارق البرزخ، و بالقوة التاسعة يحاسب و بالقوة العاشرة يصل إلى معاده أي إلى جنة الله تعالى التي فيها[73] خلق آدم عليه السلام و أولاده. و هذه أسرار عجيبة تحتها معان كثيرة في شرحها على الحقيقة يكون النجاة و في تحريفها الهلاك، نعوذ بالله من سخته.

المسألة الرابعة: أن ما يكون حالنا بعد مفارقتنا عن[74] الدنيا عند حصولنا في البرزخ.
الجواب: اعلم أنا نكون في البرزخ أيقاظا واجدين اللذات الروحانية و الصور التي نستنضجها من هذا العالم من العلم و العمل في الخير و الشر تصير فينا محكمة ذاتية مفرعة[75] مثمرة،[76] و بالجملة إنا نكون في البرزخ كالنطفة في الرحم و البدن في الأرض و يثمر على ما في أصلها التي جائت به[77] من ظهر أبيها حتى إذا اتصلت بها القوة السابعة صار حالها و حكمها إلى لون آخر، و كما يكون المؤمن مستيقظا لوجود الذات و معاينتها،[78] كذلك يجد الكافر عذابا بمعاينة الصور المنكرة المكروهة على ما يوافق علمه و عمله في هذا العالم.[79]

تمت المسائل بجواباتها و الحمد لله أولا و آخرا و صلواته على خير من دب و درج محمد و على آله الطيبين و هو حسبي و نعم الحسيب.

---

72 و: على
73 و: – التي فيها
74 ن: – عن
75 و: متفرقة
76 و: مستمرة
77 و: – به
78 و: معانيها
79 و: + و السلام على من اتبع الهدى

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article was prepared within the framework of a short-term project "Osmanlı Dönemi Felsefesinde İbn Sînâ'nın Etkisi [The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on Ottoman Philosophical Thought]," HDP(D)-2011/21, conducted by Ulvi Murat Kılavuz and Veysel Kaya, with the support of Uludağ University.

REFERENCES

Çakmak, Muharrem, "Türk Mutasavvıf Şairi Aksaraylı Cemal Halvetî [A Turkish Sufi Poet Jamāl al-Khalwatī of Aksaray]," *EKEV Akademi Dergisi* [*EKEV Academy Journal*] 16/3 (2003), 181-196.

Demirli, Ekrem, *İslam Metafiziğinde Tanrı ve İnsan: İbnü'l-Arabi ve Vahdet-i Vücud Geleneği* [*God and Man in Islamic Metaphysics: Ibn ʿArabī and the Waḥdat al-Wujūd Tradition*] (Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2009).

Gohlman, William E., *The Life of Ibn Sīnā* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1974).

Griffel, Frank, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001.

al-Gumushkhānawī, Aḥmad Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, *Jāmiʿ al-mutūn* (Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1856).

Hızlı, Mefail, "Osmanlı Medreselerinde Okutulan Dersler ve Eserler [Courses and Textbooks in Ottoman Madrasas]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] 17/1 (2008), 25-46.

Ibn ʿArabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1946).

_____ *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 4 vols., (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 2004).

Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *al-Wāridāt* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ulucami, 1698, dated 920 H).

Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād* (ed. Ḥasan ʿĀṣī; Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-Jāmiʿiyya, 1987).

_____ *Fī aqsām al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya*, in *Tisʿ rasāʾil fī l-ḥikma wa-l-ṭabīʿiyyāt* (2nd ed., Cairo: Dār al-ʿArab, n.d.).

_____ *Fī tafsīr al-ṣamadiyya*, in his *Jāmiʿ al-badāyiʿ* (ed. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, 1335 H).

_____ *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894), 445a-449a.

_____ *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya, 4849), 32b-39b.

_____ *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya fī tawḍīdihī taʿālā wa-ṣifātihī,* in *Majmūʿ rasāʾil al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs* (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1354 H).

_____ *al-Risāla al-ʿarshiyya* (ed. Ibrāhīm Hilāl; Cairo: Jāmiʿat al-Azhar, 1980).

_____ *Risāla fī l-mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894), 435b-436a.

_____ *Min kalām al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs Abī ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā* (*=Risāla fī l-mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*) (MS Nevşehir, Hacıbektaş İlçe Halk Kütüphanesi, 236), 79a-79b.

_____ *Kalām li-l-Sheikh Abī ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā ʿalā ṭarīqat al-taṣawwuf* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894), 247a.

Janssens, Jules, "Elements of Avicennian Influence in al-Fanārī's Theory of Emanation," in Tevfik Yücedoğru et al (eds.), *Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu (4-6 Aralık 2009 Bursa) – Bildiriler – (International Symposium on Molla Fanārī [4-6 December 2009 Bursa] – Proceedings –)* (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2010).

al-Kālūnī (?), Saʿd al-Dīn, *? (The Interpretation of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Kālūnī on the Correspondence between Ibn Sīnā and Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr)* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye, 4894), 247a.

Karadaş, Cağfer, "Dâvûd-i Kayserî ve Genel Hatlarıyla Düşüncesi [Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī and His Thoughts with Broad Strokes]," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*The Review of the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University*] 25/2 (2006), 1-17.

Kātib Chalabī, Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn* (eds. M. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge; vol. I, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1941).

al-Khalwatī, Jamāl, *Tafsīr al-Fātiḥa wa-min sūrat al-Ḍuḥā ilā ākhir al-Qurʾān* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, 1460), 47b-61a.

_____ *Sharḥ kalām Ibn Sīnā* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, 1460), 14b-15a.

Mullā al-Jāmī, Abū l-Barakāt Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad, *al-Durra al-fākhira*, in Fakhr al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *Asās al-taqdīs* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1935).

al-Nasafī, Abū Ḥafṣ Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad, *al-ʿAqāʾid* (with *Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid* by al-Taftāzānī) (Istanbul: Ḥājī Muḥarram Efendī Maṭbaʿasi, 1288 H).

al-Qayṣarī, Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad, *Matlaʿ khuṣūṣ al-kalim fī maʿānī Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 2 vols., (revised by Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Sāʿidī; n.p.: Manshūrāt Anwār al-Hudā, 1416 H).

Reisman, David C., *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's* al-Mubāḥaṯāt *(The Discussions)* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2002).

_____ "A New Standard for Avicenna Studies," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 122/3 (2002), 562-577, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3087524.

_____ "Stealing Avicenna's Books: A Study of the Historical Sources for the Life and Times of Avicenna," in David C. Reisman and Ahmed H. Al-Rahim (eds.), *Before and After Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

al-Ṣābūnī, Abū Muḥammad Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd ibn Abī Bakr, *al-Kifāya fī uṣūl al-dīn* (MS Bursa, İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Hüseyin Çelebi, 579).

Shams al-Dīn, ʿAbd al-Amīr, *al-Madhhab al-tarbawī ʿinda Ibn Sīnā min khilāl falsafatih*ī *l-ʿilmiyya* (Beirut: al-Sharika al-ʿĀlamiyya li-l-Kitāb, 1988).

Ṭāshkuprīzāda, Abū l-Khayr ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā, *al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1975).

_____ *Mawsūʿat muṣṭalaḥāt miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm* (ed. ʿAlī Daḥrūj; Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 1998).

Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı* [*Educational Organization of Ottoman State*] (3rd edn., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988).

MYSTICAL INTERPRETATION OF SHEIKH BADR AL-DĪN IBN QĀḌĪ SAMĀWNĀ'S CONTROVERSIAL IDEAS

Abdurrezzak Tek
Uludağ University, Bursa-Turkey

Abstract

An important factor that affected political, religious, and social life during the period of Ottoman history called the "Ottoman Interregnum" was Sheikh Badr al-Dīn ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā's (d. 823/1420) ideas and activities that resulted in a rebellion. Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, who managed to come to prominence in each position that he held, received the highest level of education. In addition to his scholarly identity, he officially served as *qāḍī ʿaskar* (judge of the army), an important bureaucratic rank for the state. Finally, as a Sufi, he attracted many supporters in a short time. Although several studies have examined his life and ideas, a considerable number of these studies were written for ideological purposes. A Sufi scholar, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn has been unrighteously and incorrectly accused of being a pioneer of atheism, pantheism, anarchism, communism, and materialism in Ottoman times. The main reason for these inaccurate accusations is that his work *al-Wāridāt* has not been regarded as a mystical text. In this paper, I will attempt to address his controversial ideas at the mystical level, demonstrating the similarities and differences between his thoughts and those of earlier Sufis. The first commentaries written on *al-Wāridāt* are the main sources for the paper.

Key Terms: Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā, *al-Wāridāt*, Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, the Judgment Day, resurrection, the eternity of the world, *mushāhada*

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.59

Sources state that because of his authority especially in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's scholarly identity and the prestige he gained were well received in academic circles during the period in which he lived and in later centuries. His influence was not limited to Anatolia and Rumelia but spread throughout the Islamic Middle East, especially Egypt. Hence, the famous scholar al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), whose company the Sheikh enjoyed in Cairo, praised his scholarly personality. Ibn ʿArabshāh, who had the opportunity to talk to Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, mentioned his authority in the field of *fiqh*. Ibn ʿArabshāh also wrote that the Sheikh's academic proficiency was so high that he disagreed with one of the major works of the Ḥanafī *fiqh,* the *al-Hidāya* with one thousand and ninety questions. Even the 16th century Idrīs al-Bidlisī, who identified him as a "*mulḥid* and *zindīq* (heretic)" due to his mystical thoughts, could not help commenting that the Sheikh was one of the leading scholars and jurists in religious and rational sciences. Undoubtedly, what established Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's scholarly authority was that he wrote such works in the field of *fiqh* as *Jāmiʿ al-fuṣūlayn* when he served as *qāḍī ʿaskar* of Mūsā Chalabī for ten years in Edirne. These works would be studied in Ottoman madrasas even after his execution.[1]

How was such a scholar, whose scholarly competency was accepted in nearly all circles, accused of blasphemy because of some words he said as a Sufi? The common opinion in studies on Sheikh Badr al-Dīn is that the reason was his work *al-Wāridāt* and the ideas expressed therein. In fact, before we address these ideas and the context in which we interpret them, we must examine the issue of the authenticity of *al-Wāridāt.* This little treatise is a collection of lectures given to the Sheikh's disciples when he was under house arrest in Iznik [Nicaea] or, according to a more reliable source, after he fled from Iznik to Rumelia in search of the Sultan Chalabī Meḥmed around 820-823/1417-1420. Judging from the fact that the subjects of the treatise are not addressed systematically, it has been claimed that the treatise as it appears today was not written by Sheikh Badr al-Dīn. It has been argued that one of his disciples collected the Sheikh's ideas, to the best of his recollection, after the Sheikh's death. It has also

[1] For remarks on Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's different identities, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-17. Yüzyıllar)* [*Zindīqs and Mulḥids in Ottoman Community (15th-17th Centuries)*] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 152-160.

been said that although the treatise most likely was not written by the Sheikh himself, he saw the treatise after it was compiled and translated into Arabic. Others hold that it may be the Sheikh himself who translated the work into Arabic, so the last version of the treatise was probably checked by the Sheikh. All of these approaches claim that *al-Wāridāt* does not present Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's original ideas and thus cannot be accepted as a reliable document.[2] I argue that these claims based on the unsystematic character of the work or the discrepancies between the ideas expressed therein and those expressed in his other works can be appraised from two angles. First, the disconnection of opinions and witnessings (*mushāhada*s) and the lack of chapter headings and sections in the book is specific to this type of literature, i.e., *wāridāt* literature. With regard to the content of his Sufi interpretations, if we consider his mystical connection to Sheikh al-Ḥusayn al-Akhlāṭī in Egypt, his affiliation with the Akbarī School and his writing of a gloss on Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī's commentary on *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, the source of his mystical opinions and witnessings about the issue of *mabdaʾ* and *maʿād* is revealed.[3]

Muslim theologians hold that because scriptural texts about the afterlife fall into the category of *mutashābih* (unclear in meaning), they can have figurative meanings in addition to their literal meanings. This is because the other world cannot be conceived with the five senses, so reason, which depends on data provided by the senses, cannot be used for its perception. In his *al-Wāridāt*, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn provides esoteric meanings instead of exoteric meanings to such eschatological issues as the Apocalypse, Judgment Day, Heaven, Hell, the rewards of Heaven, the punishment of Hell; to unseen crea-

---

[2] For similar attitudes toward *al-Wāridāt*, see Khalīl ibn Ismāʿīl, *Simavna Kadısıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin Menâkıbı* [*Manāqib of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā*] (eds. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı and İsmet Sungurbey; Istanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1967), 30; Cemil Yener, *Şeyh Bedreddin* - Vâridât [*Sheikh Badr al-Dīn* - al-Wāridāt] (Istanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1970), 44; Necdet Kurdakul, *Bütün Yönleriyle Bedreddin* [*Badr al-Dīn in All Aspects*] (Istanbul: Döler Reklam Yayınları, 1977), 145-167; Bilâl Dindar, *Šayḫ Badr al-Dīn Maḥmûd et ses* Wāridāt (Ankara: Ministère de la Culture, 1990), 51; Ocak, *ibid*., 191.

[3] Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's grandson Ḥāfiẓ Khalīl ibn Ismāʿīl, in his *Manāqibnāma* of his grandfather written in 1460, says that *al-Wāridāt* is the last work by the Sheikh himself (Khalīl ibn Ismāʿīl, *ibid*., 131-132). However, it is intriguing that he does not say that the work does not belong to him to vindicate his grandfather, who was executed because of his views in *al-Wāridāt*.

tures like angels, *jinn*s, satan, and the other controversial issues such as soul-body connection, the problem of good and evil, the eternity of the world, the relation between master and disciple, the reality of dreams, and the knowledge of the essences of things (*maʿrifa*). He attempts to explain these concepts based on the principle of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). These issues, which constitute the subject of our paper, can be addressed under the following headings.

1. The Nature of the *Ḥashr*

The *ḥashr*, i.e., the gathering of all those who are going to be resurrected on the Last Day in a place to be judged, constitutes a second eschatological stage after the resurrection (*baʿth*). The belief in both gathering and resurrection rely on the Qurʾānic text, the prophetic traditions, and the consensus of believers. Thus, these concepts constitute a creed for Muslims, and those who reject this creed are regarded as unbelievers. Almost all sects, with the exception of some non-Islamic sects, such as al-Manṣūriyya and al-Janāḥiyya, accept that the gathering and the resurrection will occur. Discussions about the topic fall into three categories:

a. Those who accept that the material body in the Hereafter will be the same as in this world.

b. Those who claim that the resurrection will only be spiritual.

c. Those who accept the resurrection and believe that re-creation in the Hereafter will be in a similar body, not in the same body as in this world.

Almost all Muslim scholars hold that the resurrection will be bodily, judging by the relevant Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions.[4] According to them, descriptions in the Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions about Heaven and Hell, the people of Heaven, the rewards in Heaven, the people of Hell, and the punishment of Hell are clear proof that the resurrection will be bodily. A Naqshbandī sheikh, Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī (d. 896/1491), who was one of the first commentators of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's thoughts, accepted that resurrec-

[4] For the relevant verses and prophetic traditions, see Q 50:4; Q 36:78-79; Q 71:17-18; Q 39:68; Q 70:43; Q 30:56; Q 50:42; al-Bukhārī, "al-Īmān," 37, "al-Tafsīr," 39/3, 78/1, "al-Riqāq," 45; Muslim, "al-Fitan," 141, 142, "al-Janna," 55-59; al-Nasāʾī, "al-Janāʾiz," 118.

tion will be bodily, however, this body could be the same with the one in this world as well as a new body created from different elements.[5]

The starting point for Muslim Peripatetic philosophers, who deny the bodily resurrection, is their view that the *iʿāda* (resurrection) of *maʿdūm* (the non-existent) as it was is impossible. This view suggests that it is not possible for the body that decayed and became non-existent to be resurrected in the Hereafter. The soul is permanent and does not change. Even though God is able to create a new body and connect it to the soul, the connection of the same soul to different bodies entails incarnation. Thus, resurrection and gathering are relevant to souls, not bodies. Bodily depictions in Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions are only symbols that are applied to help people understand the realities of life in the Hereafter, encouraging them to do good and discouraging them from doing evil.[6] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, who maintains that the soul's gaining a new body is not incarnation, sees these interpretations as unbelief and denounces these philosophers as unbelievers.[7] Among Muslim philosophers, al-Fārābī,

---

5 Sheikh ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī al-Simāwī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn* (MS Istanbul, Hacı Selim Ağa Kütüphanesi, Kemankeş, 206), 23b-24a, 45a-46a; idem., *Kashf al-Wāridāt* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1325), 9b-11b.

6 Theologians responded to this attitude of Muslim Peripatetics with a view called "*al-ajzāʾ al-ʿaṣliyya* (essential parts)." According to them, although the bodies of every living being change throughout their lives, there are some essential parts that do not change. On the day of the apocalypse, the body of every living being will be created from these essential parts. See Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (ed. Jirār Jahāmī; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1993), 213-214; Abū l-Maʿālī Imām al-Ḥaramayn Rukn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-irshād* (eds. M. Yūsuf Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd; Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1369 H [1950]), 371-372; Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir ibn Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Istanbul: Dârülfünun İlâhiyat Fakültesi, 1346 H [1928]), 234; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *Kitāb maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn* (ed. Samīḥ Dughaym; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1992), 89-90; Süleyman Toprak, *Ölümden Sonraki Hayat: Kabir Hayatı* [*Life After Death: The Intermediate Life*] (Konya: Sebat Ofset, 1989), 213-214; Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, "Ba's [Baʿth]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], V, 100.

7 See al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (ed. Sulaymān Dunyā; 2nd edn., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1955), 84-90.

Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd explain happiness in the Hereafter as the achievement of intellectual pleasure and explain punishment and pain as the lack of this pleasure. Thus, they claim that the Judgment Day will be spiritual rather than bodily.[8]

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, who was regarded by Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī as among *muḥaqqiq* Sufis, stated his views on the resurrection and the gathering in his famous *al-Wāridāt* as follows:

> The permanence of the body and the gathering of its parts together are not possible, after it dismembers and ceases to exist, as it was before. The resurrection of the dead does not mean that.[9] The judgment of the bodies is not the way ordinary people assume. However, it is possible that a time comes that there is not any single human being. After that, a human being comes to the existence just like in Adam being without parents out of soil, then through reproduction (*bi-l-tanāsul*).[10]

It can be understood from the above statements of the Sheikh that creation in the Hereafter will only be of the soul, not of the body; even if it is bodily, the body there will not be the same as the body of this world. According to ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn intended the second meaning and did not deny bodily resurrection. The point Sheikh Badr al-Dīn makes is as follows: the body consists of four elements that bear the character of dismemberment and destruction. Although the soul is in contact with the body through divine will, the connection of the soul with the body does not make the body eternal. For that reason, the elements that constitute the body change to their real character, i.e., the character of mortality after death, and the body dismembers and vanishes. If human beings are

---

8 On this issue, see Yavuz, "Ba's," V, 98-100; Süleyman Toprak, "Haşr [Ḥashr]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XVI, 416-417; Cağfer Karadaş, *İslâm Düşüncesinde Âhiret* [*Afterlife in Islamic Thought*] (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2008), 91-95; Yaşar Aydınlı, *Fârâbî'de Tanrı-İnsan İlişkisi* [*God-Human Relation in al-Fārābī*] (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2000), 112; Orhan Şener Koloğlu, "Mutezile Kelâmında Yeniden Yaratma (İʿâde) [Resurrection (Iʿāda) in Muʿtazilite Thought]," *Usûl İslâm Araştırmaları* [*Usûl Islamic Researches*] 9 (2008), 7-40.

9 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā, *al-Wāridāt*, in Sheikh ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī al-Simāwī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 9b.

10 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 35a, 36b.

to be created in the Hereafter in their bodies, even if their bodies resemble the shapes of those in this world, they differ in their characteristics. It is not possible to think of corruptible elements in the eschatological body because there will be eternity in the Hereafter. Thus, as stated in the Qurʾānic verses and the prophetic traditions about the resurrection, the differences in the structure of eschatological bodies, including not feeling exhaustion and boredom, not needing sleep, not getting sick, and not getting old, indicate this situation. Hence, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn does not oppose bodily resurrection; he only disagrees with people's incorrect understandings about the nature of the resurrection. Referring to Ibn ʿArabī's statements, ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī tries to prove Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's position that the resurrection happens with the blow of the soul and reproduction, as in the case of Adam after he was created from soil.[11]

One commentator, Sheikh Yāwṣī (d. 920/1514), who was the father of Sheikh al-Islām Abū l-Suʿūd, holds the same views. He thinks that the body consists of elements, and every thing that consists of other things is temporal, not eternal. After the elements that form the body dismember and vanish, they do not come together; they return to their essential nature.[12] Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥarīrīzāda who wrote the first Turkish commentary on *al-Wāridāt* under the name *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya* states that the collection of elements that constitute bodies in the Hereafter is not "elemental (*ʿunṣurī*)" but an "imaginal (*mithālī*)" way that is specific to that world. In other words, although the body supersedes the soul in the world, in the Hereafter, the soul supersedes the body.[13] Criticizing Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's thoughts, a 17th cen-

---

[11] See Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 9b-11a; 35a-36b; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 67; idem., *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi* [*Translation and Commentary of* Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam] (translated into Turkish with a commentary by Ahmed Avni Konuk, eds. Mustafa Tahralı and Selçuk Eraydın; 4th edn., Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2005), I, 246-249.

[12] Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafā al-Iskilībī Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq fī sharḥ Kashf asrār al-daqāʾiq* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hacı Mahmud Efendi, 2620), 4a, 22a-b.

[13] Ḥarīrīzāda holds that the bodies of prophets and saints do not vanish because their bodies are souls and their souls are bodies. See Meḥmed Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya Sharḥ-i Wāridāt-i Ilāhiyya* (MS Istanbul, Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Kütüphanesi Atatürk Kitaplığı, Osman Ergin Yazmaları, 507), 11b; 52a-57a.

tury Khalwatī sheikh Nūr al-Dīnzāda took a more deliberate approach. He suggests that if the author (the Sheikh) means that the body created in the Hereafter will be different from the one in the world, that can be accepted. However, if he means to deny the bodily resurrection and to support spiritual creation in the Hereafter, this meaning is contrary to the Qurʾān, the Sunna, and the consensus of believers and leads to blasphemy.[14] Sheikh al-Islām Mūsā Kāẓim claims that Sheikh Badr al-Dīn was not interested in the material things because he was always occupied with spiritual things; thus, he denied bodily resurrection.[15]

ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī insists that Sheikh Badr al-Dīn did not deny bodily resurrection. According to him, those who are not prophets and God's friends cannot completely understand issues related to the Hereafter. Accordingly, judging from the literal meanings of the Sheikh's words, some ignorant people supposed that he denied bodily resurrection and the material character of Heaven. However, the meaning meant by the pure (*aṣfiyāʾ*) and the saints (*awliyāʾ*) are far from the thoughts of ignorant people. Average people's knowledge and assumptions about the Hereafter, Heaven, the houries, the trees, etc. are different from the perceptions of the *muḥaqqiq* Sufis.[16] Mullā Ilāhī recommends the following to those who do not accept the words of the Sheikh:

> Just and intelligent people should accept the words of the people of *kashf* and *shuhūd*. If they do not, at least they should not insist on their bigotry. However, to accept completely what *awliyāʾ Allāh* say is a more suitable way, if possible.[17]

In addition, quoting from Ibn ʿArabī to support his thought, Mullā Ilāhī emphasizes that Ibn ʿArabī supported both bodily and spiritual

---

[14] Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafā ibn Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad Nūr al-Dīnzāda Filibawī, *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt* (catalogued as *Risale fi izahi ma vakaa fi's-sirri'llezi ebanehu Mahmud es-Simâvî*; MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah, 2079), 213a-214a, 228b.

[15] Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *Varidat-i Bedreddin* [*Wāridāt-i Badr al-Dīn*] (translated into Ottoman Turkish by Mūsā Kāẓim Efendī, ed. Mehmed Serhan Tayşi; Istanbul: MVT Yayıncılık, 2010), 3.

[16] Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 9b-11b, 35a-36b, 74b; idem., *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 45a-46a.

[17] Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 11b-12a.

resurrection.[18]

2. The Rewards of Heaven and the Torment of Hell

One of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's views that received criticism was that he saw the rewards of Heaven and the punishment of Hell as spiritual things. His statements in *al-Wāridāt* are as follows:

> Do not doubt that Heaven, mansions [therein], trees, houries, dresses, rivers, fruits; the torment of Hell, fire, etc. – they are to be found in reports and [people's sayings about them] have spread – are not limited to their literal meanings. They have other meanings that only *aṣfiyā'* of saints know.[19] ... Houries, mansions, rivers, trees, fruits, and the like exist in the imaginary world, not sensual world.[20] Heaven, Hell, and their details have meanings outside of the minds of ignorant people.[21] ... Houries, mansions, dresses, and gardens were compared [to their worldly names] to explain them to ignorant and half-wit people.[22] ... You should know that we can call every worldly/exoteric and other-worldly/esoteric state, rank, or station, which are precious, "Heaven." Similarly, we can call every worthless state, material, and low station "Hell, snakes, scorpions, and *zaqqūm*."[23] ... If the world, the Hereafter, houries, mansions, and Heaven are so, there is no need for [all] these strivings. [If anyone thinks so] they not only misguide themselves but also others.[24] ... Thus, you understand that there are other meanings of Heaven, houries, and Hell. Hence, I had mentioned this issue a couple of times before. The same applies to other verses in the issue. Accordingly, the Prophet said that the Qur'ān has one literal and up to seven figurative meanings.[25] ... Similarly, we had said that Heaven, mansions, fruits, and the like are not what the average people and the scholars of *ẓāhir* assume. Hence, they compare all these to the visible world. They even claim that those other-

---

18 See Ibn ʿArabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), I, 312-313.

19 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 4b.

20 *Ibid*., 14b.

21 *Ibid*., 36b-37a.

22 *Ibid*., 66b.

23 *Ibid*., 72a.

24 *Ibid*., 72b.

25 *Ibid*., 98a.

> worldly things consist of elements like these [worldly] trees, rivers, mansions, and houries.[26]

If the above statements by Sheikh Badr al-Dīn are considered, at first glance, one can assume that he supported the idea that the descriptions in the Scripture about the rewards of Heaven and the torments of Hell are symbolic and are no more than sanctions that encourage good and discourage evil. However, ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī asserts that this assumption is completely wrong. With these statements, the Sheikh intended to show that the Hereafter does not consist only of a material life but also has a spiritual aspect. Thus, judging from the fact that the Qurʾān has an esoteric meaning in addition to its exoteric meaning, the Sheikh sought to interpret the relevant verses in an esoteric way. Because the afterlife means the bodily and spiritual happiness, the meanings of Heaven and its rewards and Hell and its torments cannot be restricted to literal meanings. According to Mullā Ilāhī, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn notes these esoteric meanings about Heaven and Hell in addition to the literal meaning:

> Heaven is divided into three parts, the heaven of essence (*dhāt*), the heaven of attribute (*ṣifa*), and the heaven of act (*fiʿl*). After the lower self (*nafs*) escapes the curtains of corruption, achieves the attributes of perfection, and reaches the level of satisfaction, it reaches one of these heavens based on its level. When the soul separates from the body, the results of people's virtues and righteous deeds are revealed as the rewards of Heaven. The meaning of Heaven and its rewards is tasting (*dhawq*), unveiling (*kashf*), and the sciences of *tawḥīd*. The wine of Heaven and its fruits are luminous and spiritual attributes and are the nourishment of the spirit and the heart. Houries represent the self's escape from lustful desires, its purification from natural dirt and the murkiness of the elements and, finally, the *jamālī* manifestations achieved after these purifications. Rivers belong to the *tawḥīd* of the Essence and its attributes. Mansions are spiritual contentment (*riḍā*) achieved by the soul. Trees are the trees of the perfect man (*al-insān al-kāmil*) that have perfect attributes because in these trees, *ʿaqlī-qudsī* flowers blossom and the fruits of the Essence and manifestations of its attributes grow. Moreover, it is the witnessing of manifestations of divine beauty (*jamāl*) and its lights in the rank of the soul.

---

[26] *Ibid*., 102a.

Hell is the spiritual condition of pain after the soul is veiled from God because of poor character and unrighteous deeds.[27]

However, these interpretations do not mean that literal facts about Heaven and Hell cannot be accepted. Furthermore, Sheikh Ilāhī states that Hell and its torments are everlasting. He also mentions the specific levels of Heaven and Hell to which each righteous and unrighteous deed corresponds.[28]

According to ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, it is not correct to say that the form of Heaven, its rewards, gardens, and rivers or Hell and its torments are only material. It is also not correct to say that they are spiritual or to interpret them with spiritual concepts and symbols. The essential point is that the material and the spiritual will be together.[29] Moreover, spiritual pleasures, such as achieving the consent of God, speaking with Him, and observing His beauty, supersede material pleasures, such as eating, drinking, cloth, scent, houries, trees, and rivers. In other words, the spiritual heaven supersedes the material heaven. The main purpose is to turn toward God and to achieve His consent. Thus, the people of Heaven find real happiness in spiritual pleasure, not in formal things, as average people assume. On this point, Mullā Ilāhī mentions that for Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, the torments of Hell and the rewards of Heaven have the same names as in this world, but there is no other relationship between them because of the difference in their structure.[30]

---

[27] Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 4b-5b, 15b. For the heavens of essence, attributes, and act, see Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Abī l-Ghanāʾim al-Kāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya* (ed. ʿAbd al-Khāliq Maḥmūd; Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1404 H [1984]), 64.

[28] Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn,* 46b-48a, 90a-91a, 123b. Sheikh Yāwṣī and Ḥarīrīzāda compare the unity to the water river, *ḥilm* to the honey river, knowledge to the milk river, and *maʿrifa* to the wine river. In contrast, things such as wrong belief and poor character are seen as snakes and scorpions. See Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 3a-b; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 10a.

[29] Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 45a.

[30] Sheikh Ilāhī notes that average people are veiled by the literal meanings of the Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīths on the nature of eschatological issues, Heaven, and Hell. On this issue, see Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 90a-92a, 123b; idem., *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 4b-7a, 12a, 33a-b, 66b-67b, 71b-73a, 98a-99a, 102a-b; idem., *Uṣūl-i wuṣūl-i ilāhiyya* (MS Manisa, Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, 1524), 305a; Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 3a-b.

According to Sheikh Yāwṣī, who supports ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, everything in the world of *shahāda,* or sensible world, has an essence and only exists with this essence. For this essence, there is an ideal form in the angelic world (*malakūt*) and the hidden realm (*ghayb*). Thus, in his statement that "houries, mansions, rivers, trees, fruits, and the like exist in imaginary world, not in sensual world," Sheikh Badr al-Dīn stresses that the realities of these rewards come existence in the world of image (*mithāl*), not in the world of *shahāda*. Nūr al-Dīnzāda holds that this view is incorrect because the imaginary world is a *barzakh* between this world and the Hereafter. Sheikh Ilāhī regards the imaginary world as the world of *baqāʾ* after *fanāʾ*. Those who are purified from all types of veils can observe Heaven and its rewards in the sensual and imaginary world, but those who become slaves to their selves and cannot rid themselves of their evil character will not see them at all. They fall into the great fire in this world due to their veils.[31]

Nevertheless, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's esoteric interpretation of Heaven and Hell was not an original idea. It is known that some early Sufis, especially Ibn ʿArabī, held this view. According to Ibn ʿArabī, for every deed, there is a heaven; there is a heaven for every *farḍ*, *nāfila*, righteous deed, and prevention of evil or prohibited deed. Those who act with more morality and have more righteous deeds receive more shares of these heavens. Called "the heaven of deeds" or "the heaven of self," this heaven is the *ṣūrī heaven*, which includes delicious food, pleasant and healthy drinks, and beautiful partners. It is built by the deeds of believers. The spiritual heaven, which comes from the manifestations of the divine names and attributes, is called the *heaven of attributes*. The heaven of attributes, which gathers the worlds of *ghayb* and *shahāda*, is the heaven of the heart as well. The *heaven of essence* is the heaven of the soul, the observation of the beauty of the Essence at the level of oneness (*aḥadiyya*). Ibn ʿArabī accepted the Heaven that consists of formal pleasures as the heaven of the self, the heaven that consists of spiritual pleasures formed by the manifestations of the divine names and attributes as the heaven of the heart, and the heaven that is formed by observing the beauty of God beyond the two worlds as the heaven of the soul. However, this

[31] See Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 15b-16a; Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 3a-b, 6b; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 14a-16a; Nūr al-Dīnzāda, *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt*, 219a-b.

does not mean that he did not accept the existence of a sensible (material) heaven and hell in addition to the spiritual heaven and hell.[32]

3. The Apocalypse and Its Signs

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn states that some people during the time of the Prophet expected such apocalyptic signs as the Dajjāl, *dābbat al-arḍ*, and the Mahdī. Similarly, those who came after this time expected those signs to occur during their time and even wrote on this issue. However, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn attempted to interpret the apocalypse and its signs outside of their literal meanings. The apocalypse means the complete emergence of the Essence due to the annihilation of attributes, both exoterically and esoterically. ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī calls this "the great apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i kubrā*)." In a sense, this means the inclusion of the existence of the servant (human beings) in the existence of God after the self is completely annihilated. A person's death, be it voluntary or involuntary, is the little apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i ṣughrā*).[33] In fact, Sheikh Ilāhī explains the issue by dividing the apocalypse into four parts; because there are four births, there are four apocalypses. The birth of a child from the womb of the mother is called the bodily birth (*wilādat-i ṣūrī*) and the little apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i ṣughrā*). Reaching puberty and distinguishing between good and evil by learning is called the spiritual birth (*wilādat-i maʿnawī*) and the middle apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i wusṭā*). Reaching middle age and gaining satisfaction and maturity is called the beautiful birth (*wilādat-i ṭayyiba*) and the great apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i*

---

[32] For Ibn ʿArabī's views on Heaven and Hell, see *al-Futūḥāt*, I, 297-304, 317-318; III, 32; al-Kāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya*, 60-63; idem., *Laṭāʾif al-iʿlām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām* (ed. Majīd Hādīzāda; Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 2000), 223-224; Ibn ʿArabī, *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi*, I, 77-81; Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, *al-Muʿjam al-ṣūfī* (Beirut: Dār Nadra, 1981), 287-292. Al-Ghazālī accepted the esoteric interpretations on this issue. He stated that the pleasures of Heaven are divided into sensual, imaginary, and intellectual, and everyone benefits from them according to their abilities. See al-Ghazālī, *al-Maḍnūn bih*^{i} *ʿalā ghayr ahlih*^{i}, in idem., *Majmūʿat rasāʾil al-Imām al-Ghazālī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406 H [1986]), IV, 159-161; idem., *Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa-l-zandaqa* (ed. Sulaymān Dunyā; Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1381 H [1961]); Bekir Topaloğlu, "Cennet [Heaven]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], VII, 381-384.

[33] Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 73b, 74b.

ʿuẓmā). Passing the level of knowledge and reaching the level of seeing and living things that are known is called the real birth (*wilādat-i ḥaqīqī*) and the great apocalypse (*qiyāmat-i kubrā*).[34]

The esoteric interpretation is valid for the signs of the apocalypse as well as the apocalypse. According to Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, only those who are perfect men and *muḥaqqiq*s can understand the essence of the apocalyptic signs that were recorded in the Scripture, such as the sunrise from the west, the closure of the gates of repent, the emergence of the Dajjāl, *dābbat al-arḍ*, and the Mahdī. It is wrong to interpret these events in a literal way, as average people do, and to expect them occur literally. Accordingly, the Dajjāl refers to the emergence of the *ʿaql-i maʿāsh* with arrogance, the overcoming by the natural faculties of people over spiritual ones, or people who misguide others by lying, as in the example of Abū Jahl and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl in the time of the Prophet. Similarly, Gog and Magog refer to the complete emergence of the evil character and thoughts of human beings and their invasion of people's hearts. The Mahdī refers to the emergence of the universal intellect and the *rūḥ-i aʿẓām*; the *dābbat al-arḍ* refers to the regretful self (*al-nafs al-lawwāma*); the sunrise from the west refers to the separation of the soul from the body; and the closure of the gate of repent refers to the end of the lives of believers. Furthermore, the coming of Jesus is a metaphor for the emergence of the *ʿaql-i maʿād* with the light of *yaqīn*. His killing of the Dajjāl means the bringing of his rule to an end.[35] After stressing that these interpretations are not decisive, Sheikh Ilāhī states that one cannot conclude from these esoteric meanings about the apocalypse and its signs that the apocalypse and the resurrection after death will not happen.

---

[34] Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 44b-45a. Also see al-Kāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya*, 104-105; idem., *Rashḥ al-zulāl fī sharḥ al-alfāẓ al-mutadāwila bayn arbāb al-adhwāq wa-l-aḥwāl* (ed. Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ; Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1415 H [1995]), 146; Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī; Tehran: Muʾassasa-i Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1370 HS [1991]), 130-131.

[35] Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 81b-83a; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 161a-165a; Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Muḥammad al-Qūnawī, *Kırk Hadis Şerhi ve Tercümesi* [*Interpretation and Translation of Forty Ḥadīths*] (ed. and translated into Turkish by H. Kâmil Yılmaz; Istanbul: Meram Belediyesi Konevi Araştırma Merkezi [MEBKAM], 2010), 42-43.

> Life, death, and the apocalypse as explained does not cancel the belief in the resurrection and gathering after death, the apocalypse, and the Judgment Day. Our Prophet and other prophets reported the torment in grave, the Judgment, Hell, and Fire, the *ṣirāṭ* bridge, and the people of purgatory. They will happen as reported and they are literally and figuratively real.[36]

4. Angels, *Jinn*s, and Satan

One of the issues for which Sheikh Badr al-Dīn was criticized is the claim that he did not prove an external existence for the unseen creatures such as angels, *jinn*s, and Satan by contrast with the thought of Ahl al-sunna; instead, he interpreted them as esoteric powers.[37] Early in his *al-Wāridāt,* the Sheikh's words are as follows:

> Everything that directs you to God is angel and *raḥmān*; everything that directs you to worldly things (*mā-siwā*) is *Iblīs* and Satan. Your power that causes you to lean toward God is angels and your power that causes you to lean toward worldly and lustful appetites are satans. You are full of angels and satans. Your position is decided by which side is dominant. *Jinn*s are between angels and satans.[38]

According to ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, by these words, the Sheikh notes the angelic and the satanic character and thoughts of human beings. Yet, he does not deny their external existence. A person has a good as well as a bad side. The good side indicates a person's soul and his/her spiritual aspect, and the bad side indicates the ego (*nafs*) and his/her wordly appetites. Thus, people are filled with angelic and satanic characteristics. If a person has characteristics such as leaning toward what is right and good, keeping promises, and practicing religious duties, the dominant side is the angelic one. Similarly, if a person has characteristics such as envy, arrogance, stinginess, self-love, lust, and fame, the dominant side is the ego and the satanic one.

---

[36] Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 45a.

[37] Nūr al-Dīnzāda holds that the fact that angels, *jinn*s, and satan have a *laṭīf* (subtle) structure does not mean that they are not separate and real beings. See *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt*, 219b, 221b-223b.

[38] Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 20b.

Thus, one should know which side is dominant in him/her and take the required precautions.[39]

The angels that are the manifestation of the divine name *al-Hādī* inspire recitation (*dhikr*), good thoughts, and good morals with *raḥmānī* revelations (*khawāṭir*), the satans that are the manifestation of the divine name *al-Muḍill* inspire lustful and egoistic revelations and thoughts. Thus, the faculty that leads someone to God, which is the intellectual or spiritual faculty, is called an "angel," whereas the *wahmī* faculties that keep someone from God are called "satan."[40] This is because the intellect in the human body symbolizes Gabriel, and *wahm* symbolizes *Iblīs*. People are under the rule of whichever one is dominant. According to Ḥarīrīzāda, this dominance is because of predestination (*qadar* and *qaḍāʾ*), which is no more than *fayḍ-i aqdas* and *fayḍ-i muqaddas*. In contrast, the *jinn*s, which are between angels and Satan, symbolize the *al-quwwa al-khayāliyya*. Although they could have the ability to appear in different forms because they are spiritual beings they are seen by *ḥiss-i bāṭin* and the faculty of *khayāl*. Thus, angels, *jinn*s, and Satan resemble each other due to their being composed of non-material substances, and they differ due to knowledge and power.[41]

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn means that angels are spiritual beings when he says, "You should know that celestial, elemental, and similar faculties are angels. Prophet's sayings about angels indicate my words on faculty. It is not the way ignorant people assume."[42] According to ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, the Sheikh does not hold that these beings do not have any material bodies, as some philosophers assume. However, Ḥarīrīzāda states that angels can have hands and multiple wings, which represent power.[43] In other words, rather than the existence of their material forms, the reason for indicating that they have material forms is to show that they can take the form of birds or human beings

---

39 Ilāhī, *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 7a, 95b-96b.

40 According to Sheikh Badr al-Dīn (*al-Wāridāt*, 70b), angels refer to the universal faculties in *āfāq* and the particular faculties in *anfus*.

41 Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 14b, 20b-21b, 37a-b, 70b; Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 9b-10b, 22b-23b, 74a; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 23a-28a, 57b-60a, 152b.

42 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 51b-52a.

43 See Q 35:1, Q 53:5, Q 66:6, Q 81:20, Q 6:93.

depending on their duties.[44]

5. The Issue of Free Will

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn states, "All actions belong to God. Forms are His tools (…) There is no one who owns and has an influence on the forms of humans and humans are not aware of this. Thus, they imagine a choice, action, and existence that are special to them … However, this imagination is evil because of their ignorance … They assume that they have the ability to give up the actions, however the situation is not so."[45] Because of these words, he was accused of denying the *al-irāda al-juzʾiyya*, i.e., human's free will, and holding the idea of fatalism. ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī explains his words in terms of the unity of existence. Accordingly, the knowledge, power, and will of the human, those who in fact do not exist and remain in non-existence (*ʿadam*), are the attributes of God. The emergence of the actions of the human is due to their abilities and aptitutes in the eternal knowledge. They only happen as a result of the power of God. Thus, because every person's actions are because of his/her abilities and aptitutes, there is no fatalism here. The Sheikh points out that it is heedlessness for the human to imagine that they have an independent existence and thus independent actions. All possible beings, including all types of wills and actions, are the products of the existence of God. There is no other agent except for Him, and there are no will and actions except for His. The emergence of actions by the human with the presence of causes is, first, because of the divine will and, second, because of the emergence of actions in accordance with their abilities and aptitutes. In other words, when causes do not come together, the will does not occur, and when the will does not occur, actions do not come into existence. However, one should bear in mind that this relation between the will and the abilities does not contradict the *al-irāda al-juzʾiyya*.[46]

---

[44] Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 51b-52a; Yāwşī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 37b; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 88a-b. Also see Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 49; idem., *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi*, I, 119-120; al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 339-340.

[45] Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 25b-27a.

[46] See Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 25b-27a, 39a-40a; idem., *Zād al-mushtāqīn*, 82b, 101a, 110b-111a, 174b, 181a; Yāwşī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 15a-16a; Ḥarīrīzāda,

6. The Situation of Jesus

The issue of the descent of Jesus (i.e., the death of Jesus and his return to the world as a sign of the apocalypse) is one of the most controversial issues among Muslim scholars. Sunnī scholars hold that when Jesus was about to be killed, he was raised to the divine presence both bodily and spiritually, and he is still in the heavens. Before the apocalypse, he will come to this world following the revelations brought by the Last Prophet, kill the Dajjāl and establish the rule of justice. Accordingly, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn states, "Jesus (peace be upon him) is alive with his spirit and dead with his body. Because he is the soul of God (*rūḥ Allāh*), his spiritual side is dominant. There is no death for the soul. They all said: 'Jesus was not dead.' This does not mean that his body which consists of elements was not dead. For this kind of thing is impossible."[47] Thus, Jesus, as the soul of God, is spiritually alive and was raised to the world of *malakūt* and parted from his body which consists of elements when he ascended. The impossibility of his bodily ascension is because of that the essential character of the world of *malakūt* is being subtle (*laṭīf*), not intensive (*kathīf*).

In addition, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn attempts to support his ideas by narrating a dream of him about Jesus: "In the year 808 [1405] on Friday, I saw two men ready. One of them was holding the dead Jesus. It seems that they were trying to tell me that Jesus is bodily dead. God knows the best."[48] According to Sheikh Yāwṣī, while Jesus' being the soul of God and the dominance of his spirituality over his materiality is an intellectual proof, this dream is an intuitional (*kashfī*) proof for the fact that he is bodily dead. In the eyes of Sufis, the *kashfī* proof is better than the intellectual proof because it shows the truth.[49] Yet Nūr al-Dīnzāda states that this type of *kashf* cannot be accepted as proof because it contradicts the Qurʾān and the Sunna.[50]

Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya, 36a-40b. About Ibn ʿArabī's dealing with the issue in terms of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, see Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, *al-Muʿjam al-ṣūfī*, 438-442, 633-639.

47 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 34a.

48 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 34b-35a.

49 Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 22a.

50 Nūr al-Dīnzāda, *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt*, 227b.

ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī chose to adopt a moderate approach to the ideas of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, whom he saw as a Jesus-like character. For instance, contrary to the Sheikh's acceptance of the eternality of Jesus' body as improbable, he says that although it is improbable by reason, it is not improbable in terms of the divine power and the Scripture, and this can only be achieved by mystical taste (*dhawq*), not by *taqlīd*. Furthermore, he holds that the Sheikh's dream can be interpreted. The Sheikh's closing words, "God knows the best," are an indication that the dream is subject to interpretation. Nūr al-Dīnzāda severely criticizes both the Sheikh's comments and those of his commentators including ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī.[51]

On the other hand, ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī addresses another issue concerning Jesus for Christians in his work *Zād al-mushtāqīn*. He specifically criticizes the acceptance of Jesus as God and stresses not to forget that he was a servant of God, although he was created without a father and he had the name "the soul of God."

7. His Understanding of Divinity and the Issue of the Eternity of the World

It has been argued that Sheikh Badr al-Dīn takes a pantheist approach in his understanding of divinity, particularly referring to his words regarding the issue of the eternity of the world.[52] I believe that these types of claims mentioned mostly in modern works are the result of incomplete knowledge about the Sheikh's thought. In contrast,

---

[51] For example, he criticizes Ilāhī's phrase, "even if it is impossible by reason, it is possible by the Scripture and the divine power," saying that just as it was possible for Jesus to be born without a father, it was possible for him to be raised to the world of *malakūt* as well. See Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 34a-35a. Nūr al-Dīnzāda, *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt*, 226b-228b. On this issue, see also al-Kāshānī, *Sharḥ ʿalā Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (3rd edn., Cairo: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1408 H [1987]), 208; al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 845-849; Ibn ʿArabī, *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi*, III, 126-131; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 48b-51b. Ahmed Avni Konuk states that Jesus' form, which is far from the natural character, transmitted from *ẓāhir* to *bāṭin*. However, this transmission happened with the disappearance of the luminous form, which was specific to Jesus. For him, this *ghaybūba* is the ascension that happened to prophets and saints. See Ahmed Avni Konuk, "Hz. Meryem ve İsâ'ya Dair Risâle [Treatise on Mary and Jesus]," in Ibn ʿArabī, *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi*, III, 372-377.

[52] For example, see Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, 159, 201.

the entire thought of the Sheikh depends on the unity of being. Explaining his stance, he says that the absolute and the unique being is God, that His essence tends to emerge because of love, that possible beings come into existence due to this emergence and the divine names and attributes, that the essence of God is the same as things in that He gives them their existence, although it is independent (*munazzah*) from everything, and that there is a relative dualism in existence in addition to the absolute unity of being.[53]

ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī interprets Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's statement regarding the eternity of the world that "the world is eternal in terms of its genus (*jins*), species (*nawʿ*), and individuality (*shakhṣ*). Its temporality is essential (*dhātī*), not temporal (*zamānī*)."[54] by noting that the world is temporal in one way and eternal in another. According to him, the world is eternal in the knowledge of God before it comes to appearance in reality, while it is temporal in terms of its dependency to the existence of God to come to existence. However, the temporality of the world is not limited by time; it is related to the essence. This is because it is not possible to mention about time in this stage.[55]

Conclusion

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn has been both supported and criticized by scholars and Sufis because of his above-mentioned thoughts, which were the reason for his execution. Furthermore, his work *al-Wāridāt* was severely attacked because it was accepted as the source of blasphemy and heresy among the scholars. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿArabī, who was one of the scholars during the reign of the Sultan Meḥmed II, attempted to have the book burned.[56] Sheikh al-Islām Abū l-Suʿūd announced that those who followed the Sheikh were unbelievers.[57] Idrīs

---

53 Sheikh Badr al-Dīn, *al-Wāridāt*, 16b, 23b, 40a, 42b, 47a.

54 *Ibid*., 27a.

55 Ilāhī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt*, 27a-28a; Yāwṣī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq*, 17b-18a; Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 41a-42b.

56 Abū l-Khayr ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā Ṭāshkuprīzāda, *al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya* (ed. Ahmed Suphi Furat; Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1985), 174.

57 M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* [*Turkish Life in 16th Century in the Light of Fatwās of Sheikh al-Islām Abū l-Suʿūd Efendī*] (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972), 194.

Bidlisī wrote that the work spread the seeds of heresy among people.[58] One of the sheikh al-islāms of the 19th century ʿĀrif Ḥikmet Beg bought copies of the book and had them burned whenever he found because he believed that it would harm Muslims.[59] In Sufi circles, the most serious criticism came from Nūr al-Dīnzāda, who criticized the Sheikh's views on the interpretation of the Scripture, the afterlife, angels, spiritual beings, and his understanding of being. According to him, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn adopted a type of Bāṭinism in interpreting the Qurʾānic verses and prophetic traditions and he was also confused about the issue of the Hereafter. He negated the objective realities of angels by reducing them to pure faculties. In the 16th century, the Khalwatī sheikh Bālī Efendī of Sofia accepted the Sheikh as the leader of the heretics. In the 17th century, in his letter to the Sultan Aḥmad I, the Jalwatī sheikh ʿAzīz Maḥmūd Hudāʾī said that "he was hung because of his damnation in the presence of God."[60]

Despite these attacks, some Sufis regarded Sheikh Badr al-Dīn as "the sun of religion, the sultan of *ʿārif*s and *muḥaqqiq*s." Some scholars wrote commentaries on *al-Wāridāt* to defend his views soon after he was executed. Among these were Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī, who played an essential part in spreading the Naqshī order in Anatolia, the Khalwatī sheikh Muḥyī al-Dīn Yāwṣī, who was the father of the sheikh al-islām Abū l-Suʿūd, and Muḥammad Nūr al-ʿArabī, who is known as the founder of the Malāmī order in its third period. With a poem of him including the verses meaning that "Muḥyī al-Dīn and Badr al-Dīn revived the religion/*Fuṣūs* is an ocean and *al-Wāridāt* is its river," another Khalwatī sheikh Niyāzī al-Miṣrī, regarded the Sheikh as one of the followers of the school of Ibn ʿArabī.[61] Contrary to his sheikh ʿAzīz Maḥmūd Hudāʾī, Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī Būrsawī holds that

---

58 Idrīs Bidlisī, *Hasht Bihisht* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 2197), 255a-256b.

59 Aḥmad Jawdat Pasha (as Ahmet Cevdet Paşa), *Kısas Enbiya: Peygamberler Tarihi* [*Qiṣaṣ-i Anbiyāʾ: History of the Prophets*] (Istanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1942-1955), XX, 1746.

60 Meḥmed Sharaf al-Dīn (Yaltkaya), *Simawna Qāḍīsioglu Sheikh Badr al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Awqāf-i Islāmiyya Maṭbaʿasi, 1340 H [1924]), 71-72.

61 Niyāzī Meḥmed ibn ʿAlī Chalabī al-Miṣrī, *Dīwān* (Būlāq: Maṭbaʿat Būlāq, 1259 H [1843]), 14.

al-Wāridāt does not contain any disbelief.[62] Ḥarīrīzāda describing him as "the *quṭb* of martyrs" said that none of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn's thoughts is contrary to religion.[63] The common point of the Sheikh's supporters is that they interpreted his thoughts in a symbolic (*ishārī*) way in the Sunnī framework. They also strove to support their interpretations with the ideas of the followers of Ibn ʿArabī and the Akbarī School. Hence, Aḥmad Jawdat Pasha defines *al-Wāridāt* as a treatise that "was written to imitate *Fuṣūṣ*."[64]

If all of these positive and negative comments about Sheikh Badr al-Dīn are taken into consideration, it can be understood that his execution was political, not religious. When his most important supporter, Mūsā Chalabī, lost his fight for the throne, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn was regarded as one of those who rebelled against the state. His statements in *al-Wāridāt* were offered as evidence, and he was hung for the crime of heresy because of these statements. Putting aside the mystical tendencies and character differences of those Sufis who found his views heretical, the problem is still political. Hence, it is intriguing that those who criticized Sheikh Badr al-Dīn were close to the state and to the central authority, whereas those who supported him fought the state or, at least, kept their distance.

REFERENCES

Aḥmad Jawdat Pasha (as Ahmet Cevdet Paşa), *Kısas Enbiya: Peygamberler Tarihi* [*Qiṣaṣ-i Anbiyāʾ: History of the Prophets*], 20 parts in 4 vols., (Istanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1942-1955).

Aydınlı, Yaşar, *Fârâbî'de Tanrı-İnsan İlişkisi* [*God-Human Relation in al-Fārābī*] (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2000).

al-Baghdādī, Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir ibn Muḥammad, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Istanbul: Dârülfünun İlâhiyat Fakültesi, 1346 H [1928]).

Bidlisī, Idrīs, *Hasht Bihisht* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 2197).

Dindar, Bilâl, *Šayḫ Badr al-Dīn Maḥmûd et ses* Wāridāt (Ankara: Ministère de la Culture, 1990).

---

62 ʿUthmānzāda Ḥusayn Waṣṣāf, *Safīna-i Awliyāʾ* (eds. Mehmet Akkuş and Ali Yılmaz; Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2006), III, 114.

63 Ḥarīrīzāda, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya*, 3a-5a.

64 Aḥmad Jawdat Pasha, *Kısas-ı Enbiyā*, XX, 1746.

Düzdağ, M. Ertuğrul, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* [*Turkish Life in 16th Century in the Light of Fatwās of Sheikh al-Islām Abū l-Suʿūd Efendī*] (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972).

al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, *Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa-l-zandaqa* (ed. Sulaymān Dunyā; Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1381 H [1961]).

_____ *al-Maḍnūn bih*ⁱ *ʿalā ghayr ahlih*ⁱ, in idem., *Majmūʿat rasāʾil al-Imām al-Ghazālī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406 H [1986]), IV, 159-161.

_____ *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (ed. Sulaymān Dunyā; 2nd edn., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1955).

_____ *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (ed. Jirār Jahāmī; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1993).

al-Ḥakīm, Suʿād, *al-Muʿjam al-ṣūfī* (Beirut: Dār Nadra, 1981).

Ḥarīrīzāda, Meḥmed Kamāl al-Dīn, *Futūḥāt-i Ilāhiyya Sharḥ-i Wāridāt-i Ilāhiyya* (MS Istanbul, Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediye Kütüphanesi Atatürk Kitaplığı, Osman Ergin Yazmaları, 507).

Ḥusayn Waṣṣāf, ʿUthmānzāda, *Safīna-i Awliyāʾ*, 5 vols., (eds. Mehmet Akkuş and Ali Yılmaz; Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2006).

Ibn ʿArabī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, n.d.).

_____ *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi* [*Translation and Commentary of* Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam] (translated into Turkish with a commentary by Ahmed Avni Konuk, eds. Mustafa Tahralı and Selçuk Eraydın; 4th edn., Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, vol. I: 2005; vol. III: 2011).

_____ *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, 4 vols., (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.).

Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā, Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, *al-Wāridāt*, in Sheikh ʿAbd Allāh Ilāhī al-Simāwī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1325).

_____ *Varidat-i Bedreddin* [*Wāridāt-i Badr al-Dīn*] (translated into Ottoman Turkish by Mūsā Kāẓim Efendī, ed. Mehmed Serhan Tayşi; Istanbul: MVT Yayıncılık, 2010).

Ilāhī, Sheikh ʿAbd Allāh al-Simāwī, *Kashf al-Wāridāt* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1325).

_____ *Uṣūl-i wuṣūl-i ilāhiyya* (MS Manisa, Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, 1524), 286b-312b.

_____ *Zād al-mushtāqīn* (MS Istanbul, Hacı Selim Ağa Kütüphanesi, Kemankeş, 206).

al-Juwaynī, Abū l-Maʿālī Imām al-Ḥaramayn Rukn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *Kitāb al-irshād* (eds. M. Yūsuf Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd; Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1369 H [1950]).

Karadaş, Cağfer, *İslâm Düşüncesinde Âhiret* [*Afterlife in Islamic Thought*] (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2008).

al-Kāshānī, Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Abī l-Ghanāʾim, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfiyya* (ed. ʿAbd al-Khāliq Maḥmūd; Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1404 H [1984]).

_____ *Laṭāʾif al-iʿlām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām* (ed. Majīd Hādīzāda; Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 2000).

_____ *Rashḥ al-zulāl fī sharḥ al-alfāẓ al-mutadāwila bayn arbāb al-adhwāq wa-l-aḥwāl* (ed. Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ; Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1415 H [1995]).

_____ *Sharḥ ʿalā Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (3rd edn., Cairo: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1408 H [1987]).

Khalīl ibn Ismāʿīl, *Simavna Kadısıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin Menâkıbı* [*Manāqib of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā*] (eds. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı and İsmet Sungurbey; Istanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1967).

Koloğlu, Orhan Şener, "Mutezile Kelâmında Yeniden Yaratma (İʿâde) [Resurrection (Iʿāda) in Muʿtazilite Thought]," *Usûl İslâm Araştırmaları* [*Usûl Islamic Researches*] 9 (2008), 7-40.

Konuk, Ahmed Avni, "Hz. Meryem ve İsâ'ya Dair Risâle [Treatise on Mary and Jesus]," in Ibn ʿArabī, *Fusûsu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve Şerhi* [*Translation and Commentary of* Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam] (translated into Turkish with a commentary by Ahmed Avni Konuk, eds. Mustafa Tahralı and Selçuk Eraydın; 4th edn., Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2011), III, 372-377.

Kurdakul, Necdet, *Bütün Yönleriyle Bedreddin* [*Badr al-Dīn in All Aspects*] (Istanbul: Döler Reklam Yayınları, 1977).

al-Miṣrī, Niyāzī Meḥmed ibn ʿAlī Chalabī, *Dīwān* (Būlāq: Maṭbaʿat Būlāq, 1259 H [1843]).

Nūr al-Dīnzāda, Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Muṣṭafā ibn Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad Filibawī, *al-Radd ʿalā l-Wāridāt* (catalogued as *Risale fi izahi ma vakaa fi's-*

sirri'llezi ebanehu Mahmud es-Simâvî; MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah, 2079), 209b-262a.

Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-17. Yüzyıllar)* [*Zindīqs and Mulḥids in Ottoman Community (15th-17th Centuries)*] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

al-Qayṣarī, Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī; Tehran: Muʾassasa-i Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1370 HS [1991]).

al-Qūnawī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Muḥammad, *Kırk Hadis Şerhi ve Tercümesi* [*Interpretation and Translation of Forty Ḥadīth*] (translated into Turkish by H. Kâmil Yılmaz; Istanbul: Meram Belediyesi Konevi Araştırma Merkezi [MEBKAM]), 2010).

al-Rāzī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar, *Kitāb maʿālim uṣūl al-dīn* (ed. Samīḥ Dughaym; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1992).

Ṭāshkuprīzāda, Abū l-Khayr ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā, *al-Shaqāʾiq al-Nuʿmāniyya fī ʿulamāʾ al-Dawla al-ʿUthmāniyya* (ed. Ahmed Suphi Furat; Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1985).

Topaloğlu, Bekir, "Cennet [Heaven]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (*DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], VII, 381-384.

Toprak, Süleyman, *Ölümden Sonraki Hayat: Kabir Hayatı* [*Life After Death: The Intermediate Life*] (Konya: Sebat Ofset, 1989).

_____ "Haşr [Ḥashr]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (*DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XVI, 416-417.

(Yaltkaya), Meḥmed Sharaf al-Dīn, *Simawna Qāḍīsioglu Sheikh Badr al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Awqāf-i Islāmiyya Maṭbaʿasi, 1340 H [1924]).

Yavuz, Yusuf Şevki, "Ba's [Baʿth]," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (*DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], V, 98-100.

Yāwṣī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafā al-Iskilībī, *Ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqāʾiq fī sharḥ Kashf asrār al-daqāʾiq* (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hacı Mahmud Efendi, 2620).

Yener, Cemil, *Şeyh Bedreddin* - Vâridât [*Sheikh Badr al-Dīn* - al-Wāridāt] (Istanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1970).

RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY, AND RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION IN TURKEY

An Assessment of Locality and Universality Problem

Hayati Hökelekli
Uludağ University, Bursa-Turkey

Abstract

A uniform and universal understanding of science is an invalid precept, especially for the social sciences and humanities. Hence, the modern version of psychology is but a reductionist, limited, and abstract description of human reality in general. One of the most recent achievements in psychology is the recognition that every culture has a special frame of meaning and that individuals develop their identities and personalities accordingly. Therefore, to understand the spiritual world of human beings and their behaviors, a new intercultural perspective is needed. This need also applies to the field of psychology of religion, which is currently based upon the so called Judeo-Christian tradition. While the issues addressed, theories and concepts developed and introduced, have considerable relevance for the individuals within the mentioned tradition, they say very little, if any, about the religious structure of the individuals outside it. For that reason, there is urgent need in research conducted in the field of psychology of religion in Turkey to consider the basic beliefs of Islam, and social, cultural, historical, and contemporary developments within it.

Key Words: Social sciences and humanities, reductionism, hermeneutics, cultural psychology, religiosity, psychology of religion, psychology of Islam.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.60

Introduction

Psychology is a science that attempts to understand and explain the spiritual life of human beings, their personalities, characters, and their different tendencies. Since Antiquity, psychology has been subject to the curiosity of human beings in various civilizations and societies and from different points of view. There have always been psychological theories and explanations that are fed by religious traditions and philosophical understanding as well as the wisdom of humankind in general. However, the science of psychology, as developed and spread in most parts of the world, is essentially a product of "Western" modernism. Although psychology as a modern science is a product of the Western world, specifically of the North American scientific environment, the fact that the rest of the world has mostly accepted this situation remains. Psychology naturally reflects the values and the modes of thought of this environment because the psychologists themselves set their own cultural identities when analyzing the psychological cases. For that reason, it can be said that psychology has created man; in other words, psychology's conceptualization of the individual is in fact a social case.[1]

Modern psychology generally examines behavior, abstracting it from the cultural context, and thus aims to find the universal dimensions and general norms of human behavior. In psychology, the physical science model, which has a positivist philosophy of science, has been taken as the exemplar. The use of this model has resulted in a methodological approach that separates behavior from its natural environment to examine the changeable whose effects cannot be examined. Hence, until recently, academic psychology has mostly set aside culture when examining human development. Because psychology has always aimed to be a universal science, it is assumed that its theories and findings are acceptable among different cultures, ignoring the possibility that these theories and findings mostly belong

---

[1] Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, *İnsan Aile Kültür* [*Human Family Culture*] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1990), 20, 36; Kenneth J. Gergen, "Sosyal İnşa: Batının Psikolojide Kendi Kendine Konuşmasından Karşılıklı Küresel Konuşmaya [Social Construction: From Soliloquy of the West on Psychology to Global Colloquy]," in Sibel A. Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik Bilgisine Dair* [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 4; Mücahit Gültekin, *Psikolojik Tehlike* [*Psychological Danger*] (Istanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 2008), 73-75.

to Western culture. For that reason, social and cultural factors are not to be found in many analyses. This problem is not only a concern of the psychology of development but also of all branches of psychology, including religion, whose subject matter is the individual. Taken in all of its aspects, it is not an exaggeration to say that the conceptualization of the "individual," which is the main concept of modern psychology, is a very strange idea for most world cultures.[2] Any universal, uniform human conception that is generally accepted in all cultures does not have any real correspondence in real world because psychological reality can only be found in the particular cultural activities of individuals. In fact, cultural activity is the subject matter (*die Sache*) of interpretation. However, psychology does more than interpreting; it also explains. In fact, human actions, minds, and experiences take different forms and shapes in accordance with the culture in which they develop. No one can discuss anything in human nature apart from culture.

In this paper, we first emphasize the weaknesses and the problematic areas in the scientific tradition of modern psychology and point out some new approaches and to solve them. Afterwards, we provide an overall evaluation of the ramifications of these issues in the field of psychology of religion and in the studies in this field in Turkey.

1. New Approaches in Psychology

With the progress of social and cultural psychology and anthropology in recent years, it has been understood that identical or similar human behaviors indicate different meanings in different cultural environments. Consequently, we can discuss many aspects of human nature in accordance with the number of cultures, societies, and social groups, but we cannot discuss the existence of a uniform and universal human nature. In cultural psychology, researchers investigate whether psychological operation is buried meaningfully in the cultural environment. Accordingly, contrary to the universalist assumptions that serve psychology in the modern model, cultural psychologists argue that even concepts such as ego, cognition, emotion, and excitement arise within particular customs and traditions. For

[2] Clifford Geertz, "'From the Native's Point of View': On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," in idem., *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983), 59.

instance, emotions are regarded as more than just irrational indications of natural and inevitable reactions. Emotions are indications of wishes, opinions, and evaluations that are determined by belief systems and cultural societies. Moreover, emotions are experimental patterns that are acquired and expressed in social conditions and determined in a socio-cultural manner. In consequence, the emotional indication comprises the different reactions interpreted and arranged in a particular context. In other words, emotions accord with the previous cultural forms that were once valid.[3]

This point of view does not mean that universal knowledge is impossible in psychology. Certain dynamic principles governing the psychological space of human beings are not changeable and could be universal. Human beings who are brought up in a particular cultural environment develop personalities and identities according to that society. Without any relation to a particular cultural system, no one can know the shape human nature may take.[4] Therefore, the idea of "local psychology," which supposes that every culture must be examined on its own merits, gained significant strength in non-Western countries because it constitutes the most important environment for psychological cases. When common points emerge from the encounters of the different local realities, it can be assumed that we begin to approach universality.[5] For that reason, the *relativistic* and *hermeneutic* tendencies as a reaction to both positivism, which is still valid in psychology, and to the narrow definitions of reality, which ignores culture, have gained special importance in intercultural psy-

---

[3] See Jacob A. Belzen, "Din Psikolojisinde Tarihsel-Kültürel Yaklaşım: Disiplinlerarası Araştırmalar İçin Bakış Açıları [The Historicocultural Approach in the Psychology of Religion: Perspectives for lnterdisciplinary Research]," (translated into Turkish by Ali Ayten), *Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*Marmara University Journal of the Faculty of Divinity*] 33/2 (2007), 224.

[4] See David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Sosyal Psikoloji: Nazariye ve Problemler* [*Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*] (translated into Turkish by Erol Güngör; 2nd edn., Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970), 48-49; Muzafer Sherif, *Sosyal Kuralların Psikolojisi* [*The Psychology of Social Norms*] (translated into Turkish by İsmail Sandıkçıoğlu; Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985), 152-154.

[5] Kağıtçıbaşı, *Kültürel Psikoloji: Kültür Bağlamında İnsan ve Aile* [*Family and Human Development across Cultures: A View from the Other Side*] (translated into Turkish by Ayşe Üskül and Esin Uzun; Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık Ticaret ve Sanayi A. Ş., 1998), 32-33.

chology and anthropology. According to this understanding, all psychological concepts, including the concept of personality, are cultural/social products that reflect an intercultural diversity.

2. Psychology of Religion

Psychology of religion, which emerged at the turn of the twentieth century and developed in parallel with the science of modern psychology, is a science that investigates the religious phenomenon using empirical methods. Almost all of the masters of psychology and those who have been regarded as the founders of the notable schools in psychology such as W. James, W. Wundt, S. Freud, C. G. Jung, G. Allport, and A. Maslow are also psychologists of religion. A science that addresses the spiritual life of human beings and their behaviors would not neglect the religious cases, which are an indispensable part of the individual and social life and culture. Whether they have a positive or a negative attitude towards religion, the researchers with knowledge of psychology strive to decipher religious development and belief structure in the life of individuals. They also study the meaning of the strong impact of religious experience and beliefs, prayers, rituals, and worship on human behavior. First, the psychologists of religion in various European countries, especially in the US, conducted their studies in an environment in which Christian-Jewish culture dominated. The limitations in the basic understanding of psychology for human beings; its inadequacies in evaluating the characters of individuals; its restriction to middle class, white students; and, finally, its non-generalizable consequences are also problems for the science of psychology of religion. Hence, the religion these psychologists of religion encountered and the religious cases that they took as the subjects of their research were completely limited to their cultural traditions. Because only very few researchers have addressed Islam or certain Eastern religious traditions, still inadequately,[6] there

[6] While explaining the revelation experience of the Prophet, the famous psychologist of religion, W. James, claims that it was a case that revealed the subconscious automatically or semi-automatically, similar to Jewish prophets, some Christian saints and mystics; see *Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (2nd edn., London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 370; French translation: *L'Expérience Religieuse: Essai de Psychologie Descriptive* (translated into French by Frank Abauzit; 2nd edn., Paris: F. Alcan, 1908), 399-400. Recently, applying a Jungian explanation model, W. M. Watt stated that the revelation experiences of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are contents that emerge from the collective sub-

was almost no opportunity to make healthy comparisons. The most common mistake seems to be the assumption that the concepts and models that psychologists of religion apply to make sense of their own religious and cultural world are also valid for a different religious tradition. This mistake is an exemplar of reductionism.

In fact, as a general characteristic of the tradition of Western science, "reductionism" is not one-sided. On the one hand, religious cases are reduced to individual, social, and cultural non-religious cases; on the other hand, Islam and other non-Western religions are reduced to the Jewish-Christian model. As a type of research method in the natural sciences, the difference of Islam has been recently recognized in that it puts away reductionism in the social sciences. According to some scholars, Islam as a religion "challenges" the definitions both in the social sciences and humanities and in the religious sciences.[7] It is true that Islam is a religion according to all available definitions of the term, but that does not mean that Islam is only a religion or a belief system in the Western sense. In the Western religious tradition, religion has frequently been considered to be the spiritual being or reality against the material being, as sacred against profane or as religious against secular. Whether or not the reasons for this type of religious perception are philosophical, this perception has been regarded as the biggest obstacle in correctly understanding Islam because it fails to see that Islamic religious tradition addresses every aspect of life and provides a comprehensive framework for every level in society. As stated in various contexts with different forms, Islam can first be regarded as a civilization, a social structure, a certain life style, and a cultural tradition in the broadest sense. Hence,

conscious. According to Watt, when setting a relationship between traditional explanations and modern psychology, one can say that the Angel first put the revelation in the consciousness of the Prophet, and it then emerged to the surface of consciousness. It can also be said that the sub-conscious is a place where angels (or devils) are active; see *Modern Dünyada İslâm Vahyi* [*Islamic Revelation in the Modern World*] (translated into Turkish by Mehmet S. Aydın; Ankara: Hülbe Yayınları, 1982), 148-154. James also quotes from al-Ghazālī's autobiography *al-Munqidh*, where he states that the state of *wajd* cannot be explained and that mystical truth exists only for the one who experiences it; James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 311-314; Fr. trans. 340-344).

7 Jacques Waardenburg, "İnsan Bilimleri, Sosyal Bilimler ve İslam Çalışmaları," in Ömer Mahir Alper (ed. and Turkish translation), *Batı'da Din Çalışmaları* [*Religious Studies in the West*] (Istanbul: Metropol Yayınları, 2002), 256.

the interests of Western researchers regarding Muslim individuals and the lifestyles within this society are generally restricted to certain common expressions about Islam as a whole shaped by certain deep prejudices. These interests represent neither an academic interest directed toward achievable data nor a human interest about Muslim lifestyles. The interest may derive from the personal beliefs and spirituality – or lack of spirituality – of the researcher.[8] These remarks lead us to this conclusion: the religious studies conducted by Western scholars on Islam are far from revealing the objective reality. In this sense, their outlook is one-sided and determined by the ideological positions of their cultures and countries. Islam has always been regarded as an ideological monolith by Europeans. There has been considerable resistance to any just, objective and scientific study of the political and religious aspects of Muslim societies.[9] The fact that Western psychologists and social scientists have limited their basic interest to the issue of "violence and terrorism" in recent years strengthens this claim. These scholars consider revealing the psychological and behavioral fundamentals of Islamic fundamentalism to be their most important duty.

Considering the study of modern religious science applied to religion "as a cultural reality," it is well known that different religious cases observed in different cultures exist with special structures and special frames of meaning. However, it is very difficult to state that both Western scholars and other researchers from various religious backgrounds and cultures do justice to this reality. The cases and remarks that are generally represented as the universal science of the psychology of religion are results of the Jewish-Christian reality. Until recently, researches done in a paradigm that eliminate all differences and reduces religion to a uniform reality has represented the dominant view.[10]

---

8 *Ibid*., 251, 256, 271.

9 *Ibid*., 267-268.

10 Antoine Vergote is one of those who are aware of this bias and confesses it. Following are his remarks: "Psychology as an experimental science examines concrete religious cases. In following pages, we give our attention to Christianity, open to information about other religions as far as we can. There are simple reasons to necessitate this choice. Christianity, the religion of the majority of our culture is directly open to us. Most of psychological researches are being done in Christian scales. Like in every study done about a religious factor, if this work has

All of these observations vindicate the objections and criticisms of some Muslim thinkers and scholars regarding psychology in general and the psychology of religion in particular. M. Iqbāl, for instance, regarded the experimental method, used in the early stages of psychology of religion, as valuable, he complains about the scarcity of studies in the field during his time, however. According to Iqbāl, the views on the science of psychology of religion by pioneers such as W. James, Jung, and Freud are far from even reaching the crust of religion. Thus, he points out that the Muslim researchers who address the issues in psychology of religion must develop a critical approach and new research methods to be able to view critically the studies in the field both at the theoretical and conceptual level.[11] Badrī's criticisms of Western psychology regarding its Islamic sensitivity are important for another reason.[12] For Badrī, there is an essential incompatibility between the human concept in Islamic culture and civilization and the human concept in most modern psychology schools. Modern psychology, in general, poses a threat to the belief of Islam and its values. Therefore, even if it is possible to benefit from this information through a serious criticism and selection of the current science for now, there will be a need and a duty for Muslims to construct their own scientific tradition in the future.[13] A. Haque followed the ideas of Badrī, claiming that ideas and tendencies contrary to the essence of religion must be cleaned first, psychology and religion must be unified and, lastly, psychology must be re-constructed with an Islamic view.[14] In parallel with this claim, a quest for an original "Islamic psychology" through several publications and symposiums has been

a universal value, this is because the one who makes the comparison avoids ignoring the differences in a misty weather in which all cows are grey." See *Religion, Foi, Incroyance: Étude Psychologique* (Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga, 1983), 10.

11 Muḥammad Iqbāl (as Muhammed İkbal), *İslâm'da Dinî Tefekkürün Yeniden Teşekkülü* [*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*] (translated into Turkish by Sofi Huri; Istanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1964), 212-215.

12 See Mālik Badrī (as Malik Babikir Bedrî), *Müslüman Psikologların Çıkmazı* [*The Dilemma of Muslim Psychologists*] (translated into Turkish by Harun Şencan; Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1984).

13 These criticisms have been developed and elaborated by other researchers. See a recent book: Gültekin, *Psikolojik Tehlike*, 102-135.

14 Amber Haque, "Psychology and Religion: Their Relationship and Integration from an Islamic Perspective," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 15/4 (1998), 97-116.

maintained since the beginnings of the 1970s.[15] The department of Psychology at the International Islam University Malaysia, in particular, has encouraged researchers to pursue studies on Islamic psychology for some time.

It is known that conservative Christian and Jewish psychologists in the West have been on a similar quest. *Psychology and Christianity* and *The Journal of Psychology and Christianity* have existed since 1982 and *Psychology and Judaism* since 1990. Today, in spite of the lack of respect from positivist circles, scientific activity has been pursued in the field of Christo-psychology, and important developments have been made in this field. Furthermore, there are publications issued under the subject Pastoral Psychology/Care that aim to combine modern psychology with Christian beliefs to offer religious consulting and guidance for different groups in society. It is also interesting to note that the issues of religious experience and the understandings of religiosity of different religious traditions (Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism) are addressed within special chapters in some recent handbooks on the psychology of religion.[16] More important, the 2002 special edition of *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* (vol. 12, issue 4) is titled "From Conflict to Dialogue: Examining Western and Islamic Approaches in Psychology of Religion." The issue mostly covers presentations and discussions from the First International Congress of Mental Health and Religion, which was held in Tehran in 2001. The most interesting side of these presentations and discussions is that cultural viewpoints, particularly Islamic approaches, were proposed. It was stressed that psychology of religion that developed in the West basically depends on the Christian example. It was also emphasized that the studies of religion and religiosity must be widened to local chan-

---

[15] Since 1973, the Association of Muslim Social Scientists has issued *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. There are occasionally essays on Islamic psychology. The same association organized the first symposium of "Islam and Psychology" in 1975. The al-Rashad Institute organized a colloquium in Riyāḍ titled "Psychology and Islam" in 1978.

[16] See Fouad Moughrabi, "Islam and Religious Experience," in Ralph W. Hood Jr. (ed.), *Handbook of Religious Experience* (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1995), 72-86; Syed Arshad Husain, "Religion and Mental Health from the Muslim Perspective," in Harold G. Koenig (ed.), *Handbook of Religion and Mental Health* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998), 279-290.

nels to cover other religious traditions and belief systems. The efforts in this journal are not enough. However, widening studies to include individuals and groups that adhere to different religious traditions other than the West, entering a dialog and communication process with them, encouraging the local cultures to make sense of their world of belief – all of these developments are extensions of the paradigm change taking place in the scientific method. It is observed that this interest has also spread to a field that includes the scales/measures in the studies on psychology of religion. A thesis by a doctoral student titled "Measure of Islamic Religiousness"[17] under the supervision of the famous psychologist of religion, Pargament, is one of the first examples.

At the point that we have reached, the importance of a local and intercultural perspective in the humanities and the social sciences is better understood. Advancing psychology of religion in this direction is very important for its own future. The intercultural perspective provides the researcher with more sensitivity to the cultural base of his/her own beliefs. It is the only way to reach the reality of his society and humanity. Moreover, considering that psychology has developed as the local science of the West throughout its history, the validity of psychology in non-Western societies must be tested to affirm its claims to universality.

In the light of these observations, we would, now, like to examine the developments in the field of psychology of religion in Turkey.

3. Early Developments in the Field of Psychology of Religion in Turkey

Psychology of religion was recognized in Turkey with a 40-50 year delay. H. Ziya Ülken's articles and conferences,[18] which address some

---

[17] Hisham Abu Raiya, *A Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness: Evidence for Relevance, Reliability, and Validity* (PhD dissertation; Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University, 2008).

[18] The main examples are Hilmi Ziya (Ülken), "Anadolu Tarihinde Dinî Rûhiyyât Müşâhedeleri: Burak Baba, Geyikli Baba [Observations on Religious Spirituality in Anatolian History: Burāq Baba, Geyiklī Baba]," *Miḥrāb* 13-14 (June 1340 H), 434-448; idem., "Anadolu Tarihinde Dinî Rûhiyyât Müşâhedeleri: Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli [Observations on Religious Spirituality in Anatolian History: Ḥājī Bektāsh Walī]," *Miḥrāb* 15-16 (July 1340 H), 515-530; idem., *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Türk Mistisizmini Tetkike Giriş* [*Outlines of Turkish History: Introduction to the*

Anatolian Sufi personalities, are the pioneering works in the field. These are examples of the perspective in psychology of religion that stems from W. James and his followers and aims to focus on high-level religious personalities who live their religious experiences in an advanced and complete way. Also, these topics, in accordance with the spirit of contemporary values, have the character of setting example for researchers willing to conduct their studies in the field of psychology of religion. Following these early studies came Şerif Mardin's monographic-sociological study (written in the US) on Bediuzzaman Saʿīd Nūrsī, who was the most important and the most effective religious figure in the Republic Period.[19] This study was an important step towards "understanding the local religious life by using its own references." However, we must add that the social scientists in Turkey have commonly distanced themselves from religious matters. Sensitivity has been shown, to a certain degree, in the religious values and religious sources of our society in the lecture notes and books that were first published under the general title of psychology of religion. B. Ziya Egemen states that the most important duty of the psychologists of religion in the future will be to address the reality of religion, which has been an eternal need of the human spirit, "within the framework of the religion of Islam, the most complete religion of all, which has been neglected so far." He insistently stresses the concept of the "Islamic psychology of religion." To him, psychology of religion tries to investigate the religious life and all of its reflections and manifestations in the outside world. Islamic sects and Sufi orders, in particular, provide a vast area of research and observational fields for the psychologists of religion. There are mystic observations, religious rituals, and regulations, psychological situations such as *wajd, istighrāq, kashf* and *karāma*, and other supernatural observations. To address the applications that cause these observations, such as *dhikr, iʿtikāf,* and *samāʾ*, in the framework of psychological causation are the subject-matter of the psychology of religion, especially Islamic

Investigation of Turkish Mysticism] (Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1934); idem., "Tasavvuf Psikolojisi [Psychology of Sufism]," in his *Üniversite Konferansları: 1944-1945* [*University Speeches: 1944-1945*] (Istanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1946), 193-206.

[19] See Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988).

psychology of religion.[20] Pointing to the richness of the American and European literature on religious life and behaviors, the author states that the data are primarily collected from a Christian context. Although he considers this effort in Europe, whose population is Christian, reasonable and valuable, he nonetheless contends that there is a clear bigotry in ignoring other religions. To him, the clearest example of this bigotry shows itself when it comes to Islam. The efforts to disregard Islam, which are in violation of the scientific method of objectivity, have mostly led to wrong verdicts in the field of Islamic psychology. Psychology of religion provides many opportunities to criticize these prejudiced, misjudged, and non-scientific ideas. However, psychology of religion must be integrated with studies in the fields of Islamic theology and philosophy.[21] Egemen points out another crucial issue, which has recently been recognized by others. He recommends establishing the "Comparative Psychology of Religion" as a branch of psychology of religion to examine the differences in the religious lives of members of various religions.[22]

Osman Pazarlı's *Din Psikolojisi* [*Psychology of Religion*] (1968), which was written as a course material, can be regarded as a concrete step in accordance with this advice. In this book, which addresses psychology of religion together with other disciplines such as Islamic theology, Sufism, history of religions, philosophy, and parapsychology, the author tries to reflect an Islamic perspective in every topic. However, the work does not extend beyond the theoretical limits, provides very little space for the academic issues of psychology of religion and is an outdated and unsystematic work. Nonetheless, this work also has current value as an objection to the modern style of universalism in science that ignores local sources. This sensitivity, which not only concerns western knowledge but also addresses the local Islamic viewpoint in the studies on psychology of religion, was maintained in other studies.[23] However, the general efforts regarding

---

[20] Bedi Ziya Egemen, *Din Psikolojisi: Sâha, Kaynak ve Metot Üzerine Bir Deneme* [*Psychology of Religion: An Essay Concerning Scope, Source, and Method*] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1952), 20.

[21] *Ibid*., 21-22.

[22] *Ibid*., 20.

[23] In his book first published in 1993, H. Hökelekli tried to relate modern themes from the psychology of religion to Islamic beliefs and concepts. Moreover, he actualized this interest with a brief history of Islamic psychology early in the book.

the issue of including local sources and elements to the psychological study of religion are far from reaching the desired level.

Although earlier the interest has been directed toward scientifically examining the personalities who shaped the spiritual dynamics of Islam, which spread among people in the early times of Anatolia, it has not been sufficiently developed in the subsequent studies, due to a lack of proper understanding. There are some reasons for this lack of development. One of these reasons is that the studies within the field of psychology of religion have shifted focus from extreme religious personalities and mystics to daily life issues and the problems of religious development and change. Armaner's studies can be regarded in this context. Hence, in his studies, there is an effort to combine psychology of religion with subject-matters such as religious education, religious services, and mental health; he also makes an effort to make scientific knowledge function in daily life.[24] A more powerful tendency in recent years in psychology of religion has been to address situations in daily life, especially issues such as religious development, mental health, and values. The result of this tendency is that psychology of religion became more immersed in the culture in which it emerged and more engaged with local religious traditions.

See *Din Psikolojisi* [*Psychology of Religion*] (6th edn., Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2005), 22-63. Afterwards, he more systematically maintained his studies in a wider area. See "İslam Geleneğinde Psikoloji Kültürü [Culture of Psychology in Islamic Tradition]," *İslâmî Araştırmalar* [*Journal of Islamic Research*] 19/3 (*Din Psikolojisi Özel Sayısı* [*Special Issue: Psychology of Religion*]) (2006) 409-421. Some other works that were published later have almost the same content as the history of Islamic psychology; see Hüseyin Peker, *Din Psikolojisi* [*Psychology of Religion*] (2nd edn., Samsun: Aksiseda Matbaası, 2000).

[24] See Neda Armaner, *İnanç ve Hareket Bütünlüğü Bakımından Din Terbiyesi* [*Religious Discipline with regards to Faith and Behaviour Integrity*] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1967); idem., *Psikopatoloji'de Dinî Belirtiler* [*Religious Symptoms in Psychopathology*] (Ankara: Demirbaş Yayınları, 1973); idem., *Din Psikolojisine Giriş I* [*Introduction to Psychology of Religion I*] (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1990). At the end of the book, the author provides a list of the contents of the upcoming second volume. The interesting thing is that although the second volume has not been published, the first part of it, which was planned as two sections, addresses issues such as revelation, prophethood, miracles, and the psychology of Sufism.

4. Recent Developments in the Field of Psychology of Religion in Turkey

Leaving aside the high-level theoretical regulations in psychology of religion as an experimental science, real subjects are the primary source for gathering knowledge on religious experience and behavior. Surveys and interviews conducted with individuals and groups are important for sorting and interpreting the data; these can be obtained through field studies conducted using systematic observation and semi-experimental research methods. Studies in the field of psychology of religion began in the 1970s in Turkey.[25] In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of field studies. Taking the form of dissertations or books and articles, these studies are carried out in such topics as religious development, mental health and religiosity, conversion, the psychology of death and the afterlife, personality and religion, the psychology of faith, God, the perception of God, the psychology of prayer and worship. These studies were examined and evaluated using statistical analyses. Most of these studies use university students as subjects and are far from forming sampling groups that represent all levels of Turkish society. There are reasonable explanations for this. However, the period of youth and the university environment are far from being a study area that perfectly reflects the fruits of religiosity and its manifestations. Therefore, this research does not achieve a complete and sufficient quantity and quality level about religiosity in Turkey. There is a need to add many more studies that include subjects from different age-groups, sexes, and other individuals from various segments of society. The techniques and scales/measures used in these studies must also be enhanced. However, there is a positive side to all of these studies as well: they provide knowledge about Muslims in Turkey and try to reflect Muslims' religious tendencies. Regardless of the technical inadequacies and methodical deficiencies that are to be found in the scales used and the processes applied, these studies are more illuminative than the ready but insufficient knowledge transmitted from the West. However, there is a fundamental problem that has persisted: we lack proper concepts and theoretical frames that are in accord

[25] The first case study in Turkey was performed in the Department of Experimental Psychology in Istanbul University. See Belma Özbaydar, *Din ve Tanrı İnancının Gelişmesi Üzerine Bir Araştırma* [*A Study on the Development of Religion and Faith in God*] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970).

with our cultural world. Because the researchers do not think independently of Western scientific concepts, they feel compelled to adopt their findings to the available perspectives of the West. This type of research seems to be carried out according to the principles of scientific methods. However, because these researchers are disconnected from their own contexts, their findings correspond to a doubtful reality. In fact, all psychological studies in Turkey generally explain the people of Turkey in terms of the conditions that protect the individualist principle of psychology. To put it more precisely, the newly developed models use psychological assumptions that are accepted as universal in terms of collected data and explanations. The possibility that psychological conceptualizations and information can be local is either neglected or is considered under the title "cultural differences." The knowledge of westerners constitutes the fundamental source for the study of culture cultures outside of the West, just as with the mental concepts that they use. This approach deflects our attention from defining our own meanings; it also deflects us from studying the local effects and the possible effects of the natural, social, cultural, and political contexts that constitute our lives.[26] Thus, it is not an exaggeration to argue that making sense of and interpreting the data achieved by the field research studies in psychology of religion has been removed from its historical and social context. Accordingly, it appears to be very difficult to transfer the available data in psychology of religion to apply to areas in Turkey such as religious education and religious services and to use these data to contribute to the efficacy and fertility of these studies.

Studies on religiosity in today's society confront many difficulties with many aspects. First, religious people may feel that they are subject to "neighborhood pressure" within a secular structure of society in which religiosity is limited to an individual, special, and subjective living space. Many aspects of being religious in modern society and expressing and displaying this religiosity are risky. To be both modern and Muslim is only possible at a "hybrid" level within certain limits by being subject to change and by changing others.[27] People who

---

[26] Sibel A. Arkonaç, "Kartezyen Olmayan Özne, Öteki, Fail ve Yerel Gerçekliğin İnşası [Noncartesian Subject, Other, Agent, and Construction of Local Reality]," in idem. (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği*, 261.

[27] See Nilüfer Göle, *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri* [*New Public Faces of Islam*] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000), 19-40.

accept the religious lifestyle and who prefer to live a sincere religious life feel themselves subject to the threat of exclusion and accusation by influential groups of society. The unfounded "danger of reactionism" that occasionally appears in our society can direct religious tendencies and religious commitment towards impassive, aggressive, or fanatical patterns. On the other hand, although many people receive secular education and remain in secular environments, they tend toward religion and select a religious life. These people face religious tension and pain, a topic that is a primary research subject. In sum, in today's society, there is need to make sense of the consequences of religiosity in terms of choosing a religious lifestyle and to direct studies accordingly, freely expressing, sharing, and talking about beliefs and values. Studies must consider a contextual structure in which only tense, conflicted, minimized, and reduced religiosities can emerge, a structure in which religiosities cannot develop in their natural conditions and natural flows. We must recognize that we face identity structures that depend upon defense, rather than the original religious personalities. However, we must not miss new types of religiosities that recognize an agreement between religious and contemporary values and achieve harmony between these values and the new representations of tradition and religion.

In modern society, people encounter different religious types and different views on how to be religious, views that oppose or criticize religion, anti-religious philosophies, and life styles. Moreover, people receive a different education about religion, and they obtain different types of knowledge until the time when they are in a position to make their own decision regarding religion in their lives. Thus, psychological studies should consider the special reference systems in terms of scope, tools, and interpretations. Even people who were educated in the same religion can exhibit different behaviors according to the socio-cultural background of their religious education. Therefore, it is not easy to differentiate between the sociological and the psychological factors.[28] In the studies performed in Turkey, religiosity is addressed on a uniform and abstract level. Measurement models that depend on the differences in groups, societies, and sects,

[28] Vergote, "Din Psikolojisi Nedir Ne Değildir? [What the Psychology of Religion Is and What It Is Not?]," (translated into Turkish by Ali Köse), *İLAM Araştırma Dergisi* [*ILAM Journal of Research*] 2/2 (1997), 165.

all of which serve as a reference for the religiosities of individuals, are still not subjects for ongoing research.[29]

The scales used in field studies are problematic in terms of their credibility and validity for our culture. In fact, scales are problematic in themselves and, more correctly, are an important part of the problem. We know that developing scales is a professional branch of study and requires hard work. The psychologists of religion have commonly maintained their studies using the ready-to-use religiosity scales from the West. Regardless of the validity and credibility of these scales in their original contexts, when they are tested in Turkey, religious and cultural differences come to the fore, as stated earlier in the paper. We must admit, however, that many measures of religiosity developed by our colleagues in various Muslim societies are far from being sufficient. Thus, the study of the "Islamic religiosity scale," which is well elaborated and supported by a professional group, is a priority in an attempt to construct an Islamic psychology of religion.

Those who have received their post-graduate degrees abroad, written their dissertations and finally returned to Turkey are expected to accelerate and open up horizons to the studies in psychology of religion in Turkey because they have the ability to speak and write in English and can follow the international literature in the field. However, dissertations completed abroad in the field of psychology of religion – except for a few – have not yet been translated into Turkish. First, when choosing the topics, it is not clear whether the topics contribute to the national studies. Thus, there is no indication of whether this type of research, performed in the West, can shed light upon the problems of our country and raises the quality of national research. Interestingly enough, some of the researchers who were educated abroad are not aware of the threat and the danger of the "colonization of the psyche,"[30] a danger that most non-Western re-

---

[29] Along with the religiosity of "Ahl al-sunna," which constitutes a majority in Turkey, psychologists have not paid as much attention to Alevi religiosity, which has a considerable number of members. For perhaps the only exception, see Âdem Şahin and Talip Atalay, "Mezhep Farklılığının Dindarlığa Etkisi Üzerine Bir Araştırma [A Research on Effect of Denominational Differences on Religiosity]," *İslâmiyat* 5/4 (*Türk(iye) Dindarlığı* [*Special Issue: Turk(ish) Religiousness*]) (2002), 207-215.

[30] See John Shotter, "Sosyal İnşacılığın Ötesinde: Kartezyen Özne ve Faili Yeniden Düşünmek ve Yeniden Cisimleştirmek [Beyond Social Constructionism: Re-

searchers fall into. The magic of the West seduces most of them and makes them blind to the realities of their own society and culture. Some colleagues who know even the tiniest details of the religious motifs and tendencies that are typical of the average American person can be out of touch with their own religious and cultural realities. This problem exists to such a degree that there are some people who do not use Turkish in their writings, who do not pay attention to local sources and who absolutize Western concepts and explanations as universal and ultimate facts.

Conclusion

Although psychology and psychology of religion, which are Western constructions, bear universalist claims, it is clear that the knowledge achieved thus far in these fields is far from having universal value and validity. The Western-centered tendency to address human beings and their spiritual and social world using rational models and determinist relations is now being questioned by Westerners. To generalize the results achieved through the research performed using the Christian perspective and a sampling of human behaviors from another religious tradition and culture is contrary to today's logic within the social sciences and humanities.

As long as there is no local or Western alternative, the psychologists of religion who attempt to understand and interpret the religious lives and behaviors of Turkish people generally select from the available sources, without any relation to academic schools. This approach is pragmatic. Hence, most of the time, these scholars understand and interpret the religious world of their own people using Western frames of reference. However, a demand for cultural selfdom has emerged in Turkey, in terms of a new version of tradition and religion. We cannot observe a desire for a subject that has total symmetry with the West.[31] These scholars are ignoring the fact that Islam is fundamentally different from the Christian-Jewish tradition in certain fundamental issues such as human nature, individual freedom

thinking and Re-embodying the Cartesian Subject/Agent]," in Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği*, 164.

[31] See Kamile Oya Paker, "Batı Dışı Toplumlarda Sosyal Psikolojiyi Yeniden Düşünmek: İnşacı Psikolojinin İmkânları Üzerine Bir Deneme [Rethinking Social Psychology in non-Western Societies: A Trial on Opportunities of Constructionist Approach]," in Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği*, 236.

and responsibility, and the concept of God. Thus, the cultural world of the subject is very different from that of the Western world.[32] To understand the main difference between Christianity and Islam, one must at least consider the difference in the concept of revelation between the two religions.

When we take a closer look at the studies performed in Turkey, we do not see the field of humanities in accordance with daily life and in total agreement with the facts. We see a scientific perspective that restricts itself to classifying all colors of daily religious life and behaviors in a uniform class, seeking universal behavior models with quantitative results and focused on the closeness or distance from a Western scale. What we need to do is to first perceive our people and society within their religious and cultural dynamics, to examine our subjects and problems and to bring a critical approach and a new understanding. The psychologists of religion should evaluate religiosity in terms of a cultural framework in which the individual experience moves from one generation to another. In the final analysis, even the most reliable data that we consider to be valid and ultimate is the product of history and culture. These data were constructed through social interactions and ideas and maintained by social processes and practices that are valid in their own context.

It is a scientific necessity that the international studies in psychology of religion should be enriched with different religious and cultural types unique to specific religious traditions and cultures. In this context, creating a discipline that can be called an "Islamic psychology of religion" requires a two-fold working strategy that extends from the universal to the local and vice versa. We need to digest modern scientific knowledge and also criticize and evaluate these data in the light of the beliefs and values taught by the religion of Islam, a religion that shapes our own cultural identity. We then need to select, create, and apply the theories and concepts that are the most appropriate for our cultural values. Finally, we need to develop and apply data-gathering tools and scales before maintaining research. The results achieved must be evaluated, interpreted, and explained in a historical and sociological context.

---

[32] See Arkonaç, "'Kartezyen Olmayan Özne ...," 263-264; Tevfika Tunaboylu İkiz, "Doğu Batı Kavşağında Psikanalitik Özneye Bakış [A View on Psychoanalytical Subject in the Conflux of East and West]," in Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği,* 279.

REFERENCES

Abu Raiya, Hisham, *A Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness: Evidence for Relevance, Reliability, and Validity* (PhD dissertation; Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University, 2008).

Arkonaç, Sibel A., "Kartezyen Olmayan Özne, Öteki, Fail ve Yerel Gerçekliğin İnşası [Noncartesian Subject, Other, Agent, and Construction of Local Reality]," in idem. (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik Bilgisine Dair* [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 249-274.

Armaner, Neda, *İnanç ve Hareket Bütünlüğü Bakımından Din Terbiyesi* [*Religious Discipline with regards to Faith and Behaviour Integrity*] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1967).

_____ *Psikopatoloji'de Dinî Belirtiler* [*Religious Symptoms in Psychopathology*] (Ankara: Demirbaş Yayınları, 1973).

_____ *Din Psikolojisine Giriş I* [*Introduction to Psychology of Religion I*] (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1990).

Badrī, Mālik (as Malik Babikir Bedrî), *Müslüman Psikologların Çıkmazı* [*The Dilemma of Muslim Psychologists*] (translated into Turkish by Harun Şencan; Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1984).

Belzen, Jacob A., "Din Psikolojisinde Tarihsel-Kültürel Yaklaşım: Disiplinlerarası Araştırmalar İçin Bakış Açıları [The Historicocultural Approach in the Psychology of Religion: Perspectives for Interdisciplinary Research]," (translated into Turkish by Ali Ayten), *Marmara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* [*Marmara University Journal of the Faculty of Divinity*] 33/2 (2007), 221-240.

Egemen, Bedi Ziya, *Din Psikolojisi: Sâha, Kaynak ve Metot Üzerine Bir Deneme* [*Psychology of Religion: An Essay Concerning Scope, Source, and Method*] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1952).

Geertz, Clifford, "'From the Native's Point of View': On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," in idem., *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983), 55-70.

Gergen, Kenneth J., "Sosyal İnşa: Batının Psikolojide Kendi Kendine Konuşmasından Karşılıklı Küresel Konuşmaya [Social Construction: From Soliloquy of the West on Psychology to Global Colloquy]," in Sibel A. Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik*

Bilgisine Dair [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 3-33.

Göle, Nilüfer, *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri* [*New Public Faces of Islam*] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2000).

Gültekin, Mücahit, *Psikolojik Tehlike* [*Psychological Danger*] (Istanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 2008).

Haque, Amber, "Psychology and Religion: Their Relationship and Integration from an Islamic Perspective," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 15/4 (1998), 97-116.

Hökelekli, Hayati, *Din Psikolojisi* [*Psychology of Religion*] (6th edn., Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2005).

_____ "İslam Geleneğinde Psikoloji Kültürü [Culture of Psychology in Islamic Tradition]," *İslâmî Araştırmalar* [*Journal of Islamic Research*] 19/3 (*Din Psikolojisi Özel Sayısı* [*Special Issue: Psychology of Religion*]) (2006), 409-421.

Husain, Syed Arshad, "Religion and Mental Health from the Muslim Perspective," in Harold G. Koenig (ed.), *Handbook of Religion and Mental Health* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1998), 279-290, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-012417645-4/50087-0.

İkiz, Tevfika Tunaboylu, "Doğu Batı Kavşağında Psikanalitik Özneye Bakış [A View on Psychoanalytical Subject in the Conflux of East and West]," in Sibel A. Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik Bilgisine Dair* [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 275-289.

Iqbāl, Muḥammad (as Muhammed İkbal), *İslâm'da Dinî Tefekkürün Yeniden Teşekkülü* [*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*] (translated into Turkish by Sofi Huri; Istanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1964).

James, William, *Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (2nd edn., London & New York: Routledge, 2002); French translation: *L'Expérience Religieuse: Essai de Psychologie Descriptive* (translated into French by Frank Abauzit; 2nd edn., Paris: F. Alcan, 1908).

Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem, *İnsan Aile Kültür* [*Human Family Culture*] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1990).

_____ *Kültürel Psikoloji: Kültür Bağlamında İnsan ve Aile* [*Family and Human Development across Cultures: A View from the Other Side*] (translated into Turkish by Ayşe Üskül and Esin Uzun; Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık Ticaret ve Sanayi A. Ş., 1998).

Krech, David and Crutchfield, Richard S., *Sosyal Psikoloji: Nazariye ve Problemler* [*Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*] (translated into Turkish by Erol Güngör; 2nd edn., Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970).

Mardin, Şerif, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988).

Moughrabi, Fouad, "Islam and Religious Experience," in Ralph W. Hood Jr. (ed.), *Handbook of Religious Experience* (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1995), 72-86.

Özbaydar, Belma, *Din ve Tanrı İnancının Gelişmesi Üzerine Bir Araştırma* [*A Study on the Development of Religion and Faith in God*] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970).

Paker, Kamile Oya, "Batı Dışı Toplumlarda Sosyal Psikolojiyi Yeniden Düşünmek: İnşacı Psikolojinin İmkânları Üzerine Bir Deneme [Rethinking Social Psychology in non-Western Societies: A Trial on Opportunities of Constructionist Approach]," in Sibel A. Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik Bilgisine Dair* [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 203-248.

Peker, Hüseyin, *Din Psikolojisi* [*Psychology of Religion*] (2nd edn., Samsun: Aksiseda Matbaası, 2000).

Sherif, Muzafer, *Sosyal Kuralların Psikolojisi* [*The Psychology of Social Norms*] (translated into Turkish by İsmail Sandıkçıoğlu; Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).

Shotter, John, "Sosyal İnşacılığın Ötesinde: Kartezyen Özne ve Faili Yeniden Düşünmek ve Yeniden Cisimleştirmek [Beyond Social Constructionism: Re-thinking and Re-embodying the Cartesian Subject/Agent]," in Sibel A. Arkonaç (ed.), *Doğunun ve Batının Yerelliği: Bireylik Bilgisine Dair* [*The Locality of the West and East: About Individuality Knowledge*] (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), 161-199.

Şahin, Âdem and Atalay, Talip, "Mezhep Farklılığının Dindarlığa Etkisi Üzerine Bir Araştırma [A Research on Effect of Denominational Differences on Religiosity]," *İslâmiyat* 5/4 (*Türk(iye) Dindarlığı* [*Special Issue: Turk(ish) Religiousness*]) (2002), 207-215.

(Ülken), Hilmi Ziya, "Anadolu Tarihinde Dinî Rûhiyyât Müşâhedeleri: Burak Baba, Geyikli Baba [Observations on Religious Spirituality in Anatoli-

an History: Burāq Baba, Geyiklī Baba]," *Miḥrāb* 13-14 (June 1340 H), 434-448.

_____ Anadolu Tarihinde Dinî Rûhiyyât Müşâhedeleri: Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli [Observations on Religious Spirituality in Anatolian History: Ḥājī Bektāsh Walī]," *Miḥrāb* 15-16 (July 1340 H), 515-530.

_____ *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Türk Mistisizmini Tetkike Giriş* [*Outlines of Turkish History: Introduction to the Investigation of Turkish Mysticism*] (Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1934).

_____ "Tasavvuf Psikolojisi [Psychology of Sufism]," in idem., *Üniversite Konferansları: 1944-1945* [*University Speeches: 1944-1945*] (Istanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1946), 193-206.

Watt, William M., *Modern Dünyada İslâm Vahyi* [*Islamic Revelation in the Modern World*] (translated into Turkish by Mehmet S. Aydın; Ankara: Hülbe Yayınları, 1982).

Waardenburg, Jacques, "İnsan Bilimleri, Sosyal Bilimler ve İslam Çalışmaları," in Ömer Mahir Alper (ed. and Turkish translation), *Batı'da Din Çalışmaları* [*Religious Studies in the West*] (Istanbul: Metropol Yayınları, 2002), 249-283.

Vergote, Antoine, *Religion, Foi, Incroyance: Étude Psychologique* (Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga, 1983).

_____ "Din Psikolojisi Nedir Ne Değildir? [What the Psychology of Religion Is and What It Is Not?]," (translated into Turkish by Ali Köse), *İLAM Araştırma Dergisi* [*ILAM Journal of Research*] 2/2 (1997), 159-170.

VALIDATING THE PERSIAN INTEGRATED SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE SCALE WITHIN AN ISLAMIC CONTEXT

Ebrahim Khodadady (Corresponding author)
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad-Iran
&
Atefeh Taheryan
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad-Iran
&
Armin Tavakoli
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad-Iran

Abstract

The present study explored the reliability and construct validity of the 82-item Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale (ISIS) designed by Amram and Dryer (2008) in Iran. To this end the ISIS was translated into Persian by employing schema theory and administered to nine hundred and fourteen undergraduate and graduate students majoring in various fields in five universities in Mashhad. The participants' responses were submitted to principal axis factoring and Varimax with Kaiser Normalization resulting in the extraction of twenty one factors having items with at least one acceptable loading, i.e., Holistic, Positive, Detached, Purposeful, Committed, Metaphysical, Integrative, Perceptive, Receptive, Assiduous, Fragile, Prudent, Hollow, Self-Discerning, Other-Dependent, Self-Cognizant, Materialistic, Resistant, Naturalistic, Concessional, and Sensual. While fourteen factors confirm the presence of spiritual intelligence in individuals, seven are reverse revealing its absence. Both confirmatory and reverse factors correlate significantly with each other. They also show acceptable levels of reliability whenever applicable.

Key Words: Intelligence, ROS, schema, capability

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.61

1. Introduction

Intelligence gene is said to be one of the most important variables determining and shaping the survival of human beings on the earth (Darwin, 1871). As a construct intelligence itself is "the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with his environment" (Wechsler, 1944, p. 3, as cited in Fancher, 1985). In order to serve the survival function within social contexts and achieve the desired objectives, humans do need the ability to judge well, to understand well, and to reason well (Binet, 1905). Although Mayer and Caruso (2002) refined and broadened the concept as "the capacity to carry out abstract reasoning, recognize patterns, and compare and contrast" (p. 2), the most germane nature of intelligence was revealed by Gardner (1993) as

> a computational capacity – a capacity to process a certain kind of information – that originates in human biology and human psychology. An intelligence entails the ability to solve problems or fashion products that are of consequence in a particular cultural setting or community. (p. 6).

In order for a capacity to be accepted as an intelligence, Gardner (1983) offered eight criteria, i.e., 1) potential isolation by brain damage, 2) the existence of idiot savants, prodigies, and other exceptional individuals, 3) having an identifiable core operation or set of operations, 4) having a distinct and identifiable developmental history, 5) an evolutionary history and evolutionary plausibility, 6) being empirically supported by tests, 7) being supported by psychometric findings, and 8) displaying susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system.

Based on the definition and the eight criteria specified above, Gardner (1983, 2000) argued that there is *not* just one intelligence, i.e., IQ, but several independent primary intelligences, i.e., linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, naturalistic, spatial, intrapersonal, and interpersonal intelligences. Amram and Dryer (2008) and King (2008) reviewed the literature and concluded that spiritual intelligence (SI) can also be treated as another independent intelligence because it meets most, if not all, of the eight criteria.

The SI is defined as "a set of mental capacities which contribute to the awareness, integration, and adaptive application of the

nonmaterial and transcendent aspects of one's existence" (King, 2008). Individuals employ the SI "when they draw on their spiritual abilities and resources to make meaningful decisions, deliberate over existential issues, or attempt problem solving in daily life" (Nasel, 2004, p. 4). Zohar and Marshall (2000) believed that the SI utilizes the emotional intelligence and IQ to "reframe or reconceptualize our experience… and thus transform our understanding of it" (p. 56).

Nasel (2004) seems to have been the first scholar who developed the 17-item SI Scale to reflect the "affective, cognitive, and experiential capacities and resources representative of spiritual intelligence" (p. 76). The scale was not, however, utilized widely in the literature because it was limited to Christian values and beliefs as well as aspects of New Age individualistic spirituality.

In contrast to Nasel (2004), King (2008) started with four spiritual capacities, i.e., critical existential thinking, personal meaning production, transcendental awareness, and conscious state expansion, and developed a pool of 84 items to tap into these capacities. King's very dependence on the capacities resulted in his final selection of only 24 items to fit his a priori model. This approach towards validating a transcendental measure results in imposing the designers' presuppositions on the measure and employing statistical approaches such as factor analysis and structural equation modeling to support their presuppositions.

Allport and Ross (1967), for example, believed that two major orientations underlie all religious behaviors, i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic. Based on this belief, they developed their Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) to measure the two motivations. Khodadady and Golparvar (2011), however, extracted four factors when they translated the 21-item ROS into Persian and administered it to 329 undergraduate university students and applied three methods of factor extraction, i.e., Maximum Likelihood, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA), to their data and rotated the extracted latent variables via Varimax with Kaiser Normalization (VKN).

Khodadady and Bagheri (2012) added 12 religious indicators to the ROS and administered it to 536 undergraduate students majoring in various fields in two universities in Mashhad, Iran. They applied the PAF and VKN to the participants' responses and extracted seven factors, i.e., *Inspirational*, *Intrinsic*, *Social*, *Concessional*, *Theo-*

Pacific, *Humanitarian*, and *Sacrificial*. Their results thus showed that religion is not a simple construct whose application to everyday lives can be explained by just two orientations. Similarly, approaching a construct as complex as the SI as an independent intelligence consisting of just four capacities provides a very narrow, if not distorted, understanding of how it contributes to human survival in general and achievement in educational programs in particular.

Instead of limiting the SI to four capacities, Amram (2007), conducted 71 interviews with spiritual teachers and business leaders who applied and embodied spirituality in their work and daily life and developed the 83-item Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale (ISIS). In order to validate the ISIS, Amram and Dryer (2008) [henceforth A&D] administered the ISIS along with the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS, Pavot & Diener, 1993) and the Index of Core Spiritual Experiences (INSPIRIT; Kass et al, 1991) to 263 adult volunteers among whom were 15 high spiritual intelligence and business acumen. Results showed that there was a significant correlation between the ISIS and SWLS, i.e., $r = 0.30$, $p < 0.01$, and INSPIRIT, i.e., $r = 0.73$, $p < 0.01$. A&D also applied the principal component analysis to their data and extracted 22 capabilities which correlated moderately with the SWLS and the INSPIRIT. (The capabilities along with their reliability coefficients are presented in the Instrument section.)

This study is designed to translate the ISIS into Persian and investigate whether it has factorial validity in Iran as a religious, i.e., Islamic, country. The validation of the Persian ISIS is important because its English version was developed on various major traditions, i.e., Buddhism, Christianity, Earth-based (shamanic and pagan), Eclectic (personal integration of several traditions), Hindu, Islam/Sufism, Jewish, Non-dual (spiritual self-realization involving the transcendence of subject object duality), Taoism, and Yoga, in America which is a secular country. The study also explores whether the latent variables constituting the Persian ISIS correlate significantly with each other.

2. Methodology

2.1 Participants

Nine hundred and fourteen, 463 (50.7%) female and 451 (49.3%) male, university students voluntarily took part in the project. While 15 (1.65%) did not specify their age, the remaining were between 16 and 47 years old (mean = 21.20, SD = 4.05). With the exception of 191 (20.9%), the remaining participants (n = 723, 79.1%) were not studying English at any language institute at the time of research. While 561 (61.4%) did not specify their level of English proficiency, 77 (8.4%), 222 (24.3%) and 54 (5.9%) declared it to be elementary, intermediate and advanced learners of English, respectively. One participant had not specified her marital status whereas the majority, i.e., 740 (81%), were single students of Agriculture (n = 138, 15.1%), Engineering (n = 198, 21.7%), Humanities (n = 385, 42.1%), Science (n = 150, 16.4%) and Medicine (n = 31, 3.4%) at Above diploma (n = 4, .4%), B.A. (n = 657, 71.9%), M.A., M.S. or M.D. (n = 224, 24.5%) and PhD. (n = 27, 3.0%) levels. They spoke Arabic (n = 3, .3%), English (n = 5, .5%), Kurdish (n = 37, 4.0%), Lori (n = 20, 2.2%), Persian (n = 785, 85.9%) and Turkish (n = 52, 5.7%) as their mother language. They were all Muslims.

2.2 Instrument

Two instruments were employed in this study, i.e., a demographic scale and the Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale (ISIS).

2.2.1 Demographic Scale

The Persian demographic scale consisted of two short-answer questions and five multiple choice items dealing with the participants' age, the name of the institute where they studied English, their level of English proficiency, gender, marital status, field and degree of academic study, and mother language.

2.2.2 Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale

The Persian version of A&D's Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale (ISIS) was employed in this study. It consists of 82 items tapping into five logically established domains, i.e., Consciousness, Grace, Meaning, Transcendence, and Truth. (Item 83, *I have answered all the questions truthfully and to the best of my ability*, is added to secure answer validity and thus has no relationship to the domains.)

Each item is presented as a statement representing the participants' behaviour within the past 6 to 12 months. They were required to specify whether they never or almost never, seldom or rarely, sometimes, often or somewhat frequently, usually or very frequently, or always or almost always exhibited the behaviour. The values of 1 to 6 were assigned to these points, respectively. For the ease of presentation, these six values were collapsed into three points by adding up values 1 and 2 as well as values 4, 5 and 6 to form points 1 (never) and 3 (always) respectively. Value 2 (sometimes) was kept intact.

Table 1 presents the twenty two SI capabilities comprising the English ISIS. As can be seen, the number of items comprising each capability ranges from two, i.e., Gratitude, to six, i.e., Practice. The alpha reliability coefficients of these capabilities range from .88 (Presence) to .62 (Egolessness). Although Practice has the largest number of items among the capabilities, its alpha is .73. Higher-self and Sacredness with five and four items, respectively, enjoy the second highest reliability level, i.e., .87. As it can also be seen, 56 items (68.3%) are confirmatory in nature whereas 26 (31.7%) are reverse (R).

Table 1

Items constituting the capabilities measured by the English ISIS and their RCs

Capability	**Items**	**α**	**Capability**	**Items**	**α**
Beauty	I01, I47, I62	.79	Joy	I76R, I77, I80	.74
Discernment	I28, I42, I45, I79R	.75	Mindfulness	I04, I16, I29, I54, I72	.71
Egolessness	I46R, I63R, I78R	.62	Openness	I07R, I11R, I60R, I81R	.70
Equanimity	I03, I09R, I32	.74	Practice	I05, I17, I20, I30, I41, I66	.73
Freedom	I06, I31R, I44R	.77	Presence	I23R, I33R, I75R	.88
Gratitude	I24, I67	.72	Purpose	I10, I19, I39, I73R, I74R	.70
Higher-self	I15, I35, I53R, I58, I59	.87	Relatedness	I25, I48, I56	.68
Holism	I14, I37, I61, I65	.82	Sacredness	I08, I34, I57, I64	.87

Immanence	I13R, I21, I27, I52	.77	Service	I38, I40, I71	.82
Inner-wholeness	I18R, I55R, I69, I82R	.71	Synthesis	I36, I49, I70	.70
Intuition	I12, I43, I50, I51	.71	Trust	I02R, I22R, I26R, I68	.77

2.3 Procedure

Since the only theoretical rationale which provides translators with an objective criterion to translate passages from the source language to target language is schema theory, it was employed in this study (Khodadady, 2001, 2008; Seif & Khodadady, 2003). The theory treats each and all the words/phrases constituting the source text as schemata whose target equivalents must be chosen not only on the basis of what they stand for but also on the basis of the syntactic, semantic, and discoursal relationships they enter into with each other. In order to achieve the objective, an MA student of translation at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad was first asked to translate all the 83 items constituting the English ISIS into Persian.

The schemata employed in the Persian items were then compared with those of the English one by one. This approach resulted in the revision of almost all items by the first author. The fifth item, "I practice inner and outer quiet as a way of opening myself to receive creative insights," was, for example, translated as MAN BA TAMRIN ARAMESH DARUNI WA BIRUNI KHOD RA DAR MARAZEH DARYAFT BINESHHAYEH KHALAGHANEH GHARAR MIDAHAM. The back translation of this Persian sentence is "by practicing inner and outer quiet I expose myself to creative insights." As can be counted, the original English item consists of 16 schemata whereas the back translation contains only 12, i.e., "way" and "opening" have been deleted in the process. The missing schemata were therefore translated and the Persian statement was revised as ARAMESH DAROUNI WA BIROUNI BEONVANEH YEKI AZ TOROGEH BAZGHOSTANE KHOD BE DARYAFTEH DIDHAYEH KHALAGHANEH RA TAMRINMIKONAM.

Upon revising the translated Persian items on the basis of schema theory, they were put together as a pool of 82 items to develop the Persian ISIS. The scale was then presented to several university stu-

dents similar to the sample to which it was finally administered in spring 2012. They answered the items and announced that they had no difficulty in understanding them. Upon ensuring the intelligibility of the Persian ISIS it was printed along with the demographic scale and administered to participants in person. A number of these participants provided the researchers with their email address in order to be informed about the results of study.

2.4 Data Analysis

The reliability of the Persian ISIS was assessed by utilizing Cronbach Alpha. Unlike A&D who employed the PCA to extract components, the PAF was utilized in this study. The PCA was not utilized because it fails to "differentiate between variance in measures due to the common factors (factors that influence more than one measure) and variance due to unique factors (factors that influence only one measure)" (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003, 150). Similar to A&D, however, the VKN method was used to rotate the extracted latent variables (LVs). For determining the number of LVs to be extracted, the eigenvalues of one and higher were adopted as the only criteria and the items contributing to each LV were chosen on the basis of their loadings. Following Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) items having the loadings of 0.32 and higher on a given factor were treated as acceptable because they explain approximately 10% of overlapping variance with the other items in that factor.

If any item loaded on more than one LV, its highest loading on one factor was taken as its main contribution to that particular LV only and its cross loadings on other LVs were deleted. Items which loaded acceptably but negatively on any factor were also deleted regardless of the magnitude of their loadings. Upon establishing the LVs having acceptable loadings, they were correlated with each other to explore the strength of their relationships. The descriptive and statistical analyses were run via IBM SPSS Statistics 20 to explore the hypotheses below.

1. The 82 items comprising the Persian ISIS will load on the 22 factors corresponding to the subscales established by the A&D

2. The extracted LVs will correlate significantly with each other.

3. Results and Discussion

The alpha reliability coefficient obtained on the ISIS is .90 (N = 914) in this study. Although this magnitude of alpha is "excellent" (George & Mallery, 2003, 231), it is lower than the coefficient reported by A&D, i.e., .97 (N= 263). A comparison of the participants who took part in the two studies shows that while their age ranged between 18 and older than 65 in A&D's and they were either high on spirituality or successful in business, those of the present were more homogeneous in age and career. While 32 (3.5%) of them did not specify their age, the age of the remaining participants in this study ranged between 16 and 47 (Mean = 20.85, SD = 4.96). They were all university students.

Besides the homogeneity of participants' career and smaller age range in this study, they were Muslims and thus differed from those of A&D in terms of believing in one faith only, i.e., Islam. Since the items comprising the ISIS were developed on the basis of Amram's (2007) interviews with those practicing Buddhism, Christianity, Earth-based, Hindu, Islam/Sufism, Jewish, Non-dual, Taoism, and Yoga, the ISIS included some items which did not load on any factors as will be described shortly.

In order to find out whether running a factorial analysis of the data is appropriate, KMO and Bartlett's Test were run and the KMO statistic of .90 was obtained. According to Kaiser and Rice (1974), the KMO statistic in the .90s is "marvelous," in other words, the sample selected in the study and the factor analysis employed provided the best common factors. The significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, i.e., $X^2 = 20092.475$, df = 3321, $p < .001$, indicated that the correlation matrix was not an identity matrix.

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 82 items along with their initial (I) and extraction communalities (ECs). As can be seen, the skewness indices range from 1.28 (I46R) to -0.96 (I02R), indicating that the items have elicited different responses from the participants as they were designed to. The ECs ranged between 0.16 (I16) and 0.58 (I51). As will be discussed shortly the items having the highest skewness and the lowest EC indices have not loaded on any factors, i.e., items I46R and I16, respectively. (The acceptable and rotated loadings and cross loadings of items on each factor are given in Appendix A.)

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for the 82-Item Pool (N = 914)

Item	M	SD	Skew	Kurt	IC	EC	Item	M	SD	Skew	Kurt	IC	EC
I01	4.29	1.45	-.79	.12	.26	.27	I42	3.85	1.34	-.41	-.25	.45	.48
I02R	4.46	1.45	-.96	.25	.25	.24	I43	3.67	1.43	-.38	-.27	.34	.41
I03	3.51	1.25	-.06	-.25	.34	.39	I44R	4.08	1.41	-.61	-.22	.29	.41
I04	4.04	1.30	-.57	.05	.32	.39	I45	3.96	1.43	-.47	-.33	.35	.43
I05	3.27	1.48	-.08	-.59	.31	.32	I46R	2.14	1.42	1.28	.81	.38	.53
I06	3.96	1.36	-.50	-.20	.33	.35	I47	4.14	1.38	-.55	-.34	.46	.56
I07R	3.36	1.44	-.08	-.79	.19	.25	I48	4.08	1.36	-.51	-.26	.42	.46
I08	3.56	1.62	-.27	-.71	.17	.17	I49	3.60	1.36	-.23	-.43	.39	.40
I09R	3.01	1.41	.22	-.74	.33	.41	I50	3.93	1.35	-.38	-.31	.35	.41
I10	3.51	1.34	-.23	-.18	.27	.30	I51	3.84	1.34	-.39	-.27	.43	.58
I11R	3.47	1.50	-.08	-.83	.29	.34	I52	3.73	1.28	-.18	-.54	.33	.39
I12	2.90	1.63	.49	-.89	.19	.21	I53R	3.68	1.37	-.21	-.73	.17	.24
I13R	4.35	1.48	-.75	-.26	.27	.33	I54	3.69	1.39	-.10	-.65	.27	.35
I14	3.63	1.45	-.32	-.23	.33	.36	I55R	3.87	1.36	-.50	-.32	.25	.30
I15	4.13	1.55	-.69	-.31	.39	.48	I56	3.82	1.46	-.29	-.70	.31	.35
I16	3.59	1.72	-.18	-1.11	.18	.16	I57	3.62	1.50	-.32	-.55	.45	.53
I17	3.86	1.49	-.35	-.67	.29	.31	I58	4.02	1.46	-.40	-.63	.44	.50
I18R	3.87	1.50	-.43	-.61	.26	.30	I59	4.23	1.43	-.56	-.34	.51	.53
I19	3.99	1.56	-.45	-.62	.38	.42	I60R	3.28	1.58	-.07	-1.13	.25	.30
I20	3.96	1.61	-.49	-.79	.44	.50	I61	3.72	1.57	-.25	-.79	.33	.36
I21	4.07	1.54	-.41	-.72	.35	.41	I62	3.67	1.38	-.21	-.47	.41	.48
I22R	3.83	1.48	-.34	-.66	.29	.35	I63R	3.29	1.39	.04	-.60	.33	.37
I23R	3.95	1.50	-.49	-.53	.25	.28	I64	3.80	1.53	-.40	-.51	.46	.54
I24	4.09	1.44	-.45	-.54	.45	.46	I65	3.71	1.35	-.32	-.29	.46	.53
I25	4.15	1.45	-.59	-.33	.29	.31	I66	3.47	1.47	.02	-.86	.41	.53
I26R	3.91	1.52	-.47	-.70	.35	.39	I67	4.45	1.40	-.77	.00	.48	.52
I27	3.10	1.42	.39	-.54	.26	.31	I68	4.20	1.44	-.56	-.39	.46	.53
I28	4.28	1.35	-.74	.19	.40	.43	I69	4.00	1.49	-.46	-.65	.45	.52
I29	3.50	1.32	-.06	-.48	.31	.38	I70	3.35	1.36	-.14	-.27	.44	.49
I30	3.47	1.40	.01	-.07	.34	.41	I71	3.83	1.47	-.35	-.52	.44	.49
I31R	3.26	1.57	.18	-1.00	.21	.24	I72	3.77	1.40	-.33	-.46	.36	.43
I32	3.17	1.41	.22	-.77	.24	.22	I73R	2.89	1.53	.25	-.63	.36	.44
I33R	2.95	1.55	.38	-.89	.21	.23	I74R	3.71	1.50	-.42	-.45	.30	.37
I34	3.66	1.43	-.32	-.29	.28	.34	I75R	3.69	1.38	-.33	-.41	.33	.43
I35	3.82	1.32	-.29	-.32	.39	.50	I76R	3.77	1.45	-.35	-.59	.39	.51
I36	3.38	1.35	.02	-.50	.33	.38	I77	3.35	1.41	.09	-.56	.24	.23
I37	3.78	1.38	-.39	-.17	.41	.51	I78R	3.27	1.58	.10	-.97	.24	.34
I38	4.31	1.36	-.63	-.24	.46	.55	I79R	3.87	1.51	-.53	-.36	.26	.35

I39	4.05	1.42	-.46	-.46	.35	.40	I80	3.97	1.41	-.45	-.40	.45	.49
I40	3.77	1.53	-.23	-.89	.46	.55	I81R	3.25	1.38	.12	-.58	.30	.53
I41	4.06	1.47	-.47	-.65	.41	.48	I82R	4.11	1.73	-.55	-.93	.23	.29

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of 21 rotated factors extracted in this study. As can be seen, out of 82 items, twenty have not loaded acceptably on any factors, i.e., I01, I07R, I12, I16, I19, I21, I25, I31R, I32, I34, I43, I46R, I49, I53R, I55R, I56, I60R, I63R, I77, and I82R. The 23 rotated factors extracted explain 39.691 of variance in the ISIS. However, when the magnitudes of the loadings were scrutinized and the lower cross loadings on more than one factor were removed, no item loaded acceptability on factors 14 and 23, indicating that 21 rotated factors underlie the ISIS (see Appendix A).

Table 3

Descriptive statistics, reliability, and variances (V) of factors (F) underlying the ISIS

F	#	Factor name	Items	α	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
					Total	% of V	C V%
1	9	*Holistic*	I03, I04, I05, I06, I08, I10, I14, I15, I17	.71	3.137	3.826	3.826
2	5	*Positive*	I59, I67, I68, I69, I80	.76	2.592	3.161	6.987
3	6	*Detached*	I02R, I13R, I18R, I22R, I23R, I26R	.60	2.425	2.958	9.945
4	4	*Purposeful*	I24, I38, I39, I40	.71	2.242	2.734	12.679
5	3	*Committed*	I20, I41, I42	.65	2.231	2.721	15.400
6	6	*Metaphysical*	I57, I58, I61, I62, I64, I71	.73	2.150	2.622	18.022
7	3	*Integrative*	I35, I36, I37	.61	1.712	2.088	20.110
8	3	*Perceptive*	I50, I51, I52	.63	1.501	1.831	21.941
9	3	*Receptive*	I48, I70, I72	.57	1.398	1.705	23.646
10	2	*Assiduous*	I65, I66	.62	1.397	1.704	25.350
11	3	*Fragile*	I09R, I11R, I33R	.50	1.255	1.530	26.880
12	3	*Prudent*	I28, I29, I30	.55	1.146	1.397	28.278
13	2	*Hollow*	I75R, I76R	.59	1.052	1.283	29.561
14	-	-	-	-	1.047	1.276	30.837
15	1	*Self-Discerning*	I45	-	.931	1.135	31.972
16	2	*Other-Dependent*	I78R, I79R	.39	.929	1.133	33.106

17	1	*Self-Cognizant*	I54	-	.897	1.094	34.199
18	2	*Materialistic*	I73R, I74R	.41	.882	1.076	35.275
19	1	*Resistant*	I81R	-	.857	1.045	36.320
20	1	*Naturalistic*	I27	-	.752	.918	37.238
21	1	*Concessional*	I44R	-	.749	.914	38.151
22	1	*Sensual*	I47	-	.701	.855	39.006
23	-	-	-	-	.562	.685	39.691

As shown in Table 3, while no items load acceptably on F14 and F23, six Fs, i.e., 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22, consist of only one item, i.e., I45, I54, I81R, I27, I44R, and I47, respectively. The alpha reliability coefficient (RC) of these Fs could not, therefore, be estimated. The RC of the remaining 15 Fs, however, ranged from 0.76 (F2) to 0.39 (F16). In spite of having the lowest RC, F16 correlates significantly with seven Fs, i.e., 2, 3, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21, and thus establishes its relevance to the ISIS. (The factor correlation matrix in given in Appendix B). The correlations thus answer the second question and show that factors are significantly related to each other.

Nine items, i.e., I03, I04, I05, I06, I08, I10, I14, I15, and I17, load acceptably on F1. Since they belong to seven capabilities established by A&D, i.e., Equanimity (I03), Freedom (I06), Higher-self (I15), Holism (I14), Mindfulness (I04), Practice (I05 and I17), Purpose (I10), and Sacredness (I08), new labels were employed to stand not only for F1 but also for other Fs whose constituting items pertained to A&D's various capabilities. The labels given to factors extracted in this study are therefore different from those of A&D. (The items comprising the ISIS, the factors upon which they load and the magnitudes of their loadings are given in Appendix C).

The fist factor called *Holistic* shows that individuals having the SI monitor their thoughts and emotions, sense the necessity of nonconformity, remain aware and steady under chaotic circumstances, approach life cyclically, resort to higher consciousness to find their path, are open to creative insights, align themselves with destiny, resort to wisdom and find the source of life immanent and present in their everyday life. *Holistic* F correlates the highest with F4 (*Purposeful*) and F6 (*Metaphysical*), i.e., r = .47, p <.01.

Five items, i.e., I59, I67, I68, I69, and I80, load acceptably on F2 called *Positive*. Individuals having the SI are *Positive* when they have

faith that everything will work out for the best, accept themselves as they are, feel grateful for the abundance of positive things in their lives, render their activities joyful and draw on their faith when they face day-to-day challenges. The *Positive* attribute of spiritually intelligent individuals correlates the highest with F6 (*Metaphysical*), i.e., r=.59, p <.01.

Six reverse items, i.e., I02R, I13R, I18R, I22R, I23R, and I26R, load acceptably on reverse F3 called *Detached*. Spiritually intelligent individual get *Detached* when they feel limited by having few options available, are driven and ruled by fears, think about either future or the past without attending to the present, expect the worst, get disconnected from nature and do not know how to be themselves in interactions with others. It has the highest correlation with both F11 (*Fragile*) and F13 (*Hollow*), i.e., r = .36, p <.01.

Four items, i.e., I24, I38, I39, and I40, load acceptably on F4 called *Purposeful*. Spiritually intelligent individuals will be *Purposeful* if they feel that their work is an expression of love and in alignment with their greater purpose. They derive meaning from the pain and suffering and treat their life as a gift and try to make the most of each moment. F4 correlates the highest with *Positive* F, i.e., r = .51, p <.01.

Items I20, I41, and I42 load acceptably on F5 called *Committed*. It involves using rituals, rites, or ceremonies during times of transition, having a daily spiritual practice such as meditation or prayer drawn on to address life challenges and aligning one's actions with one's soul or essential and true nature. *Committed* correlates the highest with *Positive* F, i.e., r = .50, p <.01.

Items I57, I58, I61, I62, I64, and I71 load acceptably on F6 called *Metaphysical*. It involves living in harmony with the divine to act spontaneously and effortlessly, feeling like being part of a larger cosmic organism, gaining insights in dealing with daily problems by experiencing ecstasy, having goals and purpose extended beyond the material world, feeling one's work is in service to the larger whole, and finding ways to express one's true self creatively. Similar to *Purposeful* and *Committed* Fs, *Metaphysical* correlates the highest with *Positive* F, i.e., r = .59, p <.01.

Items I35, I36, and I37 load acceptably on F7 called *Integrative*. It entails striving for the integration or wholeness of all things, holding as true and integrate seemingly conflicting or contradictory points of

view and being aware of a wise- or higher-self in oneself to listen to for guidance. *Integrative* correlates the highest with *Purposeful and Metaphysical* Fs, i.e., r = .42, p <.01.

Items I50, I51, and I52 load acceptably on F8 called *Perceptive* in this study. It involves listening deeply to both what is being said and what is not being said, listening to one's intuition in making important choices and being mindful of body's five senses during one's daily tasks. *Perceptive* correlates the highest with *Holistic*, i.e., r = .41, p <.01.

Items I48, I70 and I72 load acceptably on F9 called *Receptive*. It entails being able to see things from the other person's perspective, even when one disagrees with a given argument. It also deals with enhancing one's effectiveness through connections and receptivity to others and accepting and going beyond paradoxes or seemingly contradictory viewpoints to solve problems. *Receptive* correlates the highest with *Metaphysical*, i.e., r = .51, p <.01.

Items I65 and I66 load acceptably on F10 called *Assiduous*. It requires setting aside daily and weekly times for self-reflection and rejuvenation and taking a wide view or holistic perspective to gain insights in daily problems. Similar to *Perceptive*, *Assiduous* correlates the highest with *Metaphysical*, i.e., r = .51, p <.01.

Reverse items I09R, I11R and I33R load acceptably on F11 called *Fragile*. It reflects getting upset when things don't go the way one wants them to do, finding it upsetting to imagine that one will not achieve desired outcomes and finding it frustrating when one does not know what the truth is. *Fragile* correlates the highest with F13 (*Hollow*), i.e., r = .26, p <.01.

Items I28, I29, and I30 acceptably on F12 called *Prudent*. It entails pausing several times to step back, observe, and re-assess the situation in meetings or conversations, aligning one's actions with one's values and using objects or places as reminders to align oneself with what is sacred. *Prudent* correlates the highest with *Holistic*, i.e., r = .45, p <.01.

Reverse items I75R and I76R load acceptably on F13 called *Hollow*. It reveals being frustrated by one's inability to find meaning in daily life and finding one's mind wandering away from what one is doing. *Hollow* correlates the highest with F16 (*Other-Dependent*) and F21 (*Concessional*), i.e., r = .27, p <.01.

While no item loads acceptably on F14, item I45 loads on F15 called *Self-Discerning*. Spiritually intelligent individuals are *Self-Discerning* if they are aware of their inner truth or what they know inside to be true. It correlates the highest with *Metaphysical*, i.e., r = .37, p <.01.

Reverse items I78R and I79R load acceptably on F16 called *Other-Dependent* in this study. It reflects the desires of individuals who want to be treated as special and for this very reason they have a hard time standing firm in their inner truth, i.e., what they know inside to be true. It correlates the highest with *Hollow*, i.e., r = .27, p <.01.

Similar to F15, only one item, i.e., I54, loads on F17 called *Self-Cognizant*. It shows that spiritually intelligent individuals look for and try to discover their blind spots. It correlates the highest with *Holistic*, i.e., r = .29, p <.01.

Reverse items I73R and I74R load acceptably on F18 called *Materialistic*. It reflects the views of those individuals who see financial rewards as being the primary goal of their work. They also see advancing in their career as the main reason to do a good job. *Materialistic* correlates the highest with *Detached* and *Fragile*, i.e., r = .13, p <.01.

The reverse item I81R, *I strongly resist experiences that I find unpleasant*, loads acceptably on F19 called *Resistant*. The responses of participants in this study show that while 30% seldom resist unpleasant experiences, the majority (63%) do so and thus the RF upon which it loads acceptably reveals the highest negative correlation with *Holistic*, *Positive*, and *Purposeful*, i.e., r = -.21, p <.01. (Appendix C provides the percentage of answers given to the indicators of the ISIS.)

Similar to F15 and F17, one item, i.e., I27, loads on F20 called *Naturalistic*. It represents spiritually intelligent individuals who set aside daily and weekly times to ground themselves in nature. *Naturalistic* correlates the highest with *Holistic*, i.e., r = .30, p <.01.

Similar to F19, one reverse item, I44R, loads on F21 called *Concessional*. It reflects those individuals who are not as successful as they could be because they follow the conventions of their society. *Concessional* correlates the highest with *Detached*, i.e., r = .33, p <.01.

And finally similar to F15, F17, and F20, one item, I47, loads acceptably on F22 called *Sensual*. Individual having the last attribute notice and appreciate the sensuality and beauty of their daily life. *Sensual* correlates the highest with *Purposeful*, i.e., r = .46, p <.01.

4. Conclusion

The administration of the Persian ISIS to nine hundred and fourteen Muslim university students in Mashhad, Iran, and factorially analyzing their responses showed that out of eighty two indicators of SI collected by Amram (2007) and validated by Amram and Dryer (2008), sixty two load acceptably on twenty one factors. The latent variables underlying the Persian ISIS are similar to those of the Persian ROS because they are either confirmatory factors (CFs) or reverse factors (RFs). While the fourteen CFs consist of indicators which reveal the behaviours of spiritually intelligent individuals, i.e., *Assiduous*, *Committed*, *Holistic*, *Integrative*, *Metaphysical*, *Naturalistic*, *Perceptive*, *Positive*, *Prudent*, *Purposeful*, *Receptive*, *Self-Cognizant*, *Self-Discerning*, and *Sensual*, the remaining seven RFs comprise indicators revealing the lack of spiritual intelligence, i.e., *Concessional*, *Detached*, *Fragile*, *Hollow*, *Materialistic*, *Other-Dependent*, and *Resistant*.

All the CFs correlate significantly with each other. The strongest relationship is, however, between *Metaphysical* and *Positive* factors explaining thirty five percent of variance in each other. Future research must show whether these relationships are held with educationally important variables such as English language achievement and proficiency. Similarly, the seven RFs correlate the highest with each other. Two of them, however, correlate negatively with the CFs, i.e., *Materialistic* and *Resistant*. The first correlates significantly but *negatively* with *Purposeful* and *Sensual* whereas *Resistant* does the same with all the fourteen CFs. Future research must show what type of relationships the RFs hold not only with various types of intelligences but also with abilities such as English language achievement and proficiency.

REFERENCES

Allport, Gordon W. and Ross, J. Michael (1967), "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 5/4, 432-443, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0021212.

Amram, Yosi (2007, February), "The Seven Dimensions of Spiritual Intelligence: An Ecumenical, Grounded Theory," (Paper presented at the 115th Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA, August 17-20, 2007).

Amram, Yosi, and Dryer, D. Christopher (2008), "The Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale (ISIS): Development and Preliminary Validation," (Paper presented at the 116th Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association Boston, MA, August 14-17, 2008). http://www.yosiamram.net/docs/ISIS_APA_Paper_Presentation_2008_08_17.pdf (accessed 22 May 2012).

Binet, Alfred and Simon, Théodore (1905), "Méthodes nouvelles pour le diagnostic du niveau intellectual des anormaux," *L'Année Psychologique* 11, 191-244; English Translation: "New Methods for the Diagnosis of the Intellectual Level of Subnormals," in Binet and Simon, *The Development of Intelligence in Children (The Binet-Simon Scale)* (translated into English by Elizabeth S. Kite; Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins Company, 1916), 37-90.

Conway, James M. and Huffcutt, Allen I. (2003), "A Review and Evaluation of Exploratory Factor Analysis Practices in Organizational Research," *Organizational Research Methods* 6/2, 147-168.

Cronbach, Lee J. (1951), "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests," *Psychometrika* 16/3, 297-334, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02310555.

Darwin, Charles (1871), *The Decent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (Electronic version: New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company).

Fancher, Raymond E. (1985), *The Intelligence Men: Makers of the IQ Controversy* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company).

Gardner, Howard (1983), *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York, NY: Basic Books).

_____ (1993), *Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice* (New York, NY: Basic Books).

_____ (2000), "A Case against Spiritual Intelligence," *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 10/1, 27-34.

George, Darren and Mallery, Paul (2003), *SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide and Reference Fourth Edition (11.0 update): Answers to Selected Exercises* (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon).

Kass, Jared D. & Friedman, Richard & Leserman, Jane & Zuttermeister, Patricia C. & Benson, Herbert (1991), "Health Outcomes and a New Index of Spiritual Experience," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30/2, 203-211, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1387214.

Khodadady, Ebrahim (2001), "Schema: A Theory of Translation," in Sonia Cunico (ed.), *Training Translators and Interpreters in the New Millennium, Portsmouth 17th March 2001 Conference Proceedings* (Portsmouth, UK: University of Portsmouth, School of Languages and Areas Studies), 107-123.

_____ (2008), "Measuring Translation Ability and Achievement: A Schema-Based Approach," *Quarterly Journal of Humanities, Al-Zahra University* 18/70, 56-76.

Khodadady, E. and Bagheri, Nader (2012), "Construct Validation of a Modified Religious Orientation Scale within an Islamic Context," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 3/11, 237-246.

Khodadady, E. and Golparvar, Ehsan (2011), "Factors Underlying Religious Orientation Scale – A Methodological Approach –," *Ilahiyat Studies: A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies* 2/2, 215-235.

King, David Brian (2008), *Rethinking Claims of Spiritual Intelligence: A Definition, Model, and Measure* (MA thesis; Peterborough, ON, Canada: Trent University).

King, D. B. and DeCicco, Teresa L. (2009), "A Viable Model and Self-Report Measure of Spiritual Intelligence," *International Journal of Transpersonal Studies* 28, 68-85.

Mayer, John D. and Caruso, David (2002), "The Effective Leader: Understanding and Applying Emotional Intelligence," *Ivey Business Journal* 67/2, 1-5.

Nasel, Dagmar Dasha (2004). *Spiritual Orientation in Relation to Spiritual Intelligence: A Consideration of Traditional Christianity and New Age/Individualistic Spirituality* (PhD dissertation; Australia: University of South Australia).

Pavot, William and Diener, Ed (1993), "Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale," *Psychological Assessment* 5/2, 164-172, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.5.2.164.

Salvucci, Sameena & Walter, Elizabeth & Conley, Valerie & Fink, Steven & Saba, Mehrdad (1997), *Measurement Error Studies at the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)* (Washington DC: National Center for Education Statistics).

Schmitt, Neal (1996), "Uses and Abuses of Coefficient Alpha," *Psychological Assessment* 8/4, 350-353, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.8.4.350.

Seif, Shahin and Khodadady, Ebrahim, (2003), "Schema-Based Cloze Multiple Choice Item Tests: Measures of Translation Ability," *Université de Tabriz, Revue de la Faculte des Letters et Sciences Humaines, Langue* 187/46, 73-99.

Tabachnick, Barbara G. and Fidell, Linda S. (2001), *Using Multivariate Statistics* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon).

Wechsler, David (1944), *The Measurement of Adult Intelligence* (3rd edn., Baltimore, MD: The Williams & Wilkins Company), http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11329-000.

Zohar, Danah and Marshall, Ian (2000), *SQ: Connecting with Our Spiritual Intelligence* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing).

Appendix A: Rotated Factor Matrix[a]

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
I01	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I02R	*	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I03	.46	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I04	.50	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I05	.36	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I06	.47	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I07R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-.34	*	*
I08	.32	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I09R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.50	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I10	.35	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I11R	*	*	.35	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.36	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I12	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I13R	*	*	.39	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I14	.44	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I15	.41	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I16	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I17	.35	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I18R	*	*	.36	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I19	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I20	*	*	*	*	.57	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I21	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I22R	*	*	.47	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I23R	*	*	.47	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I24	*	*	*	.34	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I25	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I26R	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I27	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.37			
I28	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.41	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I29	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.50	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I30	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.34	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I31R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-.43	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I32	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I33R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.43	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I34	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I35	*	*	*	*	*	*	.37	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I36	*	*	*	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
I37	*	*	*	*	*	*	.57	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I38	*	*	*	.57	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I39	*	*	*	.46	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I40	*	*	*	.61	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I41	*	*	*	*	.59	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I42	*	*	*	*	.41	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I43	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I44R	*	*	.35	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.45	*	*
I45	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.43	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I46R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-.34	-.48	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I47	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.48	
I48	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I49	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I50	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.51	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I51	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.64	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I52	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I53R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-.46	*	*	*	*	*	*
I54	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*
I55R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I56	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I57	*	*	*	*	*	.52	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I58	*	*	*	*	*	.44	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I59	*	.39	*	*	.33	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I60R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I61	*	*	*	*	*	.47	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I62	*	*	*	*	*	.34	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I63R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I64	*	*	*	*	*	.44	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I65	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.50	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I66	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.59	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I67	*	.52	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I68	*	.62	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I69	*	.59	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I70	*	.34	*	*	*	*	*	*	.34	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I71	*	*	*	*	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I72	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I73R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.44	*	*	*	*	*
I74R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.49	*	*	*	*	*

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
I75R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I76R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I77	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I78R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I79R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.44	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I80	*	.40	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I81R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	.66	*	*	*	*
I82R	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. Rotation converged in 78 iterations. * Loadings less than .32

Appendix B: Correlations Matrix

	SI62	F01	F02	F03	F04	F05	F06	F07	F08	F09	F10	F11	F12	F13	F15	F16	F17	F18	F19	F20	F21	F22
SI62	1	.73**	.74**	.46**	.71**	.64**	.75**	.56**	.54**	.61**	.62**	.28**	.58**	.35**	.45**	.17**	.34**	.09**	-.18**	.39**	.22**	.54**
F01	.74**	1	.44**	.21**	.47**	.46**	.47**	.40**	.41**	.41**	.41**	.11**	.45**	.09**	.34**	-.01	.29**	-.06	-.21**	.30**	.06	.330**
F02	.74**	.44**	1	.26**	.51**	.50**	.59**	.33**	.36**	.48**	.46**	.05	.37**	.25**	.33**	.08*	.21**	-.01	-.21**	.22**	.08*	.45**
F03	.46**	.21**	.26**	1	.26**	.18**	.13**	.04	.08*	.11**	.16**	.36**	.09**	.36**	.07*	.20**	.01	.13**	-.05	.14**	.33**	.22**
F04	.71**	.47**	.51**	.26**	1	.49**	.50**	.42**	.37**	.39**	.43**	.10**	.42**	.14**	.31**	-.00	.28**	-.07*	-.21**	.28**	.13**	.46**
F05	.64**	.46**	.50**	.18**	.49**	1	.48**	.34**	.31**	.33**	.34**	.04	.44**	.10**	.24**	-.02	.20**	-.04	-.18**	.22**	.05	.35**
F06	.75**	.47**	.59**	.13**	.50**	.48**	1	.42**	.40**	.51**	.51**	.05	.41**	.15**	.37**	.04	.27**	.02	-.16**	.25**	.08*	.39**
F07	.56**	.40**	.33**	.04	.42**	.34**	.42**	1	.36**	.41**	.39**	.05	.33**	.04	.34**	-.02	.26**	-.01	-.16**	.18**	.02	.27**
F08	.54**	.41**	.36**	.08*	.37**	.31**	.404**	.36**	1	.35**	.32**	-.02	.35**	.05	.32**	-.05	.22**	-.05	-.18**	.18**	.08*	.26**
F09	.61**	.41**	.48**	.11**	.39**	.33**	.51**	.41**	.35**	1	.38**	.05	.34**	.14**	.28**	.02	.22**	-.04	-.15**	.22**	.06	.37**
F10	.62**	.41**	.46**	.16**	.43**	.34**	.51**	.39**	.32**	.38**	1	.10**	.34**	.14**	.29**	.03	.26**	.02	-.13**	.27**	.10**	.31**
F11	.28**	.11**	.05	.36**	.097**	.04	.05	.05	-.02	.05	.10**	1	.05	.26**	-.02	.16**	-.03	.13**	.09**	.12**	.14**	.10**
F12	.58**	.45**	.37**	.09**	.10*	.44**	.41**	.33**	.35**	.34**	.34**	.05	1	.06	.27**	.02	.20**	-.03	-.19**	.27**	.02	.35**
F13	.35**	.09**	.25**	.36**	.14**	.10**	.15**	.04	.05	.14**	.14**	.26**	.06	1	.05	.27**	.02	.08*	.09**	.09**	.27**	.17**
F15	.45**	.34**	.33**	.07*	.31**	.24**	.37**	.34**	.32**	.28**	.29**	-.02	.27**	.06	1	.02	.13**	-.04	-.09**	.15**	-.02	.26**
F16	.17**	-.01	.08*	.20**	-.00	-.02	.04	-.02	-.05	.02	.03	.17**	.02	.269**	.021	1	-.011	.155**	.072*	.008	.13**	.02
F17	.34**	.29**	.21**	.01	.28**	.20**	.27**	.26**	.22**	.22**	.26**	-.03	.20**	.02	.13**	-.01	1	-.07*	-.11**	.12**	.05	.15**

	SI62	**F01**	**F02**	**F03**	**F04**	**F05**	**F06**	**F07**	**F08**	**F09**	**F10**	**F11**	**F12**	**F13**	**F15**	**F16**	**F17**	**F18**	**F19**	**F20**	**F21**	**F22**
F18	.09**	-.06	-.01	.13**	-.07*	-.04	.02	-.01	-.05	-.04	.02	.13**	-.03	.08*	-.04	.16**	-.07*	1	.12**	.02	.06	-.10**
F19	-.18**	-.21**	-.21**	-.05	-.21**	-.18**	-.16**	-.16**	-.18**	-.15**	-.11**	.09**	-.14**	.09**	-.10**	.07*	-.11**	.12**	1	-.10**	-.05	-.16**
F20	.39**	.30**	.22**	.14**	.28**	.22**	.25**	.18**	.18**	.22**	.27**	.12**	.27**	.09**	.15**	.01	.12**	.02	-.10**	1	.049	.24**
F21	.22**	.06	.08*	.33**	.13**	.05	.08*	.02	.08*	.06	.10**	.14**	.02	.27**	-.02	.13**	.050	.06	-.05	.04	1	.11**
F22	.54**	.33**	.45**	.22**	.46**	.35**	.39**	.27**	.26**	.37**	.31**	.10**	.35**	.17**	.26**	.02	.15**	-.09**	-.16**	.24**	.11**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Appendix C: Indicators and factors (F) underlying the ISIS and the frequency of responses (in percentage)

No	F	Load	Indicator	Never %	Sometimes %	Always %
I01			I notice and appreciate the beauty that is uncovered in my work.	9	17	67
I02R	3	.398	I expect the worst in life, and that's what I usually get.	11	9	61
I03	1	.462	When things are chaotic, I remain aware of what is happening without getting lost in my experience.	18	34	76
I04	1	.496	During an activity or conversation, I monitor and notice my thoughts and emotions.	12	18	76
I05	1	.357	I practice inner and outer quiet as a way of opening myself to receive creative insights.	27	26	63
I06	1	.466	I have a good sense for when my purpose requires nonconformity, out-of-the-box thinking, or taking an unpopular stand.	13	20	74
I07R			I resist events that I don't like, even when they need to occur.	29	20	63
I08	1	.323	In my daily life, I feel the source of life immanent and present within the physical world.	23	19	60
I09R	11	.496	I get upset when things don't go the way I want them to go.	40	21	55
I10	1	.352	In my day-to-day activities, I align my purpose with what wants to and needs to happen in the world.	19	28	72
I11R	11	.360	I find it frustrating when I don't know what the truth is.	28	20	61
I12			I pay attention to my dreams to gain insight to my life.	49	17	40
I13R	3	.392	In my daily life, I am disconnected from nature.	13	12	60
I14	1	.436	Seeing life's processes as cyclical rather than linear gives me useful insights to daily challenges.	17	26	70
I15	1	.408	A higher consciousness reveals my true path to me.	14	15	63
I16			I live and act with awareness of my mortality.	28	17	54
I17	1	.351	In difficult moments, I tap into and draw on a storehouse of stories, quotes, teachings, or other forms of time-proven wisdom.	19	20	65
I18R	3	.362	I don't know how to just be myself in interactions with others.	19	16	66

No	F	Load	Indicator	Never %	Sometimes %	Always %
I19			I hold my work as sacred.	16	20	62
I20	5	.568	I have a daily spiritual practice – such as meditation or prayer – that I draw on to address life challenges.	20	15	60
I21			I enjoy the small things in life – such as taking a shower, brushing my teeth, or eating.	16	18	60
I22R	3	.471	I am driven and ruled by fears.	20	18	66
I23R	3	.466	I tend to think about the future or the past without attending to the present moment.	18	16	65
I24	4	.344	My life is a gift, and I try to make the most of each moment.	14	19	66
I25			I draw on my compassion in my encounters with others.	13	18	67
I26R	3	.531	I am limited in my life by the feeling that I have very few options available to me.	20	14	64
I27	20	.370	I set aside daily and weekly times to ground myself in nature.	37	28	55
I28	12	.409	My actions are aligned with my values.	9	16	72
I29	12	.503	In meetings or conversations, I pause several times to step back, observe, and re-assess the situation.	23	26	70
I30	12	.338	I use objects or places as reminders to align myself with what is sacred.	23	28	68
I31R			I have a hard time going against conventions, expectations, or rules.	37	18	52
I32			Even when things are upsetting and chaotic around me, I remain centered and peaceful inside.	35	25	59
I33R	11	.429	I find it upsetting to imagine that I will not achieve my desired outcomes.	45	19	47
I34			In my day-to-day tasks, I pay attention to that which cannot be put into words, such as indescribable sensual or spiritual experiences.	17	25	70
I35	7	.367	I am aware of a wise- or higher-self in me that I listen to for guidance.	15	24	74
I36	7	.529	I can hold as true and integrate seemingly conflicting or contradictory points of view.	25	29	68
I37	7	.571	I strive for the integration or wholeness of all things.	15	24	73
I38	4	.565	My work is in alignment with my greater purpose.	11	15	68
I39	4	.462	I derive meaning from the pain and suffering in my life.	14	18	68

No	F	Load	Indicator	Never %	Sometimes %	Always %
I40	4	.611	I feel that my work is an expression of love.	23	19	62
I41	5	.592	I use rituals, rites, or ceremonies during times of transition.	17	17	65
I42	5	.411	My actions are aligned with my soul – my essential, true nature.	15	22	75
I43			I remember to consider what is unspoken, underground, or hidden.	17	25	72
I44R	21	.455	Because I follow convention, I am not as successful as I could be.	14	14	69
I45	15	.431	I am aware of my inner truth – what I know inside to be true.	15	19	69
I46R			Being right is important to me.	71	12	24
I47	22	.479	I notice and appreciate the sensuality and beauty of my daily life.	13	17	70
I48	9	.404	I enhance my effectiveness through my connections and receptivity to others.	12	18	72
I49			Even in the midst of conflict, I look for and find connection and common ground.	20	25	72
I50	8	.510	I listen to my gut feeling or intuition in making important choices.	13	22	73
I51	8	.641	I listen deeply to both what is being said and what is not being said.	14	23	75
I52	8	.399	I am mindful of my body's five senses during my daily tasks.	17	24	74
I53R			I seek to know what is logically provable and ignore the mysterious.	22	19	69
I54	17	.400	I look for and try to discover my blind spots.	20	24	68
I55R			I have a hard time integrating various parts of my life.	16	18	74
I56			I work toward expanding other peoples' awareness and perspectives.	19	21	67
I57	6	.520	I live in harmony with a force greater than myself, a universal life force, the divine, or nature, to act spontaneously and effortlessly.	20	23	68
I58	6	.436	My goals and purpose extend beyond the material world.	17	17	64
I59	2	.387	I draw on deep trust or faith when facing day-to-day challenges.	11	18	65
I60R			I hold resentment towards those who have wronged me.	34	16	58
I61	6	.474	I feel like part of a larger cosmic organism or greater whole.	21	22	62
I62	6	.340	I find ways to express my true self creatively.	18	26	71

No	F	Load	Indicator	Never %	Sometimes %	Always %
I63R			When looking at others, I tend to focus on what they need to do to improve.	30	24	63
I64	6	.443	Experiences of ecstasy, grace, or awe give me insights or direction in dealing with daily problems.	18	20	65
I65	10	.503	To gain insights in daily problems, I take a wide view or holistic perspective.	16	26	74
I66	10	.590	I have daily and weekly times set aside for self-reflection and rejuvenation.	28	23	62
I67	2	.519	I remember to feel grateful for the abundance of positive things in my life.	9	13	62
I68	2	.616	I have faith and confidence that things will work out for the best.	13	16	65
I69	2	.590	I accept myself as I am with all my problems and limitations.	18	17	64
I70	9	.342	To solve problems, I accept and go beyond paradoxes or seemingly contradictory viewpoints.	22	31	70
I71	6	.402	In my daily life, I feel my work is in service to the larger whole.	17	22	68
I72	9	.531	In arguing or negotiating, I am able to see things from the other person's perspective, even when I disagree.	18	22	70
I73R	18	.438	I see advancing my career as the main reason to do a good job.	39	24	51
I74R	18	.494	I see financial rewards as being the primary goal of my work.	19	19	68
I75R	13	.527	My mind wanders away from what I am doing.	20	19	71
I76R	13	.530	I am frustrated by my inability to find meaning in my daily life.	20	18	68
I77			Even when I seem to have very few choices, I feel free.	26	31	65
I78R	16	.527	I want to be treated as special.	34	20	54
I79R	16	.435	I have a hard time standing firm in my inner truth – what I know inside to be true.	17	17	67
I80	2	.402	I bring a feeling of joy to my activities.	15	19	70
I81R	19	.659	I strongly resist experiences that I find unpleasant.	30	28	63
I82R			I am my own worst enemy.	21	12	49

BOOK REVIEWS

Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas
edited by Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman

Peter Adamson

Gnostic Apocalypse and Islam: Qur'an, Exegesis, Messianism, and the Literary Origins of the Babi Religion
by Todd Lawson

Josef van Ess

The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Beliefs and Practices
by Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi

Hussam S. Timani

The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook
edited by Asad Q. Ahmed, Behnam Sadeghi, and Michael Bonner

Anna Ayşe Akasoy

Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings
by Reza Pourjavady

L. W. C. van Lit

Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, edited by Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science: 83), (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012), xii + 493 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-20274-0, €161.00 / $221.00 (hb)

A recent survey volume on medieval philosophy has called Dimitri Gutas, Professor of Arabic and Graeco-Arabic at Yale University, "the leading living historian of Islamic thought."[1] Such judgments are to some extent a matter of taste, of course, but few scholars have as good a claim to the title as Gutas. His publications include pioneering work on the tradition of Greek-Arabic gnomologia,[2] one of the most significant monographs ever published on Avicenna,[3] and a penetrating and influential study of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement.[4] In collaboration with Gerhard Endress he has also led the GALex project to document this same translation movement.[5] In short, this is a man who deserves a good Festschrift.

And he now has one, edited by two of his former students, Felicitas Opwis and the late David C. Reisman.[6] (In fact, the Fest-

---

1 John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2007), 338.

2 Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia* (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1975), and for a useful briefer survey see his later study "Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature: Nature and Scope," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 101 (1981), 49-86.

3 Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1988).

4 Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ʿAbbāsid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th Centuries)* (London: Routledge, 1998). For a collection reprinting his articles on aspects of the Greek-Arabic transmission, see Gutas, *Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

5 *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon: Materials for a Dictionary of the Mediaeval Translations from Greek into Arabic*, published by Brill starting in 1992.

6 For the sake of full disclosure I should mention that at the time of his tragic and untimely death David Reisman was working with me at King's College London on a project funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.62

schrift additionally brings home how many excellent students Gutas has produced over the years, since a number of them have contributed to the volume.) The generous scope of the book makes it possible to cover something like the range of topics dealt with in Gutas' own work – there are sections on ancient texts and their reception in the Islamic world, on Arabic philosophy, and on the "traditional" Muslim sciences, i.e., *fiqh* and *kalām*. In all there are 20 papers, one in German and the rest in English. I do not have space here to discuss the entire volume in detail, so I will concentrate on those that focus on the history of philosophy in the Islamic world, before summarizing the rest of the contributions at the end of my review.

The one paper in German is by the leading scholar of the Kindī circle and GALex collaborator, Gerhard Endress. He has pursued the interesting idea of focusing on the flowery introductions to al-Kindī's works. I would confess to having paid little attention to the introductions in my own work on al-Kindī.[7] Endress shows that they provide an important window into al-Kindī's cultural context. Of course his most famous addressees are the Caliph al-Muʿtaṣim (to whom al-Kindī dedicated his greatest work, *On First Philosophy*) and the Caliph's son Aḥmad, whom al-Kindī tutored. But Endress also provides information on the Barmakid Muḥammad ibn al-Jahm, recipent of a brief work *On the Oneness of God and the Finiteness of the Body of the World* (pp. 299-300). More generally, his study enhances our sense of al-Kindī as a man whose career was shaped by patronage, rivalry, and collaboration, as well as by the Greek texts translated in his circle.[8]

Moving forward through the philosophical tradition, we reach an important announcement concerning Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, in an article by Robert Wisnovsky. A Christian philosopher who was for some time in the 10th century the leading Aristotelian in Baghdad, Ibn ʿAdī has left a number of extant texts to posterity. Information on his entire *ouevre* is available in a fundamental study by the just-mentioned Endress,[9]

---

7 Although they are not omitted from the English translations now available in Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann, *The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012).

8 In this respect the piece builds on a much earlier study by Gutas' teacher Franz Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī als Literat," *Orientalia* 11 (1942), 262-288.

9 Gerhard Endress, *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: An Analytical Inventory* (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1977).

and an edition of his philosophical treatises was published in 1988.[10] Now Wisnovsky details the contents of a manuscript held in Tehran (Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, copied in 1073 AH/1662 AD). Among other texts it includes 53 works of Ibn ʿAdī, of which 24 were previously thought lost. Wisnovsky provides incipits and explicits of the newly discovered treatises. Once the manuscript is available through a facsimile edition announced here (p. 307, n. 2), it should provoke renewed efforts at understanding Ibn ʿAdī's thought. With any luck this will also lead to a more adequate assessment of those texts that were already available, but have been only partially studied.[11]

Appropriately enough, given Gutas' major contributions to the study of Avicenna, several papers here look at the background and writings of *al-Sheikh al-Raʾīs*. Jules Janssens notes parallels between the *Taʿlīqāt* and the *Metaphysics* section of the *Shifāʾ*, most of which deal with "natural theology" (p. 222). Given the imprecision of the parallels it seems that the *Shifāʾ* is being quoted from memory by the author of the *Taʿlīqāt* (Janssens does not try to decide here the question of whether it should be ascribed to Avicenna himself). The relationship between the two texts is sufficiently close that Janssens suggests seeing the latter text as a kind of commentary on the former.[12] Speaking of the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifāʾ*, for me a highlight of the volume is Amos Bertolacci's study of the essence/existence distinction in that work. He argues that our understanding of the distinction should begin with chapter I.5 of the *Metaphysics*, rather than V.1-2 as is often done. There, Avicenna is giving us a treatment of universals, whereas I.5 is a more straightforward exposition of the distinction itself. This suggestion is highly significant. For, as Bertolacci shows with a meticulous analysis of I.5, that text does not suggest (as does V.1-2) that essence is "neutral" with respect to existence. Rather essence is *always* connected to existence (p. 261; it is a *lāzim*, "some-

[10] Saḥbān Khalīfāt, *Maqālāt Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī al-falsafiyya* (Amman: al-Jāmiʿa al-Urduniyya, 1988).

[11] For a very useful overall assessment of Ibn ʿAdī as a thinker (in the context of exploring the possibility that he may have authored a work ascribed to al-Fārābī), see Marwan Rashed, "On the Authorship of the Treatise *On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages* attributed to al-Fārābī," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19/1 (2009), 43-82.

[12] Actually he calls it a "supercommentary" (p. 201) but I assume this is a slip, since the *Shifāʾ* is not itself a commentary.

thing approaching the status of a property," pp. 270-271). In other words, the scope of essences is not larger than the scope of existents,[13] or in still other words, there are no essences that do not exist. As for *why* exactly essences must always exist, this is a matter for further speculation. Obviously the essences do not receive existence from their own resources, so to speak – this is just what it means for them to be contingent. Is it then because God directly or indirectly bestows existence on all possible essences out of His generosity? Or simply because there is no essence that cannot at least be thought, so as to receive mental existence?

One of the goals for Avicenna scholarship more widely is a better understanding of how metaphysical issues like these relate to his logic, and especially his modal logic. Thanks to Tony Street and Paul Thom, this goal is coming ever closer to being reached. Another excellent contribution here, by Street, explores the question of whether Avicenna interpreted modal propositions according to a *de re* or *de dicto* analysis. The influential later logician al-Kātibī goes for the *de re* reading, which links modal statements to temporal occurrence (pp. 236-237). However, taking guidance from al-Ṭūsī, Street argues that at least in the *Ishārāt* Avicenna thinks we instead make modal claims by reflecting on natures and the properties with which they are compatible or necessarily linked (pp. 245-246). This would bring logic into close contact with metaphysics, indeed the very metaphysical issues discussed in Bertolacci's paper.

Yet another important study with Avicenna at its center is Alexander Treiger's discussion of the history of the Avicennian notion of modulation or *tashkīk*, which was so important for later authors including Mullā Ṣadrā. The fundamental question considered by Treiger is whether Avicenna was the first to propose that there is a modulation of existence between God and contingent things. Obviously this notion draws to some extent on Aristotle's idea of *pros hen* predica-

[13] Furthermore, Bertolacci points out that the scope of essences or "things" may in fact be *smaller* than the scope of existents, because God exists without being a "thing" (p. 262, cf. pp. 275-277). Of course this presupposes a negative answer to the question of whether God has an essence, or has "thingness," a notoriously vexed issue. On this see E. M. Macierowski, "Does God Have a Quiddity According to Avicenna?," *Thomist* 52 (1988), 79-87, and Peter Adamson, "From the Necessary Existent to God," in P. Adamson (ed.), *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2013).

tion. To take the famous example (*Metaphysics* Γ.2), everything called "healthy" is so called because it somehow has to do with the health of a person, yet a healthy diet is not healthy in the same sense as a healthy person. Treiger shows in detail how Aristotle, Alexander, the Neoplatonic commentators, and al-Fārābī all provide important background for understanding Avicenna on *tashkīk*. (For instance Alexander does say that "existent" is a predicate that falls between univocity and equivocity, p. 335.) Yet it is indeed only with Avicenna, and especially the *Mubāḥathāt*, that existence is both seen as a modulated *transcendental* that applies both to God and contingents (p. 360).

The contributions of Bertolacci, Street, and Treiger are the most "philosophical" pieces here, but numerous other studies will be important for those interested in the Arabic philosophical tradition. For instance the last paper, by Yahya Michot, translates passages from Ibn Taymiyya that present his understanding of the development of philosophy in Islam. An earlier reaction to philosophy is recorded by Beatrice Gruendler, who examines allusions to Aristotle in Arabic poetry. The cultural reception of philosophy is also touched upon in a breathtakingly polemical piece by Sonja Brentjes, which rails against the rhetoric of "decline" so often applied to the Islamic world. Brentjes is probably preaching to the choir by arguing for this point in such a volume. Or at least, I am a member of the choir, and agree that the "decline" narrative is to be rejected, being not only reductive and simplistic, but also misleading. Still, the more interesting part of this piece is not its rhetorically charged beginning or end but the more sedate description of educational curricula and patronage in Islamic societies, which summarizes Brentjes' previous work in this area (pp. 139-149).

Several contributors discuss topics in the history of science, and these frequently have philosophical relevance – for instance Reisman's study of the "medical ethics" of ʿAlī ibn Riḍwān or Von Staden's very useful discussion of emotion, and in particular anger, in Galen. The Aristotelian philosopher Aristo of Ceos is also discussed, befitting Gutas' interest in early Aristotelianism and especially Theophrastus. Here Fortenbaugh, a leading authority on Theophrastus, presents material related to a lost work on *eros* by Aristo. What we might call "pseudo-science" is also covered. One of the most impressive articles, by Kevin van Bladel, explores the historical sources of a

history of science (especially astrology) found in the *Fihrist*. A brief piece by Hans Daiber acquaints the reader with the 11th century scholar Ibn al-Faḍl who, among other things, wrote a refutation of astrology (p. 4). And a philological study by Charles Burnett and Gideon Bohak provides an edition and translation of newly discovered fragments in Judeo-Arabic for texts on magic. Hidemi Takahashi's piece is of a similarly philological nature, and details a collection of Syriac manuscripts now held at Yale.

There is also much material of philosophical interest in the studies on the "traditional sciences" included here, for instance Opwis' treatment of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's legal theory, which uses the notion of "suitability (*munāsaba*)" to avoid saying that previous legal judgments are actually "causes" of new judgements. Even *kalām* gets a look in, with good papers on a Muʿtazilite statement regarding the correct method of interpreting the Qurʾān, by Suleiman Mourad, and the complicated evidence bearing on a theological debate recorded in *Kitāb al-ḥayda*. This piece, by Racha el-Omari, is revealing of the ambiguous attitude of Ḥanbalīs towards *kalām* methodology (p. 421).

As the foregoing should make obvious, this is a rich and wide-ranging volume. It would take a person of highly eclectic tastes to be equally interested in all the contributions. But by the same token, anyone who works seriously on intellectual traditions in the Islamic world should find valuable material here. Every paper is at least solid; many are excellent, and will become points of reference for future research. As I have pointed out, the volume is especially strong on philosophy and science, but it manages to visit all the areas of inquiry dealt with in Gutas' own formidable research. That in itself is no mean feat.

Peter Adamson
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich-Germany

Gnostic Apocalypse and Islam: Qur'an, Exegesis, Messianism, and the Literary Origins of the Babi Religion, by Todd Lawson (Iranian Studies, 12) (London & New York: Routledge, 2012), vii + 230 pp., ISBN: 978-0-415-49539-4, £80 (hb)

The title, circumstantial and long-winded as it is, bears witness to a protracted process of maturity. The author addressed the topic in his PhD thesis (McGill Univ., 1987), and he has apportioned the material to a series of articles presented at a number of relevant conferences. He stands within a tradition: the origins of Bābism (and, in its wake, the Bahāʾī religion) attracted E. G. Browne's interest when he spent "A Year amongst the Persians" in 1887-1888, and anglophone scholarship followed with works written by Hasan Balyuzi (1973), Denis MacEoin (1979, 1992, 2009), and Abbas Amanat (1989). The present book (140 pages of text with 34 pages of endnotes) addresses the philological hub of the problem, the Bāb's *Tafsīr sūrat Yūsuf*, a strange product of religious *Schwarmgeisterei* that is anything but what it pretends to be, namely exegesis. Sūra 12 of the Qurʾān serves as a mere gimmick; the "commentary" rarely refers to the scriptural basis but accumulates a multitude of enigmatic allusions that must be decoded in the process of reception. Most of these statements conjure up the Qurʾān itself, but on the basis of a specific interpretation that could develop only in a late Iranian intellectual milieu after the spread of the Shaykhī movement. The *Tafsīr* itself was subdivided into 111 "sūras" of 42 verses each (because 42 is the numerical value of the word *balā*, the answer given by mankind to the famous *a-last* question in Q 7:172).

The Bāb was 25 years old when he wrote this text. The Qurʾān was constantly on his mind, but his knowledge of Arabic syntax was deficient. He had, of course, a message to relate: that Islam had reached an apocalyptic moment at which a hitherto unspoken truth was to be revealed. He saw himself as the mouthpiece of the Hidden Imām who had been in *ghayba* for exactly one thousand years (in 1260 H), and he was ready to proclaim a new age in which he, as the Mahdī, would abrogate the Law and ultimately assume divinity (cf. p. 131, where he has Joseph (or the Imām?) say, *innī ana llāh alladhī lā ilāha illā ana*). Instead of divinity, however, he found multiple im-

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.63

prisonments and, temporarily, even recantation. When his adherents began rioting, the government intervened, and he was executed (in 1266/1850), not without having undergone during his trial an examination of his idiosyncratic usage of Arabic. The "Gate" had only been a merchant and had never seen a madrasa from the inside.

The author of the present book is not concerned with factual history; the story of the Bāb has been told many times since the days of E. G. Browne and the Comte de Gobineau. Rather, he is interested in structural analysis and the oddities of pseudo-prophetic language. With this in mind, he delves into earlier texts of Twelver-Shīʿī "Gnosticism:" ʿAlī's apocryphal *Khuṭba Ṭuṭunjiyya* (pp. 84 ff.); the *Mashāriq anwār al-yaqīn*, written by Rajab al-Bursī (d. after 810/1410, a man from a village in Iraq known to German archeologists as ancient Borsippa); Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī's *Sharḥ al-ziyāra al-jāmiʿa*; and Kāẓim Rashtī's *Sharḥ al-Qaṣīda al-lāmiyya*. He attempts to elucidate the Bāb's opaque style and explains why his hero could pretend to be the Fire in the Light of Q 24:35 (because *nār*, "fire," has the numerical value of 251 and *nūr*, "light," 256, so that *bāb* = 5 can be used to fill the gap; cf. p. 133). He devotes an entire chapter (pp. 46-74) to the self-predications *Bāb* and *Dhikr* (a topic tentatively treated by the author in 1988, in an article contributed to the *Studies in Honor of the Late Hasan M. Balyuzi*). In the end, he edits "sūra" 93, the *sūrat al-Naḥl* ("The Bees") of the Bāb's *Tafsīr* (pp. 145-149), together with an English translation and a learned (though somewhat disconnected) commentary (pp. 93-139). Inevitably, Lawson's diction tends to be as associative as the Bāb's, hopping from one parallel to another in search of precedents and practicing the same sort of "metalepsis" he finds typical of the Bāb's treatment of Joseph (cf. p. 93 in the heading of chapter four, where, however, this rather technical term is never explained). In fact, the Bāb's opacity has a charm of its own; the author compares it to the "chaos of light" in the paintings of William Turner (p. 135). He succeeds in clarifying a number of obscure passages; the reader can justly hope to be relieved of his blindness as was Jacob when Joseph's shirt was laid upon his eyes (Q 12:93; cf. p. 93 f.). When an overview or a summary is needed, Lawson occasionally refers to Henry Corbin's *En Islam iranien,* in which the Bāb appears on the scene in the chapter on the Shaykhiyya (vol. IV, 205 ff.). He does not forget to mention, however, that Corbin was aware of the difference between both phenomena (vol. IV, 282 f., quoted p. 171, n. 28). It was only the Bāb who thought in terms of a

new cycle in which the waiting had come to an end. This is why he identified himself with Joseph; from the beginning, he seems to have seen himself as a new prophet whose Gabriel was the Hidden Imām.

The book is rendered accessible by a meticulous and very detailed index. The bibliography, in contrast, occasionally leaves the reader at a loss. Afterthoughts added to the text seem to have not always been registered there. In p. 178, n. 47, two books by (S.) Bashir are mentioned in an abbreviated form without being addressed in the bibliography; the same type of oversight appears in p. 183, n. 117, with "Landolt, H. Corbin" and "Katz," and in p. 184, n. 1, with Todorov's *Symbolism* (where the proper name has been misspelled as "Todorv"). Moreover, one must check the "Abbreviations" first (p. 185 f.); the items mentioned there are not repeated in the bibliography. On p. 19, "Huart Clement" should be corrected to "Clément Huart." There are a few misprints: p. 201 read "Pourjavady" instead of *Poujavardy*; p. 69 "aḥwal" instead of *aḥwāl*; p. 78 "Ḥūriyya" instead of *Ḥūrriyya* (i.e., sūra 29 of the Bāb's *Tafsīr*; cf. p. 43); p. 108, v. 5 "dhululan" instead of *dhalūlan*; p. 128 "al-sāʿati" instead of *al-saʿāti*; p. 133 "mishkāt" instead of *mishkā*; p. 71 "emissaries" instead of *emmissaries*; p. 72 "Resurrector" instead of *Ressurector*. I wonder whether *sirr lā yufīduhū illā sirr* can be rendered "a secret that can only speak of a secret" (p. 123). Would it not be better to say, "a secret that only discloses itself by way of another secret" (a *secretum secretorum,* as it were)? Can *mudawwira* really be "revolving" (p. 117)? This would be *dawwār*, or perhaps *mudawwar*. Of course, we are dealing with the Bāb's Arabic, not with ours. But do English grammar books ever speak of a "dual plural" (p. 67)? In some cases, a dual can be formed from broken plurals (Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, vol. I, 190 ff.), but this is not what is meant here.

The book provides a large amount of material and contributes to a better understanding of a difficult text.

Josef van Ess
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Tübingen-Germany

The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Beliefs and Practices, by Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi (London & New York: I. B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2011), xxii + 585 pp., ISBN: 978-1-84511-738-2, £39.50 (hb)

The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Beliefs and Practices is an indispensable book written by one of the most knowledgeable scholars on Shīʿī Islam. This monumental work illuminates the specifics and details of the Shīʿī tradition in general and Shīʿī mysticism in particular. Although several works have been written on Shīʿism in English, Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi's book stands out as one of the most valuable works on this topic. *The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam* is divided into four sections and fourteen chapters, with a bibliography and an index section. In the first section, the author discusses the emergence of Shīʿism and the ancient Iranian conversion to the new tradition. Chapter One presents the origins of the Shīʿī faith and reflects on the expression *dīn ʿAlī* (the religion of ʿAlī). The author discusses the works of historiographers in which the expression *dīn ʿAlī* appears. He then highlights the uniqueness of ʿAlī, arguing that the imām was the "only personality from early Islam [apart from Muḥammad] with whom the term *dīn* is associated" (p. 8). The establishment of the "religion of ʿAlī" results in part from two aspects of ʿAlī's relationship to Muḥammad: the first through blood ties (*nasab*) and the second through a marriage alliance (*muṣāhara*). The author also provides a lengthy discussion on how ʿAlī legitimized his claim to lead the community using the text of the Qurʾān. Notably, the author dedicates a section to examining the pre-Islamic basis of authority to show the continuity between the pre-Islamic era and early Islam in institutions, beliefs, and rituals. The author's purpose in this section is to show the legitimacy of ʿAlī's succession to the Prophet by showing that the Arabs "regularly elected their leaders from specific families" (p. 23) and that customs continued in early Islam and were even practiced by Muḥammad himself. ʿAlī's relationship to Muḥammad, which legitimized his political claim to the succession, prompted some early Muslims to be followers of *dīn ʿAlī*.

At the beginning of the book, the author demonstrates the link between pre-Islamic Sasanian Iran and Imāmī Shīʿism and shows how

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.64

the origin and development of Imāmī Shīʿism are centered on the figure of Shahrbānū, a Sasanian princess and the mother of the imāms. The author turns our attention to *Kitāb al-akhbār al-ṭiwāl* by Abū Ḥanīfa al-Dīnawarī (d. ca. 282/894-895) and *al-Kāmil fī l-lugha* by Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al-Mubarrad (d. 286/900) to demonstrate the connection between Sasanian Iran and Imāmī Shīʿism. Al-Dīnawarī, for instance, narrates a report about a princess from a noble Iranian bloodline who is captured during a battle against the Muslims and given to ʿAlī, who in turn asks her whether she wishes to marry his son al-Ḥasan. Al-Mubarrad, however, was the earliest author in the ninth century to mention a Sasanian wife of the Imām al-Ḥusayn. *Ithbāt al-waṣiyya*, attributed to al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956-957), reports that two daughters of a Persian king were captured, forced into slavery, and then freed and given in marriage to ʿAlī's two sons. Thus, Amir-Moezzi documents the historical link between pre-Islamic Iran and Imāmī Shīʿism. The author notes that "links of a doctrinal and religious nature" between ancient Iran and Imāmism are yet to be explored.

The author also discusses the divinity of the Imām and the role he plays as a mediator between the believers and God. The Imām of whom the author speaks here is the "ontological, cosmic, archetypal Imām" (with an upper case 'i'). This Imām is the Vehicle for the attributes and organs of God. For instance, he is the Eye, the Hand, the Face, the Side, the Heart, the Tongue, and the Ear of God. The Imām holds the most beautiful names of God; those who know the Imām know their God, and those who deny the Imām deny their God. The author refers to the third imām, al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, who said: "Oh Mankind! God created His servants in order that they may know Him, for when they know Him, they worship Him and free themselves from the worship of all else except for Him" (p. 113). The author demonstrates that the role of the Imām as a vehicle for God's attributes and organs not only is narrated by Imāmī Shīʿī tradition but also was confirmed by the Prophet Muḥammad himself, who said: "Without ʿAlī, truth would not be distinguished from falsehood, nor believer from non-believer; without ʿAlī, it would not have been possible to worship God …" (p. 118).

After discussing the divinity of the Imām, the author turns his attention to the creation and the pre-existence of the Imām. The first section discusses the creation of Muḥammad and ʿAlī from light two

thousand years before creation. According to the traditions of the imāms, Muḥammad himself frequently mentioned that he and ʿAlī were created from the same light before creation. According to Shīʿī tradition, God created five creatures from the light of His glory and gave them names derived from His own names: being the Praised One, He called the first light Muḥammad; being the Praised One He named the second light ʿAlī; being the Creator of heaven and earth, He gave the third light the name Fāṭima; and possessing the most beautiful names, He created the names al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn. God created these creatures so that they would worship Him, praise His glory, and bear witness to His Unicity even before creation. The next chapter discusses Muḥammad's ascension (*miʿrāj*) to the seventh heaven and his encounters with holy figures. According to the author, the "angels of each heaven ask Muḥammad to convey their greetings to ʿAlī … Jesus, Moses, and Abraham, encountered in the seventh heaven, sing the praises of ʿAlī and call him legatee (*waṣī*) and vicegerent (*khalīfa*) of Muḥammad" (p. 173). Not only is the *walāya* of ʿAlī mentioned in Muḥammad's ascension; the other imāms and their *walāya* are also present in the accounts of *miʿrāj*. For instance, when Muḥammad was left alone with God, he glanced at the feet of the Throne and saw twelve lights, with each containing the name of his legatees, from the first, ʿAlī, to the last, the Mahdī. Moreover, in the Imāmī accounts of *miʿrāj*, when the prophet was raised up to heaven, "not a single journey went without God entrusting the Prophet with the *walāya* of ʿAlī and the imāms … after him…" (p. 189).

The author also gives an account of the interpretations and implications of the miracle in early Imāmism. Amir-Moezzi demonstrates how miracles are an "essential aspect of the Shīʿī concept of the prophet's continuity through *walāya*." The author also presents the "phenomenon of the miracle" and its development during the formative period of Twelver Shīʿism. The author presents us with a two-part account of the phenomenon of the miracle: 1) miracles in the circles of the imāms and 2) miracles among the imāms' associates and in Shīʿī milieus (pp. 193-194). Moreover, Amir-Moezzi examines the content of *walāya* to foster a greater understanding of the very substance of Imāmī Shīʿism. In the section on *walāya* and the Qurʾān, the author lists some quotations from what early Shīʿī sources consider a "complete" Qurʾān. These quotations contain words, expressions, and parts of sentences concerning ʿAlī, the imāms, and their *walāya*, and these quotations differ significantly from the official Qurʾān. Ac-

cording to the author, the *walāya* is not only an important concept in the Qurʾān but also one of the Pillars, if not *the* Pillar, of Islam.

Amir-Moezzi also discusses theology and mystical anthropology according to early Imāmī sources. Here, the author tells us that at the heart of these sources is a series of traditions that divide humans into three categories: the Impeccable Ones (i.e., Muḥammad, his daughter Fāṭima, and the twelve imāms), the faithful supporters of the imāms, and finally, the others. Another tradition provides similar accounts but is more specific: "There are three types of men: the noble of pure descent, the protected ally, and the vile man of base descent" (p. 278). The author emphasizes that these "anthropological criteria" are understood as metaphors for the three categories that comprise mankind: the spiritual guides, their supporters, and their adversaries. The author also dedicates a chapter to a poem written by the Persian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640) that illustrates some of the philosopher's theological, philosophical, and eschatological thoughts. This poetry about ʿAlī celebrates the Figure and the *walāya* of the Imām and emphasizes two of his qualities: He is both the friend of God, the *walī*, and the warrior for the faith. Amir-Moezzi argues that, for Ṣadrā, these two qualities are intertwined and together form the basis of a "spiritual interpretation (*taʾwīl*)" of the figure of ʿAlī.

The author also explores the visions of the imāms in modern and contemporary Twelver Mysticism, particularly in non-institutional mysticism and in mystical brotherhoods. In the former, the imām becomes visible to the faithful in the physical world. The author notes that this type of mysticism is dominant in popular beliefs. The mystical brotherhoods or mystical schools, however, envision an "internalized conception of the imām." They maintain that the Imām, who is visible to the heart, is "exoterically manifested in our times by the hidden imām … and esoterically by the imām in the follower's heart" (pp. 372-373).

In the final chapters, the author examines prayer as a fundamental practice in Imāmī Shīʿism. Amir-Moezzi does not discuss it from an Islamic perspective in general, as he claims, but rather focuses on some "little-known elements about the literature and some aspects of the superogatory prayer (*duʿāʾ*)" (p. 375). He starts the chapter by discussing the concept of prayer in Henry Corbin's *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī*. In that monumental work, Corbin dedicates a section in the third chapter to prayer, entitled "Prayer of

Man, Prayer of God." Amir-Moezzi focuses on Corbin's discussion of the "reciprocity" of prayer and argues that "reciprocity," perhaps the most fundamental aspect of prayer, transforms prayer from a flat monologue into a "vibrant and intense dialogue with the Person addressed" (p. 377). Amir-Moezzi then explores this dimension in Imāmī prayer and illustrates how prayer – in its different forms – is the most widespread illustration of Imāmī devotion.

Amir-Moezzi also examines the relation between two significant concepts in Shīʿī tradition: the End of Time (*ākhir al-zamān*) and the Return to the Origin (*maʿād*). In one section, he defines the End of Time as being a period of violence, injustice, and ignorance. In the Return to the Origin, the author divides the accounts of the Origins into two groups. The first is the exoteric cosmogony: the *ex nihilo* creation, the cosmos of the seven heavens, the age of the universe, etc. The second group is the esoteric cosmogony. The latter, according to the author, is specifically Shīʿī because it concerns the doctrine of the imāms. The author also discusses the theme of occultation. Here, he attempts to "establish a typology of accounts of encounters with the hidden imām during the Occultation" (p. 433). The author attempts to shed new light on the development and evolution of the Imāmī doctrine of Occultation as well as the role of the occulted imām in the spiritual dimension of Imāmism. Amir-Moezzi concludes his work with an examination of certain hermeneutics of the Occultation.

Amir-Moezzi's monumental work – with its great detail on Shīʿī Imāmism doctrine – is a significant contribution to the fields of religious, Islamic, and spiritual studies as well as an indispensable reference work for students of spiritual Shīʿism.

Hussam S. Timani
Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA-USA

The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook, edited by Asad Q. Ahmed, Behnam Sadeghi, and Michael Bonner (Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts: 83), (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), xxvi + 385 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-19435-9; €75.00 / $107.00 (hb)

The articles that constitute this Festschrift have in common that they are fine pieces of scholarship that testify to the quality of Michael Cook as a teacher. Aside from a focus on the multiple connections between religious concerns and historiography, they have little in common in terms of material and methodology. Therefore, a survey of the individual articles will do them more justice than a summary discussion of the entire book.

R. Stephen Humphreys (pp. xxi-xxvi) opens the volume, offering an account of Michael Cook's career and scholarship from the publication of his first monograph, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) to the more iconoclastic Hagarism. Through his meticulous scholarship, Cook frequently analyzes not only what the sources can tell us, but also what they cannot tell us.

In his introduction (pp. 1-12), Michael Bonner briefly discusses the main areas of scholarship of those of Michael Cook's students who have contributed to the Festschrift and how they relate to Cook's work: early Islamic history, early modern and modern Islamic history, juridical and intellectual history, and a field that can be described as 'reinterpretations and transformations.'

Early Islamic history. In his own contribution ("'Time Has Come Full Circle': Markets, Fairs and the Calendar in Arabia before Islam," pp. 15-47), Michael Bonner explores evidence concerning the calendar system used in pre-Islamic markets, its implication for the movement of goods and people across the peninsula, and changes in early Islamic times. Najam Haider ("The Waṣiyya of Abū Hāshim: the Impact of Polemic in Premodern Muslim Historiography," pp. 49-83) discusses accounts of the ideological preparations for the ʿAbbāsid revolution in medieval historiography and the credence given (or not

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.65

given) to these preparations by modern scholars. Haider also examines different premodern historiographical strategies of dealing with contested veracity and historiographical polemics in the Mamlūk period. In "Building an Egyptian Identity" (pp. 85-105), Petra M. Sijpesteijn explores how a regional identity developed in the course of the Islamization of Egypt in the ninth and tenth centuries that integrated pharaonic culture but maintained a distinctly Islamic outlook. Maribel Fierro ("The Battle of the Ditch [*al-Khandaq*] of the Cordoban Caliph ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III," pp. 107-129) addresses similar issues of how Muslims outside of the central lands of the ʿAbbāsid empire created their own history. The campaign against Christians in 934 marked the beginning of reenactments of prophetic history for the Andalusī Umayyad. Fierro analyzes the political language used by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III against the backdrop of earlier Islamic history, both prophetic and Umayyad. Nancy Khalek ("Dreams of Hagia Sophia: the Muslim Siege of Constantinople in 674 CE, Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī, and the Medieval Islamic Imagination," pp. 131-146) examines the use of biographies of Muḥammad's companions in early Islamic history. Her focus is on Abū Ayyūb, who was connected to Constantinople by different groups and in different ways. In Ottoman times, his biography developed into a hagiography.

Early modern and modern Islamic history. Adam Sabra ("'The Second Ottoman Conquest of Egypt': Rhetoric and Politics in Seventeenth Century Egyptian Historiography," pp. 149-177) discusses the way the Ottoman state and provincial politics are presented in accounts of a mutiny of Ottoman *Sipahi*s in 1609 when the *ṭulba*, a rural tax, was abolished. He compares political rhetoric and theory and examines how the mutineers interacted with the authorities. Jane Hathaway ("Ḥabeşī Meḥmed Agha: the First Chief Harem Eunuch (Darüssaade Ağası) of the Ottoman Empire," pp. 179-195) explores the career of the first person to hold the title of Chief Eunuch of the imperial harem of the Ottoman Empire. The rise of this function reflects the growing significance of the harem, a response to the dynastic crisis, which became obvious through cultural patronage, among other ways. Samer Traboulsi ("'I Entered Mecca … and I Destroyed All the Tombs': Some Remarks on Saudi-Ottoman Correspondence," pp. 197-217) presents the curious case of a letter allegedly sent by Suʿūd ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, heir to the Saudi throne, to the Ottoman Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) following the fall of Mecca. He traces the

letter, which is first discussed in a European source, to a collaboration between a South Arabian ḥājī and an English nobleman.

Juridical and intellectual history. Nurit Tsafrir ("The ʿĀqila in Ḥanafī Law: Preliminary Notes," pp. 221-238) writes about the legal problem of holding men known as *ʿāqila* liable to pay blood money. Ḥanafīs regard these to be fellow soldiers, an interpretation that provides insights into military history. Nimrod Hurvitz ("Legal Doctrines, Historical Contexts and Moral Visions: the Case of Sectarians in the Courts of Law," pp. 239-263) offers a broad study of the ways sectarians were treated at court, including actual cases and an analysis of the underlying legal, religious, and social views. The legal schools disagreed on larger issues of how moral standing, theological views, and political conduct were related and how those in power should address different kinds of dissent. Justin Stearns ("The Legal Status of Science in the Muslim World in the Early Modern Period: an Initial Consideration of *Fatwā*s from Three Maghribī Sources," pp. 265-290) explores the legal status of science, a form of authority that differed from that represented by the legal scholars, and shows that it remained a matter of lively interest and controversy. The results of his study challenge the conventional idea of stagnation. A particular concern is the different views among legal scholars concerning the validity of empirical evidence. A parallel to the article by Hurvitz is that Stearns also addresses evaluations of witnesses by medieval jurists and the implications of the medical profession, for example, for the respectability of a witness.

Reinterpretations and transformations. Karen Bauer ("'I Have Seen the People's Antipathy to this Knowledge': the Muslim Exegete and his Audience, 5th/11th - 7th/13th Centuries," pp. 293-314) studies the flourishing genre of *tafsīr* and its readerships in the context of the educational system of the time. In particular, she analyzes medium-length works that were directed at an audience of learned non-specialists and discusses how length relates to purpose and readership in other cases. Leor Halevi ("Lex Mahomethi: Carnal and Spiritual Representations of Islamic Law and Ritual in a Twelfth-Century Dialogue by a Jewish Convert to Christianity," pp. 315-342) compares two views of Islamic law in the dialogue of the Jew Moses and Petrus, particularly the significance of the Christian view of Jews as carnal readers. Rather than taking the form of a monologue with a unified view of Islam, the dialogue form allowed Petrus to present different

aspects and interpretations of Islam. Asad Q. Ahmed ("Systematic Growth in Sustained Error: a Case Study in the Dynamism of Post-Classical Islamic Scholasticism," pp. 343-378) discusses a similar problem as that addressed by Stearns, examining Ottoman logic in the eighteenth century. In particular, the author analyzes the example of a productive misattribution to Avicenna.

To conclude, this is a beautiful collection of articles. Like the scholarship of Michael Cook, they will appeal to a readership well beyond the circle of those concerned with the same source material.

Anna Ayşe Akasoy
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum-Germany

Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings, by Reza Pourjavady (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science; Texts and Studies: 82) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2011), xii + 224 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-19173-0, €96.00 (hb)

The book under review here is an admirable piece of scholarship that will be of help to many scholars and students interested in late medieval Islamic intellectual history. In this review, I will discuss the book in such a way that prospective readers may make economical use of the book. The book can be approached from two angles, as indicated by the two-part title: "Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran" on the one hand, and "Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings" on the other hand. Thus, the book actually is comprised of one part discussing late 15th century philosophical activity in Shīrāz and another part detailing the life and works of one of these philosophers, al-Nayrīzī.

The first part, "Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran," consists of two chapters: the 'Introduction' and Chapter 2. The introduction is an excellent read on the background story of the philosophical quarrels that went on between the major philosophers of the generation before al-Nayrīzī, namely, father and son al-Dashtakī on the one hand (the son being al-Nayrīzī's teacher) and al-Dawānī on the other hand. This is undoubtedly one of the more exciting episodes of Islamic philosophy, for which barely any attention has been paid to date. Pourjavady does not seem to have spared any effort in putting the story of this crucial period on paper, often citing unpublished sources. Chapter 2 gives details on these quarrels themselves, thereby giving us an insight into what was actually discussed and at what level. For this purpose, Pourjavady selects five issues that, in his view, were the most significant issues discussed at that time in Shīrāz: the liar paradox, the distinction between *wujūd* and *mawjūd*, mental existence (*wujūd dhihnī*), God's knowledge (especially, of course, of particulars), and the relationship between the body and the soul.

The second part, "Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings," consists of three chapters: chapters 1, 3, and 4. This part will mainly be of interest to those who want to study al-Nayrīzī's writings for themselves, perhaps to prepare a text as an edition. For others,

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 3 Number 2 Summer / Fall 2012

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2012.32.66

this microscopic approach will provide unique insight into what occupied this intellectual and what corpus of literature was at his disposal. The chapters consist of a biography and a list of all of al-Nayrīzī's works that Pourjavady could find, including a short description of each work and references to manuscript copies. One drawback of this study is the disappearance of the "Nayrīzī-codex," a collection of 57 manuscripts supposedly copied by al-Nayrīzī himself that went missing some time after Āghā Buzurg saw them in the early 1930s (p. 193, though Āghā Buzurg only mentions the title of 19 manuscripts in his *al-Dharīʿa*). When the codex re-emerges (if ever), it will surely prove to be a treasure-trove of information on al-Nayrīzī.

Chapter 4, the last chapter of the book, offers some of the philosophical reflections of al-Nayrīzī, more specifically, his studies of al-Suhrawardī's philosophy. With the absence of (critical) editions of al-Nayrīzī's works and with only a few works by either of the Dashtakīs or by al-Dawānī available in print, an in-depth analysis and comparison proves difficult. Pourjavady proceeds cautiously, almost hesitantly, doing his best not to attribute originality to ideas that al-Nayrīzī most likely picked up from his predecessors. He seems to have erred on the safe side in this matter, as it remains unclear (at least to this reviewer) exactly how original a thinker al-Nayrīzī was and, by extension, how deserving al-Nayrīzī is of further study. This issue could have been corrected in a concluding chapter, but the reader will be hard-pressed to find one. Instead, chapter four is followed by four appendices that detail manuscripts of al-Nayrīzī's works, a list of works he copied himself, a typed-out version of an *ijāza* given by Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, and typed-out passages Pourjavady used in the book. A conclusion could also have been a good place to reflect on the theological dimensions of al-Nayrīzī's career, as the author introduces al-Nayrīzī explicitly as a philosopher *and* theologian, in fact, as one of the first Shīʿī theologians of the Safavids (p. x). Pourjavady does not pursue this other dimension of al-Nayrīzī's career much, at least not to the same extent as with al-Nayrīzī's philosophical activities. Then, again, no matter what the book *could* have been, it is up to the author to decide what the book *should* be, and Pourjavady chooses to end with a brief analysis of al-Nayrīzī's commentaries on some of al-Suhrawardī's works and detailed appendices. In a way, this open-endedness has a charm of its own, as a silent remark on the current state of the field of the history of Islamic philosophy. Indeed, Pourjavady's outstanding book as a whole bears

witness to the later medieval period of Islamic philosophy as being anything but a closed book.

The following typographical errors are noteworthy. Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī was born in 866, not 966 (p. 24), and he wrote his *Ishrāq hayākil al-nūr* before 1490 and not 1491 or 1495, as may be understood from page 25. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī wrote his second set of glosses in 1482-1483, not 1487 (p. 82). Footnote 12 on p. 110 should refer to pp. 643-644, not pp. 985-987 (an odd misprint indeed).

L. W. C. van Lit
Utrecht University, Utrecht-The Netherlands

INDEX TO VOLUME 3

TITLES OF ARTICLES

Title	*Pages*
Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of Ibn Sīnā's Refutation of the Platonic Forms	7-27
An Example of the Mystical Avicennism in Ottoman Thought: Jamāl al-Khalwatī's Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's *Risāla ilā Abī Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr*	173-196
Change in the Modern Practice of *Ijtihād*: The Case of Islamic Finance	149-171
Iskandar ibn Aḥmad's Epistle in Refutation of Christians	73-104
Mystical Interpretation of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā's Controversial Ideas	197-221
Opposition to the Bektāshī Order in Egypt	51-72
Religion, Religiosity, and Research in Psychology of Religion in Turkey: An Assessment of Locality and Universality Problem	223-245
The Nature of Royal Authority (*Mulk*) in the context of Continuity and Mutability in Ibn Khaldūn's Thought	29-49
Validating the Persian Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale within an Islamic Context	247-274

BOOKS REVIEWED

Title-Author	*Pages*
A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism, by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam	131-135
Gnostic Apocalypse and Islam: Qur'an, Exegesis, Messianism, and the Literary Origins of the Babi Religion, by Todd Lawson	282-284

Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, edited by Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman 276-281

Moral Agents and their Deserts: The Character of Muʿtazilite Ethics, by Sophia Vasalou 142-144

Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings, by Reza Pourjavady 294-296

The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook, edited by Asad Q. Ahmed, Behnam Sadeghi, and Michael Bonner 290-293

The Poetics of Iblīs: Narrative Theology in the Qurʾān, by Whitney S. Bodman 128-130

The Qurʾān in Context: Historical and Literary Investigations into the Qurʾānic Milieu, edited by Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai, and Michael Marx 136-141

The Spirituality of Shiʿi Islam: Beliefs and Practices, by Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi 285-289

ESSAY REVIEWS

Title-Author *Pages*

An Essay Review of *In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century*, edited by Peter Adamson 117-126

An Important Collection of New Studies on the Shīʿa: An Essay Review of *Fortresses of the Intellect: Ismaili and Other Islamic Studies in Honour of Farhad Daftary*, edited by Omar Alí-de-Unzaga 107-116

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Author	*Pages*
Cebeci, İsmail	149-171
Çift, Salih	51-72
Hökelekli, Hayati	223-245
Kaya, Veysel	173-196
Khodadady, Ebrahim & Taheryan, Atefeh & Tavakoli, Armin	247-274
Tarakçı, Muhammet	73-104
Tek, Abdurrezzak	197-221
Türker, Ömer	29-49
Uluç, Tahir	7-27

ESSAY REVIEWERS

Reviewer	*Pages*
Janssens, Jules Louis	117-126
Langermann, Y. Tzvi	107-116

REVIEWERS

Reviewer	*Pages*
Adamson, Peter	276-281
Akasoy, Anna Ayşe	290-293
Belhaj, Abdessamad	142-144
Ess, Josef van	282-284
Fitzpatrick, Coeli	131-135
Hoffmann, Thomas	136-141
Lit, L. W. C. van	294-296
Rippin, Andrew	128-130
Timani, Hussam S.	285-289

ILAHIYAT STUDIES
A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies
www.ilahiyatstudies.org
Volume 3, Number 2, Summer / Fall 2012

GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The papers submitted to *Ilahiyat Studies* should make some noticeable contribution to Islamic and religious studies. The papers will be held to imply that it contains original unpublished work and is not being submitted for publication elsewhere.

Since *Ilahiyat Studies* sends all papers for review, a copy should be submitted in a form suitable for sending anonymously to the reviewers. Manuscripts are evaluated by anonymous peer review, therefore, authors must remove all identifying information from their texts. Authors should refer to themselves in the text and citations in the third person. For example, instead of writing "I argue (Nasr, 2007)…." write "Nasr (1997) argues…"

All submissions are assessed by referees, but the Editorial board reserves the right to decide what articles will be published.

Unsolicited book reviews may not be published.

Full name(s) of author(s) must be listed, along with university or professional affiliation, address, city, state, country, phone/fax number(s), and email address where you can be reached. Provide a two-sentence biography that we can use in your article. Current information only.

All papers must include an abstract of no more 150 words.

It is strongly advised that the length of the article should not exceed 8000 words. Book reviews and conference reports must not exceed 1500 words. All pages should be numbered consecutively.

All papers should have an introductory section in which the objectives and methodology of the article are explained and a final section, which summarizes the main points, discussed and the conclusions reached.

Manuscripts should be typed double-spaced on one side of the A4 only. Tables, graphs and figures should be on separate pages. All submissions should be in MS-Word (97-2003, 2007 or higher) format. Leave margins of at least 4 cm on top, bottom, and sides.

A reference list must be included at the end of the manuscript in the following style:

Journal Article & Entry

Eichner, Heidrun, "Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī", *Medioevo* 32 (2007), 139-197.

Buckley, J. Jacobsen and Albrile, Ezio, "Mandaean Religion", (trans. from Italian by Paul Ellis), *Encyclopedia of Religion: Second Edition*, (editor in chief: Lindsay Jones; USA: Thomson Gale, 2005), VIII, 5634-5640.

Book

Kātib Chalabī, Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn*, 2 vols., (eds. M. Şerefeddin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge; Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-1943).

Michot, Yahya M., *Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au Vizir Abū Saʿd: Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique* (Beirut: al-Burāq, 2000).

Book Chapter

Janssens, Jules, "The Reception of Avicenna's *Physics* in the Latin Middle Ages" in I. Vrolijk and J. P. Hogendijk (eds.), *O ye Gentlemen*: *Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture in honour of Remke Kruk* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007), 55-64.

Online Citation

Rudolph, Kurt, "Mandaeans: ii. The Mandaean Religion", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Online Edition, 20 January 2010, available at www.iranica.com/articles/mandaeans-2-religion

Page references to works referred to in the text should take the following form: (Touraine, 1995: 9-10). The verses of the Qurʾān should be referred to as follows: Q 2:23; Q 17:108; the references from the Old and New Testament should carry chapter name and number, and verse number.

Text and references must follow the format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition.

Arabic words should be transliterated according the style used by the Library of Congress.

Ilahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 3 Number 2 Summer / Fall 2012

Contents

ARTICLES

İsmail Cebeci — Change in the Modern Practice of *Ijtihād*: The Case of Islamic Finance

Veysel Kaya — An Example of the Mystical Avicennism in Ottoman Thought: Jamāl al-Khalwatī's Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's *Risāla ilā Abī Saʿīd ibn Abī l-Khayr*

Abdurrezzak Tek — Mystical Interpretation of Sheikh Badr al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī Samāwnā's Controversial Ideas

Hayati Hökelekli — Religion, Religiosity, and Research in Psychology of Religion in Turkey: An Assessment of Locality and Universality Problem

Ebrahim Khodadady & Atefeh Taheryan & Armin Tavakoli — Validating the Persian Integrated Spiritual Intelligence Scale within an Islamic Context

BOOK REVIEWS

ISSN: 1309-1786

13091786001233