

**Cilt Volume 31 Sayı Number Special Issue on Polish Foreign Policy in 21st Century E-ISSN 2618-6330**

# **SiYASAL**

**Journal of Political Sciences**

## INDEXING AND ABSTRACTING

Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI) - Web of Science

Political Science Complete - EBSCO

TR Dizin - TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM

ERIH PLUS

SOBIAD

DOAJ



**EBSCO**



**ERIH PLUS**  
EUROPEAN REFERENCE INDEX FOR THE  
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

**SOBIAD**

**DOAJ** DIRECTORY OF  
OPEN ACCESS  
JOURNALS

**SİYASAL: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCES**

**Cilt/Volume: 31 • Sayı/Number: Special Issue on Polish Foreign Policy in 21st Century • Mart/March 2022**  
**E-ISSN: 2618-6330 • DOI: 10.26650/siyasal**

**Sahibi / Owner**

**Prof. Dr. Ayşegül KOMSUOĞLU**

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası  
İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences and  
International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey

**Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü / Responsible Manager**

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**

İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Business Administration, Istanbul, Turkey

**Yazışma Adresi / Correspondence Address**

İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dekanlığı  
Dergi Yazı Kurulu Başkanlığı, Beyazıt, İstanbul, Türkiye  
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440-0000/12236  
E-posta: sbfdergi@istanbul.edu.tr  
<http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr>  
[www.dergipark.gov.tr/siyasal](http://www.dergipark.gov.tr/siyasal)

**Yayıncı / Publisher**

İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınevi / Istanbul University Press  
İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kampüsü, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / İstanbul, Türkiye  
Istanbul University Central Campus, 34452 Beyazıt, Fatih / Istanbul, Turkey  
Telefon / Phone: +90 (212) 440 00 00

Dergide yer alan yazılardan ve aktarılan görüşlerden yazarlar sorumludur.  
Authors bear responsibility for the content of their published articles.

Yayın dili İngilizce'dir.

The publication language of the journal is English.

Mart ve Ekim aylarında, yılda iki sayı olarak yayımlanan uluslararası,  
hakemli, açık erişimli ve bilimsel bir dergidir.

This is a scholarly, international, peer-reviewed and open-access journal  
published biannually in March and October.

**Yayın Türü / Publication Type**

Yaygın Süreli/Periodical

## DERGİ YAZI KURULU / EDITORIAL MANAGEMENT BOARD

### Baş Editör / Editor-in-Chief

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [enemli@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:enemli@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Baş Editör Yardımcısı / Co-Editor in Chief

**Prof. Dr. Oylum KORKUT ALTUNA**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Sayı Editörleri / Guest Editors

**Doç. Dr. Özgün ERLER BAYIR**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [ozguner@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:ozguner@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Karol BIENIEK**, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences and Administration, Krakow, Polonya. - [karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl](mailto:karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl)

### Dergi Yazı Kurulu Üyeleri / Editorial Management Board Member

**Prof. Dr. Esra NEMLİ ÇALIŞKAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [enemli@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:enemli@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Prof. Dr. Oylum KORKUT ALTUNA**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:oaltuna@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Alan Editörleri / Section Editors

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Çağatay ASLAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Aylin Ece ÇİÇEK**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:aylin.cicek@istanbul.edu.tr)

### İstatistik Editörleri / Statistic Editors

**Prof. Dr. Enis SINIKSARAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [esiniksaran@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:esiniksaran@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Prof. Dr. Hakan SATMAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İktisat Fakültesi, Ekonometri Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mhsatman@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mhsatman@istanbul.edu.tr)

### Dil Editörleri / Language Editors

**Alan James NEWSON**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu, İstanbul, Türkiye - [alan.newson@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:alan.newson@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Elizabeth Mary EARL**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu, İstanbul, Türkiye - [elizabeth.earl@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:elizabeth.earl@istanbul.edu.tr)

## EDITORIAL BOARD

**Tindara ADDABBO**, University of Unimore, Department of Economics, Modena, Italya  
- [tindara.addabbo@unimore.it](mailto:tindara.addabbo@unimore.it)

**Meliha ALTUNIŞIK**, Ortadoęu Teknik Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Ankara, Türkiye - [maltunis@metu.edu.tr](mailto:maltunis@metu.edu.tr)

**Saadet Gülden AYMAN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [guldenayman@gmail.com](mailto:guldenayman@gmail.com)

**Karol BIENIEK**, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences and Administration, Krakow, Polonya. - [karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl](mailto:karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl)

**Ayşegül KOMSUOĞLU**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [komsu@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:komsu@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Zeynep DÜREN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye  
- [zeyduren@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:zeyduren@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Charlotte EPSTEIN**, The University of Sydney, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sydney, Avustralya  
- [charlotte.epstein@sydney.edu.au](mailto:charlotte.epstein@sydney.edu.au)

**Pınar GİRİTLİOĞLU**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [pinozden@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:pinozden@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Gülşay GÜNLÜK ŞENESEN**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [gulaygs@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:gulaygs@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Yaprak GÜRSOY**, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Institute, Contemporary Turkish Studies, Londra, İngiltere - [y.gursoy@lse.ac.uk](mailto:y.gursoy@lse.ac.uk)

**Mehmet Akif İÇKE**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mehmetakificke@gmail.com](mailto:mehmetakificke@gmail.com)

**Umbreen JAVAID**, University of the Punjab, Centre for South Asian Studies, Department of Political Science, Punjab, Pakistan - [umbreenj62@gmail.com](mailto:umbreenj62@gmail.com)

**Fernando JIMENEZ SANCHEZ**, Universidad de Murcia, Catedrático de ciencia política y de la administración, Murcia, İspanya. - [fjimesan@um.es](mailto:fjimesan@um.es)

**Mustafa KİBAROĞLU**, MEF Üniversitesi, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [mustafa.kibaroglu@mef.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.kibaroglu@mef.edu.tr)

**Bogook KIM**, Sungkyunkwan University, Academy of East Asian Studies, Seul, Güney Kore.  
- [kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr](mailto:kimbogook@hufs.ac.kr)

**Christos KOLLIAS**, University of Thessaly, Department of Economics, Volos, Greece - [kollias@uth.gr](mailto:kollias@uth.gr)

**Emre Eren KORKMAZ**, University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Oxford, İngiltere - [emre.korkmaz@qeh.ox.ac.uk](mailto:emre.korkmaz@qeh.ox.ac.uk)

**Ziya ÖNİŞ**, Koç Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [zonis@ku.edu.tr](mailto:zonis@ku.edu.tr)

**Olga KRASNYAK**, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moskova, Rusya  
- [okrasnyak@hse.ru](mailto:okrasnyak@hse.ru)

**Alexandre KUKHIANIDZE**, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Tiflis, Gürcistan - [alex\\_kukhianidze@yahoo.com](mailto:alex_kukhianidze@yahoo.com)

**Gül Mehpare KURTOĞLU ESKİŞAR**, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İşletme Fakültesi, İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İzmir, Türkiye - [gul.kurtoglu@deu.edu.tr](mailto:gul.kurtoglu@deu.edu.tr)

**Roman KUŹNIAR**, University of Warsaw, Department Of Strategic Studies And International Security, Varşova, Polonya. - [r.kuzniar@uw.edu.pl](mailto:r.kuzniar@uw.edu.pl)

**Andrea LOCATELLI**, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Facoltà di Scienze Linguistiche, Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Milano, İtalya. - [andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it](mailto:andrea1.locatelli@unicatt.it)

**Rajiv NAYAN**, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Yeni Delhi, Hindistan - [rajivnayan@hotmail.com](mailto:rajivnayan@hotmail.com)

**Yaşar ONAY**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [yasaronay@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:yasaronay@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Ömer Faruk ÖRSÜN**, New York Üniversitesi-Abu Dhabi, Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, Abu Dhabi, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri - [omerorsun@nyu.edu](mailto:omerorsun@nyu.edu)

**Eeva-Kaisa PROKKOLA**, University of Oulu, Faculty of Science, Regional Policy and Regional Development, Oulu, Finlandiya - [eeva-kaisa.prokkola@oulu.fi](mailto:eeva-kaisa.prokkola@oulu.fi)

**Pierre Bruno-RUFFINI**, University of Le Havre, Faculty of International Affairs, Le Havre, Fransa. - [pierre-bruno.ruffini@univ-lehavre.fr](mailto:pierre-bruno.ruffini@univ-lehavre.fr)

**İlter TURAN (Emekli)**, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Türkiye - [ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr](mailto:ilter.turan@bilgi.edu.tr)

**Kıvanç ULUSOY**, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [kivanacu@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:kivanacu@istanbul.edu.tr)

**Fatma ÜNSAL**, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Mimarlık Fakültesi, Şehir ve Bölge Planlama Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye - [funsal@msgsu.edu.tr](mailto:funsal@msgsu.edu.tr)

**Ayselın Gözde YILDIZ OĞUZALP**, Yaşar Üniversitesi, İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, İstanbul, Türkiye. - [ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr](mailto:ayselin.yildiz@yasar.edu.tr)

## İçindekiler Table of Contents

---

### MAKALELER ARTICLES

---

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

A New Challenger in European Politics: Rethinking Poland's International Relations Agenda..... S1  
Özgün Erler Bayır

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Poland's Foreign Policy Under the Rule of the Law and Justice Party..... S11  
Ryszard Zięba

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Poland's Security Policy after the Cold War ..... S27  
Robert Kupiecki

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Populist Foreign Policy and its Consequences: The Case of Poland Under the Rule of  
The Law and Justice Party ..... S45  
Andrzej Szeptycki

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Polish Foreign Policy Making..... S61  
Karol Bieniek, Özgün Erler Bayır

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Model of Governance and Democracy in Poland ..... S69  
Adam Szymański, Łukasz Zamecki

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Religion As a Component of Poland's State Identity and As Manifested in its Foreign Policy ..... S85  
Anita Budziszewska, Anna M. Solarz

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Party-level Foreign Policy and the Mechanics of Party Competition: The PiS's Euroscepticism  
and Its Dominance over Right-wing Politics in Poland, 2001-2015.....S105  
Mustafa Çağatay Aslan

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Poland's Extra-EU Trade After the EU Accession .....S117  
Adam. A. Ambroziak

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Poland's Natural Gas Energy Strategy in the Context of the  
European Union's Energy Policy.....S137  
Robert Klaczyński

## İçindekiler Table of Contents

---

### MAKALELER ARTICLES

---

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

The Evolution of Poland's Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans .....S147  
Artur Adamczyk

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Contemporary Dilemmas of Polish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East.  
The case of Iraq and Qatar .....S165  
Rafał Ożarowski

*Research article/Araştırma Makalesi*

Poland-Iran relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani: An analysis of  
selected external determinants .....S175  
Przemysław Osiewicz



## **PREFACE**

### **Special Issue on Polish Foreign Policy in 21st Century**

The Republic of Poland - a Central European country and member of the European Union and NATO wields a considerable influence in Central and Eastern Europe together with regional power aspirations in the international affairs. The country's foreign policy is based generally on four basic commitments: Euro-Atlantic co-operation, European integration, international development and international law. Since the collapse of communism and its re-establishment as a democratic nation, Poland has extended its responsibilities and position in European and Western affairs, supporting and establishing friendly foreign relations with both the West and with numerous European countries.

In 2014 the Republic of Poland and Republic of Turkey celebrated 600 years of bilateral relations. That unique and unparalleled anniversary has been broadly celebrated in both countries with many cultural and scientific events around. Many of the latter remained focused on the Polish foreign policy, its tools, dimensions and challenges.

Just after eight years the world and international environment changed dramatically. The recent shifts in the international order made it the less stable and less predictable. The rules established in the wake of the Cold War are steadily eroding thus requiring a deep strategic reflection on Poland's place and role in the current international relations. Since the Poland's position and role in the international environment and the phenomena of Poland's foreign policy invites a breadth of research, the *Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences* is launching this special issue on Polish Foreign Policy in 21st Century.

We hope this volume will contribute to extension of the existing scientific knowledge about Poland and its foreign policy, both in Turkey and outside it.

Özgün Erler Bayır & Karol Bieniek



## A New Challenger in European Politics: Rethinking Poland's International Relations Agenda

Özgün Erler Bayır<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

Poland has become a prominent actor in European and transatlantic politics, security, and international relations, especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The country's controversial position after the end of the Cold War has long been on the agenda of international actors and states. It has been the biggest Central and Eastern European country to try and to succeed in being a strong, assertive ally in Euro-Atlantic structures as a westernized country. However, it is not difficult to say that this more than 30-year process includes different priorities in foreign policy. From this point of view, the Poland of the 1990s and the Poland of the "post EU-accession period" differ from each other in terms of foreign policy discourse, agenda, and implications. In this paper, I will try to analyze the current focuses of Poland's foreign policy agenda in general, considering its position in the European Union and transatlantic security structures. In addition, I will discuss how the international and domestic determinants of Polish foreign policy have evolved with a holistic approach. Emphasizing the developments and dynamics of recent years, this paper also tries to answer the question of why there is a need to prepare a special journal issue on Polish foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As Poland now has a different agenda in terms of its international relations (compared to the pre-EU accession process), it is worth discussing and analyzing the breaking points, new tendencies, and current dynamics of Polish foreign policy with numerous distinguished articles in this special issue.

### Keywords

Poland, Polish Foreign Policy, Polish Security Policy, Euroscepticism

**1 Corresponding Author:** Özgün Erler Bayır (Assoc. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: [ozguner@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:ozguner@istanbul.edu.tr) ORCID: 0000-0002-5906-4362

**To cite this article:** Erler Bayır, O. (2022). A New Challenger in European Politics: Rethinking Poland's International Relations Agenda. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S1–S10. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.1028141>

## Introduction

After the Cold War, Poland's two-way policy initiatives and priorities were observed in parallel with transformations in the international system. On the one hand, economic development, liberalization priorities, policies of integration with the West and membership in the European Union (EU) were on Poland's agenda. On the other hand, security policies, tendencies toward Atlanticism, cooperation with the United States (US), and NATO membership, which was one of the most important foreign policy goals, were at the forefront. Considering Poland's foreign policy preferences and practices within this context, Poland has been one of the most remarkable countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region to recently have been integrated into the EU.

Considering the historical dimension of Poland's foreign policy, it can clearly be seen that the perception of threat from both the east and west is one of the most important factors to determine its foreign policy. Historically, although there was the perception of a threat from Germany until the end of the Cold War, Poland tried to overcome this issue through EU membership. However, the threat from and fear of Russia continued to exist. It has also been observed that Poland is close to the EU in economic issues and to the US and NATO in political and security issues. This strategy has led to a dilemma in important foreign policy issues during the last 30 years. It can be seen that Atlanticism generally prevails in this dilemma. Atlanticist tendencies are widespread compared to Europeanism in matters related to foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. This is due to Poland's geopolitical position and to historical reasons: Germany and Russia, two great powers to the east and west, put Poland under pressure. Hence, Poland does not trust them, and looks for a solution in its relationship with the US, which is a distant power. It can be seen that the Atlanticist tendency is prevailing in Poland, even after accession to the EU in 2004 and even though steps were taken to deepen integration with the EU. Events that occurred during the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy and the process of creating the EU Constitution, and particularly Poland's attitude in these situations, proves this. In these matters, Poland did not want to compromise, not only for the sake of its national interests but also for the sake of its social structure. There have been situations and periods in Poland when the concern for "ensuring security" outweighed "cooperation for integration." After the EU accession period in 2004, Europeanists hoped that this situation would change a little. However, the conservative wing that dominated Polish internal politics between 2004 and 2007 already had a skeptical view of Europe. It is difficult to say that this group internalized Europeanism or have importance to it in their politics. The Kaczyński brothers, who served as Prime Minister and President and came from the PiS party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - Law and Justice Party*), had a predominantly Atlanticist approach to the issue of security and foreign policy. They had a non-European attitude, even in internal issues of European politics concerning the future of Europe. They did not hesitate to place importance on Polish national interests prior to EU integration. When it comes to security policy, it has been argued that Atlanticist tendencies coincide with Polish national interests (for instance, it was decided to continue keeping soldiers deployed in Iraq despite opposition from the public). In fact, after 2004, Poland has desired to be effective in taking strategic and significant decisions within the EU on international issues and also strengthening its position in this sense. However, they prefer to do this by taking active roles in matters of high politics in the international

system and supporting the US instead of doing it in harmony with powers within the EU with a European perspective. Although Poland is geographically located in Europe, they are on a path similar to the US in terms of politics and strategy. In this context, it can be said that Atlanticism in security issues has outweighed Europeanism in economic issues in Poland during the post-Cold War period. The liberal Tusk Government, which came into power in 2007, has declared that Europe is their priority in foreign policy. However, in practice, Europeanism has not been ahead of Atlanticism in every aspect. Nowadays, cooperation with the US has remained the basis of Polish security policy. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that all the Europeanist tendencies that support European security are completely independent from the US and NATO.

For instance, Europeanists in Poland believed that the country's support for the US in Iraq in 2003 jeopardized its position within the EU and the development of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. In addition, they claimed that Atlanticism did not bring any considerable benefit to Poland. However, it can be said that the pro-Europeans in Poland are not anti-American in their perspective. Even Donald Tusk, the leader of the PO (*Civic Platform*), who was in power from 2007-2014, acted cautiously during the decision-making process in order not to confront the US. His support for the US Missile Shield Project can be seen as a concrete example of this.

At this point, it should also be mentioned that Poland's aim is to consolidate its position both in the international system and in the region. Poland's decision to be an ally of the US is directly related with security issues in the post 9/11 international order, which led Poland to encounter not only new threats but also new opportunities. This resulted in being one of the first countries within NATO to support the US in the case of intervention in Afghanistan and UN peacemaking operations, and in the case of Iraq, supporting intervention even without the legitimacy of UN backing at the beginning. In Poland, Europeanists criticized Atlanticists due to their policies, stating that "Poland is becoming a satellite of the US." In return, Atlanticists defended themselves by claiming that "Poland is an ally of the US, not a satellite." However, there are also a considerable number of Poles who are skeptical about whether the US perceives Poland as a permanent ally or not.

The increasing impact of the US in Poland's security and foreign policy, particularly after the Iraq War in 2003, did not make the expected positive impact and material contribution to Poland. Also, this situation caused disappointment in society. When Polish entrepreneurs were excluded from the Iraqi reconstruction process and the US did not abolish visa requirements for Polish citizens (as well as arising dissatisfaction over the F-16 Off-set Agreement and absence of foreign trade advantages), this led to disappointment in the country regarding cooperation with the US. In addition, since the cooperation seems to be unilaterally beneficial for the US, there have been certain criticisms in Poland over buying F-16 aircraft from the American company Lockheed Martin.

After Poland gained its independence, Atlanticism and Europeanism were the two main trends in its foreign policy, especially in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. This can be observed in the membership processes for EU and NATO, as well as the foreign policy outputs that followed membership. Poland, as a new independent state on the international

stage, tried to ensure its security and achieve economic development through the two basic Western alliances: NATO and the EU. These tendencies have defined all of Poland's foreign policy processes and outcomes. Poland chooses to maintain parallel policies and seek cooperation with the US in international security issues. In addition, it considers NATO to be the main security actor in the world. However, Polish politics towards the EU are oriented predominantly toward economic motivations and goals. This difference causes a dilemma in Poland's foreign policy (Erler Bayır, 2011; Erler Bayır, 2013).

To sum up, soon after the collapse of the communist regime, the new democratic Polish state was confronted with the need to take its place in the modern world. Since the communist ideology had bankrupted them, a pro-liberal and pro-western stance was the only option for the Polish political elite and consecutive democratic governments at that time. That direction was also strongly desired; the famous slogan "Return to Europe" reveals both the longing for the country's position in modern international relations - so overshadowed in the communist period - and also the need and necessity as it was actually the only stable foreign policy tendency for Poland. Just after the end of the Cold War, the Republic of Poland was to secure its international position and stabilize domestic political and economic problems. The German-Polish Border Treaty of November 14, 1990 marked an important first step in this process, hence it settled the issue that was pending in the international law context since 1945. In the meantime, the reconstruction of democratic political institutions and the restructuring of the economy overlapped with setting new goals in the international environment, i.e., future NATO accession and European integration. The former was to be achieved in 1999, thus making Poland part of the transatlantic security network and providing the country with deep sense of military security. The 2004 EU accession successfully anchored the Polish state in the European family and in general, in the western political camp.

### **Polish Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

Almost twenty years after those proceedings, Polish foreign policy and its direction are to be further debated while international and domestic challenges pose new threats and opportunities. Russian aggression toward Ukraine and capture of the Crimea Peninsula once again raise questions about Poland's security. As a NATO member, Poland strongly emphasizes the necessity of a common security policy and a coherent attitude towards the Russian Federation. At the same time, country was and still is fully supportive of Ukraine's European aspirations and the further EU accession process. On the other hand, Poland's position within the EU is as questionable as ever. The rise of the populist Law and Justice Party and its several domestic proceedings (like critical reforms undermining the political independence of the judiciary, and limitation of human rights in the abortion issue) have led to Brussels – Warsaw tensions and a situation where, for the first time, cuts in and limits to European financial support are being considered, thus providing fertile ground for domestic populism and even the extreme "Pol-exit" vision. Almost simultaneously, the condition of Polish democracy became a point of attention for the new Biden administration. Poland's traditional partnership with the US, which had been bolstered – at least in theory – during the Trump years, has become for the first time replaced with distrust and tensions. The state apparatus, which is dominated by Law and

Justice Party members, has repeatedly delayed a concession for one of the biggest private television broadcasters in Poland, (TVN, part of American-owned Discovery Concern), which is very critical towards current and previous Law and Justice Party governments. Such an attitude has succeeded in undermining Poland's relations with the US, traditionally considered a cordial one since the end of the Cold War, when the U.S. became the main supporter of Poland's NATO accession and also EU membership. After the smooth relations of the Trump era, the new American administration seem to be skeptical about the quality of democracy in Poland and the TVN issue is an open threat to American business. Currently, Poland is a US ally within NATO and an important customer of the American arms industry, but bilateral relations have moved from cordiality to aloofness and Polish top politicians are no longer warmly welcomed in Washington.

When one adds damaged relations and a historical dispute with Israel, and tense relations with neighboring countries (mainly Germany and the Czech Republic), the overall picture of Polish foreign policy seems rather blurry as the country moves slightly towards international isolation.

Since 2015, Polish-Israeli relations have deteriorated as several conflicts have broken out between the two countries. The new rightist Law and Justice Party government imposed a series of measures and legal regulations that damaged bilateral relations. In 2018, a law was passed stating that Poland must not be associated with the Holocaust in any way and in 2021 the Polish parliament passed a law that will block claims by the descendants of Holocaust victims. Appeals against administrative decisions will no longer be allowed after 30 years, which will prevent or complicate new and ongoing restitution proceedings. These regulations largely contributed to a decline in the two states' relations and are also closely followed by the Biden administration, which was already lukewarm towards Poland, as mentioned above.

Tense relations with neighboring countries also draw attention. Traditional, harsh, right-wing anti-German rhetoric and Poland's justified accusations towards the Nord Stream 2 project made authorities in Berlin reserved towards Warsaw. In the interim, open conflict with the Czech Republic erupted: Prague has complained that the open-cast Turów mine has drained water from villages near the Polish border. In May 2021, the European Court of Justice ordered mine operations to "immediately cease" and later fined Poland €500,000 per day for ignoring the injunction. As of today, this problem has not been resolved, since Poland has not stopped the Turów power plant, arguing that it generates some 7% of the nation's energy and lights up millions of households.

All these issues and crises together are even more dangerous in the context of external threats like the current migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border and country's dependence on European funding. The former poses an open threat to country's security, as Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko opened Belarusian borders and territory to thousands of migrants who currently are camping as they desperately and illegally try to cross the Polish border and get into the EU. Because they have not been allowed to enter Polish territory and have been pushed back by the Polish Border Guard, the overall situation has led to a humanitarian crisis right on Poland's doorstep. The possibility of European funding being limited by Brussels due to Poland's violation of EU treaties opens up questions about the country's future financial stability and further infrastructural

development. These kinds of developments in Polish foreign policy over the last decade have been reflected in recent publications on the subject. (See: Zieba, 2020; Batyk & Rzeczkowski, 2020; Burgonski, 2020; Polegkyi, 2021; Vorozheina, 2017; Zięba, 2019).

The above-mentioned factors should be a premise for further studies on Polish foreign policy – the nature of the changing world, shifts in the international environment, and domestic populism have an impact on the country's goals, at the same time seriously limiting its abilities to become an important regional player. This special issue emerged from the consensus that Poland is a considerable country in European politics, both as a challenger and an ambitious actor in world politics. Accordingly, this special issue is intended primarily for scholars in the field of International Relations who are interested in Central and Eastern European countries and Poland's foreign policy and distinctives in EU politics in the last few decades.

### **Special Issue on Polish Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

As every researcher who is interested in Polish foreign policy knows, Norman Davies's famous books -the volumes *God's Playground* and *Heart of Europe*, written in English- have been illuminating for those who want to comprehend Poland deeply with a historical perspective (Davies, 2005; Davies 2001). Concurrent with the emergence of Poland in the new international system as a new actor after the Cold War, the number of academic studies about Polish foreign policy has increased. (See: Kuzniar, 2001; Kuzniar, 2008; Kuzniar, 2009; Friszke, 2003; Gerard & Michowicz, 2005; Harasimowicz, 2005; Bielen, 2011; Zieba, 2010; Zieba, 2013). Parallel to this, academic interest in the subject has also increased, which can be observed through widespread publications in several languages in the literature. In addition, the evolution of Polish foreign policy can be easily observed by examining the annual and quarterly publications of PISM (the Polish Institute of International Affairs - *Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych*), such as the Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej*, *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, and the Polish Quarterly of International Affairs.

The issue aims to analyze and understand Polish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The following articles offer insights into different aspects of Poland's foreign policy. The first ones are concentrated on a more general framework and the others focus on internal and external determinants as well as some examples of the implications of Poland's foreign policy on specific regions and topics.

In his article, Ryszard Zieba provides a broad picture of Polish foreign policy. The article discusses the reasons for Poland's detrimental politics, which damage Poland in a massive way both in Europe and the world. Even though Poland was the first country to adopt democratic and market reforms in Central Europe, gradually populism, nationalism and Euro-skepticism have increased their impact in the country. Therefore, Zieba's point of view, which focuses on the populism, illiberalism, and authoritarianism that began dominating Polish internal politics and nationalism and Euro-skepticism in its foreign policy, is essential in order to understand the current situation and serious challenges in Polish politics.



Robert Kupiecki's article provides an excellent historical overview of Poland's security policy in the post-1989 era. Since Poland efficiently reconstructed its foreign and security policy after 40 years of Soviet domination, it is important to comprehend the milestones of Polish political transformation. Kupiecki's analysis begins with the key historical factors contributing to continuity and change in this policy and then continues with Poland's path to NATO and subsequent national priorities as a member of the Alliance, the role of the US in Polish security policy, the approach to collective security, and the role of the EU, as well as referring to contemporary challenges confronting the national security policy.

Andrzej Szeptycki provides an important picture of populist foreign policy and its consequences by analyzing the case of Poland under the rule of Law and Justice. Understanding the rise of populism, with its visible impact particularly in Central Europe, is essential for understanding "democratic backsliding since 2010." Accordingly, the author's analysis, which precisely emphasizes foreign policy under the rule of Law and Justice (which is considered ineffective due to Poland's growing isolation) and the deterioration of democratic standards in the country, as well as analyzing Russian pressure and the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the context of Poland's vulnerability, brings important insights on that issue.

Karol Bieniek and Özgün Erlər Bayır's article primarily focuses on the problem of using public diplomacy and soft power as a tool in Polish foreign policy making by analyzing the potential of Poland, implications of public diplomacy, and soft power use in Polish foreign policy making. Public diplomacy as the vision of the 21<sup>st</sup> century paves the way for placing importance on this tool in countries' foreign policy making processes. However, it is also important for countries to realize their potential or limit when they apply this tool. Since Poland has used public diplomacy and soft power more visibly after the EU accession period, it is crucial to answer the question of where the limits of the use of these tools are and what positive and negative effects can they bring.

In their article, Adam Szymanski and Łukasz Zamęcki present qualitative research on the instruments which were used by the Polish government in 2020 for dealing with the Covid-19 situation. Unlike other countries, Poland did not formally introduce a state of emergency during 2020. However, particular regulations were implemented in the country. Since the scope of the regulations was extensive, Szymanski and Zamęcki's analysis is important for understanding the motives of the Polish government and the further deterioration of the state of democracy in the country.

Anita Budziszewska and Anna Solarz look specifically at the analysis of religion as one component element of state identity. In particular, religion and related values are regarded as the key variables for Poland in identifying the state identity. To have a better understanding of the role of religion in building state identities, the authors analyze a theoretical part, which introduces the relevant theory and research on religion's role in shaping domestic policy and state identity, and attempt to answer questions as to how a religion-based state identity is made tangible in foreign policy and in that way also in international relations.

In his article, Mustafa Çağatay Aslan identifies party-level foreign policy and the mechanics of party competition by getting a closer look at the PiS's Euroscepticism and

its dominance over right-wing politics in Poland from 2001-2015. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, EU membership was considered Poland's top agenda item; it represented the idea of a "return to Europe." Despite the particular opposition to EU-policies by mainstream political parties and complete opposition to membership by fringe parties, massive public support played a vital role in EU membership. However, when Poland became an EU member, Eurosceptic policies increased their influence in Polish politics from the fringe parties to the mainstream right, including the Law and Justice Party. Therefore, Aslan's deep analysis, which is based on using the dichotomy of Szczerbiak and Taggart's soft-Euroscepticism and hard-Euroscepticism, assists in comprehending PiS foreign policy.

Adam Ambroziak's article provides a remarkable overview of Poland's extra-EU trade after the EU accession period. When Poland became an EU member state in 2004, they adopted particular economic regulations, including transferring national competences in the field of external trade policy to EU institutions. Currently, Poland has a high intra-EU trade rate, which is not only related with Poland's accession to the EU but also the legal circumstances and limited national competences in the shaping of external trade relations that led to change in the geographic and product structure of Polish foreign trade. Therefore, Ambroziak's analysis, which identifies changes in both directions and products in Poland's extra-EU imports and exports after EU accession, is crucial for getting a closer look at Poland's position and comparing it with other V4 countries.

In his article, Robert Kłaczynski illuminates Poland's natural gas energy strategy in the context of the EU's energy policy by referring to key problems related to the functioning of the Polish fuel market in the field of resources, production, consumption, and especially raw material supply. Since the priority of the EU is to ensure the security of its member states, energy security, with its increasing importance, remains a part of this policy. Therefore, the author's point of view, which emphasizes not only the situation in the Polish natural gas sector, but also the European condition, gives a broader picture of both Poland's natural gas energy strategy and the EU's energy policy.

Arthur Adamczyk provides an excellent historical overview of the evolution of Poland's foreign policy towards the Balkan region from 1989 to the present. Adamczyk's analysis begins with the period of 1989-2004, which contains the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and Poland's full accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, and continues with the second period, 2004-2010, when Poland implemented compatible Balkan policies with the EU. Lastly, Adamczyk's analysis focuses on the third stage, which begins with Poland's preparations for the EU Council Presidency in 2011, when Poland was eager to create policy towards the Balkans. Even though Poland has been part of the policies that were implemented towards Balkan regions since 1989, it is apparent that currently their policies in the region are considered limited. Thus, Arthur Adamczyk's article plays an important role in having a better understanding of the underlying reasons for Poland's limited policy in the region currently and the relationship between Poland and the Balkan states.

Rafał Ożarowski explores contemporary dilemmas of Polish foreign policy towards the Middle East by analyzing the cases of Iraq and Qatar. Even though Poland historically has connections with Middle Eastern states in order to achieve their foreign policy aims in the region, nowadays two kinds of interests, which can be classified as economic and

political, dominate in their foreign policy making process. Therefore, Ożarowski's article initially focuses on Poland's current economic interest related to signing an agreement with Qatar for diversifying its gas and oil supplies, and then the political one, which is basically about engagement in the mission of stabilization in Iraq. The article is significant because the author answers the question of whether or not Polish foreign policy in the Middle East is effective or not and the reasons behind this, and because it emphasizes both the real capabilities of Polish foreign policy and the key obstacles in the Middle East.

Przemysław Osiewicz's article explores the impact of external determinants on Poland-Iran political relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani from 2013-2021. In his article, the author addresses specific external conditions, which include the nuclear agreement concluded with Iran in 2015, the policy of the US, with particular emphasis on the extended sanctions imposed on Iran and the EU's policy towards Iran, and Iran's rivalry with some countries in the Middle East region (such as Israel and Saudi Arabia) whose relations with Poland are regarded as close and stable. Qualitative content analysis is applied as the main research technique.

This special issue strives to present a diverse selection of various internal and external determinants as well as implications/outcomes of Poland's foreign policy. It is obvious that Poland has been a remarkable country both in world politics and in European politics, particularly in the last decades. In addition to its economic potential and demographic structure, Poland is located in the "center" of the Central and Eastern Europe region as a large country whose desire is to establish itself as a strong actor in the international system and consolidate its power. Thus, Poland's foreign policy stance, steps, collaborations, and tendencies are worth examining in order to understand the future of European integration. In particular, considering events such as the migration crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, I believe that the articles in this special issue, which is based on examples from Poland, will be useful for readers who are curious about issues related to Euroscepticism and the rise of the extreme right, as well as concepts such as identity, national interest, and national sovereignty, which have been critical topics in the European political agenda since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Batyk, I. M., & Rzeczkowski, D. (2020). Cross-Border Cooperation at the External Border of the European Union in the context of Political, Economic and Social Conditions: the case of the Polish-Russian Neighbourhood. *Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy*, 15(4), 833–871. doi: 10.24136/eq.2020.036.
- Bayır, E. Ö. (2011). *Dilemma Between Atlanticism and Europeanization in Polish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era*, PhD Dissertation, İstanbul University, İstanbul.
- USA
- Bayır, E. Ö. (2013). *Dilemma Between Atlanticism and Europeanization in Polish Foreign Policy*. Derin Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Bieleń S. (Ed.). (2011). *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Difin, Warsaw.
- Burgoński, P. (2020). Religion and Polish Foreign Policy in the XXI Century. *Center for Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance, Belgrade, Serbia*. 14(2), 337-359.
- Davies, N. (2001). *Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present*. Oxford University Press, New York.

- Davies, N. (2005). *God's Playground, Vol. I & II*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Friszke, A. (2003). *Polska: Losy Państwa i Narodu do 1939 Roku. 1, & Polska: Losy Państwa i Narodu 1939-1989. (2)*. Wydawnictwo, Warszawa.
- Gerard, L., & Michowicz W. (2005). *The History of Polish Diplomacy X-XX c.* Sejm Publishing Office, Warsaw.
- Harasimowicz, A., & Polski, B. (2005). *1918-2004: Granice, System Międzynarodowy*. Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, *Sila Wlasna*.
- Kuzniar, R. (Ed.). (2001). *Poland's Security Policy (1989-2000)*. Scholar, Warszawa.
- Kuzniar, R. (2008). *Droga do Wolności: Polityka Zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.
- Kuzniar, R. (2009). *Poland's Foreign Policy After 1989*. Budrich Uni Press Ltd., Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. Polish Foreign Policy Strategy Document 2017-2021.
- Polegki, O. (2021). The Intermarium in Ukrainian and Polish Foreign Policy Discourse. *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. 8(2), 29-48. doi: <https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus562>.
- Vorozheina, Y. (2017). Poland's Foreign Policy Mechanisms: Legal Framework and Policy Analysis. *Baltic Region*, 9(1), 30-40. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2017-1-3.
- Zieba, R. (2010). *Główne Kierunki Polityki Zagranicznej Polski Po Zimnej Wojnie*. Warsaw.
- Zieba, R. (2013). *Polityka Zagraniczna Polski w Strefie Euroatlantyckiej*. University of Warsaw Press, Warsaw.
- Zięba, R. (2019). Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. D. S. Hamilton, & K. Spohr (Eds.), *The 20th Anniversary of Poland's Accession to NATO*. 197-214. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Washington DC.
- Zięba, R. (2020). *Poland's Foreign and Security Policy: Problems of Compatibility with the Changing International Order*. Springer, Switzerland, doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7

## Poland's Foreign Policy Under the Rule of the Law and Justice Party

Ryszard Zięba<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

Poland was the first country in Central Europe to start dismantling the political system of 'real socialism' in 1989 and has become a pioneer of democratic and market reforms. After 10 years it was admitted to NATO and after 15 years to the European Union. Then, gradually, populism, nationalism and Euro-skepticism began to grow in Poland, which was evident in the years 2005-2007, during the first edition of rules of the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party. After the next eight years of the pragmatic approach of the Polish governments towards European integration, the PiS assumed full power in the country in 2015. The new president and the PiS government began systematic changes in domestic and foreign policy. Populism, illiberalism and authoritarianism began dominating in Polish internal politics, and nationalism and Euro-skepticism in foreign policy. The most important new phenomena in the foreign policy of the PiS government are: (a) the bi-lateralization and militarization of security policy based on the strategic partnership with the US; (b) Euro-skepticism: anti-Brussels posturing and disputes with Germany and France; (c) Poland's nationalistic and great-power approach to Russia; and (d) Three Seas Initiative as a dream of Poland's greatness. The consequences of this Poland's politics are detrimental to itself and to the international environment. It has reduced the importance of Poland as a state in Europe and the world. The world's perception of Poland is increasingly unfavorable among democratic countries, and more favorable among other illiberal countries. But it is not favorable with all illiberal countries, because the nationalism that accompanies Polish illiberalism makes it impossible to improve relations with other not fully democratic or downright undemocratic countries, especially Poland's eastern neighbors. Poland's foreign policy is facing serious challenges, some of which Poland created on its own and is unable to address effectively. This means that there is a growing problem of incompatibility between Poland's policies and the changing international order.

### Keywords

Poland, Illiberalism, Foreign policy, the European Union, the USA, Russia, 3SI

**1 Corresponding Author:** Ryszard Zięba (Prof. Dr.), University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Institute of International Relations, Department of xx, Warszawa, Poland. E-mail: [rzieba@uw.edu.pl](mailto:rzieba@uw.edu.pl) ORCID: 0000-0003-1225-7017

**To cite this article:** Zięba, R. (2022). Poland's Foreign Policy Under the Rule of the Law and Justice Party. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S11–S26. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.940260>

## Introduction

The aim of the paper is to present the main actions of Poland in the international arena under the rule of the conservative-nationalist and populist Law and Justice party, which ruled the country twice between 2005-2007 and 2015-2021.

Poland is a medium-sized country that has belonged to NATO since 1999 and to the European Union since 2004. At the end of the 1980s, it played a leading role in the dismantling of the political system of real socialism and, as a consequence, contributed to the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. At that time, it was a pioneer of democratic reforms in the eastern part of Europe and after 10 years it was admitted to NATO and then to the European Union. Then it entered the path of comprehensive socio-economic development and began getting closer to the highly developed countries of Western Europe. Invariably, since the beginning of the post-Cold War period, Poland has faced various problems in relations with its eastern neighbors, and considers Russia a threat to its independence.

In general, in Poland, until the accession to the European Union, there was a consensus between the main political forces in matters of foreign policy and ensuring the country's security. The consensus prevailed in the matter of ensuring national security, and the main external pillars of Poland's security were NATO membership, a strategic partnership with the USA, and membership in the European Union. When Poland officially became a member of the EU, right-wing political forces began to express more and more clearly fears that Poland would lose its sovereignty within the EU. In autumn 2005, a government headed by the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party was formed, and Lech Kaczyński, a politician of this party, became the president of the country. The new Polish authorities began clearly formulating reservations about the policy within the EU, tightening relations with the US and fomenting conflict with the strained relations with Russia. Poland clearly pursued the strategy of *bandwagoning* towards the USA, Euroscepticism within the EU and highlighting disputes in relations with Germany, and by fueling historical and current disputes with Russia, it gained the name of a Russophobic country (Grudziński, 2008).

However, Polish society, positively oriented towards European integration, changed its political preferences and in the parliamentary elections in autumn 2007, authorized the pro-European and pragmatic parties the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party to take over the government. Successive governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz led to the improvement and dynamic development of relations, mainly within the Weimar Triangle, with the leaders of the EU, Germany and France. Together with these countries, Poland attempted to revive the stagnant Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and in the second half of 2011, Poland, which held the presidency of the Council of the EU, played a positive role in overcoming the financial crisis in the Eurozone, although it did not join this area. Poland continued its strategic cooperation with the USA, and in 2008-2011 it led to a partial normalization of relations with Russia (Zięba, 2011, pp. 43-49). From autumn 2013, it was actively involved in supporting the so-called Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, and thus relations with Russia began to worsen. After the plane crash in Smolensk, in which President Lech Kaczyński and 95 members of the state delegation died (April 10, 2010), relations with Russia were systematically deteriorating.

However, in the second half of 2015, power in Poland was taken over by the conservative-nationalist populist Law and Justice party. First, in July, Andrzej Duda, a politician of this party, was elected president, and in the autumn PiS took over the government. This started a major shift not only in Polish domestic policy, but also in foreign and security policy. First of all, the anti-liberal turn in Polish politics had its internal sources, such as: (a) the dissatisfaction of broad social strata with the harsh economic and social reforms implemented since the end of 1989, (b) the political awakening of the Polish provinces, which are populist, conservatist and nationalistic, and (c) the increasing influence of the Catholic church to social and political life in Poland. This made it easier for PiS to pursue a populist and authoritarian domestic policy.

The external origins of illiberalism and nationalism in Poland's politics are essential as well. The crisis of the European Union, which had become apparent following the great enlargement of 2004, played an important role in the rise of illiberalism and of the phenomena accompanying it, such as populism, conservatism, nationalism and authoritarianism. It also catalysed the assumption to the government in Hungary by Victor Orbán's Fidesz party (in 2010) and the growth in influence of right-wing and nationalist parties in western European countries, such as the Brexit Party and the increasingly nationalist Conservative Party in the UK, the Nation Rally (until June 2018 known as the National Front) in France, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, the Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, the Northern League (LN) and the Five Star Movement (MV5S) in Italy, and others.

Already in summer 2010, the prominent American political scientist Charles Kupchan wrote in alarming tone about the European Union's collapse, partly due to economic reasons and, above all, because of the extremely evident renationalisation of political life. In his opinion, this renationalisation was spilling over 'from London to Berlin to Warsaw' and was expressed in a return to sovereignty at the cost of selflessness in the name of a common idea, and this placed the European project under threat (Kupchan, 2010). Additionally, a factor helping to reinforce anti-liberal and nationalist sentiments in Poland was the occurrence of such trends not only in the EU, but also in its immediate neighbourhood and in distant regions of the world (Galston, 2018; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Such phenomena are present almost everywhere in the post-Soviet area, including Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and in authoritarian Turkey, theocratic Iran, nationalist India, and communist China.

As the year 2017 began, illiberalism started dominating the policy of the United States when populist and conservative Donald Trump became president (2017-2020). This strengthened a similar trend in Poland, especially as PiS conducts a very active *bandwagoning* policy with regard to the USA. Polish politicians seeking to implement illiberal policies have countless examples to follow from different autocratic systems around the world (Roth, 2019). Lastly, one should conclude that a factor helping to reinforce anti-liberal and nationalist sentiments is the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order leading to the weakening and – as the prominent neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer pointed out – to the decline of the democratic and liberal West (Mearsheimer, 2019, 30). Poland joined the growing wave of illiberalism and nationalism in the politics of many European and non-European countries.



## **The Bi-lateralization and Militarization of Security Policy Based on a Strategic Partnership with the U.S.**

For the most of Polish political parties the pursuit of a *bandwagoning* strategy towards the USA is a universal foreign policy denominator (Zajac, 2016, pp. 79, 191; Zięba, 2020, pp. 90-132). This has been the policy of many Polish governments, both from the Right and the Left. When PiS came to power, some of its politicians went as far as to suggest a bilateral political-military alliance with the US, to be formed at NATO's expense. In March 2007, then deputy foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski said that Poland should conclude a bilateral alliance with the USA outside the NATO framework.

This occurred when the Polish-American alliance had a clear asymmetrical nature, not only on account of the huge differences in the two countries' potential, but also of PiS' decision made in October a year before to accept Washington's offer to build an anti-missile shield in Poland. Officially, Jarosław Kaczyński's government began negotiations with the USA in May 2007. This was accompanied by propaganda unreservedly justifying the need to host the anti-missile shield on Polish territory. In such circumstances, it was difficult to obtain anything of substance from the Americans during the course of the negotiations. The next Polish government, a PO-PSL coalition, also signed, on August 20, 2008, a not wholly equal agreement concerning the placement of anti-missile launchers in Pomerania under conditions set by the Americans. Characteristically, PiS, now in opposition, pressed the government to sign the agreement without any delay or haggling.

After getting back to power in the autumn of 2015, PiS recommenced the policy based on subordinating Polish interests to those of the United States. This was expressed in many gestures of faithful submission and in the unquestioning support given to the USA in important international matters. During President Andrzej Duda's official visit to Washington on September 18, 2018, the Polish president proposed to the Americans to build a base for the permanent stationing of US troops in Poland – a base he himself referred to as 'Fort Trump'. In what proved to be a break with all norms of rational behavior, before any negotiations on this matter had begun, President Duda proposed that Poland would finance the entire infrastructure of this base. During the ensuing press conference, the Polish President declared that Poland would allocate 2 billion USD for this purpose and gave assurances that, even if the Polish calculations 'do not coincide with those of the Pentagon representatives, I can assure you that we will manage – the [Americans] can rest assured that the infrastructure will be prepared according to their expectations' (Cowell, 2018). This proposal was submitted to the US president without any prior consultations with NATO allies. Poland should have done so, if only out of concern for its credibility, especially as it was requesting the deployment of an additional 1,000 American soldiers, and the more so as Trump said that those soldiers would be relocated from US bases in Germany. Yet another symbolic moment occurred during the ceremony at which the new declaration of strategic partnership between Poland and the USA was signed, with President Trump sitting behind his desk, while President Duda stood to the side awkwardly, bent over the desk as he signed the document, because he had not been provided with a chair for an 'unknown reason'. The non-government media in Poland criticized this awkward moment extensively. During this visit, both sides also reiterated their intention to strengthen their cooperation in the sphere of energy.



The Polish president's visit to Washington expressed the clientelist nature of Poland's relations with the USA. This was reflected in the US administration's cancellation, on grounds that were rather unconvincing, of Trump's visit to Poland planned for August 21–September 2, 2019, where he was supposed to take part in the commemoration of the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the outbreak of WWII. The following meeting between the Polish and American presidents took place on September 23, 2019, on the occasion of a meeting of the UN General Assembly. A *Joint Declaration on Advancing Defence Cooperation* between the USA and Poland was then signed. This document provided for an increase of the US contingent in Poland by about 1,000 soldiers (up to about 5,500) and indicated the locations of the bases where they would be stationed. Then, on August 15, 2020, another agreement was signed to strengthen the presence of US troops in Poland.

The PiS authorities have continued with the militarization of security that has been initiated by their predecessors, by considerably raising spending on weapons as well as purchasing new equipment exclusively from the USA. In March 2018, a contract was signed for the purchase of two Patriot missile batteries, that is, 16 launchers and 208 very expensive PAC-3 MSE missiles to intercept enemy missiles (\$6-7 million each), as well as additional equipment such as radars and IBCS command system components. Poland has thus acquired equipment, which does not yet exist in its finished form. In other words, it has become dependent on research work on these weapons done in the USA. This contract is worth 4.75 billion USD and Poland is to obtain only about 3 billion USD in offset. This transaction is greatly overpaid because the cost of implementing the first stage of the 'Vistula' anti-missile program (by the purchase of American missiles) is equal to four annual Polish modernization budgets. Polish experts estimate that the entire 'Vistula' program will cost about 14.75 billion USD.

The purchase of the above-mentioned equipment became even less rational after Poland's withdrawal from the endeavor to develop the EU's military capabilities (such as in-flight refueling) without proposing any feasible alternative solutions. Instead, the Polish government prefers to turn to the USA for its defense-related purchases. On January 31, 2020, Poland and the USA signed an agreement for Poland to purchase 32 F-35A aircrafts for the crazy sum of 4.6 billion USD. There was no tender procedure and the agreement does not provide for any offset. Deliveries of the planes are expected to begin in 2026. It is the second-largest arms contract in Poland's history.

This case indicates, similarly to former purchases of military equipment in the USA, that Poland is working gravely in order to reinforce its own defense capabilities and, thus, is facilitating the strengthening of the NATO's eastern flank. It is praised by former US President Donald Trump as the European leader in higher defense spending. That Trump is satisfied that Poland's increased expenditures on arms will be spent to purchase costly weapons systems in the USA should come as no surprise.<sup>1</sup> Polish leaders declare further increases in defense spending. President Duda has pledged to increase such expenditures to 2.5% of GDP in 2024. These are gigantic sums, about 31 billion USD yearly. Unfortunately, it does not increase Poland's security to a degree that would justify

1 In the Polish parliament there is a consensus about increasing spending on defence. On September 15, 2017 the Sejm voted, with one vote against and five abstentions, a law increasing such sending to 2.5% GDP in 2030 and subsequent years.

the certainty that Poland would be able to defend its territory in case of an expected war with Russia. Moreover, the militarization of Poland's security policy does not contribute to reinforcing international security but, quite on the contrary, leads to its weakening by stirring up the arms race. It also has a negative impact on the financing of many heavily neglected areas of social life in Poland, such as education, science, health care or social security.

The already mentioned bases of Poland's policy such as resting its security on a tight alliance with the USA, militarizing NATO's eastern flank and 'buying its security' in the USA, while at the same time neglecting the second main pillar of Poland's external security – the European Union – bring about concerns not only within the country but also among Poland's EU allies and partners. Very critical opinions about Poland have been formulated in Western Europe. For example, *Politico* published that:

The ruling nationalists in Warsaw are gambling on personal chemistry and political affinity with U.S. President Donald Trump to ensure their security from a revisionist Russia even as they isolate themselves from the rest of the European Union. Putting so many eggs in the American basket is a risky strategy, not just because of Trump's unpredictability and uncertain duration in power, but also because Warsaw is about to lose its best friend in the EU — the U.K. — and has no obvious alternative ally in Brussels. [...] But Kaczyński, obsessed by how Britain and France abandoned Poland to the Nazi German invasion and partition with Russia in 1939, sees permanent U.S. "boots on the ground" as the only dependable insurance against Russian aggression. (Taylor, 2018).

Nevertheless, PiS authorities pay no attention to the criticism of its European allies. Instead, they supported US President Trump's irresponsible actions, such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran (on May 8, 2018) and the suspension of the INF agreement (on February 1, 2019). The Polish authorities agreed to co-organize, with the US, and to host an international foreign ministers' conference, in Warsaw on February 13-14, 2019. It was devoted to Middle East security and was primarily intended to pressure Iran. Characteristically, the Polish authorities failed to consult this highly controversial initiative with the political opposition. Instead of a joint announcement by Poland and the US, the conference was announced by US Secretary of State Mark Pompeo. Iran was not invited to this conference. Representatives of Russia, China, Turkey, and the head of EU diplomacy Federica Mogherini, also failed to attend. The US and Israel used Poland, and the US Secretary of State and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insulted the Polish nation. Poland's image suffered greatly as a result.<sup>2</sup> The conference failed to bring any positive results and only confirmed that the PiS government serves mainly American interests and pursues an openly clientelist policy with regard to the USA.

Most worryingly, Poland, while pursuing a close alliance with the USA and an increased US military presence on Polish territory, is preparing for Russia's expected military aggression. It is hoping that such an attack will automatically 'drag' the US into a war to defend Poland. Krzysztof Szczerski, minister in President Duda's Chancellery, spoke

---

<sup>2</sup> During a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz, M. Pompeo demanded that Poland return the heirless Jewish property to American citizens, and B. Netanyahu accused the Polish nation of complicity with Germany in exterminating Jews during the Holocaust. There was no adequate reaction of the Polish authorities to these statements.

about this clearly in April 2016, when he stated that: ‘We want a potential aggression on Poland to mean an automatic confrontation with the entire alliance and its military force located within the territory of our country for the purpose of mutual defence.’ (Stawka, 2016).

This political madness does nothing to guarantee Poland’s security, because, in the so-called hour of truth, in the situation of a Polish-Russian conflict, as assumed in the scenarios of the decision-makers for Polish security policy, the allied guarantees for Poland on the part of representatives of the United States could turn out to be illusory – among other things, because the United States, being guided by its own vital interests, will not risk a nuclear conflict with Russia, a nuclear superpower, over Poland, even if it meant the United States’ loss of credibility as an ally.

### **Euro-skepticism: Anti-Brussels Posturing, Disputes with Germany And France**

As Jarosław Kaczyński and other PiS activists came to power in 2005 and in 2015, one of their main slogans was about Poland ‘getting off its knees’. This entailed questioning Poland’s policy within the framework of the European Union, including its policy with regard to EU leading members Germany and France, and with regard to Russia. PiS accused the PO-PSL governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz of having ‘capitulated’ to those countries, and this included Russia, relations with which during the tenure of the two previous governments also left much to be desired. PiS’ criticism of previous governments included the publicly formulated accusation that Poland had become a ‘German-Russian condominium.’<sup>3</sup> An eruption of euro-skepticism in Poland took place during the presidential electoral campaign and during the parliamentary elections of 2005. The propaganda of right-wing and populist parties was dominated by slogans calling for the defense of Polish sovereignty in the EU, and for standing up to the ‘dictate’ of Brussels, Berlin and Paris.

During the first PiS governments, Poland refused the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty that had been signed by the previous government on October 24, 2004, and did not take part in any essential political debate within the European Union. PiS politicians still believe today that EU membership restricts Poland’s sovereignty. Some of them, such as Jarosław Kaczyński, see Brussels as the ‘new Moscow’ and believe that Poland should resist dependence on the EU, of which, paradoxically, Poland is a member. In government circles, the prevailing expectation ‘from Brussels’ is that Poland would be treated as an equal to ‘old’ EU member states.

The PiS government messed up Poland’s relations with France and Germany, the two leading EU member states. Poland was dissatisfied with Germany’s and France’s leading roles in the Union, and with the strengthening of the CSDEP, which Poland does not favor. In recent years Poland has been further dissatisfied with the care for compliance with the rule of law by EU member states. In its relations with Germany, the Polish government embarked between 2005-2007 on historical disputes and polemics about the Expellees Association’s restitution claims with regard to property left in Poland following the post-

3 This formulation was used by PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński during an interview with the right-wing *Gazeta Polska* on September 8, 2010. This slogan has been repeated by the leading PiS politicians after PiS came to power in the fall of 2015.

WWII expulsions of Germans, and protested against the German government's support for the project to build the Centre against Expulsions in Berlin. The PiS government from time to time publicly raises demands for reparations from Germany for losses inflicted on Poland during the Second World War. Given these and other differences (like criticizing Germany for its part in the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline on Baltic Sea floor) Poland contributed to block dialogue and collaboration within the framework of the Weimar Triangle (France-Germany-Poland). This collaboration was reinstated during the years 2007-2015 by the governments of the PO-PSL coalition. The PiS government which succeeded them, however, resumed the policy that had antagonized Germany and France, and this led once again to the dormancy of the Weimar Triangle.

Relations with France began to violently deteriorate in October 2016. Poland refused to purchase French Caracal battle helicopters and broke a contract worth 3.92 billion USD, undertaken by the previous government, and it was followed by irresponsible statements made by members of the government. In particular, defense minister Antoni Macierewicz lied in the Sejm, saying that the contract with France had been intended as Warsaw's reward to Paris to make up for the benefits France had to forgo when it desisted from selling three Mistral-type warships to Russia. He further claimed that France had sold these ships to Egypt, which then let Russia have them for a symbolic dollar (Egipt, 2016). These developments revealed the clearly pro-American, nationalist and anti-Russian course of Polish foreign policy.

A new cycle in continuing Polish-French polemics was marked by French president Emmanuel Macron's public condemnation of nationalism and criticism of Poland (and the other members of the Visegrád Group) that were accused for lack of solidarity in dealing with the migrant crisis and for blocking EU climate policy, whose aim was to reduce carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, and also when he proposed steps to deepen EU integration and to reinforce the CSDP. Given its disinclination toward further EU integration, Poland often criticized the positions of France and Germany. This was caused by Poland's different vision of the EU's future as compared to that of most other EU members. In 2016-2017, the government of Beata Szydło demanded a new EU treaty that would strengthen its intergovernmental character. Poland supported the United Kingdom and pointed to Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, as the person responsible for Brexit. The PiS government has an *à la carte* vision of the EU, which it sees as a free trade zone, and is opposed to integration in other areas. It takes no notice of the fact that the EU Treaty binds member states to deepen integration also in non-economic areas and to respect democratic norms and values. Polish politicians of the government camp protest severely against all criticism, which concerns infringements on the rule of law and EU norms and values, and which is articulated by other European leaders and from the European Commission.

Problematic issues in Poland's relations with EU institutions and leading EU member states are compounded by the fact that Poland's authorities maintain close contacts with similar populist and nationalist parties from the other European countries. The closest of these are with Fidesz, the party now governing Hungary. Meetings between Jarosław Kaczyński and Fidesz leader Victor Orbán, as well as meetings between the two countries' prime ministers, take place often. Not least important is the mutual friendship

felt by both nations towards each other – a sentiment with long-standing historical roots. In 2007 the parliaments of Hungary and Poland established March 23 as the Day of Polish-Hungarian Friendship. Quite early on, after the parliamentary elections of 2011, which PiS lost, Jarosław Kaczyński stated that ‘a time would come when we will have Budapest in Warsaw’ (Kaczyński, 2011). Indeed, very quickly after coming to power in 2015, PiS began to encroach on the rule of law and took exclusive control of the Polish public media: in 2018 it forced through a law on higher education which limited the autonomy of higher learning institutions in an unprecedented way. Poland and Hungary also have much in common on the international stage. Both countries are opposed to the main EU current, take a firm stand against immigration and are strongly skeptical about deeper European integration. They coordinate common defensive strategies following the European Commission’s initiation of procedures provided by article 7 of the EU Treaty with regard the two countries. In December 2020, Hungary and Poland blackmailed 25 other EU member states if funding from the EU budget would be linked to compliance with the rule of law.

PiS leaders also maintain close relations with populist and nationalist groups in western European countries, in France, Italy and Spain, and also in Great Britain. They are taking concrete steps to create a new alliance of populist forces in the EU. To this end, on April 1, 2021, Prime Minister Wojciech Morawiecki took part in a meeting in Budapest with the Prime Minister of Hungary Victor Orban and Mateo Salvini. On December 3-4, 2021, at the invitation of Kaczyński, the leaders of conservative and extreme-right parties discussed the development of a common vision of Europe and the European Union in Warsaw. (Populist, 2021). PiS’ most important ally in its illiberal and nationalist policy was the former President of the United States Donald Trump. President Trump supported the Polish authorities regardless of their violations of the rule of law and democratic standards. The situation changed when Joe Biden became the US President in January 2021, who made the promotion of human rights one of the priorities of his foreign policy. As the commentator *Politico* wrote, the position of authoritarian regimes in Poland and Hungary is imperiled by their own policies and “authoritarians also need to worry about public approval, and political isolation will not go down well with populaces of these two countries.” (Benjamin, 2021).

### **Poland’s Nationalistic and Great-Power Approach to Russia**

Both the presidential and parliamentary electoral campaigns of 2005 were characterized by the right-wing PiS’ (and also PO’s) criticism of Russia, claiming that Moscow alone bore responsibility for the poor relations between the two countries, and accusing it of being reluctant to address and elucidate the difficult historical matters burdening Polish-Russian relations. Yet again, the Polish authorities raised the issue of the Katyń Massacre (1943) and criticized Russia’s Main Military Prosecutor’s Office for having discontinued its investigation into this matter (in March 2005), demanding that the massacre be recognized as a crime against humanity, while the Polish Institute of National Remembrance launched its own investigation in the matter. Critical voices were raised in Warsaw about the divergent views of Poland and Russia on the subject of the decisions taken during the Yalta Conference in 1945; in the summer of 2005 the children

of some Russian diplomats were assaulted and beaten by unknown hooligans in Warsaw, and in August of the same year each country expelled a number of the other's diplomats. Under the PiS governments of 2005-2007, the deterioration of Polish-Russian relations became critical. However, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, the Russian president's influential advisor, arrived in Warsaw in January 2006, and in October 2006 so did Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, but but these two visits did not overcome the impasse in Polish-Russian relations. The Polish authorities behaved in an antagonistic manner, not only towards Russia but also towards its EU partners, feeling buoyant at the increasingly closer relations with the USA that followed Washington's 2006 proposal to build America's missile shield in Poland. . The nationalism of the Polish elite combined with Russophobia was also of great importance.

Since PiS has returned to power in 2015, its governments have only rarely entered into sharp disputes with Russia. The principal issue in Russia-related statements made by government officials has been the demand that Russia return the wreckage of the Polish plane that crashed on April 10, 2010 in Smolensk, killing then Polish President Lech Kaczyński along with 95 members of a Polish state delegation on the way to Katyń. Jarosław Kaczyński, and the party he leads, blamed the disaster on Russia and even added that the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had conspired to kill the Polish delegation. While PiS has not been able to produce any evidence in support of this theory, it organized commemorative 'monthlies', i.e. rallies of many thousands of people in the Polish capital to keep the 'Smolensk religion' alive until April 2018. In the meantime, Polish-Russian relations remained frozen. The first meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and Russia took place only five years later, in May 2019, on the occasion of a session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, held in Helsinki. The meeting did not bring about any breakthrough in bilateral relations.

In the opinion of the Polish opposition, the PiS government does not seek confrontation with Russia. A significant factor explaining this seems to be the similar authoritarian natures of the Polish Russian governments. Politicians and liberal or leftist media protesting against the violation of the rule of law by the Poland's government and its president allege a 'betrayal of Polish interests' and the country's 'drift' toward an eastern satrapy regime. As an example, they point to the cooperation that exists between the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and the Russian president Putin. The Russian political scientist Andrei Kortunov goes so far as to state that 'the Russians see in PiS a party that seeks to sow in Europe that which is in the Kremlin's interest' (Radziwinowicz, 2019).

In matters of domestic policy, such as 'protecting' children from sex education, discrimination, LGBT, gender, domestic violence against women, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the PiS government's way is similar to Russia's. Despite Kaczyński's Russophobia, the Russian secret services' penetration (and likely financing) of dispersed right-wing and nationalist circles in Poland can be clearly seen (Poland's, 2017).

The disputes about historical issues between Poland and Russia escalated even more at the end of 2019. Then Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of Poland's weakened position in the western world to accuse Poland – repeatedly and going against



established historical facts – of being complicit in bringing about WWII. As he did so, he passed over in silence the fact that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 was of decisive importance in this regard. Putin also raised the question of Polish anti-Semitism and Poles' participation in the extermination of Polish Jews by the German occupiers. Poland's allies (the USA, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) supported Warsaw in these polemics (Wanat, 2019), but failed to prevail in the historical disputes with Russia. Warsaw pursued its own nationalist historical policy, which collided with Russia's historical narrative. As it turned out, the PiS government's earlier decision to suspend the activities of the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters made it difficult to find common ground for dialogue. The conservative-nationalist Polish government found that Russia was a heavyweight adversary that had built its own great-power narrative on the basis of its own subjective view of history. It is worthwhile to remember that Poland's historical policy runs into similar problems, if on a lesser scale, with regard to Germany, Israel and Ukraine.

### **Three Seas Initiative as a Dream of Poland's Greatness**

Polish foreign policy, as conducted by right-wing governments, encounters problems in establishing relations with Poland's two main neighbours – Russia to the east and Germany to the west – and with adapting to the role of a middle-rank country in the contemporary, increasingly inter-dependent world. This means the thinking of PiS' conservative and nationalist politicians reverts to concepts known from the past. These stress the need to maintain full sovereignty and see Poland in a leading or even a great-power role in central Europe. This was the case during Poland's 'Golden Age' in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when the rule and influence of the Polish-Lithuanian 'Commonwealth of Both Nations' extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and when members of the Jagiellonian dynasty also reigned in Bohemia and in Hungary. The contemporary concept, the Three Seas Initiative, which is treated by the Polish authorities as a vehicle that elevates Poland to the position of international power in central Europe, has been implemented since 2015, blessed by former US President Donald Trump.

PiS' political thought most often makes reference to the federation concept of Józef Piłsudski, who proposed after the First World War that a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian-Ukrainian federation be created, with the possibility of admitting Latvia, Estonia and even Finland to it in due course. After this concept's rapid demise, in 1921-1926 Poland attempted to implement another project of regional cooperation between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas. This was the concept of Intermarium, and it was accompanied by the concept of Prometheism, which entailed support for secessionist movements in Russia and the USSR. These two concepts shared the fate of the previous one.

In conducting their policy of 'raising Poland from its knees' the Polish authorities not only created a crisis situation in relations with Russia but also led to serious tensions in relations with Berlin, Paris and with EU institutions. In practice, the Polish government reverted to the theory of finding two enemies in Russia and Germany. Contrary to obvious facts, which indicate Poland's deep structural ties within the EU framework, the Polish authorities began to distance themselves from the EU and went back to stressing Poland's geopolitical situation, as was the case in the distant past and, especially, during the inter-

war period. In this situation, PiS leaders opted to build a geopolitical trampoline of sorts, in the shape of the Three Seas Initiative, and to look for support for it with former US President Donald Trump and his clearly unfriendly stance toward the EU. Or perhaps they only took it upon themselves to do America's bidding? Generally speaking, in justifying the launch of the Three Seas Initiative, the Polish government usually mentions the need to rise to the challenges and threats emerging from the international environment, including the EU crisis, the unfavourable evolution of the decision-making processes within this community (including the emergence of a "two-speed" EU), and the neo-imperial policies of the Russian Federation.

The idea to establish multi-level collaboration between the countries lying between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea was proposed in autumn 2015 by the Chancellery of President Andrzej Duda and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to Poland, the Intermarium project includes 11 other central European EU member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Croatia in particular showed great interest in the project and, along with Poland, began to promote the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) project.

The main difference between this policy and its prototype from 2005-2007 was Poland's focus on collaboration solely with central European countries, excluding Ukraine and Georgia. On August 25, 2016 the representatives of the twelve central European states first met in Dubrovnik and adopted the *Joint Declaration on the Three Seas Initiative*. The text of the declaration clearly limits collaboration as part of the 3SI to infrastructural and economic matters and to the framework of the European Union. It announces modernization projects aimed at bridging the developmental gap between the western and eastern part of the EU, which is supposed to foster a deepening of the EU common market and, at the same time, to prevent the formation of a 'multi-speed' EU. In successive years, more 3SI summits have been held, the second of which, in July 2017, was attended by former US President Donald Trump. The sixth 3SI summit was held on July 8-9, 2021 in Sophia.

Poland's involvement in the Three Seas Initiative, similarly to its revisionist approach to the entire tried foreign policy course of 1989-2015, betrays Poland's ill-adaptation to life among Western democracies. It has to be admitted that the words that Milan Kundera wrote several decades ago, to the effect that the tragedy of Central Europe lies in the fact that it finds itself tied 'culturally to the West and politically to the East' remain valid. (Kundera, 1983). Today, despite 30 years of transformations, Poland is reverting to solutions proper to an authoritarian system and to geopolitical concepts which it knows from the past and which are triumphant in contemporary Russia.

Moreover, it should be noted that EU member states, including those involved in the Three Seas Initiative, are being played off each other by outside actors, notably by the US and Russia. This is already seriously hindering the building of unity among 3SI states, and yet it is on this unity that Poland is attempting to build its position as regional leader and a competitive block within the European Union. In addition, hanging over all this is the spectre of Poxexit – the spectre that Warsaw's policies within the EU will lead either to Poland's marginalization within the EU by all other member states or to that organisation's slow deconstruction, regardless of Jarosław Kaczyński's or Mateusz Morawiecki's stated



interest in remaining in the EU. In the event, the Three Seas Initiative as a vehicle raising Poland to international power status will not survive.

### **Consequences of the New Polish Policies**

It is rather hard to estimate what the long-term consequences of Poland's illiberal and nationalist policies will be as these policies are quite recent and have been occurring uninterruptedly for only a few years. A visible outline of some of their effects is beginning to emerge, however. Firstly, one can notice the gradual weakening of the European Union which has, in any case, been struggling with an ongoing crisis for various reasons. The decision by Poland, a relatively large EU-member state, to embark on policies that entail violations of EU norms and standards has negative consequences. It strengthens the determination of Victor Orbán in Hungary to continue along the path of illiberalism, and encourages toleration of corruption in the Czech Republic, and especially, in Romania. The entirety of Poland's behavior in the EU since the autumn of 2015 indicates that, irrespective of the pronouncements made by PiS leaders about strengthening the EU, Poland has embarked on a path that will lead to its departure from this organization, or at least out of its mainstream. In other words, Polesxit, a term invented by the media, has become the aim of Poland's PiS government.

The illiberal and nationalistic vector chosen by Poland's ruling party casts a shadow on Poland's bilateral relations with other European countries. Poland's actions that weaken the EU have led to disputes with the two countries most engaged in the integration process – France and Germany. Poland is becoming increasingly isolated in the EU. The only member state Poland can count on, and not always, is Hungary. Also, the Polish elite's nationalism precludes any improvement of relations, also heavily burdened by historical disputes, between Poland and its other eastern neighbors. Poland has opted for bilateral relations with these countries as the main vehicle for its policies. It has nothing attractive to propose to these countries, however. Generally speaking, it can be stated that Poland's eastern policy under PiS has reached a stalemate, as the Polish authorities have lost interest in Poland's eastern neighbors. Instead, they are satisfied with being a client of the USA and with supporting the policy of this superpower in the post-Soviet area.

The PiS government is also conducting a historical policy and is using history instrumentally for day-to-day policy. On March 1, 2018 Poland introduced an act of law intended to protect Poland's good name. The new regulations call for up to three years of incarceration for anyone ascribing to the Polish nation or state any responsibility for crimes committed by Nazi Germany. The intention of the new law is to counter the phrase 'Polish death camps', which quite often appears in statements made by officials in other countries and in the foreign media. The law also includes provisions allowing for the filing of criminal charges against anyone denying crimes committed by Ukrainians against Poles in 1943 in Volhynia. The law also provides for the prosecution of foreigners abroad for this. It has had negative international repercussions in Israel, the USA and Ukraine. Poland has followed in Turkey's footsteps and has put its prestige abroad at risk.

While observing the security policy Poland has pursued since 2015, one should note that it has been frantically seeking military reinforcement of its own defense and of NATO's entire eastern flank. In military terms, increasing the defense potential of Poland

and of its allies in this part of Europe is of little importance. Even if one were to assume the possibility of a conflict with Russia, an increased military presence where the two opponents come face-to-face will not determine the outcome, as cyber war and missile and air war may be of key importance. On the other hand, increasing the presence of the USA and other allied soldiers by several thousand in the vicinity of Russia's borders serves the psychological war between NATO and Russia and its significance is only mental. It also reflects in what a poor condition are the relations between the West and Russia.

Poland has opted for additional weapons and for an increased US military presence on Polish soil. Such a way of thinking is typical of politicians, who have little knowledge of the nature of any future war or understanding for how tragic the consequences of such a war would be for the population and for the environment. Such thinking is usually associated with soldiers and with irresponsible and unprofessional politicians. Any observation of PiS politicians suggests that they are, indeed, of just such type. Just such a lack of professionalism and responsibility can be seen in their quite frequent statements indicating that an attack on American soldiers stationed in Poland will automatically draw the USA into the war. It is enough, however, to read attentively the most important provision of the North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 5, to understand that it doesn't provide for any such automatism. Instead, it states that an ally is to take 'such action as it deems necessary' in case of attack on one or several allies. This 'deeming' doesn't entail any automatic action but rather the liberty for each ally to choose.

The illiberal stance of Polish conservative and nationalist politicians leads them to expect, above all, US armed assistance. Therefore, they prioritize bilateral relations with the USA over solidarity with the whole North Atlantic Alliance. The similarity of their ideological beliefs to the populist and anti-liberal policies of the former US President, Donald Trump, have given them additional motivation. By 'purchasing' Poland's security from the USA at excessive cost they not only disregard other important and yet to be filled needs of their own society, but also disregard solidarity with other NATO allies.

When, in September 2018, President Duda proposed that Poland 'buy' Fort Trump, or when Poland ordered American F-35 combat planes, Poland failed to inform its other allies of these intentions. Poland should have done so, if only out of concern for its credibility, especially as it was requesting the deployment of an additional 1,000 American soldiers, and the more so as Trump said that those soldiers would be relocated from US bases in Germany. Such moves certainly would not strengthen either the North Atlantic Alliance, or Poland's security.

However, it soon turned out how illusory were the hopes of Polish leaders in Donald Trump, who supported the Polish authorities not so much with concern for Poland's security, but with the desire to support the illiberal and Euro-sceptic policy of Warsaw. In the autumn of 2020, Trump lost the presidential election, and the new US president, Joe Biden, in one of his first decisions, canceled Trump's decision to reduce the contingent of US troops in Germany (Biden, 2021). Although Poland can still count on US support for its security, it will face problems with the US returning to the promotion of democracy in the world and respect for the rule of law in other countries. Meanwhile, the Polish PiS government is ostentatiously violating democratic norms, the rule of law, freedom of the media and discrimination against various minorities. It causes trouble in the European Union, and now it looks similar to the USA.

As a result of the foreign and security policies conducted by the Polish government and President, the country's international position has wilted and its international roles have been distorted. The roles Poland performs, contrary to the aims of its authorities, are absolutely different from the roles it declares (Zięba, 2020, p. 268 *et seq.*). Poland, which had for years been a prime example of a state that had successfully carried out democratic transformations, is now becoming an authoritarian state, where the Constitution and the rule of law are ostentatiously broken.

Under the PiS government, Poland is no longer an engaged and pragmatic participant in European integration, as it was in the years 2007-2015, including the time when Poland held the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2011. Poland abandoned the role of an active participant in the Weimar Triangle and it's gone on to multiply misunderstandings and disputes with France and Germany. It has taken on the task of breaking apart European integration and even the role of a destructor of the European Union. Since the Smolensk air catastrophe in April 2010, when a plane carrying a Polish state delegation to Katyń crashed, Poland has gradually moved away from normalising its relations with Russia under the influence of Russophobic PiS propaganda. Under the PiS government, these relations have been frozen, and Poland has openly taken the role of a 'weaker' of Russia's imperial ambitions on the international stage and neglected its bilateral relations with this power. The most visible element of Poland's overall foreign and security policy is the ever-reinforced *bandwagoning* strategy with regard to the United States. In former President Trump, the Polish authorities found an ideological ally, but now it is over. President Biden knows Poland and has a positive attitude towards the USA, but ideologically he is in opposition to the rulers of Poland.

PiS' recurring reference to the 'will of the Sovereign' while it conducts its populist and anti-liberal domestic and foreign policy is only a marketing ploy. In fact, the Polish Sovereign, that is, Polish society, is one of the most pro-European. Support among society for Poland's membership in the EU oscillates between 70-80%. Despite this, the country's government is pursuing a policy that will de facto lead to the marginalization of Poland in the EU, perhaps even to Polesxit. These same authorities also often say that they are defending Poland's sovereignty and interests against the 'greedy' European Union while, at the same time, making short thrift of the same interests and sovereignty by placing the country under the tutelage of the United States and assuming the role of vassal and client state. This may be an expression of a desire to compensate for Poland's growing isolation in the Western world. This has been the case so far, but we do not know what will happen during Biden's US presidency. It is beyond doubt that for the US Poland will remain an important ally within NATO.

To conclude, one may claim that due to illiberalism and its derivatives the importance of Poland as a state in Europe and the world has decreased. The world's perception of Poland as it is governed by PiS is increasingly unfavorable among democratic countries, and more favorable among other illiberal countries. But not all, because the nationalism that accompanies Polish illiberalism makes it impossible to improve relations with other not fully democratic or downright undemocratic countries, especially Poland's eastern neighbors. Poland's foreign and security policy is facing serious challenges. Some of them Poland created itself and is unable to address effectively. This means that there is a growing problem of incompatibility between Poland's policies and the changing international order.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

## References

- Andor, L. (2019). Nacjonalizm, demagogia, rasizm, ksenofobia, autorytaryzm. Co nazywamy populizmem? *Krytyka Polityczna*, 3 September.
- Benjamin, D. (2021, May 1). Biden Wants to Boost Democracy. He Should Shelve the Summit and Look to Europe. *Politico*. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/01/05/biden-wants-to-boost-democracy-he-should-shelve-the-summit-and-look-to-europe-454823>
- Biden potwierdza wstrzymanie wycofania wojsk z Niemiec. (2021, February 5). *Defence 24*. Retrieved from <https://www.defence24.pl/biden-potwierdza-wstrzymanie-wycofania-wojsk-z-niemiec>
- Cowell, A. (2018, September 19). Fort Trump? Poland Makes a Play for a U.S. Military Base. *The New York Times*.
- Dahrendorf, R. (1990). *Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw*. New York: Times Books.
- Egipt przekazał mistrale Rosji za dolara? *TVN24, PAP*, 20 October 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/macierewicz-jest-przekonany-ze-egipt-sprzedal-mistrale-rosji,685615.html>.
- Galston, W.A. (2018). *Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Glasius, M. (2018). What Authoritarianism is... and is Not: Practice Perspective. *International Affairs* 94(3), 515–533.
- Grudziński, P. (2008). *Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli*. Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
- Ikenberry, G.J. (2018). The End of the Liberal International Order. *International Affairs*, 94(1), 7-23.
- Kaczyński, J. (2011, October 9). Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt. *TVN24.pl*. Retrieved from <https://tvn24.pl/polska/przyjdzie-dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedzie-budapeszt-ra186922-353536>.
- Kundera, M. (1983, May 27). Un accident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l'Europe centrale. *Le Débat*, 27, 3-23.
- Kupchan, C.A. (2010, August 20). As Nationalism Rises, will the European Union Fall? *The Washington Post*.
- Kupchan, C.A. (2012). *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How Democracies Die*. New York: Crown.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (2018). *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J.J. (2019). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. *International Security*, 43(4), 7–50.
- Poland's New Front: A Government's War against Civil Society (Report), Human Rights First. America ideals. Universal values, Aug. 2017, pp. 5-7. Retrieved from <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Poland-Report-August-2017.pdf>.
- Populist leaders meet in Warsaw to discuss European Union, *Independent*, December 4, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/jaroslav-kaczynski-european-union-warsaw-viktor-orban-vladimir-putin-b1969725.html>
- Radziwinowicz, W. (2019, May 21). Rosyjski politolog dla "Wyborczej": Kreml na Orbana i Salvinię nie liczy, ale Kaczyńskiego szanuje. *Gazeta Wyborcza*.
- Roth, K. (2019). World's Autocrats Face Rising Resistance, Human Rights Watch. *World Report* 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/keynote/autocrats-face-rising-resistance>.
- Stawka większa niż Trybunał. Wywiad z Krzysztofem Szczerskim, ministrem w kancelarii prezydenta Polski, A. Dudy. (2016, April 18). *Rzeczpospolita*,
- Taylor, P. (2018, October 4). Poland's Risky 'America First' Policy. *Politico*. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-risky-america-first-policy-jaroslav-kaczynski-donald-trump/>
- Wanat, Z. (2019, December 29). Polish PM accuses Putin of "deliberate" lies in WWII spat, *Politico*.
- Zajac, J. (2016). *Poland's Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zięba, R. (2020). *Poland's Foreign and Security Policy: Problems of Compatibility with the Changing International Order*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
- Zięba, R. (2011). Współczesne stosunki polsko-rosyjskie: uwarunkowania, problemy, implikacje. *Przegląd Politologiczny*, 3, 35-61.



## Poland's Security Policy after the Cold War

Robert Kupiecki<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The three decades after the fall of communism in 1989 proved to be a good time for Poland's national security. A sovereign Poland effectively reconstructed its foreign and security policy from the ground up, following 40 years of Soviet domination. She reorganized her treaty-based relations with neighboring states, consolidated its own borders and rejected old military and economic alliances. The Polish political transformation, although costly in social terms, has made it a democratic and economically successful state, anchored in NATO and the EU, regionally cooperative and selectively engaged in the global agenda - occasionally "punching above its weight". This article deals with the key aspects of Poland's post-1989 security policy. It begins with an analysis of the key historical factors contributing to continuity and change in this policy, stemming from national responses to the changing external environment and evolving state sovereignty. A detailed analysis of Poland's security policy after 1989, covers the following issues: Poland's path to NATO and subsequent national priorities as a member of the Alliance, the role of the USA in Polish security policy, the approach to collective security, and last but not least, the role of European Union. It ends with a reflection on the contemporary challenges confronting the national security policy.

### Keywords

Poland, Security policy, NATO, Collective defence, Transatlantic relations

**1 Corresponding Author:** Robert Kupiecki (Prof.), University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies, Department of Strategic Studies and International Security., Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: r.kupiecki@uw.edu.pl  
ORCID: 0000-0003-3419-6948

**To cite this article:** Kupiecki, R. (2022). Poland's Security Policy after the Cold War. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S27–S43. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.945221>



With the demise of the communist bloc and subsequently its hegemon - the Soviet Union, factors limiting Poland's sovereignty disappeared (Fried, 2019) and existential threats to the state have subsided, most notably the prospect of nuclear war in Europe. Poland's post-1989 transformation, although socially costly, made it a democratic prosperous state, rooted in European and trans-Atlantic cooperation and selectively engaging in global agenda. Its membership into NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004) re-united the nation with the Western community, releasing Poland from the "gray zone trap" between Moscow and the West along the lines of Belarus or Ukraine (Kuźniar, 2001), as well as provided security guarantees and a development stimulus. The logic of "the Polish road to the West", since 1989, was twofold: to create a political organism, resistant to external pressure and acting in solidarity against the threats with other free nations and to lower any possible Western European temptations to deal with superpowers without taking into account the interests of Poland.

The new Polish security policy, was no longer haunted by fear of a territorial aggression mobilizing majority of state's resources. On the other hand, it was challenged by a more complex set of strategic considerations, involving military, political, economic, social and environmental factors, reflected in subsequent national security strategies (Kupiecki, 2015) and policy actions.

### **Poland's Security Policy - Continuity and Change**

Ever since the state regained its independence in 1918, Poland's security policy has been characterized by a paradox of continuous concerns, despite radically changing international circumstances. Consequently, national security policy has always been:

1. Focused on re-constructing and subsequently strengthening the existence of Poland as an independent state: in 1918, after 123 years of its partition between Russia, Austria, and Germany; after World War II and the loss of half of its territory to the Soviet Union, as well as the physical shift of the state borders to the West; and finally after 1989, as a result of four decades of subordination to Moscow.

2. A function of Poland's weakness relative to the power of its two neighbors - Russia and Germany - and their policies.

3. Actively searching for external security guarantees. Since 1918, Poland has been bound by 12 formal alliances: 4 before WWII, 7 after 1944 and 1 after 1989. Only two of them - then Warsaw Pact and NATO - were multilateral, the rest were bilateral alliances. Most of Poland's alliances were of long duration: the ones with France and Romania lasted 18 years; the longest bilateral alliance with the USSR lasted over 45 years, the Warsaw Pact existed for 36 years, and Poland has been a NATO member since 1999 (Kupiecki, 2018).

4. Characterized by Poland's lack of success in building a regional security platform representing the common interests of states in the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea space.

During periods of strategic independence-between 1918-1939, and after 1989, the foreign and security policy of Warsaw was strongly oriented towards Western Europe and the USA. The essence of this direction, apart from a military motive, was the effort to create permanent bonds preventing any possible separate Western agreements with Russia, or Germany at the expense of Poland's interests.



Considering Poland's security policy, attention should be paid to the continuity of the Polish state as an international legal entity and national community, but in three different forms of government from the point of view of sovereignty and decision-making freedom (Harasimowicz, 2013).

The first one was represented by the Second Polish Republic in the years 1918–1939, a sovereign state striving to consolidate its international position with the available foreign policy tools, involving both the League of Nations, as an imperfect form of collective security and bilateral military alliances. That period should be extended until 1944, when the Western governments started withdrawing recognition from the Polish government-in-exile (Karski, 1985).

The second one was communist Poland. Between 1944–1989 it was politically subordinated to the Soviet Union and constrained by the allied relations with communist states (Koszel, 2015). The shift of Polish borders meant territorial gains at the expense of a divided Germany and losses in the East for the benefit of the Soviet republics: Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. However, the lack of treaties guaranteeing new acquisitions resulted in lasting concerns about their permanence. The alliances of the Polish People's Republic carried the illusion of national security, as the country was exposed to the high risk of a nuclear conflict between the two superpowers, which was to take place mainly on Polish territory. From 1955, the Warsaw Pact performed two important functions in Poland's security policy. Outwardly, it was a mechanism deterring any possible aggression from the West. Inside, it disciplined Moscow's satellite states. Amidst the Cold War superpowers' rivalry, Poland was situated as a front-line state of a possible conventional and nuclear conflict. It was part of the offensive plans of the Warsaw Pact and its strategic base. Its political interests, including the international recognition of its borders, had been a hostage to the question of German reunification for over 40 years. Thus, any Soviet protection of Poland meant, above all, the protection of one's own assets in Europe (Weremiuk, 2014).

After 1989, the Third Republic of Poland, rebuilt the state's sovereignty, its strategy and policy, embedding national security in the transatlantic alliance system (NATO) and the European Union. The Atlantic Alliance is of central importance to Poland as a form of collective defense, and together with the EU, it is also a factor enabling the "densification" of ties between member states, and solidifying regional military cooperation in Central Europe (Madej, 2013; Kupiecki, 2013).

### **Poland's Security Policy after the Cold War**

The end of the Cold War brought the paradox of reducing the risk of a major war outbreak, while increasing uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe due to the situation in the Soviet Union embraced by imperial nostalgia, domestic unrest and a quick decay of its power, accelerating its withdrawal from hegemonic positions abroad (Dębski & Hamilton, 2019). For Poland's security policy, the new situation brought about as many political opportunities as it did reasons for prudence, necessitated by domestic reforms, the shadow of Soviet military presence in Poland and the West's general support for changes, yet with no readiness to open its organizations to new members.

In 1989 Poland began its democratic and economic renewal, involving a revision of membership in post-communist economic structures and alliances in foreign policy terms. The essence of this process was expressed in the catchy slogan of *return to the West*. However, for the subsequent Polish governments, the top priority was to consolidate the democratic changes and to minimize the external threats. They feared Soviet revanchism, the implosion of a weakening empire, and the general destabilization that would *derail* the Polish transformation. The directions of Polish foreign and security policy, referred to - after the prime minister's and foreign minister's names - as the "Mazowiecki-Skubiszewski line", (Kuzniar, 2009) involved:

- striving for EU membership and expanding the network of contacts with its member states. The most important aspect among the latter were Poland's relations with Germany and France, as well as the so-called Weimar Triangle - a platform for political cooperation created in 1991 and focused on European integration and international security,

- considering NATO membership as a source of security guarantees for Poland and the importance of cooperation with the USA as a factor enhancing their credibility,

- strengthening regional cooperation in Central Europe in order to shape common interests and mutual support in the processes of integration with the West,

- establishing good - neighbourly relations with Russia and separately with the successor states of the USSR. The "Russian factor" in Polish and Turkish policymaking was brilliantly compared by Özgün Erler Bayır (Erler Bayır, 2015).

The vision of Poland stuck in a *gray zone*, filled only with hopes for collective security, animated Poland's preventive actions in the security policy field. Emerging short-lived alternatives to *the road to the West* were quickly rejected. These included, among others: concepts of neutrality, relying on the regional security system based on the CSCE, the creation of a sub-regional collective security system, or an alliance within Central Europe, retaining some form of ties with the USSR/Russia or a "partial" NATO membership. The geo-strategic location of Poland (or the apparent *naivete* of the above concepts) ruled-out the adoption of any of them, as they were deemed to bring about merely an illusion of remaining on the sidelines of a possible future conflict, and could even amplify the risk of international marginalization. Poland could more effectively secure its own interests as a member of Western institutions.

Gradually, this process started to move forward, in its early phase (1989-1993) being determined by the following events and processes:

1. Moscow's actions, trying to suppress independence movements in its *internal empire* (primarily in the Baltic states) and pushing its former satellites to act. Ultimately, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were dissolved in 1991 and in September 1993, the last Russian units stationed in Poland returned home. This meant that the obstacle stopping Poland from pursuing more vigorously its Western ambitions was removed. Simultaneously, it signaled the emergence of the Russian veto over any future NATO enlargement.

2. The treaty-based settlement of relations with Germany (1990) and the legal closure of the Polish western border problem. It allowed for this issue to be taken off the Polish security agenda. Between 1990–1993, state treaties were signed with all of the state's neighbours (including Russia).



3. The evolving relations between the West and the USSR (and later with the Russian Federation) related to the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe, but in a way that would not re-fuel Russian imperialism, and harm the prospect of a peaceful relationship with Moscow and democratisation of Russia. The re-unification of Germany, which required Soviet cooperation and the conclusion of negotiations on the conventional disarmament in Europe, also remained to be settled. The gradual resolution of these problems accelerated the West's decisions to expand NATO (Goldgeier, 1999; Asmus, 2002; Goldgeier&Shiffrinson, 2020), but did not change its attitude towards Russia, whose security interests were to be respected - even at the cost of lowering the future military status of Central Europe in the Atlantic Alliance.

4. The future place of the united Germany in the European security system. The reunification took place in October 1990, Germany finally joined NATO and Moscow did not receive any formal guarantees that this would be the last expansion of the organization (Savranskaya&Blanton, 2017; Savranskaya&Blanton, 2018; Kramer, 2009; Kramer, 2004; Sarotte, 2010; Sarotte, 2014; Itzkovitz Shiffrinson, 2016). This was key for Poland's security, but it opened the narrative of Russian state propaganda, using the argument of "betrayal of the West". It resonates in its foreign policy to this day as a justification for Russian aggression in Crimea (Kupiecki, 2019b; Kupiecki & Menkiszak 2020). A united Germany has become the most powerful country in Europe and Poland's main foreign partner there.

5. The adoption of the CFE Treaty, signed in November 1990. It improved Poland's security. In the 1990s, over 59,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment were either destroyed, or transferred for peace purposes. This resulted in limiting the possibility of unexpected military aggression in Europe. These effects were reinforced by the agreements on confidence-building measures and the Open Skies Treaty. Poland benefited from these processes by: lowering tensions and raising transparency in the vicinity of its borders, the mutual involvement of Russia and the West in the negotiations, subjecting the military situation in Europe to the rigors of international law, new opportunities for a military dialogue with NATO countries and a joint approach to the future of arms control and disarmament (Kobieracki, 2001).

After 1989, following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Poland had to take-up autonomous preparations for meeting such challenges as possible military destabilization in Europe, resulting in war, the violation of territorial integrity, disruption of energy supplies, waves of refugees from the unstable East and South, as well as evolving global threats, including WMD proliferation, human trafficking, drugs or organized crime. To do so, Poland continuously sought external support, broadening the scope of its cooperation with NATO and EU countries and reforming itself to be prepared for the burden of the membership in those organizations, It also invested in subregional cooperation and continued its support for collective security structures.

### **Poland's Road to and its Priorities in NATO**

Poland joined NATO ten years after the 1989 revolution. One may conclude, that it happened relatively quickly. This remark seems necessary to bust one of the three *myths* of Polish political debate over NATO's enlargement.

The first of these claims, that Poland had sought NATO membership since 1989 and that this goal could have been achieved faster. In fact, Poland officially declared its intention to join the organization only at the beginning of 1992. Open declarations on this matter were avoided in previous years, as political realities were correctly interpreted by Polish authorities. These included the West's unwillingness to open its structures to new members in fear of the durability of changes in Central Europe and the related political differences among Allies, including their hopes of a lasting deal with Russia stabilizing security in Europe. Poland and other post-communist states were offered various forms of political and military partnership with NATO, with no security guarantees, or far-reaching obligations. The enlargement process started under Bill Clinton's presidency in the US, taking the form of a political commitment - with no deadline, though - in 1995, which in the following years received an institutional framework. In 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to accession talks. On March 12, 1999, they joined NATO. However, it wouldn't have happened without a successful political and economic transformation of Poland, comprising among other things, of its responsible foreign and security policy positioning the country as a *security producer*, and not merely its *consumer* (Kupiecki, 2019a).

The second of the accession myths states that all political forces in Poland after 1989 were in favor of joining NATO. However, this picture is untrue, both in regards to the beginning and the end of this process. The political compromise on this issue was shaped at the turn of 1992/1993, which, apart from the anxiety caused by the return of neo-imperial accents in Russia's policy, was undoubtedly helped by the growing popularity of NATO membership among Polish society. The post-communist Democratic Left Alliance underwent the most far-reaching change of position on this matter, initially reluctant to the trans-Atlantic option and preferring pan-European illusions of collective security. Paradoxically, Poland's NATO accession was finalized by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former leader of this party. The paradox is complemented by the fact that seven members of the conservative caucus representing political groups previously criticizing the government for its slowness in applying for NATO membership voted against it in the Parliament.

The third myth maintains that Poland's membership in NATO would have happened regardless of Polish activity. On the contrary, it was the success of the state's reforms, including the armed forces, and the continuation of pro-Atlantic policy by successive Polish governments that added credibility to the efforts to become a member of NATO. The outcome of this process was of course determined by the Allies' decisions and their own calculations, but without Poland's consistency this process could have failed. The example of Slovakia, which was excluded from the accession in 1999 (for a period of five years) due to the anti-democratic conduct of its government, offers a case in support of the above statement.

Poland has brought the greatest potential of all the countries that joined the organization after 1999, including a defense spending equal to the aggregated budgets of all the new Allies. The allied status influenced Polish strategic thinking, the armed forces development programs, and contributed in the early 2000's to the increase in the defense budget, with the statutory provision of allocating 2% of the annual GDP. The participation of the Polish

armed forces in NATO peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina even before the accession - was an expression of allied solidarity, all the more that in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, no vital Polish interests were at stake.

From the outset of membership, Poland opted for the primacy of deterrence and collective defense among other tasks of the organization: cooperative security and conflict management, considering the latter as an extension, not a compromise of NATO's key mission. It was collective defense that built the Allied response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and its broader definition pushed Allies to conduct demanding military missions outside the North Atlantic area. Also today, energy security, threats in cyberspace, hybrid conflicts, or the implications of disruptive technologies pave the way to an extended formula of collective defense.

Polish support for collective defense also resulted from the continuous assessment of the developments in Russia, which often clashed with the official optimism of some other Allies. The essence of *Russia's NATO problem* was not so much the developing partner relations with Moscow as it is in Poland's interest, but doing so without any concessions at the expense of NATO defense. The Polish position on NATO-Russia relations emphasized reciprocity, avoiding actions weakening the organization, and the support for dual-track strategy combining deterrence and defense with readiness for dialogue. Although Russia's motivations in relations with NATO evolved in proportion to its own strength, which varied over time - *the more strength, the more assertiveness* - geopolitical imperatives were permanently present in them. These included: stopping NATO's enlargement and minimizing "losses" in the sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, maintaining exclusivity in the former USSR and the lack of tolerance for Western criticism of Russia's actions in this area (like the Chechen wars).

The Polish efforts regarding the proper geographical distribution of Allied forces and military infrastructure also topped the Polish priority list in NATO. Unilateral restrictions in those areas were adopted by NATO before the first expansion of the organization in 1999. They concerned the non-stationing of troops and the failure to develop appropriate infrastructure in the new member states. Their effects resulted in the military exposure of NATO's eastern flank. The political threats resulting from this situation were even more serious, as they potentially signaled the existence of a "two-tier Alliance" offering different levels of military cover for their new and old Allies. The situation changed only as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea, followed by aggression in eastern Ukraine and a series of military provocations in the vicinity of NATO air and sea space. It brought back Allied attention to the issue, resulting in a package of decisions developed at four consecutive NATO summits: in Newport (2014), Warsaw (2016), Brussels (2017) and London (2019).

Having a clear priority in NATO, Poland also actively participated in Allied activities related to cooperative security, especially in partnership with Ukraine and Georgia, and crisis management. In the latter sphere, her most important contribution was Poland's participation in stabilization missions outside the North Atlantic area (see tables below).

Table 1  
*Poland's Participation in NATO Operations*

Operation	Duration	Number of soldiers
<i>Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR) – Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	1996–2004	930
<i>Kosovo Force (KFOR) – Kosovo</i>	1999–	800
<i>Albanian Force (AFOR) – Albania</i>	1999	140
<i>Amber Fox – Macedonia</i>	2001	25
<i>Allied Harmony – Macedonia</i>	2002	25
<i>Swift Relief – Pakistan</i>	2005–2006	140
<i>NATO Training Mission – Iraq</i>	2005–2011	20
<i>International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Afghanistan</i>	2007–2014	2600
<i>Resolute Support – Afghanistan</i>	2014–	400
<i>Active Endeavour – Mediterranean Sea</i>	2005–	Navy vessel and 240 crew
<i>Baltic Air Policing – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia</i>	2006–	Warplanes and 100 personnel

Source: own research.

Table 2  
*Case study: Polish Armed Forces in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom and ISAF)*

Duration: 2002–2014
Personnel: over 28000
Dead/wounded: 43 soldiers, 2 civilians; 361 wounded
Non-military assistance: 194 local assistance projects (20 million USD)
Local personnel trained by Polish instructors: 11000
Afghans trained in Poland: over 1000
Humanitarian assistance: over 267 tons
Overall cost: 2 bln USD

Source: The Operational Headquarters PLAF. <https://wp.mil.pl/artykuly/aktualnosci/2015-01-05-podsumowanie-polskiego-udzialu-w-misji-ISAF>

Today, the credibility tests of collective defense come from various strategic directions. For the security of Poland, the most important are:

- Russia's aggressive policy that steers the conflicts in the South-East of Ukraine, as well as in Syria, and conducts a hybrid sabotage against the international order and its western institutional, axiological and normative international legal foundations;

- complex threats coming from the southern neighborhood, distracting the political attention and resources of the Alliance from collective defense efforts, and politically dividing Allies on the range of policy responses;

- the quality of trans-Atlantic relations and in-house policies of the organization struggling with the reconstruction of military capabilities, planning, mobility, management and command procedures, as well as creating a sustainable financial base for them.

Poland has shown solidarity in times of trial, also bearing its costs measured by the lives of Polish soldiers carrying out allied missions abroad – 63 of them died in NATO missions. Although it lacks the potential and aspirations of a superpower, a certain paradox of Poland's situation is that it is too big to accept the status of a NATO policy executor and not to show interest in its active shaping. Against the background of its power, it requires the following from national security policy:

- a proper prioritization of NATO matters from the point of view of Polish interests and the overall effectiveness of the organization. It is not about any selectivity in the approach to NATO's agenda. It must remain integral, reflecting the breadth of Allied positions. The point is, however, to look after the key issues to be reflected in joint decision-making;

- national executive security policy apparatus for this policy - civil and military - properly formulating tasks and translating them into specific actions;

- an efficient and integrated state security system, for which NATO plays the role of a force multiplier and a source of good planning and executive practices.

Of significant importance to Polish security policy is a militarily effective and politically credible NATO (Rodkiewicz, 2017). This includes the need for prudence in the ways to cultivate allied relations, programming the development of one's own power as an effect of collective synergy, but not as a strategic incapacitation of the state. For if the loneliness of Poland is at one extreme of the security policy failure, then at the opposite end there are ill-considered obligations that do not strengthen national defense. In both cases, they lead to no-alternative situations, i.e. a return to what was the curse of Poland for the last century.

### **The US Factor in Polish Security Policy**

A strong NATO, based on a healthy transatlantic bond tops Poland's security agenda. It boils-down to three priority issues:

1. Maintaining US involvement in Europe, providing a vital trans-Atlantic link for NATO.

2. Development of NATO-EU relations for a reasonable synergy, or if need be, a division of labor in taking-up international security tasks, based on crisis management toolkits developed by both organizations and avoiding the duplication of structures (Michta, 2015).

3. Strengthening American guarantees for Poland, as an old Polish security concept (Kupiecki, 2019c), revitalized since the US-led counterterrorism operations following the 9/11 attacks, and difficult to achieve given strategic asymmetry of both nations (Kupiecki, 2016). The strong support given by Poland to Washington at that time, including the participation in the Afghan operation from its beginning in 2001, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the "secret CIA prisons" system, purchases of American military equipment, and last-but-not-least, hosting the installation of a missile defense system in Poland, resulted from decisions designed to strengthen the bilateral relations. For the second time, the calculations for strengthening strategic ties with the US resurfaced during Donald Trump's presidency.

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, the United States were the first NATO state to strengthen and then develop the "visible presence" of its troops in Poland in 2014. They also decided to invest in the development of Polish military infrastructure and to create a place for storing military equipment here. The missile defense base in Redzikowo is still waiting to become operational. An element of uncertainty was introduced into this cooperation by the statements of President Trump, sharply critical of the European allies,

mainly in relation to the insufficient level of their defense spending. This was already signaled by his campaign announcements concerning: the transactional US approach to its international commitments, the supposedly “outdated” formula of NATO and unconditional security guarantees from the US, a more liberal and sanctionless approach to relations with Russia, an open aversion to the crisis-ridden EU and a bluntly clear *America first* principle, raised to the rank of doctrine by the 2017 US National Security Strategy. Presidential decisions to reduce military presence in Germany were harmful for NATO and Poland’s security, as they meant a significant draw-down in the number of US soldiers and the removal of combat units from Europe. They also reinforced questions about the future of transatlantic relations, while the web of military, economic and political challenges facing the Western world has become more complex. Since Joe Biden took the US presidency, major concerns about the US approach to trans-Atlantic relations visibly receded as a result of a shift in political language and the early political actions aimed at renewing American alliances worldwide.

### **Poland and Collective Security**

In the past decades, the place of collective security institutions has evolved in the security policy of the Republic of Poland. After 1989, having abandoned its satellite status, Poland stopped taking instructions from the USSR in the United Nations, regaining freedom in voting and diplomacy. The other side of the coin, however, was the loss of Russian support in the election mechanisms. In the course of the 40 years of a communist Poland, the country served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council four times. After 1989 this happened only twice. There were obviously more reasons for this (the increase of countries in the Polish regional group and thus - competition between them, as well as the interest of Warsaw itself). The transformation of Polish security policy and its new European and Atlantic priorities shifted resources and the attention of the leadership (Popiuk-Rysińska, 2001).

Warsaw continued to treat the UN as a component of the international order, especially in the sphere of human rights, disarmament and conflict prevention. Perhaps, the most ambitious contribution of Poland to the work of the United Nations was the so-called *New Political Act*, suggesting the scope and modalities for the consolidation of the organization’s work in various fields of security, broadening the political perspective of its activities and starting a reflection on their normative and axiological foundations (Rotfeld, 2004a; Rotfeld, 2004b). For the two post-Cold War decades, Poland continued to participate in peacekeeping operations under the “blue flag”. In 1997, it was the largest force donor to the United Nations mission. The withdrawal from them started in 2009, when Poland’s military priorities moved towards participation in NATO and EU operations. The background of this decision should be considered more broadly in the context of changes in the doctrine and UN peacekeeping practice, lowering its quality, prestige and increasing costs as well as local sources of risk. Poland’s moderate return to UN military operations was announced in 2019.

The CSCE/OSCE was expected to transform into a pan-European system of collective security immediately after the end of the Cold War, equipped with effective institutions, universally recognized standards, military instruments and the support of



both superpowers. Poland also had its stability-related calculations connected with such a prospect, especially in the aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and having no clear timetable for joining NATO. The recognition of CSCE norms and obligations and efforts to make them a part of daily international relations “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, which was at that time a part of Western political rhetorics, communicated Poland’s aspirations to join a community of democratic states. On the other hand, it was to weaken possible Russian revisionism, the brutalization of relations in the former USSR, and attempts to regain influence by force in the former external empire. It was also a kind of code stabilizing Euro-Atlantic political relations and the institutional chaos of the first post-Cold War years.

The end of the 20th century was the most productive period in the OSCE’s history. Its institutional growth, anti-crisis mechanisms, as well as norm-building in the field of human rights, civil liberties, protection of minorities, freedom of the press and political and military aspects of security have built up considerable achievements and credibility. The conventional arms control process, developed under its auspices, and a set of CSBM’s in the military sphere, have also become a measure of the “golden decade of the OSCE”. Poland has clearly marked its presence in all these aspects of the organization’s work. The key OSCE institution – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) - was located in Warsaw as the easternmost capital of a Western state. Annually, it organizes global review conferences as part of the so-called human dimension and conducts dozens of impartial election observation missions in the Member States to monitor their compliance with democratic standards. This commitment was underlined by the OSCE chairmanship held by Poland in 1998. She will assume this function again in 2022. However, the ongoing atrophy of the OSCE’s collective security capabilities (Road, 2017) raises-up the challenges for Warsaw (Hałaciński, 2019).

### **The EU in Poland’s Security Policy**

Poland’s efforts to join the EU proceeded in parallel with the accession process to NATO, although they were accompanied by a different strategic logic (Czachór, 2017). While the Alliance was to bring military guarantees, the Western European Union and the EU were seen by Warsaw a choice aimed at the participation in the common European market, as well as the free flow of goods, ideas, and people, based on common rules, values and policies. Against that background, issues of foreign, security and defense policy originally had the value of strengthening the dialogue with the EU members. In this way, Poland wanted to demonstrate the convergence of positions, a community of values and the ability to make its own contribution to strengthening European security. Poland’s activity was also connected to the intense discussions, held in the last decade of the 20th century, on European security and defense identity. The dispute was whether it should be built within NATO (by increasing the contribution of European allies) or outside of it, using autonomously the Western European Union and the EU.

Poland could not ignore the essence of this discussion, although by remaining outside its institutional centers, it did not have a major influence on the directions of the debate. Its protracted course may have made the issue of expanding Western organizations a hostage of future decisions. The case also antagonized the United States and Turkey,

strongly advocating the development of a capability-based European defense identity within NATO. Therefore, Poland had to do its utmost not to lose credibility in the entire process as a supporter of a strong trans-Atlantic option and to avoid antagonizing the supporters of the European option (especially France).

In 1994, the policy of linking-up with Western organizations received a new institutional foundation with Poland obtaining the status of an associate partner of the WEU. It was the first Western security structure, which in mid-1992 opened to cooperation with Central European countries. For Warsaw, it was all the more important as the WEU was considered at the time “the defense component of the European Union and the European pillar of NATO”. In the mid-1990s, the WEU also became a part of a popular political concept known as the “royal road”, indicating the sequence of expansion of Western institutions. The enlargement of the Alliance as controversial - according to the supporters of this concept - should have been preceded by the membership of Central European states in the EU. Only then was the WEU to be opened for new members, and consequently NATO enlargement would be relegated to the background as unnecessary. This idea also involved its anti-American edge - the solution was based on European structures, eliminating US military guarantees and weakening transatlantic cooperation. It is not surprising that this concept was fought against by Poland.

The EU appeared relatively late as an instrument in Poland’s security policy. A breakthrough in this respect was the Saint Malo Declaration of December 1998, which accelerated the development of military capabilities and pushed for a more robust EU defense. In the pre-accession period, Poland tried to balance between conservative support for NATO’s defense monopoly and participation in discussions on the development of appropriate EU potential. However, this did not prevent Warsaw from actively participating in the US military intervention in Iraq (2003) – a step heavily criticized by major EU states. In addition to accepting American arguments on the need to strengthen NATO militarily and increasing the contribution of Europeans, Warsaw actually feared that EU plans might lead to the development of its autonomous military structures and shift a large part of its expenditure in this direction at the expense of investment in the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, the situation of a real weakening of NATO could arise, not compensated by any European solution with a potential similar to the transatlantic one.

By joining the EU, Poland declared its active participation in CSDP and did not oppose the general development of the crisis management capabilities of the organization. The greatest military effort by Poland, apart from participation in foreign missions, was related to the flagship project of the Union, so-called EU Battlegroups - rapid response units rotating by a state or a group of member states with a force of 1,500 soldiers, capable of independently conducting field operations for four months. Poland has been involved in them from the very beginning, as the framework state, issuing the largest military contingent and commanding the entire unit. Subsequent editions of the Battlegroups were carried out jointly with other countries: Germany, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia in 2010, Germany and France - the so-called Weimar Battlegroup in 2013, and then every three-year period regularly together with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine - the so-called Visegrad Battlegroup Plus (MFA Brief, 2020).

It was an important effort both financially and militarily, although it raised questions of rationality when there were no clear all-EU solutions and no political consensus on



how to use them, or their operational priorities, mission sustainability and burden sharing scheme. The latter issue also stimulated Poland, which was in favor of extending – beyond current *Athena* mechanism, built on the principle that *costs lie where they fall* - the scope of financing the common EU military operations from the common budget. Poland was also involved in the work of the European Defense Agency - EDA, whose task, since 2004, has been to coordinate the development of joint defense projects of the Member States, supporting the operational capabilities of the Union and the competitiveness of its defense industry on internal and external markets. The issues mentioned above caught Poland's attention during its 2011 presidency of the EU Council (Sus, 2014).

Poland pursued such a policy until the end of 2015, when the conservative Polish government began to systematically reduce its participation in the EU defense policy (Zwolowski, 2017). Its political attention has been shifted towards military cooperation with the US and the security of NATO's eastern flank. However, this outflow of engagement took place at a time when - under the pressure of threats from Russia and the South (terrorism, regional conflicts and migration waves), open aversion to transatlantic cooperation demonstrated by President Trump and Brexit - the EU has decided to double its efforts in this field, including the first-ever activation of Permanent Structural Cooperation envisioned by the Lisbon Treaty. Not without hesitation, along with most EU countries, Poland joined this mechanism in 2017. The country was also late in entering common defense projects implemented as part of the EDA and is not participating in the France-led European Intervention Initiative - announced in 2018 as a kind of elite military program with an undefined purpose, formally implemented outside EU and NATO structures.

### **Poland's Security Policy: The Challenges Ahead**

Currently in addition to the sharpness of the ongoing political dispute in Poland over the directions of the state's development, including its foreign and security policy, there are signs of a fundamental deterioration of its international environment (Foreign Policy Strategy, 2017). This mainly applies to:

- the general weakening of the Western position in the world and the foundations of the liberal international order it shaped for decades,

- the diminishing role of norms and institutions in the politics of great powers (especially the USA, China and Russia) and the growing likelihood of their unilateral actions. To a different degree, they also openly challenge the spirit and letter of international law and instrumentalize its interpretations, question their own political commitments (for instance in the fields of arms control, disarmament and CSBM's) and drive wedges in international cooperation,

- the weakening of multilateralism as a source of predictability, satisfying needs and equalizing opportunities for various participants in international relations,

- a general decrease of the popular credibility of institutions guaranteeing a stable international order, and with it an increase in the wave of nationalist populism and authoritarianism (also cultural, economic or religious), limiting space for international cooperation, predictable national security policies and lasting peace. Also, in recent years,

NATO raised concerns about democratic deficits in its member states (Burns & Lute, 2019).

The main international institutions that guarantee Poland's development and security are currently not finding a sufficient response to the new situation. Their internal cohesion increases anxiety about the future. NATO, while doing a lot to strengthen collective defense on the eastern flank, focuses its attention on many regional and sectoral problems often referred to as a *360-degree approach* (NATO, 2020, November 25). The EU, pressured by Russia, China and the US, has been tormented by many internal problems and questions about the effectiveness and support for its policies. Therefore, it clearly faces the challenge of either stagnation, or making a decisive step forward - also in security and defense matters. However, the vague idea of a possible European strategic autonomy, not only invites unavoidable differences among member states, but may also lead to a "multi-speed Europe", defined according to the "readiness for integration" and thus acting against the initial objective of the project.

Russia, although incapable of effective modernization and internal systemic changes, is clearly moving towards revising the foundations of the world order. It reaches for aggressive actions - political, economic and military - using their own comparative advantages, such as gas and oil supplies and nuclear weapons as doctrinal tools of deterrence through the readiness of limited pre-emption called de-escalation. It also uses instrumental interpretations of international law regarding sovereignty, self-defense and self-determination. It does not shy away from tactical alliances with other opponents of the world order, territorial aggression in Ukraine or the land annexation of sovereign Ukraine and Georgia. It is also a guarantee of the survival of oppressive regimes and a support for radicals in strategic regions of the world (National, 2020).

China, which has benefited the most from the West's global openness in the last three decades, with its enormous economic growth and prestige, technological advances and the strengthening of its military capacity, works hard to establish new rules of the international order. Its vision of this order is not entirely clear, but it is to be based on a new arrangement of the principles of the coexistence of superpowers and the marginalization of smaller states, reduced to the roles serving local or sectoral interests of world leaders.

The US prioritizes its own superpower and during Trump's presidency shown its readiness to loosen all ties that bind it - global alliances and partnerships, multilateral institutions or treaties. The acceleration in this respect attributed to the Trump Administration, however, has its deeper roots in the public mood in the US. His radical announcements, signifying the withdrawal of America from leadership roles established in the post-Cold War world, could also be seen in the actions of its predecessors: George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Thus, we are dealing with a trend that is much more serious in terms of causes and long lasting consequences than the personality of the 45th president of the United States, his rhetoric and peculiar "twitter diplomacy". As such this trend will challenge his successor.

The COVID-19 pandemic posed multiple questions about priorities for democratic governments. Possible answers will probably imply significant shifts in defense budgets, renationalization and reprogramming national and multilateral policies (less resources,

operations, exercises and cooperation). Global health threats have also sharpened the issue of leadership in the Western world. They showed the limitations of the EU and the United States. The latter did not become a leader in the fight against the pandemic, or a force calling for international solidarity. The post-pandemic financial crisis is likely to hit international co-operation, increasing the temptation of economic nationalism and limiting civil liberties, destabilizing countries and regions and opening them to greater penetration by superpowers (breeding their even sharper competition).

Poland will be strongly affected by these processes, which should invite a prudent security policy, based on sober assessments of the situation and immediate recognition of the state's strategic interests. Under the new conditions, it will also require rethinking its future directions, taking into account technological changes and other factors causing constant shifts in the chains of production and goods distribution, which have benefited Poland since 1989. In addition to the persistence of the classical ones, new threats are also emerging. These include implications of climate change, and a whole range of new problems derived from disruptive technologies, such as future cross-sectoral applications of artificial intelligence or the protection of privacy and biometric data.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Asmus, R. (2002). *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press.
- Burns, N., & Lute, D. (2019). *NATO at 70: An Alliance in Crisis*. Cambridge, Ma: Belfer Center Harvard Kennedy School of Science and International Affairs. Retrieved from: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis>
- Czachór, Z. (2017). The enlargement of the European Union – Poland's example. Between unity and diversity, *Przegląd Politologiczny*, 4, 7-19. <https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2017.22.4.1>
- Dębski, S., & Hamilton D.S. (Eds.). (2019). *Europe Whole and Free: Vision and Reality*. Warsaw & Washington DC, Poland & USA: Polish Institute of International Affairs & Transatlantic Leadership Network.
- Erler Bayir, Ö. (2015). The Perception of Russia in Poland and Turkey: A Comparative Analysis. *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 24(1), 113-121. Retrieved from <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=416982>
- Fried, D. (2019). *The United States and Central Europe in the American Century. Essays and Lectures* (pp.47-58). Warsaw, Poland: Centre for East European Studies University of Warsaw.
- Goldgeier, J.M. (1999). *Not Whether, but When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO*, Washington D.C., USA: Brookings Institution Press.
- Goldgeier, J., & Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, J.R. (2020). Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken. *International Politics*, 57, 291–321. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00243-7>
- Hałaciński, A. (2019, Spetember 12). *Hearing Before Foreign Commission of the Polish Parliament*. Retrieved from <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=42DCAF492B259506C125847E006C6D27>
- Harasimowicz, A. (2013). *Bezpieczeństwo Polski 1918-2004. Granice, system międzynarodowy, siłą własną* [Poland's Security 1918-2004: Borders, International System, Own Power]. Warszawa, Poland: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Itzkovitz Shiffrinson, J.R. (2016). Deal or No Deal? The End of Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion. *International Security*, 40(4), 7–44. [https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00236](https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00236)
- Karski, J. (1985). *The Great Powers and Poland, 1919–1945: From Versailles to Yalta*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Kobieracki, A. (2001). Problems of Disarmament in Poland's Security Policy. In R. Kuźniar (Ed.), *Poland's Security Policy 1989-2000* (pp. 347-377). Warsaw, Poland: Scholar Publishing House.

- Koszal, B. (2015). Bezpieczeństwo Polaki w okresie zimnej wojny [Poland's Security During the Cold War]. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, 8, 67–80. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2015.1.5>
- Kramer, M. (2009). The Myth of a No NATO Enlargement Pledge to Russia. *The Washington Quarterly*, 32(2), 39–61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600902773248>
- Kramer, M. (2014). No Such Promise. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(6), 208–209. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/no-such-promise>
- Kupiecki, R. (2013, April 2). Visegrád Defense Cooperation: From Mutual Support to Strengthening NATO and the EU: A Polish Perspective. *Central Europe Digest*. Retrieved from [https://cepa.org/sites/default/files/documents/CEPA\\_Report\\_No.\\_35\\_Visegrad\\_Defense\\_Cooperation.pdf](https://cepa.org/sites/default/files/documents/CEPA_Report_No._35_Visegrad_Defense_Cooperation.pdf)
- Kupiecki, R. (Ed.). (2015). *Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP. Pierwsze 25 lat*, [National Security Strategy of Poland. The First 25 Years]. Warsaw, Poland: Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej.
- Kupiecki, R. (2016). The Poland-United States Security Relations in the Light of Asymmetry Theory. *Przegląd Strategiczny*, 6(9), 31–48. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2016.1.3>
- Kupiecki, R. (2018). Polskie sojusze 1918–2018. Teoria i doświadczenia [The Polish Alliances 1918–2018. Theory and Experience]. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, (71)3, 51–69. <https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2018.71.3.05>
- Kupiecki, R. (2019a). *Poland and NATO After the Cold War*. Warsaw, Poland: Polish Institute of International Relations.
- Kupiecki, R. (2019b). Mit założycielski polityki zagranicznej Rosji [The Founding Myth of Russian Foreign Policy]. *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 72(4), 77–105. <https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2019.72.4.03>
- Kupiecki, R. (Ed.). (2019c). *Through the Eyes of a Strategist and Diplomat. The Polish-American Relations post-1918*. Warsaw, Poland: Scholar Publishing House.
- Kupiecki, R. & Menkiszak, M. (Eds.). (2020). *Documents Talk. NATO-Russia Relations After the Cold War*. Warsaw, Poland: Polish Institute of International Relations.
- Kuźniar, R. (2001). Security Policy in Polish Foreign Policy. In R. Kuźniar (Ed.), *Poland's Security Policy 1989–2000* (pp. 19–94). Warsaw, Poland: Scholar Publishing House.
- Kuźniar, R. (2009). *Poland's Foreign Policy After 1989*. Warsaw, Poland: Scholar Publishing House.
- Madej, M. (2013, June). Visegrad Group Defense Cooperation: What Added Value for the European Capabilities? *Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique Note 19* (13). Retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166134/201319.pdf+&cd=12&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=pl&client=firefox-b-d>
- MFA Brief: Poland-European Union. (2020). Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/poland--european-union>
- Michta, A. (2015). Europe's New Fault Line in the East. In R. Kupiecki & A. Michta (Eds.), *Transatlantic Relations in a Changing European Security Environment* (pp. 68–79). Warsaw & Washington DC, Poland & USA: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017. (2017, December). Washington, DC: White House. Retrieved from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov>
- National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. (2020). Warsaw, Poland. Retrieved from <https://en.bbn.gov.pl/en/publications/publications/769,National-Security-Strategy-of-the-Republic-of-Poland.html>
- NATO 2030: United for a New Era. Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General (2020, November 25). Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf)
- Popiuk-Rysińska, I. (2001). The United Nations in Poland's Security Policy. In R. Kuźniar (Ed.), *Poland's Security Policy 1989–2000* (pp. 378–402). Warsaw, Poland: Scholar Publishing House.
- Road to Warsaw Security Forum 2017 (2017, January 23–24). Discussions on threats and challenges faced by the OSCE [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwHak1oG1jw>
- Rodkiewicz, W. (2017). Poland as an Ally. In M. Wesley (Ed.), *Comparing US Alliances in the XXI Century* (pp. 133–139). Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.
- Rotfeld, A.D. (Ed.). (2004a). *The New Political Act for the United Nations. Proposals and Concepts*. Warsaw, Poland: Diplomatic Academy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Rotfeld, A.D. (Ed.). (2004b). *Towards the UN Reform. New Threats, New Responses: The Warsaw Report of the Regional Conference in Support of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Appointed by the UN Secretary General*. Warsaw, 24–25 May 2004. Warsaw, Poland: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Sarotte, M.E. (2010). Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990. *Diplomatic History*, 34(1), 119–140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00835.x>
- Sarotte, M.E. (2014). A Broken Promise? What the West Really told Moscow About NATO Expansion. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(5), 90–97. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-11/broken-promise>
- Savranskaya, S., & Blanton, T. (Eds.). (2017). *NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard?*. Retrieved from [www.nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansionwhat-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early](http://www.nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansionwhat-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early)
- Savranskaya, S., & T. Blanton (Eds.). (2018). *NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard?*, Retrieved from [www](http://www).

- nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russiaprograms/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard
- Sus, M. (2014). Polish Role in Shaping the EU Foreign and Security Policy during its Council Presidency in 2011. *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 17, 191-208. Retrieved from <https://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/wydawnictwo-naukowe/rocznik/past-issues/?rocznik=17w2014>
- Weremiuk, S. (2014). Specyfika stosunków polsko-radzieckich w latach 1944-1991 [Polish-Soviet Relations 1944-1991]. *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, 11 (6), 43–57. Retrieved from <http://www.abw.gov.pl/download/1/1612/4.pdf>
- Zwolski, K. (2017). Poland's Foreign Policy Turn. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 59(4), 167-182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349825>
- Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021. (2017). Retrieved from <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GhG53zCAsoMJ:https://www.gov.pl/attachment/869184c0-bd6f-4a20-b8af-a5c8190350a1+&cd=11&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=pl&client=firefox-b-d>



## Populist Foreign Policy and its Consequences: The Case of Poland Under the Rule of The Law and Justice Party\*

Andrzej Szeptycki<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

The rise of populism makes it necessary to study its influence on international relations. This concerns in particular the new members of the EU and NATO in Central Europe, which have witnessed a “democratic backsliding” since 2010. The analysis of Polish foreign policy under the rule of Law and Justice brings important insights into that issue. Polish authorities have critically assessed the achievements of Polish diplomacy since 1989 and Polish diplomats, have been considered to be elitist and cosmopolite. Polish foreign policy looks for enemies, rather than for partners – both at state (Russia, Germany) and non-state level (immigrant-refugee threat). Polish authorities are critical in particular towards the EU, which is considered to act in favour of Germany and France and against Poland’s sovereignty. A growing isolation of Poland is to be counterbalanced by a reliance on politically irrelevant (Hungary) or distantly remote partners (United States under Donald Trump). The foreign policy of Law and Justice is largely ineffective: relations with most European partners have deteriorated, because of its isolation and deterioration of democratic standards Poland has become more vulnerable to Russian pressure and finally since the electoral victory of Joe Biden, Poland cannot count any more on the support of the US.

### Keywords

Poland, European Union, Law and Justice, Populism, Foreign policy

\* An earlier version of this article was presented at International Studies Association 2021 Virtual Convention in April 2021 (<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISA2021/Archive/6a3d0eaf-b8dd-4c16-b62e-c908e1bcfbdf.pdf>).

**1 Corresponding Author:** Andrzej Szeptycki (Prof.), University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Strategic Studies and International Security, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: [andrzej.szeptycki@uw.edu.pl](mailto:andrzej.szeptycki@uw.edu.pl) ORCID: 0000-0003-2729-6967

**To cite this article:** Szeptycki, A. (2022). Populist Foreign Policy and its Consequences: The Case of Poland Under the Rule of The Law and Justice Party. *SiYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S45–S59. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.915894>

## Introduction

The rise of populism makes it necessary to study its influence on international relations (Stengel, MacDonald & Nabers, 2019). This concerns in particular the new members of the EU and NATO in Central Europe, which have witnessed a “democratic backsliding” since 2010 (Cianetti, Dawson & Hanley, 2018). The analysis of the foreign policy of Poland under the rule of the Law and Justice party brings important insights into that issue.

Law and Justice<sup>1</sup> won both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015 and again in 2019 – 2020. Its victory may be considered a cultural backlash against “long-term ongoing social change”. Since coming to power, Law and Justice has drawn on its parliamentary majority to dismantle democratic checks and balances – this concerned in particular the independence of the justice system (Sadurski, 2019). Law and Justice has built its popularity in particular on anti-elitism, nationalistic discourse, social spending and intense propaganda in state media (Krekó, Molnár, Juhász, Kucharczyk & Pazderski, 2018). Its policies have also led to intensifying xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, and unprecedented polarization that have engendered deep splits within Polish society (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016). The president of the ruling party Jarosław Kaczyński, since 2020 the deputy prime minister responsible for the security sector, has become the strongman of the country (Sata & Karolewski 2020). Poland is one of very few EU states which have governments solemnly formed by the populist parties (Timbro, 2019). According to research conducted by the Swedish V-Dem Institute, a think-tank based at the University of Gothenburg, the Law and Justice party is currently one of the most populist and anti-liberal (anti-democratic) political forces among the ruling parties in the Western world (Lührmann, et al., 2020; Stanley & Cześniak, 2019).

The Law and Justice party has also considerably reshaped Poland’s foreign policy. The aim of this paper is to analyse the main features of the Law and Justice foreign policy, as well as their consequences for Poland and its main partners. This task will be largely realised through the lenses of the existing literature on the foreign policies of populist regimes.

## Analytical framework

Populism is a “political program or movement that champions, or claims to champion, the common person, usually by favourable contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment”, combining the left and the right. It can designate either democratic or authoritarian movements, the latter form being more popular in our times (Britannica, n.d.). The mainstream form of populism is embodied by strong male leaders (Juan Perón – Argentina, Silvio Berlusconi – Italy, Donald Trump – United States) (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Populism can be interpreted either as an ideology or worldview, either as an electoral strategy or a type of political discourse. Populists often refer to some nationalist ideas (the “nation” being assimilated with the “people”) or socialism (the “people” being those

---

1 The Law and Justice (PiS) headed by Jarosław Kaczyński is the dominant political party within the United Right alliance, which was established by PiS, United Poland of Zbigniew Ziobro and Agreement of Jarosław Gowin. The Agreement left the United Right in 2021.



who particularly need state help) (Moffitt, 2020). It shall not be however confused with related concepts, such as nationalism, nativism or Euroscepticism (Rooduijn, 2019). It is frequently interpreted as an answer to the weaknesses of the contemporary liberal democracy, as the rise of populism is fuelled by those who feel excluded, alienated from mainstream politics, and increasingly hostile towards minorities, immigrants and neoliberal economics (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). The 2008 recession played a key role in discrediting the neoliberal agenda, which explains the rise of populism during last decade (Judis, 2016).

While a large body of literature has focused on the effect of populism on national politics, less is known about the impact of populism on foreign policy. Populism is a “thin” ideology, so much depends on a larger ideological framework adopted by a particular populist regime (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Wehner & Thies, 2020). Some elements common to most populist foreign policies can however be defined.

Populist foreign policy does represent a substantive rupture with the international political orientations of traditional parties (Giurlando, 2020). Governing populists over prioritise domestic politics and often refer to “undiplomatic diplomacy” (Cadier, 2019): professional diplomatic service is being marginalised in favour of personal contacts and “diplomacy of microphones”, while diplomacy is defined in terms of support for the regime (Cooper, 2018). Moreover, under populist rule external policy becomes highly personalised, especially when it concerns the decision-making (Destradi, Plagemann, 2019). Donald Trump honed a highly personalised style of political communication, claiming, ‘I am the only one that matters’ (Löffmann, 2019; Boucher & Thies, 2019).

Besides, under the populist rule, foreign policy is based on divisions, simplification and emotionalisation, frequently referring to the identity discourse of Self and other (Wojczewski, 2020). It is also often nationalist in character. Especially right-wing populism refers to nativism, opposition to immigration, focus on national sovereignty, and rejection of economic and cultural globalisation (Chryssogelos, 2017). Some populist forces like Five Stars Movement in Italy however do not refer to nationalist discourse (Verbeek, Zaslove, 2018). Many populist leaders are critical towards international and regional cooperation, especially integration projects such as the European Union (Balfour, et al., 2016). Such a situation is due to the fact that globalisation processes weaken the effectiveness of state authorities, which has contributed to the growing popularity of populists, who claim to be able to stop or reverse this process and to recover sovereignty (Stengel, MacDonald & Nabers, 2019).

Even if populism is often associated with nationalism and/or isolationism, in practice it is not always the case (Chryssogelos, 2017). The populist leaders seek cooperation with their fellows, as well as with great powers critical towards the US-dominated neoliberal order, such as Russia or China (Cooley & Nexon, 2020). A number of European right-wing parties are supported by the Russian Federation (Stengel, MacDonald & Nabers, 2019). Moreover, the populist claim they aim at defending their civilisation. The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) argues that Islamic civilisation could resist the universalisation of Western norms with Turkey, the heir of the Ottoman Empire, seated at the centre of this civilisational reawakening (Hakkı, 2020).

Last but not least, the populist foreign policy tends to be ineffective, as words, emotions and leaders seem to count more than the realisation of the proclaimed aims (Kane & McCulloch, 2017).

### **Poland's foreign policy 1989 – 2015**

Up to the end of the 1980s, Poland had been a member of the communist bloc and its structures: the Warsaw Pact and Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. From 1989-1991, the geopolitical situation changed fundamentally, as the Soviet bloc and later the USSR disappeared. In that context Poland aimed for the realisation of the four main goals in its foreign policy: sovereignty, security, prosperity and international position (Kuźniar, 2009).

The first aim was basically realised at the beginning of 1990s. In June – July 1991 the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact were disbanded in particular under the pressure of Poland and other Visegrad countries. Poland also signed friendship and cooperation treaties confirming the existing borders with all its old and new neighbours: Germany (which became quickly its main European partner)<sup>2</sup>, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Lithuania (Marczuk, 2019). In September 1993 the last Russian (formerly Soviet) troops left Poland, which confirmed that Poland was a fully sovereign country.

The first official declarations of Poland's desire to accede to NATO were formulated in 1992. The prospect of expanding NATO eastward was initially evaluated unfavourably by NATO member states, particularly because of a strong objection from Russia. The alliance looked for an alternative solution. In 1994, it launched its Partnership for a Peace program, which Poland joined in the same year. Attitudes towards the aspirations of Central European states changed in the mid-1990s, especially in the United States. In 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were all invited to join NATO and became members two years later. Since then, NATO has been perceived as a key instrument of Poland's security policy. It should be emphasised that the guarantees resulting from the Washington Treaty are relatively weak, since they do not provide for an obligation to provide military assistance; each NATO member state decides for itself what form of assistance is necessary. There is no certainty as to how NATO would react to a conflict of low intensity (a "hybrid war") on the pattern of that Russia has waged against Ukraine. In order to meet that challenge, Poland has been making efforts to reinforce the guarantees of its allies, in particular to strengthen ties with the US.

In 1991, Poland signed an association agreement with the European Communities that established a free trade zone between the signatories and recognised Community membership as a goal of Polish policy. That agreement entered into force in 1994. In the same year, Poland submitted a formal application on accession to the EU. In 1997, the European Commission proposed that negotiations be commenced with the most promising candidate countries, including Poland. Talks began a year later and concluded successfully in 2002 at a summit of the European Council in Copenhagen. This process demanded considerable efforts from Poland. The adoption of the *acquis communautaire*

---

2 In case of Germany two separate agreements were signed: the border treaty (1990) and the friendship and cooperation treaty (1991).

(20,000 laws, decisions and regulations spanning nearly 80,000 pages) was one of the clearly stated conditions of accession (Zielonka, 2009). In 2004 Poland along with nine other Central and Southern European countries officially joined the EU. Accession to European Union was perceived as confirmation of Poland's successful transformation and of its status as a European country and part of the West. Seventeen years after joining the EU, Poland remains one of the poorest member states: Poland's per capita GDP is just 46% of the EU average (Eurostat, n.d.). Because of its demographic potential and economic condition, Poland is the largest recipient of EU financial aid. From 2014-2019 the difference between its contributions to the EU budget and the transfers it received was 49 billion euros (European Commission, n.d.). Financial transfers from the EU have considerably contributed to the development and modernisation of Poland.

If the quest for sovereignty, security and prosperity proved to be relatively successful, the strengthening of Poland's international position has been much more difficult to achieve. Such a situation was due to the lack of both a clear road map and a political consensus among the main political forces on how to do it. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which ruled the country from 1993 to 1997 and again from 2001 to 2005 opted in particular for a close cooperation with the United States. This band-wagoning strategy led to Polish support for the American led intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Kuźniar, Szeptycki, 2005). The Civic Platform (PO) in power from 2007 to 2015 believed in the need for strengthening ties with the main EU partners such as France and Germany. This policy bore fruit both on a state and personal level: Poland became an active player within the EU (Eastern Partnership initiative) and in 2014 the leader of the Civic Platform prime minister Donald Tusk became the president of the European Council. He was the first (and the only until today) representative of the new member states to occupy one of the key posts within the EU.

All major political forces (both SLD, PO and Law and Justice, when it was in power from 2005 to 2007) attached importance to the relations with Eastern European states, in particular Ukraine. Poland aimed at strengthening the ties between Ukraine (and in a lesser way other post-Soviet states) and the EU and NATO, believing this would speed up the process of reforms in the region, stabilise the post-Soviet space, contributing positively to the security of Poland, and finally weaken the influence of Russia over the post-Soviet space (Szeptycki, 2019). Relations with the Russian Federation were always conflictual, even if attempts were made to improve them, as in 2010 after the crash of the presidential plane with President Lech Kaczyński onboard near Smolensk in Russia. Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russia was perceived as an important challenge for Poland (*National Security of the Republic of Poland*, 2014).

### A “new” foreign policy

The Law and Justice critically assessed the foreign policy of its predecessors, especially the Civic Platform. Its political program from 2014 claimed that “the basic problem that affects Poland today in the sphere of international politics is the loss, through the fault of the rulers, of the tools for an independent realisation of national interests (...).” (*Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*, 2014). Law and Justice argued that Poland freely subjugated itself to the main EU players. It accused the previous government in particular of

clientelism towards Germany and failed reset policy towards the Russian Federation. That is why it proposed changes within the foreign policy area: a new law on the instruments guaranteeing Poland's sovereignty, in particular within the EU, organisational changes within Polish diplomatic service and a new concept of foreign and security policy.

The Polish diplomatic service indeed underwent major changes. Law and Justice did not trust professional diplomats, believing they had been too close to the previous governments – both before and after the fall of the communism. That is why after 2015 key posts in the diplomatic service went either to people supporting Law and Justice (Andrzej Przyłębski, since 2016 the ambassador to Germany, in private, the husband of Julia Przyłębska, put by Law and Justice at the head of the no more independent Constitutional Court) or activists and scholars who knew the countries they were being sent to, but had little diplomatic experience (Włodzimierz Marciniak, a professor of political science, the ambassador to Russia in 2016 – 2020). Loyalty towards Law and Justice has become an important criterion of assessment of the new diplomats (Barcz, et al., 2018). This was only one of the elements of the “elite replacement”: the purging of the individuals and networks associated with the before 2015 period and their replacement with an alternative, more authentic and legitimate elite, whose actions can be influenced and steered and can be trusted to serve the ruling party agenda (Stanley & Cześniak, 2019). According to the new law on the diplomatic service, diplomats will be political appointees, probably from outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wiejski, 2021).

At the same time, the role of the MFA has progressively decreased. The first foreign minister nominated by Law and Justice Witold Waszczykowski (2015 – 2018) was both a prominent party member and a former diplomat – ambassador in Iran (1999 – 2002), deputy foreign minister (2005 – 2008). His successor Jacek Czaputowicz (2018 – 2020) was a professor of international relations and a former head of the well-known National School of Public Administration; he was also for some years an employee of the Polish MFA, mainly in the Department of Strategy and Analyses. Jarosław Kaczyński called his nomination “an experiment”. Czaputowicz was replaced by Zbigniew Rau, a professor of law specialising in political doctrines and liberal theories, and a secondary rank politician of Law and Justice with no international relations related experience (Traczyk, 2020). The competences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also formally and informally reduced. In 2019 the European (EU) section of the MFA was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office (Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2019). Since 2017 when he became the prime minister, it has been Mateusz Morawiecki who has run the European policy, while the president Andrzej Duda has largely been responsible for relations with the US. Besides several major political initiatives having implications for foreign relations (like the amendment of the law on the Institute of National Remembrance) were taken out of the MFA, in particular at the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had little influence on these issues, even if it has had to manage their often-negative consequences.

The main directions were partially redefined. Under Law and Justice Poland was no longer an engine of European integration, nor did it seem to value its relationships with Germany and France (Zwolnski, 2017). However, it recognized Russia as “the most serious threat”, because of its neoimperialism, pursued also by means of military force (*National*

*Security of the Republic of Poland*, 2020). It also remained attached to the alliance with the US.

Another peculiar feature of the Law and Justice foreign policy is the fact it did not become highly personalised like in some other countries ruled by populist regimes. Such a situation was due to three reasons. Firstly, until 2020 Jarosław Kaczyński held no formal position within the executive branch of power, so he had limited opportunities to deal with foreign relations (he met however, more than once, the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán (Foy & Buckley, 2016)). Secondly, he has little foreign experience (Wall Street Journal, 2007), which seems to be one of the reasons why he is distrustful towards other countries. Thirdly, the leader of the Law and Justice is not a typical alpha male like some other contemporary populist leaders (Rutland, 2016) – he seeks power, but not necessarily glory. Since 2015 Poland’s foreign policy has been realised mainly by the prime minister – Beata Szydło, later Mateusz Morawiecki and the president Andrzej Duda, even if the key decisions have been certainly consulted and accepted by Kaczyński.

### Self and Other

The Law and Justice uses identitarian discourse, which is based on the fear of enemies, traitors and threats, such as the LGBT community, migrants or international organisations. It creates the image of a Manichean world that justifies the concentration of power in the hands of the ruler, portrayed as the bastion of the nation (Sata & Karolewski, 2020). It also stresses the importance of Poland’s sovereignty and wants its foreign partners to respect it (Nyssönen, 2018).

Such an approach is visible in particular in relations with the EU. According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Law and Justice is opposed or somehow opposed to the European integration (Bakker, et al., 2020). The EU is claimed to act against the notion of popular sovereignty; it is equated with “the corrupt elite” that stands in conflict with “the pure people”, the Poles (Csehi & Zgut, 2021); the aim of this elite is supposedly to create a “unified Europe”, to impose a left-wing social model, i.e. to get rid of tradition, historical consciousness, patriotism, belief in God and a normal family between a man and a woman (Sata, Karolewski, 2020). Law and Justice ideologists opt for a radical reform which would guarantee the primacy of intergovernmentalism in the EU (Balcer, 2019). Since 2015 Poland has clashed with the European Union on some major issues, such as the refugee crisis, the rule of law, the new green order or the EU budget. Since the refugee crisis in 2015, Poland has consistently rejected the proposals of the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers from Southern Europe (Brzozowski, 2020). Despite criticism from the EU institutions, the Law and Justice party progressively has put the Polish justice system under its control, taking over in particular the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, as well as the National Council of Judiciary (Kovács & Scheppele, 2020). Being heavily reliant on coal, Poland did not join the European Council (2019) agreement on achieving a climate-neutral EU by 2050, even if it softened its position on that issue in 2020 (Simon, 2020). Finally, Poland threatened to veto the EU budget for 2021 – 2027 and the post-pandemic recovery plan if access to the European funds was to be conditioned by respect for the rule of law (Wanat, 2020).

Germany is especially often the target of Law and Justice discourse. The critique of Germany focuses on four main topics. Firstly, on the difficult history of the two countries

(Cadier & Szulecki, 2020), especially the period of the Second World War; PiS claims that despite huge losses during that period Poland never received war reparations from Germany (Kostrzewa-Zorbas, 2018). Secondly, on its supposed collusion with Russia, which is embodied by the Nord Stream 2 project (Fritz, 2020). Thirdly, on its policy within the EU. According to the Law and Justice party, Germany is actually following its national interests but “masquerading” them as “European” ones and seeking to stop other countries from following their own national interests (Varga & Buzogány, 2020). Fourthly, on the role of the German-owned media in Poland, in particular on their criticism towards the Polish government, which – in the opinion of the latter – is politically motivated (The Economist, 2020).

Law and Justice political discourse is also directed against immigrants, especially those from Northern Africa and the Middle East. The migration crisis in 2015 and the massive arrival of asylum seekers from these regions was presented by party officials and party affiliated media as a “raid”, a “conquest” and “penetration”. Jarosław Kaczyński argued that “various parasites and protozoa in the bodies of those people [refugees], safe for them, can be dangerous to us” (Sata, Karolewski, 2020). Such a situation led to a kind of Islamophobia without Muslims (Goździak & Márton, 2018).

Poland had been traditionally weary of Russia. The Law and Justice party however developed and modified the anti-Russian narrative. It criticised the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation (Duda, 2017). At the same time, it continued to draw a link between Russia and its internal political opponents. Before coming to power, it had developed a narrative of betrayal which insinuated collusion between the Civic Platform government and the Russian authorities in concealing the “truth about Smolensk” and even at times implied that both sides had conspired in Lech Kaczyński’s assassination (Stanley, Cześniak, 2019). Some intellectuals close to the state authorities also claimed that the Polish state had been penetrated by “grey networks” of former communist security services and the public protests against PiS could be seen as a form of hybrid war Russia allegedly was leading against Poland (Sata, Karolewski, 2020).

Under Law and Justice Poland continued to support Ukraine. It lobbied in favour of sanctions against the Russian Federation imposed in particular by the EU after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas. It also supported the development of ties between Ukraine and the EU, as well as the process of internal reforms in that country. Polish-Ukrainian relations were however considerably hampered by the historical policies of both countries. Poland argued that it could support Ukraine, only if the latter recognised the “historical truth”, i.e., the interpretation of the common past which would conform to scientifically established facts and Polish historiography. In 2016 the lower house of the Polish parliament (*Sejm*) recognised the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Ukrainian underground in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (currently Western Ukraine) in 1943 – 1944 on the local Polish population as genocide. Polish-Ukrainian relations have improved since 2019 when Volodymyr Zelenski replaced Petro Poroshenko as the president of Ukraine (Szeptycki, 2019).

### **In search of allies**

Despite its Manichean vision of the world, Poland needs partners, in particular within the EU. In this context a special place goes to Hungary. Since 2010 when Viktor Orbán



came back to power in Hungary as prime minister and embarked on a radical set of reforms that departed significantly from liberal-democratic norms, his policies have become an example for the Law and Justice. In 2011 Jarosław Kaczyński declared that “Budapest-on-the-Vistula” would emerge, and he has basically kept his promise (Stanley, Cześniak, 2020). Poland and Hungary need each other to face criticism from the EU institutions. The leaders of the two countries have stressed more than once the “friendship” uniting Poland and Hungary, both in the 19<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> century and in present times (Nyyssönen, 2018). The Polish government has backed Hungary in its anti-refugee politics since 2015, even if Poland was not located on the Balkan migration route (Sata & Karolewski, 2020). Both countries have also been opposed to linking access to the disbursement of EU funds to compliance with the rule of law. However, in December 2020 they have agreed for this solution on the condition that it would not be triggered until the European Court of Justice had ruled on the legality of this mechanism (Zalan, 2020). Nevertheless, Poland and Hungary do not agree on all the major issues. Firstly, they disagree on relations with Russia: Law and Justice perceives it as a threat, and the Hungarian Fidesz regards cooperation with the Russian Federation as a counterbalance to deteriorating relations with the EU (Varga & Buzogány, 2020). Secondly, in 2017 Orbán did not back the Polish authorities when they tried to prevent the reelection of Donald Tusk to the post of the president of the European Council. In consequence Poland was the only member state to oppose this candidature (The Economist, 2017).

Poland and Hungary are both members of the Visegrad Group. To a certain extent this forum plays a similar role in Poland’s policy like Hungary or at least Poland would like it to be so. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have faced similar challenges like Poland and Hungary (populism, deterioration of democracy) albeit to a more limited degree (Pakulski, 2016). All four countries opposed the imposed quota mechanism to relocate refugees (Schmidt, 2016), which has contributed to the strengthening of the subregional identity (Braun, 2020).

In 2015 Poland and Croatia initiated the creation of the Three Seas Initiative, which brings together 11 post-communist members of the EU and also Austria (Górka, 2018). It focuses on energy projects as well as transport and digital infrastructure (Zbińkowski, 2019). This initiative is an expression of Poland’s desire to attain the great power position in the region and to counterbalance the Western European states (Zięba, 2019). It also has been often presented by the right-wing intellectuals as the realisation of the Polish between the war project of *Intermarum* (Varga & Buzogány, 2020).

Under the Law and Justice party, Poland has adopted an unanimously pro-American foreign policy. Basically, such an attitude hasn’t differed much from the pre-2015 one, however the context has changed considerably because of the deterioration of the transatlantic relations under the presidency of Donald Trump. Such a policy has been explained by both strategic (fear of Russia) (Lanoszka, 2020) and internal reasons (real and supposed similarities between Law and Justice and Trump administration (Kowal, 2019)). This policy led Poland in particular to propose the creation of a permanent American military base on its territory, which would be called Fort Trump (Cowell, 2018), but this proposal was not accepted by the United States.

### Limited effectiveness

The foreign policy of the Law and Justice party has achieved some achievements. According to the decisions of the North Atlantic Warsaw summit in July 2016, NATO has considerably strengthened its presence in Poland. In 2019 Poland hosted some 3300 allied soldiers (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020). Such a situation was due however rather to the evolution of the Alliance since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (Friis, 2017) than to the efficiency of Law and Justice's diplomacy. The Three Seas Initiative remains the only major international project launched by Poland since 2015. Nevertheless, its value should not be overestimated, especially taking into account the fact that it does not include Poland's Eastern neighbours, in particular Ukraine (Szeptycki, 2019).

The overall assessment of the Law and Justice foreign policy is more critical. The internal situation in Poland, in particular the disrespect for the rule of law and growing control over the media, led to conflict with the EU institutions and the US. It also had a negative influence on Poland's image and position within the Union. From 2015 to 2020 its ranking in the World Press Freedom Index worsened from 18<sup>th</sup> to 62<sup>nd</sup> place out of 180 countries analysed (Reporters without Borders, n.d.). In the past, Poland actively co-shaped EU politics, the Eastern Partnership (Korosteleva, 2014) – The EU program towards six post-Soviet neighbours (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) launched on the initiative of Poland and Sweden in 2009 – being the best example. In 2017 it became the first EU country to be targeted by the Treaty of the European Union article 7 procedure which may lead to the suspension of certain rights of a member state in the case of a serious and persistent violation of EU values (Moberg, 2020).

The growing amateurism of Polish diplomacy and its realisation out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has led to major crises in relations with foreign partners. In 2018, on the initiative of the Ministry of Justice, the Polish parliament amended the law on the Institute of National Remembrance. The amendment penalised public speech which attributed responsibility for the Holocaust to Poland or the Polish nation and the members of the Ukrainian underground were compared to Nazis and communist criminals (Grzebyk, 2017). These changes were negatively received in the US, Israel and in Ukraine which forced Poland to step back – the controversial amendment was partially changed by the parliament and partially recognised as contrary to the constitution – and thus not valid - by the Polish Constitutional Court (Hackmann, 2018).

The role of personal relations, visible in particular in its policy towards the US, brought also some undesirable effects. Polish authorities adopted a policy unanimously favourable to Donald Trump and they bet on his reelection in 2020. President Andrzej Duda congratulated Joe Biden on his victory only after the Electoral College officially elected him to the post of the president of the US, i.e., more than a month after the elections in the United States (Polskie Radio, 2020). Such an attitude had a negative influence on Polish-American relations, especially taking into account the fact that the Biden administration is more sensitive to democracy and rule of law than its predecessors. However, the US will probably remain a key partner of Poland, in particular because both Biden and the Law and Justice party are distrustful towards Russia (Buras, 2020).



Polish policy towards the Russian Federation is an example of another weakness. Poland perceives Russia as a major threat and seeks its partners support on that issue. Several EU members are in favour of more pragmatic cooperation with Russia, but this is not the key problem. Firstly, if Poland asks for European solidarity in relations with the Russian Federation, it rejects a similar approach in relations to the asylum seekers influx, which makes its Eastern policy less credible. Secondly, the deterioration of relations between Poland and the EU weakens the European Union, which serves the interests of Russia.

Finally, it should be noted, that the Law and Justice party does not propose any larger “civilisational” project. Its criticism towards the European Union is “value-based”, at least on the discourse level. Poland confronts EU institutions with the Christian heritage of the continent and criticises the EU for not reflecting this heritage (Varga & Buzogány, 2019). In this context Poland is presented as a harbour of true Western (European) values. This approach however does not translate into any concrete project aiming at defending Western civilisation or bringing it a spiritual revival. The policy of Polish authorities largely focuses on defending Poland against the “illness” which has struck several countries in the West (Balcer, 2019). The Law and Justice has aimed at bringing together the Eurosceptic forces within the EU (French National Rally, Spanish Vox, Hungarian Fidesz etc.), but for the moment this policy has not brought any tangible fruit.

### Conclusions

The analysis of the external policy of Law and Justice confirms the basic scientific assumptions related to populist diplomacy, such as the rejection of the foreign policy of traditional parties, identitarian discourse of Self and Other, need of alliances with other populists and enemies of the neoliberal order and finally the limited efficiency of populist foreign policy.

Some specific features of the Polish foreign policy under Law and Justice however are to be noted. Firstly, the ruling party in Poland sticks to some priorities of Polish foreign policy from before 2015 (alliance with the US) even if they are understood/realised in a different way. Secondly, Polish foreign policy is not being fully defined and realised by the strongman Jarosław Kaczyński, even if he is being consulted on the key issues.

The analysis of the foreign policy of the Law and Justice party brings also some important insights into populism in the European Union. As European integration is being realised largely through the approximation of legal systems, the field of law, especially the question of the rule of law, has become one of the major subjects of discord between the Polish authorities and the EU institutions. The latter proved ineffective in enforcing the rule of law principle in Poland or Hungary (Ágh, 2018). The rise of populism in the region is a major challenge for the European Union, deepening longstanding divides and harming the support citizens of the region give to the EU (Balcer, 2019). This concern in particular in the case of Poland, which is the only “big” country among the new member states and one of the few which successfully coped with the international economic crisis in 2008 and later (Ágh, 2018).

Poland’s anti-European turn can be explained by its struggle for a greater status and recognition as a “middle power” (Nyyssönen, 2018). It is also another aspect of the

previously mentioned backlash against long-term ongoing social change, represented in particular by membership of the EU. The West, Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes noted, believed it could change “the East” like Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion; instead, it acted like Doctor Frankenstein “assembling replicas of human body parts into a humanoid body”, which has turned against its creator (Krastev, Holmes, 2019).

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

## References

- Ágh, A. Decline of democracy in the ECE and the core-periphery divide: rule of law conflicts of Poland and Hungary with the EU. *Journal of Comparative Politics* 11 (2), 31 – 49.
- Bakker, R., et al. (2019). Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel-hill-expert-survey>.
- Balcer, A. (2019, 7 November). National populism at the heart of Europe: When will the clash come? Retrieved from [https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_national\\_populism\\_at\\_the\\_heart\\_of\\_europe\\_when\\_will\\_the\\_clash\\_com/](https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_national_populism_at_the_heart_of_europe_when_will_the_clash_com/).
- Balfour, R., et al. (2016). *Europe’s troublemakers. The populist challenge to foreign policy*. Brussels, Belgium: European Policy Centre. Retrieved from [https://wms.flexious.be/editor/plugins/imagemanager/content/2140/PDF/2016/Europe\\_s\\_troublemakers\\_complete\\_book.pdf](https://wms.flexious.be/editor/plugins/imagemanager/content/2140/PDF/2016/Europe_s_troublemakers_complete_book.pdf).
- Barcz J., et al. (2018), *Raport. Trzy lata polityki zagranicznej rządu Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*, Warszawa, Poland: Instytut Bronisława Komorowskiego. Retrieved from <http://bronislawkomorowski.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/RAPORT-Trzy-lata-polityki-zagranicznej-rz%C4%85du-Prawa-i-Sprawiedliwo%C5%9Bci-3.pdf>.
- Boucher, J.-C. & Thies, C. G. (2019). “I Am a Tariff Man”: The Power of Populist Foreign Policy Rhetoric under President Trump. *The Journal of Politics* 81 (2), 41 – 66. <https://doi.org/10.1086/702229>.
- Braun, M. (2020). Postfunctionalism, Identity and the Visegrad Group. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 58 (4), 925 – 940. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12994>.
- Britannica (n.d.). “Populism”. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/populism>.
- Brzozowski, A. (2020, 18 September). Poland rejects southern Europe’s push for mandatory relocation of migrants. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/poland-rejects-southern-europes-push-for-mandatory-relocation-of-migrants/>.
- Buras, P. (2020, 16 December). Biden’s victory: the consequences for Poland. *Balkan Insight*. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/16/bidens-victory-the-consequences-for-poland/>.
- Cadier, D. (2019). How Populism Spills Over Into Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/78102>.
- Cadier, D. & Szulecki, K. (2020). Populism, historical discourse and foreign policy: the case of Poland’s Law and Justice government. *International Politics* 57, 990–1011. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00252-6>.
- Chrysosgelos, A. (2017). Populism in Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.467>.
- Cianetti, L., Dawson, J., Hanley, S. (2018). Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland. *East European Politics* 34 (3), 243-256. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401>.
- Cooley, A. & Nexon, D. (2020, 25 April). Why Populists Want a Multipolar World. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/25/populists-multipolar-world-russia-china/>.
- Cooper, A. (2018). Populism and the Domestic Challenge to Diplomacy. In V. Stanzel (Ed.), *New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. Berlin, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Cowell, A. (2018, 19 September). Fort Trump? Poland Makes a Play for a U.S. Military Base. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/world/europe/poland-fort-trump.html>.
- Csehi, R. & Zgut, E. (2021). ‘We won’t let Brussels dictate us’: Eurosceptic populism in Hungary and Poland. *European Politics and Society* 22 (1), 53 – 68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1717064> (accessed: 19.02.2021).
- Destradi, S. & Plagemann, J. (2019). Populism and International Relations: (Un)predictability, personalisation, and the reinforcement of existing trends in world politics. *Review of International Studies*, 45 (5), 711-730. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210519000184>.
- Duda, A. (2017, 19 September). General Debate of the Seventy-Second Session Of The General Assembly. Statement by H.E. Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved from [https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/pl\\_en.pdf](https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/pl_en.pdf).

- Eatwell, R. & Goodwin, M. (2018). *National Populism. The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*. London, UK: Penguin.
- European Commission (n.d.). EU expenditure and revenue 2014-2020. Data 2000 – 2019. Retrieved from [http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/figures/internet-tables-all\\_test.xls](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/figures/internet-tables-all_test.xls).
- European Council (2019, 19 November). European Council meeting. Conclusions. Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf>.
- Eurostat (n.d.). Real GDP per capita. Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg\\_08\\_10/default/table?lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_08_10/default/table?lang=en).
- Fomina, J. & Kucharczyk, J. (2016). The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland, *Journal of Democracy* 27 (4), 58 – 68. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0062>.
- Foy, H. & Buckley, N. (2016, 6 September). Orban and Kaczynski vow ‘cultural counter-revolution’ to reform EU. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a>.
- Friis, K. (Ed.) (2017). *NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Fritz, P. (2020). A pipeline that divides: Germany, Poland and Nord Stream. Retrieved from <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/09/25/a-pipeline-that-divides-germany-poland-and-nord-stream/>.
- Giurlando, P. (2020). Populist foreign policy: the case of Italy. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1819357>.
- Górka, M. (2018). The Three Seas Initiative as a Political Challenge for the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Politics in Central Europe* 14 (3), 55 – 73. <https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2018-0018>.
- Goździak, E.M. & Márton, P. (2018). Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 7 (2), 125-151. <https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2018.04>.
- Grzebyk, P. (2017). Amendments of January 2018 to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in Light of International Law. *Polish Yearbook of International Law* 37, 287 – 300. <https://doi.org/10.7420%2Fpyil2017o>.
- Hackmann, J. (2018). Defending the “Good Name” of the Polish Nation: Politics of History as a Battlefield in Poland, 2015–2018. *Journal of Genocide Research* 20 (4), 587 – 606. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2018.1528742>.
- Hakki, T. (2020). *The formulation and implementation of populist foreign policy: Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean*. *Mediterranean Politics* (2020). Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1833160>.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (2020). *Military Balance 2020*. London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Judis, J. B. (2016). *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports.
- Kane, C. & McCulloch, C. (2017). Populism and Foreign Policy: Deepening Divisions and Decreasing Efficiency. *Global Politics Review* 3 (2), 39 – 52.
- Korosteleva, E. (2014). *Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Kostrzewa-Zorbas, G. (2018). German reparations to Poland for World War II on global background. *Studia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* 8 (14), 207 – 220. Retrieved from <http://sbn.wat.edu.pl/pdf-132131-60755?filename=NIEMIECKIE%20REPARACJE%20DLA.pdf>.
- Kovács, K. & Scheppele, K. L. (2018). The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland—and the European Union. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51 (3), 189-200, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.07.005>.
- Kowal, P. (2019). A New Perspective in US Policy. In A. Bieńczyk-Missala (Ed.), *The great power and Poland 1919-2019 : 100th Anniversary of Polish-American Relations* (pp. 135 – 137). Warsaw, Poland: Aspra-JR. Retrieved from <https://cdn.jankarski.net/files/great-power-and-poland-en-internet.pdf>.
- Krastev, I. & Holmes, S. (2019). *The Light that Failed: A Reckoning*. London, UK: Penguin Books.
- Krekó, P., et al. (2018). *Beyond Populism. Tribalism in Poland and Hungary*. Budapest, Hungary: Political Capital Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.isp.org.pl/en/publications/beyond-populism-tribalism-in-poland-and-hungary>.
- Kuźniar, R. (2009). *Poland's foreign policy after 1989* Warsaw: Poland. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Kuźniar, R. & Szeptycki, A. (2005). The Role of the United States in the Foreign Policy of the Third Republic of Poland. In L. Kolarska-Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, P.M. Kaczyński (Eds.), *Bridges Across the Atlantic? Attitudes of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks Towards the United States* (pp. 115 – 151). Warsaw, Poland: Institute of Public Affairs.
- Lanoszka, A. (2020). Poland in a time of geopolitical flux. *Contemporary Politics*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777042>.
- Löfflmann, G. (2019). America First and the Populist Impact on US Foreign Policy. *Survival* 61 (6), 115 – 138. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1688573>.
- Lührmann, A., et al. (2020). Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V1. *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv1>.
- Marczuk, K. P. (Ed.) (2019). *Good Neighbourhood Treaties of Poland: Political, Security and Social Relations*.

- Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Moberg, A. (2020). When the Return of the Nation-State Undermines the Rule of Law: Poland, the EU, and Article 7 TEU. In: A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, K. Leijon, A. Michalski, L. Oxelheim (Eds.) *The European Union and the Return of the Nation State* (pp. 59-82). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35005-5\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35005-5_3).
- Moffitt, B. (2020). *Populism*. Oxford, UK: Polity Press.
- Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- National Security of the Republic of Poland* (2014). Retrieved from [https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS\\_RP.pdf](https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf).
- National Security of the Republic of Poland* (2020). Retrieved from [https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National\\_Security\\_Strategy\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Poland\\_2020.pdf](https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf).
- Nyssonen, H. (2018). The East is different, isn't it? – Poland and Hungary in search of prestige. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 26 (3), 258 – 269. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1498772>.
- Pakulski, J. (Ed.). *The Visegrad Countries in Crisis*. Warsaw, Poland: Collegium Civitas.
- Polska Agencja Prasowa (2019, 14 November). PM presents proposed new government line-up. Retrieved from <https://www.pap.pl/en/news/news%2C539466%2Cpm-presents-proposed-new-government-line.html>.
- Polskie Radio (2020, 15 December). Polish president congratulates Joe Biden on US election victory, invites him to visit. Retrieved from <https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7785/Artykul/2640811,Polish-president-congratulates-Joe-Biden-on-US-election-victory-invites-him-to-visit>.
- Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości [Program of the Law and Justice]* (2014). Retrieved from <https://www.pis.torun.pl/download/program-pis-2014/?wpdmdl=2286&refresh=602e564aa53791613649482>.
- Reporters without borders (n.d.). Poland. Retrieved from <https://rsf.org/en/poland>.
- Rooduijn, M. (2019). State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus. *European Journal of Political Research* 58 (1), 362 – 372. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12314>.
- Rutland, P. (2016, 27 September). Trump, Putin and Race. *Transitions Online*. Retrieved from <https://tol.org/client/article/26344-trump-putin-and-race.html> (accessed: 18.02.2021).
- Sadurski, W. (2019). *Poland's Constitutional Breakdown*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Sata, R. & Karolewski, I. P. (2020). Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland, *East European Politics* 36 (2), 206 – 225. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1703694>.
- Schmidt, A. (2016). Friends forever? The Role of the Visegrad Group and European Integration. *Politics in Central Europe* 12 (3), 113 – 140. <https://doi.org/10.1515/pce-2016-0019>.
- Simon, F. (2020, 11 September). Warsaw says 'committed' to EU's climate neutrality goal, 11.09.2020. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/warsaw-says-committed-to-eus-climate-neutrality-goal/>.
- Stanley, B. & Czeński, M. (2019). Populism in Poland. In: D. Stockemer (Ed.) *Populism Around the World* (pp. 67-87). Cham, Switzerland, Springer, 2019. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5_5).
- Stengel, F.A., MacDonald, D.B. & Nabers, D. (2019). Introduction: Analyzing the Nexus between Populism and International Relations. In: F. A. Stengel, D.B. MacDonald & D. Nabers (Eds.) *Populism and World Politics. Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions* (pp. 1 – 22). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04621-7\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04621-7_1).
- Szeptycki, A. (2019). *Contemporary Relations between Poland and Ukraine. "The Strategic Partnership" and the Limits Thereof*. Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang.
- The Economist (2017, 10 March). Poland fails by 27-1 to oust Donald Tusk as president of the European Council. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/03/10/poland-fails-by-27-1-to-oust-donald-tusk-as-president-of-the-european-council>.
- The Economist (2020, 10 October). Poland's ruling party may clobber independent media. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/10/10/polands-ruling-party-may-clobber-independent-media>.
- Timbro (2019). *Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index*, Timbro, Sweden, n.l. Retrieved from <https://populismindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/TAP2019C.pdf>.
- Traczyk, A. (2020). Poland's New Foreign Minister. Orbiting Closer to the Center of Power, *DGAP Commentary* 25. Retrieved from [https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article\\_pdfs/DGAP-commentary-2020-25-en.pdf](https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/DGAP-commentary-2020-25-en.pdf).
- Varga, M. & Buzogány, A. (2020). The Foreign Policy of Populists in Power: Contesting Liberalism in Poland and Hungary. *Geopolitics*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1734564>.
- Verbeek, B. & Zaslove, A. (2018). Populism and Foreign Policy. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P.A. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, P. Ostiguy (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Wall Street Journal (2007, 11 September). New Europe's Underachievers. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118945965457622997>.
- Wanat, Z. (2020, 13 October). Poland threatens to veto EU budget over rule of law. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-threatens-a-budget-veto-over-rule-of-law/>.
- Wehner, L. E., Thies, C. G. (2020). The nexus of populism and foreign policy: The case of Latin America. *International Relations*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0047117820944430>.
- Wiejski, P. (2021, 12 February). "Who do I call if I want to reach Poland?" Warsaw's divided diplomacy is

- undermining foreign policy. Retrieved from <https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/02/12/ministry-of-foreign-mess-how-polands-diplomacy-is-being-undone/>.
- Wojczewski, T. (2020). Trump, Populism, and American Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16 (3), 292–311. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz021>
- Zalan, E. (2020, 11 December). EU leaders unblock budget in deal with Hungary and Poland. Retrieved from <https://euobserver.com/political/150357>.
- Zbińkowski, G. (2019). The Three Seas Initiative and its Economic and Geopolitical Effect on the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe* 22 (2), 105 – 119. Retrieved from [http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10\\_2478\\_cer-2019-0015/c/5276-4951.pdf](http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_2478_cer-2019-0015/c/5276-4951.pdf).
- Zięba, R. (2019). Poland's Foreign and Security Policy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_7).
- Zielonka, J. (2009). The Return to Europe. In J. Kłoczowski & H. Łaskiewicz (Eds.), *East-Central Europe in European History. Themes & Debates* (pp. 474 – 484). Lublin, Poland: Institute of East Central Europe.
- Zwolski, K. (2017). Poland's Foreign-Policy Turn. *Survival* 59 (4), 167 – 182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349825>.





## Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Polish Foreign Policy Making

Karol Bieniek<sup>1</sup> , Özgün Erler Bayır<sup>2</sup> 

### Abstract

This paper is an attempt to draw attention to the problem of using public diplomacy and soft power as a tool in foreign policy making of Poland. As the Republic of Poland has made an effort to use these tools actively since the 1990s and became even more active after its accession to the European Union in 2004, it is important to answer the question of where the limits of the use of these tools are and what positive and negative effects they can bring. For Poland - the active country, together with strong will to change its international environment - public diplomacy and soft power are perceived as indispensable in fulfilling this ambition however they require a proper use, compatible with the potential they have. In this paper, we will try to analyze the potential, will and implications of public diplomacy, and soft power use in Polish foreign policy making with an analytical approach.

### Keywords

Poland, Soft power, Foreign policy, Public diplomacy, the EU

**1 Corresponding Author:** Karol Bieniek (Dr.), Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science and Administration, Cracow, Poland. E-mail: karol.bieniek@up.krakow.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-6349-9385

**2 Özgün Erler Bayır** (Assoc. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: ozguner@istanbul.edu.tr ORCID: 0000-0002-5906-4362

**To cite this article:** Bieniek, K., & Erler Bayır, O. (2022). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in Polish Foreign Policy Making. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S61–S68. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.1028128>





## Introduction

In the globalizing world, the traditional understanding of diplomacy, which is based on state-to-state relations through using bureaucratic channels, changed with the involvement of non-state actors, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations to the process with their increasing role in the international system. Particularly, the end of the Cold War and in parallel with the change in the bipolar structure of the international system had a great impact on this phenomenon. Diplomacy as an effective tool in the foreign policy making process of the countries has also been affected by the change and transformation in the global politics. Frankly, it is understood that the countries can no longer continue to apply traditional diplomatic methods in their foreign policy making process in a changing environment. In this new environment, the countries have begun to apply new foreign policy tools and implement new policies to achieve their national interests. In this sense, the countries' decision to change in the management of their foreign policy and diplomacy by giving importance to civil society and public opinion in their policy making process has paved the way to increase the importance of public diplomacy which is considered as a means of promoting the soft power of a country.

The concept of power that can be mainly categorized as hard power and soft power is an effective tool for countries to achieve the desired outcomes in the international system. Before describing the soft power in foreign policy, it is crucial to emphasize the distinction between hard power and soft power. Even though both are related with achieving the desired outcomes in the international arena, the methods of the two concepts are quite different from each other. Hard power is based on using threat or coercion by applying military or economic sources of a particular country to change the behaviors of others while soft power is all about attracting the others by using attractiveness of a particular country. The concept of soft power was initially used by Joseph Nye (see; Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004; Nye, 2008). He defines soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values and policies" (Nye, 2019, p.7). In this sense, all the values that are part of the countries' culture including history, sports, literature, music, art, technology, and science alongside with its political values and policies play an important role in increasing the attraction potential of a particular country. Thus, the whole process will eventually lead to achieve desired goals or interests of the countries in the international system by means of building common values among nations.

Neither soft power nor the public diplomacy terms and phenomena are new in the foreign policy making; however, they have recently become an important tool in that process. Public diplomacy can be roughly defined as a communication process through which the countries introduce their national goals, policies, values, and cultures to people of the other countries in order to support their policy goals. It can be claimed that the process of persuading the officials and policy makers through bureaucratic channels has turned into the process of informing and persuading the public of other countries to achieve the policy goals of the country in the international system.

Public diplomacy as a diplomatic strategy and a foreign policy tool is used by the states with the aim of serving the interests of the countries. (For further information and detailed

analysis about public diplomacy, see; Bjola, 2019; Cull, 2009; Snow, 2009; Melissen, 2005; Snow, 2009; Pamment, 2013). Although public diplomacy was widely used for the purpose of propaganda during the Cold War period, gaining importance of civil society and public opinion, based understandings in the international system, the collapse of the Soviet model and the spread of democracy have played an important role in the more active use of public diplomacy which is based on symmetrical communication and mutual understanding in this new environment. It is obvious that public diplomacy and its practices have become much more visible in the foreign policy making process of the countries in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Undoubtedly, we can observe the reflections of all these developments in foreign policy of Poland which emerged as a new and independent state in the international system in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is interesting to observe how the Republic of Poland creates its soft power and tries to use a public diplomacy as that country has been experiencing democratic processes since the beginning of the nineties of the previous century. Thus, it cannot and shouldn't be compared with the well-established western democracies. These countries in general have different historical experiences, tradition, and resources which are generally far bigger than those of Poland. On the other hand, it doesn't mean that Polish political elites and foreign policy makers do not pay attention to the soft power and public diplomacy.

This paper is to deliver basic data and information about Polish soft power and public diplomacy. With a view to do so, first, the country's potential and soft power components will be analyzed. While arguing that culture is basically one of the most important variables in the composition of Polish soft power, institutional limitations of cultural diplomacy will also be underlined. This study also argues that currently public diplomacy in Poland is functioning simultaneously with populist international agenda of Polish government and its harsh political rhetoric towards country's neighbors and international partners. It is highly doubtful if the country will be able to create and sustain its positive image abroad with public/cultural diplomacy as an effective tool. Qualitative content analysis is the main research technique applied in this paper. Official documents, reports, indexes, selected monographs, and scientific papers are the main sources for this publication.

### **Analyzing Soft Power Use in Polish Foreign Policy**

After the end of the Cold War, Poland, a new and independent state in the international system, tried to use soft power as a tool in its foreign policy as effective as possible. We believe that analyzing the effectiveness of the soft power that Poland has been using is significant for Polish foreign policy studies. However, it is not easy to develop an approach to measure the use of soft power in foreign policy and suggest the measurement parameters. In this regard, there are several instruments and rankings responsible for soft power measurement. Usually, they refer to the condition of a particular state in various dimensions and analyze different variables. The Soft Power 30 index is one of them (The Soft Power 30, 2019). Its framework is based on objective data (in 65%, referring to government, digital, culture, enterprise, engagement, and education) and pooling data (in 35% with the reference to conditions and attractiveness of living in particular country

including even questions about issues ,such as cuisine, friendliness, and luxury goods among many) (The Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power, 2019: p. 11). The overall position of Poland in that ranking has been rather stable in recent years – in 2017 and 2018 Poland took 24<sup>th</sup> position, and in 2019 it moved to the 23<sup>th</sup>. Among country's neighbors, in 2019 ranking only Germany, Czech Republic, and Russian Federation are included in the ranking with 3<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> position, respectively. In the overview section, authors underline rather the stable position of Poland and the ongoing development of its primary soft power assets like culture and education. They also perceive investments in ambitious digital infrastructure and technologies as one of the biggest strengths of Poland in following years, however, they also underline a possible impact of international perceptions of government decisions viewed as populist and illiberal on country's stance in next rankings (The Soft Power 30, Poland, 2019).

For more detailed analysis of Polish soft power, the Elcano Global Presence Index is quite a useful tool. This index done by the Spanish Elcano Royal Institute is a synthetic index that orders, quantifies, and aggregates the external projection of different countries. Global presence is divided into three dimensions: economy, defense, and soft presence (Elcano Global Presence Index, 2021). The last category should be attributed to the soft power, and it contains variables such as migrations, tourism, sports, culture, information, technology, science, education, and cooperation. Moreover, the Elcano Royal Institute provides us also with Elcano European Presence Index which measures the intra-European presence of the EU member states (including UK for 2020 data) and uses the same variables.

It is interesting to observe Poland's position in these two indices which have seemed to be rather stable in the recent years; in terms of global presence, Poland took the 28<sup>th</sup> position in 2020 and 2019, and 30<sup>th</sup> in 2016, 2017 and 2018. This stance has been a general feature of country's global presence basically since 2005 when it occupied 31<sup>th</sup> place. Also, the overall progress since 1990 has been clearly observable: in 1990 it was 43<sup>th</sup> position, 34<sup>th</sup> in 1995, and 35<sup>th</sup> in 2000 (all data based on: Elcano, Country File Poland, 2021).

The European presence index of Poland also reveals both country's stable stance and overall progress. In 2020 and 2019, Poland took 10<sup>th</sup> position among EU countries; it was also 9<sup>th</sup> in 2016, 2017 and 2018. Since Poland joined the European Union just in 2004, it is also interesting to observe the progress that country had made since it was first indexed in 2005 with 13<sup>th</sup> position and 12<sup>th</sup> in the period between 2010-2012.

While analyzing provided data, one can also indicate important shifts in the particular variables and its values in the index structure, both global and European one – the global military presence decreased from 24,9% in 1990 to only 6,7% in 2020, and at the same time global soft presence remained more or less constant with 30% in 1990 and 29,7% thirty years later. In the same period, the economic presence raised greatly from 45% to 63,7%. The European index proves that Poland's position among the EU member states remains rather constant with 69,3% of economic and 30,7% of soft presence in 2005 and 65,2% and 34,8% in 2020, respectively.

In the soft power context, the Elcano tool contributes to an answer about the Poland's soft power structure while it provides data about particular presence contribution

variables, as mentioned above. Here, one regularity is noticeable: in the recent years, the two dominating variables of Poland's soft presence have been culture and science, both globally and within the European Union. In 2019, the culture and science contributed to country's global soft presence with 9,4% and 5,4%, respectively; in 2020, these values were 9,4% and 5,7%. Within the European Union, the science and culture are also the most important variables; the former was 12,2% in 2019 and 13% in 2020, and the latter 8% and 7,8% for the mentioned period.

The mentioned Elcano data proves that Poland's global and European presence has been rather constant and stable in the recent years. It also shows that country's position has been shifting since 1990 and 2005. It is also interesting to observe how Poland's soft power is being made since the science and culture are the most important variables contributing largely to overall soft presence value. In this context, one should consider science and culture as the most important factors in the Polish soft power making and proper public diplomacy tools.

### **Public Diplomacy as a Tool of New Polish Foreign Policy**

It is quite clear that Polish political elites and policy makers are aware of the meaning of public diplomacy in the foreign policy making process in the modern international relations. The term public diplomacy has been for a long time under the consideration of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has also created several its own definitions of this term. According to an archival definition, the public diplomacy is a multidimensional, informational activity aimed at shaping favorable public opinion for the Republic of Poland, better understanding of our country and its contribution the Europe and world development, and strengthening of our international prestige, stimulation of contact and cooperation between international and Polish partners. It is also important to strength Poland's image as an important European country, promoting European eastern policy, important part of the NATO and the country of civilization success whose citizens appreciate freedom and are able to share it with the others. Poland is the county with growing value of developmental aid, supporting its diasporas, safe, with stable development perspectives as the EU and the NATO member which is a valuable political, economic, scientific, social and cultural partner (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, archive, 2021). The newest official definition is even more focused on soft power and its role in modern politics. It characterizes public diplomacy as a set of strategic, coordination, and executive actions aimed at finding and providing understanding and support for Poland's *raison d'état* and foreign policy through shaping social attitude and public opinion abroad. Using of soft power tools in public diplomacy (like promotion of the Polish culture, history, science, Polish language, education, sport, tourism, and economy) enables (Polish government – K.B.&Ö.E.B.) to create Poland's positive image abroad and good international relations. The public diplomacy plays a crucial role (in this process – K.B.&Ö.E.B.), together with traditional diplomacy, and is oriented towards foreign institutions, organizations, and societies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, 2021).

The newest mentioned definition stipulates the role of the culture and its meaning for public diplomacy in general. In the modern world and especially for a country such as Poland, the culture becomes a basic resource and an export good of the state and

the society thus the history of the state and the nation, that can be easily and properly translated for foreign recipients, plays a priority role in this process (Nakonieczna, 2013, p.153). Traditionally, the cultural diplomacy referred to the high culture whereas currently, its scope is even broader and consists of elements of mass culture with a view to reach audience; it also consists other elements of culture and tradition (Surmacz, 2015, p.233).

With no doubts, Poland's cultural and historical potential is huge; however, it is largely attributed to a historical policy. Since everybody recognizes prominent figures such as Lech Wałęsa or Pope John Paul II and appreciates Poland's role in struggling against communism, the newest era also provides us with a spectacular triumph such as Nobel Prize for Polish writer, Olga Tokarczuk in 2018. The accessibility of Polish culture and science due to progressing digitalization is also a factor contributing to its success and overall recognizability. The state budget expenditures for culture in Poland are also systematically on the rise – in 2020, they raised for 14,1% in comparison to the previous year (from 2,380 billion PLN to 2,716 billion PLN) (GIS, Culture in 2020, 2021, p. 29).

Despite of high expenditures, overall good recognizability, and relatively important value of culture for Polish soft power making and public diplomacy, one can say that even cultural triumphs are not sufficient for the country's success and spectacular international presence. Two basic factors contribute to the weakness of Poland in this area.

According to the report of Polish Supreme Audit Office, in general, public budget financed institutions established with a view to promote Polish culture abroad (like Adam Mickiewicz Institute, Polish Film Institute, International Cultural Center, and Book Institute) do promote Polish culture in a positive manner; however, their activities have several malfunctions. They are institutionally and substantially diffused, incoherent, they do not coordinate their activities and do not control the effectiveness of their actions or do that in an appropriate, blurry way (Supreme Audit Office, *Promocja jest. Efekty nieznanne*, 2019).

Institutional weakness is also noticeable in the context of mentioned Adam Mickiewicz Institute which cannot be in any way compared to its prominent counterparts in the western countries like Goethe Institute or British Council with definitely less branches all around the world.

It is also important to say that recently Polish public diplomacy has remained under the strong influence of particular, interim political aims of the Law and Justice Party (pol. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) government – the general picture of Poland is incoherent. On one hand, the state is declaring the usage of public diplomacy and its tools together with the culture in order to promote Poland's positive image and influence outside the country. On the other hand, Poland has become highly antagonistic towards its neighbors and the European Union in foreign policy making. Traditional right-wing, harsh anti-German rhetoric and Poland's justified accusations towards Nord Stream 2 project made authorities in Berlin reserved towards Warsaw. In the meantime, open conflict with Czech Republic erupted – the Prague complained that the open-cast Turów mine has drained water from villages near the Polish border. In May 2021, the European Court of Justice ordered mine operations to “immediately cease” and later fined Poland €500,000 per day for ignoring the injunction.

What is more, the success of populist Law and Justice Party and its several domestic proceedings like critical reforms undermining political independence of judiciary limitations of human rights on abortion issue led to Brussels – Warsaw tensions. Currently, for the first time, cutting and limiting of European financial support is considered by the Brussels thus providing a fertile ground for domestic populism in Poland and even extreme “Pol-exit” vision.

All of these things make a picture of Polish public diplomacy rather unclear and problematic. In this context, even such an important step like launching 24/7 English broadcasted public television channel (TVP World) in November 2021 creates a fear that the new channel will become a political tool for ruling party and its propaganda mouthpiece, while the government has already been using state national television domestically to promote the government’s narrative and to attack opponents, also abroad.

Such attitude is contrary to the professional perception of diplomacy and the role of state institutions which should be oriented towards creation rather and sustaining of bilateral contacts and partnership networks. They should be able to cooperate with their counterparts with mutual and multidimensional understanding, and remain professional and well informed. This policy is also challenging soft power in general since it is demanding to what J. Nye considered as a cost – if a country represents values that other want to follow, it will cost us less to lead (Nye, 2002, p. 5). The question about the future of Poland’s soft power and public diplomacy remains open in the context of provided analysis.

### Conclusion

The provided analysis proves the value of soft power and public diplomacy for the Republic of Poland. In the international indexes, Poland occupies rather stable position in the global and European presence context; however, the particular components of its soft power have been shifting through the years. What’s more, the culture herself, although widely appreciated and sometimes with spectacular international successes, is not sufficient enough to create a positive image of Poland due to institutional domestic obstacles and particular foreign policy actions antagonizing country with international counterparts.

One can risk a statement here that Poland lacks coherent soft power strategy. The Polish attitude is full of contradictions – on one hand, the creation of positive image is officially a matter of great importance, on the other hand, official governmental decisions led to its reduction, and the country started to be perceived as an unreliable partner. Single initiatives aimed at promoting Polish culture are basically unable to overcome this perception, and the country’s potential remains generally unused, and it is unlikely that soft power assets such as culture or science will be ultimately enough to save Poland’s potential in near future.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study: K.B., Ö.E.B.; Data Acquisition: K.B., Ö.E.B.; Data Analysis/ Interpretation: K.B., Ö.E.B.; Drafting Manuscript: K.B., Ö.E.B.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: K.B., Ö.E.B.; Final Approval and Accountability: K.B., Ö.E.B.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Bjola, C., Cassidy, J., Manore, I. (2019). Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. 14, 83-101.
- Cull, N. J. (2009). *Public Diplomacy: Lessons From The Past*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.
- Elcano Global Presence Index, (2021), <https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/about>
- Elcano, Country File, Poland, (2021), [https://explora.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/country/iepe/soft\\_global/ES,PL/PL/2020](https://explora.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/country/iepe/soft_global/ES,PL/PL/2020)
- GIS, Culture in 2020, (2021), <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/kultura-turystyka-sport/kultura/kultura-w-2020-roku,2,18.html>
- Melissen, J. (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, (2021), <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/dyplomacja-publiczna>
- Nakonieczna J., Kultura w tworzeniu reputacji państwa, [in:] Schreiber H.& Michałowska G. (2013), Kultura w stosunkach międzynarodowych, t.1: Zwrot kulturowy, p. 141-159.
- Nye J., Hard and Soft Power in Global Information Age, [in:], Leonard M. (2002), Re-ordering the World, p. 2-10.
- Nye, J. S. Jr. (2019). Soft Power and the Public Diplomacy Revisited. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. 14(1-2), 7-20.
- Pamment, J. (2013). *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. London, New York.
- Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, archive, (2021), [https://dziennikurzedowy.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz\\_pl/polityka\\_zagraniczna/dyplomacja\\_publiczna/index.html](https://dziennikurzedowy.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/polityka_zagraniczna/dyplomacja_publiczna/index.html)
- Snow, N. (2009). *Rethinking Public Diplomacy. The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. New York: Routledge.
- Supreme Audit Office, Promocja jest. Efekty nieznanne., (2019), <https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/promocja-polskiej-kultury-za-granica.html>
- Surmacz B. (2015), Ewolucja współczesnej dyplomacji. Aktorzy. Struktury. Funkcje.
- The Soft Power 30, A Global Ranking of Soft Power, (2019), <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf>
- The Soft Power 30, Poland, (2019), <https://softpower30.com/country/poland/>
- The Soft Power30, (2019), <https://softpower30.com/>



## The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Model of Governance and Democracy in Poland

Adam Szymański<sup>1</sup> , Łukasz Zamecki<sup>2</sup> 

### Abstract

Almost the whole of 2020 was a year of governance by pandemic measures. Many governments, in these extraordinary times, formally introduced states of emergency. One exception in this regard is Poland. Although it used, in the second and third quarter of 2020, one of the most restrictive forms of lockdown, the government did not decide on the declaration of a state of emergency. At the same time, the scope of implemented regulations was extensive.

This article presents a qualitative research on the instruments used by the Polish government in the year 2020 to deal with the pandemic. The analysis allows us to conclude that the so called “anti-crisis shields” were used to a large extent as an instrument of governance of the country, not a tool to prevent a pandemic. At least part of the restrictions adopted in Poland was beyond the need and unrelated to fighting the pandemic. However, these steps are leading to further deterioration of the state of democracy.

The analysis of the tools used by the Polish government is based on the framework on the democratic backsliding and autocratization as well as the V-dem concept of “autocratization by decree”, which can be also applied to the COVID-19 situation.

### Keywords

Autocratization, Democratic Backsliding, Pandemic, Poland, State of Emergency

**1 Corresponding Author:** Adam Szymański (Assoc. Prof.), University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Political Systems, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: ar.szymanski@uw.edu.pl  
ORCID: 0000-0002-6374-2736

**2** Łukasz Zamecki (Asst. Prof.), University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Political Systems, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: lzamecki@uw.edu.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-2135-6415

**To cite this article:** Szymański, A., & Zamecki, L. (2022). The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Model of Governance and Democracy in Poland. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S69–S84. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.944958>

## Introduction

The plot of the worldwide known dystopia – “V for Vendetta” – starts with a virus pandemic which allowed autocrats to grasp more power and autocratically govern the country. Who could have expected that 2020 became the year of governance by pandemic measures, which may lead some countries to implement a similar scenario in terms of a state of democracy. Many governments have temporarily restricted some human rights and civil liberties (Lührmann, et al., 2020). It seems that some countries have also used the moment of the pandemic to strengthen the power of rulers. They have adopted instruments, often within broader anti-COVID-19 packages, that would be difficult to implement in other situations (e.g. expanded state surveillance or strengthened executive position in relation to bodies important in the checks and balances system, such as local authorities or civil society organizations). A crisis situation may justify the seizure of more power by those in power, leading in some cases in the long-term to its further consolidation and at the same time the deterioration of democracy.

Many governments formally introduced a state of emergency for fighting the pandemic. The exception in this regard is Poland. Although it used, in the second and third quarter of 2020, one of the most restrictive forms of lockdown (the first one was introduced on 10-12 March 2020), the government did not decide on the declaration of a state of emergency. Instead, it introduced on 20 March 2020, the state of epidemic, which is not the formal state of emergency according to Polish law. At the same time, the scope of implemented regulations was extensive. The government ruled among others by introducing so-called “Anti-Crisis Shields” (the first one was adopted on 31 March 2020; there were nine “Anti-Crisis Shields” by May 2021).

This article presents a qualitative research on the instruments used by the Polish government in the year 2020 to deal with the pandemic. The main questions are as follows: Were the “Anti-Crisis Shields” used as a tool to prevent a pandemic or rather as an instrument of governance of the state? Were the restrictions adopted in Poland related solely to fighting the pandemic? What is the impact of the Polish government anti-COVID-19 measures on the state of democracy deteriorating in recent years?

The analysis of the tools used by the Polish government, mainly the legal acts adopted since March 2020, is based in the theoretical dimension on the conceptualization framework on democratic backsliding and autocratization as well as the concept of “autocratization by decree”, which can also be applied to the COVID-19 situation.

This article, which presents a part of the research within the project “De-democratization at the times of Covid-19” carried out at the University of Warsaw within the 4EU+ Alliance, consists of three parts. After outlining the theoretical framework and state of the Polish democracy before the pandemic, we conduct the analysis of the *de facto* state of emergency in Poland and adopted regulations to answer the main research questions.

## Theoretical Framework

Before we present the empirical analysis, it is imperative to outline the conceptual framework which will be used in this article. We need to define the main terms, such as democratic backsliding or autocratization, and outline the relationship between

the introduction (formally or not) of a state of emergency and changes of the state of democracy as well as basing this latter aspect on the possible scenarios of the impact of anti-COVID measures on the change of the political regime in the long run.

### **Notion of Democratic Backsliding and Autocratization**

On the following page, we draft a theoretical framework, that builds on the notion of democratic backsliding and autocratization, that could be useful to study how the COVID-19 pandemic may influence change within a regime or even of the regime to a less democratic one. Neither scenario can be excluded in the long run in Poland.

Crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, are recognized as triggering factors of the so called democratic backsliding (Bermeo, 2016). Similar concepts have also been used, such as “de-democratization” (Tilly, 2007), “democratic decline” (Plattner, 2015) or “democratic erosion” (Paloumpis, et al., 2019), just to name several terms used for describing the deterioration of the state of liberal democracy. When we take, for example, the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index into consideration, we can point out such components of the model as: working of the competitive electoral process (electoral integrity) and political pluralism, functioning of the government accompanied by the effective system of checks and balances, guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms, developed political participation and democratic political culture (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). We should add to this, particularly in the context of our research, the working of the rule of law.

The aforementioned autocratization is a separate term, even though it is a part of the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. It is about such a deterioration of the state of democracy, which means a change of the political regime to a less democratic one, depending on the working of three key aspects: executive limitations (control over the executive) as well as participation and contestation opportunities. They correspond to the aforementioned components of the liberal model of democracy. The autocratization, i.e., gradual change towards autocracy, takes place when it makes the exercise of political power more repressive and arbitrary and restricts the space for public contestation and political participation (Cassani & Tomini, 2019).

### **State of Emergency vs. Democratic Backsliding and Autocratization**

We should also outline the issue of the relationship between the processes defined in the previous section and the introduction of a state of emergency. The key question in this context, investigated in many works to date (Ackermann, 2004; Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss, 2011; Criddle & Fox-Decent, 2012; Richards & Clay 2012; Bjørnskov & Voigt, 2018; Lührmann & Rooney, 2020), is whether the introduction of a state of emergency is a favorable determinant for undemocratic changes.

The state of emergency is usually introduced in democracies according to the relevant provisions of the constitution (with exceptions as in the case of the British constitutional arrangements which, e.g., do not include the provisions on the exercise of emergency powers) and other relevant legal acts at the time of instability (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, 215). John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino write in this context about two models of emergency powers: the traditional constitutional (neo-Roman) model – based on

the provisions of the constitution and the new, more flexible and controllable (by the parliament) legislative model – with the central role of emergency legislation (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, 210-239). The state of emergency can be a result of:

- 1) military invasion, war, revolution or military defeat (traditionally);
- 2) natural disaster, pandemics, terrorist activities, crisis (domestic or international), coup, conflict, protest or rebellion (currently) (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020).

It is connected with extension of power to executives, which get extra competences to fight against instability and its consequences. “From 1800 to 2012, eighty democracies approved legal provisions for a state of emergency, specifying how the government is empowered to take actions beyond its standard procedures in the event of international or domestic crisis.” (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020) For instance, the executives (Presidents, Prime Ministers/Chancellors or Ministers) can issue decrees, limiting the role of the parliament, censor information or suspend legal processes and rights of citizens (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, 210). However, the emergency legislation, which is adopted during a state of emergency (according to a new model of emergency powers) and includes the provisions on special competences of state authorities, is still “reviewable by the constitutional court (if there is one) and is regulated in exactly the same manner as any other legislative act.” (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, 215) Moreover, it is temporary, which means that everything should come back to the previous state after the end of the state of emergency, including the previously suspended rights. In addition to this, “the legislature is expected to monitor the use of the emergency powers, to investigate abuses, to extend these powers if necessary, and perhaps to suspend them if the emergency ends.” (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004, 217)

These special competences of the executive theoretically should not lead then to democratic backsliding or autocratization (history shows that the state of emergency can even be a tool to stop undemocratic processes). As Anna Lührmann and Bryan Rooney wrote, if the special competences “are used by the elected executive to effectively and proportionately respond to a crisis situation, the quality of electoral democracy is not at stake.” (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020) The same concerns the constraints put on democracy and human rights – proportionality and limited time of a state of emergency (although a short extension is possible, it cannot be extended for a long period) are favorable conditions for keeping democracy intact (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020).

However, past political events and processes show that:

1) the executive exceptional competences during the state of emergency can become the standard work of the government afterwards;

2) executives can also use the emergency power to strengthen its power and eliminate the obstacles present during the usual time. These constraints put on the executive power are connected with the working of democratic procedures and mechanisms, such as division of power or the checks and balances system – first of all limiting the use of sources by the executive and creating accountability tools;

3) the state of emergency is the occasion for the executive to reduce the cost of this kind of actions – much higher in a normal state of affairs;

4) the state of emergency gives a good justification for the incumbents to strengthen their power, silencing opponents, including the opposition which can be accused of being, e.g., unpatriotic or irresponsible at this special time when fast and effective measures must be taken (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020).

Democratic backsliding or even autocratization is then also possible under the state of emergency in democracies (no matter if formally introduced), particularly in a situation when we have already witnessed some democratic backsliding or autocratic changes before the beginning of the state of emergency (as it will be indicated in the Polish case below). It has been confirmed by the aforementioned scholars: Lührmann, and Rooney. The results of their interesting quantitative study “suggest that countries with a state of emergency are indeed more likely to also undergo a period of democratic decline. In fact, (...) democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency than without, marking a substantial increase in the probability of democratic decline, and this result is robust to a number of alternative specifications.” (Lührmann & Rooney, 2020)

### **COVID-19 vs. Democratic Backsliding and Autocratization – Possible Scenarios**

Having in mind what we wrote in the previous section, we should now consider the case of COVID-19-related actions of incumbents during the state of emergency (*de iure* or *de facto*). They may (but do not have to) trigger democratic backsliding or even autocratization.

In any crisis situation, a ruling elite can bypass horizontal checks, limit citizen individual rights, ban demonstrations and other public gatherings, censor media (claiming that the government which fights against coronavirus cannot be criticized) and postpone/cancel elections or organize them at all costs if it is in its favor. In addition, anti-system parties and movements, which must be taken into consideration as well, can fuel violence by their anti-governmental rhetoric and actions.

When we think about crises as drivers of democratic backsliding or autocratization, we can consider several scenarios. Crises could alternatively be “used”: 1) by the ruling elite to justify democratic backsliding or autocratization; 2) by other actors (antisystem parties and movements) to delegitimize the ruling elite and the regime and to take power; 3) by the ruling elite to stabilize the government and the regime and to marginalize antisystem parties and movements.

Hence, we may identify a few possible scenarios (depending of the scope of changes) triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic<sup>1</sup>:

1. The ruling elite uses the pandemic to
  - a) expand executive power,
  - b) limit political competition (i.e., opposition parties and media’s ability to criticize the government),
  - c) postpone elections or organize them at any cost,
 ...beyond what the management of the pandemic reasonably requires;

<sup>1</sup> The scenarios presented in this section have been proposed by Andrea Cassani and Luca Tomini within the common project with the authors of this article, entitled *De-democratization at the times of Covid-19*.

2. antisystem parties and movements campaign to delegitimize the government and fuel mass revolts to make the government fall and replace it.

Alternatively, if none of these scenarios eventually materialize, the COVID-19 pandemic could have:

3. a null effect: the government makes no attempt to make the regime less democratic; antisystem parties and movements do not exist or are too weak to replace the government;

4. an “opposite” effect: the government does not try to make the political regime less democratic; antisystem parties and movements try to delegitimize the government but lose support due to their irresponsible behavior; the regime (re-)consolidates.

### **State of Democracy in Poland Before Pandemic**

Before analyzing the issue of impact of the pandemic governance and anti-COVID regulations adopted in Poland on the state of democracy in this country, it is necessary to briefly present the state of democracy before the pandemic.

Poland has been classified as one of the main “autocratizing” states in the 2009-2019 period (see Table 1 below). Although using the term “autocratization” in the case of Poland is to some extent disputable, without any doubt we can observe in this country the rising problems with keeping the liberal model of democracy. The V-dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), embracing Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) – i.e., issues concerning electoral integrity, freedom of association (with reference to political parties and civil society organizations) and freedom of expression as well as the Liberal Component Index (LCI) – equality before the law and individual liberty index, judicial constraints on executive index and legislative constraints on executive index (the last two concerning checks and balances system), shows that this state is the third country in this context, after Hungary and Turkey. Its LDI decreased from 0.83 in 2009 to 0.50 in 2019 (all results are between 0 – the worst score and 1 – the best score) (Lührmann, et al., 2020).

The term autocratization can be justified in the Polish case, when we look at other V-dem data. According to the research of the Swedish institute, Poland’s political regime changed in 2015 (the year of taking over the power by the United Right - first of all Law and Justice, PiS - in presidential and parliamentary elections) from the liberal democracy to electoral democracy, i.e., the democracy with deficits (Lührmann, et al., 2020) or, as Wolfgang Merkel put it, “defective democracy.” (Merkel, 2004) Although all Economist Intelligence Unit (democracy index) reports from 2010 to 2021 define the Polish political regime as a flawed democracy (not full democracy), proving that there was no regime change in the state in this period, this country is in recent years ever closer to the group of states with hybrid regimes (with a mixture of democratic and authoritarian components) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021)

Table 1

Poland Among Top 10 “Autocratizing” Countries 2009-2019 (LDI)

State	Change	LDI 2009	LDI 2019	Regime Type 2009	Regime Type 2019
Hungary	-0.36	0.76	0.40	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
Turkey	-0.36	0.46	0.10	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
Poland	-0.33	0.83	0.50	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Democracy
Serbia	-0.27	0.53	0.25	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
Brazil	-0.25	0.76	0.51	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Democracy
India	-0.19	0.55	0.36	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Democracy
Mali	-0.17	0.48	0.31	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy
Thailand	-0.16	0.32	0.15	Electoral Autocracy	Closed Autocracy
Nicaragua	-0.16	0.22	0.06	Electoral Autocracy	Electoral Autocracy
Zambia	-0.15	0.42	0.27	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy

Source: V-dem, 2020, 16.

The findings of the V-dem reports correspond to the EIU results. Although these reports classify the Polish political regime after 2015 continuously as an electoral democracy, the undemocratic change has been growing each year. It is evident when we look at four V-dem indexes from 2016-2019, i.e., the aforementioned Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and Liberal Component Index (LCI) as well as Deliberative Component Index (DCI) covering such items as: engaged society and range of consultation (at a low level in the Polish legislative process) as well as respect for counterarguments or reasoned justification of decisions by the incumbents (see Table 2 below). All four indexes are going down, with the exception of 2017. The worst relative decline (in comparison with other countries) is in the case of LCI (53<sup>rd</sup> rank in 2016, but 83<sup>rd</sup> in 2019) and DCI (106<sup>th</sup> rank already in 2016 and 122<sup>nd</sup> in 2019). A much better situation in the context of a state of democracy is indicated by two other indexes – Egalitarian Component Index (ECI) – referring to egalitarian dimension of democracy and Participatory Component Index (PCI) – connected with aspects of participatory democracy – at the level of civil society organizations and local democracy (which, however, can reflect the mobilization against the incumbents’ undemocratic actions).

Table 2

Poland – V-dem indexes (2016-2019)

Year	LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX			ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY			LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI)		
	INDEX (LDI)			INDEX (EDI)			INDEX (LCI)		
	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-
2016	55	0.574	0.054	56	0.707	0.056	53	0.797	0.058
2017	50	0.596	0.07	49	0.731	0.06	56	0.803	0.07
2018	56	0.548	0.053	54	0.708	0.051	62	0.754	0.054
2019	64	0.5	0.048	55	0.692	0.059	83	0.693	0.063



Year	EGALITARIAN COMPONENT			PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT			DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT		
	INDEX (ECI)			INDEX (PCI)			INDEX (DCI)		
	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-	RANK	SCORE	SD+/-
2016	27	0.860	0.061	65	0.553	0.057	106	0.631	0.116
2017	31	0.860	0.05	36	0.630	0.06	116	0.575	0.12
2018	29	0.859	0.048	51	0.596	0.052	109	0.629	0.628
2019	17	0.896	0.055	28	0.648	0.032	122	0.542	0.625

Source: V-dem, 2017-2020.

The worst democratic deficits pointed out in 2016 by the V-dem report are: taking control over judiciary by incumbents and their growing influence over the weakening the civil society, public media and educational system (Lührmann, et al., 2017, 31). The V-dem report from 2018 presented in turn the following list of the democratic components which Poland does not fully respect: freedom of expression, equality before the law, judicial constraints on the executive and deliberative components. The other democracy dilemmas in this year were the polarization of society and populist in power (Lührmann, et al., 2018, 21). We can read in the same document that: “The ruling party, PiS, has made legislative changes to the judicial system, negatively affecting constitutional checks and balances. The PiS government then pushed through legislative changes increasing the role of political appointees in election-administration bodies, and authorities can now give preferences to favored groups and gatherings.” (Lührmann, et al., 2018, 22)

### **Poland at the Times of Covid-19 – Fighting of Incumbents Against Coronavirus or Democracy?**

This part of the article is devoted to analyzing the pandemic governance period in Poland and the question if the introduced anti-COVID-19 regulations serve the pandemic goals or some other purposes and how this affects the state of democracy, already deteriorating in recent years in this country.

#### **Pandemic State of Emergency without Constitutional State of Emergency**

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the further deterioration of the state of democracy can be seen in Poland in two distinct processes:

1) restricting civil liberties and political rights without introducing a formal state of emergency in Poland and genuine doubts regarding the unconstitutionality of regulations, which limited these liberties and rights;

2) inclusion in normative acts, which were to prevent the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, regulations not related to the situation, also these which raise questions about the compliance with democratic principles. This can be seen as a case of “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo, 2016, 6).

The former process consists of two strongly interrelated issues – the government’s reason for resignation to introduce a formal state of emergency despite the rationale for its settlement and, as many legal experts point out, the government’s unconstitutional action to restrict civil liberties and rights by decrees, not laws. The issues are interlinked because a lack of a state of emergency hinders possibilities to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2

by restricting certain people's activities.

The Article 228 of the Polish Constitution provides a possibility of introducing on part or on the whole territory of the country one of three “extraordinary measures”<sup>2</sup> – “martial law”, “state of emergency” or “state of natural disaster” (Poland Const. art. 228, § 1). In the situation of a pandemic, the Polish law provides for the possibility of introducing the third of these “extraordinary measures” – the state of natural disaster.<sup>3</sup> It can be introduced by the government for a definite period, no longer than 30 days (Poland Const. art. 232). An extension of this state may be made, but the consent of the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) is needed. The state of natural disaster allows the government to limit freedom of economic activity, personal freedom, inviolability of the home, freedom of movement, the right to strike, the right of ownership, freedom to work, the right to safe and hygienic conditions of work and the right to rest. All other liberties should not be limited.

According to the Polish Constitution the extraordinary measures may be introduced when the state is “unable to manage the crisis situation by ordinary constitutional means” (Poland Const. art. 228, § 1). In this context Monika Florczak-Wątor argues that “the introduction of a state of natural disaster in Poland should have taken place as early as 12.03.2020, when an epidemic emergency was introduced.” (Florczak-Wątor, 2020, 8). The lack of this step may raise doubts about the constitutionality of the significant restrictions on the exercise of freedoms and rights of the people. The restrictions were based on “the state of the epidemic”, which is not the constitutional “extraordinary measure”. The question arises about the lack of introduction of the state of emergency in Poland. The government maintained that there were no grounds for it. However, it is suspected that this was related to the need for paying compensation to people harmed by the state of emergency (e.g. entrepreneurs whose business was closed) and the inability to organize elections during the state of emergency and 90 days after its end, which would prevent the incumbent President, Andrzej Duda, from winning the presidential election (decline in support for the President due to the negative effects of the pandemic could be expected, thus incumbents favored quick elections).

The consequences of a pandemic in Poland are managed on the basis of the act voted on 2 March 2020 (adopted two days before the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Poland) “on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the crisis situations caused by them.” (Act of 2 March 2020). The act is referred to as the “special coronavirus act” as it contains the main instruments adopted in Poland to combat the pandemic. However, the act raised doubts as to whether it is not an attempt to circumvent the requirement to introduce a state of emergency in Poland (Zajadło, 2020). It is also argued that some of the provisions of the Act went further than the solutions in the Polish constitution concerning the state of natural disaster. As it was mentioned previously, Article 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland indicates that a state of natural disaster may be introduced, for a

2 Formally those are “states of emergency” but since one out of three “extraordinary measures” is called “state of emergency”, we use here the constitutional term “extraordinary measures”.

3 Article 3 of the Act of 18 April 2002 on the state of natural disaster (Act of 18 April 2002) specifies the natural disaster as an exceptional situation “caused by spread of infectious diseases”.

fixed period of no longer than 30 days, and its extension may only take place with the consent of the Sejm (Poland Const. art. 232). The Act on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and emergencies caused by them, introduces provisions for 180 days (Jałoszewski, 2020).

During the pandemic in Poland, some political rights were significantly reduced (e.g., freedom of assembly). The restrictions on basic political rights without the introduction of a state of emergency raised questions about compliance with the rule of law. Florczak-Wątor underlines that the pandemic in Poland showed that restrictions concerning freedoms may be aimed at achieving *ad hoc* political goals and it is really difficult to justify restrictions which have been introduced “until further notice.” (Florczak-Wątor, 2020, 6-13).

An interesting case here is the right to assembly. The restrictions limiting the spread of the virus are obvious, but the restrictions on the right to protest in Poland must be seen in the process of changing the rules of holding protests in Poland before the pandemic, and in the course of the pandemic of eliminating this basic political right on the basis of decrees, not laws. In addition, during the pandemic, the possibility of abortion was limited by the decision of the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Tribunal, 2020). It was obvious that it would lead to protests. This hard-to-push decision was in the air, but its effects came at a time when protesting was hampered.

As it was previously signaled, restrictions on freedoms and rights were introduced in Poland by decrees, not laws. Although laws, which were adopted at the beginning of the pandemic, allowed to restrict certain freedoms, most of the restrictions were introduced by means of the executive decrees issued on the basis of blank statutory authorizations (Florczak-Wątor, 2020, 7). The statutory mandate is “too general and gives too much leeway to the authorities empowered to issue a regulation.” (Sobczak, 2020). Several courts already rejected, in the year 2020, the fines imposed on citizens which were based on the “COVID-19 regulations”. Courts emphasized that fines were based on regulations “that were issued in excess of statutory delegation.” (Żaczkiewicz-Zborska, 2021)

### **Rule by Regulations**

The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a further increase in “executive aggrandizement” in Poland. The post-2015 process of limiting the rule of law and changing the parliament into a “voting machine” has increased. There are also doubts concerning some provisions appearing in “COVID acts”. Part of them were not at all related to fighting the pandemic and others excessively restricted the rule of law. Several cases will be analyzed in the following part.

In the above-mentioned act of 2 March 2020, a questionable permanent change in the Polish law that allows the Minister to suspend the functioning of universities “in cases justified by extraordinary circumstances threatening the life or health of members of the university community” was introduced. It should be emphasized that the academic community is one of the most vocal institutions in terms of criticizing the democratic backsliding in the country after 2015 (Act of 2 March 2020).

This act made changes in 15 laws. Until 1 February 2021, there were already 26 legal acts amending this act, and the consolidated version of the act had already 305 pages in

October 2020 (in comparison to the original 13 pages). By 1 February 2021, 51 executive acts were issued on its basis.

The so-called Anti-Crisis Shield 1.0 of 31 March 2020, which included solutions to support entrepreneurs in the fight against the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, was to provide also for provisions not only inconsistent with the constitution, but also with the international law. The law was to enable the dismissal of members of the Social Dialogue Council by the Prime Minister during the period of an epidemic. The provision was to allow the dismissal of members of the Council indicated also by social organizations and without any request on their part. At the same time, it was to limit the prerogatives of the President of the Republic of Poland as regards dismissal or appointment of members of the Council (Act of 31 March 2020. art. 85). The principle of social dialogue and principle of the autonomy of social organizations are expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The issues of freedom of association and protection of trade union rights are also regulated by the provisions of international laws ratified by Poland (Baran, 2020). These principles were to be infringed by the new law, but at the end of the day the lawmakers decided to delete this anti-democratic provision.

The Anti-Crisis Shield 1.0 changed some laws permanently, even those not related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This raises the question about the real aim of the government and parliament majority. In the Anti-Crisis Shield, prison warders were granted the right to use tasers. The official reason was that “it may be of particular importance in the context of the epidemic threat related to COVID-19, e.g., in the case of the necessity to perform official tasks in a reduced staffing.” (Sejm, 2020a). Increasing imprisonment penalties for those who intentionally infect others with HIV virus or for stalkers belonging to the same category. These types of changes were not justified by the coronavirus pandemic.

From the perspective of more than a year of the law being in force, one wonders about the provision allowing the police to store information about healthy people who have been in contact with persons suffering from infectious diseases and who are subject to mandatory quarantine or epidemiological supervision for up to a month after the expiry of the special law. Similar questions may be raised by the very broad wording of regulations that hindered access to public information. It was written in the Anti-Crisis Shield 1.0 that “cessation of activities by a court, authority or entity, conducting proceedings or control, respectively, in the period referred to in paragraph 1, may not be the basis for deriving legal measures relating to inactivity, excessive length or infringement of the party’s right to hear the case without undue delay.” (Act of 31 March 2020. art. 15zszs, § 11.)

The Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0 adopted on 16 April 2020 raised even more doubts. The law allowed for reducing employment in government administration offices. It was an especially alarming issue when we take into consideration the previous attempts of the United Right’s government to undermine the civil service. The Anti-Crisis shield 2.0 very broadly presented the possibility to reduce employment and did not guarantee trade unions a possibility to participate in the process of staff reduction (Act of 16 April 2020. art. 15zszszszszsz). As noted by Jakub Szmit with reference to employees of the private sectors, the state attempted to maintain employment by implementing aid measures while in relation to government administration of employees, it allowed for their arbitrary dismissal. This raised questions as to whether the constitutional principles of equality before the law and

social justice were not violated. What is more, the proposed mechanism of group layoffs with the attempts to change employment in budgetary units in 2010 was questioned by the Constitutional Tribunal (Szmit, 2020).

The change of voting system in the Anti-Crisis Shield concerning the presidential elections in Poland, which were planned for 2020, triggered an international reaction. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) criticized the plan to hold presidential elections only by postal voting (ODHIR, 2020). It was emphasized that the electoral law was changed quickly, in a difficult situation and without broad support being given by parliamentary groups. Among others, transferring the organization of elections from the National Electoral Commission to the Ministry of State Assets and the excessive ease of changing the date of elections by the Speaker of the Sejm were pointed out by the ODIHR. Doubts were expressed as to the method of voter registration and collection of ballot papers. Especially in the latter case, there was a concern that in the absence of appropriate control, which is ensured in the case of usual elections, electoral irregularities may occur. The possibility of full respect for the main electoral principles, especially their secrecy, but also directness, universality and equality, were also questioned (Rutynowska, et. al, 2020).

The comments submitted by the Polish Ombudsman (officially: The Commissioner for Human Rights) to the provisions of the Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0 included the issues of shifting some of the regulatory costs onto entrepreneurs and creating inequalities on the market, as well as imprecise possibilities of extending the tasks of the tax administration or indicating new powers for the Railway Security Service. The lack of detailed regulations regarding the access of the Minister responsible for computerization to the location data of mobile phones was raised by the Ombudsman as well (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020a). He also expressed concerns related to the introduction of the possibility of issuing oral orders by public administration bodies.

It must be emphasized that, on the one hand, the adopted provisions of the “shields” have directly infringed democratic principles. On the other hand, due to their frequent vagueness, they created the fertile breeding ground for limiting these principles. Such processes are seen in the literature as a stage of democratic backsliding.

On 15 May 2020, the Act on “amending certain acts regarding protective measures in connection with the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus” was announced (Act of 14 May 2020). The act, known as the Anti-Crisis Shield 3.0, entered into force the day after its announcement. The law introduced changes to 50 legal acts. According to the lawmakers, the purpose of the act was to take on *ad hoc* actions – adapting to the current pandemic situation, and long-term measures – “a package of further simplifications and facilitations aimed at maintaining and a possible increase in investments at the stage of recovery from the pandemic.” (Sejm, 2020b).

The provisions of the analyzed act changed the rules for the selection and dismissal of the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (UKE). The participation of the Senate in the procedure of electing the president of the UKE has been removed. It is of particular importance in the situation where the incumbents, having the majority in the Sejm, have lost control over the Senate after the last parliamentary elections. The reasons for shortening the term of office of the current President of UKE may be of a political

nature. At the same time, the limitation of the Senate's powers should be perceived as a manifestation of strengthening the executive power ("executive aggrandizement"), while the Sejm has become a "voting machine" and extension of the government.

The next case is the Anti-Crisis Shield 4.0. This legal act, signed by the President of the Republic of Poland on 22 June 2020, concerned subsidies for bank loans granted to entrepreneurs affected by COVID-19. It seems that this law had a much narrower scope than the previous "shields". However, it amended 56 legal acts and had 76 pages (Act of 19 June 2020).

The Ombudsman pointed out that the Act introduced a possibility that within a lawsuit, an attorney and an accused person are in different places (the lawsuit is proceeded on-line). This regulation may significantly affect the defendant's right to defense (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020b). The challenge for the rule of law in the pandemic in Poland is not only connected with the fact that the government acts without a clear legal basis or that the hierarchy of sources of law has been changed (key role of decrees), but also that citizens' procedural rights have been violated.

In the second half of 2020, the lawmakers continued to introduce a number of normative acts related to attempts to counteract the coronavirus pandemic. One of the most significant cases challenging one of principles of liberal democracy (i.e. the electoral integrity) was the Act of 15 July 2020 on the "Polish Tourist Voucher". The Act, which introduced a one-time support for each child up to maturity, worth 500 PLN, was announced by the President of Poland just before the presidential elections (Act of 15 July 2020). It can be seen as a form of electoral malpractice in the form of an electoral bribe.

### **Conclusion**

To conclude, it is necessary to point out several basic issues that pose a challenge to the state of a liberal democracy in Poland during the COVID-19 crisis. Taking into account the large scale of the regulations issued during the pandemic, it is difficult to explain why the state of emergency has not been introduced in Poland. This situation poses threats to the rights of citizens (including participatory and contestation rights) because many freedoms were limited without introducing the state of emergency, and what is more, many restrictions were made in the form of regulations - decrees on the basis of blanket statutory provisions. Therefore, the requirements of the Polish constitution were not met. We can also notice that the scope of regulations based on "COVID-19 laws" went beyond the issues related to combating the pandemic and its consequences. This can mean that the government has used the pandemic as a possibility to strengthen and consolidate its power.

Although we can agree that the deterioration of democracy in Poland is still about undemocratic changes within one political regime (be it "flawed democracy" or "electoral democracy") and can be called democratic backsliding, the measures taken by the Polish government during the pandemic may change the situation in the future. If the adopted anti-COVID-19 regulations as well as the model of governance adopted during pandemic will not be temporary and will remain after the pandemic, it may contribute substantially to a further shift of the political regime towards a less democratic (hybrid) regime. The claims about increasing autocratization in Poland will then be fully justified.



**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study: A.S, L.Z.; Data Acquisition: A.S, L.Z.; Data Analysis/Interpretation: A.S, L.Z.; Drafting Manuscript: A.S, L.Z.; Critical Revision of Manuscript: A.S, L.Z.; Final Approval and Accountability: A.S, L.Z.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The paper presents a part of the project De-democratization at the times of Covid-19 financed within the program Excellence initiative – research university (2020-2026), 4EU+ Alliance.

**Acknowledgement:** We would like to thank Andrea Cassani and Luca Tomini for their contribution to the theoretical part of the article.

## References

- Ackerman, B. (2004). The emergency constitution. *Yale Law Journal*, 113(5):1029–1092. Retrieved from <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol113/iss5/2>
- Baran, K. W. (2020). Komentarz do niektórych przepisów ustawy z dnia 31 marca 2020 r. o zmianie ustawy o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych oraz niektórych innych ustaw [Commentary on some provisions of the Act of 31 March 2020 amending the Act on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and crisis situations caused by them, and some other acts]. In M. Borski, A. Przybyłowicz, A. Rogacka-Łukasik, I. Sierocka & K. W. Baran (Eds.), *Tarcza antykryzysowa 1.0 - 4.0, ustawa o dodatku solidarnościowym i inne regulacje, jako szczególne rozwiązania w prawie pracy, prawie urzędniczym i prawie ubezpieczeń społecznych związane z COVID-19. Komentarz* [Anti-crisis shield 1.0 - 4.0, the act on the solidarity allowance and other regulations as special solutions in labor law, official law and social security law related to COVID-19. Comment], Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.
- Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1): 5-19, DOI: 10.1353/jod.2016.0012
- Bjørnskov, CH. & Voigt, S. (2018). Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency? On the Determinants of Using Emergency Constitutions, *European Journal of Political Economy*, 54: 110–123. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.01.002
- Cassani, A., & Tomini, L. (2019). *Autocratisation in post-Cold War Political Regimes*. Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Commissioner for Human Rights. (2020a). *Koronawirus – Tarcza Antykryzysowa 2.0. Uwagi RPO dla Senatu* [Coronavirus – Anti-Crisis Shield 2.0. Remarks of the Commissioner for Human Rights for the Senate], 14 April 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawirus-tarcza-antykryzysowa-2-0-uwagi-rpo-dla-senatu>
- Commissioner for Human Rights. (2020b). *Koronawirus. Uwagi RPO dla Senatu do Tarczy Antykryzysowej 4.0* [Coronavirus. Remarks of the Commissioner for Human Rights for the Senate on the Anti-Crisis Shield 4.0], 12 June 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawirus-uwagi-rpo-dla-senatu-do-tarczy-antykryzysowej-4-0>
- Constitutional Tribunal. (2020). *Wyrok w imieniu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej K1/20* [Judgment decision on behalf of the Republic of Poland K1/20], 22 October 2020.
- Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (Dziennik Ustaw of 1997, No. 78, item 483, with amendments).
- Cridde, E. J. & Fox-Decent, E. (2012). Human rights, emergencies, and the rule of law. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 34(1):39–87. DOI: 10.2307/41345471
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2021). *Democracy Index 2020. In sickness and in health?* EIU: London. Retrieved from [www.eiu.com](http://www.eiu.com)
- Ferejohn, J. & Pasquino, P. (2004). Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers. *The International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 2:215. DOI: 10.1093/icon/2.2.210
- Florczak-Wątor, M. (2020). Niekonstytucyjność ograniczeń praw i wolności jednostki wprowadzonych w związku z epidemią COVID-19 jako przesłanka odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej państwa [Unconstitutional restrictions on individual rights and freedoms imposed in connection with the COVID-19 epidemic as a premise for the state liability for damages]. *Państwo i Prawo* [State and Law], 12, 5-22.
- Hafner-Burton, M., Helfer, L.R. & Fariss, C.J. (2011). Emergency and escape: Explaining derogations from human rights treaties. *International Organization*, 65(4):673–707. DOI: 10.1017/S002081831100021X
- Jałoszewski, M. (2020, March 5). Koronawirus w Polsce ograniczy na zawsze nasze prawa? Analiza OKO.press: ustawa PiS to prawny populizm [Will coronavirus in Poland limit our rights forever? OKO.press analysis: the PiS law is a legal populism]. *OKO.press*. Retrieved from <https://oko.press/koronawirus-w-polsce-ustawa-analiza/>
- Krakowiak, L. (2020, May 1). Prezes UKE „ofiara” koronawirusa. Aukcja na 5G zostanie anulowana? [President of UKE a “victim” of the coronavirus. Will auction on 5G be canceled?]. *Computerworld.pl*.



- Retrieved from <https://www.computerworld.pl/news/Prezes-UKE-ofiara-koronawirusa-Aukcja-na-5G-zostanie-anulowana,420794.html>
- Lührmann, A., Dahlum, S., Lindberg, S.I., Maxwell, L., Mechkova, V., Olin, M., Pillai, S., Petrarca, C.S., Sigman, R. & Stepanova, N. (2018). *Democracy for All? V-dem Annual Democracy Report 2018*. Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Retrieved from: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>
- Lührmann, A., Lindberg, S.I., Mechkova, V., Olin, M., Piccinelli Casagrande, F., Petrarca, C.S. & Saxer, L. (2017). *Democracy at Dusk? V-dem Annual Democracy Report 2017*. Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Retrieved from: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>
- Lührmann, A., Maerz, S.F., Grahn, S., Alizada, N., Gastaldi, L., Hellmeier, S., Hindle, G. & Lindberg, S.F. (2020). *Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows, V-dem Annual Democracy Report 2020*. Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Retrieved from: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/>
- Lührmann, A. & Rooney, B. (2020). Autocratization by Degree: States of Emergency and Democratic Decline. *Comparative Politics*. DOI: 10.5129/001041521X16004520146485
- Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and Defective Democracies. *Democratization* 11(5):33-58. DOI: 10.1080/13510340412331304598
- ODHIR (2020). Opinion on the Draft Act on Special Rules for Conducting the General Election of the President of the Republic of Poland Ordered in 2020 (Senate Paper No. 99), Warsaw, 27 April 2020, Retrieved from [https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8660/file/373\\_ELE\\_POL\\_27Apr2020\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8660/file/373_ELE_POL_27Apr2020_en.pdf)
- Paloumpis, A., Satterwhite, A., Paulson, A., Talero, A., Thompson, B. & Ryncarz, C. (2019). *Identifying Trends in Democratic Erosion*. The Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University.
- Plattner, M. (2015). Is democracy in decline? *Journal of Democracy* 26(1): 5-10. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2015.0014
- Richards, E.D. L. & Clay, K.C. (2012). An Umbrella With Holes: Respect for Non-Derogable Human Rights During Declared States of Emergency, 1996-2004. *Human Rights Review*, 13(4):443-471. DOI: 10.1007/s12142-012-0245-z
- Rutynowska, E., Tatała, M., Wachowiec, P. (2020, May 4). 14 grzechów „ustawy kopertowej” [14 sins of the “envelope law”]. *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*. Retrieved from <https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1474229.wybory-prezydenckie-10-maja-glosowanie-korespondencyjne.html>
- Sejm. (2020a). Uzasadnienie do „Rządowy projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych oraz niektórych innych ustaw” [Rationale to „The government bill amending the act on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the emergencies caused by them, and some other acts.”]. 26 March 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=299>
- Sejm. (2020b). Uzasadnienie do “Rządowy projekt ustawy o zmianie niektórych ustaw w zakresie działań osłonowych w związku z rozprzestrzenianiem się wirusa SARS-CoV-2” [Rationale to “The government bill amending certain acts in the field of protective measures in connection with the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus”]. 28 April 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=344>
- Sobczak, K. (2020, November 4). Prof. Andrzej Wróbel: Zgromadzenia można ograniczać tylko w zgodzie z konstytucją [Prof. Andrzej Wróbel: Assemblies can only be restricted in accordance with the Constitution]. *Prawo.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.prawo.pl/prawo/zakaz-zgromadzen-wg-prof-andrzeja-wroblamozna-ograniczac-tylko,504227.html>
- Szmit, J. (2020). Państwo wobec pracowników administracji rządowej (uwagi na tle ustawy antykryzysowej) [The state towards the government administration employees (comments on the anti-crisis act)]. *Państwo i Prawo* [State and Law], 12, 92-106.
- Tilly, C. (2007). Democratization and De-Democratization. In *Democracy* (pp. 51-79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ustawa z dnia 18 kwietnia 2002 r. o stanie klęski żywiołowej [Act of 18 April 2002 on the state of natural disaster.] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2002, no. 62, item. 558)
- Ustawa z dnia 2 marca 2020 r. o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych [Act of 2 March 2020 on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the crisis situations caused by them.] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 374)
- Ustawa z dnia 31 marca 2020 r. o zmianie ustawy o szczególnych rozwiązaniach związanych z zapobieganiem, przeciwdziałaniem i zwalczaniem COVID-19, innych chorób zakaźnych oraz wywołanych nimi sytuacji kryzysowych oraz niektórych innych ustaw [Act of 31 March 2020 amending the act on special solutions related to the prevention, counteracting and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the emergencies caused by them, and certain other acts.] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 568)
- Ustawa z dnia 16 kwietnia 2020 r. o szczególnych instrumentach wsparcia w związku z rozprzestrzenianiem się wirusa SARS-CoV-2 [Act of 16 April 2020 on specific support instruments in connection with the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 695)
- Ustawa z dnia 14 maja 2020 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw w zakresie działań osłonowych w związku z rozprzestrzenianiem się wirusa SARS-CoV-2 [Act of 14 May 2020 amending certain acts in the field of protective measures in connection with the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 875)

- Ustawa z dnia 15 lipca 2020 r. o Polskim Bonie Turystycznym [Act of 15 July 2020 on the Polish Tourist Voucher] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 1262)
- Ustawa z dnia 19 czerwca 2020 r. o dopłatach do oprocentowania kredytów bankowych udzielanych przedsiębiorcom dotkniętym skutkami COVID-19 oraz o uproszczonym postępowaniu o zatwierdzenie układu w związku z wystąpieniem COVID-19 [Act of 19 June 2020 on interest subsidies for bank loans granted to entrepreneurs affected by COVID-19 and on simplified proceedings for approval of an arrangement in connection with the occurrence of COVID-19] (Dziennik Ustaw of 2020, item. 1086)
- Zajadło, J. (2020, March 4). Demokracja deliberatywna w pułapce. Trzy grzechy ustawy dotyczącej koronawirusa [Trapped deliberative democracy. Three sins of the Coronavirus Act]. *Konstytucyjny.pl*. Retrieved from <https://konstytucyjny.pl/jerzy-zajadlo-demokracja-deliberatywna-w-pulapce/>
- Żaczekiewicz-Zborska, K. (2021, February 22) Trociuk: Bezprawne rozporządzenia rządu uderzają w obywateli [Trociuk: Unlawful government decrees hit citizens]. *Prawo.pl*. Retrieved from <https://www.prawo.pl/prawo/bezprawne-rozporzadzenia-rady-ministrow-uderzaja-w-obywateli,506440.html>

## Religion As a Component of Poland's State Identity and As Manifested in its Foreign Policy

Anita Budziszewska<sup>1</sup> , Anna M. Solarz<sup>2</sup> 

### Abstract

This article is devoted to religion as one component of state identity; where the latter is here defined as a form of identity shaped by ruling elites, i.a. on the basis of national identity, with a view to the interests and conduct of the state being legitimised – both domestically and in foreign policy. In our case study relating to Poland, we have assumed that religion and the values founded upon it are key variables, and among the most important components to present-day state identity. At the same time, we note that this specific identity for Poland also materialises in axiologically-based conflict, given that a foundation upon the factor of religion represents one of the most deeply-rooted levels of self-determination – in the CEECs in particular. In this part of the world, religion has always played an exceptional role in building state identities, not least given the fundamental impact on any understanding of what freedom denotes. In the pursuit of such ideas, the authors have organised the present article into: (1) a theoretical part that introduces the relevant theory (stressing i.a. religion's role as a tool accounting for political and international reality); (2) research on religion's role in shaping domestic policy and state identity; and (3) an attempt to answer questions as to how a religion-based state identity is made tangible in foreign policy (in line with an assumption that the latter is in essence an extension of internal policy, whereby state identity influences the conduct of the state externally); and in that way also in international relations.

### Keywords

the religion factor, State identity, Religion in domestic and foreign policy, Polish foreign policy, Poland, the CEECs

**1 Corresponding Author:** Anita Budziszewska (PhD Candidate), The University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Diplomacy and International Institutions, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: [anita.budziszewska@uw.edu.pl](mailto:anita.budziszewska@uw.edu.pl) ORCID: 0000-0002-1950-2612

**2** Anna M. Solarz (PhD), The University of Warsaw, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Department of Regional and Global Studies, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: [asolarz@uw.edu.pl](mailto:asolarz@uw.edu.pl) ORCID: 0000-0002-7110-3205

**To cite this article:** Budziszewska, A., & Solarz, A. M. (2022). Religion As a Component of Poland's State Identity and As Manifested in its Foreign Policy. *SiYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S85–S103. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.9956867>

## Introduction

Work on religion in international relations has been done for several decades now and so appears to have found itself a little “out of breath” recently (cf. Haynes, 2021); not least in the face of the “burnout” of political Islam. However we may feel certain that this phenomenon accompanying humankind from its earliest times has not yet had its last word where the international sphere is concerned. This is why any abandonment of study (even in the face of a still-tangible lack of suitable research tools or theories) would denote a failure – perhaps even a dereliction of duty – on the part of IR theoreticians, not least when it comes to the need to anticipate and account for future events in the nature of breakthroughs, watersheds or tipping points where the world as a whole is concerned.

Conclusions of this kind are particularly called for whenever any closer look is taken at the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), and most especially at one of their number – Poland. It is exactly this kind of scrutiny that we are encouraging with the considerations presented here on the basis of our investigations.

This article thus links up with research into the influence of religion on states’ foreign policies, not least the theoretical considerations spearheaded by C. M. Warner and S. G. Walker. For those authors, religion has remained nothing less than: “one of the great and the least understood security challenges in the twenty-first century” (Warner & Walker, 2011:113). That in turn led them to propose their own approach to issues involving interesting ways of applying different theories from IR (Warner & Walker, 2011:117-119). Like Warner and Walker, we recognise that constructivism in IR supplies certain tools by which the influence referred to may be studied – hence a theoretical aspect to our considerations relating first and foremost to the core analytical category of identity in IR, if also through a distinction being drawn between state and national identities.

Like other (Western) states coming together to co-create international structures, Poland has been pursuing a foreign policy that seeks to achieve security for its citizens, as well as a genuine opportunity for them to exercise their freedoms. To this extent, then, goals resemble those found elsewhere quite closely, even as Poland differs from most of its counterpart states further west (while resembling those in its part of Europe), *inter alia* as regards the role of religion in building national identity, and hence also identity at the level of the state. We recognise the influence of state-level identity in helping define the interests and directions that are considered to characterise the foreign policy that governments here in Poland pursue, and that religion has always had an exceptional role to play in building state identities in the countries now treated together under the loose heading of CEECs, exerting a very telling influence on those countries’ understanding(s) of the concept of freedom or liberty. The approaches are of a kind that have continued to stand out against the prevailing liberal discourse, and – while various views or assessments are possible in that regard – the importance of the role *vis-à-vis* identity is quite clear.

What is more, the identities in question here can be seen to have developed in line with what this borderland region has experienced in historical and geopolitical terms. For it needs to be recalled how the territory making up virtually all of today’s “Central and Eastern European Countries” formed for centuries a kind of “bulwark” zone that in practice operated in such a way as to afford more westerly parts of Europe protection

against "alien" incursions (be these by Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, the USSR or Russia). In an ideological sense, that also meant a safeguarding against the impact of different concepts of freedom (*de facto* mostly involving slavery) potentially or actually coming in from the east.

Indeed, even in today's world, it would be hard to resist the idea that something of the same kind of buffer function continues to be served. The CEECs themselves in fact seem to be nurturing a gradually-growing awareness that this is the case, especially in the face of a still-aggressive (or even increasingly aggressive) policy being pursued by Russia.

When it comes to Poland, its foreign policy is one founded on a state identity that exposes and expounds the aforementioned experience from history, in particular when it comes to the factor of religion. Indeed, this has all assumed a rather stark form since 2015 when *Zjednoczona Prawica* (the United Right") came to power, with *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (*PiS*, alias *Law and Justice*) at its head. Indeed, the present government has actively been seeking to give life and effect to the relevant concept, i.a. through the pursuit of religious rhetoric, as well as certain policy course-corrections that have more than once broken Poland out from the united front that is the West, and at the same time disrupting key powers' efforts to further their own key interests.

In the view of many foreign observers (but also probably the greater part of the Opposition domestically), the policy in question is a version and manifestation of populist nationalism that can pose a threat to both democracy and peace. This kind of view would seem to be held by much of Poland's cultural elite, for example; even as it is (quite evidently) a minority standpoint among the Catholic clergy, and within the Church hierarchy. Where Polish society is concerned, there would appear to be a deep divide regarding the identity in question. Nevertheless, *Law & Justice* victories in elections over the last 6 years have been on a scale tending to indicate that a majority of voters are not swayed much by the rhetoric from either critics outside the country or the Opposition. Indeed, part of the "blame" for the present situation lies with the latter's unending desire to criticise *PiS* at all costs, in this way seeming to largely ignore the aforesaid regional cultural and historical conditioning that is present in reality. For, in our view, identity does indeed offer a key to understanding the issue of the "populist nationalism" present in Poland and the CEECs. And, as religion plays its particular role in that, the article we present will help ensure the presence of some more-profound research into this issue.

### **State Identity and National Identity in CEEC Region**

Identity links up with awareness that is a feature of a person (awareness of "the self" as distinct from "the other"). Collective identity – has for decades been a popular, but also much-debated category anchored in the social sciences. The advantage of this approach lies, not merely in the way that a given society can be distinguished from its surroundings, but also in the way that an integrating function can be supplied in respect of units that are taking shape (Jenkins, 1996). In international relations (and all the more so in the period when this discipline was taking on its special features, i.e. in the 1970s and 1980s), a striving to rationalise the issues of security, the subordination of other aspects to the economy, and a growing attachment to quantitative methods all mitigated against research into identity. However, the idea itself (as lifted from philosophy) was

not alien, and did therefore make occasional appearances in the hands of various different workers (cf. Szeptycki, 2018). However, the real breakthrough came along as cultural issues came to be injected into the considerations (i.e. as the so-called "cultural turn" took place, thanks to an end put to the Cold War that had not been foreseen by mainstream theories); and as social constructivism became more and more popular. The rejection of the hitherto-dominant unilateral materialistic approach combined with a focusing-in on human awareness and its role in international relations to bring about a "sociologisation" of the discipline (whereby "anarchy is what states make of it"). The effect was to open the field up to the matter of collective identities within the international dimension of social relations (Jackson & Sorensen, 2012).

As constructivists harbour a conviction that there is no objective social reality beyond human awareness, their research looks at ways in which shared meaning or significance arises. In their view, identity comprises two types of idea: how people imagine themselves and how others imagine them (Skolimowska, 2019). Against that kind of backdrop, some researchers (such as A. Wendt) focus on the influence of the international environment in the shaping of state awareness, while others have started to perceive the significance of the internal environment (Skolimowska, 2019). A certain breakthrough in this regard was achieved in work under the editorship of Peter Katzenstein, involving the analysis of internal ideas, norms, cultures and identities of states as causal factors, given the part they all play in defining interests and shaping national policies vis-à-vis security (cf. Katzenstein, 1996). Thus, state identity understood as a social construct shaped by a variety of different factors and people, and changing over time, has ceased to be a matter of mere secondary importance in considerations of foreign policy (cf. Telhami & Barnett, 2002).

It was *inter alia* Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett who engaged in more in-depth study of the influence of identity on states' foreign policy. In their view, the identity of a state needed to be distinguished from national identity, even as both ideas are tied to residents' relationships with those beyond the boundaries of their community (state identity) or their territory (national identity). According to these authors: "state identity can be understood as the corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus; national identity can be defined as a group of people who aspire to or have a historical homeland, share a common myth and historical memories, have legal rights and duties for all members, and have markers to distinguish themselves from others" (Telhami & Barnett, 2002: 8).

The way in which governments define state identity – which they usually build on the basis of their convictions as regards national identity – gains its expression in both domestic and foreign policy. The external aspect referred to by us in this article is furthermore the venue for some clash with the vision of the given state (i.e. the identity) as nurtured in the imagination of "another" – in fact the various "others" also pursuing international relations actively.

It would also seem reasonable to suggest that state identity and national identity (as both perceived by people) may not depart from each other too greatly, given the way that that would denote a potential loss of legitimacy on the part of a government, with the knock-on effect being impaired credibility and effectiveness on the international scene.

It is worth recalling that, thanks to identity policy, authorities may influence national identity, shaping it to a certain degree, even as many factors influencing it remain beyond their reach.

In Poland's case, one such factor is religion, with this having played a very major nation- and state-building role during the country's history. Nevertheless, even Poland's case can be well (or better) understood if set among the specific features of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole.

As researchers note, affiliation or affinity carries with it obligations – which is why politicians both government and opposition typically encourage voters to define themselves in terms of their nationality (Herrmann et.al, 2009). Radical views in this context were expressed in *Nations and Nationalism* by Ernest Gellner, for whom: "Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures". Invoking E. Durkheim, Gellner further notes how religion favours nationalism, as the place of God as the subject of a cult can be taken by the nation – "in religious worship society adores its own camouflaged image" – thus using God as an intermediary in self-worship (Gellner, 1991: 64). A consequence of recognition for the above author's arguments as supranational communities and a global society are built may thus be an attempt to disarm, neutralise and oust "principles of nationalism" – noting their potential status as obstacles on the road to achieving the goal (cf. Gellner, 1991).

All that said, Gellner's approach may not be applied readily to the CEECs, and it would appear that we find here a cause for many misunderstandings in the subject literature as well, given the way that authors there eschew any more incisive or profound regional study. To be seen nevertheless as an interesting thesis – albeit one founded and pursued via simplification, as opposed to more in-depth research (in our region in particular) – is the work of the renowned Francis Fukuyama (as in Fukuyama, 2018).

The fact that Fukuyama's book is of value to researchers on the CEECs even despite the above shortcomings lies in the way in which, unlike Gellner, the author here perceives a dignity dimension to identity policy. One may nevertheless end up being much surprised, to say the least, by conclusions that throw together in one "populist sack" the likes of Putin, Erdoğan, Orbán, Kaczyński and Trump.

Researchers from the CEECs have come up with a different identifiable approach, presented effectively enough by M. Hroch, and drawing a distinction between two overlapping levels on which the nation can be comprehended, i.e. "the level of a large social community that exists in reality (it is a 'sociological fact')" and "the level of an abstract community of (shared) cultural values, i.e. as a specific cultural construct". The Czech researcher goes on to note how: "the nation in the sense of a community of shared values is currently being devalued and marginalised, while the nation as a sociological fact continues to thrive" (Hroch, 2020). In Hroch's view, the cause of the splitting apart of the two levels is "the neoliberal shift that has occurred on the value scale, one result of which has been the decline of education in the humanities", as well as a "postmodern campaign against 'nationalism', which has been supported by the European Union among



others” (Hroch, 2020). Hroch furthermore sees it as something obvious that a nation will be headed up by a national movement that seeks to put in place a state (with the elite in so doing making a reality out of the aspirations of the people). All ”young nations” are in particular invoked here, by which we mean those arising from the 19th century onwards, both East and West. The researcher regards this as historical fact that is hard to dispute or even discuss, notwithstanding the way in which it may or may not receive our positive assessment (Hroch, 2020).

Such approaches may be regarded as close to that proposed by Polish researcher A. Szeptycki, even though his arguments do not concern the category of nation directly, but are rather about the broader identity of international entities (or identities). [*As here translated*] the author defines this as: ”a set of symbols, norms and traditions that ensure continuity over time and distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* other groups, both when it comes to self-perception and the perceptions of others – i.e. those that are the subject of its particular care and influence over action taken in international circles” (Szeptycki, 2018). Similarity to the arguments of the Czech researcher can be noted in Szeptycki’s conviction that the identity in question is conditioned objectively by existing factors of an internal nature, if nevertheless subject to constant redefinition by actors in society coming within the given collective identity or polity, as well as indirectly via the surroundings (Szeptycki, 2018).

Looking through the prism of the two Central European authors’ considerations, we would have to see the approach advanced by Gellner as an extreme one not really suited to this particular region’s study, or indeed research on Poland specifically. In this case, “the nation” needs to be viewed, not as construct of the governing elite, but rather – first and foremost – as an instrument by which basic needs can be pursued. This is to say the ”freedom and truth” that ordinary people have been demanding. It is rather in this context that we need to locate the role of religion as a component of both national identity and state identity.

### **Religion and National Identity in the CEECs – Radosław Zenderowski’s Outlook**

The last decade of the 20th century surprised the whole world in the exceptional intensity with which nation-building and religious processes took place among the CEECs, countries which might almost have been forgotten about altogether in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in a situation characterised by Soviet domination. The circumstances under which and means by which sovereignty was regained by states in the region, and even more so the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, did draw the attention of the world to the role of the religious factor in the processes involved, but there remains no more in-depth study of the intricate linkage between religion, the nation and the state in this region (cf. Zenderowski, 2011). This is why particular importance might be attached to the work of a Polish observer of the processes ongoing in this part of Europe – Radosław Zenderowski. The researcher himself stresses how a personal origin in a borderland between religions and cultures has left him feeling like a “participant-observer” in regard to the phenomena he documents (cf. Zenderowski, 2011). He further notes how an ongoing issue in all work done in the region is the overestimation or else underestimation of the role religion plays in shaping national identity. Moreover, it is typically true to say that religion either takes the blame for extreme nationalism and

ethnic hatreds, or else people simply fail altogether to notice its entanglement in the ills of the region (Zenderowski, 2010).

It is at the same time hard to offer up an unequivocal answer to any question regarding the moral dimension to "the ethnicisation of religion", or indeed the "sacralisation of ethnos" (two phenomena the author notes in this part of Europe that are obviously in essence sides of the same coin) (Zenderowski, 2010). What is certain is that the linkage between religion and ethnos has allowed national identity to be shaped – but also preserved – among Poles, Serbs, Hungarians, Greeks and so on. But Zenderowski notes that the link between religion and nationalism in Western Europe (be that Spain or France, Germany, the UK, or the Scandinavian countries) is different from that on display and at work in the CEECs. In the first group, the development of national identity was mainly conditioned (in particular from the 17th century onwards) by conflicts of a socio-political and economic nature, with religion tending to be left in the background.

However, in our continent's Eastern part, the situation was the reverse – the arising nationalisms were founded mainly upon religious and culture-linguistic animosities, with differences of a socio-political or economic nature left more on the back burner, as it were (Zenderowski, 2010). In turn, the development of societies in the West has proceeded in the direction of religion's incapacitation by nationalism. So today the topic fails to spark the kind of emotions in society that would provide for more far-reaching political change. It has in some sense been emptied of its secrets – or even its sanctity – having been incorporated into "civil religion" as a kind of decorative element (Zenderowski, 2010).

The eastern part of the Old Continent looks totally different from this point of view. Indeed, Zenderowski (2010) noted how religion and nationalism coexisted as two powerful forces effective at influencing society (and each other). The author thus observes that this part of the world features rivalry for what Mickiewicz called "the government of souls", even as there is also close cooperation between these powerful carriers of sense in our lives. The author's research suggests that – among other reasons – we had here a consequence of Christian Churches in particular serving in a substitute role in the face of non-existent statehood, indeed given what it meant to experience the lack of a state being present under the circumstances of partitioning by hostile outsiders, and/or the actual ceding of territory to another state more powerful than one's own had been. And in the absence of state institutions – let alone states as such – ethnos tended to integrate around a particular Church or Churches, whose activities under the circumstances extended far beyond the pastoral.

All of that has left the legacy of a particular attachment on the part of this region's people(s) to religion. However, in this circumstance, religion can be taken to mean the sacred dimension, obviously; but also the cult and ritual aspects; and beyond that the idea that religious symbols are also those of the given nation (Zenderowski, 2011). What Zenderowski saw as a consequence of that was the CEECs and the region in which they are located experiencing an *en bloc*, long-term assuming of a specific identity as "bulwark of Christianity" in a borderland region forever subject to the visitations (and the repression imposed by) other outside cultures. That left religion as a matter extending beyond piety at the individual level, in the direction of its being a factor integrating an entire large group of people. What else could offer the hope of eventual victory in (repeated) moments of

defeat and calamity? In the view of the author, religion helps (as it has in the past helped) with the maintenance of identity within an ethnic minority coming under foreign rule and domination thanks to this region's very complex history (Zenderowski, 2010).

Needing to be seen as of particular importance are the researcher's observations when it comes to the consequences of the role religion plays in the shaping and maintaining of national identities among the CEECs. It is hard not to concur with Zenderowski when he says that this underpins a division of Europe into east and west that is also observable within the European Union. Zenderowski (2010) contends straightforwardly that (*in translation*: "the different ways of looking at the role of religion in public life leads to many misunderstandings, and upholds the feeling of belonging to different civilisations"). Furthermore, this fissure can be seen as far more serious than either the economic or ideological gulfs that may be hangovers from the communist era. Words from the researcher written back in 2010 may be viewed as rather prophetic, given that they describe Europeans being divided ever more firmly on the basis of attitudes to the presence or religion in public life.

Work done in 34 European countries by the Pew Research Center (as published in October 2018) served to confirm the existence of deep cultural differences between our continent's eastern and western parts. Asked whether being faithful to a given religion of religious denomination was an important part of national identity, people were far more likely to answer in the affirmative if they were from the CEECs, as opposed to Western Europe. In most of the former countries, the shares of the population accepting the validity of the statement even exceeded 50% (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Equally, more in-depth work completed a year previously (in relation to the links between religion and national identity in the CEECs) pointed to an interesting trend. While states with a Catholic majority (like Poland, Hungary and Czechia) in fact showed 1991-2015 declines in the percentages identifying themselves with that faith, the trend for the countries dominated by Orthodox faiths (in particular Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine) was quite the opposite, even though the share of people practising actively is actually much lower in these countries than in their Catholic counterparts. The fact remains that, while for 70% of followers of Orthodox faiths on average, religion is an important aspect of national identity, the corresponding figure is already down at 57% in the case of the Catholics (Pew Research Center, 2017). The Center's research further pointed to marked east-west differences in perceptions of the "immigration problem", abortion and gay marriage. This helps sustain Zenderowski's reflection that a civilisational fissure is opening up across the Old Continent. Zenderowski's research shows some uniqueness of the CEECs region in terms of the role of religion, especially if we will compare it to West countries history and concept of freedom that shaped the western identity. Thus, as Zenderowski states we cannot understand the Polish national identity without having in mind its traditional attachment to Christianity and to the role religion played through a difficult history and at the same time, in shaping national character. These characteristics, although less striking nowadays, are still important factors of identity.

### **Statistical Research on Religion and National Identity in Poland**

Those seeking to answer a question as to how Poland positions itself among these identity dilemmas (on the basis of how strong is the link between religion and the nation

that today's ruling elite use to shape the state identity they later expound in foreign policy), would need to engage in precisely the kind of in-depth sociological study that is lacking at present (cf. Szeptycki, 2018). However, it is worth referring to polling research revealing how, as of 2019, some 91.9% of Poles declared affiliation with the Catholic Church, while more than 90% regarded themselves as believers in one way or another (KAI, 2021). That said, there truly remains an inadequate basis to support a clear conclusion as regards Poles' strong links to religion and the Church. While the share of people engaging in religious practices is falling less rapidly in Poland than in other European states, we are nevertheless witnesses to a "creeping secularisation" even here. As of 1990, just 50.3% of Polish Catholics participated in Mass each Sunday, while the figures for 2013 and 2019 were as low as 39.1 and 36.9% respectively (KAI, 2021). Even fewer people were prepared to back the mainstream Catholic stance when it comes to sexual ethics. What this attests to is a religiosity on the part of Poles that can rather be dubbed "cultural Catholicism" (KAI, 2021).

That said, religiousness (including the "intensity" of religious practices), is distributed very unevenly across Poland. According to data from 2017, the proportions of people taking part in Sunday Mass ranged from 71.1% of the Catholics in the Diocese of Tarnów, via 64.1% in Rzeszów and 59.8% in Przemyśl, and just 25.6% in Koszalin-Kołobrzeg and 24.6% in Łódź and Szczecin-Kamień (KAI, 2021). The places that usually emerge as the most religious areas of Poland are those in the south-east, especially Galicja – i.e. the part of Poland once partitioned by the Austrian Empire. The lowest level of religiosity in turn characterises the large cities in the west of the country – these being lands in fact taken (back) from Germany after World War II and settled by Poles from the east – i.e. those areas lost to the country, having been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the Church in Poland has had a difficult few years recently, having been hit by paedophilia scandals of the kind at which (fairly successful) efforts at whitewash were once targeted by those high up in the hierarchy. A demand that these old scores be settled comes, not only from the liberal media (especially those viewing an attack on The Church as a simultaneous attack on the in-power *Law and Justice*). For Catholic publicists are also at times inclined to demand the same thing, knowing that this might improve the condition of a Church that has been losing its influence on people – the young especially (KAI, 2021).

Though research has not yet shown this (Bożewicz, KAI, 2020), it is reasonable to anticipate that the COVID-19 pandemic will also have changed the traditional practice of Sunday Mass, with fewer faithful than before likely to return to churches once they are fully open once more.

The work of foreign research centres allows us to set the religion and religiousness present in Poland against the situation in other countries; as well as to assess the links between their faith and national identity. Again according to the Pew Research Center, Poland was (as of 2015) the country in which the largest share of the population recognised itself as Catholic. The figure of 87% here may be compared with the 84% noted for Croats, 75% for Lithuanians, 56% for Hungarians and 21% for Czechs. Nevertheless, as the corresponding Polish figure for 1991 was 96%, a clear (if not very marked) downward trend is to be discerned (Pew Research Centre, 2017).

Equally, it is in Poland that a higher percentage of Catholics than anywhere else (as many as 64%) feel that this religious status also represents a key element of being a citizen of the country (Pew Research Centre, 2017). In a hierarchy of 34 European states associating religious affiliation and citizenship of the given state in this way, Poland took a high 7th place (after Armenia, Georgia, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria – in which faiths other than Catholicism prevail). Ninth and fourteenth places are then taken by the Catholics of Portugal and Italy (Pew Research Center, 2018). Fifty five percent of Poles also concur with a statement to the effect that, while they may not be perfect as a people, their culture is better than others (on average an answer to this effect was given by as many as 68% of the inhabitants of Orthodox countries, even as that could be set against a figure of 45% for the other countries considered) (Pew Research Center, 2018).

Overall, then, Poland finds a place for itself between the adherents of the Orthodox faith for whom that faith is a key determiner of identity, as well others far less likely to feel this way. In turn, where majority-Catholic countries are concerned, it is again Poland that stands out – in Europe as a whole, not merely among the CEECs.

Any depiction of Poland's Catholicism and its linkage with national identity would be incomplete without a reference to the role of the Polish Pope (and now Saint) John Paul II. During a papacy lasting almost 27 years, the Pontiff made many return visits to his homeland – always receiving a hugely warm welcome with ovations. His final illness and death in April 2005 were thus responded to with near-universal sadness in Poland, with acts of mourning assuming massive proportions and extending far beyond hard-core believers, or even believers in general. For a great many, a moment or period for "national recollection" was afforded then – albeit one differing in scale more than kind from other papal anniversaries (be they of the election of The Pope, of his birth or of his death) – as all marked ceremonially and richly in Poland.

Indeed, no matter which corner of the world he visited on his travels (of which there were famously many), Pope John Paul II would often refer back to his Polish roots and experiences. There remains widespread recognition – among Poles at least – of and for Karol Wojtyła's part in toppling the communist system, generating a revolution in terms of conscience, and giving rise to *Solidarność* (Poland's pioneering "Solidarity" trade union). Research carried out in 2010 found 71% of Poles saw this person as their greatest countryman. No fewer than 62% would go on to claim that the teaching of this Pope had changed their life (even though 33% admittedly said that he had not). Almost two-thirds (64%) were of the view that any reflection on John Paul II brought to mind either a particular situation, or an image or event, or certain words that the great man had spoken. For only 27% of adult Poles was there no association whatsoever of this kind (Boguszewski, 2010).

Most tellingly of all, 91% of Pope John Paul II's fellow Poles claimed that their nation owed something particular or specific to that person (with 65% saying "yes" to that, and a further 26% "rather yes"). That left only 3% voicing the opposite opinion (Boguszewski, 2010).

### **Religion in Post-2015 Polish Foreign Policy**

It needs to be noted however, that the timeframe introduced for the purposes of this article (i.e. 2015) is not a time of "religious revival" in Polish foreign policy, but rather a

specific type of linkup with a combined state-and-religious identity present consistently in Poland's policy from 1989 on, and especially noted and known at European fora. Here one may immediately invoke the intense debate surrounding Poland's EU accession (i.e. pre-2004). A very telling description of that time was offered – back in 2003 – by J. Casanova (Casanova, 2003: 2), for whom: [in translation: the fact that Catholic Poland was "rejoining Europe" at a moment when the Western part of that continent was abandoning its Christian civilisational identity was a cause for concern for both Polish Catholics and secularised Europeans (...) Catholic Poland's re-inclusion within a secularised Europe might thus be perceived as either a tough challenge or a great Apostolic task].

Casanova also referred then to the still-vibrant concept of "Polish Messianism", the maintenance of a Catholic identity, and slogans concerning "Europe's return to Christianity". The still-current status of Christian aspects and values gained reconfirmation in 2019 in an interview during a visit to Washington made by Poland's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who put it like this (after Przekiszewski & Tomasik, 2018): [in translation: Poland also has its specificity in the European Union. We are a Christian country and we try to be faithful to certain values. We want the right to keep our identity].

Thus, in seeking to offer some kind of systematisation of the influence of religion on Poland's activity and conduct at international fora, it is possible to single out several types of activity. These are:

- the recognition of religion as an important space for foreign-policy activity, including as regards the presence of religion and religious practices in public discourse;
- action taken by the state to promote defined values associated with or arising out of religion (with defined motives in the context of, for example, the promotion or non-promotion of different human rights);
- the context of international cooperation between states, i.e. partnership (including of a strategic nature) where religion is concerned and on account of the approach to religion – spontaneous or intended closeness to states sharing the vision to a greater or lesser extent.

### **The Place and Role Of Religion in Poland's Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021**

The most recent government document designating directions and priorities in Polish foreign policy, i.e. the Polish Foreign Policy Strategy for 2017-2021 (hereinafter "(the) Strategy") makes only 5 references to religion as understood in the broadest sense. Indeed, the contexts present are diverse, given that there is religious radicalism (Strategy, p. 2), the dialogue between religions (Strategy, pp. 22-23) and religious communities (Strategy, p. 22). Even this limited context for the above-mentioned makes it clear that these are only really present symbolically. The document text makes more frequent references to terms like Christianity, civilisational progress, Polish history and ties, and the promotion of Polish values.

In general, then, aspects of the document relating to religious identity are worded less directly; first and foremost calling upon traditional Polish values shaped by the country's history, though with references also made to the Christian foundations underpinning both European integration and the development of civilisation.



The axiological layer was regarded as an area of sufficient importance that a separate point entitled “Values” was devoted to it. The role of Christian values was therefore encapsulated by reference to the key premises of Poland’s position relating to universal values like democracy, governance duly constituted under the rule of law, and respect for human rights. A further general reference was to the Christian values underpinning European integration. The dissemination of these values internationally is deemed to be in Poland’s interest, representing the best guarantee of peace, stability and development around the world. Their promotion therefore needs to be treated as a manifestation of recognition for the axiological dimension, as well as a way in which Poland’s security might be strengthened, even as circumstances favourable to the further development of civilisation are favoured (*Strategia*, 2017).

In what follows in the Strategy, objectives to be pursued in relation to this dimension include action in support of human rights, albeit in line with the initial assumptions of UN documents; as well as support for – and the initiation of – action in respect of the dialogue between religions, and recognition that the promotion of Polishness abroad serves as a platform by which to promote the values present in Polish history and culture (*Strategia*, 2017).

Secondly, while the Strategy has no wording relating directly to any civilisational and cultural divide within the EU, stress is placed on policy addressing the need for national sovereignty to be retained, in the face of less-than-complete integration within the EU. More specifically, a balance is invoked between full integration and EU-reserved policies on the one hand and the independence of national policies on the other hand.

This all may in fact be suggesting an identity context contrasting with the direction being taken up by the EU as such. The Strategy thus refers to a Polish vision of the EU as a union of sovereign states that is neither a superstate on the one hand, nor on the other merely the sum of its national egoisms (...). More explicit objectives thus include action seeking to ensure that the EU reinstates some balance between the principle of state sovereignty and the prerogatives enjoyed by Community institutions, with efforts also needing to be made to enhance the transparency of EU decision-making processes, as well as the democratic mandate they enjoy (*Strategia*, 2017).

All of this needs not denote that Polish integration-related action signalled in such a way arises out of a desire to impose the country’s vision upon Europe. However, it *does* imply account being taken of values distinct from those to which homage is paid by a secularised, progressive and modernised “west” Europe.

The community of interests and shared history of the CEECs may have some alternative impact in reorientating Poland towards “the East”, with associated moves closer together in the axiological dimension (as Zenderowski suggested). This has in fact assumed a more material form in joint initiatives of a “para-religious” nature. An example here would be the joint Polish-Hungarian project to build an orphanage for 118 children in the village of Zeidal in Syria’s Hims province. In one of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviews it was recalled how the agreement entered into with Hungary had been aimed at what was termed the pursuit of joint action in the area, in the interests of Christians in particular (Przeciszewski & Tomasik, 2018).



Our interviewee also referred to US readiness to commit to the defence of clergy engaged in the protection of human rights. In that same context it was noted how Mike Pence had stressed the way in which religious freedoms (at least possibilities for faith to be declared freely and openly in public life) were in his view being curtailed in countries such as the UK, France and Germany (Przeciszewski & Tomasik, 2018). This leaves it as natural-looking if Poland does direct itself towards the CEECs in at least some subtle way, even as the emphasis is placed on the role of cooperation within the region, and a certain agreement at the axiological level. This derives from, but also further emphasises, a certain specific identity present among the countries in question, with its religious context shaped by history. It is this aspect that R. Zenderowski (as referred to in the first part) has sought to account for.

### **Religion in the Political Discourse Internationally, and Poland's Strategic Partnerships of A Religious Nature**

A manifestation of religion's influence on Poland's foreign policy has been an orientation in the direction of inter-state cooperation based around the factor of religion. In this regard, the United States of America under Donald Trump became a natural partner for Poland. Besides interests relating to security (NATO) and the economy, the cooperation involved here was conditioned by joint initiatives making reference to the religious sphere. The work to achieve greater closeness that this entailed materialised *inter alia* in a series of joint conferences under the heading *Ministerials to enhance the freedom of religion or belief*. The three such gatherings were convened in the US in 2018 and 2019 and in Poland in 2020. They were open in character, and international. The last (Warsaw-based) event took place on November 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> 2020, with participants including, not only Ministers/Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and their Deputies, but also Special Envoys for freedom of religion. The Council of Europe was *inter alia* represented by the Secretary General's Special Representative on Antisemitic and Anti-Muslim Hatred and Hate Crimes; while others present were the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, a representative of the US Commission on Religious Freedom, the Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, and the Secretary General of the Community of Democracies.

The lead subjects at these meetings were naturally the rights to religious freedom (as this also includes the rights and status of religious minorities) as fundamental human rights; the need for the international community to make efforts to ensure dialogue between religions; and actions to protect people persecuted on religious grounds (MSZ, 12.11.2020; MSZ, 17.11.2020).

It needs to be noted just how keen Poland was to expose this cooperation for all to see, with emphasis being put on the community of values linking it with the United States. The fact that a strategic partnership pertained in this area was *inter alia* emphasised in a joint communique the two countries issued. Published on the website of the US Embassy and Consulates in Poland – among other places – this had among its key wording: “The close strategic partnership between Poland and the United States is highlighted by our common interest in advancing religious freedom” (U.S. Mission Poland, 2020). In February 2020, during the visit made by the Polish Delegation to Washington, Poland's Minister of

Foreign Affairs stressed purely and simply that his country was the main partner for the USA in the given domain (Obremski (PAP), 2020).

At the same time, this cooperation stood out in its true religious character, also showing very clearly how religious narrative and spiritual values can tend to be interwoven, as indeed can religious nomenclature with the political discourse. This happens very rarely indeed – in the sense that it is actively avoided – in secularised states that often still have much in common otherwise – with both Poland and the USA. For the Polish-US meetings have sometimes been associated with highly symbolic religious celebrations and ceremonies – e.g. with joint participation in Washington in the so-called *National Prayer Breakfast*.

Comments from the Polish Foreign Minister following one of these visits alluded to American politicians and religious leaders from around the world praying for US leaders – both Trump as President and the House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi (Obremski (PAP), 2020). Later, the Minister cited Trump, who had emphasised the way in which the struggle for religious freedom included that for the right of school pupils to say prayers and the right to have the Cross on display in public places (Obremski (PAP), 2020). It was also noted how bold references to religion in public life were important matters, and (Poles might not be fully aware of the fact that they are) very much acceptable under the political culture of the USA (Obremski (PAP), 2020). Emphasis was further put on a strong message that every child was a gift from God – with this being presented as the kind of value that was subject to “eye-catching” levels of support within America’s political class (Obremski (PAP), 2020). Quite clearly, the praise and recognition for practices of this kind in the USA was seen as legitimising – giving the seal of approval to – the same kinds of customs and habits in Poland.

There have nevertheless been other international meetings and gatherings at which Poland has shown itself more than willing to resort to religious symbolism. July 2020 brought a scheduled meeting of Visegrad Group Foreign Ministers to inaugurate Poland’s 6th holding of the Group’s Rotating Presidency (in the period January-June 2021). The selected conference venue was Wadowice, i.e. the home town of Karol Wojtyła (later Bishop and Cardinal and then Pope John Paul II). This reflects the status of 2021 as marking the hundredth anniversary of the birth of the Pope and Saint. The fact that Wadowice was not a chance location for the meeting was stressed by Polish diplomats as they inaugurated the event (MSZ, 2020). It is worth adding the emphasis laid on the international role of the Visegrad Group in speaking up for Central European interests.

### **Religious Matters and Polish Activity in International Organisations**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland has been stressing how a priority for Poland in the international arena is to postulate consistently how international organisations need to be more active when it comes to fully respecting the rights of religious minorities, as well as the safeguarding of freedom of religion and belief, and the extension of protection to the victims of religious persecution. Polish diplomats have also been active in promoting freedom of religion and belief, *inter alia* at the United Nations and its Human Rights Council, in the EU and at the Council of Europe and OSCE (MSZ, 17.11.2020). Official statements from Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and President

have confirmed this approach many times, with activity engaged in at the UN, and Polish diplomats often taking up relevant initiatives.

Poland's stances and priorities could and can be further emphasised and made clear in connection with the country's terms served on the UN's Security Council (as a non-Permanent Member in the years 2018-2019) and the Human Rights Council (2020-2022). One aspect described from the outset was the role played by religion and freedom thereof. This was signalled by the Minister at a meeting in the US, when he said that action in defence of these was indeed a Security Council priority for Poland (Przeciszewski & Tomasik, 2018).

This policy approach was to be continued with confirmation at the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Council – the one inaugurating Poland's 3-year term on that body. The Minister then mentioned, not only the safeguarding of the right to belief and religion, but also the rights of the child and the disabled (including via a Polish project in the form of the *Joint Statement on the occasion of World Autism Awareness Day*).

In turn, one of the first symbolic initiatives taken up by Poland in the UN context was the establishment of the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief, as marked on August 22<sup>nd</sup>. Work on a two-page Resolution establishing the Day began at the initiative of Poland when it was one of the rotating Members of the UN Security Council, back in 2018. The Resolution wording was worked on, not only by Poland and the USA, but also by Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Canada, Nigeria and Pakistan. The text and document as finally agreed upon gained the support of 88 UN Member States.

It should be noted that Poland's activity at the UN has not been confined to promoting the right to religion, having also made itself felt in a certain selectivity; and a tendency to look at matters involving rights and values through what might be called a "religious lens". In other words, religious values may be said to condition the Polish stance in other matters (involving the aspect of religious identity). This therefore gains emphasis in – among other things – the promotion of particular human rights and the protection of defined values.

The fact above is illustrated by two types of activity engaged in by Poland at the UN. The first of these involved a perception of the right to the freedom of religion as a foundation for further activity (in the case of human rights, the promotion of those rights that can be said to originate in – and/or be in accordance with – the teachings of the Church). This kind of conceptualisation of the role of the right to religion was in some sense confirmed by Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Session of the UN General Assembly in New York held on May 28th 2019, when he said: (in translation) "The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which is commonly referred to as the right to freedom of religion or belief, is a universal right of every human being and the cornerstone of many other rights".

Polish diplomatic polemics were also engaged in at UN plenary sessions devoted to the generally-accepted norms that that organisation promotes. Poland would seem to have had reservations in this area, given that what is promoted fails to correspond with the likes of the country's ruling elite. This would be particularly the case where LGBT matters are

concerned. The dissonance was on display most clearly in March 2020, when a plenary discussion turned its attention to a UN report on the pursuit and enforcement of cultural rights in Poland (Bennoune, 2020). Elements covered by this report and coming to be seen as especially "alarming" related to a Polish religious narrative in line with which women might apparently be discriminated against, while hate speech, intolerance and other kinds of discrimination could spread, and Polish society had become steadily more polarised. Particular emphasis was laid on the lack of protection extended to minorities, including those of a gender-related nature (see more Bennoune, 2020).

Where the influence on religion is concerned, the report focused on this last issue in particular, and the wording was as follows: "Some voices associated with the Catholic Church reflect discriminatory views, for example about LGBT people, which is of grave concern. On the other hand, among the range of Catholic viewpoints in Poland, some use their interpretation of Catholicism as the basis for their activism for human rights and inclusion, and may themselves be criticised by clerical bodies" (Bennoune, 2020). The Recommendations section also noted how: "Safeguarding the separation of religion and state is vital for cultural rights in Poland today" (Bennoune, 2020).

Actions of this kind are not really anything new in state policy, wherein a major role for religion is recognised, along with the influence exerted on state identity. This may be exemplified by, in some sense analogous examples, existing not least in the United States under Donald Trump. Indeed, 2019 saw Mike Pompeo convene a Commission on Inalienable Rights whose main task was to offer "a review of the role of human rights in American foreign policy." (Gessen, 2019; Pompeo 2019).

Pompeo went on to propose that two catalogues of rights be proposed, i.e. the inalienable on the one hand and the *ad hoc* on the other – with the latter being the ones added in the aftermath of the Second World War. This leaves as *ad hoc* rights in respect of LGBT, as well as rights of women to make decisions regarding human reproduction, not least as regards abortions (Rapior, 2019). The Commission was in fact chaired by one of the Professors of the Harvard Law School (Pompeo, 2019), for whom the key subject matter is the relationship between rights and religion, as well as human rights in general. In the past, this person had posts including US Ambassador to the Holy See (Harvard University website, 2021).

The idea to call such a Commission into being thus developed – *inter alia* – around fears expressed by human-rights activists that the State Department might be developing a hierarchy of human rights within which religious freedom would be placed at the top (Rapior, 2019). Where US activity in the UN as such is concerned, a symbolic matter was the country's 2018 withdrawal from the organisation's Human Rights Council (Tarnogórski, 2018).

The above list of examples is by no means exhaustive when it comes to Poland's activity at international fora, as regards religion. Separate issues would be the activity and polemics present in such organisational fora as those of the Council of Europe or EU – not presented here in any more detail, but going a long way to confirming a specific kind of breach over identity and culture when it comes to the Polish case.

The response especially from Europe and the international community to this Polish identity will be important in signalling the condition it itself displays, along with the

state of integration processes ongoing within the European Union. The place and status of Poland in Europe is also to be revealed. The cultural diversity invoked and lionised by the EU, the Council of Europe (as even a constituent element of European-ness) and the UN may perhaps denote an acceptance of difference manifested by Poland, with account also being taken of Europe's traditional links with Christianity. The expert Jose Casanova (who was referred above) himself made reference to the words of former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland – the late Prof. Bronisław Geremek, noting as follows: "I fully agree with Bronisław Geremek that any genealogical reconstruction of the idea of the social imaginary of Europe that makes reference to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Enlightenment, while erasing any memory of Medieval Christendom in the very constitution of Europe as a civilisation evinces either historical ignorance or repressive amnesia. Secondly, the inability to openly recognise Christianity as one of the constitutive components of European cultural and political identity means that a great historical opportunity may be missed to add yet a third important historical reconciliation to the already-achieved reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics, and between warring European nation-states, by putting an end to the old battles over Enlightenment, religion and secularism" (Casanova, 2003: 16; Geremek, 2003/2004).

### **Conclusion**

Those who research the domestic and foreign policy of Poland cannot fail to notice the place religion occupies in the ruling elite's shaping of state identity; bearing in mind the way in which this conditions state activity in the public sphere, including the conduct of Poland internationally, and the decisions taken at international fora. It is worth emphasising that Catholic-and-national "imaginings" are a consequence of the role religion has played in the history of this nation, and indeed the CEECs in general. As Polish decision-makers define the identity of the state and take account of religion in so doing, they face a tough task – as the years since 2015 have made clear. Reference to the faith adhered to by ancestors and predecessors is not a popular thing in an "enlightened" Western Europe, and indeed it also arouses emotion and provokes division within Polish society itself (with traditionalism and Christian values being set against progress, unfettered freedom and laicisation). However, it is hard not to notice that it is these very values which underpin the concepts of national and individual liberty "proper" for the Eastern part of Europe and many times in history "erupting" with great strength. This region's process of laicisation has usually therefore proceeded much less rapidly than those looking in from further west would anticipate.

We may presume that, as the external environment changes, there will also be an evolution of Polish foreign policy (not least with the handover from Donald Trump to a Joe Biden determined not to continue with his predecessor's policies). So does the system internationally give rise to a change of definition of Polish state identity, and will there be a change of configuration of emphasis ... with a more nuanced invoking of religion? Beyond that, if such a change actually does take place, will it mean a loss of Polish "originality" as set against the West in general? Moreover, does Polish foreign policy enjoy any chance of success in the face of the difficulties it must address in this area? For a further question arises concerning the way in which Polish society might start to analyse

a new policy of this type, given that that society is itself divided when it comes to the current role of religion as a component of state identity.

While the considerations we have engaged in here do not offer full or even partial answers to the above questions, the reference to the concept of identity has at least allowed us to advance the Polish case as an example of the complex role the factor of religion has to play in a state's foreign policy. We trust this will encourage other researchers to press on with research into the role of religion in international relations, in particular when it comes to the Central and Eastern European Countries.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors have no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The authors declared that this study has received no financial support

## References

- Bennoune K. (2020), *Visit to Poland. Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights*, Human Rights Council Forty-third session. Agenda item 3. Retrieved from <https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/43/50/Add.1>
- Boguszewski, R. (2010). Jan Paweł II w pamięci i życiu rodaków [“John Paul II in memory and the lives of his fellow Poles”], *Komunikat z Badań (CBOS)*, BS/47, Retrieved from: [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K\\_047\\_10.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_047_10.PDF)
- Bokszanski, Z. (2006). *Tożsamości zbiorowe* [“Collective identities”], Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw.
- Fukuyama, F. (2018). *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
- Casanova J., (2003), Das katholische Polen in säkularisierten Europa, „Transit” Heft (25)
- Casanova J. (2001), Religia i świeckie tożsamości w procesie jednoczenia Europy [“Religion and secular identity in the process of Europe's unification”], Res Publica Nowa (1)
- Gessen M., (2019, July 10), Mike Pompeo's Faith-Based Attempt to Narrowly Redefine Human Rights, The New Yorker. Retrieved from <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/mike-pompeos-faith-based-attempt-to-narrowly-redefine-human-rights>
- Gellner, E. (1991). *Narody i nacjonalizm* [“Nations and nationalism”], Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warsaw
- Geremek B., (2003/2004), Welche Werte für das neue Europa?, „Transit” Heft (26)
- Haynes, J. (2017). Religion and Foreign Policy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia – Politics*, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.380>
- Haynes, J. (2021). Religion and International Relations: What Do We Know and How Do We Know It? *Religions*. 2021; 12(5):328. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050328>
- Hroch, M. (2020). *The nation as a cradle of nationalism and patriotism*, Nations and Nationalism, 26 (1).
- Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2012). *Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych. Teorie i kierunki badawcze* [“An introduction to international relations. Research directions and theories”], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków.
- Jenkins, R. (1996). *Social Identity*, Routledge, London-New York
- Katolicka Agencja Informacyjna (2021), *Kościół w Polsce. Raport* [“The Church in Poland: a report”], Retrieved from [https://www.ekai.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/KAI\\_Raport\\_Kosciol-\\_w\\_Polsce\\_2021\\_2.pdf](https://www.ekai.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/KAI_Raport_Kosciol-_w_Polsce_2021_2.pdf)
- Katzenstein, P. (Ed.). (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York
- Konferencja Ministerialna na rzecz wolności religii lub przekonań [“Ministerial Conference to advance freedom of religion or belief”] (2020, November 11), Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/re/konferencja-ministerialna-na-rzecz-wolnosci-religii-lub-przekonan>
- Konferencja Ministerialna na rzecz wolności religii lub przekonań [“Ministerial Conference to advance freedom of religion or belief”] (2020, November 12), Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/drugi-dzien-konferencji-ministerialnej-na-rzecz-wolnosci-religii-lub-przekonan>
- Minister Jacek Czaputowicz na spotkaniu ministrów spraw zagranicznych państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej [“Minister Jacek Czaputowicz at the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group countries”] (2020, February 7). Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/re/minister-jacek-czaputowicz-na-spotkaniu-ministrow-spraw-zagranicznych-panstw-grupy-wyszehradzkiej>
- Obremski M., (2020, February 7), Szef MSZ: cel wizyty w Waszyngtonie związany z tematem wolności religii



- ["Minister of Foreign Affairs: objective of the visit to Washington associated with freedom of religion"]. Retrieved from <https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/szef-msz-cel-wizyty-w-waszyngtonie-zwiazany-z-tematem-wolnosci-religii>
- Przeciszewski M. i Tomasik K. (2018, August 4), Szef MSZ: Obrona wolności religijnej jest jednym z priorytetów Polski ["Safeguarding religious freedom one of Poland's priorities"], Retrieved from <https://www.ekai.pl/minister-czaputowicz-mamy-prawo-do-zachowania-naszej-tozsamosci-wywiad/>
- Ogromny spadek religijności wśród młodych Polaków ["Huge decline in religiosity among young Poles"]. (2019, July 13), Ogromny spadek religijności wśród młodych Polaków | wMeritum.pl
- Pew Research Center, (2018). Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues, Retrieved from: <https://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/>
- Pew Research Center. (2017). Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, Retrieved from: <https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/>
- Polska inicjatorem ustanowienia Międzynarodowego Dnia upamiętniającego ofiary aktów przemocy ze względu na religię lub wyznanie ["Poland the initiator of the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief"] (2019, May 28). Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/polska-inicjatorem-ustanowienia-miedzynarodowego-dnia-upamietniajacego-ofiary-aktow-przemocy-ze-wzgledu-na-religie-lub-wyznanie>.
- Pompeo M. R., (2019, July 7), Unalienable Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/unalienable-rights-and-u-s-foreign-policy-11562526448>
- Rapior W., (2020, February 3), Prawa człowieka A.D. 2019 ["Human rights 2019 A.D."]. Retrieved from <https://czaskultury.pl/czytanki/prawa-czlowieka-a-d-2019/>
- Skolimowska, A. (2019). Dyskursywne ujęcie tożsamości państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych ["A discursive conceptualisation of the state in international relations"], *Stosunki międzynarodowe – International Relations*, 55 (1), 109-130.
- Solarz, A.M. (2020). Religion and International Relations in the Middle East as a Challenge for International Relations (IR) Studies, *Religions* 2020, 11(3).
- Strategia Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej ["The Strategy for Polish Foreign Policy"] 2017-2021. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/strategia>
- Sufkowski, Ł. (2012). Metodologie emic i etic w badaniach kultury w zarządzaniu ["emic and etic methodologies in research on management culture"], *Management and Business Administration. Central Europe*. 20 (1/108), 64-72.
- Szeptycki, A. (2018). Tożsamość międzynarodowa: zarys problematyki ["International identity: an outline of the subject"], *Sprawy międzynarodowe*, 3, 77-99.
- Telhami, S. & Barnett M. (Eds.), *Identity and foreign policy in the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, New York 2002.
- Tarnogorski R., (2018, June 21), Stany Zjednoczone opuszczają Radę Praw Człowieka ["US leaving Human Rights Council"]. Retrieved from [https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Stany\\_Zjednoczone\\_opuszczaja\\_Rade\\_Praw\\_Czlowieka](https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Stany_Zjednoczone_opuszczaja_Rade_Praw_Czlowieka)
- Valbjørn, M. (2004). Toward a "Mesopotamian Turn": Disciplinarity and the Study of the International Relations of the Middle East. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 14 (1-2), 47–75.
- Warner, C. M., & Walker, S. G. (2011). Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(1), 113-135 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00125.x>
- Wspólne oświadczenie USA i Polski ws. międzynarodowej konferencji na rzecz wolności religijnej ["Joint Statement of the USA and Poland on Ministerial to advance freedom of religion"] (2020, February 6). Retrieved from [https://pl.usembassy.gov/pl/konferencja\\_wolnosc\\_religijna/](https://pl.usembassy.gov/pl/konferencja_wolnosc_religijna/).
- Zenderowski, R. (2011). *Religia a tożsamość narodowa i nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Między etniczyczą religii a sakralizacją etnosu (narodu)* ["Religion in the face of national identity and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe: between the ethnicisation of religion and the sacralisation of ethnos (the nation)"], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław
- Zenderowski, R. (2010). Etnicyzacja religii i sakralizacja etnosu: nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej ["The ethnicisation of religion and the sacralisation of ethnos: nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe"], *Atheneum*, 24, 36-50.
- Życie religijne w czasie pandemii. ["Religious life during the pandemic"] (2020, October 30). Retrieved from: [Życie religijne w czasie pandemii koronawirusa | eKAI](https://www.ekai.pl/zycie-religijne-w-czasie-pandemii-koronawirusa/)







## Party-level Foreign Policy and the Mechanics of Party Competition: The PiS's Euroscepticism and Its Dominance over Right-wing Politics in Poland, 2001-2015

Mustafa Çağatay Aslan<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Following the collapse of the communist regime in Poland, the issue of European Union membership has emerged as one of the top issues in Poland's foreign policy. The EU membership was regarded as a symbol of the country's 'return to Europe' after an interlude of socialism. This initiated the 'Europeanization' process, which requires the harmonization of national laws and norms with those of the EU. During the EU-accession process, the symbolic importance of 'Europeanization,' combining with high level of public support for it, obliged the mainstream political parties to support the EU membership process. The strong opposition to the membership, labelled Eurosceptic stance, was largely embraced by the fringe parties. In the post-accession period, however, Eurosceptic policies became no longer confined to fringe parties and extended to mainstream politics. The right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland is an example of such mainstream parties, the Euroscepticism of which became explicit in the post-accession period. For representing the set of conflicting issues between member state and the EU, the party-based Euroscepticism is a useful reference to reveal the variation in foreign policy understanding of political parties. Using the dichotomy of Szczerbiak and Taggart's soft-Euroscepticism and hard-Euroscepticism, this study suggests that the Euroscepticism of the PiS that has been oscillating between soft and hard Euroscepticism helps the party to keep the other right-wing alternatives with hard-Euroscepticism at bay. From this point of view, the PiS's distinctive foreign policy in terms of its relations with the EU can be interpreted as a contributory factor behind the party's domination over right-wing politics particularly since the 2007 parliamentary elections.

### Keywords

Poland, Euroscepticism, Law and Justice Party, League of Polish Families, Kukiz-15

**1 Corresponding Author:** Mustafa Çağatay Aslan (Asst. Prof. Dr.), Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye. E-mail: [mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr](mailto:mustafa.aslan@istanbul.edu.tr)  
ORCID: 0000-0001-9061-5583

**To cite this article:** Aslan, M. C. (2022). Party-level Foreign Policy and the Mechanics of Party Competition: The PiS's Euroscepticism and Its Dominance over Right-wing Politics in Poland, 2001-2015. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S105–S116. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.949087>



## **Party-level Foreign Policy and the Mechanics of Party Competition: The PiS's Euroscepticism and Its Dominance over Right-wing Politics in Poland, 2001-2015**

Poland officially became a European Union member in May 2004. This marked the achievement of a foreign policy goal that had been pursued by all governments of the post-communist period. With a pure symbolic importance, the EU membership ended the cold-war interlude that had broken Poland's historical and cultural tie with Europe. This widely held perception undergirded the overwhelming public support in the 2003 EU-accession referendum (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2004: 564). Nevertheless, the public euphoria created by the symbolic importance attached to the EU membership eroded for certain voters as some practical consequences of the membership became discernible – an expectation based on the utilitarian theory (Ergün and Tillman, 2007: 397).<sup>1</sup> Indeed, recently conducted polls in Poland confirms this expectation. November 2018 CBOS survey reports that more than 70 per cent of the Poles are opposed to Euro adoption, although Maastricht Treaty defines the Euro adoption as an obligation for all countries that became EU member from 1995 onwards (Szczerbiak, 2019: 178). Cultural and religious conservatives argue loudly that European integration neither conform with traditional Catholic values nor respect Poland's national sovereignty. The other CBOS survey in June 2018 revealed a strong opposition to taking in Muslim refugees and a poll conducted by IBRIS agency in June 2017 reported that “51 per cent of the respondents supported Poland leaving the EU if this was the only way to prevent the country being forced to admit Muslim migrants” (Szczerbiak, 2019: 179). These figures intimate that the consensus on EU membership has been vitiated by the contentious approaches on ‘Poland's Europeanization.’ The divergence matters because EU-related issues influence the existing social cleavages on which the party competition at the national level plays out (Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010: 230-231).

This article focuses on the right-wing Eurosceptic parties from different party families, namely Law and Justice Party (PiS), League of Polish Families (LPR), Kukiz-15. Of the three right-wing Eurosceptic parties, the PiS has been maintaining a monopoly on appealing to conservative voters. This article seeks to explain how the PiS were able to outflank its nearby competitor through a particular emphasis on the party's dynamic foreign policy concerning Poland's part in the trajectory of the Europeanization. As a process, Europeanization requires the continuity of consistency between national laws and norms with those of the EU. The intertwined link between EU governance and national governance enables us to infer the variation in foreign policies of political parties on the basis of the party's positions on issues that have conventionally deemed component of national politics (e.g. Marks et al., 2002). This article is divided into three parts. The first part briefly reviews studies grouping the political parties by their foreign policies on the issue of Europeanization. This revision will justify the selection of the categorization, developed by Taggart & Szczerbiak (2001) and enabling this study to distinguish the PiS's stance on the European integration from those of the other right-wing Eurosceptic parties. The second part captures the nuances of foreign policy outlook of right-wing Eurosceptic parties by the content of their Euroscepticism. To do so, this part uses Chapel

---

1 The utilitarian theory expects that “Europeans consider the potential economic costs and benefits of European integration when forming their opinion [about the EU-accession]” (Ergün and Tillman, 2007: 392).

Hill expert survey that measures party positioning on European integration. The article concludes by arguing that the PiS's dynamic foreign policy oscillating between soft-Euroscepticism and hard-Euroscepticism should be taken into account in explaining why the party succeeded in keeping its electoral strength, and why its nearby competitors were unable to cripple the PiS's electoral support. Mindful of complex causality, the conclusion briefly touches on the other components that are expected to have been hampering other right wing Eurosceptic parties to challenge the PiS's dominance. In that regard, the lack of punitive measures against the disobedient EU members and the lack of a single-issue cleavage (peculiar to European integration), are to be mentioned.

### **Taxonomies of the Party-based Skepticism to the European Integration**

The early years of the post-Maastricht era was marked by the emergence of conflicting views on the European integration, which had been construed as an expert-driven process, in which a plethora of technical requirements for economic cooperation were enforced (e.g., Startin and Krouwel, 2013: 67). The Treaty of Maastricht (also known as Treaty on European Union) rejuvenated the goal of the political integration, which had been set by the expression “ever-closer union” in the preamble of the Rome Treaty, but downplayed against the backdrop of De-Gaullism of the 1960s and economic exigencies of the 1970s (Urwin, 2010: 26 – 27). Broadly speaking, the political integration warrants an increase in the purviews of the European Union Commission and Parliament in the EU decision-making at the expense of the European Union Council and the national governments of the member states. Also, the aim of cultivating a loyalty “among the peoples of Europe” to supranational EU identity by means of the EU citizenship is the leading goal of the political integration. The aim of the political integration prompted competing views, which heavily bear on the national sovereignty and nativist culture (Down and Wilson, 2008: 43). ‘Yes to Europe, No to Maastricht’ became a common slogan for Eurosceptic parties across the political spectrum (Buhr, 2012: 544). The conflicting views on the post-Maastricht integration also harks back the division between mainstream theories of the European integration: neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism.<sup>2</sup> The incipient disagreement on the political integration became further visible in the media due to rising frequency of the campaigns made on the eve of each post-Maastricht Treaty (i.e., Amsterdam, Nice, EU Constitution and Lisbon) and the EU membership referenda. The optimism of the 1980s eroded and skepticism became palpable (Neumayer, 2008: 136; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010: 798).<sup>3</sup> The political parties were compelled to confront the divergence in the views on the integration, prompting an increase in the salience of the European issues within the domestic politics (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2009: 574). In the meantime, the momentous crises such as the September-11 attack, the 2008

2 Whereas the former argues that European integration would culminate with political integration - as an inevitable corollary of the economic integration, - the latter suggests that European integration would continue insofar as interests of each member state converge.

3 There has been a long-standing discussion in the literature whether economic motives or cultural motives bolster opposition to European integration. Nevertheless, the question whether the economic and cultural motives are mutually exclusive or whether they should be treated as complementary factors has been talking point in studies on public Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks, 2007: 120). The negative effect of the 2008 Eurozone crisis, for example, should not be confined to economic difficulties as the crisis propped up ethnic-nationalism as well, which have been favoring the political parties with exclusionary attitude towards the immigrant populations.

Euro zone-crisis, the refugee crisis of the Arab Spring further accelerated the growth of Euroscepticism (Csehi and Zgut, 2021: 55). Euroscepticism, which was regarded as a hallmark of the fringe parties (i.e., radical left or radical right), began to be observed in the programs of the mainstream parties (Brack and Startin 2015: 240; Meijers, 2017: 420). The increase in the share of the seats that were won by Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament Elections also mirrors the growth of Euroscepticism across the EU member countries (Treib, 2014: 1543; 2019: 4).

As the ambit and ramifications of European integration have been widely debated, the EU-issue voting (i.e., the role of individual opinions on European integration in shaping party preferences) gained importance across the EU countries; particularly in those with lesser institutionalized party systems (de Vries and Tillman, 2011: 10 – 11). This was a reason behind the burgeoning literature on Euroscepticism in the 2000s, in which different ways of categorization for the political parties by their policies concerning the European integration have been offered (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Vasilopoulou, 2011). Considering the purpose of this study, it sufficient to note that Taggart & Szczerbiak's formulation is particularly useful to capture the nuances of the Eurosceptic parties whereas that of Kopecky and Mudde is helpful to understand the causal relationship between position of a political party on the left-right spectrum and stance on the European integration (pro-integration / anti-integration). Vasilopoulou's classification enables a study to probe differences in the Euroscepticism of the political parties that are members of the same party family.<sup>4</sup> The way Taggart & Szczerbiak categorizes the Eurosceptic parties suits this study since the main interest of this study is in the right-wing Eurosceptic parliamentary parties from different party families in Poland during the period 2001 to 2015. In his earlier study Taggart (1998: 366) defines Euroscepticism “[as an expression of] the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” Based on this definition of Euroscepticism as an umbrella term, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001: 9) develop a two-fold categorization composed of ‘hard-Euroscepticism’ and ‘soft-Euroscepticism.’ The sub-category of hard-Euroscepticism covers Eurosceptic parties the policies of which “implies an outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 9). Unlike the hard-Eurosceptic parties, soft-Eurosceptic ones do not have principled objection to European integration; yet they either (both) oppose the increase in the EU competence on specific areas (e.g., opposition to Euro adoption, EU's liberal cultural policies) or (and) prefer to defend the national interest without remaining outside the EU's institutional mechanisms (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 10-11).

### **Eurosceptic Parties in Poland, 2001 – 2015: A focus on the PiS, LPR, Kukiz-15**

The five Eurosceptic political parties secured seats in the *Sejm* during the period from 2001 to 2015. These parties are Law and Justice Party (PiS), League of Polish Families

---

4 Kopecky and Mudde's (2002: 303) four-fold category is applicable to both pro-European integration parties and anti-European integration parties. The sub-categories are labelled Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Europragmatists, and Euro-rejects. In her study Vasilopoulou (2011: 235) makes a discussion that revolve around different EU-policies of the 12 political parties (in 10 EU countries), all of which are members of the radical right party family.

(LPR), Kukiz-15, Self Defense (SO) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) (Styczynska, 2017: 143).<sup>5</sup> The purpose of this article is to make a discussion on the PiS' Euroscepticism - as a preference of its foreign policy, which should be interpreted as the distinctive characteristics of the party from the other Eurosceptic right-wing parties in Poland. Following up on this, the left-leaning Eurosceptic parties fall outside the purview of this article (Treib, 2014: 1543; Szczerbiak, 2007: 212). The 2002 Chapel Hill expert survey, for instance, showed that both SO and LPR were anti-EU political parties; yet they differ from each other in terms of scores on the left-right ideological dimension: respectively 9.25 and 5.5 - measured through a scale from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) (Hooghe, et al., 2010). The table-1 shows the level of electoral support the Eurosceptic parties won in the elections for *Sejm* from 2001 to 2015. Founded a few months before the 2001 election, the PiS and LPR were close in vote share. Their electoral performance diverged later on. Whereas the PiS won almost 30 per cent of the vote in 2007, the LPR was voted by a mere 1.3 per cent. In 2015, the vote percentages of the PiS and Kukiz-15 were 37.6 and 8.8, respectively, yet the latter, similar to the LPR, suffered annihilation in the 2019 election.<sup>6</sup>

Table 1

*Electoral Support of Right-Wing Eurosceptic Parties in the Elections for the Sejm (2001 – 2015)*

Party	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015
Law and Justice Party	9.5	27	32.1	29.9	37.6
League of Polish Families	7.9	8	1.3	.	.
Kukiz – 15	.	.	.	.	8.8

During the accession years, the PiS had been a soft-Eurosceptic party. In the post-accession years, the party maintained its negative tone (sometimes slightly intensified it), but never embraced hard-Euroscepticism as much as its nearby competitors. For instance, unlike the LPR, the PiS did not campaign against the EU membership in the 2003 referendum in spite of the fact that the party has been opposed to liberal cultural policies of the EU. Representing a well-balanced foreign policy appealing to soft-Eurosceptic voters without turning against the EU, helped the PiS not only to mirror opinions of most of the right-wing voters about the EU membership but also to be construed by the EU as preferable actors to its irreconcilable nearby competitors. This buttresses the PiS's credibility (in comparison to that of its nearby competitors) in both national and international arena. This argument does by no means explain the entire puzzle behind the PiS's emergence as the predominant party of the right-wing politics, yet it should be regarded as a contributory factor. The following subsections encapsulate the Eurosceptic policies of the PiS, LPR and Kukiz-15.

5 Whether the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was a Eurosceptic party in early 2000s is dubious. The 2002 Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe et al., 2010) describes the PSL as a neutral party. Beichelt (2004: 39) does not classify the SO and PSL in the same group either; yet he accepts the PSL had Eurosceptic tendencies. The PSL did not overtly campaign for NO votes in the EU accession referendum, in sharp contrast to LPR and SO (Szczerbiak, 2008: 238).

6 To exceed five per cent electoral threshold, Kukiz-15 joined to PSL before the 2019 elections. This was the outcome of a strategic calculation, rather than that of an ideological proximity. As a result of this, the Kukiz-15 won a mere 6 seats out of 460.

## Right-wing soft Euroscepticism in Poland: The PiS

The foreign policy of the PiS concerning the EU has been shaped through a strategy relying on a trade-off between economic benefits and cultural concerns (Szczerbiak, 2008: 234). The way the PiS designs its foreign policy on the EU epitomizes what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier call ‘the external incentive model.’ The model “assumes that the EU drives Europeanization through sanctions and rewards that alter the cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017: 1). The PiS suggests that Poland should adopt a foreign policy that would enhance its bargaining power that would enable the country to influence the way Europeanization goes. For the PiS, on the one hand, the Europeanization should be confined to economic cooperation that would bolster each member state’s economic power (Styczynska, 2017: 143). On the other hand, the party has been opposed to EU’s deepening process lest the EU’s permissive social policies ‘degrade’ the Catholic values. The results of the Chapel Hill expert survey series measuring party positioning on the European integration through a scale from 0 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly favor) confirm the dynamic nature of the PiS’s stance on European integration between pre-accession years and post-accession years.<sup>7</sup> Whereas the 2002 (pre-accession) survey qualifies the party’s EU policy as ‘somewhat in favor,’ the 2010 (post-accession) does so as ‘somewhat opposes.’ Exact scores assigned to the party’s positioning on the EU as follows: 4.75 (2002), 3.5 (2006), 2.93 (2010), 3.8 (2014), and 2.95 (2019). In the European Parliament, the PiS has been affiliated to European Conservatives and Reformist Group emphasizing the EU’s role in securing economic security of EU citizens and glossing over cultural cohesion that would form a basis of political integration. In its official website, the Group’s objective is defined as follows: “... we will continue promoting a wider agenda of long-term pan-European *euro-realist reform* [emphasis added]. We will also carry on our hard work in securing a more flexible, open and economically vibrant EU, offering citizens and taxpayers tangible benefits”<sup>8</sup> The PiS refrained from embracing a hard-Eurosceptic stance since its foundation and from working with radical right parties.<sup>9</sup> This also provides the PiS with a protection that is similar to what Ivarsflaten (2006: 2) calls ‘reputational shield’ and helpful “to fend off accusations of racism and extremism.” This ‘reputational shield’ was an apt tool for the PiS aiming to be a mainstream party with a promising appeal to large segments of the conservative voters (Dakowska, 2010: 260).<sup>10</sup>

The PiS campaigned for Poland’s membership in the 2003 referendum. Once Poland had been admitted to the EU, the PiS began to embrace Eurosceptic policies aiming to slow down the pace of political integration of the European Union. For instance, the leader of

7 The values on the scale refer to seven categories: strongly opposes (1), opposes (2), somewhat opposes (3), neutral (4), somewhat favors (5), favors (6), strongly favors (7).

8 More information can be found in <https://ecrgroup.eu/about> (last access date: 31 May 2021). The PiS repudiates that it has been a Eurosceptic party. The party describes itself as “Euro-realist) The term euro-realist. Szczerbiak (2008: 232).

9 It is true that in the period after the 2005 legislative elections the PiS formed a coalition government with Self-Defense and League of Polish Families, yet the foreign ministry was assigned to PiS (Szczerbiak, 2019: 180). Anna Fotyga was appointed as the foreign minister during the coalition government. Fotyga has been serving as a member of European Parliament since 2014.

10 Markowski and Tucker (2010: 6), for example, do not include the PiS in their studies examining the relationship between ‘euroscepticism and emergence of political parties in Poland’ on the grounds that the PiS’ Euroscepticism is the result of strategic considerations, not ideological orientation



the party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, opposed to Lisbon Treaty's ratification on the grounds that the Treaty would entitle Germans to claim compensation for their possessions they were obliged to leave under Potsdam Treaty and would grant rights - such as same-sex marriage - that do not conform to Catholic values (Dakowska, 2010: 266). Indeed, the Treaty was ratified by the Sejm in April 2008 when PiS was in opposition. It was the 2015 legislative election that brought the PiS back to power; then, the party refused to implement the agreement concluded between its predecessor, Civic Platform, and the EU for accepting refugees from North African and Middle Eastern countries. Frequently criticizing 'the Franco-German axis' for hijacking the European Union to achieve their own foreign policy goals, Kacyznki argues that a countervailing bloc, including the Central and East European countries, should be formed (Csehi and Zgut, 2021: 61; Szczerbiak, 2019: 182 – 183). The party deems the Brexit process strong evidence for the necessity of change that would reshape the European Union as a quasi-intergovernmental platform that refocus on economic cooperation (Szczerbiak, 2019: 181). The PiS's legislative affairs that brought changes to the judiciary system in Poland created a major conflict between the party and European Union (Csehi, and Zgut, 2021: 61). Still, the PiS should be regarded as a soft-Eurosceptic party owing to its support for the continuity of the Poland's strong economic ties with Europe and its opposition to the idea of cultivating relationships with Russia (Cadier and Lequesne, 2020: 4).

### **Right-wing hard Euroscepticism in Poland: The LPR and Kukiz-15**

The League of Polish Families was founded as the amalgamation of various right wing catholic groups a few months before the 2001 elections (Szczerbiak, 2002: 61). With its nativist ideology supporting monoculturalism and deeming different cultures hazard to the cultural purity, the party was described as the most Eurosceptic actor of the party competition from 2001 to 2007 in Chapel Hill expert surveys (Hooghe, et al., 2010; Bakker, et al., 2015). Using the arguments that the EU's liberal policies would decay the Catholic social and individual values and EU's supranationalism would weaken the national sovereignty, the LPR campaigned against Poland's EU membership in the 2003 referendum (Jasiewicz, 2008: 7; Szczerbiak, 2019: 179). With such a content of opposition to EU membership, the LPR epitomized radical right perception of the foreign policy (de Lange and Guerra; 2009: 535; Dakowska, 2010: 60). The fact that LPR was the only political party with an overt opposition to EU membership for cultural reasons allowed the party to attract devout churchgoers, voting against EU membership in the referendum. Indeed, the party had performed relatively well for a radical right party in the 2001 and 2005 elections, winning 7.9 and 8.0 per cent of the vote, respectively. In the meantime, the question whether Poland should be an EU member had begun to lose its relevance to party preferences with the successful completion of the membership process. The LPR, however, failed to adopt a revised and realistic foreign policy that was compatible to new title (EU member) of Poland and faced with an abysmal electoral performance in 2007, consigning itself to a complete defeat. Allocation of a large amount of EU funds to agriculture by the PiS-led coalition government, providing generous subsidies to farmers during the period between 2005 and 2007 elections, might have accelerated dramatic vote-loss of the LPR, claiming the EU membership would not benefit farmers. Remember that the PiS's electoral support increased to 32.1 per cent in 2007, when the party's

campaign strategy aimed at appealing to religious, conservative and rural voters. The PiS, for example, recruited then member of European Parliament, Janusz Wojciechowski, formerly a prominent figure within the PSL (Millard, 2010: 151 – 155). It should be noted that Wojciechowski has been serving EU Commissioner of Agriculture since 2019.

Kukiz-15 claimed to be an anti-establishment party, challenging the bi-polar structure of the party competition in which PO and PiS had been the prominent actors (Kosowska-Gastol and Myślik, 2019: 13). In the 2015 presidential elections, Pawel Kukiz, who was to be Kukiz-15's founding leader, performed well, taking the third place with 20 per cent. This was surely an auspicious beginning for the party; yet the party's subsequent decision to associate with far-right groups negatively affected its future. Many moderates of the party were predisposed towards other alternatives; plunging the party into a political extremism. Securing 42 seats out of 460 in 2015, the party suffered a disappointing electoral result; whereas its under-achievement helped the PiS to win the majority in the *Sejm* (Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier, 2016: 2-3). Should Kukiz-15 follow soft-Euroscepticism, it could win more votes, given the fact that the socio-economic issues were less important to electoral preferences in the 2015 parliamentary elections (Markowski, 2016: 1312). The Kukiz-15's conservative and nationalist outlook on social and economic lives shaped its hard-Eurosceptic policies. Conceiving of European Union as a collection of nation-states, neither the Euro adoption nor the Euro-zone was accepted by the Kukiz-15, arguing that national symbols and national sovereignty must be protected firmly. Even though the EU concurred with Kukiz-15 in its criticism about the PiS-backed encroachments on the judicial independence, Kukiz-15 argued that Poland did not need conferring with the EU. Unsurprisingly, Kukiz-15 was also opposed the EU's plan for the resettlement of refugees across the EU countries (Szczerbiak, 2019: 183). Kukiz-15 softened its Euroscepticism and formed an alliance with PSL for the 2019; yet this effort did not reverse its declining reputation, bringing the party to the edge of annihilation with its 6 seats in the *Sejm*.

### **Discussion and Conclusion: The PiS's dominance in right-wing politics**

The PiS has been the preeminent party of the right-wing politics in Poland since 2005 elections. Not only the party's nominee for presidency won the last two elections, the party was also able to form the first single-party majority government of the post-communist Poland in 2015. This article argues that its flexible and dynamic foreign policy helped the PiS in two ways. First, the PiS distinguished itself from the other right wing Eurosceptic parties that were marginalized partly due to their inflexible and impractical foreign policies. Second, the PiS's flexibility in adjusting the dose of criticism of the European integration created the perception in the minds of the conservative voters that the party were not subservient to the EU's policies. Jaroslaw Kaczynski speech criticizing Miller's government conjures up the PiS flexible foreign policy towards the EU: "You have to reject the dogma that we have to accede to the Union in 2004. ... I am determined supporter of Union accession and a determined opponent of joining on these conditions. ... In this situation you have to present the matter in a very tough way – either they change the conditions, or we discuss a different date" (quoted from Szczerbiak, 2008: 232).

The lack of realistic EU sanctions on Eurosceptic governments of the member states enables the PiS to strategically oscillate between soft and hard Euroscepticism. The

above-mentioned 'external incentive model' allows the EU to influence the domestic politics of the candidate states (as was the case in Slovakia in 1998); yet, which sanctions does the EU have against a democratic-backsliding in a member state has been long-lasting talking point.<sup>11</sup> The Populist SMER's (Direction) coalition with Slovak Nationalist Party, the PiS's coalition with LPR and SO were exemplars of democratic-backslidings that occurred in the 2000s (Rupnik, 2007: 24). In the 2010s, the Fidezs in Hungary and the PiS in Poland have been stoking up illiberal policies against which the EU still has not produced a countervailing reaction. As briefly mentioned earlier, after winning a majority in the *Sejm* in 2015, the PiS, for instance, pushed through a set of legislation that set back rule of law and fairness of elections for compromising independence of judges and electoral commissioners (Sadurski, 2019: 13 – 20). The EU's response could not go beyond making recommendation for restoring the rule of law – a recommendation that can be easily ignored by the PiS government which has so far been confronted by the idle threat posed by the Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union (Csehi, and Zgut, 2021: 61). The article provides that EU "... may decide to suspend certain rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council"; nonetheless, the decision whether that member state violated the EU values - stated in the Article 2 of the same treaty (e.g., freedom, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and so on) - is taken by unanimity, the achievement of which seems to be very unlikely.<sup>12</sup> For instance, Hungary's Viktor Orbán has already stated that his government would vote against an initiative that imposes sanction on Poland (Politico, 7 June 2018; Appel, 2019: 7).<sup>13</sup> The Court of Justice's rulings as part of infringement procedures did not hamper the PiS's authoritarian-leaning legislations that appeal mainly to devout Catholic voters.<sup>14</sup> Embracing a populist discourse, the PiS government repeatedly argue that the change in judiciary is a necessity for cleaning the establishment contaminated by the 'corrupt' judicial system. In an interview made on the eve of the 2019 parliamentary election, Kaczyński's responses evoke his above-mentioned statement before the 2003 accession referendum. Insisting on the idea that Poland does not need following the EU's recommendation, Kaczyński stated that the PiS government would be determined to continue with the reform process: "if the society trusts us, we will return to this [changes in the judicial system]. ... Repairing the country is difficult without a deep reform of the courts, because they are in a way the final barricade, the last decision-making level in many issues – civil, criminal and administrative" (Politico, 10 October, 2019).<sup>15</sup> After the 2019 election, the PiS continued its single-party majority government for winning 43.6 per cent of the vote and 51 per cent of the legislative seats.<sup>16</sup>

11 With its decision excluding Slovakia in the list of candidate states in 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU gave the signal that Slovakia's bid for EU membership would be likely to fail as long as Meciar's authoritarian-populist understanding remained in power. After the 1998 election, pro-EU government coalition under Dzurinda's premiership came to office and Slovakia began accession negotiation following the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

12 For full text of the Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M007> For full text of the Article 2 of the Treaty: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu\\_2012/art\\_2/oj](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/art_2/oj)

13 <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-article-7-test-for-eu-on-rule-of-law/>

14 Until now four infringement procedures have been started against Poland. For more information: <https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-launches-4th-infringement-procedure-over-polands-rule-of-law/>

15 <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launches-another-infringement-case-against-poland/>

16 <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/poland.html>

Surely, its Euroscepticism appealing to both soft and hard Eurosceptic conservative voters through strategic maneuvers was not the single reason behind the PiS's dominance in Poland's right-wing politics. Nor did the EU-issue voting emerged as a separate dimension on which party competition took place. Instead, the EU-issues were embedded into 'frozen' social cleavages on which party competition takes place; the Europeanization exerted a limited influence on the competition accordingly (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 434; Mair, 2001: 41; Marks et al., 2002: 586; Marks et. al., 2006: 169). In Poland, the disputed views on the issue of Poland's role in the European integration have been embedded into the cleavage between liberals and conservatives; prevailing the party competition since the 2005 parliamentary elections. The leading competitors of this cleavage have been Civic Platform and the PiS, indeed together winning 80 per cent of the seats in the Sejm in four elections in a row (Markowski, 2016: 1317).<sup>17</sup> Nearby competitors emerged; yet none of them were able to challenge the "PO vs. PiS-based electoral competition cartel", so to speak. For example, accusing the PiS of not defending the Polish interests within the EU, the Confederation, which includes, *inter alia*, a few former LPR members, competed for Catholic votes in the 2019 election. As had been the case for LPR and Kukiz-15 in previous elections, with its 6.8 per cent of the vote the Confederation remained far away from challenging the PiS (Markowski, 2020: 1519). Despite the ebb and flow of its relations with the EU, the PiS has been able to maintain its viability partly owing to its strategic Euroscepticism, in sharp contrast to its near-by competitors embracing hard-Euroscepticism.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Author Contributions:** Conception/Design of study:

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Appel, H. (2019). Can the EU stop Eastern Europe's illiberal turn? *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2019.1647956> [Accessed: 30 May 2021].
- Bakker, R. de Vries, C. Edwards, E. Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G. Polk, J., Ronvy, J. Steenbergen, M., Vachudova, M. A. (2015). Measuring party positions in Europe The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999 – 2010 *Party Politics*, 21(1): 143-152.
- Bakker, R. Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G. Polk, J., Ronvy, J. Steenbergen, M., Vachudova, M. A. (2020). 1999 – 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File. <https://www.chesdata.eu> [Accessed: 18 May 2021].
- Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015). Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the margins to the mainstream. *International Political Science Review*, 36(3), 239-249.
- Buhr, L. R. (2012). Seizing the opportunity: Euroscepticism and extremist party success in the post-Maastricht era. *Government and Opposition*, 47(4), 544-573.
- Cadier, D. and Lequesne, C. (2020). How populism impacts EU foreign policy. *EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series*. <https://www.eu-listco.net/publications/how-populism-impacts-eu-foreign-policy> [Accessed: 23 May 2021].
- Csehi, R. and Zgut, E. (2021). 'We won't let Brussels dictate us': Eurosceptic populism in Hungary and Poland. *European Politics and Society*, 22(1), 53-68.
- Dakowska, D. (2010). Whither Euroscepticism? The uses of European integration by Polish Conservative and Radical Parties. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(3), 254-272.
- Dechezelles, S. and Neumayer, L. (2010). Introduction: Is populism a side-effect of European integration? Radical parties and Europeanization of political competition. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(3), 229-236.
- Down, I. and Wilson, C. (2008). From 'permissive consensus' to 'constraining dissensus': A polarizing union?

---

17 For the results of the *sejm* elections since 2007: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/poland.html>

- Acta Politica*, 43(1), 26-49.
- Elgün, Ö. and Tilmann, E. (2007). Exposure to European Union policies and support for membership in the candidate countries. *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(3), 391-400.
- Hooghe, L. Bakker, R., Brigeveich, A., de Vries, C. Edwards, E., Marks, G., Rovny, J., Steenbergen, M., Vachudova, M. (2010). Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning. *European Journal of Political Research*. 49(5), 687-703.
- Ivrsflaten, E. (2006). Reputational shields: Why most anti-immigrant parties failed in Western Europe, 1980-2005. Paper for 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.695.761&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (Accessed: 24 May 2021).
- Jasiewicz, K. (2008). The new populism in Poland: The Usual Suspects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(3), 7-25.
- Kosowska-Gastol, B. and Soboloweska-Myślik, K. (2019). New parties in the Polish party systems 2011- 2018: The Polikot Movement, Kukiz'15 and the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru as genuinely new parties? *Central European Journal of Politics*. 5(1): 6-29.
- Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002). The two sides of Euroscepticism: Party positions on European integration in Central Europe. *European Union Politics*. 3(3), 297-326.
- De Lange, S. and Guerra, S. (2009). The League of Polish Families between East and West, past and present. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 42(4), 527-549.
- Lubbers, M. Scheepers, P. (2010). Divergent trends of Euroscepticism in countries and regions of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(6), 787-817.
- Mair, P. (2001). The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. *West European Politics* 23(4), 27-51.
- Marcinkiewicz, K. and Stegmaier M. (2016). The parliamentary election in Poland, October 2015. *Electoral Studies*, [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mary-Stegmaier/publication/290220555\\_The\\_parliamentary\\_election\\_in\\_Poland\\_October\\_2015/links/5ca6454892851c64bd50a67f/The-parliamentary-election-in-Poland-October-2015.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mary-Stegmaier/publication/290220555_The_parliamentary_election_in_Poland_October_2015/links/5ca6454892851c64bd50a67f/The-parliamentary-election-in-Poland-October-2015.pdf) [Accessed 26 May 2021].
- Markowski, R. and Tucker, J. (2010). Euroscepticism and Emergence of Political Parties in Poland. *Party Politics* <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809345854>
- Markowski, R. (2016). The Polish parliamentary election of 2015: A free and fair election that results in unfair political consequences. *West European Politics*, 39(6), 1311-1322.
- Markowski, R. (2020). Plurality support for democratic decay: the 2019 Polish parliamentary election. *West European Politics*. 43(7), 1513-1525.
- Marks, G. Wilson, C. (2000). The past in the present: A cleavage theory of party response to European integration. 30(3), 433-459.
- Marks, G. Wilson, C. and Ray, L. (2002). National political parties and European integration. *American Journal of Political Science*. 46(3), 585-594.
- Marks, G. Hooghe, L. Nelson, M. and Dewards, E., (2006). Party competition and European integration in the East and West: Different structure same causality. *Coparative Political Studies*, 39(2), 155-175.
- Meijers, M. J. (2017). Contagious Euroscepticism: The impact of Eurosceptic support on mainstream party positions on European integration. *Party Politics*, 23(4), 413-423.
- Millard, F. (2010). *Democratic Elections in Poland 1991 – 2007*. New York: Routledge.
- Neumayer, L. (2008). Euroscepticism as a political label: The use of European Union issues in political competition in new Member States. *European Journal of Political Research*. 47(2), 135-160.
- Rupnik, J. (2007). From democracy fatigue to democracy backlash. *Journal of Democracy*. 18(4), 17-25.
- Sadurski, W. (2019). *Poland's Constitutional Breakdown*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2017). The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: The External Incentive Model Revisited. Paper for the JMF Conference, EUI (22-23 June 2017). <https://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/JMF-25-Presentation/Schimmelfennig-Sedelmeier-External-Incentives-Revisited-JMF.pdf> [Accessed: 27 May 2021].
- Startin, N. and Krouwel, A. (2013). Euroscepticism re-galvanized: The consequences of the 2005 French and Dutch Rejections of the EU Constitution. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), 65-84.
- Styczynska, N. (2017). Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern European Countries: A comparative case study of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Leruth, B. Startin, N. Usherwood, S. (Ed). *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*, (139-154), Oxon, New York: Routledge.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2002). Poland's Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary Election. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 18(3), 41-76.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2007). Social' Poland defeats 'Liberal' Poland? The September-October 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential elections. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 23(2), 203-232.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Opposing Europe or Problematizing Europe? Euroscepticism and 'Eurorealism' in the Polish party system. Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (Ed.). *Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Volume 1*, (221-242) Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2019). Poland. V. Hlouchek and P. Kaniok (Ed.), *The European Parliament Election of 2019 in*

- East-Central Europe* (175-199 pp.), Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (2004). The politics of European referendum outcomes and turnout: Two models. *West European Politics*, 27(4), 557–583.
- Taggart, P. (1998). A Touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33(3), 363-388.
- Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001). Parties, positions, and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. *Sussex European Institute Paper no. 46, Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No. 2* [https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/podzim2004/EVS136/um/The\\_Party\\_Politics\\_of\\_Euroscepticism\\_in\\_EU\\_Member\\_and\\_Candidate\\_States.pdf](https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/podzim2004/EVS136/um/The_Party_Politics_of_Euroscepticism_in_EU_Member_and_Candidate_States.pdf) [Accessed: 21 May 2021].
- Treib, O. (2014). The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic voting the 2014 European election. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(10): 1541-1554.
- Treib, O. (2019). Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European parliament elections. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1737881>
- Urwin, D. (2010). *The European Community: From 1945 to 1985*. M. Cini and N. P. Solórzano Borrágán (Ed.), (16-31), Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2011). European integration and radical right: The three patterns of opposition. *Government and Opposition*, 46(2), 223-244.
- de Vries, C. E. and Tillman, E. (2011). European Union issue voting in East and West Europe: The role of political context. *Comparative European Politics*, 9(1), 1-17.
- Whitefield, S. Rohrschneider, R. (2009). The Europeanization of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe? The impact of EU entry on issues stances, salience and programmatic coherence. *Journal of Communist Studies and transition Politics*, 25(4), 564-584.



## Poland's Extra-EU Trade After the EU Accession

Adam. A. Ambroziak<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

When Poland joined the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004, it transferred its national competences in the field of external trade policy to the EU institutions. As a result, on the one hand, as of that date Poland may neither change duties on goods imported from outside of the EU, nor may it conclude trade agreements with third countries. Nowadays, Poland's intra-EU trade has reached ca. 65-75% of its total foreign trade at the expense of the exchange with the rest of the world. Although the aforementioned numbers are high, they have not changed substantially since Poland's accession to the EU. However, due to the legal circumstances and limited national competences in the shaping of external trade relations, one could expect that geographic and product structure of Polish foreign trade havr changed and reshuffled over the last few years. Therefore, the article aims to identify changes in both directions and products in Poland's extra-EU imports and exports since the EU accession. To this end, we analysed changes in the value of Poland's foreign trade with partners from outside of the EU as well as some indices that show the concentration of Poland's trade and similarities or differences to the EU average. In order to get a closer look at Poland's position, we compared the aforementioned indices to those reported for other Visegrád Group (V4) countries. We examined changes that took place in the period of 2004-2019 and have identified trends in Poland's extra-EU trade that provide evidence of its greater similarity to the EU average, an effect of EU integration and higher diversification in the mix of partners from outside the EU.

### Keywords

Poland, Extra-EU trade, European Union, Common Commercial Policy, Foreign Trade Policy

**1 Corresponding Author:** Adam. A. Ambroziak (Assoc. Prof.), SGH Warsaw School of Economic, Collegium of World Economy, Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: Adam.A.Ambroziak@sgh.waw.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-4618-8497

**To cite this article:** Ambroziak, A. A. (2022). Poland's Extra-EU Trade After the EU Accession. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S117–S135. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.945806>



## Introduction

European Union (EU) membership requires a potential Member State to abide by specific goals, principles, and legal rules stemming from primary (treaties) and secondary (directives, regulations, and decisions of EU institutions) law. As a consequence, when Poland joined the European Union on May 1, 2004, it transferred its national competences in the field of external trade policy to the EU institutions. As a result, on the one hand, as of that date, Poland may neither change duties on goods imported from outside of the EU, nor may it conclude trade agreements with third countries. At the same time, Polish interests shared and approved at the EU level can be more effectively secured through both EU trade agreements and EU trade instruments as the EU is the most powerful regional integration organisation in the world. Moreover, Poland, as an EU Member State, can benefit from free trade within the EU internal market, which has clearly enhanced the country's economic integration with other partners in the grouping. This specific dependence and the need for having intra-Community trade between the Member States became especially visible during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 when the free movement of goods within the European Single Market was put at risk (Ambroziak, 2021).

Nowadays, Poland's intra-EU trade has reached ca. 65-75% of its total foreign trade at the expense of the exchange with the rest of the world. Although the Poland's overall foreign trade increased substantially, the aforementioned proportions have not changed since 2004. This means that the value of Poland's extra-EU trade increased proportionately to Poland's intra-EU trade. However, due to the aforementioned legal circumstances and limited national competences in the shaping of external trade relations, one could expect that geographic and product structure of Polish foreign trade changed and reshuffled in the last few years. Therefore, the article aims to identify changes in both directions and products in Poland's extra-EU imports and exports since the EU accession as well as trends compared to the EU as a whole, in order to find out if trade-related consequences of Poland's relations with third countries follow those of the EU.

To this end, we presented, first, the main limits, obligations, opportunities, and challenges for Polish foreign trade policy since accession to the EU, deriving from legal framework and the international requirements of the EU. Then, we analysed changes in the value of Poland's foreign trade with partners from outside of the EU in terms of exports to and imports from third-party countries. Next, some indices showing concentration and similarities of Poland's trade to the EU average are presented to identify tendencies observed since joining the EU. In order to get a closer look at Poland's position, we compared the aforementioned indices to those for other Visegrád Group (V4) countries, whose starting points of EU membership were similar. Joining the EU together in 2004, they face similar external factors because they are located in this same part of Europe, and they should represent similar foreign trade and investment opportunities as they are viewed as one group of the Central European Countries. We examined changes in the period 2004-2019 based on the Eurostat Database. Data for products were aggregated for the sectors of economy or for 21 sections of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) while top 35 external EU trade partners, whose share in the extra-EU trade is the highest, were selected to examine geographic directions of trade. Finally, we draw conclusions about

consequences of recent and possible future developments in Polish foreign trade with third-party countries.

### **Limits and Challenges for Poland's Foreign Trade Policy as the EU Member State**

According to one of the so-called Copenhagen criteria related to Poland's accession to the EU, the EU membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union (European Council, 1993). That means that all the EU principles and rules binding on the day of accession, as well as those pertaining to the areas of the EU exclusive competence, have to be approved unconditionally. One of them is the Common Commercial Policy adopted as part of the exclusive competence of the Union (art. 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - TFUE). That triggered the need to transfer precisely specified competences from the national to the EU level. Such a transfer took place based on the Accession Treaty (2003) and Art. 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997), which stipulates that "the Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters." Hence, from the legal viewpoint, since 1 May 2004, Poland can no longer pursue an autonomous trade policy vis-à-vis third-party countries (from outside EU).

Pursuant to Art. 207 TFUE, the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy, and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. Thus, from the day of EU accession, Poland has been bound with Council, European Parliament, and Commission regulations, which are directly binding upon the Member States and provide the basis for the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy instruments as well as with trade agreements concluded by the EU with third-party countries. In this latter case, for trade agreements that provide for the creation of a free trade area or a customs union, decisions on the negotiating mandate and the conclusion of the agreement are taken by the Council acting by a qualified majority.

Hence, there might be cases when the decision on both the adoption of a legal act concerning trade instruments and the conclusion of a trade agreement with regard to which a Member State expressed its misgivings will nevertheless enter into force. Based on Art. 238 TFEU, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States (the current share of the population of Poland in the total EU-27 population is 8.5%; while for all the V4 countries, it is 14.2%). The requirement of unanimity has been maintained for a narrow group of economic relations between the EU and third-party countries (Art. 131 TFUE) in the field of: cultural and audio-visual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity; as well as in the field of trade in social, education, and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and undermine the responsibility of Member States for delivering them.

The solutions outlined above basically eliminate the possibility to pursue an autonomous trade policy (the possibilities are somewhat greater with regard to exports outside the EU). However, attention needs to be paid to two issues: Poland's involvement in EU decision-making and the position of Poland as an EU Member State on the international stage. In the first case, through its EU membership, Poland may impact the works of EU institutions, starting with the European Council, which brings together heads of states and governments and provides political impulse for the advancement of European integration and external relations, including economic relations with third-party countries through the European Commission, working with experts from the Member States, the Council, and its preparatory bodies consisting of representatives of all the EU Member States up to the European Parliament, whose members are directly elected and whose role has been clearly gaining in prominence in recent years. Given the above, there is much room for a Member State to put forward its own, sometimes even distinct, position, including potential consequences of the conclusion of an agreement or putting specific trade instruments in place. Finally, it needs to be stressed that such position of a Member State may be just a reflection of temporary political goals of the present government and does not necessarily coincide with the real political, economic, and social interest of the country at international level.

However, the above solutions should be seen not as limitations but as challenges and benefits for both government administration whose task is to make sure that the interests of its country are duly considered in the legislation and in international agreements, as well as for entrepreneurs engaged in international operations. First, an open trade policy of the EU which encourages the development of relations with countries from outside the EU intensifies competition in the domestic market and forces out innovative changes in enterprises. It may, however, be a threat to them if the EU fails to respond or responds too late to unfair practices of partners from third countries. In the face of such situations occurring increasingly more frequently, the European Commission has launched the modernization of trade policy instruments and proposed solutions that would protect the EU market against unfair competition (European Commission, 2021). Secondly, the position of the entire EU, as a surely powerful partner in global trade, is much stronger than the position of an individual, middle-sized Member State. As a result, new trade instruments introduced at the EU level, e.g., with a view to protect the market against dumping and trade sanctions, are definitely much more effective and painful to countries vis-à-vis which they have been applied. Under such circumstances, the position of Poland in international trade relations is undoubtedly stronger than if it acted individually.

Attention should also be paid to treaty provisions which stipulate that the common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. It means that interventions undertaken with respect to the conclusion of trade agreements as well as the execution of existing agreements and obeying trade regimes to certain extent depend on the EU foreign policy. As a result, we may observe joint EU actions taking place in relation to, e.g., the Russian Federation after it invaded Ukraine and occupied Crimea (Ambroziak, 2017, 2018), as well as during the EU-US tariff war (Moens & Vela, 2020). No doubt the power of EU arguments, as the richest integrational grouping in this part of the world, is stronger than the positions of its individual Member States.

Considering the historical context, economic needs, and challenges combined with the current political circumstances, the EU has developed an extremely elaborate pyramid of preferences in external trade: beginning with granting the most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment status resulting from the GATT/WTO, through special preferences for developing countries, free trade area and customs union, and up to the most advanced forms of cooperation within selected components of the common market (Figure 1.).


At the top of the pyramid of EU trade preferences that is composed of the top 35 trade partners, there is Switzerland, which, despite not being a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), has concluded many agreements with the EU that have in practice brought it closer to the common market with the EU, followed by Norway as an EEA member (their total share in extra EU exports and imports was 10.6% and 9.9%, respectively). The third country in the group of the biggest beneficiaries of EU trade preferences is Turkey, which established a customs union with the EU in 1995 and whose share in extra-EU trade was respectively 3.6% and 3.9%.

Further down on the pyramid of EU trade preferences consisting of 35 of the EU top trade partners, there are countries with which the EU concluded agreements that have already led to the establishing of free trade areas or such areas that are planned to be created. This group includes countries which signed such agreements many years ago as well as new partners such as: Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, Mercosur countries, Vietnam, and Singapore. Their share in the total value of EU exports reached only 23.7% and 21.2% in imports (according to data for all the EU trade partners, the share of those covered by EU Preferential Trade Agreements is 13.4% and 14% for exports and imports respectively, E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2020). Nevertheless, new agreements are expected to facilitate bilateral trade and foster their position in the EU trade.

By joining the EU, Poland has become a party to all trade agreements concluded by the EU as of the date of Poland's accession. Today, Poland is also actively engaged in working out new treaty solutions that consider an ever-wider product scope (goods and services) as well as an adequately adapted depth of liberalization. The Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021 includes, inter alia, the following tasks to be accomplished (MSZ, 2017):

- to favour geographic diversification in economic activities in particular by developing cooperation with Asian, African, Middle East, and Latin American countries;
- to seek to promote provisions in trade agreements negotiated by the EU that are favourable for Poland;
- to continue identifying and eliminating barriers to access to extra-EU markets that are particularly cumbersome for Polish exports;
- to support international efforts, especially those undertaken by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), that help in strengthening the global trade system in line with the economic interests of Poland.

The above tasks result from the assumption underpinning the Strategy according to which the worsening of the international environment in global trade may adversely affect the Polish economy. This is a clear declaration of Poland in favour of trade liberalisation,



US - United States	IN - India	ZA - South Africa	VN - Viet Nam
CN - China	MX - Mexico	UA - Ukraine	TN - Tunisia
CH - Switzerland	AE - United Arab Emirates	MA - Morocco	CL - Chile
RU - Russia	HK - Hong Kong	IL - Israel	ID - Indonesia
TR - Turkey	AU - Australia	EG - Egypt	PH - Philippines
JP - Japan	SG - Singapore	TH - Thailand	AR - Argentina
NO - Norway	BR - Brazil	MY - Malaysia	BY - Belarus
KR - Korea	SA - Saudi Arabia	QA - Qatar	CO - Colombia
CA - Canada	TW - Taiwan	NG - Nigeria	

Figure 1. Pyramid of the EU trade preferences (shares of top 35 countries in extra EU trade in 2019 in percentage).

Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat DataBase.

which, however, should ensure mutual benefits. The Polish foreign policy framework confirms that, so far, gradual liberalisation of global trade has brought concrete positive effects to the Polish economy- hence, the support of Poland for the negotiations of free trade agreements with different countries across the world.

Nevertheless, the major EU trade partners continue to be countries not covered by any preferences, mainly the USA, China, and the Russian Federation. These are also countries with which the EU experiences conflicts or even trade wars rather than considering trade facilitations. The observed drop in the position of Russia in extra-EU trade is the effect of two parallel processes. First, it links with the imposition of new barriers to trade under the retaliation policy pursued by the EU in response to human rights violation perpetrated in Russia and in its relations with other countries, including Ukraine. Second, the EU, including Poland, gradually restricts imports of energy raw materials and is actively searching for new suppliers and a new energy mix that would be much less reliant on natural gas and crude oil or other fossil fuels. Poland has unambiguously identified its goals as diversification of supplies and the expansion of the network infrastructure of natural gas, crude oil, and liquid fuel (Council of Ministers, 2019; Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2021).

When it comes to the USA and China, the former is losing in importance in favour of the latter. The drop in the US share in EU trade was especially visible in relation with the economic downturn 2008-2010, and then, despite some increases, the volume of trade has not recovered to pre-2008-2010 levels. On the other hand, Chinese expansion in investment and trade since the country's WTO accession in 2001 and following the financial crisis 2008-2010 has become a fact. Reinforced by initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative or China's programme of economic growth, this expansion has produced substantial increases in the country's share in trade for all its trade partners across the globe, including the EU and Poland. Looking at the Strategy of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attention needs to be paid to planned attempts of seeking cooperation opportunities with partners from outside Europe, in particular with China, in the delivery of infrastructural projects in our region. This fits into the EU agenda designed to normalise relations with China in this area manifested by the conclusion of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment in December 2020 (EU-China, 2020, Ambroziak, 2020).

### **Poland's Position in Extra-EU trade**

Polish extra-EU trade grew significantly over the period covered by the research 2004-2019: from EUR 11.7 bn for exports and EUR 17.7 bn for imports in 2004 to EUR 47.8 bn and EUR 73.4 bn in 2019, respectively (Figure 2.). It meant an extremely high, more than triple, increase in both exports and imports (309.2% and 313.8%, respectively) while the EU-28 recorded 115.5% and 100.4%, respectively. When comparing the results for Poland to other V4 countries, which also joined the EU, one may observe a similar dynamic in the growth of exports for Slovakia (324.4%) and the Czech Republic (318.8%), but for imports, it remained much lower. The convergence in the dynamics in changes in the extra-EU and intra-EU trade was confirmed by the Pearson's coefficient for the period 2004-2019, which revealed strong correlation between changes in the exports of Poland

and of the EU (exports 0.887 and imports: 0.9303) (Table 1.). Thus, the extra-EU trade of Poland evolved largely along the same lines as for the rest of the EU, both during the crisis (2008-2010) as well as in the years of relative prosperity, although at clearly much higher growth dynamics. A similarly strong correlation was also found for exports and imports for the examined EU Member States in extra-EU trade, which confirms not just the opening to the extra-EU trade but significant engagement in international cooperation.




Figure 2. Poland’s extra EU trade in 2004-2019 (in EUR)

Source: see Figure 1.

Table 1  
V4 intra and extra-EU trade dynamics in 2004-2019 compared to EU-28

	2005/04	2009/08	2014/13	2019/18	2019/04	Pearson index <sup>1</sup> : extra v. intra EU trade	Pearson index: MS v. EU
<b>Extra-EU exports</b>							
EU	11.0%	-16.4%	-1.9%	4.0%	115.5%	0.8959	X
PL	29.7%	-22.4%	-3.0%	10.2%	309.2%	0.7905	0.8874
HU	28.0%	-21.0%	-7.2%	4.5%	188.8%	0.8662	0.8579
SK	11.5%	-19.7%	-7.6%	5.4%	324.4%	0.8916	0.8037
CZ	28.2%	-17.6%	1.5%	6.8%	318.8%	0.8234	0.9080
<b>Extra-EU imports</b>							
EU	15.2%	-22.0%	0.0%	3.7%	100.4%	0.9339	X
PL	13.4%	-26.5%	5.4%	7.5%	313.8%	0.9013	0.9303
HU	5.0%	-25.7%	-8.1%	9.7%	86.7%	0.7779	0.8468
SK	21.4%	-26.1%	-9.0%	-3.2%	205.5%	0.9178	0.8651
CZ	3.1%	-26.0%	4.4%	4.0%	245.7%	0.8631	0.8680

Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat DataBase.

The aforementioned increase in Poland’s extra-EU trade should be seen as particularly high as Poland’s intra-EU trade reported almost the same dynamics (391.2% for exports and 300.9% for imports). When it comes to intra-EU trade, one needs to stress that on the day of accession, all physical (customs checks at the border), technical (various technical requirements), and fiscal (different tax systems) barriers were abolished, which largely helped in increasing trade flows between Poland and other EU Member States. Similar


1 Pearson index: a linear correlation Pearson coefficient measures the dependence (not causal relationship) between variables. It assumes values < 0.2 – no linear dependence; 0.2 – 0.4 – weak dependence; 0.4 -0.7 – moderate dependence; 0.7 – 0.9 – rather strong dependence; > 0.9 – very strong dependence.



dynamics of trade with non-EU countries suggests that trade terms and conditions created by the EU were favourable for Polish entrepreneurs (exporters and importers alike), whose offerings were welcomed by third-party countries.

As a consequence of such a significant increase in trade with non-EU countries, Poland's position as an EU trading partner for third-party countries has changed significantly, rising from 13th to 10th place in exports and from 10th to 7th in imports (Figure 3.). Despite these changes, Poland still does not belong to the leading EU Member States, who could dictate conditions in the EU's international trade with third-party countries.

This is because, as mentioned earlier, intra-EU trade is the most important for Poland although some trends of change can be observed. In the first year of Poland's EU membership, the share of extra-EU exports in Poland's total foreign sales was about 19.4% while for imports it was 24.6%. As for exports, after several years of significant increases in the share of extra-EU sales (2012-2014), its value returned to its original level (20.1% in 2019). The picture is slightly different for non-EU imports, where there has been a significant increase in the share of global imports from 24.6% in 2004 to 31% in 2019 (with a sharp rise to 32.3% in 2012) (Figure 4.). Similarly, although at slightly lower levels, intra EU v. extra EU trade developed in the other V4 countries. This means, therefore, that in their case there was greater dependence through deeper integration with the EU internal market than for Poland.




Notes:

- black bar (down bar): a decrease in a value/percentage; the top of the bar: a value/percentage for 2004, the bottom of the bar: a value/percentage for 2019;
- white bar (up bar): an increase in a value/percentage; the top of the bar: a value/percentage for 2019, the bottom of the bar: a value/percentage for 2004;
- the vertical line – observations of a value/percentage during the period under research (ranged from the highest to the lowest)

Figure 3. Changes in the shares of EU Member States in extra-EU exports and imports in 2004-2019.

Source: see Figure 1.



*Figure 4.* Share of the V4 countries' extra-EU trade in their foreign trade

Source: see Figure 1.

### Geographical Distribution of Poland's Extra EU export

As already indicated, Poland's trade relations with third-party countries are based not on national but on EU treaty solutions. In recent years, the EU has significantly expanded its trade preference pyramid presented above. The Uruguay Round, which ended with the creation of the WTO in 1995, was followed by an exceptional increase in the number of bilateral trade agreements. To be considered as Regional Trade Agreements, under which mutually granted preferences do not have to be extended to other countries under the MFN clause, they should provide for the creation of either a free trade area or a customs union. However, the assumption that the treaty legal framework for relations with third-party countries translates unambiguously into a geographical structure for the external trade of EU Member States is not entirely correct. It is necessary to take into account issues such as local, regional, and international economic factors, traditional cooperation ties, historical links, or political relations in the international arena as well as geographical proximity, transport costs, production costs, and market size.

An example of this is Poland, for which Russia is still the largest non-EU buyer of Polish products, although the country's share fell significantly from 19.9% in 2004 to 15.6% of all Polish exports to third countries in 2019 (Figure 5.). It is worth noting, however, that this trend has not been constant over the period studied. The country's position in Poland's external exports increased in the years just after accession to 23.8% in 2008. However, subsequent embargoes imposed by Russia on agri-food products originating in the EU countries, including Poland, significantly undermined the role of this country in Polish exports outside the EU (Ambroziak, 2017, 2018). For the EU as a whole, Russia's share in EU exports is much lower, less than 5%. However, Russia has also maintained its high position in the other V4 countries (in HU, a decrease from 10.6% to 8.8%, an increase in the Czech Republic from 11.3% to 13.3%, and in Slovakia from 9.5% to 12.0%). This is interesting as the EU has no agreement on trade facilitation in place with Russia and the still existing embargoes make foreign trade more difficult rather than easier.





Figure 5. Geographical distribution of extra-EU exports in 2004-2019

Source and Notes: see Figure 1 and 3.

On the other hand, a significant increase in the position of Poland's exports was recorded by the USA (from 12.4% to 14.2% of Poland's extra EU trade), thanks to industrial products offsetting the significant decrease in the US share in mineral product exports (Figure 6.). As for the remaining V4 countries, the USA still remained the most important partner of their exports, albeit with a declining position. The several percent share for these countries' exports is well below the EU average in 2019. At the same time, it is worth noting that this partner's share of total EU exports fell from 24.9% to 22.1% during the period under review. A trade agreement between the EU and the US would certainly be supportive for EU exports as it is precisely the trade in manufactured goods that is most affected by technical barrier restrictions in the US market (Czarny et. al., 2017).

Ukraine ranked third in terms of the reception of Polish goods (a significant decline in exports of industrial products accompanied by increasing sales of mineral products) but, similarly to Russia, with a significantly decreasing share from 14.2% to 10.4%. A

similar trend in trade with Ukraine was recorded by the Czech Republic and Slovakia and a significantly increasing one by Hungary (from 7.2% to 12.8%). It is worth noting that Ukraine, as a trade partner, is relatively important from the point of view of the neighbouring countries in the region while definitely not for the EU as a whole (20th place), for which the share of exports of the EU as a whole hardly moved from 1.1% to 1.2% in 2019, despite the fact that since 1 September 2017, the Association Agreement, on the basis of which the free trade area is being created, has been in force (EU-AU, 2014). Such a slight increase in sales to Ukraine can be attributed to both the economic uncertainty related to the unstable situation in the eastern part of the country and the short duration of the agreement.



**Figure 6.** Geographical distribution of Poland’s extra-EU exports in 2004-2019 broken down by products

Source and Notes: see Figure 1 and 3.

In the top fifteen of the remaining recipients of Polish exports, decreases in the share of exports were recorded by Norway and Turkey, mainly caused by manufactured goods. In the remaining cases, there was a definite increase in the share of other countries, including above all China, Switzerland, and Canada, also principally due to industrial goods. It is worth noting that the EU does not have a signed FTA with China while the other two countries are covered by mutual EU trade preferences (EU-CH, 1972; EU-CA, 2017). China’s high ranking in Polish exports of primarily agri-food products has been indirectly enforced by the aforementioned Russian embargoes but also by Poland’s external economic policy supporting the expansion of companies into Southwest Asian markets. It is worth noting that more and more important recipients of Polish exports, especially agricultural ones, are becoming: Israel, Norway, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Egypt, Australia, and South Africa, i.e., countries that have concluded relevant bilateral trade agreements with the EU, on the basis of which Poland, as an EU Member State, benefits from trade preferences granted to European products.

Polish exports of agricultural, mineral, and industrial products outside the EU are characterised by a relatively low and decreasing level of concentration<sup>2</sup> (Table 2). The concentration ratio for the remaining V4 countries in the case of agricultural and industrial products looks similar (although in the case of Slovakia it is much higher). The situation is slightly different in the case of mineral products, including energy products, for which Poland recorded the relatively lowest concentration index among the V4 countries.

Table 2  
*Concentration index of extra-EU exports of the V4 countries in 2004-19*

	Agricultural products		Mineral products		Industrial products)	
	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19
<b>EU-28</b>	0.14	-0.06	0.17	-0.24	0.18	-0.01
<b>PL</b>	0.12	-0.21	0.26	-0.17	0.17	-0.04
<b>CZ</b>	0.18	-0.10	0.38	0.17	0.14	-0.03
<b>HU</b>	0.20	-0.14	0.88	0.51	0.15	-0.04
<b>SK</b>	0.26	-0.12	0.84	0.18	0.21	-0.15

Source: see table 1.

The EU's common commercial policy and, within this framework, common trade instruments, including bilateral agreements, may, over a long run, facilitate the convergence of both the geographical and commodity structure of exports of individual Member States towards the EU patterns. However, as already mentioned, non-legislative economic, social, historical, and political factors should be taken into account. In the case of Poland, the similarity index of product structures<sup>3</sup> (at the level of 21 CN sections) was relatively high in 2019 (0.80) and slightly lower for the most important 35 trading partners (0.59) (Table 3.). However, there was an upward trend in both cases, which means that Polish exports are slowly becoming convergent with the EU's external exports although definitely more so for the commodity structure than for the main suppliers. This is also confirmed by the comparison with other V4 countries, which recorded lower values of the export similarity index in relation to the analysed 21 groups of goods, and is at similar or much higher values (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), taking into account export directions outside the EU.

2 The Concentration Index (Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, 1945) measures the degree of concentration of the international trade of a country (the degree of export/import market/country of origin concentration for each category of products). If the country trades with only a few countries its trade concentration ratio is high. If it trades with many countries, the trade concentration ratio is low. Technically, trade concentration is measured with the Herfindahl index: the sum of the squares of the trade shares with each individual trading partner.

3 Trade Similarity Index (Finger and Kreinin, 1979) measures the similarity between exports/imports of any two countries (one of the V4 country and the EU-28, as a whole) to a third countries (outside the EU) in terms of 21 groups of products and 35 Top trade partners. The index is based on the share of each product/partner in one of the V4 country's and the EU-28 total exports/imports and is calculated as the sum of the minimum value for each product/partner.

Table 3  
*Export similarity index of Poland and other V4 countries*

	21 groups of products (CN sections)		35 Top trade partners	
	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19
<b>PL</b>	0.80	0.06	0.59	0.10
<b>CZ</b>	0.71	-0.06	0.69	0.02
<b>HU</b>	0.79	0.05	0.58	-0.06
<b>SK</b>	0.61	0.01	0.70	0.08

Source: see Figure 1.

### Structure of Poland's extra-EU import

Poland's extra-EU imports are, to some extent, derivatives of geographical directions in which exports expand. The main extra-EU suppliers of goods to the Polish market are China (industrial goods), whose share significantly increased from 13.1% in 2004 to 28% in 2019, Russia (mineral products), which registered a significant decrease from 28.7% to 19.4%, followed by the USA (agri-food and mineral products) with a slight increase to 7.4% (Figure 7.). Noteworthy is the position of the fourth country: Korea, whose share in Polish imports increased from 3.4% to 5%. This is important because, just as China, the USA and Russia are the dominant suppliers of goods to the EU as a whole, Korea has definitely chosen the V4 markets for its expansion. Compared to exports to Poland, the country increased its share even more in imports of the Czech Republic (to 5.9%), Hungary (to 10.3%), and Slovakia 22.9% (becoming the unquestionable leader in the latter country). Other suppliers, both to the Polish market and to other EU Member States, including other V4 countries, achieved much smaller shares below 5%, reporting either slight decreases or slight increases.




Figure 7. Geographical distribution of extra-EU imports in 2004-2019

Source and Notes: see Figure 1 and 3.


Similar to the EU structure of geographical directions of origin of imports to the Polish market was revealed in the case of industrial goods. For all extra-EU imports, the top three remained unchanged. The clear leader was China, with a share increasing to 37.9% in 2019, followed by Russia and the USA (9.1% each) (Figure 8.). At the same time, it is worth noting the declining positions of suppliers such as Turkey, Japan, Taiwan, Switzerland, and Norway, in favour of increasing shares of Korea, India, Vietnam, and Qatar. This shows a shift away from traditional suppliers to Poland, with whom the EU had free trade agreements concluded for many years, to new exporters from countries with which either free trade agreements have already been concluded or negotiations on trade liberalisation are underway. Despite this change, the concentration index of Polish imports in 2019 changed little compared to 2004 and amounted to 0.2. It was at a similar level to that recorded for the other V4 countries, however, significantly higher than the declining index for the EU-28 (0.09) (Table 4.).

The geographical structure of agricultural imports to Poland is definitely different, with a dominant and growing position of Ukraine in recent years (16.8%), a decrease



in the share of Argentina to 10.8% (although in 2007 it was 22.4%), an increase in the position of Norway to 9.5% (although in 2008 it was only 3.1%), and Brazil to 8.8% (although in 2016 it was 3.5%). This shows quite significant fluctuations in the ranking of suppliers of agricultural commodities to the Polish market due to climate change, higher price fluctuations, and other market conditions in recent years. At the same time, it should be stressed that the EU concluded quite significant agreements liberalising access to its market both with Ukraine and Mercosur countries, which may facilitate certain stabilisation and strengthen their position in Polish imports of agri-food products. In the case of this commodity group, the concentration index, i.e., a kind of dependence on non-EU suppliers, increased in the V4 countries, including Poland, to 0.33, while in the entire EU, it is only 0.24 (by 0.17 and 0.05 points, respectively).

When it comes to mineral products, this category obviously includes oil, natural gas, and coal, whose imports are gradually being diversified by Poland. This manifests itself in a sharp decline in the share of Russia to 57.7% in 2019, as well as Ukraine and Belarus, in favour of an increase in the position of Saudi Arabia (to 10%), Nigeria (3.5%), and Australia and the USA (2.8% and 2.5%, respectively). Such a narrow group of suppliers resulted in a concentration index value more than twice as high for Poland compared to the EU (0.61 to 0.32) although it was significantly lower compared to the indices for Hungary and Slovakia (0.78 and 0.82).



**Figure 8.** Geographical distribution of Poland's extra- EU imports in 2004-2019

Source and Notes: see Figure 1 and 3.

Table 4  
*Concentration index of extra-EU imports of the V4 countries in 2004-19*

	Agricultural products		Mineral products		Industrial products)	
	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19
<b>EU-28</b>	0.09	-0.05	0.32	-0.04	0.24	0.05
<b>PL</b>	0.20	0.01	0.61	-0.17	0.33	0.17
<b>CZ</b>	0.15	0.00	0.62	-0.17	0.39	0.17
<b>HU</b>	0.26	0.01	0.78	-0.05	0.29	0.05
<b>SK</b>	0.20	0.04	0.82	-0.05	0.32	0.15

Source: see table 1.

The above analysis of the commodity and geographical structure of Polish imports is relatively consistent with that of the EU, including V4 (Table 5), although the values obtained by Polish imports (0.88 and 0.63 respectively) are higher than those recorded for exports as well as being the highest among the V4 countries. Taking into account an upward trend, it can be concluded that as in the case of Poland's exports as well as imports, the list of main suppliers is approaching that observed for the whole EU.

Table 5  
*Import similarity index of Poland and other V4 countries*

	21 groups of products (CN sections)		35 Top trade partners	
	Index	Change between 2004-19	Index	Change between 2004-19
<b>PL</b>	0.88	0.04	0.63	0.01
<b>CZ</b>	0.68	-0.14	0.62	-0.03
<b>HU</b>	0.76	0.05	0.61	0.01
<b>SK</b>	0.74	0.00	0.50	0.03

Source: see Table 1.

## Conclusions

Poland's foreign trade with non-EU countries, like that of the other V4 countries, behaved to a large extent similarly to the EU as a whole although the dynamics was much higher. This observation applies both to the crisis period (2008-2010) and the remaining years of relative prosperity. This shows that Poland is significantly involved not only in the EU internal market, of which it is undoubtedly a beneficiary, but also in extra-EU trade. This is particularly visible when considering the dynamics of intra- and extra-EU trade. Similar dynamics in trade with non-EU countries indicates that both the trade conditions created at the EU level were favourable for Polish entrepreneurs (both exporters and importers) as well as their offer gained interest in third-party countries. Consequently, Poland's position as a partner in extra-EU trade has increased although it is still much lower than it could be expected.

The expanded pyramid of EU trade preferences has not significantly affected the list of Poland's top three non-EU trading partners. The Russian Federation is still the largest recipient of Polish products. This mainly concerns industrial products, as agri-food products are subject to successive embargoes used as retaliation within the framework of difficult relations with the EU. On the other hand, from the import point of view of

Poland, as well as of the other V4 countries, the position of Russia is dominant in the trade in mineral products (petroleum, gas). However, even here the role of this country is decreasing in favour of new suppliers of raw materials from outside the EU. The situation with China is slightly different: it recorded high dynamics of trade with Poland, especially in supplies of industrial products to the Polish market. Trade with the USA is also growing, although to a lesser extent, in exports of industrial products and imports of minerals.

As far as Poland's trade partners outside the big three are concerned, the trade preference pyramid presented at the outset definitely favours geographical de-concentration of both Polish imports and exports as well as approximation to the general trends observed in the EU. In the case of countries ranked fourth and further down in Poland's extra-EU trade, differences in their proportions are relatively small. This means a relatively low level of concentration of Polish trade with individual extra-EU countries. Particularly noteworthy is the relationship with Korea, which seems to have chosen the V4 countries, including Poland, as a starting point for expansion for the rest of the EU, and the free trade agreement with the EU will certainly strengthen its position on the list of major extra-EU partners.

There are also other countries on this list, with quite different statuses and degrees of trade relations with the EU. This is especially true of those that have long established FTAs or customs unions: Norway, Switzerland, Mexico, South Africa, Egypt, and Turkey (albeit with a declining position) as well as those that have just concluded agreements to facilitate trade: Canada, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, and Vietnam. This group also includes countries that have not yet concluded such agreements: the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, and India.

This growing diversity of partners from outside the EU should be assessed very positively in the context of the need to diversify suppliers and customers, especially in times of crisis or when barriers or restrictions are imposed by individual countries. Threats associated with overdependence on non-EU supplies, especially of raw materials and processed products of strategic importance, became the subject of debate in the EU in the first year of the COVID-19 outbreak. It seems that Poland's point of view in this regard is similar to that of most Member States: there is a need for greater diversification of extra-EU trade.

It seems that, the analysis of the EU's pyramid of preferences needs further examination of not only recently concluded EU free trade agreements but also those in force for many years. They provided for a much more in-depth integration. The customs union established between the EU and Turkey is noteworthy here. As we should expect a much stronger position of Turkey in extra-EU trade of all EU Member States, this area requires definitely further research.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Accession Treaty (2003) Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, OJ L 236, p. 17–930.
- Ambroziak, A. A. (2017). Wpływ embarga Federacji Rosyjskiej na eksport jabłek z Polski w latach 2004–2015 (title in English: The impact of Russian Federation's embargo on exports of apples from Poland in 2004–2015, *Roczniki Ekonomii Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich*, T. 104, z. 1, pp. 22–29, DOI: 10.22630/RNR.2017.104.1.2.
- Ambroziak, A. A. (2018). Russia's embargo on the Polish apple exports. *BRE Review - Baltic RIM Economies*, 3, 33.
- Ambroziak, A. A. (2020). Polityka Unii Europejskiej w związku z inwestycjami zagranicznymi Chin (title in English: EU policy towards China's Foreign Investments) [in:] Radło M.J. (ed.) (2020). *Inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku. Chińska ekspansja, nowe łańcuchy wartości i rosnąca rywalizacja*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH.
- Ambroziak, A. A. (2021) Does the European Single Market Exist in the Era of a Coronavirus Pandemic? The Case of Intra and Extra-EU Trade in COVID-19-related Products, *Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs* 25(1), 63–83, DOI: 10.33067/SE.1.2021.3.
- Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997) of 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 1997, OJ No 78, item 483.
- Council of Ministers (2019) The 2030 National Environmental Policy. Annex to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 16 July 2019, MP 794.
- Czarny E. Kuźnar A., & Menkes J. (2017) *The Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on International Cooperation*, Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang Verlag.
- European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, COM(2021) 223 final, 5.5.2021.
- European Council. (1993). Conclusions of the Presidency, 21–22 June 1993.
- EU-CH. (1972). Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation, OJ L 300, 31.12.1972, p. 189–280.
- EU-UA. (2014). Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3–2137.
- EU-CA. (2017). Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 23–1079.
- Finger, J.M., & Kreinin, M. E. (1979) A Measure of Export Similarity and Its Possible Uses, *Economic Journal*, 89, pp. 905–912.
- Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (2020) Importance and motives of preferential trade agreements in the EU's external trade, *Economics and Business Review*, Vol. 6 (20), No. 3, 3–22, DOI: 10.18559/eb.2020.3.1.
- Ministry of Climate and Environment. (2021). Energy Policy of Poland until 2040, MP 264.
- Moes B., Veka J.H. (2020) EU keeps its shield up in the US trade war, [www.Politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-us-trade-tariffs-airbus-boeing-valdis-dombrovskis/) (available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-us-trade-tariffs-airbus-boeing-valdis-dombrovskis/>).
- MSZ. (2017). Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland.
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012), Consolidated version, PJ C 326, / 47–390.



## Poland's Natural Gas Energy Strategy in the Context of the European Union's Energy Policy

Robert Klaczyński<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

This article on *Poland's Natural Gas Energy Strategy in the Context of the European Union's Energy Policy* discusses key problems related to the functioning of the Polish fuel market in the field of resources, production, consumption and especially raw material supply. For more than a dozen years, Poland has been a member of the European Union and together with other member countries that form a community, it has created a political and economic reality in the area under the authority of the EU organization. One of the community's key tasks is to ensure the security of Member States, within the framework of economic policy conducted by these countries as well as European Union institutions. Energy security is an important part of this policy. The author of this article undertook the task of analyzing the situation in the Polish natural gas sector but taking into consideration the European conditions. The article outlines the prospect of future developments and special emphasis is placed on a discussion of the projects aimed at the diversification of natural gas supplies to Poland and those that concern the diversification of blue fuel supplies as seen more broadly from the perspective of the European Union. Some of these projects are currently implemented, some are still in the study phase, and some will probably never reach fruition.

### Keywords

Natural gas, Energy resources, Fuel market, European Union, Natural gas storage facilities, Diversification, Pipelines

**1 Corresponding Author:** Robert Klaczyński (Prof.), Pedagogical University of Krakow, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science and Administration, Cracow, Poland. E-mail: robert.klaczynski@up.krakow.pl  
ORCID: 0000-0002-9150-9958

**To cite this article:** Klaczyński, R. (2022). Poland's Natural Gas Energy Strategy in the Context of the European Union's Energy Policy. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S137–S145. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.973148>

## Introduction

Energy policy is one of the most important challenges facing a number of countries regardless of their position, role, or importance in international politics. The differences in this policy arise from the possibilities and limitations resulting from access to energy resources, transmission routes, and the economic power represented by a given actor in international relations. No efficient functioning of states or nations is possible without access to a supply of energy resources and its sources. Energy resources, it should be stressed, are often used as a tool for creating international relations, both in economic and political terms. Countries which have at their disposal raw energy resources, in addition to profits from their sale, use them to obtain numerous political and economic concessions, thus building their position and strength. The policy defined in this way is in line with the realities of soft power. Some political commentators draw attention to the fact that countries having oil and gas in relation to countries importing raw materials is becoming more rigid. There are many historical examples of this reality, from the Middle East crisis of 1973 to the 'gas war' between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the first years of the 21st century. Hence, Poland, a country found at the junction of two political worlds, is forced to generate an effective energy strategy based on diversification of natural gas supplies to reduce the economic pressure defined by the price of raw material, as well as the political pressure based on the security of supplies.

Poland's geopolitical location forces state authorities to undertake activities aimed at ensuring an extensive diversification of natural gas supplies. This concerns both the sources from which the raw material can be obtained and transmission routes, including those using conventional installations, as well as modern technologies in the form of gas ports. Unfortunately, many of the decisions taken are politically motivated, often referring to the history of the country or, more broadly, the region, which precludes a proper economic calculation and analysis of profits and losses. This reality has, and will probably continue to have, a negative impact on the assessment of Poland's energy security.

This research made use of studies as well as articles appearing in scientific journals and individual books. Additionally, an important supplement to the sources used for the substantive analysis of the problems discussed here was online reference material, allowing the author to follow current energy-related developments relevant to the subject of the article.

This contribution is based on the use of the case study method. According to the author, it allows for effective interpretation of facts and events subjected to problem analysis. The method was complemented by the scenario method, which made it possible to refer to the prospects for the development of the natural gas market in Poland and to forecast developments in the European energy sector.

## Poland's energy strategy

Poland does not own enough natural gas resources to become a self-sufficient country in energy. The total volume of natural gas deposits does not exceed 650 billion cubic meters, and according to geologists only 125 billion m<sup>3</sup> is exploitable. Some hopes were pinned on unconventional gas sources, but they turned out to be an unrealistic resource.



Currently, Polish natural gas deposits provide approximately 25% of the total domestic consumption demand. In the 1970s, it was over 50% but with the development of industry and consumer infrastructure in the form of individual households, there has been a steady decrease in produced raw material versus the growing demand. In the future, with further dynamic growth demand for natural gas, another decrease in the share of domestic production of natural gas in the overall balance of its consumption can be expected. The latter will increase within a decade from the current 20 billion m<sup>3</sup> annually to nearly 30 billion m<sup>3</sup>. Such growth is a result of the country's dynamic economic development as well as further gasification to areas deprived of access to this energy resource. Also of significance are the increasingly stringent environmental standards that relate to the electricity generation process. A majority of the electrical and heat energy produced in Poland is based on coal and lignite, which unfortunately are highly emissive and therefore harmful to the environment. The growing public awareness of the negative impact of gas emissions on the environment is putting increasing pressure on governments to implement an effective decarbonization process. It is worth noting that burning natural gas to produce electricity or heat is almost 30% less harmful to the environment than burning coal. Hence, the progressive decarbonization process in Europe and the increase in demand for natural gas (Szuflicki, Malon, Tymiński, 2019, 11–30).

Currently, Poland imports gas from several sources, among which the most significant supplier is Russia, with almost 40% of the demand for raw material from Russian sources. The gas is supplied by the Russian side to Poland via the Druzhba pipeline network running through the territory of Ukraine and the Yamal pipeline built in the 1990s, which runs through Belarus and then through the territory of Poland to the Federal Republic of Germany. The transmission capacities of both installations currently allow for the transmission of more than 100 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas per year, which is more than 50% of total Russian exports to the European fuel market. However, with Russian plans to build a new gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, called North Stream 2, the possibility of Russia abandoning existing natural gas transit routes has appeared on the geopolitical horizon. Poland and Ukraine would lose any possibility of influencing the EU energy policy in relation to the largest exporter of blue fuel. Not surprisingly, the Polish authorities have accelerated actions aimed at increasing independence from natural gas suppliers from the east. A decision was made to expand the liquefied gas terminal in Świnoujście, and to increase its target capacity to 7.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> per year (temporarily to 6.3 billion m<sup>3</sup>). At the same time, there is also talk to expand it further or to construct a new installation enabling reception of LNG. As a bridging solution, the rental or purchase of a floating LNG terminal is envisioned with the capacity to reach 3.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> of natural gas. However, Poland's greatest hopes are linked to the construction of the Baltic Pipeline, through which raw material is delivered from Norway resources. Norway is the second largest exporter of gas for Europe via Denmark to Poland. This pipeline is to have a capacity of 13 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas annually, out of which 10 billion m<sup>3</sup> is to be supplied to Poland and nearly 3 billion m<sup>3</sup> to Denmark. It is worth emphasizing that at present Poland could possibly obtain quantities of gas on the free market, by using the gas network which is at the disposal of Member States of the Community. It is in this way that we may receive certain, smaller amounts of gas through a network of interconnectors. We have such connections with Germany and the Ukraine. In the latter case, however,

we cannot expect more raw material supplies as the Ukraine does not have sufficient production capacity, although it does have significant raw material resources. This is a result of a number of factors, such as political instability combined with a lack of security which effectively prevent the implementation of larger investment projects. This internal conflict was caused by Russia, so the Ukrainian energy policy is still very reactive. This will not significantly change in the future because such changes are predicated on the foreign policy of Russia, which is unlikely to happen. Therefore, Poland harbors greater hopes for the implementation of further infrastructural investment projects within the European Union. At present, works on the construction of interconnectors linking Poland with Lithuania and Slovakia are being completed. In the former case, small supplies of gas are possible using the existing LNG infrastructure in Lithuania (Zaniewicz, 2018; Sumara, 2015. BP, 2019)

Poland had some hopes linked to prospects of using shale gas deposits. At the end of the 1990s, a discussion began on the possibility of using unconventional gas deposits by European countries, including Poland, which continues to this day, albeit with less intensity. The exploitation of shale gas deposits in the United States and Canada was cited as an example. However, the geological factors and location of these countries shale gas deposits were not taken into account. Initially, the volume of shale gas resources in Poland was estimated at 5.2 trillion m<sup>3</sup>. With time, the forecasts were significantly reduced. Currently, it is estimated that the deposits which can be tapped into hold no more than 350 billion m<sup>3</sup> of the raw material. Taking into consideration the environmental conditions related to the hydraulic fracturing used in drilling and the location of bituminous shale in the geological structure of the countries' rocks potential production possibilities must be treated with caution. At present, there is no major project in this field in Poland. Only works aimed at finding deposits and determining their size are being conducted. According to many experts in the natural gas market, the production of raw material from deposits found in Poland is currently not only technologically complicated and dangerous for the environment, but also economically unprofitable (Miłosz, 2015).

Another example at attempts to diversify the sources of natural gas supplies to Poland are activities aimed at taking over deposits found outside the country by purchasing shares. Thus, Poland is making efforts to gain direct access as the owner of majority stakes to deposits in Norway, Kazakhstan, and Africa. Unfortunately, in the case of African and, to some extent, Central Asian deposits, the problem is still the ability to ensure the safety of gas extraction and its later transport. Poland does not have these capabilities. The region of Central Asia is dominated by Russia and China, who are reluctant to look at the actions of competitors, and the Polish initiative would be interpreted as such. Therefore, vaguely outlined projects in this area should be approached with caution (Furman, 2021).

Natural gas storage facilities are of importance in Poland's energy security strategy. Currently, the country has six natural gas storage facilities whose capacity allows for storing a gas equivalent of two months' consumption of the raw material. These include sites in Kosakowo, Mogilno, Swarzędz, Husów, Strachocina, Brzeźnica, and Wierzchowice. The total storage capacity of the entire blue fuel storage system is 3.72 billion m<sup>3</sup> of natural gas. The Polish Gas and Oil Company (PGNiG), which owns the natural gas storage facilities, has decided to expand and modernize the facilities to increase their storage

capacities, which will enable the company to supply gas in the amount corresponding to three months' demand for the raw material. However, it should be remembered that the demand for natural gas will grow dynamically and at the end of 2030 will reach 30 billion m<sup>3</sup> of raw material annually, which would mean an increase of almost 30%. The future reality requires the construction of new natural gas storage facilities. Basing the country's energy security strategy on this may prove to be far from sufficient. It should also be noted that the European Union supports this construction and expansion, including modernization, of the existing natural gas storage systems, seeing in it the possibility of boosting energy security of the entire Community (MAG, 2020; POD, 2020).

### **Energy Strategy of the European Union**

The European Union has at its disposal small resources of natural gas, which does not allow for self-sufficiency nor any serious contribution to the task of supplying EU residents with the raw material necessary for the functioning of the economy. Despite the passage of years and an unfavorable history, the Community, defined as 26 states as well as an institution, has not managed to work out a uniform energy strategy. There are many reasons for this situation. The main reason is the domination of national policies over Community policy. Germany's strategic interest, i.e., striving to build a strategic energy partnership with Russia, is different from that of Poland, which is politically and economically much weaker. According to the concept adopted by the authorities of Germany, it is to become an energy hub in the near future, redistributing Russian raw materials throughout Europe. In this way, Germany would not only gain a serious economic advantage in the form of gigantic revenues from sales of natural gas, but also a political advantage, which would translate into strengthening its position as the dominant player on the European political scene. Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe are reluctant to adopt such a political and energy vision. This is due to fears of domination by the Russian-German tandem, underpinned by historical experiences difficult for this part of the Old Continent. The latter stay largely alien to countries once on the other side of the former Iron Curtain. For this reason, Poland, in addition to building an energy independence perceived through the prism of natural gas supplies, are trying to ensure a supply alternative to Russian resources. The assumption is that in the future it would be Poland and not Germany which would be the main gas hub of a united Europe. However, this will probably never materialize. Given the Russian-German potential, Poland's capabilities are so limited that, despite the declared support of the United States, the implementation of a policy defined in this way appears to be a fantasy calculated for the purposes of an internal political campaign. The international situation is not favorable either. The focus of American foreign policy has shifted towards Asia. The U.S. faces many years of a complicated economic confrontation with China. The European theatre of political events is of secondary importance to the administration in Washington. It even seems that the Americans are ready to sacrifice certain hitherto seemingly unshakable principles in their European policy for the sake of a constructive dialogue with Russia, counting on its neutrality in the growing dispute with the Middle Kingdom. To what extent these political calculations are consistent with reality is another matter. As far as energy policy is concerned, it is hard not to get the impression that there has been a serious shift in the policy of the United States from hard to soft power. This

is evidenced by the American withdrawal of sanctions against North Stream 2. America have given tacit consent to the implementation of the German variant of a European energy policy. On the other hand, the temporary block on construction of the Baltic Pipeline, which, contrary to the assurances of Poland, may result in delaying or even stopping the investment, is reportedly a cause for concern. The fact that the contract for natural gas supplies from Russia to Poland expires at the end of 2022, the energy balance of Poland will be, according to various data, short of 4 billion to 8 billion m<sup>3</sup> of the raw material, which results from forecasts of a dynamic increase in domestic consumers' demand for natural gas and limited possibilities of its production in Poland. Then the country will be left with either having to purchase raw material on the free market under short-term contracts and supplying natural gas using the interconnector system or signing another short-term contract with Russia. The latter, however, does not necessarily have to agree to this given the negative or even hostile stance of Poland towards the energy strategy pursued by the Russian side. It therefore seems essential to strengthen rather than weaken Poland's involvement in the European Union's energy policy, despite its obvious weaknesses. There is simply no other way. Poland's energy policy, which is independent of Community institutions, is not capable of producing good results in the diversification and security of natural gas supplies. Unfortunately, there is no such determination on the part of Poland's state power elites. What is more, the actions of the Polish authorities tend to be very destructive, not to say unfriendly, in the common energy policy of the European Union, and certainly not conducive to compromise solutions. This does not bode well for the future both in terms of the energy policy of the Community and the energy strategy of the Polish state (Miciuła, 2015, pp. 57–67; Zajączkowska, 2011, pp. 81–96; Sallet, 2021).

### **Polish position on the energy policy of the European Union in the field of production, transmission and import of natural gas**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new nation states, as well as the regaining of full sovereignty by the countries hitherto under Soviet rule, Poland has sought to limit Russian influence not only on itself, but also on the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe. The past three decades, which have shaped the geopolitical situation on the Old Continent, can be divided into two periods. The first, from 1990 to 2000, was a time of marked weakening of Russia, whose significance in international politics was clearly diminished. The second period after 2000 was associated with the seizure of power by Vladimir Putin. This was a time when Russia's position as a superpower was being strengthened, not only in the former USSR, but in a wider global context. One of the tools for shaping international relations, both economically and politically, has become energy resources, especially natural gas. Excluding Poland's own resources, the consumption of natural gas in the country in the 1990s was entirely dependent on imports from Russia. The Russians skillfully used their monopolistic position to obtain economic benefits from gas trade with Poland. Subsequent agreements with the Russians were unfavorable to Poland, not only for political reasons, but particularly, and this needs to be emphasized, from an economic point of view. It is worth noting, however, that Poland itself has, to a large extent, contributed to this by generating, as the key entity selling gas to the Polish state, not the Russian company Gazprom, which would seem rational and logical, but a private company Bartimpex, owned by the Polish entrepreneur Aleksander

Gudzowaty, which is unique on a European scale and testifies to the lack of transparency in gas trade in the last decade of the 20th century. The consequences of the agreements signed have been felt by the Polish economy right up to the present day. It was not until the end of the 1990s that an interconnector with Germany was established, which enabled Poland to connect to the EU gas system, of which it relatively quickly became a member. This improved Poland's energy security, although it did not lead to the diversification of gas supplies expected by the Polish authorities. There were many reasons for this. One of them was the lack of serious contractors capable of selling raw materials at an affordable price. Another was the permanent lack of financial resources for such a large investment project as the construction of a gas pipeline and a liquefied gas terminal. Only with time, together with the growing importance of Poland in international economic relations, which contributed to the increase of trust on the part of western contractors operating on the global fuel market, did such opportunities appear (POL, 2020).

The main problem in Poland's relations with the EU and within the Community is the doctrinaire approach to geopolitical issues on the Polish side, which precludes compromise. Unfortunately, the Polish authorities seem not to have taken note of the changing geopolitical balance of power in the world, including the growing position of China and Russia recovering from the difficult post-Cold War period. All too often, Poland's political elites refer to the Giedroyć doctrine reinforced with Promethean elements, which proclaims the need for a 'political crusade' for the democratization of the former Soviet states, and for them to become a tool of influence on Russia, thus inducing that state to transform itself from an authoritarian country into a democratic state under the rule of law. Sometimes in Polish politics there appear notions of returning to the Jagiellonian idea, where Poland would play the role of a mentor for Central European countries, showing them the way forward. The grandiosity of these plans is both at odds with Poland's interests and falls far short of the state's capabilities, the latter fact being particularly painful in taking a rational point of view of the narrative. This brings chaos to international relations and unfortunately condemns Poland to the role of a political outsider. A strong involvement in the political dispute around the North Stream 2 gas pipeline, which excluded any possibility of a compromise solution and, what is worse, went against the position of the majority of EU Member States, resulted in a political weakening of Poland and a loss of trust on the part of members of the Community. The assessment of the Polish energy policy is also negatively influenced by a certain hostility of the Polish authorities towards the EU climate policy assuming fast abandonment of hard coal as a high-emission input in the production of electricity and heat. Thus, increased problems are accumulating around the Polish energy policy, especially in the natural gas sector. Some of them are generated by the Polish side on its own. However, reality defined in this way could have been foreseen or at least considered. Unfortunately, as often happens in Polish politics, there was no alternative solution to the problem. Nonetheless, the policy aimed against the interests of leading EU states continues, which does not support compromise solutions and which, given Poland's limited capabilities is going to lead to the deepening of international isolation over time (Gawlikowska - Fyk, 2020).

## Conclusion

There is no doubt that Poland has benefited from EU membership in the area of energy security. A number of energy projects have been successfully implemented, including the expansion of the natural gas storage network, interconnectors, EU support for the construction of the Baltic Pipe and the expansion of the liquefied gas terminal in Świnoujście. Not without significance are also legal solutions in the transmission and trade of natural gas within the EU limiting the possibility of obtaining a full monopolistic position by Russia. Unfortunately, Poland is trying to implement, against the majority of EU countries, the concept of complete elimination of Russian natural gas from the EU fuel market, which is an unrealistic prospect and, what is worse, harmful for the Community. Russian gas is still the best solution for the countries of the Old Continent. There are currently no other equally stable and safe sources of this raw material. Prices for liquefied gas on the global fuel market of nearly USD 1,000 per 1,000 m<sup>3</sup> of raw material justify a far-reaching restraint against ideas such as switching the economy to this type of fuel. What remains is to use Russian gas while ensuring safeguards against the Russian energy policy of building influence on the basis of using natural gas as a tool for increasing the country's clout. Such solid safeguards include interconnectors, natural gas storage facilities, reinforcement of the domestic natural gas production system and expansion of the possibilities of importing the raw material from outside Russia based on the LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe, however within a reasonable range given economic realities. Having such possibilities, negotiating solutions good for Poland within the framework of bilateral or - which cannot be excluded in the future - multilateral agreements on purchase of gas from Russian sources can be successfully done. So far, however, Poland prefers to conduct its energy policy without basing it on pragmatism of actions and political realism of the concepts generated by the country.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support.

---

## References

- Szufflicki M. Malon A. Tyimiński M. (2020). Bilans zasobów złóż kopalin w Polsce wedle stanu na 31 grudnia 2019 roku, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny, Warszawa.
- Zaniewicz M. (2018). Po co nam dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu, <https://www.energetyka24.com/ropa/po-co-nam-dywersyfikacja-dostaw-gazu-analiza->
- Sumara A. (2015). Jakie gazociągi powstaną w latach 2016 – 2026, <https://inzynieria.com/paliwa/gazociagi/projekty/42686,jakie-gazociagi-powstana-w-latach-2016ndash2025>
- BP (2020). Baltic Pipe: o projekcie, <https://www.baltic-pipe.eu/pl/o-projekcie/>
- Miłosz M. (2015). Gaz łupkowy w Polsce. Koniec marzeń o gazowej potędze. Będzie naftowe eldorado? <https://www.baltic-pipe.eu/pl/o-projekcie/>
- Furman T. (2021). Polska przejmuje duże złoża gazu, <https://www.parkiet.com/Surowce-i-paliwa/303259882-PGNiG-przejmie-duze-zloza-gazu.html>
- Miciuła I. (2015). Polityka energetyczna Unii Europejskiej do 2030 roku w ramach zrównoważonego rozwoju. Studia Ekonomiczne Wydziału Nauk i Zarządzania, No. 42.
- Zajączkowska M. (2011). Polityka energetyczna Unii Europejskiej. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego, Kraków.
- Sallet O. (2021). Nord Stream 2. Końcowa rozgrywka, <https://www.dw.com/pl/nord-stream-2-ko-C5%84cowa-rozgrywka/a-56388016>
- POL. (2020). Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2025 roku, [https://www.cire.pl/pliki/2/pol\\_kprm2.pdf](https://www.cire.pl/pliki/2/pol_kprm2.pdf)
- Gawlikowska – Fyk A. (2020). Polityka energetyczna Polski. Nadrabianie zaległości w polskiej energetyce.

Data końca w polskiej energetyce to rok 2049, <https://www.muratorplus.pl/technika/elektroenergetyka/polityka-energetyczna-polski-aa-2VwJ-rrph-SEiD.html>  
MAG. (2020). Magazyny gazu ziemnego w Polsce, <https://pgnig.pl/podziemne-magazyny-gazu>  
POD. (2020). Podziemne magazynowanie gazu ziemnego w Polsce, <https://pgnig.pl/sanok/dzialalnosc/podziemne-magazynowanie-gazu>





## The Evolution of Poland's Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans

Artur Adamczyk<sup>1</sup> 

### Abstract

The main aim of this article is to outline the evolution of Poland's foreign policy towards the Balkan region from 1989 to modern times. Poland's foreign policy towards that region can be divided into several stages, the first being the period between the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Poland's full accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., 1989-2004. The second stage is the 2004-2010 period when Poland implemented its Balkan policy that was underpinned by the European Union's approach, and practically co-participated in the European Union's policy towards the Balkan states. The third stage's commencement was marked by Poland's preparations for the EU Council Presidency in 2011, and its obligation to coordinate the EU's Balkan policy as well. This stage is characterised by Poland's greater involvement in creating policy towards the Balkans, as evidenced by the organisation of a summit called the Berlin Process in Poznań in 2019, which was the initiative of a group of EU Member States involved in developing cooperation with the Western Balkan states. In modern times, however, Poland's policy in the Balkans remains limited while it should be far more vigorous due to the concerns related to Russia's influence and expansion in that region.

### Keywords

Poland, Foreign Policy, the Balkans

**1 Corresponding Author:** Artur Adamczyk (Dr.), University of Warsaw Center for Europe, Warsaw, Poland.  
E-mail: a.adamczyk@uw.edu.pl ORCID: 0000-0002-5444-3670

**To cite this article:** Adamczyk, A. (2022). The Evolution of Poland's Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S147–S164. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.944123>

## Introduction

The main aim of this article is to outline the evolution of Poland's foreign policy towards the Balkan region from 1989 to modern times. In order to achieve the said aim, one should apply a chronological and problematic method that will allow for a proper analysis of Poland's activity in the Balkan region resulting from the emergence of various determinants affecting the decisions of Polish diplomacy.

The first being the period between the demise of the Eastern Bloc and Poland's full accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., 1989-2004. The second stage is the 2004-2010 period when Poland implemented its Balkan policy that was underpinned by the European Union's stance, and basically co-participated in the European Union's policy towards the Balkan states. The third stage's commencement was marked by Poland's preparations for the EU Council Presidency in 2011, and its obligation to coordinate the EU's Balkan policy as well. This stage is characterised by Poland's greater involvement in creating policy towards the Balkans, as evidenced by the organisation of a summit called the Berlin Process in Poznań in 2019, which was the initiative of a group of EU Member States involved in developing cooperation with the Western Balkan states. In modern times, however, Poland's policy in the Balkans remains limited while it should be far more vigorous due to the concerns related to Russia's influence and expansion in that region.

While analysing Poland's foreign policy towards the Balkans, it should be emphasised that it is two dimensional. The first dimension constitutes bilateral relations which are rather limited and somewhat modest for such a sizeable country from Central Europe. The second dimension encompasses multilateral relations arising from Poland's membership in various organisations actively operating in the region, i.e., the European Union, NATO, OSCE, or the United Nations. Particularly noteworthy is Poland's membership in the European Union and international structures functioning within the EU, i.e. the Visegrad Group, and the Berlin Process thanks to which Poland is present in the Balkans.

While discussing the evolution of Poland's policy towards the Balkan states, it should also be specified which countries are covered by this policy, i.e., which states are considered to be Balkan states. By the end of the 1980s, the Balkan states encompassed Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Due to its membership in the European Communities, Greece was not defined as a Balkan state but was defined as a southern European state. Turkey was also not treated as a Balkan state. The breakup of Yugoslavia transformed the political map of the region and new countries such as: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), North Macedonia (originally Macedonia)<sup>2</sup>, and Kosovo emerged (Olszewski, 2010A; Wojnicki, 2003; Karadzowski & Adamczyk, 2015 ; Adamczyk & Karadzowski, 2019). At the same time, some of the countries described as Balkan states tried not only to discard this term but also ceased

---

1 In 1991, following the declaration of independence by Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia) which comprised the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro remained. In 2003, FR Yugoslavia was transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and in 2006, as a result of Montenegro's secession, two separate states emerged: Serbia and Montenegro.

2 In 2019 the Macedonian Parliament changed the state's name from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia. The decision was a result of an agreement signed by the governments in Skopje and Athens putting an end to a years-long dispute over the name of the Macedonian state.

being identified with that unstable and conflict-ridden region. Slovenia immediately “cut itself off” politically from the Balkans (Olszewski, 2010 A), and the accession process of Bulgaria, Romania (2007), and Croatia (2013) to the European Union occasioned that these countries also ceased to be referred to as Balkan states. Poland's relations with these countries are implemented within the framework of the European Union. Currently, the policy towards the Balkans means shaping relations with the group of countries defined by the European Union as the Western Balkans, including Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Albania (Babić, 2014).

### **Shaping Poland's Relations with the Balkan States between 1989 - 2004**

At the beginning, it should be emphasised that the Balkans did not play a leading role in shaping Poland's foreign policy at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. This was due to the fact that the government in Warsaw focused its attention on the state's security in the neighbouring international area, i.e., across the eastern and western borders following the demise of the Eastern bloc (Bieleń, 2011). On the one hand, the changes referred to the process of German reunification and the emergence of a strong neighbour in the West. Across the eastern border, however, the geopolitical situation transformed dramatically since the Soviet Union collapsed and new states, new neighbours of uncertain subjectivity, durability and future emerged. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, which also meant the destruction of the Warsaw Pact, positioned Poland in a specific vacuum of security and uncertainty with regards mainly to the situation in the East. It does not come as a surprise that the priorities in Poland's foreign policy in the early 1990s were to strengthen relations with the democratic countries of the West and their organisational structures as well as to establish and stabilise contact with its immediate neighbours (Orzelska, 2011). These, then, were the objectives that Poland focused its efforts and energy on in the new geopolitical situation. At that time, Poland was a weak country; it participated in no system guaranteeing security and was also indebted and far from having any ambition to prioritise relations with the Balkan states.

The foregoing does not necessarily mean that Poland marginalised and did not care about maintaining and building bilateral relations with countries from that region with which Poland was mainly connected through ties arising from the cooperation within the Socialist Bloc. It has to be noted, however, that even the socialist states in the Balkans have never been a monolith. This applies to Albania pursuing a policy of isolation or non-involvement of Yugoslavia, which affected the diverse intensity in the bilateral relations of the Polish People's Republic (Czekalski, Hauziński, & Leśny, 2009; Habowski 2016). The government in Warsaw had already established good relations with Bulgaria and Romania, which translated into the signing of agreements on friendly relations and cooperation with the governments from Sofia and Bucharest in 1993 (Pacula, 2015; Koseski, 2019; Czernicka, 2019). Common ground for cooperation between Poland and both countries were concerns regarding instability in the East, support for building Ukraine's statehood and pursuit to participate in Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e. NATO and the EU, in order to obtain the much-needed security guarantees (Kotulewicz-Wisińska, 2018). Both Romania and Bulgaria were extremely interested in conflict de-escalation in the crumbling Yugoslavia, hence, Poland, by signing agreements with both countries,

also expressed profound concerns about the situation in the Balkans (Czernicka 2019). The main outcome, however, of these agreements was economic exchange and mutual support on the road to NATO and the EU. Poland's involvement in Yugoslav problems, nevertheless, remained limited to declarations and simply awaiting Western countries' decisions. In the early 1990s, Poland also strengthened its relations with Albania, which was manifested in the signing by both governments of an array of technical and economic agreements regulating outstanding issues in bilateral relations regarding *inter alia* transportation, tourism, and agriculture (Albania). However, it should be underlined that political relations were very limited, and stemmed from the unstable situation in Albania<sup>3</sup> (Balcer, 2008).

Poland's policy towards the disintegration processes in Yugoslavia requires particular attention. The government in Warsaw observed Yugoslavia's process of disintegration through the prism of the uncertain situation across its eastern border. They feared the so-called domino effect, i.e., that the Balkan events would affect the uncontrolled collapse of the Soviet Union, which in 1991, like Yugoslavia, was a crumbling, nationally and religiously diverse state. Hence, Poland's policy was very conservative and expectant. It was emphasised that solving Yugoslav problems should not jeopardise international security, thus, Polish diplomacy closely monitored the declarations of Western European states and of the United States, but was afraid to undertake any actions itself. Since the White House announced that the Balkan issues should be resolved by European countries, Warsaw focused its attention on the diplomatic signs from the European Communities. As A. Orzelska emphasises, Poland, rather like the EC, initially made an appeal for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and refrained from recognising the independence proclaimed by Slovenia and Croatia (Orzelska, 2011). The said stance entailed expectations that preserving Yugoslavia's unity would prevent armed conflict and repercussions for European security. However, when it turned out that the determined societies of Croatia and Slovenia could not have been stopped from executing the principle of self-determination, and the government in Belgrade was trying to maintain the country's unity by using the Serbian army, the European Community members announced in December 1991 their willingness to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. Poland was also expecting potential after-effects of the Yugoslav disintegration process on the situation across its eastern border. When, on 8<sup>th</sup> December 1991, the Belavezha Accords were signed, which dissolved the USSR in a controlled manner and established the Commonwealth of Independent States, the reassured government in Warsaw followed the decisions of the EC Member States and on 21<sup>st</sup> January 1992 recognised the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia (Orzelska, 2011).

Such coordination, or rather subordination of Poland's policy towards the Balkans to the Western European states' position stemmed from a number of grounds. Firstly, Poland itself had not developed any coherent policy towards the Balkans following the eradication of the Eastern Bloc. The rapid breakup of Yugoslavia took all European countries by surprise and therefore the government in Warsaw decided that it was better to base its decisions in a situation of uncertainty on the European mainstream, i.e., the

---

3 Albania has been struggling with corruption problems, organised crime, trafficking, and a weak political class.

EC. What is more, Poland clearly declared its aspirations to join the European Union and NATO, which was associated with the willingness, or even the need, to demonstrate its support for and solidarity with the decisions made by members of those structures. After all, EU and NATO membership was subject to the acclamation of the existing members, hence Poland's diplomacy had to be very careful and conscious in order to avoid possible confrontation with any of its members. It comes as no surprise then that when the EC and the US recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1992, Poland followed suit just two days later. The same applied to Macedonia, whose recognition process was prolonged due to the dispute with Greece over the state's name (Stawowy-Kawka, 2000, Olszewski, 2010B). Poland recognised the said country on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1993 under its technical name established at the UN forum: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - (FYROM). This took place just a few days after the majority of the European Union states took a similar decision.

Although Poland did not establish its own foreign policy towards the Balkans, the willingness to join the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Union forced the country to undertake international activity which made its presence visible in this region. The said visibility was manifested mainly through the participation of Polish contingents and representatives in various missions and actions carried out by those international organisations in the Balkans. However, in order to reaffirm its credibility and responsibility for the international order and the preservation of peace and security, Poland also strived to participate in United Nations and CSCE/OSCE missions. Such activity was to strengthen its position and prospects for membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. Polish soldiers participated *inter alia* in the very difficult and dangerous United Nations Protection Force mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where between 1992-1995 they operated to resolve the conflict between the Serbs and Croats. After the Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995 on Bosnia and Herzegovina's future, Poles continued their mission in the Implementation Forces as part of NATO operations, and subsequently in the Stabilization Forces, which were to ensure the implementation of peace provisions and stabilise the situation of the young state (Smolarek, 2016). It should be emphasised that during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Polish diplomacy's stance was in line with general appeals for the preservation of peace, along with the condemnation of genocide and violation of human rights. However, Warsaw itself did not come up with any initiatives and made its position dependent on the decisions of the EU and NATO.

Poland was somewhat more active in the conflict between the Kosovars and the government in Belgrade at the turn of 1998/1999. Poland, determined to join NATO and the EU, took advantage of every possible situation to emphasise its readiness for accession and, at the same time, its value as an ally. Poland's presidency in the CSCE/OSCE in 1998, which enabled the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Geremek to demonstrate his diplomatic skills in resolving conflict, also served that objective. At the same time, an agreement in Belgrade was signed in 1998 on the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission, which was to monitor the situation in the rebellious region and lead to closer cooperation between the OSCE and NATO (Orzelska, 2011). Undoubtedly, Minister B. Geremek's activity contributed to the strengthening of Poland's position in its endeavours to join NATO.

The escalation of the conflict in Kosovo at the beginning of 1999 contributed to a greater involvement of NATO members, in particular the USA, in its resolution. Washington, which in the early 1990s handed over the initiative to pacify the situation in the Balkans to the European Union Member States, this time took over as the international leader in stabilising the situation in Kosovo. As a result, there was a NATO airborne intervention in Serbia which forced military operations in the rebellious region to cease. At that time Poland showed no originality or independence in implementing its own foreign policy. It simply followed the US's lead and unquestionably supported the NATO military intervention in Serbia. In the absence of the UN Security Council's approval (Zięba, 2013), the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified its support for the intervention by the necessity to resolve the humanitarian crisis, defend human rights and put an end to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The real determinant of the Polish position was to demonstrate credibility, predictability, and loyalty as an ally to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, in particular the USA (Zajac, 2015). The culmination of Poland's accession endeavours to NATO on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1999 coincided with the commencement of air strikes on Serbia as part of NATO's Operation Allied Force which began 12 days later. Poland did not take part in the NATO military action due to the lack of technical compatibility but joined the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission, the aim of which was to restore normality in the region and guarantee security to its inhabitants. Polish soldiers also participated in the NATO-led Albania Force (AFOR) operation, as part of which they provided humanitarian aid to Kosovar refugees in Albania (Arnold, 2019).

NATO membership as well as the support for the intervention in Kosovo affected the perception of Poland by the Balkan states. This was particularly visible in relations with Serbia and Croatia. Without doubt, relations with Belgrade cooled but, on the other hand, relations with Zagreb intensified (Habowski, 2016). Croatia, which had had poor post-war relations with Serbia, undeniably recognised the Polish government as its political ally (Podgórska, 2013). It should be emphasised, however, that Poland's relations with Belgrade were historically decent and the negative narrative towards Serbia was created due to the Polish government's determination to establish the image of an unwavering, steadfast ally in the eyes of NATO Member States. The policy towards Serbia stemmed from the fact that our interests were subordinated to the greater goal of Polish diplomacy (Habowski, 2016). In official declarations, however, the Polish government tried to avoid criticising Serbia in favour of articulating the need to maintain European security and protect human rights.

At the same time, Poland was perceived as a successful country undergoing political transformation which then became a NATO member and entered into negotiations with the European Union. Our accession experience became extremely valuable for Croatia and other Balkan states seeking to obtain a security guarantee by joining NATO. The aforementioned applied to Bulgaria and Romania, which perceived Poland as a proponent of their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The government in Warsaw, however, hoped that assisting these countries and sharing Poland's experiences with them could result in future coalitions that would support the fundamental goals of Polish foreign policy, mainly related to weakening Russia's influence in Eastern Europe. Poland strengthened its contacts with those countries by sharing knowledge on political transformation, economic reforms



and negotiations for NATO accession (Koseski, 2019). Poland's activity and support for Romania and Bulgaria contributed to a positive outcome of their endeavours to join NATO. In March 2004, NATO was joined by another group of allies thus extending the Treaty's security zone by new states in Eastern Europe<sup>4</sup> and, at the same time, the first Balkan states, which were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact. Taking into account Poland's foreign policy objectives, such decision was certainly in line with Polish diplomacy's path since NATO incorporated a group of countries that particularly feared the restoration of Russian influence in Europe and, at the same time, were interested in integration with the European Union.

The break-up of Yugoslavia and its aftermath continued to affect the situation in the region. The crisis in Kosovo, which at that time bordered with the Republic of Macedonia, contributed to the outbreak of riots by the Albanian population against the government in Skopje in 2001, and NATO and the European Union were once again involved in resolving the conflict. Poland, as was the case with the NATO accession process, also decided to take the loyalty test and undertook a more proactive role in proving that it could be a reliable and trustworthy partner under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The aim of such actions was undoubtedly to strengthen our European Union accession endeavours. An expression of such an approach was Poland's participation in the EU military mission (CONCORDIA) in FYROM in order to stabilise the situation between the Albanian community and the Macedonian government, as well as to strengthen its structures. Once the project was completed in 2003, the EU initiated a new operation, this time a police one (PROXIMA), in which Poland was also engaged (Smolarek, 2016; Szpala, 2008; Podgórzńska, 2015).

Years of endeavours to meet the membership criteria as well as Poland's involvement in the EU's international activities, including in the Balkans, resulted in Poland's accession to the European Union in May 2004. Becoming a NATO and European Union member was the culmination of the most crucial goals in foreign policy that Polish governments pursued following 1989. Poland joined a group of countries under the most effective security umbrella, guaranteeing stable economic development and the improvement of citizens' life quality. It was a paramount goal that completely superseded other directions of Polish politics. There is no surprise that the Balkans constituted no priority for Poland at that time. Since all our endeavours were focused on internal transformation as well as fulfilling the criteria for the transatlantic structures' membership, Poland, being politically and economically weak, was unable to pursue a creative, offensive policy in a region that was not its direct neighbour. It does not, however, mean that it was not an important region for Poland's security. Successive governments, nevertheless, assumed that in the absence of the ability to independently influence the situation in the Balkans, it was better to emulate the positions of the stronger countries, NATO and EU members, since it would give us the opportunity to create a positive image in the eyes of our future allies in those organisations. Such stance, undoubtedly, can be assessed as dependent and servile, but on the other hand it was a pragmatic and effective policy since it was eventually successful for Poland.

---

4 Along with Bulgaria and Romania, countries like Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia acceded to NATO.

NATO and the EU memberships played a dual role in Polish politics. Firstly, Poland, which had no independent, specific, clearly-defined, long-term nor initiatory policy towards the Balkans, followed the decisions of the most important states in those organisations, i.e., the USA in NATO, and Germany, the UK, and France in the EU. On the other hand, for the Balkan states, Poland's presence in the Euro-Atlantic structures meant that it was a successful country with extensive experience in political and economic transformation, and which could be perceived as a specific role model. Poland is a country that has been able to ensure its international security and the welfare of its inhabitants.

### **Polish Policy towards the Balkans between 2004-2010**

Poland's security and stable-development guarantees that followed its membership in Euro-Atlantic structures put an end to a certain era in its foreign policy and opened up new opportunities and, above all, offered the chance to redefine the goals of Polish diplomacy. Changes in a bilateral dimension as well as in the participation in the European Union's policy towards third countries were expected. Up to that point, Poland had no real abilities to influence the decisions of the EU diplomacy, but only to participate in activities and operations adopted by other Member States. Following the accession, new opportunities emerged in which Poland could co-create and even initiate directions for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Poland was obviously a fledgling member and it was difficult for such "nouveau riche" to be included in the EU mainstream, i.e., alongside Germany, France, or the UK. But Poland was also the largest out of the newly acceded EU states with leadership ambitions among Central and Eastern European countries. Consolidating security guarantees remained a strategic goal for Poland, and as a NATO and EU member it became their frontier country, for which the situation across its eastern border constituted the greatest problem and challenge. Therefore, Poland consistently sought to weaken Russia's influence in Eastern Europe and to strengthen the ties of its neighbours, i.e., Ukraine and Belarus, with the European Union. Consequently, Poland's energy and efforts at the EU forum focused on establishing a coalition that would ensure the use of "soft power" to incorporate the former Soviet republics into the European Union's sphere of influence (Barburska, 2018; Barburska & Milczarek, 2014). Warsaw was obviously also interested in the situation in the Balkans since the consolidation of European security depended in particular on the stabilisation of the embroiled and disunited societies of that region (Żornaczuk, 2010; Tereszkiwicz, 2013). It was also in Poland's interest to weaken Russia's influence on the Balkan peninsula. Poland, however, was aware of its limited capabilities and decided to focus its attention on the eastern dimension of the EU's policy, thus, leaving the Balkan course to the EU members more interested in that region (Domagała, 2014). The foregoing was tantamount to staying on course with the existing policy towards the Balkans, but Poland's role grew from a "pre-EU subcontractor" to a "limited, passive contractor/co-creator" of this policy. Poland's position was mainly to support the EU enlargement process in the Balkans since it meant weakening Russia's position in Europe by curbing its influence. Poland, therefore, supported the accession efforts of Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the European Union in 2007 (Koseski, 2019). Two years later Poland signed a declaration on strategic partnership with Romania on security, energy, climate, agriculture, and transport cooperation (Kotulewicz-Wisińska, 2018). The admission of these two countries to the

EU strengthened the coalition that was being built by Poland, and which focused on the eastern dimension of the EU. Both countries declared their support for the Polish-Swedish initiative to create the EU Eastern Partnership in 2009. It was obvious, however, that the said countries expected Poland's involvement in the further enlargement of the EU and NATO by the Balkan states, which for them was a priority. The government in Warsaw unquestionably supported the EU enlargement policy since they were aware of the fact that membership perspective was the most effective motivator to implement reforms in the neighbouring countries. Poland's support for EU enlargement by other Balkan states was in line with its interests of EU enlargement by Eastern Partnership states (Żornaczuk, 2019). Poland's engagement in the Balkans was also somewhat "coerced" by its participation in the Visegrad Group - V4 (Żornaczuk, 2012). Since Poland tried to use that forum to pursue its own interests in the EU, it also had to remain open to the demands of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, and it was the government in Budapest that was particularly interested in stabilising the situation in the Balkans. Hungary bordered directly with that troubled region, in particular the Republic of Serbia, which played an infamous role in the process of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Poland had to demonstrate solidarity with Hungarian interests in the Balkans if it wanted Hungary to be reciprocal in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership. Since its presidency of the V4 in 2005, Budapest had consistently made the policy towards the Balkans a priority of the Visegrad Group (Griessler, 2018).

All members of the Visegrad Group participated at the same time in the informal Group of Friends of EU Enlargement (the Tallinn Group), which intensified its endeavours for the accession of new members from Eastern Europe and the Balkans<sup>5</sup>. The Balkan states were promised membership but without any specific dates during the EU summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, i.e., one year before Poland joined the EU. The Warsaw government's activity became part of the so-called the Thessaloniki Agenda, which encouraged Balkan countries to meet membership criteria by implementing the relevant reforms. Pursuant to the Agenda, the EU signed bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreements with interested countries, which required political, economic, and social transformation (Marcinkowska, 2015). In return it offered financial assistance as well as trade facilitation in accessing the EU market. It was the EU's unswerving policy of drawing the Balkan states into its sphere of influence as well as the membership perspective that was the most effective instrument of influence. Poland strongly supported the signing of the said agreements with Croatia in 2005, Albania in 2006, Montenegro in 2007, and Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008. Poland also supported granting FYROM EU candidate status in 2005 (Łakota-Micker, 2016; Olszewski, 2010A; Adamczyk, 2018).

The first major challenge for Poland in the Balkans following its EU accession was the matter of recognising the independence of Kosovo (Pawłowski, 2008). Pristina declared independence in February 2008. This issue divided EU members; some recognised the new state, others did not (Pawłowski, 2016; Pawłowski, 2018). This internal division translated into a decision to adopt an individual stance rather than a joint declaration of EU countries. Polish politicians were also divided. According to A. Balcer, there were

---

5 Besides V4 states, the group comprises: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Italy (before Brexit, the UK was included on this list).

concerns "... that this act could be treated by Russia as a pretext to play the separatist card against the former USSR states" (Balcer, 2019). The government in Warsaw feared that this could be a pretext for Russia to recognise Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria. There were also concerns that recognising Kosovo would have a negative impact on relations with Serbia, which might seek Russia's support and therefore step away from the European Union<sup>6</sup>. Once again, the Polish government adopted the passive, wait-and-see attitude. Only after the USA and the largest EU countries (Germany, the UK, and France) decided to recognise Kosovo, did Poland follow suit<sup>7</sup>. Poland officially argued its stance with concerns and responsibility for peace and security in the region but, at the same time, the government in Warsaw declared that the recognition could not be treated as a precedent. It was a one-off act and could not be emulated by other countries (Wiśniewski, 2017). At the same time a decision not to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo was made. To this day Poland has not had an embassy in Pristina and relations between the countries take place at a very low official level. By doing that, Poland wanted to send a message of support and friendship to the government in Belgrade. In order to partially stabilise the situation in the Balkans following Kosovo's declaration of independence, NATO decided on Albania and Croatia's accession into its structures in 2009. Poland unquestionably supported their membership.

With the financial crisis in Europe in 2009, relations between the European Union and the Balkan states began to gradually weaken, thus Poland's involvement was also limited. The dependence and proportionality between the EU and Poland in the implementation of the Balkan direction was clearly visible. The more the EU policy towards the region weakened, the more lethargic and stagnant Polish diplomacy became. Poland, despite being able to influence the decision-making process in the EU and shape the Common Foreign and Security Policy, did not demonstrate any initiative and creativity in the field of Balkan policy, but remained rather passive and merely declaratory. The Polish government focused on the Eastern Partnership and did not establish its own policy towards the Balkans, it only declared its support for the projects of countries more interested in the region. A crucial event at that stage was the accession of two large Balkan states to the EU - Bulgaria and Romania. Their Europeanisation process, resulting from EU and NATO membership, as well as their predictability and credibility, meant that they ceased to be considered strictly as Balkan states. Relations with these countries have been integrated into the developed cooperation mechanisms within the European Union.

### **Polish Diplomacy towards the Balkans from 2011 to Modern Times**

The Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which was due in the second half of 2011, presented Poland with an opportunity to alter its then-current approach towards the Balkans. The government in Warsaw realised that resuming that function obligates the presiding state to take a holistic approach towards the implementation of the interests of all Member States in the organisation, and not to focus only on its own, specific goals (Podgórzńska 2012). Therefore, one of the main priorities of the Polish Presidency was the process of European Union enlargement, which, undeniably,

---

6 In lieu of not recognising Kosovo by Russia in 2008, Serbia sold its petroleum company NIP to Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft, which made it dependent on Russia in the energy sector.

7 Kosovo's independence was not recognised by Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, nor Cyprus.

was also addressed to the Balkan states. In this respect, Poland basically continued the goals set by Hungary, which had previously held the same function. The government in Budapest supported the accession process of its neighbours Croatia and Serbia with great determination, and handed over the finalisation of certain stages to Poland as a proverbial gift. While preparing for the chairman role of the Council of the European Union, Poland, in terms of Balkan policy, planned to achieve three goals: sign the accession treaty with Croatia, start accession negotiations with Montenegro and grant Serbia candidate status (Żornaczuk, 2019). It should be emphasised that Poland attempted to duly prepare for the implementation of the said objectives by intensifying diplomatic efforts and organising official visits and meetings of the highest Polish officials with their counterparts in the Western Balkan countries. As part of that diplomatic mobilisation, Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski visited Albania as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina (Żornaczuk, 2019). Subsequently, in Polish-Macedonian relations the formula of the Skopje Conference was established, the purpose of which was to share with the Macedonians the accession negotiation experience of Polish officials<sup>8</sup>. As part of the training project, the Enlargement Academy was initiated (Domaradzki & Fronczak, 2018). At the same time, Poland had to ensure a proper pro-accession campaign among those Member States whose societies felt to a great extent the effects of the financial crisis and symptoms of enlargement fatigue.

Not all the goals set by Poland were achieved. The signing of the accession treaty with Croatia on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2011 was undoubtedly a success (Babić, 2012). The Polish Presidency attempted to bring more splendour to Poland and sign the treaty in Warsaw, but eventually the ceremony was held in Brussels. The other two goals set by Poland were not obtained and were transferred to the subsequent Presidencies of the Council of the European Union. It did not, however, cloud such indisputable successes of the Polish Presidency as the treaty with Croatia was, nor did it taint the Eastern Partnership Summit with the EU, which was organised in Poland's capital city. There is no denying that the Polish government, by declaring its willingness to pursue the interests of all the Member States, devoted the majority of its energy to the eastern dimension. After fulfilling its mission in the EU Council, Poland was slightly less enthusiastic about relations with the Balkan states, but used its experience on the Visegrad Group forum, where, during its Presidency at the turn of 2012 and 2013, meetings with the Romanian and Bulgarian foreign ministers were organised which clearly focused on the opportunities of intensifying cooperation with the Western Balkans. At that time, V4 members decided to significantly increase the budget of the International Visegrad Fund, which financed grants *inter alia* in education, culture, and tourism in Western Balkan states<sup>9</sup>. It should be emphasised that the effects of these undertakings were, however, quite limited and dependent upon the financial capabilities of the V4 members.

Despite Poland's visible commitment to building relations with the Balkan states during its Presidency in the EU Council, this direction was not really taken into account in the priorities of Polish diplomacy in 2012-2016 (Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy,

8 The Skopje Conference was based on the Utrecht Conference – when Dutch officials shared their accession experiences with Polish officials preparing for EU accession negotiations.

9 In 2012 the Fund's budget amounted to 7.5 mln Euro. The contributions were paid equally by all V4 members.

2012). The cooperation with the Western Balkan states was merely limited to statements of support for the European Union's enlargement policy and applied only to Ukraine, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Turkey. Poland returned to its former passive and declarative policy model, i.e., making its relations with the Balkans dependent on cooperative progress within the European Union. The said translated into endorsing the commencement of negotiation talks with Montenegro and the granting of candidate status to Serbia in 2012. In the latter case, Poland expressed its concern about Belgrade's overly close relations with Moscow.

The last major event in EU policy on the southern flank in recent years was the accession of Croatia to the European Union in 2013. At that time, Poland declared its support for the EU project of the Baltic-Adriatic corridor aimed at building key rail, road, sea, air, and energy connections between Poland and Croatia (Podgórzńska, 2013). It was somewhat a sign from the Polish government that it was interested in going beyond the traditional directions of Polish diplomacy from the East-West axis to the North-South axis. Following its successful accession, Croatia admittedly distanced itself from being identified as a Balkan state, but the project was open to any possible extension further into the Balkans.

The deepening financial and economic crisis in the European Union forced Member States to focus their efforts on combating the crisis's consequences. Enlargement fatigue became significantly more visible among the societies of the "old" EU. During that difficult period, relations with the Western Balkan states were set aside. The President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, at the start of his five-year term in 2014, stated that the EU did not plan any enlargement before 2019 (Adamczyk, 2018).

The European Commission's stance negatively affected the accession aspirations of the Balkan states. The membership perspective had been the greatest motivator for them to implement reforms based on EU criteria. Postponing the implementation of the enlargement policy and plunging into the economic crisis undermined the EU's authority in the eyes of Balkan politicians, who began to seek alternatives to the EU's direction. Even more so since an additional player emerged in that part of Europe - China with its "16 +1" initiative - which, alongside Russia, tried to build influence in the region (Olszewski & Chojan, 2017; Balcer, 2019). Relations between the EU and the Western Balkans weakened, which translated into Polish diplomacy having less interest in the region at that time.

A clear change in Polish foreign policy took place after the Law and Justice party assumed power at the end of 2015. The then existing policy based on the East-West axis and close cooperation between Warsaw and Berlin on European affairs was abandoned. The new government, on the other hand, chose members of the Visegrad Group and the UK as its main coalition partners<sup>10</sup>. It was ambitiously declared that as part of the European policy, Warsaw would develop North-South relations and a new project, the Three Seas Initiative, was presented, which was to strengthen cooperation between the EU Member States located between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas. Twelve countries joined the cooperation: V4 members, the Baltic states, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and

---

<sup>10</sup> As an EU member, the UK was a committed proponent of the organisation's enlargement incorporating the Balkan states.



Romania. Under the initiative, which was also supported by the USA, the construction of a dense infrastructure network: transport, energy, and telecommunications was expected (Sępniewski, 2018; Ukielski, 2018). The geographic scope of the initiative reached as far as Croatia and Bulgaria, but it cannot be ruled out that in the future it may encompass other Balkan countries. Post-2015, Poland also intensified its bilateral relations with Serbia and Albania by actively participating at the forum of the Friends of Enlargement Group (Wiśniewski, 2017). Serbia remains particularly important for Poland since it is the largest Balkan country outside the EU, and which is susceptible to Russian influence (Szpala, 2014). Upon the Polish initiative in 2017, the Belgrade Conference, based on the Skopje Conference, was established, the aim of which is the cooperation between officials of both countries as well as Poland's support of Serbia's efforts in its accession discussions with the EU by sharing its negotiating experience (Domaradzki & Fronczak, 2018). The following year, the Tirana Conference was launched. Poland also supported Montenegro's efforts to become a NATO member. This process was finalised in 2017, despite the provocations organised by Russia in Podgorica (Kuczyński, 2019).

In 2018, the European Commission attempted to recover from the enlargement crisis and announced a new strategy towards the Western Balkans. That initiative was due to the fact that relations between the countries of the region and the European Union were noticeably weakening, and at the same time the activity of other actors, whose presence threatened the stabilisation of the situation in the Balkans, could thus threaten European security. The European Commission announced that it would strengthen cooperation through the systematic inclusion of the Balkan states in the legal and institutional system of the European Union in the sectoral dimension. Establishing a sectoral network of connections would anchor the Balkan states to the EU's system of influence and, hence, weaken Russia, China, and Turkey's possibilities to influence. The EC announced that Montenegro and Serbia could join the EU by 2025 (Szpala, 2018). The European Commission's new strategy was based on the experience of the Berlin Process<sup>11</sup>, initiated in 2014 by a Germany concerned about the potential effects of a slowdown in the enlargement process in the Balkans. In 2018, after the announcement of the new EC strategy, Poland decided to join the group of countries participating in the Berlin Process, which complemented the Three Seas Initiative to a great extent. The Polish Prime Minister also took part in the first EU-Western Balkans summit in Sofia in 2003, during which the membership perspectives for the region were reaffirmed.

Poland's involvement in Balkan affairs was also manifested by hosting, as part of its annual presidency, the 2019 Berlin Process Summit in Poznań. The works of the Summit focussed on key areas which were to tie Western Balkans with the EU: security and migration, social and economic development, infrastructure cohesion (transport, energy), a digital agenda, good relations with neighbours, and supporting the reconciliation process. The flagship project of the Berlin Process was the launch of the Regional Economic Area, i.e., the creation of a common market in the Western Balkans similar to the EU, with the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital, an area that could be easily integrated into the EU common market.

---

<sup>11</sup> A number of EU Member States participated in the process: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Italy and Montenegro, as well as Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The following EU institutions were also involved: The European Commission, the European Investment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.



The organisation of the Berlin Process summit in Poznań undoubtedly demonstrates Poland's will to engage in EU-Balkan relations. However, one can ask whether such an action is merely a temporary one, resulting from current policy and the need to show the "good side" of the Polish government; a government which has not been well perceived recently in the EU due to the rule of law issues. These doubts result from the fact that in the government document "The Polish Foreign Policy Strategy for 2017-2021" the Balkan direction does not actually exist, only a general will to support the EU enlargement process is expressed as was the case with the previous strategy under the former government (The Polish Foreign Policy Strategy, 2017).

Summing up the last stage of shaping Poland's foreign policy towards the Balkans, it should be emphasised that it still results from the European Union's general policy towards this region. There have, however, been some initiatives that may prove Poland's greater involvement, but one can venture a guess that the Polish government was rather forced to do so by the situation in the European Union. The foregoing refers to the Polish EU Council Presidency in 2011, the Presidency of the V4 in 2012 and 2016 as well as of the Berlin Process in 2019. These initiatives, however, do not affirm the projection, in-depth reflection and continuity in Polish policy towards the region. The Berlin Process continuation and Poland's involvement in it was ceased due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. Poland, similar to other European countries, focused its endeavours on combating the effects and preventing the spread of the pandemic, hence, set aside the shaping of relations with the Balkan states. This does not mean that Warsaw has completely forgotten about its Balkan partners; Poland was one of the countries that sent a transport of medical products indispensable to combat the pandemic to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia<sup>12</sup> (Poland helps Western Balkans fight coronavirus, 2020). It was rather a symbolic gesture showing that the government in Warsaw was trying to maintain good relations with this region. Without any doubt, as long as the pandemic is not brought under control, the interests of Poland and European countries in the Balkans will remain limited.

### **Conclusions**

When analysing the evolution of Polish policy towards the Balkan region following 1989, it should be stated that it played a secondary role among the goals of Polish diplomacy defined by the government. Its implementation was completely subordinated to strategic goals, i.e., Poland's accession to the EU and NATO, and then building a strong position in these structures. Security guarantees resulting from the presence in NATO and the EU were necessary due to the unstable situation across the eastern border, and it was the situation in Eastern Europe that Poland perceived as its greatest threat. This approach resulted in the lack of independence towards the Balkans and emulating the positions of the strongest and most important countries in Euro-Atlantic structures by Polish diplomacy. On the one hand, it was a pragmatic position, but, on the other, it proved a self-marginalisation of our role and position in the region. Polish policy was too passive, too short-term, and lacking a long-term strategy and reflection. Even when Polish diplomacy did become more active in the Balkans, it was only temporary and it is difficult

---

12 In May 2020 Poland sent nearly 70 tons of disinfecting liquid and surgical masks there.

to find some coherence, consistency and a well-planned long-term perspective in these actions. The lack of interest in the region can be somewhat explained by the absence of strong economic cooperation between Poland and the Balkan states. However, taking into account the fact that it is an extremely conflict-ridden region with unregulated territorial, ethnic, and religious issues, which pose a threat to third countries, and, therefore, to the entire European Union and its unity, Polish policy should definitely be criticised. Poland should have become more involved in Balkan affairs even if only for the sake of its own security and to limit Russia's influence in the region. Warsaw should have been one of the initiators of EU projects in the Balkans. It should have intensified efforts to contribute to enlargement, and not only express its support. The weakening of the EU's influence in the Balkan region enhances Russia, China, and Turkey's chances of strengthening their influences there (Olszewski & Chojan, 2017; Kopyś, 2018; Balcer, 2019), namely those countries that do not care about the democratisation and stabilisation of the region, but rather on escalating disputes between them and benefiting from the corrupted system. Therefore, Polish diplomacy should provide extensive support to the Balkan states in those areas in which it succeeded, i.e., in political, economic and legal transformation, combating corruption and organised crime, accession negotiations and benefitting from EU funds. If Poland is unable to offer such assistance, it should use its membership in the EU and NATO to consistently initiate and implement such actions.

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

## References

- Adamczyk, A. (2018). Prospects for Extending the European Union to the Countries of the Western Balkans. *Studia Europejskie - Studies in European Affairs*, 4, 125-148.
- Adamczyk, A., Karadzosi, M. (2019). Wyzwanie dla tożsamości międzynarodowej Macedonii – grecko-macedoński spór o nazwę państwa [The challenge to Macedonia's international identity - the Greek-Macedonian name]. *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 1(7), 333-350.
- Albania. (2021) Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. retrieved <https://www.gov.pl/web/albania/albania>,
- Arnold, J-M. (2019). Responsibilities of Alliance: Czech, Hungarian, and Polish Contributions During and After NATO's Kosovo Intervention. In D.S. Hamilton & K. Spohr (Eds.), *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War* (pp. 567-587), Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins University SAIS.
- Babić, M. (2012). Przystąpienie Chorwacji do Unii Europejskiej. Problemy konstytucyjne [Croatia's accession to the European Union. Constitutional problems] In A. Nowak-Far (Ed.) *Integracja Bałkanów Zachodnich z Unią Europejską* [Integration of the Western Balkans with the European Union] (pp. 89-113). Warszawa: Poltext.
- Babić, M. (2014). Understanding the complexity. Europeanization in the Western Balkans. *Horyzonty Polityki*, 5(10), 85-104.
- Babić, M. (2019). *Polityka bezpieczeństwa państw Bałkanów Zachodnich. Perspektywy i zagrożenia* [Security policy of the Western Balkans countries. Prospects and threats]. Toruń, Poland: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- Balcer, A. (2008). Albania [Albania]. In *Balkany Zachodnie a Integracja Europejska. Perspektywy i implikacje* [Western Balkans and European Integration. Prospects and Implications] (pp. 71-78). Warszawa, Poland: UKIE i OSW.
- Balcer, A. (2019). *Kierunek Bałkany! Znaczenie i potencjał współpracy Polski z Państwami Bałkanów Zachodnich* [Direction to the Balkans! The importance and potential of Poland's cooperation with the Western Balkans]. Warszawa, Poland: Klub Jagielloński.
- Barburska, O. (2018). *Polityka Wschodnia Unii Europejskiej jako część składowa polityki zagranicznej UE* [Eastern policy of the European Union as a component of the EU foreign policy]. Warszawa, Poland: Aspra J-R.

- Barburska, O. & Mileczarek, D. (2014). *Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej: Porażka czy sukces?* [Eastern Policy of the European Union: Failure or success?]. Warszawa, Poland: Aspra J-R.
- Bieleń, S. (2011). Poland between Germany and Russia – determinism or geopolitical pluralism?. In S. Bieleń (Ed.), *Poland's Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (pp. 272-291). Warszawa, Poland: Difin.
- Bujwid-Kurek, E. (2012). *Serbia w nowej przestrzeni ustrojowej. Dzieje, Ustrój, Konstytucja* [Serbia in the new political space. History, System, Constitution]. Kraków, Poland: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka.
- Czekalski, T., Hauziński, J., & Leśny, J. (2009). *Historia Albanii* [History of Albania]. Wrocław, Poland: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
- Czernicka, M. (2019). Polsko-bułgarska współpraca po 1989 roku. Wspólne problemy, priorytety i wyzwania [Polish-Bulgarian cooperation after 1989. Common problems, priorities and challenges]. In M. Czernicka, J. Wojnicki (Eds.) *100 lat relacji dyplomatycznych między Polską a Bułgarią. Aspekty polityczne, społeczno-gospodarcze i kulturowe* [100 years of diplomatic relations between Poland and Bulgaria. Political, socio-economic and cultural aspects] (pp. 143-150). Warszawa, Poland: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych UW, Ambasada Republiki Bułgarii w Polsce.
- Domagała, K. (2014). Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec starań Chorwacji i Serbii o członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej [Polish foreign policy towards the efforts of Croatia and Serbia for membership in the European Union]. In J. Knopek, M. Sikora-Gaca, & D. Magierek (Eds.), *Polska w Europie 1989-2014. 25 lat po przemianach. Wybrane aspekty transformacji politycznych* [Poland in Europe 1989-2014. 25 years after the transformations. Selected aspects of political transformations]. Koszalin, Poland: Politechnika Koszalińska.
- Domaradzki S., Fronczak T., Strazay T., Vit M. & Orosz A. (2018). *Visegrad group and Western Balkan Countries*. Podgorica, Montenegro: European Movement in Montenegro.
- Griessler, Ch. (2018). The V4 Countries' Foreign Policy concerning the Western Balkans. *Politics in Central Europe*, 2(14), 141-164.
- Habowski, M. (2016). Stosunki polsko-serbskie po upadku Federalnej Republiki Jugosławii [Polish-Serbian relations after the fall of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. In A. Jagiełło-Szostak (Ed.), *Republika Serbii. Aspekty polityki wewnętrznej i międzynarodowej* [Republic of Serbia. Aspects of internal and international politics] (pp. 265-286). Wrocław, Poland: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT-Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe.
- Karadzoski, M. & Adameczyk, A., (2015). Najważniejsze problemy Macedonii w procesie integracji z Unią Europejską [The Most Vital Problems of Macedonia in the Process of Integration with the European Union]. *Studia Europejskie*, 2(74), 27-42.
- Kopyś, T. (2018). Polityka Turcji wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich po 2008 roku [Turkey's policy towards the Western Balkans after 2008]. *Politeja*, 2(53), 127-149.
- Koski, A. (2019). Polska-Bulgaria 100 lat (1918-2018) [Poland-Bulgaria 100 years (1918-2018)]. In M. Czernicka, J. Wojnicki (Eds.) *100 lat relacji dyplomatycznych między Polską a Bułgarią. Aspekty polityczne, społeczno-gospodarcze i kulturowe* [100 years of diplomatic relations between Poland and Bulgaria. Political, socio-economic and cultural aspects] (pp. 31-47). Warszawa, Poland: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych UW, Ambasada Republiki Bułgarii w Polsce.
- Kotulewicz-Wisińska, K. (2018). Stosunki polsko-rumuńskie w latach 2009-2017. Wybrane problemy [Polish-Romanian relations in 2009-2017. Selected problems]. *Krakowskie Studia Małopolskie*, 23, 141-157. <https://doi.org/10.15804/ksm201807>
- Kuczyński, G. (2019)., Wojna hybrydowa Rosji na Bałkanach Zachodnich [Russia's hybrid war in the Western Balkans]. Warsaw Institute., Retrieved from <https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/wojna-hybrydowa-rosji-na-balkanach-zachodnich/>.
- Łakota-Micker, M. (2011). *Proces akcesji Republiki Chorwacji do Unii Europejskiej* [The process of accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union]. Wrocław, Poland: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe.
- Łakota-Micker, M. (2016). Czarnogóra w procesie integracji euroatlantyckiej [Montenegro in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration]. In J. Wojnicki (Ed.) *Europa Środkowa a Balkany. Determinanty i ograniczenia przemian* [Central Europe and the Balkans. Determinants and limitations of changes] (pp. 45-63). Warszawa, Poland: Aspra J-R.
- Macedonia Północna {North Macedonia}. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:K5RyU79xG14J:https://www.gov.pl/web/macedoniapolnocna/macedonia+&cd=1&hl=pl&ct=clnk&gl=pl>
- Marcinkowska, P. (2015). Unia Europejska a państwa postjugosłowiańskie [The European Union and post-Yugoslav states]. *Studia Europejskie*, 2(74), 175-192.
- (A) Olszewski, P. (2010). Bałkany Zachodnie w polityce Unii Europejskiej [Western Balkans in the policy of the European Union]. *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, 1(28), 186-201.
- (B) Olszewski, P. (2010). *Macedonia. Historia i współczesność* [Macedonia. History and the present day]. Radom, Poland: Wyższa Szkoła Handlowa.
- Olszewski, P., & Chojan, A. (2017) Rywalizacja Unii Europejskiej i Rosji na obszarze Bałkanów Zachodnich [The rivalry between the European Union and Russia in the Western Balkans]. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, 11, 135-146. <https://doi.org/10.14746/rie.2017.11.10>

- Orzelska, A. (2011). *Polityka Zagraniczna Polski wobec wybranych kwestii spornych w stosunkach transatlantycznych (1989 – 2004)* [Polish Foreign Policy towards selected contentious issues in transatlantic relations (1989 - 2004)]. Warszawa, Poland: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Pacula, P. (2015). Polsko-rumuńska współpraca obronna. Stan obecny i perspektywy [Polish-Romanian defense cooperation. Current state and prospects]. *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, 3, 11-27.
- Pawłowski, K. (2008). *Kosowo. Konflikt i interwencja* [Kosovo. Conflict and intervention]. Lublin, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.
- Pawłowski, K. (2016). *Konflikt serbsko-albański w Kosowie w latach 1999-2014. Charakterystyka, uwarunkowania i formy konfliktu społecznego* [Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo in 1999-2014. Characteristics, conditions and forms of social conflict]. Lublin, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.
- Pawłowski, K. (2018). *Państwowość Kosowa. Geneza, uwarunkowania, współczesność* [Kosovo statehood. Genesis, conditions, modernity]. Lublin, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.
- (A) Podgórzeńska, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski wobec obszaru poługosłowiańskiego* [Polish foreign policy towards the post-Yugoslav region]. Toruń, Poland: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
- (B) Podgórzeńska, R. (2013). Implikacje akcesji Chorwacji do Unii Europejskiej [Implications of Croatia's accession to the European Union]. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, 7, 207-224. <https://doi.org/10.14746/rie.2013.7.14>
- Podgórzeńska, R. (2015). Udział Polski w operacjach pokojowych Unii Europejskiej. Dylematy i wyzwania [Poland's participation in European Union peace operations. Dilemmas and challenges]. *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego – Acta Politica*, 32(879), 69-83. DOI: 10.18276/ap.2015.32-05
- Podgórzeńska, R. (2012). Polska wobec procesu europeizacji Bałkanów Zachodnich [Poland and the process of the Europeanization of the Western Balkans]. *Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego*, 80, 1-7. Retrieved from <https://www.iz.poznan.pl/plik.pobierz,447,3c38ae64954861abbde7ec3f537849ff/445-80%20pl.pdf>
- Poland helps Western Balkans fight coronavirus (2020). Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/nato-en/poland-helps-western-balkans-fight-coronavirus>
- Smolarek, M. (2016). Udział Wojska Polskiego w operacjach pokojowych na Bałkanach [Participation of the Polish Army in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans]. In D. S. Kozerański (Ed.), *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe i stabilizacyjne w polskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa w XX i XXI wieku* [International peace and stabilization operations in Polish security policy in the 20th and 21st centuries] (116-136). Warszawa, Poland: Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
- Stawowy-Kawka, I. (2000). *Historia Macedonii* [History of Macedonia]. Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, Poland: Ossolineum.
- Stępniewski, T. (2018). Inicjatywa Trójmorza: uwarunkowania geopolityczne i nowy model regionalnej współpracy [The Three Seas Initiative: geopolitical conditions and a new model of regional cooperation]. *Studia Europejskie*, 2(86), 33-42.
- Strategia Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2017-2021 [Strategy of Polish Foreign Policy 2017-2021]. Ministry of Polish Foreign Policy. Retrieved from [www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl).
- Szpała, M. (2008). Macedonia [Macedonia]. In *Balkany Zachodnie a Integracja Europejska. Perspektywy i implikacje* [Western Balkans and European Integration. Prospects and Implications] (pp. 56-62). Warszawa, Poland: UKIE i OSW.
- Szpała, M. (2014). Rosja w Serbii – miękka siła i twarde interesy [Russia in Serbia - soft power and hard interests]. Retrieved from <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2014-10-29/rosja-w-serbii-miekka-sila-i-twarde-interesy>
- Szpała, M. (2018). UE wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich: w poszukiwaniu nowych rozwiązań [The EU towards the Western Balkans: in search of new solutions]. *Biuro Analiz Sejmowych*, „INFOS”, 14(252), 1-4.
- Tereszkiewicz, F. (2013). Ewolucja polityki zagranicznej Polski po wejściu do Unii Europejskiej [The evolution of Poland's foreign policy after joining the European Union]. In F. Tereszkiewicz (Ed.), *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans dekady* [Poland in the European Union. The balance of the decade] (215-240). Warszawa, Poland: Laboratorium Idei – Prezydencki Program Eksperycki.
- Ukielski, P. (2018). Inicjatywa Trójmorza w polskiej polityce zagranicznej [The Three Seas Initiative in Polish foreign policy]. *Studia Europejskie*, 2(86), 45-58.
- Wiśniewski, J. (2017). Poland. In J. Ker-Lindsay & I. Armatolas (Eds.) *Lack of Engagement? Surveying the Spectrum of EU Member States Policies Towards Kosovo* (25-28). Prishtina, Kosovo: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society – KFOS.
- Wojnicki, J. (2003). *Przeobrażenia ustrojowe państw postjugosłowiańskich (1990-2003)* [Systemic transformations of post-Yugoslav states (1990-2003)]. Pułtusk, Poland: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora w Pułtusku.
- Zając, J. (2015). Asymetria w stosunkach polsko-amerykańskich w zmieniającym się ładzie międzynarodowym [Asymmetry in Polish-American Relations in the Changing International Order]. In B. Szklarski (Ed.), *Niekonfrontacyjna asymetria w relacjach polsko-amerykańskich* [Non-confrontational asymmetry in Polish-American relations] (pp. 45-60). Warszawa, Poland: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych.
- Zięba, R. (2013). *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantycznej* [Polish foreign policy in the Euro-

- Atlantic zone]. Warszawa, Poland: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Żornaczuk, T. (2012). How to Upgrade Poland's Approach to the Western Balkans? Ideas for the Polish Presidency of the V4. *PISM Strategic File*, 23.
- Żornaczuk, T. (2019). *Poland*. In R. Balfour & C. Stratulat (Eds), *EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans* (pp. 63-72). Brussels, Belgium: European Policy Centre.
- Żornaczuk, T. (2010). Polityka Polski wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich [Poland's policy towards the Western Balkans]. *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2010*.



## Contemporary Dilemmas of Polish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. The case of Iraq and Qatar

Rafał Ożarowski<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Poland is historically connected with the Middle Eastern states, and based on this fact in its foreign policy, it has regularly declared to achieve variable aims in the Middle East. Currently there are two kinds of interest which might be considered important in Polish foreign policy towards selected states of the Middle East. The first type is related to economic sphere when Poland tries to diversify gas and oil supplies, exemplified in agreements signed with Qatar. The second type refers to political interests, exemplified by the engagement of Poland in mission of stabilization in Iraq.

The aim of this paper is to show the real capabilities of Polish foreign policy in the Middle East and identify the key obstacles to reach many aims. The author will also try to answer whether Polish foreign policy in the Middle East is effective or not and what reasons are behind that. The short-term perspective for the foreign policy of Poland towards the two Middle Eastern states of Qatar and Iraq will also be outlined.

### Keywords

Poland, Foreign Policy, Middle East, Iraq, Qatar

**1 Corresponding Author:** Rafał Ożarowski (Assoc. Prof.), E. Kwiatkowski University of Business and Administration in Gdynia, Faculty of Law and Administration, Gdynia, Poland. E-mail: [r.ozarowski@kadra.wsaib.pl](mailto:r.ozarowski@kadra.wsaib.pl) ORCID: 0000-0003-2493-4708

**To cite this article:** Ożarowski, R. (2022). Contemporary Dilemmas of Polish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. The case of Iraq and Qatar. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S165–S174. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.1028061>



### **Introduction and Historical Overview**

The paper is related to two case studies. One concerns to Iraq, and the second selected case concerns Qatar. Poland formulated engagement in 21<sup>st</sup> Century towards both states, however in different circumstances. Iraq became a crucial partner in Poland's foreign policy after the Saddam Hussein was overthrown and the U.S. implemented the mission of stabilization. At that time, Poland, being a NATO member for just a several years, decided to stand by the U.S. Thus, relations with Iraq were mostly concentrated on political and military aspects, and after the mission of stabilization was over, Poland tried to develop economic bilateral relations. On the contrary, relations with Qatar were shaped on a different basis. Due to the adopted strategy of diversification of supplies of energy resources, Poland, in a relatively short period of time, tightened economic relations with Qatar. In result of this, Qatar has become a strategic partner which has become the most important LNG supplier to gas terminal in Poland.

The main thesis refers to the ability and also inability of pursuing by Poland effective foreign policy towards selected Middle Eastern states. Two questions related to this thesis were raised. The first concerns the issue of why Poland was unable to develop its relations with Iraq although many years of military and political engagement of Polish government and Polish military troops could have made a stable platform for highly intensified bilateral relations. The second is connected with the case of Qatar, and the question is formulated - why was Poland able to build strong platform for economic and political cooperation with Qatar that wasn't as close of a partner state for Poland as was Iraq?

In the methodological aspect, few theories and methods were used to conduct analysis in the paper. First, the paper is related to the domain of political science and international relations. Analysis conducted in the paper was based on the elements of theory of foreign policy. For the purpose of analysis, two states have been selected – Iraq and Qatar toward which Poland pursued active policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Basing the study on these case studies, the author applied the comparative method that revealed divergences and convergences between the analysed objects.

The issue of relations of Poland with Middle Eastern states was mainly examined by Polish researchers. Therefore, the majority of sources related to this topic are available in Polish. Others, written in English, were also useful but limited to the depiction of Iraqi or Qatari perspectives.

Taking into consideration the historical aspect of Poland's cooperation with many Arab and non-Arab states, a brief introduction should be presented. After the period of transition from 1989 to early 1990s, Poland reoriented its policy towards the Middle East. The new Polish government of the Third Republic of Poland desired to maintain positive relations with Arab states such as Syria, Iraq, Egypt or Libya, and on the other side, Poland re-established in 1990 diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, Poland leaned toward support of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process and thus became a significant political and economic partner for Israel and the Arab States. Poland's stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict assumed permanent regulation based on guaranteeing Jews and Palestinians the right to have their own state. As the Polish government underlined, Palestinian aspirations couldn't pose danger to Israel's existence; thus, each terrorist



activity and violence was condemned. Conversely, Poland recommended the Palestinian Authority to develop partnership with Israel for overcoming the difficulties and diversities with relations with Israel. It is also noteworthy that at that time Poland's capabilities to affect Israeli-Palestinian were limited, and its activities were really subtle. It was connected with the weak position of Poland in post-bipolar international relations in the early 1990s, in which Poland was slowly building mutual relations with many states in the new post-Cold War order (Lizak & Spyra 2002: 324).

Another step confirming Poland's change towards Middle East was the participation in the operation "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm," which were conducted against Iraqi military forces after their invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Although the participation of Poland in anti-Iraq operations was symbolic, it showed the readiness of Polish government for peaceful engagement in political crises in the Middle East. After the Second Gulf War ended, Poland stood a chance at developing relations with the Arab Gulf states, which during Cold War were merely oriented at cooperation with the West (Lizak & Spyra 2002: 325). In result, Poland strengthened ties with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, with whom diplomatic relations were established in 1995.

In fact, in the years 1989-2003, ties between Poland and Arab states in the Middle East were eased due to different priorities and specific circumstances related to Poland's political and economic situation (Dzisiów-Szuszczkiewicz 2008: 148). Firstly, at that time Poland was heavily concentrated on joining NATO and the EU. It was the key imperative of its foreign policy, and finally, Poland became a NATO member in 1999 and joined the EU in 2004. Therefore, Polish aspirations of becoming a part of a military alliance and the European structure totally overshadowed and dominated different aspects of its foreign policy. Secondly, Poland had to deal with its post-transition period to strengthen its state institutions and implement economic reforms to function as a liberal state with free market. Moreover, the position of Poland in the international relations in period of 1989-2003 wasn't strong enough to allow the Polish government to make an effective impact on regions situated outside Europe.

### **Relations with Iraq**

Since 2003 Poland turned to the Middle East with more interest. After the al-Qaeda attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon in September 2001, US president George W. Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea dangerous rogue regimes that forged the "axis of evil." All these states were accused by U.S. government for supporting international terrorism and became the target of potential American military intervention. American concentration was narrowed to the Iraqi regime, and Iraq was hit by the U.S. with demands to reveal its arsenal of weapon of mass destruction. The Leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, resisted with American high pressure that led to military conflict. The U.S. started intervention against Saddam in 2003, and after 40 days, Iraqi forces defeated. After that, the arduous process of Iraqi transition began.

At that time, Poland faced the big challenge of its participation in the U.S.-led coalition occupying Iraq. As a new member of NATO, the Polish government stood by U.S. without any hesitation. In result, during the period of stabilization, the Polish military forces took responsibility for the Central-Southern sector with Karbala, al-Kut, and al-Najaf. Polish

military presence in Iraq continued till December 2011, and the highest amount of Polish forces was estimated at 2500 soldiers. At the last period, the military contingent was reduced to just a few dozen soldiers. However, in the years 2008-2011, the Polish mission in Iraq under auspicious of NATO was reduced to training missions only.

Involvement of Polish troops in Iraq was ambiguously evaluated. A flurry of critics was correlated with victims of the operation under U.S. leadership. In 2003-2008, 22 Polish soldiers died, mainly in result of military clashes with militant forces or landmine explosions. Moreover, in the beginning of the military intervention, it was said that Poland, alongside with states involved in Iraq, would have an opportunity to obtain lucrative contracts for the exploitation of oil fields or to invest in the Iraqi petrochemical sector. However, in 2008, when Iraqi government distributed concessions for oil exploitation, there was not a single Polish company among all the foreign companies. Such a disappointing situation deepened criticism over the purpose of the Polish involvement in Iraq (Lewandowski & Lewandowski 2009:19).

Some experts underlined that Poland's engagement in Iraqi mission was the opportunity to strengthen the U.S.- Poland partnership. Thus, Poland couldn't have had any choice but to participate in the coalition and stand by the U.S. It was a matter of honour, not one of economic or political business. Besides that, Poland's decision over taking part in the Iraqi mission fit in the strategy of security promoted by Polish government. The assumption might have been appropriate, but it was supposed that the military mission in Iraq would take a year maximum. Polish political leaders also believed in the effective and quick process of democratization of Iraq by joining the international security system. After that, when the end of mission was postponed from year to year, public opinion in Poland was raising a question whether this mission made sense at all (Hołdak & Konarzewska 2008: 96).

After the military mission was over and it turned into a training mission, the basic evaluation of Poland's involvement in Iraq became a matter of public debate. First of all, the mission was regarded as highly controversial (Wągrowka 2004: 3). It was emphasized that the Polish contribution to the stabilization of Iraq was disproportionately higher than its benefits, which were mainly in the military and political sphere and which were also hard to estimate. One might believe that standing by the U.S. would guarantee Poland's better position in the security system in international relations when Poland would be less vulnerable to threats and challenges posed by Russia, in particular. In fact, the Polish government didn't have an occasion to verify its strategic partnership with U.S under the auspicious of the NATO alliance; however, it can't be taken for granted that U.S. would do as much as they could to guarantee Poland's security.

Concerning military benefits, Polish military forces had an opportunity to verify the military operations management during the mission in Iraq. Servicemen always say that real conflict is the best way to check military forces capabilities and any form of training ground can't be treated as a partial substitute for war. Thus, the Polish military command experienced cooperation with NATO allies and took responsibility for the stability and security of its administrated sector. The participation of Polish troops in Iraq also inclined the Polish Ministry of Defence to reorganise the structure of the army and implement modern organisational solutions. In addition, military equipment used by forces in Iraq

was tested in conditions of war. According to data during the five years of mission (2003-2008), around 15 thousand soldiers participated in military contingents sent to Iraq from Poland and about 60 thousand underwent special training (Hołdak & Konarzewska 2008: 104-105; Chrzan 2012; 199-212).

In the aspect of political benefits, Poland participated in such a military operation in post-cold war era for the first time as a NATO member. It was considered proof of loyalty to the U.S and the rest of the NATO states even if many of them were against the action taken by the U.S towards Iraq. Moreover, being engaged in Iraq, Poland participated in the 'global war' with terrorists. In Iraq after toppling Saddam, a lot of armed groups appeared which used terrorist methods. Al-Qaeda evolved its branch in Iraq under the name of 'al-Qaeda in Iraq,' which later transformed into 'Islamic State in Iraq.' Military experience gained by Polish contingents in Iraq was used also in the simultaneous mission ISAF (*International Security Assistance Force*) in Afghanistan.

In 2014, Iraq was plunged into a conflict with the Islamic State, which seized control over Northern-Western Iraqi territory. In response to that, Poland decided to close down its embassy in Baghdad. Iraq expressed its huge disappointment over the decision of Polish government. Fortunately, in 2016, Poland re-opened the embassy in Iraq, and diplomatic relations came back to normal. However, two-year interval in diplomatic relations significantly restricted the Polish role and influence in Iraq (Repetowicz 2018).

In 2016, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Iraq, Ibrahim Al-Eshaiker Al-Jaafari, paid an official visit to Poland. His visit concentrated on talks related to the political situation in Iraq and the threat of terrorism, particularly. The Iraqi minister with his Polish counterpart, Witold Waszczykowski, discussed details about mutual cooperation, including the aspects of trade and investments (pulaski.pl 2016).

President of Iraq Mohamed Fouad Masoum Khader visited Poland in 2017 and declared gratitude for Poland's involvement in rebuilding Iraq and fighting terrorism on Iraqi soil. President Khader also invited Polish entrepreneurs to invest in the Iraqi economy, which was in poor condition and needed foreign assets for development (onet.pl 2017). This visit initiated many mutual contacts between businessmen associated in trade chambers. For example, Iraqi-Polish business meetings took place with the involvement of the Regional Industrial-Trading Chamber in Częstochowa, the Subcarpathian Economic Chamber, the Industrial and Trading Chamber of Southern Greater Poland, and the Regional Development Agency of Lesser Poland (Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology 2019).

Even of great significance was the 1<sup>st</sup> Polish-Iraqi Business Forum held in Warsaw in 2018, which became an opportunity to tighten mutual business relations. During the event the chairman of National Investment Council of Iraq, Ahmed al-Zubeidi, stated that Iraq was widely open for Polish investors, whose activity in Iraq was at that time marginal. According to data from 2016, the investments of Polish companies were estimated around only 100,000 USD (Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology 2019). Al-Zubeidi also pointed that Iraq needed foreign investments in all sectors and after war-time and conflict with Islamic State were over, Iraq was supposed to be a 'promised land' for investors. Concerning Poland, al-Zubeidi underlined the long-lasting tradition of Polish

investments in Iraq, casting back to the 1970s and the 1980s in the last century. For this reason, Poland is still perceived as reliable partner and associates well with the Iraqi people. Despite al-Zubeidi's declarations, Iraq was a free-market state, and contracts for Polish entrepreneurs couldn't have been announced by the state arbitrarily but only as a result of foreign investments' competition (biznes.gazetaprawna.pl 2018).

According to economic data prepared by the Department of Trade and International Cooperation in the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology, from 2012 till 2015, the export of Polish goods to Iraq increased from 92.5 million USD to 188.5 million USD, then decreased in 2018 to 115.9 million USD. Poland exported mainly food products, medical and veterinary equipment, mechanical tools, and agricultural machines. In the years 2012-2018, imports from Iraq reached their highest peak in 2015, rated at 683.6 million USD, and then in 2018, declined to the rate of 235.8. The only good imported from Iraq to Poland was oil, estimated at 99% of all imports (Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology 2019).

In the ranking of Polish world trade, Iraq was ranked in a distant place. In the category of exports, Iraq was ranked at 72 and, for imports, was 66. The participation of Iraq in Polish whole turnout was completely marginal, estimated at 0.04% of Polish export and 0.09% Polish import (Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology 2019).

Since Poland was engaged in the mission of stabilization in Iraq till the year 2018, the economic cooperation didn't evolve well, and Iraq has become a negligible partner in Polish foreign policy. It was the ample proof that Poland didn't capitalize on the five years of its participation in the mission of stabilization and the next few years of its contribution to training missions. In addition to what must be underlined, when the Polish contribution to the mission of stabilization came to an end, a lack of interest of Iraqi issues was reflected in official statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each year, the minister of foreign affairs of Poland delivers a speech to the parliament on the main directions and interests of foreign policy. After 2008, Iraq was barely mentioned. Moreover, in 2017, the Strategy of Polish Foreign Policy 2017-2021 was adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the document, the Middle East is cited only in the context of conflict, instability, and the erosion of the social environment (Strategia Polityki Zagranicznej 2017-2021).

### **Relations with Qatar**

Poland established diplomatic relations with Qatar in 1989. However, the Embassy of Poland was opened in Doha in 2006, and the Embassy of Qatar began its work in Warsaw in 2008. Deputy of Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Ananicz paid an official visit as a Polish diplomat in Doha in 1993 (Qatar, <https://www.gov.pl>). It was the first small step towards strengthening mutual ties, which evolved dynamically in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. In the 1990s, Polish-Qatari bilateral relations developed slowly but with a few significant events. In March 1996, the Minister of Industry and Trade Klemens Ścierański visited Qatar as a special envoy of President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski. K. Ścierański met with the Emir of Qatar and discussed the perspectives of supplying liquid natural gas to Poland (Qatar, <https://www.gov.pl>). This visit was of great significance for the further cooperation, particularly since Poland had adopted the strategy of diversification of

supplying energy resources within its economy. It also enabled more intensifying contacts between Qatar and Poland. In June 1996, Qatari diplomat and Minister of Energy and Industry Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah paid a reciprocal visit in Warsaw. Al-Attiyah delivered a message from the Emir of Qatar with his interest to come to Poland soon. In April 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar Hamad bin Yassim Al-Thani came to Poland, and it was the first visit of a minister of foreign affairs representing Arab Gulf States (monarchies) in Warsaw in its history. Yassim Al-Thani discussed with President of Poland A. Kwaśniewski future possibilities of mutual cooperation, and both parties signed a few agreements which have become the legal foundation of Polish-Qatari relations. Among the documents signed was the agreement on civilian aviation communication, the agreement on cooperation between trade chambers, and the memorandum of understanding on establishment embassies (Qatar, <https://www.gov.pl>).

These visits in the 1990s paved the way for the official meeting between President of Poland A. Kwaśniewski and the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in Warsaw in 2002. The Emir was accompanied by a high-rank delegation and a group of businessmen. Meetings were concentrated on trade exchange and the activation of economic contacts. Two years later, president A. Kwaśniewski went to Doha with a reciprocal visit (Qatar, <https://www.gov.pl>).

President Kwaśniewski underlined the intensification of the balance of trade between Poland and Qatar that reached the amount of 5 million USD. In comparison to previous years, this rate increased tenfold although from Qatari perspective, it was just drop in the ocean. Developing bilateral relations were impacted by the engagement of Polish companies on the Qatari market, such as Polimex-Cekop, EXBUD, Gokard, and Mostostal Zabrze. According to president Kwaśniewski's statement, these companies built a bridgehead for the rest of Polish investors who consider business engagements in Qatar ([www.prezydent.pl](http://www.prezydent.pl)).

Qatar and Poland came to a real breakthrough when both parties signed a strategic deal on LNG supplies to Poland. Negotiations began in 2008, and finally, Polish Gas Company PGNiG and Qatar settled all conditions of the agreement in 2009. The contract was terminated for 20 years and envisaged supplies of 1million tons of LNG that equate with 1.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas. The first supply was supposed to be scheduled in the second part of 2014. The value of the contract was estimated annually at 550 million USD, and both parties assumed their readiness for increasing supplies at any time ([www.archiwum.premier.gov.pl](http://www.archiwum.premier.gov.pl)). Supplies of LNG from Qatar were supposed to be supplied to the Świnoujście terminal, but when the agreement was signed, the gas facilities in Poland weren't complete yet. Therefore, Poland accepted the formula when the first supply was scheduled in 2014. By this time, final construction of gas terminal in Świnoujście was delayed for over a year, and the Polish-Qatari accord couldn't be implemented. Finally in June 2016, the first shipment of Qatari LNG terminated at the Baltic coast gas terminal.

The gas terminal on the Baltic Sea has become a crucial element of the Polish strategy of the diversification of gas supplies. 5 years after the gas terminal was opened, Poland is more independent from its Russian supplies managed by Gazprom. In the perspective of final completion of the Baltic Pipe linking Norway and Poland through Denmark, Poland will have a secure position in guaranteeing itself a variety of supplies from different states in the world.

The Świnoujście gas terminal plays a significant role in the gas supplying system in Poland. According to data in the period of June 2016 – June 2021, 130 supplies of LNG were delivered to this terminal, which amounts to around 24 million cubic metres of LNG that, after the process of regasification, equated to 13 billion Nm cubic metres of natural gas. Most of the supplies came from Qatar and the USA, but some of them derived from Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Norway ([www.gaz-system.pl](http://www.gaz-system.pl) 2021).

After the gas contract was signed, prospects of business and trade between Poland and Qatar became more appealing. Polish companies and businessmen could offer products to Qatar in variable branches that, from the Polish perspective, could be defined as promising. According to the Polish edition of a guide for people willing to do business in Qatar, Polish entrepreneurs had an opportunity to be more active in the export of agriculture and food products, investments in the construction sector, and supplying machinery and tools for the building sector. In the three years of the second decade of 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the balance of trade in Polish-Qatari relations was increasing the same as the rates of exports and imports. In 2010, the balance of trade was rated at 14.2 million Euro; in 2011, it reached the amount of 19.2 million; and in 2012, it was estimated at 31.5 million Euro. It confirmed the boost in economic relations between Poland and Qatar (Rynek katarski 2013:3).

A few different decisions also favoured economic growth in mutual relations. Since 2012, Qatar Airways launched a direct connection between Doha and Warsaw, and Polish citizens could enter Qatar with a visa on arrival. The visa requirements for Polish citizens travelling for 90 days were quitted in 2017.

The Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani travelled to Poland in 2011. It was his second official visit, but at that time cooperation between Poland and Qatar was highly advanced. The Emir came with an accompanying delegation (including the Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Emir's Office, the Minister of Energy and Industry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Economy and Trade, and the General Director of Qatar Holding). In result of the visit, Poland and Qatar signed a tourism cooperation agreement and established a Polish-Qatari Business Council (Qatar, [www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl)). In December 2013, a reciprocal visit to Qatar was paid by President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski, who during his meeting with the Emir of Qatar encouraged Qatari businessmen to invest in Poland ([www.money.pl](http://www.money.pl) 2013)

In 2017, the head of state of Qatar Sheikh Tamim ibn Hamad al-Thani visited Poland. The aim of visit was to tighten economic cooperation and sign agreements on economic co-operation in the field of health and health sciences and culture (Qatar, [www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl)). President of Poland Andrzej Duda emphasized growing Qatari-Polish cooperation. The extension of the agreement on LNG deal from 2009 was regarded as sufficient proof for strengthening mutual ties. ([www.gazetaprawna.pl](http://www.gazetaprawna.pl) 2017). Then later, Qatari representatives participated in the 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Katowice, and the delegation of government of Qatar took part in the international conference “Ministerial To Promote A Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East,” organised in February 2019 by the Polish government (Qatar, [www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl))

Frequent reciprocal official visits paid by heads of state were connected with the intensification of economic ties and the growth of trade balance in Polish-Qatari relations.



In 2017, imports of Qatari products were rated at 500 million USD, but exports of goods from Poland to Qatar were estimated at 71.5 million USD. The trade imbalance was the effect of the signed LNG contract for supplies to Poland (Katar – strategiczny partner 2019).

According to recent economic data, overall imports of Qatar in 2020 were rated at 22.6 billion Euro. Poland was ranked at a distant place with exported products estimated at 161 million Euro, which was responsible for just 0.7% of Qatari imports. In turn, exports of Qatari products to Poland in 2020 were rated at 463 million USD, which pertained 1% of overall Qatari export.

### Conclusion

To sum up the analysis, a few aspects must be underlined here. First of all, Poland doesn't have the potential to expand the influence in the Middle East and thus can't be treated equally with powers for whom the Middle East region is the natural area of rivalry and cooperation. The Middle East in the foreign policy of Poland definitely plays a minor role; however, the Polish government often refers to occurrences in this region such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Syria and its post-war consequences, and in the form of condemnation of any terrorist activity. Due to a lack of capability to pursue a comprehensive policy in the Middle East, Poland can only pursue an effective policy towards selected states within the area of mutual interests.

Therefore, the case of Polish - Qatari bilateral relations is an example of successful and effective policy based on economic interests which fits in the strategy of foreign policy of both states.

On the other side, Polish - Iraqi bilateral relations, which developed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, and in comparison to Polish – Qatari relations, had a different political dimension. Being one of the militarily engaged states in post-Saddam Iraq, Poland wasn't able to strengthen cooperation with Iraq in order to a make real basis for further economic cooperation. Thus, after the mission of stabilization was over, Polish investors were completely unable to compete with variable foreign investors over the access to economic markets in Iraq. The decreasing of the trade of balance in 2018 between two states is sufficient proof for the decline of economic cooperation and also showed the inability to strengthen the position of Poland in Iraq, conversely to that what was envisaged before 2008.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

### References

- 5 lat dostaw LNG do terminalu w Świnoujściu (2021) <https://www.gaz-system.pl/centrum-prasowe/aktualnosci/informacja/arttykul/203349/>
- Bronisław Komorowski z wizytą w Katarze, (2013) <https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/arttykul/bronislaw;komorowski;z;wizyta;katarze,43,0,1438251.html>
- Chrzan K. (2012), Wpływ misji w Iraku i Afganistanie na zmiany w wojsku polskim, 'Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego', 199-212
- Dzisiów-Szuszczkiwicz A. (2008), Bliski Wschód – wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej, 'Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe' vol. I-II, 145-182.



- Hołdak K. & Konarzewska A. (2008), Afganistan, Irak, Czad- co mamy z misji? Bilans zysków i strat. Perspektywy, 'Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe', vol. I – II, 96-144
- Iraq: We want Poland more active in our economy (2018), [biznes.gazetaprawna.pl, https://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1144385,wymiana-handlowa-polski-z-irakiem.html](https://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1144385,wymiana-handlowa-polski-z-irakiem.html)
- Katar – strategiczny partner Polski w regionie (Qatar – strategic partner of Poland in the region) (2019) <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwój-technologie/katar-strategiczny-partner-gospodarczy-polski-w-regionie>
- Lewandowski R & Lewandowski W. (2009), Konsekwencje zaangażowania Polski w Iraku, 'Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe' vol. I – II, 17-41.
- Lizak W. & Spyra J., Azja, Bliski Wschód, Afryka i Ameryka Łacińska w polityce zagranicznej RP, [in:] Kuźniar R. & Szczepanik K. (2002) *Polityka zagraniczna RP, 1989-2002* [Foreign Policy of Poland 1989-2002]
- Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq in Poland: 'Iraq needs foreign investments. I do consider this as good opportunity for Poland, pulaski.pl (2016), <https://pulaski.pl/en/minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-iraq-in-poland-iraq-needs-foreign-investments-i-do-consider-this-as-good-opportunity-for-poland/>
- President hopes that cooperation with Iraq will be intensified (2018), <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/1040236,duda-wspolpraca-miedzynarodowa-katar.html>
- President of Iraq: Thank you Poland for its role in rebuilding Iraq (2017) [onet.pl, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/prezydent-iraku-dziekujemy-polsce-za-jej-role-w-odbudowie-iraku/wtyj59x](https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/prezydent-iraku-dziekujemy-polsce-za-jej-role-w-odbudowie-iraku/wtyj59x)
- Qatar, ([www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl))
- Repetowicz W. (2018), Czy Irak może być regionalną potęgą Bliskiego Wschodu?, 'Warsaw Institute Review' <https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/czy-irak-moze-byc-regionalna-potega-bliskiego-wschodu>
- Republic of Iraq. Information on economic relations with Poland (2019), Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology
- Rynek katarski. Przewodnik dla polskich przedsiębiorców (2013), [paih.gov.pl](http://paih.gov.pl)
- Strategia Polityki Zagranicznej 2017-2021 [Strategy of Foreign Policy 2017 -2021] [www.gov.pl](http://www.gov.pl)
- Wagrowska M. (2004), Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku, „Raporty i Analizy” Center for International Relations, 1-33



## Poland-Iran relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani: An analysis of selected external determinants

Przemysław Osiewicz<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of external determinants on Poland-Iran political relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani between 2013-2021. The analysis is based on a set of external conditions that determine their bilateral relations. These include the nuclear agreement concluded with Iran in 2015, the policy of the United States with particular emphasis on the extended sanctions imposed on Iran, the European Union's policy toward Iran, as well as Iran's rivalry with some states of the Middle East region. The author has applied qualitative content analysis as the main research technique. The main hypothesis is as follows: external factors determine Polish foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran due to Poland's membership in the UN, EU and NATO, as well as economic ties with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf and close relations with the USA.

### Keywords

Iran, Poland, Rouhani, External determinants, Foreign policy

**1 Corresponding Author:** Przemysław Osiewicz (Assoc. Prof.), Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Department of Non-European Political Studies, Poland. E-mail: [osiewicz@amu.edu.pl](mailto:osiewicz@amu.edu.pl)  
ORCID: 0000-0001-6883-7307

**To cite this article:** Osiewicz, P. (2022). Poland-Iran relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani: An analysis of selected external determinants. *SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences*, 31(Suppl. 1), S175–S184. <http://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2022.31.973148>



## Introduction

Poland has a special diplomatic relationship with Iran, known as Persia until the 1930s, dating back to the fifteenth century. A cursory analysis of historical ties shows that Poland-Iran relations remained good or very good regardless of internal and external conditions. However, this was mainly due to the significant geographic remoteness, and thus the lack of major discrepancies and issues. Yet this factor has ceased to be of key importance in the era of globalization and the growing interdependence of all countries in the world, regardless of their distances and various political and social differences.

The main aim of this article is to analyze the impact of external determinants on Poland-Iran political relations during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani between 2013-2021. The work will define a set of external conditions that determine the shape of Poland-Iran relations and their impact on them. These include (1) the nuclear agreement concluded with Iran in 2015, (2) the policy of the United States with particular emphasis on the extended sanctions imposed on Iran, (3) the European Union's policy towards Iran, as well as (4) Iran's rivalry with some countries of the Middle East region, especially with those who maintain close and good relations with Poland, such as, for example, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The end of the second and last term of the Rouhani presidency allows us to analyze the role of the above-mentioned variables in the bilateral relations between Poland and Iran.

The author has applied qualitative content analysis as the main research technique. The main sources are official documents, selected monographs, academic articles, and analytical reports.

### **Theoretical background: determinants of foreign policy**

Foreign policy is a unique state policy. As in the case of other policies, its main goals are determined by internal political processes and the clash of different concepts and visions, but at the same time these goals relate to the external environment of the state. Thus, it can be said that it is a policy formulated inside the state, but implemented outside its borders. Of course, such a statement is only a simplification. In fact, it is a very complex and dynamic process. The foreign policy of states is shaped by a number of internal and external determinants (Schmidt, 2017; Souva, 2005). These conditions can be further divided into subjective ones, i.e. those that are influenced by a given state, and objective ones, i.e. those that do not depend on it. In this context, it should be noted that external conditions are usually objective in nature and are the result of various events and processes that take place in the international environment. In this case, the countries of medium and low role do not have much influence on the development of the situation, and their decisions and maneuver possibilities are largely limited, for example, by global policies of the great powers. Both Poland and Iran are middle-class countries. They play significant roles in their regions, but have almost no influence on processes of global importance due to objective constraints.

The role of external determinants in foreign policy making is significant. Other nation's foreign policy and actions affect a state actor which formulates its own foreign policy (DeHaven, 1991: 91). Thus, the goals and activities undertaken in this area are the result of the influence of the external environment on a set of internal determinants such

as location, political establishment, society, culture, linkages, and economic potential. The set of external determinants, in turn, can include power structure, international organizations, reactions of other states, world public opinion, alliances and international treaties (Gimba, Ibrahim, 2018: 126-128).

This article is an attempt to determine the impact of selected external determinants on bilateral relations between Iran and Poland. These determinants are international organizations, reactions of other state actors, and alliances. Global actors such as the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and selected regional actors are included. The hypothesis is as follows: external factors determine Polish foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran due to Poland's membership in the UN, EU and NATO, as well as economic ties with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf and close allied relations with the USA. Based on the analysis of empirical factors, can the above hypothesis be confirmed or denied?

### **Poland-Iran relations: A brief overview**

The beginning of Poland-Iran relations dates back to the 16th century, when the then king of Poland, Stefan Batory, sought to form an alliance with Persia against the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, the alliance was never concluded, but in the following centuries, both countries had a lot in common, including trade relations. However, the formal establishment of diplomatic relations took place only after World War I when Poland regained independence. Persia was one of the first countries to formally recognize the Polish state. In 1927, both parties signed the Treaty of Friendship between the Republic of Poland and the Persian Empire. This document was ratified a year later (*Ustawa*, 1929). The symbol of very good relations was the help and shelter that the Iranian authorities offered to thousands of Polish refugees, especially orphans, released from camps on the territory of the Soviet Union during World War II (Surdykowska, 2014).

In the following years, Iran and Poland had very good relations regardless of historical circumstances, especially during the Cold War rivalry. The Polish People's Republic, dependent on the Soviet Union, maintained close relations with the Imperial State of Iran, despite its close ties with the United States. Even after Iran's revolution and its transformation into a theocratic state, the situation did not change (Maj, 2021). The Polish authorities, both during and after the Cold War, maintained friendly relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The situation did not change even when Poland started negotiating NATO membership and was then admitted to this organization in 1999. Diplomatic relations did not deteriorate even during the tensions over the development of the Iranian nuclear program at the beginning of the 21st century. They also remained good after the US left the JCPOA in 2018, despite Poland's alliance and close cooperation with the Americans in the field of security and defense. During this period, at least with regard to the pursued foreign policy, President Hassan Rouhani was the main Iranian politician exposed in external relations.

In 2019, during his meeting with a new Polish ambassador to Tehran, President Rouhani declared as follows: "Iran has always shown its respect towards the people of Poland at critical junctures in history. The two nations have had close and amicable relations with each other for centuries and we are willing to develop these ties in all fields" (President

Rouhani, 2019). Polish Ambassador Maciej Falkowski hailed “Iran’s effective role in establishing peace and security in the region and called for closer cooperation with Tehran and the international community in this regard” (President Rouhani, 2019). This does not mean, of course, that the Polish authorities are uncritical about various activities undertaken by Iran in the region, but at the same time they never criticize the Iranian authorities openly and as strongly as, for example, the USA or some EU countries.

Thus, such a cursory analysis of mutual relations shows that they remained good regardless of changes in internal and external determinants, what is extremely rare in contemporary international relations. Can a similar regularity be noticed today, in the post-Cold War period? Does Poland, a NATO member state and a close ally of the United States, still maintain good relations with the Islamic People’s Republic, a country defined as the American enemy not only in the Middle East region?

In order to determine the impact of external factors on the current state of Poland-Iran relations, it is worth analyzing a set of external determinants that take into account negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program and compliance with the JCPOA agreement, the U.S. policy towards Iran, especially the so-called extended sanctions; the European Union’s attitude towards Iran, and the Middle Eastern rivalry, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as between Iran and Israel.

The article is dedicated to political relations. However, for a complete picture of the situation, it is worth mentioning that good diplomatic relations do not go hand in hand with economic cooperation. And in this case, the importance of external conditions is much greater and noticeable than in the case of political relations. After 2018, both due to the existing extended sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between Poland and Iran has become minimal. According to official data published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, the value of trade exchange was about 218 million euros in 2018. For comparison, in 2019, this value dropped to 39 million euros. As a consequence, the ratio of the share of trade between Iran and Poland amounted to only 0,02 % of total Polish exports and 0,01 % of total imports (Iran, 2021). It is difficult to imagine any improvement in this state of affairs without a clear political impulse.

### **External determinant 1: The nuclear agreement**

Poland did not participate directly in the negotiations of the Iranian nuclear program, but was indirectly represented at them thanks to the participation of the European Union. The signing of the JCPOA in 2015 was very well received in Warsaw. Moreover, the Polish authorities had high hopes for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed by the EU, as it opened the way for Polish entrepreneurs to invest and conclude commercial contracts with companies in Iran and allowed the country to be considered as another oil supplier. It was particularly important from the point of view of energy security and efforts to diversify the sources of this raw material. Each action of this type made it possible to become more independent from oil supplies from the Russian Federation. Until 2018, economic cooperation with Iran was possible for Poland. However, the situation changed dramatically with the suspension of extended sanctions by the US administration. As a result, Polish companies, fearing being blacklisted in the US, withdrew from contracts

and from the implementation of orders placed by Iranian recipients. An important factor was also the allied loyalty to the USA, which became even more important from the point of view of Poland's security after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

At the same time, however, it can be emphasized that, like other EU countries, Poland supported the need for the continued compliance of the parties to the JCPOA deal with the provisions contained therein. Even when in response to the American withdrawal from the treaty, Iran began to unilaterally withdraw from compliance with individual provisions, this fact did not affect the diplomatic relations between Poland and Iran. The Polish authorities consistently support the maintenance of the nuclear deal, but at the same time have never taken any action that could be perceived as an attempt to put pressure on Tehran. Currently, after Joe Biden was elected president of the United States, the situation may improve, and Poland may benefit from this change, as it did after 2016. In 2021, Poland supports the negotiation process for the US's return to the JCPOA agreement and for Iran to fully comply with its provisions again. During the bilateral meeting with Javad Zarif in June 2021, the Polish minister of foreign affairs declared as follows: "We are convinced that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which is a nuclear agreement with Iran, can have a positive impact on developments in the Middle East. It is a core element of the global non-proliferation architecture and a point of reference in a debate on this issue" (Minister Zbigniew Rau, 2021). Javad Zarif, in turn, "referred to the long-standing relations between the two countries of Iran and Poland and emphasized the continuation of fully-fledged economic, cultural and political relations between the two countries" (Zarif meets, 2021).

However, the state of diplomatic relations between Poland and Iran will not depend on the outcome of the talks in Vienna. The change can only be noticeable in trade if the US agrees to lift the sanctions.

In the case of the Iranian nuclear program and international negotiations, this external determinant does not affect the state of political relations between Iran and Poland. Polish authorities consistently support the maintenance of the provisions and full implementation of the 2015 deal.

### **External determinant 2: The U.S. policy toward Iran**

One might assume that since the USA does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran and there are sharp tensions in relations between these countries from time to time, their allies cannot maintain good relations with both the USA and Iran. Meanwhile, many countries manage to pursue such a policy. One of them is Poland.

One of the events that put the good relations of Poland and Iran to a serious test was the Middle East summit organized in Warsaw in February 2019. The event, which is often referred to as the US-led Middle East conference in Warsaw, took place without the invitation of the Iranian delegation, although it would certainly have been advisable given the role and influence the country has in the region. As a result, the most important problems, conflicts and threats in the Middle East were analyzed by representatives of the countries favoring the then administration of President Donald Trump. Already during the conference, it became clear that many of the statements were overtly anti-Iranian, which led analysts and observers to describe the real agenda of the meeting as an attempt

to contain the growing Iranian influence in the region (Tibon, 2019; US backtracks, 2019). This was not the intention of the Polish authorities, but was the result of the actions of American diplomacy, the main goal of which was to bring about diplomatic rapprochement between the State of Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This peculiar alliance was intended to block Iran's growing influence and to be a response to proxy conflicts between primarily Iran and Israel, and Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, despite the lack of such anti-Iranian actions and intentions on the part of Polish diplomacy, the very fact of allowing the organization of the summit on Polish territory was very badly received by the Iranian authorities and led to a brief tension. One of its signs was the temporary suspension of issuing visas to Polish citizens by the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran zawiesza, 2019).

Despite Poland's close cooperation and alliance with the United States, the Polish authorities still maintain close diplomatic relations with Tehran. Proof of this was the bilateral meeting of the head of Polish diplomacy Zbigniew Rau with Javad Zarif during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey in June 2021 (Minister Zbigniew Rau, 2021). The uncertainty as to whether the United States will return to the nuclear deal and lift the extended sanctions does not stop the Polish authorities from developing diplomatic contacts with Iran. It can even be said that, unlike in 2015, Poland wants to be better prepared for the possible lifting of sanctions and to facilitate Polish companies in establishing trade contacts with Iranian contractors, as well as investing in Iran. Critical voices on the US return to the treaty with Iran are not lacking in the Democratic Party itself and in the closest circle of President Joe Biden (Desiderio, 2021), yet the Polish government is already taking action after several years of break, and its representatives are taking part in high-level meetings. Such a policy is certainly favored by the rapprochement between Poland and selected states of the Black Sea basin, such as Turkey, Ukraine and Romania. All these states have many issues and interests in common, including a skeptical or even critical assessment of the activities undertaken by the Russian Federation on the international arena. Including Iran in this process may become more and more important for Americans in the context of the geopolitical rivalry with Russia over time. For this reason, American diplomacy does not refer to closer meetings between Polish and Iranian diplomats because, at least for now, it does not perceive them as a threat. On the contrary, attracting major players such as Turkey and Iran may, over time, be a decisive factor in the global rivalry between the US and the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless, the Polish authorities give the highest priority to relations with the Americans, and if they had to choose which side to support, they would certainly choose the US, not Iran. For this reason, further progress in the US-Iran negotiations or the lack of it will affect the possibilities of Polish diplomacy to act in relation to Iranians.

### **External determinant 3: The EU's attitude toward Iran**

Poland takes advantage of the possibility of undertaking various diplomatic activities within the European Union, especially in areas where it does not want to become involved as a nation state. This was the case, for example, after the restoration of sanctions extended by the United States in 2018. Polish enterprises, like many other European



concerns, lost the most on the decision of the Donald Trump administration. However, Polish diplomacy, at least directly, did not try to undertake any diplomatic actions that could expose it to open conflict with the American side. Cooperation with the United States has become particularly important for Poland after 2014 due to the growing threat posed by the Russian Federation. At the same time, Poland was monitoring the progress of works undertaken by some other EU member states, including in particular France and Germany, in order to introduce a mechanism that would allow the US to bypass the sanctions and allow the continuation of trade with Iran.

When the introduction of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, INSTEX, was announced in 2019, the news was seen in many EU countries as an incentive to re-establish economic relations with Iran. This instrument is a European special-purpose vehicle (SPV) established to facilitate non-USD and non-SWIFT transactions with Iran to avoid breaking the U.S. sanctions (Instex, 2021). Thanks to this solution, the European enterprises would operate under the EU banner and would not be exposed to a firm response from the US. Some of the member states joined INSTEX, but Poland did not make such a decision. The main reason was the apprehension that if Polish companies were blacklisted in the United States, they would not count on an effective intervention from the EU. Poland certainly has much more to lose by risking tensions in diplomatic relations with the US and deciding to try to support the circumvention of US sanctions on Iran. The aforementioned very low level of trade exchange and the low prospects of increasing it thanks to participation in INSTEX, would make such attempts by Poland unjustified and irrational. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the very introduction of this mechanism turned out to be a very ineffective project. For the time being, it serves only humanitarian purposes.

It can therefore be stated again that the external factor having a real impact on Poland's policy towards Iran is the fear of a reaction from the United States. This is also the case with regard to the official EU policy towards Iran. Although the EU strongly criticized the US waiver of compliance with the provisions of the JCPOA agreement and took steps to circumvent US sanctions, Poland was not directly involved in such activities. It adopted the attitude of a passive observer, while at the same time assigning primacy to transatlantic relations, which can be considered justified and rational, taking into account the primacy of issues related to Poland's national security. Thus, the Polish authorities support the official position adopted by individual institutions of the European Union, but at the same time try not to initiate the development of common positions.

#### **External determinant 4: The Middle Eastern rivalry**

Poland is not involved in the rivalry of individual countries in the Middle East region. On the contrary, it tries to maintain the best possible relations with all states or parties to regional conflicts. For this reason, it has, for example, very good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The same is true for Palestine and Israel. This does not mean, however, that the Polish authorities always manage to avoid being caught up in Middle Eastern tensions.

The aforementioned organization of the Middle East Summit in Warsaw 2019 could be interpreted as Poland's unequivocal support for Iran's main rivals in the region, i.e., Israel

and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, however, it should be emphasized that Poland does not engage in disputes and conflicts in the Middle East region in such a way as to support one side against the other. Since the end of the Cold War, Polish diplomacy has been trying to remain a rather impartial observer. This is particularly evident in the Middle East conflict, in which Poland maintains close and good relations with both Israel and Palestine. The same is true of Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry. Both these countries cooperate with the Polish side. In practice, the only example of a regional conflict in which the Polish authorities have taken a firm stance and clearly support one of the parties is support for the Syrian opposition and criticism of the actions taken by President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government. However, also in this case, the official position of Poland is much more balanced than that of some other EU countries, for example France.

According to the current Polish strategy of foreign policy, “Political problems in the Middle East and Africa – brought about by economic stagnation, demographic shifts, and climate change – will doubtless gain strength over time. As such, they will increasingly sap the strength of European states and confront the continent with tough challenges. Poland is not immune to such developments: its citizens have fallen victim to multiple acts of terror and our country, in keeping with the spirit of allied solidarity, participates in NATO and EU operations in the Mediterranean. But we must bear in mind that the diverse challenges originating from the South and from the East each require a tailored response” (Polish foreign policy strategy, 2017). Thus, the declaration of the Polish government is clear. The authorities of the Middle East countries, including Iran, can count on cooperation with Poland, especially in the context of the challenges of the migration policy, the effects of climate change and conflicts in the region. At the same time, however, the Polish authorities do not support either side in ongoing regional rivalries or armed conflicts. The only exception is the war in Syria, in which the position of Poland is consistent with the position of the European Union. Polish authorities are very critical of President Bashar Assad and support the search for a peace agreement under the so-called Geneva process. This distinguishes Poland from Iran, which supports both the Assad regime and the so-called Astana peace process (Astana trio ready, 2021). However, it is worth noting that the criticism of Assad did not and still does not translate into any criticism of Iran’s military involvement in the Syrian conflict by the Polish authorities.

### **Conclusion**

The above analysis indicates that the three out of four selected external determinants do not have a decisive impact on bilateral relations between Iran and Poland. Such a clear influence of the external factor on the official position and actions taken by Poland towards Iran is visible only in the case of the Polish position with regard to the actions taken by the United States.

In this context, the primacy of this determinant is noticeable even in the case of official EU policy. Poland officially supports the EU’s actions towards Iran, but at the same time acts very cautiously and only to the extent that it does not expose it to a confrontation with the US. At the same time, however, it can be noticed that despite such close relations and cooperation between the US and Poland, Iran maintains friendly political relations with Poland. The Iranian side certainly understands the difficult geopolitical position of Poland

and the primacy of security policy. The military cooperation between Poland and the US is not directed in any way against Iran, but is a response to a potential threat to national security posed by the Russian Federation. This alliance gained special importance after 2014 when the Russians violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Political relations between Poland and Iran are independent even of those events that, in the case of other countries, could lead to tensions or even a reduction in the level of diplomatic cooperation. One example of this was the relatively soft response of Tehran to the organization of the 2019 Middle East Summit in Warsaw. One of the reasons for this was the centuries-old and friendly cooperation. Regardless of the geopolitical circumstances and the current international situation, the authorities of both countries do not perceive themselves as a potential threat.

Poland has its own policy towards Iran and maintains diplomatic relations with it. The best example is the recent bilateral meeting of Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau with his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in June 2021. For Poland, this cooperation is important especially because of its potential anti-Russian character in the future. The rapprochement of the US and Iran's positions with regard to the JCPOA agreement and the lifting of sanctions will help to pull Tehran away from Russian influence. Together with the Black Sea countries such as Ukraine, Romania and Turkey, Poland and Iran could create a strong system that would block Russia's expansion in this part of the world. If such a scenario turned out to be realistic, it is difficult to assume that it would not receive support from the USA as well. Nevertheless, in this case a lot will depend on the progress of the US-Iran negotiations. This additionally confirms the importance of this external determinant in the case of diplomatic relations between Poland and Iran.

All in all, despite Poland's strong foreign policy ties with NATO and the EU, and very close relations with the United States, the Polish authorities have successfully maintained friendly relations with Iran. Similarly, the Iranian authorities, despite Poland's strong anchoring in Euro-Atlantic structures, do not treat it as a potential enemy. It can even be noted that they apply a different measure to Poland. On this basis, it can be concluded that the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical part of this article has been denied.

---

**Peer-review:** Externally peer-reviewed.

**Conflict of Interest:** The author has no conflict of interest to declare.

**Grant Support:** The author declared that this study has received no financial support

---

## References

- Astana trio ready to support Syria Constitutional Committee process. Daily Sabah. (2021, January 28). Retrieved from <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/astana-trio-ready-to-support-syria-constitutionalcommittee-process>
- DeHaven, M.J. (1991). Internal and External Determinants of Foreign Policy: West Germany and Great Britain during the Two-Track Missile Controversy. *International Studies Quarterly* 35(1), 87-108.
- Desiderio, A. (2021). Biden faces GOP handcuffs and Democrat skeptics on Iran deal 2.0. (2021, March 5). Politico. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/03/biden-gop-democrats-iran-deal-485104>
- Gimba, Z.; Ibrahim, S.G. (2018). A Review of External Factors That Determine Foreign Policy Formulation. *Indo-Iranian Journal of Scientific Research* 2(1), 119-130.
- Instex (2021). The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges. Retrieved from <https://instex-europe.com/about-us/>

- Iran (2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/iran-en/bilateral-relations>
- Iran zawieszta wydawanie wiz obywatelom Polski [Iran suspends issuing visas to Polish citizens]. (2019, January 16). Esky. Retrieved from <https://www.esky.pl/porady-dla-podroznych/news/podroze/iran-zawieszta-wydawanie-wiz-obywatelom-polski#:~:text=Ambasada%20Iranu%20w%20Warszawie%20zawiesi%C5%82a%20wydawanie%20wiz%20obywatelom%20Polski.&text=Sytuacja%20jest%20efektem%20och%C5%82odzenia%20stosunk%C3%B3w,po%C5%9Bwi%C4%99conej%20bezpiecze%C5%84stwu%20na%20Bliskim%20Wschodzie>.
- Maj, E. (2021). Poland's double game strategy during the US-Iranian crises (1979–88). *Cold War History* 21(2), 159-177.
- Minister Zbigniew Rau holds bilateral meetings (2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/minister-zbigniew-rau-holds-bilateral-meetings>
- Polish foreign policy strategy 2017-2021 (2017). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/869184c0-bd6f-4a20-b8af-a5c8190350a1>
- President Rouhani urges closer Iran-Poland ties (2019). Tasnim News Agency (2019, June 17). Retrieved from <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/06/17/2034501/president-rouhani-urges-closer-iran-poland-ties>
- Schmidt, J.D. (2017). The internal and external constraints on foreign policy in India: exploring culture and ethnic sensitivities. *Third World Quarterly* 38(8), 1894-1908.
- Souva, M. (2005). Foreign Policy Determinants: Comparing Realist and Domestic-Political Models of Foreign Policy. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 22, 149–163.
- Surdykowska, S. (ed.). (2014). *In the archive of memory: The fate of Poles and Iranians in the Second World War*. Warsaw: University of Warsaw.
- Tibon, A. (2019, February 13). Warsaw Summit Will Test U.S. Gamble on Israeli-Arab Pact Against Iran. *Haaretz*. Retrieved from <https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-warsaw-summit-will-test-u-s-gamble-on-israeli-arab-pact-against-iran-1.6932889>
- US backtracks on Iran-focused conference in Poland after EU objections (2019, January 24). *Islamic Republic News Agency*. Retrieved from <https://en.irna.ir/news/83181997/US-backtracks-on-Iran-focused-conference-in-Poland-after-EU-objections>
- Ustawa z dnia 19 grudnia 1928 r. w sprawie ratyfikacji traktatu przyjaźni pomiędzy Najjaśniejszą Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Cesarstwem Perskiem, podpisanego w Teheranie dnia 19 marca 1927 roku, oraz wymienionych w Teheranie dnia 14 kwietnia 1928 roku pomiędzy Rządem Polskim a Rządem Perskim not, interpretujących pewne postanowienia powyższego traktatu [The Act of December 19, 1928 on the ratification of the treaty of friendship between the Serene Republic of Poland and the Persian Empire, signed in Tehran on March 19, 1927, and the notes listed in Tehran on April 14, 1928 between the Polish Government and the Persian Government, interpreting certain provisions of the above treaty]. 1929. Dz.U. 1929 nr 3 poz. 24.
- Zarif meets with Polish counterpart to discuss bilateral ties (2021, June 19). Mehr News Agency. Retrieved from: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/175026/Zarif-meets-with-Polish-counterpart-to-discuss-bilateral-ties>

### AMAÇ KAPSAM

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, siyaset bilimi, kamu yönetimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, alanlarında uluslararası ve disiplinlerarası makaleler yayınlamaktadır. Dergi, aşağıda belirtilen konuları kapsamak ile birlikte sadece bu konular ile kısıtlı değildir:

- Siyaset biliminin tüm alt disiplinleri, siyaset teorisi, siyaset felsefesi, politik davranış, siyasi kurumlar ve siyasi tarih
- Kamu yönetiminin tüm alt disiplinleri,
- Uluslararası ilişkiler ile ilgili tüm konular: uluslararası hukuk, iktisat, etik, strateji, felsefe, kültür, çevre, güvenlik, terör, bölgesel çalışmalar, küreselleşme ve diğer konular,

Dergi, yukarıda adı geçen disiplinlerin çeşitli yönlerini inceleyen, İngilizce yazılmış araştırma esaslı makalelerin yanında teorik ve kavramsal makaleleri yayınlamaktadır. Ayrıca, dergi uluslararası alandaki akademisyenlerin konuk editörlüğünde çeşitli temalar ile ilgili özel sayılar yayınlamaktadır.

### EDİTORYAL POLİTİKALAR VE HAKEM SÜRECİ

#### Yayın Politikası

Dergiye yayımlanmak üzere gönderilen makalelerin içeriği derginin amaç ve kapsamı ile uyumlu olmalıdır. Dergi, orijinal araştırma niteliğindeki yazıları yayınlamaya öncelik vermektedir. Genel İlkeler Daha önce yayımlanmamış ya da yayımlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Ön değerlendirmeyi geçen yazılar iThenticate intihal tarama programından geçirilir. İntihal incelemesinden sonra, uygun makaleler Editör tarafından orijinaliteleri, metodolojileri, makalede ele alınan konunun önemi ve derginin kapsamına uygunluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Bilimsel toplantılarda sunulan özet bildirimler, makalede belirtilmesi koşulu ile kaynak olarak kabul edilir. Editör, gönderilen makale biçimsel esaslara uygun ise, gelen yazıyı yurtiçinden ve /veya yurtdışından en az iki hakemin değerlendirmesine sunar, hakemler gerek gördüğü takdirde yazıda istenen değişiklikler yazarlar tarafından yapıldıktan sonra yayımlanmasına onay verir. Makale yayımlanmak üzere Dergiye gönderildikten sonra yazarlardan hiçbirinin ismi, tüm yazarların yazılı izni olmadan yazar listesinden silinemez ve yeni bir isim yazar olarak eklenemez ve yazar sırası değiştirilemez. Yayına kabul edilmeyen makale, resim ve fotoğraflar yazarlara geri gönderilmez. Yayımlanan yazı ve resimlerin tüm hakları Dergiye aittir.

#### Telif Hakkında

Yazarlar dergide yayımlanan çalışmalarının telif hakkına sahiptirler ve çalışmaları Creative Commons Atıf-GayriTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) olarak lisanslıdır. CC BY-NC 4.0 lisansı, eserin ticari kullanım dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.

#### Açık Erişim İlkesi

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, tüm içeriği okura ya da okurun dahil olduğu kuruma ücretsiz olarak sunulur. Okurlar, ticari amaç haricinde, yayıncı ya da yazardan izin almadan dergi makalelerinin tam metnini okuyabilir, indirebilir, kopyalayabilir, arayabilir ve link sağlayabilir.

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences makaleleri açık erişimlidir ve Creative Commons Atıf-GayrıTicari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.tr>) olarak lisanslıdır.

### İşleme Ücreti

Derginin tüm giderleri İstanbul Üniversitesi tarafından karşılanmaktadır. Dergide makale yayını ve makale süreçlerinin yürütülmesi ücrete tabi değildir. Dergiye gönderilen ya da yayın için kabul edilen makaleler için işleme ücreti ya da gönderim ücreti alınmaz.

### Hakem Süreci

Daha önce yayınlanmamış ya da yayınlanmak üzere başka bir dergide halen değerlendirmede olmayan ve her bir yazar tarafından onaylanan makaleler değerlendirilmek üzere kabul edilir. Gönderilen ve ön kontrolü geçen makaleler iThenticate yazılımı kullanılarak intihal için taranır. İntihal kontrolünden sonra, uygun olan makaleler baş editör tarafından orijinallik, metodoloji, işlenen konunun önemi ve dergi kapsamı ile uyumluluğu açısından değerlendirilir. Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar.

Seçilen makaleler en az iki ulusal/uluslararası hakeme değerlendirmeye gönderilir; yayın kararı, hakemlerin talepleri doğrultusunda yazarların gerçekleştirdiği düzenlemelerin ve hakem sürecinin sonrasında baş editör tarafından verilir.

Hakemlerin değerlendirmeleri objektif olmalıdır. Hakem süreci sırasında hakemlerin aşağıdaki hususları dikkate alarak değerlendirmelerini yapmaları beklenir.

- Makale yeni ve önemli bir bilgi içeriyor mu?
- Öz, makalenin içeriğini net ve düzgün bir şekilde tanımlıyor mu?
- Yöntem bütünlüklü ve anlaşılır şekilde tanımlanmış mı?
- Yapılan yorum ve varılan sonuçlar bulgularla kanıtlanıyor mu?
- Alandaki diğer çalışmalara yeterli referans verilmiş mi?
- Dil kalitesi yeterli mi?

Hakemler, gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdır. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir.

### YAYIN ETİĞİ VE İLKELER

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences, yayın etiğinde en yüksek standartlara bağlıdır ve Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA) ve World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) tarafından yayınlanan etik yayıncılık ilkelerini benimser; Principles of Transparency

and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing başlığı altında ifade edilen ilkeler için adres: <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-andbest-practice-scholarly-publishing> Gönderilen tüm makaleler orijinal, yayınlanmamış ve başka bir dergide değerlendirme sürecinde olmamalıdır. Her bir makale editörlerden biri ve en az iki hakem tarafından çift kör değerlendirmeden geçirilir. İntihal, duplikasyon, sahte yazarlık/inkar edilen yazarlık, araştırma/veri fabrikasyonu, makale dilimleme, dilimleyerek yayın, telif hakları ihlali ve çıkar çatışmasının gizlenmesi, etik dışı davranışlar olarak kabul edilir. Kabul edilen etik standartlara uygun olmayan tüm makaleler yayından çıkarılır. Buna yayından sonra tespit edilen olası kuraldışı, uygunsuzluklar içeren makaleler de dahildir.

### Araştırma Etiği

Dergi araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. - Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

- Araştırma ekibi ve katılımcılar, araştırmanın amacı, yöntemleri ve öngörülen olası kullanımları; araştırmaya katılımın gerektirdikleri ve varsa riskleri hakkında tam olarak bilgilendirilmelidir.
- Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdır. - Katılımcıların zarar görmesinden kaçınılmalıdır. Araştırma, katılımcıları riske sokmayacak şekilde planlanmalıdır.
- Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.
- Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.
- Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluştaki gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.
- İnsan ögesi bulunan çalışmalarda, “yöntem” bölümünde katılımcılardan “bilgilendirilmiş onam” alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdaki etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

### Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirilmediği konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telifle bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir. Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda “yazar” yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar



olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel süpervizyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar. Yazarlık için yeterli ölçütleri karşılamayan ancak çalışmaya katkısı olan tüm bireyler “teşekkür / bilgiler” kısmında sıralanmalıdır. Bunlara örnek olarak ise sadece teknik destek sağlayan, yazıma yardımcı olan ya da sadece genel bir destek sağlayan, finansal ve materyal desteği sunan kişiler verilebilir. Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve işbirliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşır.

### **Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları**

Baş editör, makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyuğundan, dini inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfayı yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Baş editör; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir. Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

### **YAZILARIN HAZIRLANMASI**

#### **Dil**

Dergide İngilizce dilinde makaleler yayınlanır.

#### **Yazıların Hazırlanması ve Yazım Kuralları**

Aksi belirtilmedikçe gönderilen yazılarla ilgili tüm yazışmalar ilk yazarla yapılacaktır. Makale gönderimi online olarak ve <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr> üzerinden yapılmalıdır. Gönderilen yazılar, yazının yayınlanmak üzere gönderildiğini ifade eden, makale türünü belirten ve makaleyle ilgili detayları içeren (bkz: Son Kontrol Listesi) bir mektup; yazının elektronik formunu içeren Microsoft

Word 2003 ve üzerindeki versiyonları ile yazılmış elektronik dosya ve tüm yazarların imzaladığı Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu eklenerek gönderilmelidir.

1. Çalışmalar, A4 boyutundaki kağıdın bir yüzüne, üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak, 10 punto Times New Roman harf karakterleriyle ve 1,5 satır aralık ölçüsü ile ve iki yana yaslı olarak hazırlanmalıdır. Paragraf başlarında tab tuşu kullanılmalıdır. Metin içinde yer alan tablo ve şemalarda ise tek satır aralığı kullanılmalıdır.
2. Metnin başlığı küçük harf, koyu renk, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 12 punto olarak sayfanın ortasında yer almalıdır.
3. Metin yazarına ait bilgiler başlıktan sonra bir satır atlanarak, Times New Roman yazı tipi, 10 punto ve tek satır aralığı kullanılarak sayfanın soluna yazılacaktır. Yazarın adı küçük harfle, soyadı büyük harfle belirtildikten sonra bir alt satıra unvanı, çalıştığı kurum ve e-posta adresi yazılacaktır.
4. Giriş bölümünden önce 200-250 kelimelik çalışmanın kapsamını, amacını, ulaşılan sonuçları ve kullanılan yöntemi kaydeden makale dilinde ve İngilizce öz ile 600-800 kelimelik İngilizce genişletilmiş özet yer almalıdır. Çalışmanın İngilizce başlığı İngilizce özün üzerinde yer almalıdır. İngilizce ve makale dilinde özlerin altında çalışmanın içeriğini temsil eden, makale dilinde 3-5 adet, İngilizce adet anahtar kelime yer almalıdır. Makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez.
5. Çalışmaların başlıca şu unsurları içermesi gerekmektedir: Makale dilinde başlık, öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce başlık öz ve anahtar kelimeler; İngilizce genişletilmiş özet (makale İngilizce ise İngilizce genişletilmiş özet istenmez), ana metin bölümleri, son notlar ve kaynaklar.
6. Çalışmalarda tablo, grafik ve şekil gibi göstergeler ancak çalışmanın takip edilebilmesi açısından gereklilik arz ettiği durumlarda, numaralandırılarak, tanımlayıcı bir başlık ile birlikte verilmelidir. Demografik özellikler gibi metin içinde verilebilecek veriler, ayrıca tablolar ile ifade edilmemelidir.
7. Yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen makale ile birlikte yazar bilgilerini içeren kapak sayfası gönderilmelidir. Kapak sayfasında, makalenin başlığı, yazar veya yazarların bağlı oldukları kurum ve unvanları, kendilerine ulaşılacak adresler, cep, iş ve faks numaraları, ORCID ve e-posta adresleri yer almalıdır (bkz. Son Kontrol Listesi).
8. Kurallar dâhilinde dergimize yayınlanmak üzere gönderilen çalışmaların her türlü sorumluluğu yazar/yazarlarına aittir.
9. Yayın kurulu ve hakem raporları doğrultusunda yazarlardan, metin üzerinde bazı düzeltmeler yapmaları istenebilir.
10. Dergiye gönderilen çalışmalar yayınlansın veya yayınlanmasın geri gönderilmez.

## KAYNAKLAR

Derleme yazıları okuyucular için bir konudaki kaynaklara ulaşmayı kolaylaştıran bir araç olsa da, her zaman orijinal çalışmayı doğru olarak yansıtmaz. Bu yüzden mümkün olduğunca yazarlar orijinal çalışmalarını kaynak göstermelidir. Öte yandan, bir konuda çok fazla sayıda orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi yer israfına neden olabilir. Birkaç anahtar orijinal çalışmanın kaynak gösterilmesi genelde uzun listelerle aynı işi görür. Ayrıca günümüzde kaynaklar elektronik versiyonlara eklenebilmekte ve okuyucular elektronik literatür taramalarıyla yayınlara kolaylıkla ulaşabilmektedir.

Kabul edilmiş ancak henüz sayıya dahil edilmemiş makaleler Early View olarak yayınlanır ve

bu makalelere atıflar “advance online publication” şeklinde verilmelidir. Genel bir kaynaktan elde edilemeyecek temel bir konu olmadıkça “kişisel iletişimlere” atıfta bulunulmamalıdır. Eğer atıfta bulunulursa parantez içinde iletişim kurulan kişinin adı ve iletişimin tarihi belirtilmelidir. Bilimsel makaleler için yazarlar bu kaynaktan yazılı izin ve iletişimin doğruluğunu gösterir belge almalıdır. Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

### Referans Stili ve Formatı

SIYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences, metin içi alıntılama ve kaynak gösterme için APA (American Psychological Association) kaynak sitilinin 6. edisyonunu benimser. APA 6. Edisyon hakkında bilgi için:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org/>

Kaynakların doğruluğundan yazar(lar) sorumludur. Tüm kaynaklar metinde belirtilmelidir. Kaynaklar aşağıdaki örneklerdeki gibi gösterilmelidir.

### Metin İçinde Kaynak Gösterme

Kaynaklar metinde parantez içinde yazarların soyadı ve yayın tarihi yazılarak belirtilmelidir. Birden fazla kaynak gösterilecekse kaynaklar arasında (;) işareti kullanılmalıdır. Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır.

### Örnekler:

#### ***Birden fazla kaynak;***

(Esin ve ark., 2002; Karasar 1995)

#### ***Tek yazarlı kaynak;***

(Akyolcu, 2007)

#### ***İki yazarlı kaynak;***

(Sayiner ve Demirci, 2007, s. 72)

#### ***Üç, dört ve beş yazarlı kaynak;***

Metin içinde ilk kullanımda: (Ailen, Ciambune ve Welch 2000, s. 12–13) Metin içinde tekrarlayan kullanımlarda: (Ailen ve ark., 2000)

#### ***Altı ve daha çok yazarlı kaynak;***

(Çavdar ve ark., 2003)

### Kaynaklar Bölümünde Kaynak Gösterme

Kullanılan tüm kaynaklar metnin sonunda ayrı bir bölüm halinde yazar soyadlarına göre alfabetik olarak numaralandırılmadan verilmelidir.

**Kaynak yazımı ile ilgili örnekler aşağıda verilmiştir.**

### Kitap

#### ***a) Türkçe Kitap***

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8.bs). Ankara: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

**b) Türkçeye Çevrilmiş Kitap**

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* (A. Kotil, Çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

**c) Editörlü Kitap**

Ören, T., Üney, T. ve Çölkesen, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: Papatya Yayıncılık.

**d) Çok Yazarlı Türkçe Kitap**

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y. ve Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme*. Ankara: Total Bilişim.

**e) İngilizce Kitap**

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

**f) İngilizce Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm**

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

**g) Türkçe Kitap İçerisinde Bölüm**

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi. M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi kitabı* içinde (s. 233–263). Bursa: Dora Basım Yayın.

**h) Yayıncının ve Yazarın Kurum Olduğu Yayın**

Türk Standartları Enstitüsü. (1974). *Adlandırma ilkeleri*. Ankara: Yazar.

**Makale**

**a) Türkçe Makale**

Mutlu, B. ve Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Florence Nightingale Hemşirelik Dergisi*, 15(60), 179–182.

**b) İngilizce Makale**

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

**c) Yediden Fazla Yazarlı Makale**

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>

**d) DOI'si Olmayan Online Edinilmiş Makale**

Al, U. ve Doğan, G. (2012). Hacettepe Üniversitesi Bilgi ve Belge Yönetimi Bölümü tezlerinin atf analizi. *Türk Kütüphaneciliği*, 26, 349–369. Erişim adresi: <http://www.tk.org.tr/>

**e) DOI'si Olan Makale**

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

**f) Advance Online Olarak Yayımlanmış Makale**

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology*. Advance online publication. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

**g) Popüler Dergi Makalesi**

Semerçioğlu, C. (2015, Haziran). Sıradanlığın rayihası. *Sabit Fikir*, 52, 38–39.

**Tez, Sunum, Bildiri**

**a) Türkçe Tezler**

Sarı, E. (2008). *Kültür kimlik ve politika: Mardin’de kültürlerarasılık*. (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi). Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.

**b) Ticari Veritabanında Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans Ya da Doktora Tezi**

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (UMI No. 9943436)

**c) Kurumsal Veritabanında Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Yaylalı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the politicals, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from: Retrieved from <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

**d) Web’de Yer Alan İngilizce Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

**e) Dissertations Abstracts International’da Yer Alan Yüksek Lisans/Doktora Tezi**

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

**f) Sempozyum Katkısı**

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer’s disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at American Psychological Association meeting, Orlando, FL.

**g) Online Olarak Erişilen Konferans Bildiri Özeti**

Çınar, M., Doğan, D. ve Seferoğlu, S. S. (2015, Şubat). *Eğitimde dijital araçlar: Google sınıf uygulaması üzerine bir değerlendirme* [Öz]. Akademik Bilişim Konferansında sunulan bildiri, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir. Erişim adresi: [http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr /index.php?menu=5&submenu=27](http://ab2015.anadolu.edu.tr/index.php?menu=5&submenu=27)

**h) Düzenli Olarak Online Yayımlanan Bildiriler**

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593-12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

**i) Kitap Şeklinde Yayımlanan Bildiriler**

Schneider, R. (2013). Research data literacy. S. Kurbanoglu ve ark. (Ed.), *Communications in Computer and Information Science: Vol. 397. Worldwide Communalities and Challenges in Information Literacy Research and Practice* içinde (s. 134-140). Cham, İsviçre: Springer. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03919-0>

**j) Kongre Bildirisi**

Çepni, S., Bacanak A. ve Özsevgeç T. (2001, Haziran). *Fen bilgisi öğretmen adaylarının fen branşlarına karşı tutumları ile fen branşlarındaki başarılarının ilişkisi*. X. Ulusal Eğitim

Bilimleri Kongresi'nde sunulan bildiri, Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi, Bolu.

### **Diğer Kaynaklar**

#### **a) Gazete Yazısı**

Toker, Ç. (2015, 26 Haziran). 'Unutma' notları. *Cumhuriyet*, s. 13.

#### **b) Online Gazete Yazısı**

Tamer, M. (2015, 26 Haziran). E-ticaret hamle yapmak için tüketiciyi bekliyor. *Milliyet*. Erişim adresi: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr>

#### **c) Web Page/Blog Post**

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

#### **d) Online Ansiklopedi/Sözlük**

Bilgi mimarisi. (2014, 20 Aralık). Vikipedi içinde. Erişim adresi: [http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilgi\\_mimarisi](http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilgi_mimarisi)

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

#### **e) Podcast**

Radyo ODTÜ (Yapımcı). (2015, 13 Nisan). *Modern sabahlar* [Podcast]. Erişim adresi: <http://www.radyoodtu.com.tr/>

#### **f) Bir Televizyon Dizisinden Tek Bir Bölüm**

Shore, D. (Senarist), Jackson, M. (Senarist) ve Bookstaver, S. (Yönetmen). (2012). Runaways [Televizyon dizisi bölümü]. D. Shore (Baş yapımcı), *House M.D.* içinde. New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

#### **g) Müzik Kaydı**

Say, F. (2009). Galata Kulesi. *İstanbul senfonisi* [CD] içinde. İstanbul: Ak Müzik.

### SON KONTROL LİSTESİ

Aşağıdaki listede eksik olmadığından emin olun:

- Editöre mektup
  - ✓ Makalenin türü
  - ✓ Başka bir dergiye gönderilmemiş olduğu bilgisi
  - ✓ Sponsor veya ticari bir firma ile ilişkisi (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ İstatistik kontrolünün yapıldığı (araştırma makaleleri için)
  - ✓ İngilizce yönünden kontrolünün yapıldığı
  - ✓ Yazarlara Bilgide detaylı olarak anlatılan dergi politikalarının gözden geçirildiği
  - ✓ Kaynakların APA6'ya göre belirtildiği
- Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu
- Daha önce basılmış ve telifte bağlı materyal (yazı-resim-tablo) kullanılmış ise izin belgesi
- Kapak sayfası
  - ✓ Makalenin türü
  - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce başlığı
  - ✓ Yazarların ismi soyadı, unvanları ve bağlı oldukları kurumlar (üniversite ve fakülte bilgisinden sonra şehir ve ülke bilgisi de yer almalıdır), e-posta adresleri
  - ✓ Sorumlu yazarın e-posta adresi, açık yazışma adresi, iş telefonu, GSM, faks nosu
  - ✓ Tüm yazarların ORCID'leri
- Makale ana metni
  - ✓ Makalenin İngilizce başlığı
  - ✓ Öz: 180-200 kelime İngilizce
  - ✓ Anahtar Kelimeler: 3-5 adet İngilizce
  - ✓ Makale ana metin bölümleri
  - ✓ Finansal destek (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Çıkar çatışması (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Teşekkür (varsa belirtiniz)
  - ✓ Kaynaklar
  - ✓ Tablolar-Resimler, Şekiller (başlık, tanım ve alt yazılarıyla)



### AIM AND SCOPE

The Journal accepts and publishes both international and interdisciplinary articles on the fields of political sciences, public administration, international relations. The journal covers, but are not limited to, following topics:

- all subfields of political science, including political theory, political philosophy, political behavior, political institutions and political history,
- all subfields of public administration,
- all topics pertaining to international relations: including law, economics, ethics, strategy, philosophy, culture, environment, security, terrorism, regional studies, globalization and other topics

The Journal publishes theoretical, conceptual as well as research-based articles concerning various aspects of aforementioned disciplines in English language. Turkish manuscripts are published along with an extended abstract in English. Moreover, it publishes special issues on various themes in collaboration with co-editors from the international academic community.

### EDITORIAL POLICIES AND PEER REVIEW PROCESS

#### Publication Policy

The subjects covered in the manuscripts submitted to the Journal for publication must be in accordance with the aim and scope of the journal. The journal gives priority to original research papers submitted for publication.

#### General Principles

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by editor-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope.

Short presentations that took place in scientific meetings can be referred if indicated in the article. The editor hands over the papers matching the formal rules to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and gives green light for publication upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims. Changing the name of an author (omission, addition or order) in papers submitted to the Journal requires written permission of all declared authors. Refused manuscripts and graphics are not returned to the author.

#### Copyright Notice

Authors publishing with the journal retain the copyright to their work licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>) and grant the Publisher non-exclusive commercial right to publish the work. CC BY-NC 4.0 license permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

### **Open Access Statement**

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences is an open access journal which means that all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Except for commercial purposes, users are allowed to read, download, copy, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author.

The articles in Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences are open access articles licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en/>)

### **Article Processing Charge**

All expenses of the journal are covered by the Istanbul University. Processing and publication are free of charge with the journal. There is no article processing charges or submission fees for any submitted or accepted articles.

### **Peer Review Process**

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.

Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by Editor-in-Chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope. Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors and ensures a fair double-blind peer review of the selected manuscripts.

The selected manuscripts are sent to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and publication decision is given by Editor-in-Chief upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees' claims.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers' judgments must be objective. Reviewers' comments on the following aspects are expected while conducting the review.

- Does the manuscript contain new and significant information?
- Does the abstract clearly and accurately describe the content of the manuscript?
- Is the problem significant and concisely stated?
- Are the methods described comprehensively?
- Are the interpretations and conclusions justified by the results?
- Is adequate references made to other Works in the field?
- Is the language acceptable?

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this

is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees is important.

### **PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE STATEMENT**

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and pays regard to Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), the Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA), and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) on <https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing>

All parties involved in the publishing process (Editors, Reviewers, Authors and Publishers) are expected to agree on the following ethical principles.

All submissions must be original, unpublished (including as full text in conference proceedings), and not under the review of any other publication synchronously. Each manuscript is reviewed by one of the editors and at least two referees under double-blind peer review process. Plagiarism, duplication, fraud authorship/denied authorship, research/data fabrication, salami slicing/salami publication, breaching of copyrights, prevailing conflict of interest are unethical behaviors.

All manuscripts not in accordance with the accepted ethical standards will be removed from the publication. This also contains any possible malpractice discovered after the publication. In accordance with the code of conduct we will report any cases of suspected plagiarism or duplicate publishing.

### **Research Ethics**

The journal adheres to the highest standards in research ethics and follows the principles of international research ethics as defined below. The authors are responsible for the compliance of the manuscripts with the ethical rules.

- Principles of integrity, quality and transparency should be sustained in designing the research, reviewing the design and conducting the research.
- The research team and participants should be fully informed about the aim, methods, possible uses and requirements of the research and risks of participation in research.
- The confidentiality of the information provided by the research participants and the confidentiality of the respondents should be ensured. The research should be designed to protect the autonomy and dignity of the participants.
- Research participants should participate in the research voluntarily, not under any coercion.
- Any possible harm to participants must be avoided. The research should be planned in such a way that the participants are not at risk.
- The independence of research must be clear; and any conflict of interest or must be disclosed.
- In experimental studies with human subjects, written informed consent of the participants who decide to participate in the research must be obtained. In the case of children and those under wardship or with confirmed insanity, legal custodian's assent must be obtained.
- If the study is to be carried out in any institution or organization, approval must be obtained from this institution or organization.

- In studies with human subject, it must be noted in the method's section of the manuscript that the informed consent of the participants and ethics committee approval from the institution where the study has been conducted have been obtained.

### **Author Responsibilities**

It is authors' responsibility to ensure that the article is in accordance with scientific and ethical standards and rules. And authors must ensure that submitted work is original. They must certify that the manuscript has not previously been published elsewhere or is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere, in any language. Applicable copyright laws and conventions must be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) must be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement. Any work or words of other authors, contributors, or sources must be appropriately credited and referenced.

All the authors of a submitted manuscript must have direct scientific and academic contribution to the manuscript. The author(s) of the original research articles is defined as a person who is significantly involved in "conceptualization and design of the study", "collecting the data", "analyzing the data", "writing the manuscript", "reviewing the manuscript with a critical perspective" and "planning/conducting the study of the manuscript and/or revising it". Fund raising, data collection or supervision of the research group are not sufficient roles to be accepted as an author. The author(s) must meet all these criteria described above. The order of names in the author list of an article must be a co-decision and it must be indicated in the [Copyright Agreement Form](#). The individuals who do not meet the authorship criteria but contributed to the study must take place in the acknowledgement section. Individuals providing technical support, assisting writing, providing a general support, providing material or financial support are examples to be indicated in acknowledgement section.

All authors must disclose all issues concerning financial relationship, conflict of interest, and competing interest that may potentially influence the results of the research or scientific judgment. When an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published paper, it is the author's obligation to promptly cooperate with the Editor to provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.

### **Responsibility for the Editor and Reviewers**

Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors. He/She provides a fair double-blind peer review of the submitted articles for publication and ensures that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential before publishing.

Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the contents and overall quality of the publication. He/She must publish errata pages or make corrections when needed.

Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers. Only he has the full authority to assign a reviewer and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.

Reviewers must have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, the authors and/or the research funders. Their judgments must be objective.

Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author's side.

A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.

The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees must be ensured. In particular situations, the editor may share the review of one reviewer with other reviewers to clarify a particular point.

### **MANUSCRIPT ORGANIZATION**

#### **Language**

Articles in English is published.

#### **Manuscript Organization and Format**

All correspondence will be sent to the first-named author unless otherwise specified. Manuscript is to be submitted online via <http://jps.istanbul.edu.tr/en/> and it must be accompanied by a cover letter indicating that the manuscript is intended for publication, specifying the article category (i.e. research article, review etc.) and including information about the manuscript (see the Submission Checklist). Manuscripts should be prepared in Microsoft Word 2003 and upper versions. In addition, [Copyright Agreement Form](#) that has to be signed by all authors must be submitted.

1. The manuscripts should be in A4 paper standards: having 2.5 cm margins from right, left, bottom and top, Times New Roman font style in 12 font size, line spacing of 1.5 and “justify align” format. For indented paragraph, tab key should be used. One line spacing should be used for the tables and figures, which are included in the text.
2. The title of the text should be centered on the page, in lower-case letter, bold, Times New Roman font and 14 font size.
3. Information about the author is to be written on the left part of the page skipping one line space after the title, and it should be in Times New Roman font, 10 font size, with one line spacing. After indicating the name of the author in lower-case letter and surname in capital letter, the title, affiliation, and e-mail address should be included.
4. Before the introduction part, there should be an abstract of 180-200 words both in the language of the article and in English. An extended abstract in English between 600-800 words, summarizing the scope, the purpose, the results of the study and the methodology used is to be included following the abstracts. If the manuscript is in English, extended abstract is not required. Underneath the abstracts, 5 keywords that inform the reader about the content of the study should be specified in the language of the article and in English.
5. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords; extended abstract (If the manuscript is in English, extended abstract is not required), sections, footnotes and references.
6. Tables, graphs and figures can be given with a number and a defining title if and only if it is necessary to follow the idea of the article. Otherwise features like demographic characteristics can be given within the text.
7. A title page including author information must be submitted together with the manuscript. The title page is to include fully descriptive title of the manuscript and, affiliation, title, e-mail address, ORCID, postal address, phone and fax number of the author(s) (see The Submission Checklist).
8. The rights of the manuscripts submitted to our journal for publication, belongs to the

author(s).

9. The author(s) can be asked to make some changes in their articles due to peer reviews.
10. The studies that were sent to the journal will not be returned whether they are published or not.

### REFERENCES

Although references to review articles can be an efficient way to guide readers to a body of literature, review articles do not always reflect original work accurately. Readers should therefore be provided with direct references to original research sources whenever possible. On the other hand, extensive lists of references to original work on a topic can use excessive space on the printed page. Small numbers of references to key original papers often serve as well as more exhaustive lists, particularly since references can now be added to the electronic version of published papers, and since electronic literature searching allows readers to retrieve published literature efficiently. Papers accepted but not yet included in the issue are published online in the Early View section and they should be cited as “advance online publication”. Citing a “personal communication” should be avoided unless it provides essential information not available from a public source, in which case the name of the person and date of communication should be cited in parentheses in the text. For scientific articles, written permission and confirmation of accuracy from the source of a personal communication must be obtained.

### Reference Style and Format

Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences complies with APA (American Psychological Association) style 6<sup>th</sup> Edition for referencing and quoting. For more information:

- American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: APA.
- <http://www.apastyle.org>

### Citations in the Text

Citations must be indicated with the author surname and publication year within the parenthesis. If more than one citation is made within the same parenthesis, separate them with (;).

### Samples:

#### ***More than one citation;***

(Esin, et al., 2002; Karasar, 1995)

#### ***Citation with one author;***

(Akyolcu, 2007)

#### ***Citation with two authors;***

(Saymer & Demirci, 2007)

#### ***Citation with three, four, five authors;***

First citation in the text: (Ailen, Ciambrune, & Welch, 2000) Subsequent citations in the text:  
(Ailen, et al., 2000)

#### ***Citations with more than six authors;***

(Çavdar, et al., 2003)

### Citations in the Reference

All the citations done in the text should be listed in the References section in alphabetical order

of author surname without numbering. Below given examples should be considered in citing the references.

### Basic Reference Types

#### Book

##### a) Turkish Book

Karasar, N. (1995). *Araştırmalarda rapor hazırlama* (8<sup>th</sup> ed.) [Preparing research reports]. Ankara, Turkey: 3A Eğitim Danışmanlık Ltd.

##### b) Book Translated into Turkish

Mucchielli, A. (1991). *Zihniyetler* [Mindsets] (A. Kotil, Trans.). İstanbul, Turkey: İletişim Yayınları.

##### c) Edited Book

Ören, T., Üney, T., & Çölkesen, R. (Eds.). (2006). *Türkiye bilişim ansiklopedisi* [Turkish Encyclopedia of Informatics]. İstanbul, Turkey: Papatya Yayıncılık.

##### d) Turkish Book with Multiple Authors

Tonta, Y., Bitirim, Y., & Sever, H. (2002). *Türkçe arama motorlarında performans değerlendirme* [Performance evaluation in Turkish search engines]. Ankara, Turkey: Total Bilişim.

##### e) Book in English

Kamien R., & Kamien A. (2014). *Music: An appreciation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

##### f) Chapter in an Edited Book

Bassett, C. (2006). Cultural studies and new media. In G. Hall & C. Birchall (Eds.), *New cultural studies: Adventures in theory* (pp. 220–237). Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.

##### g) Chapter in an Edited Book in Turkish

Erkmen, T. (2012). Örgüt kültürü: Fonksiyonları, öğeleri, işletme yönetimi ve liderlikteki önemi [Organization culture: Its functions, elements and importance in leadership and business management]. In M. Zencirkıran (Ed.), *Örgüt sosyolojisi* [Organization sociology] (pp. 233–263). Bursa, Turkey: Dora Basım Yayın.

##### h) Book with the same organization as author and publisher

American Psychological Association. (2009). *Publication manual of the American psychological association* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

#### Article

##### a) Turkish Article

Mutlu, B., & Savaşer, S. (2007). Çocuğu ameliyat sonrası yoğun bakımda olan ebeveynlerde stres nedenleri ve azaltma girişimleri [Source and intervention reduction of stress for parents whose children are in intensive care unit after surgery]. *Istanbul University Florence Nightingale Journal of Nursing*, 15(60), 179–182.

##### b) English Article

de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identity. *Discourse and Society*, 10(2), 149–173. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926599010002002>

##### c) Journal Article with DOI and More Than Seven Authors

Lal, H., Cunningham, A. L., Godeaux, O., Chlibek, R., Diez-Domingo, J., Hwang, S.-J. ... Heineman, T. C. (2015). Efficacy of an adjuvanted herpes zoster subunit vaccine in older adults. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 372, 2087–2096. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1501184>



**d) Journal Article from Web, without DOI**

Sidani, S. (2003). Enhancing the evaluation of nursing care effectiveness. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 35(3), 26–38. Retrieved from <http://cjr.mcgill.ca>

**e) Journal Article with DOI**

Turner, S. J. (2010). Website statistics 2.0: Using Google Analytics to measure library website effectiveness. *Technical Services Quarterly*, 27, 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07317131003765910>

**f) Advance Online Publication**

Smith, J. A. (2010). Citing advance online publication: A review. *Journal of Psychology: Advance online publication*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a45d7867>

**g) Article in a Magazine**

Henry, W. A., III. (1990, April 9). Making the grade in today's schools. *Time*, 135, 28–31.

**Doctoral Dissertation, Master's Thesis, Presentation, Proceeding**

**a) Dissertation/Thesis from a Commercial Database**

Van Brunt, D. (1997). *Networked consumer health information systems* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9943436)

**b) Dissertation/Thesis from an Institutional Database**

Yaylılı-Yıldız, B. (2014). *University campuses as places of potential publicness: Exploring the political, social and cultural practices in Ege University* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Retrieved from: <http://library.iyte.edu.tr/tr/hizli-erisim/iyte-tez-portali>

**c) Dissertation/Thesis from Web**

Tonta, Y. A. (1992). *An analysis of search failures in online library catalogs* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from <http://yunus.hacettepe.edu.tr/~tonta/yayinlar/phd/ickapak.html>

**d) Dissertation/Thesis abstracted in Dissertations Abstracts International**

Appelbaum, L. G. (2005). Three studies of human information processing: Texture amplification, motion representation, and figure-ground segregation. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineering*, 65(10), 5428.

**e) Symposium Contribution**

Krinsky-McHale, S. J., Zigman, W. B., & Silverman, W. (2012, August). Are neuropsychiatric symptoms markers of prodromal Alzheimer's disease in adults with Down syndrome? In W. B. Zigman (Chair), *Predictors of mild cognitive impairment, dementia, and mortality in adults with Down syndrome*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**f) Conference Paper Abstract Retrieved Online**

Liu, S. (2005, May). *Defending against business crises with the help of intelligent agent based early warning solutions*. Paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, Miami, FL. Abstract retrieved from [http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts\\_2005.htm](http://www.iceis.org/iceis2005/abstracts_2005.htm)

**g) Conference Paper - In Regularly Published Proceedings and Retrieved Online**

Herculano-Houzel, S., Collins, C. E., Wong, P., Kaas, J. H., & Lent, R. (2008). The basic nonuniformity of the cerebral cortex. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 105, 12593–12598. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805417105>

**h) Proceeding in Book Form**

Parsons, O. A., Pryzwansky, W. B., Weinstein, D. J., & Wiens, A. N. (1995). Taxonomy for psychology. In J. N. Reich, H. Sands, & A. N. Wiens (Eds.), *Education and training beyond the doctoral degree: Proceedings of the American Psychological Association National Conference on Postdoctoral Education and Training in Psychology* (pp. 45–50). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

**i) Paper Presentation**

Nguyen, C. A. (2012, August). *Humor and deception in advertising: When laughter may not be the best medicine*. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Orlando, FL.

**Other Sources**

**a) Newspaper Article**

Browne, R. (2010, March 21). This brainless patient is no dummy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 45.

**b) Newspaper Article with no Author**

New drug appears to sharply cut risk of death from heart failure. (1993, July 15). *The Washington Post*, p. A12.

**c) Web Page/Blog Post**

Bordwell, D. (2013, June 18). David Koepp: Making the world movie-sized [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/page/27/>

**d) Online Encyclopedia/Dictionary**

Ignition. (1989). In *Oxford English online dictionary* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Retrieved from <http://dictionary.oed.com>

Marcoux, A. (2008). Business ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/>

**e) Podcast**

Dunning, B. (Producer). (2011, January 12). *in Fact: Conspiracy theories* [Video podcast]. Retrieved from <http://itunes.apple.com/>

**f) Single Episode in a Television Series**

Egan, D. (Writer), & Alexander, J. (Director). (2005). Failure to communicate. [Television series episode]. In D. Shore (Executive producer), *House*; New York, NY: Fox Broadcasting.

**g) Music**

Fuchs, G. (2004). Light the menorah. On *Eight nights of Hanukkah* [CD]. Brick, NJ: Kid Kosher.

### SUBMISSION CHECKLIST

Ensure that the following items are present:

- Cover letter to the editor
  - ✓ The category of the manuscript
  - ✓ Confirming that “the paper is not under consideration for publication in another journal”.
  - ✓ Including disclosure of any commercial or financial involvement.
  - ✓ Confirming that the statistical design of the research article is reviewed.
  - ✓ Confirming that last control for fluent English was done.
  - ✓ Confirming that journal policies detailed in Information for Authors have been reviewed.
  - ✓ Confirming that the references cited in the text and listed in the references section are in line with APA 6.
- Copyright Agreement Form
- Permission of previously published copyrighted material if used in the present manuscript
- Title page
  - ✓ The category of the manuscript
  - ✓ The title of the manuscript
  - ✓ All authors’ names and affiliations (institution, faculty/department, city, country), e-mail addresses
  - ✓ Corresponding author’s email address, full postal address, telephone and fax number
  - ✓ ORCIDs of all authors.
- Main Manuscript Document
  - ✓ The title of the manuscript
  - ✓ Abstract (180-200 words)
  - ✓ Key words: 3 to 5 words
  - ✓ Main article sections
  - ✓ Grant support (if exists)
  - ✓ Conflict of interest (if exists)
  - ✓ Acknowledgement (if exists)
  - ✓ References
  - ✓ All tables, illustrations (figures) (including title, description, footnotes)

## COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT FORM / TELİF HAKKI ANLAŞMASI FORMU



Istanbul University  
İstanbul Üniversitesi

Journal name: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences  
Dergi Adı: SİYASAL: Journal of Political Sciences

Copyright Agreement Form  
Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar</i>	
<b>Title of Manuscript</b> <i>Makalenin Başlığı</i>	
<b>Acceptance date</b> <i>Kabul Tarihi</i>	
<b>List of authors</b> <i>Yazarların Listesi</i>	

Sıra No	Name - Surname <i>Adı-Soyadı</i>	E-mail <i>E-Posta</i>	Signature <i>İmza</i>	Date <i>Tarih</i>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

<b>Manuscript Type (Research Article, Review, etc.)</b> <i>Makalenin türü (Araştırma makalesi, Derleme, v.b.)</i>	
--	--

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author:</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar:</i>	
---	--

<b>University/company/institution</b>	<i>Çalıştığı kurum</i>	
<b>Address</b>	<i>Posta adresi</i>	
<b>E-mail</b>	<i>E-posta</i>	
<b>Phone; mobile phone</b>	<i>Telefon no; GSM no</i>	

**The author(s) agrees that:**  
The manuscript submitted is his/her/their own original work, and has not been plagiarized from any prior work, all authors participated in the work in a substantive way, and are prepared to take public responsibility for the work, all authors have seen and approved the manuscript as submitted, the manuscript has not been published and is not being submitted or considered for publication elsewhere, the text, illustrations, and any other materials included in the manuscript do not infringe upon any existing copyright or other rights of anyone. İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY will publish the content under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license that gives permission to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format other than commercial purposes as well as remix, transform and build upon the material by providing appropriate credit to the original work.  
The Contributor(s) or, if applicable the Contributor's Employer, retain(s) all proprietary rights in addition to copyright, patent rights.  
I/We indemnify İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY and the Editors of the Journals, and hold them harmless from any loss, expense or damage occasioned by a claim or suit by a third party for copyright infringement, or any suit arising out of any breach of the foregoing warranties as a result of publication of my/our article. I/We also warrant that the article contains no libelous or unlawful statements, and does not contain material or instructions that might cause harm or injury.  
This Copyright Agreement Form must be signed/ratified by all authors. Separate copies of the form (completed in full) may be submitted by authors located at different institutions; however, all signatures must be original and authenticated.

**Yazar(lar) aşağıdaki hususları kabul eder**  
Sunulan makalenin yazar(lar)ın orijinal çalışması olduğunu ve intihal yapmadıklarını, Tüm yazarların bu çalışmaya asıl olarak katılmış olduklarını ve bu çalışma için her türlü sorumluluğu aldıklarını, Tüm yazarların sunulan makalenin son halini gördüklerini ve onayladıklarını, Makalenin başka bir yerde basılmadığını veya basılmak için sunulmadığını, Makalede bulunan metnin, şekillerin ve dokümanların diğer şahıslara ait olan Telif Haklarını ihlal etmediğini kabul ve taahhüt ederler. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ'nin bu fikri eseri, Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı ile yayınlamasına izin verirler. Creative Commons Atıf-Gayri Ticari 4.0 Uluslararası (CC BY-NC 4.0) lisansı, eserin ticari kullanımı dışında her boyut ve formatta paylaşılmasına, kopyalanmasına, çoğaltılmasına ve orijinal esere uygun şekilde atıfta bulunmak kaydıyla yeniden düzenleme, dönüştürme ve eserin üzerine inşa etme dâhil adapte edilmesine izin verir.  
Yazar(lar)ın veya varsa yazar(lar)ın işverenin telif dâhil patent hakları, fikri mülkiyet hakları saklıdır.  
Ben/Biz, telif hakkı ihlali nedeniyle üçüncü şahıslarca vuku bulacak davalarda İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ ve Dergi Editörlerinin hiçbir sorumluluğunun olmadığını, tüm sorumluluğun yazarlara ait olduğunu taahhüt ederim/ederiz.  
Ayrıca Ben/Biz makalede hiçbir suç unsuru veya kanuna aykırı ifade bulunmadığını, araştırma yapıırken kanuna aykırı herhangi bir malzeme ve yöntem kullanılmadığını taahhüt ederim/ederiz.  
Bu Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu tüm yazarlar tarafından imzalanmalıdır/onaylanmalıdır. Form farklı kurumlarda bulunan yazarlar tarafından ayrı kopyalar halinde doldurulacak sunulabilir. Ancak, tüm imzaların orijinal veya kamitlanabilir şekilde onaylı olması gerekir.

<b>Responsible/Corresponding Author;</b> <i>Sorumlu Yazar;</i>	<b>Signature / İmza</b>	<b>Date / Tarih</b>
		...../...../.....

