İLETİŞİM ve DİPLOMASİ

Communication and Diplomacy

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Editörden

İletişim ve Diplomasi dergimizin Haziran ayında "kamu diplomasisi ve ülke markalama" konusuna odaklanan özel sayısının ardından hazırladığımız genel temalı 8. sayısı da birbirinden değerli makalelerden oluşuyor. Kıymetli bilim insanlarının ve araştırmacıların dergimize gösterdiği ilgiden dolayı büyük bir memnuniyet duyuyoruz.

İletişim ve Diplomasi dergimizin 8. sayısında 2 araştırma ve 2 derleme olmak üzere 4 makale bulunmaktadır. İngilizce makalelere ağırlık verdiğimiz bu sayıda; Özbekistan'daki medya tarihinden Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'ndaki dijital hegemonyaya, ABD-Japonya ilişkilerinden 11 Eylül saldırılarının Amerikan kamu diplomasisine yansımalarına kadar geniş bir perspektifte kritik konular analiz ediliyor.

"Bilateral Japan-US Relationship in the 1980s and the Foundation of the World Semiconductor Council" adlı makalede Elif Sercen Nurcan, Japonya'nın Dünya Yarı İletken Konseyi'nin kurulması önerisine yol açan faktörlerin tarihsel bir analizini sunmaktadır.

"Public Diplomacy of the George W. Bush Administration: 9/11 and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror" adlı çalışmada Emrah Aydemir, 11 Eylül saldırılarının kamu diplomasisine yansımasını, 'Teröre Karşı Savaş' stratejisini ve Bush Doktrini'ni ele almaktadır.

"Digital Hegemony and the Russia-Ukraine War" başlıklı çalışmada İlknur Şebnem Öztemel, ABD merkezli Google veya Starlink gibi teknoloji şirketlerinin Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Makalede ayrıca çok uluslu şirketler ile devletler arasındaki rekabetin artacağına dair öngörüler de bulunmaktadır.

Zakir Avşar, "Özbekistan'da Medya Tarihine Bir Bakış" adlı makalesinde 1991'den günümüze kadar Özbekistan'da medyanın geçirdiği süreçleri ele almış ve Dünya Basın Endeksi verilerinden yararlanmıştır. Sonuç olarak son yıllardaki gelişmeye bağlı olarak Dünya Basın Endeksinde Özbekistan'ın önemli bir ivme yakaladığını vurgulamaktadır.

İletişim ve Diplomasi dergimiz akademik literatüre istikrarlı bir şekilde katkı sağlamaya devam etmektedir. Diğer yandan dergimizin farklı uluslararası indekslerde taranması için gerekli başvuru süreçlerini de titizlikle sürdürüyoruz. İletişim ve Diplomasi dergimizin 8. sayısı için emek veren çalışma arkadaşlarıma, hakemlere ve değerli akademisyenlere teşekkür ediyorum. Dergimizin Aralık 2022'de çıkacak 9. sayısı için de güncel araştırmaları ve kapsamlı derleme makaleleri beklediğimizi ifade etmek istiyorum.

Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Altun
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanı

From the Editor

The 8th issue of the Communication and Diplomacy journal, which we have prepared following the special issue focusing on "public diplomacy and country branding" in June, consists of noteworthy articles. We are very pleased with the interest shown by esteemed scientists and researchers in our journal.

In the 8th issue of Communication and Diplomacy Journal, there are four articles, two research and two reviews. In this issue, which focuses on articles in English, critical topics varying from media history in Uzbekistan to the digital hegemony in the Russia-Ukraine War, from the US-Japan relations to the reflections of the September 11 attacks on the American public diplomacy are examined in a variety of angles.

In the article titled "Bilateral Japan-US Relationship in the 1980s and the Foundation of the World Semiconductor Council", Elif Sercen Nurcan provides a historical analysis of the factors that led to Japan's proposal for the establishment of the World Semiconductor Council.

In the study titled "Public Diplomacy of the George W. Bush Administration: 9/11 and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror", Emrah Aydemir examines the impact of the September 11 attacks on public diplomacy, the "War Against Terror" strategy and the Bush Doctrine.

İlknur Şebnem Öztemel examines the impact of US-based technology companies like Google and Starlink on the Russia-Ukraine War in her research titled "Digital Hegemony and the Russia-Ukraine War". According to the article, competition between multinational companies and states is expected to rise.

Zakir Avşar, in his article "An Overview of Media History in Uzbekistan", discussed the processes of the media in Uzbekistan from 1991 to the present and benefited from the data of the World Press Index. As a result, it highlights the fact that Uzbekistan has gained significant momentum in the World Press Index because of recent developments.

Our Journal of Communication and Diplomacy is a continuous contributor to academic literature. On the other hand, we meticulously continue the application processes for the screening of our journal in different international indexes. I would like to thank my colleagues, referees, and valuable academics for their efforts for the 8th issue of our Journal of Communication and Diplomacy. I would like to express that we expect up-to-date research and comprehensive review articles for the 9th issue of our journal, which will be published in December 2022.

Prof. Fahrettin Altun
Presidency's Director of Communications Republic of Türkiye

Bilateral Japan-US Relationship in the 1980s and the Foundation of the World Semiconductor Council[1]

1980'lerde Japonya-ABD İlişkisi ve Dünya Yarı İletken Konseyinin Kuruluşu

Elif Sercen NURCAN[2]

ABSTRACT

Integrated circuits (ICs or microchips) are indispensable for high-tech consumer electronics such as computers and automobiles. In the history of IC manufacturing, the 1980s featured rapid improvement and spreading of the chip manufacturing technology around the globe. This led the United States manufacturers, which had been the incumbent leaders so far, to face new rivals, especially from Japan. By the mid-1980s, Japanese manufacturers effectively captured both the US and the world market. In reaction, the US manufacturers filed complaints to the Office of the US Trade Representative for an official protection initiative. Under the threat of being cut out of the US market, the largest electronics market at the time, the Japanese government agreed to sign the 1986 Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement, with significant demands placed on its industry. The agreement was renewed once in 1991, and by 1996, the expectation on the US side was another renewal. Instead, Japan proposed founding the World Semiconductor Council (WSC). This major framework change from a bilateral trade agreement between governments to a multilateral forum of private sector representatives begets

the question of "why." This paper presents a historical analysis of the factors that led to the Japanese proposal for the foundation of the WSC. In this analysis, explanation factors are divided into international and domestic factors from the viewpoint of Japan. It is concluded that the effect of the US diplomatic advantage in the 1986 agreement and Japan's own domestic, political, and economic transformation culminated in the WSC proposal.

Keywords: semiconductors, Japan-US relations, Japanese politics, international trade, trade agreements

ÖZ

Entegre devreler (IC'ler veya mikroçipler), bilgisayar ve otomobil gibi yüksek teknoloji içerikli tüketici elektronik cihazları için vazgeçilmezdir. Mikroçip endüstri tarihinde 1980'ler, çip üretim teknolojisinin dünya çapında hızlı bir şekilde gelişmesine ve yayılmasına sahne olmuştur. O döneme kadar sanayi lideri olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) üreticileri, özellikle Japonya'dan gelen yeni rekabetle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Japon üreticilerinin 1980'lerin ortalarında hem ABD hem de dünya pazarını etkin bir şekilde ele geçirmelerine tepki olarak, ABD'li üreticiler resmi bir koruma girişimi talebiyle ABD Ticaret Temsilciliği Ofisi'ne şikayette bulundular. Dünyanın en büyük elektronik pazarı olan ABD'den men edilme tehdidi altında, Japonya hükümeti 1986 Japonya-ABD Yarı İletken Anlaşması'nı imzalamayı kabul etmiş, Japonya mikroçip endüstrisine ciddi engellemeler getiren bu anlaşma 1991'de yenilenmiştir. 1996 yılına gelinince ABD tarafında beklenti anlaşmanın ikinci kez yenilenmesi doğrultusunda iken Japonya, Dünya Yarı İletken Konseyi'nin (WSC) kurulmasını önermiştir. Hükümetler arasındaki ikili anlaşmadan özel sektör temsilcilerinden oluşan çok taraflı bir foruma giden bu büyük değişiklik, "neden" sorusunu gündeme getirmektedir. Bu makale, Japonya'nın WSC'nin kurulması önerisine yol açan faktörlerin tarihsel bir analizini sunmaktadır. Ele alınan açıklama faktörleri Japonya açısından uluslararası ve yerel faktörler olarak ikiye ayrılmaktadır. 1986 anlaşmasındaki ABD diplomatik üstünlüğünün ve Japonya'nın kendi iç siyasi ekonomik dönüşümünün etkisinin WSC önerisinde etkili olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yarı iletkenler, Japonya-ABD ilişkileri, Japon siyaseti, uluslararası ticaret, ticaret anlaşmaları

Introduction

An integrated circuit (abbreviated as 'IC', also referred to as a 'microchip') is a set of electronic circuits on one small flat piece (also referred to as a 'wafer') of semiconductor material. Most modern electronic devices incorporate ICs, and the evolu-

tion of high-tech electronics has been interlinked with changes in IC manufacturing. Generally, Moore's Law forecasts a doubling of IC capabilities every year (Moore, 1965). However, it was the 1980s which featured particularly major changes in global IC manufacturing. As IC manufacturing technology spread throughout the globe, the incumbent industry leaders in the United States faced new rivals. Japanese IC manufacturers proved to be the gravest threat in this period. The IC industry of Japan rose to global prominence in the 1980s with the commercial success of multiple Japanese manufacturers such as Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, NEC, Matsushita, etc. (Semiconductor History Museum of Japan, 2022). In response to this challenge, US manufacturers applied for official protection from the US government. The negotiations between Japan and the US resulted in a bilateral trade agreement titled the 1986 Japan-US Semiconductor Trade Agreement, which limits Japanese IC manufacturing in exchange for access to the US electronics market. The agreement was renewed in 1991, and by 1996, the expectation on the US side was another renewal. In a surprising move, the Japanese negotiators brought a proposal which would lead to the foundation of the World Semiconductor Council.

This study aims to answer the question of why Japan proposed the multilateral World Semiconductor Council (WSC) in 1996 instead of renewing the 1986 semiconductor agreement framework with the US. The main novelty of the analysis is bringing together external and internal factors from the perspective of Japan to present a holistic explanation of the foundation of WSC, a question in the literature which has remained understudied. The explanatory factors of this study are the diplomatic advantage of the US in 1986, the rise of semiconductor industries in other countries, and the political and economic transition Japan underwent in the 1980s. In the first section, the Japan-US relationship predating the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement is explained. This is followed by a quantitative and historical analysis of the rise of semiconductor industries in other Asian countries and their linkages to Japan. And lastly, the political and economic transition Japan underwent in the late 1980s is discussed, together with its effect on WSC's creation.

Methodology

A mixture of quantitative and qualitative data has been collected and analyzed in this study. The entire body of data has been collected from publicly available resources and the existing literature in English and Japanese. The qualitative data from both English and Japanese literature on the Japan-US relationship, the semiconductor industry in Japan, and the reforms in the Japanese political system are used to build the logical process which led to the foundation of the WSC. The technical terminology and Japanese terms are explained in the footnotes for improved brevity of the text.

Within the scope of this study, quantitative data from both English and Japanese sources have been used to illustrate time-dependent trends. In order to illustrate the change in the shares of the world supply of semiconductors by different countries, data sets from the Semiconductor History Museum of Japan and the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Blue Book have been utilized. Original graphs with trendlines have been created by the author to support relevant points in the discussion. The division between the Japanese private sector and public sector investment in Japanese government-led projects has been supported by summarizing the data given in Scott Callon's Divided Sun (Callon, 1995). The original dataset of the amount of total collected tax in Japan between 1986-1997 by the Ministry of Finance is publicly available in Japanese; therefore, the author has translated the text to create the graph, which illustrates the declining tax revenues in Japan. All the graphs in this study were created in Microsoft Excel software included in the official Microsoft Office 2016 bundle.

The Japan-US Relationship Leading to the 1986 Japan-US Semiconductor Trade Agreement

Yoshida Doctrine[3] has defined the Japan-US relationship in the post-Second War period where "Japan would ally with the West, do the minimum necessary for defense cooperation with the US, and focus on reviving the Japanese economy" (Green & Szechenyi, 2011, p. 332). Thus, economic recovery and development took precedence in Japan. However, this dynamic led to an adverse US reaction when several industries in the US were shortly overtaken by Japanese exports, such as the semiconductor industry. After holding trade negotiations with the US in the 1980s, Japan realized that the asymmetrical power dynamics in its alliance with the US favored its partner. This section lays down the historical account of the changes in the reactions of the US in the context of Japan-US semiconductor trade frictions and explains how these changes led to the multilateralism feature of the WSC.

The Japan-US semiconductor trade disputes initially started in 1959 when the Japanese transistor radios hit the US market. Similarly, the dispute over the DRAM[4] type ICs in the 1980s was due to the market being dominated by Japanese manufacturers. Losing dominance in consumer electronics was seen as undermining US economic and political authority in the Cold War. The qualitative lead of the US over the USSR in firepower was said to depend on semiconductors (Okimoto, 1984, p. 3). Therefore, in

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[3]   Yoshida Doctrine refers to the set of policy guidelines put forth by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who was the longest serving prime minister in post-WWII Japan.

[4]   Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) microchips are typically used for storage of the data or program code that a computer processor needs to function. DRAMs are vital components in personal computers and internet servers.

the US, Japan's capture of the merchant[5] semiconductor market was interpreted as a threat to national security.

After the first Japanese DRAMs arrived in the mid-1970s, US chip manufacturers formed the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) in 1977 to lobby the US government. Lobbying led to an International Trade Commission investigation which found that Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC) held 40% of the 16K DRAM market in the US in 1979. At a related investigation hearing in San Francisco, IBM's Robert Noyce drew comparisons between Middle East oil and Japanese microchips, stating that both were beneficial for the US until total dependence (Flamm & Reiss, 1993, p. 258). Noyce was not the only industry leader who expressed grave concerns (Callon, 1995, p. 166). Publication of various 'Japanese threat' themed works followed shortly; thus, 'Japan, Inc.' discourse took hold in the US. The automobile export disputes in the background did not help this image of Japan in which the state and firms were perceived to be cooperating in a grand collective strategic plan.

As the 'Japan, Inc.' discourse emerged, the US response became aggressive and decisive action via formal channels was launched when the DRAM prices declined severely in 1985[6]. The SIA filed a Section 301 complaint to seek retaliation against Japan's unfair trade practices, joined by two private dumping complaints. If these investigations went ahead, the US would have legitimate grounds to shut its market to Japan. Thus, a formal agreement became the least damaging way out. After year-long negotiations, the STA was officially signed on September 1, 1986.

The Japan-US Relationship Leading to the WSC

Conditions imposed by the STA soon created problems. The complaints from the US manufacturers had been dropped in exchange for foreign companies supplying 20% of the Japanese market, in addition to the Japanese export prices having to follow price floors – foreign market values (FMVs) – set by the US Commerce Department, even when exporting to third countries. The latter point immediately caused the European Community to lodge a complaint to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Altogether, these conditions resulted in severe supply shortages in the tightening semiconductor market in 1988.

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[5]   Merchant market refers to the market where companies sell their microchips to other companies. The reverse situation where the entire production is consumed within the same company is called the captive market.

[6]   At this time, any decline in the price of DRAMs was treated as a result of collective dumping by the Japanese manufacturers. Whether there was collusive behavior among Japanese firms took place or not is out of the scope of this paper.

The nature of the US responses was also informed by the domestic political environment. In 1986, the GDP per capita of Japan had exceeded that of the US. This fact fueled more of the Japan-as-a-threat-frenzy, part of what some scholars call the 'yellow peril politics' (Heale, 2009). The Toshiba submarine incident in 1987 worsened the situation.[7] It was revealed that alongside the Norwegian Kongsberg Vapenfabrik, a Toshiba subsidiary had sold machinery which was used to make USSR submarines harder to detect. In response, members of the US Congress held a photo-op on the Congress lawn in which they hammered a Toshiba cassette player. US Senate passed a bill to ban Toshiba imports for two years which was vetoed (Miller, 1987). The adversarial stance against Japanese microchips became particularly influential in this period, exacerbating the policy response levels.

The peak would come in 1991. During the Gulf War, the focal point was that the US military was going to war against Iraq with equipment containing foreign microchips. There was deep distrust and criticism regarding this dependence. Furthermore, due to the STA conditions, the main structural dynamics of the Japan-US semiconductor trade had remained the same, with Japanese DRAMs still constituting a sizeable threat. In this highly tense environment, the Japanese government was not able to alter the 1986 STA framework, which continued with some minimal alterations. However, the Gulf War ended shortly with a decisive win for the US, and the commotion surrounding the national security concerns started to lose its frenzy. More importantly, when the Cold War officially ended on December 25, 1991, the main driving factor behind the national security concerns disappeared. US government became more preoccupied with rebuilding the international political landscape rather than dealing with the Japanese semiconductor industry.

In addition to the disappearance of the USSR threat, the semiconductor market shares of the US and Japan reversed in 1993, and the US returned to its leadership position in world markets (Makimoto, 2008). As seen in Figure 1, the market performance gap widened in the following years after 1995. After the peak performance of the Japanese firms was left behind and the US firms no longer felt the danger of being overtaken, the US government became more relaxed about direct trade controls. This was paired with the new reality of the post-Cold War world in which there was no substantial backing to national security concerns since no large source of existential threat against the US existed. The response level of the US to the Japanese semiconductors finally leveled off.

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[7]   Toshiba Machinery-Kongsberg incident refers to the export of electric machinery to be used in the USSR submarines between 1974-1985 which violated the rules of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). CoCom controlled the machinery and technology export to the Eastern Bloc. The involvement of Toshiba's subsidiary was revealed in May 1987 which resulted in the resignation of the Toshiba's president and CEO.

Figure 1: Shares of the world supply of semiconductors by the Japanese and the US manufacturers, 1985-1997

Source: (Semiconductor History Museum of Japan, 2022).

The negotiations for the 1986 STA and its renewal took place under conditions where each side acted to protect its national interest. The diplomatic background of the negotiations can be viewed as a demonstration of realist international relations theory which sees the negotiation process as a zero-sum game (Pfetsch, 2007, p. 1). Due to the national security and industrial survival concerns, the US government's reaction was heightened throughout negotiations for the 1986 STA and its continuation in 1991. In turn, asymmetrical power dynamics and the fact that the US was its largest export target market did not allow Japan to ignore the actions or demands of the US; cutting off the major export market would have meant severe damage to the Japanese industries, which were intricately tied together in backward-forward linkages to the semiconductor industry. The downfall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War provided an opening for Japan to further its hand in the next round of negotiations. Japan started to look for a way to balance the power dynamics in its semiconductor trade since it was clearly disadvantageous facing off the US alone in bilateral settings. The solution which benefited Japan was to bring together more players on the table with different dynamics and relations with Japan, in other words, founding a multilateral framework.

The Rise of Other International Markets

This section explains the other external factor which helped push Japanese policymakers towards a multilateral semiconductor consortium framework rather than continuing with a bilateral trade agreement: The rise of other semiconductor markets in the world. The reconsolidation of the European market and the emergence of other Asian semiconductor industries in China, South Korea, and Taiwan drew the Japanese industry's attention and helped the Japanese policymakers find other players to balance out the influence of the US on the trade negotiations.

Figure 2: Shares of the total world billings in the semiconductor market for Europe, Asia Pacific, Japan, and the Americas regions, 1986-1997

Source: (World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Inc., 2022).

Europe had experienced a surge in Japanese semiconductor exports at the same time as the US. However, the relationship between the European and Japanese semiconductor industries was relatively more peaceful. This was partially possible due to the fragmented status of the European market, where Japan had more of an even footing in negotiations. By the early 1990s, the dynamics underlying Japanese-European relations changed as the European Union (EU) unified major European countries under a single market with centralized political representation of economic interests. Since then, Japan sought effective engagement opportunities (Gilson, 2011, p. 352),

and the inclusion of the European Semiconductor Industry Association (ESIA) in the WSC was a move in this direction.

During the Cold War, South Korea and Taiwan were allied with the US, and their defense from the Communist threat was a primary concern. Located very close to these two countries, Japan was a key US ally whose economic recovery followed the norm of developmentalism, as described in the theory of Chalmers Johnson's seminal work MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Johnson, 1982). The colonial history between the three countries carried its fair share of tensions; however, all three were dedicated to economic development and technological catch-up. This common mentality allowed Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese firms to take advantage of the economic opportunities. For example, when the 1986 STA pushed the Japanese semiconductor market to be opened to imports, it had not specified the required origin of the products; the US negotiators had assumed that Japan would naturally import from the US. Instead, mostly South Korean and Taiwanese products entered the Japanese market. These products were the results of long-standing FDI projects and outsourcing, processes which fit the theoretical description of the "flying geese model" of economic growth (Kojima, 2000).

In the case of the inclusion of China in the WSC framework, Japanese business and political interests developed rapidly in the 1990s. On October 23, 1992, Emperor Akihito became the first Japanese emperor to visit China. More steps towards mending the bilateral relations during the Hosokawa administration in 1993-1994 were taken (Hook et al., 2001, pp. 170-171). Having entered a rapid economic development process by keeping up the economic reforms after Deng Xiaoping started them, China was rapidly catching up to the international technological standards. By connecting to the world, the Chinese electronics industry got its start and soon came to perform well in export markets. For Japan, the familiar trend of climbing trade tensions with additional military flavoring between the US and China meant that China could be potentially depended on to balance US hegemony, at least in areas related to trade.

The strengthening of the European market and the rise of Asian markets for the Japanese semiconductor industry in the 1990s meant opportunities for both business and international relations. The semiconductor industry is fast-paced in terms of both know-how and market trends, characterized by an increasingly decentralized trade. Thus, for the Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, building information networks with the newcomers in other countries was an important objective. Furthermore, Japan had to find a way to balance its asymmetrical relationship with the US when it came to trade negotiations. The multilateral WSC framework combined these objectives; in the end, Japan achieved a platform for annual high-level information exchange between major international semiconductor business associations and firms and any initiative towards formally binding agreements featuring more than two countries.

The Internal Factors Leading to the World Semiconductor Council

Unlike bilateral trade agreements, the main participants in the WSC are the major semiconductor business associations. Governments take the backseat; they are involved in the annual information sessions where they hear out the developments in the industry as determined by the business associations. How did Japan, a country famous for state-led economic development and the so-called Japan, Inc. model of government-business relations, come to propose such a framework? The answer lies in the domestic trends of Japan observed in the late 1980s and mid-1990s. This section explains the specific domestic factors and their link to the emergence of the WSC framework.

The spreading of neoliberalism in Japan was a prominent domestic factor which had its roots in the trade frictions between the US and Japan. In most cases, the US demanded structural reform of the Japanese economy in adherence to the principles of a free market and less government involvement. For the private sector, moving towards such principles was beneficial for its growth. Thus, after finding a steadfast ally in Keidanren[8], who expressed commitment to the principal tenets of neoliberalism such as free market, trade liberalization, and financial liberalization openly by 1994 (Keidanren, 1995), it was a matter of time for the neoliberal ideology to find followers among policymakers next.

The spread of the neoliberal doctrine in the Japanese political thought system can be attributed to a type of feedback loop called the "idea trap". An idea trap, as summarized in Wakatabe, features a triangle of an idea, reality, and policy which continuously shape each other via feedback (Wakatabe, 2015, pp. 15-16). Perceptions of reality are affected by ideas; policies are then made to respond to the perceived reality, whose results in return make an impact on reality. The usual start of this loop is a crisis since crises create opportunities for challenging existing institutions by agents who carry an ideology that lends itself to the creation of new institutions and policies. The crisis periods of Japan's economic downturns and governmental instability in the 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of an idea trap shaped by neoliberal thought.

Japanese industrial transformation was considered the result of deliberate public policy (Rothwell, 1986, p. 66). At the forefront, MITI was the main actor; the industrial policy was under its control for decades. MITI's power and influence during the high growth period were well researched in works such as Chalmers Johnson's "MITI and the Japanese Miracle". However, after the mid-1980s, MITI underwent great changes. As the power to grant licenses, set quotas and other authorities that previously held existential influence were taken away from MITI, the nature of the relationship

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[8]   Keidanren is the Japanese abbreviation of Nihon Keizai Dantai Rengōkai (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, JFEO). As the largest business association in Japan, it represents majority of the Japanese private sector.

between the ministry and industries changed. As direct governmental control instruments were being removed, MITI lost its rein on the actions of the companies in the projects. Intercompany hostilities meant that bureaucrats had to provide incentives or find creative methods to build rapport among participants, such as VLSI consortium leader Masato Nebashi's utilization of drinking parties (Callon, 1995, pp. 87-88). Even in cases where MITI relied on the strategy of funding the entire consortium project, as seen in Figure 3, it proved impossible to get competitors like Fujitsu, NEC, and Hitachi to work alongside each other. The goals of projects were often not met as the funds for group laboratories in the projects were, in fact, divided between each firm's research laboratory, and each firm worked on technologies benefitting themselves.

Figure 3: The lack of corporate funding contributions in MITI High-Tech Consortia Projects

Source: (Callon, 1995, p. 152).

MITI's ability to offer fully state-funded projects with large budgets slowly disappeared as the state budget failed to grow. This point is especially relevant in considering the changing nature of the MITI-private sector cooperation. Potential loss of funds after 1991, as can be inferred from the declining tax revenue in Figure 4, meant the loss of the carrot MITI was able to incentivize the companies with earlier. The weakening of state finances is therefore certainly linked to the less-than-stellar per-

formances in government-private sector cooperative projects after the 1980s, such as the Next Generation Computer project.

Figure 4: The total amount of total collected tax in Japan, 1986-1997

Source: (Ministry of Finance National Tax Agency, 2022).

In addition to shrinking general tax revenue, fiscal austerity born during the Nakasone government adversely affected MITI's funding. In 1987, the budget only saw an anemic 0.02% increase, where USD 201.8 billion out of 335.09 billion was earmarked for general spending, which meant no funding for special projects. The final nail in the fiscal coffin came when more funds out of the budget started to be allocated to political parties due to the Political Party Subsidy Law passed in 1994 (Gaunder, 2011, p. 376). Altogether these meant MITI simply could not afford to lead the industry via large technology consortium projects.

Another area where MITI was previously influential was antitrust exemptions. The Antimonopoly Law and associated policies were hibernating until the 1990s (Beeman, 2003, p. 113). Defying the Antimonopoly Law and Fair-Trade Commission as it saw fit, MITI was able to develop plans for structurally depressed industries to receive an antitrust exemption in adjusting their excess capacity (Higashi & Lauer, 1990, p. 166). However, as more foreign factors favorable to opening the Japanese economy mounted and the policymakers caught in the neoliberal idea trap came to value the

benefits of allowing the market forces to shape industries, the environment became more supportive of private sector competition and less of governmental intervention to set up depression cartels to rescue declining industries.

In the early 1990s, the postwar 1955 system[9] ended, bringing uncertainty and a lack of political focus as various groups pushed for their own reformist agenda. The restraints on the institutional redesign, such as the lack of public challenge to policies, and the complacency on the part of policymakers broke down (Cargill & Sakamoto, 2008, pp. 126-127). Reformist leaders swept in one after another; however, their primary focus was on internal political affairs.

Prime Minister Nakasone was at the helm when the 1986 STA was crafted. To understand his role in the process, attention must be paid to his reformist agenda. As a fiscal conservative, he successfully cut government spending in 1984 via the "starve-out" strategy[10]. He then became preoccupied with US trade conflicts. His solution was to turn the export orientation of the Japanese market towards domestic demand. He commended a unified front in his party, as seen in 1985 when the US DRAM dumping complaint caused serious friction; then-chairman of the LDP's Policy Board publicly stepped up to declare the necessity of voluntary export restrictions in automobiles and semiconductors (Flamm & Reiss, 1993, p. 267). Nakasone's reformist agenda extended into the neoliberal ground with his Maekawa Commission Report, which, in 1986, put forth policy recommendations such as deregulation, liberalization and internationalization of the nation's financial markets.

A period of prominent scandal-fueled government changes emerged after Nakasone. Scandals such as the Recruit scandal[11] and Sagawa Express scandal[12] felled successive LDP governments between 1987-1993. The 38-year LDP rule finally croaked under the weight of scandals and ended in August 1993. It took three years for LDP's Ryutarō Hashimoto to take on the prime minister role. Riding the reform wave, Hashimoto pursued six large administrative reforms, one of which targeted the national bureaucracy. Hashimoto followed Nakasone's tried-and-succeeded route by establishing an advisory council named Council on Administrative Reform to set his

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[9]   The 1955 system refers to the period between 1955-1993 when the successive LDP governments were in power. One of the characteristics of the 1955 system was the iron triangle, where the three-legged relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and big business is predominant in policy making and politics (Gaunder, 2011, pp. 372-373).

[10]   A strategy in which fundings for all ministries are frozen, thereby causing subsidies and personnel to be reduced without any complaints of unfairness.

[11]   The Recruit scandal, or also known as Recruit Cosmos scandal, occurred in 1988 when it was revealed that Recruit Cosmos traded stocks for political and bureaucratic favors. 47 MPs of mostly LDP origin resigned, and the PM Takeshita fell from power.

[12]   Trucking company Sagawa Kyūbin made donations to politicians which exceeded the legal amounts in exchange for political influence.

reforms as the main political agenda. As Hashimoto's reforms gained traction and threatened their power base, bureaucrats in the council tried to sabotage the proceedings. Hashimoto's response was to remove them from the council. The problem that stopped Hashimoto rose when a politician with ties to the Lockheed bribery scandal entered his cabinet in September 1997 (Shinoda, 2013, p. 56). Hashimoto's support drained away, and his term ended in 1998. Out of Hashimoto's original agenda, reduction in the number of ministries, reforms in ministerial structures, the establishment of the Cabinet Office, and empowerment of the Cabinet Secretariat, as well as the prime minister, were achieved. However, the process was not completely successful, leaving behind structural continuity issues in areas such as the House of Councilors and local electoral systems (Noble, 2016, p. 186).

The period between 1986-1997 period had politically stable, reformist governments at the beginning and the end. When the 1986 STA was signed, Nakasone was in charge. His reformist agenda, close personal relationship with President Reagan, and commitment to the continuation of the bilateral relationship, as mentioned by Hook et al. (Hook et al., 2001, p. 98), meant that Japan was able to navigate stably on the road to the 1986 STA. The subsequent Japanese governments were not necessarily able to push for improvement of the agreement conditions even when they were of the same party due to intraparty conflicts; thus, the renewal of the STA in 1991 coincided with a lack of political leadership. However, when it came to the negotiations in 1996, a relatively more stable Hashimoto government was at the helm. Since his reform focused on domestic administration, Hashimoto was not reluctant to let the private sector step forward in the negotiations. Consequently, the private sector stepped up into its new representative role.

There were other points that redirected the Japanese state's focus. In the post-Cold War environment, the Japanese government was embroiled in changes involving the Japan-US relationship. After the Gulf War ended, Japan dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Forces in a peacekeeping capacity and overall spent USD 13 billion to support the war effort. Instead of recognizing its contributions, Japan was accused of "checkbook diplomacy" (Green & Szechenyi, 2011, p. 333). The added effect of the previously discussed US reaction to the Japanese success in semiconductors made the Japanese government seek a redefinition of its relationship with the US. Steps towards change included episodes such as the Hosokawa government's review of defense policy which traditionally had focused on the Japan-US alliance, bringing a new multilateral diplomacy perspective. Among these developments, the Heisei period started off with various crises in Japan. For example, only in 1995, Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Tokyo Metro sarin gas attack, and the All Nippon Airways Flight 857 hijacking incident occurred. Simply put, the amount of attention Japanese policymakers could pay to the ongoing semiconductor trade issues decreased.

The final domestic factor pushing Japan towards the WSC framework was the maturation of its semiconductor industry. As a latecomer, the Japanese semiconductor industry faced numerous disadvantages in the beginning, mainly the learning curve effect and lack of chance to expand freely into the market. The Japanese manufacturers had lacked the experience, information, capital, and organizational capacity to build a market existence, and therefore, cooperation with the central government was a given in such conditions. This strategy proved successful when the 1976 VLSI consortium project helped Japanese manufacturers arrive first in the 64K DRAM market in 1978 rather than as a follower (Weinstein et al., 1984, p. 39).

The Japanese semiconductor industry featured fierce domestic competition. But it helped that the domestic market was insulated from foreign interruptions while firms were building their competitive advantages and catching up to world standards. This setup slowly changed. Foreign investment in Japan was liberalized in 1974, and quantitative import restrictions were phased out by 1976. Adding the 20% import rule brought in by the 1986 STA, Japanese chip producers had to face serious competition from abroad. Instead of drowning against the foreign competition, Japanese manufacturers worked out methods to stay afloat. According to Dong et al., Japanese firms broke out of the follower mold by taking advantage of changing consumer tastes, technological changes, their free-rider position in consumer education, information spillover, skipping trials and errors, the incumbent inertia, and enhanced level of information via resourcefulness (Cho et al., 1998, p. 493). As a result, after 1986 STA, Japanese DRAM manufacturers even moved on to market sharing strategies instead of market capturing ones (Flamm & Reiss, 1993, p. 283). This highlighted the growing clout of the Japanese firms.

The semiconductor industry of Japan had started its IC journey by supplying the US transistor market. When the computer industry gained prominence, product lines shifted to accommodate the needs of this new industry. US company IBM had entered the personal computer business in 1981; within two years, the entire market grew approximately 200% to 1.4 million units sold in 1984. By 1990, this figure would reach 6 million (Forester, 1993, pp. 90-91). The demand for computers meant the demand for microchips, and the Japanese semiconductor industry rose to meet it. The Japanese manufacturers moved in tandem with the Japanese government's goal of fostering the domestic computer industry as it benefitted their infant-stage needs. It was when new market trends emerged that the Japanese industry had to develop new business models on its own as it matured.

Working in tandem with the rising game console industry proved successful, and the different approaches in IC technology opened new channels of revenue for the semiconductor manufacturers. Although much attention was paid to the grand consortium projects for Japanese supercomputers at the time, one of the symbols of

Japan's success in the world market came to be the gaming consoles (Morris-Suzuki, 1995, p. 221). During the same period, another strong signal for the industry to follow the market trends instead of ministerial guidance came in the form of software development. Until the 1990s, MITI had not paid attention to the potential of the software, and the private sector had followed MITI's lead. NTT, the public corporation of the time, was also content with its monopoly in the Japanese computer market, which was built on the Japanese-made hardware carrying the US-origin Windows operating system. As the private sector became aware of the lack of progress in Japanese software development (Toyoda, 1984, pp. 148-149), MITI initiated a consortium project called TRON which failed due to a combination of limited funding and significant bureaucratic turf struggle. Another example came with the flash memory's invention in the late 1990s; capitalizing on its invention, Toshiba dominated the flash memory field. Game consoles or flash memory areas were not target areas set by any ministry, yet firms successfully met the market demand. Thus, the confidence of the now mature industry was boosted.

The coming of age of the Japanese semiconductor industry coincided with the loss of trust in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was unable to foresee the new technological trends and act on them to give direction to the industry, given the internal turmoil caused by administrative reforms and fiscal downsizing. What nailed the coffin was the end of the bubble economy.[13] Japanese capital markets went through major upheaval as the bubble hit its peak on December 29, 1989, as Nikkei 225 hit an all-time high and rapidly went bust in 1990. Tokyo stock market's value halved in two years. The inability of any state organ to foresee or quickly remedy the aftermath of this financial catastrophe caused damage to the reputation of previously canonized bureaucrats. MITI, MOF, and Bank of Japan were regarded as the main culprits. Capital seemed to evaporate, and liquidity crises halted the economic activity. Without capital, the capital-intensive semiconductor industry could not afford to expand R&D and open new foundries on the same scale as before; the R&D expenditure of Japanese manufacturing firms decreased by approximately 10% between 1990 and 1993 (Hemmert, 1998, pp. 131-132). The private sector's confidence may have been hurt by the bubble's burst; however, the ambitious spirit that had birthed the expression "We should write Made in Japan bigger" still held on (Shimura, 1986, p. 70). Furthermore, there was a brief period of recovery in the economy that may have helped a sense of business back to normal in the mid-1990s. According to Yoshikawa's division of phases of the first lost decade, this slight recovery period is sandwiched between two periods of recession, the last one starting in the second quarter of 1997 (Yoshika-

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[13]   The bubble economy was the high growth era in 1980s when abundant capital and a real estate bubble coincided to create the most economically prosperous period in Japanese history. Record high on the NIKKEI stock exchange was recorded on December 29, 1989, and stock prices started plummeting in 1990. The bubble economy is commonly accepted to have ended in 1992, although alternating views exist regarding as to when exactly it started, ended, and what factors have caused it.

wa, 2001, p. 11). Achieving an annual economic growth rate of 5.1% in 1995-1996 after experiencing 0.6% following the burst of the bubble acted as a signal for the private sector to hope to resume business as usual. This short period of recovery just prior to the semiconductor trade negotiations in 1996 meant the breakaway from the bureaucratic mandate and solidification of the strive to handle own prospects for the semiconductor industry had a chance to affect the proceedings.

The negotiations regarding the second renewal of the 1986 STA started with these developments in the background. The Electronics Industry Association of Japan (EIAJ) representatives faced US's SIA; the entourage included industry leaders from companies such as Sony and Toshiba. Although discussions between the two governments were also held in parallel, it was decided to prioritize the consensus between the two industries. US side stuck to the minimal government involvement principle, arguing for its necessity regarding market share monitoring and dumping prevention. On the other hand, the now mature and confident Japanese side claimed that government involvement was unnecessary and that the basis of the new framework should be the free market mechanism. Going forward with the new framework idea, Japanese representatives proposed a multilateral mechanism centered on private sector representation from major semiconductor industries of the world; an opportunity for the top executives of the world's semiconductor industry to gather together without hindrance from politics, diplomacy, or bureaucratic red tape. Despite some pushback from the US side, the first meeting in the new framework was held in Hawaii in April 1997 with the additional participation of semiconductor industry associations of Europe and South Korea. At last, WSC was born (Makimoto, 2008, p. 5).

Conclusion

Instead of relying on state representation to handle its trade issues, the Japanese semiconductor companies participate directly on the global stage at the WSC; they exchange information, discuss global issues, and build networks. Throughout the paper, the emergence of this framework has been explained by historical analyses of key factors.

External and internal factors were both effective in bringing about change to Japan. Foreign factors from outside of Japan were mainly the US conduct against Japan during the semiconductor trade frictions and the rise of other countries' semiconductor industries. The climbing tensions in Japan-US relations featured episodes of US government intervention and treatment of Japanese semiconductor products as threats. The majority of these episodes were fueled by national security discourse; when the Cold War ended, the discourse lost its policymaking steam. However, throughout the 1986 STA negotiations and its renewal in 1991, Japan came to real-

ize the importance of balance on the negotiation table. New partners in the form of other semiconductor industries emerged one by one in the 1990s, and Japan did not neglect to include them in the WSC framework to build balance and take advantage of the opportunities they offered.

Most of the analysis in this paper has been dedicated to domestic factors. The ideological transformation of Japanese policymaking, the related decline of the MITI's strength, political influx, shuffling of state priorities, and the maturation of the industry were the domestic factors taken into consideration. By the late 1970s, neoliberal ideology characterized by its emphasis on the free market and reduced state role was on the rise among advanced economies; it was a matter of time until the US pressure to structurally alter the Japanese economy would lead some Japanese policymakers to adopt neoliberalist ideology in varying amounts for their political agenda. As the entire political environment within Japan split between pro-reformers and anti-reformers, political instability emerged. A few prime ministers were able to push their reforms through, cutting down the clout of the ministries. Amongst these developments, MITI, the ministry in charge of industrial policy, lost its ability to lead the industry via successful consortium projects. Its role transformed from one of 'leading' to one of 'supporting.' Alongside this, after years of success in international markets, the private sector outgrew its infant industry status and started demanding to control its own actions outside of bureaucratic intervention. Perhaps this industrial maturation process would have stopped in its tracks when the largest financial crisis in the postwar Japanese history hit in the early 1990s; however, the role of the state within the policymaking circles had been already altered by the neoliberal idea trap. The Japanese semiconductor industry would lead itself from then on.

Several points, such as whether there was a legitimate need for reforms in Japan in the 1990s or the exact nature of the relationship between South Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese semiconductor industries, were left out of the analysis. They remain relevant areas for further research. The main aim of this paper was to put forth factors which had led to Japan's move from the 1986 STA bilateral trade agreement framework into a less state interaction-oriented, private sector-led, multilateral framework in the semiconductor industry in 1997. To conclude, it was the combined effects of these domestic and international factors that resulted in a transformed state-industry relationship in the Japanese semiconductor industry.

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Public Diplomacy of the George W. Bush Administration : 9/11 and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror

George W. Bush Yönetimi Kamu Diplomasisi: 11 Eylül ve Teröre Karşı Savaş Retoriği

Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

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ABSTRACT

The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are events that profoundly affected the United States' national security, changed the political landscape of the world, and put terrorism on the primary agenda of the United States' security policy. President George W. Bush's declaration of the War on Terror after 9/11 is an approach that changed the course of the world in global political relations. The War on Terror, a multi-dimensional action, took the form of a conceptual framework for national security and was an effort to establish and maintain a global coalition on the axis of expanding cooperation. With the motives required by the discursive reactions, the War on Terror has revealed a cause-effect relationship for ideas to be shaped and understood by the masses, and it has been described as a step that legitimizes international policies. The War on Terror has evolved into a comprehensive public diplomacy campaign against anti-Americanism in public diplomacy concerning the United States' security interests. In this context, the War on Terror is a rhetorical basis for the Bush administration's public diplomacy. During the Bush administration, the War on Terror, which served as a reminder of the country's values and was used to distinguish themselves from their enemies, became increasingly important for creating unity and strength across the country. Document analysis, a qualitative research method, was conducted in this study, and a descriptive analysis was carried out by focusing on a specific topic. This study examines the impact of the 9/11 attacks on public

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diplomacy, the War on Terror strategy and the Bush Doctrine. The rhetoric of the War on Terror in forming the value judgments of the masses and implementing the policies is also examined from the perspective of public diplomacy.

Keywords: George W. Bush, public diplomacy, September 11, War on Terror, rhetoric

ÖZ

11 Eylül 2001'de meydana gelen terörist saldırılar, Birleşik Devletlerin ulusal güvenliğini derinden etkileyen, dünyanın siyasi manzarasını değiştiren ve terörün Birleşik Devletler güvenlik politikasının merkezinde yer almasını sağlayan olaylardır. 11 Eylül sonrası Başkan George W. Bush'un Teröre Karşı Savaş'ı ilan etmesi, küresel siyasi ilişkilerde dünyanın gidişatını değiştiren bir yaklaşımdır. Çok boyutlu bir eylem olan Teröre Karşı Savaş, ulusal güvenlik için kavramsal bir çerçeve şeklini almış ve iş birliğinin genişletilmesi ekseninde küresel bir koalisyon kurma ve koalisyonu sürdürme çabası olmuştur. Söylemsel tepkilerin gerektirdiği güdülerde Teröre Karşı Savaş, fikirlerin şekil alması ve kitlelerce anlaşılabilmesi açısından bir sebep-sonuç ilişkisi ortaya çıkarmış ve uluslararası politikaları meşrulaştıran bir basamak olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Birleşik Devletlerin güvenlik çıkarlarına dair kamu diplomasisinde Teröre Karşı Savaş Amerikan karşıtlığına karşı kapsamlı bir kamu diplomasisi kampanyası hâlini almıştır. Bu bağlamda Teröre Karşı Savaş, Bush yönetimi kamu diplomasisinin retorik bir temelidir. Bush yönetiminde Birleşik Devletler açısından ülke değerleri için bir hatırlatma eylemi olan ve kendilerini düşmanlarından ayırmaya yarayan Teröre Karşı Savaş ülkede birliğin ve kuvvetin oluşturulmasına yönelik ehemmiyet kazanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, nitel araştırma yöntemleri arasında yer alan doküman incelemesi yapılmış ve spesifik bir konu üzerine odaklanılarak betimsel bir analiz gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, 11 Eylül saldırılarının kamu diplomasisine yansıması, Teröre Karşı Savaş stratejisi ve Bush Doktrini ele alınmaktadır. Aynı zamanda kitlelerin değer yargılarının biçimlenmesinde ve politikaların uygulanmasında Teröre Karşı Savaş retoriği kamu diplomasisi anlayışından hareketle irdelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: George W. Bush, kamu diplomasisi, 11 Eylül, Teröre Karşı Savaş, retorik

Introduction

The United States, regarded as the world's leader in terms of soft power resources, has for many years endeavored to build an international environment consistent with its interests and values. The attacks of September 11, 2001, served as a warning that winning hearts and minds is important in maintaining the power of the United States and in addressing the international community, and the attacks cast doubt on these efforts.

The September 11, 2001 attacks altered the course of recent history and went down in history as the world's deadliest terrorist attack. The attacks caused the United States to reconsider the possibility of being attacked on its soil, resulting in a shift in international relations. Shortly after the attacks, the United States declared War on Terror.

The 9/11 attacks were the first stage of the War on Terror, and the War on Terror was a climate of opinion to destroy a defined evil. With this climate of opinion, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and toppled the Taliban regime. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003 under the guise of "preventive war", claiming that Iraq possessed chemical weapons and overthrew Saddam Hussein. The "preventive war" doctrine of the Bush administration was designed to create a climate of fear, and this doctrine presented to the world was not universally accepted.

9/11 introduced a new world order. After 9/11, Bush's political discourse influenced political processes and public diplomacy. During this process, Bush elaborately used the rhetoric of the War on Terror, and he used War on Terror to convince people that it was a just cause. The War on Terror was the process of developing a public diplomacy perspective to win the war of hearts and minds. Public diplomacy was critical at this stage for the United States to communicate its ideas and policies to the rest of the world accurately and effectively in terms of mutual social relations, and War on Terror was described as a controlled reference to the actions of the United States. The War on Terror was viewed as a description of problems, interests, and relationships, and this definition allowed for the establishment of a symbolic relationship between public diplomacy practices and rhetoric.

As a result, given the role of the War on Terror in the formation of public opinion in US public diplomacy and its impact on the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, it is a term that connects theory and practice. War on Terror, which creates selective attention, is a tool that is often associated with relationships established to make facts and events related to the same problems, create a sphere of influence for Bush, and achieve ultimate goals.

Document analysis, a qualitative research method, was conducted in this study. Within this framework, the reports issued by the United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) on "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Legislative Proposals to Amend Prohibitions on Disseminating Materials to Domestic Audiences", "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations" and "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues", the report issued by the 9/11 Commission, which was established to investigate the 9/11 attacks, on "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States", as well as statements of George W. Bush, and other sources containing information regarding the subject were examined and described. The study is limited to George W. Bush Administration's term; the data is correlated with prior knowledge within the scope of the topic, and sources and

documents for a better understanding of War on Terror rhetoric were addressed using international concrete examples.

The Power Sources of the United States

In the 20th century, no country influenced international relations as sharply as the United States, and this influence was not indecisive. The United States also insisted on the principle of interfering in the internal affairs of other states and was more committed than other states to spreading its values throughout the world. The United States has also been the most ideologically driven country in implementing its diplomacy and pursuing pragmatic or historical moral views and has assumed an unprecedented range of agreements and obligations (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 9-10). During the enlargement process, the United States initially sought to establish a system in which logic and pragmatism would replace military power and the state would adhere to the code of ethics in international relations. Within this system, American diplomacy sought to align the realities of the outside world with American values, and the interests of the United States were defined by its values (İskit, 2012, pp. 113-114). The implementation of diplomacy was used to define values, address challenges, and play an active role in global affairs. The change of topics in dialogues in international relations, the differences in communication styles, the increase in the number of actors and the many complications between states were reflected in US diplomacy. The fact that the United States dealt with global issues and acted as the world's security guarantor necessitated increased diplomatic efforts.

In the new global order, other states outside the postmodern world began to resort to terrorism, guerrilla wars, propaganda wars and cyberwars in the face of the superior military, economic and cultural dominance of the United States (Tuncer, 2009, pp. 133-134). As a matter of fact, different views were expressed on whether the United States is a hegemonic power in the international system. Although it is occasionally stated that the United States' loss of power can be delayed, this power has not been prevented so far (Doğan, 2011, pp. 21-24) because the strength of the United States is not determined by a one-dimensional analysis based on traditional military power. The United States has a more diverse portfolio of power sources than any other country (Nye and Welch, 2013, p. 456). Therefore, the leading state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is the United States, and its power sources can be listed as follows (Nye, 2003, pp. 15):

Twentieth-century: Economic growth, scientific and technical leadership, settlement, military forces and alliances, universalist culture and liberal international regime (soft power).

Twenty-first century: Technological leadership, military and economic size, soft power, the critical actor of the supranational communication network.

Apart from military power, sovereignty, independence, economic and political strength, domestic stability, and the functioning of democratic institutions are also factors that constitute power (Öymen, 2011, p. 510). Among these elements of power, universal culture is particularly significant. The United States, in particular, draws on a universal culture and exerts greater influence through its soft power, as opposed to the soft power of narrow and parochial cultures (Nye, 2005, p. 20).

Public Diplomacy History of the United States

In the early 20th century, the rise of the United States was the most decisive factor in changing the global balance of power. As the United States grew, its interventions and participation in events abroad became a characteristic feature of its foreign policy (Kennedy, 1991, pp. 282-287). The United States increasingly sought to shape the foundations of its hegemony with social power, state, and world order and benefited from concepts such as freedom, modernity, wealth, and prosperity to keep American hegemony stable (Kurtbağ, 2010, pp. 48-51).

The United States uses universal values such as democracy, human rights, equality and freedom as the representation of the state, and these universal values create soft power for the United States. The values advocated make the United States appealing in the functioning of the global system (Aydemir, 2016, pp. 428-429). In a sense, the potential access to democracy and well-being presented to the international order by the United States comes in many shapes and forms as a belief that unites different cultures.

The United States reflects its emotional and intellectual aspects through culture. State and non-state actors implement American foreign policy in various fields to win hearts and minds (Aydemir, 2016, pp. 428). Although the United States was a latecomer to the idea of using American culture for the purpose of diplomacy (Nye, 2003, p. 84), the soft power of the United States is the center of global culture hegemonically (Allison, 2008, p. 107), and promoting universal culture is a hegemonic strategy (Zahran & Ramos, 2010, p. 24). Historically, many factors contributed to the development of this strategy. The United States' establishment of the Committee on Public Information during World War I, the peaceful dissolution of the Committee on Public Information, the belief in the late 1930s that the country's security depended on good relations with other countries, World War II and the Cold War together with the United States Information Agency, activation of official efforts such as the Voice of America, the Fulbright Program, American libraries, conferences and other programs have played a role in building soft power. Other than the government, social forces have produced more soft power. American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world (Nye, 2003, p. 84).

The origins of public diplomacy, which is one of the keys to soft power, and the debates on public diplomacy also stem from the experience of the United States. As a matter of fact, public diplomacy practices were implemented before the concept of public diplomacy, which was coined in the mid-1960s in the United States (Melissen, 2005, pp. 4-6). The establishment of The Committee on Public Information to disseminate information abroad during World War I was the approval of the use of public diplomacy activities in the early years of the twentieth century. When World War II began, President Roosevelt established the Foreign Information Service and the Office of War Information/OWI to conduct intelligence and propaganda abroad. Voice of America Radio, which played a role in building soft power as an ideological propaganda tool, was one of these practices and began broadcasting in Europe on February 24, 1942 (Epstein, 2005, p. 2). In 1946, the Fulbright Act was enacted (Nakamura & Weed, 2009, p. 8), and programs were created for Soviet authors, scientists, artists, and other elites to visit the United States during the early years of the Cold War. The programs were instrumental in defending America's efforts for cultural freedom, reform, and liberalism. The visitors made a great effort to bring down the Soviet Union. Thanks to the practices, the soft power of the United States created an emulation in the world, which helped encourage other countries to implement United States policies during the Cold War (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 7).

A new step was taken in 1948 to combat the expansion of the Soviet Union, and the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (PL 80-402), commonly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act, had a significant place in the history of the cultural and broadcasting activities of the United States. Over time, public diplomacy was reorganized, and policy changes were made to reduce costs and increase efficiency (Epstein, 2005, pp. 2-3). In this context, the United States government established the Information Agency (USIA) in 1953 to manage American public diplomacy. The Information Agency bent its efforts to run Voice of America Radio, and the radio helped shape the perception of the foreign public (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 7). During this period, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE-RL), established to transmit news and information, became an important public diplomacy tool and played an influential role in the culture war against the Soviets.

During the Cold War, the Berlin Wall began to be built (August 1961), and the Fulbright-Hays Act was enacted in September 1961 (Nakamura & Weed, 2009, p. 8). The Zorinsky Amendment was passed in August 1985. With the proposal made by Senator Edward Zorinsky, it was decided to prohibit the domestic dissemination of international information and materials (Weed, 2012, p. 2). In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and in January 1991, United States operations against Iraqi forces began during the war between Iraq and Kuwait. In December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed (Nakamura & Weed, 2009, p. 8); and when the Cold War ended, the United States was dissatisfied with its superpower, and a new strategy was required by the United States that strikes a balance between the use of hard and soft power (Armitage & Nye, 2007, p. 19).

After the Cold War, the United States International Broadcasting Act was enacted in 1994, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors was established. In October 1999, the United States Information Agency was abolished, and the Department of State was charged with developing public diplomacy (with Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy established) (Nakamura & Weed, 2009, p. 8).

From 9/11 to War on Terror

With the September 11, 2001 attacks, cyclical ruptures occurred in the world, and struggles began to increase at the global level. 9/11 allowed the United States to lead the fight against terrorism at the global level, and the states and regimes that allowed the attacking organization were designated as adversaries by the United States (Dedeoğlu, 2008). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 deeply affected the United States and international public opinion and marked the beginning of an era that fuelled the flames of Islamic extremism and terrorism. It became clear that cooperation was necessary for the global war against terrorism to be successful.

The 9/11 Commission Report, which was tasked with investigating the facts and conditions regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks and making recommendations for the future, emphasized that diplomatic attempts failed to combat ideological threats and the diplomatic efforts of the Department of State before 9/11 were largely ineffective (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 349). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought about many changes in United States foreign policy and called into question the United States' role in the world.

The first phase of the United States' efforts following 9/11 involved overthrowing the Taliban and conducting a military operation against al-Qaeda. It was clear from the start that this was insufficient, and it became clear that all elements of national power such as diplomacy, intelligence, economic policy, law enforcement, foreign aid, homeland defense and public diplomacy should be used for long-term success. While there was a strategy that would certainly involve offensive operations to counter terrorism, a coalition strategy involving Muslim countries was also necessary. It became clear that military efforts alone were not enough, that they had to be accompanied by a preventive strategy, and that the strategy must clearly focus on the Arab and Muslim world to achieve its goals (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pp. 363-364). Therefore, the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the security environment being associated with public diplomacy (Hocking, 2005, p. 41) and clearly showed that public diplomacy is essential in the complexity of national security threats.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the security became a central arena in international relations, and security concerns in the implementation of smart political strategies (Henrikson, 2005, p. 74) refocused attention on public diplomacy for the Unit-

ed States, prompting the US to take action to make public diplomacy more effective. After the outbreak of the Iraq War, public diplomacy was one of the hottest topics in the United States' foreign policy without any hesitation. The tragedy of September 11, 2001, was reflected in the future of public diplomacy based on the problematic relationship between the Islamic world and the West (Melissen, 2005, pp. 6-7) and brought along a new change in the public diplomacy perspective. This change was felt in the relationship between propaganda and ethics. The perceived generality of propaganda made public diplomacy vulnerable to attacks as an ethical initiative. Given the complex political context, it was important to distinguish between errors made in good faith and purposeful ethical lapses. As a result, the public diplomacy initiatives launched in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks were mostly in good faith (Seib, 2009, p. 775).

The 9/11 dialogue impacted American political thought in terms of mutual encouragement of sharing knowledge and ideas (Arsenault, 2009, pp. 147-148) and public diplomacy programs grew in importance compared to the past (Nye, 2005, p. 120).

The correct choice of words and the adoption of a cultural perspective to eliminate multi-dimensional transnational threats and peacebuilding were essential for the quality of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy had a lower priority than political and military functions before 9/11. After 9/11, it was recognized that more funds for public diplomacy were required. The fact that globalization and technological developments facilitated the spread of ideologies and made the nature of threats multifaceted and wide-ranging demonstrated that military-based reactions could not produce effective results. Treating people as individuals and not choosing the language of the powerful party was also inevitable for crossing this threshold.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks also led the United States to investigate facts and circumstances, from diplomacy to the immigration issue, from border control to intelligence. More than two-and-a-half million pages of documents have been reviewed, and more than twelve hundred people were interviewed in ten countries. The circumstances relating to terrorist attacks were investigated (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. XV). Along with these investigations, the United States built its public diplomacy practices on the propaganda of Anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism propaganda was based on a model in which the United States should be trusted, the United States did not fight Muslims, and its major goal was the struggle for democratic peace (Aydemir, 2016, pp. 213-214).

While the troubled public diplomacy efforts of the United States in the Muslim world were investigated, and the call for public diplomacy to eliminate the terrorist network with ally governments was included in the report (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pp. 203-205), the anti-communist struggle in the Cold War era gave way to the War on Terror and Islamic extremism.

War on Terror and Public Diplomacy

Bush did not regard the War on Terror as merely a security issue. War on Terror was part of the war against pro-evil and the fight of all who believe in progress, pluralism, tolerance and freedom (Jentleson, 2014, p. 16). For this reason, Bush's War on Terror rhetoric had an impact on changing the fate of public diplomacy. The United States' policies toward the Middle East and its military presence in Iraq undermined its credibility. In particular, the fact that human rights violations in Abu Ghraib prison were covered by the press and caused controversy damaged the perception of the United States in the Islamic world for many years (Melissen, 2005, pp. 6-7). When Bush faced the fact that the United States' image was tarnished abroad and that there was hateful propaganda, public diplomacy was regarded as an intelligence tool for the War on Terror strategy. According to this strategy, public diplomacy was a publicly available database dealing with state issues. Public diplomacy was a plan based on questions such as where, what, who, to whom, what they did, and why, giving clues about intelligence and filling in the missing pieces of many puzzles. According to this plan, the Secretary of State Colin Powell argued that Iraq had biological weapons, and Bush stated that Saddam Hussein would use a weapon of mass destruction to influence American and world public opinion.

The Bush administration's stance leading to the war in Iraq and its efforts to build public support for the Iraq War were meant to mobilize people by holding them accountable for their actions. Bush stressed that the Iraqi regime must destroy weapons of mass destruction, halt the development of weapons of mass destruction, and cease its support for terrorist groups for the Gulf War to end. Bush also stated that Saddam Hussein was a murderous dictator who relied on weapons of mass destruction. Bush focused on developing a strong justification for the invasion of Iraq, noting that the Iraqi regime had violated its obligations and that by allying with terrorists, the United States could be attacked.

The administrators in the United States had mixed views and doubts. George Tenet, the then director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was also at the centre of the discussions and security issues. In a speech to students at Georgetown University in 2004, Tenet stated that they would neither be completely right nor wrong when the facts of Iraq were all in. Tenet also noted that CIA analysts may have exaggerated Saddam's progress on Iraq's missile program. Regarding chemical weapons, Tenet also stated that Saddam had the intention and capability to quickly convert the civilian industry to chemical weapon production; however, they had not yet found the weapons they expected.

It was stated in the 9/11 Commission Report that the United States should focus on defeating an ideology, not a group of people, because of the economic problems in Arab countries, as the forty per cent of adult Arabs were illiterate, and the majority of youth

expressed a desire to emigrate to other countries (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 376). According to the 9/11 Commission, the United States government had to define the message and what it stands for in the struggle for ideas. The United States should offer an example of moral leadership, abide by the rule of law, tell Muslim parents that terrorists like Bin Laden will harm them, and listen to the views of thought leaders in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The United States should also provide a vision for Muslim governments to respect the rule of law (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 376).

Before The 9/11 Commission Report, Bush's response to how some Islamic countries would respond to the violent hatred directed at the United States regarding the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was as follows (The White House, 2001):

> I'm amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hate us. I am, I am -- like most Americans, I just can't believe it. Because I know how good we are, and we've got to do a better job of making our case. We've got to do a better job of explaining to the people in the Middle East, for example, that we don't fight a war against Islam or Muslims. We don't hold any religion accountable. We're fighting evil. And these murderers have hijacked a great religion in order to justify their evil deeds. And we cannot let it stand.

The United States realized that reaching out to the Muslim world, especially the Arab world, and neutralizing negative ideas could be achieved by public diplomacy efforts. Public diplomacy has become one of the cornerstones of the War on Terror, and the United States understood that it could not kill ideas with bombs, however precision-guided they may be (Van Ham, 2005, p. 48).

On the other hand, the United States entered a performative process alongside a discursive process. The United States used the fight against international terrorism to gain support and legitimacy with War on Terror and took advantage of 9/11 to expand its hegemonic sphere of influence (Van Ham, 2005, p. 51). For the United States, it was an age when allied cooperation in the war against terrorism was essential. Having a long-term vision, credibility, and transparency in communicating with the rest of the world to end negative perceptions about the United States was a formula to achieve goals.

As part of the option, United States foreign policy was described as part of the message, as featured in the 9/11 Commission Report. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world. It was also stated that the strengthening of worldwide Islamic terrorism would make Israel and Iraq safer (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, pp. 376-377). In this context, the War on Terror was a broad field of activity for world politics beyond public diplomacy (Sharp, 2005, p. 119).

The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terror Rhetoric

The Bush Doctrine was the Bush administration's ambitious strategy against terrorism and sparked a debate about the purposes of American power and the role of the United States in the world (Kaufman, 2007, p. 1). The Bush Doctrine, introduced by Bush to prevent dangerous regimes and terrorists from developing, acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction, was a security strategy. There was a risk that this security strategy might create an approach where one nation might view the other as a threat, and other nations might use it as a pretext for aggression. The Bush Doctrine covered many topics, from defence technology development to intelligence gathering, and it was stated that diplomacy had a role in the future of the Muslim world. Another element of the Bush Doctrine was to build a balance of power that supported freedom. The Iraq War and Afghanistan were a result of the Bush Doctrine, and its reliance on the threat of retaliation was an expectation for the future of public diplomacy activities and the rapid transformation of societies without a democratic tradition.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was misguidance as to who was responsible for the attacks. The Bush administration used the agony of the 9/11 attacks to support the Iraq War. Despite the intelligence community's firm decision that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11 or Al Qaeda, the Bush administration did not want that to be considered. The United States went to war in Iraq on a false pretence that it was somehow avenging those killed by Al Qaeda (Riedel, 2021). The illegality of preventive warfare under international law, allegations of manipulated and politicized intelligence, and, most importantly, the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq discredited the legitimacy of war (Lynch & Singh, 2008, p. 148).

In fact, the impact of the rhetoric used by the Bush administration was also evident. In 2003, exaggerated allegations of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and al-Qaeda affiliations helped provide domestic support for the Iraq War (Nye & Welch, 2013, p. 409). According to a poll conducted two years after 9/11, 69% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was "personally" involved in the 9/11 attack. Even more staggering, 82% believed that Saddam provided assistance to Osama Bin Laden. Both were utterly false (Riedel, 2021). In this process, the United States, in particular, focused on information overload. The Arab and Muslim publics, who have different cultures and styles entirely, responded negatively or not at all to the messages of the United States. The bilateral relationship was not established after the adoption of one-way message strategies to inform people (Gershman & Zaharna, 2005).

Although the situation in Iraq after 9/11 was difficult and the outcome was questionable, the Bush Doctrine was somewhat successful. The United States brilliantly succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, creating the conditions for the first free elections in the country's history and facilitating the victory of Hamid Karzai as President. Karzai, unlike his predecessors, was a good man, moderate, civi-

lized, and pro-American. Despite the challenging uprisings, free elections were held in Iraq with the participation of more than eight million Iraqis and political progress was made (Kaufman, 2007, p. 46).

It should be noted that no regime can be established in a single day. The formation of social and political institutions takes time. Afghanistan received foreign aid and billions of dollars of funding for many years, and Afghan forces were trained. However, with the 2021 attack, the Taliban took over the country, and the Bush Doctrine was not a complete solution.

The notion that "if you are not with us, you are against us" that formed the basis of the Bush Doctrine was a unilateral approach to foreign policy. This policy, pursued in the War on Terror, advocated proactive action by the United States without waiting to be attacked. Bush's rhetoric created a surge in public diplomacy. Spitting venom or exaggerating anger during the crisis cast doubt on the future of public diplomacy. The logic of nuance was important in US public diplomacy because countries that posed a threat could not be treated the same. After 9/11, the United States made extensive efforts to involve its allies in Western Europe and the Middle East in the American-led campaign against Saddam for its international legitimacy. For public diplomacy, discourses such as the possibility of countries supporting the campaign to combat internal opposition, the overthrow of the regime to reduce global cracks, and the establishment of democracy were compelling. In fact, the War on Terror and the Bush Doctrine made anti-Americanism a choice. The efforts for universal values were viewed as a national interest, and the frequently widening gap between words and actions in foreign policy also made public diplomacy difficult. Because the fight against terrorism is the top priority of American foreign policy, wars were interpreted according to a scenario and winning the hearts and minds of the masses was an important issue in building a stable and democratic world.

In a sense, the War on Terror was essential to building esprit de corps. It was also polarizing rhetoric (Dimaggio, 2015, p. 1), which did not elaborate on why the war had become an inevitable response to terrorism. On the contrary, War on Terror rhetoric was the product of a persuasive effort (Silberstein, 2002, p. 15) and was an emotional component of public diplomacy activities. War on Terror came to the fore as a tool of coercion to form the basis of the logic of public diplomacy activities. In the Bush administration, the War on Terror was important in deterring future evil, and the practice of public diplomacy to use stereotypes, media images and language was viewed as a fine-tuned act in the long run.

War on Terror is a system deeply rooted in the culture of the United States. This terminology had strong effects on the world, and without considering it separately from the cultural context (Redfield, 2009, pp. 6-7), the rhetoric of fear took center

stage (Dimaggio, 2015, p. 13). While Bush invoked rhetoric between fear and hope, he was not meant to encourage a cultural war between Christians and Muslims. The focus was on fighting terrorism (Dimaggio, 2015, pp. 18-19). From this perspective, Bush used phrases like freedom and democracy to describe American values in the course of public diplomacy.

War on Terror was a psychological statement that nullified responsibility as no one took responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. The values of freedom used to create a rhetorical opposition between the United States and those, who carried out the attacks, were a step taken for public diplomacy to hold people accountable for actions.

From the beginning, Bush also tried to link terrorism to a worldwide conspiracy (Rubin, 2020, p. 71) and instilled rhetoric of fear in the American public. He used the anti-terrorism agenda for a multi-front war after 9/11. Bush took important steps to achieve his political goals and therefore faced little resistance in Congress. He made the best use of Bush's rhetoric, and the issue of terrorism was framed as a war against a worldwide enemy. Instead of focusing his actions on al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Bush focused on expanding the conflict and reshaping the Middle East (Rubin, 2020, pp. 79-80). According to Bush, the 9/11 attacks could not have shaken the foundations of the United States. War on Terror was a commitment to the values of the United States and a sense of responsibility. War on Terror was not only critical rhetoric for national sentiment but also crucial for shaping public policy by building a rationale for public diplomacy. War on Terror was an ideological impetus and a starting point for shaping perception.

Like 9/11, War on Terror had a rhetorical power, and War on Terror implied a long war, both against despotic dictators and against the Middle East. War on Terror was also a symbolic practice to turn security concerns into emotional and evocative public discourse as a valuable and pragmatic lens for public diplomacy strategies.

Conclusion

Bush administration officials creatively built power in line with the current period, and they designed power to integrate the power of different instruments of state (Wilson III, 2008, p. 113). In this design, War on Terror was identified with public diplomacy, and War on Terror became a popular term in a familiar context. For the Bush administration's international purpose, the War on Terror was an attempt to emotionally influence audiences to improve stability over the nature of the conflict.

In this attempt, the Bush administration paid strict attention to involving citizens in public diplomacy with the War on Terror. Because citizens also play a role in producing the message and image intended to be projected to the rest of the world. Public diplomacy is as sensitive to bad people as it is to bad policy. If a nation does not live up

to its' name, any message it tries to convey will fail, and a small number of people can do great harm. In this context, human rights violations in the Iraq War had a negative impact on the overall reputation of the United States. Sometimes, the key to success in public diplomacy is not to build prestige in other countries but to encourage them to act to protect the reputation of their nation (Cull, 2010, p. 15).

Public diplomacy is an essential power in the democratization of communication if policy information is suitable for dissemination and a well-designed system is in place to do so. For this power, it is important to comply with open communication and ethical standards (Seib, 2009, p. 784). The President, the Secretary of State, and various military officials sought to back up their assertions with intelligence assessments, raising questions about ethical standards (Hartnett & Stengrim, 2004).

When the falsehood of the rhetoric was exposed, the blame was placed on the intelligence agencies (Hartnett & Stengrim, 2004). According to critics, the Bush Doctrine was not justified and violated. The Iraq War divided and polarized the United States (Lynch & Singh, 2008, p. 148). The disclosure of the exaggerations dealt a significant blow to the credibility of the United States, and the harsh language used was ineffective (Nye & Welch, 2013, p. 409). Thus, Bush's rhetoric and political steps resonated all over the world.

It should be noted that effective public diplomacy requires credibility because credibility is the foundation of effective public diplomacy and provides great scope for the world of public diplomacy. Information has special respectability in credibility (Cull, 2010, p. 16), and effective communication helps resolve policy and reliability conflicts (Gershman & Zaharna, 2005). Credibility adds objectivity to public diplomacy, and decisions are justified by the evidence. Misleading the public harms credibility and prevents a conscious opinion from being formed. In this context, to justify the policies and actions to the public, intelligence assessments should be made entirely accurate, the assessments should be presented transparently, and there should be no contradictions; the risks, as well as the advantages of intelligence, should be considered. Public diplomacy should not be viewed as a promotional instrument to justify military operations, and the rhetoric and policies used for public diplomacy should be reliable.

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Digital Hegemony and the Russia-Ukraine War

Dijital Hegemonya ve Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı

İlknur Şebnem ÖZTEMEL[2]

ABSTRACT

In this article, the impacts of US-based global hi-tech companies like Google or Starlink on the Russia and Ukraine War will be examined. Also, grounding from this sample, further projections about the traditional debate on MNCs (Multinational Companies) vs. state will be made. Since the US Presidential Elections in 2008 and Occupy Wall Street Movements, social media and the internet have started to be used for political purposes. With the start of the Arab Spring events, the sphere of influence of such politically oriented movements on the internet became international. Then, with the Second Karabakh War (The 44 Days War), social media, the internet, and misinformation started to be used directly for foreign policy interests. Additionally, it can be argued that the use of social media, digital platforms, and the internet for specific foreign policy objectives entered a mature phase with the imposition of technological and cultural sanctions against the Russian people, while the well-known hi-tech and communication sector voluntarily makes its services easier to use for Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian people. Here, it is possible to see significant changes in the traditionally defended apolitical structures of global companies. Considering the increasing importance of hi-tech goods in our daily lives, sampling from the habits we got during the Covid-19 pandemic, the importance and effect of the companies that provide these products and services will also rise. Adding the lack of home-grown alternatives for these products and know-how transfer,

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this one-sided dependency could bring weaknesses for several nation-states in the upcoming period.

Keywords: The internet, social media, Russia-Ukraine War, technology firms, dependency

ÖZ

Bu makalede, ABD merkezli, Google veya Starlink gibi teknoloji şirketlerinin Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı üzerindeki etkisi incelenecektir. Ayrıca, bu örnekten yola çıkarak, çok uluslu şirketler ile devletler arasındaki rekabetin artacağına dair geleneksel tartışmalar çerçevesinde belirli öngörülerde bulunulacaktır. 2008 yılında yapılan ABD Başkanlık Seçimleri ve Wall Street'i İşgal Et Hareketinden bu yana sosyal medya ve internet, politik amaçlar dâhilinde kullanılmaktadır. Arap Baharı olaylarının başlamasıyla ise, bu olgu daha geniş bir kitleye erişmiş ve uluslararası nitelik kazanmıştır. Ardından, İkinci Karabağ Savaşı (44 Gün Savaşı) ile sosyal medya, internet ve hatta dezenformasyon, alenen dış politika aracı olarak kullanılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'nda, ilgili teknolojiler ekstra kolaylıklarla, Ukrayna makamlarının ve Ukraynalıların hizmetine sunulurken, Rus halkını hedef alan teknoloji temelli kültürel ambargolar ile sosyal medya ve internetin, propaganda ve iletişim temelli bir şekilde, belirli dış politika hedefleri için kullanması yönündeki eğilimin, olgunluk dönemine girdiği söylenebilir. Burada küresel şirketlerin geleneksel olarak savunulan apolitik yapılarında önemli değişimler görmek mümkündür. Covid-19 pandemisi ve karantina döneminde kazandığımız alışkanlıkları da düşünecek olursak, ilgili teknolojilerin günlük hayatımızdaki öneminin artması ile, bahse konu girişimlerin ve şirketlerin de önemi ve etkisi artacaktır. Bu noktada, pek çok ülkenin yerli alternatifler sunmaktan aciz olması ya da teknoloji transferi noktasında zafiyetinin olması neticesinde gelişen tek taraflı bağımlılık, ilerleyen dönemde ulus-devletleri zorlayabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnternet, sosyal medya, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, teknoloji şirketleri, bağımlılık

Introduction

In this century, there is an internationally widespread trend as everyone knows something about any subject, but it cannot be counted as 100% true and deeply analyzed information. It is undeniable that social media, digital platforms, and easy access to data via the internet are effective in this situation. Rich sources on the internet led people also to be informed about political facts briefly. At some point, the lack of heavy burdens and costs of revealing their thoughts on online platforms, even by using nicknames, increased people's tendency to be more active in the political sphere.

This led to the development of political usage of the internet, social media, and digital platforms both on the civil and commercial/professional sides to steer people. Since the US Presidential Elections in 2008 and Occupy Wall Street Movements, social media and the internet started to be used for political purposes. With the start of the Arab Spring events, the sphere of influence of such politically oriented movements on the internet became international. Then, with the Second Karabakh War (The 44 Days War), social media, the internet, and misinformation started to be used directly for foreign policy interests. What's more, it can be asserted that the use of social media, digital platforms, and the internet for specific foreign policy objectives entered a mature phase with the imposition of technological and cultural sanctions against the Russian people, while the well-known hi-tech and communication sector voluntarily makes its services easier to use for Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian people.

It is undeniable that most goods and services like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Youtube are American-based enterprises with millions of foreign users. The stranger nature of these companies make it impossible to have accountability on the side of nation-states regarding the force of legal jurisdiction. Regardless of the losses of taxes, as these companies earn money from the users they have in countries like Türkiye or Russia, governments cannot win from this. Their position as news resources or gatekeepers makes these companies more important yet harder to control. Adding crisis of fake news or the rising number of bot accounts that affect domestic and international public opinion, it has become obligatory to have an eye on the activities of these companies. The example of sanctions imposed on Russia shows that there is a digital hegemony that does not empower freedom of speech or enhance the lives of regular people but is used as a weapon.

It is well-known that technology has developed faster in the last decades and has started to interfere in any sphere of our daily lives. Besides, the Covid-19 pandemic and long periods of quarantine further accelerated digitalization and brought more interference of technology into our lives. All these changes have both positive and negative results. It is for sure that technology makes our lives more efficient and easy. On the other hand, some scholars like Baudrillard or Adorno claimed that such a close relationship with technology would irreversibly change the nature of the relations between man and machine and the future of humanity. As Kalın argues, technological devices and machinery produced to shape nature started to shape the social life of individuals (2018, pp. 119-120). In this respect, Marshall McLuhan suggests technological determinism, which orders that the central issue in life is technology, and all other things are being shaped by it (Timisi, 2016, p. 18). In this sense, İsmet Özel (2017) describes modern life as "A man besieged by a man-made nature". Additionally, there is another problem: anything provided by the technology is presented as a good thing without any deeper analysis. Postman sees this situation as another serious problem and calls it 'technopoly' (Newport, 2019, pp. 62-63).

Regardless of the position of technology in our lives, another problem pops into our mind, especially during extreme conditions like the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War. Inspiring from the view of Postman, the huge impact of technology in our lives and the technological superiority and hegemony enjoyed by a certain actor/group of actors could be more detrimental and risky for regular people. At this point, the importance of perception management in politics must be recalled. Two crucial points must be referred to. First, it is well understood that in diplomatic communications, using digital platforms and creating a positive perception about oneself in the minds of the international community became an important necessity in this post-truth age. Secondly, the open and un-monitored nature of social media and digital platforms, which constitutes the core of global communication in this century, has led to the spread of fake news and misinformation and created a fertile flora for using them for specific, hostile foreign policy interests.

What's new for this war is, for the first time, usually neutral companies that provide hi-tech or social media services become a clear side of the fight by making global social media or digital platforms unavailable for the Russian side, preventing them from presenting an alternative narrative of the war and voluntarily gave up making their Russian consumers happy, to help to their home governments to create pressure over Kremlin. Now at erst, it must be underlined that, for a long time, the dominance of GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) in the markets and their gatekeeper position in terms of access to information and news were seen as a threat for some people. These companies became available to be used against the interests of their foreign consumers and propose open threats against the solidarity of nations. Several actors like the EU imposed Digital Markets and Digital Services Acts (DMA & DSA) to control the power of these firms with both economic and social worries. The Turkish government has also prepared a draft law regulating the actions of these companies and some other giants, which foresees more transparent operation and increases their responsibility for any negative development like the spread of fake news, black propaganda, or volatility among the public. All these acts can be interpreted as necessary measures taken by governments to achieve full security against hybrid threats.

Rising Influence of the Internet and Social Media on Politics

At first, the internet and social media (Web 2.0) were used solely by civil individuals rather than public institutions or commercial media broadcasters. In this respect, the spread of social media was appreciated and seen as a gift that would bring back the supposed nature of media to constitute 'the fourth power of democracy', enhance freedom of expression, and support people's right to gain informa-

tion. For example, Rheingold claimed that people could meet and talk about social problems online, and such platforms could constitute an alternative meeting place, an agora for people (1993, p. 149). Such claims appetize people for ancient tradition of the agora, direct democracy, or cyber democracy that would be enhanced with the transparency and participation possible with the new technologies (Şener, 2006, p. 64). In time, the spread of such applications led to the creation of an alternative public sphere. Habermas conceptualizes the public sphere as a mediating space between the state and civil society. It is presented as a basic sample of a democratic space where public interests, opinions, agendas, and problems are transformed and exchanged by citizens. However, critical rationality, equality, freedom of expression, and dissemination are the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the public sphere (Habermas, 1991, pp. 398-405).

On the other side of the coin, some scholars like Yusuf Kaplan argued that with the rise of interactions between capitalist production methods and new communication technologies, local cultures would be materialized, added to the sphere of global power and under a sole global culture. Thus, monitoring and controlling the world for certain actors became easier. It is asserted that establishing a more democratic structure via these technologies is just a fantasy (Kaplan, 1991, p. 141). Unfortunately, recalling the problems with algorithms of such platforms that led to the further polarization of the public and scandals that occurred in the last 4-5 years, it can be said that rather than making the global arena more democratic, these platforms were used as aggressive tools for certain foreign policy goals.

The first official and well-known usage of social media for political means was seen in Barack Obama's campaign for the US Presidential Elections in 2008. Other than the traditional way of top-down, one-way interaction with people held via TV, published articles or websites, Obama's team used social networking systems (SNSs) such as Facebook to involve users in two-way interactions and introduced 'micro-payments' via social media apps. Also, the team established personalized environments (e.g. 'my.barackobama.com') that would lead to empowering the sense of participation and ownership in the campaign (Gliem & Janack, 2008, pp. 45-47; Orlowski, 2020).

The second mass usage of social media for political goals was also in 2008. This time, people used social media applications in order to mobilize for a bottom-up process, Occupy Wall Street protest (Gleason, 2018, pp. 76-77). This civil disobedience movement that highlights economic inequalities in the USA has shown that old theories of Henry D. Thoreau were resurrected via technological gadgets. A very significant nuance here is that, as technology makes the mobilization process easier, faster, and cheaper, it has become a more common and normal thing to organize protests all over the World.

Thirdly, with the spread of Arab Spring protests via social media, the usage of such innovations for political means became an international phenomenon. It has been written in history as the 'Twitter Revolution' (Jones & Mattiacci, 2019, p. 748) and the term 'Clicktivism' has occurred to refer to the organization of people through social media (Yeğen, 2015, p. 157). It is crucial to note that Gezi Protests began in May 2013 in Türkiye and The Euromaidan Protests started at the end of 2013 in Ukraine are some other examples of this trend.

The most interesting event regarding using social media for political agendas happened during the US Presidential Elections in 2016. In March 2018, news agencies revealed alleged cheating during the previous presidential elections as the Cambridge Analytica Scandal. As a part of this, it is claimed that Aleksandr Kogan, a lecturer at Cambridge University, created a personality and style-behavior modeling test called 'psychographics', applied to about 80 million Facebook users in the USA to change the faith of elections and referendum on BREXIT. One of the key points here is that people logged into many other applications via their Facebook accounts rather than signing up. This way, people gave important information such as names, locations, e-mail addresses, and friend lists to the relevant service providers without knowing it (Kozlowska, 2018). The company Cambridge Analytica has enabled the collection, analysis, and use of all this information within a new marketing strategy. Their main goal was to analyze all the savings of users and personalities and predict possible reactions and decisions on vital issues via the psychographic method of Kogan. Other than violating laws protecting personal data, this initiative allegedly fed polarization among people, revealed more radical thoughts of citizens, and changed the election result in 2016. At this point, it is crucial to remind that majority of these social media applications use algorithms that show relevant content to appeal to each user's appetite all the time. This led to 'homophily', which means people who like to be with others who think like themselves. With this tendency based on the algorithm of these applications, individuals became more interested in participating and making contributions and were encouraged to group and mobilize. This structure of algorithms of these social media platforms polarizes societies all around the world and makes social movements easier to occur (Hamdy, 2010, pp. 6-10). Adding the potential of bot accounts and fake news to the calculation, it is possible to think that social media and the internet have become major gadgets to achieve any political goal. In this perspective, it is crucial to recall that on July 29, 2018, the House of Commons Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport published a report on 'fake news' that also related to the elections in 2016. In this report, it is mentioned that 'relentless targeting of hyper-partisan views, which play to the fears and the prejudices of people, in order to alter their voting plans', is 'more invasive than obviously false information and called the combined impact of fake news and micro-targeting as a 'democratic crisis' (DCMS, 2018, p. 3).

Moreover, it is possible to say that such debatable platforms started to be used for specific foreign policy agendas. For instance, during the Second Karabakh War (The 44 Days War) in 2020, the just military aid of Türkiye to Azerbaijan was tried to be sabotaged by misinformation campaigns held on social media. The Armenian side tried to spread the view that Armenia was the buffer zone between Türkiye and Turkic Republics in Central Asia, and sole blockage to avoid enlargement of the sphere of influence of Ankara to the East. Thus, it is argued that Armenian interests must be protected. Also, recalling the lie of the so-called Armenian Genocide, they tried to create an illusion about the reason for war and claimed that history is repeating itself. Additionally, recalling the events of World War I, the dispute about the delimitation of the Aegean Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus Issue, a group of users asserted that Turkish authorities made a Greek genocide. In this sense, they have opened hashtags such as 'savearmenians', 'savegreeks' or 'boycottTurkey' on Twitter (Öztemel, 2021).

It can also be said that similar efforts to affect the perspectives of international audiences about the Russia-Ukraine War have been introduced. To exemplify, the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly's Commission on Social Media and Digital Platforms, and MP from Hatay of AK Party, Hüseyin Yayman, gave an interview to CNN Turk on March 19, considering the recent developments in Ukraine and the impact of social media on it. He said, "The social media does not directly control a missile but determine where it could be sent to", and referred that disinformation has become a global problem. What's more, on Safe Internet Day (02/08/2022), Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, Dr Ömer Fatih Sayan, highlighted the hate speech and misinformation on social media and claimed that these platforms act beyond their business goals, interfere in the domestic politics of states. He also claimed that these platforms are intentionally being used to challenge the national security and sustainability of states (Ertunç, 2022).

In brief, as Baudrillard said in his Simulation Theory, a super-reality that would overshadow the real world can easily be created within the scope of perception management. Hyper-reality is designed and disseminated by mass media. The made-up truth overshadows the real truth and leaves it in the background. When the 'truth', which the specific target audience would prefer to believe, is presented to this audience by perception managers at the right time, in the right medium and with the right communication tools, planned associations can be created in people's minds and hearts (Baudrillard, 2013). Adding the cartel-like situation of mostly US-based companies that provide services for social media and digital platforms, the situation becomes stricter for anyone who tries to challenge Washington's interests.

Russia-Ukraine War and the Impact of Digital Platforms and MNCs that operate in the Hi-tech Sector

In recent years, Russian foreign policy has been accused of being aggressive. Indeed, compared to the first years after the collapse of the USSR, Russian foreign policy became more active, focusing on regaining its sphere of influence. Theorized as the 'Near Abroad' or 'Russkiy Mir/Russian World' policy, inspired by the fear that appeared among the Russian ruling elite following the Orange (2004), Rose (2003), Tulip (2005) Revolutions, labeled as 'US-orchestrated' or 'NGO-special operation' (Popescu & Wilson, 2009, pp. 29-30), made Russian authorities to take stricter steps to guarantee the national security and stability of the region. Adding the Euromaidan Protest in 2014 to the equation, it is impossible to think of what's happening in Ukraine now separately from these developments.

Russian authorities interpreted all these developments as a new type of encirclement policy. Albeit, some scholars like Engel called this a new 'Cold Peace' period (2014, pp. 119-121). Russian authorities created some soft power initiatives to conduct such policies to counter increasing American or European influence in its backyard. To achieve this, Russians living abroad (compatriots or minorities), Russian language, common history and culture, Orthodox Church, media, and even social media, including hackers that work for the Kremlin, bot accounts that change the density of views on social media or fake news, were used. Meanwhile, Russian authorities tried to introduce home-grown alternatives to these media, social media, and technological goods like Vkontakte, Yandex search engine, or Sputnik news agency.

As a result of the military operation that started on February 24, several Western countries imposed matchless sanctions on the Russian people. It is well-known that, after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Kremlin was working on a sanction-proof economy, decreasing budget deficits, focusing on gold reserves, and began negotiations with major players of the world economy like China to create an alternative to the current model. Russian authorities introduced measures to combat the economic effect of potential sanctions and established the Mir payment system as an alternative to the dominance of Mastercard/Visa and the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) as an alternative to SWIFT. Also, it is seen that the traditional act of imposing sanctions on specific politicians or business people remains ineffective. However, it seems that Kremlin could not foresee having so heavy technological and cultural sanctions imposed on the Russian people. With the start of the war, Russian people were obliged to give up their most basic habits like using Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, watching videos on Youtube, wielding Google and Microsoft services for work, or shopping via Mastercard/Visa infrastructure. On the other side of the coin, the remaining population of the world became unaware of the situation in Russia, having prevented from listening to the

Russian narrative of the war. On the other hand, with the call of Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mihailov Fedorov on Twitter to Elon Musk, Starlink's satellite-based internet service provider became free and available for Ukrainian people to mobilize (Aljazeera, 2022).

Furthermore, satellite-based observation and communication systems became major weapons in this war. For example, as soon as the Russian military operations started, Viasat, a US-based provider of high-speed satellite broadband services, also to the Ukrainian army, suffered an outage (Rid, 2022). Additionally, Russia allegedly jammed GPS signals in Ukraine and erased the ability of Ukrainians to determine their location, navigate and send weapons to appropriate targets (Hitchens, 2022). Some commercial service providers joined this competition. For example, Google Maps suspended its operations regarding traffic jams, as it might be used to target troops or refugees (Meaker, 2022). The Canadian MDA satellite service served the Ukrainian army to target Russian troops (Wark, 2022). In addition, Maxar Technologies revealed images of the 40-mile Russian military convoy on the road Kyiv (Sky News, 2022). Russian authorities used their satellites to compete with the international aid that the Ukrainian side had and warned the world about a potential attack on its space infrastructure. Dmitry Rogozin, who is the head of the Roscosmos (Russian alternative to NASA), said that Russia would treat any hacking of its satellites as a 'casus belli' (a reason for war) (Reuters, 2022). Also, on the technology-based cultural sanctions related to Instagram, Russia created its national alternative, Rossgram (Dodgson, 2022).

On the perception management side of the war, it can be seen that social media platforms are becoming more powerful. At this point, Ukrainian President Zelensky is well-informed about social media management from his early career and victory in the Presidential Elections of 2019. In the light of this, he called for the usage of any platform to declare Ukraine's claims. For instance, in one of his speeches, he appealed to 'Tiktokers' as they might help end the war. Also, a Ukrainian travel blogger named Alina Volik, who has about 36,000 followers on social media, started to share posts about the invasion and help people "see the truth" about the war (Dang & Culliford, 2022). In addition, on a Russian-originated platform, Telegram, serious reflections of the war can be seen. Ukraine's Security Service tweeted that the live monitoring and release of what Russian troops were doing on the field by Ukrainian civilians on the Telegram chatbot helped them to target the enemy. So, the agency called on ordinary citizens to act like war correspondents and 'join the information front' of the war. About these developments, Ian Garner, a historian and translator of Russian war propaganda, underlined that Ukrainian and Russian propaganda goes side by side on Telegram, and the information war has been outsourced to a private company (Bergengruen, 2022).

Projections about the Post-War Period and the State-Businesses Rivalry

It is alleged that Russia is far from achieving its political agenda to overthrow the government in Kyiv but is about to take control of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Mariupol, and necessary fields to have an on-land connection with Russia and South & East of Ukraine. On economic and cultural sanctions, it is possible to say that the Russian economy is fighting back using petro-carrots and petro-sticks to divide the EU, similar to the gas crisis of 2006 and 2009. No proper analysis could be done as the majority of the world is not aware of the reaction of the Russian people to these cultural sanctions. For now, no serious civil movements occurred against the government as it is expected by Western countries. What is clear here is that states will try to take issues related to social media and digital platforms more seriously, have an eye on MNCs centered abroad, and, if possible, have home-grown alternatives to not only satellites for communication and observation systems but also for technological goods that people use in daily basis. For instance, In March 2022, while European states presented full support to the policies of the US-based companies to isolate Russia and Russian technology firms from global markets, European Parliament accepted Digital Markets Act (DMA). The act introduces multiliteracy and fair competition in the market by introducing strict economic and administrative rules that enhance the authority of member states over these hi-tech companies.

According to this, digital services, including search engines, which value above 75 billion Euro and have at least 45 million individual, or 10,000 business-oriented users and 7,5 billion USD income, would be classified as 'gatekeepers' (basic source of information for people). They will be obliged to obey certain rules inserted in order to protect the competitive structure of the market. It is referred that in case of any violation, authorities can punish these firms with administrative fees that cost 10% of their annual revenue, which would be increased to 20% (Dünya, 2022), (Taftalı et al., 2022). Also, laws on the fight against fake news and disinformation on social media were inserted in 2018. Turkish authorities are also preparing to introduce similar regulations on these agents.

Another interesting development is that: Alexander Beglov, the head of local government, announced that St. Petersburg and the Mariupol would become sister cities, and authorities are ready to begin re-construction projects (Sullivan, 2022). Similarly, in a video call with Elon Musk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called him to invest in Ukraine, especially in the space sector and rebuilding the state, at the height of the escalations (Ensonhaber, 2022).

In light of this information, it can be said that other than military competition, there can be a potential rivalry in terms of lifestyle, luxuries, and physical infra-

structure between the areas under the control of the Ukrainian government and the de facto control of Russia, similar to the one between the East and West Berlin in the Cold War. What should be emphasized here is that, unlike the Cold War period, MNCs, especially those that operate in Web 3.0 sectors, would have a major role, and hybrid measures of war might suppress traditional techniques of war. In this sense, developed states that are home to these companies will be very advantageous and increase their capabilities in the international arena, while developing states whose people are dependent and even addicted to these technologies may be weak against possible sanctions and open to interference of others. Thus, many of them would try to have options to cope with the impact of this dependency, like raising public awareness or developing options to block these gadgets' activities. To exemplify, it is declared that China started trials on anti-satellite missiles in May 2022 (Dursun, 2022).

Conclusion

It is possible to see that all direct and indirect sides of the conflict, the USA, EU member states, neighboring states, China, Russia, and Ukraine, try to ensure their interests through all diplomatic negotiations for peace, military, and hybrid methods for enhancing their capabilities on the battlefield. All sides see the war as the forward steps of another world war and act under the ideals of the Realist Theory of International Relations, such as being a self-help state but continue to use slogans and propaganda techniques of liberal theory for their interests. In this respect, it is possible to claim that the hybrid measures of war from technological services, digital platforms, and communication technologies to space technologies and more involvement of MNCs will become more visible in this rivalry. To fight against the digital hegemony of the US via companies and basic service providers like Google or Meta, governments must look into the old debate on using national alternatives and try to have know-how transfer and investment. Meanwhile, governments should have to keep an eye on the activities of these companies and guarantee that there is minimum interference of them in domestic politics and international relations of the state.

This new empowerment of the hybrid war phenomenon will forever change the relationship between state and businesses. It will become more common to threaten government authorities by mobilizing people with fake news or advantages of algorithms that polarize the public in domestic politics and propagate the narrative of counter-foreign policy initiatives for target audiences. Governments will try to insert regulations or suspend activities of these services, but this time, they might be accused of introducing censorship methods, and further negativity among people could occur. A new dilemma will become more obvious for states

with this war. It seems that what state authorities have to do is to raise awareness among people as such technologies create a fauna opposite of Habermas's public sphere, which is based on equality but could be used as gadgets of rival states for benevolent acts.

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
Özbekistan'da Medya Tarihine Bir Bakış
An Overview of Media History in Uzbekistan

Zakir AVŞAR[1]

ÖZ

Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB)'nin dağılmasının ardından bağımsızlıklarını kazanan Türk Cumhuriyetlerinde medya ve kitle iletişim araçları, komünizm etkisinden sıyrılma ve kendi kimliklerini yeniden kazanma sürecinde özellikle tarih, dil, din ve kültür alanlarında önemli görev üstlenmiştir. 1991 yılında bağımsızlığını kazanan Özbekistan'da medya SSCB döneminde daha çok ideoloji aşılama amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Ancak 1991 yılından itibaren Özbekistan komünizm etkisinden kurtularak gerek Özbek Türkçesi'nin topluma öğretilmesi gerekse kültür, din ve bilim odaklı yayın yapmaya başlamıştır. Globalleşmenin de etkisiyle devlete ait olan televizyon kanalları, gazete ve dergilerin yanında özel sektör de çeşitli yayın organları kurmuştur. Bunun yanı sıra bağımsızlığın ardından Özbekistan Anayasasında medya ve kitle iletişim araçlarının görev ve sorumluluklarının yanı sıra hakları da tanımlanmış ve özgür bir medya vaadinde bulunulmuştur. Buna karşın bağımsızlığın ilan edildiği 1991 yılından 2016 yılında ölümüne kadar iktidarda bulunan İslam Kerimov döneminde medya çalışanlarının ve medyanın özgürlüğü Anayasada yazan maddelerden öteye geçememiştir. Ancak diğer taraftan İslam Kerimov'un ardından cumhurbaşkanlığına seçilen Şevket Mirziyoyev döneminde medya alanında çeşitli reformlar hayata geçirilmiştir. Söz konusu reformlar sonucu bazıları 20 yıldır tutuklu bulunan gazeteciler serbest bırakılmış, basın ve yayın organları görece serbest bırakılmıştır. Bunun sonucu olarak da Dünya Basın Endeksinde Özbekistan artan bir trende girmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özbekistan, kitle iletişim araçları, medya, kültür, dil

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ABSTRACT

The media in the Turkic Republics, which gained independence after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, played an important role in the process of eliminating communism's influence and regaining their own identities, particularly in the fields of history, language, religion, and culture. Media in Uzbekistan, which gained its independence in 1991, was used mostly to instill the ideology during the period of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, Uzbekistan eradicated communism's influence in 1991 and began broadcasting with an emphasis on culture, religion, and science, as well as teaching Uzbek Turkish to the public. With the effect of globalization, the private sector also established various media outlets in addition to the state-owned television channels, newspapers, and magazines. Moreover, the Constitution of Uzbekistan defined the duties, responsibilities, and rights of the media after independence, and promised a free media. However, the freedom of media workers and media could not extend beyond the provisions of the Constitution under the tenure of Islam Karimov, who ruled from the country's independence in 1991 until his death in 2016. However, during the presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who succeeded Islam Karimov, numerous media reforms were adopted. As a result of these reforms, some journalists who were imprisoned for more than two decades were released, as were some press and media outlets. Consequently, Uzbekistan's ranking in the World Press Index has risen.

Keywords: Uzbekistan, mass media, media, culture, language

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

Uzbekistan is an important country because it is the geography where the founding elements of our belief system, culture, and civilization as the basis of our cultural codes, were born and developed. On the other hand, due to the influence of communism and then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it also shares a similar fate with other Turkic Republics in terms of both its administrative structure and politics.

The post-Soviet period is defined as the period following the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1990 to 2000, and the modern period is defined as the period after 2000 associated with the increased interaction brought about by developing internet technology.

The formation of national consciousness is another critical issue in the process of developing democracy and national consciousness. Uniting the identity structure, which was fragmented as a result of forced migration and resettlement policies, in the upper Uzbek identity and the Uzbek nation has not only racial, but also religi-

ous, cultural, language, and historical dimensions. In the process of rebuilding the Uzbek identity, special attention was paid to mass communication, the media and the press.

On the other hand, the first radio broadcasting in Uzbekistan started in 1920 with the foundation of Moscow Radio in Uzbekistan. Initially, radio broadcasted newspaper news and then expanded to incorporate other programs. Uzbekistan's first radio station was established in 1927. On the other side, television broadcasting might be evaluated within the context of Soviet influence. In this setting, the first television broadcast occurred in Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital, in 1956, 10 years after the first mass television broadcast began in Moscow in 1946.

After its independence in 1991, the media in Uzbekistan also needed to undergo change and transformation. To erase the impact of Soviet Russia and communism, the media arose as an important service sector for national independence in the process of reconstructing Uzbekistan's culture in the fields of culture, religion, language, and politics. However, the media structure could not be saved from the influence of Soviet Russia and communism. However, as a result of the steps taken since 1991, the printed and visual media have gradually changed.

During the first decade following Uzbekistan's independence in 1991, the focus in the media and mass communication was on efforts to replace Russian with Uzbek Turkish. While the use of Uzbek Turkish in significant areas of daily life like as science, art, literature, and education was expanded in this setting, attempts were made to make these efforts visible through media channels and mass media.

When we consider the key problems of the media in Uzbekistan, there are very few organizational changes that would directly contribute to the professional development of media workers while also ensuring the construction of democracy and civil society. In addition, the state of Uzbekistan established the "Interagency Coordination Commission" (MKK) to regulate the activities of all television companies. When representatives and executives of private television channels were excluded from the commission, diverse reactions arose. The commission's bureaucratic barriers to license applications, as well as its pre-examination of private television channel broadcasts, fuel rumors in the press of censorship against the Uzbek Constitution.

In addition to all of this, radical reform attempts in Uzbekistan stand out in terms of democracy and freedom, particularly during the tenure of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who was elected President after the death of the founding president Islam Karimov. Since 2017, Uzbekistan has risen in the World Press Freedom Index. However, despite the fact that the increasing trend persists, Uzbekistan remains one of the closed countries.

Giriş

Özbekistan, kültürel kodlarımızın temelinde yer alan inanç sistemimizin, kültür ve medeniyetimizin kurucu öğelerinin doğup büyüdüğü coğrafya olması nedeniyle önemlidir. Özbekistan'ın kökenleri 13. yüzyılda Moğol istilası sonucu büyük bir yıkım ve zarara uğrayan bölgenin 1313-1341 yılları arasında hüküm süren Altın Orda Devleti hükümdarı Özbek Han'a dayanmaktadır. Özbek Han'ın kendi idaresi altındaki Fergana Vadisi bölgesinde yaşayan Türkleri bir araya getirerek kurduğu devlet Özbek Devleti adını almıştır (Cabborov, 2008, ss. 10-28). Bunun yanı sıra Allworth (1990, ss. 31-33) günümüzde Özbekler olarak adlandırılan Türkler ile 14. yüzyılda Özbekler olarak adlandırılan topluluk etnik olarak birbirlerinden farklıdır. Buna göre 14. yüzyılda Özbek olarak adlandırılan topluluk Altın Orda Devleti'nin başkentinden ayrılarak göç eden ve Tatar ırkına ait topluluktur. Özbek olarak adlandırılan ikinci topluluk ise 1300'lü yılların ikinci yarısından itibaren Timur Devleti'nin ortaya çıkışıyla aynı dönemde yaşayan topluluktur. Dolayısıyla Türk-Moğol olan topluluk Özbek adını kullanmakta ve Timurluların hâkimiyet bölgesinin dışında yer alan Semerkant'ın kuzeyinde konumlanmaktadır. Diğer taraftan ise SSCB ile komünizm etkisi altında yer almasından dolayı da aynı zamanda gerek yönetim anlayışı gerekse politik açıdan diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleriyle benzer bir kaderi paylaşmaktadır.

Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin yakın tarihini kronolojik olarak ele aldığımızda SSCB ve SSCB'nin dağılmasının ardından gelen bağımsızlık dönemi olarak değerlendirmek mümkündür. Özbekistan ise diğer Türk Cumhuriyetlerinden Azerbaycan ile birlikte SSCB'nin boyunduruğu altına girmeden bağımsızlıklarını ilan etmeleri yönüyle ayrılmaktadır.

SSCB'nin ardından dönemsel olarak ele aldığımızda özellikle 1990-2000 arası dönem Post-Sovyet veya Sovyet sonrası dönem ve ardından gelişen internet teknolojisinin sayesinde artan etkileşimin de etkisiyle 2000 sonrası günümüze kadarki süreci ise modern dönem olarak ele almak mümkündür.

20 Haziran 1990 tarihinde egemenliğinin ardından 1 Eylül 1991'de bağımsızlığını ilan eden Özbekistan, yaklaşık 35 milyonluk nüfusuyla Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin en kalabalığı konumundadır. Tarihî ve kültürel çeşitliliğinin yanı sıra yer altı zenginliklerinden dolayı da Asya bölgesinin önemli aktörleri olan Rusya, Hindistan ve Çin arasında devamlı olarak çıkar çatışmasının yaşanmasına neden olmuştur. Diğer taraftan özellikle İslam ve Türk kültürü açısından çok önemli olan "Mâverâünnehir" adı verilen bölgenin de büyük bir bölümünün Özbekistan'a ait olması da Özbekistan'ın değerini arttırmaktadır. Mâverâünnehir bölgesi İslam ve Türk kültürü açısından İmam Matüridi, İmam Buhari, Şahı Nakşibendi, İbn-i Sina ve Mirza Uluğ Bey gibi önemli isimlerin yetiştiği ve yaşadığı bölge olmasından dolayı kültürel, dinî ve bilimsel açıdan sadece Müslümanlar ve Türk dünyası için değil aynı zamanda bütün dünya için kaynak oluşturmasından dolayı ayrıca önemlidir.

Özbekistan 1876 yılında işgal edilmiş, 1920 yılında ise komünizmin tahakkümü altına girmiştir. Dönemin komünist rejiminin yönetim anlayışının sonucu böl-yönet politikalarının etkisini de en net biçimde yaşamıştır. Bu kapsamda, coğrafi sınırları sıklıkla değiştirilmiş, demografik yapısı da böl-yönet politikaları sonucu etkilenmiştir. Sovyet etkisindeki diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleri gibi Özbekistan'da zorunlu göç ve iskân politikaları sonucu etnik, dinî, kültürel ve siyasi karmaşaya sürüklenmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla toplumun yapısında önemli bir karmaşa dönemi yaşanmıştır (Budak, 2003-2004, s. 33).

Bu kapsamda değerlendirildiğinde, Tacikistan nüfusunun %24,4'ü, Kırgızistan'ın %13,8'i, Türkmenistan'ın %9'u, Kazakistan'ın %2,5'i Özbeklerden oluşmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Özbek halkı, uygulanan zorunlu göç ve iskân politikaları sonucunda 92 boya ayrılmış ve alt kimlikler ulusal kimliğin önüne geçmiştir (Hatunoğlu, 2022, s. 111). Dolayısıyla uygulanan zorunlu göç ve iskân politikaları sonucu oluşan toplumsal dengesizlik diğer Türk Cumhuriyetlerinde olduğu gibi Özbekistan'da da bağımsızlığını kazandığı 1991 yılından itibaren bağımsızlığın pekiştirilmesi ve en önemlisi demokrasinin kalıcı hâle getirilmesi yönündeki çabaların ana omurgasını oluşturmuştur.

Demokrasi ve bağımsızlık bilincinin yerleştirilmesi sürecinde ise diğer bir önemli mesele ulus bilincinin oluşturulması sürecidir. Zorunlu göç ve iskân politikaları sonucu parçalanmış olan kimlik yapısının üst kimlik olan Özbek kimliğinde ve ulusunda birleştirilmesi süreci, sadece ırk kökenli olmayıp aynı zamanda, din, kültür, dil ve tarih boyutlarına da sahiptir. Özbek kimliğinin yeniden inşası sürecinde de kitle iletişime, medyaya ve basına özel önem verilmiştir.

Özbekistan'da Medyanın Kısa Tarihi

Türkistan-Özbekistan bölgesinde medyanın tarihini ele aldığımızda 1867'den 1917'ye kadarki süreçte iki aşamalı bir gelişim sergilediğini ifade etmek mümkündür. Birinci aşamada 1870-1905 yılları arasında yayın yapan Türkistan Bölge Gazetesi bulunmaktadır ve söz konusu gazete yerel dilde yayın yapan tek gazete olma özelliğini taşımaktadır. İkinci aşamada ise Özbek Türkçesi'yle yayın yapmaya başlayan, bağımsız ve süreli yayınların geliştiği dönemdir. Sovyet Dönemi olan 1917 yılından itibaren ise ilk gazete 1917'de Rusça yayın yapan Naşa Gazeta (Bizim Gazete) olmuştur. Ardından peşi sıra Haberler (İzvestiya), Türkistan Gerçekleri (Pravdası, Turkestanskaya Pravda) ve Doğunun Gerçekleri (Pravda Vostoka) yayın hayatına başlamıştır. Özbek Türkçesiyle yayımlanan ilk Sovyet gazetesi ise İştirakiyun (Komünist) gazetesi olmuştur. Gazete 1921-1922'de Kızıl Bayrak, 1922-1924'te Türkistan ve 1924-1964'te Kızıl Özbekistan ve 1964-1991 yılları arasında Sovyet Özbekistan adıyla yayımlanmıştır (Temir, 2021, s. 167).

Sovyet Döneminde yayınlanan gazetelerin diğer bir önemli özelliğini Sovyet etkisi, ideolojik ve siyasi içerikli gazeteler oluşturmaktadır. Bu kapsamda Genç Leninist, İşçi, Lenin'in Kıvılcımı ve Kültür Devrimi gibi çok sayıda gazete çıkmaya başla-

mıştır. 1940'lı yılların ikinci yarısı ve 1950'li yılların ilk yarısında ağırlıklı olarak kültürel ve bilimsel kimliği bulunan Özbek Türklerine yönelik muhalif tutumlu gazetelerin yine kültür, din ve ideoloji merkezli yayın yaptıkları dönemi oluşturmaktadır (Temir, 2021, s. 167).

Diğer taraftan Özbekistan'daki ilk radyo yayıncılığı ise 1920 yılında Moskova Radyosu'nun Özbekistan'da da yayına geçirilmesiyle başlamıştır. İlk başlarda gazete haberlerinin aktarıldığı radyo yayınlarında daha sonra farklı programlara da yer verilmeye başlanmıştır. 1927 yılında ise Özbekistan'ın kendisine ait radyosu kurulmuştur. Öte yandan televizyon yayıncılığını da yine Sovyet etkisi kapsamında değerlendirmek mümkündür. Bu kapsamda Moskova'da 1946 yılında yayın hayatına başlayan ilk kitlesel televizyon yayınından yaklaşık 10 yıl sonra 1956 yılında Özbekistan'ın başkenti Taşkent'te ilk televizyon yayını gerçekleştirilmiştir (Qozoqboev & Xudoyqulov, 2018, ss. 72-78).

1975 yılı resmî kayıtları ele alındığında Özbekistan'da 169'u Özbek Türkçesi olmak üzere 257 gazete ve 134 dergi bulunmaktadır. Gazete ve dergi sayısındaki artışta 1967 yılında bağımsız bir fakülte şeklinde hizmet veren Gazetecilik Bölümünün etkisini gözardı etmek mümkün değildir (Qozoqboev & Xudoyqulov, 2018, ss. 24-25).

Bağımsızlık Sonrası Özbekistan'da Medya

Bağımsızlığın kazanıldığı 1991 yılından itibaren Özbekistan'da medyanın da değişim ve dönüşüm geçirmesi gerekliliği doğmuştur. Özellikle Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm etkisinden kurtulmak için, kültür, din, dil ve siyaset alanında Özbekistan kültürünü yeniden inşa sürecinde medyanın rolü millî bağımsızlık için önemli bir hizmet alanı olarak belirmiştir. Bununla birlikte medyanın yapısını Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm etkisinden kurtarmak bir anda mümkün olmamıştır. Buna karşın 1991 yılından itibaren atılan adımlar sonucu basılı ve görsel medya yavaş yavaş değişim geçirmiştir.

Dolayısıyla öncelikle Özbekistan'ın Anayasasını ele almak gerekmektedir. Bu kapsamda, Özbekistan Anayasasını incelediğimizde, Anayasanın 4. maddesinde Özbekistan'ın devlet dilinin Özbek dili olduğu belirtilmiş, bunun yanı sıra diğer dil ve kültürlere saygılı olunacağı açıklanmıştır. Bu sayede düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğü teminat altına alınmıştır. Özbekistan Anayasasının 67. maddesi doğrudan kitle iletişimi ile ilgilidir. Bu maddede, medyanın özgür olduğu, sansürün yasak olduğu belirtilmiştir. 67. madde ile ilgili doğrudan düzenlemeler, 26 Aralık 1997 tarihli "Kitle İletişim Yasası" 24 Nisan 1997 tarihli "Gazetecilerin Profesyonel Uğraşılarının Korunması Hakkında Kanun" 24 Nisan 1997 tarihli "Enformasyon Özgürlüğünün Garantileri ve İlkeleri" ve 25 Aralık 1998 tarihli "Reklamcılık Yasası"dır (Budak, 2003-2004, s. 34).

Medya ile ilgili yazılı, görsel ve sözlü yayıncılığı düzenleyen Kitle İletişim Yasasında (Madde 2) medyanın özgür olduğu, bu alanda çalışanların enformasyonu araştırma,

elde etme ve yayma hakkına sahip bulunduğu, ancak bilginin doğruluğundan ve yasalara uygunluğundan da sorumlu oldukları belirtilmektedir. Aynı yasanın 3. maddesi ise vatandaşların düşüncelerini özgürce ifade etmesini ve basın yayın özgürlüğüyle ilgili esasları içermektedir. 4. madde ile sansür yasaklanırken ifade özgürlüğünün kötüye kullanılmaması, 6. madde ile de medyanın anayasal düzene, ülke bütünlüğüne aykırı faaliyette bulunamayacağı, savaş ve şiddet propagandasına, etnik veya dinî düşmanlığa alet edilemeyeceği, devlet sırlarının açığa vurulamayacağı belirtilmektedir. Aynı yasanın diğer maddelerinde ise kitle iletişim alanında faaliyette bulunmak için temini gereken lisans sertifikası ile ilgili esaslar, yazılı basının uyması gereken prosedüre ait süreç, yayın içeriklerinin nasıl olması gerektiğini belirleyen koşullar ile devletin taraf olduğu uluslararası antlaşmalara uygun konular yer almaktadır. Kitle iletişim yasasıyla farklılık hâlinde uluslararası antlaşma esaslarının geçerli olduğu belirtilmektedir (Budak, 2003-2004, ss. 34-35).

Gazetecilerin Profesyonel Uğraşılarının Korunması Hakkında Yasa (madde 5) ile gazetecinin tanımı yapılmış, gazetecinin enformasyona ulaşma, analiz etme, kullanma ve dağıtma hakları düzenlenmiş, basın çalışanlarının kamu veya özel kuruluşlardan bilgi talep etme, bilginin doğruluğunu kontrol etme, toplumsal olayları takip etme gibi sorumlulukları da düzenlenmiştir. Gazetecilerin yasalara uymaları, haberin doğruluğunu araştırmaları, objektiflik kriterleri, bireylerin şeref ve haysiyetinin korunması, özel hayata saygı gösterilmesi, ilgili yasanın 6. maddesinde ayrıntılı olarak tarif edilerek düzenlenmiştir. Aynı yasanın 7. maddesinde kaynağın izni olmadan elde edilen bilginin başkasına verilemeyeceği, bazı çıkarlar için kullanılamayacağı hükme bağlanmıştır. Takip eden maddeler, gazetecilerin ülkede görev yaparken yasalara uymaları gerektiği ve Özbek gazetecilerle eşit haklara sahip oldukları gibi gazetecinin temel hak ve sorumlulukları ile ilgili konuları da içermektedir (Budak, 2003-2004, s. 35).

Reklamcılık alanı ile ilgli olan düzenlemeler ise yine doğrudan kitle iletişim araçlarını, basılı ve görsel medyayı ilgilendirmesinden dolayı önemlidir. Bu kapsamda "Özbekistan Cumhuriyeti Reklam Yasası" ile düzenlenen reklamcılık alanı, reklamcılıkta üretim, dağıtım, içerik, temel özellikler ve etik konular ele alınmış, reklamda ahlak kurallarına saygının, yasalara uygunluğun, doğruluk ve güvenilirliğin korunmasının esasları belirlenmiştir (Budak, 2003-2004, s. 35).

Bütün bunların yanında 15 Ocak 2007 tarihinde Özbekistan Anayasasında yapılan değişiklikle Kitle İletişimi Yasası güncellenerek kabul edilmiştir. Buna göre yeni yasada medyanın özgür ve bağımsız olduğu, sansür uygulanamayacağı ifadelerine yine yer verilmiştir (Budak, 2013, s. 103).

Anayasal düzenlemeler ile birlikte Sovyet Rusya ve Komünizm etkisinin izlerinin silinebilmesi için uygulamada da doğrudan karşılık bulan çeşitli değişimler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Medya alanında yapılan değişikliklere örnek vermek gerekirse, "eski medya

kuruluşlarının bir kısmının isimleri değiştirilmiştir. Örneğin Lenin'in Kıvılcımı'nın yeni ismi Şafak Yıldızı olurken Genç Leninist ise Türkistan adını almıştır. 1997'de kabul edilen medya yasasına göre gerçek ve tüzel kişilere medya kuruluşları kurma hakkı tanınmıştır. Böylelikle çok sayıda medya kuruluşu ortaya çıkmıştır" (Temir, 2021, s. 173).

Yine Özbekistan'ın bağımsızlığı sonrası, hem ulus inşa sürecinde hem de din, dil, kültür ve siyaset alanlarındaki yeniden yapılanmasında özellikle devletin temel taşlarını korumak için de çeşitli yapılar oluşturulmuştur. Bu kapsamda Halk Sözü (Xalq so'zi), Mülk'ün Sahibi (Mulkdor), Adalet (Adolat), Millî Uyanış (Milliy Tiklanish) ve XXI. yüzyıl gibi birçok devlet yayınının yanı sıra çok sayıda özel yayın da ortaya çıkmıştır. Her tür medyanın millîleştirilmesi Özbek Türkçesiyle yayınların hacmini arttırmıştır. Haber ajanslarının faaliyetlerinde de büyük değişiklikler olmuştur. Devlete ait haber ajansı olan Özbekistan Millî Haber Ajansı (Uzbekiston Milliy Axborot Agentligi) 1992 yılından beri, Dışişleri Bakanlığına bağlı Jahon Haber Ajansı 1995'ten beri faaliyet göstermektedir. 1998'de ilk özel haber ajansı olan Turkiston-press kurulmuştur. Bağımsızlığın ardından Poytaxt (Payitaht) ve Vodiy Sadosi (Vadinin Sesi) gibi pek çok radyo da kurulmuştur (Qozoqboev & Xudoyqulov, 2018, ss. 26-73; Temir, 2021, s. 174).

1991 yılı resmî verilerine göre 395 medya kuruluşunun bulunduğu Özbekistan'da günümüzde aktif olarak sayının 1.472 olduğunu ifade etmek mümkündür (Khalilova, 2017, s. 56). Söz konusu sayının %60'ını devlet kontrolü dışındaki medya kuruluşları oluşturmaktadır (Rakhman, 2020). Medya kuruluşlarının sayısındaki dramatik artışta 2018 yılında Kitle İletişimi Yasası'nda yapılan değişiklik ile daha özgürlükçü bir yapının benimsenmesinin etkisi büyüktür (Article 19, 2019). Kitle İletişimi Yasası ile ifade özgürlüğü ve sansürün kabul edilemezliği tekrar vurgulanmış ve ulularararası gözlemcilerin raporlarında da 2018 yılından itibaren medyanın daha serbest olduğu, ifade özgürlüğünün görece iyi işlediği ifade edilmektedir (Temir, 2021, s. 174).

Özbekistan'ın bağımsızlığını ilan ettiği 1991 yılından itiraben ilk 10 yıllık dönemde medya sektöründe ve kitle iletişiminde odak noktanın Rusça yerine Özbek Türkçesi'nin yerleştirilmesi yönündeki faaliyetlerin oluşturduğunu ifade etmek mümkündür. Bu kapsamda, ilim, bilim, sanat, edebiyat, eğitim gibi gündelik yaşamın önemli alanlarında Özbek Türkçesi'nin kullanımını yaygınlaştırılırken diğer taraftan medya kanalları ve kitle iletişim araçları vasıtasıyla söz konusu çabalar görünür kılınmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda

- ▷ "Özbek Dili ve Adabiyatı",
- ▷ "Şark Ulduzi",
- ▷ "Cohon Adabiyatı",
- ▷ "Tefekkür",

> ▷ "Özbekistan Adabiyati ve Senati",

> ▷ "Milly Tikleniş"

gibi dergi ve gazeteler Özbek Türkçesi için önemli örnekleri oluşturmaktadır (Açık, 2002, s. 138).

Diğer taraftan Latin harflerinin kullanımının öğretilmesi ve yaygınlaştırılması çabaları kapsamında yine basılı ve görsel medya önemli yer edinmektedir. Bu kapsamda çıkartılan;

> ▷ 'Uzbekistan Ovazi'

> ▷ 'Marifat'

> ▷ 'Adolet'

> ▷ 'Turkistan Taskent Hakikati'

> ▷ 'Vatan'

> ▷ 'Mulkdor'

> ▷ 'İnsan ve Kanun'

gibi yayınlarda Latin harfleri kullanılmıştır. Benzer şekilde İngilizce kullanımı da Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm etkisinden sıyrılarak Batı ile entegre bir şekilde Batılı ülkelere açılma çabaları kapsamında yaygınlaştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda çıkartılan;

> ▷ 'Business Review'

> ▷ 'Uzbekistan Ovazi Times'

> ▷ 'Good Morning'

Gazete ve dergileri örnek vermek mümkündür. Diğer taraftan Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm etkilerinden bir anda sıyrılmak mümkün değildir. Dolayısıyla Rusça'nın ve Kiril Alfabesinin de kullanıldığı gazete ve dergileri ise;

> ▷ 'Pravda Vostoka'

> ▷ 'Golos Uzbekistana'

> ▷ 'Narodnoe Slova'

> ▷ 'Vechernii Taschkent'

şeklinde sıralamak mümkündür. Bununla birlikte gerçekleştirilen çabaların ve medyanın da desteği sonucunda Rusça'nın kullanımının azaldığı ve Özbek Türkçesi'nin kullanımının yaygınlaşmaya başladığını ifade etmek mümkündür.

Bütün bunların yanında Özbekistan ekonomisinin ve yönetim anlayışının (yine Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm etkisinden kurtarma süreci kapsamında) bağımsızlığı sonrası çeşitli düzenlemeler yapılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, Özbekistan Devletine ait olan basım tesisi Shark'ın özelleştirilmesi sonucu özel sektöre ait gazete ve dergiler ile diğer basılı medya unsurlarının kâğıt tedariği kolaylaştırılmış, dağıtım ve nakliyat konularında da devlet tarafından çeşitli yardımlarda bulunulmuştur. Diğer taraftan devlet tarafından sübvanse edilen gazete ve dergilerin içeriklerinin durağan bir yapıda olması sonucu Özbekistan halkı tarafından daha az talep görmesine neden olmaktadır (Budak, 2003-2004, ss. 36-37).

Basılı medyanın yanı sıra televizyon alanında da Özbekistan'da bağımsızlığın ardından önemli gelişmeler olmuştur. Buna karşın televizyon alanı basılı medyaya göre daha yavaş gelişme göstermiştir. Yapılması gereken yatırımın daha yüksek olması ve zaman alması buna başlıca neden olarak gösterilebilir. Bu kapsamda değerlendirildiğinde bağımsızlığın kazanıldığı 1991 yılından itibaren ilk yıllarda tek bir ulusal kanal ve her bir vilayette yerel televizyon kanalları bulunmaktaydı. Bunun yanı sıra ülkede en çok seyredilen kanal ise Rus televizyon kanalıydı. Bununla birlikte 2000'li yıllara gelindiğinde ise özel televizyon kanallarının sayısında ciddi bir artış yaşanmıştır. Bu kapsamda sadece Özbek dilinde yayın yapan özel televizyon kanallarını aşağıdaki gibi sıralamak mümkündür;

- ▷ 'YOTRK (Andican)'
- ▷ 'Orbit ATV (Yangiabad)'
- ▷ 'Bagdad TV (Bagdad)'
- ▷ 'Tutkul TV (Tutkul)'
- ▷ 'İstiklol TV (Buhara)'
- ▷ 'Koinot TV (Buhara)'
- ▷ 'Aloka TV (Gulistan)'
- ▷ 'S-TV (semerkand)'
- ▷ 'Vita TV (Taşkent)'
- ▷ 'Kadirgoch TV (Guzer)'

    ▷ 'ALC TV (Urgench)'

    ▷ 'Margilan TV'

    ▷ 'Shark TV'

Diğer taraftan devlete ait olan televizyon kanalları ise hem Özbek Türkçesi hem de Rusça yayın yapmaktadırlar. Bu kapsamda;

    ▷ 'Yoshlar Kanalı'

    ▷ '1. Kanal'

    ▷ 'TTV-1'

    ▷ 'IV. Kanal'

Devlet televizyon kanalları olarak örnek gösterilebilir. Devlet kanalları Ocak 2002'den itibaren Latin harflerini kullanmaktadır. Devlet televizyonlarından IV. Kanal'ın önemli bir özelliği ise zaman zaman Rus televizyonlarına bağlanarak doğrudan Rusya'dan yayın aktarmasının yanı sıra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne bağlı TRT Avrasya kanalına da bağlanarak doğrudan TRT Avrasya'nın yayınlarını da aktarmasıdır (Budak, 2003-2004, s. 37).

Özbekistan'da Medyanın Başlıca Sorunları

Özbekistan'da basılı ve görsel medyanın başlıca sorunlarına da ayrıca değinmek gerekmektedir. Buna göre medya çalışanlarının mesleki gelişmelerine doğrudan katkı sunacak ve demokrasi ile sivil toplumun oluşmasını sağlayacak olan örgütsel olanaklar görece kısıtlıdır. 1997 yılında medya çalışanlarına destek oluşturması amacıyla kurulan "Gazeteciler Eğitim Merkezi" gazetecilere ve medya çalışanlarına çeşitli eğitimler vermekte, konferans, seminer ve toplantılar düzenlemektedir. Gazeteciler Eğitim Merkezi Özbekistan'daki medya çalışanlarının gelişimi için aralarında Kazakistan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Almanya ve Kırgızistan'ın da olduğu çeşitli ülkelerden katılımcıların bulunduğu eğitimler düzenlemiştir (Smith, 1999).

Bütün bunların yanında Özbekistan Devleti tarafından bütün televizyon kuruluşlarının faaliyetlerini düzenlemek amacıyla "Interagency Coordination Commission (Kurumlar Arası Koordinasyon Komisyonu)" (MKK) isimli bir komisyon kurulmuştur. Buna karşın söz konusu komisyona özel televizyon kanallarının temsilcileri ve yöneticileri dâhil edilmeyince çeşitli tepkiler oluşmuştur. Diğer taraftan komisyon yapılan lisans başvurularına bürokratik engeller çıkartması, özel televizyon kanallarının yayınlarının bu komisyon tarafından ön incelemeye tabi tutuluyor olması basında Özbekistan Anayasasına karşı şekilde sansür söylentilerini gündeme getirmektedir (CPJ, 1999).

Özbekistan'da medyanın başlıca sorunları sadece devlet tahakkümü sonucu oluşmamaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Özbekistan'da gazete ve dergilerin yayın periyotları özellikle finansal sorunlar nedeniyle devamlı olarak değişkenlik göstermektedir. "Gazete fiyatları, genel tiraj sayıları, gazetelerin içerikleri (reklam veya haber ağırlıklı olup olmamaları) ve yayın hayatında kalış süreleri değişkenlik göstermekte, bir müddet yayınlanan gazetelerin daha sonra yayınlanmaması gibi çok çeşitli sorunlar Özbekistan'daki yazılı basın kuruluşlarını önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir. 2011 yılında ülkede basılı yayınların 663'ünün gazete, 195'inin dergi olduğu belirtilmektedir. Bu yayınların hepsi düzenli olarak yayınlanmamaktadır" (Budak, 2013, s. 105). Tirajları yüksek olan gazeteleri;

> ‣ 'Kahlq Sazi (devlete ait)'

> ‣ 'Narodnye Slovo (devlete ait)'

> ‣ 'Özbekistan Ozovi (iktidar partisinin)'

Televizyon kanallarını ise;

> ‣ 'Uzbekistan National Agency (devlete ait)'

> ‣ 'Jahan-Turkistan Press'

şeklinde sıralamak mümkündür.

Özbekistan'da medya organlarının diğer sorunlarını kâğıt temini, basımı ve gazetelerin Özbekistan genelindeki dağıtımı oluşturmaktadır. Devlete ait basımevlerinde basılan gazeteler çeşitli sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalabilmektedir.

Yine devlete ait gazeteler sadece gazetecilik açısından değil, uygulanan dil, kültür politikaları bakımından da yetersizlik arz etmektedir. Ayrıca gazetecilerin mesleki eğitim olanakları son derece sınırlı olup, gelişen teknolojik olanakları takip edebilmeleri de yeterli düzeyde gelişme gösterebilmiş değildir (Budak, 2013, s. 104).

Özbekistan'da televizyon en çok tercih edilen medya organıdır. Ancak gerek özel gerekse devlete ait bütün radyo ve televizyon kanalları devlet tarafından kontrol edilerek denetimlerden geçirilmektedir.

Yurt dışından kablolu yayınlar mevcuttur. Ülke ekonomisindeki iniş çıkışlar, reklam gelirlerinin yetersizliği, meslek içi eğitimde kaynak sıkıntısı ve çalışanların ücretlerinin düşük olması, teknik altyapının geliştirilmesi ile ilgili sorunlar, finansal kaynakların yetersiz oluşu, özellikle teknolojik ve mesleki anlamda eğitim faaliyetlerinin gelişememesi, üniversitede ilgili fakülte ve yüksekokulların eğitiminin yaygınlık ve yeterlilik kazanamaması gibi durumlar televizyon yayıncılığının gelişimini önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir (Budak, 2013, s. 105).

Özbekistan'da bağımsızlığın ardından temel sorun Özbek kültürü ve Özbek dili alanlarında reform sürecinde gerek Sovyet Rusya gerekse komünizm etkisinden kurtulmakta medyanın öneminin farkına varılmış olması ancak hâkim yönetim geleneği nedeniyle kitle iletişim araçları ve medyaya yeterli özerklik alanının açılamamış olmasıdır. Bu kapsamda bağımsızlığın kazanıldığı 1991 yılından itibaren geçen 31 yılda çeşitli alanlarda çok sayıda reform gerçekleştirilmiş olmasına rağmen özellikle basın ve ifade özgürlüğü kapsamında her ne kadar yasal düzenlemeler aracılığıyla çeşitli kararlar alınmış olsa da uygulamada özellikle demokrasi alanında çeşitli sorunların devam ettiğini ifade etmek mümkündür.

Geleneksel medyanın yanında yeni medya teknolojileri ve internet de yukarıda bahsi geçen sansür uygulamalarına sıkça maruz kalmaktadır. Ancak özellikle 2005 yılında yaşanan toplumsal olaylarda çok sayıda kişinin hayatını kaybetmesi ve kaybolması yönetimde otoriterleşme eğilimlerinde artış meydana getirmiştir. Bu kapsamda Özbekistan'da görev yapan yabancı medya mensuplarının çalışmalarına sınır getirilmiş, birçok yabancı medya temsilcisi ise sınır dışı edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla özellikle internet alanında yayın yapan birçok medya kuruluşuna editöryal müdahalelerde bulunulmakta ve bu nedenle tam manasıyla özgürlük sağlanamamaktadır. Benzer şekilde 2012 yılından itibaren kapsamı ve içeriği farklı olsa da çok sayıda dava ve soruşturma açılmıştır. İnternet kullanımı da devletin kontrolü altındadır ve devlet istediği takdirde internet kullanımını kısıtlayabilmektedir. Özellikle Özbekistan hükûmetinin eleştirildiği yazılar ve internet sitelerine teknoloji aracılığıyla sansür uygulanmakta, web siteleri kapatılmakta veya erişimi engellenmektedir (Budak, 2013, s. 106).

Tablo 1: Dünya Basın Özgürlüğü Endeksi'nde Türk Cumhuriyetleri										
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Kırgızistan	106	97	88	85	89	98	83	82	79	72
Özbekistan	164	166	166	166	169	165	160	156	157	133
Kazakistan	160	161	160	160	157	158	158	157	155	122
Azerbaycan	156	160	162	163	162	163	166	168	167	154
Türkmenistan	177	178	178	178	178	178	180	179	178	177

Tablo 1 Dünya Basın Özgürlüğü Endeksi (https://rsf.org/en/index, 2022)

Bütün bunların yanı sıra demokrasi ve özgürlük anlamında Özbekistan'da özellikle kurucu devlet başkanı İslam Kerimov'un ölümünün ardından Cumhurbaşkanı seçilen

Şevket Mirziyoyev döneminde (2016 yılından itibaren) köklü reform çabaları öne çıkmaktadır. Bu kapsamda değerlendirildiğinde Özbekistan'ın Dünya Basın Özgürlüğü endeksinde 2017 yılından itibaren devamlı yükselmeye başladığı görülmektedir. Ancak yine de ifade etmek gerekir ki her ne kadar yükseliş trendi devam ediyor olsa da henüz kapalı ülkeler kapsamında değerlendirilmeye devam etmektedir.

Dünya Basın Özgürlüğü Endeksi hazırlanırken nitel analiz yöntemi kullanılmaktadır ve çoğulculuk, medya bağımsızlığı ve oto sansür, yasama çerçevesi, şeffaflık, altyapı, kötü muamele göstergeleri kullanılmaktadır. Özbekistan'ın görece yükselme trendinde bulunmasında, İslam Kerimov'un ardından bazıları 20 yıldır tutuklu bulunan gazetecilerin serbest bırakılması, medyaya uygulanan denetimlerin hafifletilmesi ve sansürün azaltılmasının yanı sıra internet sitelerindeki erişim engellerinin kaldırılarak bilgiye erişimin görece kolaylaştırılmasının etkisi büyüktür. Diğer taraftan özellikle televizyon kanallarında siyasi içerikli tartışma programlarına izin verilmesi, televizyon kanalı açmak, gazete ve dergi kurmak için gerekli olan ve yukarıda detayları paylaşılan kayıtların kolaylaştırılarak medya unsurlarının çeşitlendirilmesinin önünün açılması da diğer etkenlerdendir. Medyanın görece özgürleşmeye başlaması sonrası üst düzey politikacılar henüz eleştirilemiyor olsa da özellikle yolsuzluk ile ilgili haberlerin yapılmaya başlandığı kayıtlara geçmektedir.

Sonuç

Özbekistan bulunduğu konum itibariyle Asya bölgesinde önemli yer edinmektedir. Özellikle İpek Yolu güzergâhında yer alması zengin yer altı kaynaklarının bulunması Özbekistan'ın önemini daha da arttırmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Maveraünnehir bölgesinde yer alması hem Türk kültürü hem de İslam medeniyeti açısından da önemli kültürel, dinî, dilsel ve tarihsel açıdan temel oluşturmaktadır.

SSCB'nin kontrolü altında bulunması nedeniyle Özbekistan'ın yönetim anlayışı diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleriyle paralellik göstermektedir. İdeolojik olarak komünizmin etkisi, yönetim geleneği olarak SSCB'nin etkisi altında tarihini, kültürünü, dilini ve dinini korumaya çalışması dönemin önemli çabaları arasındadır. SSCB'nin dağılmasının ardından Batı dünyası ile bütünleşme/uyum sürecinde ve demokrasinin yerleştirilmeye çalışılması sürecinde de Özbekistan önemli reformları gerçekleştirmiştir.

Bu kapsamda özellikle Özbek ulusunun inşası, Özbek dilinin korunmaya çalışılması ve toplumda hâkim dil hâline getirilmeye çalışılması için medya önemli işlev üstlenmiştir. Ancak tarihsel olarak diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nde olduğu gibi medya genel olarak oldukça kısıtlı sayıda ve sömürge politikalarını destekleyici nitelikte gelişmiştir. Buna rağmen Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nde ilk yayınlar bu koşullar altında dahi olsa bu dönemde ortaya çıkmıştır. SSCB'nin kurulmasıyla beraber medya alanında niceliksel ve teknik olarak önemli atılımlar gerçekleştirilmiş ancak söz konusu atılımlar Sovyet

propagandası için bir araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu dönemde sayıları fazla olan gazete, dergi, radyo ve televizyon kanallarının ana amacı Sovyet kültürü ve komünizm propagandası olmuştur.

Bağımsızlıklarının ardından ilk yıllarda Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nde medyanın fiziki altyapısı Sovyet mirasına dayandığı gibi Sovyet manevi mirası da bir süre etkisini sürdürmüştür. Tüm bağımsız Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nde özel girişimler, belirli derecelerde devreye girmiş ve medya çeşitliliği artmıştır. Yeni düzenlemeler ve kanunlarla medya desteklenmiştir. Özbekistan özelinde ise İslam Kerimov'un ardından değişen yönetim ile beraber basın özgürlüğü ve medya alanında önemli gelişmeler yaşanmaktadır. Bu gelişmeler Dünya Basın Özgürlüğü endeksine de yansımakta ve bu kapsamda Özbekistan yükselen bir trendi korumaktadır.

Demokrasinin gelişerek sağlıklı bir şekilde işleyebilmesi için özgür, demokratik ve sorumlu bir basın anlayışının her boyutu ile bu sürece destek vermesi gerekir. Dolayısıyla üzerinde durulması gereken en önemli nokta ise Özbekistan özelinde ve diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nin harcadıkları ve harcayacakları tüm çabalarda hem ulusal hem de uluslararası düzeyde daha fazla desteklenmelerinin gerekli olduğudur. Bağımsızlığının ilk yıllarından itibaren Özbekistan'da toplumsal, ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal yaşamın her alanında görülen değişimler ve dönüşümler, kitle iletişim ve medya alanında da gözlenmektedir. Ancak bütün toplumsal kesimlerde olduğu gibi değişimlerin birden gerçekleşmesi beklenemez. Söz konusu sürecin belli bir zamana ihtiyaç duyduğu göz ardı edilmemelidir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Özbekistan'da da diğer Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nde de tıpkı tüm dünyada olduğu gibi medya politikalarının sorunlarının bir çırpıda çözümleneceğini düşünmek olası değildir.

Bütün bunların yanında medya Özbekistan'ın Batı dünyası ile bütünleşme sürecinde, demokrasinin yerleşmesi sürecinde ve SSCB'nin ardından tekrar öz benliğini kazanma sürecinde en önemli unsurdur. Dolayısıyla önümüzdeki yıllarda başta Özbekistan olmak üzere tüm bölgede olumlu gelişmeler beklemek mümkündür.

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ETİK İLKELER VE YAYIN POLİTİKASI

Araştırma Etiği

Dergi, araştırma etiğinde en yüksek standartları gözetir ve aşağıda tanımlanan uluslararası araştırma etiği ilkelerini benimser. Makalelerin etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır.

▸ Araştırmanın tasarlanması, tasarımın gözden geçirilmesi ve araştırmanın yürütülmesinde, bütünlük, kalite ve şeffaflık ilkeleri sağlanmalıdır.

▸ Araştırma katılımcılarının sağladığı bilgilerin gizliliği ve yanıt verenlerin gizliliği sağlanmalıdır. Araştırma katılımcıların özerkliğini ve saygınlığını koruyacak şekilde tasarlanmalıdır.

▸ Araştırma bağımsızlığıyla ilgili açık ve net olunmalı; çıkar çatışması varsa belirtilmelidir.

▸ Deneysel çalışmalarda, araştırmaya katılmaya karar veren katılımcıların yazılı bilgilendirilmiş onayı alınmalıdır. Çocukların ve vesayet altındakilerin veya tasdiklenmiş akıl hastalığı bulunanların yasal vasisinin onayı alınmalıdır.

▸ Çalışma herhangi bir kurum ya da kuruluşta gerçekleştirilecekse bu kurum ya da kuruluştan çalışma yapılacağına dair onay alınmalıdır.

▸ İnsan öğesi bulunan çalışmalarda, "yöntem" bölümünde katılımcılardan "bilgilendirilmiş onam" alındığının ve çalışmanın yapıldığı kurumdan etik kurul onayı alındığı belirtilmesi gerekir.

▸ Araştırma katılımcıları gönüllü olarak araştırmada yer almalı, herhangi bir zorlama altında olmamalıdırlar.

Yazarların Sorumluluğu

Makalelerin bilimsel ve etik kurallara uygunluğu yazarların sorumluluğundadır. Yazar makalenin orijinal olduğu, daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmadığı ve başka bir yerde, başka bir dilde yayınlanmak üzere değerlendirmede olmadığı konusunda teminat sağlamalıdır. Uygulamadaki telif kanunları ve anlaşmaları gözetilmelidir. Telife bağlı materyaller (örneğin tablolar, şekiller veya büyük alıntılar) gerekli izin ve teşekkürle kullanılmalıdır. Başka yazarların, katkıda bulunanların çalışmaları ya da yararlanılan kaynaklar uygun biçimde kullanılmalı ve referanslarda belirtilmelidir.

Gönderilen makalede tüm yazarların akademik ve bilimsel olarak doğrudan katkısı olmalıdır, bu bağlamda "yazar" yayınlanan bir araştırmanın kavramsallaştırılmasına ve dizaynına, verilerin elde edilmesine, analizine ya da yorumlanmasına belirgin katkı yapan, yazının yazılması ya da bunun içerik açısından eleştirel biçimde gözden geçirilmesinde görev yapan birisi olarak görülür. Yazar olabilmenin diğer koşulları ise, makaledeki çalışmayı planlamak veya icra etmek ve / veya revize etmektir. Fon sağlanması, veri toplanması ya da araştırma grubunun genel organizasyonu tek başına yazarlık hakkı kazandırmaz. Yazar olarak gösterilen tüm bireyler sayılan tüm ölçütleri karşılamalıdır ve yukarıdaki ölçütleri karşılayan her birey yazar olarak gösterilebilir. Yazarların isim sıralaması ortak verilen bir karar olmalıdır. Tüm yazarlar yazar sıralamasını Telif Hakkı Anlaşması Formu'nda imzalı olarak belirtmek zorundadırlar.

Bütün yazarlar, araştırmanın sonuçlarını ya da bilimsel değerlendirmeyi etkileyebilme potansiyeli olan finansal ilişkiler, çıkar çatışması ve çıkar rekabetini beyan etmelidirler. Bir yazar kendi yayınlanmış yazısında belirgin bir hata ya da yanlışlık tespit ederse, bu yanlışlıklara ilişkin düzeltme ya da geri çekme için editör ile hemen temasa geçme ve iş birliği yapma sorumluluğunu taşımaktadır.

Editör ve Hakem Sorumlulukları

Editör kurulu makaleleri, yazarların etnik kökeninden, cinsiyetinden, cinsel yöneliminden, uyruğundan, dinî inancından ve siyasi felsefesinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirir. Yayına gönderilen makalelerin adil bir şekilde çift taraflı kör hakem değerlendirmesinden geçmelerini sağlar. Gönderilen makalelere ilişkin tüm bilginin, makale yayınlanana kadar gizli kalacağını garanti eder. Baş editör içerik ve yayının toplam kalitesinden sorumludur. Gereğinde hata sayfası yayınlamalı ya da düzeltme yapmalıdır. Yayın sahibi; yazarlar, editörler ve hakemler arasında çıkar çatışmasına izin vermez. Hakem atama konusunda tam yetkiye sahiptir ve Dergide yayınlanacak makalelerle ilgili nihai kararı vermekle yükümlüdür.

Hakemlerin araştırmayla ilgili, yazarlarla ve/veya araştırmanın finansal destekçileriyle çıkar çatışmaları olmamalıdır. Değerlendirmelerinin sonucunda tarafsız bir yargıya varmalıdırlar. Gönderilmiş yazılara ilişkin tüm bilginin gizli tutulmasını sağlamalı

ve yazar tarafında herhangi bir telif hakkı ihlali ve intihal fark ederlerse editöre raporlamalıdırlar. Hakem, makale konusu hakkında kendini vasıflı hissetmiyor ya da zamanında geri dönüş sağlaması mümkün görünmüyorsa, editöre bu durumu bildirmeli ve hakem sürecine kendisini dahil etmemesini istemelidir.

Değerlendirme sürecinde editör hakemlere gözden geçirme için gönderilen makalelerin, yazarların özel mülkü olduğunu ve bunun imtiyazlı bir iletişim olduğunu açıkça belirtir. Hakemler ve yayın kurulu üyeleri başka kişilerle makaleleri tartışamazlar. Hakemlerin kimliğinin gizli kalmasına özen gösterilmelidir. Bazı durumlarda editörün kararıyla, ilgili hakemlerin makaleye ait yorumları aynı makaleyi yorumlayan diğer hakemlere gönderilerek hakemlerin bu süreçte aydınlatılması sağlanabilir.

YAZIM KURALLARI

YAYIN İLKELERİ

1. İletişim ve Diplomasi dergisinde değerlendirilmek üzere gönderilen makaleler makul bir akademik dille yazılmalı, belirgin bir kuramsal ve yöntemsel arka plana sahip olmalı ve bu noktalar metin içerisinde sistematik bir biçimde ifade edilmelidir.

2. Makaleler; Türkçe başlık, İngilizce başlık, Türkçe özet (200-220 kelime), Türkçe anahtar kelimeler (5 adet), İngilizce özet (200-220 kelime), İngilizce anahtar kelimeler (5 adet), giriş, kavramsal arka plan, yöntem, analiz/bulguların tartışılması, sonuç, teşekkür (acknowledgments) ve kaynakça kısımlarından oluşmalıdır.

3. Giriş bölümünden önce 600-800 kelimelik İngilizce genişletilmiş özet yer almalıdır.

4. Makaleler için kapak sayfası hazırlanmasına gerek yoktur. Makale Türkçe ve İngilizce başlıklarla başlamalı, özetler ve anahtar kelimelerle devam etmelidir. Yazar isimleri başlıkların altında yer almalıdır.

5. Yazarların kurumsal bilgileri, posta adresleri, e-posta adresleri, ORCID numaraları makalenin ilk sayfasında başlığın altında yer alan yazar isimlerine verilecek dipnotla belirtilmelidir.

6. Makale bir tezden veya konferans bildirisinden üretildiyse, bu durum teşekkür/acknowledgments kısmında açıkça belirtilmelidir.

7. Dergimize tezden üretilen makaleler gönderilebilmektedir. Bu makalelerin yayınlanabilmesi, diğer makalelerde oldu-

ğu gibi hakem değerlendirmeleri ve editör kararı doğrultusunda gerçekleşebilmektedir. Hakemler veya editör, makalede revizyon talep edebilir.

8. Tezden üretilen makalelerin yayınlanabilmesi için revizyon taleplerinin yerine getirilmesi gereklidir. Hakem veya editör görüşleri doğrultusunda revize edilmeyen tezden üretilmiş makaleler iade edilir.

YAZIM KURALLARI

1. Makaleler Microsoft Word dokümanında, Times New Roman, 12 punto, 1.5 satır aralığında yazılmalıdır. A4 boyutundaki kağıdın bir yüzüne, üst, alt, sağ ve sol taraftan 2,5 cm. boşluk bırakılarak hazırlanmalıdır. Paragraflar 1 cm içeriden başlamalıdır.

2. Makaleler için kelime üst sınırı, Türkçe özet, İngilizce özet, anahtar kelimeler, dipnotlar, teşekkür ve kaynakça dâhil olmak üzere 7000'dir.

3. Makaleler Türkçe veya İngilizce olarak gönderilebilir.

4. İngilizce makalelerde gerekli redaksiyon desteği alarak metinlerini düzgün bir dil ve anlatıma kavuşturmaları ve bu şekilde dergiye göndermeleri gerekmektedir. Dil ve anlatım yeterliliği taşımayan İngilizce makaleler yayın sürecine alınmamakta ve iade edilmektedir.

5. Güncel gelişmeler hakkında değerlendirmeler ve yorum yazıları için kelime üst sınırı, dipnotlar ve kaynakça dâhil olmak üzere 3000 kelimedir.

6. Çalışmalarda yazar/yazarların vurguları tek tırnak ile belirtilmeli; italik ise sadece kitap, film, gazete isimlerinde kullanılmalıdır. 40 kelimeyi aşan alıntılar içerden, tek aralık ve tırnaksız bir biçimde verilmelidir.

7. Makaleler gönderilirken yazarların aynı zamanda "Telif Hakkı Devir Formu" yüklemeleri gerekmektedir.

Referanslar

Metin için Atıflar

Çalışmalarda birincil kaynaklara atıf vermek esastır. Ancak birincil kaynaklara erişmenin mümkün olmadığı hâllerde aktarana göndermede bulunulur.

Metnin içinde gerek görülen açıklamalar dipnot şeklinde verilmeli ve numaralandırılmalıdır.

Metin içinde kaynaktan doğrudan alıntılar çift tırnak (" ") içinde verilmelidir. Alıntılar 40 kelimeyi geçiyorsa ayrı bir paragraf olarak tırnak olmadan metne dahil edilmelidir.

Kullanılan referanslar parantez içinde, yazarın adı, basım yılı ve sayfa numaraları ile belirtilir.

► (Soyad, Yayın Yılı, s. Sayfa Sayısı)

► (Foucault, 1977, s. 25)

Birden çok sayfaya referans verilecekse:

► (Foucault, 1977, ss. 25-26)

Yazar ismi metin içinde geçiyorsa, parantez içinde yalnızca kaynağın yayın tarihi ve sayfa numarası yazılır: (1977, s. 25)

İki yazarlı referanslarda, her iki yazarın soyadı da kullanılır: (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972, s. 122), aynı kaynağa metin içinde daha sonra atıf yapılacaksa: (Horkheimer et al., 1972, s. 122).

Aynı yazarın, aynı yıl yayınlanmış birden fazla eseri kullanılıyorsa, basım yılına a, b, c, gibi harfler eklenerek birbirinden ayrılır: (Foucault, 1977a; 1977b).

Metin içinde aynı konuda birden çok kaynağa referans verilecekse kaynaklar birbirinden noktalı virgül ile ayrılır: (Foucault, 1977, ss. 25-26; Mitchell, 2007, s. 90)

Kaynakça Formatı
Kaynaklar alfabetik olarak çalışmanın sonunda sıralanmalıdır.

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TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI
İLETİŞİM BAŞKANLIĞI
DEVLET ENFORMASYON SİSTEMİ

Devlet Enformasyon Sistemi (DES), devletin üst makamlarını zamanında, doğru ve hızlı şekilde bilgilendirmek amacı ile kurulan, dış basından yerel basına kadar birçok alanda hizmet sunan bir platformdur.

des.iletisim.gov.tr

Stratejik önemi haiz olan bu platform zenginleştirilerek vatandaşlarımızın **Des Mobil Uygulaması** ile erişebileceği dünya basınından manşetler, yerel basından haberler, günlük ulusal gazete manşetleri bölümleri eklenmiştir.

Engelsiz Erişim ve İletişim

İletişim mecralarının ve araçlarının bu denli çeşitlendiği günümüz dijital dünyasında iletişim ve erişimin önündeki engellerin kaldırılarak engelli bireylerin medya ürün ve hizmetlerine erişebilmesi için hazırlanan bu çalışma, alanında öncü olma özelliğini taşımaktadır.

#KulakVer

Türkiye'nin Sırları

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Kulak Ver projesiyle İletişim Başkanlığımızın yayınları sesli kitap şeklinde dinlenebilmekte ve erişim ortamı çeşitlendirilmektedir. Aynı zamanda görme engelli vatandaşlarımızın İletişim Başkanlığı yayınlarına erişmesi sağlanmaktadır. Proje kapsamında yayınlarımızın farklı dillerde çevirileri de sesli kitap olarak erişime açılmaktadır. Bu platform üzerinden yayınlarımızdan teknik olarak uygun olanları görme engelli vatandaşlarımız için yeni bir dünyanın kapısını aralayan "sesli betimleme" tekniği ile seslendirilerek yayınlanmaktadır.

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AD))

İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları

Türkiye'nin Sırları

1 **Türkiye'nin Sırları**
Uygarlık tarihinin en önemli aşamalarına tanıklık eden Türkiye coğrafyası, aynı zamanda kültürel, folklorik ve doğal zenginlikleri   01:33:16

2 **Türkiye's Secrets**
Türkiye is a treasure of meanings for those who are constantly rebuilding themselves, an exciting stop for those who wish to be   01:23:12

3 **أسرار تركيا**
كتاب "أسرار تركيا " يقدم لكم وبأسلوب شيق وممتع مهرجانا من الصور   01:58:52
والمرئيات حول بعض النماذج الرائعة للتراث الثقافي الذي يحمل به بلدنا ؛

4 **ТАЙНЫ ТУРЦИИ**
Книга «Тайны Турции» представляет выдающиеся образцы   01:22:22
культурного наследия нашей страны с визуальными

Türkiye'nin Sırları
Uygarlık tarihinin en önemli aşamalarına tanıklık eden Türkiye coğrafyası, aynı zamanda kültürel, folklorik ve doğal zenginlikleri

0.00.08 / 1.33:16

50 soruda CİMER kitapçığı için tıklayınız

Acil Sağlık Yardımı ve Acil İhbarlarınız için Lütfen 112 veya 155'i arayınız.

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Doğum Tarihiniz

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Onay kodu gönder »

< >

CİMER ile yönetime ortak olun.

Yeşil Kalkınma Devrimi ile ilgili değerli görüşlerinizi ileterek yönetime katılın

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