İlahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 5 Number 2 Summer / Fall 2014

Bursa İlahiyat Foundation

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ILAHIYAT STUDIES

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

www.ilahiyatstudies.org

Volume 5, Number 2, Summer / Fall 2014

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***Aims and Scope**: Ilahiyat Studies* is an international, peer-reviewed multidisciplinary journal dedicated to publishing scholarly articles on all aspects of Islam and the Muslim peoples and on religious studies. Available in print and online, and published twice a year, the journal aims to become one of the leading platforms in the world for new findings and discussions of all fields of Islamic and religious studies.

***Annual Subscription**:* Annual subscription for each volume of two issues (print edition) is 50TL, $50 (US), €35 (EUR) for institutions; 30TL, $30 (US), €20 (EUR) for individuals, and 20TL, $20 (US), €15 (EUR) for students. An institutional subscription to the print edition includes free access to the online for any number of concurrent users across a local area network.

Abstracting & Indexing: *Ilahiyat Studies* is currently indexed in and abstracted by ***ATLA Religion Database®, Scopus, Index Islamicus, Index Copernicus International, Religious and Theological Abstracts***.

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FROM DEMOCRACY TO DESPOTISM
Tocqueville on Slavery, Colonialism, and "Other"

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Abstract

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) was born in 1805 to a noble family in Verneuil. He belonged to an aristocratic family dating back to the 15th century. He is known mostly as far-seeing thinker and politician. After his US sojourn, Tocqueville published a study on the young American democracy called *Democracy in America*, which put him on the map during and after his lifetime. He was actively involved with the various political and social problems of his day, such as colonization, slavery and inequality. His analyses on the transitivity between democracy and despotism are very important to understand the nature of modern society. Analyses by Tocqueville of colonialism clearly put forth why the modern society needs an "other" and violence to legitimize itself. He considers colonialism as a complementary element of modern society and thinks that colonial violence outside of the country is required for the prevention of despotism within the country. His contradictory opinions on colonialism and slavery do not, as it is often claimed, arise from political indecisiveness or philosophical contradiction; rather, his opinion is due to the theoretical framework of his analyses of modern society. Henceforth, the article will treat Tocqueville within the scope of his approach to the "other", to transitivity in his analyses on despotism, colonialism, and to the nature and structure of modern society.

Key Words: Tocqueville, colonialism, Algeria, slavery, other, democracy, despotism, modern society

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.107

Introduction: Story of Tocqueville

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) was born in 1805 to a noble family in Verneuil. During his first official post as a judge, he set off on a journey in 1832, together with his close lifelong friend Gustave de Beaumont[1], to investigate the penitentiary system in the United States of America. Throughout his US sojourn, however, Tocqueville analyzed not only reformatories but also the young American democracy in a comprehensive work called *Democracy in America*, which put him on the map during and after his lifetime.[2] Renowned for this work, Tocqueville was actively involved with the various political and social problems of his day. These issues were mainly concentrated on the methods and manners the French adopted regarding the colonies and slavery in general and Algeria in particular.

During the first decade after his demise, Tocqueville remained a much referred to intellectual. He was especially discussed in the process of accepting universal suffrage in France. By the 1880s, however, Tocqueville was completely forgotten. In the 1900s, his views on the French revolution and American democracy were occasionally mentioned, although he was no longer a popular thinker. His luck, however, changed after World War II. In the atmosphere during the Cold War, Tocqueville became one of the most read and studied thinkers in the US thanks to *Democracy in America*. Due to analyses on the content and functioning of American democracy and prophecies, he saw the US and Russia as the decisive powers of the future. Tocqueville has often been referred to in the literature on American political science, especially in contexts with a futuristic accent. His analyses on American democracy have mostly been employed in the defense of democracy against socialism. In the 1970s, also known as the detente era, Tocqueville was once again on the verge of oblivion. As Harvey C. Mansfield (1996) thankfully notes, Tocqueville was rediscovered in France (Europe) in the 1990s and was subsequently revived in the US. Mansfield explains this by means of the turn in French thought towards liberalism after cold war, following a period under the influ-

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1 As Seymour Drescher (1968b, 201) cites, the German poet Heinrich Heine defines Tocqueville and Beaumont as "inseparables." Throughout their lifetimes, the two were always together on voyages and in publications and politics.

2 After his return from the trip, he published the first two volumes of his work in 1835. The last two volumes followed in 1840.

ence of various types of Marxism. Today, interest in Tocqueville has been gradually increasing in various contexts.

Tocqueville is not only a far-seeing thinker and politician but he is also a reference point for comprehending and explaining his era. His analyses on the transitivity between democracy and despotism and on the nature of modern society are often overshadowed by his writings on American democracy. Analyses by Tocqueville of colonialism clearly put forth why the modern society needs "the other" and violence to legitimize itself. Moreover, his realist attitude in debates about slavery reveals the pragmatist agenda beneath all liberal attitudes. Therefore, Tocqueville considers colonialism as a complementary element of modern society and thinks that colonial violence outside of a country is required for the proper functioning of democracy and the prevention of despotism within the country. His opinion does not, as it is often claimed, arise from political indecisiveness or philosophical contradiction; rather, his opinion is due to the theoretical framework of his analyses of modern society. Henceforth, the article will treat Tocqueville within the scope of his approach to the other, to transitivity in his analyses on despotism, and to the nature and structure of modern society.

Position of Tocqueville in Slavery Debates

Following the Revolution, the restoration period witnessed fervent debates concerning political and intellectual agendas, with respect to inequality within the context of the construction of a new society and colonialism activities in France. Tocqueville's political and literary life mostly took form under such circumstances, and he predominantly wrote about inequality, slavery and poverty. Tocqueville approached these issues from within the frame of his political sphere and thus demanded the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless, his claims are founded not on enlightened egalitarianism but on the national interests of France.

Slavery Debates in France and Indecisive Position of Tocqueville

Tocqueville's political and scientific career, which includes the period from 1830 to 1850, coincides with a period of time in which debates on slavery reached their height in France. Attempts to abolish slavery in France date back to the 1780s. The abolition of slavery, which was widely discussed before, during and after the Revolution,

remained on the agenda until the 1840s.[3] Discussions on and attempts against slavery were closely related to the political agenda of the time. *La Société des Amis des Noirs* (Society of the Friends of the Blacks) was founded in 1788 for the abolition movement, which was protected by mostly liberals, and continued until 1793. The leader of the Society, Jacques-Pierre Brissot, was influenced by the Enlightenment. According to Brissot, all colonies should be independent, and slavery should be forbidden following the Revolution. This discourse, in line with the general philosophy of the Revolution, made its mark during this time period. On April 4, 1792, the right of free French citizenship regardless of color was granted, and on February 4, 1794, the parliament, under the presidency of Robespierre, enacted the abolition of slavery in France. However, the will, by revolution, to maintain control over the colonies played its part in the process. Indeed, there were concerns about losing the colonies in the havoc created by the Revolution. The beginning of the slave revolt in 1793 in Saint-Domingue (Haiti), the largest French colony, was also influential. The French administrator, sent to maintain the connections and commitment of Haitians to the Revolution, declared the abolition of slavery in Haiti.[4]

La Société des Amis des Noirs did not last long, although it did influence eventual movements and institutions during its brief existence. Because the abolitionary movement was represented by the *Société de la morale chrétienne* (Society of Christian Morality), which was connected to the British, and because the society included freemasons, Protestants and liberals, participation was quite restricted for a long time (until the 1840s). The moderately liberal abolitionary movement, to which Tocqueville also belonged, was positioned between the radical abolitionary pole under Victor Schoelcher and the conservative pole under Guizot.

In public opinion, both prison reform and the abolition of slavery were considered as deliberate British provocations against France

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[3] In 1840, there were 250.000 slaves in French colonies. For debates on the abolition of slavery in France before and after the Revolution, see (Drescher 1968b, 151-195); for discussions on abolition in Europe, also see (Drescher and Emmer 2010).

[4] For the France-Britain clash on Haiti, see (Drescher 1968b, 154-157; Geggus 1985). For detailed discussions about the impacts of a Haitian revolution in the United States, see (Geggus 2001).

due to the British-Protestant connections (Drescher 1968, 160; Geggus 2010). Britain had enacted law on abolition in 1833 and released more than 800,000 slaves, although the French public was uneasy with this fact. This move by the British led to the conviction that France could hardly maintain its colonies unless slavery was abolished. Accordingly, the *Société française pour l'abolition de l'esclavage* (French Society for Slavery Abolition) was established in 1834, and Tocqueville and his old friend Beaumont joined in 1835. The group, which was led by the Duc de Broglie (the president of the Cabinet), maintained its elite position and never became a mass movement. As Drescher (1968, 163-164) indicates, society is not a movement of "Negro love;" rather, it reflects the struggle between certain interest groups. Nevertheless, the Society became the best known representative of the abolitionist movement in public opinion, the parliament and the academy. In those days, the various representatives for plantation[5] and abolition often encountered severe debates in the parliament. In these discussions, abolitionist politicians showed that slavery, instead of universal equality, was an improper attitude that did not befit the French, and they noted slavery as an obstacle against the expansion of the French Empire. The Anglo-American world conducted the debate within the scope of civil society and rights; in France, however, this continued at a polemical level. Consequently, while discussions lasted for years, the awaited law was never implemented. In the parliament, the interests of slaveholders prevailed. Indeed, the supporters of abolition represented no singular, concrete interest group; their opposition directly stood for certain economic sectors.

As it was already noted above, on January 1, 1838, Britain abolished slavery in all colonies; whereupon discussions in France blazed up. In the following months, Hyppolite Passy, the president of the Abolition Society, submitted a petition to parliament for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. Upon receiving the petition, the parliament established an under-presidency of Guizot and utilize Rumusat as a law clerk to clarify the situation. Meanwhile, Tocqueville was elected as Member of Parliament in elections following the fall of government. The new government, in which pro-abolition members were stronger, renewed the commission in June 1839, and Tocque-

[5] A definition for the owners of vast agricultural lands where slaves were employed in colonies.

ville became the judicial clerk. On July 23, Tocqueville presented his report on slavery, which comprised both what he had listened to and what he had thought. The commission accepted the report, which suggested immediate abolition everywhere. Unfortunately, the report was mothballed due to a lack of political support (Tocqueville 1840; for the text of the report, also see Drescher 1968b).

In 1840, a supreme Royal Commission was established on this same issue. The Duc de Broglie presided over the commission, and Tocqueville was one of the members. All of the members principally supported the abolition of slavery. However, they were generally spokesmen for the commercial sector and thus did not stand up for further action. As a result, the efforts of the commission ended in a final report, mostly written by Tocqueville.[6] The report claimed the universal abolition of slavery would occur by January 1, 1853. A smaller group put an annotation in the report that only those who were born after 1838 should be completely freed. The Guizot-Soult government decided to wait for the opinions of slaveholders on the matter. Evidently, their opinions were never obtained, and the issue was suspended once again. Curiously enough, all of these discussions, parliament speeches and reports, as well as the public consensus for abolition, brought along no true consequences. By 1848, however, Napoleon III abolished slavery on April 27, following the Revolution of February. It is ironic that it was the conservatives, and not the liberals, who eventually abolished slavery.

As seen from the above discussion, Tocqueville was on the front line during the discussions on slavery. He drew up the abovementioned report for the parliament commission while he was working on the second volume of *Democracy in America*. In the report, Tocqueville tackled slavery as a moral problem and an institutional fact. The report sought an analysis on both the concerns of slaveholders and the objectives of abolitionists. It included no idea of solidarity with the victims of exploitation and oppression. In his letter to Henry Reeve, the translator of *Democracy in America*, and in an English version of the report, Tocqueville indicates that he is aware of the lack of the "scent" of freedom in the report (cited by Drescher 1968a, 184). In another letter about the report to J. S. Mill, Tocqueville complains about colonialists and says he opted for a more cautious discourse because of their crazy oppression (Tocqueville 1862b, 57).

[6] For further information about the commission, see (Jetté 2007; Nimtz 2003, 58-60)

Indeed, Tocqueville did not want to look like a sentimental abolitionist. Therefore, in a letter to Beaumont, he says "that noble passion which the mummeries of the philanthropist have made almost ridiculous" (Tocqueville 1862a, 75). Because of this cautious and moderate language, slavers occasionally used the report in their support.

The report includes no principal opposition against slavery. Rather, it concentrates on how to abolish slavery as soon as possible while minimizing the economic costs. On the other hand, the report focuses on how the vacuum of power due to abolition could be eliminated and how social control could be established in plantations. In the report, Tocqueville stresses the importance of a non-violent transition. Pursuant to his realist approach, the true problem is not the combat of races but rather economic chaos. Therefore, he thinks colonies should be provided with low-cost labor. The government should take three measures in the case of abolition: compensation of slaveholders, discipline of the freed, and low-cost for taxpayers (Tocqueville 2001h, 212-224).

The second article, by Tocqueville, on abolition appeared anonymously in the opponent newspaper *La Siècle* in six pieces between November and December 1843. In this article, Tocqueville shared his observations, which constituted his ideas, of the second parliament commission report and demanded abolition in a maximum of ten years. Articles at the time extensively focused on the harms of slavery on colonial policy and its burdens on the capital budget. Instead of a moral attitude, however, Tocqueville tried to convince the middle class, his target group, in terms of costs and benefits. He suggested that after abolition, slaves should be prevented from land ownership for a given time to maintain economic equilibrium. In Europe, a worker could not be a landholder; the same should apply for slaves as well (Tocqueville 2001h, 216). Indeed, his basic suggestion was to turn former slaves into landless proletariat: "In temporarily prohibiting Negroes from possessing land, what are we doing? We are placing them artificially in the position in which the European worker finds himself naturally" (Tocqueville 2001h, 221).

Furthermore, he thought that a worker, who has to sell his labor, would be more productive than a slave. In other words, the social status of slaves would be changed, although they would still be under control in economic and political terms. Once freedom was granted, education, family life and other social domains could be *naturally*

controlled. To that end, he recommended controlling mobility and the cost of labor. According to Tocqueville, following the abolition of slavery, colonies should be kept under tutelage until the society gained a rather European look. Deep down, Tocqueville believed that *slaves should be freed but their country and lands should continue to belong to the French* (Tocqueville 2001h).

Clearly, Tocqueville positions himself regarding abolition somewhere between the radical abolitionary views and the colonial plantation supporters (Pitts 2005, 228; also, see Lawlor 1959). Accordingly, he suggested a gradual abolition of slavery to maintain the national dignity of France and her position in the colonies (Tocqueville 1840, 14-18). For Tocqueville, as Britain had rapidly abolished slavery after long-lasting discussions, it was now even harder for France to keep hold of its colonies in the Antilles.[7] In the Antilles, slavery had become an issue, to the detriment of France. Therefore, France had to abolish slavery before there were incitements against it. According to Tocqueville, the supreme memory and legacy of the Revolution and the glory, fame and prestige of France necessitated abolition in the colonies.

Colonialism or Slavery? Abolish Slavery but Keep Their Countries Occupied!

Throughout the above discussions, Tocqueville considered slavery as the social and economic institution of a former system and not only something demanded by a group. For him, social and economic change obligated abolition. Slavery does not comply with economic laws that administrate the production of the time (Swedberg 2009, 175-177). Tocqueville indicated that slavery leads to a spreading idleness in society. In a system that includes slavery, ignorance and pride and poverty and luxury simultaneously exist.

> Slavery, … dishonors work. … It enervates the forces of the mind and puts human activity to sleep. The influence of slavery, combined with the British character, explains the mores and the social state of the South [of United States]. (Tocqueville 2010a, 52)

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[7] The French slave colonies were Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean and Guyana and Reunion in the Indian Ocean (for further information, see Gershman 1976).

Therefore, when a slave is freed, he will become a more prolific worker. As the British discovered, a man is more "active when he worked for wages, avid for the goods offered by civilization when he could acquire them, loyal to the law when the law had become benevolent toward him, ready to learn as soon as he had perceived the utility of instruction, sedentary when he had a home, regular in his mores when he had been permitted to enjoy the joys of family" (Tocqueville 2001i, 214). Tocqueville observed that marriage and family regulate the lives of Negro slaves. Therefore, the disenthralled slaves will work even more once they start families. Tocqueville also mentioned the dissidence on slavery in America, referring to the industrial north and the agricultural south by saying "[i]n the North emancipating the slaves was all profit; you rid yourself in this way of slavery, without having anything to fear from free Negroes" (Tocqueville 2010b, 578). Accordingly, he suggested abolition should be left to time rather than risk triggering a similar civil war.

Likewise, Tocqueville claimed that it is hard to abolish slavery in America in a rapid manner due to the economic, political and administrative structure. As a matter of fact, the slaves have certain difficulties in transitioning to free life (Tocqueville 2010b, 515-521). On the other hand, in the case of slavery abolition, the hatred of whites against the blacks will rise in the South, and the ground for coexistence will be completely destroyed. He says that he sees "the abolition of slavery as a means to delay in the states of the South the struggle of the two races" (Tocqueville 2010b, 578). Nonetheless, Tocqueville expresses that it is impossible for Southerners to maintain slavery forever in a world where industry gradually spreads. Therefore, only a progressive disenthralling process could be applied under such circumstances (Tocqueville 2010b, 581).

Thus, having told for so long how inhuman and démodé slavery is, Tocqueville paradoxically concludes that slavery should not be abolished immediately. He expresses understanding of the presence and necessity of the slavery institution in the United States, a country that is lauded for its functioning democracy. *Democracy in America* was published at a time when Tocqueville was a member of the *Society of Slavery Abolition*. At that time, he was under severe criticism by the press, parliament and academia; *Democracy in America* was among the much-referred-to texts by the anti-abolitionists in France. Evidently, Tocqueville wrote the work in consideration of the peculiar condition in the United States. He objected to slavery not in princi-

pal terms but because, for him, the market and goods production were no longer suitable for slavery. His constantly paradoxical position was due to political pragmatism. As his later writings on Algeria would show, for Tocqueville, there were specific principles for specific contexts instead of eternal and universal ones.

After all, he does indicate that even if slavery were to be abolished, the blacks and whites could never live together under equal conditions. For Tocqueville, the institutionalized exploitation relations will prevent the absolutely ruptured two races from coming together. The position of the blacks will be worse than that of the Indians:

> The Indians will die in isolation as they lived; but the destiny of the Negroes is in a way intertwined with that of the Europeans. Although the two races are bound to each other, they do not blend together. It is as difficult for them to separate completely as to unite. (Tocqueville 2010b, 549).

In the Antilles, for example, as the whites retreated, the blacks became more and more dominant, eventually resulting in the whites withdrawing from society. According to Tocqueville, control by an external power is needed for these two races to live together without violence. This is where the colonial administration is needed. In 1839, Tocqueville submitted a report to Parliament in which he advised white landlords to employ blacks as workers to maintain a (white) French existence in the Antilles. Thus, the negroes would have a living space, and it would be easier to keep hold of the Antilles through such a relation of economic dependence (Tocqueville 1840, 16; see also Drescher 1968b, 129).

Therefore, Tocqueville's vision is related to imperial expansion and dominance rather than to universal equality. He saw, in abolition, the opportunity to maintain an imperial hegemony. He criticizes Gobineau,[8] who predicted the fall of the white race due to abolition, saying, "A few million men, who a few centuries ago, lived nearly shelterless in the forests and in the marshes of Europe will, within a hundred years, have transformed the globe and dominated the other

[8] "Gobineau's life was crucially affected by his relations with Tocqueville. Their correspondence, which began in 1843 and ended in 1859, the year of Tocqueville's death, contains both intense controversy and avowals of friendship." (Richter 1958, 152)

races" (Tocqueville 1959, 268). Thus, in any case, whites will be superior to blacks according to Tocqueville. Nevertheless, for now, enslavement is not the right method for the political interests of the French. Consequently, support for abolition did not contradict expansion of the colonies for Tocqueville.

Difference between Races and In-Equality

In terms of race, Tocqueville adopted the French liberal tradition. Before and after the Revolution, the advantages of racial diversity were discussed, particularly in the light of the Roman Empire; nonetheless, the influence of such ideas did not last long. In the 19th century, the dominant opinion in France was closer to racism. In his *An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, Gobineau (1967), a prominent figure in racism, claims that the radicals, defined as those who defend the equality of races, are deviants who are far removed from religious influence. According to him, the divine natural order shows that the races cannot be equal. Tocqueville was one of the earliest and strictest critics of Gobineau.[9] In a letter to Gobineau on July 30, 1856, Tocqueville (1959, 292-294) expresses that Gobineau's ideas are absolutely wrong and harmful, and he criticizes determinism, which deeply influenced the French elite and the concept of racism. Explanations pursuant to biological factors closed the social domain in certain sections. In another letter to Gobineau on November 17, 1853, Tocqueville writes as follows:

> Can there be any purpose in persuading those sluggish peoples who are already living in barbarism, indolence, or servitude, that, being what they are because of their race, nothing can be done to better their conditions, change their customs, or alter their government? Do you not see that from your doctrine follow all the evils produced by permanent inequality: pride, violence, scorn of fellow man, tyranny, and abjection in all its forms? (Tocqueville 1959, 227)

Tocqueville often expresses warnings of the potential dangers of racial discrimination to and in a society, as does his fellow traveler and close friend, Beaumont. Together, they explicitly defended this argument in public; an argument that they attained after their observations in America. *Marie*, written by Beaumont (1998) after the America trip, handles the dramatic and immoral circumstances that

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[9] For a detailed discussion on correspondence between Tocqueville and Gobineau about races, see (Richter 1958).

arose due to racial discrimination and became one of the most-read books in France in its time (see Greiman 2010, 76-120). Tocqueville was deeply influenced by the ideas in this work. On two occasions in *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville refers to the work by Beaumont. In the Introduction, he speaks highly of the upcoming novel, *Marie*, by Beaumont. Later, in a chapter on the race problem in American society, he admits that he had to touch shallowly upon the matter, heralding that Beaumont would comprehensively handle the problem in his work (Tocqueville 2010a, 29). According to Beaumont, racism has much higher costs for a society than just the apparent ones. For him, social strata, established by racism (which is institutionalized through slavery), yield decadence and violence; thereupon, it poses an obstacle for the social and economic progress of humanity. In this respect, it is as though Beaumont and Tocqueville had visited different countries because the former focused on the moral collapse in American society, while the latter described the same in an egalitarian manner. Despite referring to Beaumont, Tocqueville argues for the opposite (for a detailed discussion, see Schaub, 1998). In *Democracy in America*, he depicts equality in American society. According to Tocqueville, the problem of poverty is totally off the agenda of democracy in the US. Although the poor can have no property, they can still freely vote and intervene in government affairs. In *On the penitentiary system in the United States and its application in France*, which he co-wrote with Beaumont (1964) in 1833, the two discuss at length the institutionalized poverty generated by the American system; nevertheless, Tocqueville continues to define American society on an egalitarian axis, probably because he thinks such poverty does not prejudice the American egalitarianism. He claims that, in comparison to Europe, the rich are less rich and the poor are less poor in the United States. America hosts no poor, non-property proletariat or inhuman industrial serfs (Tocqueville 2010b, 335-336). Moreover, according to Tocqueville, the amount of poverty in America is decided by democratic channels, namely, poverty laws. Placing free voting and popular politics as the basis of American democracy, Tocqueville overlooks the blacks, who are dramatically depicted by Beaumont in *Marie*, and ignores their lack of seats in the white American democracy. Tocqueville was expected to address the issue through sociological depth and political analysis, instead of via the literary view as by Beaumont.[10] Neverthe-

[10] In the preface, Beaumont (1998, 4) indicates that Tocqueville explains the institu-

less, Tocqueville does not opt for such an approach and shrugs off blacks and the poor alike. As Curtis Stokes (1990, 13) puts forth, Tocqueville's new liberalism, which marginalizes the culture of peoples, was built on racial differences as much as ever.

Colony: Key to National Glory and Solution of Problems

Apart from abolition, Tocqueville concentrates on the problem of the colonies, especially that in Algeria. As of the second half of the 18th century, France was dramatically weak compared to Britain with regard to colonialism. Especially in the wake of the Seven Years' War between 1756 and 1763, the colonies in India were left to Britain, whereupon France fell behind in the race of colonialism. During the Revolution, France was expected to resume its former glory, but, as the revolution was suppressed by European powers, France faced the danger of becoming an impotent country. This fact was most apparent in the colonies. Although France evened up (America, the most important British colony, gained independence through French support), the British still possessed other significant colonies, such as India and China. Hastily and unready, the French occupation of Algeria was partially related to such political and psychological factors and partially to the position the British had begun to obtain in the Mediterranean. At the end of the 18th century, the French had nothing but the Caribbean and a few small colonies in the Indian Ocean; North Africa was considered more promising for French expansionism.

The Ottomans had suffered a serious loss of power both inside and outside the empire in 1770. This loss was particularly felt by the states that were far from the center. Algeria, which fell under Ottoman domination in the mid-16th century, was governed in collaboration with local authorities, like other North African territories. The *dey*s who governed Algeria were symbolically connected to Istanbul. After Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1789, the Bastian Trade Centre, the foundation of which was permitted to the French in 1578 on the conditions of paying taxes and not building castles, was also occupied. Therefore, political tension increased between France and Algeria. Moreover, throughout the 18th century, Algerian pirates threatened Mediterranean commerce; this was another source of tension between the parties. Nevertheless, in the late 18th century, the balance

tions while he tries to reveal traditions.

was shifted in the Mediterranean. The British beat the French in the battles of Abukir and Trafalgar in 1798 and 1805, respectively, and solidified the British presence in the Mediterranean. In 1816, Britain sent a fleet under the command of Lord Exmont and the Dutch navy to Algeria to terminate piracy in Mediterranean pursuant to the relevant decision by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The fleet bombarded Algiers and annihilated the naval power of the country. France thus sought acquiring new colonies in this region, instead of reacquiring those previously lost. Accordingly, making use of the weak Algerian naval force and the stringent and difficult situation of the Ottomans (due to the Greek Revolt in 1828-29), France officially occupied Algeria in 1830. The Ottoman Empire could merely protest to France because of the reform process within the country and its difficult situation in world politics.[11]

Over the next ten years, the French could not decide on what to do with Algeria. At first, they removed the Turkish elements lest they complicate French rule. Consequently, however, Algeria became uncontrollable.[12] The French had two options: they could either indirectly rule the country through control of the seaports on the coasts or domineer and colonize all of Algeria. By 1840, France left behind ten years of indecision and finally opted for complete control of Algeria; nonetheless, they faced extensive resistance. Bugeaud, the viceroy, indicated that it was wrong to conduct only a defensive war by remaining in certain castle-towns because this meant leaving the rest of the country in the hands of tribes. Accordingly, he declared the need for a radical change in the war strategy. The basic principle of the war conducted by Bugeaud, an astute tactician, was to attack the sources of people, to burn the crops and to plunder the villages. He aimed to make Algeria surrender through basic terror. The intense violence continued until the end of the resistance, which was guided by Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir in 1847 when, also, the Ottoman Empire waived its rights on France. The occupation of Algeria, the practiced

[11] For further information about the French occupation of Algeria, see (Kahraman 1993, 488-489)

[12] Tocqueville (2001b, 10-11), who eventually visited Algeria, was surprised to see how the Ottomans kept hold of the country for 300 years with so few forces and suggested studying the Ottoman model. Nevertheless, Tocqueville had forgotten that the Ottoman model was not a colonial one and that France would have to completely change the basis of its colonies if they were to follow the Ottoman example.

violence, the methods for repressing revolts, the established rule, the military problems and the settler issues occupied the agenda of Tocqueville's generation.

Tocqueville was not happy with France's position among the colonialist countries or present colonies. During his sojourn in the US, he observed what a big and wonderful country the British had once maintained while wandering in this former colony that had recently gained independence. He considered Martinique to be very weak and unimportant compared to significant parts of India and China. In his trip to America, he was often lost in nostalgia of the French Colonial Empire, whose ancient remains were then scattered. Throughout the journey, Tocqueville had the following question in mind: Why does France not have better colonies than it has at the moment? What makes the British superior to the French in obtaining better colonies? On this problem, he wrote a short chapter in *Democracy in America*, named *Some Ideas about What Prevents the French from Having Good Colonies*; nevertheless, he eventually excluded the article from the book (Tocqueville, 2001g). Therefore, Tocqueville supported France having new and more important colonies. He treated the matter of Algeria, an important issue in the intellectual and political agenda, within this context. As he often did, he visited Algeria to analyze the problem in-situ and he corresponded with colonial rulers, collected information from visitors of the country, conducted comprehensive studies about Algerian society, history, law system and Islam, and attained a central position within the problem in his day.

Visit to Algeria: Tough Face of Beautiful Land

Tocqueville wrote his first articles on Algeria in a minor journal called *La presse de Seine-et-Oise* on June 23 and August 22, 1837, while he was trying to become a parliament member. Rumor has it that he wrote the two articles to attract attention to his political skills as a candidate. Moreover, he was closely related to the Algerian problem, a vital issue for France (Swedberg 2009, 183-184). In those days, Tocqueville carefully read the Qurʾān, reflected on Islam and wrote letters to friends for information[13] (Tocqueville 2001d). In 1837, his

[13] Tocqueville cared about having a great deal of knowledge about an issue before writing about it. This initiated his travelling to relevant places and not just contenting himself with a collection of written texts. In the introduction of his first article on Algeria, he clearly indicates this fact: "M. Desjobert, in a recently published book on our colony that in other respects was quite good, argues that in

main concern was to demonstrate Algeria's importance and great potential for France. Tocqueville noted this fact, saying, "I have no doubt that we shall be able to raise a great monument to our country's glory on the African coast" (Tocqueville 2001f, 24).

The Algerian problem divided the French public. Tocqueville is essentially closer to the anti-colonialist liberal intellectuals. Nevertheless, in regard to colonialism, he breaks away from the liberals so much so that he even ventures to contradict his own opinions. For example, in *Democracy in America*, he explains the necessity of an ethical principle in the encounter between Western forces and weaker nations, but the Algerian problem and the extended revolt by ʿAbd al-Qādir forced him to give up his loyalty to such an ethical framework.

Once elected, Tocqueville thought he needed to address the problem in a closer manner and was assigned as a member of the Royal Commission that was established in 1840. In the preparation process of a Commission report, Tocqueville paid his first visit, which lasted about a month, to Algeria, together with Beaumont and Beaumont's brother Hippolyte. The notes Tocqueville took upon disembarking show how he was impressed by Algeria: "A promised land, if one didn't have to farm with gun in hand" (Tocqueville 2001e, 37). The journey was planned to last longer, but Tocqueville had to return earlier due to an illness.[14] After his return, he retreated to his chateau and elaborated his notes, forming a point of view. In 1846, Tocqueville set off for a second, longer visit to Algeria. Probably because of his illness from the first trip, he did not demand to travel upcountry in the second trip (Tocqueville 1862c, 83). In 1847, he took charge as

order to discuss a foreign country properly, it is well never to have been there. This is an advantage I share with him, but I hardly pride myself on it. On the contrary, I take the popular view that in order to inform others about something, it is useful to know it oneself, and that to know something well, it is not useless to have seen it. So I do not pride myself on not having been to Africa, but I shall attempt to profit from the accounts of several of my friends who have spent a long time there, and to make it as little apparent as possible that I have never myself witnessed the things I am trying to depict" (Tocqueville 2001b, 5).

[14] The disease was an opportunity for Tocqueville to understand it was more difficult than it looked to penetrate Algerian inlands; but he considered the illness only as a consequence of carelessness. In the wake of his voyages, he wrote reports and articles; besides, as a typical 19th century intellectual, he left behind many notes, memoirs and letters.

judicial clerk in the new commission, established by Parliament, to assess the occupation policy in Algeria. His two reports in the process played their part in determining the French policy in Algeria.

Colonialism for National Glory

Tocqueville paid his first visit to Algeria at a time when the country was subject to intense violence, and there were serious debates on the issue in France. During and after his visit, Tocqueville indicated, in his letters to General Bugeaud and in his articles, his support for the strategy of spreading the violence. According to Tocqueville, a strategy to destroy everyone would not be right; nevertheless, an amicable policy could not attain achievement either. For him, Bugeaud's method was the only option for breaking the resistance:

> On the other hand, I have often heard men in France whom I respect, but with whom I do not agree, find it wrong that we burn harvests, that we empty silos, and finally that we seize unarmed men, women, and children.
> These, in my view, are unfortunate necessities, but ones to which any people that wants to wage war on the Arabs is obliged to submit (Tocqueville 2001a, 70).

In this text, his main target is the liberals whom he worked with in Parliament. The liberals considered the colony to be costly and economically useless, but for Tocqueville, a colony could not be evaluated only in financial terms. According to him, the possession of colonies signifies a political prerequisite to becoming a great nation. Tocqueville indicates that France would never quit Algeria due to threats by "a few barbarian tribes." If France behaved so, it would be seen as a second rate and weak state. Instead, the sections inhabited by settlers should be fortified and transformed into agricultural oases; thus revealing European civilization (Tocqueville 2001a, 59).

Indeed, Tocqueville declared that European settlers in Algeria could not live together with the locals, just as with the Negroes and Indians in America. However, he also announced that it was time to leave behind military policy, which was about to come to its end, for the agricultural colonial model of settlers. The establishment of small, well-protected settler villages would provide the European population with due safety and peace. Although Tocqueville never directly criticized Bugeaud's policy, he argued that military politics had reached their limit and that public opinion had begun to evolve to-

wards a view that defended the necessity of ending the bloody stage. The suppression of the ʿAbd al-Qādir revolt and control of Algeria were influential on the process. Now, the foundations were laid for applying the new models recommended by Tocqueville.

Colonialism for Solution of National Problems: Dispossession, and Construction of a European Society

Tocqueville prioritizes the glory and pride of his country over anything else. More importantly, he believes that social problems due to industrialization cannot be solved if France falls behind in colonialism. According to Tocqueville, colonies are necessary to eliminate many internal and external dangers against France. "France cannot forget those of her children who live in the colonies, nor lose sight of her greatness, which demands that these colonies progress" (Tocqueville 2001h, 221).

In the first half of the 19th century, France considered colonies as an opportunity to found an agricultural utopia. A colony was seen as a means for solving the social and political problems within the colonizing country through provision of land to landless proletariat or exportation of ordinary criminals.

According to Tocqueville, in Algeria, France needed to suppress the Arabs and the tribes through violence before settling a European community who would live apart from the locals. A form of economic supervision had to be established following the military supervision. For this purpose, Tocqueville recommended deploying more French settlers in Algeria. Because more than 100,000 settlers taken to Algeria were stuck in cities, the colonization could hardly attain success. Tocqueville suggested providing these settlers with land so that they would appropriate Algeria as their homeland. For him, the parceling out of rural areas and the foundation of French settlements were needed to build a consistent and sustainable colonial policy.

Tocqueville put forth these ideas in the light of his travel to America. For him, the rural nature of American society was an important factor for success in the colonization of this vast continent. In fact, Tocqueville was aware of the Indian massacre, which lasted until the mid-19th century to rarefy the Indian population and seize the Indian lands; moreover, he knew that a similar slaughter would have to take place in Algeria. As he indicates in a cold-blooded manner, he considers this fact to be an unfortunate necessity. According to Tocque-

ville, once a country decides to become colonialist, it has to commit such crimes. The civilization, which should arrive in such lands in the future, would have enough glory and brightness to forgive everything it did in the past.

If settlers are provided with privileges and political power and if the colonialists become more powerful in economic terms, it will be possible to give lands to the landless villagers and proletariat in France and to more easily control the colony. Nevertheless, the problem of property should be solved to settle the French permanently in Algerian lands outside of the cities. To that end, it is first of all necessary to take the land from out of the hands of Algerians.

> Establish by a law, or at the very least by royal ordinance, forms of expropriation that are less rapid and less savage than those used in Algeria. Impose the obligation of paying a real price for the property. Surround the declaration of eminent domain with certain formalities that prevent it from being as lightly used as it is now (Tocqueville 2001a, 114).

For Tocqueville, private property is among the "unalterable laws;" accordingly, he considers it to be an important institution for the existence of modern society (Tocqueville 1970, 75). This was the dominant view of the time, whereupon property could belong exclusively to the bourgeoisie in Europe and to the white outside of Europe. At the time when Tocqueville wrote these words, Marx and Engels (1976) declared in *The Communist Manifesto* the central position of private property for a bourgeois society and that dispossession was carried out for the sake of private property. In any case, dispossession was required for modern property. In the country, dispossession was employed for property based on bourgeois society; abroad, colonialists dispossessed locals to obtain property. This, in a sense, led to an equilibrium. The proletariat and peasantry were dispossessed in the homeland, which in turn had to possess colonies to provide them with property. As a matter of fact, Tocqueville saw colonies as a principal means of appeasing the ruthless struggle between classes in the motherland and of solving relevant social problems.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the precolonial statuses of the Algerian and American societies that Tocqueville tries to model. In North America, the Indians were leading a nomadic life, whereas the North African locals had adopted a sedentary life for thousands of years. In America, no private property is in ques-

tion regarding lands, whereas Algeria has a private property regime on legal grounds. Therefore, it was necessary to dispossess the Algerian locals to provide the French settlers with lands and to hand over the ownership of Algeria to the French. Consequently, this difference may be the reason behind the failure of the French in Algeria compared to the success of the American colony in establishing a new European society.

Tocqueville asserts that people will not easily succumb to losing their lands; as a result, only armed French villagers could live in Algeria. Thus, if settlers have land and property, they will seek solutions to their own problems and make Algeria their homeland. The defense of private property and the fervor for earning money constitute significant passions for protecting one's colony. Otherwise, the provisional-looking occupants will indeed have to leave the country one day. These ideas by Tocqueville were mostly grounded in his almost obsessive conception of an egalitarian democracy that will emerge through the minor aristocracy as based on land ownership. He never mentions any future trade with Algeria or industry to be established therein. In fact, he considers merchants to be speculators. For him, if French people possess the lands, then all will be better for France.

Knowledge and Power: Footsteps of Orientalist Scholar

Tocqueville believed in the necessity of being knowledgeable about the history and society of occupied lands to execute a flawless and successful colonialism. His private correspondences, reports, and speeches explicitly reveal this conviction. According to him, the success of the British in India was grounded on the possession of such knowledge. Therefore, Tocqueville claims that the French should establish a school like the British Haileybury College (Tocqueville 2001c, 148). Such a school will ensure informing colonial leaders about their new land, which in turn will lead to a more prolific and efficient rule. By saying "One can study barbarous people only with arms in hand" (2001b, 130), Tocqueville asserts that the control of a colony is crucial for obtaining information. Thus, he puts forth a close relation between Orientalism and colonialism approximately 140 years earlier than Said. Tocqueville believes the veil on Algeria is removed thanks to colonialism; now, the "right and natural boundaries" of dominance will be determined through an analysis on the history and social institutions of the Arabs and the tribes. "The true and natural limits of our domination in Africa, what must be the normal state

of our forces there for a long time to come, the instruments we need and the appropriate form of administration for the peoples who live there, what we may hope of them, and what it is wise to fear." (Tocqueville 2001c, 130). As Richter (1963, 365) indicates, this is the alternative view brought about by Tocqueville, who levees all his intellectual skills for the better colonization of Algeria. As a social scientist, he tries to create a colony model via deeper insight into the problems through historical and social structure.

According to Tocqueville, France fails in Algeria mostly because of lack of information about the latter. He often told his friends about necessity of analyses on Algerian history, social structure, Ottoman rule, Islamic law, and Islamic belief system. "It is victory that, establishing numerous and necessary connections between them and us, led us to penetrate their customs, their ideas, their beliefs, and finally yielded the secret of how to govern them" (Tocqueville 2001c, 130). Accordingly, he comprehended that more in-depth knowledge about a society would make it easier to rule. Thus, Tocqueville was among early thinkers who foresaw the need for an orientalist portrait as a vanguard of colonialists, just as depicted by Said (1977) in his *Orientalism*. In this respect, Tocqueville once again cites British model. British had sent the most reputable scholars in order to educate the officials in colonies; now, France had to follow this path. Indeed, the French were aware of such a necessity, as the first orientalist school was established in France. Nonetheless, due to the weak structure in the second half of the 18th century and the havoc following the Revolution, the French were late in building a system similar to that of the British (in the first quarter of 19th century). Tocqueville seeks the harmony established by the British between the orientalist and colonial officials.

In this respect, the demolition of former administrative records would be a huge mistake in Tocqueville's eyes. The abolition of all local administrators will be an even greater fault (Swedberg 2009, 184). According to Tocqueville, a country can only be ruled in collaboration with local administrators. He insistently emphasizes that the full-scale colonial occupation started by the French in Algeria is unsustainable. In his opinion (2001c, 147), if France ensures the complete surrender of Algerians, then France should educate and transform them into a more European and high-profile society. Thus, the glory of the French nation will become even more apparent as it fathers a lower society. Indeed, Tocqueville sees colonialism as a

method for restoring the political virtues, such as glory, fame and courage that the Republic lost due to extensive individualization. For him, a colony is the shortest and least costly way to unify a nation towards an ideal. If the aboriginals surrender to French authority, they have to fulfil their obligations to France. Otherwise, France, "God forbid," shall have to "take the sin by making them subject to what American Indians suffered." Indeed, "This is how, without recourse to the sword, the Europeans in North America ended by pushing the Indians off of their territory. We must take care that it is not the same for us" (Tocqueville 2001c, 144).

Soft vs. Hard Despotism: Conquest of the Other as a Solution

Despotism is a concept that emerged in circulation once again as a fundamental component of European political and literary terminology in the 18th century, when the definitions regarding modern society and political forms began to mature in the West. The word "despot," which originally dates back to Aristotle, turned into an adjective to define the current political system in the East. Montesquieu occasionally talked about the dangers of despotism in the West, and even Quesnay called out the danger of despotism in a well-structured system; nevertheless, at the end of the Age of Enlightenment, there was almost a conciliation that despotism would be used exclusively for the East. Hereunder, a kind of tyranny could be in question in the West due to domination by a political power, but this would be a temporary case. On the other hand, despotism appears as a systematic abuse of power, which is a natural consequence of the social structure in the East. Tocqueville is aware of the strong negation in despotism and uses the term for the industrial bourgeoisie, who he does not really like. Thus, he draws apart from the political writing tradition that uses despotism as a definition peculiar to the East and uses the term "democratic despotism" to describe the strong dominance of the industrial bourgeoisie, whose footsteps are heard in the West (Tocqueville 2010c, 1256-1261). On the other hand, Tocqueville considers colonialism to be an element in preventing despotism by the French bourgeoisie via its dynamic nature for the nation. In this respect, despotism means controlling the civilized, modern French in an unrestricted and unpreventable manner; according to Tocqueville, the suppression of uncivilized others is not included within the definition of despotism.

For Tocqueville, in a society established by industrialists, noble feelings leave little room for individual pursuits of interest. This is mostly because modern society is based on individualist foundations. In this regard, Tocqueville is concerned that this individualist egoism, which pulls people away from society and impels them to gain and collect more possessions, paves way for a new despotism. This is why he mentions a democratic despotism and uses these two words specifically, which were scarcely united until then in the history of Western thinking: "Democracy is even more compatible with despotism than with liberty" (Tocqueville 2010a, 76). In the chapter titled "What Type of Despotism Democratic Nations Have to Fear", he discusses at length that, contrary to popular belief, despotism is quite possible in a modern democratic system: "It seems that, if despotism came to be established among the democratic nations of today, it would have other characteristics; it would be more extensive and milder, and it would degrade men without tormenting them" (Tocqueville 2010c, 1248). In such a society, everybody will focus only on his own affairs and will not pay interest to public issues; consequently, the government will begin to entirely dominate every affair regarding guilds, families and, finally, individuals (Tocqueville 2010b, 398). The power vacuum of the government fills the gap due to the fragmentation of society. In other writings, Tocqueville describes the problem as the centralization of the modern state, and points it out as the emergence of a soft democratic despotism. In the old regime, guilds, families, churches, and commercial unions prevented any attempt toward despotism, whereas no such forces are left now (Tocqueville 2010b, 399-400). In this respect, Tocqueville grounds his observations in American society and seems unaware about the working class, as fervently told by Marx, or the emergence of trade unions. He speaks as if none of these existed. Tocqueville seeks an individuality that does not pull the individual away from society and that participates in social life pursuant to a public objective. In such a community, the individual would regain his self-confidence thanks to being with others; the individual as part of a collective would obtain information and adopt personal courage.

In his notes in America, Tocqueville asks "Why do elite people die away as civilization spreads?" He also notes, "We are yet to come across an elite" (Journey to America, 161, 290). According to him, upon individualization within the society, the aristocratic, courageous, brave, and sensitive people of the past fade away, whereas

weaker and ordinary people become more common. This may be because the individual feels himself to be too small and lonesome in the face of the huge changes of the era. Everything changes in such a rapid and extensive manner that the individual has nothing to which to turn. According to Tocqueville, this weakness of individuals will finally pave way for the arrival of a buffoon like Napoleon III and the establishment of despotism. Tocqueville's predictions in 1830s in *Democracy in America* did become a reality for French society within merely two decades.[15]

A common critical view of the time considered the middle class to be the source of all evil. A vast section of society, including socialists and conservatives, concluded that the bourgeoisie changed society in an irrevocable manner pursuant to their own personal interests. The bourgeois civilization was a seductive one that detracted man from what is human. This class had become major landholder via earnings through trade and industry; consequently, it had radically captured society. According to many writers and artists in Tocqueville's generation, the bourgeois obsession for wealth created a world where everything had a price: art became a commodity, life and death became marketable, principles turned into interests, and the beauty of nature transformed into a commercial advantage (Boesche 1987, 72-77).

The central value of money is strikingly told in the works of Balzac, Dickens and many other thinkers of the time; the resulting deterioration gradually paved way for the emergence of new norms in the whole society. Although Tocqueville did not express it, the instrument of the state would soon capture many things that social structure had once dealt with on its own; this would, as another Frenchman would say a century later, lead to disciplinary society (Foucault 1995). Tocqueville was right in observing that in modern society, despotism comes to light only in a democratic liberal bourgeois society. Time would tell how democratic society would besiege the individual on every side through centralization and the structure of bureaucracy. Sixty years later, Weber (1978, 1403-1409) would explain the same by indicating that modern society is entrapped in an iron cage. According to him bureaucratization and rationalization may be an *inescapable fate* for modern society.

[15] For a detailed analysis on the problem, see (Boesche 1987, 54-70)

Tocqueville severely criticizes despotism arising from equality. This theme would eventually feed many dystopias. He notes equality as a killer of virtues in public life and claims that equality lays the foundation for despotism by "leaving the individuals together but deprived of any common connection and tearing them apart." "This, apart from equality, contributes powerfully to divide men, to make them mistrust each other's judgment and seek enlightenment only within themselves alone" (Tocqueville 2010d, 708). In an order where people no longer care for one another, a despotic rule becomes possible because people are now deprived of the possibility of blending together. In such an order, every individual is seen as a client rather than a citizen. Tocqueville is loyal to the great civil society ideal of the Enlightenment; for him, the new lifestyle, which prioritizes individual interests and pleasures and overlooks other people, leads to the gathering of power in certain unsavory hands. People begin to lead a life without becoming a part of it, like an audience watching the stage. They like the order and harmony on the stage; nevertheless, as the harmony increases, their chance to intervene with the events on the stage diminishes. Establishers of the order on a stage can easily control the audience's ideas and actions through this spectacle. According to Tocqueville, centralization and bureaucratization advance as an indispensable part of a democratic bourgeois society; consequently, decisions about society are made by certain power groups. These groups are the industrialist and merchant bourgeoisie who Tocqueville dislikes and describes as the new aristocracy.[16]

Tocqueville sees the modern prison as one of the best models of despotism (Beaumont and Tocqueville 1964, 47). The system in a prison established and operated by Quakers in Philadelphia inspired Tocqueville to study the functioning of the modern bourgeois society. According to him, the three principles (equality, isolation and weakness) that enable the establishment of absolute authority over prison-

[16] Very few social theorists were aware of this fact in the 19th century. Almost all thinkers in the conservative, liberal or socialist flanks considered industry as a development that would bring along new horizons for humanity. According to them, the rise in production will generate a mechanism to ensure wealth and equality in society. In this respect, Tocqueville dramatically pulls away from his contemporaries and approaches the criticisms on modernity that would follow five decades later.

ers are also the principles of the democratic bourgeois society.[17] In these prisons, which Tocqueville and his fellow traveler Beaumont visited, the individuals are isolated from one another by means of a social system, as it is too costly to isolate them through an architectural form. Thus, only a small number of guardians are able to manage the large number of prisoners whose connection with one another is interrupted and who are helpless and unable to organize.[18] Terrified in the face of this technique, Tocqueville observed that American democracy is formed around this model, as is seen in the isolated structure of the rural regions he eventually visited. The American production and consumption system, the development of social life and the forms of city-building entrap people within their own personal worlds in search of personal desires and compel them to live in a disconnected manner; consequently, they are easily manageable by a small minority, similar to the guardians in prison.[19] This rupture between and among people renders democratic despotism stronger than any despot and draws them to a total submissiveness before the instrument of state. Such despotism draws its strength from the lack of an apparent despot; thus, it is hard to observe and intervene. In fact, Tocqueville introduces the modern disciplinary society, which Foucault (1995, 195-228) would conceptualize about a century later, by grounding it on the "Panopticon" prison model. Tocqueville diagnoses the monsters of Nazism and totalitarianism in their cradles long before their emergence in Western democracy. Such farsightedness is partly due to his being one of the criticizers of the industrial bourgeoisie that is the founding power behind the present social structure.

Tocqueville belonged to an aristocratic family dating back to the 15th century; nevertheless, one will cut corners by saying he has a grudge against the modern bourgeois society and thus defends his

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[17] For an important discussion about the relation established by Tocqueville between prison and despotism, see (Boesche 1980)

[18] The system in use in the mentioned prison bears similarities with "Panopticon" prison model, which was designed by the English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in 1785. Probably, the founders of the prison were aware of Bentham, who was also influential in the American Revolution. Tocqueville discovered that the model was not confined to the prison but rather included entire social order. Debates on the issue were started, not by him, a century later by *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* by the French Michel Foucault (1995).

[19] For analyses by Tocqueville on democracy, see (Manent 1996)

former aristocratic lifestyle. Indeed, Tocqueville knows that the aristocratic order is irrevocably over. Yet, he is severely disturbed by the new social form trivializing individuals and gradually gathering power under monopoly. As a former aristocrat, he thinks that direct arguments about the bourgeoisie may lead to adverse reactions; therefore, he adopts a cynical style and writes about democratic despotism. Indeed, Tocqueville sees the new middle class, the subject of democratic despotism, as the source of the common weakness and helplessness in society. He expresses his ideas by writing about the distant America, and not directly on France. However, as he hints in a letter to his father from the US, he has France in mind in the process (Tocqueville 2010e).

We cannot see, however, the criticisms by Tocqueville on despotism in regard to relations with non-Western societies. He complains a great deal about isolation in the modern industrial society; interestingly enough, he recommends isolation in the administration of colonies. He suggests that bourgeois despotism, which he accuses for destroying all aristocratic values and spreading around the world, compels the Algerian people to isolation through common terror. Moreover, Tocqueville advises isolation for Algerians lest they hurt the colonial authority once slavery is abolished.

According to Tocqueville, war is bad; however, a calm peace is worse. Peace and order lead a nation to degradation and lay the foundation for its enslavement; war is necessary to correct this pacification (Tocqueville 2010c, 1244). In this respect, Tocqueville tries to prove his point by discussing how social inaction in China and India pushed these societies to degradation and slavery (Tocqueville 1985). Inspired by intellectual gurus such as Montesquieu, Turgot and Condorcet, Tocqueville believes that disruptions keep a nation alive and provide a basis for freedom. For him, societies that lose their vivacity may soon lose their freedom as well. In this context, he explains the fall of Ancient Rome through the continuous dynamism of barbarians against the loss of vitality in settled Roman civilization:

> Because Roman civilization died following the invasion of the barbarians, we are perhaps too inclined to believe that civilization cannot die otherwise.
> If the light that enlightens us ever happened to go out, it would grow dark little by little and as if by itself.
> …

> The Chinese, while following the path of their fathers, had forgotten the reasons that had guided the latter. … So the Chinese could not change anything. They had to give up improvement. They were forced to imitate their fathers always and in all things, in order not to throw themselves into impenetrable shadows, if they diverged for an instant from the road that the latter had marked" (Tocqueville 2010d, 785-786).

Likewise, Tocqueville greets the constant change and colonial expansion in America. For France, the shortest way to the same end is to make a colonial war permanent because it is profitable in every aspect. Otherwise, the new despotism will take society under domination. In fact, Tocqueville discovers in-depth the fundamental principle for the smooth functioning of the modern political system: War and other. Underlying the fact that despots are always capable of finding lawyers to legalize their deeds, Tocqueville (1856, 223-224) insists that the legal system in the modern democratic bourgeois society supports an illusion. For example, the American government has done in a legal way to American Indians what the Spanish could not do through bloody methods. They were very quick to end the massacre so that no one could accuse them of murders. "The conduct of the Americans of the United States toward the natives radiates, in contrast, the purest love of forms and of legality" (Tocqueville 2010b, 546).

In this respect, Tocqueville's writings on Algeria find a totally different meaning. Defending the necessity of possessing colonies for protecting the pride of nation, Tocqueville considers war, disorder, and colonization for national pride as an opportunity to compensate for democratic despotism. In a humanistic manner, however, the colonial wars cause the destruction of other societies and are used as a means for promoting or concealing strict control within the country. Once the nation is flattered and content with itself, the internal control becomes more legitimate, acceptable and even demandable, just as in the modern US. Therefore, Tocqueville was unable to develop his criticism and to see that the colonies were indeed an instrument for reinforcing the power in the country. This may be due to his inclination towards war as a former aristocrat.

Conclusion: Position of Other in Defining Modern Society

In his voyage to England, Tocqueville visited a factory in Manchester and was shocked and terrified in the face of the miserable and

inhuman lifestyle of the workers, as already depicted by Engels (1975). The workers were living cuddled up in vaults and sheds while the bourgeoisie were enjoying a luxury life in mansions; these observations showed him the dreadfulness of the upcoming industrial era (Tocqueville 1958, 92-96). He estimated that the domination of this group, which he called the industrialist aristocracy in *Democracy in America*, would bring along the most harmful and strictest rule ever. This trouble of industry transformed the world into a crueler and more degraded place; eventually, it would sweep out all high feelings before finally decaying both classes. The greed of some for wealth and fortune would steer everyone to endless misery. As a member of the losing side, the aristocracy, Tocqueville thought this was different and more harmful than any former period. For him, this new order gradually levelled down human courage, creativity and intelligence. In a very early period, Tocqueville foresaw how industry reduces man to a one-dimensional being, thus weakening him. Yet, while worrying about suppressed European workers, Tocqueville also defended dispossession in Algeria. He accused the new, industry-related authority for reinforcing harm on the people while he reflected upon establishing a more profitable colonial domination; on the one hand, he defended the emancipation of people through socialization, and on the other, he generated ideas for how slaves could be isolated and controlled following abolition.

Indeed, this controversy, called the "Tocqueville Problem" by Swedberg (2009), deserves attention. According to Swedberg, there is a significant difference, due to lack of empathy, between his general assents on private life and his arguments in his public and political life with regard to colonies and slavery. Swedberg (2009, 198) adds that this problem is not special to Tocqueville and is an illusion that includes the entire 19th century thinking. Therefore, like his contemporaries with different opinions, such as Marx and J. S. Mill, Tocqueville has customized standards for Europeans and others (i.e., for whites and blacks). Perhaps he defends double-standard ethics for national glory, similar to the bourgeoisie whom he accuses of being hypocritical wealth hunters.

Nevertheless, the problem has a framework beyond the double-standard. Tocqueville's analysis of modern society is grounded on solutions for preventing the despotic domination of industrialists on society via an alleged democracy. According to Tocqueville, the individualization, which comes with industry, paves way for the collapse

of solidarity networks in the society; as a result, a society model where authority is invisible but everyone inspects one another on behalf of authority comes to be, similar to modern prisons. The formation of such a society can be prevented only through maintaining the dynamism of a nation by means of the liveliness of individuals who act pursuant to feelings of the past, such as glory, reputation and honor. In this regard, Tocqueville sees colonialism as the only way out for preventing the formation of despotism in the West. The people, rendered passive, will dispose of passivity thanks to colonialism; thus, the unlimited control by the industrialists over the people will be hindered. Likewise, violence should be taken abroad to prevent violence at home, and despotism should be taken abroad to prevent despotism within. Therefore, Tocqueville's indecisive attitude regarding colonialism, slavery and the "other" is not merely due to an individual double-standard. Rather, he is fed by analyses on modern society. Like his contemporaries, Tocqueville classifies the entire world as West and others and sees the others only as a means in the constitution of a modern society.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT OF *WAḤDAT AL-WUJŪD*
The Relationship between Essence and Existence

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Abstract

Discussions about "the unity of existence" (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), which is always considered together with the name of Ibn ʿArabī, are common not only in Sufism but also in almost all domains of Islamic thought. In this respect, the problem of the unity of existence is a notable and much-debated issue in the history of Islamic philosophy, which results in countless comments on and approaches to the matter. Nevertheless, no solid conclusion or solution is attained. This is primarily because of the lack of a precise explanation of the nature and content of the unity of existence manifested by Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. The unity of existence seems to have two basic principles that can be formulated as follows: "Existence as such is God, and immutable entities (*al-aʿyān al-thābita*), the truth of contingencies, are not created and existence is subsequently attached to truth." These two elements exclusively determine whether a doctrine is the unity of existence, whereas the principles abovementioned are entirely grounded on discussions about the relationship between essence and existence. The first and second principles are conclusions of the following opinions, respectively: "The existence of Allah is identical with His essence" and "among contingent beings, the existence is subsequently added to the essence." In this context, this study therefore seeks an evaluation not only of what unity of existence is but also of the importance of the relationship between essence and existence in

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.108

terms of the unity of existence as a notable discussion point in Islamic thought.

Key Words: Unity of existence (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), essence, existence, Ibn ʿArabī

Introduction

Essence and existence are among most essential and important universal concepts of philosophy, kalām and Sufism within Islamic thought. As Izutsu duly notes, the relationship between these two concepts is one of the most original philosophical theses in Islamic thought.[1] Obviously, discussions about the relationship between essence and existence result from efforts to explain the relationship between Allah and creation, which constitute the essence of Islamic revelation, on a metaphysical basis. In other words, when it is necessary, as a metaphysical problem or issue, to explain the relationship between Allah and the universe, subject to the question of faith, the disciplines are used to reveal possible problems regarding the relationship between Allah and the universe (creation) by means of solutions generated on the axis of the relationship between essence and existence – the various theses on the matter will be treated below. In this respect, arguments and solutions concerning essence and existence provide us with notable clues about the studied disciplines' points of departure and preferences. Nevertheless, it is possible to assert that the discussions conducted and theses generated related to essence and existence are the basis on which the entire structure of Islamic thought is founded.[2]

In the history of Islamic thought, theologians and great philosophers such as al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) were the first to discuss the rela-

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1 Toshihiko Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2007), 133.

2 For instance, Henry Corbin assesses the views of al-Fārābī on the relationship between essence and existence as a milestone in the history of metaphysics, whereas Hüseyin Atay claims that the starting point of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy is his distinction between essence and existence. See Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy* (translated into English by Liadain Sherrard with Philip Sherrard; London & New York: Kegan Paul International & The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1993), 160; Hüseyin Atay, *İbn Sina'da Varlık Nazariyesi* (Ankara: Gelişim Matbaası, 1983), 78.

tionship between essence and existence; however, it was the great thinker Ibn Sīnā (d. 427/1037) who provided the issue with various new aspects and brought the studies to their peak.[3] Indeed, the following discussions remain mostly within the boundaries prescribed by Ibn Sīnā. For Ibn Sīnā, because the Necessary Being needs no cause to exist – given that its definition excludes the need for cause[4]– it is impossible to discuss any priority or separation between His essence and existence. In this context, existence is neither an attribute nor an accident of essence for the Necessary Being. In other words, godhood as essence is not a prior essence, to which existence is subsequently added as an attribute. On the contrary, because His essence is His existence, no subsequence is related to Him, unlike contingent beings.[5] According to Ibn Sīnā, contingent beings require a cause to exist; as a result, their existence comes from another.[6] In this sense, Ibn Sīnā dismisses the distinction of essence-existence in the Necessary Being and claims that the essence is prior to the existence, which is added to the former afterwards, in contingent beings. This is because in the essence of all things, the conception of whose self does not include its existence – namely, the contingent beings – the existence is not the constituent of essence. Therefore, existence is not a necessary element within the essence of contingent beings; existence is but a possibility for such beings.[7] As a result, for Ibn Sīnā, the exist-

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3 For further information, see Izutsu, *ibid*., 108-132.

4 According to Ibn Sīnā, Necessary Being is necessary in His self and therefore needs no cause: "Necessary Being has no cause; this is evident. If He had a cause, He would have obtained His existence from such cause." Abū ʿAlī Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā, *Kitâbu'ş-Şifâ: Metafizik* [= *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ: al-Ilāhiyyāt*] (translated into Turkish, with the original text, by Ekrem Demirli and Ömer Türker; Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2005), I, 36. Also see Ibn Sīnā, *İşaretler ve Tembihler* [= *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*] (translated into Turkish, with the original text, by Ali Durusoy, Muhittin Macit, and Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2005), 124-132.

5 Ibn Sīnā, *İşaretler ve Tembihler*, 129-131.

6 Ibn Sīnā says: "Anything whose truth in itself is a possibility cannot exist by means of its own self. Its existence, which originates from itself, is prior to its absence due to contingency. Therefore, if one among two is prior, this is because the former is either ready or lost. Therefore, the existence of anything, whose existence is contingent, comes from another." *İşaretler ve Tembihler*, 127.

7 Ibn Sīnā says: "In essence of something, nothing can be common together with necessary being. This is because the essence of every single thing other than it is that the possibility of being is required for itself. As for being, it is neither essence

ence is something more than essence in contingent beings; it is an element added to essence.[8]

Pursuant to views of Ibn Sīnā, despite certain discipline-based variations, the debates on the relationship between essence and existence concentrate on the ontological primacy of essence and existence with respect to one another and as to whether existence is identical with essence or whether it is an added attribute of essence. The principal questions on the issue are as follows: Is essence primary and existence (*wujūd*) accidental, or vice versa? Is the existence of Allah prior or subsequent to His essence?

Responses to such questions are generally collected in three groups:

1. Theologians such as Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-936) and Muʿtazilī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) argue that in both necessary and contingent beings, existence is identical with self and essence, because it is not an attribute.

2. As is seen above, Ibn Sīnā and certain philosophers assert that no distinction between essence and existence is in question for necessary being, while for contingent beings, existence is distinct from essence and added to it afterwards.

3. According to theologians who follow al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), existence is an attribute distinct from and added to essence in both necessary and contingent beings.[9]

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of something nor a part of the essence of something. I mean, existence is not included in grasping things with essence. Rather, existence has come upon essence." *Ibid*., 131.

8 About the views of Ibn Sīnā on the relationship between essence and existence, see Atay, *ibid*., 65-94; id., "Mâhiyet-Varlık Ayırımı," in Müjgan Cunbur and Orhan Doğan (eds.), *Uluslararası İbn Sina Sempozyumu (Bildiriler)* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1984), 139-166; Mahmut Kaya, "Mâhiyet ve Varlık Konusunda İbn Rüşd'ün İbn Sînâ'yı Eleştirmesi," in Aydın Sayılı (ed.), *İbn Sînâ: Doğumunun Bininci Yılı Armağanı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984), 453-459.

9 See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī* (ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1987), I, 209-213; Abū l-Barakāt Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Jāmī, *al-Durra al-fākhira fī taḥqīq madhāhib al-ṣūfiyya wa-l-mutakallimīn wa-l-ḥukamā al-mutaqaddimīn* (eds. Nicolas Heer and ʿAlī

Sufism is subject to reflections of problems and debates in Islamic thought, as well as similar considerations. Apart from Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), the greatest figure in Sufism, there are Sufis such as al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) and al-Qayṣarī (751/1350) who address the relationship between essence and existence under different titles.[10] Although some Sufis do not directly study the matter, they are not entirely indifferent to the question. For instance, studies by Ibn ʿArabī on various issues are necessarily related with essence and existence. Why is the relationship between essence and existence important in terms of Sufism? Or which objectives did Ibn ʿArabī and his followers pursue in discussions about this issue, and which conclusions did they draw? We think that the issue of the relationship between essence and existence in Ibn ʿArabī School is directly connected with the unity of existence. The doctrine of the unity of existence wants to explain the relation Allah, universe and man pursuant to observation method and is necessarily based on the relationship between essence and existence. In past and present studies, the unity of existence is the most important and remarkable issue of Sufism. Studies of this concept lay stress on two points: First, such studies stress when and by whom was the term "unity of existence" used – a question outside the scope of this study.[11] Second, such studies analyze the meaning, content, and basis of the term. This article aims to address the concept of the unity of existence in this respect. Analysis of the content and basis of the notion of the unity of existence leads us directly to an analysis regarding the relationship between essence and existence. This is because we believe that the principal propositions of the unity of existence are derived from the relationship between essence and existence. There are several reasons for this conviction. First, al-

Mūsawī Bahbahānī; Tehran: McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies & Dānishgāh-i Tehran, 1980), 2.

[10] Al-Qūnawī treats this problem in his correspondences with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. See Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Muḥammad al-Qūnawī, *Sadreddin Konevî ile Nasireddin Tûsî Arasında Yazışmalar: al-Murāsalāt* (translated into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2002), 53-63. Al-Qayṣarī analyzes the issue in the preface to his commentary on *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*. See Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī; Tehran: Sharikat-i Intishārāt-i ʿIlmī va-Farhangī, 1383 HS), 13-42.

[11] For discussions of the problem, see Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, *al-Muʿjam al-ṣūfī: al-Ḥikma fī ḥudūd al-kalima* (Beirut: Dandara li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1981), 1145-1157.

Kāshānī (d. 730/1329), a notable commentator of Ibn ʿArabī and perhaps the first thinker to define the unity of existence as a concept, grounds his definition of the unity of existence entirely on the connection between existence and essence. Al-Kāshānī defines the unity of existence as follows:

> Unity of existence means that the existence is not divided as the necessary and the contingent. According to this group, existence is not what philosophers and theologians understand about it because most of them consider it as accident. The existence, which they deem accident, is what realizes the truth of every present and if so, it cannot be anything other than Ḥaqq. The self, defined through the attribute of unity, has two values: Firstly, the truths contained and engirdled by the self are the same; they are not other than the self. In turn, existence is one of these truths and the most obvious and apparent faculty of intellect. Thus, in this sense, existence becomes identical with the self.[12]

This definition by al-Kāshānī serves as an appropriate point of departure for us. He principally insists that existence is not accident or specific being. Rather, as al-Nābulusī (1143/1731) notes, existence here is not existence as accident ascribed to a substance nor is it either specific existence used for Allah. Al-Kāshānī indicates that Sufis do not attribute being to a distinction between essence and existence, and notes to the necessity of treating the unity of existence as "existence in itself." At exactly this stage, the relationship between essence and existence appears as problematic. Therefore, the relationship between essence and existence determines what unity of existence is or is not. According to Sufis, existence is not an attribute added to essence or self but instead is identical with the self. Therefore, the main principle of the unity of existence is the following phrase: "Existence as such is Ḥaqq (*al-wujūd min ḥaythᵘ huwa huwa l-Ḥaqq*)."[13] In other words, in consideration of the relationship between essence and existence, what lies at the heart of the unity of existence is that existence is not an attribute but is identical with the self.

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[12] Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn Aḥmad al-Kāshānī (as al-Qāshānī), *Laṭāʾif al-aʿlām fī ishārāt ahl al-ilhām* (eds. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ, Tawfīq ʿAlī Wahba, and ʿĀmir al-Najjār; Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2005), 710.

[13] Al-Qayṣarī defines it without mentioning the predicate as "existence as such (*al-wujūd min ḥaythᵘ huwa huwa*)." See al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 13.

In light of al-Kāshānī's definition, we believe that there are two principal, interconnected and distinctive propositions related to the unity of existence. First, "existence as such is Ḥaqq,"[14] and second, the "truth of contingent beings is not created, existence is added to them afterwards (question of *al-aʿyān al-thābita*)." The first proposition about the unity of existence refers to the relationship between essence and existence in necessary being, whereas the second is about the same relationship in contingent beings. Thereupon, the unity of existence cannot be conceived without analyzing the relationship between essence and existence. Throughout the history of Sufism, Sufis' point of departure from various discourses has been the criticisms of two previously mentioned propositions regarding the unity of existence; as they developed systems related to these views, the opposite approaches have also focused on essence and existence. Consequently, we believe that the response to what unity of existence is should be searched within the framework of the relationship between essence and existence. In this study, we preferred to address the relationship between essence and existence separately in necessary being and contingent beings. Therefore, this article will treat these two issues and their relationship with the unity of existence.

A. Identity of Essence and Existence in Necessary Being: Existence as such is Ḥaqq

Being has been a principal concept since the beginnings of Sufism. Indeed, the first Sufis used *wujūd* as a term that indicates the conditions that confronted them during their course in the order. In this sense, *wajd* (ecstasy), *wujūd* (existence), and *tawājud* (willful rapture) – which is to force oneself to *wajd* – were developed under the influence of primary Sufi discussions of human acts and brought into the future. These words merged under the meaning "to find" or "to know," and over time, they gained new interpretation in connection with *wujūd* and *mawjūd*, which mean "existence" and "existing." In this respect, Sufi literature may provide Islamic thought with useful contributions with respect to the settlement of words regarding existence and being. The sense "to find," first ascribed by Sufis to the

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[14] For the use of this principle, see al-Qayṣarī, *ibid*., 13-14. This phrase is occasionally formulated as "there is one existence, that of Ḥaqq." See ʿAbd al-Ghanī ibn Ismāʿīl al-Nābulusī, *Gerçek Varlık: Vahdet-i Vücûd'un Müdafaası* [= *al-Wujūd al-ḥaqq wa-l-khiṭāb al-ṣidq*] (translated into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2003), 20.

words, has been an explanation of the relationship considered by Sufis to exist between being and existing.[15] In this context, existence gained a meaning related to "to know" and "to be known" for Sufis in almost every era. The term *ahl al-kashf wa-l-wujūd* (masters of manifestation and existence), used by Sufis to define themselves, became synonymous with one who both possesses *wajd* and is *ahl al-wujūd*, that is, is able to obtain the Truth, al-Ḥaqq. Following Ibn ʿArabī and al-Qūnawī, theoreticians of new Sufism maintained the relationship between existence and knowledge/knowing.

Following Ibn ʿArabī, the Sufi conception of existence took form as an extensive interpretation of the God-universe with God at the center. On the one hand, this approach involves grounding the universe on God through causality, which enables us to obtain knowledge about God, and explaining the problem of creation in this respect – it is formulated as the relationship between knowing the universe in broad sense and knowing both the self and God in the narrow sense. On the other hand, the question concentrates on finding an explanation of how and in what context the relationship of God to both the universe and man continues. In other words, the attempt was primarily intended to explain how and why the universe exists, and accordingly, to determine how the relationship between God and the universe is realized. This contemplation depends on the proposition "Existence as such is Ḥaqq." This point is the primary proposition of Sufi metaphysics. That the expression eventually became Sufi literature's motto is notable because the existence of this fact shows its importance in Sufism. The phrase is occasionally formulated as, "There is one existence, that of Ḥaqq[16] or "*Wujūd* as such is Ḥaqq." Certain points require understanding to permit a conception of the Sufi approach to the matter. First, the meaning of concept of existence requires clarification. In fact, this may be as a continuation of the difficulties caused by the word "existence" in metaphysics generally. Attempting to explain the meaning of existence, Sufis note that existence is outside all categories. For instance, Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī indicates that in the Sufi explanation of "existence as such,"

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[15] About the use of this concept by early Sufis, see Abū l-Qāsim Zayn al-Islām ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Hawāzin al-Qushayrī, *al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya* (eds. Maʿrūf Muṣṭafā Zurayq and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Balṭajī; Beirut: Dār al-Khayr, 1991), 61-64.

[16] Al-Qūnawī, *Tasavvuf Metafiziği: Miftāḥ ghayb al-jamʿ wa-l-wujūd* (translated into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2002), 21, 23; al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 13; al-Nābulusī, *Gerçek Varlık*, 20, 26.

existence is outside any qualification such as universal, particular, one or many. According to al-Qayṣarī, existence in "existence as such" is neither substance, nor accident, nor even existence outside or within the mind.[17] Later Sufis distinguish existence in this sense from existence as "to be present;" accordingly, the mind searches for the meaning of "to be present" in natural and general terms, whereas existence is a kind of being present. As a result, Sufis treated the problems arising from these meanings. Therefore, to understand the Sufi view of existence, we first should examine the difference between existence and existing as a reality to which the mind naturally steers and existence as a term that expresses God.

Another point to understand about existence is that it is not a concept that has any antonyms whatsoever. This is the main reason that existence cannot be known. Existence is not the antonym of nothingness and in fact, there is no such thing as nothingness.[18] Nothingness is only a potentiality that makes Being possible to emerge and appear.

In terms of the Necessary Being, the principal question about being is the relationship between existence and essence. The Sufi attitude about this problem is as follows: Sufis discuss the personality, attributes, and names of Allah in detail. These are issues with a certain turn of phrase and proper terminology. For example, Sufis ceaselessly address theological and philosophical issues such as the relationship between the self and its attributes, the problem of the primacy of attributes, the names of Allah, and how and by whom these names will be determined. Moreover, Sufis insist that the source of our knowledge about Allah is divine names. Through the use of such concepts, Sufis attempt to explain how to envisage Allah and participate in discussion around those concepts. Nevertheless, a new approach comes to light, especially from Ibn ʿArabī and al-Qūnawī: to attempt to address the God conception formed within the line of relationships between self and attributes, as Absolute Being and His

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[17] Al-Qayṣarī expresses the problem as follows: "It should be noted that existence as such (*min ḥaythᵘ huwa*) is different from exterior and intellectual existence, since each of the latter is its kinds. Existence as such, namely, unconditional existence, is not restricted with absoluteness and constraint. Existence is neither universal nor particular, neither general nor private, neither one with a unity added to itself nor plural." Al-Qayṣarī, *ibid*.,13.

[18] About the mentioned aspect of *wujūd*, see al-Qayṣarī, *ibid*., 13-22.

emergence and manifestations. The relationship between the essence and existence of God is considered a part of the question regarding the relationship between His self and qualities. Thereupon, another problem comes to the fore: Having the problems and terminology descending from kalām tradition, Sufis began to confront a rich conceptual world through philosophical heritage. Along with some other factors, this fact paved the way for a rich terminology; consequently, the interpenetration among concepts and topics from various sources became one of the primary difficulties involved in understanding Sufi texts.

With respect to Allah, it is possible to discuss an essence and an existence. Essence is expressed by the terms such as the self of Ḥaqq, His truth, origin, or identity. Allah also has an existence. Accordingly, what is the relationship between His existence/essence and truth? In other words, is existence identical with His self, or is it an attribute attached to self? This is clearly the primary concern of the Ibn ʿArabī School. Al-Qūnawī moves from two points of view in analyzing this problem. First, he seeks an explanation that does not injure the simplicity and unity of Self; second, he attempts to avoid the delusion that He is dependent or in need of anything whatsoever. Therefore, in addressing the essence and existence of God and their interconnection, one must demonstrate the simplicity and unity of Allah on the one hand, and to determine that He is the self-sufficient existence that needs nothing, on the other hand.[19] In other words, the solution to the problem is based on the analysis of the concept of necessary being.

Next, through the perspective of the commentators of Ibn ʿArabī, the first thing to understand with respect to the being of Allah is that existence is not an addition to His essence. This is because if *wujūd* is considered an addition to the essence of God, then God incorporates both an existence and an essence. In that case, God is a being who is a compound of essence and *wujūd*. However, our most explicit verdict about God is that He is both *simple* and *one*. Because God cannot be considered composite in any sense, existence cannot be ascribed to His truth. Once we accept that existence of God is added to His truth, we would be asked from whence such existence was gained. His existence would be either autogenous or dependent on something else. If His existence were via itself, then a second primacy

[19] Al-Qūnawī, *Yazışmalar*, 185.

should have been present. However, this is impossible, because God is one. Alternatively, existence is gained from something else or is created by God, whereupon the existence of God should either be grounded on something else or be related to a changing thing. Nevertheless, both are impossible for God, because they contradict the idea of a "necessary being." Another aspect of the problem concentrates on the question of *unity* and *multitude*. If existence and truth are considered separate, then God should have a truth and an existence. However, God is one and simple in an absolute sense. Therefore, in God, existence or truth is one and identical. Accordingly, if God is existence with no essence other than His existence, namely, if His existence is the same as His self, then our knowledge about His existence – and the knowledge of the human mind about God consists of knowing him as sheer existence – means to know God entirely. However, we know that our knowledge about God is limited. It is impossible for us to know one aspect of His being and not another, because His being is one and simple. If He is known on one side and unknown on the other, then His being is a composite concept. This would also contradict the idea of the Necessary Being. This problem is solved by interpreting Absolute Being as a negative, not positive expression or definition. Absolute Being or One is merely an existence to make an expression and indication possible. In this respect, being or One is not a positive qualification, it is a negative one. As al-Qūnawī states, the negative does not express knowledge.[20] The Sufi distinction in this respect is often overlooked. Al-Nābulusī says: "When we call Ḥaqq as *wujūd*, we mean an expression that approximates Him to human mind."[21] The essence and self of God is one and the same. However, *wujūd*, in the sense of the self and the essence of God, is an ambiguous and negative qualification. Otherwise, to know His existence would be synonymous with knowing His self, which is impossible. Therefore, according to Sufis, for God, existence is not an attribute ascribed to self – it is identical with the self. Pursuant to the definition of the unity of existence by al-Kāshānī, "unity of existence means indivisibility of existence as necessary and contingent. Thereupon, existence is not an accident, but it is what realizes

[20] For assessments by al-Qūnawī on the issue, see *Yazışmalar*, 53-58.

[21] Al-Nābulusī, *Gerçek Varlık*, 20.

the truth of every present thing and such a thing can be nothing but Ḥaqq. In this respect, existence has become identical with self."[22]

Why do the commentators of Ibn ʿArabī such as al-Qūnawī, al-Qayṣarī, and al-Nābulusī always ground on the relationship between existence and essence in analyzing the unity of existence? In other words, with respect to Allah, why do those interpreters consider existence identical with essence (self) and not as its attribute?

We believe that the principle of identity of essence (self) and existence was obligatory to justify the unity of existence, because the proposition "existence as such is Ḥaqq" necessitates considering existence as the primary element in the doctrine of the unity of existence. Otherwise, if existence was an attribute ascribed to essence (self), we would have overlooked the fact that His existence is both simple and single (one). However, simplicity and absolute unity invalidate the compound character that there is an essence and an existence separate from one another. Therefore, to discuss the unity of existence means to discuss the unity of something that corresponds to Ḥaqq, in other words, the absolute unity that is necessarily present in the phrase "existence as such is Ḥaqq." Accordingly, the identity of essence and existence in God is the primary principle of the unity of existence, which means that being cannot be divided as necessary and contingent. Through the means of "existence as such is Ḥaqq," the advocates of the unity of existence have justified that God is an absolute being within the scope of the relationship and duality between God and the universe and that such is the existence of Ḥaqq.

Historically, the course of discussion among Sufis regarding the unity of existence clearly shows that the main principle of the unity of existence is the identity of essence and existence. Indeed, Sufis, who object to the unity of existence, primarily concentrate their criticisms on the problem of the identity between essence and existence. For instance, it is notable that ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336), one of the first Sufis to criticize Ibn ʿArabī and the unity of existence, grounds his criticism on the definition of Allah as "absolute being" by Ibn ʿArabī.[23] The assessment by al-Simnānī is apparently directed to the basic proposition that "existence as such is Ḥaqq," which consti-

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[22] Al-Kāshānī, *al-Risāla*, 710.

[23] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, *Nefahâtü'l-üns* [= *Nafaḥāt al-uns min ḥaḍarāt al-quds*] (eds. Süleyman Uludağ and Mustafa Kara; Istanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1995), 658.

tutes the basis of the unity of existence. al-Imām al-Rabbānī (d. 1034/1624), a follower of al-Simnānī, also concentrates his criticism of the unity of existence on the principle of the identity between essence and existence. Indeed, in one of his letters, al-Rabbānī indicates that he observes that the truth of Ḥaqq cannot even be called as existence once one has attained the ultimate point of Sufi experience.[24] For al-Rabbānī, whereas existence logically requires nothingness as its antonym, the truth of self is excluded from concepts in need of antonyms. According to him, "how can an existence, which can be replaced by its antonym, attain the rank of self? If we call this rank as existence, it is due to the shortage of expression. Such nomination refers the existence which nothingness cannot attain."[25] Therefore, the self, which is beyond our knowledge and intelligence, is even excluded from existence as an attribute. With respect to whether existence is an attribute or whether existence is added to essence, al-Imām al-Rabbānī seems to be in the camp claiming that existence is an attribute of the self and thus adds to it. Such an approach is an explicit criticism of the first proposition of the unity of existence, namely, "existence as such is Ḥaqq."

At this point, the discussion of the relationship between the unity of existence and the identity of essence and existence between ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. 826/1423), a disciple of Ibn ʿArabī School, and ʿAbd Allāh al-Būsnawī (d. 1054/1644), a strict defender of Ibn ʿArabī, is very interesting and provides a better understanding of the matter. As seen above, the basis of the unity of existence is that existence is not an attribute of, but is identical with, the self. Indeed, Ibn ʿArabī and later his commentators believe that with respect to the ranks of existence, the self cannot be defined through any name, attribute, qualification, or connection and that the first rank, namely, *aḥadiyya*, is the rank of absolute being, which means that existence is not an attribute, because when we refer to the self as existence, we provide no information about the self. In the words of al-Qayṣarī, "If existence were accident, it would have existed with a subject matter that exist-

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[24] Abū l-Barakāt al-Imām al-Rabbānī Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Aḥad ibn Zayn al-ʿābidīn al-Sirhindī, *Mektûbât* [*al-Maktūbāt*] (translated into Turkish by Abdulkadir Akçiçek; Istanbul: Fatih Kitabevi, n.d.), I, 244-245.

[25] Al-Imām al-Rabbānī, *ibid*., I, 244.

ed before it. Then, a thing should have existed prior to its self… This is why it is impossible that existence is added to its self."[26]

Here, al-Jīlī develops an interpretation that contradicts the abovementioned fundamental connection, although he does not directly criticize Ibn ʿArabī and his commentators. According to al-Jīlī, "existence is an attribute of the self."[27] Thus, al-Jīlī defines the first rank, indicated as absolute being and *aḥadiyya* by the commentators of Ibn ʿArabī, as "nothingness which precedes existence." This means that at this rank the self, which is exempt from all connections, does not even possess a connection to existence. The second degree, however, can only be referred to as an absolute being and *aḥadiyya*: "The second rank is inferior to the first, because at this stage, the existence becomes visible in the self. Whereas at the first rank, the self is exempt from connection with existence."[28] According to al-Jīlī, in the first rank, in the event that the self is excluded from any name, attribute, or connection, we cannot ascribe any predicate or decree to it. Accordingly, the self, which has not become visible in any manner, is far from becoming the object of any type of knowledge. In such a case, existence (which joins the self afterwards, namely, at the second rank (called by al-Jīlī as *lāḥiq*: one who attains[29]), also includes a judgment because we now refer to the existence of the self, a trait that was not present during the first stage.

Therefore, unlike Ibn ʿArabī and his commentators who defend the identity between existence and self during the first phase, al-Jīlī starts from the fact that existence is an attribute and only later considers existence as attached to the self. For us, this nuance shows how al-Jīlī differs from Ibn ʿArabī school in the context of the most fundamental principle related to the unity of existence. Accordingly, in Ibn ʿArabī tradition, the doctrine is primarily grounded on existence, whereas according to al-Jīlī, the system is primarily based on the self, rather than existence. The interesting point is how and in which context the views of al-Jīlī, who believes that existence is added to es-

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[26] Al-Qayṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 13.

[27] Quṭb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, *al-Kamālāt al-ilāhiyya fī l-ṣifāt al-Muḥammadiyya* (ed. Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ; Cairo: Maktabat ʿĀlam al-Fikr, 1997), 71.

[28] Al-Jīlī, *Marātib al-wujūd wa-ḥaqīqat kull mawjūd* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira, 1999), 17; id., *al-Kamālāt al-ilāhiyya*, 56.

[29] Al-Jīlī, *al-Kamālāt al-ilāhiyya*, 56.

sence, are addressed by the commentators of Ibn ʿArabī. Indeed ʿAbd Allāh al-Būsnawī, a serious defender of Ibn ʿArabī, severely criticizes al-Jīlī for his abovementioned approach, pursuant to the claim that the identity between essence and existence is the fundamental principle of the unity of existence. Quoting al-Qūnawī, al-Būsnawī states the two fundamental propositions of the tradition, namely, existence is identical with the self at the first stage and for those other than the self, existence is added to essence. Next, al-Būsnawī analyzes the views of al-Jīlī. The basis for al-Būsnawī's criticisms of al-Jīlī is that if we are to assert that existence is a connection and becomes visible in self at the second stage, then we will have to accept that the self does not exist at the first stage when it lacks the quality of *wujūd* and that the existence infiltrates the self at the second stage. This means that whereas al-Jīlī argues that the self is exempt from a connection with existence, al-Būsnawī ascribes the connection of "nothingness" to the self. Al-Jīlī's mistake is to rely on the judgment that existence is an attribute and to refrain from calling the self an "absolute being." For al-Būsnawī, al-Jīlī is right in not ascribing any attribute to the self. However, *wujūd* is not an attribute that we can ascribe to the self. In the words of al-Būsnawī, we cannot say that "a thing belongs to itself. Because, that thing is itself;" therefore, because existence is already identical with the self, we do not ascribe it to the self.[30] Indeed, al-Būsnawī criticizes al-Jīlī for defending the addition of existence to the self and considers the attachment of existence to the self as a deviation from the unity of existence. This means that (at the very least), al-Būsnawī's opposition to Sufi tradition is confirmed by a defender of Ibn ʿArabī.

Consequently, the view of the Ibn ʿArabī School about the relationship between essence and existence – in logical terms, the proposition "there is self," – is (pursuant to Kantian classification) an analytical proposition. Although "there is" is a predicate in terms of grammar and logic, it is actually different from the predicate in, for example, the proposition "man is mortal." In the latter example, the predicate adds something that was not already present in the subject, whereas "there is self" adds nothing to the subject. Existence is already within the scope of the concept of self. That the existence is not

[30] For al-Būsnawī's views, see ʿAbd Allāh ʿAbdī ibn Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Būsnawī, *Kitāb al-qirār al-rūḥī al-mamdūd li-l-aḍyāf al-wāridīn min marātib al-wujūd* (MS Istanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Cârullah Efendi, no. 2129), 1a-27b.

an addition to or an attribute of essence, on the contrary, that it is the same as essence, entails the proposition "existence as such is Ḥaqq," which means that existence is both single and indivisible.

B. The Status of Existence as Attachment to Essence in Contingent Beings: *al-Aʿyān al-thābita* or the Nonactualization and Nonexistence of Contingent Truths

In terms of Ḥaqq, Sufis derived from the identity of essence and existence the primary proposition of the unity of existence, namely, "existence as such is Ḥaqq;" thus, they not only indicated that existence is the primary element but also proved that there is a single existence in an absolute sense. However, if the universe also exists within the scope of the relationship between Allah and the universe, and if this existence entails plurality, how can we explain such plurality and how can we talk about absolute unity in spite of that plurality? This is one of the main problems faced by Sufis who defend the unity of existence. This problem impels us to analyze and search for a solution to the relationship between essence and existence in contingent beings. Sufi thought (which defends the unity of existence) considering the relationship between essence and existence in contingent beings can be summarized in the following words of al-Qūnawī: "For Ḥaqq, existence is same with the essence. As for those other than Ḥaqq, existence is an addition to the truth."[31] Pursuant to his definition, in contingent beings, essence and existence are separate, existence is added to essence and existence is obtained from some other thing. The concept of contingency means "something whose existence and absence is identical;" therefore, contingent beings need something else in order to exist. Indeed, the meaning of the concept is most clearly expressed in the opening phrase of *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya* by Ibn ʿArabī: "Thank God who brings things into being from nothing and absence of nothing."[32]

With respect to contingent beings, essence is used as synonymous with truth. Nevertheless, Sufis use "identical (*ʿayn*)" for the single essence or existence and "truths (*aʿyān*)" for all contingent beings.

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[31] Al-Qūnawī, *Tasavvuf Metafiziği*, 23.

[32] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿArabī, *al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya* (ed. ʿUthmān Yaḥyā; 2nd edn., Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1985), I, 41.

Ibn ʿArabī adds an attribute to this concept and attains *al-aʿyān al-thābita* (immutable entities). For al-Qūnawī, the immutable entities in the Sufi concept of immutable entities correspond to "certain absence" and "invariable thing" in Muʿtazilī terminology.[33] In this respect, immutable entities signify the truth and essence of contingent beings; research on the relationship between essence and existence in contingent beings requires an analysis of immutable entities.

In Sufi literature, immutable entities include meanings such as "truths of things," "effects of names and attributes," "knowledge of Ḥaqq," and "images of beings for divine knowledge."[34] Pursuant to such definitions, immutable entities are a store of divine knowledge that includes the content of the attribute of knowledge for divine essence and the truth and presence of contingent beings in divine knowledge in terms of the universe; in other words, it is a store in which things subject to knowledge of Allah and the reality of particular beings in universe take place.[35] In this respect, the truth is distinguished by its feature of "being around" because of the ontological relationship between Allah and the universe. Moreover, He is passive in terms of the attribute of knowledge ascribed to Him and is active in proportion to the contingent beings that He determines. Things in the domain of phenomenal being were already potentially present in divine self before becoming reasonable and sensible objects. The category of created beings is the truths that have been actualized in line with their truths in divine knowledge.

As a constitutive and decisive concept in the relationship between Allah and the universe, immutable entities are the sole concept that enables determining the position and actuality of contingent beings with respect to Allah. Accordingly, immutable entities are the fundamental concept that causes us to render a judgment about the essence and content of the unity of existence. The definition "existence

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[33] Al-Qūnawī, *Tasavvuf Metafiziği*, 23.

[34] For the concept, see Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (ed. Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfîfî; Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1980), 60, 81, 99, 111; al-Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil fī maʿrifat al-awākhir wa-l-awāʾil* (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Azhariyya, 1963), 15, 51.

[35] For an assessment of invariable truths, see Abū l-ʿAlā ʿAfîfî, *Naẓariyyāt al-Islāmiyyīn fī l-kalima (The Logos)* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī al-Faransī li-l-Āthār al-Sharqiyya, 1934); Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts* (Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 159-196.

is an addition to truth in those other than Ḥaqq" in the beginning of this chapter can now be re-established as "existence is an addition to truths in contingent beings."

Ibn ʿArabī and his followers advanced two fundamental propositions about immutable entities to ensure a more direct understanding of the unity of existence:

The first is that truths are uncreated things.

Al-Qūnawī treats the question of contingent essences in his correspondences with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and asks whether contingent essences are created.[36] Al-Qūnawī not only analyzes the knowledge and final verdict of mind about contingent essences but also assesses various possibilities. The mind can attempt to prove that essences are either created or not created. However, both cases may result in problems. If essences are not created, they should not have existence. If we assert the contrary, essences would have to be the same as the Necessary Being due to the necessity of their existence and spontaneity, whereupon they could not be contingent. Contingency means that something possesses the characteristics of possibility and requirement, which necessitates that it obtains its existence from some other thing. If something did not feature contingency due to its existence, then it should have been necessary. Conversely, if contingent essences have a type of existence even prior to creation, they will escape their essential characteristics (possibility and requirement). Sufis and the scholars on truth agree about the rule that truths are subject to no variation or alteration. Therefore, judgment about contingent essences should not result in a verdict that is different from their added features and that derive themselves from such a feature.

If we are to assume that contingent essences exist in any manner even though they are uncreated, then it is necessary to distinguish the relationship of the existence obtained from God between that of existence possessed of contingent beings. If both existences are the same, this leads to a tautology, which al-Qūnawī often mentions and calls impossible; consequently, God provides no meaning for existence. If we accept that they are two separate existences, this would also be impossible, because it has already been admitted that there is a common and single existence among all contingent beings. Another consequence follows if we accept that contingent essences are not

[36] Al-Qūnawī, *Yazışmalar*, 59.

created: we accept that all contingent essences revert from the status of necessity to contingency and from eternal and private abstemiousness to the rank of being created. In that case, we must admit that in the course of acquiring existence, contingent beings proceed from perfection towards insufficiency. Thus far, we have seen the possibilities and contradiction to emerge once we assert contingent essences as uncreated.

Can we protect the mind from encountering contradiction by accepting that contingent essences are created? If so, Ḥaqq should be the origin of infinite absences and the reason for differentiation among them. Accordingly, the consequence of the effect of Ḥaqq would be a nonexistent situation in a nonexistent thing, because those that do not exist cannot differ from one another in the state of nothingness.[37]

With respect to the matter of the relationship between essence and existence in God, the objective of al-Qūnawī is to prove the impossibility of attaining definitive judgments about contingent essences merely through the mind. According to him, the answers to be provided by the human mind about contingent essences can always be disproved in various aspects. The precise information in this respect can be information acquired through *pleasure* and pursuant to that information, "essences are uncreated and have a kind of existence."[38]

What does it mean when we say that immutable entities are uncreated as essence and truth of contingent beings? What is the connection between such fact and the unity of existence? The response by al-Qūnawī includes the following assessment. As noted above, the truths of contingent beings cannot be qualified as being created. Indeed, "to be created" means to be present, otherwise something that has no existence cannot be created. If we admit that truths are created, then eternal knowledge should have had an effect on the appearance of the known in eternity. However, the truths known by knowledge are not outside the one who knows them. In other words,

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[37] For details about the analyses by al-Qūnawī on the problems that will unfold through the judgment of the mind regarding whether invariable truths, as contingent essences, are created, see *Yazışmalar*, 59-63.

[38] Al-Qūnawī says "The true observation and authentic pleasure signify that the essences are uncreated and that they have a kind of existence; this very existence is the one which belongs to essences in the way they become apparent in eternal and everlasting knowledge of Ḥaqq." See *Yazışmalar*, 61.

we can discuss a kind of existence of the truths within the self of one who knows them, because they are nonexistent in themselves. If to be created means to exist, the truths should have been equal to the Ḥaqq who knows them in terms of being or Ḥaqq should have been a space for acceptance of the effect from Himself to Himself, and a quality for others to be able to consider truths as created.[39] According to al-Qūnawī, all such claims are void. For us, the consequence of al-Qūnawī's efforts to prove that the truths of the contingent are uncreated is relevant to the content of the unity of existence. Accordingly, to claim that the truths of contingent beings are created would point to their existence independent from Ḥaqq, which would constitute a contradiction with absolute unity. "The to-be-created of truths of the contingent impairs the absoluteness of the unity of Ḥaqq," says al-Qūnawī.[40]

Therefore, the main principle is that existence and essence are separate, and the contingent being obtains its existence from Necessary Being. The first result of this principle is that essences are uncreated. That essences are uncreated is the most fundamental issue regarding the conception of the unity of existence. If essences are uncreated, the tension between an existence and an existing plurality dies out; namely, it becomes possible to explain plurality in the universe of beings through the doctrine of the unity of existence based on absolute unity. That truths are uncreated means that they have no reality independent of a knowledge of Allah and that absolute unity is preserved in the system of the unity of existence. Therefore, one of the fundamental propositions and inclusions of the unity of existence is that in divine knowledge, the immutable entities of contingent beings are uncreated.

Second, existence is attached to immutable entities, which is the truth of contingent beings.

Ibn ʿArabī formulates the problem as follows: "One who is invariable in nothingness has not even smelled existence. They remain in their original condition even though their images in beings reproduce. The truth in all of them is one. The plurality is in the names."[41]

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[39] Al-Qūnawī, *Tasavvuf Metafiziği*, 23-24.

[40] Al-Qūnawī, *ibid*., 24.

[41] Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 76.

What does this mean? To understand, we should know that Ibn ʿArabī and his commentators discuss two modes of existence, namely, *thubūtī* and *wujūdī* existence. In the terminology of Ibn ʿArabī, *thubūt* means the existence of contingent essence in the knowledge of Allah; therefore, it principally signifies nothingness. Therefore, despite being invariable within the knowledge (wisdom) of Allah, immutable entities are actually nonexistent because they have no independent and autonomous state of existence.[42] In other words, to be absent means to be nonpresent. *Wujūdī* existence means to have an existence in outside world; Sufis call this the presence of truths. Therefore, particular beings are immutable entities disguised in existence. The assertion by Ibn ʿArabī that truths cannot even smell existence can be evaluated in this respect. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between the *thubūtī* presence of contingent essences in the knowledge of Allah and their existence outside. At this point, we can indicate that immutable entities are uncreated because they do not exist in terms of being present within the knowledge of Allah; moreover, pursuant to the definition of contingency, they have obtained their existence from another being. Thereupon existence opts for truth afterwards. Ibn ʿArabī expresses the status of contingent being before necessary being as follows:

> That which exists afterwards precisely needs one to make it exist due to the subsequence and self-possibility of the former. Therefore, the being of the thing which exists afterwards originates from another. There is a relation of indigence between the subsequent existence and that who makes it exist. The being, which the subsequent existence is grounded on, should essentially be the Necessary Being.[43]

Ibn ʿArabī clearly indicates that the contingent being, namely, the truths, obtain their existence from Ḥaqq. Thus, existence is added to contingent truths from outside. Ibn ʿArabī often defines contingency as a "state of want." Contingency includes the meaning of the "state of needing another for existence."[44] This is a crucial point, because Ibn ʿArabī, claiming that the essences of contingent beings are uncreated, equally asserts that it is Allah who provides them with existence and

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[42] For *thubūtī* and *wujūdī* existence, see al-Qūnawī, *al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhiyya* (along with *al-Sirr al-rabbānī al-maʿrūf bi-l-Nuṣūṣ*, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2007), 26-30.

[43] Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 53.

[44] Ibn ʿArabī, *ibid*., 54.

that the creation thus actualizes. However, it is worth noting that for Ibn ʿArabī, creation is not from nothing, instead it instills existence to truths that are invariable within divine knowledge or wisdom.

What is the relationship between this problem and the unity of existence? The following statements by al-Qūnawī may help us understand the meaning of the provision of existence to contingent essences by Ḥaqq in terms of the unity of existence:

> Since One can not manifest any other than One, only 'One' emerges from Ḥaqq regarding unity of existence. For us, that One is 'the general being who inspires truths' on existent or nonexistent things whose existence eternal knowledge decides.' Contrary to views of theoretical philosophers, general being is common among *al-qalam al-aʿlā*, the first existent called *al-ʿaql al-awwal*, and other beings ... Thus, it is certain that the known things are not uncreated in the mentioned manner and that there are not two separate existences in question. On the contrary, the being is one, this being is common among others and is obtained from Ḥaqq.[45]

At this stage, al-Qūnawī notes a notable problem. All categories of being have taken their being from general existence; in this respect, all those who exist are common in terms of existing. Therefore, we refer to a single existence with respect to all categories of being. What emerges from Absolute Being is merely the manifestation of being, and the being is equal among all contingents. This fact reminds us again of the following definition by al-Kāshānī: "Unity of existence means indivisibility of existence as necessary and contingent." Accordingly, the common element in all categories of being is general existence with respect to the relationship between Allah and the universe. Then, again, what is the source of difference among the contingent? If existence is equal for all the contingent beings, it cannot be the origin of differences. Sufis, who defend the unity of existence, principally refer to immutable entities as the primary fact in order to explain differences in the universe and among those who exist. The differences among the contingent originate from their uncreated dispositions. What leads to differences and reproduces existences are the uncreated dispositions and essences. Al-Qūnawī explains this by saying that "the state of contingency reproduces the Only Existent emerging from Ḥaqq as the absolute and peculiar being by means of

[45] Al-Qūnawī, *Tasavvuf Metafiziği*, 23-24.

its restrictions and various dispositions."[46] The origin of shortages in the contingent beings is the contingent beings themselves and their uncreated essence. Ibn ʿArabī indicates "the plurality is in nomination. The names are connections, which are, in turn, the 'nonexistent things.'"[47] Therefore, the origin of difference among contingent essences is not their existence but their uncreated dispositions.

As for the relationship between essence and existence in contingent beings, essences are not created, and Ḥaqq provides them with existence. What does this mean with respect to the relationship between Allah and the universe? To say that contingent essences are uncreated will render impossible that they have an autonomous existence independent from knowledge of Allah; moreover, it enables us to explain and reduce both plurality and difference. Indeed, the plurality in the universe is absent in divine knowledge, and this fact does not prejudice divine unity. However, contingent essences have been able to become existent by obtaining their existence from Ḥaqq. Because all categories of being, including the contingent, obtain existence from general existent and because the general existent is common in all existents, we talk about not two, but only one domain of existence, which enables the preservation of the unity of existence with respect to the relationship between Allah and the universe. Thereupon, in terms of unity-plurality and Allah-universe relations, the unity of existence is based not only on the unity and singularity of existence in all categories but also on the variety and plurality of dispositions in divine knowledge.

Conclusion

The unity of existence is a Sufi term that explains the relationship between Allah-universe and man via observation and that expresses the doctrine by Ibn ʿArabī. The first user of the term is a notable question, as is the analysis of its meaning, content, inclusions, and grounds, and require significant research. Ibn ʿArabī has been the subject of several accusations due to the difficulty and complexity of a determination on the content of the concept. In this regard, it is crucial to determine the content and inclusion of the concept of unity

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[46] Al-Qūnawī, *Fusûsü'l-Hikem'in Sırları: al-Fukūk fī asrār mustanidāt ḥikam al-Fuṣūṣ* (translated into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli; Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2002), 147.

[47] Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, 76.

of existence. What is the unity of existence? In this article, we attempted to assert that the fundamental principle underlying the unity of existence should be sought in the relationship between essence and existence, a point of debate in Islamic philosophy and theology and that the relationship between essence and existence entails the unity of existence.

Sufis, who defend the unity of existence, formulate the relationship between essence and existence as follows: "The existence for Ḥaqq is identical with His self. For all others, it is an addition to the truth." With respect to Ḥaqq, Sufis consider existence as identical with self, and an addition to it. Accordingly, they see the concept of existence as the primary element and in this way, they attain the fundamental proposition of the unity of existence, namely, "existence as such is Ḥaqq." This proposition includes both the absolute unity (singularity) and simplicity of existence and advances that existence consists of Ḥaqq. With respect to the term "contingent" in the definition "existence is an addition onto the truth of the contingent," Sufis identify this concept with immutable entities in Sufi terminology. For Sufis, the immutable entities, which are the truth of contingent beings, comprise the intermediate category that makes up the Allah-universe or unity-plurality relationships. Thus, this is the exclusive concept that explains how plurality emerges from unity. Next, two principles related to the abovementioned concept can be determined. First, the truths are uncreated; second, because truths do not even have a smell of existence, the latter is later added to truth. Through the first principle, Sufis ensured that the truth of contingent beings is certain in divine knowledge and that such truths was neither autonomous nor independent because they lacked an outside existence. Moreover, Sufis preserved the principle of absolute unity by relating the plurality to the names and dispositions of truths. Conversely, the assertion that existence is added to truths afterwards enables the preservation of creation in the sense of providing truths with existence. In addition, because truths obtain existence from that of Ḥaqq, namely, the general existent, it is possible to defend the idea of single existence without dividing it in two categories such as necessary and contingent. This single existence is common in both Ḥaqq and contingent beings. Therefore, the second proposition about the unity of existence is relevant to immutable entities. Truths are uncreated and existence is added to them afterwards. Accordingly, the unity of existence is also based on the relationship between essence and existence in Allah

and contingent beings. In short, the unity of existence consists of the following proposition: "existence as such is Ḥaqq; immutable entities are uncreated and existence is added to them afterwards."

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PRACTICAL THEOLOGY AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

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Abstract

The paper addresses historical approaches to Islamic theological studies and discusses new initiatives that inspire Islamic practical theology. The author argues that there is a need for practical theology in Islamic studies. The question is how practical Islamic theological studies may help Muslim religious leaders and clergy connect their theological understanding to the everyday experience of Muslims in the community, society, and the world. The second question in this paper relates to the daily life practices of our faith and tradition: "How do daily life practices gain an 'epistemic weight' in the production of new knowledge in practical Islamic theology, where Islamic doctrine, tradition, philosophy, and the 'living human document' hold a central position?"

Key Words: Practical theology, pastoral theology, Islamic theology, hermeneutical approach, religious education

Introduction

During more than ten years as a researcher and spiritual care provider in a health care setting, I have become aware that there is an enormous gap between the academic and practical paradigms in Islamic theological studies. In other words, Islamic theological studies are more subject-oriented and lack the practical aspects of the Islamic faith lived by Muslims with the exclusion of Islamic jurisprudence.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.109

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719

This leads to significant misunderstandings and incorrect perceptions in academia about real life problems, and as a result, "academic solutions" do not work well in practical situations to which Islamic theological studies should respond. However, if we take into consideration the fact that theological knowledge depends on the context and is sensitive in many ways, there is a need for an understanding of the "lived" practice of Islamic theological studies or a greater need for practical theology in Islamic studies to enable both academics and practitioners of the Islamic faith to address issues of power, cultural diversity, and religious pluralism among Muslims. We need to develop a new perspective in Islamic theological studies that reflects the lived experience of Muslims, and we also need to provide tools to put Islamic theological concepts into practice.

Although there are few data available indicating the religious makeup of faculties of Islamic theological studies (i.e., the percentage of Muslims vs. non-Muslims), I argue that these faculties fail to initiate creative resources in order to produce religious leaders that meet the psychosocial needs of the Muslim community. Most of these faculties tend to discuss practical aspects of the Islamic faith in abstract ways. One remedy to correct the condition of Islamic practical theological studies is the introduction of new approaches in practical theology in the Islamic context, which can be defined as a conversation between the lived experience and the Islamic faith and as an attempt to engage Islam both empirically and hermeneutically.

Currently, we do not have a specific and well-defined understanding of practical theology in Islamic theological studies. However, I argue that practical theology offers new opportunities for Islamic professions, such as Islamic spiritual care and counseling, and is an important addition to Islamic theological studies because the empirical aspects of practical theology allow the application of theological disciplines and humanities and the social sciences. I argue that practical theology promises new avenues to make Islamic theological studies move away from a narrow and rigid academic discipline to an increasingly vivid interdisciplinary and action-oriented field. Furthermore, practical theology will offer qualitative approaches that reflect various philosophical assumptions, world views, and theoretical lenses.[1] In this sense, practical theology promises more cultural

[1] John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches* (2nd edn., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 4.

transformations of Islam within Islamic cultures. I do not argue, however, that academic discussions of Islamic faith, which depend on the complex web of abstract theories, neglect the real life issues in any way. What I do argue is that we need practical theology in Islamic studies in order to make academic discussions relevant to the daily practice of the Islamic faith. We need to know how to design practical theology in Islamic theological studies so that it may act as a bridge between academia and all areas of life in which we observe and practice Islamic doctrine and in which we find meaning in the observance of this lived doctrine. As explained by Bonnie Miller-McLemore, E. Rhodes, and Leona B. Carpenter, Professor of Pastoral Theology and head of the International Academy of Practical Theology, a practical knowledge of theology should not only emerge from personal or social experience but also be born from a living "tradition (e.g., worship)," "scripture (e.g., lectiodivina)," and "reason."[2] Currently, in Islamic tradition, it is generally accepted that production of knowledge must be based on the integration of theory, practice, and spirituality (*al-ʿaql, al-jasad*, and *al-rūḥ*).

Practical theology in Islamic theological studies needs to be established and cherished because "practical theological knowledge is still our expert subject matter, worthy of greater study and status than it has been accorded, just as scripture is the expertise of a biblical scholar or tradition the expertise of the religious historian regardless of where they ground their constructive work."[3]

The first part of this paper addresses historical approaches to Islamic theological studies. Then, we move to a discussion of the new initiatives that inspire Islamic practical theology and the need for practical theology in Islamic studies. The question is how practical Islamic theological studies may help Muslim religious leaders and clergy connect their theological understanding to the everyday experience of Muslims in the community, society, and the world. The second question in this paper relates to the daily life practice of Islamic faith and tradition: "How do daily life practices gain an 'epistemic weight' in the production of new knowledge in practical Islamic theology, where Islamic doctrine, tradition, and the 'living human document' hold a central position?"

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2 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, "Toward Greater Understanding of Practical Theology," *International Journal of Practical Theology* 16/1 (2012), 108.

3 Ibid., 108.

A Historical Approach to Islamic Studies

Many Muslim scholars have devoted their writings to exploring the past and contemporary conditions of Islamic theological studies.[4] Although most of these authors[5] have concentrated on how to integrate the Islamic worldview into social and behavioral sciences, their works have contributed to the reformation of Islamic theological studies in Muslim countries.

Due to the lack of practical vision and mission in Islamic studies, many Muslim thinkers took the initiative to present an example for

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[4] Muhammad Hamid al-Afendi and Nabi Ahmed Baloch (eds.), *Curriculum and Teacher Education* (Jeddah: King Abdulaziz University, 1980); Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1962); Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); Nimat Hafez Barazangi, *Woman's Identity and the Qur'ān: A New Reading* (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004); Munir D. Ahmad, "Muslim Education Prior to the Establishment of *Madrasah*," *Islamic Studies* 26/4 (1987), 321-348; Ismāʿīl Rājī al-Fārūqī, "Islamizing the Social Sciences," in Ismāʿīl Rājī al-Fārūqī and Abdullah Omar Nasseef (eds.), *Social and Natural Sciences: The Islamic Perspectives* (Sevenoaks, Kent-UK: Hodder and Stoughton & Jeddah: King Abdulaziz University, 1981); Sayyid Waqqar Ahmed Husaini, "Humanistic-Social Sciences Studies in Higher Education: Islamic and International Perspectives," in Ismāʿīl Rājī al-Fārūqī and Abdullah Omar Nasseef (eds.), *Social and Natural Sciences: The Islamic Perspectives*; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Teaching of Philosophy," in Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), *Philosophy, Literature, and Fine Arts* (Sevenoaks, Kent-UK: Hodder and Stoughton & Jeddah: King Abdulaziz University, 1982); Salah Hussein Al-Abidi, "The Mosque: Adult Education and Uninterrupted Learning," *Al-Islām al-Yawm/Islam Today* 7/7 (1989), 68-77.

[5] Taha Jabir al-Alwani, "The Islamization of Methodology of Behavioral Sciences," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 6/2 (1989), 227-238; M. Umer Chapra, *The Future of Economics*: *An Islamic Perspective* (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2000); Ismāʿīl Rājī al-Fārūqī, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan* (Washington, D.C.: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982); Mehdi Golshani, "How to Make Sense of Islamic Science?,"*American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 17/3 (2000), 1-21; Sayyid Abū l-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī, *Role of Academic Research in an Age of Civilizational Struggle* (Karachi: n.p., 2000); Fazlur Rahman, "Islamization of Knowledge: A Response," *American Journal of Social Sciences* 5/1 (1988), 3-11; Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islām and Secularism* (2nd edn., Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization [ISTAC], 1993).

Islamic theological studies. For example, Ismāʿīl Rājī al-Fārūqī[6] initiated the 'Islamization of Knowledge,' which provoked Fazlur Rahman's[7] response to the dilemma. The process of so-called 'Islamization of Knowledge' began to evolve with the First World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca/Saudi Arabia in 1977 and became more prominent in the 1980s. Eventually, the two main camps of Muslim intellectuals emerged: the traditional Muslim scholars who argued that all knowledge, including science, must be based on *naqlī* tradition and rejected science that did not conform with the main sources of the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*, and the secularist-modernist scholars, who supported the role of *ʿaql* (human reason) in the evolution of Islamic studies and the neutrality of science. In addition to these two camps, the emerging postmodernist camp of Muslims scholars argues that Muslims need "to create their own science by incorporating what is positive in modern science into a world view where God reigns supreme ..."[8] Such developments in the process of the "Islamization" of knowledge encouraged the recognition of the importance of the integration of theory, practice, and spirituality (*al-ʿaql*, *al-jasad*, and *al-rūḥ*).[9]

According to Gregory Starrett,[10] reformist changes in educational systems not only transformed the practical approaches to Islamic education but also transformed ideological perspectives about religion and religious education. For example, some Muslim countries have striven to integrate Islamic education into the social and behavioral sciences to enable the younger generations to achieve cultural knowledge about their heritage. Nevertheless, there was no clear distinction between the 'religious' teachings and Islamic higher learning.[11] In addition, the Islamic education (*madrasa*) system was reserved for the poor and underprivileged, while secular education was established for rich and middle class students. In some Muslim countries, the subject of Islam was removed from the curriculum as a mandatory subject and later on, was reintroduced as an optional sub-

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6 Al-Fārūqī, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan*.

7 Rahman, "Islamization of Knowledge: A Response."

8 Nasr, "Islam and the Problem of Modern Science," *MAAS Journal of Islamic Science* 4/1 (1988), 45-57.

9 See "Fathoming IOK, An Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Zein," *IIITM Letter* 19 (1998).

10 Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

11 Barazangi, *Woman's Identity*, 11-13.

ject under the general name of 'religion' insead of ethics and character development. As a result, the field of Islamic studies was left to the realm of passive Sufi orders and the *madrasa* system.

In contrast, in some Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Egypt, state-centralized schooling, (in the past controlled by missionaries or privately funded institutions) used a secular approach to education on *tarbiya* (upbringing, nurture, teaching) that acquired a new meaning: it implied the skills and information required for a job.[12] In Turkey, for example, Islamic schools were completely under state control in the 1930s. For a brief period in 1933, the Turkish government even banned Islamic education, including theological education at the universities. Ultimately, however, the Turkish government reopened the faculties of theology in Istanbul and Ankara. The primary focus of these faculties was to train religious leaders for official state duty. Both the state and privately run Islamic theological faculties failed to incorporate the essential subjects of Islamic studies that were once taught in pre-colonial Islamic centers, where the primary education curricula concentrated on Qurʾānic *talqīn* (acquisition and dissemination of meaning and spirit), *akhbār* (history), *ḥisāb* (simple arithmetic and reckoning), elementary Arabic *naḥw* (grammar), reading, and writing, *ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* (Qurʾānic sciences), *ʿulūm al-ḥadīth* (sciences of the Prophetic tradition), and their ancillary sciences of Arabic *naḥw*, *ādāb* (literature), and *ḥikma*. In some Muslim countries, religious education differed from Islamic education and vice versa. For example, in Malaysia and Turkey, the state ensures that compulsory Islamic worldview courses are taught to all students in elementary and high schools. In general, Islamic education became more dependent on *naqlī* knowledge (acquired knowledge based on the 'religious sources,' especially the Qurʾān and the prophetic tradition) and lacked lessons on *ʿaqlī* knowledge (acquired by human efforts); thus, religious education transformed Qurʾānic principles into formalized legal and moral codes and rituals, creating a dichotomy in Islamic thinking.[13]

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[12] *Ibid*., 12.

[13] Barazangi, Nimat Hafez, "Education: Religious Education," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World,* Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0212#e0212-s1 (accessed December 28, 2014).

As a result of these secular interventions, Islamic theological education was deprived of its intellectual value.[14] There were some exceptions, however: in some private Islamic institutions in South Asia, i.e., Darul Uloom Deoband in India and Darul Uloom in Pakistan, religious centers produced very knowledgeable and competent religious leaders through their graduate and postgraduate specialization courses (*takmīl*) in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), the study of Prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*), and Islamic classical theology (*kalām*). Some programs in these centers required more than eight years of study. Nevertheless, in general, none of the Islamic theological faculties, whether state or informal, represented proper educational reform.[15] This was especially evident in the area of women's education in Islamic studies and proper methodological approaches to Islamic studies. Barazangi and Nasr[16] explain this lack of perspectives and approaches with the confusion of *taḥfīẓ* (oral and aural transmission), which often became confused with *talqīn* (the acquisition and dissemination of Qurʾānic principles and spirit). If, historically, the *talqīn* principle in Islamic institutions led to the production of many 'philosopher-scientists' in various intellectual disciplines, later on, its replacement with *taḥfīẓ* led to religious indoctrination. As Barazangi complains, Islamic education was therefore limited to the traditional method of reciting the Qurʾān instead of teaching the Qurʾān as the foundation of all knowledge in Islamic studies.[17] Ali A. Mazrui[18] explains this by citing the impact of the English colonial system in the Middle East and the French colonial system in North and West Africa, Syria, and Lebanon every area of life.

Furthermore, ideological influences and sectarianism in Islamic schools mobilized students to stand up for their own 'true' version of Islam. Such sectarianism produced intolerance toward dissenting fellow Muslims and non-Muslims and ultimately fed into political extremism. The root cause for such polarization, however, was the political manipulation of these schools by some Islamic politicians and militants. It has also been noted that, conversely, some radical and ideological groups sought to open their own schools. One ex-

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Barazangi, *Woman's Identity*, 14.

[16] Nasr, "The Teaching of Philosophy," 3-21.

[17] Barazangi, "Religious Education."

[18] See Ali A. Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (Boston & Toronto: Little Brown, 1986).

ample is Jāmiʿat al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya in Karachi, which is committed to the group's ideology.

Practical Theology in Islamic Theological Studies

Despite the efforts to produce new methodologies in Islamic studies, Islamic theological studies still lack appropriate perspectives and methodologies. This gap is especially felt with the emergence of new professions such as Islamic spiritual care and Islamic counseling, to name a few. Nevertheless, some contemporary Muslim writers reflect on research in Islamic theology that focuses particularly on field research activities. For example, Mohamed Ajouaou,[19] Amjad Hussain,[20] Nazila Isgandarova,[21] Thomas O'Connor,[22] Sophie Gilliat-Ray,[23] M.

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[19] Mohamed Ajouaou, *Imam Behind Bars: A Case Study of Islamic Spiritual Care in Dutch Prisons towards the Development of a Professional Profile* (North Charleston: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2014); id., *Wie is moslim? Geloof en secularisatie onder westerse moslims (*Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Meinema, 2014).

[20] Amjad Hussain, "Muslim Theology and Religious Studies: Relational, Practical, and Inter-Faith Dimensions," *Religious Education* 104/3 (2009), 239-242.

[21] Nazila Isgandarova, "The Crescent of Compassionate Engagement: Theory and Practice of Islamic Spiritual Care," in Daniel S. Schipani (ed.), *Multifaith Views in Spiritual Care* (Waterloo: Pandora Press, Society for Intercultural Pastoral Care and Counseling, 2013), 109-130; id., "Muslim Spiritual Care and Counselling," in T. O'Connor, E. Meakes, and C. Lashmar (eds.), *The Spiritual Care Givers Guide to Identity, Practice and Relationships: Transforming the Honeymoon in Spiritual Care and Therapy* (Waterloo: WLU Press, 2008), 235-256; id., "Islamic Spiritual Care in a Health Care Setting," in A. Meier, T. O'Connor, and P. Van Katwyk (eds.), *Spirituality and Health: Multidisciplinary Explorations* (Waterloo: WLU Press, 2005), 85-104; id., "The Evolution of Islamic Spiritual Care and Counseling in Ontario in the Context of the College of Registered Psychotherapists and Registered Mental Health Therapists of Ontario," *Journal of Psychology & Psychotherapy* 4/3 (2014), 1-6; id., "Rape as a Tool against Women in War: The Role of Spiritual Caregivers to Support the Survivors of an Ethnic Violence," *Cross Currents* 63/2 (2013), 174-184; id., "Effectiveness of Islamic Spiritual Care: Foundations and Practices of Muslim Spiritual Care Givers," *The Journal of Pastoral Care & Counseling* 66/3 (2012), 1-16.

[22] Nazila Isgandarova and Thomas St. James O'Connor, "A Redefinition and Model of Canadian Islamic Spiritual Care," *Journal of Pastoral Care & Counseling* 66/2 (2012), 1-8.

[23] Sophie Gilliat-Ray, "Body-Works and Fieldwork: Research with British Muslim Chaplains," *Culture and Religion* 11/4 (2010), 413-432.

Mansur Ali, and Stephen Pattison[24] engage Islamic professional work based on practical theology and social sciences. Nazila Isgandarova, for example, argues that religious studies in many Islamic institutions usually concentrate on memorization of the sacred texts, *ḥadīth*s, and *fatwā*s (juridical pronouncements) and exclude social sciences from their curricula. She states that the lack of a social sciences component in the religious training of Muslim spiritual caregivers contributes to the limited understanding of Islamic professions and makes their practice less than satisfactory.[25] Sophie Gilliat-Ray, M. Mansur Ali, and Stephen Pattison[26] present one of the most in-depth studies of contemporary chaplaincy in the United Kingdom and argue that due to the changing role of religion under the impact of political, social, and religious dynamics, the practice of Muslim chaplaincy has also changed to meet the needs and rights of Muslims. This type of employment of the practical aspects of Islamic tradition produces positive contributions by Muslim chaplains in public spaces and intra-faith dialog. Nevertheless, the authors use more traditional terms, such as "chaplain," to describe Islamic spiritual care and do not provide information about the importance of social sciences in Islamic spiritual care. They mainly concentrate on the "advisory" role of Muslim chaplains in public institutions rather than their roles as counselors and therapists to Muslim clients. Nevertheless, the book produces an outstanding reflection on practical aspects of Islamic theological studies and gender relations within and outside Muslim communities.

In addition to research and scholarly activities, educational centers in some Muslim countries, such as Turkey, have introduced new initiatives to bridge the gap in the above-mentioned areas. These initiatives are more practical approaches to Islamic theological studies and educational goals in order to integrate the lived experience of faith with theological education. On the one hand, the supporters of new initiatives acknowledged that theology has played an important role in defining and leading the culture. On the other hand, due to societal pressures, they developed an interdisciplinary approach to the study of theology by integrating practical, exegetical, and historical disciplines so that academic work may respond to the radical social

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[24] Sophie Gilliat-Ray, M. Mansur Ali, and Stephen Pattison, *Understanding Muslim Chaplaincy* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

[25] Isgandarova, "The Evolution of Islamic Spiritual Care," 143.

[26] See Gilliat-Ray et al., *ibid*., 5.

changes, making academic theories relevant to everyday life. Theological departments have reformed theological studies by reintegrating the lived experience and the various branches of theology. Due to these innovations, in Turkish theological departments (such as Ankara and Marmara Universities), the curricula now include subjects such as Religious Education, Religious and Spiritual Care, Turkish-Religious Music, Fine Arts/*Tadhhīb* (Illumination), *Khaṭṭ* (Calligraphy), Methodology in Social Sciences, Psychology of Religion, Social Psychology, and Social Work Practices.[27] The primary goal is to produce religious leaders who are able to promote the intellectual and moral development of the society and who are able to function within and respond to the needs of modern societies. In Malaysia, since 1983, the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) has been successful in integrating Islamic values with modern fields of knowledge in the fields of early childhood and primary education, Islamic economics, finance, banking, and insurance. This process must be spread to the field of Islamic practical theology.

Islamic departments in some European universities have also begun to offer practical theology courses. At the Free University Amsterdam, the Islamic Practical Theology course aims to provide a basic knowledge of practical Islamic theology, especially in the fields of the imamate, spiritual care, and religious education. The purpose of the course is to improve the reflection and theorizing on the practice of religious Islamic faith activities. The Islamic chaplaincy program at Hartford Seminary and Rotterdam Islamic University, as well as the MTS program in Islamic studies at Emmanuel College of Victoria University in the University of Toronto, offers courses that aim to integrate the practical and academic aspects of Islamic theology.

These changes in Islamic theological studies reflect two main aspects of theology: (1) the 'experiential-expressive' and (2) the 'cognitive-propositional.'[28] This allows us to view doctrine as a cultural lin-

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[27] For a detailed dscription of these programs see, "İlahiyat Dersleri", http://www.divinity.ankara.edu.tr/?page_id=429 (accessed December 05, 2014), "Lisans programları", http://llp.marmara.edu.tr/organizasyon.aspx?kultur=tr-TR&Mod=1&ustbirim=1400&birim=1401&altbirim=-1&program=69&organizasyonId=86&mufredatTurId=932001, (accessed December 05, 2014).

[28] George Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion in a Postliberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984), 16.

guistic construct and to fit theology into its context.[29] Nevertheless, it is too early to argue that we have achieved our goal and established contemporary Islamic practical theology studies. The kind of notion offered by Lindbeck is still missing in many Islamic practical theological studies because the terms used in Islamic theory are highly philosophical. In other words, there is a gap between the lived and the studied. However, there is some light at the end of the tunnel: because many of those who study Islam are also practicing Muslims, they have a tremendous amount of energy and knowledge to enrich our practice with academic theories, as well as to enhance their academic theories with our experience (using terms that are inherent to the Islamic tradition). This is a 'promised land' for Islamic theological studies, which I will call practical theology.

How Can We Improve Islamic Practical Theology?

As understood from its name, practical theology is a subdivision of theology that focuses on practice; in general, it is a practice-oriented theology. The practical theologian uses his/her practice as a source of new knowledge. Although theory plays an important role in this process, it comes second to practice because it is more than a dogma-based interpretation of the Islamic faith. Nevertheless, Islamic practical theology is not easy to define: there are multiple positions and definitions that capture the true meaning of practical theology.

In Christian theology, the main understanding of pastoral theology is usually based on Friedrich Schleiermacher's understanding of theology, which suggests understanding, reflecting on, and interpreting Christian practice.[30] As a branch of pastoral theology, practical theology "is a place where religious belief, tradition, and practice meet contemporary experiences, questions, and actions and conduct a dialogue that is mutually enriching, intellectually critical and practi-

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[29] Pete Ward, "Participation and Mediation: A Practical Theology for the Liquid Church," *Reviews in Religion & Theology* 17/1 (2010), 55-59.

[30] Wilhelm Gräb, "Practical Theology as a Religious and Cultural Hermeneutics of Christian Practice: An enthusiastic support of Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore's corrections of the Five Misunderstandings of Practical Theology based on Schleiermacher's Concept of Theology," *International Journal of Practical Theology* 16/1 (2012), 79-92.

cally transforming."[31] According to pastoral theologian Elaine Graham, pastoral theology is "the systematic reflection upon the nature of the Church in the world, accessible only through the practical wisdom of those very communities. Therefore, as a discipline, pastoral theology is not legislative or prescriptive, but interpretive. It enables the community of faith to give a critical and public account of its purposeful presence in the world, and the values that give shape to its actions."[32] Thus, practical theology is "more than descriptive and empirical" and holds the potential to be "transformative and transcendent," moving beyond the *normative* (e.g., ethics and prescription).[33] What makes it different from theologies? Practical theology is "a general way of doing theology concerned with the embodiment of religious belief in the day-to-day lives of individuals and communities"[34] that moves beyond the Scripture and religious texts.

There are many who argue that any discussion of practical theology should be based on methodology that offers a better chance of capturing the lived experience. For example, in his article on the "hermeneutics of religion," Philipp Stoellger argues that in this discussion, the new of role of religion should be defined first. The preconceived general terms do not offer a complete picture of religion: religion should be engaged in terms of its phenomenological aspects.[35] Nevertheless, he does not entertain the possibility of using empirical research nor does he discuss how the content of religion should be studied.[36]

According to Rudolf Bultmann, practical theology must engage both empirical and religious-hermeneutical methods in order to respond to socio-cultural religious transformations and capture the preunderstandings and self-understandings of religious people that are

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31 Stephen Pattison and James Woodward, "An Introduction to Pastoral and Practical Theology," in James Woodward and Stephen Pattison (eds.), *The Blackwell Reader in Pastoral and Practical Theology (*Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 126.

32 Elaine Graham, *Transforming Practice: Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 208-209.

33 Miller-McLemore, "Toward Greater Understanding of Practical Theology," 111.

34 Ibid., 111.

35 Philipp Stoellger, "Vom Nichtverstehen aus. Abgründe und Anfangsgründe einer Hermeneutik der Religion," in Ingolf U. Dalferth and Philipp Stoellger (eds.), *Hermeneutik der Religion* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 59-90.

36 Gräb, ibid., 79.

constructed through empirical, religious-hermeneutical procedures.[37] Gräb supports Bultmann's claim and states that practical theology should integrate empirical methods with hermeneutical methodology to engage the lived experience and exegetical, systematic, and historical theological disciplines. He mentions that such empirical research in practical theology can only be developed when it defines "a formal-functional concept of religion based in positive religions" in order to include cultural practices and discourses. This will demonstrate that believers can relate to their faith beyond any formal religious institution (i.e., church, mosque, synagogue, and temple) and hold on to their religious view of life and the world. In this regard, Gräb agrees with the arguments of sociologist Armin Nassehi, which state that religious organizations play a small role in developing the religious worldview: it is individuals who construct the meanings of their experiences, and these experiences either confirm or reject mainstream dogmatic religious world views. Nassehi argues that this is the authentic self-representation of individuality and does not necessarily need to accord with formal religious views.[38]

Gräb suggests that practical theology should offer a "discursively open and formal-functional understanding of religion."[39] Otherwise, it cannot offer an empirical interpretation of religion and culture. Sallie McFague also argues that "it is necessary for the conversation of our time within the church, within the academy, and within the world to include as primary partners, setting the agenda and not merely 'adding to it,' the voices that have hitherto been excluded. From very different embodied sites will emerge radically different agendas, agendas which will be for the benefit of a different and more inclusive community than those presently in positions of power in the church, the academy or the world."[40]

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[37] Rudolf Bultmann, "Das Problem der Hermeneutik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 47/1 (1950), 47-69.

[38] Armin Nassehi, "Religiöse Kommunikation: Religionssoziologische Konsequenzen einer qualitativen Untersuchung," in Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.), *Woran glaubt die Welt? Analysen und Kommentare zum Religionsmonitor* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008), 169-204, quoted by Gräb, 84.

[39] Ibid., 82.

[40] Sallie McFague, "The Theologian as Advocate," in Sarah Coakley and David A. Pail (eds.), *The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in Honour of Maurice Wiles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 155.

In these terms, practical theologians try to create a bridge between theory and practice, which is not the main aim of other branches of Islamic studies. In Islamic practical theology, hermeneutical methodology is still a widely used tool. As Miller-McLemore argues, however, strict binaries between "ecclesial conversation" and "secularized academy" do not help and instead deepen power struggles between "secular" and "religious." Therefore, practical theology in Islamic studies should provide students with more contemporary and diverse postmodern empirical methods so that they can engage Islamic theological studies and capture lived religious practices and experiences. For example, if practical methodology provides the perspective of the writer in terms of how she/he reads the Islamic tradition and makes sense of various practices and experiences, the empirical approach promises to make more sense of these rituals and practices from the experience of the people. Therefore, its aim is not teaching and preaching but describing the phenomenon in question and capturing human lived experience. Such an integrated approach allows the practical theology student and researcher to benefit from a rich tradition of interdisciplinary empirical methods: on the one hand, he/she uses hermeneutical methodology and depends on the Scripture and other text-based sources; on the other hand, she/he applies observation skills or perception to test the quality and trustworthiness of the experience.

Why Practical Theology in Islamic Studies?

Islamic practical theology is undergoing a transformation due to the wide-ranging conflicts and contradictions in a lived situation that question the role and function of Islamic tradition. Such contradictions invite us to examine and reformulate the role of the Islamic tradition and find new methodologies to embrace the challenge. As Bonnie Miller-McLemore notes regarding the importance of creative work on theological knowledge in the Christian tradition,[41] practical theology in Islamic theological studies must grapple with how theories about Islam are enacted in the lived experience of the Islamic faith.

[41] Miller-McLemore, "Five Misunderstandings about Practical Theology," and "Toward Greater Understanding of Practical Theology," *International Journal of Practical Theology* 16/1 (2012), 5-26, 104-123.

One Muslim thinker, Barazangi, advocates for both traditional and modernizing approaches and methods to transfer religious knowledge, practice, and faith.[42] Her suggestions sound compatible with the methodologies used in practical theology that are both descriptive and critical.[43] In this sense, it is both a theology of 'theory' and a theology of 'practice.' The revisionist approach to Islamic theology (Islamic feminist theology) has already established a model for such a practice. Islamic feminist scholars have not only examined Islamic studies as an academic discipline but have also aimed to transform the community by bringing the voices of Muslim women into Islamic prayers and rituals. The post-colonial examination of colonialism in the Muslim world has also inspired freedom against imperialist forces.

The empirical principle of practical theology made a significant contribution to the reconstruction process of Christian tradition.[44] Such an empirical approach to theology should be used to reconstruct Islamic practical theology in order to give voice to the marginalized *umma*: the battered women, ethnic and religious minorities, the LGBTQ community, the poor, and so on, rather than to authority so that they can contribute their insights and understandings. According to Elaine L. Graham, listening to the voices of women is necessary if we want to achieve greater justice in our actions.[45] The result would be the emergence of more critical Muslim spiritual caregivers and clergy who are ready to move beyond the religious and theological norm. In addition, Islamic practical theology will break taboos of silence in Muslim communities that have prevented us from paying attention to issues regarding abusive, harmful and oppressive practices. Although I have not articulated or provided evidence for new methodologies in Islamic practical theology, these emerging method-

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[42] Dietrich Reetz and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Education: Educational Methods," *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World,* Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0212#e0212-s3 (accessed December 28, 2014).

[43] Jane F. Maynard, Leonard Hummel, and Mary C. Moschella (eds.), *Pastoral Bearings: Lived Religion and Pastoral Theology* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 13.

[44] J. N. Poling, "Sexuality: A Crisis for the Church," in P. D. Couture and R. J. Hunter (eds.), *Pastoral Care and Social Conflict* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1995), 116.

[45] Graham, *ibid*., 126.

ologies will allow articulating theology or blending theology into real life issues.

Conclusion

Developing practical theology in Islamic theological studies is essential because practical theology will add substantial strength to Islamic theological studies, as well as to other Islamic disciplines. This can be explained by the fact that practical theology addresses everyday faith and life (i.e., eating, blessings, etc.); otherwise, it "has little meaning at all."[46]

We argue that it is time to transcend the ivory towers of academic Islamic studies and give voice to the lived Islamic faith. Islamic theological studies can no longer be confined to a narrow and experience-free normative and dogmatic frame of academic discussions of Islam. We need to free Islamic practical theology from the metaphysical description and analysis of Islam and develop a more functional and practical discourse of Islam in order to offer meaning to those who use Islamic practical theology in their lived experiences, even in the midst of the 'secular.' This would be a theological commitment to the Sacred that gives priority to the lived faith and pays attention to the suffering of the people.

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[46] Miller-McLemore, "The Contributions of Practical Theology," in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology* (London: Wiley/Blackwell, 2012), 7.

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ESSAY REVIEWS

The Politics of Fiṭra: On Ibn Taymiyya's Epistemological Optimism: An Essay Review on *Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment*, by Ovamir Anjum

Livnat Holtzman

THE POLITICS OF FIṬRA
On Ibn Taymiyya's Epistemological Optimism

An Essay Review on ***Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment***, by Ovamir Anjum (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilisation), (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xvi + 294 pp., ISBN 978-10107-01406-0, €60.00 / $99.00 (hb)

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The assertion that theology was the most powerful driving force in the politics of the early Muslim community seems to be an axiom that requires no proof. The birth of the various schisms in the Muslim community (*al-umma)*, along with the theological debates that accompanied them, were thoroughly studied by medieval and modern scholars alike. In describing the politico-theological groups, such as the Khārijites or the Qadarites, historians of the classical period emphasized that the concepts of divine justice and human free will were keyplayers in the dramatic chain of events that led to the emergence of these political parties. Attention has also been given to the theological concepts that the caliphs, with the help of the *ʿulamāʾ*, promoted to stabilize their status and legitimize their rule. Thus, impactful events, such as al-Maʾmūn's *miḥna* (between the years 833 and 847), were closely connected to the heated debates between the traditionalists and the rationalists on the concept of "the uncreated Qurʾān." In sum, the connection of simplistic theological formulae with the inception of early political thought in Islam was always surface level; the connection between hairsplitting theological discussions and later political thought in Islam, however, was not. Ovamir Anjum's *Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment*

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.110

fills this gap. The entanglements of politics and high-level theological thought are fully revealed in Anjum's multi-layered and discursive monograph.

Well-versed in the writings of the controversial Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 C.E.) and his loyal disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350 C.E.), Anjum dives into the deepest depression of Islamic politics. Here, he traces unfamiliar theological undercurrents that molded the worldview of these thinkers, with a special emphasis on Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya articulated the most coherent opposition to the religious establishment of their times; however, the question of their attitude toward the Mamlūk political system was never fully revealed. Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya were deeply involved in this political system – a fabric tightly woven from the intimate connections among Mamlūk officials, army officers, and local *ʿulamāʾ*. The religious establishment and the activities of the *ʿulamāʾ* were the target of these two scholars' harsh critiques in their legal as well as theological works. Nonetheless, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim volunteered to offer their advice on running the state to the "secular" elements of government, i.e., the Mamlūk officials. Their treatises on government (Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya* and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's *al-Furūsiyya*) unfolded a utopian worldview in which the *ʿulamāʾ* would take active part in the state affairs not merely by exploiting the political system for their needs but by actually navigating the system. A ruler who is a religious scholar, *ʿālim*, is the ideal that these two scholars promoted.

In this book, Anjum's goal is to expose the full purport of Ibn Taymiyya's political thought, both as a revolutionary vision or an alternative to the stagnated governmental and religious institutions of his times and as a full-fledged theory with theological dimensions yet unrevealed. The political aspect of the Taymiyyan alternative is well known and discussed in previous research, starting with Henri Laoust's monumental *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya* from 1939. Based on Ibn Taymiyya's view of the *umma* – the ancient Muslim community – as an idealistic society characterized by activism, political involvement, and piety, Ibn Taymiyya depicts the outline of this utopian society in which the laymen are involved in the affairs of the state to the degree of deciding whom they elect as their leader. The theological dimensions of the Taymiyyan alternative, however, are much less familiar. Anjum's major achievement in this impressive book is in extracting Ibn Tay-

miyya's political thought from his theological writings, and especially his magnum opus *Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql* (Averting the Conflict between Reason and Revelation). Anjum offers a politically contextualized reading to this complex theological treatise, which is truly a pioneering step. Anjum confronts Ashʿarite theology, which was the dominant trend among the religious elite in Mamlūk society, with Taymiyyan theology. He emphasizes that the Rāziyyan form of Ashʿarite theology was a factor that contributed to the political stagnation in Mamlūk society. By doing so, he contextualizes Ibn Taymiyya's theological thought: more than a systematized refutation of Ashʿarite theology, *Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql* is read almost as a political manifesto. Revealing the political dimension of Ibn Taymiyya's theology is the most meaningful contribution of Anjum's book. However, to reach to this point, one must first traverse 169 pages on the history of political thought in Islam.

Anjum pursues two parallel lines of inquiry: the first reveals the linkage between the classical Islamized monarchism and the Ashʿarite epistemological pessimism. The second line examines Ibn Taymiyya's theological concept of *fiṭra* and reveals this concept's inherent place in Ibn Taymiyya's epistemological optimism along with his political thought. The book, which comprises seven massive chapters, is divided into two parts that can be read independently. The first part, entitled "the classical legacy," sketches political thought in the early Islamic period (the 7th century) and marks milestones in the development of this thought in the classical period (in this book, the classical period lies roughly between the 8th and 14th centuries). The second part of the book, enigmatically titled "the Taymiyyan intervention," confronts Ibn Taymiyya's political thought with the political order of his time. Even before I delved into this massive book, I wondered about Anjum's decision to comprehensively discuss political thought from the days of the Prophet until the Mamlūk era in a monograph that is meant to focus on Ibn Taymiyya. Throughout the reading process, I was not fully convinced that some of the topics that Anjum diligently discusses (mostly based on secondary sources) were indeed relevant. I suspect that Anjum chose to dedicate the first two chapters of his book (some 136 pages) to the politics of the first centuries of Islam because Ibn Taymiyya's political thought emerged from profound insights on the formative political events in the history of the Arabs. Perhaps Anjum's rationale is that to fully grasp Ibn Taymiyya's vision on the utopian Islamic society, one should become

familiar with the historical events from the inception of Islam until Ibn Taymiyya's time, and not be satisfied with clichés on the grandeur of the early Muslim community. Likewise, I was not entirely persuaded that the first two chapters were indeed vital to the book. On the other hand, the other topic that appears in the first part of the book, the pessimist worldview of Ashʿarite *kalām*, is relevant to Ibn Taymiyya's theological thought. In the following pages, I will sketch the contours of the book and focus more on the theological and political aspects rather than the historical aspects of Anjum's discussion.

In the first chapter (pp. 37-92), Anjum describes how the ideal of a politically vibrant and egalitarian *umma* in the first century of Islam crashed due to the increasing needs of the growing empire, and how the idealistic *umma* was assimilated in the traditional society ruled by a monarch. Anjum provides an exhaustive discussion on keyconcepts, such as *khalīfat Allāh* (the custodian of God's law), *ulū-l-amr* (those charged with authority), *shūrā* (consultation), and mostly *siyāsa* (politics) through milestones in the history of power of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid empires. This in-depth discussion paves the way for the examination of the rise of the *ʿulamāʾ* as a political force that solidifies itself as a formidable opposition to the caliphs.

Chapter two (pp. 93-136), equally as packed as chapter one, presents a vast overview of the literature that was written by prominent Sunnī scholars from the 10th century onward, with the gradual decline of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. Anjum argues that the Ashʿarite theological discourse, rather than the juristic one, articulated a set of guiding premises about the legitimacy of the caliphate. The Ashʿarite theologians perceived themselves to be the custodians of the Sunna and therefore the defenders of the caliph, who was the most conspicuous symbol of Sunnism. These theologians customarily included a chapter on the caliphate (or the imāmate) in their works of *kalām* as part of the Sunnī attack on the Muʿtazila and Shīʿa. The *kalām* manuals authored by these theologians – al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013 C.E.), al-Baghdādī (d. 1037 C.E.), Abū Yaʿlā (d. 1066 C.E.), al-Juwaynī (d. 1085 C.E.), and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E.), just to name a few – are mostly read in western scholarship for their chapters on speculative theology and theological polemics. Anjum, however, read their chapters on the imāmate and therefore provided a useful outline of their caliphate doctrine. In a nutshell, the Ashʿarites offered a theorized justification for the notion of the rule of an omnipotent caliph with the exclusion of the community or the masses from engagement in public affairs. In

addition, in their writings, the Ashʿarites nurtured the ideal of religious life distant from any connection to the matters of the state. Furthermore, the Ashʿarites professed their disdain of politics, although they were actually part of the ruling elite embedded in the center of power. No doubt, the Ashʿarites benefitted from their involvement in the affairs of the state; however, they maintained the façade of abstaining from worldly affairs, politics included. Anjum emphasizes that their involvement in politics was exclusively for their own good, as they felt no responsibility for the masses. This attitude revealed their self-perception as intellectually superior over the traditionalistic *ʿulamāʾ*.

In the third chapter (pp. 137-169), Anjum enters the deep waters of hardcore theology to decipher the self-image of superiority that the later Ashʿarites, and especially Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209 C.E.) and his successors, advanced. Because the lion's share of Ibn Taymiyya's polemics occurred with al-Rāzī, only in the third chapter does Anjum directly address the goal of his book, which is to expose Ibn Taymiyya's political thought. Anjum goes back to the roots of the Ashʿarite self-conceit, both as the defenders of Sunnism and as the holders of esoteric knowledge accessible to a chosen few. Heavily relying on the scholarship of A. M. Goichon and Riḍwān al-Sayyid, Anjum argues that the Neoplatonic views of the philosophers were cardinal to questions of political agency and social organization. These questions in turn shaped the sense of superiority of the Ashʿarites. The Neoplatonic philosophers saw human intellect to be an essence bestowed to them from above, "[a]nd just like the intellect with respect to a human person is both an (external) essence and a function, its relationship to the society is the same, in the sense that the society is governed and constrained in its private and public life by the intellectual elite whom the Active Intellect has endowed with the right to govern…the ruler is the *ʿaql* of the society…" (pp. 146-147, a quotation translated by Anjum from Riḍwān al-Sayyid's *al-Jamāʿa wa-l-mujtamāʿ wa-l-dawla*). These ideas, which can be summarized as the supremacy of the mind (of the educated elite, of course) by means of philosophical reflection over other sources of knowledge (such as, for instance, the common sense of laymen) penetrated Sunnī *kalām* through al-Ghazālī's *Qānūn al-taʾwīl* and were systematized by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Al-Rāzī's fans among the ruling elite in Mamlūk society believed that certain knowledge cannot be obtained from the scriptural sources of revelation. Furthermore, if a contradiction exists between

reason and revelation, the conclusions obtained due to a valid procedure of reasoning supersede the content of the scriptures. In his *Asās al-taqdīs*, al-Rāzī advanced this principle a step further and determined that the scale according to which the content of the revelation was measured was the rational scale. One of the major byproducts of this epistemological system was implanting a sense of superiority in the later Ashʿarites. They perceived themselves to be the guardians of a rational apodictic truth (p. 150). Similarly, they held in contempt the traditionalistic scholars and the common people for their naïve and unreserved loyalty to the scriptures, especially to the anthropomorphic expressions in the Ḥadīth literature. Comfortable in their exclusive milieu, the later Ashʿarites quoted al-Rāzī's *Asās al-taqdīs* to justify their detached elitist and hierarchical worldview. Advancing pessimistic views on predetermination – and thus preserving the old societal order – was also in their best interest. Anjum quite rightly calls the ideas of the later Ashʿarites "theological cynicism" (p. 168).

The second part of the book (chapters 4-6) discusses Ibn Taymiyya and the alternative worldview that he presented as being in opposition to the Ashʿarite worldview. Whereas the Ashʿarites presented pessimism, Ibn Taymiyya offered optimism. Chapter four (pp. 173-195) is an indispensible introductory survey. Here, Anjum examines Ibn Taymiyya's attitude toward the *ʿulamāʾ*, his view on the ailments of Mamlūk society, and the remedies that he offers. Anjum's achievement in this chapter is in accurately presenting Ibn Taymiyya's nuanced approach toward Ashʿarite *kalām*, and in particular Ibn Taymiyya's realization that the use of rationalist reason was essential to erase the harmful effect of *kalām*. Anjum highlights a previously overlooked text by one of Ibn Taymiyya's biographers, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Bazzār (d. 1350 C.E.), in which Ibn Taymiyya explains his decision to dedicate his intellectual efforts to theology rather than to *fiqh*. Ibn Taymiyya was deeply committed to reason because he believed that the scholars of the *umma*, the *salaf*, permitted the use of rational argumentation against erroneous ideas and were engaged in such endeavors themselves (pp. 178-181). This point should have been further elaborated by Anjum, and one can only hope that he will pursue it in his future works. Later in chapter four, Anjum highlights Ibn Taymiyya's fundamental points of controversy with the Ashʿarites, and especially his perception of human will and its efficacy toward the human agent. Although these topics were thoroughly discussed by, among others, Daniel Gimaret and Jon Hoover, Anjum

makes his substantial contribution when he illuminates the political implications of the Taymiyyan form of free will, which stands in contrast to the Rāziyyan manifestation of the Ashʿarite doctrine of the human agent. Al-Rāzī's controversial declarations in favor of *jabr* (fatalism) were targeted by Ibn Taymiyya, who repeatedly emphasized the destructive effect of fatalism on society.

In the fifth chapter (pp. 196-227), Anjum provides an insightful survey of *Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l-naql*, its objectives, structure, themes, and style. The main purpose of Ibn Taymiyya in this work was to refute the foundations of the later Ashʿarite *kalām*. To demonstrate Ibn Taymiyya's optimism in the domain of politics, Anjum discusses the concepts of "natural constitution" (*fiṭra*) and "natural reason" (*ʿaql fiṭrī*) that Ibn Taymiyya systematically promoted in his writings. These terms are fundamental to Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology; however, Anjum demonstrates their role in Ibn Taymiyya's political thought. According to Ibn Taymiyya, *fiṭra* is a fundamental trait of the human disposition, and its essence is "to love what is beneficial and to conclude that there is a Creator and that He is good, and hence to love God." (p. 203). On the epistemological level, the concept of *fiṭra* enables Ibn Taymiyya to reject the *kalām* claim that establishing the existence of God can be known only by rational speculation (*naẓar*). People with uncorrupted *fiṭra* – according to Ibn Taymiyya – have inherent knowledge of the existence of God. In fact, they do not need the testimony of the scriptures to be aware of God's existence. Toward the end of the fifth chapter, Anjum explains that the elitist views of Ashʿarite theologians excluded and were disrespectful toward the naïve beliefs of the commoners. Ibn Taymiyya reconstructed an independent epistemological system that celebrates the *fiṭra*, hence the natural uncorrupted beliefs of the commoners. With this system, Ibn Taymiyya created an alternative to the elitist epistemological system of the Ashʿarites, and this alternative was presented as accessible to the commoners. This does not mean that Ibn Taymiyya accepted all types of popular beliefs and vulgar customs; on the contrary, he severely attacked popular rituals such as the sacralization of graves. The core of Ibn Taymiyya's stance is that natural reason, namely the *ʿaql* guided by the *fiṭra*, plays a crucial role in obtaining ethical truths. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya advanced an optimistic view that relied on "natural" beliefs as opposed to the bitter pessimistic views of the Ashʿarites that only generated skepticism.

In the sixth chapter (pp. 228-265), Anjum elaborates on Ibn Taymiyya's political thought, which is coherently based on the principle of *fiṭra*. Particularly in this chapter, which is the high point of the book, Anjum's circumvented method of presenting several lengthy prologues on different topics merely interferes with the reading experience. Despite its meandering course of argumentation, the chapter offers a fresh look at *fiṭra*, a concept that was examined only through the theological prism in previous research. Anjum is the first to discuss the political implications of *fiṭra*, and by doing so, he provides a broad philosophical perspective on Ibn Taymiyya's unique political stand. Anjum's analysis also simplifies the endless theological discussions; first and foremost, *fiṭra* is the permission granted by God to the Muslim community to see themselves as the custodians of divine law, instead of the rulers. *Fiṭra* is somewhat like "the wisdom of crowds;" although its basis is religious, it points to a democratic vision in which the Community is entitled to take its fate into its own hands. The concept of *fiṭra* is diametrically opposed to the elitist concept of *kashf* (spiritual disclosure) that al-Ghazālī promoted. In fact, Anjum refers to Ibn Taymiyya's *fiṭra* as the "democratic" version of al-Ghazālī's *kashf*. Hence, the knowledge of God's existence and goodness is available to everyone and not merely to the privileged few, the Ashʿarites.

The book could have benefitted from more careful editing, especially in the footnotes. These notes contain discussions that are appropriate for inclusion in the body of the text; in other instances, we find too many flaws. On pages 138-139, for example, Anjum cites a lengthy passage from al-Nawawī's commentary of *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. The footnote on page 139, however, refers the reader to Ibn Ḥajar's commentary of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*. In addition, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim bi-Sharḥ al-Nawawī* is not included in the bibliography. On page 165, a lengthy text is quoted from al-Rāzī's *al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya*; however, footnote 89 points to al-Rāzī's *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*. On page 229, Anjum mentions the Ashʿarite theologian al-Āmidī and his thought, without clarifying who he was. Several sources that the author cites throughout the book (for example, a book and an article by Yaacov Lev that appear in the footnotes on pages 102 and 104) were omitted from the bibliography. These are minor mishaps, no doubt, but they pose difficulties for a reader who wishes to track down the sources that Anjum uses, and in general, they diminish the credibility of this important work.

Lastly, "The Taymiyyan Moment," a term coined by Anjum which makes its first appearance in the conclusion (pp. 266-273), is not entirely clear. I suspect that this phrase echoes J. G. A. Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment*, but Anjum does not explain it. The reader is left puzzled about "the Taymiyyan Moment" and is forced to speculate on its meaning. Is it the moment in time in which Ibn Taymiyya appeared and challenged the classical idea of state and politics in Islam? Or perhaps "the Taymiyyan Moment" is a selectively and thematically defined "moment" in which old patterns were rejected and original ones emerged? In any case, if the question remains in the reader's mind after reading the book thoroughly, then the author should have made further efforts to clarify it, especially because "the Taymiyyan Moment" is the subtitle of the book.

That said, *Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought* offers a stimulating and rewarding reading experience. The book expresses with extreme clarity the radical implications of Ibn Taymiyya's notion of the *fiṭra*. This concept leads to a vision of a harmonious society of mutual support and solidarity, in which every sector (the rulers, the *ʿulamāʾ*, and the commoners) cooperates for the general good. This description gives the clearest background to Ibn Taymiyya's call for the people to follow only the righteous caliph, although this background is presented sometimes too sophisticatedly. Written with much enthusiasm and equally as much erudition, Anjum's *Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment* is thought-provoking, and its place on the Taymiyyan book-shelf is secured.

BOOK REVIEWS

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī's Philosophical Journey: From Aristotle's Metaphysics *to the 'Metaphysical Science'*
by Cecilia Martini Bonadeo

Damien Janos

Classical Foundations of Islamic Educational Thought: A Compendium of Parallel English-Arabic Texts
selected and introduced by Bradley J. Cook, with assistance from Fathi H. Malkawi

Mohammad Hannan Hassan

Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians
edited by Ednan Aslan, Marcia Hermansen & Elif Medeni

Tuba Işık

Shamanism and Islam: Sufism, Healing Rituals and Spirits in the Muslim World
edited by Thierry Zarcone and Angela Hobart

Kemal Enz Argon

The History of the Qur'ān, by Theodor Nöldeke, Friedrich Schwally, Gotthelf Bergsträßer, and Otto Pretzl; edited and translated by Wolfgang H. Behn (Texts and Studies on the Qur'ān, 8) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), xvi + 666 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-21234-3, €179 / $245 (hb)

The History of the Qur'ān is the first English translation of the magnum opus of western Qur'ānic Studies, *Geschichte des Qorāns*.[1] It includes English versions of the second edition of Theodor Nöldeke's original (1860) work, as revised by Friedrich Schwally (commonly referred to as *GdQ1*; first published in 1909), "Die Sammlung des Qorāns," by Nöldeke and Schwally (*GdQ2*; 1919) and "Die Geschichte des Koran-texts" (*GdQ3* 1926, 1929, 1938), begun by Schwally but finally written by Gotthelf Bergsträsser and his student Otto Pretzl (all three works were later published together: Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1970).[2] In this review I will first reflect on the nature of the translation and then discuss the usefulness of this classical work of Qur'ānic Studies to contemporary scholars.

The translation, by Wolfgang Behn, is a significant accomplishment. The collected work is well over 600 pages and the German is in many places complicated and technical. In addition to translating the body and the (extensive) notes, Behn inserts references notes to the English translations of non-English works originally referred to by Nöldeke, Schwally, Pretzl, and Bergsträsser. Thus, for example, in a note with a reference to Goldziher's *Muhammedanische Studien* Behn refers also to the corresponding pages of the English translation (*Muslim Studies*, 1977; in some other cases he misses available Eng-

[1] I am grateful to Andrew Rippin and Gerald Hawting for their comments on an earlier draft of this review.

[2] With the exception of Nöldeke who died at an advanced age in 1930, all of the other authors died premature deaths. Schwally died in 1919 from the effects of the food shortages during World War I (according to his brother-in-law's account; see p. xxi of the work under review). Bergsträsser died after a fall in the mountains of southern Germany in 1933, and Pretzl died when his plane crashed in 1941 during the Battle of Sebastopol, in World War II. For more on the strange misadventures of the authors of *GdQ* see G.S. Reynolds, "Introduction," *The Qur'ān in Its Historical Context* (London: Routledge, 2008), 1-7.

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.111

lish translations, such as: H. Lammens "Qoran et tradition, comment fut composée la vie de Mahomet;" trans. in *The Quest for the Historical Muḥammad*, 169-187). While the bibliography has not been updated to include more recent works in Qurʾānic Studies, Behn frequently adds references to the entries in the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* on personalities discussed in the course of the *History of the Qurʾān*. He also puts in capital letters the names by which Muslim scholars are most frequently known (thereby facilitating research on those figures in biographical dictionaries). *The History of the Qurʾān* is well indexed, and includes marginal references to the pagination of the original German.

As a rule Behn's English reads very well. Indeed it is remarkable that in such an enormous text only a relatively few minor corrective comments can be made. For German Flucht (i.e. Arabic *hijra*) Behn renders "flight" when in contemporary scholarship Arabic *hijra* is standard. On one occasion (p. 460) he has Jacobin when he means "Jacobite." In some cases he follows German idioms too closely (e.g. on p. 280, where he renders: "Hartwig Hirschfeld is unable…to put Weil's lame arguments back on their feet"). Overall, however, the translation is a skillful work of precision and common sense. One appreciates his manner of rendering complicated German phrases in idiomatic English. For example, in *GdQ2* Schwally writes: "Die umfangreiche Kommission scheint den Zweck zu verfolgen, den Anteil der medinischen Gemeinde an dem Qoränwerke stärker hervortreten zu lassen" (p. 53). Behn translates: "For all intents and purposes, the story of this large commission simply aims at a better representation of the Medinan community in establishing the Koran" (p. 255).

Behn's translation is thus of a quality which does justice to the importance of *Geschichte des Qorāns*. This work, in all of its three parts, has long played a fundamental role in the training of Islamicists in German speaking countries. It has been less influential in non-German speaking countries, whether in the West or in the Islamic world, where advanced knowledge of German is often wanting. In 2008 *Geschichte des Qorāns* was published in an excellent Arabic translation by Georges Tamer. The publication of an English translation is a significant event. Many students of the Qurʾān outside of Germany will now have the opportunity to discover this work for the first time. They may be surprised by what they find. In all three of its parts *Geschichte des Qorāns* offers students detailed insights on the Islamic sources, along with critical arguments about their interpreta-

tion, which remain relevant today. Indeed one might hope that the availability of this translation might contribute to the rise of interest in places such as North America and Turkey in the critical academic study of the Qurʾān.

Some scholars in the past have written off this work (and Nöldeke's contribution in particular) as an example of Orientalist excess. Others (myself included) have taken issue with certain elements of this work (notably the certainty with which Nöldeke assumes a chronological reading of the Qurʾān). Yet it should not be missed that this work has an enormous amount of data on the text of the Qurʾān, Islamic literature on the biography of the Prophet, and the historical transmission of the text. Even if readers are disappointed with certain parts of the *History of the Qurʾān*, they will certainly find other parts useful.

As there is no question of summarizing the arguments of the four authors of the *History of the Qurʾān* (or indeed five, as August Fischer – Bergsträsser's professor in Leipzig – edited the final version of Schwally's text [*GdQ2*]), I will here draw the reader's attention to certain elements of the work which still represent impressive insights on the composition and transmission of the Qurʾānic text, along with those which are less impressive today.

GdQ1 is well known as the text in which Nöldeke puts forth his argument for a chronology of Qurʾānic verses. This he does, it is important to emphasize, with a great deal of circumspection. Indeed he grew increasingly cautious about the limits of dating sūras. In a note added to the second edition of *GdQ1* Nöldeke explains that he has come to believe that for the Meccan period of Muḥammad's career there is no question of coming up with a precise chronological order of sūras, but only of grouping them into three main categories (He reflects: "Some of my claims, which at the time seemed quite certain, upon new and careful scrutiny turned out to be uncertain;" p. 61). In the second edition of *GdQ1* Nöldeke notes that many of the stories (*asbāb al-nuzūl* or otherwise) which the exegetes use to date certain sūras are unreliable. Regarding Sūra 3 he comments: "The historical explanations of tradition regarding the individual verses are of little use to us" (pp. 154-55). Elsewhere he comments: "The tales of Muḥammad's problems in private life, which tradition brings forward, are useless" (p. 185).

Too often, however, he nevertheless turns to the tales which tradition brings forward to date Qurʾānic passages. He concludes, for example, that Sūra 74 must be very early because he follows the tradition that the term *muddaththir* therein refers to Muḥammad's being "wrapped up" in blankets (which Nöldeke argues was due to the superstitious fear which overcame the Prophet at the beginning of his mission). Elsewhere Nöldeke relies on an abstract sense of older and newer styles of Qurʾānic language (for which Hartwig Hirschfeld later criticized him). Indeed the usefulness of this entire section is questionable and Nöldeke's approach to the text appears simplistic today. He never considers seriously the possibility that the Qurʾān might include different sources, or that later redactors might have had a role in modifying an earlier text. He takes for granted the traditional notion that the Qurʾān can be split up according to the episodes in the life of one man and assumes that the Qurʾān is a perfect transcript (albeit out of order) of what Muḥammad – and only Muḥammad – really said.

It should also be pointed out, however, that *GdQ1* is not entirely consumed with questions of chronology. The first 46 pages (in the English translation) involve a critical discussion of a variety of aspects of the Qurʾān's composition which is still valuable. Of particular note is the attention which Nöldeke pays to the role of rhyme in the composition of the Qurʾānic text (pp. 29-33) and to larger questions of coherence, or *naẓm* (pp. 34-35).

Schwally's contribution, *GdQ2*, is an analysis of traditions concerning the collection of the Qurʾān. Schwally works from the assumption that Islamic literature contains a mass of both valid and invalid traditions regarding the collection of the Qurʾān, and that the task of critical scholars is something like triage. In his view the traditions of Abū Bakr's collection of the Qurʾān into sheets are largely invalid, but those of the ʿUthmānic collection are largely valid (and indeed he defends their validity against both Orientalists and Shīʿites). Throughout his study Schwally demonstrates a conviction – which may seem exaggerated today – that even the details of what really happened during the process of the Qurʾān's collection can be known through this work of triage. This conviction is evident, for example, when he writes regarding the ʿUthmānic collection: "I suspect that the actual copy work was done by a staff of professional calligraphers, with Zayd ibn Thābit's activity limited to the overall charge of the project." With similar confidence he proposes (p. 306)

that ʿUthmān's goal with the dissemination of his *muṣḥaf* must have been only to solve an issue among his troops (and not to establish a standard Qurʾān throughout the empire), since he sent this *muṣḥaf* to only a few garrison cities.

In the latter part of *GdQ2* (pp. 315-68), Schwally turns from historical speculation about the collection of the Qurʾān to a remarkable review of early Islamic (and western) literature on the Qurʾān, *tafsīr*, and Muḥammad's life. This section of *GdQ2* is of great interest, and would serve as a good reading for a graduate level class in Islamic Studies, even if many new works have been edited since the publication of *Geschichte des Qorāns*.

With *GdQ3* the focus shifts to the later history of the Qurʾānic text. Therein Bergsträsser and Pretzl discuss with precision the development of Islamic literature on the proper reading of the consonantal text of the Qurʾān, beginning with early traditions and ending with the editing of the now canonical Cairo text. They begin (pp. 389-91) by commenting on the traditions of consonantal "errors" in the ʿUthmānic text and the many peculiar features of Qurʾānic orthography (for example, the variable use of *hamza*, the use of the long *tāʾ* where *tāʾ marbūṭa* would be expected, or the use of *yāʾ* or *wāw* where *alif* would be expected, which they explain as a product of early pronunciation, or *imāla*).

One of the great merits of *GdQ3* is the careful way in which Bergsträsser/Pretzl illustrate the different sorts of variants to the ʿUthmānic text. These include variants reported in traditions on the pre-ʿUthmānic codices (of these they argue that the traditions attributed to Ibn Masʿūd's codex are most likely to be authentic), variants reported in traditions on the copies of ʿUthmān's codex which were sent to Syria, Baṣra, Kūfa, and Mecca (or, according to other reports, still more cities), and the variants in the literature on the seven or ten (or more) canonical systems of reading the ʿUthmānic codex. This they do by following the medieval literature on variants, including the works of Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 223 or 224/838) and al-Dānī (d. 444/1052), in particular his *Muqniʿ*, as well as *al-Mabānī li-naẓm al-maʿānī*. For the variant readings they rely principally on Makkī ibn Abī Ṭālib al-Qaysī (d. 437/1045), al-Dānī, Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 833/1429), and al-Suyūṭī (d 911/1505). Of continuing interest – even though much work has since been done on this question – is their discussion of the establishment of seven readings (each with two

ṭarīqs), and their discussion of Ibn Mujāhid's (d. 324/935) role in that process (pp. 493-544). In the course of this work they show among other things that the nature of the variants reflects a reliance on the written text of the Qurʾān; in other words, the variants do not reflect divergences within an oral tradition but various attempts to read a written text (on this see esp. pp. 474-475).

Yet the theme which runs most prominently through *GdQ3* is the way in which variant readings found in early Islamic texts, both those based on reports of the companion codices and those based on variant readings (*qirāʾāt*) of the standard "ʿUthmānic" consonantal text, were progressively reduced over time (a process which they attribute to "the catholic tendency" of Islam; p. 488) until the establishment of the *textus receptus* (a text that would have been still more uniform had the teachings of Ibn Mujāhid about the validity of all seven readings been less influential). They add, however, illustrations of the way in which creative readings of the text were developed despite this process of standardization. For example, in Q 11:44 the reading *ibnahā* (instead of the standard *ibnahū*) was proposed to argue that the unfaithful son of Noah was not his son, but the son of an unfaithful wife (regarding which cf. Q 66:10). Later traditions avoid emending the consonantal text proposing that *ibnahā* (without the extra *alif*) can mean "her son" (p. 491).

The last part of *GdQ3*, authored by Pretzl alone, is dedicated to a report on the manuscript project which Bergsträsser began in cooperation with the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. The manuscripts he collected for this project were eventually passed down to Pretzl and then to Pretzl's student Anton Spitaler. Although they were long thought destroyed in the allied bombings of Munich in World War II, these manuscripts (and films of manuscripts) in fact survived and today form one source of the *Corpus Coranicum* project taking place in Berlin.

In this last part Pretzl discusses the sorts of variants found in the manuscripts in comparison with the reports of variants found in Islamic literature. Pretzl argues here that both the manuscripts and literary reports of variants should be used in work towards a critical edition of the Qurʾān. He writes, "Only the recognition of the relative application of the science of *qirāʾāt* makes a renewed investigation of the earliest manuscripts of the Koran rewarding" (p. 585). Later in life, however, Pretzl seems to have changed his opinion, and inclined

to the view that the *qirāʾāt* are principally later attempts at emending the text.[3] Indeed in light of the complicated history of these variants, and in particular of the many cases of variants which are meant to improve the grammar or sense of Qurʾānic passages (such as the case of Q 11:44 mentioned above), one wonders if it would not be wise to pursue work on a critical edition of the Qurʾān on the basis of ancient manuscripts alone.

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[3] This according to August Fischer who wrote in 1948: "Pretzl war, wie ich in wiederholten mit ihm in Kairo über diese Dinge geführten Gesprächen feststellen konnte, in den letzten Jahren seines – leider wie das seines Lehrers zu früh tragisch abgeschlossenen – Lebens von der generellen hohen Bewertung der Koran-Handschriften und Koran-Lesarten, wie er sie zunächst von seinem Lehrer übernommen hatte, stark zurückgekommen." August Fischer, "Grammatisch schwierige Schwur- und Beschwörungsformeln des klassischen Arabisch," *Der Islam* 28/1 (1948), 5, n. 4.

Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th-15th Century Tabriz, edited by Judith Pfeiffer, (Iran Studies, 8) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2014), xiv + 397 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-25539-5, €131.00 / $182.00 (hb)

The field of Middle Eastern history in the later Middle Period has considerably expanded over the last decades freeing itself from the last remnants of the idea of decline. In particular Mamlūk history and, closely linked, what might be called Eastern Mediterranean history have now dedicated journals, conferences, and book series with a continuous stream of articles and monographs. This expansion has been in particular focused on the Arabic-speaking lands, but has to some extent side-lined the study of contemporaneous neighbouring regions to the east. This is in particular true for the period after the Mongol invasions and the consolidation of new political structures in the Persianate world first under the Ilkhanids and subsequently under the Timurids and the Aqquyunlus. The book under review sets out to tackle this imbalance in studying Middle Eastern history by honing in on one particular case study, the history of Tabrīz in north-western Iran.

Based on papers given at a workshop and expanded by additional articles Judith Pfeiffer has edited an extraordinarily successful volume. The themes covered in the volume are broad, as is evident from its title, yet the clear regional and chronological foci make it much more than just the sum of its papers. Most importantly, it shows the vivacity of religious, economic, artistic, intellectual, and political life in what became one of the largest centres in the Persianate world. Most contributions can be broadly grouped into three large clusters, namely history of ideas (Devin DeWeese on the religious encounters of the Sufi Simnānī at the Ilkhanid court; Domenico Ingenito on contemporaneous literary encounters between the poets Saʿdī and Humām Tabrīzī; Judith Pfeiffer on religious boundaries in the Ilkhānate; Robert Morrison on the role of astronomy in al-Ījī's theological thinking; F. Jamil Ragep on the Greek Chioniades studying astronomy in Tabrīz), economic history (Johannes Preiser-Kapeller on the role of Tabrīz for Christian merchants and ecclesiastics; Patrick Wing on commercial life in Tabrīz; Sheila S. Blair on Tabrīz as an entrepôt in long-distance trade) and institutional history (Birgit Hoff-

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.112

mann on Rashīd al-Dīn's endowment complex in Tabrīz; Nourane Ben Azzouna on manuscript production in this endowment; Ertuğrul Ökten on Aqquyunlu religious institutions in the city). Two further contributions are those by Reuven Amitai on the 'wise men' in the entourage of the Ilkhānate's founder Hülegü and Joachim Gierlichs on Tabrīzī woodcarvings in the Timurid period.

The broad thematic coverage makes it difficult to identify a distinct common thread in the contributions and patronage for instance is not a relevant issue for each and every article. However, in a field that is in relative terms *terra incognita*, it is simply too early to strive at all costs for thematic coherence in such a volume. The main task at this point is to open up the field for further research and the best way to do so is to do away with great narratives that have restrained scholarship for so long. The volume splendidly does so as the reader goes away with a clear sense of excitement of what can be done and with a clear sense of the diversity of historical phenomena inaptly labelled with broad categories such as 'Persianate world' or 'Ilkhānate period.' What it meant even to reside in Ilkhānate Tabrīz was clearly a very different story for the various individuals and groups who are dealt with in the respective contributions. Yet the volume goes beyond just showing that it was all very different: The combination of micro-historical case studies (e.g. Rashīd al-Dīn's endowment and Simnānī's religious encounters) with rather long-durée papers (especially those on economic history) offer a fascinating kaleidoscope, where the individual phenomenon can be linked to broader developments of continuity and change.

On account of the broad thematic coverage most readers will have some articles that speak more to their personal interests than others. In my case I particularly found two contributions fascinating, but this is not meant as a judgment on the quality of others. Patrick Wing's discussion of the economic role of Tabrīz between 1250 and 1400 is a splendid example of how to write such a case study without losing sight of the wider regional developments. He builds a convincing argument that Tabrīz was able to gain such a prominent position in this period on account of intersecting interests of political elites and merchants. The opening of new long-distance trading opportunities in the aftermath of the Mongol conquests not only attracted more traders from abroad, but local traders were able to channel increased revenues to their own control. Judith Pfeiffer takes up another theme traditionally associated with the post-1250 period in the eastern Is-

lamic world, namely that of confessional ambiguity where the borders between Sunnī and Shīʿite identities mellowed. While accepting the broad outlines of this trend she convincingly challenges its applicability across all regions and throughout the later Middle Period. The case study aptly chosen is that of Shīʿite communities who successfully linked religious Shīʿite identity to genealogical claims (*sayyidism*) to carve out new political, social, and economic opportunities.

As with any field that is newly developing a core feature is the question of what primary sources can be used. Here, the contributions as a whole show the breadth of what is available and what is possible: Documentary sources that are well known are far from being exhausted (e.g. Rashīd al-Dīn's endowment deed); autobiographical narrations offer detailed insights into religious life (e.g. Simnānī's account); Persian narrative sources, if carefully read, allow moving beyond the rich but heavily biased picture presented in Arabic chronicles to present more indigenous voices and the use of material artefacts enables us to supplement the myopic view of the textual sources.

Except for those with encyclopaedic interests most readers will not read through the entire volume, but whatever one's choices are there is enough for a very pleasant reading experience. The contributions are mostly well written, they are carefully edited and most importantly the volume gives a great insight into an invigorated field. It should be read by anybody with an interest in the late Middle Period.

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Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers (Studies in Islamic Law and Society, 22), (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012), xiv + 591 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-22683-8, €37.5 / $49.50 (pb)

The volume at hand is a treasure trove of available knowledge of two kinds, the field's accumulated wisdom as well as new research over the last few decades. Published a decade later, the volume is based on a conference organized by M. Khalid Masud as the director of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in 2001. The editors hope, quite justifiably, that the chapters thus brought together here "will serve as a sourcebook of Islamic legal practice and *qāḍī* judgments." Given that no comparable volume exists on subject, the significance of this volume for the scholars of Islamic law, history, and politics cannot be overstated. The twenty one chapters, not including the introduction, are grouped in four sections, the first addressing the nature and function of Islamic judgeship; second, judicial apparatus; third, juristic doctrines in practice, and fourth, judicial procedure. All chapters, as required judiciously by the organizer, are constructed around "one or more court judgments" and include "a translation of an exemplary legal document" or focus on the judge's application of legal doctrine in practice. The chapters cover a broad range in both time and space, but, limited perhaps by the contingencies of such collective endeavors and areas of active research, do not cover some important times and places, such as the Mughal and Ṣafavid empires, and contemporary Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The volume opens with an excellent and comprehensive historical survey of the field of Islamic court studies along with bibliographical references to key primary and secondary sources. The survey treats its subject diachronically, chronicling developments in the Umayyad, ʿAbbāsid, Ottoman, and modern periods, as well as synchronically. The first section opens with Christian Muller's contribution, which exploits the collection of Mamlūk documents discovered at the al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf in Jerusalem in 1970s to explore the precise role of the *qāḍī*. He concludes that this role was not limited to notarizing on the basis of plain legal facts but indeed extended to deciding litiga-

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.113

tions and issuing certifications and hence exercising social influence even without issuing a formal judgment (*ḥukm*). Leslie Peirce's piece looks at the Ottoman legal records to depict the shifting legal environment of a sixteenth-century Ottoman court in Aintab, a town of moderate significance in Southeastern Anatolia, and finds that the new Ottoman government used the court to invigorating its legal system, consolidating central control and achieving local order, but the court accomplished these aims in a flexible and adaptable manner. Erin Stiles combines ethnography and legal interpretation in his examination of two cases from an Islamic court in rural Zanzibar and highlights the significance of the judges' cultural and moral authority and sensitivity. John Bowen similarly highlights the sharīʿa judge's role in a flexible Islamic legal framework and the significance of his notions of fairness that draw on lived custom, *ʿādāt*, in determining the decisions. Anthropologist Baudouin Dupret, in his study of the notion of harm as a grounds for divorce in the 1920 and 1929 codifications of personal status law in Egypt, mobilizes Hart's version of legal positivism to shift the question of the nature of Islamic law to the question of what people do when referring to Islamic law. The next two contributions seem to suggest the opposite. Baber Johansen turns to a more conventional but nuanced analysis of the consequences of codification of law in Egypt, where he argues that unlike traditional *fiqh*, it is the legislature, political authorities, expert (secular) jurists, and of course, the judges of the SCC that have been empowered to rethinking and reformulate Islamic law and normativity. Brinkley Messick's account of a mid-twentieth-century commercial litigation in a Yemenī sharīʿa court and observes that the substantive technical language adheres closely to Zaydī doctrine on the rescission of contracts and that the court bases its analysis on its assessment of intent and consent. Rudolph Peters investigates the re-Islamization of the penal code in Northern Nigeria, noting how the Sharīʿa Court of Appeal has more than once overturned lower Sharīʿa courts' sentences to stone women convicted of adultery on the basis of pregnancy – evidence acceptable in classical Mālikī law – motivated in part the desire to avoid constitutional challenges to the application of Sharīʿa law.

The second section, on organizing law, opens with Engin Akarli's contribution, which looks at litigation among artisans and traders the eighteenth-century Ottoman world and suggests that judges acted as moderators in reconciling actual or potential conflicts in an effort to

maintain harmony and order in the marketplace. Rossitsa Gradeva shows, nuancing the prevailing wisdom on the absence of judicial hierarchy and review in Islamic law, that in the seventeenth-century Ottoman province of Sofia we find both an embryonic hierarchy among the provincial *qāḍī*s as well as appellate function of the provincial *dīwān*. Allad Christelow's account of the replacement of two Islamic judicial councils, one in nineteenth-century Algeria by the French and the other in twentieth-century Nigeria by the military regime, with centralized legal systems recalls more clearly the sense of loss implicit is some other contributions: "Locally based jurisdictions with flexible procedures, guided by the rich and subtle tradition of *fiqh*, were displaced by centralized systems that operated on the assumption that human acts can be objectively described and fit into rigorously defined patterns that must be imposed throughout a sovereign territory" (p. 319).

The third section, on applying doctrines, contains six thought-provoking contributions. Maribel Fierro sheds light on the Mālikī jurists' adjustment of Islamic legal norms to local practice concerning ill-treated women. Muhammad Masud's substantial piece points out an interesting difference in the practice of Umayyad *qāḍī*s and the post-formative jurisprudence concerning the *matāʿ* (goods) mentioned in the Qurʾān as due to the woman upon divorce. This contribution also has implications for the historical studies on early Islamic legal doctrine and practice, as it questions the post-formative bias against the work of Umayyad period *qāḍī*s as irregular, baseless, and mere personal opinion, inaugurated by, most importantly, Schacht (p. 352). David Power's contribution, especially pedagogically helpful, analyses four fifteenth-century *fatwā*s from Islamic Spain and North Africa that shed light on the judicial process. In contrast with scholars who see Islamic law as informal and distinct in every way from modern law, such as anthropologist Lawrence Rosen (1989), he notes that the *qāḍī* in these cases appears as a third, neutral party, not afraid to give decision that resulted in a zero-sum game, making use of written documents liberally, and working with the *muftī*s on hard cases. Notably also, he confirms the familiar theme that women were active agents who used their wit and knowledge of the law to overcome the asymmetries of the rules of marriage and divorce (p. 409). Abdul-Karim Rafeq's contribution looks at inter-madhhab dynamics in Ottoman Damascus over the centuries and concludes that the manipulation of legal doctrine in matters related to *waqf* property benefitted

influential groups at the expense of *waqf* beneficiaries (p. 425). Through his study of Ottoman Aleppo, Stefan Knost, concludes, in agreement with some other contributors, the untenability of the Weberian notion of *Kadijustiz* and Rosen's (1989) similar conclusions, that these judges were "neither automatons who applies procedural rules in a mechanical manner nor Weberian Kadis who decided cases arbitrarily without reference to any legal rules and principles" (p. 444). Ron Shaham studies modern Egyptian Christians who, influenced by the majority culture of shopping for *fatwā*s between various Sunnī madhhabs, maneuver between their own religious family laws and those of the Islamic majority.

The fourth section, which tackles procedure and evidence, begins with Delfina Serrano's Almoravid rule during the late eleventh and late twelfth centuries, based on two texts authored by the son of the famous Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, on the legal practice of the Qāḍī and the *fatwā*s pertinent to it. Serrano concludes the *qāḍī*s enjoyed considerable freedom to apply *adab* and *taʿzīr* punishments, and to some degree, *ḥadd* punishments, without being arbitrary. The application of *ḥadd* was pulled in two directions, the strictness of formal procedures threatened letting criminals go unpunished whereas the legal weight given to suspicion made meting out such punishments difficult. Aharon Layish's contribution asserts the importance of written documents in the pre-codified Mālikī fiqh in Libya before 1970s. Lucy Carroll examines the controversies surrounding the Evidence Act of Pakistan as part of what she dubs General Zia's "anti-Islamization coup."

The volume is thoughtfully put together, reasonably complete, rich, and suggestive, corrective of any number of misinformed assumptions about Islamic law in modern literature that had been based on a thin reading of formal-theoretical texts on legal doctrine, and a welcome first step in the passage of the field of Islamic legal practice to the age of maturity.

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İslam İktisadını Yeniden Düşünmek, edited by Taha Eğri, Oğuz Karasu, and Necmettin Kızılkaya, (İslam İktisadı Kitaplığı, 1) (Istanbul: İGİAD Yayınları, 2014), 311 pp., ISBN: 9978-975-6303-19-1

This edited book includes academic papers from The First Islamic Economics Workshop, entitled *Basic Concepts and Thoughts*, which was held on March 2-3, 2013, in Istanbul. The book is composed of eleven academic articles that were written by a group of academics and thinkers from around the world.

The main aim of the book is to "reflect the concept of Islamic economics in our lives, in a deserving and meaningful way." Whether this aim can be attained will be evaluated at the end of this review. As is clear from the included articles that are reviewed below, the target audience of this book includes individuals who are familiar with Islamic economics. In particular, this book presents researchers with an alternative guide and framework for methodological, jurisprudential, and conceptual aspects of Islamic economics.

In terms of methodological guidance presented in the book, the work of Masudul Alam Choudhury is of remarkable value and interest. In his work, he describes a new and noteworthy term called 'human potential,' as opposed to 'human capital,' which he uses within the framework of a proposed alternative view of Islamic Economics. Basing his new view on this concept of human potential, Choudhury constructs a model of evolutionary learning that contains components that are ultimately connected to the concept of well-being. Choudhury's critical viewpoint of neo-classical economics is not an aim in and of itself, but does allow him to develop a comprehensive alternative approach in line with Islam, thereby making his work unique and valuable. Among the more outstanding concepts used in his alternative viewpoint are *tawḥīd* (the episteme of unity of knowledge), *shūrā* (a consultative democratic concept), and evolutionary learning. However, it is not always easy to grasp the meaning of these concepts or their association with each other. Thus, we suggest a preliminary reading of Choudhury in which he explains these concepts in detail.

Ilahiyat Studies
Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.114

Another work that prioritizes the methodological aspect of Islamic economics is the introductory article in which Necmettin Kızılkaya touches on an important issue regarding the methodology used in Islamic economics studies. He argues that the fundamental sources of Islam are generally taken as supportive and legitimizing tools for modern concepts and theories, though they should be taken as constructive elements. This point is important because there are many studies on Islamic economics in which modern concepts such as development and theories such as marginalism are accepted without question whereas the fundamental sources of Islam used to legitimize these ideas contain potentially incompatible concepts.

On a different note, a comprehensive economic analysis is performed by M. F. Khan. Specifically, he establishes the foundation of his interesting paradigm: until it is proven to be Islamic, an approach should be termed 'our economics.' He calls this an alternative secular approach. However, the limits of this approach and its connection with Islamic economics are not clarified in detail. The distinction between 'our economics' and mainstream economics is that 'our economics' defines the concept of welfare as the fulfilment of needs instead of simply satisfying desires, as is the case for mainstream economics. The distinction between needs and desires is important to highlight. The main elements of 'our economics' are defined by Khan as: the economic problems of man that include how wealth is generated and distributed, and how wealth is consumed by its owner. By exploring each of these elements independently, he constructs an outline of an introductory course book on Islamic economics.

One of the least cohesive and least purposeful articles in the book belongs to Ş. Özdemir. The lack of cohesiveness and purposefulness results from the fact that the author gives general information about Islam, followed by its connection with economics, before superficially criticizing the economic viewpoint of the current Turkish government, the AKP.[1] Thus, the weakness of the paper is based primarily on a lack of focus on both of the aforementioned subjects, combined with weak links between them.

[1] For a more comprehensive analysis in that regard, see Seda Demiralp, "The Rise of the Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 41/3 (2009), 315-335.

One of the most compact and purposeful articles in the book belongs to A. Abozaid, in which he creates an eloquent summary of the *fiqhī* (jurisprudential) problems in Islamic finance while also suggesting approaches to solve such problems. This article is a strong argument that can benefit policy-makers.

In terms of the conceptual guidance, M. S. Salleh's work is outstanding because it is one of the most innovative articles in the book. The author aims to re-define the concept of 'poverty' from an Islamic point of view. To achieve this aim, he utilizes four different events from the time of the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) as examples. Accordingly, he lists four types of poverty. The first is that in which a person is poor in both the material and spiritual sense. The second type is defined as a person who is poor in terms of spirituality but not in the material sense. The third type of poverty is described as a person who is being materially poor but not spiritually. The final type is the person who is poor in neither the material nor the spiritual sense. The most urgent types of poverty to be dealt with are the first and second types. Ultimately, the article creates a new dimension for the concept of poverty.

To conclude the book, Taha Eğri summarizes some of the articles, drawing attention to the problem of engaging Islamic economics with financialization and capitalism. This criticism is important because it is mentioned commonly and must be taken seriously.[2]

This edited book, which includes a number of articles that have been reviewed above, contains a general theme of rethinking and redefining modern economic theories and concepts from the perspective of Islamic economics. Thus, the title of the book and what is contained within are consistent with one another. When the aforementioned aim is considered, it is clear that the articles discuss concepts of Islamic economics that are largely neglected today, which is certainly a main strength of this book. One of its weaknesses, however, is that not all of the articles are equally cohesive. Ultimately, we recommend this book particularly for those already familiar with the subject and those who would like to gain an alternative perspective

[2] For a detailed study in this context, see Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

regarding the methodology, conceptualization, and jurisprudential aspects of Islamic economics.

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Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures: A Historical and Bibliographical Survey, by Hans Daiber (Themes in Islamic Studies: 7) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012), xi + 274 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-22227-4, €107 / $149 (hb)

Hans Daiber's *Islamic Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures* is aptly named. This work is both timely and necessary in that it seriously addresses one topic within Islamic Studies that is all too often neglected or merely cited as a footnote to Islamic history: the very real historical relationship between scientific and intellectual disciplines in the Western European Christian world and the Muslim world. This collection of Daiber's detailed and insightful essays painstakingly reveals the depth and breadth of intellectual dialogue between Muslim and Christian intellectuals in the Middle Ages. While these contacts may not always have been in person, the extent to which Islamic sources have added to the development of science and philosophy in the global history of the advancement of knowledge has been sorely underappreciated, or at best has been noted in passing as a kind of historical curiosity. Daiber's volume is so rich with detail and historical nuance that it makes a major contribution in fleshing out the actual meaning and significance of the Islamic contribution to philosophy and science, instead of merely paying tribute to it in passing. This volume collects the most outstanding examples of Daiber's scholarship in this area. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of science and philosophy in general, or in the history of the major Islamic contributions to topics of universal scientific and philosophical interest.

The first chapter of the volume, "The Qurʾānic Background of Rationalism in Early Islam," presents a compelling description of the conceptual bases derived from the sciences of the Qurʾān that laid the groundwork for Islamic scientific advances. Daiber shows how the rigorous study of the Qurʾān undertaken by the earliest Muslim scholars gave birth to traditions of logical reasoning that enabled, and even necessitated, the development of scientific inquiry in the medieval Islamic world. As he insightfully points out, "research in the history of scientific thought in Islam appears to be a pre-requisite for a better understanding of Islam [in general]" (p. 6). Daiber's argument is highly important: it proves that the rationalistic bases of scientific

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p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.115

inquiry are not alien to Islam as such, but can be (and were) derived from the basic principles of a genuinely Islamic worldview. The second chapter of the volume, which discusses the rational patterns of argumentation in the classic *kalām* debate over human free will, further explores the place of rationalism in the center of Islamic intellectual history. The fourth chapter, "The Autonomy of Philosophy in Islam," also provides a detailed discussion of the place of philosophy as such (*falsafa*) in Islamic intellectual history.

The third, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of the volume provide an extremely useful collection of information on the historical lines of transmission and relationship between Islamic intellectual history, Western Christian intellectual history, and the intellectual heritage of the ancient world. Chapter Three, "The Encounter of Islamic Rationalism with Greek Culture: The Translation Period and its Role in the Development of Islamic Philosophy," provides a detailed and thoroughly documented summary of the ʿAbbāsid translation movement, including important details about which works were translated in particular and why some genres were more likely to be translated over others. This chapter serves as a very useful summary of this crucial period in Islamic intellectual history and is an excellent guide for any further research in this area. The fifth chapter, "The Encounter of Islamic Philosophy with European Thought: Latin Translations and Translators of Arabic Philosophical Texts and their Importance for Medieval European Philosophy. Survey and State of the Art," is perhaps the most impressive part of the collection. It is an extensive (77 pages) bibliography of studies on and editions of Arabic texts translated into Latin in the Western European Middle Ages. The section includes information on the Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian corpus transmitted into Latin through Arabic, Syriac, and Hebrew; the lines of Platonic tradition transmitted to Medieval Europe through Arabic; and Latin translations of al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd. To give just one example of the detailed contributions of this chapter, Daiber describes the highly interesting and important history of the *Liber de Causis*, which is based on an Arabic version of Proclus' *Institutio Theologica*. As is well known, the *Liber de Causis* was foundational for Medieval European scholasticism and therefore constitutes an important component of the history of Western European thought in general. The discussion provided by Daiber on this topic sheds light, therefore, on the Arabic Islamic contribution to a crucial component of the development of philosophy in Western Europe.

The final two chapters of the collection provide a powerful summary of the significance of this research as a whole. Chapter Seven, "Islamic Roots of Knowledge in Europe," provides a rich catalog of specific examples of Islamic scientific and philosophical texts that were translated into Latin in the Middle Ages and thereby became foundational for the development of science and philosophy in Medieval Western Europe. This chapter in particular might be of interest to a wide readership in the field in that it provides such specific and compelling examples of such an important phenomenon. The concluding chapter, "Manifestations of Islamic Thought in an Intertwined World," sketches the history of Western European intellectual interactions with Islam, and ends with a call for the study of Islamic civilizations within the context of an intellectual dialogue between Christian and Muslim civilizations that has been taking place since the beginning of Islamic history. This call is amply justified by the depth of Daiber's collection and constitutes the primary importance of this text: through rigorous and documented study, Daiber proves that in order to understand the history of philosophy and science in Western European societies, it is of paramount importance to understand the history of philosophy and science in the world of Islam.

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Creation and Evolution, by Lenn E. Goodman (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), 222 pp., ISBN 978-0-415-91381-2, £24.99 (pb)

In the heated discussions about the relationship between religion and science, Stephen Jay Gould's (d. 2002) offering, known as NOMA "Non-Overlapping Magisteria," has been met with a myriad of reactions. His formula had suggested that, as completely two distinct realms, religion and science address two complementary aspects of human knowledge, the first about the ultimate meaning of universe and moral values and the other about the empirical outcomes. Whoever wants to mix these two would be mixing, in Gould's own words, "apples and oranges." Leaving aside his emotional description of the subject in *Rocks of Ages,* along with occasional statements such as "with all my heart," "brings tears to my eyes," etc., Gould's main thesis hardly conforms with the historical development of religious disciplines. The history of religious ideas is a history of rationality; one need not be a specialist in a religious discipline to see that every religious standpoint applies certain mechanisms to justify its fundamental principles on a rational basis. Rationality brings about the doctrine of the unity of truth, whether it comes from divine intelligence or the human mind, a notion that underpins the overall metaphysical and epistemological structures in the Medieval Period. As Quentin Skinner elaborates, rationality is the crucial criteria for us to recognize the range of explanatory instruments in a belief system. To wit, religion without rationality is but a massive vacuum no one can make sense of. Once this fact is observed, it is principally impossible to strip religious discourse of its ontological indications, restricting it only to morality. Thus, Gould's stance is, in the first place, prone to systematical approaches which view religion in the given context. And in fact, it has been seen as such. The subject of this review can be seen as a telling contribution in this regard.

In order for us to give such contextual meaning to this book, it seems essential to look at the overall grounds which each chapter dwells upon. Simply entitled "Backgrounds," the first chapter acknowledges a vast array of ideas and stances, a bulk of opinions that is collected to help us map the terrain, i.e., the terrain of the relationship between religion and science with special reference to the

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p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.116

thorny subject of "creationism and evolutionism." We can see that many aspects are taken into consideration by the author, from ancient philosophical questions such as the eternity of the world, to modern peculiarities such as American bumper stickers that say "I'm a fool of Christ, whose fool are you?" (p. 29). The second chapter "Leaving Eden" offers a partial commentary on the first book of the Holy Bible to explore what Genesis says about creation, skillfully enriching the content with explanations taken from the rabbinical literature. The third chapter is titled "The Case for Evolution," and it accordingly outlines the major figures and scientific theories regarding biological evolution up to the present time. It also points to the changes of thought Darwin went through as he tried to come up with a stringent theory of his own. All of these, as is in the rest of the book, are written in the unique style of the author. The fourth chapter "Three Lines of Critique" exhibits a more systematical character because it takes into consideration three fundamental questions or "worries" that are lined up against the validity of the theory of evolution. The first is the allegation that evolution is "atheistic, cold, and materialistic," strictly removing the notion of teleology in universe. The second challenge comes from the famous philosopher Karl Popper: evolution is a near tautology, it ascribes the survival of adaptive forms to their fitness, which means but survival. The third is the well-known adversary of evolution, namely, Intelligent Design, which mainly supports the idea of "irreducibly complex" systems. The fifth and the last chapter goes under the title "That Has Its Seeds within It." In this chapter, the author more explicitly emphasizes his take on the issue, referring to terms such as potency, capacity, and latency. According to the author's approach, these terms represent a more coherent understanding of the Biblical texts, rather than any literal readings which attempt to find an alternative cosmology in God's words. The book is closed by an afterword that touches upon more common subjects that have been recently discussed, which chiefly criticize Gould's approach in a prudent manner.

A student of philosophy expects to find more philosophical background in the book because the author has a deserved reputation for his scholarship of Islamic thought, with publications such as *Avicenna* (2006) and *Islamic Humanism* (2008). However, it is only on very rare occasions that we have the chance to see these references, which would contribute to contextualize contemporary discussions in the general history of ideas. As an example, the author successfully

points to medieval discussions on the eternity of the world, and in doing so, he reminds the readers of the standpoints of two important Muslim thinkers (p. 10), al-Kindī (d. after 252 A.H.) and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E.). Both defended the temporal creation of the world, refuting the views of the Aristotelian eternalists. Without a doubt, today's ongoing debate of Islamic evolutionist theories cannot be properly understood without taking into account the history of the interaction between religion and science in Islam, an issue which deserves much more scholarly attention than it has had thus far. In parallel, an elite society of philosophy in tenth-century Baṣra, the Sincere Brethren (*Ikhwān al-ṣafā'*) are quoted twice (pp. 12, 76) in reference to their ideas on natural progress, which have been seen as earlier forms of the evolutionist views within Islamic thought. Thus, the strength of the book lies in its excavations of ancient philosophical perspectives, comparing them with those of modern scientists and writers. A good example is seen in the comparison between Darwin, Aristotle, and the Book of Genesis (p. 144). For the author, teleology, namely, the immanent purpose in nature, is the key word that offers a reasonable agreement between these so-called adversaries. Nevertheless, these excavations are scarce, and the reader is faced with numerous scientific positions of many personalities, which are apparently thought to work within the general theme. This character of the book might be a burden for those readers who want to completely engage in fine, page-turning reading.

Creation and Evolution is a modern doxography in the classical sense; that is, it encapsulates the viewpoints of the actors who play different roles in everlasting discussions on an important aspect of the relationship between religion and science. If we modernize the medieval "faith and reason" issue to the contemporary "science and religion" area of thought, the author can be described as an "Averroist," in the sense that his effort in the book can be broadly defined as "combining two different realms of truth." However, the author's own remark is modest: "I can't flatter myself that this book will convert extremists. But for those who seek a middle ground, it may prove helpful" (p. 1).

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ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī's Philosophical Journey: From Aristotle's* Metaphysics *to the 'Metaphysical Science', by Cecilia Martini Bonadeo (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, 88) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013), xii + 378 pp., ISBN: 978-90-041-24916-5, €161.00 / $209.00 (hb)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (1162-1231 C.E.) was a remarkable individual. He was schooled in the Greek and Arabic philosophical traditions as well as in the traditional Islamic sciences, making him one of the most notable polymaths of his age. He was also well-versed and highly competent in the field of medicine. He traveled extensively throughout the Islamic world, debating with philosophers and other scholars and gaining the esteem and patronage of important officials and rulers. Moreover, he was actively engaged in the polemical pursuit of purging philosophy of (what he regarded to be its undesirable) Avicennian components.

Cecilia Martini Bonadeo's new book is a learned and authoritative study that synthesizes the existing literature on ʿAbd al-Laṭīf and sheds new light on various aspects of his life and thought. The book is structured into three main parts. Part 1 consists of a survey of the fate of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the ancient and late-antique contexts and an overview of its variegated reception in the early Islamic period. This part of the book covers several key issues relating to the composition, textual transmission, translation, and interpretation of *Metaphysics*, in part, by exploring the practice of commentary writing that developed around it, especially from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Avicenna. Martini Bonadeo also devotes considerable attention to the changing conception of metaphysics as a discipline in Greek and Arabic philosophical circles. How did the ancient philosophers divide the various parts of the metaphysical inquiry and define its subject matter and principal aims? What place did metaphysics occupy in their thought, particularly with regard to theology and ontology? Martini Bonadeo addresses these questions thoroughly and stresses the roles played by the Greek Neoplatonists and the Arabic adaptations of Neoplatonic works produced in the circle of al-Kindī. In essence, this part of the book amounts to a very readable survey. It offers a *status quaestionis* of several key issues and provides the essential

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p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.117

historical background for the later analysis of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's approach to metaphysics.

Part 2 offers an analysis of the biographical evidence of the life and intellectual trajectory of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf. His voyages throughout the Middle East, his meetings with various teachers and scholars, his interactions with political figures, and the main stages of his medical and philosophical formation as recorded in the available sources are deftly discussed by Martini Bonadeo. We are fortunate to possess a wealth of information about ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, much of which is contained in the works of later Arabic bio-bibliographers and other authors; the remainder is conveniently found in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's autobiography. This rich data mine allows for a detailed reconstruction of the various stages of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's medical and philosophical education; from his initial embrace of Avicennian learning to his later critical attitude toward it and his overarching project of forging a new synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and the Islamic sciences. However, the value of this section of the book is not confined to ʿAbd al-Laṭīf alone; Martini Bonadeo paints a broad and rich picture of the social and cultural life of the period that goes well beyond ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's own career and provides valuable insight into the philosophical and medical education of the learned classes of his time.

In Part 3, the author scrutinizes the structure and contents of ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's *Book on the Science of Metaphysics*, which was preserved in only two manuscripts, against the backdrop of the Greek and Arabic metaphysical traditions. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's metaphysical objective was to return to the doctrines of Aristotle and his faithful commentators, which he believed had been tainted by Avicennian theories. Avicenna's views gained widespread acceptance after his death and deeply penetrated the various layers of Islamic education, including jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and rational theology (*kalām*), in addition to the philosophical curriculum itself. However, there were reactionary attempts by various thinkers to purge Aristotelian doctrines of these accretions. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, in the eastern Islamic lands, and Averroes, in al-Andalus, are two notable examples of philosophical opposition to Avicenna, even though the motives behind their opposition varied considerably. Martini Bonadeo's analysis dwells on the various sources that made ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's revisionist project feasible: he referenced not only various versions of *Metaphysics* but also a rich array of works traceable to the Greek commentators (especially Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius), the circle of al-Kindī, and al-Fārābī. The

Arabic Neoplatonic corpus also played an important role in shaping ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's views, placing him squarely in the tradition of those Arabic thinkers who relied on Neoplatonic works for their exegesis of Aristotelian sources.

Martini Bonadeo has produced a very carefully researched study. Her sources and quotations are well contextualized, and she provides a substantial number of passages gleaned from ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's works and aptly translated into English, often for the first time. The author's style is clear and concise, and her exposition is thoughtful and informed by the latest and most authoritative scholarship on the subject. Moreover, she provides very detailed information on the manuscripts containing ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's works and the editions used. All in all, Martini Bonadeo's book offers a successful balance of philological expertise and conceptual analysis.

However, although the author's discussions of the Greek and Arabic thinkers are in general satisfactory, her treatment of Avicenna is less compelling. This is unfortunate insofar as Avicenna is (after Aristotle), arguably, the thinker who had the strongest impact (both positive and negative) on ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's approach to philosophy. In particular, Martini Bonadeo's summary of Avicennian metaphysics and cosmology (pp. 100-105) is incomplete and potentially misleading for readers who are not already familiar with the intricacies of Avicenna's thought. One wishes that the author's discussion of major Avicennian metaphysical themes (essence and existence, the modalities, and causation) had been more substantial and precise. The author altogether fails to mention the causation of the separate intellects from one another and the crucial role they play in celestial motion. Moreover, Martini Bonadeo does not provide any insight into the basic structure of Avicenna's cosmology. As a result, readers might get the impression that Avicenna ascribes only one soul to the heavens, when in fact he posits a multiplicity of souls (and intellects) to explain the activity and motion of the celestial bodies. Martini Bonadeo's treatment of this topic could have benefited from consideration of additional relevant publications (especially H. A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* [New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992]; A. Hasnawi, "Fayḍ," in *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, vol. II. *Les notions philosophiques* [Paris, PUF, 1990], I, 966-972; and D. Janos, "Moving the Orbs: Astronomy, Physics, and Metaphysics, and the Problem of

Celestial Motion according to Ibn Sīnā," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 21/2 [2011], 165-214).

A more general shortcoming of the book is that although the reader learns a great deal about the textual, formal, and structural aspects of the Greek and Arabic metaphysics traditions, there is, in the final analysis, no real attempt by the author to contextualize ʿAbd al-Laṭīf's ideas within the ongoing philosophical dialogue with Avicenna and the Avicennian philosophers who flourished shortly after his death. In this regard, I found that the author unduly emphasizes the Greek tradition at the expense of the crucial period spanning from Avicenna to ʿAbd al-Laṭīf himself, which she relegates to a secondary position. However, a more sustained analysis of the general metaphysical outlook that prevailed from Avicenna and Bahmanyār to al-Ghazālī, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (to name only a few major figures) seems a requisite to complete the (otherwise excellent) picture sketched by the author. As a result of this omission, one does not fully grasp where ʿAbd al-Laṭīf situated himself vis-à-vis some of the critiques already articulated by these thinkers against Avicenna nor to what his relation to the post-Avicennian tradition precisely amounted. I feel that the book may have benefited from an additional chapter to fill this gap and to cover what is arguably the most nuanced and complicated period of Martini Bonadeo's survey.

These two critical points notwithstanding, Martini Bonadeo's book is a welcome and valuable contribution to the history of Arabic thought and the field of Greco-Arabic studies. The book is a thoroughly researched monograph that will undoubtedly remain the reference work on ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī for many years to come.

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Classical Foundations of Islamic Educational Thought A Compendium of Parallel English-Arabic Texts, selected and introduced by Bradley J. Cook, with assistance from Fathi H. Malkawi (Islamic Translation Series), (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2011), xlvii + 305 pp., ISBN: 978-0-8425-2763-7, $49.95 (hb)

The importance of this book rests not only in its collection of key classical texts on Islamic education, but equally significant is the introduction by Cook to the book. Here, Cook made a risky but yet worthy attempt to summarize the long and nuanced histories of Islamic education in mere 26 pages. This attempt is worthy due to his conviction that the study of modern Western intellectual foundation is not possible without understanding the Muslim educational enterprise during its classical period. The phenomenal development of these Muslim traditions provided the basic foundations of the Western intellectual tradition. "Islam", Cook asserts, "not only bridged early Greco-Hellenistic intellectualism to medieval European scholasticism but also contributed to and improved the corpus of knowledge in medicine, astronomy, philosophy, mathematics, music, architecture, cartography, and geometry. Islamic society can also be credited for conserving and transmitting large bodies of knowledge from Arabic into Latin and promulgating them throughout Europe." For this reason, the attempt is indeed worthy and important.

However, this same attempt is risky because it runs the risk of over-simplifying or truncating a complex and convoluted corpus of knowledge in its long, diverse, and plural histories. Suffice to note that during the period of eighth and thirteenth centuries alone, which is the period under study, the Muslim world was extended geographically from Spain (Andalus), North Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and as far as the Southeast Asia. Politically and culturally, the Muslims were not any close to being homogenous. Although the origins of the authors of the selected texts may reflect the different geographical sites of the Muslim world, their active years remained in the Central lands of Islam. Both al-Zarnūjī (Turkistan) and Ibn Miskawayh (al-Rayy) originated from the Central Asia, but their active learning and teachings were mainly in the Central lands of Islam. Little has been done, for instance, to study Islam and Muslims in the

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Volume 5 Number 2 Summer/Fall 2014

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.118

Southeast Asia in its early centuries of Islam. Aceh Darussalam, at the Northern tip of Sumatra, was not only considered as the golden mines and thriving ports (the Indians called it the Island of Gold), it was also known as the Verandah of Mecca, the meeting points for scholars and scholarly works on Islam. The point I wish to emphasize here is the need to acknowledge and appreciate that Islamic histories are not one singular history.

Another general note need to be made here is the sources of this knowledge about Islamic education. The eight selected texts are generally and primarily instructional, pedagogical, and administrative in nature, with the exception of *Risāla* of Ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ, and in some ways Ibn Miskawayh's *The Refinement of Character*. In order to understand the philosophical foundations of Islamic educational thought, one has to unearth and discover these from various other sources whose titles may not bear the word "education" or "learning." Al-Ghazālī's discussion on the nature of knowledge (epistemology) in his Chapter on Knowledge in his magnum opus *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* is essential in understanding Islamic educational thought. His *Maʿārij al-quds fī madārij maʿrifat al-nafs* or Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Kitāb al-nafs* are yet some of these important sources to understand the psychology key to understanding Islamic educational thought. Owing to the focus on pedagogical and instructional aspects of education, al-Ghazālī's *O Son!* (*Ayyuhā l-walad*) was selected, in spite of its attribution to al-Ghazālī is arguable as highlighted by David Reisman.

On the sources, quite apart from the traditional epistles or historical treatises one is accustomed to, one must not also ignore historical sources that record education in practice. Here I mean, to learn about the educational thoughts not only conceptually from the philosophical, instructional, and pedagogical sources, but also from educational practices. One could draw this rich information from biographical sources (*tarājim* and *ṭabaqāt*). In addition to these sources, the *ijāza*s (certificates) granted to students could also provide insights to the educational thoughts and practices of classical Islam. While some studies have been done on these sources, much is still to be desired in this area.

Notwithstanding the above brief notes, these epistles are indeed foundational and essential, particularly in discussing the instructional and pedagogical aspect of Islamic education. They also shed some light on some administrative matters and best practices in education.

These administrative matters and best practices include the weekly and yearly holidays, discipline, such as administration of corporal punishments, and matters pertaining to teachers' salaries as discussed by Ibn Saḥnūn and al-Qābisī. Arranged in a chronological order, these epistles present a certain evolution to some of the instructional practices and advices. Many of these practices are subjected to cultural values and conventions, such as in determining the holidays and breaks. On this matter, al-Qābisī mentioned "similarly, the feast-days off is also [based] on customary and conventional practices." (Translation here is mine that varies from the Michael Fishbein's as provided in the book.)

The aforementioned credits overwrite some editorial errors that the book contains. These errors include transliteration mistakes, mismatch of some of the parallel paragraphs to the Arabic texts, as well as reference to the epistles and paragraphs made by Cook in his introduction. To sum, the book has done great service in understanding classical Islamic educational practices, particularly for the English speaking readers.

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Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians, edited by Ednan Aslan, Marcia Hermansen, and Elif Medeni (Wiener Islamstudien, 3), (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), 340 pp., ISBN 978-3-631-62899-7, €48.40 / $62.95 (hb)

At first glance, the title *Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians* emphasizes that female Muslim theologians have had their say: different voices discuss female-related issues from a theological perspective. The title *Muslima Theology* itself appears to avoid association with the "feminist" genre of Christian Theology. One glance at the table of contents is enough to recognize that this anthology explicitly addresses women's issues and questions from an Islamic and theological viewpoint instead of formulating or stating theological positions, which do not solely relate to female matters.

The volume starts with an introduction by one of the editors, Marcia Hermansen, a well-known scholar, inter alia, of women in Islam. She underlines that after gaining better access to education of religious texts, the voices of Muslim women are now more audible than ever before. These voices comprise those who critically examine their religious tradition as well as those who fervently voice their conservative perspective (p. 11). As Hermansen explains, the contributors not only offer their perspectives as women on certain issues, perspectives that may appear typically female, but also confront the modern-day challenges of their socio-cultural contexts and positions. In her introduction, Hermansen traces the current trends in religious thought as well as the social and political activism of Muslim women that concurrently integrates, more or less, the ideas of all authors in this volume. Instead of Islamic Feminism or Muslim Feminism, I expand the name of this field's discourse to "Islamic-Theological Gender Studies and Activism." Although more women and contemporary scholars are able to write and speak out, one wonders whether these voices are, in fact, heard in broad theological debates. Women's issues are discussed in a specific niche and do not represent a self-evident section of theological debates in the Islamic world. The title itself, however, clarifies that male scholars would not typically contribute to this text;

p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.119

editor Ednan Aslan is the only man who has contributed.[1] Muna Tatari makes this fact clear in her essay (pp. 155-166), stating that the awakening of Muslim scholars, once described as a gender-jihad, is not over yet. Therefore, Hermansen makes space in her introduction to discuss various women's movements and emancipation efforts in the last few decades.

The volume is divided into four chapters. In Chapter 1, "Muslim Women as Theologians: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives," Hermansen states that "the four writers address the development of women's theology and activism within Islam, covering both classical and contemporary periods" (p. 25). Ednan Aslan briefly discusses the importance of female companions after the Prophet Muḥammad's passing with regard to conveying prophetic narrations and their knowledge, to which early Islamic scholars showed a depreciative attitude. Zainab Alwani, Ndeye Adújar and Aysha Hidayatullah offer an overview on the female contributors in this context as well as during the last century in their own contexts. These authors note that terms such as "feminism" should not present an obstacle to others who may consider ideas and new approaches within theological debates seriously (see especially Ndeye Adújar, pp. 59-80).

In Chapter 2, "Theological Anthropology and Muslim Women," Riffat Hassan, compares Jewish and Islamic beliefs and observes that Eve was not guilty for the fall from heaven; from this perspective, Eve therefore cannot represent the evil in human creation. Hatice K. Arpaguş (pp. 115-132) approaches this subject from an anthropological perspective with a thorough exploration.

Chapter 3, "Muslim Women and Islamic Religious Law," addresses three crucial questions pertaining to women: divorce (Carolyn Baugh), sexualization of rituals (Etin Anwar), and violence against women (Rabha Al-Zeera), as related to Sūra 4:34 in the Qurʾān. The combination of these essays' themes may seem repetitive, but the essays in fact suggest that these issues remain relevant worldwide for many Muslim women and their circumstances, which requires further elaboration.

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[1] Nonetheless, there are also male scholars like Farid Esack from South Africa who show their solidarity with Muslim feminists and activists and contribute by their writings.

The most compelling part of this book is the last section, entitled "Muslima Constructive Theology," which offers a fresh perspective and infuses constructive thinking into the debate. Jerusha Tanner Lamptey (pp. 231-246) begins by inviting the reader to consider religious differences or pluralism with "an alternative conception of difference [which] is the work of Muslim women interpreters of the Qurʾān" (p. 231),[2] after which she presents the various intra-Islamic discourses on pluralism. Debra Majeed, a Muslim convert from Christianity, narrates the difficulties encountered when applying interpretative skills of Western Academia in Muslim communities, and how this is especially true for female African-American Muslims. She states at one point, "Muslim womanist philosophy creates space for Muslim women to situate themselves and, through their own lived realities, articulate who they are, what they value, and where they belong" (p. 263). In her essay, Saʿdiyya Shaikh argues "that there is an organic and a dialogical relationship between Sufism and Islamic Law that remains relatively unexplored in terms of its potential to enhance a rethinking of gender ethics" (p. 267). She believes that egalitarian options, which are authentically part of Sufism, could engage questions of gender ethics with implications for Islamic law regarding gender issues. Her essay is the only Sufi-related contribution to this volume.

With this compilation, the editors wished to make a further contribution that empowered Muslim women and subsequently enabled their theological concepts to be more perceptible and better appreciated. In summary, this volume provides several new keynote essays rather than offering a full inventory of new trends in the Islamic-Theological gender debate.

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[2] This essay is actually a summarized version of her dissertation (*Toward a Muslima Theology of Religious Pluralism: the Qurʾān, Feminist Theology and Religious Diversity*, Georgetown University, 2011).

Shamanism and Islam: Sufism, Healing Rituals and Spirits in the Muslim World, edited by Thierry Zarcone and Angela Hobart (London & New York: I. B. Tauris in association with Centro Incontri Umani, 2013), xli + 360 pp., ISBN: 978-1-84885-602-8, $104.50 (hb)

This work must be considered a major work in studies not only of shamanism but also of certain contemporary Muslim cultures. While the term "shamanism" commonly refers to a wide range of practices in various Muslim and non-Muslim parts of the world, a catch-all category for many different cults and belief systems, a certain unity can however, be perceived between the shamanic practices of North Asia and Muslim Central Asia. Zarcone, Hobart, and others examine how shamanism, Islam, and especially Sufism have interrelated over the centuries, and are still interrelating today.

The book provides an in-depth exploration of "Islamised shamanism," a survey of and a perspective on the contemporary reality of shamanism not only in Central Asia, but also in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans. Muslim shamans, like their Siberian counterparts, cultivate relationships with spirits to "help" individuals through healing and divination. This work also credits two researchers, Basilov and Garrone for combining historical and anthropological approaches to understanding shamanism. The two authors brought a comparative analysis of Islamized shamanism and North Asian shamanism. They also express an interest in the mingling of shamanism with Sufism and specific healing rituals which developed in a Muslim context and the relations of shamans with the spirits.

Islam was introduced into Central Asia by Arabs and shamanism was considered a pagan religion, in its original form. Shamanism was reinterpreted through Islam, more precisely through Sufism or Islamic mysticism. Sufism was pivotal during the campaigns of Islamization in the region and Sufi sheikhs were the main propagators of Islam. Sufism had heterodox trends and shamans of the region were forced to Islamize its external appearance and its religious discourse. The heterodox Sufi trends pleased shamanism because of their flexibility, even sometimes with disrespect toward implementations of sharīʿa. Shamans borrowed many ideas and practices from Sufism and the

Ilahiyat Studies
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p-ISSN: 1309-1786 e-ISSN: 1309-1719
DOI: 10.12730/13091719.2014.52.120

particular Sufi group, the Qalandariyya appeared making a hazy blend of shamanism and Sufism.

The actual "blending" or "syncretism" of shamanism and Sufism seems difficult to describe simply due to the variegation of examples. Nonetheless the editors state that the "amalgam" of shamanism and Sufism is based on a search for analogies and reinterpretation between aspects of shamanism and Sufism. The editors wonder as Patrick Garrone does in the present volume, whether Islamized shamanism constitutes a definitively established corpus of syncretic beliefs or if the ongoing confrontation between the two religious traditions of shamanism and Islam is an active process of mutual assimilation.

The syncretism of shamanism and Sufism continued over time and gave birth to manifold hybridisations of both traditions, differences depending on and being influenced by whether local Islamic influence was strong or soft and also where it happened. Healing and divination were mingled with Muslim devotion and rituals, these being more easily accepted by Muslim theologians. Diverse practices are linked to healing and foretelling amongst shamans.

Shamans are purported to be linked with a family of spirits. The healing process operated by the shaman is based essentially on a negotiation or fight with the spirits. These spirits or helper spirits fill a central position throughout the life of the shaman. The link can once again be seen between Sufism and shamanism with the deceased saints are seen as powerful spirits and auxiliaries of the shaman. It must also be noted that there is opposition of varying degrees to shamanism throughout the whole area by orthodox Islam and the more radical wing, Wahhābism.

The chapters in the book are all based on original research and shed light on the current situation of shamanism in the whole of Central Asia including Turkey and the Balkans and in selected areas beyond. The various chapters in the book explore complexities of shamanic rituals, music, dance, and also poetry, epic and bardic. These are connections between shamanism and arts of the Muslim world. One chapter provides information for comparison about shamanism in Siberia. This shows the heterogeneous nature of "Islamised shamanism," being sometimes close to the Northern Asian variety and sometimes closer to orthdox Islam. Garrone suggests that there is an "Islamised shamanism" and also a "shamanised Islam." The full supplement of the chapters contained in the book demonstrate and show

the variety and variegation of shamanism throughout the Central Asian region, including Turkey, tracing from Kazakhstan through to the Uyghur part of the Xinjian province in China. The second part of the book explores examples of shamanism outside of Central Asia, which can be seen to show parallels and contrasts between these and the Central Asian shamanisms.

The work will probably be quite interesting for students of Islamic studies and of comparative religion. What can be seen is the outcome of encounter with pre-Islamic religion and later with shamanic heterodoxies within these Muslim cultures. The original research in the book begins to show how orthodox Islam encountered pre-Islamic religions, how these religions transformed and survived, and how Islam treats these transformed variants of shamanism within Sufism nowadays. For students of comparative religion, the question of how shamanism was a part of syncretism with Islam in different aspects should prove interesting. For example, the shamanistic invocative song can be compared with the Sufi repetitive litany (*dhikr*) and this can be compared with aspects of other religions. Major aspects of interest to students of comparative religions should also be the healing that is purportedly done by shamans as well as the relationships to spirits and saints. These aspects can also be compared with extant similarities in other religions.

This book must receive a very positive review as it is an important work for the study of contemporary shamanism in its contemporary cultural setting. This original research uses a methodology which is primarily anthropological yet is also providing some historical relevance for much of the material. In its analyses it is showing certain coherences amidst the variegation of the various shamanisms of the region. One can also see similarities and differences with shamanisms beyond the Central Asian region. The comparisons and analyses of shamanisms contained in the various chapters of the book make this work an important and relevant description of the state of contemporary shamanisms and their encounters with Islam and other religious and spiritual trends and forces. This importance and relevance can be seen if one asks the question, “What makes Central Asia different from other parts of the Muslim world?” This book should be useful for students of Central Asian culture and for students of Islam in the modern world generally. The work provides a window in on this aspect of local culture which can be assumed to have had a signifi-

cant impact on the overall local culture and identities historically, also continuing into their contemporary settings.

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Buckley, J. Jacobsen and Albrile, Ezio, "Mandaean Religion", (trans. from Italian by Paul Ellis), *Encyclopedia of Religion: Second Edition*, (editor in chief: Lindsay Jones; USA: Thomson Gale, 2005), VIII, 5634-5640.

Book

Kātib Chalabī, Ḥājī Khalīfa Muṣṭafā ibn ʿAbd Allāh, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn*, 2 vols., (eds. M. Şerefeddin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge; Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-1943).

Michot, Yahya M., *Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au Vizir Abū Saʿd: Editio princeps d'après le manuscrit de Bursa, traduction de l'arabe, introduction, notes et lexique* (Beirut: al-Burāq, 2000).

Book Chapter

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Text and references must follow the format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition.

Arabic words should be transliterated according the style used by the Library of Congress.

Ilahiyat Studies

A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies

ISSN: 1309-1786

Volume 5 Number 2 Summer / Fall 2014

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ISSN: 1309-1786

13091786201452