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Editorial

We are happy to share the fourth volume with our readers. In this issue, we have seven articles for consideration in the academic world. The first article of this issue is titled "The Positivity of Peace Intra- and Inter-State: Strategizing the Balance of Peace-State in Multi-Level Conflict Management Approach" by Mariam Ariba. The article is quite remarkable both in terms of its subject and method. In this article, the author develops two hyper game models for both intrastate and interstate conflicts in a coherent conflict management approach using the hyper game model. The study aims to apply the theories of international relations and media spaces, to create a unified diplomatic-strategic approach to achieving peace rather than internal and international war. In this respect, we think that the article will attract attention and provide ideas for similar studies.

The second article is about Kosovo. In this article, authors Hasan Acar and Serhat Bulut discuss the difficulties Kosovo faced in terms of integration with the international community and membership in international organizations. In this context, this study hypothesizes that despite being diplomatically recognized by many states, Kosovo's relations with international organizations and the entire international community remain weak. For this purpose, this article includes speculative ideas and information about Kosovo's relations with the regional states and the international community by critically examining and discussing in shed light of current developments.

The third article brings a very interesting subject to the attention of the academic world from a different aspect. According to Neba Ridley NGWA Although the literature reveals that drug use can pose a multitude of health risks, it fails to show the extent to which such cases may pose a threat to national and regional security. Therefore, in this study, the author sheds light on the extent to which drug use poses an existential threat to national security, focusing on Tramadol use ranging from terrorist organizations to youth in Nigeria and Cameroon.

Tramadol is considered an analgesic pill that treats severe to moderate pain. But the result of the analysis in this research reveals how prevalent Tramadol is among terrorist and organized crime groups in Nigeria and is a driver of youth violence and rising crime rates in Cameroon's cities of Douala and Yaounde.

The fourth article of this issue is the common work of Hakan Ömer Tunca and Arif Ferah, which deals with "Preventive Operations against Terrorists beyond Turkey's southern borders".

The authors draw attention to the fact that Turkey has a position open to risks and threats as well as its advantages due to its geostrategic location. In this context, they stress the importance of border security besides of humanitarian, social, economic, health, and educational difficulties of many immigrants from Turkey's southern neighbors after the Arab Spring. So, this research shed light on Turkey's cross-border operations and its physical measures on the southern border.

In the fifth article of this issue, the allegations of terrorist financing against Pakistan and the security problems arising from the weaknesses of the central government in Pakistan are examined. According to the allegations made in this article by Debasish NANDY, terrorist groups in Pakistan not only run parallel economies thanks to state support but also control the country's uncontrolled economy. In this context, terrorist organizations also carry out black money transactions through various channels. In addition, violent acts by terrorist groups have resulted in thousands of casualties and damage to property and infrastructure. For this reason, international organizations have accused Pakistan several times and put it on the 'grey list' for losing the relative autonomy of the state authority in controlling terrorist organizations. Therefore, this article focuses on the reasons for Pakistan's economic backwardness in the context of security problems and terrorist organizations.

The sixth article is about cybersecurity and is titled "New Cybersecurity Threats: India's Concerns and Options" by Alik NAHA.

The author takes attention to the fact that cyber power has become an important component of national power, along with traditional aspects such as economic resources and political will.

In this context, the article claims that cyber terrorism has emerged as a new phenomenon in India and that investigations into terrorist attacks reveal traces of cyber terrorism.

So, for this reason, this article focuses on how cyber power capacity building can be used as a tool of Indian foreign policy by leveraging the experience and human resources in the region, as well as strengthening local and global cyber cooperation.

The last article of this issue is about Israel Security Organisation. The authors analyze the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War and reach the result that the Yom Kippur War was considered an intelligence failure by Israelis, and the main reason for the transformation was the motivation to eliminate social trauma and failure. This research is remarkable because of the finding that the transformation in Israeli military institutions took place in a hybrid manner, both top-down and bottom-up, and important because claiming that some intelligence failure causes transformation as a driving force.

After all, we are proud to present interesting and valuable articles to the attention of readers and the scientific world. With this issue, we have reiterated our belief that IJPS to contribute literature meticulously. And IJPS will continue to guide further studies by including the works of valuable academicians.

We hope to meet with new articles in the next issue.

Editor-in-Chief

Editörden,

Dördüncü cildi okuyucularımızla paylaşmaktan mutluluk duyuyoruz. Bu sayımızda akademik dünyanın dikkatine sunduğumuz yedi makalemiz var. Bu sayının ilk makalesi Mariam Ariba'nın "Devlet İçi ve Devletler Arası Barışın Olumluluğu: Çok Düzeyli Çatışma Yönetimi Yaklaşımında Barış-Devlet Dengesini Stratejikleştirmek" başlığını taşıyor.

Makale hem konusu hem de yöntemi açısından oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Bu makalede yazar, hiper oyun modelini kullanarak tutarlı bir çatışma yönetimi yaklaşımında hem eyalet içi hem de eyaletler arası çatışmalar için iki hiper oyun modeli geliştirmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı, uluslararası ilişkiler ve medya alanları teorilerini uygulamak, iç ve uluslararası savaştan ziyade barışı sağlamaya yönelik birleşik bir diplomatik-stratejik yaklaşım oluşturmaktır. Bu açıdan makalenin ilgi çekeceğini ve benzer çalışmalara fikir vereceğini düşünüyoruz.

İkinci makalemiz Kosova ile ilgili. Bu makalede yazarlar Hasan Acar ve Serhat Bulut, Kosova'nın uluslararası toplumla entegrasyon ve uluslararası örgütlere üyelik açısından karşılaştığı zorlukları tartışıyorlar. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmanın hipotezi, birçok devlet tarafından diplomatik olarak tanınmasına rağmen, Kosova'nın uluslararası kuruluşlar ve tüm uluslararası toplumla ilişkilerinin hala zayıf olduğudur. Bu amaçla, bu makale Kosova'nın bölge devletleri ve uluslararası toplumla ilişkileri hakkında güncel gelişmeler ışığında eleştirel bir inceleme ve tartışma yaparak spekülasyon fikir ve bilgileri içermektedir.

Üçüncü makale ise çok ilginç bir konuyu farklı bir açıdan akademik dünyanın dikkatine sunuyor. Neba Ridley NGWA'ya göre, literatür uyuşturucu kullanımının çok sayıda sağlık riski oluşturabileceğini ortaya koysa da, bu tür vakaların ulusal ve bölgesel güvenliğe ne ölçüde tehdit oluşturabileceğini gösterememektedir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada yazar, Nijerya ve Kamerun'da terör örgütlerinden gençlere uzanan Tramadol kullanımına odaklanarak uyuşturucu kullanımının ulusal güvenliğe ne ölçüde varoluşsal bir tehdit oluşturduğuna ışık tutmaktadır.

Tramadol, şiddetli ila orta derecede ağrıyı tedavi eden bir analjezik hap olarak kabul edilir. Ancak bu araştırmadaki analizin sonucu, Tramadol'un Nijerya'daki terörist ve organize suç grupları arasında ne kadar yaygın olduğunu ve Kamerun'un Douala ve Yaounde kentlerinde genç şiddetinin ve artan suç oranlarının itici gücü olduğunu ortaya koyuyor.

Bu sayının dördüncü makalesi, Hakan Ömer Tunca ve Arif Ferah'ın Türkiye'nin güney sınırlarının ötesindeki Teröristlere Karşı Önleyici Operasyonları konu alan ortak çalışmasıdır.

Yazarlar, Türkiye'nin jeostratejik konumu nedeniyle avantajlarının yanı sıra risk ve tehditlere açık bir konuma sahip olduğuna dikkat çekiyor. Bu bağlamda Arap Baharı sonrası Türkiye'nin güney komşularından gelen birçok göçmenin insani, sosyal, ekonomik, sağlık ve eğitim güçlüklerinin yanı sıra sınır güvenliğinin önemini vurgulamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla bu araştırma, Türkiye'nin sınır ötesi operasyonlarına ve güney sınırındaki fiziki önlemlerine ışık tutmaktadır.

Bu sayının beşinci makalesinde Pakistan'a yönelik terörün finansmanı iddiaları ve Pakistan'da merkezi hükümetin zafiyetlerinden kaynaklanan güvenlik sorunları incelenmiştir. Debasish NANDY'nin bu haberinde ortaya atılan iddialara göre Pakistan'daki terör grupları devlet desteğiyle paralel ekonomiler yürütmekle kalmıyor, ülkenin kontrolsüz ekonomisini de kontrol ediyor. Bu kapsamda terör örgütleri de çeşitli kanallardan kara para işlemleri gerçekleştirmektedir. Ayrıca, terörist grupların şiddet eylemleri binlerce can kaybına ve mülk ve altyapıya zarar verdi. Bu nedenle uluslararası kuruluşlar Pakistan'ı birkaç kez suçlamış ve devlet otoritesinin terör örgütlerini kontrol etmedeki görece zayıflığını kaybetmekle 'gri listeye' koymuşlardır. Bu nedenle, bu makale güvenlik sorunları ve terör örgütleri bağlamında Pakistan'ın ekonomik geri kalmışlığının nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır.

Altıncı makale siber güvenlik hakkındadır ve Alik NAHA tarafından yazılan "Yeni Siber Güvenlik Tehditleri: Hindistan'ın Endişeleri ve Seçenekleri" başlığını taşımaktadır. Yazar, ekonomik kaynaklar ve siyasi irade gibi geleneksel unsurlarla birlikte siber gücün ulusal gücün önemli bir bileşeni haline geldiğine dikkat çekmektedir. Bu bağlamda makale, siber terörizmin Hindistan'da yeni bir fenomen olarak ortaya çıktığını ve terör saldırılarına ilişkin soruşturmanın siber terörizmin izlerini ortaya çıkardığını iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu makale, bölgedeki deneyim ve insan kaynaklarından yararlanarak ve yerel ve küresel siber işbirliğini güçlendirerek siber güç kapasitesinin Hindistan dış politikasının bir aracı olarak nasıl kullanılabileceğine odaklanmaktadır.

Bu sayının son yazısı İsrail Güvenlik Teşkilatı ile ilgili. Yazarlar, Yom Kippur Savaşı'ndan sonra İsrail güvenlik örgütlerinin dönüşümünü analiz ederek, Yom Kippur Savaşı'nın İsraililer tarafından bir istihbarat başarısızlığı olarak görüldüğü ve dönüşümün temel nedeninin toplumsal travmayı ve başarısızlığı ortadan kaldırma motivasyonu olduğu sonucuna varıyor. Bu araştırma, İsrail askeri kurumlarındaki dönüşümün hem yukarıdan aşağıya hem de aşağıdan yukarıya hibrit bir şekilde gerçekleştiğini tespit etmesi ve bazı istihbarat başarısızlıklarının dönüşüme itici bir güç olarak neden olduğunu iddia etmesi nedeniyle önemlidir.

Sonuçta, birbirinden ilginç ve değerli makaleleri okuyucuların ve bilim dünyasının dikkatine sunmaktan gurur duyuyoruz. Bu sayı ile IJPS'nin literatüre titizlikle katkıda bulunacağına olan inancımızı yinelemiş olduk. IJPS de değerli akademisyenlerin eserlerine yer vererek bundan sonraki çalışmalara rehberlik etmeye devam edecektir.

Bir sonraki sayıda yeni makalelerle buluşmak dileğiyle.

Baş Editör



The Positivity of Peace Intra-and Inter-State: Strategizing the Balance of Peace-State in Multi-Level Conflict Management Approach

Mariam Ariba *

Abstract

This study develops two hypergame-models of intra-and inter-state conflicts within one coherent conflict management approach, modeling conflicts while considering the complexity of real-world circumstances. The aim is to apply theories of IR and media fields, composing a merged diplomatic-strategic approach for achieving peace rather than war within and inter-nations. Using the hypergame theory as a theoretical-methodological basis for modeling, we stand firmly at some equilibria positions, specifying the modality of achieving positive peace as a “win-win” formula nationally, regionally, and globally, thence strategizing a balance of peace-state of intra-and-inter-state conflicts. It can be argued that this study’s (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model) ’s fundamental equilibrium is equivalently equal to the dual formula of (Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War’s Inevitability) as proved strategically, applicably through our provided equations.

Keywords: *Hypergame Theory, Post-structuralism, Culture Industry, Constructivism, Nash Equilibrium*

Devlet İçi ve Devletler Arası Barışın Olumluluğu: Çok Düzeyli Çatışma Yönetimi Yaklaşımında Barış-Devlet Dengesini Stratejikleştirmek

Özet

Bu çalışmada devlet-içi ve devletler-arası çatışmaların analizinde tutarlı bir çatışma yönetimi yaklaşımı elde etmek için, gerçek yaşamda koşulların karmaşıklığı da göz önünde bulundurularak iki hypergame modeli geliştirilmiştir. Amaç ulus-içi ve uluslar-arasında, savaş yerine barışı sağlamak için Uluslararası İlişkiler ve medya alanındaki teorileri kullanarak bileşik bir diplomatik-stratejik yaklaşım geliştirmektir. Bu amaca yönelik olarak çalışmada, ulusal-bölgesel ve küresel planda devlet-içi ve devletler-arasında çatışmalarda kazan-kazan formülüne dayalı dengeli, pozitif barışa ulaştıracak bir modelleme elde etmek amacıyla teorik-metodolojik bir temel olarak hypergame teorisi kullanılmıştır. Makalede yer alan denklemlerle, çalışmanın stratejik olarak uygulanabilir olduğu ve çalışmanın temel dengesinin (Pozitif Barış İçin Hypergame Oyun Modelinin), (Barışın Küresel Hegemonyasına Karşı Savaşın Gerçekçi Hegemonyasının Kaçınılmazlığı) ikili formülüne eş değer olduğu ortaya konulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Hiper Oyun Teorisi, Post-Yapısalcılık, Kültür Endüstrisi, İnşacılık, Nash Dengesi.*

1. Introduction and Hypergame Theory

Hypergame theory, which we use as a theoretical-methodological foundation of our built models, represents comprehensively an advanced development of the precedent game theory applied to a more complicated international arena. Game theory is considered a science

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of modeling the strategic behavior of decision-makers interacting with one another, which has been used as a methodological tool for analyzing the actors' interactions in the international relations (IR) discipline for more than 50 years. Applications, extensions, modifications, and illustrations of game-theoretic models began to appear in the security studies literature shortly after publishing John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* in 1944 by Princeton University Press¹. It has been distinguished between four waves of the game theory emerging in IR over the past years before becoming an indispensable theoretical method in modeling interactive decision-making in this discipline. For Zagare and Slantchev (2021)², these four waves are a) the first generation, which was developed during the Cold War represented in the zero-sum games³; b) the second wave was that of reaching the so-called Nash Equilibrium⁴; while c) the dynamic games described in extensive form⁵, and those of incomplete information⁶ were the significant characteristics of the third wave, besides introducing refinements of Nash Equilibrium; and ultimately, d) the game theory emerged as a major theoretical method in IR during the fourth wave.

After over three decades of building the game theory foundation, the *hypergame theory* term appeared in the 1970s, explaining a situation in which players in a game may have different views of the conflict so that perceiving a game model in a differentiated way from one another in accordance with each player's own perceptions, beliefs, and interpretation of reality. This advance suggested that the second (i.e., hypergame) became an extension to the first, game

¹ Frank. C. Zagare, *Game Theory, Diplomatic History, and Security Studies* (United Kingdom and New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 44-53.

² Frank. C. Zagare and Branislav L. Slantchev, "Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias* (International Studies Association and Oxford University Press), (2021): 1-38. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.401>.

³ In zero-sum games, there are either winners or losers in the game. A player wins at the expense of the other where there is no domain of cooperation by signing an agreement or contract between players in such games.

⁴ Nash Equilibrium is the most *optimal* point reached in a non-cooperative game when all players use their strategies simultaneously, achieving the *best response* made by each to the other's strategy choice with the highest (and stable) payoffs obtained by both at the end of this game. Under this position, no one may have the incentive to deviate. Therefore, this equilibrium does not depend on each player(s)'s own rationality only but on that of the other player(s) as well.

⁵ The dynamic game is a condition wherein each player observes the other(s)'s moves, conditioning their future actions on what the other(s) chose first. While the extensive form of game theory best resembles a (decision) tree composed of branches and nodes. The game starts from the first branch's node by player A, for example, making the first move. Then, from the player B branch's node, the second move is made sequentially. This game lasts until reaching the tree's last branch's node, ending the play with payoffs gained by all players, or starting a sub-game.

⁶ In *incomplete* information games, no player exactly knows what the other player(s)'s set of actions or strategic preferences are, the future choices of this/these player(s), or/and the expected payoffs at the end of the game. This game is thus played under a (high, mid, or less) level of *uncertainty*.



theory. Given that the game-theoretic model is being built upon one situation (in real-life circumstances or a predicted one) through playing only one game, the “hypergame theory decomposes a single situation into multiple games... allowing for an unbalanced game model that contains a different view, representing the differences in each player’s information, beliefs, and understating of the game”⁷. So, the hypergame model does not address a specific set of strategic preferences unchangeably and correctly perceived, completely or incompletely, by other players along with a coherently single-situation game _ the case of game-theoretic models. Instead, different views of either perception/misperception or deception held by each player in the hypergame model allow for multiple games to occur, with various strategic preference vectors perceived differently by a player about his opponent(s) in the game _ where the in-correction and faulty about estimating the opponent(s)’s preferences could exist. In sum, those multiple games emerge because of existing *unlike* perceptions for every player about reality _which may be true or not, as well as different understandings and interpretations of the game itself.

Ultimately, the player in the hypergame does not depend only on his own perceptions of the game _ that may be misperceptions or an effect of intentional deception by the opponent, in calculating the outcome but on his belief of how the opponent perceives this game as well, since the hypergame model may contain multiple games according to each player’s perceived (hyper)game. So, “the standard rationality arguments from game theory are replaced (in the hypergame models) by knowledge of how the opponent will reason”⁸. Moreover, a player can raise his utility relying on having unknown information to the other player(s) due to the misperception or intentional deception practiced by his own. Here, the “accuracy of the perceived games depends on available information... (nevertheless) the hypergame model more accurately provides solutions for complex theoretic modeling of conflicts than those modeled by game theory and excels where perception or information differences exist between players”⁹.

⁷ Nicholas S. Kovach, Alan S. Gibson and Gary B. Lamont, “Hypergame Theory: A Model for Conflict, Misperception, and Deception,” *Game Theory* 2015, no. 1 (2015): 4.

⁸ *Ibid*, 5.

⁹ *Ibid*, 1-6.



2. Methodology of Research

a. The study aim: The key objective of this study is to employ developed models of the applied hypergame theory for the conflict settlement or/and resolution purpose within and between nations where complex world circumstances exist. Thence, under conditions of *uncertainty* regarding how the opponent reasons and how it perceives the game or the reality of conflict, we introduce two hypergame-models, describing the deception games in the first place and the misperception ones secondly. Therefore, this work contributes to bringing global, regional, and national security and peace into its proper status inter-nations and within them.

b. The built models: Based on using hypergame theory as a methodology, we present a multi-level conflict management approach's first model: the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model "PPHGM"), which is composed of strategic interactions occurring on regional, national, and global levels, first, reflecting the first entire hypergame of the model or $(HG)_1$. Then, the (PPHGM) addresses other strategic interactions on global, regional, and national levels, consecutively, representing its second entire hypergame or $(HG)_2$. That approach's second model, the (Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model "BPSHM"), comes after, including two entire hypergames: the first or $(HG)_1$ resembles the case of intra-state conflicts, whereas the second or $(HG)_2$ simulates another of conflicts inter-state.

c. Hypotheses: 1. The (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model)'s central hypothesis is: "The binary formula of (Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability) is the equilibrium or solution point of a positivity of peace developed relevant-hypergame model." 2. The (Balance of Peace State Hypergame Model)'s hypotheses are; a. "A balance of peace-state within nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties socially, politically, and diplomatically at any phase during and post-intra-state conflicts." b. "A balance of peace-state between nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties diplomatically, politically, and socially at any phase during and post-inter-state conflicts."

At last, this study is divided into five sections. In the parts to follow this introduction, the second section concentrates on relating applied theories of international relations and media



fields to a method of practice strategically, representing the theoretical roots of the first hypergame-model (i.e., the “PPHGM”) mainly and of the second model (i.e., the “BPSHM”) partially. Consequently, the third and fourth sections discuss the multi-level conflict management approach’s first and second hypergame-models, respectively, and their (HG)₁ and (HG)₂. The last part comes sequentially, suggesting the general conclusion.

3. Theory and Application: The Multi-Level Conflict Management Approach’s Theoretical Roots

Building a model of possible positivity of peace and another of the balance of peace state relying on the *hypergame theory* as a methodological foundation, we set the following theoretical application merging some IR peace agendas with other media approaches, aiming at achieving sustainable peace in any disputing region from a combined national, regional, and global scope. This section thus introduces the practice of some applied theories, representing the theoretical roots of the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model) essentially, and the (Balance of Peace State Hypergame Model) in part, where these models are the constituent pillars of the study’s multi-level conflict management approach.

3.1. First: An Applied Post-Structuralism Peace Approach; Neo-Post-Structurization of Truth

The post-structuralist agenda of peace imposes its inclusiveness on the peace discourse constructed within any attempt of building peace at all levels. Combining the “power, knowledge, elite, discourse, truth, discursive formations, ideology, and hegemony” concepts of Michel Foucault in his 1989 book¹⁰ “*The Archaeology of Knowledge*,” who is a leading figure of post-structuralism, with the “mass-culture products” conceptualization in the Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s culture industry theorization of the media’s political economy¹¹, we assume that a *comprehensive* peace agenda of our conflict management approach applies firstly through a “*neo-post-structurization of truth*,” shaped by these stages:

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1989).

¹¹ See “Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in *Media and Cultural Studies: Keywords* (Revised Edition), ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing, (2001, 2006)), 41-72; Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (London and New York: Routledge, 1991); and also, Dan Laughy, *Key Themes in Media Theory* (England: Open University Press, 2007); Nicholas Garnham, “From Cultural to Creative Industries: An Analysis of the Implications of the “Creative Industries” Approach to Arts and Media Policymaking in the United Kingdom,” *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11, no. 1 (2005): 15-29.”



a. Re-producing the (ongoing) *conflict-knowledge* within the elite or/and media discourse nationally/regionally to be in line with conflict *de-escalation*. This is the “*discourse seeds cultivation*” stage.

b. The ideology of mediators in previously and present convened-peace processes is assumed to shift from its “*semi-covertness*” past positions into openly *dominant* ones in a neo-media discourse on national and regional levels, spreading both the *priority* and *inevitability* of peace exerted efforts, highlighting the successes achieved and ignoring the failure’s aspects. This is the “*fledgling positively peace-hegemony*” stage.

According to Gramsci’s hegemony theory¹², hegemony is a power achieved by force or coercion and consent. That occurs when the consensus over the political authority’s accumulated power, domestic and foreign politics, suppressive apparatuses (i.e., police and army), etc., are being agreed on *voluntarily* by the ordinary individuals in society. Thence, the Althusser’s mentioned *ideological state apparatuses* such as churches, schools, and media¹³ play a crucial role in getting that ‘*mass mandate*’ or the mass public consent for achieving an *expansive* hegemony for the political authority. The hegemony system that the ruling (dominant) class or political society disperses not only politically, but economically and culturally, allowing its *absolute* control over diverse structures of the state’s existing system, representing the subaltern groups’ views and aspirations so that getting the civil society’s individuals’ consent as a function of hegemony.

Based on that, under our modeling’s stages, the traditional conception of (expansive) hegemony is used alternatively to seek *not* a “*political power*” within a state but a “*peace-power*” in national and regional societies through the political elite(s)/authority efforts of “*soft coercion*” first and the civil society actions of “*consent/adoption*” publicly second.

¹² See “Steve Jones, *Routledge Critical Thinkers: Antonio Gramsci*, ed. Robert Eaglestone (The USA and Canada: Routledge, 2006).”

¹³ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in *Media and Cultural Studies: Keywords* (Revised Edition), ed. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (USA, UK and Australia: Blackwell Publishing, (2001, 2006)), 79-87.



c. The notion of Foucault's disciplinary society¹⁴ in Panopticism¹⁵ plays a significant role here, but reversely, in changing the behavior of conflict sides. The change that occurs by employing the mass media power to create an all-seeing eye of a panopticon *public guardian* over conflicting parties *imprisoned* in a social circle only includes acceptable *peace* behaviors, excluding those unacceptable ones. That is being achieved in a usual manner of media functions mechanisms, by objectifying the subjects of peace processes in a peace-oriented-media discourse operated by the *elite(s)* (i.e., the ruling/dominant classes in society) and internalized by all individuals or the public eye of the region's societies, creating '*reinforcing*' knowledge about these subjects. The last express a phase of "*mass-publics-oriented-disciplinization of the conflict parties*" in a peace process. Also, it is considered the "*peace-public flak*" stage. Prominently, if it is one conflict party, political authority, besides being the *observer* in a panopticon (national/regional) society, becomes the *observed* with other conflict sides within peace process *cells* under an all-seeing eye's *peace-guardian* society. The conflict parties' behaviors thus are assumed to *meet* the expectations of a '*positively peace-hegemony*'-instilled-nation(s).

d. Transforming a "*fledgling positively peace-hegemony*" into an '*omnipotent hegemonic state*' reinforces the success of the previous stage, which is an aim of this extended phase. That is to say, under a global/regional governance mechanism, re-producing effectively "*peace process-directed-mass-cultural products*" (i.e., popular music, songs, films, and advertisements) is assumed to be facilitated on all levels for the production and exportation to nations/regions concerned. So, the consumers of this supposed "*neo-mass-culture industry*" of mass media become oriented towards adopting hard issues of politics, history, peace, and war _ instead of shifting the mass audiences to consumers occupied by the capitalist classes ideology-serving advertisements' products/commodities (e.g., the recent version of cellphones, or the new shampoo good), promoted through the mass-culture products industry. Furthermore, having the public eye to observe *peace trajectories* continuously, creating an *omnipotent peace-*

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); and see also, Julie Leth Jespersen, Anders Albrechtslund, Peter Øhrstrøm, Per Hasle and Jørgen Albretsen, "Surveillance, Persuasion, and Panopticon," *PERSUASIVE 2007*, LNCS 4744 (2007): 109-120.

¹⁵ Foucault (1977) sees Panopticism as a general principle of political anatomy where the relations of discipline occur through an existing system of ordinary citizens being controlled and therefore governed by the political authority that makes them a subject of continuous *surveillance* (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 208-216), simulating Jeremy Bentham's 1791 panopticon prison notion of an all-seeing eye, but rather in an open panopticon society.



hegemonic state, necessitates the *dependence* on that neo-mass-culture industry more than relying on a broadcasting bulletin or news shows.

Using many conventional and digital media outlets, the *peace-hegemony* message conveying supporting norms and values of conflict settlement/resolution/transformation to widespread classes of (conflict) regional societies could take the shape of any medium regardless of being contemporary modern, or future high tech-advanced. Since *the medium is the message* according to the Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan's main axiom of *media theory* developed in the 1960s, and the *message* here is *the peace-medium*, then *the "medium is the peace."* In sum, that is the "*omnipotent peace-hegemonic state*" stage of this applied post-structuralism peace approach.

e. Ultimately, the outcome of the production and re-production processes of the "discourse, truth, knowledge, power orientation, peace mediators' ideology, neo-mass-culture industry, and peace-hegemony" composes what we called "*peace-broker discourse.*" This stage is an accumulated output with a *repetitive* frame in traditional and digital media platforms actively politically and socially, and it is long-term. The following strategies-paradigm of the applied post-structuralism peace approach and culture industry summarizes the mentioned above stages:

{{*Discourse seeds cultivation* → *Fledgling positively peace-hegemony* → *Conflict parties' disciplinization & peace-public flak* → *Omnipotent peace-hegemonic state*
→ *Peace-broker discourse (Total Outcome)*}}

3.2. Second: From a Constructivist Peace Approach Perspective

The persuasion power practiced during a peace process course is crucial in this conflict management approach by employing well-known rehabilitation, socialization, and reconciliation strategies. The *rehabilitation* programs of *aggressive* non-state actors, such as terrorist groups/organizations, are *credibly* applicable here. These programs target a. the arrested members in prisons by influential characters, preachers, or/and previous-spiritual leaders of the same (terrorist) group/organization, working on changing a pro-conflict mentality or misguided labeled (terrorist) behaviors; or/and b. the concentration on dealing with the conflict parties' communities in a concerned society through some oriented-media programs or other '*pacific*' (inter)state-policies formulated on the same lines. On the other hand, during and



post-conflict stages, the socialization process focuses on integrating (non-) state actors of some/all conflict parties as partners or free persons within (national/regional) society, involving them in governmental and private institutions across/inter-state. Comparingly, the reconciliation process is achieved through signing a peace deal, pact, accords, agreement, etc., between conflicting sides, tackling significant causes of conflict partially or entirely, through convened peace talks officially or unofficially. Having this process (i.e., reconciliation) third, after the rehabilitation and socialization ones, consecutively, or initiating the constructivist trajectory by bringing it about firstly, depends *more likely* on how far every party of dispute may trust the other in future joint-political/diplomatic steps taken by each altogether. In general, the more the trust estimates' credibility and certainty among conflict parties are, the more that each prefers the reconciliation choice first to that of rehabilitation or/and socialization, and vice versa. This constructivist approach's phases are long-term.

At last, employing the precedent strategies tends to be ascertained regarding changing both conflict parties' behaviors coinciding with dispersing the peace process(es) norms and its comprehensive sustainability standards within/between nations. In this context, media discourse role as a mass persuasion power, considering the media one of the ideological state apparatuses¹⁶, is also significant in facilitating all/some parties' harmonious involvement in the (inter-)society's institutional structures during-and post-conflict stages, as well as providing them a popular acceptance in the pursuit of promoting the rehabilitation, socialization, or/and reconciliation process' efficiency.

3.3. Third: An Extended Peace Approach; Towards Mass-Ideological Rehabilitation & Neo Constructivism

While implementing a peace process facilitated by the interference of third parties, some intermediate variables may intervene in an opposite line, spoiling a reached peace agreement, for instance, or this process course at any other stage. Those factors or variables can mainly be the following¹⁷: i. The actors' interests (e.g., disputed territories, political ends, and natural

¹⁶ Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," 79-87.

¹⁷ See "Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, "Obstacles to Peace Processes: Understanding Spoiling," in *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (The USA, New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), 1-19; Ertan Efeğil, *Devlet-İçi Çatışmalar ve Çatışma Yönetimi (Intra-State Conflicts and Conflict Management)* (Istanbul: Gündoğan Yay, 2019); and, Michael J. Butler, *International Conflict Management* (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2009)."



resources supplies), where the conflict actors might represent state actors, (international/regional) foreign actors, or/and non-state actors like terrorist groups. ii. The political economy of conflict (i.e., the accessibility to natural resources such as water, oil and natural gas, diamond, and minerals). iii. The diaspora groups as peace spoilers or an international opposition to peace process arrangements, adopting anti-peace propaganda or/and providing financial support for the conflict continuity. iv. The conflict motives: these could be ethnic, religious, national, sectarian, ideological, or cultural. v. The conflict incentives (i.e., the war/conflict gains, or/and future utility).

Many counter-impact efforts of those peace-spoiling behaviors' intervening variables manifest increasingly for maintaining the conflict management path's achievements/successes, suggesting that:

The media discourse roles within our 'applied post-structuralism and culture industry' peace approach entail the *capability to* neutralize those variables that cause/express the conflict settlement/resolution's spoiling behavior. Still, it is worth noticing that the benefits of the conflict/war continuation for the peace spoilers (e.g., individuals, private or public groups, (non)state-actors, or/and superpowers) sometimes become higher than the cost accumulated from initiating the conflict/war itself or those gains obtained by participating in or implementing a peace process.

Media diplomacy¹⁸ operating through political and media discourse generally, and the discursive formations within the elites' spoken out discourse, in particular, practiced in favor of conflict settlement/resolution, is seen as an *expansionist* way in functions under this frame. It *reflects* obstacles to the masses raised by those intervening factors and *overcomes* them by attempting to achieve *breakthroughs* in the conflict trajectory. Furthermore, empowered by a 'positively peace-hegemony'-instilled-nation(s), the media diplomacy, in this context, can transform the war/conflict circle to run conversely by *directly/indirectly* forcing making concession(s) for the public interests (i.e., the common good) or what is best described as '*peace-hegemony-oriented-national interests*.'

¹⁸ See "Dmitri P. Gavra and Alyona S. Savitskaya, "Mass Media in Interstate Conflicts: Typological Model "Peace-Conflict Journalism Multidimensional Approach"," *Russian Journal of Communication* 4, no. 3-4 (2011): 251-265; and, Eytan Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12, no. 2 (2001): 1-28."



If war served to achieve national interests of self-interested states according to Realism's fundamental axiom, then it was the perception of the Realists that led them to imagine the international system actors (i.e., nation-states) as the system-competitors, self-helpers, and conflicting power-acquisitors, leading decision-makers to act in same lines for decades to come, excepting those liberal states that opt for the democratic *perpetual-peace* as a regional institution *dominating* their inter-relations in Europe in the aftermath of World War II by the 1950s through an economic unity first followed by a political one (i.e., European Union). So, constructing the *peace institution* at the core of every state-actor perception instead of that 'manufactured' war-based-conflictual reality of Realist thought about the international system is assumed to transform a chaotic structure of system defined by anarchical order into an organized structure of a semi-hierarchical system in which global "hegemonic" governance has both "(future) power and force" to impose consent *voluntarily* of peace rather than war, acquiring global mass-consensus over such a progressive advance.

The outcome of this extended approach is that such exerted efforts by global *hegemonic* governance combined with its media mechanisms and tools regionally and globally, which necessitate medium-and long-term periods, gradually achieve *breakthroughs* in conflicts around the globe, and then *global hegemony* of peace, coinciding with diffusing the *peace-broker ideology* within the relevant discourse and the global re-production of *neo-mass-culture products*. Here, this explained course predictably strategizes what we called the "mass-ideological rehabilitation" as total output, targeting *not* some/all conflict parties and their communities under this approach, but rather the 'global ordinary publics.'

Overcoming a possible negative impact of those intermediate variables on the quality of a peace process resulted might further occur by employing the media discourse when operating in a state(s) affected by the war or conflict through these three processes: i. *re-interpreting* and representing any zero-productivity variable from positively peace process-focused-news framing eye; ii. Providing *priority* of events satisfy the 'peace-broker ideology and discourse' purposes, as to be *perceived* approximately symmetrically in a sequential process of agenda-setting within the publics' consciousness; and iii. Activating *priming* effects through changing those publics' standards used to make political evaluations, rebuilding their judgments regarding the conflict/war and its parties, and future peace arrangements taken intra-or/and inter-state in a way to be inclusive of the other conflict sides. The last process plays a key role



in getting the publics' support to a "neo-hegemony of peace versus current hegemony of war's inevitability" formula.

The "*inevitability of war*" notion traces its roots from the Realist thought, particularly from the first developed Classical Realism school to which Hans Morgenthau is a founding father through his 1948 book¹⁹ "*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.*" Classical Realism considers war or conflict as a natural outcome or product of an aggressive and flawed human nature operating in an ungoverned and therefore insecure global environment²⁰ entails suspicion-based-inter-state relations. On the other hand, Structural Realism which *Kenneth Waltz* founds through his book "*Theory of International Politics,*" published in 1979²¹, sees the war or conflict as the accumulated outcome of a security dilemma dominating the state-to-state relations in an international system defined by its anarchical structure due to existing no central authority. Here, each system's unit (i.e., the nation-state) seeking its own survival and self-interests in a self-help system based on mutual suspicion is forced to move to the rational choice of making alliances and building arming strategies aggregating power and acquiring more weapons for *declared* defensive reasons. However, that behavior threatens other states in the system, prompting them to act likewise, where the war or conflict occurs as a gradual outcome of such a domino effect.

In sum, if the war or conflict is not necessary, it is "inevitable" from both viewpoints, in terms of considering the flawed individual human nature in a world without government to restore security or impose peace, or the anarchical structure of a threatening international system. Under either argument, and mainly for the pretext of serving national/state-interests, the war's inevitability principle is seen cultivated in every individual's posture that became narrowed by the same narrowness of the nation-state frontiers, under which this individual must be ceaselessly *obedient* to a *constant state of war/conflict* within a *no longer* Hobbesian state, and therefore, Hobbesian world.

Since Thomas Hobbes, in his 1651 book "*Leviathan,*" defined anarchy based on perceiving a world without government or hegemon ruler to restore order or achieve peace

¹⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (The USA, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

²⁰ Michael Cox and R. Campanaro, *Introduction to International Relations* (London: University of London, 2016), 109.

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (The USA: McGraw-Hill, 1979).



when a state of war of all against all dominates²²; at the same time, this perspective had prevailed during the seventeenth century when the nation-state's notion was still fledgling after the peace of Westphalia had achieved in 1648 among conflicting states and principalities of the European regional system, where the English Civil War was taking place along over one decade (1642-1651). That points out that Hobbes or any other like-minded philosopher of that era if witnesses our today's *absolute* order of having hegemon ruler with sovereignty (still) maintained by a way or another for preserving the Enlightenment thinker John Locke's (1632-1704) individual liberal rights of life, property, and liberty of a state of human nature (i.e., human rights), would be wondering the reason why the war is judged as a *necessity* – if not a *means* of achieving peace intra-or-inter-state, as long global diplomacy institution and collective security organizations composed of nationally-hegemon state-actors became the alternative of Hobbes's perceived global hegemon (one) ruler/government. That is to say, the *singularity* of the Hobbesian world's ruler/government is contemporarily translated into a *multiplicity* of the same imagined hegemon one with like functions as well, in each nation-state within the global system. As an outcome, a “neo-constructivism vision” of a ‘universal/global peace-hegemony’ for conflict management might strategically be substitutional to a current (national/regional) hegemony of war institution as a means for achieving national interests, integrating Europe's liberal democratic peace-built-regional system as a piece of an analogical whole.

Ultimately, these strategies outline a paradigm of our “extended peace approach and neo-constructivism” as the following:

{ { *Capable* neutralization of peace spoiling behavior → Media diplomacy of ‘*peace-hegemony*’-oriented-national interests → Constructed *peace* institution, perceptions, and reality & Imposed peace-global mass consensus by global *hegemonic* governance

→ *Mass-ideological rehabilitation* of global publics (total output) →

Neo-constructivism of a “*global* hegemony of peace vs. Realist hegemony of war's inevitability” binary formula (extended output) } }

²² See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (USA: Oxford University Press, (1651, 1996)).



3.4. Fourth: Coercive Diplomacy and Bargaining Conventional Approach

Succeeding in previous phases does not ensure initiating the bargaining strategies' course without using 'force' by some powers (e.g., the UN, US, and EU) first for coercing one or both conflict parties to accept mediation efforts and the diplomatic resolution. Although the Realism agenda of peace represents what so-called survival or victor peace²³ in which one wins at the expense of the other, using the coercive diplomacy means (e.g., imposing sanctions/tariffs, and threats), which lies in the Realism realm, by one or more coercion-practicing power in the short term, is seen indispensable for subjugating some/all conflicting sides to take part in a peace process. Moreover, the journalists as mediators may play a role in a pre-negotiation phase expressing *media-broker diplomacy*²⁴ during a conflict. Also, a conflict knowledge-based-debriefing process assumingly improves the performance of peacemaking and conflict resolution practice²⁵ on the one hand and the diplomatic resolve on the other.

Accordingly, the bargaining strategies such as; mediation, negotiation, and peace talks²⁶ are initiated once pressure is practiced over conflicting parties distinguished by involvement in peace spoiling behaviors²⁷ by mediatory deterrence-applying powers. Again, the co-optation and integration of all, rather the exclusion of some in peace talks, are considered social tactics followed for a sustainable peace process results at the end of the day. Here, power-sharing in a post-conflict stage²⁸ might appear as an exit for some intra-state conflict resolution tracks under these advantages; i. it is a security guarantee for all parties to commit an agreed-on peace settlement's terms after the conflict ends; and ii. it works on eliminating the peace spoilers' behaviors directed against a convened or implemented peace process. Furthermore, the power-

²³ See Oliver P. Richmond, *Peace in International Relations* (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2008).

²⁴ Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects," 1-28.

²⁵ Jacquie L. Greiff, Matthew Graville Bricker, Philip Gamaghelyan, Margarita Tadevosyan and Shu Deng, "Debriefing in Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution Practice: Models of Emergent Learning and Practitioner Support," *Reflective Practice* 16, no. 2 (2015): 254-268.

²⁶ See "Butler, *International Conflict Management*; Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, "Engaging Non-state Armed Actors in State and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies," *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 883 (Sep. 2011): 603-621; Efeğil, *Devlet-İçi Çatımlar ve Çatışma Yönetimi*; and, Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*."

²⁷ See "Marie-Joëlle Zahar, "Understanding the Violence of Insiders: Loyalty, Custodians of Peace, and the Sustainability of Conflict Settlement," in *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, edited by Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (The USA, New York: United Nations University Press, 2006), 40-58; and, Newman and Richmond, "Obstacles to Peace Processes: Understanding Spoiling."

²⁸ See "Butler, *International Conflict Management*; Efeğil, *Devlet-İçi Çatımlar ve Çatışma Yönetimi*; and, Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*."



sharing mechanism taking the shape of participating in domestic constituencies, constituting political parties, or governmental coalition after internal conflict, is a core part of de-escalating this conflict intensifying level _ necessarily but *not* sufficiently for a peace trajectory's success, achieving each party's conflict interests through *absolute* gains depending on making the peace process benefits exceed the conflict/war's continuation cost for both. Agreeing with Hofmann and Schneckener (2011)²⁹, employing the bargaining strategies necessitates medium-and long-terms.

The expected equilibrium (solution) of witnessed conflicts occurs through our modeling coinciding with achieving the previous paradigms' strategies and combined approaches in alternately sequential roles, transforming any disputing region into a state of positive or win-win peace. Namely, it achieves an ideal-liberal peace in its abstract norms spread across political, economic, or/and social structures of a state-system and the inter-state one. Nevertheless, a complementary element is needed to effectively restore such civil peace, embodying the idea of an "International Mediators Team (IMT)."

3.5. Fifth: The (IMT) & "Collective Diplomacy" Principle

Towards conflict resolution exerted efforts' accomplishment, functions made by an (*International Mediators Team*) inarguably take place within our modeling. The (IMT), we assume, comprises *neutral mediation*³⁰ representatives of i. intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, and EU); ii. Inter-state regional organizations (e.g., the League of Arab States (LAS), the African Union (AU), and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)); and iii. The nation-state(s) or entity affected by the war/conflict (SAW) _ which is the substantial theme of assigned peace missions. The (IMT)'s peace missions are assumed to be ascertained with dependence on precedent phases' strategies through these mechanisms: i. *Examination and debriefing*: focuses on examining the conflict's nature through interactive connectedness with representatives of (SAW), where the (IMT) pursues a debriefing process of previous/ongoing conflicts, accumulating further experience in peacemaking and conflict resolution practice. ii. *Publicization of the 'peace-broker discourse'* regionally within the conflict

²⁹ Hofmann and Schneckener, "Engaging Non-state Armed Actors in State and Peace-Building," 603-621.

³⁰ See Isak Svensson, "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral Versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (June 2009): 446-469.



settlement/resolution context. iii. *Legitimacy and cooperation*: the (IMT) does not have the political power authorization means for coercing any conflict party for initiating negotiation or recognizing their presence as official mediators unless a majority votes do legitimize it in the UN's general assembly, while being suggested by one or more Permanent Five (i.e., the U.S, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France) member, cooperating with any for the coercive diplomacy purposes. iv. *Bargaining initiation*: the (IMT) begins its mediation efforts following the legitimacy and cooperation's fulfillment tasks, down to conducting negotiations and peace talks between given conflict parties. v. *Non-militarization*: the (IMT) is not concerned with taking any military decisions or actions regarding one side or both parties of the war/conflict. At last, vi. the (IMT) performs (or reinforces) a '*monitoring function*' or '*surveillance*' mechanism upon the conflict parties overtly. It indicates that if any side deviated from the drawn course of a peace process, the (IMT) takes necessary (coercive) actions or issues acts, cooperating with some coercion-applying powers and employing mutually '*deterrence*' practices for getting an aggressor into discipline or repelling a *violating* behavior from affecting others. So, the very Panopticism scope of the "all-seeing-eye" generates not a manufactured disciplinary society only but above that a 'disciplinary region or disciplinary societies.' Thence, the (IMT) idea is an *amended* translation of the *collective security* principle _ if the latter meant a common security effort or war ensued by an inter-state coalition for deterring *undeterrable* aggressor or/and repelling a devastating international violation(s) made against others in the system. That is, the (IMT) reflects a notion of "diplomacy versus war-based-*collective* conflict management" on global, regional, and national levels, which we call the "*collective diplomacy*" principle.

4. The Multi-Level Conflict Management Approach's First Model: *The Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model (PPHGM)*

Under a multiple-games-based-hypergame model, each player in the game makes the strategy choices while a misunderstanding or incorrect information about the game's players, their strategic preference vectors, or/and their decisions made could exist. All players consider how other players reason, available information, and each one's beliefs and perceptions of reality for making those actions (decisions) of an *expected maximized utility*'s perceived outcomes. So that what a player reasons about an opponent or the other(s)'s strategies and moves might be an effect of misperception or deception practiced by another. Accordingly, this



part explains our developed (PPHGM)'s two entire hypergames first and then outlines their equilibrium equations sequentially.

4.1. First: The Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model's Multiple Games

4.1.1. The (PPHGM)'s Main Assumptions and Hypothesis


The (PPHGM) is a second-level hypergame composed of two main hypergames. In a second-level hypergame, one player or more knows that a hypergame is being played, where at least one player perceives that another player (or more) has misperceptions about the game. Including two second-level hypergames within this model, which are $\{(HG)_1, (HG)_2\}$, each entire hypergame contains those separate hypergames perceived by both players.

A given player's hypergame, in this context, is constituted out of this player's perceptions of what the other player(s)'s played game(s) is/are. Containing multiple different games, the (PPHGM) as an *unbalanced* hypergame-model emerge, representing different perceptions and views of each player about the game and the reality of conflict while being *rebalanced* to shape two spheres of strategic interactions where the entire $(HG)_1$ and $(HG)_2$ are being played with all players' views overlap when common knowledge of the conflict exists among them.

In the (PPHGM), any equilibria that could exist within each player's perceived hypergame are not needed in our model. Still, the players' strategic preference vectors, which appear by analyzing each one's hypergame separately, provide stable information for this modeling. That information is useful in determining how each actor reasons and what it believes about the game and reality, thus reasoning what the *entire* hypergames, $\{(HG)_1, (HG)_2\}$, equilibriums are. Accordingly, this stability analysis became a way of reaching a Positivity of Peace Equilibrium (PPE) of the entire (PPHGM), specifying how any may make decisions for acquiring *expected maximized utility* of *perceived* outcomes _ given that the strategic interactions of *rebalanced* models at an *overlap point* of common knowledge in either the $(HG)_1$ or the $(HG)_2$ determine those outcomes or the resulted equilibriums of each entire hypergame.



Figure 1:The Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model



Within this model, there are two players in the (Strategic Interactions)¹, which is the first played entire hypergame or the (HG)₁, and four players in the (Strategic Interactions)² that represent the second played hypergame or the (HG)₂. The actor I in both hypergames is the most *dominant* and *important* player, who has the advantage to play simultaneously or sequentially, taking one action (decision) or more at the same move, relying on having Actor II unknowledgeable, misperceived, or/and deceived about its strategic preferences, its played-game, and made actions. At the same time, Actor II in both hypergames, unknowing that a hypergame is being played, has misperceptions about the game and reality while playing in a sequential move as a reactor. So, the model is built on simultaneous-sequential move's nature. Furthermore, Actor, I has different preference vectors for each hypergame, playing those



strategies of expected utility only after reasoning how Actor II or any other actor reasons, and their beliefs and perceptions or misperceptions of the reality and the game. At last, this model is a *reductionist* one that dismisses equilibriums resulting within each player's perceived hypergame, utilizing analyzed theoretical approaches in IR and media discourse to achieve a Positivity of Peace Equilibrium (PPE). Through a process of including strategy-input and output, we outline some equations describing each entire hypergame's interactions at an overlap point of all players' views on one hand and the expected utility of *known perceived-or/and unknown*-resulted outcomes on the other, reaching the (PPE) consequently. In sum, through this modeling, we seek to prove the validity of this hypothesis: "The binary formula of "Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability (GHP vs. RHW)" is the equilibrium or solution point of a positivity of peace developed relevant-hypergame model."

4.1.2. The (Strategic Interactions)¹ Hypergame: (HG)₁

a. *The (HG)₁ Description: Misperception and Deception Games*

In (HG)₁, there are two hypergames: (HG_{1.1}) and (HG_{1.2}). The HG_{1.1} (i.e., Actor I's perceived hypergame) includes i. the knowledge of a hypergame being played; ii. the strategic preference vector of Actor I (i.e., the Elite and Discourse), which is composed of: {(Cultivation); (Disciplinization); and (Conventional Constructivist strategies: Rehabilitation, Socialization, and Reconciliation)} mixed strategies. The HG_{1.1} contains {G_{1.2}} which is the game played by the other player, Actor II (i.e., Publics), as it is perceived by Actor I. Here, Actor I is aware of Actor II and perceives {G_{1.2}} as i. a game of incomplete information where Actor II has misperceptions about the game, or/and reality; ii. Actor II's preference vector includes overt strategies such as "obedience, compliance, and subordination;" iii. a game in which Actor II is a subject of Actor I's authority influence and a reaction to its taken moves. On the other hand, the HG_{1.2} (i.e., Actor II's perceived hypergame) includes i. unknowledge of existing a hypergame being played; ii. uncertainty about who the other player is, its strategic preference vector, and the moves or actions (decisions) made; iii. strategic preference vector composed of: {(Peace-Public flak); and (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony)} mixed strategies. In the HG_{1.2}, Actor II does *not* perceive the {G_{1.1}} or the game played by Actor I, who is the sole player with Actor II in the (HG)₁. At last, the (Strategic Interactions)¹ hypergame or the (HG)₁, merging the perceived hypergames of Actors I and II, where: i. $HG_{1.1} = \{G_{1.2}\}$, and $HG_{1.2} \neq \{G_{1.1}\}$; ii. $\{(HG)_1 = (HG_{1.1} + HG_{1.2})\}$, is being played at an *overlap point* of all players' views



and perceptions where a common knowledge of intra-and inter-state conflicts exists, constituting a *rebalanced* model of equilibrium positions of the entire $(HG)_1$ – while not considering any equilibriums reached within each player’s separately perceived hypergame.

b. The $(HG)_1$ Overlap Point’s Strategic Interactions: A (Rebalanced Model)₁

- Building the (PPHGM) upon real-world circumstances, the (Strategic Interactions)¹ hypergame begins with Actor I, which is the (Elite) (i.e., ruling/dominant classes) having the (Discourse) power, activating our applied post-structuralism and culture industry peace agenda by moving to the “(Cultivation) of media, political, and academia peace-discourse seeds” action. The $(HG)_1$ ’s moves are taken regionally, nationally, and globally, consecutively.

- Within the cultivated elite’s discourse, the ‘*mass-publics-oriented-disciplinization of the conflict parties*’ strategy *first* occurs with Actor I’s moving to the (Disciplinization) choice. Here, the Panopticism idea’s inversion by achieving the *observer society* principle to be an alternative, in this given context, to the notion of individually *observed society* or the panopticon society as an ordinary citizens’ open prison, does not occur but when a society’s existing superior watcher (i.e., ruling/dominant class(es), or political authority) allows for such relation’s shifting to be internalized within the discourse and translated into active social participation in digital outlets nationwide and zero-violence mass protests publicly.

- In that case, Actor I made both the first and second moves depending on Actor II’s lack of information about its strategic preferences deceiving this actor of whether those were its picked actions or unintentionally made by another (e.g., the media gates guards such as the content-producers, and editors).

- Misperceiving Actor I’s precedent actions and moving according to its beliefs and perceptions of reality which are built on that *deception* of the (Disciplinization) strategy, Actor II (i.e., regional, national, and global Publics) choosing to be the all-seeing eye public guardian of the conflicting parties, and as a rationality-guided-actor and subject to Actor I, moves to the (Peace-Public Flak “PPF”) strategic alternative, sequentially.

- An (Elite-Publics’ Mutually Impact Realm, “EP-MIR”) outcome arises when using in a sequential move the {(Disciplinization); (Peace-Public flak)} pair of strategies by Actor I and Actor II, respectively.

- Meanwhile, Actor I moves to the (Conventional Constructivist Strategies: Rehabilitation, Socialization, and Reconciliation, “CC(Re-So-Rec)”) choice, in a simultaneous-



move to that of picking the (PPF) action by Actor II, with the (Fledgling Peace Hegemony “FPH”) results as an outcome of using both the {(Cultivation), (Disciplinization), and (CC(Re-So-Rec))} strategies by Actor I and the (Peace-Public Flak) strategy by Actor II within the (EP-MIR) initial outcome.

- As an extension of its deception and misperception-directed-previous strategic preference _ the (PPF), the (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony “OPH”) choice is now the second strategic move of Actor II, coinciding with the latter’s *own* understanding and interpretation of Actor I’s all precedent actions. Consequently, the (OPH) becomes an outcome for both in (HG)₁, with a strategic payoff/utility of Actor I (*the deceiver*) only.

- The (HG)₁ ends by the (Peace-Broker Discourse “PBD”) resulting as an ‘*accumulated output*’ of Actors I and II’s strategic interactions, constituted out of aggregating the two outcomes: {(FPH); (OPH)} as input-shifted-output strategies (ISOS); see [Figure 1](#).

- Based on that, the (HG)₁’s equilibriums are these four outcomes, which are all output strategies of expected maximized utility _ as come later, considering that we determine, in this study, each resulted equilibrium when picking a number of strategies by two players or more as an outcome while the expected utility refers to a player’s payoffs of those resulted outcomes:

- i. The (Elite-Publics’ Mutually Impact Realm) equilibrium, an unperceived and unknown outcome for both actors.

- ii. The (Fledgling Peace Hegemony) equilibrium, a perceived and known outcome for both players _ where the (FPH) is the first of (ISOS) within the (PBD) accumulated output.

- iii. The (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony) equilibrium, a perceived and known outcome for Actor I (i.e., the deceiver) and unperceived and unknown outcome for Actor II (i.e., the deceived) _ where the (OPH) is the second of (ISOS) within the (PBD) accumulated output.

- iv. The (Peace-Broker Discourse) equilibrium, an outcome unknown for the misperceiving Actor II and a known and perceived for the correctly perceiving Actor I.

4.1.3. The (Strategic Interactions)² Hypergame: (HG)₂

a. The (HG)₂ Description: Misperception and Deception Games

Including multiplied actors and interactions compared to the (HG)₁, the (HG)₂, or the second played entire hypergame of the (PPHGM) we named the (Strategic Interactions)². In the (HG)₂, there is one perceived hypergame by each player; these players are: Actor I (i.e., the Global Hegemonic Governance & Discourse “GHG-D”), Actor II (i.e., the Global Publics &



State-Actors “GP&SA”), Actor III (i.e., the Pressure-Practicing Powers “3P”), and Actor IV (i.e., the International Mediation Institution “IMI,” or the International Mediators Team “IMT”). The $(HG)_2$'s four hypergames are:

a) *The $HG_{2,1}$*

- The $(HG_{2,1})$ is Actor I's perceived hypergame within the entire “ HG_2 ,” which includes a. the knowledge of a hypergame being played; b. a strategic preference vector composed of $\{(\pm PSB); (MD-PHNI); (IPC); \text{ and } (B-MNP)\}^{31}$ mixed strategies; c. the awareness of the other players (i.e., Actors II, III, and IV) in the game; and d. the belief that it (i.e., Actor I) is the most *influential and important* player of the $(HG)_2$.

- The $HG_{2,1}$ contains the $\{G_{2,2}, G_{2,3}, \text{ and } G_{2,4}\}$ which are the games played by Actor II, Actor III, and Actor IV, respectively, in the $(HG)_2$, where these games are perceived by Actor I, as follows:

i. Actor I perceives the $\{G_{2,2}\}$ as a. a game of incomplete information in which Actor II has misperceptions about the game, or/and reality; b. a deception/misperception-based game, directed by collective diplomacy means and effective deterrence mechanisms; c. Actor II's preference vector includes overt strategies such as “obedience, compliance, subordination, or/and deterrable revisionism;” d. Actor II is a deceived subject, receiver, or/and reactor of Actor I's made moves _ where both actors' views and perceptions overlap at a conflict management-related-common knowledge strategic focal point.

ii. Actor I understands the $\{G_{2,3}\}$ as a. a game of incomplete information in which Actor III does not have complete knowledge about Actor I's preference vector, beliefs, or perceptions of the game/reality; b. Actor III is the deterrence applying party within the entire $(HG)_2$; c. the preference vector of Actor III includes (COD) pure strategy means; d. Actor III has joint leverage with Actor I, acting multilaterally with it in some cases; e. Actor II is Actor III's targeted subject in the $(HG)_2$.

iii. The $\{G_{2,4}\}$ is perceived by Actor I according to this context: a. a game of incomplete information where Actor I's preference vector is unknown to Actor IV; b. Actor IV is another diplomacy practicing party beside Actor I within the $(HG)_2$; c. Actor IV's preference vector includes the (CL-D) pure strategy; d. Actor IV is a subject or informal organ of Actor I, acting

³¹ All strategies' abbreviations mentioned in this part are explained in the next one to come.



multilaterally with it. Those $\{G_{2.2}, G_{2.3}, \text{ and } G_{2.4}\}$ games are based on Actor I's beliefs and perceptions of the game and reality, which may be true or not.

b) The $HG_{2.2}$

- The $HG_{2.2}$ is Actor II's perceived hypergame within the $(HG)_2$ that includes a. unknowledge of a hypergame being played; b. uncertainty about who the hypergame's Actor I is, its strategic preferences, and moves or actions (i.e., decisions) made; c. awareness of the third and fourth actors/players (i.e., the 3P; and IMI/IMT), their preference vectors, and actions/moves; and d. strategic preference vector composed of: $\{(RCP); \text{ and } (AD-G)\}$ mixed strategies.

- In the $HG_{2.2}$, Actor II does not perceive Actor I's played game, the $\{G_{2.1}\}$, whereas it perceives these $\{G_{2.3}, \text{ and } G_{2.4}\}$ – which are the games played by Actor III, and Actor IV, consecutively:

i. Actor II understands that the $\{G_{2.3}\}$ is a game in which: a. deterrence-based-game is played by the international system's *hegemon*s; b. the strategic preference vector of Actor III includes: (Imposing Sanctions, Boycott/Embargo, or/and Import Tariffs; Threats; Use of Hard Power; Declaring (unjustified) Wars) against aggressors or revisionists of the system; and c. Actor III is a hegemon seeks building (counter-)alliances and the accumulation of power at the expense of others, threatening both units of the system (i.e., state-actors) and their subjects (i.e., Publics).

ii. Actor II views the $\{G_{2.4}\}$, considering it played by *mediators* intervening for resolving conflicts, and that this actor's (i.e., Actor IV) strategic preference vector is composed of toothless or ineffective means for conflict management activating mediation and negotiation strategies with having no influence or apparent achievements in return.

c) The $HG_{2.3}$

- The $HG_{2.3}$ is Actor III's perceived hypergame within the $(HG)_2$ containing a. a knowledge that a hypergame is being played and awareness of all other players of the game (i.e., Actors I, II, and IV); b. certainty about who the hypergame's Actor II is, but uncertainty about its strategic preferences and actions made; d. strategic preference vector composed of: $\{(COD); \text{ and } (B-MNP)\}$ mixed strategies; e. Actor III's beliefs and perceptions over Actor II of being an *active* receiver-subject of an effective deterrence's global sphere of influence; and f. the belief that it (i.e., Actor III) might make its moves unilaterally or multilaterally.



- In the $HG_{2.3}$, Actor III does not perceive the game of Actor II, the $\{G_{2.2}\}$, while it perceives the games of Actor I and Actor IV, the $\{G_{2.1}$, and $G_{2.4}\}$, as follows:

i. Actor III understands the $\{G_{2.1}\}$ or the game played by Actor I in the $(HG)_2$ as global security maintaining and reinforcing-oriented game, in which Actor I's preference vector includes: (Conventional Conflict Management Strategies of Conflict-De-escalation; Bargaining; and Conflict Zones-Dispatched Collective Forces/Missions of Peacemaking and Peacebuilding/Peace enforcement).

ii. Actor III perceives the $\{G_{2.4}\}$ as a *mission game* operated by Actor I, in which neither Actor I nor Actor IV _ who has (Conventional Bargaining and Diplomacy Strategies) within its preference vector as understood by Actor III, has *capable* or *credible* threats or deterrence means for accomplishing such a mission; and that Actor IV is the structure-agent or the international system hegemons' client.

d) *The $HG_{2.4}$*

- The $HG_{2.4}$ is Actor IV's perceived hypergame within the $(HG)_2$ that includes a. knowledge of a hypergame being played and who the other players of the game are; b. certainty about the hypergame's Actor II, while existing uncertainty about its preference vector and moves; d. strategic preference vector composed of $\{(CL-D)\}$ pure strategy; e. beliefs over Actor II that it is the receiver-subject of a *collective* diplomacy's global spheres of influence; and f. perceiving Actor III as a capably and credibly *deterrent*-third party who might make its actions or decisions unilaterally or multilaterally.

- Within the $HG_{2.4}$, Actor IV perceives the games of Actor I and Actor III, the $\{G_{2.1}$, and $G_{2.3}\}$, but it does not perceive Actor II's _ the $\{G_{2.2}\}$, as to follow:

i. Actor IV understands that the $\{G_{2.1}\}$ is a conflict management game directed towards restoring global peace and security aim, in which Actor I's preference vector includes (Mediation, Negotiation, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding/Peace-Enforcement Strategies), perceiving that Actor I's perceptions of reality are based on multilateralism beliefs.

ii. Actor IV perceives the $\{G_{2.3}\}$ as a *power-showing game*, considering Actor III as Actor I's '*masculine*' mechanism, and a global security's maintaining side operating as the deterrence means-applying party; as well as understanding that Actor III's preference vector contains (Coercive Diplomacy, and Preventive/Collective Security-War Initiation Strategies).



Based on that, firstly, either $HG_{2.1}$, $HG_{2.2}$, $HG_{2.3}$, or $HG_{2.4}$, is a hypergame based on an actor's own understanding and interpretations of the game, perceptions of reality, available information, and reasoning of the other players' beliefs and perceptions, which all may be true or not. Also, those hypergames might be built upon misleading, inaccuracy, fault and defect, misperceiving, or/and misunderstanding. Secondly, the $(HG)_2$ includes those perceived four hypergames _ that are composed of other players' games, which we denote as: $(HG_{2.1} = \{G_{2.2}, G_{2.3}, G_{2.4}\}; HG_{2.2} = \{G_{2.3}, G_{2.4}\}; HG_{2.3} = \{G_{2.1}, G_{2.4}\}; HG_{2.4} = \{G_{2.1}, G_{2.3}\})$. Merging the (Strategic Interactions)² (entire) hypergame's perceived hypergames of Actors I, II, III, and IV altogether, where $\{(HG)_2 = (HG_{2.1} + HG_{2.2} + HG_{2.3} + HG_{2.4})\}$ while having an *overlap point* where a common knowledge of the conflict exists, the $(HG)_2$ is being played reaching equilibrium positions of this entire hypergame _ with dismissing any equilibria occurred within each player's separately perceived hypergame, rebalancing a would-be unbalanced hypergame model, which is explained below. Given the $(HG)_1$ and $(HG)_2$ entire hypergames, and each rebalanced model at an overlap point within the "*Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model*," the latter can be denoted as: $\{(PPHGM) = (HG)_1 (HG_{1.1}, HG_{1.2}) + (HG)_2 (HG_{2.1}, HG_{2.2}, HG_{2.3}, HG_{2.4})\}$.

b. The $(HG)_2$ Overlap Point's Strategic Interactions: A (Rebalanced Model)₂

- These strategic interactions resemble a neo-constructivism-institutionalism's transformation trajectory, in which the interactions tracks begin on global, regional, and national levels, respectively. Actor I, here, enhanced its sphere of influence to represent (Global Hegemonic Governance & Discourse, "(GHG-D)")³². Likewise, Actor II extended in leverage, representing (Global Publics & State-Actors "(GP&SA)").

³² If economic inputs determine political and social outcomes according to the Marxism or structuralism main axiom, and that hegemony is a power accumulated by both force of the most powerful (i.e., ruling capitalist classes) and consent of its subjects considering Gramscian theory of hegemony; then if Actor I or the global governance or government is *hegemonic* _ where being political and economic global hegemon is a condition here, this equals having a "sufficient" economic and political *capability* and *credibility* for repelling social attacks targeting social and conventional media outlets utilized as main means for this actor in achieving multi-level leverage and change of the global system within the given context applied to our model. That is to say; economic and political capability and credibility resulted from merging both the economic power and the generated political one with an internalized hegemony coined by the global governance/government actor, results in an *extended* outcome of another "social capability and credibility" of this actor after the latter's political and media discourse becomes such an integration's activated mechanism to be used within this model's context. Therefore, Actor I of the $(HG)_2$ is set as the (Global *Hegemonic* Governance & Discourse); and, using approximately the same reasoning, Actor I of the $(HG)_1$ was the (Elite/ruling classes & Discourse).



- Actor I, as a rational player and observer to the $(HG)_1$, begins the interactions, moving to the (Neutralization of Peace Spoiling Behaviors “(\pm PSB)”) strategic preference; an action made implicitly, thus deceiving Actor II in the $(HG)_2$ as to act in a similar course of action without having (complete) knowledge that it was Actor I’s decision or move. In this context, Actor II has misperceptions about the hypergame or possible future actions of Actor I.

- Simultaneously, Actor I activates the (Media Diplomacy of Peace-Hegemony-Oriented-(re-perceived) National Interests, “(MD-PHNI)”) strategy. Given the equilibriums of the precedent $(HG)_1$, Actor I, again, relies on Actor II’s misperceiving of its made moves, stimulating the latter to behave within its preferred interactions realm.

- Sequentially, Actor II absorbing a peace state as a “Hegemonic Institution, Perceptions, and Predispositions, and Re-perceived Reality, (H-IPR),” globally, regionally, and nationally, within the (MD-PHNI) strategy’s effects domain, prefers as a rational player and a (still) subject of Actor I, the (Re-constructed Peace “(RCP)”) strategic choice with excepted maximized utility of a perceived outcome to result.

- In a simultaneous move of Actor II’s action, Actor I, based on the rationality arguments of how the other reasons seeking an expected utility, moves to the (Imposed Peace-Consensus “(IPC)”) action _ as a hegemonic actor accumulating power of both force capabilities it owns and consent of the publics.

- A (Global Transformation Initial Realm, “(GTIR)”) outcome arises, here, as the output of choosing the {(Neutralization); (Media Diplomacy + PH-NI)} strategies simultaneously by Actor I firstly; and secondly, using the {(Re-constructed Peace); (Imposed Peace-Consensus)} pair of strategies by Actor II, and Actor I, respectively, in a sequential move by the former, and a simultaneous one by the last.

Indeed, Actor I’s dependence on existing a misperceived game or reality of how it reasons or what its preferences or actions (decisions) are, allows this player to randomize its choices while having unavailable information to Actor II, playing *simultaneously* in a basically extensive form game distinguished by its sequential-move nature, and enjoying a two-moving sequences advantage at the same move as well; while considering Actor II its deceived subject who, unknowing that a hypergame is being played, may not _ or mistakenly, reason(s) what Actor I’s *actual* strategic preference vectors or actions/decisions are.



- Another outcome results in the $(HG)_2$ at the overlap point, that is, the (Adoption and Gratification (AD-G) Sphere), with Actor II's using of the (Adoption and Gratification) strategy sequentially to Actor I's choice of the (Imposed Peace-Consensus) one _ where the misperceiving Actor II is a subject of this strategy's effects domain (i.e., the IPC's) re-acting upon it.
- An actor, "Actor IV" in the $(HG)_2$, mediates the strategic interactions circle, playing a central conflict-mediation role. This actor constitutes "Collective Diplomacy Spheres" using the (Collective Diplomacy "(CL-D)") pure strategy _ which is the only strategy it has in the game, simultaneously with Actor I's (Neutralization) move. Actor IV is the (International Mediators Team "IMT") or another *symmetrically* constituted (International Mediation Institution "IMI"). Therefore, the (Strategic Interactions)² begins with a simultaneous-move initial play by Actor I and Actor IV as observers to the precedent $(HG)_1$ and the previous *unbalanced* model of $(HG)_2$.
- Another player interferes here, which is the "Pressure-Practicing Powers (3P)," or the "Actor III" in $(HG)_2$. Meanwhile, the "Coercive Diplomacy Sphere" constitutes by the (3P)'s intervention, choosing the (Coercive Diplomacy "COD") strategic alternative in a sequential move after Actor I's moving to the (Neutralization) action and Actor IV's using of (CL-D) strategy.
- By the end of the (Strategic Interactions)², both Actor I and Actor III move to the (Bargaining Strategies: Mediation, Negotiation, and Peace Talks, "(B-MNP)") same strategic choice simultaneously, sequentially after the "(AD-G) Sphere" outcome results, and under (Interference Effects "IEs") of Actor IV's (CL-D) strategy _ considering how those actors (i.e., Actor I and Actor III) perceive this strategy.
- The accumulated output of all $(HG)_2$'s interactions, at the overlap point, is the (Peace-Hegemony-Oriented-Mass-Ideological Rehabilitation, "(MIR)") strategy outcome. That is to say, rehabilitation as one of the (Conventional Constructivist Strategies) diffused and internalized first regionally and nationally within the (Strategic Interactions)¹ hypergame was to target the conflicting parties and their communities only. However, the (MIR) within the $(HG)_2$ is a "*mixed strategy-outcome*," distinguishably resulting from the previously used strategies of Actors I, IV, III, and II, collectively, which is also an *extended* output on global, regional, and national levels, respectively, including the whole global publics.



- Based on that, *the (HG)₂'s equilibriums* are these three strategy-outcomes of expected maximized utility:

- i. Firstly, the (Global Transformation Initial Realm) equilibrium as a known and perceived outcome for Actor I and Actor II.

- ii. Secondly, the (Adoption and Gratification Sphere) and the (Peace-Hegemony-Oriented-Mass-Ideological Rehabilitation) equilibriums, which are perceived and known outcomes for Actor I (i.e., the deceiver) and unperceived and unknown outcomes for Actor II (i.e., the deceived). Furthermore, Actor IV and Actor III _ who is the (COD) strategy applying party, are assumed to make their {(CL-D), and (B-MNP)} moves, consecutively, “*multilaterally*” with Actor I, which we referred to as “*simultaneous-move plays*” in the (Strategic Interactions)². So, an expected utility acquired by that player (i.e., Actor I) in the given context entails that those players (i.e., Actors IV and III) obtain *absolute* gains or shares within this utility's related payoffs in real-world circumstances as in the (HG)₂, which is explained below.

- Out of the {(HG)₁ + (HG)₂} two entire-hypergames equilibriums, the (*Positivity of Peace Equilibrium* “PPE”) of the (PPHGM) results, expressing this binary formula, see [Figure 1](#): “Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War’s Inevitability, (GHP vs. RHW).” The last is an active, feasible, and viable translation of transforming the international system into a state of durable, sustainable, and positive (win-win) *peace* globally, regionally, and nationally, as proven through the (PPE) equation illustrated in the following section.

4.2. Second: The Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model’s Equilibrium Equations

In the (PPHGM), either Actors I and II in the (HG)₁, or Actors I, II, III, and IV in the (HG)₂ may *not* perceive all outcomes reached of the entire hypergame since each player chooses a strategy depending on its own interpretations and perceptions of the game and the reality of intra-or/and inter-state conflicts. Still, a known outcome, or unknown one to an actor or more which is a strategic surprise in this case, within our hypergame model, is considered “*stable*” given that the player cannot change from a perceived outcome unilaterally. The (PPHGM) is thus seen as a hypergame played by all, with all, versus all. In this section, using the strategic preference vector of every actor as stability information, we show how equilibriums, determined above, of the entire (HG)₁ and (HG)₂ at the overlap point might be proven through



some input-output relations equations. Also, each player may perceive an expected maximized utility correctly or incorrectly when using a given strategy within this context.

4.2.1. The (Strategic Interactions)¹ Equilibrium Equation: (SI¹EE)

$$\xrightarrow{\text{Input}} \square A^1 ((C) + (D) + (CC)) + A^2 ((PPF) + (OPH)) \xrightarrow{\text{Output}} \square \{ (EP-MIR)^{U(1+2)} + (PBD)^{U(1+2)+U(1)} ((FPH)^{U(1+2)} + (OPH)^{U(1)}) \}$$

- The (SI¹EE) Assumptions: i. (A¹) is Actor I, and (A²) is Actor II of the (Strategic Interactions)¹; ii. the {(C) + (D) + (CC)} are (A¹)’s chosen strategies of (Cultivation; Disciplinization; Conventional Constructivist approaches) respectively, within this interactions’ equation; iii. the {(PPF) + (OPH)} are (A²)’s used strategies of (Peace-Public Flak; Omnipotent Peace Hegemony) _ where the second strategy is an extension of the first.

- The (SI¹EE)’s outputs: i. first; the (Elite-Publics’ Mutually Impact Realm “EP-MIR”) strategy (unknown) outcome with U (Utility) of (A¹) and (A²), denoted in the equation as {U (1+2)} where (1; and 2) numbers refer to Actor I, and Actor II, respectively. ii. Second, the (Peace-Broker Discourse “PBD”) *extended* strategy-outcome that is composed of a. the (Fledgling Peace-Hegemony “FPH”) first “input-shifted-output strategy” with a utility of both, {U (1+2)}, perceived by (A¹) and (A²). Moreover, b. the (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony “OPH”), which is the second “input-shifted-output strategy” with an expected utility of (A¹) only, denoted as “U (1)” _ where the (OPH) is an unknown outcome for (A²) due to the incomplete/misled information it has about the game and reality. Nevertheless, the accumulated or “Collective Utility (CU)” of both actors’ strategic actions results within the (PPE) equation, including aggregative payoffs for all. Still, choosing the (OPH) strategy as extended input of its first used strategic choice, (A²) was perceiving an increase in its utility within the (SI)¹ while reasonably raising the (A¹)’s instead, given who the latter is and what a perceived hypergame it has. So, the misperception and deception practiced by (A¹) versus (A²) became a way of balance achieved either in future utility’s payoffs or stable positions reached at the (SI)²’s end.

4.2.2. The (Strategic Interactions)² Equilibrium Equation: (SI²EE)

$$\xrightarrow{\text{Input}} \square A^1 ((\pm PSB) + (MD-PHNI) + (IPC)) + IMI (CL-D) + 3P (COD) + A^2 ((RCP) + (AD-G)) + IEs ((A^1 + 3P) (B-MNP)) \xrightarrow{\text{Output}} \square \{ (GTIR)^{U(1+2)} + (AD-G)^{U(1)} + (MIR)^{U(1+ag(3+4))} \}$$



- The (SI²EE) Assumptions: i. (A¹) is Actor I, and (A²) is Actor II of the (Strategic Interactions)²; ii. the {(± PSB) + (MD-PHNI) + (IPC)} are the used strategies of {(Neutralization of Peace Spoiling Behaviors); (Media Diplomacy of Peace Hegemony-Oriented-(re-perceived) National Interests); (Imposed Peace-Consensus)} consecutively, by (A¹) within this interactions' equation; iii. the (IMI) is Actor IV in the (HG)₂ or the "International Mediation Institution (or the "IMT")," having the (Collective Diplomacy "CL-D") pure strategy; iv. (3P) is Actor III or the (Pressure-Practicing Powers), while the (COD) is the (Coercive Diplomacy) strategy it uses; v. the {(RCP) + (AD-G)} are the chosen strategies of {(Re-Constructed Peace); (Adoption and Gratification)} by (A²) in the (SI)²; vi. both (A¹) and (3P) move to the (Bargaining Strategies of Mediation, Negotiation, and Peace Talks, "B-MNP") strategy multilaterally by the (SI)²'s end, under (Interference Effects "IEs") of Actor IV's (CL-D) strategy.

- The (SI²EE) outputs: the (Strategic Interactions)² equation output is assumed to be:

- i. the (Global Transformation Initial Realm "GTIR") strategy outcome with mixed utility (U) of (A¹) and (A²), denoted as {U (1+2)}, which is an outcome known and perceived by both.

- ii. The (Adoption and Gratification Sphere "AD-G") strategy outcome that is perceived and known for (A¹) and unperceived and unknown for (A²), with an expected utility of (A¹) only, {U (1)}. In that case, being a misperceiving player and subject to (A¹) under the (IPC) strategy effects' domain, (A²) made a choice (i.e., "AD-G" strategy) that raises (A¹) utility within the (SI)², however, maintaining a (Collective Utility) for both in the (PPE) equation.

- iii. The (Peace-Hegemony-Oriented-Mass-Ideological Rehabilitation, "MIR") strategy outcome. Since the last is a mixed strategy-outcome standing directly in Actor I's interests' realm, perceived and known for (A¹) while being unknown for the other players in the (SI)², the expected utility of this outcome (if resulted) is assumed to be obtained by (A¹) _ given who this player is and its perceived hypergame. In this context, Actor III and Actor IV playing their {(B-MNP); (CL-D)} strategies multilaterally with (A¹), obtain "Absolute Gains (ag)" out of the Actor I's received utility here. This utility's interrelation is denoted in the (SI²EE) as: {U (1 + ag (3+4))} where (1; 3; and 4) numbers refer to Actor I, Actor III, and Actor IV, respectively.



4.3.3. The Positivity of Peace Equilibrium Equation (PPEE): The (PPHGM)’s Solution Point

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\text{Outputs}}{\text{Input}} &\square \left\{ \left((\text{EP-MIR}) + (\text{PBD}) \right)^{\text{CU} (U^2 (1+2) + U (1))} + \left((\text{GTIR}) + (\text{AD-G}) \right. \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \left. + (\text{MIR}) \right)^{\text{CU} (U (1+2) + U (1) + U (1 + \text{ag} (3+4)))} \right\} \\
 \frac{\text{Total}}{\text{Output}} &\square \left\{ (\text{GHP})^{\text{CU} (U^3 (1+2) + U^2 (1) + U (1 + \text{ag} (3+4)))} - (\text{RHW})^{-\text{CU}} \right\} \\
 \text{PPE} &\simeq \left\{ \left((\text{EP-MIR}) + (\text{PBD}) \right)^{\text{CU} (U^2 (1+2) + U (1))} + \left((\text{GTIR}) + (\text{AD-G}) \right. \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \left. + (\text{MIR}) \right)^{\text{CU} (U (1+2) + U (1) + U (1 + \text{ag} (3+4)))} \right\} \\
 &\simeq \left\{ (\text{GHP})^{\text{CU} (U^3 (1+2) + U^2 (1) + U (1 + \text{ag} (3+4)))} - (\text{RHW})^{-\text{CU}} \right\}
 \end{aligned}$$

In the (PPHGM), the *Positivity of Peace Equilibrium* (PPE) refers to the *highest utility point* reached by all actors when using their strategies simultaneously within an *unlimited* domain of strategic interactions occurring over more than one entire hypergame. Under the (HG)₁ or the (HG)₂, not all actors, having their own perceived hypergames, perceive or know (exactly) the other’s/opponent’s strategic preference vector, the game’s (all) players, or the others’ (actual) games. Substituting the standard rationality arguments of game theory, reaching the (PPE) conditions that each player calculates an expected utility of its chosen strategy depending on the belief of how the other reasons, what perceptions the other player/opponent has about the game and reality, and the available information. Therefore, in multiple games-based-hypergame models, misperception and deception can occur, and an outcome may be unknown for one player or more, rationally resulting in a utility or payoffs received by both. Nevertheless, as no player can deviate unilaterally from an equilibrium’s reached position, such an unknown outcome is seen *stable* as well as the received payoffs or the maximized utility relevant to it.

Since some equilibriums illustrated above do achieve utility for some players without others, those stable positions are considered aggregately outputs-input for having the most stable point of the whole model as total output, which is the “Positivity of Peace Equilibrium.” Here, no player would have the incentive to deviate from that stability point with the highest payoffs received by all _ not equally but equivalently coinciding with each one’s actual position in a real world-circumstances within this equilibrium domain. So, in the (PPHGM), all actors accumulate *absolute* gains by which both win; however, unequivocally given the difference in



distributing the payoffs achieved. Simultaneously, this equilibrium or (PPE) entails that the international system's aggressors are *deterred* or/and *detractable* through the input strategies used by the (HG)₂'s third and fourth actors (i.e., the "3P," and "IMI/IMT") within the (SI²EE).

Accordingly, based on the (SI¹EE) and (SI²EE) assumptions, the (Positivity of Peace Equilibrium Equation) is reached through the integration of accumulated-"outputs and utility" of the (SI)¹ and (SI)²'s equilibrium equations, proving the following:

i. *The central premise equation:* The outputs' input of $\{(EP-MIR) + (PBD) ((FPH) + (OPH))\}$ strategy outcomes in the (SI¹EE), and the $\{(GTIR) + (AD-G) + (MIR)\}$ strategy outcomes in the (SI²EE), leads to this total output: (Global Hegemony of Peace "GHP"), eliminating the (Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability, "RHW") strategy outcome if the latter's related (Collective Utility "CU") for both (A¹) and (A²), *primarily*, is less than zero.

ii. *The (PPE) is approximately or equivalently equals; first:* the dual-output of $\{(EP-MIR) + (PBD)\}$ in the (SI¹EE), where this output's (Collective Utility "CU") is the sum of a. (A¹) and (A²)'s doubled-maximized utility; and b. (A¹)'s own maximized utility. This is denoted as: $\{CU (U^2 (1+2) + U (1))\}$. *Second:* the triple-output of the (SI²EE), containing the $\{(GTIR) + (AD-G) + (MIR)\}$ strategy outcomes, with (CU) representing the sum of a. (A¹) and (A²)'s maximized utility; b. (A¹)'s own maximized utility; and c. (A¹)'s *extra* maximized utility including absolute gains/shares (ag) within for the (HG)₂'s Actor III and Actor IV. This is expressed in the (PPEE) through this formula: $\{CU (U (1+2) + U (1) + U (1 + ag (3+4)))\}$.

iii. *The conditionality of the (PPE):* this equilibrium is assumed to occur when the last strategy outcome of (SI)¹, which is the (PBD), and that of the (SI)², which is the (MIR), become parallel with each other in *real-world circumstances* while having internal parallel relations of some "*transformational strategies*" in the (SI)² used by: a. (A¹) or the (Global Hegemonic Governance & Discourse "GHG-D") actor for all its chosen strategies; b. Actor IV (i.e., "IMI/IMT") for its (Collective Diplomacy "CL-D") pure strategy; c. Actor III (i.e., the "3P") for its (Coercive Diplomacy "COD") strategy; and d. Actor II or the (Global Publics and State-Actors) for its (Adoption and Gratification "AD-G") strategy. Those are "*Conditional Parallel Relations (CPRs)*" of the (Positivity of Peace Equilibrium "PPE"), which we can denote as follows _ where the (So; Sn; S) are the abbreviations of (Strategy Outcome, Strategy Numbers, and Strategy) consecutively:



$$(CPR_s)^{PPE} \approx \{(GHP - (RHW)^{-CU})\} \parallel \{(PBD)_{so} \parallel (GHG-D)_{sn} \parallel (CL-D)_s \parallel (COD)_s \parallel (AD-G)_s \parallel (MIR)_{so}\}$$

iv. *The (PPE) and the extended output:* Constituting out of the (SI¹EE) and (SI²EE)'s outputs, which are shifted to be input in the first (PPEE), the (Positivity of Peace Equilibrium) thus is also *equivalent* to the resulted total output, or the (GHP – (RHW)^{-CU}) in this given context. That is an extended output with a *total* Collective Utility (CU), which reflects the sum of a. (A¹) and (A²)'s tripled (accumulated) utility; b. (A¹)'s own doubled (accumulated) utility; and c. (A¹)'s extra utility with Actors III and IV's absolute gains/shares. The total (CU) mentioned is denoted in the (PPE)'s equation as:

$\{(CU (U^3 (1+2) + U^2 (1) + U (1 + ag (3+4)))\}$, conditioning the elimination of the (Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability, "RHW") *opposite* strategy-outcome, if existed, and the value of its related (Collective Utility) was minus, (-CU), or less than zero, mainly for (A¹) and (A²) collectively.

Ultimately, the last condition is the justification term of a *limited* zone of a collective diplomacy-or/and deterrence's failure-generated-necessitated collective security war(s) initiated by the (HG)₂'s Actor I. That is if this war serves the "*common good or virtue*" of (HG)₁ and (HG)₂'s Actor I and Actor II altogether with a (CU)'s value for both higher than zero _ provided that "zero" is a value refers to the possible elimination of any or some of those actors in favor of the other(s). Based on that, the deterrence field will still have leverage over aggressors in the system who are demanded to be constrained but for the '*collective*' human good/interest maintaining purposes. Finally, we prove the validity of this model's hypothesis: "The binary formula of "Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability (GHP vs. RHW)" is the equilibrium or solution point of a positivity of peace developed relevant-hypergame model."

5. The Multi-Level Conflict Management Approach's Second Model: A "Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model (BPSHM)"

Preliminary: The (BPSHM)'s Main Assumptions

Within this model, there are two essential hypergames; one resembles an intra-state conflict case and the other of an inter-state conflict one, in a dynamic sequential-move game based on misperception and incomplete information. The key focus is on modeling a conflict through developing an applicable reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-



merged diplomacy hypergame-approach. Accordingly, this model applies to a specific context of application where the major conflicting parties represent the political authority and non-fighting dissident (artificially branded as terrorist) group(s)/movement(s) in the first model (intra-state). At the same time, those parties refer to the most powerful state and the less powerful one, or equally powerful two states, in the second model (inter-state). The basic definition of (reconciliation) within this model's context is that; it is a grand strategy reflected through these intra-and inter-state strategies: i. the (Social, Political, and Diplomatic Integration) cross-state-structures, and the (Limited Power-Sharing), intra-state; and ii. the (Peace-Process Initiation/Implementation), and the (Integration) diplomatically, politically, economically, and socially, cross-societies. In the (BPSHM), other assumptions exist; these are:

i. The (BPSHM) is a first-level hypergame model based on incomplete information where all actors are rational players, reasoning about the other's beliefs and perceptions of the game and reality. In this hypergame model, some players are not aware of other players in the game or/and their moves and actions (i.e., decisions). So, the players may have misperceptions about the game. At the same time, each has its own view of the conflict intra-or inter-state depending on their perspectives, interpretation, and understanding of the reality of conflict and how the other players reason about the game. Furthermore, any may have some equilibriums in its perceived game relying on its beliefs that these positions represent the game's solution(s). Still, mapping the model through matching equilibria (i.e., outcomes/solutions) reached by players at given positions _ even if some do not perceive that, contributes to reflecting stable outcomes of the entire hypergame, dismissing those perceived separately in every player's game. So that choosing the strategic actions of an expected high utility, excepting those of zero- or less-utility values seeking the most stable positions of best utility obtained by all players when using their strategies simultaneously, mirrors *Nash equilibrium* positions within this model's two hypergames' mapping function of relating outcomes between the players' individual games.

ii. The (BPSHM) is a dynamic hypergame resembling a *future* second play of a previously played (hyper)game of intra-and inter-state conflicts under real-world circumstances. So, after observing other players' moves/actions in a precedent play in the past and previous action(s) in a sequential-move current (future) hypergame, each actor randomizes its choices, depending on what other(s) chose first within a *reductionist* model focusing on



relating outcomes between individual games. Thus, each uses newly chosen strategies or/and enhances previously used ones to reach a balance point of stable and higher utility for all simultaneously – which any could not have achieved in that first play or the past (hyper)game. In sum, this model's two hypergames do not represent sub-games that emerged from nodes of extensive-form games (i.e., sequential-move games); instead, they are entirely replayed hypergames.

iii. The payoffs or utility value: Instead of referring to the utility achieved of a reached position when picking a pair(s) of strategies by some players in numbers or symbols, we assumed that the players' payoffs/gains at those positions occurred in the two hypergames are best described by providing a value of each player's payoffs at an equilibrium, averages between $\{-\}$ to $\{0\}$ to $\{1\}$ of a utility (U), dividing these values into six categories as follows:

- a. The $\{U_{-u}\}$ or (*minus-utility value*) when the player becomes “*severely worse off*” in the game.
- b. The $\{U_Z\}$, which represents the (*zero-utility value*) with the player being “*worse off*.”
- c. The $\{U_{0.1}, U_{0.2}, U_{0.3}\}$ category: that describes the (*low-utility value*) or the (U_L) when the player is “*slightly better off*.”
- d. The $\{U_{0.4}, U_{0.5}, U_{0.6}\}$ category of a (*mid-utility value*) or the (U_M), for the player who is “*moderately/adequately better off*.”
- e. The $\{U_{0.7}, U_{0.8}, U_{0.9}\}$ category of a (*high-utility value*) or the (U_H), if the player is “*highly better off*” by making an action. Where the $\{U_{-u} < U_Z < U_{0.1} < U_{0.2} < U_{0.3} < U_{0.4} < U_{0.5} < U_{0.6} < U_{0.7} < U_{0.8} < U_{0.9}\}$.
- f. The $\{U_1\}$: this is the (*highest-utility value*) absolutely in the hypergame or the (*perfect-utility value*), where the $(U_1) > (U_{0.9})$.

iv. At last, *comprehensiveness* is the primary basis of modeling intra-and inter-state conflicts within this model's specific context. Namely, the model does not deal with only the given domain of actions and reactions between each hypergame's players but also considers those *intermediate* variables/factors that could exist along with the analyzed strategic interactions.



5.1. First: The Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model's Intra-State Hypergame "(HG)₁"

5.1.1. The (HG)₁'s Description: Assumptions and Hypothesis

In this first-level hypergame model, we have four players who are: {(Political Authority "PA"); (Dissident Group(s)/Movement(s))³³ "DG"); (Mediation Power "MP"); and (Coercive-Diplomacy Power "CP")}. The (HG)₁ is considered the future (second) play of a previously played (hyper)game in the past. This current (future) hypergame is composed of the game understood by every actor, where each comprises perceived preference vectors of other players. This can be denoted as: (HG)₁ = {G_{1.1}, G_{1.2}, G_{1.3}, G_{1.4}}; and G_{1.1} = {V_{1.2}, V_{1.3}}, G_{1.2} = {V_{1.1}}, G_{1.3} = {V_{1.1}, V_{1.2}}, and G_{1.4} = {V_{1.1}, V_{1.2}, V_{1.3}}, as we explain below. Where {(HG)₁; (G_{1.1}); (G_{1.2}); (G_{1.3}); (G_{1.4})} abbreviations refer to {(the (BPSHM)'s first hypergame); (the game perceived by player I or "PA"); (the game perceived by player II or "DG"); (the game perceived by player III or "MP"); (the game perceived by player IV or "CP")}. Comparingly, the {V_{1.1}; V_{1.2}; V_{1.3}; V_{1.4}} refer respectively to the strategic preference vectors of the {(PA); (DG); (MP); and (CP)} players considering how the other actors in the game perceive one player's vector.

The central premise of the (BPSHM)'s (HG)₁ is: "Initiating a peace process between major conflicting parties by the political authority in intra-state conflicts reaching a balance of peace-state does not necessarily depend on opting for a mature mediation's conflict ripeness moment or the mutually-hurting stalemate one." Accordingly, this model's first hypothesis is: "A balance of peace-state within nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties socially, politically, and diplomatically at any phase during and post-intra-state conflicts."

5.1.2. The (HG)₁'s Perceived Games:

a. The G_{1.1}: Political Authority's

In an incomplete information hypergame either played in the past or future, the (PA) who is the most influential and important participant of the game, has a strategic preference vector (i.e., the V_{1.1}), contains these actions: a. (Branding and Naming "BN"); b. (Systematic

³³ In this model, the (Dissident Group(s)/Movement(s)) player represents those groups of people who are branded as a terrorist group(s)/organization(s) nationally artificially for some political purposes without committing actual-terrorist acts/behaviors identified legally. So, dealing with terrorist groups does not lie within this model's limits.



Persecution “SP”); c. (Social, Political, and Diplomatic Integration “GR”); d. (Limited Power-Sharing “LPS”); e. (Imposed Disciplinary Doctrine “IDD”). In this model, the (PA) randomizes its choices between the last three strategic moves, reasoning about other players’ beliefs and perceptions of the game and reality. Where the probability (p) of every strategic preference in the *future* (second) play (i.e., the (BPSHM)’s $(HG)_1$) is: i. ($p \leq 0$) for the {(BN); and (SP)}; and ii. $\{(0 < p \leq 1)\}$ for the {(GR); (LPS); and (IDD)} _ given that the (PA) cannot activate the {(GR); and (LPS)} actions if it did not deactivate first the {(BN), and (SP)} strategies if used. In contrast, the (p) in the *past* (first) play were: i. $\{(0 < p \leq 1)\}$ for the {(BN); (SP); and (IDD)} strategic preferences; and ii. $\{p \leq 0\}$ for the {(GR); and (LPS)} actions.

In the $G_{1.1}$, the (PA) perceives the $(V_{1.2})$ as a preference vector of these actions: a. (Terrorism); b. (Social Disorder and Chaos Creation); c. (National Treason or/and Foreign Agenda Adoption). So, from its own perspective of the conflict and interpretation of the game, moving to the {(GR); and (LPS)} preferences means making decisions upon a risk taken, under a level of uncertainty about how actually the (DG) actor reasons. Also, the (PA) player understands that the $(V_{1.3})$ includes a. (Biased-Mediation); and b. (Foreign Powers Interests Serving) actions. Comparingly, in the $(G_{1.1})$, the (PA) actor has a lack of information about the $(V_{1.4})$, since it is not aware of the (CP) player _ given that it is a modeling of intra-state conflicts in real-world circumstances without addressing ‘fighting’ dissident groups. Thus, the (PA) makes its moves and actions (decisions) depending on its beliefs of “state sovereignty,” excluding the possibility of the (CP)’s interference until it occurs explicitly in the hypergame. In sum, those preference vectors included in the $(G_{1.1})$ refer to how the (PA) perceives the hypergame, which may be built on a misled understanding or incorrect interpretation. This game is denoted as: $G_{1.1} = \{V_{1.2}, V_{1.3}\}$.

b. The $G_{1.2}$: Dissident Group(s)/Movement(s)’s

The (DG) player has a preference vector (i.e., the $V_{1.2}$) along with the entire hypergame, including these strategic moves: a. (Rebellion/Revolution “RR”); b. (Regime Change “RC”); c. (Maintenance of State-System’s Existing Political Structures “MSSEPS”); d. (Existing Regime’s Mass-Legitimization and Consensus “ERMLC”). Where the probability (p) of those strategic actions in the *past* (first) play were: i. $\{(0 < p \leq 1)\}$ for the {(RR); and (RC)}; and ii. $\{p \leq 0\}$ for the {(MSSEPS); and (ERMLC)}. On the other hand, the probabilities in the *future* (second) play are: i. $\{(0 \leq p < 0.5)\}$ for the {(RR); and (RC)} strategic actions; and ii. $\{(0 < p$



$< 1\}$ for the $\{(MSSEPS); \text{ and } (ERMLC)\}$ – given that the (PA) actor’s strategies used in the first play are the $\{(BN); \text{ and } (SP)\}$, and the (DG) is aware of the (PA) either in the past or a current (future) game, while the former is the reaction to the last’s actions in this sequential-move second play. Within $(G_{1.2})$, the (DG) player understands that the $(V_{1.1})$ entails this set of actions along with the conflict course: a. (State-Terrorism); b. (Suppression and Injustice); c. (Political Authoritarianism/Dictatorship). In contrast, the (DG) actor is not aware of the $\{(MP); \text{ and } (CP)\}$ players in the $(HG)_1$. Therefore, there is a lack of information in the $(G_{1.2})$ about the $\{V_{1.3}; \text{ and } V_{1.4}\}$ where that player does not perceive them. This is denoted as: $G_{1.2} = \{V_{1.1}\}$.

c. The $G_{1.3}$: Mediation Power’s

The (MP) was not a player in the past play but only in the second one. It has a (Neutral-Positive Mediation “N-PM”) strategic move within its preference vector (i.e., the $V_{1.3}$) – which is a pure strategy, of this probability: $\{(0 < p \leq 1)\}$ in the game. In the $G_{1.3}$, the (MP) player perceives that the $(V_{1.1})$ contains a. (Nation-State-Stabilization); b. (Security and Order Imposing); and c. (Maintaining and Reinforcing the Political Regime’s Pillars) strategic actions. The same actor understands that the $(V_{1.2})$ includes two preferences: a. (Rebellion/Revolution); and b. (Regime Change). The (MP) is not aware of the (CP) player and does not perceive its $(V_{1.4})$, therefore. So, this game is denoted as: $G_{1.3} = \{V_{1.1}, V_{1.2}\}$.

d. The $G_{1.4}$: Coercive-Diplomacy Power’s

The (CP) was also not a player in the past play but an actor of the second one only. It has a strategic preference vector (i.e., the $V_{1.4}$) including a. (Active-Coercive Diplomacy “A-COD”); b. (Pro-Conflict Settlement/Resolution Policy-Making Participation, “P-CS/R-PP”), where the probability of the first is: $(0 < p < 1)$, and of the second is: $(0 < p < 0.5)$. In $G_{1.4}$, the (CP) player perceives all other players’ preference vectors in the $(HG)_1$. It understands the $\{V_{1.1}; \text{ and } V_{1.2}\}$ from the same perspective of the (MP) within the $(G_{1.3})$. However, the (CP) is aware of the (MP) player, perceiving that the $(V_{1.3})$ contains a (Biased-Mediation) strategic move, relying on its interpretation of the conflict. This game is denoted as: $G_{1.4} = \{V_{1.1}, V_{1.2}, V_{1.3}\}$.



5.1.3. The (HG)₁'s Strategic Interactions, equilibria, and Expected Utility: Relating Outcomes Between Individual games in a Mapping Function

a. The “Mini-Maximum Equilibrium” & Conflict Settlement: Zero-Mediation Stage


- Within the state-system structure, the (PA) player (i.e., Political Authority) having the first-move advantage in the (HG)₁ initiates (In) the game, choosing the (Social, Political, and Diplomatic Integration “GR”) strategic action. In a misperception game where the players may misunderstand or not perceive others’ moves/actions, the (PA) makes a second move which is the (Imposed Disciplinary Doctrine “IDD”), simultaneously with its chosen first one. This (IDD) strategic preference includes the (Surveillance & State-Disciplinary Power) mechanisms. The last is a significant factor that distinguishes authoritarian regimes as well as (some) liberal-democrat ones. Also, under the (IDD) action, the (PA) employs the (*state-discourse*) practices across all state-structures to be both “*pro-integration*” and an “*all-seeing eye*” of the whole society’s (individual) behaviors. Namely, instead of excluding unacceptable behaviors that ran against the (PA) and naming, shaming, or/and branding them, within the realm of that (IDD) move of the (HG)₁, this player contains those behaviors under a pro-(not anti)-still existing-disciplinary power, directing them toward this new course of action.

- Thence, the political-social integration becomes the coin of the day versus the branding and naming, under an *amended* inclusive not exclusive (Imposed Disciplinary Doctrine) strategy applied within both the nation-state structures’ all-seeing-eye or surveillance mechanisms and the political, media, religious, and academia mainstream discourse’s discursive formations, as well.

- Given that this is a comprehensive hypergame that considers some interference factors, the last picked actions of the (PA) player preserve a (Conditionality of Existence Zone) factor. Since this actor perceives that the Dissident Group(s) or (DG) player may resume the (Rebellion/Revolution) action chosen in the hypergame’s first (past) play. Within this “(CO-EX) Zone,” the (DG) becomes a “*contained subject*” of the (PA), imprisoned ‘*freely*’ in an open panopticon society, instead of undergoing *actual* imprisonment conditions that more likely create future chaos or social disorder out of revenge tactics due to (harsh) oppression and social suppression methods followed under the domain of the (Systematic Persecution “SP”) (PA)’s strategic move of the first play. That would occur if the (DG) actor preferred its {(RR); or/and (RC)} strategic actions over the others, whose probability is: $\{(0 \leq p < 0.5)\}$ in this stage.



Figure 2: The Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model: The Intra-State Hypergame “(HG)₁”



- The (PA) as a rational player chose the “negative with vs. devastating without” formula _ given the expected chaotic social and political positions in the mentioned probabilities. Based on that, an outcome arises, which is not only an equilibrium within the (PA)’s perceived game, but also it became an equilibrium of the entire (HG)₁. It is the (Panopticon Society Sphere), which is resulted from using the {(GR); (IDD)} strategies under the (CO-EX) Zone, with the (DG) player choosing to *neutralize* the possibility of picking the {(RR); and (RC)} strategies at this position of the game. *This can be denoted as: {PA ((GR), (IDD) + (CO-EX)); DG (± {(RR + RC))} _* where the (RR + RC) actions’ probability is ($p = 0$) at this equilibrium position. This reached outcome is the “Mini-Maximum Equilibrium” of our (BPSHM)’s (HG)₁, which is the exit of a previous “zero-sum game” of this hypergame’s past first-play.

The payoffs or expected utility resulted when reaching the (HG)₁’s (Mini-Maximum Equilibrium) is: {(U_{M-1}, U_{L-1})} for the (PA), and (DG) players respectively _ where the (M-1) is a “mid-level” utility, representing the (U_{0.6}) value gained by the (AP). Moreover, the (L-1) indicates “low-level,” reflecting the (U_{0.3}) utility value obtained by the (DG) at the same position in the game. In this context, the (U_{L-1}) value is close to being a mid-level utility that starts by the (U_{0.4}) value _ according to our categories of the hypergame’s expected utilities mentioned above. Likewise, the (U_{M-1}) value is near the high-level utility’s first estimate, the



($U_{0.7}$). So, for settling the conflict and under this exact equilibrium, the (PA) player who is the most potent conflicting party could achieve *'less than higher,'* which is the “minimum of the payoffs’ maximum.” At the same time, the (DG) actor gains *'more than less'* in return, which is the “maximum of the minimum.” This outcome, known for the (PA) only while being unknown for the (DG), is *stable* since both become better off receiving higher payoffs than before at a stable position of the hypergame.

- Accordingly, using sequentially these strategies $\{PA ((GR), (IDD) + (CO-EX)); DG (\pm \{(RR + RC)\})\}$ is the Mini-Maximum Equilibrium, which is stable even if the game ends by this stage, since playing backward may have caused the $\{(U_{-u}, U_{-u}); (U_Z, U_Z); (U_Z, U_{-u}); (U_{-u}, U_Z); (U_M, U_{-u}); (U_{-u}, U_M); (U_M, U_Z); (U_Z, U_M)\}$ eight utility’s cases for the (PA), and (DG) players consecutively, in a possible *repeated* zero-sum game. In this case, either one or both become(s) (*severely*) worse off (i.e., the first four cases); or one player *adequately* wins _ when getting the $\{U_M\}$, at the expense of the other (i.e., the last four cases), under this hypergame’s given context.

- Within this stage, a (Socio-Political Reconciliation Sphere’s (PA)’s Starting Point, “(S-PRS) PA’s SPO”) occurs, like a circle in a chain for other points to come, see Figure 2.

b. The Nash equilibrium & conflict resolution: A mediatory non-state actors’ stage

- The (Mediation Power) or the (MP) player who is a non-state actor in this *intra-state* hypergame, being aware of the (PA) and (DG) players and that the (Rebellion/Revolution or/and Regime Change) are strategic preferences for the (DG) in the $(HG)_1$, chooses to pick its (Neutral-Positive Mediation “N-PM”) strategic move. The (MP) employs the (N-PM) efforts officially or/and unofficially, regularly or/and irregularly, and in simultaneous or/and sequential mediatory interactions.

- Also, being aware of all players, and that the (DG) actor, if not deterred, may prefer the (Rebellion/Revolution or/and Regime Change) strategic action in a future play, perceiving the (Possible-Instability and Resuming Conflict, “PIRC,” Sphere) as an outcome of a possible zero-sum game to arise, the (Coercive Diplomacy Power) or the (CP) player _ as another non-state actor in the $(HG)_1$, plays the (Active-Coercive Diplomacy “A-COD”) strategic move, in sequence to the (MP)’s (N-PM) one. So, depending on its understanding of



the hypergame and perceptions of the other players' preferences, which may be true or not, the (CP) picked its action.

- Sequentially, the (PA) reasoning about how the (DG) actor believes about the game and reality, and in terms of the '*minimum*' stability achieved at first reached equilibrium's position, while being a subject of the (CP)'s deterrence domain, prefers as a rational player to move to the (Limited Power-Sharing "LPS") strategic action, expecting higher utility to result.

- Observing the (PA)'s (LPS) previous move, and being a subject of the (CP)'s deterrence realm and aware of the zero-sum game played in the past, the (DG) player as a rational actor and sequentially to the precedent chosen actions of {(N-PM); (A-COD); and (LPS)} by the (MP), (CP), and (PA) players respectively, moves to the (Maintenance of the State-System's Existing Political Structures "MSSEPS") strategic action. Here, this position represents the (Socio-Political Reconciliation Sphere's (PA)'s Ending Point, "(S-PRS) PA's EPO"), and the (Socio-Political Reconciliation Sphere's (DG)'s Starting Point "(S-PRS) DG's SPO").

- In a dynamic game where each condition their actions on what the other(s) picked first, the (CP) actor, observing the (DG)'s (MSSEPS) move, chooses the (Pro-Conflict Settlement/Resolution Policy-Making Participation, "P-CS/R-PP") strategic preference from its set of actions, in a sequential-move.

- Symmetrically, perceiving that a. the (PA) played first the (GR) move and also the (LPS) strategic action preferring them to the past play's strategy choices of the {(BN), and (SP)}, b. the (MP) actor's moving to the (N-PM) action, and c. the (CP) chose the (A-COD) action and then the (P-CS/R-PP) one, the (DG) as a rational player and depending on its interpretation of the game, calculating an expected high utility, chooses the (Existing Regime's Mass-Legitimization and Consensus "ERMLC") action. Given that the (DG)'s security and participation in political and social life in post-conflict society became *de facto* guaranteed through the chosen strategies of those players collectively, as well as its capability to avoid '*credibly*' the (SP) strategy's practices used by the (PA) in the first play. Based on that, the regime's legitimacy and consensus are no longer restricted between specific social borders of the "pro-regime versus anti-regime" formula. Instead, a nationwide legitimacy and consensus become *dispersed* across all state structures, diverse mass classes, and every individual posture in society.



- The (Societally-Peacebuilding and State-building, “S-PB/SB,” Sphere) arises in which the (Socio-Political Reconciliation Sphere’s (DG)’s Ending Point, “(S-PRS) DG’s EPO”) occurs when reaching a mutual utility (MU) position. The “(S-PB/SB) Sphere” is a *known* outcome for all players, occurring reversing the (*Stability of Peace State*) equilibrium, which is the *Nash equilibrium* of the entire $(HG)_1$ resulted by using:

- a. The $\{PA ((GR), (IDD) + (CO-EX)); DG (\pm \{(RR + RC)\})\}$ strategies by the (PA) and (DG) players sequentially, in the first stage _ where the $(RR + RC)$ actions probability becomes $(p = 0)$ at this position.

- b. And the second stage’s strategies of $\{MP (N-PM); CP (A-COD); PA (LPS); DG (MSSEPS); CP (P-CS/R-PP); DG (ERMLC)\}$ in a sequential-move; see Figure 2.

- The payoffs or the mutual utility achieved at the $(HG)_1$ ’s Nash equilibrium position is: $\{(U_1), (U_{H-1}), (U_{H-1}), (U_{H-1})\}$ for the $\{(PA), (DG), (MP), \text{ and } (CP)\}$ players, respectively, where the (U_1) is the ‘*perfect utility*’ value, which is the highest utility can be achieved ever in the hypergame. At the same time, the (U_{H-1}) is a ‘*high utility* (U_H)’ that ranges here between the $\{U_{0.7}, \text{ and } U_{0.8}\}$ high-level (H-1) values obtained by the (DG) at the reached position. So, under Nash equilibrium, the (PA) who is the most influential conflicting side raised its (U_{M-1}) payoff of the settlement’s equilibrium in the first (zero-mediation) stage, while the (DG) or the less influential conflict party increased its (U_{L-1}) one. In this context, the payoffs of the (MP) and (CP) players are: $\{(U_{H-1}), (U_{H-1})\}$, where each represents high-level utility values equal to those of the (DG) player. Thus, all players become better off, simultaneously playing their strategies, achieving the *best* response to each other’s strategic choice _ where no one may have the incentive to deviate from this *stable* position of the *highest* payoffs yielded for all in the entire $(HG)_1$.

5.1.4. The $(HG)_1$ ’s Cost and Utility Assumptions:

a. Abbreviations:

- a) The cost of the (PA)’s strategies used in the $(HG)_1$ (i.e., “ C_1 ”), is the “ CA_R ,” where (C) is the (Cost), (A) refers to the (PA) player, and (R) indicates the $(HG)_1$ ’s (Reconciliation) between the (PA) and (DG) as the main conflicting parties _ considering (R) the strategic objective of this hypergame’s interactions.



b) Likewise, the cost of the (DG)'s strategies used in the (HG)₁ (i.e., "C₂"), is the "CB_R," where the {(C); (B); and (R)} refers to the {(Cost); (DG) player; (HG)₁'s (Reconciliation) strategic objective}, respectively.

c) The {(U_{A-Cf}); (C_{A-Cf}); (U_{B-Cf}); (C_{B-Cf}); (U_{MR(A-B)}); (U_{NE(A-B)}); (U_{NE(A)}); {(U_{NE(B)}); (CS_{A-R}); (CS_{B-R})} abbreviations refer consecutively to the: {(utility "U" for "A" (i.e., the "PA") by conflict "Cf"); (cost "C" for (PA) by conflict); (utility for "B" (i.e., the "DG") by conflict "Cf"); (the cost "C" for (DG) by conflict); (utility of the (HG)₁'s (Mutual Reconciliation) "MR" for both "A and B" (i.e., the (PA) and (DG) players); (utility "U" at the (HG)₁'s Nash equilibrium "NE" position for both "A and B" players); (utility at the (HG)₁'s "NE" position for the "A" player only); (utility at the (HG)₁'s "NE" position for the "B" player only); (concession(s) "CS" made by the "A" player at the (Reconciliation "R") position of (HG)₁'s Nash equilibrium "NE"); (concession(s) "CS" made by the "B" player at the (Reconciliation "R") position of "NE")}.}

b. The Cost and Utility Assumptions:

- a. If: $\{CA_R \approx (U_{A-Cf}) + (C_{A-Cf})\}$, where the $\{(U_{A-Cf}) = (C_{A-Cf})\}$
Then: $\{CA_R \approx (U_{A-Cf})^2 = (C_{A-Cf})^2\}$
- b. And if: $\{CB_R \approx (U_{B-Cf}) + (C_{A-Cf})\}$, where the $\{(U_{B-Cf}) = (C_{A-Cf})\}$
Then: $\{CB_R \approx (U_{B-Cf})^2 = (C_{B-Cf})^2\}$
- c. If: $\{(U_{MR(A-B)}) \approx (CA_R + CB_R) + (U_{A-Cf} + U_{B-Cf})\}$, where $\{CA_R \approx (U_{A-Cf})^2$ and $CB_R \approx (U_{B-Cf})^2\}$ and that $\{R \approx (U_{A-Cf} + U_{B-Cf}) - (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})\}$
Then: $(U_{MR(A-B)}) \approx ((U_{A-Cf})^2 + (U_{B-Cf})^2) + (U_{A-Cf} + U_{B-Cf})$
 $\approx (U_{A-Cf})^3 + (U_{B-Cf})^3$
- d. If: $\{(U_{MR(A-B)}) \approx (CA_R + CB_R) - (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})\}$, where $\{CA_R \approx (C_{A-Cf})^2$ and $CB_R \approx (C_{B-Cf})^2\}$ and that $\{R \approx (U_{A-Cf} + U_{B-Cf}) - (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})\}$
Then: $(U_{MR(A-B)}) \approx ((C_{A-Cf})^2 + (C_{B-Cf})^2) - (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})$
 $\approx (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})$
- e. Based on the previous assumptions, where the $\{(U_{NE(A-B)}) \approx (U_{MR(A-B)})\}$, then:
 $\{(U_{NE(A-B)}) \approx ((U_{A-Cf})^3 + (U_{B-Cf})^3) + (C_{A-Cf} + C_{B-Cf})\}$
 $\{(U_{NE(A)}) \approx (U_{A-Cf})^3 + (C_{A-Cf})\}$, where $\{(C_{A-Cf}) \approx (CS_{A-R})\}$
 $\{(U_{NE(B)}) \approx (U_{B-Cf})^3 + (C_{B-Cf})\}$, where $\{(C_{B-Cf}) \approx (CS_{B-R})\}$

And given that: $p \{(U_{A-Cf}) \geq (U_{B-Cf})\} > p \{(U_{A-Cf}) < (U_{B-Cf})\}$; and that: $p \{(C_{A-Cf}) < (C_{B-Cf})\} > p \{(C_{A-Cf}) > (C_{B-Cf})\}$ _ where the probability (p) is: $(0 \leq p \leq 1)$.

Then, based on the *highest probabilities* assumptions of i. $\{(U_{A-Cf}) \geq (U_{B-Cf})\}$; ii. $\{(C_{A-Cf}) < (C_{B-Cf})\}$, we prove that: the $(U_{NE(A-B)}) = \{U_1 (A); U_{H-1} (B)\}$ _ where a. the *less* cost paid in



conflict “ (C_{Cf}) ” reverses a *higher* utility “ (U_{Cf}) ” in return for a given player, and vice versa; and b. the $\{(CS_{A-R}) < (CS_{B-R})\}$ if the $\{(C_{A-Cf}) < (C_{B-Cf})\}$. It is an *opposite* relation, therefore, existing between the $\{(C_{Cf}) \& (U_{Cf})\}$ within this hypergame. Also, the “ (C_{Cf}) ” or the “cost of conflict” in an ongoing intra-state conflict approximately *equals* the (CS_R) or the “concession(s) at the (NE)’s (Reconciliation) position,” made in a balance of peace state’s conflict settlement/resolution interactions. So, the (U_1) is the (NE)’s ‘perfect’ utility value gained by the (PA) who paid less (C_{A-Cf}) , making less (CS_{A-R}) at the $(HG)_1$ ’s (NE) position. While the (U_{H-1}) is a ‘high’ utility value for the (DG) at the (NE), simultaneously, the actor who paid higher (C_{B-Cf}) , thus making higher (CS_{B-R}) , under the given context.

c. The Hypothesis’ Validity:

Based on the reached Nash equilibrium of the $(HG)_1$ and the cost and utility assumptions of the $(U_{MR(A-B)})$ and $(U_{NE(A-B)})$, we prove the model’s first hypothesis’ validity: “A balance of peace-state within nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties socially, politically, and diplomatically at any phase during and post-intra-state conflicts.”

5.2. Second: The Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model’s Inter-State Hypergame “ $(HG)_2$ ”

5.2.1. The $(HG)_2$ ’s Description: Assumptions and Hypothesis

In another first-level hypergame, we have five players who are: $\{(State A); (State B); (Mediation Power); (Coercive Diplomacy Power); \text{ and the } (Global \text{ Hegemonic Governance and Discourse})\}$. We refer to them by $\{(SA); (SB); (MP); (CP); (GHG-D)\}$ respectively. The $(HG)_2$ is the future (second) play of a previously played (hyper)game in the past. Also, this $(HG)_2$ is composed of every player’s perceived game, and each game includes realized preference vectors of other players. This can be denoted as: $(HG)_2 = \{G_{2.1}, G_{2.2}, G_{2.3}, G_{2.4}, G_{2.5}\}$; and $G_{2.1} = \{V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$, $G_{2.2} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$, $G_{2.3} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.4}\}$, $G_{2.4} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}\}$, and $G_{2.5} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$. Where $\{(HG)_2; (G_{2.1}); (G_{2.2}); (G_{2.3}); (G_{2.4}); (G_{2.5})\}$ abbreviations refer to $\{(the \text{ model’s second hypergame}); (the \text{ game perceived by player I or “SA”}); (the \text{ game perceived by player II or “SB”}); (the \text{ game perceived by player III or “MP”}); (the \text{ game perceived by player IV or “CP”}); (the \text{ game perceived by player V or “GHG-D”})\}$. At the same time, the $\{V_{2.1}; V_{2.2}; V_{2.3}; V_{2.4}; V_{2.5}\}$ indicates the strategic preference vectors of the $\{(SA);$



(SB); (MP); (CP); and (GHG-D)} actors, consecutively, also considering how any player may perceive one or more of the others' vectors. In the $(HG)_2$, either the (SA) and (SB) players are *equal* in power (i.e., military, economic, and political power), or that the (SA) actor is *more* powerful than the (SB). As well, the (SA) actor plays first before the (SB) in a sequential-move dynamic game, while both the (SA) and (GHG-D) actors are the most *influential* and *important* participants in this hypergame.

The central premise of the (BPSHM)'s $(HG)_2$ is: "Initiating a peace process between major conflicting parties by the most-powerful state, or one of the power-equal two-states in inter-state conflicts reaching a balance of peace-state does not necessarily depend on opting for a mature mediation's conflict ripeness moment or the mutually-hurting stalemate one." Therefore, this study's second hypothesis is: "A balance of peace-state between nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties diplomatically, politically, and socially at any phase during and post-inter-state conflicts."

5.2.2. The $(HG)_2$'s Perceived Games:

a. The $G_{2,1}$: The (State A)'s

The (State A) or (SA) player has this set of actions within its strategic preference vector (i.e., the $V_{2,1}$) along with the hypergame's course either in the past play or a replayed current 'future' one: a. (Activation of Conflict/War "A-C/W"); b. (Territorial/Political/Economic Non-Recognition/Non-Legitimization "N-R/L"); c. (Initiation of a Peace-Process "In-PP"); d. (Diplomatic, Political, Economic, and Social Integration "GR"). Where the probability (p) of those strategic preferences in the *past* (first) play were: i. ($0 < p \leq 1$) for the (A-C/W) and (N-R/L); ii. ($0 \leq p < 0.25$) for the (In-PP); iii. ($p = 0$) for the (GR). In a comparison, the probability in the *future* (second) play (i.e., the " HG_2 ") is: i. ($0 \leq p < 0.25$) for the (A-C/W) strategic action; ii. ($0 < p \leq 0.5$) for the (N-R/L); iii. ($0.5 < p \leq 1$) for the (In-PP); iv. ($0 < p < 1$) for the (GR).

In a misperception-based-hypergame, the $(G_{2,1})$ includes the $\{(V_{2,2}); \text{ and } (V_{2,3})\}$ where the (SA) player understands that the $(V_{2,2})$ includes a. (Continuation of Conflict/War), b. (Peace-Process Participation), and c. (Non-Recognition/Non-Legitimization) strategic actions. Simultaneously, the (SA) perceives that the (MP) has a (Neutral-Mediation) action in its $(V_{2,3})$. As well, within the $(G_{2,1})$, the (SA) perceives the $(V_{2,4})$, realizing that the (CP) has these



deterrence means/actions: a. (Imposing Sanctions, Boycotts/Embargos, or/and Trade Tariffs); b. (Use of (Credible/Capable) Threats); or/and c. (Use of Physical Power for Initiating Preventive/Collective Security-War(s) _ should the deterrence failed). The (SA) is not aware of the (GHG-D) actor in the game, and therefore, does not perceive its ($V_{2.5}$). The game is denoted as: $G_{2.1} = \{V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$.

b. The $G_{2.2}$: The (State B)'s

The (State B) or (SB) player has a strategic preference vector (i.e., the $V_{2.2}$) in the entire hypergame that is approximately analogical with that of the (SA), containing these actions: a. (Activation of Conflict/War "A-C/W"); b. (Territorial/Political/Economic Non-Recognition/Non-Legitimization "N-R/L"); c. (Implementation of a Peace-Process "Im-PP") _ in terms of moving second sequentially to the (SA)'s first move; d. (Diplomatic, Political, Economic, and Social Integration "GR"). The (p) of the (SB)'s strategic preferences in the *past* (first) play were: i. ($0 < p \leq 1$) for the (A-C/W) and (N-R/L) moves; ii. ($0 \leq p < 0.25$) for the (Im-PP); iii. ($p = 0$) for the (GR). In this *future* (second) play, the probability is: i. ($0 \leq p < 0.25$) for the (A-C/W) strategic move; ii. ($0 < p \leq 0.5$) for the (N-R/L); iii. ($0 < p < 1$) for the (Im-PP); iv. ($0 < p \leq 0.5$) for the (GR) _ given that the (SB)'s actions represent the *reaction* of the (SA)'s and that there are three players (i.e., the (MP); (CP); and (GHG-D)) interfere in this (second) play, who did not participate in the first one.

In the $G_{2.2}$, the (SB) actor perceives the $\{(V_{2.1}); (V_{2.3}); \text{ and } (V_{2.4})\}$ while not perceiving the ($V_{2.5}$) because it is not aware of the (GHG-D) player in the $(HG)_2$. The (SB) understands that the (SA) has a preference vector (i.e., $V_{2.1}$) composed of a. (Peace-Process Initiation); b. (Peace-Process Spoiling); c. (Continuation of the War/Conflict); and (Non-Recognition/Legitimization). On the contrary to the (SA)'s perception of the ($V_{2.3}$), the (SB) realizes the (Biased-Mediation) as the (MP) vector's included action. Nevertheless, the (SA) and (SB) perceive the ($V_{2.4}$) symmetrically. This game is denoted as: $G_{2.2} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$.

c. The $G_{2.3}$: The (Mediation Power)'s

As its role in the $(HG)_1$, the (MP) player is a participant in the second (future) play only of the hypergame, having the $\{(Neutral-Positive Mediation); \text{ and } (Face-Saving Diplomatic Tactics)\}$ moves within its preference vector (i.e., the $V_{2.3}$), which are of this probability: ($0 < p \leq 1$) in the game. In the $(HG)_2$'s $G_{2.3}$, the (MP) actor perceives the other players' preference



vectors as follows: first, it understands that both the ($V_{2.1}$) and ($V_{2.2}$) include: a. (National Security Preserving-Oriented-Military Engagement), b. (Homeland/Nation-State Borders Protection), c. (National/Natural Resources Supplies Maintaining/Securitization), and d. (Activation of Conflict/War) strategic moves. Second, the (MP) has the same perceptions over the (CP)'s ($V_{2.4}$) as the (SA) and (SB), while not being aware of the (GHG-D) in the game so that not perceiving its ($V_{2.5}$). This is denoted as: $G_{2.3} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.4}\}$.

d. The $G_{2.4}$: The (Coercive Diplomacy Power)'s

The (CP) player also participates in this future play solely or the (HG)₂. It has a preference vector (i.e., the $V_{2.4}$) indicating one strategic action that is the (Active-Coercive Diplomacy "A-COD"), which is considered a pure strategy it uses in the hypergame of this probability: ($0 < p \leq 1$). The (CP) player, in the $G_{2.4}$, understands both ($V_{2.1}$) and ($V_{2.2}$) precisely as the (MP) does while perceiving that the latter's preference vector (i.e., $V_{2.3}$) comprises the (Neutral-Mediation) strategic action, with not realizing the (GHG-D) player's existence in the game. We denote this as: $G_{2.4} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}\}$.

e. The $G_{2.5}$: The (Global Hegemonic Governance & Discourse)'s

The (GHG-D) player is the (HG)₂'s third actor who participates in this second (future) play without existing in the first (past) one. It has a preference vector (i.e., the $V_{2.5}$) composed of these strategic preferences: a. (Peace-Broker Discourse "PBD"), which is one strategy outcome of the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model)'s first hypergame and a possible strategy choice within this model; b. (Pro-Conflict Settlement/Resolution State-Building "PCS/R-SB"); and c. (the (PBD)'s Reinforcing Cultivation "D-RC"). The (p) of each of those strategic actions is: ($0 < p \leq 1$). In the $G_{2.5}$, the (GHG-D) perceives the other players' preference vectors since this actor is aware of them all in the hypergame. It understands the ($V_{2.1}$) and ($V_{2.2}$) as the (MP) and (CP) players do while realizing that the ($V_{2.3}$) includes the (Collective Diplomacy) strategic move and that the ($V_{2.4}$) contains the (Coercive Diplomacy) one. This game can be denoted as: $G_{2.5} = \{V_{2.1}, V_{2.2}, V_{2.3}, V_{2.4}\}$. Ultimately, all explained preference vectors perceived by players about others depend on those players' understanding and interpretation of the game and reality and how the others reason, which may be true or not.



5.2.3. The $(HG)_2$'s strategic interactions, equilibria, and expected utility: Relating Outcomes Between Individual Games in a Mapping Function

The $(HG)_2$'s Strategic Interactions:


- Within the international system structure, the (Global Hegemonic Governance and Discourse) or the (GHG-D) player initiates the $(HG)_2$, having a first play advantage and moving to the (Peace-Broker Discourse “PBD”) strategic preference. The (PBD) is now an action to be picked after resulting as an accumulated output in the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model “PPHGM”)’s (Strategic Interactions)¹, the action that we refer to as the $((PBD)_{(SI)_1})$. Given that a cross-region “peace-hegemony-oriented-mass-disciplinary power” results out of the {(Fledgling Peace Hegemony), and (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony)} strategy outcomes _ that are the input-shifted-output strategies of the (PBD) output in the (PPHGM), a “(PBD) Sphere” constitutes here. This outcome is an equilibrium within the (GHG-D)’s perceived game but not for the entire (BPSHM)’s $(HG)_2$.

- Sequentially to the (GHG-D)’s $((PBD)_{(SI)_1})$ move and its resulted sphere of influence regionally, nationally, and globally, with being not aware of the (GHG-D) player in the game, the (MP) actor moves to the (Neutral-Positive Mediation “N-PM”) strategic action.

- Perceiving the (SB)’s $(V_{2.2})$ in its $(G_{2.1})$ as a preference vector includes the {(Continuation of Conflict/War); and (Peace-Process Participation)} actions, whereas the probability of the (SA)’s (Activation of Conflict/War “A-C/W”) strategic choice _ if made (i.e., “ $p \neq \text{zero}$ ”), is: $(0 < p < 0.25)$, the State A or (SA) player as a rational actor and a *subject* to the “(PBD) Sphere” _ while not being aware of the (GHG-D) actor or its game, moves to the (Initiation of a Peace-Process “In-PP”) strategic preference. Here, the (SA) expects a maximized utility to result, according to its own interpretation and understanding of the game and perceptions of reality.



Figure 3: The Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model: The Inter-State Hypergame “(HG)₂”



- With the (SA)’s choosing of the (In-PP) action, the “*first*” of this hypergame’s “*interruption factors*” appears, which is the (Peace Spoiling Behaviors Spheres “PSBS”). This factor’s circle begins by the “(SA) player-directed-peace spoiling sphere,” or the (SA-PSS).
- Given that it understands that: a. the (SA)’s ($V_{2.1}$) and (SB)’s ($V_{2.2}$) include the (Activation of Conflict/War) action, and b. there is a (Possible-Instability and Resuming Conflict, “PIRC,” Sphere) as a probable outcome in the (HG)₂, the (Coercive Diplomacy Power) or the (CP) player chooses to make its (Active-Coercive Diplomacy “A-COD”) move sequentially to the (SA)’s (In-PP) one. Therefore, this actor brings major conflicting parties (i.e., the “SA, and SB”) into line, as well as overcoming possible (*high*) leverage of the constituted (PSBS) factor over one, or all, of those parties.
- The (SB) player (i.e., the State B) moves, sequentially, to the (Implementation of a Peace-Process “Im-PP”) action, thus, taking place in an initiated peace process, relying on its available information and perceptions about the (SA)’s ($V_{2.1}$) within its ($G_{2.2}$), and being a subject to possible deterrence means applied by the (CP). Since the (SB) also understands that the (SA) initiates a peace process while seeking to practice a spoiling behavior implicitly (i.e.,



the “Peace-Process Spoiling” perceived action of $(V_{2.1})$ in the “ $G_{2.2}$ ”), acquiring benefits through the initiation, the (SB)’s (A-C/W) strategic move’s probability is still $(0 \leq p < 0.25)$ at this stage of the $(HG)_2$.

- Consequently, the “(SB) player-directed-peace spoiling sphere,” abbreviated as (SB-PSS), arises with the (SB)’s choosing of the (Im-PP) action.

- Out of the previous interactions and when using these strategies sequentially: $\{(PBD)_{(SD)1}$ by (GHG-D); (N-PM) by (MP); (In-PP) by (SA); (A-COD) by (CP); and (Im-PP) by (SB) $\}$, an outcome arises that is an *equilibrium* within the (SA) and (SB)’s perceived $(G_{2.1})$ and $(G_{2.2})$ only. This equilibrium is the (Joint-Agreements/Accords/Pacts Zone) or the “(JA) Zone,” which refers to how the two players understand that such an outcome can resolve the conflict or believe what will happen in the future. At this position, the payoffs accumulated by the (SA) and (SB) players respectively are: $\{(U_{M-1}), (U_{M-1})\}$ representing the mid-level utility value of $(U_{0.5})$ for both. Thence, no player is worse off, but also none is *sustainably* better off, where the probability of the (A-C/W) is still $(0 \leq p < 0.25)$ at this position. So, this outcome is *not* stable, and therefore, *not* needed as equilibrium for the entire $(HG)_2$.

- The (SA) player, expecting an extended maximized utility by the diplomatic resolution given the reached “(JA) Zone” equilibrium, chooses the (Diplomatic, Political, Economic, and Social Integration, “GR”) strategic action in a sequential move to the (SB)’s (Im-PP) preference. However, the “*second*” interruption factor occurs as an interference variable, which is the (Internal or/and External Opposition “I/EOP”). This (I/EOP) factor represents the cost (C_1) of the (SA)’s strategic choices in the $(HG)_2$.

- Sequentially to the (SA)’s (GR) choice, the (MP) moves to the (Face-Saving Diplomatic Tactics “FS-DT”) preference.

- Consequently, the (SB) player, having like-perceptions as the (SA)’s regarding an expected maximized utility while also considering the “(JA) Zone” equilibrium, acts likewise preferring the (Diplomatic, Political, Economic, and Social Integration, “GR”) same strategic choice. Symmetrically, the (SB) player coups with the cost (C_2) of its strategic choices in the hypergame for having the (I/EOP) similar interference factor.

- Simultaneously with aggregating the (C_1) and (C_2) , the “(SA) and (SB)-directed-peace-spoiling sphere (1)” constitutes, as well as the “(SA) and (SB)-directed-peace-spoiling sphere (2).” Both are abbreviated as $(SA+SB-PSS_1)$ and $(SA+SB-PSS_2)$; see Figure 3.



b. The (HG)₂'s Equilibria and Expected Utility:

a) With the (SB)'s choosing of the (GR) action, the (Initial Diplomatic-Political-Social Reconciliation Zone) or the "(IDPSR) Zone" arises as an outcome for the entire (HG)₂ when using the {(GR), (FS-DT), (GR)} strategies in a sequential move by the {(SA), (MP), and (SB)} players, respectively. Being *known* outcome for those players, the "(IDPSR) Zone" equilibrium is also stable, given the stability of payoffs or utility accumulated at this position, which is: {(U_{H-1}), (U_{M-1}), and (U_{H-1})} of each consecutively. In this context, the (U_{H-1}) is a high-level utility in the (U_{0.7}) value gained equally by the (SA) and (SB) players, and the (U_{M-1}) is a mid-level utility in the (U_{0.6}) value, where the probability (*p*) of choosing the (A-C/W) strategic choice at this position by either (SA), or (SB), is (*p* = 0). So, using these strategies sequentially: {(GR), (FS-DT), (GR)} is the "*Nash Equilibrium (1)*" of the (HG)₂. Moreover, if the hypergame ends by this stage, no player would have the impulse to deviate from this stable position of higher payoffs achieved for all by simultaneously making their *best* reply to each other's strategy.

b) When using these strategies sequentially: {(PBD)_{(SD)1} by (GHG-D); (N-PM) by (MP); (In-PP) by (SA); (A-COD) by (CP); (Im-PP) by (SB); (GR) by (SA); (FS-DT) by (MP); and (GR) by (SB)}, an *unknown* accumulated outcome arises, which is the (Disciplinary Region Creation Zone "DRCZ"). Under this equilibrium, the payoff becomes: (U_{H-1}), for the {(SA), (SB), and (GHG-D)} players in this high-level utility value: (U_{0.7}), equivocally. As well, the {(MP) and (CP)} players' utility value at the same position is (U_{0.6}) – that is a mid-level utility (U_{M-1}) close to being high. Given that the (A-C/W) strategic choice's probability when using the {(GR), (FS-DT), (GR)} strategies by the {(SA), (MP) and (SB)} players, sequentially, is (*p* = 0), the (DRCZ) outcome becomes stable, which is the "*Nash equilibrium (2)*" of the (HG)₂. Again, once this position is reached, no player may have the incentive to deviate since each achieved higher and stable payoffs in the hypergame, simultaneously making the *best* response to the others' used strategies.

c) Considering the previous equilibria of the "(IDPSR) Zone" and the "(DRCZ)," the hypergame's yielded payoffs for all players at both positions are higher and stable. However, in the (HG)₂, and sequentially to the (SB)'s (GR) action, the (GHG-D) player as a rational actor perceiving a possible '*perfect*' equilibrium position, is assumed to prefer picking the (Pro-Conflict Settlement/Resolution State-Building, "PCS/R-SB") strategic choice, as well



as the “(PBD)’s Reinforcing Cultivation, (D-RC),” at the same move. We denote both the {(PCS/R-SB) and (D-RC)} actions as the (PSD). Given that the other players are not aware of the (GHG-D) in the hypergame, then making those two choices is more likely *not* perceived within the other players’ (individual) games unless they obtain information about this player’s game or/and made choices (i.e., decisions). In other words, the accuracy of the (HG)₂ is dependent on available information. Nevertheless, that dual-action or the (PSD) made in a sequential move to the other chosen strategic preferences results in:

d) The {(COD-PSD) Zone} equilibrium: that occurs when sequentially using these strategies: {(PBD)_(SD1) by (GHG-D); (A-COD) by (CP); and then, the (PCS/R-SB), and (D-RC), or (PSD), by (GHG-D)}. The utility value achieved for the (CP) and (GHG-D) players, respectively, at this position, is: {(U_{0.7}), (U_{0.8})}, which both lie in the high-level utility “(U_{H-1})” category, where the (*p*) of the (SA) and (SB)’s (A-C/W) strategic preference is (*p* = 0). Despite being stable, this equilibrium is *only* perceived within the individual game of the (GHG-D), conveying this player’s perceptions of how the conflict can be resolved. It is *not* needed as equilibrium for the entire hypergame, therefore.

e) The (Stability of Peace Sphere) outcome: that is the “*Nash equilibrium (3)*” of the (HG)₂, which occurs when picking these strategies in a sequential move: {(PBD)_(SD1) by (GHG-D); (N-PM) by (MP); (In-PP) by (SA); (A-COD) by (CP); (Im-PP) by (SB); (GR) by (SA); (FS-DT) by (MP); (GR) by (SB); (PCS/R-SB), and (D-RC) by (GHG-D)}. Here, the hypergame extends based on the previously achieved “Nash equilibrium (2)” so that no player deviated, but only *unilaterally*, the (GHG-D) actor develops the precedent equilibrium’s position. Similarly, each makes the *best* response to the other players’ strategies simultaneously, where the probability of the (SA) and (SB)’s (A-C/W) action is (*p* = 0). Accordingly, the payoffs result as a total “*mutual utility (MU)*,” whose values are: {(U₁), (U₁), (U_{0.8}), (U_{0.8}), (U₁)} for the {(SA), (SB), (MP), (CP), (GHG-D)} players, respectively. So, the *perfect* utility value (U₁) is yielded for the {(SA), (SB), and (GHG-D)} actors, which is *absolutely* the highest value the players can receive ever either in the (HG)₁ or the (HG)₂ of the (BPSHM). Comparingly, the {(MP) and (CP)} players achieve high-level utility “(U_{H-1})” values (i.e., “U_{0.8}”), also raising their gains in the (HG)₂ under this equilibrium. Ultimately, the (Stability of Peace Sphere) outcome is *stable* _ given its relevant position’s stability with the highest payoffs received by



all players if reached, despite being *known* for the (GHG-D) player solely and *unknown* for the other players in the hypergame.

5.2.4. The (HG)₂'s Balance of Peace-State: The (BPS)'s Equations of Inter-State Conflicts

a. The Equations' Assumptions:

a) Main premise: if $p \{SA (In-PP)\} \simeq \{p (N-PM) + p (In_{SA}) + p (GR_{SA}) + p (C_1)\}$, where (p) is the probability, and that the $\{p (N-PM) \geq p (In_{SA}) > p (GR_{SA}) \geq p (C_1)\}$ where ($0 < p \leq 1$).

b) If $N (SB-PSS) \geq N (SA-PSS)$, where (N) is the (Total Influence), given that the (SA) is the initiator to a peace process (PP). And that:

- $N (SA+SB-PSS_1) < N (SA+SB-PSS_2)$, where the (PSS₁) arises outside the (DRCZ) while the (PSS₂) occurs inside this zone.

- $N (SA+SB-PSS_2) < N (DRCZ)$.

c) If $N^2 (DRCZ) \simeq N (COD-PSD)$ Zone, where (N^2) is the (Overwhelming/Doubled Total Influence N).

And that: $\{(DCS \equiv MS); \text{ but } (MS \nparallel DCS)\}$, where the (DCS) is the "Diplomatic Convention(s) Signing;" the (\equiv) is the *equivalency* relation; the (MS) is the "Mediation Success;" and the (\nparallel) is the *unparallel* relation.

b. The (HG)₂'s "balance of peace-state (BPS)" equations:

Based on the previous assumptions and configurations, there are three cases of the "Success of Peace Process" or the $\{S (PP)\}$ inter-state under the (HG)₂'s given context; these are:

a) **Case 1:** The "Multiplied $\{S (PP)\}$ " or the $\{S^2 (PP)\}$ that occurs when:

$S^2 (PP) \simeq \{((SA (In-PP)) + N^2 (DRCZ)) - (N (SA+SB-PSS_2))\}$, where $\{N^2 (DRCZ) \simeq N (COD-PSD)\}$. In this case, the $\{S^2 (PP) \parallel (MS)^2\}$.

b) **Case 2:** The "Limited $\{S (PP)\}$," occurring when:

$LS (PP) \simeq \{(SA (In-PP)) + (n (DRCZ)) + (n (COD-PSD))\}$, where the (L) refers to (Limited), and the (n) is the (Partial Influence).

Then: $\{LS (PP) \parallel (MS) + \frac{1}{2} (N (SA+SB-PSS_2))\}$; or $\{LS (PP) \parallel (MS) - \frac{1}{2} (N (SA+SB-PSS_2))\}$. Then: $\{LS (PP) \parallel L (MS)\}$.

c) **Case 3:** The "Normality of $\{S (PP)\}$," which occurs when:



$RS (PP) \simeq \{ (SA (In-PP)) + (N(DRCZ)) + (n (COD-PSD)) \}$, where the (R) here refers to (Normality) _ given that if there is (n) of the (COD-PSD), then there cannot be (N^2) of (DRCZ).

Then: $\{RS (PP) \parallel (MS)^2 + \frac{1}{2} (N (SA+SB-PSS_2))\}$; or $\{RS (PP) \parallel (MS)^2 - \frac{1}{2} (N (SA+SB-PSS_2))\}$. Then: $\{RS (PP) \parallel R (MS)\}$.

c. Cases probabilities:

Based on the previous equations: the $\{N(S^2 (PP)) > N(RS (PP)) > N(LS (PP))\}$, where the $\{p(S^2 (PP)) > p(RS (PP))\}$, and the $\{p(LS (PP)) > p(RS (PP))\}$ where $(0 < p < 1)$.

Nevertheless, the $\{p(S^2 (PP)) > p(LS (PP))\}$ if the $\{PPE \simeq GHP - RHW^{-CU}\}$ as proved above in the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model)'s (Positivity of Peace Equilibrium "PPE") equation.

Finally, depending on the (Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model)'s $(HG)_2$'s reached Nash equilibria, and the "balance of peace-state" equations of inter-state conflicts, we prove the validity of this model's second hypothesis: "A balance of peace-state between nation-states is initially achieved through constructing a reconciliation and mutually utility-maximization-oriented-merged diplomacy bridging major conflicting parties diplomatically, politically, and socially at any phase during and post-inter-state conflicts."

6. Conclusion

This study introduces a multi-level conflict management approach, including the (Positivity of Peace Hypergame Model "PPHGM") and the (Balance of Peace-State Hypergame Model "BPSHM"). The (PPHGM) is a second-level hypergame where the entire hypergame comprises hypergames perceived by the players _ conditioning that one player at least understands that a hypergame is being played and that there is a misperception in the game so that the deception can find its way within the course of such interactions. Comparingly, the (BPSHM) is a first-level hypergame where the entire hypergame includes games perceived by the players where the misperception and incomplete or misled understanding may exist about the reality, the game, and other players' preference vectors.

Within the (PPHGM), which contained two separate entire-hypergames of different levels of strategic interactions transforming the IR and media theories applied into strategic



practice, the equilibria reached are as follows: 1. The (PPHGM)'s (HG)₁'s equilibria: {(Elite-Publics' Mutually Impact Realm "EP-MIR"); (Fledgling Peace Hegemony "FPH"); (Omnipotent Peace Hegemony "OPH"); and (Peace-Broker Discourse "PBD")}. 2. The (PPHGM)'s (HG)₂'s equilibria: {(Global Transformation Initial Realm "GTIR"); (Adoption and Gratification Sphere "AD-G"); and (Peace-Hegemony-Oriented-Mass-Ideological Rehabilitation "MIR")}. 3. The (Positivity of Peace Equilibrium "PPE"): The (PPE) is *equivalent* to the $(GHP - (RHW)^{-CU})$ formula that equals the "Global Hegemony of Peace Versus Realist Hegemony of War's Inevitability (GHP vs. RHW)" if the (RHW) was in a minus value of collective utility (CU) as proved in the (PPE) equations mentioned above.

Lastly, the (BPSHM) included an intra-state hypergame "(HG)₁" and another inter-state one "(HG)₂", emulating conflict management cases in real-world circumstances and reaching these equilibria: 1. The (BPSHM)'s (HG)₁'s equilibria, which are the {(Mini-Maximum Equilibrium) for conflict settlement in a zero-mediation stage; and (Stability of Peace State) Nash equilibrium for conflict resolution in a mediatory non-state actors' stage}. 2. Nash equilibria of the (BPSHM)'s (HG)₂, that are: the {(Initial Diplomatic-Political-Social Reconciliation Zone "(IDPSR) Zone"); (Disciplinary Region Creation Zone "DRCZ"); and (Stability of Peace Sphere)}. Based on the reached equilibria of our multi-level conflict management approach's two models, we proved the validity of this study's hypotheses.

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The Issue of Political Recognition in International Policy:

The Case of Kosovo

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Abstract

The Balkans is one of the critical regions of the world because of its geographical location, and Kosovo has an important role in this region because of its central position. Hence Kosovo has stayed at the center of historical events in the Balkan region from Ottoman time till the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Today's Kosovo strives to be recognized as a member of the international community and one of the regional actors. This study hypothesizes that the relationship of Kosovo with international organizations and the entire international community has stayed weak despite diplomatic recognition by many states. For this purpose, in this essay, the relations of Kosovo with the regional states and the international community are discussed from a critical perspective in the context of current developments.

Keywords: *International Politics, Recognition Policies, Kosovo, Diplomacy, Balkans.*

Uluslararası Politikada Devletlerin Tanınma Sorunu: Kosova Örneği

Özet

Balkanlar, coğrafi konumu nedeniyle dünyanın kritik bölgelerinden biridir ve Balkan ülkelerinden biri olan Kosova, bu bölgedeki merkezi konumu nedeniyle önemli bir role sahiptir. Bu nedenle Kosova, Osmanlı döneminden Yugoslavya'nın dağılmasına kadar olan süreçte Balkan bölgesindeki tarihi olayların da hep merkezinde yer almıştır. Günümüzde ise Kosova, uluslararası toplumun bağımsız bir üyesi ve bölgesel aktörlerden biri olarak tanınmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çok sayıda devlet Kosovanın egemen varlığını tanımaktadır. Bu kapsamda, bu çalışmanın hipotezi, birçok devlet tarafından diplomatik olarak tanınmasına rağmen Kosova'nın uluslararası kuruluşlarla ve tüm uluslararası toplumla olan ilişkisinin hala zayıf kaldığı yönündedir. Bu amaçla, bu makalede Kosova'nın bölge devletleri ve uluslararası toplumla ilişkileri güncel gelişmeler bağlamında eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla irdelenmekte ve tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Uluslararası Politika, Tanınma Politikaları, Kosova, Diplomasi, Balkanlar.*

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1. Introduction

Kosovo came up with Serbian-Albanian conflicts in the process leading to independence. As a result of the comprehensive amendments to the 1974 Constitution in Yugoslavia, autonomy was granted to the Kosovo and Vojvodina regions of Serbia, in addition to the six constituent countries that make up Yugoslavia. With the death of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito in 1980 and the dissolution of the bipolar system, Yugoslavia entered a process of disintegration with the revival of nationalist currents in external relations. In this process, the struggle for independence started in Kosovo as in other parts of Yugoslavia.

In March 1989, the Republic of Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, announced that Josip Broz Tito had unilaterally made some amendments to the 1974 constitution. Slobodan Milosevic announced that Kosovo and Vojvodina have canceled their autonomous status. After this decision, protests and uprisings started in Kosovo and Serbia suppressed this chaos by using disproportionate force. The war between Serbia and Kosovo between 1998 and 1999 emerged with the pressure of Serbia on Kosovo and the increase of ethnic cleansing policies.

This war, including NATO and the United Nations forces, ended with the withdrawal of Serbian troops on the 9th of June 1999. On the 10th of June 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo within the framework of resolution 1244. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo carried out the reconstruction of public institutions, civil administration, economic development, and security within the scope of the restructuring of Kosovo. In addition to the United Nations, international organizations such as the European Union have played a role in Kosovo.

There has been a transitional period in Kosovo under the rule of the United Nations for nine years. During this period, negotiations have been initiated to determine the final status of Kosovo and to solve the problems with Serbia. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari drafted a report on the final status of Kosovo. According to Martti Ahtisaari's report, a transition period in Kosovo under the supervision of the European



Union, NATO, and the United Nations Security Council was deemed appropriate. At the end of the transition period, the legislative and executive bodies will delegate their functions to the Government of Kosovo. International protection will be transformed into the Republic of Kosovo after a certain time.

States such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom supported the report, while states such as Russia and China expressed their views that Kosovo is an autonomous region of Serbia. Within the framework of the Martti Ahtisaari Report, the long negotiations with Serbia have failed. Besides the tough stance of Serbia, the United States, and the European Union states that have the power in the region with the support of Turkey, Kosovo has decided to declare independence. Kosovo thus declared its independence on the 17th of February 2008.

While Costa Rica, the United States, Turkey, England, and France were the first countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo on the 17th of February 2008, there were countries such as Serbia, Russia, Greece, and Spain which stated that they would never recognize Kosovo.

The fact that Kosovo, which is now recognized by 116 states, cannot be recognized by the international community makes Kosovo difficult to face against other Balkan states. Although Kosovo is recognized by most of the United Nations and the European Union Countries, its status remains controversial. The Republic of Kosovo, which is not a member of organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO, face the obstacles of Serbia and its allies in the diplomatic field. Russia's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council is a major obstacle to the recognition of Kosovo by the United Nations.

2. The Method of Study

This study hypothesizes that although Kosovo has achieved diplomacy with states on the path to recognition, it has not taken an important step towards recognition by international organizations and the entire international community. For this purpose, in the context of current developments, the relations of Kosovo with the states of the region, the strategies to gain the



personality of the international community, the diplomatic movements, and the reasons for not being recognized by the international community will be discussed.

To understand the problem of recognition of Kosovo, the study will first evaluate what the concept of recognition means in international law and politics. It will be explained that the concept of recognition not only has a legal dimension but also a political dimension. An explanation will be made of the principle of self-determination and evaluations will be presented. Secondly, within the framework of Kosovo's relations with the post-independence European Union and the returns of the European integration process to Kosovo will be analyzed. From this point, the benefits of the European Union in the negotiations on the solution of the problem between Kosovo and Serbia will be discussed. Third, Kosovo's international recognition policies will be analyzed.

As a result of our study, the following questions will be answered:

1. What are the effects of relations between Serbia and Kosovo on international recognition?
2. Is there stability in Kosovo in the process of accession to the European Union?
3. What are the obstacles to international recognition of Kosovo?

The study will be carried out in three sections. In the first part, the concepts of recognition in international law and international politics will be examined. In the second part, Kosovo's relations with the European Union after independence and the integration process will be examined. In the third part, Kosovo's recognition policies will be examined. In this study, the descriptive analysis method will be used. Qualitative research methods such as evaluation and interpretation will also be used within this framework



3. The Concept of Recognition of States in International Law and Policy

A society that has completed the conditions of being a state in general and has formed its political unity has been entitled to be a part of the international community. In this respect, the recognition process is legal in terms of its effects.¹

For a state to be recognized, it must fulfill the qualifications of being a state under the law.² According to the basic assumptions of law, the formation of states requires three constituent elements. The first is a certain community of people, the second is a geographical area on which to live, and the third is an effective political government.³

The principles of the 1933 Montevideo Convention are important for the recognition of states. Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the convention regulate the principles of the recognition of states:⁴

Article 6: The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

Article 7: The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.

Article 8: No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”

Recognition of states results in their being legally equal and having the same rights. Thus, states' rights require equal conditions rather than the power to exercise them. States that have equal legal conditions are evaluated impartially in the problems encountered.

¹ The international community is always mobile. Within this moving structure, events and phenomena occur constantly changing and developing. New states emerge, states are divided. Divided states are either merging with a new state or disappearing. The structures separated from the dividing state declare their independence and form new states. Due to these developing events and phenomena in the international arena, there is a problem of recognizing the emerging states. The concept of recognition, which is bound by the rules of law but has the ability to act independently in the international arena, can also be used as a foreign policy tool suitable for political interests.

² Heike Krieger, (ed.), *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999* (Cambridge International Documents Series), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³ See more at: Ali Zounuzy Zadeh, “International Law and the Criteria for Statehood: The Sustainability of the Declaratory and Constitutive Theories as the Method for Assessing the Creation and Continued Existence of States”, LL. M Thesis Public International Law, Tilburg University Faculty of Law Department of International and European Law.

⁴ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, <https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml>, Access Date: 03.12.2021.



Recognition as a unilateral legal process is the acceptance of the existence of a certain phenomenon that may affect the rights, obligations, or political interests of a state and its willingness to maintain its future legal relations within this framework.⁵ In short, legal recognition means acceptance of the current situation. Although the recognition process is expressed as such, it would be wrong to explain the concept of recognition without going into detail because of the nature of international law.⁶

Due to the complex nature of international law, the recognition of states has been attempted to be based on different theories. Therefore, the recognition of states and governments has been tried to be explained in different theories.

4. Recognition Theories in International Law

There are two criteria theories for explaining the concept of recognition in the field of international law. These are; Constitutional Theory and Explanatory Theory.⁷

4.1. Constitutional Theory

According to this theory, for a state to exist, it must be recognized by other states. In other words, the state must be recognized by the states making up the international community to acquire the personality of international law and to have rights and obligations in the international arena.⁸ However, while this recognition process is carried out with the consent of the states, it must be given or rejected under the principles of law. According to constitutional theory, recognition is one of the constituent elements of states.

The constitutional theory does not see much demand in international law. One of the main reasons is that one of the founding elements of states deals with the concept of recognition

⁵ See more at: Ender Kuzu, "Uluslararası Hukukta Tanıma ve Kosova'nın Tanınması Sorunu", İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Hukuk Anabilim Dalı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul, 2011.

⁶ H. Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, *Yale Law Journal* 53, (1944): 385-458.

⁷ See more at: Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda", *The American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 2, (1993): 205-239.

⁸ Philip Marshall Brown, "The Theory of the Independence and Equality of States", *The American Journal of International Law* 9, no. 2, (1915): 305-335.



that the founding elements of states are human society, a geographical area with a defined boundary, and sovereignty, that is, political management.⁹

Therefore, although there is no concept of recognition among the founding elements of states, the recognition or non-recognition of a state does not show that that state does not exist. For example, Kosovo is recognized by Turkey, France, England, and Portuguese in the international community and takes firm steps forward to become a member of many international organizations but Serbia, Russia, and China don't recognize Kosovo. This does not indicate that Kosovo is not a state. The constitutional theory has been abandoned in general, although it is not very popular in the international community and international law.

4.2. Descriptive Theory

Descriptive theory, unlike founding theory, does not include the concept of recognition among the elements that make up the state. According to the explanatory theory, for a state to exist, it is sufficient for it to fulfill the elements of being a state.¹⁰ Any state that fulfills its elements of being a state automatically becomes part of the international community and must and should behave under international law. Recognition of the state only shows its acceptance. Recognition is also dependent on the will of the states.

The international community recognizes the emerging states in different ways by the legal and political qualities that they may cause. Therefore, in international law, there are different types of recognition and explanation for the recognition of states. Recognition can be done in two forms, de jure and de facto. De facto recognition is a way of recognition, in which existing states have doubts about recognizing the new state precisely, and hence, they express their desire to enter legal relations in a limited and temporary manner.¹¹ To summarize, de facto recognition is a transition period and in the following period, it becomes full recognition that is de jure recognition.

⁹ See more at: Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State*, Second edition, (London: Routledge, 2004).

¹⁰Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Natural Law Theories", <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/>, Access Date: 23.01.2020.

¹¹ Selcen Erdal, "Uluslararası Hukukta Tanıma Kurumu ve Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Örneği" *Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 1, (2005): 157-196.



Clear recognition is when a state clearly states that it recognizes the other state. The state that recognizes with a more accurate expression is that it expresses to the recognized state with a letter of recognition that it recognizes it. Implicit recognition means that a country recognizes the relations of other countries within the framework of political or diplomatic relations without sending a recognition letter or declaration. Under international law, the ways of recognizing closedness can be expressed as follows, unless otherwise claimed.¹²

The best example of this recognition is the Litvinov Treaty, signed between the USA and the Soviet Union in 1933. With this treaty, the United States will agree to recognize the Soviets, provided that the Soviet Union avoids actions that threaten its internal security and that some financial problems between them are resolved.¹³

Recognition of a newly founded state under international law is the demonstration of the intention to accept the state as part of the international community, completion of its formation under a political administration on a particular piece of land, and fulfilling the conditions of being a state under international law.¹⁴

5. Recognition in International Politics

The recognition of a new state as part of the international community shows that other states have accepted that they have fulfilled the conditions of being a state according to international law. Thus, the existing states exercise their discretion with a semi-judicial practice. In the absence of a special institution to carry out this task, states are empowered to decide whether the new state meets the conditions for becoming a state prescribed by international law. Generally, in such a decision process, states do not act arbitrarily, ignoring political interests and legal principles when accepting or rejecting the recognition of governments or a new state.

¹² See more at: Ayça Eminoğlu, “Uluslararası Politikada Tanımın Esasları: Kosova Analizi”, Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Trabzon, 2015.

¹³ See more at: Abdullah Kıran, “Uluslararası Hukukta Devletleri Tanıma ve Tanıma Türleri”, *Social Sciences Studies Journal* 6, (2017): 1083-1098.

¹⁴ Malcolm N. Shaw, “The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today”, *British Yearbook of International Law* 67, (1996): 75-154.



Undoubtedly, the state that recognizes, in this case, is both an advocate of its interests and a representative of international law.¹⁵ The problem of recognition of governments arises if government change occurs as a result of a violation of a state's domestic law.¹⁶

Generally, the attitude of the international community towards states that are faced with such situations is different and it is more difficult for them to recognize governments. In this case, the decision is made according to the evaluation carried out by the principle of the actual existence and impact of the new government. Regarding the actual asset principle, to accept the actual existence and influence of the government in some periods, the condition of recruiting the country's society is required.¹⁷

6. Self Determination Principle and Kosovo

The self-determination right unearthed by Wilson after the First World War was not included in any document and remained only so-called. The document with the first principle of self-determination is the UN contract of 26 July 1945. Part 1 of the UN agreement consists of two articles. Although this part of the agreement focuses more on human rights and the protection of world peace, it is in this section in the declaration on the principle of self-determination first. It is stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 1, Article 2 of the UN agreement as *“To develop friendly relations between nations based on the principle of equality of rights and their right to self-determination and to take all other appropriate measures to strengthen world peace.”* Then, in the 55th article, the expressions of *“creating necessary conditions of stability and prosperity to ensure peace and friendship relations based on the principle of equality between nations and the right of each nation to determine its own destiny”*¹⁸ are used. Firstly,

¹⁵ See more at: Ayça Eminoğlu, “Uluslararası Politikada Tanımın Esasları: Kosova Analizi”.

¹⁶ Ender Kuzu, “Uluslararası Hukukta Tanıma ve Kosova'nın Tanınması Sorunu”.

¹⁷ See more at: Ayça Eminoğlu, “Uluslararası Politikada Devletlerin Tanınması: ‘Ayrılma’ ile Ortaya Çıkan Devletlerin Tanınma Sorunu”, *KTU SBE Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 9, (2015):123-141.

¹⁸ T.C. Resmi Gazete, 24 Ağustos 1945, “4801 Sanfransisko’da 26 Haziran 1945 Tarihinde Yapılmış ve İmzalanmış Olan Birleşmiş Milletler Andlaşması ile Milletlerarası Adalet Divanı Statüsünün Onanması Hakkında Kanun”, S.6092.



the use of such expressions was an important step in binding the self-determination principle before international law.

States such as the United States, Britain, and France, which are among the strong actors of the international community, recognized Kosovo. The fact that Russia is allied with Serbia and does not recognize it in line with its political interests is the biggest obstacle facing Kosovo today. Within the framework of the problems between Serbia¹⁹ and Kosovo, Serbia qualifies Kosovo as its territory. That Serbia doesn't recognize Kosovo and its actions against the countries having recognition act to revoke their decision make the recognition of Kosovo difficult.

7. International Community and Kosovo

The international community is divided into two, on the recognition and non-recognition of Kosovo's independence. While major actors are supporting Kosovo before and after the declaration of independence, some international actors do not accept Kosovo's status and state that they will never accept its independence and recognition. In this context, it is possible to divide the international community into two as supporters and not supporters of Kosovo in the way of international recognition.

The United States has provided unconditional support for Kosovo's independence and has also called for other countries to support Kosovo's independence.²⁰ After the developments, Kosovo declared its independence on the 17th of February 2008.

The United States, through the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tom Casey, demonstrates that the United States supports the statement that "Kosovo will never again be part of Serbia".²¹ At the same time, it provided support in the economic field by not leaving the United States alone in the nationalization process and by including Kosovo in the

¹⁹ See more at: Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljic, *Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016).

²⁰ Yiğit Anıl Güzelipek, "Kosova ABD'nin 51. Eyaleti" Söyleminin Medeniyetler Çatışması ve (Neo) Realizm Özelinde Karşılaştırmalı Tahlili", *OPUS-Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6, (2017): 761-779.

²¹ Halis Ayhan, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı Sürecinde Uluslararası Güçlerin ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu", *Avrasya Etütleri* 33, (2008): 113-134.



Generalized System of Preferences in December 2008. Thanks to this program, customs and quotas were facilitated for the goods imported from Kosovo. In addition, it provided support for Kosovo becoming a member of the World Bank and the IMF in June 2009.²²

In the coming period, the United States has repeated its support for the integration of Kosovo with North-Atlantic institutions. With the end of supervised independence in Kosovo in 2012, it is observed that the economic and diplomatic support of the United States for Kosovo has decreased. During the 11 years since Kosovo's independence, the United States has not supported Kosovo internationally but has not made the issue of recognizing Kosovo an agenda directly on its foreign policy.²³

“The United States and NATO owe everything, according to Kosovo Albanians. The United States has taken care of them, and without Bill Clinton, NATO would not have come to Kosovo and Kosovo would not be free.”²⁴ As a matter of fact, according to the news of Euronews about the resolution of the conflict continuing between Kosovo and Serbia, "President of the United States Donald Trump sent a letter to solve the problems with Serbia. Kosovo President Tajic and the Serbian President invited Vucic to the White House."²⁵

Another factor is the necessity of supporting Kosovo's independence from Turkey. Turkey, Kosovo's independence is one of the first countries to recognize it. The relations between Kosovo and Turkey date back to old times. In our study, we will examine the recent relationship between Turkey and Kosovo. After the violence between Kosovo and Serbia between 1998-and 1999, Like the USA, Turkey also suggested that Kosovo shouldn't be a part of Serbia for the stability of the region and to avoid the violence. The determination of Kosovo's status came up with the Kosovo Interim Administration Mission Special Envoy Martti

²² M. Cem Oğultürk, “Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci Kapsamında ABD Dış Politikasının Analizi”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* 19, (2010): 99-132.

²³ Kader Özlem, “Kosova Sorunu Ekseninde Küresel Aktörlerin Politikalarının Analizi”, *Küresel Riskler ve Bölgesel Krizler*, Atilla Sandıklı and Elanur İsmayıl (ed), (İstanbul: BİLGESAM Yayınları, 2017): 99-124.

²⁴ Halis Ayhan, “Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığının Doğallığı”, *2023 Gelecek Bir Tasarımdır Dergisi* 83, (2008): 30-39.

²⁵ Euronews, “ABD'den Kosova'ya 'Sırbistan ile Anlaşmazlığı Çözün' Çağrısı”, 19.12.2018, <https://tr.euronews.com/2018/12/19/abd-den-kosova-ya-sirbistan-ile-anlasmazligi-cozun-cagrisi>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



Ahtisaari's plan. The plan is likely when the independence of Kosovo gets certain for the stability of the region from the point of Turkey. In a statement, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made in 2005 stressed the importance of democratization and representation of all peoples of Kosovo "no matter what future status is".²⁶

Indeed, as a military force, Turkey gives supports Kosovo under the United Nations Board. When we look at the Kosovo policies, Turkey supports Kosovo on account of both the Turkish minority in Kosovo and the friendship surrounded by historical landmarks inherited by the Ottoman Empire. In case of failure to resolve the issue of Kosovo's status, one month before the declaration of independence, Kosovo's President sought support by coming to Turkey.²⁷

Since Kosovo's independence, Turkey has continued to support both economic and political sense. Turkey's Coordination Office in Pristina, which started its operations in 1999, has been upgraded to the Embassy level after the declaration of independence.²⁸ It attaches importance to stability, territorial integrity, integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, and good neighborly relations in the region.

Considering the Balkans as a whole, Albania provides the greatest support to Kosovo in the region states in the past and today. The Albanian people constitute almost 93% of Kosovo's society. It is intertwined with the concept of citizenship between Albania and Kosovo. Albania has established a diplomatic relationship with Kosovo's declaration of independence. Foreign Affairs of Albania also attaches importance to strategic cooperation with Kosovo while determining its foreign policy priorities and declaring that it will take steps towards the recognition of Kosovo in the international arena. It should be noted that while both states declare their desire to strengthen their relations, this also emphasizes the context of Euro-Atlantic relations. Albania continued its support for Kosovo's independence under all circumstances. A few months after on 17th of February 2008 declaring Kosovo's independence,

²⁶ Birgül Coşkun Demirtaş, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı ve Türk Dış Politikası (1990-2008)", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 27, (2010): 51-86.

²⁷ Halis Ayhan, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı Sürecinde Uluslararası Güçlerin ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu".

²⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye-Kosova İlişkileri", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-kosova-siyasi-iliskileri-.tr.mfa>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



on the 8th of October 8 2008 Serbia submitted a solution proposal to the UN General Assembly regarding the legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence against the Albanian solution proposal and submitted it to the Court a written statement supporting the legitimacy of Kosovo's independence in April 2009. In the following period, he made additional comments in line with the same opinion and repeated this verbally.²⁹

There is also support for Kosovo from non-state units. The fact that it is a potential member of a key international organization like the European Union is an indication that Kosovo is a sovereign state both in the international community and globally. European Union member states support Kosovo's statehood and international community-integrated stage. In this context, “digitalkosovo.org” was created with the support of the International Physics Olympics Foundation and the British Council³⁰ in the process of admission to UNESCO and the digital diplomacy process developed within the framework of Kosovo's foreign policy strategy. In addition, the Organization of the Islamic Union used the phrase 'the organization welcomes Kosovo's independence before the independence of Kosovo.'³¹ At the 38th Assembly meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Union, he called for consideration of the recognition of Kosovo and stated that he welcomes Kosovo's membership with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.³²

The most important of the parties that oppose strongly Kosovo's independence decision is Serbia. It claimed that Kosovo is part of Serbia. Indeed, this argument is based on the reason that the Medieval Serbian State had lived on these lands in the historical process, as well as the religious factor being the Serbian Orthodox Church on the territory of Kosovo. Indeed, if a conclusion cannot be reached through status negotiations, Kosovo declared its independence. Serbia opposed strongly Kosovo's independence. The International Court of Justice stated that

²⁹ Emre Kalay, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan-Arnavutluk-Kosova İlişkileri”, *Adıyaman Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 27, (2017): 1013-1042.

³⁰ Sevda Korhan, “Dijital Diplomasi Aracılığıyla Tanınma Çabası: Kosova Örneği”, *Cyberpolitik Journal* 6, (2018): 268-281.

³¹ Halis Ayhan, “Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı Sürecinde Uluslararası Güçlerin ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu”.

³² Kosova Haber, “İslam Konferansı, Üye Ülkelerine Kosova'nın Tanınması Çağrısında Bulundu” <http://www.kosovahaber.net/?page=2,9,7401>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



the declaration of independence of Kosovo was not against international law, as announced by the judiciary on the 22nd of July 2010.³³

Russia supports Serbia to prevent Kosovo's independence and recognition. When this attitude toward Russia is analyzed, not only the existence of historical, religious, and ethnic ties but also the expansion strategies of western institutions such as the United States, NATO, and the European Union after the 2000s disturbed Russia.³⁴

7.1. European Union-Kosovo Relations

Before going into the details of the European Union-Kosovo relations, it would be correct to evaluate the European Union's attitude towards supporting Kosovo for nationalization and European cohesion. The thesis put forward by the European Union, both in the process of Kosovo's independence and the post-independence, is its desire to compensate for its failure in the Bosnia and Herzegovina problem.³⁵ However, the European Union member states left their own decisions on the recognition of Kosovo, which led them to not be able to take a common stance on Kosovo.

Greece, within the Union, does not recognize Kosovo because of its problem with minorities and its support of Cyprus.³⁶ He voted against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund membership votes of Kosovo. However, in the following period, there have been changes in Greece's attitude towards Kosovo. During his visit to Pristina in February 2014, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Venizelos stated that Kosovo has a clear European perspective and European Union-Kosovo relations are important for the entire Western Balkan region, and told that Kosovo is on this way and Greece would be with Kosovo as long as he worked on the future of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic.³⁷

³³ Erhan Türbedar, "Sırbistan Kosova Siyasetini Sorguluyor", *Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi*, Blog Nu: 32. (2011).

³⁴ Kader Özlem, "Kosova Sorunu Ekseninde Küresel Aktörlerin Politikalarının Analizi".

³⁵ Şeyma Adıyman, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci ve AB ile İlişkileri", Bilge İnsanlar Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi, <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/145/-kosova%E2%80%99nin-bagimsizlik-sureci-ve-ab-ileiliskileri/#.Xf15cUczblW>, 2011, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

³⁶ Halis Ayhan, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığı Sürecinde Uluslararası Güçlerin ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu".

³⁷ Emre Kalay, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan-Arnavutluk-Kosova İlişkileri".



Spain, like Greece, does not recognize Kosovo because it will serve as an example for Catalans with minority problems. Considering the attitude of Spain, there are differences between Catalonia and Kosovo. During the independence process of Kosovo, under ethnic cleansing policies, human rights violations were carried out and the majority of the people were under the pressure from the Serbian administration. However, when considered in terms of Catalonia, there was no such situation in Catalonia. In this context, the International Court of Justice has confirmed the legitimacy of Kosovo's independence. The European Commission has evaluated on this issue that the situation of Kosovo should not be confused with Catalonia because Spain is a member of the European Union and Serbia is not.³⁸

Slovakia's attitude on the subject is skeptical of Kosovo's inability to maintain its sovereignty and stability in becoming a state. Indeed, there should be no doubt that Kosovo, as a state that has fulfilled the requirements of International Law, cannot maintain its sovereignty. Looking at the recent developments, the European Union stated that if the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is resolved, the EU will move towards membership with the two states. At the same time, former Prime Minister of Slovakia, Iveta Radicova, reported that Slovakia would recognize Kosovo as a result of the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and added that the two countries are ready to assist in moving forward.³⁹

As a result, it is possible to observe that Kosovo is not fully recognized by the European Union for these different reasons we have explained.

7.2. EU's Rule of Law Mission and Kosovo

In the situation before the European Union declared independence, its existence in Kosovo is the economic structuring of Kosovo under the United Nations Interim Administration

³⁸TUIC Akademi, "İspanya'dan AB'ye Kosova Eleştirisi", <http://www.tuicakademi.org/ispanyadan-abye-kosova-elestirisi/>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

³⁹ Kosova Haber, "Slovakya Kosova'yı Tanımaya Hazır", <http://www.kosovahaber.net/?page=2,9,18389>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



of Kosovo, through the European Agency for Humanitarian Relief and European Agency for Restructuring.⁴⁰

Kosovo-European Union relations gained a different dimension with the declaration of independence of Kosovo on the 17th of February 2008 and the transfer of the duties of the United Nations Administration in Kosovo to the European Union. Kosovo also declared that the independence declaration will remain true to the plan prepared by the United Nations Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and applied to the UN and the EU and asked for a "Police Mission" to be sent to Kosovo.⁴¹ In the post-independence situation, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has transferred its duties to the European Union.

The presence of the European Union today is bilateral. The first is the Kosovo European Union Office. The Kosovo European Union Office ensures the continuing political and technical dialogue between the institutions of the European Union and Kosovo.⁴²

Second, the European Union is the Rule of Law Mission. On the 10th of April 2006, the European Union decided to establish a European Union Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) against crises that may occur between Kosovo and Serbia as a joint decision. In this context, the European Union Planning Team decided to start the European Union Rule of Law Mission on the 16th of February 2008.⁴³ As a matter of fact, the term of office from 2008 to 2012 was extended to 2020.

In this context, the European Union is making efforts to improve Kosovo in economic, political, and social areas and bring it in line with European standards.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, it takes duties within the framework of the European Union Rule of Law Mission to determine peace

⁴⁰ Sibel Akgün, "Kosova'nın Avrupa Birliğine Entegrasyon Süreci ve Bu Süreçte Kosova Türkleri" *Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Uluslararası Avrasya Strateji Dergisi* 2, (2013): 1-14.

⁴¹ Abdly Fandaj, "Kosova'nın Devlet Olma Süreci ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Rolü", Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Bursa, 2018.

⁴² EULEX, "The EU in Kosovo", <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,19>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁴³ Şeyma Adıyman, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci ve AB ile İlişkileri".

⁴⁴ Gérard Marcou, "Legal Framework and the European Charter of Local Self-Government", *The Kosovo Decentralization Briefing Book*, Robert D. Ebel and Gábor Péteri (ed.), (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), 50-58.



and stability in Kosovo. The European Union Rule of Law Mission has made important initiatives in aligning the judicial system and Kosovo legislation in Kosovo with European standards, advising government agencies, and enacting some new laws. The training of public duties has taken important steps in the integration of minorities (especially Serbs) into state institutions.⁴⁵

8. Integration Process and Kosovo

In the case of Kosovo, it is known today as a potential member of the European Union. In addition, one of the most fundamental goals of Kosovo as a state is to become a member of the European Union before the United Nations membership, both for the development of the state's structure and for an international Kosovo position. It is one of the action plans given by the state as a state throughout the European Union integration process.⁴⁶

Kosovo started its European Union integration process with the European Union Integration Office, which was first established under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. After independence, the European Union Integration Office was transformed into the Ministry of Integration of the European Union.⁴⁷ In this context, the ministry's tasks that Kosovo must fulfill within the framework of European harmonization are the economic assistance provided by the European Union and the necessary coordination between Kosovo's institutions, and the necessary competencies to bring Kosovo laws to European standards. The European Union integration process in Kosovo is monitored by progress reports by the European Union.

It seems that the post-independence period has seen important progress for the European Union in the post-2009 period, due to the situation that appeared with the progress reports within the European Union integration process. As a matter of fact, it seems that the main problem in the European Union integration process in Kosovo is the Serbian-Albanian conflict.

⁴⁵ Fatma Gamze Çakmak, "Kosova'da Avrupa Birliği: EULEX Misyonu Hakkında Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme", *Akademik Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi* 96, (2019): 383-398.

⁴⁶ Abdly Fandaj, "Kosova'nın Devlet Olma Süreci ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Rolü".

⁴⁷ See more at: Birgit Poopuu, *The European Union's Brand of Peace Building*, (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).



The conflicts that started in Kosovo in 2004 and continued on and off cause weakness in ensuring the national integrity of Kosovo. The fact that both Serbs in the north of Kosovo and Serbia's not seeing Kosovo as an independent country has a negative impact on the way of European Union membership in the framework of the problems Kosovo faces with its neighbor.⁴⁸

Table 1. Financial Assistance Allocated by the European Union to Kosovo Between 2008-2013⁴⁹

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Million Euro	184,7	106,1	67,3	68,7	70,0	107,2	604,6

In this context, in terms of Kosovo's relations with the European Union, negotiations on the mediation of the European Union and the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia were launched in 2011. While these negotiations are addressing the status of Kosovo, the main target is aimed at issues stating that cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia should be made. In the negotiations sent by representatives of the two countries, regional cooperation, freedom of movement, and some legal problems were addressed.⁵⁰

The Stabilization and Association Agreement has been an important step toward European Union integration in Kosovo's economic and constitutional legislation. The Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union was signed by Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, European Union senior official Federica Mogherini, Integration Minister Çollaku, and Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn.⁵¹

This agreement is important for the European Union's integration in Kosovo's economic, political and legal aspects. At the same time, the European Union is considered the unit that

⁴⁸ Sibel Akgün, "Kosova'nın Avrupa Birliğine Entegrasyon Süreci ve Bu Süreçte Kosova Türkleri"..

⁴⁹ European Union of official website, "An overview of relations between the EU and Kosovo", https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/1387/kosovo-and-eu_en, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁵⁰ Nedim Emin, "Kosova'nın Siyasetini Anlama Kılavuzu", no. 42, (İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, 2014), http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20141017111147_42_kosova_web.pdf, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁵¹ AB Haber, "Kosova, Avrupa Birliği ile Arasında İstikrar ve Ortaklık Anlaşması İmzalandı" <http://www.abhaber.com/kosova-avrupa-birligi-ile-istikrar-ve-ortaklik-anlasmasi-imzaladi/>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



helps Kosovo most with the development of Kosovo and completing the state process by international organizations. Within the framework of the agreement, it has allocated 1,3 billion Euros to Kosovo for the period 2007-2020.⁵² With the Stability and Association Agreement, political dialogues were emphasized in the countries of the region and at the same time paved the way for the free movement of industrial goods in terms of economy.

Although Kosovo has taken important steps toward the European Union through the Stabilization and Association Agreement, it appears to depend on the continuation of the dialogue with Serbia for continued integration. Indeed, within the framework of the Brussels Agreement with Serbia, the fact that Kosovo's status cannot be resolved before Serbia shows that Kosovo will not become a member of the European Union unless it can solve its problems with Serbia. At the same time, another problem is that Kosovo is not included in the visa exemption. The fact that it is not supported by the European Union in terms of visa exemption, although it is supported both internationally and economically, is creating suspicion for the European Union in terms of Kosovo. The visa exemption is linked by the European Union to the solution of the border problem with Kosovo and Montenegro. Although the border problem between Kosovo and Montenegro has been resolved, Kosovo's failure to benefit from visa exemption has been disappointing for the people of Kosovo.⁵³

8.1. International Full Recognition Strategy and Recognition Micro Politics

Since the Republic of Kosovo declared its independence on the 17th of February 2008, it has been observed that it has two main objectives as a state. These are the international recognition as proof of being a sovereign state and building of its institutions. Recognized by 116⁵⁴ states in the international community today, Kosovo still faces an ongoing recognition problem. Therefore, the priority plan of the Kosovo Foreign Ministry is the increase in

⁵² Abdly Fandaj, "Kosova'nın Devlet Olma Süreci ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Rolü".

⁵³ Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi, Mogherını: kosova'ya vize muafiyeti verilmesi zamanı geldi, <https://avim.org.tr/tr/Bulten/MOghERINI-KOSOVA-YA-VIZE-MUAFIYETI-VERILMESI-ZAMANI-GELDI>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁵⁴ For a list of Recognition, <https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



international recognition and membership in international organizations.⁵⁵ As of today, the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by 113 of the United Nations states has an impact on global recognition as well as geographical recognition for the Republic of Kosovo. It is also regionally recognized by three of Kosovo's four neighboring countries.

The lack of recognition by states such as Serbia, China, and Russia still hinders membership in global organizations such as the United Nations. While Russia and China's attitudes toward the recognition of Kosovo are hindering Kosovo's full membership of the United Nations, it seriously limits the political, economic, and social development of Kosovo. The lack of international recognition also affects adversely the integration of foreign investors and Kosovo citizens into various global networks.⁵⁶

We can list the obstacles to the international recognition of Kosovo as follows:

1) Russia's vetoing Kosovo in the United Nations Security Council due to its view that Kosovo's independence is against the Ahtisaari Plan, China's veto in the United Nations due to its attitude that Kosovo will set an example for China's minority problems within itself,

2) Lack of consensus on the independence of Kosovo within the European Union and in this context, considering Kosovo as a European problem,

3) Serbia sees Kosovo as part of its territory and makes propaganda so as not to legitimize its independence in the international community,

4) The image of the state in the international community regarding Kosovo's experiences in the historical process is not bad,

5) Lack of recognition by a large number of small states that are geographically distant from Kosovo and the Balkans and have no firm knowledge of Kosovo's independence,

⁵⁵Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign, "International recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo", www.mfa-ks.net/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁵⁶ Edward Newman and Gëzim Visoka, "The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo's Diplomatic Strategy To Join International Society", *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3, (2018): 367-387.



6) The removal of foreign policies from the Balkans region within the framework of global priorities.

In addition, Kosovo's ambiguities in domestic politics can be perceived as an obstacle to Kosovo's international recognition. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult for countries that have not achieved stability in their domestic politics to adopt by the international community. In this context, unity could not be achieved in the 2014 elections and the government could not be established for 5 months, at the same time, unity could not be established after the early elections of 2017, and the government could not be established for 2 months. This situation brings Kosovo back in terms of both economic and international policy. In addition, Kosovo's diplomats have an active attitude towards the recognition of Kosovo. President Atifete Jahjaga⁵⁷ of Kosovo in 2011 and 2014 played a very active role in foreign relations. As the first President in the region, he played an active role in women's rights and victims of war, besides, in 2014, the current President was not able to play an active role in foreign affairs through the election of Hashim Thaçi as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁸

Table 2. Recognition of Kosovo by States After 2010

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Recognition Number	8	12	12	7	4	3	2	2	1

However, considering Table 2, there is a decrease in the international recognition of Kosovo in the post-2012 period. In this context, while Kosovo's recognition strategies invited internationally to recognize Kosovo as an individual, it failed to be recognized as a state. It also reflects the fact that its image has deteriorated internationally as an indicator of recent tensions with Serbia. Kosovo's solution to its problems with Serbia will both bring Kosovo into the agenda and open the way for European Union membership. As a matter of fact, while the size

⁵⁷ Atifete Jahjaga served as the President of Kosovo between 2011 and 2016. During the Presidency, Hashim Thaci was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo in 2014. He was elected President in 2016. Today he is serving as President.

⁵⁸ Gezim Krasniqi, "Rising Up In The Word: Kosovo's Quest For International Recognition", <https://prishtinainsight.com/rising-up-world-kosovo-quest-international-recognition-mag/>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia does not seem to benefit Kosovo in the short term, it seems a blurred journey for Kosovo in the long term.

In addition to these reasons, Kosovo has published a statement on international recognition through the Kosovo Foreign Ministry entitled international full recognition strategies. In the declaration, he stated that Kosovo will take steps towards influencing states that have not yet recognized them, along with the strategic goals as well as the roads that will follow the path to international recognition. The strategy that Kosovo has developed and implemented for international recognition and integration into the international community is threefold:

1. Recognition by individual states
2. International organizations
3. The special group is states and regions.⁵⁹

When the recognition strategy developed by Kosovo, in general, is examined, it is emphasized that the President should lead foreign policy in the direction of international recognition in accordance with the Kosovo Constitution and laws. It is also aimed to improve the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and accelerate the European integration process through the Ministry of Integration of the European Union.

In addition, it is emphasized that it is necessary to advocate in the international community in order to get help through the political parties with the domestic parliamentary diplomacy and to be coordinated by civil society and the respected people of the country.

8.2. Recognition Efforts under Public Diplomacy and Kosovo

Kosovo has developed several strategies for international recognition. Kosovo has gone primarily been recognized through public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a process that tells

⁵⁹ Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign, "International recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo", www.mfaks.net/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



the government of one country to try to influence the citizens and intellectuals of another country in line with their own political and ideological thoughts.⁶⁰

In this context, Kosovo has attempted to be recognized by public diplomacy by states that do not recognize it. Special visits were organized to states that did not recognize Kosovo, conferences were held in Kosovo, and the promotion of Kosovo was made. By organizing the Germia Hill International Conference,⁶¹ not only the importance and cooperation processes of the Balkans were evaluated but also the reason for the international recognition of Kosovo through the cultural diplomacy, which is the sub-unit of public diplomacy and the place of Kosovo, having a historical, religious and multicultural structure were tried to be explained. Besides this, in addition to public diplomacy, Kosovo Deputies paid visits to states that do not recognize Kosovo, especially to states that do not recognize Kosovo within the European Union.⁶²

Kosovo also aims to be recognized through interpersonal diplomacy. Interpersonal diplomacy appears as diplomacy that is generally implemented and supported by civil society. In this context, Kosovo communicates with the five targeted, yet unrecognized, European Union states through interpersonal diplomacy. As a matter of fact, with the support of the British Council and the British Embassy, "European Union Kosovo" negotiations have been initiated towards the goal of being known through cooperation without international recognition.⁶³

The United Nations Security Council asked the International Court of Justice for its opinion on the independence of Kosovo. The Court firstly investigated the general international law regulations related to the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. The member of UN states brought up the examples of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus, which were

⁶⁰ Public Diplomacy, https://www.wikizeroo.org/wiki/tr/Kamu_diplomasisi, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁶¹ Germia Hill International Conference, <http://www.mfa-ks.net/germiahill/gh-2016>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁶² Parliamentary Assembly, "The situation in Kosovo and the role of the Council of Europe", <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22306&lang=en>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.

⁶³ Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Foreign, "People-to-People Diplomacy", <http://www.mfa-ks.net/en/politika/485/people-to-people-diplomacy/485>, Access Date: 22.01.2020.



under the same conditions and were condemned by the UN, but the Court stated that the illegality in the mentioned examples was not due to the unilateral declaration of independence but to the use of force or serious violation of international law. The Court stated that general international law did not prevent the declaration of independence. In the end, the Court, regardless of the consequences of the decision and the political debate, ruled that no regulation in international law prohibits the declaration of independence.⁶⁴

9. Conclusion

When we look at the international recognition problem of Kosovo, it is seen that the concept of recognition firstly depends on international interests and political reasons, even if it occurs under international law. Although Kosovo has fulfilled its requirements to become a state under international law, the fact that it is not recognized by China and Russia, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is an example of this. Russia appears as the main actor in this regard. Russia's international support for Serbia is in the interests of both Russia and Serbia.

The European Union provided great support during the reconstruction of Kosovo, given the Kosovo relations reviews. It has made investments with economic and financial support funds and has provided a balance between public institutions and organizations politically. In addition to this, Kosovo, which received military support internationally, has also received military support from the European Union. Talks have been launched to address problems with Serbia and normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo for an international Kosovo. Indeed, although so-called relations have normalized as a result of the negotiations, Kosovo has taken a good step in the European Union integration process. Indeed, we can call this the European Union's gift to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Serbia has a great influence on the European Union and Kosovo relations. With the normalization of relations with Serbia, there is a link to Kosovo's membership in the European Union.

⁶⁴ Seçil Şahin, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık İlanının Uluslararası Adalet Divanı Kararı ve Self Determinasyon İlkesi Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi", Ankara Barosu Dergisi, (2015/3): 530-531.



In this context, both the European Union member Greece argued that although it does not recognize Kosovo, it is a complete European perspective. Slovakia, on the other hand, emphasized the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and said that it would recognize Kosovo with the normalization of relations. In this regard, Kosovo's membership of the European Union has progressed both in the historical process and with the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo today.

The problem of Kosovo's inability to be recognized internationally has been seen as a deficiency by Kosovo statesmen, and in this context, state strategies and international recognition efforts have started. With the international recognition policy published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo as a priority in 2011, it was aimed to be recognized individually by the states through a one-on-one meeting, and it became a member of the European Union and a member of the United Nations in terms of membership in international organizations.

Kosovo's recognition strategies for both external and internal reasons have failed as a deficiency, aiming at international recognition through public diplomacy types and digital diplomacy. In this context, while external obstacles that we can consider as Serbia and other factors are one side, the internal structure of Kosovo can be considered as an internal reason for both the troubles in political life and the failures of diplomats to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo.

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Drug Abuse and its Implication on Regional Security in West and Central Africa: Case Studies of Nigeria and Cameroon

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Abstract

Though previous literature establishes that abuse of drugs may amount to numerous health risks, they, however, fail to present the extent to which such cases could constitute a threat to national and regional security. Therefore, this research sheds light on the extent to which drug abuse constitutes an existential threat to national security by focusing on the use of Tramadol extending from terrorist organizations to youth in Nigeria and Cameroon. In general, Tramadol is considered an analgesic pill that treats severe and moderate pain. But the outcome of the analysis in this research reveals the extent to which tramadol is prevalent among the terrorist and organized crime groups in Nigeria, and it is the driver of youth violence and heightened crime rates in Cameroonian cities of Douala and Yaounde.

Keywords: Drug Abuse, Tramadol, National Security, Organized Crime

Batı ve Orta Afrika'da Uyuşturucu Suistimali ve Bölgesel Güvenliğe Etkisi: Nijerya ve Kamerun Örneği

Özet

Önceki literatür, uyuşturucu kullanımının çok sayıda sağlık riski oluşturabileceğini ortaya koysa da, bu tür vakaların ulusal ve bölgesel güvenliğe ne ölçüde tehdit oluşturabileceğini gösterememektedir. Dolayısıyla bu araştırma, Nijerya ve Kamerun'da terör örgütlerinden gençlere uzanan Tramadol kullanımına odaklanarak, uyuşturucu kullanımının ulusal güvenliğe ne ölçüde varoluşsal bir tehdit oluşturduğuna ışık tutmaktadır. Genel olarak, Tramadol, şiddetli ve orta derecede ağrıyı tedavi eden bir analjezik hap olarak kabul edilir. Ancak bu araştırmadaki analizin sonucu, tramadolün Nijerya'daki terörist ve organize suç grupları arasında ne kadar yaygın olduğunu ve Kamerun'un Douala ve Yaounde şehirlerindeki gençlik şiddetinin ve artan suç oranlarının itici gücü olduğunu ortaya koyuyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uyuşturucu Kullanımı, Tramadol, Ulusal Güvenlik, Organize Suç

1. Introduction

For decades before the end Cold War, the term national security by and large meant military security. The discourse on national security now includes issues such as human, food, environmental, and health security. In recent years, there has been a frequent linkage between public health and national security concerns.¹ This article hypothesized that increased consumption of synthetic opioids for non-medical purpose have potential implications for national security across West and Central African states. Thus, the paper distinctively examines

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¹ Peter Hough, Andrew Moran, Bruce Pilbeam and Wendy Stokes. *International security studies: theory and practice*.(Routledge, 2015).



the extent to which tramadol constitutes a threat to national security in Nigeria and Cameroon. Tramadol was first approved in 1995 in the United States as an analgesic that works in the brain to change how the body feels and responds to pains.² Since its inception, it is globally being used to help relieve severe and moderate pains. National governments around the world, including the United States, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Morocco, and many others widely endorse the use of tramadol as a pain reliever.³ The World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and UN's Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND) all consider tramadol as a 'centrally acting analgesic that treats pains from moderate to severe intensity.'⁴ The decision to endorse and legalize the usage of a drug is only made when national and international health bodies envisage that the expected benefit outweighs the risk involved. Tramadol is a legal drug that is neither regulated nor included in the list of illicit drugs by WHO and UNODC.

Generally, the use of synthetic opioids is severely restricted worldwide, but tramadol is perceived by WHO as a viable alternative. At the 39th Meeting of the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence in November 2017, the WHO reiterated its stance to keep tramadol unregulated. This seemingly intransigent position requires a balanced examination of the potential implications on national security. The WHO's position not to regulate its use is backed by medical experts who argue that stricter international controls would unjustly affect certain countries and patients. In recent years, much research has focused on the various health risk posed by tramadol, however, this study submits that it is probable that when tramadol is ingested with other drugs or alcohol, it can lead to violent extremism and radicalization. It is also established that the drug is addictive and has a high dependency rate, especially when taken for non-medical purposes.⁵ Though previous literature on the subject has established that tramadol may amount to numerous health risks, they failed to ascertain the extent to which this synthetic opioid is a threat to international security. While some studies claim low-risk potential, this research highlights a significant threat to public health and national security associated with tramadol abuse. According to preliminary findings, hitherto, there is no

² Marwan Diab, Guido Veronese, Yasser Abu Jamei and Ashraf Kagee. "Risk and protective factors of tramadol abuse in the Gaza Strip: The perspective of tramadol abusers and psychiatrists." *International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction* 19.6 (2021): 2074-2090..

³ Ibid

⁴ UNODC, *Drug Use in Nigeria*: Published by United Office of Drugs and Crime, (2018) file:///D:/Drug_Use_Survey_Nigeria_2019_BOOK.pdf (20.12.2020).

⁵ Björn Johnson, Richert Torkel and Svensson Bengt. "Physical violence and property damage towards parents, committed by adult children with drug problems." *Journal of family violence*, (2020): 1-16.



systematic empirical research that suggests that tramadol is an existential threat to national and international security. High levels of tramadol consumption by terrorist and organized crime groups in many parts of the world signal a threat to both national and international security. The security implications of tramadol in West and Central Africa, notably Cameroon and Nigeria remain unclear.

Tramadol is increasingly being used as a recreational drug across many parts of the globe, the non-medical use and trafficking of this synthetic opioid by youths, terrorist organizations, and organized crime groups pose an existential threat to international security. States and non-state actors are faced with the dilemma of halting its production to curb its abuse at the expense of patients who are in dire need of it. In this context, the purpose of this research is to enable national and international actors, particularly The World Health Organisation and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to comprehend the extent to which synthetic opioids, particularly tramadol poses a threat to national security in Nigeria and Cameroon. The research is meant to allow these actors to understand where their gaps exist and how to make amends. The findings particularly expose significant gaps in the regulation of synthetic opioids and spur the national and international community to introduce context-specific reforms that avert the existential threats posed by tramadol.

This article adopted qualitative research methods to generate findings, the data was drawn from both primary and secondary sources. In the Cameroonian case, the primary source included in-depth interviews with medical personnel, teachers, and addicts at a rehabilitation center in Douala. The study particularly sought to identify the consequences of tramadol abuse on youths, it focused on the effect of the drugs on national security. The interviews were conducted with the aid of an audio tape recorder. The process respected professional ethics and protected the integrity, confidentiality, and identity of the respondents. The participants were informed about the purpose of the study and they signed a form to give their consent. They were also permitted to withdraw from the interview at any time or abstain from answering any of the questions. A discourse analytical technique was employed to analyze the information drawn from the interviews. In the Nigerian case, the research relied on secondary sources of information drawn from the World Health Organization Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the national bulletin on narcotics. Other secondary sources of information from the United States provide empirical evidence of the consequences of tramadol abuse on national security. This, therefore, imply that the consequences observed in the United States



show that Cameroon and Nigeria were not unique but typical. This paper is structured into four main parts. The first section on theory accounts for the modern understanding of national security. The second part outline the international legal instrument guiding the use of tramadol. The third part provides an in-depth analysis of the extent to which tramadol constitutes a threat to national security in Nigeria and Cameroon. The final section focuses on the conclusion and policy recommendation.

2. Securitization Theory and the Modern Understanding of Regional Security

Since the end of the cold war, the field of security studies has undergone profound changes, the concept has been reconceptualized and broadened beyond the notion of state and military security. The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization and critical security theory has made significant contributions to the debate regarding the meaning of security. In this part, I argue that the meaning of security has been construed in a way that drugs abuse constitutes an existential threat to national, regional, and international security.

According to the Copenhagen school of security, the meaning of security is based on three fundamental questions; first, it relates to the "referent object," that is whether security should be about the state, the individual, ethnic group, environment, or some other entity that ought to be prioritized and protected e.g. drugs. Second, relates to the nature of threats faced, that is whether the threat is internal, external, or both? Third, whether the meaning of security should be expanded beyond the military sector to include other non-military elements such as health, food, environment, etc. Barry Buzan and his associates of the Copenhagen school opposed traditionalist scholars of International Security Studies (ISS), who draw their inspiration largely from Realist or Liberal theories in International Relations.⁶ According to supporters of the traditional approach, the answer to the first question is simply stated. For these scholars, the process of globalization, powerful as it may be, has failed to alter the most fundamental characteristic of the international system, namely, the world of sovereign state entities that was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The term 'traditionalism' within Security Studies encompasses both the Realist and Liberal perspectives on security. Thus, what binds the traditionalist school of thought is their unwavering commitment to the state as the sole referent object of security. According to them, securing the state is

⁶ Barry Buzan and Hansen Lene. *The evolution of international security studies*, (Cambridge University Press, 2009).



instrumentally considered the best way of protecting the referent object. They underpinned that the security of the state should reflect the protection of its national values and interest. Therefore, in theoretical terms, traditionalists argue that sovereign states continue to be the ‘building blocks of the Westphalian international system.’⁷ They claim that the state is the most sophisticated unit of human communal organization within world politics; and most importantly, the only legitimate and significant possessor of organized violence in the international system. Traditionalists narrowly focused on the military security of states and pay particular attention to military threats relating to nuclear proliferation, and armaments. On the contrary, this article contends that the state is not the only referent object of security, they are other entities such as health, food, individuals, ethnic groups, environment, and some other entities that require protection.

The second question is whether or not to include internal as well as external threats. In response to the second question, traditionalist proponents always link security threats with discussions about state sovereignty. In the wake of the cold war, threats to national security were mainly external, but today, national security predominantly includes both internal and external threats. The third question is whether to expand security beyond the military sector and the use of force. It’s in this part of the question that securitization theory provides a powerful intellectual understanding of the meaning of security.

According to the Copenhagen School, security is about safety and survival. They argue that in international relations something becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to mankind.⁸ According to Copenhagen school theorists, a more general sectoral meaning of security includes human, societal, economic, environmental, health, and gender as referent objects. Through the notion of securitization theory, security is an outcome of the socially constructed process such as the “speech act” rather than an objective condition. To this end, the widening and deepening of the security agenda at the end of the cold war demonstrates the connection between public health and national security, particularly the relationship between them. The ‘war on drugs’ shows how drug abuse constitutes an existential threat to national and international security. Drug abuse intersects a vast array of international security issues such as terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization of youths. The abuse of

⁷ Mely Caballero-Anthony (ed). *An introduction to non-traditional security studies: a transnational approach*, (Sage, 2015).

⁸ Ibid.



drugs such as tramadol probably exacerbates threats to national, regional, and international security. Though tramadol is considered a centrally acting analgesic that treats pains of moderate to severe intensity, nonetheless this article argues that it should be treated as an existential threat to security. The unique nature of its use makes its threat more complex, durable, and severe.

3. National and International Legal Disposition of Tramadol

Currently, there is no international legal instrument regulating the use of tramadol. At the international level, WHO and UNODC largely perceive the drug as a centrally acting analgesic and fail to quantify its threat to peace and security, as such they neither regulate nor include it in the list of illicit drugs. The World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Drug Dependence reviewed the use of tramadol five times: in 1992, 2000, 2002, 2006, and 2014. In November 2017, considering that many experts claim a low level of abuse and security risk connected to the drug, international bodies have somewhat been reluctant to introduce stricter regulations. The outcome of this study provides sufficient evidence and justification for the implementation of an international regulatory mechanism. Nonetheless, national legislations variously impose a legal status on tramadol. Tramadol is under strict national control in Bahrain since 2000, in Australia since 2001, in Sweden since 2008, in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 2008, in Ukraine since 2008, and in Iran since 2007.⁹ In India, in April 2018, a new set of rules outlined in the gazette of India placed the pills into the group of a controlled substances. In December 2017, UNODC highlighted the implications of its usage in the Middle East, and the notable implications of its connection with terrorist and organized crime groups.

The United States is amid the worst drug epidemic addiction in its history, The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported in 2010 that an estimated 16,251 emergency department visits were related to tramadol abuse, with an estimate of 20,000 abuse rate in 2011.¹⁰ According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) in 2012, 3.2 million people in the U.S. aged 12 or older used Tramadol for non-medical purposes. In 2014, NSDUH reported that the number of emergency visits involving tramadol abuse increased

⁹ Sumedha Gupta, Thuy D. Nguyen, Patricia R. Freeman and Kosali I. Simon. *Competitive Effects of Federal and State Opioid Restrictions: Evidence from the Controlled Substance Laws*. No. w27520. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020.

¹⁰ The DAWN Report. Findings on Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits; Drug Abuse Warning Network (2012) <https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files> (22.12.20).



approximately to 250% from 2005 to 2011. In 2014, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) published a revised set of rules that categorized tramadol as a controlled substance.¹¹ In 2015, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that approximately 12.5 million people in the United States abused the use of synthetic opioids while an estimated 24,861 people died from overdoses. By 2016 these numbers tripled and in effect six U.S. states declared public health emergencies to combat the opioid crisis.¹² In October 2017, President Trump declared the synthetic opioid crisis a public health emergency.¹³ In the same year, U.S. law enforcement officials estimated that about 1 billion unauthorized tramadol tablets were seized leaving India for the United States. In Cameroon and Nigeria, there's no national legislation completely outlawing the use of the drug. Despite myriad efforts by national legislators in both countries to regulate the use of the drug, there is still limited evidence of its implication for national security.

4. Tramadol as a Threat to National Security in Nigeria

The United States is amid the worst drug epidemic addiction in its history, yet the U.S is not the only country facing such a predicament. Nigeria one of Africa's largest nations is as well suffering from a wide-scale drug and opioid epidemic. The analysis in this section relied on secondary data drawn from the World Health Organization Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the national bulletin on narcotics. In 2018, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime UNODC in partnership with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) conducted the first-ever comprehensive nationwide drug use survey in Nigeria.¹⁴ The survey provides empirical data on the extent and pattern of drug use in the country, the demographic characteristics of the drug users, the health risk involved, and their national security implications. The findings from the survey revealed that the number of drug users in Nigeria is estimated at 14.4 percent or 14.3 million people aged between 15 and 64 years. The data suggested that in 2018 the prevalence of drug abuse in Nigeria is twice the global average of

¹¹ Drug Enforcement Administration, Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Tramadol into Schedule IV, accessed February 2, 2021, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents>

¹² National Survey of Drug Use and Health-NADUH. Results from National Survey on Drug Use and Health, (2019) <https://www.samhsa.gov/data/release> (18.12.2020).

¹³ Kavya Rajesh, Gary Wilcox, David Ring, Michael Mackert. "Reactions to the opioid epidemic: A text-mining analysis of tweets." *Journal of Addictive Diseases* 39, no. 2 (2020): 183-188.

¹⁴ UNODC, Drug Use in Nigeria: Published by United Office of Drugs and Crime (2018) file:///D:/Drug_Use_Survey_Nigeria_2019_BOOK.pdf (20.12.2020).



5.6 percent. The extent to which synthetic opioids, mainly tramadol are used for non-medical purposes, stood at about 4.6 million.

4.1. Tramadol Abuse Along Geopolitical Lines

Nigeria comprises 37 administrative states and six geopolitical zones that include: North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-East, South-West, and South-South. The survey found a high prevalence of drug abuse in the Northern geopolitical zones ranging from 13.8% - to 22% compared to the southern geopolitical zones with a range of 10% - to 13.6%. Tramadol, codeine, and morphine are the three main substances with a high prevalence of abuse in the Northern parts of the country while cannabis, tramadol, heroin, cocaine, and codeine are common in the southern zones. In terms of gender difference in the abuse, proportionally more men than women used synthetic opioids for non-medical purposes. While the use of tramadol was observed among all age groups in Nigeria, overall its consumption was high among young people between the ages of 15 and 39 years. The mean age was 21 years. On average. Nearly 80 percent of the abusers were daily or nearly daily users. However, there was considerable non-medical use of tramadol among older people within the age brackets of 45 and 64 years. It was observed that a vast majority of the user in this age group had been prescribed the medication legally for pain control purposes.

Poverty, unemployment, hard manual labor, sex work, and the general desperation of youths are the main drivers cited in the data. Tramadol addiction proved to have an adverse effect on the user's societal, occupational, and mental health. Many tramadol abusers report strained family relationships, as well as troubles in the workplace, at school, and in their communities. The health risk enlisted in the survey includes seizures, coma, hypertension, tachycardia, lethargy, nausea, and agitation.¹⁵ Nearly 1 in 8 persons in Nigeria felt unsecured or had experienced adverse consequences from a drug addict. Those who had experienced adverse consequences were mostly threatened or physically assaulted.

¹⁵ Ibid



Table 1: Drug Abuse in the Northern Regions of Nigeria

North Central (Most Consumed Drugs)	Consumption Rate in terms of population size	Estimated No of consumers	North East (Most Consumed Drugs)	Consumption Rate in terms of population size	Estimated N0 of Consumers
Cannabis	10.4%	150,000	Cannabis	7.0%	1000,000
Tramadol	1.3 %	160,000	Tramadol	8.5%	1,225,000
Codeine	2.1%	216,000	Codeine	4.0%	460,000
Estimated annual average	10%	1.5 million	Estimated annual average	13.8%	3,000,000

Source of Data: UNODC

The North-Central zone includes Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger States, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja. The estimated annual prevalence of drug use in this zone is 10 percent, equivalent to 1.5 million people. Drug abuse in this region is 30% lower than the overall national rate. Cannabis, codeine or dextromethorphan, tramadol, and morphine are the four main substances with a high prevalence of abuse in the North-Central zone. The North-East zone which includes Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and the Yobe States had an estimated annual average of 13.8 percent or over 3 million drug abusers. The overall extent of abuse in the North-East zone is the highest when compared with the national rates. It is interesting to note that while the prevalence of cannabis in this area is lower than other national estimates, synthetic opioids particularly tramadol, codeine, and morphine recorded the highest rates of abuse. Tramadol registered 1.2 million abusers rates. Among the North East regions, the highest rates of abuse were recorded in the Gombe State (21 percent of the adult population and 79 percent of youths).

Table 2: Drug Abuse in West and Eastern Regions of Nigeria

North West (Most Consumed Drugs)	Consumption Rate/%	Estimated No of Consumers	South East (Most Consumed Drugs)	Percentages %	Estimated N0 of Consumers
Most consumed, Cannabis	8.9%	2,100,000	Cannabis	11.4%	1,226,000
Tramadol	3.0%	670,000	Cocaine	3.6%	352,000
Codeine	2.2%	373,000	Tramadol	3.5%	301,000
Estimated annual average	11%	2,090,000	Estimated annual average	13.6%	1,550,000

Source of Data: UNODC

The North-West zone includes Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and the Zamfara States. With a population of approximately 25 million people in 2018, the zone has



the largest population of all the geo-political zones in Nigeria. The prevalence of drug abuse in this geopolitical zone stood at 11% about 2.2 million people. Cannabis and non-medical use of synthetic opioids, especially tramadol, codeine, and morphine are the most common in this zone. The South-East zone is comprised of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and the Imo States. In 2018, drug abuse in this geopolitical zone was estimated at 13.6 percent of the population, or 1.5 million people aged 15-64. In that year cannabis, cocaine and tramadol were common in the South-East zone.

Table 3: Drug Abuse in Southern Regions of Nigeria


South-South (Most Consumed Drugs)	Consumption Rate in terms of population size	Estimated No of Consumers	South West (Most Consumed Drugs)	Consumption Rate in terms of population size	Estimated No of Consumers
Cannabis	14.7%	2,760,000	Cannabis	15.3%	1,883,000
Morphine	8.4%	1,530,000	Morphine	3.6%	411,000
Codeine	4.7%	700,000	Codeine	3.3%	307,000
Estimated annual average	17.1%	2,124,000	Estimated annual average	22.9%	4,382,000

Source of Data: UNODC

Finally, the South-South geopolitical zone includes the States of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Rivers, and Cross River. The estimated rate of drug abuse in the South-South zone was 16.6 percent or 2.1 million people aged 15 to 64. Cannabis, and other synthetic opioids such as codeine, and morphine are among the main group of substances reportedly used beyond the prescribed limits in the South-South geopolitical zone. The South-West geopolitical zone includes Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and the Oyo States. Lagos with approximately 6.4 million people aged 15-64 is the second most populated state in Nigeria. The city of Lagos is an urban mega center with one of the most populated urban agglomerations. In 2018, the estimated rate of drug abuse in the South-West region was about 22.4 percent or 4.38 million people, nearly twice the national average. The high rates of drug abuse in the zone are driven by sharp poverty rates, unemployment, hard manual labor, sex work, and general desperation of people. The rate of cannabis use was particularly high in this zone with an estimated 2.7 million abusers while codeine and morphine also registered high values.



Figure 1: Map of Nigeria Showing Rates of Tramadol Abuse



Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Figure 2: Areas in Nigeria where Boko Haram is Most Active



Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica

The above maps demonstrate a striking similarity between the growing use of tramadol in areas where Boko Haram is most active. Though the drugs were largely used for non-medical purposes throughout the national territory, the consumption of cannabis and morphine were predominant in the southern parts of the country while cannabis and tramadol were widespread in the northeast and north-central regions. Though the abuse in the northern states was



particularly driven by sharp poverty rates, unemployment, manual labor, sex work, and the general desperation of people, its link to the Boko Haram terrorist organization was conspicuous and worthy of note. Information drawn from the survey revealed that the extensive use and trafficking of tramadol has a direct bearing on the security conditions in these regions with a potential to spill over to neighboring states. The outcome of the national survey on drug abuse in Nigeria denotes that tramadol is largely prevalent among the Boko-haram terrorist group and a syndicate of organized crime groups in the country.¹⁶ Of the 4.6 million people who admitted to having used the drug for nonmedical purposes throughout the national territory, 1.2 million people were from the northeastern geopolitical zone. While presenting the results of the survey, the UNODC Regional Representative in West and Central Africa, Mr. Pierre Lapaque admitted as such,

"tramadol is regularly found in the pockets of suspects arrested for terrorism in Nigeria. this raises the question of who provides the tablets to fighters of Boko Haram including young boys and girls, preparing to commit suicide bombings."¹⁷

The outcome of the UNODC survey makes it evident that tramadol is increasingly being trafficked by terrorist and organized crime groups and, in effect, poses an existential threat to national security in Nigeria. In the interview conducted by UNODC in Maiduguri, a city in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria that had once hosted the headquarters of the Boko Haram terrorist group, a rehabilitation expert at the Maiduguri Federal Neuro-Psychiatrist Hospital noted as follows:

"since the insurgency started in 2009, the occupancy of the rehabilitation center of causes related to drug abuse is 40%-60%, an unthinkable high dosage of tramadol abuse has been recorded, of recent we have started seeing 625mg of tramadol which is far above the prescribed 100mg. It is also surprising to know that these addicts take up to 10 capsules of the 625mg in a day. This is over 60 times the maximum legal dosage"

A related interview with a former Boko haram expatriate in Bornu State highlights the risk of tramadol abuse to national security. The respondent underpinned how the excessive consumption of the drug stimulated members of the group to orchestrate violent activities without recourse. The former Boko-Haram member submitted as follows

"I was in the movement for four years before escaping, they would take 100-200 of us in a house, they would takeout tramadol from their bags and hand them to us, 5-6 tablets each. When I first started taking the drug it made me feel sick, I got a headache and I

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Lapaque Pierre, Remarks by the UNODC Regional Representative in West and Central Africa on tramadol and its security and health implications: *Published by United Office of Drugs and Crime* (2017) [https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica\(8.1.2021\)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica(8.1.2021)).



vomited. Many times, they took us to go steal cattle from Cameroon. They would gather about 200-300 of us together with 80-90 gun-carrying Boko-Haram members. They would give us sticks and machetes to herd the stolen cows back to Nigeria. The drug inspired us for 24 hours to carry out our mission.”

Another defected member at the Maiduguri Federal Neuro-Psychiatrist Hospital explained to UNODC in the following words, “after taking a huge dose of tramadol, we set out on missions with guns and we were ordered to shoot and kill, they taught us how to shoot, we shot people, we often attacked military bases and when the soldiers ran away we collected their weapons, guns, and trucks. We took them to our Commander”. The response from another youth in the Adamawa region that borders Cameroon further reveals how the drug was used for suicide missions. The respondent explained as such

“My fiancée and I joined the group, she died carrying a suicide bomb attack in Cameroon. I pleaded with her not to do it but she said no. Her father as well begged her not to do it but she went ahead with it. I tried to convince her but her mind was already made up. She warned me if I continue to convince her she was going to report that am a traitor. Tramadol is the key to our activities, when there is no tramadol we couldn't have the guts to leave our bases. We were scared and we couldn't fight. We usually fight under the influence of tramadol”.

Also, the director of the Aminu Kano Teaching Hospital further acknowledged that about 50%-60% of drug addicts in the hospital were abusers of tramadol. However, he stressed that the dilemma of outlawing the drug is that it may lead to disastrous results. For example, patients suffering from sickle cell diseases, blood disorders with acute bone pains and stunted growth take tramadol as a pain reliever. This research holds the view that if the drug is completely banned, patients who genuinely need them would suffer.

4.2. Tramadol as a Threat to National Security in Cameroon

Tramadol is increasingly being used as a recreational drug across Central Africa. The illegal trade and non-medical use of this synthetic opioid is appearing to be a threat to public health and national security. In Cameroon, the alarming spike in the abuse of the drug raises national security concerns among youths. The case study on Cameroon relied on qualitative research methods to generate findings, the data is drawn from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source includes in-depth interviews with medical personnel and addicts at the rehabilitation center in the city of Douala and Yaounde. A total of 30 participants from Cameroon were sampled for the study. The study particularly sought to identify the consequences of tramadol abuse on youths. The interviews focused on the effect of the drug on national security. The interviews were conducted with the aid of an audio tape recorder. The



process respected professional ethics, protected the integrity, confidentiality, and identity of the respondents. The participants were informed about the purpose of the study and signed a form to give their consent to that effect. They were also allowed to withdraw from the process at any time or abstain from answering any of the questions. A discourse analytical technique was employed to analyze the in-depth- interviews.

Table 4: Demographic composition of respondents

Male	25
Female	5
Youths Age 13-35	10
Adults 35-60	20
Teachers	8
Youth Addicts	10
Illegal vendors	6
Medical Practitioners	4
Rehab experts	2

Table 5: Emerging Themes from the Data

Category of Respondents	Causes	Undesirable Health Effects	Undesirable Psychological Effects	Undesirable Physical Effects
Teachers	Peer pressure	Sleepiness	Irritability,	Aggressive behaviors
Addicts-Students	Curiosity Euphoria/excitement	Unconsciousness Coma	Anger, Anxiety	Violence among peers Street Violence
Illegal vendors	Parental Neglect	Seizures	Emotional	Sexual Assault/Rape
Medical Practitioners	Family crisis Daily work	Respiratory problems Low blood pressure	aloofness	Theft Suicide
Rehab experts	Sex	Weak muscles		Deaths

As illustrated in the table above, the findings of the study exposed six main themes as the underlying causes of tramadol abuse among youths in the Central region of Cameroon. Most of the youths interviewed testified that they were influenced by their peers to take the drug. Some students noted that their friends recommended the drugs to them as an effective pain reliever after work while others noted that it was suggested to them as a recipe for an overwhelming feeling of happiness, joy, and confidence. The following extract supports the view provided by one of the respondents:



A friend told me that the drug makes you feel very happy and confident, it boosts one's self-esteem. That after consuming it I will feel very happy and confident. At first, I was hesitant, but later he convinced me. So, for me, it was a friend who convinced me to take it the first time. (17-year-old high school student).

It was further observed from the information gathered that students use tramadol out of curiosity, two students noted that they had heard a lot about the possible benefits of the drugs and decided to take it out of curiosity. They reported that they first took the drug because they wanted to explore and confirm all that they had heard about it. Family neglect and broken families were other factors that account for the abuse of the drug among youths. Increasing unemployment, and the meager economic situation of the country exacerbated by family separation force some students to find solace in tramadol. According to one high school student,

I started taking tramadol not because I loved to take it. The situation in my house caused me to take it. My mum and dad separated due to family problems, life has become very difficult for my sister and me. My friend introduced me to tramadol two years ago, it helps me to forget my problems. It makes me feel happy (an 18-year-old high school student).

Some of the youths involved in manual work reported that they use tramadol to relieve themselves from the fatigue of work. others also verbalized that the drug enhances their sex performance. A motorbike rider aged 28 in the city of Yaoundé noted “I need tramadol to carry out my duty as a bike rider, with tramadol I navigate through bad roads without feeling pains, each time I take the drug I ride my bike all day without feeling any pain, I feel lighter and relieved.” The outcome of the information gathered during the field study underpins the fact that youths in the Littoral and Centre regions of Cameroon abuse the use of tramadol by taking it for non-medical purposes and in exceedingly high dosages. Medical practitioners and rehabilitation experts enumerated the health implications of tramadol abuse. Henry Fombad, a retired nurse and a lecturer at the Catholic School for Health Sciences during a field study outlined the side effects of tramadol abuse as follows: loss of consciousness, coma, seizures, respiratory problems, low blood pressure, and weak muscles.

4.3. Tramadol is a Threat to National Security

Most importantly, the research investigated the undesirable effects on national security in Cameroon. In this part, the researcher asked the respondents to share their experiences on the adverse effects they endure or witnessed after consuming the pills. The undesirable physical and psychological reactions expressed by the participant were identified as a major threat to national security. According to the participants, irritability, anger, anxiety and emotional aloofness



account for the psychological reactions that perpetuate violence among youths in that part of the country. The participants indicated that the drug makes them temperamental with the least provocation and also makes them lose interest in interacting with others in society. For instance, one respondent noted, “sometimes when I take tramadol, I don’t like to talk too much because when I do I easily get irritated when someone bothers me unnecessarily”. (22-year-old male). Another youth shared his experience as such

Each time I consume the pills, I like to isolate myself in a quiet place because I don’t feel like talking to anyone. And when someone plays or angers me the least, I lose my temper. I’m well aware of that that’s why I don’t want to mingle among others. (27-year-old male)

While the undesirable physical reaction expressed by the participant include aggression, the manifestation of violence among peers, street violence, robbery, blatant violations of societal rules and laws, sexual assault/ rape, suicide, and death. All these largely account for the phenomenon of youth violence and a heightened crime rate that is bedeviling the peace and stability of Cameroon. The outcome of the study revealed that tramadol appears to be an enabler of youth violence in these parts of the county. According to another participant, “*When I consume tramadol I feel brave and strong, at times I may become very aggressive. I know of many people who belong to a gang and take it in exceedingly high quantity when setting out for armed robbery operation*”

Tramadol is largely manufactured in India, exported to Nigeria then trafficked to Cameroon. Cameroon’s porous border with Nigeria in the North, North West, and Southwest regions furnish local markets in the country. Easy access to the drug is raising security concerns in some secondary and high schools. For instance, in one high school on the outskirts of the city of Yaoundé, the principal noted

“here in our schools we have observed students who take tramadol pills and we’ve seen how violent they have become, they are aggressive not only to their peers but also to teachers and adults. One such student raped an 8-year-old girl”.

Another high school teacher asserted that tramadol abuse is gaining ground in the school milieu. A lot of tramadol capsules have been caught circulating among students in his school. She admitted that the consumption of drugs by students is a threat to the safety and security of teachers, their families, friends, and their communities as a whole.



Tramadol is one of the main synthetic drugs posing a serious concern in Cameroon. This drug is generally trafficked from India via West Africa for distribution within Cameroon and other countries in Central Africa. It is easily accessible in the black market and it is now making its way into streets and schoolyards. Youths are some of the biggest consumers of the drug in the country. The adverse psychological and physical reactions are growing concerns to national security. Overall, levels of trafficking and consumption of Tramadol are on the rise. According to data from Cameroon Anti-Drug National Committee, in Cameroon, tramadol is the second most used substance among youths after cannabis. The outcome of the interview links the effects of the drugs with acts of violence and criminality. Cameroon's 2018 statistics on narcotic consumption revealed that the most demanded drugs include cannabis (58.54%), tramadol (44.62%), and cocaine (12.10%).¹⁸ The Wall Street Journal 2020 report entitled "Tramadol: The Opioid Crisis for the Rest of the World," highlights the fact that Cameroonian cities with high tramadol abuse have reported high rates of traffic accidents and street violence.¹⁹ In the region of Garoua, hospitals could trace 80 percent of all traffic accidents resulting from tramadol and at least half of those involved are youths of a working-age group.

5. Recommendation: International Regulatory Control

It is evident that although tramadol is useful for medical care, it also has potential for abuse or addiction and therefore needs to be forcefully regulated. The lack of international regulations greatly contributes to the problem. There is a need for national and international bodies to designate the drug as a controlled substance. Tramadol abuse is proving to be a growing threat to global health and international security. At a national level, this research suggests specific context solutions to tramadol abuse. National legislatures should impose several legislations to regulate the use of the drug. In the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established a new set of rules in 2014 making tramadol a federally controlled substance in the country.²⁰ Since 2000, it is under national control in Bahrain, in Australia 2001, in Sweden 2008, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 2008, in Ukraine since 2008, and in Iran since 2007.²¹ In India, in April 2018, a statement was published in the

¹⁸ Wansi, E., et al. "Rapid assessment of drug abuse in Cameroon." *Bulletin on Narcotics* 48, no. 1-2 (2018): 79-88.

¹⁹Wall Street Journal. "Tramadol: The Opioid Crisis for the Rest of the World," (2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/tramadol-the-opioid-crisis-forthe-rest-of-the-world-1476887401> (19.10.2021).

²⁰ Allison Pitt L, Humphreys Keith and Brandeau Margaret. "Modeling health benefits and harms of public policy responses to the US opioid epidemic." *American journal of public health* 108, no. 10 (2018): 1394-1400.

²¹Sumedha Gupta, et al. *Competitive Effects of Federal and State Opioid Restrictions: Evidence from the Controlled Substance Laws*.



gazette of India on the control of the drug.²² While the drug is a controlled substance in some national jurisdictions, a host of the west and central African states still pay little attention to it. It is regulated in some jurisdictions and not in others. More challenging is the absence of an international legal instrument regulating the use, hence, it's not regulated by international conventions. In the case of Cameroon and Nigeria, national legislations guiding the use of the drug are short of statutory enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. Tramadol is neither regulated nor included in the list of illicit drugs by the UN's Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND) or WHO's expert committee on drugs.²³ At the international level, the WHO and UNODC exclusively perceive it as a centrally acting analgesic and fails to ascertain the extent of its threat to the public and the international community. Thus, at the national level, this research supports the idea of context-specific regulations while at the international level it mandates international bodies, especially the UN's Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND) and WHO's expert committee on drugs as a distinct type of illicit substance. Besides imposing more national restrictions, this paper advocate for educational campaigns that objectively inform society about the risks of excessive tramadol use. Thus, there's also the need for international legal instruments and enforcement mechanisms against the abuse of drugs by terrorist and organized crime groups. To this end, the research underpins the need for a national and international coordination response and surveillance mechanism by states and non-state actors.

6. Conclusion

This research sheds light on how tramadol touted as a safer opioid and pain reliever has become an existential threat to national security in West and Central Africa, notably Nigeria and Cameroon. States and non-state actors such as the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UN's Commission on Narcotics Drugs consider tramadol as an analgesic that treats pains of moderate to severe intensity, consequently, it is neither regulated nor included in the list of illicit drugs. The outcome of the analysis revealed the extent to which the drug is prevalent among the Boko-haram terrorist and organized crime groups in Nigeria. Also, compelling evidence showed that the drug is a driver of youth violence and heightened crime rates that bedevil the Cameroonian cities of Douala and Yaoundé. Other

²² Folorunsho O. Muyeideen. "Predictors of Violence among Drug Abusers in Selected Drug Joints in Mushin, Lagos Metropolis." *Randwick International of Social Science Journal* 1, no.2 (2020): 211-221.

²³ World Health Organization. Management of substance abuse; WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (2018) https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/right_committee/en/ (22.12.20).



national sources of information provided empirical evidence of its consequences on national security in the United States. Therefore, consequences recorded in the United States complement the findings in Cameroon and Nigeria.

It is evident that although the drug is useful for medical care, it also has potential for abuse or addiction and therefore needs stringent regulation. The lack of international regulations greatly contributes to the problem. There is a need for national and international bodies to designate the drug as a controlled substance. Tramadol abuse is proving to be a growing threat to global health and international security. At the national level, this research proffers the need to introduce context-specific regulations. This paper advocates the need for educational campaigns that objectively inform society about the risks of excessive tramadol use. At the international level, it mandates international bodies, especially WHO's expert committee on drugs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UN's Commission on Narcotics to enlist the drug as a distinct type of illicit substance. To this far, the study craves an international legal instrument and surveillance mechanism that circumvents the use of synthetic opioids for nonmedical purposes by terrorist or organized crime groups and youths in the subsections of the continent.

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Turkey's Preventive Operations against Terrorists across Southern Border

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Abstract

Besides having advantages due to its geostrategic location, Turkey has a position open to risks and threats. In addition to the humanitarian, social, economic, health and education difficulties of a large number of immigrants from the Arab Spring, border security has also become another concern. For this reason, this paper examines the physical measures taken at the border and cross-border operations within the scope of preventing terrorists. The purpose of this study is to examine the benefits and difficulties of having a cross-border presence against terrorist organizations. In addition, an answer will be sought to the question of whether the preventive military operations carried out in the authority vacuum country benefit the border security or not. In this context, the study is limited to the cross-border operations conducted between 2016 and 2021.

Keywords: Border Security, terrorism, immigration, cross-border presence, preventive military operations

Türkiye'nin Güney Sınırları Boyunca Teröristlere Karşı Önleyici

Operasyonları

Özet

Türkiye jeostratejik konumu nedeniyle avantajlarının yanı sıra risk ve tehditlere açıktır. Arap Baharından sonra güney komşularından gelen çok sayıda göçmenin insani, sosyal, ekonomik, sağlık ve eğitim zorluklarının yanı sıra, neden oldukları sınır güvenliği de Türkiye için bir başka endişe kaynağı haline geldi. Suriye ve Irak'ta yaşanan otorite boşluğu ve çatışmalar nedeniyle Türkiye güney sınırlarında ek önlemler almaya kendini zorunlu hissetmiştir. Bu nedenle bu makale, terör eylemlerinin önlenmesi kapsamında Türkiye'nin güney sınırlarında ve sınır ötesinde gerçekleştirdiği operasyonlarla, bu kapsamda alınan fiziki önlemleri incelemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı terör örgütlerine karşı sınır ötesi mevcudiyet sağlamanın yararlarını ve zorluklarını incelemektir. Ayrıca otorite boşluğu olan sınır komşusu bir ülkede gerçekleştirilen önleyici askeri operasyonların sınır güvenliğine fayda sağlayıp sağlamadığı sorusuna da yanıt aranmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çalışma, 2016 ve 2021 yılları arasında gerçekleştirilen sınır ötesi operasyonlarla sınırlandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sınır Güvenliği, terörizm, göç, sınır ötesi varlık, önleyici askeri operasyonlar

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1. Introduction

António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who is recently serving as Secretary-General of the UN, said that “*The Syrian situation is the most dramatic humanitarian crisis the world has faced in a very long time*”¹ at the conference of *Syrian Refugee Situation-Supporting Stability in the Region*, 28 October 2014 in Berlin. Although more than six years have passed since that conference, there have been no significant positive developments in the situation in Syria. According to official figures, about six million² people had to migrate out of Syria, and millions of people had to displace internally within the country. Syrians emigrating to Turkey constitute about 4,3%³ of the population and this rate ranges from 10,6% to 73,9% throughout borderline cities according to their populations.⁴

Terrorism and irregular immigration are by far the most major security problems for nation-states and international stability in this century. Iraq and Syria have a very chaotic situation, which constitutes very risky conditions to take the required actions for controlling unrest, throughout the southern borders of Turkey. This region provides a great opportunity for terrorist groups with religious motives to emerge, terrorist organizations to operate easily, and to provide human resources. During the Arab Spring, the mass movements spreading to Syria turned into a civil war in 2011. Many people and neighboring states of Syria were negatively affected as a result of this civil war.

With the critical understanding of security, the definition⁵ of security has expanded to include non-state actors beyond the use and threat of force. The events that took place in the world in the 1980s and lastly the events of September 11 made the concept of enlargement broad, including states, individuals, and global and international organizations. In addition, non-

¹ António Guterres, UNHCR “Conference on the Syrian Refugee Situation”, The UN Refugee Agency, at <https://www.unhcr.org/544fb4189.html>, (11 January 2021)

² Syria Regional Refugee Concept, The UN Refugee Agency, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> , (15 January 2021)

³ Temporary Protection, Directorate General of Migration Management, <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638> (15 January 2021)

⁴ Syria Regional Refugee Concept, The UNHCR, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> , (15 January 2021)

⁵ Hakan Ömer Tunca, “Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Güvenlik Algısı” Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, (2020), p.72-76, summarized the definition from the works of İbrahim Erdoğan, 2013; Barry Buzan, 1998; Jef Huysman, 1995, 2000, 2006; Ole Weaver, 2015.



military threats that are not included in the concept of security have begun to be securitized. Since immigration and immigrants are seen as elements that complicate the natural flow of life, it has become a threat in itself. In the first group, international terrorism, organized crimes, cyber terrorism, states with the aim of attack, the proliferation of conventional and weapons of mass destruction as national physical threats; In the second group, attacks on the national or global economy or financial markets, encroachments on (individual, social or national) welfare or the environment and health, migrations and refugee movements are threats to national interests; In the third group, it is possible to list attacks on universal democratic values, human rights, and freedoms as threats to common values.

Turkey is a geopolitically important country, which is a strategic bridge between the continents, a NATO member, and a nodal point due to its proximity to energy sources. Inevitably, the turmoil and vacuum of authority on the southern border of a country that is so important in its region will have security implications for Turkey. It is clear that many terrorist groups, which would want to take advantage of this turmoil and chaotic conditions, will adversely affect Turkey via asylum-seekers and smugglers. Facing low-density threats on the southern border, Turkey has developed various measures to prevent the transition of asylum-seekers, terrorists, and smugglers to its hinterland. First of all, in 2014, Turkey initiated the construction of over 900 km long barrier on the border with Syria.⁶ Besides the wall with Syria, Turkey has announced building similar constructions at its border with Iraq in 2017. The physical layer includes modular concrete walls, patrol routes, manned and unmanned towers, and passenger tracks.⁷

⁶ Asena Soyluk, Aslı Yıldız, Pelin Sarıcıoğlu, "Border Walls from Past to Today", *Asia Minor Studies-International Journal of Social Sciences* 6, no. 6 (2018): 15.

⁷ *Ibid*, p.15.



Figure 1. The Construction of a Concrete Barrier on Turkey's border with Syria.⁸



After the regionalization of the Syrian civil war and its absorption into different armed groups, Turkey's external border security began to be threatened by non-state armed actors. In addition, many foreign and Turkish citizens lost their lives in bomb attacks in various cities and attacks with missiles from Syria on border provinces. Turkey's proposals such as "safe area"⁹ and "no-fly zone"¹⁰ were not supported by the international community. Therefore, Turkey decided to struggle with this problem on its own. Turkey has started operations to ensure the security of its borders, prevent the creation of a terror corridor across its southern border, neutralize terrorists and terrorist organizations threatening its national security, and create the necessary conditions for the return of displaced Syrians to their homes and lands. Operations were in line with the country's right to self-defense borne out of international law, and under the right to self-defense under Article 51¹¹ of the UN Charter, while being respectful of Syria's territorial integrity.

In this paper, the effects of Turkish preventive operations on border security and the transition will be discovered. The question of how forward presence bases and using advanced

⁸ Turkey-Syria Border Wall, Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-syria-border-wall-to-be-completed-by-end-sept/916748>, (20 July 2021)

⁹ Pursuit of a safe zone does not meet our expectations", an interview with Reuters, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/109620/-guvenli-bolge-anlayisi-beklentilerimizi-karsilamiyor->, (12 May 2021)

¹⁰ Interview with Minister, Anadolu Agency https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu_nun-anadolu-ajansi-editor-masasina-verdigi-mulak_-25-subat-2016_-ankara.tr.mfa, (21 July 2021)

¹¹ UN Charter, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.



technology over border security will be examined. First of all, the chaotic environment on Turkey's southern border and its existence in the future will be analyzed, then the cross-border operations carried out by Turkey between 2016-and 2021 and their results in the fight against terrorism will be revealed. Secondly, the legal basis of the operations, their aims, and the results obtained from the benefits of high technology will be explained. The importance of using high technology to fight against terrorism and the results of the operations will be evaluated. Finally, the paper is going to investigate the success of Turkey's military operations across her southern borders with Iraq and primarily Syria whether they prove to neutralize terrorism or not.

Figure 2. Image Taken by Turkish UAV of Terrorists Attempting to Attack Turkey from across the border during Operation Olive Branch.¹²



2. Chaotic Condition across the South of Turkey

During the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, a challenging security threat settled on Turkey's borders. The increasing armament and the developing atmosphere of insecurity in the region during the war created long-term problems for the region.¹³ During and after the Iran-Iraq War, organizations like PKK, which is a terrorist organization¹⁴, found a safe base of operations for

¹² UAVs captured the terrorist attacks in Afrin” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7i5SCgqBGT0> , TRT Haber Official YouTube Account. (21 March 2021)

¹³ Seçil Özdemir, Iran-Iraq War: Effect on Terrorism on Turkey's Borders, *Akademik Bakış* 13, no. 26 (2020): 70-71.

¹⁴ The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by numerous countries, including the members of the European Union and others such as United States, Canada and Australia. European Union also designated PKK as a terrorist entity in 2004. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also refers to PKK as a terrorist entity. (at



them in the north of Iraq. After the Gulf Crisis, Kurdish ethnic originated problems in the north of Iraq have been globalized by the international community with the UN resolutions, and the PKK terrorist organization has been the one who exploited this situation the most.¹⁵ Due to the vacuum of authority in this region, Turkey faced irregular migration and terrorist incidents. Therefore, by establishing logistics bases, camps, and training facilities in Iraq, the PKK has caused the death of more than 13,000 soldiers and civilians and 35,000 wounded, with the strategy of hit and run in Turkey since 1984.¹⁶ Turkey continues to take all kinds of military and political measures from the arising of this problem.

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Syrian administration had never considered such an uprising to take place in Syria.¹⁷ The global prominence of the Syrian crisis can be explained by two main reasons. The first of these is the diversity of internal and external actors involved in the crisis. While the peaceful demonstrations in March 2011 were mainly economic, secular segments demanding improvement in their social and political conditions, opposition groups also took their place in the struggle in the country in a short time.¹⁸ While the army, various groups other than the regime forces, consisting of some civilian militias and some civilian militias, constitute the internal actors of the war in Syria, territorial or non-regional states formed the external actors.¹⁹ The struggle of various countries over Syria, which reminds us of the cold war period, has caused the anarchy in the region not to be ended for years. Another reason why the Syrian crisis is closely followed and discussed by the world community is the human casualties caused in a short time and the size of the migration spread over a wide geography. It is important to bear in mind that the burden of protecting and assisting migrants has largely fallen on the shoulders of major host countries, primarily Jordan, Lebanon, and

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa> (28 November 2021)

¹⁵ Cihat Yaycı, "Wars in Iraq and their Effects on Turkey", *The Journal of Security Strategies* 15, no. 30 (2019): 342-343.

¹⁶ Nedim Şener, "The bloody balance sheet of the PKK", *Hürriyet* (4 September 2020)

¹⁷ David W. Lesch, "The Arab Spring –and Winter in Syria", *Global Change, Peace and Security* 23, no.3 (2011): 422.

¹⁸ Angela Joya, "Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of the Domestic and External Factors", *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 4. no.1 (2012): 31.

¹⁹ Moshe Ma'oz, "The Arab Spring in Syria: Domestic and Regional Developments", *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 7. no.1 (2014): 49-57.



Turkey.²⁰ The conclusion of the crisis will directly affect Syria's neighbors because they will have to coexist with the resulting structure.²¹

At least 600.000 people have died and more than two million have been injured or permanently disabled in the Syrian civil war, and more than 12 million Syrians are stated to have been displaced by internal or external migration. Estimates are that the war in Syria has produced around 13 million displaced people, which encompasses over 60 percent of Syria's pre-war population.²² Before the Syrian civil war started, its population was about 21 million. This population ratio clearly shows us the loss of Syria and the chaotic condition in this country. The displacement of almost 13 million Syrians -half the country's population- is the most daunting humanitarian crisis of our time.²³ In addition to many innocent Syrian people fleeing from the persecution of Assad, terrorists linked to several terrorist organizations went through Turkey's border.²⁴ Especially, DAESH/ISIS terrorists have been trying to reach Europe by using Turkey. The migration of Syrians causes the negative effects of the Syrian civil war to be felt over a wide geography and thus this situation led to more discussion around the world. The intensity of the ongoing conflicts in Syria and the acceleration in the pace of change have affected the civilian population as well as the combatants more than ever before, and those who want to live in their land are deprived of meeting their most basic needs. To prevent the influx of refugees from Syria to the European Union, the EU has committed to helping Turkey. However, in the past, EU aid has been limited and Turkey has spent more than 40 billion Euros on Syrian asylum-seekers.²⁵

²⁰ Elizabet Ferris and Kemal Kirişçi, *The Consequences of Chaos, Syria's Humanitarian Crises and the Failure to Protect*, (Brooking Institution Press, 2016), 15.

²¹ Karen Kaya, "The Syrian Crisis from a Neighbor's Perspective: View from Turkey", *Military Review* 94, no.2 (2014): 49.

²² Marko Valenta, Jo Jakobsen, Drago Župarić-Iljić and Hariz Halilovich. "Syrian Refugee Migration, Transitions in Migrant Statuses and Future Scenarios of Syrian Mobility", *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 39, (2020): 157.

²³ Elizabet Ferris and Kemal Kirişçi, *The Consequences of Chaos, Syria's Humanitarian Crises and the Failure to Protect*, 1.

²⁴ Doğan Şafak Polat, "Objectives and Results of Turkish Military Operations in the North of Syria", *The Journal of Security Strategies* 16, no. 33 (2020): 90.

²⁵ Speech of President of Turkey, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/116954/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-nin-kahraman-kadinlari-programina-katildi> (15 March 2021)



The first group of refugees escaping from the civil war in Syria arrived in Turkey on 29 April 2011. It has not been easy to control the movement of people on the 911 km long Turkish-Syrian border. The fact that so many migrants are in every city of Turkey has social, economical, political, and security effects and continues to affect Turkish citizens in many other ways. The open-door policy and the acceptance of Syrians, which are implemented with humanitarian feelings, have led to the entry of not only those who escaped the persecution of Assad but also those who moved due to different organizations and threats, especially in 2013 and 2014. It has created a perception that the bomb attacks, mortar attacks, and suicide bombings took place in places such as Istanbul, Sultanahmet, Suruç, Ankara Train Station, Ankara State District, Ankara Kızılay Square, Istanbul Istiklal Street, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Akçakale, Clive Gözü Border Gate, Reyhanlı, Kilis, Diyarbakır, Ağrı Doğubayazıt, Istanbul International Terminal, Diyarbakır Regional Traffic, Van Police Station and Gaziantep Şahinbey were carried out by people who came to Turkey from Syria. The perception in the society increased not only by the terrorist attacks but also in common crimes such as theft, pickpocketing, and begging, which are known to be crimes, is the Syrians have started to emerge in the society.²⁶

The emergence of terrorist organizations such as DAESH/ISIS and increasing attacks within the border as created major problems for Turkey's national security. In addition to ongoing problems within the Iraqi border for many years, the vacuum of authority on the Syrian border has brought additional cost and effort to Turkey. The existence of a civil war in Turkey's border neighbor poses a great threat and also poses very comprehensive risks. As a result, this condition has become a situation where everyone is fighting each other. Numerous local, regional and global actors have become a part of this civil war, and it is very difficult to detect which group is fighting against another.²⁷ Despite growing attention to the role of regional organizations, Syrian displacement is also a clear indictment of the failure of regional bodies to prevent and resolve crises. While both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic

²⁶ Hakan Ömer Tunca, *Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Yönelik Güvenlik Algısı*, (Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2020), 3.

²⁷ Emre Ozan, "Suriye İç Savaşı ve Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Gündemi", (Ankara Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2017), 25.



Cooperation suspended Syria's membership in 2011 and 2012, respectively, neither has played a significant role in addressing the conflict.²⁸

The beginning of the problems originating from Syria that Turkey faces is Turkey's security. The clashes, which took place in neighboring cities, towns, and villages on the Turkish side of the border, created very high risks.²⁹ There have been attacks against Turkey by terrorist organizations positioned in Syria beyond the border resulting in the deaths of civilians. The turmoil in Syria had a negative impact on Turkey both commercially and socially, as well as negatively affecting the tourism of the country and the region.³⁰ Turkey's main objective in Syria has been to prevent the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG)³¹ from "establishing an autonomous area along Syria's northern border with Turkey".³² Like the threat posed by DAESH/ISIS, the threat posed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD)³³ to Turkish national security has always been among the top priorities of Turkey's foreign policy.³⁴ Turkey does not want this region to turn into another short or long-term conflict zone with the interference of global powers. It is for this reason that Turkey has declared the advancement of the PYD/YPG to the west of the Euphrates River as its red line.³⁵

In addition to the different physical conditions and sharing fairly a long border, the dynamics of the civil war due to the frequent change of controlling region makes threats to border security unpredictable. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has been subjected to various terrorist attacks. The most important of these attacks were carried out by DAESH/ISIS. Terrorist acts originating from DAESH/ISIS, both in border provinces and inland

²⁸ Elizabet Ferris and Kemal Kirişçi, *The Consequences of Chaos, Syria's Humanitarian Crises and the Failure to Protect*, 111.

²⁹ Tuncay Kardaş and Ömer Behram Özdemir, "The Making of European Foreign Fighters: Identity, Social Media and Virtual Radicalization", (SETA Analysis, No: 11, October 2014), 9-15.

³⁰ Soner Söyler and Mehmet Ertaş, "The Effect of the Syrian War On Tourism: A Research on Border Provinces", (16. Tourism Congress, 2015), 881.

³¹ MoI Turkey, "PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization's Extension in Syria: PYD-YPG" (2017), p. 3.

³² European Asylum Support Office, "Syria Socio-economic situation: Country of Origin Information Report," (May 2020) p. 14.

³³ MoI Turkey, "PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization's Extension in Syria: PYD-YPG" (2017), p. 3.

³⁴ Muhittin Ataman and Çağatay Özdemir, "Turkey's Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities", *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 5, no. (2018): 27.

³⁵ Henri J. Barkey, "Syria's Dark Shadow over US-Turkey Relations", *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (2016): 30-32.



regions have become an additional security problem in Turkey. Not only did the crisis prevent Turkey from realizing its regional foreign policy priorities, but it also created a national security threat to the integrity of the country.³⁶ In addition, the emergence of structures that recruit militants for DAESH/ISIS in Turkey created significant problems for internal security.³⁷ While Turkey has conducted an intense fight against the PKK in Iraq and PYD/YPG in Syria, her allies have not accepted terrorist organizations such as the PYD/YPG due to providing military and political aid on the grounds of fighting against DAESH/ISIS, which remained Turkey alone.³⁸ This environment can lead to conflicts that cause shooting down each other's planes.³⁹

Turkey's security concerns in Syria and its security strategy can be listed under five main headings:⁴⁰

- Counterterrorism,
- Ensuring border security,
- Preventing instability and its consequences in northern Syria,
- Protection of Turkey's long-term strategic interests due to the presence of other states,
- Managing the social consequences of conflicts.

As stated above there are many concerns related to the unstable situation of the south of Turkey, like strategy, Turkey has three basic approaches either Iraq or Syria namely humanitarian aid, determined social and political solutions together with numerous military operations against terrorists for safe and secure areas not only in but also outside of Turkey under the International Law.

3. Forward Presence Over Border Against Terrorists

For many years, Turkey has tried to carry out its fight against terrorism to get security within its borders. Apart from that, Turkey carried out short-term cross-border operations and

³⁶ Muhittin Ataman and Çağatay Özdemir, "Turkey's Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities", 30.

³⁷ Emre Ozan, "Suriye İç Savaşı ve Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Gündemi", 27.

³⁸ Michael M. Gunter, "Iraq, Syria, ISIS and the Kurds: Geostrategic Concerns for the U.S. and Turkey", *Middle East Policy* 22, no.(1) (2015), pp. 102-111.

³⁹ Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Türkiye-Rusya Krizinin Dinamikleri ve İkili İlişkilere Etkileri", *Bilge Strateji* 8, no.14 (2016): 7-17.

⁴⁰ Murat Aslan, "Yeniden Yapılandırma Türkiye'nin Suriye'deki Modeli", (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2019), 30.



returned to its lands.⁴¹ The purpose of these operations was to neutralize the terrorists where they were located and to prevent them from entering Turkey by taking advantage of the harsh geographical conditions. However, as a result of the increasing terrorist incidents in both Iraq and Syria, Turkey has started to implement "proactive" methods.⁴² Since 2016, Turkey has adopted the strategy of eliminating the threat at its source with the operations it carries out across the border, instead of fighting the terrorist threat only within its borders.⁴³ The need for an operation "to destroy the terrorist threat at its source" has emerged. The operations carried out by Turkey are different from the "Bush doctrine"⁴⁴ carried out by the USA. Turkey carries out a military operation against only the shelters and bases of terrorists in Syria and Iraq but does not attack these states.

Turkey's operations result from the need to overcome the troubled security environment along Turkey's borders with Syria, as well as the geopolitical necessity of establishing cross-border operational depth until a political solution to the civil war is found.⁴⁵

3.1. Legal Status

A condition of "state toleration", exists when a state does not sponsor or support terrorist groups within its borders, but knows of their existence and fails to suppress them.⁴⁶ Such terrorist groups may be self-supporting or may have foreign sponsors or supporters. They may carry out their terrorist activities primarily abroad having reached an unspoken understanding with the host government.⁴⁷ Therefore, this condition does not remove the responsibility of the state, in which a terrorist group has settled. According to International Law, this state is under an obligation not to allow its own country to be used for activities that are

⁴¹ Ahmet Şahin, "Major Operations in Northern Iraq", available <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/irakin-kuzeyine-gerceklestirilen-buyuk-harekatlar-417275.html>.

⁴² Murat Aslan, "Türkiye'nin Terörizmle Mücadelesi Pençe Harekatı", (SETA, 2019), 8.

⁴³ Sercan Çalışkan and Hamza Haşıl, (<https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/turkiyenin-sinir-otesindeki-proaktif-stratejisi-baglaminda-sofi-nurettin-operasyonu>).

⁴⁴ Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire", (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2009), 26.

⁴⁵ Can Kasapoğlu and Sinan Ulgen, "Operation Euphrates Shield and the al-Bab Campaign: A Strategic Assessment", EDAM Foreign Policy and Security Paper Series, (2017), 13.

⁴⁶ Antony Clark Arend and Robert J.Beck, *Int. Law and the Use of Force*, (Routledge Publication, 2013), 142.

⁴⁷ Richard J. Erickson, *Legitimate Use of Force Against State-Sponsored Terrorism*, (Air Uni. Press, 1989), 26.



contrary to the rights of other states.⁴⁸ This state is obliged to prevent the activities of a terrorist organization by taking appropriate measures.⁴⁹

In this particular circumstance, the state does not wish to ignore international terrorists within its borders but lacks the ability (*either through inadequate domestic police and military forces or lack of technology*) to respond effectively. The state's responsibility to deal with these terrorists continues. It may meet this responsibility by inviting another state or regional organization to assist it.⁵⁰ However, this did not work in the course of Syria, and danger continued on Turkey's southern border. If a state is incapable of responding to international terrorism and does not request outside help, then a situation may arise in which assistance may be given without an invitation.⁵¹ However, it is accepted that such operations that are not based on the consent of the country state do not violate the "*jus cogens*"⁵² prohibition on the use of force.⁵³

UN Charter Article VII, titled "*Action concerning Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*", the collective security system provides an effective mechanism in the fight against terrorism. First of all, to take action for this mechanism, the Security Council must act within the framework of Article 39. After that, Security Council may decide on the complete or partial interruption of economic relations according to Article 41⁵⁴ or may take such action by air, sea, or land forces according to Article 42.⁵⁵ Until today, the UN Security Council has repeatedly defined terrorism as a "*threat to international peace and security*" under Article 39.⁵⁶ However, it has never implemented a collective security mechanism to eliminate

⁴⁸ Alfred P. Rubin, "Current Legal Approaches to International Terrorism: Alternative Legal Approaches", in *Terrorism & Political Violence: Limits & Possibilities of Legal Control*, ed. Henry H. Han, (Oceana Publications Inc., 1993), 380-381.

⁴⁹ Sertaç Hami Başeren, *Uluslararası Hukukta Devletlerin Münferiden Kuvvet Kullanmalarının Sınırları*, (Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2003), 200-201.

⁵⁰ Richard J. Erickson, *Legitimate Use of Force Against State-Sponsored Terrorism*, 26.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 27.

⁵² Jus cogens is a principle of international law that is based on values taken to be fundamental to the international community and that cannot be set aside (as by treaty).

⁵³ Sertaç Hami Başeren, *Uluslararası Hukukta Devletlerin Münferiden Kuvvet Kullanmalarının Sınırları*, 172-174.

⁵⁴ UN Charter, Article 41.

⁵⁵ UN Charter, Article 42.

⁵⁶ Christopher Greenwood, "International law and the war against terrorism", *Int. Affairs* 78, no.2 (2002), 303.



the terrorist threat to international peace and security. Resolutions 1373 (2001), 2170, and 2178 (2014) of the UN Security Council invite states to act as global cooperation fighting against terrorism however it does not operate a collective security system.

Syria has not attacked any other state directly, nor is there any evidence that it intends to do so shortly. On the contrary, such an action would be irrational given its internal turmoil. The situation in Syria is indeed destabilizing the region, particularly concerning refugee flows into Turkey and other neighboring countries.⁵⁷ On the other hand, DAESH/ISIS emerging as a non-state actor was involved in many terrorist attacks against Turkey. The armed attacks of DAESH/ISIS were not limited to suicide bombings, but it launched missile/rocket attacks at various times from the areas, where it controls in the Syrian region.⁵⁸ Turkey has also been exposed to attacks by the terrorist organization PKK and its extensions, the PYD/YPG. The armed attacks of the PYD/YPG against Turkey make the right of self-defense possible.⁵⁹

When cross-border operations are evaluated in terms of international law, the following conclusions are reached;⁶⁰

- Armed attacks originating from Syria are carried out against the State of the Republic of Turkey, both inside and outside its country,
- These attacks are carried out by terrorist organizations existing in Syria,
- These attacks have reached the level of an armed attack,
- The Republic of Turkey had to take the necessary measures to prevent these attacks,
- The target of the operations is not the military power and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic State, but the terrorist groups that directly attack,
- Turkey is in the region only for military purposes⁶¹.


⁵⁷ Michael N. Schmitt, "The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law Justifications", *(International Law Studies, 2013)*, 747.

⁵⁸ Fatma Taşdemir and Adem Özer, "The Operation Euphrates Shield from The Perspective of Use of Force Law", *The Academic Elegance* 4, no.7 (2017): 60.

⁵⁹ Fatma Taşdemir, *Suriye, Çatışma ve Uluslararası Hukuk*, (Nobel Akademik Yayınları, 2020), 82.

⁶⁰ Süleyman Sırrı Terzioğlu, "The Issue of Legitimacy of the Operation Euphrates Shield in terms of International Law", *Union of Turkish Bar Associations Journal* 134, (2018), 33-34.

⁶¹ Map is a supplementary showing that Turkey is in Syria not because of the energy resources in the region, but because of security concerns.

**Figure 3. Syrian Oil and Gas Field.**⁶²

3.2. Operations Carried out by Turkey over South Border

As a result of the decrease in the authority of the Assad regime during the civil war in Syria, uncontrollable areas have emerged and these areas have provided a suitable environment for terrorist groups.⁶³ DAESH/ISIS and PYD/YPG declared their de facto administration over the areas that cannot be administered by Syria. DAESH/ISIS took advantage of this chaotic environment⁶⁴ and declared its so-called caliphate⁶⁵, while the PYD/YPG declared its autonomy in Haseke, Ayn'el-Arab (Kobani), and Afrin.⁶⁶ Although Turkey took its first decision for a military operation in Syria in 2012⁶⁷, it has for a long time endeavored to resolve the problem and the dangerous situation on its border through peaceful means.

⁶² Syria war: Who benefits from its oil production?, BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/50464561>, (24 April 2021)

⁶³ Raymond Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Resilience and the Arab Uprising: Syria in Comparative Perspective" *Centre of Middle East Studies* 7, no.1 (2015): 33-34.

⁶⁴ Burhanettin Duran and Ufuk Ulutaş, "Türkiye'nin DEAŞ'la Mücadelesinin Kritik Dönemeci: Fırat Kalkanı Harekâtı", in *Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı*, (SETA, 2017), 13.

⁶⁵ DAESH Declared Its Caliphate, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/isid-hilafet-ilan-etti>, (20 March 2021)

⁶⁶ Syrian Kurds declared Its Autonomy", Aljazeera Türk, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suriyelikurtler-ozerklik-ilan-etti>, (20 March 2021)

⁶⁷ Republic of Turkey Legal Gazette, 6 October 2012, Serial: 28433.



Fighting against DAESH/ISIS is a national security priority for Turkey. As an active member of the Global Coalition since its inception, Turkey has contributed to its “*Operation Inherent Resolve*”. Turkey also carried out more than 9 major counter-terrorism operations on the Syrian and Iraq territories neighboring its border based on international law, under its right to self-defense as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the relevant Security Council Resolutions on counter-terrorism.⁶⁸ After the attacks carried out by DAESH/ISIS in Kilis and Suruç in 2015, Turkey stated that it had the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter by sending a letter⁶⁹ to the Security Council.⁷⁰

To eradicate DAESH/ISIS’s presence from the Syrian territories along its borders, Turkey launched “*Operation Euphrates Shield (OES)*” from 24 August 2016 to 29 March 2017. The Free Syrian Army, supported by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), has established control over an area of 2,015 km² and neutralized 2,647 DAESH/ISIS fighters.⁷¹ First of all, after the DAESH/ISIS and PKK/YPG terrorist organizations in the region were neutralized, then continuous territorial dominance was ensured to prevent these groups from carrying out attacks again. As a result of the success of the OES, DAESH/ISIS started to lose ground and lost its territorial control in Syria by the end of March 2019 due to subsequent operations conducted by the Global Coalition. Independent Patrol Activities are carried out with Russia to make the atmosphere of peace and security permanent.⁷² The main aims of this operation;

- Ensuring Turkey’s border security and ensuring the security of life and property of the living in the region,
- Completely neutralizing the DAESH/ISIS and PYD/YPG terrorist features here and support the Free Syrian Army for the integrity of their countries.⁷³

⁶⁸ Relations between Turkey–Syria, MoFA, (<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey%e2%80%93syria.en.mfa>), (23 April 2021)

⁶⁹ It is apparent that the regime in Syria is neither capable of nor willing to prevent these threats emanating from its territory, which clearly imperil the security of Turkey and the safety of its nationals. Individual and collective self-defence is our inherent right under international law, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the UN.

⁷⁰ Letter from the Chargé d’affaires.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council” UN, 24 July 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/563.

⁷¹ Relations between Turkey–Syria, MoFA, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey%e2%80%93syria.en.mfa> , (23 April 2021)

⁷² Operation Euphrates Shield, Land Forces Command, (<https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/firat-kalkani.aspx>) (23 July 2021)

⁷³ Press Release, Secretariat-General of the National Security Council, <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/28-eylul->



- To prevent civilians in the region from being harmed by terrorist incidents,⁷⁴
- A longer-term objective was to ensure the return of refugees from Turkey to Syria once security had been established.⁷⁵

While Israel⁷⁶, France, and Germany⁷⁷ saw Turkey's fight against terrorists as legitimate, the USA also supported the operation. Thanks to this operation, the region between Azez and Jarablus was taken under control. Therefore, the connection between Manbij and Afrin, which is under the control of the PYD, was cut off and the PYD's access to the Mediterranean was prevented.⁷⁸

The Astana peace talks were launched on 23-24 January 2017, to put an end to violence and improve the humanitarian situation in war-torn Syria.⁷⁹ The third round of meetings in Astana held on 14-15 March 2017 resulted in the agreement by all parties to the existing ceasefire agreement. Russia, Iran, and Turkey have agreed at peace talks in Kazakhstan to place observers on the border of a de-escalation⁸⁰ zone in Syria.⁸¹ Idlib was chosen as one of four de-escalation zones in which Turkey was assigned to monitor the truce between the Syrian regime and the opposition.⁸² Turkey had begun setting up observation posts in Idlib in October 2017. The Turkish Operation in Idlib Governorate or code-named “*Idlib De-escalation Control Force*” is an operation by TAF which started on 08 October 2017, following the earlier Operation Euphrates Shield. The largest one of those included the Idlib Governorate and

2016-tarihli-toplantı , (25 April 2021)

⁷⁴ Op Euphrates Shield, Land Forces Command, (<https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/firat-kalkani.aspx>) (23 July 2021)

⁷⁵ Valeria Talbot, “Turkey in Syria: Role, Interests and Challenges”, in *Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East's Next Power Game?* eds. Eugenio Dacrema and Valeria Talbot, (Ledizioni Ledi Publishing 2019), 76.

⁷⁶ Support from Israil over Cerablus, Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/israidenturkiyeye-cerablus-destegi/635036>, (15 April 2021)

⁷⁷ Dünya Ülkeleri Cerablus'a Ne dedi?, Hürriyet, at <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/dunya-ulkelericerablus-operasyonuna-ne-dedi-40207222>, (15 April 2021)

⁷⁸ Doğan Şafak Polat, “Objectives and Results of Turkish Military Operations in the North of Syria”, *The Journal of Security Strategies* 16, no. 33 (2020): 70.

⁷⁹ Turkey, Russia, Iran FMs to assess Astana Syria process, Anadolu Agency, (<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-russia-iran-fms-to-assess-astana-syria-process>), (24 July 2021)

⁸⁰ Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed a memorandum in May 2017 and are sponsors of the Astana talks on Syria.

⁸¹ Russia, Turkey, Iran Agree On Borders of Syrian De-Escalation Zones, Radio Free Europe, <https://www.rferl.org/a/astana-russia-turkey-iran-agree-on-borders-deescalation-zones.html> (25 July 2021)


⁸² Turkey finishes setting up observation posts in Idlib, Hurriyet Daily News, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/tsk-idlibde-son-ateskes-gozlem-noktasini-kurdu/1147979>, (24 July 2021)



adjoining districts of Hama, Aleppo, and Latakia Governorates. TAF would take an active role and 12 observation points were established in the interior of the region to observe the ceasefire. The first observation point took office on 13 October 2017 and the 12th on 16 May 2018. Likewise, Russia has established 10 and Iran 7 observation points outside of the Idlib de-escalation zone. The aims of these de-escalation zones,⁸³

- Increasing the effectiveness of the ceasefire regime,
- Ending conflicts around the region,
- Delivering humanitarian aid to those in need,
- Providing suitable conditions for the return of local people to their homes,
- Supporting the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Figure 4. Turkey's 12 Observation Points in Idlib.⁸⁴



The threat posed by the PYD/YPG terrorist elements located in Afrin in the northwest of Syria to the lives and properties of the local population as well as to Turkish citizens living in the bordering Turkish provinces escalated due to indirect long-range fires and attacks. The presence of DAESH/ISIS elements in Afrin and the risk of their possible attacks on Turkey as well as their infiltration into Europe constituted another reason for Turkey to act. Against this


⁸³ TAF is in Idlib, CNN, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/son-dakika-tdskdan-idlib-aciklamasi>, (25 July 2021)

⁸⁴ TAF Established 12th Observation Point”, Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/tsk-idlibde-son-ateskes-gozlem-noktasini-kurdu/1147979> , (24 July 2021)



backdrop, the TAF and the Free Syrian Army supported by the TAF launched “*Operation Olive Branch (OOB)*” on 20 January 2018 till 18 March 2018⁸⁵ which is a meaningful day that is the anniversary of the WW1 victory of Çanakkale.⁸⁶

Figure 5. PKK Attacks on Turkey between 2015-2017 (Left) and 2017-2018 (Right)⁸⁷



The objectives of the OOB were to ensure Turkey’s border security, neutralize terrorists in Afrin, and liberate the local population from the oppression and tyranny of terrorists. Control was established in Afrin as of 18 March 2018. In less than two months, an area of approximately 2,000 km² was cleared from PYD/YPG and DAESH/ISIS elements. Approximately 4,600 terrorists have been neutralized since the start of the operation. As in the OES area, Turkey focused on ensuring security and stability with the participation of the local population in areas freed from terror with the OOB. More than 371,000 Syrians have been able to return to the said operation areas thanks to stabilization efforts in areas such as de-mining, public order, local governance, and return of Internally Displaced People.⁸⁸ The main aims of this operation;

- Establishing security and stability along the Turkey-Syria border region,
- Protecting Syrian civilians from the terrorist groups’ depredations,
- Ensuring the safe return of displaced Syrians to their homelands,
- To prevent PYD/YPG's infiltrations into Turkey via the Amanos Mountains.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Relations between Turkey–Syria, MoFA, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey%e2%80%93syria.en.mfa>, (23 April 2021)

⁸⁶ Erdoğan announced Afrin center has been taken under full control, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/peace-and-security-are-waving-in-afrin-not-the-rags-of-the-terrorist-organization>, (23 April 2021).

⁸⁷ Necdet Özçelik and Can Acun, “Terörle Mücadelede Yeni Safha Zeytin Dalı Harekatı”, (SETA, 2018), 13.

⁸⁸ Relations between Turkey–Syria, MoFA, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey%e2%80%93syria.en.mfa>, (23 April 2021)

⁸⁹ Turkey's Operation Olive Branch: 10 questions answered, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkeys->



As a result of the operation, PYD/YPG terror elements were cleared and cantonal structuring was prevented in Afrin and 282 urbanized terrains were taken under control.⁹⁰ Following this operation, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Turkey has a right to act in self-defense.⁹¹

Considering the ongoing PYD/YPG threat and the inability of the U.S. to effectively address Turkey's legitimate security concerns, the Syrian National Army supported by the TAF launched "*Operation Peace Spring*" (*OPS*) on 9 October 2019 when the Turkish Air Force launched airstrikes. The objectives of the OPS were;

- To eliminate the terror threat to Turkey's national security, contribute to the preservation of Syria's territorial integrity and unity,

- Liberate the local population from the oppression and tyranny of the terrorists and lay the ground for the dignified,

- Safe and voluntary returns of displaced Syrians.⁹²

Contrary to the existing agreements, as a result of the attacks launched on 06 May 2019, many innocent civilians lost their lives and were injured.⁹³ After weeks of unheeded warnings to the Syrian regime to stop its expansionist policies in Idlib by the end of February 2020, Turkey declared the launch of an operation called *Operation Spring Shield* (*OSS*) in the region. The operation was launched after regime forces carried out airstrikes, killing 34 Turkish soldiers and injuring tens of others in the area.⁹⁴ OSS was a cross-border military operation conducted by the TAF in the Idlib Governorate of northwestern Syria, which began on 27 February 2020 in response to the airstrikes. Turkish National Defense Minister Hulusi Akar announced that the purpose of the operation had been within the framework of the Astana talks, to ensure a

operation-olive-branch-10-questions-answered/ (22 July 2021)

⁹⁰ Operation Olive Branch, Land Forces Command, at <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/zeytin-dali.aspx> (23 July 2021)

⁹¹ Turkey has right to act in self-defense, NATO chief Stoltenberg says, Eurasia Diary, <https://ednews.net/news/-turkey-has-right-to-act-in-afrin-natochief-stoltenberg-says> (13 May 2021)

⁹² Relations between Turkey-Syria, MoFA, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey%e2%80%93syria.en.mfa>, (23 April 2021)


⁹³ Operation Spring Shield", Land Forces Command, at <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/zeytin-dali.aspx> (23 July 2021)

⁹⁴ Turkey launches Operation Spring Shield against regime aggression in Syria, Daily Sabah, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkey-launches-operation-spring-shield-in-syrias-idlib/news> (19 July 2021)



ceasefire agreement in the Second Northern Syria Buffer Zone and to prevent migration from Idlib towards the Turkish border.⁹⁵ On 5 March 2020, Turkey and Russia signed a ceasefire agreement in Moscow and also agreed to establish a security corridor and joint patrols.⁹⁶ The cross-border controlled areas as a result of the operations are shown below.

Figure 6. Areas took under control as a result of operations.⁹⁷



As a result of the operations, the region was cleared of terrorist organizations, especially DAESH/ISIS and PYD/YPG, and the formation of a possible terror corridor was prevented. The terrorists in the region were pushed to the south, enabling them to leave Turkey's southern border region. In coordination with these operations; Northern Iraq operations were launched by Turkey with the Decisive Operation in 2018 and keep going without any interruption to cease the terror attacks of PKK and its affiliates. Decisive Operations are aimed to prevent the border crossings of the terrorist organization PKK by controlling the Hakurk territory. Another goal of the operations is to deal a financial blow to the terrorist organization PKK by preventing

⁹⁵ Statement by Minister Akar about Operation Spring Shield, NTV, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bakan-akardan-bahar-kalkani-harekati-aciklamasi>, (23 July 2021)

⁹⁶ Syria war: Russia and Turkey agree Idlib ceasefire, BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51747592> (23 July 2021)

⁹⁷ "Why has the Syrian war lasted 10 years?", BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229>, (23 July 2021)



the revenue it generates from fuel smuggling.⁹⁸

Operation Claw (Turkish: Pençe Harekatı) was a cross-border military operation by the TAF into Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan Region (Hakurk).⁹⁹ Turkish troops fired artillery shells and launched air attacks on 28 May 2019, followed by a border crossing by the TAF.

Operation Claw-Eagle¹⁰⁰ (Turkish: Pençe-Kartal Harekatı) was another cross-border OP on 15 June 2020 and followed by Operation Claw-Tiger (Turkish: Pençe-Kaplan Harekatı) on 17 June 2020 and Operation Claw-Eagle 2 (Turkish: Pençe-Kartal-2 Harekatı) was conducted on 18 January 2021 following the earlier Operations.¹⁰¹

The joint Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt operations (Turkish: Pençe-Şimşek Operasyonu and Pençe-Yıldırım Operasyonu) are ongoing TAF cross border operations in northern Iraq began on 24 April 2021. The operations are taking place in the Metina, Zap, and Avashin-Basyan regions.¹⁰² Now, a similar example of having a forward presence will be examined.

3.3. Forward Presence of NATO

In 2017, NATO deployed four multinational battle groups to the Baltic States as part of a wider program to deter Russian aggression called eFP (Enhanced Forward Presence). Although there is no cross-border activity here, a concept based on the principle of anticipation has been developed. After Russia annexed Crimea, there is clear evidence that Eastern Europe, as a whole, was becoming an increasingly important target for Russia.¹⁰³ Why would NATO have taken such an approach? Because NATO believes that she cannot prevent the threat with her normal deployed forces and should be present at the borderline. NATO expanded its

⁹⁸ “Decisive Operations, Habertürk, <https://www.haberturk.com/kararlilik-harekati-ndan-carpici-goruntuler-1888599>, (16 July 2021)

⁹⁹ Operation Launched in Hakurk Region, Northern Iraq, MoD, <https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2852019-47414>, (23 June 2021)

¹⁰⁰ Pençe-Kartal Operasyonu, BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-53044428>, (23 June 2021)

¹⁰¹ Pençe-Kaplan Operasyonu, BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-53072803>, (23 June 2021)

¹⁰² Pençe-Şimşek ve Pençe Yıldırım Operasyonları, MoD, <https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2442021-24360>, (23 June 2021)

¹⁰³ The Positive Impact of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence the Positive Impact of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence” at <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/9/3/hanced-forward> (30 April 2021)



presence in the eastern part of the Alliance by establishing multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland following the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Allies implemented the 2016 Warsaw Summit decisions to establish NATO's forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and to develop a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region. These decisions demonstrate the Allies' solidarity, determination, and ability to defend Alliance territory.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the idea of providing border security at the borderline requires being forward presence. At the same time, having a force that can intervene immediately on the borderline appears as an indicator of determination. Due to the circumstances, NATO cannot maintain forces across the border and ensure the security of its allies with its ready-made troops behind the border. Although the course of action of NATO and Turkey is not the same, their end state is the same: secure their borders. Countries are trying to deploy near to the threat and neutralize the threat at its source now. That's why NATO's determination to stay ahead is like Turkey's determination to stay beyond its borders.

NATO's forward presence is part of the biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defense in a generation. Forward presence can be rapidly reinforced by additional forces and capabilities.¹⁰⁵ Amidst an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, the eFP is NATO's first new deployment model since the Alliance's inception over seventy years ago: member states assisting other member states with the unanimous endorsement of the Atlantic Council.¹⁰⁶ This concept was developed directly to protect the eastern border. This forward defense concept and Turkey's need to protect its borders from forward are very similar. Because in both, preliminary preparation against attacks and control of border crossings are kept in the foreground. Despite being rival countries in NATO's concept, terrorist groups and illegal crossings are at the forefront of Turkey's practice.

¹⁰⁴ Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm, (30 April 2021)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander Lanoszka, Christian Leuprecht, and Alexander Moens, "*Lessons from the Enhanced Forward Presence 2017-2020*", (NATO Defense Collage, November 2020), 4.

**Figure 7.** NATO Enhanced Forward Presence as of April 2021.¹⁰⁷

Forward presence contributes to the NATO Alliance's strengthened deterrence and defense posture, and the Allies' situational awareness, interoperability, and responsiveness. Deterrence consists of taking measures that serve to prevent an adversary from undertaking actions that would revise the status quo.¹⁰⁸ NATO's rapid reinforcement strategy also ensures that forward presence forces will be reinforced by NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the broader NATO Response Force, Allies' additional high readiness forces, and NATO's heavier follow-on forces, if necessary.¹⁰⁹ Within the same framework, Turkey's defense from the front and having a force in the front both contribute to its deterrence and can prevent people who want to enter the country before they approach the border by detecting them early. The course of action of NATO and Turkey is to ensure their security from ahead, without the intention of attack. Although NATO cannot defend from across borders due to their nature, cross-border defense is necessary due to the chaotic environment in Syria.

The security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area continues to evolve and new threats and challenges are constantly emerging. The Alliance adapts and plans accordingly, and its forward presence will remain as long as the security situation requires it. All NATO measures

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Alexander Lanoszka et al. "Lessons from the Enhanced Forward Presence 2017-2020", 5.

¹⁰⁹ "Boosting NATO's presence in the east and southeast" NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm, (30 April 2021)



are and will remain defensive, proportionate, and consistent with international commitments.¹¹⁰ NATO is also trying to provide border security with the same idea in Turkey. As the threat continues, Turkish soldiers will fight beyond their borders, protecting their people and preventing border crossings. In this way, the flow of terrorists, smugglers, and asylum seekers, first to the European Union countries and then to the whole world, will be at a minimum level.

3.4. Effects of Turkey's Operations

As a result of the operations which has been carried out, Turkey has become an effective actor in the Syrian territory against terrorist groups thanks to its direct military force. In this way, with the political and military superiority gained in northern Syria, the balance began to change in favor of Turkey.¹¹¹ As a result of these military operations, Turkey has demonstrated its military and political deterrence.¹¹² Turkey's boots on the ground have undoubtedly changed the balance in northern Syria.¹¹³ Turkey gained a geostrategic advantage in the region and created a 220-kilometer-long security zone in the south by controlling territorial military bases.¹¹⁴

Turkey has shown that it is possible to fight without causing civilian casualties without the destruction of cities both to the world and to the people of the region and proved that only the terrorist elements are cleared. The Turkish army made a great effort in preventing civilian casualties during operations. This sensitivity is not shooting at areas where civilians are near a target, by also taking measures to prevent such situations while planning and conducting operations.

¹¹⁰ İbid.

¹¹¹ Necdet Özçelik and Can Acun, "Terörle Mücadelede Yeni Safha Zeytin Dalı Harekâtı", 33.

¹¹² Murat Yeşiltaş, "Zeytin Dalı Harekâtı: Kazananlar ve Kaybedenler", (SETA, 2018), <https://www.setav.org/zeytin-dali-harekati-kazananlar-ve-kaybedenler/>.

¹¹³ Valeria Talbot, "Turkey in Syria: Role, Interests and Challenges", in *Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East's Next Power Game?*, 84.

¹¹⁴ Doğan Şafak Polat, "Objectives and Results of Turkish Military Operations in the North of Syria", 87.



Figure 8. Comparison of the Effects of Military Operations.¹¹⁵





Figure 9. Warning Notes and Restrictions in the Operation Center.¹¹⁶



¹¹⁵ Turkish Armed Forces Official Twitter Account, at <https://twitter.com/tskgnkur/status/975778965834039296> (25 July 2021)

¹¹⁶ Sensitivity of Turkish Armed Forces on Civilians” Star, <https://www.star.com.tr/guncel/harekat-merkezindeki-pano-dikkat-cekti-iste-tsknin-sivil-hassas>, (4 May 2021)




Turkey's gains as a result of the operations were as follows:

- By providing border security, it prevented YPG/PYD terrorist attacks in the Hatay-Osmaniye-Kilis-Islahiye region,¹¹⁷
- Removed the danger of terrorist organizations at least 35 km from the borderline,
- Turkey's southern border region and the people living there remained outside the range of terrorist weapons,
- Demonstrated to the elements in the region by carrying out successful joint operations across the border,
- Demonstrated ability to carry out operations with local elements without harming local civilians and residential areas,
- Contributing to the neutralizing of terrorists in the region, Turkey took the issue diplomatically at the Astana and Sochi summits,
- With the "Operation Claw" operations carried out in coordination with these operations in the north of Iraq, attacks of terrorists have prevented the border from this region,
- With the clearing of mines and traps in the regions that were attacked by terrorists, immigrated people have started to return to their homes gradually,
- A soft power effect has been achieved on the people in terms of both hosting the refugees and neutralizing the terrorists in Syria,
- By providing territory dominance, the movement of asylum seekers, smugglers, and terrorists has been limited.

¹¹⁷ Necdet Özçelik and Can Acun, "Terörle Mücadelede Yeni Safha Zeytin Dalı Hrk.", (SETA, 2018), pp. 48-50.



Figure 10. All Operations and their Effects on Decreasing Number of Terror Incidents.¹¹⁸



3.5. Using Advanced Technology against Terrorism

With the developing technology, the operation against non-conventional forces has become even more effective. Thanks to high technology, the distinction between terrorists, smugglers, asylum seekers, and civilians has become more easily detectable now. The developments in surveillance and reconnaissance systems and the increase in the capabilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) make target detection and destruction, where necessary, even more effective. In particular, the development of UAV technology allows countries to meet arising threats and provide a preventive effect. The elimination of targets, the ability to operate in difficult areas and danger for people, the low cost in comparison to other aircraft, and the minimal risk of losses are the main reasons for preferring UAVs.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Created by the authors by analyzing data of Director of General of Migration Managements, Nedim Şener's article, attacks on Turkey and the operations carried out.

¹¹⁹ Osman Şen and Hüseyin Akarşlan, "Terrorist Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Turkey's Example", *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 13, (2020): 50.



Considering the impact on Turkey's warfighting capabilities domestically produced UAVs became successfully operative in Operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring, and several counterterrorism operations against the PKK in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq.¹²⁰ Turkey's products to be labeled as "*combat proven*" and have given Turkey a highly prestigious reputation in the worldwide drone market – as opposed to many of its competitors.¹²¹ Of course, the point to be mentioned here will be deterrence on terrorists and smugglers rather than advancing in the commercial direction. Because these people, whose every movement is observed from both land and air, are forced to move in underground tunnels like moles, cannot move comfortably and ultimately stay away from Turkish borders. Remote control of the border with systems such as UAVs, especially the troops beyond its borders, allows Turkish citizens in border provinces to live fearlessly and safely. It was stated by Defense Minister Hulusi Akar that terrorists could not stay in the same place two nights in a row without effective surveillance and reconnaissance activities.¹²²

While providing real-time situational awareness, effective area control, and reinforced survivability, the UAVs have generated force protection in hybrid battlegrounds as an expendable asset contrary unlike fighter jets and attack helicopters.¹²³ For example, Operation Olive Branch's air campaign marked the highest sortie-rates and the most intensive operational tempo in Turkey's cross-border military record in the last decade. As reported by the Turkish General Staff, on the very first day of the intervention, the air force assigned 72 combat aircraft which is tantamount to roughly 25% of the total F-16 variants and the F-4 2020s in the inventory.¹²⁴

After each operation, new measures were developed against the threats in the region via the cutting-edge military weapon systems. For example, having digested the lessons-learned

¹²⁰ Sibel Düz, *The Ascension of Turkey as a Drone Power History, Strategy, and Geopolitical Implications*, (SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2020), 20.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* 8.

¹²² "Speech of Minister of Defence", at <https://msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2672021-42115> (26 July 2021)

¹²³ *Ibid.* 8.

¹²⁴ Can Kasapoğlu and Sinan Ülgen, "Operation Olive Branch: A Political – Military Assessment", (EDAM Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy, 2018), 1.



from the Euphrates Shield, Turkish defense planners now pay utmost attention to eliminating the adversary's subterranean/tunnel warfare capabilities with high-precision smart munitions at the very beginning of the conflict.¹²⁵ The use of new generation ammunition has ensured both neutralizing the targets and not harming the objects/people around them. The fact that the commando units in the field knew that there is a continuous and effective combat air support surveillance system over them 24/7 acts as a morale booster and provides them flexibility in planning. Especially, equipped with LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red for Night) pods which enable low altitude navigation and precision targeting at night.¹²⁶

Under the Close Air Support (CAS) the indigenous T-129 ATAK helicopters made their cross-border debuts and engaged YPG targets with CIRIT-guided rockets during these operations.¹²⁷

Figure 11. Close Air Support (CAS) Preferences during operations.¹²⁸



Logistic sustainability and continuous personnel support are very significant for the execution of the operations. In particular, the supply of spare parts and food, and its execution in a terrorist-intensive area, require very careful planning and safety. Notably, KIRPI MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles) joining the campaign are provided with extra protection thanks to ROKETSAN-manufactured RPG shield, or the “cage-armor”. The flexible layered armor cage system is primarily designed for boosting the survivability of land

¹²⁵ Ibid p. 5.

¹²⁶ Terör mevzilerine Kartal ve Pars vuruşu”, Hürriyet, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/teror-mevzilerine-kartal-ve-pars-vurusu-40723074>, (14 May 2021)

¹²⁷ Turkey's T-129 helicopters hit PYD/PKK targets in Afrin Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkeys-t-129-helicopters-hit-pyd-pkk-targets-in-afrin/1040814>, (15 May 2021)

¹²⁸ Turkey's T-129 helicopters hit PYD/PKK targets in Afrin Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkeys-t-129-helicopters-hit-pyd-pkk-targets-in-afrin/1040814>, (15 May 2021)



platforms against rocket-propelled grenade threats that many terrorist groups around the world use.¹²⁹ Improvised explosives and obstacles/traps are frequently encountered in operations against terrorists. Thanks to KIRPI MRAPs, personnel transfer, and handover-takeover processes have been quite fast and reliable.

Figure 12. Flexible Layered Armor Cage Systems (RPG shield) and FIRTINA Howitzer.¹³⁰



The new generation FIRTINA howitzers, which are tasked with providing fire support inside and outside Turkey's southern border, have made very positive contributions to operations with UAV-assisted target tracking and continuous fire support. Especially with its accurate shooting ability, it provides continuous pinpoint, precise fire support to ground troops that were operating at the contact line.

4. Conclusion

Although Turkey initially tried to secure her territory with the measures taken on the borderline against the threats originating from Syria in 2011, Turkey could not get enough effective results and must protect its borders with cross-border operations. From the very first day, Turkey has identified as approaching the Syrian issue with humanitarian feelings. The existence of an authority vacuum in certain regions of Syria, and the failure of the administration to establish the necessary state sovereignty, have resulted in the dominance of terrorist organizations in these areas. Terrorist organizations taking advantage of the vacuum of the authority carried out attacks against Turkey and as a result of these attacks, many people

¹²⁹ Ballistic Protection Systems, Roketsan, <https://www.roketsan.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/BALISTIK-ENG-email1.pdf>, (15 May 2021)

¹³⁰ Remarkable detail on armored vehicles in Afrin” Hurriyet, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem /afrindeki-zirhli-araclarda-dikkat-ceken-detay-40721846>, (15 May 2021)



lost their lives, material damage was caused, and the sovereignty of Turkey has been violated. Therefore, Turkey took a series of measures to ensure the border security of its territory and the security of Turkish citizens.

Terrorist organizations do not own a country and carry out their activities using the country of another state. It is normal to intervene in countries that cannot control the activities of terrorist organizations within their borders. The main purposes of Turkey's operations in the north of Syria were to clear the area from the PYD/YPG and DAESH/ISIS terrorists and to contribute to the reconstruction of stability in Syria by considering the territorial integrity of the country. Turkey launched these operations in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter. After Turkey carried out the operations, no important events occurred in the border region, and peace and security were established within the country. This can prove the accuracy and success of the operations. Particularly the establishment of bases and the execution of joint patrols with allied countries in the region ensured that terrorists and smugglers could not move freely. Terrorists trying to attack find sheltered military areas against them and their effects are not as much as civilian settlements. 7/24 surveillance and reconnaissance activities impede greatly the mobility of terrorists and smugglers.

Turkey uses the equipment developed and produced by itself against terrorists to ensure its security. It is widely acclaimed by the whole world with its systems developed especially for cross-border operations and which do not harm the civilian population. Thanks to Turkey's operations in the region, the civilian population has not been harmed, and historical places and religious motifs have been preserved.

The most important result of the operations is that the people who had migrated because of fear, death, and torture, gradually started to return to the areas cleared from terrorists. Creating an atmosphere of trust in these regions is not as easy as it is supposed. Turkey, which has been experiencing numerous problems for decades due to the ongoing chaotic environment in the Middle East, specifically her neighbors, has taken the necessary measures to avoid the same problems in Syria this time with a new proactive approach. Having experienced that the



humanitarian tragedies on her border directly affect her own country, Turkey is now making an effort to intervene directly in the events from outbound. This problem, which has been going on for more than 10 years and is expected to continue, took a long time to be resolved, but when the events started to reach dangerous dimensions, Turkey had to intervene under international law.

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Terror Financing and Unregulated Economy of Pakistan: An Investigation of an Economically Failed State

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Abstract

Sometimes it has been witnesses the allegation of state-sponsored terrorism against Pakistan because the claim of state authority has lost its relative autonomy in controlling the terrorist organizations. Therefore this essay intends to examine the claims about the connection between the terrorist groups and Pakistan and focuses on the influence of terrorism on the economic development of Pakistan. According to claims, due to governmental support, the terrorist groups in Pakistan are not only running parallel economies but also control the unregulated economy of the country. Therefore international agencies have accused Pakistan several times and taken it on the 'grey list' because the state authority has lost its relative autonomy in controlling the terrorist organizations. So, this essay focuses on the reasons for the economic backwardness of Pakistan in the context of security problems and terrorist organizations.

Keywords: Economic security, failed state, national security, radicalization, terrorism.

Terör Finansmanı İddiaları ve Pakistan'ın Düzensiz Ekonomisi: Ekonomik Olarak Başarısız Bir Devletin Soruşturması

Özet

Devlet otoritesinin terör örgütlerini kontrol etmedeki görelî özerkliğini kaybetmesi nedeniyle bazen Pakistan'a yönelik devlet destekli terörizm iddialarına tanık olunmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu makale, terörist gruplar ile Pakistan arasındaki bağlantıya yönelik iddiaları incelemeyi amaçlamakta ve terörizmin Pakistan'ın ekonomik kalkınması üzerindeki etkisine odaklanmaktadır. İddialara göre Pakistan'daki terörist gruplar devlet desteği sayesinde sadece paralel ekonomiler yürütmekle kalmıyor, aynı zamanda ülkenin kontrolsüz ekonomisini de kontrol ediyor. Bu kapsamda terör örgütleri çeşitli kanallardan kara para işlemleri de yapmaktadır. Ayrıca terörist grupların şiddet eylemleri binlerce can kaybına ve mülk ve altyapıların zarar görmesine neden olmuştur. Bu nedenle uluslararası kuruluşlar Pakistan'ı birkaç kez suçlamışlar ve devlet otoritesinin terör örgütlerini kontrol etmedeki göreceli özerkliğini kaybettiği için onu 'gri listeye' almışlardır. Dolayısıyla bu makale, güvenlik sorunları ve terör örgütleri bağlamında Pakistan'ın ekonomik geri kalmışlığının nedenlerine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomik güvenlik, başarısız devlet, ulusal güvenlik, radikalleşme, terör.

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1. Introduction

Terrorism has been a severe threat to human civilization in the contemporary world. Since the 9/11 incident, terrorism has taken to the center stage of world politics.¹ Terrorism is the use of violence to achieve political, ideological, ethnic, or religious ends. The deadliest ideological warfare has been shifted into terrorism. Samuel Huntington has warned about clashes of a civilization long before the 9/11 incident. In his ‘clash of civilizations’ theory fundamental source of conflict in the contemporary world is not political or economic but, rather, civilizational or cultural.² The radicalization of Islamic ideology has been manifested in the name of *Jihad*. As per Quranic interpretation, the concept of *jihad* is a struggle of an individual whereby one strives at self-purification against confusions and vacillations as to the true path of Allah.³

Mahatma Gandhi once said, “*I do not regard killing or assassination or terrorism as good in any circumstances whatsoever.*” Throughout his life, Gandhi fought for nonviolence and peace. The reckless terrorism resulted in thousands of casualties, the flow of refugees, statelessness, and damage to wealth and infrastructures across the globe. In the era of globalization, terrorism has been globalized. Terrorism has not only been financed and supported by the non-state actors, but also by some states. Some states have been tagged as ‘terrorist states’. Terrorism has been flourishing by the state authority in Pakistan over the decades. A parallel economy is run in Pakistan by different terrorist groups. Through illicit ways, the money laundering process is going on for generating funds for the terrorist groups. Terrorism is not a security threat to Pakistan, but also a threat to the national economy. Because terror financing generates corruption.

A terrorist attack is ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. The development and economic growth of a country are immensely dependent upon the stability and peace of a country. Due to reckless terrorism and militarization, the socio-political situation of Pakistan is highly unstable. Religious extremism negatively affects

¹ Nivedita Majumdar, *An Anthology of Writings on Terrorism in South Asia. The Other Side of Terror* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011): xiv

² Samuel, P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (Summer,1993): 22-49.

³ Sekhar Ghosh, “Introduction” in *Essays on International Terrorism*, ed. Mohit Bhattacharya, Sekhar Ghosh and Rabindranath Bhattacharyya (Kolkata: Levant Books, 2006): 1-5.



economic growth.⁴ Pakistan is considered a rogue state for restless ethnic conflicts, intra-religious clashes, terrorism, religious orthodoxy, and military intervention. Being a democratic country with a federal structure, Pakistan has not been yet to fundamental rights and human rights for the citizens nor able to ensure equal opportunity to all ethnic groups. For an underdeveloped country like Pakistan, it is essential to pull foreign direct investment (FDI) for industrialization and economic development. Due to having a tag of ‘terrorist state’ no MNCs are not showing their interest to invest in Pakistan. Moreover, due to the running of a parallel economy by the terrorist groups national economy of the country has been severely suffering. Domestic investment has also been reducing gradually due to security reasons. National investors and industrialists are being threatened by the terrorist leaders for paying a levy to terrorist organizations.

There are several reasons for terrorism in Pakistan, intra-religious violence, ethnic conflicts, uneven development, the policy of exclusion, high rate of illiteracy, economic inequality, inflation, unemployment, uncontrolled population growth political instability, poverty, and lack of social justice.⁵ Due to terrorism, the economy of Pakistan has deteriorated gradually.⁶ At the same time, the image of Pakistan has been negatively portrayed to the global community for the continuous support of the state authority to the extremist forces. This study aims to investigate the interconnecting factors of terror financing in Pakistan. It also intends to delineate the economic effects of terror financing on the national economy of Pakistan and its impacts on regional security.

2. Contextualizing Terror Financing

The foreign policy and defense policy of Pakistan are framed based on India as the foremost enemy. Conducting proxy wars in bordering areas is not a new phenomenon for Pakistan. Since its very inception, the key motto of the Pakistani military to attack India not only through military but also through militancy also. The recruitment of Mujahedeen fighters

⁴ Muhammad Zakaria, Wen Jun and Haseeb Ahmed, “Effect of Terrorism on Economic Growth in Pakistan: An Empirical Analysis”. *Economic Research* 32, (2019): 1794-1812. DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1638290, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1638290>.

⁵ Alam Khan, Mario Estrada and Zarinah Yusof, “How terrorism affects the economic performance? The case of Pakistan”, *Quality and Quantity* 50, no.2 (2016): 867–883. <https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/qualqt/v50y2016i2p867-883.html>, accessed on March 4 2021.

⁶ Shabir Hyder, Naeem Akram, and Ihtsham Ul Haq Padda, “Impact of terrorism on economic development in Pakistan”. *Pakistan Business Review* 16, no.4 (January 2015): 704–722.



in Afghanistan by the CIA and ISI during the Cold War period led Pakistan to further employment of militancy. To attack India, Pakistan had started to sponsor and support the secessionists of Jammu and Kashmir of Indian territory. At the same time, due to over-emphasizing Islamization and pampering illegal madrasas, Pakistan subconsciously had dug its grave. From where there is no way of emancipation. The illegal madrasas are usually established by the rural youths who returned from Gulf countries after earning a lot of money. They often receive donations from the Islamic world, especially the Middle East region to foster Islamic philosophy and jihadi education. The religious leaders of Pakistan are very supportive of those madrasas. Many youngsters are joining various radical organizations after being educated by those madrasas. The leaders of terrorist organizations are being supported by the Pakistani army and the government as well. Economic corruption has been a key feature of Pakistan which has been more prominent of the unregulated economic system. Illegal monetary transactions are made by terrorist organizations across the country. Pakistan was also responsible to promote the Khalistan movement in the Punjab state of the Indian union.

The international funding agencies and donor countries have had information about Pakistan's connections with terrorist groups. The allegation of sponsoring terrorism is not a surprising thing for Pakistan. After the 9/11 incident, the US administration declared a 'global war on terror'. The US administration has rewarded Pakistan for its promise to assist the USA in fighting against Al Qaida and the Taliban. But Pakistan has failed to fulfill its promises. Pakistan's state has lost its relative autonomy due to the hegemonic decision-making power of the army and ISI. The civil government has no power to control terrorism in the country. For the sake of military interest, civil government has been a compromising agency. Now, *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, *Falah-I-Insanlat Foundation*, *Jamaat-ed Dawa*, and *Jaish-e-Mohammad* (terrorist groups of Pakistan) have been incorporated into the list of UNOs and the USA's most dangerous terrorist groups. *Jaish-e-Mohammad* is not only dangerous for India, and Bangladesh but also for the security of Pakistan. This predominant Pakistani terrorist group had initiated to kill former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. This organization also attacked the Naval base, PNS Mehran.⁷ On May 22, 2011, *Jaish-e-Mohammad* destroyed three P3C Orion aircraft.⁸

⁷ Vivek Chadha, "Economic Sanctions as an Option to Fight Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism". *Journal of Defence Studies* 11, no.2 (2017): 13-35.

⁸ Dawn. (June 17 2011). <https://www.dawn.com/news/637216>, accessed March 12, 2021



The dubious networks between the army with Jihadi groups made Pakistan a hotbed of terrorism. The military continues to build its professional skills and expands its hegemonic presence not only in legal ways but also in illegal means by using extremist forces. The civilian leadership is unable to provide a reliable alternative to military rule. The dominant presence of the military in Pakistani politics is not for only domestic causes alone, but also regional ones.⁹ The military personnel and civilian leaders have to hold a common view about regional diplomatic and strategic affairs. Both military and civil governments want to destabilize the region through cross-border terrorism and destabilizing the democratic milieu of the South Asian region. With this common view, they used to mobilize and pamper the religious extremist groups. In 2002, Musharraf had staged a mock general election under the pressure of western powers. A pre-election coalition was made between the Pakistan People's Party of Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif. However, this coalition failed to contest the election due to the repressive policies of Musharraf. The notable point is that the alliance of Islamist parties, *Mutahhidah Majlis Amal* (MMA), received the tacit support of the military.¹⁰

3. Research Questions and Methodology

The present study is based on three research questions— (1) Is Pakistan very serious to stop terror financing? (2) Why should a multi-ethnic country follow a biased policy? (3) Is it possible to stop terrorism in an unregulated economic system? The content analysis method and interview method have been used to conduct this study. The present study is based on secondary data, such as reports, books, journals, newspapers, web sources, etc.

4. Background

Pakistan has been suffering from a democratic deficit ever since it came into being. It is a nation without nationalism. Some scholars argue that from the very beginning, it is a vulnerable and disrupted state in terms of democracy, nationalism, economy, and security. There was immense potential to convert Pakistan into a proper federal democratic state with an equal accommodative policy toward the provinces. However, the process of Islamization of politics, initiated by Pakistani leadership at the cost of development and modernization has

⁹ Sayeed Shafqat, "Pakistan Military: Sustaining Hegemony and Constructing Democracy?" *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.2 (2019): 21.

¹⁰ Husain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future". *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no.1(2004): 5.



converted Pakistan into a 'warrior state'. Syed Abdul Alla Maududi (1903-78) was responsible for spreading fundamentalism in Pakistan. His speeches and writings were able to inject communal and narrow sectarian thought into the entire socio-political structure of Pakistan. Entire the Middle East and South-East Asia were influenced by Maududi's ideology. Maududi, while being one of the earliest Islamists in the 20th century, played a very important role in the politics of Pakistan, almost up to his death. Some scholars argue that Pakistan was also subsequently influenced by the dogmas of Syed Qutub of Egypt and Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. Actually, in the 20th century, these two Islamic leaders have had propagated the essence of the Islamic state. Ayatollah Khomeini's political doctrine was *Islam and Revolution* (1981) and Syed Qutub's statement was known as *Milestones* (1981). According to Maududi, Islam is a universal religion but the secular leaders failed to establish Pakistan based on the assertive features of Islam. He had claimed that Pak leaders have failed to understand that Muslims are obliged to struggle for establishing an Islamic state.

Over the years, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) has become more incentivized to claim political benefits by moving toward extremist positions¹¹ has been mentioned that in three ways PML is assisting the extremist groups-(1) giving affiliation to more extremist groups, (2) through the campaigning of essentialities of radical Islamic forces, and (3) by engaging in a violent confrontation with the incumbents and governmental forces. Political Violence is a language of politics in Pakistan. Jammāt-e-Islām (JI) is very supportive of jihadists who used to attack democratic and liberal forces. JI is very violent against the Ahmediyya community and well connected with one of the most violent terrorist organizations Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi. In this way, the Islamic political parties are feeling the extremist groups. The party's fund is often used by terrorist groups which resulted from undocumented money transactions.

The close ties between the Pakistani army and Islamist extremist groups began under Zia's regime in the context of the Afghan war in 1979. Aijaz Ahmed said, "*Zia himself, a close relation of Main Tufail, the present chief of the JI provided ample protection for secret cells of the JI inside the armed forces; it was the only political organization which had such opportunities*" He adds, "*Most important, however, is perhaps the fact that the JI's*

¹¹ Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Foundation Books): 131.



propaganda among vast numbers of troops was officially sanctioned by commanding officers on the battalion level and above".¹² Zia intentionally used Islam as a means of remaining in power. It was also injected into Pakistan's military system. More importantly, religious education became a part of the curriculum at the Pakistan Military academy and also for promotion examinations from lieutenant to captain and captain to major. Similarly, another significant step towards Islamization of the Pakistan Army was the official stamp that General Zia-ul- Haq gave to a book titled 'The Quranic Concept of War' authored by several Pakistan Army Brigadiers.¹³ In the subsequent years, this collaboration was extended through the support of the extremist movement in Jammu and Kashmir in India. During Zia's regime, Afghan militants or Mujahid warriors were partially trained in Pakistan. The United States of America and Saudi Arabia supported and funded these Mujahids to fight against the Soviet forces. The global jihadist movement was started at this time.

General Zia depended on the nexus between Islamization and the state, first establishing a connection between the lay Jamaat-i-Islami and the *Ulema*, and then launching a comprehensive program of Islamic reform that paved the way for a distinctly legalistic approach to Pakistan's Muslim identity.¹⁴ A nexus between military and orthodox ideologists or *Ulema* was quite responsible for the flourishing of madrassas, which become gradually, the hubs of *jihadists*. State-controlled and centralized Islamic network-based educational system had ruined the modern social structure. The triumph of Islamic fundamentalists over state authority had made an adverse effect on civil society also.

The politicization of Islam and Islamization of Politics, whatever, Zia used Islam as a means of remaining in power. His narrow power-centric interest transformed the entire society into an intolerant and communal segment. After the short death of Zia, his successors came into power through undemocratic ways. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z. Bhutto, wanted to prove to Islamists that even though she was educated in the West, she could be trusted to protect and advance Pakistan's Islamic character. Nawaz Sharif was also taking a pro-Islamic policy to survive in Pakistani politics.

¹² Aijaz Ahmed. "Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan". *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 8. no.4(1978): 477-512.

¹³ Bidanda Chengappa, M, *Pakistan, Islamization, Army and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: APH Publishing, 2004),1-70.

¹⁴ Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurst and Company, 2009): 44.



5. Understanding the Perception of Pakistan on Terrorism

In a memoir,¹⁵ has tried to justify his support for the USA in ‘the global war on terrorism in three ways. Firstly, Musharraf argued that in comparison with the US military strength Pakistan’s military strength is very weak. And the military strength of Pakistan is immensely dependent upon the USA. If Pakistan will not cooperate with the USA in operations against Al Qaida and Taliban groups in Afghanistan, then the USA may destroy Pakistani military forces. This argument implies that the Pakistan administration was not willing to fight against jihadist forces due to internal compulsion. Rather it was compelled to join with the US forces to fight against terrorism. Secondly, Musharraf argued that due to economic weakness will have to compromise with the USA. He said we cannot sustain our economy in the face of an attack by the USA. Thirdly, Pakistan is a fragmented state with ethnoreligious conflict. So it will be difficult to convince the entire nation to go for a united war against the Western forces, especially the USA. Another reason was very important to Musharraf.

Just after the 9/11 incident, India had given its consent to combat global terrorism in coordination with the USA. Looking into national interest, Pervez Musharraf that if Pakistan does not join with the USA then strategically India will get a more advantageous position. The major problem in Pakistan is the nexus with the radical groups. The policy of feeding terrorist groups to mobilize against India and destabilize the region was ultimately a boomerang for Pakistan. After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, Pakistan continued all types of support to them. Pervez Musharraf has confessed that due to geostrategic reasons, Pakistan will continue its support to the Taliban.¹⁶ Musharraf was supported by the Gulf countries in formulating pro-radical policies. Lieven (2012) has rightly pointed out that After the 9/11 incident the Pakistani military has compelled into an alliance with the US forces. Initially, the Taliban group was a good understanding of the government of Pakistan. But since 2007-2008, the Taliban has become a security threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban group became more powerful which is why the military of Pakistan was doubtful regarding the attack on Pakistani militants. The perception of the government of Pakistan was changed towards the Taliban due

¹⁵ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Pocket Books, 2006): 202-203.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*



to uncontrolled Taliban activities. In early 2010, more than 2,000 Pakistani soldiers and paramilitary forces were killed by internal terrorist groups and thousands were injured.¹⁷

5.1. Different Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

As per the statistics of the South Asia Terrorism Portal,¹⁸ between 2000 and 2019 about 63,898 people have been killed in Pakistan due to religious extremism. Many people were wounded. On 27 December 2007, Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide attack and her assassination has become a crucial moment in Pakistan's history.¹⁹ The Islamist political parties are immensely responsible for the radicalization of society. Just after independence, the Muslim League was not only a political party in Pakistan but also a power-mobilization factor.²⁰ However, *Jamaat-e-Islam* as a political party was established to mobilize the society in a wrong way which resulted in the emergence of several terrorist groups like *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, *Harkatul Mujahidin*, *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, etc. Pakistan has become a hub of militant organizations which resulted in enormous violent incidents across the country. State-sponsored and foreign-sponsored militant organizations are not only a threat to the native country but also dangerous to South Asia. As I have mentioned earlier, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the concept of cross-border militancy was popularized in Pakistan. The jihadist movements have become multidimensional through the activities of *Harkatul Mujahideen*, *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, and *Jaish-e-Mohammed*. These organizations are closely associated with ISI and spontaneously involved in jihadist activities in the entire South Asian region. These are also interconnected with the Taliban group. Most of the militant groups propagate the aims of Islam and intend to build up a pan-Islamic world. After the 9/11 Incident, it was gradually projected as the terror of civilization. There was a close link between Al-Qaida and the Taliban group. However, after the 9/11 incident, it became internationalized. Most of these extremist groups originated from the most populated province, Punjab, and influenced by *Jamaat-Ulama-Pakistan* of the Deobandi school of thought. Taliban chief Mullah Omar and Al-Qaida chief

¹⁷ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2012):175-76.

¹⁸ V.B. Sharma, "How Pakistan's Unregulated Economy Feeds the Criminal Terror Nexus". *South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP)* (2019). <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>, accessed on 11 March 2021.

¹⁹ Saeed Shafqat, "Praetorian and the People", in *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi, 105, (London: Rupa, 2011).

²⁰ Debasish Nandy, *Understanding Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Kunal Books, 2017), 118-119.



Osama bin Laden have jointly started the process of Islamization through armament. It caused additional irritation for India.

5.2. Connectivity between Terrorism and Corruption

The radical Islamic terrorist groups are not only a security threat to Pakistan, but it is also very alarming for the Pakistani economy. Due to the running of illicit terrorist activities and training, the illegal flow of money has been a common feature in Pakistan. Within Pakistan and outside of Pakistan through the evil network the different terrorist groups in Pakistan are increasing the degree of corruption in other South Asian countries also. These terrorist groups have a good network in Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Nepal, even in the Maldives also. Through *hawala* illegal money is being transferred to South Asian countries. The geographical position of the Terai region of Southern Nepal is favorable to generating a significant flow of black capital for the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba. This organization was banned by the Pakistan government in 2002, but Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is promoting Lashkar-e-Taiba. This organization has operated several terrorist attacks in the Kashmir valley and is also accused of hijacking an Indian Airlines flight from Tribhuvan Airport, Kathmandu in December 1999 Lashkar-e-Taiba is transferring money and generating money through several illicit channels—(1) Through the hawala banking network, funds are being received and transferring to and from Pakistan and the Middle East. (2) Through fraud letters of credit Pakistani militant groups are doing illegal money laundering business. With the help of corrupt bank officials and customs officials, Lashkar-e-Taiba cadres are generating funds. (3) Fake Currency is a comparatively easier method of production and distribution of counterfeit currency. Trader networks in the Terai deal in fake Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 Indian notes, trading them at a 2-1 rate on the underground market.²¹ (4) Exchange and Extraction Once created, illicit funds are exchanged within Nepal for liquid imported goods that hold concentrated value or are otherwise difficult to trace.

5.3. International Reactions against Terror Financing in Pakistan

Due to strong allegations against Pakistan for connectivity between the national economy and terrorism, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary in Paris decided to

²¹ Jason Miklian, *Illicit Trading in Nepal: Fuelling South Asian Terrorism South Asia. Working Paper No.3* (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009): 1-16.



take action against Pakistan. Pakistan has fallen on the 'grey list' for failing the conditions of global Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism principles. Pakistan is under FATF observation for the last 13 years. The case for 'black listing' Pakistan for its deliberate violation of FATF is supported by China, Turkey, and Malaysia. Indeed, this has been a hard diplomatic struggle for India. FATF's continued categorization of Pakistan on the 'grey list' springs from the fact that it has consistently failed to implement local legislation to comply with the relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. There is a danger that the present downward trend in terror activities might inaccurately be perceived as a result of genuine action against terrorism by Pakistan.

India has canceled Pakistan as the most favored nation trading status. Despite having a bilateral trade volume worth 2 billion USD, Pakistan has failed to stop cross-border terrorism. After the Pulwama incident in 2019 in Jammu and Kashmir, India is no more interested to continue its trading with Pakistan. After taking this decision by the government of India, Pakistan will not only be an economic loser but will also lose its reputation. The EU is one of the biggest trading partners of Pakistan. The EU has considered Pakistan a terrorist country and is unhappy with making a mockery of the FATF actions. The EU also expressed its anxiety about supporting and sheltering the global terrorist Hafiz Saeed. The liberal, democratic, open and secular society of Europe is under attack from terrorists.²²

As per several indexes by international organizations, Pakistan is ranked as one of the worst countries in the world. There are so many allegations against Pakistan that it has a grey economy, which is run by terrorist groups. Pakistan has failed to qualify to forget membership to the Egmont Group due to its unregulated economy. It is an informal network of 164 financial intelligence units. The role of Pakistan in stopping terror financing has been criticized by several international organizations including FATF and the UNO. This is an open secret that Pakistan provides shelter and support to terrorists. Pakistan is continuously motivating and supporting the secessionists of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The militants of Jammu and Kashmir of Indian territory are getting financial and logistical support to continue cross-border terrorism.

²² Sunil Prasad, EU must use its moral weight to put Pakistan on the blacklist of FATF. South Asia Monitor. (November 3 2020). <https://southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/eu-must-use-its-moral-weight-put-pakistan-blacklist-fatf>, accessed on 9 March 2021.



Pakistan is continuously stating a commitment to the FATF and Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering to reinforce to stop anti-money laundering. Since June 2018, Pakistan has had to make statements to these international agencies about combating terror financing. But the real scenario is quite different. Pakistan is continuing terror financing and even promoting terrorism in the pandemic situation. A very funny thing is that Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has openly agreed on the existence of about 40,000 terrorists in the country. The Security Council of UNO has reported that approximately 6,500 Pakistani terrorists belong to *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and *Jaish-e-Mohammed*.²³ During the regime of Pervez Musharraf, the Taliban and Al Qaida groups in Afghanistan were fed by Pakistan. Pakistan was the only South Asian country that continued economic relations with the illegitimate Taliban government of Afghanistan.

Pakistan's role as the epicenter of terrorism has been well documented by numerous international organizations including the UN and FATF. It is not a secret that Pakistan provides shelter and support to terrorists and continues to peddle false and motivated narratives on the situation in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The country seeks to portray its military, financial, and logistical support to cross-border terrorism against India as a freedom struggle.

6. The US threat to Pakistan to Stop Terrorism

Since 1954, Pakistan has been financed by the USA. During the entire Cold War period, Pakistan was recovering non-stop military assistance from the USA. The US administration was well aware of the illicit activities of the Pakistan government. The Pak-sponsored militancy in Indian territory was also not unknown to the USA. But, due to strategic interest, the Pakistan government was appeased by the US administration. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In reply, the USA also took a very active role to counter the SOVIET forces in Afghanistan. During that time, the US administration had spent a huge amount of money on recruiting Afghan youngsters as militants. They had been trained by the CIA of the USA and ISI of Pakistan. The given arms to Afghan militants were not returned to the CIA or ISI. Later on, they became mujahidin and Taliban. The liquid money was reached the unemployed Baluch youngsters also. However, after the 9/11 incident, when the US president Junior Bush

²³ *Ibid.*



announced to fight against global terrorism, then the President of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif promised to combat it. After being agreed to fight against international terrorism it was expected that the Pakistan government will be honest to stop terror financing. But it has not happened. There are several allegations and proven documents against Pakistan for direct involvement in terrorist acts. The government of India has given relevant documents for being involved in Pakistan in various terrorist activities in India. The US intelligence agencies have confirmed that Pakistan did not stop terror financing and backing of the terrorist group. Due to the failure of keeping its previous promises, the US administration has blocked USD 63 million in funds to fight against 70 designated terrorist groups, such as LeT and JeM in 2019.²⁴ US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened Pakistan to stop other financial assistance.

6.1. Responsibility of the USA

As a nation-state, Pakistan is a quite failure. As a democratic state, it is crippled. As far as security is concerned, it is volatile. The question is that despite being an old ally of the US how could it adopt an extremist path? How the US government continuously had treated Pakistan as a weaker state? How Osama Bin Laden took shelter in Pakistan in presence of US forces. Every leader of Pakistan used the tram card of Islam for remaining in power. The role of the US is highly questionable, as it has taken a “zero-tolerance policy” towards terrorism. The US is using Pakistan for its strategic interest. With the American collaboration with the Pakistani ruling elites, military, bureaucratic, and political it has become hard to differentiate between the interests of US policy-makers and these domestic elites.²⁵ After signing the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US, Pakistan gradually received a huge amount of arms aid from the US. From 1982 to 1990, Islamabad received military hardware worth about US \$ 2 billion from the US. I think the US is equally responsible for it. Today, Pakistan is considered a terrorist state. The US intelligence has sufficient evidence about Pakistan’s terrorist activities. During the resistance movement, the USA was a major player supplying

²⁴ The Economic Times, (January 1 2021). <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-blocks-usd-63-million-funds-of-global-terrorist-groups-such-as-pakistan-based-letjem/articleshow/80058410.cms?from=mdr>, accessed on March 9, 2021.

²⁵ Saeed Shafqat, “Praetorian and the People”.



funds, arms ammunition to the fighters (Mujahidin). Most of the US aid to the Mujahedeen was channeled through Pakistan.²⁶

Washington is well-informed about the extremist activities of Islamist organizations and ISI-Lashkar-e-Taiba-Taliban-Al-Qaida connections. Then, how the US is constantly supplying arms to Pakistan? The US has taken a dual policy about Pakistan. The US policy on South Asia, especially Pakistan was mistakable from the very beginning. I think American strategists could not understand the South Asian pulse. Washington will have to rethink its Islamabad policy; otherwise, it would raise a big question about the ‘fight against the global terrorism program. After the terrorist attack at Peshawar in Pakistan on 16th December 2014, US President Barrack Obama said, “terrorists have once again shown their depravity”. The US has approved a handsome amount of foreign aid to Pakistan in January 2015. The US already declared Pakistan a terrorist state. During his visit to India in January 2015, US President Obama strongly criticized Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai attack and cross-border terrorism. The US has taken a dual policy towards Pakistan. The US is to be taken a strong policy against Pakistan. Due to strategic interest, the US administration has not taken such kind of bold decisions.

7. Means of Terror Financing in Pakistan

The most alarming thing for Pakistan is many state-owned banks and private banks, even financial companies are associated with the illegal money laundering process by the terrorist groups. Some anti-money laundering measures have been taken by some banks and the government, but these are fake initiatives. The illegal means of terror financing in Pakistan are technically diverse.

a. In Pakistan, the illegal money laundering system is an open secret and that is encouraged by the government. In Pakistan, foreign remittances and online transfers remain the harmless and most popular tools of money laundering.

b. The terrorist groups are targeting some special tax wavering schemes to transfer inward and outward illegal funds. In Pakistan, some regular tax amnesty schemes are abused by extremist groups to legalize their undocumented assets.

²⁶ Anchita Borthakur and Angana Kotokey, “Ethno-Religious Deconstruction of the Mujahedeen Resistance Movement and its Impact on the Neighborhood”. *World Focus* 40, no.8 (August 2019): 25.



c. Some areas in Pakistan are tax-exempted. The formerly Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) are tax waived areas. These areas are economically backward. The government of Pakistan decided to waive the taxes of the people of these regions for relaxing the economic burden. But a huge amount of illegal business capital is rolling into the market of these areas. This amount is collectively accumulated in the hand of corrupted local businessmen and terrorist groups. Due to the annexation of these areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, the corrupted businessmen are rolling money into the local economy in association with terrorist groups. The people of these areas are exempted from paying any kind of taxes. In this way, the local economy is not only fed by terrorists, but the government of Pakistan is losing a big amount of revenue every year.

d. The terrorist groups of Pakistan and Afghanistan are jointly manipulating the Afghan transit trade. Due to having an open border between the two countries, illegal financing is done by terrorists to run illegal trade. Afghanistan is the major global manufacturer of heroin. There are at least 1.3 million heroin users in Europe and 8 million users in Pakistan. Pakis-Afghan border is 2000 K.M. long. The Northern territories reach up to China. Every year, the government of Pakistan loses \$2.6 billion of revenue for the smuggling of essential goods. Smuggling is extremely lucrative and flexible. Afghanistan produces 90% of the global supply of opium. Heroin is processed from opium. Approximately, 40 % of Afghan opium has been smuggled through the Pak-Afghan border. The opium trade is the key source of funding for the jihad led by the Al Qaida and Taliban. The government of Pakistan is well aware of “narco-jihad”.²⁷ The narco trade is running through the golden route from Afghanistan through Pakistan and into Iran.

e. A very common method of terror financing in Pakistan is donations to charitable organizations. In the name of donations, the funds are to transferring to militant groups. Many communities donate to organizations that they know are fronts for terrorists either through fear of reprisals for not contributing or because that group has influence in the community in the

²⁷ V, F. Brown, *The Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Military Conflict in the Region* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 23-27.



absence of state support for social services or amenities. This support can also be provided by friends and family who sympathize with their cause. This is becoming increasingly common.

Since 1981 the government of Pakistan has been arresting a compulsory contribution for Zakat levy on its citizens. 2.5% of the levy is collected by the government through bank deposits and also through some organizations. The government of Pakistan used to donate the Zakat funds to the entire country through local centers for arranging food, shelters, medicines, or treatment for vulnerable sections of the society. (1) Pakistan is a Sunni majority country. As a part of Sunni Islamic culture, Zakat is an integral part. Nothing wrong with it. But in many cases, citizens used to donate mandatory zakat contributions through Islamic charitable institutions. (2) Zakat levy usually is donated on the first day of Ramadan. Many extremist organizations collect zakat levies and use radical activities. Using the Islamic religious sentiment, the extremist groups used to misuse zakat funds. In Pakistan, some local NGOs are conducting commendable social work. But many organizations are directly associated with terrorist groups. The most wanted Pakistani Terrorist Hafiz Saeed (founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba) has direct connections with these organizations. Similarly, the terrorist group Jihad bi al-Saif has been linked to the charity Tablighis Jamaat. Other radical organizations, such as Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, and Jammāt-ul-Furqan used to raise through charitable organizations. Two other banned terrorist organizations, the Tehrik-i-Taliban terrorist group (TTP) and Al-Qaeda are also used to generate funds in the same way. These terrorist groups have formed new organizations namely Ansar-ul-Umma and Tehreek-e-Ghalba Islam to raise funds.

f. Illegal money transfers through informal value transfer systems (IVTSs) have been a common channel for money laundering in Pakistan. Most people used to transfer money through this channel. Only about 14% of people of Pakistan used to transfer money informal ways. The formal transactions of money are encouraged by a few financial institutions. That is why the black economy has been an integral part of the Pakistani system. For remittance and other foreign transactions, the majority of Pakistanis are remaining to believe in informal financial transactions through *hawala*, *hundi*, and so forth.

g. The unregulated financial structure of Pakistan is responsible for feeding the terrorist groups. Due to the nexus between criminal terrorists and illicit funding agencies, the entire financial system has been corrupted and criminalized. It is very hard to think that neither the State Bank of Pakistan nor the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan has any active



regularity mechanism to control the illegal money transferring process by the terrorist agencies. Even these two prime financial institutions have proper information about the number of transactions.

h. The kidnapping of targeted persons is another source of funding. To generate funding, the extremist groups used to kidnap journalists, aid workers, and rich locals. This is a continual problem. After the kidnapping, threatening calls are made by the kidnapers to the family members of the kidnapped persons and demand a big amount of money. Often the family members are compelled to sell their properties. As per the report of Dawn Newspaper (2018), in October 2018, in Karachi, three kidnapers were arrested by Anti Violent Crime Cell (AVCC). The suspects had a connection with *Gulistan-e-Jauhar* (a terrorist group). After kidnapping a young man, they demanded 10 million US \$. For Pakistan, it is very unfortunate that many people are being kidnapped and suffering from extrajudicial tortures. As an opposition leader, Imran Khan repeatedly pledged to end the practice. But after being the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 2018 he could not fulfill his accountability in stopping.²⁸

i. There are many areas of Pakistan, especially in tribal areas, and bordering areas, where the law and order and order situation is very fragile. Terrorist groups take this opportunity to influence the local communities. The terrorist groups used to pressurize the local businessmen or directly demand to move goods through check posts. In Peshawar, 2015, several businessmen received blackmailed demands from Afghan SIM cards to do the illicit business. Some businessmen failed to pay demands and suffered attacks with grenades.²⁹

j. Robbery and theft by armed groups have increased in Pakistan. Terrorist groups have regularly used robbing banks to raise their funds. If they face any sort of funds crisis, then go to banks and other business houses for robbery. They often hijack costly cars.

k. The extremist groups of Pakistan also generate funds from fake goods and drug trafficking. More than 80% of counterfeit goods are imported from China. In Pakistan, 50% of pharmaceutical products are counterfeit which are coming from China. There is no documentation of these products. The government of Pakistan is losing revenue from imports. Illegal import is run by a nexus of shadow businessmen and terrorist groups.

²⁸ Hannah Ellis Petersen, "Kidnap, torture, murder: the plight of Pakistan's thousands of disappeared" The Guardian (December 14 2020). <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/14/kidnap-torture-the-plight-of-pakistans-thousands-of-disappeared>, accessed on February 3, 2021.

²⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), Training Manual for LEAs: Counter Terrorism Financing, 2019.



1. Through fraud credit cards, some anonymous purchase is done by the IT skilled squads of the terrorist groups. Many terrorist organizations allow generating funds in this way.

m. Human trafficking is another source of terror financing in Pakistan. For the betterment of life, many people are moving to Gulf countries and European countries. There are so many illegal manpower agencies in Pakistan. These agencies used to promise to send people to the desired countries to get better jobs. Illegal agencies often cheat people through false travel arrangements. After taking money from the people they close down their offices. In an interview, Professor Sayed Sikandar Mehdi of the Department of International Relations has said,

“the mushroom growth of illegal travel agencies in different cities of Pakistan made the country jeopardize. There is some terror funding in the illegal manpower agencies. They often cheat on illiterate and poor people. The culture has been developed for the last two decades. This is not only harmful to the Pakistani economy but also social security.” ⁱⁱⁱ

In an interview, Dr. Fouzia Ajmal, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan has said,

“the most stigmatic thing for Pakistan is connections of the government with the terrorist organizations. The economy of the country has been highly affected by the feeding to terrorist groups.” ^{iv}

In a report of the UNODC (2019), it has been mentioned that illicit money transfer in Pakistan by various terrorist groups is a common phenomenon. The terrorist groups of Pakistan have made the country's financial system corrupted. The common channels of the illegal money laundering system in Pakistan are operated by channels, such as (i) changing small bills to large ones (ii) Purchasing costly assets and luxury goods, vehicles (iii) Exchanging currency, and purchase of foreign currency from illegal money exchangers. (iv) Hawala, digital transfers, postal orders, mobile banking apps (Easypaisa, Omni UBL, etc.). (v) gambling at Casinos, (vi) capital investment in the legitimate business by the terrorists. (vi) charities and donations to the illegal madrasas and other religious and social organizations.



8. Baluch Secessionist Movement and Terrorist Connections

In Pakistan, apart from religious terrorism, ethnic-based terrorism is also present. The ethnic identity-based movement has been strongly found in Baluchistan on the issue of development and identity. Due to prolonged deprivation of the rational demands of the Baluch people by the federal government of Pakistan, the Baluch ethnic movement turned into terrorism to some extent. The extremist movement is also supported by external forces. However, many conflicting theories have been advanced regarding ethnic conflicts, which may be broadly categorized into two perspectives—the soft and hard perspectives. In the former view, ethnic groups are inscriptive, firmly bounded entities based on a strong sense of commonality producing considerable loyalty, persisting over time providing larger effective rewards. The groups are also prone to ethno-centralism and the desire to dominate outsiders and liable to conflict behavior based on passion. They also tend to sacrifice for collective welfare.³⁰ The relation of democracy to ethnicity and religiosity is, to say the least, both uncertain and contingent. Our understanding of democracy as politics makes it imperative on our part to appreciate the contingent nature in the South Asian context. In our form of democracy where number matters more than anything else and the opinion of the majority prevails over that of the minority, the numerically dominant ethnic The secessionist tendency is often created due to exclusion of such groups or ethnic minorities.³¹

The choice of identity is often political ethnic groups are concerned not only with material interests but with symbolic interests too.³² Ethnic conflicts constitute the human dimension in conflict architecture. From the perspective of society, some scholars consider the concept of state-society; some scholars consider the concept of state security as harmful to the common interest of the society. Ideologies of the state are unable to concede to group demands; thus, it creates the dilemma of how the state can be effective in tackling the challenges. It also raises the pertinent question as to how the state can be secured when the communities feel

³⁰S.N. Nagewara Raw, “Patterns and trends of ethnic conflicts in South Asia: Security implications”, in *Peace and Cooperative security in South Asia*, ed. V.T Patil and N.K Jha.69. (Delhi: P.R. Books, 1983).

³¹ Samir Kumar Das, “Democracy’s Three Ripples: Reflections on The State of Democracy in India’s Neighbourhood”. *World Focus* 34, no.7 (July 2013): 5.

³² Hamza Alavi, “Class and State”, in *Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State*, ed. Hassan Gardezi and Tamil Rashid, 25-26. (London: Zed Press, London, 1983).



insecure. The politics of nationalism that is state-centric accentuates a drive for more state power in the name of security.

Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi has presented his view from the neo-Marxist argument. He claimed that the ethnic movement for Pakistan was driven not only by religious motives but by the economic and political interests of a salary-dependent class, he maintained, that stood most to gain from Pakistan. After independence this secular-minded salaried class bounded by reference to Muslim ethnicity faced disintegration. Strong regional identities linked to Sindhis, Pashtuns, Muhajir community, and Balochis resurfaced to mount a challenge. To Alavi, their target was the Punjabi salaried class, whose 'hegemonic' powers they opposed, but whose determination not to share power ruined the prospects of common national identity.³³

Some Pakistani scholars argue that the economic factor is responsible for the Baluch insurgency. Here it is a notable point is that while Baluchistan was considered a "neglected province" majority of the population lacks amenities; its ruling elite enjoyed glamorous lifestyles that provided a different perspective. Common Baluch peoples are actually, deprived economically by the Pakistan Federal Government of Pakistan as well as Baluch elites. There are some rational reasons behind the Baloch extremist movement-firstly, the Government of Pakistan neglected the Baluchistan province from the very beginning. The process of industrialization has not occurred properly. Although in recent years Pakistan government introduced a special economic package for stopping the insurgency movement, called *Aghaz-e-Haqoq-e-Baluchistan*, it was vehemently challenged by Baluch nationalist groups. This group's leader argues the benefits of these policies have not accrued to the native Baluch residents of the province. In terms of the rate of literacy, communication, transport system, jobs, and other developmental activities Baluchistan is the most underdeveloped province of Pakistan. Secondly, the movement of the Baloch people has been suppressed by the federal government of Pakistan very brutally. Many Baloch leaders have asserted and many of them have been kidnapped. In 2008, about 1102 Baloch people disappeared. The human rights violation of the Baloch people by the state forces of the federal government resulted in the extremist movement.³⁴ Thirdly, The Baluch community is tribal and socio-economically

³³ Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurst and Company, 2009): 44.

³⁴ Debasish Nandy, "Baloch Insurgency in Pakistan: A History of Deprivation (1947-2013)", *The West Bengal Political Science Review* 15, no.16 (2014):150.



backward. Instead of being uplifted through the governmental policy, the Baluch people have been deprived by the policy of exclusion. In the 1980s, The Baluch movement was supported by the Iraqi Service, and Pakistani Sunni extremist group *Sipah-e-Sahaba* Pakistan and the *Mujahedin-e-kalq*. The Baluchistan movement of Pakistan was supported by the Baluch community in Iran to form a greater Baluch state. Fourthly, the Pakistan government earns a huge amount of revenue from gas fields in Baluchistan. The collected revenues are hardly spent on the development of Baluchistan. These reasons generated discontent among the Baluch people. Sixthly, Since the later part of 2001 thousands of Afghan people entered Baluchistan and most of them are living there for the last 19 years. Due to the illegal infiltration of Afghan people in Baluchistan, a negative impact has been imposed on Baluchistan's socio-political as well as economic sectors. Finally, the government never took a humanitarian outlook to resolve the Baluch demands. Moreover, the government tried to resolve the issue militarily.

8.1. Extremist Acts of Baluch Militants and Funding

In late 2011, the Baluchistan conflict became the issue of dialogue on a new U. S South Asia strategy brought up by some U. S congressmen who said they were frustrated over Pakistan's alleged continued support to the Afghan Taliban which they said led to the continuation of the war in Afghanistan (2001-present). However, in the period from 2003 to 2012, it is estimated that 8000 people were kidnapped by Pakistani security forces in the province. In 2008 alone an estimated 1102 Baluch people disappeared. There have also been reports of torture. The Baluchistan Liberation Army has been accused by Pakistani state agencies of engaging in several domestic violence incidents when the attacks were, however, claimed by another group called *Lashkar-e-Baluchistan*. It has been designated as a terrorist group by the Government of Pakistan. In 2012, Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik stated that Baluch Republican Party chief Brahamdagh Bugti was operating militant training camps in Afghanistan which were dismissed only after Islamabad conveyed its knowledge of these camps to Kabul. Malik said that the camps in Afghanistan were responsible for training up to 5,000 insurgents who were causing unrest in Baluchistan and Bugti had hired three large houses in Kabul.



The government of Pakistan often alleged India as the key sponsor of terrorism in Pakistan over the decades.³⁵ Since the beginning, India is supportive of the Baluchistan movement. TTP was financed, sponsored, and run by the Indian government with its proxies firmly established in Afghanistan and enjoying support from other quarters also. Pakistan's government used to blame the Indian consulates in Pakistan for funding other sub-nationalist groups also. The government of Pakistan claims that to destabilize the situation in Baluchistan, India actively plays a significant role promote some sub nationalist groups in Baluchistan. These groups are funded by India. In 2016, some Baluch leaders came to New Delhi to seek more Indian support for the Baluch movement. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been conducting terrorist attacks in Baluchistan. BLA has been considered a terrorist organization by Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is responsible for attacking numerous civilians and armed forces personnel. BRAS, BRG, and Baluch sub-nationalist groups have been created as separatist organizations from BLA. India is supportive of the Baluchistan movement in Pakistan due to a counter-attack on Pakistan for its continuous militancy in Indian territory. On 2nd January 2016 Pak-sponsored terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked an Indian Airbase, Pathankot (Punjab). On 18th September 2016, a Pak-sponsored terrorist attacked an Army regiment in the Uri Sector of Jammu and Kashmir.³⁶ In February 2019, the Pakistani militant group *Jaish-e-Mohammad* had done the deadliest attack in Kashmir and killed about 50 Indian armies. Pakistan is not only promoting terrorism in India but also in Maldives, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. Considering the regional security India is retaliating against Pakistan.

The Baluchistan movement of Pakistan has been linked with terrorist connections today. It has been supported by the Baloch people of Southern Afghanistan. The Afghan portion of Balochistan is situated in the Chahar Burjak district of Nimruz Province of Pakistan. There is a strong allegation against the state authority of Pakistan that it funds the various militant groups. There is little proof available on the foreign funding for Pakistani militants. Indirectly, substantial amounts of US aid and donor money are being routed through the Pakistani

³⁵ Waquar Ahmed, "Indian state-sponsored Terrorism in Balochistan". The News, November 30, 2020. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/751520-indian-state-sponsored-terrorism-in-balochistan>, accessed on March 10, 2021.

³⁶ Debasish Nandy, "India's Pakistan Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Calculus and Reality", World Focus 40, no.8 (August 2019): 16.



authorities at times. Over the last few years, the FATA of Pakistan has been a sanctuary of the Taliban and A Qaeda. The theory of conspiracy is very much applicable to Pakistan. The US forces are in Afghanistan for the long haul. They are also planning to expand their presence in Pakistan.³⁷ Some Commentators of Pakistan are arguing that the USA is financing some of the Taliban factions.

8.2. Taken Measures to Stop Terror Financing

As per Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, the government of Pakistan has prohibited all kinds of money laundering and charity works by terrorist organizations. But it was not done. On 13th February 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Cooperation Review Group presented a report on the implementation of anti-terrorist acts in Pakistan. After visiting various terrorist-porn sites, FATF has expressed its dissatisfaction regarding the success of Pakistan in restricting terror financing. The US forces had killed Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Mansoor in Pakistan.³⁸ The network between terrorists and the Pakistani administration remains very strong. This study argues that without the willingness of state authority in stopping terror financing it would be very difficult for Pakistan to remove the tag of ‘terrorist state’. The current study also intends to identify the illegal ways of terror financing.

In October 2019, the mutual evaluation report (MER) of Pakistan was published. As per the report, Pakistan has made some progress in applying a risk-based approach to allocating resources and implementing measures to combat key high-risk areas of terror financing. The government of Pakistan is emphasizing stopping cash smuggling. The illegal imports through backchannels are under strong surveillance. Pakistan has formed the National FATF Coordination Committee to follow the guidelines of FATF. At the policy level, the National Task Force meets frequently to organize policy progress and to discuss information.³⁹

The Anti-Money Laundering Act, of 2010 has been a special law to override other laws. But, in practice, there is no active coordination between previous laws and current laws. The

³⁷ Imtiaz Gul, *The Al Qaida Connection: The Taliban and Terror in Pakistan's Tribal Areas* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009):240.

³⁸ ‘US Drone Strike in Pakistan Kills Taliban Leader Mullah Mansoor’. *The Guardian*. 22 May 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/21/us-airstrike-taliban-leader-mullah-akhtar-mansoor>, accessed on 12 January 2021.

³⁹ The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 1st Follow-Up Report Mutual Evaluation of Pakistan September 2020. Sydney South, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/fur/APG-1st-Follow-Up-Report-Pakistan-2020.pdf>, accessed on 10 February 2021.



government of Pakistan has decided to prohibit the illegal transactions of terrorist groups through all banks and financial agencies. The government will keep surveillance on financial institutions, micro-finance institutions, payment system operators, and exchange companies. Pakistan has decided to construct fencing on the volatile Pak-Afghan border.⁴⁰ This border is the free passage for illegal transactions and transits for the terrorists of both countries. The Fencing will be built shortly due to another reason. The government of Afghanistan blames the Pakistani military and ISI for supplying money and arms through the open border. In an interaction, Dr. Asifa Jahangir, a Pakistani scholar has said, “*the Pak-Afghan border should tighten to stop illegal money transaction and illicit business by the extremist groups.*”^v

9. Conclusion and Recommendations

Pakistan is a religious volcano. The revengeful defense policy orientation made Pakistan's socio-political milieu jeopardize. The use of militancy for narrow national interest has been very taxing for Pakistan. Today, the government of Pakistan has lost its control over extremist groups. The way the Pakistan government has given leverage to the terrorist groups is vehemently criticizable. The army and ISI of Pakistan jointly admitted radical forces into the state system. Feeding the criminals is a bit wrong. Pakistan's government has been assisted by international agencies and other donor countries for spending money on developmental activities. Instead of spending money on socio-economic development, the Pakistan government is spending the amount on armaments and militancy. Paul (2014)⁴¹ has rightly pointed out that the warrior state makes its trap from which it cannot easily escape. Pakistani Taliban group effectively established its hegemonic presence in around 30% of Pakistani territory. The Pakistani military cannot remove the Taliban and fight against it. So, Pakistan's state has lost its relative autonomy. The state authority has been formulating numerous rules and regulations against illicit monetary transactions of terrorist organizations, but in practice, it is a very hard task for the government. There are two strong pressures before the government of Pakistan (i) internal pressure from civilians, and (ii) the international community. If Pakistan is failed to restrict and prevent terror financing, then it may be blacklisted for global economic transactions forever. Pakistan is not only Jeopardizing itself but also Afghanistan. In an

⁴⁰ Dhruv Ashok, “Balochistan Crisis and Its Implications in the Region”. *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviewers* 6. no.1(2019): 24-27.

⁴¹ T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (Gurgaon: Random House India, Gurgaon, 2014): 184.



interview, Gulab Mir Rahmani, an Afghan scholar has said, “*During Taliban regime and after the government of Pakistan has been actively assisting the extremist forces of Afghanistan which resulted in socio-political instability in the country.*”^{vi}

In an interview, a notable Tajik Scholar, Dr. Abdugani Mamadazinov has expressed his anxiety about the role of Pakistan in terror financing. He said, “*in the peace process of Afghanistan, the role of Pakistan is very negative. The policy and attitude of Pakistan should have to be changed for greater security interest of the region.*”^{vii}

The Pakistan government should try to control terrorism by ensuring modern education and sensitization programs. The government of Pakistan should keep strong surveillance on illicit money laundering. The border should be restricted for trading. The voice of civilians should be given importance.

All connections with terrorist organizations should be eliminated. The punitive actions against the terrorist leaders and extremist forces are to be immediately implemented after being accused. All financial agencies and banks are to be under tight regulations regarding illegal transactions. The tax system of Pakistan is to be revised.

Notes

- i. Refer to the government website on Zakat for an overview of the programs <http://www.zakat.gop.pk/Programs>.
- ii. Pakistan is one of the countries with the highest share of philanthropic donations in South Asia. Refer to the report by Charities Aid Foundation, <https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications/2015-publications/caf-world-giving-index-2015>.
- iii. An interview of Professor Sayed Sikandar Mehdi was conducted by the author on 14th January 2021 at Multimedia University, Nairobi, Kenya.
- iv. An interview with Dr. Fouzia Ajmal was conducted on 14th January 2021 at Multimedia University, Nairobi, Kenya.
- v. The opinion of Dr. Asifa Jahangir, Visiting Faculty, School of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan has been received through email.
- vi. Dr. Gulab Mir Rahmany is the Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Baghlan University, Afghanistan.
- vii. The interview of Dr. Abdugani Mamadazimov, Associate Professor in the Department of Foreign Area Studies, National University of Tajikistan, Dushanbe was taken on 20th September 2019.

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Emerging Cyber Security Threats: India's Concerns and Options

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Abstract

It has been believed that cyber power, along with conventional aspects such as economic resources and political will, is becoming a key component of national power. According to this logic, the country that can best lead and control cyber power would be more powerful than others. Cyber terrorism has arisen as a new phenomenon in India and investigations about terror attacks revealed the cyber terrorism trials. Furthermore, the reliance of government organizations, businesses, economic operations, and military affairs on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) demands the inclusion of cyber technology in strategic calculations. So, this essay recons to building cyber power capacity may be used as a tool of Indian foreign policy, leveraging the experience and human resources in the area, as well as enhancing local and global cyber cooperation.

Keywords: Cyber Warfare, Cyber Terrorism, India, National Security, Pakistan.

Yeni Siber Güvenlik Tehditleri: Hindistan'ın Endişeleri ve Seçenekleri

Özet

Siber gücün, ekonomik kaynaklar ve siyasi irade gibi geleneksel yönlerle birlikte, ulusal gücün önemli bir bileşeni haline geldiğine inanılmaktadır. Bu yöndeki inanç özellikle son yıllardaki terör saldırılarının niteliğiyle oldukça pekişmiş ve siber güvenliğe verilen önem artmıştır. Bu mantığa göre siber gücü en iyi yönetebilecek ve kontrol edebilecek ülke diğerlerinden daha güçlü olacaktır. Bu kapsamda siber terörizm Hindistan'da yeni bir fenomen olarak ortaya çıkmış ve terör saldırılarına ilişkin soruşturmalar siber terörizmin izlerini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ayrıca, devlet kurumlarının, işletmelerin, ekonomik operasyonların ve askeri işlerin Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojisine (BİT) güvenmesi, siber teknolojinin stratejik hesaplamalara dahil edilmesini gerektirir. Bu nedenle, bu makale, siber güç kapasitesinin oluşturulmasını, bölgedeki deneyim ve insan kaynaklarından yararlanmanın yanı sıra yerel ve küresel siber işbirliğini güçlendirerek Hindistan dış politikasının bir aracı olarak kullanılabilmesi üzerinde duruyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siber Savaş, Siber Terörizm, Hindistan, Ulusal Güvenlik, Pakistan.

1. Introduction

Security is a key aspect in the study of IR. Until recently, security analysis was primarily concerned with state security, considering it as a consequence of the degree of dangers that states confront from other states, as well as the method and efficacy with which governments respond to such threats.¹ However, in the post-Cold War era, researchers changed their attention away from the state-centric definition of security, broadening the concept to encompass

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¹ Mohd Aarif Rather an Kishor Jose. "Human Security: Evolution and Conceptualization." *European Academic Research* 2, no.5 (2014): 6766–6797.



individual security.² National security, under this new view, began to include security issues moving beyond the conventional notion of territorial protection, such as poverty, industrial competitiveness, lack of basic education, environmental challenges, illegal drug & human trafficking, and resource scarcity. Furthermore, as a result of the technological revolution that began with the turn of the century, human lives have changed dramatically, as have the dangers to their lives and national security.

The next era's *realpolitik* is "*cyber-politik*".³ Actors have evolved beyond the traditional notions of state and military power, and they are now challenged or forfeited by cyber power. The influence of Julian Paul Assange, editor in chief of Wikileaks, on political circles throughout the world is only one example of the wide range of players enabled by ICT. Multinational companies (MNCs) and certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly free to act worldwide with little regard for the needs of particular states. The international community also regards the use of nuclear weapons as having the devastating force of conventional weapons, making their deployment on a wide scale nearly unthinkable. In this information era, non-lethal weapons (NLW) in the form of cyber warfare are viewed as more benign yet effective instruments for wielding power.

Indeed, in this technocratic era, national security is confronted with hitherto unknown dangers aimed at destroying a state's infrastructure. It is a fact that technology, more so modernization is critical for economic and social growth in a globalized society, providing an advanced technology-based infrastructure is necessary for societies, businesses, and governments to fulfill their fundamental tasks. But the vast realm of the internet which is beyond surveillance makes it an unsafe environment on several levels.⁴ Cyber threats are developing and multiplying at an alarming rate this decade. They are not just launched by dark web criminals, but also emerge from sources, such as enemy nations and political parties, and may be motivated by reasons other than profit. This latter category may encompass political hacktivism, political instability, cyberespionage, sabotage, and even military activities.⁵

² Barry Buzan. *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era*. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

³ M.K. Sharma. "Cyber Warfare: Implications for India." *In India's National Security Annual review 2011*, ed. Satish Kumar, (Routledge: 2011).

⁴ P. Pillai. 2012. "History of Internet Security."

⁵ Sushma Devi Parmar. "Cybersecurity in India: An Evolving Concern for National Security." *The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security* 1, no.1 (2018).



Human beings are susceptible to difficulties ranging from life danger to troubles at a time when individual privacy is at an elevated risk of violation owing to trojans, viruses, malware, unethical hacking, data outrage, and so on. Confidential information from public and private enterprises, defense forces, security institutions, hospitals, and online or retail shops is exposed to cyber-attacks since it may be exploited for both financial and strategic advantage. As a result of the advancement and complexity of cyber-warfare technologies, there is a growing need to implement security measures to protect individual data and national security.

Thus, Cyber-security may be defined as “*the collection of tools, policies, guidelines, training, actions, security concepts and safeguards, risk management approaches, assurance, and technologies that can be used to secure and protect the cyber environment as well as the organization and user assets.*”⁶ Its goal is to protect information technology, data, computer programs, and networks, as well as to limit unwanted access to information and prevent unintended alteration or destruction. Making the Internet as safe as feasible is increasingly important to government policy in a world where sophisticated communication and technical infrastructure are critical to security and economic progress.⁷ On the other hand, Joseph Migga Kizza characterized cyber security as consisting of three elements: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Traditional criminal behaviors like theft, fraud, forgery, defamation, and mischief, all of which are covered under the Indian Penal Code, might be included in cybercrime. The Information Technology Act of 2000 addresses a variety of new-age offenses that have arisen as a result of the misuse of digital technologies. The Information Technology Act, 2000 (also known as ITA-2000 or the IT Act) is an Indian Parliament Act (No 21 of 2000) that went into effect on October 17, 2000. It is India’s fundamental law governing cybercrime and electronic commerce. In 2008, this act was significantly amended. It enacted Section 66A, which made it illegal to send offensive messages. It also included Section 69, which empowered authorities to intercept, monitor, or decode any information through any computer resource. It also imposed sanctions for child pornography, cyber terrorism, and voyeurism at the same time.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Marco Gercke. *Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries.* (Geneva: ITU Publication, 2009)



Given this context, the paper has focused on four research questions:

- a. How is India vulnerable to this emerging threat of cyber warfare and its concerns over cyber-terrorism?
- b. How does the Sino-Pakistan cyber nexus pose an imminent challenge to Indian security?
- c. Has India benefitted in cyberspace security through cooperation with the US and Russia?
- d. How has the pandemic boosted cyber crimes against India?

1.1. Methodology

The current research was carried out using content analysis and observation techniques. Based on a review of secondary data sources such as books, book chapters, journals, papers, and other pertinent sources related to this research. The key arguments of the study were built using these sources of information.

1.2. Literature Review

Cyber security is a subset of IT security. Unauthorized access, attack, and destruction of digital data on your networks, computers, and devices are all protected by cyber security. Cyber security protects the digital data on your networks, computers, and devices from unauthorized access, attack, and destruction. While IT security protects both physical and digital data, cyber security protects the digital data on your networks, computers, and devices from unauthorized access, attack, and destruction. S W Brenner (2004)⁸ in her article titled “*Cybercrime metrics: old wine, new bottles*”, outlines the first strategy for identifying measures for assessing cybercrime. Despite the fact that defining measurements and scales for cybercrime is exceedingly challenging due to apprehension, scale, and evidence concerns, she proposes a simple taxonomy of harms consisting of three types: individual, systemic, and collective. Chertoff et al. (2015)⁹ discuss the current condition of Internet jurisdiction law, as well as the difficulty of allocating legal authority to a specific forum when a lawsuit crosses many states. They give four different formulations for clearly and fairly establishing the dominant

⁸ Susan W. Brenner. 2014. Cybercrime metrics: old wine, new bottles? Virginia Journal of Law & Technology 9, no.13 (2014): 1-52.

⁹ Michael Chertoff and Paul Rosenzweig. "A Primer on Globally Harmonizing Internet Jurisdiction and Regulations." (2015).



jurisdiction in situations. The citizenship of the offending information, data, or system's subject, the location where the harm happened, the citizenship of the data producer, or the citizenship of the data holder or custodian are all factors under these regulations. By focusing on the victimization aspect of white-collar crimes, Van Slyke et al. (2016)¹⁰ construct a taxonomy of harms for these crimes. According to Ghate and Agarwal (2017)¹¹, cyber security refers to the technology, methods, and practices used to safeguard computers, programs, networks, and data from being hacked, damaged, or accessed without authorization. In public debates, cyber security is sometimes confounded with other ideas such as privacy, information exchange, intelligence collecting, and surveillance. Through its Task Force Report on India's Cyber Security Challenge (2012)¹², the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) presented a detailed review of India's position in the area of cyber security. In a highly scientific approach, this study has detailed the Indian cyber scenario, loopholes, and strategies required to tackle the Internet war (IW) and Cyber War (CW). It has also offered a possible office structure that may be necessary to play a vital role in the event of IW and CW.

2. Conceptualizing Cyber Terrorism

The concept of cyber-terrorism may be traced back to the early 1990s when a fast increase in Internet use and discussion over the developing "information society" prompted many studies on the possible hazards confronting the increasingly networked, high-tech-dependent United States. Psychological, political, and economic pressures have all worked together to instill fear of cyber-terrorism.¹³ Dread of random, violent victimization combines well with skepticism and open fear of computer technology. An unknown threat is believed to be more dangerous than a recognized threat. Although cyber-terrorism may not pose a direct danger of violence, its psychological impact on nervous communities can be just as potent as terrorist explosives. According to former US President Barack Obama, cyber threat is one of the most significant economic and national security threats that a country faces in modern times.

¹⁰Shanna Van Slyke, Michael L. Benson, *The Oxford Handbook of White Collar Crime*. (Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹¹ S. Shweta Ghate And Pragyesh Kumar Agrawal. "A Literature Review on Cyber Security in Indian Context", *Journal of Computer & Information Technology* 8, no.5 (2017): 30-36.

¹² MP-IDSA. (2012). *India's Cyber Security Challenges*. New Delhi. Accessed September 1, 2021. https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_indiacybersecurity.pdf

¹³ Gabriel Weimann. *Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace, 2004). Accessed September 1, 2021. www.usip.org.



The phrase “cyber-terrorism” was coined in the late 1980s by Barry C. Collin. It is a broad word. There have been several roadblocks in developing a clear and uniform definition of the word “cyberterrorism”. First, most of the debate about cyberterrorism has taken place in the popular media, where journalists are more concerned with drama and sensation than with clear operational definitions of new words. Second, while working with computers, it has been very popular to coin new terms simply by adding the words “cyber”, “computer”, or “information” before another word. Thus, a slew of terms—cybercrime, info-war, netwar, cyberterrorism, cyber harassment, virtual warfare, digital terrorism, cyber-tactics, computer warfare, cyberattack, and cyber-break-ins—are employed to describe what some military and political strategists refer to as the “new terrorism” of our times.

Dorothy Denning characterized cyber-terrorism as the fusion of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to unlawful assaults and threats of attacks on computers, networks, and the information stored on them that are carried out to intimidate or compel a government or its people in the pursuit of political or social objectives. Furthermore, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack must result in violence against people or property, or at the very least do enough harm to induce fear. Attacks resulting in death or bodily harm, explosions, or significant economic damage are instances. Depending on the severity of the assault, serious cyberattacks against vital facilities might be considered acts of cyber-terrorism. dreadful attacks.¹⁴ According to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, cyber terrorism is any premeditated, politically motivated attack on information, computer systems, computer programs, and data that results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational organizations or clandestine operatives.¹⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has defined cyber-terrorism as “*A cyberattack using or exploiting computer or communication networks to cause sufficient destruction or disruption to generate fear or to intimidate a society into an ideological goal.*”¹⁶

Multiple web-based techniques and methods are employed to carry out cyber-terrorism. This may include:

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Amaresh Pujari. Cyber Terrorism: World Wide Weaponisation! Tamil Nadu Police Sesquicentennial Anniversary Souvenir, (2017).

¹⁶ Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terror, NATO Science for Peace and Security, (IOS Press; 1st ed., 2008)



a. *Hacking* - Hacking is the term used to describe operations that attempt to infiltrate digital devices such as computers, cellphones, tablets, and even whole networks. These are illegal actions carried out by cybercriminals for financial gain, protest, or information collection (spying). Hacking is encouraged by certain component automation such as packet inhaling storm assault, password crash, and bulwark depletion.¹⁷

b. *Trojans*- A Trojan horse, often known as a Trojan, is a kind of malware that is frequently disguised as genuine software. Cyber-criminals and hackers may use Trojans to obtain access to users' computers. Trojan viruses are classified into several kinds, including Cryxos Trojan, Banker Trojan, Clampi Trojan, DDoS Trojan, FakeAV Trojan, and others.

c. *Computer Worms* - A computer worm is a form of malware that replicates itself and distributes it from computer to computer. A worm can replicate itself without the need for human intervention, and it does not need to be attached to a software application to inflict harm.

d. *E-Mail Spams* - A spam email is an unsolicited and undesired junk email that is sent in mass to a random recipient list. Spam email may be harmful. It may include dangerous URLs capable of infecting your machine with malware. They are the most effective spreaders of web-based viruses and worms. They are also used to disperse distortion, terrors, and insulting content.¹⁸

e. *Denial of Service* - A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack aims to put a system or network to a stop, leaving it inaccessible to its intended users. DoS attacks do this by bombarding the target with traffic or delivering information that causes it to crash. A denial of service, for example, is common in any online-based sales when thousands of individuals are screaming for a discount. They can, however, be malevolent. In this case, an attacker tries to deliberately exhaust the site's resources, preventing legitimate users from accessing it.

3. Vulnerability to Cyber Warfare

Indian policymakers have mostly ignored the problem of cyber-security. India lacks the strong cyber-security mechanisms needed to combat the rising threat of cyber-terrorism, of which India is a major victim. According to Kaushik (2014), India's capacity to combat complex

¹⁷ Saheli Naik. "A Biggest Threat to India – Cyber Terrorism and Crime." *Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science* 27, (2017): 27-30.

¹⁸ Ibid.



malware such as Stuxnet, Flame, and Black Shades is hampered by a lack of comprehensive offensive and defensive cyber-security measures.¹⁹ Furthermore, as compared to other advanced countries, India has much fewer cybersecurity programs and efforts. Many of the important projects planned by the Indian government is far from being actualized. Furthermore, important initiatives such as India's National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIPC) and National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) are yet to be operationalized.²⁰ Furthermore, much to the dismay of many, the National Cyber Security Policy (2013) has failed to yield productive results, as its execution appears to be lacking in a variety of areas, including violation of privacy and individual rights.

Indeed, the Indian government has acknowledged a significant increase in cyberattacks on businesses such as the banking and financial services sectors. For example, while the country ranks 85th in the world in terms of internet access, it ranks 9th in terms of cyberattacks. Surprisingly, almost 1.16 million cyberattacks were recorded in 2020, nearly three times the number reported in 2019 and more than 20 times the number reported in 2016.²¹ An average of 3,137 cyber-security issues were reported every day of the year. According to official data, between September and December, roughly 115,000 cyber-attacks were registered per month. Between January and August of last year, 696,938 cyberattacks were reported, according to police. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has experienced significant growth in cyber security threats in recent years. According to research firms and experts, such assaults are expected to increase in 2021, and they may occur in any industry, including manufacturing, services, education, and healthcare. As a result, to address these critical security challenges, India must develop an efficient cyber-security management plan.

The information technology sector is a key contributor to India's economic growth. TCS, Infosys, WIPRO, and other IT behemoths play critical roles in expanding India's prominence as a major global software developing nation as well as in delivering commercial solutions. This expansion is accompanied by the requirement to create a safer virtual environment by

¹⁹ R.K. Kaushik. "Cyber Security Needs Urgent Attention of Indian Government.", 2014. Accessed September 2, 2021. <http://cybersecurityforindia.blogspot.in/2014/09/cyber-security-needs-urgent-attention.html>.

²⁰ Sushma Devi Parmar. "Cybersecurity in India: An Evolving Concern for National Security." *The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security* 1, no.1 (2018).

²¹ Prashant K. Nanda. "Cyberattacks surged 3-fold to 1.16 mn last year in India." (2021). Mint, March 23. Accessed September 2, 2021. <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/as-tech-adoption-grew-india-faced-11-58-lakh-cyberattacks-in-2020-11616492755651.html>.



instilling trust and prioritizing the security of this sector. For example, today's banking and business sectors are embracing more and more technologies to provide robust and simple customer service, therefore encouraging prospects for development, but they are also becoming increasingly exposed to cyber-attacks, the mitigation of which remains a concern.²²

Critical sectors such as military, banking, energy, telecommunications, transportation, and other public agencies rely significantly on computer networks to transmit data for transactions as well as a source of information and communication.²³ To date, the government has ambitious ambitions to expand e-commerce services, cyber connections, and overall IT use in communications. In this respect Prime Minister Modi's greater emphasis on digitalization and promotion of e-governance is crucial. He observed, "*Digital India... aims to connect all gram panchayats by broadband internet, promote e-governance and transform India into a connected knowledge economy.*"²⁴ One of the major objectives of the program undertaken in 2014 was to bring the 30,000-crore telecom endeavor for offering community wi-fi services through the forthcoming National Optic Fiber Network (NOFN) initiative to fruition. Such initiatives and efforts required strong cyber-security policies to mitigate future threats.

To address the issue of confidential data theft critical to national and strategic security perpetrated by hackers and other nations, various organizations within the purview of the Ministry of Defence have taken on the task of dealing with cybersecurity. For example, the Indian Army established the Cyber Security Establishment (2005) to secure the army's networks at the divisional level and to perform safe cyber-security assessments. According to India's Army officials, Guarding the air, land, and sea is no longer deemed enough because national borders are irrelevant in cyberspace.²⁵ In addition to military assets, well-executed cyber-attacks may cripple a country's power grids, banking, communication, and other networks. Given the importance of cyber-security, the Signals Corps has created a "*center for excellence*" in this field at its training facility, the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering at

²² S. Jain. "Cyber Security: A Sine Qua Non.", (2014), Accessed September 2, 2021. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/cyber-security-a-sine-qua-non/>.

²³ Sushma Devi Parmar. Cybersecurity in India: An Evolving Concern for National Security.

²⁴ ET Bureau. "Government Mulls Digital India Programme to Connect All Villages." *The Economic Times*, 21 August 2014, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-mulls-digital-india-programme-to-connect-all-villages/articleshow/40524106.cms>. Accessed 02 September 2021.

²⁵ Rajat Pandit. "Army gearing up for cyber warfare." *The Times of India*, 7 July 2005, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-gearing-up-for-cyber-warfare/articleshow/1163080.cms>., Accessed 02 September 2021.



Mhow.²⁶ The Ministry of Information and Communication released a draft of the National Cyber-security Policy in 2011, emphasizing critical infrastructure security and protection, development initiatives, and public-private partnerships.²⁷ Under the draft strategy, a proposal to construct the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre was developed the next year under the auspices of the National Security Council.²⁸ Also in May 2012, India's DRDO created an indigenous cyber defense system to protect the safety and security of network sectors.²⁹ Simultaneously, the Technical Intelligence Communication Centre and the National Defence Intelligence Agency formed a collaborative team to enhance government awareness of possible cyber risks.³⁰

India's energy installments have been vulnerable to many cyber-attacks throughout the years. As a result, a major non-conventional threat to India's domestic security has developed. Information about cyberattacks and equipment vulnerabilities in the Indian energy sector is practically non-existent due to poor regulation of information sharing and insufficient organizational capacity to support it. However, based on global cybersecurity patterns, we may assume that the industry is increasingly being targeted by sophisticated assaults, particularly since India has begun to integrate it with modern technology to satisfy expanding energy requirements.³¹ Indeed, with the gradual modernization of India's energy program, the sector has become increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The essential infrastructure that underpins all economic activity in India is entirely dependent on the electricity industry; this sector's reliance on ICT has highlighted several cybersecurity issues. It is believed that 60 percent of all cyberattacks on India's automated power networks occurred between 1994 and 2004.³² Northern India experienced a major blackout on July 30 and 31, 2012, disrupting over 670 million people's regular life and work and causing damage to all services in the region, including

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ DIETY. 2011. Discussion Draft on National Cyber Security Policy. New Delhi: Government of India.

²⁸ Josy Joseph. "India to Add Muscle to Its Cyber Arsenal." *The Times of India*, 11 June 2012.

²⁹ UNIDIR. *The Cyber Index: International Security Trends and Realities*. New York and Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, (2013).

³⁰ Harsimran Singh and Joji Thomas Philip. "Spy Game: India Readies Cyber Army to Hack into Hostile Nations Computer Systems." *The Economic Times*, 06 August 2010, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/spy-game-india-readies-cyber-army-to-hack-into-hostile-nations-computer-systems/articleshow/6258977.cms?from=mdr>., Accessed 02 September 2021.

³¹ Michael Walstrom. *India's Electrical Smart Grid: Institutional and Regulatory Cybersecurity Challenges*. (Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2016).

³² V. Ananda Kumar, Krishan K. Pandey and Devendra Kumar Punia. *Facing the Reality of Cyber-Threats in the Power Sector*. (Bangalore: Wipro Technologies, 2013).



road traffic and railroads.³³ The Times of India reported that in March 2021, *ten* Indian power assets and two Indian ports came under attack from China-linked cyber-hackers Red Echo. The power assets included

*“Delhi State Load Dispatch Centre, DTL Tikri Kalan substation in Delhi, Mumbai Port Trust, Western Regional Load Dispatch Centre (WRLDC) in Maharashtra, NTPC's Kudgi power plant and Southern Regional Load Dispatch Centre (SRLDC) in Karnataka, VO Chidambarnar port in Tamil Nadu, Telangana Load Dispatch Centre, Eastern Regional Load Dispatch Centre in West Bengal and North Eastern Regional Load Dispatch Centre (NERLDC) in Assam.”*³⁴ India's Energy Minister R.K. Singh informed Rajya Sabha, *“Some unsuccessful cyber attempts were reported from various agencies in the recent past. On receipt of such information, immediate measures are taken for isolation and other compliance measures by the respective organization.”*³⁵

The New York Times connected last year's grid collapse in Mumbai to Chinese hacking in a story published earlier this year. On February 12, this year, the National Key Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC), which handles India's cybersecurity activities in critical sectors, issued a warning regarding Red Echo attacking RLDCs and SLDCs.

4. The Threat of Cyber-Terrorism

Cyber terrorism is a subset of traditional terrorism in which the weapons are computer gadgets rather than firearms and ammunition. Both have the same goal in mind - to instill fear. Terrorism's primary goal is to create a ruckus by committing or inciting acts of violence throughout the world. In 1990, the National Security Council predicted that

*“computers might be employed in the future not just to aid crime, but also as the principal tool for a criminal act. A computer is more powerful than a pistol in the hands of a robber. Terrorists may be able to cause more harm with a keyboard than a bomb in the future.”*³⁶

The internet provides terrorists with the following benefits: *first*, simple mapping of the place of the attack; *second*, a larger audience reach; *third*, Anonymity, in other words,

³³ Shuran Liu, Su Guo and Hui Deng. "Analyses and Discussions of the Blackout in Indian Power Grid." *Energy Science and Technology* 6, no.1 (2013): 61-66.

³⁴ Sanjay Dutta. "10 power assets, Mumbai, Tamil Nadu ports came under RedEcho cyberattack." The Times of India, March 2021. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/10-power-assets-mumbai-tamil-nadu-ports-came-under-redecho-cyberattack/articleshow/81337328.cms>, Accessed September 6, 2021.

³⁵ Mint. 2021. "Centre says four load despatch units came under cyberattack." July 22. <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indias-four-regional-load-despatch-centres-faced-cyberattacks-govt-11626856955565.html>, Accessed September 5, 2021.

³⁶ Shiv Raman and Nidhi Sharma. "Cyber Terrorism in India: A Physical Reality or Virtual Myth." *Indian Journal of Law and Human Behavior* 5, no.2 (2019): 133-140. Doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21088/ijlhb.2454.7107.5219.5>.



cyberterrorism is more anonymous than traditional terrorist techniques; *fourth*, easy dissemination of propaganda; and *last*, the quantity and variety of targets are tremendous. Cyber-terrorists may attack the computers and computer networks of governments, people, public utilities, private aircraft, and other entities.

Denning defines information warfare as activities aimed at protecting, exploiting, corrupting, denying, or destroying information or information resources to gain a major advantage, objective, or triumph over an enemy. As a result, it could be argued that cyberterrorism is an act of hacking, blocking, and/or computer contamination to restrict legally authorized persons from accessing computer resources in general, and/or to gain or obtain unauthorized access to any information that is 'restricted information' for state security, foreign relations, etc.³⁷ These are heinous crimes committed with the purpose of endangering India's security, sovereignty, and integrity or instilling fear in the hearts of the people.

Web-based apps are increasingly being used to initiate cyber assaults. Hackers from China, North Korea, and Pakistan and terror outfits target Indian government and commercial sector websites regularly. This tendency is progressively gaining traction as societies become more and more technocratic. In such a case, cyber security rules must be implemented to address these new types of problems. Unfortunately, companies, government and private infrastructure, and institutions in India pay little attention to these problems.

India's Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGI) was subjected to a cyber assault in August 2013. A malware known as 'technical snag' disrupted the functioning of terminal number three. This malicious malware was distributed remotely to breach the airport's security system. The cyber attackers attempted to exploit the security system's flaws. Their strategy was to spread the virus program through boarding gate check-in centers and finally to the operation of CUPPS (Common Use Passengers Processing System), which has a significant impact on "online reservation systems, expected time of departure, and capacity of waiting for the lounge."³⁸ VOIP or Voice Over Internet Protocol has become a new tool for cyber-attacks used by hackers. Coded SMS, fraudulent emails with spam links, fake apps, international untraceable numbers, and gaining access to victims' mobile or other electronic devices through remote

³⁷ Halder Debarati, Information Technology Act and Cyber Terrorism: A Critical Review (August 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1964261> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1964261>

³⁸ Ibid. (same as 31)



access applications (like Any Desk & Team Viewer) are techniques used by these hackers to meet their ends. Cyber terrorists are increasingly employing methods such as DDOS (Distributed Denial of Service), Phishing, Vishing (VOIP Phishing), Buffer Overflow, IP Spoofing, and so on. DDOS is growing as a preferred weapon of offenders among these technologies. Cyber-attacks have expanded in complexity and geographical reach in recent years.³⁹ There has also been a significant increase in the number of attacks. Other factors contributing to the massive increase in cyber-attacks in recent years include the ease with which malicious software is available, terrorist groups' increasing technological skills, and the ever-increasing networking of critical infrastructure in developed and developing countries. Terrorists have the same level of internet competence as US government organizations, according to a report provided to the US Congress by CRS (Congress Research Service). According to the same source, Al-Qaeda has set up web forums for its followers to discuss their computer hacking abilities.

Terrorist organizations employ “*E-Jihad*” to transition from traditional terror methods to technology-based terror techniques. Similarly, the worldwide terrorist group Al-Qaeda used the internet to spread its wicked wings. Similarly, ISIS has altered the “terrorist world” by utilizing “social media”. Terrorists disseminate their propaganda using a variety of channels, including the internet and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. These social media channels make it simple for terrorist propaganda to propagate. Twitter banned over one lakh accounts associated with ISIS in 2016. IS defectors Abu Hajer al-Maghribi and Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi told the reporters of The Washington Post that ISIS has established its media network as the most powerful propaganda engine. Senior media personnel is considered “*emirs*” with the same rank as their military colleagues. They have a direct say in strategy and territorial choices. According to Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi, “*The media people...have the power to encourage those inside to fight and the power to bring more recruits to the Islamic State.*”⁴⁰ Furthermore, following the Paris attacks, it was proven how

³⁹ Amaresh Pujari. Cyber Terrorism: World Wide Weaponisation! Tamil Nadu Police Sesquicentennial Anniversary Souvenir. (2017).

⁴⁰ Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet. "Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State's propaganda machine." The Washington Post, 20 November 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda-machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html, Accessed August 30, 2021.



ISIS commanders utilized videos and messages posted on the internet as propaganda materials not only to terrorize an enemy but also to command a worldwide audience.

Since early 2020, web-based propaganda content targeting Indian interests has been appearing more aggressively. Technical developments have resulted in militant and terror organizations gaining technological literacy. Kashmir, for example, provides an intriguing study of the movements of online and offline terror propaganda. In Kashmir, Internet blockades and ‘downgrades’ from 4G to 2G following the central government’s abrogation of the state in August 2019 have prompted an intriguing question: is slower Internet access across the state a gauge for online propaganda to slow down?⁴¹ According to Kaul and Shah, restricting internet access and slowing surfing speed has neither prevented nor reduced the pace of online propaganda. They argue,

“Extremist propaganda posted by militant groups on Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and other social media sites continues unabated, as malicious actors seek to take advantage of the paucity of credible sources reporting on the ground to spread disinformation and rumors.”⁴²

Voice of Hind, an anti-Islamic State (IS) journal published in India, was followed by editions in Hindi, Bengali, and Urdu. The Hindi output provides an intriguing insight. To begin with, it is not aimed at Kashmir or the typical pro-IS sympathizer instances in India, which have primarily come from middle-class areas where English is widely read and written. The Hindi output is titled “गजवाये हिन्द की तैयारी” or “*Preparing for Wilayat Hind*”.⁴³ It was written in a very basic version of Hindi to appeal to a Muslim readership in India's hinterlands. This may also be viewed as a mirror to Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) outreach in the region, as AQIS propaganda channels were recently combined with Al Qaeda central's authority. For India, AQIS has a separate "hinterland" wing.

The internet arena for terrorist propaganda is now open in India, with few resources explicitly dedicated to research and public policy to address the gaps in these fast-evolving national security problems. Furthermore, a more active push is needed now to bring these

⁴¹ Kabir Taneja. *From 4G to Languages: The Developing Online Jihadist Propaganda Network in India*. (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2020).

⁴² Ayushman Kaul and Khalid Shah. "Indian government's 2G restrictions in Kashmir fail to curb online extremism." DFR Lab. 25 May 2020. <https://medium.com/dfrlab/indian-governments-2g-restrictions-in-kashmir-fail-to-curb-online-extremism-ea7a461f71cd>., Accessed September 11, 2021.

⁴³ Ibid. (same as 36)



problems to the forefront of security debates, particularly in India, which has a considerably busy and chaotic national security environment as well as major capacity constraints.

Mr. Srijit Banerjee, Cyber Expert and Director of Sharktel Infocom Pvt. Ltd mentions that user data from compromised websites are accessible for sale on the ‘Dark web’ or ‘Tor web’⁴⁴. He mentions that Big Basket’s (an online supermarket) client information, including bank account information, was recently stolen and made public on the Dark web. He further claimed that hackers are becoming more cautious about their operations and are targeting areas where individuals are readily persuaded. He uses the examples of Facebook Marketplace and Instagram Ad segments to demonstrate how people may be readily enticed by low-cost high-end items. Users are given the cash-on-delivery option or other similar ways to generate confidence, but when a user clicks the link for purchasing such items, certain malware may be placed in the user's device that can clone the device as a whole and allow the hacker total access to the device. Mr. Banerjee emphasizes that this is becoming a serious risk for consumers since cloned gadgets can be utilized for anti-national actions while the victim is ignorant. He stated that consumers should exercise caution while using mobile or web-based applications. The ISPs are taking the appropriate precautions to prevent such subtleties, but the user has the most responsibility.

In addition, the investigation into the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks revealed the use of satellite phones to carry out cross-border terrorist activities. Terrorists used the “Google Earth” program to track the movements of security agents and social media to locate their targets. Furthermore, they use technology to “*convert aural impulses into data,*” making it difficult for “*Indian defense personnel*” to pinpoint the source of information.⁴⁵ In this scenario, the terrorists employed communication services to help them in carrying out the slaughter rather than to hack or block the protected information. Intercepted texts obtained during the prosecution of the Mumbai attack case would prove that the radicals were communicating only to exercise their freedom of expression. However, when the communication is viewed as a whole, it can be shown that this speech was carried out to undermine India’s peace, security, and sovereignty, and so loses its nature as a protected speech under Art 19A of the Constitution.

⁴⁴ Mr. Srijit Banerjee was interviewed by the author on 26th August 2021.

⁴⁵ Shiv Raman and Nidhi Sharma. "Cyber Terrorism in India: A Physical Reality or Virtual Myth." *Indian Journal of Law and Human Behavior* 5, no.2 (2019.): 133-140. Doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.21088/ijlhb.2454.7107.5219.5>.



Oh, et al. (2010) demonstrated that, in addition to general websites providing information on Mumbai target areas, terrorists had extensively exploited tweets made by ordinary individuals to acquire knowledge about the present state of affairs. The majority of these posts were written in response to individuals being warned about sensitive locations.⁴⁶ From these considerations, it is clear that the current legislation fails to recognize the extent of terrorists' physical communication in cyberspace. This failure has encouraged even more terrorists to use the internet for their goals. Another prominent example is the 2011 Javeri Bazaar bombing in Mumbai.⁴⁷

Criminals now have more options because of technological advancements. Cyberwarfare entails the attack and defense of information and information systems both during armed conflict and in a non-conflict situation. Information technology has risen to prominence as a new class of less-lethal military weapons. These flaws, when exploited by individuals, would target people to instill widespread terror in the hopes of achieving a political goal. In the words of former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, India is on the cusp of a digital age and the widespread use of IT technology. The concern is that not only is it getting simpler to conceal one's identity online, but once virus programs are available on the open market, they may be purchased and reused by hackers anywhere around the globe.

To combat the threat of cyber-terrorism, the Government of India amended the IT Act of 2000 in 2008. Section 66F, which defines and characterizes cyber terrorism, was explicitly added to this law for this reason. In addition, sections 69, 69A, and 69B were adopted. Section 69 discusses the authority to issue directives for the interception, monitoring, or decryption of any information obtained through any computer resource; Section 69A discusses the authority to issue directives for the blocking of public access to any information obtained through any computer resource, and Section 69B discusses the authority to monitor and collect traffic data or information obtained through any computer resource. All of these parts might represent the communicational element of cyber terrorism, which is absent from the definition of cyber terrorism in section 66F. Even though the revised Act in 2008 includes measures to protect

⁴⁶ Onook Oh & Manish Agrawal and H. Raghav Rao. "Information control and terrorism: Tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through twitter." *Information Systems Frontiers* 13, no.1 (2011): 33-43.

⁴⁷ Debarati Halder. "Information Technology Act and Cyber Terrorism: A Critical Review".



personal data, prevent financial fraud, and limit offensive speech, the goal of limiting extremist use of cyber communications was not adequately met.

5. India-Pakistan Cyber Warfare

Pakistani nationalistic programmers and hackers appear to be using the internet to target adversaries, particularly India. Pakistani hackers, like Indian hacktivists, mostly targeted Indian government websites using mutilation techniques. Pakistani hackers, in particular, were eager to counter Indian hacking in the aftermath of events or explicit physical acts in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In November 2008, the Pakistan Cyber Army (PCA) took part for the first time in the mutilation of the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Company. The PCA utilized straightforward methods to deface India's websites. In February 2016, Pakistani Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) started a phishing campaign targeting Indian embassies in Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, dubbed 'Operation Transparent Tribe'. Trend Micro discovered in March 2016 that a similar hacker gang from Pakistan was behind 'Operation C-Major'. On the other side, Indian hackers and ethical programmers are widely known in cyberspace for their activities in support of Indian national interests. Indian hacktivists and active programmers primarily destroyed Pakistani official websites. These programmers also announced covert attacks on Pakistani government websites and airports. These acts have generally been taken in retaliation for the annoyance caused by the Pakistani perpetrators.

According to M. Dunn, the process of securitization has unavoidably resulted in a shift towards the more end of the cyber-threat spectrum and increased discussion of cyber-warfare as the most essential component of cyber-threat. Cyber attackers from India and Pakistan targeted broadly similar items and targets. However, Indian and Pakistani hackers have a proclivity to attack each other's governmental and media websites. When hackers targeted government websites, it reflected that they were doing it for political reasons, indicating that they wanted their actions to be noticed. Pakistani APT targeted primarily Indian military and strategic personnel for the sake of national security covert activities, but they also targeted other political and military substances in South Asia. While India's APT mostly targeted Pakistani business enterprises and government institutions for cyber espionage.

According to a British news agency, in 2014, Pakistani hackers known as Team Madleets attacked 2118 Indian websites, including the Central Bank of India and the website



of Indian actress Poonam Pandey. The team Madleets wrote Pakistan Zindabad on its main page and set the National Anthem as background music. According to a British news agency, an Indian cyber security official claimed that in retaliation, Indian hackers attacked nearly 100 Pakistani websites.⁴⁸ Pakistani hackers conducted a massive cyber-attack on Indian websites in 2018. Border disputes between Pakistan and India have a significant impact on the cyber world. Pakistani hackers and programmers hacked and defaced a significant number of Indian websites, including prominent hosting providers, the Government of Gujarat website, and the official website of the Kerala Government. Pakistani hackers put a message on their home page stating that “*security is an illusion and that Pakistan Zindabad*”.⁴⁹ Among the Indian security establishments, there is a growing suspicion of a Sino-Pak cyber alliance against India.

6. Chinese Cyber Warfare Capabilities & Indian Concerns

China is one of the major Asian countries that employ cyber warfare tactics extensively. China initiated a cyber-warfare program in 1995, and by 1997, they were working on computer viruses to execute tactical operations such as interrupting “*military communications and public broadcasting networks*.”⁵⁰ With the dawn of the new century, Beijing formed a special tactical strategic unit vested with the task to “*wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fire control and guidance systems*.”⁵¹ In 2010, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, announced the establishment of a specialized “Information Protection Base” in charge of information network security.⁵² Beijing’s cyber-warfare units have been extremely active; however, it is sometimes difficult to link operations originating in China to any government agency or individual Netizens. Starting from the late 20th century, there have been reports of cyber-attacks against government websites in Taiwan, the US, and Japan. These assaults have mostly consisted of simple website disruptions and/or server crashes caused by Denial-of-Service (DOS) applications. By 2002, these assaults had evolved into more sophisticated methods of stealing

⁴⁸ News Desk. "Pakistani hackers attacked 2,118 Indian websites." 2014. Pakistan Today.

⁴⁹ Ghulam Mustafa, Zainab Murtaza and Khadija Murtaza. "Cyber Warfare between Pakistan and India: Implications for the Region." *Pakistan Languages and Humanities Review* 4, no.1(2020): 59-71. DOI:10.47205/plhr.2020(4-I)2.5.

⁵⁰ Desmond Ball. "China's Cyber Warfare Capabilities." *Security Challenges* 7, no.2 (2011): 81-103.

⁵¹ Jason Sherman. "Report: China Developing Force to Tackle Information Warfare." *Defense News*, 27 November 2000.

⁵² China Review News.. "The People's Liberation Army's First Force on Strategic Information Support and Protection is Established." 20 July 2010.



sensitive and unclassified information by infecting computer systems with trojan horse viruses disguised as Microsoft Word and PowerPoint presentations.⁵³ From the late 1990s to 2005, the PLA conducted more than 100 military exercises, and a comparable number is likely to have been performed from 2005 to 2010.⁵⁴ Admiral Willard, the former Chief of US Pacific Command, highlighted it in his 2010 report to the US Congress,

“U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated from within [the People’s Republic of China], although most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data, the skills being demonstrated would also apply to wartime computer network attacks.”⁵⁵

The Chinese military and intelligence services make use of the corporate sector, along with state-owned telecommunication carriers like China Telecom Corporation, for the supply of telecommunications and information technology and services. This fear has culminated in the banning of Huawei, a Chinese telecommunication giant with a worldwide presence, from conducting business in the US on the grounds of its alleged links with the Chinese military. According to some accounts, electronic devices manufactured in China are pre-installed with trojan viruses designed to leak sensitive user information. The Chinese army’s cyber-warfare unit has prepared a detailed outline for carrying out IT attacks ranging from network scanning to obtaining passwords and breaking codes, stealing data, information-paralyzing software, information-blocking software, information-deception software & malware, and software for counter-measures. Some of these tactics were used in an IT warfare exercise in the Hubei region in 2000, in which attacks were launched against India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In another such exercise in the Xian province, new techniques of cyber warfare were practiced that included

“planting (dis)information mines; conducting information reconnaissance; changing network data; releasing information bombs; dumping information garbage; releasing clone information; organizing information defense, and establishing network spy stations”.⁵⁶

The PLA cyber warfare specialists created these tactics intending to gain control of India’s, Japan’s, and Taiwan’s communication networks.

⁵³ Weekly Standard. "Outrage in Berlin Over Chinese Cyber Attacks." 31 August 2007.

⁵⁴ Ibid. (Same as 45)

⁵⁵ John T. Bennett. "Chinese Buildup of Cyber, Space Tools Worries U.S." Defense News, 13 January 2010.

⁵⁶ Ibid. (same as 45)



There are numerous instances of Chinese cyber-attacks against its opponents. For instance, Indian communication and network systems have been a victim of Chinese hackers on several occasions. The INSAT 4B communications satellite from India failed in 2010. The communication satellite ran Siemen's software, which was compromised by the Stuxnet virus. It has been suggested that Chinese hackers disabled the Indian satellite for economic gain, as part of a larger statecraft exercise.⁵⁷ According to *Record Future*, a US cybersecurity firm, India's power grid infrastructure is a new target for Chinese hackers. Mumbai was left reeling for hours in October 2020 due to a power outage that interrupted services. According to Recorded Future, the disruption was created by a new alliance of Chinese hackers nicknamed 'Red Echo'.⁵⁸ In 2008, there were accusations that Chinese hackers were frequently attacking the websites and data infrastructure of the National Informatics Centre, the National Security Council, and the Ministry of External Affairs. Cyberattacks increased by more than 200 percent during the Galwan Valley battle between India and China, according to Singapore-based cyber company *Cyfirma*.

Today's conflicts are more technologically centric than they were in the past. In such volatile circumstances, malware serves as weapons, hackers and cybersecurity professionals serve as troops, and the battleground is data. As noted by P.S. Raghavan, India is one of the world's most cyber-targeted countries.⁵⁹ To mitigate this persisting cyber threat emanating from China, India is working on developing technology. In 2019, India established the *Defence Cyber Agency* (DCA). DCA serves two functions. It is entrusted with fighting virtual battles in the cyber domain as well as developing a cyber warfare doctrine.⁶⁰ As Chief of Defense Staff Bipin Rawat observed,

"What we are trying to do is create a system in which we ensure cyber defense. And we have been able to create a cyber agency, which is our agency within the armed forces..."

⁵⁷ Peter J. Brown. "Lost Asian Satellites Send Powerful Signals." *Asia Times Online*, 9 October 2010.

⁵⁸ Prabhjote Gill. "The Chinese cyber threat is real — and India's best defence right now is to keep its outage time limited." *Business Insider India*, 9 April 2021. <https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/news/the-chinese-cyber-threat-is-real-and-indias-best-defence-right-now-is-to-keep-its-outage-time-limited/articleshow/81981886.cms>., Accessed 24 August 2021.

⁵⁹ P.S. Raghavan. "The Evolution of India's National Security Architecture." *Journal of Defence Studies* (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) 13, no.3 (2019): 33-52.

⁶⁰ Sandeep Dhawan. *India-China Cyber Asymmetry: Act Now*. Chanakya Forum, 2021. <https://chanakyaforum.com/india-china-cyber-asymmetry-act-now/>., Accessed 24 August 2021.



Each service also has its cyber agency to ensure that even if we come under a cyber-attack, the downtime and the effect of the cyber-attack does not last long.”⁶¹

Another major concern among the Indian security establishments is the growing market share of Chinese mobile and hardware technology manufacturers in India. India is a leading market for the Chinese mobile industry that offers smartphones at cheaper costs. Chinese tech companies like Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, and Realme no doubt dominate the Indian smartphone market. Also, there is an increasing market dominance of Chinese-made network hardware in India. There are speculations that these devices are capable of stealing data and user information.

In cyber warfare, it is not that hard to predict Chinese strategic design against India. Under the project Optical Fibers, Beijing has constructed an optical fiber transmission line in Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This is the first mainline optical cable to be erected in the TAR, and by connecting it to the already constructed main optical fiber transmission lines of Gansu Province, the linking of Qinghai Province, Tibet, and the coastline areas was accomplished. This would provide China with an edge in fighting a “*local war under the conditions of informatization.*”⁶²

India still has a long way to go in contrast to China’s cyber capabilities. For more than two decades, China has been preparing for the fifth dimension of conflict, whereas India, according to Rawat, is still figuring out what it needs to do. This is reflected in the ranking published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, according to which, India ranked 21st in the National Cyber Power Index and 26th in the Cyber Capability Index.⁶³

7. Recent Trends during the Pandemic

People are accessing social platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and others more frequently during the lockdown, in addition to watching movies and series by subscribing to web channels such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, Hot Star, Zee5, and others, and playing online games by installing various applications. In doing so, we tend to grant these apps access to our personal information stored on our phones, computers, and/or social media accounts to log in

⁶¹ Prabhjote Gill. "The Chinese cyber threat is real — and India’s best defence right now is to keep its outage time limited".

⁶² M.K. Sharma. "Cyber Warfare: Implications for India."

⁶³ Sandeep Dhawan. India-China Cyber Asymmetry: Act Now. Chanakya Forum.



to the services provided by the apps. Users frequently disclose financial information to acquire applications or access internet services. Furthermore, as a result of the government's "*stay home, stay safe*" campaign, people have grown more reliant on various payment gateways to pay utility bills, and premiums, recharge mobile phones, buy medications and vital commodities online, and engage in other similar online activities. All of these actions have created a breeding ground for malware and ransomware attacks.

Because of the COVID-19 and the mandated lockdown, more individuals are trapped at home, with much more hours to spend online each day and increasingly dependent on the Internet to get services that they would typically receive offline. Cybercrime has existed for many years, but the increase in the percentage of the population connected to the Internet and the amount of time spent online, combined with the sense of confinement, anxiety, and fear generated by the lockdown, has provided more opportunities for cybercriminals to exploit the situation and make more money or cause disruption. This tectonic shift in how we live our lives and utilize the Internet has increased web-based crime.

According to a Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) study, from January to March of this year, its products discovered and blocked 52,820,874 local cyber threats in India.⁶⁴ According to data, India is now ranked 27th in the world in terms of the number of web risks detected by businesses in Q1 2020, up from 32nd in Q4 2019. The number of local threats in India in Q1 2020 (52,820,874 threats) demonstrates how frequently people are targeted by malware distributed via portable USB devices, CDs and DVDs, and other methods. According to Lt. Gen. Rajesh Pant, India's National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC), cyber thieves have created hundreds of "fraud portals" connected to the coronavirus. These websites have enticed thousands of Indians who want to help combat coronavirus to make donations. Many of these bogus websites are extremely sophisticated, almost indistinguishable from their legitimate counterparts.

8. Cyber-Cooperation with the US & Russia

Despite India being a late entrant to the cyber-security realm, the Indo-US cyber-security coordination has reached a considerable level that was probably inconceivable a decade

⁶⁴ The Economic Times. "37% increase in cyberattacks in India in Q1 2020: Report." 25 May 2020. <https://ciso.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/37-increase-in-cyberattacks-in-india-in-q1-2020-report/75962696>., Accessed 16 September 2021.



ago. The range of cyber-space issues confronting India and the United States now ranges from national security concerns to the future trajectory of their respective digital economies.⁶⁵ Following the visit of former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to the United States in 2001, the groundwork for cyber-security cooperation was laid. The visit aided in the formation of the India-US Cyber Security Forum, which stressed “*cyber-security, cyber-forensics, and associated research*” and aims to work “*...towards increasing cooperation among law enforcement authorities on both sides in dealing with cyber-crime.*”⁶⁶

This cyber cooperation got pace when the Indo-US strategic dialogue was established in 2010. Building on the foundation established by the bilateral strategic dialogue, New Delhi and Washington signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in 2011 to urge increased collaboration and information exchange on cybersecurity.⁶⁷ The MoU permits the CERTs of the two countries to share cybersecurity intelligence and work on several other operational and technical issues. The fourth session of the India-US Strategic Dialogue focused on collaboration in cyber-security (2013). Both leaders underlined the need of strengthening cyber-security partnerships, particularly through future iterations of the Cyber Security Consultations, the Strategic Cyber Policy Dialogue, and the Information and Communications Technology Working Group.

Both India and the United States realize that conversations about cybersecurity and the digital economy must take place concurrently rather than separately. India's digital economy is undergoing a historic change as increased Internet use, smartphone use, and entrepreneurial innovation continue to offer up new growth opportunities across the country. A sizable portion of the Indian population is firmly engaged in experiencing a digital ecosystem. Cities and metropolises no longer have a monopoly on the usage of mobile phones, social media, e-commerce, digital payments, and e-governance services; in fact, these services and advancements have effectively penetrated India's vast rural populations. In this regard, the

⁶⁵ Samir Saran. "Digital crossroads: Unlocking the potential of India-US cooperation in cyberspace." Orf Issue Briefs and Special Reports (Observer Research Foundation (ORF). 2019. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/digital-crossroads-unlocking-the-potential-of-india-us-cooperation-in-cyberspace-56803/>., Accessed 7 September 2021.

⁶⁶ Rahul Prakash. India-US cyber relations. (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2014).

⁶⁷ Office of the Press Secretary, USA. "United States and India Sign Cybersecurity Agreement." Department of Homeland Security. 19 July 2011. <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/07/19/united-states-and-india-sign-cybersecurity-agreement.>, Accessed September 7, 2021.



United States has emerged as a key player in this ecosystem, with constant investments, technology, and ideas influencing India's digital future.

Despite efforts on both sides to avoid allowing the occasional stumbling block to derail the larger process of greater cyber security cooperation, concerns remain on both sides. The Indian Envoy to the United States, Taranjit Sandhu, says that cyber security is essential for India and the United States' national security, even though both nations have been working technologically for decades. Sandhu stated at the Global Technology Summit,

“Technology is helping us in fighting the pandemic today in more ways than one, from staying connected to making trade and commerce easier through digital platforms to facilitating education and healthcare” however, *“Like any other weapon, it (technology) is prone to misuse too. Therefore, it cannot remain immune from the unpredictability of geopolitics.”*⁶⁸

He sees technology and cooperation as the motor and gasoline in India-US ties. Both nations are complementary in the sphere of ICTs and digital space, and their collaboration is critical to both countries' national security.

For decades throughout the Soviet era, India and Russia maintained strong ties at the highest levels. The insecurity of the post-Soviet years, on the other hand, reverberated across the Indo-Russia relationship as the newly created Russian Federation sought to reconstruct its foreign policy. India and Russia both made efforts to restore their ties. In 1993, India and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and a new era of Military-Technical Cooperation began a year later. India would eventually become a significant buyer of Russian weapons. In 2010, to mark the tenth anniversary of the 'Declaration on Strategic Partnership', the leaders of the two countries highlighted the importance of the partnership.

India and Russia inked a broad cyber-security pact on the eve of the BRICS meeting in Goa. The pact is broad in scope, allowing for collaboration not just in combating cybercrime but also in defense and national security. The agreement not only establishes a high-level conversation on cyber problems but also permits government agencies to begin working together on counter-terrorism operations. The cyber pact also appears to reflect both nations' desire to strengthen bilateral ties. The initial push to sign a cyber-security MoU came from

⁶⁸ Nayanima Basu. "Cybersecurity is critical for national security of India & US, says Indian envoy to US Sandhu." The Print, 14 December 2020.. <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/cybersecurity-is-critical-for-national-security-of-india-us-says-indian-envoy-to-us-sandhu/566765/>., Accessed 7 September 2021.



Moscow, but India moved slowly, especially in light of Russia's aggressive push for greater inter-governmental involvement in internet governance issues at the 2015 BRICS summit in the Ufa and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits. The signing of the US-India cyber framework agreement, on the other hand, left an opportunity for debate because the treaty's basic sections highlighted India's desire for multi-stakeholder participation while keeping a larger government role in security issues. As a result, although ostensibly avoiding allusions to cyber-security, the agreement with Russia is security-heavy, because India interprets the term strictly technically, with no political or economic overtones.

In 2018, Russia and India have confirmed their plans to broaden practical cooperation in cyber security. It was reported, "*.... their intention to expand practical cooperation including the exchange of technological information, to prevent the utilization of IT for criminal, and terrorist purposes.*"⁶⁹ The need for countries to establish norms, standards, and principles of responsible cyber conduct within the UN's role as a coordinator was highlighted by Oleg Khramov, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Ajit Doval, India's National Security Adviser. Recognizing the current threats in the field of information technologies and telecommunications, as well as the common approaches to cybersecurity, India and Russia discussed the possibility of establishing a long-term mechanism for cooperation between the two countries' relevant agencies and authorities within the framework of the 2016 intergovernmental agreement on security. In addition, in the aftermath of a cyber-attack on the Kudankulam nuclear power plant established by global nuclear company Rosatom, India, and Russia have increased their efforts to improve cyber security cooperation in 2019.⁷⁰

9. Policy Recommendations

a. The Ministry of Home Affairs should be the nodal agency for dealing with cyberterrorism. A plethora of measures, ranging from monitoring and surveillance to investigation and punishment, will be required to combat cyberterrorism and cybercrime.

⁶⁹ TASS. "Russia and India confirm readiness to cooperate in cyber security." Russian News Agency, 17 February 2018. <https://tass.com/world/990504>., Accessed 17 September 2021.

⁷⁰ Dipanjan R. Chaudhury. "India, Russia step up cyber security cooperation after attack on Kudankulam." The Economic Times, 13 November 2019. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-russia-step-up-cyber-security-cooperation-after-attack-on-kudankulam/articleshow/72033001.cms?from=mdr>., Accessed 8 September 2021.



Cyberterrorism should be viewed as an extension of the country's overall counterterrorism capabilities.

b. Cyber security education, research, development, and training will be essential components of the national cyber security plan. The government should establish a well-equipped National Cyber Security R&D Centre to conduct cutting-edge cyber security research and development. The DRDO should undertake specialized research for the military forces, while the NTRO should research the country's intelligence services.

c. International collaboration is critical in dealing with cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and risk management in cyberspace. Participation in multilateral talks on internet behavior standards is required. Indian authorities should also engage in regional cyber security forums. It should be encouraged for Indian cyber authorities to collaborate with internationally recognized cyber professional groups.

d. There is a need to establish a Cyber Command and develop offensive capabilities. A pool of trained individuals, such as Cyber TA Battalions, can also be formed to offer "surge capacity" to the country's resources at crucial moments or in the case of conflicts.

e. Procedural rules must be in place to achieve international organizations' and countries' cooperation and coordination in investigating and prosecuting cybercriminals. The government must make appropriate changes to current laws or adopt new legislation, such as a Data Protection/Privacy Act, to prevent the exploitation of personal information by various government entities and to preserve individual privacy.

10. Conclusion

As a result of the above research, we conclude that India must pursue an offensive cyber warfare policy as a way of strategic balance. This conclusion is founded on the core concept that cyber warfare may cause substantial financial and infrastructure destruction while requiring minimal financing, and it is difficult to identify and fight against. Given India's competence in this sector, an aggressive strategy for cyber warfare is a viable option. By acquiring offensive capabilities, India will be able to reduce, if not eliminate, the risks posed by cyber warfare. ASAT, or Anti-Satellite Technology, is viewed as a new danger to space-based assets. In this regard, India's technological and capacity gap may be filled by using cyber warfare skills until it develops such capabilities. The fundamental goal of our national security strategy is to protect



India's sovereignty and integrity. As a result, our weapons are primarily deployed to protect our borders, rather than to expand our dominion over diverse domains such as land, sea, air space, and cyberspace.⁷¹ While this appears to be reasonable, some argue that the best form of defense is the offense. They think that the capacity to eliminate the opponent by a preemptive strike outweighs the need for a defensive plan.

Increased collaboration and coordination across and within nation-states—among the military services, commercial sector, and academia—is also a critical component of cyber security. Academics already play an important role in cyber security, but their efforts are frequently thwarted by companies and governments because they are viewed as a danger rather than an advantage.⁷² This has to change, and the cyber community needs to be more accepting of any study and experimentation that leads to a greater knowledge of cyber vulnerabilities and weaknesses in security systems. The general population is sometimes neglected, yet it may play a vital role in cyber defense. Governments, businesses, and academics would need to exchange data on the most recent assaults, malware signatures, and vulnerabilities.⁷³

India's cyber posturing may be a potent foreign policy instrument. Developed offensive capabilities in cyberspace, unlike traditional military deterrence, do not need to be stored in military formations. India's strength in IT and IT Enabled Services (ITES) might be used to develop cyber deterrent capabilities to obtain an asymmetric edge over a militarily stronger prospective rival. The synthesis of the National Cyber Security Policy (2013) indicates that the national policy sets lofty goals and encompasses a wide range of activities ranging from an institutional structure for an emergency response to indigenous capacity building. However, a deeper look at NCSP-13 and a thorough study of the cyber organization reveal many flaws in addressing our nation's cyber vulnerabilities. The strategy makes references to CERT-IN and the NCIIPC, but the duties and responsibilities of the armed forces, other government agencies, and the business sector are not clearly stated, leaving the country susceptible to cyber assaults. India has long been recognized as the world's information backyard; nevertheless, the

⁷¹ M.K. Sharma, "India's Cyber Warfare Strategy in Next Decade." *Air power* (Centre for Air Power Studies) 8, no.3 (2013): 37-66.

⁷² Jaikumar Vijayan. *Carrier IQ Drops Legal Threat Against Security Researcher*. Computerworld. (2011).

⁷³ Jason Healey. "Cybersecurity Legislation Should Force U.S. Government to Listen Less and Speak More." *The Atlantic*, 15 March 2012.



government's attempts to address cyber security over the previous two decades have been reactive and fragmented.

If India is to remain relevant in today's security climate, it must accept cyberwarfare as one of the most significant elements in the outcome of future battles. Future wars will be increasingly network-centric, allowing for a power shift away from kinetic weapons and toward non-kinetic weaponry. Because of its unique character and function in society, cyberwarfare as a subset of information warfare would have a lion's share in planning and conducting future conflicts all over the world.

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Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

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Abstract

This article analyzes the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War. As the result, it is argued that the Yom Kippur War was considered an intelligence failure by Israelis, and the main reason for the transformation was the motivation to eliminate social trauma and failure. Additionally, contrary to the common view in the literature, the transformation in Israeli military institutions took place in a hybrid manner, both top-down and bottom-up. It also concludes that, given the military, political and strategic conjuncture not only during the war but also before and after, the change in question arising from the failure of the intelligence was various transformation factors. Finally, it was found that the transformation in Israeli intelligence has two stages, individually and structurally, in line with the recommendations of the Agranat Commission established in 1974.

Keywords: Intelligence, Israel, the Yom-Kippur War, MOSSAD, AMAN

Yom Kippur Savaşı Sonrası İsrail Güvenlik Kurumlarının Dönüşümü

Özet

Bu makale, Yom Kippur Savaşı sonrasında İsrail güvenlik kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümü analiz etmektedir. Araştırma sonucunda, Yom Kippur Savaşı'nın İsrail politika yapımcıları ve kamuoyu tarafından bir istihbarat başarısızlığı olarak değerlendirildiği ve yaşanan dönüşümün temel sebebinin sosyal travma ve başarısızlığı giderme motivasyonu olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, literatürdeki yaygın görüşün aksine, İsrail askeri kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümün hem yukarıdan aşağı hem de aşağıdan yukarı olmak üzere karma bir biçimde gerçekleştiği sonucuna varılmıştır. İstihbarat başarısızlığından doğan söz konusu değişimin, sadece savaşın gerçekleştiği tarihler arasında değil öncesi, savaş süreci ve savaş sonrası askeri, siyasi ve stratejik konjunktür göz önüne alındığında farklı dönüşüm faktörlerini kapsayan, hibrit bir şekilde gerçekleştiği değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak, İsrail istihbarat örgütlerinde yaşanan dönüşümün ise 1974 yılında kurulan Agranat Komisyonu'nun önerileri doğrultusunda bireysel ve yapısal olarak iki aşamalı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstihbarat, İsrail, Yom-Kippur Savaşı, MOSSAD, AMAN

1. Introduction

1973 was the year when the disentanglement of the glorious and triumphant Israeli Defense Forces surprisingly began. Fought between Arabs and Israel on October 6, 1973, Yom

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Kippur War marked a vast number of lessons to learn for both intelligence and military communities of the relevant parties.

With the defeats following in succession during the Six-Day War in 1967 when Israel captured the control over the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights and the controversial War of Attrition in 1970, to compensate for the losses, Egypt carried out an unexpected yet conclusive attack, in coordination with Syria, on Yom Kippur –a Jewish day of 1973. The operation shared similarities to Soviet doctrine and policies as a result of Egypt's ties with the USSR at the time, which came with advantages to launching an adapted and authentic doctrine for “liberation”. Following the surprise attack, the “over-the-moon” Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had no more encouragement for hubris and underwent a radical process, the results of which reached the present day and restructured the IDF.

This study aims to unearth the driving factors that led to the IDF's long-term change as well as the lessons derived while reshaping military and intelligence communities. In doing so, it seeks to apply fundamental schools of military change to the 1973 Yom Kippur War and thus, reveals to what extent the IDF was subjected to new input. Further, it also shows how an intelligence failure can be a facilitator of structural change in intelligence communities. We argue that Israeli policymakers perceived Egypt's surprise attack on Israel as an intelligence failure. Therefore, they were compelled to reorganize the Israel Defense Forces and intelligence organizations to improve the analytical and organizational capacity of Israeli security organizations and to prevent other surprise attacks in the future. The changes stand for graduality and cannot be confined to the days when the war erupted and was waged. The aftershocks damaged IDF's prestige and the need for reinvigoration accelerated the process of learning. Just as the Agranat Commission's finding that there was a lack of communication and consenting between military and politicians also reveals¹, the IDF's default of appearance at the right time first cracked the shells of tactical plans and then a tactical adaptation followed. The material inadequacy was compensated by the US and the aid was not just one time: it resulted in a long-time convergence of both armies. As the war ended, the IDF also incorporated operational, strategic, and organizational changes, all of which created a stronger army in the years following the war.

¹ Uri Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973 intelligence failure.", *Israel Affairs* 6, no.1, (1999): 17.



2. Literature Review

To understand the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War, it is vital to explore, at least, two kinds of literature: literature on military change and change in intelligence organizations. Hence, we first survey the fundamental schools of military change to explore whether the transformation that took place within the Israeli army was bottom-up or top-down. Then, we examine the literature on change in intelligence organizations to analyze the transformation of Israeli intelligence organizations thoroughly.

2.1. Fundamental Schools of Military Change

The literature on military change is dispersed around the debates regarding whether it comes top-down or vice versa. The generally-accepted factors are grounded on international order, military organization, and civilian intervention. In recent years, unit-level developments have also been converted into military innovations as militaries have tended to derive lessons from their mistakes while engaging in conflicts and rapidly adapting to the circumstances.

Searching for innovation within a military organization first sparked off with *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* by Barry Posen and his probe into military doctrine through organization theory and the theory of balance of power. In nature, organizations wish *mise en place* and do not favor any outsiders in order not to risk survival in such an insecure international environment and maximize military superiority, thereby preferring more enterprising military doctrines.² Doctrines shall meet the expectations of a grand strategy that is stipulated by civilian policymakers. Indeed, military innovation is ensured by the coherence between civilians and military –with the intervention of whom Barry Posen calls ‘mavericks’- and such coherence yields a preventive doctrine against uncertainties, especially during wartime.³

According to Stephen Peter Rosen, in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, not just the point of view of a military organization towards innovating but also being in the state of inner conflict, by all manner of means, has a bearing on innovation. A military force and units or branches affiliated with the force engage in rivalry even under the same roof and regulations and changes may be underway as either the participation of new

² Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 40.

³ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, 52-53.



concepts or the establishment of new units.⁴ The innovation in question must receive approval from senior ranks, the assistance of whom removes the blockage and clear the way for promotion of younger officers as innovation may span over a long period like the assigned class.⁵

Constructed upon and by people, each military puts a premium on its traditions and culture, all of which directly relate to the acceptance of innovations. The traits of a military organization can be deemed essential for validating innovation. Supportive of paying a great deal of attention to military organizational culture, Elizabeth Kier discusses that military organization unifies the sheer number of views atop its doctrine that is adjusted according to the domestic issues and all these views echo across the organization, choosing what sort of doctrine will be sustained rather than leaving it to its fate.⁶ Kimberly Zisk also finds that the stubbornness of military organizations against innovation and the requirement of civilian intervention is not to be in the combination all the time, if there ever appears a need for innovation, all rivers will fall into the sea of it.⁷ Organizations do not make decisions based on a set of specified rules but the general perspective of the organization is determined by the way that military decision-makers perceive threats by prioritizing those against the organization- and getting prepared to counter them.⁸ Testing institutional theory to make conclusions about military innovation, Avant finds out that political leaders do not leave the circle of political opportunities and act in a restricted way to seize those.⁹ Their choices are generally proportional to military goals and this is a bi-directional relation always affecting each other within the same range as civilian leaders 'delegate' their power to military institutions and both establish a mutual ground on which grand plans are based for the sake of a country, which means that civilian intervention is neither compulsory nor optional due to the diversity of reasons for comprehending politics for each state and doctrines.¹⁰

⁴ Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7.

⁵ Rosen, *Winning the next War*, 58.

⁶ Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars.", *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 67-68.

⁷ Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991*. (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1993), 4.

⁸ Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy*, 27.

⁹ Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 5.

¹⁰ Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, 138.



Following the harshness of doctrine-focused explanations of how militaries change, cultural trends were expanded to identify, and indeed, this put the revelation that bottom-up changes may as well kick-off change and eliminated the strict view that change takes place from bottom to top. Analyzing how culture shapes innovation and does not conflict with the previous and hierarchical ideas for innovation, Farrell and Terriff posit that innovation is far more complicated and should not be molded into absolute criteria and change will not come to fruition unless it, as hoped, contributes to the overall aims of a state. As a consequence, change is multidimensional and inclusive of both top-down and bottom-up shifts.¹¹ In other words, the strategic situation on which states are inevitably dependent, along with a variety of factors such as technology, culture, and politics, can be a reason for innovation as well as possibly cause otherwise.¹² Innovation is one of the steps of an overall combination: the others being adaptation and emulation. When combined, they can ignite a change. Innovation is far closer to developing while adaptation is not developing but enhancing. On the other hand, emulation is the leveraging of another country's innovation or system.¹³

Dominated by the approval that innovation occurs “top-down”, scholars on military change have also observed a reverse-commute change, “bottom-up”. The debut of precision-guided weapons for casualty aversion, which has come with the Revolution in Military Affairs, shrank the size of weapons and thus, units which are now more dispersed and, particularly, within sight as forces have combined their capabilities and specializations due to the irregularity and complexity of modern warfare.¹⁴ Explanatory though the RMA is for technology-based innovations, it still lacks the ideal that the RMA has the desired extent of content to encompass other sociological, political, or technological aspects and is criticized for not being as comprehensive as top-down approaches.¹⁵ Today, technology is one of the determinants in scaling up changes; however, the exaggeration of technology does not make the underlying findings into account and remains a constraint.

With a vast number of cases each of which has a particular type of innovation, the

¹¹ Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 5.

¹² Farrell and Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change*, 275.

¹³ Farrell and Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change*, 6.

¹⁴ Elinor C. Sloan, “What Is Military Transformation?”, *Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008): 1–15.

¹⁵ Eliot Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs.”, *Military Transformation and Strategy*, (2008): 27–38



debates over how militaries innovate are still ongoing and even there are combined suggestions for analysis. Where the advantage of top-down approaches is that such innovations are easier to elaborate on, the bottom-up approaches are disadvantageous as what happens at the bottom may generally stay at the bottom unless indoctrinated. For that reason, it is crucial to not confine the driving factors to one specific factor and make a thorough examination of the process.

As a milestone in the history of the Israel Defense Forces, Yom Kippur War is self-referential in many aspects and encapsulates two-way change: While the changes also started at the bottom, there was quite an evidence that the deficiencies and incapacities at the bottom level, to a great extent, initiated a form of change and enabled IDF to revise its disunity from the echelon. For that reason, this study claims that despite the general perspective of seeking changes as a process developing top-down and defining them within a limited duration, IDF's changes can be traced back to the pre-1973 era and it is the following dynamism with its two-way developments that created the cornerstones of the IDF.

2.2. Change in Intelligence Organizations

There is no robust literature specifically focusing on change in intelligence organizations. Rather, the transformation of intelligence organizations is frequently studied under two kinds of literature. These are organizational and bureaucracy studies and intelligence studies.¹⁶ While research on intelligence studies commonly focuses on historical cases¹⁷, an evaluation of organizational and bureaucracy literature shows that there are two main trends in researching the transformation of intelligence organizations. On the one hand, several studies focus on the organizational merits of intelligence agencies or communities. For instance, Robarge¹⁸, Stimson and Habeck¹⁹, and Lederman²⁰ analyze the organizational strengths and

¹⁶ Ahmet Ateş, "Understanding the Change in Intelligence Organizations: An Institutional Framework", (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Delaware, 2020): 20-21.

¹⁷ For a couple of examples, please see. Kenneth L. Lasoen, "185 years of Belgian security service.", *Journal of Intelligence History* 15, no 2 (2016): 96-118.; Victor Madeira, "No Wishful Thinking Allowed': Secret Service Committee and Intelligence Reform in Great Britain, 1919-23.", *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no 1 (2003): 1-20.; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA.", *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* eds. Loch K. Johnson, (Oxford University Press, UK, 2010): 122-137.

¹⁸ David Robarge, "Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors of Central Intelligence and the CIA.", *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, eds. Loch K. Johnson, (Oxford University Press, UK, 2010): 485-504.

¹⁹ Charles Stimson and Mary Habeck. "Reforming intelligence: A proposal for reorganizing the intelligence community and improving analysis.", The Heritage Foundation, 2016, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/reforming-intelligence-proposal-reorganizing-the-intelligence-community-and> (03/02/2022).

²⁰ Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, "Restructuring the intelligence community" in *The Future of American*



weaknesses of the US intelligence community. Likewise, Lahneman²¹, Maras²², and Marten²³ explore the role of organizational culture(s) in the transformation of intelligence agencies.

On the other hand, other studies mostly revolve around intelligence failures and reforms that occur afterward. It is important to note that many of these studies were conducted on intelligence failures of Western agencies, particularly the US agencies. For instance, Zegart²⁴ and Garicano, and Posner²⁵ examine 9/11 as an intelligence failure thoroughly. Also, other studies in this literature explore the reform processes after an intelligence failure. The research of Hulnick,²⁶ Matei, Brunei,²⁷ and Matei and Kavar²⁸ highlights the key differences between the reform processes and their effectiveness.

The theoretical standpoint of this article also overlaps with the hybrid military change approach and literature on intelligence failure. In other words, we argue that the transformation of Israeli security organizations is a result of intelligence failure during the Yom Kippur War. However, the military change literature focusing on one specific theory and variant for analysis does not shed enough light on the entire process. In Yom Kippur, the failure does not relate to a typical causality: the failure stemmed from overconfidence and with the failure disclosing the flaws of IDF, the ongoing process ended up involving a two-way street of change flowing from top to bottom and vice versa.

Intelligence, eds. Peter Berkowitz, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2005): 65-102.

²¹ William J. Lahneman, "The need for a new intelligence paradigm.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23, no 2, (2010): 201-225.

²² Marie-Helen Maras, "Overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox: Improving information sharing through change in organizational culture.", *Comparative Strategy* 36, no 3, (2017): 187-197.

²³ Kimberly Marten, "The 'KGB State' and Russian Political and Foreign Policy Culture.", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 30, no 2, (2017): 131-151.

²⁴ Amy B. Zegart, "September 11 and the adaptation failure of US intelligence agencies.", *International Security* 29, no 4 (2005): 78-111.; Amy B. Zegart, "An empirical analysis of failed intelligence reforms before September 11.", *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no 1, (2006): 33-60.; Amy B. Zegart, "9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure.", *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no 2, (2007): 165-184.

²⁵ Luis Garicano and Richard A. Posner, "Intelligence failures: An organizational economics perspective.", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no 4, (2005): 151-170.

²⁶ Arthur S. Hulnick, "Does the US Intelligence Community Need a DNI?.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17, no 4, (2004): 710-730.; Arthur S. Hulnick, "US intelligence reform: Problems and prospects.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19, no 2, (2006): 302-315.; Arthur S. Hulnick, "Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?.", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 20, no 4, (2007): 567-582.

²⁷ Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, "Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress.", *Democratization* 18, no 3, (2011): 602-630.

²⁸ Florina Cristiana Matei and Jumana Kavar, "Tunisia's Post-Arab Spring Intelligence Reform.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 33, no 1 (2020): 135-158.



3. Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

Leading up to grand changes within the IDF, the Yom Kippur War must be analyzed, to clarify the gaps and capture the mindset behind the decision made during and after the war, through 1967 experiences and the misperception of “invincibility” framed then to the IDF. In 1967, the IDF engaged in hostilities against an Arab coalition consisting of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The hostilities ended with the victory of Israel due to the success of aerial and tank supremacy for maneuvers as well as outstanding improvements in intelligence subsequently, all the investments from 1967 through 1973 were allocated based on these pillars, which misled to an uppish understanding pendant to how powerful and impassable IDF was. This arrogance also caused a repetitive pattern during the October War and raised several doubts regarding the overall capabilities of the IDF.²⁹

IDF is reported to have previously been aware of the deployments but preferred to remain deaf to them before the joint attack by Egypt and Syria carried out on October 6, 1973, as the IDF was suffocated by superfluous self-sufficiency and supremacy in every aspect, the most prominent of which could be observed in Israel Air Forces since IAF proved highly efficient with a proper amount of time for warning during the Six-Day War in 1967 against Egypt-Syria-Jordan. Yet, the detachment of other forces or units as well as this arrogance demonstrated otherwise during the Yom Kippur War.³⁰

The elements that support IDF’s estimate for absolute gain in any conflicts stem from the trust planted in the early warning systems that help detect any kind of threat 48 hours before it occurs and earns the army some time for making preparations,³¹ the discipline which IDF was absent from in 1973 as a result of turning a blind eye to the evidence as plain as day and traces of deployments. Further, the IDF was forced to stay within the limits of a small number of military personnel on active duty and overdependence on reserve forces due to demographic figures, and the doctrine required reserve forces to be called to action when that early warning system was activated.³² The military intelligence organization, AMAN, failed to comprehend

²⁹ William Forkner et. al., *Transformation Déjà Vu? A Comparison of Military Improvements of Israel (1967-1973) and the United States (1990-2002)*, (Norfolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Staff College, 2002), 25.

³⁰ David Rodman, “The Israel Air Force in the 1967 and 1973 Wars: Revisiting the Historical Record.”, *Israel Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2010): 224.

³¹ Moni Chorev, *Surprise Attack: The Case of the Yom-Kippur War*, (Fort Mcnair, Washington, D.C.: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1996), 4.

³² Avi Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War.”, *World Politics* 28, no. 3, (1976): 348.



the extent of imminent danger despite wrong-scheduled warnings and the mobilization could not be provided as desired.³³

The IDF's loss in the October War can be attributed to a series of strategic, operational, and tactical errors. In addition to the erring assessment of intelligence and the unpliant result that no one had the 'guts' to plan any attacks on Israel with new so-called strategic depth and quantitative superiority in particular following the Six-Day War, another failure was because of the false certainty that IAF could vanquish all the attackers at once.

The prewar doctrine of the IDF supported air superiority, ruling out combined arms warfare. CAS was in general discarded as it accommodated a great degree of risk for costs and losses and the weight was on IAF's shoulders since 1967.³⁴ Along with the efficacy of tanks, IAF abode by the doctrine and became the first to counter the attack by the adversaries. Indeed, IAF had been under intense preparations for a possible conflict and devoid of the chance for a preemptive strike for the fear that the only ally, the USA, could reprimand Israel and it could end up being wrong although being right as Moshe Dayan also voiced the concern that Israel would be condemned by the world.³⁵

The beginning of the hostilities without preemptive measures was exacerbated by the shady preferences of positioning: the defensive strikes with an unbalanced proportioning of air forces and armored units to ground forces stirred up the expectations and caused a stalemate and thus, many losses from IDF. Indeed, all that happened resulted from the intelligence failure at the onset of the war.

On the Sinai front, the deployments were delayed or did not even occur to the minds of the decision-makers.³⁶ Indeed, the IDF was caught unprepared by Egyptian air defense systems and anti-tank missiles. Mentored and equipped by the Soviets, Egypt introduced weary tactics to corner IAF to overcome IAF's air superiority and take over anti-aircraft systems.³⁷ A similar mistake was also committed on the Golan front: IDF's already-existing plans and operations in

³³ Shlaim, *Failures in National Intelligence Estimates*, 353.

³⁴ Mark Nowland, "Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt Phase Strategy." (MA Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999): 57.

³⁵ Yaron Druckman, "Morning of Yom Kippur War: Cabinet Rejects Call for Preemptive Strike.", *Ynet News*, June 10, 2010. <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3965041,00.html>. (03/02/2022).

³⁶ Uri Bar-Joseph, "Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? the Sources of Israel's Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.", *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 2 (2008): 519.

³⁷ Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep the Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 22.



case of any imminent Syrian attacks apart from those during the Yom Kippur War were not implemented. Dependence on less experienced ones and the fragile decision mechanisms pre and during the war made it evident that intelligence failure stormed what IDF was to put into action in case of any full-scale engagements.³⁸

Despite the contingencies at the beginning, IDF rapidly adapted to the ongoing clashes and used combined arms tactics, and focused its attention on deploying the necessary units –in delay- and weapons at the spots where urgent intervention was required. Following the defensive, IDF took an offensive position, and to compensate for the losses thus far and on both fronts, the offensive position was settled and IDF counter-attacked both sides. Tanks were not compounded with sufficient aid from artillery or infantry due to the delayed mobilization of reserve forces and while the deployments of armored units along the Sinai line were ensured, logistical setbacks came to light, which would be corrected later on.³⁹ Still, these immediate executions did not prevent the heavy losses inflicted by the repercussions of the decisions.

Throughout and even at the beginning of the war, had more proper coordination been provided among the air, ground, and naval forces –one that allows adequacy for attacks directly supporting each other and following a linear command-, the losses would have been lessened or prevented sooner.⁴⁰

3.1. Changes in the IDF

With all the technological shortfalls, following the war –about whose victory scholars have still been skeptical-, Israel was involved in a great change: the deterrence and thundery look of IDF were destroyed when the October War ended. The call for help by Israel –one that Europe remained silent to – was met by the US airlift in Operation Nickel Grass that helped temporary compensation of losses and conveyed to the world the message of the US's existence.⁴¹

The aid tightened the bounds of the US and Israel and the post-1973 era was abound with military procurements. Further, all these changes had to be aligned with political as well

³⁸ For detailed information please see Eitan Shamir, “Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War: A Reassessment.”, *Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 7 (2021): 1035–52.

³⁹ David Rodman, “Combined Arms Warfare: The Israeli Experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.”, *Defence Studies* 15, no. 2 (2015): 169.

⁴⁰ Rodman, *Combined Arms Warfare*, 174.

⁴¹ Arnon Gutfeld and Clinton R. Zumbrunnen. “From Nickel Grass to Desert Storm: The Transformation of US Intervention Capabilities in the Middle East.”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 49, no. 4 (2013): 626.



as expectations as confined by international order. In the aftermath of the war, the US took Israel under its wings: many initiatives were launched to support and uphold Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the other states. An example of such protection would be that the US, as a token, hastened the delivery of the fighter jets requested by Israel F-14 or F-15 according to the examinations and probe into what Israel may need-. Following the arrival of a delegation of relevant technical and authorized personnel in the US in 1974, the final decision was made on the F-15, costing less and having more pros compared to the F-14.⁴² Israel became the first to acquire F-15 jets, the first one landing in the state in 1976.⁴³ New batches of aircraft were also followed by the introduction of more accurate targeting and intelligence capabilities, communication lines for faster command as well as stand-off weapons for IAF.⁴⁴ All the improvements led to the air superiority against irregular warfare in Lebanon and Palestine, prevailing for many years.

Numerically speaking, Israel also had the biggest share of aid from the US in 1974 and the numbers peaked. The total sum of aid was 492.8 million dollars in 1973 and the same total sum of aid increased almost five times more and rose to 2,621.8 million dollars.⁴⁵ This five-times-higher aid only one year later demonstrates how stronger the ties between the two states grew.

As the victim burdened with the responsibility of protecting Israel first, IAF also underwent some major changes. The air forces of Egypt and Syria were far more influential than IAF could overhaul and to counter them more in the future, dogfighting capabilities were optimized.⁴⁶ In the post-1973 era, IAF added many more US-made aircraft and weapons to its inventory. According to the hearing by Harold Brown at the Congress, then US Secretary of State, with the growth in both new procurements and modernization programs and soldiers at disposal, IDF's growth reached %150 percent only a few years after the defeat when compared to the prewar situation.⁴⁷

⁴² Shlomo Aloni and Chris Davey, *Israeli F-15 Eagle Units in Combat*, (Osprey Publishing, 2006), 12.

⁴³ David R. King, and Donald S. Massey, "History of the F-15 Program: A Silver Anniversary First Flight Remembrance", *Management Faculty Research and Publications*. 49, (1997): 14.

⁴⁴ Kenneth S. Browser, "The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017". *Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*, (2018): 36-37

⁴⁵ Jeremy Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*. *Congressional Research Service*, (2009): 22.

⁴⁶ Avi Jager, "Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces.", *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism* 74, (2021): 10.

⁴⁷ Committee on Foreign Relations, Middle East Arms Sales proposals: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second session. (1978): 20.



As for the armored units, the lack of communication between the armored and ground units caused great damage to the IDF. The disorganized layout of tanks without infantry support during the battle facilitated the defeat on both fronts and sped up the process of producing an indigenous tank: the prototype of Merkava tanks was introduced in 1974.⁴⁸ Another enhancement was the night-vision systems assembled in the tanks.⁴⁹

There were also some organizational changes: Planning Department was reorganized as a Branch of General Staff⁵⁰ –one that also embodied the Strategic Planning Department⁵¹ and began to be commanded by Major General Avraham Tamir, who spearheaded the process.

What makes Israel's innovation unique is that civilians who have even a slight share in innovation are former members of the army. The leaders are members of a military-civilian generation and their views are influential in earning the political and military spheres some credit for achieving goals. With Rabin taking the seat of PM upon Golda Meir's resignation in 1974, Israel prioritized the elimination of grave concerns regarding its existence.⁵² Rabin viewed the US as the sole partner, which explains the aids and enhancements, and until Begin took the power in 1977, IDF had already been both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to ever before. Begin's administration held the belief that this superiority would deem IDF a "deterrent" against as it was in 1967.⁵³

With the 1975 Sinai Agreement II, a buffer zone was formed and the possibilities of any surprise were reduced to an extent that would allow some time for intelligence gathering and evaluation.⁵⁴

As the victim of the war overburdened with the responsibility of protecting Israel first, IAF also underwent some major changes. SAM missiles were countered and posed great risks to IAF to escape. For a while, IAF attempted to preserve air superiority as it did before yet the trajectory of the war turned out to be a fight against SAM missiles and it resulted in a

⁴⁸ Anthony Tucker-Jones, *Armoured Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflicts: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives*, (South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2013): 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 87.

⁵⁰ Martin van Creveld, "Two Years after: The Israel Defence Forces, 1973–75.", *The RUSI Journal* 121, no. 1 (1976): 30.

⁵¹ Assaf Orion and Udi Dekel. The Planning Directorate in "Momentum": "Tnufa" the New IDF Multi-Year Plan, (March 5, 2020): 1. <https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/no.-1266.pdf>. (03/02/2022).

⁵² Efraim Inbar, "Yitzhak Rabin and Israel's National Security.", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20, no. 2 (1997): 28.

⁵³ Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96.", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. 1 (1998): 67.

⁵⁴ Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking after 1973.", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6, no. 1 (1983): 42.



momentary adaptation to the new doctrine, which previously did not encompass any training for such a tactical requirement.⁵⁵ In this manner, Tactical Air Command⁵⁶ received the relevant IAF personnel in the US for F-4 training, transferring the knowledge.⁵⁷ Thus, the success of IAF's close air combat maneuvers –dogfighting– was boosted.⁵⁸ Whereas the leap of IAFs following the war through new aircraft procurements from the US cracked the door open for the inventory, the damage to the economy made a hash of periodical modernizations and US aid to Israel, due in part to the fear of harsh criticisms, was supplied as the initiatives for more indigenous products. As an example of this new concept, Lavi (meaning “lion” in Hebrew”) program was launched by Israel Aerospace Industries in cooperation with US aid to be able to produce a true “escapee” with stealth features.⁵⁹

The intelligence failures, deficiencies in close combat maneuvers, unbalanced combined arms, and lack of control as well as other tactical problems of ground forces revealed that the prewar doctrine had to be instantly adapted to the newly emerging threats by Egypt and Syria. Similarly, the obvious trickles of the conceit of the IDF to be the one who used to take the offensive first proved futile when overwhelmed by surprise and the offensive doctrine evolved into reactive defense, requiring more precise weapons. Still, it is not an uncommon assumption that RMA had been “unconsciously” applied, in particular, during the following years after 1973 as the results drawn from the 1973 war unveiled how fragile the armies could be on the battlefield.⁶⁰ Israel lost some soldiers to its adversaries and the purchase of precision-guided weapons and intelligence technologies for accurate information after 1973 –though this trend had no name then– symbolizes in part the seeds of a change towards unconventional issues planted in the mindset of the organization.⁶¹ While the improper working of seniors circumvented the tactical and operational level, it was the on-site personnel who geared up and

⁵⁵ Shmuel L. Gordon, “The Air Force and the Yom Kippur War: New Lessons.”, *Israel Affairs* 6, no. 1 (1999): 226.

⁵⁶ This unit is currently inactive within the USAF.

⁵⁷ History, Tactical Air Command (TAC), July 1973 to July 1974, Vol 1: 121. cited in Joseph S. Doyle, *The Yom Kippur War and the Shaping of the United States Air Force*, (Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, United States, 2016): 50.

⁵⁸ Avi Jager, "The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces", *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 2, (2021): 10.

⁵⁹ Gerald M. Steinberg, “Large-Scale National Projects as Political Symbols: The Case of Israel”, *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 3 (1987): 335.

⁶⁰ Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010): 94.

⁶¹ Raphael D. Marcus, *Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation under Fire*, (Georgetown University Press, 2018): 128.



could reverse the situation.⁶²

To sum up, the literature on military change sought the innovations at the senior level but more recent studies show that bottom-up innovation can be also attributed to Yom Kippur warfare. The IDF's experiences in 1973 and the aftermath are intertwined with each other and must be analyzed with the pre-1973 era. The deceptive image of an invincible IDF during and post-1967 resulted in an "overemphasis" doctrine, negligent in the enhancement of ground forces and reserves. Central to the subsequent changes was a far more proper application of combined arms and more straightforward command to avoid jeopardizing communication skills among the personnel.

3.2. Changes in the Israeli Intelligence Organizations

The Yom Kippur War was an intelligence failure since Israeli intelligence failed to prevent a strategic surprise. Therefore, Israeli intelligence organizations, particularly the AMAN, were fiercely questioned by Israeli policymakers and the public after the war. Further, a national commission namely, the Agranat Commission was established in 1973 to investigate the role of not only the Israeli army but also intelligence organizations in failing to inform policymakers beforehand.⁶³ Also, the Commission published a classified report in 1974.⁶⁴ During the inquiries of the Agranat Commission, it was determined by the committee that even though Israel's leading military agency AMAN had intelligence on Egypt's plan to attack Israel, its analytical branch overlooked this information based on their previous analytical reports on the military capabilities of Egyptian and Syrian armies.⁶⁵ Therefore, it failed to provide a timely warning to policymakers. It should also be noted that AMAN's record of providing timely and accurate analysis was not solid as well. As Bar-Joseph⁶⁶ explains in detail, it failed to provide a prior warning to policymakers in 1955 (Egyptian-Czech arms deal), 1960 (Rotem Crisis), and 1970 (Soviet intervention).⁶⁷

⁶² Murray Williamson, *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011): 303.

⁶³ Uri Bar-Joseph, "Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era", *Israel Affairs* 14, no 1, (2008): 77.; Rami Rom et. al., "The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 31, no 2, (2018): 358-359.

⁶⁴ Rom et. al, *The Yom Kippur War*, 354.

⁶⁵ Uri Bar-Joseph, *Israel's 1973 intelligence failure*, 17.

⁶⁶ Uri Bar-Joseph, *Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era*, 75.

⁶⁷ Shlomo Shpiro, "Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973–1991.", *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no 4, (2015): 494.



After an investigation, the Commission's report highlighted two main flaws in the Israeli intelligence community on personal and organizational levels. First, the Agranat Commission found the top cadre of military intelligence responsible for the intelligence failure and recommended firing Chief of Staff David Elazar.⁶⁸ After this recommendation, Elazar immediately resigned from the IDF.⁶⁹ On the organizational level, on the other hand, the report recommended the inclusion of analytical branches in MOSSAD, the Foreign Office, and local IDF branches to reduce the monopoly of AMAN on intelligence analysis.⁷⁰ Based on the report's recommendations and to prevent strategic surprises in the future analytical branches were founded not only in MOSSAD and the IDF but also in SHABAK until the 1980s.⁷¹

In a nutshell, AMAN's failure to provide timely warning to Israeli policymakers of Egypt's army maneuvers and decision to go to war with Israel and the trauma of the first days of the Yom Kippur War led Israel's policymakers to rethink the efficiency of the Israeli intelligence community. Then, the resources were relocated among the intelligence organizations and new analytical branches were formed to avoid another intelligence failure in the future.

4. Conclusion

With the entire organization being able to seize the opportunities converted from the missed ones, Yom Kippur War is a testament to how revolutionary IDF can be and go to great lengths under extreme circumstances for victory. The stagnant and separate mindset of security organizations and partly presumptuous behaviors of the IDF aggravated the situation when the war broke out. Though the IDF is acknowledged to have won the war, it was the first compelling phase that forced the IDF to change. Yet, unlike what many scholars have for long sought, this change is not to be subsumed under specific variants. It is certain that there were tactical adaptations during the war in the aftermath of which these adaptations turned out to be indoctrinated.

⁶⁸ Rami Rom et. al., "The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun.", 359.; israeled.org. *Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April 1974)*, (2015) <https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1974.4-Agranat-Commission-of-Inquiry-Interim-Report.pdf> (02/02/2022).

⁶⁹ Israel Defense Forces official website, *Lt. Gen. David Elazar*. (2017). <https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/past-chiefs-of-staff/lt-gen-david-elazar-1972-1974/> (02/02/2022).

⁷⁰ Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era.": 72; israeled.org. *Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April 1974)*, (2015) <https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1974.4-Agranat-Commission-of-Inquiry-Interim-Report.pdf> (02/02/2022)

⁷¹ Uri Bar-Joseph, *Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era*, 72.



Another outstanding result of this process was that civilian intervention was evident. With the power delegated to Rabin in 1974 and Begin three years later in 1977, the political view of Israel became more inflexible and was shaped by the new leaders who had also military roots in the past and it was the awareness of these new leaders that solidified the new acquisitions from the US and more investments into indigenous products in the defense industry to counter the existential threat.

The IDF's open culture was a catalyst for rapid adaptation. Such openness helped cloud up the mistakes and facilitated the absorption of changes. What began at the tactical level then spread across operational and strategic levels. The capabilities for combined arms were enhanced through more balanced procurements from the US as well as the increase in the number of reserves and soldiers. The ties between the two states reinforced and, in part, culminated in Israel emulating the USA's type of applying tactics on the battlefield, which may be delved into more deeply in further studies on how the US and Israel have converged due to their unique relations. In other words, the new IDF was a result of civilian intervention by ex-military people who resorted to emulation.

At the organizational level, new branches were established and the efficacy of the forces was augmented through either new leaders appointed as the head of new branches or new investments at the tactical level impacting the organizational level. For instance, the pre-emphasis on IAF and armored units continued after the war ended yet ground forces and logistical support were also involved in the allocations or plans.

The overall intelligence failure originating from the monopolization of intelligence under one organization and stagnancy of communication also prevented one-organization regime and intelligence community from transformed into a more mobile and effective body, the benefits of which can be derived in the further analysis regarding IDF and intelligence organizations' successes in the following wars or conflicts.

In conclusion, IDF's change is a multifaceted one along with both top-down and bottom-up interventions. Remarkably, what the lower echelon started was indoctrinated in the future and thus, scholars do not fail when seeking the seeds of RMA in 1973. The real change is not what happened when the war erupted; in fact, it is a cycle of change encompassing a variety of factors all at once. On the other hand, what the higher echelon ignited was also applied on the battlefield. As such, Agranat Commission exemplifies how the IDF does not hesitate to learn



from its mistakes. When the culture, experiences, openness, and alliance are combined, it can be concluded that the nascent IDF in the post- 1973 era is a complicated achievement of long-term efforts, not just one specific case depending upon specific factors.

To further this complication, more research can be carried out to understand the nature of 1973 and its effects on other wars IDF had to experience new threats. We agree that studying changes originating from specific experiences should be analyzed with a holistic approach that allows the incorporation of the previous findings of military change literature -focused on top-down- and the more recent type of it -focused on bottom-up- to detect organizational, cultural, political, military, tactical or other types of changes which may be borrowed from other fields. If applied, an unlimited detection of changes would lead to preventing stagnancy and arrogance and learning more from mistakes for military organizations due to the hybrid environment of warfare where anything can do a 180-degree turn.

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